Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02844/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02844-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RANDALL LOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14-cv-2844 GPC (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

[ECF No. 21]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James Randall Lott, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his civil rights were 

violated when his October 16, 2014 parole hearing was postponed for six months after he

missed the hearing because he was hospitalized. (ECF No. 5 at 3.) 

Presently before the Court is Defendant Board of Parole Hearings’ Motion to 

Dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 21.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies 

before filing his lawsuit and the failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the Complaint; 

and (2) Defendant has Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s lawsuit. (ECF 

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No. 21-1 at 4–8.) Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, although he 

sent a letter to the Court dated March 6, 2015 that addresses the Motion. (ECF No. 24.) 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Gonzalo P. Curiel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. After a thorough review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss, the record in this case,1and the applicable case law, the Court hereby 

RECOMMENDS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently located at the California Medical Facility in 

Vacaville, California. (ECF No. 28 at 1.) At the time of the events alleged in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, Plaintiff was located at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San 

Diego, California, and was scheduled for a parole hearing on October 16, 2014. (ECF 

No. 5 at 1–3.) Plaintiff became ill and required hospitalization from October 7, 2014 to

October 19, 2014, which resulted in his missing the October 16, 2014 hearing. (Id. at 3.) 

Upon Plaintiff’s return to the prison, he was informed he would not receive another parole 

hearing “until sometime in April of 2015.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff initiated the present action by writing a letter dated October 23, 2014 to

Judge Henderson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. (ECF 

No. 1.) That Court notified Plaintiff that his “action” had been “filed” but that he was to 

either submit a complaint on the proper form or, if he had not intended to file a new civil 

action, notify the court of that. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff filed his form Complaint in the 

Northern District of California on November 13, 2014 (ECF No. 5), and because it was 

“more likely that the events at issue took place where Plaintiff [was] incarcerated, in the 

 

 

1 The Court received two additional letters from Plaintiff on June 1, 2015 and August 3, 2015. 

(ECF Nos. 26 and 28.) However, as neither letter addresses Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court 

does not consider them for purposes of this Order. 

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Southern District of California,” Plaintiff’s case was transferred to this Court on 

November 26, 2014. (ECF No. 9 at 1.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the postponement of his missed parole hearing is 

punishment “for getting sick and going to a[n] outside hospital” and this punishment 

amounts to a violation of his civil rights. (ECF No. 5 at 3.) The Complaint further alleges

that if Plaintiff could not receive a parole hearing before April 2015, his then-current 

parole plans would no longer be viable and he would be “denied parole for at least a year 

if not more.” (Id.) The Complaint requests that either the Board of Parole Hearings or 

the Court acting as the Board of Parole Hearings hold Plaintiff’s next parole hearing

before April 2015. (Id.) Plaintiff expressly states in his Complaint that there is an 

administrative grievance procedure at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility but

he did not pursue it because “[i]t would take a lot of time and [he] would go to the Board 

before [he] got an answer.” (Id. at 1–2.) He also states that he did not pursue any available 

level of appeal because he had “no idea who to write” and “it would still take more than 

a year to get answers if one was ever given at all.” (Id. at 1.)

Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on March 4, 2015. (ECF No. 

21.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available

administrative remedies before filing his lawsuit and the failure to exhaust is clear on the 

face of the Complaint; and (2) as an agency of the State of California, Defendant has 

Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s lawsuit. (ECF No. 21-1 at 4–8.)

The Court gave Plaintiff until April 13, 2015, to file a response in opposition to 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition to 

Defendant’s Motion but sent a letter to the Court dated March 6, 2015. (ECF No. 24.) In 

the letter, Plaintiff blames the court for “start[ing]” the lawsuit when all Plaintiff had done 

was ask by letter how he could advance the date of his parole hearing. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff 

does not argue that Defendant’s position on dismissal is wrong but instead points out that 

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“[i]f the Attorney General is right then the Court was wrong in making this a civil case.”

2

 

(Id.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Construction of a Pro Se Litigant’s Complaint

“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the 

‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 

1987) (citing Boag v. McDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)). “It is settled

law that the allegations of a pro se litigant’s complaint however inartfully pleaded are 

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quoting 

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1972)). However, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights 

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” 

Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or 

 

 

2

In this letter, Plaintiff also questions the timeliness of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, asking,

“[W]hy is the Attorney General filing a motion to dismiss in May. I thought she only had until April 

sometime to give a[n] answer, 60 days I believe.” (ECF No. 24 at 1.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 

provides that a defendant must serve a responsive pleading within 21 days after being served with a

summons and complaint or, if the defendant timely waived service pursuant to Rule 4(d), within 60 days 

after the request for waiver of service was sent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). A request for waiver of 

service was mailed to Defendant on January 15, 2015, and Defendant timely waived personal service of 

Plaintiff’s Summons and Complaint on February 12, 2015. (ECF No. 20.) Thus, Defendant had 60 days

from January 15, 2015, or until March 16, 2015, to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF No. 20 at 2.) 

Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss on March 4, 2015, (not in May) and Defendant’s Motion was

therefore timely. (ECF No. 21.) 

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‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v. 

Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri 

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. The court does not look at whether the 

plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the [plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence to 

support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). When reviewing a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of the facts 

presented and construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the 

plaintiff should be given a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to 

cure. Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623–24 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment should 

the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Id.; see also Cato v. United States, 70 

F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Construction of Plaintiff’s Civil Rights Complaint

A state prisoner complaining of the conditions of his imprisonment may file a 

complaint in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for 

redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights’ but 

merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham 

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v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 

(1979)). 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 Complaint fails to assert which constitutional right or federal 

statute, if any, Defendant violated by postponing Plaintiff’s missed parole hearing for six 

months. However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, the Court 

construes his Complaint liberally. See Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257. Upon a liberal reading 

of the Complaint, specifically Plaintiff’s assertion that he was “punished for getting sick 

and going to a[n] outside hospital” (ECF No. 5 at 3), the Court interprets the Complaint 

to allege a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right against the infliction of cruel 

and unusual punishment. 

By way of relief, Plaintiff seeks to have the Court order the Board of Parole 

Hearings to hold a parole hearing for Plaintiff earlier than April 2015.3 

B. Plaintiff’s Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The first ground upon which Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies before filing his

lawsuit and the failure to exhaust is clear on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF No. 

21 at 1–2.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint on this ground be GRANTED. 

 

 

3 As an alternative to the Court ordering the Board of Parole Hearings to advance Plaintiff’s 

hearing, Plaintiff asks the Court to act as the prison’s Board of Parole Hearings and hold Plaintiff’s 

postponed parole hearing earlier than April 2015. However, the Court does not have the authority to 

provide such relief to Plaintiff, as federal district courts do not have original jurisdiction over state prison 

parole matters. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–1339 (2012). 

The Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s Complaint could be dismissed as moot as Plaintiff sought 

only the relief that his parole hearing be held before April 2015 and April 2015 has come and gone. 

(Plaintiff apparently did receive a parole hearing in April 2015, but the parole hearing was suspended 

before completion, over Plaintiff’s objections, due to concerns about Plaintiff’s health. (See ECF No. 

26.)) However, the Court addresses Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in full to provide Plaintiff a 

statement of his Complaint’s deficiencies so he may have an opportunity to cure should he choose to 

refile his lawsuit. See Karim–Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623–24.

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits any lawsuit from being 

brought “with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal 

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 

The exhaustion of available administrative remedies is a mandatory requirement 

regardless of the type of relief sought by the prisoner and the type of relief available 

through the administrative procedures, and the administrative procedures need not be 

plain, speedy, or effective. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739–41 (2001). In addition, 

administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to the commencement of an action and 

may not be exhausted during the pendency of a lawsuit. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 

F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). When a prisoner fails to exhaust the 

administrative remedies available to him and the failure “is clear on the face of the 

complaint,” a defendant may move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Because the PLRA requires exhaustion only of those administrative remedies “as 

are available,” the statute does not require exhaustion when circumstances render the 

administrative remedies “effectively unavailable” to a prisoner. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 

623 F.3d 813, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2010). 

“[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of 

proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The administrative 

remedies made available to prisoners by the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) are codified in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations.

Any inmate “may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the 

department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material 

adverse affect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

3084.1(a) (2015). The CDCR’s administrative remedies require prisoners to file an 

appeal at the appropriate level and then proceed through a three-tiered appeal response 

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process before filing a lawsuit in federal court. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.2, 3084.7

(2015). 

As a prisoner bringing a § 1983 lawsuit, Plaintiff was required to comply with the 

PLRA’s requirement that he exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a 

lawsuit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiff’s Complaint expressly states that the

administrative remedies codified in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations were

available to him while he was located at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility. 

(See ECF No. 5 at 1.) Therefore, Plaintiff was required to exhaust the available 

administrative remedies before filing his lawsuit. 

Upon a review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds it clear on the face of the

pleading that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies before filing 

his lawsuit. Section I of Plaintiff’s form Complaint asked Plaintiff, “Is there a grievance 

procedure in this institution?” (ECF No. 5 at 1.) In response, Plaintiff marked the 

checkbox labeled, “Yes.” (Id.) Next, Section I of the form Complaint asked Plaintiff, 

“[D]id you present the facts in your complaint for review through the grievance 

procedure?” (Id.) Plaintiff responded by marking the checkbox labeled, “No.” (Id.) The 

form Complaint next stated, “If you did not present your claim for review through the 

grievance procedure, explain why.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff responded, “[I]t would take a lot 

of time and I would go to the Board before I got a[n] answer.” (Id.) Based on the 

foregoing statements contained in the Complaint, the Court finds it clear that 

administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was aware of the availability 

of the administrative remedies, and Plaintiff intentionally failed to exhaust the 

administrative remedies available to him. 

Based upon his statements in his form Complaint, Plaintiff may reasonably be 

understood to be arguing that he should be excused from exhausting his administrative 

remedies based on futility. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that he did not 

present his claim for review through the prison’s administrative grievance process

because it would “take more than a year to get answers if one was ever given at all” and

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“[he] would go to the Board before [he] got a[n] answer.” (ECF No. 5 at 1, 3.) That it 

may have taken Plaintiff an extended period to exhaust the prison’s administrative 

remedies does not render the procedures effectively unavailable to him. First, the 

administrative remedies available to state prisoners need not be speedy. Booth, 532 U.S. 

at 739–40. Second, although the Supreme Court has left “open the possibility that an 

exception to the exhaustion requirement might exist” in circumstances where “the prison 

had created draconian procedural requirements,” Sapp, 623 F.3d at 827 (citing Woodford 

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006)), the Court finds this is not the case here. As Defendant 

points out in its Motion to Dismiss, the administrative remedies made available to 

prisoners by the CDCR require that after a prisoner appeals an action taken by the prison,

all first- and second-level responses to the appeal must be issued within thirty working 

days of receipt of the appeal, and all third-level responses must be issued within sixty 

working days. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(c)(1)–(3) (2015). The appeal 

response periods set forth by the CDCR are reasonable, and the administrative remedies

are not so harsh or severe that they would require Plaintiff to wait an unreasonable amount 

of time for a response.

Had Plaintiff pursued his administrative remedies and encountered inexcusable 

delays, he might conceivably have been in a position to seek relief from fully exhausting 

that course of relief. The Ninth Circuit has refused to “interpret the PLRA so narrowly 

as to permit prison officials to exploit the exhaustion requirement through indefinite delay 

in responding to grievances” and has held that a “[d]elay in responding to a grievance, 

particularly a time-sensitive one, may demonstrate that no administrative process is in

fact available.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 n.18 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lewis 

v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002)). However, Plaintiff here made no 

effort to pursue the available administrative remedies, and anticipating delay does not 

excuse him from doing so. 

When a plaintiff failsto exhaust the administrative remedies available to him before 

filing a lawsuit and his failure to exhaust is clear on the face of his complaint, dismissal 

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166; 

see also McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200–01 (requiring dismissal without prejudice when 

there was no pre-lawsuit exhaustion in a § 1983 case). As outlined above, Plaintiff was 

not excused from exhausting the available administrative remedies before filing his 

lawsuit, and his failure to exhaust is clear on the face of his Complaint. Accordingly, the 

Court recommends Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on this ground be GRANTED. 

C. Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The second ground upon which Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

is that Defendant has Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s lawsuit. (ECF 

No. 21-1 at 4.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on this ground be GRANTED. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies, as well as those where 

the state itself is named as a defendant, “unless Congress has abrogated state sovereign 

immunity under its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment or a state has waived it.” 

Holley v. California Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). “Both the Ninth 

Circuit and the Supreme Court have recognized that the ‘State of California has not 

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under 

§ 1983 in federal court.’” Aleto v. California, No. EDCV 15-0842-RGK (JEM), 2015 

WL 4507001, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (citing Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 

1020, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Defendant in this case is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from 

Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Plaintiff’s Complaint named only the “Parole Board members” as a 

defendant; it did not name individually any specific member of the Board of Parole 

Hearings. (ECF No. 21-1 at 4.) Although Plaintiff’s naming the “members” of the Board 

could indicate that Plaintiff intended to sue each member of the Board of Parole Hearings

in their individual capacity, Plaintiff failed to expressly name in his Complaint, or direct 

that service of process be made upon, any individual member of the Board of Parole 

Hearings. (See ECF Nos. 5, 17, 19, and 20.) As such, the Court must construe Plaintiff’s 

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Complaint as having sued the Board of Parole Hearings collectively as an agency and not 

as having sued each member of the Board of Parole Hearings individually. As the 

Eleventh Amendment bars suits for all types of relief against the State of California or its 

agencies and the Board of Parole Hearings is an agency of the State, Defendant is immune 

from Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court recommends Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on this ground be GRANTED.

D. Civil Local Rule 7.1 

The Court also recommends dismissal under Civil Local Rule 7.1.f.3.c of the Local

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. Civil Local Rule 7.1.f.3.c directs that an opposing party’s failure to oppose a 

motion “may constitute a consent to the granting of [that] motion.” CivLR 7.1.f.3.c. 

District courts have broad discretion to enact and apply local rules, including 

dismissal of a case for failure to comply with the local rules. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 

F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming the granting of an unopposed motion to dismiss 

under a local rule by deeming a pro se litigant’s failure to oppose as consent to granting 

the motion). However, before dismissing an action for failure to comply with local rules, 

courts must “weigh several factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 

litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the 

defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases o[n] their merits; and (5) 

the availability of less drastic sanctions.’” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 

1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). That Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action does not 

excuse his failure to follow the rules of procedure that govern other litigants. King v. 

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules 

of procedure that govern other litigants.”). 

Here, Defendant attached a Certificate of Service to its Motion to Dismiss, 

representing that Defendant timely served Plaintiff with its Motion. (ECF No. 21-1 at 

10.) In addition, Plaintiff’s letter dated March 6, 2015 confirms that Plaintiff received 

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Defendant’s Motion. (ECF No. 24 at 1.) The Court provided Plaintiff with adequate time 

to prepare a written opposition to Defendant’s Motion, and Plaintiff did not file an 

opposition. Instead, in his March 6, 2015 letter, Plaintiff takes no position on the strength 

of Defendant’s Motion but instead protests that if Defendant is correct, the Court should 

never have filed Plaintiff’s initiating letter as a court case in the first place. Thus, the 

Court concludes that the balance of the Ghazali factors weigh in favor of dismissal. See 

Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) 

directing that Defendant Board of Parole Hearings be terminated as a party in 

GRANTING its motion to dismiss without prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED that any party may file written objections with the court and 

serve a copy on all parties no later than February 1, 2016. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than February 8, 2016. 

The parties are advised that a failure to file objections to this Report and 

Recommendation within the specified time may waive their rights to raise objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2016

Case 3:14-cv-02844-GPC-JLB Document 29 Filed 01/11/16 Page 12 of 12