Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02094/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BEN MEDINA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

SEP 4199Z 

~OBERT L. HOECKEL 

Cle!'!r 

) No. 91-2094 

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ) 

SAN MIGUEL COUNTY; COUNTY ) 

COMMISSION OF SAN MIGUEL ) 

COUNTY; MAX MADRID; ERNEST ) 

QUINTANA; and ANNIE ENCINIAS, ) 

individually, and in their ) 

official capacities, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

(D.C. Civil No. 87-0956 JB) 

(D.N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, SETH, and SNEED,** Circuit Judges. 

Appellant, Ben Medina, appeals from a verdict in favor of 

Appellees, the Housing Authority of San Miguel County, the Board 

of County Commissioners of San Miguel County, and individual 

Commissioners Max Madrid, Ernest Quintana, and Annie Encinias, in 

their official and individual capacities. Appellant's action 

alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3. 

**Honorable Joseph T. Sneed, United States Circuit Judge for the 

Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-2094 Document: 010110309468 Date Filed: 09/04/1992 Page: 1
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a state law breach of contract 

claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees on all 

claims. 

On appeal, Appellant alleges eleven points of error. Most 

significantly, Appellant claims that: (1) the district court 

erred by refusing to enforce a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment against 

the Appellees in their official capacities only; (2) the district 

court erred by allowing two law firms to represent Appellees in 

their official and individual capacities; (3) the court improperly 

excluded testimony of Appellant's witness, Jack Stark; and (4) the 

court erroneously admitted parol evidence to clarify meeting 

minutes. After reviewing the record and considering Appellant's 

contentions we find no error. 

In August of 1985, Ben Medina was approved for the position 

of Executive Director of the San Miguel County Housing Authority, 

a HUD funded and regulated housing authority. The events giving 

rise to this suit began when the Housing Authority accepted bids 

for its propane supply. Appellee and then County Commissioner, 

Max Madrid, was local office manager for Doxol, a large propane 

company. Doxol provided the lowest bid in a sealed bidding 

process. Appellant expressed concern over the bid and the 

potential conflict of interest created by Madrid's position as a 

County Commissioner and as local office manager for Doxol. The 

bid was accepted contingent on a favorable legal determination 

regarding the conflict issue. 

Appellant then communicated his concerns over the conflict of 

interest to HUD Regional Assistant Counsel, Jack Stark. The 

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contract was rebid two months after Madrid retired from Doxol. 

Again, Doxol was the low bidder and was awarded the contract. 

Meanwhile the relationship between Appellant and the Board of 

Commissioners began to deteriorate. Questions were raised 

regarding Appellant's performance of his duties. Specifically, 

the Commissioners complained that Appellant failed to provide them 

with written reports concerning the administration of the Housing 

Authority and failed to communicate adequately with them. 

The conflict came to a head when Appellant failed to appear 

on time at a scheduled meeting with the Commissioners. After the 

meeting adjourned, Appellant appeared and met with the County 

Commissioners and the County Manager in the County Manager's 

office. At the later meeting, Appellant was told of the problems 

the Commissioners perceived with his work, particularly problems 

in communications between Appellant and Appellees. Appellant was 

given seventy-two hours to respond. Appellant did not respond and 

he was terminated. 

Appellant thereafter filed this suit alleging that his 

employment with the Housing Authority was terminated because he 

asserted that Commissioner Madrid had a conflict of interest in 

submitting a bid on behalf of Doxol Gas. 

Appellant first contends that the district court erred by not 

enforcing an Offer of Judgment against the official Defendants. 

Specifically, Appellant argues that the magistrate's finding that 

Appellant did not accept the offer was erroneous. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, Appellees 

delivered an Offer of Judgment to Appellant. The offer was 

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captioned "Ben Medina, Plaintiff vs. House [sic] Authority of San 

Miguel County, et al., Defendants." Nine days later, Appellant 

filed an Acceptance of Offer of Judgment which varied from the 

offer in that it specified that the acceptance only applied to the 

Defendants in their official capacities. The following day, 

Appellant moved the district court to enforce an acceptance of the 

offer. Appellees opposed the motion on the grounds that the offer 

applied to all Defendants in their official as well as personal 

capacities and that Appellant's acceptance was invalid because it 

only applied to Defendants in their official capacities. 

After a hearing on the matter, the magistrate found that 

Appellant had not accepted Appellees' offer. Although it is not 

clear from the record, the basis for the magistrate's ruling 

appears to be that Appellant's purported acceptance was 

inconsistent with Appellees' offer. 

In interpreting offers of judgment, courts generally are 

guided by principles of contract law. See Johnson v. University 

College of the Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1209 

(11th Cir.). Under basic principles of contract interpretation, 

an offeree's acceptance must mirror the terms of the offer in 

order to be valid. See Raydon Exploration, Inc. v. Ladd, 902 F.2d 

1496, 1499-1500 (10th Cir.) ("an acceptance generally will not 

bind the parties and create a contract unless it is unconditional, 

identical to the offer, and does not modify, delete or introduce 

any new terms into the offer"). Here, Appellant in his 

"acceptance" attempted to change the parties to which the offer 

applied: 

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"Plaintiff ACCEPTS the offer of 

$65,000.00, and appropriate costs and 

attorney's fees as determined by the Court 

with respect to Defendants San Miguel County 

Housing Authority, Board of County 

Conunissioners of San Miguel County, and 

individual Defendants in their 'Official 

Capacity' being represented by Mr. Felker of 

Felker & Ish, P.A. This acceptance does not 

relate in anyway (sic] to, or absolve the 

individual Defendants. Max Madrid, Ernest 

Quintana, and Annie Encinias, in their 

'Personal Capacity' who are represented by 

Mr. John L. Lenssen, of Lenssen and Mandel." 

Appellant's Appendix at 103. 

The Offer of Judgment, as communicated to Appellant's 

attorney, did not mention that the Defendants in their individual 

capacities were excluded. The language of the "acceptance" which 

says "[t]his acceptance does not relate in anyway [sic] to, or 

absolve the individual Defendants, Max Madrid, Ernest Quintana, 

and Annie Encinias, in their 'Personal Capacity' ... " is 

materially different from the offer. 

Appellant contends that the Offer of Judgment was ambiguous 

and, therefore, it should be interpreted against the offerer. 

Specifically, Appellant argues that the caption on the offer, 

which only mentioned the "Housing Authority of San Miguel County, 

et al.", refers only to the Defendants in their official capacity 

because the term "et al." is insufficient to identify all of the 

Defendants in all of their capacities as parties to the Offer of 

Judgment. As support for this proposition Appellant cites Torres 

v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318. 

In Torres, the Supreme Court held that the use of the term 

"et al." in plaintiff's notice of appeal was not sufficient to 

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identify him as a party to the appeal and, thus, did not comply 

with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c). The present case 

is distinguishable from Torres because the Court in Torres was 

limited by the language of Fed. R. App. Proc. 3(c). Rule 3(c) 

provides that "[t]he notice of appeal shall specify the party or 

parties taking the appeal . II The Court made clear that the 

requirement of Rule 3(c) that the notice of appeal specifically 

identify the parties to the appeal is a jurisdictional requirement 

imposed by Congress. There is no similar requirement in Rule 68 

and we decline to impose one. 

Further support for our holding that the Offer of Judgment 

was intended to apply to all Defendants is found in the oral 

communications between the parties before the offer was made. It 

is undisputed that Mr. Felker told counsel for Plaintiff that the 

offer included all Defendants. Mr. Felker stated in his 

affidavit: 

"I informed [Mr. Burke] ... that the 

settlement offer I would be delivering to him 

would be for all the Defendants in all their 

capacities, and that Risk Management would not 

consider settling any of the claims while 

leaving other claims unresolved . I explicitly 

informed him the coming offer was intended to 

resolve all claims and to settle the entire 

case. I was absolutely clear relative to the 

State's approach to settlement, and from 

Mr. Burke's conversation with me, I believe he 

clearly understood my position." 

Appellant's Appendix at 109-110. 

We hold that the district court properly refused to enforce 

the Offer of Judgment. 

Appellant next asserts that the district court erred by 

allowing separate law firms to represent Appellees in their 

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individual and official capacities. Because of the obvious 

potential for conflict between the defenses of individual and 

official Appellees, we find no merit in this contention. The 

Appellant does not demonstrate any prejudice, and it is difficult 

to see how he could do so. The trial court permitted separate 

representation as a wise precaution. 

The distinction between personal capacity and official 

capacity suits is important because it highlights the potential 

for conflicts of interest. While a suit against a public official 

in a personal capacity seeks to impose personal liability for 

actions taken under color of state law, a suit against a public 

official in an official capacity is, in reality, a suit against 

the governmental entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 

165. This difference between the actual parties in interest gives 

rise to differing and possibly conflicting defenses. 

To establish personal liability in a§ 1983 action, a 

plaintiff must show that the official, acting under color of state 

law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Id. at 166. A 

plaintiff in an official capacity suit under§ 1983 must prove 

that the entity's "policy or custom" played a role in the 

violation of federal law. Id. Thus, in a suit such as this one, 

an entity may defend itself successfully by asserting that the 

official whose conduct is in question acted in a manner that is 

contrary to the entity's "policy or custom." See Monell v. 

New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691. 

Similarly, a defendant in a personal capacity may assert the 

defense of qualified immunity. These defenses can be 

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contradictory. Consequently, an attorney representing public 

officials in both an individual and official capacity is faced 

with a potentially impermissible conflict of interest. 

Although we do not adopt a per se rule that an automatic 

conflict results when a governmental entity and its employees are 

sued together for a§ 1983 violation, see Dunton v. County of 

Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 910 (2d Cir.), we hold that the district 

court did not err by allowing separate representation of Appellees 

in their personal and official capacities. 

Appellant makes numerous contentions that the district court 

erred in admitting and excluding certain evidence. Absent an 

abuse of discretion by the district court, we will not disturb the 

district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence. Boren v. 

Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1033 (10th Cir.). An abuse of discretion 

occurs when there is no basis in the record upon which the 

district court could have rationally based its decision. Id. It 

is under the above described standard that we review the 

evidentiary issues raised by Appellant. After carefully reviewing 

the record, we find that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion. 

Appellant contends that the district court improperly 

excluded the deposition testimony of Appellant's witness, Jack 

Stark. In particular, Appellant argues that Mr. Stark's 

deposition should have been admitted to explain the federal 

conflict of interest standards, to explain the existence of an 

actual conflict of interest, and to confirm Appellant's concern 

over the alleged conflict. 

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Although the record is not clear, it appears that the 

district court excluded Mr. Stark's deposition testimony both 

because Mr. Stark's opinions lacked proper foundation and because 

the deposition was cumulative, repetitive and related to other 

matters which were irrelevant to the case. We agree with the 

district court's exclusion of Mr. Stark's deposition. 

Appellant's contention that Mr. Stark's deposition testimony 

is relevant to prove the alleged conflict is belied by his 

counsel's statements at trial. After Appellees objected to the 

admission of the deposition on the grounds that Mr. Stark lacked 

proper foundation for his opinions, Appellant's counsel explained 

that the proffered evidence 

"goes not to whether or not Mr. Madrid was 

guilty of conflict of interest, but whether or 

not Mr. Medina acted in accordance with his 

belief and his expression of what he felt was 

right." 

Appellees' Supp. Appendix at 90. Therefore, Appellant's argument 

that Mr. Stark's deposition should have been admitted to show the 

existence of a conflict of interest is without merit. 

Additionally, the district court properly instructed the jury 

that whether a conflict of interest existed was not an issue in 

this case. Rather, the issue in this case was whether Appellant's 

reporting of Max Madrid's alleged conflict of interest to 

Mr. Stark was the primary reason for Appellant's termination. 

Proving the existence of a conflict of interest or Appellant's 

belief that he was acting properly is immaterial to determining 

whether Appellant was fired for reporting the alleged conflict. 

Consequently, Mr. Stark's deposition, insofar as it relates to the 

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existence of an actual conflict of interest, conflict of interest 

standards or Appellant's concern over the alleged conflict, was 

irrelevant and properly excluded. 

With respect to other excluded portions of the deposition, 

the record on appeal does not reflect that the district court 

abused its discretion in finding that the remainder of Mr. Stark's 

testimony was cumulative, repetitive or irrelevant. 

Appellant's additional claims that the district court abused 

its discretion in admitting financial documents, the 1987 audit, 

the fourth page of the police officer's report and the district 

attorney's memorandum are without merit and are not supported by 

the record on appeal. 

Related to the previously described evidentiary issues is 

Appellant's contention that the district court erred in admitting 

oral testimony to explain the minutes of the San Miguel County 

Commission's special meeting. Appellant argues that the minutes 

of the meeting constitute an unambiguous written expression of a 

contract to hire Appellant as a permanent employee; therefore, the 

oral testimony of Appellees' witness, Mr. Lucero, was improperly 

admitted to alter the terms of the contract. We disagree with 

Appellant's contention. 

The parol evidence rule bars the admission of oral and 

extrinsic evidence to contradict an unambiguous written contract. 

See C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238, 112 

N.M. 504. In the case before us, however, the minutes of the 

special meeting did not constitute a written contract to hire 

Appellant. Rather, the minutes reflected the County Commission's 

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designation of job titles and job positions for seven current 

employees of San Miguel County, including Appellant, whose jobs 

had not been previously classified. Consequently, the parol 

evidence rule was inapplicable, and the oral testimony of 

Mr. Lucero was admissible. 

Even if the minutes could be considered a written expression 

of a contract to hire Appellant, parol evidence was admissible to 

explain the terms of the contract. In C.R. Anthony the court 

adopted an expansive rule allowing the trial court to use 

extrinsic evidence in determining whether a term or expression in 

a written contract is unclear, and if so, to admit parol evidence 

to explain the term or expression. Id. 

Appellant argues that the minutes clearly show that he was 

hired as a permanent employee because his name and job 

designation, along with the designations of six other individuals, 

were listed under the heading "Manager's Office for Permanent 

Position." However, Mr. Lucero's testimony showed that the 

heading was misleading and ambiguous because it only related to 

the first person and job designation listed thereunder. 

Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting 

Mr. Lucero's oral testimony to explain that Appellant's job 

position was classified as exempt. 

In addition to Appellant's numerous objections to the 

district court's admission and exclusion of certain evidence, 

Appellant objects to the court's jury instructions. Appellant 

claims that the jury was not properly instructed on his theory of 

the case and that the district court erred by rejecting other 

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requested instructions. Appellant also objects to the district 

court's instructions regarding qualified immunity and conflict of 

interest. After reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, we 

find that the instructions given by the district court adequately 

and accurately instructed the jury and that there is no reversible 

error. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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