Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02679/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02679-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael David Jones, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Sandra Walker, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-09-2679-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Motion

for Summary Judgment filed by Petitioner Michael David Jones. (Dkt. ## 1, 9.) On May 20,

2010, Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”)

in which she proposed that the Court deny Mr. Jones’s Habeas Petition and his Motion for

Summary Judgment with prejudice. (Dkt. # 12.) Mr. Jones filed Written Objections to the R

& R on June 8, 2010 (Dkt. # 13); however, because these Objections are without merit, the

Court accepts the R & R.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal district courts “‘may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].’” Carrillo-Lozano v. Stolc, 669 F.

Supp.2d 1074, 1076 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)); see United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). While a district judge “must review the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made,” Schmidt v.

Case 2:09-cv-02679-GMS Document 14 Filed 06/17/10 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Johnstone, 263 F. Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003)), no such review is necessary when

the parties do not raise specific objections. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (holding

that district courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not

the subject of objection”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the [R & R] to which objection is made.”); CarrilloLozano, 669 F. Supp. at 1076 (same). When a petitioner raises a general objection to the R

& R, rather than specific objections, the Court is relieved of any obligation to review it. See,

e.g., Sullivan v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1516005, *1 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2006) (“[G]eneral

objections to an R & R are tantamount to no objection at all.”) (citing Lockert v. Faulkner,

843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Jones’s sole objection to the R & R is akin to a general objection that fails to

provide any basis for review. Mr. Jones sets forth his Objection as follows: “Petitioner

objects to everything in the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, with the exception of

[pg. 7; lines 1–4, 18–19].” (Dkt # 13 at 1.) Mr. Jones then restates the same arguments set

forth in his Habeas Petition. (Compare Dkt. # 1 at 1–8 with Dkt. # 13 at 1–4.) This is

insufficient to raise specific objections as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Sullivan,

2006 WL 1516005, at *1–2 (denying objections for lack of specificity when the petitioner’s

objection constituted a copy of the original petition).

Nonetheless, even if Mr. Jones had set forth specific objections with sufficient

specificity, the Court agrees with the R & R’s conclusion that Mr. Jones’s Petition is

untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). And while Mr. Jones asserts that the time bar does not

apply because he is actually innocent of the crime charged, he fails to “establish that, in light

of new evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [him]

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–37 (2006) (quoting

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); see also Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937

(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the “miscarriage of justice exception” to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A)’s time bar “is limited to those extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts

Case 2:09-cv-02679-GMS Document 14 Filed 06/17/10 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

. . . actual innocence”). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Judge Burns’s R & R (Dkt. # 12) is ACCEPTED. 

2. Mr. Jones’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. # 1) is DENIED with

prejudice.

3. Mr. Jones’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 9) is DENIED. 

4. A certificate of appealability is DENIED because Mr. Jones has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE this action. 

DATED this 16th Day of June 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-02679-GMS Document 14 Filed 06/17/10 Page 3 of 3