Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00037/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00037-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OLAF PETER JUDA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

RAYMOND D. ANDREWS, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________ )

CV F 05-0037 AWI WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DENYING AS

MOOT PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR RELEASE OF

DOCUMENTS 

[Doc. 21, 24]

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This case proceeds on Petitioner’s second amended

petition filed April 5, 2006. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss,

filed November 20, 2006. Petitioner opposes the motion.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief in his second amended petition. First,

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to resentencing under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005). Specifically, Petitioner argues that any sentence or punishment under the United

States Sentencing Guidelines is void, and that any defendant who received mandatory

enhancements under the guidelines is therefore “legally innocent of the enhancements.” 

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Petitioner argues that he is not bringing a traditional Booker claim, but is bringing a claim of

actual innocense. 

Ignoring the issue of whether Petitioner may properly proceed by way of this Section

2241 petition, the court finds this contention to be without merit. As Respondent argues, the

Ninth Circuit has held that “Booker does not apply retroactively to convictions that became

final prior to its publication.” United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1119-20 (9 Cir. 2005). th

Petitioner’s conviction became final on June 26, 1995, when the United States Supreme

Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. Juda v. United States, 515 U.S. 1169 (1995). 

Because Petitioner’s conviction became final before Booker was issued in 2005, Petitioner

cannot rely upon Booker to challenge his sentence. Although Petitioner attempts to recast his

contention as one of actual innocence so as to support a claim under § 2241, he cannot avoid

the fact that his argument is dependent upon the application of the ruling in Booker to his

case. Accordingly, the court finds that this claim provides no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Second, Petitioner contends that he is legally innocent of Count 4, arson on the high

seas in violation of 18 USC § 81, because the United States lacks jurisdiction to consider this

a chargeable offense. Petitioner claims that jurisdiction was premised on the allegation that

Petitioner owned the sailing vessel in question, and the fact that he is a United States citizen. 

He claims that jurisdiction was based on 18 U.S.C. § 7(1), which creates a special maritime

jurisdiction over vessels owned by U.S. nationals. He argues that no factual basis exists for

such maritime jurisdiction, because he never owned the sailing vessel. He also argues that

the United States has misused § 7(1), because the provision was intended by Congress to be

used as a shield to protect property owned by U.S. nationals, not as a sword for prosecution. 

Finally, Petitioner claims that the United States’ claim of jurisdiction through the nationality

of a person is insufficient for the United States to become the complaining party under

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. He argues that there must be another reason for claiming

that the individual has committed an offense against the United States, and that no such

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Respondent also argues that the court should deny the petition on the ground that the 1

matter is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Juda, C.A. No. 06-15386. 

However, that court entered an order on January 24, 2007, construing the motion for

reconsideration as a petition for panel rehearing and denying it. The mandate was issued on

February 1, 2007. Accordingly, this matter is no longer pending before the Ninth Circuit.

3

reason exists in this case. He claims that the United States suffered no injury by the

destruction of a vessel that was not owned by the United States or protected by the United

States. Finally, he states that his claim of actual innocence is based on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

In response, Respondent argues that both the Northern District and the Ninth Circuit

have already ruled against Petitioner on the issue of whether the district court had jurisdiction

over the arson count. Further, Respondent argues that because Petitioner could and did raise

the jurisdiction issue earlier in his § 2255 petitions, he is precluded from raising it in this §

2241 petition. 

1

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his

conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9 Cir.1988); th

Thompson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8 Cir.1983); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 th

(3 1997); Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5 Cir.1981). In such cases, only rd th

the sentencing court has jurisdiction. Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. A prisoner may not

collaterally attack a federal conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Grady v. United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9

th

Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162; see also United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 842 (5th

Cir.1980). 

A federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may seek relief under § 2241

if he can show that the remedy available under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the

validity of his detention." Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-5 (9 Cir.2000); United th

States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9 Cir.1997) (quoting § 2255). The Ninth Circuit has th

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recognized that it is a very narrow exception. Id; Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th

Cir.1999) (per curium) (holding that the AEDPA’s filing limitations on § 2255 Motions does

not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective); Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (a court’s

denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate.); Lorentsen v.

Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9 Cir. 2000) (same); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9 Cir.1988) (a th th

petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate);

Williams v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9 Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9 th th

Cir.1956); see, United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 (9 Cir. 2001) (procedural

th

requirements of § 2255 may not be circumvented by invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651). The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. 

Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9 Cir. 1963). th

Respondent relies on Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9 Cir. 2003), in which th

the Ninth Circuit addresses the standard for claims of actual innocence as follows:

We have not had occasion to decide when a claim of actual innocence entitles

a petitioner who is procedurally barred from filing a second or successive motion

under § 2255 to seek relief under § 2241. Our sister circuits, however, have held that

§ 2255 provides an “inadequate or ineffective” remedy (and thus that the petitioner

may proceed under § 2241) when the petitioner claims to be: (1) factually innocent of

the crime for which he has been convicted; and, (2) has never had an “unobstructed

procedural shot” at presenting this claim. See Lorentsen, 223 F.3d at 954; see also

Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 903 (5th Cir.2001); Wofford v. Scott,

177 F.3d 1236, 1244 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1999); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609-11

(7th Cir.1998); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir.1997); In re

Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.1997). In other words, it is not enough that the

petitioner is presently barred from raising his claim of innocence by motion under §

2255. He must never have had the opportunity to raise it by motion.

Petitioner acknowledges that “it is theoretically true that Juda could have argued in

his first § 2255 Motion that the facts showed him to be legally innocent.” Hoping, however,

to avoid application of the above standard, Petitioner argues that this ignores that the fact

that he has no legal training. Further, Petitioner argues that Ivy is not controlling because it

ignores the earlier Ninth Circuit decision in Carriger v. Steward, 132 F.3d 463, 477 (9 Cir. th

1997). 

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The court finds both of these arguments to be meritless. There is no Ninth Circuit

authority providing an exception to Ivy for untrained pro se litigants. Further, Ivy provides

the controlling Ninth Circuit authority in regard to whether § 2255 provides an “inadequate

or ineffective” remedy so as to allow a successive petitioner to proceed under § 2241. 

Petitioner does not have the option of relying on an earlier case. Accordingly, the court finds

that Petitioner has not carried his burden for seeking relief under § 2241 of showing that he

has never had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting this claim. Thus, he has not

shown that § 2255 provides an “inadequate or ineffective” remedy, and he may not now raise

this claim through § 2241. 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2) This petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 is DISMISSED;

3) Petitioner’s motion for release of P.S.R. and judgment and commitment documents

filed August 15, 2006, is DENIED as moot;

3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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