Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-02028/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-02028-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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1 The moving KSL defendants include KSL Biltmore Resorts, Inc., KSL Recreation

Corporation; Jobing.com; Gannett, Inc.; America West Vacations; Spa Finder Travel

Arrangements, Ltd.; Spring Training Tours; American Express Company; The Leisure

Company; and Internet Publishing Corporation.

2 Defendants Hotel Discounts, LP; Hotel Reservations Network; America’s Travel

Network; Any Hotel Anywhere; Travel Golf West; World Res, Inc.; Carlson Leisure Group;

Classic Custom Vacations; ClickCity.com’ Epinions; Expedia, Inc.; Groovy Travel; Hotels

Online; The Travel Company Corporation; Nota Bene Publishing, Ltd.; Absolute Engine,LLC;

Automatit, Inc.; and Sunfinder Vacations have filed a notice of joinder [doc. #219] and an

amended notice of joinder [doc. #222] in the KSL defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment [doc. #214]. The Court notes that in their motion for partial summary judgment, the

02CV2028

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MASTERSON MARKETING, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KSL RECREATION CORPORATION, et

al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 02-CV-2028-L(CAB)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[doc. # 214]

Defendants1

 (collectively “KSL defendants”) move for partial summary judgment on the

issue of infringement with respect to a photograph taken after the expiration of certain

agreements between the parties, and indirect profits as a result of certain co-defendants’

(collectively “E&H defendants”) 2

 use of plaintiff’s copyrighted images on their websites. 

Case 3:02-cv-02028-CAB Document 247 Filed 04/13/07 Page 1 of 10
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KSL defendants term the E&H defendants as “third-parties.” For purposes of this motion, the

court refers to the non-moving defendants who have joined in KSL defendants’ motion for

partial summary judgment as the “E&H defendants.”

2 02CV2028

Plaintiff opposes the KSL defendants’ motion. The matter has been fully briefed.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Masterson Marketing, Inc. (“Masterson”) filed this action alleging copyright

infringement and breach of contract based upon Agency Agreements and Licensing Agreements

entered into with the Arizona Biltmore Resort & Spa (“Resort”) for, inter alia, plaintiff’s taking

of various photos of the Resort. Relevant to the current motion, plaintiff also contends that

defendants re-created plaintiff’s photograph of Squaw Peak, now known as Piestewa Peak, and

the Resort’s lawn taken from the vantage point of the Resort’s rooftop. The alleged duplication

of the image, according to plaintiff, entitles him to copyright infringement damages. 

Plaintiff also seeks disgorgement of KSL defendants’ profits based on the E&H

defendants’ alleged infringement, i.e., the E&H defendants’ use on various travel websites of

plaintiff’s images obtained from the KSL defendants.

The KSL defendants move for partial summary judgment on these two claims.

Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the court to enter summary judgment on

factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 327

(1986). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material when, under the substantive governing law, it

affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party does

not have the burden of proof at trial, it may carry its initial burden by “produc[ing] evidence

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negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, after suitable discovery, the

moving party may show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential

element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving party

bears the burden of proof on an issue — whether on a claim for relief or an affirmative defense

— the party “must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or

defense to warrant judgment in its favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th

Cir. 1986); see S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003).

If the moving party fails to discharge its initial burden of production, summary judgment

must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence, even if the

nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144, 159-60 (1970); Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102-03. When the moving party carries its initial

burden of production, the nonmoving party cannot “rest upon mere allegation or denials of his

pleading.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Rather, the non-movant must “go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324 (internal quotations omitted); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103. 

A “genuine issue” of material fact arises if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Disputes over

irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). When ruling on a

summary judgment motion, the court cannot engage in credibility determinations or weighing of

the evidence; these are functions for the jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Playboy Enters., Inc.

v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2002). The court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Gibson v.

County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106

(2003). The court is not required “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable

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3 Plaintiff’s “Squaw Peak” image at issue here was taken “prior to any contractual

agreement between Masterson and the Biltmore.” (Plaintiff’s Opp. at 3).

4 02CV2028

fact,” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996), but rather “may limit its review to

the documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those parts of the record

specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 

DISCUSSION 

1. Copyright Infringement

Plaintiff contends that after KSL terminated the Licensing Agreement with plaintiff,3

 the

KSL defendants hired another photographer, Evan Schiller (“Schiller”), to duplicate plaintiff’s

original photo of Squaw Peak taken from the Arizona Biltmore grounds thereby infringing

plaintiff’s work. The KSL defendants argue, however, that although photographs receive

copyright protection, the law protects the creative expression of an idea and not the idea itself. 

Therefore, according to defendants, their photo of Squaw Peak does not infringe plaintiff’s photo

unless it is virtually identical and it is not.

“Although the subject matter of a photograph, itself, is not copyrightable, a photographer

may create a pose, select lighting and angle and adorn a subject in such a manner as to be

copyrightable. The copyrightable elements of an original photographic composition that are

capable of supporting registration may include such things as time and light exposure, camera

angle or perspective achieved, deployment of light and shadow from natural or artificial light

sources, and the arrangement or disposition of persons, scenery, or other subjects depicted in the

photograph.” COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION PRACTICE, Second Edition, § 15:10. Thus, a photograph

does not and cannot create a copyright in the underlying subject matter. The subject matter is 

factual material, available for use by all photographers. For photos of existing objects, even

relatively small differences in two photos may exclude copyright infringement. But how

different from the original photo a second photograph must be in order to be something other

than an infringing copy may present difficult questions, particularly if the photographs deal with

the same natural object – in this case, Squaw Peak and the lawn of the Arizona Biltmore Resort.

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In ETS-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., following an earlier holding that "product shots" of a

vodka bottle were copyrightable based on selection of angle, lighting and other factors, the Court

held that there was no infringement of the copyrighted photos. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc.,

323 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the similarities in the

works resulted from the subject matter, rather than from any copying. Id. (citation omitted)(the

features that "are treated like ideas and are therefore not protected by copyright" are those that

are, "as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given idea." ). 

Similarly, in Sahuc v. Tucker, 300 F. Supp. 2d 461 (E.D. La. 2004) the court held that

actionable copying does not take place when a photographer simply takes a picture of the subject

matter depicted in a copyrighted photograph so long as the second photograph does not copy

original aspects of the copyrighted work. The subject matter of a photograph of a public object

or scene, i.e. the object or scene actually being photographed, is not of itself copyrightable. A

photographer cannot obtain an exclusive copyright in the subject matter of a particular

photograph if that subject matter is public property, e.g. the Washington Monument or a natural

object such as Squaw Peak and the lawn of the Arizona Biltmore Resort. 

Plaintiff contends that his creative decisions include taking the photograph from the roof

of the Biltmore at a particular time of day when there would be more desirable cross lighting.

(Opp. at 3-4). Plaintiff states he selected a wide-angle 21mm lens that would provide a photo of

the expanse of the hotel grounds along with the entire Squaw Peak range as a backdrop. Id.

Plaintiff also notes that he chose to photograph the scene in a horizontal rather than vertical

format to enhance the image of the Biltmore property as expansive. Id. Defendants contend,

and plaintiff agrees, that plaintiff extensively retouched his image by, inter alia, image

sharpening; color adjustment, balance and saturation; and image cloning. (Opp. at 4). 

Defendants argue that there are at least 19 differences between Schiller’s photo and Masterson’s

image and those differences separate the originality of Masterson’s image from Schiller’s photo. 

Schiller’s photo, taken at the request of the KSL defendants, is a Resort lawn shot with

Squaw Peak looming in the background. Schiller took the photo from the roof of the Arizona

Biltmore. Defendants contend that Schiller’s image is “simply a photograph of an existing

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4 The Court has previously determined that plaintiff failed to offer any

nonspeculative evidence creating a triable issue of fact showing that defendants’ alleged

infringement at least partially caused the profits that the infringer generated as a result of the

infringement. See Order filed March 9, 2007 [doc. #237].

6 02CV2028

object” that has not been retouched as plaintiff’s image has been. (Reply at 2). In his

supplemental declaration, Schiller states that he did not perform color adjustment, dodgingburning or image sharpening and therefore, his photo is lighter and more naturalistic than

plaintiff’s image. (Schiller Supp. Dec., ¶ 2). 

Plaintiff’s and defendants’ photographs depict a similar idea about the Arizona Biltmore

Hotel property with Squaw Peak rising in the background. But as noted above, ideas are never

copyrightable – only the original expression of those ideas is protected by copyright law. It is

not disputed that plaintiff’s heavily retouched image is subject to copyright protection. But

where a photographer takes a picture of the subject matter depicted in a copyrighted photograph,

there is no infringement if the second photograph does not copy the original aspects of the

copyrighted work. Schiller’s unretouched photo merely captures the lawn of the Resort taken

from the vantage point of the Resort’s roof with Squaw Peak in the background. Removing the

original expression found in plaintiff’s image and comparing those aspects with defendants’

photo, it is apparent that defendants’ photo of the Resort’s grounds and Squaw Peak does not

copy the original, distinct features of plaintiff’s image. The fact that both Masterson’s and

defendants’ photos were taken from the same vantage point and are in a horizontal rather than

vertical format is insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate copying of the original aspects of

Masterson’s image by defendants. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on plaintiff’s claim of copyright infringement.

2. Lost Profits for Co-Defendants’ Use of Images4

A plaintiff may recover “any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the

infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. §

504(b). In order to recover an alleged infringer’s profits, the plaintiff must establish a causal

connection between the alleged infringer’s revenues and the alleged infringement. Polar Bear

Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 348 F.3d 700, 708 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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5 “Section 504(b) does not differentiate between “direct profits” – those that are

generated by selling an infringing product – and “indirect profits” – revenue that has a more

attenuated nexus to the infringement.” Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2002). In

other words, indirect profits arise when the alleged infringer does not sell the copyrighted work

itself but rather uses the copyrighted work to sell another product. Andreas v. Volkwagen of

America, Inc., 336 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2003).

7 02CV2028

Here, plaintiff is seeking indirect profits5 from the KSL defendants for the E&H

defendants6

 alleged infringing use of plaintiff’s images. But defendants assert that plaintiff has

not, and cannot, establish the requisite causal connection between the alleged infringement by

the E&H defendants and the KSL defendants’ revenues because the KSL defendants did not

benefit, directly or indirectly, from the acts of the E&H defendants. 

Defendants, citing Polar Bear, further argue that even if causation could be established, a

claim for indirect profits will fail if the relationship between the purported infringement and the

profits is too speculative. Id. at 710-711; see also Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,

Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522-25 (4th Cir. 2003)(summary judgment is appropriate if “despite the

existence of a conceivable connection [between the infringement and recovery sought, the

plaintiff] offered only speculation as to the existence of a causal link between the infringement

and the revenues.”) In other words, and as both parties acknowledge, in order “to survive

summary judgment on a demand for indirect profits pursuant to § 504(b), a copyright holder

must proffer sufficient non-speculative evidence to support a causal relationship between the

infringement and the profits generated indirectly from such an infringement.” Mackie v. Rieser,

296 F.3d 909, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2002).

2. Causal Relationship

Plaintiff contends he has demonstrated the nexus between the E&H defendants’

infringement and the KSL defendants’ profits. Plaintiff first relies on a letter he received from

Randolph Wilcott, the Director of Marketing for the Arizona Biltmore in which Wilcott stated:

I just received our year end sales report. Our new advertising direction has

increased our leisure and group occupancy by 38% over the past nine months. We

at the Arizona Biltmore Sales and Marketing Department tip our hats to Masterson

Marketing.

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(Plaintiff’s Exh. 1). Although plaintiff believes this note “clearly” shows the infringing use of

his images caused defendants’ increased profits, it does not. The Wilcott note is dated May 17,

2000, which is within the time period of the parties’ Licensing Agreement and approximately a

year and a half prior to the termination of the Licensing Agreement. Only after the termination

of the Licensing Agreement could any alleged infringing activity occur. Thus, the Wilcott note

cannot demonstrate a connection between the alleged E&H defendants’ infringement and the

KSL defendants’ profits. Moreover, the Wilcott note does not assert a connection between the

use of plaintiff’s images and the KSL defendants’ profits. Rather, the note speaks of “[o]ur new

marketing direction” and not the specific use of plaintiff’s images that were incorporated in the

E&H defendants’ advertising. Id.

Plaintiff also relies on his own expert report in support of his position that there is a

causal connection between the E&H defendants’ use of his images and the KSL defendants’

profits. The Court notes that a party who is otherwise qualified as an expert may testify as an

expert witness in his own case regardless of concerns that the party is plainly self-interested. 3

Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 349, p. 606-07 (2d ed.

1994). But the party offering expert testimony has the burden of laying a foundation for its

admission. FED. R. EVID. 702. As defendants correctly note, plaintiff has not been qualified as

an expert in marketing and/or damages, in this case, profits attributable to alleged infringement. 

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto

in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient

facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,

and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of

the case. 

FED. R. EVID. 702. Although not making a determination of whether or not plaintiff is qualified

as an expert for purposes of trial, in cases of proffered expert testimony, the Court must find that

it is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be admitted. The

expert's testimony must be grounded in an accepted body of learning or experience in the

expert's field, and the expert must explain how the conclusion is so grounded. See, e.g.,

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AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING THE

ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AFTER DAUBERT, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994)

("[W]hether the testimony concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property

valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to the 'knowledge

and experience' of that particular field."). Further, the testimony must be the product of reliable

principles and methods that are reliably applied to the facts of the case. 

There are several problems associated with the expert report prepared by plaintiff. The

most significant being the lack of a stated methodology that supports his various conclusions,

e.g., “64% of [the Arizona Biltmore Resort’s] sales have been directly influenced by

[Masterson’s] images of the hotel; 32% of all sales are directly attributed to the use of the images

at issue,” (Masterson Report at 7); “[i]t is safe to assume that images book rooms and generate

revenue, Id. at 3; “The 2002 PhoCusWright Report found that ‘50% of US Online Travelers

look online, but book offline.’ This supports the position that at least 50% of direct sales

numbers are generated by the website image presentation.” Id. at 7. These opinions are not

supported by any sort of reliable principle and/or methodology but are rather conclusions based

on incomplete suppositions. Although plaintiff appears to recognize that “other factors can have

an influence on decision making, such as past experiences, location, amenities, etc.,” (Id. at 8),

plaintiff, as a purported expert, does not offer any explanation for or means of determining how

those other factors impact revenue for the Resort vis-a-vis the use of his images which calls into

question plaintiff’s conclusion that there is any nexus between the use of his images and the KSL

defendants’ profits. Plaintiff’s expert report offers nothing more than speculative arguments and

figures to support plaintiff’s conclusion of a causal relationship between the infringement and

the indirect profits generated by the E&H defendants for the KSL defendants. 

Here, there is no admissible evidence establishing that the alleged use of the infringing

images actually caused the public to stay at the Resort thereby generating profits for the KSL

defendants. Plaintiff has provided no non-speculative evidence concerning a causal relationship

between the alleged infringing use of his images in E&H defendants’ advertising and an increase

the KSL defendants’ profits. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this

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claim is appropriately granted.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED granting defendants’ motion for partial

summary judgment [doc. #214]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Mandatory Settlement

Conference shall be conducted on May 22, 2007, at 2:00 p.m. in the chambers of Magistrate

Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo. Counsel shall submit confidential settlement statements directly

to chambers no later than May 15, 2007. Settlement conference briefs shall not be filed with

the Clerk of the Court, nor shall they be served on opposing counsel. Pursuant to Local

Civil Rule 16.3, all party representatives and claims adjusters for insured defendants with full

and unlimited authority to negotiate and enter into a binding settlement, as well as the principal

attorney(s) responsible for the litigation, must be present and legally and factually prepared to

discuss and resolve the case at the mandatory settlement conference. Retained outside corporate

counsel shall not appear on behalf of a corporation as the party who has the authority to

negotiate and enter into a settlement. Failure to attend the conference or obtain proper excuse

will be considered grounds for sanctions. IT IS SO ORDERED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 13, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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