Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00020/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL RUBEN JAMES,

Petitioner,

 v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Acting Warden, Mule

Creek State Prison,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-0020 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. In response to the court’s order to show cause respondent has filed an answer and

a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and has lodged supporting

exhibits. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. The case is ready for decision. 

BACKGROUND

A jury convicted petitioner of one count of grand theft (Cal. Penal Code §§ 484,

487(a)), for stealing aluminum railings off of hydraulic lifts belonging to his employer, and

selling them to a recycling facility. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the

allegations that petitioner had suffered two prior strikes as defined in California’s Three

Strikes law, see Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12, and that he had served five prior

prison terms, see Cal. Pen. Code § 667.5(b). The trial court declined to dismiss either of

the prior strike findings, and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years to life in state prison. 

The trial court exercised its discretion to strike all five prison priors for sentencing purposes.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence,

rejecting his claims of insufficient evidence to support the conviction, instructional error, and

cruel and unusual punishment. The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s

application for review. Petitioner did not seek state habeas corpus relief. 

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In the present petition, petitioner renews the claims he raised on direct appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(d)(2) applies

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to intrinsic review of a state court’s process, or situations in which the petitioner challenges

the state court’s findings based entirely on the state court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant question under § 2254(d)(2) is whether

an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably

conclude that the state court findings are supported by the record. Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court, see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only if the error had a

"'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638

(1993)).

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Background

Petitioner claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's implicit finding

that he was the person who stole the aluminum railings. 

Reviewing this claim on appeal, the California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant

legal standard as follows: 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we determine

whether substantial evidence exists such that any rational trier of fact could

find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People

v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 575-578; see also Jackson v. Virginia

(1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319.) In making this determination, we presume

the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could deduce from the

evidence in support of the judgment and resolve conflicts in favor of the

prosecution. (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 576.) We do not

substitute our evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, "unless there is

either a physical impossibility that the testimony is true or that the falsity is

apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. [Citations.]' 

[Citation.]" (In re Andrew I. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 572, 578.) The test on

appeal is whether there is substantial evidence that would support a guilty

finding. (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425.) Substantial evidence is

evidence which is "reasonable, credible and of solid value." (People v.

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1

 All exhibits referenced in this order are those lodged by respondent in support of the

answer to the petition, unless otherwise noted.

2

The footnotes from the opinion have been renumbered.

3

Hall told [manager Bruce] Harmon he had last seen the lifts on Friday, and at that time,

they were not disassembled.

4

Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578.)

Ex. C-8 (Unpublished Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District,

People v. James, No. H021236 (Oct. 24, 2001)) at 2-3.1

The court of appeal then summarized in detail the evidence presented at trial:2 

Tool Shed rents equipment such as dump trucks and lifts. Lafayette

Tool Shed consisted of two large buildings separated by a yard measuring

approximately 350 feet by 350 feet. The entire lot was enclosed by a twelvefoot high fence with razor wire on top. Gates in the front of the lot were large

enough to permit trucks direct access into the yard. Locks on those gates

were accessible from the outside. One could go from the office directly into

the yard, but keys were necessary to unlock the doors before exiting the

building and entering the yard. A set of both the gate and the yard keys

usually were kept in the office.

When the store was closed for business, its front fence gates and the

building front doors would be locked, and each gate would be secured with

two locks. There was an alarm for the buildings but not for the yard. The

store manager had discretion to decide which employees had the code for the

alarm and/or had gate keys which allowed trucks access to the yard. There

were no electronic surveillance cameras on the yard. At the end of each

workday, the manager was supposed to ensure that everything was locked,

but he could designate an employee to lock the gates. The manager also

was to make certain the office and yard were clear of people before he left. 

There was no daily check to determine which equipment had been rented or

to account for everything in the yard at the end of the each day.

The court took judicial notice that February 28 [1999] was a Sunday. 

The hours of operation at Lafayette Tool Shed on Sundays were 8 a.m. to 5

p.m. On February 28, that Tool Shed outlet had hydraulic crank lifts for rent. 

Those lifts had aluminum railings which weighed about 150 pounds.

At about 7:00 a.m. on Monday, March 1, mechanic Tom Hall noticed

that two Lafayette Tool Shed hydraulic lifts near a dump truck at the back of

the lot had been stripped of their aluminum railings and that tools and bolts

were spread on the nearby ground. As recently as Wednesday or Thursday

of the preceding week,3

 Hall had noticed that the lifts were intact. When last

seen by Hall before the railing theft, the lifts were in the same location as

when he found them stripped. According to Hall, it would have taken

someone 30 minutes to an hour to disassemble the lifts.

When Hall informed manager Bruce Harmon the lifts had been

stripped, Harmon checked Lafayette Tool Shed property for signs of forced

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4

Hall testified the locks of the front gates had not been tampered with and the gate in

the rear yard had been locked for years and remained so.

5

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 10(d)), People's Exhibits 7, 11A, 12A, and

13A have been transmitted to this court. We have reviewed the signature "B. Ortiz" on

People's Exhibit 7 (the Recycling receipt) and the "Signature of Inmate," which appears to be

"M. Ortiz" on the bottom of defendant's redacted booking sheet in People's Exhibit 12A and

with the photographs, signatures and other information on the other redacted booking sheets

linked to defendant, namely People's Exhibits 11A and 13A. We note that the trial court

instructed the jury that those booking sheets were introduced into evidence for the limited

purpose of showing that defendant had, on prior occasions, identified himself to law

enforcement by the last name of "Ortiz" and to provide an exemplar of defendant's signature

by that name.

6

Defendant apparently also had worked at Tool Shed once before.

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entry but found none;4

 he then looked for the missing railings at places that

recycle aluminum. By 10:00 a.m., Harmon had located the railings at nearby

Recycling [Depot]; both rails were labeled "ATS" for A Tool Shed and had

Tool Shed's equipment numbers on them.

Recycling's owner provided Harmon with a copy of Recycling's receipt

for the purchase of the railings as scrap. That receipt had a signature in the

name of "B. Ortiz." Harmon was not familiar with any Tool Shed employee

who went by that last name.5 A handwritten number on the receipt, 4D

82864, corresponded to the license plate number on a dump truck Lafayette

Tool Shed had available for rent. That truck was not rented on February 28

or at any other time that weekend. When not rented, the dump trucks

typically were stored in the back of the lot with their keys in the ignition.

Checking Tool Shed time cards, Harmon determined that five

employees had worked on February 28; acting manager Keith Jones, Trevor

Johnson, Kenneth Russell, Brad Wilkerson, and defendant, who was known

by the name of "Mike James." Of those employees, Jones was white, about

5'9" or 5'10," with a shaved head; Johnson was a slender black man, Russell

was a 5'9" or 5'10" ponytailed native American who could not drive Tool

Shed's dump trucks because he could not use a stick shift; and Wilkerson

was a "[b]ig man," about 6'4" and 280 pounds. Harmon also determined that

defendant had clocked out on his time card at 5:08 p.m. on February 28.

Defendant had been hired by manager Dave Allen in late December

1998 or early January 1999.6 A yard worker, his job was to service

equipment, make pickups, and load and unload equipment as it was checked

out and returned. He mainly worked towards the back of the yard and, like

any yard worker, had access to the crank lifts available for rent. Like any

employee, defendant also had access to the dump truck with license plate 4D

82864. However, an employee needed a manager's permission to take a

truck off the lot and, if he drove it from the yard, someone likely would notice. 

If an employee were to take a truck after hours, he would have to obtain

special permission from the owner.

Allen trained defendant to work the front counter. A couple of weeks

before the railings disappeared, he gave defendant keys to the gate and front

door. At about the same time, he gave defendant the code for the building

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Each owner and three owners' sons had keys, and, though Allen's testimony was

ambiguous on this point, it appears the five employees who had keys were in addition to the

owners and their sons.

8

Defendant had signed his job application and related documents "Michael James." His

job did not require him to do detailed paperwork for the customers, and any other paperwork

he did typically required only his initials "M.J." Allen never had seen defendant sign anything

using the surname of "Ortiz."

6

alarm system; with the code, defendant could turn the alarm on and off. As of

February 28, five other employees company-wide had yard keys7

 and

between ten and 14 people had access to that code.

On February 28, Trevor Johnson drove a Tool Shed delivery truck to a

gas station less than a mile from Lafayette Tool Shed while defendant drove a

Tool Shed dump truck to the same station. Johnson testified they left Tool

Shed between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., they both went directly to the station, they

arrived simultaneously, and Johnson could see defendant all along the way. 

Johnson could not tell whether anything was in the bed of the dump truck. 

Defendant left the station first. Johnson stayed for 20 to 30 minutes; he then

came straight back to Tool Shed, arriving just before it closed. Defendant

already was there when Johnson arrived, and the other employees also were

present. Johnson, who did not have a gate key, recalled parking the delivery

truck in the back of the lot.

Keith Jones mainly worked in the front office on February 28, but he

occasionally checked on the yard workers. He testified that, just after 5:00

p.m., he locked up the business and then left by 5:10 p.m. When Jones left

that day, he walked through the yard, noting that the yard gates were locked

and all the other employees had gone. He did not notice anything unusual

such as any missing equipment. However, if an employee left and later had

returned with a gate key, had entered through the gate, and had driven a

truck off the lot, Jones would not have known about it.

Allen had become familiar with defendant's handwriting from reviewing

his job application and other papers defendant had filled out when hired.8

 A

few days after the railing theft, Harmon showed Allen the Recycling receipt

and asked if he recognized anything on it. Aware which five employees had

worked on February 28 and aware there was no evidence of forced entry,

Allen was under the impression the theft was an inside job and that the

investigation was to determine which employee might have taken the railings. 

When he saw the signature "Ortiz" on the receipt, Allen recognized it as

defendant's handwriting. Though Allen never had taken classes or received

formal training in the area of handwriting comparisons, he recognized that the

"style" of writing and the "way the letters are written" as "the same" as

defendant's writing.

A senior latent fingerprint examiner affiliated with the San Jose Police

Department testified as an expert in the examination, analysis, and

identification of fingerprints. She examined a certified copy of a document

which the parties stipulated was the booking sheet connected with

defendant's arrest in the instant case and two other booking sheets bearing

the name "Adam Mitchllie Ortiz." Each booking sheet had a flat fingerprint

impression on it. After a comparative analysis, she was "[a]bsolutely" certain

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that the fingerprints on the three booking sheets were made by the same

person.

Salvator Magana was working at Recycling on February 29 when the

man brought in the railings. The gist of Magana's testimony was that he was

unsure what that person looked like. However, Magana did say he was

"Latino, . . . like Mexican," that he was "kind of pudgy," "medium height,"

"more or less about 27" years old, that he weighed 175 or 180 pounds, and

that he was about 5'6". After reviewing his prior testimony, Magana recalled

that the man had come to Recycling at about 6:00 p.m. Magana testified he

thought the man may have been wearing a green jacket "with a plaid design."

Tool Shed manager Allen testified that, in late February of 1999,

defendant usually wore a black and green checkered, flannel, long-sleeved

jacket about twice a week.

Defendant was present in the courtroom during trial. Magana testified

defendant was the same person who was in a picture he had been shown by

police, but he was unsure if defendant was the person who brought the

railings to Recycling. Magana said he looked different. Magana was having

trouble remembering how the man looked.

Magana testified Officer Woo had shown him a photographic lineup on

March 3. According to Magana, Recycling's owner was present when

Magana viewed the pictures and Woo had told Magana he had to pick

someone out of the lineup.

Photograph 5 was a photograph of defendant. Magana testified that

he "thought" the person who brought in the railings may have been depicted

in photograph 5 but that he never said number 5 was the person who brought

the railings; it could have been the man, but Magana was not sure. Magana

testified he thought two of the photographs were similar, that he had had

difficulty choosing between number 5 and one or two of the other pictures,

and that he had told Woo he was having trouble deciding between numbers 5

and 6. Later, Magana testified he did not tell Woo he thought the person in

picture 6 might be the person. Still later, Magana testified he picked number

5 because the person depicted there looked familiar, but he explained that he

thought the face depicted in number 5 was that of someone who had been to

Recycling on prior occasions.

Initially, Magana testified he told Woo he did not get a good look at the

man with the railings. Later, Magana testified he could not remember if he

told Woo he had not gotten a good look, but he did tell Woo he believed he

could identify the man if he saw him again. Magana testified he wears

eyeglasses to read and sometimes to see distant objects, but he was not

wearing them on the day the man brought the railings.

Recycling's Robert Strebel was acting as cashier and manager shortly

before 6:00 p.m. on Friday 28. Strebel recalled that the man with the railings

was a medium-frame, unshaven Hispanic who about [sic] 30 years old, 5'8",

and 180 to 200 pounds. Strebel examined the railings and then wrote on the

receipt the price and a designation referring to the classification of

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Describing how Recycling receipts for scrap are generated, Strebel testified an

employee fills out a ticket. The customer would sign his name, and then, usually, the

employee would record on the document the license number of the customer's vehicle. Strebel

explained that state law requires either the customer's driver's license number or the vehicle

number be placed on the documentation.

10Based upon the railing receipt's location in the stack of receipts and upon its serial

number compared with those on other receipts issued on February 28, Strebel estimated the

transaction involving the railings occurred between 5:45 and 6:00 p.m.

8

contaminated scrap metal.9 Reviewing that receipt, Strebel noted that the

license plate number written on the receipt was "not in [his own] writing."10

A day or so after the transaction, Officer Woo interviewed Strebel. The

next day, Woo showed him a photographic lineup. He did not tell Strebel he

had to pick anyone or that the person who sold the railings was in the display. 

Strebel testified he did identify someone in the display as the man who sold

the railings, but he could not recall which picture he had picked. At trial,

Strebel thought he had been very definite in identification; on crossexamination, Strebel recalled telling Woo that, on a scale of one to ten, he

was "about 5 in certainty." Strebel testified defendant had been a Recycling

customer on about five occasions prior to February 28. At trial, Strebel was

not asked whether defendant was the person who sold the stolen railings.

Officer Woo testified that he spoke with the Recycling owner and

employees Magana and Strebel on March 2. Magana did not seem to have

any difficulty in understanding Woo's questions. Magana gave Woo a

description of the man who sold the railings, and Magana gave Woo no

reason to believe he had any difficulty in remembering the events that had

occurred the afternoon of February 28. At that time, Magana indicated "he

got a very good look" at the man, and he did not mention anything about his

need for glasses.

When Woo spoke with Strebel, Strebel seemed to recollect the

transaction with the man who had brought the railings. When Woo showed

the lineup containing six photographs to Strebel on March 3, the two were in

Recycling's parking lot, and no one was within earshot of them. Woo did not

say Strebel had to pick a photograph or that any particular photograph was

included in the display. He just asked Strebel to look at some photographs of

individuals who might or might not have been involved in the theft. Strebel

looked at the display for one or two minutes and then said something to the

effect of "I believe or I think it's number 5." On a scale with one the lowest

and ten the highest to degree of certainty of his identification, Strebel said his

level of certainty was about a five. Asked if he thought anyone else in the

display looked familiar, Strebel replied in the negative.

When finished with Strebel, Woo walked to the warehouse where

Magana was located. There was no intervening opportunity for the two

employees to communicate about the lineup. Before showing Magana the

display, Woo gave instructions similar to those given to Strebel. He did not

tell Magana he had to pick someone form the lineup; he just asked Magana to

look at some photographs to see if he possibly could recognize anyone who

brought the railings. At the time, no one else was within earshot of them. 

Magana gave no indication that he failed to understand Woo's questions;

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instead, he said he did understand. Magana examined the photographs for

about two minutes and then pointed to photograph 5 and said, "That's him." 

Magana indicated he was "positive"; asked if there were anyone else whom

he recognized, Magana said no. Woo did not recall Magana saying anything

about the person depicted in photograph 6. At trial, Woo recalled that

Magana had pointed at photograph 5, and he testified that, if Magana had

pointed out a different photograph, Woo would have recorded that, but his

report had no notation to that effect.

Woo did not know of an attempt to obtain latent fingerprints from the

railings. He personally tried to obtain latent fingerprints from other Tool Shed

equipment, but the roughness of the material plus the dirt and grease made it

impossible to lift latent prints.

Ex. C-8 at 3-10. 

After reviewing the evidence, the court of appeal concluded that "substantial

evidence supports the jury's implied finding that it was defendant who stole the Tool Shed

railings." Ex. C-8 at 10. First, the inference of an inside job was supported by evidence

the railings had been disassembled in the Tool Shed's back lot, a lack of evidence of forced

entry, and evidence that the man who sold the railings was driving a Lafayette Tool Shed

dump truck which had not been rented that weekend. Evidence that petitioner had access

to the dump truck, had been given keys to the front door and the yard gate, and knew the

code to activate and deactivate the building alarm, also showed that he had the opportunity

and ability to commit the crime. Ex. C-8 at 10-11. And while other employees at Lafayette

Tool Shed could have done the same thing, the court of appeal found "reasonable, credible

and solid evidence" had been presented that petitioner was responsible. This included the

fact that on February 28, none of the other five employees working fit the descriptions

provided by Recycling employees, except for petitioner. Also, there was the testimony from

Magana about the man wearing a green plaid jacket, which matched testimony from a Tool

Shed manager that petitioner often wore such a jacket. And the signature on the Recycling

receipt matched names used by petitioner on previous booking sheets, and it was

recognized by a Tool Shed manager as petitioner's handwriting. Ex. C-8 at 11-12. 

Addressing the identifications made by Recycling employees Magana and Strebel,

the court of appeal found that:

[A] reasonable jury could have concluded that Magana was truthful

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when he definitely and positively identified defendant's photograph as a

picture of the man who sold the railings to Recycling and that his in-court

recantation was not credible given his evasiveness and his failure to explain

the discrepancies between his and Officer Woo's testimony. A reasonable

jury also could have given credence to the pretrial photographic identification

made by Strebel. Strebel was not positive about his identification, but unlike

Magana, he did not recant his out-of-court identification.

Ex. C-8 at 12. 

And the court noted that while neither Magana nor Strebel had made an in-court

identification of petitioner, his conviction did not rest upon their testimony alone. Rather,

petitioner's identity also was established by the circumstantial evidence regarding who had

the opportunity to steal the railings, who had access to the railings and the dump truck, the

similarity of petitioner's appearance to the salient features of Magana and Strebel's

descriptions of the man who sold the railings, the pretrial identifications by Magana and

Strebel, the expert testimony regarding the presence of petitioner's fingerprints on his

booking forms in the name of "Ortiz," and the jury's comparison and the lay opinion of the

signature "B. Ortiz" to petitioner's known handwriting. Ex. C-8 at 12 n.14.

Thus considering the identification testimony and other evidence in the record

together, the court of appeal concluded that "more than sufficient evidence was presented

that defendant was the perpetrator of the railings theft." Ex. C-8 at 13.

2. Applicable Federal Law

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A federal court reviewing a claim of

insufficient evidence in a habeas petition does not determine whether it is satisfied that the

evidence meets the reasonable doubt standard. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir.

1992). The federal court "determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" See id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, may the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324.

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The prosecution need not affirmatively rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt. 

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992). The existence of some small doubt based on

an unsupported yet unrebutted hypothesis of innocence therefore is not sufficient to

invalidate an otherwise legitimate conviction. See Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 910 (9th

Cir. 1994). Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may be

sufficient to sustain a conviction. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). If

confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court "must

presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear on the record – that the trier of fact

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Except in the most exceptional of circumstances, Jackson does

not permit a federal habeas court to revisit credibility determinations. See id. 

After AEDPA, a federal habeas court applies the standards of Jackson with an

additional layer of deference. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Generally, a federal habeas court must ask whether the operative state court decision

reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id. 

at 1275 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

3. Analysis

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent if

it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases or if it confronts a

set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3,

8 (2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the state court only considered

state law in reaching its decision, the federal court must ask whether state law, as

explained by the state court, is contrary to clearly established governing federal law. See

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). A state court applies the

correct controlling authority when it relies on a state court case that quotes a Supreme

Court case for a proposition squarely in accord with controlling authority. See Hernandez

v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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The California Court of Appeal relied upon the standard set forth in People v.

Johnson when reviewing petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim. In Johnson, the

California Supreme Court expressly held that the standard of review it was applying was

consistent with the principles of Jackson. See Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 575-78; see also

People v. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th 252, 260 (1995). Since then, the Ninth Circuit has made

clear that the Johnson standard is not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274 (the California Court of Appeal's reliance on the

Johnson standard was not "fundamentally at odds with Supreme Court precedent"); Clark

v. Carey, 100 Fed. Appx. 623, *2 (9th Cir. 2004) ("It is undisputed that California courts use

the Jackson standard when reviewing claims of insufficient evidence." (citing Johnson and

Cuevas.)); Harrison v. McGrath, 99 Fed. Appx. 771, *1 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The standard under

California law for whether substantial evidence supports a conviction is identical to that

established by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson . . . ."). 

Because the state court's application of the Johnson standard was not contrary to

clearly established federal law, the question becomes whether the decision of the California

Court of Appeal reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to

petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. This court finds

that it did not. 

Petitioner does not deny that there was evidence to support the inference that the

theft was an inside job committed by an employee who was at work on February 28. 

Rather, he asserts that the jury should not have credited the identification testimony of

Magana and Strebel, which directly linked him to the sale of the railings. A review of the

record shows, however, that the jury could have resolved conflicting inferences that might

be drawn from these two witnesses' testimony in the prosecution's favor, and this court

must presume that it did so. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Moreover, as aptly spelled out by

the court of appeal, petitioner's conviction did not rest upon the testimony of these two

witnesses alone. There also was the circumstantial evidence that the theft was an inside

job, that petitioner had the opportunity to commit the crime, that petitioner had previously

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been booked for crimes under the name "Ortiz," and that the handwriting on the Recycling

receipt was the same as the handwriting on petitioner's job application and other

documents. 

The state court's rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), nor

was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented, id. § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied.

B. Instructional Error

1. Background

The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, regarding juror

misconduct, as follows:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all times during their

deliberations conduct themselves as required by these instructions. 

Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses

an intention to disregard the law or decide the case based on penalty or

punishment or any other improper basis, it's the obligation of the other jurors

to immediately advise the Court of the situation.

Ex. A-2 at 231; Ex. B at 224.

On appeal, petitioner argued that the instruction violated his rights to due process

and a fair jury trial, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically,

he claimed that the instruction undermined the jury's independence, compromised the

private and uninhibited character of jury deliberations, permitted the majority of jurors to

impose their will on any holdout jurors, denied him the right to the independent judgment of

each juror, and impermissibly infringed upon the jury's power of nullification. Ex. C-1 at 12-

17.

In reviewing the claim, the California Court of Appeal first noted that the issue of the

validity of CALJIC 17.41.1 was then pending before the California Supreme Court. Ex. C-8

at 13. The court then went on to hold as follows:

Even assuming that CALJIC No. 17.41 is erroneous, we disagree with

defendant's claim that giving the instruction amounts to a structural error; one

that defies analysis by harmless error standards and requires reversal without

regard to the strength of the evidence or other circumstances. (See People v.

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Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 493.) We do not believe that the error is one

that necessarily infects the entire trial process and renders the trial

fundamentally unfair. (See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1.) 

Rather, we agree with the court in People v. Molina (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th

1329, 1335, that harmless error review is appropriate.

Here, there was no evidence that any juror reported or threatened to

report misconduct by another juror. Defendant points to no evidence that any

juror was coerced by this instruction or that the instruction had an adverse

effect on the verdict. The record does not reveal any jury deadlock, holdout

jurors, or other impairment of deliberations, and the court received no report

that a juror had failed to adhere to the court's instructions. Thus, even if the

trial court erred by instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC 17.41.1, the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967)

386 U.S. 18.)

Ex. C-8 at 14.

In the present petition, petitioner challenges the jury instruction on the same grounds

he raised in state court.

2. Applicable Federal Law

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a

claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 71-72 (1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner

must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process. See id. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147

(1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) ("[I]t must be

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally

condemned,' but that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the

Fourteenth Amendment.") (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146). The instruction "may not be

judged in artificial isolation," but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a

whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). 

3. Analysis

In Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1037 (2004), the

Ninth Circuit rejected a state habeas petitioner's constitutional challenge to CALJIC No.

17.41.1, holding: "It is clear . . . that the California appellate court's holding was not contrary

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent,

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because no Supreme Court case establishes that an instruction such as CALJIC No.

17.41.1 violates an existing constitutional right." Id. at 955-56. Here, as in Brewer,

petitioner has pointed to no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing that CALJIC No.

17.41.1 – either on its face or as applied to the facts of his case – violated his constitutional

rights. See id. at 957. 

Because the state court's rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), this

claim for habeas corpus relief is denied.

C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

1. Background

At the sentencing hearing, petitioner's counsel moved the trial court to strike his prior

convictions. Counsel argued that the nature of the current offense, in conjunction with the

fact that two of petitioner's prior convictions were twenty years old and one occurred when

he was intoxicated and there was no severe injury to the victim, did not warrant a sentence

of twenty-five years to life under California's Three Strikes law. Ex. B at 243-44. The trial

court declined to strike any of petitioner's prior convictions, finding that since 1981

petitioner had been convicted of six felonies (two of them strikes), and twenty-one

misdemeanors (six of them violence related), and "while the first strike was quite a while

ago, there has been during the course of the years no indication the Defendant is not within

the spirit of the Three Strikes Law." Ex. B at 245. The court therefore sentenced petitioner

to twenty-five years to life in state prison. Finding that this sentence "adequately punished"

petitioner's recidivism, the court exercised its discretion to strike petitioner's five prior prison

terms. Ex. B at 248.

On appeal, petitioner argued that the sentence amounted to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of state and federal constitutional provisions. The court of appeal

chose to review the claim only under the California Constitution's ban against cruel and

unusual punishment, noting that its protections arguably were broader than the United

States Constitution's and, therefore, "punishment which satisfies this standard necessarily

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also satisfies the federal standard. (Cf. People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628.)" Ex. C-8

at 15 n.16. The court of appeal identified the standard for determining whether a sentence

amounts to cruel and unusual punishment as the one set out in In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410

(1972):

In order to determine if a punishment is so disproportionate to the

crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends

fundamental notions of human dignity, courts should (1) consider "the nature

of the offense and/or the offender", (2) compare the punishment to other

punishments imposed by the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses and

(3) compare the punishment to other punishments imposed by other

jurisdictions for the same offenses.

Ex. C-8 at 16 (internal citations to In re Lynch omitted).

The court of appeal first considered "the nature of the offense and the offender," and

noted that petitioner's current crime, alone, was not determinative of the constitutionality of

his sentence. Rather, his status as a repeat offender subjected him to harsh sentencing

under a statutory scheme which did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Ex. C-8

at 17 (discussing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 236 (1980)). In support of its conclusion, the

court of appeal reviewed petitioner's criminal history in detail:

Here, defendant was 38 years old at the time of sentencing, and his

criminal history already revealed a long pattern of illegal conduct and an

inability to conform his behavior to the dictates of the law.

Defendant's probation report reveals that in 1981, when he was 18

years old, defendant, along with another person, committed an armed robbery

at a fast-food restaurant, where defendant was employed. They entered a

rear door and went to an office where money was being counted. Defendant

was wearing a mask. The other perpetrator held a knife to the female

manager's throat and took $1,288 while defendant dragged another female

employee by the hair into an office. They both fled with the cash.

Convicted of robbery, defendant was sentenced to two years in state

prison in May 1981. The defendant was initially paroled in June 1982 to San

Joaquin County. During 1982 and 1983, the defendant was released and

returned to custody on multiple occasions. Within four months of being

paroled in March 1983 at age 21, defendant was caught driving a stolen

Cadillac. Convicted by guilty plea of unauthorized use of a vehicle, defendant

was sentenced to 16 months in state prison in September 1982. He was

paroled in April 1984 but was quickly returned to custody the following month

for a parole violation. Although he was released on May 11, 1984, a little

more than one week later defendant became involved in a new offense.

On May 19, 1984, at age 22, defendant and a woman were discovered

in a parked vehicle under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP) and in

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possession of a half-smoked PCP joint. After pleading guilty to being under

the influence and to possession of PCP, defendant was sentenced to 16

months in state prison. 

Defendant initially was paroled in February 1985, but he was returned

to custody on multiple occasions in 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989. In 1988, he

was involved in more misdemeanor criminal activities than in all of his prior

years as a young adult. He suffered convictions for substance abuse,

vandalism, driving under the influence of alcohol, and battery. Discharged

from parole on November 27, 1988, defendant was released from local

custody the following day.

Within a little more than two months, on February 3, 1989, at age 26,

police made contact with the defendant, who was seated in a parked vehicle. 

He was found in possession of a small amount of crack cocaine, which he

had tried to conceal. A blood sample provided by defendant was positive for

cocaine.

After pleading guilty [ ] to being under the influence and to possession

of the cocaine, defendant was sentenced to 16 months in state prison in May

1989. He initially was paroled on November 25, 1989; that same day, he was

arrested for a battery incident.

Following his conviction for three counts of misdemeanor battery,

defendant was paroled in March 1990. Within less than six weeks, on April

18, 1990, at age 28, defendant was on a bus when he took a wallet and

cigarette from a sleeping passenger. The man awoke and recovered his

property, at which time defendant stole the man's briefcase and exited the

bus. The man followed and confronted the defendant, who demanded $20 for

the briefcase. When the man offered $10, defendant punched him in the

face. The defendant was arrested within minutes, and a blood sample

revealed that he had a blood alcohol content of 0.20 percent.

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery and grand theft and

was sentenced to three years in state prison in addition to a five-year term for

having committed an offense within the meaning of section 667, subdivision

(a)(1). The aggregate sentence was imposed in November 1990. Defendant

initially was paroled to Santa Clara County on July 28, 1995. Within one

week, he was arrested as result of his involvement in a domestic violence

incident. A blood sample provided by the defendant on this date was positive

for methamphetamine, benzodiazepine, and PCP. For unknown reasons

defendant's parole was not violated until a subsequent arrest in November

1995, when he provided a urine sample which was positive for cocaine. 

During 1995, 1996, and 1997, defendant was paroled and returned to custody

on multiple occasions. Most recently paroled on August 29, 1998, defendant

committed the present offenses within six months.

At the time he was sentenced on the present case, defendant was a

parolee under the supervision and jurisdiction of the California Department of

Corrections. At the time of his arrest for the current offense, he was the

subject of an arrest warrant and also was reported as a "parolee-at-large"

because he had stopped reporting to his parole agent in March 1999.

Ex. C-8 at 17-20. 

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The court of appeal next rejected petitioner's claims that the sentence was

disproportionate to punishment imposed for more serious offenses in California, and to

punishment imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. Ex. C-8 at 22-23.

The court of appeal thus found that petitioner's sentence was not constitutionally

infirm, concluding as follows:

In summary, defendant has committed crimes for roughly 18 years,

from the time when he was almost 19 years old until he was about 37 years

old. During that time span, he did not refrain from criminal activity for any

appreciable period of time nor had he added any maturity to his age. All

previous sanctions, including five state prison sentences, have failed. 

Defendant never successfully completed a period of parole without incident. 

Given defendant's extensive and unrelenting criminal conduct, the fact that he

is married and has a child, that he has earned a G.E.D. certificate, that his

offenses have been related to substance abuse do not persuade us that he is

outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law, and many of the other factors upon

which he relies are similarly unpersuasive. For instance, while he appears to

rely upon his age as a mitigating factor, we agree with the People that

defendant, at age 37, "is no callow youth, deserving of any special

consideration." Similarly, as discussed above, his claims that his offense was

the result of "substance abuse and the demands of addiction" and that he

simply had "dismantled what he thought was some broken down equipment

and thought it would not be missed" do not aid his cause. In light of the fact

the current offense is just one in a lengthy series of instances in which

defendant has manifested the belief that he is above the law and that he has

not learned his lesson, the trial court reasonably could deem the instant theft

from the defendant's employer as a particularly egregious violation and that

this offense and offender warrant lengthy incarceration. [Citations omitted.]

Ex. C-8 at 24.

In the present petition, petitioner claims that his sentence violates the Eighth

Amendment.

2. Applicable Federal Law

A criminal sentence that is significantly disproportionate to the crime for which a

defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v. Helm, 436 U.S.

277, 303 (1983) (sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for seventh

non-violent felony violates the Eighth Amendment). However, "outside the context of

capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will

be exceedingly rare." Id. at 289-90 (citation and quotation marks omitted). "The Eighth

Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it

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forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001

(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 

A challenge to the proportionality of a sentence should be analyzed using objective

criteria, which include: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) a

comparison of sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) a

comparison of sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463

U.S. at 290-92. Under this proportionality principle, the threshold determination for the

court is whether the challenged sentence is one of the rare cases in which a comparison of

the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross

disproportionality. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005; Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-31 (applying

Harmelin standard). Only if such an inference arises does the court proceed and compare

the sentence with sentences in the same and other jurisdictions. See Harmelin, 501 U.S.

at 1005; cf. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 (noting that Solem does not mandate comparative

analysis within and between jurisdictions). 

The threshold for an "inference of gross disproportionality" is quite high. See id. at

30 (sentence of twenty-five years to life for conviction of grand theft, for shoplifting three

golf clubs, with prior convictions was not grossly disproportionate); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (upholding two consecutive twenty-five years to life terms for two

convictions of theft of videotapes with prior convictions); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008-09

(mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole for first offense of possession of

672 grams of cocaine did not raise inference of gross disproportionality).

In determining whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate under a state's

recidivist sentencing statute, the court looks to whether such an "extreme sentence is

justified by the gravity of [an individual's] most recent offense and criminal history." 

Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 744, 768 (9th Cir. 2004); see Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28. In

judging the appropriateness of a sentence under a recidivist statute, a court may take into

account the government's interest not only in punishing the offense of the conviction, but

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also its interest "in dealing in a harsher manner with those who [are] repeat[] criminal[s]." 

United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445

U.S. 263, 276 (1980)). 

Andrade and Ewing are the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on

Eighth Amendment claims regarding prison sentences, and both upheld California Three

Strikes sentences for shoplifters with prior convictions. In Andrade, the petitioner was

accused of stealing a total of $153.00 worth of videotapes from two different stores. 538

U.S. at 66. The jury found him guilty of two counts of petty theft with a prior conviction, and

also found that he had suffered three prior felony convictions for first degree residential

burglary which qualified as strikes under California's Three Strikes law. See id. at 68. The

Supreme Court, observing that "[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a

constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case," held that the California Court of

Appeal's affirmance of the sentence of two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life

was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See id. at 77. 

In Ewing, the petitioner was accused of stealing three golf clubs, priced at $399.00

each, and was convicted of one count of felony grand theft. Allegations that he had been

convicted previously of four qualifying felonies (one robbery and three burglaries) under

California's Three Strikes law were found true. 538 U.S. at 18-19. The Supreme Court

upheld the California Court of Appeal's determination that a sentence of twenty-five years

to life under such circumstances was not grossly disproportionate, and did not constitute

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 30-31. Looking beyond

the petitioner's most recent offense, Justice O'Connor’s plurality opinion observed:

When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made

a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals

who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. 

Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that

choice. To the contrary, our cases establish that "States have a valid interest

in deterring and segregating habitual criminals." [Citations omitted.]

Id. at 25.

3. Analysis

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Sentenced at age thirty-seven, petitioner clearly has received harsh punishment, as

he must serve a full twenty-five years in state prison before he is eligible for parole. His

current conviction – for stealing and selling property which cost his employer an estimated

loss of between $2,400 to $3,000 (Ex. C-8 at 22) – would not alone support such an

extreme sentence. However, as the California Court of Appeal properly found, petitioner's

current conviction is not viewed in isolation. 

Petitioner received a harsh sentence because he was a recidivist. His recidivist

nature must be considered in evaluating the constitutionality of his sentence. See Ramirez,

365 F.3d at 768 (because defendant "was sentenced as a recidivist under the Three Strikes

law, 'in weighing the gravity' of his offense in our proportionality analysis, 'we must place on

the scales not only his current felony,' but also his criminal history") (quoting Ewing, 538

U.S. at 29). Here, petitioner's criminal history is more extensive and at least as serious as

in those cases where the Supreme Court has rejected challenges under the Eighth

Amendment. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77 (upholding sentence of two consecutive prison

terms of twenty-five years to life for petty theft where defendant's prior crimes included

residential burglary and stealing video tapes valued at less than $200.00); Ewing, 538 U.S.

at 30-31 (sentence of twenty-five years to life upheld for felony grand theft where defendant

had prior convictions for robbery and three residential burglaries); Rummel, 445 U.S. at

284-85 (upholding life sentence with possibility of parole for recidivist convicted of

fraudulent use of credit card for $80.00, passing forged check for $28.36 and obtaining

$120.75 under false pretenses). Similarly, his history is markedly more egregious than that

of the petitioner in the Ramirez case, where the Ninth Circuit found a constitutional

violation. See Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 768 (finding sentence of twenty-six years to life for one

count of petty theft grossly disproportionate where petitioner's prior criminal history was

comprised solely of two convictions for second-degree robbery obtained through a guilty

plea, for which his total sentence was one year in county jail and three years of probation). 

Although petitioner's sentence is a harsh one, it is not strictly for his current or prior

crimes, but instead is because he was a recidivist who had committed a new crime. The

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United States District Court

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legislature permissibly may make laws that deal in a harsher manner with those who are

repeat criminals. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-28. When viewed in the light of his criminal

history and current felony offense, petitioner's is not that "'rare case in which a threshold

comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of

gross disproportionality.'" Id. at 30 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005). 

The California Court of Appeal's rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), nor

was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceedings, id. § 2254(d)(2). The state court applied a gross

disproportionality standard and reasonably concluded the sentence did not amount to cruel

and unusual punishment in light of petitioner's current offense and criminal history. 

Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk of the court shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/21/07 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.03\James0020.HabeasOrder.ECK

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