Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-03539/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-03539-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

---

ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

S.A., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-03539-LB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF Nos. 31, 32

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................. 3

STATEMENT ................................................................................................................................... 6

1. The Immigration and Nationality Act and Parole Generally ...................................................... 6

2. The Complaint............................................................................................................................. 6

2.1 September–December 2014: The Creation of the CAM Parole Program ......................... 6

2.2 2014–2016: The Operation of the CAM Program............................................................. 8

2.3 2015–Present: Donald Trump’s Statements Regarding Latinos ..................................... 11

2.4 January 2017: Executive Order 13,767 ........................................................................... 14

2.5 January 2017: The Alleged “Secret Shutdown” of the CAM Program........................... 15

2.6 February 2017: The Kelly Memorandum........................................................................ 17

2.7 August 2017: Termination of the CAM Parole Program ................................................ 19

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 1 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 2

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3. The Administrative Record ....................................................................................................... 20

3.1 2014–2016: The Record Regarding the Operation of the CAM Parole Program ........... 20

3.2 August 2017: The Record Regarding the Termination of the CAM Parole Program..... 27

STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 31

1. Administrative Procedure Act Claims....................................................................................... 31

2. Other Claims ............................................................................................................................. 33

ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................................................... 34

1. Standing..................................................................................................................................... 34

2. Administrative Procedure Act................................................................................................... 36

2.1 Termination of the CAM Parole Program Going Forward ............................................. 36

2.1.1 Whether termination violated the APA for failure to articulate a “satisfactory 

explanation”........................................................................................................... 37

2.1.2 Whether termination violated the APA for failure to provide explanations in 

the Federal Register............................................................................................... 46

2.1.3 Whether termination violated the APA for failure to take into account 

“serious reliance interests” .................................................................................... 47

2.1.4 Whether termination violated the APA for failure to “consider an important 

aspect of the problem”........................................................................................... 51

2.1.5 Whether DHS’s decision to stop processing CAM Program applications from 

January 2017 to August 2017 was a “secret shutdown” of the Program that 

violated the APA ................................................................................................... 52

2.2 Rescinding Conditional Approvals of Parole .................................................................. 53

3. Due Process............................................................................................................................... 56

4. Equal Protection ........................................................................................................................ 59

5. Equitable Estoppel..................................................................................................................... 63

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 64

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 2 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 3

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INTRODUCTION

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Secretary of Homeland Security has 

discretion to parole foreign nationals into the United States “temporarily” and “only on a case-bycase basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit[.]” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole does not constitute admission in a valid immigration or nonimmigrant 

status, but it allows a foreign national to enter and physically be present in the United States.

In 2014, the government instituted a program called the Central American Minors (“CAM”) 

Program, which allowed parents who were lawfully present in the United States to apply to bring 

their children and other qualifying family members in three countries — Honduras, Guatemala, 

and El Salvador, collectively known as the “Northern Triangle” — to reunite with them in the 

United States. A goal of the Program was to discourage children from making the long and 

dangerous journey from the Northern Triangle to the United States to try to reunite with their 

parents; the Program sought to achieve this goal by allowing applicant parents to apply for their 

beneficiary children while their children remained in their original countries.1

The CAM Program had two components: a refugee component and a parole component. U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), an agency within the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”), first evaluated beneficiaries to see if they qualified for refugee status 

(which, among other things, requires persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution “on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 

opinion”). If the beneficiaries qualified, USCIS referred them for approval as refugees under the 

CAM Refugee Program. If they did not qualify, USCIS automatically considered them for parole 

into the United States under the CAM Parole Program.

 

1 Some documents related to the CAM Program use the term “applicant” to refer to the parents present 

in the United States, while others use it to refer to the children or qualifying family members in the 

Northern Triangle countries. This order uses “applicant” to refer to the parents present in the United 

States, “beneficiary” to refer to the children or qualifying family members in the Northern Triangle 

countries, and “participant” to refer to applicants and beneficiaries. 

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 3 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 4

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By the end of 2016, USCIS had interviewed over 5,500 beneficiaries. It approved 99% for 

either refugee resettlement or parole under the CAM Program: it approved approximately 30% 

interviewed beneficiaries as refugees and approximately 99% of the remaining beneficiaries (69% 

out of 70%) for parole. Over 1,335 beneficiaries arrived in the United States.

In January 2017, following a change in presidential administrations, incoming president 

Donald Trump issued an Executive Order that (among other things) directed the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to “take all appropriate action” to ensure that DHS exercised its parole 

authority “only on a case-by-case basis” and “only when an individual demonstrates urgent 

humanitarian reasons or a significant public benefit derived from such parole.” DHS stopped 

processing CAM Program applications — including the applications for beneficiaries who had 

been conditionally approved for parole and were awaiting processing to finalize their 

arrangements to travel to the United States — and began a review of the CAM Parole Program. In 

August 2017, DHS announced that it was terminating the CAM Parole Program. It also announced 

that it was rescinding parole for the approximately 2,700 beneficiaries who had been conditionally 

approved for parole but who had not yet traveled to the United States.2It stated that those 

individuals, and other individuals who wanted to apply for parole, could still do so independent of 

the CAM Parole Program but that it would no longer award parole through the Program.

The plaintiffs in this case — applicant parents lawfully residing in the United States who 

applied to the CAM Program, their beneficiary children in Northern Triangle countries, and the 

nonprofit immigrant-rights organization CASA — filed this putative class-action lawsuit against 

President Trump, DHS, USCIS, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of USCIS, the 

State Department, the Secretary of State, and the United States, alleging that the government’s 

termination of the CAM Parole Program and its rescinding of conditional approvals of parole were 

unlawful. The plaintiffs bring the following four categories of claims:

 

2 DHS did not rescind parole for any beneficiary who had entered the United States before the time it 

terminated the CAM Parole Program.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 5

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1. claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), arguing that the 

government’s termination of the CAM Parole Program and rescinding of conditional 

approvals for parole were arbitrary and capricious,

2. a claim under the Due Process Clause, arguing that the applicant-parent plaintiffs have 

a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of their 

family members in Central America, and that the government deprived them of this 

liberty interest without due process by terminating the CAM Parole Program in an

arbitrary, irrational, and unlawful manner,

3. a claim under the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause, arguing that 

the government’s termination of the CAM Parole Program was substantially motivated 

by discriminatory animus by President Trump and the Trump Administration toward 

Latinos, and

4. a claim for equitable estoppel, arguing that the government engaged in affirmative 

misconduct by publicly representing between January 2017 and August 2017 that the 

CAM Parole Program was still in operation, when it actually had been secretly 

terminated.

The putative class is all applicants and beneficiaries who applied for the CAM Program before 

August 16, 2017, who were denied refugee status under the CAM Refugee Program, and who then 

were denied parole under the CAM Parole Program due to its termination.3

The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction (1) enjoining the government from 

terminating the CAM Parole Program and (2) requiring the government to reinstate the conditional

approvals of parole that were rescinded pursuant to that termination. The defendants moved to 

dismiss the complaint.

 

3 The plaintiffs do not bring any claims with respect to the refugee portion of the CAM Program or any 

government actions regarding that portion. They bring claims only regarding the parole portion. See

Compl. – ECF No. 3 (¶ 3), 40–44 (¶¶ 128–50). Record citations refer to material in the Electronic Case 

File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 5 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 6

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This order addresses the defendants’ motion to dismiss. (The court will address the plaintiffs’ 

motion for a preliminary injunction in a separate order.) The court denies the motion to dismiss the 

plaintiffs’ APA claims as they relate to the government’s mass-rescinding conditional approvals of 

parole made under the CAM Parole Program. In all other respects, the court grants the defendants’ 

motion to dismiss.

STATEMENT

1. The Immigration and Nationality Act and Parole Generally

The INA provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security “may, [subject to certain 

exceptions], in [her] discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as 

[s]he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 

public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States[.]”48 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 

The INA also provides that “such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the 

alien[.]” Id. The INA further provides that “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion 

of the [Secretary], have been served[,] the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody 

from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same 

manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Id. The Secretary’s 

parole authority is in turn delegated to various DHS officials. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a).

2. The Complaint

2.1 September–December 2014: The Creation of the CAM Parole Program

The government first proposed the CAM Program on September 18, 2014, as part of the 

President’s annual recommendations to Congress on proposed refugee admissions for the 

following year, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1157(d) and (e).5 The annual Presidential Determination on 

 

4 Section 1182(d)(5)(A) refers to the Attorney General, but pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 557, that authority 

has now been transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See, e.g., In re Arrabally, 25 I. & N. 

Dec. 771, 777 n.5 (B.I.A. 2012).

5 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 12 (¶ 36). 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 7

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Refugee Admissions incorporated these recommendations and provided that people in Honduras, 

Guatemala, and El Salvador “may, if otherwise qualified, be considered refugees for the purpose 

of admission to the United States within their countries of nationality or habitual residence.”

Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2015, 79 Fed. Reg. 69,753, 

69,753–54 (Sept. 30, 2014).

The CAM Program was structured as a dual refugee/parole program.6 Under the CAM 

Refugee Program, certain Central American parents lawfully living in the United States could 

apply for their minor children and qualifying family members to be considered for refugee 

resettlement while the family members were still in in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

7

Minor children and qualifying family members could be accepted as refugees if they could 

establish that they qualified for resettlement under U.S. law, that is, by demonstrating that they 

had a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion.

8 Under the CAM Parole Program, minors and 

qualifying family members who were considered under the CAM Refugee Program but did not 

meet the specific eligibility criteria for refugee admission were automatically considered for parole 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).9

In November 2014, the Departments of State and Homeland Security released a fact sheet 

regarding the program (the “November 2014 Fact Sheet”).

10 The fact sheet stated in part:

 

6

Id. (¶ 37).

7

Id.

8

Id.; accord 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugee” as requiring, among other things, persecution 

or a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion”).

9 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 12–13 (¶ 38).

10 Fact Sheet, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State and U.S. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., In-Country Refugee/Parole Program for Minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 

Honduras With Parents Lawfully Present in the United States (Nov. 14, 2014), available at

https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2014/234067.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2018) 

(November 2014 Fact Sheet) (cited by Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 13 (¶ 38)). The court may take notice of 

the fact sheet under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076–77 

(9th Cir. 2005).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 8

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Beginning in December 2014, a parent lawfully present in the United States will be 

able to file Department of State form DS-7699 requesting a refugee resettlement 

interview for unmarried children under 21 in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras.

Under certain circumstances, if the second parent resides with the child in the home 

country and is currently married to the lawfully present parent in the United States, 

the second parent may be added to the child’s petition and considered for refugee 

status, and if denied refugee status, for parole. . . .

. . . .

DHS will conduct interviews with each child to determine whether he or she is 

eligible for refugee status and admissible to the United States. . . .

Applicants found by DHS to be ineligible for refugee status in the United States 

will be considered on a case-by-case basis for parole, which is a mechanism to 

allow someone who is otherwise inadmissible to come to the United States for 

urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. An individual considered 

for parole may be eligible for parole if DHS finds that the individual is at risk of 

harm, he/she clears all background vetting, there is no serious derogatory 

information, and someone has committed to financially support the individual 

while he/she is in the United States. . . . Parole is temporary and does not confer 

any permanent legal immigration status or path to permanent legal immigration 

status in the United States.11

The CAM Program began accepting applications on December 1, 2014.12 In mid-2016, the 

government expanded the CAM Program to allow additional immediate family members of 

qualifying minor children to apply as “derivative” beneficiaries.13

2.2 2014–2016: The Operation of the CAM Program

Individuals had to apply to the CAM Refugee Program before they could be considered for the 

CAM Parole Program. The process was as follows.

 

11 November 2014 Fact Sheet. The complaint characterizes the fact sheet as stating that children and 

qualifying family members “were” eligible for parole if they were at risk of harm, cleared background 

vetting, had no serious derogatory information, and had someone committed to financially supporting 

them. Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 13 (¶ 38). The actual fact sheet states that individuals who met those 

requirements “may be” eligible for parole. See Johnson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 793 F.3d 

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“‘[W]e need not accept as true allegations contradicting documents that 

are referenced in the complaint.’”) (quoting Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 

2008)).

12 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 17 (¶ 44).

13 Id. at 14 (¶ 41).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 9

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First, a parent lawfully residing in the United States had to file an application with the 

assistance of a “resettlement agency” (a nonprofit organization partially funded by the government 

to welcome refugees into the country) and provide proof of identity, proof of legal status in the 

United States, and a passport photo of the beneficiary child.14 Second, the International 

Organization for Migration (“IOM”) — the intergovernmental organization that the State 

Department contracted to run its Resettlement Support Center in Latin America — invited the 

child to come to the capital of the country where the child was located so that IOM could 

interview the child, take the child’s biometric data and background information, prepare a case 

file, and initiate security checks.15 Third, USCIS verified the relationship between parent and child 

through documentary evidence and DNA tests.16 (The parent had to pay for DNA testing, but 

USCIS reimbursed the parent if the testing confirmed a parent-child relationship.17) Fourth, 

USCIS conducted an interview with the child in the country capital.18 Fifth, after confirming 

security-check results and DNA-test results, USCIS made a determination on the refugee 

application and notified beneficiaries of that determination by either a decision letter or a phone 

call.19 For beneficiaries who received letters, if refugee status was denied, the letter checked one of 

several boxes to explain the reason for the denial and outlined the process to request a review of 

the refugee determination.20 The letter then indicated whether the child was eligible for the CAM 

Parole Program.21

 

14 Id. (¶ 42(a)).

15 Id. (¶ 42(b)).

16 Id. at 14–15 (¶ 42(c)).

17 Id. at 15 (¶ 42(c)).

18 Id. (¶ 42(d)).

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 10

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If USCIS approved a beneficiary for the CAM Parole Program, the letter said:

You have been conditionally approved for parole into the United States. Final 

approval is conditioned upon successful completion of any remaining clearances 

that are required in the screening process. These clearances include medical 

examination by a U.S. approved panel physician, completion of security clearance 

procedures, and verification of family relationships. Please see attached 

information sheet for next steps that must be completed for you to be paroled into 

the United States.22

If USCIS conditionally approved a beneficiary for parole, the beneficiary had to undergo a 

medical examination in the country capital at the parent’s expense.23 USCIS told the beneficiary

that “IOM will contact your relative in the United States to collect payment for the medical exam” 

and that “[a]fter receiving payment, IOM will contact you to arrange your exam.”24 If the 

beneficiary cleared the examination, he or she received a medical clearance valid for six months.25

Next, USCIS told the beneficiary that “[i]f the medical results clear, IOM will contact your 

relatives in the United States to arrange for your flight” and that “[a]fter IOM receives payment for 

your travel, [it] will submit the travel itinerary to USCIS.”26 After receiving the travel-itinerary 

form from IOM, USCIS “will . . . [p]erform final security checks, [e]nsure the medical exam 

results remain valid until date of travel, and [v]erify that your relative still has a qualifying legal 

presence in the United States.”27 “[I]f we decide that you have met all requirements for parole 

under this program, we will issue Form I-512L, Authorization for Parole of an Alien Into the 

United States” and that “IOM will give you this document and your plane ticket the day you fly to 

the United States.”28

 

22 Id. at 15–16 (¶ 42(e)).

23 Id. at 16 (¶ 42(f)).

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Id. (¶ 42(g)).

27 Id. (¶ 42(h)).

28 Id. (emphasis removed).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 11

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Finally, after travel arrangements were made, the beneficiary traveled to a U.S. port of entry, 

where DHS Customs and Border Protection could authorize parole for a period of up to two 

years.29 USCIS told the beneficiary that it “will consider CAM parole extension requests for the 

duration of the program.”30

During the approximately two-and-a-half years that the CAM Program was in operation, more 

than 13,000 people applied, at least 1,627 individuals were able to settle in the United States as 

refugees, and an additional 1,465 people were able to enter the United States as parolees.31

2.3 2015–Present: Donald Trump’s Statements Regarding Latinos

Donald Trump launched his 2016 presidential campaign with the claim that Latin America was 

“not sending their best” people to the United States: “They’re sending people that have lots of 

problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing 

crime. They’re rapists.... It’s coming from all over ... Latin America.”32 Candidate Trump 

continued to categorize Latinos as gang members, killers, and rapists in promising to deport and 

exclude Latinos from the country.33

The complaint lists five examples of statements by Candidate Trump or President-Elect Trump 

before his inauguration:

1. “On August 21, 2015, when asked to respond to a report that two of his supporters had 

urinated on a sleeping Latino man and then beat him with a metal pole, Candidate 

Trump responded, ‘people who are following me are passionate. They love this country 

and want this country to be great again. They are passionate.’”

2. “In May 2016, Candidate Trump referred to anti-Trump protestors who carried the 

Mexican flag on Twitter as ‘criminals’ and ‘thugs.’”

 

29 Id. at 17 (¶ 42(i)).

30 Id.

31 Id. (¶ 44).

32 Id. at 18 (¶ 45) (ellipses in original).

33 Id. (¶ 46).

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3. “In June 2016, Candidate Trump stated that Judge Gonzalo Curiel [of the Southern 

District of California] could not be fair in presiding over a lawsuit because he was 

‘Hispanic.’”

4. “In October 2016, during a presidential debate, then-candidate Trump responded to a

question about immigration by referring to Latino immigrants as ‘bad hombres’ and

promising that ‘we’re going to get them out.’”

5. “In December 2016, President-Elect Trump referred to an article about a recent crime 

wave on Long Island and said ‘They come from Central America. They’re tougher than 

any people you’ve ever met.... They’re killing and raping everybody out there. They’re 

illegal. And they are finished.’”

34

The complaint lists eleven examples of statements by President Trump after his inauguration:

1. “On January 25, 2017, shortly after signing executive orders calling for immediate 

construction of a wall along the southern U.S. border and withholding federal funds 

from ‘sanctuary’ cities, President Trump condemned the ‘unprecedented surge’ of 

migrants from Central America for eroding safety in the United States, claiming that 

these two orders ‘will save thousands of lives.’”

2. “On January 27, 2017, newly-inaugurated President Trump and Mexico’s President 

Peña Nieto discussed President Trump’s proposal for a border wall over the phone. 

During that transcribed conversation, President Trump once again referred to Mexicans 

as ‘tough hombres.’”

3. “On February 3, 2017, during a visit to the Customs and Border Protection training

center, President Trump said ‘You know they’re bad. They’re pouring in from El

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, all over. They’re just pouring into our

country!’”

 

34 Id. (ellipsis in original).

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4. “In February 2017, President Trump said ‘What has been allowed to come into our

country, when you see gang violence that you’ve read about like never before, and all

of the things — much of that is people that are here illegally ... They’re rough and

they’re tough ... So we’re getting them out.’”

5. “On June 21, 2017, President Trump implied that thousands of immigrants are

members of the Central American gang MS-13. He said ‘These are true animals. We 

are moving them out of the country by the thousands, by the thousands.’”

6. “Similarly, on June 28, 2017, President Trump suggested that the MS-13 gang had

taken over swaths of U.S. territory, and said: ‘They are bad people. And we’ve gotten 

many of them out already... We’re actually liberating towns, if you can believe that we 

have to do that in the United States of America. But we’re doing it, and we’re doing it 

fast.’”

7. “On August 25, 2017, President Trump pardoned former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe

Arpaio, who was to be sentenced for criminal contempt for failing to comply with a

federal judge’s order to stop racially profiling Latinos. Before issuing the pardon,

President Trump asked rhetorically, ‘Was Sheriff Joe convicted for doing his job?’

After issuing the pardon, President Trump sent a tweet calling Mr. Arpaio ‘an 

American patriot.’”

8. “On September 5, 2017, in conjunction with the Administration’s announcement of the 

termination of the DACA [Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals] program, President 

Trump issued a statement decrying ‘the massive surge of unaccompanied minors from 

Central America including, in some cases, young people who would become members 

of violent gangs throughout our country, such as MS-13.’”

9. “On January 11, 2018, President Trump infamously referred to El Salvador as a 

‘shithole country’ during a meeting with lawmakers about immigration, asking ‘Why 

are we having all these people from shithole countries come here?’ He then suggested 

that the United States should bring more people from countries such as Norway, which 

has an overwhelmingly white population.”

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10. “In February 2018, President Trump claimed that immigrants from El Salvador, 

Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico are ‘just pouring into our country .... These 

countries are not our friends, you know. We think they’re our friends, and we send 

them massive aid ... and they’re pouring drugs into our country and they’re laughing at 

us’ — returning to his common refrain that Central Americans are somehow gaming 

the U.S. immigration system.”

11. “In May 2018, President Trump said of people crossing the Mexican border into the 

United States: ‘You wouldn’t believe how bad these people are. These aren’t people. 

These are animals.’”

35

2.4 January 2017: Executive Order 13,767

On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump was inaugurated as president of the United States.

On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,767, entitled Border 

Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 

8793 (2018).36 The Order stated in part:

Section 1. Purpose. Border security is critically important to the national 

security of the United States. Aliens who illegally enter the United States without 

inspection or admission present a significant threat to national security and public 

safety. Such aliens have not been identified or inspected by Federal immigration 

officers to determine their admissibility to the United States. The recent surge of 

illegal immigration at the southern border with Mexico has placed a significant 

strain on Federal resources and overwhelmed agencies charged with border security 

and immigration enforcement, as well as the local communities into which many of 

the aliens are placed.

. . . .

Sec. 11. Parole, Asylum, and Removal. It is the policy of the executive branch 

to end the abuse of parole and asylum provisions currently used to prevent the 

lawful removal of removable aliens.

 

35 Id. at 29–30 (¶ 82) (ellipses in original).

36 Id. at 23 (¶ 62). The court can take judicial notice of the Executive Order under the incorporationby-reference doctrine because it is cited in the complaint, Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076–77 

(9th Cir. 2005), and as a matter of public record, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th 

Cir. 2001).

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(a) The Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall immediately take all appropriate 

action to ensure that the parole and asylum provisions of Federal immigration law 

are not illegally exploited to prevent the removal of otherwise removable aliens.

. . . .

(d) The Secretary shall take appropriate action to ensure that parole authority 

under section 212(d)(5) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)) is exercised only on a 

case-by-case basis in accordance with the plain language of the statute, and in all 

circumstances only when an individual demonstrates urgent humanitarian reasons 

or a significant public benefit derived from such parole.

Id. at 8793, 8795–96.

2.5 January 2017: The Alleged “Secret Shutdown” of the CAM Program

Shortly after President Trump took office in January 2017, the government took the following 

actions with respect to the CAM Program.

Interviews: USCIS stopped interviews of all CAM Program beneficiaries, thereby blocking all 

CAM Program applications at the interview stage from being processed.37 Within the first seven 

days of the Trump presidency, USCIS cancelled more than 2,000 CAM Program interviews that 

were scheduled to take place in January, February, and March 2017.38 The interviews were 

cancelled in anticipation of an Executive Order suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 

— what would later become Executive Order 13,769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 

Entry into the United States, issued on January 27, 2017.39 While the Order was enjoined in part 

on February 3, 2017, USCIS did not reinstate CAM Program interviews.40 Instead, USCIS 

confirmed on February 3, 2017, that all USCIS interviews in El Salvador, Honduras, and 

Guatemala through the end of March 2017 were cancelled.41

 

37 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 18–19 (¶ 48).

38 Id. at 19 (¶ 48).

39 Id.

40 Id. (citing Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017)).

41 Id.

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Issuing determinations: The government stopped issuing decisions to CAM Program 

beneficiaries who had been interviewed.42 The government did not notify the public that it was 

doing so.43

Medical examinations: The government stopped scheduling medical examinations for CAM 

Program beneficiaries who had been interviewed and received a determination before January 

2017 that they were conditionally approved for parole.44 The government did not notify the public 

or CAM Program participants that it was doing so.45 IOM continued to solicit and accept funds 

from Program applicants during this time.46

Travel to the United States: The government blocked travel to the United States for CAM 

Program beneficiaries who had been interviewed, received a determination that they were 

conditionally approved for parole, and cleared their medical examinations.47 On or about January 

22, 2017 (two days after President Trump took office), an IOM employee told one of the plaintiffs 

in this case that IOM had received new orders that all CAM Program cases were frozen for 120 

days and that no CAM Program case could be processed because the government had changed its 

position and IOM had to wait for orders from the new administration.48 IOM continued to solicit 

and accept payments for plane tickets from CAM Program applicants during this time.49

The government did not notify the public that it was shutting down the CAM Parole 

Program.50 The USCIS program webpage for CAM Program participants stated that “[c]urrently 

there is no planned end date for the CAM parole program” and “[t]here is currently no filing 

 

42 Id. (¶ 49).

43 Id.

44 Id. (¶ 50).

45 Id.

46 See id. (¶¶ 50–51).

47 Id. at 19–20 (¶ 52).

48 Id. at 20 (¶ 53).

49 See id. (¶¶ 54–55).

50 Id. at 21 (¶ 56).

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deadline for this program.”51 The USCIS program webpage for conditionally approved CAM 

Program beneficiaries stated, “[w]e encourage your relative to book the travel within the time 

period suggested by IOM to avoid additional processing delays and costs if the medical exam or 

security checks expire.”52 A State Department website discussing the CAM Program expansion 

stated that “[a] qualifying, lawfully present parent who filed a CAM AOR [affidavit of 

relationship] from December 1, 2014, through November 30, 2016, and wishes to request access 

for expanded category relatives will need to file an amended DS-7699 prior to September 30, 

2017” and that “[a]n amended AOR form filed on or before this date will be processed regardless 

of where the qualifying child is in the process as long as the relationships of the expanded 

category relatives can be verified through DNA testing.”53 At least five webpages controlled by 

USCIS, the State Department, and the U.S. embassies in El Salvador and Honduras represented 

that the CAM Program continued to be in operation.54 IOM contacted at least one of the plaintiffs 

in this case after the government allegedly “shut down” the CAM Parole Program to tell her that 

she needed to send $2,500 for her daughter’s and grandson’s plane tickets and that they would be 

able to travel to the United States after payment was received.55 IOM may have accepted payments 

from other plaintiffs for plane tickets as well.56 These participants never received travel

arrangements to the United States.57

2.6 February 2017: The Kelly Memorandum

On February 17, 2017, then-Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly issued a 

memorandum (the “Kelly Memo”) to the Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Acting 

 

51 Id. (¶ 57).

52 Id. (¶ 58).

53 Id. at 21–22 (¶ 59).

54 Id. at 22 (¶ 60).

55 Id. at 20 (¶ 55).

56 See id. (¶ 54).

57 Id. (¶¶ 54–55).

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Director of USCIS, the Acting General Counsel of DHS, the Acting Assistant Secretary for 

International Affairs, and the Acting Undersecretary for Management.58 The memorandum stated 

in part:

This memorandum implements the Executive Order entitled “Border Security 

and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” issued by the President on January 

25, 2017, which establishes the President’s policy regarding effective border 

security and immigration enforcement through faithful execution of the laws of the 

United States. It implements new policies designed to stem illegal immigration and 

facilitate the detection, apprehension, detention, and removal of aliens who have no 

lawful basis to enter or remain in the United States. It constitutes guidance to all 

Department personnel, and supersedes all existing conflicting policy, directives, 

memoranda, and other guidance regarding this subject matter, except as otherwise 

expressly stated in this memorandum.

. . . .

K. Proper Use of Parole Authority Pursuant to Section 212(d)(5) of the INA

The authority to parole aliens into the United States is set forth in section 

212(d)(5) of the INA [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)], which provides that the Secretary 

may, in his discretion and on a case-by-case basis, temporarily parole into the 

United States any alien who is an applicant for admission for urgent humanitarian

reasons or significant public benefit. Upon careful scrutiny, the statutory language 

appears to strongly counsel in favor of using the parole authority sparingly and only 

in individual cases where, after careful consideration of the circumstances, parole is 

necessary because of demonstrated urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 

public benefit.

The practice of granting parole to certain aliens in pre-designated categories in 

order to create immigration programs not established by Congress, has contributed 

to a border security crisis, undermined the integrity of the immigration laws and the 

parole process, and created an incentive for additional illegal immigration.

Therefore, the Director of USCIS, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Director 

of ICE shall ensure that, pending the issuance of final regulations clarifying the 

appropriate use of the parole power, appropriate written policy guidance and 

training is provided to employees within those agencies exercising parole authority, 

including advance parole, so that such employees are familiar with the proper 

exercise of parole under section 212(d)(5) of the INA and exercise such parole 

 

58 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, 

U.S. Customs and Border Prot., et al., Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration 

Enforcement Improvement Policies (Feb. 17, 2017) (Kelly Memo) – ECF No. 33-5 (AR000022–34) 

(cited by Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 23 (¶ 63)). The court can take judicial notice of the Executive Order 

under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1076–77.

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authority only on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the law and written policy 

guidance.59

2.7 August 2017: Termination of the CAM Parole Program

On August 16, 2017, the government publicly announced the termination of the CAM Parole 

Program by publishing a notice in the Federal Register.

60 The notice stated in part:

As of August 16, 2017, USCIS will no longer consider or authorize parole 

under the CAM Parole Program. In addition, USCIS will notify individuals who 

have been conditionally approved for parole under this program and who have not 

yet traveled that the program has been terminated and their conditional approval for

parole has been rescinded. . . . 

Although DHS is terminating the CAM Parole Program, individuals who have 

been paroled into the United States under the CAM Parole program will maintain 

parole until the expiration of that period of parole unless there are other grounds for 

termination of parole under DHS regulations at 8 CFR 212.5(e).

Termination of the Central American Minors Parole Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 38,926, 38,927 (Aug. 

16, 2017). The notice further stated:

This discretionary change in policy does not preclude such individuals from 

applying for parole consideration independent of the CAM program by filing 

USCIS Form I-131, Application for Travel Document, consistent with the 

instructions for that form. Parole will only be issued on a case-by-case basis and 

only where the applicant demonstrates an urgent humanitarian or a significant 

public benefit reason for parole and that applicant merits a favorable exercise of 

discretion. Any alien may request parole to travel to the United States, but an alien 

does not have a right to parole.

. . . . [Individuals who were conditionally approved for parole under the CAM 

Parole Program] may apply for parole consideration independent of the CAM 

program by filing USCIS Form I-131, Application for Travel Document, consistent 

with the instructions for that form.

Id. (emphasis in original).

After this announcement, “IOM told CAM Parole Program beneficiaries whose conditional 

approval for parole was rescinded — all of whom had been previously deemed ineligible for 

refugee resettlement under the CAM Refugee Program — that they could file a request for review 

 

59 Kelly Memo – ECF No. 33-5 at 2 (AR000022), 10 (AR000030).

60 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 23 (¶ 64).

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(‘RFR’) of the denial of refugee status within 90 days of the notice of the rescission.”

61 Many 

affected CAM Parole Program beneficiaries filed RFRs, including several of the plaintiffs here.62

Many of those who filed RFRs in 2017 or early 2018 have not yet received decisions on their 

RFRs.63

3. The Administrative Record

In connection with their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ APA claims, the defendants filed the 

administrative record pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706.

64 Among other things, the administrative record 

documents the following additional facts.

3.1 2014–2016: The Record Regarding the Operation of the CAM Parole Program

As noted above, the government began accepting applications for the CAM Program on 

December 1, 2014.

On December 5, 2014, the State Department issued press guidance regarding the CAM 

Program (the “December 2014 Guidance”).

65 The guidance stated in part:

Key Messages:

• As part of the effort to address the underlying causes of this migration, the

Administration has launched an “in-country” refugee and parole processing

for certain minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This program

will allow parents who are lawfully present in the United States to request

U.S. resettlement for children under the age of 21 who are still in one of

these three countries.

• We are establishing in-country processing in El Salvador, Guatemala, and

Honduras to provide a safe, legal, and orderly alternative to the dangerous

journey that some children are currently undertaking to join parents in the

United States.

 

61 Id. at 25 (¶ 70).

62 Id. at 26 (¶ 71).

63 Id. (¶ 72).

64 Admin. Record – ECF No. 33.

65 Press Guidance, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State, In-Country 

Processing for Children in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Dec. 5, 2014) (December 2014 

Guidance) – ECF No. 33-11 (AR000053–55).

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• This program is part of the Administration’s integrated and 

comprehensive approach to addressing the underlying economic and 

security challenges facing Central American countries with increased 

unlawful migration across the southwest U.S. border last summer.

• Our goal in the United States and in Central America is to extend protection

to those with legitimate humanitarian claims while providing an effective

deterrent for irregular migration driven by dangerous criminal smuggling

networks.

• Taken together with the efforts of Central American leaders and other key

stakeholders to address the underlying causes of migration, this measure

will help end the practice of sending children on this dangerous journey.

66

. . . .

• This program is one of many measures the United States is putting in place 

to help reduce the number of parents and others who are paying smugglers 

to lead minors on the dangerous journey to the United States. It offers a real 

alternative to children who may have legitimate claims to refugee status.

• The Departments of State and Homeland Security launched new public 

information campaigns, in coordination with the Central American

governments, warning about the dangers of irregular migration and 

delivering the message that unaccompanied children are not given a 

“permiso” or permit to stay in the United States upon arrival at the border, 

and many will ultimately be returned to their country of origin.

In November 2015, the State Department issued additional press guidance regarding the CAM 

Program (the “November 2015 Guidance”).67 The guidance stated in part:

Key Messages:

• The Central American Minors program provides a safe, legal, and orderly 

alternative to the dangerous journey that some children have undertaken to 

join their parents in the United States.

• While the program launched 11 months ago, most of the approximately 

5,000 applications received so far have come in the last three to four 

months.

. . . .

 

66 Id. at 2–4 (AR000053–55) (emphasis in original).

67 Press Guidance, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State, Central 

American Minors Program (Nov. 5, 2015) (November 2015 Guidance) – ECF No. 33-12 (AR000056–

63).

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Q: What is the goal of the Central American Minors Program?

• We established the program in 2014 to provide a safe, legal, and orderly 

alternative to the dangerous journey that some children are currently 

undertaking to join their parents in the United States.

• Our goal is to protect families with legitimate humanitarian claims while 

discouraging people from sending their children on the dangerous journey 

to the United States.

. . . .

Q: What is the current status of application processing?

• The U.S. Department of Homeland Security recently completed its first 

round of 90 interviews in Central America and has conditionally approved 

approximately 12 percent for refugee admission; about 84 percent were 

recommended for parole. Approximately 1 percent were denied and 

approximately 2 percent are undergoing additional review.

. . . .

Q. Will the Administration consider ending this program, given the low 

refugee approval rate?

• This program has just begun. No assumptions or conclusions should be 

made about longer-term trends and outcomes based on the limited sample of 

cases to date.

• We will continue the program in FY2016. This program was designed as a 

hybrid refugee/parole program, and 96% of the first set of applicants were 

approved for either refugee admission or parole.68

In November 2015, USCIS issued an information sheet regarding the CAM Parole Program.

69

The info sheet stated in part:

Individuals who applied for, but were denied, refugee status under the incountry refugee program in Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador, are considered 

for parole into the United States under the CAM parole program. This Fact Sheet 

describes key parts of the process of obtaining parole for conditionally approved 

applicants.

General Parole Information

The Secretary of Homeland Security may, in his or her discretion, parole any 

foreign national applying for admission to the United States into the United States 

temporarily for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. (See 

 

68 Id. at 2–4 (AR000056–58) (emphasis in original).

69 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Central American Minors 

(CAM) Parole Program: Information for Conditionally Approved Applicants (Nov. 23, 2015) – ECF 

No. 33-48 (AR000462–66).

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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 212(d)(5)). Parole allows an 

individual, who may be inadmissible or otherwise ineligible for a visa or refugee 

status, to come to and stay in the United States for a temporary period.

A person who has been paroled (“parolee”) is not admitted into the United 

States for purposes of immigration law. Parole allows an individual to be lawfully 

present in the United States temporarily and to apply for work authorization. 

Although a parolee is lawfully present in the United States for the time period 

authorized, parole is by nature temporary and does not confer or lead to legal 

immigration status in the United States.

. . . .

Parole Termination or Expiration

Your parole status may be terminated if:

• You depart the United States;

• You violate any laws of the United States; or

• The DHS Secretary in his discretion decides to terminate parole.70

In February 2016, the State Department issued additional press guidance regarding the CAM 

Program (the “February 2016 Guidance”).71 The guidance stated in part:

Key Messages:

• The Central American Minors program provides a safe, legal, and orderly 

alternative to the dangerous journey that some children have undertaken to 

join their parents in the United States.

• While the program launched 13 months ago, most of the approximately 

6,500 applications received so far have come in the last six months. To date, 

the Department has performed its initial screening of nearly 3,000 of these 

applicants, and DHS has completed more than 600 final interviews.

• Forty-eight individuals have arrived in the United States via the program so 

far, 37 from El Salvador and 11 from Honduras.

. . . .

 

70 Id. at 2 (AR000462), 5 (AR000465).

71 Press Guidance, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State, Central 

American Minors Program (Feb. 2, 2016) (February 2016 Guidance) – ECF No. 33-14 (AR000073–

76). The guidance is dated “February 2, 2015” as opposed to “2016,” but this appears to be a typo (the 

guidance refers to the CAM Program’s having been launched “13 months ago,” which would place it 

in February 2016, not February 2015).

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Q: What is the goal of the Central American Minors Program?

• We established the program in 2014 with the goal to protect families with 

legitimate humanitarian claims while discouraging people from sending 

their children on the dangerous journey to the United States.

• Ensuring the safety of people in the region and deterring the exploitation of 

undocumented migrants requires cooperation and partnership. Central 

American governments must take the lead on creating better economic, 

social, governance and security conditions in their countries, and we are 

commit[t]ed to helping them, as evidenced by Congress’s FY 2016 

appropriation of up to $750 million in foreign assistance.

Q. Will the Administration consider ending this program, given the low rates?

• We will continue the program in FY2016. No assumptions or conclusions 

should be made about long-term outcomes based on the limited sample of 

cases to date.

• This program was designed as a hybrid refugee/parole program, and 98

percent of applicants interviewed to date were approved for either refugee 

admission or parole.72

In May 2016, the State Department issued additional press guidance regarding the CAM 

Program (the “May 2016 Guidance”).73 The guidance stated in part:

Key Messages:

• The Central American Minors program provides a safe, legal, and orderly

alternative to the dangerous journey that some children have undertaken to 

join their parents in the United States.

• While the program launched in December 2014, most of the approximately

8,500 applications received so far have come in the last nine months. To 

date, the Department has performed its initial screening of more than 5,500 

of these applicants, and DHS has completed more than 1,500 final 

interviews. The number of final interviews will increase significantly over 

the next six months.

• More than three hundred individuals have arrived in the United States via 

the program so far.

. . . .

 

72 Id. at 2–4 (AR000073–75).

73 Press Guidance, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State, Central 

American Minors Program (May 24, 2016) (May 2016 Guidance) – ECF No. 33-15 (AR000077–80). 

The guidance is dated “May 24, 2015” as opposed to “2016,” but this appears to be a typo (the 

guidance refers to the fact that most applications have come “in the last nine months,” whereas May 

2015 was less than nine months after the CAM Program was launched).

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Q: What is the goal of the Central American Minors Program?

• We established the program in December 2014 with the goal to protect 

families with legitimate humanitarian claims while discouraging people 

from sending their children on the dangerous journey to the United States.

. . . .

Q. Will the Administration consider ending this program, given the low rates?

• The Central American Minors pro[g]ram is an important part of our efforts 

to protect Central Americans at risk of harm and expand resettlement 

opportunities in the region. We have no plans to end the program.

• Although the program took some time to get started, we continue to receive 

a number of applications and more than 300 children have arrived to the 

United States via the program so far.

• This program was designed as a hybrid refugee/parole program, and 98 

percent of applicants interviewed to date were approved for either refugee 

admission or parole.74

In July 2016, the State Department issued additional press guidance regarding the CAM 

Program (the “July 2016 Guidance”).75 The guidance stated in part:

Q. What are the current statistics on CAM applications and arrivals?

• While the program launched in December 2014, most of the approximately 

9,500 applications received so far have come in the last nine months.

• To date, the Department of State has performed its initial screening of more 

than 6,800 of these applicants, and the Department of Homeland Security 

has completed 2,900 final interviews and decisions.

• Out of these, 99% (2,884) have been approved either for refugee 

resettlement or for parole. We expect that the number of final interviews 

will increase significantly over the next six months.

• More than 600 individuals have arrived in the United States via the program 

so far and we expect the pace of arrivals to increase as those approved to 

come to the United States complete the necessary post-decision steps for 

arrival.

 

74 Id. at 2–4 (AR000077–79).

75 Press Guidance, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State, Central 

American Minors Program Expansion, Protection Transfer Agreement, and In-Country Referrals (July 

28, 2016) (July 2016 Guidance) – ECF No. 33-16 (AR000081–96).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 26

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Q. How many individuals have qualified for refugee status under the existing 

program compared to parole?

• 267 have entered the US as refugees and another 400 have entered under 

parole.

. . . .

Q: What is the goal of the Central American Minors Program?

• We launched the program in December 2014 with the goal of protecting

children with legitimate humanitarian claims while discouraging people 

from placing their children in the hands of smugglers for a dangerous 

journey to the United States.

• We also believe it is critical for Central American governments to take the 

lead on creating better economic, social, governance and security conditions 

in their countries, and we are commi[t]ted to helping them, as evidenced by 

Congress’s FY 2016 appropriation of up to $750 million in foreign 

assistance to Central America, and our FY 2017 budget proposal.[]76

In November 2016, the State Department issued additional press guidance about the CAM 

Program (the “November 2016 Guidance”).77 The guidance stated that 99% of CAM Program 

participants that had been interviewed were approved for either refugee resettlement or parole:

Q. What are the current statistics on CAM applications and arrivals?

• The program launched in December 2014 and has received approximately 

10,400 applications.

• To date, the Department of State has performed its initial screening of 

nearly 9,000 of these applicants, and the Department of Homeland Security 

has interviewed more than 5,500 individuals.

• Out of these, 99 percent have been approved either for refugee resettlement 

or for parole.

• More than 1335 individuals have arrived in the United States via the 

program so far.78

The guidance noted that there was no guarantee, and the State Department could not speculate,

about whether the CAM Program would continue after President-Elect Trump was inaugurated.79

 

76 Id. at 5–6 (AR000084–85).

77 Press Guidance, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State, Central 

American Minors Program Expansion (Nov. 15, 2016) (November 2016 Guidance) – ECF No. 33-17 

(AR000097–105).

78 Id. at 8 (AR000103).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 27

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3.2 August 2017: The Record Regarding the Termination of the CAM Parole Program

As noted above, the government announced the termination of the CAM Parole Program on 

August 16, 2017.

On August 15, 2017, the USCIS issued leadership guidance regarding the termination of the 

CAM Program (“2017 Leadership Guidance”).80 The guidance stated in part:

Termination of the Central American Minors (CAM) Parole Program

Effective Aug. 16, 2017, USCIS will no longer automatically consider or offer 

parole for individuals in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras under the Central 

American Minor (CAM) Parole program. Individuals who have been conditionally 

approved for parole under this program and have not yet traveled will be notified 

that their conditional offer of parole has been rescinded. Refugee processing under 

the CAM Refugee program continues. DHS parole regulations at 8 CFR § 212.5 

continue to apply.

. . . .

Reason for Termination

In accordance with section 11 of President Trump’s Executive Order entitled 

Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Acting Secretary of 

Homeland Security Elaine Duke has decided to rescind the program, which 

automatically considered for parole all individuals found ineligible for refugee 

status under the in-country refugee program in Guatemala, Honduras, or El 

Salvador. The CAM Parole program was implemented as part of an integrated 

strategy to address factors contributing to increases in migration from Central 

America to the United States. However, as indicated by the executive order, DHS is 

pursuing a new strategy to secure the U.S. southern border.81

USCIS issued a contemporaneous document captioned “RTQ [response to queries]: 

Termination of CAM Parole Program” (the “2017 RTQ”) setting out talking points for USCIS to 

respond to inquiries about the end of the CAM Program.

82 The RTQ stated in part:

 

79 Id. at 10 (AR000105).

80 Leadership Guidance, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 

15, 2017) (2017 Leadership Guidance) – ECF No. 33-33 (AR000182).

81 Id. at 2 (AR000182).

82 Response to Queries, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

Termination of CAM Parole Program (2017 RTQ) – ECF No. 33-9 (AR000045–50). The document is 

undated, but it indicates on its face that it was contemporaneous with the termination of the CAM 

Parole Program, see id. at 2 (AR000045) (“Effective immediately, USCIS will no longer consider or 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 28

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Talking points:

• Effective immediately, USCIS will no longer consider or offer parole under 

the CAM Parole program.

. . . .

• USCIS will issue notices to individuals conditionally offered parole under 

the CAM Parole program, who have not yet traveled, notifying them that 

the CAM Parole program has been terminated and their conditional offer of 

parole has been rescinded.

. . . .

If asked only:

Q1: Why did it take the government so long to notify these individuals that 

their conditional offer of parole was rescinded?

A1: Executive Order 13767, issued on Jan. 25, 2017, instructed DHS to take 

appropriate action to ensure that its parole policies are not illegally exploited and 

that parole is granted “only when an individual demonstrates urgent humanitarian 

reasons or a significant public benefit derived from such parole.” Then-Secretary of 

Homeland Security John Kelly issued an implementing memorandum on Feb. 20, 

2017, directing DHS to undertake a review of its various parole policies. Since that 

time, we conducted a careful review of the Central American Minors (CAM) Parole 

program, and Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke decided to 

terminate the program. As stated in the Federal Register notice, we are notifying 

the affected public, including individuals who were conditionally approved for 

parole but have not yet traveled or who have already been paroled into the United 

States.

. . .

Q3: When did USCIS stop processing applications for parole?

A3: While the CAM program was under review, USCIS ceased considering or 

offering parole or further processing individuals who had been conditionally 

approved for parole under the program. The agency ceased these actions in 

February 2017.

Q3a: Why did DHS wait until August to terminate the program if it stopped 

processing individuals for the program back in February?

A3a: Following the issuance of the President’s Executive Order, then-Secretary of 

Homeland Security John Kelly issued an implementing memorandum on Feb. 20, 

2017, directing DHS to undertake a review of its various parole policies. Since that 

time, we conducted a careful review of the Central American Minors (CAM) Parole 

 

offer parole under the CAM Parole program.”), and the government represented at the motion hearing 

before the court that it was in fact a contemporaneous document. 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 29

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program, and Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke decided to 

terminate the program upon completion of that review.

Q4: What happened to individuals who received notification that they were 

conditionally approved for parole pending successful completion of 

background and medical checks? Will the process continue for them? How 

many people will this affect?

A4: All conditionally approved applicants for parole under the CAM Parole 

program without confirmed travel arrangements to the United States will be sent 

notices of the CAM Parole program’s termination, including notification that they 

will not receive parole under the program. There are approximately 2,700 

individuals currently conditionally approved. Any individual who received access 

to the CAM Refugee/Parole program for whom a final parole determination had not 

yet been issued is no longer being considered for parole under the program

Q5: Even though DHS is terminating the CAM Parole program, is parole still 

available to affected individuals?

A5: Potentially. This termination of the CAM Parole program does not preclude 

such individuals from applying for parole consideration independent of the CAM 

Parole program by filing USCIS Form I-131, Application for Travel Document, 

consistent with the instructions for that form. Parole will only be issued on a caseby-case basis and only where the applicant demonstrates an urgent humanitarian or 

a significant public benefit reason for parole and that applicant merits a favorable 

exercise of discretion. Any foreign national may request parole to travel to the 

United States, but a foreign national does not have a right to parole.

Q6: Why is the program being terminated?

A6: Executive Order 13767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 

Improvements, issued on Jan. 25, 2017, instructed DHS to take appropriate action 

to ensure that parole is granted “only when an individual demonstrates urgent 

humanitarian reasons or a significant public benefit derived from such parole.” 

Former Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly then issued an implementing 

memorandum on Feb. 20, 2017, directing DHS to undertake a review of its parole 

guidance. Since that time, DHS conducted a careful review of the Central American 

Minors (CAM) Parole program and has decided to terminate the program. The 

decision to terminate the program was made because the CAM Parole program 

provided parole very broadly and not in accordance with the statu[t]e and the 

President’s Executive Order.

Q7: By eliminating this program, do you anticipate there will be an upswing in 

the number of UACs [unaccompanied alien children] who attempt to enter the 

United States illegally?

A7: The CAM Refugee program is unaffected by the termination of the CAM 

Parole program and will continue to provide a means through which vulnerable 

children in-country may be considered for resettlement to the United States. DHS 

continues to work with other Executive Branch agencies and the governments of 

the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico to discourage irregular migration and 

secure the U.S. southern border.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 30

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. . . .

Q10: What percentage of those approved under CAM were refugees vs 

parolees?

A10: As of July 13, 2017, 7,306 CAM applicants had been interviewed by USCIS. 

Of the cases that have been issued decisions, 30% have been approved as refugees, 

69% have been recommended for parole, and 1% were denied for both refugee 

status and parole.

. . . .

Q14: How does eliminating the CAM Parole program contribute to the 

security and prosperity of the Northern Triangle? Or the United States?

A14: The decision to terminate the CAM Parole program was made by the Acting 

Secretary of Homeland Security as a result of the program review undertaken 

following issuance of Executive Order 13767, Border Security and Immigration 

Enforcement Improvements. DHS recognizes the need to make progress on 

economic and security priorities, and is currently working with U.S. interagency, 

foreign, and non-government counterparts on next steps for engagement to advance

objectives and deliverables from the June 15–16 Conference on Prosperity and 

Security in Central America.

Q15: Are there any other meaningful routes of relief for these individuals? Is

humanitarian parole a realistic option?

A15: The termination of CAM parole does not impact the CAM Refugee program, 

which continues to assist vulnerable children in-country who qualify as refugees. 

Additionally, the termination of the CAM Parole program does not preclude 

individuals from applying for parole consideration by following the standard parole 

application process. USCIS will still consider such applications for parole on a 

case-by-case basis and will authorize parole only where the applicant demonstrates 

an urgent humanitarian or a significant public benefit reason for parole and merits a 

favorable exercise of discretion.

Q16: For applicants who were conditionally approved, wasn’t it determined 

that they are at significant risk? Does the United States believe that these 

children are no longer in danger?

A16: The review and subsequent termination of the CAM Parole Program is 

unrelated to the risk of harm that USCIS evaluates within each CAM Parole case. 

Additionally, the termination of the CAM Parole program does not preclude 

individuals from applying for parole consideration by following the standard parole 

application process. USCIS will still consider such applications for parole on a 

case-by-case basis and will authorize parole only where the applicant demonstrates 

an urgent humanitarian or a significant public benefit reason for parole and merits a

favorable exercise of discretion.83

 

83 Id. at 2–6 (AR000045–49).

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USCIS told CAM Program participants that the termination of the CAM Parole Program did 

not preclude them from applying for parole independent of the Program by filing a USCIS Form 

I-131.84 USCIS told participants that “[p]arole will only be issued on a case-by-case basis and only 

where the applicant demonstrates by filing USCIS Form I-131, an urgent humanitarian or a 

significant public benefit reason for parole and that the applicant merits a favorable exercise of 

discretion.”85 USCIS additionally told participants that they could submit a Request for Review of 

their denied refugee cases within 90 days of when their conditional offer of parole was rescinded, 

even if their RFRs would have otherwise been untimely.86 USCIS additionally told participants 

that it would refund them for any expenses they may have paid for travel arrangements or for 

medical exams that had not been completed (but not for medical exams that had been 

completed).87

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Administrative Procedure Act Claims

The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 

adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 

entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The challenged agency action (if not made 

reviewable by statute) must be a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy 

in a court[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (“§ 704’s requirement that to proceed under the APA, agency action must be final or 

 

84 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Central American Minors 

(CAM): Information for Parole Applicants (Aug. 16, 2017) (August 2017 Info Sheet) – ECF No. 33-6 

at 2 (AR000036); Form Letter from U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. to CAM Program 

Beneficiaries (Rescission Form Letter) – ECF No. 33-46 at 2–3 (AR000454–55).

85 August 2017 Info Sheet – ECF No. 33-6 at 3 (AR000036); accord Rescission Form Letter – ECF 

No. 33-46 at 2–3 (AR000454–55).

86 August 2017 Info Sheet – ECF No. 33-6 at 4 (AR000037); Rescission Form Letter – ECF No. 33-46 

at 2 (AR000454).

87 August 2017 Info Sheet – ECF No. 33-6 at 4 (AR000037); Rescission Form Letter – ECF No. 33-46 

at 2 (AR000454).

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otherwise reviewable by statute is an independent element without which courts may not 

determine APA claims.”). To constitute a “final agency action,” two conditions must be met: 

“‘first, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision making process . . . it 

must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by 

which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.’” 

Gallo Cattle Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 159 F.3d 1194, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 1998) (ellipsis in 

original) (quoting W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1997)).

The APA provides that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency 

action, findings, and conclusions found to be — (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 

or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “‘Review under the arbitrary and 

capricious standard is deferential[.]’” Friends of the Santa Clara River v. U.S. Army Corps. of 

Eng’rs, 887 F.3d 906, 920 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders. of 

Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)). “[A court’s] proper role is simply to ensure that the agency 

made no ‘clear error of judgment’ that would render its action ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ and 

[courts] require only ‘a rational connection between facts found and conclusions made’ by the 

defendant agencies.” Id. (some internal quotation marks and internal brackets omitted) (quoting 

Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), abrogated on other 

grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Conservation Congress v. 

Finley, 774 F.3d 611, 617 (9th Cir. 2014)). “Accordingly, [courts] will not vacate an agency’s 

decision unless the agency ‘has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 

decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 

be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’” Id. at 921 (some internal 

quotation marks and internal brackets omitted) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 

658); accord Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[Courts] are ‘not 

empowered to substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency.’”) (quoting Citizens to Preserve 

Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by California 

v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).

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“Nevertheless, to withstand review[,] ‘the agency must articulate a rational connection 

between the facts found and the conclusions reached.’” Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1023 (internal 

brackets omitted) (quoting Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1156–57 (9th 

Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Winter, 555 U.S. 7). “[Courts] will defer to an agency’s 

decision only if it is ‘fully informed and well-considered,’ and [they] will disapprove of an 

agency’s decision if it made ‘a clear error of judgment.’” Id. (some internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1988); West v. Sec’y 

of the Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Furthermore, when an agency has 

taken action without observance of the procedure required by law, that action will be set aside.” 

Id. (citing Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2000)).

“[W]ith respect to [an] APA claim, [a c]ourt may consider matters outside the pleadings 

without converting [a m]otion to [d]ismiss to a motion for summary judgment.” Herguan Univ. v. 

Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2017). “‘When a 

party seeks review of agency action under the APA before a district court, the district judge sits as 

an appellate tribunal.’” Id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 

860, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). “In APA cases the administrative record is ‘the whole record,’ which 

‘consists of all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by agency decisionmakers.’” Id. at 1063–64 (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 

1989); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1548 (9th Cir. 

1993)). “Accordingly, [a c]ourt may consider the [administrative record], without converting [a 

motion to dismiss] to a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

2. Other Claims

In evaluating the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ non-APA claims, the court is 

limited to considering the complaint, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 

matters of which it may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 

308, 322 (2007) (citing 5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004 

and supp. 2007)). The court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as 

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true. Id. (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 

U.S. 163, 164 (1993)). The court need not accept as true conclusory allegations in the complaint. 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 

which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint does not need 

detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a claim for 

relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which 

when accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

ANALYSIS

1. Standing

Federal-court jurisdiction extends only to “cases” and “controversies.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 

U.S. 811, 818 (1997). “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a 

case or controversy.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, (2016). “The ‘irreducible 

constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that 

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is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed 

by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Friends of the Earth, Inc. 

v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). “The plaintiff, as the party 

invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. (citing FW/PBS, 

Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). “Where, as here, a case is at the pleading stage, 

the plaintiff must ‘clearly allege facts demonstrating’ each element.” Id. (internal ellipsis omitted) 

(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)). “‘As a general rule, in an injunctive case [a] 

court need not address standing of each plaintiff if it concludes that one plaintiff has standing.’” 

Atay v. County of Maui, 842 F.3d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & 

Opticians LensCrafters, Inc. v. Brown, 567 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 2009)).

The government argues that the beneficiary-children plaintiffs currently residing outside of the 

United States lack standing.88 The government also argues that CASA lacks standing to pursue 

relief on its own behalf.

89 The government does not dispute that the applicant-parent plaintiffs

residing in the United States have standing based on their interests in being reunited with their 

family members.90 Accord Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018) (“We agree that a 

person’s interest in being united with his relatives is sufficiently concrete and particularized to 

form the basis of an Article III injury in fact.”). As the applicant parents are plaintiffs with respect 

to all of the claims in the complaint and all of the relief sought, their presence is sufficient to 

render this case justiciable, and it is unnecessary to address at this juncture whether the 

beneficiary-children plaintiffs or CASA independently have standing.

 

88 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 32 at 29–30.

89 Id. at 30–31. The government does not challenge whether CASA has associational standing to 

pursue relief on behalf of its members in the United States. Id. at 30.

90 See id. at 29–31.

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2. Administrative Procedure Act

DHS’s termination of the CAM Parole Program can be seen as two related but distinct agency 

actions: (1) terminating the Program going forward for participants who had never been approved 

for parole and (2) rescinding conditional approvals of parole that had been made under the 

Program before its termination. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 

F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (Regents I) (distinguishing, in case involving 

government’s attempt to terminate DACA program, between individuals who had received DACA 

benefits and those who had never obtained benefits), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) (Regents 

III); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Batalla Vidal II) (same). 

The court addresses these agency actions separately. Cf. Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 

1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (in an APA action challenging an agency rule that may have both 

prospective and retrospective effects, the court can evaluate the prospective and retrospective 

portions separately).

2.1 Termination of the CAM Parole Program Going Forward

The plaintiffs argue that government’s actions in terminating the CAM Parole Program

violated the APA for the following reasons:

1. the government failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its actions, including a 

rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,91

2. the government failed to provide its reasons for its actions in the Federal Register,92

3. a failure by the government to take into account “serious reliance interests engendered 

by longstanding policies” violates the APA, and the government failed to take into 

account serious reliance interests in the CAM Parole Program,93

 

91 Pls. Mot. for Prelim. Injunction – ECF No. 24 at 17; see also Pls. Mot. to Dismiss Opp’n – ECF No. 

34 at 14 (incorporating arguments raised in preliminary-injunction motion).

92 Pls. Mot. for Prelim. Injunction – ECF No. 24 at 17.

93 Id. at 17–18 (internal brackets and ellipses omitted).

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 36 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 37

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4. a failure by the government to consider “an important part of the problem” violates the 

APA, and the government failed to consider “an important part of the problem” by 

failing to consider the country conditions in Northern Triangle countries and the risk 

that children from those countries face,

94 and

5. the government’s decision in January or February 2017 to cease processing CAM 

Parole Program applications, while not publicly announcing that it was terminating the 

CAM Parole Program, was a “secret shutdown” that violated the APA.95

The court addresses each argument in turn.

2.1.1 Whether termination violated the APA for failure to articulate a “satisfactory 

explanation”

The plaintiffs argue that an agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 

including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”

96

“The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for [agency] deficiencies.” Motor 

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 

“[Courts] will, however, ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may 

reasonably be discerned.’” Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 

U.S. 281, 286 (1975)). DHS’s reasons for terminating the CAM Parole Program are reasonably 

discernable here.

From its inception, the CAM Program granted parole broadly. Throughout its operation, the 

Program approved approximately 99% of beneficiaries who were interviewed and considered for 

parole.97 The Program also was expanding geometrically and approving increasing numbers of 

beneficiaries for parole.

98

 

94 Id. at 18.

95 Id. at 19–23.

96 Id. at 17 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 

U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

97 Guidance issued throughout the life of the CAM Program consistently stated that 96–99% of 

beneficiaries who were interviewed were approved as refugees or for parole; the majority of 

beneficiaries were denied refugee status but were approved for parole. November 2015 Guidance –

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 38

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Following the 2016 presidential election and the change in presidential administrations, the 

government changed its policy views on parole. In January 2017, President Trump issued 

Executive Order 13,767, which expressed a policy view that the parole provision in the INA had 

been “abuse[d]” and that “[i]t is the policy of the executive branch to end the abuse of parole and 

asylum provisions currently used to prevent the lawful removal of removable aliens.” Exec. Order 

No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8795. President Trump directed then-Secretary of Homeland Security 

John Kelly to “take appropriate action to ensure that parole authority under section 212(d)(5) of 

the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)) is exercised only on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the 

plain language of the statute[.]” Id. at 8796.

 

ECF No. 33-12 at 4 (AR000058) (96% of interviewed beneficiaries were approved as refugees or for 

parole, 12% as refugees and 84% for parole); February 2016 Guidance – ECF No. 33-14 at 4 

(AR000075) (98% of interviewed beneficiaries were approved as refugees or for parole); May 2016 

Guidance – ECF No. 33-15 at 4 (AR000079) (98% of interviewed beneficiaries were approved as 

refugees or for parole); July 2016 Guidance – ECF No. 33-16 at 5–6 (AR000084–85) (99% of 

interviewed beneficiaries were approved as refugees or for parole, and 60% of beneficiaries who 

entered the United States were approved for parole, as compared to 40% approved as refugees); 

November 2016 Guidance – ECF No. 33-17 at 8 (AR000103) (99% of interviewed beneficiaries were 

approved as refugees or for parole).

The November 2015 Guidance broke down the approval rates for refugee status versus parole. 12% 

of interviewed beneficiaries were approved as refugees, November 2015 Guidance – ECF No. 33-12 at 

4 (AR000058), and thus would not have been considered for parole. Of the remaining 88% of 

interviewed beneficiaries who were considered for parole, 84% were approved, which results in a 

parole-approval rate of approximately 95% (84/88). Later guidance did not break down the approval 

rates for refugee status versus parole. The 2017 RTQ broken down the approval rates for refugee status 

versus parole for the life of the CAM Program. 30% of interviewed beneficiaries were approved as 

refugees, 2017 RTQ – ECF No. 33-9 at 5 (AR000048), and thus would not have been considered for 

parole. Of the remaining 70% of interviewed beneficiaries who were considered for parole, 69% were 

approved, which results in a parole-approval rate of approximately 99% (69/70).

98 See November 2015 Guidance – ECF No. 33-12 at 2–4 (AR000056–58) (90 interviews had been 

conducted, 96% were approved as refugees or for parole (12% as refugees, 84% for parole), and “most 

of the approximately 5,000 applications received so far have come in the last three to four 

months”) (emphasis in original); February 2016 Guidance – ECF No. 33-14 at 2–4 (AR000073–75) 

(600 interviews had been conducted, 98% were approved as refugees or for parole, and “most of the 

approximately 6,500 applications received so far have come in the last six months”); May 2016 

Guidance – ECF No. 33-15 at 2–4 (AR000077–79) (1500 interviews had been conducted, 99% were 

approved as refugees or for parole, and 300 beneficiaries had arrived in the United States, and “[t]he 

number of final interviews will increase significantly over the next six months”); July 2016 Guidance 

– ECF No. 33-16 at 5 (AR000084) (2900 interviews had been conducted, 99% were approved as 

refugees or for parole, and “[w]e expect that the number of final interviews will increase significantly 

over the next six months”); November 2016 Guidance – ECF No. 33-17 at 8 (AR000103) (5500 

interviews had been conducted and 99% were approved as refugees or for parole).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 39

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In February 2017, Secretary Kelly issued a memorandum directing that parole authority should 

be used “sparingly and only in individual cases where, after careful consideration of the 

circumstances, parole is necessary because of demonstrated urgent humanitarian reasons or 

significant public benefit.”

99 The Kelly Memo expressed a policy view that “[t]he practice of 

granting parole to certain aliens in pre-designated categories in order to create immigration 

programs not established by Congress, has contributed to a border security crisis, undermined the 

integrity of the immigration laws and the parole process, and created an incentive for additional 

illegal immigration.”100

Following the issuance of the Kelly Memo, DHS conducted a review of the CAM Parole 

Program.101 DHS found that as of July 13, 2017, the CAM Program had approved 99% of the 

beneficiaries who had been interviewed as refugees or recommended them for parole (30% as 

refugees, 69% for parole) and that only 1% had been denied both refugee status and parole.102

DHS’s review determined that “the CAM Parole program provided parole very broadly and not in 

accordance with the statu[t]e and the President’s Executive Order.”

103

Following that review, DHS decided to terminate the CAM Parole Program and rescind 

conditional parole approvals for beneficiaries who had not yet entered the United States.

104 (It 

allowed beneficiaries who already had entered the United States to remain for the duration of their 

authorized parole and additionally allowed beneficiaries who had not entered the United States to 

apply for parole independent of the CAM Parole Program by filing a Form I-131.105) It recognized 

that the previous administration had implemented the CAM Parole Program “as part of an 

 

99 Kelly Memo – ECF No. 33-5 at 10 (AR000030).

100 Id.

101 See 2017 RTQ – ECF No. 33-9 at 3–4 (AR000046–47).

102 Id. at 5 (AR000048).

103 Id. at 4 (AR000047).

104 Id. at 3–4 (AR000046–47). DHS continued to allow affected individuals to apply for parole 

independent of the CAM Parole Program. Id.

105 2017 RTQ – ECF No. 33-9 at 4–5 (AR000047–48).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 40

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integrated strategy to address factors contributing to increases in migration from Central America 

to the United States,” but it noted that “as indicated by [President Trump’s] executive order, DHS 

is pursuing a new strategy to secure the U.S. southern border.”106

There is “a rational connection between facts found and conclusions made” by DHS. Cf.

Friends of the Santa Clara River, 887 F.3d at 920 (“[Courts] require only ‘a rational connection 

between facts found and conclusions made’ by the defendant agencies.”). The facts found were 

that the CAM Parole Program was granting parole to virtually all beneficiaries who were 

interviewed. The conclusion made was that doing so was not in keeping with the new 

administration’s view of the parole statute and its policies on immigration. Whether the court 

agrees or disagrees with the government’s conclusion, it is “not empowered to substitute [its] 

judgment for that of the agency,” Sierra Club, 510 F.3d at 1022, and it cannot say that the 

agency’s actions were arbitrary or capricious.

The plaintiffs cite to cases where courts have found that the government’s attempts to 

terminate aspects of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) or the Temporary 

Protected Status (“TPS”) programs were arbitrary and capricious under the APA and argue that the 

termination of the CAM Parole Program similarly violates the APA. Those situations are distinct 

and distinguishable.

Under the DACA program, DHS declined to pursue removal proceedings against 

undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as children, have clean criminal records, 

and meet various educational or military-service requirements. Regents III, 908 F.3d at 489–90. In 

addition to the deferral of removal itself, the DACA program allowed deferred-action recipients to 

apply for employment authorization, enabling them to work legally, pay taxes, and participate in 

the mainstream economy. Id. at 490. DHS, under the Trump Administration, rescinded the DACA

program. Id. at 491–92. Critically, DHS did not claim it was rescinding the DACA program 

because it disagreed with DACA on policy grounds. See id. Instead, it claimed that it was doing so 

 

106 2017 Leadership Guidance – ECF No. 33-33 at 2 (AR000182).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 41

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only because court decisions striking down a different program (the Deferred Action for Parents of 

Americans program) had left it unable to legally defend DACA. Id. at 500–03 (“[T]he Acting 

Secretary [of Homeland Security] based the rescission of DACA solely on a belief that DACA 

was beyond the authority of DHS.”); accord Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 148 

(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (Batalla Vidal I) (“In deciding to rescind the DACA program, Defendants 

expressly and exclusively relied on a legal determination that the program was unlawful and could 

not be sustained in court.”); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 237 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[T]he 

Department [of Homeland Security] never stated, and the government does not now contend, that 

DACA’s rescission reflected a change in the agency’s immigration enforcement priorities.”), 

appeal docketed, No. 18-5243 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 10, 2018).

By claiming that court decisions had left the DACA program legally unsupportable — instead 

of saying that it disagreed with DACA based on its own policy choices — DHS tried to rescind 

the program (which is popular and supported by a majority of Americans) without taking political 

responsibility for doing so. The DACA courts that have held that DHS’s attempts to terminate 

DACA were arbitrary and capricious did so in large part because DHS tried to blame the courts for 

its decision instead of assuming responsibility and accountability itself. As the Ninth Circuit 

explained:

[P]ublic accountability for agency action can only be achieved if the electorate 

knows how to apportion the praise for good measures and the blame for bad ones. 

Without knowing the true source of an objectionable agency action, “the public 

cannot ‘determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, 

or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall.’” . . . .

. . . . When an agency justifies an action solely with an assertion that the law 

prohibits any other course, it shifts responsibility for the outcome from the 

Executive Branch to Congress (for making the law in question) or the courts (for 

construing it). If the Executive is correct in its interpretation of the law, then the 

public is correct to blame the other two branches for any resulting problems. But if 

the Executive is wrong, then it avoids democratic accountability for a choice that 

was the agency’s to make all along. . . . “[A]n official cannot claim that the law ties 

her hands while at the same time denying the courts’ power to unbind her. She may 

escape political accountability or judicial review, but not both.”

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 42

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Regents III, 908 F.3d at 498–99 (citations omitted); accord Batalla Vidal II, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 

421 (“This rule . . . ensures that agencies are accountable for their decisions: If an agency makes a 

decision on policy grounds, it must say so, not act as if courts have tied its hands.”).

Here, by contrast, the government and DHS are assuming accountability and responsibility for 

terminating the CAM Parole Program on policy grounds. This is a crucial distinction. President 

Trump announced his new policy on parole in Executive Order 13,767: “It is the policy of the 

executive branch to end the abuse of parole and asylum provisions currently used to prevent the 

lawful removal of removable aliens.” Exec. Order 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8795. Secretary Kelly 

similarly memorialized that DHS policy’s views were that “[t]he practice of granting parole to 

certain aliens in pre-designated categories in order to create immigration programs not established 

by Congress, has contributed to a border security crisis, undermined the integrity of the 

immigration laws and the parole process, and created an incentive for additional illegal 

immigration.”107 The government recognized that it was changing policy qua policy.

108 The issue 

that was present in the DACA cases — trying to shift responsibility to the courts for the decision 

to rescind a popular program instead of the agency itself claiming responsibility — is not present 

in the same way here.

Another factor that distinguishes this case from the DACA cases is that (in the opinion of 

many DACA courts), the government’s legal assessment and analyses of DACA were wrong as a 

matter of law. Regents III, 908 F.3d at 510 (“[B]ecause the Acting Secretary [of Homeland 

Security] was . . . incorrect in her belief that DACA was illegal and had to be rescinded, plaintiffs 

are likely to succeed in demonstrating that the rescission must be set aside.”); Batalla Vidal II, 279 

F. Supp. 3d at 420–27 (“To the extent the decision to end the DACA program was based on the 

Attorney General’s determination that the program is unconstitutional, that determination was 

 

107 Kelly Memo – ECF No. 33-5 at 10 (AR000030).

108 See 2017 Leadership Guidance – ECF No. 33-33 at 2 (AR000182) (“The CAM Parole program was 

implemented as part of an integrated strategy to address factors contributing to increases in migration 

from Central America to the United States. However, as indicated by the executive order, DHS is 

pursuing a new strategy to secure the U.S. southern border.”).

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 42 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 43

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legally erroneous, and the decision was therefore arbitrary and capricious. . . . This conclusion was 

also arbitrary and capricious because it is based on an obvious factual mistake.”); but see Casa de 

Md. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 772–73 (D. Md. 2018) (holding that it 

was not arbitrary and capricious for the government to rescind DACA based on the belief that 

DACA was legally unsupportable in light of court decisions). By relying on legal analyses that 

were wrong as a matter of law, the government’s decision to rescind DACA was necessarily 

arbitrary and capricious. Regents III, 908 F.3d at 505 (“[I]t is black letter law that where an agency 

purports to act solely on the basis that a certain result is legally required, and that legal premise 

turns out to be incorrect, the action must be set aside, regardless of whether the action could have 

been justified as an exercise of discretion.”) (emphasis in original); Batalla Vidal II, 279 F. Supp. 

3d at 420 (“An agency decision that is based on an erroneous legal premise cannot withstand 

arbitrary-and-capricious review.”). In this case, the plaintiffs have not identified a similarly fatally 

flawed legal assessment or analysis by the government. DHS has expressed its view that the better 

interpretation of the statutory language of the parole statute is that it “appears to strongly counsel 

in favor of using the parole authority sparingly and only in individual cases where, after careful 

consideration of the circumstances, parole is necessary because of demonstrated urgent 

humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”109 That interpretation is not flawed in the same 

way that — according to the DACA courts — DHS’s interpretation of the legality of DACA was

flawed. In construing a predecessor version of the parole statute (that did not include the “case-bycase” requirement that the current version does), the Ninth Circuit held

The legislative history of the parole provision indicates that Congress intended that 

temporary admission be granted infrequently. . . . [“]The parole provisions were 

designed to authorize the Attorney General to act only in emergent, individual, and 

isolated situations, such as the case of an alien who requires immediate medical 

attention, and not for the immigration of classes or groups outside of the limit of 

the law.[”]

 

109 Kelly Memo – ECF No. 33-5 at 10 (AR000030).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 44

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Mason v. Brooks, 862 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting S. Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st 

Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3335).110 Congress reemphasized this view of 

parole when it amended the parole statute to restrict the government’s discretion to approve parole 

“only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Illegal 

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. 

VI, subtit. A, § 602(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689 (1996) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). 

According to the House Judiciary Committee, this change was made because

[t]he text of section 212(d)(5) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] is clear that the parole 

authority was intended to be used on a case-by-case basis to meet specific needs, 

and not as a supplement to Congressionally-established immigration policy. In 

recent years, however, parole has been used increasingly to admit entire categories 

of aliens who do not qualify for admission under any other category in immigration 

law, with the intent that they will remain permanently in the United States. This 

contravenes the intent of section 212(d)(5), but also illustrates why further, specific 

limitations on the Attorney General’s discretion are necessary.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 140 (1996). The court cannot say that DHS’s view — that the parole 

statute counsels in favor of awarding parole sparingly — is legally erroneous, or that its decision

to terminate a program that awarded parole broadly was based on a flawed legal analysis in the 

same way that its attempt to terminate DACA were.

111

The plaintiffs analogize to the TPS cases, but those are distinguishable too. The TPS program 

is a humanitarian program that authorizes DHS to temporarily permit nationals from certain 

countries to live and work in the United States when an ongoing armed conflict, environmental 

disaster, or other conditions prevent the safe return of those persons to their country of origin. See

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)–(C). Prior administrations (both Republican and Democratic) evaluated 

 

110 The version of the parole statute in effect at the time that Mason was decided read, “[t]he Attorney 

General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily, under such conditions as 

he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien 

applying for admission to the United States.” Mason, 862 F.2d at 194 (ellipsis in original) (quoting 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1988)).

111 The court expresses no opinion about whether the parole statute prohibits a program such as the 

CAM Parole Program, which awarded parole broadly. It holds only that the Trump Administration’s 

view — that programs that award parole broadly are not consistent with the Administration’s reading 

of the parole statute and thus should be terminated — is not based on a legally erroneous analysis.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 45

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whether to extend TPS status for countries beyond the period of their initial designation by 

considering both the originating conditions that led to the countries’ initial designations and 

subsequent intervening events that prevented safe return of the countries’ nationals. See Ramos v. 

Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1110–12 & nn.18–22 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (Ramos I). In a break from 

past practice, in evaluating TPS designations, the Trump Administration allegedly shifted to 

considering only whether the originating conditions had abated and stopped considering 

subsequent intervening events. Id. at 1109–15. It then used that shift to de-designate four countries 

(Sudan, Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador) from TPS status. Id. Critically, DHS did not 

acknowledge that it was changing how it was evaluating TPS status and gave no explanation for 

the change. Id. at 1116. Courts have held that this could constitute an APA violation because 

“[t]he APA constrains an agency’s ability to change its practices or policies without 

acknowledging the change or providing an explanation.” Id. at 1108, 1116; Ramos v. Nielsen, __ 

F. Supp. 3d __, No. 18-cv-01554-EMC, 2018 WL 4778285, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)

(Ramos II) (finding that plaintiffs had pleaded an APA claim because “[t]he alleged changes in 

policy — eliminating consideration of intervening conditions not directly related to the originating 

condition — [are] substantive and highly consequential . . . . [but t]here is no dispute that DHS 

never acknowledged any change in practice and thus has not provided any explanation for any 

such change”), appeal docketed, No. 18-16981 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 12, 2018); accord Centro 

Presente v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 416–17 (D. Mass. 2018) (same). 

Here, by contrast, DHS acknowledged that it was changing policy and explained why.

112 The 

challenges raised in the context of the TPS program do not apply in the same way here.

DHS’s termination of the CAM Parole Program does not violate the APA for lack of a 

satisfactory explanation.

 

112 See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8795–96; Kelly Memo – ECF No. 33-5 at 2 

(AR000022), 10 (AR000030).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 46

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2.1.2 Whether termination violated the APA for failure to provide explanations in 

the Federal Register

The plaintiffs fault DHS for not providing its reasons for terminating the CAM Parole Program 

in the Federal Register notice announcing the termination of the Program.113

In reviewing agency action to determine whether it is arbitrary or capricious, a court is not 

limited to the Federal Register. The APA provides that courts must review “the whole record,” 

5 U.S.C. § 706, which “‘consists of all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered 

by agency decision-makers,’” Herguan Univ., 258 F. Supp. 3d at 1064 (quoting Thompson, 885 

F.2d at 555); see Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Sebelius, 794 F. Supp. 2d 162, 171 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(rejecting suggestion to look solely to the Federal Register because “[t]o review an agency’s action 

fairly, the Court should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when 

it made its decision[,] and so the APA requires review of ‘the whole record’”) (emphasis in 

original, internal brackets and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Walter O. Boswell Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). DHS’s reasons for terminating the CAM Parole 

Program are readily discernable from the whole record, and the plaintiffs cite no authorities to 

support their argument that the government’s failure to list those reasons in its Federal Register 

notice renders its decision arbitrary or capricious.

Agency rules that are subject to the notice-and-comment provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553 are 

subject to certain Federal Register reporting requirements. The notice-and-comment provisions do 

not apply to the CAM Parole Program’s termination, however. First, the CAM Parole Program 

was not created through notice and comment, which suggests that its termination does not require 

notice and comment either. Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 

(Batalla Vidal III) (“Plaintiffs’ view that Defendants must use notice and comment to stop what 

started without notice and comment is not only counterintuitive, but also at odds with the general 

principle that the procedures needed to repeal or amend a rule as the same ones that were used to 

 

113 Pls. Mot. for Prelim. Injunction – ECF No. 24 at 17; Pls. Mot. to Dismiss Opp’n – ECF No. 34 at 

16–17.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 47

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make the rule in the first place.”) (citing Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 

(2015)); cf. Regents III, 908 F.3d at 513 (“The district court held that because DACA itself was a 

general statement of policy that did not require notice and comment, it could also be rescinded 

without those procedures. This proposition finds support in Mada-Luna, in which we concluded 

that a deferred-action Operating Instruction constituted a general statement of policy, and thus 

could be validly repealed and superseded without notice-and-comment proceedings.”) (internal 

quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1017 

(9th Cir. 1987)). Second, the termination of the CAM Parole Program does not foreclose parole as 

a general matter — individuals may apply for parole by filing a Form I-131, and the government 

may continue to grant parole on a case-by-case basis — and the termination thus does not effect a 

new binding rule of substantive law that would be subject to notice and comment. Cf. Regents III, 

908 F.3d at 513–14 (a rescission of DACA that “leaves in place the background principle that 

deferred action is available on a case-by-case basis. . . . is not a ‘new binding rule of substantive 

law’” that requires notice-and-comment) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (citing MadaLuna, 813 F.2d at 1014).

DHS’s termination of the CAM Parole Program does not violate the APA for failure to provide 

its explanations in the Federal Register.

2.1.3 Whether termination violated the APA for failure to take into account 

“serious reliance interests”

The plaintiffs argue that agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to take 

into account the “serious reliance interests engendered by longstanding policies,” citing Encino 

Motorcars LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016), and FCC v. Fox Television Studios, 

Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).114 Neither side addresses what the standard is for determining what 

reliance interests are “serious” or how much the agency must take them into account.115

 

114 Pl. Mot. for Prelim. Injunction – ECF No. 24 at 17 (internal brackets and ellipses omitted).

115 The D.C. Circuit addressed this issue in the context of an environmental permit where the regulated 

party and other interested parties submitted public comments to the agency (the EPA) in favor of or 

against the permit. The D.C. Circuit held that “‘the extent to which an agency is obliged to address 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 48

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CAM Parole Program participants who had not been conditionally approved for parole (for 

themselves, in the case of beneficiaries, or for their family members, in the case of applicants), and 

individuals who never applied to the Program, do not have a “serious reliance interest” in being 

approved for parole. Parole is at the discretion of DHS, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and an 

application for parole that has not been approved does not engender a reliance interest. See Wong 

v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The INA does not create any liberty interest 

in temporary parole that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the statute makes clear that 

whether and for how long temporary parole is granted are matters entirely within the discretion of 

the [Secretary of Homeland Security].”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1310 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (Regents II) (“Our court of appeals has 

accordingly held there is no protected interest in temporary parole, since such relief is ‘entirely 

within the discretion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security].’”) (quoting Wong, 373 F.3d at 967–

68), aff’d, Regents III, 908 F.3d 476.

To the extent that the plaintiffs argue that parole may be discretionary in theory but that in 

practice, the CAM Parole Program awarded parole (or refugee status) in 99% of cases and 

participants therefore had a right to rely on an expectation that they would be awarded parole, their 

argument fails. As the plaintiffs acknowledge, USCIS told participants that applications would be 

considered for parole “on a case-by-case basis,”116 and nothing in the CAM Parole Program 

materials suggested that parole was guaranteed. A liberal award of parole in the past under the 

Program does not create a “serious reliance interest” in being approved for parole under the

 

reliance will be affected by the thoroughness of public comments it receives on the issue. An agency 

cannot be faulted for failing to discuss at length matters only cursorily raised before it.’” Mingo Logan 

Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 F.3d 710, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal brackets and ellipsis omitted) (quoting 

Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2128 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). It is not clear how to apply that 

standard here, where the agency action was not subject to public comment in the same way. The 

standard suggests, however, that the “serious reliance interests” test operates on a sliding scale — the

greater the reliance interests, the greater the agency’s obligation to take them into account, and the 

lesser the reliance interests, the lesser the agency’s obligation — and further suggests that the agency 

should not be faulted for failing to raise and address sua sponte reliance interests that are less serious.

116 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 13 (¶ 38); Pls. Mot. for Prelim. Injunction – ECF No. 24 at 11; Pls. Mot. to 

Dismiss Opp’n – ECF No. 34 at 16, 24.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 49

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Program that DHS had to take into account. See Regents II, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1311 (“An 

agency’s past practice of generally granting a government benefit is also insufficient to establish a 

legal entitlement.”) (citing Gerhart v. Lake Cty., 637 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011)); GarciaMir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1451 (11th Cir. 1986) (fact that government may have generously 

granted discretionary parole in the past does not give rise to an entitlement to parole); cf. Regents 

III, 908 F.3d at 515 (“[A] 99% renewal rate under DACA provides no evidence that the 

government shared an understanding that the DACA program would continue existing indefinitely 

to provide such renewals.”).

To the extent that the plaintiffs argue that CAM Parole Program participants relied on the 

opportunity to apply for parole (as opposed to a right to receive parole), the plaintiffs have not 

pleaded why the termination of the Program implicates “serious reliance interests.” Participants 

can still apply for parole by filing a Form I-131. The plaintiffs have not shown that a reliance 

interest in the CAM Parole Program in particular (as opposed to other opportunities to apply for 

parole) was a “serious reliance interest” that DHS had to take into account. Also, the plaintiffs do 

not establish how DHS did not sufficiently take into account those reliance interests by allowing 

participants to apply for parole through a different mechanism, a Form I-131. See Termination of 

the Central American Minors Parole Program, 82 Fed. Reg. at 38,927.

To the extent that the plaintiffs argue that CAM Parole Program participants who did not 

receive a decision on their applications had “serious reliance interests” because they paid costs to 

participate in the Program, the court disagrees. There were no fees to apply to the CAM Parole 

Program.

117 Parents had to pay the cost of DNA testing, but USCIS refunded those costs if DNA 

 

117 See Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, Launch of In-Country Refugee/

Parole Program for Children in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with Parents Lawfully 

Present in the United States (Dec. 3, 2014) (December 2014 Media Note) – ECF No. 33-10 

(AR000051) (“Parents do not need to pay any fee to file [a CAM Program application] or for 

assistance in completing and submitting the form, but they are expected to cover the initial costs of 

DNA testing to confirm claimed biological parent-child relationships. Costs of DNA testing are 

reimbursable under certain circumstances.”); Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of 

State, Fact Sheet: Expansion of the Central American Minors (CAM) Program (Nov. 1, 2016) – ECF 

No. 33-18 at 3 (AR000107) (“There are no fees to file a [CAM Program application].”).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 50

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testing confirmed a familial relationship (and the plaintiffs do not allege that they were denied 

refunds of DNA-testing costs).

118 Participants incurred costs for medical exams and travel 

arrangements only after USCIS conditionally approved beneficiaries for parole, so participants 

who did not receive a decision did not incur those costs.

119

Participants did incur costs for tolls, gas, and food to travel to their country capitals.120 While 

these costs might be consequential for participants, the court concludes that they do not create a 

“serious reliance interest” that DHS had to take into account. The costs were discrete, short-term 

costs. If these isolated costs were “serious reliance interests,” then every agency action potentially 

would be subject to an APA challenge on a theory that the agency failed to take into account some 

cost that someone, somewhere, might have incurred because of an agency program. Cf. Encino 

Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (discussing “serious reliance interests” in the context of 

“longstanding policies” and, specifically, a labor-law regulatory interpretation that was in place for 

over two decades; a chanced interpretation “could necessitate systemic, significant changes” to 

employment agreements throughout an industry); Regents I, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1046 (discussing 

“serious reliance interests” in the context of DACA over the course of years); Batalla Vidal II, 279 

F. Supp. 3d at 431 (same).

DHS’s termination of the CAM Parole Program going forward does not violate the APA for 

failure to take into account “serious reliance interests.”

 

One plaintiff whose application was not conditionally approved for parole claimed that he paid 

certain “program fees,” Compl. – ECF No. 34 (¶ 102), without further elaborating what those fees 

were. There is nothing in the complaint or the administrative record that indicates that DHS knew 

about those fees, and DHS cannot be faulted for not addressing unknown reliance interests. See 

generally Mingo Logan Coal, 829 F.3d at 722.

118 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 15 (¶ 42(c)).

119 See id. at 16 (¶ 42(f)–(g)).

120 Id. at 34 (¶ 102) (“A.B. spent approximately $100 for each of four trips his son had to make to San 

Salvador for CAM-related appointments.”), 38 (¶ 118) (“Each time H.F., A.F., and their mother 

traveled to Tegucigalpa in connection with CAM — a nearly four-hour trip that required them to leave 

their house around 3:00 AM — J.F. sent them $200 to cover the costs of the trip, including tolls, gas, 

and food.”).

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 50 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 51

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2.1.4 Whether termination violated the APA for failure to “consider an important 

aspect of the problem”

The plaintiffs argue that agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “entirely failed 

to consider an important aspect of the problem.”

121 Neither side addresses the standard for 

determining “the problem” and its “important aspects.”

In the Ninth Circuit, “[w]hether an agency has overlooked ‘an important aspect of the 

problem’ . . . turns on what a relevant substantive statute makes ‘important.’” Or. Nat. Res. 

Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 1996). As one court noted, citing the Ninth Circuit, 

“[a]n ‘important aspect of the problem’ is not simply whatever plaintiffs would like the [agency] 

to consider. . . . The court is not free to invent ‘important’ things out of thin air and require the 

agency to consider them. It may only ensure that the agency’s decision is supported by reasoned 

judgment and that the agency considered the factors it was required by law to consider.” N.C. Bus. 

Enters. Program v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 354, 363 (2013) (citing Or. Nat. Res. Council, 92 

F.3d at 798).

The plaintiffs argue that “important aspect[s] of the problem” are (1) reliance interests and 

(2) conditions in the Northern Triangle countries.122 The court addressed the first issue in the 

previous section. Regarding the second issue, the plaintiffs argue that “conditions in the Northern 

Triangle that led to the inception of the CAM program have only worsened” and that “[t]hese 

country conditions predictably result in Central American children undertaking the dangerous 

journey by land to the United States and seeking relief at the border,” and the defendants failed to 

consider these factors.123

The parole statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), vests the Secretary of Homeland Security with 

discretion over parole decisions. It expressly limits the Secretary to granting parole “only on a 

 

121 Pls. Mot. for Prelim. Injunction – ECF No. 24 at 17 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 42–

43).

122 Id. at 17–18.

123 Id. at 18; Pls. Mot. to Dismiss Opp’n – ECF No. 34 at 16.

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 51 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 52

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case-by-case basis” for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(d)(5)(A); see Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. VI, subtit. A, § 602(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-689 

(adding the “only on a case-by-case basis” requirement). It does not otherwise require the 

Secretary to consider any particular factors or mandate how the Secretary must weigh competing 

interests. Among other things, it does not require the Secretary to consider (1) the general country 

conditions in the Northern Triangle or any other country or (2) whether Central American minors 

would otherwise decide to journey by land to the United States — neither of which is a “case-bycase basis” — in deciding what procedures she will establish or terminate for parole applications. 

The previous administration might have weighed these considerations more heavily in establishing 

the CAM Parole Program, but that does not obligate future administrations to consider and weigh 

them similarly. Cf. Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 

2015) (en banc) (“[Agency] was entitled in 2003 to give more weight to socioeconomic concerns 

than it had in 2001, even on precisely the same record. . . . There was a change in presidential 

administrations just days after the [] Rule was promulgated in 2001. Elections have policy 

consequences.”).

DHS’s termination of the CAM Parole Program does not violate the APA for failure to 

consider “important aspects of the problem.”

2.1.5 Whether DHS’s decision to stop processing CAM Program applications from 

January 2017 to August 2017 was a “secret shutdown” of the Program that 

violated the APA

DHS stopped processing CAM Program applications between January 2017 but did not 

announce the termination of the CAM Parole Program until August 2017. The plaintiffs 

characterize this as a “secret shutdown” of the Program that was arbitrary and capricious and 

violated the notice requirements in 5 U.S.C. § 552. Even if this were the case, DHS’s subsequent 

public termination of the CAM Parole Program in August 2017 moots that challenge, at least with 

respect to DHS’s decision to terminate the Program going forward. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 

v. EPA, 744 F.3d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that challenges to agency’s failure to provide 

notice of new rule were mooted by agency’s later re-promulgation of the rule with notice, even if 

the two rules were identical) (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 53

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Comm’n, 680 F.2d 810, 813–14 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The standard relief for an APA challenge is to 

set aside the unlawful agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Setting aside DHS’s “secret shutdown” of 

the CAM Parole Program in January 2017 would afford the plaintiffs no relief in light of DHS’s 

public termination of the Program in August 2017. The plaintiffs’ objections to the “secret 

shutdown,” as they relate to the termination of CAM Parole Program going forward, are moot.

2.2 Rescinding Conditional Approvals of Parole

The analysis is different with respect to DHS’s decision to rescind all conditional approvals of 

parole that it issued before it terminated the CAM Parole Program in August 2017. Program 

participants who received conditional approvals of parole (and made arrangements based on those 

approvals) had more serious reliance interests than individuals who never received approvals. The 

court holds that DHS’s failure to take into account and address those more serious reliance 

interests when it mass-rescinded parole for those participants was arbitrary and capricious.

The government first argues that those participants do not have reliance interests because their 

parole approvals were only “conditional.”124 But as the plaintiffs plead in their complaint and as 

the administrative record confirms, the only steps following conditional approval to travel to the 

United States and be fully paroled were nondiscretionary ones: the completion of a medical exam,

final security checks, and making travel arrangements.

125 (By contrast, participants who had never 

 

124 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 32 at 11; Defs. Mot. to Dismiss Reply – ECF No. 38 at 17.

125 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 16–17 (¶ 42(f)–(i)); Form Letter, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Central American Minors Program: Notice of Ineligibility for Refugee 

Resettlement and Conditional Approval for Parole – ECF No. 33-44 at 4 (AR000448) (“You have 

been conditionally approved for parole into the United States. Final approval is conditioned upon 

successful completion of any remaining clearances that are required in the screening process. These 

clearances include [a] medical examination by a U.S. approved panel physician, completion of security 

clearance procedures, and verification of family relationships. Please see attached information sheet 

for next steps that must be completed for you to be paroled into the United States.”); U.S. Citizenship 

& Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Central American Minors (CAM) Parole 

Program: Information for Conditionally Approved Applicants – ECF No. 33-48 at 2–3 (AR000462–

63) (“As explained in the letter denying your application for refugee status, you have been 

conditionally approved for parole into the United States, meaning that final approval of parole cannot 

be granted until certain additional steps have been completed. These steps include: • Favorable results 

of background and security checks conducted by USCIS; • Favorable results of a medical examination, 

conducted at your expense, and scheduled by International Office for Migration (IOM); • Coordination 

of travel arrangements, at your own expense, with IOM; • Verification of continued legal presence of 

your relative in the United States by USCIS; • Travel within the validity period of the parole 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 54

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been approved were subject to discretionary decisions.) This distinction means that CAM Parole 

Program participants with approved applications for parole had “serious reliance interests.” The

government argues that the Secretary of Homeland Security retained discretion to rescind parole 

for participants who had conditionally approval.

126 But that does not mean that participants with 

approval had no reliance interests in their parole. Cf. Batalla Vidal II, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 432 

(while DHS could in its discretion rescind DACA at any time, “it does not follow that 

[beneficiaries] had no reliance interests therein, such that Defendants were free to end the DACA 

program without considering such interests”) (emphasis in original) (citing Encino Motorcars, 136 

S. Ct. at 2124–26).

The government next argues that it took reliance interests into account because it did not 

rescind parole for beneficiaries who had arrived in the United States.127 The court cannot see how 

this decision for beneficiaries in the United States takes into account the serious reliance interests 

of participants with conditional approval who had not arrived or whose family members had not 

arrived in the United States. The government also argues that it considered reliance interests when 

it offered to refund fees that participants paid for medical examinations and plane tickets.128 This 

does not address the participants’ reliance interests in the parole approvals. It also does not

adequately address the fees paid because the government offered refunds only for medical exams 

that were not completed but did not offer refunds for exams that were completed.129

 

authorization letter (Form I-512). . . . IOM will contact your relative in the United States to collect 

payment for your medical examination. . . . If your medical exam clears, IOM will contact your 

relative in the United States to arrange your flight. . . After IOM receives payment for your travel to 

the United States, IOM will submit your travel itinerary to USCIS. We will: • Perform final 

security checks, • Ensure your medical exam results remain valid until date of travel, and • Verify 

that your relative in the United States still has a qualifying legal presence in the United States. If 

we decide that you have met all requirements for parole under this program, we will issue for you 

a Form I-512L, Authorization for Parole of an Alien Into the United States.”).

126 Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 32 at 20.

127 Id.

128 Id.

129 August 2017 Info Sheet – ECF No. 33-6 at 4 (AR000037); Rescission Form Letter – ECF No. 

33-46 at 2 (AR000454).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 55

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The court holds that when DHS mass-rescinded the conditional parole approvals of CAM 

Parole Program participants, it did not adequately take into account and address the participants’

serious reliance interests. Consequently, its actions in mass-rescinding approvals were arbitrary 

and capricious and must be set aside under the APA.

The “serious reliance interests” requirement does not mean that DHS lacks the authority to 

rescind conditional approvals of parole for CAM Parole Program participants, notwithstanding the 

participants’ reliance on their approvals. DHS has that authority. It has the authority to rescind 

parole even from Program beneficiaries who have arrived in the United States and similarly has 

the authority to rescind conditional approvals of applications where the beneficiaries are still 

outside the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). But DHS must recognize and 

acknowledge that Program participants who were approved for parole had serious reliance 

interests in that parole, take those reliance interests into account, and explain why it felt it 

appropriate to nonetheless mass-rescind their parole in the face of that reliance. This ensures 

transparency and accountability. If DHS thinks that Program participants’ reliance on their parole 

is less important than its new policies in mass-rescinding that parole, it can make that choice, so 

long as it explains its reasons so that it can be held accountable. Cf. NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 

249 (the government must explain its actions so that “members of the public know how their 

elected officials have used their enforcement powers, and they can hold those officials accountable 

by speaking out, by petitioning their representatives, or ultimately at the ballot box”).

When it mass-rescinded conditional approvals, DHS failed to take into account and address the 

serious reliance interests of CAM Parole Program participants whom it had approved. Its massrescission was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.130

* * *

 

130 Because the court finds that DHS’s mass-rescission of parole approvals was arbitrary and 

capricious because DHS failed to take into account serious reliance interests, it is unnecessary to 

address whether the mass-rescission was also arbitrary and capricious because it was impermissibly 

retroactive or because it violated DHS’s own guidance and thus ran afoul of the doctrine in United 

States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 55 of 64
ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 56

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For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 

APA claims as they relate to the government’s mass-rescinding of conditional approvals of parole. 

The court otherwise grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ APA claims.

3. Due Process

The plaintiffs bring a claim on behalf of the plaintiffs in the United States for violation of due 

process.

131

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person may be “deprived of 

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. “‘A threshold 

requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff’s showing of a liberty 

or property interest protected by the Constitution.’” Regents III, 908 F.3d at 514 (quoting Wedges/

Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994)). The applicant-parent 

plaintiffs claim as their protected interest a general constitutional liberty interest in “the 

companionship and society of their family members who are stranded in Central America.”132

In Gebhardt v. Nielsen, 879 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit held that the general 

right to familial companionship cannot form the basis of a due-process claim for a plaintiff in the 

United States challenging a government decision not to admit non-citizen family members located 

outside the United States. The plaintiff in Gebhardt was a U.S. citizen who filed legal-permanentresident petitions for his non-citizen wife and her three non-citizen children. Id. at 983. USCIS 

approved the petitions initially but then revoked them based on the plaintiff’s criminal conviction 

from years earlier. Id. at 983–84. The plaintiff challenged USCIS’s denials of his petition, arguing 

that (among other things) “USCIS, by denying his petitions, denied him the fundamental right to 

preserve the integrity of his family.” Id. at 988. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument:

 

131 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 42 (¶ 137). The plaintiffs do not bring a due-process claim on behalf of any 

beneficiary children outside the United States. See id.

132 Id.

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Plaintiff’s theory is that he has a fundamental right to reside in the United States 

with his non-citizen relatives. But that theory runs headlong into Congress’ plenary 

power over immigration. We acknowledge, of course, that individuals have a 

strong interest in living with their family members. But that interest cannot be so 

fundamental that it overrides Congress’ plenary power in this domain. As we have 

said before, the generic right to live with family is “far removed” from the specific 

right to reside in the United States with non-citizen family members. . . . We 

therefore conclude that Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is not colorable, 

and we decline to consider it further.

Id. (citations omitted). So too here. The applicant-parent plaintiffs’ right to familial 

companionship for their non-citizen children located outside the United States does not give rise to 

a protected interest that can form the basis of a due-process claim.

133

The plaintiffs’ authorities do not change this conclusion. The plaintiffs cite Justice Kennedy’s 

concurring opinion in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), for the proposition that they have a 

protected interest.

134 In Din, the government denied an immigrant visa to the husband of a U.S. 

citizen. Id. at 2131 (plurality op.). The husband was a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Id. The 

U.S.-citizen spouse challenged the denial because the government did not explain its reasons for 

the denial. Id. at 2131–32. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order dismissing the case. 

Id. The Supreme Court then reversed the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 2138. In his concurring opinion,

Justice Kennedy assumed for the sake of argument that the U.S. citizen plaintiff in the United 

States had a protected interest in the visa application of her non-U.S. citizen spouse and concluded 

that the government had provided her with sufficient due process in any event. Id. at 2139 

(Kennedy, J., concurring). He expressly refrained from deciding the protected-interest issue, 

 

133 Gebhardt addresses the issue of the constitutional right to familial companionship specifically in 

the context of a plaintiff located in the United States and his non-citizen family members located 

outside the United States who were not separated due to any government action. The other cases that 

the plaintiffs cite are inapposite because they address familial companionship in the context of families 

who were all originally present in the United States and were separated by the government’s actions. 

Cf. Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1074–75, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2011) (family members 

who were together in the United States were separated allegedly by the government’s actions); Kelson 

v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653–55 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 

1271–73, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979) (same).

134 The Ninth Circuit has adopted Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion as the binding opinion in Din.

Cardenas v. United States, 826 F.3d 1164, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2016).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 58

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writing that “[t]oday’s disposition should not be interpreted as deciding whether a citizen has a 

protected liberty interest in the visa application of her alien spouse.” Id. That opinion thus does not 

bear on the issue here.

The plaintiffs also cite Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2008), which involved 

a U.S.-citizen wife who brought a due-process claim after the government denied her non-citizen 

husband an immigrant visa. But the source of the protected interest at issue there was not a general 

constitutional liberty interest in familial companionship. Instead, the protected interest was 

statutory: a U.S. citizen’s statutorily created entitlement to an immigration visa for his or her

spouse. See Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[G]rant of an I-130 

petition for immediate relative status is a nondiscretionary decision. Immediate relative status for 

an alien spouse is a right to which citizen applicants are entitled as long as the petitioner and 

spouse beneficiary meet the statutory and regulatory requirements for eligibility. This protected 

interest is entitled to the protections of due process.”) (citing Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1061–62, 

and other authorities). Because the plaintiff in Bustamante satisfied the threshold requirement of 

having a protected interest in a visa for her husband, the Ninth Circuit addressed the second 

question: whether the government had deprived her of that interest without sufficient procedural 

protections. Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062. Bustamante thus does not bear on the question here:

whether the applicant-parent plaintiffs have a protected interest.

By contrast to the spousal immigrant visas in Bustamante, there is no statutorily created

protected interest in parole. Wong, 373 F.3d at 968 (“The INA does not create any liberty interest 

in temporary parole that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the statute makes clear that 

whether and for how long temporary parole is granted are matters entirely within the discretion of 

the [Secretary of Homeland Security].”); Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“Since discretionary relief is a privilege created by Congress, denial of such relief cannot violate 

a substantive interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Regents II, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1310 

(“Our court of appeals has accordingly held there is no protected interest in temporary parole, 

since such relief is ‘entirely within the discretion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security].’ . . . 

[This] foreclose[s] any argument that plaintiffs have a protected interest in . . . advance parole[.]”) 

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 59

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(citing Wong, 373 F.3d at 967–68). And Gebhardt forecloses the argument that a general 

constitutional right to familial companionship gives rise to a protected interest in this context.

Because the plaintiffs have not made a threshold showing that they have a protected liberty or 

property interest, the court dismisses their due-process claim.

4. Equal Protection

The plaintiffs bring a claim on behalf of the plaintiffs in the United States for violation of 

equal protection.

135

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporates a guarantee of equal protection 

and prohibits unjustified discrimination by federal actors. United States v. Navarro, 800 F.3d 

1104, 1112 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954)). Courts 

assess equal-protection claims against federal actors under the Fifth Amendment in the same way 

that they assess equal-protection claims against state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

(citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)). The plaintiffs argue that the 

government’s termination of the CAM Parole Program and its mass-rescission of conditional 

approvals of parole violate equal protection because the decisions were substantially motivated by 

discriminatory intent and animus against Latinos, as evidenced by President Trump’s history of 

purported slurs and epithets toward Latinos.136

The termination of the CAM Parole Program and the rescission of conditional approvals of 

parole affect the admission of foreign nationals into the United States.137 As the Supreme Court 

held in Trump v. Hawaii, “a circumscribed inquiry applies to any constitutional claim concerning 

the entry of foreign nationals.” Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 n.5.

 

135 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 43 (Count IV header). The plaintiffs do not bring an equal-protection claim 

on behalf of any beneficiary children outside the United States. See id.

136 Id. (¶¶ 144–45).

137 The government did not rescind parole for beneficiaries who were in the United States at the time it 

terminated the CAM Parole Program. See Termination of the Central American Minors Parole 

Program, 82 Fed. Reg. at 38,927.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 60

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The Trump case is instructive here. That case involved a challenge to the government’s socalled “travel ban,” a presidential proclamation limiting entry by foreign nationals from eight 

countries; most of the countries are predominately Muslim. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2405. The 

plaintiffs there argued that the primary purpose of the proclamation was to discriminate against 

Muslims. Id. at 2417. In support of their discrimination claims and as evidence of religious bias 

against Muslims, the plaintiffs cited purportedly anti-Muslim statements that President Trump

made. Id.

In rejecting the plaintiffs’ challenge, the Supreme Court wrote that “[f]or more than a century, 

this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental 

sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from 

judicial control.’” Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 

The Court acknowledged that “although foreign nationals seeking admission have no 

constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a circumscribed judicial inquiry when the 

denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen.” Id. at 2419. “But [the 

Court] limited [its] review to whether the Executive gave a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ 

reason for its action.” Id. (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972)). “Given the 

authority of the political branches over admission, [the Court] held that ‘when the Executive 

exercises this delegated power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide 

reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing 

its justification’ against the asserted constitutional interests of U.S. citizens.” Id. (internal brackets 

omitted) (quoting Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770).

The test that the Supreme Court applied in evaluating the presidential proclamation was 

whether “it is impossible to ‘discern a relationship to legitimate state interests’” and “the policy is 

‘inexplicable by anything but animus.’” Id. at 2420–21. The Court held that the proclamation was 

premised on legitimate purposes, namely, “preventing entry of [foreign] nationals who cannot be 

adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their practices.” Id. at 2421. The Court 

upheld the proclamation as “a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the 

privilege of admission.” Id. at 2423.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 61

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While the Court considered President Trump’s statements about Muslims, see id. at 2420, it 

declined to credit the plaintiffs’ argument that President Trump’s statements supported a 

constitutional challenge to the proclamation:

The entry suspension is an act that is well within executive authority and could 

have been taken by any other President — the only question is evaluating the 

actions of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid 

Proclamation. . . . [T]he Government has set forth a sufficient national security 

justification to survive rational basis review. We express no view on the soundness 

of the policy. We simply hold today that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a 

likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim.

Id. at 2423.

The plaintiffs’ challenge here to the termination of the CAM Parole Program is analogous to 

the Trump plaintiffs’ challenge to the presidential proclamation. In both cases, plaintiffs residing 

in the United States challenge government policies that prevent their foreign relatives from 

entering the United States.

138 In both cases, “[i]t cannot be said that it is impossible to ‘discern a 

relationship to legitimate state interests’ or that the policy is ‘inexplicable by anything but 

animus.’” Cf. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2420–21. The government’s view is that parole should be used 

“sparingly and only in individual cases” and that “[t]he practice of granting parole to certain aliens 

in pre-designated categories in order to create immigration programs not established by Congress, 

has contributed to a border security crisis, undermined the integrity of the immigration laws and 

the parole process, and created an incentive for additional illegal immigration.”

139 These are 

facially legitimate and bona fide reasons for terminating the CAM Parole Program. Cf. Jeanty v. 

Bulger, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1377–78, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding that discouraging mass 

migration of Haitians to the United States by applying parole criteria in a more restrictive manner 

was a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason[]” for changing from a policy of favoring parole 

 

138 While the plaintiffs here are bringing an equal-protection claim under the Fifth Amendment, and 

the plaintiffs in Trump brought an Establishment Clause claim under the First Amendment, the 

Supreme Court “ha[s] reaffirmed and applied its deferential standard of review across different 

contexts and constitutional claims.” Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419.

139 See Kelly Memo – ECF No. 33-5 at 10 (AR000030); accord Exec. Order 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. at 

8795–96.

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 62

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for certain low-risk Haitian nationals arriving in the United States to a policy of limiting parole), 

aff’d sub nom. Moise v. Bulger, 321 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2003). Because the government has 

facially legitimate and bona fide reasons for terminating the CAM Parole Program, here, as in 

Trump, the court cannot “look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its 

justification’ against the asserted [equal-protection] constitutional interests of [the plaintiffs].” Cf.

Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770).

140

Citing cases that do not involve the admission of foreign nationals into the United States, the 

plaintiffs argue that the court should infer from President Trump’s anti-Latino statements that the 

government acted with discriminatory animus and thus violated their equal-protection rights. Their 

arguments might carry more weight in the context of a program like the DACA or TPS programs 

that involve only individuals located in the United States. Cf. Regents III, 908 F.3d at 518–20

(plaintiffs could plausibly plead an equal-protection that the government’s decision to terminate 

the DACA program was based on racial animus based on President Trump’s anti-Latino 

statements); Ramos I, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1131–32 (same re the TPS program); Ramos II, __ F. 

Supp. 3d __, 2018 WL 4778285, at *16–21 (same re the TPS program). But unlike the DACA or 

TPS programs, the CAM Parole Program involves the admission of foreign nationals presently 

outside the United States into the United States, and the court’s review of constitutional equalprotection claims thus is circumscribed. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–20 & n.5; cf. Regents III, 908 

F.3d at 520 (“[DACA] differs from [Trump v.] Hawaii in several potentially important respects, 

 

140 The plaintiffs argue that these reasons do not match the government’s actions in terminating the 

CAM Parole Program because, they allege, the Program operated on a case-by-case basis. Pls. Mot. to 

Dismiss Opp’n – ECF No. 34 at 24. But the plaintiffs do not plead that the Program granted parole 

“sparingly,” that it granted parole “only in individual cases,” or that it did not “grant[] parole to certain 

aliens in pre-designated categories in order to create immigration programs not established by 

Congress.” Contrary to the plaintiffs’ claims, there is no mismatch between the government’s view

that parole should be granted sparingly and not used to create an immigration program not established 

by Congress and its decision to terminate the CAM Parole Program.

The plaintiffs also try to distinguish Trump by arguing that it was decided on a preliminary-injunction 

motion, not a motion to dismiss. Pls. Mot. to Dismiss Opp’n – ECF No. 34 at 23–24. They cite no 

authorities to support their argument that a court cannot decide the question of whether the government 

has “facially legitimate and bona fide reasons” on a motion to dismiss. Cf., e.g., Bustamante, 531 F.3d 

at 1062–63 (evaluating whether government had a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for 

denying visa on a motion to dismiss).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 63

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including the physical location of the plaintiffs within the geographic United States”) (citing 

Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)); Ramos I, 321 F. Supp. 

3d at 1129 (“the TPS-beneficiaries here, unlike those affected by the Proclamation in Trump, are 

already in the United States” and hence “this case is unlike Trump; it does not implicate ‘the 

admission and exclusion of foreign nationals,’ who have ‘no constitutional rights regarding [their] 

application’ in light of the ‘sovereign prerogative’ ‘to admit or exclude aliens’”) (citing Trump, 

138 S. Ct. at 2418; Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)); Ramos II, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 

2018 WL 4778285, at *21 (same). The plaintiffs’ general equal-protection cases are inapposite 

here.

The government has facially legitimate and bona fide reasons for terminating the CAM Parole 

Program. Because the court cannot test those reasons by balancing them against the plaintiffs’ 

constitutional interests, cf. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419–21, the court dismisses the plaintiffs’ equalprotection claim.

5. Equitable Estoppel

The parties dispute whether equitable estoppel can be pleaded as an affirmative claim or 

whether it is only an affirmative defense.141 The court need not resolve this question because the 

plaintiffs have not pleaded the elements of equitable estoppel as either a claim or defense.

Equitable estoppel requires that (among other things) the government engaged in “affirmative 

misconduct,” which the Ninth Circuit has defined to mean a “deliberate lie” or “a pattern of false 

promises.” Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing 

Mukherjee v. INS, 793 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986)). “Negligently providing misinformation to 

an alien does not meet this definition” and thus is insufficient to plead equitable estoppel. Id.

 

141 Compare Defs. Mot. to Dismiss – ECF No. 32 at 25 (“‘Equitable Estoppel is not an affirmative 

claim, but rather an affirmative defense.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Mazza, No. 2:15-cv-09183-ODW(AS), 

2016 WL 5842186, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016)) with Pls. Mot. to Dismiss Opp’n – ECF No. 34 at 

24 (“Ninth Circuit precedent recognizes an affirmative cause of action for equitable estoppel.”) (citing 

Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).

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ORDER – No. 18-cv-03539-LB 64

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The plaintiffs allege that during the time between January and August 2017, when the 

government was purportedly engaged in a “secret shutdown” of the CAM Parole Program, 

(1) government web pages continued to represent that the Program was active and that participants 

should not delay in paying for plane tickets,142 and (2) IOM contacted participants to solicit and 

accept payments for plane tickets.

143 This does not plead a deliberate lie or a pattern of false 

promises on the part of the government, as opposed to (for example) the government’s negligently 

failing to update its websites and inform IOM of the purported shutdown (or IOM’s not getting the 

message and inadvertently providing participants with incorrect information). The plaintiffs have 

not pleaded that the government engaged in a deliberate lie or a pattern of false promises, and the

court thus dismisses their equitable-estoppel claim.

CONCLUSION

The court grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court denies 

the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ APA claims as they relate to the government’s massrescinding conditional approvals of parole made under the CAM Parole Program. In all other 

respects, the court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss.144

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 10, 2018

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

 

142 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 21–22 (¶¶ 57–60).

143 Id. at 20 (¶¶ 54–55).

144 Because the court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to all claims other than a 

portion of the APA claims and President Trump is not named as a defendant in the APA claims, the 

court does not address the defendants’ arguments regarding naming the president as a defendant.

Case 3:18-cv-03539-LB Document 51 Filed 12/10/18 Page 64 of 64