Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02179/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02179-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Reginald Haywood, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jeffrey A. Bedatsky, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-2179-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Rosalie Banasiak’s motion for a more definite

statement. Doc. #14. Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff's motions to respond to

Defendants' Banasiak, Tyson, Mayorga, NPMHU, and NPMHU 320 motions in one filing

and for an extension of time to respond to the Court's Orders on Plaintiff's motions for default

and appointment of counsel. Docs. ##16, 42, 43, 45. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court will deny the motions for a more definite statement and for an extension of time to

respond to the Court's Orders, and will grant the motion to respond to Defendants' motions

in one filing. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a pro se complaint against various

Defendants on July 22, 2005. Doc. #1. Plaintiff alleges wrongful termination from the

United States Postal Service ("USPS") in violation of various federal statutes. Id. at 1-2.

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Banasiak alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s right

to privacy by furnishing the USPS with detailed medical information on Plaintiff in violation

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of 5 U.S.C. § 555, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996

("HIPAA"), and various Arizona statutes. Id. at 5, ¶ 18. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(e), Defendant Banasiak moves the Court for an order compelling Plaintiff to

provide a more definite statement concerning allegations against Defendant and requests

specifically that Plaintiff provide: (1) specific dates on which Defendant provided services

to Plaintiff, (2) specific dates where medical records were allegedly given to the USPS, and

(3) specific dates of alleged wrongdoing by Defendant Banasiak. Doc. #14 at 1. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Defendant Banasiak's Motion for a More Definite Statement.

A. Standard for Motion for More Definite Statement.

Indefiniteness of the complaint does not constitute grounds for dismissal. Bowles v.

Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 1945). “If a defendant needs additional

information to enable him to answer or prepare for trial the procedure provided by the

Federal Rules is a motion for a more definite statement . . . .” Id. Under Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(e), if “a complaint is ‘so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading,’ the defendant may move for an order

requiring a more definite statement by pointing out ‘the defects complained of and the details

desired.” Bautista v. County of Los Angeles, 216 F.3d 837, 843 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000). “The

district court may also order a more definite statement on its own initiative. Id. (citing

Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 907 n.13 (11th Cir. 1996)). The rule,

however, “authorizes a district court to strike the complaint under that subsection only in the

event that the plaintiff disobeys the court’s Rule 12(e) order.” Id. 

B. Analysis.

Defendant Banasiak argues that because a responding party must have the minimum

amount of information required to form a defense pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(b), Plaintiff's complaint must give specific dates or a general period of time in

which the claims arose. Doc. #14 at 2. The question before the Court is whether a more

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definite statement is required from Plaintiff concerning dates the claim allegedly arose. See

Doc. #1 at 5. 

Requests for more definite statements under Rule 12(e) are not to be used as a means

of securing discovery. 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ("Wright & Miller") § 1376 (3d ed. Supp. 2005). Rule 12(e)

motions are "'ordinarilyrestricted to situations where a pleading suffers from unintelligibility

rather than want of detail, and if the requirements of the general rule as to pleadings are

satisfied and the opposing party is fairly notified of the nature of the claim such motion is

inappropriate."' Castillo v. Norton, 219 F.R.D. 155, 163 (D. Ariz. 2003) (quoting Sheffield

v. Orius Corp., 211 F.R.D. 411, 414-15 (D. Or. 2002)). "[F]ederal courts have been properly

desirous of avoiding any possibility that the permissive allowance of Rule 12(e) motions

seeking detailed factual averments will shift the burden of fact elicitation from the discovery

phase back to the pleadings." Wright & Miller, § 1376. "'[P]leadings in the federal courts

are only required to fairly notify the opposing party of the nature of the claim.'" Castillo, 219

F.R.D. at 163 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean, 854 F. Supp. 626, 649 (D. Ariz.

1989)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a "short and plain statement of the claim").

Rule 12(e) is "'not to be used to assist in getting facts in preparation for trial as such; other

rules relating to discovery, interrogatories and the like exist for such purposes.'" Castillo, 219

F.R.D. at 163 (quoting Sheffield, 211 F.R.D. at 415). 

Courts have recognized an exception to the generally restrictive attitude of Rule 12(e)

relating to possible threshold defenses to claims for relief. Wright & Miller, § 1376.

"Plaintiffs . . . have been required to give particulars about the date on which the claim arose,

so that the timeliness of the action could be determined." Id.; see Rose v. Kinevan, 115

F.R.D. 250, 252 (D. Colo. 1987) ("[E]ven if a particular defendant knows which claim or

claims apply to him, the filing of an appropriate responsive pleading is hampered by the

absence of vital knowledge of applicable time periods."); Buchholtz v. Renard, 188 F. Supp.

888, 892 (1960) (holding that the defendants were entitled to a more definite statement as to

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the date or dates various plaintiffs received unregistered securities allegedly purchased by

them). 

In this case, Defendant Banasiak seeks a more definite statement for the specific

purpose of evaluating the timeliness of Plaintiff’s complaint. Although this potentially is an

appropriate use of Rule 12(e), the Court concludes that the more efficient approach in this

case, where Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, will be for Defendant Banasiak to inquire into

timeliness issues through discovery and then file a motion for summary judgment if she

believes the action against her is untimely. The complaint is sufficiently detailed for

Defendant to understand the charges against her, and the Court is not confident that requiring

a more definite statement will result in the clarity Defendant seeks for her statute of

limitations defense. In the interest of efficiency, the Court will deny Defendant Banasiak’s

motion for a more definite statement and require that she proceed by way of discovery.

II. Plaintiff's Motions.

On October 17, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion to respond to Defendants' Banasiak,

Tyson, Mayorga, NPMHU, and NPMHU 320 motions in one filing. Doc. #16. The Court

will grant Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff also filed a motion for an extension of time to respond

to the Court's Orders on Plaintiff's motions for default and appointment of counsel on March

28, 2006. Doc. #45. Because no response is required, the Court will deny the motion as

moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That Defendant Banasiak’s motion for a more definite statement (Doc. #14)

is denied.

2. That Plaintiff's motion to respond to Defendants' Banasiak, Tyson, Mayorga,

NPMHU, and NPMHU 320 motions in one filing (Doc. #16) is granted.

3. That Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to respond to the Court's Orders

on Plaintiff's motions for default and appointment of counsel (Doc. #45) is denied.

4. A Rule 16 case management conference will be set for May 31, 2006. 

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DATED this 12th day of April, 2006.

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