Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06835/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06835-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BYRON G. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF CALIFORNIA

DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-cv-06835-LJO-NEW (DLB) PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING THIS ACTION PROCEED

ON PLAINTIFF’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT

AND DUE PROCESS CLAIMS, AND

PLAINTIFF’S SUPERVISORY LIABILITY

CLAIM BE DISMISSED

(Doc. 20)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Byron G. Martin (“plaintiff”) is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 6, 2006, the court issued an order

finding that plaintiff’s second amended complaint stated Eighth Amendment claims against

defendant Doe 1 for use of excessive force, and against defendant Doe 2 for failing to protect

plaintiff, but did not state any other cognizable claims for relief. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiff was ordered

to either file a third amended complaint or notify the court of his willingness to proceed only on the

claims found to be cognizable by the court. (Id.) On June 19, 2006, plaintiff notified the court that

he is willing to proceed only on his cognizable claims against defendants Doe 1 and Doe 2. (Doc.

23.) Based on plaintiff’s notice, this Findings and Recommendations now issues.

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B. Screening Requirement 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

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C. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in Vermont. At the time of the events at issue in this action,

plaintiff was incarcerated at Avenal State Prison in Avenal, California. Plaintiff is seeking money

damages from defendants John Does 1, 2, 3, and 4. Plaintiff alleges claims for relief against Doe

1 for use of excessive physical force, against Doe 2 for failure to protect plaintiff from harm, against

Doe 4 for denial of procedural due process, and against Doe 3, the warden, for supervisory liability.

1. Excessive Force Claim

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain orrestore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

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“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that on April 1, 2001, defendant Doe 1 kicked him, handcuffed him so tightly

that his hands immediately turned red and swelled, knocked him to the ground, and pushed his face

into the asphalt. Plaintiff alleges that he bled profusely from his face, shoulder, and arm as a result

of the beating. These allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983

against defendant Doe 1 for use of excessive physical force, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

2. Failure to Protect Claim

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Doe 2 was present during the beating and did nothing to

protect plaintiff. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation oftheEighth Amendment,

prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray,

682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect

inmates from physical abuse. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To establish a violation of this duty, the inmate must establish that prison

officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates’s safety.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective

prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer

at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[]

of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.

An officer can be held liable for failing to intercede if he had a “realistic opportunity” to

intercede. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s allegations are

sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 against defendant Doe 2 for failing to

protect plaintiff, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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 In the order filed on June 6, 2006, the court found that plaintiff’s due process claim was barred by the 1

habeas termination rule. However, for the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned finds that the claim does not

appear to be barred.

 In his second amended complaint, plaintiff described Doe 4 as the committee which found him guilty. 2

(Doc. 20.) In his response filed on June 19, 2006, plaintiff clarified that Doe 4 was the hearing officer. (Doc. 23.)

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3. Due Process Claim1

Plaintiff alleges that he was found guilty of assaulting an officer, and he spent ten months in

segregation and two extra months in prison as a result. Plaintiff alleges that he was innocent of the

charge and defendant Doe 4 did not allow him to call any witnesses. 

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The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.”

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484;

Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating the existence of a protected liberty interest

in remaining free from segregation. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Myron, 476 F.3d at 718. Therefore,

plaintiff’s allegation that he spent ten months in segregation does not support a claim that plaintiff

was deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process of law. However, plaintiff does have

a protected liberty interest in the length of his sentence. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78 (citing with

approval Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (state-created interest in shortened prison sentence is an interest of

“real substance”)). Where “success in a . . . [section] 1983 damages action would implicitly question

the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination

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of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or

sentence.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004) (citing to Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (applying Heck

to a prison disciplinary hearing where good-time credits were affected). However, plaintiff’s

allegations indicate that he finished serving his sentence. Therefore, plaintiff’s damages claim, at

the pleading stage, is not barred by the habeas termination rule. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.

74, 81-2, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1248 (2005); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2002).

Having established the existence of a protected liberty interest in the length of his sentence,

the inquiry turns to what process is due. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal

prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural

requirements that must be met are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between

the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may

prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and

reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense,

when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional

goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented

are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. As long as the five minimum Wolff requirements are met, due

process has been satisfied. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff’s allegation that he was not allowed to call any witnesses is sufficient to give rise

to a claim for relief under section 1983 against Doe 4 for denial of procedural due process. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a).

4. Supervisory Liability Claim

Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Doe 3, the warden, is liable for failing to supervise

the subordinates who violated plaintiff’s rights, and for failing to train his officers to act

professionally. Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds

a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional

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violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state

a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts

indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and

is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.

1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that defendant Doe 3 personally participated in

the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black

at 646. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendant Doe 3 and this claim shall be

dismissed. 

D. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint states cognizable claims for relief under section 1983

against defendant Doe 1 for use of excessive physical force, against defendant Doe 2 for failure to

protect plaintiff from harm, and against defendant Doe 4 for denial of procedural due process.

However, plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not state a cognizable claim for relief under

section 1983 against defendant Doe 3, the warden, for supervisory liability. Plaintiff was provided

with the opportunity to file a third amended complaint but opted to proceed on the claims found to

be cognizable by the court. 

On February 2, 2007, and April 13, 2007, plaintiff notified the court that Doe 1 is

Correctional Officer Padilla and Doe 2 is Correctional Officer Rauh. Accordingly, defendants will

be identified by their names.

Based on plaintiff’s notice filed June 19, 2006, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action proceed on plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed August 12, 2005,

against defendant Padilla aka Doe 1 for use of excessive physical force, against

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defendant Rauh aka Doe 2 for failure to protect plaintiff from harm, and against

defendant Doe 4 for denial of procedural due process; and

2. Plaintiff’s claim for relief against defendant Doe 3, the warden, for supervisory

liability be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted under section 1983.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 1, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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