Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00182/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00182-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 On February 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Reply [] Limited to the Answer Limited for

Writ of Habeas Corpus Notice of Appearance of a State Bar Contract Counsel.” (Doc. 32.)

Although Petitioner refers to “State Bar Contract Counsel,” he is proceeding pro se and no

attorney has entered an appearance of his behalf. On February 26, 2013, Petitioner also filed a

“Supplemental Reply by This Affidavit.” (Doc. 33.) Although the Court did not grant Petitioner

leave to file a supplemental reply, the Court will consider both pleadings. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Everett Gregory Casteel,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et. al,

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-12-182-PHX-GMS (BSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Everett Gregory Casteel has filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 13.) Respondents have filed a Limited

Answer arguing that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides the statute of limitations for state

prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 24.) Alternatively, Respondents argue

that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred. (Id.) In reply, Petitioner opposes Respondents’

assertions and argues that he is entitled to relief on the merits of his claims. (Docs. 32 and 33.)1

The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)(A) and

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3

 In March, April, and May 2013, Petitioner filed the following additional documents:

“Proposed Order/Affidavit” (Doc. 35), “Nunc Pro Tunc/Affidavit Reply” (Doc. 36), “Affidavit”

(Doc. 37), “Notice of Appearance” (Doc. 38), “Affidavit” (Doc. 40), and “Notice of Denial of

Access to the Court.” (Doc. 41.) The Court will not consider these documents because they

were filed after the briefing on this § 2254 Petition had closed and because Petitioner’s access

to this Court has not been impeded. Petitioner has also filed several “Notices.” (Docs. 27, 28,

29, and 30.) The Court will not consider these notices, which are almost entirely

incomprehensible and do not request specific relief. On June 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a Motion

to Obtain Release/Bail Bond. (Doc. 44.) Petitioner seeks release on bond “upon issuance of

writ of habeas corpus.” Because the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied, the

request for release on bond is moot. Finally, on June 19, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Motion for

Emergency Injunction Request for Jury Trial and/or Hearing.” (Doc. 48.) Petitioner asserts that

the “library staff” has refused to e-file his documents and has read his legal briefs. Petitioner

has filed numerous materials with the Court. He does not describe any filings he has been

unable to make due to the “library staff’s” alleged conduct. Accordingly, this motion should

be denied. 

4

 Citations to “Respondents’ Ex.” are to exhibits to Respondents’ Limited Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 24.) 

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(B) (governing when the court should hold an evidentiary hearing). For the reasons set forth

below, the Second Amended Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the AEDPA.3

 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Indictment, Trial, and Sentencing

On March 22, 2007, Petitioner was indicted in the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa

County, Case No. CR2007-116559, on two counts of possession of narcotic drugs for sale

(Counts One and Two), and on one count of possession of dangerous drugs for sale (Count

Three), all of which are class two felonies. (Respondents’ Ex. A.)4

 The State subsequently

alleged several aggravating circumstances, including several historical prior felony convictions

and that the offenses were committed while Petitioner was on release from confinement.

(Respondents’ Exs. D, E, F.) Before trial, Petitioner filed and later withdrew several requests

to represent himself. (Respondents’ Exs. C, G, H.) Petitioner ultimately proceeded with

appointed counsel, Douglas Loefgren. (Respondents’ Ex. H.) Following a hearing, Petitioner

waived his right to a jury trial and his case was tried to the court. (Respondents’ Ex. I at 4-16,

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Ex. J and K.) 

On August 17, 2007, the trial court found Petitioner guilty on all three counts.

(Respondents’ Ex. L.) The court subsequently found that Petitioner was on probation when he

committed the offenses, had two prior historical felony convictions, and had violated the terms

of his probation by failing to register as a sex offender. (Respondents’ Exs. M, Ex. N at 24-28,

Ex. O.) The court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of 15.75 years’ imprisonment on

each count, to run consecutively to 2.5 years’ imprisonment imposed for the probation violation.

(Respondents’ Ex. M.) 

Petitioner’s convictions were based on the following evidence presented at the bench

trial. On March 12, 2007, Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) Officer Steve Svestka

was conducting surveillance of a west Phoenix house to determine if Petitioner was inside.

Petitioner was wanted on an unrelated matter. (Respondents’ Ex. K. at 9-10.) After watching

traffic entering and exiting the house, the officer suspected that drugs were being sold from the

house. (Id. at 12-13.) After confirming that Petitioner was inside, Svestka called a DPS SWAT

team. (Id. at 14-15.) The SWAT team approached the front door and announced that it had an

arrest warrant for Petitioner. Several people, including Petitioner, came out of the house. (Id.

at 15-16; Respondents’ Ex. S.) 

Officers searched the house and found twelve bags of drugs; two of these bags contained

crystal methamphetamine, three bags contained powered cocaine, and the other bags contained

cocaine base or crack cocaine. (Id. at 17-23, 26-27.) Officer Svestka testified that based on the

packaging, the quantities, and the varieties of drugs found in the house, and based on his

training and experience, he concluded that the drugs were possessed for sale. (Id. at 28-46)

Petitioner waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he had been selling drugs, but claimed

that he mainly served as an enforcer to protect the drugs from theft. He told Officer Svestka that

“they were selling about five to $10,000 worth of drugs out of the house every couple of days,

that there was a large amount of crack that had been delivered a couple days earlier and that

they were doing a lot of business out of there.” (Id. at 46-50) 

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B. Direct Appeal 

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely direct appeal raising the following claims:

(1) the trial court erred in failing to grant Petitioner’s motion to dismiss based on insufficiency

of evidence to establish that he had possessed the drugs at issue, (2) Petitioner’s conviction

should be reversed because Detective Svestka was not qualified to testify as an expert regarding

whether Petitioner possessed the drugs for sale, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to hold

a hearing to determine whether Petitioner had voluntarily waived his right to testify.

(Respondents’ Exs. P, Q, R.) 

On October 23, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims and

denied relief. (Respondents’ Ex. S.) Petitioner filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, which

the court denied on November 12, 2008. (Respondents’ Exs. U and V.) Petitioner did not seek

review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings

After his direct appeal, Petitioner pursued post-conviction relief (PCR) pursuant to

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. 

1. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

a. December 2008 Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

On December 9, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se notice of post-conviction relief.

Petitioner did not request the appointment of counsel. (Respondents’ Ex. V.) The trial court

directed Petitioner to file a petition within sixty days. (Respondents’ Ex. W.) On January 22,

2009, Petitioner filed a “Notice for Post-Conviction Relief (Supplemental Request for Record)”

to which he attached several documents. (Respondents’ Ex. X.) 

On February 5, 2009, the trial court denied Petitioner’s “motion entitled Notice for PostConviction Relief.” (Respondents’ Ex. Y.) The court stated that, “to the extent that [the Notice

of Post-Conviction Relief] is defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, it is denied

without prejudice to refiling at a later date on the appropriate form.” (Id.) The court further

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5

 On July 29, 2009, Petitioner filed a “nunc pro tunc order,” and a “motion to remand to

court of origin.” (Respondents’ Ex. FF.) On August 19, 2009, Petitioner filed two different pro

se notices of post-conviction relief in which he indicated that he thought the court had not

disposed of his previously filed Rule 32 petition. (Respondents’ Exs. GG, HH.) On August 20,

2009, Petitioner filed documents entitled “motion to set aside judgment as void for lack of

jurisdiction,” “motion to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence en banc,” “return of the

indictment,” and “motion to remand to court of origin Arcadia Biltmore Justice Court.”

(Respondents’ Exs. II, JJ, KK.) The trial court did not acknowledge or rule on these motions,

which were filed after its June 2, 2009 Order. 

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stated that if Petitioner had intended “to initiate a civil action, he must file separate pleadings

with the Clerk of the Court.” (Id.) 

On February 23, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for review challenging the trial court’s

February 5, 2009 order denying his petition for failure to use the proper form. (Respondents’

Ex. Z.) The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review on March 11, 2010.

(Respondents’ Ex. AA.)

b. April 2009 Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

On April 21, 2009, while his appeal of the February 5, 2009 order was pending,

Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Ex. BB.) On April 30,

2009, he filed a “motion for nunc pro tunc order” arguing, without any supporting facts, that the

prosecutor had violated his right to due process. (Respondents’ Ex. CC.) 

On June 2, 2009, the trial court denied Petitioner’s “motion entitled Motion for Nunc Pro

Tunc Order” stating that “[t]o the extent that defendant is attempting to file his [Petition] for

Post-Conviction relief, it is denied without prejudice” to refiling in the appropriate form in

accordance with Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.5. (Respondents’ Ex. DD.)5

c. October 2009 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

On October 29, 2009, Petitioner filed a “Petition for Post-conviction Relief” on the

appropriate form asserting sixteen grounds for relief arguing, in part, that there was newly

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6

 Although the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief

without prejudice and Petitioner appealed that decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the

record reflects that the trial court treated Petitioner’s filings between April 21, 2009 and October

29, 2009 as a continuation of Petitioner’s first Post-Conviction proceeding, which he had

commenced by filing a notice on December 9, 2008. (See Respondents’ Exs. WW, HHH.) 

7

 The January 15, 2010 minute entry appears at Respondents’ Exhibit WW after

Petitioner’s “Motion to be Present at Review.” (Respondents’ Ex. WW.) 

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discovered evidence in support of his claims.6 (Respondents’ Ex. LL.) Petitioner subsequently

filed several additional pleadings. (Respondents’ Exs. NN, OO.) After the State filed a

response requesting that the court dismiss Petitioner’s claims as frivolous (Respondents’ Exs.

PP, QQ), Petitioner filed several more motions. (Respondents’ Exs. RR, SS, TT, UU, VV,

WW, XX, and YY.) 

On review of the petition, the trial court noted that Petitioner had filed his notice of postconviction relief on December 9, 2008 and that the court had directed him to file a petition by

February 16, 2009. Thus, the October 29, 2009 petition was untimely because Petitioner filed

it well beyond that deadline. The court further stated that:

The Defendant has checked off several items under number 3 on the Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief form. One of the items is “the existence of newlydiscovered material which require the court to vacate the conviction or sentence.”

Defendant states that the Detective intentionally lied as to when the narcotics

were found. However, the information relied upon for this assertion is contained

in a police report and in the trial testimony of the officer. This is not “newly

discovered material.” 

All of the claims raised by Defendant in this proceeding are precluded by Rule

32[.2] (a)(1) and (2) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure as they are

claims “raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post-trial motion under Rule

24,” and/or were “finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal,” or are merely

conclusory statements without factual support.

(Respondents’ Ex. WW.)7

 Accordingly, on January 15, 2010, the court dismissed Petitioner’s

“Rule 32 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Id.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review

with the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

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8

 The court noted that Petitioner’s previous Rule 32 petition had been dismissed on

January 25, 2010, but did not mention Petitioner’s appeal of the trial court’s February 5, 2009

order denying his “petition” without prejudice to refiling it on the proper form. 

9

 After the February 24, 2010, Order, Petitioner filed an untitled pleading, a “certified

promissory note,” and a “court bond no. A549394716.” (Respondents’ Exs. CCC, DDD, EEE.)

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2. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

On February 2 and 3, 2010, Petitioner filed two “petition[s] for writ of habeas corpus ad

pro se petitioner,” requesting an order transferring him from the custody of the Arizona State

Prison to the custody of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department. (Respondents’ Exs. ZZ,

AAA.) On February 24, 2010, the trial court construed these filings as a single notice of postconviction relief and then dismissed this notice as untimely and successive pursuant to Rules

32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h), and Rule 32.4(a).8

 The court explained that “Defendant presents no

facts or argument why he did not file this notice in a timely manner, why the claims were not

raised in the previous proceeding or how his claims fall within the cited subsections.”

(Respondents’ Ex. BBB.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review.9

3. Petitioner’s Third Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 

On April 4, 2012, Petitioner filed another “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.”

(Respondents’ Ex. FFF.) He subsequently filed two affidavits claiming that County Attorney

Andrew Thomas had filed false charges against him that were based on fraud and perjury.

(Respondents’ Exs. GGG, III.) 

On April 23, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief

and dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding. (Respondents’ Ex. HHH.) The court found that

Petitioner had previously pursued post-conviction relief, that many of Petitioner’s claims were

not properly presented in a successive Rule 32 petition, and that these claims were precluded

pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) because they should have been raised on direct appeal or in a prior

Rule 32 proceeding. (Id. (noting that previous Rule 32 proceedings had been dismissed on

January 15, 2010 and February 24, 2010)). The court rejected Petitioner’s assertion that there

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10 Respondents mistakenly state that the court denied the motion for rehearing on June

7, 2012 and cite to exhibit FFF. (Doc. 24 at 13.) The order denying the motion for

reconsideration is located at exhibit LLL, not exhibit FFF.

11 On September 17, 2012, the Court dismissed Ground Two as “entirely

incomprehensible” and because it did not “make a cognizable challenge to Petitioner’s

conviction or sentence.” (Doc. 16 at 2.) Accordingly, only Grounds One, Three, and Four are

before the Court. 

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were newly discovered facts that would probably change the outcome of his convictions and

sentences and found that he failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted in an

untimely Rule 32 proceeding. (Id. (citing Rule 32.4(a)). 

On May 11, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing accompanied by a “bond

promis[e] to pay at $3,000,90000.00 (sic).” (Respondents’ Exs. JJJ and KKK.) The court

denied the motion on May 30, 2012.10 (Respondents’ Ex. LLL. )

D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On January 26, 2012, Petitioner commenced a federal habeas corpus proceeding in this

Court. (Doc. 1.) The Court dismissed the petition, but twice granted Petitioner leave to file an

amended petition. (Docs. 7, 10.) On July 30, 2012, Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition

asserting the following claims: (1) Petitioner is in custody in violation of the laws of Arizona

and the United States and he was not provided state-appointed counsel (Ground One);

(2) Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the trial court did not suppress

evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree and he was convicted by the use of perjured testimony

(Ground Three); and (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction and Petitioner’s trial counsel was

ineffective because he “told [him] to reject all plea offers and then did no pre-trial . . . he said

‘I will not do anything to help you, get ready for prison because that’s where you[’re] going’”

(Ground Four).11 (Doc. 13.) As discussed below, these claims are barred by the AEDPA statute

of limitations. 

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12 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on

direct review on October 23, 2008 and denied his motion for reconsideration on November 12,

2008. Petitioner had thirty days, or until December 12, 2008, to file a petition for review in the

Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Petitioner did not do so; therefore, his

convictions became final on December 12, 2008. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 132

S.Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (for a state prisoner who does not seek review in the State’s highest court,

the judgment becomes “final” on the date the time for seeking such review expires).

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II. Statute of Limitations

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides a one-year

statute of limitations for state prisoners to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That period generally commences on “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The statute of limitations is tolled during the

time that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

A. Commencement of Limitations Period and Statutory Tolling

Here, Petitioner’s convictions became final on direct review on December 12, 2008.12

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 2007)

(direct appeal is final upon expiration of time for seeking further appellate review); Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). The limitations period, however, was

immediately tolled because Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on December 9,

2008. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled during the time

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending”). 

The trial court considered Petitioner’s post-conviction relief filings, starting with his

December 9, 2008 notice through his October 29, 2009 petition (which was on the state court’s

approved form, but untimely), as his first post-conviction relief proceeding. (Respondents’

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13 Respondents do not discuss whether Petitioner’s various state court filings from April

21, 2009 through August 2009 and from November 12, 2009 through January 19, 2010 would

have tolled the limitations period. (Doc. 24 at 7-10, 16-17 and n.5.) To the extent that any of

Petitioner’s filings during those periods would have tolled the limitations period, any Rule 32

proceeding to which those filings were related concluded before March 11, 2010, and thus those

filings did not extend the tolling of the limitations period beyond March 11, 2010. 

Additionally, the trial court considered Petitioner’s February 2 and 3, 2010 “petitions for

writ of habeas corpus” as a single notice of post-conviction relief and, on February 24, 2010,

dismissed the notice as untimely and successive. This untimely notice of post-conviction relief

did not toll the limitations period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (postconviction proceedings that are untimely under state law are not “properly filed” and do not toll

the AEDPA limitations period). 

On March 24, 2010, Petitioner filed an untitled pleading in the trial court, and on April

4, 2010, he filed a certified promissory note. (Respondents’ Exs. CCC, DDD.) These filings

are not “application[s] for state post-conviction relief or other collateral review” for purposes

of the AEDPA and did not toll the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

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Ex. WW, HHH.) The trial court denied review of the October 29, 2009 petition on January 15,

2010, and Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, because Petitioner’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of his first petition for

post-conviction relief (which was timely, but not on the proper form) was pending until March

11, 2010, the statute of limitations was tolled until March 11, 2010, and commenced the

following day. See Hemmerle, 495 F.3d 1074 (a post-conviction action is “pending” when the

notice is filed in conformity with Rule 32.4(a), and statutory tolling begins on that date and

continues “until the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction

procedures”). Therefore, the limitations period remained tolled until March 11, 2010 when the

Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the dismissal of Petitioner’s first post-conviction

relief proceedings. (Respondents’ Ex. AA.) Accordingly, the statute of limitations commenced

on March 11, 2010 and expired one year later on March 11, 2011.13 

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14 Petitioner filed several other pleadings in state court after the statute of limitations had

already expired on March 11, 2011. None of these filings tolled the already-expired statute of

limitations. (See Respondents’ Ex. EEE, “Court Bond No. A549394716” filed November 2,

2011; Respondents’ Ex. MMM, “Writ of Certiorari/Mandamus by Special Action for 13 People

of U.S.A” filed August 30, 2012; and Respondents’ Ex. OOO, “Petition for Review by Letter

of Rogatory to John Pelander (attached to record) Notice by Affidavit,” filed November 16,

2012.) 

Moreover, even if the limitations period had not yet expired, none of these filings could

have tolled it because they are not “application[s] for state post-conviction relief or other

collateral review” for purposes of the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

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B. Other Possible Grounds for Statutory Tolling 

Petitioner also filed additional post-conviction relief proceedings, a “writ of certiorari”

in the Arizona Supreme Court, and prior federal habeas corpus proceedings. As set forth below,

none of these proceedings provide grounds for statutory tolling of the statute of limitations.

1. April 2012 Notice of Post-Conviction Review

On April 4, 2012, after the limitations period had already expired on March 11, 2011,

Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Ex. FFF.) Because the

AEDPA statute of limitations had already expired, this post-conviction notice did not toll the

limitations period. Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed petition

for post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute of limitations. See Brinkley v. Tilton, 372

Fed. Appx. 732, 733 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding “no basis to apply statutory tolling because the

one-year limitations period had already expired by the time [petitioner] filed his first state

petition”); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “section

2244(d) does not permit reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state

petition was filed”); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).14

2. “Writ of Certiorari” filed with the Arizona Superior Court

While his direct appeal was pending, on December 28, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se

“writ of certiorari” pursuant to “Rule 4 and/or Rule 8(b)” in his underlying criminal case

alleging various errors during his trial. (Respondents’ Ex. UUU.) The trial court did not

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15 Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure for Special Actions governs the procedure for

commencing a special action. Rule 8(a) governs the procedure for appealing the decision of a

superior court in a special action. 

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acknowledge this pro se filing. Because Petitioner’s “writ of certiorari” was filed before the

statute of limitations commenced, it could not have tolled the AEDPA limitations period.

Moreover, even if the writ of certiorari were pending during the limitations period, it would not

have resulted in tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

In Arizona, a special action takes the place of “writs of certiorari, mandamus, or

prohibition in the trial or appellate court.” See Rule 1(a) and (b), Rules of Procedure for Special

Actions (writs of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition originating under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-

2001, 12-2021 or the common law are special actions). Petitioner labeled his filing a “writ of

certiorari” and cited “Rule 4” and “Rule 8(b).”15 (Respondents’ Ex. UUU.) Considering the

context in which Petitioner cited these rules, it appears he was citing the Rules of Procedure for

Special Actions, Rules 4 and 8(b), and thus filing a special action.

Special actions, do not toll the AEDPA limitations period because they are not

“application[s] for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claims” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). See Dema v. Arizona, 2008 WL

2941167, at *11 (D. Ariz. Jul. 25, 2008) (special action did not toll the AEDPA limitations

period)). 

3. Prior Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings

Petitioner previously filed three § 2254 petitions that this Court dismissed without

prejudice. See Casteel v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 2:07cv1564-EHC (MEA)

(dismissing petition as premature because of ongoing criminal proceedings); Casteel v. Dora

B. Schriro, 2:08cv232-GMS (MEA) (dismissing petition for failure to raise claims challenging

the legality or duration of Petitioner’s confinement); Casteel v. Charles L. Ryan, 2:11cv2412-

GMS (MEA) (dismissing petition for failure to pay filing fee or to complete application to

proceed in forma pauperis). Petitioner’s first three federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus

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did not toll the AEDPA limitations period because they were not applications for “state postconviction relief or other collateral review.” See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172, 180-81

(2001); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 n.2 (2007). 

Therefore, the AEDPA statute of limitations commenced on March 11, 2010 and expired

on March 11, 2011. Petitioner did not file his initial § 2254 petition in this matter until January

26, 2012 and he filed a Second Amended Petition on July 30, 2012. Assuming that January 26,

2012 is the operative filing date, the pending habeas corpus petition is untimely and not subject

to review unless Petitioner establishes a basis for equitable tolling. 

C. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period of § 2244(d) may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, ___ U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560

(2010). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he establishes: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable

diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565 (internal citations and

quotations omitted). 

 Here, although Petitioner asserts that he had some difficulty presenting his claims to the

state courts, he does not specifically address the untimeliness of his § 2254 Petition other than

to refer to his numerous state-court filings and assert that “all time statute[s] are still current no

response to October 17, 2007 appeal, writ of certiorari, notice of post-conviction relief

12/09/2008.” (Docs. 13 at 11, 32 at 5, 15, and Doc. 33 at 19, 27.) Contrary to Petitioner’s

assertion, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled on his direct appeal on October 23, 2008

(Respondents’ Ex. S.) Additionally, the Petition states that the direct appeal was “dismissed,”

and thus he did receive a response to his direct appeal. (Doc. 13 at 2.) Petitioner further states

that he did not receive a response to his petition for writ of certiorari. (Doc. 13 at 11.)

Following his direct appeal, Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Doc. 13 at 3.) However, Petitioner asserts that he filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the

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United States Supreme Court on September 25, 2007, but that he did not receive a response.

(Doc. 13 at 3.) Even assuming that the United States Supreme Court never responded to

Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioner does not explain why the lack of a response

prevented him from filing a timely federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, especially

considering his numerous other filings challenging his convictions and sentences. 

Petitioner also asserts that he did not receive a final response to his December 9, 2008

notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 13 at 11.) Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the record

reflects that the trial court ultimately dismissed the notice of post-conviction relief and related

petition on January 15, 2010. (Respondents’ Ex. WW.) Additionally, the Petition states that

the December 9, 2008 notice was “dismissed without consideration.” (Doc. 13 at 5.) Thus,

Petitioner received a final response to his December 9, 2008 notice of post-conviction relief.

Petitioner has not articulated, and the record does not reveal, any extraordinary

circumstance that would justify equitable tolling. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th

Cir. 2003) (noting that “equitable tolling only [applies] where ‘external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim.’”) (quoting Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and

lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the

limitations period. See Ballesteros v. Schriro, 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007)

(a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable

filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances).

Petitioner filed numerous pleadings in state court and has not explained his failure to file a

timely petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 

Because Petitioner has not presented any circumstance that would justify equitably

tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations, his § 2254 Petition should be denied as untimely and

the Court need not consider Respondents’ alternative argument that Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally barred.

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III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 13) should be denied and dismissed as untimely.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 13) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion for Emergency

Injunction Request for Jury Trial and/or Hearing (Doc. 48) and Motion to Obtain Release/Bail

Bond (Doc. 44) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by

a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable and because

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed

until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date

of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with

the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have

fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections

to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge

may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2013.

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