Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08118/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

United Scates Court o1 Appem 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 12 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

__________ PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk CENTRAL WYOMING LAW ASSOCIATES, ) 

P.C., formerly HURSH AND DONOHUE, ) 

P.C., d/b/a HURSH, DONOHUE, & ) 

MASSEY, P.C., a Wyoming ) 

professional corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

v. ) 

) 

THE HONORABLE ROBERT B. DENHARDT, ) 

in his capacity as County Court ) 

Judge of Fremont County, Wyoming, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

and ) 

) 

WILLIAM FLAGG, in his capacity ) 

as County Attorney of Fremont ) 

County, Wyoming, and those acting ) 

under his direct supervision, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

No. 93-8118 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. CIV 93-1011-B) 

Michael J. Krampner & Donald L. Fuller on the brief, Casper, 

Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Hugh Kenny (Senior Assistant Attorney General, Wyoming), 

Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellant Denhardt. 

Before TACHA and MCKAY, Circuit Judges, and HANSEN, District 

Judge.+ 

HANSEN, District Judge. 

+ The Honorable c. LeRoy Hansen, United States District Judge 

for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-8118 Document: 01019277234 Date Filed: 07/12/1995 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant Denhardt appeals the entry by the United 

States District Court for the District of Wyoming of a 

declaratory judgment that a warrant issued by him was invalid 

because it lacked the requisite particularity to comply with the 

requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Because we find that the 

action before the district court had ceased to be a case or 

controversy as required by Article III of the United States 

Constitution, we REVERSE the decision of the district court and 

REMAND with instructions to dismiss. 

Background 

Central Wyoming Law Associates (CWLA) filed this lawsuit 

against the Honorable Robert Denhardt (Judge Denhardt), a Fremont 

County Court Judge, for allegedly issuing a search warrant in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The search warrant authorized 

the search of confidential client files belonging to Hursh, 

Donohue & Massey, P.C., 1 as well as the seizure of particular 

documents alleged to be in those files. Specifically, the 

warrant described the premises to be searched as "the law offices 

of Hursh, Donohue & Massey, P.C., being a 1 story building at 105 

South 6th East, Riverton." The warrant described the subject 

1 The parties dispute the relationship between CWLA and 

HD&M. Defendant-Appellee argues that CWLA lacks standing to 

challenge a warrant issued against HD&M because they are separate 

legal entities under Wyoming law. The district court concluded, 

for purposes of its decision, that CWLA was the direct successor 

to HD&M and therefore had standing to assert claims for HD&M. We 

express no opinion on this issue. 

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Appellate Case: 93-8118 Document: 01019277234 Date Filed: 07/12/1995 Page: 2 
property as "written and/or typed statements by [R.F.] concerning 

an alleged assault against [L.H.] which occurred in the Fremont 

County Jail." 

The essential facts are undisputed. In November, 1991, a 

minor, referred to as L.H., was arrested and placed in the 

Fremont County jail pending juvenile proceedings. While there, 

other prisoners allegedly physically and sexually assaulted L.H. 

Soon after this incident, Mr. Massey, an attorney employed by 

Hursh, Donohue & Massey, P.C., entered into an attorney-client 

relationship with L.H. for the purpose of representing him in the 

juvenile proceedings. Massey later learned of the assault and 

was asked by L.H.'s parents to investigate and determine whether 

a valid claim could be asserted against the Fremont county 

sheriff's office for failing to exercise due care for L.H.'s 

safety while in their custody. 

In early 1992, Massey talked to R.F., another juvenile who 

shared a cell with L.H. at the time of the alleged assault at the 

Fremont County jail. R.F. asserted that he had first-hand 

knowledge of the incident and gave Massey a signed statement 

concerning the incident. Later in 1992, Fremont County deputy 

sheriff Coppock and deputy county attorney Newell, began an 

investigation into L.H.'s allegations of assault; the 

investigation led to R.F. Coppock unsuccessfully attempted to 

locate him. Coppock learned of R.F.'s signed statement from 

R.F.'s mother. Coppock then tried to talk to L.H. directly, but 

was informed by his parents that Mr. Massey had instructed them 

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Appellate Case: 93-8118 Document: 01019277234 Date Filed: 07/12/1995 Page: 3 
not to talk to anyone, including the authorities, about the 

assault. 

Coppock prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant 

directed at obtaining a copy of the statement that R.F. gave to 

Massey. Coppock and Newell presented the affidavit to Judge 

Denhardt, who then issued a search warrant on December 31, 1992. 

Coppock and Newell executed the warrant that afternoon at 

attorney Massey's offices. Mr. Massey was not present. After 

two hours, during which time the staff and attorneys of the law 

offices searched for the statement and attempted to research the 

validity of the warrant, a draft copy of R.F.'s statement was 

located and given to Coppock. At no time did Coppock or his 

deputies personally search any files. They left with the draft 

statement and with the understanding that the finalized version 

of the statement would be forwarded to them when located. 

On January 4, 1993, Mr. Massey and his firm filed for a 

temporary restraining order in state court to enjoin any further 

searches of his offices for the signed document. The court 

issued the restraining order and the signed statement of R.F. was 

placed under seal pending further hearing. 2 The warrant, by its 

own terms, expired 10 days after its issuance; no further search 

warrants have been issued. 

Following the issuance of the TRO in state court, CWLA 

alleges that members of the Fremont County Attorney's Office 

2 The hearing had still not occurred at the time the briefs 

were filed in this appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 93-8118 Document: 01019277234 Date Filed: 07/12/1995 Page: 4 
threatened, on four separate occasions, to obtain search warrants 

for the offices of CWLA and on one occasion issued subpoenas for 

employees of the firm to testify against one of its former 

clients in a criminal trial. The four instances cited by CWLA 

occurred between January 20 and April 1, 1993. None of the 

threatened search warrants was ever issued by any judge. 

Similarly, the subpoenas were rendered moot when the criminal 

case settled before a motion to quash could be heard. At the 

time of the district court's decision and at the time of this 

appeal, no further threats had been alleged. 

CWLA filed the underlying action in April,1993, four months 

after the warrant expired and five days after the last alleged 

threat by the Fremont County Attorney's Office. CWLA's complaint 

sought a declaratory judgment that the search warrant was per se 

invalid on two grounds: (1) the affidavit was insufficient to 

enable Judge Denhardt to find that probable cause existed; and, 

2) the warrant did not describe the items to be seized with 

sufficient particularity. The complaint also sought prospective 

injunctive relief from similarly issued search warrants. It is 

important to note that the plaintiffs did not seek a declaration 

from the district court that the process by which the search 

warrant was issued lacked constitutional safeguards or was in 

some other way constitutionally infirm. 

Judge Denhardt moved for summary judgment. The district 

court first concluded that sufficient evidence of probable cause 

existed to justify the issuance of the challenged search warrant 

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Appellate Case: 93-8118 Document: 01019277234 Date Filed: 07/12/1995 Page: 5 
and granted summary judgment for Judge Denhardt on that issue. 

However, the court then concluded that the warrant issued by 

Judge Denhardt violated the Fourth Amendment because it failed to 

identify the items to be seized with adequate particularity and, 

sua sponte, granted summary judgment for CWLA on that issue. 

Lastly, the court determined that prospective injunctive relief 

would be inappropriate and granted summary judgment for Judge 

Denhardt on that claim. 

Discussion 

Judge Denhardt challenges the district court's entry of a 

declaratory judgment on four separate grounds: the warrant 

described the item to be seized with more than the requisite 

particularity; CWLA is not a real party in interest; the district 

court should have abstained under the principles of Younger y. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); and CWLA failed to present an Article 

III case or controversy. Because we find that CWLA's request for 

a declaratory judgment was moot when presented to the district 

court, we need not reach the other issues presented on appeal. 

Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may 

only adjudicate live controversies. ~ Honig y. Doe, 484 u.s. 

305, 317 (1988); Fischbach y. New Mexico Activities Assoc., 

38 F.3d 1159 (lOth Cir. 1994). In general, a case becomes moot 

when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack 

a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Murphy y. Hunt, 

455 u.s. 478, 482 (1982) (citations omitted). In this case, the 

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district court, sua sponte, concluded that CWLA's request for a 

declaratory judgment was moot because the warrant had expired. 

Judge Denhardt issued the challenged warrant on December 31, 

1992, and it expired on January 10, 1993. The district court 

entered its judgment declaring that the warrant lacked the 

requisite particularity eight months later. 

In deciding that subject matter jurisdiction existed, the 

district court concluded that the "case falls within that narrow 

class of cases which are 'capable of repetition, yet evading 

review.'" District Court opinion at 16-18 (quoting Murphy, 455 

u.s. at 482). In the absence of a class action, the Supreme 

Court has limited the application of this exception to the 

mootness doctrine to those situations where two elements combine: 

(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be 

fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and, 

(2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining 

party would be subjected to the same action again. Weinstein y. 

Bradford, 423 u.s. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam), cited by Murphy, 

455 u.s. at 482. The district court concluded that both elements 

existed in this case and that it was thus presented with an 

Article III case or controversy. We disagree. 

In Murphy, the Supreme Court limited the application of the 

"capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the 

mootness doctrine to those factual circumstances where the 

plaintiff can demonstrate a "reasonable expectation" or a 

"demonstrated probability" that the same controversy will recur 

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involving the same complaining party. Murphy, 455 U.S. 482. The 

Court pointed out that "a mere physical or theoretical 

possibility" of recurrence was insufficient to satisfy the test. 

~ We cannot say, even accepting as true CWLA's allegations 

that the Fremont County Attorney's Office threatened future 

searches of CWLA's offices, that there exists a "reasonable 

expectation" or "demonstrated probability" that Judge Denhardt 

will issue a similarly controversial warrant against this same 

Appellee. 3 CWLA failed to present any evidence to support such a 

conclusion. The undisputed facts indicate that Judge Denhardt, 

in his ten years on the bench, could not recall ever before 

issuing a search warrant for a lawyer's offices, nor could he 

recall ever having a search warrant he issued successfully 

challenged as constitutionally infirm. 

Indeed, the district court concluded that CWLA lacked 

standing to seek prospective injunctive relief because there was 

insufficient evidence that a similar search warrant would likely 

be issued in the future. 

Plaintiffs have clearly alleged that the defendants 

have engaged in a pattern of behavior by threatening to 

exercise their powers as governmental officers to 

obtain search warrants and to subpoena documents from 

the plaintiffs' law offices. There are, however no 

allegations that support a finding that the defendants 

have a present plan to continue with this type of 

behavior. Essentially, plaintiffs' contentions are the 

type of speculative, conjectural injury that the 

Supreme Court has said are insufficient to create a 

true case or controversy •••• 

3 We express no opinion on the issue of whether the warrant 

in dispute satisfied constitutional requirements for 

particularity. 

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Appellate Case: 93-8118 Document: 01019277234 Date Filed: 07/12/1995 Page: 8 
District Court opinion at 44-45. We agree with the district 

court's conclusion and believe its reasoning applies with equal 

force to the analysis of whether the CWLA's claims for 

declaratory relief were moot when originally presented. We 

conclude that there was and is no reasonable expectation that 

CWLA would be subjected to the same allegedly unconstitutional 

action again. We find that the second element of the exception 

to the mootness doctrine has not been satisfied. Consequently, 

this case does not fall within that narrow class of cases which 

are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 

Accordingly, we find that the case presented is now moot. 

Indeed, this case was moot at the time of the decision of the 

district court. Therefore, the district court lacked the 

jurisdiction required by Article III of the Constitution to 

consider the underlying issues. The judgment of the district 

court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the district court 

with instructions that the complaint be dismissed. 

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