Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-00701/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-00701-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Non-Motor Vehicle

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The parties are reminded that the Court’s Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(b)(1)

requires all pleadings and motions to be “in a fixed-pitch type size no smaller than ten (10)

pitch (10 letters per inch) or in a proportional font size no smaller than 13 point, including

footnotes.” The parties’ memoranda do not comply with this rule.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wesley Simmons and Sharon Simmons,

husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Navajo County, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV-06-701-PCT-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary judgment and Defendants have filed

a motion summary judgment. Dkt. ##175, 179. Responses and replies have been filed.

Dkt. ##185, 189, 194-95. The requests for oral argument will be denied because the parties

have filed voluminous briefs and exhibits and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision.

See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999). For

reasons explained in this order, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion and grant Defendants’

motion.1

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I. Background.

Tragically, Plaintiffs’ son, Jasper Simmons, committed suicide by hanging himself

with medical gauze while detained at the Navajo County Jail. Plaintiffs claim that

negligence and civil rights violations caused their son’s death. Plaintiffs’ claims are based

on allegations that Jasper’s cell had not been adequately searched for the gauze used for the

suicide, jail policy required checks on suicide watch detainees every fifteen minutes and jail

staff had last observed Jasper more than one hour before he was found dead, the jail was

understaffed, jail staff was not properly trained, and Jasper did not receive adequate physical

and mental health care or reasonable accommodations for his depression. Plaintiffs have

sued Navajo County and its Board of Supervisors, the County Sheriff, nine officers employed

at the jail, and jail medical staff personnel. Dkt. #1 at 8-28.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of

summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

III. Officers Stump, Robinson, Ratcliff, Nabors, Crandell, and Peterson.

 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate facts sufficient to establish the

liability of any individual Defendant, and summary judgment therefore is appropriate under

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Dkt. #179 at 5-6. Plaintiffs state that they

have agreed to dismiss Defendants Stump, Robinson, Ratcliff, Nabors, Crandell, and

Peterson (Dkt. #175 at 3 n.1), but Plaintiffs have not filed a notice of dismissal. 

Summary judgment must be granted to Defendants if Plaintiffs “fail[] to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [Plaintiffs’] case, and

on which [Plaintiffs] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

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Because Plaintiffs have made no such showing with respect to the alleged liability of Officers

Stump, Robinson, Ratcliff, Nabors, Crandell, and Peterson, the Court will grant summary

judgment in their favor. See id.

IV. The State Law Claims.

Counts one through six of the complaint assert state law negligence claims. Dkt. #1

at 8-28, ¶¶ 88-99. Counts ten and eleven assert state law claims of disability discrimination.

Id. ¶¶ 107-14. Prior to filing suit, Plaintiffs served a notice of claim on Defendants pursuant

to A.R.S. § 12-821.01. Defendants seek summary judgment on the state law claims on

the ground that the notice of claim failed to comply with the statute. Dkt. #179 at 16-17.

A. Did Defendants Preserve the Insufficiency of Notice of Claim Defense?

Plaintiffs assert that the insufficiency of notice of claim defense has not been pleaded

and was “disallowed” in the Court’s order denying Defendants leave to amend their answer

to assert insufficiency of the notice as an affirmative defense. Dkt. #185 at 15. Defendants

argue that the pleadings are sufficient to allow the Court to render a summary judgment

ruling on the notice of claim issue. Dkt. #194 at 9. The Court agrees.

Paragraph 19 of the complaint alleges that Plaintiffs served a formal claim upon all

Defendants “in accordance with Arizona law” and that “[a]ll conditions precedent to this

lawsuit, including exhaustion of formal claims, has been timely completed.” Dkt. #1 at 1-28,

¶ 19. In their answer, Defendants admitted that Plaintiffs submitted a notice of claim prior

to filing the complaint, but denied “the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 19 of

the [c]omplaint.” Dkt. #54 ¶ 19. The remaining allegations, of course, are that the notice of

claim accorded with Arizona law and that all other conditions precedent to suit were

satisfied. Defendants’ denial of these allegations joined the issue of whether the notice of

claim is sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) (requiring a party to assert defenses and denials

in “short and plain terms”); Baisten v. Peters, No. 91 C 7673, 1993 WL 39724, at *1 (N.D.

Ill. Feb. 12, 1993) (“[N]otice pleadings need only apprise a party of the nature of a claim or

defense to satisfy the pleading requirements.”). 

The fact that Defendants were denied leave to amend their answer to assert the notice

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issue as an affirmative defense does not change this conclusion. The proposed amendment

merely repeated the denials of paragraph 19 of Defendants’ answer. See S.H.P. Vevelstad

v. Flynn, 230 F.2d 695, 703 (9th Cir. 1956) (affirmative defenses are “merely denials in

affirmative form of the allegations of the complaint”); Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532

F. Supp. 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (striking affirmative defense because it did “nothing more

than deny plaintiff’s jurisdictional statement, echoing Paragraph 1 of defendants’ Answer”);

Baisten, 1993 WL 39724, at *1 (“[A] ‘so-called’ affirmative defense that is surplusage – one

that raises matters already at issue under a denial – may be stricken.”).

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the Court did not previously “disallow” the notice

of claim defense. The Court denied Defendants’ motion for leave to amend because it was

untimely and Defendants failed to show good cause for the delay. See Dkt. #110. The Court

did not determine whether the notice of claim issue was joined by the pleadings. That issue

was not raised by the parties. See Dkt. ##71, 82, 95.

B. Does the Notice of Claim Comply with the Statute?

A.R.S. § 12-821.01 requires anyone with a claim against a public entity or public

employee to file a notice of the claim with the entity or employee prior to initiating suit.

See Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Houser, 152 P.3d 490, 491 ¶ 1 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc).

The statute provides that the notice “shall contain facts sufficient to permit the public entity

or public employee to understand the basis upon which liability is claimed.” A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A). The statute further provides that the notice shall “contain a specific amount for

which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” Id. “The purpose of

[the] statute is to give [the public entity or public employee] notice of a claim, an opportunity

to assess the claim and the potential for liability, and a chance to settle the claim before an

action is filed in court.” Barth v. Cochise County, 138 P.3d 1186, 1189 ¶ 9 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2006); see Houser, 152 P.3d at 492 ¶ 6.

Plaintiffs’ notice of claim includes a request for $20,000,000. Dkt. #181-8 at 44.

Defendants argue that the notice fails to comply with the statute because it provides an

insufficient factual basis for this lump sum amount. Dkt. #179 at 16-17. In response,

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Plaintiffs assert only that “the lengthy claim was sufficient.” Dkt. #185 at 15 (citing Dkt.

#82). 

The statute expressly provides that a notice of claim “shall . . . contain a specific

amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” A.R.S. §

12-821.01(A) (emphasis added). This obligation “requires that claimants explain the

amounts identified in the claim by providing the government entity with a factual foundation

to permit the entity to evaluate the amount claimed.” Houser, 152 P.3d at 493 ¶ 9. Requiring

claimants to state the facts in this fashion “ensures that claimants will not demand unfounded

amounts that constitute ‘quick unrealistic exaggerated demands.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs’ notice of claim identifies three general categories of damages: loss of love,

affection, consortium, and other forms of emotional distress; loss of economic support; and

funeral costs. Dkt. #181-7 at 9. The notice does not address the value of these claims. The

notice does not explain the value attached by Plaintiffs to their emotional distress or how that

value was determined. Nor does the notice explain the dollar value of the loss of support

claim – generally, an economic calculation based on the anticipated support that would have

been provided by Jasper. The letter does not even state the amount of funeral costs. The

only mention of a value for Plaintiffs’ claims is found in the last sentence of the notice:

“Wesley and Sharon Simmons request 20 million dollars as compensation for the loss of their

son, based on the claims identified in this claim letter.” Id. at 44. The notice contains “no

indication as to how Plaintiffs reached the figure of $20,000,000, as opposed to an other

conceivable settlement value.” Bamonte v. City of Mesa, No. CV-06-01860-PHX-NVW,

2007 WL 2022011, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2007). 

The notice fails to satisfy the “clear and unequivocal” requirements of Arizona law.

Houser, 152 P.3d at 493 ¶ 9. Although the notice contains “a specific amount for which the

claim can be settled,” it does not set forth “the facts supporting that amount” as required by

the claim statute. See A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). This latter requirement is not mere window

dressing. It is a “mandate[]” that “ensure[s] that government entities will be able to

realistically consider a claim.” Houser, 152 P.3d at 493 ¶ 9. Absent the factual basis for the

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“Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Because pretrial detainees’ rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth

Amendment, however, [courts] apply the same standards.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

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settlement amount, Defendants could not properly evaluate Plaintiffs’ claim. Id.; see also

Campos v. City of Glendale, No. CV-06-610-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 3287586, at *3 (D. Ariz.

Nov. 5, 2007); Estrada v. City of San Luis, No. CV-07-1071-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 4025215,

at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 15, 2007). 

The Arizona Supreme Court has held that “[c]laims that do not comply with A.R.S.

§ 12-821.01.A are statutorily barred.” Houser, 152 P.3d at 493 ¶ 6; see also ¶ 23. Because

Plaintiffs’ state law claims are barred, the Court will grant summary judgment on those

claims. The Court therefore need not address Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants were

negligent as a matter of law. See Dkt. #175.

V. The § 1983 Claims.

Counts seven through nine of the complaint assert constitutional violations under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Jasper’s

welfare. Dkt. #1 at 8-28, ¶¶ 100-06.

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion.

Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the issue of deliberate indifference. Dkt. #175.

The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit jail personnel from being deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk that an inmate will commit suicide. See Bowens v. City of

Atmore, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1252 (S.D. Ala. 2001). Deliberate indifference occurs when

a person consciously disregards a substantial risk of harm of which he is aware. See Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).2

 

Plaintiffs assert that Sheriff Butler, Commander Burke, Lieutenant Reynolds, Sergeant

Warren, Dr. Kartchner, and nurses Jones and Greason “were all ‘deliberately indifferent’ to

the suicidal threat and care of [the decedent].” Dkt. #175 at 16. In support of this assertion,

Plaintiffs’ counsel cites his entire statement of facts – all 183 paragraphs. See id. (citing Dkt.

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#174 ¶¶ 1-183). Counsel makes no attempt to specify which paragraphs support a finding

of deliberate indifference with respect to any particular defendant, choosing instead to assert

all facts against all defendants and leave it to the Court to sort out the differences. This

approach is not only inconsiderate of the Court’s time, it is contrary to law.

“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

[the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (emphasis added). Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 expressly

states that a motion for summary judgment “shall include citations to the specific paragraph

in a statement of facts that supports factual assertions made in the [motion].” LRCiv 56.1(e)

(emphasis added). The principal purpose of this rule, of course, is to obviate the need for the

Court to scour the record in search of facts relevant to summary judgment. See Keenan v.

Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). As other courts have noted, “‘judges are not like

pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.’” Independent Towers of Wash. v. Washington,

350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs have not met their summary judgment burden of demonstrating the absence

of a triable issue with respect to the deliberate indifference for any particular defendant.

Moreover, for reasons stated in the next section of this order, the Court’s review of the record

suggests that Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgement on the issue of deliberate

indifference is not well taken. The Court accordingly will deny Plaintiffs’ motion.

B. Defendants’ Motion.

Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate under Celotex because

Plaintiffs cannot present facts giving rise to liability for each individual Defendant. Dkt.

#179 at 5-6. Defendants further argue that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity and that there is no basis for municipal liability under § 1983. Id. at 6-14.

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose

of factually unsupported claims[.]” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Once the moving party has

met its initial summary judgment burden, as Defendants have done in this case, the opposing

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party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Reliance upon the mere allegations of the party’s pleadings

is not sufficient to survive summary judgment. See id.; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

Plaintiffs’ response, like their motion for summary judgment, does not comply with

Local Rule 56.1(e). Plaintiffs do not address the essential facts of the case, but instead rely

generally on the allegations of the complaint and their voluminous statements of facts.

Dkt. #185 at 2-5. Indeed, in support of their opposition Plaintiffs cite often to their entire

statement of facts and their entire opposition to Defendants statement of facts, a collection

of documents spanning 98 pages and 630 numbered paragraphs (Dkt. ##174, 186). See Dkt.

#185 at 4-5. Plaintiffs again fail to organize their citations by defendant, apparently

assuming that the Court will sort through 630 paragraphs – and some 12 inches of related

exhibits – to determine which evidence establishes a question of fact with respect to which

defendants. As noted above, however, the Court is not obligated to “‘scour the record in

search of a genuine issue of triable fact.’” Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1279 (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs, as the nonmoving parties, have the burden of identifying “‘with reasonable

particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.’” Id. Plaintiff has failed to

satisfy this burden, but that is not the only basis for the Court’s ruling. The Court has also

made its best effort to identify the relevant evidence from Plaintiffs’ voluminous filings, and

concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 

1. Sergeant Warren.

The following facts are undisputed. Jasper was arrested and brought to the Navajo

County Jail on May 20, 2005. Dkt. ##181 & 186 ¶¶ 2, 5. Eight days later he tried to kill

himself by cutting his wrists with a razor blade. His wounds were cleaned and dressed with

medical gauze and he was placed on Level I suicide watch. Id. ¶¶ 41-44. Following an

evaluation by jail medical staff, Jasper was moved from Level I to Level II suicide watch on

June 8, 2005. Id. ¶¶ 122. 

/ / / 

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On July 2, 2005, Sergeant Warren had the assignment of conducting suicide welfare

checks at the jail beginning at approximately 11:00 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 270, 332. Sergeant Warren

checked on Jasper four times between 11:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m., at which time he took Jasper

out of his cell for a family visit. Id. ¶¶ 271, 274. Sergeant Warren returned Jasper to his cell

at 3:50 p.m. and served him dinner at 4:35 p.m. Id. ¶¶ 299. At approximately 5:46 p.m., one

hour and eleven minutes after he was last checked by Sergeant Warren, Jasper was found

dead in his cell. Id. ¶¶ 306-11; see Dkt. #181-3 at 34-35 (Jail Logs).

A jury might reasonably conclude from these facts that Sergeant Warren was

negligent in not checking on Jasper’s welfare more often, but negligence is not sufficient for

liability under § 1983. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). “The question is not whether [Sergeant Warren] did

all [he] could have, but whether [he] did all the Constitution requires.” Rellergert v. Cape

Girardeau County, 924 F.2d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 1991). The Constitution requires that

Sergeant Warren not act with deliberate indifference, that is, that he not consciously

disregard an excessive risk that Jasper would commit suicide absent more frequent checks.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-39. Even when construed in Plaintiffs’ favor, the evidence in

this case does not support a finding of deliberate indifference by Sergeant Warren.

The undisputed evidence shows that Sergeant Warren did not ignore Jasper. He

allowed Jasper to call home and visit with his family. Dkt. ##181 & 186 ¶¶ 286. He allowed

the family visit on July 2, 2005, to extend beyond the normal time limits. Id. ¶¶ 248. And

he checked on Jasper five times between 11:00 a.m. and 4:35 p.m. that day. Id. ¶¶ 271, 274,

299, 332. “Indifference is apathy or unconcern.” Rellergert, 924 F.2d at 797. Sergeant

Warren’s conduct reflects concern for inmate welfare and a lack of deliberate indifference.

See Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 989-90 (11th Cir. 2003).

Moreover, while Jasper’s placement on Level II suicide watch indicated he remained

a suicide risk, there is no evidence that Sergeant Warren knew Jasper had a specific plan to

commit suicide on July 2, 2005. Dkt. ##181 & 186 ¶¶ 316-18. Nor have Plaintiffs produced

evidence that Sergeant Warren knew Jasper – whose razor wounds had healed – had medical

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gauze that he could use to harm himself. Id. ¶¶ 261-63, 326-27; see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837

(deliberate indifference is judged only on facts the officer actually knew); Cagle, 334 at 989

(finding no deliberate indifference where the defendant was unaware of the implement used

to commit suicide). In fact, it is undisputed that Sergeant Warren was not aware of Jasper’s

prior suicide attempt on May 28, 2005. Dkt. ##181 & 186 ¶¶ 260.

Plaintiffs’ essential contention is that Sergeant Warren failed to check on Jasper every

fifteen minutes as required by jail policy. Plaintiffs assert that the jail was overcrowded and

chronically understaffed, that there were many inmates on suicide watch on July 2, 2005, and

that the jail was short three detention officers that day. But these assertions all lead to the

same essential contention – that Sergeant Warren failed to check on Jasper every 15 minutes.

Had there been more staffing or less crowding, Plaintiffs contend, then someone could have

checked on Jasper at the intervals required by jail policy. Similarly, Plaintiffs assert that the

cell in which Jasper was held was not a proper suicide watch cell because it lacked a camera,

again suggesting that Sergeant Warren or others could have checked on Jasper more often

with the aid of a camera. Plaintiffs further contend that the cell had protrusions that could

be used to hang oneself, but provide no evidence that Sergeant Warren knew of this fact. 

As already noted, although Sergeant Warren’s failure to check on Jasper every 15

minutes could support a verdict for negligence, that is not enough for § 1983 liability.

Plaintiffs must prove deliberate indifference – that Sergeant Warren actually knew of an

excessive risk to Jasper’s safety and yet consciously chose to disregard the risk. Sergeant

Warren’s failure to “recognize that closer observation was needed suggests only negligence,

if anything, and does not demonstrate the kind of deliberate conduct or callous indifference

necessary to support a § 1983 claim.” Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1461 (D.N.J.

1989); see Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t, 228 F.3d 388, 398 (5th Cir. 2000)

(deputy’s failure to follow jail policy requiring fifteen-minute checks did not constitute

deliberate indifference); Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 2000) (jail official

not deliberately indifferent in waiting more than a half hour to check on the decedent after

receiving specific warning that the decedent was going to kill himself); Rellergert, 924 F.2d

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at 797 (allowing the decedent to remain out of sight with a bed sheet did not amount to

deliberate indifference).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Camps v. City of Warner Robins, 822 F. Supp. 724 (M.D. Ga.

1993), is misplaced. The plaintiffs in Camps, unlike Plaintiffs in this case, presented

evidence sufficient to support a finding of deliberate indifference. The evidence showed that

despite receiving specific information that the decedent was in imminent danger of

committing suicide, jail officials placed the decedent in the general population with access

to the means to kill himself and checked on him only once over a thirty-one hour period. The

evidence also showed that the officials denied requests from the decedent’s parents to visit

with their son and have a pastor, doctor, or mental health worker talk to him. 822 F. Supp.

at 728. No such evidence has been presented in this case.

In summary, Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence from which a jury reasonably

could conclude that Sergeant Warren was deliberately indifferent to Jasper’s constitutional

rights. The Court will therefore grant summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Warren. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

2. Dr. Kartchner.

 Plaintiffs assert that “Dr. Kartchner provided no supervision whatsoever, but knew

that inmates were on suicide watch.” Dkt. #185 at 4. Plaintiffs cite no evidence in support

of this assertion. Nor have Plaintiffs otherwise identified evidence sufficient to create a

triable issue as to whether Dr. Kartchner was deliberately indifferent to Jasper’s

constitutional rights. The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Dr. Kartchner. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

3. Nurses Jones and Greason.

Plaintiffs have presented evidence that nurses Jones and Greason did not properly

evaluate Jasper on a daily basis, did not complete a suicide risk assessment, failed to inform

other jail staff about Jasper’s risk of suicide, and failed to ensure that the medical gauze used

to dress Jasper’s wrist wounds had been removed from his cell. Dkt. #185 at 3-5 (citing Dkt.

#186 ¶¶ 51, 61, 90, 122, 135, 171, 207). Plaintiffs contend that Jones and Greason failed to

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take these measures in violation of jail policy. Id. at 8. As noted above, however, violations

of jail policy are not alone sufficient for liability under § 1983.

While these facts could support a verdict of negligence, Plaintiffs have failed to

present evidence from which a jury reasonably could conclude that nurses Jones and Greason

were deliberately indifferent to Jasper’s constitutional rights. Nurses Jones and Greason, like

Sergeant Warren, did not ignore Jasper. 

Nurse Jones saw Jasper six times between May 31 and June 27, 2005. She changed

the dressing on his wrist wound, kept him on suicide watch status, and placed him on the list

to see a psychiatric counselor. Dkt. ##181 & 186 ¶¶ 79, 87, 94, 122, 162, 207; see Dkt.

#181-2 at 31-32 (Progress Notes). As Plaintiffs acknowledge, this conduct shows that nurse

Jones was concerned about Jasper’s emotional state. Dkt. #186 ¶ 207.

Nurse Greason saw Jasper everyday when she gave him his medication and changed

his dressing. Dkt. ##181 & 186 ¶¶ 51, 74, 80, 88, 145. She saw him on July 1, 2005, noting

that he was cheerful and had denied any thoughts of harming himself. Id. ¶¶ 229. She

checked on him again the next day and thought that he did not seem depressed. Id. ¶¶ 273.

Plaintiffs fault nurses Jones and Greason for not properly evaluating Jasper on a daily

basis (see id. ¶¶ 231, 273), but their failure to do so constitutes, at most, negligence. The

Court will therefore grant summary judgment in their favor.

4. Lieutenant Reynolds, Commander Burke, and Sheriff Butler.

Plaintiffs have sued Sergeant Warren’s supervisors – Lieutenant Reynolds,

Commander Burke, and Sheriff Butler – in their individual capacities. Individual liability

under § 1983 “arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A

supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiffs assert that Sergeant Warren’s supervisors knew that the jail was understaffed

and yet took no corrective action. Dkt. ##185 at 4. Plaintiffs further assert that the

supervisors failed to train jail staff in the proper monitoring of suicidal inmates. Dkt. #1 at

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8-28, ¶ 104. Plaintiffs have identified no evidence in support of these assertions. The Court

accordingly will grant summary judgment in favor of Lieutenant Reynolds, Commander

Burke, and Sheriff Butler in their individual capacities. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.3

5. Navajo County, the Board of Supervisors, and Sheriff Butler.

Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims against Navajo County, its Board of Supervisors, and

Sheriff Butler in his official capacity under the theory of municipal liability. Municipal

liability can result from the unconstitutional actions or omissions of the municipality itself

or the municipality’s final policymaker. See Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989).

In this case, Plaintiffs do not challenge the adequacy of the suicide prevention policy

adopted by the municipal Defendants. See Dkt. #185 at 10. Rather, they contend that, as a

matter of custom and practice, the policy was not followed. Id. at 10-13. The Court need not

address this contention because without an unconstitutional act by an individual Defendant

there can be no municipal liability under § 1983. See City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

799 (1986); Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1986).

VI. The ADA Claim.

Count ten of the complaint alleges that Jasper’s depression constituted a disability and

that the Navajo County Jail was not readily usable by depressed inmates in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Dkt. #1 at 8-28, ¶ 108. Plaintiffs do not address

this claim in their response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs instead

appear to contend that Defendants violated the ADA by placing Jasper on suicide watch and

thereby excluding him from the jail recreational programs. Dkt. #185 at 14-15.

The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be discriminated against by any such entity.”

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42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendants

excluded Jasper from recreational programs because of his depression. Rather, the evidence

uniformly shows that Defendants excluded Jasper from certain jail programs in an effort to

prevent him from committing suicide. Because Plaintiffs have presented no evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants discriminated against Jasper because

of his depression, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. #175) is denied.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #179) is granted.

3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 6th day of February, 2008.

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