Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01806/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01806-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN ROETTGEN,

CDCR #AX-5810,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. PARAMO; M. STOUT; M. 

HAGEMANN; T.B. RUSSELL; 

DELEON; G. STRATTON; K. SPENCE; 

M. CURTIS; J. HEDDY; A. GARVEY; F. 

PINTADO; A. SANCHEZ; N. MOON; 

SEIBEL; C. COVEL,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01806-LAB-BGS

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[Doc. No. 2] and

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

John Roettgen (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 1 at 1. 

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Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the 

time of filing; instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2).

I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his prison 

trust account statements, as well as a prison certificate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements

shows that Plaintiff had an available balance of zero at the time of filing. Therefore, the 

Court assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, 

the Court directs the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of 

the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

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Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations2

Plaintiff has filed a forty three (43) page Complaint in which he names seventeen 

(17) defendants and attaches ninety four (94) pages of Exhibits. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff 

alleges that his claims arise during his incarceration at RJD from July 3, 2014 to March 9, 

2015. (Id. at 1.)

 

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 The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has filed four other § 1983 actions in this Court which 

involve some of the same defendants who are named in this action. A court “‘may take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings 

have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). See Roettgen v. Foston, et 

al. S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:13-cv-01101-GPC-BGS; see also Roettgen v. Arnold, et al. S.D. Cal. Civil 

Case No. 3:11-cv-02562-MMA-NLS; see also Roettgen v. Des Jardins, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

3:14-cv-02913-BAS-JMA; see also Roettgen v. Paramo, et. al. S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-02988-

JAH-WVG. 

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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

C. Rule 8

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with 

Rule 8. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order to state a 

claim for relief in a pleading it must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds 

for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) & (2). In addition, “the pleading 

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands 

more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Plaintiff is also admonished that he must comply with Local Rule 8.2 which 

requires, in part, that “[c]omplaints by prisoners under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, must be legibly written or typewritten on forms supplied by the court” and 

“additional pages not to exceed fifteen (15) in number may be included with the court 

approved form complaint, provided the form is completely filled ion to the extent 

applicable.” S.D. CivLr 8.2(a). Here, Plaintiff filed an additional thirty five (35) pages, 

along with the Court’s form complaint, which well exceeds the number of pages 

permitted by the local rule.

D. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Paramo, Hagemann, Stout and “all ranking staff” 

failed to protect him from harm when one of Plaintiff’s known “enemies” was housed in 

his yard. (Compl. at 15, 17.) When Plaintiff learned that this inmate was housed in his 

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yard, he “immediately wrote a letter to Defendant Paramo and to the Courts.”3(Id. at 15.) 

When he addressed his concern to Defendant Hagemann, Plaintiff was told that he would 

“go to ad-seg because he was the complaining party.” (Id. at 16.)

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety and well-being of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–

33 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). To state an Eighth 

Amendment failure to protect claim, however, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 

plausibly show that (1) he faced conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” to 

his health or safety, and (2) the individual prison officials he seeks to hold liable were 

“deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). To demonstrate deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must 

show that the defendant both knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to 

his health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, Plaintiff must allege “the official 

[was] both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exist[ed], and [that] he . . . also dr[e]w that inference.” Id.

There are no facts from which the Court could conclude that any Defendant acted 

with “deliberate indifference” to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. In fact, Plaintiff claims 

that when he informed prison officials of the alleged enemy being housed in his yard, 

Plaintiff was removed from that housing assignment to avoid the risk of harm. There are 

 

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 Plaintiff claims that he wrote to District Judge Anello in Roettgen v. Arnold, et al, S.D. Civil Case 

No. 11cv2562 MMA (NLS). A review of the Court’s docket in that matter indicate that Plaintiff did 

raise his concerns with being housed with inmate Johnson to the Court in that matter. (Id., Doc. No. 

117.) In addition, Plaintiff raised a general “failure to protect” claim in this separate matter based on his 

housing in Ad-Seg which the Court found in favor of Defendants and entered judgment as to that claim. 

(Doc. No. 189.) To the extent that Plaintiff is raising duplicative claims, this Court may ultimately 

dismiss these claims as frivolous. A complaint “that merely repeats pending or previously litigated 

claims is subject to dismissal as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Cato v. United States, 70 

F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 

(10th Cir. 1997) (“Repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under 

§ 1915 as frivolous or malicious.”) (quotation omitted). If Plaintiff chooses to amend his pleading, he 

must clearly identify why these claims should not be dismissed as duplicative.

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no facts that any named Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s concerns. There are no 

allegations that Plaintiff faced any serious risk of harm after he was placed in ad-seg. 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege that any Defendant was aware of 

any facts demonstrating an “obvious” risk and failed to take any action. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

842; see also Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Much like 

recklessness in criminal law, deliberate indifference . . . may be shown by circumstantial 

evidence when the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a 

risk of harm.”).

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims against all 

Defendants also must be dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 

1004. If Plaintiff chooses to amend these claims, he must identify Eighth Amendment 

claims he has not already raised and litigated in Roettgen v. Arnold, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil 

Case No. 3:11-cv-02562-MMA-NLS.

E. Access to Courts 

Plaintiff claims Defendants have denied him access to courts and sets forth 

examples in which he alleges Defendants hampered his efforts to effectively litigate his 

ongoing civil rights matters. (See Compl. at 22.)

Prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas 

petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may 

arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” 

(forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit that cannot now be tried 

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002); see 

also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011). (differentiating “between 

two types of access to court claims: those involving prisoners’ right to affirmative 

assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate without active interference.”).

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However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any 

access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual 

injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the 

“inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to allege an actual 

injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to 

show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 353 & n.4). 

In addition, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” 

underlying claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the 

underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently 

pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be 

awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be 

brought.” Id. at 415.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege the actual injury required to state an access to 

courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. Plaintiff failed to 

include any “factual matter” to show how or why any individual Defendant in this case 

caused him to suffer any “actual prejudice” “such as the inability to meet a filing deadline 

or to present a claim,” with respect to that case. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; Jones, 393 F.3d 

at 936; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While Plaintiff alleges that he was prevented from 

“complying with Court deadlines” in his ongoing civil rights matters, he then claims that 

he has actually prevailed in several rulings. There is no adverse event that Plaintiff links 

to any action on the part of Defendants. 

Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Plaintiff 

suffered any “actual injury” with respect to that case, or any other non-frivolous direct 

criminal appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights action he may have filed, see Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 354, the Court finds Plaintiff’s access to courts claims must be dismissed for 

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failing to state a plausible claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

F. Due Process

Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendants liable for his placement in ad-seg in 

violation of his right to due process. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners against 

deprivation or restraint of “a protected liberty interest” and “atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 

(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the level of the hardship must be 

determined in a case-by-case determination, courts look to:

1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon 

inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state’s 

action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). Only if an inmate has 

alleged facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest does the court next consider 

“whether the procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.” Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 860.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts which show that the 

conditions in ad-seg subjected him to any “atypical and significant hardship in relation to 

the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584. Plaintiff does not 

compare the conditions of his confinement before or after his placement in ad-seg.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s pleading contains no “factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that Defendants’ actions 

“presented a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Plaintiff’s] indeterminate 

sentence,” or caused him to suffer an “atypical” or “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 

U.S. at 584-85; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).

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G. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his pleading to state a claim unless 

it is absolutely clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect”). 

Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix the pleading deficiencies 

discussed in this Order, if he can. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to file an Amended Complaint 

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned, 

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however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by 

itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim not realleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

If Plaintiff fails to follow these instructions and/or files an Amended Complaint 

that still fails to state a claim, his case may be dismissed without further leave to amend. 

See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take 

advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2016

HON. LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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