Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02299/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02299-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2299

___________

Gary Bowman, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Arkansas.

John A. White, in his official capacity *

as Chancellor of the University of *

Arkansas; Donald O. Pederson, in his *

official capacity as Vice Chancellor for *

Finance Administration for the *

University of Arkansas; Larry L. *

Slammons, in his official capacity as *

Director of the University of Arkansas *

Police Department, *

 *

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: January 14, 2005

 Filed: April 14, 2006 

___________

Before BYE, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Gary Bowman filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants-Appellees John A. White, Donald O. Pederson, and

Larry L. Slammons as officials representing the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville

(collectively hereinafter known as the “University”). Bowman alleges that the

University’s policy regarding the use of its facilities and space, which contains

restrictions on use by non-University entities, unconstitutionally abridges his right to

free speech. Following a plenary hearing on the merits of Bowman’s request for

injunctive relief, the district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice. The district

court found that the University’s campus was a nonpublic forum and that all the

challenged restrictions on speech were reasonable. Bowman now brings this timely

appeal. 

I.

Gary Bowman is a professing Christian who engages in street preaching about

his religious beliefs and convictions as a tenet of his faith. His message typically

concerns sin, repentance and a final judgment. He states that he shares his message

in the hope of securing salvation for his audience. He employs various means of

communication, including the use of signs, public speaking, literature distribution,

symbolic speech, and one-on-one conversation.

Bowman particularly wants to share his religious message with college students

and others found at public universities because of what he deems to be a moral

obligation. To this end, he preaches at many college campuses, including the

University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. Bowman considers the University a uniquely

suitable place to communicate his message because of its close proximity to his

residence in Oklahoma and the significant number of students that can be found in

outdoor areas. 

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1

 Use of indoor space is governed by individual use policies which are not at

issue in this case.

2

 It should be noted, however, that on one occasion Bowman was able to obtain

sponsorship from a student organization which allowed him to reserve space as a

University Entity.

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The University is the flagship campus of the University of Arkansas System.

It has an enrollment of more than 16,000 students. In an attempt to regulate an everincreasing demand on the use of its facilities, the University enacted Fayetteville

Policies and Procedures 708.0, entitled “Use of University Facilities and Outdoor

Space” (the “Policy”). The Policy comprehensively governs the use of University

outdoor space.1

 It contains guidelines and procedures for space allocation and

reservations. The Policy applies to all areas within the University’s direct control,

including its streets, sidewalks, and parks.

The Policy distinguishes between University Entities and Non-University

Entities. Under the Policy, Bowman is classified as a Non-University Entity.2

 The

Policy places a five-day cap per semester per entity on the use of facilities and outdoor

space by Non-University Entities. In addition to the five-day cap, the Policy requires

Non-University Entities to make reservations in advance of their use of a space. A

reservation allows a Non-University Entity to use the outdoor space for one eight-hour

day. A reservation is required regardless of the use that will be made of the space,

whether that use be speaking, carrying signs, handing out literature, or sitting silently.

The Policy does not, however, regulate one-on-one conversations. The Policy also

imposes a three-business-day advance notice requirement for the use of space by NonUniversity Entities. The Policy prohibits a Non-University Entity’s use of space from

interfering with the educational mission of the University and allows the University

to cancel or modify a space reservation in the event that a use does interfere. The

Policy further prohibits the use of space by Non-University Entities during so called

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“dead days,” which consist of one quiet study day per semester, all final exam periods,

and dates of commencement activities. 

In the fall of 1998, Bowman obtained permits to appear twice on campus for

speaking purposes. Bowman returned to the University in the fall of 2000, at which

time he complained to University officials that the permit requirement was imposing

a significant restraint on his speech. According to Bowman, it was more difficult for

him to plan the days he wished to speak in advance because he could not determine

with any certainty his future work schedule or whether a noteworthy event would

prompt him to want to speak on a certain day.

To alleviate these concerns, the University granted Bowman blanket permission

to appear on campus and communicate his message during the fall semester. With the

blanket permission in place, Bowman spoke approximately twenty times in the fall of

2000. Despite having blanket permission to speak on campus, Bowman discovered

he needed a permit for any other form of expression. Bowman was not permitted to

hand out literature, use signs, or engage in symbolic protests without first obtaining

a permit. 

Bowman often used inflammatory language and tactics in his presentations, the

nature of which were considered highly offensive by many students. During the fall

semester of 2000, several students and faculty members complained of Bowman’s

presence on campus. Campus police, in response to these complaints, occasionally

had to curb violent outbursts and erect barricades to maintain crowd control as

Bowman sometimes drew crowds as large as 200 people. 

In the spring semester of 2001, the University denied Bowman blanket

permission to speak. As a result, Bowman submitted individual requests for permits

to speak on selected days. By letter, the University advised Bowman that it would

only consider up to three separate space reservation forms at any one time. The letter

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further indicated that the campus speech policies “are currently under review and are

likely to be revised in the future.” That semester, Bowman was denied permission to

speak on the University’s dead days.

For the next fall, Bowman planned a series of presentations entitled “Ten

Commandments,” which was to be part of a larger series entitled “Forty Things Every

Student Needs to Know.” During each campus visit, he anticipated covering one

Commandment and one “Thing Every Student Needs to Know.” Bowman applied for

individual permits to cover each of the first six Commandments. 

In the meantime, the University formally revised the Policy to its current form.

By letter dated August 21, 2001, the University informed Bowman of the revisions

and approved, in part, his request for use of the grounds by granting him three days

in which to present his message. Bowman, in a letter outlining his concerns regarding

the Policy, subsequently requested an additional seven days. The University, citing

its new five-day cap, denied Bowman a permit for the additional seven days. Bowman

resubmitted his permit application, requesting an additional three days, for a total of

six days. The University granted him permission for two days, but denied permission

for the third day, citing the five-day cap. Bowman proceeded with his speech on the

days he was allowed to speak, covering the first five Commandments. Due to the

five-day cap, Bowman was precluded from sharing his message for the rest of the fall

semester of 2001. 

During the spring semester of 2002, Bowman once again utilized his five

permitted days. Bowman applied for a sixth visit. His request was denied under the

five-day cap.

Later that spring, with the sponsorship of a student organization, Bowman

attempted again to speak on a sixth day. The University approved the appearance, but

required a representative of the student organization to be with Bowman at all times

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while Bowman remained on campus. Bowman was forced to cease his expression

whenever the representative was not present.

Unable to resolve his differences with the University, Bowman filed the present

lawsuit alleging that the permit requirement, five-day cap, three-day advance notice

requirement, and dead day ban are unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and

discriminatory as applied to him, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well

as damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

After previously dismissing his claim for compensatory damages, the district

court held a plenary hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2), consolidating the

preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits of his complaint. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the district court dismissed Bowman’s complaint because

it found the University to be a nonpublic forum and all the challenged restrictions on

speech to be reasonable. 

Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a),

thereby invoking our jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo the district court’s conclusions of law. Doe v. Pulaski County Special

Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 621 (8th Cir. 2002). There are no material facts in dispute.

II.

“[S]tate colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of

the First Amendment.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). However, “the

First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned

or controlled by the government.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,

460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). “The existence of a right of

access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must

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be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue.” Id. at 44. To

this end, the Supreme Court uses a forum analysis for evaluating restrictions of speech

on government property. See id. at 45-46. The forum analysis initially requires a

court to determine whether a property is a traditional public forum, a designated

public forum, or a nonpublic forum. Families Achieving Independence & Respect v.

Neb. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 111 F.3d 1408, 1418 (8th Cir. 1997). Once a court makes

a determination on the nature of the forum, it then applies the appropriate standard of

scrutiny to decide whether a restriction on speech passes constitutional muster. See,

e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-683 (1998)

(hereinafter “Forbes”); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990). Thus,

the extent to which access to, and the character of speech upon, government property

may be limited depends upon the nature of the forum in which the speech takes place.

Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1997).

A. Traditional Public Forum

The government’s ability to restrict speech is most circumscribed in a

traditional public forum. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (“In places which by long tradition or

by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state

to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”). A traditional public forum

is a type of property that “has the physical characteristics of a public thoroughfare, .

. . the objective use and purpose of open public access or some other objective use and

purpose inherently compatible with expressive conduct, [and] historical[ly] and

traditional[ly] has been used for expressive conduct . . . .” Warren v. Fairfax County,

196 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). “‘[P]ublic places’ historically

associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks,

and parks, are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums.’” United States v.

Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 

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A content-based restriction on speech within a traditional public forum must be

necessary to serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly drawn to

achieve that interest. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. A restriction on speech that is not

content-based and that restricts the time, place or manner in which speech may be

communicated is subjected to a different, less restrictive standard. Id. The

government may enforce a reasonable, content-neutral time, place and manner

restriction in a traditional public forum if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve

a significant government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels of

communication. Id.

B. Designated Public Forum

A designated public forum is a nonpublic forum the government intentionally

opens to expressive activity for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups or use

for discussion of certain subjects. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. “The government does not

create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but

only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public discourse.”

Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 

Despite this direction from the Supreme Court, our Circuit’s analysis of what

constitutes a “designated public forum,” like our sister Circuits’, is far from lucid.

Substantial confusion exists regarding what distinction, if any, exists between a

“designated public forum” and a “limited public forum.” See generally, Chiu v. Plano

Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 345-46 & nn.10-12 (5th Cir. 2001). As the First

Circuit pointed out in a footnote in Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65,

76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004), “The phrase ‘limited public forum’ has been used in different

ways.’” The First Circuit accurately states that the phrase has been used as a synonym

for the term “designated public forum” and also for the phrase “nonpublic forum.”

Id. The Second Circuit has articulated the view that the phrases “designated public

forum” and “limited public forum” are not synonyms. See, e.g., N.Y. Magazine v.

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Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 128 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing a limited

public forum as a “sub-category of the designated public forum, where the

government ‘opens a non-public forum but limits th expressive activity to certain

kinds of speakers or to the discussion of certain subjects.’” (quoting Travis v. OwegoApalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991))); see also Chiu, 260 F.3d at

346 n.12. A designated public forum can be classified as either “of a limited or

unlimited character.” Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1553 n.8 (8th Cir.

1995).

Under this analysis, a “limited public forum is a subset of the designated public

forum [that] arises ‘“where the government opens a non-public forum but limits the

expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or to the discussion of certain

subjects.”’” Make the Road By Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.

2004) (quoting Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union Local 100 of N.Y. v. City

of N.Y. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting N.Y.

Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 128 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998)). For

example, a university concert hall might be considered a “limited public forum,”

designated for particular speech by university-supported musicians. An “unlimited”

designated public forum is a forum designated for expressive conduct by the

government but not limited to a particular type of speech or speaker. 

The distinction between a limited designated public forum and an unlimited

designated public forum is significant because it controls the level of scrutiny given

to restrictions on speech. Like the government’s ability to restrict speech in a

traditional public forum, the government’s ability to restrict speech in an unlimited

designated public forum is sharply circumscribed. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. In an

unlimited designated public forum, the government may enforce a content-neutral

time, place, and manner restriction only if the restriction is necessary to serve a

significant government interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Perry,

460 U.S. at 46. In contrast, in a limited designated public forum, “[r]estrictions on

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speech not within the type of expression allowed in a limited public forum must only

be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” Turner, 378 F.3d at 143. 

C. Nonpublic Forum

The government can most freely restrict speech in a nonpublic forum. A

nonpublic forum is government property which is not classified a traditional public

forum or designated public forum. Warren, 196 F.3d at 192. In a nonpublic forum,

the government may restrict speech “‘as long as the restrictions are reasonable and

[are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because the public officials oppose

[a] speaker’s view.’” American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas,

333 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist.

Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, when analyzing how to classify a forum we must ask two

questions. First, is the space a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, or

a nonpublic forum? Second, if the space is a designated public forum, is the forum

limited or unlimited in its character?

III.

The district court found that the campus of the University of Arkansas at

Fayetteville is not a public forum. We disagree. The facts of this case show that the

University’s grounds cannot be labeled as only one type of forum and that the areas

in question in this case are unlimited designated public fora.

A modern university contains a variety of fora. Its facilities may include private

offices, classrooms, laboratories, academic medical centers, concert halls, large sports

stadiums and arenas, and open spaces. The University of Arkansas at Fayetteville is

this type of institution. Its open spaces, like those at most major universities, come

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3

 The Union Mall is located in the center of campus between the library and

Union Mall facility. It is an outdoor area composed of grassy mounds surrounded by

sidewalks and walkways, benches, and potted trees and plants. A bike rack, basketball

hoop, fountain and street lamps appear in pictures depicting the area. The Union Mall

hosts a variety of organized events such as political gatherings and musical events.

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in a number of different types. Some are enclosed quadrangles bordered on all sides

by university buildings and traversed by sidewalks, while others are grassy areas or

plazas on the edge of campus where the University’s grounds abut the city property.

Thus, labeling the campus as one single type of forum is an impossible, futile task.

See Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that “the

Supreme Court’s forum analysis jurisprudence does not require us to choose between

the polar extremes of treating an entire university campus as a forum designated for

all types of speech by all speakers, or, alternatively, as a limited forum where any

reasonable restriction on speech must be upheld”); see also Ala. Student Party v.

Student Gov’t Ass’n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1354 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)

(stating that not all of a University campus is a public forum, but rather that a campus

contains a variety of fora). Some places on the University’s campus, such as the

administration building, the president’s office, or classrooms are not opened as fora

for use by the student body or anyone else. As Bowman concedes, these areas are

nonpublic fora. Other campus locations, such as auditoriums or stadiums allow for

certain speech on certain topics. These locations may be described as designated

public fora. Further, the public streets and sidewalks which surround the campus but

are not on the campus likely constitute traditional public fora. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.

Accordingly, rather than attempt to label the entire campus as one type of forum, we

will discuss only the specific areas at issue in this case.

Bowman desires to speak at various locations throughout the campus including

the streets, sidewalks, and open areas located inside and directly adjacent to the

campus. Specifically at issue in this case, Bowman desires to speak at the outdoor

areas clearly within the boundaries of the campus known as the Union Mall,3

 the

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Students use the Union Mall to sit on its benches and lay on its grass to read, study,

and talk to one another. 

4

 The Peace Fountain is located in the center of campus and hosts a variety of

organized and unorganized events. The Peace Fountain is a metallic tower structure

with a fountain of water at the base. A cemented area with potted trees and plants

surrounds the fountain. Sidewalks run through and parallel to the Peace Fountain. A

statue and small stone wall appear in pictures of the area. 

5

 The Brough Commons building is an on-campus eating facility, but the area

in question is outside the building at the intersection of Dickson Street and Ozark

Street. Dickson Street runs from downtown Fayetteville and dead-ends in part of the

campus. The area in question consists of a large sidewalk with some landscaping

featuring trees and plants. The area also contains a historical marker memorializing

the acquisition of the farmland on which the University sits.

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Peace Fountain4

 and Brough Commons,5 presumably because of the high

concentration of students in these locations. 

The objective evidence in the record shows these particular areas combine the

physical characteristics of streets, sidewalks, and parks, and are open for public

passage. They do not include university buildings or stadiums, but they are located

within the boundaries of the campus. The Union Mall and Peace Fountain are

completely surrounded by University buildings. The physical characteristics of these

spaces, “without more,” might make them traditional public fora. Grace, 461 U.S. at

177; Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the titles

of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use

of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,

communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”).

However, “[p]ublicly owned or operated property does not become a ‘public forum’

simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at will.” Grace,

461 U.S. at 177. Rather, the open nature of these spaces is merely a factor to consider

in determining whether the government has opened its property. Grace, 461 U.S. at

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6

 It must be noted that none of these factors are dispositive.

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177. We must also examine the traditional use of the property, the objective use and

purposes of the space, and the government intent and policy with respect to the

property, not merely its physical characteristics and location.6

 In particular, we must

acknowledge the presence of any special characteristics regarding the environment in

which those areas exist. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.

503, 506 (1969) (noting the “special characteristics of the school environment”);

Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1976) (discussing the unique nature of military

bases and the fact that these circumstances must be taken into consideration). 

In the case of the University, although it “possesses many of the characteristics

of a public forum,” such as open sidewalks, “[it] differs in significant respects from

public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters.” Widmar v.

Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981). A university’s purpose, its traditional use, and

the government’s intent with respect to the property is quite different because a

university’s function is not to provide a forum for all persons to talk about all topics

at all times. Rather, a university’s mission is education and the search for knowledge

– to serve as a “‘special type of enclave’ devoted to higher education.” ACLU

Student Chapter – Univ. of Md., College Park v. Mote, 321 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679 (D.

Md. 2004) (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 180); see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 n.5 (“We

have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally

available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access

to all of its grounds or buildings.”). Thus, streets, sidewalks, and other open areas that

might otherwise be traditional public fora may be treated differently when they fall

within the boundaries of the University’s vast campus. 

The University argues that the areas at issue should be treated as nonpublic fora.

This argument is contrary to how the University itself, through its policies and

procedures, has treated the Union Mall, the Peace Fountain, and the Brough

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Commons. The Policy, which permits speech by University and Non-University

Entities, offers strong evidence that the University “intentionally open[ed]” areas of

the campus “for public discourse.” Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (internal quotation

omitted). The Policy expressly states that it applies to “facilities or outdoor space .

. . for use by University entities and Non-University entities.” Fayetteville Policies

and Procedures, “Use of University Facilities and Outdoor Space” 708.0 (A). The

Policy governs the specific areas at issue here. The only use of the space that is

prohibited is any activity by private, for-profit businesses. 708.0 (A). Further, the

Policy indicates that the University has opened up the campus generally, not merely

“to either a specific group of speakers or for discussion on a very narrow topic.”

Bourgault v. Yudof, 316 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420 (N.D. Tex. 2004). The Policy provides

strong evidence that the University, like many public colleges, has opened select

portions of its campus “to facilitate discussion on issues of public concern.” Id. As

such, the Policy indicates that the University itself designated the areas in question as

locations for free expression. 

College campuses traditionally and historically serve as places specifically

designated for the free exchange of ideas. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (stating that

universities represent a “marketplace of ideas”). The Supreme Court has advanced the

idea that universities have traditionally opened parts of their campuses to speech.

Th[e] danger [of chilling speech] is especially real in the University

setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of

thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and

philosophic tradition. . . . [U]niversities began as voluntary and

spontaneous assemblages or concourses for students to speak and to

write and to learn. The quality and creative power of student intellectual

life to this day remains a vital measure of a school’s influence and

attainment.

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835-36 (1995)

(citations omitted). Indeed, in times of great national discussion, such as during the

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height of the Vietnam War or the debate over the war in Iraq, college campuses serve

as a stage for societal debate. Often those speaking on college campuses are not

enrolled students, but rather people like Bowman, who travel from campus to campus

to spread their message. Thus, public university campuses historically contain places

where space is specifically designated by society and universities themselves for

speech. 

This tradition of free expression within specific parts of universities, the

University’s practice of permitting speech at these locations, and the University’s past

practice of permitting both University Entities and Non-University Entities to speak

at these locations on campus demonstrate that the University deliberately fosters an

environment that permits speech “subject to the limits necessary to preserve the

academic mission and to maintain order.” Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d

111, 117 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding certain outdoor areas of a university to be a

designated public forum, designated for the speech of students). Accordingly, we

hold that the specific property at issue – the Union Mall, Peace Fountain, and Brough

Commons – are designated public fora. This holding does not apply to any other areas

on the University campus, about which we express no opinion.

We must next decide whether the forum is limited or unlimited in its character.

In this case, although the University gives preferential treatment to University Entities

over Non-University Entities in regard to use of University space, there is little

evidence that the University intended to limit the use of University space to a

particular type of speech or speaker. Accordingly, we hold that the spaces at issue are

unlimited designated public fora.

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 This interest includes the University’s interest in preserving University

Entities’ priority for the space in furtherance of that mission.

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IV.

Having concluded that the outdoor areas in question are unlimited designated

public fora, we must ascertain whether the Policy impermissibly restrains free

expression. We analyze the University’s time, place, and manner restrictions using

the appropriate scrutiny standard, which requires a restriction on speech to be contentneutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. Perry, 460

U.S. at 45.

There is no evidence that the Policy is anything but content neutral. Our

analysis, therefore, focuses on whether the Policy is narrowly tailored to serve a

significant government interest. The University has identified a number of interests

that justify a restriction on speech. One significant interest is protecting the

educational experience of the students in furtherance of the University’s educational

mission.7

 This interest is significant because an educated electorate is essential to the

vitality of our democracy and a lack of proper education diminishes the value of our

free speech rights. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y.,

385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through

wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas . . . .”). A second significant interest

is in ensuring public safety. Like education, safety is a fundamental human need

without which the desire to speak one’s mind becomes moot. See Heffron v. Int’l

Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981) (“As a general

matter it is clear that a State’s interest in protecting the ‘safety and convenience’ of

persons using a public forum is a valid governmental objective.”). Finally, a third

significant interest asserted by the University is the fostering of a diversity of uses of

University resources. 

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8

 The Policy gives the University broad discretion to deny permits to for-profit

entities. 

-17-

A regulation is narrowly tailored when it furthers a significant government

interest that would be achieved less effectively without the regulation. Thorburn v.

Austin, 231 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2000). The statute does not, however, need to

be the least restrictive means of regulation possible. Id. Accordingly, we next analyze

whether each of the time, place and manner restrictions imposed by the University are

sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet one or more of the significant government

interests described above. 

A. Permit Requirement

The University’s requirement that a Non-University Entity obtain a permit

before “using” outdoor space is a prior restraint on speech against which there is a

heavy presumption of unconstitutionality. Forsyth County v. The Nationalist

Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992). The government “may impose a permit

requirement on those wishing to hold a . . . rally.” Id. This permit may only be

imposed, however, if it does not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a

government official, is content-neutral, is narrowly tailored to the University’s

significant governmental interests, and leaves ample alternative channels for

communication. Id.

The University’s policy does not delegate overly broad discretion to its

officials, nor does it allow the denial or revocation of permits on the basis of content.

The Policy applies to all not-for-profit Non-University Entities.8

 The Policy grants

the University the right to deny or revoke a permit for the use of a space by a NonUniversity Entity only for limited reasons, such as interference with the educational

activities of the institution. 

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-18-

The University has a significant public safety interest in requiring a permit

because of the time and resources necessary to accommodate the crowds that Bowman

attracts. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (upholding a

requirement that individuals obtain a permit before conducting events in public parks

involving fifty or more people); see also Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200,

1206 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Some type of permit requirement may be justified in the case

of large groups, where the burden placed on park facilities and the possibility of

interference with other park users is more substantial.”). Bowman argues that the

Thomas and Grossman analyses are not applicable to him because he is a single

speaker. This argument fails because regardless of whether Bowman is speaking

alone or with others, carrying a sign, or handing out literature, he has demonstrated

the capacity to attract a crowd and disrupt the unique educational environment.

See Mote, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 679. In fact, the majority of Bowman’s space

reservation requests listed an estimated attendance of between fifty and one hundred

people, analogous to the situation in Thomas. The actual attendance at his events has

run as high as two hundred people. Under these circumstances, the permit

requirement is justified to “coordinate multiple uses of limited space,” “assure

preservation of the [campus],” “prevent uses that are dangerous” to students or other

people, and “to assure financial accountability for damage” caused by Bowman’s

event. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322.

The University’s permit requirement is narrowly tailored to meet these

significant interests. The University’s requirement that Non-University Entities notify

the University in advance of their intent to use its facilities does not burden

substantially more speech than is necessary to further the University’s interests. These

interests include ensuring public safety, minimizing the disruption of the educational

setting, and coordinating the use of limited space by multiple entities. Further, the

University’s requirement leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.

Accordingly, although the Policy admittedly does burden Bowman’s speech by

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requiring him to plan sufficiently in advance to obtain a permit, it is not overly

burdensome so as to make the permit requirement unconstitutional. 

B. Five-Day Cap

In addition to the permit requirement, the University regulates the time in which

a speaker may speak by imposing a cap of five, eight-hour days per semester. If a

speaker requests a sixth day, the University will deny the permit. The University

explains that the five-day cap allows the speaker, on a semester basis, the same

number of access hours as expended on a typical three-semester-hour class. The

University argues that the five-day cap fosters a diversity of usage, prevents

monopolization of space and preserves the property’s tax-exempt status. 

The University’s interest in fostering a diversity of viewpoints and avoiding the

monopolization of space serves a significant interest. However, the five-day cap is

not sufficiently narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. The Policy as written does

not by itself foster more viewpoints; it merely limits Bowman’s speech. If no one else

wants to use the space after Bowman has used his five permits, the space will go

unused even if Bowman still wants to use the space. A more narrowly tailored policy

might grant Bowman more than just five days per semester to speak if the space is not

being used, but give preference to other speakers who have not already obtained five

permits. Furthermore, a policy that allows speakers to obtain permits for a limited

number of events at any one time might be permissible to further the significant

interest of keeping spaces open for an array of groups and a diversity of uses. This

type of policy would further the University’s interest in preventing a single entity

from monopolizing a specific space by reserving that space for an entire semester with

a single permit request.

Although the five-day cap might increase the odds that the space will be

available for informal use, this rationale is not a sufficient justification in light of the

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disfavor with which restrictions on speech are viewed. The University’s limitation is

not narrowly tailored to achieve its interest in fostering a diversity of viewpoints and

avoiding monopolization of space. Accordingly, we conclude that the five-day cap

is an unnecessary abridgment of Bowman’s speech rights, and therefore

unconstitutional.

C. Three-Day Notice Requirement

The University requires three-days’ advance notice. Bowman argues that the

advance notice requirement effectively bars him from engaging in constitutionally

protected spontaneous speech. The University asserts that the notice requirement is

necessary to allow it to plan for exigencies such as crowd control and insurance

requirements. This court stated in Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1523-24 (8th

Cir. 1996), that a five-day advance notice requirement for a permit was not narrowly

tailored. We noted, however, that advance notice requirements of three days or fewer

have been upheld by courts as sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id. at 1523. The case

at bar is distinguishable from Douglas in at least two ways. First, the notice

requirement is only three days. Second, a university is less able than a city or other

entity with police powers to deal with a significant disruption on short notice. Mote,

321 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (“a University’s resources are limited and the University has

an interest in reserving those resources for University community members”); see also

Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197, 1203 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[a] college has a right to

preserve the campus for its intended purpose and to protect college students from the

pressures of solicitation”). In light of the modest nature of the requirement and what

the district court described as the University’s reduced capacity to address “the

exigencies of determining what, if any, security, crowd control, additional insurance,

etc., will be required for a particular event,” we conclude that the advance notice

requirement is sufficiently narrowly tailored, and thus permissible.

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D. Dead Day Ban

The University bans Non-University Entities from using its space during socalled “dead days.” The University explains that “dead days” are the official final

examination periods, which allow students to study for and take final exams in a

peaceful, quiet environment, and the dates of official University commencement

activities. Protecting the educational experience of the students by preserving limited

quiet study and exam-taking time is a significant government interest. The University

has shown that Bowman’s activities such as preaching, passing out literature, or

carrying a sign could very easily interfere with a student’s educational experience by

causing a noise disturbance. For example, carrying a sign, though silent as an action,

might provoke noisy, disruptive confrontations.

Bowman argues that the dead day ban is underinclusive because it leaves a

substantial amount of seemingly intrusive conduct unregulated, in that it allows

speech by University Entities, which could be just as intrusive as speech by NonUniversity Entities. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52-53 (1994) (stating

that exceptions to a regulation of speech may diminish government’s credibility in

justifying its regulation). This underinclusivity, however, does not necessarily

undermine the credibility of the university’s rationale for limiting access during

examination and commencement periods. The underinclusive regulation of speech in

Ladue was a “red flag” that rendered “implausible the government’s claim that the

regulation . . . [wa]s narrowly tailored,” National Federation of the Blind v. Federal

Trade Commision, 420 F.3d 331, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2005), but a limitation on speech

that is not all-encompassing may still be narrowly tailored where the underinclusivity

does not favor a particular viewpoint or undermine the rationale given for the

regulation. Id.; Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 982 (9th Cir.

1998); ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

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-22-

Here, the university reasonably justified a modification of its unlimited

designated forum during discrete times of the academic year when an abundance of

speakers would be likely to interfere with the educational mission. During these

periods, the university restricts not only outside speakers like Bowman, but also

university-related activities (such as athletic contests and work on the physical plant)

that have a potential to hinder students in their preparation for examinations.

(Appellant’s App. at 290-91). We think it was reasonable for the administration to

conclude that University Entities who do reserve space in the designated forums on

these dates are more likely to be attuned to the special needs of the university

community during examination and commencement periods (see id. at 341), and thus

less likely to disrupt the campus during these sensitive times. In effect, the university

has elected to limit the designated forums to certain classes of speakers during these

narrow windows in the academic year, and it is well established that the government

is not required “to indefinitely retain the unlimited open character of” a designated

public forum. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Accordingly, we conclude that the dead day ban

passes constitutional muster.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the University’s permit

requirement, notice requirement, and dead day ban are constitutional, but that the fiveday cap is insufficiently narrowly tailored to survive. Accordingly, we affirm in part

and reverse in part.

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9 While the purpose for which a space was created is important to determine

whether a traditional public forum exists, government intent is not otherwise relevant

to a determination of whether a space is a traditional public forum. See Am. Civil

Liberties Union of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1104 & n.11 (9th Cir.

2003). Even under a broader intent analysis, however, the University’s historical use

of the spaces for expressive purposes suggests the areas were intended to be traditional

-23-

BYE, Circuit Judge, concurring,

While I agree with the Court as to the ultimate outcome of this case, I write

separately because the Union Mall, Peace Fountain, and Brough Commons should be

recognized as traditional public fora. 

The most important analysis we undertake in a First Amendment case is the

forum analysis. As the Court recognizes, the forum analysis dictates the level of

scrutiny we apply in First Amendment cases. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.

Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-83 (1998). While the Court does an excellent job of

wading through the muddy waters of First Amendment forum analysis jurisprudence,

like so many courts, it fails to plant the seeds of its discourse in the marshes at issue

here. I cannot adopt the Court’s view as to public areas on a public university campus

not being traditional public fora but instead designated public fora which the

University can redesignate to a non-public forum on a whim.

I

The Court employs the now-standard definition of a traditional public forum:

property owned or controlled by the government which (1) has the physical

characteristics of a public thoroughfare, (2) was created with the purpose of open

public access or for a purpose inherently compatible with expressive conduct,9

 and (3)

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public fora. See Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Intent

is not merely a matter of stated purpose. Indeed, it must be inferred from a number

of objective factors, including: [the government’s] policy and past practice, as well as

the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.”).

-24-

has traditionally been used for expressive conduct. Warren v. Fairfax County, 196

F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 1999). Streets, sidewalks and parks are the quintessential

traditional public fora. See ante at 12 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,

177 (1983); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); see also Am.

Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.

2003). Indeed, “public places historically associated with the free exercise of

expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without

more, to be public forums.” Ante at 7 (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 177) (internal

quotations omitted); see also Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (“Wherever the title of streets

and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public

and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating

thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”). However, the Court’s

analysis fails to give any weight to the precedent it cites.

The Court acknowledges the areas in dispute–the Union Mall, Peace Fountain,

and Brough Commons–have the “physical characteristics of streets, sidewalks, and

parks, and are open for public passage.” Ante at 12. The Court even goes so far as

to note “[t]he physical characteristics of these spaces, ‘without more,’ might make

them traditional public fora.” Id. Of course, the physical characteristics of a space are

not the only factors to consider in a traditional public forum analysis. The purpose for

which the space was created and the traditional use of the space must also be

considered. See Warren, 196 F.3d at 191. In analyzing the other factors, the Court

missteps. It gives undue weight to largely irrelevant factors, insufficiently analyzes

others, and fails to contextualize its analysis to the University of Arkansas spaces at

issue.

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10 One of the University of Arkansas’s purposes in enacting the Policy is the

promotion of viewpoint diversity.

-25-

The Court, relying upon dicta in a case dealing with spaces on the University

of Maryland campus, claims a public university’s mission is “not to provide a forum

for all persons to talk about all topics at all times,” but rather to serve as an enclave

for higher education. Ante at 13. The Court next ascribes this mission to the

University of Arkansas without analyzing its varied missions or how they relate to

determining the existence of a traditional public forum.10 See ACLU of Nevada, 333

F.3d at 1104 & n.11 (noting government intent is not relevant to a traditional public

forum analysis). Despite its contention no factor is dispositive, see ante at 12 n.6, the

Court essentially concludes this mission is sufficient to outweigh all other factors. 

The Court’s analysis, however, does not comport with Supreme Court

precedent. The issue is not whether the mission of the University as a whole is to

provide full access to everyone on all topics, but whether the University created the

spaces for public access and a purpose not incompatible with expressive conduct and

such spaces have historically been used for expressive conduct. The University’s

overall mission is irrelevant to a proper First Amendment forum analysis. 

Should the University’s mission be relevant, it would not be dispositive of

whether a space is a traditional public forum. “The primary factor in determining

whether property owned or controlled by the government is a public forum is how the

locale is used.” Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 of New York,

N.Y. & Vicinity, AFL-CIO v. City of New York Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311

F.3d 534, 547 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.

N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1982)); see also Int’l

Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (“If our public forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize

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that certain objective characteristics of Government property and its customary use

by the public may control.”) (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737

(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 

The Court’s analysis gives rather short shrift to another significant factor in the

traditional public forum analysis: whether the space was created for a purpose

incompatible with expressive conduct. The Court does not suggest how expressive

conduct, occurring in the Union Mall, Peace Fountain, or Brough Commons is

“basically incompatible” with a mission of promoting higher education. See Greer v.

Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976). Indeed, courts have consistently held expressive

conduct is compatible with a purpose of promoting education. See, e.g., Keyishian

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (noting the purpose

of public universities is to expose students to a “marketplace of ideas”); Bd. of

Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 (2000)

(“[R]ecognition must be given as well to the important and substantial purposes of the

University, which seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech.”); Peck v. Upshur County

Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court finding

the express purpose of a primary school board’s practice of allowing private speakers

access to the public schools was to promote “a broad spectrum of knowledge”); N.J.

Sports & Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d at 160 (“[T]he exchange of ideas is an essential

part of the educational process . . . .”); Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir.

1985) (“A college milieu is the quintessential ‘marketplace of ideas.’”).

In analyzing the particular spaces, it is undisputed the Union Mall, Peace

Fountain, and Brough Commons are public thoroughfares open to public access. It

is also undisputed these areas are used and have historically been so for expressive

and non-expressive activities by both University and Non-University Entities. The

Court’s analysis discounts such significant factors in favor of a lesser one–the

University’s mission–which is largely irrelevant to a traditional public forum analysis.

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II

The authority upon which the Court relies does not support the view streets,

sidewalks, and parks on a public university are not traditional public fora. In fact, the

Court’s position is tenuous at best. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)

(“[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the

acknowledged order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on

college campuses than in the community at large.”). The only appellate case the Court

cites arguably on point is Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 118 (5th

Cir. 1992), which held sidewalks and plazas to be designated public fora for the

speech of university students. The analysis in Hays, however, follows the test for

determining whether a space is a traditional public forum. See id. at 117 (noting

Southwest Texas State University’s regulations permit “[a]ny group or person,

whether or not a student or employee, and whether or not invited by a registered

student, faculty, or staff organization, may assemble and engage in free speech

activities on the grounds of the campus”). In analyzing the spaces, however, the Fifth

Circuit never addressed the traditional uses of the sidewalks and plazas or whether

they might be considered traditional public fora. Accordingly, Hays does not stand

for the proposition outdoor sidewalks and plazas on University property are not

traditional public fora; it only stands for the proposition they are at least designated

public fora.

The other cases to which the Court cites are clearly distinguishable as they

relate to: (1) public high schools, which have not been traditionally held open to

expressive conduct, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506

(1969); see also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 237 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[Our] cases

dealing with the right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students

have been confined to high schools, whose students and their schools’ relation to them

are different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college

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-28-

education.”) (internal citations omitted), and which face unique and significant

discipline concerns, N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d at 160 (“Since the

exchange of ideas is an essential part of the educational process, but the need for

discipline and order is great, a public high school is probably a limited forum also.”);

and (2) military bases which have not been historically held open as a public

thoroughfare or for expressive conduct, Greer, 424 U.S. at 838. 

The Court also relies upon dicta found in a footnote in Widmar v. Vincent, 454

U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) (“We have not held, for example, that a campus must make

all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a

university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.”), for the

proposition streets, sidewalks, and parks found within public universities are not

traditional public fora. This reading is not supported by the footnote. The footnote

begins, “[t]his Court has recognized that the campus of a public university, at least for

its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.” Id. (internal

citation omitted). The footnote goes on to limit this generality when applied to college

classrooms. For this limitation, the Court relies upon cases dealing with public high

schools, which, as noted above, are readily distinguishable from college campuses.

The Court in no way suggests, and perhaps with its use of the term “all” implies the

contrary, all streets, sidewalks, and parks on a public university are non-traditional

public fora. 

Indeed, the Court’s reading is in tension with its position a public university

campus contains a variety of fora. See Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 766

(5th Cir. 2005); Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1354 n.6

(11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). If a public university contains a space which

is properly considered a traditional public forum, which it almost certainly does, I

cannot think of a more appropriate traditional public forum than a street, sidewalk, or

park. For this reason, I disagree with Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mote, 423 F.3d

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-29-

438, 433-34 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding because the campus is an institution of higher

learning, its outdoor areas are not held open to the general public). Mote stands for

the proposition the campus as a whole, including classrooms, facilities, and buildings,

must be open to the entire public for the outdoor areas to constitute a traditional public

forum, even when the public has unfettered access to such outdoor areas. I

emphatically disagree with Mote for the reasons described in this concurrence. See

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (“[High] school

facilities “may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have ‘by

policy or by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general

public.”) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,

47 (1983)); see also Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 766 (noting a public university campus may

contain a variety of fora); Ala. Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1354 n.6 (same). 

III

The Court does acknowledge public universities and colleges have been

historically and traditionally used for expressive purposes by students and nonstudents alike. The Court considers the outdoor areas on the University of Arkansas

campus to be unlimited designated public fora, presumably to ensure student and nonstudent speech is protected to the level we associate with public universities.

However, although the Court’s designation requires the application of the same level

of scrutiny of regulations limiting speech as does a traditional public forum

designation, see, e.g., Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2003), the

Court’s designation does not effectively serve to protect either student or non-student

speech.

Once a space is deemed something other than a traditional public forum, even

if an unlimited designated public forum, the government is free to redesignate the

space to limit further expressive conduct or to prohibit it completely. See, e.g., Lee,

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-30-

505 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (declaring a

governmental entity is not required to retain indefinitely the open character of a

designated public forum); Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d

695, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1998). This is a concept inconsistent with our basic

understandings of a public university. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the

Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835-36 (1995) (discussing the historical use of

universities as “voluntary and spontaneous assemblages or concourses for students to

speak”).

To safeguard a public university street, sidewalk, or park’s role as a place for

students to assemble and speak, these areas must be considered the type of property

which would fall within the traditional public forum category. Whether a particular

public university street, sidewalk, or park is a traditional public forum will depend

upon the purpose for which it was created and its traditional use. However, there is

no forum more appropriately considered a “marketplace of ideas” and historically

used by all members of the public to present both socially acceptable and unacceptable

speech than a street, sidewalk, or park found on a public university campus.

Indeed, there is no reason students who may or may not pay tuition and who

may or may not live on campus should have more expressive rights upon a campus

street than should non-students who directly support the public university with tax

dollars. The non-student public attends civic, sporting, theater, and other events on

public university campuses. In this sense, a public university belongs just as much to

a community as it does to the students. Nor is a public university’s educational

mission limited to its students–a university and its faculty publish books to benefit the

public good and use public tax dollars to conduct important research. If we are to

protect any space as a traditional public forum for expressive purposes, a public

university street, sidewalk, or park must be such a space.

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-31-

Wherever a public street or sidewalk runs, it is presumed to be a traditional

public forum. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988). There is, therefore, no

reason to apply a different level of scrutiny to a street, sidewalk or park which

happens to fall within the boundaries of a public university than to one owned by a

municipality. The location of the street “may well inform the application of the

relevant test, but it does not lead to a different test.” Id.; see also Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (“The nature of a place, the pattern of its normal

activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are

reasonable.”) (internal quotation omitted). The University of Arkansas allows

indiscriminate expressive use by all members of the public at the Union Mall, Peace

Fountain, and Brough Commons, regulated only by narrowly tailored time, place, and

manner restrictions designed to serve significant government interests. While the

university context may allow greater and different types of time, place, and manner

regulations, those regulations do not change the character of the space as a traditional

public forum.

IV

The Court wholly fails to acknowledge the University did not formally regulate

expressive conduct on its public thoroughfares until it enacted the Policy in 1993.

Because the University now chooses to regulate speech, however, may not be

sufficient to overcome the objective indicia of contrary purpose. See Paulsen v.

County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991).

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11 While the Court uses its analysis of the historical and traditional use of the

spaces to determine whether the spaces are designated public fora or non-public fora,

the same analysis applies equally to determine whether the spaces are traditional

public fora or non-traditional public fora. 

-32-

It is unclear from the record whether the spaces at issue in the instant case were

designated when the University was founded in 1871 or were created sometime

thereafter. If created at the time the University was founded or prior to the enactment

of the Policy, this might suggest the University designated the spaces for a purpose

inherently compatible with expressive conduct. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835-36

(“[U]niversities began as voluntary and spontaneous assemblages or concourses for

students to speak and to write and to learn.”); Mote, 423 F.3d at 433-34 (“There is

nothing in the record to indicate that until the policy at issue here was implemented,

the campus was anything but a non-public forum for members of the public not

associated with the university.”). If created after the enactment of the Policy, it is

possible the University intended a purpose not inherently compatible with expressive

conduct. However, the record is conspicuously silent on this issue and, indeed, why

the spaces were designated as such in the first instance. 

The Court, however, does acknowledge the spaces at issue have historically and

traditionally been used by University and Non-University Entities.11 The Court

further recognizes “college campuses traditionally and historically serve as places

specifically designated for the free exchange of ideas.” Ante at 14. Indeed, the Court

recognizes a historical and traditional use of public universities and colleges by nonstudents and students alike is to discuss issues of public significance during times of

turmoil. The Court, however, does not suggest where this speech historically or

traditionally occurred on the campuses.

I am left with uncertainty when the spaces were designated and why–factors of

significant importance in determining whether the spaces were created for purposes

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inherently compatible with expressive conduct. In spite of the Court’s valiant effort

to use generalization to establish the historical and traditional use of the Union Mall,

Peace Fountain, and Brough Commons, the record remains insufficient to determine

whether the spaces are traditional public fora under our adopted precedent.

However, the absence of a record should not necessarily preclude us from

reaching a conclusion on the merits of a case. Grace is instructive: “‘[p]ublic places’

historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets,

sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums.’” 461 U.S.

at 177. This view is buttressed by Frisby, which states, “[n]o particularized inquiry

into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the

public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at

481; see also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 744 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen citizens

are going about their business in a place they are entitled to be, they are presumptively

entitled to speak.”). 

While Frisby does not stand for the proposition every sidewalk, street or park

located on government property is a public forum, it does suggest a heavy burden to

prove otherwise. Frisby, read in light of Grace and Kokinda, suggest there is a

presumption of public streets, sidewalks, and plazas being associated with expressive

conduct, wherever they are located, are presumed to be traditional public fora, unless

proved otherwise. While other spaces may constitute traditional public fora, see

ACLU of Nev., 333 F.3d at 1099 n.6, these are the spaces the case law presumes to

be traditional public fora.

Given the sparse record in the instant case, it is incumbent upon us to determine

a framework for proving whether a particular space is a traditional public forum.

Given the presumption established by Grace and Frisby, we should permit a prima

facie showing of a traditional public forum to be made when a plaintiff establishes the

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12 That the University has restricted speech for over a decade does not establish

that those restrictions comport with the greater history of the spaces or their inherent

compatibility with expressive purposes. Indeed, although a University may attempt

to change the character of a traditional public forum, it can only do so legitimately by

changing the physical characteristics of the space–it may not do so by fiat. See Lee,

505 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 743 (Brennan, J.,

dissenting) (“Public access is not a matter of grace by government officials but rather

inherent in the open nature of the locations.”).

13 The Court fails to analyze the differences between the three areas, including

those related to public perception, which might counsel a different outcome for the

Brough Commons than the Union Mall or the Peace Fountain. Brough Commons is

unique even among the other two public places because it is located at the intersection

of two public streets and is not separated from the city sidewalks and public

thoroughfares by a fence or other clear demarcation. The record establishes a

passerby would not know she had entered a “special enclave” with reduced

protections for expressive conduct once she passed onto the Brough Commons area.

See Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-80; Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. United States Postal

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space at issue is a public street, sidewalk, or plaza associated with expressive activity.

Here, Mr. Bowman has clearly done so. 

When a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing a space is a traditional public

forum, the defendant should bear the burden to produce objective evidence of the (1)

physical characteristics, (2) original purpose, or (3) historical and traditional use of

the space which would rebut plaintiff’s prima facie showing. 

Here, the University failed to produce evidence which would establish anything

other than a traditional public forum regarding the purposes for which the Union Mall,

Peace Fountain, and Brough Commons were created or regarding the historical and

traditional uses of those spaces.12 Accordingly, I would conclude the University failed

to meet its burden to produce evidence sufficient to rebut Bowman’s prima facie

showing the spaces at issue are traditional public fora.13 Nevertheless, this does not

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Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Under the case law which speaks

directly to this issue, Brough Commons is a traditional public forum.

14 Although the same scrutiny is applied in cases involving traditional public

fora and designated public fora, see, e.g., Goulart, 345 F.3d at 250, I disagree with the

Court’s implicit suggestion there is a lessened burden for designated public fora

because the University may simply redesignate the space at issue. While the

University may redesignate the space if the space is deemed a designated public

forum, such a redesignation cannot serve to avoid review under the designated public

forum standard, nor can it be applied as a post hoc rationalization for an

unconstitutional restriction of expressive conduct.

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end the inquiry. A determination must still be made whether the regulations comport

with the standard of scrutiny applied to regulation of traditional public fora.

V

Although I disagree with the Court’s forum analysis and failure to place

appropriately the burden of rebuttal on the University, I agree with the ultimate

disposition of this case because the advance notice and permit requirements, as well

as the dead day restrictions, imposed by the University pass constitutional muster

under the traditional public forum analysis, while the five day limitation does not.14

See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 118-19 (noting the city can restrict the public’s expressive

activity on public sidewalks adjacent to a school if the conduct “materially disrupts

classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others”).

Although the Court’s reasoning as to Bowman’s proposed leafletting and silent

speech activities comes close to upholding improper prohibitions on speech based

upon a feared reaction, see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09; PeTA, People for the Ethical

Treatment of Animals v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1206 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 560 (1965)), given the University’s limited resources,

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15Bowman has raised concerns regarding the distinction between University and

Non-University Entities’ speech on dead days. I disagree with the Court’s treatment

of this argument insofar as the limitations on athletic contests and plant maintenance

are highly distinguishable. Maintenance work is not a protected expressive activity.

Limitations on athletic contests do limit speech, but it is unclear from our precedent

whether such speech is actually deemed protected speech. In any event, the spaces in

which the contests occur might not be considered either traditional public fora or

unlimited designated public fora and the limitations imposed restrict both student and

non-student speech. I further question the Court’s speculation University Entities’s

expressive activities, which may include speech by individuals not associated with

education, are more attuned to the needs of the University for quiet during the dead

days than the public. Nevertheless, the differential treatment raised by Bowman does

not serve to make the regulation improper under a traditional public forum analysis

because it serves significant government interests and is narrowly tailored to those

interests since it minimizes the distractions faced by students during exam period and

leaves open ample other times during which expressive activities may occur. Further,

such claims are more properly raised under the Equal Protection Clause than under the

First Amendment. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733.

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the advance notice and permit regulations nevertheless serve significant governmental

interests in protecting University Entities against unwanted solicitation and ensuring

proper crowd control capabilities, while being narrowly tailored to those interests.

See Glover, 762 F.2d at 1201-03 (concluding solicitation restriction is a “manner”

restriction which passes constitutional muster).

Similarly, the dead day ban is a time restriction which serves a significant

government interest in ensuring proper studying and testing conditions and is

narrowly tailored to those interests.15 See PeTA, 298 F.3d at 1204-05.

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Based on such reasoning as to the nature and status of the Union Mall, Peace

Fountain, and Brough Commons, which, I believe, should be recognized as traditional

public fora, I do, nonetheless, concur in the ultimate outcome of this case.

______________________________

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