Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01271/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01271-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN C. OYARZO and NICHOLAS 

HART,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TUOLUMNE FIRE DISTRICT, KENNETH 

HOCKETT, and TONEY POWERS,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:11-cv-01271-SAB

ORDER RE DAMAGES

(ECF Nos. 224-227)

I.

INTRODUCTION

A jury trial commenced in this action on December 3, 2013. Following the presentation 

of evidence and closing argument by the parties, the jury returned verdicts for Plaintiff Oyarzo 

and against Defendant Tuolumne Fire District in the amount of $12,345.67 for failure to pay all 

wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”); and for Plaintiff Hart and against 

Defendant Kenneth Hockett in the amount of $290,767,00 for retaliation in violation of the First 

Amendment and punitive damages in the amount of $1.00, and against Defendant Tuolumne Fire 

District for threatening Plaintiff Hart with punitive action during an investigation in violation of 

the California Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights (“FPBR”). On December 19, 2013 the 

parties filed briefs regarding Plaintiff Oyarzo and Hart’s damages. 

Case 1:11-cv-01271-SAB Document 236 Filed 01/06/14 Page 1 of 6
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There are two issue of damages still to be resolved by the Court: 1) what amount of 

liquidated damages, if any, should be awarded to Plaintiff Oyarzo for the violation of the FLSA; 

and 2) whether Plaintiff Hart may obtain injunctive relief for the violation of the FPBR. A 

hearing was held on December 20, 2013 to allow counsel for the parties to argue these issues. 

Counsel Shannon Seibert and Joseph Bautista appeared for Plaintiffs Hart and Oyarzo and 

counsel Anthony Abbott appeared for Defendants Tuolumne Fire District and Hockett. Having 

considered the evidence presented at trial, the briefs filed by the parties, and the argument during 

the December 20, 2013 hearing, the following order issues.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Liquidated Damages

Where an employer fails to pay overtime wages in violation for the FLSA, the employer 

is liable to the employee for an additional amount of damages equal to the unpaid overtime as 

liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Liquidated damages are not a penalty, but are 

compensation to the employee. Chao v. A-One Medical Services, Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 920 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

“If the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise 

to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or 

omission was not a violation of the [FLSA] . . . the court may, in its sound discretion, award no 

liquidated damages or” award a lessor amount. 29 U.S.C. § 260. “Double damages are the 

norm, single damages the exception. . . .” Local 246 Util. Workers Union v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 

83 F.3d 292, 297 (9th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). 

“An employer has the burden of showing that the violation of the [FLSA] was in good 

faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that no violation took place. 

Absent such a showing, liquidated damages are mandatory.” Bratt v. County of Los Angeles, 

912 F.2d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. First 

Citizens Bank, 758 F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir.)). The requirement of good faith and reasonable 

grounds has both a subjective and objective component. Bratt, 912 F.2d at 1072-73. To satisfy 

Case 1:11-cv-01271-SAB Document 236 Filed 01/06/14 Page 2 of 6
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the subjective component that it acted in good faith, the employer must show that it had “an 

honest intention to ascertain what [the FLSA] requires and to act in accordance with it.” Id. at 

1072 (citations omitted). The subjective component is not at issue here. The objective 

component requires the employer to show reasonable grounds for believing that its conduct 

complies with the FLSA. Id.

The legislative history of the Portal Act makes it clear that the employer's ‘good 

faith’ is not to be determined merely from the actual state of his mind. Statements 

made in the House and Senate indicate that ‘good faith’ also depends upon an 

objective test—whether the employer, in acting or omitting to act as he did, and in 

relying upon the regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, administrative 

practice or enforcement policy, acted as a reasonably prudent man would have 

acted under the same or similar circumstances. ‘Good faith’ requires that the 

employer have honesty of intention and no knowledge of circumstances which 

ought to put him upon inquiry.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.15(a) (footnotes omitted). “The 

‘good faith’ defense is not available to an employer unless the acts or omissions 

complained of were ‘in conformity with’ the regulation, order, ruling, approval, 

interpretation, administrative practice or enforcement policy upon which he 

relied. This is true even though the employer erroneously believes he conformed 

with it and in good faith relied upon it; actual conformity is necessary.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 790.14(a) (footnote omitted).

Ketchum v. City of Vallejo, 523 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1158 n.12 (E.D. Cal. 2007).

Defendants base their argument on the unusual employment relationship which resulted 

in Plaintiff Oyarzo being responsible for payroll and verifying that payroll records are correct. 

(Def. Tuolumne Fire District’s Mem. of P. & A. re Liquidated Damages 3-4, ECF No. 227.) 

While the Court understands Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff Oyarzo was responsible for 

ensuring that payroll records were correct, in considering whether Defendants have proved that 

there were reasonable grounds for believing that their conduct complied with the FLSA, the issue 

is whether TFD conformed with the FLSA. Management has a duty to exercise control to see 

that work is not performed that it does not want performed and cannot sit back and accept the 

benefits without compensating the employee for time worked. 29 C.F.R. § 785.13. Defendants’ 

are arguing that Plaintiff Oyarzo was responsible for ensuring that time records were correct and 

they were therefore unaware that he was not reporting all overtime hours that he worked. 

However, the jury has found that TFD either knew or should have known that Plaintiff 

Oyarzo was working overtime hours for which he was not compensated. During the trial of this 

matter, Plaintiff Oyarzo presented evidence that he was at the fire station working consecutive 

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forty-eight hour shifts. Further, the Directors received monthly budget reports that did not reflect 

an increase in expenditures to indicate that Plaintiff Oyarzo was receiving payment for these 

hours worked. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that 

TFD should have known that Plaintiff Oyarzo was working hours for which he was not 

compensated. While the employer/employee relationship was different than those usually found 

in FSLA cases due to the duties assigned to Plaintiff Oyarzo to ensure accuracy of employment 

times for its employees, Defendant TFD did not seek to establish procedures by which the Board 

was to ensure the accuracy of Plaintiff Oyarzo’s time and that he was in fact being compensated 

for hours he worked. Accordingly, defendants cannot assert a good faith belief that they were 

complying with the FLSA if they should have been aware that Plaintiff Oyarzo was working 

hours for which he was not being compensated.

Defendants have not met their burden of showing reasonable grounds for believing that 

the failure to pay overtime complied with the FLSA.1 Therefore, liquidated damages are 

awarded in the amount of $12,345.67.

B. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff Hart seeks an injunction enjoining Defendant TFD from violating the FPBR by 

threatening punitive action against firefighters during investigations.2 Defendants contend that 

Plaintiff Hart does not have the standing to seek such relief and has failed to meet the elements 

required for issuance of the requested relief. 

For each form of relief sought in federal court, the plaintiff must establish standing. 

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citation omitted); Mayfield v. 

 

1 While the purpose of liquidated damages is not punitive, the Court believes that awarding double damages in this 

action does appear to be unduly punitive given the state of the economy and the rate of return during this period of 

time. However, the Court is aware that Congress mandated double damages in the form of liquidated damages to 

compensate the employee for the employer’s failure to pay wages. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (“Any employer who violates 

the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the 

amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an 

additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”). The Court lacks discretion to order a reduced amount of damages 

absent Defendants meeting their burden of showing a reasonable grounds for believing the failure to pay overtime 

complied with the FLSA. 28 U.S.C. § 260.

2 Originally, Plaintiff Hart also sought an order requiring Defendant to remove the records of discussion from his 

personnel file. The parties have resolved this issue and therefore, the Court shall not address it in this order. 

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United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “Standing under Article III 

of the Constitution requires that an injury be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; 

fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Monsanto Co. v. 

Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010). 

Plaintiff argues that California courts have held that that an injunction must issue when 

there has been a violation of the FPBR. (Briefing re Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights and 

Pl. Hart’s Request for Injunctive Relief 2-3, ECF No. 225.) However, in Hangarter v. Provident 

Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit considered whether a 

plaintiff in Federal Court must meet the Article III standing requirement to receive injunctive 

relief for his state law claims. Id. at 1021-22. In Hangarter, the district court issued a permanent 

injunction requiring the defendant to refrain from future violations of the Unfair Competition Act

(“UCA”). Id. at 1003, 1021. Although the district court found that defendants had violated the 

UCA, because the plaintiff had no contractual relationship with the defendants, she was not 

personally threatened by their conduct. Id. at 1022. The Ninth Circuit found that the district 

court erred in concluding that the plaintiff had standing to pursue injunctive relief. Id. at 1021. 

Similarly here, Plaintiff Hart is no longer employed with TFD. Although Plaintiff Hart 

argued at the December 20, 2013 hearing that he works as a relief firefighter at a different fire 

district and may in the future work on a strike team with the TFD, this is speculative. Since 

Plaintiff Hart is no longer employed by TFD, he does not show a real or immediate threat of 

irreparable injury and cannot demonstrate the requisite injury to establish Article III standing. 

Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1022. Plaintiff Hart does not have standing to receive the requested 

equitable relief, and therefore, the request for an injunction under the FPBR is denied.

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III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff Oyarzo is awarded liquidated damages in the amount of $12,345.67 

against Defendant Tuolumne Fire District; and 

2. Plaintiff Hart’s request for a permanent injunction is denied for lack of standing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 6, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:11-cv-01271-SAB Document 236 Filed 01/06/14 Page 6 of 6