Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01365/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 15:1938 Fair Labor Standards Act

---

1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ARNEL AGDIPA, DALE BERGENDAHL, 

WILLIAM CHO, RALPH CORREA, 

MARGUERITE DIAS-BRECK, SARAH 

FARREN, STEVE GRIVES, JOHN 

KAHN, EMILY KELLY, TUYEN KIM, 

BRIAN RAHLF, MATTHEW SCOTT 

acting for themselves and 

others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

GRANT JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, 

 Defendant. / 

No. Civ. S-06-1365 DFL DAD 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiffs, current or former employees of Grant Joint 

Union High School District (the District), allege that the 

District violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by 

miscalculating plaintiffs’ overtime pay. Plaintiffs seek 

facilitated notice, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), to notify 

potential plaintiffs of their right to participate in an FLSA 

collective action. Defendant argues that the potential 

Case 2:06-cv-01365-RRB-DAD Document 20 Filed 04/10/07 Page 1 of 8
2 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the current plaintiffs 

and that the proposed notice is insufficient. The court GRANTS 

the motion but orders plaintiffs to alter the proposed notice as 

specified below. 

I. 

Plaintiffs are current or former employees of Grant Joint 

Union High School District. The Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU) between the District and California School Employees 

Association (CSEA) #523 establishes the policies governing 

plaintiffs’ compensation. Employees are assigned both a pay 

“range” and a pay “step,” resulting in a particular per-hour 

rate as specified in the MOU. Overtime pay is “compensated at a 

rate of pay equal to time and one-half the regular rate pay of 

the employee.” MOU at §9.8.2. Plaintiffs argue that additional 

pay provided in the MOU for oral translation, educational 

incentives, longevity, working out of classification, shift 

differentials, standby time, and health care cash-out should be 

included in the rate of pay when calculating overtime pay. 

According to plaintiffs, all employees covered by the MOU’s 

terms were potentially undercompensated for their overtime work 

due to the District’s failure to include such compensation in 

its calculation. Plaintiffs filed this motion to obtain 

facilitated notice (Hoffman-La Roche Notice) under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 216(b). Defendant filed a timely opposition. 

Case 2:06-cv-01365-RRB-DAD Document 20 Filed 04/10/07 Page 2 of 8
3 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. 

A. Facilitated Notice 

“An action to recover [under the FLSA] may be maintained 

against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and 

in [sic] behalf of himself or themselves and other employees 

similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to 

any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become 

such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which 

such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In Hoffman-La 

Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), the Supreme Court 

held that district courts should facilitate notice of such 

collective actions to similarly situated potential plaintiffs.1 

Although the Ninth Circuit has not defined “similarly situated,” 

the majority approach to determining whether a potential 

plaintiff falls within the collective action is a two-tiered 

process. See Wynn v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 234 F. 

Supp. 2d 1067, 1082 (C.D. Cal 2002). Under this approach, 

“[t]he court first makes an initial ‘notice stage’ determination 

of whether plaintiffs are similarly situated . . . requir[ing] 

 

1 Although the claims in Hoffman-La Roche involved the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the ADEA incorporated 

the same enforcement scheme as the FLSA and the same rules 

govern judicial management of collective actions under both 

statutes. See Gerlach v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-0585, 2006 

WL 824652, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2006). 

Case 2:06-cv-01365-RRB-DAD Document 20 Filed 04/10/07 Page 3 of 8
4 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

little more than substantial allegations, supported by 

declarations or discovery, that ‘the putative class members were 

together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.’” 

Gerlach, 2006 WL 824652, at *2. “The standard for certification 

at this stage is a lenient one that typically results in 

certification.” Id. (citing Wynn, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1082). 

The second consideration of whether plaintiffs are similarly 

situated is made following discovery, typically on a motion for 

decertification, under a stricter standard. See Gerlach, 2006 

WL 824652, at *2. 

In determining whether potential plaintiffs are similarly 

situated, courts have considered whether allegations of classbased discrimination are present. See Church v. Consolidated 

Freightways, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 294, 301 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Here, 

plaintiffs’ claims rest on an alleged common pattern or 

practice. Cf. Wynn, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1084-85 (refusing to 

find potential plaintiffs similarly situated due to overwhelming 

presence of individualized issues). All potential plaintiffs 

were employed by the District, covered by the MOU’s additional 

compensation provisions, and paid for overtime according to the 

MOU’s scale. If the District misapplied the MOU’s compensation 

provisions, its conduct potentially violated the rights of all 

employees paid under the system. The District argues that 

plaintiffs provide insufficient support for their allegations 

Case 2:06-cv-01365-RRB-DAD Document 20 Filed 04/10/07 Page 4 of 8
5 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and that different payroll procedures may have existed for 

potential plaintiffs. These arguments are unpersuasive. The 

applicable MOUs, attached as exhibits to plaintiffs’ papers, 

sufficiently establish a common pay system.2 Requiring 

plaintiffs to go beyond the MOU to describe the specific payroll 

systems for all employee categories would be to demand an 

inappropriate level of particularity for this stage of the 

litigation. For now, plaintiffs’ general allegations based upon 

the common MOU are sufficient to demonstrate that potential 

plaintiffs are similarly situated. The court GRANTS the motion 

for facilitated notice. 

B. Sufficiency of Notice 

Defendant submits a revised version of plaintiffs’ proposed 

notice form and argues for seven changes. 

First, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ description of the 

action is improperly biased. See Pls. Proposed Notice ¶ 2. 

Defendant recommends adding a paragraph to the notice explaining 

the District’s position. See Def. Proposed Notice ¶ 4. The 

court orders plaintiffs to include defendant’s summary paragraph 

in the notice, immediately following plaintiffs’ proposed 

 

2 The Cho Declaration, contrary to the District’s argument, 

does not aim to establish that all employees were similarly 

situated but rather states that one employee group (police) was 

still bound by common pay procedures to the remaining plaintiffs 

despite the group’s tentative adoption of a separate MOU in the 

summer of 2006. 

Case 2:06-cv-01365-RRB-DAD Document 20 Filed 04/10/07 Page 5 of 8
6 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

summary paragraph. See Gerlach, 2006 WL 824652, at * 4 (citing 

Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174)(discussing the importance of 

judicial neutrality in the notice process). Plaintiffs are to 

make no additional changes to the wording of their original 

paragraph or defendant’s proposed paragraph. 

Second, defendant argues that plaintiffs should be eligible 

to recover back pay from November 16, 2004, the start of the 

MOU’s applicability, rather than June 30, 2003, plaintiffs’ date 

on the notice form. Plaintiffs respond that the June 30 date 

corresponds to the three-year statute of limitations and that 

the disputed pay procedures have been included in the past two 

MOUs, dating back to November 15, 2000. The court finds 

plaintiffs’ proposed eligibility date to be supported by the 

relevant MOUs documenting pay procedures, attached by plaintiffs 

to their motion papers. 

Third, defendant argues that the notice form mentions 

potential monetary recovery for plaintiffs but does not discuss 

potential costs should the suit fail. Plaintiffs respond that 

the FLSA does not allow for fees for prevailing defendants and 

that any other costs would be borne by plaintiffs’ attorneys. 

Plaintiffs correctly characterize the fee provision of 29 U.S.C. 

§ 216(b). The court finds plaintiffs’ monetary recovery 

language to be appropriate. 

Case 2:06-cv-01365-RRB-DAD Document 20 Filed 04/10/07 Page 6 of 8
7 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Fourth, defendant argues that the phrase “may join this 

lawsuit” should be replaced by the phrase “may be eligible to 

join this lawsuit.” Compare Pls. Proposed Notice ¶ 4 with Def. 

Proposed Notice ¶ 6. Plaintiffs do not oppose this change. The 

court orders plaintiffs to include defendant’s eligibility 

language. 

Fifth, defendant argues that the action’s opt-in deadline 

should vary depending upon the date of the notice’s issuance and 

should allow plaintiffs a sixty-day response period. Plaintiffs 

respond that a fixed opt-in date will reduce the potential for 

confusion and that a sixty-day period is too short for many 

plaintiffs to opt-in, ultimately resulting in the filing of 

additional suits. The court favors a fixed opt-in date and 

orders plaintiffs to specify June 30, 2007 as the deadline. 

Sixth, defendant argues that plaintiffs should include both 

plaintiffs and defense counsels’ contact information. 

Plaintiffs do not oppose this change. The court orders 

plaintiffs to include defense counsel’s contact information. 

Seventh, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ statement that 

federal law prohibits the District “from taking adverse action 

against persons who have exercised their rights under the FLSA 

to participate in this lawsuit” is prejudicial and inflammatory. 

Pls. Proposed Notice ¶ 9. Defendant also argues that the 

warning is unnecessary because no threats have been made, but 

Case 2:06-cv-01365-RRB-DAD Document 20 Filed 04/10/07 Page 7 of 8
8 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

does not dispute the statement’s accuracy. The court does not 

find the adverse action language to be objectionable. 

III. 

For these reasons, the court: 

(1) GRANTS the motion; and 

(2) ORDERS plaintiffs to add to their proposed notice form 

defendant’s paragraph describing the action, defendant’s 

proposed language regarding plaintiffs’ eligibility for the 

action, and defense counsel’s contact information; and 

(3) ORDERS defendant, within twenty-one (21) days of this 

order’s issuance, to provide plaintiffs’ counsel with a list of 

the names and addresses for all persons known to be District 

classified employees at any point from June 20, 2003 to the 

present; and 

(4) AUTHORIZES plaintiffs to mail the proposed notice form 

containing the above-ordered modifications to all persons who 

were Grant Joint Union High School classified employees at any 

time between June 20, 2003 and the present. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 9, 2007 

 /s/ David F. Levi___________

 DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge 

Case 2:06-cv-01365-RRB-DAD Document 20 Filed 04/10/07 Page 8 of 8