Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03537/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03537-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:160(1) National Labor Relations Act

---

1

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

FRANK RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIP 

BUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS 

AND HELPERS UNION, LOCAL CLG100, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 88, 97

Plaintiff Frank Rodriguez asserts that Defendant International Brotherhood of 

Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers (“IBB”) breached IBB’s duty 

of fair representation in connection with a grievance filed after Plaintiff was fired by his employer. 

ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Before the Court are two motions: (1) IBB’s motion for summary 

judgment, ECF No. 97; and (2) Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, ECF No. 88. The 

Court finds these matters suitable for decision without oral argument under Civil Local Rule 7-

1(b) and hereby VACATES the motion hearing set for December 3, 2015, at 1:30 p.m. The case 

management conference scheduled for that date and time is also VACATED. Having considered 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 1 of 13
2

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby

GRANTS IBB’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to amend the 

complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Until his termination on October 25, 2012, Plaintiff was an employee of Lehigh Southwest 

Cement Company (“Lehigh”). See ECF No. 97-4 (Lehigh Termination Letter to Plaintiff, or 

“Termination Letter”). As part of his duties for Lehigh, Plaintiff would inspect the heavy 

equipment used to produce cement and report any safety hazards found therein. ECF No. 97-1 

(June 30, 2015 Deposition of Frank Rodriguez, or “Plaintiff Depo.”), at 83-84. Plaintiff would 

also lubricate various pieces of machinery, including a roller press, or “6RP1,” and a weigh feeder,

or “6WF1.” ECF No. 99-1 (January 13, 2015 Testimony of Frank Rodriguez before the Federal 

Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Mine Safety Commission”), or “Plaintiff Mine 

Safety Testimony”) at 24; id. (January 1, 2015 Testimony of David Zeidler before the Mine Safety 

Commission, or “Zeidler Mine Safety Testimony”) at 240-41.

In September 2012, the 6WF1 physically broke and failed. Zeidler Mine Safety Testimony 

at 241. On October 15, 2012, the 6RP1 caught fire and had to be shut down. ECF No. 99-6 Exs. 

34-35. Plaintiff and two other employees were faulted for the equipment failures, and Plaintiff 

was terminated. See ECF No. 99-4 (September 3, 2015 Deposition of David Lawrence, or 

“Lawrence Depo.”) at 62; Termination Letter (“The major failures of 6WF1 and 6RP1 due to lack 

of oil are attributed to [Plaintiff’s] performance.”). 

At the time of his termination, Plaintiff was a member of International Brotherhood of 

Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers Local Union CLG-100 

(“Local CLG-100”), a local union affiliated with IBB. See Plaintiff Depo. at 80. Local CLG-100 

and Lehigh had a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). ECF No. 97-3 at Union 00007 

(“CBA”). IBB was not a party to the CBA. Id. The CBA provided for a multi-step grievance 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 2 of 13
3

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

process whereby the union would file a grievance on behalf of a member, the grievance would be 

presented at a joint labor-management meeting, and then, if not settled, the grievance would move 

to arbitration. Id. at Union 00052. Lehigh also operated in accordance with a progressive 

discipline policy, with termination usually occurring only after verbal counseling, a written 

warning, and suspension. ECF No. 97-5.

In October 2012, the local union steward, David Zeidler, contacted David Lawrence to ask 

for direction in handling a grievance on behalf of Plaintiff. Lawrence Depo. at 12, 19-20. 

Lawrence was employed by IBB to represent the members of individual local unions, including 

Local CLG-100, in negotiating grievances and arbitration proceedings. Id. at 12, 16. Lawrence 

advised Zeidler on filing a grievance and on requesting information from Lehigh. ECF No. 97-2 

(October 27, 2015 Declaration of David Lawrence, or “Lawrence Decl.”). Zeidler believed that 

Plaintiff was “being scapegoated due to lack of maintenance[,] budget and management failures,” 

ECF No. 97-2 at Union 00401, and filed a grievance alleging wrongful termination and requesting 

reinstatement, ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 41. Lawrence continued to communicate with Zeidler about 

Plaintiff’s grievance, and investigated Plaintiff’s grievance by collecting and reviewing documents 

from Zeidler and Lehigh. Lawrence Depo. at 54, 102; Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10-11, 28.

In December 2012 and January 2013, Lawrence delegated another individual to present 

Plaintiff’s grievance at a joint labor-management meeting, and prepared a set of arguments for that 

individual to present. Id. at 52; Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, 12-13. Upon learning that the grievance 

was not presented as planned, Lawrence negotiated with Lehigh to move the grievance forward in 

the grievance process, to arbitration. Lawrence Decl. ¶ 14. Additionally, Lawrence spoke with 

Lehigh in January and February 2013 to request that Lehigh reinstate Plaintiff. ECF No. 97-2 at 

Union 00386. From February to September 2013, Lawrence communicated with Zeidler and 

Lehigh to schedule the arbitration of Plaintiff’s grievance. Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 15-27. In January 

2014, Lawrence continued his efforts, without success, to negotiate a settlement between Plaintiff 

and Lehigh. Id. ¶ 30; Lawrence Depo. at 100. According to Lawrence, on February 5, 2014,

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 3 of 13
4

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff told Lawrence that Plaintiff had financial difficulty and needed a job. Lawrence Decl. 

¶ 32-33; Lawrence Depo. at 130.

On February 6, 2014, Lawrence informed Plaintiff that Lawrence had negotiated a 

settlement with Lehigh that resolved Plaintiff’s grievance. ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 45 (February 6, 

2014 Email from Lawrence to Plaintiff, or “Lawrence Settlement Email”). The settlement, which 

was approved by Local CLG-100, included the following terms: Plaintiff would be returned to 

work without back pay; Plaintiff would not return as an oiler, but would receive an increase in 

pay; intervening time would be considered as an agreed to suspension; Plaintiff and the union 

would execute a last chance agreement; and, prior to being returned to work, Plaintiff would 

submit to a work fitness evaluation. Lawrence Settlement Email; ECF No. 97-1 at Union 00356; 

Lawrence Decl. ¶ 35. Given the settlement, Lawrence informed Plaintiff that the case would not 

proceed to the March 27, 2014 arbitration. See Lawrence Settlement Email; ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 43. 

The Local CLG-100 president urged Plaintiff to take the settlement, and noted that arbitration 

involved risk while the settlement “is in [Plaintiff’s] best interest and will undoubtedly serve 

[Plaintiff] well with the increase in pay rate!” ECF No. 97-1 at Union 00356. However, Plaintiff 

responded to Lawrence that Plaintiff was prepared for and wanted to proceed to arbitration, and 

rejected the settlement. ECF No. 99-6 Exs. 46-47. Lawrence informed Plaintiff that the 

arbitration had been cancelled and the “grievance has been resolved with an offer of your return to 

work.” ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 48.

B. Procedural History

On August 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against Lehigh, IBB, and Local CLG-100. ECF No. 

1. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for breach of collective bargaining 

agreement against Lehigh and a cause of action for breach of duty of fair representation against 

IBB and Local CLG-100. Id. ¶¶ 11-19. On March 24, 2015, the Court found that Plaintiff had 

failed to properly serve IBB and Local CLG-100 and quashed service as to those defendants. ECF 

No. 50, at 16. However, the Court extended the time for service. Id. On April 29, 2015, the 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 4 of 13
5

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Local CLG-100 without prejudice following Plaintiff’s 

continued difficulty in effecting service. ECF No. 60. On May 13, 2015, the Court dismissed 

Lehigh with prejudice following Lehigh’s settlement with Plaintiff, leaving IBB as the only 

defendant remaining in the case. ECF No. 65.

In a joint case management statement filed on September 30, 2015, Plaintiff informed the 

Court that Plaintiff planned to file a motion to amend the complaint “to include allegations to 

confront the anticipated motion for summary judgment to be filed by the IBB.” ECF No. 83, at 1. 

At the case management conference and in the accompanying case management order, the Court 

noted that the deadline to amend pleadings was March 28, 2015 and the fact discovery cutoff was 

September 3, 2015. The Court ordered Plaintiff to file a motion to amend no later than October

12, 2015 and ordered the parties to address whether the motion to amend would be dispositive of 

the anticipated motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 85, at 2. On October 12, 2015, Plaintiff 

filed the motion to amend the complaint. ECF No. 88 (“MTA”). On October 26, 2015, IBB

opposed the motion to amend. ECF No. 89. Plaintiff replied on November 2, 2015. ECF No. 98.

After Plaintiff filed the motion to amend, IBB filed a motion for summary judgment on 

October 29, 2015. ECF No. 93. The Court struck IBB’s motion for summary judgment on 

October 30, 2015 because IBB filed an oversized brief in violation of Civil Local Rules 7-3 and 

7-4. ECF No. 95. IBB filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, in compliance with the 

local rules, on November 3, 2015. ECF No. 97 (“MSJ”). Plaintiff opposed the motion for 

summary judgment on November 17, 2015. ECF No. 98 (“Opp.”). IBB replied on November 24, 

2015. ECF No. 100 (“Reply”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there “is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the Court 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 5 of 13
6

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a 

genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559-60 (2006). A fact is “material” 

if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute as to a material 

fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of 

the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “If the 

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be 

granted.” Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, 

it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the 

moving party, but on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, 

the party moving for summary judgment need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence 

to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325; accord Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 

F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 

party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

III. DISCUSSION

A. IBB’s Motion for Summary Judgment

IBB moves for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff fails to produce evidence 

that IBB breached the duty of fair representation; and (2) IBB owed no duty of fair representation 

to Plaintiff because IBB was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement between Local 

CLG-100 and Lehigh. MSJ at 15-25. Because the Court concludes below that summary judgment 

is warranted in IBB’s favor on the first ground, the Court need not address IBB’s remaining 

argument.

Where a union is the “exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in [a] 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 6 of 13
7

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

bargaining unit,” the union has a duty to “fairly represent all of those employees, both in its 

collective bargaining with [the employer], . . . and in its enforcement of the resulting collective 

bargaining agreement.” Carballo v. Comcast, Inc., No. C-13-5572 MMC, 2015 WL 106372, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2015) (alterations and ellipsis in original) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 

177 (1967)). In order to determine whether a union breaches its duty of fair representation, the 

Ninth Circuit follows a two-step analysis. Moore v. Bechtel Power Corp., 840 F.2d 634, 636 (9th 

Cir.1988). First, the Court must decide whether the alleged union misconduct “involved the 

union’s judgment, or whether it was ‘procedural or ministerial.’” Id. (quoting Peterson v. 

Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985)). Second, if the conduct was procedural or 

ministerial, then the union breaches its duty of fair representation if the conduct was “arbitrary, 

discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Id. However, if the conduct involved the union’s judgment, then 

“the plaintiff may prevail only if the union’s conduct was discriminatory or in bad faith.” Id. 

Thus, to find breach, the Court “must determine either that the union conduct at issue is a 

discriminatory or bad faith exercise of judgment, or is an arbitrary (meaning wholly irrational, 

inexplicable, or unintentional) action that substantially injured an employee.” Beck v. United 

Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff claims that IBB breached the duty of fair representation because IBB settled 

Plaintiff’s meritorious grievance on terms detrimental to Plaintiff’s interest and without Plaintiff’s 

consent, and IBB did not take the grievance to an arbitration hearing. Opp. at 2, 15. IBB counters

that these actions were exercises of judgment and thus must be given deference. MSJ at 20-22. 

IBB also argues that Plaintiff offers no evidence of bad faith, or of discriminatory or arbitrary 

conduct. Id. at 17-20. Further, IBB asserts that Plaintiff had no right to reject the settlement or 

compel an arbitration hearing. Id. at 16-17.

At the first step of the two-step analysis, the Court agrees with IBB that IBB’s alleged 

misconduct involved an exercise of judgment. Although “differentiating a ministerial task from a 

judgment call is not always easily accomplished,” the Ninth Circuit has previously concluded that 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 7 of 13
8

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

a union exercises judgment when the union determines how to proceed with a grievance. See 

Wellman v. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc., 146 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n general, a 

union’s decision about how best to handle a grievance also is a matter of its judgment.”);

Burkevich v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 894 F.2d 346, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that a 

union’s decision to settle the group claim and refuse to litigate the individual claims was an act of 

judgment). By contrast, acts that the Ninth Circuit has considered ministerial or procedural 

include (1) a failure to file a meritorious grievance within the established time limit, Dutrisac v. 

Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1983); (2) an unexplained failure to 

pursue a grievance after the grievance was submitted to arbitration by a joint labor-management 

group, Herman v. United Building BHD of Carpenters and Jointers of America, Local No. 971, 60 

F.3d 1375, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1995); (3) an inexplicable failure to consider a strong substantive 

argument in favor of the employee, Peters v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 931 F.2d 534, 539 

(9th Cir. 1990); and (4) failure to notify an employer that an employee was a union steward, 

Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1514 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In this case, it is uncontroverted that IBB, through its employee Lawrence, reached a 

settlement with Lehigh that returned Plaintiff to work at a higher wage, after Lawrence 

investigated Plaintiff’s grievance, fulfilled the ministerial duties relating to filing the grievance, 

and negotiated with Lehigh on Plaintiff’s behalf. See Lawrence Depo.; Lawrence Decl. IBB and 

Local CLG-100 approved the settlement, and Lawrence told Plaintiff that proceeding to arbitration 

involved risk, ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 44, while the settlement provided Plaintiff with Plaintiff’s desired 

return to work, ECF No. 97-1 at Union 00362. IBB’s conduct reflects that IBB’s settlement of 

Plaintiff’s grievance was a “decision about how best to handle [Plaintiff’s] grievance,” and thus 

constituted an act of judgment. See Wellman, 146 F.3d at 671. 

Plaintiff does not dispute the evidence showing that IBB pursued Plaintiff’s grievance or 

that IBB made a decision to settle the grievance. Rather, in opposition, Plaintiff argues that his 

grievance was meritorious and should have received a more favorable settlement. Opp. at 15-18. 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 8 of 13
9

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

However, whether the grievance is meritorious, alone, does not determine whether IBB’s conduct 

involved judgment or was instead procedural or ministerial. Even if Plaintiff’s grievance were 

meritorious, there is no indication that IBB inexplicably failed to take action on Plaintiff’s 

grievance and thus that IBB’s conduct was procedural or ministerial. See Peters, 931 F.2d at 539

(inexplicable failure to consider a substantive argument in employee’s favor was ministerial); 

Herman, 60 F.3d at 1380-81 (unexplained inaction on the employee’s grievance, after the 

grievance was submitted to arbitration, was ministerial). Rather, uncontroverted evidence 

demonstrates that IBB pursued Plaintiff’s grievance by investigating and then negotiating a 

settlement. See Lawrence Depo. at 54, 102; Lawrence Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10-11, 28; Lawrence Settlement 

Email. Moreover, whether IBB exercised judgment does not depend on whether Plaintiff agrees 

with the result of that judgment. See Beck, 506 F.3d at 879 (a union’s conduct “constitutes an 

exercise of judgment entitled to deference even when the union’s ‘judgments are ultimately 

wrong.’” (quoting Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1998))). 

Consequently, “[IBB’s] decision to settle [Plaintiff’s] grievance with [the employer], rather than to 

continue to pursue arbitration, involved an exercise of judgment concerning the likelihood of 

success in arbitration versus the value of [the employer’s] settlement offer. . . .The strategic 

decision to settle the dispute rather than press forward with litigation was not merely procedural 

. . . .” Reyes v. Pac. Bell, 21 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1994) (table). 

Because IBB’s decision to settle Plaintiff’s grievance before arbitration involved the 

exercise of judgment, at the second step of the two-step analysis the Court must find that IBB

acted with a discriminatory motive or in bad faith in order to find breach of the duty of fair 

representation. To show that IBB’s conduct was discriminatory, Plaintiff must offer “substantial 

evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union 

objectives.” Beck, 506 F.3d at 880 (quoting Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach 

Employees of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971)). To show that IBB acted in bad faith, 

Plaintiff must adduce “substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.” Id.

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 9 of 13
10

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(quoting Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 299).

Reviewing the record and Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court concludes that Plaintiff does not 

raise a genuine dispute of material fact that IBB’s decision to settle Plaintiff’s grievance prior to 

arbitration was discriminatory or in bad faith. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that IBB’s conduct was 

not discriminatory or in bad faith by failing to argue the point in Plaintiff’s opposition. See 

generally Opp. Nor does Plaintiff even allege discriminatory conduct by IBB, or any acts of fraud 

or deceit, in the complaint. See generally Compl. 

Additionally, as discussed above, the evidence shows that IBB, through Lawrence, took 

action to effectively pursue Plaintiff’s grievance and achieve a return to work for Plaintiff, at a 

higher pay rate. Plaintiff does not point to, and the evidence does not reveal, “substantial 

evidence” of bad faith or discrimination in Lawrence’s actions. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 

(noting that the nonmoving party must identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial”); see also Plaintiff Depo. at 201-02 (admitting that Plaintiff had not heard Lawrence 

make any negative comments about Plaintiff). Moreover, Plaintiff’s disapproval of the settlement 

negotiated by IBB is insufficient, on its own, to demonstrate bad faith or discriminatory conduct. 

Moore, 840 F.2d at 637 (“Nor does a disagreement between a union and an employee over a 

grievance, standing alone, constitute evidence of bad faith, even when the employee’s grievance is 

meritorious.”). Given that IBB’s conduct involved judgment and that Plaintiff offers no evidence 

that IBB’s conduct was discriminatory or in bad faith, IBB is entitled to summary judgment that 

IBB did not breach the duty of fair representation. See Moore, 840 F.2d at 636 (“If it is a union’s 

judgment that is in question, as it is in this case, the plaintiff may prevail only if the union’s 

conduct was discriminatory or in bad faith. Arbitrariness alone would not be enough.”).

Alternatively, even if the Court were to find that IBB’s decision to settle before arbitration

was ministerial and not an act of judgment, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find

that IBB’s conduct was arbitrary. A union’s conduct is arbitrary “only when it is irrational, when 

it is without a rational basis or explanation.” Beck, 506 F.3d at 879. “[M]ere negligence is not 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 10 of 13
11

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

arbitrariness. The union must have acted in ‘reckless disregard’ of the employee’s rights.” 

Moore, 840 F.2d at 636. For example, courts have found arbitrary conduct where (1) a union fails 

to explain any basis for failing to research the collective bargaining agreement, Peters, 931 F.2d at 

541; (2) a union inexplicably stopped pursuing a grievance after a joint labor-management board 

decided to submit the grievance to arbitration, Herman, 60 F.3d at 1380; and (3) a union failed to 

file a grievance on time, Dutrisac, 749 F.2d at 1274.

Plaintiff claims that IBB acted in an arbitrary manner because IBB settled Plaintiff’s 

grievance in a perfunctory manner without Plaintiff’s consent, and again emphasizes that 

Plaintiff’s grievance was “facially meritorious.” Opp. at 2, 15, 17. Plaintiff also disputes the 

terms of the settlement because, Plaintiff says, the last chance agreement leaves Plaintiff without 

future union protection and the return to work was illusory since Lehigh had ordered Plaintiff to 

be terminated. Opp. at 20-23. IBB responds that, even if the decision to settle were somehow 

mistaken, IBB’s conduct was rational because IBB had reasons to settle. Reply at 7.

The Court agrees with IBB. A decision to settle is not arbitrary merely because the 

settlement is not the best possible settlement; rather, to be arbitrary, the decision to settle must be 

“unintentional, irrational or wholly inexplicable.” Beck, 506 F.3d at 880. In this case, Lawrence 

made the decision to settle after spending over a year investigating Plaintiff’s grievance, advising 

Zeidler on filing the grievance, preparing to present the grievance, and scheduling the arbitration. 

Lawrence Decl.¶ 7, 9-28; Lawrence Depo. at 54, 102. Additionally, Lawrence informed Plaintiff 

of the reasons for seeking and accepting a settlement: proceeding to arbitration involved risk and 

time, ECF No. 99-6 Ex. 44, while the settlement provided Plaintiff with Plaintiff’s desired return 

to work, ECF No. 97-1 at Union 00362. The settlement also increased Plaintiff’s pay. ECF No. 

97-1 at Union 00356. Moreover, uncontroverted evidence shows that Plaintiff told Lawrence, 

before the settlement that Plaintiff had financial difficulty and needed a job. Lawrence Decl. ¶ 32-

33; Lawrence Depo. at 130. While Plaintiff believes that IBB could have won a more favorable 

result at arbitration, Plaintiff fails to present any argument or evidence that IBB’s decision not to 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 11 of 13
12

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

proceed to arbitration was “wholly inexplicable.” See Opp. at 21. Thus, there is no evidence that 

Lawrence treated Plaintiff’s grievance in an arbitrary or perfunctory fashion. See Vaca, 386 U.S. 

at 191, 195 (finding union did not act in a perfunctory manner when the union attempted to gather 

evidence to prove the union member’s case, attempted to secure other work for the union member, 

and processed the grievance through multiple steps of the grievance process); see also Shane v 

Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 1989) (a union’s decision to accept a 

settlement over the grievants’ contemporaneous objections was not arbitrary).

At bottom, Plaintiff claims that IBB acted arbitrarily solely because IBB decided to settle 

the case without Plaintiff’s consent before arbitration. However, “a union does not breach its duty 

of fair representation . . . merely because it settled the grievance short of arbitration.” Vaca, 386 

U.S. at 191-92 (1967); accord Moore, 840 F.2d at 637 (“Unions do not have an absolute duty to 

take every grievance to arbitration.”). Additionally, the individual employee has no absolute right 

to reject a settlement. Shane, 868 F.2d at 1061 (“Unions are free to negotiate and accept 

settlements even without the grievants’ approval.”). Finally, a “breach of the duty of fair 

representation is not established merely by proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious.” 

Vaca, 386 U.S. at 195. Thus, given that IBB’s decision to settle was not discriminatory, arbitrary, 

or in bad faith, IBB is entitled to summary judgment that IBB did not breach the duty of fair 

representation.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint

Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint would not alter the outcome of this motion for 

summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion to amend does not address IBB’s breach of the duty of fair 

representation but rather adds allegations to show that IBB, who was not a signatory to the CBA

with Lehigh, owed Plaintiff a duty of fair representation. MTA at 5-7; ECF No. 88-2 (Proposed 

First Amended Complaint). Given that the Court finds above that IBB is entitled to summary 

judgment on the issue of whether IBB committed a breach of the duty of fair representation, the 

Court need not reach the question of whether IBB owed Plaintiff a duty of fair representation. 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 12 of 13
13

Case No. 14-CV-03537-LHK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s proposed amendments would be futile, and Plaintiff’s motion to amend is 

DENIED. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (a

district court may deny leave to amend a complaint due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] 

futility of amendment”).

1

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IBB’s motion for summary judgment and 

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

 

1 Moreover, an amendment of the complaint now, almost three months after the close of fact 

discovery on September 3, 2015 and more than eight months after the March 28, 2015 deadline to 

amend pleadings, would cause undue delay and unduly prejudice IBB. See Leadsinger, Inc., 512 

F.3d at 532. Furthermore, although the Court’s October 7, 2015 case management order set a 

deadline to file the instant motion for leave to amend, the order did not render Plaintiff’s request 

timely or excuse Plaintiff’s delay. See ECF No. 85. 

Case 5:14-cv-03537-LHK Document 103 Filed 12/01/15 Page 13 of 13