Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00046/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00046-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0201fl FLSA: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCUS ALFARO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00046-H-KSC

ORDER RE JOINT MOTIONS FOR 

RESOLUTION OF DISCOVERY 

DISPUTES[Doc. Nos. 36, 38]

Presently before the Court are two Joint Motions for resolution of discovery 

disputes. [Doc. Nos. 36, 38]. The parties’ first Motion addresses Interrogatories put to 

defendant, City of San Diego, by plaintiffs and allegedly insufficient answers thereto. 

[Doc. No. 36]. The second Motion addresses documents or information withheld by the 

City of San Diego on the basis of various privileges, which the plaintiffs argue are wrongly 

asserted. [Doc. No. 38]. 

Section I of this Order addresses the issues raised in the first Motion [Doc. No. 36]. 

Sections II and III address the issues raised in the second Motion [Doc. No. 38]. The 

Court’s ruling as to each Motion is explained in greater detail below.

/ / /

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I. Discovery Dispute Regarding Interrogatories

A. The Boilerplate Portions of Defendant’s Interrogatory Answers

Will Not Be Considered by the Court

For each of the 14 contested Interrogatories, defendant, City of San Diego, issued 

the same boilerplate objection at the outset that contained numerous independent potential 

reasons not to respond:

The City objects to this interrogatory on the basis that it is vague, ambiguous, 

overly broad, indefinite as to time, and without reasonable limitations in its 

scope. Additionally, the City objects to this interrogatory on the ground that 

it calls for a legal conclusion. The City also objects to this interrogatory as 

seeking information protected as attorney-client privileged and attorney workproduct. Subject to and without waiving these objections, the 

City responds: . . . .

[Doc. No. 36, at p. 6]. The City would then follow the above paragraph with a specific 

objection.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 governs interrogatories to parties. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 33. “The responding party must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days 

after being served with the interrogatories.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2). “Each interrogatory 

must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under 

oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be 

stated with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the 

court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). Finally, responses to 

interrogatories must be verified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5) (“The person who makes the 

answers must sign them, and the attorney who objects must sign any objections.”).

Nonspecific boilerplate objections to an opposing party’s interrogatories are 

“inadequate under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 34.” Solomon v. Jacobson, No. 

EDCV 15-1453-VAP (JPRx), 2016 WL 6039184, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2016); see also

Romero v. Securus Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-1283-JM-MDD, 2017 WL 4621223, at *2 (S.D. 

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Cal. Oct. 16, 2017) (explaining that defendant repeatedly recited “disfavored boilerplate 

objections” in responding to five interrogatories). 

The manner in which defendant deploys boilerplate objections demonstrates that 

they are without substance. Indeed, for every interrogatory particularized response

provided, defendant first made a boilerplate objection.

1

 The Court recognizes the 

paragraph is an oft used tactic to avoid waiver of some future objection. But it also 

needlessly complicated the dispute, causing plaintiffs to object to language in the 

boilerplate paragraph that never constituted the true basis for the defendant’s objection. 

The purpose of requiring specific and particularized objections is to ensure clear 

communication between the parties and avoid disputes like the one now before the Court. 

Consequently, the Court will only consider the portions of defendant’s objections 

that come after the colon of the boilerplate paragraph. 

B. Interrogatories at Issue

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2 are contention interrogatories2seeking “all 

facts” supporting the potential assertion by defendants (1) that Alfaro “was not entitled to 

overtime pay while working for SDFD as an ERO”, and (2) that Alfaro “engaged in ‘fire 

suppression activities’ while working for SDFD as an ERO.” [Doc. No. 36 at pp. 4, 6]. A 

contention interrogatory “should not require the answering party to provide a narrative 

account of its case.” Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 403, 404-405 (D. Kan. 

1998). Courts “will generally find [contention interrogatories] overly broad and unduly 

burdensome on their face to the extent they ask for ‘every fact’ [or ‘all facts’] which 

support[] identified allegations or defenses.” Id. at 405. “Interrogatories may, however, 

properly ask for the ‘principal or material’ facts which support an allegation or defense.”

 

1 For example, following the boilerplate paragraph, defendant’s answer to Interrogatory No. 9 states that 

the Interrogatory is overbroad in requesting “each and every date that a communication occurred.” [Doc. 

No. 36 at p. 13]. The boilerplate language is vague and duplicative of defendant’s later argument.

2 A “contention interrogatory” is “any question that asks another party to indicate what it contends.” In 

re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation, 108 F.R.D. 328, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 

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Id. On this basis alone, the Court agrees with defendants [Doc. No. 36 at pp. 5, 7] and

finds that Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2 are overly broad and unduly burdensome as worded 

and must be limited to the principal, or material, facts that support plaintiffs’ claims or 

defendant’s defense.

The Court finds that defendant’s answer to Interrogatory No. 1 would be satisfactory, 

even in the face of appropriately worded interrogatories. Defendant states that because 

“[p]ursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (‘7k exemption’), employees engaged in ‘fire 

suppression activities’ are exempt from standard overtime pay . . . . [and] [a]t all relevant 

times Plaintiff worked as an ERO . . . [Alfaro, therefore,] fell within the 7k exemption.”

[Id. at pp. 4-5]. Defendant’s response is an adequate answer to plaintiffs’ Interrogatory.

Interrogatory No. 2 asks defendant to disclose “all facts” that support the contention 

plaintiff, Alfaro, “engaged in ‘fire suppression activities’” while an ERO for the SDFD. 

[Id. at p. 6]. Defendant responded that Mr. Alfaro engaged in such activity “[a]t all relevant 

times . . . based on the job duties, responsibilities, expectations and functions of the ERO 

position.” [Id.]. Plaintiffs argue the response is inadequate because it “does not provide

actual facts nor specific examples to support [the] contention Plaintiffs engaged in such 

activities.” [Id.]. Defendant counters that if plaintiffs wanted the City “to explain, on a 

day-to-day basis over the course of several years, where and how Plaintiffs engaged in fire 

suppression activities, . . . the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome.” [Id. at 7]. 

Setting aside the Court’s earlier finding regarding the boilerplate objection language and 

the overbroad nature of the Interrogatory, the Interrogatory, as worded, also does not call 

for the sort of specific answer plaintiffs seek. The City’s answer is sufficient.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to compel further responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2 is

therefore DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 3 asks whether during Mr. Alfaro’s employment as an 

ERO for the SDFD, did he “ever respond to the scene of a fire” as part of those ERO duties. 

Defendant responded that the “ERO position was a supervisory [one] responsible for 

command and control of all dispatch floor operations”, and then went on to provide a nonCase 3:17-cv-00046-H-KSC Document 42 Filed 09/21/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 14
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exhaustive list of various “duties.” [Id. at p. 8]. Defendants concluded that “each of the 

[listed] job functions, as well as the numerous other job functions performed by EROs, 

responded to the scene of a fire.” [Id.]. Plaintiffs contend the interrogatory “requires simply 

a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer” and a further answer is needed. [Id.]. Although plaintiffs’ 

Interrogatory could be answered with a “yes” or “no,” defendant is not limited to single 

word answers. Nonetheless, the response – while informative – is inadequate. Defendant 

appears to make the point that the phrase in plaintiff’s interrogatory, “respond to the scene 

of a fire,” is imprecise and fails to accurately describe the array of responsibilities held by 

an ERO. While the Court agrees with defendant that its answer need not be circumscribed 

solely to a “yes” or “no,” the Interrogatory plainly requires an affirmative or negative 

answer. Consequently, plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel a further response to Interrogatory 

No. 3 is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 5 asks whether plaintiff, Mr. Alfaro, was “required to 

handle firefighting equipment” as an ERO. [Id. at p. 9]. Defendant objected, explaining 

that Mr. Alfaro was “required to be knowledgeable and capable of using firefighting 

equipment if the need arose” and that such knowledge would have been acquired by dint 

of his position as a “fire captain.” [Id. at p. 10]. Further, Mr. Alfaro was required to 

“maintain certification of all applicable firefighting equipment.” [Id.]. Again, defendant’s 

answer is inadequate. One could conclude that Mr. Alfaro operated firefighting equipment 

during his time as an ERO, but plaintiffs ask explicitly whether he did, indeed, do so. 

Consequently, a further response is required by defendant, and plaintiffs’ Motion to 

Compel regarding Interrogatory No. 5 is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 6 requests defendant to “list all of [Alfaro’s] job duties 

as an ERO for SDFD.” [Id. at p. 11]. Defendant directs plaintiffs to review the “lists of job 

duties which will be produced in response to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of 

Documents.” [Id.]. Plaintiffs use their well-worn boilerplate argument that references Rule 

33(a)(2). [Id.]. Defendant’s Response implicitly invokes Rule 33(d), which permits a 

responding party to direct the interrogator to business records that contain the answer. Fed. 

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R. Civ. P. 33(d). Directing a party to business records is appropriate if the “burden of 

deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for either party.” Id. Defendant 

has indicated it is providing the relevant document with the job duties to plaintiffs, and 

plaintiffs do not claim that the burden of determining the duties is more onerous than it 

would be for defendants. Defendant’s answer is sufficient and the Motion to Compel 

regarding Interrogatory No. 6 is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 9 asks defendant to “[l]ist each and every date on 

which [Alfaro] communicated (whether verbally or in writing) with any supervisor about 

any issue related to his pay.” [Doc. No. 36 at p. 12]. Defendant answers that it does not 

know the full universe of potential communications “at this time,” that the City cannot 

inspect plaintiff’s e-mail account as per the agreement of counsel, but, nonetheless, that it 

will produce “all responsive, nonprivileged written communications in one or more 

productions to plaintiff’s counsel” on an ongoing basis, rather than a list. [Id.]. Plaintiffs 

object, indicating they have not received any documents of the kind defendant mentions. 

Next, they argue that the interrogatory inquires about oral communications. [Id.]. In its 

briefing, defendant states that all defendants “have since provided the email 

communications agreed to with Plaintiff’s counsel” after an in-person meet and confer. 

[Id. at p. 14]. Thus the parties appear to have reached some agreement regarding the written 

productions. 

As to the oral communications, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that it is highly 

relevant that they “know if, when, and to who they communicated regarding their wages.” 

[Id.]. Despite the overbroad nature of plaintiff’s Interrogatory – like Interrogatory Nos. 1 

and 2, supra – defendant must still supplement its production with any potentially 

“material” oral communications of which the City is aware.3 These material oral

 

3 The City is not obligated by this Interrogatory to canvas every employee who might have had a 

conversation with Mr. Alfaro. To do so would be onerous and over burdensome. Moreover, the fluid 

nature of oral communications are such that this information might be better suited to inquiry during 

depositions, rather than interrogatories. 

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communications must be provided to plaintiffs, and on that limited basis, plaintiffs’ Motion 

to Compel regarding Interrogatory No. 9 is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 13 asks defendant to “state all facts” that indicate “the 

date [individuals identified in Interrogatory No. 12] learned that [Alfaro] and others sought 

unpaid overtime wages from the City.” [Id. at p. 14]. Defendant answered that all 

individuals learned of Mr. Alfaro’s claim for unpaid wages from a letter sent by Mr. Alan 

Arrollado. [Id. at p. 15]. Plaintiffs’ objection focuses on the boilerplate portion of 

defendant’s answer, and does not claim the substantive portion of the answer is inadequate. 

The Court finds that defendant’s answer is sufficient, although the Court would note the 

Interrogatory asked for a specific date. Presumably the letter is dated and the information 

is thus readily available to both parties. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel a further response to 

Interrogatory No. 13 is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Nos. 14 and 17. Interrogatory No. 14 seeks “all facts” that 

individuals identified in Interrogatory No. 12 relied upon that “militated in favor of” 

removing plaintiff, Alfaro, from the ERO position. [Id. at p. 16]. Defendant answers that 

there was no specific decision to remove Mr. Alfaro from his position, but rather all ERO 

positions were eliminated in restructuring the SDFD Command & Data Center. [Id.]. That 

decision “was planned prior to Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages” and “motivated solely 

by legitimate business reasons.” [Id.]. Plaintiffs, again, take issue solely with defendant’s 

boilerplate language, and does not indicate any inadequacy in the substantive answer. The 

Court concludes that defendant has provided a complete answer. 

Interrogatory No. 17, like No. 14, asks for “each and every reason each person made 

the decision to remove [Alfaro] from the ERO position.” [Id. at p. 17]. It differs in that it 

inquires about the reasoning of those individuals identified in Interrogatory No. 16 rather 

than No. 12. [Id.]. Defendant’s answer is identical to No. 17 and so, too, is the Court’s 

finding. 

The Motion to Compel regarding Interrogatory Nos. 14 and 17 is DENIED.

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Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Nos. 18 and 19 ask defendant to state every reason why it 

did not pay overtime to plaintiff, Mr. Alfaro, prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Haro 

v. City of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2014), and still does not pay Mr. Alfaro 

overtime. The non-boilerplate portions of defendant’s responses are identical. [Id. at pp. 

19, 20]. First, defendant states employees engaged in “‘fire suppression activities’ are 

exempt from standard overtime pay” under 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (“7k exemption”). [Id.]. 

Next, defendant states that “[a]t all relevant times, including before and after publication 

of [Haro]” plaintiff was within the 7k exemption “based on the job duties, responsibilities, 

expectations and functions of the ERO position.” [Id.]. Plaintiffs assert the answer is 

inadequate because it “does not state any facts to support its contention that Plaintiffs 

[engaged] in fire suppression activities.” [Id. at p. 21]. The answer to Interrogatory Nos. 

18 and 19 states that any of the myriad duties and responsibilities of an ERO falls within 

the Section 7k exception. If plaintiffs sought specific examples, the Interrogatory could 

have made such a request through a more concise interrogatory. Plaintiffs’ Motion to 

Compel regarding Interrogatory Nos. 18 and 19 is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21 asks whether the City currently pays EROs 

overtime (No. 20), and if so, why (No. 21). [Id. at 22]. The City explains that the ERO 

position no longer exists, that Battalion Chiefs now perform, in part, the duties of EROs,

and that the Battalion Chiefs are paid pursuant to an agreement with the San Diego 

Firefighters, International Association of Firefighters, Local 145. [Id.]. Plaintiff does not 

object to defendant’s substantive portion, and only takes issue with the boilerplate 

objection paragraphs in each response. The position no longer exists and defendant offers 

further information regarding how the City pays the individuals that took over ERO 

responsibilities. Defendant’s response is sufficient and so plaintiff’s Motion to Compel 

regarding Interrogatory Nos. 20 and 21 is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 22 asks defendant to state the “name and position of 

[your] person most knowledgeable regarding the determination of whether to compensate 

EROs at a rate of 1.5 times their regular hourly rate of pay for hours worked beyond 40 

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hours in one week.” [Id. at p. 24]. Defendant objects, contending the interrogatory seeks 

information protected by the attorney-client and work-product privileges. [Id.]. Defendant 

asserts the Interrogatory “is asking the City to produce a witness to explain why the City 

is defending itself in this litigation, instead of agreeing to Plaintiffs (sic) demands to pay 

them overtime wages.” [Id. at p. 25]. Defendant’s argument is misguided. Plaintiffs seek 

a name, not a detailed explanation. If at a later date during a deposition, for example, 

plaintiff seeks additional information, defendant might have a colorable basis to assert 

either privilege, but it is unavailing at this time. Defendant must provide plaintiff the name 

of the individual most knowledgeable about the determination of whether to compensate 

EROs as explained in the Interrogatory. Consequently, plaintiff’s Motion to Compel 

regarding Interrogatory No. 22 is GRANTED. 

II. Settlement Negotiation Privilege as Basis for Document Withholding and

Redaction

The instant Joint Motion [Doc. No. 38] centers primarily on assertions of the 

settlement negotiation privilege and the deliberative process privilege (see Section III, 

infra). The City asserts several privileges for multiple items in the Privilege Log. Notably,

plaintiffs do not contest the City’s assertion of the attorney-client privilege or the workproduct privilege on any item. Accordingly, the Court will not consider any item where 

defendant has made clear that the attorney-client privilege or the work-product privilege 

have been asserted in tandem with any other privilege. Even if the Court were to find that 

the assertion of the settlement negotiation privilege or deliberative process privileges were 

wrongly made, that finding would not serve to waive the properly made – and uncontested 

– assertion of the remaining privileges. 

Plaintiffs identify a series of documents in defendants’ Privilege Log that defendant

either did not produce, or redacted, based on an allegedly incorrect assertion of the 

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“settlement negotiation” privilege. 4[Id.]. The 26 “items” at issue, however, were not all 

redacted or withheld solely because of the settlement negotiation privilege. The Privilege 

Log indicates that the settlement negotiation privilege was the sole privilege asserted for 

items 1, 2, 4, and 10, which were withheld completely, while item 3 was partially redacted. 

[Doc. No. 38-3 (“Exhibit B”)]. The attorney client and work-product privileges were 

asserted alongside the settlement negotiation privilege for items 3, 5, 6, 12, 23, 24, 25, 30, 

31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, and 40. [Id.]. And the settlement negotiation privilege was 

asserted with the deliberative process privilege for items 15, 16, 17, 22, 27, and 29. [Id.].

The issue before the court is discoverability, not admissibility. The “settlement 

negotiation” privilege asserted by defendants emanates – if it exists at all – from Federal 

Rule of Evidence 408. Rule 408 provides that “conduct or a statement made during 

compromise negotiations about the claim” is inadmissible “either to prove or disprove the 

validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a 

contradiction.” Fed. R. Evid. 408(a). By its own terms, Rule 408 offers no safe harbor 

from discovery because some information was prepared for, or disclosed during, settlement 

negotiations. The Advisory Committee Note to the 2006 Amendments makes that clear:

The sentence of the Rule referring to evidence ‘otherwise discoverable’ 

has been deleted as superfluous. . . . The intent of the sentence was to prevent 

a party from trying to immunize admissible information, such as a pre-existing 

document, through the pretense of disclosing it during compromise 

negotiations. . . . But even without the sentence, the rule cannot be read to 

protect pre-existing information simply because it was presented to the 

adversary in compromise negotiations. 

Fed R. Evid. 408, Advisory Committee Note to the 2006 Amendments (emphasis added). 

Thus, any settlement privilege must reside not in the plain text of the Rule, but in the Rule’s 

penumbra. That argument is unpersuasive in this Circuit. 

 

4 The specific Item numbers are: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 

34, 35, 36, 38, 40. [Doc. No. 38-3].

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The Ninth Circuit has not recognized a settlement negotiation privilege that would 

shield information from discovery as asserted by defendants. [Doc. No. 38 at pp. 8-11]. 

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Rhoades v. Avon Products, Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th 

Cir. 2007), explained that “statements made in settlement negotiations are only excludable 

under the circumstances protected by the Rule.” The Rhoades Court addressed whether 

Rule 408 permitted it to consider a letter threatening an infringement suit against the 

plaintiff when evaluating jurisdiction. Id. at 1160. The panel held that it did. The Rule is 

“one of limited applicability,” so “[w]hen statements made during settlement are 

introduced for a purpose unrelated to liability, the policy underlying the Rule is not 

injured.” Id. at 1162; see also A.D. v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 460-61 

(9th Cir. 2013) (holding Rule 408 permits district courts to consider settlement offer 

amounts when determining fee awards). As Rule 408 is not expansive enough to preclude 

admissibility in multiple contexts, extending Rule 408 to prevent the discoverability of 

such information is untenable. Defendant’s argument “[q]uite simply . . . is not an accurate 

statement of the law.” Rhoades at 1160. 

Consequently, it is ORDERED that Defendant must produce to plaintiffs a version 

of item 3 that is free from those redactions predicated on the settlement negotiation 

privilege. Further, defendant is to produce in their entirety the documents or information 

identified in items 1, 2, 4, and 10. Defendant’s assertion of a settlement negotiation 

privilege for all other items is unavailing. The Court will consider the other privilege 

claims for those items in Section III, infra. 

III. Deliberative Process Privilege as Basis for Document Withholding and

Redaction

Plaintiffs contest defendant’s assertion of the deliberative process privilege as a basis 

to withhold or redact requested, responsive, documents. [Doc. No. 38, at pp. 12-14]. 

Plaintiffs take issue with every item in the City of San Diego’s Privilege Log where it 

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asserts the deliberative process privilege.5[Id. at pp. 13-14]. Defendant asserted only the 

deliberative process privilege for items 11, 13, 14, 41, and a portion of 25. However, the 

Court’s ruling in Section II also renders the deliberative process privilege the single

remaining basis for withholding, or redacting, items 15, 16, 17, 22, 27, and 29. Therefore, 

the Court must consider the appropriateness of the City’s deliberative process privilege 

assertion for items 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 27, 29, 41, and a portion of 25. For all 

remaining items, defendants asserted the attorney-client and work-product privileges “in 

conjunction with” the deliberative process privilege. [Id. at p. 14]. As stated above, 

because plaintiffs do not object to the assertions of attorney-client privilege or workproduct privilege for those items, the Court need not determine the appropriateness of the 

deliberative process privilege claim for those items, here.

The deliberative process privilege covers “documents reflecting advisory opinions, 

recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental 

decisions and policies are formulated.” Dep’t. of Interior v. Klamath Water Users 

Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 

132, 150 (1975)); see also F.T.C. v. Warner Commc’ns, 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984). 

“The deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not 

communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery 

and front page news, and its object is to enhance the quality of agency decisions, by 

protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within the 

Government.” Id. at 8-9 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Lahr v. Nat’l 

Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the deliberative 

process privilege “shields certain intra-agency communications from disclosure to allow 

agencies freely to explore possibilities, engage in internal debates or play devil’s advocate 

without fear of public scrutiny.”).

 

5 Namely, items 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 

42, 43, 43 (sic), and 44.

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Documents must be both “predecisional” and “deliberative” to qualify for the 

privilege. Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 307 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). A 

document is predecisional if it was prepared “to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving 

at his decision,” and deliberative if its release would “expose an agency’s decisionmaking 

process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby 

undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.” Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dept. of 

Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992). “Purely factual material that does not reflect 

deliberative processes is not protected,” but factual material that “is so interwoven with the 

deliberative material that it is not severable” is protected. F.T.C., 742 F.2d at 1161; see 

also Sanchez v. Johnson, No. C-00-1593 CW (JCS), 2011 WL 1870308, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 19, 2001 (“[T]he fact/opinion distinction should not be applied mechanically. Rather, 

the relevant inquiry is whether revealing the information exposes the deliberative process.” 

(internal citations and quotations omitted)). 

The burden of establishing the privilege lies with the party asserting it. North 

Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003). If established, 

the privilege is “strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the 

logic of its principles.” Sanchez, 2001 WL 1870308, at * 6. And yet, even when 

established, it is a qualified privilege that can be overcome. F.T.C., 742 F.2d at 1161. That 

is, “[a] litigant may obtain deliberative materials [or information] if his or her need for the 

materials [or information] and the need for accurate fact-finding override the government’s 

interest in non-disclosure.” Id. 

While the Court appreciates the balance that must always be struck when crafting a 

Privilege Log, the City’s Log offers no meaningful insight into the items withheld due to 

the deliberative process privilege. The City’s briefing in the Joint Motion is also of little 

help to the Court. [Doc. No. 38 at pp. 15-16]. Consequently, to resolve this discovery 

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dispute, the Court ORDERS defendant to provide copies of the disputed documents6for 

in camera review on or before September 28, 2018 at 5:00PM. Along with these 

documents, defendant must attach a declaration explaining, where applicable, which 

portions of these documents it believes to be privileged based on the deliberative process 

privilege, and therefore not subject to production. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ Motion to compel further discovery responses 

from defendant, as presented in this Joint Motion [Doc. No. 36] is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART. To the extent that this Court has ordered further answers, 

defendant must do so within 14 DAYS of this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ Motion to compel the production of 

documents, as presented in the Joint Motion [Doc. No. 38], is GRANTED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant shall lodge with the Court the 

disputed documents identified in Section III, supra, for in camera review by the Court on 

or before September 28, 2018 at 5:00PM.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2018

 

6 Specifically, items 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 25, 27, 29, and 41. 

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