Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01866/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01866-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald Lee Morales, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Lane Blair, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-1866-PHX-FJM (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

This case comes before the court on a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. #1). In lieu of a Response, Respondents filed a Motion

to Dismiss or Stay and Abey the Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus For Lack of Exhaustion

with Available State Court Remedies (hereinafter, "Motion to Dismiss") (Doc. #15).

Petitioner has filed a Response, titled as "Reply to Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Abey.

Request Exception to the Exhaust Doctrine" (hereinafter, "Response") (Doc. #17), and

Respondents have filed a Reply (Doc. #18).

BACKGROUND

Ronald Morales filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254

on July 31, 2006. Therein he raises three claims relating to his plea and sentencing in state

court. The relevant procedural facts are as follows: on September 15, 1999, Petitioner

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entered a change of plea to an Indictment in the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Motion

to Dismiss, at. 47-48.) He pled guilty to three felony counts: Count I, Illegally Conducting

an Enterprise, Count II, Conspiracy to Sell or Transport Narcotic Drugs, and Count III,

Attempted Possession for Sale of Narcotic Drugs. The plea agreement contained a

stipulation to a ten (10) year prison term on Count II, and a deferred sentence of probation

on Counts I and III, to commence upon his release from imprisonment. He was sentenced

on October 25, 1999, to 10 years of imprisonment on Count II, and probation on Counts I and

III, to commence upon his release from confinement on Count II. (Motion to Dismiss, at 22-

23.) Petitioner's sentence, therefore, was consistent with the stipulations contained in the

plea agreement.

Petitioner's three claims before this Court can be summarized as follows: as Claim I,

Petitioner argues that the imposition of probation to run consecutive to his prison sentence

violated the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and its prohibition against

multiple prosecutions or punishment. In Petitioner's Claim II, he argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his

plea of guilty was involuntary. Both of these claims were presented by Petitioner in a Rule

32 post-conviction proceeding, and when denied, presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals

in a Petition for Review. After that was summarily denied, Petitioner sought, and was denied

review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Petitioner's third grounds for relief, set forth in Claim III, is that his sentence violated

his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury find the existence of any particular fact that the law

makes essential to punishment. Because his stipulated sentence of ten (10) years was an

aggravated sentence under Arizona law, the sentencing judge necessarily had to find one or

more aggravating factors to justify the imposition of that sentence. Petitioner argues that

because some of the aggravating facts listed by the sentencing judge as supporting the

sentence were facts not found by a jury or admitted by him, those findings violated his rights

under the Sixth Amendment. Petitioner did not raise this issue in his first Rule 32 petition

before the state court, because his claim was based upon the United States Supreme Court

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decision Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 396 (2004). He raised this "Blakely" issue by filing

a motion to reopen his Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court. That Petition had

just been denied by the Court ten (10) days earlier, on May 25, 2005. His Motion to Reopen

was denied, and he subsequently filed a second Rule 32 petition, raising this Blakely claim.

That petition was denied, and is pending review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner

is due to be released from state prison on May 17, 2007 (Exhibit G, Reply.).

In Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, they assert that the habeas petition should be

dismissed as a "mixed petition" because Petitioner's Claim III is not exhausted; in the

alternative, Respondents requests that the Court enter an order that stays and abeys the

petition until the Arizona appellate court has concluded its review of the denial of Petitioner's

second Rule 32 petition. In Petitioner's Response, he does not dispute that Claim III is

pending in the Arizona appellate court, and is therefore not exhausted, but asks the court to

deny the request to either dismiss or stay and abey his petition. He argues, essentially, that

his petition should be exempt from the exhaustion requirement because he was diligent in the

prosecution of the claim, and the fact that the claim was not exhausted by the time of his

filing of his petition was the fault of the Arizona Court of Appeals. In their Reply,

Respondents dispute Petitioner's claim that he has been diligent or that the Court of Appeals

is responsible for the delay, and request that the mixed-petition not be ordered exempt from

the exhaustion requirement. 

DISCUSSION

A federal district court may dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus containing

any claims that have not been exhausted, a so-called "mixed-petition," in the state courts.

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). Upon dismissal, it is appropriate to instruct the

petitioner "that upon his return to federal court he bring only exhausted claims." Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000) Confirming the dictates of Slack, the U.S. Supreme

Court has recently held that if petitioner then returns with a fully exhausted petition, the

second petition "would not confront the 'second or successive' bar." Burton v. Stewart, 127

S.Ct. 793, 798 (2007). There is no dispute here that a mixed-petition is at issue in this case.

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Respondent asks in the alternative to dismissal, that the court consider entering an

order staying the proceedings until Petitioner has exhausted his claim. Petitioner objects to

both a dismissal and the stay request. The court has discretion to grant a stay if a petitioner

can demonstrate good cause for failing to exhaust his claims, that the unexhausted claims are

potentially meritorious, and that there is no evidence that petitioner is intentionally delaying

the proceedings. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). Petitioner makes no such

showing; in fact, he objects to a stay. Respondents set forth in great detail in their Reply,

facts which demonstrate that Petitioner does not have good cause for failing to exhaust his

claims. The United States Supreme Court decided Blakely on June 24, 2004. Petitioner's first

Rule 32 petition was pending before the Arizona Court of Appeals at that time. Petitioner

did not raise the Blakely issue until nearly a year later, on June 2, 2005, when he filed a

Motion to Re-Open his Appeal. At that time, however, his Petition for Review had already

been denied. (Reply at 3-4.) 

Neither party addresses the merits of claim III; the order by the trial court denying

the second Rule 32 petition reads, in part, as follows:

IT IS ORDERED dismissing the petition.

This Order is based upon the following findings:

1. The Defendant has failed to show any colorable claim entitling him to

post-conviction relief.

2. Because the Defendant raises his Blakely claim in a second Rule 32 

petition filed on August 30, 2005, after his conviction had become 

"final" under the reasoning of State v. Ward, __Ariz.___, 118 P.3d 1122

(App. 2005), his case falls within the purview of authority holding that

Blakely does not have retroactive effect on collateral review.

3. Even assuming that Blakely could be applied retroactively to the 

Defendant's case, the Defendant has not demonstrated that the Court's

finding of aggravating factors did not constitute fundamental error 

resulting in prejudice.

4. Once a Jury finds or a Defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the

Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and consider 

additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the 

maximum prescribed in that statute. State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578,

115 P.3d 618 (2005). Here the Defendant stipulated to a 10-year prison

term on Count 2 and thereby explicitly and voluntarily agreed and 

exposed himself to that sentence. Additionally, no Sixth Amendment

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violation occurred because the Court found at least one aggravating 

factor that was either Blakely-exempt (prior felony convictions) or 

Blakely-compliant (presence of accomplices and commission of the 

conspiracy for pecuniary gain established through the Defendant's guilty

pleas to Counts 1,2, and 3; amount of drugs involved and the 

Defendant's probation status established through the Defendant's 

admissions during the change of plea and sentencing hearings).

5. Even assuming that none of the aggravating factors satisfy Blakely, the

Defendant has not shown that no reasonable Jury could have found the

existence of at least one aggravating factor based upon the facts in the

record. 

(Motion to Dismiss, at 90-91.)

A case attached by Petitioner, as Exhibit F, to his Response, State v. Martinez, 209

Ariz. 280 (Ariz.Ct.App.2004), supports the trial judge's conclusions. The Arizona State

Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, in part:

The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt, or

a defendant admit, any fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to

establish the range within which a judge may sentence the defendant. If,

however, additional facts are relevant merely to the exercise of a judge's

discretion in determining the specific sentence to impose on a defendant within

a given statutory sentencing range, the Sixth Amendment permits the judge to

find those facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Under 1. A.R.S. §13-702,

the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes a defendant to an

aggravated sentence. Therefore, once a jury finds or a defendant admits a

single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge

to find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence

up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.

State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 528, 585 (2005), cert den. Martinez v. Arizona, 126 S.Ct. 762

(Nov. 28, 2005).

A stay in this case is not warranted under the facts and applicable law in this case. For

the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that Respondents' Motion to Dismiss be

granted and that the request in the alternative to stay and abey be denied.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED: 

That the Motion to Dismiss or Stay the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.#15)

be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART: that the request for a stay be DENIED,

and that the Petition be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and that Petitioner be

ordered that upon return to federal court, he present only exhausted claims.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

DATED this 11th day of May, 2007.

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