Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01843/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01843-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY MARTINEZ, 

Plaintiff,

v.

LONGS DRUG STORES, INC., 

Defendant.

CIV-S-03-1843 DFL CMK 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Tony Martinez moves for attorneys’ fees in the

amount of $34,967.06 following the disposition of his ADA suit

against defendant Longs Drug Stores, Inc. (“Longs”). Longs

challenges the reasonableness of the requested fee award. For

the reasons discussed below, Martinez is awarded $11,972.47 in

attorneys’ fees and expenses. 

I.

Martinez filed this suit on September 5, 2003 against Longs,

Arden Way No. 2, LLC (“Arden”), and several unnamed defendants

claiming that he “encountered architectural barriers that denied

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him full and equal access” to Longs Drug Store #463 (the

“store”). (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 18.) In the complaint, Martinez did not

list the barriers that he encountered at the store. However, in

his August 6, 2004 deposition, Martinez described eight specific

barriers that allegedly hindered his access to the store. Four

days later, Martinez’s expert completed an accessibility report

that identified twenty-one violations of the ADA Accessibility

Guidelines (“ADAAG”) at the store. 

Martinez and Longs each moved for summary judgment on the

twenty-one alleged violations. See Martinez v. Longs Drug

Stores, CIV-S-03-1843 DFL CMK slip op. at 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25,

2005). Martinez’s motion was granted on five of the alleged

barriers. Id. at 15. Longs’ motion was granted on the other

sixteen. Id. The summary judgment order disposed of all issues

in the case except for an award of attorneys’ fees. Id.

Martinez now moves for attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$27,196.25 and expenses in the amount of $7,770.81. (Mot. at 4.) 

Longs opposes the motion. The matter was submitted on the

papers. 

II.

The ADA provides that a court “in its discretion, may allow

the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including

litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. A

prevailing party under this statute “should ordinarily recover an

attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an

award unjust.” Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d

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 The lodestar analysis includes the following factors: (1) 1

the novelty and complexity of the issues; (2) the special skill

and experience of counsel; (3) the quality of representation; (4)

the results obtained; and (5) the contingent nature of the fee

agreement. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.9

(9th Cir. 1996). 

 These factors include: (1) the time and labor required; 2

(2) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly;

(3) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to

acceptance of the case; (4) the customary fee; (5) time

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (6) the

undesirability of the case; (7) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and (8) awards in

similar cases. Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.8. 

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1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002). A prevailing party may also recover

reasonable fees and costs after succeeding on a claim under the

Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 52; Engel v.

Worthington, 60 Cal. App. 4th 628, 632 (1997).

Calculating an appropriate fee award involves a two-step

process. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir.

2000). “First, the court must calculate the ‘lodestar figure’ by

taking the numbers of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

and multiplying it by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. Certain

factors should be taken into consideration when calculating the

appropriate lodestar figure. “Second, a court may adjust the 1

lodestar upward or downward using a ‘multiplier’ based on factors

not subsumed in the initial calculation.” Van Gerwen v. 2

Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, a multiplier should only be awarded “in rare and

exceptional cases.” Id. (citations omitted).

Longs challenges the request for attorneys’ fees on the

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following grounds: (1) Martinez is not a prevailing party; (2)

Martinez failed to make an attempt at conciliation; (3) fees

prior to the dismissal of Arden should be reduced by 50%; (4)

Martinez seeks to recover for the same costs twice; (5) Martinez

was only partly successful; (6) Martinez rejected meritorious

settlement offers; (7) the rate for Martinez’s counsel is

excessive; (8) Martinez should not be reimbursed for his

attorneys’ travel time to and from Sacramento; (9) Martinez

should not be reimbursed for using an attorney from Chico,

California to depose an expert in San Diego, California; (10)

Martinez’s expert fees are unreasonable; and (11) Martinez seeks

reimbursement for overhead costs not properly taxed as fees. 

A. Prevailing Party

Longs argues that Martinez is not a prevailing party

because: (1) he only succeeded on five of his claims; and (2) the

court denied injunctive relief under the ADA. (Opp’n at 4.) 

Martinez argues that he prevailed on his damages claim because he

was awarded $4,000 and he prevailed on his claim for injunctive

relief under the “catalyst theory.” (Reply at 5.) 

“[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits

of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the

parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that

directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,

111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566 (1992). A plaintiff who obtains an

enforceable judgment for damages of any amount is a prevailing

party. Id. at 112-13. 

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Martinez is the “prevailing party” because he obtained a

judgment against Longs for $4,000. Therefore, he is entitled to

recover a reasonable attorney fee on this ground alone, and it is

not necessary to consider the catalyst theory. 

B. Attempt at Conciliation

Citing Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 373 F.Supp.2d 1028 (C.D.Cal.

2005), Longs asserts that Martinez’s failure to attempt a prelitigation conciliation bars him from recovering attorneys’ fees. 

(Opp’n at 5.) However, the ADA does not require plaintiffs to

engage in such pre-litigation efforts. See White v GMRI, CIV-S04-0465 DFL CMK slip op at 4 n. 3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2005). 

Therefore, Martinez’s failure to notify Longs before filing suit

will not affect his award of attorneys’ fees.

C. Fees Prior to Dismissal of Arden

Martinez filed suit against both Longs and Arden. Longs

argues that Martinez is only entitled to fees incurred in

prosecuting the action against it. (Opp’n at 6.) Therefore,

Longs requests that the court: (1) strike all charges exclusively

related to defendant Arden; and (2) reduce by 50% the fees and

expenses generated before Arden’s May 20, 2004 dismissal. (Id.

at 7.)

Longs is not required to pay Martinez for expenses that are

related exclusively to claims against Arden. However, with the

exception of the $55.00 cost of serving Arden, the record reveals

that Martinez only seeks fees for those expenses that he would

have incurred even if Longs had been the sole defendant. 

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Therefore, Longs’ request for a 50% blanket reduction is denied. 

The award will be reduced by $55.00.

D. Double-Recovery

Longs argues that Martinez has listed as “expenses”

$1,234.19 in charges which have already been taxed as “costs.” 

(Id.) Martinez concedes the point. (Reply at 3.) The fee award

will be reduced by $1,234.19 to prevent double-counting these

expenses.

E. Martinez’s Success

Longs asserts that any fee award should be reduced by 76%

because Martinez only succeeded on five of his twenty-one claims. 

(Opp’n at 7-8.) Martinez contends that such a reduction is not

warranted because he received all of the relief to which he was

entitled. (Id. at 11-12.)

In determining the lodestar figure, courts must consider the

“results obtained” in the litigation, especially where a

plaintiff did not succeed on some of his claims. Schwarz v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1995). 

When a plaintiff fails to obtain all of the relief sought, courts

use the following two-part analysis to determine whether a

reduction in the fee award is appropriate: 

First, the court asks whether the claims upon which

the plaintiff failed to prevail were related to the

plaintiff’s successful claims. If unrelated, the

final fee award may not include time expended on the

unsuccessful claims. If the unsuccessful and

successful claims are related, then the court must

apply the second part of the analysis, in which the

court evaluates the significance of the overall

relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the

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hours reasonably expended on the litigation. If the

plaintiff obtained excellent results, full

compensation may be appropriate, but if only partial

or limited success was obtained, full compensation

may be excessive. Such decisions are within the

district court’s discretion. 

Id. at 901-02. In determining whether the unsuccessful and

successful claims are related, 

the test is whether relief sought on the

unsuccessful claim is intended to remedy a course of

conduct entirely distinct and separate from the

course of conduct that gave rise to the injury on

which the relief granted is premised. The focus is

on whether the unsuccessful and successful claims

arose out of the same “course of conduct.”

Id. at 903. If a court finds that the successful and

unsuccessful claims are unrelated, it may either identify

specific hours that should be eliminated or simply reduce the

award to account for the limited success. Id. at 904. 

Martinez succeeded on five of his twenty-one claims. The

remaining sixteen claims are not related to the five; each is a

distinct alleged violation requiring separate evidence. See

White, CIV-S-04-0465 slip op. at 11-12 (finding that “alleged

violations are premised on different facts and require the

application of different sections of the ADA Accessibility

Guidelines to determine liability.”); Hooper v. Calny, Inc., CIVS-03-0167 DFL GGH slip op. at 10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2005)(same). 

Therefore, the award must be reduced to reflect Martinez’s

limited success. 

The time records Martinez provided are not sufficiently

detailed to enable the court to match each entry to the

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corresponding claims. Therefore, the court elects to reduce the

lodestar amount by a percentage that corresponds with Martinez’s

success. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436-37, 103

S.Ct. 1933 (1983) (recognizing this approach). Because Martinez

succeeded on so few of his claims, the court finds that a

significant reduction is in order. Based on a review of the

entire record and the recognition that some of the requested fees

would have been incurred even if Martinez had only brought the

five claims upon which he was successful, the court finds that a

2/3 reduction of the fee award will appropriately account for

Martinez’s limited success. 

F. Rule 68 Offers

Longs alleges that Martinez declined two “exceedingly

reasonable Rule 68 offers,” one on June 12, 2004 and the other on

March 24, 2005. (Opp’n at 8.) The June offer was for $5,001.00,

and the March offer was for $15,001.00. (Id.) As a result,

Longs argues that it should not be charged fees or costs after

June 12, 2004, or, at the latest, March 24, 2005. (Id.) 

Martinez argues that Rule 68 only cuts off an entitlement to fees

when the applicable statute defines costs to include fees. 

(Reply at 8.)

Rule 68 provides that a plaintiff must pay the costs

incurred after a Rule 68 offer was made if he: (1) rejects a

timely pretrial settlement offer; (2) prevails on the merits; and

(3) recovers less than the offer. See Gudenkauf v. Stauffer

Communications, Inc., 158 F.3d 1074, 1083 (10th Cir. 1998). 

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However, Rule 68 only applies to attorneys’ fees “where the

underlying statute defines ‘costs’ to include attorney’s fees.” 

Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9, 105 S.Ct. 3012 (1985). Neither

the ADA nor applicable California law define costs to include

attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52,

54.3. Therefore, Rule 68 does not operate to cut off Martinez’s

entitlement to fees in this case. 

G. Rates

Martinez requests the following rates for his attorneys and

paralegals: (1) $250 per hour for attorney Lynn Hubbard; (2) $175

per hour for Hubbard’s associate; and (3) $75 per hour for

Hubbard’s paralegals. Longs challenges the rate of $175 per hour

for Hubbard’s associate, arguing that he should be compensated at

$150 per hour instead. (Opp’n at 9.) 

The reasonable rate in this district for Hubbard’s associate

is $150 per hour. Hooper, CIV-S-03-0167 slip op. at 6; Sanford

v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 2005 WL 2562712 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11,

2005); Loskot v. USA Gas Corp., CIV-S-01-2125 WBS KJM (E.D. Cal.

Apr. 26, 2004); Loskot v. Pine St. Sch., CIV-S-00-2405 DFL JFM

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2002). Martinez provides no evidence other

than Hubbard’s associate’s declaration to justify a rate of $175

per hour for Hubbard’s associate. Specifically, he provides no

affidavits from other lawyers in the region stating that $175 per

hour is the appropriate rate for someone of Hubbard’s associate’s

skill and experience. Because Martinez has failed to demonstrate

why Hubbard’s associate is entitled to bill at $175 per hour, the

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court will use a rate of $150 per hour to calculate his fee

award.

H. Travel Time to Sacramento

Longs argues that Martinez’s request for reimbursement for

Hubbard’s travel time to and from Sacramento should be denied. 

(Opp’n at 10.) Martinez claims that this is time that would

ordinarily be billed to a paying client and therefore should be

approved. (Reply at 10.)

Other judges of this court have held that the defendant is

not “required to shoulder [Hubbard’s] travel expenses to and from

Sacramento” because Hubbard has filed hundreds of cases in

Sacramento and it appears that he maintains his office in Chico

for his own convenience. See Sanford, 2005 WL 2562712 at *3; USA

Gas, CIV-S-01-2125 slip op. at 15. Moreover, the attorney fee

rates that Hubbard claims are those for Sacramento, not those for

a Chico practitioner whose normal work consists of appearances in

the courts of Butte County.

Hubbard’s associate avers in his declaration that, “on those

occasions where we have paying clients” Hubbard charges them for

travel time. (S. Hubbard Decl. ¶ 23.) Assuming that the

Hubbards have “paying clients” and that they charge them for

travel time, this does not justify shifting these expenses to

Longs. A paying client who hires the Hubbards can negotiate

travel expenses up front. If the client objects to Hubbard’s

request for $700 in fees per trip to Sacramento, then the client

can seek representation elsewhere. Longs did not have this

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choice. Instead, according to Martinez, Longs is forced to pay

for his attorneys’ travel time to and from Sacramento regardless

of where the attorneys reside. 

The Ninth Circuit held in Davis v. City and County of San

Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992), that “[t]he

touchstone in determining whether hours have been properly

claimed is reasonableness.” The Hubbards have filed hundreds of

cases in this district. Their law business is the filing of ADA

lawsuits, and their principal place of business is Sacramento. 

They claim Sacramento rates. However, they choose to live in

Chico. The court finds that it is unreasonable for the Hubbards

to charge their adversaries for their travel time to and from

Sacramento when they generate such a large volume of litigation

here. Therefore, Martinez’s award for attorneys’ fees will not

include the eight hours Hubbard billed for traveling between

Chico and Sacramento.

I. San Diego Deposition

Martinez hired a “contract attorney” located in Chico to

depose Longs’ San Diego-based expert. Longs argues that Martinez

should not be compensated for this attorney’s travel time because

Martinez could have contracted with an attorney in San Diego. 

(Opp’n at 10.) This argument is unpersuasive. 

Longs knew that it was dealing with a Chico-based attorney

when it hired Evans as its expert witness. It should have

anticipated that Martinez’s deposition of Evans would require an

attorney from Chico to travel to San Diego. Martinez’s choice to

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contract this deposition out to a Chico-based attorney, rather

than have Hubbard take the deposition is irrelevant. The fees

for the contract attorney will not be reduced. 

J. Expert Fees

Longs challenges Martinez’s request for fees related to

A.C.C.E.S.S.’s preliminary site inspection and HolLynn D’Lil’s

subsequent site inspection and report. (Opp’n at 11.) 

1. Preliminary Inspection

Martinez seeks to recover $450.50 for the preliminary site

inspection and $250 for the time Hubbard spent reviewing the

ensuing report. Longs argues that no fees should be awarded for

the preliminary site inspection because it was “premature,

yielded no value to the case, and was inconsistent with

Plaintiff’s testimony and the expert report.” (Id.) Martinez

argues that the site report was part of a “Rule 11 due diligence

check” required by Hubbard. (Hubbard Decl. at 7.) According to

Hubbard, the report and photos are necessary to “confirm that the

barriers at the facility are both present and substantial.” 

(Id.) Although Hubbard notes that such a report is not legally

required, he states that it is a personal requirement. (Id.) 

Hubbard’s desire to check the facts before filing suit is

understandable. However, requiring Longs to reimburse him for

the expense of hiring an expert to make a preliminary inspection

of the store is unreasonable. This inspection provided no

material benefit to the case because: (1) it was superseded by

Martinez’s expert’s report and again by the neutral expert’s

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report; and (2) Martinez lacked standing to bring claims for all

but two of the fifteen barriers identified by the inspection. 

Furthermore, in addition to the $250 Hubbard billed for reviewing

the report, he billed $250 for his own time spent inspecting the

store. The court finds that Martinez’s request to award fees for

both Hubbard’s own inspection and the time Hubbard spent

reviewing the inspection report is unreasonable. 

The court will award Martinez for the time Hubbard spent

inspecting the store. However, Martinez will receive no award

for the preliminary inspection by A.C.C.E.S.S. or the hour

Hubbard spent reviewing the report. 

2. D’Lil’s Inspection and Report

Longs also challenges the $1,328.75 charged for the site

inspection and expert report prepared by D’Lil. (Opp’n at 11.) 

D’Lil charged $175 per hour for the site inspection and the

ensuing report. (Hubbard Decl. Ex. C.) She billed one hour for

the survey and 5.25 hours for the report. (Id.) She also billed

$95 for one hour of travel to and from the store, $52.50 for one

hour of her “survey assistant’s” time, and $87.50 for one hour of

her “survey assistant for photos’” time. (Id.) 

Longs argues that the charge should be reduced because D’Lil

reported on twenty-one barriers, only five of which Martinez

succeeded on. The court agrees. Because the time spent

inspecting and reporting on sixteen of the twenty-one alleged

barriers did not contribute to Martinez’s recovery from Longs,

the amount awarded for all expenses but the travel time will be

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 This description is in-line with that provided by the 3

U.S. Department of Labor. In its Occupational Outlook Handbook,

the Labor Department describes paralegal work as follows: 

One of a paralegal’s most important tasks is helping

lawyers prepare for closings, hearings, trials, and

corporate meetings. Paralegals investigate the facts

of cases and ensure that all relevant information is

considered. They also identify appropriate laws,

judicial decisions, legal articles, and other materials

that are relevant to assigned cases. After they

analyze and organize the information, paralegals may

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reduced by 76%. This yields an award of $391.10 for D’Lil’s site

inspection and report.

K. Unreasonable Charges

Finally, Longs argues that awarding fees for the following

charges would be unreasonable: (1) paralegal work that was

secretarial in nature; (2) calendar reviews and meetings by

support staff; (3) work conducted before Martinez was injured;

and (4) the generation of boilerplate documents.

1. Paralegal Work

Longs argues that it is unreasonable for Martinez to request

fees at paralegal rates for time spent filing and serving

documents because those are secretarial tasks. (Opp’n at 11-12.)

Martinez claims that all of the paralegal time for which he seeks

an award was spent on work that was appropriate for paralegals. 

(Reply at 12.) 

In his declaration, Hubbard’s associate describes paralegal

work as drafting complaints, preparing joint status reports,

propounding discovery, and preparing motions, statements, and

expert disclosures. (Scott H. Decl. ¶¶ 29-30.) He does not 3

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prepare written reports that attorneys use in

determining how cases should be handled. Should

attorneys decide to file lawsuits on behalf of clients,

paralegals may help prepare the legal arguments, draft

pleadings and motions to be filed with the court,

obtain affidavits, and assist attorneys during trials.

Paralegals also organize and track files of all

important case documents and make them available and

easily accessible to attorneys.

In addition to this preparatory work, paralegals

also perform a number of other vital functions. For

example, they help draft contracts, mortgages,

separation agreements, and trust instruments. They

also may assist in preparing tax returns and planning

estates.

See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook,

available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos114.htm. Filing and

serving documents appear to be tasks for which paralegals are

overqualified.

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mention the appropriateness of having paralegals serve or file

documents. 

In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10, 109 S.Ct.

2643 (1989), the Supreme Court stated that “purely clerical or

secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate,

regardless of who performs them.” The Ninth Circuit interpreted

this statement as allowing prevailing plaintiffs in fee-shifting

actions to recover fees for secretarial services. Burt v.

Hennessey, 929 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The court finds that filing and serving documents are

secretarial tasks that cannot be billed at a paralegal rate,

regardless of who performs them. Martinez has the burden of

establishing a reasonable rate for such activity. The rate

cannot be the same as that charged for paralegal work. Missouri,

491 U.S. at 288 n. 10. Because Martinez failed to establish a

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reasonable rate for this time, the court denies his request for

fees for the 8.2 hours of time a paralegal spent filing and

serving various documents. 

2. Calendar Reviews and Meetings

Longs argues that the thirteen billing entries described as

“Meet with calendar clerk re Review and update calendar” are

improperly billed meetings between support staff. (Opp’n at 12.) 

It requests that all time charged for these meetings be cut from

the fee award. The court finds that it is reasonable for a legal

professional to keep the calendar clerk informed of developments

in the case. 

However, a paralegal billed eighteen minutes for nine of

these meetings and ninety minutes for one. This length of time

is too long for a legal professional to spend updating a calendar

clerk. Therefore, the court will exercise its discretion and

reduce the time awarded for these meetings to .2 hours per

meeting. As a result, the award for paralegal time will be

reduced by 2.2 hours. 

Longs also challenges the charges for support staff

“meetings” and a fax that a paralegal sent to Hubbard on 2/01/05. 

(Id. at 13.) This objection is unfounded. Only a few time

entries could be construed as meetings for support staff, and the

records reflect that only one person billed time for each alleged

meeting. The court finds that these entries are reasonable and

denies Longs’ request to strike them from the award. 

Billing a paralegal’s time to send a fax to a partner is

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unreasonable. This is secretarial work and, as discussed above,

should be billed at a lesser rate. Again, Martinez has failed to

satisfy his burden of producing a reasonable rate for such work.

Therefore, the .3 hours of paralegal time will be removed from

the award. 

3. Pre-injury Work

Longs argues that all work prior to Martinez’s visit to the

store should be removed from the fee award. (Id. at 12.) 

Martinez argues that the August 27, 2003 visit to the store was

not his first and that he initiated discussions with his

attorneys about the case in early August. (Reply at 10.) 

A review of the billing records reveals that Martinez’s

attorneys and paralegals billed 8.1 hours before filing the

complaint. (Lynn H. Decl. Ex. B.) This included conducting

conflict checks and the site inspection, reviewing the inspection

report, reviewing the client file, drafting the complaint, etc. 

(Id.) Other than reviewing the inspection report (as discussed

above), these charges appear reasonable. There will be no

further reductions to fees incurred before Martinez filed the

complaint. 

4. Boilerplate Documents

Longs argues that the court should strike from the award the

time spent generating the following documents: the complaint, the

settlement package, the joint status reports, the request for

admissions, the interrogatories, the request for documents, the

disclosure of D’Lil, the notice of taking depositions, the joint

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pretrial statement, and the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

(Opp’n at 12-13.) Longs avers that these documents had already

been developed for use in one or more of the hundreds of ADA

cases that Hubbard has previously filed, at least thirty of which

involved Martinez as the plaintiff. (Id.) The court agrees. 

Generating these boilerplate documents is “a mere

secretarial task” which cannot be billed at an attorney or

paralegal rate. White, CIV-S-04-0465 slip op at 8. The court

will strike from the award: (1) the .80 hours Hubbard billed for

generating the settlement demand letter; (2) the four hours

Hubbard billed for overseeing the preparation of discovery

requests; (3) the 1.4 hours billed by Hubbard’s associate for

preparing the proposed joint status report; (4) the 1.5 hours

Hubbard billed for the “Disclosure of Plaintiff’s Expert HolLyn

D’Lil”; and (5) the .70 hours Hubbard billed to “Oversee

preparation of Plaintiff’s Notice of Taking Deposition.” The

court also strikes three of the four hours Hubbard billed for

preparing the Final Joint Pretrial Statement and five of the six

hours spent preparing the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees,

Costs, and Litigation Expenses because each of these documents

should have been created in less than one hour. 

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III.

Martinez is entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys’ fee.

Based on the foregoing, the court awards Martinez $4,953.00 in

attorneys’ fees, calculated as follows:

Attorneys/Paralegals Hours Rate Total

Lynn Hubbard 72.80 $250 $18,200.00

Scott Hubbard (Associate) 4.45 $150 $ 667.50

Paralegals 23.60 $75 $ 1,770.00

Sub-Total: $20,637.50

Negative Multiplier (2/3): $ 6,879.00

In addition, the court awards Martinez $5,093.47 in

litigation expenses. This represents the amount Martinez

requested less: (1) the amount recovered as costs; (2) the cost

of serving Arden; (3) the cost of the preliminary site

inspection; and (4) the adjustment to D’Lil’s expert report. 

In total, the court awards Martinez $11,972.47 in attorneys’

fees and expenses.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/28/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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