Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02973/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02973-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO CEJA-LICEA,

Petitioner,

Case Nos. 11cv2973 BEN

 11cr1961 BEN

ORDER DENYING § 2255

MOTION

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Francisco Ceja-Licea moves pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for a reduction in his

sentence based on his alien status and challenges to Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) policies which

preclude him from participating in certain pre-release programs. (Dkt. No. 26.) Because, as discussed

below, he waived the right to challenge his sentence and his Equal Protection argument lacks merit,

the Court DENIES the motion. 

DISCUSSION

I. Waiver

The Ninth Circuit recognizes strong public policy considerations justifying the enforcement

of a defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal or collaterally attack a judgment. United States v.

Novarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). Waivers play an important role in the plea

bargaining process and help ensure finality. Id. at 322. Generally, courts enforce a defendant’s waiver

of his right to appeal, as long as the waiver was “knowingly and voluntarily made” and “encompasses

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the defendant’s right to appeal on the grounds claimed on appeal.” United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d

956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Petitioner waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence in his plea agreement.

(Petitioner’s Plea Agreement § XI.) The plea agreement states that “[i]n exchange for the

Government’s concessions in this plea agreement, defendant waives, to the full extent of the law, any

right to appeal or to collaterally attack his sentence . . . unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence

above the high end of the guideline range recommended bythe Government pursuant to this agreement

at the time of sentencing.” (Id.) The Court did not impose a sentence above the high end of the

guideline range. Rather, the Court imposed the 46-month sentence recommended by both the

Government and Petitioner and the low end of the guideline range. (Dkt. Nos. 22-23.) Petitioner

received the benefit of his plea agreement and his knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to

collaterally attack his sentence requires denial of his § 2255 motion. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322

(finding a defendant could not ignore his part of the bargain in a plea agreement after obtaining

concessions from the government).

II. Equal Protection

Petitioner filed the present motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but his Equal Protection challenge

to the constitutionality of certain BOP policies is better construed as a challenge to the manner in

which his sentence is being executed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d

861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (instructing that petitions challenging the “manner, location or

conditions of a sentence’s execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241”); see also Montano-Figuero

v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 549 (9th Cir. 1998) (illustrating that challenges to BOP policies are

challenges to the execution of an inmate’s sentence). Construing his motion liberally, the Court

considers Petitioner’s Equal Protection claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d

1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting a court’s “duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally”). 

Petitioner claims that the BOP policy preventing him from participating in certain programs

or being housed in certain facilities due to his alien status violates his right to Equal Protection. 

However, BOP policies preventing deportable aliens from participating in certain programs survive

constitutional challenge. Cf. McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding BOP

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exclusion of prisoners with detainers, including INS detainers, from community-based program based

on petitioners’ alien status did not violate Equal Protection).

Additionally, a number of district courts have also found that policies preventing alien

prisoners from participating in certain pre-release programs are also justified because the purpose of

the program — helping prisoners reenter the communityafter serving their sentence — is not advanced

in the case of prisoners who will be deported upon release. See Lizarraga-Lopez v. United States, 89

F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1169-70 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (upholding deportable alien’s ineligibility for community

confinement); United States v. Rodas-Jacome, No. 06cv1481, 2007WL1231630, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr.

24, 2007) (upholding restrictions for alien prisoners to obtain “good time” credits in rehabilitation

programs). Because deportable alien prisoners pose a greater flight risk and the public policy

justifications for pre-release programs are inapplicable, the challenged policies survive constitutional

scrutiny and Petitioner’s Equal Protection claim fails. The Court also denies relief under § 2241.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s motion is DENIED. The Clerk shall close case number 11cv2973.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 30, 2011

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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