Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04035/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04035-72/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ROE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

THOMAS F. WHITE,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-04035 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE

COUNSEL FEES AND COSTS

Defendant Thomas White paid the 20 plaintiffs $350,000 each to settle this lawsuit. 

Now pending before the Court is the motion of plaintiffs’ counsel for an award of attorney’s

fees and costs from the settlement fund. Pursuant to contingency fee agreements between

plaintiff’s counsel David Replogle and each individual plaintiff, counsel seek 40 percent of

the gross recovery of the 16 adult plaintiffs and 33 percent of the gross recovery of the

plaintiffs who were minors at the time they brought their claims, plus reimbursement for

costs.

BACKGROUND

A. Pre-settlement proceedings

In September 2003, a minor from Puerto Vallerta, Mexico filed this lawsuit against

White alleging child sexual tourism pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 2255. The minor, known

fictitiously as Jose Roe, brought the lawsuit through his purported guardian ad litem, 

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 1 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Mauricio Rodriguez Borrego (“Rodriguez Borrego”). The complaint identifies David

Replogle and John Hill as plaintiff’s counsel of record and alleges that beginning in 1998,

White traveled to Mexico from San Francisco to find homeless young boys who he would

bring to his home in Puerto Vallerta and sexually abuse. Plaintiff Jose Roe alleged he is one

of White’s victims. Counsel moved for an order permitting the filing of the complaint under

the minor’s fictitious name, Jose Roe, and for appointment of Rodriguez Borrego as the

minor’s guardian ad litem. The Court granted the motion and appointed Rodriguez Borrego

guardian ad litem. Around the same time, plaintiff’s counsel filed a separate sexual abuse

lawsuit against White in state court on behalf of two California residents.

The United States subsequently indicted White for conspiracy to travel with intent to

engage in sexual acts with children (18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)), and conspiracy to sexually exploit

children (18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)), among other things. White, however, remained in prison in

Thailand, fighting extradition to Mexico for similar charges. 

In June 2004, counsel filed a Second Amended Complaint which added six new

plaintiffs to the lawsuit: one minor plaintiff, identified fictitiously as Jose Roe II, and five

adult plaintiffs, identified fictitiously as Carlos Roe I through Carlos Roe V. Although the

complaint added a minor plaintiff, counsel did not file an application to appoint Rodriguez

Borrego as guardian ad litem for the minor. Two months later a Third Amended Complaint

was filed, adding a third minor plaintiff, fictitiously identified as Jose Roe III, and six more

adult plaintiffs, Carlos Roe VI through Carlos Roe XI. Once again no application was made

to appoint Rodriguez Borrego, or anyone else, as guardian ad litem. Two months later yet

another amended complaint was filed; this complaint added a fourth minor plaintiff and

seven additional adult plaintiffs. As a result of this amendment, the complaint had 22

plaintiffs.

B. The settlement

In the summer of 2005 White and the state court plaintiffs agreed to settle their

lawsuit. The parties to this action also settled. The agreement tied the settlement of this

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 2 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

action to the settlement of the state court action, and was conditioned upon the participation

of all plaintiffs. In exchange for releases, White agreed to pay each plaintiff $350,000.

White paid the plaintiffs in the state court case pursuant to the terms of that settlement

in July 2005. As of the beginning of August, however, plaintiff’s counsel had not yet moved

the Court for approval of the settlement in this action; accordingly, as the compromise of the

minor plaintiffs’ claims required the Court’s approval, the Court ordered plaintiffs to file a

motion for approval and set a hearing for August 16, 2005. 

The day of the hearing, counsel filed an application for the appointment of Rodriguez

Borrego as guardian ad litem for the three additional minor plaintiffs. Replogle explained

that he had inadvertently failed to seek such appointment at the time the minor plaintiffs had

appeared in the action, the previous year. The Court approved the appointment nunc pro

tunc. 

The parties also disclosed that plaintiffs’ counsel had been unable to locate two of the

named plaintiffs, known as Carlos Roe XI and Carlos Roe XIV. Because the settlement

required the participation of each plaintiff, the parties entered into a written stipulation

dismissing Carlos Roe XI and Carlos Roe XIV from this action. The stipulation provided

that if plaintiffs’ counsel is unable to locate any plaintiffs by the date the Court approves the

settlement, the missing plaintiffs shall be dismissed from the lawsuit. After White’s counsel 

provided the Court with a copy of the stipulation, the Court scheduled the hearing on the

Court’s approval of the settlement for August 29, 2005.

At the August 29 hearing White substituted in new counsel. New counsel had not

reviewed the settlement agreement and therefore asked to continue the hearing. The Court

denied counsel’s request, noting that trial was scheduled for October 11 and that the Court

had reviewed the settlement and found that it was an appropriate compromise for the minor

plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court ordered White to pay the settlement funds to the Clerk of

the Court.

//

//

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 3 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

C. The enforcement of the settlement and entry of judgment

 White subsequently signed a document purporting to repudiate the settlement and

filed a motion to vacate the Court’s approval. White’s primary argument was that since the

settlement required the signature of each plaintiff, the stipulation dismissing the claims of the

two missing plaintiffs was an improper modification of the settlement agreement. White also

argued that the settlement was invalid because at the time Rodriguez Borrego signed the

settlement on behalf of the minor plaintiffs the Court had not yet appointed him as guardian

ad litem for three of those plaintiffs. The Court rejected White’s arguments. October 3,

2005 Memorandum and Order.

White then filed a second motion to vacate the Court’s approval of the settlement. 

This time White argued that the plaintiffs, or more specifically, their counsel and guardian ad

litem, had violated the settlement agreement’s confidentiality and non-disparagement

provisions and that these violations required the Court to vacate its prior approval of the

settlement. The Court denied White’s motion. October 11, 2005 Memorandum and Order. 

Plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary enforcement of the settlement pursuant to

California Code of Civil Procedure 664.5 and for appointment of a receiver. At an October

7, 2005 hearing, the Court denied these motions as the law is clear that under the

circumstances of this case summary enforcement was not warranted. The Court converted

plaintiffs’ motion into a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 motion for summary judgment

for enforcement of the settlement and gave White a deadline to respond. 

White raised the same arguments he had made in support of his earlier motions to

vacate the settlement; namely, he challenged the validity of the stipulation, the Court’s

appointment of Rodriguez Borrego as guardian ad litem nunc pro tunc, and Rodriguez

Borrego’s and Replogle’s alleged breaches of the confidentiality provisions of the settlement

agreement. The Court granted plaintiffs’ motion, denied White’s counter motions, and

entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. White appealed and posted a bond. 

//

//

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 4 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

D. Post appeal proceedings

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment enforcing the settlement. Roe ex rel.

Borrego v. White, 232 Fed. Appx. 733 (9th Cir. May 23, 2007). The amount of the judgment

plus interest was subsequently deposited with the Court pending the Court’s approval of a

trust for plaintiffs’ benefit and the Court’s determination of the amount of fees and costs to

award plaintiffs’ counsel from the settlement.

Before the Court ruled on any of these pending matters, Eric Safire, a San Francisco

attorney, filed a motion to substitute in as counsel for some, but not all, of the plaintiffs. 

Safire contended that these plaintiffs desired new counsel so that they could renounce their

participation in the settlement and judgment. Shortly thereafter Rodriguez Borrego filed a

motion to intervene as a party and to stay the proceedings. Rodriguez Borrego argued that

Replogle intended not to honor a fee agreement with Rodriguez Borrego. Around the same

time it came to the Court’s attention that Replogle and his co-counsel John Hill were

disputing Hill’s compensation for his work on this case, and, indeed, Replogle filed various

motions seeking to terminate Hill’s work on this case.

In light of Safire’s remarkable representation, the dispute between Replogle and

Rodriguez Borrego, and the dispute between Replogle and Hill, the Court appointed a

Special Master to investigate all of these matters. While the Special Master was preparing

his report, Safire withdrew his request to substitute in as counsel for plaintiffs. As there was

no longer a dispute as to who represented the plaintiffs, the Court approved a trust for

plaintiffs’ benefit and directed that a portion of the settlement funds deposited with the Court

be distributed to the plaintiffs’ trust.

E. The guardian ad litem’s financial interest in plaintiffs’ recovery

In support of the original motion to appoint Rodriguez Borrego as guardian ad litem

for Jose Roe I, Replogle declared that Rodriguez Borrego, a lawyer and former judge in

Puerto Vallerta, “has no adverse interest” and “is fully qualified to act as guardian ad litem.” 

Sep. 4, 2003 Declaration of David Replogle ¶ 8 (Docket no. 2). In support of the belated 

application to appoint Rodriguez Borrego guardian ad litem for the three additional minor

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 5 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

plaintiffs, Replogle declared that Rodriguez Borrego “has demonstrated his ability to act

faithfully to the minor plaintiffs in this case.” Aug. 16, 2005 Replogle Decl. ¶ 5 (Docket no.

233). Rodriguez Borrego swore in a declaration attached as an exhibit to Replogle’s

declaration: “I have no conflict of interest with the Applicants.” Id., Exh. D, ¶ 6. 

Replogle’s and Rodriguez Borrego’s representations were untrue. From the outset of

this lawsuit, Rodriguez Borrego had a contingency interest in the fees paid to Replogle for

Replogle’s representation of all of the plaintiffs in this case. At the October 7, 2005 hearing,

and in response to White’s complaint that Replogle had refused to disclose whether

Rodriguez Borrego has a financial interest in the outcome of this case, the Court and

Replogle engaged in the following colloquy:

THE COURT: Why wouldn’t I be entitled to know what Mr. Borrego’s financial

interest in this litigation is? What–why wouldn’t I know that? Why

wouldn’t you tell me?

MR. REPLOGLE: There is no reason.

THE COURT: So you would tell me that.

MR. REPLOGLE: Right. He is not getting any compensation for assisting the minors

without court approval. And we have no intention of seeking that court

approval. I have paid him directly for some of the activities he has done

in Puerto Vallerta with the criminal proceedings down there.

THE COURT: Are you telling me–and that is what I’m hearing–he doesn’t have a

contingency interest in the recovery in this case.

MR. REPLOGLE: I pay him directly.

THE COURT: That doesn’t quite answer the question. I mean, you can pay a

contingency directly.

MR. REPLOGLE: There is nothing in writing.

THE COURT: That doesn’t answer it, either. My question is, does he–are you telling

me he has no contingent interest in the outcome of this litigation?

MR. REPLOGLE: No, I believe he does, because if I don’t get paid, he doesn’t get paid.

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 6 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. REPLOGLE: But he will not be paid from the minors. It has been very clear to him.

Oct. 5, 2005 Hearing Transcript at pp. 10-11 (Docket no. 379).

Replogle attempted to conceal the guardian ad litem’s contingency interest in this

case; only when the Court refused to accept his evasive answers did he reluctantly concede

that there was such an arrangement. Replogle, however, still did not reveal the whole truth. 

His assertion that “there is nothing in writing” reflecting Rodriguez Borrego’s financial

interest was false. Only four months earlier Replogle had memorialized his agreement with

Rodriguez Borrego in a letter dated June 13, 2005:

This is to acknowledge our agreement concerning attorneys’ fees to be earned

in the above-referenced action pending before the federal court in San

Francisco. In consideration of your continuing efforts on behalf of the

plaintiffs in Mexico, we have agreed that you will receive 20% of the

attorneys’ fees earned in the case.

Replogle’s representation that Rodriguez Borrego did not have a contingency interest in the

fees earned from the minor plaintiffs’ recovery was also false. The June 15, 2005 letter

memorializing the contingency agreement directly contradicts Replogle’s representation. 

Moreover, the January 29, 2008 proposed findings of fact submitted jointly by Replogle and

Rodriguez Borrego assert: “Replogle agreed to compensate Rodriguez Borrego for his work

in Mexico on behalf of the Plaintiffs and pay to Rodriguez Borrego 20% of the gross

attorneys’ fees earned on behalf of the adult Plaintiffs. Rodriguez Borrego understood he

would be paid a like amount for his services as the Guardian ad Litem for the Plaintiffs.” 

Jan. 29, 2008 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at ¶ 5 (Docket no. 754); 

see also Declaration of Mauricio Rodriguez Borrego in Support of Joint Stipulation, Jan. 30,

2008 at ¶ 13 (Docket no. 763) (“At the outset of the litigation Replogle orally agreed that I

would be paid 20% of all the fees earned as compensation for my legal services, not just out

his portion. The oral agreement was memorialized in a letter dated June 13, 2005.”). 

The Special Master’s investigation included Rodriguez Borrego’s agreement with

Replogle. White has also repeatedly urged Rodriguez Borrego’s financial interest as a

ground for vacating the judgment. Most recently he filed a writ of mandamus with the Ninth

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 7 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Circuit that, among other things, argued that the Court could not distribute any of the

settlement funds because of Rodriguez Borrego’s conflict of interest and how it allegedly

impacts the settlement. Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed White’s petition on April 8,

2008, White has now filed a fifth motion to vacate the settlement, again basing his argument

on Rodriguez Borrego’s financial interest in the outcome of this lawsuit and the conflict it

created between he and the minor plaintiffs. White has already filed another appeal with the

Ninth Circuit, even though the Court has not yet issued its written order on his motion.

F. The attorney’s fees and costs proceedings

After the Special Master filed his Report, Replogle, Hill and Rodriguez Borrego all

filed objections to certain portions of the Report. At the Court’s direction, each also filed

their requests for costs with supporting documentation. The Court determined that because

Rodriguez Borrego has a financial interest in the amount of fees awarded to plaintiffs’

counsel (the more Replogle receives the more Rodriguez Borrego is entitled to receive),

Rodriguez Borrego could not represent the minor plaintiffs’ interests with respect to

Replogle’s request for fees and costs. Accordingly, the Court replaced Rodriguez Borrego as

guardian ad litem with James Wagstaffe, an attorney with no financial interest in the outcome

of this lawsuit.

Replogle, Hill and Rodriguez Borrego subsequently stipulated to binding arbitration to

resolve the dispute among themselves as to the allocation of the ultimately awarded

attorney’s fees and costs. Thus, this Court’s task is to determine the total amount of fees and

costs to award to counsel; the Court will not decide how that amount is to be apportioned

among the claiming attorneys.

DISCUSSION

Rodriguez Borrego and Replogle have jointly asked this Court to award fees and costs

for Replogle’s representation of the 16 adult plaintiffs in accordance with Replogle’s fee

agreement with each plaintiff; namely, 40 percent of the adult plaintiffs’ $5.6 million

judgment ($2.24 million) and 33 percent of the minor plaintiffs’ $1.4 million judgment

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 8 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Counsel’s most recent pleading in support of an award of fees, filed April 11, 2008, erroneously states that each plaintiff received $375,000 from the settlement for a total settlement

of $7,700,000 (Docket no. 871).

9

($462,000), plus counsel’s costs and interest.1 The current guardian ad litem recommends

that the Court award counsel 30 percent of the judgment for all plaintiffs for fees and costs

($2.1 million), plus an additional amount for interest.

A. The Court has the authority to set a reasonable fee

The Court has the authority, and indeed the obligation, to approve the amount of

attorney’s fees and costs awarded to counsel for the representation of the minor plaintiffs.

Donnarumma v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 79 F.R.D. 455, 460 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Cal. Fam.

Code § 6602. Thus, notwithstanding the contingency fee agreements with the minor

plaintiffs, the Court must set the fee and costs. 

The Court is also not obligated to award fees and costs in accordance with the

contingency fee agreements with the adult plaintiffs. The ABA Canons of Professional

Ethics, Canon 13, provide: “A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should

be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of

the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its

reasonableness.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, “a court is empowered to supervise fee

awards under contingent fee agreements to avoid unreasonable results.” Hamner v. Rios, 769

F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1985); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litig., 818 F.2d

226, 240 (2nd Cir. 1987) (“It is well established that a district court, pursuant to its

rulemaking authority or on an ad hoc basis, may review a contingency fee agreement.”); 

Hoffert v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he district judge has

broad equity power to supervise the collection of attorneys’ fees under such fee

arrangements.”). The Court can respond to a specific concern of a plaintiff or can raise the

issue sua sponte. See Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., 602 F.2d 1105, 1108 (3d Cir. 1979)

(“Because contingency fee agreements are of special concern to the courts and are not to be

enforced on the same basis as are ordinary commercial contracts, courts have the power to

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 9 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

monitor such contracts either through rule-making or on an Ad hoc basis.” (citations

omitted)). 

Consistent with this authority, the Ninth Circuit directed this Court to consider the

conduct of Replogle and the former guardian ad litem in connection with the request for

attorneys fees:

To the extent that the district court’s orders prematurely distributed funds

without fully resolving questions surrounding the propriety of the actions taken

by plaintiffs’ counsel and the guardian ad litem, those questions can still be

accounted for by the district court going forward by awarding some of the

money originally slated for counsel and the guardian ad litem to plaintiffs

themselves should the district court find any impropriety in counsel or the

guardian ad litem’s actions after it completes its review of those actions.

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus, White v. United States District , 08-70226

(9th Cir. April 8, 2008); see also Jackson v. United States, 881 F.2d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1989)

(“all courts possess an inherent power to prevent unprofessional conduct by those attorneys

who are practicing before them.”).

B. A reasonable fee

 Counsel’s request for 40 percent of the adult plaintiffs’ $5.6 million recovery and 33

percent of the minor plaintiffs’ gross recovery--plus costs--is unreasonable in the

circumstances of this case.

Some circumstances do support a substantial fee award. The case presented several

difficulties, including that the plaintiffs were poor, resided in Mexico, and did not speak

English, and that the case was brought under a relatively new federal law with little

precedent. Counsel also took a risk in bringing the case, and paid the expenses necessary to

litigate the action. Of most significance, counsel obtained an appropriate outcome. Plaintiffs

received a substantial sum of money which, if spent wisely, can transform their lives. To

ensure that the funds will be spent wisely, counsel had the money placed in a trust for each

plaintiff and secured the services of a trust protector to facilitate the use of the funds to

improve the plaintiffs’ lives.

Counsel’s overall conduct of this litigation, however, compels a much lower fee. For

example, while counsel negotiated a beneficial settlement, counsel’s conduct jeopardized that

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 10 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

settlement and created the issues that White used to attack the settlement and delay plaintiffs’

receipt of the settlement proceeds by more than two years.

Counsel neglected to move for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for three of the

minor plaintiffs until after the settlement was signed by all parties. This omission required

the Court to appoint the guardian nunc pro tunc and created an issue that White repeatedly

urged as a ground for vacating the Court’s approval of the settlement. While the Ninth

Circuit ultimately rejected White’s argument, White was only able to raise the issue in the

first place because of counsel’s neglect. 

Counsel also negotiated a settlement that required the participation of all 22 plaintiffs,

even though counsel had not had any contact with two of the plaintiffs during the preceding

eight months. Counsel added these two plaintiffs to the complaint after meeting with each

only once, and then had no further contact with them. Oct. 7, 2005 Hearing Transcript at 7-8

(Docket No. 379). As a result, counsel was unable to locate the plaintiffs to sign the

settlement agreement and had to negotiate the stipulation that led to further litigation and

delay. Again, the Ninth Circuit ultimately rejected White’s arguments as to the stipulation,

but counsel’s carelessness as to who he maintained as a plaintiff created an issue that

contributed to the more than two-year delay.

Finally, counsel failed to disclose Rodriguez Borrego’s financial interest in the

plaintiffs’ recovery and instead affirmatively misrepresented that Rodriguez Borrego did not

have any interests adverse to the minor plaintiffs. Rodriguez Borrego’s contingency interest

created a conflict with the minors he was appointed to represent. The operation of this

conflict is most apparent in the context of Replogle’s request for attorney’s fees; while the

minors’ interests are best served by receiving as much of the settlement as possible,

Rodriguez Borrego advocates for a large fee recovery since he is entitled to a percentage of

all fees awarded. The conflict existed regardless of whether Rodriguez Borrego had a

financial interest in only the adult plaintiffs’ recovery or in the recovery of all plaintiffs. See

Williams v. Superior Court, 147 Cal.App.4th 36, 48 (2007). As Rodriguez Borrego’s

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 11 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

contingency interest was material to the Court’s decision to appoint Rodriguez Borrego

guardian ad litem, it should have been disclosed.

Not only did Replogle not disclose the conflict until it was raised by White (and then

only under persistent questioning from the Court), he then lied about the details. He falsely

represented that there was no writing memorializing the agreement and he falsely represented

that the agreement did not include the fees earned on the minors’ recovery. The Court cannot

overlook such misconduct; indeed, the Ninth Circuit directed the Court to consider such

misconduct when deciding counsel’s fee request.

Moreover, much of counsel’s “legal work” was frivolous and involved filing

documents with wholly unsubstantiated allegations. For example, Replogle served a

subpoena dues tecum on the bank account of White’s then-criminal counsel Arguedos,

Cassman and Headley (“ACD”). Replogle sought all of the firm’s banking records from

January 2001 to the present based on the scurrilous and unsupported allegation that ACD had

attempted to bribe the plaintiff into recanting his allegations against White. ACD moved to

quash the subpoena and for a protective order prohibiting Replogle from deposing the

members of ACD and obtaining their clients files, time records, and phone records. Replogle

did not file an opposition to the motion to quash and, in violation of the Local Rules, did not

even file a notice of non-opposition; he simply ignored ACD’s motion and made no attempt

to defend his discovery requests on White’s criminal attorneys. 

Most recently, Replogle filed a letter with the Court accusing Hill of traveling to

Puerto Vallerta on March 29, 2008 and, assisted by Rodriguez Borrego, contacting the

plaintiffs for some improper purpose; indeed, he accused Hill of working with White’s

counsel, Geoffrey Rotwein to “tag team” the plaintiffs. April 1, 2008 Letter (Docket no.

858). As is often the case with Replogle’s filings, he offered no support whatsoever for his

inflammatory accusations. That same day Hill wrote the Court and explained that he had not

been to Puerto Vallerta since November 1, 2007. April 1, 2008 Letter (Docket no. 859). 

Replogle made no effort to defend his baseless allegations. This proceeding is just one of 

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 12 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

many examples of the poor quality of counsel’s representation of plaintiffs during this

litigation.

 The Court is not persuaded that a 40 percent fee plus costs is appropriate based on

counsels’ claim that the lodestar of Replogle, Hill and Rodriguez Borrego together exceeds

the fee they seek here. The amount of hours claimed is excessive and incredible. Counsel

conducted little, if any, discovery; counsel did not even take White’s deposition after--over

White’s vigorous objection--the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to take his deposition in jail. 

Counsel’s pleadings were unhelpful and contained little, if any, legal argument or citations. 

The Court had to address White’s arguments and reasoning on its own without meaningful

assistance from plaintiffs’ counsel. 

Moreover, as is explained above, many of the hours spent on this case were required

because of counsel’s carelessness and misconduct or were not beneficial to the plaintiffs. 

White continues to use counsel’s failure to disclose Rodriguez Borrego’s contingency

interest as a basis for attacking the judgment. While this Court has found that regardless of

Rodriguez Borrego’s conflict of interest, the settlement was and is in the best interests of the

plaintiffs, and has continually rejected White’s challenges (as has the Ninth Circuit), the

plaintiffs themselves did not create these circumstances; counsel and the former guardian ad

litem are responsible.

In light of all these circumstances, the arguments made by the current guardian ad

litem, and based on the Court’s detailed knowledge of counsel’s conduct during this nearly

five year litigation, the Court awards counsel a total of $2,315,240.00 for fees, costs and

interest. The Court calculated this amount by awarding counsel 30 percent of the total $7

million recovery for fees and costs, that is, $2.1 million. If the Court had not included costs

in this figure, it would have awarded a lower total amount. The Court notes that as of August

2005, when the Court approved the settlement, counsel represented that the attorneys had up

to that point incurred reimburseable expenses of approximately $200,000. Motion to

Approve Compromise of Minors, Aug. 26, 2005 ¶ 15 (Docket no. 240). Any costs incurred

after this date are primarily counsel’s responsibility.

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G:\CRBALL\2003\4035\settlementfunds\attorneyfees\attorneysfees1.wpd 14

The Court then added $215,240.00 in interest to the $2.1 million figure. Interest was

calculated at the federal post-judgment rate (4.34%) as of the December 5, 2005 date of the

judgment. From this amount the Court subtracted the cost to plaintiffs of the Special Master

and the new guardian ad litem ($114,496.00). Counsel, and not plaintiffs, should bear the

burden of these costs because the Special Master and new guardian ad litem were required

because of counsel’s infighting about fees and Rodriguez Borrego’s financial arrangement

with Replogle. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court awards plaintiffs’ counsel a total of $2,315,240. 

The difference between $2,315,240 and the amount remaining in the Clerk’s Registry has

been distributed to plaintiffs in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2008 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:03-cv-04035-CRB Document 890 Filed 04/18/08 Page 14 of 14