Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06100/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06100-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:227 Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD CHINITZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

NRT WEST, INC., d/b/a Coldwell Banker 

Residential Brokerage Company,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06100-NC 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR CLASS 

CERTIFICATION

Re: Dkt. No. 60

In this class action, plaintiff Ronald Chinitz accuses defendant NRT West (“NRT”), 

Inc., of making unlawful robocalls. Chinitz now seeks to certify three nationwide classes. 

See Dkt. No. 60. For two of those classes, Chinitz failed to present any evidence to 

establish numerosity. And for all of his proposed classes, Chinitz failed to present 

sufficient evidence to establish a common question. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Chinitz’s motion for class certification.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

NRT, more commonly known as Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage, is a 

residential brokerage company. See Dkt. No. 60-6 (“Robinson Depo.”) at 14:14–18. NRT 

operates regional offices, where it contracts with local realtors or “sales associates.” Id.; 

see also Dkt. No. 60-12. In NRT’s Palo Alto office, NRT has hired over 100 current or 

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former sales associates since 2014. See Dkt. No. 61-5 at 4–11. Similar Coldwell Banker 

entities operate throughout the United States. See Robinson Depo. at 23:23 – 25:18.

In 2003 and 2018, Chinitz placed his landline and VOIP numbers on the national 

do-not-call registry, respectively. See Dkt. No. 60-2, 60-3. In 2017, after Chinitz placed 

his home in Santa Cruz, California on an online real estate listing portal for sale, he 

received unwanted calls on behalf of NRT sales associates. See Dkt. No. 61-14 (“Chinitz 

Depo.”) at 59:6–14; see also Dkt. No. 60-12. One of those associates was Matt 

Christensen. See id. at 145:10–20. After receiving those calls, Chinitz asked the caller to 

not call him back, but he continued to receive unwanted calls. See Dkt. No. 60-4 at 3. On 

more than one occasion, Chinitz received calls using a prerecorded message. See id.

According to Christensen, it was common practice in the industry to use third-party 

services or online listings to gather lists of prospective real estate clients and to use those 

lists to call prospective clients. See Dkt. No. 60-5 (“Christensen Depo.”) at 62:14–64:13. 

Although NRT provided various onboarding documents regarding cold calling practices, 

Christensen did not receive any specific training regarding the requirements of the 

National Do-Not-Call Registry. Id. at 71:12–72:20. Likewise, Christensen had access to 

NRT’s internal do-not-contact lists, but did not use those lists to screen his calls. Id. at 

74:1–18. Christensen also used third-party services to call homeowners on his behalf. Id.

at 84:10–85:1.

B. Procedural History

On October 4, 2018, Chinitz initiated this putative class action alleging violations of 

the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. See Dkt. No. 1. He 

amended his complaint on December 14, 2018, alleging putative class claims for (1) 

calling individuals on the national do-not-call registry, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2); (2) 

calling individuals on its internal do-not-call registry, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d); (3) using a 

non-exempt artificial or prerecorded message, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B); and (4) violating 

the UCL. See Dkt. No. 16 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 55–93. On February 20, 2019, the Court dismissed 

Chinitz’s UCL claim. See Dkt. No. 42. Chinitz now moves to certify three classes:

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National Do-Not-Call Registry Class (“NDNC Class”): All persons in the 

United States who: (a) received more than one call made by one of NRT’s 

real estate agents on NRT’s behalf or by another agent of NRT on NRT’s 

behalf; (b) promoting NRT’s goods or services; (c) in a 12-month period; (d) 

on their residential telephone line; (e) whose residential telephone number(s) 

appear on the DNC; (f) at any time since October 4, 2014.

National Internal Do-Not-Call Class (“IDNC Class”): All persons in the 

United States who: (a) received more than one call made by one of NRT’s 

real estate agents on NRT’s behalf or by another agent of NRT on NRT’s 

behalf; (b) promoting NRT’s goods or services; (c) in a 12-month period; (d) 

on their residential telephone line; (e) who made a request not to receive 

calls from or on behalf of NRT; (f) at any time since October 4, 2014.

National Prerecorded Message Residential Class (“Prerecorded 

Message Class”): All persons in the United States to whom: (a) one of 

NRT’s real estate agents on NRT’s behalf, or another agent of NRT on 

NRT’s behalf, initiated one of more non-emergency telephone calls; (b) 

promoting NRT’s goods or services; (c) to a recipient’s residential telephone 

line; (d) through the use of an artificial or prerecorded voice; (e) at any time 

since October 4, 2014.

See FAC ¶ 43. Chinitz seeks both monetary relief and injunctive relief. See id. at 15–16. 

All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. See Dkt. Nos. 8, 25.

II. Legal Standard

As the party seeking certification, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating 

compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by a preponderance of the evidence. 

See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)). The plaintiff must satisfy the four prerequisites of Rule 

23(a) and one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b). Id.; see also Civil Rights Educ. & 

Enforcement Ctr. v. Hosp. Props. Trust, 867 F.3d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 2017). 

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Rule 23(a) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that: “(1) the class is so numerous that 

joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 

the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 

defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

Chinitz seeks to certify three classes under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). See 

Dkt. No. 60 at 18. To certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class, the plaintiff must also show that “the 

party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 

class, so that final relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 

class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). To certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class, the plaintiff 

must also show that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 

any questions affecting only individual members” (predominance); and that a class action 

is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 

controversy” (superiority). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Class certification analysis “may entail some overlap with the merits of the 

plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 

U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “That is so because 

the class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual 

and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33–34 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). However, the ultimate goal of Rule 23 is to 

determine whether efficiency and justice are best served by the plaintiff pursuing his 

claims on behalf of a class as “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by 

and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 348 (quoting 

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701(1979)).

III. Discussion

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires Chinitz to demonstrate that: “(1) the 

class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of 

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law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 

typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly 

and adequately protect the interests of the class.”

1. Numerosity

As the first Rule 23(a) requirement, Chinitz must demonstrate that “the class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). To 

determine practicality of joinder, courts consider: “(1) the number of individual class 

members; (2) the ease of identifying and contacting class members; (3) the geographical 

spread of class members; and (4) the ability and willingness of individual members to 

bring claims . . .” Twegbe v. Pharmaca Integrative Pharmacy, Inc., No. 12-cv-5080-CRB, 

2013 WL 3802807, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013). The Ninth Circuit has not offered a 

precise numerical standard; district courts generally hold, however, “that the numerosity 

requirement is usually satisfied where the class comprises 40 or more members, and 

generally not satisfied when the class comprises 21 or fewer members.” Id.

Chinitz has not offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate numerosity for the 

proposed IDNC class or the Prerecorded Message class. Chinitz relies solely on the expert 

report of Anya Verkhovskaya. See Dkt. No. 60-8. Verkhovskaya, however, merely 

describes her intended methodology and does not provide any opinion regarding the 

number of individuals that may be part of the IDNC class or Prerecorded Message class. 

See id. at 8–9. This is insufficient to satisfy Chinitz’s burden on class certification. 

Chinitz’s reliance on two out-of-circuit cases is unavailing. See Dkt. No. 69 at 8. Both 

cases are distinguishable. In Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 320 F.R.D. 582, 600 (N.D. Ga. 

2017), the plaintiffs provided a rough estimate regarding the number of class members. 

And in Reyes v. BCA Financial Services, Inc., No. 16-cv-24077, 2018 WL 3145807, at *9 

(S.D. Fla. June 26, 2018), numerosity was not in dispute. Thus, Chinitz fails to 

demonstrate numerosity as to the IDNC and Prerecorded Message class.

As to the NDNC class, Verkhovskaya opined in her initial report that 19 of 60 

sampled phone numbers dialed by Christensen were on the NDNC. See id. at 8. And in 

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reply, Verkhovskaya supplemented her analysis after analyzing over 400 numbers called 

by Christensen, finding that 49 of those numbers would fit the NDNC class definition. See

Dkt. No. 69-24 at 2–3. A class of 49 satisfies the numerosity requirement. See Twebge, 

2013 WL 3802807, at *2.

NRT briefly argues that the Court should disregard Verkhovskaya’s opinion 

because she failed to account for whether any of Christensen’s calls were personal in 

nature. However, Christensen redacted personal calls from the phone records he produced 

to Chinitz. See Dkt. No. 69-2 at 3.

In sum, Chinitz has satisfied the numerosity requirement as to the NDNC class, but 

not the IDNC and Prerecorded Message classes. Accordingly, the Court DENIES class 

certification as to the IDNC class and Prerecorded Message class.

2. Typicality

Typicality requires that the named plaintiff’s individual claim is “typical of the 

claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). This standard is “permissive,” 

and claims are typical if they are “reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class 

members; they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 

1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). “The test of typicality ‘is whether other members have the 

same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the 

named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course 

of conduct.’” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 

Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)).

Chinitz is typical. He registered his phone numbers on the national do-not-call 

registry (see Dkt. No. 60-2, 60-3), but was called by an NRT associate against his wishes. 

This is the same injury suffered by other members of the NDNC class.

NRT offers two arguments in opposition but neither are persuasive. First, NRT 

argues that Chinitz lacks standing because he registered his VOIP number after he was 

called. See Dkt. No. 61 at 25. But Chinitz was called on both his VOIP number and his 

landline, which was registered in 2003. See id.; Dkt. No. 69-19. Second, NRT also argues 

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that Chinitz gave express consent to be called by listing his VOIP number on his real estate 

listing. Even if the Court assumes that Chinitz’s listing constitutes express consent to be 

called on his VOIP number, that listing does not constitute consent as to Chinitz’s landline. 

See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(1) (express consent requires a written agreement that 

“include[s] the telephone number to which the calls may be placed”).

3. Adequacy

The plaintiff must also show that they “will fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Adequacy requires that (1) the proposed 

class representatives and their counsel do not “have any conflicts of interest with other 

class members”; and (2) the proposed class representatives and their counsel must 

“prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 

938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020).

Here, NRT attacks Chinitz’s adequacy largely on the grounds that he was unable to 

recall certain details with regards to the unwanted calls and that he is a frequent litigant. 

Such attacks are not well received. See Nevarez v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC, 326 

F.R.D. 562, 582–83 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The alleged calls were placed over a year ago and 

being a serial or professional plaintiff is generally not grounds for inadequacy. See id.

Rather, there is no evidence of conflicts of interest between Chinitz and the 

proposed class members. And Chinitz’s counsel are experienced class action litigators. 

See Dkt. No. 60-11. Accordingly, the Court finds that Chinitz and his counsel are 

adequate representatives.

4. Commonality

Next, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are “questions of law or fact common to the 

class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality requires more than simply whether class 

members have suffered a violation of the same provision of law. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. 

at 350. Rather, “[c]ommonality requires that the class members’ claims ‘depend upon a 

common contention’ such that ‘determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue 

that is central to the validity of each [claim] in one stroke.’” Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor 

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Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. 

at 350). “What matters to class certification [is] the capacity of a classwide proceeding to 

generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 564 

U.S. at 350 (emphasis in original). “Commonality only requires a single significant 

question of law or fact.” Mazza, 666 F.3d at 589.

Here, Chinitz seeks to hold NRT liable for its sales associates’ allegedly unlawful 

phone calls to individuals on the national do-not-call registry. Whether NRT is vicariously 

liable turns on whether an agency relationship exists between NRT and its associates. See

Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d 136 S. Ct. 

663, 674 (2016). Chinitz asserts that NRT is liable because it controls the manner and 

means of its associates’ work (see Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., 887 F.3d 443, 450 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (outlining ten-factor test to determine agency relationship)) and its associates 

had apparent authority (see Thomas v. Taco Bell Corp., 582 Fed. Appx. 678, 679 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing In re DISH Network, LLC, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 6574, 6590 n.124 (2013)).

Whether NRT had an agency relationship with its sales associates is ostensibly a 

common question. But Chinitz has not provided sufficient evidence showing that the 

proposed classwide proceeding has “the capacity . . . to generate common answers.” WalMart, 564 U.S. at 350 (emphasis in original). Rather, “[d]issimilarities in the proposed 

class”—i.e., the fact that each class member was called by different NRT associates—has 

“the potential to impede the generation of common answers.” Id. NRT may exert 

different levels of supervisory control over its associates, such that it is vicariously liable 

for the actions of some associates, but not others.

The cases Chinitz cites provides an illustrative contrast. In Kristensen v. Credit 

Payment Services, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1306 (D. Nev. 2014), for example, the court found 

that vicarious liability was a common question. But there, the plaintiffs sought to prove 

that a payday lender was vicariously liable for two of its contractors’ actions. Id. at 1297. 

Generating common answers was fairly simple—plaintiffs only needed to prove two 

agency relationships. Here, by contrast, Chinitz seeks to hold NRT responsible for the 

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actions of every one of NRT’s associates. Absent a preponderance of evidence that NRT’s 

relationship with its associates can be determined across the board, Chinitz has not 

satisfied the commonality requirement.

Similarly, Chinitz’s reliance on California law to assert that NRT is automatically 

vicariously liable for its associates’ actions is unpersuasive. See Dkt. No. 69 at 11 (citing 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 10 § 2725). Even if California law in fact requires NRT to supervise 

its associates’ sales activities, Chinitz seeks to certify a nationwide class, which necessarily 

includes individuals who received calls by associates that may not be governed by 

California law. And Chinitz has not shown that California law should apply in this case. 

See In re Hyundai, 926 F.3d at 561–62.

Of course, Chinitz has provided some evidence to establish the existence of 

common questions. That evidence, however, is currently too limited. The sample sales 

associate agreements, for example, state that NRT’s relationship with its associates is an 

independent contractor relationship and shines no light on the level of control exercised by 

NRT. See Dkt. No. 69-12. Chinitz provides no evidence of a broader practice by NRT’s 

associates; he only submits evidence of Christensen’s practice. Likewise, Chinitz offers 

evidence of Christensen’s knowledge of NRT’s Do-No-Contact policy, but it is unclear if 

NRT actually mandates training as to its Do-Not-Contact policy or some other level of 

control over its associates. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 69-14.

In short, Chinitz has identified common questions, but has not shown by a

preponderance of evidence that common answers exist to those questions. Because 

Chinitz fails to demonstrate all four requirements of Rule 23(a), the Court does not address 

the requirements of Rule 23(b).

IV. Conclusion

Because Chinitz fails to meet his burden of proof, the Court DENIES Chinitz’s 

motion for class certification.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2019 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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