Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01371/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01371-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW CONTASTI, an individual;

ANNETTE CONTASTI, an individual;

JOE HERNANDEZ, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 09cv1371 WQH (BLM)

ORDER

vs.

CITY OF SOLANA BEACH,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative

Summary Adjudication of Issues filed by Defendant City of Solana Beach (ECF No. 32).

PROCEDURAL FACTS

On October 29, 2007, in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego,

Plaintiffs Andrew Contasti and Joe Hernandez filed a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and a complaint for damages alleging

violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

Defendant City of Solana Beach. (ECF No. 5-3 at 2-8). On February 15, 2007, Plaintiffs

Andrew Contasti and Joe Hernandez filed an amended petition for writ of mandate pursuant

to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and a complaint for damages alleging

deprivation of due process and equal protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 10-21. 

On August 15, 2008, the state court issued an order denying the petition for writ of mandate

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and sustaining a demurrer to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. Id. at 23. The court granted

Plaintiffs twenty days to file an amended petition for writ of mandate or to amend the equal

protection claim. Id. On September 3, 2008, Plaintiffs Andrew Contasti, Annette Contasti,

and Joe Hernandez filed a second amended complaint in state court, which asserted claims for

inverse condemnation and deprivation of substantive due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Id. at 25-34. The second amended complaint did not contain a petition for writ of

mandate or a claim for violation of equal protection. Id. On April 3, 2009 Plaintiffs filed a

Request for Dismissal Without Prejudice of their second amended complaint. Id. at 36. On

June 9, 2006, the state court granted Plaintiffs’ request for dismissal. Id. at 39.

On January 28, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) against

the City of Solana beach in this Court, asserting two claims for relief. (ECF No. 15). In the

first claim for relief, Plaintiffs assert that the City Council’s denial of Plaintiffs’ application

for a development review permit and structure development permit for one of two lots that they

own was arbitrary and unreasonable, constituting a deprivation of substantive due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the second claim for

relief, Plaintiffs assert that they were treated differently from similarly situated persons when

the City Council denied their permit, constituting a deprivation of equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On April 29, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or in the

Alternative Summary Adjudication of Issues. (ECF No. 32). Plaintiffs filed no opposition. 

On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 36).

On January 24, 2012, Plaintiff Andrew Contasti filed a Motion for Relief from

Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ attorney had fallen seriously ill and failed to inform

them that a Motion for Summary Judgment had been filed by Defendant. (ECF No. 45). On

February 2, 2012, Defendant filed a response to the Motion for Relief. (ECF No. 47). On May

11, 2012, Plaintiffs Annette Contasti and Joe Hernandez filed Notices of Joinder in the Motion

for Relief from Judgment. (ECF Nos. 52, 54).

On July 9, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief from Judgment and

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vacated the July 26, 2011 Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 61).

On August 6, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment.

(ECF No. 64). On August 13, 2012, Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 70).

FACTS

Plaintiffs Andrew Contasti, Annette Contasti and Joe Hernandez own two adjacent lots,

Lot 9 and Lot 10, located at 360 North Granados Avenue in the City of Solana Beach. 

Plaintiffs applied for development review permits and structure development permits to build

a home on each lot. On July 11, 2007, the City Council approved Plaintiffs’ permit application

for the Lot 9 home, on the condition that Plaintiffs reduce the 4,031 square foot design by 230

square feet. Plaintiffs agreed to the reduction of the Lot 9 home and submitted revised

drawings after the hearing which were approved by the City Council. The hearing was

continued to August 22, 2007 to discuss the permit application for the Lot 10 home, which was

designed to be 4,387 square feet. After the July 11, 2007 hearing, Plaintiffs submitted revised

drawings which reduced the size of the Lot 10 home by 258.25 square feet. On August 22,

2007, the hearing was continued to September 19, 2007. On September 19, 2007, the City

Council denied Plaintiffs’ permit application for the original 4,387 square foot design of the 

Lot 10 home.

On October 10, 2007, the City Council issued City Resolution 2007-125, which

formally denied the permit application for Lot 10. The Resolution states: “The proposed

single-family residence is designed in a manner that is incompatible with other nearby

residences because it is not compatible with existing or potential future single family

development. Adverse effects upon neighboring properties have been identified from this

development....” The Resolution also states: “The site layout and design of the proposed

project do not visually and functionally enhance its intended use as a single-family residence

because the bulk and scale of the proposed project is incompatible with nearby structures.” 

Plaintiffs submit the declaration of Plaintiff Andrew Contasti, who states:

In March 2007, the Solana Beach Civic and Historical Society sought to halt

demolition of the church building located on Lots 9 and 10 in the hope of

obtaining a historical designation for the church building. ...

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At the April 11, 2007 meeting, I learned that the Mayor and all of the other

members of the City Council were, in fact, members of the Historical Society. 

I also learned that two of the five City Council members at the time lived in the

same area in which my property was located. Indeed, Councilmember Mike

Nichols recused himself from the discussion because he lived across the street

and within 500 feet of Lots 9 and 10. Furthermore, then-mayor, Lesa Heebner,

stated at the hearing that she “lived very close to this area” and that she was

“very interested in saving this building” because she “love[d] this building.”

Also at the April 11, 2007 meeting, the Mayor and Councilmember David

Roberts admitted that each of them had spoken with the prior City Manager

about the City possible purchasing the property for a community center, but

were advised by the City Manager that the previous price (of $1.4 million) was

too expensive and that there was not enough “in the City coffers” to purchase the

property. ...

 On July 11, 2007, the Solana Beach City Council held a hearing, which I

attended, in which the permit application for Lot 9 was approved (with a slight

reduction of 230 feet in square footage initiated by us after the City Council

began discussing Ordinance No. 357, even though it did not apply to Lot 9). 

The findings of this hearing are set forth in Solana Beach Resolution No. 2007-

108, and were consistent with the City’s Staff Report dated July 11, 2007

(Exhibit 4 to the RJN). ...

Yet even though the plans for Lot 10 were developed in conjunction with the

plans for Lot 9 and were in all respects fundamentally the same, and even though

the city staff had recommended approval of both applications and Ordinance No.

357 did not apply to either application, the City Council refused to approve the

Lot 10 application during the July 11, 2007 hearing (even though it had just

approved the Lot 9 application at the same hearing). 

The City Council kept referencing Ordinance No. 357 and the “spirit” of the

ordinance even though it did not apply to my properties. The City Council told

me I had “one bite at the apple.” The Mayor told me I would not be allowed to

make a “back-room” adjustment to the square footage of the home proposed for

Lot 10. She also threatened that I could go forward with my application but that

if it was denied (as I certainly believed it would given the tenor of her remarks),

I would have to “go to the back of the line” and reapply (and thus be subject to

the provisions of Ordinance No. 357, even though my original application was

exempt from the Ordinance). And while I understood the City Council to be

asking for a reduction in square footage for Lot 10 like that which we had

voluntarily given for Lot 9 ..., this time it refused to give any guidance about the

amount of square footage it wanted reduced. Instead, the City Council told me

to “take your best shot” at changing the plans. As with the other City Council

meetings, I was only given three minutes to speak to address the Council’s

concerns. ...

At the September 19, 2007 hearing, the City then denied the Lot 10 home

application, finding that the residence was now “incompatible with other nearby

development” and that “adverse effects upon neighboring properties have been

identified from this development.” ...

I investigated whether the City had approved any other new homes in the

immediate vicinity of Lots 9 and 10 and found approvals for homes located at

140 South Granados (4,209 square feet), 142 South Granados (4,209 square

feet), and 146 South Granados (4,263 square feet). These homes were approved

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in 2006, the year before our applications, and were identical in all material ways

to the proposed Lot 10 home. 

 (ECF No. 69-3 at 3-5). 

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive

law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party

satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e)). “Regardless of whether . . . [the nonmoving party] responded at all[] to [a] motion

for summary judgment,” a court may not grant summary judgment unless the moving party

“affirmatively showed” that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Martinez v. Stanford,

323 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court

must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986).

 I. Claim One - Deprivation of Substantive Due Process under the Fourteenth

Amendment in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendant asserts that “California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.51

 is the proper

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California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 provides: “Where the writ is issued

for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made

as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is

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vehicle for challenging a discretionary decision by the legislative body of a municipality (i.e.,

a city council).” (ECF No. 32-1 at 9). Defendant asserts that “the necessity of appealing the

agency’s decision by a writ is a procedural requirement that cannot be skirted by clouding

claims in constitutional terms.” (ECF No. 70 at 2). Defendant contends that “because

[P]laintiffs failed to file a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure [section]

1094.5, their federal Civil Rights complaint is barred as a matter of law.” (ECF No. 32-1 at

9). 

Plaintiffs assert that “the requirement of judicial exhaustion is not applicable in a § 1983

claim brought in federal court.” (ECF No. 69 at 12) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs assert

that “the applicable standard articulated by the controlling federal authorities on this issue ...

state[s] that to have preclusive effect in federal court, the findings of administrative agencies

must satisfy both the State requirements for preclusion and the “fairness requirements” set

forth in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiffs contend that under California preclusion law they are not precluded from bringing

a substantive due process claim “because Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for violation of their right

to Substantive Due Process is different from Plaintiffs’ application for a permit which was

denied by the City Council in the underlying administrative proceeding.” Id. at 13.

A. Plaintiffs’ Failure to Exhaust State Remedies

In California state court, where a party fails to challenge an administrative agency’s

decision by pursuing a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure section

1094.5, the administrative agency’s decision becomes final. See Johnson v. City of Loma

Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 70 (Cal. 2000) (“Exhaustion of judicial remedies ... is necessary to avoid

giving binding ‘effect to the administrative agency's decision, because that decision has

achieved finality due to the aggrieved party's failure to pursue the exclusive judicial remedy

for reviewing administrative action’”). However, “exhaustion of state administrative remedies

should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983 [in federal

required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior

tribunal, corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a

jury.” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 1094.5(a). 

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court].” Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (“Based on the

legislative histories of both § 1983 and § 1997e ... [w]e decline to overturn our prior to

overturn our prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required”); see also Embury

v. King, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2001) affirmed 361 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding that “[t]he Loma Linda requirement of judicial exhaustion ...” is procedural in nature

and is therefore “inapplicable in a § 1983 action brought in federal court”).

In this case, Plaintiffs did not pursue a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil

Procedure section 1094.5 in their second amended complaint in state court. However, the

Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their state court remedies does not bar them

from bringing this § 1983 action in federal court. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n,

Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 104 (1981) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state

remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”)

(quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)); see also Embury, 191 F. Supp. 2d at

1082 (“It is well established that a § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust State remedies before

bringing a federal civil rights claim.”).

B. Preclusive Effect of the City Council’s Decision

The doctrine of claim preclusion “prevents the relitigation of claims previously tried and

decided. It bars the subsequent application of all defenses that could have been asserted in a

previous action between the same parties on the same cause of action, even if such contentions

were not raised.” Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1992). “When an

administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact

properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts

have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.” United States v. Utah Construction

& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421–22 (1966) (footnotes omitted); see also University of

Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 794-99 (1986); Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d

1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 1994). In order to have preclusive effect in federal court, the findings of

a state administrative agency must satisfy both the state preclusion requirements and the

requirements of fairness outlined in Utah Construction & Mining Co. See Misischia v. Pirie,

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60 F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Guild Wineries and Distilleries, 853 F.2d at 758. 

However, “[t]here are no special circumstances requiring [the federal Court] to look beyond

the state’s preclusion law, because California [has] adopted the Utah Construction standard.”

See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1033; see also Plaine v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713, 719-720 n. 13 (9th Cir.

1986); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th

Cir.1993). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has noted that, in California, “unless

state court review of the administrative findings is sought, ‘an administrative hearing

adjudication binds the parties on the issues litigated.’” Miller, 39 F.3d at 1033 (citing

Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 3 Cal.App.4th 896 (1992).

In this case, Plaintiffs did not pursue a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil

Procedure section 1094.5, which, in California, was their “exclusive remedy” for challenging

the City Council’s decision. See Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, 40 Cal. App. 4th 637,

645 (1995) (“A proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is the exclusive

remedy for judicial review of the quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of the local-level

agency....”); see also Plaine, 797 F.2d at 719 n. 12; Miller, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032-33. The City

Council hearing “binds the parties on the issues litigated” because the Plaintiffs “cannot

obstruct the preclusive use of the [City Council] decision simply by foregoing [the] right to

appeal.” Miller, 39 F.3d at 1032.

C. Scope of the Preclusive Effect of the City Council’s Decision

Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim in this action will be deemed an “issue

litigated” at the City Council hearing if the claim “encompasses the same primary right that

was at stake” in the City Council hearing. Swartzendruber, 3 Cal.App.4th at 896. In Mycogen

Corp. v. Monsanto Co., the court explained:

A “cause of action” is comprised of a “primary right” of the plaintiff, a

corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the

defendant constituting a breach of that duty. The most salient characteristic of

a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right

gives rise to but a single cause of action.

28 Cal.4th 888, 904 (Cal. 2002) (quoting Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d

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386, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Cal.1994)).

 In Miller, the plaintiff unsuccessfully contested an employment dismissal before the

Santa Cruz County Civil Service Commission, declined to pursue a writ of mandate under

Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, and instead brought a § 1983 action in federal court. The

court explained that “[i]t is Miller’s election to pursue his claim initially in an administrative

forum, and to forego his right to seek judicial review in state court, which requires us to

determine whether that decision is binding on all that was, or could have been, determined

there.” The court found that the same primary right, the right to continued employment, was

at stake in the Civil Service Commission action and the federal court action, and concluded

that Miller was precluded from “restat[ing] his wrongful termination contentions in

constitutional terms” in the federal district court. Id. at 1035. 

In Guru Nanek Sikh Society of Yuba v. County of Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1128

(E.D.Cal.2003), a non-profit religious organization challenged the County of Sutter’s denial

of its application for a permit to build a temple on a number of constitutional grounds. After

the Sutter County Community Services Department issued a report recommending that the

County Planning Commission grant the permit, the Commission voted unanimously to reject

the permit. Id. The federal district court rejected the County’s claim preclusion argument on

the grounds that the claims presented in the federal lawsuit were “entirely different” from the

claim that was presented to the administrative body. Id. at 1133. The district court stated:

First, and perhaps most obviously, the doctrine of claim preclusion is inapposite

because the claims in this lawsuit are entirely different from the claim, or more

accurately, the application, that was denied by the Board of Supervisors. ...

Those claims could not have been before the Board, of course, because it was

the Board’s ultimate decision to reverse the County Planning Commission, and

the allegedly discriminatory nature of that decision, that gave rise to plaintiff’s

claims.

Id. Distinguishing the case from Miller, the district court explained that “[h]ad Miller alleged

constitutional violations on the part of the county civil service commission, however, his suit

would be analogous to the instant case, and the claim preclusion doctrine would have been

inapplicable.” Id. at 1134.

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In this case, the City Council held three hearings to discuss Plaintiffs’ application for

development review and structure development permits, and its decision was announced at the

third and final hearing. Unlike Miller, where the plaintiff appealed his termination at an

administrative hearing, Plaintiffs in this case did not present their substantive due process

claim before the City Council because it was the allegedly discriminatory nature of the City

Council’s decision that gave rise to the claim. The Court finds that the primary right presented

by Plaintiffs in this action is outside the scope of the issue that was litigated during the City

Council hearings. The Court concludes that the preclusive effect of the City Council’s

decision does not extend to the substantive due process claim presented in this federal action. 

See Jensen v. City of Sonoma, C-08-3440 JCS, 2008 WL 5048203 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2008)

(finding that a state administrative decision does not have preclusive effect on plaintiff’s

federal constitutional claims because “... [s]ome of Plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations

here arise out of the conduct at the hearing in this case. Plaintiffs assert due process violations

and violations of the First Amendment”); see also Guru Nanek Sikh Society of Yuba, 326

F.Supp.2d at 1134 (“It would be counterintuitive, to say the least, for a federal court to shield

local government officials from scrutiny under the Constitution and federal civil rights laws

by giving preclusive effect to their allegedly discriminatory decisions. Federal common law

does not command such an abdication of judicial responsibility”).

II. Claim Two - Deprivation of Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment

in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendant asserts that a demurrer was sustained on Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim

in state court and that Plaintiffs failed to amend their complaint. Defendant contends that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim on the grounds that the claim was

adjudicated on its merits and the state court judgment has res judicata effect. Defendant

contends that the equal protection claim fails as a matter of law on the grounds that Plaintiffs

were not treated differently from similarly situated individuals and there was a rational

relationship between Defendant’s decision and legitimate state interests.

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A. Res Judicata

“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or

their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen

v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). A federal court must give to a state court judgment the

same preclusive effect as would the courts of the state in which it was rendered. Chao v. A-One

Medical Services, Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 921 (2003) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd.

of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). The elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel are the

same in California and federal courts: “(1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is

identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted

in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted

was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” Pitzen v. Superior Court, 120

Cal.App.4th 1374, 1381 (2004) quoting Brinton v. Bankers Pension Services, Inc., 76

Cal.App.4th 550, 556 (1999). 

Under California law, there is a judgment on the merits where a demurrer to a claim is

sustained and the Plaintiff fails to amend within the time allowed. Wells v. Marina City

Properties, Inc., 29 Cal.3d 781, 785 (Cal. 1981) (citing Goldtree v. Spreckels, 135 Cal. 666,

672 (Cal. 1902) (“Since the defendant by his demurrer has admitted all the facts of the

plaintiff's case, we see no reason why the judgment should not be regarded as a conclusive

determination of the litigation on its merits”)). However, the Supreme Court of California has

“emphasize[d] that the res judicata effect of a judgment of dismissal, ... after the sustaining of

a demurrer, is of limited scope.” Wells, 29 Cal.3d at 789; see also Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal.2d

826, 829 (1952) (“[I]t has been the settled rule in this state that a judgment entered on demurrer

does not have such broad res judicata effect”). With this in mind, the court in Wells stated:

[A judgment of dismissal after sustaining a demurrer] is a judgment on the

merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not constitute a

cause of action. ... If, on the other hand, new or additional facts are alleged that

cure the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is

not a bar to the subsequent action whether or not plaintiff had an opportunity to

amend his complaint.

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Id. (quoting Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal.2d 826, 828 (1952) (reasoning that “less prejudice is

suffered by a defendant who has had only to attack the pleadings, than by one who has been

forced to go to trial until a nonsuit is granted ...”)); see also Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & 

Guar. Co., 14 Cal.2d 47, 52 (1939) (holding that “a judgment of dismissal based upon a

demurrer sustained for defects of form, under circumstances where it was possible to plead a

good cause of action in another suit[,] ... is not res judicata”).

In this case, a demurrer on Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim was sustained in San Diego

Superior Court on the grounds that “Plaintiffs have failed to allege a required element, ... that

Plaintiffs have been treated differently than other people in similar situations.” (ECF No. 5-3

at 23). The order stated: “Plaintiffs are granted 20 days leave to amend to allow them to state

a cause of action including this element.” Id. Plaintiffs failed to do so. On June 9, 2009,

Plaintiffs filed a request for entry of dismissal of their entire complaint, Id. at 18, which the

state court granted. Id. at 20.

The Court finds that the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim in state court

does constitute a judgment on the merits because Plaintiffs did not amend their complaint

within the time allowed. In the Complaint filed in this Court, as well as in Plaintiff Contasti’s

supporting declaration, Plaintiffs state that three nearby properties, located at 140,142 and 146

South Granados were “identical in all material ways to plaintiffs’ proposed Lot 10 home,” and

were approved by the City Council. (ECF No. 69-3 at 5; ECF No. 15 at 15). The Court finds

that Plaintiffs have alleged “new or additional facts” showing that they were treated differently

which “cure the defects in the [state court] pleading.” Wells, 29 Cal.3d at 789. For res judicata

purposes, the dismissal in state court only constitutes a judgment on the merits to the extent

that the facts pleaded were insufficient to allege the element of unequal treatment. See Wells,

29 Cal.3d at 789; see also Keidatz, 39 Cal.2d at 828. The Court concludes that the state court

judgment of dismissal does not have res judicata effect on Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Wells,

29 Cal.3d at 789; see also Goddard, 14 Cal.2d at 52.

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B. “Class of One” Equal Protection Claim

Under the Equal Protection Clause, “all persons similarly situated should be treated

alike” by the government. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439

(1985). “[A]n equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained even if the

plaintiff has not alleged class-based discrimination, but instead claims that she has been

irrationally singled out as a so-called ‘class of one.’” Gerhart v. Lake County, Mont., 637 F.3d

1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2011)). To

succeed on a “class of one” claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant

intentionally treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated persons, and (2) there

was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. In an action

where a property owner contends that “she has been unconstitutionally deprived of property

through governmental regulation, motions for summary judgment must be viewed with

particular skepticism.” Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496

(9th Cir. 1990), affirmed 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (citing Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. Simi

Valley, 882 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1989)).

1. Intentionally Different Treatment

 In Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found

that the plaintiff’s affidavit, alleging that the defendant “arbitrarily and unreasonably limited

use and development of [a] property ... whereas owners of comparable property ... were not

subjected to these conditions and restrictions,” was sufficient to overcome the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. 920 F.2d at 1496. Similarly, in this case, Plaintiffs assert that

the City’s denial of the Lot 10 home was “discriminatory” and constituted “disparate”

treatment. Plaintiff Contasti states in his declaration that the permit applications for three other

nearby homes, which “were identical in all material ways to the proposed Lot 10 home,” were

approved by the City Council “in 2006, the year before our applications.” (ECF No. 69-3 at

5). Defendant argues that “[w]hat is missing from plaintiff’s theory is that the city approved

the [permit] application plaintiffs submitted for Lot 9.” (ECF No. 32-1 at 12). Defendant

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contends that “as a matter of law therefore, plaintiffs cannot claim that they have been treated

differently than similarly situated persons. (See Christian Gospel Church v. San Francisco,

896 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1990)). ” Id. The Defendant did approve Plaintiff’s application

for Lot 9; however, that does not indicate that the Defendant treated Plaintiffs and “persons

similarly situated ... alike” when it denied the permit application for Lot 10. Cleburne Living

Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 439. Construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have come forward with facts that,

if proven, support a finding that the Defendant intentionally treated Plaintiffs differently from

other similarly situated permit-seeking property owners.

2. Rational Basis Test

In this case, the question is whether Defendant had a rational basis for making a

distinction between Plaintiffs’ Lot 10 property application and the applications of other

similarly situated property owners. See Gerhart, 637 F.3d at 1023 (“[T]he rational basis prong

of a ‘class of one’ claim turns on whether there is a rational basis for the distinction, rather than

the underlying government action”); see also Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 (explaining that a class

of one claim requires plaintiff to show that “there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment”). The City Council, in passing Resolution 2007-125, denied the permit application

for Lot 10, stating: “[t]he proposed single-family residence is designed in a manner that is

incompatible with other nearby development because it is not compatible with existing or

potential future single family development. ... The site layout and design of the proposed

project do not visually and functionally enhance its intended use ....” (ECF No. 5-3 at 56-57). 

Plaintiffs assert that Defendant’s “justifications were merely cover for the City Council’s true

ulterior and impermissible motives. (ECF No. 69 at 21). More likely (and presenting factual

issues for trial), because a City Council member lived across the street and the City Mayor

lived in the neighborhood, they each sought to limit the size of Plaintiff’s proposed homes to

suit their own personal interests.” Id.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated: “it is clearly established that a

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plaintiff may pursue an equal protection claim by raising a ‘triable issue of fact as to whether

the defendants' asserted [rational basis] ... was merely a pretext’ for differential treatment.” 

Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Fajardo

v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 700 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999) (“If Defendants' justification

for discriminating against domestic-violence crimes is nothing more than pretextual, then

Defendants' actions are arbitrary and violate the Equal Protection Clause”). On summary

judgment, “[a] plaintiff may show pretext by creating a triable issue of fact that either: (1) the

proffered rational basis was objectively false; or (2) the defendant actually acted based on an

improper motive.” Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936 at 946; see also Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478

F.3d 985, 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In the regulatory land-use context, ‘acts that are malicious,

irrational, or plainly arbitrary do not have a rational basis’”); Valley Outdoor, Inc. v. City of

Riverside, 446 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir.2006) (applying “class of one” theory to city's denial of

billboard permits despite esthetic values as the alleged basis for the denial); Bookstore, Inc. v.

Leonard, 11-35436, 2012 WL 2992131 (9th Cir. July 23, 2012).

Plaintiff Contasti states that at a July 11, 2007 hearing, then-Mayor Lesa Heebner, who

“lived very close” to Plaintiffs’ lots, stated that she was “very interested in saving” a church

located on Lot 10 because she “loved this building.” (ECF No. 69-3 at 3). Plaintiff Contasti

states that the Mayor and another City Council member, David Roberts, both discussed the

possibility of purchasing the property “but were advised by the City Manager that “there was

not enough ‘in the City coffers’” at the “previous price (of $1.4 million).” Id. at 3-7. Two

Staff Reports prepared for the July 11, 2007 City Council hearing recommended that Plaintiffs’

permit applications for Lots 9 and 10 be approved. At the July 11, 2007 hearing, the Lot 9

permits were conditionally approved. (ECF No. 69-2 at 83). Plaintiff Contasti states that the

City Council told him he could continue to pursue permits for Lot 10, but states that he was

given no guidance regarding changes that he should make to his design proposal. (ECF No.

69-3 at 5). Instead, Plaintiff Contasti states that he was told that he had “one bite at the apple”

and was advised to “take your best shot.” Id. A Staff Report prepared for the September 19,

2007 City Council meeting, where there the permits for Lot 10 were denied, states: “The

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applicant has delayed the demolition of the Church pending approval of the Development

Review and Structure Development Permits [for Lot 10].” (ECF No. 69-2 at 122). Defendant

does not dispute these factual assertions, but contends that “[t]he subjective intent of the City

Council members is irrelevant.” (ECF No. 32-1 at 15); but cf. Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d

1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Construed in the light most favorable to appellants, [defendant’s]

refusal to grant water hookups to [plaintiffs] may have been arbitrary or even malicious

conduct prohibited by due process and equal protection”); but cf. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 993

(“In the regulatory land-use context, acts that are malicious, irrational, or plainly arbitrary do

not have a rational basis”). 

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that

there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the Defendant’s alleged justification for denying

Plaintiff’s application was “based on an improper motive” and served as a “pretext for

differential treatment.” Goldberg, 375 F.3d at 936; see also Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d

1311, 1327 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding “a triable issue of fact as to whether the [city’s]

asserted rationale of directing efforts to enforce the housing code in high-crime areas was

merely a pretext” to reduce property values for the city to purchase them at a reduced rate);

compare Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that pretext might

have been shown if the city was “using its code enforcement process not to enforce compliance

with the codes but rather to drive ... downtown motels out of business”). 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment or in the

Alternative Summary Adjudication of Issues (ECF No. 32) filed by Defendant City of Solana

Beach is DENIED. Counsel shall contact Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major as soon as

possible to schedule a case management conference.

DATED: September 18, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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