Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00506/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00506-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LIEU TRUONG, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF 

DEPARTMENT, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:10-cv-00506-MCE-KJN

ORDER 

----oo0oo---- 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application to Modify the 

Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order (“Application”). (ECF No. 57.) Plaintiffs seek this 

modification to continue the current deadline for completion of discovery. Pursuant to 

the current PTSO, the deadline to complete discovery was September 28, 2012. (ECF 

No. 46.) Defendants have filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application. (ECF No. 62.) 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Application is DENIED. 

Generally, the Court is required to enter a pretrial scheduling order within 120 

days of the filing of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The scheduling order “controls 

the subsequent course of the action” unless modified by the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

16(d). 

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Orders entered before the final pretrial conference may be modified upon a showing of 

“good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d 604, 

608 (9th Cir. 1992). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the 

diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. In explaining 

this standard, the Ninth Circuit has stated: 

A district court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably be 

met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Moreover, 

carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no 

reason for granting of relief. Although the existence or degree of prejudice 

to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to 

deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons 

for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should 

end. 

Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has further clarified why the PTSO deadlines 

should be taken seriously: 

In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the federal and state 

systems routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the 

efficient treatment and resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful 

only if the deadlines are taken seriously by the parties, and the best way to 

encourage that is to enforce the deadlines. Parties must understand that 

they will pay a price for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other 

orders, and that failure to do so may properly support severe sanctions and 

exclusions of evidence. 

Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). “[R]ules are 

rules - and the parties must play by them.” Singh v. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., 2006 WL 

1867540, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 5, 2006). 

This is Plaintiff’s second ex parte application seeking a PTSO modification. On 

June 22, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their first request to modify the PTSO seeking the 

continuation of the deadlines for completion of non-expert discovery and filing dispositive 

motions. (ECF No. 30.) At that time, Plaintiffs sought to extend non-expert discovery 

from June 25, 2012 to August 27, 2012. Although the Court granted Plaintiffs’ first 

ex parte application, it specifically found that Plaintiffs had not been diligent “in either 

prosecuting this action or in filing their . . . Application.” (ECF No. 44, at 2.) 

/// 

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The Court noted that Plaintiffs’ counsel had done “little work . . . to move the case 

forward” since filing the complaint in March of 2010. (ECF No. 44, at 2.) The Court also 

emphasized that Plaintiffs’ filing their ex parte application “just one court day prior to the 

close of non-expert discovery” contributed to the finding of Plaintiffs’ lack of the requisite 

diligence. (ECF No. 44 at 3.) However, despite Plaintiffs’ lack of diligence, the Court 

granted Plaintiffs’ first ex parte application to modify the PTSO “to avoid prejudice to 

Plaintiffs” and because Defendants “took no real issue with modification.” (ECF No. 44, 

at 3.) The Court set the discovery cut-off date for September 28, 2012, thus providing 

Plaintiffs with one month more than they requested to complete discovery. (ECF 

Nos. 44, 46.) 

On October 5, 2012, a week after the discovery cut-off date, Plaintiffs filed the 

instant Application seeking (again) to extend the discovery deadline.1 (ECF No. 57.) 

Plaintiffs argue that they cannot meet the discovery deadline set by the current PTSO 

because “Defendants reneged on a prior agreement to allow the depositions, leaving 

insufficient time to obtain an order compelling the depositions and to complete discovery 

before fact discovery cut-off.” (ECF No. 57, at 1.) 

/// 

/// 

/// 

 

1 Prior to filing the instant ex parte Application, Plaintiffs noticed a Motion to 

Compel Depositions and Expand Discovery before the assigned Magistrate Judge. 

(ECF No. 47). On September 21, 2012, Magistrate Judge Newman denied Plaintiffs’ 

Motion on the ground that the relief requested by Plaintiffs “would be inconsistent with 

the current non-expert discovery deadline set by the district judge.” (ECF No. 50, at 

1-2.) The Magistrate Judge explicitly advised Plaintiffs that, in light of the September 28, 

2012 discovery cutoff date, Plaintiffs “must first seek leave from the district judge to 

modify the [PTSO].” (ECF No. 50, at 2.) Despite this specific instruction, Plaintiffs failed 

to seek a PTSO modification prior to the discovery cutoff date. Instead, on October 2, 

2012, Plaintiffs refiled the same Motion to Compel Depositions and Expand Discovery 

renoticing it before the undersigned District Judge. (ECF No. 51.) Plaintiffs were again 

instructed to “notice and file a motion seeking relief from the pretrial scheduling order 

before the district judge.” (ECF No. 56.) Finally, on October 5, 2012, a week after the 

discovery cutoff date, Plaintiffs filed the instant ex parte Application. (ECF No. 57.) 

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Defendants allegedly “stipulated” to Plaintiffs taking more than ten depositions, as 

allowed under Rule 30(a)(2), but “unilaterally rescinded” that stipulation “on the eve of 

the tenth deposition” and raised for the first time the argument that Rule 30(a)(2) 

requires the parties to prepare a written agreement and submit it to the court for prior 

approval before the ten deposition limit can be exceeded.” (ECF No. 57, at 2, 4.) 

According to Plaintiffs, Defendants “stipulated” to additional depositions by consenting to 

and assisting in scheduling the depositions in excess of Rule 30’s limit and by not 

objecting to Plaintiffs scheduling more than ten depositions. (ECF No. 57, at 4.) 

Defendants respond that the parties never stipulated to exceeding Rule 30’s limit on the 

number of depositions, and that Defendants had the right to object when Plaintiffs 

reached that limit. (ECF No. 62, at 4.) 

Rule 30(a)(2) allows parties to take up to ten depositions unless they enter into a 

stipulation or obtain leave of court to take more. Local Rule 143 requires all parties’ 

stipulations to be in writing and approved by the Court to be enforceable. Here, Plaintiffs 

have neither obtained a written stipulation nor obtained the required leave of court. 

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, Defendants’ counsel does not have a duty to educate 

Plaintiffs’ counsel on the federal and local procedural requirements. Defendants had a 

right to object when, on August 27, 2012, Plaintiffs reached the limit on the number of 

depositions allowed under Rule 30(a)(2).2 (See ECF No. 57, at 4.) As a party seeking to 

exceed the established limit, Plaintiffs had a duty to seek an appropriate court order. 

Plaintiffs have failed to do so. 

Furthermore, the breadth and scope of the discovery that Plaintiffs served on 

Defendants one month before the discovery cut-off date also demonstrate Plaintiffs’ lack 

of diligence. 

 

2 Additionally, as Defendants correctly point out, Defendants had no way of 

knowing how many depositions Plaintiffs will actually conduct because Plaintiffs had 

previously noticed depositions of third party witnesses that did not take place. (ECF No. 

62, at 4.) 

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On August 20, 2012, Plaintiffs noticed a deposition of Defendant’s person(s) most 

knowledgeable (“PMK”) under Rule 30(b)(6), which identified eighty-four categories of 

the matters subject to examination. (ECF No. 62, at 5; Ex. 11 ¶ 7.) The deposition 

notice was accompanied by eighty-four requests for production of documents, one set of 

interrogatories and one set of requests for admissions. (Id., Ex. 11 ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiffs 

noticed those depositions for September 4, 2012, thus providing Defendants with only 

nine business days to identify the person most knowledgeable on the eighty-four 

identified subject matters, to prepare for the depositions, to respond to eighty-four 

requests for production of documents, a set of interrogatories and a set of requests for 

admissions. Taking into consideration that the defense counsel was scheduled for 

deposition preparation meetings or for depositions on eight out of those nine days, (see 

ECF No. 62, at 8-9), it is difficult to conceive how Defendants could adequately respond 

to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests within the time allotted. As this Court has previously 

explained, “when a deposition notice . . . is accompanied by a production request, a 

minimum of 30 days’ notice is required.” Van Scoy v. New Albertson’s Inc., 2011 WL 

1079914, at *4 n. 4 (E.D. Cal. March 21, 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(a)). Not 

surprisingly, Defendants objected to Plaintiffs’ PMK notice. (ECF No. 62, at 9.) 

In addition to leaving the PMK deposition(s) for the end of the discovery period, 

Plaintiffs also attempted to depose numerous key witnesses within the last month before 

the discovery cut-off. (ECF No. 62, at 8.) Plaintiffs have provided no explanation why 

they delayed in taking the PMK deposition(s) and other requested depositions until so 

late in the discovery process. By leaving the bulk of their discovery for the end of the 

discovery period, Plaintiffs have assumed the risk of not being able to resolve any 

disputes relative to the requested depositions through court intervention. 

Nor do Plaintiffs explain why they did not seek relief prior to the discovery cut-off 

date when they recognized that Defendants had not stipulated to exceeding Rule 30’s 

limits and when the parties could not reach an agreement with respect to the breadth 

and scope of the discovery. 

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In its previous Order granting Plaintiff’s Application to Modify the PTSO, the Court 

explained that “seeking ex parte relief just one day prior to the close of non-expert 

discovery” does not establish diligence. (ECF No. 44, at 3.) Thus, Plaintiffs were on 

notice that, in order to establish diligence, a party requesting a PTSO modification must 

do so in advance of the established discovery deadlines. By filing their Application a 

week after the close of the discovery, Plaintiffs have demonstrated their lack of diligence 

required to justify modifying the Court’s PTSO. 

This Court previously granted Plaintiffs’ first ex parte application to modify the 

PTSO despite Plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate the requisite diligence. To do it again 

would impermissibly undermine the importance of court-ordered deadlines and the timely 

disposition of pending cases. Such a development would “undermine the court’s ability 

to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward the 

indolent and the cavalier.” See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. Because Plaintiffs have not 

demonstrated the reasonable diligence required for the Court to find good cause to 

modify the PTSO and to reopen discovery, Plaintiffs’ Application is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 15, 2012 

__________________________________ 

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

DEAC_Signatur e-END: 

c4d6b0d3 

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