Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01243/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01243-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. CATES, FAYE MONTEGRANDE, 

OLUFEMI OWALBI, U. BANIGA,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-01243-ADA-HBK (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL DISMISSAL

(Doc. No. 23)

FOURTEEN DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss filed on November 3, 2022. 

(Doc. No. 23, “Motion”). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants seek 

partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Id.). Despite being afforded an opportunity to do so, 

Plaintiff elected not to file any opposition to the Motion. See Order dated July 31, 2023 (Doc. 

No. 27); see also L.R. 230(l). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that 

the district court grant Defendants’ Motion. 

BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action while a prisoner and confined at California Correctional 

Institution (“CCI”). According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Morton’s 

Neuroma or ganglion cyst on his feet by his physician at California State Prison, Los Angeles 

County and prescribed orthotic boots and insoles with a permanent order for the boots and 

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insoles. (Doc. No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff was transferred to CCI on February 19, 2019. (Id.). After his 

transfer, Plaintiff twice met with Dr. Owolabi concerning the fact that his prescribed orthotic 

boots were over a year overdue, that he was in pain, and that his condition was worsening. (Id. at 

8-9). Dr. Owolabi initially agreed to investigate the issue, but then declined to provide Plaintiff 

with the orthotic boots because CDCR was required to pay for the boots and insoles and were 

only providing them to prisoners who were diabetic or had missing toes. (Id.). After Dr. 

Montegrande personally considered Plaintiff’s health care appeal, he examined Plaintiff’s feet

and told him that he did not qualify for orthotics because he was not diabetic and was not missing 

any toes. (Id. at 8-9 ¶ 8). Thereafter, Dr. Baniga denied Plaintiff’s health care appeal. (Id. at 9 ¶

9). Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 22, ¶¶ 2-4). 

The undersigned screened the Complaint, and determined it alleged an Eighth 

Amendment medical deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Dr. Montegrande, Dr. 

Owolabi, and Dr. Baniga in their individual capacities and an official capacity claim against

Defendant Warden Cates to the extent that Plaintiff sought injunctive relief concerning CDCR’s 

orthotics policy but no other claims. (Doc. No. 10). Plaintiff agreed to proceed on his Complaint 

as screened. (Doc. No. 11). The Court directed service and Defendants agreed to waive personal 

service but sought extensions of time to respond to the Complaint, which the Court granted. 

(Doc. Nos. 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22). On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of 

address indicating he was released from CDCR’s custody. (Doc. No. 19). On November 3, 2022, 

Defendants filed the instant Motion in response to the Complaint. (Doc. No. 23). 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The Motion seeks partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants Cates and 

Baniga. (See generally Doc. No. 25). Specifically, Defendant Cates seeks dismissal of the 

Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against him seeking injunctive 

relief in connection with CDCR’s orthotics’ policy is moot due to Plaintiff’s release from prison. 

(Id. at 5). Defendant Baniga argues the Complaint, as pled, does not state an Eighth Amendment 

claim against him in his individual capacity. More particularly, the Complaint alleged only that 

Defendant Baniga denied Plaintiff’s appeal of his health care grievance and the denial of 

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Plaintiff’s health care grievance alone, is not sufficient to state a cognizable medical deliberate 

indifference claim. (Id. at 9-10). 

C. Plaintiff’s Opposition 

On January 19, 2023, after Plaintiff failed to timely file any opposition to Defendant’s 

Motion, the Court directed Plaintiff to file an opposition or to file a statement of no opposition. 

(Doc. No. 24). The Court warned Plaintiff that if he failed to file any opposition, “the Motion 

shall be deemed unopposed.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff filed no opposition or statement of no 

opposition. See docket.

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 

A. Applicable Law

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “tests the 

legal sufficiency of a claim.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 

2011). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper if there is a “lack of a cognizable legal 

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Id.; see

also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (to survive a motion to dismiss, the 

complaint must have sufficient facts to state a facially plausible claim to relief). In deciding a 

motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the 

complaint and determines whether the factual allegations are sufficient to state a right to relief 

above the speculative level. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see also Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.

v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011) (court accepts as true all material allegations in the 

complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them). Though courts construe 

pro se filings liberally and afford the pro se litigant the benefit of any doubt, a pro se complaint 

still must satisfy these standards. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-43 (9th Cir. 2010). 

“Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court must decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, 

thus, leave to amend should be freely granted.” Winebarger v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ.

Assistance Agency, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citation omitted). However, 

where leave to amend would be futile, because “the allegation of other facts consistent with the 

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challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency,” leave to amend may be denied. 

DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Plaintiff’s Failure to Oppose Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

This Court’s local rules provide that the “[f]ailure of the responding party to file an 

opposition or to file a statement of no opposition may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to 

the granting of the motion and may result in the imposition of sanctions.” L.R. 230(l). Under 

Ninth Circuit precedent a “[f]ailure to follow a district court’s local rules is proper grounds for 

dismissal.” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Warren, 601 

F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, a court may dismiss an action when the plaintiff fails to 

oppose a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 53-54 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a 

pro se prisoner’s case for a failure to follow the local rules when the prisoner failed to file an 

opposition to the motion to dismiss).

After Plaintiff failed to timely file an opposition, the Court sua sponte afforded Plaintiff an

extension of time to file an opposition and warned Plaintiff that his failure to oppose Defendants’ 

motion “would be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion” consistent 

with Local Rule 230(l). (Doc. No. 24 at 2). Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to file any opposition to the 

Motion, in violation of Local Rule 230(l), is sufficient reason for the district court to grant

Defendants’ Motion. See id. Thus, the undersigned recommends that, consistent with Local Rule 

230(l) the district court grant Defendants’ Motion and dismiss Defendants Cates and Baniga from 

this case. 

C. Merits of the Motion 

In the alternative, the undersigned finds the Defendants’ Motion should be granted on the 

merits. As noted supra, Plaintiff’s Complaint articulated only a claim against Defendant Warden 

Cates in his official capacity as it relates to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief concerning 

CDCR’s orthotics policy. (Doc. Nos. 10, 11). Notably, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff 

from seeking monetary damages from Defendant Cates in his official capacity. U.S.Const., 

Amend. XI; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Therefore, the Complaint states 

only a request for injunctive relief against Warden Cates. 

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“Federal Courts are limited to live cases and controversies.” Kittle v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 

949, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968)); see also Deakins v. 

Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199 (1988) (“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to the 

adjudication of actual, ongoing controversies between litigants.”) “Prisoners who have been 

released from prison or transferred to a different prison may not sue for injunctive relief because 

they no longer benefit from having the injunction issued.” Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp. 2d 1035, 

1043 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010) (citing Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995)) (other 

citations omitted). A prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief is moot if there is no reasonable 

expectation the prisoner will be transferred back to the prison where the harm occurred. Dilley, 

64 F.3d at 1369. It is not a reasonable expectation that a released prisoner will commit a criminal 

act and be re-incarcerated. Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 632 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1988). 

On February 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address indicating he was 

released from prison. (Doc. No. 12). There is no reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will 

commit a criminal act and be re-incarcerated. Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at CCI

and there is no reason to expect he will be reincarcerated within CDCR, yet alone in CCI, 

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief directing Warden Cates to provide him with orthotic boots 

and insoles in contravention to CDCR’s alleged policy is moot. Accordingly, the undersigned 

recommends the district court dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief and the official 

capacity claim against Defendant Cates and dismiss Defendant Cates from this action. 

D. Defendant Baniga 

Unlike Plaintiff’s allegations against Drs. Owolabi and Montegrande who both reviewed 

Plaintiff’s medical file and examined Plaintiff, the Complaint contains a sole allegation against 

Defendant Baniga: “On August 22, 2019, Defendant Baniga denied the appeal.” (Doc. No. 1 at 9, 

¶9). The mere fact that a prison official signs an appeal does not mean the defendant sufficiently 

knew about the prisoner’s complaints to be held liable under § 1983. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 

1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2014). “An allegation that a prison official inappropriately denied or 

failed to adequately respond to a grievance, without more, does not state a claim under § 1983.” 

Evans v. Skolnik, 637 Fed. Appx. 285, 288 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished opinion). 

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Inmates lack a constitutional right to a specific grievance procedure and there are no 

constitutional requirements regarding how a grievance system is operated, even if plaintiff 

believes the process to be unfair or not accurate. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th 

Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under § 1983, a 

plaintiff must show that a defendant caused an alleged deprivation of a right secured by federal 

law either (1) by the defendant’s “personal involvement” in the alleged deprivation or (2) a 

“sufficient casual connection” between the defendant’s conduct as a supervisor and the alleged 

deprivation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2017); 

King v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Unlike, Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014), there are no allegations that 

Defendant Baniga denied the appeal of Plaintiff’s medical grievance solely on an administrative 

policy in contravention to a specialist’s recommendation to the contrary. There are no facts 

alleging that Baniga was personally involved in Plaintiff’s medical care or treatment, or that 

Baniga knew of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. The mere fact that Baniga signed 

Plaintiff’s health care appeal is not enough to state a claim. See Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1086-87. 

Baniga’s signature on the denial of the appeal does not establish that he knew of Plaintiff’s 

medical complaints sufficient to be held liable. See id. at 1086 (holding that chief medical 

officer’s signature on a second-level appeal did not establish that the official was “aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exits . . .”) (citing 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Because Baniga’s denial of Plaintiff’s health care 

appeal, alone, does not state a medical deliberate indifference claim, the undersigned recommends 

the district court grant Defendant Motion as Defendant Baniga and dismiss him from this action. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends the district court grant Defendants’

Motion and dismiss Defendants Warden Cates and Dr. Baniga from this action. The undersigned

further recommends that Defendants Cates and Baniga be dismissed from this action without 

granting Plaintiff leave to amend. Regarding Defendant Cates, Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, 

so leave to amend would be futile because his claim for injunctive relief is moot. The 

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undersigned also recommends the district court deny Plaintiff leave to amend against Defendant 

Baniga. Plaintiff failed to timely file an amended complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure in response to Defendants’ Motion to the extent he could have cured the 

deficiencies as identified in the Motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Furthermore, despite 

the Court affording Plaintiff an extension of time to respond to the Motion, Plaintiff still failed to 

file any opposition. The Court advised Plaintiff at the outset of this case that he must comply 

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Doc. No. 3 at 1). His pro se status does not 

entitle him to more favorable treatment. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(“pro se litigants in the ordinary civil case should not be treated more favorably than parties with 

attorneys of record.”). Nor is it the Court’s role to advise Plaintiff of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and how a failure to comply with the rules will impact his case. Id. at 1364-67 

(holding that the district court did not have to inform the pro se plaintiff to file affidavits before 

granting summary judgment against him). Instead, Plaintiff “must follow the same rules of 

procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 

United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1984)), overruled in part on other grounds 

by, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, Plaintiff had an ample 

opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in his Complaint against Defendant Baniga, but he failed 

to take any action. 

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

1. The district court GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 23) and dismiss 

Defendants Cates and Baniga from this case without further leave to amend and order 

Defendants Drs. Montegrande and Owolabi to Answer the Complaint in fourteen (14) 

days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(B).

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

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Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: August 30, 2023 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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