Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_04-cv-02274/USCOURTS-alnd-4_04-cv-02274-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

DONNIE ARRINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHASE JENKINS, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

04-AR-2274-M

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before this court are the motions for summary judgment of

defendants, Chase Jenkins (“Jenkins”), Charles Clifton

(“Clifton”) and Alex Hudson (“Hudson”). Plaintiff, Donnie

Arrington (“Arrington”), alleges false arrest, false

imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conversion against all

three defendants. He also alleges excessive force under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and assault and battery against Jenkins and Hudson. 

For the reasons that follow, summary judgment will be denied. 

Analysis 

In its memorandum opinion of May 15, 2005, denying Jenkins’

previous motion for summary judgment, this court held as follows: 

Genuine issues of material fact exist precluding an entry of

summary judgment for Jenkins on the § 1983 excessive force

claim, or on the state law claims of assault and battery,

false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and

conversion. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to Arrington, the evidence demonstrates that Jenkins

physically overtook, battered, and arrested Arrington

without a subjectively or objectively reasonable basis for

FILED

 2005 Dec-14 AM 11:50

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:04-cv-02274-WMA Document 74 Filed 12/14/05 Page 1 of 3
his actions. There is a genuine issue as to whether Jenkins

actually thought Arrington’s camera was a gun with a laser

sight. Jenkins and his fellow officers testify that they

believed the camera was a gun, but an equally plausible

explanation, also supported by the evidence, is that Jenkins

and the other officers were angered by Arrington’s lawful

return to the general area of the search and by his taking

pictures, and decided to do something about it. Jenkins

cannot be heard to argue that anger alone constitutes a

reasonable basis for an arrest or for an accompanying use of

force. Jenkins’ argument that he is due peace officer

immunity under Alabama law is not viable under summary

judgment because, based on the evidence, a jury could

conclude that Jenkins acted in a way that abrogates such

immunity.

Despite additional discovery and briefing, these genuine issues

of fact persist today. Their existence is material to the claims

against Hudson and Clifton as well as to the claims against

Jenkins. 

The only substantial argument added by Hudson and Clifton is

the qualified immunity defense to Arrington’s § 1983 claim. 

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, “governmental officials

performing discretionary function[s] generally are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). With respect to Fourth

Amendment qualified immunity claims, a law is “clearly

established” if a “reasonably well-trained officer” with a

“reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits” would know that

the law prohibits the conduct in question. Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335 (1986). Whether a use of force is excessive under the

Case 4:04-cv-02274-WMA Document 74 Filed 12/14/05 Page 2 of 3
Fourth Amendment “must be judged on a case-by-case basis ‘from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Post v. City of Ft.

Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989)),

modified, 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994). 

The facts in this case, when taken in the light most

favorable to Arrington, support a finding that Arrington was

arrested using excessive force and without probable cause. Any

reasonably knowledgeable police officer knows that an arrest made

under these circumstances is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 

In particular, a jury could find that no reasonable officer on

the scene could have concluded that the camera was a gun and,

thus, that Hudson and Clifton are not entitled to qualified

immunity. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment

will be denied by separate order. 

DONE this 14 day of December, 2005. th

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:04-cv-02274-WMA Document 74 Filed 12/14/05 Page 3 of 3