Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05801/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05801-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN KRESICH,

Plaintiff,

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-05801-MEJ 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. No. 16

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff John Kresich (“Plaintiff”) asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (“IIED”) arising from Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s (“Defendant”) 

conduct during the processing of his claim for long-term disability benefits. Defendant moves for 

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is preempted under section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Dkt. No. 16. Plaintiff filed an Opposition 

(Dkt. No. 19), and Defendant filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 20). The Court finds this matter suitable for 

disposition without oral argument and VACATES the April 14, 2016 hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and the 

record in this case, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the former Vice President Controller of Kaiser Permanente. Compl. ¶ 10, Dkt. 

No. 1-1. Through his employer, Plaintiff entered into insurance contracts with Defendant for 

disability income coverage effective April 1, 2009. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant issued Group Policy

Number 95910-1-C (the “Plan”), which Plaintiff attached as Exhibit A to his Complaint. Plaintiff 

suffers from severe chronic back pain that has worsened over time until he could no longer 

continue working on March 12, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15. As a result of his condition, Plaintiff 

experiences severe, chronic back pain that is debilitating and prevents him from sitting or 

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concentrating for extended periods of time. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff’s physicians have treated him with 

narcotics that cause him serious impairing side effects, including severe fatigue, cognitive 

impairments, drowsiness, disorientation, agitation, and lack of concentration. Id. ¶ 18. 

On July 17, 2014, Plaintiff met with Dr. Abraham Boskovitz to discuss potential surgery 

options to treat his back. Id. ¶ 20. However, Dr. Boskovitz discouraged surgery because in 

Plaintiff’s case such surgery would be risky and of uncertain value. Id. Thus, on September 12, 

2014, Plaintiff made a claim for Total Disability benefits under the Plan. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff 

alleges Defendant investigated his claim and determined he was entitled to Total Disability 

benefits, but it “repeatedly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the aim of forcing 

[him] to drop his claim and return, in pain, to work.” Id. ¶ 24. This conduct included ignoring his 

correspondence, demanding time extensions, intentionally delaying the scheduling of Independent 

Medical Examinations (“IMEs”), intimidating Plaintiff to attend multiple IMEs that Defendant

knew would cause him pain and emotional distress, falsely alleging that Plaintiff was lying about 

and exaggerating his physical disability, and purposely misstating and misrepresenting statements 

made by Plaintiff and his treating physicians. Id. ¶ 25.

Plaintiff filed the present Complaint on July 13, 2015 in the San Francisco Superior Court, 

alleging one cause of action for IIED. Id. ¶¶ 26-32. Plaintiff alleges Defendant “knew of his 

physical disabilities and weak emotional state,” yet it engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct 

by unnecessarily prolonging review of his claim and causing severe mental distress. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. 

Plaintiff contends Defendant intentionally sought to force him to “drop his disability claim, return 

to work in pain, and/or accept a smaller settlement than he is rightly entitled” under the Plan. Id. ¶

29. 

Defendant removed the case to this Court on December 17, 2015. Dkt. No. 1. It now 

moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff’s Complaint is preempted under 

ERISA. Mot. at 1.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are 

closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of 

material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming 

v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).

“Analysis under Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to analysis under [Rule 12(b)(6)] 

because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken 

as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only 

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable 

legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 

While a complaint “need not contain detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion, “it must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cousins 

v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In considering whether a claim satisfies this standard, the court must “accept factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2008). However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to 

avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[I]t is within [the court’s] wheelhouse to reject, as implausible, allegations that are too 

speculative to warrant further factual development.” Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1076 

(9th Cir. 2013).

“Where a court grants . . . a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), leave 

to amend should be freely given if it is possible that further factual allegations will cure any 

defect.” Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues “Plaintiff’s complaint is a bald attempt to evade ERISA preemption by 

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affixing state law labels to what is obviously an ERISA case.” Mot. at 4. It maintains his IIED 

claim is “inextricably intertwined” with ERISA claims handling and is therefore preempted.

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Plan at issue is governed by ERISA. Compl. ¶ 11. 

However, he argues his IIED claim “invokes legal rights and duties wholly independent from 

ERISA.” Opp’n at 10. He contends Defendant’s conduct is far outside the scope of ordinary 

insurance claim activity because Defendant “insulted, harassed, and ignored [him] for months on 

end with the intent to cause him mental distress and potentially fatal physical injury.” Id. at 15.1

A. ERISA Preemption Principles

ERISA provides a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans. Aetna Health 

Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). “To this end, ERISA includes expansive pre-emption 

provisions, see ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, which are intended to ensure that employee 

benefit plan regulation would be ‘exclusively a federal concern.’” Id. As the Supreme Court 

explained, “[t]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of 

others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and 

beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.” Id. at 

208-09 (noting that “Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to 

incorporate expressly.” (emphasis in original)). In particular, “any state-law cause of action that 

duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear 

congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.” Id. at 

209; Chamblin v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 

(state law claims are “preempted where they would offer an alternative enforcement mechanism to 

ERISA.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

“There are two strands to ERISA’s powerful preemptive force.” Cleghorn v. Blue Shield 

of Cal., 408 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005). First, ERISA preempts state laws that “relate to” an 

ERISA plan. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Though the limiting principle in this expansive language 

 

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Plaintiff also argues at length that his IIED claim is valid because it meets all required elements. 

Opp’n at 7-10. However, whether Plaintiff meets the elements of an IIED claim is not at issue—

Defendant’s Motion focuses solely on preemption.

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can be difficult to identify, precedent teaches that the statute “is to be read practically, with an eye 

toward the action’s actual relationship to the subject plan.” Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 

385 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 

Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-56 (1995)); see also Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Castonguay, 984 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that ERISA “regulates certain 

relationships ” and presumptively preempts laws affecting those relationships but not other 

relationships “where a plan operates just like any other commercial entity” (emphasis in original)). 

Thus, a “state law claim is preempted by ERISA if it has a ‘connection with’ or a ‘reference to’ an 

ERISA-governed benefit plan.” Wise v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 600 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)). “Stated another 

way, where ‘the existence of an ERISA plan is a critical factor in establishing liability’ under a 

state cause of action, the state law claim is preempted.” Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 

McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1990) (brackets omitted)). “ERISA’s preemption provision 

functions ‘even when the state action purports to authorize a remedy unavailable under the federal 

provision.’” Id. at 1190-91 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 144 (brackets omitted)).

The second strand of ERISA preemption bars state-law causes of action that fall within the 

scope of ERISA’s “comprehensive scheme of civil remedies to enforce ERISA’s provisions . . . 

even if those causes of action would not necessarily be preempted” by § 1144(a). Cleghorn, 408 

F.3d at 1225. “[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the 

ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA 

remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.” Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209. Said another way, 

ERISA preempts state-law claims that merely would supply “alternative enforcement 

mechanisms” for ERISA provisions. Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974, 982 

(9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, ERISA plaintiffs “cannot obtain relief by dressing up an ERISA 

benefits claim in the garb of a state law tort.” Id. at 983. “The Ninth Circuit has applied a ‘but 

for’ standard to assess the relationship between the harm alleged and the ERISA-governed plan for 

purposes of determining whether a plaintiff is seeking such an alternate enforcement mechanism.” 

Serpa v. SBC Telecomms., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 865, 871 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Dishman, 269 

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F.3d at 983). “To avoid ERISA preemption, [a plaintiff’s] claim must exist even without the 

defendants’ failure to pay her benefit.” Id. The Dishman court found ERISA did not preempt a 

claim for invasion of privacy stemming from surveillance by a private investigator hired by a 

defendant ERISA plan to verify the plaintiff’s disability claim, because the alleged intrusions on 

plaintiff’s privacy did not “depend on or derive from his claim for benefits in any meaningful 

way.” 269 F.3d at 983. Under Dishman, the fact that the conduct at issue allegedly occurs in the 

course of administering an ERISA plan does not necessarily result in preemption: where the statelaw claim has only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection” to the ERISA plan, it is not 

preempted. 269 F.3d at 984 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661); accord Darcangelo v. Verizon 

Commc’ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 191-92 (4th Cir. 2002) ( “[T]he simple fact that a defendant is an 

ERISA plan administrator does not automatically insulate it from state law liability for alleged 

wrongdoing against a plan participant or beneficiary.”).

B. Application to the Case at Bar

Defendant raises its challenge under the second strand of ERISA preemption. It argues

there can be no dispute that Plaintiff’s action is for the alleged improper processing of a claim for 

benefits under an insured employee benefit plan and that his IIED claim therefore springs from the 

handling and disposition of his claim. Mot. at 7-8. However, as noted above, the fact that the 

alleged conduct occurred in the course of administering an ERISA plan does not automatically 

result in preemption. 

As a preliminary matter, there is no allegation in Plaintiff’s Complaint that his benefits 

have been granted or denied, and Plaintiff’s suit is not based on the processing of his claim. 

Courts have denied preemption where the common law or state law claims are too tangentially 

related to the administration of the employee benefits plans. For example, in Dishman, the Ninth 

Circuit found that ERISA did not preempt plaintiff’s state law claim for tortious invasion of 

privacy against a benefits plan administrator. 269 F.3d at 983-84. The defendant plan 

administrator hired investigative agencies to investigate plaintiff’s claim for long-term disability 

benefits, and plaintiff alleged that the investigators used methods to elicit information about him 

that invaded his privacy. Id. at 979-80. The Ninth Circuit held that “the fact that the conduct at 

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issue allegedly occurred in the course of [defendant’s] administration of the plan does not create a 

relationship sufficient to warrant preemption,” because Congress’s purpose in enacting 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1144(a) “was not to provide ERISA administrators with blanket immunity from garden variety 

torts which only peripherally impact daily plan administration.” Id. at 984. The court reasoned 

that, if this were the case, “a plan administrator could ‘investigate’ a claim in all manner of 

tortious ways with impunity.” Id. The court also noted that, unlike in other cases where 

preemption was found, plaintiff’s tort claim did not depend on or derive from his claim for 

benefits, meaning that his claim for damages for invasion of privacy remained regardless of 

whether his claim for benefits was paid. Id. at 983; see also Providence Health, 385 F.3d at 1172 

(“In evaluating whether a common law claim has ‘reference to’ a plan governed by ERISA, the 

focus is whether the claim is premised on the existence of an ERISA plan, and whether the 

existence of the plan is essential to the claim’s survival.”). Thus, for preemption to occur, 

Defendant must show that “there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a 

defendant’s actions.” Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 946 

(9th Cir. 2009). In other words, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff’s IIED claim “relies 

on a legal duty that arises independently of ERISA” and that “would exist whether or not an 

ERISA plan existed.” Id. at 950. 

Even if Defendant has approved or denied Plaintiff’s claim, it exists outside of the claim 

process. Plaintiff alleges Defendant ignored his correspondence, demanded time extensions, 

intimidated him into attending multiple IMEs and often delaying them, accused him of lying about 

and exaggerating his disability, and purposely misstated and misrepresented statements made by 

Plaintiff and his treating physicians. Compl. ¶ 25. He further alleges Defendant “knew of his 

physical disabilities and weak emotional state,” yet it prolonged review of his claim to force him 

to “drop his disability claim, return to work in pain, and/or accept a smaller settlement than he is 

rightly entitled” under the Plan. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. 

Following Dishman, other courts have held that a claim for IIED based on alleged hostile 

conduct during an insurance investigation was not preempted by ERISA. In Daie v. The Reed 

Group., Ltd., 2015 WL 6954915 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015), the plaintiff alleged he was 

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wrongfully denied disability benefits under his policy and that the policy administrator repeatedly 

engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the aim of forcing plaintiff to drop his claim and 

return to work. Id. at *1. Plaintiff brought one claim for IIED. Id. at *2. Although the conduct 

occurred in connection with the plaintiff’s claim, the court held that the defendants had a “duty not 

to engage in the alleged tortious conduct existed independent of defendants’ duties under the 

ERISA plan.” Id. at *3. The court noted that the complaint alleged “such tortious conduct as 

falsely accusing plaintiff of ‘lying’ about his disability, urging plaintiff to take experimental 

medications, inducing plaintiff to increase his medications, forcing plaintiff ‘to undergo a litany of 

rigorous medical examinations without considering their results,’ and pressuring plaintiff ‘to 

engage in further medical testing that it knew would cause . . . pain, emotional distress and 

anxiety.’” Id. The court found that “[t]hese allegations are based on events that involved 

harassing and oppressive conduct,” and that such “actions implicate an independent legal duty.” 

Id. 

In Sarkisyan v. CIGNA Healthcare of California, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (C.D. Cal. 

2009), the plaintiffs sued the defendant plan administrators after they denied coverage for their 

minor daughter’s liver transplant. Id. at 1200-01. Plaintiffs brought a claim for IIED, in part 

based on “verbal abuse” they suffered at the hands of CIGNA employees and one CIGNA 

employee that directed “a lewd hand gesture” toward them. Id. at 1206. The court found 

plaintiffs’ IIED claim was not preempted because “it does not arise out of CIGNA’s denial of 

coverage, nor does its resolution depend upon the Court’s interpretation of the Plan’s terms.” Id. 

In Barker v. The Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., 2007 WL 2192298 (N.D. Tex.

May 18, 2007), the plaintiff alleged that insurance investigators “attacked” his credibility, 

suggested he was lying about his illness, and asked “belittling questions” in an “effort to ‘shame 

[the plaintiff] into returning to work.’” Id. at *3 (quotation omitted). The court found the plaintiff 

had the right to be “free from” such treatment and that such conduct “exists independently” of 

plaintiff’s rights under ERISA. Id. at *4. Moreover, “[i]f such claims were held to be preempted 

by ERISA, [plaintiff] would be subject to such treatment with no available recourse, and ‘a plan 

administrator could investigate a claim in all manner of tortious ways with impunity.’” Id.

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(quoting Dishman, 269 F.3d at 984).

Courts have also recognized other tort claims that are not preempted. See Duran v. Cisco 

Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 4793486, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss 

negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims for conduct that occurred during the defendants’ 

administration of benefits plan, finding preemption “would immunize defendant from liability for 

alleged behavior-negligently allowing a third party to access plaintiff’s personal information-that 

is only peripherally related to the administration of the plan. This is not a result envisioned by 

Congress.” (citing Dishman, 269 F.3d at 984)); McGill v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 2015 WL 6039267, at 

*7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2015) (finding state law fraud claim was not preempted by ERISA because 

the plaintiff’s claim did not require review of the ERISA plan at issue, and “[t]he legal 

implications of this alleged misrepresentation would exist whether or not the Plan was governed 

by ERISA.”); Scripps Health v. Schaller Anderson, LLC, 2012 WL 2390760, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 

22, 2012) (finding state law claims, including negligence, were not preempted because they “do 

not address the employee benefit structure or the administration of benefits; they are not aimed at 

binding employers or plan administrators to particular practices, nor do they preclude uniform 

administrative practices; and they are not an alternative enforcement mechanism for employees to 

obtain benefits.”).

Reviewing this persuasive authority and taking Plaintiff’s pleading in the light most 

favorable to him, the Court finds his allegations involve harassing and oppressive conduct 

independent of the duties of administering an ERISA plan. Although the conduct occurred in 

connection with Plaintiff’s claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendant engaged in such tortious conduct as 

falsely accusing him of ‘lying about and exaggerating” his disability and intimidating him into 

attending multiple IMEs that Defendant knew would cause him pain and emotional distress. 

Compl. ¶ 25. If such claims were held to be preempted by ERISA, Plaintiff would be subject to 

such treatment with no available recourse, and a plan administrator could investigate a claim in all 

manner of tortious ways with impunity. See Dishman, 269 F.3d at 984.

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim is preempted because it “is an ill-disguised attempt to 

evade ERISA preemption by affixing a state law label to what is obviously an ERISA case.” Mot. 

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at 1. Defendant cites Bast v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 

1998), to support this proposition. There, the surviving family of a woman insured by an ERISA 

health plan brought claims against the plan administrator for breach of contract, loss of 

consortium, loss of income, emotional distress, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, 

and violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act in connection with the insurer’s denial 

of benefits to the deceased. Id. at 1005-08. The Court held the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted

because they arose from the defendant’s alleged bad faith in failing to timely pay benefits, and the 

defendant’s “alleged breach of fiduciary duty while administering the benefit plan” was conduct 

covered by ERISA. Id. at 1007-08. Here, there are no allegations regarding Defendant’s breach 

of fiduciary duty in administering the Plan or whether Plaintiff’s benefits have been approved or 

denied—Plaintiff’s IIED claim stems from independent harassing and oppressive conduct

allegations. This claim is wholly independent of any duty or legal remedy under ERISA. 

Defendant also cites Tingey v. Pixley-Richards West, Inc., 953 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In that case, an employee of Pixley fathered a child born with birth defects. Id. at 1127. Pixley 

initially paid all benefits due under the employee’s insurance plan, but after it fired him without 

explanation, it refused to allow him to convert the plan into a direct payment-based plan. Id. 

Plaintiff and his family filed suit against Pixley and his insurance company, including a claim for 

IIED against Pixley for terminating him in order to deny benefits. Id. at 1128, 1131. The Ninth 

Circuit dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims, including the IIED claim, with leave to amend under

ERISA. Id. at 1131. As to the IIED claim, the court found that although it “appear[ed] to concern 

Mr. Tingey’s employment relationship rather than his employee benefit plan, [it] spring[s] from 

the handling and disposition of Tingey’s medical benefits insurance claim and [is] thus [] subject 

to preemption.” Id. at 1131. However, the court noted that if the employee alleged another 

theory, such as that he was fired because his employer did not want to pay his benefits, such 

allegations “would not relate to ERISA and would therefore not be preempted.” Id. In contrast,

Plaintiff’s IIED claim stems not from the handling and disposition of his claim, but from 

independent allegations of harassment and oppressive conduct. There is no alternative 

enforcement mechanism under ERISA by which Plaintiff could bring such a claim. 

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Defendant also cites two out-of-district cases that are similarly distinguishable. In Mullins 

v. Nevada Cancer Institute, 2011 WL 5190808 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2011), the plaintiff asserted an 

IIED claim arguing that the Cancer Institute intended to cause her emotional distress by depriving 

her of benefits to cover her cancer treatment. Id. at *2. The court held the claim was preempted 

because the benefits played “a central role and the deprivation of such is the principal harm.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff’s IIED claim is not based on the denial of benefits; instead, he seeks damages from 

Defendant’s harassing and oppressive conduct that existed wholly independent of whether or not 

he was denied benefits. Mullins is thus inapposite. 

In Daleidan v. DuPage Internal Medicine, Ltd., 2002 WL 1858790 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 

2002), the plaintiff brought two claims, one under ERISA and one for IIED, relating to her alleged 

wrongful discharge. Id. at *1. The court found ERISA preempted the IIED claim because she 

“inexorably connected” the IIED and ERISA claims. Id. at *2. The court noted plaintiff’s 

allegations that the defendant knew there was a high probability that terminating her while trying 

to pay a $10,000.00 hospital bill would inflict severe emotional distress, and that the defendant 

fired her in order to avoid liability for failing to provide medical insurance. Id. Once again, 

Plaintiff in this case seeks damages from Defendant’s alleged harassing and oppressive conduct 

that existed wholly independent of the Plan. Plaintiff does not bring an ERISA cause of action 

and his IIED claim does not depend on whether or not he was denied benefits. Accordingly, 

Daleidan is also distinguishable.

In sum, because Plaintiff’s IIED claim appears to be only tangentially related to the 

administration of the Plan, a finding of preemption is not warranted. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:15-cv-05801-MEJ Document 21 Filed 04/04/16 Page 11 of 11