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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 25, 2003 Decided March 28, 2003

No. 02-7035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. JOSEPH T. SIEWICK,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMIESON SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cv00045)

Joseph J. Aronica argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Robert B. Norris and David T.

Fischer.

William H. Carroll argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief was Mitchell I. Batt.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-7035 Document #740805 Filed: 03/28/2003 Page 1 of 5
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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge; SENTELLE and RANDOLPH,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: This appeal from an order of the

district court, Oberdorfer, J., granting summary judgment

raises the question whether a corporate shareholder and

director may be considered the ‘‘employer’’ of a corporate

employee within the meaning of the False Claims Act, 31

U.S.C. § 3730(h).

From May 1990 to December 1991, Dr. Joseph T. Siewick

worked as a physicist for Jamieson Science and Engineering,

Inc. (JSE), a Maryland corporation engaged in contract work

for the Department of Defense’s Strategic Defense Initiative

Organization and its successor, the Ballistic Missile Defense

Organization. Dr. John A. Jamieson, who supervised Dr.

Siewick, owned 85 percent of the shares of the company,

served as the president and chairman of the board of directors, ran day-to-day operations, set salaries, and made

hiring and firing decisions. On November 11, 1991, Dr.

Siewick received a 30–day notice of termination after he

questioned Dr. Jamieson and Vincent O’Connor, one of JSE’s

officers, about what Dr. Siewick believed to be improper

billing practices. The following January, Dr. Siewick filed a

complaint under the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–

3733.1

 One of the claims, and the only one relevant to this

appeal, was that JSE, O’Connor, and Dr. Jamieson2

 violated

§ 3730(h) by discharging Dr. Siewick for his inquiries into

JSE’s billing practices.

On April 16, 2001, Dr. Jamieson and O’Connor moved to

dismiss, arguing that neither of them was an ‘‘employer’’

within the meaning of § 3730(h). The district court granted

1 Several of his claims were dismissed on summary judgment in

1998. See United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g,

214 F.3d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

2 Jamieson’s Estate was substituted as a defendant on January

6, 2000. For consistency we refer to the defendant as Dr. Jamieson.

USCA Case #02-7035 Document #740805 Filed: 03/28/2003 Page 2 of 5
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the motion with respect to O’Connor but denied it with

respect to Dr. Jamieson, concluding that an additional factual

inquiry was necessary to determine if Dr. Siewick and Dr.

Jamieson had an employment relationship. After discovery,

Dr. Jamieson moved for summary judgment, which the court

denied on the ground that there were unresolved facts relating to whether Dr. Jamieson was Dr. Siewick’s employer.

Dr. Jamieson moved for reconsideration in light of our intervening opinion in Yesudian ex rel. United States v. Howard

Univ., 270 F.3d 969 (D.C. Cir. 2001). On reconsideration the

district court granted summary judgment, holding that under

Yesudian whether Dr. Jamieson was Dr. Siewick’s employer

was a legal question, and that, as a matter of law, Dr.

Jamieson was not Dr. Siewick’s employer. See United States

ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, 191 F. Supp. 2d 17

(2002). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),

the district court certified the dismissal of the wrongful

termination claim as final. Dr. Siewick then filed this appeal.

A district court may grant summary judgment when there

is ‘‘no genuine issue of material fact and TTT the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’’ FED R. CIV. P.

56(c). The applicable law here is the whistleblower section of

the False Claims Act: an ‘‘employee who is discharged TTT by

his TTT employer because of lawful acts done by the employee

on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an

action under this section TTT shall be entitled to all relief

necessary to make the employee whole.’’ 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(h). We have interpreted this section to impose liability only upon employers. See Yesudian, 270 F.3d at 972.

Dr. Siewick’s primary argument is that whether Dr. Jamieson was Dr. Siewick’s employer is a factual issue, which, until

resolved, precludes a grant of summary judgment. Our

precedents are otherwise. The existence of an employment

relationship is a question of law, not of fact; it calls for a legal

conclusion. See Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1536

n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. Meyer v. Holley, 123 S. Ct. 824, 829

(2003). Our decision in Yesudian did not hold differently.

The case was on appeal from a district court’s judgment

setting aside a verdict imposing § 3730(h) liability upon a

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supervisor at Howard University. This court affirmed,

agreeing that as a matter of law a supervisor was not an

‘‘employer’’ as used in § 3730(h). See Yesudian, 270 F.3d at

972.

Dr. Siewick, while acknowledging that JSE was his employer, maintains that Dr. Jamieson was also his employer in light

of Dr. Jamieson’s majority ownership of JSE and his control

of JSE’s operations. The False Claims Act does not define

the term ‘‘employer.’’ In the absence of explicit statutory

language to the contrary, we therefore infer that Congress

intended ‘‘employer’’ in § 3730(h) to have its ordinary, common law meaning. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529,

534 (1993); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.

318, 322–23 (1992). Dr. Siewick thinks a Senate Report on

the provision supports another meaning of ‘‘employer.’’ The

Report stated that ‘‘[a]s is the rule under other Federal

whistleblower statutes as well as discrimination laws, the

definition[ ] of TTT ‘employer’ should be all-inclusive.’’ S. REP.

NO. 99–345, at 34 (1986). Inclusive of what? As far as we

can tell, the Report signified only that both public and private

entities should be considered employers under § 3730(h).

Dr. Siewick cites nothing suggesting that the term ‘‘employer’’ as used in discrimination laws or in other whistleblower

statutes means something different than what it meant at

common law, and the precedents are to the contrary. See,

e.g., Coupar v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 105 F.3d 1263, 1266–67

(9th Cir. 1997); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1395, 1399 (D.C.

Cir. 1995); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507

(4th Cir. 1994).

Neither Dr. Jamieson’s ownership nor his control of JSE

make him Dr. Siewick’s ‘‘employer’’ within its common law

meaning. See Int’l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades Union

v. George A. Kracher, Inc., 856 F.2d 1546, 1548 (D.C. Cir.

1988); cf., e.g., Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees

Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1989). The

corporation only is the employer of the corporation’s employees. See Meyer v. Holley, 123 S. Ct. at 829; Int’l Bhd. of

Painters & Allied Trades Union, 856 F.2d at 1548. A

corporation is a distinct entity from its shareholders, see

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Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163–

63 (2001), and corporate officers, even when they may seem to

function as an employer, act only as agents on behalf of the

corporation, see Int’l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades Union, 856 F.2d at 1548. The principle applies with no less

force when an individual has a significant ownership interest

in the corporation and substantially controls its actions. See

Connors v. P & M Coal Co., 801 F.2d 1373, 1375–76 (D.C. Cir.

1986).

A footnote in Dr. Siewick’s brief asserts that the corporate

veil should be pierced because JSE allegedly engaged in

fraud. But his complaint did not even allege that JSE’s

corporate form was a sham. See United States v. Andrews,

146 F.3d 933, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Labadie Coal Co.

v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96–97 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The district

court correctly held that an allegation of fraud against the

United States in violation of the False Claims Act does not

amount to an allegation that the corporate form was a fraud.

‘‘The difference between being a fraud and conducting one is

important. Even a fully-capitalized, Fortune 500 corporation

can embark on a fraud, but that would not make its corporate

form a sham or its shareholders personally liable.’’ Andrews,

146 F.3d at 940.

Affirmed.

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