Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01724/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01724-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Alfred Perez-Valenzuela, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; the Attorney General of

the State of Arizona,

Respondents.

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No. CV-08-1724-PHX-DGC (ECV)

ORDER

On May 3, 2004, Jose Perez-Valenzuela pled guilty in state court to one count of

attempted kidnaping, a dangerous felony offense. He signed a plea agreement addendum

consenting to a judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence as to any sentence

enhancement. The trial court sentenced him to an aggravated 15-year prison term.

Perez-Valenzuela commenced this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. #1. United States Magistrate Judge Edward Voss has

issued a report and a recommendation that the petition be denied (“R&R”). Dkt. #18.

Petitioner has filed an objection. Dkt. #23. For reasons that follow, the Court will accept the

R&R and deny the petition.

The habeas petition asserts three grounds for relief. The first ground alleges that there

was no factual basis to support his conviction for attempted kidnaping as a “dangerous”

offense and the absence of a factual basis constitutes a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

Dkt. #1 at 5-7. The second ground alleges that trial counsel was ineffective, in violation of

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the Sixth Amendment, when he advised Petitioner that the maximum sentence Petitioner

would receive was 7.5 years. Id. at 8-10. The third ground asserts violations of the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments based on the trial court’s finding that the State could withdraw from

the plea agreement if Petitioner refused to waive his right to a jury determination of any fact

used to enhance his sentence. Id. at 11-13. The Magistrate Judge recommends that each

ground be denied as procedurally defaulted. Dkt. #18 at 4-7.

The Court may accept, reject, or modify the findings and recommendations made by

the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The Court must

undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are

made. Id.; see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

I. Ground One.

The R&R finds that ground one is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not

fairly present his Fourteenth Amendment claim to the state courts during post-conviction

relief proceedings, the time to raise that claim in state court has expired, and Petitioner has

not shown cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice sufficient to overcome the

procedural default. Dkt. #18 at 5. Petitioner does not object to these findings. See Dkt. #23

at 2-3. The Court will therefore accept the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and deny

ground one as procedurally defaulted. See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121 (“[Section

636(b)(1)] makes clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”) (emphasis in original);

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (same).

II. Grounds Two and Three.

The R&R finds that grounds two and three are procedurally defaulted because

Petitioner failed to present these federal claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals and he would

no longer have a remedy if he returned to state court. Dkt. #18 at 6. Petitioner contends that

his post-conviction relief attorney failed to raise the claims in the petition for review before

the Court of Appeals and this ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for the

procedural default. Dkt. #23 at 3. As explained in the R&R (Dkt. #18 at 7), counsel’s

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ineffectiveness during post-conviction relief proceedings “will constitute cause only if it is

an independent constitutional violation.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991).

Petitioner has not raised ineffective assistance of his post-conviction relief counsel as a claim

in his habeas petition, nor has he otherwise presented facts showing that counsel’s

performance rises to the level of an independent constitutional violation under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Petitioner has not established cause for the procedural

default of grounds two and three. Nor has he shown that it would be a miscarriage of justice

not to consider these claims. See Dkt. #18 at 7. The Court will accept the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation and deny grounds two and three as procedurally defaulted.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Dkt. #18) is accepted.

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is denied.

3. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 4th day of January, 2010.

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