Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00372/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00372-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donald J Gregory, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Arizona Division of Child Support 

Enforcement, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV11-0372-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant Melanie Gregory moves to dismiss on grounds that the complaint does 

not allege facts that would plausibly entitle Plaintiff to relief against her. Doc. 7. 

Defendant Gregory also argues that she is misjoined in this suit. Id. Defendants 

Veronica Ragland and the Arizona Division of Child Support Enforcement (“AZDCSE”) 

move to dismiss on grounds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the § 1983 statute of 

limitations bar this suit, that the State of Arizona is immune under the Eleventh 

Amendment, that neither of the State Defendants are persons under § 1983 when acting 

in their official capacities, and that the complaint fails to allege facts that would plausibly 

entitle Plaintiff to relief against Defendant Ragland in her individual capacity. Doc. 8. 

Defendants Ragland and AZDCSE will be referred to collectively as “State Defendants.” 

Pro se Plaintiff responds that Defendant Gregory was responsible for enforcing 

the child-support judgment against him. Doc. 9 at 2. He further argues that RookerFeldman does not apply because he alleged a claim independent of a state court 

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judgment, and that the § 1983 statute of limitations does not apply because Defendants’ 

last action took place on June 21, 2010. Id. at 2, 3. As to sovereign immunity, Plaintiff 

asserts that his due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment trump the Eleventh 

Amendment. Id. at 3. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that both Gregory and Ragland are 

persons contemplated by § 1983. Id. Defendants have not filed replies, and the parties 

do not request oral argument. 

 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants, in enforcing a child-support debt, 

have placed levies, liens, and tax offsets against Plaintiff’s property contrary to state law. 

Doc. 1. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants misinformed him about the law, that 

Defendants have failed to follow the processes required by law for state agencies and 

officials, and that this Court has judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706. Doc. 1 at 6. The 

complaint demands a cessation of all debt-enforcement actions by Defendants; a vacatur 

of all liens, levies, and tax offsets; a curing of Plaintiff’s credit profile with three credit 

reporting agencies; $172,000 in compensatory damages; and any other relief the Court 

deems appropriate. Id. at 7. 

 The Court begins by noting that 5 U.S.C. § 706 pertains to judicial review of 

federal agencies, not state agencies. Because AZDCSE is a state agency, its actions are 

not reviewable under § 706. 

 With regard to the State Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument, the state-court 

judgment was not filed with the motions and therefore the Court cannot conclude that 

Plaintiff is attempting to collaterally-attack the judgment. A court should apply less 

stringent pleading standards to pro se plaintiffs, such that inartful pleadings are still 

considered by the court. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Although the 

complaint states that the state-court judgment denied Plaintiff his constitutional rights, the 

complaint also states Defendants’ actions were taken using a “false court order.” Doc. 1 

at 6. If this statement meant a “wrongfully-decided court order,” then the Court would be 

inclined to agree that Rooker-Feldman bars the suit. The complaint also states, however, 

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that Defendants did not obtain a judgment in time and that State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec. v. Hayden, 115 P.3d 116 (Ariz. 2005), precludes collecting arrearages. Doc. 1 at 6. 

Therefore, the complaint may also be interpreted as alleging that Defendants falsified or 

forged a court order in order to obtain the liens, levies, etc. or that the enforcement 

actions were taken without a court order at all – neither of which would be subject to 

Rooker-Feldman. The complaint does not allege sufficient facts from which this Court 

may conclude that Plaintiff meant either of the latter interpretations, or that these 

interpretations are plausible. Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[A]llegations must be sufficiently plausible [so] that it is not unfair to require the 

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery.”). 

 With regard to the claims against Defendants Gregory and Ragland individually, 

the complaint does not state sufficient facts from which the Court may infer how they 

were involved or that they would be liable under one or more causes of action. Although 

Plaintiff’s response to the motion describes their involvement in general terms, this 

description is not in the complaint. Even if it were, the description is too generic to give 

Defendants fair notice of their alleged wrongdoing. At a minimum, “allegations in a 

complaint or counterclaim must be sufficiently detailed to give fair notice to the opposing 

party of the nature of the claim so that the party may effectively defend against it.” Starr, 

633 F.3d at 1204. Because the Court finds the complaint deficient as to Gregory and 

Ragland in their individual capacities, the Court need not decide the § 1983 statute of 

limitations issue. 

 As to Defendants’ immunity argument, state officials are not immune from suits in 

federal court for violations of federal law with regard to claims that merely seek 

prospective relief. E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Plaintiff’s complaint 

seeks in part cessation of future enforcement, vacatur of liens, and curing of his credit 

profile. Plaintiff has not shown, however, that the officials named in the suit have the 

power under state law to perform or not perform the acts requested. In other words, 

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Plaintiff has not shown that the appropriate state officials have been named in this action. 

 Finally, the State Defendants’ “§ 1983 person” argument is persuasive. A state 

and officials of state agencies cannot be sued in their official capacities under § 1983. 

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 

 For the reasons above, the claims against Defendants are dismissed without 

prejudice. Plaintiff may, by June 10, 2011, amend the complaint to properly plead viable 

claims. If no amendment is filed with the Court within this period, the Clerk shall 

terminate this matter. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendants’ motions (Docs. 7, 8) are granted as stated above. 

 2. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by June 10, 2011. 

 3. The Clerk shall terminate this action, with no further leave of Court, if no 

amended complaint is filed on or before June 10, 2011. 

 Dated this 10th day of May, 2011. 

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