Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01976/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01976-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 1Plaintiff has not named or served the unidentified medical physician in this matter. ECF. 1 at 4 & 17-1 at

3. As such, the instant motion is only brought on behalf of the Defendants who have been properly named and

served. Id.

10cv1976-AJB (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAWANTA J. LAMBERT,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANK SOTO, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Case No. 10cv1976-AJB (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[ECF No. 17] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Anthony

J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California.

On September 20, 2010, Plaintiff Jawanta J. Lambert, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights suit against Licensed Vocational Nurse Shady M.

Villalobos, Correctional Officer Frank Soto, and an unidentified Medical Physician under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. ECF No. 1. Defendants Shady Villalobos and Frank Soto (“Defendants”)1 filed a motion

to dismiss the complaint on May 3, 2011 for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 17. Plaintiff

opposed the motion on June 30, 2011 [ECF No. 22] and Defendants filed a reply on July 14,

2011 [ECF No. 23].

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28 2CDCR Form 7219. ECF No. 1 at 3. 

2 10cv1976-AJB (BLM)

This Court finds the issue appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral

argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1 (d)(1). See ECF No. 18. The Court has considered

Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition, Defendants’ Reply and

all supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept

as true all material allegations in the complaint, and must construe the complaint and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Thompson

v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). According to the complaint, Plaintiff was involved

in an “incident” on April 21, 2009 after which he sought medical treatment from a licensed

vocational nurse, Defendant Villalobos. ECF No. 1 at 3. During the evaluation, Defendant

Villalobos completed a medical report of injury form2 in which she documented Plaintiff’s injuries.

Id. The injuries mentioned in the report were: (1) pain in the back; (2) pain in the left shoulder;

(3) abrasions; and (4) scratches with dried blood. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Villalobos

refused to treat these injuries and responded to Plaintiff’s request for first aid by stating that

“you shouldn’t have been fighting with staff” before walking away. Id. 

After his appointment with Defendant Villalobos, Plaintiff was escorted back to a holding

cell via golf cart by Correctional Officer A. Gonzales and Defendant Soto. Id. at 5. During the

ride, Plaintiff told Defendant Soto that Defendant Villalobos refused to treat his injuries and

showed Defendant Soto that he was actively bleeding down his leg. Id. In response, Defendant

Soto merely stated that Defendant Villalobos “should have taken care of it.” Id. When Plaintiff

informed Defendant Soto that he still needed medical attention, Defendant Soto stated “the

medics will take care of it dude.” Id. Plaintiff was then taken to his holding cell and left with a

bleeding right leg and back and shoulder pain. Id.

On May 12, 2009, Plaintiff was evaluated by an unnamed yard physician for the injuries

sustained on April 21, 2009. Id. at 4. At the appointment Plaintiff complained of back and knee

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pain that made it difficult for him to climb in and out of the top bunk of his bed without

assistance. Id. Plaintiff told the physician that he had to rest on the ground during the day or

remain in his bed for long periods of time due to his injuries. Id. The physician ordered x-rays

of Plaintiff’s back, prescribed pain medication, and instructed Plaintiff to refrain from doing any

push ups or sit ups. Id. 

Plaintiff states that after his evaluations by Defendant Villalobos and the unnamed yard

physician, he continued to suffer from pain in his back and knee due to Defendant Villalobos’s

“deliberate indifference, malpractice and neglect.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims that as a result of

his untreated injuries from April 21, 2009, he sustained further injury on May 14, 2009, when he

fell “approximately five feet” to the ground from the top bunk of his bed. Id. at 3 & 4. After the

fall, Plaintiff was treated at a local emergency room and housed in the facility’s correctional

treatment center for five days on bed rest. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated his constitutional right of freedom from

cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. Id. at 3-5. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $750,000 and

injunctive relief preventing Defendant Villalobos from “performing unconstitutional medical

practices.” Id. at 7.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because he has failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 17-1 at 2. Specifically, Defendants

explain that Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that he suffered a serious medical injury

or had a serious medical need, that Defendant Soto had a duty to treat him, and that either

Defendant knew of or disregarded a serious medical need or created a substantial risk of serious

harm to Plaintiff. Id. at 4-6; ECF No. 23 at 3-6. Defendants also assert that they are protected

by qualified immunity. ECF No. 17-1 at 6-7. Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ arguments. ECF Nos.

1 & 22.

///

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A. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 23 at 6. Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ..." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S.

---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but

whether he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff must set

forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’"

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). If the facts alleged in the

complaint are "merely consistent with" the defendant’s liability, the plaintiff has not satisfied the

plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, "[a] claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556).

When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007); Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895. This rule of liberal construction is “particularly

important” in civil rights cases. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1063 (S.D. Cal. Dec.

28, 2007) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “because Iqbal incorporated the Twombly

pleading standard and Twombly did not alter the Court’s treatment of pro se filings; accordingly

we continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” This is particularly important where the

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Petitioner is a pro se prisoner litigant in a civil rights matter). When giving liberal construction

to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court is not permitted to “supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Easter v. CDC, 694 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1183

(S.D. Cal. March 9, 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266,

268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at

268).

The court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint "unless the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "before dismissing a pro

se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his

complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively." Wayne

v. Leal, 2009 WL 2406299, *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (quoting Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261).

B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT - DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

ECF No. 1 at 3-5. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Villalobos and Soto knew or

should have known that their "conduct, attitudes and actions created an unreasonable risk of

serious harm to Plaintiff." Id. at 3 & 5. Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered as a result of this

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights in the form of "pain and suffering, shame, humiliation,

emotional distress, degradation, embarrassment, mental distress and other injuries." Id. at 3.

He further alleges that Defendant Soto's actions were "willful, intentional, malicious, wanton and

despicable." Id. at 5. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead facts "that sufficiently

establish that his condition was 'objectively serious,' that Defendants acted with culpable states

of mind, or that Defendants' actions caused him harm." ECF No. 17-1. at 5. 

A prison official’s “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” violates

the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Clement v.

Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). There is both an objective and a subjective

component to an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. The objective component generally is

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satisfied so long as the prisoner alleges facts to show that his medical need is sufficiently

“serious” such that the “failure to treat [the] condition could result in further significant injury

or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id.; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The subjective component requires the prisoner to allege facts showing a culpable mental

state, specifically, “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when “the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The indifference must be

substantial, and inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.”

Tracey v. Sacramento County Sheriff, 2008 WL 154607, *2 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 15, 2008) (quoting

Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir.1988)). 

The Objective Prong

Plaintiff does not satisfy the objective prong of the test for an Eighth Amendment violation

because Plaintiff does not allege that a sufficiently serious medical need existed. A "serious"

medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant

injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Nawabi v. Wyatt, 2009 WL 3514849,

*7 (C.D.Cal., Oct. 26, 2009) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). In considering

the seriousness of an alleged medical need, courts should consider whether (1) a reasonable

doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment or treatment; (2) the condition

significantly affects the prisoner's daily activities; and (3) the condition is chronic and

accompanied by substantial pain. Id. (citing Doty, 37 F.3d 540 at 546 n. 3). 

Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that he experienced shoulder and back pain, abrasions, and

scratches with dried blood. ECF No. 1 at 3. In addition, Plaintiff later alleges that he was

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3See Nawabi, 2009 WL 3514849 at 7 (finding that plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment violation

where plaintiff failed "to show how a bloody lip and/or a scratch to his knee" compromised a sufficiently serious

medical condition and plaintiff had no evidence that defendant "knew of any serious medical risk to plaintiff by not

addressing his bloody lip or scratched knee."); see also Thomas v. Diaz, 2008 WL 227932, *5 (E.D.Cal., Jan. 28, 2008)

(finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs where plaintiff alleged that defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs by failing "to request

an R.N. or M.D. to examine plaintiff and for failing to clean and bandage his abrasions/wounds subsequent" to an

incident); and Johnson v. Runnels, 2010 WL 3430369, *16 (E.D.Cal., Aug. 30, 2010) (stating that plaintiff submitted

no evidence that cuts, abrasions, contusions, and lacerations were the types of injuries that a failure to treat could

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and finding that plaintiff failed to

raise a triable issue that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical requests before granting defendants'

motion for summary judgment). 

7 10cv1976-AJB (BLM)

actively bleeding down his leg. Id. at 5. None of these alleged injuries are serious injuries3.

First, the injuries as described by Plaintiff are not injuries that are likely to lead to “further

significant injury” or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Nawabi, 2009 WL 3514849

at *7. Second, neither the scratches nor the shoulder and back pain that Plaintiff alleges he

experienced significantly altered Plaintiff’s daily activities. Apart from alleging that he needed

assistance from his cell mate in order to get in and out of his bunk bed, and that he had to rest

on the ground or in bed, Plaintiff does not allege or give any indication that his daily routine was

greatly impacted because of his sore back, shoulder and scratches. Id. at 3-5. Finally, Plaintiff

does not allege that he continues to suffer because of his injuries or that he has developed a

chronic condition accompanied by substantial pain from his sore back, shoulder and scratches.

Id. Since the only injuries Plaintiff alleges are not serious injuries, Plaintiff does not allege that

Defendants failed to treat a serious medical need as required to satisfy the objective portion of

deliberate indifference. 

The Subjective Prong

Defendant Villalobos

Plaintiff also fails under the subjective prong of the test as he has not alleged that

Defendant Villalobos was aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or

safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Villalobos knew that he had

pain in his back and shoulder and had abrasions with dried blood. As discussed previously, these

injuries are not serious and as such, Plaintiff has not alleged that there were any facts that

Defendant Villalobos was aware of from which she could have inferred that a substantial risk of

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serious harm existed. Id. Plaintiff also fails to allege any facts indicating that Defendant

Villalobos's conduct caused or exacerbated his injuries. Defendant Villalobos was not involved

in the original altercation that injured Plaintiff or in Plaintiff’s fall from his bunk bed. ECF No. 1

at 3. Although Plaintiff states that he is experiencing "pain and suffering, shame, humiliation,

emotional distress, degradation, embarrassment, mental distress and other injuries," he does not

sufficiently connect this harm to Defendant Villalobos’s alleged indifference. Id. While Plaintiff

asserts that Defendant Villalobos’s failure to treat his injuries caused him to fall out of his bunk

bed and injure himself further, he fails to allege any facts connecting these two events. See

Smedley v. Reid, 2010 WL 391831, *11 (S.D.Cal., Jan. 27, 2010) (to survive Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, complaint must directly connect defendants’ actions with alleged harm) (citing Moss v.

U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Wilson v. Woodford, 2009 WL

839921, *26 (E.D.Cal. March 30, 2009) (stating that “if there is no affirmative link between a

defendant's conduct and the alleged injury, there is no deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional

rights”) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S., 370 (1976)). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s “threadbare”

recital of the elements of a claim for deliberate indifference by Defendant Villalobos is only

supported by conclusory statements which are not sufficient to state a constitutional violation.

Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Villalobos failed to respond to his pain or possible

medical need, but that is not accurate. According to Plaintiff’s complaint, “Plaintiff was evaluated

by Licensed Vocational Nurse (L.V.N.) S. Villalobos” and Defendant Villalobos completed and

submitted a “Medical Report of Injury” which documented Plaintiff’s injuries. ECF No. 1 at 3. 

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Villalobos did not treat his actual injuries, but given that those

injuries only included pain and scratches, it is possible that Defendant Villalobos did not think any

further treatment was necessary. Plaintiff’s opinion that he should have received additional

treatment for his sore back and shoulder and abrasions, does not support a finding of deliberate

indifference. See McMaster v. Thomas, 2010 WL 3785571, *2 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 24, 2010) (stating

that a “difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff's] serious

medical needs”) (quoting Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)).

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Finally, even if Defendant Villalobos was indifferent to Plaintiff’s pain, Plaintiff fails to

explain how he was harmed by the indifference or would have suffered less, or received better

care, had Defendant Villalobos treated his scratches, back and shoulder pain or wiped off the

dried blood. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant

Villalobos. 

Defendant Soto

Plaintiff also fails to satisfy the subjective portion of the deliberate indifference test with

respect to Defendant Soto. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Soto was aware of and

disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that

Defendant Soto knew that Plaintiff’s leg was bleeding. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff does not allege

that he was in danger of losing too much blood, suffering from a serious wound on his leg, or

anything else that would let Defendant Soto know or infer that Plaintiff’s health or safety were

at risk. Id. Also, as Plaintiff stated, Defendant Soto was aware that Defendant Villalobos, a

nurse, had just examined Plaintiff because Defendant Soto was transporting Plaintiff from that

appointment. Id. Given that Defendant Soto is a correctional officer, not a doctor, nurse or

other medical professional, he was entitled to rely on the judgment of Defendant Villalobos not

to further treat Plaintiff’s injuries. It was not Defendant Soto’s responsibility to provide Plaintiff

with whatever additional medical care he was seeking. See Daughtery v. Wilson, 2011 WL

3664799, *15 (S.D.Cal. July 1, 2011) (stating that lay officers could rely on the determinations

of the nurses and doctors and had no independent duty to pursue additional treatments for

plaintiff) (citing Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 518–20, 527 (7th Cir.2008)).

Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Soto committed a purposeful act that

caused his pain or injury. Defendant Soto was not involved in the incident that caused the

abrasions and back and shoulder pain and did not cause Plaintiff to fall from his bunk bed. 

Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Soto failed to get him medical care for his bleeding leg.

ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff does not explain how this alleged omission caused Plaintiff harm or

created an excessive risk to his health or safety. Id. While Plaintiff says that has suffered

irreparable harm due to Defendant Soto’s deliberate indifference to his rights, Plaintiff has not

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alleged an affirmative link between Defendant Soto’s action or inaction and the deprivation of

his Eighth Amendment rights. Id.; see also Tracey, 2008 WL 154607 at *2 (stating that plaintiff's

"amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in

the deprivation of plaintiff's rights" and that “there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the

claimed deprivation”) (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371); and Dixon v. Sheldon, 2006 WL 1049930,

*3 (E.D.Cal. April 20, 2006) (same).

For the above reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference against Defendants Villalobos and Soto be GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. See Moss, 572 F.3d at 972 (dismissing complaint but granting

plaintiffs leave to amend in accordance with new pleading standards); see also Ramirez, 334 F.3d

at 861 (court must grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his complaint "unless the pleading

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts") (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

C. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Defendants argue that they “are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not

violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right when they allegedly refused to treat

Plaintiff’s minor pain and scratches.” ECF No. 17-1 at 6. Plaintiff responds that Defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity because his complaint “establishes the existence of factual

allegations of constitutional violations of which a reasonable person would have known.” ECF

No. 22 at 6. 

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from

liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987). "Qualified immunity is 'an entitlement not to stand trial or face the

other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.

Ct. 808 (2009). This privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability;

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and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial." Id. at 200-01 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). Thus, the Supreme Court "repeatedly

[has] stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in

litigation." Id. at 201 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). 

In Saucier, the Supreme Court established a two-step inquiry for determining whether an

official is entitled to qualified immunity. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

First, the court was directed to consider whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right."

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If a constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations

established, the Saucier Court instructed lower courts to next examine whether the right was

clearly established such that "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 201-02. If an officer makes a reasonable mistake

as to what the law requires - i.e. the right is not clearly established - the officer is entitled to

immunity. Id. at 202-03. The Supreme Court subsequently determined that "while the sequence

set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory."

Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. Instead, lower courts may "exercise their sound discretion in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Id.

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts in his complaint that could "make out a violation of

a constitutional right" by Defendants. Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 815-16. As set forth above, the

Court has recommended that the Eighth Amendment claim asserted against Defendants be

dismissed with leave to amend. See, supra at 10. Because there are no viable claims alleged

against Defendants, the Court is unable to evaluate whether they are entitled to qualified

immunity for the alleged conduct. Unless and until Plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation,

there can be no determination regarding the applicability of qualified immunity. As stated by the

Supreme Court, "if no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity" Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201; see also Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (en

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banc) (explaining that “we must ask first whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff would establish a [constitutional] violation.... Only if the answer is in the affirmative

should we address the immunity issue”).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendants on qualified immunity grounds be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

D. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief to prevent Defendant Villalobos from “performing

unconstitutional medical practices.” ECF No. 1 at 7. 

The Eleventh Amendment does permit "suits for prospective injunctive relief against state

officials acting in violation of federal law." Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437

(2004). However, injunctive relief is available if there is a "real or immediate threat that the

plaintiff will be wronged again." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).

Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate only when "irreparable injury" is threatened. Id. To

establish irreparable injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate a "real or immediate threat that the[y]

will be wronged again-a 'likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury." Id. "A state

law enforcement agency may be enjoined from committing constitutional violations where there

is proof that officers within the agency have engaged in a persistent pattern of misconduct."

Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Thomas v. County of Los

Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1048 (9th

Cir. 1998) ("Injunctive relief is appropriate in cases involving challenges to government policies

resulting in a pattern of constitutional violations").

The standard for injunctive relief must be considered in conjunction with the Prison

Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). Under the PLRA, the court must find that the prospective relief

is "narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,"

before granting injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1); see also Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1128-9.

Additionally, the court must give "substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or

the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief." Id.; see also Oluwa v. Gomez,

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4The PLRA provides, in relevant part: Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions

shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.

The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn,

extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact

on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 

13 10cv1976-AJB (BLM)

133 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)) (holding that Congress

explicitly prescribed section 3626's reach to include pending cases)4

.

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that Defendants violated federal

law. Plaintiff failed to allege or demonstrate that there is a "real or immediate threat” that he

will be wronged again or that there is a “likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable

injury." Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged a persistent pattern of

misconduct by officials that would support any type of injunction. Finally, Plaintiff’s request that

Defendant Villalobos be prevented from “performing unconstitutional medical practices” is too

broad, not narrowly drawn, and not necessary to correct the violation of a federal right. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief be

DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than November 2, 2011. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than November 23, 2011. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: October 12, 2011

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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