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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 12, 2008 Decided December 16, 2008

No. 07-5389

NORTH CAROLINA FISHERIES ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

CARLOS GUTIERREZ, HONORABLE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cv01815)

Shaun M. Gehan argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs was David E. Frulla. 

Sambhav N. Sankar, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee. R. Craig

Lawrence and Aaron P. Avila, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, entered

appearances.

Before: TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

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1

 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, SeniorCircuit Judge: Appellants are the North

Carolina Fisheries Association, Inc., two commercial fishermen,

and a fish-packing plant (collectively, the “Association”). They

filed a complaint (petition for review) in district court against

the Department ofCommerce, claiming that Amendment 13Cto

the Fishery Management Plan for South Atlantic Snapper

Grouper violated the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation

and Management Act (the “Act”).1 The district court granted in

part and denied in part the Association’s motion for summary

judgment. The court held that the Department had not complied

with its statutory obligation to promulgate a rebuilding plan for

certain fish species following a determination that such species

were “overfished,” which failure the Government had conceded.

The court then ordered that the parties confer on an appropriate

remedy and submit a joint proposal or, should disagreement

persist, separate proposals. Because the parties were unable to

reach agreement, the district court adopted the Government’s

proposal with slight adjustments to the suggested timetable.

This appeal resulted. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction and,

therefore, dismiss the appeal.

I

America’s fisheries are regulated by the Department of

Commerce via the National Marine Fisheries Service. Pursuant

to the Act, the Service appoints regional fishery management

councils composed of representatives of both commercial and

recreational fishermen. These councils are empowered to submit

to the Service “fishery management plans” (and any necessary

amendments thereto) for fisheries under their authority requiring

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2 The Service can also initiate the regulatory process. In the event

that the Service first identifies a particular fishery as “overfished” and

notifiesthe relevant regional council of this determination, within two

years of such notification, the appropriate council must prepare and

submit a management plan, plan amendment, or proposed regulations.

3

 71 Fed. Reg. 55,096 (Sept. 21, 2006).

conservation and management.2 Under the Act, any plan

prepared by a Council must contain measures “necessary and

appropriate . . . to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished

stocks” and must take into account, inter alia, the technical and

biological characteristics of the affected fishery as well as the

distributive effects of the plan on fishing communities and other

parties interested in the fishery. Plans, however, do not

themselves have any regulatory effect–implementing regulations

must also be enacted in order to effectuate them. Plans and

implementing regulations are both subject to public notice and

comment rulemaking prior to approval by the Service. The Act

provides for judicial review, implicitly in federal district court

and only to the extent authorized by the Administrative

Procedure Act, of regulations promulgated by the Service or

actions taken thereunder for the implementation of a fishery

management plan.

Amendment 13C,3

 an amendment to the Fishery

Management Plan for South Atlantic Snapper Grouper, was

prepared by the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council in

order to end overfishing of black sea bass, snowy grouper,

vermilion snapper, and golden tilefish and to permit limited

increases in the commercial and recreational harvest of red

porgy, off the coast of the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida. The

Council, however, neglected to include a rebuilding plan for

black sea bass and snowy grouper, despite the Service’s prior

conclusion that these species were not only subject to overfishing

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4

 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612.

but also already overfished. Notwithstanding, the Service

approved Amendment 13C and implementing regulations

thereunder on August 14, 2006, imposing a variety of

commercial quotas, trip limits, gear restrictions, and recreational

bag limits. 

The Association, whose members depend upon grouper and

bass for their livelihood, along with the State of North Carolina

as amicus curiae, challenged Amendment 13C and its

implementing regulations on the ground that the Service had

violated the Act by failing to comply with the national standards

for fishery conservation and management set forth by Congress

in the Act. Specifically, the Association charged that the Service

had not made use of “the best scientific information available”

in developing Amendment 13C and that it had neither made a

fair distribution of economic burdens nor minimized the negative

economic effects of the plan, in violation of §§ 1851(a)(2), (4),

(5), (6), and (8) of the Act. It was alleged, moreover, that

because the Service had previously made a determination that

populations of snowy grouper and black sea bass were

“overfished,” the Act required that Amendment 13C also include

a rebuilding plan for these fisheries. Finally, the Association

claimed that the Service had violated the Regulatory Flexibility

Act4

 in promulgating the plan amendment without adequate

consideration of its effect on small businessmen. The

Association sought vacation of Amendment 13C and its

implementing regulations.

The district court rejected most of the Association’s

grievances in a thorough memorandum opinion, concluding that

the Service had acted reasonably in its discretionary balancing of

the various interests implicated. N.C. Fisheries Ass’n v.

Gutierrez, 518 F. Supp. 2d 62, 95 (D.D.C. 2007) (“N.C.

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Fisheries I”). The Service conceded the validity of the

Association’s remaining claim that, consistent with the Act,

Amendment 13C must include rebuilding plans for the

replenishment of the overfished snowy grouper and black sea

bass stocks and not merely restrictions designed to end the

overfishing of these species. Accordingly, the court held that

Amendment 13C was unlawful. Id. at 101.

The district court, relying on our precedent, see, e.g., Sugar

Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 98 (D.C.

Cir. 2002), declined to vacate Amendment 13C, as the

Association had requested, because it would be “highly

disruptive.” N.C. Fisheries I, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 104. But the

judge, apparently concerned about the delay inherent in the

Service’s rulemaking process–despite there having been no

allegation of unreasonable delay–did not merely remand to the

Service. Instead, he ordered the parties to confer on an

appropriate remedy or else to submit separate remedial

proposals. Id. at 104-05.

Discussions between the parties did not yield agreement, and

separate proposals were proffered. By the time of the remedial

negotiations between the parties, the Service had already drafted

Amendment 15, an omnibus amendment to the fishery

management plan containing, inter alia, rebuilding plans for the

snowy grouper and black sea bass fisheries, and the existence of

the amendment was apparently made known to the district court.

The court approved the Service’s remedial proposal, which

called for the removal of the rebuilding provisions for snowy

grouper and black sea bass from Amendment 15 and their

placement into a separate Amendment 15A, where the provisions

could proceed through the administrative process in a more

expeditious manner. N.C. Fisheries Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 518 F.

Supp. 2d 105, 106 (D.D.C. 2007) (“N.C. Fisheries II”). After

insisting on a shortening of the proposed administrative calendar,

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the court deemed this proposal to be an appropriate remedy and

remanded to the Service. Id.

The Association, objecting to the Service’s proposal, had

urged the court to require the inclusion of certain management

measures and requested interim reinstatement of quota levels in

effect for the first year of Amendment 13C. The court

recognized, however, that the Association’s preferred remedy

would essentially require relitigation of the very same issues

decided by the district court in its first opinion. Id. at 107. The

court noted, moreover, that the Association would “have an

opportunity to air [its] displeasure during the public comment

period” for Amendment 15A. Id. 

The Service ultimately approved Amendment 15A on March

14, 2008 after an administrative process that, we are told,

included consideration of written comments and public hearings.

Yet, for reasons that were not explained by the Service,

implementing regulations were not promulgated. (Paradoxically,

due to the fact that this appeal was taken from the district court’s

remand order prior to issuance of the relevant amendments, the

record before us includes neither Amendment 15A nor for that

matter Amendment 15.) It is undisputed that the Association and

its constituent members participated in this process, but they did

not seek judicial review of Amendment 15A in the district court.

Instead, the Association filed this appeal.

II

The Association claims that the district court remand order

was not an adequate remedy for the violations that the court

found. Yet its brief reiterates many of the same merits

arguments the district court rejected, i.e., that the remedial order

did not correct the Service’s alleged failure to consider

distributive impacts on commercial and recreational fishermen,

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5

 Moreover, appeal under the collateral order doctrine set forth in

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541, 546-

47 (1949) is similarly inappropriate.

as well as fishery-dependent communities. The Service responds

that we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the case is

moot. It explains that since its sole legal error–the failure to

include a rebuilding plan in Amendment 13C–has been

corrected, the controversy has terminated. We do not agree: the

controversy is not moot, because there remains a live dispute as

to the Association’s contention that Amendment 15A is

inadequate, but we agree that we lack jurisdiction for somewhat

different, if related, reasons.

It is black letter law that a district court’s remand order is

not normally “final” for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. NAACP v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1436 (D.C.

Cir. 1996); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325,

329 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Granted, there is a limited exception

permitting a government agency to appeal immediately rather

than bear significant expenses that cannot be recovered or take

action pursuant to the remand that cannot be reversed if it is later

determined that the order was improper, U.S. Sugar Corp., 84

F.3d at 1436 (citing Occidental Petroleum, 873 F.2d at 330), but

that path is not normally available to a private party. See Lake

Pilots Ass’n v. U.S. Coast Guard, 359 F.3d 624, 625 (D.C. Cir.

2004).5

 We have recently applied this principle in a similar

dispute involving the Service. In Oceana, Inc. v. Gutierrez, No.

05-5176, 2006 WL 1457713 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2006), we said

that a district court order remanding another fishery management

plan amendment was not a final decision and, therefore,

dismissed the appeal.

The Association’s attempts to distinguish Oceana are

unpersuasive. First, it is argued that the district court’s opinion

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definitively determined the “metes and bounds” of Amendment

15A’s substantive content; thus, it would have been futile to

litigate the matter again in district court. In other words, since

the district court had already passed judgment on the essential

legality of Amendment 15A and had predetermined that the

Service need not consider the distributive impact of its fishery

plan, a new petition challenging Amendment 15A, which would

undoubtedly be assigned to the same judge, would be redundant.

To be sure, the district court, sitting as a court in review of

agency action under the Act and APA, should have done what a

court of appeals normally does when it identifies an agency

error: remand to the agency for further proceedings. As we have

said, “[u]nder settled principles of administrative law, when a

court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made

an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be

remanded to the agency for further action consistent with the

corrected legal standards.” PPG Indus. v. U.S., 52 F.3d 363, 365

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-

95 (1943)); see also South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of

Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800, 806 (1976); Federal Power

Comm’n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952); Global

Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 804 F.2d 1293, 1305 n.95 (D.C. Cir.

1986). Only in extraordinary circumstances do we issue detailed

remedial orders, and this maxim applies equally to district courts

acting in an agency review capacity. 

Although a simple remand for proceedings consistent with

the court’s opinion would have been preferable, the district court

judge’s order did not actually approve Amendment 15A; indeed,

he was never presented (as we have not been) with the

amendment’s text. He did say that “the proposed rebuilding plan

is consistent with [the Service’s] general rebuilding plan criteria

as defined in the agency’s own ‘Technical Guidance

specifications.’” N.C. Fisheries II, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07.

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 “Regulations promulgated by the Secretary . . . shall be subject

to judicial review to the extent authorized by, and in accordance with,

[the APA], if a petition for such review is filed within 30 days after the

date on which the regulations are promulgated or the action is

published in the Federal Register, as applicable . . . .” 16 U.S.C. §

1855(f)(1). “Actions” are defined as “actions that are taken by the

Secretary under regulations which implement a fishery management

plan.” 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(2). 

The Association construes this statement as not only approving

the actual plan, but also as ignoring and thereby dismissing sub

silentio and ex ante the other statutory criteria. We think that

this contention makes a mountain out of a molehill. After all, as

we have noted, the court recognized that the Association would

have a full opportunity to express any concerns with Amendment

15A during the comment period. Implicitly, then, the district

judge recognized that Amendment 15A (and any future

implementing regulations) could be challenged when

promulgated. And he certainly did not prejudge such challenges,

which could well be based on an entirely fresh record. In short,

the district judge did not have before him–and did not explicitly

approve–Amendment 15A. 

Still, the Association claims that it might not have been able

to challenge Amendment 15A because it was not a “regulation”

promulgated by the Secretary under 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1) and

(2),6 since when the amendment was issued it included a

statement that it “does not contain measures with direct

regulatory effect.” 73 Fed. Reg. 14942 (Mar. 20, 2008). Rather,

the amendment was styled merely as “agency action.” Id.

However, at least one circuit court has interpreted § 1855(f)(1)

to include challenges to agency actions that are in substance

challenges to prior regulations. See Turtle Island Restoration

Network v. DOC, 438 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that

the court lacked jurisdiction on time-bar grounds). And, in any

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event, APA review would appear to suffice. 5 U.S.C. § 704

(“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency

action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are

subject to judicial review.”).

It does seem rather peculiar–perhaps even a bit fishy–that

the Service promulgated Amendment 15A without

accompanying regulations, indeed, without any “regulatory

effect.” Recall that the Service acknowledged that it had

violated the Act (which was rather obvious) by omitting a

rebuilding plan; thus, it could be thought that the Service is

continuing to evade its statutory obligations by failing to put

teeth into the rebuilding plan. But if the Association thought that

the Service had not complied in substance with the district

court’s mandate, it should have sought direct relief in the district

court. In any event, we lack jurisdiction at this stage in the

proceedings. 

The case is dismissed.

So ordered.

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