Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03084/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03084-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCHOULEE CONES, et al,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL 

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-03084-L-BGS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION [Doc. 11] TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court is Defendant Parexel International Corporation LLC’s 

(“Defendant”) motion to dismiss portions of Plaintiffs’1 First Amended Complaint. The 

Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L. 

R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES 

IN PART Defendant’s Motion. 

 

1 This is a putative class/collective action. The named plaintiffs are Schoulee Cones and Dexter Pasis. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this action are former employees of Defendant. During their 

employment, Plaintiffs were classified as exempt salaried employees and worked in 

excess of eight hours a day and forty hours a week. Plaintiffs contend that their 

classification as exempt was improper. As a result of this misclassification, Plaintiffs 

allege they were wrongfully denied overtime pay, meal and rest periods, properly 

itemized wage statements, and prompt payment of all wages upon termination. Plaintiffs 

filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint on February 15, 2017 alleging violations 

of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201; California Labor Code 

Sections 201, 202, 203, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, and 1198; and California’s Unfair 

Competition Law (the “UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. (FAC [Doc. 8].) 

Defendant now moves to dismiss portions of the FAC. (MTD [Doc. 11].) Plaintiffs 

Oppose. (Opp’n [Doc. 12].) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 

581 (9th Cir. 1983). The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and 

“construe them in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Gompper v. VISX, 

Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of 

Seattle, 83 F.2d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996). 

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Instead, the allegation in the complaint “must be enough to 

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raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965. A complaint may be 

dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient 

facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 

534 (9th Cir. 1984).

III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Defendant’s motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages on 

the grounds that none of the claims alleged in the FAC can trigger a punitive damages 

award. The authority cited by Defendant does clearly establish that, in the context of 

statutory wage and hour claims under the FLSA and the California Labor Code, punitive 

damages are not available. Brewer v. Premier Golf Properties, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1243, 

1252 (2009) (punitive damages not available for violations of California Labor Code 

provisions that govern only where an employment contract exists); Dittmar v. Costco 

Wholesale Corp., 2015 WL 7106636 at *5 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (same); Madrigal v. Tommy 

Bahama Grp., Inc., 2010 WL 4384235 at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (no punitive damages 

available for FLSA violations). Tellingly, Plaintiffs do not contest Defendant’s 

arguments that punitive damages are unavailable on the presently alleged claims. Rather, 

Plaintiffs’ opposition argues only that a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion is a procedurally 

improper method by which to attack a prayer for relief. This argument is unpersuasive

because it flatly contradicts binding Ninth Circuit authority cited in Defendant’s original 

motion. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(holding that a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)6 or 56 is the proper pre-trial 

mechanism to attack a prayer for relief contained in a complaint). Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion as to the prayer for punitive damages. 

 

IV. CAL. LABOR CODE § 226 AND THE UCL

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim to the extent it is predicated on 

Defendant’s alleged failure to provide properly itemized wage statements in violation of 

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Cal. Labor Code §226. The only remedies the UCL provides for private plaintiffs are 

restitution and injunctive relief. Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1389, 

1401 (2010) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203). “The object of restitution is to 

restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an 

ownership interest.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1149 

(2003). Thus, the California Supreme Court has held that Labor Code penalties for 

failure to pay wages are recoverable under the UCL because “[o]nce earned,... unpaid 

wages [become] property to which ... employees [are] entitled.” Cortez v. Purolator Air 

Filtration Products Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 168 (2000). By contrast, the California 

Supreme Court has held that Labor Code penalties for the late payment of wages 

following termination are not recoverable under the UCL because such penalties do not 

serve to “restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has 

an ownership interest.” Pineda, 50 Cal. 4th at 1401. 

Labor Code penalties for failure to provide properly itemized wage statements are 

much more similar to penalties for the late payment of wages than they are to penalties 

for failure to pay wages at all. To wit, as with penalties for late payment of wages, a 

plaintiff has no vested interest in penalties for failure to provide properly itemized wage 

statements unless and until awarded by a relevant body. See Pineda, 50 Cal. 4th at 1402 

(an employee has no vested interested in penalties for late payment of wages unless and 

until a relevant body awards such penalties.) Because Plaintiffs therefore have no vested 

ownership interest in penalties for the late payment of wages, they cannot seek these 

penalties as restitution. 

That said, the UCL also provides for injunctive relief. Pineda, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 

1401 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203). Further, Plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Complaint can be construed as including a request for an injunction requiring Defendant

to issue Labor Code complaint wage statements. (FAC ¶ L.) Defendant presents no 

argument as to why Plaintiffs could not feasibly obtain such relief. Accordingly, the 

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Court DENIES Defendant’s motion as to the inclusion of the wage statement violation in 

Plaintiffs’ sixth claim for relief. 

V. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND THE UCL

Defendant also seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request under California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 1021.5 for attorneys’ fees stemming from prosecution of the UCL claim. 

§1021.5 provides that 

Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against 

one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the 

enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a 

significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred 

on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and 

financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public 

entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award 

appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out 

of the recovery, if any.

Cal. Civ. P. Code § 1021.5. Defendant argues that class action statutory employment

litigation such as the present case cannot trigger § 1021.5 because the potential recovery 

provides adequate incentive for parties to bring this type of suit. Plaintiffs oppose, 

arguing that the issue of § 1021.5 attorney’s fees is not ripe for consideration at the 

pleading stage. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the issue of attorney’s fees is not ripe for 

adjudication. To recover attorney’s fees under § 1021.5, a plaintiff need not even include 

a prayer in any pleadings. Snatchko v. Westfield LLC, 187 Cal. App. 4th 469, 497 (2010). 

Rather, a plaintiff can raise the issue for the first time via a post judgment motion. Id. 

Furthermore, determining whether awarding attorneys' fees under § 1021.5 is appropriate 

requires a factor based analysis that seems impossible to properly undertake at the 

pleading stage. See Madrigal v. Tommy Bahama Grp., Inc., 2010 WL 4384235 (C.D. 

Cal. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a prayer for attorneys’ fees on materially 

identical facts). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion as to the prayer for 

§ 1021.5 attorneys’ fees. 

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VI. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss as follows:

 Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is dismissed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2017

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