Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02818/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02818-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EXPRESS COMPANIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

CASE 12-CV-2818 W (MDD)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANT MITEL

TECHNOLOGIES’ MOTION

TO DISMISS [DOC. 4]; (2)

DENYING DEFENDANT

MITEL TECHNOLOGIES’

MOTION TO STRIKE [DOC.

5]; AND (3) GRANTING

DEFENDANT JOHN

GARDNER’S MOTION TO

DISMISS [DOC. 13.]

vs.

MITEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et

al.,

Defendants.

Pending before the Court are Defendant Mitel Technologies’ motions to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and motion to strike pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(F). (Mitel’s MTD [Doc. 4]; Mitel’s MTD Reply [Doc. 23]; Mitel’s MTS [Doc. 5];

Mitel’s MTS Reply [Doc. 21].) Plaintiff Express opposes. (Express’ MTD Opp’n [Doc.

25]; Express’ MTS Opp’n [Doc. 19].) Also pending before the Court is Defendant John

Gardner’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). (Gardner’s MTD

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[Doc. 13]; Gardner’s Reply [Doc. 31].) Plaintiff Express opposes. (Express’ Opp’n

Gardner’s MTD [Doc. 26].) The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and

without oral argument. See Civ. L. R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons discussed below, the

CourtGRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant Mitel Technologies’

motions and GRANTS Defendant Gardener’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Express Companies Inc.

(“Express”) has been offering safety training courses and products related thereto since

1993. (FAC [Doc. 1-2] ¶¶12, 13.) Since 1997, Express has been advertising and selling

its products and services on the Internet. (Id. ¶ 13.) Express “has no brick-and-mortar”

stores and therefore “relies entirely on the Internet and telephone for the sales of its

products and services. As such, reliable, consistent, and fast Internet and voice

capabilities are of utmost importance” to the company. (Id. ¶ 14.)

In early 2009, Mitel Technologies, Inc. (“Technologies”) and Mitel Leasing, Inc.

(“Leasing”)(collectively,“MITEL”),telecommunications providers, approachedExpress

and “solicited its business for Express’ telecommunications platforms.” (FAC ¶ 15, 16.) 

Express ultimately bought the “Mitel TotalSolution Program” from MITEL. (FAC ¶

20.) Express entered into two agreements in connection with the “Mitel TotalSolution

Program,” one with Technologies and one with Leasing. 

Despite MITEL’s promises, the “TotalSolution” that Express purchased never

lived up to Express’ expectations. (See generally FAC.) In light of numerous

disagreements about the performance of all parties under the agreement, both parties

began to get their lawyers involved. In April 2011, Express advised its corporate

counsel Mr. T.C. Johnson to contact Defendant John L. Gardner, counsel for MITEL,

who had been involved in discussions between Express and MITEL. (FAC ¶ 47.) Mr.

Johnson sent Mr. Gardner an email, requesting a legible copy of the MITEL contract. 

(Id. 48-49.) Mr. Gardner agreed to send a copy, but never did. (Id.)

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Eventually, litigation was initiated by both parties. In June 2011, Express was

served with a lawsuit filed by MITEL in Texas on May 13, 2011. (FAC ¶ 50.) John L.

Gardner was attorney of record for MITEL. (Id.) This matter was later settled.

Express filed a Complaint against Technologies, Leasing, and Mr. Gardner in

California state court. On September 18, 2012, Express filed its First Amended

Complaint, which is the operative complaint. The FAC alleges the following twelve

causes of action against Defendants: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of covenant of

good faith and fair dealing; (3) breach of warranty; (4) deceit; (5) misrepresentation;

(6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) negligence; (8) negligent hire; (9) wrongful use of

civil proceedings (malicious prosecution; (10) abuse of process; (11) trespass to chattel;

and (12) conversion. On November 12, 2012, Defendants removed the case to this

Court. (Notice of Removal [Doc. 1].) On the same day, Technologies moved to dismiss

the Complaint, and in the alternative, to strike portions of the complaint. (Mitel’s

MTD [Doc. 4]; Mitel’s MTS [Doc. 5].) On November 28, 2012, John Gardner followed

suit and filed a motion to dismiss. (Gardner’s MTD [Doc. 13].) On the same day,

Leasing filed a 12(b)(3)motion. (MTD [Doc. 15].) On September 30, 2013, the Court

ordered granted Leasing’s 12(b)(3) motion, leaving Technologies and Gardner as the

only named Defendants. (See Order Granting 12(b)(3) Motion [Doc. 34].) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

The Court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington,

51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law

either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable

theory. Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In ruling

on the motion, a court must“accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe

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the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Vasquez v. L.A.

Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007).

However, the Court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “While a complaint

attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). 

Instead, the allegations in the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

B. Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) allows a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 

Motions to strike must be filed within twenty-one days after the filing of the pleading

under attack. Id. However, the court may consider an untimely motion to strike if

appropriate because the court may act on its own motion. See id. 

The purpose of a motion to strike is to avoid wasted time and money litigating

spurious issues by dispensing with them before trial. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft

Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d

1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)). However, motions to strike are generally disfavored, and

“usually denied unless the allegations in the pleading have no possible relation to the

controversy, and may cause prejudice to one of the parties.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.

of Am. v. Dunmore, 2010 WL 5200940, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2010).

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Redundant matter is the needless repetition of assertions. Travelers Cas. & Sur.

Co. of Am. v. Dunmore, 2010 WL 5200940, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2010). “Immaterial matter

is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the

defenses being plead.” Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 974 (quoting Fogerty, 984 F.2d at

1527). “Impertinent matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not

necessary, to the issues in question.” Id. (quoting Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527). 

“Scandalous matters are allegations that unnecessarily reflect on the moral character

of an individual or state anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity

of the court.” Consumer Soultions REO, LLC v. Hillery, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1021

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Corbell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2004)) (internal

punctuation omitted).

The court may not strike from the pleadings any disputed and substantial factual

or legal issue. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.

2010). Any doubt about whether the matter under attack raises a factual or legal issue

should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See id.

C. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Rule 12(b)(2) permits the court to dismiss a claim upon a motion to dismiss for

“lack of personal jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). While the defendant is the

moving party, the plaintiff is the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction and thus bears

the burden of proof. When a district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, the

plaintiff need only show a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. Bauman v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 919 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Doe v. Unocal Corp.,

248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)). The plaintiff’s verison of the facts is taken as true

when not directly controverted. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 922.

//

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Mitel Technologies’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Breach of Contract

In California, “[a] cause of action for breach of contract requires proof of the

following elements:(1) existence of a contract;(2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for

nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the

breach.” CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado, 158 Cal. App. 4 1226, 1239 (2008). th

“Resolution of contractual claims on a motion to dismiss is proper if the terms of the

contract are unambiguous.” Monaco v. Bear Stearns Residential Mortgage Corp., 554

F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2008). “A contract provision will be considered

ambiguous when it is capable of two or more reasonable interpretations.” Id. (citing Bay

Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. V. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. 4th 854, 867 (1993). 

“[T]he language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party

who caused the uncertainty to exist.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1654.

Here, Technologies argues that Express’ breach of contract claim “is uncertain

in its entirety, and fails as a result . . .” because “[Express] improperly refers to

Technologies and Leasing as a single party.” (Mitel’s MTD 4-5.) This, according to

Technologies, renders the complaint void of factual peadings “that identify any alleged

breach by Technologies.” (Id.) The Court disagrees.

As Express rightfully points out, its breach of contract claim is “directed at all

parties including specifically [Technologies].” (Opp’n 4.) The fact that these claims

were made against Technologies and Leasing as the collectives “MITEL” or

“defendants” does not render them “uncertain” or insufficient. Indeed, Express has

plead every element of a breach of contract claim: (1) existence of a contract between

Technologies ane Express (FAC ¶¶ 20, 24); (2) Express performed on the contract (Id.

¶ 75); (3) Technologies breached the agreement (Id. ¶¶ 15, 30-33; 34, 38, 41, 76); and

(4) damages (Id. ¶ 77.) 

In light of the foregoing, Technologies’ motion to dismiss is DENIED on this

ground.

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2. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Technologies next argues that Express’ cause of action for breach of the covenant

of good faith and fair dealing fails “for the same reason its breach of contract claim

fails–plaintiff fails to adequately plead the actions of Technologies that allegedly

amount to a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (Mitel’s MTD 5-6.) 

As explained above, this argument is unpersuasive. Furthermore, contrary to

Technologies suggestion, plaintiff has plead that it fulfilled its obligations under the

contract. (Id. 6; FAC ¶ 75.)

In light of the foregoing, Technologies’ motion to dismiss is DENIED on this

ground. 

3. Breach of Warranty

A cause of action for breach of warranty must involve a sale of goods. Cal. Com.

Code §§ 2313-15. The term “goods” encompasses “all things (including specially

manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract

for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities .

. . , and things in action.” Id. § 2105. An action for breach of warranty will not lie

where there has been only the furnishing of services. Gautier v. General Tel. Co., 234

Cal. App. 2d 302, 307 (1965).

In determining whether an agreement is for the sale of goods or the provision of

services, courts look to the “essence” of the agreement. When service predominates,

the incidental sale of personal property does not alter the basic transaction. Wall Street

Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co., 164 Cal. App. 4 1171, 1186 (2008). th

Here, Technologies suggests that its agreement with Express is solely for the

provision of services, not goods. (Mitel’s MTD 6.) Therefore, Technologies suggests

that Express’ claims of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular

purpose fail. (Id.) However, the Court is not convinced that services predominate over

the sale of goods in this situation, since the agreement that Technologies drafted

expressly warrants that goods, namely, “the Equipment, System Software and/or

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Related Software,” will be free of “defective parts, programming and workmanship.” 

(Ex. A p. 27 ¶ 13.) Thus, Technologies’ argument fails.

Technologies also argues that the breach of warranty is “uncertain as it includes

allegations concerning both express and implied warranties.” (Mitel’s MTD 6.) 

However, nothing is uncertain about Express’ warranty claims. “In order to plead a

cause of action for breach of express warranty, one must allege the exact terms of the

warranty, plaintiff’s reasonable reliance thereon, and a breach of that warranty which

proximately causes plaintiff injury.” Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 185 Cal.

App. 3d 135, 142 (1986). Express has plead the exact terms of the warranty (FAC ¶¶

84, 85; Ex. A. p. 27 ¶ 13). Express has also plead breach which proximately caused

injury (FAC ¶ 91). The only element not specifically pled is reliance. This omission

is not fatal as reliance can be reasonably inferred from the tenor and totality of the

allegations in the complaint. See Shurpin v. Elmhirst, 148 Cal. App. 3d 94, 98 (1983). 

Moreover, Express has plead a valid cause of action for breach of implied

warranty. The elements for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular

purpose are: (1) the buyer intended to use the product for a particular purpose; (2) the

seller had reason to know this; (3) the buyer relied on the seller's judgment to select

suitable goods for that purpose; (4) the seller had reason to know that the buyer was

relying on seller in this way; and (5) the product failed to suit buyer's purpose and

subsequently damaged the buyer. Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 25 (1985). 

Again, the only element which Express has not specifically plead is reliance, but as

explained above, the totality of the allegations reasonably permit an inference of

reliance. 

Therefore, Technologies’ motion to dismiss is DENIED on this ground.

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4. Fraud and Misrepresentation

A claim for fraud or intentional misrepresentation requires (1) a representation, 1

(2) falsity, (3) knowledge of falsity, (4) intent to deceive, and (5) reliance and resulting

damages. Cooper v. Equity Gen. Ins. Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 1252, 1262 (1990). 

Complaints alleging fraud must meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 9(b), which provides that “a party must state with particularity the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) thus

imposes two separate requirements on complaints alleging fraud. First, a plaintiff must

specifically identify the allegedly fraudulent statements or acts of fraud. Kaplan v. Rose,

49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994). This requires the plaintiff to plead evidentiary facts

including the dates, times, places and person associated with each misrepresentation or

act of fraud. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548-49 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994)

(en banc)(superseded by statute on other grounds); Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666,

672 (9th Cir. 1993).

Second, where the act of fraud is based on a misrepresentation, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the statement was false or misleading at the time it was made. 

GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1549. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “often there is no reason

to assume that what was true at the moment plaintiff discovers was also true at the

moment of the alleged misrepresentation, and thattherefore simply because the alleged

misrepresentation conflicts with the current state of facts, the charged statement must

have been false.” Id. at 1549. For this reason, “a plaintiff must set forth, as part of the

circumstances constituting fraud, an explanation as to why the disputed statement was

untrue or misleading when made, [which] can be done most directly by pointing to

Express’ fourth cause of action is for “false promise [deceit].” Express’ fifth cause of 1

action is for“misrepresentation.” The elements of fraud or intentional misrepresentation give

rise to the tort action for deceit in California. City Solutions, Inc. v. Clear Channel

Communications, 365 F.3d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, these two claims are essentially

identical. Thus, the Court will analyze the “false promise [deceit]” and “misrepresentation”

claims as fraud clams.

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inconsistent contemporaneous statements or information ... which were made by or

available to the defendants.” Id. at 1549.

The particularity requirement serves four central purposes: it (1) “prevents the

filing of a complaint as a pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs,” (2) “ensures

that allegations of fraud are specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular

misconduct ... so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they

have done anything wrong,” (3)“protects potential defendants – especially professionals

whose reputations in their fields of expertise are most sensitive to slander – from the

harm that comes from being charged with the commission of fraudulent acts,” and (4)

“prohibit[s] a plaintiff from unilaterally imposing upon the court, the parties and society

enormous social and economic costs absent some factual basis.” Semegen v. Weidner,

780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). 

Here, there is no doubt that Express has plead numerous representations by

Technologies. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 19, 21, 24, 25, 30, 32, 33, 43.) However, Express fails

to explain which of these representations are subject to its fraud claim. It is not enough

to generally allege that “MITEL and its agents knowingly and willfully misrepresented

the nature of and sold products and services to EXPRESS that were not suited to

EXPRESS’ expressly expressed business needs; and then knowingly and willfully

misrepresented the terms and bases of said agreements by methods including simplying

denying that they said what they had said, although they had said it in writing on more

than one occasion.” See GlenFed,, 42 F.3d at1548-49 n.7. Nor does Express plead any

facts demonstrating that these representations were false at the time they were made.

See id. at 1549. Moreover, Express does not plead facts in support of its claim that

“MITEL and its agents, at the time of making the representations, knew them to be

false or did not have a reasonable belief in their truth.” (FAC ¶ 104.) In addition,

Express pleads no facts to support its claims that Technologies had an “intent to

deceive” or the Express relied on Express’ misrepresentations. The absence of such

factual allegations is fatal to Express’ fraud claims.

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In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Technologies’ motion to dismiss

with respect to Express’ deceit and misrepresentation causes of action WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND.

5. Negligent Misrepresentation

A claim for negligent misrepresentation is identical to a claim for fraud of

intentional misrepresentation except plaintiff need not show defendant knew its

representations were false, only that defendant lacked reasonable grounds to believe the

representation was true. Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d

1101, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 

Technologies moves to dismiss this claim on the same grounds it moves to dismiss

Express’ fraud claims. Express bases its opposition on the fact that it validly stated a

cause of action for intentional misrepresentation. As explained above, this is not the

case. Because Express’ opposition hinges on the premise that its intentional

misrepresentation claims are valid, and they are not, the Court GRANTS

Technologies’ motion to dismiss with respect to Express’ negligent misrepresentation

cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. Negligence and Negligent Hiring

Technologies has moved to dismiss Express’ negligence and negligent hiring

claims, and Express does not oppose. Instead, Express requests dismissal of these claims

without prejudice. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Technologies motion to dismiss

with respect to Express’ negligence and negligent hiring causes of action WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

7. Malicious Prosecution

“To establish a cause of action forthe malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding,

a plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the

direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s

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favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” 

Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 50 (1974). 

Express claims that MITEL filed suit in Texas on May 13, 2011, which establishes

the first element of the claim for purposes of this motion. (FAC ¶ 51.) Technologies’

argument that Express failed to “plead facts demonstrat[ing] Technologies brought the

referenced Texas lawsuit, or that the same was filed at its discretion” is contradicted by

Express’ claims that Technologies and Leasing were working in concert. (Mitel’s MTD

13-14; FAC ¶ 16, 65, 66.) It can be reasonably inferred from the FAC that Express is

suggesting that MITEL directed Leasing to file suit against Express. Express has also

sufficiently alleged the prior action was a favorable termination in its favor, as a

voluntary dismissal by Plaintiff in a civil action is considered a favorable termination

which will support an action for malicious prosecution. MacDonald v. Joslyn, 275 Cal.

App. 2d 282, 289 (1969).

In addition, Express has plead that the civil case was brought without probable

cause (FAC ¶¶ 53-59, 65) and with malice (Id. ¶¶ 65, 66). Technologies’ argument

that the Texas suit was filed due to Express’ failure to pay completely ignores Express’

allegations that Technologies was contractually bound to provide notice of default

before bringing a suit. 

Therefore, Technologies’ motion to dismiss is DENIED on this ground.

8. Abuse of Process

“Abuse of process is not just another name for malicious prosecution. Simply

filing or maintaining a lawsuit for an improper purpose (such as might support a

malicious prosecution cause of action) is not abuse of process.” Binda v. Rosen, 19 Cal.

App. 4th 27, 40 (1993). Malicious prosecution concerns “a meritless lawsuit” and abuse

of process concerns “the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a

lawsuit.” Id. Here, there are no allegations of misuse of tools of litigation. Instead,

Express claims that the filing of the lawsuit itself is the abuse of process. (FAC ¶ 137-

139.) As explained above, this is insufficient. Therefore, the Court GRANTS

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Technologies motion to dismiss with respect to Express’ abuse of process cause of action

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

9. Trespass to Chattel

In cases of interference with possession of personal property not amounting to

conversion, an owner of personal property may recover under a trespass cause of

action. Jamgotchian v. Slender, 170 Cal. App. 4th 1384, 1400-01 (2009); Zaslow v.

Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 551 (1946). Under California law, trespass to chattels “lies

where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has

proximately caused injury.” Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4 1559, 1566

th

(1996). 

Here, Express has claimed that“plaintiff was dispossessed of its personal property

including longstanding telephone numbers.” (FAC ¶ 143.) Permanent dispossession

of property gives rise to a claim for conversion, which supersedes Express’ claim for

trespass. See Zaslow, 29 Cal. 2d at 551. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Technologies

motion to dismiss with respect to Express’ trespass to chattel claim WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND.

10. Conversion

The basic elements of the tort of conversion are (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or

right to possession of personal property; (2) defendant’s disposition of the property in

a manner that is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) resulting

damages. Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal. App. 4 1062, 1066 (1998). th

Technologies argues that Express’ conversion claim fails because the FAC “does

not contain facts that establish plaintiff owned the telephone numbers, or that it had

a right of possession to the same, nor does it include facts that evidence an intentional

tort on the part of Technologies.” However, the FAC does contain allegations that

Express owned the telephone numbers. (FAC ¶ 143.) From those same allegations it

is easily inferred that Express is asserting a right of possession of those telephone

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numbers. (Id.) In addition, the FAC also claims that “MITEL, without the consent or

knowledge of EXPRESS, transferred EXPRESS’ phone numbers to itself.” (FAC ¶ 72.) 

It is blatantly obvious from this allegation that Express is claiming that Technologies

transferred these numbers intentionally.

Therefore, Technologies’ motion to dismiss is DENIED on this ground.

11. Punitive Damages 

Technologies moves to dismiss Express punitive damage claims because the FAC

is “void of specific facts evidencing malice, oppression or fraud” and “there are

absolutely no facts that would support the conclusion any of the acts complained of

were done with the knowledge or under the direction of corporate officials having

power to bind Technologies.” (Mitel’s MTD 17). Express argues that a punitive

damage claim is not a proper target of a 12(b)(6) motion. (Express’ Opp’n 15). Express

then argues that since its claim for fraud is adequately plead, its punitive damages claim

is necessarily adequately plead.

First, Express’ claim that a punitive damages claim is not subject to a 12(b)(6)

motion is contradicted byKelley v. Corrections Corp. of America, 750 F. Supp.2d 1132,

1146-47 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Second, the Court has dismissed Express’ fraud claim as

insufficient. Therefore, Express has provided no valid argument to refute Technologies

motion to dismiss their punitive damages claim. In light of the foregoing, the Court

GRANTS Technologies motion to dismiss with respect to Express’ punitive damages

claim WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. Mitel’s Motion to Strike

Technologies also moves to strike portions of the FAC. However, for all of the

allegedly objectionable portions of the FAC that Technologies sites, it fails to provide

any substantive explanation as to why the allegations are “immaterial,” “irrelevant,”

“impertinent,” or “scandalous.” Instead, Technologies’ motion, merely provides a

laundry list of allegations from the FAC and legal conclusions as to why the claims

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should be stricken. This approach completely ignores the moving party’s burden of

explaining how they reached their conclusions. Indeed, the motion is completely

devoid of any substantive analysis as to why any of the claims should be stricken. Thus,

the Court DENIES Technologies’ motion to strike. 

C. John Gardner’s Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident only if the

defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state and it is reasonable

for the defendant to defend in that jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Jurisdiction can be general or specific. Sonora Diamond

Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 536 (2000). General jurisdiction results

where the defendants’s contacts with the forum state are so “systematic and so

continuous as to make it consistent iwth traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum, even where the cause

of action is unrelated to the contacts.” Id. (citing Calvert v. Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674,

677 (E.D. Cal. 1995). “Specific jurisdiction results when the defendant’s contacts with

the forum state, though not enough to subject the defendant to general jurisdiction of

the forum, are sufficient to subject the defendant to suit in the forum on a cause of

action related to or arising out of those contacts.” Sonora Diamond, 83 Cal. App. 4th

at 536. 

It is well settled that a non-resident defendant my be subjected to specific

jurisdiction if the following three requirements are met:

(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some

transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully

avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (2) The claim must be

one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related

activities. (3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1996).

Mr. Gardner moves to dismiss Express’ FAC against him for lack of personal

jurisdiction. Specifically, Gardner argues that there is no general orspecific jurisdiction

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over him. (Gardner’s MTD 5-7, 7-13.) Express does not dispute that the Court has no

general jurisdiction over him. Instead, Express argues that the Court has specific

jurisdiction over Gardner because Gardner’s alleged intentional torts are a basis for

personal jurisdiction. (Express’ Opp’n Gardner’s MTD 7-10.) The Court disagrees.

In support of this argument, Express relies Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984),

and Gordy, 95 F.3d 829. However, Express fails to explain how the law of those cases

applies to the case at bar. In each of those cases, the courts found that a court can

exert personal jurisdiction over a foreign resident who commits the intentional tort of

defamation by producing tortious written articles to be published in the forum state. 

The facts here are markedly different, as Gardner is alleged to have maliciously

prosecuted a case against Express, and abused process, in Texas. Moreover, Express

failsto explain how Gardner’s alleged malicious prosecution and abuse of process, which

allegedly occurred in Texas, shows purposeful availment to the privilege of conducting

activities in California. This is insufficient to carry Express’ burden of making out a

prima facie case for jurisdiction.

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Gardner’s motion to dismiss.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PARTY

Defendant Technologies’ motion to dismiss WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Express

shall file its Second Amended Complaint on or before October 28, 2013. It is

FURTHER ORDERED thatTechnologies’ motion to strike isDENIED. FURTHER,

Mr. Gardner is DISMISSED from this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 30, 2013

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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