Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05773/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05773-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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1

 On November 5, 2003, plaintiff’s due process claims and defendant Wackenhut Corporation were

dismissed from this action for failure to state a claim. 

2Defendants Rivas, Gardner, Holm, Choate and Hammonds have not been served with the instant action.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES B. MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREWS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:01 CV 5773-REC-DLB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

IN PART

(Doc. 49)

I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff James B. Mitchell (“plaintiff”) is a former federal prisoner proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of civil

rights by federal actors. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint, filed

March 17, 2003, against defendants Andrews, Puentes, Toews, Hunt, Smetzer, Rivas, Gardner,

Holm, Choate, Quibrera and Hammond for retaliation and against defendants Ford and Rivas for

interference with plaintiff’s right to receive mail.1 On February 8, 2005, defendants Andrews,

Towes, Smetzer, Ford, Puentes and Hunt filed a motion for summary judgment.2 Plaintiff filed an

opposition on March 22, 2005 and an amended opposition on March 25, 2005. Defendants filed a

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filed a reply on April 28, 2005 and plaintiff filed an additional response on May 6, 2005. 

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56©). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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3The undisputed facts are taken from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, Plaintiff’s Opposition and

the Fourth Amended Complaint.

3

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56©).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Undisputed Facts3

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Taft Correctional Institution (“TCI”), a federal prison operated

by Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (“WCC”) pursuant to a contract between it and the United

States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), from May 1998 to April 2000.

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Fourth Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) at ¶ 3. TCI has three identical housing units (A3A, A3B

and A3C) and one Special Housing Unit. Declaration of Raymond Andrews (“Andrews Dec.” )¶5;

Declaration of Georgina Puentes (“Puentes Dec.”) ¶ 4. The identical housing units house all general

population approved inmates and the Special Housing Unit houses inmates separate from the general

population. Id. During incarceration, inmates are constantly rotated from their sleeping quarters due

to medical concerns, sleeping habits and other related factors. Id. The institution is obligated to

assign inmates to sleeping quarters which are not a privilege. Id.

Defendant Puentes authored a memorandum dated September 15, 1999 advising inmatesthat

there were several beds “opening” in units A3A and A3C and interest “eligible” inmates should see

their assigned counselors. Plaintiff’s Amended Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Opposition”), Ex. 2.

Plaintiff alleges that while the three general population housing units are identical in physical

structure, the living conditions are quite different in that the non-preferred and less desirable unit

(A3B) is overcrowded and the preferred housing units (A3A and A3C) are not. Opposition at p. 3.

Defendants Smetzer, Toews and Puentes are plaintiff’s unit team. Complaint at ¶ 27.

On or about August 26, 1999, plaintiff was moved from housing unit A3A to A3B, where

he continued to reside until October 25, 1999 when he was placed in the Special Housing Unit.

Opposition at p. 3; Complaint at ¶ 31. Plaintiff continued to reside in the Special Housing Unit until

his transfer in April 2000. Id.

In response to plaintiff’s administrative complaints regarding his move from housing unit

A3A to A3B in August 1999, defendant Smetzer advised that “Administration felt you were not

making a positive adjustment.” Opposition, Ex. 5.

If mail addressed to an inmate contained serious contraband, the letter would be provided to

the special investigations officer on duty. Declaration of Terry Ford (“Ford Dec.”), ¶ 3. This is the

process to be followed pursuant to the BOP and TCI rules and regulations. Id.

On or about October 25, 1999, defendant Ford was the mail room supervisor at TCI, when

a letter, addressed to plaintiff from is sister was received. Complaint at ¶ 31. The letter contained,

inter alia, the names and home addresses of many of the defendants in this lawsuit which plaintiff

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had asked his sister to obtain for him for use in preparation of a lawsuit. Id. The letter was routed

for investigation as contraband and plaintiff was placed in the Special Housing Unit - Administrative

Detention. Complaint at ¶¶ 31, 32; Andrews Dec. ¶ 8; Puentes Dec. ¶ 7; Toews Dec. ¶ 4. The

information was inaccurate and out of date so TCI did not take formal action disciplinary action but

TCI determined that plaintiff was a risk to the institution, staff, and other inmates and should be

transferred to another institution. Id. Pending that transfer, plaintiff remained in the Special Housing

Unit because TCI found his continued presence in the general population posed a serious threat to

life, property, self, staff, other inmates, or to the security or orderly running of the institution and

placement in general population was not prudent. Id. Defendants Puentes and Smetzer did not have

the authority to place an inmate into the Special Housing Unit. Puentes Dec. ¶ 6; Smetzer Dec. ¶ 3.

Plaintiff filed a “barrage of administrative remedies” in the months preceding his housing

change in August 1999 relating to being denied participation in the BOP’s RDAP. Opposition at

p. 7. 

Plaintiff filed a “series of administrative remedy complaints over the housing change” after

August 26, 1999. Plaintiff filed a grievance over his denial of mail and participated in Court

proceedings entitled Mitchell v. Andrews, USDC, EDCA 99-CV-05551 OWW HGB (HC) and

Mitchell, et. al. V. Wackenhut Corrections, et. al., USDC, EDCA 00-CV-05196 OWW HGB (P)

during the alleged period of retaliation, August 26, 1999 to April 2000. Opp. P. 5; Complaint at ¶¶

5, 32; Opposition at p. 11. 

D. Discussion

In his fourth amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against by defendants

for filing inmate grievances. He alleges that the August 1999 move from “preferred” housing to

“non-preferred” housing was in retaliation for filing administrative complaints in the preceding

months. Plaintiff alleges that his October 1999 placement in Special Housing was also retaliatory

for filing prison grievances. He also alleges that defendant Ford interfered with his First Amendment

right to receive mail in October 1999 when Ford confiscated the letter from plaintiff’s sister and did

not provide it to plaintiff. 

///

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1. Interference with Mail Claim

Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52

F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison regulations relating to the regulation of incoming mail are

analyzed under the Turner reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91

(1987). Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). The regulation is valid if it is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. In determining the

reasonableness of the regulation, court must consider the following factors: (1) whether there is a

“valid, rational connection between the regulationand the legitimate government interest put forward

to justify it,” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right,” (3) the impact that the

“accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,” and (4)

“the absence of ready alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. Prison officials may 

Defendant Ford was the mail room supervisor at the times relevant to plaintiff’s allegations.

See Ford Dec. ¶1. While defendant Ford does not specifically recall the letter at issue, he states that

if the letter contained serious contraband, he would, in the normal course of business provide the

letter to the special investigations officer on duty pursuant to BOP and TCI rules and regulations.

Defendants submit the declarations of defendant Andrews and defendant Puentes which state that

the letter at issue was sent to plaintiff by his sister and purported to have the home addresses of TCI

staff members. Andrews Dec. ¶8; Toews Dec. ¶ 4. 

Defendants argue that Section 514.14 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations allows

prison staff to open and inspect all incoming general correspondence which may be rejected by the

Warden if it is determined detrimental to the security, good order or discipline of the institution, to

the protection of the public, or if it might facilitate criminal activity. Defendants contend that the

regulations are in place to protect the security and safety of the institution, maintain the orderly

running of the institution and to deter criminal activity. Defendants note the “obvious connection

between the regulations and the interest of the institution, its employees and the inmates” and that

plaintiff was not restricted from sending or receiving correspondence as long as he and those he

corresponded with followed BOP and TCI rules and regulations.

Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate on this claim as a matter of law

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because the letter from plaintiff’s sister was suspected to contain contraband and therefore Ford was

required to forward the letter and disclose its contents to TCI’s investigation unit. 

The court finds that defendants have met their initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which they believe demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish that

a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

In opposition, plaintiff does not address defendants’ arguments on this claim and in fact now

appears to question whether the letter ever existed. See Opposition at p. 9. Based on the evidence

submitted by defendants, the letter was confiscated, pursuant to regulation because it was suspected

to contain contraband. Prison security is clearly a valid penological concern and there is an obvious

connection between the regulation and the government’s interest. Inmates are not restricted from

sending or receiving mail as long as the security concerns are observed. The court therefore finds

that plaintiff has not submitted evidence raising any triable issues of fact with respect to his First

Amendment Claim for interference with his mail and therefore summary judgment is appropriate as

to this claim. 

2. Retaliation Claim

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 2003). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise

of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). The court must “‘afford

appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate

penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). The burden is on plaintiff to

demonstrate “that therewere no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he complains

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of.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808.

a. Housing Unit Change in August 1999. 

It is undisputed that plaintiff filed administrative grievances over being denied participation

in the RDAP prior to his housing change in August 1999. In their motion for summary judgment,

defendants claim that TCI does not have “preferred” housing units or “less desirable” units and that

they are all identical. Defendants contend that plaintiff’s housing unit was changed because the

inmates are constantly rotated among the three identical housing units to accommodate medical

concerns, sleeping habits and other related factor. In their reply to plaintiff’s opposition, defendants

claim that “plaintiff’s move from A3A to A3B was made because Plaintiff was not making a positive

adjustment, a valid penological interest . . .” Defendant’s Reply p. 5:15-16. Defendants nevertheless

argue that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he cannot show that

defendants’ conduct had a chilling effect on his participation in the protected activities.

The court finds that defendant has met his initial burden of informing the court of the basis

for his motion, and identifying those portions of the record which he believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish that

a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, plaintiff may

not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; First Nat'l Bank,

391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). Verified complaints and

oppositions constitute opposing affidavits for purposes of the summary judgment rule if they are

based on facts within the pleader’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-

1400 (9th Cir. 1998). In this instance, for the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s verified complaint

and opposition are sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact precluding

summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for retaliation relating to the August 1999 Housing change.

Filing prison grievances is a protected activity, See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568. The issue here

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is whether the change in plaintiff’s housing unit was an adverse action and if so whether the change

advanced a legitimate correctional goal and whether it chilled plaintiff’s rights. It is undisputed that

the three housing units are physically identical. However, plaintiff claims that the unit he was moved

to was “overcrowded” and “less desirable.” Plaintiff submits a declaration from another inmate

attesting to this and plaintiff also provides a copy of a memorandum from defendant Puentes dated

September 15, 1999 outlining eligibility requirements for units A3A and A3C (the alleged

“preferred” units). See Opposition, Ex. 1& 2. In their reply, defendants appear to concede that

plaintiff’s move to unit A3B move was punitive in nature by stating, “plaintiff’s move was because

he was not making a positive adjustment.” Reply at p. 5:15-16. However, defendants provide no

evidence in support of this assertion. Plaintiff alleges that he met all of the eligibility criteria for the

“preferred” units. Opposition at p. 4. There is therefore a factual dispute over whether the housing

unit change in August 1999 was an adverse action and whether the move advanced a legitimate

correctional goal thereby precluding summary judgment on this claim.

Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because the conduct, even

if adverse did not have a chilling effect on plaintiff in that he continued to file grievances after the

move. However, this argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d

559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005)[The infliction of harms other than a total chilling effect can establish prison

officials' liability for retaliating against a prisoner for exercising his or her First Amendment rights.].

As plaintiff correctly notes, “ The mere fact that he continued to exercise his right to file grievances

against defendants, did not negate, in its entirety, the chilling effect of the defendants’ acts of

retaliation against plaintiff and his First Amendment Rights.” Plaintiff’s Response to Reply at p. 3.

Defendants Puentes, Towes and Smetzer argue that they did not order a change in plaintiff’s

housing and therefore cannot be liable. However, defendants Puentes, Towes and Smetzer were

plaintiff’s unit team (Complaint at ¶ 6). In the assistant warden’s response to plaintiff’s grievance

regarding the housing change, defendant Gardner stated that, “Your Unit Team does not feel you are

making a positive adjustment to incarceration at Taft Correctional Institution and therefore do not

believe you are appropriate for an A dorm.” Opposition, Ex. 7. There is therefore a factual dispute

over defendants Puentes., Towes and Smetzer’s involvement in the housing change. 

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b. Plaintiff’s Move to the Special Housing Unit in October 1999.

Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in the Special Housing Unit in October 1999 in retaliation

for filing inmate grievances. Defendants argue that plaintiff was placed in the Special Housing Unit

pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 541.22 which provides:

The Warden may place an inmate in administrative detention when the inmate is

in holdover status (i.e., en route to a designated institution) during transfer, or is a

new commitment pending classification. The Warden may also place an inmate in

administrative detention when the inmate's continued presence in the general

population poses a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, other inmates or to

the security or orderly running of the institution and when the inmate:

(1) Is pending a hearing for a violation of Bureau regulations;

(2) Is pending an investigation of a violation of Bureau regulations;

(3) Is pending investigation or trial for a criminal act;

(4) Is pending transfer;

(5) Requests admission to administrative detention for the inmate's own

protection, or staff determines that admission to or continuation in administrative

detention is necessary for the inmate's own protection (see § 541.23); or

(6) Is terminating confinement in disciplinary segregation and placement in

general population is not prudent. The Segregation Review Official is to advise

the inmate of this determination and the reasons for such action.

28. C.F.R. § 541.22. Defendants argue that plaintiff was placed in the Special Housing Unit

because TCI was conducting an investigation into threats made by him to TCI employees arising

out of an October 25, 1999 letter from his sister which purported to have the home addresses of

TCI staff members. Defendants allege the letter contained serious contraband and therefore was

forwarded to TCI’s unit for further handling. Defendants assert that the information in the letter

was obtained by plaintiff’s sister from the internet at Plaintiff’s request. The information was

inaccurate and out of date so TCI did not take formal discipline. However, it was determined

that plaintiff was a risk to the institution, staff and other inmates and should be transferred to

another institution. Pending that transfer, plaintiff remained in the Special Housing Unit. 

The court finds that defendant has met his initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for his motion, and identifying those portions of the record which he believes demonstrate

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the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to

establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

Filing prison grievances is a protected activity, see Rhodes, 2005 WL 937814, at *5, and

placement in the Special Housing Unit (administrative detention) is clearly an adverse action. 

The issue then becomes whether the placement in the Special Housing Unit advanced a

legitimate correctional goal and whether it chilled plaintiff’s rights.

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving “that there were no legitimate correctional purposes

motivating the actions he complains of.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808. In his fourth amended complaint,

plaintiff admits that on or about October 25, 1999, while incarcerated at TCI, he received a letter

from his sister that contained names and addresses of many of the defendants in this action. 

Complaint ¶ 31. Therefore, defendants proffered basis for placing plaintiff in the Special

Housing Unit is undisputed. Plaintiff also states in his complaint that the letter was given to

TCI’s investigation unit and never provided to him and that on the same day, he was

“interrogated” and placed in the Special Housing Unit. Id. Plaintiff offers no evidence to

support his claim that his placement in the Special Housing Unit was for any other reason than

that offered by defendants. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that the investigation was a “sham”

and that defendants’ actions were retaliatory are insufficient to meet his burden. Defendants

have identified a legitimate reason for plaintiff’s placement in the Special Housing Unit - namely

the investigation of potential threats to TCI employees. Plaintiff has provided neither argument

nor evidence on this point, instead choosing to question whether the letter exists since defendants

did not produce it. In light of plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint, these arguments are

insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating that defendant’s action did not serve a legitimate

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correctional goal. Plaintiff must submit evidence that the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff has not done so. The court therefore finds that plaintiff has

not submitted evidence raising any triable issues of fact with respect to his retaliation claim

regarding his placement in the Special Housing Unit in October 1999. Accordingly, defendant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this retaliation claim.

E. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, filed February 8, 2005, be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as

follows:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim

against defendants Ford and Rivas for interference with mail be GRANTED;

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim

regarding his placement in the Special Housing Unit in October 1999 be

GRANTED; and

3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim

regarding the August 1999 housing move be DENIED and this case proceed to

trial on this claim only.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty (20) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may

file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

///

///

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Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 25, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:01-cv-05773-DLB Document 58 Filed 08/26/05 Page 13 of 13