Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00398/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00398-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Jesus J. Canela, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

R.I. GOWER, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 15-cv-0398-TEH 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Jesus Canela, a state prisoner, has filed this pro se 

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should not 

be granted. Respondent has filed an answer. For the reasons set 

forth below, the petition is DENIED. 

I 

A jury convicted Petitioner of several crimes including 

second degree robbery, evading a peace officer, and driving in 

the direction opposite of traffic. People v. Canela, 224 Cal. 

App. 4th 703, 705 (2014). The jury also found sentencing 

enhancements for gang involvement and great bodily injury for 

multiple counts. Id. The trial court granted a motion for a new 

trial with respect to the gang enhancement for the evading 

charge. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 554-62; Reporter’s 

Transcript (“RT”) at 957-59. 

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The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in a 

partially published opinion. People v. Canela, 224 Cal. App. 4th 

703, 705 (2014); Answer, Ex. C. The California Supreme Court 

denied a petition for review. Answer, Ex. F. 

II 

The following factual background is taken from the order of 

the California Court of Appeal:1

The Crimes 

On May 8, 2010, I.B. walked by a parked Buick 

LeSabre. A man—later identified as 

appellant—was in the driver's seat. Another 

man—later identified as Francisco Chavez—was 

in the passenger seat. Chavez asked to 

borrow I.B.'s phone; I.B. handed the phone to 

Chavez, who made a call while I.B. walked 

around to the driver's side of the car. When 

Chavez finished the call, I.B. asked Chavez 

to return the phone. Chavez asked to use the 

phone again and I.B. did not respond. 

Chavez pulled out a gun, leaned across 

appellant, and pointed it at I.B. Chavez 

told I.B. to give him “whatever” I.B. had. 

I.B. ran. Appellant got out of the car and 

chased him, catching him, and grabbing I.B.'s 

sweat shirt. I.B. pulled himself free of the 

sweat shirt, leaving it in appellant's hands, 

and fled. Without saying anything, appellant 

returned to his car and drove away. I.B. 

called the police from a nearby store. 

Shortly thereafter, Richmond Police Officer 

Byron Macrenato responded to a call from 

dispatch that a person had been robbed at 

gunpoint and that the robbers' vehicle was a 

blue, older-model Buick occupied by two 

Hispanic men in their 20's wearing darkcolored tops and hats, and armed with a 

semiautomatic handgun. Officer Macrenato saw 

a 90's “blue-purplish Buick occupied by two 

Hispanic males wearing black shirts and black 

hats.” The car was preparing to turn left. 

Officer Macrenato made eye contact with 

appellant, who looked in Officer Macrenato's 

 

1

 This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 

1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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direction and continued northbound instead of 

turning. Officer Macrenato followed the 

vehicle without activating his lights and 

sirens and called for backup. 

Shortly thereafter, two other Richmond police 

officers, Phil Sanchez and Ian Reid, arrived 

in separate patrol cars with their lights and 

sirens activated. At that point, appellant 

“immediately took off at a high rate of 

speed,” and the three officers followed with 

their lights and sirens activated. Appellant 

drove “at least 40 miles an hour” in a 25 

mile per hour zone. Appellant ran a stop 

sign, turned left, and ran three red lights. 

Then he made a left turn through a red light 

without slowing down and hit pedestrian M. 

Broadway, who was pushing a shopping cart. 

The force of the collision knocked Broadway 

about 25 feet into a parking lot, and sent 

some of his possessions flying. The impact 

was so strong that Broadway “went airborne” 

like a rag doll tossed into the air. 

Broadway—who was lapsing in and out of 

consciousness, and who appeared to have 

severe head and leg injuries—was taken to the 

hospital, where he underwent surgery for a 

spinal fracture. 

Appellant's car skidded. The rear wheels 

landed on the sidewalk and the rear 

windshield shattered. Appellant drove back 

onto the street and slowed down; Chavez 

jumped out of the car and ran. Officers 

Macrenato and Reid followed appellant, who 

continued to speed, made several more turns, 

and ran two stop signs. Appellant also drove 

for some distance in the wrong direction and 

into oncoming traffic before running another 

red light and turning left. After several 

more blocks, appellant jumped out of his car 

and ran. Officer Macrenato pursued appellant 

on foot, pulled out his gun, and ordered 

appellant to stop. Appellant did not comply. 

Eventually, Officers Reid and Macrenato 

subdued and arrested appellant, who was 

“kicking and kicking.” Law enforcement 

officers found I.B.'s sweatshirt and phone in 

appellant's car. 

Ex. C. at 2-3. 

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III 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal 

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless 

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, habeas relief 

is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of 

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under 

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

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“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court 

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether 

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in 

conducting its analysis, the federal court must presume the 

correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the 

petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by 

clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the 

Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas review, AEDPA ‘imposes a 

highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ 

and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of 

the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly 

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the 

dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A 

federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a 

view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 

Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 

12, 17 (2003). 

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When applying these standards, the federal court should 

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no 

reasoned opinion from the state’s highest court, the court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

804. 

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and 

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses 

Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner alleges that: (1) the trial 

court erroneously denied his motion that the prosecutor unfairly 

excluded jurors based on race, in violation of Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) there was insufficient evidence 

to support a gang enhancement; and (3) there was insufficient 

evidence to support a true finding that Petitioner personally 

inflicted great bodily injury while evading a police officer. 

IV 

A 

 Petitioner first contends that the trial court erred in 

denying the Wheeler/Batson2

 motion. Petitioner is a Hispanic male 

and alleges that the prosecutor improperly excused an African 

American juror, Ms. N. The California Court of Appeal set forth 

the relevant background for this claim: 

After filling out standard jury and gang 

questionnaires, the court and counsel voir 

dired prospective jurors. The juror who was 

the subject of appellant’s Batson/Wheeler 

motion provided the following information and 

 

2 The California counterpart to Batson is People v. Wheeler, 22 

Cal. 3d 258 (1978).

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was questioned by the court and the 

prosecutor as follows: 

In her standard and gang questionnaires, Ms. 

N. indicated she is single and has no 

children. She lives in Richmond and works for 

the Social Security Administration in 

Richmond. She did not date her gang 

questionnaire. She checked or answered “no” 

to every box on the questionnaires, and she 

wrote no narrative responses to any of the 

questions. When questioned by the court, Ms. 

N. provided one-word answers. The prosecutor 

questioned Ms. N. because she responded “no” 

to the question asking whether she had seen, 

read, or heard news coverage of cases 

involving gang activity. In response, Ms. N. 

admitted she had “heard” about gangs but did 

not “pay much attention to it.” She denied 

witnessing gang violence or being a crime 

victim. She stated she could be fair and 

impartial. 

After the prosecutor used peremptory 

challenges to excuse three African-American 

jurors, including Ms. N., defense counsel 

made a Batson/Wheeler motion, arguing: “I 

do not believe that there was any — any 

proper reason to dismiss Ms. N[.] She said 

very unequivocally that she could be fair and 

impartial, had no knowledge about gangs, no 

gang concerns. There was nothing indicating 

that she would be anything but fair and 

impartial. [¶] And I don’t believe that . . 

. [the prosecutor] followed up to try to 

pursue any valid reasons as to why she could 

not be fair and impartial in this case. [¶] 

Ms. N[.] is an African-American juror, I 

presume. . . . I don’t believe there was 

anything elicited as to Ms. N[.] as to any 

reason why she could not be fair and 

impartial.” 

When the court asked the prosecutor to 

“respond to the prima facie issue,” she 

stated, “I don’t believe there’s been prima 

facie case. . . . [¶] I hear [defense 

counsel’]s argument that [Ms. N.] didn’t say 

anything wrong that would justify it, but the 

problem is and the reason why I had no 

comfort level with her, is she didn’t say 

anything at all. She sticks out like a 

blinking red flag because her entire standard 

questionnaire is marked no, and her entire 

gang questionnaire is marked no on 

everything. She doesn’t have any feelings 

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about gangs. And then she denied ever 

hearing any gang coverage news at all, which 

I think is implausible, so that’s the one 

question I asked her. And then she admitted 

that she had heard some. But she just didn’t 

seem responsive and forthcoming.” 

The prosecutor explained she “look[ed] for . 

. . jurors with a stake in the community, an 

interest in the community, an interest in 

having crime off the street. [¶] And 

specifically I prefer married jurors with 

children. [Ms. N is] single and has no 

children. And just her demeanor seems like — 

she works for Social Security, so my thought 

process is she’s probably getting paid to be 

here and would like to be on the jury, and 

isn’t giving us anything at all to work with. 

She didn’t date her questionnaire and just 

simply circled no to every single thing, 

which I found suspicious. [¶] Now, if I had 

already used nine challenges and Ms. N[.] was 

on the panel, then, okay, but the rest of the 

jurors in the box look pretty good to me 

right now, so I had the luxury of having a 

challenge available for a juror that was 

outside my comfort level.” 

In response, defense counsel argued: “Well, 

nonverbal cues, which it seems like [the 

prosecutor] is alluding to, ha[ve] 

specifically been held to be . . . an 

insufficient . . . basis to kick off a juror. 

. . . [¶] And there were also other jurors 

where they also answered no on every 

questionnaire and they have not been kicked 

off. So I don’t — I don’t believe that that 

is a valid basis to kick Ms. N[.] off.” The 

prosecutor disagreed, stating, “I don’t think 

there’s anybody else who did a straight no, 

with no feelings about gang and no input as 

to anything in all 85 — or the portion of the 

85 who did the questionnaires.” 

The court denied the Batson/Wheeler motion. 

It explained, “I do think that [defense 

counsel] has made a prima facie case, at 

least. There were only three AfricanAmerican jurors in the first 21. . . . They 

are a cognizable group. And exercising three 

out of four challenges to date as to AfricanAmerican Americans, I think, does raise a 

prima facie case. [¶] So that then puts the 

issue of whether there is justification for 

the challenges. And the — although I do have 

some concerns about — about this, I think 

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that [the prosecutor] has expressed 

legitimate bases in the record for the 

exercise of this challenge.” 

The court continued, “[m]y own note[ ] on Ms. 

N[.] is that she’s not forthcoming. I wrote 

that down at the time. And her affect, I 

think — I had the same sense from [the 

prosecutor] that her affect was of 

disengagement. So I understand what [the 

prosecutor] is talking about and, you know, 

at the time I wrote ‘not forthcoming.’ . . . 

[¶] So although I understand [defense 

counsel’s] concern, and just simply based on 

numbers, I think that there’s a basis for 

that concern and, therefore, a prima facie 

case being made, I think [the prosecutor’s] 

explanations for the reasons that she 

challenged Ms. N[.] are in good-faith based 

on the record for nonracial — based on 

nonracial criteria. And so for that reason 

I’m going to deny the Wheeler/Batson motion.” 

Ex. C at 5-7. 

The use of peremptory challenges by either the prosecution 

or defense to exclude cognizable groups from a jury may violate 

the Equal Protection Clause. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 

42, 55-56 (1992). The Supreme Court has held that the Equal 

Protection Clause forbids the challenging of potential jurors 

solely on account of their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 

U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Batson permits prompt rulings on objections 

to peremptory challenges under a three-step process: 

First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case that 

the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of 

race “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives 

rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Batson, 476 

U.S. at 93-94. 

Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden 

shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation 

for striking the jurors in question. Id. at 97; Wade v. Terhune, 

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202 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Finally, the trial court must determine whether the 

defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful 

discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; Wade, 202 F.3d at 1195. 

To fulfill its duty, “the trial court must evaluate the 

prosecutor’s proffered reasons and credibility under ‘the 

totality of the relevant facts,’ using all the available tools 

including its own observations and the assistance of counsel.” 

Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. 

Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2003). “As part of its 

evaluation of the prosecutor’s reasoning, the court must conduct 

a comparative juror analysis . . .,” particularly when the state 

court declined to do so. Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 

1224 (9th Cir. 2013). Then the court should “reevaluate the 

ultimate state decision in light of this comparative analysis and 

any other evidence tending to show purposeful discrimination to 

decide whether the state was unreasonable in finding the 

prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications to be genuine.” Id. at 

1225. 

In evaluating the race neutrality explanation, the court 

must keep in mind that proof of discriminatory intent or purpose 

is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 

See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355-62 (1991) (no 

discriminatory intent where Latino jurors dismissed because of 

possible difficulty in accepting translator’s rendition of 

Spanish language testimony). It should also keep in mind that a 

finding of discriminatory intent turns largely on the trial 

court’s evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility. See Rice v. 

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Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 340-41 (2006); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 830. 

Because determinations of credibility and demeanor of the 

prosecutor and jurors lie “peculiarly within [the] trial judge’s 

province,” the trial court’s ruling on the issue of 

discriminatory intent is entitled to great deference and must be 

sustained unless clearly erroneous. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 

U.S. 472, 476-82 (2008) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 

412, 428 (1985)); see Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 

(2011) (per curiam) (reversing Ninth Circuit’s “inexplicable” and 

“unexplained” finding that proffered race-neutral explanations 

for peremptory strikes were insufficient to outweigh evidence of 

purposeful discrimination). 

The California Court of Appeal discussed the relevant state 

law and denied this claim after also conducting a comparative 

juror analysis: 

Here, appellant contends “the prosecutor’s 

asserted reasons for striking Ms. N. do not 

withstand scrutiny. Nor, for that matter, 

does the court’s finding.” We disagree. As 

our high court has explained, “‘[t]he proper 

focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry . . . is on 

the subjective genuineness of the raceneutral reasons given for the peremptory 

challenge, not on the objective 

reasonableness of those reasons.’ 

[Citation.] ‘“[E]ven a ‘trivial’ reason, if 

genuine and neutral, will suffice.” 

[Citation.]” (Jones, supra, 57 Cal. 4th at p. 

917.) 

Here, the prosecutor offered several reasons 

why she excused Ms. N.: (1) she stuck “out 

like a blinking red flag” because she did not 

date one of her questionnaires and “marked 

no” on her “entire standard questionnaire” 

and her “entire gang questionnaire[;]” (2) 

her denial of having heard gang news coverage 

on her questionnaire seemed implausible and 

she was not responsive and forthcoming when 

questioned about it on voir dire; and (3) her 

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single and childless status suggested she did 

not have a “stake in the community” or an 

“interest in having crime off the street.” 

Numerous cases have held these reasons are 

legitimate race-neutral reasons for 

exercising peremptory challenges. (See 

People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 50, 

61 [juror’s lack of interest in a case proper 

basis for exercising peremptory challenge]; 

Jones, supra, 57 Cal. 4th at p. 917 [“[a] 

prospective juror may be excused based upon 

facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and 

even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic 

reasons”]; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal. 

4th 141, 166 [court properly denied 

defendant’s motion “with respect to J.M. 

because of his less than forthcoming 

responses on the juror questionnaire and 

during voir dire”]; People v. Perez (1994) 29 

Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1328 [marital status and 

lack of life experience].) The prosecutor’s 

reasons for excusing Ms. N. “were neither 

inherently implausible nor affirmatively 

contradicted by anything in the record.” 

(People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 903, 

926.) 

We are not persuaded by appellant’s reliance 

on People v. Long (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 

826 (Long). In Long, the reporter’s 

transcript revealed one of the prosecutor’s 

reasons for using a peremptory challenge was 

“demonstrably false” and that the prosecutor 

excused a prospective juror based on “his 

‘body language’” without providing specific 

examples. (Id. at pp. 843, 847.) Here and 

in contrast to Long, both the court and the 

prosecutor believed Ms. N. was reticent when 

answering questions. Unlike Long, there is 

no indication any of the prosecutor’s reasons 

for excusing Ms. N. were “demonstrably 

false.” Finally, the prosecutor here gave 

specific examples of Ms. N.’s reluctance to 

answer questions. “[N]othing in Wheeler 

disallows reliance on the prospective jurors’ 

. . . manner of answering questions as a 

basis for rebutting a prima facie case. . . 

.” (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 707, 

715.) 

Appellant contends a comparative analysis 

demonstrates the prosecutor acted with 

discriminatory intent. “[C]omparative juror 

analysis must be considered for the first 

time on appeal while reviewing third stage 

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Batson/Wheeler claims when a defendant 

relies on such evidence and the record is 

adequate to permit the comparisons. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2013) 56 

Cal.4th 630, 662.) Our high court has, 

however, “warned of the inherent limitations 

of such evidence. ‘On appellate review, a 

voir dire answer sits on a page of 

transcript. In the trial court, however, 

advocates and trial judges watch and listen 

as the answer is delivered. Myriad subtle 

nuances may shape it, including attitude, 

attention, interest, body language, facial 

expression and eye contact.’ [Citation.] ‘A 

transcript will show that the panelists gave 

similar answers: it cannot convey the 

different ways in which those answers were 

given. Yet those differences may 

legitimately impact the prosecutor’s decision 

to strike or retain the prospective juror.’ 

[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 662.) 

Appellant contends the prosecutor excused Ms. 

N. because she is “single with no children” 

but was “not consistent in striking jurors 

based on either marital status, or 

parenthood.” According to appellant, the 

prosecutor stated she “preferred” married 

jurors with children but “kept” several other 

jurors on the jury — Juror Nos. 1 and 3 

— who did not meet that criteria. FN6 

Appellant’s use of comparative juror analysis 

does not persuade us the court erred in 

denying his Batson/Wheeler motion. “While an 

advocate may be concerned about a particular 

answer, another answer may provide a reason 

to have greater confidence in the overall 

thinking and experience of the panelist. 

Advocates do not evaluate panelists based on 

a single answer. Likewise, reviewing courts 

should not do so.” (People v. Lenix (2008) 

44 Cal. 4th 602, 631, fn. omitted.) 

FN6 Appellant also notes the prosecutor 

allowed Juror No. 5, who was single with 

a child, and Juror Nos. 6 and 7, who 

were married but childless, to remain on 

the jury. These jurors are different 

from Ms. N. and, in any event, they 

provided narrative responses to the jury 

questionnaire and were forthcoming 

during voir dire.

Juror No. 1 was single with no children, but 

she had previously served on a jury in a 

criminal case that reached a verdict, had 

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family members and friends who worked in 

law enforcement, and had been a victim of a 

gang crime. In addition, Juror No. 1 was 

engaged, responsive, and forthcoming during 

voir dire. Juror No. 3 was similarly single 

and childless but provided narrative 

responses on the jury questionnaire, had 

“seen neighborhoods ruined by gang 

activity[,]” and was “fearful” when living 

near public housing and witnessing gang 

activity. In contrast to Ms. N., Juror Nos. 

1 and 3 were forthcoming and gave answers 

during voir dire indicating they held a 

favorable view of law enforcement and had a 

stake in the community. 

Next, appellant argues the prosecutor’s claim 

that she struck Ms. N. “because she works for 

the Social Security Administration and was 

‘probably getting paid to be here and would 

like to be on the jury’” was pretextual 

because Juror No. 2 also worked for the 

Social Security Administration. Appellant 

misconstrues the prosecutor’s remarks. The 

prosecutor did not challenge Ms. N. because 

of where she worked; she challenged Ms. N. 

because she believed Ms. N. was not an ideal 

juror based on her demeanor, her lack of 

engagement during voir dire, and the 

prosecutor’s belief that Ms. N lacked a stake 

in the community. Moreover, and in contrast 

with Ms. N., Juror No. 2 wrote narrative 

answers on the jury questionnaire, was 

talkative during voir dire, had prior jury 

experience, was married with children, and 

had family in law enforcement. 

We conclude appellant’s comparative analysis 

claim fails. Substantial evidence supports 

the denial of appellant’s Batson/Wheeler 

motion. 

Ex. C at 8-11 (footnote omitted). 

In this case, both the trial court and the California Court 

of Appeal reached the third Batson step and discussed the 

prosecution’s reasons for striking these jurors and engaged in a 

comparative juror analysis. RT at 119-20; Ex. C at 9-11. 

Petitioner does not argue that the state courts used an improper 

legal standard. Therefore, the California Court of Appeal 

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opinion is entitled to AEDPA deference. See Johnson v. Finn, 665 

F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Briggs v. Grounds, 

682 F.3d 1165, 1171 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Where the state court 

conducted comparative analysis and determined that the prosecutor 

did not exercise her peremptory challenges in a discriminatory 

manner, AEDPA deference applies and we need not undertake 

comparative analysis de novo.”). 

 Petitioner has failed to show that the state court denial of 

this claim was objectively unreasonable. Juror Ms. N. was one of 

only two jurors who did not provide any information in the juror 

questionnaire other than marking ‘no’. Supp. CT at 119-22, 136-

39. Ms. N. answered that she had not seen, read, or heard any 

news coverage regarding cases involving gang activity. Supp. CT 

at 121. The prosecutor thought that was implausible and when she 

specifically questioned Ms. N., the juror responded that she had 

in fact heard about gang violence in the news. Augmented 

(“Aug.”) RT at 136-37. 

 At the hearing in the trial court, the prosecutor argued 

that Ms. N. marking ‘no’ for every question on the questionnaire 

and providing no narrative answers were red flags. The 

prosecutor stated that she preferred jurors who had a stake in 

the community and that Ms. N.’s answers did not reflect that she 

had such a stake. The prosecutor also preferred married jurors 

with children. These are race-neutral reasons, and Petitioner 

has not shown that the prosecutor’s explanations were pretextual. 

The only other juror to just answer ‘no’ on the questionnaire and 

provide no detailed answers was Juror No. 32 who was also 

dismissed by the prosecutor. Juror No. 32’s race is not known, 

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but she was not African-American. The trial court and 

Petitioner’s counsel noted the previously struck African-American 

jurors,3 and that did not include Juror No. 32. RT at 115-16. 

 In addition to the prosecutor’s reasons being race-neutral, 

the trial court independently had the same reservations about Ms. 

N. The trial court noted that Ms. N. was not forthcoming and her 

affect was of disengagement. RT at 119-20. 

 Nor has Petitioner shown that the comparative juror analysis 

conducted by the California Court of Appeal was unreasonable. 

Petitioner argued that other single jurors with no children were 

allowed to serve on the jury, and these jurors were not AfricanAmerican. However, these other single jurors were not similarly 

situated to Ms. N. Juror No. 1 had previously served on a jury 

for a criminal case, had been the victim of a gang crime, and had 

friends who worked in law enforcement. It was reasonable for the 

prosecutor to want a juror who was the victim of gang crime on 

this case with gang allegations, even if that juror was single 

and childless. Juror No. 3 was also single and childless, but 

noted in the questionnaire he or she had seen neighborhoods 

ruined by gang activity and was fearful when living near public 

housing and witnessing gang activity. Petitioner has not shown 

discriminatory intent by the prosecutor; rather, these single and 

childless jurors were forthcoming in their answers on the 

questionnaire, and had stakes in the community, and had concerns 

about gang violence, as opposed to Ms. N. 

 

3

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the California Supreme Court and this federal petition only 

involved Ms. N. RT at 115-16; Ex. H at 25-32; Petition at 6, 64-

72. 

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 The prosecutor also noted that Ms. N. worked for the Social 

Security Administration and was probably getting paid to be at 

court and would like to be on the jury. Petitioner argues this 

reason was pretextual because Juror No. 2 worked for the Social 

Security Administration and served on the jury. The state court 

noted that these jurors were not similar because Juror No. 2 

wrote narrative answers on the questionnaire, was talkative 

during voir dire, had prior jury experience, was married with 

children, and had family in law enforcement. The California 

Court of Appeal did not find these two jurors similarly situated 

to demonstrate discriminatory intent in the peremptory challenge 

to Ms. N. This conclusion was not unreasonable. 

Finally, as noted above, the only other juror who also 

answered ‘no’ to all questions on the questionnaire was excused 

by the prosecutor, and the juror was not African-American. 

Petitioner has failed to show that the California Court of Appeal 

was objectively unreasonable, and a review of the record does not 

indicate purposeful discrimination; rather, the prosecutor 

expressed proper race neutral explanations that were supported by 

the trial court’s independent observations. This claim is 

denied. 

B 

Petitioner next argues that there was insufficient evidence 

to support a gang enhancement for second degree robbery for the 

benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a 

criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)). The 

California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant background for 

this claim: 

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Richmond Police Detective Daniel Reina 

testified as an expert on Richmond criminal 

street gangs. Reina described the history, 

culture, and violent character of the Sureño 

gang, which has several subsets in Richmond. 

Sureños are spread throughout Richmond, and a 

majority of the city is Sureño territory. 

Most homicides and narcotics offenses in 

Richmond are gang related. The Sureños’ 

“primary activities . . . include homicides, 

assaults, robberies, stolen vehicles, . . . 

vandalisms [and] . . . weapons offenses[.]” 

The Sureño gang is highly structured, and its 

core values are pride and respect. Many 

Sureño gang subsets incorporate the term 

“loco” — meaning “crazy” — to show their 

members will do anything. To become a 

Sureño, a new member is typically “jumped 

in,” undergoing a physical assault to prove 

loyalty, willingness to take a beating for 

the gang, and to show he will stand his 

ground if attacked. A Sureño must remain 

active in the gang and commit crimes: 

committing crimes allows members to remain in 

good standing, to gain respect, and to 

enhance their reputation within the gang. It 

is very important for a Sureño to appear 

tough to other Sureños and to rival gang 

members because it permits the gang to retain 

control over its territory and to instill 

fear in the community. Sureños typically 

wear blue and black clothing and get tattoos 

to show they are associated with the gang. 

They associate with the letter M, and the 

numbers 13 and 3. Sureños use graffiti to 

mark the gang’s territory, advertise the 

gang, and to intimidate and instill fear in 

the community. Gang members tend to carry 

guns and to be uncooperative with the police 

to show they are not afraid. 

The prosecution introduced evidence of three 

crimes committed by appellant and Chavez as 

members of the Sureño gang. In an October 

2007 incident, appellant and another Sureño, 

Aguilar, threatened the victim, smashed his 

car window, and Aguilar shot the victim’s car 

tire. Appellant “terrorized the victim.” 

Gang signs “played a significant role” in the 

terrorization and “were being thrown at the 

time of the incident.” FN5 Appellant was 

convicted of assault, criminal threats, and 

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being a felon in possession of a firearm. In 

November 2007, appellant was convicted of 

vehicle theft after a police officer saw him 

“driving a stolen vehicle” and arrested him. 

In the third offense, in October 2009, Chavez 

was convicted of various crimes, including 

auto theft, possession of stolen property, 

and possession of a deadly weapon. 

FN5 Appellant was not present when 

Aguilar shot the car tire. The police 

report did not indicate the incident was 

gang related. 

Reina opined Chavez is a Sureño because he 

associates with other Sureños, has common 

Sureño tattoos, and because he admitted “to 

being a Sureño while being housed in jail.” 

Reina also opined appellant was a Sureño at 

the time of the October and November 2007 

offenses. Shortly before the May 2010 

robbery of I.B., appellant told Reina he was 

a member of the Sureño gang. After his 

arrest, appellant told jail personnel “[a]t 

least half a dozen” times that he is a 

Sureño. Appellant has Sureño tattoos on his 

hand and elbow. 

The prosecutor posed a hypothetical where two 

Sureño gang members commit a street robbery 

where “two Sureños together approach a person 

in the street and ask to use the cell phone, 

and this person initially agrees, but then 

when he asks for his cell phone back, one 

Sureño says, No, brandishes a gun, and then 

says, This is a robbery, give me what you’ve 

got, maybe not verbatim, but communicates 

it’s a robbery, at which point the victim 

runs. And the other Sureño, without the gun, 

chases down that victim and pulls his 

sweatshirt off and then leaves with the 

sweatshirt and the cell phone.” Based on 

this hypothetical, Reina opined the crimes 

were “definitely done” for the benefit of, or 

in association with, the Sureño gang, even if 

the victim did not know the men were gang 

members and even if the item stolen was of 

little value. Reina explained, “you have two 

Sureños . . . committing a robbery. [¶] 

Second, it benefits the gang in the fact that 

whether this person is just a normal citizen 

in the community, the fear and intimidation 

factor is there. He is asked to borrow a 

cell phone. Then when the citizen asks for 

his cell phone back, he’s denied it. . . . 

That right there is kind of an intimidation 

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factor. Even more so when a firearm is 

presented[.]” 

As Reina explained, committing a street 

robbery and evading the police elevates a 

gang member’s status in the eyes of the gang. 

On cross-examination, Reina agreed it would 

bolster his opinion that the offenses were 

committed for the gang’s benefit if appellant 

or Chavez had worn gang colors, used gang 

slogans, or flashed gang signs, if the gang 

had taken credit for the crimes, or if the 

victim was rival gang member. Reina 

concluded, however, that the lack of these 

additional factors did not change his opinion 

that the robbery was committed for the 

benefit of, or in association with, the 

Sureño street gang. 

Ex. C at 11-13. 

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against 

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who 

alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction 

cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

therefore states a constitutional claim, see Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to 

federal habeas relief, see id. at 324. 

 The Supreme Court has emphasized that "Jackson claims face a 

high bar in federal habeas proceedings . . . ." Coleman v. 

Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (finding 

that the Third Circuit "unduly impinged on the jury's role as 

factfinder" and failed to apply the deferential standard of 

Jackson when it engaged in "fine-grained factual parsing" to find 

that the evidence was insufficient to support petitioner's 

conviction). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state 

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court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that 

the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne 

v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). The federal court 

"determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.'" Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have 

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has there been a 

due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d 

at 338. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim after 

citing relevant state law: 

Appellant challenges only the first element 

of the enhancement: that the robbery was 

committed “for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, or in association with any 

criminal street gang . . . .” (§ 186.22, 

subd. (b)(1); People v. Albillar (2010) 51 

Cal. 4th 47, 61, 63-64 (Albillar).) 

. . . 

Appellant is correct that “[n]ot every crime 

committed by gang members is related to a 

gang.” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal. 4th at p. 

60.) Here, however, there is substantial 

evidence the robbery was committed “for the 

benefit of” the Sureño gang. (§ 186.22, 

subd. (b)(1).) Albillar is instructive. 

There, the prosecution expert testified “that 

‘[w]hen three gang members go out and commit 

a violent brutal attack on a victim, that’s 

elevating their individual status, and 

they’re receiving a benefit. They’re putting 

notches in their reputation. When these 

members are doing that, the overall entity 

benefits and strengthens as a result of it.’ 

Reports of such conduct ‘rais[e] the[ ] level 

of fear and intimidation in the community.’ 

[The expert] then applied his analysis to a 

hypothetical based on the facts of the crime 

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. . . where the victim knew that at least two 

of her assailants were members of Southside 

Chiques. ‘More than likely this crime is 

reported as not three individual named 

Defendants conducting a rape, but members of 

[Southside] Chiques conducting a rape, and 

that goes out in the community by way of 

mainstream media or by way of word of mouth. 

 That is elevating [Southside] Chiques’ 

reputation to be a violent, aggressive gang 

that stops at nothing and does not care for 

anyone’s humanity.’” (Albillar, supra, 51 

Cal. 4th at p. 63.) 

. . . 

That appellant and Chavez did not wear gang 

clothing does not alter our conclusion. 

Reina testified it was more common for 

younger gang members to wear gang colors 

whereas for “the older” gang members “it’s 

not as significant.” Additionally, while 

I.B. did not notice appellant and Chavez’s 

tattoos, there was evidence each had gang 

tattoos in visible places, on their hands. 

And while there was no evidence appellant or 

Chavez threw gang signs or bragged about the 

robbery, Reina testified the commission of 

violent crime in gang territory benefited the 

gang, as evidenced in the level of comfort 

with which the two men robbed I.B. at 

gunpoint in broad daylight. 

In addition, there was substantial evidence 

the offenses were committed “in 

association” with a gang. (§ 186.22, subd. 

(b)(1).) Albillar is on point. There, our 

high court determined there was substantial 

evidence the “defendants came together 

as gang members to attack [the victim] and, 

thus, that they committed these crimes in 

association with the gang.” (Albillar, 

supra, 51 Cal. 4th at p. 62.) As the 

Albillar court explained, the “defendants’ 

conduct exceeded that which was necessary to 

establish that the offenses were committed in 

concert. Defendants not only actively 

assisted each other in committing these 

crimes, but their common gang membership 

ensured that they could rely on each other’s 

cooperation in committing these crimes and 

that they would benefit from committing them 

together. They relied on the gang’s internal 

code to ensure that none of them would 

cooperate with the police, and on the gang's 

reputation to ensure that the victim did not 

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contact the police.” (Id. at pp. 61-62.) 

As in Albillar, Chavez and appellant acted 

together. They approached I.B. and — when he 

did not comply with Chavez’s demand for the 

phone — Chavez pointed a gun at him and 

appellant chased him. When appellant and 

Chavez fled from the police, appellant slowed 

the car down so Chavez could escape. In 

addition, appellant and Chavez — both 

admitted Sureños — had previously committed 

crimes together. The evidence supports the 

jury’s finding that appellant and Chavez 

“came together as gang members” to rob I.B. 

in association with the Sureño gang. 

(Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 62-63.) 

We conclude substantial evidence supports the 

jury’s true finding on the gang enhancement 

in Count 1. 

Ex. C at 14-17. 

 The Jackson standard must be applied with explicit reference 

to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by 

state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; see, e.g., Boyer v. 

Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding it was 

not unreasonable, in light of Oregon case law, for Oregon court 

to conclude that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that petitioner intended to kill his victim based on proof 

that he anally penetrated several victims with knowledge that he 

could infect them with AIDS). The state court’s ruling on the 

state law issue is binding on this Court. 

However, “the minimum amount of evidence that the Due 

Process Clause requires to prove the offense is purely a matter 

of federal law,” Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2064, yet, Petitioner has 

not shown that the state court was objectively unreasonable in 

finding sufficient evidence to support the enhancement in light 

of the high bar for Jackson claims. Nor has he demonstrated an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

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Petitioner argues that he was a gang member who committed a 

crime but not every crime committed by a gang member is related 

to the gang. Yet, the gang expert testified to various ways in 

which the robbery was committed for the benefit of, at the 

direction, or in association with a street gang. While the 

evidence was not overwhelming, viewing it in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found the 

essential elements of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Petitioner has failed to meet the high threshold of a sufficiency 

of the evidence claim and he is not entitled to habeas relief. 

This claim is denied. 

C 

 Petitioner next asserts that there was insufficient evidence 

to support a true finding that he personally inflicted great 

bodily injury while evading a police officer and driving in the 

opposite direction of traffic. 

 Petitioner was found guilty of violating California Vehicle 

Code section 2800.4, and it was found that he personally 

inflicted great bodily injury while committing the offense 

pursuant to section 12022.7(a) of the state penal code. 

Vehicle Code section 2800.4 provides in relevant part, 

“Whenever a person willfully flees or attempts to elude a 

pursuing peace officer in violation of [Vehicle Code] [s]ection 

2800.1, and the person operating the pursued vehicle willfully 

drives that vehicle on a highway in a direction opposite to that 

in which the traffic lawfully moves upon that highway,” the 

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person may be punished by imprisonment in county jail or prison.4 

Petitioner argues that the great bodily injury enhancement 

must be stricken because he struck the victim with his car before 

he drove in the opposite direction of traffic. Petitioner 

contends that the crime outlined in Vehicle Code section 2800.4 

does not commence until the defendant drives in the opposite 

direction of traffic. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim: 

Because section 12022.7 “is dependent upon 

and necessarily attached to its underlying 

felony” (People v. Mustafaa (1994) 22 Cal. 

App. 4th 1305, 1311, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172) 

the question is whether appellant was engaged 

“in the commission of a felony or attempted 

felony” when he caused Broadway's injuries. 

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The answer is yes. 

First, we “examine the statutory language, 

giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.” 

(People v. Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal. App. 4th 

1415, 1421, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383.) Vehicle 

Code section 2800.4 provides that “[w 

]heneverr a person willfully flees or 

attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer in 

violation of [Vehicle Code] [s]ection 2800.1” 

and “drives that vehicle on a highway in a 

direction opposite to traffic” the person has 

committed a misdemeanor or felony. (Italics 

added.) Although Vehicle Code section 2800.4 

requires driving in the direction opposite to 

traffic at some point during the flight, the 

wrong-way driving need not be coextensive 

with the entire duration of the flight; in 

other words, the element of willfully driving 

in the wrong direction may occur any time 

during the act of willfully fleeing a 

pursuing peace officer. Appellant cannot 

avoid the enhancement by attempting to 

temporally segment his willful evasion into 

the crime of violating Vehicle Code sections 

2800.1 and 2800.4. Here, appellant injured 

 

4 California Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) provides a 

sentencing enhancement for “[a]ny person who personally inflicts 

great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the 

commission of a felony or attempted felony.”

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Broadway while fleeing from a pursuing 

officer and/or attempting to evade that 

officer; during that same evasion appellant 

later drove in the wrong direction. That 

appellant had not completed the crime 

prohibited by Vehicle Code section 2800.4 by 

driving in the direction opposite to traffic 

when he struck Broadway does not alter our 

conclusion. Section 12022.7 applies because 

appellant was engaged in the commission of 

the felony when he inflicted the great bodily 

injury. (See People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal. 

4th 249, 254, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 179 P.3d 

917 [in a continuing offense “no artificial 

parsing is required as to the precise moment 

or order in which the elements are 

satisfied”] ; see also People v. Mixon (1990) 

225 Cal. App. 3d 1471, 1488, 275 Cal. Rptr. 

817 [section 12022.7 applied where victim 

sustained injuries after the burglary].) 

Our conclusion finds support in cases broadly 

construing identical language in section 

12022.3, subdivision (a), which imposes a 

sentencing enhancement for the use of a 

deadly weapon “in the commission” of 

specified sex crimes. (See People v. Jones 

(2001) 25 Cal. 4th 98, 107–108, 104 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 753, 18 P.3d 674 [use of a weapon 

after a series of sex crimes can be “found to 

have occurred ‘in the commission of’ ” the 

crimes under section 12022.3, subd. (a) ]; 

People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 1001, 

1006, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760, 920 P.2d 705 

[section 12022.3, subd. (a) enhancement 

upheld where the defendant displayed the 

handgun before the rape]; People v. Castro 

(1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 578, 586, 32 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 529 [broadly construing phrase “ ‘in 

the commission of’ ” in statutes providing 

enhancement for use of a weapon in the 

commission of a crime].) Appellant has not 

articulated a persuasive reason why we should 

interpret “in the commission of” in section 

12022.7, subdivision (a) narrowly where 

numerous courts have given identical language 

in similar statutes an “‘expansive, not a 

tailored meaning.’” (People v. Calles (2012) 

209 Cal. App. 4th 1200, 1222, 147 Cal. Rptr. 

3d 673, quoting People v. Frausto (2009) 180 

Cal. App. 4th 890, 900, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 

and distinguishing People v. Valdez (2010) 

189 Cal. App. 4th 82, 116 Cal. Rptr.3 d 670 

(Valdez).) 

Appellant relies on Valdez, which considered 

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when a great bodily injury enhancement may 

attach to the crime of fleeing the scene of 

an injury accident in violation of Vehicle 

Code section 20001, subdivision (a). 

(Valdez, supra, 189 Cal. App. 4th at p. 84, 

116 Cal. Rptr.3d 670.) The Valdez court 

determined the “criminal act” prohibited by 

Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) 

is defendant's flight from the scene of the 

accident and that the injuries sustained in 

the car accident preceding the defendant's 

flight “were not inflicted in the commission 

of a felony or attempted felony based upon 

defendant's subsequent flight.” (Valdez, 

supra, 189 Cal. App. 4th at p. 90, 116 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 670.) As the Valdez court 

explained, “the purpose of section 20001, 

subdivision (a) is to ‘punish not the 

“hitting” but the “running.”’ [Citation.] 

The injuries were ‘caused by acts which 

occurred prior to the criminal act, not as a 

result of the criminal act.’ [Citation.] 

The fact that defendant subsequently fled 

does not retroactively alter the character of 

the accident from noncriminal to criminal.” 

(Id. at p. 90, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 670, fn. 

omitted.) Valdez concerned a different 

Vehicle Code statute and we decline to apply 

its reasoning here. In Valdez, the 

enhancement could not be attached to the 

crime of fleeing the accident scene 

prohibited by Vehicle Code section 20001, 

because the injury occurred before the 

flight; here, and in contrast to Valdez, the 

injury occurred during the flight that is the 

subject of Vehicle Code section 2800.4. 

We conclude the evidence establishes 

appellant inflicted great bodily injury “in 

the commission” of count 4 within the meaning 

of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).

Canela, 224 Cal. App. 4th at 709-10; Ex. C at 18-20. 

 The state court in the published opinion found that 

Petitioner’s actions were sufficient to have personally inflicted 

great bodily injury while evading a police officer and driving in 

the opposite direction of traffic. Petitioner disagrees with 

this interpretation of state law. Yet, “a state court's 

interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct 

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appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court 

sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 

(2005). It is undisputed that Petitioner was driving the car, 

was attempting to evade police after a robbery, and struck the 

victim causing great bodily harm. Therefore, there was 

sufficient evidence to support the state court’s finding of great 

bodily harm and Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas 

relief on this claim. 

V 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. 

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 

11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has 

not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not 

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court 

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

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The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of 

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions 

as moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 01/06/2016 

________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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