Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-01592/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-01592-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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JUDGMENT GRANTING PLAINTIFF''S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

No. C-08-01592 RMW

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 2/8/10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HOMER T. MCCRARY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARLOS M. GUTIERREZ, in his official

capacity as U.S. Secretary of Commerce, the

NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE,

and RUSS M. STRACH, in his official capacity

as Assistant Regional Administrator of the

Protected Resource Division of the Southwest

Region of the National Marine Fisheries

Service.

Defendants.

No. C-08-01592 RMW

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Re Docket Nos. 39, 43]

Plaintiff Homer T. McCrary ("McCrary") moves for summary judgment that defendant

National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting his

petition arguing that coho salmon south of San Francisco should not be designated as "endangered"

under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Plaintiff also complains that defendants ignored the

statutory ninety-day deadline for making a threshold determination as to whether the petition

"present[ed] substantial scientific and commercial information indicating that the petitioned action

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JUDGMENT GRANTING PLAINTIFF''S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING

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may be warranted." 16 U.S.C. § 1553(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). In response, defendants Carlos

Gutierrez, United States Secretary of Commerce, Russ M. Strach, Assistant Regional Administrator

of the Protected Resources Division of the Southwest Region, and the NMFS move for summary

judgment that the NMFS's decision to deny plaintiff's petition is entitled to deference under the

Administrative Procedures Act, and plaintiff has failed to show that the decision was arbitrary and

capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). For the reasons stated below, the court grants plaintiff's motion

and denies defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Endangered Species Act, enacted in 1973, provides for the listing and conservation of

endangered and threatened species of wildlife, fish, and plants. The ESA defines a "species" as "any

subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of vertebrate fish or

wildlife which interbreeds when mature." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). The statute does not define

"distinct population segment" ("DPS"), but regulations require that species be determined in

accordance with "standard taxonomic distinctions and the biological expertise of the Department and

the scientific community concerning the relevant taxonomic group." 50 C.F.R. 414.11(a). The

NMFS determined that any evolutionary significant unit ("ESU") of Pacific salmon constitutes a

species under the ESA. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58612. The NMFS's 1991 policy defines an ESU as a

salmon stock that is: (1) substantially reproductively isolated from other nonspecific population

units; and (2) represents an important component in the legacy of the species. Id.

Coho salmon that occupy the coastal streams in Santa Cruz and San Mateo counties south of

San Francisco have been classified under the Endangered Species Act as a "threatened" species since

1996 and an "endangered" one since 2005. 71 Fed. Reg. 14683. These salmon are part of the

Central California Coast ("CCC") coho salmon ESU, which includes salmon populations from Punta

Gorda, California down to the San Lorenzo River in Santa Cruz. 61 Fed. Reg. 56138.

Under the ESA, interested parties may petition the Secretary of Commerce to add or remove

a species from the "endangered" or "threatened" lists. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(A). Plaintiff Homer

McCrary's petition seeks to exclude coho salmon south of San Francisco from the CCC ESU. 

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JUDGMENT GRANTING PLAINTIFF''S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING

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McCrary's petition argues that hatchery-introduced salmon populations should not be protected by

the ESA because they are not an evolutionarily important component of the species. Pl.'s Mot. for

Summ. J. at 8. The petition contends, generally, that coho salmon are not native and cannot survive

long term south of San Francisco, and thus any existing population is hatchery introduced. Because

the ESA is meant to protect "naturally spawned populations," not hatchery-supported ones, the

petition requests that the CCC ESU be revised to exclude coho salmon south of San Francisco. See

50 C.F.R. § 224.101(a).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and discovery show there is "no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although there may have been factual issues before an administrative agency

whose action the district court is asked to review, "the function of the district court is to determine

whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to

make the decision it did. . . . [S]ummary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for deciding the

legal question of whether the agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did." Occidental

Engineering Co. v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 766, 769-770 (9th Cir. 1985). In other words, summary

judgment is appropriate in this case because "[w]hen a party seeks review of agency action under the

APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal. The entire case on review is a question of law." 

American Bioscience v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.Cir. 2001); see Occidental, 753 F.2d

at 769.

B. The Standard of Review

The ESA provides for a two-step process to review petitions seeking changes to the

threatened and endangered species lists. Under the ESA, "[t]o the maximum extent practicable,

within 90 days after receiving the petition of an interested person . . . , the Secretary shall make a

finding as to whether the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial information

indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A)(emphasis

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added). "Substantial information" is "that amount of information that would lead a reasonable

person to believe that the measure proposed in the petition may be warranted." 50 C.F.R.

424.14(b)(1). If the Secretary determines that the petition does present substantial information, the

Secretary "shall promptly commence a review of the status of the species concerned." Id. Within

twelve months after the initial finding, the Secretary must make one of the following findings: (1)

that the action is not warranted; (2) that it is warranted and a proposed regulation should be

published; or (3) that it is warranted but implementation is precluded by other pending proposals. 16

U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B). In making this twelve-month determination, the NMFS must invite

comment from all interested parties. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Morgenweck, 351 F.Supp.2d

1137, 1143 (D.Col. 2004) (citing 50 C.F.R. § 424.15(c)).

The standard that the agency must apply at each stage, and the materials it normally should

consider, are different for the 90-day findings and those required at the twelve-month stage. At the

90-day stage, the statute directs the agency only to assess whether the scientific or commercial

information presented in the petition is substantial. The twelve-month inquiry, on the other hand,

involves a full assessment of the petitioned action's merits, with public comment and proposed rulemaking. Although there is no explicit prohibition against consulting extra-petition information at

the 90-day stage, the statute's language and procedural structure suggest that the petition itself

should be the inquiry's primary focus. See Morganweck, 351 F.Supp.2d at 1143 ("Invitations to

others to respond to the Petition should await the twelve-month status review."). Additionally, in

order to merit a twelve-month status review, the evidence at the 90-day stage need only be

substantial enough that a reasonable person would find that the requested addition or removal may

be warranted. 

At the 90-day stage, the question is not whether the designation is warranted, only

whether it may be. The standard requiring consideration of whether a "reasonable

person" would conclude that action "may be warranted" contemplates that where

there is disagreement among reasonable scientists, then the Service should make the

"may be warranted" finding and then proceed to the more-searching next step in the

ESA process.

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 2007 WL 163244, at *7 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 19, 2007); see

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 659822, at *12 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2008). This

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more limited standard "seems to require that in cases of contradictory evidence, the Service must

defer to information that supports [the] petition's position." Kempthorne, 2007 WL 163244, at *4. 

The statute thus suggests that the evidentiary assessment at the 90-day stage is a preliminary one. 

Nevertheless, as defendants point out, the initial 90-day assessment does require an evaluation of 

whether the evidence supporting the petition is substantial.

Generally, the court will set aside an agency action only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Review under

the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, and the court will not substitute its judgment for that

of the agency. The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). A decision is

arbitrary and capricious if "the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider,

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation that runs

counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a

difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Id. (internal quotations and citations

omitted). As defendants point out, particular deference is appropriate when reviewing an agency

judgment on a matter within that agency's scientific expertise. As the Ninth Circuit wrote in Lands

Council, "[w]e are to be most deferential when the agency is making predictions within its area of

special expertise, at the frontiers of science." 537 F.3d at 993 (citing Forest Guardians v. U.S.

Forest Service, 329 F.3d 1089, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003)).

The parties dispute whether the NMFS's decision at the 90-day stage is due heightened

deference under Lands Council. Defendants argue that the "NMFS has expertise in fish biology and

ecology, and as such its evaluations of the available scientific information is entitled to a high level

of deference." Federal Defs.' Combined Opp'n. and Cross-Mot. Summ. J. at 14:15-17. Plaintiff

responds that the determination of whether a reasonable person would find that the petitioned action

may be warranted is "manifestly not the ultimate scientific and policy determination, and, indeed, is

not the sort of determination as to which the defendants have any particular expertise." Pl.'s

Combined Opp'n. and Reply at 6:12-14. 

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1

 In support of their contention that the preliminary assessment requires exercise of agency

expertise, defendants point to the regulation requiring that a petition be accompanied by "appropriate

supporting documentation in the form of bibliographic references, reprints of pertinent publications,

copies of reports or letters from authorities, and maps." 50 C.F.R. 424.14(b)(2)(iv). This regulation

does reflect that some expertise may be necessary, but the 90-day determination is only preliminary

and only assesses whether a reasonable person may find the requested action warranted.

JUDGMENT GRANTING PLAINTIFF''S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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The regulatory scheme supports each side's position to a limited extent. There is nothing in

the regulatory scheme that suggests that the agency should not use its expertise at the 90-day stage in

determining whether the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial information.1

However, its determination at the 90-day stage is only whether the information would lead a

reasonable person to believe action "may" be warranted. If it determines that the petition is

supported by substantial scientific or commercial information that may justify the action requested

by the petitioner, the agency should not reject the petition at the 90-day stage. Rather, it should

proceed with a full investigation of the merits of the requested action, including considering public

comment and scientific or commercial information outside what is supplied with the petition. The

agency's expertise is particularly important at the 12-month stage when the agency makes findings as

to whether the action requested by the petition is warranted.

C. The NMFS's Decision to Reject the Petition

In this case, the plaintiff filed his petition on November 6, 2003 seeking a reconsideration of

the ESA listing of coho salmon in California, arguing that the geographic scope of the listing should

not include populations south of San Francisco. The petition led to a lengthy dialogue between

plaintiff and the NMFS. On July 16, 2004, the NMFS's Southwest Fisheries Science Center

provided an evaluation of plaintiff's petition and supporting materials and concluded that the

petitioner's request was not supported. Petitioner responded by submitting supplemental information

on October 18 and 25, 2004. The NMFS responded on March 17, 2005 and provided a second

evaluation that again concluded that the petition was not supported by historic or scientific evidence. 

Once again, plaintiff responded by sending a written response on May 10, 2005 and additional

submissions on October 11, 2005 and December 5, 2005. Staff from the NMFS's Southwest

Regional Center met with plaintiff and his representative on November 30, 2005. On March 23,

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2006, the NMFS published its findings under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A), rejecting the petition. This

protracted exchange does not appear to be what the regulatory scheme contemplates will occur

before an initial 90-day determination. However, it appears that plaintiff was at least in part

responsible for the protracted period because he supplemented his petition several times. 

Nevertheless, the fact that a more lengthy and rigorous evaluation was undertaken than the statute

envisions does not change the standard to be applied. Thus, the question to be answered by this

court is whether the NMFS had a rational basis for concluding that a reasonable person would not

find the scientific or commercial information supplied with plaintiff's petition sufficient to show that

coho salmon south of San Francisco should not be designated as an endangered specie. In other

words, were the NMFS's findings under § 1533(b)(3)(A) arbitrary and capricious? 

Plaintiff marshaled three types of evidence supporting his proposal to modify the geographic

scope of the CCC ESU. First, he contended that historical sources demonstrate that the central

California coho habitat does not extend south of San Francisco. Administrative Record ("AR")

1362. This historical evidence comes in a variety of forms. Plaintiff quotes from works by

prominent ichthyologist David Starr Jordan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, stating

that coho salmon are rare or nonexistent south of San Francisco. AR 1362-63. Plaintiff also points

to newspaper and administrative records suggesting that: (1) coho salmon did not exist south of San

Francisco; and (2) local hatcheries sought to introduce coho to the Santa Cruz area. AR 1363-64. In

addition, the petition states that the first "credible scientific mention" of coho salmon south of San

Francisco appeared in a 1912 bulletin of the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries. Plaintiff contends that this

appearance is the result of hatchery-introduced coho salmon. AR 1365.

Second, the petition points to the lack of coho remains in Native American middens (i.e.

refuse areas) in Santa Cruz and San Mateo counties. Third, the petition summarizes the inhospitable

environment that the streams south of San Francisco present to coho salmon: short, steep streams

with widely variable water flows, frequent droughts, and easily eroded terrain.

Defendants respond that the NMFS reasonably found this evidence unpersuasive. 

Defendants contend that genetic data contradicts the hypothesis that turn-of-the-century

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introductions of out-of-state hatchery salmon are responsible for the coho population south of San

Francisco. Defendants point to samples of juvenile coho salmon retrieved in 1985 from streams in

San Mateo and Santa Cruz counties. Defendants contend that the number of fish introduced by

hatcheries could not have produced the population that exists today. Fed. Defs'. Combined Opp'n.

and Cross-Mot. Summ. J. at 21. Defendants also criticize the newspaper and magazine excerpts as

not representing scientific evidence that coho salmon are exotic south of San Francisco. Defendants

argue that the lack of coho remains in the Native American middens is not evidence of their absence

and contend that the climate south of San Francisco does, in fact, allow persistent salmon

populations. To these objections, plaintiff has his rejoinders. See Pl.'s Combined Opp'n. and Reply

in support of Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 6-24. 

The NMFS cites the recent district court decision in Palouse Prairie Foundation v. Salazar,

2009 WL 415596 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2009), as supporting its position. In Palouse Prairie, the

plaintiffs challenged the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service's ("FWS") 90-day finding rejecting their

petition to list the giant Palouse earthworm under the ESA. The plaintiffs in Palouse relied heavily

upon circumstantial evidence, much like plaintiff does here. 2009 WL 415596 at *2. The plaintiffs

in Palouse argued that:

FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by discounting their interpretation of the data. 

They submit that the FWS was required to accept their interpretation unless no

reasonable person would accept it. The plaintiffs acknowledge that their

interpretation may not be the only reasonable interpretation or even the most

persuasive one. That does not matter at the initial stage in the proceedings, say the

plaintiffs. All that matters is that their interpretation is a reasonable one. 

Consequently, as the plaintiffs see it, the FWS's negative 90-day finding must be

reversed unless the FWS demonstrates to the Court's satisfaction that no reasonable

person would accept their interpretation of the data.

Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs' position as according "insufficient deference to the FWS's

scientific judgment." Id.

Plaintiff seeks to distinguish Palouse on the basis that the plaintiff's evidence in that case was

feeble and, unlike in the instant case, there was no evidence that the FWS applied the wrong

standard. Although the court agrees that the evidence in Palouse was weaker than that offered by

plaintiff here, this does not mean that plaintiff's evidence necessarily supports a conclusion that

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removal of the designation of coho salmon south of San Francisco as an endangered species "may be

warranted." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A). However, it does appear that the NMFS, although

purporting to utilize the correct procedure and review standard, simply bypassed the initial 90-day

review and proceeded to do what was, in essence, a twelve-month status review without the required

notice and the opportunity for public comment. See Morgenweck, 351 F.Supp.2d at 1143; Western

Watersheds Project v. Hall, 2007 WL 2790404 (D. Idaho Sept. 24, 2007). 

"[T]he [reasonable person] standard . . . contemplates that where there is disagreement

among reasonable scientists, then the FWS should make the 'may be warranted' finding and then

proceed to the more-searching next step in the ESA process." Kempthorne, 2007 WL 163244 at *7;

see Kempthorne, 2008 WL 659822, at *12. "The only question before the FWS when it conducts a

90-day review is whether the petitioned action may be warranted, not whether it is warranted. As

such, the application of an evidentiary standard requiring conclusive data in the context of a 90-day

review is arbitrary and capricious." Kempthorne, 2007 WL 163244 at *7 (emphasis added).

Courts faced with the issue of what evidence should be considered during the 90-day review

have held that the agency may only consider information within the four corners of the petition. See

Morgenweck, 351 F.Supp.2d at 1143 ("FWS's consideration of outside information and opinions

provided by state and federal agencies during the 90-day review was over inclusive of the type of

information the ESA contemplates to be reviewed at this stage."); Western Watersheds Project, 2007

WL 2790404 at *6 ("It was improper for the Service to make an outside solicitation or inquiry about

the Petition and consider the responses when making its 90-Day Finding); Western Watersheds

Project v. Norton, 2007 WL 2827375, at *7 (D. Idaho Sept. 26, 2007) ("[C]onsidering information

outside of the four corners of the petitions impermissibly expanded the scope of the 90-day review");

Kempthrone, 2007 WL 16322 at *4 ("The 'may be warranted' standard, however, seems to require

that in cases of such contradictory evidence, the Service must defer to information that supports

petition's position. It would be wrong to discount the information submitted in a petition solely

because other data might contradict it.").

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Defendants, in their effort to refute the showing made by plaintiff, offer evidence that

appears to go beyond the four corners of the petition, some of which appears to have been gathered

from third parties. In their findings rejecting the petition (which was made almost two-and-one-half

years after the petition was filed), the NMFS cites evaluations by its Southwest Fisheries Science

Center in October 2004 and March 2005. These evaluations appear to consider information gathered

from third parties, such as the Collection Manager of the California Academy of Sciences

Ichthyological Collection, as well as studies not included in the petition, such as records of out-ofstate salmon plantings. 2006 WL 721667 (F.R.) at *4, 5, 7.

Although defendants purport to find that substantial evidence does not support the petition,

there are indications that defendants actually considered the threshold requirements met. First, it

seems unlikely that defendants would undertake two evaluations and meet with plaintiff during the

nearly two and a half year period the petition was pending if the petition did not present sufficient

evidence to meet the 90-day threshold requirement. Second, in August of 2004 the Regional

Administrator of the NMFS acknowledged receipt of the petition and stated:

[T]his office did receive your petition in November 2003. Due to heavy workload . . .

we neglected to acknowledge receipt of the petition in writing and also failed to

prepare and publish a Federal Register Notice indicating that we had accepted your

petition. Subsequent to receipt and initial review of the petition, however, Regional

office staff did determine the petition should be accepted and that it warranted further

technical review. 

AR 1450. Although the NMFS dismisses this letter as not being a finding, the letter nevertheless

offers some insight regarding how the NMFS actually viewed the sufficiency of plaintiff's petition. 

Third, the last sentence of defendant's findings made on March 17, 2005 reads: "In any case, even if

the information presented by the petitioner were to have been considered to warrant further review, a

review of the additional scientific and commercial information regarding the description of the CCC

coho salmon ESU indicates that the petitioned action is not warranted." 2006 WL 721667 (F.R.) at

*8. Although the NMFS purports to have determined that review beyond the 90-day stage was not

warranted, this sentence does suggest that defendants did not appreciate the difference between the

scope of evidence to be reviewed at the two stages and that a twelve-month review required notice

and time for interested parties to comment.

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The court should not substitute its judgment for that of the NMFS on subject matter within

the particular expertise of the NMFS. However, here, the court need not make a determination on

the merits regarding whether the geographic scope of the listing of coho salmon as an endangered

species is appropriate. The court only needs to determine whether the NMFS's denial of plaintiff's

petition was arbitrary and capricious. An agency rule is generally considered arbitrary and

capricious when "the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider." 

Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Here, the

NMFS appears to rely upon evidence beyond the four corners of the petition. In addition, the NMFS

appears to have used the standard to be applied for a twelve-month status review rather than the

proper standard at the 90-day threshold determination. The court concludes that defendants did not

follow the statutory scheme for the 90-day review of plaintiff's petition and that the rejection of

plaintiff's petition was arbitrary and capricious. 

The Supreme Court has made clear that where an agency has improperly relied on outside

factors, "the reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not

supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given." Id. Therefore,

the court need not determine whether there could be a rational basis for denying plaintiff's petition

using the correct 90-day standard and considering only information in the four corners of the

petition.

III. ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS plaintiff's motion for summary judgment,

DENIES defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, VACATES the 90-day finding, and

REMANDS to the NMFS the petition for proceedings in accordance with 16 U.S.C. §

1533(b)(3)(A). The NMFS shall make a 90-day finding based solely on information in the four

corners of the petition and applying the proper 90-day standard.

DATED: 2/8/10

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:08-cv-01592-RMW Document 53 Filed 02/08/10 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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JUDGMENT GRANTING PLAINTIFF''S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

No. C-08-01592 RMW

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

James L. Buchal counsel@buchal.com

Andrea Mocsny Miller amiller@NMLawFirm.com

Counsel for Defendants:

Robert Pendleton Williams robert.p.williams@usdoj.gov

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 2/8/10 CCL

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:08-cv-01592-RMW Document 53 Filed 02/08/10 Page 12 of 12