Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01002/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01002-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUIS ARCIGA, for himself and on behalf

of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIAMOND ENVIRONMENTAL

SERVICES, L.P., et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 13cv1002 L (WMC)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

REMAND [doc. #7]

1. Background

Plaintiff brought a putative class action complaint in the Superior Court of the State of

California, in and for the County of San Diego alleging violations of California statutory

provisions and common claims: failure to pay prevailing wages and overtime; failure to pay

meal period premium pay; failure to pay rest break premium pay; violations of the UCL; and

penalties under California Labor Code §2699. In that portion of his complaint concerning class

allegations, plaintiff asserts that he and the class he seeks to represent are 

current and former employees who worked for defendants at and/or drove to and

from various construction project subject to the California prevailing wage law

(“PWL”), California Labor Code (“Labor Code”) sections 1720-1813 and/or the

Davis Bacon and Related Acts (“DBRA”), 40 U.S.C. sections 3141-3148 . . . .

(Comp. at ¶ 13 (emphasis added.))

13CV1002

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Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for violation of California’s UCL alleges that defendants

violated the California Labor Code and/or the Davis Bacon and Related Acts. Based on this

allegation, defendants filed a notice of removal on April 26, 2013, contending that the Court has

jurisdiction based on one or more issues arising under a federal statute, thereby invoking the

court’s federal question jurisdiction. Defendants rely on Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v.

Darue Engineering & Manufacturing to assert that federal jurisdiction exists because the

allegations in the complaint implicate a substantial federal interest in seeking to recover, within a

purported state law claim, wages under a federal statute. Defendants also invoke the Court’s

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). 

Plaintiff moves to remand this action to the Superior Court of the State of California, in

and for the County of San Diego contending the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The

motion has been fully briefed and is considered on the papers submitted and without oral

argument under Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

2. Legal Standard

The Court addresses the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first as “[t]he requirement that

jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the

judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-94 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C & L. M. Ry. Co. v.

Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by Constitution or

statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is to

be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also

Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is strictly

construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992);

see also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); O’Halloran v. University

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of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The strong presumption against removal

jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is

proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d

709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. 

“The propriety of removal . . . depends on whether the case originally could have been

filed in federal court.” Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997). “Federal

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”

Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. The Court’s removal jurisdiction must be analyzed on the basis of the

pleadings at the time of removal. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,

159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Defendants may remove any action filed in state court over which federal district courts

have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Generally speaking, a party may bring a case

within the jurisdiction of the federal courts by demonstrating the existence of either: (1) diversity

of citizenship, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; or (2) a federal question, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Defendants removed this action based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331:

federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction of “all civil actions arising under the Constitution,

laws, or treatises of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

3. Discussion

As noted above, defendants contend that plaintiff’s UCL cause of action is based on a

violation of federal law – the DBRA – that would provide a federal remedy. The complaint does

not allege a federal cause of action or seek federal remedies under the DRBA notwithstanding

defendants’ assertion to the contrary. Plaintiff specifically asserts in his complaint that he is

bringing “no claims under federal law.” (Comp. ¶13.) The five causes of action are based on

California state statutes and only the UCL claim even mentions the DBRA. The DBRA

functions as an alternative and independent predicate offense for the UCL claim. 

The allegations in the Complaint make clear that federal law is not essential to the UCL

claim. Although plaintiff alleges that defendants have violated the DBRA, he also alleges that

the predicate violations for his UCL claim include violation of California prevailing wage law

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and Labor Code. “When a claim can be supported by alternative and independent theories – one

of which is a state law theory and one of which is a federal law theory – federal question

jurisdiction does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim.” Rains v.

Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff

has not alleged a federal cause of action by basing their UCL claim in part on defendants’

alleged violation of the DBRA. Nor have defendants shown that there is a substantial, disputed

question of federal law that is necessary to the resolution of plaintiffs’ UCL claim.

Further, and as plaintiff correctly notes, there is no private right of action for a federal

claim under the DBRA. See Operating Engineers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ

Contracting, 135 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1998). The DBRA therefore cannot implicate a

substantial federal interest. Utley v. Varian Associates, Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.

1987)(“if a federal law does not provide a private right of action, then a state law action based on

its violation perforce does not raise a ‘substantial’ federal question.”).

Because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case, plaintiffs’

motion for remand is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall return this action to the Superior

Court of the State of California, in and for the County of San Diego. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 3, 2014

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. WILLIAM MCCURINE, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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