Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00466/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00466-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRAKASH NARAYAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-00466-TLN-CKD PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(ECF No. 29.)

Presently before the court is defendant Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss brought pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7). (ECF No. 29). Plaintiff filed a response, and the court held a 

hearing on Wells Fargo’s motion on December 18, 2019. (ECF Nos. 35, 45.) For the following 

reasons, the court recommends granting defendant’s motion and dismissing plaintiff’s action 

against Wells Fargo. 

BACKGROUND

Pro se plaintiff Prakash Narayan filed the present suit against Wells Fargo, Sacramento 

County, the City of Sacramento, and related entities. The complaint alleges improper property 

taxes and utility charges were assessed against plaintiff’s property and that Wells Fargo, the 

creditor for the property, created an illegal escrow account to pay these charges. Plaintiff’s first 

Case 2:19-cv-00466-TLN-CKD Document 50 Filed 01/03/20 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

amended complaint has five numbered counts, premised on the Fair Debt Collect Practices Act 

(FDCPA), and two unnumbered counts, public corruption and tampering. (ECF No. 12.)

Wells Fargo makes four arguments for dismissal: (1) plaintiff’s complaint is insufficiently 

pleaded pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2); (2) plaintiff failed to join a necessary party, his wife who also 

signed the contract in dispute, warranting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(7); (3) plaintiff’s claims are 

premised on an incorrect reading of the contract at issue; and (4) all of plaintiff’s individual 

causes of action fail to state a claim. Because the undersigned recommends dismissal premised 

on the last two points, the court does not address defendant’s first two points. 

DISCUSSION

Legal standard

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. 

Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b), the court “may generally consider 

only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters 

properly subject to judicial notice.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 

895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendant has requested this court take judicial notice of certain

documents. (ECF No. 29-1 at 2.) That request is granted.

Case 2:19-cv-00466-TLN-CKD Document 50 Filed 01/03/20 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The deed allows Wells Fargo to create an escrow account

Although difficult to decipher, all plaintiff’s claims against Wells Fargo appear to arise 

from Wells Fargo’s alleged unlawful creation of an escrow account for tax and utility liabilities. 

(See ECF No. 12 at 3 (“Plaintiff is a consumer borrower and has valid loan with defendant Wells 

Fargo Bank that was signed and agreed plaintiff will have no escrow account Exhibit B. 

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank violated written legal cont[r]act and instrument by adding escrow 

account”); id. (“Wells Fargo Bank violated written legal cont[r]act and instrument by adding 

escrow account.”).) 

However, the deed explicitly allows Wells Fargo to create an escrow account for liabilities 

including “taxes and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security 

Instrument as a lien or encumbrance on the Property.” (ECF No. 29-1 at 9.) If plaintiff fails to 

pay the escrow items, pursuant to a waiver, Wells Fargo can pay such amounts directly and seek 

reimbursement from plaintiff. (Id.) 

Here, plaintiff’s complaint against Wells Fargo is largely, if not entirely, premised on 

Wells Fargo allegedly paying property taxes and utility assessments, which are “Escrow Items” as 

defined in the deed. (See id.) Because property taxes and utility items statutorily have priority 

over other liens, and the deed allows Wells Fargo to pay and seek a refund for “taxes and 

assessments . . . which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien,” Wells Fargo 

was within its rights under the deed to pay these escrow amounts and assess those charges against 

plaintiff. (Id.); see also Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 2192.1 (“Every tax declared in this chapter to be 

a lien on real property ... have priority over all other liens on the property, regardless of the time 

of their creation”); Sacramento City Code 13.12.100(F) (delinquent utility charges create a lien 

that is “paramount to all other liens except those for state, county, and municipal taxes, with 

which it shall be on parity”). It was therefore within Wells Fargo’s rights to pay the delinquent 

property taxes and utility assessments that had priority over its security interest, and to assess 

those charges to plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument that Wells Fargo did not have the 

authority to establish an escrow account and charge plaintiff is refuted by the plain reading of the 

deed. 

Case 2:19-cv-00466-TLN-CKD Document 50 Filed 01/03/20 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiff’s individual claims against Wells Fargo do not state claims

Plaintiff enumerates five counts premised on the FDCPA. Each cause of action lists a 

section number and corresponding title of the FDCPA. (ECF No. 12 at 1-4.)

Congress passed the FDCPA in 1977 with the stated purposes of eliminating “abusive 

debt collection practices,” ensuring “that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive 

debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged,” and promoting “consistent State 

action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). In furtherance 

of these purposes, the FDCPA bans a variety of debt-collection practices and allows individuals 

to sue offending debt collectors.

“Debt collector” 

means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails 

in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who 

regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 

asserted to be owed or due another.

15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Wells Fargo violated five FDCPA provisions. Four of 

these provisions prohibit “debt collectors” from certain activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (“A 

debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any 

debt”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (“A 

debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, 

oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692g 

(creating requirements for debt collectors to follow when validating debts). 

Courts have consistently held that creditors, even assignees from the original creditor, are 

not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA. Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1209 

(9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal, in part, because plaintiff’s “complaint makes no factual 

allegations from which we could plausibly infer that Wells Fargo regularly collects debts owed to 

someone other than Wells Fargo”); De Dios v. Int'l Realty & Investments, 641 F.3d 1071, 1074 

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he person who originated the debt, such as a creditor to whom the debt was 

Case 2:19-cv-00466-TLN-CKD Document 50 Filed 01/03/20 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

originally owed, is not considered a debt collector”); Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 

F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] ‘creditor’ is not a ‘debt collector’ under the FDCPA.”).

As stated in the deed, Wells Fargo is the lender and beneficiary. Accordingly, any alleged 

debt-collection activities Wells Fargo performed would be in relation to debt which Wells Fargo 

was a creditor, precluding Wells Fargo from being a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action fail as a matter of law.1

In addition to plaintiff’s numbered causes of action premised on the FDCPA, the 

complaint also contains two headings entitled “public corruption” and “t[a]mpering with public 

records.” (ECF No. 12 at 5, 8.)

Regarding plaintiff’s unnumbered public corruption count, plaintiff generally alleges that 

Wells Fargo should be liable due to a fine imposed by the federal government on Wells Fargo, the 

company sending mail to an address not associated with plaintiff, and the creation of the 

previously mentioned escrow account. Wells Fargo argues this count “fails to identify any basis 

for relief in statute, tort, or contract.” (ECF No. 29 at 17.) Regarding plaintiff’s second

unnumbered count, tampering with public records, plaintiff gives a partial cite to statute which 

the court infers is a New York statute. (ECF No. 12 at 8.) The substance of his argument is that 

because an unrelated clerk of court backdated a document, Wells Fargo backdated a declaration in 

the present case. (Compare ECF No 12 Ex. O with Ex. P.) 

Neither of plaintiff’s unnumbered causes of action state a claim against Wells Fargo that 

would entitle plaintiff to relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Accordingly, the undersigned 

recommends dismissing those causes of action against Wells Fargo as well. 

Leave to amend would be futile

Although the court ordinarily liberally provides litigants, especially pro se litigants, with 

an opportunity to amend if pleading deficiencies can be cured, the nature of plaintiff’s claims here 

 

1 Plaintiff’s final FDCPA claim, “furnishing certain deceptive forms” would not apply to Wells 

Fargo for similar reasons. That statute makes it unlawful to “furnish any form knowing that such 

form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor of 

such consumer is participating in the collection[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692j. As Wells Fargo was the 

creditor, collecting its own debt, this statute has no application. 

Case 2:19-cv-00466-TLN-CKD Document 50 Filed 01/03/20 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

suggests that granting leave to amend would be futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 

F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). As discussed above, plaintiff’s FDCPA claims fail as a matter of 

well-settled case law, and plaintiff’s unnumbered claims are legally frivolous. Because the court 

previously granted plaintiff leave to amend (ECF No. 4), and his amended complaint still fails as 

a matter of law, the court concludes any further leave would be futile. Accordingly, the court 

recommends dismissing plaintiff’s claims against Wells Fargo with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED; and

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Wells Fargo be dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 3, 2020

16. nara. 466

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:19-cv-00466-TLN-CKD Document 50 Filed 01/03/20 Page 6 of 6