Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00565/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00565-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cornelius Dora; Barbara Dora, husband

and wife,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

United States of America, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV-05-565-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1). (Doc. 4). Plaintiff

has filed a response in opposition (Doc. 7) and Defendant has filed a reply. (Doc. 8). The

Court heard oral argument on Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on January 20,

2006. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court granted the parties permission to provide

supplemental briefing which has now been filed. (Doc. 12 & 13). Having reviewed the

pleadings and heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the Court issues this Order.

I.

Background.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County, on August

31, 2004 asserting state law claims for defamation and slander against named defendant

Michael Achey. Defendant, represented by the United States Attorney for the District of

Case 2:05-cv-00565-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/13/06 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Arizona, filed a notice of removal (Doc. 1). On February 22, 2005, the United States

Attorney filed the summons and complaint in support of the notice of removal. (Doc. 2). On

February 23, 2005, the United States Attorney filed certification that Michael Achey was

acting within the course and scope of his employment as an employee of the United States

at the time of the conduct alleged in the complaint. (Doc. 3). Also on February 23, 2005,

a notice to substitute the United States as Defendant was filed. (Doc. 5). The Court ordered

the United States substituted as Defendant on March 23, 2005. (Doc. 6).

Plaintiffs have asserted the following allegations in the complaint. Plaintiff Cornelius

Dora serves as a representative for the Veterans Services Association, Inc. (“VASi”), a nonprofit corporation organized to assist veterans in using the VA Hospital in Phoenix.

(Complaint, at ¶ 5). Mr. Dora is also a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and was

selected to be a member of the Military Order of the Cooties ("MOC").(id., at ¶ 4). Until

February 10, 2004, Mr. Dora served as the Veterans Affairs Voluntary Services ("VAVS")

representative assigned to the VA Hospital in Phoenix where he had an office. (id., ¶ 6). His

wife Barbara Dora, also a plaintiff, volunteered at the VA Hospital as the VAVS

representative for the MOC Auxiliary. (id., ¶ 5-6). In 2003, Michael Achey was assigned to

the VA Hospital as the Voluntary Services Officer. (id.. ¶ 7). 

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Achey made statements about Mr. Dora, asserting the

following in the complaint:

7. In 2003, Michael D. Achey, federal employee, was assigned

to the VA Hospital as Voluntary Services officer. Upon his

assignment to the Hospital, Achey began making defamatory

and slanderous remarks to VA officials about Cornelius Dora.

Achey stated that Dora illegally and improperly diverted funds

properly belonging to the VA Hospital to "other organizations,"

presumably VASi.

8. In written letter to the Supreme Commander of the MOC,

Achey defamed Dora by calling him "rude'" "disruptive," and

"unprofessional." He further stated that Dora brought "shame"

on the MOC. These statements and Achey's statements that

Dora diverted or embezzled VA Hospital funds are false,

defamatory and maliciously made.

9. As a result of Achey's false, slanderous and defamatory

statements, Dora was removed from his position as VAVS

Case 2:05-cv-00565-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/13/06 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

representative at the VA Hospital. He was removed from his

office at the Hospital and barred from entering the Hospital save

to visit specifically identified veterans. Barbara Dora has been

barred from entering all VA facilities to do the volunteer and

charitable work she has done for years. Barbara Dora has been

barred from volunteering with the DAR Ladies at the National

memorial Cemetery in Phoenix.

(id.). 

II.

Standard of Review.

A jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) may be made either on the face of the

pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328

F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). If the challenge to jurisdiction is that the allegations are

insufficient on their face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction, plaintiff is entitled to

safeguards similar to those applicable when a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion is made. The

factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true, and the motion is granted only if the

plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Wolfe v.

Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). A complaint will be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction (1) if the case does not "arise under" any federal law or the United

States Constitution; (2) if there is no case or controversy within the meaning of that

constitutional term; or, (3) if the cause is not one described in any jurisdictional statute.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the

federal court has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. Scott v. Breeland, 792

F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Where the jurisdictional issue is separate from the merits of the case, the court can

consider evidence regarding jurisdiction and resolve factual disputes when necessary.

However, "[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence

of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits

of jurisdictional claims." Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citations and quotations omitted). Discovery is necessary only if it would allow the plaintiff

to show the requisite jurisdictional facts. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th

Case 2:05-cv-00565-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/13/06 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Cir. 1989). The government’s scope of employment certification is conclusive unless

challenged, in which case, the court reviews the certificate de novo. Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d

695, 698 (9th Cir. 1993). 

III.

Discussion.

Defendant contends that the complaint and action should be dismissed based on the

Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), as amended by the Federal Employee Liability Reform

and Tort Compensation Act ("FELRTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80, because the

United States has not waived sovereign immunity for a civil action alleging the torts of

defamation and slander per se. Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs did not exhaust their

administrative remedies, a jurisdictional requirement. Plaintiffs have responded that Mr.

Achey's statements and actions were taken outside the scope of his employment as a federal

official and are not subject to the FTCA. 

(A) Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Federal Tort Claims Act is the exclusive remedy for a tort by a Government

employee "where the employee was 'acting within the scope of his office or employment' .

. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). However, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) places a jurisdictional restriction

that any claim arising out of libel, slander" is excepted from the FTCA. Meridian Int'l

Logistics, Inc. v. United States, 939 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, if Mr. Achey

was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the conduct alleged, the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. Meridian Int’l Logistics, Inc., 939 F.2d at 743

(district court would lack subject matter jurisdiction if the FBI agent made the allegedly

defamatory comments within the scope of his job of investigating the plaintiff).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), a case is removable from state court “[u]pon

certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the

scope of his office or employment.” This certification has three consequences: "it requires

the Attorney General to remove the lawsuit to the local federal court; it requires the

substitution of the United States for the federal employee as the defendant in the lawsuit; and

Case 2:05-cv-00565-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/13/06 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

it converts the lawsuit into an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims

Act", 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). Haddon v. United States, 68 F.3d 1420, 1423 (D.C. Cir.

1995). 

An FTCA action "shall not be instituted" against the United States unless the claimant

first presents a claim to the "appropriate Federal agency." 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Augustine

v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). This is a jurisdictional limitation. Id.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have not submitted a claim to the "appropriate

administrative agency." (Doc. 7 at p. 5). 

(B) Review of Certification

The Westfall Act gives federal officials absolute immunity from state tort lawsuits for

money damages if their conduct is within the scope of employment. Arthur v. United States

By and Through Veterans Admin., 45 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1995). While the scope of

employment certification is conclusive for purposes of removal, it is not conclusive regarding

substitution of the United States. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432

(1995). The party challenging the certification "bears the burden of presenting evidence and

disproving the Attorney General's certification by a preponderance of the evidence." Billings

v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The question of whether a federal employee is acting within the course and scope of

his employment is determined by applying respondeat superior principles of the state in

which the alleged tort occurred. See Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1993). In

Arizona, "[t]he conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if it is of the kind the

employee is employed to perform, it occurs substantially within the authorized time and

space limit, and it is actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master." Smith v.

American Exp. Travel Related Services Co., Inc., 876 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1994). An employer is liable for its employee's conduct if at the time of injury, the employee

"was performing a service in furtherance of [the] employer's business." Id., 876 P.2d at 1171

(citing Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Norman, 594 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)).

Citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229(1), the Arizona courts look to whether the

Case 2:05-cv-00565-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/13/06 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

conduct was of the same nature as the employer authorized or incidental to that as authorized.

State, Dept. of Admin. v. Schallock, 941 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Ariz. 1997). When material facts

are not in dispute, a court may decide as a matter of law that an employee was acting within

the scope of employment. See Duncan v. State, 754 P.2d 1160, 1164 (Ariz. Ct. App.1988).

Defendant did not submit any documents in support of its motion to dismiss except

for the affidavit of Gregory G. Ferris, Regional Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs,

stating there was no record of an administrative claim first being presented concerning the

complaint's allegations. As part of its reply, however, Defendant has submitted documents

that discuss the duties and responsibilities of the Voluntary Service Program Manager for

the Carl Hayden VA Hospital in Phoenix. Defendant states in the reply that Mr. Achey is

the Voluntary Service Program Manager (Doc. 8 at p. 4), and that in this position, Mr. Achey

is responsible for aspects of the Voluntary Service program including policy, program and

assignment development, administrative operations, and supervision of program staff and

volunteers. He also is responsible for recruitment, selection, placement, evaluation,

counseling, dismissal, etc., of all volunteers. Defendant further states that "[t]he Voluntary

Service Program Manager may remove a VAVS volunteer for unsatisfactory performance,

inability to perform the assignment, or violation of established policy and/or procedures."

(Doc. 8 at p. 4, n. 2). 

According to Defendant, "[Mr.] Achey terminated the plaintiffs as volunteers of the

VA medical center for reasons within Achey's responsibilities..." (id., at p. 6). Defendant

argues that in light of these duties and responsibilities, even if Mr. Achey made or wrote

defamatory comments in the performance of his responsibilities, including comments to

others not associated with or employed by the VA, this conduct fell within the scope of his

employment and furthered the business of the VA medical facility. In its supplemental

briefing, Defendant has cited authority that actions, even if unauthorized, fall within the

scope of office or employment if they are "incidental" to that employment. 

Plaintiffs argue in their response, however, that they bear the burden of rebutting the

certification and that they cannot discharge this burden without some opportunity for

Case 2:05-cv-00565-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/13/06 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

discovery. Plaintiffs point out that they have alleged that Mr. Achey was acting outside the

scope of his employment duties with the Department of Veterans Affairs and that he made

statements to "among others, those not associated with or employed by the Department."

Plaintiffs did not submit any documents in support of their response. Plaintiffs did state in

their response that Mr. Achey was "Plaintiff's superior directly responsible for overseeing

certain of the activities which are the subject of this defamation suit." (Doc. 7, at p. 3). In

their supplemental briefing, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Dora was not removed by Mr. Achey

but by his superiors at the MOC to whom Achey made the alleged defamatory statements.

Plaintiffs have cited Stokes v. Cross, 327 F.3d 1210 (D.C.Cir. 2003), in support of

their request that discovery should proceed on the scope-of-employment issue. In Stokes,

the appellate court noted that plaintiff, in challenging the certification of scope of

employment, had the burden to raise a material dispute by alleging facts that, if true, would

establish that the defendants were acting outside the scope of their employment but the

district court never gave them the opportunity. Rather, the district court gave conclusive

weight to the certification. Id., at 1214. The appellate court considered the plaintiff's

allegations in the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8's liberal pleading standards. Id., at 1215.

 In the instant case, the parties appear to set forth disputed facts regarding the context

in which the alleged statements were made. Plaintiffs appear to dispute that Mr. Dora was

removed by Mr. Achey. The facts that have been presented do not sufficiently show the

context of the remarks such as when Mr. Achey made the allegedly actionable comments or

whether the comments were made during work hours or at the work place, particularly any

comments made to persons outside the VA medical center. 

In Arthur v. United States, etc., 45 F.3d at 296, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit discussed as follows the district court's review of a certification question:

[W]hen a district court is reviewing a certification question

under the Westfall Act, it must identify and resolve disputed

issues of fact necessary to its decision before entering its order.

In doing so, it should hold such hearings as appropriate

(including an evidentiary hearing if necessary), and make the

findings necessary to bind the parties by its decision and enable

Case 2:05-cv-00565-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/13/06 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

them to appeal the certification decision if they deem an appeal

necessary.

The Court has determined that discovery should proceed on the limited issue of whether Mr.

Achey's alleged remarks and activity occurred within the course and scope of his federal

employment. The parties' limited discovery on the scope-of-employment issue shall proceed

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and shall be completed no later than May 1, 2006.

The Court will hold a status hearing at the conclusion of the discovery period to discuss with

counsel further proceedings in the case. Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is

denied without prejudice. 

 Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 4) is denied

without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may proceed with discovery on the

limited issue of Plaintiffs' challenge to the scope of employment certification. Discovery on

this limited issue shall be completed no later than May 1, 2006.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a status hearing will be set at the close of the

discovery period.

DATED this 8th day of March, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-00565-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/13/06 Page 8 of 8