Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05215/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05215-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELISSA JOY PERNA,

Plaintiff,

v.

SF COUNTY JAIL #2,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-05215-JD 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Plaintiff, a detainee, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has filed an amended 

complaint.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

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cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 

omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” 

standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 

to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

II. LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff challenges many conditions concerning her confinement in San Francisco County 

Jail. When a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of her confinement, the proper inquiry is 

whether the conditions amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). “‘[T]he State does 

not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has 

secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where the State 

seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent guarantee is the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 

671-72 n.40 (1977)).

A court presented with a procedural due process claim by a pretrial detainee should first 

ask if the alleged deprivation amounts to punishment and therefore implicates the Due Process 

Clause itself; if so, the court then must determine what process is due. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 

537-38 (discussing tests traditionally applied to determine whether governmental acts are punitive 

in nature). Disciplinary segregation as punishment for violation of jail rules and regulations, for 

example, cannot be imposed without due process, i.e., without complying with the procedural 

requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 

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523-26 (9th Cir. 1996).

If the alleged deprivation does not amount to punishment, a pretrial detainee’s due process 

claim is not analyzed under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 474 (1995), which applies to convicted 

prisoners, but rather under the law as it was before Sandin. See Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 

1039, 1041 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002). The proper test to determine whether detainees have a liberty 

interest is that set out in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983), and Kentucky Dep’t of 

Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989). Under those cases, a state statute or 

regulation creates a procedurally protected liberty interest if it sets forth “‘substantive predicates’ 

to govern official decision making” and also contains “explicitly mandatory language,” i.e., a 

specific directive to the decisionmaker that mandates a particular outcome if the substantive 

predicates have been met. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462-63 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472).

If the alleged deprivation does not amount to punishment and there is no state statute or 

regulation from which the interest could arise, no procedural due process claim is stated and the 

claim should be dismissed. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976) (interests 

protected by due process arise from Due Process Clause itself or from laws of the states).

Plaintiff is also informed that here is no constitutional right to a prison administrative 

appeal or grievance system. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); accord Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974) 

(accepting Nebraska system wherein no provision made for administrative review of disciplinary 

decisions).

Plaintiff states that she had no access to stationary from October 16, 2014, to November 8, 

2014, her attempts to purchase items through the commissary were denied, her inmate appeals

were not addressed, her due process rights were violated in discipline hearings, and there was no 

access to hair care services. Other than listing these grievances, plaintiff provides no specific 

information and identifies no individual defendants. Plaintiff’s prior complaint was dismissed 

with leave to amend to cure these same deficiencies, but she has failed to provide additional 

information. She will be granted one final opportunity to amend. She must provide additional 

information regarding her claims and identify how individual named defendants violated her 

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rights. With respect to plaintiff’s claim of a due process violation for a discipline hearing she 

must describe the reason for the hearing, her punishment, and how her due process rights were 

violated. 

CONCLUSION

1. The amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. The second 

amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed and 

must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 

the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik 

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). She may not incorporate material from the 

original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the 

dismissal of this case.

2. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice 

of Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 

do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELISSA JOY PERNA,

Plaintiff,

v.

SF COUNTY JAIL #2,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-05215-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on July 29, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Melissa Joy Perna

#1467851

c/o Prisoner Legal Services

555 Seventh Street, Rm 201

SF, CA 94103 

Dated: July 29, 2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

Case 3:14-cv-05215-JD Document 15 Filed 07/29/15 Page 5 of 5