Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01578/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01578-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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-1- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY CHARLES CLEVELAND,

Plaintiff,

v.

T DENNISON, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 06cv1578-WQH (BLM)

(1) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. No.

43] and (2) ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE [Doc. No. 43-

2]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

On August 8, 2006, Plaintiff Larry Charles Cleveland, a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil

rights suit against several defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.).

Doc. No. 1. Defendants D. M. Barnes, T. Dennison, S. Hernandez, E.

Hoffman, B. Larson, M. McMinn, A. Moreno, R. Perez, A. Pittman, E.

Reyes, J. T. Stovall, J. Vasquez, S. Walls, D. K. Williams, A. L.

Cota, and J. S. Woodford (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a motion

Case 3:06-cv-01578-WQH-BLM Document 56 Filed 12/04/07 Page 1 of 41
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-2- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

to dismiss the Complaint on May 11, 2007, on the grounds of failure

to exhaust administrative remedies, failure to state a claim and

qualified immunity. Doc. No. 43. Plaintiff timely opposed the

motion [Doc. No. 50] and Defendants filed a reply on July 23, 2007

[Doc. No. 54].

 This Court finds the issues appropriate for decision on the

papers and without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule

7.1.(d)(1). See Doc. Nos. 44 & 48. The Court has considered the

Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition,

Defendants’ Reply and all supporting documents submitted by the

parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS

that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 43] be GRANTED IN PART

AND DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims his constitutional rights were violated

while he was incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility.

Doc. No. 1. Though Plaintiff’s numerous complaints are set forth in

greater detail below, he generally alleges that many of the

Defendants repeatedly harassed him following false allegations that

he engaged in sexual misconduct with a prison teacher and retaliated

against him as a result of various complaints he lodged. Id.

Additionally, Plaintiff highlights several incidents where officers

allegedly used excessive force against him and/or acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Id.

As detailed more thoroughly below, Plaintiff filed numerous

administrative complaints and appeals within the prison grievance

system in response to these perceived wrongs. The instant Complaint

alleges claims against twenty-four defendants. However, Plaintiff

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-3- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

has never served Defendants Staneff, Avila, Hill, Merto, Ortiz,

Graham and Camacho and the District Judge previously dismissed

Defendant Schwarzenegger from this case (see Doc. No. 55).

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995 provides

that:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the

quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). However, the prisoner is not

required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his or her

complaint because failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under

the PLRA. Jones v. Bock, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007). 

The proper vehicle for challenging a complaint based on

failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an unenumerated motion

under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Unlike under Rule

12(b)(6), “[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to

exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. If

the district court concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust

his or her administrative remedies, the claim should be dismissed

without prejudice. O'Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr, 502 F.3d 1056,

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-4- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

Failure to exhaust may not be waived. See Woodford v. Ngo,

__ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct 2378, 2382 (2006) (“[e]xhaustion is no longer

left to the discretion of the district court”). The United States

Supreme Court has stated as recently as this year that “[t]here is

no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that

unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones, 127 S.Ct at

918-19. A prisoner also cannot satisfy the PRLA’s exhaustion

requirement by “filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally

defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Ngo, 126 S.Ct at

2382. Nor can a prisoner who did not make any attempt to utilize

the prison grievance system sidestep the exhaustion requirement by

arguing that it now would be futile to attempt to exhaust within the

prison system. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (“we

stress the point . . . that we will not read futility or other

exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has

provided otherwise”); see also Ngo, 126 S.Ct at 2391 (“if the party

never pursues all available avenues of administrative review, the

person will never be able to sue in federal court”).

B. Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, “we do not require heightened fact pleading of

specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1974 (2007). “However, the court is not required to accept

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-5- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”

Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th

Cir. 1994)). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately

will prevail, but whether he has properly stated a claim upon which

relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th

Cir. 2003). 

When the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must

construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any

benefit of doubt. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2002) (citing Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988)). This rule of liberal construction is

“particularly important” in civil rights cases. Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal

interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint the court is not,

however, permitted to “supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are

not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

If the court concludes that dismissal is appropriate, the

court has discretion to dismiss the complaint either with or without

leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (concluding that the PLRA did not strip district

courts of this discretion). Because the language of section

1915(e)(2) parallels the language of Rule 12(b)(6), the Ninth

Circuit has suggested that there is no reason to depart from its

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-6- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

longstanding policy that when dismissing a complaint for failure to

state a claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if

no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that

the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other

facts.” Id. at 1127.

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Counts 1-3 and 6-10 of Plaintiff’s

Complaint, as well as an unenumerated claim set forth on pages 63-64

of the Complaint, are unexhausted. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs.’ Mot.

to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 3-8, 12, 14-16. Defendants argue that

Counts 1, 4, 5 and 10, as well as an unenumerated claim against

Defendants Cota and Stovall, fail to state claims for which relief

may be granted. Id. at 8-14, 19-20. Finally, Defendants seek to

have what sequentially would be Claim 11, which alleges that

Defendant Moreno violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights and

the Americans with Disabilities Act, dismissed on the grounds that

Defendant Moreno is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 16-19.

A. Unexhausted Claims

Unless otherwise specified, the facts are presented as set

forth in the Complaint and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

Where necessary, the Court decides disputed issues of fact. Wyatt,

315 F.3d at 1119-20. 

1. Claims Pertaining to the May 17, 2004 Incident

Counts 1-3 arise from an incident that took place on May 17,

2004. Beginning in late October 2003, Plaintiff contends that

Defendant Dennison conspired with Defendants Hill and Merto (as well

as other officers not named as Defendants in the Complaint) and

monitored him in an attempt to catch Plaintiff engaging in sexual

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-7- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

misconduct with Ms. Dakota, a prison teacher. Compl. at 10-15.

This “harassing” behavior continued through the end of 2003 and into

2004. Id. at 10-18. 

On May 17, 2004, Plaintiff entered the workchange office

after being released from his assigned work. Id. at 18-19.

Pursuant to the standard daily procedure, Plaintiff removed all of

his clothing, except his shorts, and set them on the counter in

front of Defendant Dennison. Id. at 19. He then followed

Dennison’s instructions to take his tennis shoes and socks and walk

through the metal detector while Dennison examined his clothes. Id.

After walking through the metal detector, Plaintiff put his shirt

and socks back on. Id. Plaintiff contends that he then repeated

this procedure several more times at Dennison’s request. Id. at 19-

20. When he sat down to take his socks off before going through the

metal detector for the fourth time, Dennison approached him and

asked for his left sock. Id. at 20. Dennison said he felt

something in the sock, which Plaintiff claimed was a separate

elastic ankle sock wadded up inside the first sock. Id. Plaintiff

tried to grab the sock from Dennison, who then threw it to another

officer. Id. at 20-21. That officer left the room with the sock,

which later was determined to contain marijuana (according to

reports Plaintiff attached to his Complaint). Id. at 21, Ex. A. 

At the same time, an alarm sounded and Dennison ordered

Plaintiff and the other prisoners in the workchange area to get down

on the ground. Id. Plaintiff refused due to medical impairments.

Id. As a result, Dennison sprayed him with pepper spray, wrestled

him to the floor, and with the help of other officers, restrained

him in handcuffs and leg shackles. Id. at 22-23. 

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1 Plaintiff attaches the referenced CDC-7219 form, also called a

“Medical Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence” form, to his Complaint. Compl.,

Ex. A. There is no line on the form for the prisoner’s signature, but MTA

Hernandez did write on an open space on the form “refused to be examined for

injuries.” Id. 

-8- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

Thereafter, Defendants Larson and Reyes escorted Plaintiff to

the infirmary. Id. at 28. During the walk, Plaintiff alleges that

Larson tightened the handcuffs behind his back and twisted his arm

upwards, causing “enormous pain.” Id. at 29. When they reached the

infirmary, Plaintiff refused to sign the CDC-7219 form presented to

him and, therefore, received no treatment for his injuries or pepper

spray exposure.1 Id. at 29-31.

Plaintiff raises three claims as a result of this incident.

In Count 1, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dennison, Hill and

Merto deprived Plaintiff of his Equal Protection rights and

interfered with his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1985(3) and 1986. Id. at 77. Count 2 alleges that Defendant

Dennison used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Id. Finally, in Count 3, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Larson,

Reyes and Hernandez were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 78.

Defendants argue that these counts must be dismissed because

Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies.

Defs.’ Mem. at 7-8. As Defendants correctly explain, the

administrative appeal system for California inmates is described in

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. See Defs.’ Mem. at

7 n.3. Under these regulations, inmates “may appeal any

departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which they can

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-9- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” 15

C.C.R. § 3084.1(a). An inmate wishing to exhaust his or her

remedies must complete four steps: (1) fill out a complaint form

(generally termed a “602" form), present it to the prison official

involved, and attempt informal resolution; (2) if not resolved, file

for and receive a first formal level decision; (3) if relief is not

granted at the first formal level, file for and receive a second

formal level decision; and (4) if relief is not granted at the

second level, file for and receive a third level decision from the

Director of Corrections. 15 C.C.R. § 3084.5. However, of key

importance is the requirement that “[a]n appellant must submit the

appeal within 15 working days of the event or decision being

appealed, or of receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal

decision.” 15 C.C.R. § 3084.6(c). 

In this case, the regulations required Plaintiff to present

his complaint to the prison official(s) involved within fifteen days

of May 17, 2004, and then timely appeal each denial, in order to

have timely and properly exhausted his claim. 15 C.C.R. § 3084.5

and 15 C.C.R. § 3084.6(c); Jones, 127 S.Ct at 918-19. As previously

noted, an inmate cannot satisfy the PRLA’s exhaustion requirement by

“filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective

administrative grievance or appeal.” Ngo, 126 S.Ct at 2382. Here,

J.T. Stovall, the Appeals Coordinator at the prison, submitted a

sworn declaration stating that:

The California Attorney General’s Office requested

this Office research its records to ascertain if

Plaintiff Cleveland exhausted any inmate appeals at

the institutional level (up to the second formal level

of appeal) as to any allegations of excessive force,

denial of equal protection or deliberate indifference

to Plaintiff’s health or safety arising from an

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2 Plaintiff argues that he submitted appeals in May, July, August,

October and November of 2004 “raising the matters state[d] in plaintiff’s

complaint” and prison officials never responded to or returned these appeals.

Pl.’s Opp’n at 9-10. But the prison log, which reflects many complaints by

Plaintiff, shows no evidence that Plaintiff filed the alleged appeals. Stovall

Decl., Ex. A. Moreover, Plaintiff does not attach copies of any appeals

demonstrating that he properly submitted them within the fifteen day window and

it appears that only the alleged May 2004 appeal would have fallen within the

required time frame (presuming it pertained to the May 17, 2004 incident, which

Plaintiff does not specifically claim). While Plaintiff did submit an appeal on

June 1, 2004 (within the applicable time frame), it pertains to Plaintiff’s claim

that he was denied access to legal materials and the law library, not the May 17,

2004 incident. Compl., Ex. B. Accordingly, the Court does not find this

argument sufficient to overcome Defendants’ showing that Plaintiff did not file

a timely appeal regarding this incident. 

-10- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

incident on May 17, 2004. The appeals log and copies

of appeals maintained by the Appeals Office, which are

kept in the ordinary course of business at or near the

time this Office receives an inmate appeal, show that

Plaintiff did not properly file or exhaust any such

appeal at the institutional level. 

Decl. of J.T. Stovall Supp. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Stovall Decl.”)

¶ 7. The attached log does not show that any appeals related to

staff conduct were received from Plaintiff within fifteen days of

May 17, 2004.2 Id.

Moreover, Plaintiff admits that he did not submit any appeal

of the May 17, 2004 incident until April 11, 2005. Compl., Ex. A;

Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. “A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a

valid ground for dismissal, so long as no exception to exhaustion

applies.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120. While Plaintiff submitted his

April 11, 2005 grievance on a 602 form, he added language to the

form specifying that it was a “Citizen’s Complaint” and that he was

filing it within twelve months of the events giving rise to the

complaint in accordance with 15 C.C.R. § 3391(b). Compl., Ex. A.

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-11- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

As such, Plaintiff appears to argue that his administrative

complaint was timely under 15 C.C.R. § 3391(b), regardless of

whether or not he complied with the fifteen-day requirement. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on 15 C.C.R. § 3391(b) as affording him

more than the standard fifteen days in which to lodge a complaint is

misplaced. 15 C.C.R. § 3391(b) expressly is limited to complaint’s

lodged by non-inmates, stating:

An allegation by a non-inmate of misconduct by a

departmental peace officer as defined in section

3291(b), is a citizen’s complaint pursuant to Penal

Code section 832.5. Citizen’s complaints alleging

misconduct of a departmental peace officer shall be

filed within twelve months of the alleged misconduct.

15 C.C.R. § 3391(b). Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time of the

incident and, therefore, was required to submit his grievance within

fifteen days of May 17, 2004.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s concession that he did not

file an appeal of the May 17, 2004 incident until April 11, 2005,

coupled with Stovall’s declaration and the log records showing the

absence of any related appeals during the fifteen days following May

17, 2004, demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claims regarding the May 17,

2004 incident are unexhausted. See Bovarie v. Giurbino, 421 F.

Supp. 2d 1309, 1314-1315 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (relying on Wyatt and

holding that declaration of appeals officer that prisoner failed to

exhaust corroborated prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion and

evidence together justified dismissal). Accordingly, the Court

finds that Counts 1-3 against Defendants Dennison, Larson, Reyes and

///

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3 Because the Court finds that Count 1 is unexhausted and should be

dismissed on that basis, the Court finds it unnecessary to address Defendants’

additional argument that Count 1 fails to state a claim.

-12- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

Hernandez are unexhausted and RECOMMENDS that they be DISMISSED.3

2. Claims Pertaining to the August 6, 2004 Incident

Plaintiff claims that on August 6, 2004, officers came to his

cell and presented him with a subpoena ordering him to appear in

Court that day on charges related to the May 17, 2004 incident.

Compl. at 48. Plaintiff objected because he had not received prior

notification of the court appearance, as required by the

regulations. Id. at 49. In response, Defendant Avila called in

additional officers to extract Plaintiff from his cell. Id. During

this extraction, Plaintiff claims he was subjected to verbal threats

and abuse, which Defendants Avila and Perez observed but failed to

discourage. Id. at 49-50. Once he left for his Court appearance,

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Staneff and Graham, in

retaliation for asserting his right to prior notification of court

appearances, searched his cell and read his confidential legal

papers. Id. at 50-51. Plaintiff returned to find his confidential

legal papers and court documents in disarray. Id. at 51. 

Plaintiff appears to raise two claims related to this

incident. In Count 6, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Staneff and

Graham violated his constitutional rights when they retaliated

against him for asserting his First Amendment rights. Id. at 78-79.

In Count 8, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Avila and Perez

violated his constitutional rights when they acted with deliberate

indifference to the substantial risk that he would be harmed when

the other officers retaliated against him. Id. at 79. 

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4 Defendants cite only to Count 8, but argues that claims related to

this incident must be dismissed as unexhausted. Defs.’ Mem. at 12. Count 6 also

pertains to this incident, but alleges claims against Defendants Staneff and

Graham only — neither of whom have been served. Because the Court finds that

Count 6 also pertains to this incident, the Court will address these counts

jointly. The unserved Defendants will be addressed further in Section C of this

Order. 

-13- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

Defendants contend that these claims4 must be dismissed

because Plaintiff did not file a timely inmate appeal or receive

final resolution of his claims. Defs.’ Mem. at 12. Defendants

point to a grievance described as log no. 05-490, which Plaintiff

attached to his Complaint (see Compl., Ex. E). Id. This grievance

described the August 6, 2004 acts of retaliation by Defendants

Staneff and Graham, but Plaintiff dated it January 23, 2005.

Compl., Ex. E. According to a declaration filed by N. Grannis, the

Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch: 

The screenout records query [attached to his

declaration] shows that the inmate appeal, log no. RJD

05-490, that inmate Cleveland attempted to file

concerning a complaint against staff arising from an

August 6, 2004 incident was screen out by my office

because it did not comply with the inmate appeals

process. This appeal was subsequently canceled and

therefore remains unexhausted.

Decl. of N. Grannis Supp. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 8.

In response, Plaintiff argues that his retaliation claims

related to his refusal to come out of his cell for a court

appearance were exhausted through the state courts (he cites case

numbers from the Superior Court, Court of Appeal, and California

Supreme Court). Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. 

The Court agrees that Claims 6 and 8 are unexhausted because

Plaintiff did not appeal any acts related to the August 6, 2004

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-14- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

incident until well beyond the fifteen day time period for doing so.

See 15 C.C.R. § 3084.6(c). Once again, the Court cannot entertain

unexhausted claims. Jones, 127 S.Ct at 918-19; Ngo, 126 S.Ct at

2382. While Grannis’ declaration in and of itself is insufficient

to meet Defendants’ affirmative burden because it does not explain

how the appeal failed to comply or whether the prison complied with

its obligation to explain to Plaintiff why his appeal was

unacceptable and how to correct it (see 15 C.C.R. § 3084.3(d)),

Plaintiff once again has admitted that he did not submit an appeal

as to this incident until months after it occurred (see Compl., Ex.

E). As previously noted, a court may dismiss if the prisoner has

conceded failure to exhaust. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120. Furthermore,

Plaintiff’s concession that he did not file his appeal until January

23, 2005, strongly suggests that his complaint was “cancelled”

because it was untimely. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s concession, together with Grannis’ declaration and the

attached log records, establishes that Plaintiff’s claims are

unexhausted. 

On a final note, to the extent Plaintiff argues that he

exhausted the claims in state court, this argument fails because the

PLRA requires administrative exhaustion. Congress specifically has

stated that the reason for this is to allow the institution an

opportunity to correct errors internally. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);

Ngo, 126 S.Ct at 2385 (“[b]ecause exhaustion requirements are

designed to deal with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these parties to do what

they would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to give the agency a

fair and full opportunity to adjudicate their claims”). Claims

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5 To the extent Plaintiff argues that he exhausted these claims by way

of an appeal contesting the district attorney’s failure to notify him within ten

days that the May 17, 2004 incident had been referred to them for prosecution

(this prosecution being the impetus for the August 6, 2004 court appearance),

Plaintiff’s claim also fails. In the appeals Plaintiff attaches to his

Complaint, he lists the date of this incident as June 25, 2004. Compl., Ex. D.

However, he did not submit a related grievance until a month later on July 25,

2004. Id. Additionally, the appeal eventually was cancelled at the third level

because the prison does not have jurisdiction over the district attorney’s

actions. Id. Because this appeal was untimely and procedurally defective, it

does not provide a proper basis for finding exhaustion. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. at 2382.

-15- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

filed outside of the institution, therefore, are irrelevant for PLRA

exhaustion purposes. See O'Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1062 (rejecting

prisoner’s argument that he exhausted his claim by filing a

complaint with the Department of Justice because “the Supreme Court

has made clear that the PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust the

prison's internal grievance process”). 

In sum, this Court RECOMMENDS that Claims 6 and 8 be

DISMISSED as unexhausted.5 

3. Claims Pertaining to the October 12, 2004 Incident

Plaintiff submitted a complaint to Defendant Barnes regarding

the August 6, 2004 incident requesting that an investigation be

conducted. Compl. at 51-52. He alleges that, as a result of having

lodged a complaint, Defendant Staneff had a “vendetta” against him

and sought to retaliate against him. Id. at 52. On October 12,

2004, Staneff was serving the evening meal and placed a meal on the

tray slot for Plaintiff’s cell. Id. at 53. Plaintiff asked if

Defendant Staneff could leave the tray on the slot because he was

busy doing legal writing at his desk. Id. Staneff said no and

removed the tray. Id. In response, Plaintiff leaped up and stuck

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his left arm through the slot in an effort to retrieve the tray.

Id. Staneff allegedly then began kicking the tray slot. Id.

Defendant Williams, who was nearby, joined Defendant Staneff in

“kicking, hitting, pushing, punching, and applying their body weight

against the tray slot door” in an effort to force Plaintiff’s arm

back into his cell. Id. at 53-54. When Plaintiff finally attempted

to jerk his arm back through the slot, he claims that Staneff

sprayed him in the eyes with pepper spray. Id. at 54. Plaintiff

submits that Defendant Pittman observed all of these proceedings and

failed to intervene. Id. at 57. 

Following the incident, Plaintiff was not taken to the

infirmary, but Defendant Camacho examined him outside his cell. Id.

at 55-56. Camacho allegedly did not treat Plaintiff’s eyes and only

treated his left arm by way of suggesting that Plaintiff wash it

with soap and water. Id. at 56.

Plaintiff raises four claims pertaining to the October 12,

2004 incident. In Count 7, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Staneff and Williams violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights

by using excessive force against him in retaliation for Plaintiff’s

filing of a complaint against Defendant Staneff. Id. at 79. In

Count 8, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Avila, Perez and Pittman

acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious risk of

harm in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. Similarly,

Plaintiff claims in Count 9 that Defendants Barnes, Avila, Perez and

Pittman acted with deliberate indifference by breaching their

respective duties to take protective measures to deter Defendant

Staneff’s misconduct — again, in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights. Id. at 80. Finally, in Count 10, Plaintiff avers

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that Defendants Barnes, Avila and Woodford violated his Eighth

Amendment rights in that they were deliberately indifferent to a

pattern and practice of officers using excessive force in the

prisons — a practice of which these individuals were put on notice.

Id. 

Defendants argue that Counts 7-10 must be dismissed due to

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defs.’

Mem. at 14-15. While Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff did file

an appeal relating to the October 12, 2004 incident (log no. 05-

328), Defendants argue that this appeal is irrelevant because it

only challenged on due process grounds the disciplinary proceedings

against Plaintiff with respect to a rules violation he received for

the incident and sought dismissal of the rules violation report; it

did not address Plaintiff’s excessive force/retaliation claims. Id.

at 14. Defendants submit that only the “citizen’s complaint,” which

Plaintiff belatedly filed on February 16, 2005, addressed

Plaintiff’s excessive force allegations. Id. at 14-15. The

Complaint confirms that the appeals coordinator screened the

Citizen’s Complaint out because it was filed late. Id. at 15

(citing Compl. at 62). As for Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference

claims, Defendants assert that Plaintiff procedurally defaulted

these claims and argues they should be dismissed under Woodford v.

Ngo. Id. at 15. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff denies that he failed to exhaust

these claims, but provides no elaboration or evidence to support his

argument. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17.

Defendants are correct that Plaintiff also failed to properly

exhaust this claim. The Court’s review of Plaintiff’s appeal in log

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no. 05-328 reveals that it does, in fact, only raise a due process

claim challenging the discipline Plaintiff received following the

October 12, 2004 incident, not claims of excessive force,

retaliation, or deliberate indifference. See Compl., Ex. F. Thus,

it did not sufficiently alert the officers to the nature of the

claims so as to provide prison administrators with a fair

opportunity to address the problem. Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 915.

Regardless, Plaintiff signed that grievance and submitted it at the

informal level on February 15, 2005. Id. This is well past the

fifteen-day window for doing so. See 15 C.C.R. § 3084.6(c). 

The same is true of Plaintiff’s February 16, 2005 “Citizen’s

Complaint.” See Compl., Ex. F. In this complaint, Plaintiff did

challenge the actions of Staneff, Walls and Hoffman as constituting

retaliatory excessive force and Plaintiff also asserted claims

against Barnes, Avila, Pittman and Perez for their deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. But again,

he signed the grievance four months after the October 12, 2004

incident occurred, which makes his complaint untimely. See 15

C.C.R. § 3084.6(c). Plaintiff admits as much by explaining in his

Complaint that the Appeals Coordinator returned his Citizen’s

Complaint with a screening form indicating that it was being

returned as untimely. Compl. at 62. Having conceded not only that

he filed his appeal late, but that he received a notice from the

appeals coordinator explaining that it was not filed because it was

after the fifteen day window, Plaintiff now offers no evidence to

rebut Defendants’ demonstration that these claims were not properly

exhausted. 

///

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6 Because the Court finds that Count 10 is unexhausted and should be

dismissed on that basis, the Court finds it unnecessary to address Defendants’

additional argument that Count 10 fails to state a claim.

7 The prison records attached to the Complaint suggest that the

correctional officer confiscated a “hard core” pornography magazine that was

hidden within Plaintiff’s legal papers and “excess fruit” (defined by the officer

as more than a day’s ration). Compl., Ex. F.

-19- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

Because exhaustion is a mandatory requirement, Jones, 127

S.Ct at 918-19, which this Court is not authorized to waive, Ngo,

126 S.Ct at 2382, and because Defendants have demonstrated

nonexhaustion and Plaintiff admits that he failed to exhaust Counts

7-10, Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120, this Court RECOMMENDS that Counts 7-

10 be DISMISSED6.

4. Claims Pertaining to the November 12, 2004 Incident

While these allegations do not appear to correspond to an

enumerated claim, Plaintiff alleges on pages 62-64 of his Complaint

that Defendants Staneff, Hoffman, Walls, Vasquez, and Ortiz

retaliated against him on November 12, 2004, because of complaints

Plaintiff had made against Staneff. Compl. at 63-64. Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that while Hoffman escorted Plaintiff to the

shower, Walls entered his cell, read his confidential legal papers,

and confiscated his personal items7. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff

claims Defendants Staneff, Walls, Hoffman, Vasquez and Ortiz

conspired to discourage him from exercising his First Amendment

rights by subjecting him to frequent cell searches, confiscating and

destroying his property, using excessive force, and issuing false

rules violation reports against him. Id. at 64.

Defendants argue that these unenumerated claims must be

dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust them properly. Defs.’

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Mem. at 16. While Plaintiff references exhibit I of his Complaint

to demonstrate exhaustion, Defendants contend that the attached

documentation shows only that Plaintiff’s administrative grievance

of these issues was untimely. Id. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff

waited until August 27, 2005, to administratively grieve these

issues and the documentation at exhibit I shows that his inmate

appeal was rejected as untimely. Id. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that he did exhaust this

claim, as demonstrated by the documentation he attached to his

Complaint at exhibit F. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17.

The August 27, 2005 “Citizen’s Complaint” at Complaint

Exhibit I challenges ongoing retaliatory conduct by Defendant

Vasquez that allegedly occurred between November 2004 and April

2005. Compl., Ex. I. The record at Complaint Exhibit F contains a

February 16, 2005 “Citizen’s Complaint,” which addresses Defendants

Hoffman, Staneff and Wall’s conduct on November 12, 2004, and again

attempts to take advantage of the one year limitations period for

filing such a complaint. Compl., Ex. F. As this Court has already

explained, the regulation governing such “Citizen’s Complaints,” 15

C.C.R. § 3391(b), does not cover complaints by inmates. The Appeals

Coordinator acknowledged this fact in returning the August 27, 2005

complaint to Plaintiff because it was submitted outside of the

fifteen day window for submitting such grievances. Compl., Ex. I.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Citizen’s Complaints dated February 16,

2005 (over three months after the November 12, 2004 incident) and

August 27, 2005 (over nine months after the November 12, 2004

incident and four months after the April 2005 harassment) are

untimely. See Compl., Exs. F & I. Because Plaintiff himself admits

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that he attempted exhaustion by way of the grievance at Complaint

Exhibit F, which on its face is untimely, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed as unexhausted. Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1120. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that the

unenumerated claims against Defendants Staneff, Walls, Hoffman,

Vasquez and Ortiz alleged on pages 63-64 of the Complaint be

DISMISSED.

B. Claims that Must be Dismissed Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

Because these claims come before the Court on a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim and because Plaintiff is

appearing pro se, the Court construes the Complaint, and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefore, liberally and in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff. Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895. 

1. Defendants’ Request For Judicial Notice

Before addressing the merits of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, this Court will briefly address Defendants’ request for

judicial notice of federal court records. Doc. No. 43-2. Federal

Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of two

types of facts: (1) those that are generally known within the court’s

territorial jurisdiction, and (2) those that are capable of accurate

and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Under Ninth Circuit

precedent, a court may not take judicial notice of factual findings

from other cases, see Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1114 & n.5, nor may it take

judicial notice of any matter that is subject to reasonable dispute,

see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the

dockets in Case Nos. 03cv2930 and 04cv0903 (both from the Central

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District of California), three orders and one civil minutes report

from those cases, the dockets in Case Nos. 03-72207 and 03-56455

(both from the Ninth Circuit), and one order from the Ninth Circuit.

Doc. No. 43-2. The Ninth Circuit has held that a court may take

judicial notice of “matters of public record,” and it may do so

without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a summary

judgment motion. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. However, “when a court takes

judicial notice of another court’s opinion, it may do so ‘not for the

truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the

opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its

authenticity.’” Id. at 690 (quoting S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc.

v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426-27 (3rd Cir.

1999)). In this case, the accuracy of the public records cannot

reasonably be questioned and the copies provided by Defendants

contain all appropriate file stamps, Pacer or CM/ECF stamps, and

other indicia of reliability. Additionally, the records are provided

only for purposes of demonstrating dates on which pleadings and

orders were filed or how the courts ultimately ruled on procedural

issues. Defendants do not seek to rely on factual findings by these

other courts. Therefore, because these records are relevant to the

resolution of Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion and because they fall

within the range of documents allowed under Federal Rule of Evidence

201(b), this Court finds it appropriate to take judicial notice of

these exhibits.

For these reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for

judicial notice.

///

///

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28 8 As previously noted, the Court grants Defendants’ request.

-23- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

2. Count 4

In Count 4, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Barnes violated

his constitutional right of access to the Courts. Compl. at 78.

Plaintiff explains that he had litigation pending in the Central

District of California (Case No. 04cv0903-DSF(RC)) and the Ninth

Circuit (Case No. 03-72207). Id. at 37. On June 1, 2004, he

submitted a 602 appeal requesting that he be issued all of his legal

materials while he was being held in administrative segregation. Id.

In response, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Barnes sent him a

letter dated September 17, 2004, stating that because of the amount

of legal materials involved, Plaintiff would only be allowed one box

of legal materials at a time. Id. at 39. Plaintiff claims the

limitation to one box at a time caused him to miss the deadline for

filing a request for a Certificate of Appealability in the Ninth

Circuit in Case No. 03-72207 because he was using his box of legal

research for Case No. 04cv0903-DSF(RC) and, therefore, could not swap

it out with the box for Case No. 03-72207. Id. at 37-38; see also

Pl.’s Opp’n at 14 (referring the Court back to the allegations in his

Complaint). He seeks relief in the form of equitable tolling in the

Ninth Circuit case. Id.

Defendants respond that this claim is frivolous and must be

dismissed. Defs.’ Mem. at 10-11. Defendants request that the Court

take judicial notice of the dockets from Plaintiff’s various federal

cases in order to allow Defendants to demonstrate why Plaintiff’s

claim is frivolous.8 Relying on these dockets and Plaintiff’s own

exhibit, Defendants submit that Plaintiff’s certificate of

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appealability was ruled upon long before Plaintiff even was placed

in administrative segregation and subjected to the “one box at a

time” rule. Id. Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

claim that he was working on Case No. 04cv0903-DSF(RC) while he was

pursuing his appeal in Case No. 03-72207 is frivolous because he did

not, in fact even initiate the 04cv0903-DSF(RC) case until six months

after the Ninth Circuit denied the certificate of appealability. Id.

at 10-11. Finally, even if all of the above were not true,

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim is frivolous because the

appeal he sought to file related to his third successive petition.

Id. Accordingly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that

Defendant Barnes impeded a nonfrivolous attack on his criminal

conviction. Id. 

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the Courts

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.

817, 821 (1977). “[A]ccess to the courts means the opportunity to

prepare, serve and file whatever pleadings or other documents are

necessary or appropriate in order to commence or prosecute court

proceedings affecting one’s personal liberty, or to assert and

sustain a defense therein, and to send and receive communications to

and from judges, courts and lawyers concerning such matters.” Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 384 (1996) (quoting Hatfield v. Bailleaux,

290 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 1961)). 

This right is limited to cases where the inmate is able to

demonstrate an “actual injury” to his ability to litigate a case.

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-53. The Ninth Circuit has defined “actual

injury” as a “specific instance in which an inmate was actually

denied access to the courts.” Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796

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(9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th

Cir. 1989)). However, actual injury exists only if “a nonfrivolous

legal claim has been frustrated or was being impeded.” Lewis, 518

U.S. at 353. Where a prisoner asserts a backward-looking claim

seeking a remedy for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim, he

must show: “1) the loss of a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying

claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) a

remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise

available in a future suit.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14

(2002)). 

In this case, Defendants are correct that Plaintiff fails to

demonstrate an actual injury because his claim is frivolous. See

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353. In Case No. 03-72207, Plaintiff filed an

application for leave to file a second or successive petition.

Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 4. On July 24, 2003, the

Ninth Circuit construed this filing as a notice of appeal and

transferred it back to the Central District of California with

instructions that it be treated as a motion for a certificate of

appealability. Id. Upon receiving the motion from the Ninth

Circuit, the Central District denied Plaintiff’s motion for a

certificate of appealability (Case No. 03cv2930-CBM (RC)). Id., Ex.

3. The Central District then forwarded the record of Plaintiff’s

case back to the Ninth Circuit. Id., Ex. 1. On November 18, 2003,

the Ninth Circuit also denied Plaintiff’s request for a certificate

of appealability (Case No. 03-56455). Id., Ex. 6. Thus, Defendant

Barnes’ alleged conduct between June and September 2004 did not

deprive Plaintiff of an opportunity to file a certificate of

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appealability in Case No. 03-72207 — he already had filed one and

received a decision from both the district court and the Ninth

Circuit. C.f. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414 (prisoner must

demonstrate “the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order

of relief” to state a claim of denial of access to courts). Nor were

the certificates denied based on untimeliness, which could be

attributed to prison officials’ delay. Both courts denied the

certificates because the underlying petition was successive. RJN,

Exs. 3 & 6. 

Plaintiff’s claim that the “one box at a time” limitation

impaired his ability to file also does not stand up to scrutiny. As

already discussed, Plaintiff had received a decision from the Ninth

Circuit on his motion for a certificate of appealability by November

18, 2003. He did not even file Case No. 04cv0903-DSF(RC) until

February 10, 2004. See RJN, Ex. 7. Thus, he could not have been

working on Case No. 04cv0903-DSF(RC) at the time his motion for a

certificate of appealability was due. Moreover, Plaintiff was not

confined to administrative segregation and subjected to Defendant

Barnes’ “one box at a time” rule until May 17, 2004. See Compl., Ex.

A (Administrative Segregation Unit Placement Notice). As such, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege an actual injury.

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not seek relief that is within

the purview of this Court to grant. The issue is not whether the

plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he has properly stated

a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson, 353 F.3d at

755. Plaintiff asks that as a result of the alleged denial of access

to the courts, this Court afford him equitable tolling of the statute

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9 It also does not appear that relief in the form of equitable tolling

would resolve Plaintiff’s successive petition problem.

-27- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

of limitations in his habeas case. This Court has no authority to

mandate that equitable relief be provided in another case before a

different judge.9 Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim fails to state a

claim for which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6); Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755; see also Phillips, 477 F.3d at

1076 (prisoner must seek a remedy that may be awarded). For these

reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Count 4 be DISMISSED.

3. Count 5

In Count 5, Plaintiff alleges that while still housed in

administrative segregation, Defendant McMinn denied Plaintiff legal

copies, which resulted in a denial of meaningful access to the

courts. Compl. at 42. Specifically, he claims that on July 12,

2004, Defendant McMinn denied his request for copies, instead

suggesting that Plaintiff copy his motion by hand. Id. at 43.

Plaintiff subsequently filed his motion in Case No. 04cv0903-DSF(RC)

without serving opposing counsel. Id. The Central District returned

the motion to Plaintiff unfiled due to Plaintiff’s failure to serve

opposing counsel. Id. Plaintiff gave the order and motion to

Defendant McMinn and asked for copies so that he could mail the

motion out by July 22, 2007 (in a second attempt to have it filed).

Id. at 43-44. According to Plaintiff, Defendant McMinn never

returned the motion or copies and refused to take additional papers

to the library for copying because he claimed other inmates were

ahead of Plaintiff in line. Id. at 44-46. Plaintiff states that

the motion ultimately was denied and that this denial is attributable

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to Defendant McMinn’s actions in denying him access to the courts.

Id. at 47. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that

Defendant McMinn impeded his ability to litigate Case No. 04cv0903-

DSF(RC) for two reasons. Id. at 11-12. First, the docket from

04cv0903-DSF(RC) reflects that Plaintiff did succeed in filing his

motion — which was entitled “Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order

to Demand All Legal Material and Legal Books Returned to Inmate or

Order to Show Cause Why” — and it was ruled on immediately. Id. at

11. Specifically, the district court denied the motion, but advised

the warden and corrections officers that Plaintiff was representing

himself in a pending proceeding and required access to writing

materials and the prison law library, as permitted by prison rules.

Id. at 12; RJN, Ex. 9. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendant McMinn fails because Plaintiff’s problems in

obtaining copies were the result of his own failure to follow proper

procedures. Id. Defendants cite to Chief Deputy Warden Oliveros’

response to Plaintiff’s grievance concerning the copies, which

states:

[I]t has been determined that you have not been

following proper procedures in your requests. Proper

procedure dictates that you submit requests for legal

copies through the institutional mail on Inmate

Request forms, during pre-scheduled law library

visits, or submitted on an Inmate Request when the

assigned Legal Officer is delivering other

documentation to your cell. Written request for

legal copies take a minimum of three business days to

process. 

Compl., Ex. C. In light of these issues, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim because Plaintiff’s

problems were attributable to his own actions, not those of Defendant

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McMinn. Defs.’ Mem. at 12.

 In his opposition, Plaintiff reiterates his allegations and

refers back to his Complaint. Pl.’s Opp’n at 14.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that his

alleged inability to access the courts was due to Defendant McMinn’s

improper conduct instead of his own. Plaintiff states that he first

requested copies from Defendant McMinn on July 12, 2004. Compl. at

43. The docket from Case No. 04cv0903-DSF(RC) reflects that the

court received his motion two days later on July 14, 2004. RJN, Ex.

7. Given that under prison procedures, “[w]ritten request for legal

copies take a minimum of three business days to process,” (Compl.,

Ex. C), Plaintiff’s own pleadings demonstrate that his inability to

obtain copies before filing was due to his failure to timely request

them and wait three or more business days for the copies to be

returned. This is reflected in his subsequent complaint that

Defendant McMinn did not return copies on July 22, 2004, of document

that Plaintiff had only provided to him the day before. Compl. at

43-44. A self-inflicted injury attributable to Plaintiff’s own

impatience and disregard for prison procedures cannot constitute the

“actual injury” necessary to state a claim for denial of access to

the courts. See Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076 (denial of access to

courts claim requires showing of what official acts frustrated the

litigation).

Nor does the fact that Plaintiff’s original motion was

rejected by the Central District on discrepancy alone support a

cognizable denial of access claim. As previously noted, the right

of access to the courts is limited to cases where the inmate is able

to demonstrate an “actual injury” to his ability to litigate a case,

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-30- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-53, as shown via a “specific instance in which

an inmate was actually denied access to the courts,” Vandelft, 31

F.3d at 796. While Plaintiff’s motion was rejected for filing on

July 14, 2004, it was accepted two weeks later on July 28, 2004.

RJN, Ex. 7. One day later, the district court ruled on the motion.

Id., Exs. 7 & 9. While the court denied the motion, it did expressly

advise the Warden and corrections officers that Plaintiff needed

access to written materials and the law library. Id., Ex. 9. Thus,

not only did Plaintiff receive the sought after access to the court

(the filing of his motion), he received some relief from the court

(the warning to the prison officials). As such, he fails to allege

a specific instance where he actually was denied access to the court.

Vandelft, 31 F.3d at 796; Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076 (a plaintiff

must show “a lost opportunity to present a legal claim”). 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Count

5 by DISMISSED. 

4. Claims Against Defendants Cota and Stovall

Plaintiff alleges in a general manner on pages 72-74 of his

Complaint that Defendants Cota and Stovall, both of whom apparently

work(ed) in the Appeals Coordinator’s Office, prevented him from

exhausting several of his grievances. Compl. at 72-74. While no

specific count is attached to these claims, Plaintiff also lists in

the declaration accompanying his Complaint that Defendants Cota and

Stovall “refused to process valid appeals, and rejected Plaintiff’s

appeals as untimely.” Cleveland Decl. ¶ 23. 

Defendants argue that any claims against Cota and Stovall

must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Defs.’ Mem. at 19.

More precisely, Defendants submit that a prison official’s

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-31- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

involvement and actions in reviewing and/or investigating a

prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for

liability in a § 1983 action. Id. (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.

2003) and Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)). 

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion, arguing that he was

denied access to the courts when the Appeals Coordinator failed to

process his Citizen’s Complaints and 602 appeals. Pl.’s Opp’n at 21.

“To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege

the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States....” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). However,

“inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific

prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. As the

Eighth Circuit explained under facts similar to those presented here:

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right

only, it does not confer any substantive right upon

the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a

protected liberty interest requiring the procedural

protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment.”

Thus, defendants’ failure to process any of Buckley’s

grievances, without more, is not actionable under

section 1983. (internal citation omitted).

Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495.

In this case, Plaintiff’s claims against Cota and Stovall

stem from their alleged failure to process his complaints and appeals

through the prison’s grievance system. Because Plaintiff does not

have a constitutional right to a prison grievance system, Ramirez,

334 F.3d at 860, or certain treatment within an established one,

Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under

section 1983. West, 487 U.S. at 48.

///

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10 Plaintiff also acknowledges in his Complaint that these complaints

were returned to him with screening forms indicating that they were untimely.

Compl. at 72-74. 

-32- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

Moreover, even if the Court instead views Plaintiff’s claim

through the denial of access to the courts lens, which Plaintiff

presents in his opposition, Plaintiff still fails to state a claim.

As discussed supra, an inmate’s constitution right of access to the

courts, Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821, is limited to cases where the inmate

is able to demonstrate an “actual injury” to his ability to litigate

a nonfrivolous claim, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-53. In his Complaint,

Plaintiff summarizes the appeals that Cota and Stovall allegedly

failed to process properly. Among these, Plaintiff lists his

(1) April 25, 2005 Citizen’s Complaint regarding the May 17, 2004

incident, (2) his February 16, 2005 and August 27, 2005 Citizen’s

Complaints regarding the November 12, 2004 incident, and (3) a

director’s level complaint regarding the August 6, 2004 incident

involving Defendants Graham and Staneff. Compl. at 72-74. This

Court already has determined that all of these complaints are

unexhausted because Plaintiff failed to file them within the fifteen

day time period (as demonstrated by his own handwritten dates on the

complaints and admissions in his pleadings). Thus, any claim based

on Cota and Stovall’s failures to process these untimely claims after

Plaintiff submitted them late would be frivolous.10 Lewis, 518 U.S.

at 353. 

The only other specific complaint Plaintiff lists is a

“602/Citizen’s Complaint” against Defendant Ortiz that he claims to

have submitted on July 29, 2005 and attached at Complaint Exhibit I.

Id. at 74. Upon reviewing the “Citizen’s Complaint” at Exhibit I,

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11 And, of course, the Court once again notes that Defendant Ortiz was

never served.

-33- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

this Court learned that it pertained to Ortiz’s retaliatory actions

on June 7, 2005. Compl., Ex. I. As set forth above, Plaintiff is

not eligible to utilize Citizen’s Complaints and this allegation is

untimely under the prison grievance system because Plaintiff

submitted it more than fifteen days after the incident.11 Thus,

Plaintiff also fails to state a nonfrivolous claim as to this

complaint.

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s claims against Cota and Stovall fail to state claims for

which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);

Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755. For this reason, the Court RECOMMENDS that

these claims be DISMISSED.

C. Claims Against Defendants Who Have Not Been Served

As previously noted, Plaintiff has never served Defendants

Staneff, Avila, Hill, Merto, Ortiz, Graham and Camacho. The Court

recommends that the District Judge sua sponte dismiss the claims

against these Defendants. Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that “[i]f service of the summons and complaint

is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the

complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after

notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Here, more than 120 days have passed since the

summons was issued and USM 285 forms for each unserved Defendant were

returned unexecuted. See Doc. No. 26 (reflecting April 23, 2007 as

being the most recent occurrence of a summons being returned

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12 Defendants discuss only Defendant Moreno because Plaintiff never

served Defendant Avila.

13 This refers to a plan that resulted from Armstrong v. Davis, Case No.

94cv2307 (NDCA), a class action to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act

-34- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

unexecuted). Because Defendants highlighted in their motion to

dismiss which Defendants have not been served and because Defendants

seek dismissal of the Complaint, Plaintiff has been put on notice

that the case may be dismissed against all Defendants. Moreover,

Plaintiff has filed nothing since April 2007 that suggests he has

attempted further service of these Defendants. Accordingly, to the

extent that any claims remain against the unserved Defendants, this

Court RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DISMISS Defendants Staneff,

Avila, Hill, Merto, Ortiz, Graham and Camacho pursuant to Rule 4(m).

D. Qualified Immunity

In what sequentially would be Count 11, Plaintiff claims that

Defendants Avila and Moreno violated his Eighth Amendment rights and

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by refusing to allow him

to wear his medically-prescribed orthopedic shoes while in

administrative segregation. Compl. at 65-71, 80. Without these

shoes, Plaintiff suffers pain when walking and, therefore, was unable

to exercise outdoors during his term in administrative segregation.

Id. 

Defendants argue that Defendant Moreno12 is entitled to

qualified immunity on this count because Moreno simply was enforcing

prison rules, which prohibit inmates in administrative segregation

from wearing hard shoes with steel components. Defs.’ Mem. at 16.

More precisely, Defendants assert that Moreno’s actions were in

conformity with the Armstrong remedial plan13, Section I.22, which

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28 in California prisons. Defs.’ Mem. at 18, n.12.

-35- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

provides: “[h]ealth care appliances, as defined in CCR, Title 15,

Section 3358, shall be taken away from an inmate in ASU, SHU or other

disciplinary detention units only to ensure the safety of persons,

the security of the institution, or to assist in an investigation...”

Id. at 18. Defendants cite to the third level response to

Plaintiff’s administrative appeal of this claim (log no. 03-366), as

evidence that Plaintiff was made aware of this administrative

segregation policy prohibiting hard shoes, like Plaintiff’s, because

they pose a security hazard. Id. (citing Compl., Ex. H).

In his opposition, Plaintiff claims that his orthopedic shoes

did not have steel components. Pl.’s Opp’n at 18. 

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing

discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless their

conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987). “Qualified immunity is ‘an

entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of

litigation.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). This privilege is

“an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and

like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is

erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. at 200-01 (quoting

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). Thus, the Supreme Court “repeatedly

[has] stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the

earliest possible stage in litigation.” Id. at 201 (quoting Hunter

v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). 

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14 Plaintiff has presented no evidence that his ADA claim rises to the

level of a constitutional violation and this Court declines at this time to find

that ADA violations are synonymous with constitutional violations. In fact, in

distinguishing ADA violations from constitutional claims related to denial of

access to the courts, the Ninth Circuit specifically referred to prisoner ADA

claims as seeking to enforce “a statutorily-protected interest in equal access

with other prisoners” (emphasis in original). Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849,

-36- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

In Saucier, the Supreme Court established a two-step inquiry

for determining whether an official is entitled to qualified

immunity. Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007); Saucier, 533

U.S. at 201; Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007).

“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must

consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged

show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This

must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “If no

constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning

qualified immunity.” Id. Only if a constitutional violation could

be found should the court move on to the second step and consider

whether the right was clearly established such that “it would be

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. If an officer makes a

reasonable mistake as to what the law requires — i.e. the right is

not clearly established — the officer is entitled to immunity. Id.

at 202-03. 

The Court must first consider then whether, taken in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts alleged show that

Defendants Avila and Moreno’s conduct violated the Eighth Amendment14.

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28 880 (9th Cir. 2001).

-37- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. As Defendants appear to concede by

skipping over this threshold question and arguing the second prong

of the Saucier test, Plaintiff’s allegations may be sufficient to

show that the correctional officers violated Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights by depriving him of his medically-prescribed shoes

and, thereby, depriving him of outdoor exercise for a prolonged

period of time. The Ninth Circuit has long held that “a deprival of

outdoor exercise to prisoners incarcerated for long periods and under

highly restrictive conditions of confinement constitute[s] cruel and

unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. Allen v. City &

County of Honolulu, 39 F.3d 936, 938-939 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing

Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979)). Here, Plaintiff

claims to have been detained in administrative segregation without

his shoes from May 17, 2004 through July 25, 2005. Compl. at 68.

The Allen court found a constitutional deprivation sufficient to

overcome a claim of qualified immunity where the prisoner had been

detained in disciplinary segregation for only four months. Allen,

39 F.3d at 939. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has plead

sufficient facts to allege a constitutional violation. Saucier, 533

U.S. at 201.

The next question then is whether the right was clearly

established such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at

202. Defendants argue that it was not sufficiently clear to Moreno

that he was violating Plaintiff’s rights because Moreno simply was

enforcing a prison regulation enacted in conformity with the

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Armstrong remedial plan. Defs.’ Mem. at 18. Defendants cite to

Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999) for the

Ninth Circuit precedent establishing that “when a public official

acts in reliance on a duly enacted statute or ordinance, that

official ordinarily is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 18.

Though Defendants have correctly cited the conclusion of the Dittman

court, the Dittman case is inapplicable to the instant situation

because Dittman addressed only statutes and ordinances, not prison

policies. “Such a policy, of course, could not make reasonable a

belief that was contrary to a decided body of case law.” Wilson v.

Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). Only if the applicable case law was

unclear or undeveloped would it be appropriate for the Court to find

qualified immunity shielded an officer who reasonably relied upon a

formal prison policy. See id.

On the facts currently before this Court, the Court finds

that Moreno is not entitled to qualified immunity. It has been

clearly-established in this Circuit since at least 1979 that “a

deprival of outdoor exercise to prisoners incarcerated for long

periods and under highly restrictive conditions of confinement

constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth

Amendment. Allen, 39 F.3d at 938-939. 

Furthermore, from the limited evidence presented by

Defendants, it does not appear that Moreno in fact acted in

conformance with the Armstrong remedial plan. While it appears that

Defendants quoted from the 2001 revision of the plan, they have not

provided the Court with a full copy of any version of the Armstrong

remedial plan. However, according to the original remedial plan

filed in Armstrong v. Davis on November 30, 1998 (Case No. 94cv2307,

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-39- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

Doc. No. 337), removal of health care appliances is strictly limited

as follows:

a) Health care appliances, as defined in CCR

Section 3358, shall be taken away from an inmate

in ASU, SHU or other disciplinary detention

units only to ensure the safety of persons, the

security of the institution, or to assist in an

investigation (which may include collecting the

appliance as evidence of a crime) and only when

supported by documented evidence. No inmate

will be deprived of his or her appliance because

of the acts of another inmate.

b) If the health care appliance presents a direct

and immediate threat to safety and security, the

appliance may be taken away immediately by any

custody staff. The senior custody officer on

duty may temporarily authorize the taking away

of an inmate’s appliance for any of the reasons

listed in the foregoing paragraph; however, the

process described below must be followed as soon

as possible, at least by the next business day,

if the appliance is to be retained. In no event

shall the procedures set out herein obstruct

standard protocols for crime scene preservation,

evidence collection, emergency response or any

other measure necessary for the safety of

persons and security of the institution.

c) When a health care appliance is taken away from

an inmate in special housing for reasons of

safety and security, the senior custody officer

in charge shall consult the Health Care Manager,

Chief Medical Officer or designee, regarding the

inmate’s need for the appliance and reasonable

alternative in-cell accommodations. The senior

officer in charge shall then inform the Warden

or designee of the incident and the alternative

means to accommodate the inmate. The Warden or

designee shall decide what course to take

regarding depriving the inmate of the appliance

and providing alternative in-cell accommodation.

If the decision is to retain the appliance, it

will be stored in a designated location in the

unit and provided to the inmate if needed when

released from his or her cell for yard, escorts,

visits, etc. Medical staff shall evaluate the

inmate’s ability to function without the

appliance, as appropriate. 

(emphasis added) Case No. 94cv2307, Doc. No. 337, § H.20. Nothing

in the record before this Court demonstrates that Moreno followed

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15 The record before the Court also does not allow the Court to

determine whether or not Plaintiff’s shoes did, in fact, contain metal or whether

the presence or absence of removable metal in the shoe would alter the analysis

as to whether Moreno complied with the Armstrong remedial plan.

-40- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

proper procedure in retaining Plaintiff’s medically-prescribed shoes

for over fourteen months and failing to provide them to Plaintiff

when he was released into the yard for exercise.15 Plaintiff attached

numerous passes and medical authorization forms to his Complaint,

which demonstrate that he required the shoes and had permission to

use them (see Compl., Ex. H) and Defendants have provided no contrary

evidence. Moreover, Defendants state in a wholly conclusory manner

without any evidentiary support that “Plaintiff was advised that if

he needed any help walking in the Administrative Segregation Unit,

staff were available for assistance.” Defs.’ Mem. at 18. Absent

some support for Defendants’ claims, Defendants fail to demonstrate

that the law was not clearly-established, that Moreno acted

reasonably and that, therefore, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DENY

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Defendant Moreno. 

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

the District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation, (2) denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendant Moreno, and (3) granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the

remaining Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no

later than December 27, 2007. The document should be captioned

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-41- 06cv1578-WQH (BLM) 

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 18, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: December 4, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

 

 

COPY TO:

HONORABLE WILLIAM Q. HAYES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL AND PARTIES

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