Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02753/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02753-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELLIOT STENNES, ) 2:09-cv-02753-GEB-KJM

)

Plaintiff, ) ORDER DISMISSING FEDERAL

) CLAIMS AND REMANDING CASE

v. )

)

AMERICA’S SERVICING COMPANY, and )

DOES 1 to 10, )

)

Defendants. )

)

When evaluating the amount of sanction to impose on

Plaintiff’s counsel because of his failure to respond to an Order to

Show Cause (“OSC”), and when deciding whether he should be issued

another OSC because of his failure to respond to yet another order,

the Court discovered that the federal claims in Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) are insufficient under applicable federal

pleading standards. 

This case was removed from the Superior Court of the State

of California in the County of Shasta, premised on the existence of

federal question jurisdiction. The removal petition argues that the

following federal claims are in Plaintiff’s FAC: a claim under the

Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, and a claim under the

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2614. 

Plaintiff’s FAC also contains various state law claims. 

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Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC on

February 11, 2010, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to

which Plaintiff’s response is not yet due. However, since it is

evident that Plaintiff fails to state actionable federal claims,

Plaintiff’s federal claims will be dismissed. 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion concerns “a complaint’s compliance

with . . . pleading requirements.” Champlaie v. BAC Home Loans

Servicing, LP, No. S-09-1316 LKK/DAD, 2009 WL 3429622, at *1 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 22, 2009). A pleading must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief

. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the [plaintiff’s] claim is and the

grounds upon which relief rests . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Further, “[a] pleading that offers

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it

tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 

To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must allege “only enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Plausibility, however, requires

more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Id. “When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility

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and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quotations and

citation omitted).

In evaluating a dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the

court “accept[s] as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Al-Kidd

v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). However, neither

conclusory statements nor legal conclusions are entitled to a

presumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.

Plaintiff’s TILA and RESPA claims are comprised of

conclusory statements and legal conclusions that are not entitled to a

presumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. Therefore,

these claims are dismissed.

Since Plaintiff’s FAC no longer contains a federal claim,

the Court may sua sponte decide whether to continue exercising

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See Acri

v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state] claim” if “all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction” have been dismissed.

“While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one of the

conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the [United Mine Workers v.

Gibbs,383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966),] values of economy, convenience,

fairness and comity.” Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 (Quotations omitted). 

“Since state courts have the primary responsibility to develop and

apply state law,” comity does not favor continued exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims. Anderson v.

Countrywide Financial, No. 2:08-cv-01220-GEB-GGH, 2009 WL 3368444, at

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*5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009); see also Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 (stating

that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated

before trial, the balance of factors will point towards declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims” (quotations

and citation omitted)).

Nor are the factors of economy and convenience served by

exercising supplemental jurisdiction. With regard to economy, this

case was just removed on October 10, 2009, and before this dismissal

order issued, the court was unsuccessful in its two efforts to hold a

status conference. This is because Plaintiff failed to respond to two

court orders. Convenience also appears to favor declining exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction since the case was removed from the Superior

Court in the County of Shasta; however, it is recognized that defense

counsel is located in the Central District of California and would

have to travel further north in the state for appearances at court

proceedings. Since the balance of Gibbs values does not favor

continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

claims, this case is remanded to the Superior Court of the State of

California in the County of Shasta.

Dated: March 25, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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