Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00007/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCELLUS LEWIS, JR.,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0007 EFB

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ORDER

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. 

 /

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment is granted, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is

denied, and this matter is remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further

proceedings as directed in this opinion. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born April 22, 1961, applied for disability benefits under Title XVI of the Act

on April 29, 2004, alleging disability since March 5, 2004, due to “bad back/disc, problems in

right arm,” right shoulder pain, back pain, pain on the left side from the hip down, left arm pain,

groin infection, diabetes, and numbness in hands and fingers. Administrative Record (“AR”) 13,

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 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382, et seq. Both provisions define disability,

in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) and

1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under

both programs. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 and 416.971-76; Bowen v.

Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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35, 37, 44, 59, 60, 80. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 35-41,

44-48. On August 23, 2006, following a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

Theodore T.N. Slocum, plaintiff was found not disabled.1

 AR 12-23. 

At the May 18, 2006, hearing and in the subsequent written decision, the ALJ took note

of plaintiff’s previous application for disability benefits. Plaintiff’s previous application, filed on

May 13, 2002, alleged disability since June 1, 1995, in connection with upper and lower

extremity nerve injuries. AR 30, 32. That application was denied initially and upon

reconsideration. The same ALJ presided over the subsequent hearing, and issued a March 4,

2004, decision finding plaintiff not disabled. AR 27-31. The determination of non-disability

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was affirmed on appeal by a federal magistrate judge on May 18, 2005, thereby making the

March 4, 2004, decision the final decision of the Commissioner with regard to the 2002

application. AR 12. 

With regard to the March 5, 2004, application, the ALJ again found that plaintiff was not

disabled. AR 12-23. In his written decision dated August 23, 2006, the ALJ applied

Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9), which directs the Commissioner to apply a presumption of

continuing nondisability where a claimant files a subsequent claim for benefits following a prior

denial by an ALJ. See Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9). “A claimant may rebut the presumption by

showing a changed circumstance affecting the issue of disability with respect to the

unadjudicated period,” such as a change in his age category under 20 C.F.R. § 416.963, an

increase in the severity of his impairments, the alleged existence of new impairments not

previously considered, or a change in the criteria for determining disability. Id. 

The ALJ found that there had been no change in circumstances with respect to plaintiff’s

functional abilities from the previous decision, despite that the existence of new medical

evidence in the record. AR 13. He concluded that plaintiff was not disabled and retained the

ability “to perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Id.

 Specifically, the ALJ made the following findings:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since the alleged onset of disability.

2. The claimant’s cervical degenerative disc disease, mild

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, diabetes

mellitus and he is [sic] status post surgery on the left elbow

are considered “severe” based on the requirements in the

Regulations 20 CFR § 416.920(c).

3. These medically determinable impairments do not meet or

medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix

1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. 

4. The undersigned finds the claimant’s allegations regarding

his limitations are not totally credible for the reasons set

forth in the body of the decision. 

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5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift and

carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. 

He can stand and walk four hours during an eight-hour day

and sit for at least six hours in an eight-hour day. The

claimant could frequently kneel, climb, balance, crawl,

stoop and crouch. The claimant can perform frequent

reaching, handling and manipulation with the left upper

extremity. He must also avoid concentrated exposure to

cold and hot temperatures. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work

(20 CFR § 416.965).

7. The claimant is a “younger individual between the ages of

45 and 49” (20 CFR § 416.963).

8. The claimant has a “high school (or high school equivalent)

education” (20 CFR § 416.964).

9. The claimant has no transferable skills from any past

relevant work and/or transferability of skills is not an issue

in this case (20 CFR § 416.968).

10. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform a significant range of light work (20 CFR §

416.967). 

11. Although the claimant’s exertional limitations do not allow

him to perform the full range of light work, using MedicalVocational Rule 202.21 as a framework for decisionmaking, there are a significant number of jobs in the

national economy that he could perform. Examples of such

jobs include work as a skip tracer (DOT #241.367-026),

bus monitor (DOT #372.667-042) and agricultural jobs

(DOT# 521.687-086).

12. The claimant was not under a “disability,” as defined in the

Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this

decision (20 CFR § 416.920(g)).

AR 22.

On October 27, 2006, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, and the

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 4-6.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff essentially alleges four errors in the

Commissioner’s decision. First, he alleges unprofessional behavior by the ALJ during the

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hearing that he claims deprived him of a fair hearing. Second, he alleges that the ALJ failed to

properly evaluate the medical opinions in the record. Third, plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed

to credit his testimony without adequate basis regarding the nature and extent of his pain and

functional limitations. Finally, he alleges that the ALJ failed to include all of his functional

limitations in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert at the hearing. As discussed below,

the court finds that remand is required for a full and fair hearing of plaintiff’s claim. 

Accordingly, the court does not specifically address each of the other alleged errors.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards are

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000);

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel,

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).

The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol.

Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff appeared at the May 18, 2006, hearing with a non-attorney representative. AR

236-38. He alleges that the ALJ’s comments during the hearing revealed bias and a

predisposition to rule against him, thus depriving him of a fair hearing.

 Administrative law judges “are presumed to be unbiased.” Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d

1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Schwiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982)). “This

presumption can be rebutted only by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific

reason for disqualification.” Id. “[J]udicial remarks during the course of a [hearing] that are

critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do

not” constitute bias. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Further, “expressions of

impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” do not establish bias. Rollins v.

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56). However,

judicial remarks may support a finding of bias “if they reveal an opinion that derives from an

extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or

antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. The relevant inquiry

is whether, in the context of the whole case, the ALJ’s behavior was “so extreme as to display

clear inability to render fair judgment.” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 858 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at

551)). 

Here, plaintiff does not allege a conflict of interest, but rather argues that the ALJ’s

comments demonstrate a clear “inability to render a fair judgment.” Specifically, plaintiff points

to several comments by the ALJ regarding plaintiff’s character and failure to find a job. For

example, after questioning by the ALJ about whether plaintiff had tried to find a job, plaintiff

testified that he “tried to work for Light Rail and everything else too,” but that “they said . . . [he]

probably wouldn’t pass the physical.” AR 243. Upon further questioning, it was revealed that

“they” were simply employees who were not qualified to make a medical determination about

plaintiff’s ability to pass the physical. Plaintiff admitted he simply took “their” word for it, and

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the ALJ responded by stating, “[a]nd you took their word. You sound to me like you don’t want

to work.” AR 243-44.

The ALJ made other comments in this same vein. After receiving vague responses from

plaintiff regarding his smoking habit and efforts to obtain smoking cessation education, the ALJ

commented:

You’re really looking for a free ride, looking for insurance, you’re

looking for disability, you’re looking for child support. You’re

getting food stamps. You’re getting free medical at the VA Clinic. 

You get free medical the Sacramento County Clinic. You’ve got

some kind if [sic] medical up in Roseville. Why don’t you just go

out and look for work? 

AR 252-53. 

The ALJ also expressed frustration when plaintiff could not remember the last time he

was examined by a doctor:

You know, sir, you’ve been to one of these hearings before. 

You’ve had an unfavorable Decision [sic] issued. You’ve tried to

appeal it. You’ve reapplied. I mean, you know how to work the

disability system. I can’t understand why you say you’re not

prepared for this hearing, because you’ve even been through a

prior hearing with me.

AR 254. 

The ALJ also accused plaintiff of “doctor shopping” in light of his treatment at both the 

Veteran’s Administration (“VA”) hospital and the Sacramento Family Medical Clinic. AR 251. 

The plaintiff explained that he began going to the VA hospital because it was closer to where he

was staying at the time (he was homeless) and because he had trouble finding transportation. 

See id. Plaintiff explained his transportation difficulties again when the ALJ asked him why he

had an upcoming appointment at the Sacramento Family Clinic rather than the VA hospital. AR

257. 

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The ALJ responded, by commenting: 

Have you just thought, you know, let’s go out and get a job? A lot

of us work with injuries. There are people who have served with

me as ALJs, who are in their late 50's, and some of them have had

one or two open heart surgeries. I’ve had colleagues here who

have had double hip replacements, and they’ve worked for a long

time with a single hip replacement. I have colleagues here who are

in their 80's, who’ve had open heart surgery and continue to work. 

I have a colleague here who’s been in the hospital several times in

the last few weeks with blood clots, and he continues, as soon as

he gets out fo the hospital, he’s in here working or picking up work

to take home. . . . But it’s a matter of attitude sir. And I don’t see

– you see, this is not a welfare program that you’re in here for. 

This is a disability program. It’s for people who want to work who

may have some medically determinable impairments, which

they’re trying to take care of, i.e., by following their medically

recommended treatment. They’re trying to make themselves well,

and they’re trying to find jobs. And I don’t see any job effort here

since before last – even before the last hearing. Your [sic] telling

me you haven’t tried to get a job since 2000. You got a denial

from me in 2004, and the Federal Court just affirmed it. . . . 

AR 257-58 (emphasis added).

When plaintiff testified that he could not sit for more than ten or fifteen minutes, the

following curious exchange took place: 

ALJ: You’ve been sitting 40 minutes now. But go ahead. It’s ten

o’clock. 

[Plaintiff’s] REP: He’s gotten up a couple times during the 40 minutes,

Your Honor. 

ALJ: You noticed. 

AR 264.

This exchange, in combination with the other comments noted above, suggests that the

ALJ was preparing a record to impugn plaintiff’s credibility, which would have been effective

had plaintiff’s representative not challenged him. Reviewing all the above comments in the

context of the whole case, and in light of applicable law, it is clear that plaintiff did not receive a

fair hearing. 

The ALJ’s commentary at the hearing must be viewed in the context of the nonadversarial nature of Social Security hearings. “Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial

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rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments

both for and against granting benefits.” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-111 (2000) (citing

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971)). “The ALJ in a social security case has an

independent duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests

are considered.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996)) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The ad

hominem attacks here show the ALJ stepping from his role of developing a record and into the

role of an adversary.

The ALJ appears to have begun the process with the predicate that if plaintiff was not out

looking for work, he simply was not disabled. Apart from the fact that the former does not

necessarily establish the latter, the hearing record shows that the ALJ did little to assure that

plaintiff’s interests were properly considered, even if ultimately rejected. Instead the record

show the ALJ preempted the hearing and accused plaintiff of lying, doctor shopping, and having

an attitude problem. The ALJ’s comments demonstrate an adversarial and antagonistic approach

to plaintiff and his disability claim. They reveal more than mere impatience or frustration and

demonstrate a prejudgment as to the merits of plaintiff’s case and an assessment of his character. 

While assessing credibility of testimony regarding subjective complaints and inability to perform

work functions and daily activities may well warrant consideration of evidence of “malingering”

or lack of motivation, the ALJ’s challenges to plaintiff’s attitude and character are not presented

in the context of a credibility determination as to a specific fact in issue at some step in the

sequential analysis. Rather, the record reveals that the ALJ began and ended the process with the

presumption that plaintiff was not willing to look for work and therefore was not disabled. Apart

from the fact that the former does not necessarily establish the latter, the record shows that these

prejudgments were formed even before the ALJ had the opportunity to review all the evidence in

the record. See AR 246 (ALJ commenting that he had not yet had an opportunity to review

newly admitted records).

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More troubling, however, is the ALJ’s lengthy colloquy about his colleagues and other

claimants who continue to work despite injuries or medical conditions. These reference to extrarecord factual information appear to have actually influenced the outcome of his decision. His 

comments suggest to a preconceived opinion regarding plaintiff’s alleged disability that appears

to have been improperly informed by “extrajudicial” sources.

Although the final written decision by the ALJ reflects a much more balanced and

analytical approach to plaintiff’s claim, certain mischaracterizations found therein confirm that

remand for a new hearing before a different ALJ is appropriate here.

For example, the ALJ completely ignored the written observations of the physicians’

assistant who treated plaintiff. Although physicians’ assistants are not “acceptable medical

sources” under the regulations, they are nonetheless “other medical sources” whose observations

and opinions the ALJ is required to consider. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). Social Security

Ruling (“SSR”) 06-03p explicitly provides that the “requirement to consider all relevant

evidence in an individual’s case record” includes “consideration of opinions from medical

sources who are not ‘acceptable medical sources.’” SSR 06-03p.

Here, Anita Makowski, a physician’s assistant at the Sacramento Family Medical Clinic

(where plaintiff received regular treatment), completed an evaluation of plaintiff’s limitations on

April 4, 2006. AR 176-79. She noted that plaintiff’s lumbar disc protrusion and cervical

degenerative disc disease resulted in pain. She opined that the pain limited his ability to walk

and stand for more than an hour. AR 176. She further opined that he could sit for less than an

hour, could only lift five pounds frequently, and was restricted from climbing stairs and ladders. 

AR 177. If the ALJ rejected these opinions and discounted the weight of the observations, he

was obliged to explain why.

The government defends the ALJ’s failure to consider this evidence, arguing that an ALJ

need not “discuss all evidence presented,” especially where it is based solely on plaintiff’s

subjective complaints. See Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., 10:1-19 (citing Vincent v. Heckler,

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 The plaintiff, while trying to recall the name of a specialist he was sent to see at a VA

clinic, stated “right now I’m nervous and the name’s not coming.” After having previously

elicited testimony from plaintiff that “I’ve been homeless for two years, me and my wife and my

family,” AR 248, the ALJ reacted to plaintiff’s lack of recall with the comment “I can’t

understand why you’re so sloppy and not keeping track of whose [sic] treating you.” AR 250.

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739 F.2d 1393, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984)). The point is well-taken. However, the court in Vincent

held that while the ALJ need not discuss all evidence presented, he nonetheless “must explain

why significant probative evidence has been rejected.” Id., at 1395 (quoting Cotter v. Harris,

642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981)). Here, while the opinion of the physicians’ assistant may be

based largely on plaintiff’s subjective complaints, it is nonetheless significant, probative

evidence bearing directly on the plaintiff’s functional limitations, and indeed, it is the only

opinion evidence in the record from a treating source. Her assessment of substantial functional

limitations is significant and probative, and while the ALJ is free to discount it for particularized

reasons, he is not free to ignore it.

Finally, while the ALJ’s credibility determination was based, in part, on discrepancies

between plaintiff’s grave, subjective complaints and objective evidence tending to show only

mild abnormalities, it was also based on other, seemingly improper considerations. For example,

in finding plaintiff not “entirely credible,” the ALJ noted that “the claimant tested positive for

cocaine in January 2006,” and that he “has not actively sought employment and . . . could not

recall his physician’s name at the hearing.”2

 AR 20. Whether these are appropriate

considerations in assessing a claimant’s credibility depends on context and how they specifically

relate to a particular fact in question. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“factors that an ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s credibility include reputation for

truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily activities, and

unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of

treatment”). No such explanatory context was provided here. Other than impugn the plaintiff’s

character generally the ALJ did not address the relevant factors and explain how they relate to

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 Given the remand for a new hearing on these grounds, the court does not reach

plaintiff’s other challenges to the ALJ’s decision.

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plaintiff’s testimony as to a specific material issue.

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, the court finds that the ALJ’s antagonism toward

plaintiff colored the entire hearing process and appears to have affected his consideration of the

record. Because plaintiff did not receive a full and fair hearing, this matter should be remanded

to the Commissioner for a new hearing before a different ALJ. On remand, the ALJ must satisfy

his or her “special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s

interests are considered.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288 (quotations and citation omitted)3

.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied;

3. This action is remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this order; and,

4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff.

DATED: September 19, 2008.

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