Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-03253/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-03253-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FAYE SLICE, 

Plaintiff,

 vs.

HARLEY LAPPIN, Director, Federal Bureau

of Prisons; ROBERT McFADDEN, Western

Regional Director FBOP; PAUL

COPENHAVER, Warden, FBOP Dublin;

DR. BASILE, FBOP Dublin Health Services

Director; DR. EZAZ, FBOP Dublin Medical

Director; and D. KNUTSON, SPC

Administrator, FBOP Dublin,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-3253 PJH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Federal Prison Camp in Dublin, California, has filed a pro

se civil rights complaint under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

She has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;

the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per

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curiam) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need

detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his

'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. The United States

Supreme Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly:

“[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 

The elements of a private cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny, are: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a federal actor. Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991) (§

1983 and Bivens actions are identical save for the replacement of a state actor under §

1983 by a federal actor under Bivens). When reviewing a Bivens action for which there is

no case on point, therefore, § 1983 cases are applied by analogy. See, e.g., Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (no distinctions for purposes of immunity between

state officials sued under § 1983 and federal officials sued under Bivens); Van Strum v.

Lawn, 940 F.2d at 409 (same statute of limitation should be used for § 1983 actions as for

Bivens actions).

B. Analysis

On March 1, 2010, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Because no responsive

pleading to the original complaint had yet been filed, it was an amendment as of right. See

Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a). It completely replaces the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). It is the amended complaint that is reviewed here.

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Plaintiff contends that her Eighth Amendment rights are violated by the conditions of

confinement at the camp, and that she has received inadequate medical care, also an

Eighth Amendment claim.

1. Conditions of Confinement

a. Overcrowding

Plaintiff contends that the prison camp houses many more inmates than

allowed by the standard of the American Corrections Association. The Ninth Circuit has not

constitutionalized American Correctional Association standards requiring that each inmate

have 60 square feet of space. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Rather, the adequacy of cell size must be judged in relation to other factors contributing to

overcrowding. Id. at 1248-49. 

Overcrowding itself is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981);

Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1249-50. However, the Constitution is violated when overcrowding

results in specific effects forming the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation, such as

reduction in services and an increase in violence disproportionate to the simple increase in

numbers. Id. at 1249; see Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1987) (allegations

of increase in stress, tension, communicable diseases, and confrontations between

inmates due to overcrowding states 8th Amendment claim). A court may hold prison or jail

crowding unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment only if "an individual plaintiff proves

that the crowding causes the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment of that inmate." 18

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1).

Plaintiff refers to the conditions in Building C-4, but does not say if that is where she

is housed. She thus has not alleged that she is subject to the conditions described. She

also has failed to allege facts linking any of the named defendants with the alleged violation

of her constitutional rights. Even at the pleading stage, "[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not

simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation

of [her] civil rights." Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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In addition, she has described only mental injuries, namely stress, anxiety, fear, and

depression. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that prisoners may

recover for mental or emotional injuries suffered while incarcerated only if they first show

that they suffered a physical injury, which plaintiff does not allege. See 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(e). Thus in this claim she does not state a claim for money damages. 

This claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

b. Toxic Living Conditions

Plaintiff contends that she suffers “chronic nausea, bloody sinus mucous,

severe headaches, sore throat, inflamation-caused sleep apnea from swollen respiratory

tissues and burning skin” from the gases emitted from a severe build-up of pigeon feces

inside her housing unit. She also describes how ventilation is inadequate, a claim that is

discussed further below under “Lack of Air Circulation.” 

A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an

inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the standard for criminal recklessness is

met, i.e., the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

also draw the inference. Id. Allegations in a pro se complaint sufficient to raise an

inference that the named prison officials acted with deliberate indifference – i.e, that they

knew plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to

take reasonable measures to abate it – states a "failure-to-protect" claim. Hearns v.

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005). Because plaintiff has not linked any of

the named defendants to the conditions she describes, she has failed to meet this

standard. This claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

c. Safety

Plaintiff alleges that on May 30, 2009, she was struck in the back by a large piece of

plywood that had been blown off a boarded-up window by a gust of wind. She alleges that

leaving the plywood in place for nearly a year was “negligence” and that she “may” have

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 Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the USDA’s recommendations for daily fruit and

vegetable consumption do not require that those items be fresh, but rather specifically state

that they may be fresh, frozen, canned, or dehydrated. See Inside the Pyramid / What foods

are in the vegetable group?, http://www.mypyramid.gov/pyramid/fruits.html; Inside the Pyramid

/ What foods are in the Fruit Group?, http://www.mypyramid.gov/pyramid/vegetables.html (last

visited March 11, 2010).

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suffered a cracked vertebra. She also has not linked any named defendant with this

incident. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the Farmer standard

described above, and thus this claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

d. Lack of Air Circulation

Plaintiff contends that the only ventilation is from open windows, and that other

inmates often will not cooperate to open them. Inadequate ventilation and air flow violates

the Eighth Amendment if it "'undermines the health of inmates and the sanitation of the

penitentiary.'" Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d

1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

The allegations here are not enough, however, to meet the Farmer standard discussed

above, and she has not alleged facts linking any named defendant with this condition. This

claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

e. Lack of Meaningful Training or Employment Opportunities

Plaintiff asserts the inadequacy of training classes and that there are no employment

opportunities at the camp. There is no constitutional right to a job or rehabilitation in prison. 

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1982) (no right to job); Rizzo v. Dawson,

778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (no right to vocational course or rehabilitation). This

claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

f. Food Quality

Plaintiff alleges that she is a Buddhist vegan. She asserts that the “non-flesh” meals 

do not contain enough fresh vegetables and fresh fruit, and that many of the items served

are “over-processed.” These allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for failure

to provide a proper diet.1

 

Plaintiff also asserts that a meat-substitute provided caused her blood potassium

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levels to soar to a dangerous level, and that when she stopped eating the meat substitute,

her potassium levels returned to normal. For pleading purposes, this allegation is sufficient

to assert that the meat substitute caused the elevated potassium levels, but plaintiff has not

alleged any facts regarding how elevated her potassium levels were, or any facts regarding

the effect of levels elevated to the degree hers were. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that the meals lacked “essential minerals and vitamins” is

conclusory – no facts are provided.

As to all these claims, plaintiff has failed to link the alleged violations of her rights

with specific defendants. These claims will be dismissed with leave to amend.

g. Lighting

Plaintiff asserts that on hot days the doors and windows in building C-4 are covered

with blackout curtains and the lights are kept off to minimize the heat load, resulting in the

inmates sitting in the dark for extended periods. Although she says that “shady areas”

outside are off limits between 5 am and 2 pm, she does not say that inmates are not

permitted to leave the darkened building, and her statement that there is not “adequate”

lighted common space suggests that using common space may be an option at times. She

also has not provided facts linking these claims with specific defendants. This claim will be

dismissed with leave to amend.

h. Inadequate Mattresses

Plaintiff contends that her Eighth Amendment rights are violated by her being given

a mattress that is one inch thick. She contends that the lack of a thicker mattress has

exacerbated her back problems. She has pleaded no facts that would link the mattress to

the alleged deterioration in the condition of her back. This claim will be dismissed with

leave to amend. 

i. Pesticide Use

Plaintiff contends that pesticides, insecticides, and rodenticides are used

indiscriminately, not in compliance with instructions for use, and without proper ventilation

and safety measures. She asserts that she has a medical order that she not be exposed to

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Cyfluthrin insecticide, which causes her respiratory distress, but that “the FBOP” refuses to

comply. Plaintiff has not linked the named defendant to this claim. This claim will be

dismissed with leave to amend.

2. Medical

Plaintiff contends that she has suffered bone loss as a result of an inadequate diet

and the prison’s refusal to provide supplemental vitamins and minerals. She has not

provided factual allegations regarding the alleged bone loss or facts that would link diet with

it. She also has not provided facts linking the named defendants with the alleged violation

of her rights. This claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff also contends that an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Chipina (not a defendant)

ordered orthopedic devices to help support her feet and ankles, but those provided by the

prison were inadequate. She also says that Dr. Chipina ordered surgery, but the prison

refused to provide it. Again she has not linked these claims with any of the named

defendants. This claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has moved for appointment of counsel. 

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case, Lassiter v. Dep't of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981), and although district courts may "request" that counsel

represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis, as plaintiff is here, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1), that does not give the courts the power to make "coercive appointments of

counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may ask counsel to represent an

indigent litigant only in "exceptional circumstances," the determination of which requires an

evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the

plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff appears able to present her claims adequately, and the issues are not

complex. Although all the claims in the complaint are dismissed in this order, all that is

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necessary for her to amend is facts which should be within her knowledge; if she does not

know of any such facts, then she does not have any actionable claims. The motion for

appointment of counsel will be denied. 

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff’s claim regarding training and employment opportunities is DISMISSED

with prejudice. It may not be included in the amended complaint allowed below.

2. The other claims in the complaint are DISMISSED with leave to amend, as

indicated above, within thirty days from the date of this order. The amended complaint

must be on the court’s form for prisoner section 1983 complaints, which are in most

respects similar to this Bivens case. Plaintiff must include the caption and civil case

number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. 

Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must

include in it all the claims she wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). She may not incorporate material from the original complaint by

reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of the

case. The clerk shall send plaintiff a copy of the court’s form packet for prisoner § 1983

complaints with her copy of this order.

3. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed

“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute.

4. The motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED (doc 3).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2010. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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