Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01444/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01444-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGINA SHANTELL THOMAS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE )

CORPORATION, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-1444 OWW/DLB

ORDER GRANTING STATE CENTER

COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

AND CITY OF FRESNO'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docs.

67 & 90), GRANTING NATIONAL

RAILROAD PASSENGER

CORPORATION AND BNSF RAILWAY

COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (Docs. 70 & 88) AND

DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGMENT FOR ALL 

DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST

PLAINTIFF 

Plaintiff Georgina Shantell Thomas (hereinafter referred to

as Plaintiff), now proceeding in pro per, filed a Complaint for

Damages for Wrongful Death on October 14, 2005, arising from the

death of her son, Deondrae Mullin on September 2, 2004, who was 

struck at the Weldon Avenue Crossing on the campus of Fresno City

College by a passing Amtrak train on the tracks and right-of-way

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of BNSF Railway Company.

The First Cause of Action of the Complaint alleges that

Defendants Fresno City College, State Center Community College

District and the City of Fresno 

15. ... possessed, controlled, maintained,

operated, inspected, licensed, installed,

sited, constructed, leased, positioned,

furnished, serviced, repaired, used, owned,

or designed Weldon Avenue, at or near its

intersection with Glenn Avenue, in whole or

in part, and specifically the area in which

the decedent was killed, including, but not

limited to, the public street, the public

sidewalks, the train tracks, the crossing

gates and all systems related thereto, the

plants and the artificial structures placed

in the vicinity of the intersection of Weldon

Avenue and the train tracks and any and all

other surrounding features of said area.

16. On ... September 2, 2004, and prior

thereto, said public street, pedestrian

crossing, intersection, crossing gates and

related systems were in a hazardous,

defective and unsafe and dangerous condition

because of a combination of factors existing

thereupon, which conditions created a

substantial risk of injury when said public,

[sic] intersection, pedestrian crossing,

crossing gate and signals located at said

intersection were used with due care in a

manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable

that they would be used; in that at said time

and place and prior thereto, defendants, and

each of them, failed to control said location

despite the recognized danger presented by

fast-moving trains traversing the campus and

numerous fatalities which had occurred at

said site since its design and construction

so as to create a trap to members of the

general public, including decedent, who were

invited to use the pedestrian crossing by

defendants, and each of them. 

The First Cause of Action alleges that defendants, and each of

them, created a dangerous condition of public property: (A) in

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the manner in which it constructed and maintained the area around

the intersection of the train tracks and Weldon Avenue at the

time of the subject incident; (B) in placing and maintaining

train tracks that traversed through the middle of the college

campus; (C) by failing to change the design, layout and

construction of the tracks at Weldon Avenue after the time that

the Fresno City College campus expanded from being located

entirely west of the tracks to adding campus property on the east

side of the tracks; (D) by placing a concrete wall and foliage on

the north side of Weldon Avenue just east of the tracks so as to

obstruct and minimalize a pedestrian’s ability to determine that

a train was coming and to minimalize the perception of danger and

risk that a pedestrian might have as the pedestrian approached

the track crossing on the sidewalk on the north side of Weldon

Avenue; (E) by failing to install sufficient and proper crossing

gates at the location of the incident including, but not limited

to, a pedestrian crossing arm that would descend over the

sidewalk area as trains approached in light of the prior history

of trains striking pedestrians in the area of the college campus,

generally, and Weldon Avenue, specifically; (F) by allowing

Amtrak trains and other trains operated by Burlington Northern

Santa Fe Corporation/Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway

Company to operate at speeds greater than were safe and

reasonable for traversing a college campus; (G) by unreasonably

placing and allowing tracks to be located in close proximity of a

college campus where significant pedestrian traffic would exist

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and where it would reasonably be and was, in fact, expected that

young, inexperienced and less mature young people would

frequently be required to cross over the train tracks as they

walked through the campus; (H) by failing to properly provide

reasonable warnings to pedestrians on Weldon Avenue of the danger

of trains using the tracks that traverse Weldon Avenue and the

Fresno City College campus, generally; (I) by creating a trap for

pedestrians using Weldon Avenue where the street crosses the

train tracks by failing to install proper warning devices,

obstructing a pedestrian’s view of the tracks and otherwise

causing pedestrians to fail to appreciate the danger that existed

at the railroad crossing as described above. Paragraph 17 of the

First Cause of Action alleges:

17. Notwithstanding the facts alleged herein

above, the defendants, and each of them,

negligently, consciously, recklessly or

otherwise tortiously, failed to correct or

render safe said unsafe, defective,

concealed, hazardous and dangerous conditions

or failed to request that such remedial

action be taken; and further, said

defendants, and each of them, consciously,

recklessly, negligently or otherwise

tortiously, failed to post any signal, sign,

markings or device or to give any warning of

any type, or failed to request that such

warning be given to decedent and others

members [sic] of the general public within

said area, and would not be reasonably

apparent to or anticipated by decedent or

other such persons exercising due care, and

which defective, concealed, hazardous and

dangerous condition created a reasonably

foreseeable risk of the kind of injuries and

damages hereinafter alleged.

The Second Cause of Action for negligence alleges in pertinent

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part:

22. On ... September 2, 2004, at

approximately 9:20 a.m., decedent was on the

railroad tracks which are owned, maintained

and inspected by defendants BURLINGTON;

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION

(AMTRAK); CLARDLY LEE MULLIN, JR. [sic] and

Does 1 through 500, inclusive. This railroad

track traverses the premises of Fresno City

College ....

23. At said time and place, defendants

BURLINGTON; NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER

CORPORATION (AMTRAK); ERNEST MARTINEZ and

Does 31 through 60, so negligently,

carelessly and unlawfully operated, drove,

owned, leased, entrusted, inspected, examined

and maintained a certain train, along with

all of the component parts, in such a manner

that said train was proximately caused to and

did run over the decedent ... killing him.

Defendants State Center Community College District

(erroneously sued as Fresno City College) and City of Fresno move

for summary judgment. Defendants National Railroad Passenger

Corporation (Amtrak) and BNSF Railway Company also move for

summary judgment.

A. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir.1987). Materiality is determined by the substantive law

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governing a claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all

inferences drawn from it must be construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to defeat

summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. The nonmoving

party “may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in

order to preclude summary judgment,” but must set forth by

affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific facts showing

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The nonmoving party

may not simply state that it will discredit the moving party’s

evidence at trial; it must produce at least some “significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Id. A

plaintiff’s verified complaint may be considered as an affidavit

in opposition to summary judgment if it is based on personal

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9 Cir.2000). As th

explained in Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237

F.3d 1026, 1031 (9 Cir. 2001): th

[T]he district court may determine whether

there is a genuine issue of material fact, on

summary judgment, based on the papers

submitted on the motion and such other papers

as may be on file and specifically referred

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to and facts therein set forth in the motion

papers. Though the court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other

materials, it need not do so. The district

court need not examine the entire file for

evidence establishing a genuine issue of

material fact, where the evidence is not set

forth in the opposing papers with adequate

references to that it could conveniently be

found.

The question to be resolved is not whether the “evidence

unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the

evidence presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9 Cir.1995). This requires th

more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff’s position”; there must be “evidence on

which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. 

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

nonmoving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment.” Id.

B. STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT AND CITY OF

FRESNO’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

1. STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS.

In Plaintiff’s Statement of Genuine Issues in opposition to 

this motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states that she

“agrees with ALL undisputed Facts but would like The Court to

consider” certain facts and/or issues in resolving the motion for

summary judgment. See infra. 

Given Plaintiff’s concession, the following facts set forth

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by State Center Community College District and City of Fresno are

undisputed.

UMF 1: On September 2, 2004, at approximately 9:20 a.m.,

Deondrae Mullin was walking on the north side of Weldon Avenue

crossing over the railroad tracks that intersected Weldon Avenue,

when he was struck and killed by a passing northbound Amtrak

train traveling on the tracks and right-of-way of Defendant BNSF.

UMF 2: The intersection of the railroad tracks and Weldon

Avenue is on the campus of Fresno City College, which is operated

by State Center Community College District.

UMF 3: The roadway constituting Weldon Avenue on the east

side of the railroad tracks is owned by the City of Fresno.

UMF 4: A block wall and foliage are located near the Health

Science building, east of the tracks and north of Weldon Avenue.

UMF 5: The train involved in this accident did not come from

the direction of the wall and foliage. The train came from the

opposite direction, traveling from the southeast to the

northwest.

UMF 6: The fencing on the south side of Weldon Avenue and

each of the tracks was, and is, comprised of wrought iron bars,

with approximately 6 inches of space between each metal bar.

UMF 7: BNSF owned, controlled, leased, managed, operated,

supervised, maintained, constructed, repaired and otherwise was

responsible for the railroad tracks and the safety equipment in

the immediate vicinity of the accident.

UMF 8: On September 2, 2004, the following train warning

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devices were present: (1) vehicular crossing arms with two

flashing lights; (2) one constant-red tip light, 12" diameter

train-warning-red-flashing lights; (3) train-warning gong; and

(4) train whistle/horn blasts and bells emitted by the train

engine.

UMF 9: On September 2, 2004, the roadway at the grade

crossing contained two painted cross-bucks and a yellow warning

sign was posted on the roadway before the at-grade crossing.

UMF 10: On September 2, 2004, at the time of the accident,

the vehicular crossing arms with two flashing lights, the 12"

diameter train-warning-red-flashing lights, the train-warning

gong, and the train whistle/horn blasts and bells emitted by the

train engine, were activated and functioning.

UMF 11: On September 2, 2004, Jessica McAllister and two

other individuals attended class with Deondrae Mullin in the

Health Science building on the Fresno City College campus.

UMF 12: After class was let out, Ms. McAllister, two

classmates and Decedent left the Health Science building and

walked on the sidewalk located north of Weldon Avenue and east of

the railroad tracks.

UMF 13: Ms. McAllister was advised by one of her classmates

that a train was coming and she heard the train horn blare as it

was proceeding in a northwest direction, crossing McKinley

Avenue. As they continued to walk toward the tracks, Ms.

McAllister saw that the crossing arms were down, the big red

lights on the light pole were flashing, and she again heard the

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train horn.

UMF 14: Ms. McAllister and her two classmates stopped at the

light pole with the flashing red lights to wait for the train to

pass. Decedent failed to stop and walked into the path of the

oncoming train.

UMF 15: At the time Decedent kept walking, it appeared to

Ms. McAllister that he was distracted by two females ahead of him

and that he was wearing earphones.

UMF 16: State Center Community College District and BNSF

agreed to build a grade separation underpass just south of the

Weldon Avenue Crossing, with State Center Community College

District to seek funding from the State of California through the

State Capital Outlay Program (Community College Construction Act

of 1989).

UMF 17: This grade separation project provided for the

construction of pedestrian and vehicular access beneath the BNSF

railroad tracks at a point approximately 450 feet south of the

intersection of the railroad tracks and Weldon Avenue, with the

intersection ultimately to be permanently closed to vehicle and

pedestrian access.

UMF 18: The underpass project was designated as a

Life/Safety project with State Center Community College

District’s five year plan and the Chancellor’s Office allowed

State Center Community College District to bypass the Initial

Project Proposal submission.

UMF 19: On April 2, 2002, the Board of Trustees for State

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Center Community College District considered and adopted

Resolution No. 02-72, that authorized the submission of Final

Project Proposal to the State of California, Community Colleges

Chancellor’s Office.

UMF 20: The Final Project Proposal for the underpass project

was prepared by Blair, Church & Flynn, a local civil engineering

firm, working in conjunction with Caltrans, BNSF and SCCCD

administrative staff.

UMF 21: In preparing the Final Project Proposal, Blair,

Church & Flynn set forth and addressed three alternatives in

dealing with the intersection: (1) do nothing to the

intersection; (2) create a pedestrian and vehicular underpass

access (grade separation) south of the intersection and allow

continued vehicle/pedestrian access across the railroad tracks

along Weldon Avenue until the underpass project was completed;

and (3) close Weldon Avenue to through traffic and create

pedestrian underpass.

UMF 22: State Center Community College District chose to

proceed with the creation of a pedestrian and vehicular underpass

access (grade separation) south of the intersection and allow

continued vehicle/pedestrian access across the railroad tracks

along Weldon Avenue until the underpass project was completed.

UMF 23: The State Chancellor’s Office informed State Center

Community College District that the underpass project had been

approved and that State Center Community College District had the

authority to prepare the preliminary plans for the project.

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UMF 24: Pursuant to the authority granted by the State

Chancellor’s Office, the Board of Trustees voted at its October

7, 2003 meeting to authorize an agreement with Blair, Church &

Flynn for civil engineering services for the design of the

underpass access at Fresno City College.

UMF 25: State Center Community College District, through its

contact person, specifically told Blair, Church & Flynn that its

preference was that the existing Weldon Avenue Crossing was to

remain open for vehicular and pedestrian use, with the Weldon

Avenue Crossing to be closed when the underpass project was

completed.

UMF 26: The Engineering Project Manager, a registered

professional engineer with Blair, Church & Flynn, determined, in

his professional engineering opinion, that keeping the Weldon

Avenue Crossing open until the underpass project was completed

was technically accurate and met the design criteria set forth by

State Center Community College District.

UMF 27: Approval of the preliminary plans was provided by

the State Chancellor’s Office on January 12, 2004.

UMF 28: The State Chancellor’s Office approved the final

working drawings and specifications on June 1, 2004.

UMF 29: The State of California, Department of General

Services, Division of the State Architect, provided its written

approval of the working drawings and specifications that was

filed on May 24, 2004.

UMF 30: During the approval process with the State

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Chancellor’s Office, Blair, Church & Flynn, on behalf of State

Center Community College District, contacted the City of Fresno

regarding vacating a portion of Weldon Avenue to the east of the

tracks and the entirety of Weldon Avenue to the west of the

tracks.

UMF 31: A September 2, 2003 drawing prepared by Blair,

Church & Flynn, entitled “Vacation of Street Right of Way - state

Center Community College District”, was provided to the City of

Fresno for its review.

UMF 32: The City of Fresno was advised that State Center

Community College District was seeking vacation of the identified

city streets within the Fresno City College campus, as set forth

on the September 2, 2003 drawing, because of a proposed grade

separation crossing project that would eliminate the need for the

Weldon Avenue Crossing at the railroad tracks once the grade

separation project was completed.

UMF 33: In response to the request by State Center Community

College District, the City of Fresno wrote to utility companies

and other interested parties with an interest in the areas

possibly to be vacated. Additionally, the City of Fresno sought

written input from the various City of Fresno departments that

might be impacted by the possible vacation of the streets.

UMF 34: The City of Fresno held a public meeting on March

30, 2004, for general public input. On that same day, the City

Council for the City of Fresno adopted Resolution N. 2004-115,

which ordered the vacation of Weldon Avenue and other city

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streets listed on Exhibit A-1 to Resolution No. 2004-115.

UMF 35: The Mayor for the City of Fresno approved the

Council’s adoption of Resolution No. 2004-115 in writing on March

31, 2004.

2. DANGEROUS CONDITION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY DOES NOT

EXIST BECAUSE PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT DECEDENT USED

PUBLIC PROPERTY WITH DUE CARE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.

California Government Code § 835 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a

public entity is liable for injury caused by

a dangerous condition of public property if

the plaintiff establishes that the property

was in a dangerous condition at the time of

the injury, that the injury was proximately

caused by the dangerous condition, that the

dangerous condition created a reasonably

foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which

was incurred, and either:

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission

of an employee of the public entity within

the scope of his employment created the

dangerous condition; or

(b) The public entity had actual or

constructive notice of the dangerous

condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient

time prior to the injury to have taken

measures to protect against the dangerous

condition.

A “dangerous condition” is defined in Government Code § 830(a) as

“a condition of property that creates a substantial (as

distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of

injury when property or adjacent property is used with due care

in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be

used.” To allege a Section 830 “dangerous condition”, a

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plaintiff is only required to show that the condition “creates a

substantial risk of harm when used with due care by the public

generally ....” Murrell v. State of California ex rel. Dept.

Pub. Wks., 47 Cal.App.3d 264, 267 (1975). “So long as a

plaintiff-user can establish that a condition of property creates

a substantial risk to any foreseeable user of the public property

who uses it with due care, [she] has successfully alleged the

existence of a dangerous condition regardless of [her] personal

lack of due care.” Fredetter v. City of Long Beach, 187

Cal.App.3d 122, 131 (1986).

In moving for summary judgment on this ground, Defendants

place primary reliance on three cases, Mathews v. City of

Cerritos, 2 Cal.App.4th 1380 (1992), Schofeldt v. State of

California, 61 Cal.App.4th 1462 (1998), and Milligan v. Golden

Gate Bridge Highway and Transportation District, 120 Cal.App.4th

1 (2004).

In Mathews, a minor sued the City of Cerritos for injuries

suffered when he lost control of his bicycle while riding down a

steep hill in a city park. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary

judgment for the City, holding in pertinent part:

A condition is not dangerous within the

meaning of the statute ‘unless it creates a

hazard to those who foreseeably will use the

property ... with due care. Thus, even

though it is foreseeable that persons may use

public property without due care, a public

entity may not be held liable for failing to

take precautions to protect such persons.’

... Any property can be dangerous if used in

a sufficiently abnormal manner; a public

entity is required only to make its property

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safe for reasonably foreseeable careful use

....

Reasonably foreseeable use with due care, as

an element in defining whether property is in

a dangerous condition, refers to use by the

public generally, not the contributory

negligence of the particular plaintiff who

comes before the court; the particular

plaintiff’s contributory negligence is a

matter of defense. Nevertheless, the

plaintiff has the burden to establish that

the condition is one which creates a hazard

to persons who foreseeably would use the

property with due care ....

In Fredette v. City of Long Beach, [187

Cal.App.3d 122 (1986)] ..., the court held

the intent of the statute is ‘to impose

liability only when there is a substantial

danger which is not apparent to those using

the property in a reasonably foreseeable

manner with due care.’ ... Fredette involved

a diving accident. The court said, ‘Here,

the absence of a gangplank and the

shallowness of the water between the pier and

the float were apparent to all users. The

physical characteristics of the facility gave

immediate notice to those persons exercising

due care that diving from the pier was, in

and of itself, a hazardous activity that

should be avoided. We think it clear that no

member of the public may ignore the notice

which the condition itself provides.’ ....

The statutory definition of reasonably

foreseeable persons using the property with

due care takes into consideration the lower

standard of care which is expected of

children ....

Applying these principles here, we conclude

that the danger of riding a bicycle down a

very steep, wet, grassy hill is obvious from

the appearance of the property itself, even

to children exercising a lower standard of

due care ... Even children instinctively

recognize steepness of a hill and

slipperiness of wet grass. The trial court

properly concluded there is no triable issue

of fact and no reasonable person would

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conclude the property created a substantial

risk of harm to reasonably foreseeable child

users who use the property with the due care

expected of children. ‘While it is common

knowledge that children often heedlessly

engage in games or activities which are

dangerous or harmful to their health, at some

point the obligation of the public entity to

answer for the malfeasance or misfeasance of

others, whether children or parents, reaches

its outer limits.

2 Cal.App.4th at 1384-1385. 

In Schonfeldt, a minor who climbed a freeway fence, ran

across the freeway, and was struck by a truck, brought a personal

injury action against the State of California. Summary judgment

for the State was affirmed on appeal, the Court of Appeal ruling

in pertinent part:

The Schonfeldts cite Gardner v. City of San

Jose, (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 798 ... Their

reliance on Gardner is misplaced. In

Gardner, a vehicle struck a minor pedestrian

crossing a dark, unmarked crosswalk at the

intersection of two city streets. The

pedestrian subway underneath the street was

not illuminated on the evening of the

accident, and it was otherwise unsafe. There

were no warning or yield-to-pedestrian signs

for the motorists.

The Court of Appeal upheld judgment for the

plaintiff after jury trial in Gardner. The

situation created a ‘trap’ because both the

pedestrian and the driver had the right-ofway due to the existence of the subway ...

Here, however, there was no trap nor rightof-way for pedestrians on the freeway. Brian

jumped a fence to illegally run across a

limited-access which had signs telling

drivers that pedestrians are not permitted to

be on the freeway. Unfortunately, the

consequences of his actions are tragic, but

there is no liability here.

...

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‘[P]ublic entities have no duty, as a matter

of law, to prevent members of the public -

including you children - from scaling walls

and fences erected for the purpose of keeping

them out of areas of relative danger.’ ...

That the instant fence was slightly shorter

than state maintenance manual guidelines

suggested does not establish a dangerous

condition of the freeway ... Neither does the

lack of warning signs on the freeway, because

no concealed trap existed there ....

None of the facts alleged here constitute a

dangerous condition, either by themselves or

in combination ... Brian chose to do

something no reasonable person using due care

would do under the circumstances alleged -

jump a fence and run across a freeway ....

61 Cal.App.4th at 1466-1468.

In Milligan, a minor committed suicide by climbing over the

three and one-half-foot railing and jumping from the Golden Gate

bridge. Her parents filed suit, alleging that the lack of a

suicide barrier constituted a dangerous condition of public

property. The Court of Appeal affirmed the State’s demurrer

because the bridge was safe when used with due care, holding in

pertinent part:

The theory of appellant’s challenged

complaint was that the bridge constituted a

dangerous condition of public property

because it lacked a suicide barrier in

addition to the existing three-and-one-half

foot safety railing. Appellant pled

specifically that her ‘daughter committed

suicide by jumping off of the Golden

GateBirdge.’ As the phrase implies, a

suicide barrier would be used to protect

those who intend to commit suicide by jumping

off the bridge. We conclude reasonable minds

will reach but one conclusion as to whether

the lack of a suicide barrier is a dangerous

condition. By definition, persons who use

the bridge to commit suicide are not using

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the bridge in a manner used by the general

public exercising ordinary care. As a matter

of law, the Bridge District cannot be held

liable for its failure to install a suicide

barrier to protect those who intentionally

used the bridge without due care.

120 Cal.App.4th at 7.

Noting that the plaintiffs in Mathews, Schonfeldt and

Milligan contended that additional precautions should have been

taken to prevent the harm that occurred, Defendants argue that

summary judgment based on the conclusions of these cases is

required with regard to the allegations in paragraph 16 (A)

through (F). The undisputed facts establish Decedent’s failure

to exercise due care. The existence of the railroad tracks

themselves provided “an open and obvious” warning to pedestrians

that trains pass by. The train warning devices were in place and

operating at the Weldon Avenue Crossing on the date of the

accident, as well as the warning devices on the train itself. 

Ms. McAllister’s evidence establishes that she and two other

classmates heard the warning devices from the oncoming train and

saw the warning devices at the Weldon Avenue Crossing in

operation as they walked with Decedent towards the tracks. She

and her two classmates stopped at the crossing to wait for the

train to pass. Decedent did not stop and appeared to be

distracted by two females ahead of him and appeared to be wearing

earphones. As Defendants contend:

Although faced with these various and obvious

warning devices as the train approached, and

despite the fact that other pedestrians

walking in the same direction and on the same

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side of the street had stopped to allow the

train to pass because the activated warning

devices, and the train itself, made them

aware that a train was approaching, Mr.

Mullin inexplicably ignored these activated

warning devices and continued into the path

of the train. The failure to heed the

activated warning devices was akin to someone

jumping over a suicide railing, jumping a

fence and running across a highway or someone

riding their bike down a slippery and muddy

hillside. The danger was open and obvious on

the date of the incident and a reasonable

person, using the subject public property

leading up to the train tracks, would not

have ignored the activated warning devices

that other people had paid heed to and walked

into the path of the train. As tragic as the

facts are in this case, the public property

owned by State Center and the City of Fresno

was not in a dangerous condition when used

with due care by the general public and the

sole cause of this unfortunate incident was

the failure to Mr. Mullin to use due care.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with regard to

the allegation that a wall and foliage to the north and east of

the Weldon Avenue Crossing blocked the view of the oncoming

train. The undisputed evidence set forth above establishes that

the train, traveling southeast to northwest, was approaching the

Weldon Avenue Crossing from Decedent’s left. Decedent had an

unobstructed view of the oncoming train as the fencing to his

left which was constructed of wrought iron bars spaced

approximately 6" apart. 

Although Plaintiff does not dispute any of the facts set

forth above, she has filed a Declaration in which she avers in

pertinent part:

3. When the incident occurred it was

perceived (from witnesses) that Deondrae had

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no knowledge of the approaching locomotive

and no one made him aware of this Danger

[sic].

4. Deondrae had previously had eye surgery

(May 2004) in which there was a lens placed

over his left eye (eye was impaired). 

Deondraes [sic] lens had yet to adjust at the

time of death. Deondrae wore glasses but the

left eye piece was removed in order for the

lens and eye to adjust. Not one student

exercised common courtesy in making the

decedent aware of danger (coming train). As

a result Deondrae walked right into the path

and was swept away never to return. Deondrae

left behind his loving family to mourn his

death and think of him continuously. 

The averments in Plaintiff’s declaration do not constitute

admissible evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment. 

The averment in Paragraph 1 is inadmissible opinion unsupported

by any evidence or declarations by eyewitnesses. The averment in

Paragraph 2 concerning her son’s continued vision impairment

following the surgery is inadmissible lay opinion as to a medical

condition. The averment in Paragraph 2 that witnesses failed to

make her son aware of the oncoming train is unsupported by any

evidence or declarations of eyewitnesses and, in any event, would

not establish a breach of any duty owed to her son by the moving

Defendants.

Plaintiff asserts in her brief that Deondrae used “‘DUE

CARE’ as much as her [sic] could considering his ‘DISABILITY’. 

Plaintiff contends in her brief:

At a young age Deondrae was diagnosed by Dr.

Sidney Ames that he was blind in left eye. 

Later in years (before his 18 birthday) it th

was decided by Dr. Kaye that Deondrae would

have surgery to implant a lens over the left

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Plaintiff’s averments and/or contentions also are deficient 1

because of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of

Rule 56-260(b), Local Rules of Practice, requirements of which

Plaintiff was made aware by Order filed on April 3, 2007 (Doc. 86).

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eye so that maybe he would be able to see

better. The surgery was completed in May of

2007 [sic]. As of September 2, 2004 Deondrae

had not yet adjusted to the lens in his eye

at the time of his death. Referring to the

statement from Martinez (police report), ‘saw

the victim following behind a pack of

students, looking straight ahead. The

subject made no effort to hurry or run and

didn’t acknowledge the train until it was too

late.’ Through perceived deductions physical

actions shows that there was no need for the

decedent to feel his life was in danger.

Again, Plaintiff’s assertions are inadmissible hearsay and 

lay opinion evidence unsupported by any admissible evidence or

declarations.1

Summary judgment for Defendants with regard to Plaintiff’s

claim that Defendants created or maintained a dangerous condition

of public property is GRANTED.

3. DESIGN IMMUNITY.

Even if summary judgment was denied with respect to a

dangerous condition of public property, Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment because of the design immunity set forth in

California Government Code § 830.6.

Government Code § 830.6 provides in pertinent part:

Neither a public entity nor a public employee

is liable under this chapter for an injury

caused by the plan or design of a

construction or, or an improvement to, public

property where such plan or design has been

approved in advance of the construction or

improvement by the legislative body of the

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public entity or by some other body or

employee exercising discretionary authority

to give such approval or where the plan or

design is prepared in conformity with

standards previously so approved, if the

trial ... court determines that there is any

substantial evidence upon the basis of which

(a) a reasonable public employee could have

adopted the plan or design or the standards

therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative body

or other body or employee could have approved

the plan or design or the standards therefor.

“Section 830.6 design immunity is asserted as an affirmative

defense in actions arising out of an alleged dangerous condition

of public property. It is ordinarily raised on a motion for

summary judgment or nonsuit; the court decides whether there is

sufficient evidence to support it ... It is error to submit the

issue to a jury.” Higgins v. State of California, 54 Cal.App.4th

177, 184 (1997). The Court of Appeal in Higgins further

explains:

In determining the sufficiency of the state’s

proof, the court ‘must bear in mind the

rationale underlying the theory of design

immunity. “Basically, this defense is

predicated upon the concept of separation of

powers - that is, the judicial branch through

court or jury should not review the

discretionary decisions of legislative or

executive bodies, to avoid the danger of

‘impolitic interference with the freedom of

decision-making by those public officials in

whom the function of making such decisions

has been vested.’ ... Additionally, judicial

economy underlies design immunity -

forbidding a jury from reweighing the same

factors considered by the governmental entity

which approve[d] the design ....”’ ....

If there is any substantial evidence

supporting the reasonableness of the approved

design, design immunity applies. This is

true even though the plaintiffs present

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evidence of a design defect: ‘That a paid

expert witness for plaintiff, in hindsight,

found ... the design was defective, does not

mean, ipso factor [sic], that the design was

unreasonably approved.’ ... ‘[A]s long as

reasonable minds can differ concerning

whether a design should have been approved,

then the governmental entity must be granted

immunity.’ ....

54 Cal.App.4th at 185. To prevail on the design immunity 

affirmative defense, Defendants have to show: “‘(1) [a] causal

relationship between the plan and the accident; (2) discretionary

approval of the plan prior to construction; [and] (3) substantial

evidence supporting the reasonableness of the design.’” Id.

a. CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP.

“[A] causal relationship between the plan and the accident

... requires proof that the alleged design defect was responsible

for the accident, as opposed to some other cause.” Grenier v.

City of Irwindale, 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 940). “Causal

relationship is proved by evidence the injury-producing feature

was actually part of the plan approved by the governmental

entity: Design immunity is intended to immunize only those design

choices which have been made.” Higgins, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at

185. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s claim that Decedent would not

have been struck by the train if the Weldon Avenue Crossing had

been closed, the undisputed facts establish that a decision was

made to allow vehicular and pedestrian access through the Weldon

Avenue Crossing from 2002 to 2005 while the underpass project was

being planned and constructed. 

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State Center and BNSF agreed to build a grade separation

underpass just south of the Weldon Avenue Crossing and the City

agreed to vacate a portion of Weldon Avenue for parking use by

State Center after being provided with a copy of the plans by

State Center’s agent. At State Center’s direction, a Final

Project Proposal for the underpass project was prepared by Blair,

Church & Flynn, civil engineers, working in conjunction with

staff from Caltrans, BNSF and State Center. In preparing the

Final Project Proposal, Blair, Church & Flynn set forth and

addressed three alternatives, one of which was to close Weldon

Avenue to through traffic and create a pedestrian underpass. 

State Center chose to proceed with the creation of a pedestrian

and vehicular underpass south of the intersection and to allow

continued vehicle/pedestrian access across the tracks until the

underpass project was completed. State Center informed Blair,

Church and Flynn that the Weldon Avenue Crossing was to remain

open during the planning and construction of the underpass. 

After being informed, Blair, Church and Flynn provided in their

project design for the continued use of the Weldon Avenue

Crossing while the underpass project was planned, funded and

constructed. 

According to the Engineering Project Manager, the design and

construction documents for the underpass project, which provided

that the existing Weldon Avenue Crossing remain open until the

project was completed, were technically accurate and met the

design and operational criteria set forth by State Center. The

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City was advised that State Center was seeking vacation of

identified city streets within the Fresno City College campus, as

set forth in the September 2, 2003 design drawing, because the

proposed underpass would eliminate the need for the Weldon Avenue

Crossing once the project was completed. Those streets to be

vacated east of the tracks would accommodate the necessary

realignment of the Weldon Avenue underpass and the construction

of parking areas.

This undisputed evidence establishes that Decedent’s

injuries were caused by a feature inherent in the approved plan,

i.e., leaving the Weldon Avenue Crossing open to

vehicular/pedestrian traffic during the planning and construction

of the underpass.

Summary judgment on this element of design immunity is

GRANTED. 

b. DISCRETIONARY APPROVAL OF PLAN PRIOR TO

CONSTRUCTION.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this element

because of the undisputed evidence that Defendants approved a

design that kept the Weldon Avenue Crossing open while the

underpass project was being planned and constructed.

On April 30, 2002, the Final Project Proposal, as approved

by the Board of Trustees for State Center Community College

District’s Resolution No. 02-07, was submitted to the State

Chancellor’s Office. Thereafter, the State Chancellor’s Office

informed State Center that the underpass project was approved and

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that State Center had authority to prepare the preliminary plans.

Pursuant to that authority, State Center’s Board of Trustees

voted on October 7, 2003 to authorize an agreement with Blair,

Church and Flynn for civil engineering services for the design of

the underpass. Preliminary working plans were prepared and

submitted to the State Chancellor’s Office on December 4, 2003

and were approved by the State Chancellor’s Office on January 12,

2004. As required by the January 12, 2004 approval, on May 27,

2004, State Center requested approval of the working drawings

and authority to proceed to bid. The State of California,

Department of General Services, Division of State Architect,

approved of the working drawings and specifications on May 27,

2004. The State Chancellor’s Office approved the working

drawings and specifications on June 1, 2004. 

The City, after public hearing on March 30, 2004, adopted

Resolution No. 2004-114. Resolution No. 2004-114 approved the

vacation of identified streets within the Fresno City College

campus, as set forth in the September 2, 2003 drawing, because of

the proposed underpass project that would eliminate the need for

the Weldon Avenue Crossing once the underpass project was

completed, with the Weldon Avenue Crossing to remain open until

the project was completed. 

Because their respective governing bodies adopted

resolutions pertaining to the underpass project, the design of 

which required the Weldon Avenue Crossing to remain in use until

that project was completed, Defendants’ motion for summary

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judgment on this element of design immunity is GRANTED. 

c. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING REASONABLENESS

OF DESIGN.

As noted, “‘as long as reasonable minds can differ

concerning whether a design should have been approved, then the

governmental entity must be granted immunity. The statute does

not require that property be perfectly designed, only that it be

given a design which is reasonable under the circumstances.’”

Grenier v. City of Irwindale, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at 941. The

Court of Appeal explained:

Generally, a civil engineer’s opinion

regarding reasonableness is substantial

evidence sufficient to satisfy this element

... Approval of the plan by competent

professionals can, in and of itself,

constitute substantial evidence of

reasonableness ... That a plaintiff’s expert

may disagree does not create a triable issue

of fact.

Id.

The undisputed facts satisfy this element of design

immunity. The plan was approved by the engineering firm hired by

State Center, by the Board of Trustees, the State Chancellor’s

Office, the State Architect, and the City, after recommendation

of approval by the Engineering Division of the State Public Works

Department. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence or expert

opinion that suggests the design of the crossing was not

reasonable.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this element of

design immunity is GRANTED.

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4. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE PRECLUDES

LIABILITY OF STATE CENTER AND THE CITY.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in connection

with Plaintiff’s claim that State Center and the City created a

dangerous condition of public property “by failing to install

sufficient and proper crossing gates at the location of the

incident including, but not limited to, a pedestrian crossing arm

that would descend over the sidewalk area as trains approached

....”

It is undisputed that BNSF owned, controlled, leased,

managed, operated, supervised, maintained, constructed, repaired

and otherwise was responsible for the railroad tracks and the

safety equipment in the immediate vicinity of the accident. 

California Public Utilities Code § 1202 provides that the

PUC has the “exclusive power” in pertinent part:

(a) To determine and prescribe the manner,

including the particular point of crossing,

and the terms of installation, operation,

maintenance, use, and protection of each

crossing ... of each crossing of a public or

publicly used road or highway by a railroad

... and of a street by a railroad or of a

railroad by a street.

(b) To alter, relocate, or abolish by

physical closing any crossing set forth in

subdivision (a).

(c) To require, where in its judgment it

would be practicable, a separation of grades

at any crossing established and to prescribe

the terms upon which the separation shall be

made and the proportions in which the expense

of construction, alteration, relocation, or

abolition of crossings or the separation of

grades shall be divided between the railroad

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... corporations affected or between those

corporations and the state, county, city, or

other public subdivision affected.

Public Utilities Code § 1219 provides:

The Legislature declares that Sections 1201

to 1205, inclusive, are enacted a germane and

cognate parts of and as aids to the

jurisdiction vested in the commission for the

supervision, regulation, and control of

railroad .... corporations in this State, and

the Legislature further declares that the

authority and jurisdiction thus vested in the

commission involve matters of state-wide

importance and concern and have been enacted

in aid of the health, safety, and welfare of

the people of this State.

Even if Defendants wanted to demand that additional warning

devices, such as a pedestrian gate, be installed at the Weldon

Avenue Crossing, they did not have the power to alter the design

of the Weldon Avenue Crossing and, therefore, did not and could

not owe a duty to Plaintiff or the Decedent to install a

pedestrian gate.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground is

GRANTED.

C. AMTRAK AND BNSF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

1. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS.

In Plaintiff’s Statement of Genuine Issues in opposition to

Amtrak and BNSF’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states

that she “agrees with ALL undisputed Facts but would like The

Court to consider” certain facts and/or issues in resolving the

motion for summary judgment. See infra. 

Given Plaintiff’s concession, the following facts set forth

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by Amtrak and BNSF are undisputed.

UMF 1: On September 2, 2004, the Weldon Avenue Crossing was

equipped with the following warning devices and crossing

protective systems: (1) gates; (2) flashing lights (large 12"

LED/red lights); (3) bells (or gongs); (4) yellow railroad

crossing warning sign; and (5) fencing.

UMF 2: The fencing is an added crossing improvement that

improves the protective systems by channelizing pedestrians to

the Weldon Avenue Crossing where there are active warning

devices.

UMF 3: Much of the fencing was constructed with federal

funds.

UMF 4: These warning devices and protective systems provided

reasonable warning of the presence of the BNSF railroad tracks.

UMF 5: The design and installation of the warning devices

and protective systems at the Weldon Avenue Crossing are in

accordance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

(“MUTCD”) set forth by the Federal Highway Administration as well

as other nationally recognized design guidelines and standards. 

Further, pedestrian gates, which are not recommended by the MUTCD

or other nationally recognized design guidelines and standards,

were not indicated at this location.

UMF 6: In 2004 the equipment at the Weldon Avenue Crossing

was inspected by BNSF on a monthly basis, including checking

gates, lights, bells and battery power.

UMF 7: The last inspection prior to the incident was on

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August 12, 2004. Everything at the Weldon Avenue Crossing was in

working order, including sufficient warning time (over 20

seconds) required by the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”).

UMF 8: On September 2, 2004, Amtrak Train Number 701 was

traveling north (or railroad west) on BNSF’s mainline tracks in

the Stockton Subdivision. The train was operated by engineer,

Ernest Partida.

UMF 9: Prior to beginning the trip the Amtrak engineers

inspected the train, including the headlight, ditch lights and

horn. Everything was in working order.

UMF 10: The weather was clear with good viability. The

locomotive (Engine 2014) was equipped with windows giving the

engineer clear visibility of the tracks in front and to the left

and right of the tracks.

UMF 11: There were no visual obstructions at the Weldon

Avenue Crossing that would have blocked Decedent’s view of the

Crossing or of the oncoming train.

UMF 12: The maximum allowable track speed at the Weldon

Avenue Crossing was 80 miles per hour in accordance with federal

regulations for FRA Class 4 track.

UMF 13: At approximately 9:20 a.m. on September 2, 2004, the

train was approaching the Weldon Avenue Crossing at approximately

50-53 mph. The train was traveling within the allowable speed

for that location.

UMF 14: The lead locomotive of the train was equipped with a

dual element headlight, two ditch lights, a warning bell and

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horn. These safety devices were functioning at the time of the

accident. They also were inspected after the accident and found

to be in good working condition and in compliance with applicable

regulations.

UMF 15: The Amtrak engineer sounded the train’s horn to

alert vehicles and pedestrians at the Weldon Avenue Crossing of

the approach of the train. The activation of the horn

automatically activates the train’s bell and the two flashing

ditch lights at the base of the front of the locomotive.

UMF 16: On September 2, 2004, at the time of and before the

accident, the vehicular crossing arms with two flashing lights,

the 12" diameter train-warning-red-flashing lights, train-warning

gong, and train whistle/horn blasts and bells emitted by the

engine were activated and functioning.

UMF 17: The train warning horn was audible to pedestrians.

UMF 18: Analysis of the locomotive event recorder data

confirms that the train warning horn sequence commenced more than

20 seconds prior to impact when the train was over 1400 feet from

the accident location. The locomotive bell and horn warnings

provided were in compliance with the applicable state regulations

and the General Code of Operating Rules (“GCOR”) as adopted by

BNSF and Amtrak.

UMF 19: The horn was also inspected and tested after the

accident and found to be working properly and in compliance with

applicable federal regulations.

UMF 20: At the very last instant before the train reached

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the Weldon Avenue Crossing, a pedestrian (Decedent) walked out in

front of the train. Decedent did not appear to look up or look

in the direction of the train.

UMF 21: The Amtrak engineer immediately applied the

emergency brake, but the train could not stop in time to avoid

impact.

UMF 22: The Amtrak engineer complied with the applicable

rules and regulations and operated the train in a safe and

reasonable manner by initiating his emergency response and train

braking when Decedent unexpectedly walked into the train’s path.

UMF 23: Based on the location of the point of rest (“POR”)

of the train, the locomotive event recorder data and the

emergency braking capabilities of the train, impact with Decedent

would not have been avoided even if the engineer would have

initiated his emergency response when Decedent first came into

view. Train handling was not the cause of the accident.

UMF 24: The train and its component parts were properly

inspected and maintained on the date of the accident. There is

no evidence that the maintenance and/or inspection of the train

was a cause of the accident.

UMF 25: The Weldon Avenue Crossing equipment was inspected

immediately after the accident on September 2, 2004. All warning

devices and protective systems were working as intended and

provided sufficient warning time (over 20 seconds). There was no

damage to the equipment. The signal download was obtained and

confirmed that the equipment was working properly.

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UMF 26: There is no evidence of any hazardous, defective,

unsafe or dangerous condition of the Weldon Avenue Crossing.

UMF 27: There is no evidence that the accident was caused by

any negligence by BNSF.

UMF 28: There is no evidence that the accident was caused by

any negligence by Amtrak.

UMF 29: BNSF did not own, lease, operate, inspect or

maintain the train involved in the accident.

UMF 30: In 2003, approximately $1 million of federal funds

were allocated for the construction of the underpass (grade

separation) with the understanding that, after completion of the

underpass, the Weldon Avenue Crossing would be closed.

UMF 31: The federal funds used for the fencing and grade

separation projects were specifically allocated by the federal

government, though the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”) to

eliminate grade crossing hazards and to improve grade crossing

safety in California along the Bakersfield to Port Chicago route.

Although Plaintiff does not contest any of the undisputed

facts set forth above, she has filed a Declaration in which she

avers in pertinent part:

3. When the incident occurred it was

perceived (from witnesses) that Deondrae had

no knowledge of the approaching locomotive

and no one made him aware of this Danger

[sic].

4. Deondrae had previously had eye surgery

(May 2004) in which there was a lens placed

over his left eye (eye was impaired). 

Deondraes [sic] lens had yet to adjust at the

time of death. Deondrae wore glasses but the

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left eye piece was removed in order for the

lens and eye to adjust. Not one student

exercised common courtesy in making the

decedent aware of danger (coming train). As

a result Deondrae walked right into the path

and was swept away never to return. Deondrae

left behind his loving family to mourn his

death and think of him continuously. 

Plaintiff asserts that Deondrae used “‘DUE CARE’ as much as

her [sic] could considering his ‘DISABILITY’. Plaintiff contends

in her brief:

At a young age Deondrae was diagnosed by Dr.

Sidney Ames that he was blind in left eye. 

Later in years (before his 18 birthday) it th

was decided by Dr. Kaye that Deondrae would

have surgery to implant a lens over the left

eye so that maybe he would be able to see

better. The surgery was completed in May of

2007 [sic]. As of September 2, 2004 Deondrae

had not yet adjusted to the lens in his eye

at the time of his death. Referring to the

statement from Martinez (police report), ‘saw

the victim following behind a pack of

students, looking straight ahead. The

subject made no effort to hurry or run and

didn’t acknowledge the train until it was too

late.’ Through perceived deductions physical

actions shows that there was no need to for

the decedent to feel his life was in danger.

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s averments and

contentions are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. 

2. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR BNSF.

a. OPERATION, INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF

AMTRAK TRAIN.

Asserting that the only claim alleged against BNSF is that

set forth in Paragraph 23 of the Complaint, i.e., that BNSF “so

negligently, carelessly and unlawfully operated, drove, owned,

leased, entrusted, inspected, examined and maintained a certain

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train, along with all of the component parts, in such a manner

that said train was proximately caused to and did run over the

decedent”, BNSF contends that it is entitled to summary judgment

as a matter of law. BNSF refers to the undisputed evidence that

BNSF did not own, lease, operate, inspect or maintain the Amtrak

train that struck the Decedent. Plaintiff has no contrary

evidence.

Summary judgment for BNSF on these claims is GRANTED. 

b. WARNING DEVICES. 

BNSF argues that, if Plaintiff had alleged other claims of

negligence against it, BNSF is entitled to summary judgment. 

BNSF cites CACI 805:

Railroad companies must post signs or other

devices that give the public reasonable

warning of the presence of its tracks. A

railroad company must use reasonable care in

the design, installation, operation and

maintenance of its warning signals and

protective systems. The amount of care that

is reasonable depends on the particular

characteristics of each crossing.

BNSF contends that the undisputed facts set forth above

establish that it met the standard of care. BNSF refers to the

evidence that the Weldon Avenue Crossing had crossbucks, fencing

and advance warning signs and was equipped with active warning

devices including gates, lights and bells. The lights are large

12" bright LED/red lights which are clearly visible to

pedestrians and vehicles. The bells are standard and audible for

pedestrians. BNSF also refers to the undisputed evidence that

the gates, lights and bells were working properly at the time of

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the incident. BNSF refers to the undisputed evidence that it

complied with FRA regulations by providing at least 20 seconds of

warning time for the gates, lights and bells.

Plaintiff does not dispute this evidence and presents no

evidence from which it may be inferred that BNSF breached any 

duty of care to provide pedestrians at the Weldon Avenue Crossing

reasonable warning of the presence of the tracks and in the

design, installation, operation and maintenance of its warning

signals and protective systems.

Summary judgment for BNSF on these claims is GRANTED.

c. PREEMPTION.

BNSF further argues that any claim for negligence in the

design, construction, installation or adequacy of the warning

devices at the Weldon Avenue Crossing on September 2, 2004 is 

preempted by federal law.

In Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Shanklin, 529 U.S.

344 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed whether the Federal

Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 et seq., by virtue

of 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), pre-empts state tort

claims concerning a railroad’s failure to maintain adequate

warning devices at crossings where federal funds have

participated in the installation of such devices.

BNSF contends that it is undisputed that federal funds were

used to improve the Weldon Avenue Crossing in projects approved

by the FHWA by the construction of an iron fence and the

construction of an underpass (grade separation). The fence was

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in place at the time of the accident, plans for the underpass

were in process, and federal funds necessary for the construction

of the underpass were allocated. 

Plaintiff’s opposition asserts that “[p]recautions could of

been deemed if pedestrian rails had been implemented also as a

contribution instead of just the iron gate.” 

However, Plaintiff’s contention is preempted by Shanklin and

its progeny.

Summary judgment for BNSF on the ground of preemption is

GRANTED.

d. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR.

BNSF alternatively argues that it is entitled to summary

judgment even if summary judgment is otherwise denied because

Plaintiff presents no evidence from which it may be inferred that

its breach of duty was a substantial factor in causing the

Decedent’s death.

“In California, the causation element of negligence is

satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant’s

breach of duty (his negligent act or omission) was a substantial

factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm and (2) that there

is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability.” Leslie

G. v. Perry & Associates, 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 481 (1996). 

BNSF concedes that California courts have not defined

“substantial factor”. However, BNSF refers to People v.

Caldwell, 36 Cal.3d 210, 220 (1984), as providing “helpful

guidance.” In Caldwell, the California Supreme Court stated:

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To be considered a proximate cause of

Belvin’s death, the acts of the defendants

must have been a “substantial factor”

contributing to the result ... “[N]o cause

will receive judicial recognition if the part

it played was so infinitesimal or so

theoretical that it cannot properly be

regarded as a substantial factor in bringing

about the particular result. This is merely

a special application of the general maxim -

‘de minimus nor curat lex’ ....” 

BNSF also cites Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(b)(one

consideration in determining whether the defendant’s acts were a

substantial factor is “whether the actor’s conduct has created a

force or series of forces which are in continuous and active

operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation

harmless unless acted upon by another force for which the actor

is not responsible.”).

As BNSF contends, the undisputed evidence establishes that

the Decedent was the substantial factor in his death. The train

crew sounded their horn and whistle providing Decedent with

warning of their approach and there was clear sight-distance for

pedestrians at the Weldon Avenue Crossing. This evidence

establishes that Decedent should have been able to see and hear

the approaching train before he walked onto the tracks.

Summary judgment for BNSF on this ground is GRANTED.

3. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR AMTRAK.

Asserting that the only claim alleged against Amtrak is that

set forth in Paragraph 23 of the Complaint, i.e., that Amtrak “so

negligently, carelessly and unlawfully operated, drove, owned,

leased, entrusted, inspected, examined and maintained a certain

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train, along with all of the component parts, in such a manner

that said train was proximately caused to and did run over the

decedent”, Amtrak contends that the undisputed facts set forth

above entitle it to summary judgment as a matter of law.

a. EXCESSIVE SPEED.

Amtrak argues that any claim that the train was negligently 

operated at an excessive speed at the time of the accident is

preempted by federal law.

In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658

(1993), the Supreme Court held that, under the FRSA, 45 U.S.C. §§

421-488, federal regulations adopted by the Secretary of

Transportation and published at 23 C.F.R. § 213.9, preempted a

state law negligence claim “only insofar as it asserts that

petitioner’s train was traveling at any excessive speed.” Id. at

676. However, the Supreme Court noted:

Petitioner is prepared to concede that the

pre-emption of respondent’s excessive speed

claim does not bar suit for breach of related

tort law duties, such as the duty to slow or

stop the train to avoid a specific,

individual hazard ... As respondent’s

complaint alleges only that petitioner’s

train was traveling too quickly given the

‘time and place,’ ... this case does not

present, and we do not address, the question

of FRSA’s pre-emptive effect on such related

claims.

Id. at 675-676 n.15.

Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 213.9, the allowable maximum

operating speed for a passenger train on a Class 4 track is 80

m.p.h. The evidence is undisputed that the Amtrak train was

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traveling between 50-53 m.p.h. when the accident occurred. As

stated by the FRA, 63 Fed.Reg 333999 (June 22, 1998):

FRA current regulations governing train speed

do not afford any adjustment of train speed

in urban settings or at grade crossings. 

This omission is intentional. FRA believes

that locally established speed limits may

result in hundreds of individual speed

restrictions along a train’s route,

increasing safety hazards and causing train

delays. The safest train maintains a steady

speed. Every time a train must slow down and

speed up, safety hazards, such as buff and

draft forces, are introduced. These kinds of

forces can enhance the chance of derailment

with its attendant risk of injury to

employees, the traveling public, and

surrounding communities.

Defendants did not refer to the comment by the Supreme Court

in Easterwood at footnote 15. However, in Armstrong v. Atchison,

Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 844 F.Supp. 1152, 1153 (W.D.Texas

1994), the District Court rejected plaintiff’s contention that

the condition of the crossing where the accident occurred was

such that defendant’s employees should have operated the train at

a slower speed:

[T]he Easterwood court noted that the

regulations promulgated to enforce the FRSA

‘should be understood as covering the subject

matter of train speed with respect to track

conditions, including the conditions posed by

grade crossings.’ ... 113 S.Ct. at 1743

(emphasis added). The related safety

regulations were adopted ‘only after the

hazards posed by track conditions were taken

into account.’ ... 113 S.Ct. at 1742

(emphasis added). If the Court were to

follow Plaintiff’s argument, the Easterwood

opinion would have no meaning, because it

would allow state tort law to determine the

maximum speed at a particular crossing based

upon conditions already considered by the

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Secretary of Transportation.

The ‘specific, individual hazard’ identified

by the Easterwood court logically relates to

the avoidance of a specific collision ... The

holding in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Lemon,

841 S.W.2d 501 ... is not inconsistent with

this interpretation. Liability was imposed

in the Lemon case, in part, because the train

engineer failed to reduce his speed even

though his vision of an upcoming crossing was

obscured by a number of ‘illegally and

improperly parked tank cars.’ ... As the

court noted, ‘The improper parking of tank

cars which obstruct the view of a crossing is

not a hazard which the Secretary took into

consideration when determining train speed

limits under the FRSA.’ ... Plaintiff’s

claims, however, specifically relate to

conditions which were taken into

consideration by the Secretary. As such,

they are preempted by the FRSA.

In Bakhuyzen v. National Rail Passenger Corp., 20 F.Supp.2d

1113 (W.D.Mich.1996), the Plaintiffs alleged that the engineer

should have operated the train at a slower speed because of (1)

limited visibility due to snowy weather conditions; (2) the

obstructed view from motorists looking westbound at the crossing;

(3) the lack of protection at the crossing; and (4) the

engineer’s admission that this was a dangerous crossing. The

District Court held that, with respect to the crossing hazards,

the Easterwood court noted that the speed regulations “should be

understood as covering the subject matter of train speed with

respect to track conditions, including the conditions posed by

grade crossings.” The District Court held that, in line with

this language from Easterwood a number of district courts have

held that excessive speed claims were preempted by the FRSA

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despite the fact that the plaintiffs identified specific hazards

associated with the particular crossing where the accident

occurred. 20 F.Supp.2d at 1117. However, the District Court

held, the allegation that the weather conditions required the

train to slow down is not preempted by the FRSA. Id. at 1118. 

In Baker v. Canadian Nat.l/Illinois Cent. Railway Co., 397

F.Supp.2d 803, 812-814 (S.D.Miss.2005), the District Court held:

... It has been consistently emphasized that

the kinds of conditions that could constitute

a ‘specific individual hazard” are limited to

transient conditions that could lead to an

imminent collision, such as a child standing

on the railway or a motorist stranded on a

crossing or improperly parked tank cars which

obstruct the view of the train engineer ...

In the case at bar, Baker submits that the

work of the Hancock crew at the Greens Road

crossing fits the definition of a specific,

individual hazard, because in setting

applicable speed limits, federal regulators

obviously did not ‘account[] for the

possibility of a two-day construction job

involving truck-drivers repeatedly driving

across a crossing to dump vegetation and

other debris removed from near the adjacent

railroad track when they established the

track classifications.’ ... [T]he mere fact

of workers in proximity to the tracks whose

work requires them to frequently traverse a

public crossing in dump trucks cannot

reasonably be said to be a specific

individual hazard as contemplated by

Easterwood. Simply put, this is ‘[a]

condition that can be or is present at many

sites” and thus is not a specific, individual

hazard.

397 F.Supp.2d at 813-814.

In Peters v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 455 F.Supp.2d

998, 1002 (W.D.Mo.2006), the District Court held that an

allegation of an unwavering approach by a motorist to the

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crossing was not preempted.

Plaintiff’s claims concerning excessive speed are preempted. 

The possible exception to preemption noted in Easterwood does not 

apply to the undisputed facts because Plaintiff makes no

reference to and presents no evidence of a specific individual

hazard unrelated to the track conditions.

Summary judgment for Amtrak on this ground is GRANTED.

b. ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE.

Although Amtrak concedes that questions of negligence are

usually reserved for the trier of fact, it notes that “summary

judgment is proper where the facts are undisputed and only one

conclusion may reasonably be drawn from them.” Flying Diamond

Corp. v. Pennaluna & Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 707, 713 (9 Cir.1978); th

see also Camacho v. Du Sung Corp., 121 F.3d 1315, 1317 (9th

Cir.1997)(“Although summary judgment in a negligence action is

generally disfavored, it is proper where the facts are

essentially undisputed and only issues of law remain”).

Amtrak contends that it is entitled to summary judgment

based on the undisputed facts set forth above. Plaintiff

presents no evidence from which it may be inferred that the train

was negligently operated, inspected, examined or maintained. The

evidence set forth above establishes that the train was operating

at a legal speed, that its warning lights and horn were properly

operating, that the engineers had good viability and maintained a

proper look out, that they saw the Decedent walk into the path of

the train at the last instant, that the train’s emergency brake

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was immediately applied, and that, in the time it took the train

to stop, the accident could not be avoided. Plaintiff presents

no evidence that negligent operation of the train caused the

accident. The undisputed evidence the train was regularly

inspected and was inspected on the date of the accident and found

to be in proper working order. Plaintiff presents no evidence

that negligent inspection or maintenance of the train caused the

accident.

Summary judgment for Amtrak on this ground is GRANTED.

c. AMTRAK NOT A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR.

Amtrak alternatively moves for summary judgment on the

ground that Decedent, not Amtrak, was the substantial factor in

causing his death. See discussion supra.

For the reasons set forth above, summary judgment for Amtrak

on this ground is GRANTED.

D. PLAINTIFF’S IMPLIED REQUEST TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT.

Plaintiff asserts in her oppositions to these motions that

she “would like the court to reside [sic] case under the

protection of The American Disability Act [sic] (42 U.S. Code

12102 and following).” 

Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that

“leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” “The purpose of pleading is ‘to facilitate a proper

decision on the merits’ ... and not erect formal and burdensome

impediments to the litigation process. Unless undue prejudice to

the opposing party will result, a trial judge should ordinarily

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permit a party to amend its complaint.” Howey v. United States,

481 F.2d 1187, 1990 (9 Cir.1973). However, “[t]his strong th

policy toward permitting the amendment of pleadings ... must be

tempered with considerations of ‘undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to

cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, futility of amendment, etc.’ Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 182 ... (1962).” Schlacter-Jones v. General Telephone of

California, 936 F.2d 435, 443 (9 Cir. 1991). 

th

Cases specifically hold that denial of leave to amend is not

an abuse of discretion when the motion for leave to amend is an

attempt to avoid pending summary judgment. See Schlacter-Jones,

id., 936 F.2d at 443 (“A motion for leave to amend is not a

vehicle to circumvent summary judgment”) and cases cited therein.

Plaintiff’s belated reference to Decedent’s alleged disability

and request to allege that Defendants somehow violated the ADA is

clearly an attempt to forestall summary judgment. Discovery has

been closed since December 28, 2006 and jury trial is set for

August 14, 2007. The case has been pending since October 14,

2005. Plaintiff has been granted two extensions of time in order

to retain an attorney, (Docs. 44, 46, 69, 84), and did not do so. 

Plaintiff’s implied request to amend the pleadings to allege a

violation of the ADA is untimely and DENIED.

E. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR ALL DEFENDANTS NAMED IN ACTION.

Of the Defendants named in the Complaint, Defendant County

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of Fresno was dismissed from this action by Order filed on

September 11, 2006 (Doc. 32). By Order filed on March 27, 2006,

all claims alleged against the State of California, Department of

Transportation were remanded to the Fresno County Superior Court 

(Doc. 25). 

By Order filed on September 27, 2006, Defendant Clardy Lee

Mullin, Jr. was ordered to be served by publication. There is no

indication on the docket whether service by publication was

effected. Defendant Mullin is the father of Decedent Deondrae

Marcquise Mullin and was named as a defendant in the action in

order to protect the rights and interests of Plaintiff and

Defendant Mullin. 

Defendant Ernest Martinez, alleged to be an employee of

either Amtrak or BNSF, does not appear from the docket to have

been served.

No Defendants were substituted for Doe Defendants.

All Defendants who were served and appeared in this action

have either been dismissed, remanded, or granted summary

judgment. There is not proof of service of process on the only

two named Defendants who have not appeared. The time for service

of process has long passed and all pretrial proceedings in this

action have been completed. 

This record establishes that direction of judgment for all 

Defendants is appropriate. 

 CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

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1. Defendants State Center Community College District and

City of Fresno’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on all

grounds.

2. Defendants National Railroad Passenger Corporation

(Amtrak) and BNSF Railway Company’s motion for summary judgment

is GRANTED on all grounds.

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT for

all defendants and against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01444-OWW -DLB Document 108 Filed 07/12/07 Page 49 of 49