Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00248/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00248-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

OWEN FRANCIS CARGOL, et al., 

Defendants. _________________________________

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No. CIV 03-0248-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court are three interrelated Motions: 1) Plaintiff's Motion for

Attorney's Fees [Doc. No. 89]; 2) Defendants Cargol's and Lee's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's

Joint Reply to Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Bill of Costs [Doc. No. 94] and 3)

Defendants' Motion to File Surreply or Alternatively to Strike New Evidence in Plaintiff's Reply

Memorandum [Doc. No. 126]. 

BACKGROUND

This case arose out of an altercation between Plaintiff John Doe, an employee of

Northern Arizona University ("NAU") and Dr. Owen Cargol, the President of NAU at the time

of the altercation. On April 5, 2002, Plaintiff filed a notice of claim as required by A.R.S. § 12-

821.01 and demanded $300,000 to settle the claim. The State of Arizona subsequently denied

the claim and on October 22, 2002 Plaintiff filed suit in state court naming as defendants NAU,

the Arizona Board of Regents, Owen Francis Cargol, and Dai-Lih Cargol (collectively

"Defendants"). The following procedural activity also took place in this case: 

• On May 15, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed under a

Pseudonym which Defendants opposed. 

• On February 6, 2003, this case was removed from state court to this Court. 

• On February 26, 2003, the NAU Board filed a two paragraph motion to dismiss

the Title VII claim on jurisdictional grounds because the Plaintiff had not

completed the EEOC administrative process. 

Case 2:03-cv-00248-SMM Document 130 Filed 03/29/06 Page 1 of 8
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1

 Plaintiff entered into a Stipulation with Defendant Heidrick & Struggles dismissing them from this

action and agreeing that each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees on July 9, 2005 [Doc. No. 101].

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• On October 2, 2003, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint which cured the

jurisdictional defect and added negligence claims against Heidrick & Struggles,

Inc.1

 [Doc. No. 30].

• On October 16, 2003, Defendant Cargol filed a Motion to Dismiss contending

that the first amended complaint failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutional

right and failed to allege Defendant Cargol acted under color of law [Doc. No.

32]. This Motion was opposed by Plaintiff and subsequently denied by this

Court [Doc. No. 50]. 

• On September 21, 2004, the parties also filed a Joint Case Management Plan

[Doc. No. 56] and appeared at a Rule 16 Hearing on September 28, 2004. 

• Thereafter, the parties engaged in limited discovery (Defendants took Plaintiff's

deposition and Plaintiff took Defendant Cargol's and Ms. McKay's depositions).

• On April 1, 2005, the parties participated in an unsuccessful mediation in which

Stephen Scott, a former Superior Court judge served as mediator. 

• On April 26, 2005, the Defendants made an Offer of Judgment pursuant to Rule

68 [Doc. No. 86] of $101,005 "plus taxable costs and attorney's fees reasonably

incurred to the date of this offer, as determined by the court." 

• On May 4, 2005, Plaintiff accepted the Offer of Judgment and the clerk of court

entered judgment on May 11, 2005 [Doc. No. 84]. 

• On May 11, 2005, the Court entered judgment against Defendants NAU, the

Arizona Board of Regents, Owen Francis Cargol, and Dai-Lih Cargol in the

amount of $101,005 [Doc. No. 87].

• On May 25, 2005, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion for Attorney's Fees [Doc.

No. 89].

DISCUSSION

The Court will first address Defendants' procedural motions before addressing

Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. 

I. Defendants' Motion to Strike

Defendants have moved to strike Plaintiff's Reply to the their Objections [Docs. No. 

91 and 92] to Plaintiff's Bill of Costs [Doc. No. 88]. The Court finds that under LRCiv

54.1, a Reply to Objections is not permitted or contemplated. In fact, LRCiv 54.1

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specifically sets forth the procedure for resolving disputes over taxable costs and states that

either the parties may request or the Clerk may call for a taxation hearing. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Joint Reply to Defendants'

Objections [Doc. No. 94] is granted. 

II. Defendant Motion to File Surreply 

Defendants have filed a Motion to File a Surreply to Plaintiff's Reply in support of his

Motion for Attorney's Fees which they contend is necessary because Plaintiff presented new

evidence in his Reply. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the position taken by the Seventh

Circuit and held that where "new evidence is presented in a reply to a motion...the district

court should not consider the new evidence without giving the [non-] an opportunity to

respond." Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Black v. TIC

Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 116 (7th Cir. 1990)). 

After examining the Plaintiff's Reply, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Reply does

contain new affidavits from Mr. Rogers, Mr. O'Connor, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Bonnett and Mr.

Gomez. Accordingly, the Court finds that in the interest of thoroughness and justice it will

consider the new evidence filed by Plaintiff, but will also allow Defendants to file a

Surreply. Thus, Defendants' Motion to File a Surreply or Alternatively to Strike New

Evidence in Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum [Doc. No. 126] is granted. 

III. Attorney's Fees

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 In Section 1988 and Title VII cases, the fees must be determined using the

lodestar/multiplier calculation method. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 97, 94 (1989);

Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 518 (9 th Cir. 2000)

(addressing fees awarded pursuant to Title VII and Section 1983); Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72

F.3d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1995); The Ninth Circuit requires a district court to calculate an award

of attorneys' fees by first calculating the lodestar. See Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co. Inc., 224

F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours

the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate and

excluding those hours that are "excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary." Id. at 1028.

DISCUSSION

 The Court must also provide "concise but clear" reasons for a fee award. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983). Both the Supreme Court and

Ninth Circuit have also held that a prevailing party in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 429;

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2

 Plaintiff has conceded that he is not entitled to fees for hours expended after the offer of judgement.

(Pl.'s Reply p. 4)

3

 The Court finds that while Defendant's do not agree that 726.2 expended hours is reasonable, it does

not dispute that Plaintiff's attorneys did in fact bill these hours. The Court also notes that Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's

Reply indicates that Plaintiff agreed to reduce 17.0 hours for Attorney Wilson, 7.0 hours for Attorney Rogers

and 2.5 hours for paralegal Garcia for a total of 22.7 hours to be deducted from 726.2. Finally, the Court finds

that Defendants do not dispute the accuracy of Plaintiff's $175,453 figure but rather contend that the figure is

derived from an improper number of hours multiplied by improper hourly rates for some of Plaintiff's attorneys.

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Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that in civil

rights cases in which the plaintiff prevails, "fee awards should be the rule rather than the

exception"). Moreover, the Offer of Judgment accepted by Defendants clearly provides for

the reasonable recovery of attorney's fees. 

The issue of whether Plaintiff prevailed is not before the Court, as Defendants

concede that Plaintiff "prevailed" and is entitled to attorney's fees. (Def. Response, p. 7).

Defendants, however, contend that the figure sought by Plaintiff is unreasonable because

Plaintiff both (1) expended an excessive and unreasonable number of hours on this case and

(2) has proposed an hourly rate that is unreasonable.

A. Hours

Preliminarily, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to set forth, in a clear and

concise manner the exact number of hours and the total dollar amount of fees sought. For

example, in his Motion for Attorney's Fees [Doc. No. 99] Plaintiff seeks $191,194.50 in

fees based on 761.7 hours billed. In the Memorandum filed in support of this Motion [Doc.

No. 100], Plaintiff seeks compensation for 722.6 hours and $181,125.00 in fees prior to the

offer of judgment and 115.6 hours expended after the offer of judgment.2

 In his Reply,

Plaintiff concedes that the fees sought should be reduced by $5,672.00 to $175,453 (Pl.'s

Reply p.11, Ex. 1). Accordingly, after its best efforts to determine Plaintiff's most current

fee request, the Court finds that Plaintiff is seeking fees in the amount of $175,453 for

approximately 700 hours.3

 

After reviewing the motions and evidence provided by the parties, the Court finds

that Plaintiff seeks fees for the following noteworthy activities: 1) three different time

keepers spent approximately 40 hours transforming a Notice of Claim into a Complaint; 2)

the attorneys engaged in extensive conferencing (approximately 60 hours) in a case that was

in its early stages; and 4) Mr. Rogers and Mr. O'Connor billed approximately 80 hours in

connection with Plaintiff's Deposition; 5) Mr. Rogers and Mr. O'Connor billed

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4

 In fact, Plaintiff states: "[t]hat is not to say that in light of Defendants' Response, that some further

adjustments, in addition to the more than 80 hours already deleted or reduced, are not appropriate." (Pl's Reply,

p. 6).

5

 These figures include the reductions Plaintiff conceded were appropriate in his Reply. (Pl.'s Reply,

Ex. 1).

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approximately 40 hours in connection with Defendant Cargol's deposition; 6) Mr. Rogers

and Mr. O'Connor billed approximately 25 hours in connection with Ms. McKay's

deposition; and 7) Mr. Rogers engaged in substantial amount of legal research despite his

role as a senior attorney and the availability of junior associates. 

The Court notes that Plaintiff expressly relies on the experience and expertise of Mr.

Rogers and Mr. O'Connor in attempting to justify his requested billable rates and finds that

such reliance is understandable as Mr. Rogers was admitted to practice in 1973 and Mr.

O'Connor was admitted to practice in 1984. The Court, however, also finds that given the

extensive experience of these attorneys, sending both of them to depositions where Mr.

Rogers did not actively question the deponents is unreasonable. Likewise, the Court finds

that it is unreasonable for a senior attorney to conduct approximately 50 hours of research

where more junior associates were available and also finds that 40 hours is an unreasonable

amount of time for the conversion of a notice of claim into a complaint. Furthermore, the

Court finds having several senior attorneys staffed on this case led to an unreasonable

generation of fees from conferencing and consultation. Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff

has conceded that his fee request should be adjusted.4

 Based on these findings, the Court

concludes that following hours expended by Plaintiff's attorneys and paralegals are

reasonable:5

 

1) Mr. Roger: 300 hours 

2) Mr. O'Connor: 80 hours

3) Ms. Wilson: 139.3

4) Mr. LaSota: .2 hours

5) Ms. Whalen: .4 hours

6) Ms. Cannata: .4 hours

7) Ms. Buzicky: 6.7 hours

8) Ms. Garcia: 31.3 hours

9) Ms. Holm: 2.2 hours

10) 40 reclassified hours at the rate of $150 per hour. (20 hours for each Mr. 

Rogers and Mr. O'Connor). 

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6

 While the fee agreement does specify this rate, the Court finds that the fee agreement specifically

states that this is a reduced rate to be paid prior to any potential recovery from which the attorneys would get a

contingency fee. 

7

 David Schwartz, Mr. Cargol's Attorney billed at $125, Mr. Richard Woods, the attorney for Heidrick

& Struggles billed at $175 per hour and Mr. Goodwin, who as an assistant Attorney General does not bill at any

rate, has a rate of $185 per hour under the Attorney General's fee schedule. 

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While the Court finds that reductions in Plaintiff's requested hours are necessary, the

Court also finds that this was a complicated case, involving significant issues that lasted for

approximately three years. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff was forced to prepare

and file several procedural and substantive motions over the course of the litigation. Finally,

the Court notes that while Defendants strenuously object to the amount of hours expended

by Plaintiff's counsel, Defendants lawyers spent approximately 500 hours defending this

case. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's requested hours, reduced in accordance

with this Order, are reasonable. 

B. Rate

The Court also finds that a significant dispute exists over the appropriate hourly rate

for Plaintiff's attorneys. The Ninth Circuit has held that "[i]n determining a reasonable

hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community for

similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation." 

Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-1211 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff contends that the following hourly rates should apply: 1) $275/hour for Mr.

Rodgers, Ms. O'Connor, Mr. LaSota and Ms. Whalen; 2) $225/hour for Ms. Wilson and Ms.

Canata; 3) $150/hour for Jodi Buzicky and 4) $60/hour for paralegal assistance. In support

of this contention, Plaintiff has provided the Court with numerous affidavits from attorneys

that indicate that labor and employment attorneys in Phoenix bill in a range from $250-$400. 

Defendants object to these rates as unsupported by the evidence and have presented

affidavits indicating that this range is unreasonable for the Phoenix market. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff's fee agreement indicates that Plaintiff is required to pay the attorneys at

a rate of $120 per hour.6

 Furthermore, Defendants contend that these hourly rates dwarf the

rates at which the Defense team billed.7

 

The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has upheld an award of $250/hour as

reasonable in the Phoenix market in a fact intensive and time consuming case. Shapiro v.

Paradise Valley Unified School Dist., 374 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, in

Shapiro, the Ninth Circuit also rejected an argument that the plaintiff's rate was not based on

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the prevailing market rate because it was higher than the rate typically charged by the

defense counsel. Id. at 866. 

Like the case in Shapiro, this Court finds that the instant case was time consuming

and complex. The Court also finds that rates requested by Plaintiff's counsel are on the low

end of the market rate based on the evidence presented to this Court and are either slightly

above or below the $250 per hour award recently found to be reasonable by the Ninth

Circuit. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's requested hourly rates fall within the

market rate and are therefore appropriate. 

C. Lodestar Adjustment

After the Court calculates the lodestar amount, it must also assess whether additional

considerations require it to adjust the figure. Caudle, 224 F.3d at 1028; accord Kerr v.

Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976)

(factors the court can consider in adjusting the lodestar are: (1) the time and labor required;

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the

legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to

acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)

time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the

results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the

"undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with

the client; and (12) awards in similar cases).

 Having considered the factors set forth above, the Court finds that an adjustment to

the lodestar amount is not warranted in this case. 

IV. Costs

The Court finds that Plaintiff has re-asserted his request for costs under 28 U.S.C. §

1920 and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in his Motion for Attorney's Fees [Doc. No. 89]. 

Under LRCiv 54.1, however, the Clerk of Court is required to decide which costs are taxable

under Section 1920. Accordingly, this Court will not address Plaintiff's request for costs

until after the Clerk has evaluated Plaintiff's Bill of Costs [Doc. No. 88]. If Plaintiff still

wishes to seek nontaxable costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 after the Clerk's determination, he

may re-file a request for costs. 

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CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of

$145,122.50.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant ABOR's Motion to File a Surreply

Plaintiff's Reply in Support of his Motion for Attorney's Fees [Doc. No. 126] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Cargol's and Lee's Motion to Strike

Plaintiff's Joint Reply to Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Bill of Costs [Doc. No. 94] is

GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is

hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees in the

amount of $145,122.50 from Defendants NAU, the Arizona Board of Regents, Owen Francis

Cargol, and Dai-Lih Cargol. The Court will not address Plaintiff's request for costs under 42

U.S.C. §1988 at this time. If necessary, Plaintiff may re-file a request for costs after the Clerk

has addressed Plaintiff's Bill of Costs. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall address Plaintiff's Bill of Costs [Doc.

No. 88] as soon as feasible. 

DATED this 28th day of March, 2006.

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