Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00134/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gerald Markham, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Pima County, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

 CV 16-134-TUC-JAS (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

On July 8, 2016, Defendants Pima County, former Sheriff Dupnik, Sheriff 

Nanos, and Pima County Sheriff’s Department filed a Motion to Dismiss, and 

Defendant Deputies Jansen, Dixon, and Curtin filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. 23).1

 Plaintiff filed a Response on August 23, 2016 (Doc. 34) and Defendants 

filed a Reply on August 26, 2016 (Doc. 37). For the reasons stated herein, the Court 

 

1

 “Doc.” refers to the docket number in CV 16-134-TUC-JAS (JR). 

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recommends that the District Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss. 

I. Factual Background 

 On March 8, 2014, at 11:40 p.m., Plaintiff, a 65 year-old disabled senior 

citizen, was driving his car in the community of Green Valley, Arizona when he was 

pulled over by Pima County Sheriff Deputy Jansen. Doc. 1, p. 2, 4. The deputy 

asked to see Plaintiff’s drivers’ license, registration and proof of insurance. Id., p. 4. 

He also asked Plaintiff if he had been drinking and Plaintiff admitted he had, but that 

he had not consumed an amount that would influence his ability to drive. Id., p. 5. 

Plaintiff agreed to perform field sobriety tests but refused to submit to a portable 

breath test. Id. Deputy Jansen placed him under arrest, handcuffed him and directed 

him to enter the rear seat of the police vehicle. Id. 

 Plaintiff invoked his right to counsel but agreed without the assistance of 

counsel to have his blood drawn on the condition that the procedure be performed by 

a qualified person at a nearby hospital. Id., p. 6. Plaintiff advised the deputy that he 

had a serious heart condition and that it had always been difficult for his blood to be 

drawn. Id. In the meantime, Deputy Dixon arrived. Id. Plaintiff asked to see his 

credentials but the deputy refused to discuss his qualifications to draw blood. Id. 

Plaintiff again asked that he be taken to a qualified person to draw his blood but both 

Deputies Jansen and Dixon refused. Id. 

 Plaintiff was taken to the Green Valley Sherriff’s station and held in a room 

without a telephone to call counsel for a substantial period of time while the deputies 

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obtained a warrant to draw his blood. Id. The deputies later returned with a 

document purportedly signed by a judge. Id., p. 7. The deputies refused to provide 

proof of the document and Plaintiff persisted in his request to be taken to a qualified 

person to take his blood. Id. Plaintiff was told that he must either agree to let Deputy 

Dixon draw his blood or he would be taken to the Pima County jail. Id. Because of 

his health condition and because Deputy Dixon could not prove he was qualified, 

Plaintiff refused to submit to a blood test. Id. 

 Deputy Jansen took Plaintiff to the Pima County jail in Tucson where he was 

met in the parking lot by Deputy Dixon and several other officers, one of whom had 

a video camera. Id. Plaintiff asked that he be allowed to perform physical acts in 

front of the camera to prove that he was not intoxicated but Deputy Dixon refused 

and restrained Plaintiff by the arm and shoved him toward the jail. Id. 

 Once inside the jail, Plaintiff was un-handcuffed and told to sit in a restraint 

chair. Id. He was warned that if he did not cooperate and let Deputy Dixon take his 

blood, he would be restrained and blood would be forcibly drawn from him. Id. 

Plaintiff cooperated but Deputy Dixon was not able to draw blood. Id. Deputy 

Curtain joined and made two more attempts to draw blood. Id., p. 7-8. Over 

Plaintiff’s protest, Deputy Dixon made one more attempt. Id., p. 8. After five 

unsuccessful attempts, Plaintiff became irate and demanded to speak to counsel or 

the judge who signed the warrant. Id. Instead, Plaintiff was taken to the hospital 

where a qualified nurse took his blood on her first attempt. Id. 

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 Plaintiff was then taken back to the jail and booked and was finally allowed to 

use the phone. Id. Plaintiff spent the night and most of the next day in jail until he 

was released on bail. Id. 

 Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988. Id., p. 2. 

He alleges that his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were violated. Id. Plaintiff further claims discrimination based on disabling physical 

disabilities. Id. He sues the three deputy sheriffs involved in his arrest (Defendants 

Jansen, Dixon and Curtin) as well as Pima County, the Pima County Sherriff’s Office 

(PCSD), retired Sheriff Dupnik, and current Sheriff Nanos. Id., pgs. 2-4. 

 Defendants Jansen, Dixon and Curtin move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth, Sixth, 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims as well as any disability claims. They do 

not move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims. Defendants Pima 

County, the PCSD, retired Sheriff Dupnik, and current Sheriff Nanos move for the 

dismissal of the entire complaint. 

II. Legal Discussion

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific facts 

are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544 , 555 (2007). A document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed” and “a 

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards 

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than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 

(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a court 

dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

North Star Int’l. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair 

notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. A formulaic recitation of a cause of action with conclusory allegations 

is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts showing that a violation is not just 

possible, but also plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, a court will 

take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). A court, 

however, need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. Nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched 

as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

A. Defendants Jansen, Dixon and Curtin 

 1. Right to Counsel Claims

 Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel during 

interrogation as well as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 

counsel. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that prior to consenting to his blood draw and 

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during the various attempts to take his blood, he asked to speak to an attorney but 

was denied. 

 Before a person is questioned by law enforcement officers after being taken 

into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, he 

must first be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statements he does 

make may be used against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 

either retained or appointed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). 

Plaintiff does not allege that he was “interrogated” and so Miranda warnings were 

not required. Additionally, in the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a 

police inquiry of whether a suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an 

“interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 

553, 571, n. 15 (1983). Plaintiff has failed to allege a Fifth Amendment claim. The 

Court will recommend that the claim be dismissed with leave to refile. 

 The Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions, an accused 

shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. This right 

attaches only upon “the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings” against 

the defendant. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984). The right to 

counsel does not attach until “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal 

proceedings--whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, 

information, or arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 

1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). Without the right to have counsel present, an accused 

does not have a Sixth Amendment right to place a phone call, be it to an attorney or 

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family members. State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1147, 1145 n. 2. (7th

Cir. 1983); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760–66 (1966) (holding 

that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel when an accused is asked to 

submit to a chemical test because the person is “not entitled to assert the privilege 

[against self-incrimination]” by refusing to submit to a chemical test). Plaintiff has 

failed to allege a Sixth Amendment claim. The Court will recommend that the claim 

be dismissed without leave to refile. 

 2. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims 

 Inmates who sue prison officials for injuries suffered while in custody may do 

so under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or, if not 

yet convicted, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Castro v. 

County of Los Angeles, 2016 WL 4268955,*2 (9th Cir. 2016). Under both clauses, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” Id. Here, 

since Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee his claim arises not under the Eighth 

Amendment but under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

 The elements of a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect 

claim against an individual officer are: (1) The defendant made an intentional 

decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) 

those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) the 

defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a 

reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of 

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risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (4) 

by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at * 7. 

 Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support a Fourteenth Amendment 

claim. He alleges that he advised the deputies that he had a medical condition that 

made it difficult for his blood to be drawn. Instead of taking Plaintiff to the hospital 

or some medical facility where trained medical staff could attend to him, the deputies 

made five unsuccessful attempts to draw his blood. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered 

severe pain. The Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim be 

dismissed with prejudice and that his Fourteenth Amendment claim go forward. 

 3. Disability Claims 

 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) defines a “disability” as “(A) a 

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 

activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being 

regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A “qualified 

individual with a disability” is someone who “with or without reasonable 

modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, 

communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and 

services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the 

participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12131(2). The term “public entity” is defined as “any department, agency, special 

purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12131(1). 

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 The ADA consists of three titles that address discrimination against the 

disabled in different contexts. Title I prohibits employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112; Title II prohibits discrimination in the services of public entities, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12132; and Title III prohibits discrimination by public accommodations involved in 

interstate commerce such as hotels, restaurants, and privately operated transportation 

services, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, 12184. 

 The title most applicable to Plaintiff’s case is Title II. Courts have recognized 

two genres of Title II ADA claims related to arrests: a wrongful-arrest theory and a 

reasonable-accommodation-during-arrest theory. Sheehan v. City & Cty. Of San 

Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert. dismissed in part 

sub nom., City & Cty. of San Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765 (2015). 

Under the first theory, police are alleged to have wrongly arrested someone with a 

disability because they misperceived the effects of that disability as criminal activity. 

See Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F.Supp. 175, 176–77 (S.D.Ind. 1997). Under the second 

theory, while police properly investigated and arrested a person with a disability for a 

crime unrelated to that disability, they failed to reasonably accommodate the person’s 

disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater 

injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 

F.3d 907, 912–13 (8th Cir. 1998). 

 Plaintiff’s claim falls under the second theory. He argues that he advised one 

of the deputies that he had a serious heart condition and that it had always been 

difficult for his blood to be drawn. Rather than accommodating his disability by 

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having a medical professional draw his blood, Defendants made five unsuccessful 

attempts to draw his blood. Assuming the Defendants fall within the statutory 

definition of a “public entity” and assuming that the Plaintiff can prove that he is 

disabled, his claim falls within the framework of Title II of the ADA. The Court will 

recommend that his ADA claim go forward.2

B. Defendant PCSD 

 State law determines whether a government entity has the capacity to be sued. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(3). In Arizona, a government entity may be sued only if the 

legislature has given that entity the power to be sued. See Schwartz v. Superior 

Court, 186 Ariz. 617, 619 (Ct.App.1996). “Governmental entities have no inherent 

power and possess only those powers and duties delegated to them by their enabling 

statutes.” Braillard v. Maricopa Co., 224 Ariz. 481, 487 (2010). In Braillard, the 

court found that although an Arizona statute provided that counties have the power to 

sue and be sued through their board of supervisors, no Arizona statute conferred that 

power on the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office as a separate legal entity. Braillard, 

224 Ariz. at 487. Accordingly, a number of Arizona courts have found that sheriff's 

offices and police departments are non-jural entities and have dismissed them when 

named as a party in Arizona District Court. See Wilson v. Maricopa Cnty., 2005 WL 

3054051, at *2 (D.Ariz. 2005); Gotbaum v. City of Phoenix, 617 F.Supp.2d 878, 886 

 

2

 Plaintiff makes a passing reference to having been discriminated against because of 

his age and having been denied the equal protection of the law. His Complaint 

however, lacks any specificity sufficient to even address those references. 

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(D.Ariz. 2008); Ekweani v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 2009 WL 976520, at *2 

(D.Ariz. 2009); Payne v. Arpaio, 2009 WL 3756679, *3, 8 (D.Ariz. 2009); Duqmaq 

v. Pima Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2012 WL 1605888 (D.Ariz. 2012); Tarantino v. 

Dupnik, 2012 WL 1718893 (D.Ariz. 2012); and Phillips v. Salt River Police Dep't, 

2013 WL 1797340 (D.Ariz. 2013). 

 Based on the lack of an Arizona statute granting the PCSD the capacity to sue 

and be sued as well as prior court decisions dismissing such departments as non-jural 

entities, the Court will recommend that Defendant PCSD be dismissed with 

prejudice. 

C. Defendants Dupnik and Nanos (in their individual capacities) 

 Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of 

subordinates on a theory of vicarious liability. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 

U.S. 469, 479 (1986). A supervisor may be liable if there exists either (1) his 

personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). Supervisory liability 

can exist however even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if the 

supervisory official implemented a policy so deficient that the policy “itself is a 

repudiation of constitutional rights” and is “the moving force of the constitutional 

violation.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 Here Plaintiff does not allege that either the former Pima County Sheriff 

(Defendant Dupnik) or the acting Sheriff (Defendant Nanos) were personally 

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involved in the incident. Nor does he allege that either Defendant personally 

implemented the particular policy that resulted in Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional 

violation. The Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants 

Dupnik and Nanos in their individual capacity be dismissed with leave to amend. 

D. Defendants Dupnik and Nanos (in their official capacity) 

 Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “An action does 

not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or 

otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The officer's successor is 

automatically substituted as a party. Later proceedings should be in the substituted 

party's name, but any misnomer not affecting the parties' substantial rights must be 

disregarded. The court may order substitution at any time, but the absence of such an 

order does not affect the substitution.” Accordingly, the Court will recommend that 

Defendant Dupnik in his official capacity be dismissed without leave to amend. 

 The Court will further recommend that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant 

Nanos in his official capacity be dismissed without leave to amend. See Atencio v. 

Arpaio, 161 F.Supp.3d 789, 806 (D.Ariz. 2015) (stating that an action against a 

municipal officer in his official capacity is simply another way of pleading an action 

against the municipality and there is no point to bringing official-capacity actions 

against local government officials because, under Monell, local government units can 

be sued directly.) 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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E. Defendant Pima County 

 In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme 

Court held that a municipality may not be held liable for a § 1983 violation under a 

theory of respondeat superior for the actions of its subordinates. In order to establish 

municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a “policy or custom” led to the 

plaintiff's injury. Id. at 694. Liability attaches only where the municipality itself 

causes the constitutional violation through “execution of a government's policy or 

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly 

be said to represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A municipality’s 

failure-to-train an employee who has caused a constitutional violation can be the 

basis for § 1983 liability where the failure-to-train amounts to deliberate indifference 

to the rights of persons with whom the employee comes into contact. City of Canton 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 

 Here, Plaintiff references the PCSD’s Phlebotomy Program as it relates to 

“field sobriety tests, tests to determine blood alcohol concentration, and implied 

consent laws.” (Doc. 1, p. 3). His Complaint does not detail any specific provisions 

of the program, but attached to his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss are excerpts 

from the PCSD’s Manual with hand written notations on some of the paragraphs. 

Docs. 34-1 to 34-4.3

 Plaintiff has adequately referenced the “policy” required by 

 

3

 The Court will consider the document in ruling on this Motion to Dismiss based on 

the rule which allows that “[s]tatements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in 

a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion.” See 

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Monell. But under Monell, Plaintiff must also allege that the DUI policy violated his 

constitutional rights. There is nothing inherently unconstitutional alleged in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Complaint cannot be read as to give rise to such an 

inference. 

 Regarding his failure-to-train claim, Plaintiff only generally alleges that “the 

remaining named defendants are responsible to the above conduct of deputies Jansen, 

Dixon and Curtain for their part in implementing rules and practices that proscribed 

their above actions in this situation and in failing to pass others to prevent it and in 

failing to supervise and to implement training and periodic testing of these and other 

officers.” Doc. 1, p. 8. Plaintiff does not allege a cognizable failure-to-train claim. 

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (A court, need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as 

true.) 

 The Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Pima 

County be dismissed with leave to amend. 

III. Leave to Amend 

 If the court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then decide whether to grant 

leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to 

amend “shall be freely granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the 

 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); see also Cortec Industries Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 

47 (2nd Cir. 1991) (“Relying on Rule 10(c), we have held that the complaint is 

deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any 

statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”) (citations omitted). The 

Court will not however consider any of the other attachments, Docs. 34-5 through 

34-18. 

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underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the 

pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc). Generally, leave to amend shall be denied only if allowing amendment would 

unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving 

party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 

532 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 With these low standards in mind, the Court recommends that the District 

Court permit the Plaintiff, if he wishes to do so, to file within 30 days an amended 

complaint (on certain claims) to cure the deficiencies outlined above. An amended 

complaint should contain short, plain statements advising the Court of the following: 

(1) the constitutional right violated; (2) the name of the defendant who violated the 

right; (3) exactly what that defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or 

inaction of that defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights; and (5) what specific injury the Plaintiff suffered because of that defendant’s 

conduct. Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person named as a defendant. 

 If Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant 

with the specific injury suffered by the Plaintiff, this Court will recommend that the 

District Court dismiss the allegations for failure to state a claim. 

IV. Recommendation 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) as follows: 

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Deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss: 

 -Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Jansen, Dixon and Curtin 

 -ADA claim against Defendants Jansen, Dixon and Curtin; 

Grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without leave to refile: 

 -Sixth Amendment claim against Defendants Jansen, Dixon and Curtin 

 -Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Jansen, Dixon and Curtin 

 -all claims against Defendant PCSD 

 -all claims against Defendants Dupnik and Nanos in their official capacity 

Grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend: 

 -Fifth Amendment claim against Defendants Jansen, Dixon and Curtin 

 -all claims against Defendants Dupnik and Nanos in their individual capacity 

 -all claims against Defendant Pima County 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. No replies shall be filed without 

leave of the District Court. If any objections are filed, this action should be 

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designated case number: CV 16-134-TUC-JAS. Failure to timely file objections to 

any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 28th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Jacqueline M. Rateau 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 4:16-cv-00134-JAS-JR Document 38 Filed 09/29/16 Page 17 of 17