Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02745/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02745-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. DURAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

OMAR MANDUJO, et al

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-CV-2745-DMS-WVG

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER 

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

[Doc. No. 91]

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff David B. Duran’s 

(“Plaintiff”) Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure to state a claim pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Larry Lewis and Jonta Yancy

(collectively “Defendants”). As explained below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the 

Motion be GRANTED with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 7, 2015, alleging Defendants

violated his rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments of the United

States Constitution. (ECF No. 1.) On August 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to

File an Amended Complaint in order to add two exhibits. (ECF No. 33.) The Court granted

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the motion and ordered Plaintiff to file his First Amended Complaint by September 2, 2016.

(ECF No. 34.) On August 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Document No. 33

by Permission of the Court, requesting the Court to construe his previous motion as his

First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 37.) On August 23, 2016, the Court granted the

motion and deemed as the First Amended Complaint the complaint and the exhibits filed

in the Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 40.)

On September 8, 2016, defendants Mandujano, A. Hernandez, L. Hernandez, and

Seaman filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failure to state

a claim. (ECF No. 41.) On January 31, 2017, this Court filed a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”), recommending the motion be granted in part with leave to amend and granted in

part without leave to amend. (R&R, ECF No. 64.) On March 2, 2017, the Honorable Dana

M. Sabraw adopted the R&R, granted the motion, and dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint with leave to amend. (ECF No. 69.)

On April 7, 2017 Plaintiff filed a Second Amended complaint, followed by a Motion

to Amend on April 11, 2017. (ECF Nos. 73, 76.) In his Motion, Plaintiff requested leave

to amend in order to add newly identified defendants Larry Lewis1and Jonta Yancy. (ECF

No. 76.) The motion was granted and on April 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Third Amended

Complaint, naming defendants Lewis and Yancy but omitting defendants Mandujano, A.

Hernandez, L. Hernandez, and Seaman. (ECF No. 80.) Defendants Mandujano, A.

Hernandez, L. Hernandez, and Seaman filed duplicative motions for entry of judgment in

favor of the unnamed defendants on April 27, 2017 and May 11, 2017, arguing their

omission was tantamount to voluntary dismissal. (ECF Nos. 82, 86.) On May 10, 2017, the

Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint that includes “all

allegations against all defendants in one document no later than June 15, 2017.” (ECF No.

85 at 2:1-2.)

 

1 Defendant Lewis was erroneously sued as “Larry Louis.” (See ECF No. 91 at 2:1-6.)

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Plaintiff filed his Fourth Amended Complaint on May 19, 2017, naming as

defendants Mandujano, A. Hernandez, L. Hernandez, Seaman, Lewis, and Yancy.2(FAC,

ECF No. 89.) The FAC alleges defendants Mandujano, A. Hernandez, L. Hernandez, and

Seaman violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights through the execution of an invalid

search warrant and use of excessive force in executing the search warrant in violation of

his Eighth Amendment rights. The FAC alleges defendants Lewis and Yancy conducted

an illegal search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights and violated

Plaintiff’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the his Eighth

Amendment rights.

On June 2, 2017, defendants Mandujano, A. Hernandez, L. Hernandez, and Seaman

filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. (ECF No. 94.) On August 22, this Court filed a R&R,

recommending the motion be granted and defendants Mandujano, A. Hernandez, L.

Hernandez, and Seaman be dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 102.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court evaluates 

whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Rule 8 “does 

not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, 

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a 

plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

 

2 After receiving Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint, naming all defendants, the Court denied 

defendants Mandujano, A. Hernandez, L. Hernandez, and Seaman’s motion for an entry of judgment in 

their favor. (See ECF No. 90.)

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will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further 

factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 

when the facts pled “allow [ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to 

say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability” 

fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the complaint.

Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court's “judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has 

alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. The Court 

will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent with 

the challenged pleadings ... [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yello Freight Sys., Inc., 

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

Where, as here, a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights suit, the Court also must 

be careful to construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the 

doubt. Garmon v. Cty. of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2016). The rule of liberal 

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In construing a pro se civil rights complaint liberally, however, 

a court may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pleaded.”

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague 

and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. Thus, at a minimum, even the pro se

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plaintiff “must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants 

engaged in that support [his] claim.” Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 

649 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The Court should grant a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). Before 

dismissing a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff, a court must give some notice of the 

complaint’s deficiencies. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

Nevertheless, when amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of 

leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice/Incorporation By Reference

Before proceeding to the merits of the Motion to Dismiss, the Court first must 

determine whether certain records attached to and referenced in the Motion to Dismiss are 

judicially noticeable or acceptable for consideration under the doctrine of incorporation. 

Defendants have asked the Court to incorporate the following items: (1) Superior Court of 

the State of California, County of Imperial, Search Warrant No. SW 2014-011, citing to 

the search warrant attached to Plaintiff’s original complaint; (2) Statement of Facts Roster 

of Public Agencies Filings filed December 2013, 2014, and 2016, showing Pioneers 

Memorial Healthcare District is a public entity; and (3) Licenses from the State of 

California Department of Public Health, showing that Pioneers Memorial Healthcare 

District operates and maintains the general acute care hospital in Brawley, CA. (ECF No. 

91 at 28-29.) Defendants also request the court judicially notice the fact that on and since 

January 16, 2014, Pioneer Memorial Healthcare District owned Pioneers Memorial 

Hospital. (ECF No. 91.) 

“Generally, a court may not consider material beyond the complaint in ruling on a 

[motion to dismiss].” Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “However, a court may take judicial notice of 

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matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment, as long as the facts noticed are not subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. A court 

may also consider materials “incorporated into the complaint.” Coto Settlement v. 

Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). The doctrine of “incorporation by 

reference” has been extended to permit courts “to consider documents in situations where 

the complaint necessarily relies upon a document or the contents of the document are 

alleged in a complaint, the document’s authenticity is not in question and there are no 

disputed issues as to the document’s relevance.” Id.

i. Search Warrant

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of a search warrant attached to 

Plaintiff’s original complaint. (ECF No. 91-2). However, since Plaintiff has filed amended 

complaints since the original complaint, the Court treats the latter as non-existent. See 

Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is well-established that 

an amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as nonexistent.”) (internal quotation omitted); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 

(9th Cir. 2010) (applying the same standard to a pro se prisoner’s second amended 

complaint made pursuant to § 1983). Given this, the Court declines to consider the warrant 

attached to Plaintiff’s original complaint.3

ii. Roster of Public Agencies Filing; Licenses from the State of California 

Department of Health; Ownership of Pioneers Memorial Hospital

Defendants attached to their motion three Statement of Facts Roster of Public 

Agencies Filings filed December 2013, 2014, and 2016, respectively. (Foote Decl., ECF 

No. 91-3, Exs. 1, 2, 3.) Defendants also attached licenses from the California Department 

of Health that certify Pioneers Memorial Healthcare District to operate and maintain the 

 

3 Plaintiff attached an incomplete version of the search warrant to his FAC lacking its essential 

attributes. This copy is missing pages and lacked the signature of the authorizing judge. If Defendants 

had requested the Court to take judicial notice of the search warrant attached to the FAC, the Court 

would have declined to do so for the simple reason that, on its face, the search warrant lacks 

trustworthiness given the missing information.

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general acute care hospital in Brawley, California. (Foote Decl., Ex. 4.) The Court finds 

consideration of these filings and licenses for the present motion to be appropriate without 

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Both the Statement 

of Facts Roster of Public Agencies Filing and Licenses from the California Department of 

Health are undisputed matters of public record. The Public Agency Filings have been filed 

with California’s Secretary of State, are accessible to the public, and are undisputed by 

Plaintiff. Similarly, the licenses issued by the California Department of Health are state 

government-issued documents whose authenticity are not reasonably disputed. 

Finally, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that “since 

January 2014, Pioneers Memorial Hospital has been owned and operated by Pioneers 

Memorial Healthcare District, a public entity.” (Mot. at 29:15-18.) Similar to the licensing, 

the Court finds consideration of this appropriate because this is a matter of public record 

that is not subject to reasonable dispute.

B. § 1983 Claims

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s FAC should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s FAC fails 

to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a). Defendants further argue 

the FAC should be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot support any § 1983 claim against 

Defendants because: (1) Respondeat Superior claims are unavailable in § 1983 claims; (2) 

Plaintiff’s claims are time barred; and (3) Plaintiff failed to comply with the California 

Government Claims Act.4

The FAC indicates Plaintiff underwent a blood draw pursuant to a search warrant. 

(See e.g., FAC at 8:14-15, 9:15-19, 16, 17:12-15.) Plaintiff appears to allege Defendants 

 

4 Defendants make eight separate arguments for dismissal. While the arguments made by Defendants 

appear cogent, they also appear to rest on details contained in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which 

the Court does not consider in deciding the present Motion. See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 

857 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is well-established that an amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 

being treated thereafter as non-existent.”) (internal quotation omitted); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 

F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the same standard to a pro se prisoner’s second amended 

complaint made pursuant to § 1983).

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performed an illegal search and seizure and subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unusual 

punishment when conducting the blood draw. (FAC at 33:14-17, 34:6-13.)

i. Applicable Law

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.’” 

Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42. U.S.C. § 1983), 

superseded on other grounds by statute, 42 C.F.R. § 430.0. To prevail on a claim for the 

violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two 

elements: (1) that a person acting under the color of state law committed the conduct at 

issue; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity 

conferred by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 

U.S. 637, 643 (2004). “Dismissal of a § 1983 claim following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is 

proper if the complaint is devoid of factual allegations that gave rise to a plausible inference 

of either element.” Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2015).

ii. Failure to Comply with Rule 8

Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 8(a) because the FAC is 

“vague and undetailed [].” (Mot. at 14:17-22.) In response, Plaintiff simply states he “has 

made clear factual arguments, that are plaus[i]ble.” (Opp’n at 19:10-11.)

The Court agrees with Defendants. A thorough review of the FAC reveals that it is 

almost entirely devoid of factual allegations. Rather, the FAC is merely excerpts of case 

law mixed with objections to this Court’s previous R&R. Plaintiff simply states that 

defendant Lewis is being sued for an “illegal search and seizure of plaintiffs biological 

matter,” insinuating that his DNA is already on file. (FAC at 33:15-17.) Plaintiff then states 

that defendant Lewis is liable as the “director” of Pioneer Memorial. (Id. at 34:10-13.)

Plaintiff then claims defendant Yancy is guilty of assault for stabbing Plaintiff. (Id. at 35:7-

9.) However, these are nothing more than “legal conclusion[s]” and the Court need not 

accept them as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Critically, the FAC does not even describe the 

event in which Plaintiff claims his rights were violated or where the event occurred.

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Setting aside the legal conclusions and construing the FAC liberally, Plaintiff’s 

claim does not even reach the point where it could be called a “naked assertion” as it is 

devoid of any supporting facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to “allege 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that 

support [his] claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. Given this, the Court is unable to draw a 

“reasonable inference” that Defendants are “liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 677. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion be 

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated his Fourth and Eighth

Amendment rights be DISMISSED.

iii. Respondeat Superior Claim

Defendants argue the FAC should be dismissed in regards to defendant Lewis 

because respondeat superior claims are unavailable in § 1983 claims. (Mot. at 14:26.) 

Plaintiff offers nothing in response to this argument in his Opposition.

Plaintiff claims Lewis is liable for violations of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment 

rights because he is the “director” of the Pioneer Memorial Hospital. (FAC at 33:9-13.) 

“Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on any 

theory of vicarious liability.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989). A 

supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved, or (2) there is ‘“a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.’” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 

F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff has not claimed nor pled any facts that indicates Lewis was personally 

involved or causally connected to any wrongful conduct. Thus, Lewis is not liable as a 

supervisor. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion be GRANTED and 

Plaintiff’s claim that Lewis violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights be 

DISMISSED.

iv. California Government Claims Act

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Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to comply with the Government Claims Act 

because his complaint does not assert compliance with the Act. (Mot. At 24:21-26.) 

Defendant argues the Act is applicable here because Pioneer Memorial is a public entity 

and the alleged acts committed by Defendants were done during the scope of their 

employment. (Id. at 23:8-10, 25:16-20.) Plaintiff offers nothing in response to this 

argument in his Opposition.

California’s Government Claims Act provides that a party seeking to recover money 

damages for personal injury from a public entity must submit a claim to the entity within 

six months after accrual. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2; see also City of Stockton v. Superior 

Court, 171 P.3d 20, 25 (Cal. 2007). “No suit for money damages may be brought against 

a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented until a 

written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon or 

has been deemed to have been rejected.” City of Stockton, 171 P.3d at 25 (citing Cal. Gov. 

Code § 945.4.) A suit brought against a public entity must be filed within six months of the 

response from the public entity. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6(a)(1). “The deadline for filing a 

lawsuit against a public entity, as set out in the [Government Claims Act], is a true statute 

of limitations defining” when a plaintiff must file a lawsuit for facts set out in a claim. 

Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist., 164 P.3d 630, 634 (Cal. 2007). Subject to exceptions 

not relevant here, “a cause of action against a public employee ... for injury resulting from 

an act ... in the scope of his employment as a public employee is barred if an action against 

the employing public entity for such injury is barred...” Cal. Gov. Code § 950.2. The 

claims presentation requirement “constitutes an element of any cause of action arising 

under the Government Claims Act” and failure to meet this requirement subjects a claim 

to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Mohsin v. Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., 52 F.Supp.3d 

1006, 1017-18 (E.D. Cal. 2014).

Section 911.2 applies because Pioneer Memorial Hospital is a public entity. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are in regards to the acts of Defendants that occurred in the scope of 

their employment. However, Plaintiff’s FAC makes no reference to this requirement and 

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presents no facts to indicate that the requirement was met. Thus, Plaintiff has omitted a 

necessary element of his claim. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion be 

GRANTED and the FAC be DISMISSED for failing to plead compliance with the Act.5

v. Statute Of Limitations

Defendants argue the FAC should be dismissed with prejudice because the 

complaints against Defendants were filed after the statute of limitations expired. (Mot. at 

21:26.) Plaintiff offers nothing in response to this argument in his Opposition.

The closest Plaintiff comes to stating a cause of action against Yancy is the allegation 

that Yancy is “guilty of assault” for “stabbing” Plaintiff. (FAC at 35:7-9.) Additionally,

Plaintiff appears to claim that Lewis is vicariously liable as the director or Pioneer 

Memorial Hospital. (Id. at 33:9-13.) Construing this as a claim for battery, even had 

Plaintiff sufficiently stated a battery claim against Defendants, which he has not, his claim 

would be barred under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 340.5, which 

provides:

In an action for injury or death against a health care provider 

based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the 

time for the commencement of action shall be three years after 

the date of injury or one year after plaintiff discovers, or through 

the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the 

injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for 

commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled 

for any of the following: (upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional 

concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which has no 

therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the 

injured person.

See also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5(1)-(2); Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc., 179 

Cal. Rptr.3d 161, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App 2014) (claim of intentional tort for battery construed 

as professional negligence where no allegation intentional tort committed for an ulterior 

 

5 As will be discussed immediately below, notwithstanding the comparatively shorter time frame in 

which to pursue a claim subject to the Government Claims Act, Plaintiff is still time barred in bringing 

suit against Defendants pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.5.

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purpose).6

Section 340.5 applies here because Yancy, a phlebotomist working at Pioneers 

Memorial Hospital, is a healthcare provider, and because Plaintiff alleges an injury based 

on Yancy’s professional negligence – specifically, the drawing of blood.7 Section 340.5 

also applies to Lewis because vicarious liability is “wholly dependent upon or derived from 

the liability of the employee, [and] any substantive defense that is available to the employee 

inures to the benefit of the employer.” Lathrop v. Healthcare Partners Med. Grp, 8 

Cal.Rptr.3d 668, 675-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).

A plaintiff has one year from the date an injury was discovered to bring suit. Belton 

v. Bowers Ambulance Service, 20 Cal.4th 928, 934-35 (Cal. 1999). In Belton, a prisoner 

claimed he was injured during transportation from prison to a hospital. Id. at 929-30. The 

Supreme Court of California held that because the plaintiff “discovered the injury on the 

day it occurred” he had one year from the date of injury to bring suit absent any tolling 

available. Id. at 930. Plaintiff alleges the incident in question took place on January 16, 

2014. (FAC at 1.) Accordingly, he had until January 16, 2015 to file his complaint, absent 

possible tolling.

Tolling of the statute of limitations is governed by CCP § 352.1, which provides for 

tolling up to two years when a person is imprisoned at the time of the cause of action 

accrues. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1; see also Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-

44 (1989) (finding state statutory tolling does not frustrate § 1983 goals); Torres v. City of 

Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1997). Given this, Plaintiff is allowed a maximum 

of two additional years to file a complaint, up to the three-year maximum allowed under 

 

6 Section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, thus, for § 1983 claims, the courts will borrow 

the relevant state statute of limitations that would apply in a personal injury action. See Wallace v. Kato, 

549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 631 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“The statute of limitations applicable to an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 is the personal 

injury statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action arose.”).

7 The phrase ‘Health care provider’ refers to any person licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing 

with Section 500) of the California Business and Professions Code. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §340.5(1). See 

also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1246 (defining certified phlebotomist).

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CCP § 340.5. Belton, 20 Cal.4th at 934-35 (finding § 352.1 allows for statutory tolling 

beyond the one-year limitation period but not longer than the three-year maximum 

permitted under § 340.5).

Allowing tolling pursuant to CCP 352.1, the statute of limitations would have been 

tolled for two years and expired on January 16, 2017. Because Plaintiff did not seek to 

amend his complaint to add new claims against new parties until April 11, 2017, Plaintiff’s 

claims against Defendants are untimely. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants Motion be GRANTED and the FAC be DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.

C. Leave to Amend

Notwithstanding the Court’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s FAC be dismissed with

prejudice as time barred, the Court further recommends the FAC be dismissed with

prejudice in regards to Defendants’ other arguments for the reasons articulated below.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its

pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court

should freely grant leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When

determining whether to grant leave to amend, courts weigh certain factors: “undue delay,

bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of [the party who wishes to amend a pleading],

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment

[.]” See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Although prejudice to the opposing party “carries the greatest weight[,]...a strong

showing of any of the remaining Foman factors” can justify the denial of leave to amend.

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

Analysis of these factors can overlap. For instance, a party's “repeated failure to cure

deficiencies” constitues “a strong indication that the [party] has no additional facts to

plead” and “that any attempt to amend would be futile[.]” Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc

Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 988, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(upholding dismissal of complaint with prejudice when there were “three iterations of [the]

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allegations—none of which, according to [the district] court, was sufficient to survive a

motion to dismiss”); see also: Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1084

(9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend where plaintiff failed to correct

deficiencies in complaint, where court had afforded plaintiff opportunities to do so, and

had discussed with plaintiff the substantive problems with his claims), amended by 234

F.3d 428, overruled on other grounds by Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th

Cir. 2007); Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. # 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997)

(denial of leave to amend appropriate where further amendment would be futile).

Including the original complaint, Plaintiff has now had five opportunities to state a

claim for which relief could be granted. When recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint, this Court advised Plaintiff of the deficiencies of that complaint for

his claims regarding the warrant and excessive force. (See R&R at 11:1-14, 11:19-12:7.)

In the order adopting the first Report and Recommendation, the Honorable Dana M.

Sabraw granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint and again advised

Plaintiff to “cure[] the pleading deficiencies identified in the R&R.” (ECF No. 69 at 2.)

When this Court granted Plaintiff’s request to file a Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

was yet again advised the complaint “must specifically allege facts” and “precisely identify

which cause(s) of action are brought against each person.” (ECF No. 77.)

Plaintiff failed to heed these warnings when filing his Third and now Fourth

Amended Complaint. Notwithstanding the fact that defendants Yancy and Lewis were only

added in the third amended complaint, Plaintiff wasstill advised of hisrequirement to plead

all facts and how they relate to each defendant throughout this litigation. Had this been

Plaintiff’s original complaint, perhaps some latitude would be permitted to allow him to

cure the noted deficiencies. But this is Plaintiff’s fifth attempt and there appears to be no

interest or effort by Plaintiff to provide even a minimally sufficient pleading despite

repeated admonitions from the Court. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s statute of limitation

problems, his repeated failure to cure deficiencies is a strong indication to the Court that

Plaintiff has no additional facts to plead. Given this, the Court finds that any further

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attempts to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS the FAC be

dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s FAC be DISMISSED with PREJUDICE. This 

Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to 

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(1988) and Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 72(b). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 29, 2017, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

shall be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED no replies to objections will be accepted, and the 

motion will be deemed taken under submission on September 29, 2017. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2017

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