Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00375/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00375-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORENZO FOSSELMAN JR.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

RANDOLPH GIBBS, M.D.; ALLISON

BRAGER; C. KATES, LVN; CHARLES

DUDLEY LEE, M.D., Health Care

Manager; and C. MATHEWS, MTA, 

Defendants. /

No. C 06-0375 PJH (PR)

ORDER RULING ON

PENDING MOTIONS

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Plaintiff contends that the

defendants, despite being alerted to his serious need for surgery for an inguinal hernia, and

agreeing that he needed the surgery, delayed it from September of 2003 to August of 2004. 

He asserts that as a result he suffered severe pain daily until the surgery was done. The

defendants who have been served, Lee, Kates, and Brager, who hereafter will be referred

to as “defendants,” have moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff has opposed the motion

and filed several other motions, which will be addressed first below.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

Plaintiff has moved to compel more complete answers to his interrogatories and to

compel responses to his requests for production, which he says were ignored. Although

defendants have opposed the motion to compel, they do not mention the requests for

production, so have not disputed their failure to answer. The motion to compel will be

granted as to the production of documents. 

Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to reply to the opposition to his motion to

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 1 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

compel will be granted and the reply treated as timely.

In his motion to compel plaintiff contends that in response to his interrogatories

defendants made “unfounded objections” and gave “evasive incomplete” answers. Pl. Mot.

Compel at 1. The court will review the contested interrogatory answers below. In

conducting this review, the following general propositions will be applied. 

The federal rules allow liberal discovery. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S.

20, 34 (1984). The party resisting discovery has the burden of establishing lack of

relevance or undue burden. Oleson v. Kmart Corp., 175 F.R.D. 560, 565 (D. Kan. 1997). 

A recitation that the discovery request is “overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and

irrelevant” is not adequate to voice a successful objection. Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677

F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982); Oleson, 175 F.R.D. at 565. The party resisting discovery

must instead “‘show specifically how ... each interrogatory is not relevant or how each

question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive.’” Josephs, 677 F.2d at 992 (quoting

Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296-97 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). 

1. Brager Interrogatory One

As to defendant Brager, plaintiff moves to compel additional or revised answers to

interrogatories one and two, out of four. In the first interrogatory plaintiff asked her to

identify the positions she held at the prison and the associated duties for each position

“between July 03 and January 05.” The response was: “Objection. Overbroad as to time. 

Additional objection. Not relevant and not likely to lead to discoverable admissible

evidence. Oppenheimer Fun, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351-352 (1978) F.R.C.P.

26(b)[.]” 

In her opposition to the motion to compel Brager has reprinted the interrogatories

and the answers, and after some of the answers added material in parentheses and italics. 

It appears that these interpolations are intended to be argument as to the adequacy of

those answers, although that is not explicitly stated. As to interrogatory one to Brager, the

italicized explanation is: “Defendant Brager is not a trained medical personnel [sic] and

would have no authority to grant or deny any treatment requested by plaintiff. Her

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 2 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

personnel record is not relevant and unlikely to lead to admissible evidence. Furthermore,

Defendant Brager’s personnel records are protected from disclosure pursuant to the Official

Information Privilege. Currently, Allison Brager is a medical appeals analyst.”

Brager’s objection that the question is overbroad as to time is without merit. The time

period specified covers the time from the onset of plaintiff’s hernia in July of 2003 until a

date about five months after the surgery. In the very case cited by Brager in her answer,

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, the Court said: “The key phrase in this definition --

“relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” -- has been construed

broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other

matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. See Hickman v. Taylor,

329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). [Footnote omitted] Consistently with the notice-pleading system

established by the Rules, discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for

discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues. Id., at 500-501. Nor is

discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented issues may arise

during litigation that are not related to the merits.” Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351. 

Certainly under this generous standard the relevant time period for a claim involving failure

to provide timely surgery includes a reasonable period after surgery when the effects of the

delay might be felt. Although this objection is without merit, it is not frivolous, as it goes

further than merely saying “overbroad” and because the time period identified in the

question does extend to a time after the surgery occurred.

 The same cannot be said of the second objection, however. Brager contends that

the information asked for is not relevant nor likely to lead to admissible evidence, but

Brager’s positions and job responsibilities in the period when plaintiff was not receiving care

most certainly is relevant. This objection is frivolous.

The material contained in the parentheses in Brager’s opposition to the motion to

compel is puzzling. If it is intended as an explanation of the relevance objection, it should

have been included in the answer; in any event, the contention that she has no authority to

grant or deny medical treatment is insufficient to justify the objection because (1) a bare

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 3 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

assertion is insufficient to prove the point; (2) it would seem likely that a person who grants

or denies medical grievances could cause medical care to be given, or at least influence

whether it is given; and (3) whether she is “a trained medical personnel” has no bearing on

whether she could cause medical care which had been ordered by a doctor to actually be

given. The comments having to do with personnel records are also not to the point,

because the question does not call for personnel records. And finally, the statement that

she is now a medical appeals analyst -- given only in the opposition, remember -- is

irrelevant, because the question calls for job titles and descriptions at the time of the events

giving rise to the case, not at present.

2. Brager Interrogatory Two

In interrogatory two plaintiff asks Brager to “describe how you first became aware of

plaintiff’s hernia condition. (a) Please identify the names and titles of all person present at

these meetings or discussions. (b) Please identify the dates, names, titles and locations of

all documents that were submitted to you[] concerning plaintiff’s need for surgical

treatment.” In response, Brager said: “Objection. Unintelligible as the meaning of the

question. Responding party was not personally aware of any patient’s condition. Further

objection. Burdensome and harassing. Responding party reviews many medical appeals

and inmate medical records, and the relevant ones are enumerated in the response to the

appeal with is provided to the inmate. Without waiving the objections, responding party

answers that plaintiff’s medical grievance appeal and a copy of plaintiff’s medical record

speak for themselves.” In the parenthetical opposition to the motion to compel, plaintiff

states: “(Plaintiff seeks privileged information in his interrogatory and his second

interrogatory was compound and vague as to what information he is seeking.)”

The argument in the opposition to the motion to compel, quoted above in italics,

presents new objections that should have been contained in the answer, if Brager wished

to rely on them. As to the substance of the opposition, the question is multi-part, but not for

that reason unanswerable. If an issue as to the number of interrogatories arises, it will be

counted as three; but at the moment, only an ostensible four interrogatories have been

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 4 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006) (that prisoner-plaintiff wrote

to prison administrators asking for help with a medical problem is sufficient to generate a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the administrators were deliberately indifferent in

failing to act). 

5

asked of Brager, or six counting the subparts of interrogatory two, so that is not an issue. 

The contention that the question is vague may have some merit as to subpart a, as

discussed below.

The objection that the question is unintelligible is without merit as to the first

sentence and subpart b. It does have merit as to subpart a, which refers to “these

meetings or discussions,” apparently assuming that the answer to the first sentence would

be that Brager learned of plaintiff’s hernia condition in a meeting or discussion. 

The sentence in the answer “[r]esponding party was not personally aware of any

patient’s condition” does not seem to explain the objection that the question is unintelligible. 

On the other hand, if it is intended as an answer to the first sentence of the interrogatory,

where Brager is asked when she first “became aware of plaintiff’s hernia condition,” than it

does constitute an answer, though it seems surprising that Brager should be contending

that she was not personally aware of plaintiff’s condition, since she answered his

administrative appeal alerting her to it.1

 Given this lack of clarity, the motion to compel will

be granted as to the first sentence of the interrogatory.

The objection “burdensome and harassing” is not adequately explained and seems

unlikely, given that relatively discrete events are involved. The sentence following the

“burdensome and harassing” objection, which may or may not be intended to explain it, is

“[r]esponding party reviews many medical appeals and inmate medical records, and the

relevant ones are enumerated in the response to the appeal with is provided to the inmate.” 

That Brager reviews many medical appeals is irrelevant to the question and to whether the

question is burdensome, and the statement about the relevant records being enumerated

to inmates with the response to the grievance says nothing about what was done with

respect to plaintiff. Furthermore, Brager’s statement that “relevant” documents “are

enumerated” does not answer the question, which was what documents were “submitted”

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 5 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

to Brager. 

Finally, the answer given subject to objection, “responding party answers that

plaintiff’s medical grievance appeal and a copy of plaintiff’s medical record speak for

themselves” does not answer the questions and is unintelligible in this context.

For these reasons, the motion to compel will be granted as to the first sentence of

this interrogatory and subpart b. It will be denied as to subpart a. 

3. Kates Interrogatory One

 In interrogatory one directed to nurse Kates, plaintiff asked for her job description

and “any and all” other positions she held “during the times relevant to plaintiff’s

contentions.” Katkes’ response was “[o]bjection. Overbroad as to time. Additional

objection. Not likely to lead to discoverable evidence. Without waiving the objection, my

job description with response to inmate appeals was to complete research of issues related

to the appeal.” Kates does not comment on this answer in her opposition.

The overbreadth objection is without merit for the reasons discussed above, and the

contention that the answers would not be likely to lead to discoverable evidence is frivolous

because her job descriptions and positions held self-evidently are likely to lead to

admissible evidence. The motion to compel will be granted as to this interrogatory.

4. Kates Interrogatory Two

The second interrogatory directed to Kates is the same as the second directed to

Brager. The answer, however, is different. In response, Kates says: “Objection[.] The

information requested is equally available to all parties. Without waiving the objection,

responding party reviewed plaintiff’s grievance so long ago that she has no actual

recollection of the information requested, but it would have included the grievance written

by plaintiff and plaintiff’s medical record, which plaintiff himself has copies of. Further, the

interrogatory is compound and assumes facts not in evidence (e.g. meetings and/or

discussions actually happened)[.]” 

The objection appears to be factually frivolous -- how could a prisoner be equally

aware of when the nurse became aware of his medical need, and how could he have equal

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 6 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

access to the knowledge of what documents were submitted to her with regard to his need

for treatment? And in any case the objection that information is equally available to the

questioner is not a proper objection. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial

Financial Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 514 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (citing City Consumer Services v.

Horne, 100 F.R.D. 740, 747 (D. Utah 1983); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United

States, 1989 WL 110300 *3 (D. Kan. June 7, 1989)). 

The answer supplied subject to objection also is not sufficient. If Kates has no

recollection of when she learned of plaintiff’s need nor of what documents were submitted

to her, she may give that as the answer, but only after attempting to discover the answers

and with an explanation of what she did to try to provide an answer. See Budget

Rent-A-Car of Mo., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 55 F.R.D. 354, 357 (W.D. Mo.1972) (if person

answering interrogatory cannot furnish the information and details required, he or she must

so state under oath and should set forth in detail the efforts made to obtain the information).

The motion to compel will be granted as to this interrogatory. Because part a of the

question has the same defect as part a of the same interrogatory addressed to Brager,

Kates need not attempt to answer it. 

5. Kates Interrogatories Four and Five

This is interrogatory five: “Please describe what is the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation[] (CDCR)’s established policy concerning prisoners with

serious medical needs that require surgery who are transferred out to court, before

treatment has been undergone.” Interrogatory four is the same but without “before

treatment as been undergone.” The difference between the questions is unclear; while it

might seem that interrogatory four is directed to those who have had surgery and five to

those who have not yet had it, the words ”that require surgery” seem to be forward-looking;

that is, the most logical interpretation of both questions is that they apply to prisoners with

serious medical needs that require surgery which they have not yet had. In any case,

Kates does not object to the form of the questions, and for purposes of this ruling they will

be treated as being the same.

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 7 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

In her answer to interrogatory four, Kates says: “Objection. The question seeks

information not within the knowledge of this responding party. Additional objection in that

Department policy would not cover patients who are not under the control of the

Department when they are out to court.” As noted above, the objection is without merit in

the absence of an explanation of efforts made to determine the answer. This is particularly

true in this case, given that Kates is a nurse and deals with medical appeals, so should be

in a position to find out what the policy is, if there is one. The “additional objection” is not

an objection at all and is irrelevant, given that the Department might have a policy as to the

proper procedure for dealing with prisoners who are in need of surgery but who are

scheduled to be away from the institution.

In her answer to interrogatory five, Kates says: “Objection. The question is one for

an expert witness, which responding party is not. The institution has a policy and practice

of scheduling surgery which [is] routine, urgent or emergen[cy], as determined by a

licenced physician who has examined the patient.”

As to the objection, for one thing Kates is a LVN, so she certainly is an expert as to

some things; for another, the question calls for whether there is a policy and what it is, not

something which requires expert opinion. And the answer, about the classifications of

urgency, is not responsive to the question.

The motion to compel will be granted as to these interrogatories.

6. Kates Interrogatory Six

Interrogatory six reads: “In your opinion, in as much detail as possible, why was

there an inordinate delay in plaintiff receiving surgical treatment, after staff surgeon’s

recommendation[]?” 

In response, Kates said: “Objection. Responding party has no direct knowledge

concerning movement of prisoners, or knowledge of the availability of appointments with

outside surgical consultants. [¶] Defendant Kates is an LVN whose job is to review the

medical issues raised in an inmate’s appeal. She has no operational duties, such as

delivery of medical assistance, scheduling of services or movement of inmate patients and

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 8 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

would therefore have no basis for an opinion based on these issues.”

The objection is not proper. It is evasive with the use of “direct,” and it does not say

whether Kates has an opinion and, if so, what it is. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 33 (a)(2)

(interrogatory not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that

relates to fact or the application of law to fact). To the extent it is an answer rather than an

objection, it is not responsive to the question. Given the reference to a problem with a

contract with the local hospital in another interrogatory answer, it seems possible that Kates

might have an opinion based on information learned from others. 

The second paragraph also does not answer the question, first because the lack of

“operational duties” would not necessarily mean she would have no basis for an opinion,

which after all might be based on second-hand information, and second because it does

not actually say that she has no such opinion. 

The motion to compel will be granted as to this interrogatory.

7. Lee Interrogatory One

Plaintiff’s interrogatories addressed to defendant Lee state in the instructions that

they “relate to the times and dates in the complaint of this lawsuit, from July ‘03 until

January ‘05.” In response to interrogatory one, which asked for the names of the members

of the Medical Authorization Review Committee “during all times relevant to plaintiff’s

contentions,” Lee has answered “Objection. Overbroad as to time. Additional objection. 

Not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because the diagnostic procedure

for plaintiff’s symptoms was approved by every committee which reviewed the physician’s

request for services.” 

Given that plaintiff’s claim is that surgery was delayed from September of 2003 to

roughly August 31 of 2004, roughly the period about which plaintiff inquires, the “overbroad

as to time” objection is frivolous. The second objection, that a “diagnostic procedure” was

approved, is nonsensical because plaintiff’s claim goes not to diagnosis but to the delay in

surgery. And knowing who was on the committees which approved the diagnosis is

reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, as those people might be able to

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 9 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

testify to the need for surgery and might know what happened to delay surgery.

In his opposition Lee adds this parenthetical: “(There were several committee

reviews at different facilities over a period of two years. Records are not keep [sic]

regarding the committee reviews themselves. The results of the committee reviews are

keep [sic] in the inmate’s record).” These facts were not presented in the answer to the

interrogatory and are not responsive to the question, and thus are irrelevant.

The motion to compel will be granted as to Lee interrogatory one.

8. Lee Interrogatory Two

In his response to the second interrogatory, which asked for the names of the

members of the Health Care Review committee (the first interrogatory was about the

Medical Authorization Review Committee), Lee again raises his contention that the

information requested is not likely to lead to admissible evidence because the committees

approved “the diagnostic procedure,” although he inexplicably does not assert the

overbreath objection posed to the first interrogatory. For the reasons set out above, the

objection he does raise is frivolous.

9. Lee Interrogatory Four

Plaintiff does not move to compel a further answer to interrogatory three.

In interrogatory four, plaintiff asked Lee to describe his “health care responsibilities,

and limitations, once you became aware of plaintiff’s need for surgical treatment.” The

response is: “Objection. The information requested is equally available to all parties in the

Second Level Response. I was informed that plaintiff had undergone surgical repair of an

inguinal hernia on August 31, 2004.” The answer regarding the date Lee was informed of

the surgery is not responsive to the question, which clearly did not call for a date. 

In his opposition Lee says: “(The Second Level Response was given to plaintiff on

October 14, 2004. On page two of that report it cites CCR 3354 Health Care

Responsibilities and Limitations. Plaintiff attached a copy of this response to his First

Amended Complaint)[.]” This, if Lee had also stated that the regulation constitutes the

extent of his responsibilities and limitations, would have constituted an answer. It does not

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 10 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

constitute reason to deny the motion to compel however; that is, as argument in opposition

to a challenge to the sufficiency of the answer it is irrelevant. The motion to compel will be

granted as to interrogatory four.

10. Lee Interrogatory Six

Plaintiff does not challenge the answer to interrogatory five.

In interrogatory number six petitioner asked Lee to “describe ... how many times and

by how many different physicians, nurse, or medical staff, were you alerted that I needed

surgery between July ‘03 and August 30th 2004?” In response, Lee wrote: “Objection. Not

likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff’s surgery was approved as

routine. The scheduling for outside medical services depends on whether it is routine,

urgent, or an emergency, and upon the availability [of] custody staff for transport, and of the

outside specialist for the procedure, none of which is under the control of medical staff at

plaintiff’s institution.” 

Obviously, how many times a defendant was told the prisoner required surgery is

relevant in a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and the factors Lee

lists that affect availability of medical care would not necessarily immunize him from liability. 

See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1097 (failure to provide treatment because administrative reasons

prevented a prisoner from being sent to a non-contracted facility would be a failure to

provide treatment for non-medical reasons, which is sufficient to generate a genuine issue

of material fact as to deliberate indifference on the part of the doctor for failing to treat the

patient). For that reason, the information sought was reasonably calculated to lead to

admissible evidence. 

In the opposition to the motion to compel, Lee says: “(If there is no contract with an

outside hospital for a particular service, outside consultants refuse to accept inmate

patients. For a period of a year and a half, Natividad Hospital near Salinas refused to

accept any patients due to a contract dispute with the Department of Corrections. This

resulted in delays for services from several institutions.)” Even if this had been included in

the answer to the interrogatory, it would have been unresponsive to the question, and as

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 11 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

opposition it provides no explanation as to why the answer that was given was satisfactory

or the objection valid. 

The motion to compel will be granted as to interrogatory six. 

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Motion for Denial or

Continuance

Defendants have moved for summary judgment and plaintiff, although he has

opposed the motion, also has moved under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure for the motion to be denied or continued so he may complete discovery. In view

of the ruling granting the motion to compel, plaintiff’s motion will be granted and he will be

afforded time to complete discovery. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only the

power to "request" that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). This does not give the courts the power to make "coercive

appointments of counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989).

The court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 only in

"exceptional circumstances," the determination of which requires an evaluation of both (1)

the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Terrell v. Brewer, 935

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.

1986).

Plaintiff has done an exceptionally good job litigating this case so far. He appears

able to present his claims adequately, and the issues are not complex. The motion for

appointment of counsel will be denied.

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to reply to the motion to compel

(document number 34) is GRANTED and the reply is deemed timely.

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (document 28) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. It is granted as to: Brager interrogatory one and the first sentence of Brager

interrogatory two and subpart b of that interrogatory; Kates interrogatories one, four, five,

and six, and the first sentence and subsection b of Kates interrogatory two; and Lee

interrogatories one, two, four and six. It is also GRANTED as to plaintiff’s request for

production. Defendants are ORDERED to provide proper responses, taking into account

the defects identified above in the discussion of the present answers, and to respond to the

request for production of documents, within thirty days of the date this order is entered. 

3. Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel (document 44) and for sanctions

(document 37) are DENIED.

4. Plaintiff’s motion to withhold ruling on the motion for summary judgment

(document 45) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted until May 26, 2008, to complete discovery. 

He then may file a supplemental opposition to the motion to dismiss by June 23, 2008. If

defendants wish to reply to the supplemental opposition, they shall do so by a date fourteen

days from the date the supplemental opposition is served upon them. After the deadline for

filing a supplemental reply has passed the court will rule on the motion for summary

judgment without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered at a later date.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.06\FOSSELMAN375.DISCOVERY.wpd

Case 4:06-cv-00375-PJH Document 52 Filed 03/18/08 Page 13 of 13