Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00262/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00262-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

LEE ANDREW DA VIS PLAINTIFF 

v. No. 5:16-cv-262-DPM 

WALTER JOHNSON; DAVID NIXON; JOHN 

DOES, 1-20; and JEFFERSON HOSPITAL 

ASSOCIATION, INC., d/b/a Jefferson Regional 

Medical Center 

ORDER 

DEFENDANTS 

1. Dr. Lee Davis is a cardiologist who used to have staff privileges at 

Jefferson Regional Medical Center in Pine Bluff. The hospital revoked those 

privileges. Dr. Davis sued, arguing that his race drove JRMC' s decision. His 

lawsuit failed. His problems in taking care of patients, with documentation, 

and with unprofessional behavior - not his race - led to the revocation. Davis 

v. Jefferson Hospital Association, No. 5:09-cv-58-DPM, NQ 141 & 142 (E.D. Ark. 

2010), affirmed, 685 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Dr. Davis still practices medicine 

in Jefferson County; and he understandably wants his privileges at the local 

hospital restored. As things are, he must admit patients to Little Rock 

hospitals, which is not only inconvenient, but means more expenses and less 

income. 

Case 5:16-cv-00262-DPM Document 39 Filed 01/10/17 Page 1 of 6
After much back and forth, JRMC denied Dr. Davis's request for 

restoration of privileges at the pre-application phase. JRMC's January 2014 

decision letter is attached to and incorporated in Dr. Davis's complaint and 

amended complaint. NQ 1 & 15. The hospital gave two main reasons for 

saying no: insufficient credentials and a lawsuit. The credentials issues were 

about Dr. Davis's practice in recent years-lack of on-call work, lack of 

hospital committee service, and not enough heart procedures. JRMC also 

pointed to its 2008 revocation, which was based partly on patient-care 

concerns. The hospital also pointedly relied on Dr. Davis's having filed a 

lawsuit against JRMC and several doctors. It wasn't the federal case already 

mentioned; Dr. Davis had filed a similar lawsuit alleging race discrimination 

in state court while he was also seeking re-appointment to the medical staff. 

Though Dr. Davis eventually dismissed this other case without prejudice, 

JRMC concluded that his simultaneous pursuit of undisclosed litigation and 

restored privileges showed an unwillingness to work with the hospital. 

In this case, Dr. Davis claims (under federal and state law) a retaliatory 

decision based on his second lawsuit, with a side claim that JRMC violated 

the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act. Dr. Davis pleads that "[w]ith the 

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exception of the comments concerning the lawsuit, the factual allegations 

contained in the 1/24/14 letter referencing other reasons for the refusal to 

allow [Dr. Davis] to apply are false." Ng 15 at 2. He also pleads that two 

similarly situated doctors have current JRMC credentials. Are Dr. Davis's 

retaliation claims implausible, and thus subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, 

as defendants argue, based on Blomker v. Jewell, 831F.3d1051 (8th Cir. 2016), 

a recent divided opinion from the Court of Appeals? 

2. They are. This Court is bound by the precedent. Dr. Davis's 

pleading is materially indistinguishable from Ms. Blomker's. She also 

attached a mixed-bag letter from her employer, which listed her intention to 

file an EEO complaint and poor performance as reasons for her firing. 

Dr. Davis's suing JRMC again was protected conduct. JRMC shouldn't have 

relied on that action in deciding whether to accept his application for restored 

staff privileges. But a solid retaliation claim under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981 requires a plausible allegation thatJRMC's reliance on the lawsuit was 

the 'but-for' cause of its rejection. "It is not enough that retaliation was a 

'substantial' or 'motivating' factor in the [hospital's] decision." Blomker, 831 

F.3d at 1059 (quotation omitted); see also Wright v. St. Vincent Health System, 

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Case 5:16-cv-00262-DPM Document 39 Filed 01/10/17 Page 3 of 6
730 F.3d 732, 738 n.5 (8th Cir. 2013). JRMC's other reasons for its decision, 

reflected in the letter, stop Dr. Davis's federal retaliation claim at the door. 

Dr. Davis has worked mightily to avoid this conclusion. After 

defendants responded to his complaint with a Blomker-based motion to 

dismiss, Dr. Davis amended his pleading, adding the allegations about the 

letter being partly false and about the current doctors, essentially offering 

comparators. And he argues that Blomker breaks faith with other precedent 

and draws courts into the merits too early. None of these efforts, though, 

saves Dr. Davis's federal claim. 

First, the letter. It is part of Dr. Davis's pleadings. As with his factual 

allegations, the Court must take what JRMC's letter says as the truth. So 

there's clash between the amended complaint (the letter's true about JRMC' s 

relying on the lawsuit, but otherwise false) and the incorporated document. 

While not unusual, these circumstances call for the plaintiff to plead more; 

he must give some factual particulars to show a plausible claim. Dr. Davis's 

plea of partial falsity is a matter of fact, not law. But it is conclusory. It's 

unsupported by any details. He did not say, for example, that he actually has 

recently worked on call, served on hospital committees, or performed enough 

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heart procedures. In the absence of particulars, the Court is left with the 

letter-the (assumed) truth of the whole letter, as in Blomker. 

Next, the comparators. They don't stand up. Neither of them applied 

for restored privileges. While the bar for considering alleged comparators at 

the pleading stage must be low, Dr. Davis hasn't cleared it with his allegations 

about Dr. Dharamsey's and Dr. Boast's deficiencies. 

Last, the applicable precedent. Dr. Davis is partly wrong and partly 

right. The Court sees no inconsistencies. But the governing law is moving 

toward closer scrutiny of cases at the pleading stage, scrutiny informed by the 

law on the merits. Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1055-56. 

3. Blomker and related cases are persuasive but not binding authority 

on the meaning of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 16-123-

105(c). As Dr. Davis points out, Arkansas's causation standard for a solid 

retaliation claim is unsettled. The Court therefore declines to exercise 

jurisdiction over this state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Williams v. Hobbs, 

658 F.3d 842, 853 (8th Cir. 2011) . Like the FOIA claim, it will be dismissed 

without prejudice. Gregory v. Dillard's, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 477 (8th Cir. 2009) 

(en bane). 

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Case 5:16-cv-00262-DPM Document 39 Filed 01/10/17 Page 5 of 6
* * * 

Motions to dismiss, NQ 19 & 30, granted as modified. 

So Ordered. 

D.P. Marshall Jr. {I 

United States District Judge 

lo VrM-Y ,;)..~/7 I 

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