Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05669/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05669-37/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

The Regents of the University of California,

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

 v.

Micro Therapeutics Inc., et al.,

Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party

Plaintiffs

 v.

Boston Scientific Corp., et al.,

 Third Party Defendants.

 /

NO. C 03-05669 JW 

ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANTS’

OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SEEBORG’S ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 9, 2007, Magistrate Judge Seeborg issued an Order Re: Motions to Compel and

Motions for Protective Orders. (hereafter, “Order,” Docket Item No. 535.) The Order found, inter

alia, that two communications between Plaintiff’s prosecution counsel and Franco Cossu (“Cossu”),

an Italian-to-English translator, were not discoverable because they were potentially protected by the

attorney-client privilege. On April 23, 2007, Defendants filed their objection to the Order. 

(hereafter, “Objection,” Docket Item No. 578.) The Court conducted a hearing on June 5, 2007. 

Based on the papers submitted to date and oral arguments of counsel, the Court SUSTAINS

Defendants’ Objection to Magistrate Judge Seeborg’s Order. 

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1

 Specifically, Defendants contend that Cossu mistranslated one critical word, rottura. 

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II. BACKGROUND

This is a patent infringement case in which Plaintiff alleges that Defendants infringed twelve

of Plaintiff’s patents relating to devices and apparatuses for occluding vascular cavities. 

Defendants’ Fourth Affirmative Defense is that Plaintiff’s patents are unenforceable by reason of

inequitable conduct for two reasons. First, Plaintiff allegedly initially failed to disclose to the Patent

and Trademark Office (“PTO”) the 1983 Congresso Nazionale Paper (and the prior art experiments

described within) (hereafter, “Article”), written in Italian by the co-inventor of the claimed

technology and Plaintiff’s then-employee, Dr. Guido Guglielmi. Second, Plaintiff subsequently

provided to the PTO an intentionally false translation and mischaracterization of the paper;1

 the

translation was provided by Cossu. (See First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and

Counterclaim of Micro Therapeutics Inc. and Dendron GmbH; Jury Demand; Certificate of

Interested Persons, Docket Item No. 46; see also Order at 7.)

Defendants sought discovery of Plaintiff’s counsel’s communications with Cossu; Plaintiff

withheld two of the documents sought on grounds of attorney-client privilege. (Order at 7.) The

first document is an undated note sent by Cossu to Plaintiff’s prosecution counsel, Attorney Dawes. 

The second document is a letter from Dawes to Cossu dated May 15, 1996. Both documents are

described as, “Communication with patent counsel relating to translation services for Italian article.” 

(Declaration of Gabrielle E. Bina in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of

Documents Ex. A, Docket Item No. 393.)

Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has proffered two defenses to Defendants’ charge of

inequitable conduct. First, Plaintiff contends that Cossu’s translation is accurate, not erroneous or

misleading. (See, e.g. Plaintiff’s Opposition to and Defendants’ Objection to and Motion for

Review of Magistrate Judge Seeborg’s Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of

Documents at 2, hereafter, “Opposition,” Docket Item No. 638.) Second, Plaintiff has repeatedly

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2

 (See, e.g. Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment of

No Inequitable Conduct and in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 15,

Docket Item No. 285 (“The fact that brief telephonic communication occurred among Mr. Davis,

Mr. Cossu, and Dr. Guglielmi – the details of which are privileged – is not improper . . . the

conversation did not negate the independence or accuracy of Mr. Cossu’s translation, as he

unequivocally testified.”); Motion to Strike Inadmissible Evidence Submitted in Support of

Defendant MTI’s Supplemental Summary Judgment Brief at 2-4, Docket Item No. 284 (“Daniel

Dawes, The Regents’ attorney responsible for prosecuting the patents-in-suit, testified at length to

the circumstances involving his decision to retain an independent, Italian translator, Franco Cossu . .

. MTI also knows based on its own cross-examination that Mr. Cossu arrived at the translation of the

word [“rottura”] independently and, in fact, prepared the translation before ever speaking to Dr.

Guglielmi or Dawes on May 23 and 24, 1996 . . .”) (emphasis added); The Regents of the University

of California’s Supplemental Reply Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,

Docket Item No. 295 (“Mr. Cossu’s sworn testimony not only confirmed the accuracy and

independence of his translation, but he also testified that he translated it the way he did before

speaking to Dr. Guglielmi and that it was the only translation he considered.”); Reply in Support of

the Regents’ Motion to Strike Inadmissible Evidence Submitted in Support of Defendant MTI’s

Supplemental Summary Judgment Brief at 7, Docket Item No. 294 (“Mr. Cossu testified that he

arrived at translation of the Italian word “roturra” (sic) on his own, that he did not consider any

alternative translation, that this translation was included in the original draft that he prepared, and

that he never sent any other translation of the Italian Paper to Dr. Guglielmi or Mr. Dawes other than

the draft that was ultimately provided to the PTO.”))

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contended that it cannot be charged with any errors that might exist in the translation, because the

translation was independent.2

 

Defendants filed a motion to compel production of the two documents that Plaintiff withheld. 

Id. On April 9, 2007, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion, finding as follows: 

[Plaintiff] has simply made an argument—that Cossu’s translation was

independent—that cannot be reconciled with its present insistence on withholding the

documents in dispute. To be sure, Cossu has testified that he arrived at his translation

“independently,” but without full disclosure of all communications between him and

any [of Plaintiff’s] representatives. An inference, therefore, can be drawn that he

may have been given instructions or directions, or even simply exposed to contextual

information, that possibly compromised his independence or influenced his

translation choices, even if only to a subtle degree . . . 

[Plaintiff] has proffered its assertion that the Cossu translation is “independent” as

part of its defense, but is resisting allowing full inquiry into whether the translation

could have been influenced by the suggestions of counsel. At this juncture, however,

UC has only made the argument, (sic) it has neither designated Cossu as a witness for

trial, nor otherwise presented this argument to a finder of fact in a manner analogous

to presenting an expert witness. Accordingly, it would be premature to conclude that

disclosure of the documents in dispute must be compelled for reasons akin to those

that lead courts to require disclosure of similar materials in the context of designated

expert witnesses. The motion will therefore be denied at this juncture, with the

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3

 Federal Circuit law governs whether particular materials are discoverable in a patent case,

if the materials relate to an issue of substantive patent law. Echostar, 448 F.3d at 1298.

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understanding that the issue may need to be revisited depending on the use UC makes

of the translation at issue.

(Order at 8-9.) Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Objection to and Motion for Review of

Magistrate Judge Seeborg’s Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of

Documents.

III. DISCUSSION

A district court may modify a magistrate judge's ruling on a non-dispositive matter, such as

an order to compel discovery, if the order is "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Bahn v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1414 (9th Cir.

1991). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 72-2, the court may not grant a motion objecting to a

Magistrate Judge’s order without first giving the opposing party an opportunity to brief the matter. 

See Civ. L.R. 72-2. In this case, Plaintiffs have opposed Defendants’ Objection. (See Docket Item

No. 638.)

Defendants contend that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff’s counsel’s

communications with Cossu are protected by the attorney-client privilege. (Objection at 6.) The

attorney-client privilege protects disclosure of communications between a client and its attorney.3 In

re Echostar Communications Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The purpose of the

attorney-client privilege is to promote full and frank communication between a client and its

attorney so that the client can make well-informed legal decisions and conform its activities to the

law. Id. at 1300-01.

The general rule is that disclosure of confidential communications or attorney work-product

to a third party constitutes a waiver of privilege as to the items disclosed. Bd. of Trustees v. Roche

Molecular Sys., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 618, 622 (N.D. Cal. 2006). An exception to this general rule

occurs where privileged information is disclosed to “one employed to assist the lawyer in the

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rendition of professional legal services.” Samuels v. Mitchell, 155 F.R.D. 195, 198 (N.D. Cal.

1994). Within the patent context, courts have found that communications between an inventor and

prosecuting counsel in anticipation of the filing of a patent application are also privileged. Adv.

Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372, 375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 

The parties particularly dispute the significance of United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2nd

Cir. 1961), one of the leading cases on the attorney-client privilege and communications with thirdparties. In Kovel, a non-lawyer accountant employed by a law firm refused to testify before a grand

jury concerning his communications with a client, citing attorney-client privilege. Id. at 919-20. 

The Kovel court analogized the accountant’s situation to that of a foreign language interpreter. The

court found that where an attorney and a client require an interpreter to communicate, the privilege

extends to the client’s communications with the non-lawyer interpreter where: (1) the attorney

engages an interpreter to provide a literal translation of the client’s story; (2) the attorney, who is

minimally competent in the foreign language, has an interpreter in the room to assist with client

communications; (3) the client supplies the translator; or (4) the attorney sends the client to an

interpreter proficient in the foreign language with directions to interview the client and summarize

the interview for the attorney. Id. at 921. In each scenario, the court held that the policy

justifications of the attorney-client privilege were satisfied. Id. at 921-22. Applying these principles

in the accounting context, the court found:

[T]he presence of the accountant, whether hired by the lawyer or by the client, while

the client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not destroy the

privilege, any more than would that of the linguist in the second or third variations of

the foreign language theme discussed above; the presence of the accountant is

necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client

and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit. By the same token, if the

lawyer has directed the client, either in the specific case or generally, to tell his story

in the first instance to an accountant engaged by the lawyer, who is then to interpret it

so that the lawyer may better give legal advice, communications by the client

reasonably related to that purpose ought fall within the privilege . . . What is vital to

the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for the purpose of

obtaining legal advice from the lawyer. 

Id. at 922; see also Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 247 (1st Cir. 2002).

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In this case, there is presently no evidence before the Court that communications between

Cossu and Dawes, or Cossu and Dr. Guglielmi, occurred in order to assist Dawes in advising

Plaintiff. For instance, there is no evidence that Cossu was hired to work with Dr. Guglielmi and

Dawes (1) to generate the most favorable translation to Plaintiff of which the Article was readily

susceptible or (2) to assist Dr. Guglielmi in explaining to Dawes what he intended the word “rottura”

to mean, as co-author of the Article. Both of these examples are similar to Kovel: in each case,

Cossu’s translation would have been in aid of Dawes’ representation of his client and related

communications between the three individuals would likely have been privileged. Rather, Cossu

(according to Plaintiff’s own representations to the Court) was retained to produce an independent

translation of a publically available article for public submission to the PTO. It does not advance the

policy underlying the attorney-client privilege—of full and frank communication between a client

and attorney—to extend the privilege to attorney or client communications with a third-party,

“independent” translator.

Accordingly, the Court declines to find that Cossu was employed to assist Dawes in

rendering professional legal services to Plaintiff. Phrased differently, the Court declines to find that

the two disputed communications (made between Cossu and Dawes) were made in confidence for

the purpose of Plaintiff obtaining legal advice from Dawes. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ Objection to Magistrate Judge Seeborg’s Order. Plaintiff

shall produce the two withheld documents to Defendants within fourteen (14) days of this Order. 

Plaintiff may redact any portion of the documents not pertaining to Cossu’s provision of services as

an independent translator. 

The parties shall file a joint status report with the Court within 21 days of this Order

confirming that Plaintiff has produced the documents and indicating whether the documents were

redacted. If either of the documents were redacted and on the motion of either party, the Court will

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schedule an in camera review of the unredacted documents to determine whether the redacted

portions are protected by the attorney-client privilege.

Dated: June 6, 2007 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Allison H Stiles astiles@goodwinprocter.com

Amanda Marie Kessel akessel@goodwinprocter.com

Autumn Noelle Nero autumn.nero@hellerehrman.com

Charlene M. Morrow cmorrow@fenwick.com

Charles G. Curtis ccurtis@hewm.com

Chien-Ju Alice Chuang achuang@fenwick.com

Christopher T. Holding cholding@goodwinprocter.com

Colin G. Sandercock csandercock@proskauer.com

David Edwin Jones dejones@hewm.com

David J. Harth dharth@hewm.com

David L. Anstaett david.anstaett@hellerehrman.com

Gabrielle E. Bina gbina@hewm.com

Henry Zuzueta Carbajal hcarbajal@fenwick.com

J. Anthony Downs jdowns@goodwinprocter.com

John S. Skilton jskilton@hewm.com

John S. Skilton jskilton@hewm.com

Julie Lynn Fieber jfieber@flk.com

Lissa Rose Koop Lissa.Koop@Hellerehrman.com

Lynn H. Pasahow lpasahow@fenwick.com

Michael Francis Kelleher mkelleher@flk.com

Michael G. Strapp mstrapp@goodwinprocter.com

Michael J. Shuster mshuster@fenwick.com

Michael K. Plimack mplimack@hewm.com

Michelle M. Umberger mumberger@hewm.com

Nicole Elise Perroton nperroton@goodwinprocter.com

Patrick E. Premo ppremo@fenwick.com

Patrick S. Thompson pthompson@goodwinprocter.com

Paul F. Ware pware@goodwinprocter.com

Rita A. Hao rita.hao@ucop.edu

Roland Schwillinski rschwillinski@goodwinprocter.com

Sarah C. Walkenhorst swalkenhorst@hewm.com

Wendy Lynn Bjerknes Wbjerknes@fenwick.com

Dated: June 6, 2007 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: /s/ JW Chambers 

Elizabeth Garcia

Courtroom Deputy

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