Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00540/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00540-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

On January 27, 2016, the Court issued an order that granted in part and denied in part 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Doc. No. 57 (“OMSJ”). Late yesterday, the 

Court received the parties’ latest proposed jury instructions (both joint and separate) and a 

proposed verdict form from Defendants (the Court previously received a proposed verdict form 

from Plaintiff). Although a number of jury instructions are joint instructions, the Court has 

substantial concerns because both parties have requested instructions that are inconsistent with the 

summary judgment order. Because trial is set to begin on March 22, 2016, the Court believes that 

a clarification of the issues in this case is appropriate.

First, both parties have submitted instructions regarding the status of George Campo under 

Title VII, that is whether Campo was a supervisor. However, as part of the OMSJ, the Court held 

that the evidence failed to show that Campo met the Title VII definition (as explained by Vance v. 

Ball St. Univ., 133 S.Ct. 2434 (2013)) of a “supervisor.” The Court therefore found no liability for 

Title VII harassment based on Campo being a “supervisor.” See OMSJ at 45:17-18. In light of 

JUAN CARLOS ROBLES,

Plaintiff

v.

AGRESERVES, INC., et al.,

Defendant

_____________________________________

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-0540 AWI JLT 

CLARIFICATION FOLLOWING 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

RECEIPT OF PROPOSED JURY 

INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT 

FORMS

Case 1:14-cv-00540-AWI-JLT Document 129 Filed 03/18/16 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

this ruling, the Court does not intend to give any jury instructions regarding Title VII harassment 

by a supervisor.

Second, the parties’ submissions indicate that Plaintiff is attempting to pursue an 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim against Agreserves for the conduct of 

Jay Payne. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Agreserves on an IIED claim based 

on Payne’s false imprisonment. See OMSJ at 66:11-14, 68:18. Therefore, the Court does not 

intend to give any jury instruction relating to IIED claims based on false imprisonment conduct by 

Payne.

1

 See id. 

Third, the parties’ submissions are unclear about an IIED claim against Campo. In the 

OMSJ, the Court held that there was a viable IIED claim against Campo based on the same 

conduct that constituted religion harassment. See OMSJ at 37:7-39:22. The Court also held that 

Agreserves could potentially be vicariously liable for the IIED claim against Campo. See id. at 

66:28-67:8. The parties will clarify whether there is still an IIED claim against Campo, or whether 

Plaintiff is only pursuing the claim against Agreserves on a vicarious liability basis.

Fourth, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting to obtain state law punitive damages against 

Agreserves based on the conduct of Campo and (at least in part) on Campo being a managing 

agent. Under California law, “managing agents” are “those corporate employees who exercise 

substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decision-making so that their 

decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.” White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal.4th 563, 566-67 

(1999). These are corporate policies that “affect a substantial portion of the company and that are 

the type likely to come to the attention of corporate leadership.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 

Cal.4th 686, 714 (2009). Here, however, the evidence submitted during the OMSJ demonstrated 

that Campo was a foreman who had very limited authority. See OMSJ at 45:17-28. The evidence 

submitted does not come close to suggesting that Campo was a “managing agent,” as that term is 

understood in California. See Taylor v. Trees, Inc., 58 F.Supp.3d at 1092, 1106-07 (E.D. Cal. 

2014); White, 21 Cal.4t h at 566-67; Roby, 47 Cal.4th at 714. Therefore, the Court does not 

 

1 The Court did find, however, that Agreserves could be liable to Robles for IIED if the jury determined that Robles 

was terminated because of his national origin. See OMSJ at 66:28-67:8. Such an IIED claim remains viable. 

Case 1:14-cv-00540-AWI-JLT Document 129 Filed 03/18/16 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

intend to give any jury instruction that would permit a finding that Campo is a “managing agent.”

Fifth, Plaintiff is pursuing a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

claim. Based on the arguments and evidence presented, the Court held in the OMSJ that Plaintiff 

had a viable wrongful discharge claim based on being discharged based on national origin animus. 

See OMSJ at 64:7-16. As part of the Plaintiff’s submissions, Plaintiff indicates that he is pursuing 

a wrongful discharge claim based on national origin and complaints to Agreserves about national 

origin discrimination. However, in the OMSJ, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Agreserves on Plaintiff’s Title VII national origin retaliation claim, and also granted summary 

judgment on wrongful termination claims based on Title VII retaliation. See id. at 43:21-44:9, 

63:28-64:6. With respect to Title VII national origin retaliation, Plaintiff argued in opposition to 

summary judgment that he complained to Payne about Payne saying “fucking Mexican” and

complained to someone about Campo saying “stupid Mexican.” See id. at 43:21-44:9. The Court 

found that the evidence cited in support of Plaintiff’s assertion that he had complained about 

Payne saying “fucking Mexican” did not actually support the assertion. See OMSJ at 43:21-44:9. 

The Court also found insufficient evidence regarding complaints of Campo saying “stupid 

Mexican” because the relevant portions of Robles’s declaration had been stricken. See id. 

Therefore, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Agreserves on the Title VII national 

origin retaliation claim. See id. Permitting Plaintiff to pursue a state law wrongful termination 

claim based on what amounts to the same summarily adjudicated Title VII retaliation claim is 

inconsistent with the summary judgment order. See id. at 43:21-44:9, 63:28-64:6. At the 

appropriate time, Plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that he was terminated in connection with 

complaints about national origin discrimination/national origin statements by Payne. Therefore, 

the Court does not intend to give instructions relating to any complaints by Robles of national 

origin discrimination.

Sixth, from the proposed verdict forms, it is not clear to the Court whether a FEHA 

harassment/hostile work environment claim based on religion against Agreserves is being pursued. 

In addition to clarifying whether an IIED claim against Campo is being pursued, the parties shall 

clarify whether a FEHA religion harassment claim against Agreserves is being pursued. 

Case 1:14-cv-00540-AWI-JLT Document 129 Filed 03/18/16 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

In light of these clarifications and observations, the Court will makes itself available for a 

telephonic conference during the afternoon of March 21, 2016 if the parties wish to raise concerns 

or address the above matters further. If they wish to have a telephonic conference, they are to 

contact the Court as soon as possible. Alternatively, the parties may briefly address these issues 

on the morning of March 22, 2016, but the parties are advised that the Court does not intend to 

make the jury panel wait for a significant period of time. Finally, the parties shall file a notice of 

clarification no later than 11:00 a.m. on March 21, 2016 that clarifies whether an IIED claim 

against Campo and a FEHA religion harassment claim against Agreserves are being pursued in 

this matter. Failure to timely respond (i.e. by 11:00 a.m. on March 21, 2016) will be construed as 

a representation that no IIED claim against Campo and no FEHA religion harassment claim 

against Agreserves are it issue, and no instructions relating to such claims will be submitted to the 

jury.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2016 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00540-AWI-JLT Document 129 Filed 03/18/16 Page 4 of 4