Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00682/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00682-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DJOLIBA NARCISSE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

EZRA D. TAFESSE, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 16-00682 EJD (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE; DIRECTING 

DEFENDANTS TO FILE 

DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR 

NOTICE REGARDING SUCH 

MOTION; INSTRUCTIONS TO 

CLERK

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, filed the instant pro se civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against police officers at the Hercules Police Department 

(“HPD”). Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be addressed in a 

separate order. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 

cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 

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upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 

construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims 

Plaintiff claims that on January 29, 2012, while being detained at the Hercules 

Police Department, Defendants Tafesse, Kim and Vasquez took a blood sample by force 

when he refused to submit to one. (Compl. Attach. at 1-4.) The force they employed 

included slamming and squeezing Plaintiff’s face into a concrete wall, and punching him 

in the head, back, ribs and stomach. (Id. at 3.) Then Defendant Duff, a phlebotomist, took 

two blood draws by sticking a needle into Plaintiff’s right arm. (Id. at 4.) Liberally 

construed, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the Fourth 

Amendment for an unreasonable search and seizure, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 

757, 766-72 (1966); Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 1999), 

and under the Eight Amendment for excessive force, see Pierce v. Multnomah County, 

Oregon, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996), and denial of medical care, see Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

Plaintiff also names Sergeant Eaves as a Defendant, claiming he validated 

Defendant Tafesse’s “false” police deport for driving under the influence, and he seeks 

punitive damages against him. (Compl. Attach. at 7.) However, this claim appears to 

attack the validity of a conviction based on his allegation that the police report was 

falsified. In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction 

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or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question 

by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 

486-487 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence 

that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. Accordingly, 

this claim for damages against Defendant Eaves is DISMISSED as barred by Heck. Id. 

Plaintiff also names as defendants an “U[n]known Captain” and Chief of Police 

William Goswick, claiming that their “failure to take action to curb the physical abuse of 

arrestee’s violated the plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendment.” 

(Compl. Attach. at 8.) A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) 

personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. 

Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 

(9th Cir. 2011)); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); Redman v. County of 

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Here, there is no allegation that 

the Defendants “Captain” and Goswick were personally involved in the forced blood draw 

or the denial of medical care thereafter. Nor is there any allegation that these Defendants 

were even aware of the incident such that they could have intervened, and yet failed to do 

so. Furthermore, under no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under 

section 1983. Or, in layman's terms, under no circumstances is there liability under section 

1983 solely because one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. See Taylor 

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the claims against these 

defendants are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons state above, the Court orders as follows: 

1. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for 

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Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy 

of the complaint, all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon Defendants 

Officers Ezra D. Tafesse, J. Vasquez, and C. Kim at the Hercules Police Department

(111 Civic Drive, Hercules, CA 94547). The Clerk shall also mail a copy of this Order to 

Plaintiff. 

With respect to Defendant Dianna L. Duff, Plaintiff describes her as the 

“Phlebotomist of CML” and states that her employment address is unknown. (Compl. at 

2.) While incarcerated plaintiffs proceeding IFP may rely on service by the U.S. Marshals, 

see Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir. 1990), “a plaintiff may not remain 

silent and do nothing to effectuate such service. At a minimum, a plaintiff should request 

service upon the appropriate defendant and attempt to remedy any apparent defects of 

which [he] has knowledge.” Rochon v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987). If 

the marshal is unable to effectuate service through no fault of his own, e.g., because 

plaintiff failed to provide sufficient information or because the defendant is not where 

plaintiff claims, and plaintiff is informed, plaintiff must seek to remedy the situation or 

face dismissal. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated 

on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (prisoner failed to show cause 

why prison official should not be dismissed under Rule 4(m) because prisoner did not 

prove that he provided marshal with sufficient information to serve official or that he 

requested that official be served). If service of the summons and complaint is not made 

upon a defendant in 90 days after the filing of the complaint, the action must be dismissed 

without prejudice as to that defendant absent a showing of “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(m). Ninety days have already passed since the filing of this action on February 10, 2016. 

(ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, the action may be dismissed without prejudice as to Defendant 

Duff unless Plaintiff provides sufficient information to enable the marshal to effectuate 

service. Plaintiff is hereby directed to provide an address where Defendant Duff may be 

served no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date this order is filed to avoid 

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dismissal of the claims against her under Rule 4(m). 

Defendants at the Hercules Police Department are also requested to provide an 

address where Defendant Duff may be served, if known to them, in order to facilitate the 

prosecution of this action. 

2. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the 

summons and the complaint. Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this 

action and asked by the Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail 

to do so, they will be required to bear the cost of such service unless good cause shown for 

their failure to sign and return the waiver form. If service is waived, this action will 

proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date that the waiver is filed, except that 

pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required to serve and file an answer 

before sixty (60) days from the day on which the request for waiver was sent. (This 

allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of summons is 

necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver 

form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 

service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but 

before Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days 

from the date on which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date 

the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

 3. No later than ninety (90) days from the date of this order, Defendants shall 

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to the claims 

in the complaint found to be cognizable above. 

 a. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate 

factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor 

qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any Defendant is of the 

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opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the 

Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

 b. In the event Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that Plaintiff must be concurrently provided the appropriate 

warnings under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). See 

Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 4. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 

and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date Defendants’ 

motion is filed. 

 Plaintiff is also advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary judgment 

must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential 

element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an opposition to 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to 

the granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against Plaintiff without a trial. See 

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 

F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 5. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after 

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

 6. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

 7. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on 

Defendants, or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true 

copy of the document to Defendants or Defendants’ counsel. 

 8. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local 

Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery. 

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United States District Court 

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 9. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a 

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to 

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

 10. Extensions of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be 

extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: _____________________ ________________________ 

EDWARD J. DAVILA 

United States District Judge 

Order of Service 

PRO-SE\EJD\CR.16\00682Narcisse_svc 

7/5/2016

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