Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05365/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05365-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

MANGO WATTS, )

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Plaintiff, )

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v. )

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DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS, et al., )

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Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 03-5365 OWW DLB P 

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

A. Background

Plaintiff Mango Watts (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis in

this civil action pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is represented by counsel. This action was

based on plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed April 14, 2004 against defendants Zuniga, Lewis,

Vanderpoel, Hickman and Alameida in which he alleged that the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) hair length grooming standards, Cal.Code Regs. Tit. 15,

§ 3062, violated the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et. Seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Plaintiff sought injunctive, compensatory and declaratory relief.

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U.S. District Court

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Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, on August 4, 2005, the Court ordered that during the

pendency of this action, or until further order of the Court, defendants shall refrain from enforcing,

with respect to plaintiff, the CDCR grooming standards requirement that male prisoners maintain

their hair no longer than three inches in length. 

On August 17, 2005, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed

an opposition on September 12, 2005. On October 25, 2005, plaintiff substituted Catherine

Campbell and Carolyn Phillips as his attorneys of record. On December 1, 2005, plaintiff filed a

supplemental opposition to defendants’ motion. On February 24, 2006, defendants filed a Notice of

Change in the Applicable Law, advising that CDCR had changed their grooming to standards and

inmates were now allowed to grow their hair. A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was

held on March 3, 2006 at which time the parties discussed settlement and agreed to continue the

discussions after the hearing. The remaining issue was the expungement of plaintiff’s disciplinary

file and attorneys’ fees. 

When settlement was not reached, the Court issued Findings and Recommendation on

August 10, 2006 recommending that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied in part

and granted in part as follows: defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of plaintiff’s First

Amendment Claim be GRANTED; defendants motion for summary adjudication of plaintiff’s Equal

Protection claim and RLUIPA claim be DENIED; defendants be granted qualified immunity as to

plaintiffs claims for damages; and because plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief prohibiting

defendants from enforcing the grooming standards was moot in light of the modification to the

grooming regulations, the case was to proceed only on plaintiff’s request for an injunction mandating

expungement from plaintiff’s central file of disciplinary reports relating to non-compliance with the

grooming standards. Accordingly, the only issue remaining after the motion for summary judgment

was plaintiff’s request for expungement of his rules violation reports regarding the grooming

standards. The District Judge adopted the Findings and Recommendation in full on September 19,

2006.

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U.S. District Court

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On November 3, 2006, the Court signed a stipulation and order to expunge the

disciplinary reports from plaintiff’s file thereby concluding the action.

On November 17, 2006, plaintiff’s counsel filed the present motion for attorneys’ fees. 

At the request of counsel, the hearing was continued to January 19, 2007. Defendants filed an

opposition on November 30, 2006 and plaintiff filed a reply on December 14, 2006. 

Ms. Campbell requests an order granting compensation for a total amount of 79.55

hours. Counsel requests that the lodestar amount for this work be set at the PLRA rate.

Ms. Phillips seeks a total amount of 17.5 hours. Counsel requests that the lodestar

amount for this work be set at the PLRA rate.

Defendants oppose the motion and argue that under the PLRA, attorneys’ fees are

limited to those fees directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of plaintiff’s

constitutional or statutory rights. Defendants contend plaintiff asserted but never proved an actual

violation of his civil rights.

B. Discussion

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act attorney’s fees awarded in cases brought by

prisoners must be (1) “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of plaintiff’s

rights protected by a statute to which a fee may be awarded” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; (2)

“proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation,” and (3) “directly and reasonably

incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). In addition,

“[n]o award of attorney’s fees in an action [brought by a prisoner] shall be based on an hourly rate

greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. A. §

3006A, for payment of court appointed counsel.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3). Plaintiff “prevails when

actual relief on the merits of the claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by

modifying defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. Farrar v. Hobby, 506

U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992). “It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially decreed in

order to justify a fee award under § 1988. A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the

defendant that affords plaintiff all or some of the relief [the plaintiff] sought through a judgment.” 

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Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-761(1987). 

When counsel assumed responsibility for this case, they were immediately faced with

opposing a motion for summary judgement filed on claims asserted by plaintiff without the benefit of

counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel appropriately conceded many of the issues in the motion for summary

judgment and contested others. The supplemental opposition brief filed by counsel was directed at

the legal issues in the case which were the basis for the relief sought, namely, damages and

injunctive relief. The Court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part, granted

defendants qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s claims for damages and ordered the case proceed to

trial on plaintiff’s Equal Protection and RLUIPA claims for injunctive relief. Immediately following

the order on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, defendants agreed to the expungement of

plaintiff’s central file. 

While plaintiff was not 100% successful on all of his claims, due to counsel’s efforts,

he was successful in having his disciplinary record removed from his central file after defeating

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his Equal Protection and RLUIPA claims. The Court

granted defendants qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s claims for damages but the case proceeded on

plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief which were based on the same legal claims. Counsel

ultimately settled the claims in plaintiff’s favor, an agreement which “materially altered the legal

relationship” of the parties. Based on the outcome of this case, the Court finds that plaintiff is the

prevailing party and is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). The Court

further finds that 50% of counsel’s time was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual

violation of plaintiff’s rights. Counsel is therefore entitled to compensation for 48.5 hours at the rate

of $138.00 per hour. Defendants are ordered to pay the total amount of $6,693.00 directly to

plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 11, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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