Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02890/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02890-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241st Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLORENCIO JOSE DOMINGUEZ,

Petitioner,

Case No. 14-cv-2890-BAS-RBB

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary, California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation, 

Respondent.

Petitioner Florencio Jose Dominguez filed this petition for writ of habeas 

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state court conviction for first-degree 

murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Since then, a state court has vacated 

Dominguez’s conviction. Therefore, for the following reasons, the Court dismisses 

this § 2254 petition because the two claims it raises are moot. 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Conviction and Direct Appeal1

In a gang-related incident, fifteen-year-old Moises Lopez was beaten and then 

executed in Mountain View Park in southeast San Diego. The San Diego County 

District Attorney charged Dominguez with first-degree murder for the killing.

The case proceeded to trial, but the jury deadlocked nine to three in favor of 

acquittal. Afterwards, the trial judge declared a mistrial and dismissed the case 

without prejudice pursuant to California Penal Code § 1385. In doing so, the judge 

noted: 

Well, this is a tough call because a 15-year-old boy was executed in a 

park. [¶] The evidence shows the defendant is, in fact, the shot-caller for

[the gang]. There is no question about that. He has a double life. He’s a 

good employee and a dad and a husband; but he also has a girlfriend and 

is an active gang member, in fact, probably the head of that gang. There 

is no question he was in the park . . . . So he did it, or he obviously knows 

who did.

The question in this case, though, is one of did the D.A. meet their 

burden? . . . .

That’s what this case is all about . . . . He [the prosecutor] has shown by 

a preponderance the defendant is the murderer. He has even probably 

shown by clear and convincing evidence the defendant is the murderer. 

At this point he has failed to meet—I agree with the nine jurors. If I was 

to sit and make a call on this case without a jury, I think the D.A. has 

failed to meet their burden at this point in time . . . . [If Dominguez] didn’t 

pull the trigger, he knows who did. He’s standing right there. It may be 

somebody else, but based on the current state of the evidence, that can’t 

be proven. And so at this point the matter is dismissed without prejudice.

Undeterred, the District Attorney refiled the case with an additional charge for 

conspiracy to commit murder. Dominguez demurred to the criminal complaint under 

California Penal Code § 1004. He argued the protection against double jeopardy 

 1 The Court draws this background from the California Court of Appeal’s unpublished 

opinion, which is available in Lodgment No. 7 (ECF No. 5-32).

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barred the new complaint because he believes the trial judge dismissed the first case 

for a lack of evidence—that is, the judge effectively acquitted him of the murder 

charge. The demurrer was assigned to a different judge, who overruled the demurrer. 

At the ensuing second trial, the jury found Dominguez guilty of both first-degree 

murder and the new charge of conspiracy to commit murder.

Dominguez appealed, again arguing that double jeopardy principles barred his 

second prosecution, as well as raising other claims of error. The California Court of 

Appeal rejected his claims and affirmed the judgment. Petitioner then raised the same 

claims in a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which denied the 

petition without comment.

B. Federal Petition

Dominguez did not pursue collateral review in state court. Instead, he filed this 

action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his habeas petition, Dominguez alleges his state 

conviction violates the Constitution because: (1) his second “trial was barred by 

Double Jeopardy”; and (2) he was “denied his constitutional right of confrontation 

when the judge limited the cross examination” of a witness at trial. (Pet. ¶ 22; see 

also Pet. Mem. 10:11–26:17, ECF No. 1.)

After the State of California responded, the magistrate judge issued a Report 

& Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that this Court grant the petition on 

double jeopardy grounds. (ECF No. 9.) The R&R also recommends that Petitioner’s 

Confrontation Clause claim be denied. (Id.)

The State objected to the R&R, and Dominguez replied. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.)

After holding oral argument on the petition, the Court requested supplemental 

briefing regarding Dominguez’s conspiracy conviction. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.)

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C. State Petition

Meanwhile, with this petition pending, Dominguez filed a second petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the state trial court (“State Petition”). The State Petition 

objected to the prosecution’s use of certain DNA evidence at Dominguez’s second 

trial. (In re Dominguez, No. HC 22238, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2017) 

(“Order Granting State Petition”), ECF No. 16, Ex. 1.) This DNA evidence was based 

on an analysis of mixture samples collected from a pair of bloody gloves found near 

the scene of the murder. (Id. at 5–7.) Mixture samples are samples containing DNA 

that was contributed from more than one person. (Id. at 3, 8.) For several years prior

to Dominguez’ssecond trial, “concern arose within the forensic scientific community 

regarding some of the techniques used by DNA laboratories in the interpretation of 

mixture samples.” (Id. at 11.) This concern eventually led to the adoption of new 

guidelines for analyzing these samples. (Id. at 12–17.)

An evidentiary hearing on the State Petition revealed that the San Diego Police 

Department’s Crime Laboratory had changed its procedures to conform to the new 

DNA mixture sample guidelines a few days before Dominguez’s second trial. (Order 

Granting State Petition at 18.) If these new procedures had been followed to analyze 

the relevant mixture samples, the prosecution’s expert would have testified that “it 

was impossible to determine if [Dominguez] was even a minor contributor to the 

DNA” in either sample presented. (Id. at 20.) In other words, the inculpatory DNA 

evidence at issue would not have been presented at trial. (Id. at 21.) Yet, although the 

prosecution’s own expert was the one responsible for changing the laboratory’s 

procedures—as he was the lab’s technical manager—he failed to “disclose that the 

changes in policy had occurred.” (Id. at 18.) 

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Because the change in guidelines was both favorable to Dominguez and 

material, the state court found this nondisclosure violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 (1963). (Order Granting State Petition at 22–35.) Accordingly, the state court 

granted the petition and vacated Dominguez’s conviction for murder and conspiracy 

to commit murder. (Id.) It further provided that the State could retry Dominguez or 

otherwise must release him. (Id. at 36.) The State did not appeal. 

Upon learning Dominguez’s conviction had been vacated, this Court issued an 

order to show cause as to why this federal petition attacking the conviction is not now 

moot. (ECF No. 18.) Both parties responded. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.)

II. ANALYSIS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts “shall entertain an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus [from] a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Constitution limits federal 

courts’ jurisdiction over habeas petitions, like other actions, to those that present live 

cases or controversies. E.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Burnett v. 

Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). “Failure to satisfy Article III’s case-orcontroversy requirement renders a habeas petition moot.” Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 

F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no 

longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell 

v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).

The claims raised in a federal habeas petition may become moot when the 

petitioner obtains relief in state court. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 

634 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting a state court appeal “may result in the reversal of the 

petitioner’s conviction on some other ground, thereby mooting the federal question”). 

For instance, in Cumbo v. Eyman, 409 F.2d 400, 400 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), 

the petitioner successfully obtained habeas relief in the district court, and the state 

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appealed. However, while the federal appeal was pending, the state appellate court 

reversed the petitioner’s conviction. Id. The Ninth Circuit consequently remanded 

the action for dismissal, reasoning that the proceeding had “been rendered moot.” Id.; 

see also Hunt v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 384, 384 (9th Cir. 1968) (concluding an issue raised 

by a habeas petition was moot where the state court had granted the petitioner relief 

after the petition was filed).

Dominguez filed this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his 

conviction for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. But the state 

court has since vacated this conviction. In doing so, it extinguished Dominguez’s two 

claims under § 2254. His claim that he was denied his constitutional right of 

confrontation at his second trial no longer presents a live controversy. Similarly,

Dominguez’s claim that his second prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause 

also does not present a live controversy. He is no longer in custody pursuant to the 

conviction procured by the second prosecution. Moreover, unlike cases where 

petitioners have completed their sentences but are still permitted to challenge their 

convictions because the convictions cause collateral consequences, there is no 

conviction here for Dominguez to seek to set aside. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7–9 

(discussing the role of collateral consequences in satisfying the case-or-controversy 

requirement); see also, e.g., Robertson v. Pichon, 849 F.3d 1173, 1177 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2017) (noting the court has jurisdiction over a § 2254 habeas appeal because the

petitioner “is presumed to experience collateral consequences as a result of his 

convictions”). At this point, opining on the constitutional condition of Dominguez’s 

second prosecution would be advisory. Therefore, the two claims raised in 

Dominguez’s § 2254 petition are moot. 

Dominguez, who is represented by counsel, disputes this conclusion. He 

reports that the State has not released him from custody; rather, it has placed him in 

pretrial detention and is moving forward with a third prosecution for only conspiracy 

to commit murder. (ECF No. 21.) He therefore argues his § 2254 petition has been

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simply transmuted into a pre-trial custody petition. (Id. 2:18–3:15.) Dominguez 

further requests that the Court now summarily: (1) determine abstention is 

unwarranted, (2) excuse Dominguez from exhausting his pre-trial custody challenge 

in state court, and (3) find his conspiracy prosecution is barred by collateral estoppel 

and principles of fundamental fairness. (Id. 2:18–6:3.)

The Court will not wade into these issues. None of them are properly before 

it. Nor have they been developed. Dominguez’s § 2254 petition challenges his 

conviction for murder and conspiracy to commit murder—not his impending third 

prosecution for only conspiracy. Because his conviction has been vacated, his two 

claims targeting it under § 2254 are moot. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the 

petition. 

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES Dominguez’s petition under 

§ 2254 because the two claims it raises attacking his state court conviction are moot.2

This dismissal does not preclude Dominguez from seeking other relief.

Further, a petitioner may not appeal “the final order in a habeas corpus 

proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a 

State court” unless “a . . . judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c). When a petition is resolved on procedural grounds, a certificate should issue 

when the petitioner demonstrates “at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court 

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether this Court is correct in finding 

Dominguez’s § 2254 claims attacking a now-vacated conviction are moot. See id.

 2 Because they are moot, the Court also declines to adopt the R&R (ECF No. 9) and 

overrules as moot the State’s objections to the R&R (ECF No. 10).

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Consequently, the Court declines to issue Dominguez a certificate of appealability. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 18, 2018

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