Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00156/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00156-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Wrongful Death

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

DARLENE FLETCHER, )

administratrix of the )

estate of Frank Carter, )

deceased; KWAMIKA FLETCHER, )

individually; and ROSITA )

BOYD, individually, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:13cv156-MHT 

) (WO)

COOPER TIRE & RUBBER )

COMPANY, a foreign )

corporation; ROBERT )

SIMMONS d/b/a Simmons Used )

Cars; and the ESTATE OF )

TARA DENITA SANDERS, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Asserting state-law claims arising out of a one-car

accident, the plaintiffs (administratrix of the estate of

Frank Carter, Kwamika Fletcher, and Rosita Boyd)

initially filed this lawsuit in state court against the

defendants (Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, Robert Simmons

(d/b/a Simmons Used Cars), and the estate of Tara Denita

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 1 of 30
1. While the plaintiffs named the estate of Tara

Denita Sanders as a defendant, Sheryl Smith (in her

capacity as administratrix of the estate of Tara Denita

Sanders) responded with an answer to the complaint and a

crossclaim against Cooper Tire. Because the plaintiffs

are the ones who initiated this lawsuit, the court will

refer to the defendant as the estate of Tara Denita

Sanders, rather than as Sheryl Smith as administratrix of

the estate of Tara Denita Sanders.

2

Sanders).1

 Carter, Fletcher, Boyd, and Sanders were

injured or killed. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Cooper

Tire removed this lawsuit from state to federal court,

asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

This matter is now before the court on the

plaintiffs’ motion to remand. For the reasons that

follow, the motion will be denied.

I. REMAND STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375

(1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095

(11th Cir. 1994). A federal court may hear a case only

if it is authorized to do so by federal law. Kokkonen,

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3

511 U.S. at 377. The party seeking removal has the

burden of establishing it. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. The

removal statute must be strictly construed because it

raises significant federalism concerns. Shamrock Oil &

Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941). All doubts

about federal-court jurisdiction should be resolved in

favor of a remand to state court. Burns, 31 F.3d at

1095.

II. BACKGROUND

This case involves a one-car accident in which all

persons riding in the car had familial connections.

Driving the car was Sanders, who is now deceased. Her

estate has been named as a defendant; she is charged with

contributing to the accident through unsafe driving. The

passengers were Sanders’s husband, Carter, who is also

now deceased, and two nieces, Fletcher and Boyd.

Fletcher, Boyd, and the Carter estate administratix are

all plaintiffs. They claim that besides Sanders (whose

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4

estate is named as a defendant), two other parties (both

named as defendants too) contributed to the accident:

Cooper Tire is charged with manufacturing a defective

tire that was a substantial cause of the accident, and

Simmons, who sold Carter the car and provided subsequent

maintenance, is charged with negligently failing to have

discovered the defect in the tire or some other dangerous

condition when he should have done so. The Sanders

estate has filed a crossclaim against Cooper Tire that is

essentially identical to the plaintiffs’ claim that the

company manufactured a defective tire. 

III. DISCUSSION

In removing the state-court lawsuit to this federal

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Cooper Tire invoked

this court’s diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1332. In order for diversity jurisdiction to

be proper, there must be complete diversity between the

parties, which means that no plaintiff may be a citizen

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 4 of 30
5

of the same State as any defendant. Strawbridge v.

Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). Here, there is not complete

diversity. While Cooper Tire is a citizen of Delaware

and Ohio, all three of the plaintiffs and two of the

defendants (Simmons and the Sanders estate) are all

citizens of Alabama.

Cooper Tire contends that Simmons and the Sanders

estate, the two Alabama defendants, were fraudulently

joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction; that is, the

company argues that the plaintiffs do not actually intend

to pursue claims against Simmons and the Sanders estate

in good faith, but have rather named them as defendants

solely for the purpose of defeating complete diversity.

See, e.g., Henderson v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 454

F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing fraudulent

joinder). If Simmons and the Sanders estate were

fraudulently joined as Cooper Tire alleges, their

citizenship is not considered for the purpose of

determining diversity jurisdiction. See id.

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A removing party who contends that a defendant has

been fraudulently joined carries a “heavy” burden of

proof. Id. There are three ways a party charging

fraudulent joinder may satisfy its burden: (1) by

establishing that “there is no possibility that the

plaintiff can prove a cause of action against the

resident (non-diverse) defendant”; (2) by establishing

“outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of

jurisdictional facts”; or (3) by establishing that “a

diverse defendant is joined with a non-diverse defendant

as to whom there is no joint, several or alternative

liability and [that] the claim against the diverse

defendant has no real connection to the claim against the

non-diverse defendant.” Triggs v. John Crump Toyota,

Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).

In making that determination, the court must examine

the plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal,

supplemented by any affidavits, deposition transcripts,

and other evidence submitted by the parties. Legg v.

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 6 of 30
2. Throughout their briefing, the plaintiffs insist

that the court should look to nothing more than their

complaint to determine whether they have asserted a

plausible claim. See, e.g., Pls.’ Br. (Doc. No. 30) at

8-9 (arguing that the court cannot find fraudulent

joinder because the “complaint states a cause of

action”). No matter how many times the plaintiffs repeat

it, that is simply not the law. The Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has explained on numerous occasions that

fraudulent joinder decisions “must be based upon the

plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal,

supplemented by any affidavits and deposition transcripts

submitted by the parties.” Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322

(emphasis in original).

7

Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2005).2

 The

court must resolve all genuine factual disputes in favor

of the plaintiffs. Id. Likewise, if the plausibility of

the plaintiffs’ claims depends on disputes of law, the

court must resolve those legal disputes in favor of the

plaintiffs as well. Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536,

1538 (11th Cir. 1997).

A. The Estate of Tara Denita Sanders

First, the court will determine whether “there is [a]

possibility that the plaintiff[s] can prove a cause of

action against” the Sanders estate. Triggs, 154 F.3d at

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 7 of 30
8

1287. In this lawsuit, the plaintiffs charge decedent

Sanders with unsafe driving that contributed to the

accident. In support, they have submitted an accident

report stating that Sanders “over steered” before she

“lost control” of the vehicle. Ala. Unif. Traffic Crash

Report (Doc. No. 14-2). If there is admissible evidence

to support the contention contained in the accident

report, it would be plausible that the plaintiffs may

receive a judgment against the estate. The report alone,

however, is not enough since it is inadmissible hearsay.

See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). And here, the plaintiffs have

shown no corroborating evidence to support the report’s

hearsay. In other words, the record is devoid of

admissible evidence that the claim against the Sanders

estate has even plausible merit.

In fact, to the extent that the record contains any

admissible evidence relating to Sanders’s possibly unsafe

driving, the evidence is to the contrary. During their

depositions, the plaintiffs in this case expressed

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 8 of 30
9

surprise and confusion about the fact that they had sued

the estate of their family member. Boyd, who rode in the

car, testified that she did not think her aunt Sanders,

the driver, “did anything wrong” or “caused the accident

in any way.” Boyd Dep. (Doc. No. 1-12) at 102:6-103:6.

In fact, Boyd thought that there was nothing that Sanders

“could have done to prevent the accident.” Id. at 30:3-

5. Sanders, she said, “tried to prevent the accident as

best she could.” Id. at 30:14-16. Boyd did not even

know that she had sued the Sanders estate until Cooper

Tire informed her of that fact in the deposition. Id. at

28:15-29:3. She could not explain why she had. Id. (By

contrast, she understood that she had sued Cooper Tire

and she clearly articulated her reasons for doing so:

because they sold a “bad tire.” Id. at 63:8-19.)

Fletcher was aware that the Sanders estate was named as

a defendant, but she, like Boyd, did not know why, as she

thought her aunt drove safely and carefully “[t]o the

best of her ability” and did nothing wrong. K. Fletcher

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10

Dep. (Doc. No. 1-13) at 46:2-47:3. The administratrix of

Carter’s estate could also not explain why she had sued

the estate of Carter’s wife. See D. Fletcher Dep. (Doc.

No. 1-14) at 81:9-88:21. 

These depositions are relevant for several reasons.

For one, they reveal that the actual plaintiffs did not

knowingly authorize their attorneys to bring the claim

against the Sanders estate. Under the Alabama Rules of

Professional Conduct, “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s

decisions concerning the objectives of representation ...

and shall consult with the client as to the means by

which they are to be pursued.” Ala. R. Prof. Conduct

1.2(a). Here, it is clear that the attorneys did not, at

even the most basic level, consult with their clients as

to which claims should be pursued. Of course, the court

recognizes that in some instances, a case can be so

complex (say, an antitrust case) that a lawyer could not

reasonably be expected to ensure his client understands

all of the claims being pursued on his behalf and it is

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 10 of 30
11

entirely reasonable that the client entrust the lawyer

with those decisions. But, this is not one of those

cases. This case involves a simple car crash and, here,

it is obvious that the actual clients themselves had no

interest in suing the estate of their family member who

drove them on the day of the accident. That is

compelling evidence of fraudulent joinder.

More importantly, the depositions constitute actual,

affirmative, and, critically first-hand evidence that the

claim against the estate has no merit. Two of the three

plaintiffs, Boyd and Fletcher, rode in the car that this

lawsuit charges was driven recklessly, and, here, they

have shown that they believe that no such reckless

driving actually occurred. If this case were to proceed

to trial, Boyd and Fletcher would surely be called to

testify and their perceptions of the accident would be

admissible evidence. Based on evidence from two

witnesses who were not only present at the accident but

also have testified against their own interest in seeking

recovery, this claim does not have plausible merit. In

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12

sum, the plaintiffs not only lack any admissible evidence

supporting plausible merit, but they have actually put

into the record affirmative evidence that their claim is

meritless.

The plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that the disastrous

deposition transcripts are not as bad for the plaintiffs

as they first appear because, they explain, despite what

the transcripts may seem to say, the plaintiffs were

actually doing nothing more than indicating that they

lack personal knowledge of the facts underlying their

claim and they want their attorneys to speak on their

behalf regarding factual matters. After the depositions

occurred, the attorneys submitted affidavits signed by

their clients stating the following: “I have no

independent knowledge regarding the legal claims that

have been asserted on my behalf by my attorneys” and “I

have relied on my attorneys to pursue any and all claims

on my behalf.” Boyd Aff. (Doc. No. 14-12); K. Fletcher

Aff. (Doc. No. 14-8) (same); D. Fletcher (Doc. No. 14-7)

(same). According to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, the

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3. In that civil fraud case, the plaintiff also

answered “no” when asked whether the defendant made any

false statements or concealed information, but, as the

district court explained, that answer was not

inconsistent with the “innocent fraud” claim the

plaintiff asserted, which charged that the defendant

passed along a brochure that misled the plaintiff because

of contextual circumstances even though the defendant did

not himself make misleading statements. See Shields, 375

F. Supp. 2d at 1349-50.

13

situation is like that in Shields v. Washington Nat’l

Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (M.D. Ala. 2005)

(Albritton, J.). There, when the plaintiff was asked

what the allegedly fraudulently joined defendant did

wrong, he answered, “I’ll leave that up to my attorneys.”

Id. at 1350.3

 Despite the attorneys’ attempted gloss on

what happened here, the two cases are nothing alike. The

plaintiff in Shields referred factual matters to his

attorneys to explain on his behalf; by contrast, the

plaintiffs here stated, based on their own first-hand

perceptions, what they thought the facts were: that

Sanders drove as safely as possible and did nothing

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4. The plaintiffs also turn to Maxwell v. E-Z-Go, a

Div. of Textron, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (M.D. Ala.

2012) (Fuller, J.), but that case is no more availing.

That case involved the plaintiff’s lack of personal

knowledge regarding the facts underlying his claim. As

explained, here, the testimony involved in this case does

not evince a lack of personal knowledge but rather

evinces personal knowledge that the claim asserted is

meritless. 

14

wrong.4

 To the extent that the affidavits attempt to

contradict and erase the damaging deposition testimony,

they are unavailing. Cf. Van T. Junkins & Assocs., Inc.

v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 656 (11th Cir. 1984)

(“Although there may be some occasions where a party may

by affidavit clarify testimony given in his deposition

..., we ... hold a district court may find an affidavit

which contradicts testimony on deposition a sham when the

party merely contradicts its prior testimony without

giving any valid explanation.”).

The plaintiffs, seeming to recognize that the

complete lack of evidence supporting the claim against

the Sanders estate is problematic, note that they had not

yet taken depositions of the investigating police officer

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 14 of 30
5. The case began in state court in March 2012. The

same day the case began, the plaintiffs began sending

discovery requests to Cooper Tire. Cooper Tire removed

the case to this court in March 2013.

15

or “any expert accident reconstructionist” and

circumstances may be different if they had done so.

Pls.’ Br. (Doc. No. 14) at 12. In cases like this, where

the plaintiffs argue that they need further discovery,

the plaintiffs “must be able to provide some showing that

[their] claim against the resident defendant ... is

likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable

opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”

Sellers v. Foremost Ins. Co., 924 F. Supp. 1116, 1119

(M.D. Ala. 1996) (Thompson, J.). Here, the court cannot

be blind to the fact that discovery in this case has been

ongoing for a full year.5

 Indeed, when Cooper Tire

removed the case to this court, the state court had

already ordered that discovery conclude in a little over

two months. If there is indeed evidence supporting a

claim against the Sanders estate for negligent driving,

it strains credibility to imagine that the evidence had

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 15 of 30
16

not been uncovered in a year of discovery but would be in

the final remaining two months. That is particularly

true here, where the actual eyewitnesses to the accident,

the plaintiffs themselves, claim that the driving was

safe and without fault. The plaintiffs, through their

attorneys, provide no particulars as to what they think

they will uncover and how it will support their claim.

While the attorneys still make promises that the claim

will be supported some time later, those promises are

naked ones. Because the plaintiffs have not adequately

shown that the case against the Sanders estate is likely

to survive with further opportunity for discovery, there

seems to be no reasonable possibility that the claim will

have merit and the court must conclude that the estate

has been fraudulently joined.

While the court finds fraudulent joinder on the basis

of the claim lacking plausible merit and not being

reasonably likely to become meritorious after further

discovery, it is worth noting that there are additional

circumstances supporting the fraudulent joinder finding.

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 16 of 30
6. In their brief, the plaintiffs erroneously stated

that Sanders “has liability insurance.” Pls.’ Reply Br.

(Doc. No. 21) at 13 n.8. The undisputed evidence in the

(continued...)

17

For one, even if one were to assume a declaration of

liability against the estate may be obtained, it seems

that recovery of monetary compensation, which is what the

plaintiffs ostensibly seek in this lawsuit, is a complete

impossibility. The administratrix for the Sanders estate

testified that the estate currently has no assets. See

Smith Dep. (Doc. No. 1-15) at 18:1-19:18. Although the

estate has filed a crossclaim against Cooper Tire which

may have merit, even if that claim results in recovery,

the funds the estate receives will pass directly to

Sanders’s heirs and will not be recoverable by the

plaintiffs. See Steele v. Steele, 623 So. 2d 1140, 1141

(Ala. 1993) (“[D]amages awarded pursuant to [the Alabama

Wrongful Death Act] are distributed according to the

statute of distribution and are not part of the

decedent’s estate.”). Sanders did not have any insurance

that may pay out claims against her.6

 In short, there is

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 17 of 30
6(...continued)

record actually shows that Sanders was completely

uninsured at the time of the accident. First Acceptance

Records (Doc. No. 25-3); see also Smith’s Initial

Disclosures (Doc. No. 25-2) at 5 (disclosing lack of

insurance). That the plaintiffs were unaware of that

after a year of discovery is telling.

18

nothing in the record indicating that the plaintiffs

could in any way recover from the Sanders estate. The

plaintiffs do not argue otherwise, apparently conceding

that doing so is impossible. While the inability to

recover is by itself not enough to find fraudulent

joinder, it nevertheless buttresses the fraudulent

joinder finding the court has already made. See Myers v.

Air Serv Corp., 2008 WL 149136, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 9,

2008) (Kelley, J.) (“A defendant's inability to pay a

judgment, without more, does not render his joinder

fraudulent.... [T]he crucial question pertains to the

likelihood of liability, not the likely success of

collection efforts.”).

Second, there is no evidence in the record that the

plaintiffs have pursued any discovery against the estate,

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19

although they have had a year to do so. During Cooper

Tire’s deposition of the estate’s administratrix, the

plaintiffs did not ask a single question even though the

prior questioning did not touch upon the ability of the

estate to pay a judgment. If the plaintiffs were truly

seeking recovery from the estate, it stands to reason

that they would have pursued discovery on that topic.

The record reveals no indication that they had.

Third, there is a legal dispute in this case that

seems to be probative, that is, whether Alabama’s socalled “guest statute” (1975 Ala. Code. § 32-1-2) should

apply here. Under that statute, speaking generally, a

person offering a ride to another without payment

therefor cannot be held liable for injuries the guest

incurs in an accident unless a very high legal standard

is met. See, e.g., Coffey v. Moore, 948 So. 2d 544 (Ala.

2006) (discussing the statute). If the statute applies

in this case, it is very unlikely that the estate will be

held liable. (And it would also increase the chance of

this court finding that the estate was fraudulently

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20

joined, as it would mean that the plaintiffs brought a

claim with a very unlikely chance of success.) On the

other hand, if the statute does not apply, ordinary

negligence law principles do instead, and there is a far

greater possibility that the estate could be declared

liable. (And a corresponding lesser chance of this court

finding fraudulent joinder, as the claim would appear

more likely to have potential merit.)

It is unnecessary to recount the various legal

arguments for whether the guest statute should apply or

not, as the answer is besides the point at this stage.

See Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538 (“[T]he jurisdictional

inquiry must not subsume substantive determination.”).

For the reasons already explained, regardless of which

legal standard applies, the evidence in the record shows

that their claim is meritless either way. Instead, the

point is this: Although the argument that the guest

statute should apply is at least colorable, the defendant

estate, on the contrary, has taken and argued the same

position as the plaintiffs, that the guest statute does

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21

not apply and the estate should be open to liability.

The estate has gone further even, arguing that, under the

standing doctrine, Cooper Tire cannot invoke the defense

on the estate’s behalf when the estate chooses not to.

It is not often that a plaintiff and a defendant coalesce

to jointly argue for the defendant’s exposure to

liability. This evidence of collusion between the

plaintiffs and the Sanders estate further establishes

that the claim between them is, at best, a sham.

In sum, the plaintiffs themselves, as opposed to

their lawyers, do not understand why they have sued the

estate of their family member and one plaintiff was

surprised to learn that she had; after a full year of

discovery, the plaintiffs have not yet identified any

admissible evidence supporting the claim their lawyers

asserted on their behalf against the estate; the only

relevant and admissible evidence in the record indicates

that the claim is most likely meritless; there has been

no reasonable showing that the plaintiffs will uncover

actual supporting evidence later; the plaintiffs seem to

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22

have never bothered to look into whether actual recovery

from the estate is a possibility and they now do not

challenge the conclusion that recovery is impossible;

and, finally, the estate’s conduct in this litigation

raises suspicions about possible collusion with the

plaintiffs to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The lack of

plausible merit alone is enough to find fraudulent

joinder, but here, in light of those other circumstances,

the conclusion is obvious; deciding otherwise would

require this court to “suspend reality” and “shelve

common sense.” Roe v. Michelin North America, Inc., 613

F.3d 1058, 1062 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Roe v. Michelin

N. Am., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999 (M.D. Ala. 2009)

(Thompson, J.)).

Although the Sanders estate has been fraudulently

joined, the court will not dismiss the estate from the

case. That is because the estate has asserted a

crossclaim against Cooper Tire. Rather than dismissal,

it is more appropriate here to realign the parties so

that the estate is named as a plaintiff and may, like the

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 22 of 30
other plaintiffs, pursue the products-defect claim

against Cooper Tire. See City of Vestavia Hills v.

General Fidelity Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313-14 (11th

Cir. 2012) (“[P]arties cannot avoid diversity by their

designation of the parties.... [I]t is the duty of the

lower federal courts to look beyond the pleadings and

arrange the parties according to their sides in the

dispute.”) (punctuation, emphasis, and citation omitted).

B. Robert Simmons

Again, the court will determine whether “there is [a]

possibility that the plaintiff[s] can prove a cause of

action against” Simmons. Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287.

Here, the plaintiffs charge that Simmons, who sold Carter

the car involved in this case and provided subsequent

maintenance, negligently failed to identify a defect in

the tire or other dangerous condition of some sort when

he should have done so. Before the court is evidence

that Simmons, as alleged, sold Carter the car and

subsequently provided certain maintenance. It has also

been shown that, during the maintenance, he completely

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24

omitted examining the tire that is alleged to have been

defective. What has not been shown, however, is that,

even if Simmons had examined the tire in question, there

would have been some reasonable possibility of his

identifying a defect or other dangerous condition. Under

basic principles of negligence law, if the danger in

question was not reasonably identifiable, no liability

will be imposed on a person who failed to find it. Cf.

Tucker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 89 So. 3d 795, 801 (Ala.

2012) (“[A] customer asserting delinquent inspection on

the part of a storekeeper must still prove that the

foreign substance was on the floor for a sufficient

period of time that an adequate inspection would have

discovered it.”). Whether the alleged danger in question

is one that Simmons should have been expected to find

with due care cannot be discerned from the record before

this court. In fact, the record contains entirely no

evidence about the sort of defect or other dangerous

condition the tire is alleged to have had. If not a

defect in the tire itself, the record contains no

Case 2:13-cv-00156-MHT-SRW Document 51 Filed 07/25/13 Page 24 of 30
7. Cooper Tire made this lack-of-evidence argument

only briefly, see Def.’s Resp. Br. (Doc. No. 20) at 8,

instead focusing the bulk of its briefing on whether

Simmons had a legal duty to inspect all four tires on the

car or whether his duty was more limited to only the

single tire Carter had asked him to inspect (which was

different from the one the plaintiffs now contend was

defective). That legal dispute, however, misses the more

important issue: whether, had Simmons examined the tire

in question (regardless of whether he had a legal duty to

do so), he could have reasonably discovered any defect or

other problem. If there is no evidence that he

reasonably could have discovered anything wrong with the

tire, the claim lacks merit under state law regardless of

whether he had a legal duty to examine the tire or not.

25

evidence as to what it is that Simmons should have

uncovered but failed to. There is, in short, no actual

evidence of what Simmons did wrong, and without such

evidence, the claim lacks plausible merit.7

In response, the plaintiffs state only that they

“have not had an opportunity to depose Mr. Simmons,”

implying that such a deposition may result in material

evidence to support the negligence claim, and, therefore,

there is “a possibility of recovery” against him. Pls.’

Reply Br. (Doc. No. 21) at 15-17. Again, the plaintiffs

do not make a reasonable showing that further discovery

is likely to change anything. Once again, the promise of

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8. In fact, the court is having difficulty

discerning what the theory of recovery against Simmons

actually is. After this court first stated its

understanding that the plaintiffs were charging Simmons

with failing to identify a defect in the tire that Cooper

Tire was responsible for through negligent manufacturing

or design practices, the plaintiffs rebuffed the court,

stating that, “Plaintiffs allege that Simmons should have

inspected for any dangerous condition.” Pls.’ Br. (Doc.

No. 30) at 9 (emphasis in original). Notably, the

plaintiffs still do not explain what sort of dangerous

condition Simmons was supposed to have found. It is

telling that at this late stage in the litigation, the

plaintiffs speak in utter generalities and cannot

articulate with clarity the claim they are pursuing, let

alone provide the court with supporting evidence. That

is itself probative of fraudulent joinder.

26

future evidentiary support is a naked one made without

any details as to what the plaintiffs think they will

uncover. After a full year of discovery and in the final

weeks before trial, that is not enough.8

 In short, the

plaintiffs have failed to show that the claim against

Simmons has plausible merit, and therefore, the court

must conclude that Simmons has been fraudulently joined.

Additionally, there are other reasons to find that

Simmons has been fraudulently joined. Once again,

although the plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that there is a

potential claim against Simmons, all of the plaintiffs

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themselves have stated unequivocally that they do not

personally believe that Simmons committed any wrongdoing.

Their deposition testimony regarding Simmons was similar

to their testimony regarding the Sanders estate. When

asked if she knew anything that Simmons “did wrong in

this, leading up to the accident,” Boyd answered, “No.”

Boyd Dep. (Doc. No. 1-12) at 62:5-10. At the time of her

deposition, she was not even aware that she had sued

Simmons. Id. at 61:12-16. Asked if she knew “any

reasons why [she] would sue Simmons,” she said that she

did not. Id. at 62:13-18. Similarly, when asked what

she thinks Simmons “did wrong,” Fletcher answered,

“Nothing.” K. Fletcher Dep. (Doc. No. 1-13) at 92:17-

93:2. Finally, the administratrix for Carter’s estate

was aware that she had sued Simmons, but she did not know

why. D. Fletcher Dep. (Doc. No. 1-14) at 39:25-40:7.

The administratrix did not know of anything Simmons “did

wrong.” Id. at 40:8-16. She sued Simmons only “[a]t the

direction of [her] attorney.” Id. Again, the record

reflects that attorneys for the plaintiffs have caused

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their clients to sue a person the plaintiffs have no

personal interest in suing.

Finally, there is one additional issue that warrants

mention although it does not factor into the court’s

fraudulent joinder analysis: According to Simmons, after

this lawsuit was filed, the administratrix for Carter’s

estate approached him after church, said, “I’m sorry but

I’m not really after you, I’m after Cooper Tire,” and she

then hugged him. Simmons Decl. (Doc. No. 1-16). The

administratrix, through an affidavit submitted by her

attorneys, disputes that this occurred. As the matter is

disputed, the court accepts the plaintiff’s version that

no such thing occurred, but nevertheless thinks, given

the other circumstances of this case, that the allegation

warrants passing mention.

In sum, there is insufficient evidence in the record

to establish that the claim against Simmons has even

plausible merit. It is apparent that Simmons was named

as a defendant in this lawsuit solely for the purpose of

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destroying Cooper Tire’s right to have this case

litigated in federal court. Simmons will be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Although proving fraudulent joinder requires a heavy

burden to be satisfied and the court must err on the side

of remand, this is the case in which the burden has been

met. The record here shows that the claims against the

Sanders estate and Simmons are, in basic terms, not ‘for

real’ and that these two defendants have been

fraudulently joined. To conclude otherwise in the face

of the above-recounted overwhelming evidence would

require this court to close its eyes to the obvious.

While the fraudulent joinder standard is high, it is not

so high as to require the court to ignore reality.

Accordingly, this court will retain jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1332 over the real dispute in this lawsuit: the

claims of the plaintiffs and the Sanders estate, all

citizens of Alabama, against Cooper Tire, a citizen of

Delaware and Ohio.

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***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) The motion to remand (Doc. No. 14) filed by

plaintiffs administratrix of the estate of Frank Carter,

Kwamika Fletcher, and Rosita Boyd is denied.

(2) Defendant Robert Simmons (d/b/a Simmons Used

Cars) is dismissed and terminated as a party.

(3) Defendant estate of Tara Denita Sanders is

realigned as a plaintiff.

DONE, this the 25th day of July, 2013.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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