Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02353/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02353-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIANITES AGAINST

SHAKEDOWN TACTICS, an

unincorporated association; and

CALIFORNIANS AGAINST

LITIGATION PREDATORS, an

unincorporated association, 

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 05-CV-2353 BTM (WMc)

AMENDED ORDER (1)

DENYING MOTION TO

INTERVENE [DOC. 30], AND

(2) RENDERING MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS AND CEASE AND

DESIST ORDER [DOC. 32]

v. MOOT

TEJJR (“TOTAL EQUALITY, JUST

JUDGMENT AND RIGHTS”), an

organization of unknown nature;

MANTIC ASHANTI’S CAUSE, an

organization of unknown nature;

Attorney THEODORE A. PINNOCK,

a natural person; and DOES 1 through

10, inclusive, 

Defendants.

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1

The original complaint identifies “Julinians Against Shakedown Tactics” as a plaintiff. The

first amended complaint, however, identifies “Julianites Against Shakedown Tactics” as a plaintiff. 

2

This order supersedes the Court’s December 29, 2006 order [Doc. 65].

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This declaratory-relief action was filed in December 2005 by Julianites Against

Shakedown Tactics (“JAST”) and Californians Against Litigation Predators (“CALP”).1

Defendants are attorney Theodore A. Pinnock and two of his clients, Total Equality,

Just Judgment and Rights (“TEJJR”) and Mantic Ashanti’s Cause (“Mantic Ashanti”).

Plaintiffs are suing for alleged unlawful and unethical pre-litigation conduct arising from

Defendants’ pursuit of Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims.

Pending before the Court is a motion to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a)(2) and 24 (b)(2) filed by Santa Ysabel General Store/Antiques, Rong

Branch Restaurant, Mom’s Pie House, and the Warm Hearth (“Applicants”). Four of

the five Applicants are being sued by Defendants in a separate case for alleged ADA

violations. Applicants contend that in this case, Plaintiffs’ counsel has, among other

things, made misrepresentations regarding Applicants’ relationship with JAST and

CALP that have complicated Applicants’ ability to settle with Defendants.

Accordingly, Applicants seek to intervene to pursue sanctions and a cease and desist

order against Plaintiffs’ counsel.

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d.1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court

DENIES Applicants’ motion to intervene. Applicants’ motion for sanctions and a cease

and desist order is, therefore, moot.2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs are challenging Defendants’ pre-litigation conduct.

According to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, in November 2005, defendant

Pinnock visited the small, mountain community of Julian, California. (FAC at ¶11.)

Shortly thereafter, Pinnock sent letters to 67 businesses alleging violations of the ADA

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and demanding, in total, more than $200,000 for his client, TEJJR. (Id.) Pinnock later

distributed a memo to the Julian businesses warning that if his monetary demands were

not met, they would begin to increase on a daily basis. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Pinnock then

distributed a “series of proposed settlement agreements wherein he made varying

financial demands, but which contained the significant requirement that the payment

which the Julian business would make would be for an ‘investigation fee’ payable to

TEJJR....” (Id. at ¶20.) 

Plaintiffs contend that Pinnock’s demands are subject to extraordinarily short

deadlines so that the businesses have a difficult time obtaining “appropriate legal

advice.” (FAC at ¶23.) Plaintiffs also complain that Pinnock refuses to discuss any of

the legal issues before filing litigation. For example, Pinnock allegedly conducts “on-site

mediations” at the property he is considering suing, during which time if “a business or

lawyer desire [sic] to dispute the claims, engage in fact finding or make legal arguments”

Pinnock terminates the mediation and files litigation. (Id. at ¶26.) 

Aside from the claims against the Julian businesses, Plaintiffs allege that Pinnock

has filed more than 2000 ADA/access lawsuits and “has sent hundreds – if not

thousands – of letters to businesses around Southern California threatening litigation....”

(FAC at ¶¶12, 17.) Businesses that refuse to pay the “investigation fee” or hire TEJJR

to conduct the access inspection are sued for alleged ADA violations by Pinnock’s other

client, Mantic Ashanti. Plaintiffs further assert that Pinnock’s actions in Julian, which

Pinnock has allegedly referred to as “the Julian Experiment”, constitute a new approach

for pursuing ADA claims. (Id. at ¶25.) 

In filing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs are seeking court review of Defendants’ prelitigation practices, which“the Pinnock Group worked very hard to keep away from

judicial attention....” (FAC at ¶14, emphasis in original.) The First Amended

Complaint, therefore, requests a declaration that Defendants’ pre-litigation tactics are

unethical and unlawful, and a mandatory injunction requiring Defendants to, in

essence, comply with the law and rules of professional conduct.

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B. Applicants seek to challenge Plaintiffs’ counsel’s pre-litigation conduct.

Applicants are among the Julian businesses that received a demand letter from

Pinnock in November 2005. (Apps.’ P & A at 2.) Applicants contend that in

approximately December 2005, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Lawyers Against Lawsuit Abuse

(“LALA”), entered into negotiations with Pinnock on behalf of Applicants. (Id. at 5.)

LALA, however, was neither retained nor authorized to represent Applicants, and

during the negotiations with Pinnock, LALA allegedly received settlement offers, but

failed to timely advise Applicants of the offers. (Id.) Applicants also allege that LALA

knowingly and intentionally lied about certain Applicants’ position with regard to ADA

compliance. (Id.) According to Applicants, these misrepresentations were made so that

LALA could buy time in order to file this lawsuit. (Id.) 

As a result of LALA’s alleged failure to advise Applicants of Pinnock’s settlement

offers, Applicants contend that they were denied the opportunity to settle the ADA

claims, which resulted in Pinnock filing an ADA enforcement action against 4 of the

5 Applicants. Additionally, Applicants assert that as a result of LALA’s conduct,

Applicants have incurred significant expenses and have encountered “great difficulty

‘undoing’ the adverse affects of LALA’s actions and false representations.” (Apps.’ P

& A at 8.) Accordingly, although Applicants acknowledge that they could pursue a

separate action, Applicants seek to intervene to protect their interests and pursue

sanctions and a cease and desist order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

against LALA.

II. LEGAL STANDARD.

Rule 24(a)(2) permits anyone to intervene as a matter of right who is “so situated

that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the

applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately

represented by existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit applies a

four-prong test, under which the applicant must establish:

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(1) the application for intervention is timely; 

(2) the applicant has a ‘significant protectable’ interest relating to the

property or transaction that is the subject of the action; 

(3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a

practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that

interest; and 

(4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by the existing

parties in the lawsuit.

Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1988). In evaluating whether these

requirements are met, courts “are guided primarily by practical and equitable

considerations, and the requirements for intervention are broadly interpreted in favor

of intervention.” U.S. v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2002). Failure

to satisfy any one of the requirements, however, justifies denial of the motion.

Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 409. Additionally, in evaluating the motion, the court accepts

as true all well-pleaded non-conclusory allegations. Southwest Center for Biological

Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In order to satisfy the interest requirement, the applicant’s interest must be

“direct, substantial, and legally protectable.” Dilks v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 642 F.2d

1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit applies a two prong test, under which

an applicant’s interest is significantly protectable if (1) it is protected under some law,

and (2) there is a relationship between the interest and the plaintiff’s claims. Donnelly,

159 F.3d at 409. The second prong, the “relationship” requirement, is generally satisfied

“only if the resolution of the plaintiff’s claims will affect the applicant.” Id. at 410. 

III. DISCUSSION.

A. Applicants are not entitled to intervene as a matter of right.

Applicants contend that they have the following interests in this litigation: (1)

the resolution of certain ADA issues; (2) their legal representation; (3) enforcement of

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the ADA in their community; (4) their good relationship with the disabled community;

and (5) correcting LALA’s alleged misrepresentations in this case. The Court finds that

these interests are either not significantly protectable under Rule 24(a)(2), or that they

will not be impaired or impeded by the resolution of this litigation.

1. Applicants’ interest in the resolution of certain ADA issues.

Among the pre-litigation tactics at issue in this case are Pinnock’s demand letters

to the Julian businesses. Applicants argue that because they also received a demand

letter, they have a “personal interest in the pending challenge to their legality.” (Apps.’

Reply at 5, emphasis in original.) According to Applicants, in the ADA enforcement

action, they have raised the validity of the demand letter as an affirmative defense to

Pinnock’s request for attorney’s fees. To the extent the validity of the letters is decided

in this case first, Applicants contend that they will be bound by that determination

under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Thus, Applicants contend that their interest

in challenging the legality of the demand letters will be impacted or impeded by the

resolution of this case. The Court does not agree for several reasons.

a) The issues in this case and the ADA enforcement action are

not identical.

Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating issues that were resolved in a

prior proceeding. Fund for Animals v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). The

doctrine only applies to issues actually litigated and decided in the first proceeding.

General Teamsters v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 682 F.2d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1982).

Additionally, the issues presented in each case must be identical; the “doctrine does not

apply if the issues are merely similar.” Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320

(9th Cir. 1992); Fund for Animals, 962 F.2d at 1399. 

Applicants’ affirmative defense to Pinnock’s request for attorney’s fees (in the

ADA enforcement action) is based on a recent district court decision that refused to

award attorney’s fees and costs to a plaintiff who did not provide sufficient pre-litigation

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notice of the alleged ADA violations. (Apps.’ Reply at 7, citing Doran v. Del Taco,

Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2005) and Graham v. DaimlerChrysler

Corp., 34 Cal.4th 553, 577 (2004).) In Doran, the district court found that the prelitigation notice was not sufficient because the letter to the defendants made “a general

complaint that the sender ‘could not find handicapped parking’ and ‘had serious

problems trying to use your restroom’ . . . .” Id. at 1034. According to the court, 

[a]lthough the letter put Defendants on general notice that they may not

be ADA compliant, it provided nothing specific. An unambiguous

warning notice would specify and detail the nature of the claimed ADA

violation” and provide a “reasonable time” within which to fix the

violation. 

Id. 

Under Doran, whether Pinnock is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs will depend

on each Applicant’s alleged ADA violation, the content of the demand letter, and any

additional pre-litigation communications by Pinnock. Accordingly, the issue of whether

Pinnock’s pre-litigation notice was sufficient not only differs between this lawsuit and

the ADA enforcement action, but between the individual Applicants.

Moreover, this lawsuit is not an ADA enforcement action and, as Applicants’

acknowledge in their reply, will not involve the determination of whether Pinnock’s prelitigation notice was sufficient for an award of attorney’s fees. Rather, Plaintiffs are

challenging whether “the TEJJR notices are part of an improper scheme and therefore

unlawful.” (Apps.’ Reply at 7.)

Because the issues in this case and the ADA enforcement action are not

identical, collateral estoppel does not apply and Applicants’ interest in challenging the

validity of Pinnock’s pre-litigation notice will not be impaired or impeded by the

resolution of this case.

b) Applicants are not in privity with Plaintiffs.

Collateral estoppel may only be asserted against a party that was afforded a

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hearing that comports with due process. Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, 924

F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, issue preclusion will not be applied unless the

party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party or in privity with a party to the

prior adjudication. Gibson v. U.S., 761 F. Supp. 685, 692 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 1991).

Starker v. U.S., 602 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Applicants are not parties to this action. And in arguing that they may be barred

by collateral estoppel, Applicants never discuss whether they are in privity with

Plaintiffs. Instead, throughout their motion, Applicants argue that intervention is

appropriate because they are not sufficiently represented by Plaintiffs and because their

interests differ from Plaintiffs. 

The Court agrees that the Applicants’ and Plaintiffs’ interests differ. Because

those interests differ, Applicants are not in privity with Plaintiffs for purposes of issue

preclusion. Accordingly, for this additional reason, collateral estoppel does not apply

and Applicants’ ability to challenge the validity of Pinnock’s pre-litigation notice will

not be impaired or impeded by the resolution of this case.

c) Applicants’ interest is insufficient because it is contingent.

Currently, at least three other district courts within this Circuit have refused to

follow Doran’s requirement for a pre-litigation notice in order to obtain attorney’s fees.

See Doran v. Vicorp Restaurants, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2005);

Jankey v. Ranch House BBQ & Grill, 2005 WL 3478138 (C.D. Cal. 2005); While v.

Save Mart Supermarkets, 2005 WL 2675040 (E.D. Cal. 2005). And the Ninth Circuit

has not decided whether a pre-litigation notice is necessary in order to award an ADA

plaintiff attorney’s fees. 

Given the uncertainty regarding Doran, Applicants’ contention that they have

a significantly protectable interest in the determination of the validity of the demand

letter lacks merit because it is based on the theoretical possibility that the district court

will follow Doran. “Such a theoretical possibility cannot constitute the requisite

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practical impairment” given the emphasis on a practical reading of Rule 24(a)(2). See

U.S. v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting

applicant’s argument that interest may be impaired by stare decisis or res judicata based

on possible future judicial determination); City of Stilwell v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Coop.

Corp., 79 F.3d 1038, 1042 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a contingent interest is not

sufficient basis for intervention as a matter of right).

2. Applicants’ interest in their legal representation.

Applicants next assert an interest in their legal representation. Applicants,

however, do not explain, and the Court cannot envision, how that interest will be

impaired or impeded by the resolution of this litigation. 

Plaintiffs are challenging Defendants’ pre-litigation conduct. Applicants do not

allege that they have been legally represented by Defendants. Additionally, Applicants

have never been parties to this litigation. (See July 20, 2006 Order Denying Motion for

Substitution of Attorney, Doc. No 27.) Thus, resolution of this case will not impair or

impact Applicants’ interest in their legal representation.

3. Applicants’ remaining interests.

Applicants also seek “to protect their personal interest in the enforcement of the

[ADA] in their community, their good relationship with the disabled community, and

to correct the record of LALA’s misrepresentations concerning them and others.”

(Apps.’ P & A at 2:5–7.) Additionally, Applicants seek to intervene in order to pursue

a cease and desist order and sanctions against LALA under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11. (Id. at 2:7–13.) 

Only interests that are “direct, substantial and legally protectable” are sufficient

to justify intervention as a matter of right. Dilks, 642 F.2d at 1157. While the interest

requirement may be satisfied by non-property interests, they are generally not sufficient

to support intervention as of right. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 24.03[2][b] (Matthew

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3

The Court notes that this was one of the only relevant arguments made in Plaintiffs’

opposition, which despite the substantial body of case law dealing with intervention, failed to cite even

a single case in support of Plaintiffs’ arguments.

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Bender 3d ed.); see also, Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 958,

961 (7th Cir. 1994) (concern about legal principles insufficient to justify intervention).

New York News, Inc. v. Kheel, 972 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1992), is particularly relevant

because it dealt with an applicant’s motion to intervene in order to pursue Rule 11

sanctions.

In New York News, Inc. the applicant claimed to have personal knowledge that

the complaint “contained baseless allegations” involving the applicant, and claimed an

interest in protecting his reputation. Id. at 486. The applicant, therefore, sought to

intervene in order to pursue Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs. The district court

denied the motion, and on appeal, the applicant argued that he was seeking to protect

the judicial process against abuse from plaintiffs’ filing of baseless papers. Id. at 486. In

affirming the district court, the Second Circuit held that under the Rules Enabling Act,

28 U.S.C. § 2072, the applicant did not have a legally protectable right in moving for

Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at 486. Accordingly, the applicant’s interest in protecting the

judicial system was too remote and thus “not a ‘significantly protectable interest’ within

the meaning of Rule 24(a)(2).” Id. (citing Donaldson v. , 400 U.S. 517, 531(1971)). 

As explained in New York News, Inc., Applicants do not have a legally

protectable interest in pursuing Rule 11 sanctions, and their interests in correcting

LALA’s alleged misrepresentations, the enforcement of the ADA and their relationship

with the disabled community are simply too remote and general. Indeed, as Plaintiffs

point out in their opposition3

, undoubtedly, many individuals and organizations share

Applicants’ interests. Accordingly, to find these interests sufficient to allow

intervention would be to create a standard whereby anyone concerned with the

resolution of legitimate ADA cases could intervene in this litigation, the ADA

enforcement case pending against Applicants, or the thousands of other ADA actions

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filed in California. See Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d at 920 n. 3 (“A mere interest in

property that may be impacted by litigation is not a passport to participate in the

litigation itself. To hold otherwise would create a slippery slope where anyone with an

interest in the property of a party to a lawsuit could bootstrap that stake into an interest

in the litigation itself.”); Glyn v. Roy Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 897 F. Supp. 451, 453 (D.

Haw. 1995) (“Were this court to agree that [the applicant] could intervene . . . it would

transform every civil suit before this court into a kind of exaggerated interpleader action

where all potential creditors of all parties could assert their rights.”). Accordingly, the

Court concludes that Applicants’ interests are not sufficiently direct, substantial, and

legally protectable to support intervention as a matter of right.

Moreover, this litigation involves Defendants’ pre-litigation conduct; it is not an

ADA enforcement action, and it does not involve LALA’s pre-litigation conduct.

Accordingly, Applicants’ interests in the enforcement of the ADA, their reputation with

the disabled community, and in correcting LALA’s alleged misrepresentations will not

be impaired or impeded by the resolution of this case. 

B. Permissive intervention is not appropriate in this case.

A person seeking permissive intervention must establish the following three

requirements:

(1) the applicant’s claim or defense shares a common question of law or

fact with the main action;

(2) the motion is timely; and

(3) the court has an independent basis for jurisdiction over the applicant’s

claims. 

Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 412. However, even if the applicant satisfies these requirements,

the Court has discretion to deny permissive intervention. Id. Relevant factors for

evaluating whether to allow intervention include “the nature and extent of the

intervenors’ interest, their standing to raise relevant legal issues, the legal position they

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4

The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ original complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, there also appears to be an issue as to whether jurisdiction exists over Plaintiffs’ claims.

(See August 1, 2006 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Doc.

No. 28.) 

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seek to advance, and its probable relation to the merits of the case.” Spangler v.

Pasadena City Bd. of Ed., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977). Additionally, in

evaluating intervention, the court should consider whether intervention will unduly

delay the main action or will unfairly prejudice the existing parties. Fed.R.Civ.P.

24(b)(2); Donnelly, at 412. 

Applicants have failed to establish an independent basis for jurisdiction. Based

on their motion, it appears that Applicants seek to pursue state-based claims for

misrepresentation and breach of the rules of professional conduct against LALA.

Because there is no alleged diversity, the Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims. See

Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“Permissive intervention ordinarily requires independent jurisdictional grounds.”).4

Accordingly, Applicants have failed to establish a threshold requirement for permissive

intervention.

Moreover, even if an independent basis for jurisdiction existed, the Court

concludes that permissive intervention is not appropriate in this case. Again, this

litigation challenges Defendants’ pre-litigation conduct. In contrast, Applicants seek

to pursue claims against LALA – who is not a party to this case – for their litigation

conduct. This would significantly prejudice Plaintiffs because their counsel would have

to focus on defending itself in the litigation, thereby jeopardizing LALA’s ability to

continue representing Plaintiffs. Additionally, Applicants’ claims for misrepresentation

and ethical violations against LALA would significantly change the focus and nature of

the litigation, resulting in undue delay. See Washington Elec. Coop., Inc. v.

Massachusetts Muni. Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1990) (Court denied

intervention where applicant’s claims changed the nature of the case from a contract

dispute between 2 parties for $924, 208 to contract dispute involving 6 other signatories

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seeking over $6 million in damages. Court noted that “intervenors must take pleadings

as they find them.”); City of Stilwell, 79 F.3d 1038 (affirming denial of permissive

intervention because, among other things, applicant’s proposed answer interjected new

damage issues). Finally, as Applicants concede, they may pursue their claims against

LALA in a separate legal proceeding and thus will not suffer prejudice by the denial of

their motion to intervene. (See Apps.’ P & A at 10.) 

For each of these reasons, the Court denies Applicants’ motion for permissive

intervention.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.

For the reasons addressed above, the Court DENIES Applicants’ motion to

intervene. Applicants’ motion for sanctions and a cease and desist order is, therefore,

moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 5, 2007

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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