Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-02113/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-02113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rose Hernandez, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 03-2113 PCT VAM

)

AutoZone, Inc., et al., ) O R D E R

)

 Defendants. )

A. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her pro se complaint in state court on

October 2, 2003. (Doc. 1). Defendant removed the case to federal

court on October 29, 2003. (Id.). The parties consented to

proceed before the Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 6-8). Defendants

Dave Brown and Dave Janeway were dismissed. (Doc. 18). Defendant

AutoZone filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 30, 33, 36). 

Plaintiff opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 38,

39). The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part (Doc.

44) and the case proceeded to trial on two issues:

(1) whether plaintiff was constructively discharged under the

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) based on a work-related

injury and

(2) whether defendant denied plaintiff overtime based on her

national origin (Hispanic) in violation of Title VII. (Doc. 44 at

p. 24).

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The case was tried to the Court on October 25 and 26, 2005. 

At the close of trial, the Court found for defendant on

plaintiff's Title VII claim. The basis for the Court's ruling is

stated on the record. The claim of constructive discharge under

the ADA was taken under advisement. The Court now rules on the

remaining claim.

B. LAW

To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, plaintiff must

show she is: (1) disabled; (2) qualified; and (3) suffered an

adverse employment action (in this case constructive discharge)

because of her disability. Snead v. Metropolitan Property &

Casualty Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 888 (2001); see also Sanders v. Arneson, 91 F.3d 1351,

1353 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). The ADA

defines "disability" as:

(2) ... (A) a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life

activities of such an individual;

(B) a record of such impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102.

The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the term "substantially"

in "substantially limits" to mean "considerable" or "to a large

degree." Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,

534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002). The Court further stated that "[t]he

word 'substantial' thus clearly precludes impairments that

interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks

from qualifying as disabilities."

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The Court defined the term "major" in relation to "major life

activities" to refer to: 

those activities that are of central importance to daily

life. In order for performing manual tasks to fit this

category - a category that includes such basic abilities

as walking, seeing, and hearing - the manual tasks in

question must be central to daily life.

Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197. 

A "qualified person" is defined as one who "with or without

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of

the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The ADA also requires covered entities "to

provide 'reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability

who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can

demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

In a claim predicated on constructive discharge, as plaintiff

has alleged in this case, a plaintiff must show her employer made

"working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would

have felt compelled to resign." Pennsylvania State Police v.

Suders, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2354 (2004). Once an

employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination based on

disability, and the employer has produced evidence of a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the

analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas for suits under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies. Snead v. Metropolitan

Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001).

In short, once plaintiff has established a prima facie case of

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discrimination and defendant has come forward with a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its actions, then the burden shifts

back to plaintiff to establish that defendant's proffered reason

is merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive. McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); see also

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981). The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the

plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

C. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Rose Hernandez was hired by the Flagstaff AutoZone store

on July 11, 2001. She started as a cashier and in May, 2002 she

asked for a transfer and was reassigned to the "commercial" area

as a driver.

2. On October 1, 2002, plaintiff suffered an injury to her

back and shoulder while working in the store. She went to the

doctor and was released to return to work on that day with

restrictions. Plaintiff's initial restrictions were no repetitive

lifting over two pounds, no pushing and/or pulling over five

pounds of force, no reaching above shoulders and unable to drive

company vehicle. (Def. Ex. 11). Plaintiff continued to see her

physician for this injury on October 16, 2002, February 3, 2003,

March 4, 2003 and March 26, 2003. (Def. Ex. 11). Gradually

plaintiff's lifting restrictions were lessened and by her last

visit of record (March 26, 2003) she was restricted to no

repetitive lifting over twenty pounds, no reaching above shoulders

and limited use of left arm. (Def. Ex. 11). Plaintiff was never

released by her doctor but eventually discontinued visiting the

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doctor.

3. Plaintiff resigned her job with AutoZone by letter dated

June 11, 2003 indicating, in part:

This action is due to the constant harassment and mental

abuse I have endured for the past year and a half from

some management personnel and management's decision to

ignore my request for assistance. I am accepting the

advice of my doctors for health reasons and this is to

be effective June 13, 2003.

4. Dave Brown harassed plaintiff on the job on a regular

basis. He also harassed his other co-workers, including his

supervisor, to the point where his supervisor stepped down as the

store manager to avoid having to supervise Dave Brown. Dave Brown

criticized plaintiff in front of customers, pulled her off

assignments her supervisor gave her which prevented her from

completing these tasks. Plaintiff would become so upset she would

cry. Dave Brown harassed all employees but picked on plaintiff

more than others.

5. After complaining to her supervisors and corporate

management regarding her problems with Dave Brown and receiving no

assistance, she felt forced to resign.

6. Plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint on June 18, 2003 (one

week after her resignation letter) indicating, among other things:

. . .I have been disciplined for refusing to violate

medical restrictions placed on me. I know of younger,

non-disabled, non-Hispanic employees who have been

promoted, received raises and have been allowed to work

overtime. Finally, I am constantly criticized by store

manager Dave Janeway and assistant store manager Dave

Brown. The harassment became so unbearable that I was

forced to take a medical leave of absence. I believe

the harassment and the foregoing adverse actions have

been taken against me for the reasons listed below. I believe I have been discriminated against because of

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my national origin, age, and disability. . .

(Pl. Ex. 2). 

In order to establish a prima facie case under the ADA,

plaintiff must show that she is disabled. A showing of disability

requires plaintiff to prove a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102. Lifting restrictions, even if permanent, do not qualify

as a disability unless the plaintiff demonstrates that she is

"significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class

of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to

the average person having comparable training, skills and

abilities." Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537, 540

(9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff made no showing that she is

substantially limited in a major life activity of lifting or work. 

Plaintiff did not even allege that she was significantly

restricted in her ability to perform a class of jobs or broad

range of jobs. As a result, plaintiff has not demonstrated a

disability within the meaning of the ADA. Thompson v. Holy Family

Hospital, 121 F.3d at 540. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment

for defendant.

DATED this 6th day of December, 2005.

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