Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04657/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04657-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 5/7/08

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JENNY WOLFES,

Plaintiff,

v.

BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, et

al.

Defendants.

No. C-07-00696 RMW

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES

[Re Docket No. 32]

JENNY WOLFES,

Plaintiff,

v.

BURLINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, et

al.

Defendants.

No. C-07-04657 RMW

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

TO CONSOLIDATE CASES; DENYING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS;

GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

STRIKE

[Re Docket No. 8, 9, 20]

Plaintiff Jenny Wolfes ("Wolfes") was sued by her former employer, Big Sky Entertainment

III, Inc. ("Big Sky") in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Big Sky Entertainment III et al. v. Jenny

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 2

Wolfes, Sup. Ct. Case No. 104CV025291 ("the Big Sky Action"). Wolfes subsequently sued

defendant The Burlington Insurance Company ("Burlington") in California state court seeking a

declaration that Burlington has a duty to defend or indemnify her in the Big Sky Action under an

insurance policy issued to Big Sky. Burlington successfully removed the case to this court. Wolfes

v. Burlington Ins. Co., Case No. 07-00696. Wolfes then filed a second action against Burlington in

federal court, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and seeking, inter

alia, punitive damages. Wolfes v. Burlington Ins. Co., Case No. 07-04657.

Before this court are several motions. First, Wolfes moves for partial summary judgment in

Case No. 07-00696 that Burlington had and continues to have a duty to defend her in the Big Sky

Action. Second, Wolfes and Burlington submit cross-motions regarding Case No. 07-04657. 

Wolfes moves to consolidate Case No. 07-04657 and Case No. 07-00696 while Burlington moves to

dismiss Case No. 07-04657 entirely as improperly duplicative of Case No. 07-00696. Third, to the

extent that the court is not inclined to dismiss Case No. 07-04657, Burlington moves to strike

plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. For the reasons set forth below (1) the court denies

Burlington's motion to dismiss Case No. 07-04657 and will consolidate it with Case No. 07-00696,

(2) grants Burlington's motion to strike Wolfes' prayer for punitive damages, and (3) denies Wolfes'

motion for summary judgment that Burlington had a duty to defend her.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Big Sky Action

Big Sky operated a night club, the Blue Tattoo, in San Jose in 2004. From June 2004 to July

2004, Wolfes, the plaintiff in this action, was vice president, secretary, officer and director of Big

Sky as well as the night club's manager. In spring 2004, Big Sky was in financial difficulty and

seeking to sell its assets to a third party. Wolfes objected to the sale, suggesting that the assets

should be sold on the open market, and allegedly vowed to do everything in her power to stop the

sale. According to the complaint in the Big Sky Action, Wolfes solicited employees and promoters

of the club to stop working with Big Sky, made unauthorized contact with the San Jose Planning

Commission and other agencies, made accusations about the building site and made phone calls that

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1

 William Leunis, a plaintiff and counterdefendant in the Big Sky Action tendered his defense of

Wolfes's counterclaim for defamation to Burlington, which defense Burlington agreed to provide. 

Also, plaintiff tendered her defense of the Big Sky Action to Crusader, which (unlike Burlington)

agreed to provide a defense under the policy. 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 3

were allegedly designed to discourage the third party purchasers from buying the club's assets. On

or about July 21, 2004, the buyers gave notice that they wanted to back out of the transaction.

On August 17, 2006, Big Sky and its directors filed a verified complaint against Wolfes

seeking injunctive relief enjoining Wolfes from contacting the buyers of the company assets or

taking action to affect the company without first consulting with and obtaining approval from Big

Sky's directors. The complaint alleges causes of action for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and

interference with prospective economic relations under state law. Wolfes cross-complained against

plaintiffs in the Big Sky Action for defamation.

B. The Federal Actions

Big Sky was insured by two Commercial General Liability insurance policies: (1) an

insurance policy from Crusader Insurance Company, number SRL-004903, which insured officers,

directors and employees from June 27, 2003 to June 27, 2004 (which is not at issue in this case); and

(2) a commercial general liability insurance policy from defendant Burlington, number

585BW03318 ("the Policy"), from June 27, 2004 to September 27, 2004. Decl. of Patrick C. Stokes

("Stokes Decl."), Ex. A. Wolfes tendered her defense of the Big Sky Action to Burlington, but

Burlington declined to defend her.1

 Wolfes subsequently filed suit in state court against Burlington

seeking a declaration that Burlington had a duty to defend her against he claims brought by Big Sky. 

The action was removed to this court. Wolfes v. Burlington Ins. Co., Case No. 07-00696.

Several months after filing Case No. 07-00696, Wolfes filed a second action, Case No. 07-

04657, against Burlington in federal court asserting claims for breach of Burlington's insurance

contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with Burlington's failure to provide a defense to

Wolfes.

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

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MAG 4

C. The Burlington Policy

Wolfes contends that the Policy requires Big Sky to provide her a defense in the Big Sky

Action. Section II of the CGL Coverage Form of the Policy, "Who is an Insured," states, in relevant

part: "If you are designated in the declarations as . . . [a]n organization other than a partnership, joint

venture, or limited liability policy, you are an insured. Your 'executive officers' and directors are

also insured, but only with respect to their duties as your officers or directors." Stokes Decl., Ex. A

at 028, § II ¶ 1.d. Section I, "Coverages," Coverage B(1.a) of the same coverage form reads, "We

will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of

'personal and advertising injury' to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to

defend the insured against any 'suit' seeking those damages." Id. 

The Policy defines "personal advertising injury" as follows: "'Personal and advertising injury'

means injury, including consequential 'bodily injury', arising out of one or more of the following

offenses: . . . d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization

or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products, or services." Id. § V ¶ 14.d. 

D. Tender of Defense

On October 20, 2005, Wolfes tendered her defense to Burlington. Kraft Decl., Ex. D. On

November 1, 2005, a claims manager at Burlington, Frank Evans, acknowledged receipt of the letter

tendering Wolfes' defense, but disclaimed coverage and declined to provide a defense. Id., Ex. E. 

On July 17, 2006, Wolfes requested that Burlington reconsider its decision. Id., Ex. F. On

September 11, 2006, Burlington reaffirmed its decision to decline provision of a defense. Id., Ex. G. 

Burlington declined coverage for two reasons. First, it asserted that there was no potential

for coverage of the claims asserted against Wolfes in the Big Sky Action. Second, Burlington found

that Wolfes was not an insured under the policy at the time of the acts alleged by Big Sky.

Burlington asserted there was no potential for coverage under the Policy because (1) the Big

Sky Action "does not contain a cause of action for slander or libel"; and (2) the complaint "does not

contain any allegations of unprivileged communication by Ms. Wolfes which slanders or libels an

organization or the organization's goods, products, or services." Id., Ex. G at 5-6, 7. 

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 5

Burlington also believed that Wolfes was not an insured under the Policy because the

complaint in the Big Sky Action alleges that when Wolfes made statements to various state agencies,

Wolfes advised that she was no longer affiliated with Big Sky. Id., Ex. D. at 5.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Wolfes moves for summary judgment that Burlington has a duty to defend her in the Big Sky

Action. Burlington did not, however, move for summary judgment that it does not have a duty to

defend her. As discussed below, the court denies Wolfes' motion for summary judgment that

Burlington has a duty to defend her. Although it would appear that Burlington does not have a duty

to defend, until Burlington successfully moves for summary judgment that it has no defense duty,

judgment cannot be entered against plaintiff Wolfes on her complaints alleging coverage.

1. Duty to Defend 

An insurer's duty to indemnify runs to claims that are actually covered, in light of the facts

proved. The insurer's duty to defend, however, also runs to claims that are merely potentially

covered in light of facts alleged or otherwise disclosed. The duty to defend "extends beyond claims

that are actually covered to those that are merely potentially so – but no further." Buss v. Superior

Court, 16 Cal. 4th 35, 45-46 (1997) (citing Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 10 Cal.

4th 287, 659 n. 9 (1993) and Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 45

Cal. App. 4th 1, 107-108 (1996)). "[I]n an action wherein none of the claims is even potentially

covered, the insurer does not have a duty to defend." Id. at 47. "[I]n a 'mixed' action, in which some

of the claims are at least potentially covered and the others are not, the insurer has a duty to defend

as to the claims that are at least potentially covered, having been paid premiums by the insured

therefor, but does not have a duty to defend as to those that are not, having not been paid therefor." 

Id. at 47-48. An insurer must defend a mixed action in its entirety prophylactically. Id. at 49. The

duty to defend arises on tender of the defense and lasts until either the conclusion of the underlying

lawsuit or until the insurer can establish conclusively that there is no potential for coverage (and thus

no duty to defend). Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287, 295 (1993); Amato

v. Mercury Cas. Co., 53 Cal. App. 4th 825, 832 (1997). 

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 6

Under California law, "the duty to defend arises when the facts alleged in the underlying

complaint give rise to a potentially covered claim regardless of the technical legal cause of action

pleaded by the third party." Cort v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Companies, Inc., 311 F.3d 979,

983 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Barnett v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 90 Cal. App. 4th 500, 510 (2001)). A

defense is excused only when "the third party complaint can by no conceivable theory raise a single

issue which could bring it within the policy coverage." Montrose, 6 Cal. 4th at 295. "[T]he insured

need only show that the underlying claim may fall within the policy coverage; the insurer must

prove it cannot." Id. at 300. On a motion for summary judgment on the insurer's duty to defend, an

insurer must be able to negate coverage as a matter of law. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co

of Calif., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1822, 1832 (1996).

2. Whether Wolfes Was An Insured 

Wolfes argues that contrary to Burlington's denial letters stating that she was not an insured,

there is potential that she was an officer of Big Sky when she made the statements complained of in

the Big Sky Action. As set forth above, the Policy states, "Your 'executive officers' and directors are

also insured, but only with respect to their duties as your officers or directors." Stokes Decl., Ex. A

at 028, § II ¶ 1.d. Burlington's first argument that Wolfes was not an insured is based on the

contention that Wolfes was not employed by Big Sky when she took the actions leading to the Big

Sky Action. Its second argument is that even if she was technically employed, she was not acting

"with respect to [her] duties as [Big Sky's] officer[] or director[]." The parties appear to agree that

the statements Wolfes is accused of making are set forth in paragraphs 18 and 21 of the Big Sky

complaint:

Paragraph 18: On or about July 21, 2004, plaintiffs heard from reliable sources that

Wolfes had made telephone calls to interfere with the sales transaction. That evening,

the buyers gave notice that they wanted to back out of the purchase of assets, and the

company had to make significant concession to the buyers to keep them interested.

Paragraph 21: Notwithstanding the decisions of the directors and shareholders to sell

company assets, Wolfes has continued to take actions which are disruptive of that

sale. Plaintiffs have spoken with employees of the company and with promoters who

state that defendant Wolfes has solicited them to stop working with the company. 

Defendant Wolfes has made accusations about building at the property without

knowing all the facts and without discussing the facts at directors' meetings. She has

made unauthorized contact with the San Jose Planning Commission, and other state

and local agencies, for the apparent purpose of interfering with the planned sale of

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 7

assets to the buyers. She has made demands to inspect corporate records at times

when she knew the director and Chief Financial Officer of the company was out of

the area and when the company could not possibly comply. Defendants actions are

not beneficial to the company and are in breach of her fiduciary duties to the

company, its shareholders and creditors.

With regard to whether she was a director eligible for coverage during the appropriate time

period, Wolfes argues that she could have made the statements complained of in paragraphs 18 or 21

at some time between July 8 and July 20, 2004, during which time she was employed by Big Sky. 

In support of her position, Wolfes presents minutes of a July 19, 2004 meeting of the Big Sky board

of directors. The meeting was conducted in two parts: the first part was conducted on July 19, 2004

at which the board discussed the finances of the company and the possible sale of the company to an

outside party to which Wolfes appears to have been opposed. Decl. of David Kraft ("Kraft Decl."),

Ex. C at 067-68. At that time, "Ms. Wolfes discussed that the company should be sold 'properly'

through a third party broker." Id. Thereafter, the meeting was temporarily recessed, and the second

part was "reconvened at 8:00PM on July 20th, 2004 with Mr. Pope, Mr. Simpson and Mr. Leunis

attending." Id. at 068. At the reconvened meeting, at which Wolfes was not present, "[i]t was

decided that Ms. Wolfes should be removed from all officer positions within the company, including

being Vice President and Secretary." Id. Wolfes does not contest the contents of these minutes or

argue that she was not removed as director at the reconvened board meeting. Thus, the undisputed

facts establish that at least as of 8:00 p.m. on July 20, 2004, Wolfes was no longer a director of Big

Sky. 

However, the court cannot conclude based on the evidence presented that Wolfes could have

only made the statements alleged at paragraphs 18 and 21 after 8:00 p.m. July 20, 2004. The

complaint merely alleges that plaintiffs heard from reliable sources that Wolfes had made telephone

calls to interfere with the sales transaction on July 21, 2004 and that the buyers called that night to

indicate that they wanted to back out. Big Sky Compl. ¶ 18. This does not mean that the statements

were made on July 21, nor does Burlington submit any evidence to fix those statements in time. 

Even assuming that Wolfes became dissatisfied only after the July 19, 2004 board meeting, Wolfes

could have made some of the statements between the time she expressed her disagreement with the

option of selling the company on July 19, 2004 and the time she was removed from the board at the

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 8

end of the day on July 20, 2004. There appears to be an issue of material fact as to when the

statements were made by Wolfes.

Burlington asserts, however, that even if the statements were made prior to 8:00 p.m. on July

20, 2004 when Wolfes was still an officer of Big Sky, the allegations in the Big Sky Action establish

that Wolfes was not acting with respect to her duties as an officer of Big Sky when she made the

statements. Wolfes, on the other hand, asserts that by the allegations of the complaint, she was

potentially acting with respect to her duties as an officer of Big Sky.

The court finds that even assuming Wolfes was an officer at the time, there is no potential

that she could have been acting with respect to her duties as an officer when she made the

statements. The fact that the complaint does not allege why she made the statements does not

foreclose the court's conclusion that her statements could not have made while acting with respect to

her duties as an officer of Blue Sky. She contends that the entry in the July 19, 2004 minutes that

"Ms. Wolfes discussed that the company should be sold 'properly' through a third party broker,"

Kraft Decl., Ex. C at 067-68, demonstrates that she was acting with the interests of the company in

mind when she made the alleged statements. However, the statements she is alleged to have made

are (1) facially contradictory to her still acting on behalf of the company since they interfere with the

sale of the company and apparently attempted to disrupt Big Sky's relationships with its employees,

the San Jose Planning Commission and other state and local agencies; and (2) are so far contrary to

the interest of Big Sky that, even to the extent she may have represented that she was acting for Big

Sky, those actions would have been outside the coverage provided by the insurance policy. The

types of statements that form the basis of the Big Sky Action demonstrate that Wolfes is being sued

in her capacity as an individual rather than as a director or shareholder of Big Sky. See, e.g., Lomes

v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 88 Cal. App. 4th 127, 133 (2001) (finding with respect to a similar

insurance provision that a director and minority shareholder was not an insured because claims for

defamation against him were made in his capacity as an individual, not as an director or

shareholder). Further, the statements that form the basis of the underlying complaint include

Wolfes's alleged assertion that she was no longer affiliated with Big Sky. 

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2

 Cal. Civ. Code § 46 provides:

Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also

communications by radio or any mechanical or other means which:

1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or

punished for crime;

2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 9

Based on the evidence presented on summary judgment, there are no material facts

suggesting that Wolfes was acting in her officer of Big Sky at the time of the statements made. To

the extent any of the statements alleged in the underlying action were made before her employment

with Big Sky was terminated, those statements could not have been in furtherance of her duties as an

officer of Big Sky as required under the Policy. Accordingly, the court finds as a matter of law that

Wolfes was not an insured under the Policy at the time the statements were made.

3. Covered Causes of Action

Burlington further contends that it has no duty to defend because the underlying action does

not allege any causes of action that are even potentially covered under the Policy. Wolfes, on the

other hand, argues that the allegations in the underlying action, specifically those in paragraph 18,

give rise to the potential for a cause of action for slander and for disparagement against her because

of her statements about Blue Sky to third parties. The parties do not appear to dispute that both

slander and disparagement could be covered under the Policy.

"The determination whether the insurer owes a duty to defend usually is made in the first

instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy." Horace Mann

Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 4 Cal. 4th 1076, 1081 (1993). The complaint need not allege a covered cause

of action so long as it discloses enough facts to indicate a potential for coverage. See Barnett v.

Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 90 Cal. App. 4th 500, 510 (2001) ("The duty to defend arises when the

facts alleged in the underlying complaint give rise to a potentially covered claim regardless of the

technical legal cause of action pleaded by the third party.").

Although the underlying action does not assert a claim for slander, Wolfes asserts that the

paragraphs 18 and 21 of the complaint in the Big Sky Action set forth above support her contention

that there was potential for coverage for slander2

 or disparagement. Here, because the court has

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disease;

3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business,

either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office

or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to

his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its

profits;

4. Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; or

5. Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 10

determined that Wolfes is not an insured under the Policy, it need not reach the question of whether

the facts in the complaint in the Big Sky Action potentially provide a basis for a claim that Wolfes

engaged in slander or libel or that she herself was slandered, libeled or her services disparaged.

B. Duplicative Action

Burlington asserts that the court should dismiss Case No. 07-04657 as impermissibly

duplicative of Case No. 07-00696. "Plaintiffs generally have no right to maintain two separate

actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same

defendant." Adams v. California Dept. of Health Services, 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citations and quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit recently stated district courts may exercise

their broad discretion to dismiss a duplicative later-filed action. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held,

"[a]fter weighing the equities of the case, the district court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a

duplicative later-filed action, to stay that action pending resolution of the previously filed action, to

enjoin the parties from proceeding with it, or to consolidate both actions." Id. In Adams, the court

applied the principles of claim preclusion and found that the later-filed suit was duplicative. Id. at

691. The court also found that the later-filed complaint was "an attempt to avoid the consequences

of her own delay and to circumvent the district court's denial of her untimely motion for leave to

amend her first complaint" and that given the circumstances of the case, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in dismissing the later-filed complaint. Id. at 688.

Although the court agrees that it has the power to dismiss Case No. 07-04657 as duplicative

as was done in Adams, the court will instead consolidate the actions. The court certainly wonders

why Wolfes filed the second action. There does not appear to be any dispute that the two federal

cases involve identical parties, the same insurance policy and the same decision to deny Wolfes a

defense under the policy. It also does not appear that parties dispute that the claims could (and

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

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MAG 11

should) have been brought in the same action. Wolfes did not seek to amend her claims in Case No.

07-00696 to add the claims now asserted in Case No. 07-04657, and she provides no explanation for

filing an entirely separate action rather than seeking to amend. 

Although Wolfes's new claims should not have been brought in a new action, it does not

appear that she filed a new case in an attempt to circumvent a prior court ruling or for any other

improper purpose. Therefore, the court finds that it is appropriate to merely consolidate Case No.

07-04657 with Case No. 07-00696. 

C. Motion to Strike

Finally, Burlington asks the court to strike plaintiff's allegations of punitive damages under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), contending that Wolfes cannot sufficiently plead facts to warrant an award of

punitive damages. The court grants Burlington's motion to strike Wolfes' allegations of and prayer

for punitive damages. Since Burlington has not breached its duties under the policy, the court

strikes her claim for punitive damages. 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment that

Burlington has a duty to defend. The court denies Burlington's motion to dismiss the complaint as

duplicative and grants plaintiff's motion to consolidate Case Nos. 07-00696 and 07-04657. The

court also grants Burlington's motion to strike plaintiff's allegation and prayer for punitive damages. 

DATED: 5/7/08

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:07-cv-04657-RMW Document 28 Filed 05/07/08 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

CONSOLIDATE CASES—No. C-07-00696 RMW; 07-04657

MAG 12

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

David Kraft DKraft6885@aol.com 

Counsel for Defendants:

Aaron Agness aagness@wmattorneys.com

Richard C. Weston rweston@wmattorneys.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 5/7/08 /s/ MAG

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:07-cv-04657-RMW Document 28 Filed 05/07/08 Page 12 of 12