Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00942/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NA’IL CHARLES DOWNEY, Civil No. 07-cv-0942-JLS (POR)

Petitioner, PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND

RECOMMENDATION THAT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS BE DENIED

v.

KEN CLARK; JERRY BROWN, Attorney

General of the State of California,

Respondents.

Petitioner Nai’il Charles Downey (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his custody at

California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility. Petitioner claims that he was convicted in violation

of his federal rights to procedural due process and effective counsel. In accordance with Local Rule

72.1(d), this Court issues the following Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for

Disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully recommends that the Petition be

DENIED.

I. Background

A. Petitioner’s Conviction

Petitioner was one of eleven men charged with murder and attempted murder after a fight

between rival street gangs at the 2003 Puerto Rican Festival in Mission Bay Park resulted in

gunshots that killed one man and injured two others. Eight of the men charged in the case pled

guilty to lesser crimes, and at trial a jury was unable to reach a verdict as to a ninth defendant. 

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Darrel James Tittle was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted manslaughter . The jury

found that Petitioner had personally used the handgun which caused the death and injuries. 

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and two counts of attempted murder. Petitioner

was sentenced to 65 years to life, plus an additional 16 years. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), factual determinations by a state court are presumed correct

unless a habeas petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner has

not attempted to rebut the factual findings made in state court as to his crime, his arrest or his

conviction. The following facts, therefore, are taken verbatim from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion upon Petitioner’s direct appeal of his conviction.

[Petitioner] and [Darrell James] Tittle, stepbrothers by marriage, were members

or associates of the Lincoln Park Bloods (Lincoln Park) criminal street gang on June 15,

2003, when the events pertinent to this case began unfolding. On that day, each met up

with other Lincoln Park gang members and associates to travel to Mission Bay Park to

attend the annual Puerto Rican Festival. When the group arrived at the beach in their

traditional colors of red and green, they saw a large group of people associated with their

rival criminal street gang, the Skyline Pirus or Crips (Skyline). The men from the

Lincoln Park group, which included Tittle and [Petitioner], walked quickly toward the

Skyline group. As they did so, several members donned gloves, and [Petitioner] and

others put green bandanas over their faces.

When the groups met face to face, they exchanged hostile, degrading and

derogatory words, with Tittle telling the Skyline group, “we ain’t trippin’, if you ain’t

trippin’.” When someone in the Skyline group said there were “no truces” and asked

who Tittle was, Tittle declared, “I’m Knockout-D from Lincoln Park murda gang.”

When the Linoln Park group began chanting “murda gang,” someone, probably Tittle,

tossed a soda can at Skyline member Michael Canty, who immediately punched Tittle

in the face, causing other Lincoln Park and Skyline members to exchange blows. Within

seconds of this outbreak, [Petitioner] pulled out a .38 caliber revolver from his waistband

and fired four to six shots at the Skyline group. Members of both groups fled after the

shots were fired and police immediately arrived on the scene. 

While detaining people for questioning, the police saw several Black males

drving in an Oldsmobile, which they later found abandoned in the beach parking lot. A

search of the car revealed a Dupont jacket with a digital camera in the pocket on the back

passenger seat and the firearm used in the shooting under that seat.

As a result of the shooting, Skyline member Travis Thomas was hit in the upper

chest by one bullet and died at a hospital within the hour. A second bullet passed

through Canty’s calf causing him great bodily injury and a third bullet hit Skyline

member Greggoy Fulgham’s foot.

Because many of the witnesses to the altercation and shooting were friends,

associates or members of the gangs involved, there was a tremendous amount of

intimidation placed on them in the months following the shootings and the actual trial.

Numerous witnesses were reluctant to talk to police or testify about the incident.

[Petitioner] had even telephoned one witness, Angel Parrison, telling her she should

leave town.

At trial, the above evidence was presented as well as the testimony of a number

of witnesses associated with Lincoln Park and Skyline, and two cooperating witnesses,

Deandre Moore and Kenny Reed. The testimony revealed the group from Lincoln Park

knew members of Skyline would likely be at Mission Bay Park that fateful day and there

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would be a fight if the members of Skyline posed any problems as they had in 2002 at

the Puerto Rican festival, which had also erupted in a fight and shooting between the two

rival gangs. In addition to independent witnesses giving accounts of how the Lincoln

Park group menacingly advanced toward the Skyline group at Mission Bay Park and

giving physical descriptions of the shooter as having long hair pulled back in a ponytail,

wearing a Dupont jacket with a green bandana over his face, being about 5'10" to 5'11"

tall and thin, the jury received video and photographic evidence taken by Skyline

member Allen Reddick at the beach that day showing the approaching gang’s actions,

and included stills of the 11 persons originally charged in this case. The physical

descriptions of the shooter matched [Petitioner]’s physical build.

In addition, both Moore and Reed, who had originally been charged with the

same crimes as [Petitioner] and Tittle, and had pled guilty to lesser charges to avoid

prison terms, testified as accomplices as a matter of law. Each had been to the Bay Vista

Apartments with [Petitioner], known as “Li’l Knockout,” and other Skyline members

before heading for the beach in several carloads via a liquor store, where Tittle, Silvels

and additional Lincoln Park members joined the caravan. Before leaving the apartments,

Reed heard the group talk about Skyline being at the beach and [Petitioner] ask “who

was going to carry the gun or whatever.” Both Reed and Moore described [Petitioner]

as wearing a Dupont jacket or red “race car jacket” that day and said he had a digital

camera with him earlier in the day. 

Moore, who rode to the beach in an Oldsmobile with [Petitioner] and others,

stated they parked the car near the roller coaster and walked across the street toward

Bonita Cove after meeting with Reed and other Lincoln Park member who had arrived

at the beach. When the group saw people from Skyline, gang signs and yelling began

between the two rivals. Although they saw [Petitioner] pull a green handkerchief out of

a pocket, saw someone in the Skyline group punch Tittle, and heard about six shots

before running back toward the parking lot where he was detained by police, Moore did

not see a gun or who was shooting it that day.

Although [Petitioner] had threatened Moore about testifying in this case, Moore

identified [Petitioner] in court as the person wearing the Dupont jacket visible in one of

the video stills, noted [Petitioner] had cut his hair two days after the shooting, and said

[Petitioner] had merely smiled when asked if he had anything to do with the shooting.

Reed claimed he did not see the fight with Skyline take place, but only saw the

two groups of people “running at each other.” According to Reed he bent down to tie

his shoe and when he got up he heard gunshots. He froze when he saw the gun and saw

[Petitioner] firing it in “their direction.” When Reed ran back across the street to the

parking lot, he saw [Petitioner] run to the Oldsmobile and return from the car without the

Dupont jacket. When Reed later talked with [Petitioner] about the shooting, [Petitioner]

told him he was the shooter and “it wasn’t supposed to happen like that.” Reed told

others he had been close to the shooting and [Petitioner] was the shooter. Reed was

impeached with many inconsistent statements he had made during the investigation

about whether he had seen the shooting or knew who the shooter was.

The jury further received evidence that, besides [Petitioner], an older Lincoln

Park member, Chantell Wilson, also carried a gun to the beach that day, and that

[Petitioner] had essentially admitted afterwards to various Lincoln Park members and

associates other than Reed that he was the “shooter.”

Parrison also unwillingly testified regarding her threats from [Petitioner] about

her testifying and was impeached by numerous statements she had made to the police

during the investigation when she denied knowing anything about the shooting at trial.

In those earlier statements, she had told police [Petitioner] and others had planned the

encounter with Skyline before leaving the Bay Vista Apartments, with [Petitioner] to

carry the gun, and that afterwards, at her apartment, many of the [gang] members met,

including [Petitioner], and everyone talked about [Petitioner] being the one who shot

“the kid” at the beach. Parrison also told the police [Petitioner] had cut his hair the day

after the shooting. She thought the person in the Dupont jacket in the photograph stills

could have been [Petitioner].

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In addition to the above, testimony of numerous police officers regarding the

investigation and pretrial statements of other witnesses, who later changed their

testimony at trial, as well as a gang expert testifying about the history of violence

between Lincoln Park and Skyline and the significance of gang colors, monikers, signs

and language were presented. The expert opined violence and shootings would be

expected when large groups of these two antagonistic gangs came in [contact] while in

full gang colors. The expert and another police officer also discussed the gang songs on

various CDs and letts found in the possession of Lincoln Park gang members, including

Tittle and [Petitioner], which contained words and lyrics about murdering Skyline

members and warning about “snitches.” The expert further discussed the “code of

silence” among gang members and the practices of switching clothing around so as not

to be identified by police.

Tittle presented several witnesses in his defense to show he did not fight back

after Canty swung at him, he was angry with [Petitioner] and he thought the shooting

was a “stupid thing” to do. He also relied on codefendant Silvel’s testimony that he

(Tittle) had made it clear to the Skyline group that he did not want any problems and the

Lincoln Park group was only there to pick up girls at the festival. [Petitioner]’s mother

and an investigator testified in [Petitioner]’s defense, hoping to show [Petitioner] had

worn a striped sweater that day and was not the shooter as depicted in the video still

photographs shown the jury.

After considering all the evidence, arguments and instructions, the jury convicted

Tittle and [Petitioner] of various offenses stemming from the shootings, with [Petitioner]

being found to have been the person who fired the gun that killed Thomas and wounded

Canty and Fulgham. 

B. Petitioner’s Direct Appeal and Collateral Attack

Petitioner appealed his conviction, based upon the same four claims that he raises in the

Petition. (Lodgment 3.) The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Court, Division

One affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, rejecting all of the claims raised in his appeal. (Lodgment 5.) 

Petitioner next filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, based upon the

same claims. (Lodgment 6.) The California Supreme Court denied that petition on August 23,

2006. (Lodgment 7.)

C. Petition for Federal Habeas Corpus Relief

The instant petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus was filed with this Court on May 23,

2007, and is Document 1 on this civil docket. The Petition seeks relief on the grounds that: (1)

Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when the jury was not

instructed that witness Angel Parrison may have been an accomplice to the charged crimes, (2) there

was insufficient evidence presented at trial of the specific intent that is required for murder

convictions, (3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury that convictions for attempted murder

require an intent to kill each victim, and (4) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel

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when counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s explanation of concurrent intent to the jury. 

An Answer to the petition was filed on August 3, 2007 by the Attorney General of the State

of California. The Answer argues that Grounds 1 and 3, which seek to challenge the jury

instructions given at Petitioner’s trial, do not raise a federal question for the Court to review. The

Answer further contends, in response to Ground 2 of the Petition, that the last reasoned decision by a

state court in Petitioner’s case correctly applied clearly established federal law to Petitioner’s claim

that he was convicted on insufficient evidence. In response to Ground 4 of the Petition,

Respondents asserts that the last reasoned decision correctly applied clearly established federal law

to Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Petitioner did not file a traverse to the Answer, despite an Order allowing him to do so by

September 5, 2007. (Doc. 4.) 

II. Standard of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. section 2254(a), allows for federal review of “the judgment of a State court

only on the ground that [the habeas petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2007). The Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). The current petition was filed in 2006, and is governed by the

AEDPA. As amended by the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim-- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

In addition to the AEDPA’s limitation of federal court review to “violation[s] of the

Constitution of laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the United States

Supreme Court has also instructed that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-8 (1991). 

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Federal habeas review is available to assess the constitutionality of a judgment of a state

court. Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court to review, a federal court

“looks through” the silent state court decision to the “last reasoned opinion” issued in the state’s

courts. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 805 (1991). In Petitioner’s case, the California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s state petition for writ of habeas corpus without comment. 

Therefore, in reviewing Petitioner’s claims, this Court looks to the reasoned opinion by the

California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, dated May 5, 2006 (filed with

this Court as Lodgment 5) - which denied Petitioner’s direct appeal. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

III. Discussion

The instant petition raises four grounds for federal habeas relief. Doc. 1 at 6-9. Each of

these grounds was presented to the California Court of Appeal upon direct appeal. (Lodgment 3.) 

Ground 1 of the Petition seeks relief on the basis of Petitioner’s claim of prejudicial error from a

lack of jury instruction in response to the testimony of witness Angel Parrison. Ground 2 of the

Petition claims that there was insufficient evidence at trial of the specific intent required for the

attempted murder convictions. Ground 3 seeks relief because the jury was not instructed that

convictions for attempted murder require an intent to kill each victim. Ground 4 of the Petitioner is

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, premised on the argument that counsel unreasonably

failed to object to the prosecutor’s explanation to the jury of concurrent intent. 

A. Ground One

Petitioner’s first ground for relief is a claim that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that

they should determine whether Angel Parrison was an accomplice and, if they determined that she

was, to treat her testimony accordingly. Petitioner claims that if the trial court had issued such an

instruction, the jury would have found Parrison to be an accomplice and would have discredited her

testimony. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 

In Estelle v. McGuire, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of jury instructions

and narrowed the inquiry of federal review to the question of “whether the ailing instruction by itself

so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violate[d] due process.” 502 U.S. 62, 72

(1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973)). The Supreme Court also determined that

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a disputed jury instruction “must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the

trial record.” Id. The standard for federal courts reviewing jury instructions in a state criminal

prosecution is whether the jury instructions in a case, read as a whole and in light of the entire

record, failed to instruct the jury of an element of a commitment offense. The Supreme Court’s

prejudice standard for evaluating trial error on collateral review, as set forth in Brecht v.

Abrahamson, is also applicable. 507 U.S. 619 (1993) 

In examining this claim upon Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the

trial court made no error in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury to consider whether Parrison’s

testimony could be trusted or whether she may be an accomplice. The Court of Appeal found that

“there was no evidence to support a finding that [Parrison] was an accomplice.” (Lodgment 5 at 26.) 

This was because Parrison “only heard about the shooting and had not seen it. In addition the video

and still photographs showing the conflict between Lincoln Park and Skyline that day revealed there

were no women present during the confrontation.” (Id.) The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s

argument because Parrison’s mere knowledge that Petitioner was armed on the day of the murder,

did not make her an accomplice to murder or attempted murder. (Id. at 6.)

The Court of Appeal’s decision that the trial court was not obligated as a matter of law to

provide a jury instruction for a determination of Parrison’s status as an accomplice was not contrary

to clearly established federal law. The Court of Appeal’s analysis and determination that Parrison

was indeed not an accomplice to murder or attempted murder under California law, leads to the

conclusion that the trial court’s omission of a jury instruction to that effect did not so infect the

entire trial so as to violate Petitioner’s right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72

(1991). While the Court of Appeal found no error in the omission of a jury instruction, the Court of

Appeal’s decision correctly resolved whether the lack of an instruction “had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim posed by Ground

One of the Petition.

B. Ground Two

Ground 2 of the Petition claims that there was insufficient evidence of the specific intent

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required for attempted murder with which to convict Petitioner. (Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner asserts the

evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that he intended to kill the victims who were wounded

in the shooting. In the Answer, Respondent contends that the Court of Appeal properly applied the

standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). 

The federal constitutional right to due process “protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When a habeas petitioner claims

that there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to support a conviction, a federal court

determines whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 301, 319 (1979). Deference is provided to the trier of facts’

weighing of the evidence by reviewing “all of the evidence . . . in the light most favorable to the

prosecution.” Id. (emphasis in the original). With the additional layer of deference established by

the AEDPA, Petitioner must demonstrate that the California Court of Appeal contradicted clearlyestablished Supreme Court precedent by rejecting Petitioner’s claim because no rational trier of fact

could have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262,

1274-5 (9th Cir. 2005).

In considering Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Court of Appeal did apply the clearlyestablished federal standard from Jackson v. Virginia, as quoted by the Supreme Court of California

in People v. Rich, 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1081 (1988). (Lodgment 5 at 10.) Using that standard, the Court

of Appeal examined Petitioner’s claim that there was insufficient evidence at his trial to support a

finding of specific intent to kill the wounded victims. The Court of Appeal cited the California

Supreme Court in finding that, to be guilty of attempted murder, Petitioner had to have an intent of

express malice toward each victim, and that this required a showing that Petitioner either desired the

result or knew that the result would occur. (Lodgment 5 at 11) (quoting People v. Smith, 37 Cal.4th

733, 739 (2005). 

The Court of Appeal went on to hold that “firing a gun toward a victim at close range ‘in a

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manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had it been on target is sufficient to support an

inference of intent to kill.’” (Id. at 12.) (quoting People v. Lashley, 1 Cal. App.4th 938, 945 (Cal. Ct.

App., 2d Dist., 1991.) The Court of Appeal considered that the evidence at Petitioner’s trial showed

that Petitioner armed himself prior to going to Mission Bay Park, with the understanding that the

Skyline gang would be there and he would use the gun if there was trouble. When the fighting

between the two gangs began, Petitioner pulled out the gun and shot at Skyline members at close

range. The Court of Appeal found three alternative ways that the jury could have found that

Petitioner had the requisite intent to kill the injured victims. 

First, the Court of Appeal found that the jury could have reasonably inferred from the

evidence that Petitioner shot into the group with the intent to kill each person who he could have hit,

or that Petitioner had knowledge that shooting in the group would result in deaths of Skyline

members. The court acknowledged that “the evidence was conflicting as to whether [Petitioner]

pointed the gun toward the ground when he shot.” (Lodgment 5 at 13.) However, “there was

testimony Skyline members began ducking and hitting the ground to get out of the way when they

heard shots being fired. The jury could have reasonably inferred from such evidence that

[Petitioner] was pointing the gun down to hit some Skyline members who had reacted in such a

manner.” (Id.) 

Second, the Court of Appeal found express malice based on Angel Parrison’s testimony that

prior to going to the park Petitioner had armed himself knowing that Skyline gang members would

be there. The jury could have found that Petitioner went to the park armed intending for a fight to be

provoked so he could kill Skyline members. This, the Court of Appeal found, provided substantial

evidence of specific intent as to any Skyline member, including the victims who were in fact shot. 

(Lodgment 5 at 13-14.)

Third, the Court of Appeal held that California case law supports a “kill zone” theory of

transferred intent. Under this theory, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner intended to kill Canty, who had punched Tittle, and that he shot at the other two victims

because they were in the “kill zone.” (Lodgment 5 at 14.)

In concluding that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that Petitioner

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attempted to murder the victims who were wounded in the shooting, the Court of Appeal reasonably

applied clearly established federal law. The Court of Appeal properly determined whether “after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 301, 319 (1979). 

C. Ground Three

In Ground 3, Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that to find

Petitioner guilty of the attempted murder charges, they must find that Petitioner intended to kill each

of the shooting victims. (Doc 1 at 8.) Petitioner claims that the lack of an instruction, combined

with the prosecutor’s closing argument about transferred intent, resulted in his being

unconstitutionally convicted. 

As stated above, the constitutionality of jury instructions is assessed based on “whether the

ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violate[d] due

process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. The standard for federal courts reviewing jury

instructions in a state criminal prosecution is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury

has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). 

Petitioner raised this same claim in his direct appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the

court had properly instructed the jury on the necessary elements of attempted murder. (Lodgment 5

at 28.) The court made it clear to the jurors that the elements of attempted murder needed to be

separately found in regards to each victim in order to convict Petitioner of both counts of attempted

murder. (Id. at 31.) The Court of Appeal found that “[t]he instructions of attempted murder were

correct and unambiguous.” (Id.) Despite the fact that Petitioner’s counsel did not request clarifying

instructions, the Court of Appeal proceeded to examine whether there had been any prejudicial error

in the absence of further instructions when the prosecutor “inartfully” argued a theory of concurrent

intent in his closing argument. The court concluded that “there is no reasonable probability the jury

misapplied those instructions and found [Petitioner] guilty of attempted murder without the requisite

specific intent to kill as to each victim.” (Id. at 33.)

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The Court of Appeal applied the standard set forth in Estelle v. McGuire and found no

reasonable probability that the jury misapplied the trial court’s instructions on the elements of

attempted murder. The Court of Appeal’s decision as to this claim was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.

D. Ground Four

 In Ground 4 of the Petition, Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, based on trial

counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s explanation of concurrent intent, presented to the jury

in the prosecution’s closing argument. (Doc. 1 at 9.) 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a federal habeas petitioner must

meet two requirements. First, “the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Deficient performance is performance which

is objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695,

702 (9th Cir., 1990). Second, “the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced

the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. To determine whether Petitioner’s claim

meets these two requirements, the Court undertakes an examination of the trial record and of

counsel’s performance, but “judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.” 

Id.. 466 U.S. at 689. 

Upon Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the clearly-established federal

standard for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as it was restated by the Supreme Court of

California in People v. Benavides, 35 Cal.4th 69 (2005). (Lodgment 5 at 44.) The court indulged

the strong presumption that Petitioner’s trial counsel engaged in reasonable conduct, and rejected

Petitioner’s claim on the lack of prejudice resulting from the allegedly deficient performance. The

Court of Appeal found that the trial court’s issuance of California Jury Instruction 8.66.1, which

explains concurrent intent, left no reasonable probability that the jury would have rendered a more

favorable verdict if counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s closing argument. (Lodgement 5 at 45.) 

The prosecutor told the jury that she did “not need to prove the shooter killed or attempted to

kill a particular person in this case. A person who primarily intends to kill one person may also

concurrently intend to kill other persons within a particular zone of risk.” (Lodgment 2, Volume 16

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at 2348.) California Jury Instruction 8.66.1, which was given by the trial court, explains attempted

murder by concurrent intent as occurring “when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at

a primary victim, are such that it is reasonable to infer the perpetrator intended to kill the primary

victim by killing everyone in that victim’s vicinity.”

The California Court of Appeal applied the clearly established federal standard in assessing

Petitioner’s claim. By applying that standard, the Court of Appeal found that Petitioner can not

meet his burden of demonstrating that defense counsel’s failure to object during the prosecution’s

closing argument - if that failure was indeed objectively unreasonable - prejudiced the defense. The

Court of Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, the clearlyestablished Strickland standard. 

IV. Conclusion

After thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, this

Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This Proposed

Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, the Honorable Janis L.

Sammartino, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2007) and Local Rule 72.1(d).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than October 17, 2008, any party may file and

serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 24, 2008

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

All parties

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