Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-10-57008/USCOURTS-ca9-10-57008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL VERDUGO, brother of

Decedent; ROSEMARY VERDUGO,

mother, successor and heir of Mary

Ann Verdugo, Decedent,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TARGET CORPORATION, a Minnesota

corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-57008

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-06930-

ODW-AJW

Central District

of California, 

Los Angeles

ORDER

Filed December 11, 2012

Before: Harry Pregerson, Susan P. Graber,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Concurrence by Judge Graber;

Dissent by Judge Pregerson

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2 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

*

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

SUMMARY

*

Certification to CA Supreme Court

The panel certified a question of California law to the

California Supreme Court, withdrew the case from further

consideration, and stayed further proceedings pending final

action by the California Supreme Court.

The panel certified the following question:

In what circumstances, if ever, does the

common law duty of a commercial property

owner to provide emergency first aid to

invitees require the availability of an

Automatic External Defibrillator (“AED”) for

cases of sudden cardiac arrest? 

Judge Graber concurred fully in the order, and wrote

separately to note that in the absence of the California

Supreme Court’s guidance, she would disagree with Judge

Pregerson’s dissenting view.

Judge Pregerson dissented from the order certifying a

question to the California Supreme Court. Judge Pregerson

would reverse the district court’s dismissal of the complaint

and remand for further proceedings because he would hold in

the circumstances of this case that the California common law

duty for a business to provide emergency first aid to its

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 3

invitees requires the availability of an AED for cases of

sudden cardiac arrest.

COUNSEL

Robert A. Roth, Tarkington, O’Neill, Barrack & Chong,

Berkeley, California; David G. Eisenstein, Law Offices of

David G. Eisenstein, P.C., Carlsbad, California for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Benjamin R. Trachtman and Ryan M. Craig, Trachtman &

Trachtman, Mission Viejo, California for DefendantAppellee.

ORDER

Pursuant to Rule 8.548 of the California Rules of Court,

we request the California Supreme Court to decide the

question of California law set forth in Part II of this order.

This case is withdrawn from submission until further order of

this court, and all further proceedings in this court are stayed

pending final action by the California Supreme Court.

There is no controlling precedent resolving the question

we set forth below. The answer will determine the outcome

of the present appeal. Our phrasing of the question below is

not meant to restrict the California Supreme Court’s

consideration of the issue involved. We agree to follow the

answer provided by the California Supreme Court.

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4 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

I

CAPTION AND COUNSEL

Michael and Rosemary Verdugo are considered the

petitioners in this request because they appeal from the

district court’s adverse ruling on the specified issue. The

caption of this case is:

MICHAEL VERDUGO, brother of Decedent;

ROSEMARY VERDUGO, mother, successor

and heir of Mary Ann Verdugo, Decedent,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TARGET CORPORATION, a Minnesota

corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

The names and addresses of counsel are:

For the Verdugos: Robert A. Roth, Tarkington, O’Neill,

Barrack & Chong, Berkeley, CA; David Griffith Eisenstein,

Law Offices of David G. Eisenstein, P.C., Carlsbad, CA.

For Target Corporation: Benjamin R. Trachtman, Ryan

M. Craig, Trachtman & Trachtman, Mission Viejo, CA.

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 5

II

QUESTION OF LAW

The question of law we wish to be answered is:

In what circumstances, if ever, does the common law duty

of a commercial property owner to provide emergency first

aid to invitees require the availability of an Automatic

External Defibrillator (“AED”) for cases of sudden cardiac

arrest?

III

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mary Ann Verdugo, age 49, was shopping at a Target

store in Pico Rivera, California, with her mother and brother

on August 31, 2008, when she suffered sudden cardiac arrest

and collapsed. In response to a 911 call, paramedics were

dispatched from a Los Angeles County Fire Department

station nearby. It took the paramedics several minutes to

reach the store, and several more minutes to reach Verdugo

inside. By the time the paramedics arrived, Verdugo was

dead and could not be resuscitated. Target did not have an

AED in its store.

Nearly 300,000 Americans suffer from sudden cardiac

arrest every year, and only eight percent survive. Sudden

cardiac arrest is caused by a problem with the heart’s

electrical impulses, causing it to stop pumping blood. Unlike

a myocardial infarction (a heart attack), sudden cardiac arrest

often strikes with no prior symptoms and can strike a heart

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6 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

that is otherwise healthy. A shock from an AED can restart

a heart by correcting the misfiring of its electrical impulses.

To be effective, the AED must be used immediately. The

chance of surviving sudden cardiac arrest decreases by 10

percent for everyminute that passes before the heart’s rhythm

is restored. Cardiac Arrest Survival Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.

106–505, § 402(5), 114 Stat. 2314. It is estimated that 30

percent of those who experience cardiac arrest could be saved

if an AED were used immediately. Id. § 402(4). 

Target sells AEDs on its website for approximately

$1,200. AEDs can be used by the untrained, as the devices

provide oral instructions to users and “are designed not to

allow a user to administer a shock until after the device has

analyzed a victim’s heart rhythm and determined that an

electric shock is required.” Id. § 402(8).

Verdugo’s mother and brother filed a wrongful death

action against Target in California Superior Court, and Target

removed to federal court. Target then filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

which the district court granted, holding that Target had no

duty to acquire and install an AED. The Verdugos appealed,

arguing that a duty does exist under California common law

and, in the alternative, asking that the question be certified to

the California Supreme Court. Target opposed certification.

IV

STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE REQUEST

The resolution of the question presented by this case

implicates strong state interests and could have wide-reaching

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 7

effects in the state of California. The Verdugos seek the

announcement of a common-law rule that would require

many retail establishments across the state to acquire AEDs.

Target suggests that such a rule would burden it and many

companies like it, that California common law does not

support such a rule, and that the California AED statutes

preclude the imposition of such a common law rule. More

broadly, Target maintains that California common law does

not support any requirement that property owners provide

first aid to invitees beyond calling 911 to summon assistance.

As a matter of comity, we consider the California Supreme

Court better positioned to address these major questions of

California tort law than this court. See Klein v. United States,

537 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (order).

A

Both parties agree that there is no statutory duty in

California requiring a business like Target to obtain a

defibrillator. The California legislature has enacted a series

of statutes governing AEDs that are acquired by building

owners and managers. See Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 1797.196 (West 2012); Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.21(d) (West

2012) (providing immunity from civil liability for those who

acquire AEDs as long as they comply with specified

maintenance, testing, and notice requirements). These

statutes “reflect legislative policy to encourage the

availability of AEDs by providing immunity from liability for

those who acquire the devices.” Rotolo v. San Jose Sports &

Entm’t, LLC, 151 Cal. App. 4th 307, 314 (Ct. App. 2007).

At the same time, the legislature has declared that

“[n]othing in this section . . . may be construed to require a

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8 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

building owner or a building manager to acquire and have

installed an AED in any building.” Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 1797.196(f). Whether the AED statutes as a whole,

including § 1797.196(f), preclude the existence of a common

law duty to acquire an AED is one of the issues in this case.

See Rotolo, 151 Cal. App. 4th at 325.

Target argues, and the district court held, that the

statutory scheme has “occupied the field,” and that imposing

a common law duty here would “defeat the underlying

legislative purpose.” Id. at 314. For this proposition, Target

relies largely on Rotolo, which held that where a hockey rink

had acquired an AED but failed to notify invitees of its

existence and location, and a hockey player died as a result,

the statutory scheme precluded common law liability where

there had been compliance with the statutory requirements for

immunity. Id. at 322–23.

The Verdugos maintain, to the contrary, that the thrust of

California’s legislative scheme regarding AEDs is to

encourage their availability by providing immunity for those

who acquire them and comply with training and maintenance

requirements. Id. at 319–20. According to the Verdugos, the

statutes deal with situations in which business owners do

acquire AEDs and do not apply to the situation presented

here, where a business owner has not acquired an AED.

Imposing a common law duty to acquire an AED in these

circumstances, the Verdugos maintain, would not frustrate the

legislature’s desire to promote the acquisition of AEDs by

providing a safe harbor from liability for those who install

and maintain them properly, as any business required to

install an AED under a common law tort theory would be

entitled to statutory immunity. On this analysis, the existence

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 9

of California’s statutory scheme is not determinative as to

whether a common law duty exists.

B

If the court were to accept the Verdugos’ view of the

relationship between the AED statutes and California

common law, then the pertinent question would become

whether Target Stores had a duty under California common

law to have an AED available. There is under California law

a “special relationship” between business owners and their

invitees, which creates a duty to provide “‘assistance [to] . . .

customers who become ill or need medical attention.’”

Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 36 Cal. 4th 224, 241 (2005)

(alteration in original) (quoting Breaux v. Gino’s, Inc.,

153 Cal. App. 3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 1984)). Beyond this

basic principle, California’s invitee precedents are in some

tension as they pertain to the issue in this case.

Target suggests, first, that the duty to provide medical

assistance to invitees is uniformly discharged simply by

calling 911, relying for this proposition on Breaux. In

Breaux, the Court of Appeal held that a restaurant had

fulfilled its duty to a choking patron by summoning

emergency services and was not required to provide further

assistance. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 381–82. The Verdugos point

out, however, that Breaux relied in its reasoning on a

statutory scheme similar to the one implicated in Rotolo:

California law required the posting in restaurants of first aid

instructions for choking victims and created a safe harbor

from liability for restaurants that did so. Id. at 381 & n.2.

Gino’s, the defendant in Breaux, had posted the instructions

required for the safe harbor. Under those circumstances,

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10 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

imposing a common law duty beyond calling 911 would, as

in Rotolo, have contradicted the legislative scheme. Here, in

contrast, Target did not have an AED available on the

premises, and so had not taken the steps necessary under the

statute to trigger immunity from liability.

Just as Target relies on Breaux, so the Verdugos rely on

Delgado, maintaining that it refutes any categorical rule that

summoning emergency services is always sufficient to fulfill

a business’s duty of care to its patrons. In Delgado, the court

held that a bar had a duty to do more than simply call the

police when a fight broke out between several of its

customers. 36 Cal. 4th at 245–46. In determining the scope

of the duty owed to invitees, Delgado observed, foreseeability

of injury is a “‘crucial factor.’” Id. at 237 (quoting Ann M. v.

Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 6 Cal. 4th 666, 676 (1993)). The

foreseeability of the harm must be balanced “against the

burden of the duty to be imposed.” Ann M., 6 Cal. 4th at 678.

Where the burden of preventing the harm is great, a higher

degree of foreseeability is required, and where “the harm can

be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of

foreseeability may be required.” Id. at 679 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Applying this analysis, the court in Delgado

reasoned that the bar’s bouncers could foresee that a fight was

about to erupt and, in that situation, there were “reasonable,

relatively simple, and minimally burdensome steps” they

could have taken to prevent it. Delgado, 36 Cal. 4th at 246.

In so holding, the court distinguished Ann M., in which the

plaintiff was raped in the shopping center where she worked.

Ann M., 6 Cal. 4th at 671. Noting that hiring security guards

would be relatively burdensome, the court concluded that the

harm that befell the plaintiff was not sufficiently foreseeable

to justify imposing this duty. Id. at 679–80.

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 11

While the court has thus laid out a basic framework for

analyzing the scope of the duty to prevent harm to invitees,

neither Delgado nor Ann M. involved the duty to provide first

aid to invitees, much less decided the precise issue presented

here, the duty to have AEDs available on one’s business

premises. Nor does applying the general test articulated in

Delgado provide “clear controlling California precedent.”

Klein, 537 F.3d at 1030 (internal quotation marks omitted).

On one hand, it was not foreseeable to Target that

Verdugo herself would suffer cardiac arrest, and so Target

was not aware of the specific danger, which the bouncers in

Delgado were. On the other hand, California courts

considering foreseeability as an aspect of duty often focus on

whether the type of harm suffered was foreseeable, not

whether “‘a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably

foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s conduct.’”

Carrera v. Maurice J. Sopp & Son, 177 Cal. App. 4th 366,

378 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis in original) (quoting

Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 572 n.6 (1986)). In this

sense, it could be foreseeable to Target that one of its

customers might suffer sudden cardiac arrest while shopping,

given the fact that more than 700 people die of sudden

cardiac arrest in the United States every day. Cardiac Arrest

Survival Act § 402(1). Even so, it is not clear to us under

California precedents whether the foreseeability inquiry is to

be undertaken on a store-by-store or a company-wide basis,

or what degree of likely occurrence of a particular illness is

sufficient to make that occurrence foreseeable. Moreover, the

parties dispute the degree to which the foreseeability issue

should be influenced by the location of this particular Target

store—in a shopping center—or by its large size, both factors

which increase the likelihood that 911 or other outside AED

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12 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

assistance will not be able to reach patrons suffering sudden

cardiac arrest in time to save them.

The burden side of the analysis is similarly debatable

under the existing precedents. Target sells AEDs online for

approximately $1,200 each. For a property owner to be

eligible for the statutory immunity from liability, an AED,

once purchased, must be checked every 30 days, and one

employee must be trained in its use. Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 1797.196(b)(2). Requiring Target to purchase and

maintain an AED for each of its California stores would be

economically less burdensome than, for example, requiring

it to hire security guards to prevent crime. See Ann M., 6 Cal.

4th at 679; see also Sharon P. v. Arman, 21 Cal. 4th 1181,

1190 (1999). On the other hand, requiring such preventive

purchases appears more burdensome than requiring alreadyemployed bouncers to intervene to stop a fight once it occurs.

See Delgado, 36 Cal. 4th at 246–47. Moreover, as with the

foreseeability prong, the California precedents do not provide

clear guidance as to whether the burden is to be evaluated on

a store-by-store or a company-wide basis.

In sum, given the uncertainty in the most applicable

California precedents as applied to the present circumstances,

weighing the foreseeability of the harm suffered by Verdugo

against the burden to be imposed on Target does not provide

a clear answer to the question of whether Target had a duty

under California law to purchase AEDs.

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 13

 Rowland seems to have originally articulated these factors as helpful 1

in determining whether to make an exception to “the general principle that

a person is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable

care,” and not for the purpose of determining the precise scope of the duty

of care that arises from a special relationship. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112.

Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court has since considered those

factors as “useful” for this purpose. See Delgado, 36 Cal. 4th at 237 n.15;

Ann M., 6 Cal. 4th at 675 n.5.

C

The court in both Ann M. and Delgado also mentioned the

factors listed in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112–13

(1968), as being useful “‘in determining the existence and

scope of a duty [to invitees] in a particular case.’” Delgado,

36 Cal. 4th at 237 n.15 (quoting Ann M., 6 Cal. 4th at 675

n.5). In addition to foreseeability and burden, these factors 1

are:

[1] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff

suffered injury, [2] the closeness of the

connection between the defendant’s conduct

and the injury suffered, [3] the moral blame

attached to the defendant’s conduct, [4] the

policy of preventing future harm, . . . and [5]

the availability, cost, and prevalence of

insurance for the risk involved.

Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113. 

Applying these factors also does not provide a clear

answer to the question whether Target had a duty to have an

AED available on its premises. Without an AED on-site, it

was virtually certain that Verdugo would die. Defibrillation

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14 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

is the only definitive treatment for sudden cardiac arrest, and

“every minute that passes before returning the heart to a

normal rhythm decreases the chance of survival by 10

percent.” Cardiac Arrest Survival Act § 402(5). On the other

hand, it is far from certain that immediate treatment with an

AED will revive a particular patient. While the first two

factors thus may support the imposition of a duty, they do so

only mildly. The third factor weighs against finding a duty,

as Target’s failure to provide an AED was not morally

blameworthy in the sense that term is used by California

courts. See Rotolo, 151 Cal. App. 4th at 337–38. The fourth

factor strongly supports finding a duty, as doing so would

help prevent future harm by increasing the availability of

AEDs. The final factor also supports a duty, as California has

provided a safe harbor from liability for businesses that

acquire AEDs, so no insurance would be required as long as

the conditions for invoking the safe harbor were met. Cal.

Civ. Code § 1714.21(b).

D

Pertinent to our request for certification, finally, is that

courts in other jurisdictions applying similar balancing or

multi-factor approaches to liability have reached divergent

conclusions when confronting AED issues similar to the one

in this case. Some courts to have considered the matter have

held that there is no duty on the part of business owners to

provide AEDs to be used on their invitees in the event of

cardiac arrest. See Boller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Ctr.,

Inc., 716 S.E.2d 713, 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); L.A. Fitness

Int’l, LLC v. Mayer, 980 So. 2d 550, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2008); Salte v. YMCA of Metrop. Chi. Found., 814 N.E.2d

610, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 15

Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1224 (Pa. 2002); Rutnik v. Colonie

Ctr. Court Club, Inc., 672 N.Y.S.2d 451, 453 (N.Y. App. Div.

1998). Other courts, however, have allowed similar AED

suits to go to the jury, concluding that the duty question turns

on case-specific factual matters. See Aquila v. Ultimate

Fitness, 52 Conn. L. Rptr. 81 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011);

Ksypka v. Malden YMCA, 22 Mass. L. Rptr. 122 (Mass.

Super. Ct. 2007); Fowler v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., No. 07

L 12258 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 2007).

Thus, neither California precedents nor cases from other

courts provide us with sufficient guidance to answer the

important question of California tort law presented by this

case. We therefore respectfully ask the California Supreme

Court for guidance and will follow that guidance once

received.

V

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.548(d), the Clerk

of this court shall forward an original and 10 copies of this

order, under official seal, to the California Supreme Court,

along with a certificate of service on the parties, and copies

of all briefs, excerpts of record, requests for judicial notice,

and post-argument letters that have been filed with this court.

The parties shall notify the Clerk of this court within 14

days of any decision by the California Supreme Court to

accept or to decline our request. If the California Supreme

Court accepts, the parties shall file a joint report six months

after the date of acceptance and every six months thereafter

advising us of the status of the proceedings. The parties shall

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16 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

also notify the Clerk of this court within 14 days of the

issuance of an opinion by the California Supreme Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur fully in the Order certifying a question to the

California Supreme Court. I write separately only to note

that, in the absence of that court’s guidance, I would disagree

with the dissent’s view, as I understand extant California law.

First, the legislature’s wide-ranging statute concerning the

availability and use of AEDs strongly suggests that the

legislature occupied the field and displaced any duty that a

business may have under California common law to acquire

or install an AED. See Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 1797.196(f) (“Nothing in this section or Section 1714.21

may be construed to require a building owner or a building

manager to acquire and have installed an AED in any

building.”). Second, I read California law to establish only a

limited duty on the part of a business to come to the aid of an

invitee who is in physical distress. Third, because the

foreseeability of cardiac arrest is universal, the dissent’s view

contains no limiting principle; all businesses, of any size, can

foresee equally that a customer might suffer sudden cardiac

arrest. Thus, in essence, finding a common law duty might

well eviscerate California Health & Safety Code section

1797.196(f).

In short, because reasonable minds differ about the state

law that we must apply, certification is particularly

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 17

appropriate here. See Klein v. United States, 537 F.3d 1027,

1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that certification is appropriate

if “no clear controlling California precedent squarely

addresses the question before us” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

On August 31, 2008, 49-year-old Mary Ann Verdugo

went shopping at a Target store in Pico Rivera, California.

While inside the store, Mary Ann suffered sudden cardiac

arrest. She died within minutes.

Paramedics were called promptly. But it took several

minutes for them to arrive at Target’s curbside and several

minutes more to reach Mary Ann inside the big box store.

The paramedics attempted to revive Mary Ann. But it was

too late to save her life. 

Nearly 300,000 Americans are victims of sudden cardiac

arrest every year. Victims of sudden cardiac arrest collapse

and quickly lose consciousness–often without warning.

Death follows unless normal heart rhythm is restored within

a matter of minutes. 

Sudden cardiac arrest is treatable, but more than 95

percent of cardiac arrest victims die, mainly because of the

lack of an available external defibrillator (“AED”). Cardiac

Arrest Survival Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-505, § 402(3),

114 Stat. 2314 (2000). Although “CPR may help prolong the

window of survival,” defibrillation “is the only definitive

treatment” for sudden cardiac arrest. The American Red

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18 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

C ro ss AED Fr eq ue ntly A sked Que stions ,

http://www.redcrosscny.org/pdf/AED_FAQs.pdf. To be

successful, an AED shock generally must be administered

within five minutes from the onset of sudden cardiac arrest.

Despite the frequency of sudden cardiac arrest and the

absolute necessity of using an AED within the first few

minutes, the Pico Rivera Target failed to equip its store with

a life-saving defibrillator. That is why Mary Ann Verdugo’s

life could not be saved.

A business has a “special relationship” with its invitees.

This special relationship creates an affirmative duty requiring

the business to provide first aid to its invitees who become ill

or injured on the premises, and “to care for them until they

can be cared for by others.” Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 314A; see also Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 36 Cal. 4th

224, 241 (2005).

The scope of a business’s duty to provide care is

“determined in part by balancing the foreseeability of the

harm against the burden of the duty to be imposed.” Ann M.

v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 6 Cal. 4th 666, 678 (1993).

“[W]here the burden of preventing future harm is great, a

high degree of foreseeability may be required.” Id. (citation

and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “in cases where

there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the

harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of

foreseeability may be required.” Id. at 678–79 (citation and

quotation marks omitted). “Duty in such circumstances is

determined by a balancing of ‘foreseeability’ . . . against the

‘burdensomeness, vagueness, and efficacy’ of the proposed

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 19

. . . measures.” Id. at 679 (quoting Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal.

App. 3d 622, 631 (Ct. App. 1983)).

More than 700 people in the United States die of cardiac

arrest every day. Cardiac Arrest Survival Act at § 402(1).

Because of the significant number of people who suffer

sudden cardiac arrest, it is reasonably foreseeable that a

customer, while shopping at the Pico Rivera Target, could

suffer sudden cardiac arrest. Moreover, if a customer suffers

sudden cardiac arrest in the large Pico Rivera Target in an

area where paramedics cannot reach her within five minutes,

she will likely die unless there is an accessible defibrillator in

the store. Seconds count when the life of a cardiac arrest

victim is in the balance. “[E]very minute that passes before

returning the heart to a normal rhythm decreases the chance

of survival by 10 percent.” Cardiac Arrest Survival Act at

§ 402(5) (emphasis added). But the harm can be easily

reduced by quick use of a defibrillator. When “CPR and

AEDs are used within three to five minutes from the onset of

collapse, the survival rate of a sudden cardiac arrest victim is

as high as 50 to 70 percent.” Automatic External

Defibrillators: Hearing on S.B. 1436 Before the S. Comm. on

Health, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. 1–2 (Cal. 2012). 

Defibrillators are relatively inexpensive and virtually

foolproof. Target sells an AED on its website for $1,199.99.

AEDs are “safe and effective, even when used by lay people.”

Cardiac Arrest Survival Act at § 402(8). AEDs are virtually

fail-safe because they do not “allow a user to administer a

shock until after the device has analyzed a victim’s heart

rhythm and determined that an electric shock is required.” Id.

 Case: 10-57008, 12/11/2012, ID: 8433306, DktEntry: 38, Page 19 of 21
20 VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION

 Moreover, in California, any business that acquires an AED is “not 1

liable for any civil damages resulting from any acts or omissions in the

rendering of the emergency care” if the business, among other things,

regularly maintains the defibrillator, trains one employee per every AED

unit on AED usage, and complies with regulations governing placement

of the AED. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1797.196(b). California limits

the liability for civil damages of any entity that acquires an AED so long

as the entity complies with the non-onerous requirements of Cal. Health

& Safety Code § 1797.196(b).

Purchasing an AED and periodically training an employee

on its use is not much of a burden for a large store like the

Pico Rivera Target. Providing an AED is an easy and 1

effective way to remedy a grave and foreseeable harm. In the

analogous context of preventing criminals from harming

invitees, the California Supreme Court has recognized that, in

certain circumstances, some precautionary measures are

onerous. Some measures found onerous include: employing

security guards, Ann M., 6 Cal. 4th at 679; and providing

bright lightsin parking garages, monitoring security cameras,

and requiring existing personnel to make periodic walkthroughs of the property, Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd., 21 Cal.

4th 1181, 1196 (1999).

But this case is different. The remedy is not onerous, and

a defibrillator “is the only definitive treatment for [sudden

cardiac arrest].” The American Red Cross AED Frequently

Asked Questions, http://www.redcrosscny.org/pdf

/AED_FAQs.pdf. Acquiring a relatively inexpensive AED

and training one employee to use it is not comparable to

hiring a security guard or requiring an employee to walk

through a garage. A security guard is hired for one purpose:

to guard a premises. Moreover, requiring existing personnel

to make periodic walk-throughs removes that employee from

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VERDUGO V. TARGET CORPORATION 21

their regular duties for a significant amount of time and

training. A Pico Rivera Target employee trained in proper

AED usage, however, is not hired specifically to use the AED

device and is not required to periodically abandon his or her

normal post; the employee is merely trained on how to use

the foolproof defibrillator. Finally, unlike bright lights,

security cameras, and periodic basement walk-throughs,

acquiring an AED would be extremely effective in preventing

death by sudden cardiac arrest.

Because of the reasonable foreseeability that a Pico

Rivera Target customer could suffer sudden cardiac arrest,

the insignificant burden of acquiring an AED and training

employees on how to use the simple device, and the virtual

certainty of death if an AED is not used within minutes of the

onset of sudden cardiac arrest, the Pico Rivera Target had a

duty to have available an AED in its store. The majority

refers the question to the California Supreme Court. I believe

that in the circumstances of this case, the California common

law duty for a business to provide emergency first aid to its

invitees requires the availability of an AED for cases of

sudden cardiac arrest. Thus, I would reverse the district

court’s dismissal of the complaint against Target and remand

for further proceedings.

 Case: 10-57008, 12/11/2012, ID: 8433306, DktEntry: 38, Page 21 of 21