Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00229/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00229-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Scott Detrich,

Petitioner, 

v.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 03-229-TUC-DCB

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, seeking

reconsideration of the Court’s November 15 Order (Dkt. 260), which denied the remainder

of Petitioner’s claims and dismissed the Amended Petition.

A motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e) is in essence a motion for

reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and appropriate only if the court

is presented with newly discovered evidence, if there is an intervening change in controlling

law, or if the court committed clear error. McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th

Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,

5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Petitioner asserts that the Court’s order was erroneous

and manifestly unjust.

Petitioner contends it was error to not hold closing arguments after the evidentiary

hearing on Claim B because the Court represented during the hearing that the parties would

have such an opportunity. Petitioner argues that the lack of oral argument deprived him of

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the chance to fully argue the evidence developed at the hearing and to make all available

prejudice arguments. As is evident from the Court’s ruling and judgment, upon review of

the evidentiary hearing transcripts and all of the briefing, the Court concluded that additional

argument would not be helpful in resolving Claim B. Because argument is held solely for

the benefit of the Court, there is no error in the Court’s decision not to hold it under the

circumstances. Further, Petitioner thoroughly raised, briefed, and developed Claim B in the

Amended Petition, Traverse, Motions for Evidentiary Development, subsequent reply briefs

and oral argument on the motions, post-hearing brief, and at the four-day evidentiary hearing.

(Dkts. 31, 75, 81, 82, 86, 90, 103, 259.)

First, Petitioner argues that he needed oral argument to rebut the portion of

Respondents’ post-hearing brief regarding the applicable standard of review. (See Dkt. 262

at 4 (citing Dkt. 259 at 1-2).) Specifically, that the state post-conviction court’s factual

findings are not entitled to deference and/or that Petitioner has rebutted them by clear and

convincing evidence. Because Petitioner does not point to any error or identify an erroneous

legal standard in the Court’s Order, reconsideration on this ground is not warranted.

Second, Petitioner argues that at oral argument he would have been able to satisfy the

prejudice prong of Strickland as to Claim B. In support of this very general assertion,

Petitioner points only to a new declaration by Dr. Lauro Amezcua-Patino, which is attached

to his motion. Additional evidence would not have been admitted at post-hearing argument,

and it is not properly submitted with a motion for reconsideration. Additionally, the

declaration does not contain anything new, and the doctor’s opinion was fully considered in

the Court’s November 15 Order.

Third, Petitioner asserts that, at the anticipated post-hearing oral argument on Claim

B, he had planned to request an opportunity to amend his petition. Petitioner lists nine

claims, challenging both his conviction and his sentence, that he says were fully exhausted

in state court as of March 14, 2006. Petitioner had one year and eight months to seek

amendment after completing his state court proceedings. He asserts that he delayed in

making such a request because, if he had been granted relief on Claim B, he would not have

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sought amendment; thus, requesting it earlier could have been a waste of resources. The

Court finds this argument unpersuasive, particularly as some of the claims he now seeks to

pursue are challenges to his conviction; it is unreasonable to suggest that counsel intended

to forego an allegedly meritorious conviction-related claim if Petitioner had obtained a new

sentencing. Regardless, the Court is not responsible for that tactical decision, and Petitioner

points to no error by the Court; therefore, reconsideration and reopening of the judgment is

not appropriate. See Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). As a final matter,

it appears that a request to amend would have been denied as futile because: the claims are

likely procedurally defaulted as they were dismissed based on a state court procedural rule;

they are likely time-barred under the AEDPA’s statute of limitations; and Petitioner unduly

delayed seeking amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Bonin v. Calderon,

59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

(Dkt. 262) is DENIED.

DATED this 5th day of December, 2007.

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