Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02695/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02695-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

ORDER — No. 16-cv-02695-LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

PENNY L. PATINO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 

CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02695-LB 

ORDER GRANTING THE 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 7

INTRODUCTION

In this mortgage-foreclosure case, Penny Patino, proceeding pro se, brings nine claims against 

three defendants: Franklin Credit Management Corporation, Bosco Credit, and The Wolf Firm.1

Ms. Patino’s claims, though difficult to understand, center around the formation, rescission, and 

foreclosure of a debt secured by a deed of trust on her Danville, California property.2The 

defendants now move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).3The court can decide this 

 

1

See generally Compl. — ECF No. 1. Record citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File 

(“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.

2 Compl. at 1–5.

3 Motion to Dismiss — ECF No. 7.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 1 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 2

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matter without oral argument. N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The court grants the defendants’ motion 

because Ms. Patino fails to state a plausible claim for relief but grants Ms. Patino leave to amend.

STATEMENT

The following facts in this section are from the complaint and the loan-related documents, the 

existence of which the court judicially notices as matters of the public record (see Analysis 

Section 1, below).

Ms. Patino lives in Danville, California.

4

She is sixty-four years old, “disabled [in] body and 

mentally not capable of contracting[,]” and “was pursued and pressured into signing” a loan with 

the defendants in July 2006.

5

The loan, a revolving credit facility for $159,984, was secured by a 

deed of trust on her Danville property in favor of the lender, Cal State 9 Credit Union.6 Ms. Patino 

wrote a check to return the money and rescind the loan.7 Yet “they” (the defendants) wrote 

“VOID” on and an “X” through Ms. Patino’s check and sent it back.8 Over seven years later, a 

new trustee — The Wolf Firm — demanded that Ms. Patino pay a lump sum within thirty days.9

Over the years, there were several publicly recorded documents purportedly related to Ms. 

Patino’s loan. On May 28, 2008, Cal State 9 Credit Union assigned the deed of trust to defendant 

Bosco Credit, but Ms. Patino asserts that Cal State 9 told her the transfer was to defendant 

Franklin Credit.10 In September 2015, The Wolf Firm was substituted as trustee on the deed.11

Two weeks later, The Wolf Firm filed a Notice of Default and Election to Sell on Ms. Patino’s 

property.12 Ms. Patino asserts that the notice was forged, contains the incorrect loan balance, and 

 

4 Compl. at 2, 3, 18.

5

Id. at 3–4, 9.

6 Deed of Trust — ECF No. 7-2 at 2–3; Compl. at 10.

7 Compl. at 4, 10.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10 Id. at 4; Assignment of Deed of Trust — ECF No. 7-2 at 23–24.

11 Substitution of Trustee — ECF No. 7-2 at 26.

12 Notice of Default and Election to Sell — ECF No. 7-2 at 28–42; Compl. at 7.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 2 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 3

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was therefore void.13 Ms. Patino told a “Sindy” about the notice’s problems, but Sindy said that it 

was “not the[ir] problem” and that the demand made was “OK.”14

A Notice of Trustee’s Sale was then filed and Ms. Patino filed suit.15 She specifically asserts 

the following nine claims against each defendant: (1) violation of “Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau 1/2014;” (2) violation of “Penal Code Section 115;” (3) violation of “Dodd-Frank Act 

1/10/2014;” (4) violation of article I, section 1 of the California Constitution; (5) violation of 

California Finance Lenders Law, Cal. Fin. Code §§ 22000 et seq.; (6) “statute of limitations 6 

years;” (7) negligence; (8) declaratory relief; and (9) negligent infliction of emotional distress.16

The defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).17

RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 

which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be 

enough to raise a claim for relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(internal citations omitted). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, 

accepted as true, “‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

 

13 Compl. at 5, 7, 18.

14 Id. at 5, 7, 18.

15 Notice of Trustee’s Sale — ECF No. 7-2 at 44–51.

16 Compl. at 6–19.

17 Motion to Dismiss — ECF No. 7.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 3 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 4

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern 

California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).

ANALYSIS

1. Requests for Judicial Notice

Both parties make requests for judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.18 “[A] 

court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable disputes because it: (1) is 

generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

First, the defendants ask that the court judicially notice six publicly recorded documents: (1) 

the credit line deed of trust; (2) a grant deed signed by Ms. Patino; (3) the Assignment of Deed of 

Trust; (4) the Substitution of Trustee; (5) the Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of 

Trust; and (6) the Notice of Trustee’s Sale.19 The court takes judicial notice of the existence of 

these documents as matters of the public record, but not the truth of the contents to the extent 

disputed by Ms. Patino. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005); Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. 

Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] court may not take judicial notice of a 

fact that is ‘subject to reasonable dispute.’”).

 

18 Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice — ECF No. 7-1; Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice —

ECF No. 18.

19 Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 4 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 5

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Second, Ms. Patino asks the court to judicially notice several documents.20 The defendants 

oppose the request.21 The court does not take judicial notice of these documents because none of 

them presents the type of fact or existence that is generally known in the jurisdiction or that can be 

readily and accurately determined. Ms. Patino’s records are instead partially handwritten, 

incomplete loan documents and private communications that the court cannot judicially notice.

The court therefore denies Ms. Patino’s request.

2. Ms. Patino Does Not State a Plausible Claim to Relief

2.1 Claims 1 and 3: the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Dodd-Frank Act 

Ms. Patino asserts a claim for violation of the “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 1/2014” 

and the “Dodd-Frank Act 1/10/2014.”22 In her CFPB claim, she alleges that all defendants failed 

to provide “notification of foreclosure alternatives” and failed to provide “clear monthly mortgage 

statements.”23 In her Dodd-Frank claim, she asserts essentially the same things, alleging that she 

did not receive monthly mortgage statements.24 She also says that she did not receive written 

mortgage workout options from Franklin Credit.25

There are several problems with Ms. Patino’s claims. First, Dodd-Frank created the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau; her styling of these two claims is confusing. Second, the CFPB is an 

agency designed to “enforce Federal consumer financial law”; it is not a law itself that can be 

violated. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a). Third, and most important, Ms. Patino fails to identify (1) the 

specific legal basis for her claims and (2) the specific defendants responsible for the alleged 

wrongdoing (other than one allegation against Franklin Credit). This is critical because the 

complaint must be specific enough to allow the defendants to answer, which they cannot do 

 

20 Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.

21 Objections and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice — ECF No. 22.

22 Compl. at 6, 8.

23 Id. at 6

24 Id. at 8

25 Id.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 5 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 6

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without more information. Claims not based on specific laws or on specific defendants’ 

misconduct are too ambiguous to give notice under Rule 8(a)(2). The court therefore dismisses 

Ms. Patino’s claims without prejudice.

2.2 Claim 2: California Penal Code 115

Ms. Patino alleges that the defendants violated California Penal Code section 115, which

makes knowingly recording a forged instrument a felony. Cal. Pen. Code § 115(a).26 Ms. Patino’s 

claim is based on The Wolf Firm’s recording of the Notice of Default despite Ms. Patino’s 

warning that it contained an incorrect loan balance and a forged signature (supposedly evidenced 

by different handwriting styles).27 The problem with this claim is that section 115 is a criminal 

statute that does not provide a private right of action. See Cal. Pen. Code § 115; Ellis v. City of San 

Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir.1999) (finding district court properly dismissed claims for 

violation of California Penal Code sections that did not create individual rights); Woodrow v. 

Cnty. of Merced, No. 1:13-CV-01505-AWI, 2015 WL 164427, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2015)

(finding “no indication of a private right of action” in section 115); Byrd v. Sand Canyon Corp., 

No. CIV. S-10-1914, 2010 WL 3942830, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2010).

Because California Penal Code section 115 does not provide a private right of action, the court 

dismisses this claim with prejudice. Ms. Patino may not reassert this claim.

2.3 Claim 4: Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution

Ms. Patino also brings a claim under article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution.28 That 

section provides that all people are “free and independent and have inalienable rights” — which 

includes “enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, 

and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1. The defendants 

 

26 Id. at 6–7.

27 Id. at 7, 12.

28 Id. at 9–10.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 6 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 7

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do not make a specific argument to dismiss this claim; Ms. Patino argues this means the motion 

should be denied.

29 The court will, however, address the plausibility of this claim because the 

defendants broadly move to dismiss the entire complaint.30

Ms. Patino’s claim here appears based on several alleged wrongdoings (i.e. she was not 

capable of contracting; she rescinded the loan; and the defendants are foreclosing with no 

expectation of profit), all of which she asserts the CFPB says violate her “constitutional right to 

defending [her] life.”31 This raises several issues. First, the CFPB does not establish what does and 

does not violate the California Constitution. Second, the only allegations against the named 

defendants — that Franklin Credit did not send her a letter and has “scammed many homeowners” 

— are insufficient to plausibly assert a deprivation of her constitutional rights.

32 The rest of her 

allegations are based on the formation and rescission of the loan agreement with Cal State 9 Credit 

Union, a non-party.33 Third, Ms. Patino has not plausibly pleaded that the defendants’ sale of the 

property would “give Defendants -0- money” (just because she has no equity does not mean the 

defendants will not receive any sale proceeds), or that such a result would be unlawful under the 

California Constitution. And fourth, “nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust constitutes private 

action authorized by contract[.]”Garfinkle v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 21 Cal. 3d 

268, 282 (1978). The California Constitution’s declaration of rights provisions generally —

though not always — have a state action requirement. See Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 

Cal. 4th 1, 19–20 (1994) (no state action requirement for right to privacy, but noting others). The 

defendants are private actors exercising their right to non-judicial foreclosure, and absent authority 

to the contrary, Ms. Patino’s claim under article I, section 1 appears to require state action. 

The court dismisses Ms. Patino’s claim without prejudice.

 

29 See generally Motion to Dismiss; Opposition at 26.

30 Motion to Dismiss at 19 (“Plaintiff’s lawsuit is vague, overly ambiguous, and fails to state any claim 

against any defendant.”)

31 Compl. at 9–10.

32 Id. at 9.

33 Id. at 9–10.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 7 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 8

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2.4 Claim 5: California Finance Lenders Law

Ms. Patino asserts that the defendants violated the California Finance Lenders Law by making 

a loan that she was incapable of repaying.

34 See Cal. Fin. Code §§ 22000 et seq. Under cited 

lenders law regulations: 

When making or negotiating loans, a finance company shall take into consideration, 

in determining the size and duration thereof, the financial ability of the borrowers to 

repay the same, to the end that the borrowers should be reasonably to repay said 

loans in the time and manner provided in the loan contracts. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 10, § 1452; Cal. Fin. Code § 22150. Here, Ms. Patino asserts that the 

defendants violated this section because “[t]here would . . . be a[n] 80% loan to value” ratio.35

There are two issues with this claim. First, the entity that made the loan — Cal State 9 Credit 

Union — is not a party to the suit. The named defendants did not make the loan, and thus could 

not have failed to take these factors into consideration. Second, although Ms. Patino asserts that 

there “would be” a loan-to-value ratio of 80%, she does not allege facts plausibly showing that (1) 

the loan-to-value ratio was 80% (i.e. she does not plead the value of her home); (2) the lender did 

not consider these factors; or (3) she was not reasonably able to repay the loan (i.e. she does not 

plead her income and other debt obligations). See O’Donovan v. Cashcall, Inc., No. C08-03174 

MEJ, 2009 WL 1833990, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2009) (dismissing claim where plaintiff did 

not allege facts, “such as information about Plaintiffs’ income and other debt obligations, although 

such information is presumably within Plaintiffs’ knowledge”).

The court accordingly dismisses the claim without prejudice.

2.5 Claim 6: Statute of Limitations

Ms. Patino calls her sixth claim “statute of limitations 6 years.”36 Without citing specific case

law or statutory authority, she asserts that “enforcement of the deed of trust must take place during 

 

34 Id. at 10–11. 

35 Id. at 11.

36 Id. at 11–12.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 8 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 9

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the six year period” after default.37 There are two distinct rights of foreclosure: judicial foreclosure 

and non-judicial foreclosure. See Ung v. Koehler, 135 Cal. App. 4th 186, 192 (2005). The right of 

judicial foreclosure terminates on the expiration of the statute of limitations on the underlying debt 

— typically, four years after the final maturity date. Id. at 193, 198 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 337, 

725a, 2911). The right of non-judicial foreclosure, on the other hand, terminates ten years after the 

final maturity date if the maturity date is “ascertainable from the recorded evidence of 

indebtedness.” Cal. Civ. Code § 882.020(a)(1).

The defendants here are engaging in a non-judicial foreclosure. The evidence of indebtedness 

(a/k/a “the record” a/k/a the deed of trust),38 shows that the maturity date on Ms. Patino’s credit 

line is July 20, 2031.39 That means the right of non-judicial foreclosure does not expire until 

July 20, 2041 — ten years after the maturity date. The Wolf Firm filed the Notice of Default on 

October 8, 2015, well before the statute of limitations expires.

40 The court therefore dismisses the 

claim without leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

2.6 Claims 7 and 9: Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Ms. Patino brings separate claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress.

41 The elements of a negligence claim are (1) the existence of a duty to exercise due care, 

(2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 

465, 500 (2001). “‘Negligent infliction of emotional distress’ is not an independent tort doctrine.” 

Varnado v. Midland Funding LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 985, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Potter v. 

 

37 Id. at 11.

38 Prior to 2007, section 882.020 terminated the right of non-judicial foreclosure ten years after the 

maturity date if the maturity date was “ascertainable from the record.” Cal. Civ. Code § 882.020(a)(1)

(emphasis added). At least two California appellate courts held that “the record” meant the evidence of 

indebtedness — i.e. the deed of trust — and did not include all recorded documents, such as laterrecorded notices of default. See Ung, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 204; Schmidli v. Pearce, 178 Cal. App. 4th 

305, 315–16 (2009).

39 Deed of Trust — ECF No. 7-2 at 2.

40 Notice of Default — ECF No. 7-2 at 28.

41 Compl. at 12–16, 17–19.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 9 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 10

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Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984 (1993)). It is instead “a form of the tort of 

negligence, to which the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages apply.” 

Varnado, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 990 (quoting Griffith v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV-11-5867 PA 

(FFMx), 2011 WL 6849048, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2011)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Under California law, financial institutions generally do not owe borrowers a duty of care 

unless their involvement in the loan transaction exceeds the scope of their “conventional role as a 

mere lender of money.” See Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 

1095–96 (1991) (citations omitted). To determine “whether a financial institution owes a duty of 

care to a borrower-client,” courts must balance the following non-exhaustive factors:

[1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, 

[2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of certainty that the 

plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the connection between the 

defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to 

the defendant's conduct, and [6] the policy of preventing future harm.

Id. at 1098 (quotation marks and citations omitted). See Rowland v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

No. C 14-00036 LB, 2014 WL 992005, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014); Ansanelli v. JP 

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. C 10-03892 WHA, 2011 WL 1134451, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 

2011). 

Here, Ms. Patino does not plausibly plead that the defendants owed her a duty of care. She 

instead re-alleges many of her other grievances and concludes that these acts amount to 

negligence. For example, she says “No monthly mortgage statement is negligence”; “Negligence 

is recording a Notice of Default with [the] wrong amount”; “Negligence is recording a Trustee 

Sale in a State county Recorders Office with a ‘FORGERY’ signature from the Trustees the Wolf 

Firm”; “Negligence is being treated badly by customer service representatives”; “Negligence is 

waiting over 7 years so that the homeowner cannot pay a lump sum”; and “Negligence is where a 

Notice of Default was recorded without a correct amount and over charging.”42 She asserts that 

certain of Franklin’s and Bosco’s statements — such as that they maintain close contact and 

 

42 Id. at 12, 16.

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ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 11

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frequently communicate with borrowers — are “1,000% false.”43 She also alleges that she called 

customer service (without identifying which defendant’s customer service), that the service 

representative scolded and talked down to her, and that she cried “after [she] got off the phone.”44

And, Ms. Patino asserts that when the Notice of Default was filed, she “was in possession of 

someone else[’s] loan history sta[t]ing that the amount due was $25,000.”45

Ms. Patino’s above assertions are conclusory, vague, and confusing, and do not show that any 

of the defendants went beyond their conventional mortgage financing and servicing roles. Some of 

her allegations, such as the defendants’ failure to send monthly statements, appear based in statute 

and thus an attempt to establish negligence per se. But as discussed above, these assertions are too 

vague and ambiguous as to both the statutes supposedly violated and the defendants that violated 

them. And, in any event, “‘an underlying claim of ordinary negligence must be available before 

[negligence per se] can be employed.’” Winter v. Chevy Chase Bank, No. C 09-3187 SI, 2009 WL 

351769, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009) (quoting Cal. Serv. Station and Auto. Repair Ass’n v. Am. 

Home Assurance Co., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1178 (1998)) (alteration in original). Similarly, she 

asserts that the customer representative (possibly, “Sindy” of The Wolf Firm)46 acted wrongfully 

and a defendant (it is unclear which) acted wrongfully by confusing her loan history with 

another’s. Although these acts may demonstrate a lack of care, absent a duty (i.e. an act beyond 

the institutions’ conventional roles), it is legally irrelevant. See Varnado v. Midland Funding LLC, 

43 F. Supp. 3d 985, 990–91 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Software Design & Application, Ltd. v. 

Hoefer & Arnett, Inc., 49 Cal.App.4th 472, 481 (1996)).

In sum, then, Ms. Patino fails to demonstrate that any of the defendants owed her a duty of 

care. The court therefore dismisses her negligence claims but grants leave to amend.

 

43 Id. at 13.

44 Id. at 14.

45 Id. at 15.

46 Id. at 7.

Case 3:16-cv-02695-LB Document 29 Filed 08/29/16 Page 11 of 14
ORDER — No.16-cv-02695-LB 12

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2.7: Claim 8: Declaratory Relief 

Ms. Patino asserts a claim for declaratory relief.47 The federal Declaratory Judgment Act 

provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United 

States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 

declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). To fall 

within the Act’s ambit, the “case of actual controversy” must be “definite and concrete, touching 

the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, . . . real and substantial and admi[t] of 

specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion 

advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” MedImmune, Inc. v. 

Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aetna Life 

Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937)).

Here, Ms. Patino’s claim (properly, a request for remedy) repeats her other various 

contentions, or what she apparently sees as the parties’ disputes — i.e. the legality of recorded 

documents; the validity of the Notice of Default; the mix up with her and another’s loan histories; 

the identity of the loan’s true owner; and the legality of the foreclosure proceedings.

48 Because 

Ms. Patino’s substantive claims are vague, ambiguous, and confusing (not definite, concrete, and 

specific), and because the court dismisses all of Ms. Patino’s claims, it dismisses this one, too. She 

may re-allege her request for declaratory relief if she amends her complaint.

3. Ms. Patino’s Other Allegations

Throughout her complaint and her opposition brief, Ms. Patino alludes to various other claims 

without actually asserting them. For example, she frequently says that the defendants engaged in 

fraud — i.e. by fraudulently obtaining the loan.

49 She also states that she was mentally incapable 

of contracting and only entered the loan agreement by way of duress (thus, maybe arguing the 

 

47 Id. at 16–17.

48 Id.

49 See, e.g., id. at 3, 11.

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agreement should be voided).

50 And, she appears to touch on rights under the Real Estate 

Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., and the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§§ 1601 et seq. For instance, buried in her negligence claim, she alleges that she sent a “qualified 

written request which came back that it would be burdensome for defendants to comply with [her] 

request” — a potential RESPA violation.51 See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). She also repeatedly asserts 

that she rescinded the loan — a potential TILA action.52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635. Yet she does not 

actually assert any of these as claims against the defendants.

To the extent Ms. Patino intended to raise these additional claims, the court dismisses them for 

lack of plausibility; and in the case of her fraud claim, for failure to plead fraud with particularity

because she pleads no facts about how the named defendants fraudulently procured the debt (if 

anything, that claim may more properly be asserted against Cal State 9 Credit Union). Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 9(b); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Averments of fraud 

must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.”)

Ms. Patino may assert these additional claims in her amended complaint, if she chooses to file one. 

If she does, the court encourages her to make explicit which claims she intends to bring.

4. Leave to Amend

Ms. Patino alleges several new facts in her opposition brief and attached declaration. The court 

does not consider these facts in ruling on the current motion because, generally, it cannot consider 

material outside of the complaint. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 

925 (9th Cir. 2001); Paulsen v. CNF, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“[T]he 

court cannot consider material outside the complaint (e.g., facts presented in briefs, affidavits or 

discovery materials).”) (quoting Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Rutter Group Prac. Guide: 

Federal Civ. Pro. Before Trial § 9:211 (The Rutter Group 2004) (internal quotations omitted) 

 

50 See, e.g., id. at 3–4, 9–10.

51 Id. at 15.

52 Id. at 4, 10; Opposition at 17.

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(alteration in original)). Ms. Patino’s new factual allegations, however, and any others that she 

may wish to include, may give rise to more plausible claims for relief: the court cannot say that 

amendment would be futile. The court therefore grants Ms. Patino leave to amend all of her claims 

except for her second (California Penal Code § 115) and sixth (“Statute of Limitations 6 Years”) 

claims.

CONCLUSION

The court grants the defendants’ motion and dismisses Ms. Patino’s complaint with leave to 

amend. Her amended complaint is due within 28 days of the date of this order. If Ms. Patino does 

not file an amended complaint within this time, the court will dismiss the action without prejudice 

and the Clerk of Court will close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2016

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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