Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02957/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02957-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE PAUL HICKER, Civil No. 13-CV-2957 WQH (JMA)

Petitioner, REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

vs.

SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY

OF SAN DIEGO, 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner George Paul Hicker (“Petitioner”) has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his

conviction in San Diego Superior Court case number CN251716. [Doc. No. 10.] 

Respondent Superior Court for the State of California, County of San Diego

(“Respondent”) filed a motion to dismiss the Petition, contending Petitioner has

failed to exhaust his state remedies on his Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause claim. [Doc. No. 6.] Petitioner timely opposed the motion. [Doc. No. 7.]

The Court has reviewed the parties’ papers, as well as the record, and for

the following reasons, RECOMMENDS United States District Judge William Q.

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Hayes adopt the finding that Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies. 

The Court further RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be DENIED with

prejudice, and the Petition be allowed to proceed on the merits. 

On February 20, 2009, a San Diego Superior Court jury found Petitioner

guilty of violating Vehicle Code § 23152(b), driving with a blood alcohol level in

excess of .08, with a prior Vehicle Code § 23152(b) conviction. [Pet. at 2:24-27.] 

Thereafter, Petitioner was sentenced to five years of summary probation, 96

hours jail with credit for 24 hours, 5 days weekend work release, an 18-month

alcohol program, a Mothers Against Drunk Driving panel class, a fine of

$2,408.00, and other terms as set forth in the Misdemeanor - Traffic Judgment

Minutes. [Respondent’s Lodgment 1.] 

Petitioner challenges his conviction in this Court with the instant habeas

corpus action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Specifically, he claims the trial

court’s admission of testimony by a blood sample analyst who did not perform

the blood tests in question should not have been admitted into evidence, as it

violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the analyst who actually

performed the analysis. Petitioner maintains he would not have been convicted

of violating Vehicle Code § 23152(b) if his Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause objections to the evidence about his blood alcohol level had been

sustained by the trial court judge. [Pet. at 4:2-15.]

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

On August 28, 2008, at 10:48 p.m., Petitioner was driving under the

influence with a .142% blood alcohol content, over .06% greater than the legal

maximum. [Resp. Mot. at 2:2-3.] Petitioner was pulled over and two deputy

sheriffs made contact with him, whereupon they performed field sobriety tests

after noticing Petitioner’s red and watery eyes. [Id.] After his arrest, a sample of

Petitioner’s blood was taken and tested by the San Diego County Sheriff’s Crime

Laboratory. [Pet. at 9:6-7.] The District Attorney’s office filed a complaint against

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Petitioner on January 23, 2009, charging him with three counts: Count One -

driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of Vehicle Code § 23152(a);

Count Two - driving with a measurable blood alcohol level above .08, a violation

of Vehicle Code § 23152(b); and Count Three - driving with an open container,

a violation of Vehicle Code § 23222(a). [Resp. Mot. at 2:4-9.] Petitioner pled not

guilty to the charges. [Pet. at 9:11.] Count Three was dismissed at trial on the

People’s motion. [Resp. Mot. at 2:9.] After a jury trial (discussed below),

Petitioner was acquitted of the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol

and convicted of the charge of driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08% or

greater. [Pet. at 9:11-13.]

The two week jury trial began February 9, 2009 in the Superior Court for

the County of San Diego in Vista, California. [Id. at 9:14-16.] The prosecution

called witness Jorge Peña (“Peña”), an analyst employed by the San Diego

Crime Laboratory where Petitioner’s blood sample was analyzed for blood

content. Peña did not perform the analysis of Petitioner’s blood. Rather, the

analysis was performed by another lab technician, Raegan Carter (“Carter”). [Id.

at 9:19-21.] Peña was not present during the analysis of Petitioner’s blood

sample, nor did he supervise Carter. [Id. at 9:21-22.] After the analysis was

completed and reported by Carter, Peña reviewed her report. [Id. at 9:24-10:1.]

During direct examination of Peña, the prosecutor asked about the analysis

of Petitioner’s blood performed by Carter. [Id. at 10:4-5.] Petitioner objected to

Peña’s testimony about the blood alcohol work performed by Carter on the

grounds the testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The

objection was overruled. [Id. at 10:6-9.] The trial court granted the request by

Petitioner’s counsel that his Sixth Amendment objection continue throughout the

prosecutor’s line of questioning. The prosecutor then asked Peña if he had an

opinion about the accuracy of the blood alcohol results based upon the work

performed by Carter. Again, Petitioner objected based on the Sixth Amendment.

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The objection was overruled. [Id. at 10:15-19.] Peña provided his opinion that

the blood alcohol results were accurate and testified the blood alcohol level was

.142. The blood alcohol report was then introduced into evidence. A jury

subsequently convicted Petitioner for violation of Vehicle Code § 23152(b).

[Resp. Mot. at 2:14-15.] 

Petitioner argues the analysis set forth in the United States Supreme Court

decisions of Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011), and Michigan v.

Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011), applies to the determination of whether Peña’s

testimony should have been permitted in Petitioner’s trial. [Pet. at 17:5-13.]

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the San

Diego Superior Court. The Appellate Division affirmed Petitioner’s conviction,

finding it was in alignment with recently decided California Supreme Court

decisions, mainly People v. Lopez, 55 Cal.4th 569 (2012), dealing with

confrontation. [Resp. Mot. at 2:16-21; Resp. Lodgment 2.]

After the Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, Petitioner filed in the

Appellate Division an application for certification for transfer to the California

Court of Appeal. The application was denied on March 25, 2013. [Pet. at 4:16-

18.] Petitioner then filed a petition for transfer in the California Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District, Division One. The Court of Appeal denied the petition

on April 16, 2013. [Id. at 4:18-21; Resp. Lodgment 3.] Next, Petitioner filed a

Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on July 11,

2013. The petition was denied on October 7, 2013. [Id. at 4:22-24; Resp.

Lodgment 4.] Finally, Petitioner filed the instant Petition on December 5, 2013. 

Petitioner did not file a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court

prior to initiating this action. [Pet. at 5:12-15; Resp. Mot. at 2:27-29.] 

/ /

/ /

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IV. DISCUSSION

The exhaustion of available state judicial remedies generally is a

prerequisite to a federal court’s consideration of claims presented in habeas

corpus proceedings. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982); McQueary

v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). Title 28 of the United States Code

§ 2254(b)(1) provides that:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted unless it appears that–

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B) (i) there is an absence of State corrective process;

or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the

meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law

of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the

question presented.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1), (c).

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must first provide the

state courts with a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the

facts bearing upon his [or her] constitutional claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459

U.S. 4, 6 (1982). In addition, the petitioner must have ‘fairly presented’ to the

state courts the ‘substance’ of his [or her] federal habeas corpus claim. Id.

Exhaustion is accomplished if the state’s highest court had an opportunity to rule

on the merits of the claim. Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir.

1982)(citing Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1979.) If the claim

was not presented to the state’s highest court on direct appeal, state collateral

remedies must have been exhausted. Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425,

1427 (9th Cir. 1986.)

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Here, Petitioner admits he did not present his claim to the California

Supreme Court by way of either a petition for review or a habeas corpus petition.

[See Pet. p. 1-8.] Generally, claims that are not presented to the state’s highest

court are unexhausted; however, here Petitioner was procedurally prohibited

from raising his claim before the California Supreme Court. 

The exhaustion requirement may be satisfied notwithstanding a failure to

present a claim to the state supreme court if it is clear that (the habeas

petitioner’s) claims are now procedurally barred under (state) law.” Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 16-62 (1996), quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.

346, 351 (1989); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26 n.28 (1982) (noting that

the exhaustion requirement applies “only to remedies still available at the time

of the federal petition.”); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 770 (9th Cir. 2002)

(a procedurally barred claim satisfies exhaustion requirement), citing Philips v.

Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the district court correctly

concluded that [the] claims were nonetheless exhausted because ‘a return to

state court for exhaustion would be futile.’”). As discussed below, Petitioner was

procedurally barred from raising his claim before the California Supreme Court

and the exhaustion requirement must be deemed satisfied.

A. Petitioner was Barred From Filing a Petition for Review with the

California Supreme Court.

California Rule of Court 8.500(a)(1) provides:

A party may file a petition in the Supreme Court for review of any

decision of the Court of Appeal, including any interlocutory order,

except the denial of a transfer of a case within the appellate

jurisdiction of the superior court.

Cal. Rules Ct. 8.500(a)(1). 

Here, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the

San Diego Superior Court. The Appellate Division affirmed Petitioner’s

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conviction. Then, Petitioner filed in the Appellate Division an application for

certification for transfer to the California Court of Appeal. That application was

denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for transfer in the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, which was denied. Because the

Court of Appeal denied transfer of a case within the appellate jurisdiction of the

Superior Court, Rule of Court 8.500(a)(1) barred Petitioner from filing a petition

for review with the California Supreme Court.

B. Petitioner’s Claim Could Not Be Raised by Habeas Petition to the California Supreme Court.

Respondent also argues Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted because he

could have presented his claim to the California Supreme Court by filing a

habeas petition. The Waltreus rule provides, “In the absence of strong

justification, any issue that was actually raised and rejected on appeal cannot be

renewed in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391,

393 (Cal. 1993); see In re Waltreus, 397 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Cal. 1965). The

Waltreus rule prohibits a petitioner from making the same claims made on direct

appeal by way of a state habeas petition. The California Supreme Court in In re

Reno declined to address renewed claims, “noting simply that ‘these arguments

were rejected on appeal, and habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second

appeal.” In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th 428, 477 (2012), quoting In re Waltreus, 62

Cal.2d 218, 225 (1965); see Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2002); see also

White v. Ollison, 592 F.Supp.2d 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2008). “If an issue has been

raised and rejected first at trial and then on appeal, no reason exists to permit

what amounts to a third bite of the apple.” In re Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 477.

In the instant case, Petitioner, in his direct appeal, argued the trial court,

over Petitioner’s objection, permitted Peña to testify about the blood alcohol

analysis performed by another person on Petitioner’s blood sample. [Pet. at 3:19-

27.] Petitioner further argued that Peña had no direct participation in the actual

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analysis of the blood, and that Carter, the actual analyst, never testified at the

trial. [Id.] Lastly in his direct appeal, Petitioner argued the actual blood report,

reflecting the analysis by Carter, should not have been admitted into evidence

as it violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the analyst who

actually performed the analysis, but who did not testify at trial. [Id. at 4:1-7.]

Accordingly, if Petitioner had, following the appellate division’s affirmation

of the superior court’s judgment, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with

the California Supreme Court raising this argument again, such petition would

have served as Petitioner’s “second appeal” [see Reno, 55 Cal.4th at p. 477], 

or “a third bite of the apple.” [Id.] This is because Petitioner had already had the

opportunity to present his case on the merits at trial and then on appeal. As the

above cited cases demonstrate, California courts have ruled that a second

appeal, in the form of a petition for a writ for habeas corpus, is impermissible

under California law.

In sum, Petitioner was prohibited by California Rule of Court 8.500(a)(1)

from petitioning the California Supreme Court for review. A party may not file a

petition for review in the Supreme Court after a denial of a transfer of a case

within the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court, which occurred here. The

Waltreus rule further barred Petitioner from pursuing his claim by habeas petition

to California’s highest court. Thus, although Petitioner did not present his claim

to the California Supreme Court, his claims are effectively exhausted. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the

Motion to Dismiss. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 4, 2014 any party to this

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action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed

with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 15, 2014. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections with the specified time may

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 18, 2014

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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