Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00655/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00655-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pi Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CANDICE MARKOWITZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, 

INC. ET AL.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv655-L-LL

ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO 

STATE COURT

Defendants Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., CooperSurgical, Inc. and The Cooper 

Companies, Inc. removed this personal injury action from State court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§1332 and 1441. For the reasons stated below, the action is remanded.

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 

authorized by Constitution or statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is 

to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of 

establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Consistent 

with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is strictly construed 

against removal. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The burden of 

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establishing removal jurisdiction is on the removing party. See Abrego Abrego v. The 

Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682-85 (9th Cir. 2006). 

“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 

United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . ..” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Defendants’ notice of removal is based on 28 U.S.C. §1332. Under section 1332(a), 

original jurisdiction exists in cases of complete diversity, where the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is complete diversity, i.e., where each plaintiff is a 

citizen of a different state from each defendant. 

Defendants admit that The Cooper Companies, Inc. ("Cooper") is not diverse 

because its principal place of business is in California. (Removal (doc. no. 1) at 4.) They 

argue that Cooper was fraudulently joined, and should therefore be disregarded for 

purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 

“There is a general presumption against fraudulent joinder.” Hamilton Materials, 

Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). Fraudulent joinder can 

be established in two ways: “(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) 

inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in 

state court.” Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendants proceed on the latter theory. In this 

regard, the inability to establish a claim must be “obvious according to the settled rules of 

the state.” Hamilton Materials, 494 F.3d at 1206. 

Plaintiff alleges that Cooper is liable because it "purchased certain assets of Teva 

and as such ha[s] successor liability." (Compl. (doc. no. 1-1) at 4.)1 Under California 

law, 

a successor company has liability for a predecessor's actions if: (1) the 

successor expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the subject liabilities . . ., 

(2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the successor and 

the predecessor, (3) the successor is a mere continuation of the predecessor, 

 

1 Page numbers are assigned by the Electronic Case Filing System.

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or (4) the transfer of assets to the successor is for the fraudulent purpose of 

escaping liability for the predecessor's debts.

CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (City and County of San Francisco), 157 Cal. App. 

4th 1101, 1120 (2007) (citation omitted). Defendants contend that Cooper does not meet 

any of these criteria; however, they provide no support for their bald assertion. (See 

Removal at 5-6). 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants, as the moving parties, have not met their 

burden to show fraudulent joinder. The notice of removal fails to establish federal 

jurisdiction. "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). This 

action is therefore remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the 

County of San Diego.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 9, 2019

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