Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07080/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 15-7080 September Term, 2016

 FILED ON: OCTOBER 4, 2016

JEFFREY M. CAMARDA AND KIMBERLY K. CAMARDA,

APPELLANTS

v.

CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER BOARD OF STANDARDS, INC.,

APPELLEE

Consolidated with 15-7089 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00871)

Before: SRINIVASAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal of a grant of summary judgment and cross-appeal of a denial of a motion for 

sanctions by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia was presented to the Court, 

and briefed and argued by counsel. The Court has accorded the issues full consideration and has 

determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons 

stated below, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment be 

affirmed and the District Court’s denial of the motion for sanctions be vacated and remanded.

The District Court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. Summary judgment is 

appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A movant is entitled to summary judgment 

when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, could not return a verdict for the non-movant.” Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 

1091 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “[T]he defendant need only identify the ways in which the plaintiff has failed 

to come forward with sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury to find in her favor on one or 

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more essential elements of her claim.” Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 

2015).

Appellants, Jeffrey and Kimberly Camarda, are Certified Financial Planners who applied to 

the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc. (CFP Board) for, and were granted, 

certification and the right to use the designation “Certified Financial Planner.” The use of the 

certification was governed by the CFP Board’s “Terms and Conditions of Certification,” which 

incorporate by reference certain policies of the CFP Board. After an anonymous complaint, the CFP 

Board conducted disciplinary proceedings to adjudicate alleged violations of those terms and 

conditions by Appellants. The disciplinary proceedings culminated in the CFP Board’s decision to 

issue Appellants a public letter of admonition. To forestall the issuance of the public letter, 

Appellantssought an injunction – among other remedies – in the District Court, pressing a number of

claims based on purported deficiencies in the disciplinary process. After discovery concluded, the 

District Court entered summary judgment for the CFP Board, which Appellants now appeal. At the 

same time, the District Court denied a number of discovery-related motions as moot. In a crossappeal, the CFP Board argues that the denial of one of those motions – a sanctions motion alleging 

that Appellants circumvented the District Court’s order staying discovery – was improper because 

the entry of summary judgment did not render the motion moot.

Appellants contend that the CFP Board breached its contract with them by failing to 

abide by the procedures that governed the disciplinary process in which the CFP Board 

adjudicated alleged violations of its rules. The Terms and Conditions of Certification contain a 

choice of law clause specifying that they are governed by the laws of the District of Columbia. 

Under D.C. law, the elements required to prevail on a claim of breach of contract are “(1) a valid 

contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of 

that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.” Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 

187 (D.C. 2009). Here, the existence of a valid contract – the Terms and Conditions of 

Certification, which incorporated by reference the rules and policies of the CFP Board – is 

undisputed. Similarly, the CFP Board does not claim that it had no duty under the contract. 

Instead, the primary disputed issue is whether the CFP Board breached its contractual duty.

Appellants allege several violations of the CFP Board’s rules during the disciplinary 

process. Importantly, the facts that undergird these allegations are not in dispute. Rather, the 

parties differ on whether the undisputed facts constituted violations of the CFP Board’s 

disciplinary procedures. After reviewing the record and Appellants’ allegations, there is

insufficient evidence in the record to support the legal conclusion that any of the CFP Board’s 

rules or disciplinary procedures were breached by the CFP Board.

Appellants argue that, even if no express provision of the CFP Board’s rules were 

violated, the CFP Board breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Under D.C. 

law, “all contracts contain an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which means that 

neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the 

other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 201 

(D.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 

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310 (D.C. 2000)). “Bad faith requires more than mere negligence; examples include lack of 

diligence, purposeful failure to perform, and interference with the other party’s ability to 

perform.” Wright v. Howard Univ., 60 A.3d 749, 754 (D.C. 2013). “Fair dealing means 

reasonable conduct that is not arbitrary and capricious.” Id. The D.C. Court of Appeals has 

repeatedly rejected claims of bad faith and unfair dealing where the defendant had established 

procedures for denying entitlements or imposing discipline, and the defendant followed those 

procedures. See, e.g., Allworth, 890 A.2d at 202-03; Paul, 754 A.2d at 310-11; Alden v. 

Georgetown Univ., 734 A.2d 1103, 1111 n.11 (D.C. 1999). Despite Appellants’ protests to the 

contrary, the behavior by the CFP Board was neither “more than mere negligence” nor “arbitrary 

or capricious.” Instead, the record shows that the CFP Board followed its disciplinary procedures 

and therefore did not violate the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Appellants also argue that it was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing for the CFP Board to “single out” the Camardas and not bring similar enforcement 

actions against other certificants who operated similarly. As Judge Posner noted in memorable 

terms, the fact that a party may have treated some counterparties “more leniently is no more a 

defense to a breach of contract than laxity in enforcing the speed limit is a defense to a speeding 

ticket.” Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 

F.2d 273, 279 (7th Cir. 1992). Just as selective enforcement is not a defense to a breach of 

contract, nor is selective enforcement alone a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing. Cf. Bagley v. Found. for Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110, 1114 (D.C. 

1994) (“[Plaintiff] has cited no constitutional, legislative, or common law authority—and we 

know of none—under which one who has breached a contract with a private actor may escape the 

consequences of his breach upon the ground that the party seeking to enforce the agreement has 

acted more leniently vis-a-vis persons who have failed to comply with separate agreements with 

the enforcing party.”).

Even if there were a genuine factual dispute as to any of the alleged procedural 

deficiencies, Appellants have not adduced any record evidence that a perfect process would have 

led to a different outcome. In the absence of such a showing, any dispute about procedural faults

does not involve a material fact, because the CFP Board is nonetheless entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law on the grounds that the Camardas failed to establish the fourth element of a breach 

of contract (“damages caused by breach”) or demonstrate any genuine dispute of material fact 

with respect to that element.

As an alternative to their breach of contract claim, Appellants contend that the CFP Board 

committed the tort of unfair competition. Under D.C. law, the common law tort of “[u]nfair 

competition is not defined in terms of specific elements, but by the description of various acts 

that would constitute the tort if they resulted in damage.” Furash & Co., Inc. v. McClave, 130 F. 

Supp. 2d 48, 57 (D.D.C. 2001). The acts that may support a claim for unfair competition at 

common law are “defamation, disparagement of a competitor’s goods or business methods, 

intimidation of customers or employees, interference with access to the business, threats of 

groundless suits, commercial bribery, inducing employees to sabotage, false advertising or 

deceptive packaging likely to mislead customers into believing goods are those of a competitor.” 

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B & W Mgmt., Inc. v. Tasea Inv. Co., 451 A.2d 879, 881 n.3 (D.C. 1982) (citing WILLIAM 

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 956-57 (4th ed. 1971)). Appellants have failed to 

establish that the CFP Board committed any of these acts – or that there was a genuine dispute as 

to any material fact with respect to such acts – and summary judgment in favor of the CFP Board 

was therefore appropriate.

After Appellants filed a notice of appeal of the District Court’s entry of summary 

judgment, the CFP Board filed a notice of cross-appeal, challenging the District Court’s denial of 

a sanctions motion as moot. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal 

in a civil case must be filed “within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” 

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). An exception to this rule is that, “[i]f one party timely files a notice 

of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first 

notice was filed.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3).

The CFP Board’s notice of cross-appeal was filed forty-two days after the entry of the 

order denying the motion for sanctions and twelve days after Appellants’ notice of appeal was 

filed. Therefore, to be timely, the CFP Board’s notice of cross-appeal must fall within Rule 

4(a)(3)’s exception. Appellants’ notice of appeal was timely filed – on the thirtieth day following 

the entry of the order it sought to appeal – and, therefore, the fourteen-day extension period was 

triggered. Even though the CFP Board’s cross-appeal involves a separate order from that 

appealed by Appellants, nothing in Rule 4(a)(3) limits the extension period to cross-appeals of 

the order that was the subject of the initial notice of appeal. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth 

Circuits have all interpreted Rule 4(a)(3) as “allowing any party to file a notice of appeal from 

any order within fourteen days after another party appealed a decision of the district court,”

finding that this interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the rule and the commentary that 

accompanied its enactment which suggested that its application was intended to be broad. 

Woodruff v. Covington, 389 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also 

Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 1997); Kurdziel v. Pittsburgh Tube Co., 416 

F.2d 882, 883-85 (6th Cir. 1969). Accordingly, the CFP Board’s cross-appeal was timely filed.

As mootness is a question of law, see Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 

we review the District Court’s denial of the motion for sanctions de novo. A determination of 

mootness is proper “if events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the 

parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Am. Bar 

Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 636 F.3d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The CFP Board’s motion for 

sanctions requested several different categories of sanctions, among them the reimbursement of 

the CFP Board’s attorneys’ fees by Appellants. The grant of summary judgment did not moot 

this motion because an order compelling the payment of attorneys’ fees would affect the rights of 

the parties, notwithstanding the termination of the litigation. Therefore, the District Court’s 

denial of the motion for sanctions on mootness grounds is vacated and remanded for 

reconsideration.

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Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed 

to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for 

rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41.

PER CURIAM

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

 Ken Meadows

 Deputy Clerk

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