Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01118/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRISCILLA LOPEZ,

Movant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01118-BEN

 3:13-cr-04513-BEN-1

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT SENTENCE UNDER 

28 U.S.C. § 2255

Movant, Priscilla Lopez, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 

Correct her Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Respondent, the United States (“the 

government”), filed a response, opposing the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court DENIES Movant’s Motion.

BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2013, the government filed a one-count indictment charging 

Movant with violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)A(vii) and 846, Conspiracy to 

Possess with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances, and 21 U.S.C. § 853, Criminal 

Forfeiture. (Docket No. 1.)1 Movant entered into a plea agreement with the government, 

 

1 All docket citations refer to the criminal case docket, No. 13-cr-04513-BEN-1.

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in which she “waive[d], to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally 

attack the conviction and sentence, including any restitution order.” (Docket No. 46 at p. 

8.) Movant thereafter pleaded guilty and came before this Court for sentencing. (Docket 

Nos. 47, 55.) 

The parties agreed to jointly recommend Movant’s sentencing be based on the 

following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Base Offense Level, Specific Offense 

Characteristics, Adjustments, and Departures: 

1. Base Offense Level [USSG § 2D1.1(c)(11)] 26

2. Drugs into Jail [USSG § 2D1.1(b)(4)] +2

3. Acceptance of Responsibility [USSG § 3E1.1] -3

(Docket No. 46 at p. 6.) At sentencing, the government complied with the plea 

agreement by recommending the above Guideline calculations. (Docket No. 63.) The 

government further determined that these calculations produced an Adjusted Offense 

Level of 25, which in combination with Movant’s Criminal History Category of VI, 

produced a Guideline Range of 110 to 137 months’ custody. (Id.) The government 

additionally recommended a downward variance that was equivalent to a two-level 

reduction in the Base Offense Level in exchange for Movant’s agreement not to seek a 

further reduced sentence in the event the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were amended 

on November 1, 2014 to revise the Drug Quantity Table in USSG § 2D1.1(c). (Id.) This 

reduced the Guideline range to 92 to 115 months’ custody. (Id.) The government then

recommended Movant receive a sentence of 90 months’ custody. (Id.) 

Movant concurred with the government’s Guideline calculations, argued for a twolevel reduction in the Base Offense Level for alternative reasons, and likewise 

recommended a sentence of 90 months’ custody. (Docket Nos. 65, 66.) The Court

ultimately sentenced Movant to 90 months in custody and a term of supervised release of 

five years. (Docket Nos. 67, 70.)

On May 9, 2016, Movant filed the instant motion. (Docket No. 77.) Her filing is 

captioned as a “Modification/Reduction pursuant to Johnson 135 S. CT. 2563(2015) V. 

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United States & Welch V. United States 4B1.2(a)2, 4B1.1(a) & 4A1.2 Provision 

4A1.1(a), (b), (c) [sic].” (Id.) In essence, Movant argues she is entitled to a reduced 

sentence pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 

Ct. 2551 (2015) and Welch v. United States, 163 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).

LEGAL STANDARD

Under section 2255, a movant is entitled to relief if the sentence: (1) was imposed 

in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) was given by a court 

without jurisdiction to do so; (3) was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by 

law; or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. 

Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1230 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). If it is clear the movant has failed to 

state a claim, or has “no more than conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts and 

refuted by the record,” a district court may deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary 

hearing. United States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1986).

DISCUSSION2

Movant’s motion fails because she validly waived her right to collaterally attack 

her sentence. The record discloses no issues as to the voluntariness of Movant’s plea. 

And, contrary to her contentions, her sentence was not unconstitutionally enhanced under 

Johnson or Welch. In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered language in the Armed 

Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 

15 years for a defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and “has three previous 

convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both.” 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Supreme Court examined the definition of “violent felony” and 

held that a portion of that definition known as the “residual clause” is void for vagueness. 

Imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the definition of “violent 

felony” violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The 

 

2 The Court determines there is no need for an evidentiary hearing.

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Supreme Court expressly confined its holding to this particular portion of the statute and 

confirmed that its holding does not apply to the “serious drug offense” clause or the 

remainder of the “violent felony” definition. Id.

In Welch, the Supreme Court considered whether Johnson was a substantive 

decision that is retroactive in cases on collateral review, 194 S. Ct. at 1261, and 

concluded that it was, id. at 1265. 

However, neither Johnson nor Welch are applicable because Movant was not 

sentenced under the residual clause of the violent felony definition of the ACCA. See 

United States v. Ruiz-Diaz, 668 F. App’x 289, 290 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Because the 

[sentencing] enhancement was not predicated on a residual clause like the one struck 

down in Johnson, there is no arguable issue as to whether [defendant’s] sentence is 

illegal.”). Rather, she was sentenced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 and USSG 

2D1.1, which were not implicated by Johnson. See United States v. Padilla, No. 2:10-

CR-00454-CAS, 2017 WL 962756, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (finding Johnson

inapplicable to petitioner’s § 2255 petition because petitioner’s “sentence was not based 

upon any guidelines that might have been implicated by Johnson.”).

Movant’s motion may be construed as challenging the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

as unconstitutionally vague based on the same reasoning as Johnson.

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 (See generally

Docket 77) (asserting her prior offenses fell within the “Residual Clause” discussed in 

Johnson and thus the Court should now modify her sentence under the Guidelines 

without considering those prior offenses.) However, the Supreme Court rejected such an 

argument in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), holding that the federal 

sentencing guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the due process 

clause. Id. at 890, 892, 895.

 

3 Movant’s motion is not entirely coherent, but this inference of an underlying 

challenge to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines constitutes the Court’s best effort to 

understand her arguments.

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As there are no arguable grounds as to whether Movant’s sentence is illegal, the 

Court enforces the collateral attack waiver. Ruiz-Diaz, 668 F. App’x at 290 (citing 

United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2009)). Alternatively, Movant’s 

motion is denied on the merits. 

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence is DENIED.

A court may issue a certificate of appealability where the movant has made a 

“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and reasonable jurists could 

debate whether the motion should have been resolved differently, or that the issues 

presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 335 (2003). This Court finds that Movant has not made the necessary showing. A 

certificate of appealability is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2018

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