Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01522/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01522-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Non-Motor Vehicle

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON FOREMAN and

RASHEEDEH FOREMAN,

NO. CIV. S-07-1522 LKK/GGH 

Plaintiffs,

v.

O R D E R

PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL RICE

MILLS, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

This is a negligence and premises liability action arising out

of an injury that plaintiff sustained while performing roof work

at defendant Pacific International Rice Mills, Inc.’s (PIRMI’s)

facility. Plaintiffs Brandon Foreman and his wife, Rasheedeh

Foreman, wish to pursue this action in state court, because they

seek to join a defendant whose presence would destroy subject

matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, they have moved for voluntary

dismissal of this action, or dismissal on the basis that an

indispensable party cannot be joined. Alternatively, they seek

leave to amend the complaint to add the putative defendant, whose

Case 2:07-cv-01522-LKK -GGH Document 34 Filed 08/20/08 Page 1 of 9
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PIRMI is allegedly a wholly owned subsidiary of Anheuser- 1

Busch, Inc., which was dismissed as a defendant by stipulation and

order on August 10, 2007.

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presence would require dismissal of the action. For the reasons

explained below, the court grants the motion to dismiss under Rule

41(a)(2), which permits the court to dismiss an action at

plaintiffs’ request on terms it deems proper.

I. Background

Plaintiff Brandon Foreman was employed by Petrochem Insulation

as an asbestos abatement worker. Compl. ¶ 12. Petrochem

Insulation was hired by defendant PIRMI, the owner of a warehouse

in Woodland, California, to secure asbestos material that had come

loose on its roof. Compl. ¶ 20. Plaintiff Foreman was working 1

at the Woodland warehouse on June 19, 2007 when the roof gave way

and he fell into the warehouse below, sustaining injuries. Compl.

¶ 12. On July 27, 2007, he and his wife, both California

residents, brought the present suit against defendant PIRMI, a

Missouri resident, for negligence and premises liability.

Plaintiffs did not demand a jury trial.

Plaintiffs now wish to join John Davidowski, a safety

consultant working at the warehouse, as a defendant. Plaintiffs

claim that they were not made aware of Mr. Davidowski’s status as

an independent contractor (to Anheuser-Busch), rather than as an

employee of plaintiff or defendant, until Mr. Davidowski’s

deposition on June 4, 2008. Defendant, however, notes that Mr.

Davidowski’s status as a private contractor was disclosed in its

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initial disclosures on September 11, 2007. In addition, plaintiffs

previously noticed Mr. Davidowski’s deposition on October 24, 2007.

Mr. Davidowski is a resident of California, whose presence in

this suit would therefore destroy diversity of citizenship.

Plaintiffs commenced an action in state court against both PIRMI

and Davidowski on June 19, 2008, demanding a jury trial. They now

seek to dismiss this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)(2) and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Alternatively,

plaintiffs seek leave to amend the complaint to add Davidowski,

which would then require dismissal of the suit.

II. Standard

Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) provides for two methods

of voluntary dismissal. First, plaintiff may dismiss an action

without a court order if (i) a notice of dismissal is filed before

the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary

judgment, or (ii) all parties who have appeared sign a stipulation

of dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1). Second, an action may be

dismissed at the plaintiff’s request by court order on terms that

the court deems proper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2).

“A district court should grant a motion for voluntary

dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it

will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.” Smith v.

Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted).

Legal prejudice means “prejudice to some legal interest, some legal

claim, [or] some legal argument.” Id. at 976 (internal quotation

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marks omitted). That said, uncertainty because a dispute remains

unresolved does not constitute legal prejudice. Id. In addition,

legal prejudice does not arise simply because the defendant would

be inconvenienced by having to defend in another forum, or where

plaintiff would gain a tactical advantage. Id.; see also Airborn

Operating v. Erik-A Electronics, No. C 04-4996 JL, 2007 WL 484836,

at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2007) (rejecting argument that prejudice

would result simply because defendant would lose the opportunity

to succeed on the merits and accordingly recover attorneys’ fees

or pursue an action for malicious prosecution).

III. Analysis 

As noted above, “[a] district court should grant a motion for

voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show

that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.”

Smith, 263 F.3d at 975. Here, defendant argues that it would be

prejudiced because (1) plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent

their waiver of a jury trial in this action, and (2) defendant

would be subject to duplicative discovery in the state court

action.

1. Jury Trial Waiver

Where a party fails to make a timely demand for a jury trial,

he or she cannot simply request that the court dismiss the action

in order to pursue a new action and then file a timely demand for

a jury trial. Russ v. Standard Ins. Co., 120 F.3d 988, 990 (9th

Cir. 1997). To allow otherwise would permit plaintiffs to

accomplish indirectly under Rule 41 what they could not accomplish

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Of course, in cases where forum-shopping is at issue, this 2

is not a “cost” but the very reason for seeking dismissal. See,

e.g., Kern Oil and Refining Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 792 F.2d 1380,

1390 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding prejudice where plaintiff requested

dismissal after suffering adverse dispositive ruling). Here,

however, the court has not made any rulings at all, let alone

rulings adverse to plaintiffs, which therefore minimizes the

likelihood that forum-shopping prompted the motion.

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directly under Rule 38, which governs jury trial demands. The

“specific prohibition on district courts granting jury trials where

the parties have failed to comply with Rule 38 must trump the more

general discretionary powers of district courts to permit

plaintiffs to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2).” Id. 

The difficulty here is determining whether plaintiffs filed

the state court action to circumvent their “failure” to file a

timely demand for a jury trial in this action, or whether

plaintiffs merely wish to pursue an action against Mr. Davidowski.

In Russ, for example, the plaintiff filed a motion for a jury trial

under Rule 39(b), which was denied, and she followed with a motion

to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2). 120 F.3d at 989. Accordingly,

there was no dispute that plaintiff wanted to dismiss the action

simply to file a new action and timely demand a jury trial.

Here, however, plaintiffs also seek to pursue their claims

against a new defendant. In addition, pursuing relief against this

defendant comes at a “cost” to plaintiffs by disrupting their

initial choice of forum. In light of these circumstances, it 2

appears that plaintiffs’ request for dismissal is motivated by the

desire to pursue their claims against a new defendant, rather than

by the desire to cure an alleged failure to demand a jury trial.

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Indeed, the discovery cut-off (August 14, 2008) occurred 3

shortly after plaintiffs filed their motion.

Plaintiffs respond that seven of the eleven depositions took 4

place after plaintiffs requested that defendant stipulate to

dismiss the action, which defendant declined to do. Of course,

given that defendant had a right to refuse the stipulation (and

similarly had a right to oppose plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary

dismissal), it was perfectly sensible for defendant to press

forward with discovery. Defendant did not, for example, have the

luxury of delaying the depositions pending the court’s ruling on

this motion, given that the discovery cut-off would have expired

before briefing on the motion was even completed. Cf. Westlands

Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 98 (9th Cir. 1996)

(court may delete award of fees and costs attributable to summary

judgment motion where defendant could have awaited district court’s

ruling on motion for voluntary dismissal before incurring such

costs).

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Accordingly, the court declines to find prejudice on this basis.

2. Duplicative Discovery

Defendant also contends that (1) it will suffer prejudice from

a dismissal of this action, because significant discovery has

already taken place, and (2) it would be subject to duplicative 3

discovery in the state court action, because any stipulation

entered into by plaintiffs in this action to permit the sharing of

discovery across the actions would not be binding on Mr.

Davidowski. As of the filing of the motion, eleven percipient

witnesses had been deposed and the parties exchanged expert 4

witness information and reports on June 30, 2008.

Some courts have relied on the stage of preparedness of the

action sought to be dismissed in finding that defendant would

suffer prejudice. See, e.g., Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Costa

Lines Cargo Services, Inc., 903 F.2d 352, 360 (5th Cir. 1990)

(“Where the plaintiff does not seek dismissal until a late stage

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and the defendants have exerted significant time and effort, the

district court may, in its discretion, refuse to grant a voluntary

dismissal.”); Young v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 07-0297 LJO/SMS, 2007

WL 1847663, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 27, 2007) (finding prejudice to

defendant where action had proceeded for 15 months and was on brink

of expert discovery).

These cases, however, stand as exceptions to the rule:

typically, “the expense incurred in defending against a lawsuit

does not amount to legal prejudice,” because the court may simply

condition dismissal on payment of costs by the plaintiff.

Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97; see also Smith, 263 F.3d at

976; Helio, LLC v. Palm, Inc., No. C 06-7754 SBA, 2007 WL 1063507,

at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2007) (“Legal prejudice is not constituted

by the expense incurred in defending a lawsuit”). 

This is particularly true where it is likely that the

discovery can and will be used in future litigation. For that same

reason, courts may only award attorneys’ fees for work “which

cannot be used in any future litigation of these claims” Westlands

Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97. Here, defendant notes that Mr.

Davidowski would not be bound by any court order or stipulation to

permit the sharing of discovery across actions. Nevertheless,

discovery is costly for both sides -- not only defendant -- and

while it is theoretically possible that Mr. Davidowski will engage

in duplicative discovery, the court cannot make a finding of legal

prejudice based on the mere prospect of discovery abuses in a

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 To the extent that Mr. Davidowski engages in duplicative 5

discovery, the court will entertain a motion for attorneys’ fees

against plaintiffs at that point in time.

Accordingly, the court need not address plaintiffs’ 6

alternative arguments, that dismissal is warranted because Mr.

Davidowski is an indispensable party under Rule 19, or that leave

to amend should be granted. While plaintiffs’ delay in joining Mr.

Davidowski as a defendant is pertinent to whether leave to amend

should be granted, it is not part of the analysis for granting

dismissal under Rule 41. As with the dismissal of cases that have

already advanced to a mature stage, “the defendants' interests can

be protected by conditioning the dismissal . . . upon the payment

of appropriate costs and attorney fees.” Westlands Water Dist.,

100 F.3d at 97.

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future forum.5

Furthermore, if the court were to deny plaintiffs’ motion to

dismiss, it is likely that both suits would simultaneously proceed.

Unless this action were to reach final judgment prior to discovery

in the state court action, it is likely that defendant would

inevitably be subject to the same duplicative discovery burdens.

In sum, defendant has failed to show that plaintiffs’ motion

to dismiss is simply a veiled attempt at resuscitating a waived

right to a jury trial, or that legal prejudice would result from

duplicative discovery burdens. Instead, the court finds that

dismissal of this action is appropriate, given plaintiffs’ desire

to pursue their claims against Mr. Davidowski. See Favoured 6

Development Ltd. v. Lomas, No. C06-02752 MJJ, 2007 WL 915234, at

*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2007) (granting dismissal under Rule

41(a)(2) where plaintiff learned of new potential defendant during

discovery and where dispute against new defendant would require

arbitration).

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) (Dock. No. 27)

is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 20, 2008.

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