Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01472/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01472-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL STEWART,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF OCEANSIDE, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No.14cv1472 AJB (JLB)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

(Doc. No. 2); and

(2) DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, (Doc.

No. 1)

Plaintiff Michael Stewart (hereinafter “Plaintiff” of “Stewart”), a nonprisoner

proceeding pro se, has submitted a Complaint alleging civil rights violation under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No.1.) Plaintiff has not paid the $450 civil filing fee required to

commence this action, but rather, has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Doc. No. 2.) Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in

forma pauperis is GRANTED. However, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim, thus

his Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

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BACKGROUND 

I. Factual Allegations 1

On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff was attacked while walking at Oceanside Beach,

City of Oceanside, California. Plaintiff states that he protected himself against his

attackers by using a knife. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) According to Plaintiff, two weeks prior to

the August 29, 2013 incident, Plaintiff contacted the Oceanside Police Department to

report threats made against him. “TOLD THEM THAT THIS (sic) PEOPLE HAD BEEN

THREATHING (sic) ME, HARRASSING (sic) ME BECAUSE I WOULD RIDE THEM

(sic) AROUND IN MY CAR SO THEY COULD SELL DRUGS . . . .” (Id.) A dispatch

officer instructed Plaintiff to go to the police station to make his report; he did so the

next day. Plaintiff states that he asked an officer to “TELL THEM LEAVE ME ALONG

(sic). (Id.) 

When officers arrived on the scene on August 29, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that his

attackers made false statements to the officers. Moreover, one witness who spoke on

Plaintiff’s behalf attempted to tell the officers that Plaintiff did nothing wrong, but was

told to leave. (Id.) Plaintiff was arrested and charged with two counts of PC 245(1)

Assault with a Deadly Weapon. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Chris Ruedi retained

possession of Plaintiff’s car keys after booking him in the county jail. Plaintiff further

states that his car was ticketed and impounded. Plaintiff alleges that such actions were

unlawful. 

Plaintiff states that during his court case, the only “EVIDENCE THAT OCEANSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENT HAD IN [his] CASE WAS THE POLICE REPORT AND

THEY DID NOT HAVE MY CAR KEYS.” (Id.) Plaintiff spent forty-four (44) days in

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jail. When he was released, Plaintiff had to pay $1,790.00 for impound fees and

$2,011.91 to have his car re-keyed due to Officer Ruedi’s alleged unlawful actions. 

Plaintiff further alleges that his car was broken into and his personal belongings stolen. 

 All factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1.) 1

 No further details are given with regards to Plaintiff’s state court proceedings. 2

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Plaintiff filed a claim for damages with the City of Oceanside (Claim Number

GC2013000147) which was denied by operation of law. (Doc. No. 1 at Ex. C.)

According to Officer Ruedi’s Report, attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, he

received a citizen flag at the Oceanside Police Beach Lockup Facility referencing a fight

that was occurring behind the building. (Doc. No. 1, Ex. A at 7.) Officers Ruedi was

flagged by witnesses as he and a colleague exited the Lockup Facility. There, Officer

Ruedi saw the suspect, Michael Stewart, holding a “large, black handled, fixed blade

knife in his right hand.” (Id.) Officer Ruedi states that Stewart appeared to have blood

on his clothing and face. Officer Ruedi then proceeded to draw out his firearm and

instructed Stewart to drop the knife and to lie in the prone position. Stewart complied

and Sgt. Stanley handcuffed Stewart without further incident. (Id.) Thereafter, multiple

officers assisted in the investigation by locating witnesses, interviewing witnesses, and

collecting additional evidence. While conducting a witness search, Officer Ruedi

noticed a black male nearby appearing to be injured. The subject, later identified as

David Williamson (“Williamson”), reported that he had been stabbed by the suspect. 

Officer Ruedi noticed a small puncture wound on Williamson’s left arm. (Id.) Williamson stated that he had tried to help a friend who was also being assaulted by Stewart. (Id.

at 8.)

Based upon evidence and statements obtained on the scene, Officer Ruedi formed

the opinion that “Stewart was in violation of two counts of PC 245(1) Assault with a

Deadly Weapon. Multiple witnesses identified Plaintiff as using his knife to stab two

victims. Plaintiff was transported to Tri-City Medical Center based upon a laceration he

sustained above his eye. Plaintiff stated to Officer Ruedi that he had pulled the knife in

self-defense. Thereafter he was booked into custody and transported to Vista Detention

Facilities. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges Officer Ruedi and the City of Oceanside maliciously violated his

rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff contends that as a result of the Officer’s action, his application for low3 14cv1472 AJB (JLB)

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income housing was denied due to his lengthy history of serious crimes. (Id. at 2; Ex. D

Letter Denying Housing Application.) Plaintiff seeks $12 million in punitive and

compensatory damages for mental, emotional and monetary loss. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also

requests the Court to instate a temporary restraining order against Officer Ruedi because

he is “going through legal means to settle this matter.” (Doc. No. 2.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a court may authorize the commencement of a

suit without prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement

of all his assets, showing he is unable to pay filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

However, even if a court finds the plaintiff has submitted adequate documentation

detailing his inability to pay, before granting IFP status, the court must conduct a sua

sponte review of the complaint to determine if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254

F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not

limited to prisoners.”).

Here, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit to show his inability to pay the filing fees

in this matter. (Doc. No. 2.) Plaintiff is not currently employed though he does receive

an unspecified amount of money from Social Security, disability, or other welfare. (Id. at

2.) Plaintiff has a checking account and has listed the present balance as $ -79.00.3

Plaintiff owns an automobile with a total of $6,900 still owed. Plaintiff has also listed a

number of other debts owed and indicates he has no other assets. (Id. at 3.) 

Though Plaintiff’s affidavit fails to specify the amount he receives from Social

Security, disability, or other welfare, the Court, in its discretion, finds that Plaintiff has

 It appears that Plaintiff’s affidavit states that the present balance of his checking account is a 3

negative number. 

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satisfied the necessary showing to proceed in forma pauperis. See Weller v. Dickson,

314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963) (agreeing with the statement that “the privilege of

proceeding in forma pauperis is a matter within the discretion of the trial court . . . .”). 

Based on the numerous debt obligations listed compared to assets, the Court finds that

Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fees for his suit to proceed. 

After granting in forma pauperis status, the Court must dismiss the case if the

complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to

sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). The Court

must now review Plaintiff’s Complaint to determine whether it states a claim for which

relief may be granted. 

II. Initial Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Legal Standards

After granting IFP status, the Court must dismiss the case if the complaint “fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc)

(noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). In order to properly

state a claim for relief, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A complaint must contain more than “labels and

conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must

contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). “ ‘The

pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates

a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.’ ” Id.

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A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989) (superseded on other

grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir.2000)). Where a

complaint fails to state “any constitutional or statutory right that was violated, nor asserts

any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction,” there is no “arguable basis in law”

under Neitzke, and the court on its own initiative may decline to permit the plaintiff to

proceed and dismiss the complaint under Section 1915. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d

1103, 1106 (9th Cir.1995).

The Court takes note that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and recognizes its duty to

ensure that the pro se litigant is afforded a review of his pleadings under a more lenient

standard than if drafted by lawyers. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th

Cir. 1986); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Pleadings drafted by

laymen, proceeding in propria persona, are to be interpreted by the application of less

rigid standards than those applicable to formal documents prepared by lawyers.”).

However, it is also the duty of the district court to examine any application for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if

it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion

seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.

1965). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

based upon Officer Ruedi’s conduct. Essentially, Plaintiff argues that Officer Ruedi

falsely arrested him on August 29, 2013. Plaintiff’s primary claim for damages stems

from the fact that he was forced to pay impounding fees for his vehicle as well as costs

for re-keying his car when the Oceanside Police Department allegedly lost his keys. 

B. Section 1983 Claims

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show: (1) a

person acting “under color of state law” committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the

conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

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Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Shah v. County of Los

Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1983 claims must also conform to

Rule 8's pleading standards. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8. A complaint must contain more

than “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule 8 is designed to provide defendants with fair notice of the claims and the factual allegations supporting those claims. 

See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

The United States Supreme Court has explained that any § 1983 claim must begin

by isolating “the precise constitutional violation with which the defendant is charged.”

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). 

1. Claims Against Officer Ruedi

“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the

Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001).

4

Thus, to succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must first demonstrate that he

was arrested without probable cause. “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have

knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed or is being committed by the

person being arrested.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Probable cause is an objective inquiry. Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 590

F.3d 936, 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Where probable cause for arrest exists under the circumstances for arrest, civil

rights are not violated by an arrest even though innocence may subsequently be established. Beauregard v. Wingard, 362 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1966). By Plaintiff’s own

admissions, he was in possession of a knife when officers arrived at the scene. (Doc. No.

 The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth 4

Amendment. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528,

87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967). 

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1 at 1.) According to Officer Ruedi’s report, a witness told him a suspect in possession

of a knife was nearby Lockup Facility. Officer Ruedi also heard witnesses stating a male

subject attempted to stab someone. (Id. at Ex. A, Probable Cause for Warrantless Arrest

Report.) Thereafter, Officer Ruedi saw Plaintiff with a fixed blade knife in his right

hand and blood on his clothing and face quickly walking towards the officer. Multiple

witnesses at the scene, including the two victims, identified Plaintiff as the attacker. (See

Reports of Officer Ruedi, Officer Jose Lopez, and Officer James Ridenour, Doc. No. 1,

Ex. A.) Moreover, Officer Ruedi personally saw the injuries on Williamson. Officer

Ruedi’s declaration of probable cause for warrantless arrest also details the circumstances of arrest. (Id.) Based upon the information known to Officer Ruedi at the time

of arrest, he placed Plaintiff under arrest for two counts of violation of PC 245(a)(1)

Assault with Deadly Weapon. Even taking Plaintiff’s allegation as true, that he was

acting in self defense, Officer Ruedi acted with probable cause based on the objective

circumstances surrounding the time of arrest. The defense of good faith and probable

cause, available to police officers in a common law tort action, is also available in an

action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 

Accordingly, this Court finds that based on Plaintiff’s own allegations and the

records attached to his Complaint, Officer Ruedi had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff

for Assault with Deadly Weapon. 

Plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment violations when Officer Ruedi seized Plaintiff’s car keys after he was booked into county jail. However, once an accused has been

lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention

that were subject to search at the time and place of arrest may lawfully be searched and

seized. U.S. v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1974). Therefore, Plaintiff has no claim

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against Officer Ruedi for Fourth Amendment violation when the Officer seized Plaintiff’s car keys. 

5

Plaintiff further alleges violations of his rights under the Thirteenth Amendment,

prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Involuntary

servitude “occurs when an individual coerces another into his service by improper or

wrongful conduct that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other person to believe

that he or she has no alternative but to perform labor.” Brogan v. San Mateo Cnty., 901

F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint, even under the

most liberal of readings and by any stretch of the imagination, is woefully deficient in

stating a claim of Thirteenth Amendment violation against Officer Ruedi. There are

absolutely no allegations made that would support a showing that Plaintiff was subjected

to involuntary servitude. Based upon the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s Complaint and the

Officer Reports attached as exhibits to the Complaint, the Court fails to see how any of

Officer Ruedi’s conduct during the August 29, 2013 could amount to a violation of the

Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Ruedi are DISMISSED for failure

to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

4. Claims against Defendant City of Oceanside

Plaintiff names as a defendant, the City of Oceanside. (Id. at 1.) However, a local

governmental unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employee under a

respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2019 (1978). Instead, liability under § 1983 can only

be established where the alleged constitutional violation results from an official policy or

 If Plaintiff meant to plead that his car keys were unlawfully retained and/or lost by the police 5

department, those allegations should be brought under a claim of relief under the California Tort Claims

Act. However, the Court reminds Plaintiff that a claim for conversion against a state agency does not

create a basis for federal jurisdiction. Moreover, even if the Court could exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the conversion claim, it has the discretion to decline to hear such a claim if all federal

claims have been dismissed. 

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custom. Id. The Ninth Circuit has articulated three ways a plaintiff may establish

vicarious liability against a local government entity. See Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal.,

47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995). First, a plaintiff may show liability “by proving that

a city employee committed the alleged violations pursuant to the city’s official policy or

custom.” Id. Second, a plaintiff may show “that, rather than being the product of

general official policy, on a given occasion the conduct was the result of a ‘deliberate

choice... made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.’” Id. (citing

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)). Third, a plaintiff could

demonstrate that “an official policymaker either delegated policymaking authority to a

subordinate or ratified a subordinate’s decision, approving the ‘decision and the basis for

it.’” Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126-27 (1988)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead such bare facts. Moreover, this Court has

already found Officer Ruedi’s arrest of Plaintiff justified by probable cause, thus there

can be no liability under the Fourteenth Amendment as to the City of Oceanside based on

Officer Ruedi’s conduct as alleged. As to any Thirteenth Amendment violations brought

against the City of Oceanside, even if Plaintiff intended to plead that he was subjected to

involuntary servitude when he was required to work in accordance with prison rules

during his forty-four day incarceration, such a claim is without merit. See Berry v.

Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1957 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment does not

apply where prisoners are required to work in accordance with prison rules.”) 

As it is clear from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that these deficiencies cannot

be cured by amendment, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint against the City of

Oceanside for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

The Court finds that, at this time, Plaintiff has failed to state claim for which relief

may be granted. A plaintiff should be granted leave to amend when the deficiencies in

the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th

Cir. 2000). In this case, it is unclear whether Plaintiff can allege facts supporting his

claims of civil rights violation. As the four page Complaint stands now, there are no

factual allegations that could support a claim for civil rights violations. However,

recognizing the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the “rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly important for the pro se litigant.” Id. (quoting Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1987). As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint is

DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file a First Amended Complaint

within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Failure to file the amended complaint in a timely manner will result in the dismissal of this case without prejudice. 

DATED: July 8, 2014

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

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