Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00476/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00476-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 47:0151 Wire or Radio Communication

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TOIA PRICE, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0476-WS-M

 )

DISH NETWORK, LLC, ) 

 )

Defendant. )

 ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion for partial 

summary judgment. (Doc. 27). The parties have filed briefs and evidentiary 

materials in support of their respective positions, (Docs. 27, 30, 35), and the 

motion is ripe for resolution. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that 

the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, the defendant made multiple unsolicited 

telephone calls to the plaintiff’s cell number, apparently in an effort to reach one 

of its customers. The defendant continued to do so even after the plaintiff 

informed the caller they had the wrong number and asked them not to call her 

again. At least some of the calls were made using an automated telephone dialing 

system, and at least some of them employed an artificial and/or pre-recorded 

voice. None of the calls was made for an emergency purpose or with the 

plaintiff’s prior consent. Count One asserts violations of the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act (“the Act”), while Count Two asserts a state-law claim for invasion 

of privacy. (Doc. 1-1 at 1-7).

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The parties agree there is a universe of fourteen specific calls potentially 

involved in this lawsuit. (Doc. 27 at 5-6; Doc. 30 at 1-2). The plaintiff agrees 

with the defendant that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the 

defendant on Count Two. (Id. at 8). The plaintiff also agrees with the defendant 

that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendant on Count One 

with respect to calls 1, 3 and 7 through 14. (Id. at 2, 8). Thus, only calls 2, 4, 5 

and 6 remain. The defendant seeks summary judgment with respect to calls 2, 4 

and 5, but not call 6. (Doc. 27 at 4).

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial 

burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no 

genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & 

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The moving party may meet its 

burden in either of two ways: (1) by “negating an element of the non-moving 

party’s claim”; or (2) by “point[ing] to materials on file that demonstrate that the 

party bearing the burden of proof at trial will not be able to meet that burden.” Id. 

“Even after Celotex it is never enough simply to state that the non-moving party 

cannot meet its burden at trial.” Id.; accord Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 

1313 (11th Cir. 2000); Sammons v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1992). 

“If the party moving for summary judgment fails to discharge the initial 

burden, then the motion must be denied and the court need not consider what, if 

any, showing the non-movant has made.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 

1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993); accord Mullins, 228 F.3d at 1313; Clark, 929 F.2d at 

608. 

“If, however, the movant carries the initial summary judgment burden ..., 

the responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant to show the existence of a 

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genuine issue of material fact.” Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. “If the nonmoving 

party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with 

respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the moving party is entitled to 

summary judgment.” Clark, 929 F.2d at 608 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (“If a 

party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address 

another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... 

consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion ....”).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence, and all 

reasonable inferences, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmovant ....” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 

(11th Cir. 2003).

There is no burden on the Court to identify unreferenced evidence 

supporting a party’s position.1 Accordingly, the Court limits its review to the 

exhibits, and to the specific portions of the exhibits, to which the parties have 

expressly cited. Likewise, “[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill 

every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on 

summary judgment,” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 

(11th Cir. 1995), and the Court accordingly limits its review to those arguments the 

parties have expressly advanced.

 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it 

may consider other materials in the record.”); accord Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 

F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The district court has discretion to go beyond the 

referenced portions of these [summary judgment] materials, but is not required to do 

so.”). “[A]ppellate judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs,” and 

“[l]ikewise, district court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a 

massive record ....” Chavez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 647 F.3d 

1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotes omitted). 

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I. Liability.

“It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States ... to make 

any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or with the prior express 

consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an 

artificial or prerecorded voice ... to any telephone number assigned to a ... 

cellular telephone service ....” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Count One is based 

on alleged violations of this provision. (Doc. 1-1 at 5). 

The defendant argues that calls 2, 4 and 5 were not made using an 

automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), an artificial voice, or a prerecorded 

voice. The plaintiff counters that these calls were made using an ATDS.2

“The term ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ means equipment which 

has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a 

random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(a)(1). The defendant asserts that the equipment it uses does not have this 

capacity. (Doc. 27 at 9, 15). Its evidence in support of this proposition is confined 

to a single, conclusory sentence from the affidavit of its business operations 

manager: “The Cisco Dialer does not have the capacity to store or produce 

telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” 

(Doc. 27-2 at 3). As the defendant’s own authority states, such an ipse dixit is 

inadequate as a matter of law. See Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 629 Fed. Appx. 369, 

373 (3rd Cir. 2015) (expert’s affidavit testimony that the equipment “did not have 

the capacity to store or produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential 

number generator, and to call those numbers,” was only a “restating of the 

 2 It appears to be uncontroverted that the system employed by the defendant does 

not use an artificial voice. (Doc. 27 at 9). It also appears to be uncontroverted that the 

system would or could use a prerecorded voice but that this feature was activated only 

when a call was answered by a human voice. (Id. at 9-10, 15). As to calls 2, 4 and 5, 

there was no answer and thus no use of a prerecorded voice. (Id. at 7, 10, 15). The Court 

assumes this is why the plaintiff relies solely on the ATDS angle in opposing summary 

judgment as to these calls. 

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statutory definition amount[ing] to nothing more than a legal conclusion couched 

as a factual assertion”). Because the defendant has not carried its initial burden, its 

motion must be denied, and the plaintiff’s showing need not be considered. 

Mullins, 228 F.3d at 1313; Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116; Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.

The defendant acknowledges that, in addition to the strict language of 

Section 227(a)(1), “the FCC has expanded the definition of an ATDS to include 

calling equipment having as its basic function the capacity to dial numbers without 

human intervention.” (Doc. 27 at 15).3 The defendant seeks to negate this means 

of showing an ATDS with its affiant’s statement that “[h]uman intervention was 

involved in all aspects of making Call Nos. 2, 4, and 5.” (Doc. 27-2 at 3; Doc. 27 

at 9, 15). The statement fails to carry the defendant’s initial burden for several 

reasons.

First, the affiant’s statement is as conclusory a parroting of a legal standard 

as is his denial that the equipment satisfies the specific language of Section 

227(a)(1). Second, the defendant acknowledges that the standard is whether the 

equipment has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, yet the 

affiant does not address capacity but only the actual events surrounding three 

particular telephone calls. 

Even had the defendant carried its initial burden with respect to the FCC 

gloss, in its reply brief the defendant injects excerpts from the affiant’s deposition

that contradict his affidavit. According to the witness’s deposition, the equipment 

(not any human) “select[s] the phone number and press[es] the keyboard.” (Doc. 

35-1 at 3). Since selecting the phone number and pressing the keyboard are 

presumably “aspects of making” calls, the defendant has controverted its own 

evidence.

 3 The defendant notes that the FCC’s order is on appeal but does not ask the 

Court, on that or any other basis, to ignore the order as a potential basis of liability. The 

time to make such a request has now passed for all purposes in this litigation.

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II. Treble Damages.

Section 227(b)(3) extends discretion to the Court to award treble damages 

“[i]f the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this 

subsection ....” The defendant argues that, even if it is subject to liability under 

the Act, it is not subject to treble damages. (Doc. 27 at 16).

The defendant asserts that treble damages may be awarded only as to calls 

“made after the caller was put on explicit notice that the caller was calling the 

wrong number.” (Doc. 27 at 16). The defendant relies on what its affiant calls 

“DISH’s internal Account Memos for DISH’s customer account” (“Memos”) for a 

particular period. (Doc. 27-2 at 4). The defendant points to an entry from August 

18, 2015 stating that “NON DISH CUSTOMER KEEPS GETTING CALLS IN 

REGARDS THIS ACCT.” (Doc. 27-7 at 2). The defendant says it “first learned” 

it was calling the plaintiff rather than its customer on this date. (Doc. 27 at 10, 

16).4 Because calls 2, 4 and 5 all occurred before August 18, 2015, (id. at 7), the 

defendant concludes it cannot be exposed to an award of treble damages. (Id. at 

16).

Once again, the defendant’s presentation does not satisfy its initial burden 

on motion for summary judgment. The defendant has offered no affidavit 

supporting counsel’s insistence in brief that the defendant “first learned” it was 

calling the wrong number on August 18; instead, the defendant simply invites the 

Court to assume that, since August 18 is the earliest date its records reflect its 

awareness, August 18 must be the earliest date it possessed such awareness. That 

may be one reasonable inference from the defendant’s evidence, but it is not the 

only one; it is equally plausible that the defendant knew previously that it was 

calling the wrong number but simply failed to make a notation to that effect. Thus, 

the defendant’s evidence does not negate an element of the plaintiff’s case for 

 4 According to the defendant, the customer’s cell number was erroneously entered 

in the defendant’s records as the plaintiff’s number. (Doc. 27 at 1, 6).

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treble damages and so does not carry the defendant’s initial burden. As a 

consequence, its motion for summary judgment as to treble damages must be 

denied.

Even had the defendant met its initial burden, the plaintiff’s evidence would 

create a genuine issue of material fact. According to the plaintiff’s evidence, she 

received a call on July 31, 2015 from a gentleman calling “to confirm the service 

call” regarding “satellite television apparatus.” The plaintiff told him, “I’m not 

this person. Please remove my number from the account.” (Doc. 27-3 at 6-7). 

This is call 1, (Doc. 27 at 7), so it preceded calls 2, 4 and 5. 

In its reply brief, the defendant points out that this call was not made from 

the toll-free number associated with calls 2, 4 and 5 but from (251) 287-0517. 

(Doc. 35 at 10; Doc. 27 at 7). The defendant then notes that, according to its 

affiant, “DISH does not own, use, or control the telephone number 251-287-

0517,” has “never made a telephone call from” this number, and “does not know 

to whom the ‘0517 number ... belongs.” (Doc. 27-2 at 3). Moreover, the 

defendant notes that calls 2, 4 and 5 were for installation, not service, so the 

purpose of call 1 is inconsistent with the purpose (per the affiant) of the calls from 

the defendant’s toll-free number. (Doc. 35 at 11). Finally, the plaintiff did not 

testify that the caller identified himself as a DISH representative. (Id. at 10-11).

The defendant’s evidence and argument, however, could not eliminate the 

fact issue raised by the plaintiff’s evidence even had the defendant not already lost 

its motion for failure to meet its initial burden. The caller may not have identified 

himself as associated with DISH, but he did call regarding “satellite television 

apparatus,” which pretty well narrows the field of possible entities. The caller 

may have discussed a “service” appointment as opposed to an “installation” 

appointment, but this hardly raises an eyebrow, given that Memos reflects the

customer had been a customer since at least February 2013 and that the customer 

in fact received a “technician visit” on August 14, 2015 after his “refusal to 

troubleshoot.” (Doc. 27-7 at 3, 11). Memos also draws into question the affiant’s 

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denial of any connection between (251) 287-0517 and the defendant, since it 

reflects that, on July 31, 2015 (the day of call 1), a “service call” was “cancelled 

per customer request.” (Id. at 3). Perhaps it is just coincidence that the plaintiff 

received a call on July 31 confirming a satellite TV service call while the 

defendant’s internal records reflect the customer cancelled a satellite TV service 

call on the same date, but the evidence supports an inference that the caller on call 

1 was sufficiently associated with the defendant that his knowledge constitutes the 

defendant’s knowledge. 

III. Plaintiff’s Request for Summary Judgment.

The Magistrate Judge established a deadline for filing dispositive motions 

of April 15, 2016, later extended to May 20, 2016. (Docs. 12, 25). The plaintiff, 

unlike the defendant, filed no dispositive motion. Instead, embedded within her 

response filed June 17, 2016 is a request that the Court enter summary judgment in 

her favor with respect to call 6. (Doc. 30 at 7-8). The request is procedurally 

improper, both because it is not in the form of a motion5 and because it was made 

long after the deadline for seeking such relief.6 Accordingly, the defendant’s 

motion to strike the plaintiff’s request, (Doc. 36), is granted. 

 5 “A request for a court order must be made by motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1).

6 “We recognize that district courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding how best to 

manage the cases before them.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 

(11th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly employed this rule to uphold trial 

courts’ enforcement of deadlines. E.g., School Board of Collier County v. K.C., 285 F.3d 

977, 981-82 (11th Cir. 2002) (untimely expert testimony); Enwonwu v. Fulton-DeKalb 

Hospital Authority, 286 Fed. Appx. 586, 595 (11th Cir. 2008) (untimely motion for 

summary judgment); Edman v. Marano, 177 Fed. Appx. 884, 886 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(untimely request for mental examination); cf. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 

1027 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Parties opposing summary judgment are appropriately 

charged with the responsibility of marshaling and presenting their evidence before 

summary judgment is granted, not afterwards.”). The underlying principles are clear. 

“[I]n order to ensure the orderly administration of justice, [a trial court] has the authority 

and responsibility to set and enforce reasonable deadlines.” Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc. 

v. Olin Corp., 313 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, “[d]eadlines are not 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s motion for partial summary 

judgment is granted as to Count Two and granted as to Count One with respect 

to calls 1, 3 and 7 through 14. In all other respects, the defendant’s motion is 

denied.

7

DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of July, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

meant to be aspirational,” and a litigant does not “ha[ve] carte blanche permission to 

perform when he desires.” Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 864 (11th Cir. 

2004). 

7 From the Court’s perspective, neither side has reason to be confident of its 

position in this litigation. The Court expects both sides to exhibit substantially more 

facility with the evidence and especially with the governing law should this case proceed 

to trial.

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