Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01846/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01846-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HEDWIG LISMONT,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION, 

ALEXANDER BINZEL SCHWEISSTECHNIK GMBH 

& CO. KG, IBG INDUSTRIE-BETEILIGUNGS-GMBH 

& CO. KG, RICHARD SATTLER,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1846

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia in No. 2:12-cv-00592-MSDLRL, Judge Mark S. Davis.

______________________ 

Decided: February 16, 2016 

______________________ 

 FRANK PORCELLI, Fish & Richardson, P.C., Boston, 

MA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

 DOUGLAS A. DOZEMAN, Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, 

Grand Rapids, MI, argued for defendants-appellees. Also 

represented by AMANDA M. FIELDER. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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2 LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal arises from an inventorship dispute between Hedwig Lismont (Mr. Lismont) and Alexander 

Binzel Schweisstechnik GmbH & Co. KG (BinzelGermany), Abicor Unternehmensverwaltungs GmbH 

(Abicor), IBG Industrie-Beteiligungs-GmbH & Co. KG 

(IBG), Richard Sattler (Mr. Sattler), and Alexander Binzel 

Corporation (Binzel-USA) (collectively, Appellees). The 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, concluding that Mr. Lismont’s inventorship claim, 

which he filed ten years after the patent issued, was 

barred by laches. See Lismont v. Alexander Binzel Corp., 

No. 2:12-cv-592, 2014 WL 4181586 (E.D. Va. Aug. 20, 

2014). Because we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the presumption of laches applies against Mr. 

Lismont’s claim and that he failed to rebut that presumption, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Lismont is a resident and citizen of Belgium. 

Binzel-Germany1 is a German company that manufactures welding equipment, including welding contact tips 

for use in metal inert gas welding. Binzel-Germany is the 

owner of German Patent No. 197 37 934 (DE ’934 patent)

filed on August 30, 1997, which serves as the priority 

document for a PCT application filed in 1998. BinzelGermany also owns the patent at the heart of this dispute, United States Patent No. 6,429,406 (the ’406 patent), entitled “contact tip.” The ’406 patent, which issued 

in 2002 to Mr. Sattler, claims priority to the 1998 PCT 

application. The claims of the ’406 patent are generally 

 

1 Binzel-Germany is affiliated with Abicor and is 

wholly owned by IBG. Binzel-USA is a wholly owned 

subsidiary of Abicor and IBG. 

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LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION 3

directed to a method of manufacturing a contact tip for 

use in metal inert gas welding. The ’406 patent explains 

that this process is more cost-effective than prior art 

methods. 

Mr. Lismont asserts that, beginning in 1995, he developed the method of manufacturing contact tips disclosed in both the DE ’934 patent and the ’406 patent in 

response to Binzel-Germany’s request for assistance in 

developing a lower-cost manufacturing process. Mr. 

Lismont further alleges that by mid-1997, he had fully 

developed his proposed manufacturing process and disclosed the details of the process to Binzel-Germany. Mr. 

Lismont also contends that, despite numerous representations from Binzel-Germany that he was the first to conceive of this method, Binzel-Germany filed the DE ’934 

patent application naming Mr. Sattler, a Binzel-Germany 

employee, as the inventor, rather than Mr. Lismont. 

Binzel-Germany filed its patent application on August 30, 

1997, and one year later, on August 13, 1998, BinzelGermany filed PCT Application No. PCT/EP98/05138 

covering the same method of manufacturing contact tips. 

As with the DE ’934 patent application, Binzel-Germany 

did not identify Mr. Lismont as an inventor on its PCT 

Application. This PCT Application resulted in issued 

patents in numerous countries, including the ’406 patent

in the United States. 

On October 13, 2000, two years after the DE ’934 patent issued, Mr. Lismont initiated litigation against 

Binzel-Germany in the German Regional Federal Court in 

Frankfurt, Germany (First German Litigation). In this 

litigation, Lismont maintained that he was the sole 

inventor of the subject matter disclosed in the DE ’934 

patent and therefore sought to change inventorship on the 

German patent. 

In addition, on June 24, 2002, Mr. Lismont’s attorneys 

sent a letter to the named inventor of the DE ’934 patent, 

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4 LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION

Mr. Sattler, demanding damages for his purportedly false 

declarations of inventorship. The letter noted that BinzelGermany had filed a patent application in the United 

States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and explained 

that, if Mr. Lismont did not receive compensation for his 

contribution toward inventing the claimed method, he 

would be “extensively assessing and pursuing your conduct and actions from every legal perspective.” Joint 

Appendix (J.A.) 1554.2 The letter further stated that if 

Binzel-Germany did not respond by July 5, 2002, Mr. 

Lismont would “initiate the necessary legal steps without 

further notice.” Id. Neither Mr. Sattler nor BinzelGermany responded. Accordingly, in December 2002, Mr. 

Lismont filed a second action in Germany (Second German Litigation) against Binzel-Germany, Abicor, and Mr. 

Sattler, seeking damages related to his inventorship 

claim. The complaint in the Second German Litigation 

also sought information about the countries in which 

Binzel-Germany was pursuing patents and information 

about the manufacture and sales of contact tips that used 

the method disclosed in the DE ’934 patent. 

Ultimately, the German courts ruled against Mr. 

Lismont in both cases for essentially the same reasons: 

that he failed to prove that he had an inventorship interest in the DE ’934 patent. Specifically, on December 18, 

2008, the German court concluded that Mr. Lismont had 

not proven that he was either the sole inventor or a joint 

inventor of the inventive process disclosed in the DE ’934 

patent. Mr. Lismont appealed this decision to the German Supreme Court, which rejected his appeal on November 25, 2009. After losing his inventorship claim and 

 

2 The record before us contains numerous English 

translations of documents from the German litigations. 

Neither party has challenged the accuracy of these translations.

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LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION 5

his related claim for damages, Mr. Lismont also filed 

actions in the German Federal Constitutional Court and 

in the European Court of Human Rights. These two cases 

were not appeals from the German Supreme Court’s 

rejection of his appeal, but were separate actions claiming 

that the earlier proceedings amounted to a denial of basic 

due process in violation of his constitutional or human 

rights, respectively. 

On October 31, 2012, twelve years after Mr. Lismont 

initiated the First German Litigation, he initiated the 

underlying litigation seeking, among other things, to 

correct inventorship of the ’406 patent under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 256(a). After the parties engaged in discovery tailored 

to the issue of laches, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Mr. Lismont’s inventorship 

claim was barred by laches. The district court agreed and 

entered judgment in favor of Appellees. Mr. Lismont filed 

a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

“Laches is an equitable defense that may bar an inventorship claim.” Serdarevic v. Advanced Med. Optics., 

Inc., 532 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008). To prevail on a 

defense of laches, a defendant must establish that (1) the 

plaintiff’s delay in filing a suit was “unreasonable and 

inexcusable”; and (2) the defendant suffered “material 

prejudice attributable to the delay.” A.C. Aukerman v. 

R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 

1992) (en banc); see also SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. 

First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1317 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015) (en banc). Further, a rebuttable presumption 

of laches attaches whenever more than six years passes 

from the time a purportedly omitted inventor knew or 

should have known of the issuance of the relevant patent. 

Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., 

Inc., 988 F.2d 1157, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Serdarevic, 532 

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6 LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION

F.3d at 1358. This presumption of laches may be rebutted 

if the plaintiff “offer[s] evidence to show an excuse for the 

delay or that the delay was reasonable” or by offering 

“evidence sufficient to place the matters of defense prejudice and economic prejudice genuinely in issue.” Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038. 

Here, the district court concluded at the summary 

judgment stage that Mr. Lismont’s inventorship claim 

was barred by laches. We review the grant of summary 

judgment under the law of the regional circuit. Charles 

Mach. Works, Inc. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 723 F.3d 1376, 

1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit generally

reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. 

See Myers v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The issue of laches, however, “is committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court.” Aukerman, 960 

F.2d at 1032. Because the factors underlying a laches 

determination—unreasonable delay and prejudice—are 

factual in nature, genuine issues of material fact as to 

these factors will preclude summary judgment in favor of 

the defendant. For this reason, “[w]hen reviewing a 

laches decision rendered on summary judgment, this 

court reviews for an abuse of discretion unless genuine 

issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.” PeiHerng Hor v. Ching-Wu Chu, 699 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012). 

If the presumption of laches attaches, a plaintiff may 

defeat summary judgment by “rais[ing] a genuine dispute 

as to either delay or prejudice.” Hemstreet v. Comput. 

Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If 

the plaintiff makes such a showing, the presumption 

dissolves and the defendant is then “put to its proof on 

both factors” and “must affirmatively prove 

(1) unreasonable and inexcusable delay and (2) prejudice 

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LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION 7

resulting from that delay.” Id. If, however, we agree with 

the district court that there are no genuine issues of 

material fact, we may set aside the imposition of laches if 

“the decision rests on an erroneous interpretation of the 

law or on clearly erroneous factual underpinnings.” 

Serdarevic, 532 F.3d at 1358; see also Ray Commc’ns, Inc. 

v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 673 F.3d 294, 299 (4th 

Cir. 2012) (“The court has abused its discretion if its 

decision is guided by erroneous legal principles or rests 

upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

On appeal, Mr. Lismont first asserts that the district 

court should not have applied the laches presumption 

against his inventorship claim. Alternatively, Mr. Lismont seems to argue that his litigation in the German 

and European courts served as notice to Binzel-Germany 

that an inventorship suit in the United States was likely 

forthcoming and thus was sufficient to excuse his delay 

and rebut the presumption of laches. We address each 

argument in turn.

I. Presumption of Laches

The district court found, based on a statement made 

by Mr. Lismont to the German court, that Mr. Lismont 

undisputedly knew by February 12, 2001, that BinzelGermany and/or Mr. Sattler had already filed the application that eventually issued as the ’406 patent. Because 

Mr. Lismont knew of the application before the ’406 

patent issued, the district court concluded that the laches 

clock started to run when the ’406 patent issued on August 6, 2002. See Pei-Herng Hor, 699 F.3d at 1335 (“[T]he 

laches clock [can]not start to run—at the earliest—until 

the patent issue[s].”). More than ten years later, on 

October 31, 2012, Mr. Lismont initiated the present 

action. Given that this delay exceeded six years, the 

district court found that the rebuttable presumption of 

laches attached. Serdarevic, 532 F.3d at 1358 (“‘A delay 

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8 LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION

of more than six years after the omitted inventor knew or 

should have known of the issuance of the patent will 

produce a rebuttable presumption of laches.’” (quoting 

Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 988 F.2d at 1163)).

Mr. Lismont argues that he did not delay in initiating 

the underlying action because he had been diligently 

seeking to vindicate his inventorship rights in German 

and European courts. Mr. Lismont further asserts that 

he specifically sought resolution of the ’406 patent inventorship issue in the Second German Litigation when he 

requested “worldwide damages, including in the U.S., and 

a worldwide declaration of liability, including in the U.S.” 

Appellant Br. 25. Thus, according to Mr. Lismont, the 

parties have been litigating inventorship of the ’406 

patent in Germany since he filed the Second German 

Litigation in 2002 and the presumption of laches is therefore inappropriate. 

We disagree. The relevant inquiry for the laches presumption is whether more than six years passed between 

the time when the inventor knew or should have known of 

the subject patent and the time the inventor initiated 

litigation. See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1034. As the 

district court correctly recognized, Mr. Lismont was aware 

that Binzel-Germany had filed a U.S. patent application 

covering the manufacturing method he allegedly invented

before the ’406 patent issued. Accordingly, to avoid the

imposition of the rebuttable laches presumption, Mr. 

Lismont should have filed his United States inventorship

litigation within six years of August 6, 2002, the date on 

which the patent issued. Because it is undisputed that he 

waited more than ten years from that date to initiate this 

litigation, the district court correctly found that the 

presumption of laches attached.

As to Mr. Lismont’s contention that he was attempting to correct the inventorship of the ’406 patent in his 

foreign litigation, he has not pointed to any allegations in 

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LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION 9

his German or European litigations in which he sought to 

correct the inventorship of the ’406 patent.3 In his complaint in the Second German Litigation, Mr. Lismont 

requested that Binzel-Germany “issue the plaintiff information, when and where the protected invention specified

. . . was also registered and if applicable where it was 

published or rather issued, as well as to provide the 

plaintiff information about the respective current process 

status.” J.A. 694. In addition, the complaint seeks “a

rendering of accounts regarding the scope of the preceding 

and committed acts and . . . a description of the quantity 

of the goods manufactured, as well as the individual 

deliveries by designating the delivery quantity, delivery 

price, and the names and addresses of the recipients.” Id. 

Finally, the complaint asks the German court “[t]o determine that the defendants are obligated as joint debtors to 

make up for all losses incurred by the plaintiff, which 

were committed against him through the acts [alleged in 

the complaint] and the losses that will be incurred in the 

future.” Id. Based on these statements in the complaint, 

a fact-finder could conclude that Mr. Lismont was seeking 

compensation for worldwide damages, but there is noth-

 

3 This argument is based on the questionable assumption that, even if properly presented, the German 

court could or would resolve the issue of inventorship on 

the ’406 patent such that no litigation in the United 

States would be necessary. Mr. Lismont has not pointed 

to any authority supporting the proposition that a German court may declare rights under a United States 

patent. In fact, Mr. Lismont’s attorney acknowledged at 

oral argument that even if the German courts had discussed inventorship of the ’406 patent, an action in the 

United States would have nevertheless been necessary to 

correct inventorship on the ’406 patent. See Oral Argument at 4:26–4:48 available at http://oralarguments.

cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl+2014-1846.mp3. 

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10 LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION

ing in the complaint indicating that he was also asking 

the German court to correct the inventorship on the ’406 

patent as provided by 35 U.S.C. § 256. 

For these reasons, Mr. Lismont’s argument that he 

was continuously litigating the issue of inventorship of 

the Binzel-Germany’s United States patent fails. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion that a 

presumption of laches was appropriate in this case.

II. Rebutting the Presumption

Although Mr. Lismont’s litigation abroad may not be 

used to avoid a presumption of laches, it may help to 

rebut that presumption. Serdarevic, 532 F.3d at 1359–60 

(holding that one option for overcoming the presumption

of laches is to rebut it with “evidence to show an excuse 

for the delay or that the delay was reasonable”).4 We 

have previously recognized that “[a] patent owner may 

avoid the consequences of what would otherwise be an 

unreasonable delay in filing suit by establishing that he 

or she was engaged in ‘other litigation.’” Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 

870, 876–77 (Fed. Cir. 1991). We have also recognized 

that it is not an abuse of discretion to consider litigation 

 

4 In addition to deciding that Mr. Lismont could not 

prove that his delay was either reasonable or excusable, 

the district court also concluded that Mr. Lismont had 

failed to rebut the presumption by showing the existence 

of a genuine issue as to prejudice. Mr. Lismont does not, 

however, raise this as a ground for reversal in his opening 

brief. To the extent his reply brief can be construed as 

objecting to the district court’s conclusions on the prejudice factor, this argument is waived. See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed. Cir. 

1990) (“[A]n issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief . . . is waived.”).

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LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION 11

in fora outside the United States when determining 

excusable delay. See Mainland Indus., Inc. v. Standal’s 

Patents Ltd., 799 F.2d 746, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (overruled 

on other grounds by A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038–39)

(“[W]e are unwilling to say as a matter of law that litigation in non-United States forums cannot be considered in 

determining excusable delay . . . .”); see also 6A Donald S. 

Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 19.05[2][b][i] (Matthew 

Bender) (recognizing that proceedings including “court 

action in a foreign country concerning the same invention 

and similar issues of fact and law” could be used to excuse 

delay, “subject to the notice requirement applied to litigation”). 

For other litigation to excuse a plaintiff’s delay, however, the defendant must have adequate notice of the 

other proceedings as well as plaintiff’s intention to pursue 

its patent rights upon completion of the other proceedings. Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 877. “What is important is 

whether [the defendant] had reason to believe it was 

likely to be sued.” Id. at 878. For example, in Vaupel, we 

found that a plaintiff’s delay in filing suit could be excused by its engagement in reissue proceedings in which 

the defendant participated so long as “the evidence as a 

whole show[ed] that the accused infringer was in fear of 

suit.” Id. Specifically, the evidence in Vaupel supported 

the conclusion that the infringer was in fear of suit based 

on (i) a letter sent by the plaintiff to the defendant declaring that it would “protect its [U.S. patent] and look after 

our rights” and requesting discussions with the defendant 

before “plunging into court proceedings”; (ii) a letter sent 

by the defendant to the PTO during the reissue proceedings acknowledging the “continued threats of infringement”; and (iii) a letter sent by the defendant to the 

plaintiff during the same time period threatening a declaratory judgment action. Id. We thus found that the 

defendant was sufficiently aware of the threat of litigation 

upon completion of the reissue proceedings. Id.

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Although the “other litigation” excuse is typically invoked when a plaintiff is serially asserting its patents 

against different defendants, in circumstances like those 

presented in this case, the defendant in the foreign litigation must likewise receive adequate notice that the plaintiff intends to later pursue its rights under United States 

patents after termination of the proceedings in the foreign 

jurisdiction. We agree with the district court that the 

mere initiation of patent litigation in a foreign jurisdiction 

and the existence of United States patents are not sufficient to notify a defendant that the plaintiff will eventually seek to assert its patent rights in the United States. 

Mr. Lismont points to three possible sources of the 

requisite notice.5 Mr. Lismont first points to a document 

filed in the First German Litigation in which he stated 

that “the witness Sattler has applied for the patent that is 

in dispute here in the Unite[d] States in his own name as 

inventor” and then stated that an “extension of claim 

according to § 263 ZPO is therefore expressly reserved.” 

J.A. 1556. Mr. Lismont contends that this statement 

notified Binzel-Germany that he was reserving his right 

to assert correction of inventorship on the ’406 patent. 

Mr. Lismont is incorrect. “ZPO” refers to the German 

Code of Civil Procedure and section 263 of the German 

Code of Civil Procedure permits amendments to pleadings 

 

5 On appeal, Mr. Lismont does not maintain his argument that his delay should be excused because of the 

parties’ settlement negotiations between July and September 2012. Even if he had, however, the district court 

was correct to conclude that “a tolling of the laches period 

for three months [during these settlement negotiations] 

would make little difference . . . , as the overall time 

between the issuance of the U.S. patent and the filing of 

Plaintiff’s action . . . amounts to nearly a decade.” Lismont, 2014 WL 4181586, at *8. 

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LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION 13

pending in a German civil action. Thus, Mr. Lismont’s 

reference to “§ 263 ZPO” reserves only his right to “extend” his German claim in front of the German court. 

Nothing in this statement could lead a reasonable factfinder to infer that Mr. Lismont communicated his intent 

to pursue a separate inventorship claim in a United 

States court. 

Next, Mr. Lismont relies on the June 2002 Letter to 

Mr. Sattler. In this letter, he (i) noted the filing of a U.S. 

patent application naming Mr. Sattler as the inventor; 

(ii) advised that Mr. Lismont would “carefully examine 

and prosecute your conduct and actions in all legal respects”; and (iii) notified Mr. Sattler that failure to pay 

damages would result in the initiation of “appropriate 

legal action with no further notification.” J.A. 1396–97. 

Again, this communication lacks any indication that Mr. 

Lismont intended to commence legal proceedings to 

correct inventorship in the United States.6 In fact, approximately six months after sending the letter, Mr. 

Lismont followed through on his threat to pursue further 

legal action by filing the Second German Litigation in 

December 2002. Mr. Lismont has not pointed to anything 

in the record from which a fact-finder could conclude that 

Binzel-Germany expected further litigation after completion of the Second German Litigation, especially not in a 

forum other than Germany. 

Mr. Lismont’s request in Germany for “worldwide 

damages” does not alter this conclusion. There are no 

assertions in the complaint filed in the Second German 

Litigation indicating that Mr. Lismont was pursuing the 

issue of inventorship as to the ’406 patent. More im-

 

6 It is also worth noting, at the time of this letter, 

the ’406 patent had not yet issued. Thus, at the time this 

letter was sent, there was not yet a United States patent 

to be litigated. 

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14 LISMONT v. ALEXANDER BINZEL CORPORATION

portantly, there are no assertions in the complaint that 

could serve to notify Binzel-Germany that this issue 

would eventually be litigated in the United States if left 

unresolved upon conclusion of the litigation abroad.

Thus, because the plaintiff did not provide any notice 

to the defendants in a foreign patent dispute that it would 

pursue litigation in the courts of the United States 

against the same defendants upon termination of the 

foreign litigation, it is not an abuse of discretion to find 

that laches bars the later claim.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court 

correctly imposed the presumption of laches and properly 

determined that Mr. Lismont had not presented any 

genuine issues sufficient to rebut the presumption. We 

therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it held Mr. Lismont’s claim barred by 

laches.7

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs.

 

7 In his reply brief, Mr. Lismont requested that we 

strike the portions of Appellees’ brief discussing collateral 

estoppel. Because our decision does not turn on these 

contents, we deny Mr. Lismont’s motion as moot.

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