Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00183/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00183-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rick Wayne Valentini,

Petitioner,

v.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-00183-PHX-MTL (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

This matter is on referral to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to Rules 

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings and a report 

and recommendation. (Doc. 6) Rick Wayne Valentini (“Petitioner”) filed his Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (NonDeath Penalty) (“Petition”) on January 8, 2019

1

. (Doc. 1 at 13)

2

 Respondents filed their 

Answer on March 27, 2019. (Doc. 11) Petitioner filed his Reply on April 9, 2019. (Doc. 

12) As is explained below, undersigned recommends the Petition be denied and dismissed 

1 Petitioner placed the Petition in the prison mailing system on January 8, 2019. (Doc. 1 at 

13) The Clerk of Court filed the Petition on January 10, 2019. There is no dispute over 

timeliness of the Petition.

2 Citationsto the record indicate documents as displayed in the official electronic document 

filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case Number CV-19-00183-

PHX-MTL (DMF).

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with prejudice because Grounds One through Three are procedurally defaulted without 

excuse and each of Grounds Four through Six lacks merit.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Indictment, Trial, and Sentence

On March 24, 2011, the grand jurors of Maricopa County charged Petitioner on 

Count One of second degree murder of his girlfriend Jamie Laiadee on or between March 

17 and 18, 2010. (Doc. 11-1 at 50-51) Petitioner was also charged on Count Two of the 

indictment of fraudulent schemes and artifices for using Ms. Laiadee’s credit cards and 

personal assets on or between March 18 and May 27, 2010. (Id. at 51)

Petitioner’s defense at his 15-day trial was that there was no physical evidence of 

homicide against him, including no body or any DNA evidence. (Doc. 11-8 at 271-287)

His defense counsel’s closing argument suggested that Jamie Laiadee was terrified of her 

father, that she loved Petitioner and wanted to marry him, and that the prosecution 

witnesses either had a motive to lie or their testimony was unsupported by evidence. (Id. 

at 272-281) The jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts. (Id. at 310) At sentencing, 

Petitioner insisted that Jamie Laiadee was not dead and he did not kill her (Id. at 331, 333, 

335). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated sentence of 22 years on the 

second degree murder charge, and to an aggravated sentence of 20 years on the fraudulent 

schemes and artifices charge with the sentences to run concurrently to each other and also 

to a sentence previously imposed in a separate criminal case. (Id. at 337-338)

B. Direct Appeal

In Petitioner’s direct appeal, appointed counsel raised one issue: whether Petitioner

was “deprived of the right to a unanimous verdict by a duplicitous indictment, erroneous 

jury instructions and a faulty verdict form.” (Doc. 1 at 127-128) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals held that pursuant to Arizona statutes, “second-degree murder defines a single 

offense that may be committed with any of three culpable mental states, and a jury need 

not agree unanimously on which of the three mental states the defendant possessed when 

causing the victim’s death.” (Id. at 135) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review (Id.

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at 169) and Petitioner did not pursue a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States 

Supreme Court (Id. at 3).

C. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

On May 24, 2013, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”).

(Doc. 11-9 at 4-6) In July 2014, appointed counsel filed a notice of completed review 

stating she was unable to identify an “issue to pursue in a PCR” and requesting 60 days for 

Petitioner to file a pro per petition. (Doc. 1 at 171) The superior court gave Petitioner until 

August 18, 2014, to file his PCR petition pro per. (Doc. 11-9 at 8-9) Petitioner executed 

a “state court complaint” on December 2, 2014, that was filed in the superior court on 

January 6, 2015. (Id. at 11-13) Petitioner alleged claims based on facts that: (1) no body 

was found and there was no physical evidence of a crime; (2) the prosecution used false 

witnesses and false statements to obtain an indictment; and (3) the jury was not unanimous 

and could not agree on what action Petitioner had taken that was “deliberate, reckless, 

negligent, and/or.” (Id. at 12) Petitioner attached a note to the state court complaint form 

advising the clerk of court that the filing was the “pro per part of my Rule 32 appeals 

proceedings.” (Id. at 16)

The superior court construed the complaint as Petitioner’s pro per PCR petition and 

ordered the State to file a response. (Id. at 17) The State’s response argued that the petition 

was procedurally deficient for failure to include “a declaration by the defendant stating 

under penalty of perjury that the information contained is true to the best of the defendant’s 

knowledge and belief” as required by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.5. (Id. at 22)

In his reply, Petitioner moved the superior court to “dismiss the incorrect petition and allow 

[Petitioner] sixty days [60] to re-file his Rule (pro per) petition with the correct paperwork 

pursuant to [Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32.5.” (Id. at 26) In an order dated June

9, 2015, but filed on June 24, 2015, the superior court found that Petitioner had failed to 

comply with the Rule 32.5 requirement to include a declaration. (Id. at 30) The superior 

court dismissed Petitioner’s January 2015 pro per PCR petition without prejudice and 

required Petitioner to file a petition corrected to include the required declaration within 30 

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days. (Id.) The court instructed it was rejecting the petition “because it lacks the required 

declaration and 30 days is sufficient time to resolve that problem.” (Id. at 31)

On July 16, 2015, the superior court filed Petitioner’s PCR petition, which he had 

signed on July 14, 2015, and which was completed using a standard PCR form. (Id. at 36-

39) The petition included the required declaration (Id. at 36), but asserted additional issues 

not raised in the January 2015 petition. Petitioner raised the same six grounds for relief he 

now asserts in the instant § 2254 Petition (Id. at 42-60), and also raised an additional claim 

that his PCR counsel refused to investigate his claim, did not communicate with him, and 

never filed a petition on his behalf (Id. at 39).

On December 4, 2015, the superior court filed an order inaccurately stating it had 

dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding on June 24, 2015, “when [Petitioner] missed the 

deadline for filing a supporting declaration.” (Id. at 63) In fact, as noted above, the court 

had dismissed Petitioner’s pro per petition without prejudice, the court had given Petitioner

30 days to correct the petition by adding the Rule 32.5 declaration, and Petitioner had 

timely filed a petition containing the declaration but also added new claims not asserted in 

his January 2015 petition. The superior court construed Petitioner’s July 16, 2015, petition 

as a notice of PCR and held that the PCR notice was a successive second PCR proceeding.

(Id. at 62-63)

The superior court held that all claims Petitioner raised except his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim were precluded under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.2(a)(3)3 because Petitioner had not raised the claims on direct appeal. (Id.) The court 

further held that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was precluded in 

3 The court’s order mistakenly cited “Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3).” (Doc. 11-9 at 63) The 

context of this citation plainly indicates that the superior court order intended to instead 

cite Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3), which addressed preclusion for failure 

to raise a claim “at trial or on appeal, or in any previous post-conviction proceeding[.]” In 

contrast, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a) governed the scope of remedy in a 

PCR action involving a conviction or sentence alleged to be violation of the United States 

or Arizona Constitutions, and did not include a subsection (3) or any other numbered 

subsection.

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his “second” Rule 32 action pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(2).4(Id.) In addition, the superior 

court rejected Petitioner’s claim for newly discovered evidence, concluding that Petitioner 

could have asserted this evidence on appeal, that the evidence was not “new,” and that 

Petitioner failed to explain why the evidence “would have changed the verdicts and 

sentences.” (Id. at 64) The superior court found Petitioner’s appeal related claims

unpersuasive based on the court’s previous ruling and the court refused to revisit those 

same claims.5(Id.) The superior court rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel claim for failure to investigate, communicate with Petitioner, or file a PCR petition 

because “there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a state postconviction relief proceeding for a non-pleading defendant.” (Id.)

The superior court denied Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. (Id.

at 67) On petition for review of the superior court’s ruling, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

granted review and denied relief, finding Petitioner had not established the superior court 

abused its discretion. (Id. at 75) The Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition 

for review in a December 3, 2018, order. (Id. at 77)

D. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims

Petitioner raises six grounds for relief in the Petition. (Doc. 1 at 6-11) Petitioner’s 

Ground One alleges a denial of his Miranda rights regarding the testimony of a witness, 

J.R., who had been housed with Petitioner in jail. (Doc. 1 at 6, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436 (1966)) In Ground Two, Petitioner contends he was denied due process 

guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment when the State used witness J.R.’s statement during 

grand jury proceedings. (Id. at 7) In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges the jury violated his 

Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury when the “biased and irrational” jury 

found him guilty of second-degree murder. (Id. at 8) Petitioner’s Ground Four claim is 

4 Again, the superior court mistakenly cited Rule 32.1(a)(2) instead of Rule 32.2(a)(2). The 

context of this citation plainly indicates that the court order intended to instead cite Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(2). See footnote 3, supra.

5 Petitioner “complain[ed] that the Arizona Department of Corrections confiscated his legal 

files on January 20, 2015 and did not return them until May 2015.” (Doc. 11-9 at 64)

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that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated when he received ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at 9) In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges there is new 

evidence in his case supporting a claim of actual innocence. (Id. at 10) Petitioner contends 

in Ground Six that there was “obstruction of [his] constitutionally protected right to 

represent himself and participate in the appeals process.” (Id. at 11)

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Exhaustion of Remedies and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before this Court 

may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999).

Arizona’s “established appellate review processes” consist of a direct appeal and a PCR 

proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31, et. seq. and Rule 32, et. seq.; see also Roettgen v. 

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (“To exhaust one’s state court remedies in 

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his 

conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.”).

To be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and 

the specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 

1999) (“The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to 

establish exhaustion.”). A claim may be subject to an express or implied procedural bar. 

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express procedural bar exists 

if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural bar “that is both 

‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s 

decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 

(2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of federal law because 

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they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits”); Johnson v. 

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist when a state strictly or 

regularly follows its procedural rule). An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not 

fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); 

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

This Court may review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or 

(2) a miscarriage of justice/actual innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 

495-96 (1986). “Cause” is something that “cannot be fairly attributable” to a petitioner, 

and a petitioner must show that this “objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice a “habeas petitioner must show 

‘not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked 

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.’” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 

U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original)). “Such a showing of pervasive actual

prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other than a showing that the 

prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.” Id.

The miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default “is limited to those 

extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his [actual] innocence and establishes that 

the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.” Johnson v. Knowles, 

541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). To pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish his or her factual innocence of the 

crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); 

Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner “must show that 

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

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the new evidence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 399 (2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 327)). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations 

of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011); McQuiggin, 569 

U.S. at 399 (2013) (explaining the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting 

new evidence”). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the 

allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 

982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Under clearly established Federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance was both objectively deficient and 

also caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under 

federal habeas review, this results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s 

performance. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (explaining that in a 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 case, deference is due both to defense counsel’s performance and to the state 

court’s ruling). The Court has discretion to determine which Strickland prong to apply 

first. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998). A habeas court reviewing 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must determine “whether there is a reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard, such that the state court’s 

rejection of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not an unreasonable application 

of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist could disagree that the state 

court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations 

and quotations omitted).

C. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition – Merits Standard of Review

On habeas review, this Court may grant relief if the petitioner demonstrates 

prejudice because the adjudication of a claim on the merits in state court either: “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

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clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

This is a “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings’ which demands 

that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)).

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the 

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... case” or 

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context 

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context 

where it should apply.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). For a federal court 

to find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 

2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely incorrect 

or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

To make a determination pursuant to § 2254(d)(1), the Court first identifies the 

“clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on 

habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of the holdings of the United 

States Supreme Court which existed at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction 

became final. Id. at 412. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. at 

410 (emphasis in original). Under AEDPA, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim 

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 

(2011). Accordingly, to obtain habeas relief from this Court, Petitioner “must show that 

the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.

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With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination 

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the 

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

340 (2003). A “state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the 

federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood 

v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, to find that a factual 

determination is unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2), the court must be “convinced that an 

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably 

conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 

1000 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 

(9th Cir. 2014). “This is a daunting standard—one that will be satisfied in relatively few 

cases.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s Grounds One, Two, and Three are Procedurally Defaulted 

Without Excuse

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that prosecution witness J.R. was recruited in jail 

by police detectives and a fellow inmate to supply false testimony that Petitioner had

reported he had “blasted Jamie [Laiadee] with a shotgun, cut her up, and fed her to the 

pigs.” (Doc. 1 at 442) Petitioner contends that “[a]nything [J.R.] says is a violation of 

[P]etitioner’s Miranda rights under the U.S. Constitution, since [J.R.] did not read 

[P]etitioner his rights before speaking to him.” (Id. at 443)

In his Ground Two claim, Petitioner asserts that the only evidence provided to the 

grand jury was the “false statement” provided by J.R. to a police detective. (Doc. 1-1 at 1)

Petitioner states that it must be concluded that J.R.’s testimony was false because J.R. 

changed his “story” from his initial statement to the police detective, to his grand jury 

testimony, then to a pre-trial interview with defense counsel, and finally to his trial 

testimony. (Id.) Petitioner further argues that the prosecution used J.R.’s testimony 

knowing it was false. (Id. at 2)

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Petitioner’s Ground Three claim is that he was convicted by a biased jury. (Doc. 1 

at 8, Doc. 1-1 at 4-6) Petitioner supports this conclusion with: (1) evidence that jurors 

reported to media outlets they had allegedly found Petitioner guilty because he was 

“arrogant and indifferent”; (2) the prosecution changed its theory of how the victim was 

killed; and (3) the jury “was exposed” to false testimony given by a police officer, the 

victim’s father, and witness J.R. (Doc. 1-1 at 4-6) More generally, Petitioner contends 

that no unbiased jury could have found him guilty in a case lacking a body, other physical 

evidence, a coroner or medical examiner’s report, a murder witness, or a weapon. (Id. at 

4)

Petitioner raised these Grounds One, Two, and Three arguments in his PCR action 

filed on July 16, 2015. (Doc. 11-9 at 37-38, 42-44, 46, 48-50) The superior court found 

the claims precluded because he could have raised each claim on direct appeal but did not 

do so.6(Doc. 11-9 at 63) In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts 

via either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because an attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in 

a narrow category of claims for which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for postconviction relief), 32.4(a) (time bar). Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s 

procedural rules to bar further review of claims that were not raised on direct appeal or in 

prior Rule 32 post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860

(determinations made under Arizona’s procedural default rule are “independent” of federal 

law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that 

Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly followed [“adequate”] in several cases.”) 

(citations omitted), reversed on other grounds, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002). 

Petitioner failed to exhaust his claims asserted here in Grounds One, Two, and Three and 

he is time-barred under Arizona law from returning to state court with these claims.

6 As noted above, the superior court order mistakenly cited to “Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3)” 

when it is obvious that it intended to cite Rule 32.2(a)(3).

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However, the Court may review Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims if he can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice/actual innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995). For the reasons explained below, Petitioner has not established either cause and 

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice/actual innocence to excuse procedural 

default of Grounds One, Two, or Three.

1. Petitioner fails to establish excuse for default of Ground One

Petitioner asserts generally that the record supports a basis for establishment of 

cause and prejudice as well as an “extreme miscarriage of justice” to excuse procedural 

default of Ground One. These general arguments do not meet the cause and prejudice or

the extreme miscarriage of justice standard to establish excuse for default of Ground One.

Petitioner’s Ground One claim is that J.R.’s “participation and testimony” violated 

Petitioner’s Miranda rights. (Doc. 1 at 6) Petitioner contends that J.R. was “recruited” by 

fellow inmate Ethan Ducharme to tell the same “false confessional story” that Ducharme 

gave Chandler Police Department Detective Nathan Moffat, which was that Petitioner 

“blasted Jamie with a shotgun, cut her up, and fed her to the pigs.” (Id. at 442-443) 

Petitioner reasons that because J.R. and Ethan Ducharme allegedly provided the same story 

to the police, Detective Moffat must have known the story was false and further that any 

testimony J.R. provided violated Petitioner’s Miranda rights because J.R. did not read 

Petitioner his rights before speaking with Petitioner. (Id. at 443)

In his Reply, Petitioner contends that Respondents’ answer to the Petition (Doc. 11) 

supplies “new” evidence that J.R. never even spoke with Petitioner and that instead J.R.

used Ducharme’s concocted story, lied to the police, and lied to the jury at trial by claiming 

he had spoken to Petitioner. (Doc. 12 at 9-10) Additionally, Petitioner asserts that the 

prosecutor and Petitioner’s defense counsel knew that J.R. was lying at trial and “did 

nothing about it.” (Id. at 10)

The record reflects that the grand jury was told by Detective Moffat that Petitioner 

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had reported to J.R. that Petitioner “killed Jamie, and he used the shotgun from the storage 

unit.” (Doc. 11-1 at 43) Detective Moffat also testified before the grand jury that J.R. had 

sought out the Chandler Police Department to provide this information, that J.R.’s 

sentencing “went ahead without any input from the Chandler Police Department” and that 

there was “no deal [with J.R.] to secure “a more lenient sentence for the information he 

had provided[.]” (Id. at 42-43) A police incident report prepared by Detective Moffat in 

April 2011 described the “free talk” conducted with J.R., J.R.’s counsel on an unrelated 

criminal case, Detective Moffat, and a deputy county attorney present. (Doc. 1 at 203)

The detective reported that during the free talk, J.R. had said Petitioner was distraught 

when he first arrived at the jail pod, that Petitioner was saying that the police knew 

Petitioner had killed his girlfriend and that Petitioner wanted to see a chaplain and “get it 

off his chest.” (Id.) Detective Moffat further reported that J.R. said that later, during 

conversations with Petitioner, Petitioner told J.R. that the police would never find Jamie’s 

body so there could not be any crime, and that the police had “found the murder weapon 

and added that he killed Jamie with the shotgun that was located during the search of his 

storage unit.” (Id.) J.R. did not testify before the grand jury.

At trial, J.R. testified that he walked by Petitioner’s cell where some inmates were 

standing around and overheard the “agitated” Petitioner “talking about how the police 

[knew that he] killed her, that he - - needed to get it off his chest. He wanted to talk to a 

preacher or somebody tonight.” (Doc. 11-5 at 15) After the prosecutor asked J.R. if 

Petitioner had told J.R. “who it was that he had killed” J.R. testified, “[n]ot at that particular 

time, but he never told me that he killed her. He just said that night that his wife was 

missing - - or, not missing, but that the police know that he killed her, that - - that he can’t 

take it no more, that he needs to get it off his chest and he needed to talk to somebody.”

(Id. at 15-16) J.R. further testified that sometime after Petitioner and he were housed in 

the same unit, they were walking together and “out of the blue” Petitioner “just said, “Can 

they charge you with murder without a body?” (Id. at 18) On cross-examination, J.R. 

testified he had advised his counsel representing him in another criminal matter that “he 

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had some information” and counsel told him “she would take it to [whomever] she needed 

to take it to.” (Id. at 41) J.R. affirmed that he did not tell Detective Moffat that Petitioner 

killed Jamie and he used a shotgun. (Id. at 45)

After questioning of J.R.’s by trial counsel was complete, the court and counsel 

addressed jury question 25, which the court later posed to J.R. as “Did - - this is a yes or 

no: Did [Petitioner] ever discuss ever telling you the status of his girlfriend, current 

whereabouts?” (Id. at 95-97) J.R. answered, “No.” (Id. at 97) While considering the jury 

question outside the presence of the jury and before the question was posed to the jury, the

prosecutor advised the court that “[J.R.] did hear what [Petitioner] did, but he heard it from 

another inmate so I don’t want him to say that because that’s hearsay because [Petitioner]

never told him that[.]” The prosecutor suggested that in asking the question, the court 

should emphasize only what Petitioner had told J.R. (Id. at 95) Defense counsel said he 

did not think “we should get into whether he heard it.” (Id. at 96) The court indicated that 

the jury question as posed read, “[d]id he ever discuss it,” which the parties and court 

appeared to agree could mean whether Petitioner ever discussed what happened to Jamie 

with anyone, including J.R. (Id. at 96) The court said it would rephrase the question to 

inquire only about what Petitioner may have said to directly to J.R. rather than to anyone 

else. As noted above, J.R. answered that Petitioner had not discussed the status or current 

whereabouts of Jamie Laiadee with him. (Id. at 97)

On examination without the jury present so that the trial court could determine a 

disputed hearsay issue, Detective Moffat testified that J.R. in fact had told Moffat that 

Petitioner confessed to J.R. that Petitioner had used the shotgun from the shed to kill Jamie 

Laiadee. (Doc. 11-5 at 103-104) Detective Moffat said he knew that other inmates, 

including inmate Ethan Ducharme, had said that Petitioner had killed Jamie with the 

shotgun, and Moffat believed the inmates had discussed this statement among themselves.

(Id. at 104-105) Moffat confirmed he had told the grand jury that “J.R. told [him] that 

[Petitioner] told [J.R.] that [Petitioner] killed Jamie Laiadee with a shotgun from the 

shed[.]” On further questioning, Detective Moffat acknowledged that J.R.’s trial testimony 

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had been that J.R. had not told Moffat that Petitioner said he killed Jamie with a shotgun. 

(Id. at 107) In addition, Detective Moffat agreed with the prosecutor that hearsay evidence 

is admissible before a grand jury, and that inmates other than J.R. had told Moffat about 

how Petitioner killed Jaime Laiadee. (Id. at 112)

Shortly before trial, Petitioner had moved to suppress the statements of Petitioner’s 

fellow jail inmate Ethan Ducharme as a violation of Petitioner’s Miranda rights and his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and also identified J.R. as a jailhouse “snitch.” (Doc. 

11-1 at 55-60) In its response, the prosecution advised the court it had not listed Ducharme 

as a witness and did not intend to call him to testify. (Id. at 67) The superior court 

conducted a hearing on Petitioner’s motion to suppress. (Id. at 71-92) The court noted that 

J.R., unlike Ethan Ducharme, had not been in contact with the police prior to providing 

testimony about Petitioner’s statements in jail, and concluded that Petitioner had not 

presented evidence to establish a prima facie case that J.R.’s statements should be 

suppressed. (Id. at 91-92) The court permitted defense counsel additional time to interview 

J.R. before trial. (Id. at 92, 108-115) After defense counsel interviewed J.R., counsel

declined to pursue further motions based on the interview. (Id. at 128-129) The 

prosecution advised the court that during J.R.’s interview by defense counsel, J.R. stated 

that law enforcement had not contacted him to act as an agent, and that he had been in the 

pod when Petitioner was brought to jail and subsequently made the statements he later 

reported to the Chandler Police Department. (Id. at 130) The superior court permitted J.R. 

to testify.

In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that a person 

“questioned by law enforcement officers after being ‘taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way’ must first ‘be warned that he has 

the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 

him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.’”

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 

at 444, 478-79). When a suspect is subjected to a custodial interrogation and not warned 

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of the above rights, any subsequently elicited statements may not be admitted for certain 

purposes in a criminal trial. Id. The admission of statements made by a defendant to an 

undercover agent does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights because the 

conversation does not constitute a “custodial interrogation.” Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 

292, 296-99 (1990). As the Supreme Court stated in Perkins:

Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the 

concerns underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a “policedominated atmosphere” and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated 

person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate. 

Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect. When a suspect 

considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive 

atmosphere is lacking. There is no empirical basis for the assumption that a 

suspect speaking to those whom he assumes are not officers will feel 

compelled to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope 

of more lenient treatment should he confess.

. . .

Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do 

not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within 

Miranda’s concerns.

Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296-98 (internal citations omitted). Further, “Miranda does not 

govern interrogation by private citizens acting on their own.” United States v. Eide, 875 

F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). Petitioner’s Miranda claim is 

misplaced and cannot form a basis for excuse of his procedural default in any event.

Petitioner argues that in light of J.R.’s trial testimony that he had not told Detective 

Moffat that Petitioner had said he killed Jamie Laiadee with a shotgun, this proves that J.R. 

lied to Detective Moffat, who in turn lied to the grand jury and again at trial. (Doc. 12 at 

10) Petitioner further contends that based on J.R.’s testimony, it is now “clear” that Ethan 

Ducharme had “recruited” J.R. and “supplied him with the false story.” (Id.) Petitioner 

further concludes that the inconsistency on this point between the trial testimony of J.R. 

and Detective Moffat proves that Petitioner did not make any incriminating statements to 

J.R. Additionally, Petitioner relies on this inconsistency to allege that the prosecutor and 

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both of his trial attorneys “knew of this perjury and hearsay and did nothing about it.” (Id.) 

Based on these assumptions, Petitioner declares that “[i]t is now clear that Ground One 

involves “cause,” “prejudice,” and an “extreme miscarriage of justice.” (Id.) As set forth 

above, the Court has carefully reviewed the record. The Court does not agree with

Petitioner’s assertions or conclusions about the record before the Court.

“Cause” is a factor not fairly attributable to a petitioner, which the petitioner must 

establish interfered with his efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule. Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 753. To establish “prejudice,” a petitioner must demonstrate that trial errors

“of constitutional dimensions” denied him fundamental fairness. Murray, 477 U.S. at 494.

The miscarriage of justice exception requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new evidence sufficient to “show that it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.”

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 399 (2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)). 

Petitioner fails to meet these standards.

Petitioner fails to explain how he is entitled to a finding of either cause or prejudice, 

let alone both cause and prejudice, to excuse his procedural default of Ground One. 

Although Petitioner alleges a freestanding claim of actual innocence in Ground Five, 

undersigned recommends the Court find the claim fails on the merits. See Ground Five, 

Section III(C), below. Undersigned finds the record does not support excuse for 

Petitioner’s procedural default of Ground One.

2. Petitioner fails to establish excuse for default of Ground Two

In his Ground Two claim, Petitioner asserts that the State’s use of J.R.’s allegedly 

false statements to the grand jury violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. (Doc. 

1 at 7) He states that his “rebuttal of the Respondents’ claim that Ground Two is 

procedurally defaulted rests with the same arguments as in Ground One.” (Doc. 12 at 11) 

Petitioner implies that without Detective Moffat’s hearsay statement to the grand jury that 

J.R. had reported hearing that Petitioner had killed Jamie with a shotgun, the jury would 

never have returned an indictment on second degree murder. (Id. at 14) Specifically, 

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Petitioner asserts his Ground Two claim relies on the conclusions that: (1) J.R. lied to 

Detective Moffat, who in turn lied to the grand jury; (2) J.R. never “received” a confession 

from Petitioner and relied solely of the allegedly false statements of fellow inmate Ethan 

Ducharme; (3) the prosecutor knew that Detective Moffat’s statement about J.R. having 

killed Ms. Laiadee with a shotgun was hearsay and perjury but used it anyway to obtain an 

indictment; and (4) both defense trial lawyers knew Detective Moffat’s statement was 

perjurious and did nothing, thus allowing Petitioner to be convicted of a crime he did not 

commit. (Id. at 11)

Petitioner’s arguments are premised on faulty reasoning. As discussed, J.R.’s trial 

testimony was that he did not tell Detective Moffat that Petitioner had killed Jamie Laiadee 

with a shotgun. (Doc. 11-5 at 45) Subsequently, while discussing juror question 25, the 

prosecutor advised the court outside the presence of the jury that “[J.R.] did hear what 

[Petitioner] did, but he heard it from another inmate so I don’t want him to say that because 

that’s hearsay because [Petitioner] never told him that[.]” (Id. at 95) Detective Moffat 

testified at trial that J.R. did in fact tell him that Petitioner said he had killed Ms. Laiadee 

using a shotgun. (Id. at 107) Based on the prosecutor’s statement regarding hearsay and 

the inconsistent testimony by J.R. and Detective Moffat at trial, Petitioner concludes that 

J.R. must have been telling the truth on the issue at trial, and that Detective Moffat must 

have been lying both during trial and before the grand jury.

However, Detective Moffat’s testimony was consistent before the grand jury and at 

trial, and J.R.’s inconsistent testimony at trial does not prove that Moffat’s testimony was 

false. This same evidence may equally suggest that J.R. lied at trial and that Detective 

Moffat’s testimony at the grand jury and at trial was truthful. Additionally, leaving aside 

Detective Moffat’s testimony about J.R.’s statement regarding Petitioner having killed

Jamie Laiadee with a shotgun, Moffat’s other grand jury testimony was sufficient to 

provide probable cause for the indicted offense. See United States v. Brown, 347 F.3d 

1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (even where the government concedes that some grand jury 

testimony was perjured, remaining truthful testimony can provide probable cause to 

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support the indictment).

Such additional testimony by Detective Moffat included that: Petitioner did not 

contact Ms. Laiadee’s family until ten weeks after her disappearance (Doc. 11-1 at 11); 

Petitioner was driving Ms. Laiadee’s vehicle when he was arrested (Id. at 15-16, 19); 

Petitioner lied when he said that Ms. Laiadee had accepted a job in Colorado and decided 

to move there (Id. at 17-18); a search of Petitioner’s residence located two of Ms. Laiadee’s 

intact credit cards (Id. at 24); that search also found a sealed envelope containing a driver’s 

license, four additional credit cards, a health insurance card, and several membership cards, 

each of which belonged to Ms. Laiadee and had been cut into pieces (Id. at 25-26); Ms. 

Laiadee failed to notify her employer before she disappeared (Id. at 29); Ms. Laiadee’s 

personal cell phone was located at Petitioner’s residence and forensic evaluation indicated 

that the final outgoing call was made shortly before Ms. Laiadee disappeared after which 

the phone was used only to dial and check voicemail (Id. at 30-32); the evidence established 

that neither Ms. Laiadee’s employer nor her friends and family ever heard from her after 

she disappeared on March 17 or 18, 2010 (Id. at 32); video evidence showed Petitioner 

using or attempting to use Ms. Laiadee’s credit cards in the days following her 

disappearance (Id. at 36-38); and Petitioner had used Ms. Laiadee’s credit cards for internet 

purchases on dating sites and for utilities supplied to Petitioner’s residence during the days 

and weeks following Laiadee’s disappearance (Id. at 38-40).

As with Ground One, Petitioner’s bare statement that there is a showing of cause 

and prejudice and a fundamental miscarriage of justice necessary to excuse procedural 

default of Ground Two fails to address or apply the legal standards required to establish 

excuse for procedural default. Additionally, Petitioner does not support his conclusory 

statements that his default of this ground may be excused. It is Petitioner’s burden to 

establish either cause for the default and prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of 

federal law or that the habeas court’s failure to consider his claims would result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Petitioner has not met this 

burden. As noted, undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s freestanding claim of actual 

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innocence fails on the merits. See Ground Five, Section III(C), below. Further, 

undersigned finds there is no basis in the record to support excuse for Petitioner’s default 

of this claim.

3. Petitioner fails to establish excuse for default of Ground Three

Petitioner’s Ground Three claim is that “[t]he jury was biased and irrational when 

it found [Petitioner] ‘guilty’ of 2nd degree murder – a violation of [Petitioner’s] 6th

Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.” (Doc. 1 at 8) Petitioner agrees with 

Respondents that his Ground Three claim is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 

(Doc. 12 at 14-15)

Petitioner reiterates that the evidence against him included no body, no crime scene, 

no physical evidence, no weapon, and no witnesses. (Doc. 12 at 15) He further states that 

Jamie’s father, Sampongse Laiadee, testified that he was in contact with Jamie as late as 

May 28, 2010, and further declares that “now we have no confession[,]” apparently in 

reference to J.R.’s testimony at trial that he did not hear Petitioner say he had killed Jamie 

with a shotgun. (Id.)

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). On review for 

sufficiency of the evidence “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). In United States v. Nevils, the Ninth 

Circuit explained how a reviewing court will apply Jackson to determine a question of 

sufficiency of the evidence:

Jackson thus establishes a two-step inquiry for considering a challenge to a 

conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence. First, a reviewing court 

must consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781. This means that 

a court of appeals may not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering 

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how it would have resolved the conflicts, made the inferences, or considered 

the evidence at trial. See id. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781. Rather, when “faced 

with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences” a 

reviewing court “must presume-even if it does not affirmatively appear in the 

record-that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the 

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326, 99 S. Ct. 2781;

see also McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 673-74.

Second, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the reviewing court must determine whether this evidence, so 

viewed, is adequate to allow “any rational trier of fact [to find] the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 

99 S. Ct. 2781. This second step protects against rare occasions in which “a 

properly instructed jury may ... convict even when it can be said that no 

rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” Id. at 317, 

99 S. Ct. 2781. More than a “mere modicum” of evidence is required to 

support a verdict. Id. at 320, 99 S. Ct. 2781(rejecting the rule that a 

conviction be affirmed if “some evidence” in the record supports the jury's 

finding of guilt). At this second step, however, a reviewing court may not 

“ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (quoting Woodby 

v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282, 87 S. Ct. 483, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted), only whether “any ” rational trier of fact could 

have made that finding, id. at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781.

Because the government does not need to rebut all reasonable interpretations 

of the evidence that would establish the defendant's innocence, or “rule out 

every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” at the first 

step of Jackson, id. at 326, 99 S. Ct. 2781, a reviewing court may not ask 

whether a finder of fact could have construed the evidence produced at trial 

to support acquittal.2 Only after we have construed all the evidence at trial 

in favor of the prosecution do we take the second step, and determine whether 

the evidence at trial, including any evidence of innocence, could allow any

rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781. At this second step, we must 

reverse the verdict if the evidence of innocence, or lack of evidence of guilt, 

is such that all rational fact finders would have to conclude that the evidence 

of guilt fails to establish every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See id.

United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Petitioner’s reliance on Mr. Laiadee’s statement at trial that he was in contact with 

Jamie as recently as May 28, 2010, is not supported by the greater record. On crossexamination by defense counsel, Mr. Laiadee discussed what he had reported to a Chandler 

police detective:

Q. What did you tell Detective Shellum?

A. I say I did contact with Jamie from - - from the March to May.

Q. Of when?

A. March - - on March 30th to May 28th.

Q. Of 2010?

A. Yes.

Q. So you didn’t tell him anything about 2009?

A. No.

(Doc. 11-2 at 129-130, RT 10/20/2011) Petitioner relies on Mr. Laiadee’s statement that 

he had contact with his daughter Jamie from March 30 to May 28, 2010, as proof that Jamie 

had not been killed between March 17 and 18, 2010. However, Mr. Laiadee’s subsequent 

testimony and his testimony as a whole indicates that Mr. Laiadee was actually referring 

to contact he had with Jamie a year earlier, in 2009. On redirect, the following questioning 

by the prosecutor ensued:

Q. When was the last time that you remember talking to [Jamie] on the 

telephone?

A. I believe on the May, May - - May 31st.

Q. Of what - - of what month?

A. On May. On May 31st.

Q. Of the previous year?

A. Yeah, previous year.

[Defense counsel]: What is the previous year? I’m sorry.

Q. Would that be 2009, sir?

A. Yes, it did.

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(Id. at 134-135) Mr. Laiadee also testified that he received a telephone call from Petitioner 

in May 20107advising Laiadee that Jamie was missing. (Id. at 120-121) Mr. Laiadee said 

he then called the police to report Jamie’s disappearance. (Id. at 123-124) When he was 

asked whether he had been worried about Jamie at that point, he said he was “just like 

numb [in] my head. I don’t know what to do you know.” (Id. at 123) Mr. Laiadee 

explained that he and his wife drove to Chandler in June 2010 from their home in California 

because his wife had been crying all day and telling him they had to go to Arizona to see 

what happened. (Doc. 11-2 at 124) If Mr. Laiadee actually had been in contact with Jamie 

on May 28, 2010, as Petitioner argues, it is patently unreasonable to conclude that Mr. 

Laiadee would have called the Chandler Police Department to report Jamie missing if she 

had contacted him on that same day.

Petitioner’s assertion that “we now have no confession” similarly disregards key 

evidence. Although J.R. testified at trial that he “did not tell Detective Moffat that 

[Petitioner] killed Jamie and he used a shotgun” (Doc. 11-5 at 45), Detective Moffat’s 

testimony was consistent at the grand jury hearing and at trial that J.R. did tell him about 

this “confession.” Moreover, J.R.’s trial testimony included that he heard Petitioner 

“talking about how the police know that [he] killed her, that he - - he needed to get it off 

his chest” and that Petitioner wanted to talk to a preacher that night. (Id. at 15) J.R. also 

testified that Petitioner asked him whether a person could be charged with murder without 

a body. (Id. at 18) Additionally, J.R. confirmed that Petitioner had said he wanted to get 

the criminal process over with as soon as possible, to get out of jail or prison quickly 

because “you never know what may come up.” (Id. at 19)

Evidence at trial supported a conclusion that Jamie Laiadee was dead, including: 

that her family and friends never heard from her after March 17, 2010; that all of Jamie’s 

personal possessions remained at her residence or were found at Petitioner’s residence, 

including her cars, driver’s license, credit cards and both her personal and work cell 

phones; and that Jamie did not liquidate any assets she would have needed to start a new 

7 Petitioner testified that he called Mr. Laiadee on May 28, 2010. (Doc. 11-7 at 280)

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life. Trial evidence also indicated that Petitioner had physically abused Jamie and 

expressed his disgust with her to others and that Petitioner had lied about Jamie obtaining 

a job in Colorado, about attempting to contact Jamie by phone, and about trying to file a 

missing persons report with the Chandler police department. Moreover, as is discussed 

above, J.R.’s testimony indicated that Petitioner was distraught because he believed the 

police knew he killed Jamie, and Detective Moffat testified that J.R. had told him Petitioner 

had said he had killed Jamie with a shotgun, a statement J.R. disavowed at trial.

As is the case with Grounds One and Two, Petitioner’s bare statement that there “is 

clearly ‘cause,’ ‘prejudice’ and an exceptionally gross miscarriage of justice” necessary to 

excuse procedural default of Ground Three neglects to address or apply the legal standards 

required to establish excuse for procedural default. Petitioner fails to meet his burden to 

establish either cause for the default and prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of 

federal law or that the habeas court’s failure to consider his claims would result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. In addition, undersigned 

recommends the Court find Petitioner’s Ground Five claim of freestanding actual 

innocence fails on the merits. See Section III(C), below. Undersigned’s review of the

record does not reveal support within the record to excuse procedural default of Petitioner’s 

Ground Three claim.

B. Petitioner’s Ground Four Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Lack Merit

Petitioner’s Ground Four claim is that he received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel in violation of his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 9)

As is discussed above in Section I(C), the superior court erred when she held that 

Petitioner’s pro se petition had been dismissed, rather than dismissed without prejudice to 

correcting a procedural defect, which Petitioner timely accomplished. Respondents 

concede this error and do not argue his Ground Four claims were procedurally defaulted. 

(Doc. 11 at n.1) Accordingly, Respondents have addressed the merits of Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims, which this Court reviews de novo rather 

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than under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Atwood v. Schriro, 489 F.Supp.2d 982, 1000 (D. Ariz. 

2007) (citing Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Menendez v. Terhune,

422 F.3d 1012, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir.

2003)).

Petitioner argues seven instances of alleged ineffectiveness by one of his two trial 

attorneys. (Doc. 1-1 at 8-9) Each sub-claim of ineffective assistance is addressed in turn.

1. IAC claim regarding false statement at grand jury

Petitioner first contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial challenge to the grand jury indictment and alleges the indictment was secured with a 

false statement from a jailhouse informant. (Doc. 1-1 at 8) The Ninth Circuit has held that 

“the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated when a defendant has to stand 

trial on an indictment which the government knows is based partially on perjured 

testimony, when the perjured testimony is material, and when jeopardy has not attached.” 

United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974).

Here, Petitioner fails to establish that Detective Moffat’s grand jury testimony, 

which was based on what he reported J.R. had told him, was either false or false and 

knowingly presented. As is discussed in Section III(A) above, Detective Moffat’s 

testimony at the grand jury and later at trial about what J.R. had told him was consistent, 

despite J.R. testifying at trial that he had not told anyone that Petitioner reported to him 

that Petitioner had killed Jamie and had used a shotgun. Detective Moffat was crossexamined about J.R.’s contrary trial testimony and reaffirmed under oath that J.R. had told 

him Petitioner said he had killed Ms. Laiadee with a shotgun. (Doc. 11-5 at 107-108) On 

these facts, Petitioner does not establish either that his defense counsel was ineffective for 

not filing a challenge to the grand jury indictment or that he suffered prejudice. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687.

2. IAC claim regarding motion to dismiss murder count

Petitioner’s second claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is that trial counsel “failed 

to file a timely motion to dismiss the murder charge for lack of ‘Corpus Delecti’ – a murder 

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charge with no body, no physical evidence, etc.” (Doc. 1-1 at 8) Prior to trial, defense 

counsel filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s second degree murder count and for an order 

“precluding the State from offering any and all statements allegedly made by [Petitioner] 

due to the State’s inability to show Corpus Delecti[.]” (Doc. 11-1 at 119) Counsel asserted 

the evidence may support “charges of theft, credit card fraud, or perhaps fraudulent 

schemes and artifices, not homicide.” (Id. at 124 (emphasis in original)) Counsel further 

argued that because there was no direct evidence of Ms. Laiadee’s death, “the State should 

not be allowed to present evidence of [Petitioner’s] ‘confession’ to inmate and convicted 

felon [J.R.] because it has no independent corroboratory evidence sufficient to warrant the 

introduction of any inculpatory statements.” (Id.at 124-125) The superior court stated it 

would rule on Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the murder count upon a Rule 20 motion.

(Doc. 11-5 at 7)

When defense counsel moved to dismiss both counts against Petitioner pursuant to 

Rule 20, she argued the State’s evidence against Petitioner, particularly testimony provided 

by J.R., was not credible substantial evidence on which a jury could find him guilty of 

second degree homicide. (Doc. 11-7 at 112) The prosecution contended that credibility of 

witnesses was a jury function, and that the State had presented substantial evidence that 

Petitioner had killed Ms. Laiadee, “because that’s what he said.” (Id. at 113) The superior 

court stated that under Rule 20, it was required to consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, that witness credibility was a question for the jury, and that there 

was “substantial circumstantial evidence that Jamie Laiadee is in fact dead, and that the 

[Petitioner] did it[.]”

To the extent Petitioner is arguing his counsel was ineffective for untimely filing 

the motion to dismiss, this argument fails because the court stated that a Corpus Delecti 

argument was properly decided at the close of the State’s evidence, and thus counsel’s 

pretrial motion may have been premature, but not untimely, because the superior court 

decided the motion at the time of the Rule 20 motion. Petitioner does not demonstrate his 

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance on this claim.

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3. IAC claim regarding failure to call a specific defense witness

Petitioner’s third claim of IAC is that trial counsel failed to call as a defense witness 

Gretchen Deo, who he alleges was Ms. Laiadee’s “real best friend” who “would have 

refuted the testimony of State’s witness Karlynne Martin in regards to alleged intimidating 

behavior of the Petitioner while the alleged victim was on the phone.” (Doc. 1-1 at 8)

Petitioner, however, fails to provide any evidence to support his argument that Ms. 

Deo would have provided testimony to counter the testimony of Karlynne Martin. See

Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel because “Dows provides no evidence that this witness would have 

provided helpful testimony for the defense-i.e., Dows has not presented an affidavit from 

this alleged witness.); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended 

by 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (mere speculation of possible helpful information from 

potential witnesses is not sufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel). Moreover, 

as Respondents note, Ms. Deo had been listed as a potential witness for the prosecution 

(Doc. 11-1 at 62, 135), suggesting that Deo could offer testimony supportive of the State’s 

case rather than Petitioner’s. Considered more broadly, the United States Supreme Court 

has recognized that trial counsel is best positioned to make choices such as which witnesses 

to call based in part on “tactical considerations of the moment and the larger strategic plan 

for the trial.” Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008).

Because Petitioner does not establish his trial counsel’s representation was 

objectively deficient on this claim, he cannot demonstrate his counsel was ineffective under 

Strickland.

4. IAC claim regarding failure to call expert witness

In his Fourth claim of IAC, Petitioner alleges his appointed defense counsel refused 

to use or even investigate the possibility of using as an expert witness Dr. John Bruhn, who 

Petitioner described is “a world-renowned psychologist who would have testified that 20% 

(1 in 5) of all people who disappear do so with nothing more than the clothes on their back 

and the money in their pocket.” (Doc. 11-9 at 53)

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However, Petitioner has not shown that failure to call Dr. John Bruhn to testify was 

prejudicial. Petitioner offers nothing other than his own conclusory allegations that Dr. 

Bruhn would have so testified. Petitioner does not support his claim with any competent 

evidence indicating Dr. Bruhn’s qualifications or any statement by Bruhn about what his 

testimony might have been. In his reply, Petitioner freely admits that he does not know if 

Dr. Bruhn would have testified but blames this on one of his trial counsel, who Petitioner 

asserts was “too lazy to drive over to Gold’s Gym in Scottsdale [where Petitioner had been 

an employee] and interview him.” (Doc. 12 at 21-22)

Unsupported conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate prejudice under

Strickland. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994);see also Gonzalez v. Knowles, 

515 F.3d 1006, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2008) (speculative allegations do not establish Strickland

prejudice); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (no prejudice from 

counsel’s failure to retain an expert where no offer of proof detailing facts to which such 

expert would have testified at trial); Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002)

(“[C]omplaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus review 

because allegations of what the witness would have testified are largely speculative.... In 

addition, for [petitioner] to demonstrate the requisite Strickland prejudice, [he] must show 

not only that [the] testimony would have been favorable, but also that the witness would 

have testified at trial.”) (citations omitted); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir.

2000) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance for failure to call witness based upon lack 

of affidavit from witness regarding substance of testimony), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 908 

(2000); and United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (counsel not 

ineffective for failing to call witness where defendant made no showing that witness was 

willing to testify).

Petitioner’s failure to make the requisite showing of “prejudice” renders it 

unnecessary for the Court to address the “deficient performance” issue. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack 

of sufficient prejudice, ... that course should be followed.”); see also Williams v. Calderon, 

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52 F.3d 1465, 1470 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Dr. Bruhn to testify 

at trial.

5. IAC claim regarding failure to search for co-worker witnesses

Petitioner’s fifth IAC claim alleges that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective 

for failing to conduct an investigation at Gold’s Gym, Petitioner’s employer, “to uncover 

potential witnesses and evidence supporting” his case. (Doc. 1-1 at 8) Petitioner’s claim 

is wholly speculative because it is based on the assumption that the investigation Petitioner 

claims defense counsel failed to do might have uncovered evidence helpful to his defense.

Fatal to Petitioner’s claim of IAC is that he does not demonstrate any prejudice from his 

counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness for failure to conduct an investigation at Gold’s Gym.

Petitioner does not support his speculative conclusion that there were any witnesses at the 

gym who would have assisted in his defense or what their testimony would have been. See 

Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d at 486. This claim of IAC also fails on the merits.

6. IAC claim regarding phone records

In his sixth IAC claim, Petitioner argues his defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to introduce evidence that calls made to Ms. Laiadee’s cell phone might support a 

conclusion that Petitioner did not possess her cell phone and that the phone could have 

been located at either of Ms. Laiadee’s two prior places of employment as easily as at 

Petitioner’s condominium, because all three locations were serviced by the same cell phone 

tower. (Doc. 1-1 at 8) Petitioner also contends that his defense counsel should have 

introduced Petitioner’s cell phone records indicating that he received calls from Denver, 

Colorado while he was in jail. (Id.at 8-9) He suggests these unidentified calls could have 

come from Ms. Laiadee and would support his argument that she was still alive and may 

have moved to Denver. (Id. at 9)

The police located Ms. Laiadee’s personal cell phone at Petitioner’s condominium

during a search conducted on May 29, 2010. (Doc. 11-4 at 197, 208, 225) Petitioner does 

not provide any explanation for why Ms. Laiadee’s phone would have been at either of her 

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two places of employment yet wind up at Petitioner’s condominium when it was searched

by the Chandler Police Department the day after Ms. Laiadee’s father called the police to 

report her missing. Petitioner fails to support a claim that his counsel was ineffective for 

not introducing evidence or making an argument that Ms. Laiadee’s cell phone could have 

been somewhere other than at his condominium, where the police located it.

Petitioner’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for not introducing 

Petitioner’s cell phone records for the period after he was arrested and confined in jail

depends on evidence indicating that his cell phone was called from an unidentified party 

or parties in Denver, Colorado.

8

(Doc. 1-1 at 8-9) Petitioner alleges he had never been to 

Denver and knew no one in Denver. (Id. at 9) Petitioner reasons that based on his assertion

that Ms. Laiadee told him she wanted to relocate to Denver, the calls from the unidentified 

party must have been from her, thus proving she had been alive as late as the most recent 

call, which was made on June 29, 2010. (Id.)

An obvious risk to Petitioner’s defense in introducing evidence of these calls from 

unidentified callers in Colorado is that the calls may have been traced and it established

that the calls did not come from Ms. Laiadee. Certainly, Petitioner did not provide any 

evidence linking Ms. Laiadee to the phone numbers other than his own self-serving 

statements. As Respondents posit, these calls could have come from a wide array of 

sources, including telemarketers. Moreover, Petitioner was the only person out of Ms. 

Laiadee’s circle of family, employers, co-workers, or friends who said that Ms. Laiadee 

had moved to Colorado.

Based on Petitioner’s speculative and entirely unsupported claims regarding phone 

records, he fails to show that under the circumstances, defense counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness or that a reasonable probability exists that 

but for these alleged errors Petitioner’s trial would have had a different outcome.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 693-94.

8

In January 2018, Petitioner advised the Arizona Court of Appeals that his cell phone was 

called from the telephone number (303) 784-2421 on June 10, 16, and 29, 2010. (Doc. 1 

at 407)

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7. IAC claim regarding Petitioner testifying at trial

Petitioner argues in his seventh claim of IAC that defense counsel was ineffective 

for advising Petitioner that the only way to “prove his innocence” was by testifying at trial, 

and for not adequately preparing him for his testimony. (Doc. 1-1 at 9) As a result, 

Petitioner states, he was confused about questions addressing his memory and he “believed 

the prosecutor was trying to trick him instead of providing him with the opportunity to 

review materials before answering questions.” (Id.) Petitioner concludes that this caused 

him to appear to the jury to be arrogant and indifferent. (Id.)

Petitioner’s allegation that defense counsel improperly pushed him to testify is

conclusory. Petitioner asserts that counsel advised him he needed to testify but does not 

provide any details regarding his conversation with counsel wherein counsel allegedly gave 

Petitioner erroneous advice regarding testifying at trial. In his reply, Petitioner states only 

that he had made it “crystal clear” to both of his trial counsel that he “would not testify 

unless they felt it was absolutely necessary” and that they had insisted he testify. (Doc. 12 

at 23) Petitioner’s conclusory allegations do not support a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing James v. Borg, 24 

F.3d at 26, and noting that the claim argued was made “’without reference to the record or 

any document’”). Further, Petitioner states that he was willing to testify if it was the 

opinion of his trial counsel that such was absolutely necessary. Given the persuasive 

evidence against Petitioner presented by the state, it would not have been ineffective 

assistance of counsel to advise Petitioner that his testimony was necessary for a reasonable 

hope that he would be acquitted.

Petitioner’s claim that defense counsel failed to properly prepare him to testify is 

both conclusory and speculative. Petitioner refers to a news report after the trial ended of 

the jury foreman stating that Petitioner had hurt his case “by taking the stand and admitting 

he lied about things ranging from his name and age to whether he was college-educated 

and where he banked,” and that what “most hurt” Petitioner was his attitude presented as 

“indifference or arrogance.” (Doc. 1 at 278) The jury foreman was also reported as having 

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stated that the jury “collaboratively believed that there were multiple convincing factors 

that [Petitioner] murdered Jamie Laiadee.” (Id.) Although Petitioner states that improper 

preparation by trial counsel caused him to appear to at least one juror as indifferent or 

arrogant, he does not specify what advice or preparation he should have received or how 

such advice or preparation would have made a difference to his defense. The record 

transcripts of Petitioner’s testimony on direct examination (Doc. 11-7 at 238-302, Doc. 11-

8 at 8-42), on cross-examination (Doc. 11-8 at 42-160, 190-193), and on redirect (Doc. 11-

8 at 160-183, 186-187) do not suggest that Petitioner’s preparation generally was lacking 

with regard to his responses on cross-examination by the prosecutor.

Because Petitioner’s arguments that defense counsel was ineffective for advising 

him to testify at trial and for not adequately preparing him for his testimony are speculative, 

conclusory, and unsupported by the record, Petitioner’s arguments do not establish 

prejudice under the Strickland test. His arguments do not establish either that his counsel’s 

advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that there is a “reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 694.

8. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, undersigned recommends the Court hold that Petitioner’s 

IAC claims fail on the merits because he has failed to establish both that defense counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and a reasonable 

probability that but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of his trial would have been 

different.

C. Petitioner’s Ground Five Claim of Freestanding Actual Innocence Fails 

on the Merits

In Ground Five, Petitioner argues he has new evidence to support a claim that he is 

actually innocent of the murder of Ms. Laiadee. (Doc.1 at 10, Doc. 1-1 at 12, Doc. 12 at 

25-29) Petitioner describes three instances of “new evidence.” First, Petitioner states that 

Chandler Police Detective Moffat told a television reporter with the CBS program “48 

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Hours”9that in Petitioner’s case “there was no crime scene, so we created a virtual crime 

scene.” (Doc. 1-1 at 12) Petitioner also claims that State’s witness Karlynne Martin told 

“48 Hours” staff that she had “misled jurors by presenting herself as [Ms. Laiadee’s] best 

friend, when in fact, she was” Ms. Laiadee’s former supervisor, and that Ms. Laiadee 

despised Ms. Martin because Martin had dismissed Laiadee without cause. (Id.) Petitioner 

asserts he learned of the “48 Hours” claims from information provided to him “by Judy 

Rybak, the producer of the ‘48 Hours’ segment.” (Id.) Petitioner further declares that 

witness J.R. had been released from custody after serving only 10 months of his “amended 

18-month plea deal and [after serving] only 27% of his original plea deal of 2.5 years.”

(Id.) Petitioner states that the jury was never informed of these three pieces of “new 

evidence.” (Id.)

The Supreme Court has assumed that a freestanding actual innocence claim is 

cognizable on federal habeas review, but it has noted that “the threshold showing for such 

an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 

390, 417 (1993). The Ninth Circuit has analyzed freestanding innocence claims similarly.

See Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit has instructed 

that its “cases suggest that relief would be available, if at all, only in very narrow 

circumstances. [A petitioner] must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt and 

must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent.’” Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 

1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc)). In Jones v. Taylor, the Ninth Circuit explained that while it had not “articulated 

the precise showing required,” it had discussed a freestanding innocence claim standard 

“by reference to the Schlup ‘gateway’ showing[.]” Jones, 763 F.3d at 1247. The Schlup

gateway showing requires that “a petitioner must demonstrate that in light of new 

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found the 

9 Petitioner raised evidence from the “48 hours” program as “new evidence” relating to 

untimeliness under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a) and 32.1(e). The superior 

court rejected this argument, finding Petitioner could have raised the evidence on appeal 

but failed to do so. (Doc. 11-9 at 64)

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petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The new 

evidence required pursuant to Schlup must be reliable “whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Id.

at 324.

The information allegedly derived from the producer of “48 hours” is double 

hearsay, because Petitioner asserts that statements made by Detective Moffat and 

witness Karlynne Martin were made to the staff of “48 Hours” and the producer of the 

show allegedly repeated the statements to Petitioner. Petitioner does not provide sworn 

affidavits to support these “48 Hours” related statements made after trial, which in Ms. 

Martin’s case allegedly contradict a portion of her trial testimony made under oath

regarding the closeness of her relationship to Ms. Laiadee. Although a court assessing 

a claim of actual innocence is “not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern 

at trial[,]” the court must consider “all of the evidence” with “due regard” to reliability 

of the evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28.

Petitioner asserts that Detective Moffat’s alleged statement that he used a “virtual 

crime scene” in the investigation of Ms. Laiadee’s death and disappearance is “critical 

information” of which the jury was not made aware. In the State’s closing argument, 

the prosecutor tacitly admitted that there was no crime scene evidence in Petitioner’s 

prosecution. The prosecutor stated there was “no blood anywhere.” (Doc. 11-8 at 239)

The prosecution’s argument at trial was that Petitioner choked Ms. Laiadee to death and 

then disposed of her body. (Id.) In support of that theory, the prosecutor stated

“[c]ircumstantially I can tell you that he didn’t shoot her and he didn’t knife her.” (Doc. 

11-8 at 253) In the defense closing argument, Petitioner’s counsel emphasized to the jury

that “[t]here is no physical evidence to show that [Petitioner] killed Jamie Laiadee, none 

whatsoever. There is no hair. There’s no blood. There’s no DNA. There’s no smoking 

gun.” (Doc. 11-8 at 281-282) In his [rebuttal] to defense closing, the prosecutor again 

admitted that there was no physical evidence that Petitioner had killed Ms. Laiadee. (Doc. 

11-8 at 294-295) On this record, the jury was plainly aware that the prosecution’s case did 

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not rely on any crime scene evidence. That part of Detective Moffat’s alleged statement 

to “48 Hours” was not new. Further, Petitioner provides no details of what Detective 

Moffat’s alleged “virtual crime scene” consisted of, how it was allegedly used by the 

Chandler Police Department in its investigation, or how this alleged use prejudiced his 

case. Petitioner fails to establish that if the jury had been aware the “new evidence” he 

identifies, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found the 

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

On questioning by the prosecution, Karlynne Martin testified that she and Jamie 

Laiadee became “close friends,” had been employed at the same time by two different 

companies and had kept in touch regularly after they worked for separate employers. (Doc. 

11-3 at 116-118) Ms. Martin stated that she became aware that Jamie Laiadee was not 

happy with Petitioner in March 2010. (Id. at 122) Ms. Martin said that during her 

telephone conversations with Laiadee between January and March 2010, Laiadee would 

stop talking when Petitioner would walk into the room. (Id. at 124-125) Ms. Martin also 

testified that she had not communicated with Ms. Laiadee since March 15, 2010, despite

Ms. Martin attempting to contact Ms. Laiadee, including by e-mail. (Id. at 125) Ms. Martin 

explained that even though Ms. Laiadee had held eight jobs with different companies 

during an eight-year period, the fact that Ms. Laiadee frequently changed jobs did not affect 

their relationship. (Id. at 133) Ms. Martin was also called as a witness by the defense. 

(Doc. 11-7 at 114-122) Martin said that Jamie Laiadee had been disappointed when she 

had applied for a job in Denver, Colorado but did not get it. (Id. at 117) Ms. Martin said 

she considered herself to be Jamie Laiadee’s best friend. (Id. at 118) She stated that when 

she spoke by telephone with Ms. Laiadee on March 15, 2010, Laiadee did not mention any 

plans to leave town. (Id. at 120)

Even if Karlynne Martin’s alleged hearsay statements that Martin had misled jurors 

by presenting herself as Jamie Laiadee’s “best friend,” and that Ms. Laiadee despised Ms. 

Martin are assumed to be true, these statements at most might minimally support doubt 

about Petitioner’s guilt, but clearly would not affirmatively prove that Petitioner was 

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probably innocent. Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d at 1145. Further, this alleged new 

evidence would not demonstrate “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 327.

Petitioner also claims that the jury did not hear “new” evidence that witness J.R. 

had been released from custody after serving only 10 months of his “amended 18-month 

plea deal and [after serving] only 27% of his original plea deal of 2.5 years.” (Doc. 1-1 at 

12) Petitioner’s argument that this evidence is new is squarely contradicted by the record.

On direct examination at trial, J.R. testified that before providing any information in 

Petitioner’s case, he had entered into a plea agreement on three cases in which the 

presumptive sentence was a total of two-and-a-half years. (Doc. 11-5 at 24-25) J.R. 

explained that after he provided information in Petitioner’s case, his plea agreement was 

amended to reduce the presumptive prison sentence to one-and-a-half years, but to increase 

his term of probation from two years to three years. (Id. at 26, 29-30) J.R. stated that at 

the time he testified at Petitioner’s trial, he had already served his prison sentence and was 

then on probation. (Id. at 28) J.R. said that he had been imprisoned in jail for a time-served

total of ten months, and that after he “behaved himself” in prison, he only had to serve 85% 

of his time. (Id. at 77-79) J.R. reported he had spent only three months in prison after 

sentencing. (Id. at 78) J.R. agreed that in the end he had gained a benefit by providing 

information about Petitioner. (Id. at 69)

During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that J.R. had already served 

his prison time and that J.R. did not get a deal from the State but had received a year off 

his sentence. (Doc. 11-8 at 257) Moreover, during the defense closing, Petitioner’s 

counsel reminded the jury it had heard evidence that J.R. received “10 months for a 

sentence, and with his back-time credit he was released almost immediately after 

sentencing. He had about a month to serve.” (Id. at 280-281)

For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s asserted new evidence, considered 

separately or together, is either not new evidence at all or does not fall within the narrow 

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circumstances recognized by the Ninth Circuit, Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1145, and fails to 

meet the “extraordinarily high threshold” assumed by the Supreme Court, Herrera, 506 

U.S. at 417. See Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[e]vidence that 

merely undercuts trial testimony or casts doubt on the petitioner’s guilt, but does not 

affirmatively prove innocence, is insufficient to merit relief on a freestanding claim of 

actual innocence.” (citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006))).

D. Ground Six Claim of Denial of Access to the Courts Lacks Merit

Petitioner’s Ground Six claim is that his “constitutionally protected right to 

represent himself and participate in the appeals process was obstructed when, between

October 12 and November 27, 2012, he was detained in a “psych ward” without any of his 

property, including his legal materials. (Doc. 1-1 at 14) Petitioner says this situation 

occurred during his direct appeal process and that he was not permitted to communicate 

with his family or legal counsel. (Id.) Further, Petitioner states that in July and August 

2014, he requested from prison officials copies of the standard Rule 32 Post-Conviction 

Relief petition forms and that at first his request was ignored and later the paralegal sent 

him the wrong forms. (Id.) He contends the paralegal also sent him the wrong instructions

on how to fill out the forms. (Id. at 15) Petitioner further complains that on January 20, 

2015, he was moved to an isolation cell without any of his property “for no reason 

whatsoever.” (Id.) He states that until early May 2015 his legal materials were kept from 

him and he then discovered that half of his legal paperwork was missing and the remaining 

half was mixed up with the paperwork of several other inmates. (Id.) Petitioner asserts 

that the “obstructionist and disruptive behavior” of the Arizona Department of Corrections 

is “a clear violation of the Petitioner’s constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment” 

and caused the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court to deny his motions 

for review. (Id. at 16-17)

Petitioner raised this claim in his July 2015 PCR petition. (Doc. 11-9 at 60) In its 

December 3, 2015, order dismissing Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding, the superior court 

rejected the claim for the reasons provided in its dismissal order dated June 9, 2015, but 

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filed on June 24, 2015. (Id. at 64) In its June 2015 order, the superior court rejected 

Petitioner’s argument that he needed more time to file his PCR petition due to the 

confiscation of his legal files between January and May 2015, and concluded that “he had 

all the files in his possession” for the six months prior to January 2015 during which to 

“prepare the substance of the petition.” (Id. at 31) In its December 2015 order, the superior 

court rejected Petitioner’s argument that his right to appeal had been obstructed, stating it 

had already found the argument unpersuasive. (Id. at 64)

As noted, Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel on direct appeal and his 

appellate brief was filed by counsel on October 11, 2012. (Doc. 1 at 77) Because Petitioner 

was placed in a “psych ward” on October 12, 2012, his separation from his legal materials 

did not affect his direct appeal. Appointed counsel subsequently filed a petition for review 

in the Arizona Supreme Court (Id. at 140-153), which petition was denied on November 

26, 2013 (Id. at 169). In his reply, Petitioner asserts he was “never informed of his right

(and responsibility) to file a supplemental brief” on direct appeal. (Doc. 12 at 28) 

Petitioner was represented throughout his direct appeal process and had no constitutional 

right to a hybrid representation. United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1193 (9th Cir. 1995) 

There is no record that Petitioner desired or asserted the right to represent himself. Further, 

this argument was not raised in the Petition and the Court will not address new grounds 

for relief raised for the first time in a reply brief. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 

919, 930 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Arguments raised for the first time in petitioner’s reply 

brief are deemed waived.”) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 

F.3d 1085, 1093 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2007)). Petitioner also discusses instances of IAC by his 

counsel on direct appeal for the first time in his reply to the Petition. (Doc. 12 at 28-

29)10 These allegations are also deemed waived. Delgadillo, 527 F.3d at 930 n. 4.

As noted, Petitioner also argues that prison officials’ errors in 2014 caused him 

to file the wrong form in his PCR action, that prison officials placed him in “max” 

10 In any event, the claims would be technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted 

because Petitioner never raised such claims in his state PCR proceedings.

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custody from January into May 2015 without his legal papers, and that between May 

2015 and March 22, 2016,11 he had access to only half of his legal paperwork. (Doc. 

1-1 at 14-16)

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state officials from actively 

interfering with an inmate’s attempt to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). That right, however, only encompasses the ability to bring 

petitions or complaints to court and not to discover or even effectively litigate such 

claims once filed with a court. Id. at 354. The right “guarantees no particular 

methodology but rather the conferral of a capability–the capability of bringing 

contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.”

Id. at 356. See also Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The right 

of access is designed to ensure that a habeas petition or civil rights complaint of a person 

in state custody will reach a court for consideration.”)

Petitioner does not establish that the actions of prison officials unconstitutionally 

interfered with his right to access to the courts as set forth by the United States Supreme 

Court in Lewis v. Casey. In his PCR proceedings, Petitioner’s “state court complaint” 

that Petitioner asserts was filed on the wrong form was accepted by the superior court 

and construed as his pro per PCR petition, as Petitioner requested the court to do. (Doc. 

11-9 at 16, 17) The “state court complaint” was filed on January 6, 2015 (Id. at 11), 

prior to the time Petitioner says he was moved to an isolation cell without any of his 

property (Doc. 1-1 at 15). In mid-July 2015, Petitioner was able to file a petition for PCR 

containing the declaration that had been missing from his January 2015 petition, and which 

11 Although Petitioner asserts also that he did not have access to his legal papers after May 

2015 and that this impacted his ability to properly address his appeals of the superior court 

rulings on his PCR proceeding, the Arizona Court of Appeals repeatedly advised Petitioner 

this claim was beyond the scope of review of his initial PCR proceeding. (Doc. 1 at 390, 

400, 409, 416) Because Petitioner did not properly raise any claims of obstruction of access 

to the courts involving confiscation of his legal papers after May 2015 in state court, any 

such claims he asserts in the Petition are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted 

without excuse.

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asserted each of the claims he raises now in the instant Petition. (Doc. 11-9 at 36-60)

In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas court looks through summary 

opinions to the “last reasoned” state court decision. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 

1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the last reasoned decision is that of the PCR court. Petitioner 

does not establish that the superior court’s decision on his claim “was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or “was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented[.]” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). Petitioner’s Ground Six claim fails on the merits.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the District Judge find

that Grounds One through Three of the Petition are procedurally defaulted without excuse 

and that each of Grounds Four through Six fails on the merits. Assuming the 

recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s judgment, the District Judge’s 

decision will be on procedural grounds for Grounds One through Three and on the merits 

for Grounds Four through Six. Undersigned recommends that a certificate of appealability 

be denied because reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the District Judge 

was correct in his procedural ruling regarding Grounds One through Three and because 

Petitioner has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and jurists of reason would not find the Court’s assessment of 

Petitioner’s constitutional claims “debatable or wrong,” regarding Grounds One through 

Six. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Rick Wayne Valentini’s Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (NonDeath Penalty) (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because dismissal of Grounds One through Three of the Petition are justified by a plain 

procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable, and 

because as to Grounds Four through Six of the Petition, Petitioner has not “made a 

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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and 

jurists of reason would not find the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s constitutional claims 

“debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 7th day of April, 2020.

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