Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00541/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00541-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donna Mae Robinson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Heritage Elementary School,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-0541-PHX-LOA

ORDER

On February 16, 2010, Defendant Heritage Elementary School filed its second

Motion to Dismiss in this case, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.

(docket # 48) Plaintiff Donna Mae Robinson (“Plaintiff”) responded, docket # 54, opposing

dismissal to which Defendant replied, docket # 57. Plaintiff also requests the Court take

judicial notice of certain facts contained within EEOC’s right-to-sue Notices to which

Defendant objects. (docket ## 55-56) Because the briefing is adequate and oral argument

would not aid the Court, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for oral argument. Mahon

v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

 After considering the briefing on the issues, the Court will sustain the School’s

objection to the date of “December 8, 2008” which is not the date the EEOC’s right-to-sue

Notices were issued; will overrule Defendant’s other objections to Plaintiff’s request for

judicial notice; and will deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint on the merits. 

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1

 Plaintiff abandoned her claims against these individual defendants with the filing of

her Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint.

2

 Plaintiff used the singular word “charge” in her original Complaint but Defendant

does not dispute that Plaintiff filed two separate charges with the Arizona Attorney General’s

Office and EEOC: Charge No. 35A-2008-00134 (religious discrimination, filed on

November 26, 2007) and Charge No. 35A-2008-00251 (retaliation, filed on January 11,

2008). (Exhibits (“Exhs”) 1-3, docket # 29; docket # 1 attached to original Complaint)

Counsel are reminded that “a pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]’ ” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97,

106 (1976); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”)

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BACKGROUND

The Heritage Elementary School (the “School”), a nonprofit Arizona

corporation, is an Arizona charter school that serves students from kindergarten through

eighth grade. Plaintiff, a school teacher, was hired in the summer of 2007 to work as a first

grade teacher at the School located in Glendale, Arizona. Plaintiff, a non-lawyer, filed this

Title VII action against the School and two individuals,1

 alleging, or attempting to allege,

claims of wrongful discriminatory termination, retaliation and a hostile work environment

in her employment based on Plaintiff’s religious beliefs. (docket # 1) Prior to filing suit,

Plaintiff filed separate “charges”2

 with the Arizona Attorney General’s Office and the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on November 26, 2007 (religious

discrimination) and on January 11, 2008 (retaliation), alleging that the School violated Title

VII in connection with her employment. (Exhs 1 and 3, docket # 29) 

After exhausting her administrative remedies, the EEOC issued Plaintiff two

Notices of Right to Sue on December 30, 2008. (Exh 2, docket # 29; docket # 1 attached to

original Complaint; docket # 55, Exh 1) As is customary, each Notice provided: “[Y]our

lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your right to sue

based on this charge will be lost . . . .” (Id.) On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff timely filed her

initial Complaint, docket # 1, and prior to the School’s appearance in this action, an

Amended Complaint on June 19, 2009. (docket # 11) The parties disagree what claims pro

se Plaintiff alleged, or attempted to allege, in the Complaint and Amended Complaint.

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3

 Because the Court denied Defendant’s initial Motion to Dismiss, docket # 29, solely

because it was directed to the pro se Amended Complaint which was replaced by the lawyerprepared Second Amended Complaint, docket # 46, Defendant’s second Motion to Dismiss,

docket # 48, is not, as Plaintiff contends, “a thinly veiled attempt to urge a Motion for

Reconsideration.” (docket # 54 at 3) Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the Court has not

“already considered and ruled on Defendant’s relation back argument and its claim that it

would be futile to permit Plaintiff to amend the Complaint.” (Id. at 6)

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When the School filed its initial dismissal motion on November 2, 2009,

Plaintiff realized she needed legal representation. (docket # 32) Plaintiff promptly retained

counsel who appeared on her behalf and timely responded to the extended deadline to

respond to Defendant’s dispositive motion. (docket ## 34, 35) In Plaintiff’s January 8, 2010

Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s counsel requested leave to amend

the pro se Amended Complaint, although the amendment deadline had expired two weeks

earlier. (docket # 35 at 8-9) On February 1, 2010, the Court found that Plaintiff demonstrated

good cause and granted Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the pro se Amended

Complaint. (docket # 45) The Second Amended Complaint was timely filed and the Court

denied as moot the School’s initial Motion to Dismiss solely because it was directed to the

pro se Amended Complaint, docket # 11.3

 (Id. at 3)

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the School moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint on two grounds: (1) the Second Amended Complaint attempts

to state claims that are allegedly barred by the 90-day statute of limitations because they were

lodged 393 days after the EEOC issued its Notices of Right to Sue and Plaintiff’s new

allegations do not relate back to the original Complaint; and (2) Plaintiff’s allegations fail to

state prima facie claims for religious discrimination and punitive damage claims. (docket #

48 at 2) 

 Relying upon Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008),

the School contends that Plaintiff’s original pro se Complaint and Amended Complaint

alleged only “general and vague conclusions, recitations of legal theories without sufficient

fact allegations to support them. The core of material facts is lacking in the original

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Complaint, consequently, her Second Amended Complaint [prepared and filed by her

attorney] does not relate back. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).” (Id. at 4) Identifying eight specific

allegations in the pro se Complaint, the School argues “[t]he original Complaint attempted

to set forth only a retaliation claim – no factual allegations are included regarding any claim

of discrimination . . . The retaliation claim raised in the Complaint was insufficiently pled

because Plaintiff’s conclusory statements lacked sufficient fact allegations.” (Id. at 7) The

School argues that because the “timely filed” pro se Complaint and Amended Complaint

“contain[] no core of material facts related to either retaliation or discrimination on which

Plaintiff can relate back[,]” the Second Amended Complaint does not relate back to March

17, 2009, the original filing date, and is barred by the 90-day limitation period. (Id.)

Conversely, Plaintiff claims that her “original pro se Complaint set[s] forth

sufficient facts to provide Defendant with fair notice of her claims (i.e., religious and

retaliation discrimination) and the grounds upon which they rest. Her Second Amended

Complaint is related to the timely claims of religious and retaliation discrimination contained

in the pro se Complaint.” (docket # 54 at 4) Despite Plaintiff’s use of the singular word

“charge” in her pro se Complaint, docket # 1 at 4, Plaintiff’s counsel points out that “the pro

se Complaint includes a heading titled: ‘Religious Discrimination’ and another heading

titled: ‘Statement of Claims.’ [docket # 1 at 2, 4] (emphasis in original) Plaintiff

undoubtedly attempted to set out more than one claim (i.e., Statement of Claims) in the

Complaint, including a religious discrimination claim.” (Id.) (internal single quotation marks

added).

Plaintiff’s counsel also argues that “Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

does not include a new legal theory depending on different facts. Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint includes additional facts relating to the religious discrimination and

retaliation claims that arose out of the incidents set out in her pro se Complaint, or, at a very

minimum, that Plaintiff ‘attempted to . . . set out’ in the pro se Complaint.” (Id. at 5)

Plaintiff’s counsel cites Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B) and Sanders v. City of Phoenix, 2008 WL

5001624, * 4 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that Rule 15(c)’s relation back principle applied to

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Plaintiff’s amended Complaint because “Plaintiff’s original pleading did attempt to set forth”

a race discrimination claim, especially when the facts were reviewed in the “light most

favorable to Plaintiff, and keeping in mind that she was pro se at the time”) (emphasis in

original). (Id.) 

In her Response, Plaintiff’s counsel requests the Court “take judicial notice that

the EEOC mailed Defendant copies of both right to sue notices prior to Plaintiff’s pro se

Complaint based on the official EEOC records attached to the Second Amended Complaint.”

(Id. at 6) Filed contemporaneously with her Response was Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial

Notice, docket # 55, which proffered that:

1. On December 8, 2008, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission mailed copies to Defendant of its Notices of Right to Sue relating

to both Plaintiff’s retaliation (Charge No. 35A-2008-00251) and religious

discrimination (Charge No. 35A-2008-00134) charges, copies of which are

attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

(docket # 55 at 1) (emphasis added).

The School objects to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice because Plaintiff

requests “notice of (a) inaccurate information; (b) matter that is not proper for judicial notice;

and (c) [the] documents [are] proffered for an irrelevant purpose.” (docket # 56 at 1) The

School points out that the date of “December 8, 2008” is incorrect because “[t]he two Notices

of Right to Sue do not reflect anywhere a date of December 8, 2008 . . . each Notice attached

to the Request is dated ‘DEC 30 2008.’” (Id.) The Court concurs with the School that the two

EEOC right-to-sue Notices do not reflect an issuance date of December 8, 2008. Plaintiff’s

right-to-sue the School commenced on December 30, 2008. (Exh 2, docket # 29; docket #

1 attached to original Complaint; docket # 55, Exh 1)

Although the Court will sustain the School’s objection to the erroneous date

of December 8, 2008, it will overrule the School’s other objections and will take judicial

notice of the two EEOC Notices because the parties have previously filed these Notices in

this case and they are a part of the record: Charge No. 35A-2008-00134 (religious

discrimination) was filed on November 26, 2007, docket # 29, Exh 2; and Plaintiff filed the

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Notice for Charge No. 35A-2008-00251 (retaliation) on January 11, 2008, docket # 1

attached to original Complaint. It is an “established rule” that a “federal district court can

take judicial notice of its own records[.]” Chandler v. United States, 378 F.2d 906, 909 (9th

Cir. 1967); Taylor v. Critelli, 2010 WL 597129, * 4 (E.D.Cal. 2010). Additionally, a district

court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. United States v. 14.02 Acres of

Land, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court “may take judicial notice of matters

of public record” and consider them without converting a Rule 12 motion into one for

summary judgment[,]” (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001));

Fed.R.Evid. 201(b) (defining the scope of judicial notice); Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413

F.2d 887, 889 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1969) (taking judicial notice of EEOC proceedings). Here, the

authenticity of the EEOC charges and the respective right-to-sue Notices are not contested,

are relevant to the issue of fair notice of the two charges to, and against, the School, and such

charges and the right-to-sue Notices are matters of public record. Therefore, this Court takes

judicial notice of the two EEOC charges and the two right-to-sue Notices.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

On a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept the allegations in the

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S.

183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a

plaintiff needs to plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “While legal conclusions can

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). A claim has “facial

plausibility” “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Moss v. U.S.

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).

Dismissal is appropriate, however, where a plaintiff fails to state a claim supportable by a

cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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4

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides in relevant part:

(c) Relation Back of Amendments.

(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates

back to the date of the original pleading when: 

(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows

relation back; [or]

(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set

out--in the original pleading; or . . . .

 Rule 15(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. (emphasis added)

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1990).

In general, a district court may not consider materials other than the facts

alleged in the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d

932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996). “[A]mple authority exists,” however, “which recognizes that

matters of public record, including court records in related or underlying cases which have

a direct relation to the matters at issue, may be looked to when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss.” In re Am. Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524,

1537 (9th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases), rev’d on other grounds by Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg

Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).

TITLE VII’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A Title VII claimant is authorized to file suit only if the claimant has filed a

timely charge with the EEOC or appropriate state agency and obtained a right-to-sue-letter.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), (f); Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708-09 (9th Cir.

2001). Such a suit must be commenced not more than ninety days after receipt of the

right-to-sue-letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’ship,

495 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If a litigant does not file suit within ninety days ‘[of]

the date EEOC dismisses a claim,’ then the action is time-barred.”) (citation omitted)).

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B)4

, however, allows a Title VII

plaintiff to amend her timely-filed complaint to add a claim when that claim “arose out of the

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conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out - or attempted to be set out - in the original

pleading.” Sanders, 2008 WL 5001624, * 2 (emphasis added) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.

15(c)(1)(B) and Donnelly v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 410 (7th Cir. 1989)

(holding that an amended complaint alleging violations of federal anti-discrimination law

related back to the filing date of the plaintiff’s original complaint, which alleged violations

of a state anti-discrimination statute based upon the same facts and conduct). In Williams, the

Ninth Circuit instructs that “[c]laims arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence

if they ‘share a common core of operative facts’ such that the plaintiff will rely on the same

evidence to prove each claim.” 517 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Martell v. Trilogy Ltd., 872 F.2d

322, 325-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that amended complaint related back where amended

complaint added new theory of recovery based on facts alleged in original complaint) and

citing Percy v. S.F. Gen. Hosp., 841 F.2d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 1988)). “When faced with this

issue, the Martell court explained that a ‘district court should [ ] analyze[ ] the two pleadings

to determine whether they share a common core of operative facts sufficient to impart fair

notice of the . . . conduct called into question.’” Sanders, 2008 WL 5001624, * 2 (also

quoting Martell, 872 F.2d at 327). “A new claim can be linked to a timely pleading when it

will likely be proved by the same kind of evidence offered in support of the original

pleadings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dominguez v. Miller, 51 F.3d 1502,

1510 (9th Cir. 1995)).

DISCUSSION

After careful analysis of the two pro se pleadings and the Second Amended

Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s religious discrimination and retaliation claims

relate back to Plaintiff’s original Complaint and should not be dismissed for failure to

comply with the ninety-day limitations period. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges under

“NATURE OF THE ACTION” heading that she was “wrongfully terminated [and]

retaliated against . . . due to her religious beliefs and practices.” (docket # 1 at 1) (emphasis

in original) Under the heading “RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION,” Plaintiff further

alleges, among others, for example:

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1. Defendants attempted to force Plaintiff to participate in training activities

on Holiday Days and failed to provide a reasonable religious accommodation

that would have allowed the Plaintiff to practice her religion. (Id. at 2)

2. Defendants refused to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s sincerely held

religious practices and refused to allow Plaintiff to engage in religious

expression. (Id.)

3. Defendants unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff, by firing her, for

opposing employment practices that discriminated based on religion. (Id.)

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and keeping in mind that she

was pro se at the time, Plaintiff’s allegations in her original Complaint, while mostly

conclusory in nature, did attempt to set forth Title VII religion-based discrimination and

retaliation claims against the School. These allegations are entirely consistent with the

narratives and two boxes Plaintiff checked on the Charge-Of-Discrimination forms,

indicating that the discrimination that Plaintiff allegedly experienced at the School was based

on her religion and in retaliation for her having filed a discrimination charge with the Civil

Rights Division of the Arizona Attorney General’s Office. (Exh. 1 and 3; docket # 29)

Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1123 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The information

contained in an EEOC charge must be sufficient to give the employer notice of the subject

matter of the charge and identify generally the basis for a claim, but it need not specifically

articulate the precise claim or set forth all the evidence an employee may choose to later

present in court.”)

Similarly, Plaintiff’s pro se Amended Complaint, filed on June 19, 2009,

confirmed that Plaintiff was attempting to allege claims of “RELIGIOUS AND

RETAILIATION (sic) DISCRIMINATION,” repeated numerous conclusory allegations,

and alleged her filing of two separate charges of “religious and retailiation (sic) with the

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Civil Rights Division.” (docket # 11 at 2)

On February 1, 2010, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Second Amended Complaint.

(docket # 46) The Second Amended Complaint alleges a “FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Religious Discrimination),” a “SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Retaliation

Discrimination),” provides further clarity and additional factual allegations and content to

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5

 Because Plaintiff’s Response does not argue that the Second Amended Complaint

alleges, or attempts to allege, a claim for religious-based hostile work environment, the Court

informs the parties that Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing this claim at this juncture in the

case. 

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establish a “facial plausibility [for] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (Id. at 6-7) (emphasis in original); Moss v.

U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). Moreover, after

comparing and analyzing the two pro se pleadings with the Second Amended Complaint, the

Court concludes they all “share a common core of operative facts sufficient to impart fair

notice of the . . . conduct called into question.” Martell, 872 F.2d at 327. Although no new

claims are alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s claims of religious and

retaliatory discrimination5

 “will likely be proved by the ‘same kind of evidence’ offered [or,

at least, partially set forth] in support of the original pleadings.” Dominguez, 51 F.3d at 1510;

Jones v. Greenspan, 445 F.Supp.2d 53, 56-57 (D.D.C. 2006). Proper application of Rule

15(c)(1)(B), FED.R.CIV.P., allows Plaintiff’s religious and retaliatory discrimination claims

to relate back to March 17, 2009 because they “[arise] out of the conduct . . . set out - or

attempted to be set out - in the original pleading[s].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B) (emphasis

added).

Lastly, the School argues that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages alleged

in the Second Amended Complaint contain “insufficient facts alleged to support any basis

for punitive damages[]” and because Plaintiff failed “to state a timely claim for punitive

damages in her Original Complaint[,] [t]he Second Amended Complaint is untimely and does

not relate back.” (docket # 48 at 11) Conversely, Plaintiff contends that “Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint sets forth ample allegations to support her punitive damages claim.

Plaintiff’s religious discrimination and retaliation claims require her to prove intentional

discrimination. . . Plaintiff’s allegations show a reckless indifference by Defendant to her

federally protected rights, including subjecting her to different terms and conditions of

employment because she exercised her religious rights and also opposed its discriminatory

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conduct.” (docket # 54 at 10-11)

The School acknowledges that “[p]unitive damages are available . . . where the

employer is found to have ‘engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices

with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved

individual.’” (Id.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). “Punitive damages are appropriate only

where an employer has engaged in intentional discrimination with ‘malice or with reckless

indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.’” (Id.) (quoting

Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 538-39 (1999)).

Plaintiff’s initial Complaint requested the district court “[o]rder Defendants to

pay [Plaintiff] punitive damages for their malicious and reckless conduct, in amount to be

determined at trial.” (docket # 1 at 6) The Amended Complaint reiterated Plaintiff’s request

for punitive damages. (docket # 11 at 6) Thus, the Second Amended Complaint’s punitive

damages request is not a new damages request and is one about which the School had notice

since the beginning of this lawsuit. Because the Court has concluded that Rule 15(c)(1)(B),

FED.R.CIV.P., allows Plaintiff’s religious and retaliatory discrimination claims to relate back

to the initial Complaint and because a district court must accept the well-pled allegations in

the Second Amended Complaint as true, Iqbal,129 S.Ct. at 1949, the Court will deny the

School’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Heritage Elementary School’s Motion to

Dismiss, docket # 48, is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for oral argument,

docket # 54 at 1, is DENIED as unnecessary.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice,

docket # 55, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Heritage Elementary School’s

Objection to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, docket # 56, is SUSTAINED to the

erroneous date of “December 8, 2008” as the date Plaintiff was authorized to file this lawsuit.

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All other objections are overruled.

DATED this 14th day of April, 2010.

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