Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00446/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00446-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID FLORENCE,

CDCR #H-42260,

Plaintiff,

vs.

A. BENROSTROL, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-0446-CAB-KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff, David Florence, an inmate currently incarcerated at North Kern State 

Prison (“NKSP”) located in Delano, California has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). In addition, Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his 

inmate trust account statement which the Court liberally construes as a Motion to Proceed 

In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

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A. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (U.S. 2016); Williams v. Paramo, 

775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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As noted above, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his inmate trust account 

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. His trust account 

statement indicates he has insufficient funds from which to pay a partial initial filing fee 

at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be 

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment 

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial 

partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and directs the Acting 

Secretary for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to 

collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and 

forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

B. Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

1. Plaintiff’s allegations

Plaintiff has filed a nearly one hundred and fifty (150) page Complaint in which he 

names forty-five (45) defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges constitutional 

violations by Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) prison officials when he 

was housed there in from August of 2013 to September of 2014. Id. at 1, 8-23.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

3. Rule 8

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with 

Rule 8. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order to state a 

claim for relief in a pleading it must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds 

for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) & (2). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 

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1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding Rule 8(a) dismissal of complaint that was 

“argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Cafasso, 

United States ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citing cases upholding Rule 8 dismissals where pleadings were “verbose,” 

“confusing,” “distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible,” “highly repetitious,” and 

comprised of “incomprehensible rambling,” while noting that “[o]ur district courts are 

busy enough without having to penetrate a tome approaching the magnitude of War and 

Peace to discern a plaintiff’s claims and allegations.”).

Plaintiff is also admonished that he must comply with Local Rule 8.2 which 

requires, in part, that “[c]omplaints by prisoners under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, must be legibly written or typewritten on forms supplied by the court” and 

“[a]dditional pages not to exceed fifteen (15) in number may be included with the court 

approved form complaint, provided the form is completely filled in to the extent 

applicable.” S.D. CivLr 8.2(a). Here, Plaintiff has filed a nearly one hundred and fifty 

(150) page Complaint, which well exceeds the number of pages permitted by the local 

rule.

4. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff’s claims arise from the time he was housed at RJD which ranges from 

April of 2013 to September of 2014. See Compl. at 1. “A claim may be dismissed [for 

failing to state a claim] on the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the 

complaint.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 

2006)). “‘A complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.’” Id.

(quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also 

Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1993) (where the running 

of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of a complaint, dismissal for failure to 

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state a claim is proper, so long as Plaintiff is provided an opportunity to amend in order to 

allege facts which, if proved, might support tolling); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 

Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 788 (9th Cir. 2000) (court may raise 

the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte), overruled on other grounds by Gonzalez 

v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 

1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

of prisoner’s time-barred complaint). 

Because section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitation, federal courts apply 

the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 

F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); 

Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Before 2003, California’s statute of 

limitations was one year. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Effective January 1, 2003, the 

limitations period was extended to two. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1). The 

law of the forum state also governs tolling. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) 

(citing Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1989)); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (noting 

that in actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitation, the federal 

court also borrows all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in 

state law). 

Under California law, the statute of limitations for prisoners serving less than a life 

sentence is tolled for two years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352.1(a); Johnson v. California, 

207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 

Accordingly, the effective statute of limitations for most California prisoners is three 

years for claims accruing before January 1, 2003 (one year limitations period plus two 

year statutory tolling), and four years for claims accruing thereafter (two year limitations 

period plus two years statutory tolling). In addition, the limitations period for prisoners is 

tolled while the “prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process.” Brown v. Valoff,

422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Unlike the length of the limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983 

cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” 

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; Hardin, 490 U.S. at 543-44 (federal law governs when a 

§ 1983 cause of action accrues). “Under the traditional rule of accrual ... the tort cause of 

action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or

omission results in damages.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391. Put another way, “[u]nder 

federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 

which is the basis of the action.” Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 

F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Plaintiff’s claims accrued in 2013 and 2014. See Compl. at 1. Thus, 

assuming Plaintiff is not serving a life sentence, he is entitled to an additional two (2)

years of statutory tolling pursuant to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352.1(a). Johnson, 207 

F.3d at 654; see also Jones, 393 F.3d at 928 n.5 (noting that “California courts have read 

out if the statute the qualification that the period of incarceration must be ‘for a term less 

than for life’ in order for a prisoner to qualify for tolling.”). Consequently, based on the 

face of Plaintiff’s own pleading, it is clear Plaintiff’s claims fall far outside California’s 

two-year statute of limitations, even including all presumed periods of tolling provided 

by statute. See Wallace, 591 U.S. at 391; Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; CAL. CODE CIV.

PROC. § 335.1 (tolling statute of limitations “for a maximum of 2 years” during a 

prisoner’s incarceration).

Finally, Plaintiff’s claims could be considered timely if, in his Complaint, he 

alleges facts sufficient to show the limitations period may be equitably tolled. See 

Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1276-77. Generally, federal courts also apply the forum state’s law 

regarding equitable tolling. Fink, 192 F.3d at 914; Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 

372, 374 (9th Cir.1988). Under California law, however, Plaintiff must meet three 

conditions to equitably toll the statute of limitations: (1) he must have diligently pursued 

his claim; (2) his situation must be the product of forces beyond his control; and (3) 

Defendants must not be prejudiced by the application of equitable tolling. See Hull v. 

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Central Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); 

Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316-17 (Cal. 1978); Fink, 192 F.3d at 916. 

As currently pleaded, however, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts 

which, if proved, would support any plausible claim for equitable tolling. See Cervantes, 

5 F.3d at 1277; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 

1993) (plaintiff carries the burden to plead facts which would give rise to equitable 

tolling); see also Kleinhammer v. City of Paso Robles, 385 Fed. Appx. 642, 643 (9th Cir. 

2010).

Accordingly, the Court finds the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on 

the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and therefore he has failed to state a claim upon which 

section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1).

5. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint

fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to 

fix the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 

1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

C. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect 

from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

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time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Acting Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). as well as for 

failing to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from 

the date of this Order in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself 

without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; 

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 

F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which 

are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended pleading, he must also comply with S.D. 

CivLr 8.2(a).

5. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2019

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