Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03126/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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... 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

IVORY L. HAISLIP, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

vs. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF 

KANSAS: and RAYMOND ROBERTS, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

FILL D 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

MAY 3 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-3126 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 90-3131-S} 

Tom Stacy, Kansas Defender Project, University of Kansas School of 

Law, Lawrence, Kansas, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

John K. Bork, Assistant Attorney General (JaLynn Copp, Assistant 

Attorney General, with him on the brief} Topeka, Kansas, for 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN and KELLY, Circuit Judges and ALLEY, District Judge . t 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Ivory L. Haislip appeals the district court's denial of his 

first habeas corpus petition. Mr. Haislip was convicted in 1984 

of first degree murder and aggravated battery of a law enforcement 

officer. Petitioner is currently incarcerated, and challenges his 

conviction on the grounds that: (1) he was denied his 

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and (2) he 

t The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge 

for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-3126 Document: 010110110035 Date Filed: 05/03/1993 Page: 1 
was denied due process when he was not allowed a continuance to 

consult with an expert in hypnosis before trial . Our jurisdiction 

arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253 and we affirm. 

Background 

Mr. Haislip was convicted of murder in the death of Wichita, 

Kansas, police officer Paul Garofalo and of aggravated battery in 

the shooting of officer Randy Mullikin. This conviction followed 

Petitioner's third trial; the first two convictions were vacated 

and remanded by the Kansas Supreme Court. The facts are stated 

fully in State v. Haislip. 673 P.2d 1094 (Kan. 1983), cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985) and State v. Haislip, 701 P.2d 909 

(Kan.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985). 

Mr. Haislip filed a federal habeas corpus petition in 1990. 

The district court denied the petition, rejecting Petitioner's 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and error based on 

denial of a continuance. 

Discussion 

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner argues ineffective assistance of counsel because 

counsel did not gain admission of a codefendant's confession and 

did not present other exculpatory evidence. The two-part test of 

Strickland v. Washington requires that Petitioner show both that 

his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that, but for his counsel's inadequacies, the 

result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. 

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668, 689 (1984). Ineffective assistance claims raise "a mixed 

question of law and fact which requires 'us to view the "totality 

of the evidence before the judge and jury."'" United States v. 

Maxwell, 966 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. 

Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Cuyler v. 

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980))), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 826 

(1992). 

A. Martin's Confession 

Petitioner's theory of defense was that the murder was 

actually cormnitted by Anthony Ray Martin. Mr. Martin had been 

charged with aiding and abetting the murder, but was acquitted. 

See State v. Martin, 699 P.2d 486 (Kan. 1985). Several witnesses, 

including Mr. Martin, identified Petitioner as the gunman, and 

other witnesses testified that Petitioner admitted cormnitting the 

murder. Mr. Martin testified in person at the second trial, and 

his testimony was read into the record at the third trial after he 

exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege. Mr. Martin testified 

that, just prior to the shooting, he saw a man throw down a pool 

cue case, which Martin picked up, hoping to find drugs. After the 

shooting, he found the case again and decided that he should wipe 

off his fingerprints, which he did, and then tossed it away. He 

identified Mr. Haislip as the gunman, and denied knowing him or 

giving him the gun. 

Several of Petitioner's witnesses testified to observing 

Anthony Martin at the scene. Krystal Butler, a witness who had 

been talking to the officers from the passenger side of the car 

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when the shooting occurred, testified that she saw Mr. Martin on 

the other side of the car, with a shotgun. She also testified 

that she had been smoking marijuana that night, and admitted that 

in a prior sworn statement she had denied knowing the identity of 

the gunman. Defense counsel attempted to question Ms. Butler 

about a confession by Mr. Martin, which, upon objection, the court 

disallowed as hearsay. Defense counsel did not challenge the 

court's ruling. 

Petitioner contends that the statement was admissible as a 

statement against penal interest under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-460(j) 

and would have changed the outcome of the case, and that his 

counsel's failure to argue for admission and cite the statute was 

objectively unreasonable. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the 

evidence may have been admissible had the trial court considered 

it. Haislip. 701 P.2d at 921. The possible application of the 

Kansas statute was waived, however, because the trial court was 

not given an opportunity to consider it. 

Petitioner must overcome a "strong presumption that counsel's 

conduct· falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance .... " Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Petitioner 

argues that counsel's failure to offer exculpatory evidence is 

obviously unreasonable, relying on Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 

1472 (4th Cir. 1991); Moffett v. Kolb, 930 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 

1991) and Nixon v. Newsome, 888 F.2d 112 (11th Cir. 1989). Each 

of these cases, however, concerns the utter failure of defense 

counsel to offer evidence which was highly exculpatory and which 

was not introduced through other means. Here, Petitioner's 

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counsel introduced several witnesses who testified that Mr. Martin 

was the killer. Ms. Butler testified as an eyewitness to the 

shooting. Defense counsel may have erred in not arguing for 

admission of the confession, but we cannot say that Petitioner's 

representation was objectively unreasonable. 

Furthermore, considering the totality of the evidence, we do 

not find a reasonable probability that introduction of the 

confession would have resulted in a different verdict. The 

prosecution presented a strong case against Petitioner, which 

included eyewitness accounts and evidence of Petitioner's own 

confession. The jury heard evidence supporting Petitioner's 

theory and chose to convict him anyway. 

B. Other Exculpatory Evidence 

Petitioner also argues that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to introduce evidence of Mr. Martin's prior inconsistent 

statements, favorable treatment from police, and prior crimes. 

Specifically, Petitioner claims that defense counsel did not bring 

to light Mr. Martin's three different versions of what happened on 

the night in question, including a statement in which he admitted 

seeing Ms. Butler shortly before the shooting. Petitioner also 

argues that counsel failed to introduce evidence that the police 

dropped a burglary charge against Mr. Martin, and evidence linking 

Mr. Martin to a similar shooting which occurred two days prior. 

The district court found, and we agree, that defense counsel 

repeatedly impeached Mr. Martin's testimony during crossexamination. Defense counsel did in fact inquire into the 

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burglary charge, and whether it was dropped because Mr. Martin 

identified Mr. Haislip. XII R. 125. As for the evidence of prior 

crimes, evidence of a conviction may be admissible against a 

witness for impeachment purposes. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-421; State 

v. B;r:yant, 613 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Kan. 1980). Here, Mr. Martin was 

not convicted, nor even charged, in the prior shooting. We 

conclude that defense counsel's performance was objectively 

reasonable, and find no reasonable probability that the 

recommended tactics would have changed the outcome of the case. 

II. Due Process Right to a Continuance 

Petitioner's final argument concerns the trial court's denial 

of petitioner's request for a continuance in order to consult with 

an expert in hypnosis. Two witnesses, Officer Mullikin and Dale 

Jackson, underwent hypnosis at the direction of the Wichita Police 

Department in order to enhance their memory of the event. The 

witnesses' descriptions of the murderer changed somewhat after the 

hypnosis, which occurred on November 18, 1980. On February 24, 

1984, thirteen days before the start of Petitioner's third trial, 

Petitioner requested and received funds to hire an expert in 

hypnosis, but the trial court denied his request for a 

continuance. The trial court also ruled that the witnesses could 

only testify to the descriptions they gave prior to hypnosis; they 

could not testify to new facts revealed during hypnosis. 

The grant or denial of a continuance was well within the 

trial court's discretion. Haislip, 701 P.2d at 926. To warrant 

federal habeas relief, a denial of a continuance "'must have been 

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so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violates 

constitutional principles of due process.'" Case v. Mondragon, 

887 F.2d 1388, 1396 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hicks v. Wainwright, 

633 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1035 

(1990). Here, counsel waited until the brink of the third trial, 

following almost three years of representation in this case, and 

three years after the hypnosis, to request a continuance. 

Petitioner does not suggest that he was surprised at the proposed 

testimony. That fact, coupled with the trial court's restrictive 

ruling on admissibility of the testimony, convinces us that there 

was no abuse of discretion. 

AFFIRMED. 

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