Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00723/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00723-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

---

– 1 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENOVATION REALTY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 18-cv-723-BAS-MDD

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS OR IN THE 

ALTERNATIVE TRANSFER 

VENUE

[ECF No. 11]

v.

RENOVATION AND DESIGN, 

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is a Motion by Defendants Renovation and Design, 

Inc. and Renovation Design Realty, Inc. Defendants move the Court to dismiss 

Plaintiff Renovation Realty, Inc.’s Complaint for improper venue, or in the 

alternative, transfer venue to the Northern District of California. (“Mot.,” ECF No. 

11-1.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion, (“Opp’n,” ECF 

No. 12), and Defendants’ Reply in support of the Motion, (“Reply,” ECF No. 13). 

The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 

without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the

Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion.

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 11
– 2 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging trademark 

infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair competition. (“Compl.,” ECF 

No. 1.) Plaintiff is the owner of the service mark and trade name RENOVATION 

REALTY® and the owner of the trademarks RENOVATION REALTY® and 

(Id. at 2.)1

Plaintiff offers “full-service real estate brokerage and residential renovation 

contractor” services under and in connection with its trademarks. (Id. at 3.) “Plaintiff 

offers a variety of services including real estate consulting, contracting, real estate 

listing, brokerage, staging, and in many cases, uses its own capital or the equity in a 

client’s property to renovate client’s property.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

Renovation Design Realty (“RDR”) is in the business of real estate brokerage and 

“has been offering and selling services using one or more trademarks strikingly 

similar and/or identical to one or more of Plaintiff’s Renovation Realty® Registered 

Trademarks.” (Id. at 5.) RDR offers design and renovation services that help sellers 

prepare their property for sale, and offers “expert negotiation [and] escrow 

management.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Renovation and Design, Inc. 

(“R&D”) is a component of Defendant RDR and also offers services using Plaintiff’s 

trademark. (Id. at 6.) R&D “provides interior design, real estate staging, and 

renovation consultancy to private clients and property developers.” (Id. at 5.) 

In June 2017, Plaintiff sent RDR a cease and desist letter requesting 

Defendants stop all infringing activities. (Id. at 6; ECF No. 12-2, at 36.) In October

2017, RDR filed petitions with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel 

 

1 The Complaint is mis-numbered and contains multiples of each paragraph number. The Court 

refers to the Complaint by page number rather than paragraph number to avoid confusion.

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 11
– 3 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s trademarks. (Compl. at 6; ECF No. 12-2, at 25.) As a result, Plaintiff filed 

the present suit.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal venue determinations are governed exclusively by federal law. 

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988). Proper venue is generally 

based on the most convenient or fair forum as established by the various statutory 

criteria (such as defendants’ residences or where the cause of action took place.) See 

Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986); 

see also Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939). A 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) is the 

appropriate method to challenge improper venue. Under the general venue statute:

A civil action may be brought in: (1) a judicial district in 

which any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the 

same State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial 

district in which a substantial part of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action 

is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which the action 

may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any 

judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the 

court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Once a defendant challenges venue, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing 

that venue is proper. Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 

496 (9th Cir. 1979). In determining whether venue is proper, the Court may consider 

facts outside the pleadings probative of the issue of venue. Argueta v. Banco 

Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996). If a court determines venue is 

improper, it may dismiss the case, or if it is in the interest of justice, the court may 

transfer the case to any other district in which it could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1406(a); Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist. v. Alaska, 682 F.2d 797, 799 n.3 (9th Cir. 

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 11
– 4 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1982). Ultimately, the decision whether to dismiss or transfer rests in the court’s 

sound discretion. See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 1992). 

III. ANALYSIS

The issue is whether venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).2 For 

purposes of venue, a defendant corporation is “deemed to reside in any district in 

[the] State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal 

jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). Defendants 

argue they do not have sufficient contacts in this district to subject them to personal 

jurisdiction. There is no question that Defendants are based in the Northern District, 

and Defendants state they have no offices or employees in this district. (Mot. 6.)

A. Personal Jurisdiction

“There are two forms of personal jurisdiction that a forum state may exercise 

over a nonresident defendant—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.” 

Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). No party argues general 

jurisdiction exists in this case, thus, the Court analyzes specific jurisdiction. The 

Ninth Circuit has established a three-prong test for analyzing a claim of specific 

personal jurisdiction: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct 

his activities or consummate some transaction with the 

forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which 

he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be 

one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must 

comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must 

be reasonable. 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). Under 

the first prong, “purposeful direction” and “purposeful availment” are two different 

 

2 No party asserts a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this district. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 11
– 5 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

concepts. Ziegler v. Indian River Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). “A 

purposeful availment analysis is most often used in suits sounding in contract” and 

“typically consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the forum, such as 

executing or performing a contract there.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. “A 

purposeful direction analysis, on the other hand, is most often used in suits sounding 

in tort” and “usually consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions outside the forum 

state that are directed at the forum, such as the distribution in the forum state of goods 

originating elsewhere.” Id. at 802–03. As Plaintiff here has alleged causes of action 

sounding in tort, the Court will perform a purposeful direction analysis.

1. Whether Defendants Purposefully Directed Their Activities 

at This District

“In tort cases, [the court] typically inquire[s] whether a defendant 

‘purposefully direct[s] his activities’ at the forum state, applying an ‘effects’ test that 

focuses on the forum in which the defendant’s actions were felt, whether or not the 

actions themselves occurred within the forum.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le 

Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Schwarzenegger, 

374 F.3d at 803). This test, often referred to as the “effects” test, derives from Calder 

v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The defendant must have “(1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the 

defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. 

Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Calder, 465 U.S. 

783). All three parts of the test must be satisfied. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has warned courts not to focus too narrowly on the effects 

prong of this test, holding that “something more” is needed in addition to a mere 

foreseeable effect. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 

1087 (9th Cir. 2000). 

a. Intentional Act

“Intent” refers only “to an intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real 

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 11
– 6 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.”

Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Here, Defendants allegedly performed the act of using Plaintiff’s trademarks on their 

website. (Compl. at 5.) See Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix Int’l LLC, 198 F. Supp. 3d 

1127 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (finding that allegations that the defendant operated a website 

using infringing marks sufficiently established an intentional act under Calder); Int’l 

Oddities v. Record, No. CV 12–3934–CAS (VBKx), 2013 WL 3864050, at *5 (C.D. 

Cal. July 22, 2013) (finding that allegations that the defendant used an infringing 

mark to sell products on its website sufficiently established an intentional act under 

Calder). Accordingly, the first prong of the effects test is satisfied.

b. Express Aiming

Plaintiff argues Defendants have expressly aimed their conduct at this district 

because their website “list[s] San Diego properties, complete with options to contact 

agents and request showings.” (Opp’n 10.) Indeed, one may use Defendants’ 

website to search and view available multiple listing service (“MLS”) listings in San 

Diego County and other counties in California. (See ECF No. 12-2, at 9.)3

“[M]aintenance of a passive website alone cannot satisfy” the express aiming

prong, but, operating a website “in conjunction with ‘something more’—conduct 

directly targeting the forum—is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Brayton 

Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 

1007, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002)). “In determining whether a nonresident defendant has 

done ‘something more,’ [the Ninth Circuit has] considered several factors, including 

the interactivity of the defendant’s website, the geographic scope of the defendant’s 

 

3 Plaintiff also points out that Defendants advertise the infringing mark on websites and social 

media pages which are “accessible to consumers located in the Southern District.” (Opp’n 10.) 

This is a meritless argument, because the websites and social media pages are available to anyone 

with internet access. “Not all material placed on the Internet is, solely by virtue of its universal 

accessibility, expressly aimed at every state in which it is accessed.” Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at

1231.

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 11
– 7 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

commercial ambitions, and whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a plaintiff 

known to be a forum resident.” Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1229 (citations omitted). 

Express aiming can be shown where a corporation “continuously and deliberately” 

exploits the forum market for its own commercial gain. Id. at 1229–30 (citing Keeton

v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773–74, 781 (1984)).

In Brayton Purcell, plaintiff sued defendant for plagiarizing its website

verbatim. 606 F.3d at 1157. Both parties were law firms practicing in the area of 

elder abuse law and both parties were residents of California. Id. at 1126–27.

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant “placed the two law firms in competition in the 

area of elder abuse law and created confusion among potential clients as to the true 

authorship of the [plagiarized] elder abuse materials.” Id. at 1130. The court held

that the defendant (1) knew of plaintiff’s existence, (2) targeted plaintiff’s business, 

and (3) entered into direct competition with the plaintiff. Id. Accordingly, the court 

found that the express aiming prong was satisfied.

Here, Defendants’ website has state-wide listings and users can locate real 

estate listings in various districts, thus the scope of the Defendants’ commercial 

ambitions is broad. And it is true that Defendants did not create the MLS listings;

the listings are simply available through their website. But Defendants allow 

customers to view listings in this district through Defendants’ website. The evidence 

demonstrates that Defendants intend clients in this district to access and use their 

website, locate listings, and then contact Defendants’ agents regarding the listings in 

this district. (See ECF No. 12-2, at 10–11 (showing seven listings of properties in 

San Diego).) Defendants assert “the actual listing offices and agents are displayed 

[with the search results] – not Defendants.” (Reply 3.) This is true, but customers 

may also request a showing of the properties through Defendants’ site. (ECF No. 

12-2, at 21 (“Request a Showing”).) It is not specified who would contact a customer 

who requests a showing. But it is commonsense that Defendants include the MLS

properties on their site in an attempt to generate new business, likely through 

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 11
– 8 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

referrals, future renovation projects, or through the use of Defendants’ real estate 

agents. This places Plaintiff and Defendants’ companies in competition because both 

companies work in the real estate and design markets and both seek business in this 

district. (Compl. at 3–6.) See Brayton Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1130 (nonresident 

defendant subject to specific jurisdiction “had every reason to believe prospective 

clients in [the forum] would see the website—indeed, attracting new business was 

the point”). This is evidence of targeting of Plaintiff in this district.4

Further, the Court acknowledges there is no evidence Defendants knew of 

Plaintiff’s location at the time they began allegedly using the trademarks, but this 

changed when Plaintiff sent Defendants a cease and desist letter in 2017. (ECF No. 

12-2, at 36–40 (cease and desist letter with attached trademark registrations which 

are registered to Plaintiff in La Mesa, California).) Defendants were then on notice 

that the trademarks were registered by a resident of this district. Afterwards, in 

October 2017, Defendant R&D filed a Petition for Cancellation for Plaintiff’s 

trademark. (See ECF No. 12-2, at 25.) In the Petition, R&D provided that the 

Registrant (i.e., Plaintiff) is “a California corporation with its principal place of 

business in La Mesa, California.” (Id. at 27.) This shows Defendants knew Plaintiff 

is located in this district. This knowledge is sufficient to turn what might otherwise 

have been Defendants’ state-wide economic activity into “individualized targeting” 

of Plaintiff. See Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668,

678–79 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding even if the defendant was not aware of the infringing 

product at the outset, it became aware its acts would impact the plaintiff “by virtue 

of the cease-and-desist letters it had received”). Such targeting satisfies the express 

aiming requirement. See Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.

 

4 The Court has reviewed the declaration of Sammy Lee Hastings, who is the founder of RDR and 

R&D. (ECF No. 11-2.) Mr. Hastings declares, “Defendants do not solicit customers in the [sic] 

southern California.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Although it is evident that Defendants’ main goal is to solicit 

customers and developers in the northern district, the Court finds Defendants’ website, through the 

MLS postings of available properties in this district, does indeed solicit customers in this district. 

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 11
– 9 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2002) (“[T]he ‘express aiming’ requirement . . . is satisfied when ‘the defendant is 

alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the 

defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state.’” (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 

223 F.3d at 1087)).

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged facts demonstrating that 

Defendants engaged in conduct directly targeted or expressly aimed at this district. 

This prong of the effects test is met.

c. Harm Likely to be Suffered in the Forum

The third and final prong of the purposeful direction inquiry requires that 

Defendants’ actions “caused harm that [they] knew was likely to be suffered in the 

forum.” Brayton Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1131 (citation omitted). The touchstone of 

this requirement is not the magnitude of the harm, but rather its foreseeability. 

Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1207. In an action for trademark infringement, it is 

foreseeable that the economic harm suffered by the owner of a trademark will be felt 

in the owner’s home state. Washington Shoe, 704 F.3d at 679. Here, it is clear that 

harm is suffered by Plaintiff in this district because Plaintiff is located in and sells 

services using its trademark in this district. As noted above, Defendants were aware 

of Plaintiff’s location, thus it was foreseeable that Plaintiff would suffer harm in this 

district.

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff has established Defendants purposefully 

directed their activities at this district under the Calder effects test.

2. Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Arise Out of Defendants’ ForumRelated Contacts

The second requirement for specific personal jurisdiction is that the claim

asserted in the litigation arises out of Defendants’ forum-related activities. The Ninth

Circuit follows a “but for” test in determining whether the claim “arises out of” the 

nonresident’s forum-related activities, i.e., if plaintiff would not have suffered loss 

“but for” defendant’s activities, this element is satisfied. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 11
– 10 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, it is alleged Defendants used Plaintiff’s trademark 

on their website which, among other things, generates business using real estate 

listings in this district. This competes with Plaintiff who also provides real estate 

services in this district, and thus, harms Plaintiff’s business. But for Defendants’ 

activities, Plaintiff would not have suffered loss. This element is met.

3. Whether Jurisdiction is Reasonable

Once purposeful direction is established, a defendant may defeat jurisdiction 

only by “present[ing] a compelling case that the presence of some other 

considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Core–Vent Corp. v. Nobel 

Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court must consider whether

maintenance of the action in this district offends “traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). In determining whether asserting jurisdiction is 

reasonable, the Court considers: “(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) existence of an 

alternative forum, (3) convenient and effective relief for the plaintiff, (4) the forum 

state’s interest in adjudicating the suit, (5) efficient resolution of the controversy, (6) 

purposeful interjection, and (7) conflicts with sovereignty.” Id. (citation omitted).

Defendants argue litigating this case in this district is unreasonable because 

they are based in the Northern District and have no contacts in this district. (Mot. 

15.) Indeed, the Northern District is a more convenient location for Defendants and 

it would therefore be more burdensome for them if the case remains in this district. 

However, the Court foresees little evidence in this case that cannot be transported 

here electronically and therefore the burden is minimal. Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 

1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding “with the advances in transportation and 

telecommunications and the increasing interstate practice of law, any burden is 

substantially less than in days past” (quoting CE Distrib., LLC v. New Sensor Corp., 

380 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004)). And, given the proximity of the two districts, 

the distance between the fora is not a travel inconvenience “so great as to constitute 

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 11
– 11 – 18cv723

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a deprivation of due process.” Panavision Intern., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,

1323 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 

128–29 (9th Cir. 1995)). After considering the above factors, the Court finds 

Defendants have not demonstrated adjudication of this case in this district would be 

unreasonable. 

In sum, Plaintiff has shown that Defendants purposefully directed their 

activities at this district and these activities relate to Plaintiff’s claim. Defendants 

have not presented a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would be 

unreasonable. The Court concludes Defendants “reside” in this district for purposes 

of venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Venue is proper in this district and the Court 

therefore declines to dismiss or transfer this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds venue is proper in this district. The 

Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Transfer.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 26, 2018

Case 3:18-cv-00723-BAS-MDD Document 14 Filed 11/26/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 11