Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00927/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00927-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

LA CORA GRIFFIN, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO: 2:13-cv-927-WKW-WC 

 ) 

FOOD GIANT SUPERMARKETS, ) 

INC., ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

 On December 18, 2013, La Cora Griffin (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against 

Food Giant Supermarkets, Inc.,1

 purporting to allege claims of unlawful race and genderbased employment discrimination and harassment as well as retaliation in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title 

VII”). Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On January 14, 2014, the District 

Judge entered an Order (Doc. 3) referring this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

“for further proceedings and determination or recommendation as may be appropriate.” 

Presently before the court are several motions filed by the parties, including: a) 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 37 for Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply 

 

1

 Plaintiff also sued several individual defendant-employees of Food Giant in her complaint. 

On March 26, 2014, the District Judge entered an Order (Doc. 12) adopting the undersigned’s 

Recommendation (Doc. 10) that the individual defendants be dismissed from this action because 

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With the Court’s Order (Doc. 45); b) “Plaintiff’s Motion of Objection” (Doc. 48); c) 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 49); and d) Plaintiff’s “Motion to 

Assign Master” (Doc. 53). Upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and the pleadings of the 

parties, and for the reasons that follow, the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that all other 

pending motions be denied. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court shall 

grant a motion for “summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes about material facts will preclude 

the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 

(1986). A dispute “is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of 

fact to find for the nonmoving party. A[] [dispute] is ‘material’ if it might affect the 

outcome of the case under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland 

Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 

 The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion[,]” and alerting the court to portions 

of the record which support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

 

Title VII provides for relief against the employer, not individual employees whose actions might 

violate the Act. 

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(1986). However, once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmovant is then 

similarly required to cite to portions of the record which show the existence of a material 

factual dispute. Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant 

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

The parties must support their assertions “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” 

by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[], admissions, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do not 

establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). 

 If a party “fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address 

another party’s assertion of fact” as required by Rule 56(c), then the court may “consider 

the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion” and “grant summary judgment if the 

motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that 

the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) & (3). 

 In determining whether a genuine dispute for trial exists, the court must view all 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McCormick v. City of Fort 

Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the reviewing court must 

draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for 

summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine 

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dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

The undersigned has carefully considered the pleadings in this case and all 

documents submitted in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. The submissions 

of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish the 

following relevant facts:2

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on September 12, 2013. 

Charge of Discrimination, Ex. 12 to Pl.’s Dep. (Doc. 51-4) at 122. The EEOC issued a 

Dismissal and Notice of Rights on September 30, 2013. Notice of Rights, Ex. 14 to Pl.’s 

Dep. (Doc. 51-4) at 136. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint against Food Giant 

Supermarkets, Inc., on December 18, 2013. Compl. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff is an AfricanAmerican female. Pl.’s Dep. (Doc. 51-4) at 30:16-21. Plaintiff claims she was denied a 

promotion, harassed, and terminated because of her race, sex, and complaints about 

perceived health code violations. Compl. (Doc. 1). 

Plaintiff interviewed with Store Manager Ben Hogan (African-American male), 

and Hogan offered her a job as a deli clerk on June 3, 2011. Pl.’s Dep. at 35:10-14, 

 

2

 Notwithstanding her “Motion to Assign Master” (Doc. 53), which is in no way responsive to 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and in spite of provisions in the court’s Uniform Scheduling 

Order (“USO”) instructing her to do so, see USO (Doc. 22) at 2-3, Plaintiff did not file a response to the 

Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, she has not set forth a statement of facts apart from the allegations 

of her complaint. Moreover, because Plaintiff has not intelligibly responded to the Motion for Summary 

Judgment, she has not challenged Defendant’s recitation of undisputed facts. Indeed, Defendant makes 

clear that Plaintiff declined to respond when, pursuant to the USO, it provided her with its statement of 

facts prior to filing for summary judgment. See Def.’s Br. (Doc. 50) at 2, n. 1. Accordingly, the 

undersigned herein largely adopts Defendant’s statement of facts since it is undisputed by Plaintiff. See

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37:20-38:8. Plaintiff remained in this position until her termination by Food Giant on 

May 29, 2012. Personnel Status Form Exs. A & B to Affidavit of Peggy Gates (Doc. 51-

2). Plaintiff’s supervisors at the time of her hiring were as follows: a) Store Manager 

Hogan; b) Assistant Store Manager Rick Shirah (Caucasian male); c) Night Manager 

Daryl Byrd (African-American male); d) Deli Manager Cindy Starks (African-American 

female); and e) Assistant Deli Manager Louise Beasley (African-American female). Pl.’s 

Dep. at 40:4-13. 

A. Failure to Promote Claim

Starks was terminated in December, 2011. Affidavit of Ben Hogan (Doc. 51-3) ¶ 

4. Beasley was promoted to Deli Manager, leaving the Assistant Deli Manager position 

vacant. Id.; Compl. (Doc. 1) at 2; Pl.’s Dep. at 59:1- 3. Plaintiff was offered the 

opportunity to train for the position of Assistant Deli Manager in December of 2011. 

Id. Plaintiff trained for the Assistant Deli Manager position from December of 2011 

until her termination in May of 2012. Pl.’s Dep. at 63:1-3. During P l a i n t i f f ’ s 

employment, no one was promoted to Assistant Deli Manager after Starks was 

terminated. Hogan Aff. (Doc. 51-3) ¶ 4. Plaintiff believes that she was denied 

promotion to the Assistant Deli Manager position because of retaliation over her threats 

to report Food Giant to the health department. Pl.’s Dep. at 64:18-65:3. 

B. Racial and Sexual Harassment Claims

Plaintiff’s racial and sexual harassment claims are based on the conduct of Hogan, 

Shirah, and Beasley. Compl. (Doc. 1). Food Giant has written policies prohibiting 

 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

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discrimination and harassment based upon race and sex. EEO Policy, Ex. G to Gates Aff. 

(Doc. 51-2); Harassment Policy, Ex. J to Gates Aff. (Doc. 51-2). Employees are directed 

to report objectionable conduct to their supervisors or by contacting the Human Resource 

Department on the Employee Hotline at any time. Id. Plaintiff received and signed a 

memorandum articulating Defendant’s equal employment and harassment policies, Ex. 2 

to Pl.’s Dep. (Doc. 51-4) at 95, and acknowledged that Hogan reviewed these policies 

and procedures with her when she was hired. Pl.’s Dep. at 43:19-44:8. 

Plaintiff’s allegations of race and sex-based discrimination and harassment appear 

to be as follows: Plaintiff alleges that her workplace “became hostile” on her birthday, 

December 2, 2011, when Shirah approached her and asked “when [she] was gonna start 

doing [her] job.” Compl. (Doc. 1). Shirah then sent her home and, when Hogan returned 

to work, she was “cussed out.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Hogan once threatened to 

fire “all of us Mother F-----’ B------” if he caught deli employees throwing away food. 

Id.3

 Plaintiff also alleges that Hogan commonly referred to her as “team wolf.” Pl.’s 

Dep. at 50:22-24. Hogan explained that the term meant she “was the leader of the pack.” 

Id. Plaintiff believes that calling her “team wolf” was a racial remark. Id. at 129:21-

131:7. Plaintiff further accuses Hogan of harassing her by expressing that he “ate dark 

meat, and preferred white meat” when she asked him how he likes his chicken. Compl. 

(Doc. 1); Pl.’s Dep. at 122:3-25. Plaintiff believes this was a “sexual remark.” Pl.’s Dep. 

at 42:15-25. Plaintiff also accuses Hogan of sexual harassment due to several incidents 

 

3

 Plaintiff testified repeatedly that Hogan actually threatened to fire “Black A—B------” in the 

deli. Pl.’s Dep. at 23:15-17, 137:17. 

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of alleged brushing up against her, beginning sometime around mid-August 2011. Id. at 

110:2-13. Plaintiff states that the alleged brushings almost always had the pretense of 

inadvertence, and that Hogan would often remark along the lines of “oh, excuse me, team 

wolf.” Id. at 111:17-24. Although Plaintiff acknowledged that some of the incidents 

might have been accidental, Id. at 118:10-13, after the third such incident, Plaintiff 

confronted Hogan and accused him of intentionally brushing against her as a form of 

sexual harassment or abuse. Id. at 116:8-25. Plaintiff acknowledged that she felt Hogan 

was the only person who sexually harassed her. Id. at 152:8-10. Plaintiff did not report 

any of Hogan’s alleged conduct to the corporate office as instructed by the policy 

documents she reviewed when she was hired. Id. at 121:7-18. 

Plaintiff appears to allege that Beasley sexually harassed her because she “would 

bring sex oils to work and always talking about sex acts with other employees and 

myself.” Compl. (Doc. 1). However, as stated above, Plaintiff testified at her deposition 

that she believes Hogan was the only employee who sexually harassed her. Pl.’s Dep. at 

152:8-10. 

Plaintiff does not allege that Shirah harassed or discriminated against her on the 

basis of her sex. However, she complains that Shirah intimidated her by standing too 

close to her, that he always found a reason to write her up when Hogan was away from 

the store, and that he “harassed” her during the week of her termination by watching her 

time card to make sure that she did not get overtime. Compl. (Doc. 1). Without alleging 

that any of his conduct was racially animated, Plaintiff speculates “maybe it is a white 

and black issue since he’s the only one that used to write me up.” Pl.’s Dep. at 135:8-11. 

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C. Termination

Food Giant utilizes a progressive discipline policy. See Ex. I to Gates Aff. (Doc. 

51-2). The written policy provides for termination following an oral counseling session, 

a written warning, and a final written warning. Id. Notably, where “an employee 

receives a second written warning within a twelve (12) month period of time, the 

employee should be terminated.” Id. Furthermore, the “three (3) reprimands (oral, 

written, final) do not have to be for identical infractions, provided the employee has been 

properly counseled.” Id. 

Food Giant’s Employee Handbook, which Plaintiff acknowledged reading, see

Pl.’s Dep. at 53:17-54:13, instructs that “All overtime must be approved in advance by 

management.” Ex. 4 to Pl.’s Dep. (Doc. 51-4) at 103. The Handbook also establishes 

Standards of Conduct, the violation of which “could result in disciplinary action up to 

and including discharge.” Id. at 105. Among those “Standards” are that employees are 

not allowed to work off the clock, falsify their time card or record, use “insulting or 

abusive language,” or refuse “to follow the instructions of a supervisor, [commit] gross 

misconduct, or insubordination.” Id. Plaintiff was disciplined several times during the 

course of her employment at Food Giant for violations of these standards, including the 

following: on September 28, 2011, Plaintiff was given a written warning for failing to 

speak to management with respect (Ex. A to Hogan Aff. (Doc. 51-3)); on January 1, 

2012, Plaintiff was given a written reprimand, and was suspended for a week, for arguing 

with a manager over the manager’s instructions to her (Ex. B to Hogan Aff. (Doc. 51-3)); 

on May 24, 2012, Plaintiff received another written reprimand for her attitude in response 

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to management orders and working beyond her scheduled time (Ex. C to Hogan Aff. 

(Doc. 51-3)); and on May 27, 2012, Plaintiff received another written reprimand after a 

customer complained that Plaintiff was rude to her concerning an order at the deli (Ex. D 

to Hogan Aff. (Doc. 51-3)). 

Finally, on May 29, 2012, Plaintiff was terminated for being rude to a customer 

and having a bad attitude toward management. Ex. E to Hogan Aff. (Doc. 51-3). 

Plaintiff believes that she was terminated because of her threats to report purported 

unsanitary conditions in the Food Giant deli to the Health Inspector. Pl.’s Dep. at 104:9-

19. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Disparate Treatment – Race and Gender Discrimination 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis 

of her race and sex. However, the complaint never clearly articulates Plaintiff’s belief 

that she was subjected to any adverse employment action as a result of her race or gender. 

Although Plaintiff appears to describe at least two adverse employment actions—the 

failure to promote her to Assistant Deli Manager and her termination—as set forth above, 

Plaintiff unequivocally testified to her belief that those employment actions were the 

product of retaliation over her threats to report Food Giant to the health inspector. 

Elsewhere, Plaintiff mused in her deposition that perhaps Shirah was motivated by racial 

animus since he was the only one who wrote her up and he is Caucasian. Pl.’s Dep. at 

135:8-11. However, Plaintiff never specifically identifies any adverse employment 

action and alleges that it was the result of her race or gender. 

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Racial and gender disparate treatment claims require a prima facie showing of 

discriminatory intent, E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 

2000), which “can be established three ways: 1) direct evidence; 2) circumstantial 

evidence; or 3) statistical proof.” Davis v. City of Panama City, Fla., 510 F. Supp. 2d 

671, 681 (N.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 

(11th Cir. 1990)). Plaintiff has not provided direct evidence that discrimination was the 

reason for any alleged adverse employment action, nor has she proffered statistical 

evidence or evidence of a pattern of discrimination in this case. Because Plaintiff’s 

discrimination claim therefore relies on circumstantial evidence, the claim is analyzed 

under the burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff must first create a 

presumption of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas, 

411 U.S. at 802. If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to 

Defendant to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action.” 

Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty., Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Joe’s 

Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at1286). If Defendant does so, the burden shifts again to 

Plaintiff to “prove that the reason provided by the defendant is a pretext for unlawful 

discrimination.” Id. 

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1. Establishing a Prima Facie Case

 “[T]he plaintiff first has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of 

discrimination, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer acted illegally.” 

McCalister v. Hillsborough County Sheriff, 211 F. App’x 883, 884-85 (11th Cir. 2006). 

“To establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment in a race [or gender] 

discrimination case, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; 

(2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated 

similarly situated employees outside of her protected class more favorably than she was 

treated; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.” Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 

447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). In general, as to the third prong of the prima facie

test, in order to identify a viable comparator, 

the plaintiff must show that [s]he and the employees are similarly situated 

in all relevant respects. Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st 

Cir. 1994); Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992); 

Smith v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 770 F.2d 719, 723 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986). In determining whether employees are 

similarly situated for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, it is 

necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of 

the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways. Williams 

v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 1994). If a plaintiff fails to 

show the existence of a similarly situated employee, summary judgment is 

appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is present. See, e.g.,

Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 182 (1st Cir. 

1989). 

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original). A proper 

comparator is an employee outside of the plaintiff’s protected class who is similarly 

situated to the plaintiff “in all relevant respects.” Coar v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 372 F. 

App’x 1, 3 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 

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(11th Cir. 2004)). “This prevents ‘courts from second-guessing employers’ reasonable 

decisions and confusing apples with oranges.’” Id. (quoting Burke-Fowler v. Orange 

Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted)). 

[I]n disciplinary contexts, the quality and quantity of a comparator’s 

conduct must be nearly identical to the plaintiff’s in order to prevent courts 

from second-guessing a reasonable decision by the employer. Maniccia v. 

Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1999). While not always the 

case, differences in treatment by different supervisors or decisionmakers 

can seldom be the basis for a viable claim of discrimination. [Silvera v. 

Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001)]. 

Foster v. Biolife Plasma Servs., LP, 566 F. App’x 808, 811 (11th Cir. 2014). 

In this instance, Plaintiff’s testimony that the failure to promote her and the 

decision to terminate her were retaliation for her threats to report Food Giant to the health 

inspector is fatal to any claim that such adverse employment actions were the result of 

disparate treatment based upon her race or gender. Even if Plaintiff’s own testimony 

were not fatal to any disparate treatment claim, she has failed to establish a prima facie

case of disparate treatment related to her failure to promote and termination claims. 

Plaintiff does not identify any employee outside of her protected class that was treated 

more favorably than she. With respect to Plaintiff’s failure to promote claim, as set forth 

above, Food Giant did not promote any individual to the Assistant Deli Manager position 

during Plaintiff’s employment. With respect to Plaintiff’s termination, which was based 

at least partly on Plaintiff’s working overtime without preauthorization, Plaintiff only 

mentioned at her deposition that another employee, Jennifer Belscher, was similarly 

supposed to be off the clock at the same time as her, but that Shirah “never said anything 

to her about her being on a time clock.” Pl.’s Dep. at 125:14-15. Plaintiff wonders why, 

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“if both of us are standing up here and we’re supposed—both of us are supposed to be on 

the clock—off the clock at 2, why is it that you’re just going to come up and—to me and 

say something and not say anything to Jennifer?” Id. at 125:15-19. To the extent 

Plaintiff might proffer Belscher as a comparator for any disparate treatment or 

termination claim, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case because Jennifer Belscher 

is an African-American female and is therefore not outside either of Plaintiff’s subject 

protected classes. See id. at 87:2-12. 

Stripped of any contention that the failure to promote Plaintiff or her termination 

were the product of animus over Plaintiff’s race or gender, all that is arguably left of 

Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim is her contention that perhaps Shirah discriminated 

against her because he is the only one who wrote her up and he is Caucasian. Defendant 

is entitled to summary judgment on any such claim which might be construed from the 

complaint. Plaintiff’s idle speculation that Shirah may have discriminated against her is 

insufficient and, in any event, Plaintiff fails to identify any comparator from outside of 

her protected classes for purposes of any disparate discipline claim. Indeed, not only 

does Plaintiff fail to allege that non-African-American or non-female employees were not 

subject to disciplinary actions for conduct similar to hers, she affirmatively testified that 

employees were treated the same regardless of their race. See id. at 140:4-7 (“Anybody 

in the front of the house that’s behind that counter is treated better than anybody in the 

back. It doesn’t matter what race you are.”). Plaintiff has simply failed to establish a 

prima facie case of disparate treatment based upon her race or gender. Accordingly, 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on any claim alleging such disparate 

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treatment which might be construed in the complaint. 

B. Racial and Sexual Harassment Claim 

 Plaintiff also appears to allege that she was subjected to a racially and sexually 

hostile work environment. In general, 

Title VII prohibits a hostile work environment in which “a series of 

separate acts . . . collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment 

practice.’” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 

(2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). As opposed to “[d]iscrete acts 

such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to 

hire,” a hostile work environment claim addresses acts “different in kind” 

whose “very nature involves repeated conduct,” such as “‘discriminatory 

intimidation, ridicule, and insult.’” Id. at 114-16 (quoting Harris v. Forklift 

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Thus, these “claims are based on the 

cumulative effect of individual acts.” Id. at 115. 

McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) 

 To establish a claim of a hostile work environment, an employee must 

prove that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 

ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working 

environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The 

employee must prove five elements if [s]he bases h[er] harassment claim on 

race [or gender]: (1) that [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) that 

[s]he was subjected to unwelcome racial [or sexual] harassment; (3) that the 

harassment was based on h[er] race [or sex]; (4) that the harassment was 

severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of h[er] 

employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; 

and (5) that the employer is responsible for the environment under a theory 

of either vicarious or direct liability. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 

277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2014). As set out 

above, Plaintiff’s claim that she was subjected to a racially or sexually hostile work 

environment is predicated on her allegations that 1) Hogan referred to her and other deli 

workers as “Mother F----- B------” or “Black A—B------”; 2) Hogan’s statement, when 

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asked by Plaintiff how he likes his chicken, that he “eats dark meat, but likes white 

meat”; 3) Hogan’s referring to Plaintiff as “team wolf”; 4) Hogan’s instances of 

brushing-up against Plaintiff; 5) Beasley’s bringing sex oils to work and talking about sex 

acts; and 6) Shirah’s intimidating and harassing Plaintiff by standing too close to her. 

Compl. (Doc. 1). 

 Most of the conduct identified by Plaintiff is not connected to her race or sex. For 

example, Hogan’s explanation about his chicken preferences appears, according to 

Plaintiff’s own testimony, to have been a straightforward answer to Plaintiff’s question 

about what kind of chicken he likes. Plaintiff testified as follows: 

We had - we – like we were cleaning. I was cleaning those things on the 

side. And he just came up to me and said, I heard you make the best 

chicken. I don’t remember the exact day it was, but I know he said you 

make the best – I heard you make the best chicken in town. And he said – I 

said to him, do you want white meat because we – that’s the way we serve 

it. You either serve white meat, you get dark meat, or you get it mixed. 

And mixed is the white and dark meat together. And he said, I eat dark 

meat, but I prefer white. And I turn around him and tell him, everybody in 

the store knows that you date white women. 

Pl.’s Dep. at 122:8-20. As is apparent from Plaintiff’s own testimony, Hogan simply 

answered Plaintiff’s question about how he likes chicken, and it was Plaintiff who 

supplied the innuendo she finds in Hogan’s answer. Likewise, Plaintiff has made no 

showing that Hogan’s referring to her as “team wolf” constitutes racial or sexual 

harassment. Hogan explained that he used the nickname to denote that Plaintiff was 

“leader of the pack” of deli workers. Id. at 50:22-24. Plaintiff somehow construes the 

remark as racial because she is not an animal. Id. at 130:1-131:7. However, Plaintiff 

points to nothing in the record which permits the inference that Hogan, who is AfricanCase 2:13-cv-00927-WKW-WC Document 54 Filed 03/04/16 Page 15 of 28
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American like Plaintiff, intended his nickname for her to be a racial remark. Nor, despite 

Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that it was, is there any reason to construe it as such. 

Based upon the record, and Plaintiff’s failure to provide any credible evidence of racial 

intent, the undersigned finds that Hogan’s use of “team wolf” when referring to Plaintiff 

was nothing more than a racially-neutral nickname utilized by one African-American 

when referring to another. It was not harassment based upon Plaintiff’s race. See Walker 

v. Boys and Girls Club of Am., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1337 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (“Where the 

allegedly discriminatory decision makers are within the same protected class[,]” it is 

“extremely difficult for a plaintiff to establish discrimination.”). Finally, and as 

discussed in relation to Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims, Plaintiff points to nothing 

in the record, other than her own baseless speculation, that Shirah’s conduct in 

disciplining Plaintiff was motivated by racial or sexual animus. Nor does the mere act of 

standing “almost kissing distance,” Compl. (Doc. 1), from Plaintiff when dealing with her 

permit the inference, without more, that Shirah sought to harass Plaintiff due to her race 

or sex. 

 The remaining conduct identified by Plaintiff—Beasley’s sex oils and discussions 

of sex acts, Hogan’s use of foul language when referring to the deli employees, and 

Hogan’s alleged brushing-up against Plaintiff—arguably could be perceived as 

constituting some form of racial or sexual harassment. However, based upon the record 

before the court, the undersigned cannot conclude that Plaintiff has met her burden of 

showing that “the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and 

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conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment.” 

McCann, 526 F.3d at 1378. 

Determining whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive 

involves “both an objective and subjective component.” [Miller, 277 F.3d 

at 1275]. In determining the objective element, a court looks to “‘all the 

circumstances,’ including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 

employee’s work performance.’” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116 (quoting 

Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367); see also Miller, 277 F.3d at 1275. 

McCann, 526 F.3d at 1278. 

 With regard to Beasley’s bringing sex oils to work and discussing sex acts around 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not allege that Beasley’s conduct was so “severe or pervasive” 

that it somehow altered the terms or conditions of her employment. Plaintiff does not 

allege that Beasley forced her to participate in any discussion about sex acts or to view, 

or handle, her sex oils. More to the point, Plaintiff testified that, notwithstanding 

Beasley’s alleged conduct, she considers Hogan the only employee to have sexually 

harassed her at Food Giant. Pl.’s Dep. at 152:8-10. As such, the undersigned cannot 

conclude that Beasley’s conduct was even subjectively sufficiently severe or pervasive 

that it altered the terms or conditions of Plaintiff’s employment, much less that it 

contributed in any material way to an objectively sexually charged or abusive working 

environment. 

 Taking Plaintiff’s factual allegations in her complaint and her deposition 

testimony at face value, the undersigned accepts that Plaintiff found the remaining 

conduct of Hogan described above as subjectively harassing. However, for the reasons 

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that follow, the undersigned cannot conclude that, objectively, the complained of conduct 

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s 

employment and create an abusive working environment. 

 With regard to Hogan’s use of the expression “Mother F----- B------” or “Black 

A—B------,” Plaintiff testified that Hogan used the offending language on only one 

occasion, and that he directed it at a group of employees, rather than just Plaintiff, when 

he was threatening to fire deli workers for throwing away food. Compl. (Doc. 1); Pl.’s 

Dep. at 61:25-62:5 (“[B]ut Ben said that if we threw away food – if – management job 

was to throw away the food. And if we threw away the food, he was going to fire all of 

us black a—b------ and start all over new. And that was not only me. There was like four 

or five other employees that he was standing there talking to.”). There is no allegation in 

the complaint or in Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that Hogan regularly used this or any 

other racially or sexually derogatory language when referring to Plaintiff or even in her 

presence. As such, the undersigned finds that this incident, even if nominally offensive, 

is simply too “sporadic and isolated to establish that her employers’ conduct was so 

objectively severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment.” 

McCann, 526 F.3d at 1379 (upholding award of summary judgment on racial hostile 

work environment claim where plaintiff was called “girl” one time and simply heard that 

other racial epithets had been used in the workplace). See also Marable v. Marion 

Military Inst., 595 F. App’x 921, 927 (11th Cir. 2014); Dominguez v. Lake Como Club, 

520 F. App’x 937, 940-41 (11th Cir. 2013). 

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 The other conduct constituting sexual harassment which Plaintiff attributes to 

Hogan is his alleged brushing against her and other employees. Plaintiff testified that the 

incidents typically occurred in the deli, which was a small, confined space cluttered with 

equipment, which meant that employees were “bumping into each other anyway” when 

working in that area. Pl.’s Dep. at 110:13-19. She testified that the incidents were 

normally the product of feigned accident: 

Okay. Our spaces are only so – so big, right? So say, for example, he’s 

coming by and he’s going to check the chicken that’s over in this corner 

right here. He’ll wait – he’ll see me over here in this corner and he will 

walk up right behind me. And all of a sudden, you’re – you’re brushed up 

on me, right? So he be like, oh, excuse me team wolf. And I’m like what? 

I’m like, okay. 

So first time I’m like he’s just—you know, maybe I’m just—I’m just 

making this up. Maybe I’m just thinking this. So then he’ll walk by you 

accidentally. But now he rubbed—and he’ll be like, excuse me, team wolf, 

I didn’t mean that. And the last time—the third time I was like this man is 

doing this intentionally. He did it again. I said, excuse you. I said, you 

know what you’re doing. 

. . . Instead of him saying, excuse me, let – can I come in there, he’ll come 

up behind you, well, that look like it need a little bit of – why are you all 

over me? You’re not supposed to be that close. You see, he’s leaning up 

over me right now and you’re touching me. 

Id. at 111:17-112:17. Plaintiff testified that were more than three such incidents, and that 

they occurred from approximately mid-August of 2011 into February of 2012. Plaintiff 

conceded that up to three such incidents could be excused as accidents, but that “anytime 

you’re after three you’re not doing anything on accident.” Id. at 118:10-14. Plaintiff 

believes that the incidents were not accidental because she considers Hogan a “pervert.” 

Id. at 116:5. 

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 The conduct alleged by Plaintiff falls well short of the threshold level of “severe or 

pervasive conduct sufficient to alter” Plaintiff’s terms or conditions of employment. See 

Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). In 

Mendoza, for example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s claim that she was 

subjected to a sexually hostile work environment where the plaintiff identified four 

separate instances of alleged sexual harassment, including: 

(1) one instance in which Page said to Mendoza “I’m getting fired up”; (2) 

one occasion in which Page rubbed his hip against Mendoza’s hip while 

touching her shoulder and smiling; (3) two instances in which Page made a 

sniffing sound while looking at Mendoza’s groin area and one instance of 

sniffing without looking at her groin; and (4) Page’s “constant” following 

and staring at Mendoza in a “very obvious fashion.” 

Id. at 1247. Applying the factors discussed in McCann compels the conclusion that the 

conduct alleged by Plaintiff does not suffice to establish a viable claim of an objectively 

sexually hostile work environment. As to the frequency of the alleged conduct, Plaintiff 

offers only vague testimony that it occurred more than three times over a roughly six 

month period. Given Plaintiff’s testimony that the incidents occurred in tight, confined 

places where employees were naturally bumping into one another, and in which Hogan 

had every right to be in the performance of his job, the undersigned cannot conclude that 

the conduct was so frequent and pervasive so as to alter the terms or conditions of 

Plaintiff’s employment. Nor can the undersigned conclude that the alleged conduct was 

objectively severe. Plaintiff’s own testimony establishes that the incidents she describes 

occurred in tight areas where employees were already bumping into one another. She 

testified that Hogan would apologize after brushing against her. There is no testimony 

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that Hogan’s alleged brushings were so intense, prolonged, or emphatic that, objectively, 

a reasonable person would find them so severe as to alter the terms or conditions of 

Plaintiff’s employment. 

 Nor can the undersigned conclude that the alleged conduct was objectively 

physically threatening or humiliating. Again, given the circumstances surrounding the 

alleged instances, there is no evidence that Hogan deliberately targeted Plaintiff for 

unwanted sexually-charged touchings. Plaintiff admits that some of the instances could 

have been accidental, but does not explain why only three such incidents could be 

accidental.4

 Plaintiff also does not assert that any of the alleged brushings were 

accompanied by any “verbal suggestions or advances.” Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 

212 F.3d 571, 585 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & 

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). Indeed, she testified that Hogan would 

apologize after he brushed against her. Courts have generally required far more extensive 

and degrading conduct to find that the offensive touching was sufficiently threatening or 

humiliating to establish a claim of a sexually hostile work environment. See, e.g., Hulsey 

v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding evidence of sexual 

harassment sufficient to preclude summary judgment where plaintiff described at least 

 

4

 Plaintiff’s only rationalization for why Hogan’s brushings could not have been accidental is 

her charge that he is a “pervert.” However, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence to support 

such belief. She does not claim that he made sexual advances, overt or implied, to her when he 

brushed against her. She appears to believe that Hogan’s alleged statement about eating dark 

meat but liking white meat is probative of her claim that he was sexually aggressive and a 

“pervert,” but, as set forth above, Hogan’s statement appears to have been a straightforward 

answer to Plaintiff’s question about his chicken preferences and it is Plaintiff who appears to be 

layering his answer with innuendo that, objectively, simply is not there. There simply is no 

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eighteen incidents during two-and-a-half-week period, including “many direct as well as 

indirect propositions for sex,” “following her into the restroom, and repeated attempts to 

touch her breasts, place his hands down her pants, and pull off her pants[,]” and “enlisting 

others to hold her while he attempted to grope her”); Olson v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs. Inc., 

130 F. App’x 380, 388 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding conduct sufficiently threatening and 

intimidating where “over a span of 2 1⁄2 months, Senkle subjected [plaintiff] several times 

a week to offensive sexual comments, and touched her at least three times,” including an 

attempt to kiss plaintiff and “rubb[ing] his entire body (not merely a hand or hip)” against 

plaintiff with such rubbings being “forcible and not mere brushes”). Where the alleged 

touchings are more sporadic, brief, and objectively less forceful and intense, however, 

courts routinely find that plaintiffs have failed to establish a minimum threshold of 

objectively physically threatening or intimidating behavior to support a sexual 

harassment claim. See, e.g., Gupta, 212 F.3d at 585 (finding that incidents where 

employee placed his hand on plaintiff’s knee once and touched the hem of her dress once 

were not sufficiently severe, threatening, or humiliating because there were only two such 

incidents in six months, the incidents were “only momentary,” and were not coupled with 

“verbal suggestions or advances”); Lockett v. Choice Hotels Intern., Inc., 315 F. App’x 

862, 866 (11th Cir. 2009) (“However, the alleged sexual remarks and two incidents of 

brief touching fall below the minimum level of severity or humiliation needed to 

establish sexual harassment.”); Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F. App’x 911, 913-14 (11th Cir. 

 

evidence in the record, other than Plaintiff’s testimony about her subjective beliefs, to support 

any contention that Hogan’s alleged conduct was sexual in nature. 

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2006) (affirming summary judgment where employer committed three unwanted 

touchings—including attempting to kiss plaintiff, lifting her over his head, and rubbing 

against her and reaching across her chest). Here, Plaintiff has only accused Hogan of 

brushing against her, and apologizing for having done so, on a few occasions when the 

two of them were in tight, confined spaces. Plaintiff has failed to put forward sufficient 

evidence that the alleged brushing incidents were so physically threatening or humiliating 

that they altered the terms and conditions of her employment. 

 The final factor to be considered is whether Hogan’s conduct unreasonably 

interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to perform her job. Plaintiff makes no allegation nor 

offers any testimony that she found her ability to do her job compromised by Hogan’s 

conduct. Indeed, she testified that she adopted behaviors to allow her to perform her job 

and preclude Hogan from brushing against her: “if he said come here and let me show 

you something, I’d be like okay, I’m going to follow you. And that way he will be 

leading the direction and I would be behind him and he wouldn’t have the opportunity to 

brush up on me.” Pl.’s Dep. at 112:20-24. Plaintiff did not complain about Hogan’s 

conduct to corporate human resources, and she continued training for the Assistant Deli 

Manager position and working a schedule so full that she sometimes worked overtime. It 

is therefore evident that, whatever Plaintiff’s subjective beliefs about Hogan’s behavior, 

objectively it did not unreasonably interfere with her ability to do her job. 

 For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to 

establish that there is a dispute of material fact about whether she was subjected to racial 

or sexual harassment so severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her 

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employment. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

claim that she was subjected to a racially or sexually hostile work environment. 

C. Retaliation Claims

 Plaintiff claims that she was subject to retaliation, including the failure to promote 

her to the Assistant Deli Manager position and her termination, in violation of Title VII. 

Retaliation is a separate violation of Title VII: 

Title VII . . . prohibits retaliation against an employee “because [s]he has 

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], 

or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing [thereunder].” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-3(a). A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires the 

plaintiff to show that: (1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title 

VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a 

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 

employment action. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 

(11th Cir. 2001). 

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). If a plaintiff can establish a 

prima facie case of retaliation, “the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the 

presumption of retaliation by producing legitimate reasons for the adverse employment 

action.” Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 n.6 

(11th Cir. 2000). “If the defendant offers legitimate reasons, the presumption of 

retaliation disappears. The plaintiff must then show that the employer’s proffered 

reasons for taking the adverse action were actually a pretext for prohibited retaliatory 

conduct.” Id. 

Defendant contends Plaintiff is not able to establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation. Def.’s Br. (Doc. 50) at 19-21, 32-33. While Defendant concedes that 

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Plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment actions, including a failure to promote and 

termination, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not shown that she engaged in 

statutorily protected expression. Id. at 32. 

Defendant is correct. Plaintiff made clear, repeatedly, in her deposition that she 

believes she was not promoted and, eventually, terminated, due to her threats to report 

conditions in the Food Giant deli to the health inspector.5

 However, a reasonable person 

would not objectively believe that a threat to report a perceived health code violation is 

protected Title VII expression. It does not denote opposition to any employment practice 

outlawed by Title VII and does not constitute the making of a charge or testifying or 

otherwise participating in any proceeding or investigation of an unlawful employment 

practice under Title VII. In short, whether the sanitary conditions in the deli offend local 

laws has nothing to do with an unlawful employment practice predicated on the race or 

gender of the victim, and Plaintiff’s threats to report such conditions to the health 

inspector therefore were not statutorily protected expression under Title VII. See, e.g., 

 

5

 For example, when asked whether she believes she was “denied the assistant manager position 

because of her race,” Plaintiff articulated the supposed retaliatory motive behind the adverse 

actions against her: 

 I think I was denied the assistant manager position – like I said, it’s all 

about retaliation, health violation, house evaluations, that I told them I was going 

to call the health department. . . . They said that we had big mouths because we 

were like, there’s flies in here and everything like that. 

 . . . 

 So since you’re not following my rules and regulations because I’m 

breaking the law, then guess what, I’m going to get rid of you. 

Pl.’s Dep. at 64:18-65:13. Plaintiff provided the same rationale for the decision to terminate her: 

“I feel, like I said, retaliation. I feel like I was still terminated because I told them I was going to 

tell on them, period.” Id. at 104:11-13. 

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Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 F. App’x 781, 786 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that 

employee’s complaints about adequacy of employer’s procedure for investigating alleged 

sexual assault was not protected expression under Title VII for purposes of retaliatory 

discharge claim). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of 

retaliatory failure to promote or termination, and Defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment on any such claim which arguably may be construed in the complaint. 

V. OTHER PENDING MOTIONS

 There are other pending motions before the court, including Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 37 for Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply With the Court’s Order 

(Doc. 45), “Plaintiff’s Motion of Objection” (Doc. 48), and Plaintiff’s “Motion to Assign 

Master” (Doc. 53). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is predicated on Plaintiff’s 

misconduct in discovery, including her failure to adequately respond to Defendant’s 

requests to produce documents. Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint, as 

well as an award of attorney’s fees, as a result of Plaintiff’s actions. Plaintiff’s “Motion 

of Objection” contains her general objection to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and 

recounts her efforts to comply with Defendant’s discovery requests and the court’s orders 

in discovery. Because the undersigned is hereby recommending that Defendant’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment be granted, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s “Motion of Objection” be denied as moot. Likewise, 

because the undersigned believes that Plaintiff, who was granted in forma pauperis status 

when she initiated this action, will be unable to pay Defendant’s expenses or attorney’s 

fees in seeking to compel Plaintiff’s participation in discovery or in preparing its Motion 

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to Dismiss, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s request for an award of 

attorney’s fees be denied. 

 The final motion before the court is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Assign Master” (Doc. 

53). In this motion, which was filed shortly after Defendant filed its Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Plaintiff lists a litany of health issues which, she contends, affect her 

memory of the events described in her complaint. She appears to request that the court 

order a mental examination pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 53) at 1. However, Plaintiff has articulated no good cause to order a 

mental examination as her mental or physical condition is not in controversy in this 

litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a)(1). Whether or not Plaintiff’s intervening health issues 

have affected her mental abilities is simply irrelevant to any claim in the complaint. It 

would advance no cause in this litigation to order a mental examination of Plaintiff. 

 Plaintiff also appears to request the appointment of a Master pursuant to Rule 53. 

Plaintiff merely recites the language of Rule 53. She does not explain why a Master 

should be appointed in this case. In any event, the prerequisites for such an appointment 

are plainly not met in this case. Plaintiff’s motion is due to be denied. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS 

as follows: 

a. that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 49) be GRANTED 

and the complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice; 

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b. that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 37 (Doc. 45) be 

DENIED as moot; 

c. that Plaintiff’s “Motion for Objection” (Doc. 48) be DENIED as moot; and 

d. that Plaintiff’s “Motion to Assign Master” (Doc. 53) be DENIED. 

It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before March 17, 2016. A party must specifically identify the 

factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is 

made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file 

written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance 

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the 

Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by 

the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning 

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 

F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The parties are advised that this Recommendation 

is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Done this 4th day of March, 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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