Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00807/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00807-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HEATHER SUIT, ERIC SUIT, 

individually and as Guardian 

ad Litem for BRAELYN SUIT, a 

minor,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FOLSOM, FOLSOM POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, OFFICER KRACHER, 

STEVE CARSON, and DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:16-00807 WBS AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Heather and Eric Suit and their minor 

daughter filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a car 

accident that resulted from defendant Officer Kracher’s pursuit 

of defendant Steve Carson. Defendants City of Folsom (“the 

City”), Folsom Police Department (“the Department”), and Officer 

Kracher now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

Case 2:16-cv-00807-WBS-AC Document 23 Filed 11/15/16 Page 1 of 10
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granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On October 26, 2015, Heather Suit was driving her minor 

daughter to school in Folsom, California. (Second Am. Compl. 

(“SAC”) ¶ 23 (Docket No. 16).) While they were on the road, 

Officer Kracher allegedly engaged in a vehicle pursuit of Carson 

because he suspected Carson of having committed a “non-violent 

‘cold’” misdemeanor. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.) Carson allegedly was 

“driving lawfully” before the pursuit and began driving “in a 

reckless manner” once Officer Kracher initiated the stop. (Id.

¶¶ 26, 32.) Plaintiffs allege that during the chase, Carson 

collided with another bystander’s vehicle and subsequently 

collided with plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 37, 55.)

Plaintiffs initiated this action based on the injuries 

they incurred when Carson hit their vehicle. After amending 

their Complaint in response to defendants’ first motion to 

dismiss, plaintiffs alleged five claims in their First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”): (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Officer 

Kracher for violations of plaintiffs’ due process rights under 

the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) Monell claim under § 1983 against 

the City; (3) “supervisorial liability” claim under § 1983 

against the City and the Department; (4) negligence claim against 

the City, the Department, and Carson; and (5) loss of consortium 

claim by Eric Suit against all defendants. On August 8, 2016, 

the court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims (“August 8 Order”). 

(Aug. 8, 2016 Order (“Aug. 8 Order”) 11:16-19 (Docket No. 15.).)

Plaintiffs filed their SAC on August 26, 2016, 

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asserting the same claims as in the FAC and adding the City and 

the Department to plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim under 

§ 1983. (SAC at 6-14.) The City, the Department, and Officer 

Kracher now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ SAC for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

II. Discussion

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) 

(citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice,” and “the tenant that a court must accept as true all of 

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 

conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Where a complaint pleads facts 

that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

entitlement to relief.” Id. (citation omitted). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

A. Section 1983 Claims

In relevant part, § 1983 provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . 

. . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other 

proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any 

person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of 

federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory 

rights. Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

In their initial Complaint, plaintiffs alleged 

violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from

unreasonable seizures. Plaintiffs abandoned that theory in their 

FAC and SAC and instead allege only substantive due process 

violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally County 

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (holding that an 

officer’s collision into a motorcycle on which plaintiff was 

riding did not give rise to a cognizable Fourth Amendment 

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violation because a “seizure” requires “a governmental 

termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally 

applied”).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

“guarante[es] more than fair process” and extends to “a 

substantive sphere as well, ‘barring certain government actions 

regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 

them.’” Id. at 844. “The touchstone of due process is 

protection of the individual against arbitrary action of 

government,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), and 

“only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be 

‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense,’” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 

(quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 

(1992)). Official conduct rises to this level only if it “shocks 

the conscience.” Id.

“Where actual deliberation is practical, then an 

officer’s ‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the 

conscience.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 

2010). “On the other hand, where a law enforcement officer makes 

a snap judgment because of an escalating situation, his conduct 

may only be found to shock the conscience if he acts with a 

purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement 

objectives.” Id. The deliberate indifference standard

categorically does not apply to high-speed police chases, even 

though an officer could deliberate while accelerating after a 

suspect. Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 

2008). Instead, a plaintiff must allege that a law enforcement 

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officer on a high-speech chase acted with an intent to harm the 

suspect or bystanders. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854 (“[H]igh-speed

chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or worsen their 

legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, redressible by an action under § 1983.”); Bingue v. 

Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Lewis requires 

[the court] to apply the ‘intent to harm’ standard to all highspeed chases.”).

In the court’s August 8 Order, the court found 

plaintiffs’ FAC did not allege sufficient facts to give rise to 

the inference that Officer Kracher acted with the intent to harm 

bystanders. (Aug. 8 Order 7:27-8:4.) The FAC did “not even 

allege the legal conclusion that Officer Kracher continued his 

pursuit of Carson with an intent or purpose to cause harm to 

plaintiffs.” (Id. 7:24-27.) The SAC fails for much of the same 

reasons.

Plaintiffs have added new allegations relating to 

Officer Kracher’s deliberation prior to the pursuit, his 

awareness of the high traffic location of the pursuit, and time 

period the pursuit would occur during. (SAC ¶¶ 29-30, 39, 44, 

50-52.) Even though plaintiffs now allege Officer Kracher 

deliberated for several minutes prior to pursuing Carson, (id. ¶ 

31), this is not enough to satisfy Ninth Circuit precedent that 

holds the intent to harm standard applies to all high-speed 

chases, Bingue, 512 F.3d at 1177. Plaintiffs allege defendants 

were deliberately indifferent to nearby bystanders and “were 

further aware and appreciated the fact that [there would be a 

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dangerous pursuit] due to the probable pursuit taking place 

through residential and school zones.” (SAC ¶¶ 30-31.) 

Allegations that the officer acted negligently, recklessly and 

carelessly, grossly negligent, or in a conscious disregard of 

plaintiffs’ rights does not rise to the level of intent or 

purpose to cause harm. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854; accord Bingue, 

512 F.3d at 1174. 

The SAC also contains several new allegations that 

Officer Kracher had Carson’s contact information, residence 

address, vehicle information, and physical description and 

Officer Kracher could later safely apprehend Carson. (SAC ¶¶ 28, 

31, 39, 44.) An officer has a legitimate law enforcement 

objective in pursuing a fleeing suspect until the officer 

apprehends the suspect. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 385 

(2007) (“But wait, says respondent: Couldn’t the innocent public 

equally have been protected and the tragic accident entirely 

avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pursuit? We think 

the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the 

best. . . . First of all, there would have been no way to convey 

convincingly to respondent that the chase was off, and that he 

was free to go. . . . Second, we are loath to lay down a rule 

requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away 

whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s 

lives in danger.”); Onossian v. Block, 175 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“[I]f a police officer is justified in giving chase, 

that justification insulates the officer from constitutional 

attack, irrespective of who might be harmed or killed as a 

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consequence of the chase.”); (see also Aug. 8 Order 9:8-10.) The 

SAC alleges that Carson was suspected of a “non-violent ‘cold’ 

crime,” and plaintiffs do not cite a single case suggesting that 

Officer Kracher lacked authority to pursue or stop Carson at that 

time. (See SAC ¶ 25.) Any allegations regarding Officer 

Kracher’s ability to later apprehend Carson are thus irrelevant

to the current inquiry.

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Officer Kracher, 

the City, or the Department acted with the purpose to harm 

plaintiffs. Because the SAC lacks even a single factual 

allegation from which the court could reasonably infer that 

Officer Kracher acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to a 

legitimate law enforcement objective, plaintiffs fail to allege a 

cognizable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment necessary to 

sustain a § 1983 claim against Officer Kracher, the City, and the 

Department. In the absence of an underlying constitutional 

violation, plaintiffs’ Monell and “supervisorial liability” 

claims again fail. See Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 

1021 (9th Cir. 2010); Patel v. Maricopa County, 585 Fed. App’x 

452, 452 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Defendants request that the court dismiss each of 

plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

(Defs.’ Reply at 2:16-20 (Docket No. 21).) Generally, a court 

should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[A] district court need not grant 

leave to amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing 

party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in 

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litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. 

Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). In the 

third iteration of their complaint, plaintiffs have failed to 

allege facts that address, let alone remedy, the concerns 

expressly noted in the court’s August 8 Order. The plaintiffs 

only needed to allege facts indicating Officer Kracher acted with 

the intent to cause harm to plaintiffs, but they failed to do so. 

To give plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint again after 

their SAC failed to address the issues raised by the court would 

constitute undue delay and prejudice to defendants. Accordingly, 

the court will dismiss all of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims with 

prejudice.

B. State Law Claims

“[The court] may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it] has dismissed all 

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(c)(3). Because plaintiffs fail to allege a cognizable 

federal claim and the SAC relies on allegations of negligence 

under state law, the court declines to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims. See Sanford v. 

MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the 

usual case in which all federal law claims are eliminated before 

trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 

jurisdiction doctrine . . . point toward declining to exercise 

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” (citation 

omitted)). The court also has discretion to consider sua sponte 

whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction in the 

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absence of a motion to dismiss, Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 

114 F.3d 999, 1003 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), and declines to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law 

claims against Carson.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint be, and the same 

hereby is, GRANTED and all claims against all defendants are 

dismissed. Plaintiffs’ federal law claims are DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

Dated: November 14, 2016

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