Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08024/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jeanette Young, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

United States Department of the Interior, 

Bureau of Indian Education, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-13-08024-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss / Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (Doc. 11.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff, Jeanette Young, was an employee of the United States Department of the 

Interior, Bureau of Indian Education (“BIE”). (Doc. 12.) She was terminated by the 

Defendant, BIE, on May 20, 2011. (Id.) On January 29, 2013, Ms. Young filed a 

complaint with this Court. (Doc. 1.) Ms. Young alleges that BIE violated her freedom of 

religion in terminating her because of her refusal to be “saved.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6.) She 

claims that her action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 

Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Doc. 1 at 1.) BIE and Ms. Young are unable to 

agree that Ms. Young’s pleading is curable by an amendment. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 9.) On April 

22, 2013, BIE filed a Motion to Dismiss/ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 11). The 

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deadline for a response by Ms. Young was on May 9, 2013 and no response was ever 

filed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a complaint need not contain 

detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. When a complaint does not 

“permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 

alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal 

quotation omitted). 

 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll 

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, 

legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of 

truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not 

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

/ / / 

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II. Analysis 

A. Young Fails to State a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 Ms. Young contends that this action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1 at 1.) 

The sole defendant in this action is BIE. (Id.) The BIE, as a federal agency, is part of the 

United States and is not a state actor. “[T]he United States itself is not a state actor and 

therefore does not come within the provisions of sections 1983 or 1985.” Psket v. U.S., 

Dep't of Justice-Organized Crime Strike Force, 41 F.3d 1513 (9th Cir. 1994); see also

Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 1983 is 

“applicable only to actions by state and local entities, not by the federal government”). 

Thus, § 1983 is not applicable to the BIE and Ms. Young has failed to state a valid claim 

under § 1983. 

 Ms. Young also requests attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). (Doc. 1 

at 3.) Section 1988 gives discretion to the Court to allow a prevailing party in a claim 

brought under § 1983 a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 

(West). Ms. Young’s claim for attorneys’ fees based on § 1988 requires her to be a 

prevailing party under her § 1983 claim. But, as discussed above, Ms. Young has failed 

to state a valid claim under § 1983. Thus, there is no possible basis in Ms. Young’s 

complaint for an award of attorney’s fees.

 B. Young Fails to State a Claim Under Bivens

In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff may recover damages that 

resulted from federal agents’ violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Bivens, 403 U.S. 

at 397. “[T]he Supreme Court has held that no Bivens remedy is available against a 

federal agency.” W. Radio Servs. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994)). Ms. Young contends that this 

action also arises under Bivens. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Ms. Young, however, does not explain how 

or why Bivens applies and has not filed a response to BIE’s Motion to Dismiss. 

 In the present case, BIE, a federal agency, is the sole defendant. Thus, Ms. Young 

has failed to state a claim under Bivens because no Bivens remedy is available against a 

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federal agency. 

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

 BIE contends that Ms. Young’s exclusive remedy for religious discrimination 

is under Title VII and that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a Title 

VII claim because Ms. Young failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. (Doc. 11 

at 5.) BIE cites to external evidence, (Doc. 12), in support of this argument. Absent 

specific exceptions, however, the Court will not consider evidence or documents 

beyond the complaint in the context of a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. See Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1990) 

(amended decision). When a party files affidavits and other evidence in support of a 

12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the Court may convert the motion to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 

motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Here, because Ms. Young has not 

brought any claims under Title VII, the Court need not consider the external evidence 

to determine whether she exhausted her administrative remedies. Because it is 

unnecessary to convert the Motion and because Ms. Young has not alleged any Title 

VII claim, this Court will not address BIE’s contention about lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11), 

is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action and enter 

judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 21st day of June, 2013. 

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