Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-00580/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-00580-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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28 1 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eldon M. Schurz, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE: RENEWED MOTION TO

FILE AMENDED PETITION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s renewed motion for leave to file amended

petition, including recently exhausted federal constitutional claims. (Dkt. 120.)1

Respondents filed an opposition to the motion, and Petitioner filed a reply. (Dkts. 123,

127.)

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed an initial petition (dkt. 1) and subsequently filed a First Amended

Petition (“Amended Petition”) (dkt. 14), raising 14 claims. After review of the Amended

Petition, this Court entered its Order concluding that certain claims were procedurally

barred and that the remainder of the claims were exhausted and would be reviewed on the

merits. (Dkt. 29.) 

Subsequently, the Court stayed Petitioner’s sentencing-related claims to allow him

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to seek p ost -conviction relief (“PCR”) in state court based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002) (concluding that a jury, not a judge, must be the finder of fact regarding the

exist ence of aggravating circumstances that render a defendant death-eligible at

sentencing). (Dkt. 86.) Petitioner returned to state court and initiated successive PCR

proceedings to det ermine whether Ring applied retroactively. However, Petitioner did not

limit his PCR petition to the filing of a claim based on Ring, but also presented all of the

claims this Court had earlier found procedurally barred as well as 13 additional claims never

before raised in collateral proceedings. The state court denied the PCR pet it ion. Petitioner

sought review in the Arizona Sup reme Court, which was denied. Following the conclusion

of PCR proceedings, this Court lifted its stay regarding Petitioner’s sentencing claims. (Dkt.

102.) Petitioner filed an initial motion to amend, which was denied, wit hout prejudice, on

procedural grounds. (Dkts. 104, 117.) Subsequently, Petitioner filed the instant motion,

renewing his request for leave to amend his habeas petition. (Dkt. 120.) Concurrently with

his motion, Petitioner lodged a proposed amended petition raising 27 claims (“Lodged

Petition”). (Id.)

II. STANDARD FOR AMENDMENT

 A petition for habeas corpus may be amended pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll.

§ 2254 (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied to habeas

petitions to the ext ent t he rules are not inconsistent with the habeas rules). Thus, the

Court looks to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address a party’s motion

to amend a pleading in a habeas corpus action. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for

the N. Dist. of Cal., 134 F.3d 981, 986 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.

680, 696 n.7 (1993)). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), leave to amend “shall be freely given when

justice so requires,” and courts must review motions to amend “in light of the strong policy

permitting amendment.” Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d 762, 765 (9t h Cir.

1986). 

In M ay le v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005), the Supreme Court clarified amendment of

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2 All cases filed after April 24, 1996, are governed by t he Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 335-36 (1997).

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habeas petitions filed under the AEDPA,2 and its corresponding one-year statute of

limitations provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court construed Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)’s

relation-back principle and held that amended habeas claims only relate back to “timely”

habeas claims when such claims are tied to a common core of operative facts. For

purposes of relat ion back, the Court rejected the argument that a common core of operative

facts could be interpreted to include all facts arising out of a petitioner’s trial, conviction,

or sentence. Id. at 2574.

The factors which may justify deny ing a motion to amend are undue delay, bad faith

or dilatory motive, futility of amendment , and undue prejudice to the opposing party.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to amend may be denied based upon

futility alone. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). To assess futility, a

court necessarily evaluates whether relief may be available on the merits of proposed

claims. See Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 837-39 (9th Cir. 2004) (conducting a two-part

futility analysis reviewing both exhaustion of state court remedies and the merits of the

prop osed claim); Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1560 (10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the

evidence present ed at t rial and determining it would be futile to allow the addition of a

sufficiency of the evidence claim). If proposed claims are untimely, unexhausted,

procedurally defaulted, or if they otherwise fail as a matter of law, amendment should be

denied as futile.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Lodged Petition--New Claims

Petitioner’s Lodged Petition seeks to add 13 new claims not previously raised in the

Amended Petition. (Dkt. 120 at Ex. 2.) Petitioner seeks to add Claim 11 and Claims 16-27

to the Amended Petition. Respondents assert that t hese new claims may not be added to

the Amended Petit ion based on equitable principles and time bar, as well as lack of

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exhaust ion in state court. (Dkt. 123 at 2, 5-11.) In reply, Petitioner cites Nardi v. Stewart,

354 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2004), to argue that Respondents are not entitled to assert a time bar

defense to amendment after they omitted to plead this defense in response to Petitioner’s

initial motion to amend. Consequently, Petitioner contends that such defense is waived

and may not sua sponte be raised by this Court. (Dkt. 127 at 3-4.) Alternatively, Petitioner

contends that even if Respondents are allowed to assert t he AEDPA time bar, it is not

controlling for the new claims presented in his Lodged Petition because Resp ondents had

sufficient notice of the facts underlying these claims and thus the new claims are ent itled

to relate back t o t he Amended Petition. (Id. at 2.) Finally, Petitioner contends that these

new claims were exhausted by his most recent third PCR petition in state court. (Id. at 4-

10.)

Petitioner’s Nardi argument is not applicable to Petitioner’s new motion to amend.

Respondents are not foreclosed in a new response to a new motion from asserting a time

bar defense. Based on Mayle v. Felix, Respondents are entit led t o assert and Nardi does

not preclude Respondents from asserting an AEDPA time bar defense to Petitioner’s

motion.

Accordingly, the Court must construe the effect of Mayle v. Felix on Petitioner’s

mot ion to amend. In Mayle v. Felix, the Court concluded that if claims asserted after

expiration of the one-year limitation period could be revived simply because t hey relate to

the same trial, conviction or sent ence as the claims already filed, “AEDPA’s limitation

period would have slim significance.” 125 S. Ct. at 2574. The petitioner in Mayle v. Felix

sought to add a new 5th Amendment involuntary admission of statements claim to his

pet it ion, which consisted only of a 6th Amendment confrontation claim. Id. at 2567. The

facts underly ing t he 5t h Amendment claim differed in time from the facts underlying the 6th

Amendment claim. Id. The Court concluded t hat the 5th and 6th Amendment claims

differed in both time and type, and therefore the 5th Amendment claim did not relate back

to the original petition and was time-barred. Id. at 2573. Under Rule 15(c)(2), the Court held

that new claims do not relate back to the original petition if they assert a new ground for

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relief sup p ort ed by facts that differ in both time and type from those claims included in the

original petition. Id. at 2566. 

In adop t ing a “time and type” analysis for relation back, the Court followed t he

majority of circuit courts that had resolved that new claims differing in bot h t ime and type

do not relat e back t o a timely-filed petition. See Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d at

1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that newly-offered claims of IAC do not relate back to

timely-filed claims of IAC because they were based on different sets of fact s); United

States v. Pit t man, 209 F.3d 314, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that claims regarding

obstruction of justice enhancement and failure of counsel to file an appeal do not relate

back to claims that the district court lacked jurisdict ion to impose an enhanced sentence

and the government failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the drugs

at issue were crack cocaine); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337-38 (3rd Cir. 1999)

(stating that a claim of IAC for failing to move to suppress evidence did not relate back to

a claim of IAC for failing to contend on appeal that evidence was insufficient to support

conviction); United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that IAC

claims alleged in a timely-filed petit ion were separate from other IAC claims because

“[f]ailing to file an appeal is a separate occurrence in both time and type from a failure to

pursue a downward departure or failure to object t o t he t y p e of drugs at issue”). However,

in contrast, if the new claim merely clarifies or amplifies a claim or t heory already in the

original petition, the new claim may relate back to the date of the original p et it ion and avoid

a time bar. See Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001). 

1. Lodged Petition Claim 11

In Claim 11, Petitioner asserts four separate claims of IAC at sentencing. In review

of Claim 11(A), asserting t hat sent encing counsel failed to develop a mitigation case for

life, this claim relies up on a legal theory and a similar factual basis that was presented to

the Court in the Amended Petition and found exhausted. (Dkt. 29 at 39.) Because Claim

11(A) merely amplifies a claim or theory already in the original p et it ion, it may be added to

t he Amended Petition and it will relate back to the filing date of the Amended Petition. See

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Woodard, 263 F.3d at 1142. In Claim 11(C), Petitioner argues that sentencing counsel

prevented meaningful appellate review of mitigation because he submitted the mitigation

report of Psychologist Donald Tatro at sentencing. Claim 11(C) relies upon an factual basis

already being used in support of other habeas claims. The only difference is a new legal

theory--that counsel, by filing t he rep ort, prevented meaningful appellate review of

mitigation. Because Claim 11(C) merely amp lifies a claim or theory already in the original

petition, it may relate back to the Amended Petition. See Felix, 125 S. Ct. at 2575.

Petitioner’s motion to amend to add Claim 11(A) and 11(C) will be granted.

Claims 11(B) (counsel failed to secure expert assistance) and 11(D) (counsel advised

Petitioner not to speak to the presentence report writer) are new allegations of IAC at

sent encing which were not part of the Amended Petition. These new factual allegations

of IAC at sentencing differ from the IAC allegations previously raised in the Amended

Petition and constitute separate IAC claims. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

690 (1984) (stating that a petitioner making an IAC claim must identify the particular acts

or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment). Petitioner’s new allegations of IAC at sentencing do not arise out

of the same facts included in the Amended Petition, but arose from separate conduct and

occurrences in both time and type. As noted in Felix, “each separat e congeries of facts

supporting the grounds for relief” delineates an occurrence under Rule 2(c). See Felix, 125

S. Ct. at 2573 (citing Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases, which

instructs the petitioner t o specify all grounds for relief available to him and to state the

facts supporting each ground.) Therefore, Petit ioner’s Claims 11(B) and 11(D) do not relate

back to the Amended Petition and are time barred. See Davenport, 217 F.3d at 1346.

Petitioner’s motion to amend will be denied as to Claim 11(B) and 11(D).

2. Lodged Petition Claims 16-27

Based upon Mayle v. Felix, Respondents argue that Claims 16-27 are time barred.

(Dkt . 123 at 5-6.) The Court finds that Claims 16-27 rest upon factual bases separat e from

the fact ual bases of claims already presented in the Amended Petition. Additionally, all of

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these claims present separate grounds for relief. Consequently, they differ in both time and

type from claims already presented. Thus, pursuant to Felix, Claims 16-27 do not relate

back to the Amended Petition and are time-barred. See 125 S. Ct . at 2566 (stating that a

claim does not relate back “when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that

differ in both time and t y p e from those the original pleading set forth.”). Therefore,

Petitioner’s motion to amend is denied as to Claims 16-27.

B. Lodged Petition--Claims Previously Found Procedurally Barred

In his Lodged Petition, Petitioner presents claims t hat this Court previously

concluded were procedurally barred. Respondents contend that this Court’s earlier ruling

regarding procedural bar is controlling regarding t he exhaustion status of such claims and

therefore amendment is futile. (Dkt. 123 at 6-11.) Pet it ioner acknowledges that in his third

PCR, he included claims that this Court previously found procedurally barred. (Dkt. 127

at 5-10.) Nonetheless, regardless of the Court’s earlier ruling, Petitioner argues that these

claims are now exhausted and available for merits review because the state court decision

denying relief on these claims did not clearly and expressly rest on a p rocedural bar. (Id.)

Respondents are correct that this Court previously concluded that certain claims in

the Amended Petition were procedurally barred. (Dkt . 29.) However, the Court’s ruling

regarding claims presented in the Amended Petition did not foreclose Petitioner from

attempting to actually exhaust procedurally-barred claims. Subsequently, Petitioner

initiated a successive PCR; those state proceedings must be analyzed to determine the

exhaustion status of the claims presented. 

Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the AEDPA, which

requires that a writ of habeas corpus not be granted unless it appears that the petit ioner

has exhaust ed all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). To properly

exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to the state’s highest

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999).

A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operat ive fact s and

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the federal legal t heory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the fact s bearing upon his

constitutional claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 277-78 (1971). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit eit her by

citing specific provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a

claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. M adding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), or by citing

state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Pet erson v.

Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Such explicit fair presentation must

be made not only to the t rial or p ost-conviction court, but to the state’s highest court.

Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351 (2004). 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs when petitioners may

seek relief in post-conviction proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to

their convictions or sentences in state court. Rule 32.2 provides, in part:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this

rule based upon any ground:

 . . . . (2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous

collateral proceeding;

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding.

b. Exceptions. Rule 32.2(a) shall not apply to claims for relief based

on Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). When a claim under [these subsections] is to be raised in a successive or untimely post-conviction relief

proceeding, the notice of post-conviction relief must set forth t he substance

of the specific exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in the

previous petition or in a timely manner. If the specific except ion and

meritorious reasons do not appear substantiating the claim and indicating

why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or in a timely manner,

the notice shall be summarily dismissed.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (West 2004) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 32.2,

petitioners may not be granted relief on any claim which could have been raised on direct

appeal or in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief. Only if a claim falls within

certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and t he p etitioner can justify

why t he claim was omitted will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2 be avoided. It is firmly

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resolved in the Nint h Circuit that Arizona’s Rule 32.2(a)(3) is an adequate state-law

procedural bar because it is regularly and consistently applied. See, e.g., Poland (Patrick)

v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 1999). 

1. Lodged Petition Claims 1-3, 5(B), 6, 8, 9(F)-(I), 10(C), 14-15

Petitioner raised these claims in his third PCR. Petitioner brought these claims as

exceptional claims of actual innocence, thereby allowing their consideration in a successive

PCR. (Dkt. 116 at 26-71.) The state court attempted to summarily dismiss these claims as

not falling within the scope of actual innocence, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h). (Id. at 307.) The

state court then went on to determine which claims were procedurally barred and whether

any remaining claims entitled Petitioner to relief. (Id.) The state court held these claims

precluded because they either were or could have been raised on direct appeal or in a

previous PCR petition. (Id. at 308.) At issue is whether this state court ruling procedurally

defaulted the claims brought in the third PCR or whether the state court ruling was

ambiguous, thus entitling these claims to federal habeas review on the merits. 

In order to uphold a st at e law procedural default and bar federal review of a claim,

the state court must “ clearly and expressly rely on procedural default as an independent

and adequate state law ground.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735. If an Arizona state court,

pursuant t o Rule 32.2(a)(2), precludes further review of a claim because it has been

p reviously raised and litigated, then such a claim is exhausted and available for federal

habeas review. If the state court, pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), bars a claim because it could

have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous PCR proceeding but was not, that claim

is waived and procedurally defaulted. However, if the state court does not distinguish

which claims are precluded from further review under (a)(2) and which claims are precluded

as waived under (a)(3), then t he decision is ambiguous and does not clearly and expressly

rely on an independent and adequate state procedural default. See Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d

1246, 1253 (9t h Cir. 1996) (reviewing the distinction between Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32.2(a)(2) and 32.2(a)(3) and concluding that ambiguous decisions do not

foreclose federal habeas review of the claims encompassed in that ruling); see also Valerio

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v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774-75 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039,

1049-50 (9th Cir. 2003).

T he state court unequivocally found Claims 12, 17 and 26 procedurally default ed.

(Dkt. 116 at 309.) However, the state court’s decision as to Claims 1-3, 5(B), 6, 8, 9(F)-(I),

10(C), 14-15 is ambiguous. (Id. at 308.) The state court did not distinguish between the

claims it found “precluded” because they had been p reviously raised on direct appeal or

in a previous PCR proceeding from the claims that were precluded as waived because they

could have been but were not raised eit her on direct appeal or in a previous PCR

proceeding. (Id.) This ambiguous state court ruling is controlled by Poland which held,

as follows:

A claim that has been found to be “precluded” under subsect ion

(a)(2) appears to be a classic exhausted claim and may therefore be subject

to consideration in federal habeas. See Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1252-53

(9th Cir.1996) (recognizing the distinction between waiver and preclusion,

and holding that “[p]reclusion does not provide a basis for federal courts to

apply a procedural bar”). 

In contrast, a claim t hat has been “waived” under subsection (a)(3) is

procedurally defaulted and therefore barred from federal court consideration,

absent a showing of cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of

justice.

Poland (Patrick), 169 F.3d at 578. 

Therefore, Claims 1-3, 5(B), 6, 8, 9(F)-9(I), 10(C), 14 and 15 are treated as having been

reviewed on the merits and are available for federal review. Amendment to add these

claims will be futile if a proposed claim for amendment is nevertheless meritless. See

Caswell, 363 F.3d at 837-39 (conducting a two-part futility analysis reviewing both

exhaust ion of state court remedies and the merits of the proposed claim). Accordingly ,

p ursuant to the AEDPA, the Court will conduct a merits review of these claims to determine

whether leave to amend should be denied as futile.

AEDPA deference ap p lies to all claims that were adjudicated on the merits; that is,

t hose claims that were not resolved on the basis of a state procedural rule or bar. See

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to the AEDPA, Petitioner

is not entitled t o relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that

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adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of t he facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

§ 2254(d)(1)

T o assess a habeas claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the

“clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on

habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law includes the holdings of the Supreme

Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction became final. See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 (2000). Habeas relief cannot be grant ed if t he Supreme Court has

not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by a pet it ioner,

even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. See id. at 381. A state court decision

is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it reaches a conclusion on a question of

law that is counter to a decision of the Supreme Court or if it applied the correct authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling Supreme

Court case, but nonetheless reached a different result. Id. at 413; see also Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003); Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). Whether

a st ate court’s interpretation of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority, as

opposed to an unreasonable ap p lication thereof, is a question of federal law as to which

federal courts owe no deference t o t he st ate courts. Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929-30

(9th Cir. 2003). 

A state court decision amounts to an “unreasonable applicat ion” under § 2254(d)(1)

if the state court correctly identifies the governing “clearly established” legal principle from

the Supreme Court’s decisions, but then makes an objectively unreasonable application

of that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. An

“objectively unreasonable” application of federal law involves more than an incorrect or

even clearly erroneous ap p licat ion of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11 (“[A]

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federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.”) In contrast to the “contrary to” prong of § 2254(d)(1), the AEDPA

mandates deferential review of a state court’s application of clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (citing Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)). 

In considering a challenge under either the “contrary to” or “unreasonable

application” prong of subsection (d)(1), state court factual determinations are presumed

correct pursuant to § 2254(e)(1) and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing

evidence. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct.

809 (2004).

§ 2254(d)(2)

To obtain habeas relief under subsection (d)(2), the state court factual det ermination

at issue must be “objectively unreasonable” in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Davis v. Woodford, 384

F.3d 628, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2004). As explained by t he Ninth Circuit, the “unreasonable

determination” clause:

applies most readily to situations where pet it ioner challenges the state

court’s findings based entirely on the state record. Such a challenge may be

based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by sufficient evidence,

see, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2538-39, 156 L. Ed.2d

471 (2003); Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 704-08 (7th Cir. 2003), that the

process employ ed by the state court is defective, see, e.g., Nunes v. Mueller,

350 F.3d 1045, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2003); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 961-68

(5th Cir. 2001)(Dennis, J., dissenting), or that no finding was made by the

state court at all, see, e.g., Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir.

1999); cf. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2539-41. 

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999; cf. Norton v. Sp encer, 351 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003) (describing

grounds to find state court factual determinations unreasonable under (d)(2)).

When a petitioner challenges a state court’s factual findings under subsection

(d)(2), a federal court must be satisfied that an appellate court could not reasonably affirm

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3 Former A.R.S. § 13-503 (1990), repealed in 1993, provided: 

No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is

less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the

act ual existence of the culpable mental state of intentionally or wit h t he

intent to is a necessary element t o constitute any particular species or degree

of offense, the jury may take into consideration the fact t hat the accused was

intoxicated at the time in determining the culpable mental state with which he

committed the act.

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t he finding. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. “Once the state court’s fact-finding process survives

this intrinsic review . . . the state court ’s findings are dressed in a presumption of

correctness, which then helps steel them against any challenge based on ext rinsic

evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal court.” Id. The presumption

of correctness may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to §

2254(e)(1). Id.; see Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 125

S. Ct. 808 (2004).

(a) Claim 1 The Trial Court Violated the 8th and 14th

Amendments by Instructing the Jury that it Could not

Consider Petitioner’s Intoxication in Determining His

Mental State

Petitioner argues that the trial court committed constitutional error when it

instructed the jury not to consider his intoxication in determining his mental state to

commit the crime of first degree murder. (Dkt. 120, Ex. 2 at 6.) Petitioner further cont ends

that the trial court’s jury instruction, “coupled with the [c]ourt’s refusal to give Petitioner’s

requested instruction, violated the 8th Amendment by prohibiting the jury from fully

considering his capacity to form the requisite intent to kill.” (Id. at 7.)

At the time of Petitioner’s trial, Arizona law only allowed introduction of intoxication

evidence when specific intent was a necessary element of the crime charged. See Schurz,

176 Ariz. at 54-55, 859 P.2d at 164-65 (citing A.R.S. § 13-503,3 which, in p ertinent part,

provided t hat the jury may only consider voluntary intoxication in determining a culpable

mental state when t he culp able mental state of intentionality is a necessary element of the

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4 A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1) (1990) provides, in pertinent part:

 A person commits first degree murder if: (1) Intending or knowing that his

conduct will cause death, such person causes the death of another with

premeditation.

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offense). Under Arizona’s first degree murder statute, the State was required to prove that

Petitioner had either an intentional or knowing mental state that his conduct will cause

death. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1).4 Where a defendant is charged, in part, with knowingly

committing first degree murder, a voluntary intoxication instruction is not permit t ed. See

State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116, 122, 765 P.2d 518, 524 (1988). In compliance with state

law, the court refused to allow him to introduce intoxication evidence as a defense to the

“knowing” mental state and refused to give a jury instruction indicating t hat voluntary

intoxication was a defense to the first degree murder charge. 

A challenge to a jury instruction that alleges an error under state law does not state

a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus p roceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 71-72 (1991). A state trial court’s failure to give a jury inst ruct ion does not raise a

cognizable federal claim unless the failure so infected the trial that the defendant was

deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.

See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). “A federal court is limited to

deciding whet her a conviction violated the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 480.

Because the omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement

of the law, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction

bears an “especially heavy” burden. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

As earlier indicated, the trial court complied with Arizona law in not giving a

voluntary intoxication instruction. The Arizona legislature has wide latitude in

promulgating state substantive law. See State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6, 648 P.2d 119, 121

(1982). The Constitution “reserves to the states considerable freedom in defining crimes,

including mental elements required, and in establishing penalties for the crimes defined.”

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5 During his t hird PCR, Petitioner only exhausted the claim that there was

insufficient evidence to sustain his first degree murder conviction; he did not exhaust a

similar claim as to the other convictions rendered at his trial. (Dkt. 116 at 31-33.)

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Id. (cit ing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968)). In defined circumstances, Arizona

has determined that public policy dictates that one who voluntarily seeks the influence of

alcohol should not be insulated from criminal responsibilit y . See Ramos, 133 Ariz. at 6-7,

648 P.2d at 121-22 (concluding that A.R.S. § 13-503 does not violate a defendant’s

constitutional rights). 

T he Ramos court’s public policy pronouncement regarding intoxication evidence

does not violate the Constitution. In Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (plurality),

t he Court ruled that a similar Montana statute, which barred the introduction of volunt ary

intoxication evidence in order to determine the existence of a mental state, did not offend

the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause is not offended by

such a statute unless the statute violated a fundamental principle of justice. Id. at 43. The

Court concluded that a state’s definition of a mental state to eliminate the exculpatory

value of voluntary intoxication does not offend fundamental principles of justice. Id. at 58-

59. Because the Supreme Court has not “ broken sufficient legal ground” on the

constitutional principle advanced by the Petitioner in this claim, habeas relief cannot be

granted. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 381. T herefore, amendment to add Claim 1 would be

futile and is denied. 

(b) Claim 2 Petitioner’s Conviction violated the 5th, 6th, 8th and

14th Amendments because there was insufficient

evidence to establish the element of premeditation

Claim 15 Insufficient Ev idence Existed to Sustain Petitioner’s

First Degree Murder Verdict5

In Claim 2, Petitioner contends that the evidence at trial failed to establish

p remedit at ion because (1) his voluntary intoxication rendered him incapable of

premeditation; (2) any act committed by him was in the heat of p assion as the murder

occurred direct ly after a fight; and (3) there was no reliable evidence that Petitioner knew

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6 A.R.S. § 13-1101(1) (1990), provides, as follows:

A.R.S. § 13-1101. Definitions. In this chapter, unless the context otherwise

requires: 1. “Premeditation” means that the defendant acts with either the

intention or the knowledge that he will kill another human being, when such

intention or knowledge precedes the killing by a length of time to permit

reflection. An act is not done with premedit ation if it is the instant effect of

a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

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or int ended that his conduct would kill the victim. (Dkt. 120, Ex. 2 at 11-12.) In Claim 15,

Petitioner generally contends that that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his first

degree murder conviction. Thus, Petitioner challenges whether he acted with

premeditation, rather than out of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (Dkt . 120, Ex. 2 at 11

(citing t he definition for premeditation, A.R.S. § 13-1101(1),6 which element is necessary to

support a conviction under Arizona’s first degree murder statute, A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1)).

Petitioner also challenges, in light of his alleged volunt ary int oxication, whether reliable

evidence supports premeditation before the murder. 

The “rational factfinder” standard is used to det ermine whether there is sufficient

evidence to support a state court’s finding of the elements of the crime. T hus, the

question is “ whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

p rosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of t he crime

beyond a reasonable doubt .” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A habeas court

“faced with a record of historical facts t hat supports conflicting inferences must presume--

even if it does not affirmatively appear in t he record--that the trier of fact resolved any such

conflicts in favor of the prosecution and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326.

Under Arizona law, premeditation requires that the defendant act with either the

intention or knowledge that he will kill another human being, when such intention or

knowledge precedes the killing by a length of time to permit reflection. See A.R.S. § 13-

1101(1). Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the state

supreme court found that Petitioner and t he victim, Bahe, got into a physical altercation.

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7 “ROA” refers to documents in t he five-volume record on appeal from trial,

sentencing, and the first and second petitions for post-convict ion relief. Copies of the

record on appeal, as well as the trial transcripts and the pleadings filed in t he Ariz ona

Supreme Court, were provided to this Court by counsel for Respondents. (Dkt. 25.)

8 “RT” refers to the reporter’s transcripts of Petitioner’s trial.

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After the fight, the following occurred:

Bahe was on the ground and, in an attempt to get away, crawled under a

chain-link fence into a small enclosed rectangular space between a stairwell

and a brick wall. Schurz picked up the plast ic jug, smelled its contents, and

t hen sp lashed gasoline on Bahe. Using a lighter, Schurz ignited a small

p uddle of gasoline. When the flames failed to spread to Bahe, he kicked t he

burning puddle toward him. Bahe went up in flames. 

Schurz, 176 Ariz. at 50, 859 P.2d at 160. At sentencing, the trial court stated the facts as

follows: 

[O]nce the victim crawled under the chain link fence in an attempt to escape

from Schurz, Bahe was essentially help less and he effectively ended the

confrontation and the attempted robbery. Nevertheless, instead of simply

leaving the scene, Schurz picked up t he container of gasoline, smelled it to

determine what it was, intentionally splashed it on t he victim and purposely

lit it on fire. When he saw the fire was on the ground instead of on the

victim, he then purposely kicked the flame toward the victim so that his goal

of setting the victim on fire would be accomplished.

ROA 137 at 5.7

 Both accounts were based on testimony received at trial from Patrick

Allison. Allison, a co-defendant, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the prosecution days

before trial. Allison testified that aft er t he fight, Bahe crawled under a fence enclosure.

Realizing Bahe was trapped, Petitioner doused him with gasoline. After dousing Bahe with

gasoline, Allison testified that “[Petitioner] pulled–I believe it was a lighter from out of his

pocket and he lit t he p uddle [of gasoline] on fire. The fire did not go toward the guy so he

flicked it with his foot . . . . Well, the puddle was on the ground, on the stair, and he flicked

it t owards t he guy that was doused with the gasoline, with his foot, and immediately the

whole guy went up in flames. And after that we just turned around and walked off.” (R.T.

6/6/90 at 103.)8

Regarding, both Claim 2 and Claim 15, taking the evidence in a light most favorable

to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt t hat

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Petitioner knowingly killed the victim and that such knowledge preceded the killing by a

length of time to permit reflect ion. As the record indicates, the fight between Petitioner and

the victim was over. The victim had crawled into a fenced-in area space to protect himself

from Petitioner. Petitioner could have walked away but instead took deliberate steps to kill

the victim. 

Premeditation may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See State v. Thomp son,

204 Ariz. 471, 476, 65 P.3d 420, 425 (2003) (discussing the history of p remeditation in

Arizona and indicating as early as 1946 that proof of premeditation may be inferred from

the facts and circumstances of the killing). The circumstantial evidence in this case

strongly supports that Petitioner knowingly killed the victim with premeditation beyond

a reasonable doubt. Petitioner deliberately planned to kill the victim as he doused the

victim with gasoline and then kicked a puddle of gasoline fire on him. See Stat e v. Vickers,

159 Ariz. 532, 541, 768 P.2d 1177, 1186 (1989) (concluding that there was evidence of

premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant threw flammable liquid onto

the victim and then lit the victim on fire); see also Thompson, 204 Ariz . at 479, 65 P.3d at

428 (stating that the state may use all of the circumstantial evidence at it s disp osal to prove

premeditation including “a pattern of escalating violence between the defendant and the

victim.”).

Petitioner also complains about Allison’s reliability as a witness. However, there

was no evidence presented to the contrary. Moreover, the jury judged Allison’s credibility

and a jury’s credibilit y det erminations are entitled to significant deference. See Bruce v.

Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (cit ing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995),

for the proposition that assessment of credibility of witness is generally bey ond t he scope

of habeas review). A rat ional trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner knowingly killed the victim and that such knowledge p receded the killing by a

length of time to permit reflection. Based on t he lack of merit of Claim 2 and 15, the Court

denies Petitioner’s motion to reamend these claims into the Amended Petition. 

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(c) Claim 3 Petitioner’s Death Sentence for felony murder violates

the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments

Hypothetically, Petitioner argues that if this Court invalidates Petitioner’s

conviction for premeditated first degree murder, then his death sentence for felony murder

should also be invalidated because there is insufficient evidence to support his felony

murder conviction. (Dkt . 120 at 13-16.) This claim is without merit because the Court has

found Petitioner’s Jackson challenge to his premedit at ed first degree murder conviction to

be meritless. Even if there was error in the felony murder conviction, Pet it ioner’s death

sentence st ands on the basis of his conviction for premeditated first degree murder. Based

on the lack of merit of Claim 3, the Court denies Petitioner’s motion to reamend it into the

Amended Petition. 

(d) Claim 5: The Trial Court’s Ev aluation of Petitioner’s

Intoxication Evidence as Mitigation Violated the 8th

Amendment

Petitioner raises two separate arguments in Claim 5 related to the trial court’s

evaluation of mitigation evidence at sentencing. In a p revious Order, this Court determined

that Claim 5(A)–t he trial court’s alleged failure to find Petitioner’s intoxication as a

statutory mitigating circumstance–was exhausted and entitled to a merits review. However,

the Court did not finally determine the procedural st at us of Claim 5(B)–the trial court’s

alleged failure to consider his intoxication as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance.

(Dkt. 29 at 28.) The Court concludes that judicial efficiency is best served by resolving

both aspects of Claim 5 on the merits at this time.

Claim 5(A) Failure to Find Intoxication as Statutory Mitigation

Petitioner argues t hat the overwhelming evidence presented at his sentencing

substantiated that he was intoxicated at the time of the murder and that the trial court erred

by not finding and concluding that such intoxication est ablished a statutory mitigating

circumstance. (Dkt . 120, Ex. 2 at 21-22.) Due to his intoxication at the time of the offense,

Petitioner argues that his “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired. (Id. (citing

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A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) (1993)).)

Although the sentencer, in a capital proceeding, may not refuse t o consider

constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, it is constitutionally permissible for a state

death penalty statute to impose on defendants the burden of establishing the existence of

a mitigating circumst ance by a preponderance of the evidence. See Walton v. Arizona, 497

U.S. 639 (1990) (plurality), overruled on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);

see also Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 275 (1993) (per curiam) (st ating that “we recently

made clear t hat a State may require the defendant to bear the risk of nonpersuasion as to

t he existence of mitigating circumstances”) (other citation omitted). In a weighing state like

Arizona, if the sentencer determines that a mitigating circumstance has been established

by a preponderance of the evidence, the 8th and 14th Amendments further require that

such evidence be given whatever effect, or weight, the sentencer deems appropriate. See

Richmond v Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 47-48 (1992); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367

(1993) (stating that the sentencer must be able to give effect to relevant mitigation that has

been established by t he evidence). However, the Constitution does not require that a

death penalty statute assign a specific weight to any part icular mitigating factor

established at sentencing. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512 (1995). The Harris

Court explained that requiring states to assign p art icular weight to mitigation would “place

wit hin constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks that properly rest within the [s]tat e’s

discret ion to administer its criminal justice system.” Id. Thus, it is under the cont rol of

state law whether a mitigating circumstance exists and, if established, the weight to be

assigned to it . Cf. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (stating that the existence of an

aggravating circumstance is a state law question). 

Regarding the degree of Petitioner’s intoxication at the time of the murder, the

sentencing court, based upon the report of Petitioner’s psychologist , Dr. Donald Tatro,

concluded that his degree of intoxication did not rise to the level of a statutory mitigating

circumstance. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed those findings, as follows:

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Lat er, however, Schurz confessed to Dr. Tatro, who performed a

psychological examination for use at sentencing, that he did remember what

happened and that he had previously lied to police about his memory lapse.

He stated that although he had consumed a large amount of beer and used

some heroin that night, he was still aware of what was happening. Dr. Tatro

stated in his rep ort that “it does not appear that [defendant] was so

intoxicated at the time that he did not know what he was doing or t hat he was

unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.” He concluded,

essentially, that defendant knew what he was doing but, because of his

intoxication and a personalit y hardened by past institutionalization, simply

did not care. . . . 

We agree with the trial court that the evidence is insufficient to

establish the existence of the (G)(1) mitigating circumstance. Contrary t o

Schurz’s argument, we do not find that an uncaring attitude, even though

partially caused by drug use, constitutes an impaired ability to “appreciate”

the wrongfulness of one’s conduct. Nor is there evidence t hat Schurz’s

intoxication deprived him of his ability to control his conduct. 

Schurz, 176 Ariz. at 56, 859 P.2d at 166 (footnote omitted). 

The Arizona Supreme Court ’s conclusion that Petitioner’s intoxication did not meet

t he requirements for finding the existence of statutory mitigation is not contrary t o nor an

unreasonable application of Sup reme Court precedent. It is for the sentencer to determine

the existence of a mitigating circumstance. See Harris, 513 U.S. at 512. Whether the

evidence supports or does not support the existence of a mitigating circumst ance is a state

law question; it is a decision that properly rests within the state’s discretion t o administer

its criminal justice system. Id.; Cf. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780. Claim 5(A) is meritless

on its face; Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Claim 5(B) Failure to Consider Intoxication as Non-Statutory Mitigation

Next, Petitioner argues that the trial court refused to consider his intoxicat ion

evidence as non-statutory mitigation, once such mitigation was denied as a stat ut ory

mitigating circumstance. (Dkt. 120, Ex. 2 at 20-23.) 

Under the federal constitution, in capital sentencing proceedings, t he sentencer,

whether by statute or case law or any other legal barrier, must not be precluded from

considering relevant mitigat ion evidence. See Lockett, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In Lockett and

later in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Sup reme Court established that under

the 8th and 14th Amendments, the sentencer may not be p recluded from considering and

may not refuse t o consider any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings, 455

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U.S. at 113-14. Constitut ionally relevant mitigating evidence is “any aspect of a

defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the

defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less t han death.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. The

Constitution and the clearly established law require only that the sentencing court hear

and consider all constitutionally relevant mitigation evidence, but the court may determine

the weight to accord such evidence. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15 (emphasis added).

On habeas review, the habeas court does not evaluate the substance of each and every

piece of evidence submitted as mitigation; rather, it reviews the state court record to ensure

that t he state court allowed and considered all relevant mitigation. See Jeffers v. Lewis, 38

F.3d 411, 418 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that when it is evident that all mitigating evidence was

considered, trial court is not required to discuss each p iece of such evidence). Ultimately,

this Court must assess whether t he Ariz ona Supreme Court’s conclusion–that the trial

court considered all proffered mitigation evidence–was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of the principles set forth in Lockett and Eddings.

In Arizona, sentencing court s have been instructed that if mitigation does not rise

to t he level of a statutory mitigating circumstance, relevant mitigation must be considered

as non-statutory mitigation in order t o determine whether the defendant should be treated

with leniency. See State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 102, 664 P.2d 637, 646 (1983). In the

special verdict, in addition to finding that Petitioner experienced alcohol dep endance and

mixed substance abuse as non-statutory mit igat ing factors, the sentencing court stated

that it considered these mitigating factors as well as all those listed in Petitioner’s

sentencing memorandum. (ROA 137 at 8.) Petitioner’s allegations of intoxicat ion at the

time of the crime were argued to the sentencing court in his sentencing memorandum. (Id.)

Thus, the sentencing record demonstrates that the sentencing court as well as the Arizona

Supreme Court were able to and did consider Petitioner’s intoxication evidence as nonstat utory mitigation. See Schurz, 176 Ariz. at 55-57, 859 P.2d at 165-67. The Arizona

Supreme Court’s conclusion – that the trial court considered all proffered mitigation

evidence – was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the principles set forth

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in Lockett and Eddings. Claim 5(B) is meritless; Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

(e) Claim 6 The Disparity Between Petitioner’s Sentence and that

of Patrick Allison Violates the 8th Amendment

Because the Death Penalty May Not Be Imposed in an

Arbitrary and Capricious Manner

Petitioner argues that his deat h sentence is arbitrary and capricious under the 8th

Amendment because of the disparity between the death sentence he received and the

sentence received by his co-defendant, Patrick Allison. 

In Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1984), the Court held that the 8th Amendment

does not require a state appellate court to determine whether the death sentence imposed

is proportional to t hat imposed in other similar cases. The Court further stated that states

that did provide comparative proportionality review did so as an additional safeguard

against allowing an arbitrary and capricious death sentence to stand, not because such

comparative review was const itutionally mandated. Id. at 50; see also Walton v. Arizona,

497 U.S. 639, 655-56 (1990) (stating that, after review of Arizona’s death penalty

procedures, comparative proportionality is not constitutionally required in Arizona).

Under the AEDPA, Claim 6 is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent because the Supreme Court has st at ed that there is no federal

constitutional right to comparative proportionality review. Consequently, this claim is

meritless. Amendment to reamend this claim would be futile and is, therefore, denied. 

(f) Claim 8: Petitioner’s 6th Amendment Right to Confront

Witnesses and his 5th and 14th Amendment Right to

Due Process was Violated

Petitioner argues t hat the trial court violated his 6th Amendment right to confront

witnesses and his 14th Amendment right to due process when the trial court overruled

defense counsel’s object ion and allowed Patrick Allison to testify regarding a statement

Petitioner allegedly made to Julie Moore. At trial, the prosecution elicited testimony from

Patrick Allison, who testified that he overheard Petitioner tell Moore that “[the victim]

wouldn’t give me the money or the beer so I burned him.” (R.T. 6/6/90 at 107.) 

On federal habeas review, the Court may only consider whether Petitioner’s

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conviction violated the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 67; Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 1997). A state court’s evidentiary

ruling may be grounds for habeas relief only if it renders the state proceeding so

fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75; Bueno v. Hallahan,

988 F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1993). 

In this case, the challenged out-of-court statement was made by Petitioner himself,

which makes the statement an admission of a party opponent, which is not hearsay . See

Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Since the out-of-court statement was made by Petitioner

himself, he can claim no confront ation claim violation. See United States v. Moran, 759

F.2d 777, 786 (9th Cir. 1985). Similarly, regarding the state court ruling, admission of the

statement creates no fundamental unfairness under the Due Process Clause of the 14th

Amendment which would be grounds for habeas relief. Consequently, this claim is

meritless. Amendment to reamend this claim would be futile and is, therefore, denied.

(g) Claim 9(F): Petitioner was Denied Effectiv e Assistance of Counsel

at Trial: Trial Counsel was Ineffective by Failing to

Prevent Admission of Hearsay Statements of Julie

Moore; Failure to Request Rule 104 Hearing; Failure

to Follow Up Impeachment of Patrick Allison

Claim 9(G): Petitioner was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel

at Trial: Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to

Call Julie Moore to Rebut any Claims that Petitioner

made Inculpatory Statements

Claim 9(H): Petitioner was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel

at Trial: Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to

Preclude or Rebut the Testimony of Criminalist Greg

Ballard and for Retaining His Own Expert to do so.

Claim 9(I): Petitioner was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel

at Trial: Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to

Test Petitioner’s Blood for Alcohol Levels.

In Claim 9, Petitioner asserts various IAC allegations that occurred during the guilt

phase of his trial. IAC at the trial phase of a capital case is not an issue where the Court

encount ers a paucity of legal authority in the Ninth Circuit. Due to the importance of

effective counsel and the severity of the penalty at issue, the Ninth Circuit has frequently

addressed this issue and on numerous occasions granted habeas relief. See, e.g., Daniels

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v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005); Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th Cir.

2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796 (9th Cir.

2002); Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2002); Jones v. Wood, 207 F. 3d 557 (9th Cir.

2000); Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). Reviewing the allegations set fort h in

the Lodged Petition, t he Court cannot summarily conclude that Petitioner’s IAC claims are

facially meritless. Accordingly, t he Court will allow Claims 9(F)-9(I) to be reamended into

the petition and will order supplemental briefing on the merits. 

(h) Claim 10(C): Petitioner was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel

at Sentencing: Trial Counsel was Ineffective for

Failing to Adequately Prepare His Mental Health

Expert to Assist in Petitioner’s Case for Life

In Claim 10(C), Petitioner asserts an IAC allegation that occurred during the

sentencing phase of his trial. Due to the importance of effective counsel and t he severity

of the penalty at issue, the Ninth Circuit has frequently addressed this issue and has

frequent ly granted habeas relief. See, e.g., Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005);

Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th

Cir. 2002); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Ainsworth v.

Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2001); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000).

Reviewing the allegations set forth in the Lodged Petition, the Court cannot summarily

conclude that this IAC claim is facially meritless. Accordingly, the Court will allow Claim

10(C) to be reamended into the petition and will order supplemental briefing on the merit s.

(i) Claim 14: The Trial Court Erred in Allowing Introduction

of Prejudicial Bad Act Testimony in Violation of

the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendment

Petitioner alleges t hat the trial court’s admission of certain bad act testimony under

Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b) violated his right s under the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments.

Petitioner contends that the trial court should not have allowed the State to introduce

evidence that (1) prior to the homicide, Petitioner robbed Marcella Bonito of her beer, and

(2) after the homicide, in the course of a robbery, Petitioner held a lit cigarette lighter up to

the face of a man who picked up Petitioner, Patrick Allison and Julie M oore in his car. (Dkt.

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120 at Ex. 2 at 92-93.) Petitioner contends that admission of such evidence denied him a

fundamentally fair trial.

A federal habeas court is prohibited from reviewing whether “other crimes”

evidence was properly admitted by the state trial court pursuant to Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b),

which is a matter of state evidentiary law. See Jammal v. Van DeKamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20

(9th Cir. 1991). The issue is not whether introduction of the evidence violated state law

evidentiary principles, but whether the trial court committed an error which rendered the

trial so fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process. Id. at 20.

The United States Supreme Court has narrowly defined the cat egory of infractions

that violate the due process test of fundament al unfairness. See Dowling v. United States,

493 U.S. 342, 352-54 (1990). In Dowling, the Supreme Court suggested that evidentiary

rulings regarding 404(b)-type evidence do not implicate federal due process concerns. Id.

T he Dowling Court declined to hold that evidence of other crimes or wrongs was so

extremely unfair that its admission violated fundamental conceptions of justice, especially

when the trial court issued a limiting instruction to guard against p ossible misuse of such

evidence. Id.; see also Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 & n.5. There is no clearly established

Supreme Court precedent holding that a state violat es fundamental fairness if it admits

propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts evidence. Absent such authority,

habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal

ground” on a const it ut ional principle advanced by a petitioner. See Williams, 529 U.S. at

381.

Even if such Supreme Court p recedent existed, however, the trial court in this case

issued a limiting instruction to guard against any misuse of the admitted evidence. (See

R.T. 6/8/90 at 78; ROA 99 at 4.) Absent Supreme Court authority to the contrary, Claim 14

is meritless on its face; amendment to reamend this claim would be futile and is, therefore,

denied.

2. Lodged Petition Claim 10(A) and 10(B)

In the third PCR, Petitioner neither attempted to exhaust Lodged Petit ion Claim 10(A)

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(sentencing counsel’s submission of the mitigation report of Dr. Donald Tatro was

presumptively prejudicial) nor 10(B) (sent encing counsel was IAC for submitting to the

court the mitigation report of Dr. Donald Tatro). Therefore, Claims 10(A) and 10(B) remain

procedurally barred. (Dkt. 29 at 39-41.)

3. Lodged Petition Claim 12

In the third PCR, Petitioner did attempt to exhaust the claim that cumulative IAC

errors on the part of counsel, even if they do not merit relief individually, entitle him to

relief. (Dkt. 116 at 66-67.) The PCR court summarily dismissed this claim as not assert ing

a ground for which successive PCR relief is available. (Dkt. 116 at 309.) Based on the

summary dismissal, Respondents contend that Claim 12 continues to be procedurally

barred, as this Court earlier determined. (Dkt. 123 at 18-19 (referencing dkt. 29 at 41).)

Under Arizona law, the initial and any successive PCR are commenced by the filing

of a notice of PCR. Rule 32.4(a), Ariz . R. Crim. P. However, different procedural rules

govern an init ial PCR proceeding from a successive PCR proceeding. Successive PCR

rules only allow certain exceptional claims to be filed. Id. T hese include matters such as

newly discovered evidence, a significant change in the law or evidence of actual

innocence. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e)-(h). In order to ensure that successive PCRs are

only utilized in exceptional circumstances, the successive not ice of PCR, “must set forth

the substance of the specific exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in the

previous p et it ion or in a timely manner. If the specific exception and meritorious reasons

do not appear substantiating the claim and indicat ing why the claim was not stated in the

previous petition or in a timely manner, the notice shall be summarily dismissed.” Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.2(b).

A claim is procedurally defaulted if it was raised in state court but found by that

court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Regarding

Claim 12, the state court did not reach the merit s of this claim but, based on Arizona’s Rule

32.2(b), summarily dismissed it on state procedural grounds. (Dkt. 116 at 309.) See State

v. Rosales, 205 Ariz. 86, 90, 66 P.3d 1263, 1267 (App. 2003) (construing Rule 32.2(b) and

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stating t hat if a trial court is presented with a successive notice of PCR in which no claim

under Rule 32.1(d) through (h) is articulat ed, the court should summarily dismiss the

notice). Regarding Claim 12, the PCR court expressly dismissed this claim; it is

procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 116 at 309.)

Petitioner contends that the state court’s summary dismissal of this claim is

insufficient to foreclose federal review. (Dkt . 127 at 4-10, 15.) Petitioner’s summary

contention must be rejected. Claim 12 is procedurally defaulted. The Court has already

provided an opportunity and determined that Petitioner’s cause and prejudice/fundamental

miscarriage of justice arguments do not overcome any procedural default. (Dkt. 29 at 41.)

Claim 12 is procedurally barred. 

4. Lodged Petition Claim 13

In Petitioner’s third PCR, he attempted to exhaust a claim of IAC of appellate

counsel. (Dkt . 116 at 64-65.) However, he failed to allege any factual basis for this claim

to the Arizona Supreme Court; rather, he only st at ed a generic allegation of appellate IAC.

(Dkt. 113 at 41.) Consequently, Petitioner failed to fairly p resent his appellate counsel IAC

claim. 

Allegat ions of IAC constitute separate claims, each of which must be exhausted in

state court. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (stating that a petitioner

making an IAC claim must identify the particular acts or omissions of counsel that are

alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment). The Ninth

Circuit has confirmed that a generic IAC claim is insufficient to exhaust particular IAC

allegations. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Thus, in

order to exhaust specific IAC allegations, Pet it ioner needed to fairly present those

allegations to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351

(2004) (stating that explicit fair p resentation must be made not only to the trial or postconviction court, but to the state’s highest court). 

In Arizona, in a petition for review arising from the denial of post-conviction relief,

state rules require the petitioner to identify both the issues and the material facts for the

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appellate court’s consideration. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(i-ii). Further, the petition for

review may not utilize incorp orat ion by reference to present issues for review; rather, in the

petition, the petitioner must present both argument and fact s in sup port of the claims for

which review is sought. Id. 32.9(c)(1)(iv). An appendix may only be utiliz ed t o provide the

appellate court with the trial record of the issues. Id. 

Here, Petitioner did not present any allegations of ap p ellat e IAC in his petition for

review. (Dkt. 113 at 41.) Based on this record, Petitioner failed to exhaust appellate IAC

allegat ions to the Arizona Supreme Court. If Petitioner were to return to state court now

and attempt to litigate Claim 13, it would be found waived and untimely under Rules

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does not fall

within an exception to preclusion. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, the

claim is “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted because Petitioner no longer

has an available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. The Court has already

provided an opportunity for Petitioner’s cause and prejudice/fundamental miscarriage of

justice arguments. (Dkt. 19 at 48-50.) Such arguments do not overcome any procedural

default. Claim 13 is procedurally barred. 

C. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration from Denial of Evidentiary Hearing

Motions for reconsideration are appropriate only in rare circumstances. Sullivan v.

Faras-RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 305, 308-09 (D. Ariz. 1992). 

The motion to reconsider would be appropriat e where, for example, the court

has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the

adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, or has made an error

not of reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis for a motion to

reconsider would be a controlling or significant change in the law or facts

since the submission of the issue to the court. Such problems rarely arise

and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.

Above the Belt, Inc. v. M el Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983); see

also Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). A motion

for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court “to rethink what the court had

already thought through -- rightly or wrongly.” Above the Belt, Inc., 99 F.R.D. at 101.

Such arguments should be directed to the court of appeals. Sullivan, 795 F. Supp. at 308.

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First, Petitioner requests that if the Court allows amendment of claims to his habeas

petition, he should also be allowed to submit a supplemental motion for discovery and

evidentiary hearing regarding such claims. (Dkt. 131 at 2-4.) The Court agrees and will

authorize such briefing. 

Next, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), Petitioner requests the Court to reconsider

diligence conclusions regarding the actions of PCR counsel during his first PCR in

developing the factual basis of Claim 9, which raised allegat ions of IAC at his trial. (Dkt.

131 at 4.) Petitioner reargues that the short time frame allowed to prepare his first PCR

petition result ed in PCR counsel not requesting appropriate investigative assistance. (Id.)

The Court denies this contention for the reasons previously stated. (Dkt. 128 at 6-8.) 

Next, based on Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2005), Petitioner argues

that PCR counsel did not request investigative assistance to develop Claim 9 because his

direct appeal and first PCR counsel were one and the same att orney and such counsel

could not raise appellate IAC claims due to a conflict of interest . (Dkt. 131 at 4-5.)

Moormann is not pert inent ; in Claim 9, the Court evaluated Petitioner’s diligence in

developing the factual basis of his claim that trial counsel rendered IAC at trial and

sentencing, not appellate IAC allegations. 

Next, Petitioner reargues that he diligently attempted to develop the factual bases

of Claims 10(A) and 10(B) in st ate court. (Dkt. 131 at 5-9.) The Court denies this

contention for the reasons previously stated. (Dkt. 128 at 8-18.)

Next, Petit ioner argues that IAC of PCR counsel should not be attributable to him.

(Dkt. 131 at 9-11.) A mot ion for reconsideration is not an appropriate time to raise new legal

argument s. Regardless, allegations of IAC of PCR counsel cannot result in an independent

const it ut ional violation. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755. There is no constitutional right to

counsel in state PCR proceedings. See Pennyslvania v. Finley , 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987);

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1989) (stating that the Constitution does not require

states to p rovide Counsel in PCR proceedings even when the petitioner is facing the death

penalty). Thus, absent a constitutional right to counsel during PCR proceedings, attorney

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error is attributable to Petitioner. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).

Finally, Petitioner reargues that even if he was not diligent, he is still entitled to a

hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B). (Dkt. 131 at 11-12.) This argument is

rejected for the same reasons previously stated. (Dkt. 128 at 18-19.) 

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes t hat Petitioner’s renewed motion to amend his Amended

Petition is denied as to the following claims: Lodged Pet it ion Claims 11(B), 11(D) and 16-27

are denied as time barred; Lodged Petition Claims 10(A), 10(B), 12, and 13 are denied as

procedurally barred; and Lodged Petition Claims 1-3, 6, 8, 14 and 15 are meritless, therefore

it would be futile to reamend these claims into the Amended Petition. The Court further

concludes that Claims 5(A) and 5(B) are denied on the merits. Petit ioner’s renewed motion

to amend is granted as to Lodged Petition Claims 9(F)-9(I), 10(C), 11(A) and 11(C); these

claims will be briefed on the merits and addressed in a future order. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pet itioner’s renewed motion for leave to file

Amended Petition (dkt. 120) is GRANTED IN PART, with respect to Lodged Pet ition

Claims 9(F)-9(I), 10(C), 11(A) and 11(C), and DENIED IN PART, as to Lodged Petition

Claims 1-3, 6, 8, 10(A), 10(B), 11(B), 11(D), and 12-27.

 IT IS FURTHER O RDERED that Claims 5(A) and 5(B) are denied on the merits and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that t he Clerk of the Court shall file Petitioner’s Lodged

Petition, which was lodged on August 26, 2004, and rename it “Second Amended Petit ion.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no lat er t han forty-five (45) days following the

filing the filing of the Second Amended Petition, Petitioner shall file a memorandum

regarding the merits of Claims 9(F)-9(I), 10(C), 11(A) and 11(C) (“Supplemental Merits

Brief”). The Merits Brief shall specifically ident ify and apply appropriate AEDPA

standards of review as to each claim for relief, not simply restate facts and argument

contained in the Lodged Amended Pet it ion. Petitioner shall also identify in the

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Supplemental Merit s Brief: (1) each claim for which further evidentiary development is

sought; (2) the facts or evidence sought t o be discovered, expanded or presented at an

evidentiary hearing; (3) why such evidence was not developed in st at e court; and (4) why

the failure to develop the claim in state court was not the result of lack of diligence, in

accordance with the Sup reme Court’s decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than forty-five (45) days following the

filing of the Merits Brief, Respondents shall file a Response (“Supplemental Merits

Response”).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than thirty (30) days following t he filing

of Respondents’ Supplemental Merits Response, Petitioner may file a Supplemental Reply.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(g), Petitioner or

Respondents file a M ot ion for Reconsideration of this Order, such motion shall be filed

wit hin fifteen (15) days of the filing of this Order. The filing and disposition of such mot ion

shall not toll the time for the filing of the Supplemental Merits Brief, Sup p lemental

Response or Supplemental Reply as scheduled in this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

(Dkt. 131.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a courtesy copy of this

Order to the Clerk of the Ariz ona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, Arizona

85007-3329.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2006.

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