Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06172/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06172-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ANTHONY ESPARZA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

M. KNOWLES, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:04-CV-06172 LJO DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by jury

trial of making a terrorist threat and brandishing a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §§ 422, 417(a)(2)),

assault with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2)), attempted murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 664,

187), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12021(a)). See Lodged Doc.

No. 1. In addition, allegations that Petitioner inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a

firearm were found to be true. Id. On January 7, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to serve terms of

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 1 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

thirty-two months, life with the possibility of parole, twenty-five years to life, plus an additional

three years. Id. 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “5 DCA”). On June 18, 2003, the 5 DCA struck the three year sentence enhancement th th

and ordered the matter remanded for resentencing on the attempted murder count. Id. The judgment

was affirmed in all other respects. Id.

On July 23, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. See

Lodged Doc. No. 2. The petition was summarily denied on August 27, 2003. Id.

On August 20, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County

Superior Court. See Lodged Doc. No. 3. The petition was denied on October 18, 2004. Id.

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5 DCA on November 19, th

2004. See Lodged Doc. No. 4. The 5 DCA denied the petition on September 16, 2005. See Lodged th

Doc. No. 5. 

On December 16, 2005, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5th

DCA. That petition was denied on January 13, 2006. See Lodged Doc. No. 7.

Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on

February 16, 2006. See Lodged Doc. No. 8. The petition was denied on October 25, 2006. See

Lodged Doc. No. 9. 

On August 26, 2004, this Court received the instant petition which Petitioner had filed in the

Sacramento Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California

following an order of transfer to this division. Following a two-year stay of the petition, on January

3, 2007, Petitioner filed an amended petition including newly exhausted claims. The amended

petition presents the following seven (7) grounds for relief: (1) “Petitioner was denied the

constitutional right to present a defense where court excluded defense evidence of witness bias and

fabrication”; (2) “Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process was denied where his sentence was

enhanced for G.B.I. based upon insufficient evidence”; (3) “Petitioner was denied the constitutional

right to effective assistance of trial counsel, where counsel’s failure to timely disclose alibi

witnesses’ statements resulted in sanctions by the court”; (4) “Petitioner was denied the

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

constitutional right to effective assistance of trial counsel where counsel failed to properly

investigate alibi defense”; (5) “Petitioner was denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of

trial counsel where counsel failed to move to supress [sic] the only evidence which linked Petitioner

to the charged offense”; (6) “Petitioner’s constitutional right to a fair trial was denied when the trial

court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to sever the charged offenses”; and (7)

“Petitioner’s constitutional right to a fair trial and due process was denied when the trial court

refused to instruct the jury as to self-defense pursuant to California Jury Instr. 5.17.”

Respondent filed an answer to the amended petition on April 17, 2007. Respondent concedes

the petition is exhausted. Petitioner did not file a traverse.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court hereby adopts the factual summary of the case as set forth by the 5 DCA in its

th

opinion of June 18, 2003:

1. Threatening and Brandishing

While Thomas Roman was walking home on February 3, 2001, at approximately 1:30

p.m., a dark blue Suburban pulled up along side him. Roman knew the driver, "David," as the

brother of a girl Roman's brother Jose was dating. David was alone in the vehicle. He called

Roman's name, pointed a black nine-millimeter handgun at Roman's forehead, and said he

was going to kill Roman and Roman's brother Anthony because they had hit his sister and

called her names.

Roman stood paralyzed with fear. He had no prior problems with David and, in fact,

he had seen him only once before. Nor was Roman aware of any conflict between his brother

and David or, for that matter, between his brother and David's sister. Roman had not hit

David's sister. Roman's assailant smiled and drove off.

Roman reported the incident with David to the police. The detective assigned to the

case, Joe Giuffre, played "phone tag" with Roman for several months. On May 2, 2001,

Roman quickly identified appellant as his assailant from a photographic line up. At trial,

Roman testified that he was "very certain" appellant was the man who had threatened and

assaulted him.

Maria Chappa, appellant's sister, testified she had an ongoing relationship with Jose

Roman, Thomas Roman's brother. They have a child together. Their relationship caused

inter-family discord, as the Romans did not like her. Thomas Roman, in particular, remained

a constant annoyance and spread lies about her. However, no one in the family had ever

struck her.

2. Attempted Murder and Assault

On March 12, 2001, John Perkins, his girlfriend Diana Pimental, and his friend Chad

Jackson, went to a house on Garber Way to collect a debt from a man named Leonel.

Pimental's mother had rented Leonel a room and he owed her approximately $80 for an

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

unpaid phone bill. Pimental and her mother made an unsuccessful attempt to collect the

money two weeks prior. That Friday, Leonel told them he would have the money on Monday,

the 12 .

th

Pimental and Perkins approached the front door and asked for Leonel. Jackson stayed

in the car. When Leonel came out he said he did not have the money, but offered them two

parrots instead. When Pimental stated she did not want the parrots, Leonel became angry and

said he would not pay Pimental's mother. Perkins, in turn, became angry because Leonel was

belligerent, and an argument ensued. Pimental translated the exchange between the two men

as Perkins did not speak Spanish.

According to Pimental, Leonel threatened to kill, or have someone kill, Perkins.

Leonel was laughing as he said it, so Pimental did not take it seriously at the time. Perkins

challenged Leonel to "come out and do it," but Pimental persuaded Perkins to leave with her

so there would not be a fight. Pimental gave Perkins a ride home and did not see him again

that evening.

Still angry at Leonel's behavior, Perkins decided to collect some friends and go back

to the residence that evening. Approximately 10 friends gathered at a park two houses away,

while Perkins, his 15-year-old brother Gary, and Chad Ybarra walked up to the house. A little

girl in the yard pointed at him, said "that's him, the one in the white shirt," then a man came

out of the house, ran towards the fence, and started shooting. Perkins, who was still in the

street, turned and ran for his life. Gary testified that no words or gestures were exchanged

prior to the shooting. Perkins denied that anyone with him had a weapon.

Five or six shots were fired. Perkins was hit in the back of his head, but kept running.

Although bleeding and in pain, he made it to the house of a friend some three blocks away.

An ambulance was called and Perkins was taken to the hospital. Perkins was lucky; the bullet

entered his scalp, slid across the skull without penetrating it, then exited.

Perkins did not recall speaking to law enforcement prior to being taken to the

hospital. Deputy Larry McCurtain testified Perkins told him at the scene that he (Perkins) had

been walking down the street when he was fired upon by an unknown Mexican male for no

apparent reason. When other witnesses related a different version of events, McCurtain

reinterviewed Perkins at the hospital. Perkins then disclosed the earlier collection attempt and

confrontation. McCurtain had difficulty obtaining details from Perkins, but he was unable to

say whether Perkins was deliberately being evasive.

Officers responding to the Garber Way residence seized an informal photograph of

appellant posed with several other people, and mail addressed to appellant at that address.

Approximately an hour and a half after the shooting, Perkins identified appellant as his

assailant from the photograph. Within another hour Perkins was presented with a formal

photographic line up and again easily identified appellant as the man who shot him. Gary

Perkins could not identify anyone from the photograph or line up.

At trial, Perkins testified that he was certain appellant was the man who shot him. He

was only 10 feet away and was looking directly at the gunman when he opened fire. Perkins

used to live next door to Leonel; Leonel, who is much taller and thinner than appellant, was

not his attacker. No gun or shell casings were ever recovered.

Appellant presented an alibi defense but did not testify on his own behalf. Lisa

Rodriguez, a friend of appellants, testified she, her boyfriend Alex Luna, Victor Navarette,

and appellant were all in Los Angeles on the day of the shooting, as Luna was scheduled for

trial on narcotics charges in Fullerton that day. Navarette was subpoenaed as a witness and

appellant accompanied them because he was familiar with the area and they were not. They

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

left Bakersfield at 6:00 or 6:30 a.m. The court date was continued after the lunch break. They

left the courthouse between 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock, shopped, and visited with appellant's aunt

before leaving southern California.

The party returned to Bakersfield between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. On their arrival they

were greeted by appellant's mother (who had been babysitting Rodriguez' children) who was

"frantic" over rumors that appellant was in some sort of trouble. Rodriguez learned about the

shooting from the newspaper, but never contacted law enforcement regarding appellant's alibi

because she did not want to get involved. She had heard the incident was gang related and

feared for her safety and that of her five children.

Victor Navarette confirmed Rodriguez's testimony in all significant respects.

However, he was impeached with the fact that he initially told the investigator that the court

appearance was for Alex Garza, and that a fifth person had been in the car.

See Lodged Doc. No. 1 at pp. 2-6.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. th th

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 5 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 7

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Petitioner’s right to present defense evidence of witness bias and fabrication. Petitioner sought to

introduce evidence that Thomas Roman had allegedly made false complaints and police reports

against Petitioner and members of his family. Petitioner presumably sought to impeach Roman’s

credibility with this evidence.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."

U.S. Const. am. VI. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause was made applicable to the states

through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,

403-05 (1965). The Confrontation Clause gives a defendant the right “to be confronted with the

witnesses against him.” Id. “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for

effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever

extent, the defense might wish.’” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987), quoting Delaware

v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). The Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 8

defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose [the witness’] infirmities through

cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant

weight to the witness’ testimony. Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 21-22.

This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the 5 DCA. On June 18, 2003, the 5 th th

DCA denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. See Lodged Doc. No. 1. The claim was then presented

to the California Supreme Court where it was summarily denied on August 27, 2003. See Lodged

Doc. No. 2. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying review of the 5 DCA’s th

decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion

of the 5 DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). th

The 5 DCA first summarized the relevant facts, as follows: th

On cross-examination, appellant's counsel asked Roman whether he had any problems

with appellant's family. He denied any disagreement in the family due to Jose Roman's and

Maria Esparza's relationship. He admitted that appellant's mother had come at him with a

knife and that he had reported the incident to the police, but maintained it had nothing to do

with Jose and Maria. When appellant's trial counsel asked if Roman knew Rudy Reyes,

appellant's cousin, the prosecutor objected on grounds of relevancy and discovery.

Appellant's counsel defended the relevance of the question at a sidebar conference:

"MR. KATHKA [DEFENCE COUNSEL]: ... Rudy Reyes, Junior and Senior, they are

cousins of my client. They live just across the street on Garber Way as well. They

indicate they started having trouble with Thomas Roman last winter, December of

2000, January of 2001, over an incident involving paint ball guns, him and his brother

shooting paint ball guns all over [the] neighborhood. They reported these incidents.

They then started having all sorts of problems with the Roman family, specifically

Thomas Roman. Thomas Roman had called the 14 year old, asked her how much she

charged and basically called her a prostitute, in so many words, in March of last year.

He got in a fight with Marcus Banducci, that's the other witness we subpoenaed, that 

-in July of last year basically because- Mr. Banducci told me this morning basically

because he was a friend of Thomas. I mean of -

"THE COURT: The Esparzas?

"MR. KATHKA: No. Of Mr. Reyes. And Mr. Reyes is related to the Esparzas. And

basically this person, his brother, knocked Mr. Banducci unconscious. When the

Reyes tried to come to his rescue, after he was knocked unconscious. Basically the

police came out and investigated it, they arrested these two gentlemen for assault.

They reported falsely, evidently, for all the other witnesses, that Mr. Reyes had

assaulted Thomas with a pole, basically making a false report. But there's a real

history between this gentleman and my client's family. And specifically that they all

live in the same neighborhood. I think it's to bias and motive. It also might be

admissible character evidence for the authority under that, your Honor.

"THE COURT: Is your defense self-defense?

"MR. KATHKA: No. But there is an allegation -- and there's allegations that these

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 9

people make false reports, that they call the police all the time, there is a real grudge,

which he is denying, amongst the families. There's a disagreement -- I believe the

sister may be testifying as well, I will learn that today, that these two are very

antagonistic towards her and the relationship between her and Jose and just generally

antagonistic toward my client and his family in general. And this antagonism has

developed to the point of making false reports to the police to getting in fights."

The prosecutor countered that the evidence was relevant only to tangential issues. The

court agreed, and sustained the objection.

"THE COURT: I'm having trouble dealing with the relevance issue. I mean, you have

-- I have allowed you, as you know, to examine. Didn't you have a beef with his

mother as -- the defendant's mother? Haven't you had other beefs with the family?

Isn't your family pretty unhappy about Mr. Esparza's sister having a relationship with

Jose? I have allowed you to ask that. But, there is very little, if any, relevance to

bringing in people or to question this man about incidents he's had with other

extended family relatives of the defendant on the theory, which is the only theory that

I could -- that you have hit upon, the only possible theory you could urge it on, on the

theory that then those people are going to come in and say that he made false reports

about us. And you have got involved people, you are going to end up trying a whole

bunch of little sub cases in this case. And unless you can show a better basis for doing

this than what you propose, I will sustain the objections before me now. That has

nothing to do with discovery. It has to do with relevance."

See Lodged Doc. No. 1 at pp. 6-8.

The 5 DCA then analyzed the claim and rejected it as follows: th

Appellant argues that all relevant evidence is admissible and the proffered evidence

was relevant as it tended to establish whether Roman was truthful in his testimony. The

evidence was nonetheless properly excluded.

"Although the right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine adverse

witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility, ‘trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as

the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623, quoting

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679.)

Appellant's protestations to the contrary, evidence of Roman's conflicts with Banducci

and the Reyes', was not directly relevant to the issue at trial: whether appellant drew a gun on,

and threatened, Roman on February 3, 2001. None of appellant's proposed witnesses was

prepared to testify the confrontation did not happen, or could not have happened, i.e., that

Roman or appellant was somewhere else at the time in question. The proposed testimony

bore only on Roman's credibility.

Appellant claims the prosecution's ability to present evidence of a defendant's prior

sex offenses and domestic violence (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903) grants him a

reciprocal due process right to present evidence of a witness's prior falsehood to establish a

propensity to lie. This novel argument is completely unfounded. As our Supreme Court

observed in People v. Falsetta, “‘The rule excluding evidence of criminal propensity is nearly

three centuries old in the common law.’” (Id. at p. 913.) In California, this rule is codified in

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). Evidence code sections 1108 and 1109 provide

specific exemptions for evidence of prior acts of domestic violence and sexual assault from

section 1101. The Legislature has enacted no comparable section for truthfulness. Sections

1108 and 1109 do not abrogate the general rule excluding evidence of prior acts to prove

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 10

propensity as expressed in section 1101. Both sections 1108 and 1109 have withstood

constitutional scrutiny. (See People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 916-922; People v.

Escobar (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1095-1096; People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th

1301, 1309-1313; People v. Johnson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 417-420; People v. Brown

(2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1331-1334; People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th

1020,1025-1029.) If due process is not offended by admission of evidence of prior sexual

assault and/or domestic violence to prove a propensity to commit charged sex crimes and/or

domestic violence under sections 1108 and 1109, it cannot be said that due process is

violated in cases not alleging sexual crimes or domestic abuse where such evidence is not

introduced.

A defendant's right to confront witnesses by impeachment on cross-examination is not

violated if a reasonable jury would not have received a significantly different impression of

the witness's credibility had the defendant been permitted to pursue the proposed line of

cross-examination. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680.) Roman's biases,

and hence his motivation to fabricate, were presented to the jury. Appellant was able to

establish the existence of an interfamily conflict through Maria's testimony and Roman's

incident with appellant's mother. Roman also testified that after the shooting he saw appellant

and some friends jump the fence at his parents' house with the purpose of attacking Roman's

father.

Roman's interactions with appellant's cousins is significantly less probative of the

truthfulness of his trial testimony. Although they lived somewhere on the same street, the

Reyes' were not appellant's immediate family members, and counsel never articulated a basis

for inferring animus against them to appellant. Indeed, Roman and the Reyes' apparently had

a long running grudge arising out of behavior that had nothing to do with appellant or his

sister.

As pointed out by the trial court, establishing Roman's alleged untruthfulness on this

issue would have consumed an unwarranted amount of time. The Reyes' and Banducci would

have to explain their relationship to appellant and their versions of their dealings with

Roman. The prosecutor would be entitled to cross-examine them on their biases against

Roman. Roman, and likely his brother(s), would be called to rebut the allegations. Finally,

various law enforcement officers would likely be called to establish whether a police report

was taken, what, if any, action was taken on the report, and whether the police considered the

report unfounded. This testimony could easily have consumed as much time, if not more, as

the case in chief.

In the instant case, the trial court weighed the minimal probative value of the

proposed testimony against its concern with avoiding undue consumption of time that would

be caused by trying "a whole bunch of little sub cases" on the issue of Roman's credibility.

This legitimate concern justified the exclusion of the proffered impeachment evidence.

(People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 788.) Without specifically designating Evidence code

section 352, it is apparent that is what motivated the trial court. Evidence code section 352

provides:

"The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)

necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."

Appellant's contention that the evidence should have been admitted because it was not

prejudicial, i.e., not inflammatory or bias inducing, misses the mark. The evidence was not

excluded due to its prejudice, it was excluded as collateral and unduly time consuming. As

the California Supreme Court recently noted:

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 11

"A trial court's discretionary ruling under Evidence Code section 352 will not

be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] "'[T]he

latitude section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in

individual cases is broad. The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal

trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral

credibility issues." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th

334, 374-375.) 

There was no error by the trial court.

See Lodged Doc. No. 1 at pp. 8-10.

The appellate court’s determination is not unreasonable. As discussed by the appellate court,

the witness’ possible bias and prejudice against Petitioner was made known to the jury by the

questioning allowed by the court of the witness and by the testimony of Maria. Petitioner was able to

establish the existence of an interfamily conflict and therefore a motivation for the witness to

fabricate. There was nothing to be gained by allowing further questioning of the witness on these

issues. However, doing so would have consumed a vast amount of time. Thus, the trial court did not

err by finding the evidence to be collateral and unduly time consuming, and Petitioner was not

denied his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. 

Accordingly, the rejection of this claim by the state courts was neither contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, nor an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim should be denied.

B. Ground Two

In his next claim, Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s

finding of great bodily injury as to Petitioner’s shooting of the victim, Perkins, in the head.

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, California courts expressly follow the Jackson

standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d

557, 575-578 (1980); see also People v. Thomas, 2 Cal.4th 489, 513 (1992). Pursuant to the

Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson, the test in determining whether a factual finding is fairly

supported by the record is as follows:

“[W]hether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990). 

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 12

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324

n. 16. This Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). This presumption of correctness

applies to state appellate determinations of fact as well as those of the state trial courts. Tinsley v.

Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9 Cir.1990). Although the presumption of correctness does not apply to th

state court determinations of legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact, the facts as found by

the state court underlying those determinations are entitled to the presumption. Sumner v. Mata, 455

U.S. 539, 597 (1981). 

This claim was also first presented on direct appeal to the 5 DCA and rejected in a reasoned th

opinion. See Lodged Doc. No. 1. Also, the claim was presented to the California Supreme Court in

the petition for review and it was summarily denied on August 27, 2003. See Lodged Doc. No. 2. 

The 5 DCA analyzed the claim as follows: th

“It is well settled that the determination of great bodily injury is essentially a question

of fact, not of law. “‘Whether the harm resulting to the victim ... constitutes great bodily

injury is a question of fact for the jury. [Citation.] If there is sufficient evidence to sustain the

jury's finding of great bodily injury, we are bound to accept it, even though the circumstances

might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’” [Citations.]” (People v. Escobar

(1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 omitted.)

“Great bodily injury is bodily injury which is significant or substantial, not

insignificant, trivial, or moderate.” (People v. Armstrong (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1066;

see CALJIC 9.02.) While the law formerly required permanent or extended disfigurement,

impairment, or loss of bodily function, these strictures have been abandoned. (See People v.

Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 588-589 [applying the former test], disapproved in People v.

Escobar, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 745-750.) In Escobar a rape victim's bloody knees,

abrasions, painful neck, and vaginal soreness was held to constitute great bodily injury.

Perkins's scalp was pierced by a bullet which traveled approximately two and one half

inches before exiting his head. Perkins testified he was bleeding "quite a bit" and in "a lot" of

pain after being shot. Perkins described having a "big mushy knot like a softball a lot of

blood" on the "whole back" of his head. He was initially given morphine for pain, and the

hematoma was drained so that the swelling would not effect the brain. Perkins was

discharged the next day. At the time of trial, (10 months later), Perkins reported the wound

caused painful headaches if he slept on it.

Numerous pre-Escobar decisions, which applied the more stringent standard adopted

in People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d 562, have upheld findings of great bodily injury

based on injuries of comparable or less severity. (See, e.g., People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98

Cal.App.3d 830 [battered child suffered multiple contusions and swelling of her hands, arms

and buttocks]; People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 718 [multiple abrasions and

lacerations to the victim's back and bruising of the eye and cheek]; People v. Brown (1985)

174 Cal.App.3d 762 [one-inch long laceration of victim's vagina]; People v. Corona ( 1989)

213 Cal.App.3d 589 [swollen jaw, bruises to head and neck and sore ribs].)

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 13

Perkins's injury was at least as significant and substantial as the injuries suffered by

the victims in People v. Mendias (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 195, People v. Wolcott (1983) 34

Cal.3d 92 and People v. Lopez (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 460, where great bodily injury

findings were upheld. In Mendias, the victim was shot in the upper thigh and experienced

burning pain. He was admitted to the hospital, treated and released the next day. The bullet

was not removed. At trial, the victim testified that the bullet moved but was not painful.

(People v. Mendias, supra, at p. 201.) In Lopez, the defendant argued that one victim "felt no

pain when he was shot in the right cheek of the hip and that there was no evidence that the

wound was more than superficial. Appellant note[d] that a bullet traversed [the other

victim's] thigh, but there was no evidence that the wound was more than superficial or that

she suffered more than momentary distress." (People v. Lopez, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p.

463, fn. omitted.) There was "no evidence that either [victim] sought or received medical

treatment ...." (Id. at p. 463, fn. 5.) In Wolcott, the victim was shot in the calf, the bullet

fragmenting. The treating doctor removed one fragment but left the others to "work their way

out naturally." (People v. Wolcott, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 107.) The victim lost little blood, no

sutures were required, and the victim was released after treatment and went to work the next

day. The victim suffered "no permanent disability, but feels pain when his arm is touched

near the unremoved bullet fragments." (Ibid.)

Appellant claims Lopez was wrongly decided, faulting its lack of analysis. We have

located no opinion of any court, published or unpublished, which shares appellant's opinion.

The Lopez decision quotes Wolcott at length, including Wolcott's discussion of People v.

Jaramillo, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d 830, People v. Sanchez, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 718, People

v. Williams (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 446, and People v. Salas (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 600. We

find the Lopez and Wolcott decisions well reasoned.

Appellant nonetheless argues Lopez and Wolcott are distinguishable. Unlike the

victims in Lopez, Perkins did not fall to the ground, scream, become disoriented, or feel

"fire." Rather, Perkins ran three blocks and was offered only over the counter medications on

discharge. Furthermore, Perkins's wound was smaller than that in Wolcott, no invasive

procedures were performed, and no foreign bodies remained. We conclude the seriousness of

a wound is not dependant on the stamina, constitution, or stoicism of the victim. Perkins

suffered a piercing gunshot wound to the back of his head. We reject appellant's supposition

that no underlying tissue was damaged. The wound bled. Perkins felt significant pain. He

developed a swollen area the size of a baseball. He sought medical treatment and was kept for

observation. It is perfectly foreseeable that a similarly situated victim would have reacted

dramatically. Perkins's physical ability and tolerance for pain do not diminish the seriousness

of his injury. The wound was not superficial. (See People v. Jung (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th

1036, 1042 ["Abrasions, lacerations, and bruising can constitute great bodily injury"].)

See Lodged Doc. No. 1 at pp. 11-13.

In light of the above, it cannot be said that the state court resolution of this claim was

unreasonable. The Court must presume the correctness of the state court finding that the gunshot

wound to the victim’s head was great bodily injury. Petitioner fails to overcome the presumption.

The claim should be denied. 

C. Grounds Three, Four and Five

In his next three grounds for relief, Petitioner claims he was denied the effective assistance of

trial counsel. In claim three, Petitioner claims trial counsel failed to timely disclose alibi witness

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 13 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 14

statements thereby resulting in sanctions by the court. In claim four, Petitioner asserts trial counsel

failed to properly investigate his alibi defense. In claim five, Petitioner argues trial counsel failed to

move to suppress evidence which linked Petitioner to the charged offense.

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151

F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance

th

of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must

th

show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so

serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were

not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United

States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's th

performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at 694. Petitioner

must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose

result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78

F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9 Cir. 1994). th

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S.

668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any

deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are certain instances

which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual or constructive

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 14 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent. 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 15

denial of the assistance of counsel or where the State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659, and n. 25, 104 S.Ct., at

2046-2047, and n. 25 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the

“unreasonable application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle,

215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (2000). 

These claims were first presented on collateral review to the Kern County Superior Court.

See Lodged Doc. No. 3. On October 18, 2004, the Kern County Superior Court denied the claims in

a reasoned opinion. Id. The claims were then presented to the 5 DCA where they were denied on the th

merits on September 16, 2005. See Lodged Doc. Nos. 4, 5. Petitioner then presented his claims to the

California Supreme Court, where they were summarily denied on October 25, 2006. See Lodged

Docs. Nos. 8, 9. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying review of the 5 DCA’s th

decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion

of the 5 DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). th

1. Failure to Timely Disclose Alibi Witnesses

Just prior to the commencement of trial, the prosecution moved to exclude the testimony of

two alibi witnesses: Lisa Rodriguez and Victor Navarette. RT 18-20. The prosecutor stated he had

1

not been timely given copies of the statements of these alibi witnesses by the defense counsel despite

the fact defense counsel had copies of the reports available 2 weeks prior. RT 18-20. The prosecutor

argued he did not have adequate time to prepare for these witnesses. RT 18-23. As a result, the trial

court did not suppress the evidence; however, the court sanctioned the defense by giving an

instruction to the jury on the untimely production of evidence. Pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.28, the trial

court instructed the jury as follows:

Disclosures of evidence are required to be made at least 30 days in advance of trial.

Any new evidence discovered within 30 days of trial must be disclosed immediately. In this

case, defendant failed to timely disclose the following evidence: The names and statements of

Lisa Rodriguez and Victor Navarette.

The court has, nevertheless, under the law, permitted the production of the evidence at

trial.

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 15 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 16

The weight and significance of any delayed disclosure are matters for your

consideration. However, you should consider whether the untimely disclosed evidence

pertains to a fact of importance, something trivial or subject matters already established by

other credible evidence.

RT 272-273.

In rejecting this claim, the superior court applied the proper standard and found Petitioner

suffered no prejudice. The court noted the instruction given did not bolster the prosecution’s

argument regarding the alibi defense, nor did it deny Petitioner a meritorious defense. Further, the

evidence was in fact admitted. Last, Petitioner failed to present any facts or evidence that the jury

gave any weight to the delay in disclosure.

The state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim for lack of prejudice is reasonable. The

witnesses were able to testify that they were with Petitioner more than one hundred miles away from

the scene of the shooting at the time it occurred. The evidence was submitted to the jury for

consideration. It is not reasonable to conclude that the jury believed the witnesses’ accounts but then

chose to discredit their testimony because the prosecutor was not given ample time to investigate.

Accordingly, the state court rejection of this claim was a consistent and reasonable application of

governing Supreme Court authority. 

2. Failure to Properly Investigate Alibi Defense

Petitioner’s defense at trial was that he was attending court in the City of Fullerton at the time

of the incident and was then later visiting with his aunt at her residence. Petitioner faults trial counsel

for failure to secure court documents which purportedly would have showed a court appearance for

Petitioner’s acquaintance, or testimony from his aunt that Petitioner was in fact at her residence at

the time of the incident. Petitioner further faults trial counsel for failing to secure the attendance of

counsel’s investigator who could have testified to additional information regarding the alibi defense. 

The state court properly rejected this claim as speculative. Petitioner provides no facts

whatsoever regarding the court matter he allegedly attended. He fails to state whether he was a party

or witness in the matter, whether he had been subpoenaed to attend, what the case number was,

whether he was there to attend a hearing or some other matter, what courtroom he was in, or whether

he was represented by counsel. In addition, he provides no particulars on what could have been

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 16 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 17

elicited from the investigator.

Furthermore, Petitioner fails to show how the evidence could have altered the outcome.

Witnesses Rodriguez and Navarette did in fact testify that Petitioner was with them at court in

Fullerton at the time of the shooting. As correctly argued by Respondent, the additional evidence

would have added nothing meaningful to the defense. Accordingly, this claim was reasonably

rejected by the state court.

3. Failure to Move to Suppress

Next, Petitioner complains trial counsel failed to move to suppress a photograph allegedly

secured improperly by law enforcement from the house of one Debbie Solano. From this photograph,

the victim made his first of three identifications of Petitioner as the perpetrator.

The state court also correctly rejected this claim. First, there was no error on the part of

defense counsel, because counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise a meritless objection.

Petitioner submits a statement from Debbie Solano dating to three years after the incident wherein

she stated she had not given law enforcement permission to enter her residence. However, Petitioner

concedes the police officer stated in her report that Solano did in fact give her permission to enter

and search. Without more, it is clear the trial court would have resolved the issue in the prosecution’s

favor. 

Moreover, there is no prejudice. Although the victim made his first identification from this

photograph, he later positively identified Petitioner from a separate photographic lineup and again at

trial as the perpetrator. This claim was also rightly rejected.

D. Ground Six

Petitioner next argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sever the charged

offenses. Petitioner argues that the two separate offenses occurred at different dates and had no

transactional or logical relationship to merit joinder. Petitioner claims he was prejudiced because the

jury likely convicted him on the terrorist threat offense based on the alleged facts in the attempted

murder charge. 

As correctly set forth by Respondent, the Supreme Court has stated that improper joinder, in

itself, does not violate the Constitution. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986).

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 17 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 18

“Rather, misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice

so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Id. 

Here, Petitioner was not so prejudiced as to be denied a fair trial. As noted by Respondent,

the terrorist threat charge was not weak. It was supported by eyewitness testimony by the victim who

had come face to face with Petitioner at which time Petitioner pointed a gun at him and threatened to

kill him. The victim made three positive identifications of Petitioner as the perpetrator including an

in-court identification, and he stated he was certain of his identification. In addition, both the

prosecutor and defense counsel stressed that Petitioner was charged with separate offenses and the

facts of one could not be applied to the other. Further, Petitioner points to no evidence that the jury

convicted him on one count based on facts from the other counts. Accordingly, the rejection of this

claim was not unreasonable.

E. Ground Seven

In his final claim for relief, Petitioner alleges the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the

jury as to self-defense pursuant to CALJIC No. 5.17. 

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that an allegation involving the omission of a jury

instruction under state law does not form a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991) ("We have stated many times that federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law."). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the

jury charge, a petitioner must show that the instructions given the jury so infected the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violates due process. Id. at 72, citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147

(1973). The court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a

component of the entire trial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982), citing

Henderson v, Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Furthermore, even if it is determined that the

instructions violated the petitioner’s right to due process, a petitioner can only obtain relief if the

unconstitutional instructions had a substantial influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in

actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993) (whether

the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.). See

Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9 Cir. 1996). “The burden of demonstrating that an th

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 18 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 19

erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional

validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error

on direct appeal." Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154. “An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less

likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Id. 

In this case, the trial court rejected the proposed instruction, reasoning as follows:

And my reasoning is - - I don’t disagree with anything you said, including the fact that

the court must instruct on any theory that might present itself in the case, whether it will be

argued or heard by the defense or not. In this case, however, my reasoning in rejecting the

5.17, although it is not going to impact the range of verdicts made available to the jury, I’m

not going to instruct on the actual but unreasonable belief with regard to the defense because

(a), we have no testimony as to the state of mind of the defendant; (b), we do not - - there

were ten people in the park apparently ready to come in as a flying squad, if things soured

with the first three guys that went up to the place, but there is no evidence at all on the record

that anybody knew they were down there, so they aren’t really an issue; (c), the object of the

assault, if there was going to be an assault by Mr. Perkins and his friends, was not the

defendant; and (d), there is no indication that the precise moment that the shots were fired, if

they were fired by the defendant - - and that’s obviously the issue that the jury is going to

have to come to grips with, an issue, rather - - there is no indication that anybody at that point

in time, based on the testimony that we have, was doing anything that could possibly cause a

person to believe it was time to open fire. So I’m rejecting that.

RT 209-210.

Respondent persuasively argues that this claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas action

because Petitioner is simply arguing the application of state law. Moreover, the trial court clearly

applied the law correctly finding the instruction not warranted in light of the evidence. The omission

of the instruction did not deprive Petitioner of a fair trial. Therefore, the state court denial of this

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court authority.

The claim should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days (plus three days if served by mail) after being served with a copy,

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 19 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 20

any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to

the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail)

after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 27, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06172-LJO-DLB Document 54 Filed 08/28/07 Page 20 of 20