Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02610/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02610-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1986 Neglect of Duty

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES E. ROBINSON, SR.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al.

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-02610 JSW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants the City and Count of San Francisco (“City”), Municipal Transit Agency (“MUNI”),

Michael Burns (“Burns”), and Kathleen Forrester (“Forrester”) (collectively “City Defendants”). 

Having considered the parties’ pleadings, relevant legal authority, and the record in this matter,

the Court finds the motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-

1(b). Accordingly, the hearing date set for December 16, 2005 is VACATED.

The City Defendants’ motion is GRANTED, with leave to amend as set forth in the

terms of this Order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Robinson,

who was a pimp in the 1970’s and 1980’s but later became a minister, ran for the position of

First Vice President of the Executive Board of the Transport Workers of America Local 250A

(“Local 250A”). (SAC, ¶ 1.) Robinson wrote a novel about his former experiences as a pimp,

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and, prior to the union election, an article about Robinson and his former way of life appeared in

the San Francisco Examiner. (Id., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) 

Robinson alleges that he successfully defeated the incumbent and was elected First Vice

President on December 3, 2002. (Id., ¶ 4.) He claims, however, that members of his union

impeded his ability to perform his duties, that Local 250A’s president claimed he was elected

Third Vice President rather than First Vice President, and that he was harassed by members of

Local 250A. (Id., ¶¶ 5-10, 12.)

Robinson’s novel was published on May 15, 2003, and on June 4, 2003, another article

about his former life and his then current union activities appeared in the San Francisco Weekly. 

(Id., ¶¶ 16-17, Exs. H, I.) On June 4, 2003, in apparent response to the publication of

Robinson’s novel and the San Francisco Weekly article, the Executive Board of Local 250A

held a meeting. (Id., ¶ 18.) Robinson claims that union officials suggested that Robinson give

up his office. (Id.) 

The bulk of the allegations in the SAC address actions by defendants who have been

dismissed from this case. However, Robinson claims that on January 15, 2003, Burns “initiated

a thirty (30) day moratorium, whereby any and all new union officials were to be trained by their

predecessor,” the first time such a moratorium had been established. (Id., ¶ 6.) Robinson

alleges that Forrester “aggressively solicited workers of [Local 250A] to sign a petition to

remove” Robinson from his position with Local 250A. (Id.. ¶ 21.) Robinson further alleges that

Burns “did affix to Plaintiff’s and all workers’ paychecks with [sic] a bias communique in

regard to Plaintiff for sexual harassment ...” and that Forrester “submitted a biased and

misleading communication to” Local 250A’s president. (Id., ¶¶ 27-28.)

On June 27, 2003, following a suspension hearing on charges of sexual harassment and

selling his novel on company property, Robinson was removed from his office. (Id., ¶¶ 26-31.)

Robinson initiated suit on June 28, 2004, and on March 17, 2005, he filed his Second

Amended Complaint, in which he alleges causes of action: (1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2)

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); under the common law of conspiracy; (4) for negligent infliction of

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1 After the briefing on this motion was complete, the Court received

correspondence directly from Mr. Robinson enclosing materials that he claims support his

allegations of on-going harassment. The Court has not considered these materials in ruling

on this motion.

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emotional distress; (5) for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (6) for declaratory

relief.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss should

not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can show no set of facts

supporting his or her claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also De La Cruz

v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint

is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in

the complaint are taken to be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). The

court, however, is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations

if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged. Cleggy v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 286 (1986)).

 As a general rule, “a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994),

overruled on other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted). The Court may, however, consider the facts alleged in the complaint,

documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint

when the authenticity of those documents is not questioned, and other matters of which the

Court can take judicial notice. Branch, 14 F.3d at 453-54; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richmond

& Feiner Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989).1

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B. Robinson’s Section 1985 Claim Is Dismissed With Leave to Amend.

To establish a claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), “a plaintiff must allege and

prove four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or

indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; 4)

whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege

of a citizen of the United States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corporation, 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th

Cir. 1992) (citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S.

825, 828-29 (1983)) (“Scott”). 

To establish the second element of a Section 1985(3) claim, a plaintiff must allege and

prove that the deprivation of the right in question was “motivated by ‘some racial, or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.’” Id.

(quoting Griffith v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)); see also McCalden v. California

Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1992) (“‘the plaintiff must be a member of a class

that requires special federal assistance in protecting its civil rights’” ) (quoting Gerritsen v. de la

Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

In Scott, the Supreme Court held, in the context of a Section 1985(3) claim based on

alleged violations of First Amendment rights, that conduct taken by union members against nonmembers was not subject to the protection of Section 1985 where the alleged conspirators were

driven by an economic or commercial motive. Scott, 463 U.S. at 838-39. Subsequent to the

Supreme Court’s decision in Scott, in Sever, supra, the Ninth Circuit stated that its general rule

is that section 1985(3) is extended beyond race only when the class

in question can show that there has been a governmental

determination that its members require and warrant special federal

assistance in protecting their civil rights. ... More specifically, we

require either that the courts have designated the class in question

as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring more exacting

scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through legislation that the

class required special protection.

Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

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2 The City Defendants requested either that the Court not consider this

supplemental pleading or give them leave to address the arguments therein. Because the

Court has considered it only for its lack of opposition to Defendants’ arguments on the state

law claims, the City Defendants’ requests are denied.

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In this case, Robinson alleges that “the conspiratorial purpose was financial,” and has

not alleged facts demonstrating that the City Defendants were motivated by animus based on his

membership in a protected class. The Court cannot, however, conclude that there are no facts

upon which Robinson could base such a claim. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Section 1985(3) claim. If Robinson intends to pursue this claim,

and if he can set forth facts alleging that the purported conspiracy was motivated based upon his

membership in a protected class, he is granted leave to amend.

C. Robinson’s State Tort Law Claims Are Dismissed With Leave to Amend.

Robinson has not disputed any of the Defendant’s arguments as to his claims for

common law conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of

emotional distress. Indeed, in his supplemental memorandum in opposition to the City

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, he states that he “seeks to proceed ... on his § 1983 claims,” and

does not address the remaining claims at all.2 

With respect to the state law claims, Robinson has not alleged compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), nor has he attempted to refute the City Defendants’

assertion that he has not complied with the CTCA. Pursuant to the CTCA, a plaintiff is required

to file a claim with a municipal entity prior to filing a lawsuit. See, e g., State v. Superior Court,

32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1243 (2004). That alone would warrant dismissal without prejudice of the

state law claims. However, dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is

also warranted because the factual allegations insufficiently allege extreme or outrageous

conduct. See, e.g., Cochran v. Cochran, 64 Cal. App. 4th 488, 496 (1998) (“the tort does not

extend to ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities”)

(emphasis omitted). 

“[T]he negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort of

negligence.” Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588 (1989)

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3 Robinson’s claim for declaratory relief is dependent upon the remainder of his

claims. Accordingly, if he intends to pursue that cause of action, he also is granted leave to

amend that cause of action in accordance with the terms of this Order.

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(quoting 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 838, p. 195 (emphasis

omitted)). Accordingly, Robinson must establish the traditional elements of a tort claim,

namely that (1) the City Defendants owed him a duty of care, (2) they breached that duty, and

(3) caused him damages. Id. He has not done so and dismissal of the claim for negligent

infliction of emotional distress is warranted on this ground as well. 

Finally, because Robinson’s claim for common law conspiracy depends upon the

commission of an actual tort, and because the Court has concluded that the facts alleged in the

SAC are insufficient to allege such a tort, that claim is dismissed as well. See Applied

Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 510-12 (2004) (noting that civil

conspiracy is not a cause of action but a doctrine imposing liability on persons who share with

tortfeasors a common plan or design in perpetration of the tort).

Again, however, the Court cannot conclude on this record that there are no facts that

could support these claims. Accordingly, the state tort law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. If Robinson intends to pursue these claims, if he can allege compliance with the

CTCA, and if he can allege facts beyond those set forth in the SAC, he shall be given leave to

amend those claims.

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D. Robinson Shall Be Given Leave to Amend His Section 1983 Claim.

The City Defendants have also moved to dismiss Robinson’s Section 1983 claim on the

ground that he has not alleged, and cannot allege, facts demonstrating that the City Defendants

deprived him of his union position or were motivated by racial animus. In his opposition to the

City Defendants’ motion, Robinson asserts that his Section 1983 claim is premised upon

violation of his First Amendment rights. 

Because the bulk of the allegations in the SAC are directed to the actions of defendants

whom Robinson has dismissed, because the allegations as to this claim against the City

Defendants are vague, and because the Court is dismissing Robinson’s other claims without

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prejudice, the Court shall afford Robinson one final opportunity to amend his complaint to

clearly set forth his Section 1983 claims against the City, MUNI, Burns and Forrester. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with

leave to amend. Robinson shall file his Third Amended Complaint, in accordance with the

terms of this Order, by December 23, 2005. The City Defendants shall file their responsive

pleading twenty days after service of the amended complaint. 

This matter shall be set for a case management conference on Friday, February 10,

2006 at 1:30 p.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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