Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00316/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00316-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

CAREY DALE GRAYSON, 

DEMETRIUS FRAZIER, 

DAVID LEE ROBERTS, 

ROBIN DION MYERS, and 

GREGORY HUNT, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, et al., 

 Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

 CASE NOS. 2:12-CV-0316-WKW 

 2:13-CV-0781-WKW 

 2:14-CV-1028-WKW 

 2:14-CV-1029-WKW 

 2:14-CV-1030-WKW 

 

and 

CHARLES LEE BURTON, ) 

ROBERT BRYANT MELSON, ) 

RONALD BERT SMITH, ) 

GEOFFREY TODD WEST, ) 

TORREY TWANE MCNABB, ) CASE NOS. 2:16-CV-0267-WKW 

 ) 2:16-CV-0268-WKW 

 Plaintiffs, ) 2:16-CV-0269-WKW 

 ) 2:16-CV-0270-WKW 

v. ) 2:16-CV-0284-WKW 

 ) 

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

Case 2:12-cv-00316-WKW-CSC Document 192 Filed 10/31/16 Page 1 of 29
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Carey Dale Grayson, Demetrius Frazier, David Lee Roberts, Robin 

Dion Myers, and Gregory Hunt are Alabama death-row inmates who have been 

committed to the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) 

awaiting their presently unscheduled executions. They each filed separate actions 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of Alabama’s method-ofexecution under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because 

these actions involve common questions of fact and law, on September 5, 2015, the 

court consolidated these five cases for discovery and trial in order to promote judicial 

economy, eliminate duplication of discovery, and avoid unnecessary costs. (See 

Doc. # 59.) 

 This matter is before the court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

on Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims. (Doc. # 127.) The motion has been fully 

briefed and is ripe for review. Defendants’ motion is due to be granted. 

A. Plaintiffs’ Capital Litigation History 

Plaintiffs Grayson, Frazier, Roberts, Myers, and Hunt all have been convicted 

of capital murder and sentenced to death. Grayson was convicted of capital murder 

for the February 1994 death of Vickie Deblieux committed during a kidnapping in 

the first degree. Grayson v. State, 824 So. 2d 804 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). In 

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October 1996, Frazier was convicted of capital murder of Pauline Brown. Frazier 

v. State, 758 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Ex parte Frazier, 758 So. 2d 611 

(Ala. 1999). In December 1992, Roberts was convicted on two counts of capital 

murder for the death of Annetra Jones, for murder committed during the commission 

of a robbery and arson. Roberts v. State, 735 So. 2d 1244, 1269 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1997). In January 1994, Myers was convicted on two counts of capital murder for 

the death of Ludie Mae Tucker because the murder occurred during the commission 

of a robbery and burglary. Myers v. State, 699 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). 

In June 1990, Hunt was convicted on a three-count indictment for the capital murder 

of Karen Lane, committed during sexual abuse in the first degree and burglary in the 

first degree. Hunt v. State, 659 So. 2d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); Ex Parte Hunt, 

659 So. 2d 960 (Ala. 1995). 

 Plaintiffs’ direct appeals concluded many years ago,1

 and their state postconviction and federal habeas proceedings have also been concluded for at least 

three years.2

 

                                                             1

 Grayson’s direct appeal ended in 2002. Grayson v. Alabama, 537 U.S. 842 (2002). 

Frazier’s direct appeal concluded in 2000. Frazier v. Alabama, 531 U.S. 843 (2000). Roberts’s 

direct appeal ended in 1999. Roberts v. Alabama, 528 U.S. 939 (1999) (table). Myers’s direct 

appeal ended in 1998. Myers v. Alabama, 522 U.S. 1054 (1998). Hunt’s direct appeal ended in 

1995. Hunt v. Alabama, 516 U.S. 880 (1995). 

2

 Grayson v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 124 (2011); Frazier v. Thomas, No. 11-10111 (S. Ct. Oct. 

1, 2012); Roberts v. Thomas, 133 S. Ct. 949 (2013); Myers v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 2771 (2012); 

Hunt v. Thomas, 133 S. Ct. 611 (2012). 

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B. Formation and Chronology of the Midazolam Litigation 

 From 2002 until 2011, sodium thiopental was the first drug used in the 

ADOC’s three-drug, lethal injection protocol. In 2011, the ADOC amended its 

protocol by substituting pentobarbital for sodium thiopental as the first drug. At that 

time, the ADOC made no amendment to the other two drugs administered, 

pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. 

 In April 2012, Grayson filed a § 1983 complaint challenging the ADOC’s 

substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental, alleging an Eighth Amendment 

violation. In October 2013, Frazier filed a similar § 1983 complaint challenging the 

ADOC’s substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental, also alleging an Eighth 

Amendment violation. 

 On September 10, 2014, the ADOC amended its execution protocol again, this 

time by substituting midazolam for pentobarbital as the first drug used in its threedrug, lethal-injection sequence, and by substituting rocuronium bromide for 

pancuronium bromide as the second drug. On September 11, 2014, the State 

disclosed the ADOC’s amended protocol in motions the State filed in the Alabama 

Supreme Court to set execution dates for several death-row inmates. (Doc. # 160-1, 

¶¶ 24–28.) 

 In October 2014, Plaintiffs Roberts, Myers, and Hunt filed separate § 1983 

lawsuits challenging the ADOC’s amended lethal-injection protocol employing 

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midazolam instead of pentobarbital, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation.3 

Subsequently, in January 2015, Frazier amended his complaint to challenge the 

ADOC’s substitution of midazolam for pentobarbital, and in March 2015, Grayson 

followed suit, amending his complaint to challenge the ADOC’s substitution of 

midazolam for pentobarbital. 

 In June 2015, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Glossip v. Gross, 

135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), and applied the Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S. 

35 (2008), to Oklahoma’s lethal-injection protocol (which is virtually identical to 

Alabama’s protocol) and held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of 

success on the merits of their claim that the use of midazolam violated the Eighth 

Amendment. Post-Glossip, the lawsuits filed by Roberts, Myers, and Hunt were 

consolidated with the pending lawsuits of Grayson and Frazier to form what the 

court has termed the “Midazolam Litigation,” with the Grayson case (12-cv-316), 

the first-filed of these five cases, designated as the lead case. (Doc. # 59.) 

Following the close of discovery in the consolidated case, in compliance with the 

dispositive motions deadline established in the scheduling order (Doc. # 67), 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims. 

(Doc. # 127.) 

                                                             3

 These Plaintiffs did not challenge the ADOC’s amendment of the protocol substituting 

pancuronium bromide for rocuronium bromide, the second drug in the sequence. 

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C. Plaintiffs’ Claims 

 Plaintiffs’ amended complaints all assert identical Eighth Amendment claims 

challenging the ADOC’s current execution protocol, alleging that the ADOC’s use 

of midazolam, the first drug to be administered, is unconstitutional.4

 Specifically, 

Plaintiffs assert that midazolam will not properly anesthetize them so as to prevent 

them from feeling an unconstitutional level of pain associated with the injection of 

potassium chloride, the third drug. On this premise, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ 

current execution protocol creates a “substantial risk of serious harm,” Baze v. Rees, 

553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (plurality opinion), and violates their right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. Instead of the use of midazolam in a three-drug lethal injection 

protocol, Plaintiffs propose three alternative methods of execution, using either 

pentobarbital, sodium thiopental, or a 500-milligram dose of midazolam in a onedrug lethal injection protocol. 

                                                             4

 Grayson also asserts an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, 

alleging that Defendants do not always perform all three steps of the consciousness assessment in 

the execution protocol. Defendants have not challenged this claim with a dispositive motion. The 

other four Plaintiffs did not raise a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Eighth 

Amendment Claims 

 

Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

Eighth Amendment claims because Plaintiffs cannot establish the second prong of 

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), viz., the existence of a known and available 

alternative method of execution that is “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact 

significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. 

Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015). Defendants assert that the evidence garnered in discovery 

unequivocally shows that there is no genuine dispute that two of Plaintiffs’ proposed 

alternatives—one-drug protocols using either compounded pentobarbital or sodium 

thiopental—are unavailable to the ADOC, and that Plaintiffs’ own evidence 

contradicts a 500-milligram dose of midazolam as the sole agent of execution. 

Defendants also point out that Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence of a single 

source for either compounded pentobarbital or sodium thiopental that is willing and 

able to provide either drug to the ADOC, and that Plaintiffs have also failed to 

produce any admissible evidence that a one-drug midazolam protocol would 

significantly reduce any alleged risk of severe pain from “[t]he three-drug protocol 

approved in Glossip . . . the very same protocol that [Plaintiffs] challenge[] here.” 

See Brooks v. Warden, 810 F.3d 812, 818 (11th Cir. 2016). 

 

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 1. Standard of Review

 Summary judgment is proper only when the record evidence, including 

depositions, affidavits, and other materials, shows “that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). “The 

moving party bears the burden of proof,” Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 

495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007), and the court must “view the evidence and all 

factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and 

resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant,” Skop v. 

City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1143 (11th Cir. 2007). 

2. Standard for Establishing a § 1983 Method-of-Execution Claim

 Summarizing the Baze/Glossip test, to successfully challenge a method of 

execution, a prisoner must establish that the method presents a risk that is ‘“sure or 

very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ and give rise to 

‘sufficiently imminent dangers.”’ Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737 (emphasis in original). 

To prevail, “there must be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively 

intolerable risk of harm’ that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were 

‘subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’” Id. 

 Further, a prisoner “cannot successfully challenge a State’s method of 

execution merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative.” Baze, 553 

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U. S. at 51. The prisoner “must identify an alternative that is ‘feasible, readily 

implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.’” 

Id. at 52. In short, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must point to admissible 

evidence that would, if credited, establish a risk and a known and available 

alternative method of execution that significantly reduces that risk. 

 Plaintiffs have proposed alternative, one-drug protocols using either 

compounded pentobarbital, sodium thiopental, or midazolam. The evidence as to 

the availability or efficacy of each of these drugs is reviewed below. 

 a. Alternative #1 – Pentobarbital/Compounded Pentobarbital 

 Plaintiffs claim that since January 1, 2014, nearly forty executions have been 

performed nationwide “using a single large dose of pentobarbital, making it the most 

common method of execution in the United States” (Doc. # 48 at 16), and that several 

states, including Colorado, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, 

Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Texas “have used or intend to use compounded

pentobarbital for executions.” (Doc. # 48 at 17.) 

 In recent years, commercially manufactured pentobarbital has become 

unavailable to states’ departments of corrections for use in lethal-injection 

executions in the United States. In a similar § 1983 method-of-execution case 

containing an Eighth Amendment claim virtually identical to Plaintiffs’ Eighth 

Amendment claims, this court found that the ADOC’s supply of commercially 

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manufactured pentobarbital, Nembutal®, expired around November 2013. See 

Arthur v. Dunn, No. 2:11-cv-0438-WKW (M.D. Ala. Apr. 15, 2016) (Doc. # 359 at 

17, ¶ 1). Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative concerns “compounded pentobarbital” 

rather than Nembutal®, the commercially manufactured pentobarbital. 

 Plaintiffs support their claim that compounded pentobarbital is a viable 

alternative with the report and testimony from their expert, Deborah L. Elder, 

Pharm.D.5

 Dr. Elder is a registered pharmacist in the State of Georgia, is certified 

in compounding (Doc. # 127-6 at 1), and is a Clinical Associate Professor in the 

Pharmaceutical and Biomedical Department in the College of Pharmacy at the 

University of Georgia (UGA). She has been on the faculty of UGA’s College of 

Pharmacy since 2002. (Elder Dep. 80: 8-10.) 

Plaintiffs retained Dr. Elder to opine on the practicality of “the procedure for 

compounding pentobarbital using individual ingredients” that would be equivalent 

to commercially manufactured pentobarbital. (Elder Dep. 15:13-22.) Plaintiffs did 

not ask Dr. Elder to address whether compounded pentobarbital is available to the 

ADOC. (Elder Dep. 16:19-23.) Dr. Elder’s report describes the regulations 

governing the compounding of pentobarbital sodium.6

 (Doc. # 127-6 at 2-4.) The 

                                                             5

 As discussed infra, Plaintiffs also rely on Dr. Elder to support their claim that sodium 

thiopental is an available alternative. 

 

 6

 Sodium pentobarbital is the active pharmaceutical ingredient in compounded 

pentobarbital. See Arthur v. Dunn, No. 2:11-cv-0438-WKW (M.D. Ala. Apr. 15, 2016) (Doc. 

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report also includes the formula and outlines the procedure for producing 

compounded pentobarbital from pentobarbital sodium. (Doc. # 127-6 at 4-5). Dr. 

Elder performed internet searches and attached to her report printouts from the 

websites of two pharmaceutical companies that listed pentobarbital sodium for sale. 

(Doc. # 127-7.) However, Dr. Elder provided no evidence that either of these 

companies actually had pentobarbital sodium available for sale on-line that could be 

shipped to an unknown compounding pharmacist. In fact, these printouts from the 

websites state that there are sales restrictions on the distribution of sodium 

pentobarbital7

 Id. Dr. Elder sent an e-mail to Sigma-Aldrich to inquire about the 

availability of pentobarbital sodium (Doc. # 127-8), but there is no evidence that she 

received a response to this e-mail.8

 

 Dr. Elder also made a telephone call to Sigma-Aldrich’s Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) schedule department to ask what was required to comply with 

the screening process for the purchase of sodium thiopental and pentobarbital 

sodium. (Elder Dep. 69:12 – 70:4.) Dr. Elder was advised that the purchase of either 

                                                            

# 359 at 17, ¶ 4). 

7

 The TOCRIS printout states: “This product is a DEA controlled substance and is not 

available for purchase online. Please inquire to place your order.” (Doc. # 127-7.) Similarly, the 

Sigma-Aldrich printout states: “Sales restrictions may apply.” Id. 

 8

 When deposed, Dr. Elder stated that she believed Sigma-Aldrich did respond to her 

December 28, 2015 e-mail, and that she believed she had provided that response to Plaintiffs’ 

counsel. (Elder Dep. 65:6-13.) However, if Sigma-Aldrich responded to Dr. Elder’s December 

28 e-mail, it is not of record. 

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of these drugs requires a valid DEA license and that pentobarbital sodium also 

requires completion of a DEA 222 form. (Elder Dep. 70:9-13.) Dr. Elder was also 

informed that generally, Sigma-Aldrich’s products are used for research and 

development purposes9

 and that the DEA compliance department requires the 

completion of a form stating how the product is to be used. (Elder Dep. 70:14 – 

71:16.) As of the date of Dr. Elder’s deposition, April 5, 2016, pentobarbital sodium 

was backordered, but might be available within thirty days. (Elder Dep. 71:19-21.) 

 Plaintiffs’ proof that compounded pentobarbital is available to the ADOC falls 

short. Plaintiffs’ statements that since January 1, 2014, nearly forty executions have 

been performed “using a single large dose of pentobarbital,” and that ten states “have 

used or intend to use compounded pentobarbital for executions” (Doc. # 48 at 16-

17), are inconsequential. “[T]he fact that the drug was available in those states at 

some point over the past two years does not, without more, make it likely that it is 

available to Alabama now.” Brooks v. Warden, 810 F.3d 812, 819 (11th Cir. 2016). 

It is undisputed that in 2015, only four states – Georgia, Missouri, Texas, and 

Virginia10 – were able to perform executions using compounded pentobarbital. See 

                                                             9

 The person to whom Dr. Elder spoke opined that Sigma-Aldrich products were to be 

used only for research and development purposes, but because this person did not work in the DEA 

compliance department, she could not be certain of that statement. (Elder Dep. 70:25 – 71:4.) 

10 Virginia was unable to obtain compounded pentobarbital from its traditional suppliers, 

and was only able to carry out the execution because the Texas Department of Criminal Justice 

supplied Virginia with three vials of pentobarbital. See Prieto v. Clarke, No. 3:15-cv-587-HEH 

(E.D. Va. October 1, 2015) (Doc. # 19 therein, Memorandum Opinion at 3). 

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Anne Adams Hill testimony in Arthur v. Dunn, No. 2:11-cv-0438-WKW (M.D. Ala. 

Jan. 12, 2016) (Doc. # 348 at 4). 

 Dr. Elder did not identify any pharmacist or supplier who could provide 

compounded pentobarbital to the ADOC. Neither Dr. Elder’s report nor her 

testimony establishes that compounded pentobarbital is available to the ADOC. 

Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that compounded 

pentobarbital is a feasible alternative. 

 Defendants support their summary judgment motion with the testimony of 

Anne Adams Hill at the trial in Arthur v. Dunn, No. 2:11-cv-438 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 12, 

2016) (Doc. # 348). Defendants rebutted Arthur’s allegation that compounded 

pentobarbital was an available alternative with Hill’s testimony. Hill, the ADOC’s 

general counsel since March of 2011, testified as the ADOC’s party representative. 

She was aware that in 2015, Georgia, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia performed 

executions using compounded pentobarbital. (Arthur Trial Tr. vol. 1, 98.) Hill 

testified that, in her recent efforts to obtain compounded pentobarbital for the 

ADOC’s use in executions, she had contacted the departments of corrections in at 

least those four states. (Arthur Trial Tr. vol. 1, Doc. # 349 at 106.) 

 Elaborating, Hill testified that, as part of her job duties, she is routinely in 

contact with other departments of corrections on a variety of issues, including the 

subject of lethal injection generally, the availability of compounded pentobarbital, 

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and, in those states that have been able to obtain compounded pentobarbital, their 

willingness either to provide it to the ADOC or to provide their source to the ADOC. 

(Arthur Trial Tr. vol. 1, Doc. # 349 at 107.) She reiterated that she has had these 

similar, ongoing, conversations not just recently, but “for some time.” (Arthur Trial 

Tr. vol. 1, Doc. # 349 at 109.) 

 In her quest to find a source for compounded pentobarbital, Hill has also 

contacted all eighteen accredited compounding pharmacies in Alabama, but her 

efforts were to no avail. “[N]one of the 18 were able to provide the Department of 

Corrections with compounded pentobarbital.” (Arthur Trial Tr. vol. 1, Doc. # 349 at 

149.) In all, she has contacted at least twenty-nine potential sources to inquire about 

obtaining compounded pentobarbital, and all of those efforts failed. (Arthur Trial 

Tr. vol. 1, Doc. # 349 at 158.) 

 The court credited Hill’s testimony and made the following findings of fact 

concerning pentobarbital and compounded pentobarbital: 

8. The ADOC has attempted to obtain compounded pentobarbital 

for use in executions from departments of corrections in at least 

four states, Georgia, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia, but those 

efforts were unsuccessful. 

9. The ADOC has contacted all of the accredited compounding 

pharmacies in Alabama to ascertain whether any of these 

pharmacies would be willing and able to provide compounded 

pentobarbital to the ADOC, but those efforts have been 

unsuccessful. 

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10. Pentobarbital is not feasible and readily implemented as an 

execution drug in Alabama, nor is it readily available to the ADOC, 

either compounded or commercially. 

See Arthur v. Dunn, No. 2:11-cv-438 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 15, 2016) (Doc. # 359 at 18-

19.) 

 Plaintiffs’ evidence obtained after Hill’s testimony in the Arthur trial in 

January 2016, fails to establish that compounded pentobarbital has since become 

available to the ADOC. Dr. Elder’s report and testimony obtained on April 5, 2016, 

did not demonstrate that pentobarbital, either compounded or commercially 

manufactured, is available to the ADOC. Further, testimony from Plaintiffs’ expert 

anesthesiologist, Michael A. Forelich, M.D., M.S., obtained on March 23, 2016, is 

consistent with the court’s finding in Arthur concerning the unavailability of 

pentobarbital in any form to the ADOC. Dr. Forelich testified that pentobarbital is 

unavailable in his clinical practice. (Forelich Dep. 116:20 – 117:8.) The court’s 

earlier finding in Arthur that pentobarbital, either compounded or commercially 

manufactured, is not readily available to the ADOC is unchanged by the additional 

evidence offered in this case. 

 b. Alternative #2 – Sodium Thiopental 

 Although sodium thiopental has not been used in the ADOC’s protocol since 

April 2011, Plaintiffs claim that it is an alternative for use in a single-drug protocol. 

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To support this claim, Plaintiffs rely on a May 2015 news article reporting that “the 

Nebraska Department of Corrections claims that it can obtain sodium thiopental to 

use in its protocol, and do so legally.” (Doc. # 48 at 18.) However, Plaintiffs 

acknowledge that sodium thiopental is no longer made by any commercial drug 

manufacturer in the United States, but assert that sodium thiopental could be made 

by a compounding pharmacist or molecular chemist. (Doc. # 127-3 at 1-2.) 

Plaintiffs also state that there is no blanket prohibition per se on importing sodium 

thiopental, “if appropriate laws are followed.” (Doc. # 127-3 at 2.) Plaintiffs 

acknowledge that no other State has performed an execution using a one-drug 

sodium thiopental protocol. Id.

 As with pentobarbital, Plaintiffs rely on Dr. Elder to support their claim that 

sodium thiopental is a viable alternative for use in a one-drug protocol. However, 

Dr. Elder’s five-page report focuses almost exclusively on sodium pentobarbital and 

compounded pentobarbital. Dr. Elder’s attention to sodium thiopental is confined 

to the following note at the conclusion of her report: 

NOTE: Thiopental is a logical substitute to sodium pentobarbital. 

This agent is available through suppliers in the United States (U.S.) 

and India. The U.S. supplier lists availability with shipping date 

ranges of 2/11/16 to 3/11/16 and costs of $17.00 – 52.00 per 10 mg. 

Larger quantities are available by request. 

(Doc. # 127-6 at 5.) 

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 Dr. Eldertestified that, although she had provided printouts from the websites 

of suppliers in India and the United States concerning sodium thiopental, she did not 

contact these companies directly to inquire about the availability of sodium 

thiopental, nor did she inquire about sales restrictions on this product. (Elder Dep. 

50:18 – 51:8, 57:9 – 58:22.) She also testified that she was “not aware of any of it 

being used right now” in clinical settings. (Elder Dep. 51:9-15.) Similar to 

pentobarbital, Dr. Elder testified that, when she called the company whose website 

listed sodium thiopental as a product for sale, she was informed that it was limited 

to research and development use and that a request to purchase the drug for other 

purposes would likely be denied. (Id. at 70:5 – 71:16.) In any event, Dr. Elder 

admitted that one of the internet printouts for sodium thiopental indicated that the 

product was discontinued, and that she did not contact the company to determine 

how much, if any, of the drug remained in stock. (Id. at 73:21 – 74:15.) Dr. Elder 

contradicts her own testimony that sodium thiopental is “available.” 

 In considering the availability of sodium thiopental to the ADOC, the court 

takes judicial notice of a publication by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA) known as the FDA Orange Book, which contains a list of all approved drugs 

in the United States. At the Arthur trial in January 2016, the court heard testimony 

from Arthur’s expert, Gaylen M. Zentner, Ph.D., that sodium thiopental is no longer 

listed in the FDA Orange Book, meaning that it is not available legally in the United 

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States. See Arthur v. Dunn, No. 2:11-cv-0438-WKW (M.D. Ala. Apr. 15, 2016) 

(Doc. # 359 at 14.) The court found Zentner’s testimony to be credible, id., and 

made the following findings of fact concerning sodium thiopental: 

11. Per the FDA Orange Book, sodium thiopental is no longer 

legally available in the United States. 

12. While sodium thiopental may be available from an overseas 

supplier and could conceivably be imported into the United States, 

such importation requires the approval of the FDA. There was no 

evidence at trial that any state’s department of corrections had 

obtained the FDA’s approval to import sodium thiopental for use in 

performing its executions. 

13. Sodium thiopental is unavailable to the ADOC for use in lethal 

injections. 

See Arthur v. Dunn, No. 2:11-cv-0438-WKW (Apr. 15, 2016) (Doc. # 359 at 19). 

 Plaintiffs have failed to present any credible evidence that, after sodium 

thiopental became illegal to manufacture commercially in the United States, any 

state has successfully obtained sodium thiopental for use in an execution. Plaintiffs 

point to a May 14, 2015 newspaper article reporting that the Nebraska Department 

of Corrections has obtained sodium thiopental to use in its protocol; however, a 

newspaper article is inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Hope 

For Families & Comm. Service, Inc. v. Warren, 721 F. Supp. 2d 1979, n.114 (M.D. 

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Ala. 2010); United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Moreover, that newspaper article is inconsequential old news.11 

 Further, given that sodium thiopental can no longer be manufactured legally 

in the United States, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that sodium thiopental has 

been imported lawfully for use in an execution. Plaintiffs’ proof of the availability 

of sodium thiopental is similar to the proof offered in the Arthur trial in January 

2016, in that Plaintiffs have only provided evidence that sodium thiopental may be 

available from an overseas supplier and could conceivably be imported into the 

United States, but only with the FDA’s approval. Plaintiffs have provided no 

evidence that any state’s department of corrections has obtained the FDA’s approval 

to import sodium thiopental for use in performing its executions. 

 In short, Plaintiffs’ evidence obtained after the Arthur trial in January 2016, 

fails to establish that sodium thiopental has since become available to the ADOC. 

Plaintiffs’ expert anesthesiologist, Michael A. Forelich, M.D., M.S., deposed on 

March 23, 2016, testified that sodium thiopental is unavailable in his clinical practice 

and that he has not used it for “maybe five years.” (Forelich Dep. 117:9-21.) This 

evidence is consistent with and confirms the court’s finding in Arthur that sodium 

thiopental is not readily available to the ADOC. 

                                                             11 The court takes judicial notice of the fact that on May 27, 2015, in passing LB 268, the 

Nebraska Legislature abolished the death penalty in Nebraska. (See

nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=25136 (last visited October 25, 2016). 

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 c. Alternative #3 – Midazolam 

 Plaintiffs’ third proposed alternative is a 500-mg dose of midazolam 

administered in a single-drug protocol. The basis for this proposal is the finding by 

a federal district court in Oklahoma that a 500-mg dose of midazolam alone would 

likely cause death in less than an hour.12 (Doc. # 48 at 18.) 

 Plaintiffs support this alternative with the report and testimony of Randall 

Tackett, Ph.D. Dr. Tackett, a pharmacologist and toxicologist, is a professor at the 

University of Georgia (UGA) College of Pharmacy in the Department of Clinical 

and Administrative Pharmacy. He has been on UGA’s faculty since 1981. (Doc. # 

145-5.) Dr. Tackett’s report concerns the pharmacology of midazolam. He 

concludes his report with the following statement: 

If midazolam was to be used as the sole agent for lethal injection, a 

loading dose between 2.5 and 3.75 g[rams] could be used followed 

by a continuous IV infusion until death. This would be preferable 

to repeated boluses of midazolam until death, as the bolus method 

would result in spikes and dips in concentration while the 

continuous infusion method would provide a continuous increase in 

the drug until death. This would be similar to the protocol 

mentioned above that is used for terminal sedation but would 

involve much higher doses which would result in death. Death due 

to midazolam has been attributed to respiratory depression and 

cardiac arrest. 

                                                             12 The finding to which Plaintiffs refer is the trial court’s finding made after a preliminary 

injunction hearing in Warner v. Gross, No. 5:14-cv-0665 (D. Okla. Dec. 19, 2014) (Doc. # 173 

therein). Warner was a challenge to Oklahoma’s three-drug protocol, which is similar to 

Alabama’s protocol. There, the court heard testimony from defendants’ expert, Dr. Roswell Lee 

Evans, that a 500-mg dose of midazolam will induce a coma. The trial court credited Dr. Evans’s 

testimony and found that a 500-mg dose of midazolam “alone would likely cause death by 

respiratory arrest within [thirty] minutes or an hour.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2736. 

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(Doc. # 145-5 at 3.) 

 When deposed, Dr. Tackett summarized his opinions concerning midazolam 

and the 500-mg dose, as follows: 

Q. Dr. Tackett, what are your conclusions in this case based on your 

report? 

A. Well, based on my report is that I do think that one is midazolam; 

its mechanism of action is pretty well known. I would say as far as 

my conclusions with this report is that midazolam does have a 

variability of response. I think that the recommended dose of 500 

milligrams is too low. I do not -- have not seen a good scientific 

explanation for how the 500 milligrams was arrived at. If 

midazolam is going to be used, I guess my conclusion is if that is 

the sole agent for lethal injection, then I would think I would use the 

one document which is in the published peer-reviewed literature that 

gives an estimate of the LD5013 that I would use that as the dose, 

and instead of an injection or multiple injections, I would use a 

continuous infusion as I indicated and carry that until death. 

(Tackett Dep. 20:7-24 (footnote and emphasis added).) 

 Dr. Tackett opined that a 500-mg dose of midazolam is too low, presumably 

to cause death. He testified that, if midazolam were used in a one-drug protocol, he 

would recommend a loading dose of between 2.5 and 3.75 grams, the equivalent of 

between 2500 and 3750 milligrams of midazolam, a dose five to eight times larger 

                                                             13 Explaining the term LD50, Dr. Tackett stated that it is a dose that is determined by giving 

different doses to groups of animals, usually rats or mice, to ultimately arrive at a dose that will 

kill 50 percent of the selected group of animals: “You give different groups different [dose] ranges 

and you can determine – usually 24 hours later you come back and see how many are alive and 

then you can calculate what would be the dose at which 50 percent of the animals were killed. 

That’s called the LD50.” (Tackett Dep. 80:12-21.) 

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than the 500-milligram dose Plaintiffs have pled as an alternative method of 

execution. Dr. Tackett also recommended that this loading dose should be followed 

by continuous infusion until death. (Id. at 80:22 – 81:15.) However, Dr. Tackett 

makes no recommendation as to the amount of midazolam to be administered in the 

continuous infusion stage and the rate of its administration. 

 The opinion of Plaintiffs’ own expert that a 500-mg dose of midazolam is too 

low refutes the feasibility of Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative, and there is no other 

scientific evidence of record to support this novel alternative. Dr. Tackett’s report 

and opinion fail to support, and in fact undermine, Plaintiffs’ claim that a 500-mg 

dose of midazolam in a one-drug protocol would result in significantly less risk of 

substantial pain than Alabama’s present protocol, as Glossip requires. Plaintiffs also 

have failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that a 500-mg dose of 

midazolam in a single-drug protocol is a feasible alternative that is readily 

implemented. 

 3. Summary of the Alternative Method Prong

 Post-Baze and Glossip, it is clear that before a prisoner is entitled to relief, he 

must also establish a remedy, that is, “the existence of a known and available 

alternative method of execution that would entail a significantly less severe risk.” 

Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737 (quoting Baze, 553 U. S. at 56-60). A challenge to a 

method of execution that merely shows “a slightly or marginally safer alternative,” 

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Baze, 553 U. S. at 51, fails to meet the remedy test. Further, “because it is settled 

that capital punishment is constitutional, it necessarily follows that there must be a 

constitutional means of carrying it out.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33 (quoting 

Baze, 553 U. S. at 47) (alteration omitted)). Moreover, “because some risk of pain 

is inherent in any method of execution[,] . . . the Constitution does not require the 

avoidance of all risk of pain.” Id. at 2733 (citation omitted). 

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of 

proof to survive summary judgment. To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on a singledrug protocol using pentobarbital/compounded pentobarbital or sodium thiopental, 

based on the evidence presented in Arthur v. Dunn, No. 2:11-cv-0438-WKW (M.D. 

Ala. Apr. 15, 2016) (Doc. # 359 at 17, 19), the court has previously found that neither 

pentobarbital/compounded pentobarbital nor sodium thiopental was available to the 

ADOC. The reports and opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Deborah L. Elder, Dr. 

Randall Tackett, and Dr. Michael Forelich, obtained post-Arthur, in no way render 

the court’s findings in Arthur inaccurate; in fact, this later-acquired evidence 

confirms the correctness of the findings in Arthur. As to Plaintiffs’ proposed 

alternative using a 500-mg bolus dose of midazolam, it is eviscerated by the opinion 

of their own expert, Dr. Tackett, who opined that a 500-mg dose is too low for a onedrug execution. (Tackett Dep. 20:7-24.) 

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4. Alternative Method Evidence: Hippocrates and Hypocrites 

The collision between the rulings of the United States Supreme Court and 

ethical rules for the medical profession provides no grounds for relief to Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs clearly bear the burden of proving a known and available alternative 

method of execution that significantly reduces the risk of substantial pain in 

execution (sometimes referred to by inmates as the “suicide burden.”). Grayson v. 

Dunn, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1349 (M.D. Ala. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Brooks v. 

Warden, 810 F.3d 812 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Brooks v. Dunn, 136 

S. Ct. 979 (2016). To the extent that burden encroaches upon the medical realm, it 

is not accidental, and injury that accrues to a party accrues to the party with the 

burden of proof. In what can only be described as an attack on the death penalty 

itself (which is legally impermissible in a last-ditch § 1983 action, see Hill v. 

McDonough, 547 U. S. 573 (2006)), death row inmates refuse to cooperate in 

making safe the means of their own death. This is a legal and practical judgment 

arrived at by weighing one’s own interests in survival. But that tactic is blocked by 

Glossip and Baze: “[T]hey argue that they need not identify a known and available 

method of execution that presents less risk. But that argument is inconsistent with 

the controlling opinion in Baze.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738. If an alternative 

method involves medical procedures, it is the burden of the inmate to prove them. 

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 The Hippocratic Oath is often interjected into the argument to say why 

medical personnel cannot opine on alternative methods of execution. But modern 

medicine has orphaned Hippocrates and his Oath, in the name of patient selfdetermination and choice, by countenancing medical procedures that the original 

Oath prohibited. For instance, the oldest version of the Oath says, “I will not give 

to a woman an abortive remedy.” Today, that provision is history, aborted by 

modern medical ethicists. Likewise, modern medical ethicists have found pure 

magic in unleashing the genies of physician-assisted suicide, medical marijuana, 

drug and alcohol use—even abuse—during pregnancy and without personal 

responsibility, all in the name of liberty, self-determination, and choice. So much 

for the Oath vis-à-vis modern ethics and ethicists. 

 The modern version of the Oath does contemplate the rare but not extinct 

potential of taking life: “If it is given me to save a life, all thanks. But it may also 

be within my power to take a life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with 

great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty. Above all, I must not play at 

God.” Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ 

body/hippocratic-oath-today.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (attributing the oath, 

revised in 1964, to Louis Lasagna, then-Academic Dean of the School of Medicine 

at Tufts University and noting that the revised oath is used in many medical schools 

today). 

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 Playing at Hippocrates and God in the same breath, the American Medical 

Association, which is opposed to human execution by any means (ironic, when the 

third leading cause of human death in the United States is medical error, at the rate 

of over 250,000 souls a year14 (compared to 35 executions a year on average since 

197615)), adopted Rule 9.7.3 which prohibits a physician from taking an “action” 

that would “assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of another individual to 

directly cause the death of the condemned,” including rendering technical advice 

regarding execution or consulting with or supervising lethal injection personnel. 

Rule 9.7.3(b), (i), (n). Death row inmates and their expert medical witnesses could 

reflect upon whether “action” prohibited by Rule 9.7.3 would include testifying 

hypothetically, or testifying generally on how chemicals act upon the human body 

when dosed in specific amounts, or opining that a detailed sequence of specific 

amounts of drugs would or would not cause human death, or that, hypothetically, a 

specific drug regimen would compassionately ensure no measurable possibility of 

feeling pain during execution. Surely, were they so inclined, clever counsel could 

devise a way to ethically and legally generate medical evidence of safe alternative 

                                                             14 Letter from Martin A. Makary, M.D., Professor at Johns Hopkins University and 

Hospital, to Dr. Thomas Frieden, Director, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, dated 

May 1, 2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/05/03/476636183/death-certificatesundercount-toll-of-medical-errors (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 

15 Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions 

(last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 

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execution procedures. Were it not so, it would be the first such evidentiary abyss in 

the history of mankind and lawyers. But alas, the abolitionists (as Justice Scalia 

called them) continue social, legal and political experimentation at the sole and 

ultimate expense—by their own argument—of the condemned. 

 The medical community stood by passively as sodium thiopental and 

pentobarbital were ripped from its medical bag of compassionate pain management 

by a tiny cadre of death penalty abolitionists. These valuable tools for alleviating 

sensation of pain were rendered unavailable to all patients, not just death row 

inmates. Now complaints about midazolam from the same medical community ring 

hollow, especially with the galling development of the abolitionists suggesting the 

same sodium thiopental and pentobarbital as alternatives, knowing well they are now 

unavailable to states for purposes of execution protocols. As Justice Scalia said in 

Glossip, it reminds one of the man “sentenced to death for killing his parents, who 

pleads for mercy on the ground that he is an orphan.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2749 

(Scalia, J., concurring). 

 The legal profession is not without sin in this. While physicians take an oath 

not to “play at God,” the United States Supreme Court famously embarked upon a 

divine journey to discern “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 

of a maturing society . . .”, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958), “a task for 

which we are imminently ill suited.” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2749 (Scalia, J., 

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concurring). According to Justice Scalia, “[t]hat case has caused more mischief to 

our jurisprudence, to our federal system, and to our society than any other that comes 

to mind.” Id. And the hollow arguments from a debased medical community in 

death penalty cases are both the progeny of, and prompted by, just such standardless 

Trop jurisprudence as applied to the death penalty. 

 The medical profession may choose: it could continue on the side of guerilla 

tactics against a clearly constitutional right of the state to execute criminals 

convicted of vile human desecration and death; or, it could choose to become part of 

a compassionate solution to perceived human suffering by rendering assistance to 

inmates facing the final human judgment, with “great humbleness and awareness of 

[one’s] own frailty.” 

III. CONCLUSION 

 In the final analysis, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims because Plaintiffs have failed to present 

evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to an alternative method 

of execution, an essential prong of the Baze/Glossip test for an Eighth Amendment 

method-of-execution claim. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739. Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED that: 

 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Eighth 

Amendment claims (Doc. # 127) is GRANTED. 

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 2. Judgment is entered in Defendants’ favor on the Eighth Amendment 

claims of Plaintiffs Carey Dale Grayson, Demetrius Frazier, David Lee Roberts, 

Robin Dion Myers, and Gregory Hunt. 

 3. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and the court’s 

finding that there is no just reason for delay, a Final Judgment in Defendants’ favor 

on all claims asserted by Demetrius Frazier, David Lee Roberts, Robin Dion Myers, 

and Gregory Hunt will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum 

Opinion and Order. 

 4. All claims asserted by Plaintiffs Frazier, Roberts, Myers, and Hunt 

against Defendants having been resolved, the actions filed by Demetrius Frazier 

(2:13-cv-0781-WKW), David Lee Roberts (2:14-cv-1028-WKW), Robin Dion 

Myer (2:14-cv-1029-WKW), and Gregory Hunt (2:14-cv-1030-WKW) are 

DISMISSED. 

 5. There being no just reason for delay, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b), this is a final and appealable Order as to Plaintiffs Demetrius 

Frazier, David Lee Roberts, Robin Dion Myers, and Gregory Hunt. 

 6. Grayson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim remains pending. 

 DONE this 31st day of October, 2016.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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