Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00423/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00423-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 For ease of reference, the Court will use the page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic filing

system.

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 1 10cv0423

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD CHARLES BUCHANAN, Civil No. 10-0423 BTM (NLS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: 

(1) DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING; and

(2) DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Richard Charles Buchanan, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Pet.) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his

convictions in San Diego County Superior Court case number SCS187166 for kidnaping for ransom or

extortion, assault with a semi-automatic firearm, making a criminal threat, possession of a firearm by

a felon, transportation of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance for sale, and

possession of a controlled substance. (Pet. at 6-16, ECF No. 40; Attach. C, ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P.

& A. Supp. Pet., ECF No. 40-2; Lodgment No. 23, vol. 3 at 0725.02-07.)1

 As to the kidnaping, assault

with a firearm and criminal threat charges, the jury found true an allegation that the crimes were

committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Lodgment No. 23, vol. 3 at 0725.05-07.) The jury

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 1 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 2 10cv0423

also found Buchanan personally used a firearm during the commission of the kidnaping. (Id. at

0725.07.) Following the trial, the trial court found Buchanan had suffered three prior convictions which

were serious or violent felonies and which also constituted “strikes” under California’s Three Strikes

law. (Lodgment No. 25, vol. 11 at 1604-21.) The petition presents eleven claims. (See Pet. at 6-16,

ECF No. 40; Attach. C, ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet., ECF No. 40-2.) Buchanan also asks

for an evidentiary hearing. (See Pet. at 1, ECF No. 40; Traverse at 33, ECF No. 77; Req. for Evid. Hrg,

ECF No. 99.) 

 This case is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 72.1(d)(4)

for Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court respectfully recommends that both Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing and the

Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct;

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings

of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion denying Buchanan’s direct appeal of his convictions.

During the summer of 2003, the San Diego Violent Crimes Task Force began an

investigation of the Mexican Mafia, an Hispanic prison gang, and its operations in and

out of California Prisons. In July 2004 a cooperating witness with the FBI gave

Buchanan a cell phone with a wiretap on it. Buchanan was validated by the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 1989 as a member of the Mexican

Mafia. A common name for a member of the Mexican Mafia, such as Buchanan, is a

“Big Homie.”

Another cell phone with a wiretap on it was given to Rodney Brooks, who was

an inmate at R.J. Donovan State Prison (Donovan) and an associate of the Mexican

Mafia in a supervisorial role. 

Jessica Chavez was a correctional officer at Donovan who was assigned to

housing unit 1. Ernesto “Triste” Torres was an inmate who was housed in the Enhanced

Outpatient Unit (EOP) of housing unit 1; most of the EOP inmates were classified as

mentally ill. Chavez had daily contact with Torres while he was in the day room, and

a friendship developed. When a Mexican Mafia “soldier” put a “hit” on Chavez, Torres

arranged to have the “hit” neutralized; as a result, he and Chavez became closer. Chavez

gave Torres her cell phone number in order to set up a meeting after he was released.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 2 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 3 10cv0423

On May 15, 2004, Torres was released from prison and called Chavez. After

spending the day together, they had sex that evening at her residence. For the following

month, Chavez and Torres saw each other on a regular basis. However, when Chavez

noticed changes in Torres’s behavior and tried to distance herself from him, he

threatened to expose their relationship to prison officials, which he said would result in

her job termination and the removal of her children.

Meanwhile, Chavez started to have conversations at work with inmate Brooks,

who knew Torres. Chavez told Brooks she was experiencing undue stress from her

relationship with Torres and was considering transferring to another prison. Brooks

replied he would call Torres; Chavez gave Brooks the telephone number of Torres’s

brother.

On August 21 Brooks telephoned Buchanan; the call was recorded by the task

force investigating the Mexican Mafia. Brooks told Buchanan he had a “connection” at

Donovan that helped him with business in the prison and she was considering

transferring to another institution because “Triste” was threatening her and her children.

[footnote 3: Chavez did not know Brooks planned to use her as a connection inside the

prison and, up to that time, had not assisted the Mexican Mafia]. Brooks gave Buchanan

the telephone number to reach Torres, but asked permission to call Torres first to assess

Torres’s attitude and reaction before Buchanan called him and “got at him.” Buchanan

gave Brooks permission to call Torres.

Brooks called Torres on Chavez’s behalf and told him to stay away from her.

Torres, however, continued to see Chavez.

On August 22 Brooks called Buchanan and told him that although Torres said he

no longer would bother Chavez, he was “disrespecting” them because he “turned around

and banged on her ass again,” telling her he was a “ ‘rider for life.’ ” Later that day,

Brooks set up a three-way phone call between himself, Torres and Buchanan. After

Torres answered, Brooks told him: “Like I told you the other day, I talked to the homie

and he told me to let you know personally, just . . . don’t get at her, dog. Don’t threaten

her, her kids, none of that shit, homie. You know what I mean?” Torres said he

understood. Buchanan identified himself as “Richie, the big homie,” and told Torres to

leave Chavez alone and to respect the fact that she was “there and it’s there for a purpose

. . . something that was worked out by other people.” Torres indicated he would leave

Chavez alone.

On the morning of August 25, Brooks called Buchanan and told him Torres was

continuing to threaten Chavez. Chavez was present and she gave Buchanan the pass

code to her phone message machine so he could listen to a threatening message Torres

left her on the machine. Chavez also gave Torres’s phone number to Buchanan.

Buchanan said he would “get on that right now.”

Later that day, Chavez called Buchanan on her cell phone. Torres was on her

house phone, and she wanted Buchanan to hear what Torres was saying to her.

However, Buchanan could not hear what Torres was saying. Buchanan told Chavez to

hang up on Torres and asked if he could come to her residence. Chavez gave Buchanan

her address. Buchanan said he would go to Home Avenue to pick up somebody first.

Buchanan arrived at Chavez’s house with Parraz. When Torres called Chavez’s

cell phone, she gave it to Buchanan, who told Torres: “This is the Big Homie. Man to

man I want to talk to you.” Torres gave Buchanan his brother’s address.

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 3 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 4 10cv0423

When Buchanan and Parraz arrived at the residence of Torres’s brother, Torres

walked out to greet them. The three of them went inside and sat at the dining room table.

Buchanan told Torres to leave Chavez alone and asked him if he knew what happened

if a person gave his word to the Big Homie and did not keep it. Torres testified Parraz

walked around the table “flashing a gun that he had in his right pocket, and said: “ ‘If

your family wasn’t here, I’d smoke you.’ ” Parraz flashed the gun six or seven times.

Torres’s brother and his family were upstairs during most of the discussion. At one

point, Torres’s brother Leobardo came downstairs, and Parraz told him Torres “ ‘really

messed up,’ ” but that they were not going to “ ‘disrespect’ ” Leobardo’s house as long

as he did not call the police. Neither Leobardo or his wife, who also came downstairs

at least once, saw Parraz or Buchanan with a gun.

Buchanan telephoned Chavez and asked her what she wanted from Torres; she

replied she wanted him to leave her alone. Buchanan handed the phone to Torres and

told him to tell Chavez it was over and he would not have anything more to do with her.

Torres complied. After Buchanan and Parraz learned Torres did not have any money,

they asked if he and any connections they could tax. [footnote 4: A primary activity of

the Mexican Mafia is to tax drug dealers who are forced to pay a portion of their

proceeds to the Mexican Mafia.] Torres called a drug dealer named Louie and made

arrangements to meet him at a taco shop in Chula Vista for purposes of setting up a

taxing situation.

Buchanan, Parraz and Torres left the house and drove away. Buchanan was the

driver, Torres sat in the passenger seat, and Parraz sat in the back seat. Officer Perry

McIvor, a task force member, was concerned Torres’s life could be in danger and

contacted two patrol officers to make a traffic stop. When the officers pulled behind

Buchanan’s vehicle and activated the overhead lights on their car, one of the officers saw

Parraz lean forward. Parraz extended a gun around the right side of the front passenger

seat and told Torres to take the gun. As Buchanan pulled the car over and stopped,

Torres opened the car door and ran. San Diego Police Officer John Beilstein chased

Torres and saw him throw a silver gun against a building; the gun went off. The gun was

a loaded semi-automatic firearm. While being handcuffed, Torres exclaimed: “ ‘The gun

wasn’t mine. The guy in the back seat gave it to me and told me to run . . . . I can’t go

back to prison. I’m dead. They’re going to kill my family.’ ”

San Diego Police Officer Javier Nunez pulled Buchanan from the car and found

a loaded .38 caliber semi-automatic firearm inside his pants. Police also seized a blue

clip-on pouch from Buchanan; inside the pouch was 23.4 grams of methamphetamine

(18.9 grams pure power), some marijuana and a wallet containing nine $100 bills.

During the vehicle search, police found a shaving kit containing receipts, telephone

numbers, a notebook and a digital scale. The outside pouch of the kit contained .24

grams of methamphetamine in a small bindle.

Chavez learned of the arrest from Brooks. When Chavez returned to work at

Donovan on August 27, she had sex with Brooks in a restroom off the EOP housing

unit’s sally port. At trial, Chavez testified she had sex with Brooks because she was

stressed and she was grateful for his effort to help her. For months Chavez withheld

information from prison officials, the San Diego Police Department and the FBI.

Ultimately, Chavez resigned from her job and pleaded guilty to making a criminal threat

and admitted a street gang enhancement; charges of assault with a deadly weapon and

kidnaping were dropped. As part of the plea bargain, Chavez agreed to testify truthfully

in the prosecution cases against Buchanan, Parraz and Brooks; the People agreed to

relocate her in a witness protection program.

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 4 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 5 10cv0423

Torres and his brother’s family were relocated and placed in a witness protection

program. They had to be moved again after committing crimes.

At Buchanan’s and Parraz’s trial, the jury heard 11 taped phone conversations

between Brooks and Buchanan and other conversations the two had with Torres and

Chavez. Additionally, the prosecution presented Torres, Chavez and two gang experts

as witnesses.

Torres testified he believed the Mexican Mafia put a “green light” on him for

disobeying a direct order and causing Buchanan’s arrest. Torres also believed he had no

choice but to tell law enforcement they had a Big Homie so he could go into protective

custody and thus avoid being “smoked” by the Mexican Mafia.

Steve Contreras, a member of the gang intelligence unit of the Department of

Corrections, testified about the history and structure of the Mexican Mafia, also known

as La Eme. [footnote omitted.] The Mexican Mafia is the “umbrella” for all Southern

California Hispanic gang members in the state’s prisons; those individuals are called

Surenos and are basically the foot soldiers in the Mexican Mafia. The Mexican Mafia

is one of the main prison gangs that control California prisons; the other are the Black

Guerilla Family, the Aryan Brotherhood and the Nuestra Familia (Northern California

Hispanic gang members). As of December 2005, there were 1,789 Mexican Mafia

members in California prisons, including 152 members validated by prison officials, 993

associates, 461 dropouts and 183 inactive members.

Contreras testified Hispanic gangs started the Mexican Mafia in the 1950’s for

self-protection. Later, the Mexican Mafia began operating as a crime syndicate and

organized criminal activity both inside and outside of the prison system. Inside the

prisons, the Mexican Mafia controls drug trafficking by, among other things, “taxing”

— collecting a third of the proceeds from inmates who deal drugs. The Mexican Mafia

maintains its power through intimidation and control by arranging assaults and

homicides. Contreras testified the Mexican Mafia sometimes used prison guards as

“tools” to advance their operations.

Outside the prisons, the Mexican Mafia conducts the same activities plus

extortion, kidnaping and torture. If a drug dealer refuses to pay the tax to a Big Homie

— a member of the Mexican Mafia at the top of the gang’s hierarchy — the dealer will

be “taxed hard,” which means he will be duct taped, beaten and robbed of his drugs and

valuables so that he realizes he better voluntarily pay the tax next time or be tortured,

kidnaped or killed.

According to Contreras, prison officials validated Buchanan as a Big Homie for

the Mexican Mafia in 1989. As a Big Homie, Buchanan had the authority to mediate

disputes. Brooks was going to be classified as a validated associate in the Mexican

Mafia as a result of this case. The Mexican Mafia often used people such as Parraz, who

were not members or associates, to carry out its operations.

Contreras testified he was familiar with Buchanan, whom he said was involved

in distributing drugs, extortion and ordering assaults. Contreras also testified about the

consequences of disobeying an order from a Big Homie.

Contreras opined Buchanan became involved in a love triangle between Brooks,

Torres and Chavez because as a prison guard Chavez was valuable to the Mexican

Mafia.

San Diego Police Detective Mike Gutierrez, a member of the gang task force,

opined the Mexican Mafia engages in a pattern of criminal activity. Gutierrez testified

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 5 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 6 10cv0423

the instant offenses were committed for the benefit of the Mexican Mafia. According

to Gutierrez, Torres was threatening to eliminate an invaluable tool for the Mexican

Mafia by exposing a guard who potentially could pass drugs, sneak cell phones and help

the Mexican Mafia with other illicit business inside the prison.

Buchanan stipulated at trial that he had been convicted of a felony within the

meaning of section 12021, subdivision (a)(1).

(Lodgment No. 7 at 3-11.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2006, the San Diego County District Attorney filed an amended information

(information) charging Richard Garcia, aka Richard Charles Buchanan (Buchanan), with one count of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count one), a violation of California Penal Code (Penal

Code) § 12021(a)(1), one count of transporting a controlled substance (count two), a violation of

California Health and Safety Code (Health and Safety Code) § 11379(a), possession for sale of a

controlled substance (count three), a violation of Health and Safety Code § 11378, one count of

possession of a controlled substance (count four), a violation of Health and Safety Code § 11377(a),

making a criminal threat (count five), a violation of Penal Code section 422, assault with a semiautomatic firearm (count six), a violation of Penal Code section 245(b), and one count of kidnaping for

ransom or extortion (count seven), a violation of Penal Code section 209(a). As to counts two and three,

the information also alleged that Buchanan was personally armed with a firearm during the commission

of those crimes, within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022(c). As to count four, the information alleged

Buchanan was armed with a firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022(a)(1). As to counts five

and six, the information alleged Buchanan personally used a firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code

§ 12022.5(a). Finally, as to counts five, six and seven, the information alleged the crimes were

committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang with the

specific intent to promote and further and assist criminal conduct by the gang, within the meaning of

Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). (Lodgment No. 21 at 0008-10.) 

Following a jury trial, Buchanan was convicted on all counts. (Lodgment No. 23, vol. 3 at

0725.01-.07.) The jury also found true the allegation that Buchanan personally used a firearm during

the commission of the kidnaping, and that the kidnaping, making a criminal threat and assault with a

semi-automatic firearm were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 6 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 7 10cv0423

criminal street gang. (Id. 0725.05-.07.) The jury found not true the allegation that Buchanan was

personally armed with a firearm during the transportation, possession and possession for sale of a

controlled substance. (Id.) The trial judge found two of the three prior strike convictions alleged were

true. (Lodgment No. 35, vol. 11 at 1621.) Buchanan was sentenced to forty-five years-to-life plus ten

years in prison. (Lodgment No 24, vol. 4 at 0901-02.) 

Buchanan appealed his convictions to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed them in

a written, unpublished opinion. (See Lodgment Nos. 1-7.) Buchanan then filed a petition for review

in the California Supreme Court and also joined in any claims made by his co-defendant Steve Parraz.

(Lodgment Nos. 8, 9.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review without citation of

authority. (Lodgment No. 10.) 

On September 24, 2009, Buchanan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego

Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 13.) The state court denied the petition in a written, unpublished

opinion. (Lodgment No. 11.) Buchanan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 together with a motion for stay in this Court on February 12, 2010. (See ECF No. 1.) In the

petition, Buchanan admitted claims one through seven were unexhausted. (See id. at 6-13.) 

On March 29, 2010, Buchanan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court

of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 12.) He filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeal on May 12, 2010. (Lodgment No. 14.) On May 27, 2010, the state court issued a

written opinion denying both petitions. (Lodgment No. 15.) 

On June 21, 2010, Buchanan filed a petition for review of the denial of his habeas corpus petition

in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 16.) The Supreme Court issued an order on June 23,

2010 directing Respondent to file an Answer to the petition. (lodgment No. 17.) Respondent filed an

Answer on July 19, 2010. (Lodgment No. 18.)

While Buchanan’s petition was pending in the California Supreme Court, this Court granted his

motion for stay on July 23, 2010. (ECF No. 26.) Buchanan filed a reply to Respondent’s Answer in

state court on August 3, 2010, and the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review of

Buchanan’s habeas corpus petition on September 7, 2010. (Lodgment Nos. 19, 20.)

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 7 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The Court vacated the stay on October 4, 2010. (ECF No. 30.)

3

 Buchanan has filed numerous other motions and documents which are not recounted in the procedural

history here. 

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 8 10cv0423

On September 15, 2010, this Court issued an order requiring a response to the petition.2 (ECF

No. 29.) Buchanan filed a First Amended Petition (FAP) and supporting documents on December 9,

2010. (ECF No. 40.) Respondent filed an Answer and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of the Answer on March 9, 2011. (ECF No. 51.) Buchanan filed a Traverse on June 10, 2011,

and a Request for Evidentiary Hearing on September 14, 2011. (ECF Nos. 77, 99.)3

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will

not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal

court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court

applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was

objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d

872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct,

and Buchanan carries the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.”

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applied

a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case

differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state

court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably

applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application”

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 8 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 9 10cv0423

clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief,

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial

of a claim or claims. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court

order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result

of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not

be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal

law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme

Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

B. Analysis

Buchanan alleges eleven claims in his petition: (1) the prosecution presented perjured testimony;

(2) his car was stopped and searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) the prosecution

presented false evidence as to what was said on some of the wiretaps; (4) the prosecutor failed to

disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (5) the trial judge

exhibited bias; (6) there was excessive security imposed on him at the trial; (7) prosecutorial

misconduct; (8) the trial court did not properly limit the scope of the gang expert’s testimony; (9) trial

counsel was ineffective; (10) appellate counsel was ineffective; and (11) the trial court improperly

imposed a $10,000 restitution fine. (Pet. at 6-16, ECF No. 40; Attach. C, ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P. &

A. Supp. Pet., ECF No. 40-2; Traverse, ECF No. 77.)

Respondent contends claims one through seven, nine and eleven are procedurally defaulted.

(Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 12-18, ECF No. 51-1.) As to claim eight, Respondent argues the

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 9 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 10 10cv0423

state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. (Id. at 18-25.) Respondent does not address claim ten in the

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, but does argue in the Answer that

the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 19-20, ECF No. 51.)

1. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

On page thirty-three of Buchanan’s Traverse, he contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing

on his claims. (See Traverse at 33, ECF No. 77.) Buchanan also filed a separate request for an

evidentiary hearing which repeats the arguments and allegations contained in the petition and supporting

documents. (See Req. for Evid. Hrg., ECF No. 99.)

Evidentiary hearings in § 2254 cases are governed by AEDPA, which “substantially restricts the

district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th

Cir. 1999). The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) control this decision:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that – 

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;

or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (West 2006).

Buchanan argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to resolve his claims of “prosecution

teams committing perjury, use of false evidence, fabrication of evidence, suppression of evidence, as

well as to demonstrate judicial bias, excessive security effects upon jury, ineffective assistance of

counsels at trial and on appeal . . . .” (Traverse at 33, ECF No. 77; Req. for Evid. Hrg. at 1-12, ECF No.

99.) In order to determine whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the court must first “determine

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 10 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 11 10cv0423

whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078). If not, the court must “ascertain

whether the petitioner has ‘failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in State court.’” Id. at 669-70.

A failure to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court implies “some lack of diligence, or some

greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

420, 432 (2000). The Supreme Court has said that “[d]iligence will require in the usual case that the

prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state

law.” Id. at 437. 

In the present case, a sufficient factual basis exists in the trial transcripts and other records before

the Court to resolve the merits of Buchanan’s claims. See Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 669-70. Moreover,

any facts that would be developed at an evidentiary hearing in this Court were never actually presented

to the state court, and the state courts, therefore, did not have those facts before them when they

rendered their decision. This Court’s review of a state court adjudication under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

“is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen

v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Accordingly, the Court recommends

Buchanan’s request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED.

2. Whether Claims One Through Seven, Nine and Eleven Are Procedurally Defaulted

Respondent contends claims one through seven, nine and eleven are procedurally defaulted

pursuant to the procedural bar of In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953), which states that claims which can

be raised on direct appeal, must be. Buchanan raised claims one through seven, nine and eleven in a

habeas corpus petition filed in the California appellate court which issued a written unpublished opinion

denying the petition on the basis of the rule of Dixon and citing In re Martinez, 46 Cal. 4th 945, 956

(2009), In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 829 (1993) and In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 797-98 (1993) as

support for this proposition. (Lodgment No. 15.) Buchanan thereafter filed a petition for review of the

habeas corpus denial in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 16.) The California Supreme

Court issued an order directing Respondent to file a brief addressing the question “[w]hether petitioner

established a prima facie case for relief, such that this court should grant the petition for review, and

transfer the matter to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue an order to show cause.” (Lodgment

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 11 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 12 10cv0423

No. 17.) Following the briefing, the state supreme court denied the petition for review without citation

of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 19, 20.)

a. Effect of Trigueros v. Adams

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed a similar situation in a case concerning California’s

timeliness bar. In Trigueros v. Adams, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 4060503 (9th Cir. 2011), Trigueros filed

a habeas corpus petition in the Los Angeles Superior Court, which rejected the petition as untimely

citing In re Clark. The state appellate court then denied a subsequently filed habeas corpus petition with

the statement, “The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied,” and citing no case. Id. at *1. Trigueros

then filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court. That court ordered Respondent to

file an informal brief on the merits. Id. In federal court, the Attorney General argued the time during

which Trigueros’ habeas corpus petitions were pending in state court was not tolled under AEDPA’s

statute of limitations because the state superior court had rejected the petition as untimely and

subsequent state court rejections were assumed to be on the same grounds as the lower courts’ decisions.

Id. at *2. The Ninth Circuit disagreed:

There are, however, compelling factual circumstances in this case signaling that

the California Supreme Court did consider and reject the States’ timeliness argument.

Specifically the California Supreme Court requested informal briefing on the merits,

even though the Superior Court made a finding of untimeliness and the Court of Appeal

summarily denied the petition. We find this highly significant. Additionally, the State

briefed the timing issue and Trigueros responded. The California Supreme Court thus

had before it all of the timeliness arguments from the parties. Given these factual

circumstances, we rely on the California Supreme Court’s orders practice explained in

Robbins and conclude that it considered Trigueros’s petition timely because the

California Supreme Court had the timeliness question before it, and did not cite to cases

involving a timeliness procedural bar. See Robbins, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.3d at 340

n. 34.

Id. at *5.

Although Trigueros did not concern Dixon, the Ninth Circuit referenced the following statement

by the California Supreme Court’s in Robbins as the basis for its conclusions:

[W]hen respondent asserts that a particular claim or subclaim should be barred

under Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d 218, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001, or Dixon, supra, 41 Cal.2d 756, 264 P.2d 513, or the related bars of repetitiveness (In re Miller, supra, 17 Cal.2d 734, 735, 112 P.2d 10) or successiveness (see ante, fn. 9), or is untimely, and

when, nevertheless, our order disposing of a habeas corpus petition does not impose the

proposed bar or bars as to that claim or subclaim, this signifies that we have considered

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 12 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 13 10cv0423

respondent’s assertion and have determined that the claim or subclaim is not barred on

the cited ground or grounds.

Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 814, fn.34.

Thus, the Court concludes that Trigueros’ rationale applies equally in this case. The court of

appeal rejected Buchanan’s petition for writ habeas corpus on Dixon grounds. (Lodgment No. 15.) The

California Supreme Court asked for briefing on whether Buchanan had stated a prima facie case for

relief. (Lodgment No. 17.) In his Answer in state court, Respondent briefed the issue of procedural

default pursuant to Dixon. (Lodgment No. 18). The California Supreme Court’s rejection of the petition

for review did not cite Dixon or any other procedural bar. (Lodgment No. 20.) Accordingly, the Court

concludes claims one through seven, nine and eleven are not procedurally barred.

b. Procedural Default

In the event Trigueros does not apply, the Court will address Respondent’s procedural default

argument. The Ninth Circuit has held that because procedural default is an affirmative defense,

Respondent must first “adequately [plead] the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural

ground . . . .” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to place the defense at

issue, Buchanan must then “assert[] specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the

state procedure . . . .” Id. The “ultimate burden” of proving procedural default, however, belongs to the

state. Id. If the state meets its burden under Bennett, federal review of the claim is foreclosed unless

Buchanan can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation

of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage

of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).

i. Independence

A state procedural rule is “independent” if the state law basis for the decision is not interwoven

with federal law. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265

(1989). A ground is “interwoven” with federal law if the state has made application of the procedural

bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law such as the determination of whether federal

constitutional error has been committed. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). In Robbins, 18

Cal. 4th at 770, the California Supreme Court stated that it would no longer consider federal law when

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 13 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 14 10cv0423

denying a habeas claim as procedurally barred under Clark or Dixon. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 582-82; see

also Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 11561 (9th Cir. 2000). Although the Ninth Circuit has not

specifically determined whether a post-Robbins application of the Dixon rule is independent of federal

law, the Bennett court’s analysis of the independence of Clark compels the same result for claims barred

pursuant to Dixon. The pre-Robbins application of the two procedural bars was similar in that the

invocation of either Dixon or Clark required the state court to determine if there existed fundamental

constitutional error that would excuse the petitioner’s default, and such an analysis necessarily involved

the consideration of federal law. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581-82; see also LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d

702, 707 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that consideration of federal law in barring claims as pretermitted

is “analogous” to consideration of federal law in barring claims as untimely). Furthermore, in Protsman

v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (S.D. Cal. 2004), a judge of this Court found a post-Robbins

application of Dixon to be independent of federal law, and this Court agrees with that conclusion.

Accordingly, Respondent has met his initial burden under Bennett to establish that Dixon is an

independent state procedural bar. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

ii. Adequacy

Respondent argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Walker v. Martin, 562

U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1120 (2011) and Beard v. Kindler, 130 S.Ct. 612 (2009), effectively overruled the

Ninth Circuit’s definition of adequacy as “well established and consistently applied” with a new

definition, “firmly established and regularly followed.” (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 12-18, ECF

No. 51-1.) Respondent also asserts the Dixon bar is adequate under this definition. (Id.) It is not

necessary for this Court to decide whether Walker, Beard and Bennett state different definitions for the

term “adequate” because Respondent has met his burden under either standard by “adequately pleading

the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground . . . .” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586.

Respondent’s initial burden under Bennett is satisfied. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

iii. Petitioner’s Burden

The burden now shifts to Petitioner. In order to place the defense at issue, Buchanan must cite

to specific examples where the rule has not been consistently applied. Id. In his Traverse, Buchanan

attempts to rebut Respondent’s showing. First, he states that Dixon does not apply because “grounds

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 14 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 The effect of the imposition of Dixon on claim nine is addressed in section IV(B)(10) of this R&R.

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 15 10cv0423

one through seven and nine through eleven concern matters, in part, [which are] not shown in the

transcripts” and that appellate counsel has specifically told him that those claims could not be raised on

direct appeal because the evidence that supported the claims was not part of the record on appeal.

(Traverse at 44-46, ECF No. 77.) 

Buchanan also states that “the claims raised by Petitioner are intertwined not only ‘with new

evidence,’ id., but also with Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” (Id. at 46.) Buchanan

goes on to cite Protsman v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (S.D. Cal. 2004) for the proposition that

“California’s procedural bar rests on independent state grounds unless otherwise noted” and further

notes that “the California Court of Appeal cited a United States Supreme Court decision in its denial,

i.e. Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 285.” (Id. at 47.) He further argues that there is “an

exception to the general rule . . . where claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental, In

re Harris, (Cal. 1993) 5 Cal. 4th 813, 830.” (Id.)

Nowhere does Buchanan cite to specific instances where the Dixon rule has not been consistently

applied as required by Bennett. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Accordingly, Buchanan has not met his

interim burden under Bennett. Id.

iv. Respondent Has Met His Burden Under Bennett

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Respondent has established that, to the extent

the state court imposed a Dixon bar, it is an independent and adequate procedural bar to claims one

through seven, nine and eleven.4

 Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Federal review of the claim is therefore

barred unless Buchanan can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

v. Cause

The cause prong is satisfied if Buchanan can demonstrate some “objective factor” that precluded

him from raising his claims in state court, such as interference by state officials or constitutionally

ineffective counsel. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991). Buchanan does claim that

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise grounds one through seven and eleven on appeal.

(Pet. at 15, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 36-38, ECF No. 40-1.) As discussed below, however, in section

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 15 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 16 10cv0423

IV(B)(11) of this Report and Recommendation (R&R), this Court concludes that appellate counsel was

not ineffective for failing to raise these claims in state court. Accordingly, this cannot form the basis

for a successful showing of cause under Coleman. Buchanan does not allege any other “objective

factor” that precluded him from raising this claim, and thus he has not established cause for the default.

McClesky, 499 U.S. at 493-94. 

 vi. Prejudice

“Prejudice [sufficient to excuse procedurally barred claims] is actual harm resulting from the

alleged error.” Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). Buchanan has failed to establish

prejudice resulting from the state court’s refusal to address the merits of the claims one through seven,

nine and eleven because, as discussed below in section IV(B)(3)-(12) of this R&R, his claims are

meritless.

vii. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Buchanan has also failed to demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The Supreme Court has limited the

“miscarriage of justice” exception to petitioners who can show that “a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in one the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995). “Actual innocence” means factual innocence, not simply legal insufficiency; a mere

showing of reasonable doubt is not enough. See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1997).

Buchanan has not presented evidence sufficient to establish he is actually and factually innocent of the

charges of which he was convicted. Thus, Buchanan has not satisfied the fundamental miscarriage of

justice exception, and the claims are procedurally defaulted. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

c. Conclusion & Standard of Review

If Trigueros applies, the claims are not procedurally defaulted and the Court presumes the

California Supreme Court addressed Buchanan’s claims on the merits. Trigueros, __ F.3d __, 2001 WL

4060503 at *5. In that case, this Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court’s denial of the claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). If, on the other

hand, Buchanan’s claims are procedurally defaulted and this Court nevertheless addresses the merits of

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 16 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 To the extent Buchanan’s claim is that McIvor’s statements at the hearing on the motion to suppress

evidence were false, or that the falsity of those statements mean the motion should have been granted, relief is

precluded by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) as discussed in Section IV(B)(4) of this Report and

Recommendation.

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 17 10cv0423

the claims, the Court must conduct a de novo review. Id. at 1167-68. Although it is not clear which

standard of review to apply, the Court need not decide the issue as the claims fail even under the more

stringent de novo standard of review. 

3. The Prosecutor’s Use of Perjured or False Testimony (Claims One and Three)

Buchanan claims the prosecutor used perjured testimony to convict him. (Pet. at 6, ECF No. 40;

Attach. C to Pet. at 6-8, ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 4-18, ECF No. 40-2.)

Specifically, Buchanan alleges several instances in which Detective McIvor lied at both the hearing on

the motion to suppress evidence and at trial. (Id.)

5

 Buchanan also claims the prosecutor presented

inaccurate translations of the wiretapped phone calls between he and Brooks, which in turn provided

a false basis upon which the jury could have concluded that Buchanan was planning to harm Torres.

(Id.) Respondent contends the claims are procedurally defaulted. (Answer at 8-9, 10-11, ECF No. 51;

Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 12-19, ECF No. 51-1.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is

procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

 Where a prosecutor is accused of presenting false or altered evidence or testimony, “the

petitioner must show that (1) the . . . evidence was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should

have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the false testimony was actually material.”

United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Napue v. People of the State of

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-71 (1959)); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).

However, the presentation of conflicting versions of events, without more, does not constitute knowing

presentation of false evidence. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Court will address each of the

instances alleged by Buchanan. 

a. McIvor’s Statements About the Identity of the Passengers Inside Buchanan’s Car

Many of Buchanan’s complaints are about Detective McIvor’s testimony at the preliminary

hearing and the hearing on the motion to suppress, not the trial. Buchanan’s claim is that his convictions

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 17 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 Because “Triste” and “Torres” are the same person, the names are used interchangeably. 

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 18 10cv0423

are based on false evidence. Thus, while contradictions in testimony given before trial may shed light

on whether testimony at the trial was truthful, it is the testimony that was presented to the jury, not

contradictions in the testimony from the preliminary hearing and the hearing on the motion to suppress

evidence, that must form the factual basis for this claim. 

Buchanan contends McIvor lied about when in the course of the investigation he directed the

stop of Buchanan’s car. (Pet. at 6, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 6-8, ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Pet at 8-9, ECF No. 40-2.) According to Buchanan, McIvor testified at the preliminary hearing there

were three people in the car when he directed Officer Javier Nunez to stop it, (Lodgment No. 12,

Attach. F, Ex. 3 at 11), but contradicted this statement at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence

when he testified he told Nunez “Buchanan and another person were going over to pick up Triste and

that they were armed, that they were probably going to kill him, and that we needed them to stop the

vehicle to prevent that,” meaning that there were two people in the car. (Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F,

Ex. 4 at 11.) 

At trial, McIvor testified that on August 25, 2004, he received information from the wiretap on

Buchanan’s phone that Jessica Chavez was calling Buchanan to complain that an individual named

“Triste” (Torres) was harassing her.6

 (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 1027.) Buchanan was very upset and

was going to go over to Chavez’s house to talk to her. (Id. at 1028.) McIvor, who was on surveillance,

saw Buchanan arrive at Chavez’s house, then learned from other officers on surveillance that the car

drove away. (Id. at 1033-34.) McIvor believed, on the basis of information from the wiretaps, that

Buchanan was on his way to see Triste. (Id. at 1068.) Other members of the surveillance team saw

Buchanan and Parraz arrive at a house and go inside. (Id. at 1069.) Buchanan, Parraz and Torres

eventually left the residence and drove away, followed by the surveillance team. (Id. at 1070.) On the

basis of information he had heard on the wiretap, he believed Triste was in the car with Buchanan and

Parraz and that his life was in danger. He told Officer Nunez that the car would have to be stopped. (Id.

at 1034.) He communicated this to Nunez while Buchanan, Parraz and Triste were inside the house.

(Id. at 1071.) 

First, Buchanan has provided no evidence that the testimony McIvor gave at trial was false,

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 18 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 19 10cv0423

much less that the prosecutor knew it was false. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71; Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d

at 889. According to Buchanan, McIvor testified at the preliminary hearing that there were three people

in the car when he advised Nunez they would have to stop it. (Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 3 at 11.)

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, McIvor testified he told Nunez that “Buchanan and another

person were going over to pick up Triste . . . and that we needed [him] to stop the vehicle . . . . ”

(Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 4 at 11.) At that point, therefore, there were two people in the car.

At trial, McIvor testified he told Nunez the car would have to be stopped when Buchanan, Parraz and

Triste were in the house, just before all three got in the car and drove away. (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9

at 1071.) On all three occasions, McIvor was roughly referring to the same small window of time. The

contradictions in testimony Buchanan points to are minor discrepancies that cannot support an inference

of false testimony or that the prosecutor knew McIvor was lying. See Geston, 299 F.3d at 1135.

In addition, the evidence Buchanan alleges was false — when McIvor communicated the need

to stop Buchanan’s car to Nunez — was not material because there was “[no] reasonable likelihood that

the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (internal quotation marks

omitted).) The discrepancies Buchanan points to relate only to the question whether Buchanan’s car was

stopped in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment, not the substantive evidence of the crimes

he was alleged to have committed. The state’s case rested almost entirely on the wiretaps and the

testimony of Chavez and Torres. When McIvor told Nunez to stop Buchanan’s car did not call into

question the validity of the information provided by the wiretaps, or the credibility of Chavez or Torres.

For all the foregoing reasons, Buchanan has failed to establish his convictions are based on false

evidence. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71; Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at 889. He is not entitled to relief as

to this claim.

b. McIvor’s Statements About the Reason for the Stop of Buchanan’s Car

Buchanan next complains about McIvor’s testimony regarding the reason he directed the stop

of Buchanan’s car. (Pet. at 6, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 6-8, ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet.

at 4-18, ECF No. 40-2.) As with the preceding claim, many of the statements Buchanan complains

about were made at the preliminary hearing or the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence. For the

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 19 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 20 10cv0423

same reasons discussed above, it is to McIvor’s trial testimony that this Court must look in determining

whether Buchanan’s convictions are based on false evidence, and McIvor’s testimony before trial is

relevant only to the extent it helps to establish his testimony at trial was false. 

Buchanan’s claim involves the backdrop to the stop of his car. At trial, McIvor testified that by

listening to the wiretaps, he learned that an individual referred to as “Triste” was “interfering in Mexican

Mafia business.” (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 1025.) McIvor attempted to learn the identity of Triste

and determined he probably was Jesse Gutierres, a recent parolee. (Id. at 1026.) On August 25, 2004,

McIvor learned from the wiretaps Buchanan was upset with Triste and was going to drive over to see

him with another, unknown individual. (Id. at 1028.) McIvor was in a surveillance position outside

Chavez’s house and saw Buchanan drive up. (Id. at 1030.) The next time he saw the car, it was driving

on highway 5 with three people in it. (Id. at 1031-32.) He had a brief view of the car’s occupants and

believed one of them to be Gutierres based on his comparison with a mug shot he had obtained. (Id. at

1032.) He also believed, based on information he had heard on the wiretaps, that Buchanan posed a

threat to “Triste’s” life and that the car would have to be stopped. (Id. at 1033-34.) At that point,

McIvor told Nunez that the car would have to be stopped because of the threat, but also told him there

was a parolee at large in the car, that the car could be stopped on that basis in order to avoid disclosing

the wiretaps. (Id. at 1034.) 

At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence and the preliminary hearing, McIvor testified

he told Nunez they needed to stop Buchanan’s car because he was concerned about Triste’s safety, that

the people inside the car were probably armed, and that he did not need to use the hanging licences plate

as the reason for the stop because there was a parolee at large in the car. (Attach. C at 6-8, ECF No. 40-

1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet at 7-18, ECF No. 40-2.) Buchanan contends McIvor’s testimony is

contradicted by the transcript of the radio transmissions between McIvor and other officers (the TAC

3 talkgroup) which occurred before the stop. (Id.) As Buchanan points out, the transcript does indicate

McIvor told Nunez that probable cause for the stop was the hanging license plate, not the possibility of

there being a parolee at large in the car. (Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 6.) In addition, the TAC 3

talkgroup transcript does not reflect that McIvor told Nunez he feared for Triste’s safety. But the

conversation recorded on the TAC 3 talkgroup transcript is not the only conversation McIvor had with

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 20 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 21 10cv0423

Nunez before the stop. McIvor testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence that he was

in communication with other officers via radio transmissions and via cell phone, and that he used his

cell phone to tell Nunez Buchanan’s car would have to be stopped, that he was concerned for Triste’s

safety and that a parolee at large was in the car and could be used as probable cause for the stop.

(Lodgment No. 27, vol. 3 at 76, 80.) That conversation would not have been recorded in the TAC 3

talkgroup transcript of the radio transmissions. Thus, Buchanan has not established the testimony he

complains of was false.

In any event, the testimony Buchanan alleges was false was not material for the same reasons

discussed above. McIvor’s communications with Nunez about the reason for the stop does not call into

question the validity of the information provided by the wiretaps, or the credibility of Chavez or Torres,

which form the basis for the substantive evidence of guilt presented at trial. There was “[no] reasonable

likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Hayes, 399 F.3d at

984. For all the foregoing reasons, Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

c. Other Statements By McIvor

Buchanan also alleges several other false statements by McIvor at the hearing on the motion to

suppress evidence. Buchanan alleges McIvor testified he told Nunez the people in Buchanan’s car were

armed and would probably kill Triste but that there was no evidence in the wiretaps to support this

claim. (Attach. C at 6, ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet at. 11, ECF No. 40-2.) In the

transcript of the wiretap between Buchanan and an individual named Corrado, however, Buchanan,

suggests he will be armed when he meets with Torres:

BUCHANAN: Yeah, uh . . . well, we’re going to talk right now. If . . . if he gets out of

line well, uh . . . you know, anything goes.

CORRADO: [CHUCKLES] All right.

BUCHANAN: We are prepared, no problem, you know?

CORRADO: Yeah.

(Lodgment No. 27, vol. 1 at 0134.)

In addition, McIvor testified that, based on his training and experience, when a person defies an

order from a “Big Homie,” the consequence is usually serious injury or death. Torres had disobeyed

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 21 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 22 10cv0423

Buchanan, a “Big Homie,” and Buchanan, who was angry about Torres’ disobedience, was traveling

to see Torres. (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 1086.) Torres himself testified he believed Buchanan was

coming to “smoke” him, i.e., kill him. (Lodgment No. 31, vol. 7 at 711.) Under these circumstances,

Buchanan has not established McIvor’s testimony was “actually false” or that the prosecution knew it

was false. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at 889; Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71.

Buchanan also claims McIvor falsely testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence

that he told Nunez Buchanan’s car needed to be stopped. Buchanan bases his claim on the transcript

of the TAC 3 talkgroup which indicates FBI Agent Desarno was the one who made this statement.

(Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 11.) As with Buchanan’s claim regarding McIvor’s testimony that he

told Nunez to stop Buchanan’s car using the presence of a parolee at large as probable cause, the TAC

3 talkgroup transcript does not account for the cell phone conversations between McIvor and Nunez.

Nunez corroborated McIvor’s testimony by testifying at both the hearing on the motion to suppress and

the trial that McIvor called him and told him Buchanan’s car needed to be stopped. (Lodgment No. 27,

vol. 3 at 36; Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 970.) Thus, Buchanan has not established McIvor’s testimony

at trial was “actually false.” Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at 889; Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71.

Next, Buchanan argues McIvor falsely testified that the identity of the individual in the front seat

of Buchanan’s car was the individual they needed to identify. This is contradicted by the transcript of

the TAC 3 talkgroup wherein Agent Desarno states it is the identity of the person in the back seat that

is at issue. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 11.) There does appear to be a discrepancy between

McIvor’s testimony at trial and Desarno’s statements on the TAC 3 talkgroup transcript. Given the fact

that police did not know the identity of two of the three individuals in Buchanan’s car, however, this is

a minor discrepancy. Geston, 299 F.3d at 1135 (stating that the presentation of conflicting versions of

events, without more, does not constitute knowing presentation of false evidence). Buchanan has not

established McIvor’s trial testimony was actually false or that the prosecutor knew it was false. ZunoArce, 339 F.3d at 889; Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71. In any event, the testimony was not material for the

same reasons discussed above. Any confusion over which of the passengers police thought was a

parolee at large does not call into question the validity of the information provided by the wiretaps, or

the credibility of Chavez or Torres, and there was “[no] reasonable likelihood that the false testimony

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 22 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 This discrepancy was also not material to whether there was sufficient probable cause to stop

Buchanan’s car. The probable cause for the stop was the threat to Triste’s life.

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 23 10cv0423

could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984. For all the foregoing reasons,

Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

Buchanan also claims McIvor falsely testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that

Buchanan ordered Torres to stay where he was so Buchanan could come get him. (Attach. C at 6-8,

ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 12, ECF No. 40-2.) McIvor did testify at the hearing on

the motion to suppress evidence that Buchanan had ordered Torres to stay where he was. (Lodgment

No. 27, vol. 3 at 100.) There is no transcript of the call between Torres and Buchanan. Buchanan stated

in the phone call to Corrado that he had spoken to Torres and told him he had broken his word to the

“Big Homie.” (Lodgment No. 21, vol. 1 at 0130.) Buchanan then asked Torres for the address where

Torres was located, and Torres responded that he was at Pancho’s house but would go back to his own

house; Buchanan said he replied, “Okay, it’s cool.” (Id. at 132.) Torres testified to the same series of

events at trial. (Lodgment 31, vol. 7 at 710.) Thus, it is not clear upon what basis McIvor based his

statement at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Buchanan ordered Torres to stay where he was.

But, as with Buchanan’s preceding claims, the only testimony that matters for his claim that his

convictions are based on false evidence is McIvor’s testimony at trial. McIvor did not testify at trial that

Buchanan ordered Torres to stay where he was. (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 1020-1141 [testimony of

Perry McIvor].) Accordingly, Buchanan has failed to establish McIvor’s trial testimony was “actually

false” or that the prosecutor knew it was false. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at 889; Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71.7

Buchanan complains McIvor falsely testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence

that he knew from a phone call made by Buchanan to Chavez that Torres had not been harmed at the

time police initiated the stop of Buchanan’s car. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 13, ECF No. 40-2.)

In the transcript of a phone call between Buchanan and Chavez which occurred at 5:43 p.m., about seven

minutes before police stopped Buchanan’s car, Chavez, who called Buchanan, asks “[I]s he still with

you?” to which Buchanan replies, “Yes.” Chavez then says, “Oh, okay. Don’t, don’t say what I’m

saying out loud then.” (Lodgment No. 21, vol. 1 at 0123; see also, Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 1

at 16 [surveillance log].) It appears very likely to the Court that Chavez’s question, “[I]s he still with

you?” referred to Torres, or, at a minimum, police believed Chavez was referring to Torres.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 23 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

 Whether or not McIvor knew the identity of Triste may have been relevant to whether Buchanan’s car

was stopped in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. But that issue has already been litigated in state court

and Buchanan may not attack that ruling in federal court. See Stonel, 428 U.S. at 494.

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 24 10cv0423

Accordingly, Buchanan has not established McIvor’s testimony was false. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at 889;

Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71. 

Finally, Buchanan argues McIvor falsely testified he did not know that “Triste” was Torres.

(Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 14, ECF No. 40-2.) As support, Buchanan points to the transcript of the

TAC 3 talkgroup wherein Officer Rios asks, “[H]ave we run this address here on Elder?” In response,

McIvor replies, “[T]hose are those guys I gave you, the Torresses[.]” (Lodgment 13, Ex. D at 4.) The

most this shows is that police knew the residence Buchanan was seen entering belonged to the Torreses.

It does not establish that McIvor connected Triste’s identity to Torres. Thus, Buchanan has not

established McIvor’s trial testimony was actually false or that the prosecutor knew it was false. ZunoArce, 339 F.3d at 889; Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71. In any event, the testimony was not material for the

same reasons discussed above. Even if McIvor knew Triste was Torres, the prosecution’s case was built

on the information provided by the wiretaps, and the credibility of the story told by Chavez and Torres.

Whether or not McIvor knew the identity of Triste is not relevant.8

 Thus, there was “[no] reasonable

likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Hayes, 399 F.3d at

984. For all the foregoing reasons, Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

In sum, Buchanan has not established that McIvor testified falsely at trial, that the prosecutor

knew he was testifying falsely, or that any allegedly false testimony was material. Napue, 360 U.S. at

269-71; Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984. His claim that his convictions are based on false evidence, therefore,

fails.

d. Inaccurate Translations of Wiretapped Phone Conversations

Buchanan alleges the translation of two phrases in the transcript of one of the wiretapped phone

conversations between himself and Brooks (tape number 776) which was admitted at trial was

inaccurate. In the first exchange, according to the transcript of the tape admitted at trial, Brooks,

speaking to Buchanan, states: “[T]here’s one other thing . . .I have a person here that, that, that watches

over the businesses I have here.” (See Lodgment No. 21, vol. 1 at 0021.) Buchanan contends the

correct translation was: “I have a person here that takes care of me with what I got, her issues.”

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 24 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 25 10cv0423

(Attach. C, Ex. 17 at 9, ECF No. 40-1.) In the second exchange, Brooks, referring to Torres and his

harassment of Chavez, says to Buchanan: “So, I wanted . . . so, so I wanted to talk to him first and if,

if he doesn’t behave then its like all right, he’s fucked and then I’ll let you get at him, uh, later, you

know what I mean?” (Lodgment No. 21, vol. 1 at 0024.) Buchanan contends the phrase “he’s fucked”

should have been translated as “I know I crapped,” a phrase Buchanan says is a jail-house Spanish term

for “failed to win.” (Attach. C, Ex. 17 at 7-8, ECF No. 40-1.) As support for this claim, Buchanan has

provided a copy of the motion for a new trial he filed pro per with the corrections made to the transcript

which was admitted at Brooks’ trial and a copy of the minute order noting the prosecution stipulated to

those corrections. (See Lodgment 12, Attach. F, Exs. 17, 18.) 

While it is clear there was a dispute as to the proper translation of many of the Spanish phrases

and idioms spoken on the wiretapped phones, Buchanan has not established that the evidence he alleges

was false was “actually material.” Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at 889; Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71; Agurs, 427

U.S. at 103. As to the first challenged phrase, the allegedly false translation was not material because

shortly after the complained-of exchange, the following, unchallenged exchange took place:

BROOKS: He’s about . . . Yeah, he’s trying to, uh, threaten the girl and putting the girl

(UI) and all this shit . . . saying that they are going to lose their jobs and all this bull shit,

man.

BUCHANAN: Uh, he’s (UI) the guy on the streets is fucking with him?

BROOKS: Yeah, the person that helps me out with, with my businesses inside, my

connection.

BUCHANAN: Yeah.

BROOKS: It’s a, it’s a lady that has kids and everything.

(Lodgment No. 21, vol 1 at 0021.)

Thus, even if the first translation (“I have a person here that, that, that watches over the

businesses I have here”) was false and the corrected version (“I have a person here that takes care of me

with what I got, her issues”) had been admitted, there is “[no] reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984.

As to the second challenged translation, the phrase “he’s fucked,” which Buchanan alleges

should have been translated as “I crapped” meaning “I failed,” there is, again, “[no] reasonable 

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 25 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 26 10cv0423

likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Hayes, 399 F.3d at

984. The prosecution’s purpose in presenting this tape was to establish Brooks and Buchanan had given

Torres a chance to comply with Buchanan’s order, Torres had not done so, and therefore Buchanan’s

intent when he went to Torres’ house and took him for a ride in his car was to “get at him,” i.e., assault

or kill him. If the jury had been given the allegedly correct translation, Brooks would have told

Buchanan, “So, I wanted . . . so, so I wanted to talk to him first and if, if he doesn’t behave then it’s like

all right, I failed and then I’ll let you get at him, uh, later, you know what I mean?” From this, a

reasonable jury could have concluded that Brooks wanted a chance to get Torres to obey Buchanan’s

order to leave Chavez alone, but that, if Torres did not “behave,” Brooks had “failed” in his attempt and

Buchanan could “get at him” using presumably more serious measures. The difference in the two

translations would not have resulted in a different outcome for Buchanan because they both

communicated the same thing about Buchanan’s intent.

For all the foregoing reasons, Buchanan has not established that his convictions are based on the

introduction of false evidence at his trial. He is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief as to those

claims.

4. Illegal Detention of Buchanan’s Vehicle (Claim Two)

Buchanan argues the state courts erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence based on a

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights during the search of the vehicle. (Pet. at 7, ECF No. 40;

Attach C at 9-12, ECF No. 40-1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 19-41, ECF No. 40-2; Traverse at 15-18,

ECF No. 77.) “[W]here the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth

Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone, 428 U.S.

at 494; Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 1993). Under California law, Green had the

opportunity to litigate, and in fact did litigate, the suppression of evidence on the ground that the stop

and search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. (See Lodgment No. 21, vol. 1 at 6.02-6.12;

Pet’rs Ex. 4 at 7-26; see also Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5; Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir.

1990).) In addition, he raised this claim in the habeas corpus petitions he filed in the superior, appellate

and state supreme courts. (See Lodgment Nos. 11-13, 15-16, 20.) Because Buchanan has had “an

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 26 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 27 10cv0423

opportunity for full and fair litigation of [his] Fourth Amendment claim” in state court, he is not entitled

to federal habeas relief. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494; Gordon, 895 F.2d at 613-14. 

5. Prosecution’s Failure to Disclose Exculpatory or Impeachment Evidence (Claim Four)

Buchanan claims the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of his federal right

to a fair trial. (Pet. at 9, ECF No. 40; Traverse at 18-19, ECF No.77.) Specifically, Buchanan claims

the prosecutor withheld: (1) Torres’ prison disciplinary, medical, mental health and housing records;

(2) Torres’ parole records; (3) wiretap evidence of a phone interview of Chavez by Detective Gutierrez;

and (4) wiretap evidence from Torres’ phone. (Pet. at 9, ECF No. 40.) Buchanan argues this

information would have impeached Torres by showing he misrepresented his mental health status in

prison, establishing he provided false testimony, and would have shown Detective Gutierrez coerced

Chavez to provide false testimony. (Id.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally

defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

Where a prosecutor is accused of withholding exculpatory evidence, a petitioner must show:

(1) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the withheld

evidence was exculpatory or impeachment material; and (3) he was prejudiced by the failure to disclose.

See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 678 (1985) and United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976)). “Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or material, only if it undermines

confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, Agurs,

427 U.S. at 111-12). “Moreover, we analyze all of the suppressed evidence together, using the same

type of analysis that we employ to determine prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel cases.” Id.

(citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 and United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1986)).

a. Torres’ Prison Disciplinary, Medical, Mental Health and Housing Records

Buchanan claims the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence in the form of records of Torres’

prison disciplinary file, and his medical, mental health and housing records. Buchanan contends this

evidence could have helped him impeach Torres by showing that Torres “misrepresented his mental

health and EOP background, his status among the inmate prison population, etc., and that he provided

false testimony in [his] case.” (Pet. at 9, ECF No. 40; Traverse at 18-19, ECF No. 77.) In support of

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 27 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

 The regulation makes an exception for the Attorney General.

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 28 10cv0423

this claim, Buchanan has submitted copies of some of Torres’ psychiatric records. (Lodgment No. 12,

Attach. F, Ex. 12.) The psychiatric records date from 2002 until 2004 at various penal institutions.

They are relatively consistent in their depiction of Torres as depressed and anxious due to his

incarceration and inability to contact his wife. (Id. at pg. 1-9, 11-13.) According to the records, Torres

attempted suicide once in 2002, and was referred to a psychiatrist once in 2003 when his cellmate

reported he was going to hurt himself. (Id. at 10, 12.) Torres was also on anti-depressants while in

prison. (Id. at 1-13.) The records also indicate his mood was within normal range at all times, and that

he never reported auditory or visual hallucinations, nor did he have suicidal or homicidal ideations. (Id.

at 1-13.) In the most recent report from September 2004, the attending psychiatrist indicated Torres

“suffer[s] from a mood disorder but not sufficiently so that an EOP level of care is required at this time.”

(Id. at 13.) Buchanan has also submitted a rules violation report Torres suffered while in prison which

found he had stolen batteries, and a Parole Detail Record for Torres, dated October 27, 2001.

(Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 12 at 14-16.) 

First, Buchanan has not established that the prosecutor suppressed Torres’ prison disciplinary

file, and his medical, mental health and housing records because, as the trial judge pointed out, the

prosecution was not in possession of Torres’ CDCR (California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation) file. (Lodgment No. 29, vol. 5 at 271-72.) The Department of Corrections Operations

Manual (DOM) states that “[i]nmate records shall not be released to any agency . . . or person outside

the Department without a court order.”9

 (DOM § 71010.11.2.) Thus, Buchanan and the prosecutor

had equal access to Torres’ CDCR file. Prosecutors cannot be said to have suppressed material that is

equally available to the defense. See Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that

“[t]here is no Brady violation if the ‘defendants, using reasonable diligence, could have obtained the

information’ themselves”). 

The failure to establish the prosecutor suppressed Torres’ CDCR file, in and of itself, is fatal to

Buchanan’s Brady claim. But Buchanan also has not established the second and third prong of Brady.

He has not established Torres’ CDCR file actually contained any impeachment material. He merely

speculates, based on the excerpts he does possess, that it would have contained impeachment

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 28 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 29 10cv0423

information. And, without any specific evidence as to what impeachment evidence Torres’ CDCR file

contained, Buchanan has also not established the third prong of a Brady violation, that the lack of access

to the information in Torres’ CDCR file “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Benn, 283

F.3d at 1053 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111-12). Even in the absence of the

CDCR file, Torres was thoroughly impeached with a variety of misdeeds, lies and crimes. At trial,

Torres was cross-examined by Buchanan’s attorney about his heavy drug use, drug dealing, and gun

possession, all of which were parole violations. (Lodgment No. 32, vol. no. 8 at 762-76.) Parraz’s

attorney cross-examined Torres about his placement in the EOP, the fact that he suffered from

depression and was treated for depression while he was in prison, the medications he was taking for

depression, his use of marijuana, PCP, and methamphetamine beginning when he was twelve years old,

his crimes against his wife for which he was incarcerated, and his stalker-like behavior toward Chavez.

(Id. at 777-85, 800-01.) Both attorneys also questioned Torres about the favorable treatment he had

received in return for his testimony, including the lack of prosecution for his crimes, placement in the

witness protection program for himself and his family, and financial assistance from the government.

(Id. at 800-05.) In addition, the defense called Dr. Greg Michel, a forensic psychologist with expertise

in drug addiction. (Lodgment No. 35, vol. 11 at 1403-06.) Dr. Michel testified that a person who was

consuming an “eight ball” (three and a half grams) of methamphetamine a day, the amount Torres said

he was consuming, would likely be hyperactive and paranoid, have visual and auditory hallucinations,

and could misperceive the intentions of people around them. (Id. at 1413-18.) 

Given all of the foregoing, Buchanan has not established the prosecutor suppressed material,

exculpatory or impeachment information that undermines the confidence in the outcome of his trial. 

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052-53. He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

b. Torres’ Parole Records

Buchanan next argues the prosecutor suppressed Torres’ parole records. (Pet. at 9, ECF No. 40;

Traverse at 18-19, ECF No. 77.) Parole records are also in the custody of the CDCR pursuant to DOM

§ 71010.8.3, which notes that “field files” are those records “maintained by the assigned Parole Agent

in the unit parole office.” (DOM § 71010.8.3). As such, they are also “not to be released to any agency

. . . or person outside the Department without a court order.” (Id., § 71010.11.2.) Thus, they were

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 29 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 30 10cv0423

equally available to the prosecution and defense and were not suppressed. See Westley, 83 F.3d at 726.

In addition, Buchanan’s speculation as to what might have been contained in Torres’ parole records is

insufficient to establish the records were material and that he was prejudiced by the their suppression.

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. For the same reasons as discussed above in section IV(B)(5)(a) of this

R&R, therefore, Buchanan has not established a Brady violation with regard to Torres’ parole records.

He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

c. Wiretap Evidence of a Phone Interview of Chavez by Detective Gutierrez

Buchanan also contends the prosecutor failed to turn over wiretap evidence of Detective

Gutierrez’s phone interviews of Jessica Chavez. (Pet. at 9, ECF No. 40; Traverse at 18-19, ECF No.

77.) Buchanan claims this evidence would have established Chavez was coerced into providing false

testimony and was coached as to the testimony she did provide. (Pet. at 9, ECF No. 40; Traverse at 18-

19, ECF No. 77.) As support for this claim, Buchanan has included a copy of a portion of an interview

of Chavez by Gutierrez. (See Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 13.) The origin of this document is not

clear, as there is no identifying information on it. 

Assuming the prosecutor suppressed phone interviews of Chavez, Buchanan has not established

the allegedly withheld evidence was exculpatory or impeachment material. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-

82; Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052-53. The excerpt provided by Buchanan as exhibit 13 reads as follows:

CHAVEZ: It wasn’t . . . uh, it wasn’t like after you’re done like oh, you know,

to do that. That doesn’t, c’mon now . . . .

GUTIERREZ: . . . umkay. Well, can I ask you somethin’ though? You’re a

correction officer, okay, and you’re gonna go have dinner with a Mex . . . full blown

Mexican mafia member. Not . . . not an associate, not a homie. A member where you

know what it takes to be a member. You know the violence it takes to be a member.

They don’t just make Carnales just . . . it’s not easy to become a Carnal. You know that,

right?

CHAVEZ: Well, from what you told me, yeah.

GUTIERREZ: Umkay. Well, you’ve worked the prison system, too. You’re

not . . . not . . .

CHAVEZ: . . .but it . . .it’s not accessible to us. And when . . . whenever

Buchanan comes he’s thrown in the hole right . . . automatically . . . .

GUTIERREZ: . . . but everybody knows . . . .

CHAVEZ: . . . (U) . . . .

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 30 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 31 10cv0423

GUTIERREZ: . . . but everybody knows why . . . everybody knows that

Buchanan’s a . . . a Mexican mafia member, correct?

CHAVEZ: An associ . . . yeah, a member, yeah. Associate.

GUTIERREZ: But . . . well everybody knew he wasn’t an associate. Everybody

knew he was a member. There’s a difference. Rayo was an associate. Rayo was a . .

. he was the . . . he was a key holder. He called some shots in there. Triste has a one-two

yard.

(Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 13.)

Nothing in the transcript provided by Buchanan establishes Gutierrez coerced Chavez or shaped

her testimony, and Buchanan has provided no evidence to show other tapes would establish Gutierrez

coerced Chavez, or even that other tapes actually exist. Finally, because Buchanan has not established

whether any further tapes exist or what those tapes contain, he has not shown he was prejudiced. Benn,

283 F.3d at 1053 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111-12).

For all the foregoing reasons, Buchanan has not proven a Brady violation occurred with regard

to taped phone interviews by Gutierrez of Chavez. He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

d. Wiretap Evidence from Torres’ Phone

Lastly, Buchanan alleges there was a wiretap on Torres’ phone and the prosecution withheld this

evidence. This evidence, he claims, would have shown that Torres was lying at trial. (Pet. at 9;

Traverse at 18-19.) Buchanan has provided no proof that any such evidence exists. As such, he cannot

establish the prosecutor suppressed the evidence, that it contained exculpatory or impeachment material,

or his lack of access to it affected the outcome of his trial in any way. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82;

Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052-53. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

e. Conclusion

Buchanan has failed to establish the prosecutor withheld any material exculpatory or

impeachment evidence. See Strickler, 527 U.S. 281-82. His Brady claims fail.

6. Judicial Bias (Claim Five)

Buchanan argues the trial judge was biased against him, denying him a fair trial. (Pet. at 10,

ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 13-16, ECF No. 40-1; Traverse at 19, ECF No. 77.) Specifically, Buchanan

alleges the following instances of bias: (1) the trial judge’s decision to shackle him; (2) the excessive

security in the courtroom; (3) the trial judge’s refusal to permit defense counsel to examine the

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 31 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10 Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b) permits the citation of unpublished dispositions and orders to the courts

of the circuit. See Circuit Rule 36-3(b).

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 32 10cv0423

documents he considered to support the shackling and courtroom security measures; (4) the trial judge’s

reference to Buchanan “pimping” his defense counsel; (5) the trial judge reference to the jury as

“idiots”; (6) the trial judge’s decision to permit testimony by gang experts which “demonized”

Buchanan; (7) the trial judge’s failure to take any action despite being aware of problems with the

translation of the wiretapped phone calls; (8) the trial judge’s denial of Buchanan’s Marsden motions;

(9) the trial court’s failure to admonish the jury or take other corrective action after the jury observed

Buchanan in shackles and waist chains; (10) the trial judge’s denial of defense counsel’s request to

contact members of the jury post trial; (11) the trial judge’s severance of Rodney Brooks from the case;

(12) the trial judge’s coaching of a prosecution witness during the hearing on the suppression motion;

and (13) the trial judge’s speculation as to the prosecution’s asserted basis for the detention of

Buchanan’s car at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence. (Pet. at 10, ECF

No. 40; Attach. C. at 13-16, ECF No. 40-1.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally

defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

The Ninth Circuit has delineated the clearly established Supreme Court law bearing upon a

judicial bias claim:

The Supreme Court has long established that the Due Process Clause guarantees

a criminal defendant the right to a fair and impartial judge. See In re Murchison, 349

U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). To succeed on a judicial bias claim,

however, the petitioner must “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those

serving as adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d

712 (1975). In the absence of any evidence of some extrajudicial source of bias or

partiality, neither adverse rulings nor impatient remarks are generally sufficient to

overcome the presumption of judicial integrity, even if those remarks are “critical or

disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases.” Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994); see United States v.

Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1005 (9th Cir.2002).

Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008).

“When the question of the propriety of the trial judge’s conduct is raised in a habeas action, the

inquiry is ‘whether the state trial judge’s behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate

federal due process under the United States Constitution.” Macky v. Scribner, 2010 WL 334474 at *13

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ducket v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995)).10

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 32 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 33 10cv0423

a. Shackling, Excessive Security Measures and Denial of Defense Access to Documents

Supporting Security Measures

Buchanan claims the state trial judge’s decision to shackle him during the trial, the “excessive”

security measure employed during trial, and the judge’s denial of defense access to the evidence used

to support the judge’s decisions evidenced bias against him. (Pet. at 10, ECF No. 40; Attach. C. at 13,

ECF No. 40-1; Traverse at 19, ECF No. 77.) Before trial began, defense counsel filed a motion seeking

to limit the security measures, including the shackling of Buchanan, that would be implemented during

the trial. (Lodgment No. 23, vol. 3 at 698-711.) The trial judge held a brief hearing on the matter and

ruled as follows:

THE COURT: It’s my understanding that the sheriff’s department here has a

standing order that they must have two deputies available for every green-bander. All

three clients fit in that category. So I’m saddled with their policy and procedure that I

have to have at least six people present.

At this point in time, I think I’m going to limit it to seven, two of which, it’s my

understanding, will not be inside the courtroom anyway. I will coordinate that with my

own bailiff on that issue.

The motion, in essence, will be granted. There will be a limit. I’ll place it at this

point at seven.

. . . .

There are a series of bolts on the floor. All three defendants will be bolted to the

floor. No defendant will be shackled as far as their hands are concerned. They will be

simply — there will be an ankle, plastic-coated-chain affair that makes it virtually

impossible for anyone to hear that a person is chained. It’s extremely difficult to see that

anyone is chained. They are free to assist counsel, to take notes, to handle exhibits and

papers and assist you throughout the entire trial. That’s my tentative ruling with regard

to restraints.

. . . .

The law requires that I go through and make determinations, specifically findings

as to each defendant the necessity to have physical restraints.

I have received certain information, as I’ve indicated to you, that I will include

in a sealed document for purposes of appellate review. Some of it I do feel is classified,

confidential, could put people at risk. The vast majority, however, is not.

We’ll start first with Mr. Buchanan.

The information I have from the Sheriff’s Department is that Mr. Buchanan has

a series of incidents involving confrontations with staff. That he’s been involved with

incidents receiving contraband through the mail. He’s been involved with assaults on

other inmates. He has two prior instances of potential or possible escapes. He’s

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 33 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 34 10cv0423

classified as a level 6 maximum assaultive escape risk. He has certainly numerous

priors, although they in and of themselves cannot serve as a basis. I think certainly the

court has to consider whether or not Mr. Buchanan has a violent tendency. It would

appear that he does.

There’s additional materials, as I indicated, that will be part of the sealed order

from the court.

(Lodgment No. 27, vol. 3 at 169-72.)

Buchanan’s lawyer objected to his lack of access to the sealed information and the possibility

that jurors could see the chains. (Id. at 174-75.) Defense counsel also asked that if the defendants were

not permitted to stand when the jury entered for security reasons, that all parties be prevented from

standing. (Id. at 176-77.) The judge indicated there would be a curtain blocking any view of the ankle

chains, and granted the defense request to prevent all parties from standing if defendants were not

permitted to stand. (Id. at 175-77.) 

The Court has reviewed the sealed order regarding the courtroom security and shackling, as well

as the information upon which the judge relied to make his decision, which are contained as Exhibits

one through two of the habeas corpus petition Buchanan filed in the state appellate court on March 28,

2010. (Lodgment No. 12, Exs. 1-2.) The information consists of a letter dated February 28, 2006, from

the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department detailing the need for the use of restraints during trial based

on “numerous incidents of disobeying and disrespecting staff, receiving contraband via legal mail, and

assaults on other inmates.” (Id., Ex. 1.) The letter is followed by an incident report from March of

2005, in which Buchanan was overheard telling his cellmate that because leg chains had not placed on

him, it would have been easy to escape through an open gate while being transported. (Id.) The letter

and the incident report also list Buchanan as a “high-ranking EME prison gang member” who “has

several convictions for prison escapes in his criminal history.” (Id.) In its order directing the use of

restraints, the trial judge stated that Buchanan would have a plastic leg chain that would not make any

sounds and would be concealed by a table drape. (Id., Ex. 2.) The judge indicated he had reviewed “the

criminal records of each defendant as well as documentation provided to the Court by the Sheriff’s

Department outlining each defendant’s actions while in local custody.” (Id.) He reiterated the

information from the Sheriff’s Department letter and incident report as support for his decision. (Id.)

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 34 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11 The propriety of the use of shackling and other security measures is addressed in Section IV(B)(7) of

this R&R.

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 35 10cv0423

The record does not reflect judicial bias against Buchanan. To the contrary, the judge relied on

sufficient, verified information given to him by the Sheriff’s Department. He thoughtfully considered

the information he was provided and granted both the request to limit the number of security personnel

in the courtroom and the request to either permit the defendants to stand or require that everyone stay

seated. The judge also made various accommodations, such as the use of a curtain to obscure the ankle

chains, the use of plastic coated chains to deaden any noise from the chains, and did not require

Buchanan and the other defendants to have their arms chained in any fashion. In short, the judge

properly and fairly balanced the need to ensure courtroom security with Buchanan’s right to fair trial.

There is nothing in the record before this Court that establishes “the state trial judge’s behavior rendered

the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.”

Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740.11

b. Reference to Buchanan “Pimping” Defense Counsel and Reference to the Jury as “Idiots”

Buchanan next claims the trial judge was biased because he said Buchanan was “pimping” his

defense attorney and referred to the jury as “idiots.” (Attach. C at 13, ECF No. 40-1.) As to the first

allegation, Buchanan is presumably referring to the following exchange between the judge and counsel

regarding jury instructions:

[PROSECUTOR]: I think everything else comes out.

THE COURT: All the way through?

[PROSECUTOR]: Yes. Defense is in momentary possession or justifiable

possession, unless [defense counsel] is advancing one of those.

[COUNSEL FOR PARRAZ]: Momentary, just slipped into his skivs.

THE COURT: I’m surprised he hasn’t pimped you to do that.

[COUNSEL FOR BUCHANAN]: Actually, he has.

(Lodgment No. 34, vol. 10 at 1352.)

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 35 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 36 10cv0423

While perhaps injudicious, it is clear from the record that the judge’s comment was a simply an

attempt at humor, made to lawyers who frequently appear in his courtroom. It was not part of a pattern

of delegitimizing or belittling Buchanan or his attorney which would indicate bias. 

As to Buchanan’s allegation that the judge referred to the jury as “idiots,” Buchanan has not

pointed the Court to any pages of transcript where this reference occurred, and the Court is unable to

locate anywhere in the transcript where such an event occurred. Even if it did occur, however, it is

unclear how this would translate into bias against Buchanan. Therefore, Buchanan has not established

“the state trial judge’s behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due

process under the United States Constitution.” Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740.

c. Permitting Two Gang Experts to Testify

Buchanan argues the trial judge’s decision to permit two gang experts to testify shows he was

biased against him. (Attach. C at 13, ECF No. 40-1.) Buchanan claims the experts simply corroborated

and repeated each other’s testimony and “demonized” him. (Id.) 

Buchanan filed a pretrial motion to limit the number of gang experts. At the hearing on the

motion, the trial judge asked the prosecutor whether he was presenting “different gang experts who are

going to testify to different things,” and stated that “[if] they are going to testify to the same thing, why

should I let you call two?” (Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 348.) The prosecutor explained that the first

expert, Steve Contreras, was a CDCR representative who would testify about “the history, formation,

his expertise in the Mexican Mafia, his experience interviewing Mexican Mafia members, and his

experience in both the prison system and outside the prison system,” and that he had “specific

knowledge of Mr. Buchanan [and would] be able to render an opinion that Mr. Buchanan is a member

of the Mexican Mafia.” (Id. at 349.) The second expert, Detective Mike Gutierrez with the San Diego

Police Department, “had specific knowledge of this case,” and “wide reaching knowledge of the

relationship between Surenos and the Mexican Mafia.” (Id.) He would “testify as to two predicate acts

as required by the statute to prove the allegation under Penal Code section 186.22 [the “for the benefit

of a street gang” enhancement].” (Id.)

At trial, Contreras, testified generally about prison life, classification of prisoners, the conditions

in certain housing units of prisons, and prison gangs. (Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 365-90.) Contreras

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 36 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 A “validated” Mexican Mafia member is a person who has been determined, through various criteria,

to belong to the Mexican Mafia and hold a certain amount of power within that organization. (See Lodgment No.

30, vol. 6 at 403-04.)

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 37 10cv0423

also testified about the Mexican Mafia specifically — where and how it was born, how it is organized,

the rules governing the organization, terms used by members and their meanings, how many Mexican

Mafia members there are on the streets and in prison, how prison officials “validate” a Mexican Mafia

member,12 and what criminal activities the Mexican Mafia is engaged in, both in prison and on the

streets. (Id. at 365-428.) Contreras also specifically identified Buchanan as a member of the Mexican

Mafia and a “Big Homie,” i.e., a controlling member of the Mexican Mafia. (Id. at 409, 414-15.)

Gutierrez testified about his contact and experience with Mexican Mafia members on the street and

specifically gave his opinion as to whether the crimes committed against Torres were for the benefit of

the Mexican Mafia, as alleged in the information. (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 1177-1210.) 

Although there was some overlap between the two experts with regard to Mexican Mafia

members’ activities on the street, Contreras and Gutierrez had expertise in distinct areas that were

relevant to the prosecution’s case. (See Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 348-49.) In addition, the trial judge

did not blindly agree to the prosecution’s request to call two gang experts, but rather questioned the

prosecutor as to why he needed both. (Id. at 348.) Thus, the record does not reflect a judge who was

biased against Buchanan and whose “behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate

federal due process under the United States Constitution.” Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740.

d. Inaction Regarding Disputed Translation of Wiretapped Phone Calls

Buchanan contends the trial judge showed bias when he failed to take any action regarding the

disputed translation of the wiretapped phone calls. (Attach. C at 13-14, ECF No. 40-1.) Buchanan also

notes that after his conviction, the prosecutor stipulated to a different version of the transcripts of the

wiretapped phone calls in Rodney Brooks’ trial which did not contain the disputed translations. (Id. at

14.)

The issue of whether the translations of the wiretapped phone calls was accurate was discussed

several times over the course of the state court proceedings. It was first discussed on March 26, 2006,

at a pretrial motions hearing. At that time, Rodney Brooks, who was representing himself, alleged that

the transcripts were inaccurate. (Lodgment No. 29, vol. 5 at 297-99.) The trial judge told Brooks

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 37 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 38 10cv0423

“[t]here’s nothing to prohibit you from bringing that expert in your case in chief saying this is what the

correct interpretation of this is.” (Id. at 299.)

Buchanan next brought the issue up on April 18, 2006, during trial. Defense counsel told the

judge that Buchanan wanted to put on the record his request for an independent review of the

translations of the wiretapped phone calls. Counsel noted that he had had an investigator review the

transcripts, who told counsel they were accurate, but that, upon reflection, there were some changes to

two of the transcripts that should be made. (Lodgment No. 34, vol. 10 at 1311.) Counsel provided the

prosecutor with corrected transcripts of the two calls, and noted that they had not had a chance to discuss

any changes or come to an agreement. (Id. at 1311-12.) In response, the trial judge told defense

counsel:

THE COURT: If you can’t agree, you are going to have to call an expert on

behalf of the defense, or whoever your interpreters were that reviewed it, to say that they

believe that’s what this means.

You can submit, potentially, a supplemental page and have that marked as an

exhibit. If your expert says this is what we think its should say, that may go in in

conjunction with the transcripts marked by the people.

(Id. at 1312.) 

The following day, April 19, 2006, counsel were prepared to submit a modified version of the

transcripts at issue. The trial judge and counsel discussed how to best present the modified transcripts

to the jury, and agreed to simply substitute the new transcripts for the old. (Id. at 1318-21.)

The next time the transcript issue was discussed was April 27, 2006, following Buchanan’s

conviction. At that time, Buchanan complained his attorney had not submitted altered transcripts for

two of the phone calls relied on by the prosecution at trial. (Lodgment No. 35, vol. 11 at 1622-23.) The

trial judge listened to Buchanan, and defense counsel indicated he intended to raise the issue of the

transcripts in a post trial motion. (Id. at 1623.) Finally, on March 16, 2007, Buchanan’s new attorney

argued in her motion for a new trial that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to submit alternate

transcripts of the phone calls; the trial judge denied the motion, stating that while the altered translations

may have had some effect on Buchanan’s case, it would not have likely altered the outcome. The judge

also found the transcript issues would have come down to a “battle of the experts,” and that counsel

simply made a tactical decision not to pursue that line of defense. (Id. at 1679-80.)

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 38 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 39 10cv0423

As with Buchanan’s preceding claims of judicial bias, there is simply no evidence in the record

that the judge treated Buchanan, his attorney and the defense theories and evidence with anything but

respect and consideration. Moreover, it was the responsibility of counsel, not the trial judge, to address

any reliability issues with regard to the transcripts. There is simply no evidence the judge was biased

against Buchanan with regard to the transcript issue, and no evidence his “behavior rendered the trial

so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.” Ducket,

67 F.3d at 740.

e. Denial of Buchanan’s Marsden Motions

Buchanan also complains that the trial judge’s denial of his Marsden motions is evidence of

judicial bias. (Attach. C. at 14-15, ECF No. 40-1.) The Court has reviewed the sealed Marsden hearing

transcripts. At each hearing, the trial judge listened thoughtfully and respectfully to Buchanan’s

complaints before denying the motion. As previously noted, “[i]n the absence of any evidence of some

extrajudicial source of bias or partiality . . . adverse rulings . . . are generally [in]sufficient to overcome

the presumption of judicial integrity . . . . ” Larson, 515 F.3d at 1067 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510

U.S. at 555). On the record before this Court, Buchanan has not established the denial of his Marsden

motions was motivated by judicial bias or that his “behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair

as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.” Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740.

f. Failure to Admonish or Caution the Jury After They Saw Buchanan in Shackles

Buchanan contends the trial judge was biased because he did not admonish or caution the jury

after members saw him in shackles. (Attach. C. at 15, ECF No. 40-1.) Buchanan is presumably

referring to an incident which took place on April 18, 2006, during trial proceedings. Parraz informed

his counsel, who informed the court, that he and Buchanan were observed by jurors as they were being

led into the courtroom. (Lodgment No. 34, vol. 10 at 1214.) Buchanan and Parraz were shackled. (Id.)

When asked by the judge, one bailiff said that he had been escorting the defendants and had not seen

any jurors. A second bailiff confirmed this. (Id. at 1214-15.) The trial judge stated that he would speak

to all the security personnel involved in transporting Buchanan and Parraz to make sure no one had seen

them in shackles and to ensure that “something like that doesn’t happen again, if it happened at all.”

(Id. at 1215.) No further discussions on the record appear to have occurred.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 39 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 40 10cv0423

Again, Buchanan has not provided any evidence the judge was biased against Buchanan, and no

evidence his “behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under

the United States Constitution.” Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740. To the contrary, the judge said he would

investigate whether any jurors had seen Buchanan while he was shackled and committed to ensuring

any such sightings did not happen again. That the judge did not caution the jury is simply an indication

that he concluded no juror had seen Buchanan in shackles, or he decided that any admonishment would

only draw more attention to the shackling. Buchanan has not established the judge was biased against

him, nor that his “behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process

under the United States Constitution.” Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740. He is not entitled to relief as to this

claim.

g. Refusal to Permit Defense Counsel to Contact Jurors After the Verdict and Decision

to Sever Co-Defendant Brooks and Grant Him a Continuance

Buchanan next complains about two rulings made by the trial judge. First, he argues the judge’s

refusal to disclose jurors’ contact information establishes he was biased against Buchanan. (Attach. C.

at 15, ECF No. 40-1.) After Buchanan was convicted, the trial judge appointed a new attorney to

research and present a motion for a new trial. (Lodgment No. 36, vol. 12 at 1640-43.) Among other

motions, counsel filed a motion to disclose the names of jurors who completed the juror questionnaires

during voir dire. The motion was brought in order to provide a factual basis for a motion for a new trial

based on the ground that Buchanan was denied his federal constitutional right to be tried by a jury drawn

from a source representative of the community. (Lodgment No. 24, vol. 4 at 0774-77.) A hearing on

the motion was held on February 22, 2007. The judge denied the motion as follows:

THE COURT: As to the issues regarding the jury questions, the motion for

disclosure of the panel members, the motion for a new trial based on constitutional

infirmities, denied.

As to the disclosure of the names of the jury pool, the court offers the following:

there’s absolutely no evidence before this court in this case to suggest that there was any

constitutional infirmity as to the selection process for the Garcia/Parraz jury. There’s no

evidence that’s been presented in this case to this court that was not in existence at the

time of the selection of this panel that was available had that evidence been pursued.

There’s no evidence in our case with regard to the panel picked for these

gentlemen that shows any type of underrepresentation or any type of systematic

exclusion of a cognizable group in the process. The defendants have not presented

evidence in our case that any cognizable group was excluded from the jury selection

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 40 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 41 10cv0423

process nor that any such group is in fact a distinct group within our community.

There’s no evidence to indicate that any cognizable group has been defined.

Nothing to indicate that the jury trial for these gentlemen in our case was not fair and

reasonable.

To the extent there was any underrepresentation, if that’s determined to have

taken place, there’s absolutely no evidence in our case to suggest that any type of

systematic exclusion suggests any type of constitutional violation.

Further, no objection was made to the composition of the panel prior to the panel

being sworn in our case, as required under C.C.P. [California Civil Procedure] 225.

Further, the panel make-up was clearly acceptable to trial counsel as they

exercised only 21 peremptory challenges, leaving nine remaining peremptory challenges

unexercised.

Based upon those facts, the motions that the two of you have brought on the jury

selection issue are denied.

(Lodgment No. 36, vol. 12 at 1652-53.)

Buchanan also contends the trial judge’s decision to sever Brooks from the case and grant him

a continuance is evidence of judicial bias. (Id..) At a hearing on motions following the granting of

Brooks’ request to represent himself, Brooks asked for a continuance in order to secure several records,

interview some witnesses and file motions that required a certain amount of notice. (Lodgment No. 29,

vol. 5 at 268-310.) Counsel for Buchanan belatedly joined in the motion, noting that he had not received

fingerprint evidence or transcripts of interviews with Chavez. (Id. at 287-90.) The trial judge noted that

he had ordered the prosecutor to turn over those items, but that this did not form the basis for a

continuance because it was not clear whether such items even existed. (Id.) If they did exist, and there

was a delay in providing them, the court agreed to consider that at a later date. At that time, however,

the court said a continuance for Buchanan and Parraz was premature. (Id.) Following a lengthy

discussion and argument about Brooks’ request for a continuance, the trial judge agreed that Brooks had

established good cause for a continuance, in large part due to Brooks’ recent decision to represent

himself, and granted the motion as to Brooks. The judge denied the motion as to Buchanan and Parraz

and severed Brooks’ case. (Id. at 307-11.)

As previously noted, “[i]n the absence of any evidence of some extrajudicial source of bias or

partiality . . . adverse rulings . . . are generally [in]sufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial

integrity . . . . ” Larson, 515 F.3d at 1067 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). The judge’s decision to deny

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 41 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 42 10cv0423

the motion to disclose juror information was based on his determination that there was insufficient

evidence to support an motion to challenge the make up of the jury pool. The judge’s decision to grant

Brooks’ motion to continue was based on the fact that Brooks’ decision to represent himself required

additional time for preparation. On the record before this Court, Buchanan has not established that

denying the motion for disclosure of jurors information or granting Brooks’ request for a continuance

and severing him from Buchanan’s and Parraz’s case were motivated by judicial bias, nor has he shown

the judge’s “behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under

the United States Constitution.” Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief as to

these claims.

h. Coaching a Witness at the Suppression Motion Hearing 

Buchanan argues the judge exhibited bias when he “told the witness what to say” at the hearing

on the motion to suppress evidence. (Attach. C at 16, ECF No. 40-1.) Buchanan appears to be referring

to the following exchange between defense counsel, the prosecutor, the trial judge and Officer McIvor:

Q [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you and the other officers immediately, to save

Triste’s life, entered the house, or at least knocked on the door, true?

MR. BOST: Objection. Argumentative.

THE COURT: Overruled. He can say that’s not what they did.

THE WITNESS: That’s not what we did. I know that another phone call was

made from Mr. Buchanan to Ms. Chavez that indicated that Mr. Triste has not been

harmed at that time.

(Lodgment No. 27, vol. 3 at 102.)

This exchange does not establish judicial bias. The trial judge was explaining the basis for

overruling the prosecutor’s objection, i.e., the question was not argumentative because McIvor could

simply answer that that is not what they did. Further, it is clear from the totality of the McIvor’s

testimony that the judge’s comment did not direct or in any way affect his McIvor’s testimony. As with

Buchanan’s preceding claim, “[i]n the absence of any evidence of some extrajudicial source of bias or

partiality . . . adverse rulings . . . are generally [in]sufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial

integrity . . . . ” Larson, 515 F.3d at 1067 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). Buchanan has not established

the judge’s comment was motivated by judicial bias, nor has he shown the judge’s “behavior rendered

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 42 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 43 10cv0423

the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.”

Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740. 

i. Speculation Regarding Prosecution’s Justification for the Stop of Buchanan’s Car

Buchanan’s final claim regarding judicial bias relates to comments the judge made about the

reasons the prosecution put forth as justification for the stop of his car. (Attach. C at 16, ECF No. 40-1.)

This claim stems from comments made during the argument portion of the hearing on the motion to

suppress evidence. The argument made by defense counsel at the motion to suppress was that police

concern about the welfare of Triste was simply a pretext to stop Buchanan’s car and search him.

(Lodgment No. 27, vol. 3 at 126-27.) The trial judge asked defense counsel why all of the information

known to the officers before stopping Buchanan’s car, including all of the information gleaned from the

wiretaps, could not be used to provide the probable cause for the stop. (Id. at 127-28.) Defense counsel

replied that the information from the wiretaps had never been advanced by the prosecution as a basis

for the stop, and that, should the prosecutor wish to do so, he wanted more time to respond. (Id. at 128-

31.) The prosecutor told the judge he had, in fact, advanced the theory that probable cause was based

in part on the information gleaned from the wiretaps. (Id. at 132.) The judge denied the motion. (Id.

at 132.)

The record does not support an inference of bias on the part of the state trial judge. At the

hearing, the trial judge stated the proper standard for deciding the motion to suppress: “[T]he question

for me based upon all the evidence that’s been presented to me, is [whether there is] p.c. [probable

cause] to stop the car[.]” (Id. at 130.) As the Ninth Circuit has noted:

The Supreme Court has made clear that an officer’s subjective thoughts play no

role in the Fourth Amendment analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-12

[citations omitted] (1996). More specifically, the fact that officers acted on one rationale

“would not foreclose the [government] from justifying [the search] by proving probable

cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 [citations omitted] (1983); United States v.

Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 2005) (Whren stands for the proposition that if the

officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, the officers may

conduct a traffic stop even if the stop serves some other purpose.”) Thus, it does not

matter that [the officer] was directed to make a “traffic stop,” nor does it matter whether

he had valid grounds to make the traffic stop because of lane-straddling. If the officers

had probable cause, then the seizure and search of the vehicle will be justified.

United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, Buchanan has provided no evidence that the judge’s ruling was the result of bias.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 43 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 44 10cv0423

As with Buchanan’s other claims attacking the state judge’s rulings, “[i]n the absence of any evidence

of some extrajudicial source of bias or partiality . . . adverse rulings . . . are generally [in]sufficient to

overcome the presumption of judicial integrity . . . . ” Larson, 515 F.3d at 1067 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S.

at 555). He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

j. Conclusion

Buchanan has not established, either individually or collectively, that the state trial judge was

biased against him because he has not shown the judge’s “behavior rendered the trial so fundamentally

unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.” Ducket, 67 F.3d at 740.

7. Excessive Security and Shackling (Claim Six)

In claim six, Buchanan contends that his federal due process rights were violated by the

excessive security employed in the courtroom during his trial and by his shackling. (Pet. at 11, ECF No.

40; Attach. C at 17-18, ECF No. 40-1; Traverse at 19-22, ECF No. 77.) Specifically, he complains: (1)

there was a full sized, temporary metal detector and five to ten armed sheriff’s deputies outside the

courtroom; (2) there were groups of federal agents, “SWAT-style clad California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation transportation officers” and other security personnel in the courtroom;

(3) a bomb-sniffing dog was brought into the courtroom; and (4) jurors were allowed to view Buchanan

in leg and waist chains and being escorted by armed guards. (Pet. at 11, ECF No. 40; Attach. C. at 17-

18, ECF No. 40-1; Traverse at 19-22, ECF No. 77.) Buchanan claims the jury asked for an armed escort

out of the building following the verdict. (Attach C. at 18, ECF No. 40-1.) Because it is unclear

whether this claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d

at 1167.

a. Excessive Security

In Hayes v. Ayers, the Ninth Circuit framed the inquiry regarding courtroom security in the

following way:

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) . . .

establishes the framework for analyzing whether courtroom security measures violate

a defendant's right to a fair trial. We must first “look at the scene presented to jurors and

determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an

unacceptable threat to defendant’ right to a fair trial.” Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 572, 106

S.Ct. 1340. In assessing inherent prejudice, the question is “whether an unacceptable

risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play” in the jury’s evaluation of

the defendant. Id. at 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (internal quotation marks omitted). If security

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 44 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 45 10cv0423

measures are not found to be inherently prejudicial, a court then considers whether the

measures actually prejudiced members of the jury. Id. at 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340. “[I]f the

challenged practice is not found inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show

actual prejudice, the inquiry is over.” Id.

Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 521-22 (9th Cir. 2011).

As the state trial judge noted, Sheriff’s Department regulations required two officers for each

defendant. Before Brooks was severed from the case, this meant a minimum of six deputies had to be

present in the courtroom during trial. (Lodgment No. 27, vol. 3 at 169-70.) The trial judge limited the

number to seven maximum, with two of the seven deputies outside the courtroom. There is no

indication as to how many deputies were present in the courtroom once Brooks was severed from the

case, but the Court assumes that, based on the logic of the judge’s previous order, there were a

maximum of five deputies permitted. Buchanan alleges there were “groups of radio wired/carrying

suited federal agents” and “task force related personnel” seated in in the gallery as well. (Pet. at 11,

ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 17-18, ECF No. 40-1.) 

The Supreme Court in Holbrook found that the presence of four uniformed state troopers was

not inherently prejudicial. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569. Applying Holbrook, the Ninth Circuit has found

that the deployment of security measures and personnel similar to that deployed in Buchanan’s case was

not inherently prejudicial. See Hayes, 632 F.3d at 521-22 (finding that three extra deputies, personal

screening of spectators, including the use of a hand-held metal detector, patting down of outer clothing,

inspection of bags, and locking the courtroom door was not inherently prejudicial); Williams v.

Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 587-90 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the presence of four marshals in the

courtroom was not inherently prejudicial); Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787, 797 (9th Cir. 1998)

(finding that the presence of four and sometimes six armed sheriff’s deputies at trial, two of whom sat

behind each defendant during trial, was not inherently prejudicial). As to the alleged presence of bombsniffing dogs, there is no evidence the jury witnessed the dogs.

Buchanan has also not established actual prejudice from the presence of excessive security. The

evidence Buchanan presents to support a finding of actual prejudice is his allegation that jurors

expressed a concern for their safety and asked for an armed escort out of the building. The jury did send

a note out from deliberations indicating they had reached a verdict, expressing concern about the

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 45 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 46 10cv0423

confidentiality of their personal information and safety. The note read as follows:

There is concern in the jury room as to the amount of personal information the

defendants were able to obtain/see regarding the jurors (i.e. the questionnaire).

Should there be any concern for our personal safety (some of us were asked

questions in front of the defendants)?

And, we have reached verdicts on all counts.

(Lodgment No. 23, vol. 3 at 0568.)

The only reference in the record to the jury’s request for an armed escort out of the building is

found in defense counsel’s motion for a new trial. (Lodgment No. 24, vol. 4 at 0753.) The Court has

been unable to locate any evidence in trial record that jurors made such a request.

As Respondent has pointed out, Buchanan has not presented any evidence of actual prejudice,

such as declarations or other evidence from jurors, that establishes the jury was prejudiced against

Buchanan as a result of seeing the security in the courtroom. Although the jury expressed concern for

their safety following the verdict, this, by itself, is insufficient to establish that the jury’s verdict was

affected by the security visible in the courtroom. Hayes, 632 F.3d at 521-22.

b. Shackling

“[A] defendant has the right to be free of shackles and handcuffs in the presence of the jury,

unless shackling is justified by an essential state interest.” Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2002). A shackling error, however, is subject to the harmless error analysis of Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), that is, a petitioner must show the error had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. “When the jury

never saw the defendant’s shackles in the courtroom . . . the shackles did not prejudice the defendant’s

right to a fair trial. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 592-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Castillo v.

Stainer, 997 F.2d 669, 669 (9th Cir. 1993)). “[T]he unconstitutional shackling of a defendant results

in prejudice only if the evidence of guilt is not “overwhelming.” Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 891 (9th

Cir. 2010).

As previously discussed, defense counsel filed a motion for Buchanan to appear without

restraints, and, relying on information provided by the Sheriff’s Department, the judge decided the

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 46 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 47 10cv0423

defendants would be bolted to the floor with plastic leg chains that did not make noise and were hidden

by a skirt around defense table. There would be no chains on their hands. (Lodgment No. 27, vol. 3 at

172.) The information the court relied on, which consisted of incident reports and Buchanan’s criminal

history, and the sealed order it issued are contained as Exhibits one through two of the habeas corpus

petition Buchanan filed in the state appellate court on March 28, 2010. (Lodgment No. 12, Exs. 1-2;

see also this R&R at section IV(B)(7)(a).)

The trial judge’s decision was reasonable and supported by specific factual allegations that

justified the use of restraints. But, even if the judge’s decision was wrong, Buchanan has not established

prejudice under Brecht. The Ninth Circuit has held that leg chains on a defendant constitute harmless

error where, as here, a curtain around the defense table concealed them and there is no evidence the jury

ever saw the defendant’s shackles in the courtroom. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 593-94 (citing Castillo

v. Stainer, 997 F.2d 669, 669 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding harmless error in shackling where the waist chain

on defendant would not be seen by the jury); Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 583 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

no prejudice resulted from shackles when no juror interviewed remembered seeing the shackles); Rich

v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no prejudice from shackling where a curtain

concealed ankle chains); and United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1997) (same)).

Buchanan also claims jurors saw him in shackles, waist chains and cross-cuffed while being

transported to court. (Attach. C. at 17-18, ECF No. 40-1.) In Williams, the Ninth Circuit noted that “a

jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in physical restraints outside of the courtroom does

not warrant habeas relief unless the petitioner makes an affirmative showing of prejudice.” Williams,

384 F.3d at 593 (citing Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1133 (holding a jury’s occasional, brief glimpses of defendant

in restraints in the hallway before court was not prejudicial); United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1190

(9th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557, 560-62 (9th Cir. 1989) (same)). As

with his excessive security claim, the only evidence Buchanan presents to support a finding of actual

prejudice is his allegation that jurors expressed a concern for their safety in a note and asked for an

armed escort out of the building. Buchanan has not presented any declarations or other evidence from

jurors that would establish the jury was prejudiced against Buchanan as a result of briefly seeing him

in shackles. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 47 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 48 10cv0423

8. Prosecutorial Misconduct (Claim Seven)

Buchanan contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in several ways. He claims: (1) the

prosecutor purposefully gave the defense an old parole detail record on Torres in an attempt to conceal

the fact that Detective McIvor knew the individual in the car with Buchanan was Torres and to facilitate

McIvor’s claim that he stopped Buchanan’s car because he believed Jesse Gutierres, a parolee at large,

was the passenger in the car; (2) the prosecutor and law enforcement used coercive and suggestive

questioning to “coach” from and “feed” information to witnesses; (3) unlike other witnesses and

suspects interviewed in the course of the investigation, there was no transcribed interview of Torres,

which indicates Torres was an FBI recruit which was not disclosed to the defense; (4) the prosecutor

withheld wiretap information by failing to give the defense a copy of a transcript of a phone call

between Jessica Chavez and Detective Gutierrez, failing to provide “all the discovery required by law”

as he claimed, falsely telling the trial court that there were no recordings of any interviews with suspects

and witnesses in the case and giving the defense a large envelope of CD recordings at the close of the

prosecutions’ case; (5) the prosecutor falsely claimed he would present a Spanish language expert at trial

to verify the translations of the wiretapped phone calls were accurate; (6) Agent Desarno intimidated

witnesses into not speaking with defense investigators; (7) the prosecutor made false statements during

closing argument; (8) the prosecutor referred to Buchanan’s cell phone, which law enforcement had

provided, as a tool used by drug dealers to further their drug dealing activities; (9) law enforcement had

an undisclosed wiretap on Ernesto Torres before August 24, 2005, and evidence of this wiretap was not

disclosed; and (10) Buchanan was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of this misconduct. (Pet. at 12,

ECF No. 40; Attach. C. at 19-23, ECF No. 40-1; Traverse at 22-24, ECF No. 77.) Buchanan also

alleged trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise these claims at trial and on appeal,

respectively. (Attach. C at 23, ECF No. 40-1.) Ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel

claims are addressed in section IV(B)(10) and (11) of this R&R, infra. Because it is unclear whether

this claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

“[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).

“It is not enough that the prosecutor’s remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.”

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 48 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 49 10cv0423

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Rather, a prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her actions “‘so

infect . . . the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Id.

(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).) “Moreover, the appropriate standard of

review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is ‘the narrow one of due process, and not the broad

exercise of supervisory power.’” Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642). 

As previously discussed, where a prosecutor is accused of withholding exculpatory evidence,

a petitioner must show: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or

inadvertently; (2) the withheld evidence was exculpatory or impeachment material; and (3) he was

prejudiced by the failure to disclose. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. “Evidence is deemed

prejudicial, or material, only if it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Benn, 283 F.3d

at 1053 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111-12). “Moreover, we analyze all of the

suppressed evidence together, using the same type of analysis that we employ to determine prejudice

in ineffective assistance of counsel cases.” Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 and United States v.

Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1986)).

a. Torres’ Parole Detail Record

Buchanan contends the prosecution provided an outdated parole detail record for Torres, which

was designed to conceal the fact that Detective McIvor knew the identity of Triste. (Pet. at 12, ECF No.

40; Attach. C at 19, ECF No. 40-1.) According to Buchanan, an up to date parole detail record would

have revealed that Torres’ moniker was “Triste.” (Pet. at 12, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 19, ECF No. 40-

1.) This is essentially a rehash of claim four, subclaim two which this Court has already addressed in

section IV(B)(5)(b) of this R&R. As discussed in that section, parole records are not in the possession

of the prosecution and may only be released to a party with a court order. (See DOM § 71010.11.2.)

There is evidence, therefore, that either the prosecutor or McIvor was in possession of the CDCR file

or Torres’ “Triste” moniker. Further, Buchanan simply speculates the parole detail record would have

contained Torres’ moniker “Triste,” and speculation alone does not establish that the record contained

material information. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052-53. Moreover,

although evidence of McIvor’s knowledge of Torres’ “Triste” moniker would have impeached McIvor’s

credibility to a degree, the evidence was not material because it does not undermine confidence in the

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 49 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 50 10cv0423

outcome of the trial. Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053. The essence of the prosecution’s case was the credibility

of Torres and, to a lesser degree, Chavez. Given Torres’ testimony about the kidnaping and gun

possession, coupled with the testimony of the arresting officers regarding the gun and drugs found on

Buchanan’s person, impeaching McIvor about the reason for his stop of Buchanan’s car would not have

resulted in a more favorable outcome for Buchanan. Id.

b. Coaching and Threatening Witnesses

Next, Buchanan claims the prosecutor and law enforcement used “leading, suggestive

commentary, innuendo, untruths, badgering, coercion, etc., to coach, feed information to, and recruit

interviewees to the prosecution’s ‘team.’ ” (Attach. C at 19, ECF No. 40-1.) As support for this

assertion, Buchanan cites to exhibit nine, a copy of an FBI investigation report, exhibit ten, a copy of

a transcript of an FBI interview of George Presson, and exhibit thirteen, a copy of a transcript of a phone

interview of Jessica Chavez by Detective Gutierrez. (See Lodgment 12, Attach. F, Exs. 9-10, 13.)

Buchanan does not specify what portions of these exhibits demonstrate coercion, coaching or badgering

on the part of prosecutors and law enforcement. 

Buchanan’s claim can be characterized as an allegation that the prosecution improperly relied

on or presented coerced testimony at trial to secure Buchanan’s conviction. In such a claim, the question

before a district court is “whether the post-arrest coercion of a government witness so tainted that

witness’ trial testimony as to render the testimony’s admission a violation of the defendant’s right to due

process.” Williams, 384 F.3d at 594; see also United States v. Mattison, 437 F.2d 84, 85 (9th Cir. 1970).

Exhibit nine consists of a narrative report by FBI agent Ann Murphy, detailing an interview with

Torres in which Torres relayed basically the same facts to which he testified at trial. Torres told Murphy

he was dating a woman he initially identified as Buchanan’s niece, named “Susanna.” (Lodgment No.

12, Attach. F, Ex. 9 at 1.) Buchanan, who Torres identified as a “Big Homie” or “validated member of

the Mexican Mafia,” called him after Torres had threatened Susanna and told Torres to stop. (Id.)

When Torres did not heed Buchanan’s order, Buchanan went to Torres’s brother’s home with Parraz.

(Id. at 2.) Buchanan told Torres he would have to “donate to the cause,” and Torres told Buchanan he

knew a drug dealer they could “tax.” (Id.) While at the house, Parraz threatened Torres and displayed

a gun. Because he feared Buchanan and Parraz would resort to violence at his brother’s home, Torres

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 50 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 51 10cv0423

agreed to accompany Buchanan and Parraz to the drug dealer’s location, but feared Buchanan and Parraz

were going to kill him. (Id.) While driving, law enforcement stopped the car. Parraz tossed his gun to

Torres and told him to get out of the car and run, which Torres did. While running, Torres threw the

gun at a wall and it discharged. (Id. at 3.) Upon arrest, Torres told law enforcement his life was in

danger and the police “did not know who they had in custody.” (Id.) Torres later told Murphy the

woman he was involved with was actually a guard at Donovan State Prison whom he did not want to

identify because he feared she would get in trouble and lose custody of her kids. Torres also stated he

had initially been introduced to Buchanan by a fellow inmate named Ray Brooks. (Id.) Torres told law

enforcement he was afraid to go to county jail or state prison because Mexican Mafia associates would

be informed of his involvement in Buchanan’s arrest and would be instructed to kill him. (Id.) Torres

was offered federal custody, but declined. (Id.) 

Exhibit ten is a transcript of a portion of an interview of George Dennis Presson by FBI Agents

Ann Murphy and Matthew Desarno and Detective McIvor. It is not clear what the relevance of this

interview is to Buchanan’s case. In the interview, Presson is told of the necessity to tell the truth in

order to avoid any future problems with law enforcement as a result of his filing a false report.

(Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 10 at 3.) Agent Desarno then tells Presson that “[I]f you are honest

with us and you sign up with us — I don’t mean to officially sign up but if you are honest with us and

you, you can come to our team . . . you really have to do that. Make a commitment to do that.” (Id. at

4.) Agent Desarno then tells Presson that “[w]e’re gonna take good care of you and you’re gonna [sic]

do the right thing. And we’ll help you get yourself on the right track,” but that “[i]f you try to play both

sides, you’re playing with fire on both sides.” (Id.) Presson then tells the interviewers that he was a

friend of Buchanan’s, that Buchanan and three “soldiers” had show up his house one night and told

Presson that he was going to take care of Buchanan for a while by allowing him to stay at Presson’s

house. (Id. at 6-7.) Presson told the interviewers at least one of the “soldiers” was armed with a gun.

(Id.)

Exhibit thirteen is, as previously discussed, a transcript of a portion of an interview of Jessica

Chavez by Detective Gutierrez. In it, Gutierrez questions Chavez about her association with and

knowledge of Mexican Mafia members in prison and challenges her denial of knowledge. (See

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 51 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 52 10cv0423

Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 13.)

None of the exhibits Buchanan has cited as support for this claim provide any evidence of

coercive measures or coaching. Exhibit nine is simply a report of an interview with Torres in which

Torres essentially tells the same story he testified to at trial. The report does not indicate Torres was

threatened with or promised any aid in return for false testimony. Exhibit ten, Presson’s interview, is

not relevant to this case in any manner the Court can discern, and, in any event, no coercive measures

are present in the interview. Agents Murphy and Desarno and Detective McIvor simply informed

Presson that if he did not cooperate with law enforcement by telling the truth, he risked prosecution for

filing a false report. Exhibit thirteen also does not indicate Chavez was coerced by Gutierrez into

providing false testimony. The interview only recounts Gutierrez’s confrontation of Chavez with regard

to the extent of her knowledge of Mexican Mafia members and associates in the face of her denial.

“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Cox v. Del Papa, 542 F.3d 669, 681 (9th

Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

c. Withholding Evidence of Torres’ Status as an FBI “Recruit”

Although not entirely clear, Buchanan seems to argue that Torres was an FBI recruit, and that

the prosecution failed to turn over his FBI interview. (Attach. C at 20, ECF No. 40-1.) Buchanan has

not provided any evidence that Torres was working for the FBI, or that there was an interview that the

prosecutor failed to turn over. As previously stated, “[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported

by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James, 24 F.3d at 26; see also Cox, 542

F.3d at 681. 

d. Withholding of Witness Interviews, Recordings, and Torres’ Medical, Psychiatric and

Parole Records

Buchanan argues the prosecutor withheld evidence from the defense, including phone call

interviews with Chavez, recordings of interviews with witnesses, Torres’ medical, psychiatric and parole

records, and other recorded material. (Attach. C at 20-21, ECF No. 40-1.) As previously discussed, to

prove a claim of withholding evidence, Buchanan must show: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the

prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the withheld evidence was exculpatory or impeachment

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 52 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 53 10cv0423

material; and (3) he was prejudiced by the failure to disclose. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052-53. “Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or material, only if it undermines confidence in

the outcome of the trial.” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053. “Moreover, we analyze all of the suppressed

evidence together, using the same type of analysis that we employ to determine prejudice in ineffective

assistance of counsel cases.” Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 and United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d

682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1986)).

This is essentially a rehashing of the claims Buchanan makes in claim four, which this Court has

already addressed in section IV(B)(5)(a)-(d) of this R&R. For the reasons set forth in that section,

Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim. In addition, Buchanan fails to explain what material

evidence was suppressed or how he was prejudiced by it. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. 

e. Failure to Present a Spanish Language Expert to Verify the Translations of the Wiretaps

Buchanan argues the prosecutor committed misconduct when he failed to present a Spanish

language interpreter at trial to verify the translation of the wiretaps. (Attach. C at 21, ECF No. 40-1.)

He cites to Lodgment No. 12, Attachment F, Exhibit four as support for his claim. Exhibit four is a copy

of a portion of a transcript of a hearing on pretrial motion to continue the trial by Rodney Brooks. In

the transcript, the prosecutor noted that Brooks could “[cross-examine] the FBI about what wasn’t done

in this investigation” and could “[cross-examine] our language expert about the interpretation they had

of the conversations that were captured on the wiretaps.” (Id.) The prosecutor’s statement may have

meant the prosecutor was going to call a language expert at trial, or may have meant that Brooks could

call the prosecution’s language expert himself and cross-examine him or her. In any event, there is no

federal constitutional requirement for the prosecutor to call any particular witness, only to prove every

element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970); see

also United States v. Bond, 552 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that “it is elementary that

litigants are not required to call every witness identified on their witness list . . . [because] [w]hether

a litigant actually calls all, or any, of the witnesses on its witness list is purely a matter of trial strategy”)

(emphasis in original). Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

f. Intimidation of Witnesses by Agent Desarno

Buchanan alleges Agent Desarno intimidated defense witnesses by confronting those who spoke

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 53 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 54 10cv0423

to defense investigators by asking, “Why are you helping a killer?” (Attach. C at 22, ECF No. 40-1.)

Buchanan does not provide any support for this claim, and the Court’s review of the record also does

not reveal any support for the claim. At a pretrial hearing, however, Buchanan’s attorney alleged that

he had had “a great deal of difficulty and delay in interviewing witnesses in this case,” and stated that

“when my investigator contacts a person, . . . if they call Agent Desarno or one of the other folks who

identifies them as a . . . cooperating witness, . . . he tells them not to talk.” (Lodgment No. 29, vol 5 at

304-05.) 

Prosecutorial misconduct claims are subject to the harmless error analysis of Brecht, which

provides that Buchanan must establish that the misconduct had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623; see also Shaw v. Terhune, 380

F.3d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 2004). Buchanan has not established what evidence would have been presented,

or how that would have affected the outcome of his trial, in the absence of the alleged intimidation.

Moreover, Buchanan’s claim is conclusory. “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James, 24 F.3d at 26; see also Cox, 542 F.3d

at 681. Accordingly, Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

g. False Statements During Closing Argument

Next, Buchanan contends the prosecutor made false statements during closing argument. He

claims the prosecutor wrongly stated, “Is there ever a reference to caring about Ms. Chavez? Is there

ever a reference to ‘I personally like her. We want to help her out?’ No.” (Attach. C at 22, ECF No.

40-1.) Buchanan contends that, contrary to this statement, the prosecution had recorded phone calls

which revealed Brooks “was deeply in love with Ms. Chavez.” (Id.) Buchanan does not state where

in the transcript the prosecutor made these statements, but it appears he is referring to the following

statements by the prosecutor during closing argument:

[MR. BOST]: Nowhere in any of these calls is there the insinuation made by the

defense that Mr. Brooks is telling Mr. Buchanan we need to help this person because

they are being bothered by an inmate that got outside because we care about her. We

want to help her.

They want to help themselves.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 54 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 55 10cv0423

Nowhere in there does it say where Mr. Brooks reports, hey, there’s a correctional officer

inside that I’d like to have an affair with, could you help me out and get this guy to leave her

alone because I’m afraid she’s going to get transferred and then I won’t be able to sleep with her,

I won’t be able to hang out with her.

That’s not what’s happening here.

What you saw from the very beginning of this case is the Mexican Mafia

cultivating a relationship with a prison guard that can be beneficial to them. That once

this relationship develops further, they will have an edge over her. They will have an

advantage over her. She will be someone who can help them to take care of their

business inside.

(Lodgment No. 35, vol. 11 at 1491.)

Buchanan does not provide any support for his contention that the prosecution was in possession

of recorded calls that contradicted the prosecution’s argument, and the Court has not located any such

evidence in the record before it. In any event, even if untrue, the prosecutor’s statement did not so infect

the trial with unfairness that it denied Buchanan his federal due process rights. See Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). Prosecutors are given wide latitude in closing argument to argue

reasonable inferences from the evidence. Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1996). This

was a brief comment in a lengthy trial, and the evidence supporting Buchanan’s convictions, specifically

the testimony by Torres and Chavez as well as the wiretapped phone calls, was overwhelming.

Accordingly, Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-

66 (1987) (stating that remarks alleged to constitute prosecutorial misconduct must be judged within the

context of the entire trial).

h. Reference to Buchanan’s Cell Phone as a Tool of Drug Dealers

Buchanan also argues the prosecutor improperly used the fact that that he possessed a cell phone

to establish that Buchanan was a drug dealer. (Attach. C at 22-23, ECF No. 40-1.) Buchanan contends

this was misconduct because the cell phone was provided to him via a paid police informant. (Id.)

Buchanan cites to the affidavit in support of the search warrant (Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Exhibit

23) and the testimony of Det. McIvor (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 1054) as support for this claim.

Even assuming the prosecutor improperly elicited this testimony as evidence that Buchanan was

a drug dealer, this single question, in the context of the trial as a whole, did not so infect the trial with

unfairness that it denied Buchanan his federal due process rights. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. As

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 55 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 56 10cv0423

noted above, the testimony of Torres and Chavez, in addition to the wiretapped phone calls, supported

Buchanan’s convictions. He is therefore not entitled to relief as to this claim. See Greer, 483 U.S. at

765-66.

i. Alleged Undisclosed Wiretap of Torres

Buchanan argues the prosecutor withheld evidence of a wiretap that was placed on Torres’ phone

before the events of Buchanan’s case. (Attach. C at 23, ECF No. 40-1.) Buchanan tends this constituted

“suppression of evidence favorable to the defense.” (Id.) Buchanan cites to Exhibit 15, which is a

portion of a motion filed by Buchanan’s federal defense attorney in this Court. (See Lodgment No. 12,

Attach. F, Ex. 15.) In that motion, the attorney states in a footnote that “there was a state wiretap up on

Ernesto Torres, the passenger of interest and alleged victim of an alleged kidnaping plot, but the

application is not being turned over due to the government’s characterization of it as ‘not relevant’ to

the issues in the federal wiretap.” (Id. at 3.)

As previously discussed, to prove a claim of withholding evidence, Buchanan must show: (1)

the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the withheld

evidence was exculpatory or impeachment material; and (3) he was prejudiced by the failure to disclose.

See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052-53. “Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or

material, only if it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053.

Assuming the wiretap evidence was suppressed, Buchanan has not established it was exculpatory or that

he was prejudiced by its suppression because he does not say what was contained in any wiretap of

Torres’ phone and how it was exculpatory. He has only presented “[c]onclusory allegations which are

not supported by a statement of specific facts [and] do not warrant habeas relief.” James, 24 F.3d at 26;

see also Cox, 542 F.3d at 681. Accordingly, Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim. 

j. Cumulative Error

Finally, Buchanan alleges that the cumulative effect of all the prosecutorial misconduct violated

his federal due process rights to a fair trial. (Attach. C at 23, ECF No. 40-1.) “Cumulative error applies

where, although no single trial error examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal,

the cumulative effect of multiple errors has still prejudiced a defendant.” Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d

1057, 1085 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 56 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 57 10cv0423

Because the Court has determined there is no merit to the prosecutorial misconduct claims Buchanan

has alleged, it follows there was no cumulative error. Accordingly, Buchanan is not entitled to relief

for his cumulative error claim.

9. Erroneous Admission of Testimony by the Gang Expert (Claim Eight)

Buchanan next argues the testimony of the prosecution’s gang experts was improperly admitted

because it went beyond the scope of the issues at trial and because the experts testified regarding

“ultimate facts” the jury was to decide. (Pet. at 13, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 24, ECF No. 40-1.)

Buchanan also argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this testimony. (Pet. at 13,

ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 24, ECF No. 40-1.) Because Buchanan raised this claim on direct appeal,

Respondent does not allege this claim is procedurally defaulted, but rather argues that the state court’s

denial of this claim was consistent with state law and was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem. Supp. of Answer at 18-25, ECF No. 51-

1.)

Buchanan raised this claim in the petition for review he filed on direct appeal. (Lodgment No.

8.) That court rejected the claim in an order without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 10.)

Accordingly, this court must “look through” to the state appellate court opinion denying the claim to

determine whether the state court’s denial was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06; Williams, 529 U.S. 412-13. Citing California

law, that court wrote:

Buchanan argues the court should have limited the scope of the expert’s

testimony to basic gang-related information. We disagree. To say the workings of the

Mexican Mafia in and out of California prisons was central to this case is — at the very

least — an understatement. Contrary to Buchanan’s characterization, this was a complex

gang case, involving a major prison gang’s activities and influence inside and outside

penal institutions. This is a subject clearly beyond a juror’s common knowledge. Expert

evidence of the workings and motivations of the Mexican Mafia, Buchanan’s long-time

association with and stature within the gang and how the Mexican Mafia would find a

prison guard a useful tool in its operations were essential to explain to lay jurors the

motive and intent for the principal crimes charged against Buchanan and Parraz —

making a terrorist threat, assault with a semi-automatic firearm and kidnapping for

extortion. (See People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1370 [gang expert’s

testimony explaining the defendant’s need to discover identity of person who crossed out

gang “tag” and their violent reaction to person calling out name of rival gang held

admissible on issues of motive and intent].) Thus, the expert evidence was relevant

because it explained why a prison gang would become involved with a prison guard

under these circumstances; why, under gang culture, Torres’s’ reneging on his promise

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 57 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 58 10cv0423

to Buchanan, a Big Homie, was perceived as an extreme form of disrespect that justified

his death; and why Parraz’s status with the Mexican Mafia would benefit by assisting

Big Homie in dispensing the punishment. It is “difficult to imagine a clearer need for

expert explication than that presented by a subculture in which this type of mindless

retaliation promotes ‘respect.’” (Id. at p. 1384.) “The law does not disfavor the

admission of expert testimony that makes comprehensible and logical that which is

otherwise inexplicable and incredible.” (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th

1539, 1551.)

Moreover, the testimony concerning the culture, habits, actions, membership,

territorial claims and disputes involving the Mexican Mafia was unquestionably relevant

to issues related to the gang enhancement. The gang enhancement under section 186.22,

subdivision (b)(1), “imposes additional punishment when a defendant commits a felony

for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. To

establish that a group is a criminal street gang within the meaning of the statute, the

People must prove: (1) the group is an ongoing association of three or more persons

sharing a common name, identifying sign or symbol; (2) one of the group’s primary

activities is the commission of one or more statutorily enumerated criminal offenses; and

(3) the group’s members must engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang

activity.” (People v. Duran, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1457.)

It is well established the prosecution may utilize expert testimony about gang

culture and habits to establish the elements of a gang allegation. (People v. Hernandez

(2004) 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1040, 1047-1048; People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494,

506.) Among other things, the experts’ testimony was relevant and admissible on such

gang-enhancement issues as establishing the Mexican Mafia was a criminal street gang

within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (f); Buchanan was a Big Homie of the

Mexican Mafia; and these three crimes were “committed for the benefit of, at the

direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)

As our high court has explained: “[T]he criminal street gang enhancement is

attached to the charged offense and is, by definition, inextricably intertwined with that

offense.” (People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1048.) To the extent admission

of evidence concerning the operation of the Mexican Mafia and the nature of its criminal

activities was inflammatory, this aspect was a necessary byproduct of the evidence

submitted to support a gang allegation. It does not make the evidence inadmissible. (But

see People v. Avitia (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 185, 192-193 [evidence of gang posters in

the defendant’s room erroneously admitted, where there was no allegation the crime was

gang-related and no gang enhancement was alleged].)

Buchanan specifically complains the following expert testimony was

unnecessary: details about irrelevant gang terms and gang activities, the Mexican

Mafia’s operations in and out of California prisons, the housing of Mexican Mafia

members in segregation at the highest security prisons, the names of Big Homies active

in San Diego County and the rarity of a woman involved in a supervisory capacity in the

Mexican Mafia. However to the extent any of this evidence was irrelevant, it was not

unduly inflammatory or prejudicial in light of the other relevant gang evidence.

Buchanan also argues the expert opinions that the crimes were committed for the

benefit of the Mexican Mafia were improper because the testimony went to an ultimate

issue to be decided by the jury.

“There is no hard and fast rule that the expert cannot be asked a question that

coincides with the ultimate issue in the case.” (People v. Wison (1944) 25 Cal.2d 341,

349.) Our Supreme Court continued: “‘[T]he true rule is that admissibility depends on

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 58 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 59 10cv0423

the nature of the issue and the circumstances of the case, there being a large element of

judicial discretion involved . . . . Oftentimes an opinion may be received on a simple

ultimate issue, even when it is the sole one, as for example where the issue is the value

of an article, or the sanity of a person; because it cannot be further simplified and cannot

be fully tried without hearing opinions from those in better position to form them than

the jury can be place in.’” (Ibid.)

“Expert testimony repeatedly has been offered to show the ‘motivation for a

particular crime, generally retaliation or intimidation’ and ‘whether and how a crime was

committed to benefit or promote a gang.’” (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1550; see also People v. Valdez, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 507-508.)

The experts’ opinion testimony here that Buchanan and Parraz committed the

crimes against Torres for the benefit of the Mexican Mafia were rooted in the facts and

evidence presented about the crime. The expert’s opinions were permissible. (See

People v. Garcia (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1512-1513.)

Buchanan’s reliance on People v. Killebrew, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 644 and

People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37 is misplaced. In People v. Killebrew police

officers searched three cars close to the site of a gang shooting and discovered a gun in

one car and a second gun near the other two cars. (103 Cal.App.4th at p. 647.) The

defendant, a gang member found standing in the vicinity of the car containing the gun,

was convicted of conspiracy to possess a firearm based on the expert’s testimony that

when one gang member in a car possesses a gun, every other gang member in the car

knows of the gun and constructively possesses it. (Id. at pp. 647-648, 652.) The Court

of Appeal found that this was improper expert opinion on an ultimate issue: a

defendant’s subjective intent and knowledge. The evidence should have been excluded

because it was the only evidence connecting the defendant to the firearm he was charged

with conspiring to possess. (Id. at p. 658.) Further, “[s]ince the erroneously admitted

testimony provided the only evidence to support the conspiracy theory, reversal of the

judgment is required.” (Id. at p. 659.) In People v. Torres, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at

pages 45 to 48, the expert defined the robbery and extortion and opined defendant

committed robberies. The court concluded that was impermissible expert testimony

because the expert essentially opined defendant was guilty of robbery and first degree

felony murder.

In contrast, neither Contreras’s nor Gutierrez’s testimony established an element

of any crime, and they did not opine on whether Buchanan and Parraz committed the

crimes against Torres.

“‘[R]arely, if ever, does an expression of opinion by a so-called expert not

amount to that which either the court or jury might adopt as a basis for the ultimate

decision in the case. However, that does not mean that the witness is deciding the case

or that in so testifying he is usurping the functions of the jury. He is merely giving an

opinion based upon his technical training which the court may or may not accept as

testimony that “was proper and necessary to an enlightened consideration and a correct

disposition of the ultimate issue.”’” (Eger v. May Department Stores (1953) 120

Cal.App.2d 554, 559.)

Next, Buchanan complains Contreras was improperly allowed to testify

Buchanan ran a gang crew and was involved in distributing drugs, extortions, taxing and

ordering assaults with a deadly weapon. Buchanan asserts this testimony was based on

incompetent hearsay. Experts, however, “may give opinion testimony that is based upon

hearsay, including conversations with gang members as well as with the defendant.

[Citations.] Such opinions may also be based upon the expert’s personal investigation

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 59 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 60 10cv0423

of past crimes by gang members and information about gangs learned from the expert’s

colleagues or from other law enforcement agencies.” (People v. Vy (2004) 122

Cal.App.4th 1209, 1223, fn. 9; see also People v. Duran, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p.

1465.) Further, the determination of whether to exclude extrajudicial matters relied on

by such experts in forming their opinions because they “conflict with an accused’s

interest in avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay . . . must generally be left to the

trial court’s sound judgment.” (People v. Valdez, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 510.)

Moreover in this case the hearsay testimony about Buchanan’s criminal activities

was elicited on re-direct examination after Buchanan’s defense counsel opened the door

about Contreras’s knowledge on the subject during cross-examination. There was no

error in admitting this testimony.

Inasmuch as we have rejected Buchanan’s appellate arguments concerning the

admission of the gang experts’ testimony, we need not further address his alternative

theory for relief — namely, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his

trial counsel did not object to the disputed expert gang evidence when it was introduced.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show we was prejudiced

by counsel’s deficient representation. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,

687-688.) Buchanan cannot show he was prejudiced by the admission of the expert gang

evidence or by his counsel’s failure to object to it during trial.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 11-20.)

To the extent Buchanan is challenging the application of state evidentiary law, he is not entitled

to relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (holding that federal habeas relief is not

available for alleged violations of state law); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Buchanan can establish a

violation of his federal constitutional rights, however, if he can show the admission of the evidence was

so prejudicial that it “‘fatally infected the trial.’” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir.

1996) (quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Buchanan was charged with making a criminal threat, assault with a semi-automatic firearm and

kidnaping for ransom, all for the benefit of a street gang within the meaning of Penal Code

§ 186.22(b)(1). That section reads as follows:

Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), any person who is convicted of a

felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any

criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal

conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and

consecutive to all the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which

he or she has been convicted, be punished . . . .

Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1).

Buchanan was alleged to have committed the crimes for the benefit of the Mexican Mafia.

(Lodgment No. 21, vol. 1 at 0010.) As the state court noted, in order to prove the Mexican Mafia is a

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 60 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 61 10cv0423

“criminal street gang” within the meaning of Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1), the prosecution had to prove

that “(1) the [Mexican Mafia] is an ongoing association of three or more persons sharing a common

name, identifying sign or symbol; (2) one of the group’s primary activities is the commission of one or

more statutorily enumerated criminal offenses; and (3) the [Mexican Mafia’s] members must engage

in or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.” People v. Duran, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1448,

1457 (2002). The prosecution presented two expert witnesses, Detective Steve Contreras and Detective

Mike Gutierrez. Each testified to different portions of the gang allegation the prosecution sought to

prove against Buchanan.

At the time he testified, Contreras had worked for the CDCR for eighteen years. (Lodgment No.

30, vol. 6 at 365-66.) Contreras’ testimony was relevant to prove “the [Mexican Mafia] is an ongoing

association of three or more persons sharing a common name, identifying sign or symbol.” Duran, 97

Cal. App. 4th at 1457. Contreras first testified about his qualifications as an expert, working for the

CDCR and as a parole agent. (Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 365-81.) Contreras also explained how the

security and inmate classification within the prison system works in order to explain how California

prisons deal with gangs. (Id.) The Mexican Mafia is a gang that operates inside California prisons and

gang members from the streets make up the “backbone” of the Mexican Mafia. (Id. at 390-91, 396.)

Another name for the Mexican Mafia is “Eme,” the Spanish letter M. (Id. at 391-92.) When an inmate

is in prison, he or she must obey the dictates of the gang with which they are associated or risk assault

or death. (Id. at 396.) In 2005, there were 1145 validated members and associates of the Mexican Mafia

in the CDCR system. (Id. at 392.) Contreras also talked about the process by which prisoners are

validated as Mexican Mafia members. (Id. at 403-04.) 

At the time he testified, Detective Mike Gutierrez had worked as a detective specializing in

gangs for nineteen and a half years. (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 1178-82.) His testimony also

supported the prosecution’s evidence that the Mexican Mafia is a gang for purposes of Penal Code §

186.22(b)(1). Gutierrez testified about the names and “turfs” of various gangs in the southern portion

of San Diego county. (Id. at 1183-84.) These gangs operate under the “umbrella” of the Mexican

Mafia. (Id. at 1187.) He testified that various gangs use various symbols, tattoos and graffiti to identify

themselves. (Id. at 1183-84.) Specifically, Gutierrez testified that Mexican Mafia members sometimes

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 61 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 62 10cv0423

have a black hand and/or the letter “M” tattooed on their body. (Id. at 1194.)

Contreras’ testimony was also relevant to prove “the primary activities [of the Mexican Mafia]

is the commission of one or more statutorily enumerated offenses.” Duran, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1457.

“The phrase ‘primary activities,’ as used in the gang statute, implies that the commission of one or more

of the statutorily enumerated crimes must be one of the group’s ‘chief’ or ‘principal’ occupations.” Id.

at 1464 (quoting People v. Senqpadychith, 26 Cal. 4th 316, 322 (2001)) (internal quotations omitted).

Homicide, the sale, transportation, and possession for sale of drugs, intimidation of witnesses,

kidnaping, torture, and extortion are listed in § 186.22(e) as the enumerated offenses which can form

these “primary activities.” See Penal Code § 186.22(e)(3), (4), (8), (15), (18), (19). Contreras testified

that inside prisons, the Mexican Mafia’s main business relates to “power, status, intimidation and

control.” (Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 405.) It is involved in drug trafficking, assaults, and homicides

in prison; outside the prison, it controls the gang via intimidation and engages in extortion, kidnaping,

torture, homicides, and the sale and transport of drugs. (Id. at 406.) Both inside the prison and on the

streets, the Mexican Mafia engages in “taxing” of drug dealers whereby gang members force drug

dealers in the gang’s territory to pay a portion of their profits to the gang. (Id. at 406-07.) Gutierrez also

testified that the main activity the Mexican Mafia engages in outside of prison is “taxing.” (Lodgment

No. 33, vol. 9 at 1193.) 

Finally, Gutierrez’s testimony was relevant to prove that the Mexican Mafia engages in a pattern

of criminal activity. Duran, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1457. “A ‘pattern of criminal activity’ is defined as a

gang members’ individual or collective ‘commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to

commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more’ enumerated

‘predicate offenses’ during a statutorily defined time period.” Id. (quoting Penal Code § 186.22(e), and

citing People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 617 (1996)). The enumerated offenses include assault with

a deadly weapon, robbery, and kidnaping. Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(e)(1), (2), (15). Referring to

certified copies of conviction records, Gutierrez testified that known members of the Mexican Mafia,

Alfredo Fonseca, Jose Yanez and Monica Yanez had committed the crimes of kidnaping, robbery,

assault with a firearm and attempted murder. (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 1195-98.) In his opinion, the

crimes were committed for the benefit of the Mexican Mafia. (Id. at 1196, 1198.) 

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 62 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 63 10cv0423

Both Contreras’ and Gutierrez’s testimony was also relevant to prove the substantive crimes of

which Buchanan was charged. Both experts discussed the structure of the Mexican Mafia, who is in

charge, who can give orders, who must obey those orders and what the consequences of disobeying

those order were. (Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 396; vol. 9 at 1189-1201.) This evidence was relevant

and probative to show why Buchanan and Parraz would go to such extreme measures to enforce

Buchanan’s edict that Torres stay away from Chavez and why Parraz would help Buchanan.

As the state court properly concluded, both Contreras’ and Gutierrez’s testimony was relevant

and probative of both the gang allegations and the substantive crimes charged against Buchanan. To

the extent that Contreras and Gutierrez were permitted to testify about the specifics of gang culture, the

inner operations of the California prison system, the structure of the Mexican Mafia and gang

terminology, it was necessary background information which the prosecutor properly introduced in order

to prove the motivations and intent of Buchanan and Parraz and to assist the jury in understanding the

testimony of Contreras, Gutierrez, Chavez and Torres. The admission of such relevant testimony was,

therefore, not so prejudicial that it “‘fatally infected the trial.’” Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 897. To the

extent that Buchanan claims the experts’ testimony was repetitive, and therefore prejudicial, his claim

is also without merit. Contreras’ testimony focused mainly on whether the Mexican Mafia met the

definition of a criminal street gang pursuant to Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1) and whether the gangs’

primary activities were those crimes enumerated in the gang statute. Gutierrez’s testimony focused

mainly on the question whether members of the Mexican Mafia had engaged in a pattern of criminal

activity by being convicted of two or more of the enumerated offenses in Penal Code § 186.22(e). To

the extent the testimony of the two experts overlapped, it was minor and not so prejudicial as to have

“fatally infected” Buchanan’s trial. Id.

Regarding Buchanan’s claim that the experts were permitted to testify about “ultimate facts” that

the jury was to determine, he is not entitled to relief. Contreras and Gutierrez simply offered their

opinions, based on their expertise, as to whether the crimes were committed for the benefit of the

Mexican Mafia. The jury was free to reject those opinions and come to a different conclusion. In any

event, the Court is unaware of any clearly established Supreme Court law that prevents an expert from

rendering an opinion on an ultimate fact that must be decided by the jury. In the absence of such

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 63 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 64 10cv0423

authority, Buchanan is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70,

76-77 (2006).

Finally, Buchanan’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim also fails. The expert testimony

evidence was properly admitted; consequently, there was no basis upon which counsel could have

objected to the testimony, and Buchanan has not established he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

do so. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. Accordingly, habeas relief is not available to Buchanan as

to this claim because the state court’s denial was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

10. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel (Claim Nine)

Buchanan alleges trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: (1) failure to challenge

admission of the wiretapped phone conversations; (2) failure to object to Chavez’s testimony regarding

the meaning of terms used in the wiretapped phone conversations; (3) failure object to Chavez’s

testimony regarding her rape by Torres; (4) failure to obtain the dispatch tapes for the stop of

Buchanan’s car, which led to the denial of the motion to suppress; (5) failure to adequately investigate

the accuracy of the translation of the wiretaps; (6) failure to obtain Torres’ medical, psychiatric and

prison records; (7) failure to make an adequate record regarding the jury’s view of Buchanan’s

shackling; (8) failure to obtain Buchanan’s gang validation packet; (9) failure to obtain and Spanish

language expert; (10) failure to call a methamphetamine expert, Matthew Carol, to testify about Torres’

drug use and how it affected his perception of events; (11) failure to ask Buchanan to testify; (12) failure

to use wiretap number 1223 at trial; (13) failure to introduce transcripts of Torres’ voice mail messages

to Chavez; (14) failure to call an expert on stalking; and (15) failure to properly prepare for the motion

to suppress. (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 30-35, ECF No. 40-1; Traverse at 24-26, ECF No.

77.) Respondent contends that Buchanan raised grounds one, two and three of his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim in his petition for review on direct appeal in state court, but did not raise those grounds

in the First Amended Petition he filed in this Court. Further, Respondent argues the additional

ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, grounds four through fourteen, were raised only in the habeas

corpus petitions he filed in state court and are thus procedurally defaulted pursuant to Dixon for the same

reasons claims one through seven and eleven are procedurally defaulted. (Answer at 16-18, ECF No.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 64 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 65 10cv0423

51; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 13 and fn. 2, ECF No. 51-1.)

It is not entirely clear from Buchanan’s First Amended Petition whether he is raising grounds

one through three in this Court. While he cites to only the factual portion of his appellate brief, he also

states that “additional facts, pursued on habeas by Petitioner, in prose, relating to claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel are as follows.” (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 40.) In the interest of thoroughness,

however, the Court will address those grounds. 

As noted by Respondent, grounds one, two and three were raised by Buchanan in the petition

for review he filed in the California Supreme Court, which rejected the claims without citation of

authority. (Lodgment No. 10.) Accordingly, the Court must “look through” to the state appellate court

opinion denying those claims as the basis for its analysis to determine whether the state court’s denial

of the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The question whether grounds four through

fourteen are procedurally defaulted is addressed in section IV(B)(2) of this R&R. As with the other

claims Respondent argues are procedurally defaulted, the Court will address the merits of the claim and

apply a de novo standard of review.

To prevail on a claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in federal court, Buchanan must

have first established in state court that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “This requires a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be “highly

deferential.” Id. at 689. Second, he must have shown counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the

defense, such that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s errors. Id.

at 687. On federal habeas review, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, [but]

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”

Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). The Court need not address the

performance prong if the claim can be resolved on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697. 

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 65 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 66 10cv0423

a. Failure to Challenge the Admission of the Wiretapped Phone Conversations

Buchanan contends counsel should have challenged the admission of the wiretapped phone

conversations as both irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative under California Evidence code

section 352. (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 40; Lodgment No. 1 a 66-72.) The appellate court addressed this

claim as follows:

As a general rule, evidence of gang membership and activity is admissible if it

is logically relevant to some material issue in the case, other than character evidence, is

not more prejudicial than probative, and is not cumulative. (People v. Avitia, supra, 127

Cal.App.4th at 192.) Consequently gang evidence may be relevant to establish the

defendant’s motive, intent or some fact concerning the charged offenses other than

criminal propensity as long as the probative value of the evidence outweighs its

prejudicial effect. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193; see generally Evid.

Code, § 352.) “Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation — including evidence of the

gang’s territory, membership, signs symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises,

rivalries, and the like — can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent,

means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.”

(People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1049; see e.g., People v. Jones (2003) 30

Cal.4th 1084, 1114-1116 [evidence of gang membership and formation of gang was

admissible because it was relevant to show relationship between individuals involved in

the robberies and the advance plan to kill victims and witnesses].)

The tapes revealed (1) how Brooks and Buchanan came to believe Torres had to

be sanctioned or killed because he disrespected Buchanan by not keeping his word to

leave Chavez alone and (2) why she was thought to be an asset of the Mexican Mafia.

The intercepted calls were clearly relevant to show the motives of Buchanan and Parraz

and their intent in making a terrorist threat, assaulting Torres with a semi-automatic

firearm and kidnapping him. (Evid. Code § 210.) Accordingly, we reject Buchanan’s

argument the calls constituted impermissible propensity evidence under Evidence Code

section 1101, subdivision (a), and find they were admissible under Evidence Code

section 1101, subdivision (b), to show motive and intent.

Further, the intercepted calls constituted independent evidence of an uncharged

conspiracy under the hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1223 (the exception

for statements made during the existence and in furtherance of a conspiracy) and showed

an ongoing conspiracy existed before the kidnapping. (See People v. Herrera (2000) 83

Cal.App.4th 46, 60-61.) The taped phone conversations were clearly relevant.

Counsel’s failure to make meritless objections cannot be deemed deficient performance.

(See People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 625, overruled on another ground in

Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn.13.)

Buchanan also claims trial counsel rendered deficient performance by not

objecting to the tapes or seeking redaction under Evidence Code section 352. Because

gang evidence can be inflammatory, the trial court must determine not only the evidence

is relevant, but also it is not unduly prejudicial. However, it is important to realize the

purpose of Evidence Code section 352 is to prevent undue prejudice, that is “‘“evidence

which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual

and which has very little effect on the issues,”’ no the prejudice that naturally flows from

relevant, highly probative evidence.’ ” (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 800, 823,

fn. 1.) “‘“[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilty is prejudicial or damaging to the

defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is ‘prejudicial.” . . . In applying

Section 352, ‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous with “damaging.’” [Citation.]’” (People v.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 66 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 67 10cv0423

Poplar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1138.) An objection under Evidence Code section

352 will not be sustained unless there is undue prejudice that substantially outweighs the

relevance of the evidence. (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)

Given the facts in this case it was inescapable extensive evidence concerning the

Mexican Mafia and its criminal activities would be presented at trial. In light of this, the

evidence of the taped conversations was not so out of the ordinary or so particularly

prejudicial that it would be an abuse of discretion to admit the tapes. The probative

value of the taped calls outweighed their prejudicial effect. Also, most of the tapes were

brief, with the longest tape running 31 minutes; they did not take up an excessive amount

of time. Further, there was relatively little overlap or cumulative testimony, and it is

clear an Evidence Code section 352 objection to any of this evidence would have been

overruled, and properly so. (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 673.) Counsel

cannot be ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. (People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 625.)

(Lodgment No.7 at 24-27.)

The state court’s analysis of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The state appellate court

thoroughly and accurately discussed the admissibility of the wiretapped phone evidence. As the state

court noted, the tapes were clearly relevant to establish motive and intent with regard to the kidnaping

and assault with a semiautomatic firearm charge, as well as to the gang allegation charges. This Court

agrees that any objection to the admission of the tapes would have been futile, and thus Buchanan has

not established deficient performance on the part of his attorney. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Moreover, Buchanan has not established he was prejudiced by the admission of the tapes in unredacted

form. Given the expert testimony presented about the Mexican Mafia and Buchanan’s role in it, he has

not established that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the tapes had been redacted.

Id. at 687. Because the state court’s denial was not objectively unreasonable, he is not entitled to relief

as to this claim.

b. Failure to Object to Jessica Chavez’s Testimony About the Meaning of Terms Used

in the Wiretapped Phone Calls

Next, Buchanan claims counsel should have objected when Chavez testified regarding the

meaning of certain terms used by Buchanan and Brooks because Chavez’s interpretation of the terms

was irrelevant and that she did not have sufficient knowledge or expertise to testify on the matters. (See

Lodgment No. 1 at 72-74.) Specifically, Buchanan says Chavez should not have been permitted to

testify that the term “black” meant black tar heroin, and that a reference to someone having a “green

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 67 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 68 10cv0423

light” on them meant that person could be assaulted. (Id.) Further, Buchanan objects to Chavez being

permitted to speculate as to whether some prison guards at Donovan were assisting the Mexican Mafia

and denying she was one of them. (Id.) 

As with the preceding claim, the last reasoned state court decision to address this claim is the

state appellate court opinion in Buchanan’s direct appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. That court

stated:

Buchanan contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to

Chavez’s testimony regarding the two calls because her lay opinion about the content of

calls was irrelevant and she had no personal knowledge whether there were prison

guards working for the Mexican Mafia at Donovan. Buchanan also claims counsel

should have objected under Evidence Code section 352 to Chavez’s testimony about

prison guards working for the Mexican Mafia at Donovan because it was prejudicial.

These contentions are without merit.

Chavez’s testimony regarding the gang terms was relevant because it showed the

extent of her knowledge and her perceptions of how the Mexican Mafia worked. This

was the prison guard who was at the center of the violent crimes involved in this case —

perhaps unwittingly — but who nonetheless set in motion the crimes by complaining to

Brooks about Torres. The testimony was probative of Chavez’s role in these crimes;

counsel cannot be faulted for not lodging an objection. Also, there was nothing improper

about Chavez’s testimony denying assertions she assisted the Mexican Mafia.

As to Chavez’s testimony about other prison guards assisting the Mexican Mafia,

she made it clear she had no personal knowledge whether this was true or not; hence, any

error was harmless. Chavez said her only source of information concerning guards

assisting the Mexican Mafia was Brooks. The jury heard Brooks discuss this subject

with Buchanan on the taped calls. Since there was no undue prejudice from Chavez’s

testimony, counsel was not deficient for not objecting to this aspect of Chavez’s

testimony under Evidence Code section 352. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S.

at p. 697.)

(Lodgment No. 7 at 28-29.)

This Court cannot find fault with the state court’s analysis. Buchanan has not established he

suffered any prejudice from Chavez’s testimony. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. With regard to Chavez’s

testimony about the meaning of “green light,” both the prosecution’s gang expert, Steve Contreras, and

the defense’s gang expert, Dennis Bammann, testified consistently with Chavez that “green light” meant

the Mexican Mafia had authorized an assault on an individual. (See Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 421;

Lodgment No. 34, vol. 10 at 1255.) Chavez’s testimony that “black” meant heroin was not sufficiently

prejudicial by itself to warrant habeas relief. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 68 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 69 10cv0423

It was an extremely brief portion of Chavez’s testimony, one question out of nearly two hundred pages

of testimony and not central to the issues the jury had to resolve. 

With regard to Chavez’s testimony about prison guards working for the Mexican Mafia, she

spoke only from her personal opinion and knowledge. When asked if she took Brooks’ comment,

“We’ve got two or three or three or four working for us” to mean that people inside Donovan were

working for the Mexican Mafia, Chavez said that she did. When asked if she was aware of guards

working for the Mexican Mafia, Chavez said she was told by Brooks there was one individual who was

doing so. She did not testify that she knew of any such guards herself, nor did she speculate about the

existence of such guards. (See Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 520-21.) As the state court pointed out, the

jury heard Brooks’ comments regarding the possibility that people on the inside of Donovan were

working for the Mexican Mafia:

BROOKS: And I’m telling him, “Hey, homie, respectfully dog, you’re on the

streets, don’t fuck up what we’re trying to accomplish in here.” Tio, we have almost

three. We have almost three, four working with us, right?

BUCHANAN: Yeah.

BROOKS: And the last thing we need is the people that . . . those people inside

to . . . to know that . . . “Oh, this girl, she was fired because this,” and then they are going

to scare everyone else.

(Lodgment No. 1 at 0070.)

A reasonable jury would have concluded from this wiretapped phone call alone that Brooks and

Buchanan had secured the cooperation of three or four people working inside of Donovan State Prison.

Thus, Buchanan has not established that he suffered any prejudice from Chavez’s testimony, and he is

therefore not entitled to relief as to this claim.

c. Failure to Object to Chavez’s Testimony About Her Rape by Torres

Buchanan also complains that counsel should have objected to Chavez’s testimony about being

raped by Torres. (Lodgment No. 1 at 74-75.) He contends the testimony was irrelevant to the charges

and prejudiced his defense by encouraging speculation by the jury about gang members’ involvement

in rapes and by heightening the jury’s fear of Buchanan and Brooks. (Id.)

As with the preceding two claims, the state appellate court’s opinion addressing the claim is the

last reasoned state court decision to which this Court must look as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 69 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 70 10cv0423

U.S. at 801-06. That court wrote:

The evidence was probative of Chavez’s credibility because of the tardiness of

her report. This was another example of Chavez not being forthright with law

enforcement authorities about the events of this case. It was a proper factor for jury

consideration in evaluating her credibility. Evidence of the rape — if believed by the

jury — also shed light on Torres’s character.

Buchanan unpersuasively argues that the evidence of the sodomy by Torres

“permitted the jury to engage in speculation and conjecture about gang members and the

commission of rapes” and “could only serve to heighten the jury’s fear of [Buchanan]

and Brooks.” Not only is Buchanan’s argument based on speculation and conjecture, it

fails to recognize Torres’s rape of Chavez had nothing to do with Buchanan, and there

was no evidence other Mexican Mafia members engaged in sex crimes. The rape

evidence reflected poorly on Torres and Chavez (for nor reporting it sooner); it was not

prejudicial against Buchanan or Parraz. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object

to the rape evidence.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 30-31.)

The state court’s analysis of this claim is consistent with Harrington. Trial counsel could have

very reasonably concluded that the damaging effect of the evidence of rape on both Chavez’s credibility

and on Torres’ character far outweighed any prejudice that might have occurred as a result of its

admission. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (stating that “the question is not whether counsel’s actions

were reasonable, [but] whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard”). Buchanan is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

d. Failure to Acquire the Dispatch Tapes for the Stop of Buchanan’s Car

Buchanan contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to secure the

dispatch tapes (TAC 3) for the stop of his car. (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 30, ECF No. 40-1.)

He argues that his motion to suppress evidence would have been successful had the tapes been used.

(Pet. at 14, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 30, ECF No. 40-1.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is

procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

As previously discussed in section IV(B)(3)(b) of this R&R, McIvor testified at the hearing on

the motion to suppress that he told Officer Nunez to stop Buchanan’s car because he feared for the

safety of one of the individuals who was in the car, someone he identified as “Triste.” (Lodgment No.

27, vol. 3 at 75-80.) The information about the threat came from the wiretap on Buchanan’s and others’

phones. (Id. at 77.) McIvor testified at the motion hearing that he directed Nunez to stop the car

because of the threat to Triste’s life. He also told Nunez that he believed Triste was a parolee at large

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 70 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 71 10cv0423

and that Nunez could use that as the reason for the stop. (Id. at 80.) Buchanan claims that had counsel

obtained the TAC 3 transcript, he could have used it to impeach McIvor because the TAC 3 transcript

indicates McIvor told Nunez to use the fact that Buchanan’s front license plate was barely attached as

a pretext to stop the car. (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 30, ECF No. 40-1.) As previously

discussed, however, McIvor testified at the motion hearing that he communicated with Nunez via cell

phone, and thus the information imparted to Nunez about the threat to Triste and his status as a parolee

at large was not contained in TAC 3 transcript. Thus, there is nothing in the TAC 3 transcript that

contradicts McIvor’s testimony at the motion hearing or that nullifies the probable cause officers had

to stop Buchanan’s car, namely, their belief, based on the wiretaps, that Buchanan and Parraz were

going to kill Triste. That officers were attempting to use other, valid bases for the stop, such as

McIvor’s belief that Triste was a parolee at large or that Buchanan’s licence plate was hanging down,

in order to keep the existence of the wiretap secret, does not alter the fact that the perceived threat to

Triste provided sufficient probable cause to stop Buchanan’s car. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-12.

e. Failure to Adequately Investigate the Accuracy of the Translations of the Wiretaps

Buchanan next contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to sufficiently

investigate the accuracy of the translations of the wiretapped phone calls. (Attach. C at 30, ECF No.

40-1.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this

claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

Buchanan makes the same allegations about the inaccuracy of the translations as he does in

ground three, wherein he argues that two of Brooks’ statements were inaccurately translated. The first

statement, “[T]here is one other thing . . . I have a person here that, that, that watches over the businesses

I have here,” Buchanan argues, should have been translated as “I have a person here that takes care of

me with what I got, her issues.” In the second statement, “So, I wanted . . . so, so I wanted to talk to him

first and if, if he doesn’t behave then it’s like all right, he’s fucked and then I’ll let you get at him, uh,

later you know what I mean,” Buchanan contends the phrase “he’s fucked” should have been translated

as “I know I crapped,” meaning “I failed to win.” (Pet. at 8, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 30, ECF No. 40-

1; Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 17 at 7-8.)

As this Court has already concluded in the context of Buchanan’s claim the prosecutor used false

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 71 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 72 10cv0423

evidence to convict him, see section IV(B)(3)(d) and (8) (e) of this R&R, Buchanan has not established

he suffered any prejudice from the allegedly inaccurate translations. The first challenged statement was

immediately followed by an unchallenged exchange between Brooks and Buchanan in which Brooks

refers again to “the person who helps me out with, with my business inside, my connection.” (Lodgment

No. 21, vol. 1 at 0021.) The second allegedly incorrect translation also did not prejudice Buchanan.

Even if the jury had heard the translation Buchanan alleged was correct, “if he doesn’t behave then it’s

like all right, I failed to win, and then I’ll let you get at him,” instead of the allegedly incorrect

translation, “if he doesn’t behave then it’s like all right, he’s fucked, and then I’ll let you get at him,”

the jury could easily have concluded that Brooks wanted an opportunity to persuade Torres to do as he

was told, but that, if he did not, Brooks would conclude he had failed and, at that point, Buchanan would

go after Torres with more serious measures. Thus, Buchanan has not established sufficient prejudice

under Strickland because he has not shown the result of the proceeding would have been different absent

counsel’s alleged errors. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

f. Failure to Adequately Investigate Torres’ Prison Records, Mental Health Records,

and Parole Records 

Next, Buchanan argues counsel failed to adequately investigate Torres’ background, specifically

his prison disciplinary records, his mental health records, and his parole records. (Attach. C at 30-31,

ECF No. 40-1.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will

analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

As with the preceding claim, this Court has already addressed the lack of prejudice Buchanan

suffered from the lack of such records in section IV(B)(5)(a) and (8)(a) and (d) of this R&R. As this

Court noted in that portion of the R&R, Torres was thoroughly impeached with various lies, crimes and

misdeeds. Buchanan has not specified what additional evidence Torres’ prison records, mental health

records, parole records and voice mail messages contained. He simply speculates that additional

impeachment evidence would have been discovered and presented had counsel done so. Without

specific evidence and the effect such evidence would have had on the outcome of his trial, Buchanan

has he has not established that counsel’s failure to acquire this evidence prejudiced him under the

Strickland standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 72 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 73 10cv0423

g. Failure to Make an Adequate Record Regarding the Jury Seeing Buchanan in Shackles

Buchanan contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make a sufficient record

to support his contention that the jury saw Buchanan in shackles during his transport to and from the

courtroom. (Attach. C at 31, ECF No. 40-1; Lodgment No. 34, vol. 10 at 1214-15.) Buchanan claims

counsel “failed to effectively address [the] fact [that the] jury viewed Petitioner shackled/crosscuffed

[and] under escort by four armed deputy sheriffs in uniform.” (Id.) Buchanan does not specify what

precisely he claims counsel should have done. Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally

defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

As previously noted, there was an allegation that a juror saw Buchanan and Parraz in shackles,

cross-cuffed and escorted by sheriffs while being transported to the courtroom. (See Lodgment No. 34,

vol. 10 at 1214.) This claim was contradicted by the bailiff who said no jurors saw Buchanan and

Parraz. (Id. at 1215.) The trial judge stated he would speak to all of the security personnel to determine

whether the incident had occurred and, if it did occur, what to do to insure it did not happen again. (Id.

at 1215.) The judge said he did not “want to say anything and bring it to anyone’s attention” at that

point. (Id.) No further discussions were had about the incident.

Buchanan has not shown counsel was ineffective, or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

inaction. First, a reasonably competent attorney could have concluded that questioning the jury or

bringing any further focus on Buchanan’s restraints would have had a more prejudicial effect on the jury

than not discussing the incident at all. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (stating that “the question is

not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, [but] whether there is any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard”). Second, there is no solid evidence that any juror

actually saw Buchanan in shackles, cross-cuffed and escorted by sheriff’s deputies. While Parraz’s

attorney told the court that Parraz told her a juror had seen him and Buchanan in shackles, the bailiff told

the judge there were no jurors who saw Parraz and Buchanan. In absence of definitive evidence that

a member of the jury saw Buchanan in shackles, he cannot establish he was prejudiced under Strickland.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

h. Failure to Obtain Buchanan’s Gang Validation Packet

Buchanan claims counsel should have obtained his CDCR gang validation packet. (Attach. C

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 73 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 74 10cv0423

at 31, ECF No. 40-1.) Had counsel done so, Buchanan contends, counsel could have more effectively

challenged the prosecution’s contention that he was a member of the Mexican Mafia, eliminated the

gang expert’s testimony and established for the jury the lack of due process in the gang validation

process. (Id.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze

this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

Buchanan does not specify what was contained in his gang validation packet and how counsel

could have used it to challenge the gang expert’s testimony that he is a member of the Mexican Mafia.

It is difficult for this Court to imagine, and Buchanan does not explain, how evidence of Buchanan’s

CDCR gang validation as a Mexican Mafia member could have helped counter the prosecution’s case.

Nor does Buchanan explain how the gang validation packet would have prevented the prosecution from

presenting the gang experts’ testimony on the existence and structure of the Mexican Mafia. The

prosecution was certainly entitled to present the gang experts’ testimony in order to prove the gang

allegations. Absent this, the Court cannot conclude counsel’s failure to obtain the gang validation

packet was an error “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Finally, it is not clear to this Court,

and Buchanan does not explain, how the lack of due process protections in the CDCR gang validation

process would have helped to disprove the crimes of which he was accused and thus affected the

outcome of his trial. Id. He is therefore not entitled to relief as to this claim.

i. Failure to Secure the Services of a Spanish Language Expert

Buchanan argues counsel was ineffective when he failed to secure Spanish language expert

Esteban Hernandez, who was Brooks’ Spanish language expert, to translate the wiretaps. (Attach. C

at 31-32, ECF 40-1.) Hernandez, Buchanan states, found the “major problem” with the translations,

which presumably refers to the previously discussed portions of phone call number 776 wherein Brooks

refers to “the person her that . . . watches over the businesses I have here,” and states that if Torres

“doesn’t behave, then it’s like all right, he’s fucked . . . .” (Id. at 32.) Because it is unclear whether this

claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

As previously discussed, Buchanan has not established he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure

to secure a Spanish language expert. To the extent Buchanan is arguing that had counsel hired a Spanish

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 74 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 75 10cv0423

language expert he would have been able to secure the same changes to his transcript as suggested by

Brooks’ translator, the changes would not have affected the outcome of his trial for the same reasons

discussed in section IV(B)(3)(d) of this R&R — other, unchallenged portions of the transcript conveyed

the same information as the challenged portions, and the changes Buchanan suggests would not have

affected the jury’s perception of the information contained in the tapes. To the extent Buchanan is

arguing that a Spanish language expert would have discovered other problems with the translations, his

claim is speculative. He does not provide any evidence regarding what changes would have been made

to the translations. Without such evidence, he has not established the outcome of his trial would have

been different absent counsel’s alleged errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

j. Failure to Call Methamphetamine Expert, Matthew F. Carroll as A Witness

Defense counsel called Dr. Greg A. Michel, M.D. to testify about the effect of methamphetamine

use on a person’s perception of reality. (Lodgment No. 35, vol. 11 at 1404-11.) The testimony was

offered to impeach Torres’ testimony about what occurred among him, Buchanan and Parraz and

counter the evidence supporting the kidnaping charge. Specifically, counsel sought to portray Torres

as paranoid and delusional due to his excessive methamphetamine use and suggest that he misinterpreted

Buchanan’s actions and intent. Dr. Michel was specifically asked how an individual who used an “eight

ball” of methamphetamine a day (about three and a half grams), the amount Torres said he used, would

act. (Id. at 1413.) Dr. Michel testified that when such a person was under the influence of

methamphetamine, he or she would be “hyperactive, possibly have some mental confusion.” (Id. at

1414.) He or she would also be suffering from sleep deprivation which could result in “varying degrees

of paranoia.” (Id.) Such an individual would likely also suffer from “visual perceptual distortions” and

might exhibit “paranoid symptomology.” (Id. at 1417.) Buchanan complains that counsel should have

called Dr. Matthew F. Carroll as a methamphetamine expert, either instead, or in addition to, Dr. Michel.

Dr. Carroll, according to Buchanan, would have testified that “use of an eight-ball (3 1⁄2 grams) of

methamphetamine a day, for approximately three months, would probably result in one being

susceptible to paranoia and hallucinations.” (Attach. C at 32, ECF No. 40-1.) Because it is unclear

whether this claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d

at 1167.

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 75 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 76 10cv0423

Buchanan does not explain how Dr. Carroll’s testimony would have differed from Dr. Michel’s

testimony and how he was prejudiced as a result of counsel not introducing testimony from Dr. Carroll.

Absent this, the Court has no basis upon which to conclude that counsel was ineffective for failing to

call Dr. Carroll, or that Buchanan was prejudiced as a result of this failure. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

k. Failure to Ask Buchanan to Testify in His Own Defense

Buchanan states counsel did not ask him to testify in his own defense. (Attach. C at 32, ECF No.

40-1.) Had counsel done so, Buchanan contends, he would have testified that the guns and drugs found

on his person did not belong to him, and counsel should have pursued this line of defense. (Id. at 32-

33.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim

de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

A criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to testify on his or her own behalf.

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49, 51 (1987). “The right is personal, and ‘may only be relinquished by

the defendant and the defendant’s relinquishment of the right must be knowing and intentional.’”

United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1094 (quoting United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177

(9th Cir. 1993)); see also Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that Ninth

Circuit “cases may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court

decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help us determine what

law is ‘clearly established.’”). “The Strickland standard is applicable when a petitioner claims his

attorney was ineffective by denying him his constitutional right to testify.” Matylinsky v. Budge, 577

F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

Buchanan’s claim is the trial counsel did not “ask” him to testify in his own defense. (Attach.

C at 32, ECF No. 40-1.) Counsel has no obligation to ask a defendant to testify if, in his judgment, it

would not assist in the defense. The decision whether to have a defendant testify is a tactical one,

afforded great deference under Strickland. Matylinsky, 577 F.3d at 1097. Here, counsel made a

reasonable, tactical decision not to call Buchanan as a witness to testify that the guns and drugs found

on him did not belong to him. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. Counsel had succeeded in preventing

the jury from hearing of Buchanan’s prior convictions, which were numerous and serious. (See

Lodgment No. 24, vol. 5 at 0739-41.) Had Buchanan testified, he would have been impeached with his

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 76 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 77 10cv0423

prior convictions. Moreover, it was reasonable for counsel to determine that Buchanan’s proposed

testimony — that Torres forced him to take the gun and drugs at gunpoint and threatened to kill him if

he did not take them — was not believable in light of the testimony of Officer Nunez and Detective

McIvor about where the gun and drugs were found. (See Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F., Ex. 27

[declaration of Richard Buchanan in support of state habeas corpus petition].) Officer Nunez testified

Buchanan was sitting in the driver’s seat with his knees tightly clamped together which indicated to

Nunez he was hiding something there. (Lodgment No. 33, vol. 9 at 984.) Buchanan refused to stand

up and kept his knees pressed together as he fell out of the car. (Id. at 985.) Nunez later discovered a

gun in Buchanan’s shorts. (Id. at 989-90.) Methamphetamine was found inside a blue fanny pack

Buchanan was wearing on his belt loop. (Id. at 992, 1047.) During the search of the car, McIvor found

a black shaving kit bag on the driver’s side floor. The bag contained a notebook, a digital gram scale

and more methamphetamine. (Id. at 1045.) The notebook contained a “pay/owe” sheet indicating

methamphetamine sales. (Id. at 1052.) Nunez’s and McIvor’s testimony also defeats Buchanan’s claim

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call him as a witness because he has not shown the result

of the proceeding would have been different had counsel called him as a witness. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687. 

Further, waiver of the right to testify may be implied from the record. “A defendant is

‘presumed to assent to his attorney’s tactical decision not to have him testify.’” United States v. PinoNoriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1094 (citing United States v. Edwards, 897 F.3d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1990) &

United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 760 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘[W]aiver of the right to testify may be

inferred from the defendant’s conduct and is presumed from the defendant’s failure to testify or notify

the court of his desire to do so.’” Id. at 1095 (citing United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir.

1993)). “‘When a defendant remains ‘silent in the face of his attorney’s decision not to call him as a

witness,’ he waives the right to testify.” Id. (citing United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir.

1993)). Here, there is no evidence in the record Buchanan protested his attorney’s failure to call him

as a witness, or that he told the trial court he wanted to testify, but was being prevented from doing so

by his attorney. Indeed, the only reference to Buchanan’s desire to testify is in the sealed transcript of

Buchanan’s second Marsden hearing. There, Buchanan makes the same allegation as he does in this

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 77 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 78 10cv0423

petition. (Lodgment 29 at 319.) The judge advised Buchanan that the law did not permit counsel to

prevent him from testifying. (Id.) Buchanan did not insist on testifying at that time. (Id.) 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes counsel’s decision not to call Buchanan as a

witness was a reasonable, tactical decision under Strickland, and that, in any event, Buchanan has not

established he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to do so. Moreover, the record supports a conclusion

that Buchanan waived his right to testify in his own defense. He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

l. Failure to Introduce Transcripts of Wiretaps of Voice Mail Messages from Torres to Chavez

Buchanan argues counsel should have used wiretaps of voice mail messages Torres left for

Chavez as impeachment evidence to establish Torres was mentally unstable. (Attach. C at 33, ECF No.

40-1.) Specifically, Buchanan complains counsel should have used and submitted into evidence tape

numbers 1223 and 1225. (See Lodgment No. 21, vol. 1 at 0110-22.) Because it is unclear whether this

claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

Tape number 1225 was played for the jury and was admitted into evidence. (See Lodgment No.

21, vol. 1 at 0014; Lodgment No. 30, vol. 6 at 536; Lodgment No. 31, vol. 7 at 706-07.) Buchanan is

thus not entitled to relief as to that portion of his claim.

Tape number 1223 consists of voice mail messages Torres left on Chavez’s telephone about two

hours before Buchanan’s car was pulled over with Torres inside. (Exhibit 21.) In the messages, Torres

threatens Chavez with revealing their relationship to her employers as well as making other threatening

statements:

TRISTE [Recording]: Hey, call me at the house. I’m gonna be here for about ten

(10) minutes. I need you to call me right away. Um . . . they got a hold of me again, so

when they um . . .so, um . . . Shit! Um, give me a call within ten (10) minutes.

Seriously, ‘cause um . . . whatever kind of shit you got me into . . (ui) . . . give me a call

right now. I’m not bullshitting. Bye.

. . . .

TRISTE [Recording]: Hey, What the fuck did you hang so for . . . for so fast?

. . . .

TRISTE [Recording]: Hey, I’m a give you fifteen (15) minutes to do it. I’m a

call back. If you don’t do it then um . . . you’re whole world’s gonna come crashing

down, ‘cause I’ll just . . . let everything out. [Noises] You know who you are fucking

with . . . losing everything. [Pause] Just do it for me. Do me that favor and then . . . I’ll

be at the house in like thirty (30) minutes. Haven ‘em come pick. Tell ‘em I don’t care

no more. All right? [Noises] Um . . . I’m a call you back in fifteen (15) minutes . . . and

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 78 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 79 10cv0423

if you don’t answer, if you don’t tell me, then I’ll just do that. And it’ll be even worse.

You’re better off just having them get rid of me. Bye. [Pause] Love you. Bye. [Noise]

. . . .

TRISTE [Recording]: Hey. Um . . . Why don’t you pick up your phone? Um,

shit. I know you ain’t at the hospital, so . . . stop bull shitting. Answer your calls.

[Noises]

. . . .

TRISTE [Recording]: Hey. I hope you did what [Noises] I fucking asked you.

[Pause] I know you’re at home already. You’d better answer your phone. [Noises]

. . . .

TRISTE [Recording]: Hey. My part is done, so do yours. [Noise]

. . . .

TRISTE [Recording]: Hey. You think mother fuckers are stupid? You went out

with Elsa, right? [Noise]

. . . .

TRISTE [Recording]: Answer your phone. You’ve got me fucked up.

(Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 21.)

During Torres’ direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Torres about calling Chavez on

August 25, 2004, the date of the crimes, and Torres admitted he had called Chavez “10 to 12 times,” and

was mad at her. (Lodgment No. 31, vol. 7 at 705-06.) The prosecutor then played tape number 1225

for the jury. On the tape, Torres is heard arguing with Chavez and demanding that she contact

Buchanan and Brooks and tell them Torres had disobeyed their orders so they could “smoke” (kill) him.

(Id. at 707.) The prosecutor also asked Torres, “Is it fair to say what you were saying to Ms. Chavez

was sort of representative of the kind of calls you had been making to her all day?,” to which Torres

responded, “Yes.” (Id.) 

Buchanan has not established either prong of Strickland. Tape 1223 contained a reference to

Buchanan as “Big Homie Richie,” by Torres. In addition, the prosecution’s theory of the case was

corroborated by Torres’ statement on tape 1223 that “Big Homie Richie just talked to me . . . to leave

you alone. They’ve been working on you for a while. . . .” (Lodgment No. 12, Attach. F, Ex. 21.)

Torres was thoroughly cross examined about his obsessive relationship with Chavez. Counsel

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 79 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 80 10cv0423

reasonably determined that any benefit from further highlighting Torres’ obsession by introducing tape

number 1223 was outweighed by the negative impact the references to Buchanan as a “Big Homie” and

support for the prosecution’s theory the tape contained. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. Secondly,

Buchanan has not established he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to introduce tape number 1223.

Torres testified that he repeatedly called Chavez the day of the crimes and that the tone and content of

his calls were similar to those on tape number 1225 in which he threatened her. He also testified that

he was mad at her, that he was in love with her, that he aggressively pursued the relationship with

Chavez and threatened to expose their relationship to her employers. (Lodgment No. 31, vol. 7 at 695-

96.) Thus, the jury already had the essential information contained in tape number 1223 before them,

and further evidence of these behaviors would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, Buchanan has not established counsel was ineffective as to this claim.

m. Failure to Call a Stalking Expert

In the same vein as the preceding claim, Buchanan contends counsel should have called an

expert on stalking and should also have contacted Chavez’s neighbors, housekeeper and babysitter to

obtain impeachment evidence on Torres’ mental instability. (Attach. C at 33, ECF No. 40-1.) Because

it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo.

Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

As discussed above, Torres’ placement in the EOP program in prison, his obsessive pursuit of

Chavez, his threatening and violent behavior toward Chavez, including his alleged rape of her, were all

placed before the jury. There is no likelihood that the result of the proceeding would have been different

had counsel called a stalking expert. Strickland, 466 at 687. Accordingly, Buchanan is not entitled to

relief.

n. Cumulative Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Buchanan argues the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors at trial denied his Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of counsel. (Attach. C at 33-35, ECF No. 40-1.) “Cumulative error applies

where, although no single trial error examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal,

the cumulative effect of multiple errors has still prejudiced a defendant.” Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1085

(quoting Whelchel, 232 F.3d at 1212)). Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 80 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 81 10cv0423

defaulted, the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

The Court has determined there is no merit to Buchanan’s individual ineffective assistance of

counsel claims; consequently, there is no basis for the Court to conclude the cumulative effect of

counsel’s errors amounted to ineffective assistance. Accordingly, Buchanan is not entitled to relief as

to this claim.

11. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel (Claim Ten)

Next, Buchanan contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims one

through seven and ground eleven of this Petition in state court. (Pet. at 15, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at

36-37, ECF No. 40-1; Traverse at 27-32, ECF No. 77.) Respondent does not argue this claim is

procedurally defaulted and notes the California Court of Appeal expressly adopted the reasoning of the

superior court’s analysis of the claims. (Answer at 19-20, ECF No. 51.) 

 Buchanan raised his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the petition for review

of his state habeas corpus petition he filed in the state supreme court. The California Supreme Court

denied the petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 20.) This Court will “look through”

to the last reasoned state court opinion addressing this claim which is the state appellate court’s opinion

denying Buchanan’s habeas corpus petition. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The appellate court stated that,

with regard to Buchanan’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims he

raised in his state habeas corpus petition, it “adopt[ed] the analysis of the superior court’s December

31, 2009, order denying relief on the merits,” and that “because petitioner’s contentions fail on the

merits, he cannot show that ‘but for’ counsel’s failure to raise the issues the result of his appeal would

have been different. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 285.).” (Lodgment No. 12 at 2.)

The state superior court found as follows: (1) the police had sufficient reasonable suspicion

under the Fourth Amendment to stop Buchanan’s car because they believed the individual in passenger

seat was a parolee at large and because they believed the passenger was in danger; (2) the prosecution

did not withhold Torres’ prison mental health records because they were not in possession of the records

and Buchanan could have subpoenaed them; (3) the prosecution did not falsify evidence or present false

evidence by introducing the Spanish translations of the wiretapped phone calls that Buchanan alleges

contain inaccurate translations, and, in any event, Buchanan had not established he was prejudiced by

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 81 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 82 10cv0423

any errors in the translations because the changes to the transcripts would not have led to a different

outcome; (4) Buchanan did not present sufficient evidence to support his claim that the prosecution

relied on false evidence in the form of testimony by Detective McIvor that he was unable to identify the

“Triste” referred to in the wiretapped phone conversations and that he lied about the reason for the stop

of Buchanan’s car, and, in any event, Buchanan had not established he was prejudiced by such

statements; (5) Buchanan had not established the prosecutor had committed misconduct by suppressing

audio and video recordings, lying about when certain discovery was turned over to the defense and

implying that he would call a Spanish language expert to verify the translations of the wiretaps because

the claims were based on insufficient evidence or speculation and Buchanan had not established he was

prejudiced by any error; (6) Buchanan had not established law enforcement coerced or intimidated

witnesses because he had presented only speculation to support the claims; (7) Buchanan had failed to

establish that using the cell phone given to him as part of the investigation as evidence against him

violated his due process rights, essentially an entrapment defense, because law enforcement did not

induce him to commit the crimes; (8) Buchanan had failed to establish the trial court imposed excessive

security or that he was prejudiced when by the jury seeing him in shackles because there was sufficient

evidence to support the security and he had failed to establish he was actually prejudiced by any juror’s

view of him in shackles; and (9) Buchanan had failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective

because he had not established that he was prejudiced by any of the errors he alleged counsel had

committed, including counsel’s failure to obtain Buchanan’s CDCR gang validation packet, counsel’s

failure to call an methamphetamine expert to testify as to the effects Torres’ methamphetamine use

would have had on his mental stability, failure to call a Spanish language expert to testify as to the errors

in the translations in the wiretaps, failure to challenge law enforcement’s use of the cell phone given to

him by law enforcement as evidence of his guilt, failure to call a stalking expert, and failure to play

wiretap number 1223 for the jury. (Lodgment No. 11 at 8-23.)

“The proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective . . . is that

enunciated in Strickland.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527, 535-36 (1986)). To establish prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,

Buchanan must have shown in state court a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 82 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 83 10cv0423

appeal absent counsel’s errors. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). As with

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, “[t]he performance component need not be addressed first

‘[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which

we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.’” Id., n. 14 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 697).

The state court’s denial of Buchanan’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. As discussed in sections IV(B)(3), (5)-(8), (10) and (12) of this R&R,

there is no merit to Buchanan’s claims that the prosecutor used false and perjured testimony to secure

the convictions and withheld exculpatory evidence, the judge was biased against him, there was

excessive security at trial, he was improperly shackled, the prosecutor committed misconduct, trial

counsel was ineffective and the $10,000 restitution fine was excessive. (See R&R, Sections IV(B)(3),

(5)-(8), (10), (12.) Thus, there is no reasonable probability that Buchanan would have prevailed on

those claims if counsel had raised them on appeal. Smith, 428 U.S. at 285.

Regarding Buchanan’s claim that the his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search

and seizure of his car and person, the Court agrees with the state court’s analysis of this claim. As both

the state court and this Court noted in section IV(B)(6)(i) of this R&R, the sole question before the trial

court was whether there was probable cause to stop Buchanan’s car. “[A]n officer’s subjective thoughts

play no role in the Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-12. The perceived threat to

Triste’s life heard by law enforcement on the wiretap was sufficient cause under the Fourth Amendment

to stop Buchanan’s car. There is no reasonable probability he would have prevailed on this issue had

counsel raised it on appeal. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of the claim

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 83 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 To the extent Buchanan is challenging the application of state law, he is not entitled to relief. Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (holding that federal habeas relief is not available for alleged violations

of state law); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 84 10cv0423

12. Erroneous Imposition of a $10,000 Restitution Fine (Claim Eleven)

Finally, Buchanan claims the trial court improperly imposed a $10,000 restitution fine. (Pet. at

16, ECF No. 40; Attach. C at 39-40, ECF No. 40-1; Traverse at 26-27, ECF No. 77.)13 Respondent

contends this claim is procedurally defaulted. (Answer at 6-7, ECF No. 51; Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Answer at 12-18, ECF No. 51-1.) Because it is unclear whether this claim is procedurally defaulted,

the Court will analyze this claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

“The Eighth Amendment provides that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’ U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.” Norris v. Morgan,

622 F.3d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 2010). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a fine must be

“‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.’” United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d

1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (applying the

Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause to punitive forfeitures)). Given that Buchanan was

convicted of committing serious and violent crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang, the $10,000

fine imposed by the state court was not so grossly disproportionate to his offenses, that it violates the

Eighth Amendment. He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Barry Ted

Moskowitz under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(4) of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the request for an evidentiary

hearing and DENYING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 28, 2011 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 84 of 85
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\Chmb_Sto\Habeas Cases\Buchanan\R&R re Answer.wpd 85 10cv0423

served on all parties no later than November 11, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 30, 2011

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:10-cv-00423-GPC-NLS Document 101 Filed 09/30/11 Page 85 of 85