Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02474/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02474-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Freddie Lee Ford, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-02474-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation (R&R) of Magistrate Judge 

Burns. Doc. 16. The R&R suggests that the Court deny the pro se petition for writ of 

habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 15. Specifically, Judge Burns 

found that Petitioner procedurally defaulted grounds one and three of his petition by 

failing to present them to the state court, and that he failed to show cause and prejudice to 

excuse the default. Doc. 15 at 12. Judge Burns found that ground two of the petition is 

not a cognizable federal claim. Id. at 14. For the reasons that follow, the Court will 

accept the R&R and deny the habeas petition. 

I. Background. 

 The petition concerns two Arizona state cases: CR 2010-106247, in which 

Petitioner was charged with threatening two police officers and others with a pellet gun, 

and CR 2010-117471, in which he was charged with assaulting a detention officer in the 

Maricopa County Jail. Doc. 15. In CR 2010-106247, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts 

Case 2:13-cv-02474-DGC Document 17 Filed 06/30/15 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of class 2 felony aggravated assault and one count of class 3 felony aggravated assault. 

Doc. 15 at 2. The plea agreement required that Petitioner be sentenced to prison for the 

class 2 felony assaults and did not state whether these sentences would be served 

consecutively or concurrently. Id. Petitioner agreed to be placed on supervised probation 

for the class 3 assault. Id. In CR 2010-117471, Petitioner pled guilty to a class 5 felony 

aggravated assault. The plea agreement provided that Petitioner would be placed on 

supervised probation upon his release. Id. at 9. 

 At sentencing, the trial court heard from officers present at the scene of the class 2 

assaults. They described Petitioner’s brandishing of what appeared to be a firearm in the 

middle of a public street, pointing it at drivers who fled in fear, pointing it at officers who 

were trying to get the scene under control, and refusing to comply with officers’ 

commands until he was forcibly subdued. Doc. 13-1 at 47-79. The trial court considered 

Petitioner’s criminal history and past gang affiliation, heard arguments about his mental 

health, and sentenced Petitioner to two terms of 18.5 years on the class 2 felonies, to be 

served consecutively, and to a probationary period following his imprisonment. Id. This 

was less than the 46.5-year sentence requested by the State. Id. at 65. 

 Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). His PCR 

counsel found “no claims for relief to raise in post conviction proceedings.” Doc. 15 at 3 

“Petitioner filed a timely pro per PCR petition, raising the following issues: 1) ineffective 

assistance of counsel (“IAC”) for failure to ‘explain contents of plea agreements to 

defendant;’ and 2) the trial court improperly aggravated his sentences and also 

improperly ordered them to be served consecutively.” Id. at 3-4 (quoting Ex. N at 6-8). 

The trial court denied the PCR petition. Id. at 4. 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals raising 

four issues: “1) whether his plea was legal because he was on ‘psychotropic narcotic 

drugs while pleading guilty before the judge;’ 2) whether his sentence was properly 

aggravated with a prior conviction; 3) whether the imposition of consecutive sentences 

was proper; and 4) IAC (generally and relating to his plea).” Id. (quoting Doc. 6 at 31-

Case 2:13-cv-02474-DGC Document 17 Filed 06/30/15 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

46). The Court of Appeals denied the petition, finding that nothing in the record 

indicated that the trial court or Petitioner’s trial counsel should have doubted his 

competency at the plea hearing, that the sentence was properly aggravated, that 

consecutive sentences were lawful because the sentences were imposed for a single act 

that harmed multiple victims, and that most of Petitioner’s IAC claims were too vague or 

unsupported to permit meaningful review. Id. at 4-6. The Court of Appeals found that 

Petitioner’s IAC claim regarding his acceptance of the plea agreement was sufficiently 

specific, but determined that the record contradicted his claim and that Petitioner had 

failed to establish prejudice arising from trial counsel’s actions. Id. at 5. The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied review. Id. 

 Petitioner’s federal habeas petition raises three grounds for relief: (1) ineffective 

assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because trial 

counsel failed to investigate Petitioner’s mental history and his alleged prior conviction 

and failed to “group plea’s at sentencing;” (2) the sentence violated the Fifth and Sixth 

Amendments because the trial court improperly used a prior conviction, “transfer[red] 

intent in violation of the law,” relied on insufficient testimony, and engaged in judicial 

fact finding; and (3) the sentence was excessive and violated the Fifth Amendment 

because it was based on brandishing a pellet gun which had no CO2 cartridge. See

Doc. 6 at 6-8. 

 Judge Burns found that Petitioner failed to exhaust his remedies in state court on 

grounds one and three, resulting in procedural default. Id. at 12. On ground one, she 

found that “[w]hile Petitioner raised differing IAC claims [in] his PCR petition and 

petition for review, both pleadings failed to mention any failure to investigate or [group 

the plea agreements], but instead argued IAC generally and relating to the acceptance of 

his plea and failure to explain the contents of his plea.” Id. On ground three, Judge 

Burns found that Petitioner failed to raise a “claim in his PCR petition or petition for 

review arguing that his sentence was constitutionally excessive or ‘absurd’ as set forth in 

his habeas petition.” Id. Judge Burns also found on grounds one and three that Petitioner 

Case 2:13-cv-02474-DGC Document 17 Filed 06/30/15 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

failed to establish any basis “to excuse the procedural default by showing of cause and 

prejudice [and did not argue] a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. Finally, Judge 

Burns found that ground two failed to state a cognizable federal claim because it 

concerned “[s]entence calculation and application of state sentencing statutes [that] are 

matters of state law,” and Petitioner failed to establish that his sentence was “arbitrary 

and capricious, or fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 14-15 

 Petitioner’s objection to the R&R focuses entirely on exhaustion and procedural 

default. Petitioner argues that his counsel at the sentencing hearing failed to state that the 

pellet gun was inoperable, that he was under the influence of both drugs and alcohol, and 

that he lacked the intent to place anyone in imminent physical danger. Id. He argues that 

this is a substantial claim and that he was left unrepresented during PCR proceedings 

when his appointed PCR counsel filed a notice stating that he could find no errors in the 

conviction or sentencing. Id. at 2. Petitioner also argues that his PCR counsel should 

have addressed “judicial fact finding” and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. at 

2. Petitioner closes by claiming that his counsel acted in violation of the State Bar of 

Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct and that he has been denied due process. Id. at 3. 

II. Analysis. 

A. Ground Two. 

 As noted, Judge Burns found that ground two failed to state a cognizable federal 

claim. Petitioner raises no objection to this conclusion. Doc. 6. The Court must 

undertake a de novo review only of those portions of the R&R to which specific 

objections are made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court therefore will not address ground two. 

B. Ground One. 

 As noted, ground one asserts that Petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to investigate his mental history and his prior conviction and by 

failing to “group plea’s.” Doc. 6 at 6. Judge Burns found that Petitioner did not raise this 

claim in state court and that it is now procedurally defaulted because Petitioner cannot 

Case 2:13-cv-02474-DGC Document 17 Filed 06/30/15 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

return to state court to raise it. Doc. 15 at 12. Petitioner does not object to this finding, 

but appears to argue that his procedural default of ground one should be excused for 

cause and prejudice. Doc. 16 at 2. 

 When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, a federal district court may 

consider the merits of that claim if the petitioner can establish cause for the procedural 

default and resulting prejudice. Coleman v. Thompson ̧ 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). In 

Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), the Supreme Court held that 

cause and prejudice can be satisfied when PCR counsel “was ineffective under the 

standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)” and a petitioner shows “that 

the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is 

to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id. at 1318. 

 Petitioner did not argue before Judge Burns that his procedural default of ground 

one should be excused for cause and prejudice. Doc. 15 at 12-13. Even considering the 

cause and prejudice arguments that appear to be raised for the first time in Petitioner’s 

objection, they are unavailing. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under 

Strickland, a petitioner “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness” and that the “deficiencies in counsel’s performance [were] 

prejudicial to the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 692. Prejudice means “a 

reasonable probability” that, “but for counsel’s deficient performance, ‘the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.’” Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1237, (9th 

Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

 In his objection, Petitioner mixes arguments regarding his trial counsel and his 

PCR counsel. He asserts that trial counsel should have mentioned at the sentencing 

hearing that he “brandish[ed] an inoperable air pellet gun” that had no CO2 cartridge. 

Doc. 16 at 2, 3. He argues that this fact indicates that he lacked the intent to place anyone 

in imminent physical danger. Id. at 3. Additionally, Petitioner argues that trial counsel 

should have mentioned that he was under the influence of “not only drugs, but alcohol” at 

the time of the incident, and should have objected to judicial fact finding and consecutive 

Case 2:13-cv-02474-DGC Document 17 Filed 06/30/15 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

sentences. Id. at 2. Finally, Petitioner complains that his PCR counsel raised no issues 

with the conviction and sentencing, leaving Petitioner “unrepresented.” Id. 

 None of these arguments relate to ground one. As noted above, ground one asserts 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to investigate Petitioner’s mental 

health history and prior convictions, and on a failure to “group plea’s.” Doc. 6 at 6. 

Because the arguments made in the objection do not relate to ground one, Petitioner has 

failed to establish cause for the procedural default of ground one.1

 Nor do the arguments 

show that ground one was a substantial claim.2

 Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318. 

C. Ground Three. 

 Ground three asserts that Petitioner’s sentence was excessive and violated the 

Fifth Amendment because it was based on brandishing a pellet gun which had no pellets 

or CO2 cartridge. See Doc. 6 at 6-8. Judge Burns found that Petitioner did not raise this 

claim in state court and that it is now procedurally defaulted. Doc. 15 at 12. Petitioner 

does not object to this finding, but appears to argue that his procedural default should be 

excused for cause and prejudice. Doc. 16 at 2. 

 Again, Petitioner did not argue before Judge Burns that his procedural default of 

ground three should be excused for cause and prejudice. Doc. 15 at 12-13. When this 

Court considers the new cause and prejudice arguments, it finds them unpersuasive. As 

noted above, Petitioner’s objection argues that trial counsel should have mentioned that 

he brandished an inoperable pellet gun, that he lacked the intent to place anyone in 

imminent physical danger, and that he was under the influence of “not only drugs, but 

 

1

 Procedural default can also be excused when “failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Petitioner 

does not raise this issue in his objection. 

2

 On the merits of ground one, Petitioner does not explain what he means by the failure to “group” pleas (this may simply be an objection to the consecutive sentences) or 

how further investigation of his criminal history would have made a difference. With respect to trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate Petitioner’s mental health issues, those issues were the primary focus of trial counsel’s argument at the sentencing. See 

Doc. 13-1 at 65-70. (The Court notes that the sentencing transcript attributes many of the mental health arguments to the trial judge, but this appears to be a clear error as the speaker – defense counsel – is addressing the judge. See id. at 68, lines 16-17 (“in your court”), and 69, line 19 (“Your Honor”)). 

Case 2:13-cv-02474-DGC Document 17 Filed 06/30/15 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

alcohol.” Doc. 16 at 2-3. Because ground three is not an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, these arguments are not directly relevant, but Petitioner may be asserting 

them to show that PCR counsel should have made the ground three arguments, that his 

failure to do so was ineffective, and that this ineffectiveness constitutes cause and 

prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedure default. Even so construed, they are 

unavailing. 

 The fact that Petitioner used a pellet gun and not a real firearm was abundantly 

clear at the sentencing hearing. Witnesses referred to the weapon as a “BB gun” or 

“pellet gun.” See, e.g., Doc. 13-1 at 58. The presentence report referred to it as an “air 

gun.” Id. at 93. The Court clearly understood that it was not a firearm in the traditional 

sense. And the fact that it was also inoperable would have made little difference as it was 

the appearance of the weapon, not the fact that it was a pellet gun, that made Petitioner’s 

crime so serious. Id. at 47-79. Petitioner’s alleged lack of intent to place anyone in 

physical danger is inapposite because the charge was that Petitioner placed law 

enforcement and others “in reasonable apprehension of physical injury.” Id. at 3. 

Witnesses testified at the sentencing hearing that they thought Petitioner’s gun was an 

actual firearm and felt fear when he pointed it at them in the middle of a city street and 

refused to put it down when ordered to do so by law enforcement. See, e.g., id. at 57-59. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that counsel should have made clear that Petitioner was “under 

the influence not only of drugs, but alcohol.” Doc. 16 at 2. This fact was also clear at the 

sentencing. The presentence report noted that, at the time of the offense, Petitioner was 

holding a gun in his right hand and a beer in his left hand. Doc. 13-1 at 93. Given that 

these facts were known to the trial court at sentencing, and given the nature of the 

charges for which Petitioner was sentenced, Petitioner’s arguments do not provide a basis 

for concluding that PCR counsel was ineffective when he failed to assert that the sentence 

was excessive. Nor do they provide a basis for concluding that PCR counsel overlooked 

a substantial argument.3

 

3

 Petitioner’s citation to State v. Fell, 115 P.3d 594 (Ariz. 2005), where the 

Case 2:13-cv-02474-DGC Document 17 Filed 06/30/15 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

D. Conclusion. 

 Petitioner does not object to Judge Burns’ recommendation on ground two and has 

procedurally defaulted his claims in grounds one and three. Petitioner has not shown 

cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. The Court will accept Judge Burns’ 

recommendation. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 

 2. A certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

 appeal are denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

 the denial of a constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

 3. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 30th day of June, 2015. 

 Arizona Supreme Court reviewed Arizona’s non-capital, first degree murder sentencing scheme, appears to be inapposite. Petitioner does not explain this citation beyond stating that “Arizona statute[]s were clear at the time.” Doc. 16 at 2. 

Case 2:13-cv-02474-DGC Document 17 Filed 06/30/15 Page 8 of 8