Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00413/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00413-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE L. GARDNER #231984, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:06-CV-413-WHA 

) [WO]

)

KENNETH JONES, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Willie L. Gardner [“Gardner”], a state inmate, on April 25, 2006. In this petition,

Gardner challenges convictions for capital murder, attempted murder and first degree

robbery imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama in 

October of 2003.1

 1The trial court entered these convictions against Gardner pursuant to his pleas of guilty. Specifically, Gardner

pled guilty to the capital murder of Travis Benefield during the commission of a first degree robbery against Benefield,

the attempted murder of Ray Davis and the first degree robbery of Ray Davis. Pursuant to Ala. Code § 13A-5-42,

even though Gardner pled guilty to this capital offense, a jury trial was held on October 27-28, 2003, in which the

State proved Gardner’s guilt of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt as demonstrated by the petit jury’s verdict

of guilt. Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-3 through 11-5. On October 28, 2003, after waiver of the

participation of the jury in the sentencing phase, the trial court sentenced Gardner to life imprisonment without parole

for the capital murder conviction. Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-5 at 22. The court also sentenced

Gardner “to life in prison” for the attempted murder and first degree robbery convictions. Id. at 23. Gardner did not

properly appeal his convictions and, on January 9, 2004, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his

attempted appeal “as untimely filed.” Respondents’ Exhibit B - Court Doc. No. 11-6 at 1 -- Gardner v. State, 910

So.2d 841 (Ala.Cr.App. 2004) (table decision). The appellate court issue the certificate of judgment on this same date. 

Respondents’ Exhibit B - Court Doc. No. 11-6 at 2. 

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On August 22, 2004, Gardner filed a state post-conviction petition pursuant to Rule

32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure challenging his capital murder, attempted

murder and robbery convictions. Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at 15. In

this petition, Gardner presented the following claims for relief: (1) The capital murder

indictment is defective as it fails to allege that Petitioner intentionally caused the death of

another person, as the use of the victim’s name in the indictment and/or references to the

victim via pronouns does not properly charge the murder of a person or human being;2

 (2)

The conviction for robbery of Ray Davis violates double jeopardy and should be vacated

as this conviction arises from the same facts as the conviction for capital murder of Travis

Benefield during a robbery of Benefield;3

 (3) Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

 2Count I of the indictment contains the capital murder charge lodged against Gardner and, in pertinent part, reads

as follows:

The Grand Jury of [Montgomery] County charge that ... WILLIE LIZZLIE GARDNER, whose

name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did intentionally cause the death of Travis Benefield

by shooting him with a gun and caused said death during the time that Willie Lizzlie Gardner and/or

an accomplice, was in the course of committing a theft of a gun and/or lawful currency and/or

coinage of the United States of America, better descriptions of which are unknown to the Grand

Jury, of some value, the value of which is unknown to the Grand Jury, the property of Travis

Benefield and/or Premium Package, by the use of force against the person of Travis Benefield, with

intent to overcome his physical resistance or physical power of resistance, while the said Willie

Lizzlie Gardner and/or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,

to -wit: a gun, ... in violation of Section 13A-5-40 of the Code of Alabama ....

Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at 41.

 3Count IV of the indictment charges Gardner with first degree robbery of Ray Davis. This count, in relevant part,

states:

WILLIE LIZZLIE GARDNER, whose name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did, in the

course of committing a theft of a gun and/or lawful currency and/or coinage of the United States ...,

of some value, the value of which is unknown to the Grand Jury, better descriptions of which are

unknown to the Grand Jury, use force against the person of the owner or any person present,

Raymond Davis, with intent to overcome his physical resistance or physical power of resistance,

or threaten the imminent use of force against the person of the owner or any person present,

Raymond Davis, with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property,

while the said Willie Lizzlie Gardner and/or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon or

2

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during the plea negotiations because he failed to explain the lesser included offenses of

capital murder. Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at 17-29. 

On November 15, 2004, the trial court issued an order denying Gardner’s Rule 32

petition. In this order, the court deemed Gardner’s challenge to the indictment “without

merit.” Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at 58.4

 With respect to the double

jeopardy and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court held that:

2. The Petitioner’s claim that the Double Jeopardy clause was violated is

without merit and is denied because the victim named in the capital murder

count of the indictment is a separate individual from the victim listed in the

first-degree robbery count to which the Petitioner pled guilty. Because the

State of Alabama bore the burden of proving that Travis Benefield was

intentionally murdered during the course of a robbery under Count I and that

Ray Davis was also a victim of first-degree robbery under Count IV, each of

the counts to which the Petitioner pled guilty is a separate offense which

required proof of an additional element that the other did not. Thus, the

Petitioner’s claim that his protection from double jeopardy was violated is

without merit and is denied.

 3. The Petitioner’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel

is without merit and is denied. Petitioner failed to show that but for

counsel[’]s alleged errors that the outcome of his trial and/or plea would have

been different in accordance with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984)....

Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at 59. 

On May 20, 2005, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Gardner’s

dangerous instrument, a gun, ... in violation of Section 13A-8-41 of the Code of Alabama....

Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at 44.

 4It is clear that Gardner’s attack on the validity of the indictment is devoid of merit as the indictment clearly

identifies Travis Benefield as a person, alleging that Gardner intentionally caused the death of Travis Benefield during

the course of a theft of property “by the use of force against the person of Travis Benefield....” Respondents’ Exhibit

A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at 41 (emphasis added). 

3

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capital murder, attempted murder and robbery convictions in an unpublished memorandum

opinion. Respondents’ Exhibit E - Court Doc. No. 11-9 -- Gardner v. State, 926 So.2d

1085 (Ala.Cr.App.)(table decision), rehearing denied (June 10, 2005), cert. denied, Ex

parte Gardner, 971 So.2d 748 (Ala. 2006). The appellate court’s opinion reads as follows:

 The appellant, Willie Lizzlie Gardner, appeals from the trial court’s

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32,

Ala.R.Crim.P., in which he challenged his 2002 guilty-plea convictions for

first-degree robbery, attempted murder, and murder made capital because it

was committed during the commission of a felony. Following a jury trial [on

the capital offense], as required in capital murder cases by § 13A-5-42, he

was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

for the capital murder conviction, and to terms of life imprisonment for both

the attempted murder and first-degree robbery convictions. No [proper]

direct appeal was taken. 

On August 22, 2004, Gardner filed the instant Rule 32 petition, in

which he raised the following claims: (1) that the Court was without

jurisdiction to render judgment or impose sentence against him because count

one of his indictment, which charged Gardner with capital murder [of Travis

Benefield], was invalid because, he alleged, it did not specify that he was

charged with the killing of “another human being”; (2) that his constitutional

protection against double jeopardy was violated because the trial court

entered separate judgments of guilty to both the capital murder of Travis

Benefield in count one of the indictment and the first-degree robbery of Ray

Davis as charged in count four of the indictment, even though the crimes

occurred during the same transaction; and (3) that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to explain the lesser-included offenses of capital

murder to him; more specifically, trial counsel allegedly told Gardner that

“he would be sentenced to death if [he did] not accept the plea of guilty,” and

that, if his attorney had explained to him that there was any possible chance

of the jury returning any verdict other than capital murder, he would have

elected to proceed to trial. On November 15, 2004, after receiving a response

from the State requesting that all of Gardner’s claims for relief be denied, the

trial court entered a detailed written order summarily dismissing Gardner’s

petition. The trial court held that Gardner’s claim regarding the indictment

was without merit and additionally that Gardner had failed to plead and prove

4

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sufficient facts that would entitle him to relief. The trial court also held that

Gardner’s double jeopardy claim was without merit on the grounds that each

of the offenses to which Gardner pleaded guilty was a separate offense which

required proof of an additional element that the other did not. Further, the

trial court held that Gardner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was

without merit, because he failed to meet the two-prong test established in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The trial court noted that

extra lengths were taken to ensure that Gardner’s pleas were entered

voluntarily and knowingly, ensuring that all of his rights were protected. 

Moreover, the Court found that Gardner’s counsel had represented him in an

exceptional manner. The trial court also determined that Gardner failed his

burden of pleading and proof pursuant to Rule 32.3, Ala.R.Crim.P., and

further, that his claims lacked the specificity required under Rule 32.6(b),

Ala.R.Crim.P. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Gardner argues that the trial court abused its discretion

when it denied his claim regarding the indictment. Specifically, Gardner

contends that his capital murder indictment was void because the count did

not specifically state that the victim, Travis Benefield, was a person. 

The record contains a copy of Gardner’s capital murder indictment,

which reads: 

“Willie Lizzlie Gardner, whose name is otherwise [un]known

to the Grand Jury, did intentionally cause the death of Travis

Benefield by shooting him with a gun and caused said death

during the time that Willie Lizzlie Gardner and/or an

accomplice was in the course of committing a theft of a gun

and/or lawful currency and/or coinage of the United States of

America, better descriptions of which are unknown to the

Grand Jury, of some value, the value of which is unknown to

the Grand Jury, the property of Travis Benefield and/or

Premium Package, by the use of force against the person of

Travis Benefield, with intent to overcome his physical

resistance or physical power of resistance, while the said Willie

Lizzlie Gardner and/or an accomplice was armed with a deadly

weapon or dangerous instrument, to-wit, a gun, a better

description of which is unknown to the Grand Jury, in violation

of § 13A-5-40 of the Code of Alabama 1975 as amended,

against the peace and dignity of [the State of] Alabama.”

... (Emphasis added.)

As set out above, the indictment named Travis Benefield as the victim

5

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of an intentional killing. Also, the indictment clearly stated that Gardner

“used force against the person of Travis Benefield.” Finally, the indictment

stated on its face that Travis Benefield was a person. An indictment is

sufficient if it substantially tracks the language of the statute, provided the

statute sets out the elements of the offense. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 879

So.2d 594, 605 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003); R.L.G. v. State, 712 So.2d 348, 362

(Ala.Crim.App. 1997). The capital murder indictment was sufficient. 

Therefore, Gardner’s claim is without merit.

Next, Gardner claims that he was subjected to double jeopardy

because the capital murder of Travis Benefield and the robbery of Ray Davis

arose out of the same incident. Because the murder of Travis Benefield

required different elements to prove the crime than the robbery of Ray Davis

and vice versa, Gardner’s right to be free from double jeopardy was not

violated. 

This Court noted in Ivey v. State, 698 So.2d 179 (Ala.Crim.App.

1995), aff’d, 698 So.2d 187 (Ala. 1997):

“‘The “same evidence [or element]” test of

Blockburger [v. United States, 284 U.S. 299

(1932)] is stated as follows: ‘Where the same act

or transaction constitutes a violation of two

distinct statutory provisions, the test to be

applied to determine whether there are two

offenses or only one is whether each provision

requires proof of an additional fact which the

other does not.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304,

52 S.Ct. at 182.’ State v. Patton, 669 So.2d

1002, 1004 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993).” 

698 So.2d at 183.

Section 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975 provides that “[a] person

commits the crime of murder if: (1) With intent to cause the death of another

person, he causes the death of that person or of another person . . . .” Section

13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, provides that murder is made a capital

offense when it is committed “. . . during a robbery in the first degree or an

attempt thereof committed by the defendant.” Section 13A-8-43 provides

that “[a] person commits the crime of robbery in the third degree if in the

court of committing a theft he: (1) Uses force against the person of the

owner or any person present with intent to overcome his physical resistance

or physical power of resistance. . . .” Finally, Section 13A-8-41(a) states that

“[a] person commits the crime of robbery in the first degree if he violates

6

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Section 13A-8-43 and he: (1) Is armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument; or (2) Causes serious physical injury to another.” 

Under Gardner’s indictment, capital murder required an intentional 

killing of Travis Benefield, which was not required to commit the robbery of

Ray Davis; conversely, the first degree robbery of Ray Davis required the

intentional taking of property by force from Ray Davis, which was not

required to prove the capital murder of Travis Benefield. Thus, the trial court

correctly denied any relief as to this claim.

Gardner also argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly and

voluntarily made. Specifically, he contends that because his trial counsel did

not inform him of the lesser-included offenses of felony murder and murder,

and had he known that there was a possibility that the jury could have

convicted him of one of these lesser offenses, he would have gone to trial

rather than pleading guilty. He further claims that his attorney was

ineffective based on his failure to advise him of this fact. 

There is no requirement that requires an accused to be advised or

informed of the elements of any lesser included offenses of the offense to

which he is pleading guilty. See Holcomb v. State, 519 So.2d 1378, 1379

(Ala.Crim.App. 1988). In addition, before accepting Gardner’s guilty plea,

the trial court ascertained that Gardner was entering this plea of guilty to

capital murder because he was, in fact, guilty of that offense. Thus,

Gardner’s claim that his plea was involuntary because he did not know of the

lesser-included offenses of capital murder is without merit.

Moreover, Gardner did not meet his burden of pleading and proving

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with specific facts that

would entitle him to relief. Thus, the trial court did not err when it held that

Gardner did not meet the criteria outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984), and in denying relief as to this claim. 

In Strickland, supra, the United States Supreme Court articulated two

criteria that must be satisfied to show ineffective assistance of counsel. A

defendant has the burden of showing (1) that his counsel’s performance was

deficient and (2) that the deficient performance actually prejudiced the

defense. To prove prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. Furthermore, “a court must indulge a strong presmption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profesional

assistance.” Id. at 689. 

7

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Rule 32.3, Ala.R.Crim.P., states that “[t]he petitioner shall have the

burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts

necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.” Rule 32.6(b), Ala.R.Crim.P.,

states that “[t]he petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the

grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual

basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been

violated and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any

further proceedings.”

“A petition is ‘meritorious on its face’ only if it contains a clear

and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is

sought, including full disclosure of the facts relied upon (as

opposed to a general statement concerning the nature and effect

of those facts) sufficient to show that the petitioner is entitled

to relief if those facts are true. Ex parte Boatwright, supra; Ex

parte Clisby, 501 So.2d 483 (Ala. 1986).”

Moore v. State, 502 So.2d 819, 820 (Ala. 1986).

Although Gardner argues that he would not have pleaded guilty had

his counsel told him there was a possibility that the jury would have found

him guilty of murder or felony murder as a lesser-included offense of capital

murder, his petition contained no specific facts supporting this claim which

would entitle him to relief. Indeed, Gardner’s claim that the jury could have

convicted him of either of the aforementioned lesser-included offenses is

wholly unsupported by the record, which contains a transcript of the evidence

presented by the State during the “trial phase” of his plea proceeding. Our

review of the evidence presented indicates that the evidence against Gardner

was overwhelming, including eyewitness testimony of the one victim who

survived the robbery and shootings at the Premium Package Store. Ray

Davis testified that he was able to identify Gardner as one of the four males

who entered the store, forced him to open the store’s safe, and shot both store

employees, killing Travis Benefield as he lay begging for his life and

seriously wounding Davis. Moreover, evidence was presented that another

person overheard Gardner and his cohorts planning the robbery several days

before the robbery-homicide occurred.

Although a defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser offense if there

is any evidence supporting the charge, Ex parte Hannah, 527 So.2d 675 (Ala.

1988), charges on lesser-included offenses should not be given where the

evidence permits no reasonable conclusion other than that the defendant is

guilty as expressly charged or is not guilty of any offense. Love v. State, 677

So.2d 1272 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996). Assuming Gardner’s claim is true, given

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that no evidence supported an instruction on either murder or felony murder,

it would have been unwise for Gardner’s counsel to have offered him false

hope that the court would instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses or that

the jury would somehow disregard eyewitness testimony to convict him of

any offense other than capital murder in the death of Travis Benefield. Thus,

we fail to see how counsel could have been ineffective for failing to advise

him about the existence of lesser-included offenses when the evidence did

not support instructing the jury on these charges. 

Rule 32.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P., authorizes the trial court to summarily

dismiss a Rule 32 petition “[i]f the court determines that the petition is not

sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no

material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief

under this rule and that no purpose would be served by any further

proceedings.” See also, Hannon v. State, 861 So.2d 426, 427 (Ala.Crim.App.

2003); Cogman v. State, 852 So.2d 191, 193 (Ala.Crim.App. 2002); Tatum

v. State, 607 So.2d 383, 384 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992). As discussed above,

Gardner’s claims were either precluded, insufficiently pleaded, or lacked

merit. Thus, summary disposition was appropriate.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Respondents’ Exhibit E - Court Doc. No. 11-9 at 1-7 (citation to record omitted) -- Gardner

v. State, 926 So.2d 1085 (Ala.Cr.App.)(table decision), rehearing denied (June 10, 2005),

cert. denied, Ex parte Gardner, 971 So.2d 748 (Ala. 2006).

Gardner initiated this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action on April 25, 2006 in which he asserts

the following claims for relief:

1. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

as the indictment failed to allege the essential

element that the petitioner intentionally caused

the death of another person.5

 5As previously noted, infra at 3 n.4, this claim is patently frivolous because the indictment specifically charges

that Gardner used “force against the person of Travis Benefield....” Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at

41. Moreover, a federal district court’s review of a claim attacking the sufficiency of an indictment is limited to

considering the adequacy of the notice afforded a petitioner through the state procedures. The Due Process Clause

9

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2. The conviction for first degree robbery of Ray

Davis violates double jeopardy because “the acts

of accomplishing the robbery or the force used

on Ray Davis would not constitute a separate ...

robbery offense from the underlying robbery

which is the aggravating circumstance of [the

capital murder conviction].” Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus - Court Doc. No. 1 at 6. 

3. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

during the plea bargaining process because he 

failed to explain the law regarding possible lesser

included offenses to capital murder so “that

[Petitioner] could make an informed decision

prior to entering” a plea of guilty to capital

murder. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus -

Court Doc. No. 1 at 6. 

In their answer to the petition, the respondents argue that the claims pending before

this court entitle Gardner to no relief as the state courts properly adjudicated these claims

on the merits. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (2003); Williams v.

Taylor,529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). 

of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that whatever charging method the State chooses to employ, it must give

the criminal defendant fair notice of the charge against him to permit adequate preparation of his defense. Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). “The sufficiency of a state

indictment is an issue on federal habeas corpus only if the indictment was so deficient that the convicting court

was deprived of jurisdiction. DeBenedictis v. Wainwright, 674 F.2d 841 (11th Cir.1982).” Heath v. Jones, 863

F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1989); Branch v. Estelle, 631 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he sufficiency of a state

indictment is not a matter for federal habeas corpus relief unless it can be shown that the indictment is so defective

that the convicting court had no jurisdiction.”). A review of the indictment for capital murder issued against

Gardner demonstrates that it substantially tracked the language of the state statute and adequately incorporated

all elements of the charged offense. Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at 41. Thus, this count of the

indictment is not fatally defective as it provided Gardner sufficient notice of the charge lodged against him so as

to allow preparation of an adequate defense, and, therefore, “the state trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction.” 

Heath, 863 F.2d at 821. Consequently, the indictment for capital murder did not deprive Gardner of any

constitutionally protected interest. 

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Upon review of the § 2254 petition, the answer of the respondents, Gardner’s

response to the answer, the state court record and applicable federal law, this court finds

that no evidentiary hearing is required, Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in

United States District Courts, and concludes that the petition is due to be denied.

II. DISCUSSION

During the Rule 32 proceedings, both the Circuit Court of Montgomery County,

Alabama and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals deemed the deficient indictment,

double jeopardy and ineffective assistance of counsel claims without merit. Review of the

instant habeas petition is therefore governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. “A habeas petitioner whose claim was

adjudicated on the merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he

meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. 634, 638, 123 S.Ct. 1848,

1852; Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518. Under the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d), with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, federal

habeas relief from a state court judgment may not be granted unless the adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

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In Williams, the Supreme Court held:

Under the “contrary to” clause a federal court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

529 U.S. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. 

The Court subsequently explained that habeas relief is appropriate when a petitioner

demonstrates “that a decision by a state court is ‘contrary to’ ... clearly established

[Supreme Court] law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Supreme Court’s] cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[Supreme Court] precedent.’ Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495,

146 L.Ed. 2d 389 (2000).” Price, 538 U.S. at 640, 123 S.Ct. at 1853. Additionally, federal

review in a habeas action “is limited to whether the state court’s decision was objectively

unreasonable in the light of clearly established federal law. Williams, [529 U.S. at 409],120

S.Ct. at 1521.” Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003); Parker v.

Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001), citing Williams, supra (“[F]ederal habeas relief

[is] available under the ‘unreasonable application’ standard only if the state court’s

application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”). Thus, a

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federal court is not to decide “the correctness per se ... of the state court decision” but only

the “objective reasonableness” of such decision. Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th

Cir. 2001). Moreover, “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522

(emphasis in original). “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522. 

Federal district courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court

based its findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

determinations of fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall

have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, even when the state court addresses a

question of law, this court is not authorized “to evaluate [a petitioner’s] claim de novo

rather than through the lens of § 2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. at 639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852. The

Supreme Court admonishes that such de novo evaluation “exceeds the limits imposed on

federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)....” 538 U.S. at 636, 123 S.Ct. at 1851. 

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Gardner is entitled to no relief as

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the state court properly adjudicated each of his federal habeas claims on the merits. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-405, 120 S.Ct. at 1518-1523 (2000). Specifically, the decisions

of the trial court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denying Gardner relief on his

Rule 32 petition were not contrary to or unreasonable applications of federal law nor

unreasonable determinations of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state

courts.

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals deemed “Gardner’s claim [challenging the indictment] ... without merit” as the

indictment clearly identified Travis Benefield as a person and likewise sufficiently set forth

the elements of the offense. Respondents’ Exhibit E - Court Doc. No. 11-9 at 3. In

addressing Gardner’s double jeopardy claim, the state appellate court, upon application of 

the test set forth in Blockburger, determined that “[b]ecause the murder of Travis Benefield

required different elements to prove the crime than the robbery of Ray Davis and vice

versa, Gardner’s right to be free from double jeopardy was not violated.” Id. at 4. With

respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, both the trial and appellate courts

applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) in determining that such claim

provided no basis for relief to Gardner. Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 11-2 at

59; Respondents’ Exhibit E - Court Doc. No. 11-9 at 5-7. 

Neither the Circuit Court of Montgomery County nor the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals decided Gardner’s deficient indictment, double jeopardy or ineffective assistance

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of counsel claims “differently than [the Supreme] Court has [in a case based] on a set a of

materially indistinguishable facts” nor did the state courts apply a rule that contradicts

governing federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. Consequently, the

rejection of these claims by the state courts was not contrary to actual Supreme Court

decisions. Moreover, a thorough review of the evidentiary materials submitted in this case

establishes that the decisions of the state courts denying these claims were objectively

reasonable and likewise constituted reasonable determinations of the facts in light of the

evidence presented by the parties. Consequently, Gardner is not entitled to relief from this

court as the state courts properly adjudicated each of his claims on the merits.6

 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the

petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Willie Lizzlie Gardner be DENIED and this case

be DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further 

ORDERED that on or before April 14, 2009 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Objections must specifically identify the findings in the 

 6The respondents also argue that Gardner is procedurally defaulted on his double jeopardy and ineffective

assistance of counsel claims because he failed to fairly present these claims as federal claims in his petition for

certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court on appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,

526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-1146 (11th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S.Ct. 1081, 151 L.Ed.2d 982 (2002); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th Cir.

2002); Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1254 n. 9 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1017 (2000); McNair v.

Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302-1303 (11th Cir. 2005); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-276 (1971); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). However, it appears to this court that Gardner did fairly present his double jeopardy

and ineffective assistance of counsel claims as federal claims in the petition for writ of certiorari. Thus, based on the

foregoing and in light of the disposition of these issues in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the court deems

it unnecessary to address the respondents’ procedural default argument. 

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Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings in this Recommendation

shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in

the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in

the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); see

Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the

 former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to September 30, 1981.)

Done, this 1st day of April, 2009.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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