Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00401/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00401-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRIN ARMSTRONG,

CDCR #V-00141,

Civil No. 11-0401 WQH (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING

INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE

AND GARNISHING BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[Doc. No. 2]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[Doc. No. 3]; AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE OF COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) 

& 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

vs.

LARRY SMALLS, Former Warden CDCR; 

S. ANDERSON, Assoc. Warden;

M. WHITMAN, Correctional Officer,

Captain; J. MONTANO, Correctional

Officer, Sergeant; P. ZILLS, Correctional

Officer, Lieutenant; and DOES 1-5,

Correctional Officers,

Defendants.

Darrin Armstrong (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Centinela State

Prison in Imperial, California, and proceeding in pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims various Calipatria State Prison officials failed to

protect him from a racially motivated attack by fellow inmates on March 20, 2010, despite prior

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knowledge of the attack. See Compl. at 3-4. As a result, Plaintiff was “stabbed in the face with

an inmate manufactured weapon” and now suffers “permanent disfiguration on the right side of

his mouth & cheek.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as well as compensatory and

punitive damages. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he

has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc.

No. 2], as well as a Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[Doc. No. 3]. 

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP

remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847

(9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of

the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

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forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1119. This statement shows an available balance of $34.59 as of February 23, 2011, an average

monthly balance of $202.86 and average monthly deposits of $64.01 for the 6-month period

immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. Based on this financial information, the

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] and assesses an initial partial

filing fee of $40.57 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

or his designee, shall collect this initial fee only if sufficient funds in Plaintiff’s account are

available at the time this Order is executed pursuant to the directions set forth below. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing

a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has

no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281

F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve”

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack

of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance shall be collected

and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth

in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel because “his imprisonment will greatly limit his

ability to litigate,” and the issues in his case are “complex” and will “require significant research

and investigation.” See Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No. 3] ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff claims he is unable to afford

counsel, that his case “will likely involve conflicting testimony,” and “counsel would be better

able to present the evidence and cross-examin[e] [the] witnesses.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. 

/ / /

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Nevertheless, “[t]here is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.”

Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d

1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d

1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.”)

(citation omitted). Federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of

counsel.” Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United

States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts do have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to

“request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional

circumstances.” See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.

2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff

seeking assistance requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on

the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v.

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,

1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Court agrees that any pro se litigant “would be better served with the assistance of

counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). However, so long as a pro

se litigant, like Plaintiff in this case, is able to “articulate his claims against the relative

complexity of the matter,” the “exceptional circumstances” which might require the appointment

of counsel do not exist. Id. (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when

district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well have

fared better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert testimony.”). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint involves a relatively straightforward Eighth

Amendment claim related to Defendants’ alleged failure to protect him on one specific occasion,

and Plaintiff has demonstrated the ability to articulate essential facts supporting his claim. Thus,

the Court finds that Plaintiff does appear to have an adequate grasp of his case as well as the

legal issues involved. See Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. 

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As noted below, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to survive the initial

screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Thus, because Plaintiff has not

satisfied the stringent standards required for an appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1), Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3] must be DENIED at

this time. 

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, courts “have an obligation where the petitioner

is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court may not, however,

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations

/ / /

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 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of,

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and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12[] motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.”

Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

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of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss.” Id.

 As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to survive the sua

sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1

1126-27; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (“Prison officials have a duty ... to

protect prisoners from violence.”). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to U.S.

Marshal service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue

and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court

may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff

is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[Doc. No. 3] is DENIED without prejudice. 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]

is GRANTED.

3. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or

his designee, is ordered to collect the $40.57 initial partial filing fee assessed by this Order

and forward that amount to the Clerk of Court, if those funds are available at the time this

Order is executed. THE INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. Thereafter, the Secretary of California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the balance of

the $350 filing fee owed in this case and forward monthly payments from his trust account in an

amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court

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each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2). ALL MONTHLY PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE

CASE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883,

Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. The Clerk shall issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. No. 1] upon

Defendants and shall and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for

each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order

and a certified copy of his Complaint and summons so that he may serve Defendants. Upon

receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as completely and

accurately as possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according to the

instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. Upon receipt,

the U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendants as directed

by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

6. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the

time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to

reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on

the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the

merits,” the defendant is required to respond). 

7. Plaintiff shall serve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document

submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be

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filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy

of any document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, and the date of service.

Any paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to

include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

DATED: March 7, 2011

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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