Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02579/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02579-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARRY G. DENTON, No. 2:13-CV-2579-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

D. DEROCO, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c) and no other party has been served or appeared in the action. On January 10, 2017, the

court ordered plaintiff to show cause in writing within 30 days why this action should not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff was warned that failure to file a response could

result in dismissal of the action, both for the reasons outlined in the order to show cause as well

as for failure to comply with court orders. See Local Rule 110. Plaintiff has failed to file a

response to the court’s January 10, 2017, order. 

/ / /

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In the order to show cause, the court summarized plaintiff’s allegations as

follows:

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Deroco; (2)

Henrich; (3) Guzman; (4) Lidge; (5) Sacks; (6) Ahrens; and (7)

McCollough. Plaintiff states that, on December 3, 2012, he refused to

enter his assigned cell during a lockdown of Crip inmates because he is

not a member of that gang. Plaintiff was told that the only way to avoid

the lockdown was to find a cellmate who was a “non-affiliate.” Plaintiff

states that he asked defendant McCollough to help him with the issue and

that defendant McCollough said he would “check the board.” On

December 4, 2012, plaintiff moved into a cell with inmate Pearson. 

Plaintiff next states that he had an “altercation” with inmate

Pearson the following day and that he informed defendant McCollough

that he needed a cell move. According to plaintiff, he was told by

defendant McCollough that it was too late in the day for a cell move and

that he had already moved a few days ago. Plaintiff alleges that he was

attacked by inmate Pearson on December 11, 2012. According to plaintiff,

the attack rendered him unconscious. When plaintiff awoke, he was

surrounded by officers asking if he was okay. Plaintiff was immediately

transported to the medical clinic and treated for a cut lip and lumps on his

forehead. Plaintiff was provided pain medicine and an ice pack. As a

victim of an in-cell assault, plaintiff was protectively placed in

administrative segregation. 

Plaintiff alleges that, while in administrative segregation,

he overheard inmate Pearson, who had been moved to a cell a few doors

down, say that he had “been warning ‘these fools’” that assigning him

(Pearson) a cellmate would cause problems. According to plaintiff, he

learned from this overheard conversation that inmate Pearson had prior

problems with cellmates. Plaintiff adds that Pearson had been approved

for single-cell status but that approval had been withdrawn by defendant

Deroco to retaliate against Pearson. Plaintiff adds that he overheard

Pearson say that he had been placed back on single-cell status as a result of

the attack on December 11, 2012. According to plaintiff, he confirmed all

this when he had a conversation with inmate Pearson on December 22,

2012. 

Next, plaintiff claims that, upon return of his personal

property on January 29, 2013, he discovered that some of inmate Pearson’s

paperwork and other effects had been mistakenly packed with his own. 

Among these items was an April 6, 2012, “classification chrono” stating

that Pearson had been having homicidal thoughts at the prospect of being

assigned a cellmate. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ conduct endangered his

safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

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Regarding the legal sufficiency of these allegations, the court stated:

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the

conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny

under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual

punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . .

embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). 

Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison

officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,

medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d

1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the

official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and

wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a

“sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take

reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. 

Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the

prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of

serious harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and

disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness

of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. See Wallis v.

Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not

liable, however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a

safety risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does

not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials know for a certainty

that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a

mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th

Cir. 1986). Finally, the plaintiff must show that prison officials

disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually knew of a

substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond

to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 844. 

In this case, plaintiff has not stated a claim. Specifically,

plaintiff has not alleged facts to indicate that the named defendants were

aware of any risk of serious harm to plaintiff if he were assigned to the

same cell as inmate Pearson. While plaintiff has alleged that defendant

Deroco withdrew Pearson’s single-cell status chrono in order to retaliate

against Pearson, plaintiff does not allege that Deroco had any reason to

believe that doing to could result in a safety risk. In particular, there is no

indication from the facts alleged that Deroco – or any named defendant for

that matter – knew about the supposed April 6, 2012, classification chrono

stating that Pearson was having homicidal thoughts at the prospect of

being assigned a cellmate. 

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In light of the foregoing, and given plaintiff’s failure to respond to the court’s

order to show cause, the court finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action is dismissed for failure to state a claim; and

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file. 

DATED: March 1, 2017

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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