Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01415/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FLOYD NORTON, ARNOLD PEDERSEN, ) 

ROBERT LEE REMMICK, and STEVE ) 

NEIFFER, on behalf of ) 

themselves and all other ) 

employees and former employees ) 

of Worthen Van Service, Inc. ) 

similarly situated, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

FILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals 

TEinth Circuit 

FEB 171988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. ) No. 86-1415 

) 

WORTHEN VAN SERVICE, INC., a ) 

Wyoming corporation, · ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Wyoming 

D.C. No. C85-0069-Bl 

Jay C. Schultz (Gregory A. Eiesland with him on the briefs) of 

Lynn, Jackson, Shultz & Lebrun, P.C., Rapid City, South Dakota, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

David R. Gorsuch (Jane D. Smith with him on the brief) of Gorsuch, 

Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover, Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 86-1415 Document: 010110017404 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 1 
Before MOORE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, District 

Judge.* 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Layn R. Phillips, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1415 Document: 010110017404 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 2 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment 

dismissing plaintiffs' claim for back wages under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219 (FLSA). Plaintiffs Floyd 

Norton, Robert Remmick, and Steve Neiffer, argue on behalf of 

fifty-two current and former Worthen Van employees that the 

district court incorrectly decided time spent waiting on call did 

not constitute working time under the FLSA. Plaintiffs contend 

that waiting to be called was an integral part of their job 

because during this period they had to be immediately available to 

work and therefore could not pursue personal matters. While we 

sympathize with plaintiffs' claim, we affirm the district court's 

judgment that Worthen Van employees should not be compensated for 

being on call. 

I. 

The facts are not in dispute. Worthen Van operates a van 

service throughout Wyoming and adjoining states transporting 

railroad crews to and from their trains. When the railroad needs 

a crew transported, a dispatcher telephones a driver who is 

responsible for quickly arriving at the Worthen Van facility. 

Drivers generally work shifts of eight to twelve hours a day. 

During these shifts, drivers must be near enough to the employer's 

premises to be able to respond to calls within fifteen to twenty 

minutes. However, drivers are compensated for this waiting time 

only if they receive a call to transport railroad crews within two 

hours of their last call. If a driver fails to promptly respond 

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Appellate Case: 86-1415 Document: 010110017404 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 3 
to a dispatcher's call, he is disciplined by the company. A 

driver may be fired if he is disciplined three times. 

In February 1985, plaintiffs brought suit seeking back wages, 

overtime compensation, and liquidated damages. The trial court 

ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to be paid for time spent 

cleaning and inspecting vans but denied recovery because it found 

only the minimum wage provisions of FLSA applied to Worthen Van, 

and its employees had been paid at least a minimum wage for each 

week they had worked. The court also found that Worthen Van was 

exempt from paying overtime wages under the motor carrier 

exemption, 29 u.s.c. § 213(b)(l). Neither issue is before us on 

appeal. Finally, the trial court denied recovery of unpaid ·wages 

for waiting time. The court emphasized that time spent on c_all was 

primarily used for the benefit of the employees, since employees 

could leave the employer's premises and pursue personal matters 

which did not interfere with their ability to quickly return to 

work. 

II. 

Plaintiffs argue that this final finding by the trial court 

is clearly erroneous and urge us to decide that waiting while on 

call constitutes an integral part of their job. The employees 

argue that the unpredictability of assignments and the short 

response time which they are allowed preclude their using this 

waiting period for their own purposes. 1 Rather, they argue, the 

1As the plaintiffs note in their brief: 

(Continued to next page.) 

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Appellate Case: 86-1415 Document: 010110017404 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 4 
period between assignments is predominantly for Worthen Van's 

benefit, and employees should therefore receive compensation for 

the time they spend waiting. Plaintiffs also argue that Worthen 

Van strongly encourages drivers on call to remain at work between 

runs. Because of this policy, according to the plaintiffs, 

drivers have waited on or very near the Worthen Van premises for 

up to seven hours without getting paid. 

Whether periods of waiting for work should be compensable 

under the FLSA is to be determined by the facts and circumstances 

of each case. The FLSA simply defines "employ" as "to suffer or 

permit to work," and does not further define the relevant terms. 

29 u.s.c. § ·203(9). Case law has focused on how close an on-call 

employee must remain to the employer's premises or a work-related 

vehicle to be considered working. In Armour v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 

126 (1944), plaintiffs had to remain on call on the employer's 

premises for fifteen hours after their regular shifts as auxiliary 

firemen. The Supreme Court affirmed a lower court holding that 

the time spent eating and sleeping did not constitute work time, 

(Continued from prior page.) 

There are a host of personal, private pursuits that 

cannot be accomplished due to the strict mandate that 

on-call drivers be available at a moment's notice to 

respond to a call. For example, a driver who is 

waiting on call is effectively precluded from holding 

another job •..• He is unable to take his children 

to the park to play, or to work on his car for fear 

he may not hear the phone, or to work on his car and 

otherwise be unable to drive it anywhere •... An 

"on call" driver furthermore cannot safely invite 

people over to his house for dinner or to play cards, 

for example, because he must be available, on short 

notice. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1415 Document: 010110017404 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 5 
but that all waiting or on-call time should be compensated under 

the FLSA because "time spent lying in wait for threats to the 

safety of the employer's property may be treated by the parties as 

a benefit to the employer." Id. at 133. That same day, the Court 

in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), awarded 

compensation to auxiliary firemen for their on-call shifts, during 

which they had to remain on or very near the employer's premises. 

According to the Court, resolution of the matter involved 

determining the degree to which the employee could engage in 

personal activity while subject to being called. "Facts may show 

that the employee was engaged to wait, or they may show that he 

waited to be engaged." Id. at 137. 2 

The progeny of Armour and Skidmore further elucidate when 

waiting to work should be compensable. In Allen v. United States, 

1 Cl. Ct. 649 (1983), aff'd, 723 F.2d 69 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the 

court determined that federal marshals should not receive 

compensation under the FLSA for being on call after their regular 

work day. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that 

on-call federal marshals were free to pursue their individual 

pursuits subject only to the requirement that they remain sober 

and within range of their electronic beepers. Similarly, in 

Pilkenton v. Appalachian Regional Hosps., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 334 

(W.D. Va. 1971), the court held that plaintiff laboratory 

2These two cases are factually similar to Handler v. Thrasher, 191 

F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1951), in which we granted overtime 

compensation to an oil pumper who was required to be on call at 

his employer's oil field. The court specified that although the 

employee was probably not continually engaged in physical labor 

while on call, he had to be on the premises and ready to perform 

any function necessary to keep the wells pumping. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1415 Document: 010110017404 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 6 
technicians should not receive compensation for being on call 

because their freedom during these periods was circumscribed only 

by the requirements that they leave a phone number and arrive at 

the hospital within twenty minutes of receiving the call. See 

also Kelly v. Ballard, 298 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D. Cal. 1969) (awarded 

overtime for the period during which ambulance drivers were on 

call and required to remain at their station or by their 

ambulances). 3 

These opinions indicate that plaintiffs should not recover 

for the time they are on call. The firemen in Armour had to 

remain on the employer's premises, and in Skidmore, plaintiffs 

only had the choice of remaining in the firehall or staying within 

immediate hailing distance. Subsequent case law follows Armour 

and Skidmore by compensating employees who are required to remain 

either on the employer's premises, in the immediate vicinity, or 

by a work-related vehicle. The Van Worthen employees, on the 

other hand, have more of an opportunity to pursue personal 

business between assignments, even if being on call does limit 

3The principles set forth in these cases have been summarized in 

the various rules promulgated by the Administrator, Wage and Hour 

Division, United States Department of Labor. Of these rules, 

which are not controlling on the courts but may be used for 

guidance, the most relevant states: 

An employee who is required to remain on call on the 

employer's premises or so close thereto that he cannot 

use the time effectively for his own purposes is working 

while "on call." An employee who is not required to 

remain on the employer's premises but is merely required 

to leave word at his home or with company officials 

where he may be reached is not working while on call. 

29 C.F.R. § 785.17 (1985). 

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Appellate Case: 86-1415 Document: 010110017404 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 7 
their activity. Testimony showed that drivers spent their time 

between assignments at the homes of friends, at church, at 

laundromats, at restaurants, at pool halls, and at a local 

gymnasium. Several plaintiffs testified that they pursued 

hobbies, such as working on guns or physical fitness, while 

waiting to be called by a dispatcher. Furthermore, a simple 

paging device, which the drivers are free to purchase and to use, 

would have allayed the necessity of remaining by a phone. 

We also believe Worthen Van made a significant 

allow its drivers to use their waiting time effectively. 

effort to 

Although 

on several occasions drivers were told by dispatchers to wait at 

the employer's premises, in each instance the head dispatcher sat 

down with the driver and the ordering dispatcher and reiterated 

the ''Worthen Van policy" that on-call drivers may wait anywhere so 

long as they can be reached. Drivers also had the option to "go 

unavailable" for a certain period of time during which they would 

not be called, or to drop to the bottom of the driving list, 

making it far mor~ unlikely they would be called. 

Even though a condition of the plaintiffs' employment 

required a restriction on their personal 

the trial court correctly concluded 

constitute working time. Accordingly, 

district court is AFFIRMED. 

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activities, we believe 

this restriction did not 

the judgment of the 

Appellate Case: 86-1415 Document: 010110017404 Date Filed: 02/17/1988 Page: 8