Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03348/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03348-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

E.J. MCELROY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADAM, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-03348-YGR (PR)

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND 

SERVICE; DISMISSING CERTAIN 

CLAIMS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO 

FILING IN EASTERN DISTRICT; AND 

ADDRESSING PLAINTIFF’S PENDING 

MOTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJDCF”), filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

prison officials at two different institutions. His motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) has been granted. He also filed the following motions: a request for appointment of 

counsel (dkt. 1 at 5); a motion for a preliminary injunction (dkt. 5); and a motion entitled, “Motion 

for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Seeking 30-day Enlargement of Time to File IFP Form; 

Requesting Sanctions in the Form of Constitutional Repair & Restoring & Unhanding All Legal 

Necessities of[] Defendants” (dkt. 11).

Specifically, Plaintiff’s action involves allegations against Defendants at Pelican Bay State 

Prison (“PBSP”) and California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). Because the acts complained of 

with respect to Defendants at CHCF occurred in San Joaquin County, which lies within the venue 

of the Eastern District of California, see 28 U.S.C. § 84(b), venue properly lies in that district and 

not in this one. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Accordingly, the claims arising at CHCF are 

DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling them in a new civil rights action in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of California.1 See In re Hall, 939 F.2d 802, 804 (9th 

 

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Plaintiff sues several Doe Defendants at CHCF, whose names he intends to learn through 

discovery. Dkt. 1 at 2-3. The use of Doe Defendants is not favored in the Ninth Circuit. See 

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Should Plaintiff learn these Doe 

Defendants’ identities through discovery, Plaintiff should add them as named defendants when 

filing the Eastern District action. See Brass v. Cnty. of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 

2003).

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Cir. 1991) (dismissal on venue grounds without prejudice).

In his complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants who are either at PBSP or 

employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)2: PBSP 

“P.A.C. [Physician Assistant, Certified] or other R.N. [Registered Nurse] Doctor Adam”; CDCR 

Secretary Scott Kernan; as well as several Doe Defendants, including (1) PBSP “Chief Medical 

Officer Doe,” (2) PBSP “Medical Dept. Does and Dental Dept. CDCR Agenc[ies] contracted to 

provide individual[ized] effective health care,” (3) “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S. [Doctor of Dental 

Surgery],” (4) PBSP “Medical Supervisor,” and (5) “7-10 Does” who are PBSP “Medical Record 

Analysts.” Dkt. 1 at 2-3. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Injunctive Relief Claims

As mentioned above, Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and monetary damages. The 

 

2 Because the claims arising at CHCF have been dismissed without prejudice from this 

action, the Court will not include any named Defendants who are at CHCF. 

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jurisdiction of the federal courts depends on the existence of a “case or controversy” under Article 

III of the Constitution. PUC v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim is 

considered moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy, and if no effective relief 

can be granted: “Where the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by developments 

subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 

U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Where injunctive relief is involved, questions of mootness are determined in 

light of the present circumstances. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). 

When an inmate has been transferred to another prison and there is no reasonable 

expectation nor demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions 

from which he seeks injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot. 

See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995). A claim that the inmate might be retransferred to the prison where the injury occurred is too speculative to overcome mootness. Id. 

When Plaintiff filed his prior action, he was incarcerated at the CHCF. Plaintiff sought 

injunctive relief to remedy his alleged injuries stemming from various constitutional violations at 

CHCF and PBSP. As mentioned above, all claims related to his incarceration at CDCF had been 

dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling them in a new civil rights action in the Eastern 

District. The record shows that he has since been transferred to RJDCF. Because Plaintiff is no 

longer incarcerated at either CHCF or PBSP, his claims for injunctive relief—specifically such 

claims based on his confinement at PBSP—are DISMISSED as moot. The Court proceeds to 

review Plaintiff’s remaining claims for monetary damages. 

2. Claims for Monetary Damages

a. Eighth Amendment Claim

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs amounts to the cruel and 

unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 

F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only 

when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, 

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and (2) the official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

It seems that Plaintiff claims that he was not provided with adequate medical and dental 

care at PBSP, stating as follows:

Prior to [PBSP] adverse transfer (July 2016) claimant was 

given a bonafide initial medical plan that discovered several or 

several more painful injuries and symptoms that tie in to injuries that 

were being disregarded at PBSP. . . .

Being adversely transfer[ed] to [PBSP] a second time didn’t 

make any symptoms better nor manageable and did cause several 

allergen outbreaks from what the Plaintiff did have allergic reaction 

in general . . . being more specific Plaintiff instantly “suffered 

gum/tooth pain,” inability to chew, “loud funk,” “ab[sc]ess ,” 

“cavity” “infection,” tongue inflammation, blisters, bleeding 

“pustules” and “painful swelling” on gums and tongue, “abdominal 

pain,” nausea, trouble swallowing, “flaring” and “burning” etc. etc. 

. . . [T]he PBSP Defendants allowed the same issues to 

rebuild as God-awful as the[y] were . . . claimant re-complained ever 

since, claimant wrote “Employee Misconduct Complaint” directly to 

the Chief Medical Officers at PBSP and CHCF and 1824 Special 

Accommodation request forms at least twice also.

Dkt. 1 at 6. Plaintiff has linked his claim to Defendants Adam and “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.,” and 

the Court notes that Plaintiff refers to these Defendants in one portion of the complaint as follows:

Not only has claimant made out several grievances, he also 

has usually made it plain and simple of his needs with 7362 request 

for medical services at [PBSP] and at CHCF prisons to medical 

nurses, Assistants Adam [from PBSP] and Youssef [from CHCF] or 

B Yard CHCF Medical Doctor (to no avail) to get before a bonafide 

dental specialist . . . at PBSP between September and January 2016 

and since July 18-22, 2016 Plaintiff has had no real medical 

awareness, alerts, nor proper treatment . . . (discriminatively) despite 

a bonafide medical facility that the state department recognizes . . . 

has made initial medical recommendations and prescriptions that 

specifically prevent defect . . . .

The Medical (“Olsen”) Record has since been withheld from 

claimant/proprietor of timeliness . . . those PBSP Defendants DDS 

and Does and Dental Assistant Phang [from CHCF] have recklessly 

been indifferent every time Plaintiff brought his dental injury to 

their attention. . . .

Id. at 8. These allegations above, liberally construed, state a claim of deliberate indifference 

against Defendants Adam and “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.” However, regarding “PBSP Doe . . . 

D.D.S.,” it is evident that Plaintiff does not know this Defendant’s name. Id. at 3, 8. Again, 

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although the use of “John Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored in the Ninth Circuit, see 

Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642, situations may arise where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be 

known prior to the filing of a complaint. In such circumstances, the plaintiff should be given an 

opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery 

would not uncover their identities or that the complaint should be dismissed on other grounds. See 

id.; Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Plaintiff must provide to the 

Court the name of Defendant “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.” by the date scheduled in this Order for any 

served Defendant to file a dispositive motion. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of 

Defendant “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.” without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a new action against him or 

her. 

Lastly, Plaintiff names the following Defendant groups: PBSP “Medical Dept. Does and 

Dental Dept. CDCR Agenc[ies] contracted to provide individual[ized] effective health care” and 

“7-10 Does” who are PBSP “Medical Record Analysts.” Dkt. 1 at 2-3. A defendant cannot be 

held liable simply based on his membership in a group without showing his individual 

participation in unlawful conduct. Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996). Either 

personal involvement or integral participation of each defendant in the alleged constitutional 

violation is required before liability may be imposed. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 936 

(9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff cannot name the aforementioned Defendants without naming and linking 

specifically each PBSP employee to his claim Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, any claims 

against the Defendant groups of PBSP “Medical Dept. Does and Dental Dept. CDCR Agenc[ies] 

contracted to provide individual[ized] effective health care” and “7-10 Does” who are PBSP 

“Medical Record Analysts” (as opposed to individually named PBSP employees) are

DISMISSED. 

b. Supervisory Liability Claim

Plaintiff sues the following Defendants in their supervisory capacity: Defendant Kernan;

PBSP “Chief Medical Officer Doe”; and PBSP “Medical Supervisor.” Again, as mentioned 

above, the use of “John Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored in the Ninth Circuit. See 

Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating the 

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aforementioned Defendants violated his federal rights, but seems to claim that these Defendants 

are liable based on the conduct of their subordinates, Defendant Adam and “PBSP Doe . . . 

D.D.S.” There is, however, no respondeat superior liability under section 1983 solely because a 

defendant is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor generally “is only liable for constitutional violations of 

his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. A supervisor may also be held liable if he or she 

implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights 

and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 

1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Because there is no vicarious liability under section 1983 

and Plaintiff does not include allegations showing that the aforementioned Defendants were 

personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants

are therefore DISMISSED without prejudice.

C. Pending Motions 

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel. Dkt. 1 at 5. The motion is DENIED without 

prejudice for lack of exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 

390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997); 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 

1331 (9th Cir. 1986). This denial is without prejudice to the Court’s sua sponte appointment of 

counsel at a future date should the circumstances of this case warrant such appointment.

Plaintiff also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Dkt. 5. Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 65 sets forth the procedure for issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary 

restraining order (“TRO”). Prior to granting a preliminary injunction, notice to the adverse party 

is required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). Therefore, a motion for preliminary injunction cannot be 

decided until the parties to the action are served. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 

1983). A TRO may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or that party’s

attorney only if: (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified 

complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before 

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the adverse party or the party’s attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant’s 

attorney certifies in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give notice and the 

reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The 

motion is DENIED because the parties to this action have not yet been served, and Plaintiff has 

failed to satisfy either of the criteria under Rule 65(b) for granting a TRO without notice to the 

adverse parties. Id.

Finally, Plaintiff has filed a motion entitled, “Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis Seeking 30-day Enlargement of Time to File IFP Form; Requesting Sanctions in the 

Form of Constitutional Repair & Restoring & Unhanding All Legal Necessities of[] Defendants.” 

Dkt. 11. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP has already been 

granted. See Dkt. 9. Therefore, the Court DENIES as moot any request for an extension of time 

to file supporting documents to his IFP application. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief or 

“sanctions” for any alleged constitutional violations stemming from his incarceration at CHCF, 

which is where he was incarcerated when he drafted the aforementioned motion, the Court 

DENIES his request without prejudice to raising it when he files his new civil action in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of California. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons state above, the Court orders as follows: 

1. All claims arising at CHCF are DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling 

them in a new civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

California. The Clerk of the Court shall forward to the Eastern District: (1) a copy of this Order; 

and (2) a copy of the complaint filed in this action (dkt. 1). 

2. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief based on his confinement at PBSP are 

DISMISSED as moot. 

3. Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant 

Adam and “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.” Plaintiff must provide to the Court the name of Defendant

“PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.” by the dispositive motion due date indicated below. Failure to do so will 

result in dismissal of Defendant “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.” without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a new 

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action against him or her. 

4. Any claims against the Defendant groups of PBSP “Medical Dept. Does and Dental 

Dept. CDCR Agenc[ies] contracted to provide individual[ized] effective health care” and “7-10 

Does” who are PBSP “Medical Record Analysts” (as opposed to individually named PBSP 

employees) are DISMISSED. 

5. Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Defendant Kernan, PBSP “Chief 

Medical Officer Doe,” and PBSP “Medical Supervisor” are DISMISSED without prejudice.

6. The Clerk shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of 

Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint, (dkt. 1), all 

attachments thereto, and a copy of this Order upon Defendant “P.A.C. [Physician Assistant, 

Certified] or other R.N. [Registered Nurse] Doctor Adam” at Pelican Bay State Prison. The 

Clerk shall also mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. As mentioned above, Plaintiff has also 

alleged cognizable Eighth Amendment claim again Defendant “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.,” but that 

Defendant will be served after Plaintiff provide the Court with a full name. Nonetheless, both 

Defendants Adam and “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.” (after he or she is served) shall follow the 

instructions below.

7. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on 

behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the 

cost of such service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and return the waiver 

form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date 

that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required 

to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver 

was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 

summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the 

waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 

service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before 

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Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on 

which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed, 

whichever is later. 

8. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date their answer is due, Defendants 

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be 

supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary 

judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 

and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which 

Defendants’ motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given

to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment 

by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for 

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a 

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 

be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact -- that is, 

if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result 

of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a 

party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is 

properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you 

cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must 

set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 

56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations 

and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material 

fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, 

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If 

summary judgment is granted [in favor of the defendants], your case 

will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

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Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment must come forward 

with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). 

Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the burden of proving his allegations in this case, he 

must be prepared to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files his opposition 

to Defendants’ dispositive motion. Such evidence may include sworn declarations from himself 

and other witnesses to the incident, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn declaration. 

Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment simply by repeating the allegations of his 

complaint.

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the 

date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.

9. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to 

depose Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

10. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants, or 

Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 

Defendants or Defendants’ counsel.

11. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

12. Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be 

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granted provided they are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend.

13. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is DENIED. Dkt. 1 at 5. 

14. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED without prejudice. Dkt. 

5.

15. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Seeking 30-day 

Enlargement of Time to File IFP Form; Requesting Sanctions in the Form of Constitutional Repair 

& Restoring & Unhanding All Legal Necessities of[] Defendants” is DENIED. Dkt. 11. 

16. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 5 and 11.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

February 23, 2018

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