Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00517/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00517-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jay Bernard Gillilland, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Wendy J. Roal, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV11-0517-TUC-FRZ (JM) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Jay Bernard Gillilland’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

 . . . . 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 After a jury trial, Gillilland was convicted of approximately three hundred 

offenses including sexual conduct with a minor, child molestation, sexual 

exploitation of a child, and child abuse. Answer, Ex. E, pp. 1-2. “He was sentenced 

to numerous consecutive life sentences, with possibility of parole after serving thirtyfive years on each sentence, as well as to a combination of concurrent and 

consecutive shorter sentences.” Id., p. 2. On appeal, Gillilland argued that two 

search warrants were not valid and that the trial court therefore should have 

suppressed videos found during the searches. Id., p. 3. He also argued that the trial 

courted erred in denying his motion to dismiss what he claimed were “multiplicitous 

counts” in the indictment. Id., p. 24. 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Gillilland’s convictions and sentences, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows: 

Gillilland was employed as a customs inspector at a U.S./Mexico 

border crossing. Federal authorities began investigating him on 

suspicion that he was smuggling narcotics across the border. On July 

20, 2004, a United States magistrate issued a warrant to search 

Gillilland’s home for evidence of possession and distribution of 

controlled substances. During the search, the agents seized a computer 

and some data storage discs and took them to their office. Upon 

opening one of the discs, an investigating agent immediately saw what 

appeared to be child pornography. The agent halted his examination 

and subsequently obtained a warrant on July 23, 2004, to search the 

items they had already seized for further evidence of child 

pornography. During the search of those items, the agent discovered 

pornographic pictures involving Gillilland’s minor daughter. The agent 

showed this evidence to the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Department. 

 Meanwhile, federal agents had also obtained a warrant on July 

21 to search a storage unit leased by Gillilland for further evidence of 

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drug trafficking. During that search, the agents observed a box of 

sexual instruments, video cassettes, and compact discs, including one 

with a label indicating it contained photographs. The agents also 

shared this information with the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s 

Department. The sheriff’s department began its own investigation and 

obtained a warrant on July 30 from the state superior court authorizing 

another search of the storage unit. This search yielded videos depicting 

Gillilland performing multiple sexual acts with his daughter within a 

two-year period of time. Gillilland’s daughter was between five and 

seven years old during the incidents depicted. These videos comprised 

the primary evidence of guilt the state presented at trial. 

Answer, Ex. E, pp. 2-3. 

 The Arizona Supreme Court denied Gillilland’s petition for review, Answer, 

Ex. G, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, id., Ex. H. Gillilland 

did not file a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief under Rule 32, Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. 

 In the petition before the Court, Gillilland raises one ground for relief. He 

urges the Court to find that Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), does not bar review 

of his Fourth Amendment claims because he was not afforded “full and fair” 

consideration by the state courts. Petition, p. 6. Further, he argues that if his Fourth 

Amendment claims are reviewed under the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, he is 

entitled to relief. Memorandum, p. 1. Although not raised as a separate ground for 

relief, Gillilland also contends that he received ineffective assistance of postconviction relief counsel. As explained below, none of Gillilland’s claims merits 

relief. 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. AEDPA Standards

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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B. Stone v. Powell 

 As Gillilland recognizes, the primary obstacle to having his Fourth 

Amendment claim considered by the Court is the rule found in Stone v. Powell, 428 

U.S. 465 (1976). Stone held that when the State has given a petitioner a full and fair 

chance to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas review is not available 

to a state prisoner claiming that his conviction was based on evidence obtained 

through an unconstitutional search and seizure. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 

682-83 (1993). 

 Gillilland asserts that he did not benefit from an “opportunity for full and fair 

litigation” of his Fourth Amendment claim in the state court. He then proceeds, 

however, for 25 pages to explain how the trial and appeals court addressed his claim, 

but applied the incorrect standards and made incorrect factual findings. 

Memorandum, pp. 6-32. In doing so, he misapprehends the standards applicable to 

his claim. “The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate 

his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly 

decided.” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, a 

“court’s mistaken recitation of the facts, even assuming arguendo that it resulted in 

an incorrect decision, is not enough in and of itself to establish that [a petitioner’s] 

claims were not fully and fairly considered.” Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir.1977). Gillilland’s Fourth Amendment argument fails under these standards. 

 The record reflects that Gillilland not only had the opportunity to fully litigate 

his search and seizure claims, but that he actually did. On February 6, 2007, the trial 

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court conducted a hearing on Gillilland’s motion to suppress. Answer, Ex. A. The 

transcript reflects that Gillilland submitted to the trial court a transcript of an 

interview of John Anderson and presented the live testimony of two witnesses, Scott 

Mulay and Cecilia Cene. Id., pp. 17-18, 91. The hearing ran several hours and the 

transcript of the testimonial portion of the hearing covers approximately 100 pages. 

Id. pp. 17-116. In arguing the motion, Gillilland’s counsel notes that the written 

motion was approximately 50 pages long, id. pp. 119-20. The argument of 

Gillilland’s counsel and the government consumes another 37 transcript pages. Id., 

pp. 120-157. There is no indication in the transcript, or elsewhere in the record, that 

the trial court put any limitations on Gillilland’s ability to litigate the claim. 

 Also relevant to the evaluation of whether a petitioner was provided a full and 

fair opportunity for litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim is the extent to which the 

claim was considered by the state appellate court. Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 

1176, 1178-79 (9th Cir.1990); Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir.1981). 

Here, Gillilland’s Fourth Amendment claims received extensive consideration by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. The discussion of the claim covers 21 pages of the Court 

of Appeals’ Memorandum Decision and cites to numerous state and federal cases and 

contains extensive discussion of the application of that authority to the claims raised 

by Gillilland. Answer, Ex. E, pp. 3-24. 

 Thus, the record is clear that Gillilland received and took advantage of the full 

and fair opportunity to litigate in the state courts the Fourth Amendment claims now 

before the Court. The claims are therefore barred by the holding in Stone and are not 

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cognizable on federal habeas review. Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th

Cir.1990) (“Given that [the petitioner] had an opportunity in state court for ‘full and 

fair litigation’ of his fourth amendment claim, the Constitution does not require the 

[the petitioner] be granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained 

in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”). 

 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In this sub-claim, Gillilland appears to be arguing that he was not made aware 

of his right to pursue post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure and, therefore, he was “denied a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to 

litigate his constitutional claims before the state courts.” Memorandum, p. 36. Thus, 

according to his argument, Stone does not apply. Id. There are a number of 

shortcomings to this argument. 

 The only substantive claim Gillilland references in relation to his ineffective 

assistance claim is the Fourth Amendment claim discussed above. Other than that 

argument, Gillilland merely alleges that “counsel did nothing to pursue state 

postconviction remedies at all.” Memorandum, p. 34. Gillilland’s argues that his 

counsel’s ineffective assistance allows him to overcome the “procedural bar” of 

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). He does not, however, explain how couching 

this claim as one for ineffective assistance would operate to affect the rejection of the 

stand-alone Fourth Amendment claim rejected by the Court of Appeals on direct 

appeal. 

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 Moreover, this is not a case where Gillilland is seeking to overcome a 

procedural default which has prevented him from pursuing his claims in federal 

court. Cf. Martinez v. Ryan, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) (ineffective 

assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel established cause for a prisoner's procedural default of 

same claim in a federal habeas proceeding); Maples v. Thomas, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 

S.Ct. 912 (2012) (cause for the petitioner's state procedural default of failing to file a 

timely appeal in state court shown where petitioner was abandoned by counsel during 

post-conviction proceedings and lacked notice that he needed to protect himself by 

proceeding pro se). Gillilland raised his claims before the trial court, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, the Arizona Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court. 

Answer, Exs. A (trial court transcript), E (Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision), 

G (Mandate reflecting Arizona Supreme Court denial of petition for review), H 

(denial of petition for certiorari by United States Supreme Court). Thus, Gillilland 

did not procedurally default his Fourth Amendment claims and any deficiency in 

representation in post-conviction proceedings cannot be said to have resulted in this 

Court’s inability to address them due to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in 

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 

 Finally, even if Gillilland’s claims were cognizable, under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1994), he is required to prove is trial attorney’s 

performance was both “deficient” and “prejudicial” to his defense. Under these 

circumstances, Gillilland has shown neither ineffective assistance, as he has not 

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described a claim that was lost because it was not raised in PCR proceedings, nor 

prejudice resulting from any alleged deficiency. Id. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 11-517-TUC-FRZ. Failure to timely 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 5th day of July, 2012. 

 

 

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