Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06409/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06409-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

JOSEPH THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHREE JALARAM LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06409-LB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 62

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Joseph Thomas, who is representing himself, filed a complaint against the 

defendants based on allegedly unsanitary and untenable conditions at the National Budget Hotel, 

where he lived.1 He also alleged discriminatory practices by the owners and operators of the Hotel 

and retaliation against him for lodging complaints about the building.2

Defendants Balwantsinh Thakor, Kirasinh Thakor, and Shree Jalaram Lodging LP 

(erroneously sued as Shree Jalaram LLC) (collectively, the “Shree Jalaram defendants”) move to 

dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).3 They 

 

1 Third Amended Compl. (“TAC”) – ECF No. 46. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case 

File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.

2

Id.

3 Mot. – ECF No. 62.

Case 3:18-cv-06409-LB Document 82 Filed 08/01/19 Page 1 of 17
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 2

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argue that the plaintiff’s claims against them should be dismissed because (1) the plaintiff released 

all claims against them when he signed two settlement agreements with the parties and (2) the

claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because each of his claims was either settled or 

litigated, or should have been raised in the previous proceedings.4 They also seek an injunction to 

enforce the covenant not to sue in the earlier settlement agreements.5

Under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the court can decide the motion without oral argument. The 

court finds that the plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are barred by the plain terms of the 

settlement agreements and the doctrine of res judicata and grants the motion to dismiss.

STATEMENT6

The plaintiff moved into the National Hotel Budget Inn (“the Hotel”) in San Francisco, 

California in November 2012.7 The Hotel “ was overrun with bedbugs, roaches, mice, and rats. 

Every toilet and shower leaked or was inoperable, the heat did not work properly, and windows 

were missing.”8 The plaintiff “filed scores of complaints with [the] Department of Building 

Inspection and the Department of Public Health between 2014 and 2018.”

9

In July 2015, he was 

“the lead Plaintiff” in a lawsuit about “habitability issues” at the Hotel.10 The other plaintiffs were 

Jeffrey Scarcello, Ty Cook, and Christopher Soots.11 In October 2016, he settled the suit with 

 

4

Id. at 14–21. 

5

Id. at 6.

6 The facts are from the allegations in the amended complaint, documents attached to the complaint, 

and documents submitted by the defendants in a declaration and in a request for judicial notice. The 

court considers the first settlement agreement under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine and takes 

judicial notice of the public records. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2005); Lee v. 

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

7 TAC – ECF No. 46 at 4 (¶ 6).

8

Id.

9

Id.

10 Id. Thomas v. Thakor, et al, San Francisco Superior Court No. CGC-15-547763 (October 2016 

Settlement Agreement, Ex. B to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 7).

11 See October 2016 Settlement Agreement, Ex. B to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 7 (¶ 1).

Case 3:18-cv-06409-LB Document 82 Filed 08/01/19 Page 2 of 17
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 3

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Balwantsinh “Bill” Thakor.12 The settlement “stipulated [that] PLAINTIFFS would pay no rent

until the City and County of San Francisco had approved all of the repairs and remodeling.”13

The October 2016 Settlement Agreement listed the “released parties” as follows:

Balwantsinh Thakor, Lataban Thakor, Kirasinh Thakor and Shree Jalaram Lodging 

LP dba Budget Inn including, but not limited to, their respective current and former 

partners, owners, co-owners, principals, managers, associates, predecessors, 

subsidiaries, successors, assigns, heirs, employees, independent contractors, 

subcontractors, agents, representatives, officers, directors, parent entities, affiliated 

entities, predecessor entities, successor entities, insurers, members, and attorneys.

14

Under the agreement, the defendants agreed to pay $300,000 to the plaintiffs.15 They also 

agreed not to collect new rents from the claimants in the suit “until after CCSF signoff of the 

remodel work presently being completed.”16 Mr. Thomas agreed to “promptly withdraw” his 

appeals regarding the work permits and to “take no other steps to obstruct the completion of the 

bathroom and other upgrades to the Budget Inn.”17

The Agreement contained the following mutual release:

CLAIMANTS hereby release and forever discharge the RELEASED PARTIES of 

and from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, liens, . . . damages, 

any sanctions awarded by any court against RELEASED PARTIES related to the 

SUBJECT ACTION, losses, costs, attorney’s fees and expenses of every kind or 

nature whatsoever, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, fixed or 

contingent, which they may now have, against the RELEASED PARTIES by reason 

of any matter, cause, or thing arising out of or connected with their occupancy, as 

tenants, guests, or otherwise, at the premises commonly known as the Budget Inn, 

1139 Market Street, San Francisco, California, any injury to or damages of 

CLAIMANTS occurring at or arising out of said premises, or by reason of any 

matter, cause or thing arising out of or connected with any landlord tenant 

relationship existing between the RELEASED PARTIES, or any one of them, and 

the CLAIMANTS, or any one of them, at any time. The subject matter of this 

released includes without limitation or exclusion any and all causes of action, actions, 

claims or demands, known or unknown, of CLAIMANTS existing or accruing at any 

 

12 TAC – ECF No. 46 at 4 (¶ 7).

13 Id.

14 October 2016 Settlement Agreement, Ex. B to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 7 (¶ 2).

15 Id. at 8 (¶ 6).

16 Id. at 19 (¶ 29).

17 Id. (¶ 30).

Case 3:18-cv-06409-LB Document 82 Filed 08/01/19 Page 3 of 17
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 4

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time against the RELEASED PARTIES up to the effective date of this Agreement, 

including but not limited to those alleged in the SUBJECT ACTION. CLAIMANTS 

are not releasing future claims or damages as they relate to any harm suffered for 

actions or inactions of RELEASED PARTIES which take place after execution of 

the release.18

The Agreement contained the following provision:

(24) Covenants Not to Sue To the extent allowed by law, in consideration for the 

matters stated herein, CLAIMANTS hereby covenant and agree never to commence 

or in any manner prosecute against RELEASED PARTIES or any master tenant any 

legal action or other proceeding based in whole or in part upon any of the claims, 

demands, causes of action, obligations, damages, or liabilities released herein for:

a) Those matters alleged or that could have been alleged in San Francisco County 

Superior Court case Number CGC-15-547763 up to the Effective Date of this 

Agreement; and

b) In the event that repair or renovations of the Budget Inn renders any 

CLAIMANT’S unit temporarily uninhabitable, the current owners agree to abide by 

the temporary relocation provisions of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance. During 

any such temporary relocation, all work shall be performed in a workmanlike and 

non-negligent manner.19

In December, 2016, Tenderloin Housing Clinics (“THC”) took over the management of the 

Hotel and converted it into “supportive housing.”20 Mr. Thomas alleges that the THC clients 

brought “needles, sexual liaisons, bedbugs, roaches, noise, dogs, and visitors” to the building and 

turned it into a “safe-injection site.”21 Mr. Thomas asked THC “about housing in a building that 

wasn’t ‘supportive housing;’ but THC never responded.”22 He alleges that THC “has a history of 

churning tenants in order to get higher rents.”23 The plaintiff’s “quiet enjoyment of the premises” 

lasted one month before the THC clients moved in.24

 

18 Id. at 10–11 (¶ 8(a)).

19 Id. at 17–18 (¶ 24).

20 TAC – ECF No. 46 at 4 (¶ 8).

21 Id.

22 Id. at 9 (¶ 18).

23 Id. at 5 (¶ 10).

24 Id. at 4 (¶ 9).

Case 3:18-cv-06409-LB Document 82 Filed 08/01/19 Page 4 of 17
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 5

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Between February and August 2017, the plaintiff was “forced to leave the building for weeks 

or months at a time” because of “noise and unsanitary conditions.”25 He alleges that THC 

“continued the remodeling work, using unlicensed contractors and unskilled labor.”26 His 

complaints to THC went unheeded.27 The plaintiff listed the following “violations” that occurred 

between January and September 2017:

Broken light fixtures, less than required number of ceiling fans, smoke alarms not 

working properly, fire alarms not working properly, security system frequently 

malfunctions, heat cannot be regulated by tenants or staff, inadequate heat, heat not 

turned on, thermostat does not work, insufficient hot water, inadequate water 

pressure, rust/discoloration in water, inadequate drainage, toilet leaks, shower leak, 

feces on toilets, walls, floors, door handles and light switches, showers dirty/no 

curtains, no mats in bathrooms, dog waste in the halls and stairways, flooring 

dislodged, floors and stairs filthy, windows do not open or close, windows have no 

screen, front door often does not close securely, stairways and halls dirty, dust 

accumulation, walkways and stairways have trop hazards, laundry room dirty, 

inadequate trash and recycling bins/pickup, rodents, cockroaches, bedbugs, spiders, 

flies/mosquitoes, fleas, mold/mildew, tobacco and “crack” smoke from tenants in 

building, drug trafficking on the premises, “activity” in halls all night, syringes left 

in common areas, criminal acts by other tenants, prostitution in the building, moving 

contaminated items through the building without containment, and no rear fire exit 

that can be used by most of the tenants.28

The plaintiff’s “complaints to DPH finally result[ed] in one tenant who was near death being 

relocated to a place he could receive proper care, and to DBI issuing Notices of Violation.”29 In 

July 2017 the plaintiff was “attacked by one of the janitors (Ricardo) working for THC, because 

[the] manager Mwangi Mukami told him [he] had complained about his work.”30

In September 2017 the plaintiff contacted California Senator Diane Feinstein’s office about 

conditions at the Hotel.31 The Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) 

 

25 Id. 

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 Id. at 5–6 (¶ 11).

29 Id.

30 Id. at 5 (¶ 10). 

31 Id. at 5–6 (¶ 11).

Case 3:18-cv-06409-LB Document 82 Filed 08/01/19 Page 5 of 17
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 6

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“conducted an investigation, but found nothing, despite” the conditions documented by the 

plaintiff.32 “Immediately after the HUD investigation,” the plaintiff received an eviction notice.33

In October 2017, Shree Jalaram Lodging LP filed an unlawful-detainer action against Mr. 

Thomas in San Francisco Superior Court.

34 The plaintiff “fought” the eviction, and the parties 

“reach[ed] a settlement where they [paid] him $30,000, and [he] agree[d] to leave by February 1, 

2018.”35 The Shree Jalaram defendants attached the November 2017 Settlement Agreement to 

their motion.

36 Pursuant to the agreement, Shree Jalaram would pay Mr. Thomas $30,000, with 

$10,000 payable within five days of the date of agreement.37 In return, Mr. Thomas agreed that he 

would vacate the unit by February 1, 2018.38 The agreement stated that if Mr. Thomas complied 

with his obligations under the agreement, Shree Jalaram would “waive all remaining accrued and 

unpaid rent and unlawful detainer damages” and would “tender the remaining $20,000 

immediately” to Mr. Thomas.39 The agreement contained a mutual release of all claims.40 The 

relevant portions of the release are as follows:

6) The parties expressly waive and relinquish any and all rights and benefits that they 

may have had under or which may be conferred upon them by the provisions of 

California Civil Code § 1542.41 In connection with such waiver and relinquishment, 

the Parties hereby acknowledge that they are aware that they or their attorneys may 

 

32 Id. In a “Determination of No Reasonable Cause,” Anne Quesada, Regional Director of the Office of 

Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, wrote that the department “investigated the complaint and [] 

determined that there is no reasonable cause to establish that” the defendants violated the Fair Housing 

Act. HUD Determination, Ex. A to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 4–5.

33 TAC – ECF No. 46 at 5–6 (¶ 11).

34 Shree Jalaram Lodging LP v. Joseph Thomas, San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CUD-17-

660071 (November 2017 Settlement Agreement, Ex. C to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 32, 33 (¶ 

2)).

35 TAC – ECF No. 46 at 5–6 (¶ 11).

36 November 2017 Settlement Agreement, Ex. C to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 32.

37 Id. at 34 (¶ 1(b)).

38 Id. (¶ 1(c)).

39 Id. at 37 (¶ 2(a)).

40 Id. at 38–40.

41 California Civil Code § 1542 provides the following: “A general release does not extend to claims 

that the creditor or releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of 

executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have materially affected his or her 

settlement with the debtor or released party.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1542.

Case 3:18-cv-06409-LB Document 82 Filed 08/01/19 Page 6 of 17
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 7

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discover claims or facts in addition to or different from those which they now know 

or believe to exist with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement, but that it is 

their intention to hereby fully, finally and forever settle and release all of the claims 

known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, which they now have or may have 

against each other concerning any subject matter whatsoever, except as provided 

hereinabove. In furtherance of such intention, the release herein given shall be and 

remain in effect notwithstanding the discovery of existence of such additional 

different claims or facts.

7) Except for their rights to enforce the terms of the Agreement and as provided 

hereinabove, the Parties hereby release and forever discharge each other, and their 

respective present and former agents, principals, attorneys, consultants, 

beneficiaries, heirs, successors, and assigns, jointly and individually, of and from any 

and all claims, demands, causes of action, obligations, damages, and liabilities which 

said Parties now have or could assert in any manner against any said persons or 

entities arising from or relating to Defendant’s occupancy of the Premises, with the 

express intention of effecting the legal consequences provided for under California 

Civil Code § 1541, the extinguishment of all obligations owed to the other Parties 

arising from or in connection with the matters released herein.

8) The Parties acknowledge that they have entered into this Agreement freely and 

voluntarily, and before they signed this Agreement, they have had the opportunity to 

seek advice from their own legal counsel concerning its provisions.42

On December 11, 2017, Mr. Thomas was awoken by “fighting words” at his door.43 Jeffrey 

Scarcello, another resident of the Hotel, was uttering racial and homophobic slurs at him through 

his door.44 Mr. Scarcello “incited the other tenants in the building by telling them the reason the 

heat wasn’t working properly is because ‘management was retaliating against the building’ on 

account of [the plaintiff’s] advisory to the tenants of their rights to safe and habitable living 

conditions.45 The plaintiff “felt threatened, and did everything possible to get Sarcello away from 

[his] door.”46 When the plaintiff eventually exited his room, “most of the mob [had] disappeared 

back into their rooms” but Mr. Sarcello was still there and “stood close enough so that spittle was 

sprayed into [the plaintiff’s] face.”47 “Half-asleep, and with [his adrenaline surging, all [the 

 

42 November 2017 Settlement Agreement, Ex. C to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 38–39 (¶¶ 6–8).

43 TAC – ECF No. 46 at 6 (¶ 13).

44 Id.

45 Id.

46 Id.

47 Id.

Case 3:18-cv-06409-LB Document 82 Filed 08/01/19 Page 7 of 17
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 8

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plaintiff] remember[s] is chasing him away from [his] room.”48 He called the SFPD, who told Mr. 

Scarcello to stay away from his door.49 The following day, the plaintiff “filled out a Tenant 

Communication form and addressed it to Mukami,” the manager of the building.

50

On January 18, 2018, the plaintiff was served with an order to appear in court “the next day.”51

He alleges that the desk clerk “‘forgot’ to give [him] the notice when it arrived.”52 The attorney 

representing Shree Jalaram and THC “would not tell [him] what the case was about, so [he] had no 

time to prepare a defense or find representation.”53 Shree Jalaram and THC claimed that he had 

“caused a disturbance, and therefore violated the Settlement Agreement” based on his altercation 

with Mr. Scarcello.54 Mr. Thomas alleges that “the evidence was manipulated to make it a appear 

a black man was assaulting a white man.”55 The court “voided the settlement agreement and, as a 

result, the plaintiff became “homeless and penniless.”56

Mr. Thomas alleges that “as of February 2018” the remodeling work on the Hotel was still not 

completed, “specifically the bathrooms in the Southwest corner of the building.”57

In March 2018 the plaintiff filed a second complaint with HUD.58 HUD “said that the 

videotape had no sound, so they were unable to hear anything that was said.”59 The video “did not 

show [Mr. Thomas’s] interactions with other tenants, which le[]d [him] to believe that the video 

 

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 Id.

51 Id. at 6–7 (¶ 14).

52 Id.

53 Id.

54 Id.

55 Id.

56 Id.

57 Id. at 4 (¶ 7).

58 Id. at 7 (¶ 15).

59 Id.

Case 3:18-cv-06409-LB Document 82 Filed 08/01/19 Page 8 of 17
ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 9

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[was] altered.”60 HUD denied his claim, but “indicated that [he] could sue in Federal Court for 

retaliation and habitability issues.”61 Mr. Thomas filed the instant lawsuit on October 19, 2018.62

The plaintiff’s operative complaint names Randall Shaw, Mwangi Mukami, Jeffrey Scarcello, 

Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. (“THC”), Balwantsinh D. Thakor, Kirasinh Thakor, and Shree 

Jalaram as defendants.

63 He brings five claims: (1) Violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1868 (18 

U.S.C. § 5245(B)(2) and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (28 U.S.C. § 994)

based on THC employees allegedly assaulting Mr. Thomas and directing racial slurs at him; (2) 

Violation of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617) based on alleged retaliation against 

Mr. Thomas after he raised issues regarding the conditions at the Hotel and discrimination against 

him; (3) Violation of the Housing and Community Development Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 5304) based 

on his not being offered a new lease in the Hotel (or alternative housing) after it changed 

ownership; (4) Violation of California Civil Code § 1941.1 based on the conditions in the Hotel 

being “untenable”; and (5) Violation of the California Health and Safety Code § 17920.3 also 

based on the alleged conditions at the Hotel.

64

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 

which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

 

60 Id.

61 Id.

62 Compl. – ECF No. 1.

63 TAC – ECF No. 46 at 1.

64 Id. at 7–13 (¶¶ 16–20). The first claim is against only the THC defendants, so the court does not 

address it here.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 10

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a claim for relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which 

when accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557).

“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the inartful pleading 

of pro se litigants. It is settled that the allegations [in a pro se complaint,] however inartfully 

pleaded[,] are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Eldridge 

v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th 

Cir. 2000); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2011).

If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “pleading could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 

848 F.3d 1161, 1182 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But “leave 

to amend may be denied when a plaintiff has demonstrated a ‘repeated failure to cure deficiencies 

by amendments previously allowed.’” Id. at 1183 (quoting Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 

316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 11

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ANALYSIS

The Shree Jalaram defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against them on the 

following grounds: (1) all of the plaintiff’s claims are covered by the release provisions in the 

settlement agreements and (2) the plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata.65 The plain terms of 

the October 2016 and November 2017 Settlement Agreements bar the plaintiff’s claims, and the 

claims are barred under principles of res judicata.

1. The Plaintiff Released His Claims Against the Shree Jalaram Defendants

“The construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of 

local law which apply to interpretation of contracts generally.” United Commercial Ins. Service, 

Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).

“According to the California Supreme Court, a release is the ‘abandonment, relinquishment or 

giving up or a right to the person against whom it might have been demanded or enforced . . . and 

its effect is to extinguish the cause of action.’” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 711 (1945)).; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1541 

(“An obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor, upon a 

new consideration, or in writing, with or without new consideration.”). “‘In general, a written 

release extinguishes any obligation covered by the release’s terms, provided it has not been

obtained by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence.’” Marder, 450 F.3d at 

449 (quoting Skrbina v. Fleming Cos., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1353 (1996)).

“The interpretation of a release is governed by the same principles applicable to any other 

contractual agreement.” Id. (citing Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 

1357 (2002)). “The court must interpret the [r]elease so as to give effect to the parties’ mutual 

intent as it existed when they contracted.” Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1636; Bank of the W. v. 

Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264–65 (1992)). The parties’ intent should be inferred from the 

language of the [r]elease, so long as that language is not ambiguous or uncertain.” Id. (citing Cal. 

 

65 Mot. – ECF No. 62 at 6.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-06409-LB 12

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Civ. Code §§ 1638, 1639). “‘Where contract language is clear and explicit and does not lead to 

absurd results, [the court] ascertains intent from the written terms and go[es] no further.’” Shaw v. 

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 Cal. App. 4th 44, 53 (1997) (quoting Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Employers 

Ins. of Wausau, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1699, 1707 (1995)).

As set forth in the statement, both settlement agreements contained broad release provisions.

The plain language of these provisions unequivocally bars all claims, known or unknown, with a 

waiver of Civil Code § 1542, arising from Mr. Thomas’s occupancy in the Hotel.66 The plaintiff’s 

claims against the Shree Jalaram defendants all arise out of the conditions at the Hotel and his 

eviction from his unit. Thus, the claims are covered by the releases, which bar Mr. Thomas from 

relitigating them here.

Mr. Thomas does not seriously contest that his claims are barred by the settlement agreements. 

Rather, he argues that his claims are based on “harms inflicted after [the Shree Jalaram 

defendants] violated the terms of the” settlement agreements, specifically by “doing construction 

work without proper containment, not replacing toilets in a timely manner, continued violations of 

Plaintiff’s right to quiet enjoyment of the premises, and continued violations of the implied 

Warranty of Habitability.”

67 As the defendants persuasively argue, this argument fails because the 

release in the November 2017 Settlement Agreement was broad and included “any and all claims, 

demands, causes of action, obligations, damages and liabilities . . . relating to Defendant’s 

occupancy of the Premises.”68 That release thus expressly released (for new consideration) any 

claims that Mr. Thomas had in late 2017 related to alleged breaches of the 2016 settlement 

agreement and precludes his claims.

 

66 October 2016 Settlement Agreement, Ex. B to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 10–11 (¶ 8(a)); 

November 2017 Settlement Agreement, Ex. C to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 38–39 (¶¶ 6–8).

67 Opp. – ECF No. 64 at 3.

68 Reply – ECF No. 77 at 4; November 2017 Settlement Agreement, Ex. C to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 

62-1 at 39 (¶ 7).

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2. The Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata

Res judicata bars all of the plaintiff’s claims against the Shree Jalaram defendants.

A defendant may raise the affirmative defense of res judicata by way of a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6). See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). Under 28 

U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts are required to give full faith and credit to state court judgments. San 

Remo Hotel, L.P. v. Cty. & Cnty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005); Brodheim v. Cty, 

584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009).

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on ‘any claims that were raised or could 

have been raised’ in a prior action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp., 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(emphasis in original) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th 

Cir. 2001)). “To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment[,] federal courts look to 

state law.” Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. Cty, of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2005) (citing Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n v. Cty. of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 

1993)). “In California, res judicata precludes a plaintiff from litigating a claim if: [(1)] the claim 

relates to the same ‘primary right’ as a claim in a prior action, [(2)] the prior judgment was final 

and on the merits, and [(3)] the plaintiff was a party or in privity with a party in the prior action.” 

Trujillo v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

2.1 Same Primary Right

“California’s res judicata doctrine is based on a primary rights theory.” Manufactured Home, 

420 F.3d at 1031. The primary-rights theory

[p]rovides that a “cause of action” is comprised of a “primary right” of the plaintiff, 

a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant 

constituting a breach of that duty. The most salient characteristic of a primary right 

is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single 

cause of action.

Id. (quoting Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 904 (2002)). “Thus, in California, 

‘if two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then 

the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of 

recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.’” Furnace v. 

Giurbino, 838 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San 

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Diego City Emps. Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009)). “The critical focus of primary 

rights analysis is the harm suffered.” Id. (quoting Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 

2009)). 

“A party may bring only one cause of action to vindicate a primary right.” Manufactured 

Home, 420 F.3d at 1031 (citing Mycogen, 28 Cal. 4th at 904). “Claims not raised in this single 

cause of action may not be raised at a later date.” Id. (citing Mycogen, 28 Cal. 4th at 904). 

The primary right that Mr. Thomas asserts in this litigation is the same as the right he asserted 

in his prior litigation: his right to possession of his unit in the Hotel and to safe and sanitary 

conditions there.

In Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc., the plaintiff was served with a three-day notice to 

quit his rental apartment. 239 Cal. App. 4th 750, 753 (2015). He did not leave, and the lessors 

filed an unlawful-detainer action against him. Id. The parties reached a settlement that allowed the 

plaintiff to remain in the apartment so long as he abided by the conditions of his lease. Id. If he 

violated the lease, the lessors would be entitled to submit an ex parte application for a judgment 

for possession of the premises and for money damages for any rent due, plus attorney’s fees and 

other damages. Id. at 753–54. The agreement also provided that the plaintiff “waive[d] any claims 

he may have . . . to bring an attempted wrongful eviction against [the lessors] or any action in any 

way arising out of or concerned with his tenancy . . . .” Id. at 754. The plaintiff allegedly violated 

the lease and the lessors secured a judgment giving them possession of the apartment. Id.

The plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. Id. at 755. 

The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the lessors for, among other things, breach of contract, 

wrongful eviction, and conversion. Id. The trial court granted the defendants’ demurrer based on 

res judicata. Id.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that five of his 10 causes of action were based on conduct 

occurring after the entry of judgment and that they were therefore unrelated to the unlawful 

detainer action. Id. at 758. The court upheld the trial court’s ruling, finding that the plaintiff “had 

the opportunity to litigate the unlawful-detainer action and all of his claims were based on 

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defenses that could have been raised in this action or were specifically addressed and settled in the 

stipulated judgment.” Id. at 761.

Here, the plaintiff’s claims are similarly barred because they all were actually litigated or 

could have been litigated in his first lawsuit against the Shree Jalaram defendants and THC about 

the habitability issues at the Hotel or are defenses that could have been raised in the unlawfuldetainer action. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata applies. 

2.2 Prior Judgment on the Merits

“It is well established that court-approved settlement agreements . . . have res judicata effect.” 

Grimes v. Barber, No. C 12–3111 CW, 2014 WL 793575, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014) (citing 

Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2006)). The November 

2017 Settlement Agreement was reviewed and approved by Judge Pro Tem Diana Kruze in San

Francisco Superior Court.69

Additionally, in the unlawful-detainer action that the Shree Jalaram defendants brought against 

Mr. Thomas, Superior Court Judge Ronald E. Quidachay ruled against Mr. Thomas on the merits 

and entered a final judgment of eviction against him.70

The court-approved settlement agreement and the final judgment in the second lawsuit are

prior judgments on the merits for the purposes of res judicata here.

2.3 Same Parties or Parties in Privity

The October 2016 Settlement Agreement lists Joseph Thomas as a claimant and lists 

Balwantsinh Thakor, Kirasinh Thakor, and Shree Jalaram Lodging, LP (among others) as released 

parties.71 The November 2017 Settlement Agreement includes Shree Jalaram Lodging LP and 

Joseph Thomas as the parties entering into the agreement.72 The plaintiff named Balwantsinh 

Thakor, Kirasinh Thakor, and Shree Jalaram Lodging LP (erroneously sued as Shree Jalaram 

 

69 November 2017 Settlement Agreement, Ex. C to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 32.

70 Judgment, Ex. F to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 83.

71 October 2014 Settlement Agreement, Ex. B to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 62-1 at 7.

72 November 2017 Settlement Agreement, Ex. C to Thakor Decl. – ECF No. 32.

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LLP). Thus, the current suit involves the same parties as the previous state-court suits and 

settlement agreements.

3. Defendants’ Request for an Injunction

In their motion, the Shree Jalaram defendants moved the court to issue an injunction enforcing 

the covenant not to sue in the October 2016 Settlement Agreement.73 The court denies the motion 

because it lacks jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.

Courts have “the inherent power summarily to enforce a settlement agreement involving an 

action pending before it.” Brionez v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. C 01-3969 CW, 2007 WL 217680, 

at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (citing In re Suchy, 786 F.2d 900, 902–903 (9th Cir. 1985)). But 

courts have no inherent power to enforce settlement agreements after a case has been dismissed: 

“Enforcement of the settlement agreement . . . is more than just a continuation or renewal of the 

dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994); see Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1433 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Thus, if the original action has been dismissed, and the court has not retained 

jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, a party seeking to enforce the terms of the 

settlement agreement must file a new action in a court that has subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. Pro. before Trial ¶ 15:141 (The 

Rutter Group 2015). For a case to be in federal court, this means that there must be diversity 

jurisdiction because enforcing a settlement does not involve a federal question. Id. (citing 

Limbright v Hofmeister, 566 F.3d 672, 676 (6th Cir. 2009)); see O’Connor v. Colvin, 70 F.3d 530, 

532 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

To invoke diversity jurisdiction in an action involving United States Citizens, the complaint 

must allege that “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 

interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Here, the plaintiff and the Shree Jalaram defendants are all citizens of the State of California. The 

 

73 Mot. – ECF No. 62 at 6.

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October 2016 Settlement Agreement was the result of a suit in California state court. Thus, the 

court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the October 2016 Settlement Agreement. Any 

motion to enforce the agreement must be filed in state court.

CONCLUSION

The court grants the motion to dismiss and dismisses the claims against Balwantsinh Thakor, 

Kirasinh Thakor, and Shree Jalaram Lodging LP. Because res judicata applies to any amendment 

of these claims, amendment would be futile, so the dismissal is with prejudice. Cf, e.g., Ratliff v. 

Mortg. Store Fin. Inc., No. 17-cv-02155-EMC, 2017 WL 5890090, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 

2017) (dismissing complaint that was barred by res judicata with prejudice because amendment 

would be futile).

The court denies the motion for an injunction to enforce the covenant not to sue for lack of 

jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2019

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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