Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01141/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01141-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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19-CV-1141-CAB-BGS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PIERRE RHODAN, on behalf of himself 

and others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOB OPTIONS, INC. et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-1141-CAB-BGS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND

[Doc. No. 9]

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to remand. The motion has 

been fully briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for submission without oral argument. 

For the following reasons, the motion is granted, and this case is remanded to San Diego 

County Superior Court.

I. Background

On November 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint in San Diego County Superior 

Court asserting one claim against Defendant Job Options, Inc. (“JOI”), whom the 

complaint alleged was Plaintiff’s employer, for failure to provide access to employee 

personnel records as required by the California Labor Code. [Doc. No. 1-2.] JOI was 

personally served with the complaint on December 3, 2018.

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Plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint to add several individuals as 

defendants [Doc. No. 1-3], and again to assert numerous wage and hour violation claims 

under California law, including a claim under California’s Private Attorney General Act, 

and a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law [Doc. No. 1-4]. Neither the 

original complaint nor the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) included an 

allegation as to the physical location where Plaintiff worked for JOI. On April 26, 2019, 

Defendants demurred to Plaintiff’s FAC in state court. [Doc. No. 9-2.] 

On May 21, 2019, while the demurrer was pending, Plaintiff sought leave from the 

state court to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”). [Doc. No. 1-5.] The proposed 

SAC attached to Plaintiff’s application added, among other things, an allegation that 

Defendants had assigned Plaintiff “to work at the Camp Pendleton MCB Commissary as a 

Shelf Stocker.” [Doc. No. 1-5 at 28.] The state court denied Plaintiff’s application to file 

the SAC on May 22, 2019. [Doc. No. 9-2 at 4.] On May 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to the demurrer [Doc. No. 1-6 at 145], and on May 31, 2019, Defendants filed 

their reply in support of their demurrer [Doc. No. 1-6 at 197]. On June 7, 2019, the state 

court overruled Defendants’ demurrer. [Doc. No. 1-6 at 222.]

On June 17, 2019, ten days after losing their demurrer, Defendants removed the case 

to federal court, alleging subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of a federal question 

because Camp Pendleton is a federal enclave. On July 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed his motion 

to remand.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff makes three arguments for remand: (1) removal was untimely; (2) 

Defendants waived their right to remove; and (3) lack of federal question jurisdiction. 

Because the first two grounds for remand have merit, the Court need not address whether 

Defendants demonstrated the existence of subject matter jurisdiction based on Plaintiff’s 

employment at a federal enclave. 

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A. Timeliness of Removal

Defendants contend that this Court has federal question jurisdiction because 

Plaintiff’s claims concern his employment at Camp Pendleton, which is a federal enclave. 

For the purposes of this opinion, the Court assumes that subject matter jurisdiction on the 

basis of a federal question exists on that ground. See generally Jamil v. Workforce Res., 

LLC, No. 18-CV-27-JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 2298119, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 21, 2018) 

(holding that federal question jurisdiction based on the federal enclave doctrine existed for 

the plaintiff’s wage and hour claims stemming from work performed at Camp Pendleton). 

Defendants contend that their removal on this ground was timely because it was 

made within thirty days of Plaintiff’s allegation in the proposed SAC filed on May 21, 

2019, that he worked at Camp Pendleton. The applicable removal statute states that:

(b) Requirements; generally. –(1) The notice of removal of a civil action or 

proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, 

through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the 

claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 

days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading 

has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, 

whichever period is shorter.

. . .

(3) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial 

pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days 

after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an 

amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 

ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The 30-day time limit “is mandatory and a timely objection to a late 

petition will defeat removal. . . .” Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 

(9th Cir. 1980). 

“[T]he ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading in 

order for the first thirty-day clock under § 1446(b) to begin.” Harris v. Bankers Life & 

Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005). “[A] defendant does not have a duty of inquiry 

if the initial pleading or other document is ‘indeterminate’ with respect to removability.” 

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Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Harris, 425 F.3d at 693–94). Defendants are not charged “with notice of removability until 

[they have] received a paper that gives them enough information to remove.” Kenny v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 881 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). At the same time, 

“a defendant is required ‘to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in ascertaining 

removability.’” Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1129–30 (C.D. Cal. 

2016) (quoting Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA, LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 

2013)). “A defendant should not be able to ignore pleadings or other documents from 

which removability may be ascertained and seek removal only when it becomes

strategically advantageous for it to do so.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125.

Here, Defendants argue that the original complaint and FAC did not trigger the first 

30-day time limit because they did not contain an allegation that Plaintiff worked at Camp 

Pendleton. Further, according to Defendants the second 30-day time limit in §1446(b)(3)

was not triggered until Plaintiff served the proposed SAC containing an allegation that 

Plaintiff worked at Camp Pendleton. The proposed SAC, however, was not the first 

document from this litigation indicating that Plaintiff worked at Camp Pendleton. Putting 

aside the fact that Defendants, as Plaintiff’s employer, presumably knew all along that 

Plaintiff worked at Camp Pendleton, documents Defendants produced to Plaintiff more

than thirty days prior to the notice of removal indicate that Plaintiff worked there. [Doc. 

No. 9-2 at 25.] These documents were produced in response to requests that included the 

following: “All DOCUMENTS evidencing PLAINTIFF’S work locations during 

PLAINTIFF’S employment for YOU.” [Doc. No. 9-2 at 18.]1 Defendants claim that these 

documents are not “other papers” under §1446(b)(3) because JOI produced them, but

§1446(b)(3) contains no requirement that “other papers” be received from or produced by 

 

1

In addition, on April 15, 2019, Plaintiff served document requests on Defendants asking for “all 

agreements between YOU and the Defense Commissary Agency concerning the management and control 

of CLASS MEMBERS during the CLASS PERIOD.” [Doc. No. 9-2 at 32.] 

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the plaintiff. Rather, it states that the 30-day clock starts “after receipt by the defendant, 

through service or otherwise, of a copy of an . . . other paper.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). At 

a minimum, Defendants here were in receipt of the documents they produced to Plaintiff 

when they located those documents in their own files and produced them to Plaintiff in 

accordance with their discovery obligations in this case. 

Although Defendants may not have had a duty to search their own records upon 

receipt of the complaint to determine removability, see Kenny, 881 F.3d at 791, and even 

if their subjective knowledge that Plaintiff worked at Camp Pendleton did not trigger the 

30-day time limit for removal, see Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125, they cannot “ignore” documents 

they produced in the litigation itself that demonstrate removability. See id. Accordingly, 

because at a minimum, the 30-day clock of §1446(b)(3) was triggered more than thirty 

days before removal, removal was untimely.

B. Waiver

 Even if removal was timely, Defendants waived their right to remove by 

proceeding through adjudication of their demurrer in state court before filing the notice of 

removal. “A party, generally the defendant, may waive the right to remove to federal court 

where, after it is apparent that the case is removable, the defendant takes actions in state 

court that manifest his or her intent to have the matter adjudicated there, and to abandon 

his or her right to a federal forum.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 

1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Jan. 20, 1995). The waiver must be “clear and 

unequivocal,” and “the right of removal is not lost by action in the state court short of 

proceeding to an adjudication on the merits.” Id. (quoting Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 

781 (5th Cir. 1989)).

Defendants argue that their filing of a demurrer in state court did not constitute a 

waiver of their right to remove because the case did not become removable until Plaintiff 

filed the proposed SAC on May 21, 2019. Accepting Defendants’ premise that the case 

did not become removable until May 21, 2019, the filing of a demurrer before that date did 

not constitute a waiver. The inquiry does not end there, however. Defendants did not 

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merely file a demurrer, they saw it through to final adjudication by the state court even 

when, by their own admission, they knew the case to be removable. Defendants could have 

removed this case any time between May 21, 2019 and June 6, 2019, before the state court 

ruled on their motion. Instead, they continued to prosecute their demurrer, filing their reply 

on May 31, 2019, which reiterated their request that the FAC be dismissed with prejudice 

[Doc. No. 1-6 at 210], and then waiting until the state court ruled on the demurrer before 

filing their notice of removal. In other words, Defendants hoped to obtain an adjudication 

on the merits in state court,2and only when that effort was unsuccessful did they file their 

notice of removal. By choosing to file a reply to their demurrer and await the state court’s 

decision instead of filing a notice of removal, Defendants made a clear and unequivocal 

waiver of their right to remove. Compare Kenny, 881 F.3d at 791 (finding that where the 

defendant had filed a demurrer, the fact that it removed the case before an opposition was 

filed “and before any hearing was held, let alone any ruling issued,” demonstrated that the 

defendant did not waive its right to remove); and Yusefzadeh v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & 

Scarborough, LLP, 365 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding no waiver where the 

defendant, despite filing a motion to dismiss did not schedule a hearing and the state court 

had not ruled on the motion); cf. City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enterprises, Inc., 864 F.3d 

1089, 1099 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen a defendant files a motion to dismiss seeking 

disposition, in whole or in part, on the merits in state court before removing the case to 

federal court, it manifests a ‘clear and unequivocal’ intent to submit the case to the state 

court’s jurisdiction, and thus waives removal.”). Accordingly, the motion to remand is 

granted on this ground as well.

 

2 Cf. Hammler v. Davis, No. 214CV2073MCEACP, 2016 WL 336193, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. 214CV2073MCEACP, 2016 WL 8731359 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 

2016) (“The sustaining of a demurrer may be construed as an adjudication on the merits for purposes of 

res judicata.”).

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III. Conclusion

Defendants, as Plaintiff’s employer, presumably knew that Plaintiff worked at Camp 

Pendleton when the original complaint was filed. Yet, Defendants did not seek to remove 

this action upon service of the original complaint or FAC. Defendants then produced 

documents, in response to document requests from Plaintiff, indicating that Plaintiff 

worked at Camp Pendleton. Again, Defendants did not seek to remove this action. Then 

Plaintiff explicitly alleged in the proposed SAC that he worked at Camp Pendleton, and 

instead of filing a notice of removal at that time, Defendants filed a reply to their previously 

filed demurrer ten days later, and waited another week for the state court to rule on their 

motion. Then, only after the state court overruled their demurrer did Defendants finally 

file a notice of removal. Because Defendants were in receipt of documents produced in 

response to discovery in this litigation that indicate that Plaintiff worked in a federal 

enclave more than thirty days before filing their notice of removal, their removal was 

untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Further, by filing a reply brief and waiting until 

after the state court had overruled their demurrer before filing their notice of removal, when 

by their own admission the grounds for removal arose weeks before the state court’s 

decision, Defendants waived their right to remove. Accordingly, because removal was 

untimely and/or waived, the motion to remand is GRANTED, and this case is 

REMANDED to San Diego County Superior Court. Plaintiff’s request for costs and 

expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is DENIED because Defendants had an 

objectively reasonable basis for removal. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 

132, 136 (2005) (“[A]bsent unusual circumstances, attorney’s fees should not be awarded 

when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal.”).

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2019

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