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Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 14, 2003 Decided May 20, 2003

No. 98-5340

GREGORY EUGENE AUGUST,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00769)

Andrew W. Bagley, appointed by the court, argued the

cause as amicus curiae for appellant. With him on the briefs

was J. Michael Klise.

Gregory E. August filed a pro se brief.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #98-5340 Document #750110 Filed: 05/20/2003 Page 1 of 9
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John S. Koppel, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Leonard Schaitman,

Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Kathleen M. Frye and Robin

M. Earnest, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: EDWARDS, RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Responding to a federal prisoner’s

Freedom of Information Act request for his investigative file,

the Federal Bureau of Investigation withheld the bulk of the

requested materials pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(A), which

exempts from disclosure any records that could reasonably be

expected to interfere with ongoing law-enforcement proceedings. After the district court granted summary judgment in

favor of the Government and while that ruling was pending

on appeal, however, the law-enforcement proceedings against

the prisoner ended, thus undermining the Government’s reliance on Exemption 7(A). Citing this court’s decision in

Maydak v. Department of Justice, 218 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir.

2000), which held that the Government generally waives any

FOIA exemption it fails to raise at the initial proceedings

before the district court, the FOIA requester here seeks

wholesale disclosure of his criminal file on the ground that the

Government waived its right to invoke any exemptions other

than 7(A). But because the Government has provided clear

evidence that wholesale disclosure would jeopardize the safety and privacy of third parties involved in the FBI’s investigation, and because we believe the Government’s failure to

invoke all applicable exemptions in the original district court

proceedings was the result of a reasonable mistake, rather

than an attempt to gain a tactical advantage over the FOIA

requester, we remand to allow the Government to demonstrate the applicability of other FOIA exemptions to withhold

third parties’ names and other identifying information.

USCA Case #98-5340 Document #750110 Filed: 05/20/2003 Page 2 of 9
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I.

After receiving an eight-year sentence for financial fraud,

Appellant Gregory E. August sent the Federal Bureau of

Investigation a pro se request pursuant to the Freedom of

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., seeking all Bureau

records pertaining to him. Although the FBI released some

public-source material after redacting names and telephone

numbers of Bureau personnel, it withheld the bulk of the

information August requested under FOIA Exemption 7(A),

which permits the government to withhold ‘‘records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes TTT to the

extent that production of such law enforcement records or

information TTT could reasonably be expected to interfere

with enforcement proceedings.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).

August brought suit in the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia to compel disclosure of the materials

the FBI withheld. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government. On appeal, this court

remanded, directing the FBI to provide a more specific

explanation of its nondisclosure of materials pursuant to

Exemption 7(A). August v. FBI, No. 98–5340 (D.C. Cir.

March 2, 1999) (unpublished order). By the time the case

returned to the district court on remand, however, August’s

conviction had been affirmed. Because there were no longer

any ongoing law-enforcement proceedings, the Government

abandoned its reliance on Exemption 7(A) and requested a

stay to allow it to process all documents pursuant to other

FOIA exemptions. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction to

grant the relief the Government requested, the district court

denied the stay motion and ordered the record returned to

this court.

At that point, the case was held in abeyance pending a

decision in Maydak, which also presented the question of

whether to permit the Government to raise additional FOIA

exemptions after its initial reliance on Exemption 7(A) was

undermined by the conclusion of law-enforcement proceedings. In our decision in that case, we denied the Government

the opportunity to raise additional FOIA exemptions and

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ordered wholesale disclosure of the requested materials. 218

F.3d 760. Applying Maydak to August’s pending appeal, this

court vacated the grant of summary judgment on Exemption

7(A) and directed the Government to release the withheld

materials. August v. FBI, No. 98–5340, 2002 WL 335534

(D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2002) (per curiam order).

The Government filed a petition for panel rehearing, requesting permission to redact material covered by other lawenforcement exemptions. The Government attached to its

petition the in camera declaration of FBI Special Agent

Randy L. Durney to establish the applicability of FOIA

Exemptions 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F), which allow the Government

to withhold information that ‘‘could reasonably be expected to

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,’’ ‘‘to

disclose the identity of a confidential source,’’ or ‘‘to endanger

the life or physical safety of any individual,’’ respectively. 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), (D), (F). In his declaration, Durney

explains that the records August requested include names of

confidential sources, as well as the dates of birth, social

security numbers, and home addresses of persons interviewed

in the course of the investigation and of others who testified

for the Government at trial. Durney states that because

August has a history of violent behavior, release of the

information would pose a risk to these persons’ safety and

privacy. Agreeing to rehear the case, we vacated our earlier

order and appointed an amicus curiae to present arguments

in support of August’s position. August v. FBI, No. 98–5340,

2002 WL 31010076 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 2002) (per curiam

order).

II.

Two powerful, competing interests are at stake in this case.

The first is the interest in judicial finality and economy, which

has ‘‘special force in the FOIA context, because the statutory

goals—efficient, prompt, and full disclosure of information—

can be frustrated by agency actions that operate to delay the

ultimate resolution of the disclosure request.’’ Senate of the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. United States Dep’t of

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Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Particularly wary of agency attempts ‘‘to play cat and mouse by

withholding its most powerful cannon until after the District

Court has decided the case and then springing it on surprised

opponents and the judge,’’ id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted), we have ‘‘plainly and repeatedly told the

government that, as a general rule, it must assert all exemptions at the same time, in the original district court proceedings,’’ Maydak, 218 F.3d at 764–65.

But although FOIA strongly favors prompt disclosure, its

nine enumerated exemptions are designed to protect those

‘‘legitimate governmental and private interests’’ that might be

‘‘harmed by release of certain types of information.’’ John

Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Given the drafters’ recognition that the harms of disclosure may in some cases

outweigh its benefits, we have avoided adopting a ‘‘rigid

‘press it at the threshold, or lose it for all times’ approach to

TTT agenc[ies’] FOIA exemption claims.’’ Senate of Puerto

Rico, 823 F.2d at 581. Instead, we have repeatedly acknowledged that there are some ‘‘extraordinary’’ circumstances in

which courts of appeals may exercise their authority under 28

U.S.C. § 2106 to require ‘‘such further proceedings to be had

as may be just under the circumstances,’’ in order to allow the

government to raise FOIA exemption claims it failed to raise

the first time around. Maydak, 218 F.3d at 767.

In Jordan v. United States Department of Justice, 591

F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978), we outlined the considerations

courts should take into account in deciding whether to exercise their section 2106 discretion to allow the Government to

raise belated FOIA exemption claims. As we observed in

that case, ‘‘there are at least three situations in which an

agency might be led to invoke an exemption on appeal for the

first time.’’ Id. at 780. One of those situations is where the

Government deliberately withholds some of its FOIA claims

‘‘to gain a tactical advantage over the requestor,’’ a motive

undoubtedly inconsistent with FOIA’s ‘‘broad remedial purpose’’ and which counsels denying the Government’s request

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for remand. Id. That said, we also acknowledged that the

exercise of section 2106 discretion might be appropriate

where the agency’s motives for belatedly invoking FOIA

exemptions are less sinister, such as where an agency is

‘‘forced to invoke an exemption for the first time on appeal

because of a substantial change in the factual context of the

case or because of an interim development in applicable legal

doctrine.’’ Id. We also recognized that ‘‘there could be

circumstances where, through pure mistake, the Government

attorneys had not invoked the correct exemption in the

district court.’’ Id. In this latter situation, we stated that

[i]f the value of the material which otherwise would be

subject to disclosure were obviously high, [e].g., confidential information compromising the nation’s foreign relations or national security, and it appeared highly likely

was intended to be protected by one of the nine enumerated exemptions, then under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, the appellate court would have discretion to ‘‘remand the cause

and require such further proceedings to be had as may

be just under the circumstances.’’

Id.; accord Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 792 (D.C.

Cir. 1980) (recognizing exception to general waiver rule where

‘‘sensitive, personal private information might be revealed’’);

Wash. Post v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 795 F.2d 205,

208 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Although Maydak affirmed Jordan’s flexible approach to

handling belated invocations of FOIA exemptions, 218 F.3d at

767, it ultimately determined that none of the circumstances

Jordan recognized as counseling remand was present: The

‘‘simple resolution of other litigation’’ is not the type of

‘‘interim development’’ that excuses the Government’s failure

to assert FOIA exemptions other than 7(A), and the Government neither argued that that failure resulted from human

error nor offered evidence to substantiate the applicability of

other FOIA exemptions, id. at 768–69. Maydak concluded

that the Government’s failure to make an evidentiary showing

about the ‘‘dire consequences’’ that would ‘‘flow from the

release of the requested documents TTT strongly suggests the

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sort of tactical maneuvering at a plaintiff’s expense that we

have explicitly rejected.’’ Id. at 769.

This case differs from Maydak in several important respects. First, and most important, the Government seeks

only the opportunity to withhold ‘‘sensitive, personal private

information’’ pertaining to third parties involved in its investigation of August, and it has provided clear evidence that

wholesale disclosure of the requested information would endanger such persons. According to the Durney Declaration,

August’s file includes the names and other identifying information pertaining to confidential sources and other persons

who provided information in the course of the investigation.

Disclosure of this information, Durney declares, ‘‘could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety’’ of such

persons, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F), and ‘‘could reasonably be

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy,’’ see id. § 552(b)(7)(C), since release of such information would expose them to the risk of physical harm, harassment, and identity theft. Durney Decl. ¶ ¶ 25–34.

Second, the Government has admitted that it made a

mistake in failing to invoke FOIA Exemptions 7(C), 7(D), and

7(F) in the district court, acknowledging that it ‘‘did not fulfill

its responsibility under FOIA in a timely fashion.’’ Appellees’ Br. at 12–13. The Government’s behavior in this case,

moreover, is far more consistent with simple human error

than with the kind of tactical maneuvering we disapproved in

Maydak. To begin with, at the time this litigation commenced, Maydak had not yet been decided, and under thengoverning law, the Government might quite plausibly have

believed that it could rely solely on Exemption 7(A) without

reviewing its voluminous investigative file on August to determine whether other exemptions might apply. See Senate of

Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 581 (holding that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in permitting the Government to

invoke other FOIA exemptions after its initial reliance on

7(A) ‘‘collapse[d],’’ and leaving open the question of whether

the conclusion of law-enforcement proceedings constitutes a

‘‘substantial change in the factual context of the case’’ sufficient to invoke an appellate court’s section 2106 discretion to

remand). Indeed, Maydak was not decided until well after

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the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

Government on its Exemption 7(A) claim and this court

issued its order in August’s first appeal. In light of the

substantiation of the important third-party interests at stake,

it seems quite likely that the Government’s failure to invoke

Exemptions 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F) was not an effort to gain a

tactical advantage, as August argues, but rather stemmed

from its ultimately mistaken but reasonable belief that it

would have an opportunity to raise these exemptions if the

law-enforcement proceedings against August ended before his

FOIA case.

Nothing in Maydak requires that we order disclosure

solely to deter the Government from playing ‘‘cat and mouse

games’’ where, as here, not only did the Government’s behavior result from a mistake, but doing so would endanger the

safety and privacy of third parties––who, after all, bear no

responsibility for the Government’s litigation strategy. The

law does not require that third parties pay for the Government’s mistakes. Cf. Sherman v. United States Dep’t of the

Army, 244 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the

Government cannot waive FOIA Exemption 6 on behalf of the

individual whose privacy interests the exemption protects);

Computer Prof ’ls for Soc. Responsibility v. United States

Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903–04 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding

that the district court erred in refusing to grant the Secret

Service’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to rehear arguments

about the applicability of FOIA Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D) in

light of the Secret Service’s belatedly proffered proof of a

promise of confidentiality, noting that the case was ‘‘not the

ordinary one,’’ since ‘‘it involves not only the interests of the

Secret Service, but that of a third party whose identity and

information are expressly protected by FOIA’’); Schanen v.

United States Dep’t of Justice, 798 F.2d 348, 349 (9th Cir.

1986) (reversing the denial of the Government’s Rule 60(b)

motion to allow it to make a belated response to a FOIA

request on the ground that ‘‘[r]elease of the documents would

endanger the lives and well-being of agents and informants’’).

Finally, remand is particularly appropriate in this case

because ‘‘the government has taken affirmative steps to abide

by Maydak, to guard against recurrence of this problem.’’

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Appellees’ Br. at 24. Reiterating this point at oral argument,

counsel explained that the government has changed its policy

for the review of FOIA requests to ensure that all applicable

exemptions are raised at the outset.

To sum up, because the Government’s failure to raise all

FOIA exemptions at the outset resulted from human error,

because wholesale disclosure would pose a significant risk to

the safety and privacy of third parties, and because the

Government has taken steps to ensure that it does not make

the same mistake again, we see this case as inappropriate for

the rigid ‘‘press it at the threshold, or lose it for all times’’

approach urged by August. We remand to the district court

for in camera consideration of the applicability of FOIA

Exemptions 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F).

So ordered.

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