Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00711/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00711-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Although defendants do not specifically note it in their motion, defendant Marrow was 1

apparently incorrectly sued as Morrow and defendant Heintschel as defendant Heintchel, and the

court will direct the Clerk to correct the spelling in the court’s docket.

 Plaintiff objects to defendant Woodard’s motion to join the pending motion to dismiss 2

on the ground that this defendant could have filed a timely response and that defendants wrongly

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD LAY, JR., 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0711 JAM GGH P

vs.

R. MARROW, et al., ORDER & 1

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are 1) motion to dismiss, filed on 2/14/08, by

defendants Marrow, Dean, Tinseth, Roblez, Heintschel, Long, Neis (incorrectly named “Neil”)

and Williams, to which plaintiff filed an opposition on 3/03/08, after which defendants filed a

reply on 3/07/08; 2) defendant Woodard’s motion to join defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on

3/06/08, which request, although plaintiff filed his opposition on 3/14/08, is hereby granted; 3) 2

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asserted at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss that Woodard had not yet been served. 

A review of the waivers of service filed for defendants Marrow (incorrectly spelled Morrow),

Dean, Tinseth, Roblez, Heintschel (misspelled Heintchel), Long, and William, filed on 1/15/08,

all indicate that those executed waivers were signed on 12/19/07. In a separate filing on 1/24/08,

defendant Neis’ waiver was signed on 1/15/08, and defendant Neis’ waiver was signed on his 

behalf on 1/15/08 and defendant Woodard’s was signed on 1/16/08. While it is puzzling that

defendant Neis’ name was included on the original motion and defendant Woodard’s was not and

that defendants’ incorrectly therein stated that Woodard had not yet been served, this appears to

be simply a clerical error on defendants’ part that Woodard’s motion to join is intended to rectify.

 The undersigned references the pagination of the court’s electronic docket. 3

 Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed on 4/16/07. 4

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plaintiff’s request for leave to file a second amended complaint and proposed second amended

complaint, filed on 4/23/08.

First Amended Complaint

The gravamen of plaintiff’s allegations against defendants is that he was subjected

to an excessive use of force in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment during an

unnecessary cell extraction by defendants Morrow, Dean, Tinseth and Roblez, acting under the

supervision of defendants Long, Heintschel and Neis, on 10/25/05, resulting in serious physical

injuries to plaintiff. Amended Complaint (AC), pp. 2, 4-19, filed on 9/20/07. He also claims to 3 4

have been subjected to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and a conspiracy to

cover up constitutional violations in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. AC, p.

2. 

At about 10:00 a.m. on 10/25/05, defendant Long asked plaintiff to “cuff up” so

water in plaintiff’s cell could be cleaned up. When plaintiff objected, defendant Long warned

plaintiff if he refused he would be pepper-sprayed; plaintiff nevertheless continued to refuse and

defendant Long left. About 15 minutes later, defendant Long returned with defendant

Heintschel, shaking cans of pepper spray; defendant Long opened the food port and sprayed a can

of pepper spray through the food port of plaintiff’s cell and then closed the door. Five minutes

later, more cans of pepper spray were “shot into his cell.” Breathing became unbearable, so

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plaintiff breathed through a hole in the back window of his cell. With his back to the cell door,

plaintiff heard a booming sound followed by another and felt something hit the right side of his

head and lost consciousness. AC, p. 5.

Plaintiff contends that when he regained consciousness he was being struck by

feet and fists although he offered no resistance. He was handcuffed, shackled, dragged from his

cell by the leg shackles’ chain, forced to stand and walk by defendants’ Morrow and Dean even

though he complained of the tight shackles causing him great pain. Plaintiff was not put on the

gurney for the decontamination shower until defendants Morrow and Dean, after Morrow had

looked back and yelled for plaintiff to “stop resisting,” had forcefully slammed his face into the

6-blocks’ door frame which “busted” his jaw open. Although non-defendant M.T.A. Schiller

ordered that plaintiff be taken to the emergency room, defendants Morrow and Dean threw

plaintiff head first into the shower by the leg irons and handcuffs, where plaintiff remained from

11:00 a.m. until 4:15 p.m. with the shackles and cuffs so tight “he lost all feeling in his hands and

feet.” AC, p. 6.

Defendant Pazos came to the decontamination shower and asked if plaintiff had 

injuries at 11:45 a.m., but even though plaintiff showed Pazos his injuries, included the

laceration on his jaw, and described what had happened, defendant Pazos walked away doing

nothing. AC, pp. 7, 15. Plaintiff states that he did not see non-defendant R.N. D. Klith or

receive any medical treatment from her that day. At 4:15 p.m. on 10/25/05, non-defendant C/O

Dunkle loosened plaintiff’s leg irons and handcuffs and escorted plaintiff to the emergency room

where defendant Williams wiped some of the blood off the plaintiff’s jaw laceration for

photographs by Dunkle, but she failed to treat, clean or close the laceration or check to determine

if the jaw had been fractured or if plaintiff had a concussion; nor did she call a doctor. Plaintiff

was taken to the holding cell until 6:30 or 7:00 p.m., then returned to the cell that was still

contaminated with pepper spray. AC, pp. 7, 17-18.

\\\\\

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Plaintiff claims that defendant Heintschel had nodded to defendant Morrow

indicating that the video camera was turned off before defendant Morrow slammed his face into

the door frame. AC, pp. 8, 14. Plaintiff contends that defendants Roblez and Tinseth acted with

defendants Morrow and Dean in attacking him while he lay unresisting on the floor. AC, pp. 8. 

Defendants Dean and Tinseth kicked plaintiff multiple times while he lay helpless. AC, pp. 8-9.

In addition, defendant Roblez had shot the 40 mm twice, one time causing a rubber block to

strike plaintiff in the side of the head rendering plaintiff unconscious. AC, p. 10. Defendant

Woodard failed to video record what occurred in the cell and turned the video camera off before

plaintiff was slammed into the door frame. AC, pp. 12-13. Defendant Heintschel provided false

information to defendant Nies for the use of force authorization; defendant Long authorized the

use of unnecessary force and defendants Long and Heintschel stood in the doorway to block the

video camera from recording the assault in plaintiff’s cell. AC, pp. 14-15. Defendant Morrow

filed a false report on what occurred, subjecting plaintiff to disciplinary action and possibility of

felony charged for attempted battery on staff. AC, p. 9. Defendants Tinseth, Heintschel and

Pazos, also filed a false report; defendant Dean filed a false CDC Rule 115 rule violation report. 

AC, pp. 10-11, 15-16. Defendant Nies authorized the excessive use of force, failed to ensure

compliance with cell extraction procedures, and failed in his duty to protect plaintiff. AC, pp.

18-19. Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights for which plaintiff

seeks money damages. AC, pp. 2, 21. 

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move for dismissal under non-enumerated Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)

alleging a failure to exhaust administrative remedies properly. Motion to Dismiss (MTD), pp. 1-

2. Defendants move for dismissal of defendants Marrow, Dean, Tinseth, Roblez, Heintschel,

Long and Neis. By defendant Woodard’s subsequent joinder, dismissal of this defendant is also

sought. As to defendant Pazos, the court has separately recommended dismissal of this

defendant. Defendants seek to limit defendant’s lawsuit against defendant Williams to a claim of

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deliberate indifference to serious medical needs on 10/25/05. Id. 

Legal Standard under Non-Enumerated Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)

In a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under nonenumerated Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants “have the burden of

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9 Cir. th

2003). The parties may go outside the pleadings, submitting affidavits or declarations under

penalty of perjury, but plaintiff must be provided with notice of his opportunity to develop a

record. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. The court provided plaintiff with such fair

notice by Order, filed on 11/09/07. 

Should defendants submit declarations and/or other documentation demonstrating

an absence of exhaustion, making a prima facie showing, plaintiff must refute that showing. 

Plaintiff may rely upon statements made under the penalty of perjury in the complaint if the

complaint shows that plaintiff has personal knowledge of the matters stated and plaintiff calls to

the court’s attention those parts of the complaint upon which plaintiff relies. If the court

determines that plaintiff has failed to exhaust, dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate

remedy for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120.

PLRA Requirements

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that, 

“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Inmates seeking injunctive relief

must exhaust administrative remedies. Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). In Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,741, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001), the Supreme Court held that

inmates must exhaust administrative remedies, regardless of the relief offered through

administrative procedures. Therefore, inmates seeking money damages must also completely

exhaust their administrative remedies. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (inmates

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seeking money damages are required to exhaust administrative remedies even where the

grievance process does not permit awards of money damages). The United States Supreme Court

has held that exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA requires that the prisoner

complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules. 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006). Thus, in the context of the applicable

PLRA § 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement, any question as to whether a procedural default may

be found should a prisoner plaintiff fail to comply with the procedural rules of a prison’s

grievance system has been resolved: the PLRA exhaustion requirement can only be satisfied by

“proper exhaustion of administrative remedies....,” which means that a prisoner cannot satisfy the

requirement “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance

or appeal.” Woodford v. Ngo, supra, at 84, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

provides that no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Administrative Exhaustion Procedure

In order for California prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies, they must

proceed through several levels of appeal: 1) informal resolution, 2) formal written appeal on a

CDC 602 inmate appeal form, 3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and 4)

third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. Barry v. Ratelle,

985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. xv, § 3084.5). A final

decision from the Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 1237-38.

However, if the subject of the prisoner’s complaint is a “staff complaint,” such

does not proceed through the ususal grievance procedures. The remedy for such a complaint is

that CDCR initiate an investigation. An inmate can receive no other relief at that time regarding

the staff complaint. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.2d 926, 937-938 (9th Cir. 2005) (not cited in

defendants’ motion). If relief other than is available for a staff complaint is sought, e.g., be

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 The reason why a staff complaint grievance might only be partially granted when an

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investigation is ordered, is that prisoners quite often ask for a specific punishment to be awarded

as a part of the grievance. In no case may a prisoner be awarded specific punishment to be meted

out to staff for staff misconduct – such is a remedy that is never available to the prisoner – only

CDCR in its role as the staff disciplinary authority. In other words, the prisoner has no standing

to seek a specific punishment.

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housed in protective custody, be single celled etc., then the regular three level appeal process

must be exhausted as for that relief. Id at 938. Importantly for this motion, if on a staff

complaint, a request is granted or partially granted, i.e., an investigation is ordered, the inmate

has exhausted all available remedies for the staff complaint. Id. at 937-938. If misconduct on 5

the part of staff is found, only CDCR has the authority to impose punishment, i.e., an inmate

does not proceed in an adversarial fashion to determine the punishment. If the charge of

misconduct is not sustained, the matter ends. Thus, for allegations of staff misconduct, there is

nothing a prisoner can do in either event past being awarded an investigation “remedy.”

Argument/Discussion

Defendants contend that plaintiff filed, with respect to the 10/25/05 incident, four

inmate administrative grievances accepted by the Inmate Appeals Branch, and one inmate appeal

that was submitted three times but screened out and rejected. MTD, pp. 4-5. In appeal no. 05-

02082, plaintiff alleged improper medical care by defendant Williams related the 10/25/05 cell

extraction. MTD, p. 5, Exhibit (Exh.) A, ¶ 4, Declaration of N. Grannis, Chief of the Inmate

Appeals Branch, & Exh. B, grievance 05-02082, re: defendant Williams through third level.

However, defendants aver, only in inmate appeal no. 05-02184 (IAB nos. 5019103 & 5032039),

did plaintiff detail the alleged injuries of the 10/25/05 cell extraction, contending “he was

subjected to excessive force, injury assault and conspiracy by correctional staff.” MTD, p. 5,

Exh. C, appeal no. 05-02184, filed on 11/08/05, through the “partially granted” second level

response. Defendants argue that this appeal was first rejected at the director’s level on 2/23/06 as

“untimely by over two months” because CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3084.6(c) requires that an

appeal be submitted by an inmate to the next level of review within 15 days of receipt of a

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response, dated 12/15/05. MTD, p. 5, Exh. A, Grannis Dec., ¶¶ 4, 6. When plaintiff resubmitted

appeal no. 08-02184 on 10/18/06, it was again rejected as untimely, and on his third submission

of the same appeal, on 12/28/06, the IAB informed plaintiff that the appeal was not accepted at

the director’s level. Id. Thus, this appeal, according to defendants, was never properly exhausted

through the third level. MTD, p. 5. 

In appeal no. 06-00121 (IAB no. 0509558), signed by plaintiff on 12/12/05,

plaintiff alleged that he “was inappropriately found guilty” of attempted battery on a peace

officer, a charge arising from the incident of 10/25/05. MTD, p. Exh. D. In the appeal, plaintiff

complains that the preponderance of the evidence does not substantiate the charge and that he

was denied his due process rights related to the hearing procedures. Exh. D. In an attachment to

the appeal, plaintiff does complain, inter alia, that the videotape of the incident does not show

whether he resisted or not because defendants Long and Heintschel blocked the camera view,

that there was a cover-up once the officers entered the cell, that at some point he sustained a jaw

laceration and that the evidence demonstrated that excessive force was used against him,

resulting in his alleged serious injuries. Id. Plaintiff concludes that he is, therefore, not guilty of

attempted battery on a peace officer, and the RVR should be dismissed. Id. Although defendants

concede that plaintiff refers to the 10/25/05 incident, they contend that the references therein are

“merely for peripheral background information” and plaintiff’s principal grievance is the

supposed “mishandling and adjudication” of the RVR at the 11/24/05 hearing. MTD, p. 5, Exh.

A, Grannis Dec. ¶ 7. Defendants state that the IAB review was “appropriately limited” to the due

process violation allegations. Id., & Exh. D. Defendants further contend that if plaintiff’s intent

had been to complain of excessive force arising from the incident that it would have been

untimely as filed more than seven months after the incident. MTD, p. 5. As to this contention,

however, the court notes that this grievance appears to have been initiated on 12/12/05 or

thereabouts which, while not within the 15-working-days prison administrative appeal filing limit

of the 10/25/05 incident, is less than two months, not more than seven months beyond that date. 

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That grievance does appear to be closer to the apparent RVR hearing date. In any case,

defendants’ contention that the grievance at that point relating to the excessive force claims

would have been untimely in the prison grievance process is not of itself a persuasive argument

in this court, what is germane is how the prison appeal was framed and construed. 

In appeal no. 06-01209 (IAB no. 0609488), wherein plaintiff complains that

custody and medical staff were removing medical records from his Unit Health Records in an

attempted cover-up of the 10/25/05 incident, defendants again concede that plaintiff references

the incident, but that the references once again are “peripheral background information” and that

the IAB review appropriately was limited to the staff misconduct allegations related to the record

removal. MTD, p. 6, Exh. A, Grannis Dec., ¶¶ 4, 8 & Exh. E. The court’s review of the

grievance establishes that its focus is an allegation of staff misconduct arising from purported

stealing or destruction of documents that were discovered as missing on 5/8/06, although plaintiff

does contend that the “misconduct” is related a cover-up of “police brutality on 10/25/05...” 

Defendants again aver that this appeal cannot be treated as an excessive force complaint and if

that were plaintiff’s intent he would have been late by more than seven months. MTD, p. 6. 

While in this instance, defendants’ assessment of the tardiness with respect to any excessive

force complaint arising from the 10/25/05 incident appears to be accurate, this part of defendants’

argument would be relevant only if the grievance had been so construed and the appeal found

untimely on that basis as the court will not make a finding based on speculative claims of

whether or not prison appeal time limits might have been exceeded. 

 Finally, in appeal no. 06-00814 (IAB no. 0611629), plaintiff filed a grievance 

complaining of not being permitted to review and copy his medical records. MTD, p. 6, Exh. A,

Grannis Dec., ¶¶ 4, 9. Defendants acknowledge that plaintiff was seeking medical records from

10/25/05 and 10/26/06 but had not received the records. Exh. A, ¶ 9.

Defendants cite Woodford v. Ngo, supra, 126 S. Ct. at 2385, for the proposition

that proper exhaustion requires adherence to the deadlines for proceeding through all levels of

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 Plaintiff maintains within his first amended complaint that in three separate inmate 6

appeals, nos. 05-02184, 0502082 and 06-00121, he exhausted his allegations through the third

level of review. AC, p. 20. 

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review and maintain that only appeal no. 05-02184, which was not submitted for third level

review until two months after the second level decision, addressed plaintiff’s claims of excessive

force, injury, assault and conspiracy raised herein, and thus the claims were not properly

exhausted. MTD, pp. 6-7.

In opposition, plaintiff contends that his first level grievance in appeal no. 05- 6

02184, resulted in the promise of an investigation of his claims and thereby satisfied the

exhaustion requirement. Opposition (Opp.), pp. 1-2. Plaintiff includes the second level reviewer

response to that appeal as Exh. A (pp. 17-18). (Defendants also include the response as part of

their Exh. C to MTD.) The second level review response makes quite clear that that grievance

directly addressed the allegations raised herein:

You contend that on October 25, 2005, excessive and unnecessary

force was used on you resulting in serious injury in violation of

California Penal Code -245(A)(1) and that officers have conspired

to “cover-up” the violent assault on you. You claim that officers

shot you in the head with a 37 MM weapon causing you to lose

consciousness. When you claim to have awoken fists and feet

were striking you in the head, back, neck and left leg. You claim

to have heard officers yelling, “Where are the fucking handcuffs”. 

As you were escorted out of 6-block, Correctional Officer (C/O) R.

Morrow told you to stop resisting, then ran your face into the

doorframe that resulted in serious injury (laceration) to your jaw. 

You allege to have been thrown head first into the decontamination

shower by C/Os Morrow and C. Dean resulting in neck injuries. 

Furthermore you claim officers manipulated the video camera prior

to the violent assault on you. You assert the assaults are

premeditated and carried out by veteran officers maliciously to

cause serious or fatal injury. You claim to have received injuries to

your jaw, left leg, ankle, neck, middle back, head, wrists, forearms

and right foot as a direct result of C/Os Morrow, Dean and J.

Tinseths’ premeditated assault on you while they were under the

supervision of Correctional Sergeant M. Long, Correctional

Lieutenant C. Heintschal [sic] and Facility Captain G. Nies. You

request this complaint be forwarded to the Sacramento District

Attorney Office for possible prosecution, that all staff and inmates

be interviewed who were in C-Section at the time of the incident

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and that you be given a polygraph examination.

Opp., Exh. A, p. 16, MTD, Exh. C, p. 17.

The second level review included a decision showing the appeal was partially

granted:

Your appeal is partially granted in that your allegations of staff

misconduct have been referred to the Associate Warden of A

Facility for a review. You will be interviewed during this process. 

Pursuant to state law, the results of any staff review shall not be

released to the public, inmates, parolees, or other staff. However,

you will be notified when the review has concluded and whether

your allegations were or were not sustained.

Be advised that although you have the right to submit an appeal as

a staff complaint, the request for administrative action against staff

is beyond the scope of the departmental appeals process. In

addition, no reprisal is taken against any inmate for filing an

appeal.

Opp., Exh. A, p. 17, MTD, Exh. C, p. 18.

Plaintiff maintains that, after the appeal was bypassed at the first level, it was

partially granted at the second level on 12/19/05. Plaintiff includes in his Exh. A a portion of the

appeal and response that defendants do not include in their Exh. C. 

Conclusion

The exhaustion question here is directly controlled by Brown v. Valoff. Plaintiff

was granted an investigation (the only relief available) and was expressly told that the Director,

or third level of appeal could do no more for plaintiff in regards to his complaint against staff. 

As such plaintiff’s excessive force claim was exhausted, and there was nothing else plaintiff had

to perform. Defense counsel could have saved much time by recognizing the on point Ninth

Circuit authority regarding exhaustion of complaints against staff for misconduct.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Clerk is to correct the spelling of the names of defendant “Morrow” to

“Marrow,” defendant “Heintchel” to “Heintschel,” and defendant “Neil” to “Neis” in the court’s

docket;

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2. Defendant Woodard’s 3/06/08 (# 21) request to join the motion to dismiss is

granted.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on 2/14/08 (# 18) be denied;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, filed on

4/23/08 (# 27) be granted; and

3. This matter also proceed as to plaintiff’s claims of deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs against defendant Williams from whom an answer must be filed within

thirty days of adoption of these findings and recommendations, should that occur.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 07/30/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

lay0711.mtd+

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