Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04943/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04943-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jon Beyers,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 19-04943-PHX-SPL (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On August 9, 2019, Petitioner Jon Beyers, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison,

Huachuca Unit, Kingman, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (hereinafter “habeas petition”). (Doc. 1.)

Respondents filed a Limited Answer on December 13, 2019. (Doc. 9.) Petitioner has not filed

a Reply.

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2013, Petitioner was charged by an Arizona state grand jury with five

felony counts: molestation of a child (count one), a class 2 felony and dangerous crime against

children, sexual exploitation of a minor (counts two-four), class 2 felonies and dangerous

crimes against children, and voyeurism (count five), a class 5 felony. (Doc. 9, Exh. B.) 

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement on January 16, 2015, in which he agreed to plead

guilty to count one, and counts two and three as amended to attempted sexual exploitation of

a minor. (Id., Exh. E.) In exchange, Petitioner agreed to a presumptive sentence of 17 years

Case 2:19-cv-04943-SPL Document 10 Filed 06/03/20 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

in prison on count one, and lifetime probation supervision on amended counts two and three.

(Id. at 1-2.) 

A presentence report was prepared, in which the facts underlying the offenses were

summarized. (Doc. 9, Exh. G.) In 2012, Petitioner’s wife had found explicit photographs

of Petitioner’s 14-year-old daughter on Petitioner’s computer jump drive. (Id. at 1.)

Petitioner’s daughter confirmed that her father had touched her inappropriately on the leg and

buttocks. (Id.) Several of the pictures found on Petitioner’s jump drive were of his

daughter’s exposed breast and vagina, and some had pictures of a hand pulling down her

shorts or touching her vagina. (Id.) Petitioner was sentenced on February 26, 2015, to 17

years in prison on count one, and lifetime probation on counts two and three - the probation

to follow upon Petitioner’s release from prison. (Id., Exh. H.) Petitioner was given, and

acknowledged receipt of, a Notice of Rights of Review after Conviction and Procedure, in

which he was advised of the deadlines to file an appeal or petition for post-conviction relief.

(Id., Exh. I.)

Over three years later, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”).

In his Notice, he alleged generally that his trial counsel was ineffective, and claimed he was

not at fault for his untimely notice, but did not offer specific facts in support of this claim.

(Doc. 9, Exh. J.) The trial court dismissed the Notice, finding it untimely:

Under Rule 32.4(a)(2)(C) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

the Notice of Post-Conviction Relief must be filed within 90 days of the entry

of judgment and sentencing. This date is clearly stated in the “Notice of PostConviction Relief After Conviction Procedure” form that Defendant received

at sentencing. Because this Court sentenced Defendant on February 26, 2015,

the deadline for Defendant’s Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was May 27,

2015. His Rule 32 proceeding is untimely by more than three years. ...

Nevertheless, Defendant contends that the untimeliness of this Rule 32

proceeding is without fault on his part and he is entitled to relief under Arizona

Rule of Crimnial Procedure 32.1(f), (Notice at 3) He fails to supply an

adequate factual or legal basis for relief. Moreover, the “Notice of rights of

Review After Conviction and Procedure” form he received at sentencing

clearly states that a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief must be filed within 90

days. ...

He also contends that his convictions and punishment were obtained in

violation of his constitutional rights and he is entitled to relief under Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a). Specifically, Defendant claims that he

Case 2:19-cv-04943-SPL Document 10 Filed 06/03/20 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

received ineffective assistance from counsel and seeks a reduction in sentence

and probation terms. (Notice at 2-3) He cannot raise this Rule 32.1(a) claim

in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding because the notice may only raise claims

pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h), Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)(2)(A);

see generally State v. Petty, 225 Ariz. 369, 373 ¶ 11, 238 P.3d 637, 641 (App.

2010) (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “cognizable under

Rule 32.1(a)”). The Rule 32.1(a) claim Defendant has asserted was required

to be raised in a timely Rule 32 proceeding.

In sum, Defendant fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted

in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding. Defendant must assert substantive claims

and adequately explain the reasons for their untimely assertions. Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.2(b). Defendant has failed to meet that standard.

(Doc. 9, Exh. K.)

On August 3, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, challenging the trial court’s dismissal of his PCR proceedings. (Doc. 9, Exhs. L,

M.) The appellate court granted review, but denied the petition, finding that, after a review

of the record in the matter that “petitioner has not shown any abuse of discretion.” (Id., Exh.

M.) The mandate issued on December 21, 2018. (Id., Exh. O.)

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), as his habeas petition was

filed on August 9, 2019, over four years subsequent to his sentencing on February 26, 2015,

and that he is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. (Doc. 9.) Petitioner has not filed

a reply.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. Timeliness under the AEDPA.

 The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

Case 2:19-cv-04943-SPL Document 10 Filed 06/03/20 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

 An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

 Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

 In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See id.

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

Case 2:19-cv-04943-SPL Document 10 Filed 06/03/20 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

A. Statutory Tolling.

 As Petitioner pleaded guilty, his conviction became final upon “conclusion of the

Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the expiration of time

for seeking such proceeding or review.” Summers, 481 F.3d at 711. Petitioner was

sentenced on February 26, 2015. The deadline for Petitioner to file a PCR notice was 90-

days later, or on May 27, 2015. See, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (in an of-right proceeding,

petitioner must file notice of PCR within 90 days of the judgment and sentence). The

AEDPA statute of limitations expired one year later, on May 27, 2016. Petitioner did not

submit his habeas petition for filing until August 9, 2019, rendering his habeas petition

untimely by over three years. 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the time his PCR proceeding was

pending, as his PCR notice was not “properly filed.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The trial

court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR proceedings as untimely, as it was filed well past the 90-

day deadline, and Petitioner had not raised any claims permitted in an untimely PCR

proceedings. Nonetheless, even if Petitioner was entitled to statutory tolling of the time his

PCR proceedings were pending, his habeas petition is still untimely, as the limitations period

had expired two years prior to Petitioner initiating PCR proceedings. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d

at 823 (“2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended

before the state petition was filed.”). 

B. Equitable Tolling.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

Case 2:19-cv-04943-SPL Document 10 Filed 06/03/20 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648-53

(2010); see Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19. Petitioner must also establish a “causal connection”

between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. See Bryant

v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). Petitioner’s burden of

establishing entitlement to equitable tolling is a heavy one. Rubin v. Myles, 781 F.3d 1043,

1055 (9th Cir. 2014).

In his habeas petition, Petitioner acknowledges his petition is untimely, but states as

an excuse, “that of misplaced paperwork done on a schedule poorly search. [sic] It has taken

this much time to recover, re-review said paperwork and submit it to this court.” (Doc. 1 at

11.) He provides no further details, and Petitioner has not replied to Respondents’ Answer.

Petitioner has not carried his burden of establishing that he pursued his rights diligently, or

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in the way of his timely initiating habeas

proceedings. As such, this Court will recommend that Petitioner’s habeas petition be denied

and dismissed with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, and that Petitioner

is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, the Court need not address Respondents’ other

affirmative defense. The Court will recommend that Petitioner’s habeas petition be denied

and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

Case 2:19-cv-04943-SPL Document 10 Filed 06/03/20 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 3rd day of June, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-04943-SPL Document 10 Filed 06/03/20 Page 7 of 7