Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-00430/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-00430-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH NORWOOD,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KIM T. THOMAS, et al.,

 

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-00430-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Joseph Norwood, asserts federal and state-law claims against the

following five defendants: Kim T. Thomas, Commissioner of the Alabama

Department of Corrections;Corizon, Inc., the contract healthcare service provider for

the Alabama Department of Corrections;Bettina Carter, Warden of the WorkRelease

Facility in Decatur, Alabama; Leon Forniss, Warden of the Staton Correctional

Facility in Elmore, Alabama; and LeVan Thomas, Warden of the Frank Lee Work

Release Center in Deatsville, Alabama. Each of the individual defendants was sued

in both his or her individual and official capacities. 

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts federal claims for violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process right to bodily integrity (Count I),1

violation of

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (Count

1

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 21-28.

FILED

 2016 Jan-15 PM 02:47

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 1 of 40
II),2

and intentional infliction of emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count

III).3 His complaint also alleges supplemental state-law claims for wantonness

(Count IV) and breach of contract (Count V).4

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiff

claims compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. 

This court dismissed all claims alleged against the individual defendants

employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections in their official capacities by

means of a memorandum opinion and orders entered on December 12, 2014.

5 The

same decision also dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

claim alleged in Count I of plaintiff’s complaint, but only against the individual

defendants,

6

because Corizon, Inc., did not join in the motion to dismiss filed by the

individual defendants. Consequently, that claim remained pending against Corizon.

7

The action now is before the court on the amended motions for summary

judgmentfiled byCorizon, Inc., and the individual defendants.

8 FederalRule of Civil

Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment should be rendered if the pleadings,

2

 Id. ¶¶ 29-34. 

3

Id. ¶¶ 35-42. 

4

 Id. ¶¶ 43-48 (wantonness); id. ¶¶ 49-56 (breach of contract). 

5

See doc. no. 19 (Memorandum Opinion and Orders), at 8-9 and 19. 

6

Id. at 9-11 and 19. 

7

Id. at 11 n.11. 

8

See doc. no. 35 (Corizon’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment); doc. no. 36 (ADOC

Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment).

2

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 2 of 40
the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that “there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words, summary judgment is proper

“after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who failsto make

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “In making this determination, the court must

review all evidence and make all reasonable inferencesin favor of the party opposing

summary judgment.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). 

Inferences in favor of the non-moving party are not unqualified, however. “[A]n

inference is not reasonable if it is only a guess or a possibility, for such an inference

is not based on the evidence, but is pure conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin

Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1983). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the

materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party

for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (emphasis supplied). 

3

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 3 of 40
See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) (asking

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law”).

Applying the foregoing standards, and following consideration of the

pleadings, briefs, and evidentiary submissions, the court concludesthat both motions

should be granted, but only as to plaintiff’s federal claims. 

I. SUMMARY OF FACTS

Plaintiff was convicted during February of 2000 in the Circuit Court for

Houston County, Alabama, of the state criminal offense of distribution of cocaine,

and sentenced to 42 years of incarceration in the custody of the Alabama Department

of Correections (“ADOC”).9 Plaintiff served only three years of that sentence before

he was released on parole by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles.

10 On

November 14, 2008, however, while still on parole, plaintiff’s vehicle was pulled

over and searched by police. Crack cocaine was found inside the vehicle.11 As a

result, plaintiff’s parole was revoked, and he was remanded to the custody of the

ADOC on January 28, 2010.12 

9

See doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 16.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 18-19. 

12

Id. at 11, 13. 

4

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 4 of 40
On March 5, 2012 — the date on which plaintiff sustained the injury that forms

the basis of this action — he was being housed in the Decatur, Alabama, Work

Release Facility. Although incarcerated in Decatur, plaintiff was assigned to a

landscaping crew performing work fortheCity of Athens, Alabama.13 Hissupervisor,

Roger Weldon, directed him to cut down a small tree with a chainsaw. Plaintiff had

never before operated a chainsaw. In addition, he was not provided goggles or other

safety equipment.

14 While operating the chainsaw, a gust of wind blew sawdust and

wood chips into plaintiff’s right eye.15 When he returned to the Decatur Work

Release Facility at the conclusion of his shift, plaintiff “filled out a sick call form”

provided by defendant Corizon, Inc., for the purpose of requesting examination by

one of Corizon’s jail nurses.

16

 Even so, he was not seen by a nurse that evening. 

Early on the morning of the following day, Tuesday, March 6, 2012, plaintiff

returned to work in Athens. He soon began to experience acute eye pain and

vomited.

17 Hissupervisor allowed himto return to the Decatur WorkRelease Facility

13

Id. at 32.

14 Doc. no. 51 (Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment) ¶ 1; see also doc.

no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 33-34.

15

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 33-34. 

16

Id. at 34-35 (alteration supplied). Bettina Carter, the Warden at Decatur Work Release

Facility, attested that plaintiff “was initially told to fill out a sick call slip because that is the agency

policy for non-emergency situations.” Doc. no. 31-3 (Carter Affidavit), at 3. 

17

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 36. 

5

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 5 of 40
before the end of his shift. When plaintiff arrived at the facility, he told correctional

officers about his injuries, and was instructed to fill-out another “sick call form.”18

He continued to vomit throughout the afternoon, and his right eye began to swell.

19

Plaintiff was notscheduled to work on Wednesday, March 7, 2012. He waited

for the sick call announcement, but he was not among the inmates who were called

to the health care unit (“HCU”). By that point, however, plaintiff’s pain had become

so intense that he walked to the HCU. The on-duty nurse, identified in this record

only as “Nurse Wallace,” asked what plaintiff was doing at the HCU. Plaintiff told

her that, despite having submitted sick callslips on each of the two previous days, he

had not been called to the HCU, and his eye was hurting and swelling. Despite the

fact that plaintiff’s eye was obviously swollen,

20 Nurse Wallace “told [him] to get the

hell out of there,” and added that she would attend to him “when she [got his] sick

18

 Id. “Sick call” is a common procedure used for inmate health care: 

Correctional heath care is guided by several fundamental principles. Inmates may

make a request for health care attention at any time. Requests that are emergent are

attended to immediately. Requests that are not emergent are reviewed every day; this

often is called sick-call triage. Nurses usually are the professionals responsible for

reviewing and responding to requests for health care attention via sick call.

Screening, Sick Call and Triage, NATIONALCOMMISSIONONCORRECTIONALHEALTHCARE(2010),

http://www.ncchc.org/cnp-screening-sickcall-triage (last visited Jan. 15, 2016). 

19

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 36.

20

Id. at 37 (“[T]he thing about it, it wasn’t swollen around my eye. It was my eyeball

swelling, coming out like a mullet, a Popeye mullet fish.”) (alteration and emphasis supplied); id.

at 90. 

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Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 6 of 40
call [form].”

21

 

On the night of the following day, Thursday, March 8, 2012, plaintiff still had

not been examined by a Corizon nurse, and he was “vomiting real bad.”22

 

On the afternoon of Friday, March 9, 2012 — four days after injury— plaintiff

took a photograph of his swollen eye with a fellow inmate’s contraband cellular

telephone and sent the picture to his mother as an attachment to a text message. That

evening, he called his mother to explain how his eye had been injured, and informed

her that the prison staff was ignoring his medical needs.

23 Plaintiff testified that his

mother immediately

called up there, and they said that they were going to give — get me

some medical attention. They said my eye — she didn’t tell them that

she saw my eye. She told them that she spoke with me and everything,

and they said that my eye wasn’t [as] bad asI probably made it out to be. 

But my eyeball itself was bigger than a golf ball. And so, my mom told

me that she was going to find an attorney. And while she was saying

she was going to find an attorney, [the correctional officers]were calling

me [over the intercom], telling me to put on my prison whites, I was

about to go to Limestone [Correctional Facility to see a nurse].

Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 41 (alterations supplied). 

Thus, on the night of Friday, March 9, 2012, plaintiff was transported to

Limestone Correctional Facility, and then from there to Crestwood Medical Center

21

Id. at 38 (alterations supplied).

22

 Id. at 39-40.

23

Id. at 40 (alteration supplied).

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Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 7 of 40
in Huntsville, Alabama,24 where he finally was examined by a physician during the

early morning hours of Saturday, March 10, 2012, five days after his injury. Dr.

Wayne Jones, the emergency roomphysician who examined plaintiff, noted abrasions

on his right cornea.25 He wrote prescriptions for Lortab and Ciprofloxacin

Ophthalmic Solution, and entered the following statements in his report: “Patient

agreesto follow up with *EMERGENCY ROOM. Instructed to obtain follow up care

in one day.”26 Dr. Jones gave the correctional officers escorting plaintiff several

sheets of paper to return to the nurses at the Limestone Correctional Facility.

27

 

Plaintiff spent the night of March 10th in a cell at Limestone Correctional

Facility, where he alleges that nurses administered Lortab pills to him every four

hours, but did not provide him with the Ciprofloxacin Ophthalmic Solution (eye

drops).28 The following day, a nurse gave plaintiff his eye drops, but informed him

24

Id. at 42.

25

 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 17-20. “ECF” is an acronym formed from the

initial letters of the name of a filing system that allows parties to file and serve documents

electronically (i.e., “Electronic Case Filing”). Bluebook Rule 7.1.4 allows citation to page numbers

generated by the ECF header. The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, at 21 (Columbia Law

Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). Even so, the Bluebook recommends against citation to ECF

pagination in lieu of original pagination. Consequently, unless stated otherwise, this court will cite

to the original pagination in the parties’ pleadings. When the court cites to pagination generated by

the ECF header, it will, as here, precede the page number(s) with the letters “ECF.”

26 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 20 (ALL CAP emphasis in original, italicized

emphasis supplied).

27

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 45.

28

Id. 

8

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 8 of 40
that he would not be returning to the doctor at Crestwood for “follow up care” as

directed by Dr. Wayne Jones, or transported to a specialist.29

In summary, plaintiff’s eye was lacerated by flying wood chips on Monday,

March 5, 2012, and he received no medical care until the following Saturday, March

10, 2012. The emergency room physician wrote that plaintiff should be seen for a

follow-up examination in “one day,” but, as will be seen, plaintiff was neither

returned to the emergency room, nor examined by an optometrist or ophthalmologist

for four additional days. 

Plaintiff was examined by optometrists Robert Sandlin and Megan Morris in

Athens, Alabama, on or about March 14, 2012.

30 Dr. Morris gave plaintiff a small

bottle of “Pred Forte” eye drops, and instructed himto administer the drops four times

each day, and to return for a follow-up visit “on or about 03/21/2012.”31 Plaintiff

states that the Pred Forte drops decreased the swelling in his eye.32

 

By March 20, 2012, however, plaintiff had used the entire bottle of Pred Forte

drops.33 Consequently, he asked Charles Hooper, an on-site certified registered nurse

29

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 45.

30 Doc. no. 31-2 (Inmate Movement History), at ECF 6; doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at

ECF 26.

31

 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 33.

32 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 13.

33

Id. 

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Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 9 of 40
practitioner at Decatur Work Release Facility, when he would again be seen by Dr.

Sandlin or Dr. Morris. Hooper replied: “Real soon.”34 By the following day, March

21, 2012, plaintiff was experiencing sharp pains and blurred vision, and he returned

to the HCU, seeking some relief.35 He says that he was again ordered to return to his

cell because he did not have a sick call appointment.

36

 

Throughout the ensuing days, plaintiff informed various correctional officers

of his symptoms, but was repeatedly directed to fill-out Corizon sick call forms, and

to return to his cell. In frustration, he requested a meeting with defendant Bettina

Carter, the Warden of the Decatur Work Release Facility. He met with her on March

27, 2012.

37 During that meeting, plaintiff complained that the medical staff was not

providing appropriate care for his injury.

38 Warden Carter telephoned the HCU,

spoke with the nurses, and then told plaintiff that, if he did not see an eye specialist

within the week, to come back and inform her.39

Plaintiff was taken to see Dr. Morris in Athens on March 30, 2012: three days

34

Id. 

35

 Id. ¶ 14.

36

Id. 

37

 Doc. no. 31-3 (Carter Affidavit), at 2.

38

 Id.

39

Id.

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Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 10 of 40
after his meeting with Warden Carter.40 Dr. Morris reported that plaintiff was “doing

better,” and that his inflammation and acute conjunctivitis had resolved.

41

 

Plaintiff was transferred to the Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility

(“ATEF”) in Columbiana, Alabama, on April 16, 2012.

42

 

Plaintiff made two visits to the nurse prior to May 3, 2012.

43 He testified that,

during each of those visits “a Corizon nurse” filled-out a form indicating that he

needed to see an opthalmologist, and submitted it to her superior.44 Plaintiff alleges

that, on May 3rd, that nurse told him that Corizon had denied her request for plaintiff

to be examined by an ophthalmologist.

45

 

During a routine physical examination on May 14, 2012, a different Corizon

nurse noticed plaintiff’s eye and inquired about his injuries.

46

 

40 Doc. no. 31-2 (Inmate Movement History), at ECF 6.

41

 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 38. 

42 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 53; doc. no. 31-2 (Inmate Movement History), at

5. “The Alabama Therapeutic Education Facility opened in March 2008 and is a residential reentry

center that uses tested cognitive behavioral reentry treatment and vocational training to help

offenders change their criminal thinking and behavior.” 

See http://www.cecintl.com/facilities_rr_al_001.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 

43

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 56-57.

44

Id. at 57.

45

Id. The medical records do not entirely support plaintiff’s assertion. Corizon medical

personnel submitted two ophthalmologist Consultation Request Forms on plaintiff’s behalf, and both

were approved. See doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 31-40 (no denial of plaintiff’s request

to see an opthalmologist). It should be noted, nevertheless, that plaintiff’s appointment was

scheduled for September — six months after his injury. Id. at ECF 31, 42. 

46

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 55.

11

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 11 of 40
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Jay Glover at Callahan Eye Hospital at the

University of Alabama at Birmingham during September of 2012.

47 Dr. Glover

reported that plaintiff’s “optic nerves [did] not look glaucomatous.”48

Plaintiff was transferred to the Frank Lee Work Release Center in Deatsville,

Alabama, on October 10, 2012.

49

 He was again examined by a physician at UAB’s

Callahan Eye Hospital on December 3, 2012.

50 That physician wrote “Glaucoma

suspect” on plaintiff’s Provider Consultation Report, and stated that plaintiff needed

to “obtain [Timolol and Alphagan P drops]immediately, or [he] may lose [his] vision

permanently!”51 

On the same day, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Scott Hartzell, an

ophthalmologist, at the University of Alabama at Birmingham glaucoma clinic: an

entity separate from the Callahan Eye Hospital.

52 Dr. Hartzell formally diagnosed

plaintiff with glaucoma, and recommended that he continue taking Alphagan P and

Timolol 0.5% drops. He also added Xalatan drops to plaintiff’s medication

47 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 43; doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 60,

63-64; doc. no. 51-5 (Griffin Affidavit), at ECF 3. See also note 45, supra. 

48

 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 43 (alteration supplied).

49

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 62.

50

Id.

51

 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 57 (alterations supplied).

52 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 65; doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 54.

12

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 12 of 40
regimen.

53 Under the heading “Other Recommendations,” Dr. Hartzell wrote

“None.”54 

At some point between December of 2012 and January of 2013, however,

plaintiff “started bumping into things at the prison,” and complained to the staff at the

Frank Lee Work Release Facility. He was transported to a consultation appointment

with Dr. Kirk Sturridge at a Dothan, Alabama facility known as “Eye Center South”

on January 27, 2013.55 Dr. Sturridge recommended surgery that same day, in order

to alleviate the excessive pressure in plaintiff’s eyes.

56

 

During the ensuing surgical procedure, Dr. Sturridge cut and placed stitchesin

plaintiff’s eyeball. Plaintiff contends that he should have received his filled

prescription for corticosteroid eye drops on January 27th— the purported date of his

eye surgery — but that he did not actually receive the eye drops until February 4,

2013.

57 He claims that delay resulted in his having to go to the eye hospital

emergency roomat the University of Alabama atBirmingham.

58 The medical records

53

 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 54.

54

Id.

55

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 66-67.

56

Id. at 68.

57

Id. at 69.

58

Id. at 73; see doc. no. 35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 9; but see doc. no. 35-3 (Medical

Records), at ECF 94 (letter from Dr. Kirk Sturridge to ADOC, dated March 25, 2013, stating that

plaintiff “is using his postoperative drops”).

13

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 13 of 40
contradict plaintiff’s claims, however. Corizon medical personnel submitted a

Consultation Request Form for glaucoma filter surgery on plaintiff’s behalf on

January 30, 2013, and he underwent surgery on February 4, 2013.

59 Those records

also state that, the following day, February 5, 2013, plaintiff attended a “one-day

follow up” appointment with Dr. Sturridge.60 

Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Sturridge on multiple occasions after his

February 4, 2013 surgery.

61 As part of his post-operative treatment, Dr. Sturridge

“would take [plaintiff’s] eyeball and take an instrument and take his finger and

squeeze it to . . . make fluid squeeze out where the [stitches were] to make fluid come

out” for the purpose of alleviating pressure in the eye.62

 

Following plaintiff’s first surgical procedure, Dr. Sturridge prescribed

corticosteroid eye drops, but plaintiff, who was not driven back to camp from workrelease until approximately seven p.m. each night, routinely missed the six p.m. “pill

call.”

63 He testified that, “[a] lot of times[,] the nurse wouldn’t wait for [him] to get

59

 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 61, 68.

60

Id. at 74.

61

See, e.g., doc. no. 35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 5, 12, 21, 26, 29, 32, 34, 40, 45, 51, 65,

72.

62 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 27-28 (alterations and ellipsis supplied); doc. no.

35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 69.

63 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 70-72. Plaintiff testified that no one at the facility

would hold his medications for him. 

14

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 14 of 40
in from work,”

64

and the only time a nurse gave his eye drops to a correctional officer

for delivery to plaintiff when he returned from work was after his mother called the

facility and complained.

65 Plaintiff also telephoned defendant LeVan Thomas,

Warden of the Frank Lee Work Release Center, who assured himthat his medications

would be available upon his return from work. Even so, whenever plaintiff returned,

the medications were not there.66 

Plaintiff underwent a second surgical procedure at Eye Center South on April

11, 2013.67 Following thatsurgery, plaintiff was given a small bottle of Prednisolone

Acetate, which he was told to administer every hour.68 

Plaintiff returned to Eye Center South on April 22, 2013.

69 He alleges in his

complaint that, during the examination, Dr. Sturridge told him that he could go blind

because he had been deprived of Prednisolone Acetate for five days.

70 Plaintiff also

alleges that Dr. Sturridge filed a complaint on behalf of plaintiff with the ADOC.71

64

Id. at 72 (alterations supplied).

65

Id.

66

Id. at 72-73.

67

Id. at 75.

68

 Doc. no. 35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 22.

69

 Id. at ECF 26. 

70 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 6 ¶ 19. Note: There is no evidence of that statement in the

medical records. 

71 There is no written complaint by anyone affiliated with Eye Center South to ADOC in the

record. But see doc. no. 35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 55 (Corizon nurse notes containing the

statement: “Apparently pt’s Brother called [Eye Center South] reporting pt has not received his

15

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 15 of 40
In May of 2013, plaintiff’s mother met with defendant LeVan Thomas, the

Warden of the Frank Lee Work Release Center. Her affidavit states that 

Mr. Thomas told me he was sorry for all the problems that Joseph had

[been] dealing with [in connection with] his eye [injury] and his meds

and eye drops and that basically it was the Nurses’ fault because they

[came]fromanother prison. Mr. Thomas also said that if Joseph has any

problem with the Nurses or Officers about his eye, for him to come see

him. I brought up the fact that Joseph’s eye had been swollen for a

while. Mr. Thomas said that they were going to take care of everything.

Doc. no. 51-5 (Griffin Affidavit), at ECF 4 (alterations supplied). 

Plaintiff was released from ADOC custody on April 6, 2015.

72 Before his

release, however, plaintiff underwent a total of four surgical procedures, and will

require further operations to prevent complete blindness.

73 He already has lost some

of his peripheral vision.

74

 

II. PLAINTIFF’S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIM

AGAINST CORIZON, INC.

The courtfinds that plaintiff’ssubstantive due process claimagainst defendant

Corizon, Inc., is due to be dismissed for the same reasons stated in the December 12,

2014 order dismissing that claim against the individual ADOC defendants: that is, 

Prednisolone in 3 weeks.”) (alteration supplied).

72

 Doc. no. 31-2 (Inmate Movement History), at 5.

73

 See doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 90.

74

Id.

16

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 16 of 40
The Supreme Court has made clear that “[w]here a particular

Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection against a particular government behavior, that Amendment,

not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the

guide for analyzing these claims.” See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

273 (1994) (citations omitted).

Because plaintiff wasimprisoned following a criminal conviction

at the time of the alleged violations, his claims are properly brought for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth

Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)

(holding that the Eighth Amendment provides explicit constitutional

protection for claims by prisoners against correctional officers for

“deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm). He is not

entitled to bring an independent claimunder the Fourteenth Amendment

for violations of his substantive due process rights based on the same

alleged conduct. See Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274 (11th

Cir. 1989) (holding that, if an inmate is entitled to protection under the

Eighth Amendment, “then [he] is afforded ‘no greater [substantive]

protection’ by the due process clause.”) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). See also Lee v. Sikes, 870 F. Supp. 1096, 1101

(S.D. Ga. 1994) (rejecting an inmate’s separate substantive due process

claimand analyzing only the cruel and unusual punishment claim where

both claims arose fromthe same prison workplace injury). Accordingly,

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim(Count

I) is due to be dismissed as to the individual defendants.

Doc. no. 19 (Memorandum Opinion and Orders), at 10-11 (alterations in original,

footnote omitted). 

III. PLAINTIFF’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT DELIBERATE

INDIFFERENCE CLAIM AGAINST CORIZON, INC.

The record revealsthat plaintiff received extensive off-site treatmentfor his eye

injury. He was examined by three optometrists and at least three opthalmologists, in

17

Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 17 of 40
addition to other doctors.

75 Moreover, Corizon approved at least seventeen

Consultation Request Forms submitted by its medical staff on plaintiff’s behalf.76

There are many inconsistencies between plaintiff’s allegations and his medical

records, and this court will adopt the facts as set forth in the medical records where

such inconsistencies exist.77 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When

opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by

the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that

75

See doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 20 (Dr. Wayne Jones, emergency room

physician); doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 26, 32, 36 (Dr. Robert Sandlin, optometrist);

doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 37-38 (Dr. Megan Morris, optometrist); doc. no. 35-3

(Medical Records), at ECF 54 (Dr. Scott Hartzell, opthalmologist); doc. no 35-3 (Medical

Records), at ECF 43, 51 and doc. no. 35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 8 (Dr. Jay Glover,

opthalmologist); doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 70, 74, 90, 93 and doc. no. 35-4 (Medical

Records), at ECF 18, 23, 30, 36, 43, 50, 53, 64-65, 73-74 and doc. no. 35-5 (Medical Records), at

ECF 20, 22 (Kirk Sturridge, opthalmologist); doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 61, 63, 65-

66, 86 and doc. no. 35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 13 (Dr. Michael Bradford, optometrist); doc.

no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 42, 46, 48-50 (Dr. Lawrence, specialty unknown); doc. no.

35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 1-5, 24-25 and doc. no. 35-5 (Medical Records), at ECF 11 (Dr.

Bobby Crocker, specialty unknown); doc. no. 35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 34, 38-39 (Dr.

Simon Issac, specialty unknown); doc. no. 35-5 (Medical Records), at ECF 1 (Dr. Marcial

Mendez, specialty unknown). 

76

See, e.g., doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 31, 42, 48, 50, 53, 61-65, 71, 76, 80,

85, 91; doc. no. 35-4 (Medical Records), at ECF 1, 7, 26, 61; doc. no. 35-5 (Medical Records), at

ECF 5.

77

 For example, plaintiff testified that the “first set of [eye] drops [he] had [came] from the

emergency room [on or about March 10, 2012]. And [he] had those drops until [he] ran out. And

the next time [he] was ordered some drops was when [he] . . . went to Eye Center South in 2013.” 

Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 50 (alterations and ellipsis supplied). That is contradicted

by the medical records. Dr. Megan Morris prescribed Pred Forte drops “qid” (four times per day)

for plaintiff on March 14, 2012. See doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 33. [Note:

“Prescribed” and “receipt / dispensing” are not the same.] Dr. Morris also gave plaintiff free samples

of non-prescription artificial tears when she examined him on March 30, 2012. See id. at ECF 37.

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Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 18 of 40
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”);

Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (same). 

See also Whitehead v. Burnside, 403 F. App’x 401, 403 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing

Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1990)) (“Self-serving statements by a

plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory,

contemporaneously created medical records.”). Of course, the court will accept as

true any of plaintiff’ssworn testimony that is not directly contradicted by information

contained in his contemporaneously created medical records. 

“When a private entity . . . [such as Corizon] contracts with a county to provide

medical services to inmates, it performs a function traditionally within the exclusive

prerogative of the state” and, accordingly, the entity “becomes the functional

equivalent” of the state under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452

(11th Cir. 1997) (alteration supplied). 

The Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal

liability under § 1983. A county’s liability under § 1983 may not be

based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989); Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct.

2018 (1978). A county is “liable under section 1983 only for acts for

which [the county] is actually responsible.” Marsh v. Butler County,

268 F.3d 1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Indeed, a county is

liable only when the county’s “official policy” causes a constitutional

violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Thus, [the plaintiff] must “identify

a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused [his] injury.” Gold v. City

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Case 5:14-cv-00430-CLS Document 54 Filed 01/15/16 Page 19 of 40
of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks

omitted) (alteration in original) (citingBd. ofCounty Comm’rs v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 403, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).

A plaintiff . . . has two methods by which to establish a county’s

policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated county policy or (2)

an unofficial custom or practice of the county shown through the

repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county [or state]. Monell,

436 U.S. at 690-91, 694; Brown v. Neumann, 188 F.3d 1289, 1290

(11th Cir. 1999) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,

121, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988)). Because a county rarely

will have an officially-adopted policy of permitting a particular

constitutional violation, most plaintiffs . . . must show that the county

has a custom or practice of permitting it and that the county’s custom or

practice is “the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.’” 

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (alteration in original) (citing Monell,

436 U.S. at 694 and Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 70 L.

Ed. 2d 509, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981)). 

Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2003) (alterations,

emphasis, and ellipsis supplied). 

In other words, in the absence of proof of an official policy, a plaintiff asserting

a federal constitutional claimagainst a private entity such as Corizon under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 must demonstrate that some unofficial policy has been carried out so

pervasively through repeated acts that it is fair to attribute the conduct to the

apparently condoning municipality. SeeCraig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1311

(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226

F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2000)) (“In the absence of a series of constitutional violations

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from which deliberate indifference can be inferred, the plaintiff[] must show that the

policy itself is unconstitutional.”) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in

Craig, emphasis supplied). 

Note well that “‘[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not

sufficient to impose liability’ against a municipality,” or an entity like Corizon that

has metaphorically stepped into the legal “shoes” of the Alabama Department of

Corrections. Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310 (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)) (alteration supplied); id. at 1311 (“Even if we assume that

these practices amount to constitutional violations, [the plaintiff] did not even present

evidence that these practices had been employed by Georgia Correctional for any

other detainees.”) (alteration and emphasissupplied); id. at 1311-12 (holding that the

plaintiff’s expert witness, who testified as to experiences at other jails, did not help

plaintiff establish “a policy or custom . . . [that] has led to more than one alleged

constitutional violation,” and that a plaintiff must present evidence of similar

constitutional violations occurring at the facility in which he isincarcerated) (ellipsis

and alteration supplied). 

Plaintiff has not presented any examples of an unofficial Corizon policy or

practice that resulted in an unconstitutional delay or denial of necessary medical care

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to inmates other than himself.

78 Consequently, he must prove that deliberate

indifference was manifested through an official Corizon policy. 

Plaintiff attempts to prove an official policy of deliberate indifference by

offering excerpts fromCorizon’s “Provider Info” manual,

79

and deposition testimony

by Dr. Hugh Hood, the Regional Medical Director of Corizon, from a prior lawsuit.

80

For instance, the manual states, “We are stuck with these types of patients [i.e.,

inmates].”81It also indicatesthat cost is a major, if not the preeminent,factor Corizon

providers should consider when making treatment decisions regarding inmates, and

strongly suggests that the containment of costs is more important than doing one’s

“best.”82

 

CMS is acutely aware of costs and practice habits. It is necessary

to use more and more guidelinesto educate physicians about appropriate

but cost effective care. It is the physician’s nature to want to do the

“best” for the patient. However, the “best” is often a reflection of the

physician’s past practice habits in a system that was not overly

78 Plaintiff submitted a scan of a LexisNexis search for all cases in which Corizon was named

as a party. This search yielded 777 results. See doc. no. 51 (Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to

Summary Judgment), ¶ 95, at 5; doc. no. 51-6 (LexisNexis search results). Even so, plaintiff fails

to identify any specific instances in which Corizon’s purported policy of deliberately depriving

inmates of needed health care for the purpose of saving costs resulted in a judgment for an inmate

housed at any of the facilities in which he was incarcerated. See Craig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d

1306, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2011). 

79

 See doc. no. 51-3.

80

 See doc. no. 51-2.

81

Id. at ECF 3 (alteration supplied).

82

See doc. no. 51-3 (Corizon “Provider Info” Manual), at ECF 3.

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concerned with costs. 

. . . .

[T]he prison medical director hasto keep an eye on utilization of all offsite procedures . . . The patients should be returned, as soon as possible,

to the prison or jail to be managed on-site.

The primary cause of cost overruns is due to off-site medical care. 

Thisisthe essential reason for putting well-trained primary care doctors

at the prison site. The more we can do, the better the cost control.

. . . .

In the prison and jail health care business, these costs cannot be

transferred to the patient or, in most cases, to the client. It is very

difficult to get a contract increase in payment when dealing with

government entities. Therefore, we are forced to look at each and every

case with cost containment related to necessary medical care. 

Doc. no. 51-3 (Corizon’s “Provider Info” Manual), at ECF 3, 5, 7 (ellipsis and

alteration supplied). 

Dr. Hood testified that Corizon has a “full risk” contract with ADOC, which

meansthat ADOC pays Corizon a predetermined monetary amount, regardless of the

extent to which Corizon’s on-site services or other, off-site medical services are

utilized.

83

In other words, the less treatment inmates receive, the higher the profit

realized by Corizon.

84

 Even so, Corizon argues that

83

 See doc. no. 51-2 (Hood Deposition), at 113.

84

 See id. at 115.

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[a] mere allegation that Corizon did not provide treatment to Mr.

Norwood to save money, although this is not supported by the medical

records, is insufficient to overcome summary judgment as there is no

evidence of a policy or procedure utilized byCorizon to not provide Mr.

Norwood necessary medical treatment. The medical records clearly

show that Mr. Norwood was taken to the hospital as soon as he

complained about pain in his eye, he was thereafter seen by multiple

specialists and outside medical providers and underwent four separate

surgeries. Certainly not evidence of medical providers trying to save

money. 

Doc. no. 35-1 (Corizon’s AmendedBrief in Support of Summary Judgment), at 16-17

(alteration supplied). Contrary to Corizon’s argument, however, plaintiff was not

“taken to the hospital as soon as he complained about pain in his eye.”85 In spite of

submitting several sick call slips pursuant to Corizon’s policy, plaintiff was forced

to wait over four days to be examined by a doctor. During that period, plaintiff’s eye

continued to swell, to the point that it eventually was swollen shut, and the extent of

the attention he received from the Corizon staff consisted of being given some

Tylenol tablets, and instructed to “get the hell out” of the health care unit.

86

Even so, plaintiff has not presented any legal authority indicating that the

policies enumerated in either the “Provider Info” manual or the “sick call”

methodology are facially unconstitutional. See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312 (stating that

85

See doc. 35-3 (Hood Affidavit), at ECF 3. Plaintiff was injured on Monday, May 5, 2012,

and was first seen in the health care unit on Friday, May 9, 2012. He was seen at Crestwood Medical

Center in the early morning hours of Saturday, May 10, 2012.

86

See doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 91.

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it is a “highly questionable assumption” to say that a “policy or custom of using the

least costly means of treating patients” would, by itself, “amount to a constitutional

violation.”).

In short, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an unconstitutional policy of

deliberate indifference through either of the two possible ways — that is, by showing

that an unofficial policy or procedure is so pervasive that it is fair to impute conduct

undertaken pursuant to that policy toCorizon, or by showing that any official Corizon

policy is unconstitutional on its face. 

Moreover, even if plaintiff could demonstrate an unconstitutional policy or

procedure, an “‘inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a

constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to

establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.’” Easley v.

Department of Corrections, 590 F. App’x 860, 869 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hill v.

Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Center, 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994)

(overruled in part on other grounds)). There is no evidence in plaintiff’s medical

records that any delay in treatment caused or exacerbated his glaucoma. 

Therefore, and in spite of the high likelihood that Corizon’s full-risk contract

model and sick call methodology encourage the delivery of substandard healthcare

services to inmates, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of Corizon on

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plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT DELIBERATE

INDIFFERENCE CLAIM AGAINST THE

INDIVIDUAL ADOC DEFENDANTS

This court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against the ADOC defendants in their

official capacities pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

87 The court

declined to dismiss plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against the ADOC

defendants under the doctrine of qualified immunity at the time it entered an order on

the ADOC defendants’ motion to dismiss.

88

 Because of discovery undertaken since

the entry of that order, however, it now is necessary to revisit the question of whether

the ADOC defendants are entitled to the benefits of the qualified immunity doctrine.

It is well-settled that the doctrine provides “immunity from suit to government

officials performing discretionary functions as long as ‘their conduct violates no

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’” Green v. Brantley, 941 F.2d 1146, 1148 (11th Cir. 1991)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The purpose of the

doctrine isto allow government officialsto execute their discretionary duties without

fear of personal liability or harassing litigation. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

87

 See doc. no. 19 (Memorandum Opinion and Orders), at 8-9.

88

See id. at 19.

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638 (1987); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2002). Even so,

“qualified immunity would be defeated if an official knew or reasonably should have

known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would

violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff] . . . .” Harlow, 475 U.S. at 815

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted, alteration in original). 

To claim the benefits of qualified immunity, the public official “must first

prove that ‘he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the

allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’” Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.3d 1479, 1487

(11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1988)). The

individual defendants contend that they have done so, because “[e]verything alleged

in the Complaint describes the defendants doing what correctional officials do:

supervising and controlling inmates and running prisons.”89 The court agrees. “It has

long been held that the decision to bestow or deny medical services to prisoners . . .

is a discretionary function for purposes of qualified immunity analysis.” Cooper v.

Rogers, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1130 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (citing Townsend v. Jefferson

County, 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010)) (ellipsis supplied). Accordingly, the

burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate. 

89 Doc. no. 37 (ADOC Defendants’ Amended Brief in Support of Summary Judgment), at

14 (alteration supplied).

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See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.

Courts generally apply a two-part test in determining whether a defendant is

entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. The “threshold question” is whether

the facts, viewed “in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,” show

that the prison official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If that question is answered in the affirmative, then the court

will proceed to the second step of the analysis, which seeks to determine whether the

right was “clearly established.” Id.

90

 

“The Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments

prohibits prison officialsfromexhibiting deliberate indifference to prisoners’serious

medical needs.” Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999); see also

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail on a claim of this variety, a

plaintiff must satisfy three prima facie elements: that is, show that he suffered from

a serious medical need; the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that need; and,

that there is a causal linkage between the defendant’s indifference and plaintiff’s

90 The Supreme Court has relieved lower courts from mandatory adherence to the order of

the two-part analytical framework established by the Saucier opinion. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while

the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”). 

It now is within the court’s discretion to, in appropriate cases, assume that a constitutional violation

occurred for purposes of addressing, in the first instance, whether such a violation would be “clearly

established.” Id. Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, Saucier’s tested sequence of

analysis will be followed.

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injury. Mann v. Taser International, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009).

The individual defendants do not challenge the first element. Indeed, it would

be difficult for them to do so, because plaintiff’s eye injury unequivocally constituted

a serious medical need. See Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 n.4 (11th Cir.

1990) (“Evidence of recent traumatic injury . . . has generally been sufficient to

demonstrate a serious medical need.”) (ellipsis supplied); Aldridge v. Montgomery,

753 F.2d 970, 972-73 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a 1.5-inch laceration over

plaintiff’s eye, bleeding for 2.5 hours, constituted a serious medical need). 

This court need not proceed to the causation factor, however, as plaintiff has

failed to prove that the ADOC defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. “In our circuit, to find deliberate indifference on the part of

a prison official, a plaintiff inmate must show: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of

serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross

negligence.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing

Townsend v. Jefferson County, 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010)). This court

will analyze the issue of deliberate indifference for each of the ADOC defendants, in

turn. 

Defendant Kim Thomas, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of

Corrections, testified that he has never met plaintiff and did not know of plaintiff’s

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injury or related issues until he was served with this lawsuit.

91 Even so, plaintiff

contends that Commissioner Thomas is liable for his role in “award[ing] Corizon the

contract for Alabama inmates’ medical care,” and for doing so “without regard to the

numerous legal actions Corizon is involved in across the United States.”92 Plaintiff

also states that he named Commissioner Thomas as a defendant in this action

“[b]ecause he’s the commissioner,” and because he “is over the prison system” and

“ran it.”93 Plaintiff concedes that he has never met Commissioner Thomas, spoken

with him, or submitted a grievance to him.

94 None of the foregoing facts demonstrate

that Commissioner Thomas had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to

plaintiff and, with such knowledge, disregarded the risk. Accordingly, plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claim against Commissioner Thomas is due to be dismissed. 

Similarly, defendant Leon Forniss, Warden of StatonCorrectional Facility, has

never met plaintiff.95 Plaintiff sued Warden Forniss because “[h]e run[s] the prison,”

“sign[s] all the paperwork of people going in and out of that prison,” and “know[s]

everything.”

96 Those vague allegations do not demonstrate that Warden Forniss had

91

See doc. no. 31-6 (K. Thomas Affidavit), at 2.

92

 Doc. no. 51 (Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment), at 5 ¶ 95 (alteration

supplied).

93

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 176-77 (alteration supplied).

94

 Id. at 177.

95

Id. at 124.

96

Id. (alterations supplied).

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“subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm” and disregarded that risk through

conduct amounting to more than gross negligence. See Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312;

see also Hall v. Smith, 170 F. App’x 105, 107-08 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Marsh v.

Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001)) (“Vague and conclusory

allegations will not support a claim under § 1983.”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim against Warden Forniss is due to be dismissed. 

Defendant Bettina Carter, Warden of Decatur Work Release Facility, did have

subjective knowledge of plaintiff’s eye injury, because she met with plaintiff on

March 27, 2012, to discuss his eye injury. She testified,

Inmate Norwood did tell me his eye was injured and he was concerned

about not seeing the free world doctor regarding treatment of it. I

picked up the phone, called medical and inquired about Inmate

Norwood’s complaint. I don’t recall whom I spoke with, but they

informed me Inmate Norwood had an appointment on March 30ththat is

in approximately 3 days to see the free world eye specialist. It is

security policy and procedures not to inform inmates of the exact times

and dates of appointments or transfers.

Doc. no. 31-3 (Carter Affidavit), at 2. 

Plaintiff admits that he spoke with Warden Carter “on or about” March 27,

2012, and his medical records indicate that he saw an optometrist on March 30,

2012.

97

 Even so, plaintiff alleges that Warden Carter told him during their meeting

97 Doc. no. 35-3 (Medical Records), at ECF 38; doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 141;

doc. no. 31-2 (Inmate Movement History), at ECF 6.

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that “she was a busy woman and she [was] trying to run a prison.”

98 That is not

constitutionally significant: plaintiff asked Warden Carter for help and, regardless

of whether she was polite, plaintiff was examined by an optometrist within three days

of their conversation. 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that Warden Carter prevented him from going to his

follow-up appointment within “one day” after he went to the emergency room at

Crestwood Medical Center on March 10, 2012.99 He bases that allegation on the fact

that Warden Carter has accessto the inmates’ paperwork and should have known that

he needed to go to a follow-up appointment. Even so, he presents no evidence that

Warden Carter had any subjective or actual knowledge of the need for a twenty-fourhour follow-up visit. See Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir.

2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)) (“[A

deliberate indifference plaintiff] cannot say, ‘Well, they should have known.’ Were

we to accept that theory of liability, the deliberate indifference standard would be

silently metamorphosed into a font of tort law — a brand of negligence redux —

which the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear it is not.”) (alteration supplied). 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Warden Carter did not

98

 Doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 140 (alterations supplied).

99

 Id. at 145.

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disregard any risk of serious harm of which she had subjective knowledge, and

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against her is due to be dismissed.

DefendantLeVan Thomas, Warden of the FrankLee WorkReleaseCenter, had

“numerous conversations” with plaintiff.100 Plaintiff claims that Warden Thomas

stated that he did notsee anything wrong with plaintiff’s eye (although plaintiff does

not dispute that, to a lay person, there would have been no outward signs of injury by

the time he was at Frank Lee).101 Even so, plaintiff contends that he told Warden

Thomas everything that had happened to his eye, thereby providing notice to

Thomas.

102

 

Although plaintiff could perhaps prove that Warden Thomas had subjective

knowledge of a serious risk of harm, plaintiff cannot prove that Warden Thomas

disregarded that risk by conduct amounting to more than gross negligence. See

Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312. Plaintiff contends that he was only transported to Staton

Correctional Facility for medical care “half of the time [he] was trying to go,” and

that, after one of his eye operations, Warden Thomas failed to ensure that plaintiff’s

prescriptions were filled.

103 When asked by counsel for the ADOC defendants how

100

Id. at 153. “I called Warden Thomas, I know, over 150 times in a year-and-a-half.” Id.

101

Id. at 153-54.

102

Id. at 155.

103

Id. at 156 (alteration supplied), 158.

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Warden Thomas would have known that he was not receiving his medications,

plaintiff testified that Warden Thomas “[knew] [plaintiff’s] work schedule and he

[knew] the pill call schedule.”104

 An insinuation that Warden Thomas should have

known of a serious risk of harm to plaintiff is not enough. “Deliberate indifference

is not the same thing as negligence or carelessness. To the contrary, the Supreme

Court has made clear that a state official acts with deliberate indifference only when

he disregards a risk of serious harm of which he is actually aware.” Ray v. Foltz, 370

F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)) (internal citations omitted, emphasis

in original). 

If Warden Thomas acted in any culpable manner, he was, at most, negligent. 

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against him is accordingly due to be

dismissed. 

In summary, this court concludesthat each of the ADOC defendants is entitled

to qualified immunity. 

V. DISCUSSION OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS PURSUANT TO

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

Plaintiff also asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

104

See doc. no. 35-2 (Norwood Deposition), at 167 (alterations supplied).

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).105 That section provides for the recovery of damages by

a party who is injured as a result of a conspiracy to deprive any person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities

under the laws. The statute reads as follows: 

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in

disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose

of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons

of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities

under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the

constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing

to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the

laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force,

intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from

giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of

the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President

or Vice-President, or as a member of the Congress of the United States;

or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support

or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or

more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in

furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured

in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right

or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or

deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by

such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). There are four prima facie elements of a claim based upon §

1985(3): 

105

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 9-10, ¶¶ 35-42.

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(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or

indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the

laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws; and (3) an act

in furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is either injured

in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen

of the United States.

Childree v. UAP/AG Chem, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (11th Cir. 1996); see also

Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624, 627-28 (11th Cir. 1992)

(same); Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military College, 970 F.2d 785, 793-

94 (11th Cir. 1992) (same). 

Strangely, plaintiff does not assert any allegations of conspiracy in his

complaint. Even so, the court need not reach the merits of plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim,

because — as the Eleventh Circuit observed in Lucero v. Operation Rescue of

Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992) — such claims have been construed to

apply only to equal protection violations predicated upon class-based animus.

Plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits because they did not state a claim under section 1985(3). In

particular, plaintiffsfailed to identify ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus’ behind defendants’

actions, as required under Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91

S. Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)). 

Lucero, 954 F.2d at 627. In describing the groups protected under § 1985(3), the

Eleventh Circuit stated that: 

Two types of classes come within § 1985(3)’s protection: (1) classes

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having common characteristics of an inherent nature — i.e., those kinds

of classes offered special protection under the equal protection clause,

and (2) classes that Congress was trying to protect when it enacted the

Ku Klux Klan Act. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 347

(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110, 102 S. Ct. 687, 70 L.

Ed. 2d 651 (1981).

Childree v. UAP/GA AG Chem., 92 F.3d 1140, 1147 (11th Cir. 1996).

The only classes of which plaintiff could be a member are African-American

persons, males, and inmates. Plaintiff’sstatuses as an African-American or as a male

are not relevant, because he has neither alleged nor offered any evidence that racial

or gender-based animus motivated any of the defendants’ conduct. With regard to his

status as an inmate, the Eleventh Circuit has held that § 1985(3) is not applicable to

individuals so classified: 

[The plaintiff] allegesthat he states a claimagainst the Defendants under

§ 1985(3) because he is a member of the ‘prisoner class.’ Although we

have never addressed whether prisoners are a protected class under §

1985(3), we conclude that the district court properly dismissed [the

plaintiff’s] § 1985(3) claimbecause prisoners are neither a class offered

special protection under the equal protection clause nor a class that

Congress intended to protect when it enacted § 1985(3).

Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1229 n.7 (11th Cir. 2003) (alterations and

emphasis supplied). Accordingly , plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

is due to be dismissed. 

VI. DISCUSSION OF PLAINTIFF’S STATE-LAW CLAIMS

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Plaintiff’s complaint also asserts state-law claims for wantonness and breach

of contract.

106

 In cases where the court’s jurisdiction is based solely upon a federal

question, the district court has discretion to entertain state claims that are

supplemental to the federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).107 The district court may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claimsubstantially predominates over the claimor claims over

which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons

for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court added a gloss to this statutory language in

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), when observing that

a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every

stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience,

106

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 43-48 (wantonness) and ¶¶ 49-56 (breach of contract).

107

 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that:

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided

otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of

the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims

that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.

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fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction

over a case brought in that court involving pendant [now

“supplemental”] state-law claims. When the balance of these factors

indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the

federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages

and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the

exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.

Id. at 349-50 (emphasis supplied) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent

jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will

point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” 

Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7;see also L.A. Draper &Son V. WheelabratorFrye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that “if the federal claims are

dismissed prior to trial, Gibbsstrongly encourages or even requires dismissal of state

claims”). 

Here, the claims over which this court has original jurisdiction — plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim — are due to be dismissed. 

Accordingly, this court declinesto exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

state-law claims. 

VII. ORDERS

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In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that defendants’motionsfor

summary judgment be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED in part, and DENIED in

part. It is ORDERED that plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendmentsubstantive due process

claim, Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

claim are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s state-law wantonness and breach

of contract claims are DISMISSED, but without prejudice to plaintiff’sright to re-file

those claims in an appropriate state forum, if he so chooses. 

Costs are taxed to plaintiff. 

The Clerk is directed to close this file. 

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of January, 2016. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

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