Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01167/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01167-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 06cv1167 BTM(LSP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDERICO TORRES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv1167 BTM(LSP)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, R. GIBSON,

J. COPPEDGE and DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claims

of unlawful search and seizure (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and state law false arrest. For the

reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

I. FACTS

On April 19, 2005, Plaintiff Frederico Torres was driving his 12-year old son to school

in his Chevy van. Deputy Robert Gibson was parked at the intersection of Olive Avenue and

Bonita Drive, watching for stop sign violations. (Gibson Depo. at 44-45.) Gibson claims that

he saw Plaintiff’s van approach the stop sign then drive through the intersection at

approximately 15 m.p.h. without stopping. (Id. at 48:9-20.) In contrast, Plaintiff claims that

he made a complete stop at the stop sign. (Torres Decl. ¶ 3; Torres Depo. at 19-20.)

Plaintiff had a valid driver’s license but had left it at home that morning. (Torres Decl.

¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff also claims that he had valid proof of insurance in the van. (Torres Decl.

Case 3:06-cv-01167-BTM-LSP Document 20 Filed 01/02/08 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 06cv1167 BTM(LSP)

¶ 5.) 

Gibson claims that he had Plaintiff write down his name, date of birth, and address on

a memo pad. (Gibson Depo. at 55-56.) Plaintiff claims that Deputy Gibson wrote down

Plaintiff’s name, after asking Plaintiff what his name was, and then handed the paper to

Plaintiff to write his address. (Torres Decl. ¶ 7.) Whoever wrote Plaintiff’s name down, the

first name was incorrectly spelled “Fredericho.” As a result, dispatch reported that there was

no DMV record for Plaintiff. (Gibson Depo. at 31-32.) Plaintiff claims that Gibson repeatedly

accused him of lying when he insisted that he had a valid driver’s license at home. (Torres

Decl. ¶ 7.)

When the DMV search failed to show a valid license for Plaintiff, Gibson escorted

Plaintiff to the back of his patrol car. (Gibson Depo. at 58-59.) Gibson states that he

performed a routine inventory search of the van because it had to be towed (due to the lack

of a licensed driver for the vehicle). (Id. at 60.) Gibson claims that he did not find proof of

insurance in the van. (Id. at 61.) Gibson did not ask Plaintiff whether he had proof of

insurance with him. (Id. at 60.) Gibson claims that Plaintiff seemed upset when he learned

that the vehicle had to be towed and started yelling words to the effect that he had a license

and that the situation was unfair. (Id. at 62-63.) 

Gibson wrote Plaintiff a ticket for (1) failure to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle Code §

22450); (2) being an unlicensed driver (Vehicle Code § 12500(a)); (3) no proof of insurance

(Vehicle Code § 16028(a)); and (4) obstructing a peace officer (Penal Code § 148(a)(1)).

(Ex. 2 to Marinnan Decl.)

According to Gibson, he tried several times to get Plaintiff to sign the ticket, but

Plaintiff would not do so. (Gibson Depo. at 73.) Gibson claims that for a period of 5-10

minutes, he tried to explain the court process to Plaintiff and tried to make him understand

that he was not necessarily admitting guilt by signing the ticket. (Id. at 73-74.) Plaintiff

argued that he had stopped at the stop sign and indicated that he was not going to sign the

ticket. (Id.) By this time, another deputy, J. Coppedge had arrived on the scene. Coppedge,

who speaks some Spanish, talked to Plaintiff in both English and Spanish about signing the

Case 3:06-cv-01167-BTM-LSP Document 20 Filed 01/02/08 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Although Defendants papers state that the “false arrest” allegations would

necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction, it is apparent that Defendants are

discussing the illegal stop/unlawful detention aspect of Defendants’ Fourth Amendment

claim.

3 06cv1167 BTM(LSP)

ticket. (Id. at 75.) Gibson claims that Plaintiff still would not sign the ticket. Gibson explains

that after five or ten minutes more of asking Plaintiff to sign the ticket, he and Coppedge had

no choice but to arrest Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has a different version of events. Plaintiff denies ever refusing to sign the

citation. (Torres Decl. ¶ 6.) He explains that due to the language barrier, he did not

understand what Gibson wanted him to sign. (Id.) Torres also claims that neither deputy told

him he could be arrested if he did not immediately sign the ticket. (Id.) Plaintiff states that

when Coppedge asked him to sign the ticket, he simply repeated that he had a valid license.

(Id.) Immediately thereafter, the deputies grabbed his arms, broke his elbow, and arrested

him. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that everything happened very quickly. (Id.; Torres Depo. at

34:19.) 

Plaintiff denies obstructing Deputy Gibson or any other deputy on the date of his

arrest. (Torres Decl. ¶ 5.)

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful search and

seizure (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and false arrest. The Court grants the motion in part and denies

it in part.

A. Unlawful Detention

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim1 is barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court agrees.

Defendants have presented evidence that Plaintiff pled guilty to driving without his

license in possession. Cal. Veh. Code § 12951(a). (Defs.’ Ex. 4.) This conviction arises

Case 3:06-cv-01167-BTM-LSP Document 20 Filed 01/02/08 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Plaintiff correctly points out that he was not originally charged with the no license

in possession violation. However, he ultimately pled guilty to that offense, at which point the

initial four charges were dismissed.

3

 In Heck, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote: “[A] suit for damages attributable

to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced

evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s stilloutstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable

discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not

necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.” 512 U.S. at 487 n. 7. Some

circuits have held that this footnote creates a general exception to Heck for § 1983 Fourth

4 06cv1167 BTM(LSP)

from the events that took place on April 19, 2005.2 

Defendants argue that if the initial stop of Plaintiff was unlawful, then all charges

stemming from the stop would be fruit of the poisonous tree. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim that his detention was unlawful necessarily implies the invalidity of his

conviction for driving without his license in possession. 

Plaintiff counters that his unlawful detention claim does not necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction because a person could be validly convicted of such a charge even

if he was unlawfully stopped in the first place. Plaintiff reasons that there could be nontainted evidence of the offense such as witness testimony that the accused was driving

without his license in possession.

However, if the stop was unlawful, there would be no legitimate reason to determine

whether Plaintiff had his license in possession in the first place. This case can be compared

to Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842 (4th Cir. 2003). In that case, Ballenger filed a § 1983

claim that he was illegally stopped for following too closely behind another automobile.

However, Ballenger was convicted of cocaine trafficking based on drug evidence that was

found in the car during the stop. The Fourth Circuit held that Ballenger’s illegal stop claim

necessarily implied the invalidity of the conviction, reasoning:

If Ballenger succeeds in demonstrating in this § 1983 case that his traffic stop

was illegal, the illegality of the search would require the suppression of the

evidence seized. Ballenger has advanced no circumstances, nor conceived

of any to our knowledge, to suggest how the state could convict him of cocaine

trafficking if the automobile stop were to have been found illegal. In the

particular circumstances of this case, there could be no independent source

for the cocaine and no inevitable discovery of it.

Id. at 845. 3

Case 3:06-cv-01167-BTM-LSP Document 20 Filed 01/02/08 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d

1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit does not construe footnote seven as creating

a general exception, but, rather, examines the facts and circumstances of the particular case

before it to determine whether the successful prosecution of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

necessarily implies the invalidity of the plaintiff’s earlier conviction. See, e.g., Smith v. City

of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 698-99 (9th Cir. 2005). 

4

 This case can be distinguished from Smith v. City of Hemet, where the Ninth Circuit

held that it could not determine the factual basis for the plaintiff’s plea of guilty to resisting,

delaying, or obstructing a peace officer and therefore could not hold that a successful

prosecution of his excessive force claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction. 394 F.3d at 699. It was unclear whether Smith was pleading guilty to resisting

the officers during the investigative stage, prior to the alleged use of excessive force, or

during the course of the arrest. Here, the factual basis for Plaintiff’s plea of guilty is clear –

i.e., at the time he was stopped on April 19, 2005, he was driving without his license in

possession. 

5 06cv1167 BTM(LSP)

As in Ballenger, the evidence underlying Plaintiff’s conviction was uniquely available

as a result of the stop. Absent the stop, there would be no occasion to inquire whether

Plaintiff had his license in possession at that time. 4

 Plaintiff has not shown that there would

have been an independent source or inevitable discovery of the facts underlying Plaintiff’s

conviction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim of unlawful detention is barred by Heck. 

B. False Arrest 

In addition to claiming that he was unlawfully detained, Plaintiff claims that Gibson

lacked probable cause to arrest him for (1) running the stop sign; (2) being an unlicensed

driver; (3) not having proof of insurance; and (4) obstructing a peace officer. Plaintiff’s false

arrest claims are not barred by Heck because Plaintiff’s success on these claims would not

impugn the validity of his conviction for driving without his license in possession.

Furthermore, the Court finds that there are triable issues of material fact with respect to the

existence of probable cause as to all four charges.

Deputy Gibson claims that he saw Plaintiff run the stop sign. However, Plaintiff claims

that he actually did stop. Therefore, there is a triable issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s

arrest on this charge. 

There is no dispute that Plaintiff was actually a validly licensed driver, even though he

did not have his license in possession. The question is whether there was probable cause

for Gibson to believe otherwise. According to Gibson, the way the computer systems work

Case 3:06-cv-01167-BTM-LSP Document 20 Filed 01/02/08 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 06cv1167 BTM(LSP)

for the DMV is that the “absolute correct spelling of the first name” is necessary to retrieve

license information. (Gibson Depo. at 25.) Due to the incorrect spelling of Plaintiff’s first

name on the memo pad, there was no match found for Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff claims

that Gibson, not he, misspelled his name on the memo pad. Further, Plaintiff alleges that

Gibson never asked him how to spell his name. If this is true, Gibson lacked reliable

information for purposes of conducting the DMV search and did not have probable cause for

arresting Plaintiff for not having a valid license.

Gibson claims that he did an inventory search of the van and did not find proof of

insurance. He admits, however, that he did not ask Plaintiff if he had proof of insurance with

him. Plaintiff claims that he did have proof of insurance in the van. Thus, there is a genuine

dispute of material fact with respect to whether probable cause existed for arresting Plaintiff

on this ground.

Although Plaintiff was arrested for “obstructing a peace officer,” it is unclear what the

factual basis of this charge was. Plaintiff states that he did not, in any way, obstruct Gibson

or any other deputy on the date of his arrest. (Torres Decl. ¶ 5.) Therefore, summary

judgment is denied as to this charge as well. 

Finally, there is a triable issue with respect to whether Plaintiff “refused” to sign the

citation, resulting in Plaintiff being taken into custody so he could be presented before a

magistrate pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 40302. According to Plaintiff, he did not

understand what Gibson wanted him to sign. Although he did not sign the citation at this

time, he did not refuse to do so. When Coppedge, who spoke some Spanish, asked him to

sign the ticket, Plaintiff repeated that he had a valid license. Immediately thereafter, the

deputies grabbed his arms, broke his elbow, and arrested him. Plaintiff claims that neither

Coppedge nor Gibson told him he could be arrested if he did not immediately sign the

citation. Plaintiff says that everything happened very quickly. Based on Plaintiff’s version

of events, it can be argued that Plaintiff was not given enough information or time for his

actions to be construed as a “refusal to sign.”

Case 3:06-cv-01167-BTM-LSP Document 20 Filed 01/02/08 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 06cv1167 BTM(LSP)

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim to the extent that it alleges unreasonable detention in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. The motion is denied as to the false arrest claims under § 1983 and state law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 2, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01167-BTM-LSP Document 20 Filed 01/02/08 Page 7 of 7