Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00752/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00752-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332ed Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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b

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN RAYMOND WHITE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-00752-BAS-AGS

ORDER: 

(1)GRANTING DEFENDANT

HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 30];

(2)DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH PREJUDICE

[ECF No. 1 Ex. A];

(3)DIRECTING ENTRY OF 

FINAL JUDGMENT 

PURSUANT TO RULE 58; 

AND

(4)CLOSING CASE

v.

HOME DEPOT U.S.A. INC.,

Defendant.

This case concerns Plaintiff Stephen White’s (“White”) April 9, 2015 

termination from his position as a Customer Order Specialist (“COS”) by Defendant 

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Home Depot”) after some 24 years of employment. 

White contends that Home Depot terminated him because of his age in violation of 

California anti-discrimination law. White raises several other claims concerning his 

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tenure with Home Depot, including harassment based on age, retaliation, wrongful 

termination, defamation, and violations of California labor law. Home Depot now 

moves for summary judgment on all claims or, in the alternative, partial summary 

judgment. (ECF Nos. 30, 53.) White opposes. (ECF No. 42.) 

The Court provided the parties with its tentative ruling to grant Home Depot’s 

motion in full and held oral argument on the motion. (ECF Nos. 57, 63.) For the 

reasons herein, the Court: (1) grants Home Depot’s motion for summary judgment in 

its entirety, (2) dismisses with prejudice White’s claims in his Complaint, (3) directs

entry of final judgment in favor of Home Depot, and (4) closes this case.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND1

Home Depot hired White on June 17, 1991. (ECF No. 54 Joint Statement of 

Undisputed Facts2(“JSUF”) ¶ 1; ECF No. 45-1 Marie Mirch (“M. Mirch”) Decl. ¶ 5 

 

1 The Court relies on the parties’ joint statement of undisputed material facts to outline the 

relevant background as well as the parties’ summary judgment submissions, as appropriate. Home 

Depot has raised evidentiary objections to many of White’s submissions. However, it is 

unnecessary to expressly rule on many of the objections because they would not alter the Court’s 

resolution of the summary judgment motion. However, “to the extent that the Court relied on 

objected-to evidence, it relied only on admissible evidence and, therefore, the objections are 

overruled.” Capitol Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1200 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 

2010). To the extent it is necessary to address evidentiary objections, the Court does so as part of 

its analysis of the parties’ arguments.

2

In an attempt to comply with this Court’s Standing Order for civil cases, Home Depot 

filed a proposed joint statement of undisputed material facts with its reply in support of its motion 

for summary judgment on October 15, 2018. (ECF No. 53-2.) Home Depot expressly noted that 

although its counsel had conferred with Marie Mirch, one of White’s attorneys, about the need to 

file such a joint statement with the reply brief, she had not responded to Home Depot’s proposed 

joint statement by the time Home Depot’s reply brief was due. (ECF No. 53-1 James T. Conley 

Decl. ¶ 6; ECF No. 53-2 at 1 n.1.) Two days later, the Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts was 

filed and electronically signed by counsel for all parties, including Marie Mirch for herself and 

Kevin Mirch on behalf of White. (ECF No. 54.) The JSUF outlines undisputed facts, which are 

all supported by citations to record evidence, including White’s own deposition testimony. (Id.) 

The JSUF is plainly not the same as the earlier draft submitted by Home Depot. (Compare ECF 

No. 53-2 (identifying 81 undisputed facts) with ECF No. 54 (identifying 61 undisputed facts).) 

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Ex. 1.) During his entire tenure with Home Depot, White was always over 40 years 

old. (JSUF ¶ 25; White Dep. at 26:01–03 (White “had just turned 40” before his 

1991 hire).) After nearly twenty years serving in other roles at Home Depot, White 

became a COS on January 3, 2011, a position he held until his termination. (JSUF 

¶¶ 18, 24; ECF No. 42 at 1 (statement by White’s counsel that “[i]n 2011, White was 

promoted to a [COS].”).) Home Depot contends that it terminated White after 

determining he violated two “major rules” of the company. White contends his age 

was the true reason. Central to this dispute are White’s COS duties, a workers’ 

compensation claim White filed, White’s COS performance reviews and disciplinary 

actions, and the rules violations.

The COS Duties. At Home Depot, “[COS]s are primarily responsible for the 

timely and accurate fulfillment of all special order and installation projects from the 

initial sale through project completion[.]” (Brown Decl. Ex. A at 15.) The COS job 

description expressly enumerates certain duties, including: “provide[] proactive post-

 

The Court relied on the actual JSUF in its tentative ruling. (See generally ECF No. 57

(citing ECF No. 54).) Nevertheless, over four and half months after the filing of the JSUF on the 

docket, Kevin Mirch argued at length during oral argument that the JSUF on which the Court relied 

was false because it was allegedly filed without the consent of both parties. Marie Mirch

represented that she did not recall receiving or consenting to the filing of the final JSUF. However, 

Home Depot’s counsel stated that Marie Mirch had agreed to the JSUF on which the Court relied. 

The Court ordered Home Depot to file a declaration with proof of Marie Mirch’s consent by the 

day after oral argument. Home Depot did so. (ECF No. 64, James T. Conley Decl.) Most 

damningly to the representations by White’s counsel at oral argument, Home Depot has provided 

proof that Marie Mirch expressly consented to the filing of the JSUF and affixture of her signature 

to the JSUF. (Id. Ex. B at 35 (“Yes, you have my permission to affix my e-signature on the joint 

statement[.]”) (email from Marie Mirch).) Marie Mirch filed an affidavit hours after oral 

argument—and before Home Depot’s filing—confirming that she consented to the filing of the 

JSUF on which the Court relied. (ECF No. 62.) 

The Court appreciates the post-hoc clarification from White’s counsel. Yet, the Court also 

believes it is necessary to underscore that counsel has a duty to ensure that its factual 

representations to the Court are accurate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), (4). A basic investigation 

into the circumstances surrounding the filing of the JSUF by Kevin Mirch—namely, by conferring 

with his co-counsel—would have obviated his unfounded claims of falsity during oral argument 

and the attendant waste of judicial time on a non-issue.

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sale follow up” with customers and vendors, “maintain[] oversight on special orders 

and installs to ensure execution,” and “respond[] to service provider/vendor . . . notes 

in a timely manner[.]” (JSUF ¶ 19; Brown Decl. ¶ 3 Exs. A, B.) White expressly 

recognizes that his job was to “work[] on customers complaints[.]” (Compl. ¶ 25; 

White Dep. at 18:10–14 (“following up with customers on special orders” is 

“technically what we did”); id. at 19:12–14 (“We followed up with the customers to 

let them know what was going on.”).) White viewed the position “was a lot more 

work” than his prior Home Depot position and believed he was doing “about the job 

of five people.” (JSUF ¶ 20.) 

Worker’s Compensation Claim. In December 2011, while in his COS 

position, White sustained an injury to his left foot or ankle while working and filed a 

claim for worker’s compensation. (JSUF ¶ 21.) Ultimately, the claim was resolved

in May 2014 with Home Depot agreeing to pay White some $9,700. (JSUF ¶ 22.) 

White, however, contends that two Home Depot employees, Carmona and Coronado 

“retaliated” against him because of his claim. (JSUF ¶¶ 23, 61.) White contends that 

Specialty Supervisor Carmona ordered him to perform certain work despite his 

doctor-imposed limitations. (JSUF ¶ 51.) After White complained to a Home Depot 

manager, Carmona was told to abide by the work restrictions. (White Dep. at 45:5–

9.) White contends that Carmona did not like this response and “she gave negative 

reviews all the time.” (Id. at 45:10–16.) White further contends that Operations 

Manager Melissa Coronado “retaliated” against him for filing the claim. (JSUF ¶ 52; 

White Dep. 195:14–22; 197:5–7.) Specifically, Coronado told White that he should 

not have gone to his own doctor for a work-related injury and, rather than completing 

White’s paperwork for the claim, told White that a different assistant manager do so. 

(White Dep. at 198:17–199:9.)

Performance Reviews and Disciplinary Actions. White received biannual 

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performance reviews, including as a COS. (JSUF ¶ 37.) Between September 24, 

2012 and April 1, 2015, White received five performance reviews which rated his 

“overall performance” as “V” for “Valued Associate” and his promotion “Potential 

Code” as “2 - Well Positioned.” (JSUF ¶¶ 27, 29, 32, 34, 36; ECF No. 30-1 Charles 

Brown Decl. (“Brown Decl.”) ¶ 11 Exs. K, L, N, O, P.)3 The reviews, however, also 

rated White with an “I” for “Improvement Needed” for certain categories, typically 

the “professionalism” and “time management” categories. (JSUF ¶¶ 26, 28, 31, 33, 

35; Brown Decl. ¶ 11 Exs. K, L, N, O, P.) Several notes identified as areas for 

improvement White’s response to “dealing with issues in a timely fashion” and

“proactively provid[ing] consistent post-sale follow up on all special orders,” 

commenting that “he picks and chooses which orders he will fix and take care of [.]”

(Brown Decl. ¶ 11 Exs. K, L, M.) White’s October 8, 2013 review rated him an “I” 

in six categories. (JSUF ¶ 30; Brown Decl. ¶ 11 Ex. M.) White did not agree with 

his “I” ratings. (White Decl. ¶¶ 23, 30.) Home Depot store managers and 

supervisors, including Carmona and Coronado, completed or approved these 

reviews. (Brown Decl. ¶ 11 Exs. K, L, M.) 

During his final two years, White received several disciplinary notices.4 

Specifically, on March 7, 2013, Operations Assistant Store Manager Randy Phillips 

gave White a “coaching” Progressive Disciplinary Notice (“PDN”) because “[w]ithin 

the last week there has [sic] been two incidents where Steve has provided poor 

customer service.” (Brown Decl. ¶ 12 Ex Q.) White received another “coaching” 

PDN on December 16, 2014 for a similar reason. (Brown Decl. ¶ 12 Ex V.) White 

 

3 Home Depot’s “Performance and Development Summary” uses three ratings for each 

review category and for an associate’s overall rating: “O – Top Performer,” “V- Valued Associate,” 

and “I – Improvement Needed.” (See, e.g., Brown Decl. ¶ 11 Ex. K.) In addition, an associate 

receives a promotion “potential code” of “1 – Promotable” or “2 – Well Positioned.” (Id.) 

4 Home Depot’s PDNs range in severity from “coaching,” “counseling,” “final warning,” 

to “termination.” (ECF No. 30 at 6.) 

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received “counseling” PDNs on August 26, 2013 and October 4, 2013, for issues with 

orders, including his failure to follow up on “notes left to Steve that required 

immediate attention” resulting in delays over 45 days and his interactions with 

customers. (Brown Decl. ¶ 12 Exs. R, S.) White also received Manager’s Notes 

regarding customer service and customer order issues, including notes dated August 

14, 2014, March 10, 2015, and March 10, 2015. (Brown Decl. ¶ 12 Exs. W, X, Y.) 

White did not agree with the Manager’s Notes or the disciplinary actions. (White 

Decl. ¶¶ 33, 35, ¶¶ 38–40, 42.) 

The Wine Cooler Purchase and First Major Rule Violation. In the months 

leading up to his termination, Home Depot determined that White had violated two 

major rules. The first major rule violation stemmed from Home Depot’s Standard 

Operating Procedures (“SOP”) ADM 06-30 policy, titled “Associate Purchases.” 

(Brown Decl. ¶ 13 Ex. Z.) The policy stated in relevant part that “[a]ssociates . . . 

may buy marked down merchandise . . . only if: . . . the merchandise has been on 

display and available to regular customers for at least 24 hours at the same price the 

associate . . . is buying the merchandise for.” (Id. at 178.) Home Depot determined 

that White violated this policy based on his February 3, 2015 purchase of a marked 

down wine cooler. 

Angela Harris, an advisor in Home Depot’s Associate Advice and Counsel 

Group (“AACG”) based in Atlanta, Georgia, investigated the incident, interviewing 

White and ASM Lauren Donna. As part of the investigation, ASM Donna verified 

that White purchased the wine cooler only seven hours after it was marked down and 

apparently overheard White tell another Home Depot employee that he purchased the 

wine cooler “within 24 hours of it being on the floor.” (JSUF ¶ 47; Brown Decl. ¶ 

13; White Dep. at 250:02–252:16.) By February 10, 2015, AACG had determined 

that White had violated ADM 06-30 and sent a recommendation to Home Depot 

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Manager Rick Carpenter that White be placed on a “Final Warning.” (JSUF ¶¶ 46–

47; Brown Decl. ¶ 13 Ex. BB.) “Based on the Company’s investigation,” ASM 

Donna issued White the PDN on February 17, 2015, which stated that “Steve violated 

a major work rule violation under the Associate Purchases SOP” and warned that 

“Steve should refrain from further violations of the Standards of Performance. 

Further infractions will result in additional disciplinary action up to and including 

termination of employment.” (Brown Decl. ¶ 13 Ex. AA.) White acknowledged the 

PDN. (Id.)

Second Major Rule Violation and Termination. Two months after being 

placed on a “Final Warning” for the wine cooler purchase, Home Depot determined 

that White had committed a second “major rule” violation in the discharge of his 

COS duties. Home Depot’s Code of Conduct establishes that “disregarding a 

customer’s needs . . . may individually or cumulatively result in termination of 

employment,” particularly when an “associate does not follow up in a timely manner 

with customers[.]” (JSUF ¶ 48; Brown Decl. ¶ 9 Ex. I.) Home Depot determined 

that White failed to comport with this standard.

Specifically, on March 24, 2015, a customer complained to Carpenter about 

an overdue order the customer placed on January 24, 2015 and re-placed on February 

16, 2015. (ECF No. 30-2 David Nystrom Decl. (“Nystrom Decl.”) ¶ 4.) A note “was 

left in the system addressed to White requesting that he follow up on the order[.]” 

(Id.) It appears that ASM Donna contacted AACG regarding White’s failure to 

follow up on an order, which AACG decided to investigate. (Nystrom Decl. Ex. B 

at 1.) 

AACG manager Angela Wheeler investigated the incident, interviewing White 

on March 30, 2015 by phone, and communicating with SM Carpenter. (Nystrom 

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Decl. ¶ 4, Ex B at 2–3, 10–11.) The investigation culminated in an AACG report to 

ASM Carpenter on April 9, 2015, which concluded: 

[White] failed to follow up on an overdue order causing a customer 

complaint. [White’s] performance file indicates a continuous concern with 

updating and following up on orders in a timely manner. [White] is on 

active final warning. AACG recommends termination for the major work 

rule violation of Job Responsibilities SoP - Demonstrating a significant lack 

of attention to assigned duties and responsibilities.

(JSUF ¶ 49; Nystrom Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. B at 1.) The investigation also concluded that 

ASM Donna “failed to follow up on the order,” which for her was a “minor work rule 

violation of Customer Service SoP – Failing to take promised follow-up action.” (Id.) 

AACG recommended a “coaching” to ASM Donna. (Id.) 

David Nystrom, an ASM at the Home Depot store where White worked, 

decided to terminate White after receiving AACG’s recommendation. (Nystrom 

Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6 Ex. A.) White’s April 9, 2015 termination notice, prepared by Nystrom, 

identifies the “reason” for the “action taken”:

Steve has demonstrated a lack of attention to customer orders. he 

has been neglecting his primary job responsibilities of customer 

follow up and communicating with installers. [O]n [M]arch 24th 

we received a customer care [sic] for order 923670[.] After

careful consideration of the facts by the AACG ticket number 

19001426, it has been concluded that Steve’s poor job 

performance will result in a termination. Based on the Company’s 

investigation, it has been determined that this performance fell 

below the standards expected for job performance. (Nystrom 

Decl. ¶ 6 Ex. A.) 

The PDN also contains an “Associate Comments” section, in which White 

commented, “I did not order the Merchandise for this customer AJ Smith did and she 

was also following up on this order as the notes show,” but White would “have been 

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more than happy too [sic]” if Smith had asked. (Id.) White further commented that 

“[]Carmona the department head for the Millwork dept. when asked by our store 

manager to look into the order, went looking for any excuse to try and get me in 

trouble, because I was the expeditor for both Millwork and Flooring for the store[.]” 

(Id.) White “fel[t] the AASG [sic] dept. investigation is a farce also.” (Id.)

Procedural History. White brought suit in California Superior Court for the 

County of San Diego on February 3, 2017, raising California state law claims against 

Home Depot for: (1) unpaid wages in violation of the California Labor Code, (ECF 

No. 1 Ex. A (Complaint) ¶¶ 34–41); (2) wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy, (id. ¶¶ 42–50); (3) retaliation in violation of the California Fair Employment 

and Housing Act (“FEHA”), (id. ¶¶ 51–58); (4) failure to prevent discrimination and 

retaliation in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12904(k), (id. ¶¶ 59–67); (5) age 

discrimination in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12941, (id. ¶¶ 68–80); (6) 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, (id. ¶¶ 81–86); (7) negligent infliction of 

emotional distress, (id. ¶¶ 87–88); (8) defamation, (id. ¶¶ 89–96); and (9) harassment 

in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j), (id. ¶¶ 97–104).5 Home Depot 

removed the action to federal court on April 14, 2017 and answered the Complaint. 

(ECF Nos. 1, 5.) Home Depot moved for summary judgment on July 2, 2018. (ECF 

 

5 White’s claims raised pursuant to FEHA are subject to an administrative exhaustion 

requirement. Specifically, “to bring a civil action under FEHA, the aggrieved person must exhaust 

the administrative remedies provided by law.” Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Yurick v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)). 

“Exhaustion in this context requires filing a written charge with DFEH within one year of the alleged 

unlawful employment discrimination, and obtaining notice from DFEH of the right to sue.” Id. 

Thus, “[a] plaintiff suing for violations of FEHA ordinarily cannot recover for acts occurring more 

than one year before the filing of the DFEH complaint.” Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles, 194 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 689, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); Cal. Gov. Code § 12960(d). Although White alleges in the 

Complaint that he obtained a right to sue letter from the DFEH on February 3, 2016 (Compl. ¶ 34), 

there is no evidence in the record of White’s filing of a complaint with the DFEH for any of his 

FEHA causes of action or the issuance of a right to sue letter. The absence of such evidence raises 

questions about whether any of White’s FEHA claims are properly raised in this action.

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No. 30.) After various requests to extend White’s July 30, 2018 deadline to oppose, 

White filed an opposition on October 5, 2018 and briefing was completed on October 

15, 2018. (ECF Nos. 42, 53.) 

On January 23, 2019, the Court provided the parties with its tentative written 

ruling to grant Home Depot’s motion in full. (ECF No. 57.) The Court ordered oral 

argument on the motion and the tentative ruling, which was held on March 11, 2019. 

(ECF Nos. 57, 63.) During oral argument, instead of identifying actual triable issues 

of fact that would preclude summary judgment on any claim, White’s counsel 

primarily focused on issues and arguments that bore little relation to the issues in this 

case or the Court’s tentative ruling.6 Accordingly, the Court turns to the merits of 

the motion of summary judgment with little in its tentative ruling changed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper on “each claim” “or the part of each claim” on 

which summary judgment is sought when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under 

the governing law, and a dispute is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a 

 

6 Specifically, the arguments of White’s counsel consisted of hard-to-follow ramblings about 

consent decrees for Home Depot and alleged hazmat problems. As the Court indicated at oral 

argument, White’s Complaint does not address any of these issues. (See ECF No. 1 Ex. A.) Counsel 

indicated that he would amend the Complaint to raise these issues. Under Rule 15, leave to amend 

shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). But a district court properly 

denies leave to amend “when it [would] cause undue prejudice to the defendant, or when it is sought 

in bad faith.” Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2010). Counsel’s request is 

plainly made in bad faith and would prejudice Home Depot because fact discovery is closed and 

counsel’s request was made solely to defeat summary judgment. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network 

Sols. Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that seeking leave to amend in light of an 

opposing party’s pending summary judgment motion not only indicated bad faith for the party 

requesting amendment, but would also prejudice the opposing party); Solomon v. N. Am. Life & 

Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Allowing the motion would have required reopening discovery, thus delaying the proceedings.”). The Court denies counsel’s belated request.

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reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court’s role at summary judgment 

“is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims” so that they are “prevented 

from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private 

resources.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 328 (1986). Summary 

judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court does not make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, but instead views the evidence and 

draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255.

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 

genuine factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. A movant satisfies its initial 

burden by affirmatively negating the nonmoving party’s claim or by demonstrating 

that the nonmoving party is unable to prove an essential element of the claim. Id. at 

322–33; Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015); see also J. 

Friedenthal, M. Kane, & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 9.3, p. 457, n.81 (5th ed. 2015). 

To meet this burden, a party cites to depositions, affidavits or declarations, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

When the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 

pleadings and, by its own evidence or by citing appropriate materials in the record, 

show by sufficient evidence that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 324; see also S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde 

& Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[A] party cannot manufacture a 

genuine issue of material fact merely by making assertions in its legal memoranda.”) 

(citations omitted). 

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The “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess 

the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Thus, the nonmoving 

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts . . . . [w]here the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of 

fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. A 

“scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient, 

rather “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the 

[nonmoving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 at 252.

DISCUSSION7

A. FEHA Age Discrimination Claim

White alleges that he “was terminated, because of his age” in violation of 

FEHA. (Compl. ¶¶ 68–80.) FEHA makes it an unlawful “[f]or an employer, because 

of . . . age . . . to discharge the person from employment[.]” Cal. Gov’t Code § 

12940(a). California courts look to federal cases interpreting the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., to interpret and apply FEHA. Nidds v. 

Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996); Juell v. Forest Pharms., 

 

7

In its summary judgment motion, Home Depot passingly contends that White was an “atwill” employee. (ECF No. 30 at 1–2.) Whether an employee is at-will is relevant to a breach of 

an implied contract claim arising from an employee’s alleged termination without good cause. See 

Riordan v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 1:04-cv-6568-OWW-DLB, 2008 WL 3166524, at *20–24 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2008); Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1994). But, as Home Depot acknowledges, White has not pleaded a breach of implied contract 

claim. (ECF No. 53 at 2; see also Compl.) Such a claim therefore is not before the Court on 

summary judgment. Moreover, even if Home Depot is correct that White was an at-will employee, 

at-will employees cannot be fired as a result of unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Scott v. Pac. 

Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834 (Cal. 1995); Stephens v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp. Inc., 

245 Cal. Rptr. 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). Home Depot would not be able to thwart claims of age 

discrimination simply because an employee is at-will. 

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Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2006). In doing so, California courts 

have adopted the three-step McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–

04 (1973) framework for assessing employment discrimination claims based on 

disparate treatment. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal. 2000); Trop 

v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 

Application of the framework turns on how a plaintiff seeks to prove his claim, i.e. 

direct or indirect evidence. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 

802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 

1985); Cozzi v. Cty. of Marin, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 

The McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply when a plaintiff premises 

his discrimination claim on direct evidence. Trop, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 152–53 (“The 

United States Supreme Court has held . . . that ‘the McDonnell Douglas test is 

inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.’” (quoting 

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)). Direct evidence 

is “evidence, which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without 

inference or presumption[.]” Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 

1027, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

652, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). “[W]here a plaintiff offers direct evidence of 

discrimination that is believed by the trier of fact, the defendant can avoid liability 

only by proving the plaintiff would have been subjected to the same employment 

decision without reference to the unlawful factor.” Trop, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 152; 

Morgan, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664.

Because direct evidence of discrimination may rarely exist, the McDonnell 

Douglas framework recognizes that discrimination “claims must usually be proved 

circumstantially[.]” Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113; Trop, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 152. Pursuant to 

the McDonnell Douglas framework, (1) the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie

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case of discrimination; if the plaintiff does so, (2) then the employer must offer a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and, if the employer does so, (3) 

then the plaintiff must show through “substantial responsive evidence” that 

employer’s reason is untrue or pretext for discrimination. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113; see 

also Sako v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-1034-GPC-JMA, 2015 WL 5022307, 

at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) (quoting Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Int’l, 60 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 45, 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). Through these “successive steps of 

increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts 

that create a reasonable likelihood of bias[.]” Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113; Morgan, 105 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d at 665 (citations omitted); Trop, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 152. The framework “is 

flexible and adaptable to each case’s unique facts.” Cozzi, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 

(citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981)). 

The McDonnell Douglas framework is modified when the employer moves for 

summary judgment. “[T]he employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to 

present admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of plaintiff’s 

prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action was based upon 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.” Serri v. Santa Clara Univ., 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

732, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he 

ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff” to show unlawful 

discrimination. Juell, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).

1. White Lacks Direct Evidence of Age Discrimination

The Court first considers whether White has proffered direct evidence of age 

discrimination. White argues that he has evidence of discriminatory animus because 

“comments were made to [him] about older people.” (ECF No. 42 at 11.) He 

identifies a comment made to him in March 2015 after he called in sick because he 

had “thrown out his back.” (Id.; White Dep. at 29:16–23.) At some point thereafter, 

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ASM Donna remarked, “Oh, you old men and your back problems.” (White Dep. at 

29:17–23; 30:1–14.) White further contends that other individuals at Home Depot 

said that he had a “bad back” and “we’ve got the bunch of older employees that have 

back issues” and “[w]e need to keep an eye on them.” (Id. at 30:22–31:7.) These 

remarks and statements are not clearly ageist, nor do they directly show 

discrimination motivated his termination.

Courts have found direct evidence of age discrimination when alleged 

statements reflect directly on a plaintiff’s age and his employment. See, e.g., 

McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir. 1990) (older 

employee told he could be “cheaply replaced with a younger salesman”); Corbin v. 

Southland Int’l Trucks, 25 F.3d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1994) (“at your age you cannot 

produce like you once could, and we are going to have to make some kind of 

adjustment”). But isolated references to “old men” are akin to statements found 

insufficient to constitute either direct or even circumstantial evidence of age 

discrimination. See Nidds, 113 F.3d at 918–19 (finding insufficient “old timers” 

comment allegedly made as evidence of discriminatory motive); Nesbit v. Pepsico, 

Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding insufficient comment that “we don’t 

necessarily like grey hair”); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1420–21 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (“old-boy network” did not support inference of discriminatory motive). 

The statement regarding “keeping an eye” on older employees with “bad 

backs” is also too ambiguous to constitute direct evidence of discrimination. See 

McClain v. Cty. of Clark, 585 Fed App’x 410 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (isolated 

references to the plaintiff as an “old dog” and a “crazy Canadian” were not direct 

evidence of discriminatory motive); Wexler v. Jensen Pharms., Inc., No. CV 15-

03518-AB (AJWx), 2016 WL 6594106, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2016) (finding “it 

is a stretch to say” that comment that “older reps were the hardest reps to train, were 

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most challenging” reflects discriminatory animus), aff’d by, Wexler v. Jensen 

Pharms., Inc., 739 Fed. App’x 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2018).8 Although White suggests 

in his opposition brief that the statement is discriminatory, his deposition testimony 

provides context that does not indicate discriminatory intent. White specifically

elaborated that Home Depot developed a program “for doing stretches and exercises 

in the store” so that “we don’t end up with some back injuries” and to make sure 

employees were “lifting properly.” (White Dep. at 32:2–11.) This context from 

White cannot show discriminatory intent in an ambiguous statement. See Razo v. 

Timec Co., No. 15-cv-03414-MEJ, 2016 WL 6576625, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 

2016) (context plaintiff provided for ambiguous comments meant such comments did 

not constitute evidence of discrimination).

Assuming arguendo that White has identified comments that might show

discriminatory animus, he fails to argue or show they have a causal connection to his 

termination. “[S]ection 12940(a) does not purport to outlaw discriminatory thoughts, 

 

8 White’s counsel also suggests there is evidence of age discrimination based on White’s 

testimony that “other ASMs” told him “Oh, we know how much you make, you know. And we 

could get two people for what we pay you.” (ECF No. 42 at 11; White Dep. at 357:15–17.) This 

statement does not directly speak to White’s age, nor is it, without more, circumstantial evidence of 

age discrimination. White’s deposition reflects pay increases over the course of his 24 years of 

service with Home Depot—service he completed while always over the age of 40. (White Dep. at 

11:19–20:23 (beginning pay was $12.75 per hour and final rate was $25.05 per hour).) An 

employer’s desire to terminate an employee because of his years of service may be age-related, but 

it does not equate to a decision to terminate an employee on the basis of age. See Hazen Paper Co. 

v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612–13 (1993) (“[B]ecause age and years of service are analytically 

distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say 

that a decision based on years of service is necessarily ‘age based’”); Turney v. Beltservice Corp., 

No. 95-35063, 92 F.3d 1194, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19820, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 1996)

(unpublished) (relying on Hazen to find that terminating an employee because he has a higher salary 

due to his years of service does not equate to a decision to terminate on the basis of age); Conwright 

v. City of Oakland, No. 09-2572-THE, 2012 WL 174843, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012) (granting 

summary judgment because “even if, as [plaintiff[ contends, she was treated differently because she 

was eligible for retirement based on her years of service, that does not, in the absence of any 

additional evidence—which [plaintiff] fails to present—establish disparate treatment based on 

age.”). 

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beliefs, or stray remarks that are unconnected to employment decisionmaking.” 

Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 65 (Cal. 2013) (emphasis added). 

“Comments demonstrating discriminatory animus may be found to be direct evidence 

if there is evidence of a causal relationship between the comments and the adverse 

job action at issue.” DeJung v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 99, 111 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2008) (emphasis added). White, however, does not link any comment with the 

decision-making process that resulted in his termination. And despite identifying 

ASM Donna, White does not provide evidence that ASM Donna was “closely 

involved” in the decision to terminate him or that her comments were made in the 

context of that decision-making process. See Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 

(8th Cir. 1991) (observing that comments uttered by individuals closely involved in 

employment decisions could constitute direct evidence of discrimination). White has 

failed to provide direct evidence of age discrimination.

9

 

2. Application of McDonnell Douglas Framework

a. Prima Facie Showing of Age Discrimination

With no direct evidence, the Court turns to the McDonnell Douglas framework

At the first step, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of discrimination by 

showing that: “(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) . . . he was performing 

competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, 

such as termination [], and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory 

motive.” Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113; see also Sneddon v. ABF Freight Sys., 489 F. Supp. 

2d 1124, 1129 (S.D. Cal. 2007). A prima facie showing is “only a minimal burden”

 

9 To the extent White seeks to rely on these remarks as circumstantial evidence of 

discrimination, the Court finds the evidence too weak to withstand summary judgment. See Nesbit, 

994 F.2d at 705 (employer’s comment about the plaintiff’s “grey hair” was “weak circumstantial 

evidence of . . . animus.”); Culver v. Qwest Commc’n Corp., No. 05-CV-1720-HU, 2007 WL 

963446, at *13 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 2007) (concluding “that a plaintiff’s evidence of discrimination 

was not “specific and substantial” because “it consist[ed] of stray remarks . . . which [were] 

ambiguous and unconnected to the termination decision”). Accordingly, the Court does not further 

address this evidence.

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and, at the summary judgment stage, need not rise to the level of a preponderance of 

the evidence standard that would apply at trial. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 

1112 (9th Cir. 2002); Sneddon, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. 

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993)). But however “minimal” it may be, “a plaintiff 

must offer evidence that ‘gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.’” 

Nidds, 113 F.3d at 917 (quoting Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. College Dist., 

934 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1991)).

i. The First and Third Elements Are Not Disputed

White was 40 years old when Home Depot hired him in 1991. (White Dep. at 

26:01–03.) Thus, at all relevant times during his employment, he was in a protected 

age category for the purposes of a prima facie showing. See Mundy v. Household 

Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1989) (being over age of 40 establishes 

membership in protected age group). It is also undisputed that White was terminated

from Home Depot and White’s termination is the relevant adverse employment 

action. Thus, the parties principally focus on whether White has shown he was 

performing competently in his Home Depot position or has sufficient circumstantial 

evidence of discrimination.

ii. There is Adequate Evidence for the Second Element 

Home Depot argues that White cannot establish the third element of a prima 

facie showing “because he cannot show he was performing competently in his 

position.” (ECF No. 30 at 12.) Home Depot points to White’s “Improvement 

Needed” ratings in his performance reviews, the PDNs and Manager’s Notes, as well 

as the rules violations. White, however, contends that he was performing 

competently and points to his entire record at Home Depot, several emails from 

customers, as well as his overall rating in all but one of the same performance reviews 

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on which Home Depot relies during his time as a COS.

10

 (ECF No. 42 at 3 (citing 

M. Mirch Decl. Exs. 1–19, 22).)

Even if White performed competently in his earlier positions at Home Depot, 

the relevant issue is whether White was performing competently in the role which he 

held at the time he was terminated. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113; see also Sneddon, 489 

F. Supp. 2d at 1129. White’s reliance on his earlier performance evaluations is 

therefore unavailing. Earlier positive ratings “do[ ] not demonstrate that plaintiff’s

performance was necessarily adequate or competent” later, when he was terminated. 

Sneddon, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 1129–1130 (granting motion for summary judgment, 

finding that 2002 and 2003 performance reviews with no “needs improvement” 

ratings do not show that plaintiff was performing competently in 2004 when he 

received 17 “needs improvement” ratings). Thus, White’s pre-COS evaluations do 

not impact whether White can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. 

Focusing solely on White’s COS position, the Court nevertheless finds there 

is sufficient evidence for White to satisfy the second element in light of the “very 

little” evidence a plaintiff must provide at the summary judgment stage to make a 

 

10 Amongst many arguments about why White received “I” ratings, White’s counsel 

contends that the performance review in which White received an overall “I” rating resulted 

because Specialty Supervisor Carmona “disliked White.” (ECF No. 42 at 4.) White also objects 

to the disciplinary notices, manager’s notes, and all “I’ ratings in the performance evaluations 

Home Depot submitted. (White Decl. ¶¶ 30–35.) He contends that they are not “supported by 

specific factual scenarios,” are “false,” and argues that because “net revenues and net income” for 

Home Depot in the San Diego region “were growing” during the time of these evaluations, he could 

not have been performing poorly. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 33.) Tellingly, neither White, nor his counsel, argues 

or provides evidence that that the “I” ratings, manager’s notes, or disciplinary notices were because 

of his age or that similarly situated employees of a younger age were evaluated differently. Thus, 

none of these contentions and objections suggest or raise an inference of age discrimination. See 

McGill v. Comcast Cable Comm’cns. Mgmt., LLC, No. 16-cv-05202-NC, 2017 WL 4877449, at 

*7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2017); Castillo v. Garrett, No. 1:13-cv-00412-LJO-BAM, 2014 WL 

4792585, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (plaintiff provided no evidence to support his contention 

that he received negative performance evaluations and warnings because of his race, color, and 

national origin). 

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prima facie showing. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1113; Derr v. Footlocker, Inc., No. 04-9523 

FMC (Ex), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15317, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2006) (finding 

that although defendant pointed to plaintiff’s performance and ratings, the record also 

indicated that plaintiff’s performance ranged from satisfactory to strong such that 

there was a genuine dispute). Accordingly, summary judgment is not warranted on

this prima facie element.

iii. Home Depot Has Not Negated the Fourth Element

Home Depot also moves for summary judgment on the ground that White 

cannot establish the fourth element of a prima facie showing. In age discrimination 

cases, the fourth element typically “requires that [the] plaintiff show he was replaced 

by a substantially younger person” with equal or inferior qualifications. Diaz v. 

Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); 

Sneddon, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products 

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–143 (2000); Begnal v. Canfield & Associates, Inc., 92 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)).11 Alternatively, a plaintiff may instead make a 

prima facie showing by providing evidence that he was “discharged under 

circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.” Diaz, 

521 F.3d at 1207; Cowboy v. Zinke, No. CV-16-08094-PCT-DGC, 2018 WL 619722, 

at *7, 8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2018) (criticizing defendant for contending that plaintiff 

 

11 The Complaint does not allege that White was replaced by a younger employee, which 

undermines White’s prima facie showing of age discrimination based on the pleadings alone. 

Compare Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard Enter., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (plaintiff 

failed to allege he was replaced by younger employee) with Brazill v. Cal. Northstate College of 

Pharm., LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (finding adequate allegation that plaintiff 

was replaced by an employee ten years younger than him). White’s summary judgment opposition 

underscores the deficiency in his prima facie showing by failing to provide any evidence that he 

was replaced by a younger employee. See Haynes v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 15-cv-1038-

CAB-JLB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194284, at *36 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2016). However, Home Depot 

never moved to dismiss White’s age discrimination claim on the pleadings and, as the summary 

judgment movant, faces the initial burden of negating White’s ability to make a prima facie showing.

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could establish fourth element only with evidence he was replaced by a younger 

employee); Derr, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15317, at *16 (same).

As the Court has explained, California courts modify application of the 

McDonnell Douglas framework when an employer moves for summary judgment

such that Home Depot has the initial burden to negate a prima facie showing. Dep’t 

of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 745 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[W]hen an employer moves for summary judgment [on a FEHA claim]. the burden 

is reversed because the defendant who seeks summary judgment bears the initial

burden.”); Carr v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 17-cv-1377 JM (JLB), 2018 WL 

2329673, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2018); Serri, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 759. Home Depot 

argues solely that White cannot show discriminatory motive on the basis of a 

comment by “one of his supervisors, on one occasion” about “you old men and your 

back problems.” (ECF No. 30 at 12 (citing White Dep. at 29:17–33:23).) Although 

the Court agrees that such a comment is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence of 

age discrimination, Home Depot does not provide any evidence regarding whether

White was replaced and, if so, whether the replacement was a younger employee with 

equal or inferior qualifications—evidence uniquely within Home Depot’s province 

as the former employer. The Court must therefore conclude that Home Depot has 

failed to meet its summary judgment burden to negate a prima facie case of age 

discrimination. See Contreras v. George L. Mee Mem. Hosp., No. 15-cv-03963-BLF, 

2017 WL 2955748, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2017) (defendant failed to negate a 

prima facie case of age discrimination given that “the Hospital has not provided any 

admissible evidence regarding [plaintiff’s] replacement”). 

b. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons for Termination

Assuming a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the 

employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s 

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discharge. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. “‘[L]egitimate reasons in this 

context are reasons that are facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which, if true, 

would . . . preclude a finding of discrimination,” such as “a failure to meet 

performance standards[.]” Serri, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759 (citing Trop, 29 Cal. Rptr. 

3d at 144)) (emphasis added). Violation of company policies, or an employer’s 

honest belief that an employee has done so, is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for the employee’s termination. Neumeyer v. Wawanesa General Ins. Co., No. 

14cv181–MMA (RBB), 2015 WL 1924981, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015); Day v. 

Sears Holdings Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Elmore v. New 

Albertson’s, Inc., No. CV 11-04802-ODW (JCx), 2012 WL 3542537, at *4 (C.D.

Cal. Aug. 15, 2012) (“Albertson’s has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for Elmore’s termination. Specifically, Elmore violated Albertson’s company 

policy through her conduct.”); Rezentes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 729 F. Supp. 2d 

1197, 1205 (D. Haw. 2010) (“Sears may have ‘honestly believed’ that Rezentes 

violated company policy and then lied about her actions. Firing an employee because 

of honesty and integrity concerns is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a 

termination.”). 

Home Depot argues “it is undisputed that [it] can articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions,” specifically, White violated two major 

work rules. (ECF No. 30 at 13–16.) First, Home Depot determined through an 

AACG investigation that White purchased a marked down wine cooler on February 

3, 2015 in violation of Home Depot’s policy on associate purchases of marked down 

merchandise. (JSUF ¶¶ 46–47; Brown Decl. ¶ 13 Ex Z, BB.) White was placed on 

a “Final Warning” as a result of the AACG’s investigation. (JSUF ¶ 47; Brown Decl. 

¶ 13 Ex AA.) Second, Home Depot determined through an AACG investigation that 

White failed to follow up on a customer order that was originally placed on January 

24, 2015 and re-placed on February 16, 2015, in dereliction of his COS duties. (JSUF 

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¶ 48; Brown Decl. ¶ 9 Ex. I; Nystrom Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, Exs. A, B.) In light of his 

placement on active “Final Warning,” the AACG recommended White’s termination 

for this conduct. 

The Court concludes that Home Depot has provided sufficient evidence that 

White was terminated for reasons which, if true, constitute legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination. Accordingly, the burden shifts to 

White to demonstrate that Home Depot’s proffered reasons are untrue or are pretext.

c. Pretext for Age Discrimination

White bears a particular burden at the third McDonnell Douglas step: “[w]hen 

evidence of pretext is circumstantial, rather than direct,” as in this case, “the plaintiff 

must produce ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ facts to create a triable issue of pretext.”

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998); Wynes v. Kaiser 

Permanente Hosps., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1171. (E.D. Cal. 2013); Serri, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 759–60. Evidence of pretext is considered cumulatively. Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. 

Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). An employer’s 

nondiscriminatory reason is not rebutted where “the employee simply show[s] the 

employer’s decision was wrong, mistaken, or unwise.” Horn v. Cushman & 

Wakefield W., Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Rather, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, 

or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 

reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, . . . and hence 

infer that the employer did not act for the [ . . . asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.” 

Morgan, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 670. The ultimate issue is whether a reasonable trier of 

fact could find that it is “more likely than not that [defendant’s] actions were based 

on a prohibited discriminatory criterion.” Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113. “In short, [a plaintiff] 

must produce sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that age was a 

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‘substantial motivating factor’ in his termination.” Merrick v. Hilton Worldwide, 

Inc., 867 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2017). 

i. Specific Issues with Rule Violations

White attempts to show pretext by taking issue with Home Depot’s 

determinations that he committed two major rule violations. In addressing White’s 

arguments, the Court is mindful that “‘[t]he [anti-discrimination law] was not 

intended as a vehicle for the general judicial review of business decisions.’” Nasser 

v. AT & T Corp., No. C 05-5426 PJH, 2007 WL 1119203, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 

2007), aff’d by, 307 Fed. App’x 103 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Phipps v. Gary Drilling 

Co., 722 F. Supp. 615, 620 (E.D. Cal. 1989)). Nor is McDonnell-Douglas “a device 

which permits the jury to examine an employer’s reasons for discharge and determine 

that the employer’s business judgment or policies do not appeal to its sensibilities.” 

Phipps, 722 F. Supp. at 621 (quoting Elliott v. Grp. Med. & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 

556 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 

2000) (“We do not sit as a superpersonnel department that reexamines an entity’s 

business decision and reviews the propriety of the decision.”).

Associate Purchases Policy. First, White takes issue with the determination 

that he violated Home Depot’s Associate Purchases Policy on marked down 

merchandise. He repeatedly contends that he was unaware of the policy and believed 

that it was permissible for him to purchase the wine cooler when he did. (ECF No. 

42 at 5; White Dep. at 82:1–15, 83:1–11, 251:2–17, 252:9–13; 259:9–11.) White 

further contends that his direct supervisor, ASM Donna, was unaware of the policy. 

(ECF No. 42 at 5.) But whether White was aware of the policy or maintained a 

different belief about what Home Depot policy permitted, White does not controvert 

the record evidence that Home Depot determined that he had violated the Associate 

Purchases Policy. “An employee is not protected by [anti-discrimination law] when 

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he violates legitimate company rules[.]” Unt v. Aerospace Cor., 765 F.2d 1440, 1446 

(9th Cir. 1985).

12 Even if White did not know about the policy at the time of his 

violation, “[Home Depot’s] conduct attempt[ed] to correct Plaintiff’s unsupported 

understanding of company policy and practice, which in this instance was a final 

warning[.]” Sorensen v. AMTRAK, No. ED CV 16-01343-AB (JPRx), 2017 WL 

6550426, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017). White’s lack of awareness of the policy 

cannot give rise to an inference of age discrimination simply because Home Depot 

determined he violated a company policy. 

White also contends that his termination notice does not refer to his wine 

cooler purchase, but rather “poor customer service” although White understood his 

termination resulted from the purchase. (ECF No. 42 at 5.) The Court takes White 

to argue that Home Depot has changed its justifications for his termination. 

“[F]undamentally different justifications for an employer’s action would give rise to 

a genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext since they suggest the possibility that 

neither of the official reasons was the true reason.” Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 

1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1993). The record, however, does not support White’s 

suggestion. White’s termination notice refers to the “[c]ompany’s investigation” and 

identifies the ticket number for the AACG investigation report which recommended 

White’s termination based on his failure to discharge his duties in light of White’s 

 

12 White also suggests pretext because another “Home Depot employee named Paul, went 

out of his way to make sure that I knew about the sale,” and “Paul and most employees at The 

Home Depot store in question . . . knew that one of my hobbies was collecting fine wines.” (White 

Decl. ¶¶ 7–12, 14–17.) Even accepting White’s statements regarding Paul as true, the Court fails 

to see what legal difference it makes. White concededly purchased the wine cooler—not Paul—

and it is White’s purchase which violated a Home Depot policy that the Court has no occasion to 

find is illegitimate. Unt, 765 F.2d at 1446. White does not claim that “Paul” had any role in the 

decisional process to discipline White or to ultimately terminate him. Thus, White’s declaration 

regarding the events leading up to his purchase of the wine cooler is not “substantial” and 

“specific” evidence of pretext for Home Depot’s termination of White. See Godwin, 150 F.3d at

1222.

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placement on “active final Warning.” (Nystrom Decl. Ex. A at 6; Ex. B at 9.) It is 

undisputed that White was on a Final Warning because of the conclusion that he 

violated Home Depot’s Associate Purchases Policy. Thus, White has not provided 

evidence of “the sort of ‘substantial changes over time in the employer’s proffered 

reason for its employment decision [which] support a finding of pretext.’” Cooper v. 

United Air Lines, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1084, (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Sanchez v. 

Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 06-0152, 2007 WL 1390675, *12 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2007)). 

Failure to Follow-Up on Customer Order Note. Second, White takes issue 

with the conclusion that he committed a second major rule violation by failing to 

follow up on a customer order. Home Depot and White do not dispute that White 

did not place the initial order with the customer. (ECF No. 42 at 6.) The basis for 

the determination that White committed a major rule violation, however, arose from 

the determination that White did not follow up on the order after another Home 

Depot employee left a note for him to do so. (Nystrom Decl. ¶ 6 Ex. B.) 13 Although 

White’s counsel makes a slew of factual assertions regarding the determination that 

White failed to follow up on the note, including by intimating that no note even 

existed, White’s counsel cites no evidence to support these bare assertions. (ECF 

No. 42 at 6.) Counsel’s mere assertions in opposition to summary judgment cannot 

create a triable issue of fact. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter 

Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[A] party cannot 

manufacture a genuine issue of material fact by merely making assertions in its legal 

memoranda”); Marketquest Grp., Inc. v. BIC Corp., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1278 

 

13 White appears to suggest that the fact that he did not place the order can give rise to an 

inference of age discrimination. (ECF No. 42 at 6.) However, White does not dispute that his COS 

position duties expressly covered proactively responding to customer complaints. (ECF No. 42 at 

1–2; JSUF ¶ 19; White Dep. 243:16–20.) Absent from the COS duties is a condition that White 

must have placed the order with a customer. (See generally Brown Decl. Exs. A, B.) To the 

contrary, the record reveals that the core function of the position was customer service.

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(S.D. Cal. 2018) (same).

In any event, the relevant issue is not whether Home Depot can prove there 

was a note that White failed to follow up on, but rather whether Home Depot had a 

good faith belief that White failed to do so in violation of his COS duties such that it 

believed in good faith his termination was warranted. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island 

Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In judging whether [defendant's] 

proffered reasons were ‘false,’ it is not important whether they were objectively false 

(e.g. whether [defendant] actually lied). Rather, courts only require that an employer 

honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or 

even baseless.”) (emphasis in original). Home Depot has produced evidence showing 

a good faith belief that White committed a second major rule violation that warranted 

his termination in light of his Final Warning status. That White disagrees with 

whether he should have been terminated based on the underlying conduct is 

insufficient. See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 n.6 

(9th Cir. 2006) (a plaintiff’s subjective belief that his termination was unnecessary 

or unwarranted is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact).

White also argues that Home Depot’s treatment of ASM Donna regarding the 

same incident is “proof of discrimination.” (ECF No. 42 at 6.) Home Depot 

determined that ASM Donna committed a “minor rule violation” whereas White 

committed a “major rule violation” by failing to follow up on the order. “A plaintiff 

may raise a triable issue of pretext through comparative evidence that the employer 

treated . . . similarly situated employees more favorably than the plaintiff.” Earl v. 

Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). But a plaintiff 

must show that he is “similarly situated to those employees in all material respects.” 

Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006). White’s and ASM Donna’s 

alleged rule violations, however, are expressly premised on different standards of 

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care and duties applicable to their different positions at Home Depot. (Nystrom Decl. 

¶ 6 Ex. B.) Employees in different positions are not similarly situated. See Vasquez 

v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (employees “are similarly 

situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct”); Mitchell v. 

Nielsen, No. CV 16-7695 PA (MRWx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76859, at *14 (C.D. 

Cal. May 7, 2018) (rejecting argument that an employee outside of plaintiff’s 

protected class was treated more favorably because the employee held a different 

position); Freitas v. Kyo-Ya Hotels & Resorts, LP, Nos. 12-cv-00358, 00359 

SOM/KSC, 2013 WL 6073455, at *5 (D. Haw. Nov. 18, 2013) (employees not 

similarly situated because they held different positions). White cannot show pretext 

based on how Home Depot disciplined ASM Donna. 

ii. Alleged Age Discrimination Against Older Employees

In addition to challenging Home Depot’s determinations that he committed 

two major rules violations, White advances three more sweeping arguments of 

generalized age discrimination at Home Depot against older employees as 

circumstantial evidence that age discrimination motivated his termination. After 

carefully considering each argument, the Court concludes that, whether taken 

individually or cumulatively, they cannot meet White’s burden to show pretext.

Promotions of Younger Individuals Over White. White argues that six or 

seven employees younger than him were promoted over him throughout his 24-year 

tenure with Home Depot. (ECF No. 42 at 11; White Dep. at 26:17–25; 27:1–6.) 

Although White’s age discrimination claim in this suit concerns only his 

termination14, out of an abundance of caution the Court considers whether White’s 

 

14 White’s FEHA age discrimination claim raised in the Complaint does not concern age 

discrimination on the basis of promotions. FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer “because of 

the . . . age . . . of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person . . . , or to discriminate against 

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promotions evidence shows “a circumstance suggest[ing] a discriminatory motive”

for his termination. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113. The Court concludes that it does not.

Even if six or seven younger employees were promoted over White, White

fails to provide substantial and specific evidence of pretext for his termination. There 

is no evidence concerning most of these promotions, including when they occurred, 

whether the employees were of equal or inferior qualifications compared to White, 

or whether there was some other reason why they were promoted.

15 This Court 

cannot find that the promotion of a handful of younger employees over the course of

a 24-year period at a large employer like Home Depot constitutes substantial and 

specific evidence of pretext for White’s 2015 termination. 

The sole concrete evidence White identifies is the promotion of (1) a “31 or 

32” year old African American man apparently around the time Home Depot hired 

White in 1991 and (2) the promotions of two employees, a younger man and woman, 

to ASMs when he was a supervisor in Millworks between 1999 and September 2001 

(when he became an ASM). (ECF No. 42 at 11; White Dep. at 13:14–24; 26:4–7; 

26:17–25.) Temporal proximity may serve as evidence of pretext. See Dawson v. 

Entek, 630 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (temporal proximity can alone constitute 

sufficient circumstantial evidence for purposes of both the prima facie case and 

pretext); Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th 

 

the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 12940(a).

15 The absence of evidence on this latter point is important. FEHA expressly qualifies what 

constitutes unlawful age discrimination specifically in the area of promotions: “[p]romotions within 

the existing staff, hiring or promotion on the basis of experience and training, . . . and prior service 

with the employer, . . . do not, in and of themselves, constitute unlawful employment practices.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). Although White does not bring an age discrimination claim based on 

a failure to promote him, his reliance on evidence of Home Depot’s promotion of younger 

employees as circumstantial evidence for his FEHA age discrimination claim colors how such 

evidence should be viewed.

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Cir. 2000) (“[E]vidence based on timing can be sufficient to let the issue go to the 

jury, even in the face of alternative reasons proffered by the defendant”). But the

promotions of a younger employee around 1991 and two other younger employees 

around 2000 are so temporally removed from White’s 2015 termination that the

promotions cannot give rise to an inference of age discrimination for White’s

termination. See McGill v. Comcast Cable Comm’cns. Mgmt., LLC, No. 16-cv05202-NC, 2017 WL 4877449, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2017) (gap longer than one 

year was too long to constitute circumstantial evidence giving rising to an inference 

pretext); Guthmann v. Classic Residence Mgmt. Ltd. P’ship, No. 16-cv-02680-LHK, 

2017 WL 3007076, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2017) (same).

“Try[ing] to Bring in Younger People Constantly. White also contends that 

“Home Depot tried to bring in younger people constantly.” (ECF No. 42 at 4; White 

Dep. at 32:24–33:1.) White’s sole evidence in support of this subjective belief

regarding Home Depot’s hiring is that Home Depot hired a 23-year-old male 

employee who had a college degree in late 2014 or 2015. (White Dep. at 33:1–4.) 

White does not connect this hire to any COS position, his termination, or to any 

adverse employment action against any older employee at his Home Depot location. 

Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that the hire of a younger employee 

constitutes substantial and specific evidence of pretext for White’s termination in 

April 2015. 

Alleged Systematic Termination of Older Employees. Finally, White argues

that Home Depot “systematically got rid of older employees.” (ECF No. 42 at 11.) 

He contends that “the people that they [Home Depot] managers were getting rid of 

were all of the older people in the store.” (Id.; White Dep. 359:10–23.) White’s 

declaration lists several individuals as former employees who, according to White, 

Home Depot terminated because of their age and without cause “during Plaintiff’s 

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tenure.” (White Decl. ¶ 25.) White’s speculative and conclusory assertions about 

the reasons why other individuals were terminated throughout his 24-year tenure with 

Home Depot cannot create a genuine dispute. See Schuler v. Chronicle Broadcasting 

Co. Inc., 793 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th Cir. 1986) (“subjective personal judgments do not 

raise a genuine issue of material fact”); Schiff v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 816 

F. Supp. 2d 798, 819 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding subjective averments of 

discrimination in plaintiff’s declaration insufficient to survive summary judgment at 

pretext step of McDonnell Douglas framework).

White also proffers declarations of six individuals who state they are former 

employees Home Depot terminated between 2011 and 2016. (M. Mirch Decl. Exs. 

35–40.) Home Depot raises a number of evidentiary objections to these 

declarations.16 (ECF Nos. 53-1, 53-2, 53-3, 53-4, 53-5, 53-6, 53-7, 53-8, 53-9.) Five

declarations were submitted over two years ago in connection with a different 

discrimination case against Home Depot before a different judge in this district. 

(Compare M. Mirch Decl. Exs. 36–40 with Haynes v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 

15-CV-1038-CAB-JLB, ECF Nos. 35–16, 35–17, 35–18, 35–23, 35–24 (S.D. Cal. 

Mar. 16, 2016)). White does not request judicial notice, nor does he set forth any

independent basis by which the Court could take notice of the declarations’ contents

pursuant to Rule 201.

17 See Fed. R. Evid. 201; (see generally ECF No. 42; ECF No. 

45, M. Mirch Decl. ¶¶ 22–26 (acknowledging that five declarations were “prepared 

by my law firm in opposition to a motion for summary judgment” in the Haynes case 

without requesting judicial notice or providing any other reason for taking notice of 

 

16 It is not necessary for the Court to wade through the majority of Home Depot’s objections 

because, even considering the declarations, their contents do not alter the Court’s resolution of 

Home Depot’s motion.

17 During oral argument, White’s counsel raised for the first time seeking judicial notice of 

these filings pursuant to Rule 201. Counsel, however, repeated the shortcomings of the summary 

judgment opposition by failing to identify any grounds for taking judicial notice.

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their contents). Accordingly, the five declarations are not properly before the Court. 

See Steward v. West, No. CV 13-02449 BRO (JCx), CV 13-02449 BRO (JCx), at *5 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (declining to take judicial notice of four declarations

submitted in connection with a different court proceeding); Bass v. Cty. of Butte, 

CIV-S-02-2443 DFL/CG, 2004 WL 1925468, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2004) 

(“[Plaintiff] seeks judicial notice of a declaration produced in another case in this 

district. But the court may only take judicial notice of the existence of the document 

as a public record—there must be an independent basis for taking notice of the facts 

referenced in the declaration.”); Allen v. Pac. Bell, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1180,1192 (C.D.

Cal. 2002). 

The only declaration submitted as a part of this case is from Amapola Martin, 

who states that she is a former Home Depot employee who was terminated from the 

“Home Depot Fairmount Store” in July 2016. (M. Mirch Decl. Ex. 35 ¶ 4.) Martin 

states that between 2002 and 2016, she worked at the Lemon Grove store, followed 

by the El Cajon store, followed by the Fairmount Store. (Id. ¶¶ 3–4.) Martin contends 

that she saw “a trend in terminating older employees” that “was really noticeable 

around 2014–2016” and then refers only to the fact that she was over 40 years old

when she was terminated. (Id. ¶ 25.) To the extent White attempts to rely on Martin’s 

opinion about a “trend,” his attempt is unavailing. For statistical evidence to raise a 

triable issue of pretext, it “must show a stark pattern of discrimination unexplainable 

on grounds other than [the protected characteristic].” Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 

329 F.3d 740, 748 (9th Cir. 2003). In the absence of any corroborating evidence, 

Martin’s subjective belief about her termination and subjective appraisal of a “trend” 

fall below this standard. Moreover, White’s reliance on the termination of a single

Home Depot employee at a different location terminated over a year after him does 

not rise to the level of substantial and specific evidence of pretext. See Hernandez v. 

DOT, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1128 (D. Ariz. 2010) (circumstantial evidence was not 

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sufficiently specific and substantial for a jury to render a verdict in favor of plaintiff 

because there was “nothing in the record” showing it occurred at, or near the time, 

the plaintiff was denied a position); Lattimore v. Euramax Int’l, Inc., No. EDCV 16-

2156 PSG (KKx), 2017 WL 6886081, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (a single email 

suggesting discriminatory intent did not constitute “the sort of ‘specific and

substantial’ evidence needed to establish pretext” particularly because the 

termination decision began “several months before email”). 

Even if the Court considers all the declarations not properly before the Court, 

White’s protestations of pretext ring hollow. “In a large corporation with branch 

offices throughout the country, the discharge of seven older employees over a twoand-a-half-year period alone does not establish a pattern or practice of 

discrimination.” Mundy, 885 F.2d at 545. This is true here. Four declarants vaguely 

state that they worked “at a store in District 199” and the remaining declarant states 

he worked at the “Lemon Grove Home Depot” location. Martin states that she 

worked at the Lemon Grove, El Cajon, and Fairmount locations, although she was 

ultimately terminated at the latter. Assuming their truth, the declarations show, at 

best, that Home Depot terminated a handful of older employees over a five-year 

period at, at least, three to four different locations when accounting for White’s 

termination. As in Mundy, neither White, nor any declarant “offers [any] evidence 

that these terminations were without good cause, or that age was a determining factor 

in any of them. The fact that other older employees of [Home Depot] were 

discharged is simply not probative of [Home Depot’]s motives for terminating” 

White. Id.; see also Schechner v. KPIX-TV, 686 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2012) (a 

plaintiff must “show a stark pattern of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other 

than age”). 

Moreover, the declarations are not substantial and specific evidence of pretext 

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on their own terms. Five declarants offer bare and identical averments that Home 

Depot terminated them and they were over 40 years old. (M. Mirch Decl. Exs. 36, 

37, 38.) Two declarants further attest to a subjective belief that their terminations 

resulted from age discrimination. (Id. Exs. 39, 40.) Subjective personal beliefs about 

the reasons for an adverse employment action are insufficient to withstand summary 

judgment for an individual plaintiff and they fare no better simply because they are 

held in unison by other former employees. See Lindsey v. Shalmy, 29 F.3d 1382, 

1385 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Mere conclusory assertions of discriminatory intent, 

embodied in affidavits or deposition testimony, cannot be sufficient to avert summary 

judgment. The court must satisfy itself that there is sufficient direct or circumstantial 

evidence of intent to create a genuine issue of fact for the jury, before it can deny 

summary judgment[.]”); Stucky v. Hawaii, No. 06-00594 JMS/KSC, 2008 WL 

214944, at *16 (D. Haw. Jan. 25, 2008) (finding plaintiff’s reliance on “opinions 

contained in her declaration” and another declaration “to demonstrate that 

[defendant’s explanation is pretext . . . . do not constitute specific and substantial 

evidence sufficient to overcome summary judgment.”). Accordingly, White has 

failed to produce specific and substantial evidence of pretext. Home Depot is entitled 

to summary judgment on White’s age discrimination claim.

B. Claim for Retaliation in Violation of FEHA

White’s third claim is that Home Depot retaliated against him in violation of 

FEHA for “complaining about illegal conduct in the work place” including “us[e] 

[of] unqualified contractors and subcontracts,” his “taking medical leave,” and his 

complaints about “safety issues within the store.” (Compl. ¶¶ 52–53.) White testified 

that he was retaliated against because of an ankle injury and related workers’ 

compensation claim. (White Dep. 197:23–198:4.) According to White, this 

retaliation took the form of negative reviews in performance reviews, “specifically, 

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Plaintiff was given ‘I’ ratings that were not warranted.” (White Decl. ¶ 23.)18

FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge, expel, or otherwise 

discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices 

forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or 

assisted in any proceeding under this part.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h) (emphasis 

added). “[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under [] FEHA, a plaintiff 

must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected 

the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between 

the protected activity and the employer’s action.” Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 

116 P.3d 1123, 1130 (Cal. 2005); Light v. Cal. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 221 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 668, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). As with disparate treatment claims, the 

McDonnell Douglas framework applies to FEHA retaliation claims. Lawler v. 

Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2013). If a plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, then the burden shifts to the employer to 

offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment actions. Cenis 

v. Winco Holdings, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00863-DAD-JLT, 2018 WL 2412324, at *7 

 

18 Although White claims that “I” ratings in several of his performance reviews were the 

result of retaliation, White and his counsel offer yet another explanation for White’s “I” ratings. 

White’s counsel claims that Home Depot set up “quotas” for how many employees should receive 

“I” ratings, with “[e]ach store required to have at least three to five ‘I’s per store per cycle which 

was every three months.” (ECF No. 42 at 2.) Albeit in the context of arguing that punitive damages 

are warranted, White’s counsel further contends that Home Depot had a “roundtable” system for 

evaluating employees which was intended “to get rid of older and higher paid employees.” (Id. at 

16.) Counsel fails to cite any evidence in the record that corroborates these claims. White’s 

testimony does not corroborate it either. White testified that Home Depot had a “roundtable” 

system in the early 2000s in which Home Depot store managers would “target” individuals “by 

write-ups” some of which were “bogus write-ups.” (White Dep. at 385:10–15.) White suggested 

that Carmona followed this process. (Id. at 385:15–19.) White further suggested that ASMs were 

“told” to write-up an employee “costing” Home Depot too much money or for which complaints 

had been received. (Id. at 385:20–24.) Even accepting as true White’s account, White’s testimony 

does not connect this alleged roundtable system to an impermissible motivation to discriminate 

against older Home Depot employees, let alone against White on the basis of his age or to retaliate 

against him for participating in activities that FEHA protects. 

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(E.D. Cal. May 25, 2018) (citations omitted). If the employer produces a legitimate, 

non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action, then the burden shifts back 

to the employee to prove intentional retaliation. Id.

Home Depot argues that White cannot establish a causal link between his April 

2015 termination and the activities for which White claims he suffered retaliation. 

(ECF No. 30-1 at 10–11.) This argument misses a threshold issue dispositive of this 

claim: White has failed to identify an activity the FEHA protects from retaliation. 

White contends that he “engaged in a protected activity when he exercised his 

right to make a workers’ compensation claim[.]” (ECF No. 42 at 8.) White asserts 

that in 2011 a Home Depot manager, Melissa Coronado, refused to file an accident 

report for him for a workers’ compensation claim and, after Home Depot approved 

White for 8 weeks of leave in 2012, the same employee gave him “negative remarks” 

on his September 26, 2012 performance review. (ECF No. 42 at 8–9; White Dep. 

198:5–200:9; M. Mirch Decl. Ex. 14.) Specialty Supervisor Rosa Carmona, 

allegedly was “very negative” with White after he reported her for requiring him to 

do certain work tasks although he was “under certain work restrictions” after he 

returned to Home Depot from his medical leave and gave him negative reviews. 

(ECF No. 42 at 9–10; JSUF ¶ 51.) Even accepting White’s factual averments about 

mistreatment, none of the conduct resulted from an activity FEHA protects.

To constitute a “protected activity” pursuant to FEHA, an employee must have 

opposed an employment practice FEHA makes unlawful. Dinslage v. City & Cty. of 

San Francisco, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809, 820–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). “‘[A]n 

employee’s conduct may constitute protected activity . . . not only when the employee 

opposes conduct that ultimately is determined to be unlawfully discriminatory under 

the FEHA, but also when the employee opposes conduct that the employee 

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reasonably and in good faith believes to be discriminatory, whether or not the 

challenged conduct is ultimately found to violate the FEHA.’” Id. at 819 (citing 

Yanowitz, 116 P.3d at 1130–31). “Merely complaining about Home Depot’s actions 

without also complaining that such actions were the result of discrimination [, 

however,] is not ‘protected activity’ within the meaning of FEHA.”19 Carr v. Home 

Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 17-cv-1377-JM-(JLB), 2018 WL 2329673, at *6 (S.D. Cal. 

May 23, 2018) (quoting Haynes v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 15-cv-1038 CAB, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194284, *31 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2016)); Craig v. Southwest 

Airlines, No. ED CV 04-1086-GHK (SSx), 2007 WL 4105980, at *4 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 

Jan. 25, 2007) (concluding that retaliation based on workers’ compensation claim is 

not a basis for a FEHA claim). White does not allege or provide evidence that he 

complained to Home Depot about age discrimination, or any other type of 

discrimination, before or at the time of the alleged retaliation. Accordingly, White 

has failed to establish the first element of a prima facie case of retaliation and Home 

Depot is entitled to summary judgment.

C. Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation Claim

White raises a fourth claim for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation 

in violation of FEHA. (Compl. ¶¶ 59–67.) FEHA makes it unlawful “for an 

employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination 

and harassment from occurring” in the workplace. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k). 

“When a plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on a claim of failure to prevent 

discrimination or harassment []he must show three essential elements: (1) plaintiff 

was subjected to discrimination, harassment or retaliation; (2) defendant failed to 

 

19 In his opposition to summary judgment, White also passingly avers that he was retaliated 

against because he complained about “Home Depot’s fraudulent sales practices.” (ECF No. 42 at 

8.) White does not provide any evidence to substantiate this averment in his declaration (ECF No. 

44) or otherwise. Even if he had, complaining about such practices is not activity the FEHA protects.

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take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment or retaliation; and (3) 

this failure caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm.” Lelaind v. City

& Cty. of San Francisco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citation 

omitted); see also Lucent Techs., 642 F.3d at 748 (“[E]mployers are not liable for 

failing to take necessary steps to prevent discrimination, ‘except where the 

[discriminatory] actions took place and were not prevented.’” (citation omitted)).

Home Depot moves for summary judgment on the ground that the failure of White’s 

underlying retaliation and age discrimination claims means White cannot sustain this

claim. (ECF No. 30-1 at 20.) White concedes that the claims rise or fall together. 

(ECF No. 42 at 15.) 

A claim for failure to prevent discrimination or retaliation in violation of 

FEHA is viable only if the defendant has engaged in actionable discrimination or 

retaliation. See Trujillo v. N. Cty. Transit Dist., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1998). Absent underlying claims for retaliation and discrimination, White’s 

failure to prevent claim also fails. See Carr, 2018 WL 2329673, at *6; Ricks v. United 

Air Lines, Inc., No. C 11-3637 PJH, 2013 WL 1003596, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 

2013) (“There can be no independent claim for failure to prevent discrimination 

absent an underlying claim of discrimination under FEHA.”); Beagle v. Rite Aid 

Corp., No. C 08-1517 PJH, 2009 WL 3112098, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009) 

(same). Accordingly, without viable claims of discrimination and retaliation, Home 

Depot is entitled to summary judgment on White’s failure to prevent claim.

D. Claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

White’s second claim concerns wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy. (Compl. ¶¶ 42–50.) Specifically, White contends that Home Depot 

unlawfully terminated him “in violation of the public policy expressed in California 

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Gov’t Code § 12900 et. seq.” i.e., the FEHA. (Id. ¶ 45.)20 “A common law claim for 

wrongful termination in violation of public policy requires a showing that there has 

been a violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in statute.” Merrick v. 

Hilton Worldwide, Inc., 867 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Reno v. Baird, 

957 P.2d 1333 (Cal. 1998); Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 

1994)); see also Sako, 2015 WL 5022307, at *12. However, when a plaintiff’s 

wrongful termination claim is derivative of an unviable FEHA claim, the wrongful 

termination claim fails. Merrick, 867 F.3d at 1150; Featherstone v. S. Cal. 

Permanente Med. Grp., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 258, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). Without a 

viable FEHA claim, Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

E. Claim 9: Harassment 

White’s ninth cause of action concerns harassment in violation of FEHA. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 97–104.) White alleges that he “was subjected to harassment based on 

his protected status as a male employee over the age of forty, in his workplace at 

Home Depot causing a hostile or abusive work environment,” and “unwanted 

harassing conduct.” (Id. ¶¶ 98–99.) He further alleges that “[d]uring his last year of 

employment, [he] was repeatedly called an ‘old man’ and/or ‘an old man with an old 

back.’” (Id. ¶ 102.) Although absent from the Complaint, White also contends that 

 

20 White also opposes summary judgment on the ground that he was terminated “in 

retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim.” (ECF No. 42 at 14.) The Complaint, however, 

lacks any claim regarding retaliation for such conduct and instead concerns retaliation in violation 

of FEHA. (Compl. ¶¶ 51–58.) White has never moved to amend the Complaint to add such a 

claim of retaliation, nor does he cite to any statutory provisions regarding this claim. “Plaintiff 

bears the burden of identifying the specific statute(s) or constitutional provision(s) on which” he 

bases his claim. Day v. Sears Holdings Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 

Moreover, White fails to identify any case in his opposition and thus the Court need not consider 

this argument further. See United States v. Aguilar, 782 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015) (courts 

need not consider an undeveloped argument that is not supported by citations to authority); 

Williams v. Eastside Lumberyard & Supply Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1114 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (“A 

judge is . . . neither required to hunt down arguments [parties] keep camouflaged nor required to 

address perfunctory and undeveloped arguments.”). 

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several employees “had a running joke” about his “allergy which causes his uvula to 

swell significantly[.]” (ECF No. 42 at 14.) Specifically, “the girls would say ‘Oh, 

his uterus is swollen up again.’” (Id.; White Dep. 37:7–12.) Home Depot argues that 

White fails to identify conduct sufficient to show harassment. (ECF No. 30-1 at 17.) 

The Court agrees. 

FEHA makes it an unlawful for an employer “because of the . . . age . . . of any 

person, . . . to discriminate against the person . . . in terms, conditions, or privileges 

of employment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). FEHA also makes it an unlawful 

employment practice for an employer “because of . . . age, . . . to harass an employee.”

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1). “To establish a claim for harassment, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that: (1) []he is a member of a protected group; (2) []he was subjected 

to harassment because []he belonged to this group; and (3) the alleged harassment 

was so severe that it created a hostile work environment.” Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1244 

(citing Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal. 1999)). “To 

survive summary judgment on a claim of hostile work environment under FEHA, [a] 

plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact” regarding any one of these elements. See 

Juell, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1157. 

The third element is particularly important. “A determination of whether 

conduct qualifies as hostile under this standard includes its frequency, severity, and 

nature, including whether it is physically threatening or humiliating as opposed to 

merely verbally offensive.” Cozzi, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (citations omitted). 

“Unlike discrimination claims, harassment ‘consists of actions outside the scope of 

job duties which are not of a type necessary to business and personnel management,” 

such as “hiring and firing, job or project assignments, . . . promotion or demotion, 

[and] performance evaluations, . . . do not come within the meaning of harassment.” 

Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1244 (citing quoting Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1336–37 (Cal. 

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1998)). The plaintiff must show a “concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, 

routine or generalized nature.” Id. (citing Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 851). “Like Title VII, 

FEHA is not a general civility code.” Juell, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1157; Cozzi v, 787 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1070 (“Most importantly, Title VII and FEHA do not proscribe a general 

civility code in the workplace.”). Thus, “[s]imple teasing, offhand comments, and 

isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory 

changes in the terms or conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 

524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). “While unkind, [a] single comment does not constitute 

harassment or create a hostile work environment under FEHA standards.” Carr, 

2018 WL 2329673, at *7. White’s harassment claim fails under this standard.

First, the Court cannot find that the jokes regarding White’s uvula are 

sufficient to show harassment. “An employee claiming harassment based upon a 

hostile work environment must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was 

severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and 

create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because 

of their [age].” Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 220 (Cal. 

2006) (emphasis in original). Because White premises harassment on his 

membership in a protected age category, he must show that the comments made to 

him were age-related. See Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1244 (harassment must result from 

plaintiff’s membership in the protected group); Landig v. CooperSurgical, Inc., No. 

2:16-cv-07144-CAS(KSx), 2017 WL 5633036, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017); 

Dodson v. Fedex Corporate Servs., No. CV 14-3733-JFW (AGRx), 2015 WL 

13358194, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim of 

harassment on the basis of age lacked merit because comments at issue were “facially 

neutral and do not suggest or evidence the existence of any age-based harassment.”). 

White, however, fails to show how such comments bear any relation to his 

membership in a protected age category and, to the contrary, claims it was because 

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of an allergy. Even assuming the comments were made by Home Depot employees 

younger than White, the Court cannot assume on that basis alone that the comments 

were made because of White’s age. See Pinder v. Empl. Dev. Dep’t, 227 F. Supp. 3d 

1123, 1145 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (reasoning that offensive comments, such as being told 

to “sit” down in an angry tone, are not racial harassment simply because they are 

made by persons of a different race). The record shows that, rather than being agebased, the comments were “simple teasing” and “offhand comments” that do not 

amount to “discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.” 

Ayala v. Frito Lay, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 891, 910 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Faragher 

v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)); Dodson, 2015 WL 13358194, at 

*9.

Second, ASM Donna’s comments about “old men” with “bad backs” are also 

insufficient to sustain White’s harassment claim. The Court has already concluded 

that the comments are not clearly discriminatory on the basis of age. Even if the 

comment could be construed as discriminatory, the comment is not sufficiently 

severe to constitute harassment. White at most identifies a single concrete incident 

in which ASM Donna made a comment about old men. (White Dep. at 29:17–34:22.) 

This is insufficient to constitute harassment in violation of FEHA. See Day v. Sears 

Holdings Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1195 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Ramirez v. Salvation 

Army, No. C06-0631 TEH., 2008 WL 670153, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2008) 

(granting summary judgment for harassment claim because supervisor’s comments 

in front of customers that young people work faster and that plaintiff was “getting 

too old” was insufficiently severe and pervasive); Muller v. Automobile Club of So. 

California, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (two remarks by a supervisor, 

and one by a co-worker, did not constitute an actionable “‘concerted pattern of 

harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized nature’”), disapproved on other 

grounds in Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc., 63 P.3d 220, 226 n.6 (Cal. 

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2003); see also Stevens v. Cty. of San Mateo, 267 Fed. App’x 684, 686 (9th Cir. 2008)

(unpublished) (affirming summary judgment for employer on harassment claim 

because isolated and sporadic comments, such as a supervisor telling plaintiff that he

was an “old lion,” “old dog,” and “old stupid man,” were insufficiently severe and 

pervasive). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment for Home Depot on 

White’s harassment claim.

F. Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims

White’s sixth and seventh claims respectively concern intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). 

(Compl. ¶¶ 81–86 (IIED); id. ¶¶ 87–88 (NIED).) Home Depot moves for summary 

judgment on these claims, which the Court agrees is warranted.

Home Depot argues that White has failed to identify extreme and outrageous 

conduct and that personnel conduct cannot serve as the basis for an IIED claim. (ECF 

No. 30-1 at 18–19.) An IIED claim requires: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by 

the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability 

of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional 

distress; and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were actually and proximately caused by the 

defendant’s outrageous conduct. Cochran v. Cochran, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 543

(Cal. Ct. App. 1998). “[A]n essential element of such a claim is a pleading of 

outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency.” Janken v. GM Hughes 

Electronics, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). A plaintiff must 

surmount a “high bar” to demonstrate severe emotional distress. Hughes v. Pair, 209 

P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009). “Severe emotional distress means ‘emotional distress of 

such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized 

society should be expected to endure it.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

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White argues that his termination as a result of retaliation and age 

discrimination and being “intentionally harassed by insensitive jokes and 

intimidation” serve as the basis for this claim. (ECF No. 42 at 14.) However, “even 

where improper motivation underlies personnel management decisions, the remedy 

is not in an IIED claim, but in a suit against the employer for discrimination.” Wynes, 

936 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (citing Janken, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756). Even if White may 

raise this claim separately from his discrimination, harassment, and retaliation 

claims, summary judgment on this claims defeats his derivative IIED claim. See 

Hawkins v. SimplexGrinnell L.P., No. 12-cv-1406-L-BGS, 2014 WL 769345, at *11 

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (citing Lee v. Eden Med. Ctr., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1022 

(N.D. Cal. 2010)) (granting summary judgment on IIED claims because plaintiff 

failed to provide sufficient evidence to support FEHA claims of harassment, 

discrimination, and retaliation arising from the same non-outrageous conduct)); 

Weiss v. Alere Med., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00215-LRH-WGC, 2013 WL 2450598, at

*10 (D. Nev. June 5, 2013) (same); Gutierrez v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., No. C 

11-3428 CW, 2012 WL 5372607, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2012) (same). Home 

Depot is entitled to summary judgment on White’s IIED claim.

Home Depot also argues that White’s NIED claim is improper because NIED

is not an independent tort but requires a negligence claim—something not alleged in 

the Complaint. (ECF No. 30-1 at 20; Compl. ¶¶ 87–88.) It is true that “[a]n NIED 

claim ‘is not an independent tort but the tort of negligence to which the traditional 

elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.’” Biggs v. Bank of 

Am. Corp., No. EDCV 15-00267-VAP (KKx), 2015 WL 3465739, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 

Jun. 1, 2015) (quoting Wong v. Tai Jing, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)); 

Bates v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 

2011). White contends that Home Depot’s negligence can be established per se

because Home Depot “violated certain statutes,” namely, “the Labor Code and FEHA 

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regarding age discrimination.” (ECF No. 42 at 15.) Setting aside that White did not 

plead a negligence claim in the Complaint, the Court has already found that Home 

Depot is entitled to summary judgment on White’s FEHA discrimination and 

retaliation claims. Therefore, White cannot premise his NIED claim on FEHA’s

duties of anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation. White’s Labor Code claims

similarly do not survive summary judgment for reasons the Court will discuss. Thus, 

Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment on White’s NIED claim.

G. Defamation Claim

White raises an eighth claim for defamation. (Compl. ¶¶ 89–96.) He alleges

he was defamed because “Home Depot managers told Plaintiff’s fellow employees 

that he had violated a Home Depot Policy which prohibited employees from buying 

discounted inventory until a certain amount of time had passed and the inventory was 

determined to be a final discount.” (Compl. ¶ 90; JSUF ¶ 55.) The Complaint 

identifies April 5, 2015 through the present as the date of publication. (Id. ¶ 92.)

Pursuant to California law, defamation is a tort which involves (a) a 

publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a 

natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 

1185, 1209 (Cal. 2007); Smith v. Maldonado, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 402 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1999). “[D]efamation consists of either libel or slander; ‘slander’ is false and 

unprivileged publication, orally uttered, which tends directly to injure person in 

respect to his office, profession, trade or business, by imputing to him general 

disqualifications in those respects which office or other occupation peculiarly 

requires.” Lee v. Eden Med. Ctr., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 

(citing Cal. Civ. Code § 46). Because summary judgment is a favored remedy for 

defamation claims, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden to show a triable issue exists

and that there is “high probability the plaintiff will ultimately prevail.” Couch v. San 

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Juan Unified Sch. Dist., 33 Cal. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see 

also D.A.R.E. Am. v. Rolling Stone Magazine, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1278 (C.D. Cal. 

2000) (noting that although “it is pointless to declare in the abstract that summary 

judgment is a favored or disfavored remedy,” courts may find “no triable issues 

unless it appears that actual malice may be proved at trial by clear and convincing 

evidence”) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 498, (1984)).

1. Pleading Deficiencies and Evidentiary Shortcomings

As an initial matter, there are fundamental deficiencies with White’s 

defamation claim as pleaded. A plaintiff claiming defamation must identify the 

person who made the statement at issue and to whom it was made. See Wheeler v. 

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 15-cv-2236-CAB-AGS, 2017 WL 1080691, at *11

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017) (citing CACI (2018) Nos. 1704 and 1705; Matson v. 

Dvorak, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (to be actionable, the publication 

must in fact be made by the defendant)). White’s vague references to “Home Depot 

managers” and “fellow employees” fails to plead defamation with the requisite

particularity. See Hardin v. Mendocino Coast Dist. Hosp., No. 17-cv-05554-JST, 

2018 WL 6331009, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2018) (finding insufficient allegations 

that statements were made to “numerous employees”); PAI Corp. v. Integrated Sci. 

Sols., Inc., No. C-06-5349 JSW (JCS), 2007 WL 1229329, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 

2007) (similar). The parties’ joint statement of undisputed facts echoes these 

deficiencies by parroting White’s defamation claim as pleaded. (See JSUF ¶ 55 

(citing Compl. ¶ 90).) 

However, in opposition to summary judgment, White tethers his defamation 

claim to his underlying age discrimination and retaliation claims. He contends that 

ASM Donna defamed him by telling other “Home Depot employees” that he was

terminated because of the wine cooler purchase when age discrimination and 

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retaliation were the true reason. (ECF No. 42 at 15.) A defamation claim premised 

on these factual allegations is not properly before the Court as White never alleged 

that ASM Donna defamed him in this manner. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest 

Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here . . . the complaint does not 

include the necessary factual allegations . . . raising such a claim in a summary 

judgment motion is insufficient to present the claim to the district court”). But even 

accepting White’s new identification of ASM Donna and her alleged defamatory 

statements, (ECF No. 42 at 15), White’s defamation claim lacks evidence. The 

Court’s determination that White’s age discrimination and retaliation claims are 

subject to dismissal vitiates the gravamen of the ASM Donna’s alleged defamation 

in these new factual allegations. White does not otherwise identify through record 

evidence a single Home Depot employee to whom Donna made the alleged 

defamatory statement regarding White’s purchase of the wine cooler. Instead, 

White’s counsel (1) cites to a portion of White’s deposition that does not concern any 

facts underlying his defamation claim, (see ECF No. 42 at 15 (citing White Dep. at 

7–16, 4–17)), and (2) names several Home Depot employees without providing any 

evidentiary support in the record, including White’s own deposition testimony. (Id.

(counsel merely names “Paul,” “all of the salespeople in the appliance department, 

and Roseanne George, A.J. Smith[]”) These unsupported averments are insufficient 

at summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Sorensen, 2017 WL 

6550426, at *12. It would be proper for the Court to grant summary judgment on 

White’s defamation claim on these grounds alone. See Wheeler, 2017 WL 1080691, 

at *11 (lack of any evidence for defamation claim warranted summary judgment).

2. The Common Interest Privilege

Even if White’s claim was adequately fleshed out, Home Depot further 

contends that any alleged defamatory statements are protected by the common 

interest privilege. (ECF No. 30 at 12.) The Court agrees. California Civil Code 

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Section 47 provides in relevant part that, “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is 

one made. . . (c) [i]n a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, 

(1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the 

person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the 

communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to 

give the information.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 47. “Th[e] common interest privilege . . .

has been determined to apply to statements by management and coworkers to other 

coworkers explaining why an employer disciplined an employee.” McGrory v. 

Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154, 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). “Under 

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), defendant generally bears the initial burden 

of establishing that the statement in question was made on a privileged occasion, and 

thereafter the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that the statement was made with 

malice.” Taus, 151 P.3d at 1210. Application of the privilege is a question of law 

where the facts that are alleged to give rise to the privilege are undisputed. 

SDV/ACCI, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 522 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2008).

White does not controvert that ASM Donna’s alleged statements were made 

only to Home Depot employees and concerned a disciplinary action taken against 

him by Home Depot. It is undisputed that Home Depot determined that White 

violated its Associate Purchases policy after an AACG investigation. (Brown Decl.

¶ 13 Ex. Z, AA, BB.) These facts give rise to application of the privilege. See 

Jacques v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00821-SAB, 2016 WL 4548863, at *17 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016); McGrory, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 176. To create a triable 

issue, White must provide evidence that ASM Donna made the alleged statements 

with malice. “[T]he issue is not the truth or falsity of the statements but whether they 

were made recklessly without reasonable belief in their truth.” Cuenca v. Safeway 

San Francisco Employees Fed. Credit Union, 225 Cal. Rptr. 852, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1986); see also Rangel v. Am. Med. Response West, No. 1:09-cv-01467-AWI-BAM, 

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2013 WL 1785907, at *19 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013). White does not contend, nor 

provide evidence on malice, leaving the mere assertion that ASM Donna made the 

alleged statements as the purported proof of malice. “Insofar as the common-interest 

privilege is concerned, malice is not inferred from the communication itself.” Noel 

v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); see also 

Thomsen v. Georgia-Pacific Corrugated, LLC, 190 F. Supp. 3d 959, 975 (E.D. Cal. 

2016). Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment on White’s defamation claim.

H. Claim for Wages Pursuant to California Labor Code

White’s first claim raised in the Complaint is for unpaid wages pursuant to 

various provisions of the California Labor Code. (Compl. ¶¶ 34–41.) White alleges 

that he was a non-exempt hourly employee in his last four years with Home Depot

and (1) performed overtime work for which Home Depot did not pay him because he 

had to answer texts and phone calls “off the clock,” which pushed him over 40 hours 

of work on a weekly basis, and (2) Home Depot did not provide required meal or rest 

break periods because his position did not allow for or discouraged breaks, and he 

did not receive uninterrupted break periods because other associates would 

constantly ask him questions in the authorized break room. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 38–39.) 

White raises these claims independently of his assertions of discrimination.

1. Statute of Limitations

Home Depot argues that any claims that concern wages not paid before 

February 3, 2013 are barred by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 30 at 22.) The 

limitations period applicable to wage claims is generally three years. Cal Civ. P. § 

338(a); Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 155 P.3d 284 (2007) (wages for unpaid 

breaks and meal periods); Aubry v. Goldhor, 247 Cal. Rptr. 205, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1988) (overtime wages). As a practical matter, however, the limitations period is 

four years if the plaintiff raises a claim pursuant to California’s Unfair Competition 

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Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration 

Products Co., 999 P.2d 706, 716 (Cal. 2000). Home Depot applies a four-year 

limitations period to White’s wage claims because he raises a UCL claim. (ECF No. 

30 at 22 n.7.) 

Pursuant to California law, claims for unpaid wages are timely as to all 

paydays falling within the relevant limitations period. Cuadra v. Millan, 952 P.2d 

704, 707 (Cal. 1998), disapproved on other grounds by Samuels v. Mix, 989 P.2d 701 

(Cal. 1999). Claims for unpaid breaks and meal periods accrue upon the employer’s 

“failure to provide required meal and rest breaks.” Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, 

Inc., 274 P.3d 1160, 1168 (Cal. 2012). A plaintiff may recover for each missed break 

and meal period during the statute of limitations. See Van v. Language Line Servs.,

No. 14-cv-03791-LHK, 2016 WL 3143951, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2016); Delgado 

v. Deanda, No. C10-02799 HRL, 2011 WL 7946405, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 

2011). White did not file his Complaint until February 3, 2017, which would bar any 

claims that accrued prior to February 3, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) White concedes that he 

“is not seeking unpaid wages for any time prior to February 3, 2013.” (ECF No. 42 

at 16.) Thus, the relevant time period for White’s wage claims is February 3, 2013 

through his April 5, 2015 termination. 

2. Alleged Unpaid Overtime Wages

California law requires employers to pay non-exempt employees “no less than 

one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for an employee” for “any work in 

excess of 40 hours in any one workweek.” Cal. Lab. Code § 510(a). An employee 

may establish that an employer is liable for unpaid wages based on work allegedly 

performed off-the-clock if the employer “knew or should have known that off theclock work” actually occurred. Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 273 P.3d 513,

544 (Cal. 2012). California courts recognize a presumption that employees are doing 

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no work while clocked out, which employees have the burden to rebut. Id. While an 

employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of the hours its employees work is an 

issue of fact, on summary judgment the Court must determine whether evidence has 

been presented that would support a finding that off-the-clock work occurred without 

such knowledge. Jong v. Kaiser Health Found., Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 881 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 

Home Depot provides evidence that it had a policy prohibiting hourly 

employees from working off the clock, including specifically pursuant to California 

law, which White acknowledged in 2012. (ECF No. 30 at 22; White Dep. at 245:1–

246:12; Brown Decl. ¶ 4 Ex. C; id. ¶ 7 Ex G.) It is undisputed that White understood 

he had to punch in and out of Home Depot’s timekeeping system. (JSUF ¶ 13.) 

Home Depot additionally provides copies of White’s January 2013 through April 

2015 time records, which show when White clocked in and out of work. (Brown 

Decl. ¶ 7 Ex. H.) When a defendant’s off-the-clock policy disavows such work, as 

consistent with state law, an employee’s clocking out creates a presumption they are 

doing no work. Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 273 P.3d 513 (Cal. 2012). 

This evidence thus creates a presumption that White did no work after he clocked 

out. White fails to overcome this presumption. 

“To prove an off-the-clock claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she actually 

worked off the clock, that she was not compensated for it, and that the employer was 

aware or should have been aware that she was performing off the clock work.” Ortiz 

v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 1117614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 19, 2014) (emphasis added); York v. Starbucks Corp., No. CV 08-07919 GAF 

(PJWx), 2011 WL 8199987, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) (“In other words, proof 

of an off-the-clock claim requires proof that the employer had actual or constructive 

knowledge that [the plaintiff] performed work for which she was not paid.” (citing 

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White v. Starbucks Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007)). White’s 

summary judgment opposition regarding his unpaid overtime claim fails to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact. 

White’s counsel first contends that “oftentimes, White clocked out at the end 

of his shift at HD,” but then “would stop at a customer’s place to check on the 

progress of the order.” (ECF No. 42 at 16.) There is no evidence in the record 

substantiating counsel’s averment. Therefore, it is not sufficient to overcome 

summary judgment. White does declare that “[t]here were times” when “it was 

impossible to complete the work assigned to him without working off the clock” and 

he “could not get his work done without incurring overtime.” (White Decl. ¶¶ 21–

22.) At his deposition, however, when asked whether he worked off the clock, White 

testified: “I did not work off the clock.” (White Dep. at 249:11–15.) In view of his 

earlier testimony, White’s subsequent assertion in his summary judgment affidavit 

cannot show a genuine dispute of material fact. See Block v. City of Los Angeles, 

253 F.3d 410, 419 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A party cannot create a genuine issue of 

material fact to survive summary judgment by contradicting his earlier version of the 

facts.”); Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] 

party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition 

testimony”). 

Second, White’s counsel also contends that White was forced to work off the 

clock because after clocking out, he was required to wait in line for approval to leave. 

(ECF No. 42 at 16.) White declares that Home Depot made him work off the clock 

for standing in line waiting for approval. (White Decl. ¶ 22.) This subsequent 

assertion in White’s summary judgment affidavit similarly contradicts White’s 

deposition admission that he did not perform work off the clock. See Block, 253 F.3d 

at 419 n. 2; Kennedy v, 952 F.2d at 266. Further, “[t]he Ninth Circuit ‘has refused to 

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find a ‘genuine issue [of fact]’ where the only evidence presented is ‘uncorroborated 

and self-serving’ testimony.’” Cole v. CRST, Inc., No. 08-1570-VPA (SPx), 2017 

WL 1234215, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2017) (citing Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1061). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment 

on White’s claim for unpaid overtime wages.

3. Meal Breaks 

Home Depot’s meal breaks obligations are “governed by two complementary 

and occasionally overlapping sources of authority: the provisions of the [California] 

Labor Code, enacted by the Legislature, and a series of 18 wage orders, adopted by 

the [Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”)].” Brinker Rest. Corp., 273 P.3d at 

527. Labor Code § 226.7(b) provides that “[a]n employer shall not require an 

employee to work during a meal or rest or recovery period mandated pursuant to an 

applicable statute, or applicable regulation, standard, or order of the Industrial 

Welfare Commission[.]” Cal. Lab. Code. § 226.7(b). Labor Code § 512(a) in turn 

requires an employer to provide an employee working for a period of more than five 

hours a day with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes.” Cal. Labor Code § 

512(a); see also Wage Order 16-2001, §§ 10, 11. “If an employer fails to provide an 

employee a meal or rest or recovery period in accordance with a state law . . . the 

employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular 

rate of compensation for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery period is not 

provided.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(c).

Home Depot argues that White’s time records “plainly reflect that White took 

every lunch period to which he was entitled” and “White admitted at deposition that 

he never performed work while off-the-clock.” (ECF No. 30 at 23; White Dep. at 

249:10–15.) Home Depot’s Timekeeping Policy requires associates to “clock out for 

meal breaks and clock back in before returning to work.” (Brown Decl. Ex. G at 35.) 

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In his opposition, White fails to address Home Depot’s argument regarding meal 

breaks. (ECF No. 42 at 16.) The Court has reviewed the time records submitted by 

Home Depot for the relevant time period, which generally reflect that White clocked 

out in the middle of each work day for roughly 30 minutes. (See generally Brown 

Decl. Ex. H.) Home Depot expressly acknowledges that White’s time records reflect 

that White twice took less than a 30-minute break for lunch and was “immediately”

compensated with an one hour of pay for each occasion. (ECF No. 3- at 23 n.8; 

Brown Decl. Ex. H at 98, 102.) Notwithstanding Home Depot’s express reference to 

these instances, White does not even attempt to premise his meals break claim on 

them. It is not the Court’s duty to make White’s summary judgment arguments for 

him and the Court will not do so. See Wright v. Old Gringo Inc., No. 17-cv-1996-

BAS-MSB, 2018 WL 6568199, at * 12 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2018); Bladeroom Grp. 

Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:15-cv-01370-EJD, 2018 WL 514923, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 23, 2018) (“[I]t is not the Court’s duty to create arguments or find evidence” for 

the parties at the summary judgment stage); Blankenship v. Cox, No. 3:05-CV00357-RAM, 2007 WL 844891, at *12 (D. Nev. Mar. 19, 2007) (“It is not the court’s 

duty to do Defendants’ legal research.”). Accordingly, in the absence of argument 

and evidence from White, the Court concludes White has failed to show a genuine 

dispute and grants summary judgment to Home Depot.

4. Rest Breaks

California law also requires that employers provide a non-exempt employee 

with an uninterrupted, ten-minute rest break for every four hours of work performed. 

See Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7; Wage Order 16-2001, § 12. Home Depot argues that (1) 

Home Depot’s Timekeeping Policy informs hourly associates in California that they 

are required to a 10-minute break for each 4 hours of work during which associates 

“should be relieved of all duty” and (2) White fails to produce “evidence suggesting 

that Home Depot discouraged or prevented him taking rest breaks.” (ECF No. 30 at 

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24; Brown Decl. ¶ 7 Ex. G.) The Court agrees that summary judgment is warranted.

Much of White’s rest breaks claim—which concerns Home Depot’s alleged 

failure to ensure that White’s breaks would not be interrupted—is not actionable as 

pleaded. California law “only requires employers to make rest breaks available, but 

does not require employers to ensure that employees actually take their rest periods.” 

Cleveland v. Groceryworks.com, LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 924, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 

(citation omitted); Lanzarone v. Guardsmark Holdings, Inc., No CV06-1136 R 

(PLAx), 2006 WL 4393465, *6 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“Under California law, rest periods 

need only be authorized and permitted, they need not be enforced or actually taken.”). 

Thus, “[w]ork by an employee during a break does not, by itself, breach the 

employer’s obligation to provide the break.” Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los 

Angeles Cty., 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). In opposition to 

summary judgment, White’s counsel contends that “White often missed rest periods, 

not of his own choosing, but because he was helping customers, which is the number 

one priority of HD.” (ECF No. 42 at 16.) Counsel cites no evidence in the record to 

substantiate this assertion and White’s declaration does not address it—or rest 

breaks—at all. (Id.; see generally White Decl.) Accordingly, the Court concludes 

that White has failed to show there is a genuine dispute regarding this claim. Home 

Depot is entitled to summary judgment.

I. Violation of California Business and Professions Code 

White alleges that Home Depot violated the UCL by failing to pay him all 

wages due, requiring him to work during meal and rest periods, and for 

“[d]iscriminating against older, more highly compensated workers, such as the 

Plaintiff in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.” (Compl. ¶ 

106.) In opposing summary judgment, White further premises this claim on 

violations of California wage laws. (ECF No. 42 at 16.) The UCL prohibits “any 

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unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 

17200. The unlawful prong of Section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and 

treats them as unlawful practices independently actionable under Section 17200. 

Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 668 n.1 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 1990). Because the Court has granted summary judgment for Home Depot 

on all underlying laws that could comprise the basis for White’s “unlawful” prong 

UCL claim, Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment on this claim well. 

J. Punitive Damages

Finally, Home Depot moves for summary judgment on White’s request for 

punitive damages. (ECF No. 30 at 24–25.) Punitive damages are authorized by 

California Civil Code Section 3294, which requires the plaintiff prove “by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or 

malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). Because the Court has granted summary 

judgment for Home Depot on the claims for which White seeks punitive damages, 

Home Depot is also entitled to summary judgment on White’s request for punitive 

damages. See Sako, 2015 WL 5022307, at *21 (granting summary judgment on 

request for punitive damages because court granted defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on the underlying related claims); Munson v. Splice Commc’ns, Inc., No. 

12-cv-5089-JCS, 2013 WL 6659454, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Dec.16, 2013) (same).

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that:

1. The Court GRANTS Home Depot’s motion for summary judgment in 

its entirety. (ECF No. 30.) 

2. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE White’s claims in his 

Complaint. (ECF No. 1 Ex. A.) 

3. Pursuant to Rule 58, the Clerk of the Court SHALL ENTER A FINAL 

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JUDGMENT for Home Depot and against White in a separate document.

4. After entry of final judgment, the Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 13, 2019

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