Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01963/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01963-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 05cv1963

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05-CV-1963-H

(RBB)

ORDER DISMISSING WITH

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT 

vs.

G. STRATTON, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Shawn Taylor is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He initially filed this

civil rights action in the Los Angeles Superior Court on May 23, 2005. (Doc. No. 1.)

Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District

of California on July 29, 2005. (Id.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on

improper venue, and the action was transferred to this Court. (Id.)

Defendants Stratton, Butler, Leapheart, Schoch, Rowe, Carpio, Calipatria State

Prison (“Calipatria”), and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDC”) filed their motion to dismiss on February 27, 2006. (Doc. No. 4.) Defendant

Edwards has not been served with the complaint. Plaintiff filed his opposition to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on May 2, 2006, (Doc. No. 9.), and Defendants filed a

reply on May 16, 2006. (Doc. No. 11.) Magistrate Judge Brooks filed a Report and

Recommendation on July 21, 2006. (Doc. No. 12.) Defendants filed an objection on

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 05cv1963

August 17, 2006. (Doc. No. 13.) For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the

motion to dismiss, and the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint.

Background 

During all relevant times, Plaintiff was incarcerated by CDC. Plaintiff was

housed at Calipatria until August 14, 2002, when he was transferred to California State

Prison at Lancaster in Los Angeles County (“Lancaster”). (Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff

alleges that on August 6, 2002, Defendant Rowe, a correctional officer at Calipatria,

issued Plaintiff a rules violation report (“RVR”). (Id. ¶ 15.) The RVR indicated that

Correctional Officer Mosley told Defendant Rowe that Plaintiff refused to submit to

DNA testing as required by California Penal Code § 296. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) According

to Plaintiff, Defendant Rowe was not present during the conversation between Plaintiff

and Mosley, and Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Rowe violated California Code of

Regulations, title 15, § 3025(h) by not providing him written notice of CDC’s intent to

collect a DNA sample. (Id. ¶¶ 16-18.) 

According to Plaintiff, when he received the RVR he requested both an

Investigative Employee and a Staff Assistant from Defendant Doe One. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff did not receive the services of either an Investigative Employee or a Staff

Assistant, however, and the request form Plaintiff attached to his complaint, which

contains his signature, indicates that he waived his right to request an Investigative

Employee. (Id. ¶ 20 & Ex. B.) 

On September 5, 2002, approximately three weeks after Plaintiff was transferred

to Lancaster, Defendant Stratton, a correctional lieutenant, held a hearing on the RVR

at Calipatria. (Id. ¶ 22.) Although the report on the hearing indicates that Plaintiff was

present and testified at the hearing, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Stratton

conducted the hearing outside of Plaintiff’s presence and that Defendant Stratton

falsified those portions of the report indicating otherwise. (Id. ¶¶ 22-26 & Ex. A.)

Defendant Stratton found Plaintiff guilty of refusing to provide a DNA sample and

assessed him a penalty of sixty days loss of credits. (Id. Ex. A.) According to Plaintiff,

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 05cv1963

he did not learn of this finding until he applied for honor housing at Lancaster and was

informed that he was not eligible because of the September 2002 rules violation. (Id.

¶ 35.)

Plaintiff appealed the guilty finding and loss of credits, and on October 1, 2004,

Acting Chief Deputy Warden Ochoa at Calipatria partially granted Plaintiff’s appeal.

Warden Ochoa determined that a due process violation had occurred because Plaintiff

was not present at the hearing and because the report did not indicate that Plaintiff was

transferred to Lancaster or that he had appeared telephonically. (Id. Ex. C.) Warden

Ochoa’s memorandum indicated that a modification order would issue dismissing the

rules violation, expunging all documentation related to the violation, and restoring all

privileges. (Id.) Further, Warden Ochoa indicated that any remaining credit forfeiture

related to the violation would be restored, and he indicated that Plaintiff could reapply

to the honor housing program. (Id.) 

After his successful appeal, Plaintiff filed another appeal with Jeanne Woodford,

the director of CDC, and he submitted a claim for damages to her. (Id. ¶ 42.) He also

submitted a claim to the State Board of Control, which, according to Plaintiff, accepted

the appeal but declined to process it. (Id. ¶ 42-43.) On February 1, 2005, CDC declined

to review his appeal or to take any disciplinary actions against the individuals named

in Plaintiff’s complaint. (Id. ¶ 44.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action.

Plaintiff’s complaint contains four counts, in which he asserts various claims

alleging violation of the following constitutional, regulatory, and statutory provisions:

(1) due process; (2) equal protection; (3) California Code of Regulations, title 15, §§

3025(h), 3315(d)(1) (A) & (B), 3320(g), and 3320.1(a) & (b); (4) California Penal Code

§ 132; and (5) California Civil Code § 1714(a). (Compl. ¶¶ 14-45.) Finally, Plaintiff

asserts that several Defendants acted negligently in supervising or disciplining

subordinates. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 44.)

In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 05cv1963

which relief can be granted. Defendants make four arguments in support of their

motion. First, they argue that, because Calipatria and CDC are not persons within the

meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they cannot be held liable. Second, they argue that

Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because they are all based on

violations of state law. Third, they argue that Plaintiff’s claims are moot because any

deprivation was cured on administrative appeal. Finally, they argue that Plaintiff has

failed to set forth a claim for supervisory liability.

Discussion

A. Legal Standards

1. Review of Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation

The district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The Court also reviews de novo the magistrate judge’s conclusions of law.

Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled

on other grounds by United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir.

2003). 

2. Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is

reviewed de novo. Monterey Plaza Hotel Ltd. v. Local, 215 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir.

2000). Rule 12(b)(6) permits the Court to dismiss a claim which is not legally

sufficient. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2002). “Dismissal is proper

only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged

to support a cognizable legal theory.” Id. (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). In considering the motion, the Court must accept all

material allegations and reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the complaint

as true. Id. (citing Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996)).

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 05cv1963

considered in determining whether dismissal was proper without converting the motion

to one for summary judgment.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480,

1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir.1980)).

In a § 1983 action where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must

construe his pleadings liberally. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985)).

The court must grant leave to amend the complaint unless it is clear that amendment

could not cure the complaint’s deficiencies. Id. (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d

1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted)). The plaintiff must still allege

specific, overt acts which support his claims. See Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733

F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Of Alaska,

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of

official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss.”). Even though the plaintiff’s claims are to be liberally construed, the court

must determine whether the pro se plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would

support his claim and entitle him to relief. Ortez v. Washington County, State of Or.,

88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Jones, 733 F.2d at 649). 

3. Sua Sponte Dismissal

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires courts to review complaints filed by

prisoners against officers or employees of governmental entities. In particular, 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a) provides that “[t]he court shall review, before docketing, if feasible

or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in

which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity.” Section 1915A(b)(1) provides that sua sponte dismissal is

appropriate if the court finds that the complaint, or any portion of the complaint “fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”

The statutory language clearly authorizes screening regardless of the prisoner

litigant’s fee status. Rowe v Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1999). In fact, the

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 05cv1963

Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have all held that the mandatory

screening provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who

bring suit against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g., Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000); Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d

Cir. 1999); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998); Benson v. O’Brian,

179 F.3d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1999); Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1129 (10th Cir.

2000). As with motions to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “[u]nder §

1915A, when determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447.

B. Analysis

1. Stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal citations omitted); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,

1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Because a plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the

United States Constitution, a litigant seeking damages based on a violation of a

constitutional right must use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as his cause of action. Azul-Pacifico,

Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements.

First, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted “under color of law,” and second,

the plaintiff must allege that the “injury he suffered at the [defendant’s] hands infringed

a right guaranteed by federal law or the federal Constitution.” Shah v. County of Los

Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986). 

When a plaintiff alleges violations of state law, “[t]o the extent that the violation

of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond

that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, § 1983 offers no redress.” Sweaney v. Ada

County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lovell v. Poway Unified

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 05cv1963

Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824

(9th Cir. 2002). In other words, § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a

violation of state law unless the violation of state law is also a violation of a federal

constitutional right. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 370; Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan

Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1998); Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 921

(9th Cir. 1986); Ybarra v. Bastian, 647 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir. 1981). 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff incorrectly opposes Defendants’ characterization

of his complaint as one brought under § 1983. Plaintiff titles his complaint as an action

for “Civil Rights Violations,” and throughout his complaint he asserts that his claims

are for civil rights violations and violations of constitutional rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 20,

29, 33, & 38.) As noted above, “a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional

right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Azul-Pacifico, 973 F.2d at 705. Further, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants were acting under color of state law when they took the actions

described in the complaint. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-13.) Accordingly, interpreting Plaintiff’s

complaint liberally, his claims are most properly construed as being brought under §

1983. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 82 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1987)

(construing complaint grounded in criminal civil rights statutes as more properly based

on 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

2. Due Process Claims

The majority of Plaintiff’s complaint focuses on alleged due process violations.

He brings both direct claims, in which he alleges that particular Defendants themselves

took actions to deprive him of his due process rights, and indirect claims, in which he

seeks to hold some Defendants liable based on supervisory liability. With regard to his

due process claims, in Count I, he asserts: (1) that Defendant Rowe violated California

regulations when he failed to give Plaintiff written notice that CDC sought to collect a

DNA sample before issuing the RVR; (2) that Defendant Rowe violated California

regulations when Plaintiff was not provided with a staff assistant or investigative

employee to aid in the preparation of his defense on the violation; (3) that Defendant

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 05cv1963

Stratton violated California regulations when he conducted the hearing outside

Plaintiff’s presence; and (4) that Defendant Doe 2 falsified portions of the record of the

hearing to reflect Plaintiff’s participation. 

Plaintiff brings additional claims in Counts II, III, and IV. In Count II, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Rowe failed to follow California regulations related to

progressive discipline when Defendant Rowe issued Plaintiff a rules violation report

without first seeking to verbally counsel him or conduct a custodial counseling session.

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Edwards refused to accept his initial appeal

of the violation for filing. Finally, in Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that CDC, the Office

of the Director of CDC, and the State Board of Control refused to process his appeals.

Before reaching Plaintiff’s underlying allegations of due process violations, the

Court must consider the effect of Plaintiff’s successful administrative appeal. Courts

have found that, when procedural errors are corrected during the administrative process,

“there has been no compensable due process violation. The appeal is considered part

of the process afforded, and any error in the process can be corrected during that

appeals process without necessarily subjecting prison officials to liability for procedural

violations at lower levels.” Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F. Supp. 1405, 1414 (C.D. Cal.

1997); see also Wycoff v. Nichols, 94 F.3d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1996) (rehearing and

reversal cured alleged due process violations); Morissette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119, 1122

(7th Cir. 1995) (“no denial of due process if the error the inmate complains of is

corrected in the administrative appeal process”); Young v. Hoffman, 970 F.2d 1154,

1156 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The administrative reversal constituted part of the due process

protection [Plaintiff] received, and it cured any procedural defect that may have

occurred. We believe that, as a policy matter, this possibility of cure through the

administrative appeals process will encourage prison administrators to correct errors as

an alternative to forcing inmates to seek relief in state or federal courts.”).

On October 1, 2004, Acting Chief Deputy Warden Ochoa at Calipatria

determined that a procedural violation had occurred during Plaintiff’s hearing. (Compl.

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 05cv1963

Ex. C.) As a result, Warden Ochoa dismissed the rules violation and expunged all

documentation related to the violation. (Id.) Further, Warden Ochoa indicated that any

remaining credit forfeiture related to the violation would be restored. (Id.) Plaintiff

does not allege that he was subjected to any discipline other than the temporary loss of

time credits for the period between the hearing and his successful appeal. For example,

he does not allege that he was placed in any sort of segregated environment as a result

of the violation. In fact, he alleges that he did not even learn of the guilty finding and

loss of credits until he applied for honor housing at Lancaster. Further, although

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Edwards refused to accept his appeal for filing and that

Defendant CDC and the State Board of Control similarly failed to process his appeal,

Plaintiff was successful in overturning the guilty finding. Thus, even assuming that

Defendants committed procedural errors in disciplining Plaintiff and in handling his

appeal, because the procedural errors were corrected during the administrative appeals

process, “there has been no compensable due process violation.” Torricellas, 954 F.

Supp. at 1414. The appeal constituted part of the due process Plaintiff received. 

Plaintiff’s only other complaint arising out of Defendants’ alleged due process

violations is that he was ineligible for honor housing. (Compl. ¶ 35.) As a general

matter, prison regulations are “not designed to confer rights on inmates.” Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). Although state laws and regulations “may under

certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process

Clause,” to rise to the level of a due process liberty interest, the deprivation must

impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. In Sandin, the Court determined that disciplinary

placement in segregated confinement for thirty days did not amount to an atypical and

significant hardship, and thus, it did not create a due process liberty interest. Id. at 486.

The Court explained that such confinement did not exceed similar discretionary

confinement in either duration or scope, and placing the plaintiff there did not cause a

major disruption in his environment. Id. In light of Sandin, Plaintiff’s lack of

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 05cv1963

eligibility for honor housing falls far short of the sort of “atypical and significant

hardship” creating a due process liberty interest. Moreover, Deputy Warden Ochoa

explicitly stated that Plaintiff could reapply for the honor housing. (Compl. Ex. C.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot recover for his temporary loss of eligibility for honor

housing.

Because Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his due process claims,

the Court dismisses them with prejudice.

3. Supervisory Liability for Due Process Violations

In Count II, in addition to his due process claims, Plaintiff asserts claims against

Defendants Schoch, Carpio, Stratton, Leapheart, and Butler (“Defendant supervisors”)

based on their failure to discipline subordinates and for allowing the due process

violations to occur. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-33.) Similarly, in Count IV, he asserts that the

Office of the Director of CDC failed to discipline subordinates. (Id. ¶ 44.) As just

discussed, however, the alleged due process violations of which Plaintiff complains are

not actionable. Thus, his claims based on supervisory liability must also fail. 

Moreover, respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983, and

defendants cannot be held liable simply because they allowed others to commit wrongs

against an inmate. See Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993).

Rather, “[l]iability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the

defendant.” Barron v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that any of the Defendant

supervisors caused Defendant Rowe’s actions. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the

Defendant supervisors and the Office of the Director of CDC failed to discipline

Defendant Rowe. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot recover against these Defendants for

the acts of Defendant Rowe. Because there is no respondeat superior liability under §

1983, and because, as discussed above, the alleged due process violations are not

compensable in any event, Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint to state a valid claim.

/ / / /

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 05cv1963

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims based on supervisory liability with

prejudice.

 4. Equal Protection Claims

Plaintiff also indicates in his complaint that Defendants’ actions denied him equal

protection of the laws. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 29, & 30.) The Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,

439 (1985). “The guarantee of equal protection . . . is not a source of substantive rights

or liberties, but rather a right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory

classifications and other governmental activity.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322

(1980) (citations omitted). 

Conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss, however, unless the plaintiff alleges facts which may prove invidious

discriminatory intent. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429

U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Therefore, when an equal protection violation is alleged, the

plaintiff must plead facts to show that the defendant “acted in a discriminatory manner

and that the discrimination was intentional.” FDIC. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471

(9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than

intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision

maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because

of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers.

Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 

While the Supreme Court has recognized equal protection claims brought on

behalf of a “class of one” in which the plaintiff does not allege membership in a

protected group, the plaintiff must allege that he “has been intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).

/ / / /

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 05cv1963

Other than mentioning “equal protection” in three paragraphs, Plaintiff does not

make a single allegation related to an equal protection claim. Plaintiff does not allege

that he is a member of a protected class or that he was treated differently than other

similarly situated inmates. Further, the only injuries of which Plaintiff complains in the

Counts mentioning equal protection relate to the alleged lack of due process during the

hearing and the adverse decision. Accordingly, because Plaintiff can allege no facts to

overcome these deficiencies, and because all of his allegations relate to due process

claims, his equal protection claims are dismissed with prejudice.

5. Claims Against the Office of the Director of CDC and the State Board of

Control for Failing to Process Plaintiff’s Subsequent Appeals

In Count IV, although somewhat unclear, Plaintiff apparently brings claims

against the Office of the Director of CDC and the State Board of Control. He alleges

that these Defendants failed to process Plaintiff’s appeals and claims for damages.

(Compl. ¶¶ 40-45.)

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state, and neither states nor

state officials in their official capacity are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “‘[I]n

the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is

named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.’” Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (quoting Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984))

(alteration in original). “This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”

Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100-01).

Accordingly, regardless of the basis for Plaintiff’s claims against the Office of

the Director of CDC and the State Board of Control, those claims are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. Because no amended complaint could overcome the Eleventh

Amendment bar, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims in Count IV with prejudice.

/ / / /

/ / / /

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 05cv1963

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

and the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice in its entirety.

DATED: September 6, 2006

Hon. Marilyn L. Huff, U.S. District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Copies To:

Shawn Taylor, pro se

K-66151 / C1-230

California State Prison, Los Angeles County

44750 60th St. West

Post Office Box 8547

Lancaster, CA 93539-8547

Bill Lockyear, Attorney General of the State of California

Jill Vander Borght, Deputy Attorney General

300 South Spring St., Suite 1702

Los Angeles, CA 90013

Case 3:05-cv-01963-H-RBB Document 14 Filed 09/06/06 Page 13 of 13