Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00568/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00568-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

LAURA JOHNSON-PRICE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:07cv568-MHT

) (WO)

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF )

HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Laura (Clemons) Johnson-Price, an AfricanAmerican, brings federal employment discrimination claims

against the following defendants: the Alabama Department

of Human Resources (DHR), DHR Commissioner Nancy Buckner,

the Alabama State Personnel Department (SPD), and SPD

Director Jackie Graham. Johnson-Price charges that DHR

and Buckner engaged in race discrimination and

retaliation in respect to hiring and the terms and

conditions of her employment, while SPD and Graham

perpetuated race discrimination in the allocation of

promotions. She asserts each of these claims pursuant to

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 1 of 33
2

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. § 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17. This court has

original jurisdiction over the Title VII claims under 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and the § 1981 claims pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1343.

The defendants now move for summary judgment on all

claims. For the reasons that follow, the defendants’

motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Under

Rule 56, the court must view the admissible evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 2 of 33
3

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

Johnson-Price was employed by DHR for over 25 years.

After graduating from the University of Alabama in 1978

with a Masters of Social Work degree, she was hired by

the DHR office in Calhoun County as a Social Worker III.

In 1983, she was promoted to Welfare Supervisor II, and

in 1993, after the state DHR reclassified the agency’s

job categories, she was named Service Supervisor II,

followed by a promotion to Senior Social Worker that same

year. In August 1993, she was named Human Resources

Program Specialist, a position with the state DHR.

A. Pickens County Director 

Johnson-Price submitted an application for the

Pickens County Director position in 1993. The

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 3 of 33
1. DHR county boards are comprised of non-DHR

employees who are citizens of the relevant county, each

of whom is appointed by the county commission, and who

serve as autonomous entities from the state DHR. The

county boards are the hiring authorities for the county

directors.

4

applications were reviewed by the Pickens County Board.1

Among the list of applicants, Johnson and Tony Black, a

white man, were similarly ranked. However, the Board

ultimately chose Black for the position. 

B. Calhoun County Assistant Director

Also in 1993, the position of Assistant Director in

Calhoun County became vacant, and, between September 1993

and January 1994, Johnson-Price wrote letters expressing

her interest in the job to several members of the DHR

leadership, including the DHR Commissioner, Calhoun

County Director Erin Snowden, and the Director of DHR’s

Civil Rights/Equal Employment (CR/EE) Office, Sylvester

Smith. A state-wide budget freeze was in effect at that

time, which purportedly delayed the hiring process. 

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 4 of 33
5

In January 1994, in the midst of the budget freeze,

Director Snowden was offered the opportunity to hire

either a Financial Support Supervisor or an Assistant

Director; Snowden chose to hire a Financial Support

Supervisor. In April 1994, Johnson-Price again informed

Snowden and Smith, as well as Waldo Spencer, Director of

DHR’s Personnel Division, that she wished to be

considered for the Assistant Director position. Soon

after, the DHR Staffing Committee exempted the position

from the hiring freeze. 

In August 1994, Mike Galloway, a DHR Regional

Manager, instructed Snowden to post and distribute an

announcement for the Assistant Director opening.

Johnson-Price was one of two applicants for the job,

along with Mike Norton, a white male. Norton eventually

withdrew his application, and, on January 7, 1995,

Johnson-Price was provisionally appointed as the

Assistant Director for Calhoun County. Her position

became permanent in May 1995.

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 5 of 33
6

After her promotion to Assistant Director, JohnsonPrice had severe disagreements with Snowden, who served

as her immediate supervisor. Snowden harassed JohnsonPrice and engaged in repeated efforts to undermine her

authority. Several of these instances, summarized in

Johnson-Price’s brief opposing summary judgment, are

outlined below.

Stress Management Training: In May 1995, JohnsonPrice sent a memo to Snowden and the Calhoun County DHR

supervisors about a county-wide Stress Management

Workshop, planned for August 1995. Bobby Malone, who was

both the DHR County Board Chairman and the Director of

Family and Children Services at the Calhoun County Mental

Health Center, agreed to conduct the workshop. In June

1995, Malone informed Snowden and Johnson-Price that he

would not charge a personal fee to conduct the workshop,

but would only collect $ 250 from Calhoun County for

materials. Johnson-Price sent a letter to Snowden,

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 6 of 33
2. DHR and Buckner assert that Snowden opposed the

training because it presented an “ethical issue” to hold

“a DHR event in which a Calhoun County DHR Board member

stood to make a profit.” DHR Defs.’ Br. at 8 (doc. no.

46). Johnson-Price states that Snowden’s ethical claim

is “bogus” as “[n]one of the money [from the training]

would go to Malone personally.” Pl.’s Br. at 5 and n. 5

(doc. no. 61).

7

confirming that Malone would not receive DHR funds for

his personal benefit. 

On July 21, 1995, Snowden sent a memo to the county

supervisors informing them that it was against DHR policy

to use local funds to support staff training. JohnsonPrice contends that the memo implied that she was

attempting to illicitly spend the office’s money.2

Snowden consequently refused to pay for the training. On

August 25, 1995, Regional Manager Galloway informed

Snowden that he supported the training and after

addressing Snowden’s various funding concerns, the event

went forward as planned.

Tile Removal: On September 7, 1995, Snowden berated

Johnson-Price in front of other Calhoun County employees

for authorizing the removal of tiles in the staff

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 7 of 33
3. In her letter, Ledbetter also stated that Snowden

repeatedly attempted “to undermine and discredit”

Johnson-Price, and engaged in “blatant attack[s] on her

credibility as a manager.” Pl.’s Ex. 21 (doc. no. 66-4).

8

breakroom without Snowden’s approval. Snowden claimed

that the tiles contained asbestos and thus constituted a

health hazard to the employees in the building. JohnsonPrice presented evidence that “the tile was not asbestos

and therefore presented no problem for removal and

disposal.” Pl.’s Ex. 23 (doc. no. 66-6). As a result of

Snowden’s actions, Calhoun County Supervisor June

Ledbetter wrote a letter to Malone on September 8, 1995,

complaining of the “verbal beating” that Snowden

inflicted upon Johnson-Price. Pl.’s Ex. 21 (doc. no. 66-

4).3

 Johnson-Price also sent a memo to Snowden, objecting

to the director’s decision to take unfounded and

inappropriate disciplinary action in the presence of

Johnson-Price’s subordinates. 

Internal Protocol and Procedures: Throughout the

year, Snowden repeatedly held meetings without informing

Johnson-Price. In the meetings Johnson-Price did attend,

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 8 of 33
9

Snowden would often request detailed reports, to be

completed on very short notice, or would falsely accuse

Johnson-Price of failing to submit reports in a timely

fashion. Furthermore, when Johnson-Price purchased

furniture, supplies, equipment, or other “enhancement

items” for the office, Pl.’s Br. at 9 (doc. no. 61),

Snowden would object to her purchases--though they had

been discussed and approved beforehand--and refuse to pay

the bills in a timely fashion. 

Allocation of Supervisory Duties: On January 11,

1996, Snowden distributed a memorandum to Calhoun County

staff, informing them that she was taking a medical leave

of absence and assigning supervisory duties in her

absence. As Assistant Director of Calhoun County,

Johnson-Price was second in command to Snowden;

nevertheless, upon her leave, Snowden left JohnsonPrice’s subordinates in charge of many office functions.

For instance, Supervisor Kay Tolbert was put in charge of

one of the two Calhoun County offices, and granted

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 9 of 33
4. The record indicates that Calhoun County operated

two DHR offices, a building at 801 Noble Street, and

another office at 1200 Noble Street Building. 

5. After Snowden’s retirement in 1996, Johnson-Price

served as Assistant Director to Tony Black, who succeeded

Snowden as Calhoun County Director. Johnson-Price notes

that when Black took a leave of absence, she was left to

oversee all office programs and administration.

10

oversight of the agency’s service delivery programs,

financial transactions, and personnel matters.4

 In

contrast, Johnson-Price was left in charge of one agency

office, and instructed to oversee leave processing,

financial support programs, and emergency procedures.

Pl.’s Ex. 25 (doc. no. 66-8). When Snowden was again

absent in June 1996, Supervisors Tolbert and Price were

charged with operating one of the Calhoun County offices,

while Johnson-Price was instructed to supervise the

other. Johnson-Price submits that Snowden’s delegation

practices were inconsistent with Calhoun County

procedure.5

Annual Performance Evaluation: In December 1995,

Snowden conducted Johnson-Price’s annual job-performance

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 10 of 33
6. In her review, Snowden declared that, on numerous

occasions, Johnson-Price failed to notify her of planned

trainings and workshops (including the Stress Management

Workshop, described above), submitted requests for

additional staff or equipment that were beyond the

ability of the director to deliver, which created

“friction, disillusionment, and negatively impact[ed]

morale,” fomented “health and safety risk[s]” on DHR

premises (referring to the asbestos tile incident), and

repeatedly violated the National Association of Social

Workers Code of Ethics. Pl.’s Ex. 30 at 3-4 (doc. no.

66-13). 

7. DHR’s Personnel Manual states: “The purpose of

the pre-appraisal session is to enable the supervisor and

(continued...)

11

evaluation and rated her as “Partially Meets Standards.”

Pl.’s Ex. 30 (doc. no. 66-13). In the evaluation,

Snowden set forth several examples of Johnson-Price’s

allegedly poor performance.6

 Johnson-Price did not agree

with Snowden’s review and refused to sign the form. As

a result of Snowden’s rating, Johnson-Price was not

eligible for a merit-based pay raise. 

Under DHR policy, Snowden was expected to supply

Johnson-Price with a “pre-appraisal” assessment at the

beginning of the year, listing the relevant standards of

evaluation for her position. Pl.’s Br. at 9-10.7

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 11 of 33
7. (...continued)

worker to discuss written statement[s] concerning the

employee’s job tasks and the performance standards to be

used in monitoring these tasks.” Pl.’s Ex. 29 at 6 (doc.

no. 66-12).

8. In the CR/EE complaint, Johnson-Price alleged race

discrimination and retaliation based on many of the same

facts set forth in her brief opposing summary judgment.

9. In his memorandum to Snowden, Spencer referred to

(continued...)

12

However, Snowden did not distribute the pre-appraisal

report until immediately before the actual evaluation.

After receiving the negative performance review, JohnsonPrice filed a complaint with the CR/EE Office, charging

Snowden with failing to provide task statements and

performance standards over the course of the year and

alleging that Snowden’s evaluation was “unfair” and

“being used as a form of retaliation.” Pl.’s Ex. 36

(doc. no. 67-2).8

 In response, Personnel Director Spencer

notified Snowden that Johnson-Price had filed a

complaint, and reprimanded Snowden for her failure to

provide Johnson-Price with performance standards prior to

her evaluation.9

 In January 1996, Galloway conducted a

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 12 of 33
9. (...continued)

DHR’s Departmental Personnel Manual (which states that

“[e]mployees shall not be given an Unsatisfactory Rating

unless action has been taken on the part of the

supervisor to bring the infraction to the attention of

the employee”) and found that Snowden had failed to

engage in this process prior to the evaluation. Spencer

also informed Snowden that she had inappropriately based

her evaluation on the National Association of Social

Workers Code of Ethics, by failing to advise JohnsonPrice that she would be evaluated based on those

criteria. Pl.’s Ex. 37 (doc. no. 67-3). 

10. In the investigative report, Smith determined

that Snowden retaliated against Johnson-Price in the

following ways: “1) coercive questioning, 2) retaliatory

work assignments, 3) discriminatory job performance

evaluation, 4) retaliatory (verbal) reprimands, 5)

threats to take adverse employment action based on

(continued...)

13

second performance rating to replace Snowden’s

evaluation, at which time Johnson-Price received “a

perfect rating” and a merit-based pay raise. King Decl.

(doc. no. 47-6).

In October 1996, in response to Johnson-Price’s

internal complaint, CR/EE Director Smith issued an

investigative report, which concluded that Snowden had

retaliated against Johnson-Price in violation of

§§ 703(a)(1) and (2) and § 704(a) of Title VII.10 Smith

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 13 of 33
10. (...continued)

manufacturing a cause, 6) failing to provide to the

complainant a non-hostile working environment, and 7)

retaliatory usurping of the complainant’s job authority.”

Pl.’s Ex. 45 at 3 (doc. no. 67-11). 

11. Johnson-Price first filed an EEOC charge against

DHR in 1990, but the charge was resolved and its factual

allegations are not at issue in this litigation. In

November 2003, she filed a third EEOC charge against DHR,

alleging race discrimination and retaliation, after she

was removed by the Calhoun County Board as County

Director and transferred to a position with the state DHR

office in the Quality Control Unit. 

14

recommended that the performance evaluation conducted by

Snowden be permanently removed from Johnson-Price’s

employment file and that DHR take reasonable steps to

“remedy the [effects] of the discriminatory retaliatory

treatment directed against Laura Johnson-Price.” Pl.’s

Ex. 45 at 4 (doc. no. 67-11). Snowden retired as County

Director effective September 1, 1996, one month before

the CR/EE Office issued its report. 

In June 1994, Johnson-Price filed a charge with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),11 alleging

that she had been the victim of racial discrimination and

retaliation with respect to the terms and conditions of

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 14 of 33
12. The charge specifically stated that DHR’s

systemic discrimination affected her opportunities in

hiring, promotions, compensation benefits, selection

ratings, training, discipline, and job assignments.

Johnson-Price also alleged that, “In the absence of such

racial discrimination in hiring and promotions, I and

other blacks would have had a great opportunity of

supervising and being supervised by persons of my same

race.” Pl.’s EEOC Charge (doc. no. 47-11).

13. Applicants for DHR positions may be placed on the

register for a specific position only after filing a

valid application and satisfying the position’s entrance

requirements, as set forth in the job announcements

published by the DHR Personnel Department.

14. A ‘Certificate of Eligibles’ constitutes a list

of eligible applicants, adopted from the register, and

ranked by examination score and personal service rating.

15

her employment with DHR.12 In August 2004, she amended

the charge, claiming that DHR employed a discriminatory

selection system, which affected the agency’s entrance

requirements and examinations, job classifications, and

the criteria and procedures used to formulate job

‘registers’13 and ‘Certificates of Eligibles.’14 Pl.’s Am.

EEOC Charge (doc. no. 47-12). 

On November 23, 1998, Johnson-Price sought to

intervene in the case of Crum et al v. State of Alabama,

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 15 of 33
16

consolidated as In re Employment Discrimination

Litigation Against the State of Alabama, CV 945-356-N.

On June 1, 2007, this court granted her motion to

intervene, and this case was subsequently converted into

a separate lawsuit.

 III. DISCUSSION

 As a preliminary matter, Johnson-Price improperly

asserted violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against

instruments of the Alabama government. Agencies of the

state are immune from such suits under the Eleventh

Amendment, regardless of the relief requested. See Cory

v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982) (citing Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)); see also Carr v. City

of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting

that Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment

immunity). As to DHR and SPD, Johnson-Price admits they

are immune from suit under § 1981, as enacted through

§ 1983. She also concedes that, as Buckner and Graham

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 16 of 33
15. Johnson-Price does not contest summary judgment

for her failure to hire claims as to the Calhoun County

Director position in 1997, Regional Manager position,

Pickens and Blount County Director positions, or the St.

Clair County Director position. She also concedes to the

dismissal of her claim alleging discriminatory delay in

hiring for the Calhoun County Director position in 1998.

17

are sued in their official capacities, they are immune

from suit for monetary damages and are unnecessary

parties to the Title VII claims. Johnson-Price may

legally maintain suit for injunctive relief against these

officials. See Taylor v. Alabama, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1297,

1310 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (DeMent, J.) (citing Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 

In opposing the defendants’ motions for summary

judgment, Johnson-Price also concedes to the dismissal of

the majority of her claims.15 As a result, only six

claims remain. She has four claims of race

discrimination as to (1) the selection of the Pickens

County Director in 1993; (2) the hiring delay for the

Calhoun County Assistant Director position in 1994; (3)

her mistreatment as the Calhoun County Assistant

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 17 of 33
16. In order to bar a subsequent action, the moving

party must show: “(1) the prior decision was rendered by

a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there was a final

judgment on the merits; (3) the parties were identical in

both suits; and (4) the prior and present causes of

action are the same.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

326 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations

omitted).

18

Director; and (4) the allocation of promotions within

DHR. She also maintains two retaliation claims

pertaining to (5) the hiring delay and (6) her treatment

as Assistant Director. Each claim is governed by Title

VII and § 1981, by and through § 1983. 

Finally, before reaching the merits in this case, the

court addresses the defendants’ defense that JohnsonPrice’s claims are precluded on the grounds of res

judicata. Res judicata bars the re-litigation of claims

that “arise[] out of the same nucleus of operative fact,”

In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th

Cir. 2001), and which were raised or could have been

raised in the prior litigation.16 See Davila v. Delta Air

Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003).

Johnson-Price previously brought actions in state court

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 18 of 33
17. In the state suit, the court dismissed the action

following a bench trial. Summary judgment was granted in

the federal case.

19

(Johnson-Price v. Fuller et al., CV-2003-3236) and

federal court (Clemons v. Alabama Department of Human

Resources et al., CV-04-2939), alleging discrimination

and retaliation based on her removal from the Calhoun

County Director position in 2002. Judgment was entered

for the defendants in both suits.17 

However, res judicata does not apply to the remaining

claims in this case. Johnson-Price filed the state and

federal suits over five years after moving to intervene

in the Crum litigation. In the later cases, she did not

raise claims related to her tenure as Assistant Director

for Calhoun County or her application for the Pickens

County Director position, as litigation on those issues

was already pending before this court. Instead, her suit

concerned facts that arose after her intervention in

Crum. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289,

1298 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted)

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 19 of 33
20

(Claims are not precluded where “the facts giving rise to

the second case only arise after the original pleading is

filed in the earlier litigation.”). Therefore, as the

instant claims have not been previously litigated and as

Johnson-Price had no opportunity to raise them in a prior

action, they are not precluded by res judicata.

 Having addressed the necessary preliminary issues in

this case, the court moves to a discussion of the merits.

A. Race Discrimination

Johnson-Price brings four claims of race

discrimination pertaining to her employment with DHR.

She asserts that DHR and Buckner engaged in racial

discrimination (1) as to the selection process for the

Pickens County Director position in 1993; (2) in delaying

the hiring process for the Calhoun County Assistant

Director position in 1994; and (3) in her mistreatment as

Assistant Director after she was hired. She also alleges

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 20 of 33
18. See Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d

1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Both [Title VII and 42

U.S.C. § 1981] have the same requirements of proof and

use the same analytical framework, therefore we shall

explicitly address the Title VII claim with the

understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1981

claim as well.”). 

21

(4) that SPD and Graham engaged in racial discrimination

as to the allocation of promotions. 

Johnson-Price first asserts a ‘failure-to-hire’ claim

for the position of Pickens County Director. She alleges

that the Pickens County Board of Directors discriminated

against her in selecting Tony Black, a white man, for the

position of County Director, though both she and Black

were of commensurate rank, based on DHR hiring criteria.

The court presumes that Johnson-Price has established

a prima-facie case of race discrimination under both

Title VII and § 1981.18 See Walker v. Prudential Property

and Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1274-75 (11th Cir.

2002) (To establish a prima-facie case of failure to

hire, the plaintiff must show “that she is a member of a

protected class, that she applied for and was qualified

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 21 of 33
22

for an available position, that she was rejected, and

that the defendant filled the position with a person

outside the protected class.”). However, DHR provided

evidence that the Pickens County Board chose Black as

director based on the fact that one of the board members

knew Black personally, had worked with him in the past

and, as a result, internally promoted Black’s

application. Cowart Decl. (doc. no. 76-2). JohnsonPrice is unable to rebut this “legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection,”

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.

248, 253 (1981), and offers no evidence that the board’s

stated reasons for hiring Black were “a pretext for

discrimination.” Id. (setting forth the burden-shifting

framework for Title VII claims established in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).

Johnson-Price also asserts race discrimination in

Calhoun County’s delay in hiring her for the Assistant

Director position. She alleges that, in January 1994,

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 22 of 33
23

when Snowden was granted a reprieve from the hiring

freeze and permitted to employ either a Financial

Services Superior or an Assistant Director, she purposely

chose to fill the former position so as not to hire

Johnson-Price. Johnson-Price contends that Snowden

“delayed filling [the Assistant Director] position to

retaliate and discriminate” against her. Pl.’s Br. at

41. 

Johnson-Price’s claim cannot be analyzed under the

“failure to hire” framework, as she was, in fact, hired

for the Assistant Director position in January 1995.

Instead, the court examines whether DHR’s delay in hiring

Johnson-Price constitutes an adverse action, so as to

establish, absent direct evidence, a prima-facie case of

disparate treatment. See Wilson v. B/E/ Aerospace, Inc.,

376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004) (in order to

establish a prima-facie case of disparate treatment under

both Title VII and § 1981, the plaintiff must show that

she was “a qualified member of a protected class and was

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 23 of 33
24

subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast

with similarly situated employees outside the protected

class”). There is nothing in the record to indicate that

the hiring delay constituted an “adverse employment

action.” At the time Johnson-Price applied for the

Assistant Director position, she was employed as a Human

Resources Program Specialist with the state DHR. She

offers no evidence that, as a result of the delay, she

suffered a loss in compensation or other employment

benefits. In fact, she provides no evidence of any

alteration in the conditions of her employment during the

12 months the position remained vacant. See Davis v.

Town of Lake Park, Fla, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.

2001) (“[T]o prove adverse action in a case under Title

VII’s anti-discrimination clause, an employee must show

a serious and material change in the terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment.”) (emphasis in original).

Johnson-Price instead expects the court to find a genuine

issue of fact as to the discrimination claim based on

Snowden’s alleged “propensity to ... discriminate,” from

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 24 of 33
25

which a reasonable fact-finder could infer “that she

delayed filing the position to ... discriminate against

[Johnson-Price].” This wholly tautological argument

fails to satisfy Johnson-Price’s burden at this stage in

the litigation. 

Johnson-Price also claims race discrimination based

on her treatment as Calhoun County Assistant Director,

while under the supervision of Director Snowden. She

states that Snowden repeatedly undermined her authority

before subordinates, chastised her in a demeaning and

disrespectful manner, delegated duties so that she was

constructively “demoted,” Pl.’s Br. at 14, and issued an

unfounded annual performance evaluation. Johnson-Price’s

claim fails, however, as she is again unable to establish

a prima-facie case of discrimination.

Even assuming a jury could find that the above-named

acts constitute adverse-employment action, Johnson-Price

does not show that a similarly situated member of an

unprotected class was treated more favorably during the

relevant time period. In order to show that employees

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 25 of 33
26

are similarly situated, “it is necessary to consider

whether the employees are involved in or accused of the

same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different

way.” Silvera v. Orange County School Bd., 244 F.3d

1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations

omitted). This is generally demonstrated by the use of

a “comparator,” a human measuring stick of racial

discrimination, who must be “nearly identical to the

plaintiff to prevent courts from second-guessing a

reasonable decision by the employer.” Wilson, 376 F.3d

at 1091.

Johnson-Price does not provide such a comparator.

She merely concludes that “Snowden did not treat her with

respect and that was different treatment than the white

employees received.” Pl.’s Br. at 42. As evidence, she

points to a letter from Calhoun County Supervisor

Ledbetter, which stated that Snowden inflicted a “verbal

beating” upon Johnson-Price in the presence of

subordinate employees. Pl.’s Ex. 21 (doc. no. 66-4).

However, Ledbetter does not maintain that Snowden acted

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 26 of 33
27

in a discriminatory fashion; in fact, in this same

letter, Ledbetter, a white woman, also complained that

Snowden severely rebuked her before other supervisors.

The record suggests that Snowden maintained antagonistic

relationships with several of her employees, both white

and black, and there is no evidence of racial favoritism

in this regard. 

Johnson-Price does attempt to conduct a direct

employee comparison by alleging that she was treated less

favorably in the pre-appraisal process than white

employees. Specifically, she states that Snowden

conducted only a “very general” pre-appraisal prior to

her annual performance evaluation, while “detailed

preappraisals [were] done in other counties on white

employees.” Pl.’s Br. at 11. As evidence, Johnson-Price

underlines the reports conducted on behalf of two white

employees, both of whom worked in other counties. 

In order to constitute “similarly situated”

employees, the individuals to be compared must have “(1)

dealt with the same supervisor, (2) been subject to the

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 27 of 33
28

same standards, and (3) engaged in the same conduct

without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances

that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s

treatment of them for it.” Sanguinetti v. United Parcel

Service, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (S.D. Fla.

2000) (Ryskamp, J.); see also Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d

1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that “disciplinary

measures undertaken by different supervisors may not be

comparable for purposes of Title VII analysis”). The

pre-appraisal reports at issue here were conducted by

different supervisors, who evaluated employees working in

different offices, performing different job

responsibilities. Johnson-Price and the white employees

were not similarly situated, and thus, their preappraisal reports cannot be utilized as evidence of

discrimination.

In sum, Johnson-Price has provided no evidence that

ties her treatment, albeit perhaps unfair, to race, such

as that a supervisor treated a similarly situated white

person differently from the way she was treated or that

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 28 of 33
29

there was otherwise an environment of discrimination

against black persons in the place where she worked.

Without any basis for comparison, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Snowden’s actions were

performed with racial bias. Summary judgment will be

granted on Johnson-Price’s claim of race discrimination

in the Assistant Director position. 

Finally, in her initial complaint, Johnson-Price

charged SPD and Graham with race discrimination in the

allocation of promotions, in violation of Title VII and

§ 1981. However, in her brief opposing summary judgment,

Johnson-Price does not address either SPD or Graham, and

she fails to undertake any arguments relating to the

allocation and distribution of promotions. Consequently,

there are no remaining issues of material fact as to the

SPD defendants.

Summary judgment will be granted on each of JohnsonPrice’s claims of race discrimination.

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 29 of 33
30

B. Retaliation

Johnson-Price brings two claims of retaliation.

First, she asserts that DHR, acting through Snowden,

retaliated against her by delaying her appointment to the

position of Assistant Director of Calhoun County.

Second, she contends that Snowden subjected her to

retaliatory treatment after she accepted the position of

Assistant Director in 1995. In order to establish a

prima-facie case of retaliation, Johnson-Price may show

that “(1) she engaged in an activity protected under

Title VII; (2) she suffered [a materially adverse]

action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action.”

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).

In addressing the matter of causality, encapsulated

in the third prong of the Crawford test, Johnson-Price

relies principally upon a chronology drafted by Regional

Manager Galloway as “evidence that Snowden did not want

to promote [Johnson-Price] because of her prior EEO

activity.” Pl.’s Br. at 35. In this chronology,

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 30 of 33
31

Galloway summarizes the hiring process for the Calhoun

County Assistant Director position and notes that Snowden

“was critical of [Johnson-Price’s] history of filing EEO

complaints” and did “not want to offer [Johnson-Price]

the position.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 (doc. no. 64-7). Galloway’s

statement, if reliable and believable, is clear evidence

that Snowden knew of Johnson-Price’s protected activity;

however, it also constitutes an unofficial memorandum,

and there is no evidence that it was kept in the regular

course of business. As such, the chronology is

inadmissible hearsay and may not be considered in a

motion for summary judgment. See E.E.O.C. v. Alton

Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 926 (11th Cir. 1990)

(“Under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), business records are

admissible if (1) they were made at or near the time the

recorded events occurred; (2) they were made by, or from

information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of

the recorded events; (3) it was the regular business

practice of the organization to keep such records; (4)

the record was kept in the course of a regularly

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 31 of 33
32

conducted business activity; and (5) all of the above is

shown by the testimony of the evidence custodian or other

qualified witness.”); see also Macuba v. DeBoer, 193 F.3d

1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The general rule is that

inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered on a motion for

summary judgment.”) (internal citations omitted).

Johnson-Price has submitted a motion pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(f), requesting the opportunity to conduct

additional discovery by deposing Regional Manager

Galloway, so that he can “provide testimony that Snowden

was critical of [Johnson-Price’s] history of filing EEO

complaints.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2 (doc. no. 98). As

Galloway’s testimony may establish a genuine issue of

fact as to Johnson-Price’s retaliation claims, the court

granted her motion to the limited extent of allowing the

deposition of Galloway. Therefore, the court pretermits

addressing the merits of Johnson-Price’s retaliation

claims until the evidentiary record is complete.

***

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 32 of 33
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motions

for summary judgment are granted as to the defense of

Eleventh Amendment immunity and unnecessary parties and

as to Johnson-Price’s race discrimination claims; the

motions are denied as to Johnson-Price’s retaliation

claims, with leave for DHR and Buckner (the only

defendants on the retaliation claims) to renew the

motions as to these claims within 35 days from today’s

date, so as to give Johnson-Price an opportunity to

depose Galloway. If DHR and Buckner fail to renew the

motions as to the retaliations claims within this timeframe, these claims will be set for trial. An

appropriate order will be entered.

DONE, this the 30th day of March, 2010.

 

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:07-cv-00568-MHT-CSC Document 114 Filed 03/30/10 Page 33 of 33