Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-02633/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-02633-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUINCY ROBERTSON,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES WALKER, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 10-cv-02633-PJH 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Before the court on reconsideration is the petition of Quincy Robertson, a state 

prisoner, for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered 

supplemental briefing on Robertson’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial 

was violated when a jury convicted him of second degree felony murder without an 

express finding of malice. The matter is submitted on the briefs. For the reasons set 

forth below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Summary

The following summary of the evidence presented at trial is taken from the 

published opinion of the California Supreme Court affirming the judgment. The summary 

of evidence is not in dispute:

During the evening of December 27, 1998, the victims 

Kehinde Riley and Ricky Harris, joined by Bradley Gentry and 

Lamont Benton, imbibed alcohol and used marijuana and 

cocaine while they went for a drive in Benton's automobile. At 

approximately 10:30 p.m., they stopped in front of defendant's 

residence on 99th Avenue Court in Oakland. Riley and Harris 

approached defendant's automobile, a Chevrolet Caprice 

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Classic, which was parked in front of defendant's residence. 

According to Benton's testimony at trial, while Gentry and 

Benton looked on, Riley and Harris began removing the 

vehicle's hubcaps, making loud noises in the process. They 

had removed the passenger side hubcaps and were turning to 

the driver side hubcaps when defendant emerged onto the 

porch of his residence.

According to statements subsequently made by 

defendant to the police, he had been watching television with 

his wife and children, heard a loud noise and, retrieving a 

firearm, went outside to investigate. Defendant denied any 

involvement in the shooting in his initial statement. After 

gunshot residue was discovered on his right hand, defendant 

claimed he had fired a weapon earlier in the day to 

demonstrate its operation for a prospective buyer. Following 

further interrogation, defendant explained that upon hearing a 

sound outside, he looked out and observed three or four men 

near his automobile, apparently engaged either in dismantling 

it or stealing it. Defendant recalled that the men looked at him 

in a threatening manner, and he was uncertain whether they 

would attempt to enter his residence. In his final statement to 

the police, defendant claimed that when he emerged from his 

residence, he held his gun at a 45–degree angle and fired two 

warning shots. The physical evidence, however, indicated that 

three shots had been fired. A bullet hole discovered in the 

windshield of defendant's automobile and two other bullet 

holes found two feet above ground level in a vehicle that was 

parked across the street tended to disprove defendant's claim 

that he had held the gun at a 45–degree angle.

Benton testified at trial that immediately following 

defendant's discharge of the weapon from the porch, Benton 

and Gentry drove away, while Riley and Harris attempted to 

flee on foot. Benton testified he heard from seven to nine 

additional gunshots as he drove away. Defendant, claiming he 

had heard a sound that resembled either a car backfire or the 

discharge of a firearm, admitted in his final statement to the 

police that he had walked at least as far as the sidewalk and 

possibly into the street before firing three shots at the fleeing 

men. He denied intending that the shots hit the men and 

claimed that he fired upwards into the air, intending, as he 

said, to “scare people away from my domain.” He conceded 

that firing a weapon in a residential neighborhood was 

dangerous to human life, but said he had not been thinking 

clearly.

Riley's body was discovered approximately 50 yards 

from where gun casings indicated the firearm had been 

discharged. It appeared the shots had been fired by a person 

standing in the middle of the street in front of defendant's 

residence. Riley had been shot in the back of the head. Harris 

suffered a gunshot wound to the sole of his right foot.

On the night of the incident, one of defendant's 

neighbors heard shots and witnessed a person standing in a 

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“firing stance” in the street, firing shot after shot straight ahead 

and on each occasion correcting for the weapon's “kickback.” 

The neighbor witnessed this person “swagger” back to the 

apartment complex where defendant resided.

One bullet casing was discovered on the porch of 

defendant's residence, two additional casings at the bottom of 

the stairs leading to defendant's apartment, and seven 

casings in the middle of the street in front of defendant's 

residence. Based upon the location of the bullet casings found 

in the street, the physical features of the surrounding 

neighborhood, and the location at which Riley and Harris were 

discovered after the shooting, the prosecution's ballistics 

expert testified that if the person who fired the weapon had 

held it at a 45–degree angle, he or she would not have struck 

the victims. This witness testified that in his opinion, the 

shooter must have pointed the weapon at the victims.

Character witnesses who testified in favor of defendant 

asserted that he was not a violent person, nor was he prone 

to anger. He enjoyed working on cars and was engaged in 

restoring his Chevrolet Caprice Classic for resale. Defendant's 

wife testified that during the time they resided on 99th Avenue 

Court, at least three of the family's vehicles had been broken 

into or vandalized.

Defendant's nephew recounted an episode in which 

defendant had been the victim of a shooting. The episode 

occurred six months prior to the charged crimes, following an 

automobile accident involving this nephew and the driver of 

another vehicle. After an argument erupted between the 

nephew and the other driver and while defendant was 

attempting to subdue his nephew, someone from the other 

vehicle fired on them, seriously injuring defendant's right arm. 

A clinical psychologist testified in defendant's behalf, 

expressing the opinion that defendant suffered from 

posttraumatic stress syndrome as a result of this and other 

incidents, that this condition caused defendant to be fearful 

and easily aroused emotionally, and that defendant likely had 

acted impulsively, without forethought, when he fired on the 

victims.

A ballistics expert testified on behalf of defendant, 

stating that persons lacking experience in shooting firearms 

tend to shoot in a manner that causes them to strike objects 

below their intended target.

In connection with the homicide charge, the jury was 

instructed on first degree murder, second degree murder with 

express malice, second degree murder with implied malice, 

second degree felony murder based on commission of the 

crime of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, 

and voluntary manslaughter. The defense argued that, at 

most, defendant might be liable for voluntary manslaughter on 

the theory that he acted in the heat of passion or from an 

honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend himself.

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The jury deliberated for three days. At that point, a juror 

who complained of debilitating stress arising from asserted 

conflict among the deliberating jurors was excused. The juror 

was replaced by an alternate, and the jury deliberated for an 

additional three days prior to rendering its verdict.

People v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156, 161-63 (2004), overruled on other grounds by 

People v. Sarun Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).

B. Procedural History

Robertson was convicted following a jury trial in the Superior Court of Alameda 

County of the second degree murder of Kehinde Riley in violation of California Penal 

Code § 187, and assault of Rickey Harris with a deadly weapon and by means of force 

likely to inflict great bodily injury in violation of § 245(a)(1). The jury found that Robertson 

personally used a firearm in the commission of these offenses (Cal. Pen. Code 

§§ 1203.06, 12022.5); that he intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing 

great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53(d)); and that he inflicted great bodily injury

(§ 12022.7(a)). Robertson was sentenced to 40 years to life in prison, representing 15 

years to life for the murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement of the 

murder conviction, with a concurrent sentence of 8 years for the assault and related 

enhancements.

Robertson appealed his conviction, challenging the trial court’s second degree 

felony-murder instruction based on his commission of the offense of grossly negligent 

discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code § 246.3). In an opinion dated June 30, 2003, the 

California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment upon determining that grossly negligent 

discharge of a firearm in violation of California Penal Code § 246.3 is an offense that 

merges with the resulting homicide and cannot serve as a predicate for second degree 

felony murder, but that the error in giving the felony murder instruction was harmless. 

Answer, Ex. 1 (People v. Robertson, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1740, 1 Cal. Rptr. 353 (2003), 

superseded by People v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156 (2004)). The California Supreme 

Court subsequently affirmed Robertson’s conviction in a published opinion issued August 

19, 2004, which overruled the court of appeal’s application of the merger doctrine to his 

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section 246.3 predicate offense. The state supreme court held that under the collateral 

purpose test, Robertson’s asserted underlying purpose in discharging a firearm was to 

frighten away the men who were burglarizing his car, rather than to injure or kill them. 

Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th at 171. Although the state supreme court disagreed with the court 

of appeal’s holding that the merger doctrine barred application of the felony-murder rule, 

it noted that the court of appeal affirmed the conviction on the ground that any 

instructional error was harmless, and affirmed the judgment. Id. at 173.

On August 1, 2005, Robertson filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus 

which asserted three claims: (1) that the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his 

confession violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because he had invoked 

his right to counsel and because his confession was coerced; (2) that his Sixth 

Amendment jury trial right was violated when a jury convicted him of second degree 

felony murder without an express finding of malicious intent; and (3) that the California 

Supreme Court’s decision upholding his conviction constituted an unforeseeable and 

retroactive judicial expansion of the second degree felony murder rule in violation of his 

due process rights. See Robertson v. Runnals, C 05-3103 PJH. On January 3, 2008, 

the court denied Robertson’s petition. On February 2, 2009, the Ninth Circuit issued a 

memorandum disposition affirming the order denying habeas relief. Answer, Ex. 7. 

Mandate issued on April 1, 2009. 

On March 30, 2009, the California Supreme Court issued a decision in People v. 

Chun, expressly overruling its holding in Robertson that the merger doctrine did not bar a 

second degree felony-murder instruction where the underlying felony was a violation of 

section 246.3 and the purpose for discharging the firearm was independent of, or 

collateral to, an intent to cause injury that would result in death. 45 Cal. 4th 1172, 1201 

(2009). The court in Chun held that when the underlying felony is assaultive in nature, 

such as a violation of section 246.3, the felony merges with the homicide and cannot be 

the basis of a felony-murder instruction. Id. at 1200. However, the state supreme court 

held that, based on the evidence presented at Chun’s trial, the error in instructing the jury

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on felony murder was, by itself, harmless because any juror who relied on the felonymurder rule necessarily found that Chun willfully shot at an occupied vehicle, and 

therefore “no juror could find felony murder without also finding conscious-disregard-forlife malice.” Id. at 1205. In Chun, the state supreme court overruled the lower appellate 

court’s holding that the error in instructing on felony murder, standing alone, was 

prejudicial, and remanded for consideration whether the instructional error in combination 

with a separate evidentiary error, in allowing the jury to hear evidence that Chun admitted 

that he fired a gun, were prejudicial. Id. at 1205. 

The state supreme court in Chun did not vacate Robertson’s conviction or remand 

his case. Following issuance of the decision in Chun, Robertson filed a habeas petition 

in the California Supreme Court on May 8, 2009. On October 14, 2009, the state habeas 

petition was denied. Answer, Ex. 8.

On December 23, 2009, Robertson filed an application in the Ninth Circuit for 

leave to file a second or successive petition. On June 15, 2010, the court of appeals 

granted his application for authorization to file a second or successive petition. Answer,

Ex. 9 (Robertson v. Walker, No. 09-74044 (9th Cir.)). 

Robertson filed his second habeas petition in this court on June 16, 2010. By 

order entered April 13, 2012, the court dismissed the petition as a second and successive 

petition. Doc. no. 32. The court granted Robertson’s request for a certificate of 

appealability, doc. no. 35, and Robertson appealed from the dismissal of his second 

habeas petition. 

 By memorandum disposition entered October 25, 2013, the Ninth Circuit vacated 

the order of dismissal and remanded the matter for consideration whether Robertson’s 

case presents extraordinary circumstances that would warrant relief under Rule 60(b). 

Robertson v. Walker, No. 12-16067 (9th Cir.). The court of appeals held that the court 

erred in finding that Robertson’s petition was second or successive, ordered the court to 

construe the second-in-time petition as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration of the 

denial of Robertson’s original federal habeas petition, and held that the Rule 60(b)(6) 

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motion was timely. By order entered September 12, 2014, the court granted Robertson’s 

motion for reconsideration of the claim that his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was 

violated when a jury convicted him of second degree felony murder without an express 

finding of malice. The court ordered supplemental briefing on limited issues. The matter 

is fully briefed and submitted on the papers.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Robertson seeks habeas relief on the ground that his Sixth Amendment jury trial 

right was violated when a jury convicted him of second degree felony murder without an 

express finding of malicious intent.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence 

on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state 

court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions 

of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–09 

(2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, 

Miller-El v. Cockrell (“Miller-El I”), 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under 

the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a 

case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable 

application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), 

if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions 

but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

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The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the 

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “[E]valuating whether a rule application [i]s 

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the 

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Id. “As 

a condition for obtaining habeas corpus [relief] from a federal court, a state prisoner must 

show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual 

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable 

in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 

340. Review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court 

that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 

(2011).

DISCUSSION

I. Retroactive Application of Chun

Robertson claims that his Sixth Amendment jury trial right was violated when a jury 

convicted him of second degree felony murder without an express finding of malicious 

intent, based on the second degree felony murder instruction given at his trial which was 

erroneous under state law by retroactive application of Chun.

The parties agree that on present habeas review, the court looks to the state 

supreme court’s summary denial of Robertson’s second habeas petition, by order 

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entered October 14, 2009. Pet.’s Suppl. Br. (doc. no. 49) at 1 (citing Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011)). It is also undisputed that the state supreme court’s 

denial of habeas relief is presumed to have been adjudicated on the merits, in the 

absence of some indication to the contrary. Id. at 2. 

In his second habeas petition to the state supreme court, Robertson sought 

retroactive application of Chun to his case to overturn his conviction based on the error in 

giving the second degree felony murder instruction. The state supreme court summarily 

denied the habeas petition and did not articulate whether the denial was based on (1) a 

determination that Chun did not apply retroactively under state law, or (2) a determination 

that Chun applied retroactively to Robertson’s case, but that any instructional error was 

harmless. Robertson has not identified any alternative grounds for the state court to 

deny his second habeas petition, other than these two possible grounds for denial. The 

court therefore proceeds to review both of these possible rulings by the state court.

If the state supreme court denied Robertson’s habeas petition on the ground that 

Chun did not apply retroactively to his conviction, which became final in August 2004, this 

state court decision on non-retroactivity would not be contrary to, or involving an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as there is no clearly 

established federal law that requires the state court to apply changes in the law 

retroactively to a defendant whose judgment is final. See Moore v. Helling, 763 F.3d 

1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing grant of federal habeas relief on claim of 

instructional error based on change in Nevada law before conviction became final, where 

state court judgment predated Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835 (2003) (per curiam), in 

which the Supreme Court directed the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether a 

potentially exonerating change in state law had occurred before the defendant’s 

conviction became final, and held that the state court was required to apply that change 

to the defendant's conviction if it found in the affirmative), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2361 

(2015). 

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Robertson argues that Chun did not announce a change in the law, but only 

clarified the law as it already existed and should be applied retroactively under the 

principles set forth in Bunkley, as well as state appellate court decisions on retroactive 

application of Chun. Pet’s Suppl. Br. (doc. no. 49) at 3-12 (citing, inter alia, In re Hansen, 

227 Cal. App. 4th 906, 919 (2014), review denied (Oct. 1, 2014), and In re Lucero, 200 

Cal. App. 4th 38, 46 (2011)). As respondents point out, the California Supreme Court 

has not addressed the issue whether Chun applies retroactively, and the state appellate 

court decisions cited by Robertson held that Chun announced a new rule that applies 

retroactively as a matter of state law. Resp. Suppl. Br. (doc. no. 50) at 1-4.

Furthermore, in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 

Chun announced a change in the law and affirmed denial of a federal habeas petition 

filed by a state prisoner whose conviction was final when Chun was decided. Lozano v. 

Diaz, 586 Fed. Appx. 413, 414 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Lozano v. Sherman, 

135 S. Ct. 1740 (2015). “Although the California Supreme Court's decision in [Chun] 

indicates that negligent discharge of a firearm merges with the killing so a charge under 

§ 246.3 cannot support felony murder, that decision came out after Petitioner's conviction 

was final.” Id. The Ninth Circuit in Lozano recognized that “[s]ubsequent changes in 

state law cannot be grounds for federal habeas relief.” Id. (citing Kleve v. Hill, 243 F.3d 

1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A change of law does not invalidate a conviction obtained 

under an earlier law.”)).

In light of this Ninth Circuit authority, the state court’s decision that Chun did not 

apply retroactively to Robertson’s case was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law.

Alternatively, if the state supreme court determined that Chun applied retroactively 

to Robertson’s case, it would have denied Robertson’s habeas petition on the ground that 

any error in giving a felony murder instruction was harmless. The court proceeds to 

consider whether Robertson is entitled to habeas relief based on the state court’s 

harmless error determination. 

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II. Harmless Error Analysis

If the state court denied Robertson’s habeas petition on the ground that the felonymurder instruction omitted the element of malice by retroactive application of Chun, and 

that the instructional error was harmless, this court must determine whether the state 

court’s harmless error determination was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). On federal 

habeas review, the state must provide a “fair assurance” that the error was harmless

under Brecht. Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Valerio 

v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 761 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). Under Brecht, the harmless 

error standard on federal habeas review of state court convictions is whether the error 

“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.”

Brecht v. Abrahamson holds that where there is constitutional 

error but the review is collateral rather than direct, we should 

not apply the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 

Chapman standard, and should instead apply the “less 

onerous” Kotteakos standard. Accordingly, the critical 

question is “whether, in light of the record as a whole,” the 

error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict.” On collateral review, Brecht

holds that a federal court cannot grant the writ based merely 

on a “reasonable possibility” that the constitutional error 

contributed to the verdict, but only where the petitioner “can 

establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.”

Morales, 388 F.3d at 1171 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)) 

(footnotes omitted). Cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (applying Chapman

standard for harmless error on direct review of federal conviction).

Looking to the last reasoned state court decision on Robertson’s claim, the state 

supreme court issued a summary denial of Robertson’s habeas petition that did not set 

forth a reasoned analysis on the question whether the instructional error on the count of 

second degree felony murder was harmless. In the absence of a reasoned explanation 

of the state supreme court’s decision on Robertson’s federal habeas claim, the court 

conducts “an independent review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s 

decision was objectively unreasonable. Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

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(9th Cir. 2006); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. 

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000); accord Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 

n.16 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The court notes that on direct appeal, the court of appeal articulated its analysis 

whether the instructional error caused prejudice, having held that a violation of section 

246.3 merged with the resulting homicide, as the state supreme court would later hold in 

Chun, and that it was error to instruct the jury that it could convict Robertson of second 

degree felony murder by finding that he had violated section 246.3. See Answer, Ex. 1,

People v. Robertson, No. A095055, slip op. at 25-29 (Cal. Ct. App., June 30, 2003), 

overruled by 34 Cal. 4th 156. The court of appeal determined that the erroneous 

instruction on felony murder was harmless, reasoning as follows: 

[U]nder the instructions given in this case, the jury must 

have concluded in convicting appellant of assaulting Harris 

that appellant intended to harm Harris, in the sense that 

“intent” has traditionally been defined in the law, by intending 

to use force on him or to do an act that was substantially 

certain to result in the application of such force. In so 

concluding, the jury must have rejected appellant's defense, to 

the charge of murder as well as assault that he was only 

trying to frighten the victims when he fired the shots. As to the 

murder charge, if the force appellant intended to apply against 

Riley was lethal force, then he was guilty of murder with 

express malice (§ 188 [intent to kill]); if the force was intended 

only to injure, then he was guilty of murder with implied 

malice; in either event, he was not guilty merely of grossly 

negligent discharge of a firearm. Thus, the murder conviction 

was necessarily based on a valid ground and the erroneous 

instruction on felony murder was harmless.

Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted). Because the court of appeal’s decision was superseded 

by the opinion of the California Supreme Court, 34 Cal. 4th 156, the holding of which was 

subsequently overturned by Chun, 45 Cal. 4th at 1201, and the court of appeal’s 

reasoning was not adopted or substantially incorporated by the state supreme court, the 

prejudice analysis by the court of appeal is not entitled to deference on present habeas 

review under AEDPA. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Upon independent review of the record, the court finds that the evidence 

presented at trial established the element of implied malice beyond a reasonable doubt to 

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support a conviction for second degree murder and that the evidence did not support 

either of the affirmative defenses asserted by Robertson. Accordingly, the court 

determines that the instructional error on the felony murder charge, presuming that Chun

applies retroactively to Robertson’s case, did not have “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict.” California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 4-5 (1996) (per 

curiam) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

A. Evidence of Malice

At Robertson’s trial, the jury was given the following instructions, among others, on 

the charge of second degree murder of Kehinde Riley: 

(1) second degree murder with express malice:

Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful 

killing of a human being with malice aforethought when the 

perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but the 

evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and 

premeditation.

CT 325.

(2) second degree murder with implied malice:

Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful 

killing of a human being when:

1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,

2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous 

to human life, and

3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge 

of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.

When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is 

not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the 

act would result in the death of a human being.

CT 326. 

(3) second degree felony murder predicated on the crime of grossly negligent 

discharge of a firearm in violation of Penal Code § 246.3:

The unlawful killing of a human being, whether 

intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs [during 

the commission or attempted commission of] [as the direct 

causal result of] the crime of PC § 246.3 is murder of the 

second degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to 

commit that crime.

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The specific intent to commit PC § 246.3 and the 

commission or attempted commission of such crime must be 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

CT 327. 

(4) first degree murder reduced to second degree by provocation:

If the evidence establishes that there was provocation 

which played a part in inducing an unlawful killing of a human 

being, but the provocation was not sufficient to reduce the 

homicide to manslaughter, you should consider the 

provocation for the bearing it may have on whether the 

defendant killed with or without deliberation and 

premeditation.

CT 343. 

Robertson contends that omission of the element of malice in the felony murder 

instruction was not harmless error because if the jury had been properly instructed that 

they were required to find malice to convict Robertson of second degree murder, the jury

would have found him not guilty of murder. Robertson argues that firing his gun into the 

air as warning shots may have established the general intent to use or apply physical 

force as required for an assault conviction, but that the intent required for assault does 

not satisfy the malice required for second degree murder, particularly implied malice 

which requires performing the intentional act with knowledge of the danger to, and with 

conscious disregard for, human life. Pet’s Suppl. Br. (doc. no. 49) at 16-17. The 

evidence at trial, however, did not support Robertson’s contention that he fired warning 

shots into the air. The only evidence to support this contention was Robertson’s 

recorded statement to investigators that he fired into the air, which was inconsistent with 

other statements that he had made to police, first denying that he saw anything when he 

went outside his apartment, then stating that he fired his gun to a prospective buyer but

failing to mention that he fired warning shots in order to scare off thieves. In contrast to 

this self-serving statement by Robertson, the prosecution presented credible evidence, 

including eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence, that Robertson aimed at the 

victims, to show an intentional act of firing at or in the direction of the victims to support, 

at a minimum, a finding of implied malice.

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1. Witnesses to the Shooting

An eyewitness saw Robertson firing his gun with his arm extended straight ahead, 

and not pointing in the air. P. Brown, a neighbor living in an apartment complex on the 

same street as Robertson’s home, testified that he saw the shooter standing in “a firing 

stance” and shooting his gun straight ahead, “aiming up the street,” with “feet spread” 

and his arm extended straight out, “parallel to the ground,” and not firing wildly up in the 

air, and then saw the shooter walk back to his apartment building with a swagger. RT 

488-492, 526-527, 529.

Another neighbor, S. Spears, testified to hearing rapid gunfire and then peeking 

out her window facing the court where she saw Robertson walking back to his house. RT 

469. 

L. Benton and B. Gentry testified that they were drinking, smoking marijuana and 

using cocaine with the victims, Kehinde Riley and Ricky Harris, before Benton drove 

them to 99th Avenue Court where the victims took the hubcaps off Robertson’s Caprice 

Classic. The victims started taking the hubcaps off the Caprice Classic, and Riley put 

two hubcaps in the back of Benton’s car, then walked back to the Caprice Classic to get 

the other two hubcaps. RT 398. Benton was sitting in his car and Gentry was standing 

outside Benton’s car when they heard gunshots. Both Benton and Gentry testified that 

they did not hear anyone yell “Hey” or “Get away from my car!” before the shots were 

fired. RT 367-368, 402, 434. 

Gentry also testified that he saw the shooter point the gun “in our direction” and 

shoot, with his arm out parallel to the ground. RT 404, 412. The victims ran past Gentry, 

who jumped into Benton’s car which then drove off while the shooter was still shooting. 

Gentry could hear bullets coming at them, and could see the flash from the muzzle of the 

gun as it fired. RT 412. Gentry saw that Riley was running towards the car then “spun 

around the back end of the car and then that was it.” RT 412-413.

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2. Forensic Evidence

The forensic evidence showed that the gun was pointed at the victims, not fired 

into the air. The coroner testified that victim Kehinde Riley had a gunshot wound to the 

right back side of the head, about one inch off the midline of the back of the head. RT 

164-165. The bullet passed through part of the brain, and was going in the direction 

“towards the front of the body, going very slightly towards the top of the head at a fivedegree angle, and it did not deviate either to the right or left sides.” RT 171.

Ricky Harris suffered a gunshot to his foot, and required surgery to remove the 

bullet. RT 277-278. Officer Doolittle tracked down Harris at the San Leandro Hospital 

where he showed up with a gunshot wound to the bottom of his right foot. RT 788. 

Officer Doolittle retrieved Harris’s shoes, which had a bullet hole in the foot bed of the 

right shoe, with material pushed up from the base of the shoe into the interior of the shoe. 

RT 795. 

The police recovered three 9-mm casings in the porch area in front of Robertson’s 

apartment, and seven 9-mm casings on the street, in the center of the court. RT 611,

681-692. The ballistics expert opined that the 10 casings found at the scene were fired 

by the same Lorcin 9-mm gun. RT 847. He also opined that the bullets taken from 

Harris’s foot and Riley’s head were fired in a 9-mm luger caliber pistol, and most likely a 

Lorcin. RT 862. No firearm was recovered at the scene or from Robertson, so the expert 

was not able to testify about the accuracy of the firearm. RT 888. 

The prosecution’s firearms expert, Sgt. Tolleson, opined that based on the location 

of the bullets lodged in Robertson’s car, where the bullet went through the windshield, hit 

the dash and bounced up and traveled along the ceiling, and the side of a trailer parked 

outside Robertson’s home, if someone stood on the porch area of Robertson’s apartment 

complex and fired a 9mm Lorcin, it was not possible that the shooter was pointing the 

gun up at a 45-degree angle into the air. RT 675, 908-909. The firearms expert 

explained that if the gun were fired at a 45-degree angle, the bullet could travel up to half 

a mile or even a mile away, but would not end up in the car or trailer where the bullets 

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were recovered. RT 909, 922. Similarly, based on the strike marks found on a nearby 

wash house, the firearms expert opined that the gun would have to be pointing in the 

area of the wash house, not at a 45-degree angle. RT 909-910. 

Sgt. Tolleson also opined that if a person running down 99th Avenue Court were 

shot in the bottom of his foot, the shooter standing in front of the apartment complex 

would have been pointing the gun at the running person, because “even if one of the 

rounds skipped off the ground down there, if I’m shooting down there I have to be 

pointing this gun at that person. I’m not pointing it somewhere else in the air.” RT 911. 

Finally, the firearms expert opined that if a person running away down 99th Avenue Court 

is shot in the rear of his head, the shooter firing the gun from the front of the apartment 

complex would have pointed the gun in the direction of the running person, and that it is 

not possible that the gun was pointed at a 45-degree angle up in the air because the 

bullet would have climbed about several hundred feet above the runner’s head. RT 911-

912. 

Notably, the defense firearms expert, Mr. Rellar, conceded that if someone was 

standing at the stoop in front of Robertson’s apartment and fired a gun hitting a person in 

the head, “it would have had to have been pointed where the bullet struck when again 

when it detonated. I don’t know how it got to that position or did it come down, but it had 

to have been pointed there in order for it to strike there.” RT 1302.

3. Robertson’s Statements

Robertson did not testify but his statements to the police and investigators were 

introduced at trial, including recorded interviews that were played for the jury. RT 577, 

634. Robertson was detained at the scene of the shooting, where he told Officer Sena 

that he was in the bedroom when he heard someone messing with his car, went outside

to check on his car when he heard some gunshots but did not see anything, went back 

inside his residence and shortly later, came back outside, where the police first contacted 

him. RT 533. Robertson signed a written statement prepared by Officer Sena. RT 535.

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Later, while Robertson was detained in a police car, Sergeant Brock talked to him. 

Robertson mentioned coming outside because he heard something or heard gunshots. 

RT 547. Sgt. Brock asked Robertson if he would let the police take a gunshot residue 

test of his hands which would eliminate him as a possible suspect. RT 547. Robertson 

then told Sgt. Brock, “I shot a gun earlier tonight,” and indicated that he had sold a gun 

earlier that day so he could buy a windshield for his car and that he fired a couple rounds 

to demonstrate it was in working condition. RT 548. Robertson did not tell the police at 

that point that the gun accidentally discharged. RT 548. 

The next day, the police conducted a formal interview of Robertson at the 

homicide room of the police station, where Robertson told Sgt. Brock that the night of the 

shooting, he was in his bedroom when he heard noise sounding like somebody was 

dismantling his car. “At that point, he got up from the bed, grabbed his gun and went to 

the front door of his apartment which is on the porch area, and he fired . . . five rounds 

. . . from what he said.” RT 564-565. Robertson said there were a couple of people by 

his car and that they scattered when he fired his gun. RT 565. In his taped statement to 

Sgt. Brock, as summarized by defense counsel,1 Robertson said “I heard something like 

a backfire or a gunshot. I’m not for sure.” RT 1415. Then he said, “That’s when they 

were driving away.” RT 1415-1416. Robertson also said, “They looked, they looked at 

me kind of like they was gonna do something. Then that’s when I shot in the air. . . . My 

heart was beating too fast. I didn’t know what they were gonna do.” RT 1416.

Robertson then gave a taped interview with an investigator for the District 

Attorney’s office, Inspector Landini, and a deputy D.A. when he stated, “I don’t know, I 

 

1 Robertson refers the court to a transcript of his post-arrest statement that is not in 

the record. See Pet. Suppl. Br. (doc. no. 49) at 13-14. The trial court provided the jury 

with a transcript of Robertson’s taped interviews while the tape was played in court, but 

specifically instructed the jury, “remember that the actual evidence is the spoken word, 

not the transcript. They are solely an aid to your listening to this.” RT 576. See also RT 

635. The parties stipulated that “the court reporter does not have to report the taped 

statement,” and the record does not reflect that the transcripts, People’s Exhibits 37A and 

45A, were admitted into evidence. CT 203, 205, 259. The record reflects only that the 

cassette tapes themselves, People’s Exhibits 37 and 45, were admitted into evidence. 

CT 259, 264.

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can’t really say because all I saw is somebody looking at me like they was gonna come 

back and try and do something to me. . . . The only thing I heard at the time was like a 

backfire or a shot. The two warning shots, they was a warning. The three shots, I 

actually heard something that sounded like a backfire.” RT 1416. He also said, “All I saw 

was people down by my car. I don’t know what they was doing or what they was 

carrying. All I know, when they took off there was like a backfire or a shot. That’s all I 

know. I asked Detective Brock did they find any shells, but he didn’t give me no 

response.” RT 1416.

4. Closing Arguments

In closing, the prosecutor argued primarily that “[m]alice is present, is pervasive in 

this case. It permeates it. The defendant’s actions clearly demonstrate malice. This 

case is about murder.” RT 1395-1396. In the alternative, the prosecutor argued “[e]ven if 

you actually believe that the defendant had an honest belief that he was -- his life was 

threatened right then and there when he shot that gun, even if you believe that you don’t 

get around recklessly discharging that firearm and killing somebody. You still get felony 

murder. When he recklessly discharged that gun as they were running away from him, 

Kehinde Riley died, you still get second degree murder. There’s no way around this 

fourth theory. There really isn’t. Implied malice, express malice, first degree knocked 

down to a second and felony murder rule. It is -- this case is a murder.” RT 1396. 

In rebuttal, the prosecution argued as follows:

You cannot get around that this case is not second degree 

because it clearly is. Like I said, there are four ways to get 

there. If you believe the evidence presented to you by the 

prosecution you have express malice. There is no doubt 

about it. If you believe the evidence presented to you by the 

prosecution you have first degree murder with a slight 

provocation. If you don’t believe any of the evidence that was 

put forth in this trial and you only -- by the prosecution, you 

only believe the defense, you have implied malice. If you only 

believe the defense evidence and disregard all that other 

evidence you still got felony murder in the second degree.

RT 1449.

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The record reflects that the prosecution focused its presentation of evidence and 

argument on proving malice, and did not rely solely on the felony murder rule to prove 

only grossly negligent discharge of a firearm to secure a second degree murder 

conviction. Here, the evidence showed not mere recklessness to support gross 

negligence, but an intentional act of aiming and shooting in Riley and Harris’s direction to 

support a finding of implied malice, if not express malice. The court limits its analysis to 

the implied malice theory of second degree murder, on which respondents focus their

argument addressing whether the instructional error had a substantial and injurious effect 

or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Resp. Suppl. Br. (doc. no. 50) at 8-9.

The jury was instructed on implied malice as follows: 

Malice is implied when:

1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,

2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous 

to human life, and

3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge 

of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.

CT 323; RT 1345. 

The evidence of implied malice presented at trial was overwhelming. Prosecution 

witnesses P. Brown and B. Gentry both testified that they saw Robertson shooting his 

gun with his arm straight out, not pointed up in the air to fire warning shots as Robertson 

told investigators. Both the prosecution and defense firearms experts opined that 

Robertson’s gun was pointed in the direction of the victims when they were shot, and the 

prosecution expert opined that the victims could not have been hit by bullets that were 

aimed upward at an angle. The prosecution expert’s opinion that the bullets were aimed 

in the victims’ direction, and not angled up in the air, was consistent with the defense 

theory that one of the bullets may have ricocheted to hit Harris in the foot. The direction 

of the bullets that were lodged in Robertson’s car and a camper trailer, and strike marks 

found on the wall of a wash house, also contradicted the defense argument that 

Robertson fired up in the air. 

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The evidence was consistent with the motive proffered by the prosecution: that

when Robertson found the victims dismantling his car, he shot at them out of anger, not 

out of fear for his life. The prosecutor pointed out that if Robertson had been scared for 

his safety, he would not have walked another 50 feet into the court after the victims ran 

away and fired seven more shots, rather than run back inside the house. RT 1393-1394. 

The forensic evidence established that Robertson, who admitted to firing a few shots, 

fired 10 casings that were found at the scene, and that the casings were consistent with 

being fired by the same type of 9-mm pistol as four bullets that were recovered from the 

scene, including bullets recovered from each of the victims. The location of the casings 

were consistent with the prosecution’s theory that Robertson heard noises, went outside 

to check on his car, saw some people at his car and pointed his gun at them, firing three 

bullets, one of which was fired into his car, then walked about 50 feet toward the center of 

the court and fired another seven shots at them. RT 1441. Although it could not be 

proven that the casings and bullets were fired from the same firearm, there was no 

evidence of other bullets or casings at the scene to support the defense theory that the 

victims may have fired weapons first. RT 1417-1418.

Although the defense argued that Robertson was inexperienced with firearms and 

that when he thought he was firing warning shots up in the air, the shots were lower than 

he expected, RT 1433-1435, the eyewitness testimony and physical evidence established 

that Robertson aimed in the direction of the victims as they ran away from his car. The 

evidence presented at trial supported the required elements for implied malice: that 

Riley’s death resulted from Robertson aiming and firing his gun at Riley and Harris; the

natural consequences of firing a gun at or near someone are danger to human life; and 

Robertson deliberately shot his gun with knowledge of the danger, and with conscious 

disregard for, human life.

The superseded opinion of the court of appeal, though not entitled to deference 

here, is persuasive on the issue whether the jury found implied malice despite the 

erroneous felony-murder instruction. In concluding that the felony-murder instructional 

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error was harmless, the court of appeal reasoned that the jury’s finding of intent to injure 

to support the conviction for assault on Harris indicates that the jury found that Robertson 

intended to use force on Harris by shooting in his direction and rejected the defense 

theory that he was only trying to scare off the victims by firing warning shots. Answer,

Ex. 1 (slip op.) at 28-29. In the instruction on the assault charge, the jury was instructed 

that it must find (1) a person was assaulted; and (2) the assault was committed with a 

deadly weapon or instrument or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. 

CT 347. Thus, even if the jury believed that Robertson intended to apply force intended 

only to injure the victims, and did not intend to use lethal force, that finding is sufficient to 

satisfy the implied malice requirement for second degree murder. See Answer, Ex. 1 

(slip op.) at 28-29. In light of the record, the state court’s finding of malice was not an 

unreasonable determination of the facts.

B. Affirmative Defenses

Robertson contends that the erroneous felony-murder instruction caused actual 

prejudice because the jury was not required to find the element of malice and therefore 

did not reach his affirmative defenses of imperfect self-defense and heat of passion 

which would negate malice. Robertson argues generally that evidence sufficient to 

establish intent to support the assault conviction does not necessarily establish the 

malice required to support the second degree murder conviction because he asserted 

affirmative defenses that would negate malice on the second degree murder count that 

could not be asserted as defenses to the assault count. However, Robertson fails to 

address the weight of the evidence of malice that was presented at trial and the lack of 

evidence to support either of his affirmative defenses.

1. Defense Evidence

At trial, Robertson presented evidence that he recently had been the victim of 

violent crime, including carjacking and being shot in the shoulder following a minor traffic 

accident in March 1998. RT 984-986, 1157. In his post-arrest statement to the deputy 

district attorney and investigator, Robertson stated that he fired his gun in the air in order 

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to scare away the men who were burglarizing his car. In his taped statement to the 

police, Robertson stated that he fired his gun after the burglars looked at him as if they 

were going to do something. RT 1416.

Robertson called an expert in clinical psychology and psychological testing, Dr. 

Kaufman, who testified that in his opinion, Robertson suffered from post-traumatic stress 

disorder after being shot in March 1998, prior to the December 1998 shooting of Riley 

and Harris. RT 1159-60, 1272. Dr. Kaufman opined that some of Robertson’s symptoms 

were that he “wasn’t going out, he was more reclusive, he was edgy, he was fearful, he 

was kind of haunted by nightmares and fears for his own safety or images of his own 

death, and it put him on edge.” RT 1191. Dr. Kaufman also suggested that Robertson 

“was probably hyperreactive, what we call this startle response. What was that? What 

was that? And sometimes . . . people who experience PTSD[,] if then they are in another 

situation they perceive to be life threatening they can become extremely reactive, do 

things that are very much out of character and sometimes do things without their 

complete conscious awareness.” RT 1191. In Dr. Kaufman’s opinion, Robertson’s 

condition would have “likely caused him to act impulsively, perhaps without much 

forethought, and out of a position of intense fear,” to hearing noise that he perceived to 

be a threat to him and his family. RT 1059.

Robertson did not testify at trial. The defense called several character witnesses 

to testify about Robertson’s nonviolent nature. None of the defense witnesses refuted 

the eyewitness testimony that Robertson fired straight ahead in the direction of the 

victims and did not fire randomly up in the air.

2. Jury Instructions

The jury was instructed on the affirmative defenses of (1) actual but unreasonable 

belief in the need for self-defense, and (2) heat of passion, as follows:

[1] ACTUAL BUT UNREASONABLE BELIEF IN 

NECESSITY TO DEFEND -- MANSLAUGHTER

A person, who kills another person in the actual but 

unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against 

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imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but 

does not harbor malice aforethought and is not guilty of 

murder. This would be so even though a reasonable person 

in the same situation seeing and knowing the same facts 

would not have had the same belief. Such an actual but 

unreasonable belief is not a defense to the crime of voluntary 

manslaughter.

As used in this instruction, an “imminent” peril or 

danger means one that is apparent, present, immediate and 

must be instantly dealt with, or must so appear at the time to 

the slayer. . . .

[2] SUDDEN QUARREL OR HEAT OF PASSION AND 

PROVOCATION EXPAINED

To reduce an unlawful killing from murder to 

manslaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of 

passion, the provocation must be of the character and degree 

as naturally would excite and arouse the passion, and the 

assailant must act under the influence of that sudden quarrel 

or heat of passion.

The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to 

manslaughter must be such a passion as naturally would be 

aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person in the 

same circumstances. A defendant is not permitted to set up 

his own standard of conduct and to justify or excuse himself 

because his passions were aroused unless the circumstances 

in which the defendant was placed and the facts that 

confronted him were such as also would have aroused the 

passion of the ordinarily reasonable person faced with the 

same situation. Legally adequate provocation may occur in a 

short, or over a considerable, period of time.

The question to be answered is whether or not, at the 

time of the killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or 

disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the 

ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act 

rashly and without deliberation and reflection, and from 

passion rather than from judgment.

CT 333, 334. See also CT 335-338.

3. Defense Argument

In closing, defense counsel did not deny that Robertson fired the bullet that killed 

Riley, but focused on evidence about his state of mind and the affirmative defenses that 

would negate malice:

This is voluntary manslaughter. And there are two 

ways to get there: heat of passion, or 2, unreasonable belief 

for self-defense.

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Let’s look at the facts we have here. You’ve got an 

instruction which is going to say to you when you are 

considering heat of passion the question is at the time of the 

killing was the reason of the accused obscured or disturbed 

by passion to such an extent as would cause an ordinarily 

reasonable person to act rashly, without deliberation and 

reflection from passion rather than judgment?

And the instructions go on further to say that there’s no 

specific emotion which constitutes heat of passion, not fear, 

not revenge. Any emotion may be involved in heat of passion 

that causes judgment to give way to impulse and rashness.

That’s why we’ve talked about post-traumatic stress 

disorder here. Post-traumatic stress disorder, when 

somebody suffers from that and suffers under that -- I’m going 

to talk about that more in a minute -- they may experience 

extreme anxiety or even panic upon exposure to 

circumstances that either literally or symbolically remind them 

of the traumatic circumstances which initially caused the 

condition. That was the shooting.

. . .

Now the other way to get to voluntary manslaughter is 

an actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend 

oneself against imminent peril to life or possibility of great 

bodily injury. And that’s another possibility here. You know 

from the statements that Quincy made -- and you will have the 

opportunity to listen to those again if you choose -- what 

Quincy said to Sergeant Brock was “I heard something like a 

backfire or a gunshot. I’m not for sure.” What he says also to 

Brock, “That’s when they were driving away.” He also says to 

Brock “They looked, they looked at me kind of like they were 

gonna do something. Then that’s when I shot in the air.” And 

again he said “They looked at me sort of funny.” And he also 

said to Sergeant Brock “I was -- my heart was beating too 

fast. I didn’t know what they were gonna do.”

Unreasonable? They were far away from him. Was he 

panicked, was he scared? Yes, he was. When he gave the 

statement to Lou Landini and Joanie Leventis he said “I don’t 

know, I can’t really say because all I saw is somebody looking 

at me like they was gonna come back and try to do something 

to me.” . . .

When he first went out there here was a guy was 

pumping -- that’s how he describes himself -- he was jacked 

up, his heart was beating fast, he was scared. He thought, he 

thought and he said that -- and you can read it again in his 

statement -- that they were coming in the side window. He 

ran to his front door, he looked out and the first place he 

looked was right at that bedroom window which you know as 

you look out is on the left-hand side of the door. And he 

looked over there because that’s where he thought they were. 

Now, at the time he gets out there he’s nervous and 

scared and probably misperceiving and he sees these guys, 

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he tells you that, he didn’t know what they were doing by his 

car but they look over at him and he thinks that maybe they’re 

gonna run up on him. Maybe this is not even a rational belief 

but that’s what he thought. He thought they were gonna come 

over and try and do something to him. And given his past 

experiences, this is not an unreasonable thought for him to 

have. He’s terrified out there and so he fires a shot at them. 

Then he goes down the walkway after he sees -- he says [sic] 

them going, he says [sic] them scattering, he goes down the 

walkway and as the car is pulling out that’s when he hears a 

backfire. And that’s when he fires the rest of the shots. He 

thinks they’re shooting at him. He believed that it was either a 

backfire or a shot and he believed it was a shot enough -- I 

mean you can say well, he made that up. But then he asked 

Sergeant Brock did you find any other casings? Did you find 

any other bullets? Do you know if they were shooting at me?

RT 1413-1417.

4. Heat of Passion

To establish the heat of passion affirmative defense, Robertson’s attorney argued 

that after experiencing the life-threatening event of being shot, Robertson was easily 

agitated due to his PTSD, and that he got into a panic and distress when he heard 

sounds and thought someone was coming into his house and thought he was being shot 

at as the perpetrators’ car was driving away. RT 1413, 1418-24. However, the 

prosecutor emphasized that the heat of passion defense had to be decided under a 

reasonable person standard. RT 1387-1389, 1400. Based on Robertson’s statements in 

the record, that he heard noises and thought someone was trying to come into the side 

window, and after looking out the front door to see if anyone was going into the house, 

that he went outside and saw people next to his car, and that they looked at him “sort of 

funny,” it was not unreasonable for the state court to find that under the circumstances, 

an ordinarily reasonable person would not be provoked to act rashly, and without 

deliberation and reflection, and to reject the heat of passion defense.

5. Actual But Unreasonable Belief in Need for Self-Defense

The prosecutor conceded that PTSD could contribute to whether Robertson had 

an honest belief in the need for self-defense. RT 1400. However, although defense 

counsel argued that Robertson felt scared, there was no evidence presented at trial that 

Robertson stated that he felt that his life or safety was threatened when he went outside 

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to check on his car. Robertson indicated that when he thought someone was coming in 

the side window, he ran to his front door and looked at the bedroom window because 

that’s where he thought they were. RT 1416-1417. Then, after checking to see if anyone

was breaking into the house, Robertson indicated that he went outside to check on his 

car, then seeing people near his car and that “they look at me sort of funny.” In closing, 

defense counsel argued that “he thought they were gonna come over and try and do 

something to him,” and “based on the weird looks that the guys were giving him and the 

sound of the backfire, that he needed to protect himself and he needed to protect his 

family and he fired those shots.” RT 1417-1418. The evidence, however, did not show 

that Robertson was actually scared or feared for his safety when he went outside, after 

he looked out the front door to make sure no one was coming into the side window.

Robertson’s statement, as summarized by defense counsel, indicates that he

initially thought someone was trying to break into his house when he heard noises 

outside from his bedroom, but the record does not reflect that Robertson indicated that he 

continued to think that someone was coming into his house after he went outside to 

check on his car. RT 1416-1417. As the prosecutor argued in closing, Robertson did not 

tell the police or the investigator that he was scared for his life, or that he thought that the 

people dismantling his car were coming at him. RT 1392-1393. Rather, in the taped 

interview, as summarized by the attorneys, Robertson described going outside and 

seeing people dismantling his car, then seeing someone look up at him, and firing his 

gun. RT 1391, 1416. As the prosecutor noted, Robertson described seeing people 

crouched down by the tires on the driver’s side of his car, and one person standing on the 

passenger side, suggesting that he understood that they were taking his hubcaps. RT 

1392. Robertson stated that he was just scaring away the victims who were dismantling 

his car, but even after the victims ran away, the evidence showed that Robertson walked 

into the middle of the street and fired more rounds. RT 1394-1396. The evidence 

supported the prosecutor’s argument that Robertson’s intent was not to protect himself, 

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and that he did not honestly believe that he was in fear for his life or great bodily injury, 

but that he was “angry because these guys were messing with his car.” RT 1395. 

It was not unreasonable for the state court to find that Robertson’s statements that 

he fired warning shots in the air meant to scare off the victims, which were inconsistent 

with previous statements that he made to police denying that he saw anything and failing 

to mention that he shot at the victims or that he feared for his safety, were not credible, in 

light of the eyewitness testimony that Robertson shot in the victims’ direction in a firing 

stance with his arm parallel to the ground, which was consistent with the forensic 

evidence.

C. Harmless Error

In light of the evidence, the state court’s findings of an intentional act for implied 

malice to support second degree murder, and the findings on the affirmative defenses 

that there was inadequate provocation to support a heat of passion defense, and that 

Robertson did not have an actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend 

himself or his family, were not an unreasonable determination of the facts. In light of the 

overwhelming evidence in the record of Robertson’s intentional act of aiming and firing 

his gun at the victims, Robertson has failed to show that the felony murder instruction had 

a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. Accordingly, the state 

court’s denial of Robertson’s Sixth Amendment claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 

DENIED. This order fully adjudicates the petition and terminates all pending motions. 

The clerk shall close the file.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

To obtain a certificate of appealability, Robertson must make “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy 

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§ 2253(c) is straightforward. “The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists 

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Section 2253(c)(3) requires a 

court granting a COA to indicate which issues satisfy the COA standard. Here, the court 

finds that the following claim presented by Robertson in his petition meets that standard: 

whether his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was violated when a jury convicted him of 

second degree felony murder without an express finding of malice based on instructional 

error. Accordingly, the court GRANTS the COA as to that issue. See generally Miller-El, 

537 U.S. at 335-38. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2016

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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