Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01611/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01611-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTHA BRONSON,

 Plaintiff,

v.

GREEN TREE FINANCIAL SERVICING

CORP., nka CONSECO FINANCIAL 

SERVICING CORP., GREEN TREE 

INVESTMENT HOLDINGS, LLC, CFN 

INVESTMENT HOLDINGS, LLC, GREEN 

TREE SERVICING LLC, US BANK 

TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, US 

BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

GREEN TREE HE/HI BORROWERS, LLC, 

et al.,

 Defendants. 

_______________________________/ 

No. 2:03-cv-01611 JAM EFB

(1) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF‟S 

MOTION TO SET ASIDE MARCH 3, 

2009 ORDER DISMISSING THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND (2)ORDER 

DENYING PLAINTIFF‟S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

The instant matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff

Martha Bronson‟s (“Plaintiff‟s”) Motion to Set Aside the Court‟s 

March 3, 2009 Order Dismissing Plaintiff‟s Third Amended 

Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 and 

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Plaintiff‟s Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Defendants

Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp., NKA Conseco Financial 

Servicing Corp., CFN Investment Holdings, LLC, Green Tree 

Servicing, LLC, US Bank Trust National Association, US Bank 

National Association, Green Tree HE/HI Borrowers, LLC, Venae 

Valdez, and Randy Lake (“Defendants”) did not respond to 

Plaintiff‟s Motions nor is it clear to the Court that these 

Defendants were served with these motions. For the reasons set 

forth below1, Plaintiff‟s Motion to Set Aside the March 3, 2009 

Order and Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint

are DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background underlying this case 

is more fully outlined in the Court‟s previous March 3, 2009 

Order Setting Aside Default and Dismissing Claims (“2009 

Order”). The 2009 Order dismissed Plaintiff‟s Third Amended 

Complaint (“TAC”) in its entirety against all Defendants with 

prejudice. (Docket (“Doc.”) # 131.) On February 22, 2010, 

Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Set Aside the 2009 Order

and Motion for Leave to Amend. (Doc. # 140.)

 

1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

L.R. 230(g).

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II. OPINION

A. Motion to Set Aside Order

1. Legal Standard

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits 

relief “from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed R. 

Civ. P. 60(b). A party may be relieved from a final judgment for 

the following reasons: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 

diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move 

for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing 

party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 

discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has 

been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is 

no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made 

within a reasonable time --- and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) 

no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order. . 

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.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). “What constitutes „reasonable time‟ 

depends upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration 

the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical 

ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied 

upon, and prejudice to other parties.” Ashford v. Steuart, 657 

F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the Court entered the final judgment 

on March 3, 2009. Plaintiff filed the present Motion to Set 

Aside (“the Motion”) on February 22, 2010. Plaintiff fails to

identify any reason for filing the Motion more than eleven 

months after this Court issued the 2009 Order. As such, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff‟s Motion is untimely. Nevertheless, 

the Court will address the merits of the Motion.

2. Analysis

The Court may relieve a party from a final order for 

“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Plaintiff argues that the 2009 Order 

should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) for “surprise” 

from being deprived of “the constitutional right to be heard” on 

numerous issues. (Motion 3:12-4:4.) Specifically, Plaintiff 

claims that the 2009 Order should be set aside for “surprise and 

resulting depravation of plaintiff‟s constitutional right to be 

heard regarding this court‟s sua sponte dismissal of VENAE 

VALDEZ and RANDY LAKE who were nonmoving party defendants, but 

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who this court nonetheless dismissed in contravention to Judge 

Levi‟s prior order denying dismissal of them.” (Motion 4:1-4.)

Plaintiff erroneously contends that the 2009 Order 

contravenes Judge Levi‟s prior order denying dismissal of 

Defendants Randy Lake (“Lake”) and Venae Valdez (“Valdez”). 

Lake and Valdez moved to dismiss Plaintiff‟s Complaint for lack 

of personal jurisdiction on August 14, 2003. (Doc. # 7.) Judge 

Levi denied Lake and Valdez‟s motion finding that jurisdiction 

over Defendants was reasonable. (Doc. # 26.) Here, the Court 

properly dismissed Lake and Valdez in the 2009 Order on the 

basis of res judicata.

Lake and Valdez were employees of Defendant Green Tree 

Servicing (“GTS”), who allegedly harassed Plaintiff while 

collecting a debt on behalf of GTS. (TAC ¶ 18.) GTS moved for 

partial summary judgment on all claims in the SAC. (Doc. # 52.) 

The Court granted GTS‟s motion for partial summary judgment, 

ruling that all causes of action were barred against GTS. (Doc.

# 66.) In the TAC, Plaintiff reasserted the same causes of 

action from the SAC plus several new causes of action against

Lake, Valdez, GTS, and others. (Doc. # 88.) The 2009 Order 

dismissed all causes of action against each and every Defendant. 

(Doc. # 131.) Although not mentioned as “moving Defendants,”

Lake and Valdez were properly dismissed by the Court. Res 

judicata prohibits future lawsuits when there is “(1) an 

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identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) 

identity or privity between parties.” F.T.C. v. Garvey, 383 

F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Providence Health Plan v. 

McDowell, 361 F.3d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir. 2004)). The 2009 Order 

dismissed claims against Lake and Valdez because there was an 

identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits, and privity 

between parties. (2009 Order 10:1-18:2.) 

Here, Plaintiff brought claims against Lake and Valdez in 

their official capacity as employees of GTS. Accordingly, Lake 

and Valdez meet the privity requirement for purposes of res 

judiciata. See Thurman v. General Mills Operations Inc., 210 

Fed. Appx. 614, 615 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As an employee of General 

Mills, [defendant] meets the privity requirements for purposes 

of res judicata.”); Spector v. El Ranco, Inc., 263 F.2d 143, 145 

(9th Cir. 1959) (“Where . . . the relations between two parties 

are analogous to that of principal and agent, the rule is that a 

judgment in favor of either . . . rendered upon a ground equally 

applicable to both, is to be accepted as conclusive against the 

plaintiff‟s right of action against the other.”). Accordingly, 

the Court DENIES Plaintiff‟s motion to set aside the 2009 Order 

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).

Plaintiff also moves to set aside the 2009 Order because 

the bankruptcy court decision, upon which the Court partially 

based its 2009 Order, has allegedly been appealed and no longer 

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serves as a legitimate basis for res judicata. (Motion 2:1-2.) 

The Court may set aside an order if “the judgment . . . is based 

on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). “Rule 60(b)(5) may not be used to 

challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior . . . order 

rests, but the Rule provides a means by which a party can ask a 

court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if „a significant 

change in either the factual conditions or in law‟ renders 

continued enforcement „detrimental to the public interest.‟” 

Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593 (2009) (quoting Rufo v. 

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)).

Here, Plaintiff fails to substantiate this allegation with 

any showing that the bankruptcy court has, in fact, changed its 

decision regarding res judicata. Moreover, Plaintiff has not 

made any significant showing that the law or factual conditions 

on which the Court based its decision on March 3, 2009 have 

changed. Additionally, even if the bankruptcy decision were on 

appeal, it would still be a final judgment for purposes of res 

judicata. Thurman, 210 Fed. Appx. at 615 (“[T]he district court 

entered a final judgment on the merits on August 3, 2004. 

Although Thurman‟s appeal of that judgment is pending, it is a 

final judgment for purposes of res judicata.”); Eichman v. 

Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The federal 

rule on the preclusive effect of a judgment from which an appeal 

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has been taken is that the pendency of an appeal does not 

suspend the operation of an otherwise final judgment for 

purposes of res judicata.”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiff‟s Motion to Set Aside the 2009 Order pursuant to Rule 

60(b)(5).

Plaintiff also moves the Court to correct alleged clerical 

mistakes in the 2009 Order. “The court may correct a clerical 

mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever 

one is found in a[n]...order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). “Errors 

correctable under Rule 60(a) include those where what is written 

or recorded is not what the court intended to write or record.” 

Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir. 1987). “Rule 

60(a) is limited, however, to correcting errors arising from 

omission and may not be used to correct more substantial 

errors.” Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). “[A] substantive error, which 

cannot be corrected by Rule 60(a), is one in which the court 

does not merely correct the record to indicate its original 

intent, but has a substantive change of mind.” Barber for 

Crytzer v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., No. 95-35411, 1996 WL 

473731, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1996) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff‟s Motion seeks to make corrections unavailable 

under Rule 60(a). Plaintiff moves the Court not to correct 

clerical errors, but rather, to make substantive changes to the 

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2009 Order. Plaintiff seeks to correct the Court‟s finding that 

all remaining Defendants in 2009 were in privity with the 

Defendants that were dismissed in the 2005 Order. (Motion 2:15-

18.) Plaintiff also requests that the Court correct its finding 

that claim preclusion applies to the Defendants in the 2009 

Order. (Id. 2:27-28.) Further, Plaintiff claims that the Court 

made an inadvertent mistake of fact in the 2009 Order when it 

claimed that the 2005 Order dismissed Defendant Green Tree 

Financial. Plaintiff is mistaken. The 2009 Order correctly 

states that “Green Tree Investment Holdings and Green Tree 

Servicing, moved for partial summary judgment on all claims 

against them.” (2009 Order 5:8-10). Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff‟s motion to correct errors and mistakes 

pursuant to Rule 60(a).

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the 2009 Order should be set 

aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). The Court may set aside an 

order for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b)(6). “Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) will not be 

granted unless the moving party is able to show both injury and 

circumstances beyond its control prevented timely action to 

protect its interests.” Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 991 

(9th Cir. 2009). “The Supreme Court has construed Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b)(6) as providing relief to parties who were confronted 

with extraordinary circumstances that excused their failure to 

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follow ordinary paths of appeal.” In re Pacific Far East Lines, 

Inc., 889 F.2d 242, 250 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations 

omitted). Here, Plaintiff shows no extraordinary circumstances 

explaining why the Court should set aside the 2009 Order and

excuse her from following the ordinary paths of appeal. 

Plaintiff presents no new facts or law that would provide the 

Court with a basis to set aside the 2009 Order. Moreover, 

Plaintiff alleges that her “basis of this motion is more fully 

explained in the memorandum of points and authorities in support 

of this Motion.” (Motion 4:27-28.) However, Plaintiff failed 

to provide the Court with the alleged memorandum. As such, 

Plaintiff‟s Motion goes largely unsupported. Accordingly, the 

Court DENIES Plaintiff‟s motion to set aside the 2009 Order.

B. Motion for Leave to Amend

In addition to Plaintiff‟s motion to set aside the 2009 

Order, Plaintiff moves the Court to grant her leave to file a 

fourth amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civ. 

Procedure 15(a). Rule 15(a) applies to amendments to pleadings 

before trial. Here, the Court granted Defendants‟ motion to 

dismiss all causes of action with prejudice (Doc. # 131) and 

entered a final judgment on March 3, 2009 (Doc. # 132).

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Accordingly, the case is closed and the Court hereby DENIES 

Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to amend her complaint for a fourth 

time. 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

(1) DENIES Plaintiff‟s Motion to Set Aside the Order 

dismissing Plaintiff‟s Third Amended Complaint; and

(2) DENIES Plaintiff‟s Motion for Leave to File a 

Fourth Amended Complaint; 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2010

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