Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01506/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01506-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 The full title of Plaintiff's motion is Motion for Summary Judgment on

Complaint for Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Claims

for Supplemental Security Income Benefits Based on Disability.

[Doc.15].

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Amal H. Tohmeh, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

JoAnne Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-1506-PHX-MS

ORDER

This social security disability benefits case comes before the Court on

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment1

 [Doc. 15] and Defendant's Motion for

Remand [Doc. 21]. The Court now remands this matter for an award of benefits.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits in October, 2002,

alleging an onset date of July 2, 1998. [Doc. 15 at 1; Doc. 7 at 68, 95]. Her claims

were denied initially and on reconsideration. [Doc. 15 at 2]. Plaintiff obtained a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who issued an unfavorable

decision on April 15, 2004. [Doc. 15 at 2; Doc. 7 at 21-31]. On March 24, 2005, the

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, and the ALJ’s decision became

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the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner for purposes of judicial review.

[Doc. 15 at 4; Doc. 7 at 5-8]. 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on May 20, 2005 [Doc. 1], and a Motion

for Summary Judgment on November 30, 2005. [Doc. 15]. Defendant opposed the

motion and filed a Motion for Remand on February 3, 2006. [Doc. 21]. 

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Standard of Review

Because the Social Security Act confines the scope of judicial review to

evidence within the administrative record, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment as a motion for reversal of the Commissioner’s decision. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Higgins v. Shalala, 876 F. Supp. 1224, 1226 (D. Utah

1994)(collecting cases and discussing the appropriate treatment of summary

judgment motions requesting review of administrative decisions). The appropriate

standard of review is whether the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence and whether the denial of benefits was free from legal error. Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is “relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971));

accord Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). To determine

whether substantial evidence exists to support an administrative decision, the Court

must “review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that

supports and detracts from the [ALJ]’s conclusion.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750.

If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision, the

Court must uphold the decision. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir.

1995). However, reviewing courts cannot accept post hoc rationalizations for

agency action. See, e.g., NLRB v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 444 (1965);

Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the ALJ's decision must

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be upheld, if at all, on the grounds articulated in the order by the ALJ. Pinto, 249

F.3d at 847.

B. Regulatory Disability Standards

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must

show that: (1) she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months; and (2) the

impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing work previously performed

and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in

the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 423(d)(2)(A); Tackett v. Apfel, 180

F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). The Social Security Regulations set forth a five-step

sequential process for evaluating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. A

claimant’s claim of disability can be rejected at any stage of the sequential process.

Id.; § 404.1520. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four

of the sequential process. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,

721 (9th Cir. 1998). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Reddick,

157 F.3d at 721. 

At step one of the sequential process, the ALJ determines whether the

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. Tackett, 180 F.3d at

1098; § 404.1520(b). At step two, the ALJ determines, based on the medical

evidence, whether the claimant has a “severe impairment.” Id.; § 404.1520(c). If the

claimant’s impairment is not severe, then the claimant will not be considered

disabled. If the impairment is severe, the ALJ proceeds to step three and

determines whether the impairment meets or equals a specific impairment listed in

the regulations. Id.; § 404.1520(d). When the impairment “meets or equals” one of

the specified impairments, disability will be found. When the impairment does not

meet or equal a specified impairment, the ALJ proceeds to step four and determines

whether the claimant can still perform “past relevant work.” Id.; § 404.1520(e). If the

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2

 The ALJ made this determination based on the report of a vocational

expert who took into account Plaintiff's age, educational background,

and employment history. 

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claimant can perform such work, the claim is denied. However, if the claimant is

unable to do past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step and determines,

based on the claimant’s age, education, work experience and residual functional

capacity (RFC), whether the claimant can perform other work that exists in the

national economy. Id.; § 404.1520(f). If the claimant cannot, she is entitled to a

finding of disability. 

III. DISCUSSION

In this case, the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff was disabled based on her

allegations that she suffered from: (1) post-traumatic stress disorder; (2) depression;

(3) and anxiety. [Doc. 7 at 113]. The ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled at step five of

the sequential evaluation process. [Doc. 7 at 29]. At step one, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date.

[Doc. 7 at 25]. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had post traumatic stress

syndrome, an affective disorder, and a history of headaches, impairments that were

severe within the meaning of the guidelines. [Id.] At step three, the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff's severe impairments were not severe enough to meet or medically

equal one of the impairments specified in the regulations. [Id. at 25-26]. Because

Plaintiff had no work history, the ALJ proceeded to step five of the sequential

process. At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity to perform "simple, repetitive tasks, with no complex or written

instructions" and "can do low stress work, with no high production quotas." [Id. at

28]. He further determined that Plaintiff's reported limitations did not prevent her

from performing work as a hand packager, laundry laborer, or food assembler, and

that she was therefore not disabled.2

 [Id. at 29].

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 Plaintiff now contends that the ALJ erred in several ways. First, Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ erred by failing to assign any weight to the opinions of the

agency's examining psychologists, whose opinions led to vocational expert

testimony that a person so limited would be unable to perform substantial work.

[Doc. 15 at 3-8]. Specifically, Plaintiff contends, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1) requires

that an ALJ give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the

claimant, than to the opinion of a source who has not. Because there was no

contradictory opinion by another physician, Plaintiff submits that the examining

physicians' opinions may only be rejected for clear and convincing reasons

supported by substantial evidence. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by

relying on non-testifying, non-examining state agency physicians' assessments.

Plaintiff argues that this was error because the Ninth Circuit has only allowed

opinions of non-examining physicians to be introduced in circumstances where they

are subject to cross-examination. [Id. at 8-9]. Third, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ

erred by basing a hypothetical question to the vocational expert, and the unfavorable

decision, on a person limited to "simple repetitive tasks" with "no high production

quotas," instead of determining the function by function residual functional capacity

assessment required by Social Security Ruling 96-8p. [Id. at 10-12]. Fourth, Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ erred by relying on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

(DOT) to conclude that she could work as a food assembler or a hand packager

because the DOT description is inconsistent with the RFC found by the ALJ. [Id. at

12-14]. Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by discrediting her testimony

without clear and convincing reasons. [Id. at 14-16]. 

Defendant concedes that a remand of this matter is appropriate. Defendant

contends, however, that Plaintiff's application for benefits requires further factual

development and evaluation of the evidence, which requires further administrative

proceedings. [Doc. 22 at 4]. Defendant observes that a new step five determination

is necessary and that clarification of the opinions of Drs. Piatka and Salk is

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necessary to determine their functional assessments of Plaintiff's capacity. [Id.]. To

this end, Defendant proposes that the Court direct the ALJ to obtain the following on

remand: 

(1) conduct a new hearing and issue a new decision; (2) re-contact

consultative examiners Alexander Piatka, Ph.D., and Eliot Salk, Ph.D. to

obtain clarification of their opinions and to further consider their opinions and

state the weight given to them; (3) obtain testimony from a medical expert

specializing in mental impairments; (4) obtain another consultative mental

status examination; and (5) obtain supplemental vocational expert testimony

to clarify any apparent conflicts between the vocational expert's testimony and

information contained in the DOT. 

[Doc. 22 at 4]. 

Generally, when reversing an administrative determination, "the proper

course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional

investigation or explanation." Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir.

2004)(quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam)). Remand for

further consideration is appropriate where issues are unresolved and enhancement

of the record is required. Id.; Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003);

Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,1178-79 (9th Cir. 2000). However, the Ninth Circuit

has recognized that it is both reasonable and desirable to require hearing officers to

articulate the grounds for discrediting testimony in the original decision. Harman,

211 F.3d at 1179. Thus, improperly rejected evidence should be credited and an

award directed when:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting

such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be

resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. See also Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593; Moisa v. Barnhart,

367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178; Varney v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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A. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to assign any weight to the opinions of the agency's examining psychologists and by rejecting the

opinions in favor of that of a non-examining doctor

A primary issue in this case is the ALJ's rejection of the testimony of Drs.

Piatka and Salk in the absence of other contradictory testimony from an examining

physician. The two examining physicians evaluations are summarized as follows:

 1. Dr. Alexander Piatka, Ph.D. 

Dr. Piatka performed a consultative examination on January 8, 2003. He

noted that there were no medical or psychiatric records available to review. Dr

Piatka noted that Plaintiff reported problems with sleep disturbance, fatigue,

depression, and irritability. She described her fear of the police and security in Iraq

and Lebanon, which stems from the arrest and detention of her husband for five- to

six months. She also "reported difficulty being around people" and "feeling

restrained or suffocated" when she left her home. [Doc. 16 at 6, 7 at 174].

Dr. Piatka diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder

and anxiety with agoraphobia. He articulated that it would be 

very difficult to estimate the impact of [Plaintiff's] emotional

difficulties on capacity for employment. She tended to be

somewhat vague in describing the intensity and severity of her

symptoms via translation. Based on her self-report the

greatest area of difficulty would likely be leaving the home

secondary to agoraphobic symptoms. Medical Source

Statement ratings are provided below. Ability to function

independently or demonstrate reliability may be seriously

limited or poor due to agoraphobia. Ability to follow work rules

is estimated to be satisfactory. Ability to relate to co-workers,

the public, and supervisors is estimated to be seriously limited

due to being fearful of social situations. This is difficult to rate

given issues of acculturation and language barrier. Ability to

deal with work stresses is estimated to be seriously limited

secondary to anxiety and PTSD symptoms. Ability to maintain

attention to task persistence is estimated to be satisfactory.

Ability to use judgment is estimated to be satisfactory. A

thorough mental status evaluation was not possible with

[Plaintiff] due to a language barrier. She incorrectly reported

some orientation information though the reasons for this are

not clear. Ability to understand, remember, and carry out

simple job instructions appears very good. Ability to

understand, remember, and carry out detailed or complex job

instructions is difficult to rate. She did not come across as

confused during the evaluation. She appeared to interact

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appropriately with the translator. Ability to maintain personal

appearance appears satisfactory. Ability to behave in an

emotionally stable manner appears seriously limited secondary to agoraphobia and PTSD symptoms. She appears to

experience increased distress when leaving the home or

encountering reminders of past traumatic experiences. Ability

to relate predictably in social situations appears satisfactory to

seriously limited. No difficulties were observed during the

interview though she reports difficulty coping with social

situations. It is very difficult to disentangle reported difficulties

with anxiety, cultural factors, and language. Ability to

demonstrate reliability may be seriously limited or poor

secondary to agoraphobic and PTSD symptoms. 

[Doc. # 7 at 177]. 

 2. Dr. Elliot D. Salk, Ph.D.

Dr. Salk performed a consultative examination on April 24, 2003. He reviewed

the evaluation from Dr. Piatka, but no other medical records were available. Plaintiff

reported pain in her head and forgetfulness. She reported being hit in the head at

age 10 or 11 by the Iraqi army. She expressed her depression to Dr. Salk, and

reported that she does not do much in terms of housework, and does not like to

leave her home. Dr. Salk concluded that Plaintiff was uncooperative during the

evaluation, in contrast to her participation with Dr. Piatka. Specifically, Dr. Salk

stated, "her facial expression was one of irritability and [Plaintiff] flatly stated that she

wanted to leave. Nevertheless, based on information presented to Dr. Piatka

coupled with a limited information that she presented to this examiner, it is this

examiner's opinion that PTSD is probably [a] reasonable diagnosis." [Doc. 7 at 195-

197]. 

 3. The Vocational Expert's Testimony

Having considered the evaluations of Drs. Piatka and Salk, the vocational

expert ("VE") testified at Plaintiff's hearing before the ALJ. The VE articulated that

based on Plaintiff's limitations, as diagnosed by the examining doctors, it would be

unlikely that Plaintiff could sustain work related activities on a regular and continuing

basis. [Doc. # 7 at 65]. 

 4. The ALJ Decision

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The ALJ discussed the reports and opinions of Drs. Piatka and Salk. The ALJ

additionally considered the examination performed by Dr. Sadek on October 24,

2002. Ultimately, the ALJ discredited the testimony of the examining doctors, and

accepted the findings found in the psychiatric review technique form (PRTF) dated

May 9, 2003, which determined that Plaintiff suffered from "an anxiety-related

disorder, with moderate functional limitations in activities of daily living and in

difficulties in maintaining social functioning, with mild difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence or pace." [Doc. # 7 at 27]. As a result, the ALJ found that

the medical evidence did not support a finding of any severe physical limitations

which lasted any 12 month period of time. [Id. at 28]. Additionally, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff "retains the residual functional capacity to perform simple,

repetitive tasks, with no complex or written instructions (not conversant in English)

and can do low stress work, with no high production quotas." [Id.] 

In reviewing the ALJ's unfavorable decision, it is plain that the opinions of the

examining physicians were rejected in favor of a non-examining physician. [Id.

("With regard to the mental impairments, the undersigned concludes that the findings

by the state agency medical consultant in exhibit 8F (the PRTF) are supported by

the record and accepted by the undersigned.") The question that remains is whether

the ALJ utilized clear and convincing reasons in so doing.

The ALJ is responsible for evaluating the opinions of each doctor, resolving

conflicts in the medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Morgan v. Social Sec.

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The degree of weight given to a

particular physician's opinion depends on a variety of factors. Among the relevant

factors to be considered are the relationship between the physician and patient, the

length and extent of treatment, the physician's specialty, and the support for the

physician's opinion in the medical record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); see also

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1035, 1041(discussing the weight to be given to different types

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of physicians' opinions). Greater weight is accorded to the opinion of an examining

physician than to the opinion of a non-examining physician. Andrews, 53 F.3d at

1040-41. The ALJ may reject an uncontroverted opinion of a treating physician only

for clear and convincing reasons. Id. at 1041; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751.

Similarly, "the Commissioner must provide 'clear and convincing' reasons for

rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician." Lester v. Chater,

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996)(as amended)(citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502,

506 (9th Cir.1990)). Further, "like the opinion of a treating doctor, the opinion of an

examining doctor, even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the

record." Id. at 830-831 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043).

Here, Defendant acknowledges that no weight was assigned to the examining

doctors' opinions, and urges this Court to remand this case to allow further

clarification of Drs. Piatka and Salk, and allow the ALJ to further consider the

opinions and state the weight given to them. Plaintiff contends that no clear,

convincing, specific, or legitimate reasons were used in rejecting the examining

psychologists' opinions. Plaintiff further posits that, although the ALJ stated in his

opinion, that the "evaluations did not make findings which would preclude sustained

work," the VE testimony predicated on the psychological evaluations did just that.

[Doc. # 15 at 7]. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred in not assigning any weight

to the examining doctors' opinions. Furthermore, the Court agrees that the stated

reasons for rejecting their opinions were not clear and convincing, and that the VE

testimony predicated on the psychological evaluations did make findings which

would preclude sustained work.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff's depressive syndrome results in a moderate

restriction of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social

functioning and mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace.

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The ALJ further determined that there had been no findings which would preclude

sustained work. [Doc. 7 at 28]. However, the ALJ makes no mention of the VE's

testimony that Plaintiff would be unable to perform sustained work. [Doc. 7 at 65].

This testimony was wholly based on the examinations and reports of Drs. Piatka and

Salk. In addition, the ALJ credited the findings by the state agency medical

consultant, a non-examining physician. [Doc. 7 at 28]. In so doing, the ALJ implicitly

rejected the opinions of the examining physicians. However, the ALJ's proffered

reasons for rejecting the examining physicians findings, "[Plaintiff] reported no

psychiatric treatment" and "was not taking medication," do not rise to the level of

clear and convincing. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. It is certainly possible that Plaintiff

has failed to seek further treatment because of her underlying psychological

disorders, which hinder her ability from leaving her home. [See Doc. # 7 at 172, 195].

Because the ALJ must set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary

support for his interpretation of the medical evidence. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at

1102, and because that was not done here, the Court agrees with the parties that

the ALJ's opinion was not supported by specific reasons or substantial evidence.

B. Whether the ALJ was justified in determining that Plaintiff's subjective complaints were not credible

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was not entirely credible, specifically finding

that "[h]er complaints and alleged limitations are out of proportion to the evidence."

[Doc. 7 at 28]. It is within the province of the ALJ to make credibility determinations.

To discredit a claimant’s testimony, and ALJ must provide specific, cogent reasons

supported by substantial evidence. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. The ALJ may not

reject a claimant’s testimony without specifically identifying the portions of the

testimony found not credible and explaining what evidence contradicts or

undermines the testimony. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1036 n.1 (9th Cir.

2001); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001); Reddick, 157 F.3d at

722. An ALJ's credibility findings must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing

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court to conclude that the hearing officer rejected the testimony on permissible

grounds rather than arbitrarily discrediting it. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856. Where there

is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ's reasons for rejecting the

claimant's testimony must be clear and convincing. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722;

Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 

Here, there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, and Defendant makes

no argument in support of malingering. The ALJ offered the following reasons for

determining that Plaintiff's testimony was not credible. The ALJ determined that 

[Plaintiff's] complaints are not consistent with the treatment she

receives. [Plaintiff] has received conservative treatment, with

no hospitalizations. She stated that she does laundry and

cares for her children and cooks for them. There is no

subjective evidence to support significant side-effects from

medication. Accordingly, the subjective complaints of the

claimant are discounted to the extent they conflict with the

mental functional capacity assigned to the claimant by the

undersigned.

Based on the evidence in the record, the Court finds that the ALJ's reasoning

is not supported by clear and convincing reasons. The main reason cited by the

ALJ is Plaintiff's ability to perform some daily activities. However, the fact that a

claimant can perform some daily activities does not mean that she is not disabled.

Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) ("This court has repeatedly

asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such

as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any

way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability. One does not need to be

'utterly incapacitated' in order to be disabled." (citations omitted)). 

Although an ALJ may consider a claimant's failure to seek or adhere to

treatment plan in assessing credibility, Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.

1989, he has an obligation to support an adverse credibility finding with substantial

evidence and specific findings. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. In order to find a claimant

not-disabled for failure to follow a course of treatment without good reasons, the ALJ

must examine the claimant's medical conditions and personal factors to determine

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3 DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (DOT)(United States Dept. of Labor,

4th Ed. 1991), available at www.oalj.dol.gov/libdot.htm

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whether the impairment is indeed remediable by such treatment and whether the

claimant could return to work if treated. See Byrnes v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 641 (9th

Cir. 1995). See also Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1299-1300 (cautioning against

"chastising one with a mental impairment for poor judgment in seeking

rehabilitation")(quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d , 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996). The

ALJ's determination in this case falls far short of meeting these standards, especially

in light of the fact that Plaintiff did not have a treatment plan in place. 

Although an ALJ may consider a claimant's abilities to engage in daily

activities in determining credibility, Fair, 885 F.2d at 603, the level of activity is only

relevant if it is inconsistent with the claimant's claimed limitations. Reddick, 157

F.3d at 722. See also Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004); Fair,

885 F.2d at 603(recognizing that "many home activities are not easily transferable

to ... the more grueling environment of the workplace, where it might be impossible

to periodically rest or take medication"); Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th

Cir. 1987)(noting that a disability claimant need not "vegetate in a dark room" in

order to be deemed eligible for benefits). In this context, it is plain that the ALJ did

not provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff's testimony. As a

result, the Court finds error. 

C. Plaintiff's Remaining Arguments

Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) conducting a global

assessment of her residual functional capacity rather than conducting a function-byfunction assessment, and (2) relying on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)3

to conclude that she could work as a hand packager or food assembler. [Id. at 9-

11]. As to the first argument, when the rejected VE testimony is credited, it becomes

apparent that the ALJ's failure to conduct a function-by-function assessment was

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VE articulated that Plaintiff could perform work as a food assembler or hand

packager. Subsequently, under questioning by Plaintiff's counsel, the VE conceded

that, when considering the limitations found by the two examining physicians, an

individual in Plaintiff's situation would be unable to sustain work. [Doc. 7 at 61, 65].

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error, as "the individual must be able to perform substantially all of the exertional and

nonexertional functions required for work at that level. Therefore, it is necessary to

assess the individual's capacity to perform each of these functions. . . ." Social

Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5, at *8. 

As to the second argument, Defendant concedes there is a conflict between

the testimony of the vocational expert and the DOT regarding the potential jobs the

ALJ found Plaintiff could perform. More specifically, the ALJ relied on the VE's

testimony4

 to conclude that Plaintiff could perform jobs as a hand packager or a food

assembler. However, the DOT describes these two jobs as requiring the ability to

recognize the meaning of 2,500 words, and yet the ALJ assessed that the Plaintiff

was not conversant in English. [DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (DOT)(United

States Dept. of Labor, 4th Ed. 1991), available at www.oalj.dol.gov/libdot.htm, at Appendix

C; Doc. 7 at 28]. The ALJ may not rely on VE testimony that differs from the data

articulated in the DOT without resolving the apparent conflict. Defendant concedes

that the conflict was not resolved. This Court will not allow Defendant a second bite

at the apple in connection with the instant claim. Step five of the sequential

evaluation process shifts the burden to Defendant to demonstrate that a claimant

can perform relevant work in the national economy. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). Defendant concedes that the burden has not been met. As

a result, the Court finds additional error.

D. Remand

Having found error, this Court must determine whether to remand for further

consideration or for the award of benefits. McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072,

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1076-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001).

As noted above, a remand for an award of benefits is only appropriate if there are

no outstanding issues to resolved, and the record clearly indicates that the ALJ

would be required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected evidence credited.

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292.

For the foregoing reasons, this matter will be remanded for an award of

benefits. All the requirements of Smolen have been met. First, as explained

previously, the ALJ erred in failing to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting

Plaintiff's testimony and failing to assign any weight to the examining physicians'

testimony. Moreover, there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved on

remand. At the hearing before the ALJ, the vocational expert testified that a person

with Plaintiff's limitations, as established by the testimony of Plaintiff and Drs. Piatka

and Salk, would not be able to sustain work. Thus, further inquiry into whether

Plaintiff would be found disabled if the improperly discredited evidence were credited

is not required. Based on the record before the Court, in the absence of any

contradictory opinion testimony by an examining or treating physician, it is clear that

Plaintiff would be entitled to a finding of disability. For these reasons, the Court

finds that an award of benefits is warranted. Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593; Smolen, 80

F.3d at 1292.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 15];

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter to the Social Security

Administration for an award of benefits;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant's Motion for Remand [Doc.

21] as moot.

DATED this 27th day of March, 2006.

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