Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06357/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06357-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 All parties have consented to my jurisdiction for all

proceedings, including entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PERCY JAMES PEARCE,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social

Security Administration,

Defendant(s).

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No. C06-6357 BZ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

On October 11, 2006, pro se plaintiff Percy Pearce filed

a rambling 25 page complaint seeking judicial review of

defendant’s denial of his application for supplemental social

security income (SSI). In addition, plaintiff arguably

attacks his SSI denial on due process grounds. See Complaint

at 6-7. Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

(6).1

 After full briefing, the motion was heard on May 30,

Case 3:06-cv-06357-BZ Document 24 Filed 06/07/07 Page 1 of 8
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2

2007.

Plaintiff’s complaint and defendant’s and plaintiff’s

admissible evidence show that following more than one

hearing, on August 16, 2002, an administrative law judge

denied plaintiff’s SSI claim. See Devera Decl. Exh. 1 (ALJ

Decision), at 3-5. The decision, with an attached notice

accurately describing his right to appeal within sixty days

of receipt of the decision, was mailed to plaintiff on August

16, 2002. Devera Decl. ¶ 3(a).

On April 7, 2004, well after the sixty day window,

plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision. See Devera

Decl. Exh. 2. Defendant thereafter issued two notices to

plaintiff - one dated October 27, 2004, the other December

11, 2004 - asking plaintiff to file within thirty days a

written explanation for his failure to timely appeal the

ALJ’s decision. Devera Decl. Exh. 3. Hearing nothing more

from plaintiff, defendant dismissed his claim by Order dated

March 4, 2005. Devera Decl. Exh. 4. Plaintiff’s October 11,

2006 suit against defendant followed. 

Defendant argues that I lack subject matter jurisdiction

to hear this case and that, assuming I have jurisdiction,

plaintiff’s suit it time barred by the sixty day filing

requirement contained in 42 U.S.C. section 405(g). I

conclude that I do not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s

case, and that he does not plead or otherwise establish a

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2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows for a

motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The plaintiff has the burden to establish that subject matter

jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); In re Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952,

957 (9th Cir. 2001). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be factual in

nature, allowing the court to look beyond the complaint to

extrinsic evidence. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th

Cir. 2004); Savage v. Glendale Union High School Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). When a defendant

makes a factual challenge “by presenting affidavits or other

evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing

the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary

to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction.” Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035,

1039 (9th Cir. 2004); Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n.2. By

scheduling order dated April 20, 2007, I informed plaintiff of

his burden to respond to defendant’s 12(b)(1) motion.

3

colorable due process claim.2 

Judicial review of the denial of SSI may be undertaken

only “after any final decision of the Secretary made after a

hearing to which he was a party.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(emphasis added). The dismissal by defendant of an SSI claim

for failure to timely meet administrative requirements is not

a “final decision,” and thus generally fails to confer

federal jurisdiction over such matters. See Harris v. Apfel,

2000 WL 635444, at *2 (N.D. Cal) (citing Peterson v.

Califano, 631 F.2d 628, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

There is, however, a narrow exception: A court may have

jurisdiction in “rare instances where the Secretary’s denial

of a petition to reopen is challenged on constitutional

grounds.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977);

Harris, 2000 WL 635444, at *2 n.1 (noting the potential

applicability of the Sanders exception on facts similar to

the case at bar). According to the Ninth Circuit, “the

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4

Sanders exception applies to any colorable constitutional

claim of due process violation that ‘implicate[s] a due

process right [either] to a meaningful opportunity to be

heard,’ [Panages v. Bowen, 871 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1989)],

or to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits

determination.” Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th

Cir. 1997). “A challenge that is not wholly insubstantial,

immaterial, or frivolous raises a colorable constitutional

claim.” Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). 

The first problem with the application of Sanders is

that it is not even clear that plaintiff challenges the

decision on due process grounds. In his complaint, plaintiff

states: “This Court has jurisdiction under Title 42 U.S.C. §§

205(g) [sic] and 405(g).” Complaint at 1. The due process

arguments he raises are focused on arguments relating to why

the sixty day statute of limitations should be equitably

tolled. See, e.g., id. at 6-9. Insofar as these allegations

go only to plaintiff’s argument for equitable tolling, my

jurisdiction to consider them is questionable. 

Reading the complaint liberally to construe it as

pleading a separate due process attack, plaintiff fails to

make out a colorable claim. First, plaintiff’s assertion

that he was unaware of the deadlines for filing does not

present a cognizable due process claim. Plaintiff admits to

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3 Plaintiff states in his declaration that he “did not

receive notice of adverse action from Defendant Commissioner.” 

Pearce Decl. at 3. The statement, however, seems only to go to

the fact that plaintiff claims to have received his copy from

his United States Probation Officer. Complaint at 24. 

4 At the hearing, plaintiff offered no explanation for

why he waited so many months after receiving actual notice of

the decision before filing his appeal.

5 Plaintiff’s Submission goes well beyond my direction

at hearing to provide the Court with a particular citation. I

do, however, consider the Submission to the extent it

introduces relevant citations or argument.

5

having received a copy of the ALJ’s decision in August 2003.3

See Complaint at 24. Despite having thus been informed of

his right to appeal and thereafter waiting to file until

April 7, 2004,4

 plaintiff was given multiple chances to

explain his late filing. He simply failed to do so. 

In his papers, plaintiff claims to have been

incarcerated at various time, including perhaps between June

and November 2005. Pearce Decl. at 3. At the hearing,

though not under oath, plaintiff claimed that he was

incarcerated at least at the time the December 2004 notice

was mailed, and that he received neither the October nor the

December notices. See also Docket No. 21 (Plaintiff’s

Submission of Supporting Case Law), at 2.5 Assuming the

accuracy of these allegations, there is no colorable due

process violation. 

It is undisputed that the two notices were mailed to

plaintiff’s correct mailing address, and there is no evidence

that the notices were returned to sender. That plaintiff was

not diligent in collecting his mail or otherwise pursuing his

appeal cannot be blamed on defendant. Defendant’s preCase 3:06-cv-06357-BZ Document 24 Filed 06/07/07 Page 5 of 8
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6 Plaintiff does not contend that the notices were

somehow deficient or misleading, or that he was incapable of

understanding the notices or the appeals process itself. 

7 In his Submission of Supporting Case Law, plaintiff

argues that “appellate courts treat SSA cases differently where

SSA claimants are unrepresented by counsel....” Docket No. 21,

at 12. Under his statutory right to counsel, plaintiff’s being

unrepresented will not affect the validity of an SSI hearing

unless prejudice or unfairness is shown. Mendoza v. Barnhart, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2006). No prejudice is

shown such as would rise to a constitutional violation. The

ALJ ordered an additional psychological examination of

plaintiff, and his decision gives due consideration to all the

evidence before him. It even appears that the ALJ put the

matter over to allow plaintiff to secure counsel. See ALJ

Decision at 1. Certainly, plaintiff does not explain how his

lack of counsel precluded him from timely seeking

administrative review. Nor is this a case like Udd v.

Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2001) (cited by plaintiff

6

dismissal procedures gave plaintiff a “meaningful opportunity

to be heard” on both the reasons for his late filing and why

reversal of the ALJ’s decision was proper, and plaintiff

provides no facts to the contrary.6

Plaintiff also complains of having to represent himself

in the hearings, and suggests that counsel should have been

appointed. Complaint at 7; Pearce Decl. at 2. While there

is a statutory right to counsel at an SSI hearing, 42 U.S.C.

§ 406, no constitutional right to counsel exists. Holland v.

Heckler, 764 F.2d 1560, 1562 (11th Cir. 1985); Ware v.

Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that

the Social Security Administration is provided no funds to

retain counsel or otherwise assist in representation). That

the ALJ did not appoint counsel for plaintiff is in no way a

violation of his constitutional rights. Nor does Pearce

claim to have been uninformed of his statutory right to

counsel.7

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for a different proposition, Docket No. 21 at 12), where the

claimant alleged he was unrepresented while suffering a mental

impairment precluding him from understanding SSI procedure.

8 Plaintiff complains that the SSI proceedings were

moved from Fresno to Oakland; that he was unable to secure

documents and transcripts relating to the prior hearing; and

that the Oakland hearing was detrimentally brief. Complaint at

6-9. 

9 Plaintiff spends a lot of time complaining of the

conduct of his probation officer. These allegations are

irrelevant and without merit for a variety of reasons,

including that the officer is not a named defendant and is not

employed by defendant. 

10 Even if jurisdiction were present, the complaint

appears to be time barred. Conceding that his claims are

barred, plaintiff asks the court to apply equitable tolling to

allow his suit to proceed. See Complaint at 6; Docket No. 17

(Plaintiff’s “Objection” to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss), at

7. Plaintiff’s arguments fail to demonstrate sufficient reason

to apply the narrow tolling doctrine. See, e.g., Bowen v. City

of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986) (stating that tolling is

appropriate only where “the equities in favor of tolling are

compelling.”); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.

7

The remainder of the infirmities plaintiff complains of

do not implicate due process.8 None of them affected

plaintiff’s opportunity to be heard before the ALJ or perfect

his appeal. Plaintiff does not claim to have suffered from

an impairment that precluded him from understanding the

dismissal notice and related procedures. That plaintiff did

not take advantage of the appeals process cannot be held

against defendant, and it certainly does not make out a

colorable due process claim.9 Defendant’s hearing and appeals

procedures gave plaintiff “a meaningful opportunity to

present his case,” and none of the infirmities complained of

demonstrate otherwise. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319, 348-349 (1976). I therefore lack jurisdiction to

consider plaintiff’s suit.10

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101, 113 (2002) (noting that equitable tolling is “to be

applied sparingly.”). I was particularly troubled by

plaintiff’s unconvincing explanation at the hearing why this

lawsuit was filed so long after defendant’s 2005 notice of

dismissal was mailed to the proper address. 

8

Because defendant never issued a “final decision” within

the meaning of section 405(g), and because plaintiff does not

plead or otherwise submit evidence of a colorable due process

claim, I have no jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s suit. 

Even if I were to reach the merits of plaintiff’s due process

arguments, they fail. Due to the unchangeable nature of the

infirmities of plaintiff’s complaint, amending the complaint

is futile. For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss

is GRANTED. 

Dated: June 7, 2007 

 Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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