Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00874/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00874-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH LEE TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. MILLER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-00874-VC (PR)

ORDER RECOGNIZING COGNIZABLE 

CLAIMS; DISMISSING CERTAIN 

CLAIMS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; 

DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS WITH 

PREJUDICE; DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL

Re: Dkt. No. 3

Kenneth Lee Taylor, an inmate at Solano State Prison proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights 

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five officers at Pelican Bay State Prison, where he 

was previously incarcerated. Taylor has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 

which is granted in a separate order. Taylor also requests appointment of pro bono counsel. This 

request is denied. The Court now addresses the claims asserted in Taylor’s complaint. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A federal court must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, to dismiss any claims that: 

(1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or 

(3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 

699 (9th Cir. 1988).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Although to state a claim a 

Case 3:16-cv-00874-VC Document 7 Filed 04/21/16 Page 1 of 8
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 

grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough 

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 

plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the 

deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corrections & 

Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 

1988). A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if he does 

an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or fails to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d 

at 633. 

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074. That is, 

a supervisor is not liable merely because the supervisor is responsible, in general terms, for the 

actions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor may be 

liable only on a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). It is insufficient for a 

plaintiff to allege generally that supervisors knew about the constitutional violation or that they 

generally created policies and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging “a specific 

policy” or “a specific event” instigated by the supervisors that led to the constitutional violation. 

Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012).

Case 3:16-cv-00874-VC Document 7 Filed 04/21/16 Page 2 of 8
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

II. Taylor’s Allegations

Taylor’s complaint alleges the following: 

On May 21, 2015, Defendant Correctional Officer M. Miller of the Investigative Services 

Unit (“ISU”) confiscated Taylor’s outgoing mail addressed to his sister, Ms. Verdie Smith, 

without the proper notification. Miller forwarded Taylor’s mail to the Institutional Gang 

Investigation Unit (“IGI”). The mail contained a withdrawal order from Taylor’s inmate trust 

account in the amount of $720 with instructions to Ms. Smith to deliver portions of the $720 to 

four parties. The mail also contained stamped self-addressed envelopes to the four parties who 

were to receive portions of the $720, a graduation card to Taylor’s granddaughter and thank you 

notes to three parties. Miller returned to Taylor the trust withdrawal form but not the other items 

he confiscated. 

On June 17, 2015, Taylor submitted a formal request to Miller for the return of the rest of 

the mail that he confiscated. Miller did not respond. On July 1, 2015, Taylor submitted a request 

to Defendant Captain Patton of the ISU for the return of his mail, but Patton did not respond. 

On July 7, 2015, Taylor filed a formal staff complaint against Miller for the illegal 

confiscation and retention of Taylor’s outgoing mail. The second level reviewer of Taylor’s 

complaint granted Taylor’s request for the return of the confiscated mail. However, Defendant 

IGI Lt. J. Frisk, without the required legal notification to Taylor, retained the mail on the ground 

that it was gang contraband, although it had nothing to do with any gang. The reason given for the 

retention of the mail was that one of the parties who was to receive a portion of Taylor’s $720 is 

related to a state inmate and Taylor was attempting to circumvent the regulation prohibiting

correspondence between inmates. Taylor alleges that the person to whom he was sending money 

is not a relative of an inmate. Frisk retained the mail, in part, in retaliation for Taylor’s past 

grievances and staff complaints against him. 

On July 9, 2015, Defendant M. Townsend, Pelican Bay Appeals Coordinator, dismissed 

Taylor’s formal complaint and this prevented the investigation of Taylor’s claim against Miller. 

On August 4, 2015, Defendant IGI Sgt. J. Puente denied Taylor’s staff complaint against 

Miller at the second level review. Puente did this, in part, in retaliation for Taylor’s previous 

Case 3:16-cv-00874-VC Document 7 Filed 04/21/16 Page 3 of 8
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

lawsuit against him.

Patton did not adequately supervise his subordinates, Miller, Puente and Frisk, thus, he 

allowed them to violate Taylor’s constitutional rights. 

III. Claims

Based on these allegations, Taylor asserts the following claims: (1) claims under the First 

Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment and for unspecified state torts against all Defendants for 

confiscating Taylor’s outgoing mail; (2) an Equal Protection claim against Miller and Patton for 

confiscating Taylor’s outgoing mail; and (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim against all 

Defendants. 

A. First Amendment Claim

Liberally construed, the allegations in the complaint give rise to a cognizable First 

Amendment claim against Miller and Frisk for confiscating and retaining Taylor’s outgoing mail. 

Liberally construed, the allegation that Patton did not respond to Taylor’s request for the return of 

his mail gives rise to a cognizable First Amendment claim against him. However, the allegation 

that Patton failed to adequately supervise his subordinates does not give rise to a cognizable claim 

against him, so the claim based on this allegation is dismissed. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 

(supervisor is not liable merely because he is responsible, in general terms, for actions of another). 

The allegations that Townsend and Puente denied or mishandled Taylor’s administrative appeals

do not give rise to a cognizable claim against them. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance 

procedure.”). An incorrect decision on an administrative appeal or a failure to handle it in a 

particular way does not amount to a violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. Therefore, 

the claim against Townsend and Puente is dismissed. Dismissal is without leave to amend, as 

amendment would be futile.

B. Due Process Claim

Liberally construed, the allegations that Miller and Frisk confiscated and retained Taylor’s 

mail without notice and an opportunity for a hearing appear to give rise to a cognizable due 

process claim against them. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) 

Case 3:16-cv-00874-VC Document 7 Filed 04/21/16 Page 4 of 8
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to 

the deprivation of a significant property interest). However, even liberally construed, the 

complaint does not give rise to a due process claim against Townsend and Puente for their 

handling of Taylor’s appeals or against Patton for lack of supervision. The due process claim 

against these three defendants is dismissed. Dismissal is without leave to amend as amendment 

would be futile.

C. State Tort Claims

Taylor alleges state tort claims against all Defendants. However, except for alleging he 

suffered from emotional distress, Taylor does not specify which torts Defendants committed. 

Further, he does not specify which Defendants’ actions caused him emotional distress. Therefore, 

the state tort claims are dismissed with leave to amend. 

D. Equal Protection Claim

Taylor alleges that, by confiscating his outgoing mail, Miller discriminated against him 

because he treated him differently than similarly situated inmates “in California that’s allowed to 

mail their personal funds to their family members.” Taylor alleges that Patton is liable because he 

failed to adequately supervise Miller. As discussed above, the general allegation that a supervisor 

failed to adequately supervise a subordinate is insufficient to state a claim under section 1983. 

Therefore, the Equal Protection claim against Patton based on his failure to supervise is dismissed.

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or 

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” 

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). Where state action does not 

implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification, the plaintiff can establish an equal 

protection “class of one” claim by demonstrating that the state actor (1) intentionally (2) treated 

him differently than other similarly situated persons, (3) without a rational basis. Gerhart v. Lake 

County, Montana, 637 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 

528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)). 

Even liberally construed, the allegations fail to give rise to an equal protection claim

Case 3:16-cv-00874-VC Document 7 Filed 04/21/16 Page 5 of 8
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

against Miller. First, Taylor’s comparison of his situation to that of inmates who are allowed to 

mail funds fails to allege that he is a member of a protected class. Second, even if he is alleging a 

claim based on a “class of one,” he has not alleged facts showing that Miller or Patton

intentionally treated him differently than other similarly situated inmates without a rational basis. 

The claim is dismissed without leave to amend.

E. Retaliation Claim

Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation requires an 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate because of that inmate’s 

protected conduct, and that such action chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights, and the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Liberally construed, the allegations that Puente and Frisk withheld Taylor’s mail to 

retaliate against him for his previous grievances and lawsuits against them give rise to a 

cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim against them. However, the allegations, even 

liberally construed, do not give rise to a cognizable retaliation claim against Miller, Patton or 

Townsend because there is no suggestion that these defendants knew of Taylor’s previous 

grievances or acted to retaliate against him for filing grievances. This claim against these three 

defendants is dismissed with leave to amend.

IV. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Taylor moves for the appointment of counsel “so that his interests may be protected.” 

“[I]t is well-established that there is generally no constitutional right to counsel in civil 

cases.” United States v. Sardone, 94 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court has the discretion to appoint counsel to “any person unable to 

afford counsel.” The discretionary appointment of counsel typically is reserved for cases involving 

“exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding 

of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both ‘the likelihood of success on the merits 

and the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal 

issues involved.’ Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before 

Case 3:16-cv-00874-VC Document 7 Filed 04/21/16 Page 6 of 8
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

reaching a decision.” Id. 

Here, exceptional circumstances requiring the appointment of counsel are not evident. If, in 

the future, the Court concludes it is necessary to appoint counsel to represent Taylor, it shall do so 

sua sponte. The request for appointment of counsel is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. The motion to appoint counsel is denied. Dkt. No. 3.

2. The allegations, liberally construed, appear to give rise to the following cognizable 

claims: (1) a First Amendment claim against Miller and Frisk and a First Amendment claim 

against Patton based on the allegation that they did not return Taylor’s mail; (2) a procedural due 

process claim against Miller and Frisk; and (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim against Puente 

and Frisk. 

3. The following claims are dismissed with prejudice: (1) the First Amendment claim 

against Townsend and Puente and the First Amendment claim against Patton based on the 

supervisor allegation; (2) the procedural due process claim against Patton, Puente and Townsend; 

and (3) the equal protection claim against Miller and Patton.

4. The following claims are dismissed with leave to amend: (1) state tort claims against all 

defendants; and (2) the First Amendment retaliation claim against Miller, Patton and Townsend.

5. Taylor may, but is not required to, file a first amended complaint (“FAC”) remedying 

the deficiencies noted above regarding the two claims that are dismissed with leave to amend. 

6. If Taylor wishes to file a FAC, he must do so within twenty-eight days from the date of 

this Order. The FAC must include the caption and civil case number used in this Order and the 

words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint 

completely replaces the original complaint, Taylor must include in it all the allegations he wishes 

to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate 

material from the original complaint by reference. However, Taylor is not required to repeat 

factual allegations, as he has done in his original complaint. Taylor is advised that Rule 8 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only requires a complaint to allege a short and plain statement of 

Case 3:16-cv-00874-VC Document 7 Filed 04/21/16 Page 7 of 8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the claim that shows the plaintiff is entitled to relief and which puts the defendants on notice of the 

claims asserted against them. 

Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal with prejudice of 

the claims that are dismissed in this Order with leave to amend. The Court will order service of 

Taylor’s cognizable claims when it reviews his FAC, if he chooses to file one, or after the twentyeight days have passed and Taylor has not filed an FAC.

7. It is Taylor’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court informed of 

any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of Change of 

Address,” and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may 

result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b).

8. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. Any 

motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than ten days prior to the deadline sought to 

be extended.

9. The Clerk of the Court shall send Taylor a blank civil rights complaint form.

10. This Order terminates docket number 3.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

April 21, 2016

Case 3:16-cv-00874-VC Document 7 Filed 04/21/16 Page 8 of 8