Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01294/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPE.Ab%ited States Co~rt'?f Appeals Tenth C1rcu1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DANIEL R. WILEY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO; ) 

LUIS D. ROVIRA, Chief Justice, JOSEPH R.) 

QUINN, Justice, WILLIAM H. ERICKSON, ) 

Justice, GEORGE E. LOHR, Justice, ) 

HOWARD M. KIRSHBAUM, Justice, ANTHONY F.) 

VOLLACK, Justice, MARY J. MULLARKEY, ) 

Justice, in their official capacities; ) 

GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME COURT) 

OF COLORADO; DAVID L. WOOD, its Chair, ) 

VICKI J. BRAUNAGEL, as Vice Chairperson,) 

MICHAELE. MCLACHLAN, as Vice Chair- ) 

person, in their official capacities, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAY 1 I_ 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-1294 

(D.C. No. 92-C-1326) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3. 

Appellate Case: 92-1294 Document: 010110114144 Date Filed: 05/11/1993 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

This case requires us to decide whether the district court 

correctly found itself without jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's 

complaint regarding the constitutionality of Colorado Rule of 

Civil Procedure 241.24(a}, both as applied to him and in general. 

Because the district cou!t lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's 

challenge to the Rule as applied to him, and because plaintiff 

lacks standing to challenge the Rule as a general matter, we 

affirm the district court's dismissal of this case. 

In 1987, plaintiff-appellant Daniel R. Wiley filed a 

grievance against a Colorado lawyer which resulted in the issuance 

of a private letter of admonition to the lawyer. The fact of the 

admonition is required to be kept confidential by Colo. R. Civ. P. 

241.24(a} (the 1 Rule}. Plaintiff later filed suit against a 

1 Rule 241.24(a} in effect at the 

pertinent part: 

relevant time provided 

Upon final determination of any proceedings 

conducted pursuant to these Rules, notice of the 

disposition of the platter shall be given by the Clerk of 

the Supreme Court to the lawyer, the complainant, their 

counsel of record and the Committee Counsel. Any person 

having received notice that an admonition or private 

censure has been imposed shall treat such information as 

confidential and shall not divulge such information to 

anyone, except by order of the Supreme Court. Any 

person, other than the Committee, Committee Counsel or 

Disciplinary Counsel as specified in C.R.C.P. 241.24(b}, 

who wishes to disclose the pendency, subject matter, and 

status of proceedings conducted pursuant to these rules 

in 

(continued on next page) 

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• 

business entity of which the lawyer was president and, as required 

under the Rule, petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for 

permission to disclose facts concerning the grievance proceeding 

at the trial. Plaintiff did not raise any constitutional 

challenge to the Rule at that time. The Colorado Supreme Court 

denied plaintiff's petition. 

After plaintiff lost at trial, he appealed to the Colorado 

Court of Appeals, where he first raised the issue of the 

constitutionality of the Rule. Because of the presence of the 

constitutional issue, the court of appeals transferred the case to 

the Colorado 

§ 13-4-102 (1) (b) 

Supreme 

(1987). 

Court pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. 

That court dismissed plaintiff's 

constitutional claim with prejudice because he had failed to file 

a trial transcript as required by Colorado Appellate Rule lO(b). 

Plaintiff's remaining issues on appeal were remanded to the 

Colorado Court of Appeals. Plaintiff then filed this action in 

the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 

naming the Colorado Supreme Court, that court's grievance 

committee, and the individual members of each body as defendants. 

His action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleged that, as applied, the 

Rule deprived him of his rights under the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments. He also requested a declaratory judgment that the 

(continued from 

shall file 

disclosure 

Any person 

punishment 

previous page) 

a petition setting forth the reasons why the 

should be permitted with the Supreme Court. 

who violates this provision may be subject to 

for contempt of the Supreme Court. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1294 Document: 010110114144 Date Filed: 05/11/1993 Page: 3 
Rule is unconstitutional and an injunction against its 

enforcement. 

The district court dismissed the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b) (1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In so doing, 

the court properly relied on District of Columbia Court of Appeals 

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In Feldman, the Court held that 

a federal court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review a 

state court's denial of the petitioners' individual applications 

for waiver from state bar admission rules. Id. at 482. II [A] 

United States District Court has no authority to review final 

judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings." Id. Because 

part of plaintiff's complaint here alleged error in the way Rule 

241.24(a) was applied in his case, the district court was correct 

to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction. 

The second part of Feldman, however, provided that, to the 

extent petitioners had mounted a general challenge to the 

constitutionality of the bar rules, jurisdiction in the federal 

court would lie. 

challenges 

Id. at 482-83. That is so because such 

do not necessarily require a United States district 

court to review a final state-court judgment in a 

judicial proceeding. Instead, the district court may 

simply be asked to assess the validity of a rule 

promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding. If this is the 

case, the district court is not reviewing a state-court 

judicial decision. 

Id. at 486. 

In Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1991), this court 

addressed a situation remarkably similar to plaintiff's. In 

Facio, the plaintiff had filed a motion in Utah state court to set 

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• 

aside a default judgment. The state court judge denied the motion 

because the plaintiff had not presented proof of a meritorious 

defense as required under Utah law. The plaintiff then filed a 

§ 1983 action in federal court alleging deprivation of his 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court found the Utah 

procedural requirement to be unconstitutional and set aside the 

default judgment. This court reversed. 

Citing Feldman, this court in Facio held that the district 

court had no jurisdiction to set aside the default judgment 

because federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse a 

state court judgment. Id. at 543. The plaintiff, however, had 

also requested a declaratory judgment holding the Utah default 

procedure unconstitutional. The court found jurisdiction to be 

lacking over this claim as well because Feldman had also 

"prohibited. federal courts from issuing any declaratory 

relief that is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court 

judgment." Id. (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16). The 

court explained that the plaintiff's request for declaratory 

relief was inextricably intertwined with his request t o vacate the 

default judgment. Id. 

[T]he two forms of relief are so intertwined, in fact, 

that if [plaintiff] is not able to set aside the default 

judgment against him, he would lack standing to assert 

his second claim, which is the request that the federal 

court declare Utah's default judgment procedures 

unconstitutional. Unless [plaintiff's] default judgment 

is upset, his only interest in Utah's default judgment 

procedures is prospective and hypothetical in nature. 

He cannot establish a sufficient interest in the future 

application of those procedures to him to establish a 

constitutional case or controversy. 

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Appellate Case: 92-1294 Document: 010110114144 Date Filed: 05/11/1993 Page: 5 
Id. Because the plaintiff had not "demonstrated any real chance 

of being subjected in the future to Utah's procedures for 

reversing default judgments," id. at 544, he lacked th~ standing 

necessary to confer jurisdiction on the district court. Id. at 

545. 

the same defect. 

his claim is 

Plaintiff's complaint here suffers from 

Unless the Colorado Supreme Court's dismissal of 

upset, he has only a hypothetical interest 

241.24(a) declared unconstitutional. Like Mr. 

in seeing Rule 

Facio, plaintiff 

has not demonstrated any real chance of .being involved in the 

future with an attorney discipline proceeding in Colorado and the 

attendant confidentiality provisions. A plaintiff "cannot 

maintain a declaratory or injunctive action unless he or she can 

demonstrate a good chance of being likewise injured in the 

future." Id. at 544. Without this showing, the court had no 

jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's general challenge to the Rule's 

constitutionality because plaintiff did not have the requisite 

standing . "[T]he federal courts have 'no jurisdiction to 

pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States, 

void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it 

is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual 

controversies.'" Id. at 545 (quoting Live;r:pool, N.Y. & Phila. 

S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33 (1885)). 

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• 

7 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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