Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00643/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00643-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael J. Ottiano, Sr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

The Honorable John Foreman, Judge of

the Superior Court of the State of

Arizona, in and for the County of

Maricopa; and Frances L. Johansen,

State Bar of Arizona, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-643-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants John Foreman and Frances Johansen have filed motions to dismiss t he

amended complaint. Docs. ## 6-7. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss

this case as moot.

Background

Pro se Plaintiff Michael Ottiano commenced this action by filing a complaint

against Defendants on February 28, 2005. Doc. #1. Plaintiff subsequently amended his

complaint. Doc. #8. Plaint iff alleges the following: On March 11, 2004, Plaintiff filed a

“motion for immediate release” in a state court criminal case against Nicole Ottiano, State

v. Nicole Ottiano, CR-2003-015692. Id. at 2. Plaintiff filed the motion pursuant to a

“Special Power of Attorney” signed by Ms. Ottiano that granted Plaintiff the power

Case 2:05-cv-00643-DGC Document 18 Filed 01/09/06 Page 1 of 5
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1

 Rule 31(b) provides in part: “ Excep t as hereinafter provided in section (c), no

person shall practice law in this state or represent in any way that he or she may practice

law in this state unless the person is an act ive member of the state bar[.]” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.

31(b). Subsection (c) of Rule 31 lists 25 exceptions to the bar membership requirement.

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31(c). 

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“ t o act in her stead” in the criminal case. Id. At a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion, Superior

Court Judge John Foreman barred Plaint iff from filing further motions because he was not

licensed to practice law in Arizona and informed Plaint iff that the matter would be referred

to the State Bar of Arizona. Id. at 2-3. Subsequently, State Bar representative Frances

Johansen stated in two separate letters that Plaintiff had engaged in the unauthorized

practice of law under Rule 31 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona. Id. at 3.1

Plaintiff claims that Rule 31 is unconstitutional. Id. at 4. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

that Rule 31 violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because

subsection (c) lists 25 excep t ions “granting to citizens and/or businesses privileges or

immunities that are denied to Plaintiff[.]” Id. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the

rule is unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against its enforcement. Id. at 7.

After Plaintiff filed his complaint , Nicole Ottiano entered a plea agreement and was

sentenced t o a t erm of imprisonment in the state court case. Id. at 9, Ex. 1 (State v. Nicole

Ottiano, CR-2003-015692, Apr. 19, 2005 Sentence of Imprisonment). This Court may take

judicial notice of the plea and sentence. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Roberts v. Corrothers, 812

F.2d 1173, 1177 (9t h Cir. 1987) (stating that in resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings without

converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment); Augustine v . United

States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).

Discussion

Defendant Foreman argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claim because it is moot in light of Ms. Ottiano’s guilty plea and sentence.

Doc. #6 at 8-9. Defendant Johansen joins Defendant Foreman’s motion. Doc. #7. Plaint iff

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2 Plaint iff’s reliance on Exxon Mobile is misplaced because that case involved the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, not the mootness doctrine. 

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argues that his claim is not moot because “federal jurisdiction over an action does not

terminate automatically on the entry of judgment in a state court.” Doc. #9 at 7 (citing

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517 (2005)).2

“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of actual,

ongoing controversies between litigants.” Ruvalcaba v. City of L.A., 167 F.3d 514, 520

(9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The “case-or-controversy

requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial p roceedings . . . . The parties

must continue to have a ‘p ersonal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit.” Spencer v.

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff’s claim is moot. Plaintiff alleges that he should be p ermitted to act in the

state criminal case on behalf of Ms. Ottiano pursuant to the “Special Power of At t orney”

she gave him. Docs. ##8 at 2, 9 at 5. But the state criminal case has been resolved by p lea

agreement and Ms. Ottiano has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Doc. #6 Ex. 1.

The relief Plaintiff seeks – to represent Ms. Ottiano in the state case – no longer is

available. “If there is no longer a p ossibility that [a plaintiff] can obtain relief for his claim,

that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at

521; see Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a claim challenging

the constitutionality of a state budget reduction plan was moot because t he court could

not undo what ever injury the plaintiffs may have suffered); Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v.

Shalala, 166 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were moot

where the court no longer had the power to grant t he requested declaratory and injunctive

relief). 

An exception to the mootness doctrine applies “if the underlying dispute bet ween

t he parties is one ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart,

427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976) (citation omitted). “A dispute is capable of repetition if ‘there is

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a reasonable exp ectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same

action again’; it is likely to evade review if ‘the challenged action was in its duration too

short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.’” Unabom Trial Media

Coalition v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E.D. of Cal. (Sacramento), 183 F.3d 949, 950 (9t h Cir.

1999) (citations and alteration omitted). “[T]his exception to mootness applies only in

‘exceptional situations,’ and only when both factors are ‘simultaneously present.’” Foster,

347 F.3d at 748 (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17). The “mere possibilit y t hat something

might hap pen [in the future] is too remote to keep alive a case as an active controversy .”

Id. (emphasis in original).

This exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply t o Plaint iff’s claim. Plaintiff

does not contend that he will file additional legal documents on M s. Ottiano’s behalf. Nor

does he cont end that he will attempt to represent other individuals in court proceedings.

There is no reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will again be subjected to the actions taken

by Defendants Foreman and Johansen in this case. See id. (“Plaintiffs do not establish a

reasonable expectation that they will be subjected to the challenged action again in t he

fut ure. T he only fact in the record before us that supports this claim is that it happened

once.”); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9t h Cir. 2000)

(holding that the moot ness exception did not apply to high school students’ claims

challenging the defendant’s refusal to allow a sectarian graduation ceremony because the

students had already graduated).

Because Plaintiff’s claim is moot, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See

Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 521; Foster, 347 F.3d at 745; In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir.

2005). The Court accordingly will dismiss this action.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant Foreman’s motion to dismiss the original complaint (Doc. #4)

is denied as moot.

2. Defendant Johansen’s motion to dismiss the original complaint (Doc. #5)

is denied as moot.

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3. Defendant Foreman’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. #6),

which Defendant Johansen has joined, is granted.

4. Defendant Johansen’s separate mot ion to dismiss the amended complaint

(Doc. #7) is denied as moot.

5. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 6th day of January, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-00643-DGC Document 18 Filed 01/09/06 Page 5 of 5