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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 87-1381 

LAKE HEFNER OPEN SPACE ALLIANCE, ) 

an Oklahoma non-profit corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ELIZABETH HANFORD DOLE, Secretary of ) 

the United States Department of ) 

Transportation, et al, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

THE CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, an Oklahoma ) 

municipal corporation: OKLAHOMA CITY ) 

MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY, a ) 

public trust, ) 

) 

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 2 81989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. Civ-86-181-W) 

William w. Gorden, Jr., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jean c. Rogers, Regional Counsel, Federal Highway Administration, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (William s. Price, United States Attorney, William Lee Borden, Jr., Assistant u.s. Attorney, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, with her on the brief), Attorneys for Federal 

Defendants-Appellees; 

Appellate Case: 87-1381 Document: 01019300943 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 1 
Floyd w. Taylor of Miskovsky, Sullivan, Taylor & Manchester, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney for State Defendant-Appellee; 

Daniel T. Brummit, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorney for Oklahoma 

City, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee; and Craig B. Keith, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, Attorney for Oklahoma Municipal Improvement 

Authority, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee, on the brief. 

Before BALDOCK, EBEL and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

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Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance, an Oklahoma non-profit 

corporation formed for the purpose of preserving open space and 

controlling use, improvement, and development of the land surrounding Lake Hefner in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, brought suit in 

the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Oklahoma against Elizabeth Hanford Dole, then the Secretary of 

Transportation, Ray A. Barnhart, the Administrator of the Federal 

Highway Administration, and v. o. Bradley, Director of the 

Oklahoma Department of Transportation. The City of Oklahoma City 

and the Oklahoma Improvement Authority subsequently intervened as 

state defendants. Lake Hefner prayed for judicial review of an 

administrative decision of the Federal Highway Administration 

(FHWA) approving a final environmental impact statement (FEIS) for 

a federally funded highway project which would build a six-lane 

urban freeway from the Northwest 63rd Street in Oklahoma City to 

N.W. 136th Street in Oklahoma City. The freeway would then become 

a four-lane divided urban arterial road to N.W. 178th Street in 

Oklahoma City. 

The decision which Lake Hefner complained of was made pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 u.s.c. § 4321-

4361, and the Transportation Act of 1966, as amended, Section 

4(f), 49 u.s.c. § l653(f), recodified at 49 u.s.c. § 303. The 

relief sought was an order reversing the decision of the FHWA approving the FEIS and allowing the highway project to proceed, and 

for a further order requiring the several defendants to "properly 

review the Alternatives to the route chosen for this project, and 

find that route which [is] prudent and feasible for this 

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Appellate Case: 87-1381 Document: 01019300943 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 3 
project, not by comparison of Alternatives, but by specific findings as to each possibility. • " 

After the federal and state defendants had filed separate 

answers, a joint motion for summary judgment was filed by all 

defendants. The motion was based on the administrative record, 

evidentiary matters, and supporting affidavits. Although Lake 

Hefner filed no evidentiary matter or affidavits in response to 

the defendants' motion for summary judgment, it did file a brief 

in opposition to the motion. 

After a hearing, the district court granted the defendants' 

motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for the 

defendants. Lake Hefner appeals. We affirm. 

I. The "Burden" on Summary Judgment 

Rule 56, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 

that a claimant or a defending party may move, with or without 

supporting affidavits, for summary judgment and that "judgment 

shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a-c). Rule 56(e) further 

provides that when a motion for summary judgment is made and "supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 

upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, 

but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise 

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Appellate Case: 87-1381 Document: 01019300943 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 4 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial." 

As above indicated, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was supported by the administrative record, several affidavits and other evidentiary matter. Plaintiff resisted the 

motion with a brief, but no affidavits or evidentiary matter. 

Therefore, the defendants in urging summary judgment were relying 

on the administrative record supported by affidavits, and Lake 

Hefner, in resisting the motion for summary judgment, was relying 

on that same administrative record, or its interpretation of that 

record. 

The district court correctly stated, in the 

paragraph of its order granting summary judgment, 

penultimate 

that summary 

judgment was only proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Lake Hefner argues that in preceding portions of the 

district court order, however, the court incorrectly indicated 

that Lake Hefner had some sort of "burden of proof." 

Specifically, Lake Hefner notes that in his order the district 

judge spoke as follows: "The burden of proof is on the challenging plaintiffs to establish that the EIS [environmental impact 

statement] was inadequate or the Secretary of Transportation acted 

improperly in opposing use of park lands," and the district judge 

further stated that Lake Hefner's "arguments have not demonstrated 

that the FHWA [Federal Highway Administration] erred on these issues; to that extent Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of 

proof." 

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We are concerned about these references made by the district 

judge to Lake Hefner's "burden of proof." When a defendant files 

a motion for summary judgment, he has to show that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 u.s. 242, 247-48 (1986); Brown v. ParkerHanni fin Corporation, 746 F.2d 1407, 1411 (lOth Cir. 1984). The 

opposing party, Lake Hefner in this case, has no "burden of 

proof, II as such; however, in resisting the motion for summary 

judgment, Lake Hefner may not rely on mere allegations, or denials, contained in its pleadings or briefs. Bryant v. O'Connor, 

848 F.2d 1064, 1067 (lOth Cir. 1988)(quoting Contemporary Mission, 

Inc., v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 

1981)); Burnette v. Dresser Industries, 849 F.2d 1277, 1284 (lOth 

Cir. 1988). Rather, Lake Hefner must set forth specific facts 

showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial 

and significant probative evidence supporting the allegations. 

Burnette, 849 F.2d at 1284 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49). 

If Lake Hefner had filed a motion for summary judgment, it 

would have had to show that there was no genuine issue of material 

fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

And, of course, if this case had gone to trial, Lake Hefner would 

have the plaintiff's usual "burden of proof." But in resisting 

defendants' motion for summary judgment, Lake Hefner only has a 

"burden," if that be the appropriate word, to identify specific 

facts posing genuine issues of material fact. See generally 

Bryant, 848 F.2d at 1067-68; Burnette, 849 F.2d at 1284. 

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However, under all the circumstances, we do not find that the 

district court's reference to Lake Hefner's "burden of proof" 

necessitates reversal. One of these "circumstances" is Celetex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317 (1986). 

In Celetex, decedent's administratrix brought a wrongful 

death action against Celetex claiming that her husband's death 

resulted from exposure to asbestos products manufactured by 

Celetex. A motion for summary judgment was filed by Celetex asserting that during discovery the administratrix failed to produce 

any evidence to support her allegation that the decedent had been 

exposed to Celetex products. The administratrix, in response to 

Celetex's motion, produced documents tending to show such 

exposure, but Celetex argued that such documents were inadmissible 

hearsay and should not be considered in opposition to Celetex's 

motion. The district court granted summary judgment, but the 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. On 

certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, and in so doing, commented 

as follows: 

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates 

the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 

an element essential to that party's case, and on which 

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In 

such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to 

any material fact," since a complete failure of proof 

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's 

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a 

sufficient showing on an essential element of her case 

with respect to which she has the burden of proof. 

"[T]h[e] standard [for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure SO(a) ...• " 

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Id. at 322-23 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 

250). 

In its complaint, Lake Hefner sought judicial review, and 

reversal, of an administrative decision, which necessarily 

involved a review of the record upon which that decision was 

based. In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, 

Lake Hefner did not "by affidavits or as otherwise set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 

Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e). Rather, Lake Hefner was apparently content 

to have the district court rule on the defendants' motion for summary judgment based only on a review of the administrative record 

before the court, and on the several affidavits submitted by the 

defendants. Thus, in such setting, the district court's references in its order to Lake Hefner's "burden of proof" are not 

fatal, particularly in view of its penultimate paragraph wherein 

the district court clearly indicated that summary judgment was 

only proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the "moving party" is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, we proceed to dispose of this appeal on the merits of 

the issues raised by Lake Hefner as grounds for reversal. 

II. Feasible and Prudent 

The FEIS considered eight Alternative Plans for the project, 

several of which involved the use of park land. Alternative I, 

the particular plan recommended in the statement and ultimately 

approved by the FHWA, involved using a part of Lake Hefner Park. 

On appeal, Lake Hefner asserts that the defendants in approving 

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Alternative I failed to comply with 23 U.S.C. § 138. That statute 

provides as follows: 

S 138. Preservation of parklands 

It is hereby declared to be the national policy 

that special effort should be made to preserve the 

natural beauty of the countryside and public park and 

recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and 

historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall 

cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the 

Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation 

plans and programs that include measures to maintain or 

enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. 

After the effective date of the Federal-Aid Highway Act 

of 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or 

project (other than any project for a park road or 

parkway under section 204 of this title) which requires 

the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, 

recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of 

national, State, or local significance as determined by 

the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of 

national, State, or local significance as so determined 

by such officials unless (1) there is no feasible and 

prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) 

such program includes all possible planning to m~n~m~ze 

harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and 

waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such 

use. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Lake Hefner's argument is that the words "feasible" and 

"prudent," as used in the statute, are "absolutes" and do not 

permit "comparisons" of the various alternatives. According to 

Lake Hefner, comparison of alternatives is at the heart of an FEIS 

which does not involve park land, but § 138 precludes comparisons 

of alternatives where park land is involved. In this vein, Lake 

Hefner argues that five of the eight alternatives in the FEIS were 

rejected on the "improper" basis of comparison, and only three 

alternatives were considered using the "proper" § 138 feasible and 

prudent test. We are not persuaded. 

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Both the FEIS and the record of the decision of the Highway 

Administration use the word "prudent" and "feasible" repeatedly in 

evaluating the eight alternatives. The FHWA in its record of 

decision found Alternative I to be the only feasible and prudent 

alternative, and determined that the other alternatives were not 

feasible and prudent. 

Further, we believe our holding in this regard is in accord 

with the rationale of Citizens to Preserve Overtqn Park v. Volpe, 

401 u.s. 402 (1971), a case relied on here by both parties. In 

Volpe, the Supreme Court, addressing 23 u.s.c. § 138 and the 

"feasible and prudent" standard, stated that "the Secretary cannot 

approve the destruction of park land unless he finds that the 

alternative routes present unique problems." Id. at 413. Our 

study of the record convinces us that the alternatives to the plan 

approved did present "unique problems." Therefore, we believe 

that the district court did not err in holding that the Secretary 

followed the statute. 

III. Freezing of Public Comment 

Regulations promulgated pursuant to 

Environmental Policy Act provide that after a draft 

the National 

environmental 

impact statement is prepared the agency shall request comments 

from the public. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (1987). A similar regulation 

promulgated pursuant to the Transportation Act provides for "effective public participation in consideration of highway location 

and design •••• " 23 C.F.R. § 790.1-790.11 (1987). Lake Hefner 

argues that the draft environmental impact statement and the 

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notice given concerning a public hearing referred to only six of 

the eight alternatives ultimately considered in the FEIS, and that 

such omissions "froze" public comment. We find no error in that 

regard. 

Lake Hefner concedes that it is not incumbent on the agency 

to hold a public hearing, but contends that once the agency 

determines to hold a public hearing such must "be enlightening 

instead of misleading." We hold that here the agency 

substantially complied with the regulations. One purpose of a 

public hearing is to develop new alternatives that may have been 

previously overlooked. 23 C.F.R. § 790.3 (1988). The fact that 

the draft environmental impact statement made no mention of mass 

transit or improved existing facilities, both of which were listed 

as alternatives in the final environmental impact statement, is 

not fatal. 

IV. "No Build" Alternative 

Alternative VIII in the final environmental impact statement 

was referred to as the "no build" or "do nothing" alternative. As 

indicated, in the FEIS and in the decision of the FHWA, Alternative I was deemed to be "the only feasible and prudent alternative," that is, all of the other seven, including "no build," were 

not "feasible and prudent." In this case the "no build" alternative was rejected because the existing streets would not be able 

to accommodate future traffic volumes. Other courts have found 

this reason adequate justification for eliminating a "no build" 

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alternative from consideration. 1 We have examined closely the 

exceedingly detailed FEIS and, in our view, the decision of the 

FHWA based thereon was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse 

of discretion, and was in accordance with the law. Accordingly, 

the district court acted properly in granting defendants' summary 

judgment. 

Judgment affirmed. 

1 See Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700~15 (11th Cir. 1985); Maryland Wildlife Federation v. Dole, 

747 F.2d 229, 242 (4th Cir. 1984); Arizona Past & Future Foundation v. Lewis, 722 F.2d 1423, 1429 (9th Cir. 1983); Coalition on 

Sensible Transp., Inc, v. Dole, 642 F. Supp. 573, 598 (D. D.C. 

1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Compare with Stop H-3 

Associat1on v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cerE: denied, 

sub nom Yamasaki v. Stop H-3 Association, 471 u.s. 1108 

(1985)(case remanded for more information when "no build" alternative rejected but existing highways with unused capacity during 

peak traffic hours). 

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