Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01610/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01610-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORLANDA PRADD, Civil

No. 15-cv-1610 BAS (BGS)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND GRANT

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 15 and 19.]

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 20, 2015, Orlanda Pradd (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant to the

Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), challenging the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of disability

benefits. (ECF. No. 1.) On December 1, 2015, the Commissioner filed an answer.

(ECF No. 9.) After receiving an extension of time, Plaintiff filed a motion for

summary judgment on February 29, 2016, requesting reversal of the Administrative

Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) final decision. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff seeks reversal and/or

remand alleging: (1) the ALJ’s rejection of two treating physicians was legally

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insufficient and unsupported by the record; and (2) the ALJ erred by assigning greater

weight to the consultative examiner’s opinions than to the treating physicians. (ECF.

No. 15 at p. 2.) After receiving an extension, the Commissioner filed a cross-motion

for summary judgment and a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on April 22,

2016. (ECF No. 19-20.) Plaintiff filed neither a reply to the Commissioner’s

opposition, nor an opposition to the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.

Pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the parties’ cross-motions

suitable for decision on the papers and without oral argument. After careful

consideration of the administrative record and the applicable law, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED and that

the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. 

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance

benefits on September 1, 2011 alleging disability beginning on September 17, 2010.

(Administrative Record (“AR”) 166-69; 177-82.) The Commissioner denied

Plaintiff’s application initially and on reconsideration. (AR 107-10; 118-24.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. (AR 125-27.) 

The Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Mason Harrell, Jr.,

on December 5, 2013, represented by her attorney Dan Richard Cohen, Esq. (AR at

12.) Corinne J. Porter, an impartial vocational expert, also appeared and testified.

(Id.) In a decision dated December 20, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not

disabled as defined by the Act because she could perform other work that existed in

significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 23.) When the Appeals Council

declined to review the ALJ’s decision on May 26, 2015, the ALJ’s decision became

the Commissioner’s final decision. (AR 1-6.) Plaintiff then commenced this action for

judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g).

///

///

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A. Relevant Medical Evidence

1. Treating Physician - Dr. Calvin Yang - (Ex. 2F)

On January 17, 2012, Plaintiff presented for an appointment with Calvin Yang,

MD, PhD, of UCSD Outpatient Psychiatric Services. Dr. Yang’s progress note from

January 17, 2012, reported the results of Plaintiff’s mental status exam as: Obese

female, tearful through whole visit, extremely depressed/angry, labile affect,

organized TP [thought process], no SI [suicidal ideation] / HI [homicidal ideation] /

AVH [auditory verbal hallucinations]. I/J [insight, judgment] are limited.” (AR 304.) 

In the assessment/plan section of the January 17th progress note, Dr. Yang also wrote: 

“Patient with maj[or] depression, severe, complicated grief with depression due to

psychosocial stressors: losing unemployment, problems with finances and housing. 

Currently depression improving after introduction of celexa. She is actually doing

much better now.” (AR 304)

Three weeks later, on February 6, 2012, Dr. Yang completed a psychiatric

review form concerning Plaintiff’s impairments. In the form, Dr. Yang opined that

Plaintiff had “Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode, Severe Without Psychotic

Features and Bereavement.” Dr. Yang noted that:

 “Since her sister passed away, patient’s grief has not resolved. She has been

severely depressed. She isolates in her room. She is afraid to go outside, afraid

to use the bus or to go to social functions because she dreads if people ask about

her sister. She feels hopeless and unable to live without her sister. She feels

tired all the time. She eats only one meal a day because of loss of appetite. She

has problems with her sleep. She has headaches, irritability.” 

(AR 293-94.) 

When prompted on the psychiatric review form to describe clinical findings

demonstrating the severity of the patient’s mental impairment, Dr. Yang wrote: 

“Patient is tearful during every visit, with poor grooming. She has psychomotor

slowing. Her responses are delayed. Her mood is depressed and affect is

depressed and angry at times. She perseverates on the negative and feels

hopeless, She wishes she were not alive at times. She has found it difficult to

come to appointments at times due to fear of leaving her house.” 

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(AR 294.) 

As to treatment, Dr. Yang reported: 

“Client has been seen for cognitive behavioral therapy biweekly, and treated

with medications including wellbutrin 150 mg bid and celexa 40 mg daily. She has

had some improvement since adding celexa however she has significant psychosocial

stressors, including problems with family, sister with kidney failure, lack of income,

inability to provide for her food or rent. She will likely be homeless if she is unable to

secure any source of income. Her ability to perform in a work setting is severely

impaired.”

(AR 294.)

When prompted on the psychiatric review form to explain his opinion that

Plaintiff would have difficulty working, Dr. Yang wrote:

 “Base[d] on my interactions with patient, I feel she would have significant

difficulty making it to work or maintaining at work due to fear of leaving her

home, feelings of shame, and inadequacy. She is afraid of rejection and her

anxiety would interfere with her ability to carry through tasks. Her

concentration and memory are impaired. She is isolative and would have

difficulty interacting with customers or other employees.” 

(AR 295.)

When prompted to identify additional test or evaluations he would advise to

“fully assess” Plaintiff’s impairments and limitations, Dr. Yang wrote: “none at this

time”. (AR 295.) Dr. Yang responded “No” to a section in the form which asked if

the patient has a medically documented history of chronic organic mental,

schizophrenic, or affective disorder of at least two year’s duration that has caused

more than a minimal limitation of anility to do any basic work activity. (AR 296.)

2. Treating Physician - Dr. Lawrence Malak - Ex. 9F

On August 6, 2013, Plaintiff presented for an appointment with Lawrence

Malak MD, of UCSD Outpatient Psychiatric Services. Dr. Malak’s Individual

Progress Note from August 6, 2013, reported the results of Plaintiff’s mental status

exam as: “Obese woman who is fairly groomed and casually dressed and walks

slowly. Speech is normal and she makes good eye contact. Mood is “depressed” and

affect is dysphoric and tearful during interview. Thought process LLGD [linear,

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logical and goal directed”]. Denies SI [suicidal ideation] / HI [homicidal ideation] /

AVH [auditory verbal hallucinations] and no evidence of psychosis. Insight and

judgment are fair. She is AOx4 [alert and oriented to (1) person, (2) place, (3) time

and (4) situation].” (AR 416.) 

One week later, on August 15, 2013, Dr. Malak completed a mental impairment

questionnaire form provided to him by the Plaintiff. (AR 379-81.) On the form, Dr.

Malak indicated he diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder, severe without

psychotic features. He listed the following clinical signs and symptoms in support of

the diagnosis as: “low mood, hopelessness, poor sleep, crying episodes, poor energy,

guilt and low motivation and poor focus/attention.” Dr. Malak rated as “seriously

limited”, Plaintiff’s ability to remember, understand and carry out short and simple

instructions and her ability to exercise appropriate judgment in matters of safety and

work procedures. Dr. Malak rated as “marked” Plaintiff’s ability to: (1) remember,

understand and carry out more complex and detailed instructions; (2) maintain

attention; (3) maintain regular attendance; (4) ability to sustain work activity without

the need for additional supervision; (5) ability to perform work tasks without

interruption; (6) ability to appropriately interact with supervisors; (7) ability to

appropriately interact with co-workers and (8) ability to deal with normal work

stressors. (AR 379-81.)

Dr. Malak’s next Individual Progress Note from September 10, 2013, reported

the results of Plaintiff’s mental status exam as: “Obese woman who is fairly groomed

and casually dressed in black athletic pants and yellow shirt and walks slowly. 

Speech is normal volume, rhythm but somewhat monotone. She maintains good eye

contact although she is tearful at a couple points during the interview. Mood is “Tired

but a little better” and affect is overall dysphoric although less tearful than last visit. 

Thought process LLGD. Denies SI/ HI/ AVH and no evidence of psychosis. Insight

and judgment are fair. She is AOx4.” (AR 418.) 

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3. Consultative Examiner - Dr. Mounuir Soliman - Ex 1F

Plaintiff presented to the QTC Medical Group where she underwent a

psychiatric evaluation by psychiatrist Mounuir Soliman, M.D. In a report dated

December 20, 2011, Dr. Soliman summarized Plaintiff’s mental status examination as

follows: (1) as to attitude and behavior, Plaintiff “was pleasant and cooperative”; (2)

as to intellectual functioning and sensorium, Plaintiff “was alert and oriented to

person, place and time”; (3) as to abstract thinking, Plaintiff’s “thinking was normal”;

(4) as to insight and judgment, Plaintiff’s “insight was good”; (5) as to affective

status, Plaintiff’s “mood was depressed. Affect was congruent....denies current

suicidal ideations ...denies current homicidal ideations ... neurovegetative signs and

symptoms were significant for decreased concentration and decreased energy”; and

(6) as to reality testing, Plaintiff had “no looseness of associations ... no evidence of

ideas of reference, thought insertion, thought broadcasting or thought withdrawal ...

no evidence of auditory hallucinations or visual hallucinations.” (AR 287-88.) Dr.

Soliman diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression and opined “from a psychiatric

standpoint, the claimant is able to understand, carry out, and remember simple and

complex instructions... interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public...

[and] withstand the stress and pressures associated with an eight-hour workday and

day-to-day activities.” (AR 288.)

4. Consultative Examiner - Dr. Alan Berkowitz - Ex. 6F

Plaintiff presented to Valette & Associates where she underwent a psychiatric

evaluation by psychiatrist Alan Berkowitz, M.D. In a report dated October 19, 2012,

Dr. Berkowitz summarized Plaintiff’s mental status examination as follows: 1) as to

attitude and behavior, Plaintiff “was initially quite quiet but as the interview

progressed, she became engaging and much less uncomfortable ... Put good effort into

the interview... ”; (2) as to orientation, attention and memory, Plaintiff “was

completely oriented in all spheres”; (3) as to affective status, Plaintiff’s mood was

“mildly dysphoric”; and (4) as to reality contact, Plaintiff’s “thought processes were

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well organized and without any evidence of internal stimuli... no thought blocking or

speech latency.” (AR 312.) Dr. Berkowitz diagnosed Plaintiff with mild major

depression. Dr. Berkowitz noted “I believe this woman was somewhat disingenuous

during her interview stating she ‘does nothing at all.’ When I asked her if she was

sleeping much of the day, she denied this stating that she just ‘stares at the wall’. To

that end, I believe that she is capable of functioning at a much higher level than she

will admit particularly given how much detail put into the office questionnaire and

how well she did on the mental function portion of the interview. Thus I see no

functional limitations.” (AR 313.)

B. Hearing Testimony - Plaintiff Orlanda Pradd

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she started seeing a psychiatrist for

depression after one of her sisters passed away at the end of 2010 or the beginning of

2011. (AR 58.) Plaintiff also testified that she lives with another sister, who is

mentally disabled, and helps that sister pay bills, read mail and sometimes go grocery

shopping. (AR 60-62.) Plaintiff stated at the hearing that doctors at UCSD were

helping her deal with grief, guilt and depression. (AR 63.) She testified that she

typically spends her day sitting or watching television. (AR 66.) She has periods of

time where, for three to four times in the week, she does not feel like getting out of

bed and she sometimes goes two days in a row without showering or eating. (AR 67-

68.) Plaintiff stated at the hearing that she has negative thoughts and her mood and

emotions fluctuate. (AR 69.) She takes prescription medicines effexor, wellbutrin,

risperdal and trazodone as part of her mental health treatment. (AR70.)

C. ALJ’s Findings

On December 20, 2013, the ALJ issued his decision denying benefits to

Plaintiff. (AR 12-24.) In arriving at his decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff using the

five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in the Commissioner’s regulations, 20

C.F.R. section 416.920(a), and described below. The ALJ found that the Plaintiff had

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not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 17, 2010. (AR 14.)

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied step one. (Id.)

The ALJ found step two was satisfied because Plaintiff has the following severe

impairments: obesity, degenerative joint disease and depression.1

 (Id.)

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not, however, have an impairment

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed

impairments for depression under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR

15.) In support of his decision, the ALJ explained his reasoning as to why Plaintiff

did not meet the “B” and “C” criteria of listed impairments section 12.04 for

depression. Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not satisfy the “paragraph B”

criteria because Plaintiff only has mild restrictions in activities of daily living;

moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning; moderate difficulties

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and no episodes of decompensation of

extended duration. (AR 15.) At least two “marked” limitations or one “marked”

limitation and “repeated” episodes of decompensation of an extended duration are

required to satisfy “B” criteria. (AR 15.)

Similarly, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not meet the “C” criteria because there

was no evidence in the record of: repeated episodes of extended decompensation; a

residual disease process that has resulted in such marginal adjustment that even a

minimal increase in mental demands or change in environment would cause

decompensation; or current history of one-or-more years of inability to function

outside of a highly supportive living arrangement. (AR 16.) Because none of the “C”

criteria had been met, the ALJ proceeded to step four.

The fourth and fifth steps require the ALJ to determine how the claimant’s

impairments affect the claimant’s ability to perform work. To make this

1

 12.04 Affective disorders: Characterized by a disturbance of mood, accompanied by a full or partial manic or

depressive syndrome. Mood refers to a prolonged emotion that colors the whole psychic life; it generally involves either

depression or elation. The required level of severity for these disorders is met when the requirements in both A and B are

satisfied, or when the requirements in C are satisfied. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.04.

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determination, the ALJ formulates the claimant’s RFC. An RFC “is the most [the

claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). An

RFC “is used at step four of the sequential evaluation process to determine whether

the individual is able to do past relevant work, and at step five to determine whether

an individual is able to do other work, considering his or her age, education, and work

experience.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had an RFC to perform “sedentary work ... except

the claimant is limited to simple unskilled work at the Specific Vocational Preparation

Level 1 or the Specific Vocational Preparation Level 2; the claimant can be on her

feet for 30 minutes at one time; she requires use of a cane to walk, she can be on her

feet a total of 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; the claimant cannot bend, stoop, crouch

or crawl; she cannot have any interaction with the public; she can have occasional

non-intense interaction with co-workers and supervisors; the claimant is precluded

from tasks requiring hypervigilance, she cannot perform fast-paced work, such as

rapid assembly lines; the claimant cannot perform tasks requiring quick decision

making.” (AR 16.) 

In compiling the residual functional capacity for Plaintiff, the ALJ discounted

opinions from treating sources Calvin Yang, M.D. and Lawrence Malak, M.D. (AR

20-21.) The ALJ stated that he gave little weight to Dr. Yang’s and Dr. Malak’s

opinions because they: (1) did not provide an explanation for the assessments, did not

propose Plaintiff’s specific functional limitations or state what Plaintiff could do

despite her impairments; (2) did not provide medically acceptable clinical or

diagnostic findings as support and instead relied on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints;

(3) were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence as a whole and (4) were

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s admitted activities of daily living. (AR 20.) 

The ALJ specifically addressed his interpretation of the objective medical

evidence, finding: 

“The medical records showed the claimant sought psychiatric treatment for her

diagnosed major depressive disorder (Exs. 4F;7F). The claimant underwent

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Group therapy in which the medical records indicated the claimant endorsed

depressive symptoms in the context of psychosocial stressors (e.g. unstable

housing environment and possible loss of shelter soon) as well as three month

anniversary of her sister’s death (Exs. 4F, p.1; 7F). The claimant was

conservatively treated with medications (e.g. Celexa, Wellbutrin, Trazadone,

Ativan, Prozac. Id. It has been noted that the claimant has tolerated her

medication well (Ex. 7F, p.17). Her mental status examination was somewhat

normal (Exs. 4F; 7F). Although she was given Global Assessment of

Functioning ("GAF”) score of 45 (Ex.7F, p.15). A progress note, dated

September 13, 2011, revealed the claimant was “doing better” but she did [not]

read “Feeling Good” as assigned and has not been doing “thought exercises.”

(Ex. 10F, p. 1).” 

(AR 20.)

The ALJ also specifically addressed activities of daily living, finding: 

“[T]he claimant admitted to the consultative examiner, Dr. Soliman, that she

could cook, clean, shop, do errands, take care of her personal hygiene, take care

of her financial responsibilities, drive a car, get along well with her family,

friends and neighbors, and focus on her activities of daily living (Ex. 1F, p.3). 

However, the claimant [made] inconsistent statements to consultative examiner,

Dr. Berkowitz, that she does nothing (Ex. 6F, p. 2). She said she stares at walls

and does not watch television. She does not talk, do laundry, or cook. These

statements are inconsistent with the function reports and her testimony, which

weighs against her credibility.”

(AR 18.)

In determining the RFC, the ALJ also gave “some weight” to the opinion of

consultative psychiatric examiner, Mounir Soliman, M.D., a Board certified

neurologist and psychiatrist who interviewed Plaintiff and conducted a mental status

examination. Dr. Soliman diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression. (AR 21.) Dr.

Soliman opined Plaintiff could: (1) understand, carry out, and remember simple and

complex instructions; (2) interact with coworkers, supervisors and the general public;

and (3) withstand the stress and pressures in an 8-hour workday. (Id., AR 287-88.) 

The ALJ, however, gave Plaintiff a more restrictive functional capacity assessment

than recommended by Dr. Soliman based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (AR

21.)

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Similarly, the ALJ gave “some weight” to the opinion of consultative

psychiatric examiner, Alan Berkowitz, M.D., a Board certified psychiatrist who

interviewed Plaintiff and conducted a mental status examination of Plaintiff. Dr.

Berkowitz diagnosed Plaintiff with mild major depression. (AR 22.) Dr. Berkowitz

opined that Plaintiff had no mental functional limitations and was overall normal

besides exhibiting an initially guarded mannerism. The ALJ again gave Plaintiff a

more restrictive functional capacity assessment than recommended by Dr. Berkowitz

based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (AR 21-22.)

Based on the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff had an RFC to perform sedentary

work limited to simple unskilled work at Specific Vocational Preparation Levels 1 or

2, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a

telemarketer, which qualifies as a sedentary, semi-skilled job at Specific Vocational

Preparation Level 3. (AR22). Nevertheless, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform

other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy including addresser and

document preparer based on the vocational expert’s testimony from the December 5,

2013 hearing. (AR 23; 74-75.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not

disabled as defined by the Act. (AR 24.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To qualify for disability benefits under the Act, an applicant must show that: (1)

she suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to result in

death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve

months or more; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of performing

the work that she previously performed or any other substantially gainful employment

that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).

A. Sequential Evaluation of Impairments

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step process to determine

whether an applicant is “disabled.” The five steps are as follows: (1) Whether the

claimant is presently engaging in any substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is

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not disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds to step two; (2) Whether the claimant's

impairment is severe. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds

to step three; (3) Whether the impairment meets or equals a specific impairment listed

in the Listing of Impairments (“listings”). If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, the

evaluation proceeds to step four; (4) Whether the claimant is able to do any work she

has done in the past. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds

to step five; (5) Whether the claimant is able to do any other work. If not, the claimant

is disabled. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1509; see

also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 1999). The claimant bears the

initial burden of proving disability in steps one through four of the analysis. Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d

683, 687 (9th Cir.1989)). If a claimant establishes an inability to carry on past work,

the burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five to show that the claimant can

perform other substantial gainful work. Id.

B. Judicial Review

A claimant may seek judicial review of an unfavorable decision of the

Commissioner. The district court will not disturb the Commissioner's decision unless

it is based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence. Smolen v. Chater,

80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla,

but less than a preponderance. Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971)); Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975)).

Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would consider adequate to

support a conclusion. Id. The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving

conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.1995). If the evidence is subject to more than one rational

interpretation, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,

679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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The district court may enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the

Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court may also remand the matter

to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s two treating physicians

was legally insufficient and unsupported by the record; and (2) the ALJ erred by

assigning greater weight to the consultative examiner’s opinions than to the treating

physicians. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that while the ALJ stated the Yang and Malak

opinions lacked support, the record actually demonstrates that each physician supported

his opinion in the psychiatric review form and mental impairment questionnaire that they

completed by providing answers to follow-up questions provided in the forms. Plaintiff

contends the forms constitute valid opinion evidence and the ALJ failed to address the

factors set forth in the Social Security Regulations to discount them. Plaintiff also argues

that because the ALJ only cited to a small number of records in his decision, he could not

have reviewed the entire record in this case. Similarly, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s

consideration of her daily activities, in order to develop an RFC, was superficial at best.

[ECF No. 15 at pp. 5-9.] As for the issue of assigning greater weight to the consultative

examiners than to Plaintiff’s treaters, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to afford the

treaters the deference to which they were presumptively entitled and made no effort to

explain why the consultative examiners’ opinions were entitled to more weight when both

the consultative examiners and the treating physicians had equal opportunity to observe

Plaintiff’s condition in person. [ECF No. 15 at pp. 10-11.]

In response, Defendant contends the ALJ’s decision to assign little weight to the

opinions of treating physicians, Drs. Yang and Malak was based on several legally valid

factors including: (1) Drs. Yang and Malak’s opinions were based heavily on Plaintiff’s

self reports, as opposed to clinical or diagnostic findings; (2) Drs. Yang and Malak’s

opinions were inconsistent with the medical record as a whole; and (3) Drs. Yang and

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Malak were unfamiliar with Plaintiff’s admitted activities of daily living. [ECF No. 19-1

at 5.] As for the ALJ”s assignment of the higher, “some weight” consideration to the

opinions of consultative examiners, Drs. Soliman and Berkowitz, Defendant argues the

assignment of some weight to their opinions was acceptable because both physicians

conducted an in-person assessment and examination of Plaintiff, which in turn constitutes

substantial evidence under Ninth Circuit case law. [ECF No. 19-1 at 6.]

B. Assignment of Weight - Standard of Review

In evaluating medical opinions, Ninth Circuit case law and Social Security

regulations “distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who

treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the

claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995,

as amended April 9, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) & 416.927(d) (prescribing

the respective weight to be given the opinion of treating sources and examining sources). 

“As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source

than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830;

accord Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir.2003). This is

so because a treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to

know and observe the patient as an individual.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230

(9th Cir.1987). Due to this deference, the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons

for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of treating or examining physician. Lester, 81

F.3d at 830; Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.2006). When a treater

or examiner is contradicted by another doctor, the opinion of that treating or examining

physician can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Regennitter v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 166

F.3d 1294, 1298–99 (9th Cir.1999). 

In this case, the opinions of the consultative examiners - Dr. Soliman and Dr.

Berkowitz - which were based on their in-person assessment and mental status

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examinations of Plaintiff, conflicted with the opinions of treating physicians Dr. Yang

and Dr. Malak on whether Plaintiff was able to work due to her depression. Accordingly,

the ALJ needed to provide specific and legitimate reasons in his decision, supported by

substantial evidence in the record, to discount the treating physicians’ opinions. Id. As

mentioned in the Judicial Review section supra, substantial evidence means more than

a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279. It is evidence that

a reasonable mind would consider adequate to support a conclusion. Id.

1 . Dr. Yang’s Psychiatric Review Form 

The ALJ provided four reasons for giving little weight to the opinion in Dr. Yang’s

psychiatric review form that Plaintiff could not work. First, the ALJ found the form did

not provide an explanation for the opinion, did not propose Plaintiff’s specific functional

limitations and did not state what Plaintiff could do despite her impairments. It is wellestablished that an ALJ does not need to give weight to conclusory opinions supported

by minimal clinical findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999)

(affirming the ALJ’s rejection of a minimally supported treating physician’s opinion.) 

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Yang’s opinion actually did provide an explanation, and

upon the Court’s review of Dr. Yang’s psychiatric review form, there is an explanation

as to why Dr. Yang felt it would be difficult for Plaintiff to work at a regular job on a

sustained basis. (AR 295.) However, the explanation is brief. Dr. Yang wrote: “Base[d]

on my interactions with patient I feel she would have significant difficulty making it to

work or maintaining at work due to her fear of leaving her home, feelings of shame, and

inadequacy. She is afraid of rejection and her anxiety would interfere with her ability to

carry through tasks. Her concentration and memory are impaired. She is isolative and

would have difficulty interacting with customers or other employees.” (AR 295.) An

ALJ may discount treating physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and

unsupported by the record as a whole. See e.g. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,

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1149 (9th Cir. 2001).2 In addition, the functional limitations that were identified by Dr.

Yang on the form were compiled as a checklist, which also provides a legitimate basis

for discounting a treating physician’s opinion. See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding an ALJ’s decision discounting the

treating physician’s view because it was in the form of a checklist, did not have

supportive objective evidence and was based on Plaintiff’s subjective descriptions of

pain.)3

 Finally, the Court’s review of Dr. Yang’s form revealed that the form did not state

what Plaintiff could do despite her impairments, just as the ALJ described. See Burch

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that if the evidence is subject

to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.) It is

also important to note that the issue of Plaintiff’s ability to work is reserved to the

Commissioner of Social Security and Dr. Yang’s opinion on that issue is not entitled to

special weight. Specifically, under the Code of Regulations for the Social Security

Administration, the Commissioner is responsible for determining whether a claimant

meets the statutory definition of disability and “will not give any special significance”

to a statement that the claimant is “unable to work” - which is the opinion made in

Dr. Yang’s form. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1)-(3)4

; see also McLeod v. Astrue, 640

2

 The Court discusses inconsistency with the record at pp. 18-19 below as it is the ALJ’s third stated reason for

discounting Dr. Yang’s opinion. 

3

 The Court discusses reliance on subjective complaints at pp. 17-18 below as it is the ALJ’s second stated reason

for discounting Dr. Yang’s opinion.

4

 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d) - Medical source opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Opinions on some issues, such as the examples that follow, are not medical opinions, as described in

paragraph (a)(2) of this section, but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner

because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the

determination or decision of disability. 

(1) Opinions that you are disabled. We are responsible for making the determination or decision

about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. In so doing, we review all of the

medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source's statement that you are

disabled. A statement by a medical source that you are “disabled” or “unable to work” does not

mean that we will determine that you are disabled. 

(2) Other opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner. We use medical sources, including

your treating source, to provide evidence, including opinions, on the nature and severity of your

impairment(s). Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as whether

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F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Although a treating physician’s opinion is generally

afforded the greatest weight in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect

to the existence of an impairment or the ultimate issue of disability.”) Thus, IT IS

RECOMMENDED the Court find the ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to Dr.

Yang’s opinion.

The second reason the ALJ listed for giving little weight to Dr. Yang’s opinion was

that Dr. Yang primarily summarized the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints as opposed to

citing medically acceptable clinical findings in support. The Ninth Circuit has explained

that rejection of a treating physician’s opinion constitutes a specific and legitimate reason

when the opinion is premised on a claimant’s own subjective complaints. Fair v. Bowen,

885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989). Given this standard, the Court has reviewed Dr.

Yang’s psychiatric review form. The form includes a section that specifically asks the

practitioner to “[i]dentify additional tests or evaluations you would advise to fully assess

your Plaintiff’s impairments and limitations.” Dr. Yang responded “none at this time”

to that inquiry. (AR 295.) The Court notes that although Dr. Yang failed to identify

additional clinical tests or evaluations on the form, he did list Plaintiff’s Global

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score on the form. However, the ALJ explained in

his decision that he found the GAF scores were “of limited evidentiary value [because]

they reveal only snapshots of impaired and improved behavior ... [t]he GAF score (as a

method of evaluating the severity of impairments) has been specifically rejected by the

Social Security Administration.” (AR 20.) Indeed, in its Revised Medical Criteria for

Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, the Social Security

Administration states:

“The GAF scale ... is the scale used in the multiaxial evaluation system endorsed

your impairment(s) meets or equals the requirements of any impairment(s) in the Listing of

Impairments in appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404 of this chapter, your residual functional

capacity (see §§ 416.945 and 416.946), or the application of vocational factors, the final

responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.

(3) We will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to

the Commissioner described in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this section.

20 C.F.R. 416.927(d)(3).

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by the American Psychiatric Association. It does not have a direct correlation to

the severity requirements in our mental disorders listings.” 

65 Fed. Reg. 50746-01, 2001 WL 117632, (Aug. 21, 2000).

In addition, the Court has reviewed the record as a whole and the majority of

mental status examination results provided in the medical record rated Plaintiff’s insight

and judgment as adequate, normal or fair, which supports the ALJ’s interpretation of the

form as mainly reporting subjective complaints as opposed to clinical results. (AR 329,

331, 333,335, 337, 339, 346, 387, 389, 391, 393, 394, 399, 401, 404, 405, 407, 409, 411.)

Thus, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court find the ALJ’s second reason for

assigning Dr. Yang’s opinion little weight - that the opinion was based primarily on

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints as opposed to acceptable clinical findings - constitutes

a specific and legitimate basis for assigning lesser weight to Dr. Yang’s opinion that

Plaintiff was unable to work.

The third reason the ALJ cited for giving little weight to Dr. Yang’s opinion was

inconsistency with the objective medical evidence. Inconsistency is a specific and

legitimate reason for assigning a treating physician’s opinion less weight. Magallanes

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir.1989). Inconsistency is also one of the factors the

ALJ is instructed to consider under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations in

determining what weight to accord the opinion of the treating physician. 20 C.F.R.

404.1527(c)(4). Specifically, the ALJ cited evidence from the medical record in his

decision that was contrary to Dr. Yang’s opinion showing: (1) psychosocial stressors that

provided context for Plaintiff’s depressive symptoms; (2) well-tolerated and conservative

medications5

 (3) mental status that was “somewhat normal” [although as explained above,

the ALJ gave accompanying GAF scores limited evidentiary value]; and (4) improvement

in Plaintiff’s condition. (AR 20.) The Court’s review of the record supports the ALJ’s

5

 An ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician who prescribed conservative treatment,

yet opines that a claimant suffers disabling conditions. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th

Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly rejected opinion of treating physician where physician had prescribed

conservative treatment and plaintiff's activities were inconsistent with the physician's disability

assessment).

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determination. For example, on January 17, 2012, Dr. Yang wrote in a progress note:

“Currently depression improving after introduction of celexa. She is actually doing much

better now.” (AR 386.) In an April 16, 2012 progress note, Dr. Yang wrote: 

“Patient is doing better but she had altercation with ex-boyfriend...We examined cognitive ways in which she could intervene and change her mood as we as behavioral techniques she could use.” (AR 387.) 

A May 14, 2012 progress note of Dr. Yang’s stated: 

“She is tolerating her medications well, and feels they do help however recent stressors have been very difficult for her ... Patient is working on CBT techniques and thought record. Her mood was improved with medications but recent events

have made her more depressed. She is able to rally her coping skills though.” (AR389.) 

On May 29, 2016 Dr. Yang similarly wrote in a progress note that: 

[Plaintiff] has not been doing the thought record and I reinforced the importance of it to improving her mood. Her medications have been helpful and she reports fair mood despite all the stressors she is going through.” (AR 391.) 

On August 29, 2012, Dr. Yang wrote in a progress note:

“Moderate depression exacerbated by anniversary of her sister’s death. But she is handling it better this year.” (AR 395.)

On September 12, 2012, Dr. Yang wrote: 

“Patient doing much better since last saw her. She says she has more good days than bad. .... moderate improvement since last seen ... continues to improve, currently left with some irritability/distractibility/poor concentration and some insomnia. Possibly above is a medication side effect.” (AR 397.) 

Because there is medical evidence in the record that a reasonable mind would consider

adequate to support the ALJ’s determination, IT IS RECOMMENDED the Court find

the ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to Dr. Yang’s opinion due to inconsistency

with the overall record. 

The fourth and final reason the ALJ listed for discounting Dr. Yang’s opinion that

Plaintiff could not work was its inconsistency with Plaintiff’s admitted activities of daily

living. As explained above, inconsistency is a specific and legitimate reason for assigning

a treating physician’s opinion less weight. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. Inconsistency

is also one of the factors the ALJ considers in determining what weight to accord the

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opinion of the treating physician. 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c)(4). The ALJ explained in his

decision that “some of the physical and mental abilities and social interactions required

to perform these activities are as the as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining

employment.” (AR 18.) Specifically, the ALJ cited in his decision to Plaintiff’s

testimony that “she pays the bills for her sister, who is mentally disabled, reads the mail,

shops for groceries, watches television, sits around the house and attends church.” (AR

17.) The ALJ also cited to Plaintiff’s adult function report, in which Plaintiff indicated

that she can “take her medications, maintain her personal care, eat, watch television,

prepare her own meals, do laundry, clean, ride in a car, drive, shop in stores for groceries,

manage her finances, spend time with others, and attend church.” (AR17-18; 214-221.) 

Finally, the ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s admission to consultative examiner, Dr. Souliman that

she could “cook, clean, shop, do errands, take care of her personal hygiene, take care of

her financial responsibilities, drive a car, get along well with her family and friends and

neighbors, and focus on her activities of daily living.” (AR 18, 287.) Given this evidence

in the record, which a reasonable mind would consider adequate to support the ALJ’s

determination, IT IS RECOMMENDED the Court find the ALJ did not err in assigning

little weight to Dr. Yang’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable to work due to its

inconsistency with Plaintiff’s daily activities. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining an ALJ may discount a physician's opinion that is

contradicted by a claimant's own admitted abilities.)

2. Dr. Malak’s Mental Impairment Questionnaire 

On the Mental Impairment Questionnaire, Dr. Malak rated as “seriously limited”,

Plaintiff’s ability to remember, understand and carry out short and simple instructions and

her ability to exercise appropriate judgment in matters of safety and work procedures. On

the questionnaire, Dr. Malak rated as “marked” Plaintiff’s ability to: (1) remember,

understand and carry out more complex and detailed instructions; (2) maintain attention;

(3) maintain regular attendance; (4) ability to sustain work activity without the need for

additional supervision; (5) ability to perform work tasks without interruption; (6) ability

to appropriately interact with supervisors; (7) ability to appropriately interact with co-

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workers and (8) ability to deal with normal work stressors. (AR 379-81.)

The ALJ discounted Dr. Malak’s opinions based on the same four reasons given

to discount Dr. Yang’s psychiatric review form. As discussed above, those four reasons

were: (1) failure to provide an explanation, propose Plaintiff’s specific functional

limitations or state what Plaintiff could do despite impairments; (2) failure to provide

medically acceptable clinical findings and primary reliance on Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints; (3) inconsistency with objective medical evidence as a whole; and (4)

inconsistency with Plaintiff’s daily activities. (AR 20.) 

The Court has reviewed the Mental Impairment Questionnaire. (AR 379-381.) As

to the ALJ’s first reason for discounting the questionnaire - that it is essentially

conclusory - the Court’s review confirmed that there are very brief explanations after

each assessment on the form, but as the ALJ noted, the form does not state what Plaintiff

could do despite her impairments. An ALJ does not need to give weight to conclusory

opinions supported by minimal clinical findings. Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1113. 

The second reason the ALJ listed for giving little weight to Dr. Malak’s form was

reliance on subjective complaints instead of medically acceptable clinical findings. 

Again, the Court’s review revealed there were no clinical findings cited in Dr. Malak’s

form. An ALJ has stated a specific and legitimate reason for discounting a treating

physician’s opinion when it is based primarily on subjective complaints. Fair, 885 F.2d

at 605. 

The ALJ’s third and fourth reasons for discounting Dr. Malak’s opinion that

Plaintiff has limited or marked impairments were inconsistency with both the medical

record as a whole and with plaintiff’s admitted daily activities. Inconsistency is a specific

and legitimate reason for assigning a treating physician’s opinion less weight. 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. Inconsistency is also one of the factors the ALJ considers

in determining what weight to accord the opinion of the treating physician. 20 C.F.R.

404.1527(c)(4). As the Court discussed in Section IV(B)(1) above with respect to its

review of the evidence as whole, there is evidence in the medical record of well-tolerated,

conservative medications; “somewhat normal” mental status and improvement in

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Plaintiff’s condition as the ALJ noted. (AR 20.) Specifically, Dr. Malak’s treatment

notes reflect this interpretation of the ALJ. For example, on August 6, 2013, Dr. Malak

wrote: 

“She feels some of the medications have helped but minimally and feels the Celexa makes her feel ‘Duh’ or slow. She would like to consolidate her WBT and try a different medication to better help her depression. She denies any SI or HI and is optimistic that she can get better eventually.” (AR 416.)

Similarly, the results of Plaintiff’s mental status exam from the August 6th appointment

indicate:

 “Obese woman who is fairly groomed and casually dressed and walks slowly. Speech is normal and she makes good eye contact. Mood is “depressed” and affect is dysphoric and tearful during interview. Thought process LLGD [linear, logical and goal directed”]. Denies SI [suicidal ideation] / HI [homicidal ideation] / AVH [auditory verbal hallucinations] and no evidence of psychosis. Insight and

judgment are fair. She is AOx4 [alert and oriented to (1) person, (2) place, (3) time and (4) situation].” (AR 416.) 

One month later, Dr. Malak’s progress note from September 10, 2013 indicates: 

“Patient initially comes in saying she feels ‘ok today’ and that she still is

depressed. She goes on to report feeling less cognitive dulling since stopping the Celexa and has more days with less tearfulness than she did a couple months ago. She still has bad days and low energy but no side effects from Effexor.” (AR 418.)

The results of Plaintiff’s mental status exam from the September 10th appointment state: 

“Obese woman who is fairly groomed and casually dressed... Speech is normal volume, rhythm but somewhat monotone. She maintains good eye contact although

she is tearful at a couple points during interview. Mood is ‘Tired but a little better’

and affect is overall dysphoric although less tearful than last visit. Thought process LLGD. Denies SI/HI/AVH and no evidence of psychosis. Insight and judgment

are fair. She is AOx4.” (AR 418.) 

Accordingly, there is evidence in the overall record that a reasonable mind would

consider adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279. 

Furthermore, if the evidence is subject to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's

conclusion must be upheld. Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. IT IS THEREFORE

RECOMMENDED that the Court find the ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to

Dr. Malak’s mental impairment questionnaire.

3. Consultative Examiners - Dr. Mounuir Soliman and Dr. Alan Berkowitz 

The ALJ assigned “some weight” to consultative examiner Mounir Soliman’s

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opinion that Plaintiff could: (1) understand, carry out, and remember simple and complex

instructions; (2) interact with coworkers, supervisors and the general public; and (3)

withstand the stress and pressures in an 8-hour workday. (Id., AR 287-88.) However,

the ALJ gave a more restrictive residual functional capacity than opined by Dr. Soliman

in light of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (AR 21.) 

The ALJ also assigned “some weight” to consultative examiner Alan Berkowitz’s

opinion that Plaintiff had “no functional limitations.” (AR 313.) The ALJ again gave a

more restrictive residual functional capacity than opined by Dr. Berkowitz in light of

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (AR 21-22.) 

 Important to the ALJ's decision to assign some weight to these examining

physician opinions was his observation that despite diagnosing Plaintiff’s depression,

both psychiatrists found Plaintiff to be “overall normal” after conducting mental status

examinations and after interviewing and observing Plaintiff. (AR 21.) The ALJ’s

observation of a history of normal mental status examinations also aligns with the bulk

of the mental status examination results documented in the medical record, which

generally rated Plaintiff’s insight and judgment as adequate, normal or fair. (AR 329,

331, 333,335, 337, 339, 346, 387, 389, 391, 393, 394, 399, 401, 404, 405, 407, 409,

411.)6

 These opinions therefore constitute substantial evidence properly considered by

the ALJ. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that an

examining opinion can amount to substantial evidence, as long as there is other evidence

in the record to support it.) The Court also notes that by according only “some weight”

6

 The ALJ also noted the GAF scores of Dr. Soliman and Dr. Berkowitz, which conflicted with

the GAF assigned by Dr. Yang. Dr. Soliman assigned a GAF score of 66, which indicates some mild

symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school

functioning) ... but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful relationships.” Dr.

Berkowitz assigned a GAF score of range of 55-60, which indicates moderate symptoms (e.g. flat affect

and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or

school functioning (e.g. few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers.)” Dr. Yang assigned Plaintiff

a GAF score of 45, which indicates serious symptoms (e.g. suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals,

frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g. no

friends, unable to keep a job.)” (AR 20-21.) An examining physician's opinion based on independent

clinical findings that differ from the findings of a treating physician may also constitute substantial

evidence. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (2007) (explaining independent clinical findings can be

diagnoses that differ from those offered by another physician and that are supported by substantial

evidence).

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to the consultative examiners’ opinions, the ALJ also discounted these opinions in order

to give credit to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints when formulating the residual

functional capacity assessment.7

 When the evidence reasonably supports the ALJ's

decision, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Tackett v. Apfel,

180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.1999). IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the

Court find the weight the ALJ assigned to the examining physician opinions in this case

was articulated with specific, legitimate reasoning and supported by substantial evidence. 

V. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment be GRANTED. This Report and Recommendation of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned

to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 29, 2016, any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy to all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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7

 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not fully credible based on some noncompliance with therapy that was documented in the record. (AR 20; 382.) The ALJ wrote: “This [noncompliance] demonstrates a possible unwillingness to do what is necessary to improve her condition. 

It may also be an indication that the claimant’s symptoms were not as severe as the claimant purported. 

This evidence of noncompliance undermines the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints and

alleged disability. Although the failure to follow prescribed treatment without a good reason can be the

basis for finding that a claimant is not disabled, the undersigned considered it as a credibility factor in

this case and does not base the ultimate decision in this case on this factor alone.” (AR 19-20, fn.4)

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than August 12, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 15, 2016

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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