Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05635/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05635-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JILL BURNELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MARIN HUMANE SOCIETY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-05635-JSC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 20

This action arises out of the Marin Humane Society’s seizure of four horses from the 

property of Plaintiffs Jill and Alex Burnell (“Plaintiffs”) in December 2012 and January 2013 on 

the grounds that the animals were either severely malnourished or otherwise unhealthy. Plaintiffs 

bring suit against the Marine Humane Society, Marin County, and eight individual Defendants, 

including: four Marine Humane Society employees who act as humane officers, a member of the 

Marine Humane Society’s board who also serves as its authorized spokesperson, a veterinarian 

whose clients include Plaintiffs and the Marin Humane Society, and two individuals who reported 

Jill Burnell to the Marine Humane Society. Plaintiffs bring one count against all defendants under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983; the six other counts against various groupings of Defendants arise under state 

tort law, including trespass upon land, trespass to chattels, conversion, portraying Plaintiffs in a 

false light, public disclosure of private facts and invasion of Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to 

privacy, and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Now 

pending before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss; the Marin Humane Society and all 

individual defendants filed one motion, and the County filed separately. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 20.) All 

Defendants allege that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court finds the matter suitable for disposition 

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without oral argument, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the hearing set for July 9, 2015, and 

GRANTS the motions to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not a “probability 

requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.

2008). “[D]ismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare 

Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see 

also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a 

claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”).

Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), under 

which a party is only required to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 

are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.

2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations in a complaint 

or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain 

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.”). The court must be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the 

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reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 663-64.

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ complaint falls short of the pleading standards set forth in the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and well-established federal law, and her oppositions reflect a fundamental

misunderstanding of the governing requirements. (See Dkt. No. 23 at 6 (citing a 1996 Ninth 

Circuit case with the former notice pleading standard); Dkt. No. 24 at 7 (same).) As a threshold 

matter, the bulk of Plaintiffs’ oppositions to the motions to dismiss consist of new factual 

allegations. (See Dkt. No. 23 at 6-23; Dkt. No. 24 at 8-19.) Although the Court cannot and does 

not consider these facts in deciding whether the Complaint states a claim as they were not alleged 

therein, they are relevant to Plaintiffs’ ability to successfully amend. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t 

of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); Monzon v. S. Wine & Spirits 

of Cal., 834 F. Supp. 2d 934, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Thus, the Court considers the newly alleged 

facts solely with regard to whether to grant leave to amend.

A. Improper Plaintiff

Turning to the Complaint itself, with respect to all causes of action pertaining to seizure of 

the horses, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that plausible establish that Alex Burnell is a proper 

party. Plaintiffs allege that they both own and live on the property in Marin County from which 

the horses were taken. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2.) Thus, to the extent that certain causes of action are 

premised on trespass or invasion of property itself, the Complaint adequately pleads facts to show 

that Alex Burnell is a proper plaintiff. However, the same is not so for claims related to the 

horses. The Complaint alleges that Jill Burnell—and not Alex—“is engaged in the personal 

avocation and commercial professional venture of breeding livestock[.]” (Id. ¶ 2.) The Complaint 

does not set forth any facts that show that Alex Burnell has any ownership interest in the horses, 

and therefore fails to establish that Alex Burnell may bring claims pertaining to the seizure of 

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those animals. Plaintiffs shall have leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) to allege 

facts that plausibly establish that Alex Burnell is a proper party to each cause of action or to clarify 

which claims are brought solely by Jill Burnell.

B. Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is a Section 1983 claim against all Defendants. To state a 

claim under Section 1983, a complaint “must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by

the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was committed by a 

person acting under color of state law.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2006). To adequately plead these elements, the complaint must identify what constitutional or 

other federal right each defendant violated, providing sufficient facts to plausible support each 

purported violation. See, e.g., Drawsand v. F.F. Props., L.L.P., 866 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121 

(“Aside from passing references to due process and equal protection, the Complaint fails to allege 

how [plaintiff’s] constitutional rights were violated and fails to identify each Defendant’s role 

therein.”); Walsh v. Am. Med. Response, No. 2:13-cv-2077 MCE KJN (PS), 2014 WL 2109946, at 

*7 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2014) (“Before any claims may be found to be cognizable, plaintiffs must 

separate each specific claim they wish to pursue, identify which defendants relate to each 

particular claim, and identify the Constitutional right implicated by each claim.”). 

Here, the complaint states only that “Defendant Martin Humane Society and/or the other 

defendants . . . acted . . . to interfere with Burnells’ liberty, personal and/or real property rights 

guaranteed by the Constitution” by engaging in “some or all” of sixteen enumerated activities. 

(Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.) Elsewhere, Plaintiffs state generally that Defendants—again, without specifying 

which ones—engaged in “other . . . conduct purposed to alienate the Burnells from real and 

personal property, their good reputations and livelihood, and to intimidate them from enjoying 

protections and remedies at law in the agency civil and criminal courts as guaranteed by the 

Constitution[.]” (Id. ¶ 2.16.) These conclusory allegations neither identify the constitutional right 

at issue nor each defendant’s role in the alleged violation, and are therefore insufficient to state a 

Section 1983 claim. See Drawsand, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1121; Walsh, 2014 WL 2109946, at *7. 

While Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants “subject[ed] Plaintiffs to unconscionable, cruel and 

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unusual, fines and penalties that offend at least the Fifth and Eighth Amendments[,]” (Dkt. No. 1 

¶ 2.15), Plaintiffs do not allege facts that plausibly support this claim, such as what the fines and 

penalties are and which Defendants imposed them. The Section 1983 claim is therefore dismissed 

against all Defendants. Plaintiffs shall have leave to amend to specifically identify which 

constitutional rights each defendant purportedly violated and how each defendant did so. Such 

amendments may cure the Section 1983 claim against Marin Humane Society employees acting in 

their official capacity as humane officers.

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim is also alleged against four non-state actors—i.e., 

individuals who are not humane officers. “Private parties are not generally acting under color of 

state law” for purposes of Section 1983, and the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that an 

individual defendant is a state actor. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 

916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, “[w]hile generally not applicable to private parties, a § 1983 

action can lie against a private party when ‘he is a willful participant in joint action with the State 

or its agents.’” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 

449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). This joint action may be established by showing that private individuals 

are engaged in a task that is “both traditionally and exclusively governmental” or that “the state 

has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private entity that it must be 

recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1092 (citations 

omitted). The Complaint alleges only that Defendant Nathan Keefer is a veterinarian for both 

Plaintiffs and the Marine Humane Society, and that Defendant Bruce Wagman was a board 

member and spokesperson for the organization. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 11.) There are no other factual 

allegations about these two defendants. These allegations are not enough to state Section 1983 

claims against them.

As for Defendants Dina Ricci and Genevieve Ghilotti, the Complaint alleges only that they 

made “false and/or malicious reports” to the Marin Humane Society about Jill Burnell. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 

15.) However, it is well established that merely “[p]roviding false information to the police does 

not transform a private individual into a state actor” absent sufficient facts from which the court 

could plausibly infer that the police knew the information was false and agreed with the informant 

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to conspire against the plaintiff. Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 

2008); Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation 

omitted). There are no other facts alleged against Ricci and Ghilotti, so the Section 1983 claim 

against them likewise fails to state a claim.

The remaining individual defendant, Albert Burnham, is sued in his capacity as the 

administrative hearing officer who oversaw the Marin County administrative proceedings into the 

propriety of the Marin Humane Society’s seizure of Jill Burnell’s horses. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 12.) “It is 

well established that state judges are entitled to absolute immunity for their judicial acts.” Swift v. 

State of Cal., 384 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Courts have extended 

absolute judicial immunity from damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 not only to judges but 

also to officers whose functions bear a close association to the judicial process[,]” including 

“hearing officers and administrative law judges” when they are performing adjudicative functions. 

Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156 (9th Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted). Here, the minimal facts 

alleged in the Complaint indicate that Plaintiffs sue Burnham solely in his capacity as an 

administrative hearing officer; as he made findings and fact and conclusions of law in this regard 

and therefore served an adjudicative role, he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See 

Demoran, 781 F.2d at 156. The additional facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ opposition—namely, that 

Burnham should have disclosed that he was not qualified to serve as a county hearing officer—are 

likewise related to his role as hearing officer. Because it appears that the newly alleged facts 

cannot survive judicial immunity, the claims against Defendant Burnham are dismissed with 

prejudice.

Likewise, even if the constitutional right at issue were sufficiently identified as discussed 

above, the Complaint would still fail to state a claim against the Marin Humane Society and Marin 

County because there are insufficient facts alleged to give rise to liability consistent with Monell v. 

Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

1

 The Supreme Court 

 

1

The Marin Humane Society is a private entity contracted with the local government to provide 

animal services. Though it is not a municipality, courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the Monell

analysis to such entities. See Young v. Cnty. of Hawaii, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1114 (D. Haw. 

2013) (citing Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012)).

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stated in Monell that municipalities are not liable through respondeat superior or vicarious liability 

for Section 1983 violations of their employees. Id. at 692. Thus, instead of relying on vicarious 

liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal (or entity, as here) policy or custom caused 

the plaintiff’s injury. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 

403 (1997) (citation omitted). Here, with respect to Marin Humane Society and Marin County, 

aside from assailing the conduct of the Humane Society’s employees, Plaintiffs allege that the 

County has a “[c]ustom and practice” of according “Animal Services officers with the full rights 

and authority reserved to Humane Officers and peace officers.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 5.) There are no 

other facts that make this alleged custom or practice plausible, nor does the Complaint connect this 

custom and practice to Plaintiffs’ injuries. The Complaint therefore fails to state a Section 1983 

claim against either the Marin Humane Society or Marin County. 

As the factual allegations in the Complaint do not sufficiently identify the basis for the 

Section 1983 claim, the Court declines without prejudice Defendants’ invitation to find that the 

May 15, 2015 administrative decision upholding the seizure of Jill Burnell’s horses as lawful 

under California Penal Code Section 597.1 precludes Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim. 

C. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs did not substantively respond to any of Defendants’ arguments about the 

pleading defects of these six causes of action. Such failure to respond to Defendants’ arguments 

could be deemed a concession that the Complaint in fact fails to state a claim. See Ardente v. 

Shanley, No. 07-4479 MHP, 2010 WL 546485, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (“Plaintiff fails to 

respond to this argument and therefore concedes it through silence.”). The Court declines to 

address the substance of the state law claims at this time, as without an adequately pleaded Section 

1983 claim, the Court is unlikely to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 

law causes of action. See Foster v. Wilson, 504 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [statelaw] claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction.”). Still, even a cursory review of the Complaint indicates that these claims are 

pleaded in the most conclusory manner and without factual allegations that give rise to a plausible 

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claim. To use one example, the trespass upon land claim in Plaintiffs’ second cause of action 

alleges that Defendants Marin Humane Society, Machado and Rogers “trespassed on their 

property[,]” that Plaintiffs owned the property, that Defendants entered the property without 

permission, and that their conduct caused Plaintiffs harm. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 24-28.) The only other 

factual allegation in the Complaint relating to this claim is equally conclusory. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 

1 ¶ 2.1 (alleging that Defendants “[t]respass[ed] upon private land”).) Merely stating the elements 

of a cause of action is not enough to plead a plausible claim. The state law causes of action are 

therefore dismissed with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. All 

claims against Defendant Burnham are dismissed with prejudice. The Section 1983 claim against 

the remaining Defendants, as well as the state law claims, are dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiffs shall have leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) by July 21, 2015 to 

allege facts that plausibly establish Alex Burnell is a proper party to each cause of action and to 

remedy the defects with respect to other causes of action discussed above. Failure to file an SAC 

may result in dismissal of the remaining causes of action with prejudice. The case management 

conference currently scheduled for July 9, 2015 is continued to August 13, 2015 and at 1:30 p.m., 

a joint case management conference shall be filed seven days prior to the conference. 

This Order terminates Docket Nos. 14 and 20.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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