Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00022/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00022-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

YOLANDA CISNEROS-BARNADAS, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

MIGUEL CISNEROS and CARMEN 

BANDELIA CISNEROS-ESPINOZA, 

Defendants. 

CASE NO: 11-CV-0022-IEG () 

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS, (2) DENYING REQUEST 

FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION, AND DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILING TO 

STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH 

RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2). 

Plaintiff, a nonprisoner proceeding pro se, has submitted a complaint seeking a restraining 

order against Defendants and a request for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 

Plaintiff has also submitted a Motion and Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury in Support of Motion 

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, 

except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 

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An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is 

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 

1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets is sufficient to show that she is unable to pay the 

fees or post securities required to maintain this action. See CIVLR 3.2(d). Plaintiff’s sole source of 

income is a monthly Social Security disability payment; she owns an automobile, but no other 

property, assets, or securities; and owes more than $10,000 in medical bills. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

II. Plaintiff’s Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 

In determining whether to grant a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the 

Court applies the standard articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 

7, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate: (1) the 

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public 

interest. Id. at 374. Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 375-76. 

It is not clear from the face of Plaintiff’s complaint that the Court has either subject matter 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims or personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Thus, Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that she is likely to succeed on the merits. As a result, the Court need not address the 

remaining prongs of the standard for issuing a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. 

Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 

III. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by any person 

proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and 

dismissal by the court to the extent it is “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc). Prior to its amendment by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the former 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Id. at 1130. The 

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newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), however, mandates that the court reviewing a complaint filed 

pursuant to the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before 

directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2). Lopez, 

203 F.3d 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma 

pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 

(9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the “the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). As currently pleaded, it appears as though Plaintiff’s complaint is 

subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because it fails to establish that the Court 

has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim or personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 

Plaintiff’s complaint details threats of bodily harm allegedly made against her by Defendants 

and seeks protection through a restraining order against them. Plaintiff makes disturbing allegations, 

but, without jurisdiction, the Court is powerless to act. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).1

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 Though Plaintiff’s complaint is granted with leave to amend, the Court notes that the Courts 

of the State of California may be better suited to address her claim. 

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CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP is 

GRANTED, Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is 

DENIED, and Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2). If Plaintiff still wishes to continue to proceed with this matter she must, within thirty 

(30) days of the date of this Order: (1) SUBMIT AN AMENDED COMPLAINT WHICH 

ADDRESSES ALL THE DEFICIENCIES OF PLEADING SET FORTH ABOVE; AND (2) 

ATTACH A COPY OF THIS ORDER. If Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, it will be dismissed with prejudice and without any further leave to 

amend. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that court may 

dismiss action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) if Plaintiff fails to comply with previous court order 

regarding amendment). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: _______________________________ 

 IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge 

 United States District Court 

 

1/10/2011

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