Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01072/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01072-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JARED M. THEOBALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN CANYON POLICE DEPT, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01072-HSG 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Claybank Detention Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a 

separate order. His complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or an employee of a governmental 

entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b) (1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 

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necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

B. Complaint

Plaintiff has named as defendants the following individuals: the lead police officer at 

American Canyon Police Department; a physician at Napa County Detention Center, and the K-9 

officer/handler at American Canyon Police Department. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. 

The complaint makes the following allegations.

In the first claim, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive force during his 

arrest. Plaintiff alleges that when he was ordered to step out of the shed, he complied and clearly 

told the officers that he was coming out hands up and unarmed. He exited the shed and lay face 

down on the floor with his arms spread, per the officers’ instructions. The K-9 officer stated, 

“Next time, you’ll stay on the other side of Mini Dr,” and then allowed the K-9 to attack Plaintiff, 

drag him, and pull at his lower left bicep. As the dog was attacking Plaintiff and Plaintiff was 

pleading, “Get the dog, get the dog, I’m not resisting,” another officer stated, “You wanna run 

from us, well, welcome to American Canyon!” The K-9 attack left Plaintiff with severe and 

debilitating injury to the nerves and tendons in his left arm, and limited rotation of his left 

shoulder. There is limited chance of recovering full function in his left arm and shoulder. Dkt. 

No. 1 at 3.

In the second claim, Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at Napa County 

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Detention Center, he was not provided with adequate medical care. He stated that the only care 

provided was mild medication, cleansing of his wound, and dressing exchange. He did not receive 

the necessary x-ray and MRI or bone scan to assess the extent of the damage to his left arm and 

shoulder. Plaintiff also alleges that the doctor did not have the knowledge or ability to assess or 

treat his injuries, and that he was not treated by an orthopedic specialist. As a result, his chances 

for recovering function in his left arm and shoulder dropped dramatically. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. 

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s allegation that the K-9 officer/handler instructed the K-9 dog to attack him when 

he was not resisting arrest and lying prone on the floor, and that another officer taunted him and 

did nothing to prevent or stop the attack, states a cognizable § 1983 claim for use of excessive 

force. See Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other 

grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (allegation of use of excessive force by law 

enforcement officer in effectuating arrest states valid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim); Cunningham v. 

Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2000) (police officers may also be held liable if they 

have an opportunity to intercede when their fellow officers violate constitutional rights of plaintiff 

but fail to do so); Bracken v. Chung, 869 F.3d 771, 778 (9th Cir. 2017) (if there is affirmative 

conduct on part of officers that places plaintiff in danger of reasonably foreseeable harm, then 

officers have duty to intercede and will be liable if they are deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s 

plight).

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegation that Napa County Detention Center failed to 

provide the necessary treatment for his left shoulder and arm, and was incapable of providing 

adequate treatment states a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical 

needs, under either the Eighth Amendment (if he was incarcerated at Napa County Detention

Center pursuant to a conviction) or the Fourteenth Amendment (if he was incarcerated at Napa 

County Detention Center as a pre-trial detainee). Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious 

medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 

punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Where the inmate-patient is a 

pretrial detainee rather than a convicted prisoner, his right to be from deliberate indifference to his 

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serious medical needs derives from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than 

the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See Gibson v. County of 

Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). 

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 

F.2d 1059, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. 

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). A prison official is 

deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and 

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 837 (1994). Failure to provide a system of ready access to adequate medical care, failure to 

provide a medical staff competent to examine and diagnose inmates’ problems and failure to treat 

the problems or refer the inmates to others who could, for physical, dental and mental health 

problems, are violations of the Eighth Amendment. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th 

Cir. 1982).

However, the complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend because it does not comply 

with Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and because Plaintiff has only named Doe 

defendants.

 Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all persons “may be 

joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, 

severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 

series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants 

will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The upshot of these rules is that “multiple 

claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with 

unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.” Id. Plaintiff’s first claim 

arises out of the use of excessive force by American Canyon police officers during his arrest while 

his second claim arises out of the medical care provided (or not provided) by a physician at Napa 

County Detention Center. These claims do not share a common question of law or fact. In his 

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amended complaint, Plaintiff may only allege claims that (a) arise out of the same transaction, 

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (b) present questions of law or fact 

common to all defendants named therein. Plaintiff needs to choose the claims he wants to pursue 

that also meet the joinder requirements set forth in Rule 20.

Plaintiff has not identified the defendants by name. As a general rule, the use of “John 

Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 

1980). However, when the identity of alleged defendants is not known prior to the filing of a 

complaint, the Ninth Circuit has held that the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through 

discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover 

the identities, or that the complaint should be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. 

Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). Because Plaintiff has not specifically named the 

defendants responsible for the alleged violation, the Court cannot order service of the complaint. 

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify the Doe defendants. If he is unable to do so, 

he should submit to the Court an explanation of what he has done to try and learn the Doe 

defendants’ names and why he has been unsuccessful.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to address the 

deficiencies identified above. Within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this order, Plaintiff 

shall file an amended complaint. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case 

number used in this order, Case No. C 19-01072 HSG (PR) and the words “AMENDED 

COMPLAINT” on the first page. If using the court form complaint, Plaintiff must answer all the 

questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. Because an amended complaint 

completely replaces the previous complaints, Plaintiff must include in his amended complaint all 

the claims he wishes to present and all of the defendants he wishes to sue. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the prior 

complaint by reference. If Plaintiff is unable to identify the Doe defendants, he must submit to the 

Court an explanation of what he has done to try and learn the Doe defendants’ names and why he 

has been unsuccessful.

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Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order in the time 

provided will result in dismissal of this action without further notice to Plaintiff.

The Clerk shall include two copies of the court’s complaint form with a copy of this order 

to Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

5/1/2019

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