Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00209/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00209-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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1 For ease of reference, all citations to page numbers of docketed items

are to the page assigned by the court’s case management and electronic case filing

(CM/ECF) system. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity )

Commission, )

)

Petitioner, ) No. CIV 09-0209 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Bashas’, Inc., )

 )

)

Respondent. ) )

On September 30, 2011, this court ordered, inter alia, that

“within ten (10) days of the date [t]hereof the parties shall file

with the court, for its review and approval, a joint proposed

confidentiality order.” Ord. (Doc. 104) at 63:17-191

 (emphasis

added). Jointly seeking an extension of time in which to submit

such an order, the parties indicated that they were “hopeful” that

an “extension w[ould] allow them to work through differing concerns

Case 2:09-cv-00209-DJH Document 109 Filed 12/08/11 Page 1 of 11
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2 See, e.g., EEOC v. Bashas’, Inc., Doc. 104 (Sept. 30, 2011); EEOC v.

Bashas’, Inc., 2009 WL 3241763 (D.Ariz. Sept. 30, 2009); and EEOC v. Bashas’, Inc.,

2009 WL 1783437 (D.Ariz. June 18, 2009). The court assumes familiarity with those

decisions and, for the sake of brevity, adopts the relevant parts as if fully set

forth herein. 

3 Parra refers to the related private class action of Parra v. Bashas’,

Inc., No. CIV 02-0591, familiarity with which also is assumed.

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and jointly submit a proposed order.” Mot. (Doc. 105) at 1:18-19. 

Even with an extension, the parties were unable to “work through”

their differences. See id. The petitioner, the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the respondent, Bashas’, Inc.,

therefore, each submitted separate proposed confidentiality orders

for this court’s review. Consequently, the court now has before it

two very divergent proposed confidentiality orders.

Discussion

I. Need for Confidentiality Order

Before comparing the substance of those orders, the court is

compelled to make explicit what was formerly implicit - - the need

for a confidentiality order here extending beyond the statutory and

regulatory safeguards already in place. In the ordinary EEOC

subpoena enforcement action, those safeguards would adequately

protect a respondent/employer’s confidentiality concerns. This has

been anything but an ordinary EEOC subpoena enforcement action

though, as thoroughly discussed in prior court orders.2

Vigorously opposing this EEOC investigation, Bashas’

maintained that this subpoena enforcement action constituted an

abuse of process. Central to Bashas’ abuse of process theory is

the notion that the EEOC is pursuing this investigation with an

improper motive, i.e., “to bolster the struggling Parra3

litigation.” Resp.’s Brief (Doc. 103) at 4:11 (footnote added). 

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Ultimately, however, Bashas’ was unable to prove that theory with

the requisite degree of proof. Hence, the court granted the EEOC’s

renewed Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) to enforce the subject

subpoena, albeit with some modifications. 

Nonetheless, the hearing on that OSC heightened rather than

allayed the court’s concerns as to the EEOC’s conduct herein. The

court cannot turn a blind eye to the strong correlation between

setbacks for the plaintiffs in the Parra litigation and the EEOC’s

conduct herein. To be sure, Bashas’ did not establish that the

initiation of the Commissioner’s Charge; the timing of the filing

of this action; or the timing of other aspects of this

investigation, such the EEOC’s requests for Bashas’ employee data, 

were tantamount to an abuse of process. The record as a whole, and

especially the testimony of Ms. O’Neill, the Regional Attorney for

the EEOC’s Phoenix District Office, leaves the court with grave

concerns, however, regarding the close ties between the EEOC and

counsel for the plaintiffs in Parra. That relationship gives the

court even more pause at this juncture because to comply with the

EEOC’s subpoena, Bashas’ must produce a fairly wide range of

employee payroll and personnel data - data to which this court

previously held that the Parra plaintiffs were not entitled. 

Perhaps the subpoenaed personnel and payroll data in the

present case is not as “exceptionally sensitive” as the employmentrelated tests in EEOC v. Aon Consulting, Inc., 149 F.Supp.2d 601

(S.D.Ind. 2001), where the court required that such information “be

kept confidential from the charging party.” Id. at 608 (emphasis

added); see also EEOC v. C & P Telephone Co., 813 F.Supp. 874

(D.D.C.1993) (permitting a limited confidentiality agreement to

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protect employment tests). Likewise, arguably the subpoenaed data

herein is not as sensitive as the “personally identifiable medical

information and records [of] other employees” in EEOC v. Alabama

Dep’t of Youth Services, 2006 WL 1766785, at *3 (M.D.Ala. 2006),

which the EEOC was prohibited from disclosing to the charging party

without prior court approval. 

Partially due to the breadth of the subpoenaed employee data

though, potentially it is quite sensitive. That data becomes even

more sensitive taking into account the close nature of the

relationship between the EEOC and counsel for the Parra plaintiffs,

and the substantial similarity between the Commissioner’s Charge

and the allegations in Parra. Indeed, the combination of those two

factors renders a confidentiality order even more of a necessity

here than in the foregoing cases. Bolstering this finding is the

fact that a non-disclosure agreement under section 83 of the

Compliance Manual, alluded to in the EEOC’s proposed order, would

not sufficiently protect Bashas’ interests. See C & P Telephone,

813 F.Supp. at 877 (EEOC did not adequately assure respondents that

their interests would be protected by a section 83 non-disclosure

agreement because it was “unclear how the EEOC effectively could

enforce such an agreement[]”). In sum, the unique circumstances of

this particular EEOC investigation mandate entry of a

confidentiality order to safeguard Bashas’ interest in maintaining

the confidentiality of its employee data. 

II. Contents of Proposed Confidentiality Orders

In submitting its proposed order, Bashas’ explains how the

parties arrived at an impasse and hence the submission of separate

orders. Rather than engaging in any meaningful dialogue with

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respect to the parties’ differences, the EEOC’s stance has

continued to be one of intransigence. The EEOC’s response to

Bashas’ proposed draft best exemplifies that intransigence. After

“review[ing] prior versions of drafts circulated between” the

parties earlier in this litigation, the objections thereto, and

this court’s order requiring a confidentiality order, “Bashas’

prepared a revised draft of its proposed Order, . . . specifically

deal[ing] with” the EEOC’s concerns. See Bashas’ Filing Regarding

Confidentiality Order as Ordered by Court (“Resp.’s Filing”) (Doc.

108) at 1:19-22. Additionally, Bashas’ prepared a chart

summarizing the differences between the parties’ respective

proposed orders. See Summary of Differences between Bashas’ and

EEOC’s Proposed Confidentiality Agreements (“Summary”) (Doc. 108-

2). That chart also includes “Bashas’ Proposed Resolution[s][.]”

Id. Further, as part of its revision process Bashas’ conceded that

the EEOC did not have to return to Bashas’ all confidential

documents and copies. Resp.’s Filing, exh. 1 thereto (Doc. 108-1)

at 16. 

In response, the EEOC sent a draft order previously rejected

by Bashas’. See id. at 1:26-27. The omission of a single citation

was the only difference between the two EEOC drafts. See id. at

1:27. Evidently the EEOC did not address Bashas’ summary of

differences, nor Bashas’ proposed resolutions. Instead, according

to Bashas’, the EEOC reiterated its “unwilling[ness] to enter into

any order that goes beyond the requirements of . . . FOIA [Freedom

of Information Act] or the confidentiality provided for in EEOC

regulations.” Id. at 2:2-4. In fact, the EEOC submitted its

proposed order to this court while simultaneously “maintain[ing]

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4 In addition to prohibiting the EEOC from making “public” its charges,

that section “also forbids the public disclosure or use in a subsequent proceeding

of any information acquired during the informal procedures.” EEOC v. Recruit

U.S.A., Inc., 939 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 

5 The EEOC’s proposed order mistakenly refers to 42 U.S.C. “2000-8(e)[.]”

Pet.’s Prop. Ord. (Doc. 107), exh. A thereto (Doc. 107-1) at 1, ¶ II(4). There is

no such statute so presumably the EEOC meant to refer to section 2000e-8(e). Among

other things, that section makes it “unlawful for any officer or employee of the”

EEOC “to make public in any manner . . . information obtained by the” EEOC “prior

to the institution of any proceeding . . . involving such information.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-8(e).

6 Much like Title VII’s non-disclosure provisions, this EEOC regulation

provides that an EEOC charge and “any information obtained during the investigation

of” a charge of discrimination under Title VII “shall” not “be made matters of

public information” by the EEOC “prior to the institution of any proceeding under

. . . Title VII involving such charge or information.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22.

7 That section governs the “Disclosure of Information in Open Files[.]”

EEOCCM § 83.1, 2006 WL 4673280 (emphasis omitted).

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that no confidentiality order is needed or appropriate” here. 

Petitioner EEOC’s Proposed Confidentiality Order (“Pet.’s Prop.

Ord.”) (Doc. 107) at 1:24. 

The EEOC’s proposed order (barely one page long) adheres to

its view that Title VII’s two prohibitions against public

disclosure, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b)4 and 2000e-8(e);5 its own

similar non-disclosure rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.226; and section 83

of the EEOC’s Compliance Manual,7 are sufficient “to maintain the

confidentiality of information contained in its investigative

files.” Id. at 2:8-9. Disclosure in violation of sections 2000e5(b) and 20003-8(e) is punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 or

imprisonment up to one year, or both. In its proposed order the

EEOC also recognizes its obligation to comply with disclosure

requests made pursuant to the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq. See

id., exh. A thereto (Doc. 107-1) at 1, ¶¶ II(4); and III (6). In

requesting entry of its proposed order, without any explanation,

the EEOC asserts that “[i]mposing additional burdens and restraints

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8 The order which the EEOC eventually submitted to this court differs

from the one that it provided to Bashas’ when they were attempting to agree on the

terms of a joint proposed order. The EEOC’s order for this court’s consideration

omits the final paragraph, which puts the burden on Bashas’ to identify any

documents it believes are exempt from production under FOIA. See Resp.’s Filing

(Doc. 108), exh. 3 thereto (Doc. 108-3) at 3, ¶ III(8). 

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. . . beyond what” the foregoing “already requires would impede its

ability to conduct [sic] investigation.” Id. at 3:6-9. 

The EEOC’s response and proposed order is troubling,

especially in the face of this court’s September 30, 2011, order. 

If this court were convinced that the existing statutory and

regulatory protections were adequate, it would not have ordered the

submission of a joint proposed confidentiality order. Clearly the

court contemplated that the parties would jointly agree to some

additional protections. 

 Not unexpectedly, Bashas’ proposed eight page order contains

far more detail than does the EEOC’s. Bashas’ chart summarizing

the differences between the parties’ orders is illuminating. 

After reviewing that summary, comparing the two proposed orders,8

and taking into account the exceedingly rare and unique

circumstances of this proceeding, the court finds that a

confidentiality order substantially in the form which Bashas’

proposes is necessary. 

Before outlining the specific terms of Bashas’ proposed

order, it is noteworthy that the EEOC’s proposed order does not

include any sections corresponding to paragraphs 11 through 19 of

Bashas’ proposed order. After carefully considering each of those

paragraphs, essentially the court will include those paragraphs in 

the form which Bashas’ proposes.

Several of Bashas’ other proposed provisions warrant closer

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scrutiny though. The first pertains to the distinction between

“confidential information” and “confidential commercial

information.” Bashas’ defines “confidential information” to

“mean[] any document designated in good faith by counsel as

confidential in accordance with the terms of this Order[,]” 

Resp.’s Prop. Ord. (Doc. 108-1) at 3:5-7, ¶ I(c), whereas the

EEOC’s proposed order does not define “confidential information.” 

Nor does it allow for a document to be designated as such. 

Instead, the EEOC’s proposed order refers only to the narrower

category of “[c]onfidential commercial information[,]” which it

vows not to disclose “except in accordance with 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1610.19[,]” Pet.’s Prop. Ord. (Doc. 107-1) at 2, ¶ III(7)

(emphasis added), governing “[p]redisclosure notification

procedures for confidential commercial information.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1610.19. That type of confidential information is “arguably

exempt for disclosure under [FOIA exemption four], because

disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause substantial

competitive harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1610.19(a)(1). Unlike

confidential information in general, FOIA specifically exempts

from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial

information obtained from a person and privileged or

confidential[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 

So that information other that strictly “commercial” may be

designated as “confidential,” Bashas’ proposed order allows “the

producing party [to] designate [a] document as Confidential

Information.” Resp.’s Prop. Order (Doc. 108-1) at 3:17-18, ¶ 3. 

Paragraph 13 of that order includes a process for objecting to the

“Confidential Information” designation. Basically, that paragraph

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allows for written objections if a party wishes to challenge the

“Confidential Information” designation. And, if the parties

cannot resolve the issue, after the mandatory “filing] [of]

simultaneous briefs, not to exceed two pages[,]” the court will

decide the confidentiality issue. See id. at 7:18, ¶ 13. 

Bashas’ proposed resolution regarding the designation of

“Confidential Information” and objections thereto differs from what

its proposed order actually states in one significant way. Bashas’

proposed resolution requires the parties to “confer in good faith

in an attempt to resolve the matter” of confidentiality

designations, Summary (Doc. 108-2) at 2, but its proposed order

omits that language. The court will import that good faith

requirement into paragraph 13 of the confidentiality order adopted

herein. 

Another significant issue pertains to the scope of disclosure

of confidential information. The EEOC’s proposed order does not

limit to whom it may disclose confidential information. The EEOC’s

order does not even require that a witness or expert agree not to

disclose confidential information. 

Bashas’ proposed order, on the other hand, specifically states

that “[n]o party shall disclose the content of any document marked

‘confidential,’ except to: attorneys, testifying witnesses (and

only upon an agreement to keep it confidential), court reporters,

the court, the parties, and testifying experts.” Summary (Doc.

108-2) at 2, (citation omitted). “Other than [those] categories 

. . . , [the] EEOC cannot disclose confidential information to

anyone, including aggrieved persons, unless it obtains written

permission from Bashas’.” Id. To address the EEOC’s “concerns

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9 Consistent with Title VII and its proposed order, presumably Bashas’

means “aggrieved persons,” as distinguished from “aggrieved parties.” 

10 The court is striking all language with a line through it. Underlining

denotes added language. 

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about being able to release the file or portions thereto to

‘aggrieved parties[,]’” Bashas’ proposed order contains some

further limitations on disclosure of confidential information to

“aggrieved persons.”9

 Resp.’s Filing (Doc. 108) at 2:8-9. Those

limitations are set forth in full below at paragraph 4(g). The

EEOC did not object or in any way indicate its disagreement with

that paragraph. Accordingly, the confidentiality order herein will

include that paragraph.

One other paragraph in Bashas’ proposed order warrants

specific consideration – requests to the EEOC for documents which

Bashas’ has identified as confidential under FOIA. After closely

examining paragraph nine, pertaining to that issue, the court will

adopt the following modified version of that paragraph:10

If upon completion of the EEOC’s investigation 

and prior to the completion of any subsequent 

litigation, it the EEOC receives a request for 

documents identified by Bashas’ as Confidential 

pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 

the EEOC agrees shall to provide Bashas’ with notice 

of such request so that Bashas’ has an opportunity to 

object to its disclosure under one of the exemptions 

to the Act. The EEOC shall provide Bashas’ with such 

notice (through its counsel), including the wording of 

the request and the identity of the person making the 

request, within five (5) business days of a FOIA 

request. Simultaneously therewith the EEOC shall notify

the requester that notice and opportunity to comment

are being provided to Bashas’. Bashas’ shall respond 

to the EEOC’s notice within five (5) business days, 

 providing the EEOC with a detailed statement of its

 objections to disclosure. The EEOC shall consider

carefully any such objections submitted by Bashas’. If the EEOC determines that FOIA requires it to disclose 

the Confidential Information despite Bashas’ 

objection(s), it shall promptly notify Bashas’ and the

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requester of such decision and. The EEOC shall not 

respond to any such FOIA request until Bashas’ has the 

opportunity to assert its objection(s)and seek a 

protective order from the this Ffederal District 

Court to the extent allowed by law,. Bashas’ shall

assert such objection(s), if any, and seek a protective 

order, if any, within a time period of at least fourteen 

(14) days after such notification is actually received 

by Bashas’.

Resp.’s Prop. Ord. (Doc. 108-1) at 6:9-26, ¶ 9 (as modified). 

For the reasons just discussed, after considering the

parties’ respective proposed confidentiality orders (Docs. 107-1

and 108-1,p. 2-10), the court hereby ORDERS the entry of a

Confidentiality Order, which is being separately filed

simultaneously herewith.

DATED this 8th day of December, 2011.

Copies to counsel of record

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