Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00071/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Glenn Cornell Worley, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00071-TUC-DCB (DTF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Petitioner Glenn Worley, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State PrisonEyman, Rynning Unit, Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the Court is the Petition (Doc. 1) and 

Respondents’ Limited Answer to Petition. (Doc. 10.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of 

the Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and 

Recommendation. After its independent review of the record, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court dismiss the petition because it is time-barred. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Worley was convicted of seven counts of sexual conduct with a minor and 

sentenced to seven consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole for 35 years. 

(Doc. 10, Exs. A, B.) He timely appealed and, on August 31, 2011, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. (Id., Exs. D, I.) Worley did not seek 

review with the Arizona Supreme Court. 

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On August 31, 2010, concurrently with his direct appeal, Worley started his first 

post-conviction relief (PCR) proceeding by filing a notice. (Id., Ex. K.) The petition that 

followed was dismissed by the trial court. (Id., Exs. M, P.) Worley filed a Petition for 

Review with the Court of Appeals. (Id., Ex. Q.) The Court of Appeals reviewed the 

petition but denied relief. (Id., Ex. R.) Worley did not seek review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals issued its mandate on December 31, 2012. (Id., 

Ex. S.) 

On April 24, 2013, Worley commenced his second PCR proceeding by filing a 

notice, which the trial court dismissed on May 7, 2013, and he did not seek review of that 

decision. (Id., Exs. T, U.) On November 25, 2013, Worley started his third PCR 

proceeding by filing a notice, which was dismissed on December 6, 2013, and Worley 

did not appeal that dismissal. (Id., Exs. V, W.) On December 9, 2013, Worley 

commenced his fourth PCR proceeding by filing a petition, which the trial court 

dismissed on December 10, 2013, and he did not seek review of that dismissal. (Id., Exs. 

X, Y.) 

 On February 20, 2015, Worley filed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court. (Doc.1.) 

DISCUSSION 

The government argues that Worley’s claims are time-barred because the petition 

violates the statute of limitations. 

Statute of Limitations and Statutory Tolling 

 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a one-year 

statute of limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period begins to run 

from the latest of: 

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

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 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

 removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

 recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

 presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

Id. 

In applying (d)(1)(A), the Court must assess when direct review of Worley’s 

convictions became final. On August 31, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed Worley’s 

convictions and sentences. Because Worley did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court, the judgment became final 30 days later – on September 30, 2011 – when the time 

for such review expired. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012) (finding 

that when a petitioner does not file for review, the judgment becomes final when the time 

for pursuing direct review expires); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (assessing § 2244 finality in light of the Arizona rules), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 

829 (2008). Absent tolling, the statute of limitations began to run on October 1, 2011. 

The statute of limitations is tolled during the time a properly filed state PCR 

petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). At the time Worley’s direct review became 

final, he had already begun his first PCR proceeding by filing a notice, which 

immediately tolled the statute of limitations. Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, 383 F.3d 

1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that tolling period begins with filing of notice 

pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a)). The trial court dismissed 

Worley’s first PCR petition, but he timely appealed. His first PCR proceeding was 

pending until the appellate court issued its mandate on December 31, 2012. See Celaya v. 

Stewart, 691 F. Supp.2d 1046, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2010) (finding that when the court of 

appeals grants review but denies relief, and petitioner does not seek further review, 

appellate review of a PCR petition is final when the mandate is issued). Thus, the 

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AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began to run the following day on January 1, 

2013. 

Worley subsequently initiated three more PCR proceedings. Therefore, the statute 

of limitations was tolled between April 24, 2013 and May 7, 2013, for the duration of the 

second PCR proceeding; between November 25, 2013 and December 6, 2013, while his 

third PCR proceeding was pending; and between December 9, 2013 and December 10, 

2013, for the duration of the fourth PCR proceeding. By the time Worley’s fourth PCR 

proceeding was dismissed on December 10, 2013, the statute of limitations had run for 

316 days. 

When Worley filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 20, 

2015, 752 days (2 years and 22 days) had elapsed since his judgment became final. 

Because this exceeded the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, the petition is 

statutorily time-barred. 

Equitable Tolling 

Worley admits that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely. (Doc. 1 at 

11.) However, he argues that he should be entitled to equitable tolling because he sent his 

file to another inmate who could help him complete it. (Id.) The other inmate was 

transferred to another facility, and Worley was not able to get his file back until February 

17, 2015. (Id.) Worley argues that when he got his file back, the statute of limitations had 

only run for 35 days. (Id.) 

Petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate. 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). To justify equitable tolling, 

petitioner must establish “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 

418 (2005). The diligence required for equitable tolling is “reasonable diligence,” not 

“maximum feasible diligence.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010)). In order to show reasonable 

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diligence, petitioner does not have to provide specific dates and times, but instead can 

allege facts showing that it was a circumstance beyond his control, and not his tardiness, 

that caused the failure to file. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Worley failed to establish either requirement to justify equitable tolling in his case. 

First, Worley did not show that he had been pursuing his rights with reasonable diligence. 

He did not allege any facts that would show that he tried to get his legal file back after the 

other inmate was transferred out. Second, Worley failed to establish that an extraordinary 

circumstance beyond his control impeded the timely filing. Worley made a decision to 

send his legal file to another inmate – a circumstance well within Worley’s control. Cf. 

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for further evidentiary 

development of a claim of equitable tolling because the petitioner was transferred to 

another prison and lacked access to his legal file). Additionally, it is unclear why Worley 

alleged that the statute of limitations had run only for 35 days before he filed the petition. 

Even if Worley was entitled to equitable tolling, it would be impossible to calculate the 

duration of such tolling because Worley did not specify when he sent his legal file to 

another inmate, only when he got his file back. Because Worley did not show that he 

acted with reasonable diligence and that extraordinary circumstances stood in his way, he 

is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

RECOMMENDATION 

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District 

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Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are 

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-15-0071-TUC-DCB. 

 Dated this 6th day of January, 2016. 

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