Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00029/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00029-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

---

1. Initially, Kubek asserted federal claims with

jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal

question), but with her federal claims now resolved, see,

e.g., Kubek v. Teachers' Retirement System of Ala., 2008

(continued...)

 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

RISOLETA M. KUBEK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:04cv29-MHT

) (WO)

NORA KUBEK JONES, )

)

Defendant. )

 OPINION

Plaintiff Risoleta M. Kubek seeks damages under

Alabama law for the conversion of her benefits under her

late ex-husband’s retirement and life-insurance policies.

Kubek alleges that her step-daughter, defendant Nora

Kubek Jones, converted these policies by forging “Limited

Power of Attorney” and “Notice of Survivor Benefits

Cancellation” forms and exercising undue influence over

the ex-husband. This court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental).1

 Based on an on-the-record

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 1 of 13
1. (...continued)

WL 696870 (M.D. Ala. 2008), only her state conversion

claim is left, with jurisdiction, as stated, resting on

§ 1367. Kubek also asserts diversity jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1332, but Kubek and Jones are not “diverse”

under § 1332 because Kubek is a dual American-Brazilian

citizen residing in Brazil. See Molinos Valle Del Cibao,

C. por. A. V. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011)

(holding that “an individual who is a dual citizen of the

United States and another nation is only a citizen of the

United States for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction

under § 1332(a)”).

2. There is a wrinkle, however: While Jones filed

an answer in August 2004, she has not made an appearance

since then. At the pretrial conference on September 26,

2011, Kubek waived her right to a jury trial. The court

finds that Jones’s absence constitutes a waiver of her

right to a jury trial. See Southland Reship, Inc. v.

Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 644-45 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding

waiver of right to jury trial when counsel participated

at hearing and failed to object); 9 Charles Alan Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2321

(3d ed. 2008) (“The right to jury trial also may be

waived as it has in many, many cases, by conduct.”).

3. On March 31, 2009, this court denied summary

(continued...)

2

stipulation at the pretrial conference to resolve the

conversion claim on the record without a jury trial and

after a full review of the record,2

 this court now makes

the following findings of fact and reaches the following

conclusions of law on Kubek’s conversion claim.3

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 2 of 13
3. (...continued)

judgment in favor of Kubek and against Jones. Kubek v.

Jones, 2009 WL 903289 (M.D. Ala. March 31, 2009). More

recently, in September 2011, this court sua sponte issued

an order directing Kubek to show cause why summary

judgment should not be granted to Jones. On September

30, 2011, this court denied summary judgment in favor of

Jones and against Kubek.

3

I. Findings of Fact

Kubek’s conversion claim arises from her status as a

beneficiary under two policies. 

First, Kubek was entitled to survivor benefits under

her ex-husband’s retirement policy. While Alabama law

prohibited the ex-husband from changing the retirement

policy’s beneficiary, he did retain the right to cancel

the survivor’s allowance. See 1975 Ala. Code

§ 36-27-16.1(a). Kubek alleges that Jones filed a forged

“Notice of Survivor Benefits Cancellation” form with the

ex-husband’s former employer. As a result, Jones

received a pro-rata survivor benefit of $ 188.05 for the

ten days that her father was alive in June 2003.

Second, Kubek was listed as the beneficiary of her

ex-husband’s life-insurance policy. Kubek alleges that

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 3 of 13
4

Jones exercised undue influence to remove Kubek and name

Jones as the policy’s beneficiary. Upon the ex-husband’s

death, the life-insurance policy paid out $ 60,000 in

benefits and $ 17.26 in interest.

The court finds that Jones engaged in forgery and

undue influence to obtain control unlawfully over these

policies. 

With regards to the retirement policy, Kubek contends

that Jones used a fraudulently acquired power-of-attorney

to cancel her survivor benefits. The disputed “Limited

Power of Attorney” form was signed in July 1999 and the

“Notice of Survivor Benefits Cancellation” form was

completed in November 1999. Both forms include notary

seals of Tina Carter. But Carter has submitted an

affidavit testifying that she did not notarize these

documents. Kubek argues that these two forgeries cast

doubt on the veracity of the ex-husband’s signatures and

the documents as a whole. 

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 4 of 13
5

The court agrees with this reading of the Carter

forgeries. The disputed forms benefitted Jones at

Kubek’s expense, and, given the undisputed evidence that

Carter’s notarizations were forged, it is clear that

these documents lack any reliable indicia of

authenticity. 

Other evidence also points to Jones as the author of

the forms. For instance, the “limited power of attorney”

form includes handwriting that refers to the ex-husband

in the third person. Doc. No. 178-3 (referring to

“royalties from his books published”) (emphasis added).

The court, therefore, concludes that the “Limited Power

of Attorney” and “Notice of Survivor Benefits

Cancellation” forms fraudulently notarized by Tina Carter

are total forgeries and that Jones orchestrated this

scheme to benefit herself. 

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 5 of 13
4. Kubek relies on a undue-influence theory because

a superceding power-of-attorney granted Jones authority

over the ex-husband’s affairs and there is no evidence in

the record to support a claim that this second power-ofattorney is a forgery. (Doc. No. 106-8).

6

As to the life-insurance policy, Kubek asserts that

Jones exerted undue influence over the ex-husband when he

submitted a change-of-beneficiary form in September 2000.4

The court finds that the ex-husband, then 80 years

old, was in failing mental and physical health in 2000.

A November 21, 1999, letter from Jones to Kubek details

the ex-husband’s health. Jones describes the exhusband’s inability to care for himself, do his own

laundry, clean his home, and follow a proper diet. Jones

states that her father’s health was “deteriorating” and

that he was “weak and fragile.” Doc. No. 106-6.

Additionally, the ex-husband’s death certificate shows

that he suffered from dementia at the time of his death

in June 2003. 

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 6 of 13
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II. Conclusions of Law

To prevail on a claim of conversion under Alabama

common law, Kubek must establish that there was “(1) a

wrongful taking; (2) an illegal assertion of ownership;

(3) an illegal use or misuse of another's property; or

(4) a wrongful detention or interference with another's

property.” Drennen Land & Timber Co. v. Privett, 643

So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Ala. 1994); see also Greene County Bd.

of Educ. v. Bailey, 586 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala. 1991) (“The

gist of the action is the wrongful exercise of dominion

over property to the exclusion or in defiance of a

plaintiff’s rights, where the plaintiff has a general or

special title to the property or the immediate right to

possession.”). 

In Alabama, a beneficiary’s interest in an insurance

policy can form the basis for a claim of conversion.

Williams v. Prudential Insur. Co. Of America, 470 So. 2d

1200, 1201 (Ala. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff

“correctly argue[d] that an insurance policy may be the

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 7 of 13
8

subject of conversion”). While an action for conversion

for money is generally barred, “if the money at issue is

capable of identification, then a claim of conversion may

be appropriate.” Bailey, 586 So. 2d at 898. In

accordance with this exception, Alabama courts have

treated the plaintiff’s interest in an insurance policy

as the property that is converted. Williams, 470 So. 2d

at 1201. 

Here, Kubek has satisfied her claim of conversion. As

to the retirement policy, Jones appropriated $ 188.05 of

Kubek’s property. But more significantly, Jones’s

removal of Kubek as beneficiary resulted in the loss of

all future survivorship payments. See Greer v. Carl

Johnson Motor Co., 114 So. 2d 907, 910 (Ala. 1959)

(noting that the destruction of property satisfies a

claim of conversion). Jones’s fraud in obtaining the

“Limited Power of Attorney” and “Notice of Survivor

Benefits Cancellation” forms constitutes a conversion of

Kubek’s survivor benefits.

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 8 of 13
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As to the life-insurance policy, Jones’s acquisition

of the death benefit was the product of undue influence.

Under Alabama common law, in “transactions inter

vivos, where the parties stand in confidential

relationship, and evidence tends to show that the

beneficiary is the dominant party, the law raises a

presumption of undue influence and casts upon the

beneficiary the burden of repelling such presumption when

the transaction is assailed.” Wolfe v. Thompson, 235

So. 2d 878, 882 (Ala. 1970). The beneficiary must

demonstrate that the “transaction was fair, just, and

equitable in every respect.” Id. at 882-83.

The relationship between a parent and child is

confidential. Chandler v. Chandler, 514 So. 2d 1307,

1308 (Ala. 1987). Moreover, if the evidence makes it

appear that the child is the “dominant spirit” in the

relationship, the burden shifts to the child to show that

the transaction was fair and just. Id. 

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 9 of 13
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Kubek has established that Jones was the “dominant

spirit” in relation to her father. As detailed above,

the ex-husband was in poor health and suffering from

dementia in the final years of his life. Jones also

served as his primary care-giver in Texas.

Furthermore, the correspondence that initiated the

change-of-beneficiary process used hand-written fax cover

sheets depicting a dog and cartoon characters. Prior

correspondence between the ex-husband and his insurance

provider used type-written letters. The difference is

striking. The fax correspondence raises the specter that

Jones controlled the change-of-beneficiary process to

benefit herself and that her father had become dependent

on her.

Thus, the court finds that Kubek has established a

presumption of undue influence. Jones’s general denial

and subsequent unresponsiveness are insufficient to rebut

this presumption. As the life-insurance policy’s changeCase 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 10 of 13
5. The court awards no punitive damages.

11

of-beneficiary form was the product of undue influence,

Jones unlawfully converted Kubek’s death benefits. 

III. Damages

Under Alabama law, the measure of compensatory

damages for the conversion of personal property is the

value of the property as of the date of the conversion

with interest at an annual rate of 6 % from the date of

conversion. Edwards v. Vanzant, 492 So. 2d 990, 994

(Ala. 1986).5

Kubek’s entitlement under the retirement policy needs

to be calculated based upon the survivor benefit paid to

Jones: a pro rata amount of $ 188.05 for the ten days the

ex-husband was alive in June 2003. The per diem rate for

the policy, therefore, was $ 18.81. Under the retirement

policy, Kubek was entitled to receive a lifetime monthly

survivor benefit. Using actuarial tables submitted by

the plaintiff, the court has calculated Kubek’s life

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 11 of 13
6. The court’s survivor benefits calculation is

based upon Kubek’s life expectancy at the time of the exhusband’s death and necessarily includes the benefits

($188.05) already paid to Jones that were due to Kubek.

12

expectancy to be 19.24 years at the time of her exhusband’s death. Thus, Kubek’s expected survivor

benefits amounted to $ 132,095.11.6

 

Under the life-insurance policy, Kubek is due what

Jones received in payment: $ 60,000 in benefits and

$ 17.26 in interest.

Kubek’s principal amount is $ 192,112.37. As

benefits were paid in June or July 2003, Kubek is

entitled to 6% annual interest over 8 years and 3 months.

Kubek’s interest on the conversion comes to $ 95,095.62.

Kubek’s total damages, therefore, amount to $ 287,207.99.

* * *

In sum, the court finds that Kubek has established

her claim of conversion against Jones and is entitled to

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 12 of 13
damages of $ 287,207.99. An appropriate judgment will be

entered.

DONE, this the 30th day of September, 2011.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-00029-MHT-WC Document 185 Filed 09/30/11 Page 13 of 13