Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02116/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

15-CV-2116-AJB (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE HARRINGTON,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15-CV-2116-AJB 

(JMA)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Steve Harrington (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 7.] Respondent Daniel Paramo 

(“Respondent”) filed a motion to dismiss the Petition. [Doc. No. 15.] The motion 

to dismiss is opposed by Petitioner. [Doc. No. 20.] This Court has reviewed the 

Petition, Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner’s opposition, and all 

supporting documents. After a thorough review, this Court RECOMMENDS

Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED and the Petition DISMISSED. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

California State Courts

On May 28, 2009, Petitioner was convicted of one count of burglary 

Case 3:15-cv-02116-AJB-JMA Document 22 Filed 11/08/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2

15-CV-2116-AJB (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 459 in the County of San Diego, Superior Court 

of California, Case No. SDC216977. [Doc. No. 1, pp. 1- 2.] Petitioner directly 

appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the 

Superior Court’s conviction on March 15, 2011. [Lodgment No. 1 & 2.] On May 

18, 2011, the California Supreme Court also affirmed Petitioner’s conviction

when it denied his petition for review. [Id.]

On December 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

with the California Supreme Court [Case No. S198407], challenging his 2009 

conviction. [Lodgment 5, pp. 2-3.] Petitioner argued his 14th Amendment Due 

Process rights were violated as there was insufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s determination that his prior out-of-state burglary was a serious 

felony. [Id.] On March 28, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied the 

petition. [Lodgment 6.]

Federal Courts

On August 31, 2011, prior to filing the instant Petition, Petitioner filed 

Harrington v. Neotti, 11CV2016-H(MDD), another petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in this Court, in which he challenged his 2009 conviction and sentence in 

Superior Court Case No. SDC216977, arguing he was entitled to relief due to 

juror misconduct. [Lodgment 2, 3.] District Judge Marilyn L. Huff issued an order

in that case on September 13, 2012 denying that petition on the merits. 

[Lodgment 2, pp. 6-7.]

Petitioner filed this action on September 21, 2015. [Doc. No. 1.] The

Petition was dismissed without prejudice because Petitioner failed to satisfy the 

filing fee requirement. [Doc. No. 1, 2.] Proceeding in forma pauperis, Petitioner 

then filed a First Amended Petition on February 19, 2016. [Doc. No. 7.] In his 

First Amended Petition, Petitioner argues his 6th and 14th Amendment rights 

were violated in Superior Court Case No. SDC216977, and that the trial court 

illegally enhanced his sentence and relied upon insufficient evidence in 

Case 3:15-cv-02116-AJB-JMA Document 22 Filed 11/08/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3

15-CV-2116-AJB (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

determining his prior out-of-state burglary conviction was a serious felony. [Doc. 

No. 7.] On July 13, 2016, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing the

Petition is both time-barred and successive under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). On August 18, 2016, Petitioner filed an 

opposition to the motion to dismiss. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Petition Is Time-Barred Under the AEDPA

The AEDPA’s statute of limitation applies to Petitioner’s claims in this 

Court. Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-1287 (9th 

Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of rhg. and rhg. en banc, cert. denied, 522 

U.S. 1099 (1998), overruled on other grounds in Calderon v. U.S. District Court, 

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1063 (1999). “A 1-year 

period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). The period of limitation begins to run on one of the following: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable 

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

Case 3:15-cv-02116-AJB-JMA Document 22 Filed 11/08/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4

15-CV-2116-AJB (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(A)-(D). In calculating the statute of limitations, “the time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall 

not be counted toward any period of limitation. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

However, the statute of limitations does run while a federal habeas corpus 

petition is pending. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001)

The AEDPA statute of limitations for habeas review of Petitioner’s 

conviction began to run on August 17, 2011, 90 days after the California 

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on May 18, 2011. 1 See

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, absent 

any applicable tolling, Petitioner had until August 16, 2012 to file his federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. Petitioner, however, filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on December 1, 2011, 

thus tolling the statute of limitations until that petition was denied on March 28, 

2012. [Lodgment Nos. 5 & 6.]; See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Nino v. 

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). At the time Petitioner filed his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court, 106 days

(August 17, 2011 to, and including, November 30, 2011) of the statute of 

limitations period had lapsed. The statute of limitations was then tolled during 

the time the petition for writ of habeas corpus was pending before the California 

Supreme Court (December 1, 2011 to, and including, March 28, 2012). When 

the statute of limitations began to run again, on March 29, 2012, 259 days 

remained, resulting in a deadline of December 12, 2012 for Petitioner to timely 

 

1 See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (When calculating the statute of limitations the 

day of the event that triggers the running of the statute of limitations is not counted. Instead the calculation of the 

statute of limitations period begins on the next day.)

Case 3:15-cv-02116-AJB-JMA Document 22 Filed 11/08/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5

15-CV-2116-AJB (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

initiate federal habeas review of his conviction in San Diego County Superior 

Court, Case No. SDC216977. 

Petitioner did not file this case until September 21, 2015, over two years 

and nine months beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

2 Petitioner has 

also failed to prove he is entitled to equitable tolling because he has not shown 

“(1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); 

See also Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002) (Petitioner has the 

burden of demonstrating the limitation period was tolled.) As a result, Petitioner 

is time-barred under the AEDPA and the Petition should be dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

B. The Petition Is Successive 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, a Court is not required to consider a writ of 

habeas corpus when “it appears that the legality of such detention has been 

determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application. . . .” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244. A claim presented in a second or successive petition that was 

not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of 

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 

by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of 

the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no 

 

2

 Although Petitioner’s first federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was pending from August 31, 2011 to 

September 13, 2012, the pendency of that action is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis of the timeliness of the 

Petition, as an application for federal habeas relief does not toll the AEDPA’s statute of limitations period. See

Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82.

Case 3:15-cv-02116-AJB-JMA Document 22 Filed 11/08/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6

15-CV-2116-AJB (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the 

underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Petitioner does not allege any facts to establish his new 

Petition satisfies the requirements of § 2244(b)(2). It does not rely on a new rule 

of constitutional law or contain any claims “that could not have been discovered 

previously through the exercise of due diligence,” and does not contain facts that 

sufficiently establish Petitioner’s innocence. Id. Petitioner fails to prove the 

claims raised in this second Petition could not have been raised in any prior 

petition’ accordingly, his second Petition should be considered successive. See

Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).

Moreover, even if Petitioner had satisfied or met one or more of the 

exceptions of § 2244(b)(2), he must still show he has obtained an order from the 

Ninth Circuit authorizing this Court to consider the Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any such authorization and, 

as a result, the Petition should be dismissed. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent’s motion to dismiss should 

be GRANTED and the Petition should be DISMISSED. 

This report and recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony J. 

Battaglia, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with 

the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before November 18, 2016. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

Any reply to the Objections shall be served and filed on or before December 5, 

2016. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

/ /

/ /

Case 3:15-cv-02116-AJB-JMA Document 22 Filed 11/08/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7

15-CV-2116-AJB (JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

f.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 8, 2016

Case 3:15-cv-02116-AJB-JMA Document 22 Filed 11/08/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7