Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00817/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00817-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OMAR HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DUTTON RANCH CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-00817-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

CERTIFICATION AND TO

FACILITATE COLLECTIVE ACTION 

NOTICE

Docket No. 30

Plaintiffs are Omar Hernandez Hernandez (“O. Hernandez”) and Antonio Hernandez 

Santiago (“A. Hernandez”). In December 2018, they initiated this action – which includes wageand-hour claims brought on Plaintiffs’ own behalf and on the behalf of those similarly situated –

in state court.1 Defendant Dutton Ranch Corporation removed the case to federal court. The 

current operative complaint – namely, the second amended complaint (“SAC”) – contains a FLSA 

claim. O. Hernandez is the only named plaintiff for this claim. Currently pending before the 

Court is O. Hernandez’s motion for preliminary certification of the FLSA claim. O. Hernandez 

also asks that the Court facilitate a collective action notice. The Court held a hearing on the 

motion on March 12, 2020. This order memorializes the Court’s oral rulings and provides

additional analysis as necessary.

A. Preliminary Certification

The FLSA provides in relevant part that 

[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 

207 of this title [minimum wage and overtime] shall be liable to the 

1 O. Hernandez has also asserted individual claims for employment discrimination.

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employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid 

minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case 

may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated

damages. . . . An action to recover the liability prescribed . . . may 

be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in 

any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or 

more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 

employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff 

to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become 

such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such 

action is brought.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Thus, under the FLSA, “workers may litigate jointly if they (1) claim a 

violation of the FLSA, (2) are ‘similarly situated,’ and (3) affirmatively opt in to the joint 

litigation, in writing.” Campbell v. City of L.A., 903 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2018).

In Campbell, the Ninth Circuit provided guidance as to how lower courts should proceed 

with requests for collective action certification for purposes of the FLSA. Certification comes in 

two stages. The first stage is known as either preliminary or conditional certification and 

generally occurs at an early stage of litigation. Here, a “court’s analysis is typically focused on a 

review of the pleadings but may sometimes be supplemented by declarations or other evidence”; 

“[t]he level of consideration is ‘lenient’ – . . . loosely akin to a plausibility standard, 

commensurate with the stage of the proceedings.” Id. at 1109. The consequence of preliminary 

certification is simply that a notice is issued to members of the putative collective action. See id. 

at 1101. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, unlike Rule 23 class certification, “[p]reliminary 

certification in the FLSA context does not ‘produce a class with an independent legal status[] or 

join additional parties to the action’”; rather, “‘[t]he sole consequence’ of a successful motion for 

preliminary certification is ‘the sending of court-approved written notice’ to workers who may 

wish to join the litigation as individuals.” Id. “[P]reliminary certification is ‘neither necessary nor 

sufficient for the existence of a [collective] action.’” Id. (emphasis omitted).

In the instant case, O. Hernandez has met the lenient standard for preliminary certification. 

O. Hernandez has effectively alleged (and the declarations submitted in support of the motion 

reflect) that it was a common practice for Dutton to, inter alia, not compensate field workers2for 

2

In its opposition brief, Dutton contends that O. Hernandez cannot legitimately assert that there 

are common practices for all H-2A workers because H-2A workers cover not just field workers 

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expenses incurred in getting H-2A visas; to require field workers to get to work 10-15 minutes 

before start time to do prepatory work; to require field workers to keep on working 10-15 minutes 

after end time to clean up; to require field workers to pay for their tools; to require field workers to 

pay for transportation from the Dutton housing to the work sites, etc. The factual support for the 

allegations is O. Hernandez’s personal observations (as reasonably reflected in his declaration) 

and the personal observations of at least one other ex-employee, i.e., Mr. Osbaldo.3

To the extent Dutton argues that O. Hernandez needs more evidence to back up his 

allegations, the Court does not agree. Campbell indicates that a lenient standard is applied for 

preliminary certification; moreover, the focus is largely on the allegations in the pleadings. To the 

extent Dutton argues that there are too many individualized issues to warrant preliminary 

certification (e.g., because there are different crews, different crews have different tasks which 

require the use of different tools, there are different work sites, there are different supervisors, 

etc.), this would not defeat preliminary certification. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Campbell, 

these kinds of distinctions largely become immaterial to certification if in fact there is a common 

policy, or at least a common practice. In other words, at this juncture, Dutton has not shown that 

there are so many different circumstances under which field workers worked that a common 

practice is not plausible. Compare Castle v. Wells Fargo Fin., Inc., No. C 06-4347 SI, 2008 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 106703, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2008) (“The variety of different circumstances 

but other kinds of jobs as well (e.g., tractor drivers, mechanics, and foremen). But in his papers,

O. Hernandez indicates that his FLSA claim is in fact limited to field workers. See Reply at 4 

(stating that “Plaintiff seeks to certify H-2A workers who worked under the job orders cited in 

Plaintiff’s complaint, which explicitly cover only agricultural field labor; they do not cover 

mechanical work, tractor drivers, or managerial staff”); see also Mot. at 1 (asking “to represent 

current and former H-2A workers hired by Dutton Ranch Corp. . . . to harvest grapes and apples” 

from October 12, 2016, to the present”); Weinberg Decl., Ex. 3 (proposed notice) (defining the 

collective as follows: “FARMWORKERS WHO WORKED FOR DUTTON RANCH, CORP. IN 

CALIFORNIA BETWEEN [CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR TO INSERT DATE THREE YEARS 

AND FIVE MONTHS PRIOR TO START OF NOTICE PERIOD] WITH H-2A WORK 

VISAS”).

3

In its opposition brief, Dutton objects in part to the testimony of O. Hernandez and Mr. Osbaldo. 

The main objection is that the declarants do not have a sufficient basis to opine about what 

happened with other Dutton employees. See Opp’n at 22-24. This objection is overruled. It can 

reasonably be inferred from the declarations that O. Hernandez and Mr. Osbaldo’s testimony 

about other employees is based on their own personal observations.

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under which the declarants were allegedly required to work unpaid overtime also weighs against 

certification.”).

Accordingly, the Court grants O. Hernandez’s motion for preliminary certification. 

Because preliminary certification is warranted, notice to the putative collective is proper.

B. Notice

The parties have not yet met and conferred on how notice should be effectuated. At the 

hearing, the Court provided guidance to the parties, as indicated below.

• The notice shall be sent by a third-party administrator. (Both parties agreed to 

such.) The parties shall meet and confer to select the third-party administrator. 

Dutton has agreed to pay for the cost of the third-party administrator (with respect 

to notice).

• The parties shall meet and confer, along with the third-party administrator, to 

determine the best means to effect notice. Direct mail shall be one form of notice, 

but the administrator should consider other additional means of notice, including 

via cell phone (e.g., text), through an application (e.g., WhatsApp), and through 

social media (e.g., Facebook) – particularly because mail notice may not be 

effective for all members of the putative collective, some of whom are in rural 

Mexico. Cf. Roes v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018) (in the 

class action context, holding that the notice “fell short of ‘the best notice that is 

practicable under the circumstances’” because, “despite concerns that former 

employees in particular might be difficult to reach by mail, the settlement provided 

no other means of reaching former employees”; adding that, “when at least 12% of 

the mailed notices were ultimately determined to be undeliverable[,] . . . still no 

additional means of notice reasonably calculated to reach those class members was 

attempted”). At this juncture, physically posting the notice at Dutton facilities 

(e.g., field locations or bathrooms) does not appear to be necessary unless other 

means of notice are not effective.

• The notice shall implicate a three-year statute of limitations rather than a two-year

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statute of limitations. It is difficult to prejudge willfulness at this early stage in the 

litigation; moreover, as a practical matter, it is more efficient to issue a broader 

notice and then scale back, if necessary. This ruling does not preclude Dutton from 

arguing that any collective should in fact be subject to a two-year statute of 

limitations.

• Putative collective members shall be given 4 months to opt in (particularly because 

some members are in Mexico and there may be more than one round of notice if 

notice proves ineffective).

• The notice shall not include a header referring to the Court but the text of the notice 

may indicate that the notice is being issued as part of a case pending before this 

Court.

• The notice shall include contact information for both Plaintiffs’ counsel and 

Dutton’s counsel. There must be clear language explaining, e.g., that Plaintiffs’ 

counsel seek to represent workers and defense counsel represents Dutton.

• Dutton asks that the notice include a statement as to what its litigation position is. 

This is a fair request, although the Court acknowledges that there is some language 

in the notice indicating that Dutton denies the claims being asserted against it. The 

parties should meet and confer on this issue as they should be able to reach 

agreement.

• Dutton argues that the notice contains confusing language about what happens if a 

worker does not join the lawsuit. O. Hernandez notes that the notice includes a 

section on “What happens if I decide not to join this lawsuit?” The parties should 

meet and confer on this issue as they should be able to reach agreement.

• The notice need not contain language informing members that costs could be 

assessed against them if they do not prevail. Plaintiffs’ counsel has stated on the 

record that they will cover taxable costs. The prospect of nontaxable costs is not 

sufficiently substantial to warrant a warning.

• The notice need not contain detailed language informing a member about his or her 

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obligations as a litigant (e.g., to be subject to a deposition); however, the notice 

should contain some language notifying a member that he or she does have an 

obligation to participate in the case and provide relevant information. The parties 

shall meet and confer on this issue as they should be able to reach agreement.

The parties shall meet and confer as required above and shall submit a joint 

proposed notice by March 26, 2020. If the parties are unable to agree on any specific issue 

and/or language, then, in a joint submission, the parties shall identify what the dispute is and then 

each party shall provide its position on the issue and/or proposed language.

This order disposes of Docket No. 30.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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