Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01036/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01036-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS ALFREDO CASTRO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11-cr-323 – IEG

Related Case: 12-cv-1036 – IEG

ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR

CORRECT CONVICTION AND

SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 2255

[Doc. No. 26 in 11-cr-323]

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Presently before the Court is a motion by Petitioner Carlos Alfredo Castro (“Petitioner”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and sentence. [Doc.

No. 26.]1

 Petitioner, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, seeks relief on several grounds, including

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons given below, the Court, after due

consideration, DENIES Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and

sentence.

BACKGROUND

On December 30, 2010, Border Patrol agents arrested Petitioner near Calexico, California

after he was seen entering the United States by climbing over the international boundary fence

between the United States and Mexico. [Doc. No. 1.] The Government filed a complaint on

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, reference is to filings in 11-cr-323.

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January 3, 2011 charging Petitioner with violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. [Id.] Petitioner waived

indictment on January 27, 2011 and consented to being charged by information with violation of 8

U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b); the information also alleged that Petitioner had been removed from the

United States after July 10, 2008. [Doc. Nos. 8-9.] 

On February 24, 2011, Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty before a

magistrate judge to violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b). [Doc. Nos. 15-16.] In his plea

agreement, Petitioner admitted that he is “an alien and not a citizen of the United States . . . , [that

he received] an aggravated felony conviction . . . in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5(A)

. . . , [and that he] subsequently was lawfully excluded, deported and removed from the United

States to El Salvador on November 10, 2010 . . . .”2 [Doc. No. 16 at 2.] Petitioner also expressly

waived in the plea agreement any right to appeal or collaterally attack his guilty plea, conviction,

or sentence. [Id. at 3.] The Court subsequently accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea and, on May 23,

2011, sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 57 months, followed by a three-year term

of supervised release.3

 [Doc. Nos. 17; 23-24]. 

Petitioner brought the present timely motion on April 26, 2012. [Doc. No. 26.] On May 7,

2012, the Court ordered the Government to show cause why Petitioner’s motion should not be

granted. [Doc. No. 273] The Government filed its response in opposition on June 1, 2012. [Doc.

No. 31.] Petitioner filed his reply on July 3, 2012. [Doc. No. 32.]

Petitioner seeks relief on the grounds that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel

2

 On August 8, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of Corporal Injury to Spouse in violation of

California Penal Code § 273.5(a) in California state court and received a custodial sentence of 6 years.

[Doc. No. 31, Ex. 2.] On May 23, 2001, an immigration judge ordered that Petitioner be removed

from the United States pursuant to then 8 U.S.C. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii); immigration officials carried out

the order on August 22, 2001. [Doc. No. 31, Exs. 1, 3.] On June 30, 2008, immigration officials in

Los Angeles discovered Petitioner was in the United States without permission. [Doc. No. 31, Ex. 5.] 

The Government subsequently charged Petitioner in the Central District of California with violating

8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). [Id.] Following Petitioner’s guilty plea, Judge Matz sentenced

Petitioner on January 15, 2009 to a term of imprisonment of 30 months, followed by a three-year term

of supervised release. [Doc. No. 31, Ex. 6.] After immigration officials subsequently reinstated

Petitioner’s prior removal order, Petitioner was removed from the United States on November 10,

2010. [Doc. No. 31, Ex. 7-9.]

3

 At sentencing, the Court ruled Petitioner’s instant offense had an adjusted offense level of

19; because Petitioner was in Criminal History Category V, the Guidelines range was 57 to 71 months. 

[Doc. No. 30 at 15.]

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(“IAC”); (2) his prior removals were invalid; and (3) the Court improperly calculated his criminal

history score and sentence in a variety of ways.4

 [Doc. No. 26.] The Government contends

Petitioner’s claims are barred because Petitioner “knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence” and that Petitioner’s factual allegations

are refuted by the record. [Doc. No. 31 at 10.] Although several of Petitioner’s IAC allegations

are irrelevant to whether he waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, a

number of them challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea agreement and its waiver

of his collateral attack right. Therefore, whether Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his

right of collateral attack is determined by first examining the waiver provision in Petitioner’s plea

agreement and then considering Petitioner’s IAC claims attacking his plea agreement’s validity.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard for a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Conviction and

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

Petitioner brings the present motion to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 provides that a federal prisoner seeking relief from a

custodial sentence “may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct

the sentence” on “the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or

that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to

collateral attack . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To warrant relief under § 2255, a prisoner must allege

a constitutional, jurisdictional, or otherwise “fundamental defect which inherently results in a

complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair

procedure.” United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United

States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Errors of law which might

require reversal of a conviction or sentence on appeal do not necessarily provide a basis for relief

4

 Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the Court erred by (1) enhancing the level of his instant

offense by sixteen points for a prior aggravated felony conviction; (2) adding points to his criminal

history score for three prior felony convictions and for being on supervised release at the time of the

instant offense; and (3) refusing to grant his cultural assimilation motion. [Doc. No. 26 at 4-8.]

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under § 2255.” United States v. Wilcox, 640 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1981). 

“Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the

prisoner is entitled to no relief,” the Court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a §

2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The Ninth Circuit has stated the “standard is essentially

whether the movant has made specific factual allegations that, if true, state a claim on which relief

could be granted.” United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 

Therefore, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if the allegations, “when viewed against the

record, do not state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to

warrant summary dismissal.” United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, if a “prisoner’s motion presents no more than

conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts and refuted by the record, an evidentiary hearing is

not required.” United States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A defendant’s past representations in open court “constitute a formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong

presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by

specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are

wholly incredible.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); see also Womack v.

McDaniel, 497 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding it “reasonable . . . to reject [petitioner’s

habeas] claim that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently entered . . . . [where

petitioner’s] allegation is belied by his statements in open court and the contents of his signed plea

agreement.”). 

II. Waiver

Courts generally enforce plea agreements containing knowing and voluntary waivers of

statutory rights of appeal or collateral attack because such “waivers usefully preserve the finality

of judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to valid plea agreements.” United States v. Anglin,

215 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000). A “defendant may waive the statutory right to file a § 2255

petition challenging the length of his sentence” but the defendant must (1) expressly waive the

right of collateral attack and (2) do so knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

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431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993); United

States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 672 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). Further, even with an otherwise

seemingly valid waiver, a defendant cannot waive the statutory right to file a § 2255 petition

challenging the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea agreement and waiver because enforcing

the waiver would presuppose the very thing at issue: whether the waiver was valid in the first

place. See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 869-73 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a “plea

agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is

unenforceable with respect to an IAC claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver.”);

United States v. Racich, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“a waiver does not bar

claims that relate to the validity of the waiver itself.”); United States v. Contreras-Garcia, 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83282, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 15, 2012) (citing Lampert, 422 F.3d at 871) (“The

only claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary.”). 

Courts interpret plea agreements “using contract principles with any ambiguity construed

in the defendant’s favor.” United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 986 (9th Cir. 2009). The “scope

of a knowing and voluntary waiver is demonstrated by the express language of the plea

agreement.” Anglin, 215 F.3d at 1066. Courts look to “the circumstances surrounding the signing

and entry of the plea agreement to determine whether the defendant agreed to its terms knowingly

and voluntarily.” United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner’s plea agreement provides that Petitioner expressly “waives, to the full extent of

the law, any right to appeal or collaterally attack [his] guilty plea, conviction, and sentence, . . .

unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the greater of the high end of the guideline

range recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing . . .

.”5

 [Doc. No. 16 at 3.] During a thorough Rule 11 colloquy with Petitioner prior to accepting his

guilty plea, the magistrate judge discussed this waiver provision with Petitioner and received

confirmation from both Petitioner and his counsel that he understood it and the remainder of his

5

 The Court imposed a custodial sentence of 57 months, which is at the low end of the

Guideline range recommended by the Government. [Doc. Nos. 20 at 2; 30 at 14-16.] 

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plea agreement. [Doc. No. 29 at 8-9.] Petitioner’s claims collaterally attacking his guilty plea,

conviction, and sentence in his present § 2255 motion thus fall within the scope of the express

language of the waiver provision. Accordingly, Petitioner, by his plea agreement and his

representations in open court, waived his right to collaterally attack his guilty plea, conviction, and

sentence. 

Nonetheless, Petitioner alleges that his counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his waiver

invalid because it was not knowing and voluntary. Therefore, whether Petitioner’s waiver is valid

must be determined by considering the merits of his IAC claims challenging the knowing and

voluntary nature of his waiver. See Lampert,422 F.3d at 869-73; Contreras-Garcia, 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 83282, at *3-4. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Challenges to Validity of Waiver

A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show that (1) “counsel’s

performance was deficient”; and (2) the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)

(ruling Strickland test “applicable to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea

process.”). “In the context of a guilty plea, the ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether the alleged

ineffective assistance impinged on the defendant’s ability to enter an intelligent, knowing and

voluntary plea of guilty. To succeed, the defendant must show that counsel’s assistance was not

within the range of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases and that the defendant

suffered actual prejudice as a result.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2004). 

To prove prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 

Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply [objective]

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-689. However,

“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential [because it] is all too

tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,

and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to

conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Id. For this reason, there

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is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. . . .” Id. Finally, “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective

assistance claim to . . . address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an

insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

Petitioner brings two claims of IAC that challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his

waiver of his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. He alleges his counsel was

ineffective because she (1) did not properly advise him of the possible charges, penalties, and

immigration consequences he faced; and (2) allowed him to plead guilty to an offense Petitioner

was not charged with violating. [Doc. Nos. 26 and 32.] The record before the Court, however,

shows that Petitioner’s waiver was knowing and voluntary and that Petitioner’s allegations to the

contrary are wholly without merit.

For his first IAC claim, Petitioner vaguely alleges in his § 2255 motion that his counsel

failed to properly advise him of the charge and penalties facing him. [Doc. No. 26 at 6.] In his

reply brief, Petitioner improperly alleges for the first time that his counsel never discussed 8

U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) with him or informed him that the level of his instant offense was being

enhanced by sixteen points due to his removal from the United States following a prior aggravated

felony conviction.6

 [No. 32 at 3-4.] These allegations are not credible in light of the record,

however. Both the plea agreement and the magistrate judge informed Petitioner of the charge

against him and its elements and that by pleading guilty he faced a statutory maximum penalty of

“twenty years imprisonment, a $250,000 fine, supervised release of not more than three years and

a mandatory $100 penalty assessment.” [Doc. Nos. 16 at 1; 29 at 6-7.] Similarly, the sixteen point

enhancement Petitioner objects to in his reply is clearly stated in his plea agreement both as part of

the factual basis for his guilty plea as well as in the parties’ agreed upon Guidelines calculations.

[Doc. No. 16 at 2.] The plea agreement contains a clause providing that by signing the agreement

Petitioner was certifying he had read the agreement (or had it read to him), discussed it with his

counsel, and fully understood its “meaning and effect.” [Id. at 4.] Before entering his guilty plea,

6

 Ordinarily, “arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.” Graves v.

Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Petitioner and his counsel swore at his change of plea hearing that Petitioner had read the plea

agreement in its entirety, signed and initialed it on each page, discussed it “thoroughly” with his

attorney, and gone over with her the relevant sentencing guidelines and how they might apply to

him. [Doc. No. 7-9.] 

Moreover, Petitioner’s counsel openly discussed with the Court at sentencing the sixteen

point enhancement and its applicability to Petitioner. [Doc. No. 30 at 11.] Petitioner subsequently

spoke at length to the Court yet never expressed any surprise, confusion, or objection regarding his

counsel’s references to this enhancement. [Id. at 15.] Even after the Court expressly mentioned

the enhancement in its oral rendering of judgment, Petitioner made no objection. [Id. at 14-16.]

Though he alleges now he was never informed of the enhancement, Petitioner’s “earlier silence

refutes his present allegations.” Watts v. United States, 848 F.2d 275, 278 (9th Cir. 1988) (per

curiam) (finding the court did not err in dismissing the § 2255 motion without an evidentiary

hearing because “[it] is impossible to believe that if Watts had thought he was to receive a

sentence of no more than 20 years rather than the life sentence he was given, . . . he would not

have mentioned this obviously relevant inconsistency in his Rule 35 motion and in his

correspondence with Judge Duenas.”). Accordingly, when viewed against this record, Petitioner’s

allegations here are so palpably incredible that his claims are subject to dismissal. See Leonti, 326

F.3d at 1116; Womack, 497 F.3d at 1004.

Petitioner also alleges that his counsel failed to inform him of the “clear immigration

consequences” of his guilty plea, in violation of her duty under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.

1473 (2010). [Doc. No. 26 at 6.] Petitioner contends his guilty plea was therefore not knowing or

voluntary. [Id.] Petitioner, however, never makes any specific factual allegations explaining what

immigration consequences he was not informed of by counsel.7

 Petitioner’s allegation is also

undercut by the fact that Petitioner confirmed before entering his guilty plea that he was

stipulating to being removed from the United States following his imprisonment for the instant

offense, thereby revealing an understanding that his guilty plea would have severe immigration

7

 Indeed, it is not clear Petitioner truly seeks to bring a Padilla claim because the few facts

alleged in support have no bearing on whether his counsel informed him of the immigration

consequences of his plea. 

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consequences for him. [Doc. No. 29 at 6-7.] 

As his second IAC claim, Petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective in allowing

him to plead guilty to a crime he was not charged with, which caused him to receive a sentence

greater than he should have. [Doc. No. 26 at 6.] This IAC claim also must fail in light of the

record. In his § 2255 motion, Petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective because she

allowed him to plead guilty to §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2) when the indictment only charged him with

violating § 1326. [Id.] Petitioner goes on to allege that, if not for this error on his counsel’s part,

he would only have faced a maximum custodial sentence of 2 years under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. [Id.] 

Contrary to his allegations, however, Petitioner was not indicted for violation of § 1326; rather, he

waived indictment and was charged by information with violation of §§ 1326(a) and (b).8 [Doc.

Nos. 8-9.] Moreover, because Petitioner was indeed charged with violation of §§ 1326(a) and (b),

his allegation that he only faced at most 2 years of imprisonment also must fail. The record

therefore conclusively refutes Petitioner’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in this regard. 

For the reasons given above, Petitioner’s IAC claims challenging the knowing and

voluntary nature of his guilty plea and waiver are without merit. Because Petitioner has presented

no other grounds for his waiver’s invalidity, the Court concludes Petitioner knowingly and

voluntarily waived his statutory right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. 

IV. Remaining Claims

Petitioner’s remaining claims do not challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his

guilty plea and waiver but rather attack his conviction and sentence on other grounds. Because

these claims are within the scope of Petitioner’s valid waiver, the Court will enforce it against him

to bar these remaining claims.9

8

 Petitioner concedes as much in reply. [Doc. No. 32 at 2.] 

9

 Petitioner’s remaining IAC claims do not challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his

waiver, but only his counsel’s performance after the entry of Petitioner’s guilty plea. Accordingly,

they too are barred by Petitioner’s waiver. United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 340-44 (5th Cir.

2002) (holding that “an ineffective assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only

when the claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself. . . . [because

the] opposite result would render waivers of appeal meaningless.”); Pastoriza-Valerio v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1388, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2009) (Petitioner waived “purported ineffective

assistance claims because they are not directed to the voluntary or intelligent nature of his decision

to enter a guilty plea.”). 

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V. Certificate of Appealability 

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), there is no appeal from the final order in

a proceeding under § 2255 unless a “circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate

of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).” A “certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if

the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). To make the required showing, a “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner has failed to make such a showing. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court also DENIES

Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 21, 2012 ______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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