Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02503/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02503-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (District or BAP)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVIS JACOB TRUPP

Debtor.

Case No. 16-cv-2503 DMS (DHB)

Bankruptcy No. 14-09360-CL7

ORDER AFFIRMING THE

JUDGMENT OF THE 

BANKRUPTCY COURT 

TRAVIS JACOB TRUPP,

Appellant, v.

HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK,

Appellee.

Pending before the Court is an appeal from an order of the United States 

Bankruptcy Court, the Honorable Christopher B. Latham presiding, entered on 

September 28, 2016. The challenged order awarded Appellant Travis Jacob Trupp

civil contempt damages against Appellee Higgs Fletcher & Mack (“HFM”) for its 

willful discharge injunction violation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). The parties 

have fully briefed the issues presented to the Court. For the reasons set forth below, 

the bankruptcy court’s order is affirmed.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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I.

BACKGROUND1

On January 14, 2009, Trupp retained HFM to represent him in a family law 

dispute. Daniel C. Herbert (“Mr. Herbert”) of HFM was the lead attorney. HFM’s 

services continued through October 7, 2013, at which time Trupp accrued a balance 

of $158,534 in unpaid legal fees. 

On August 4, 2014, Trupp retained Doan Law Firm (“DLF”) to seek Chapter 

7 relief. On the same day, DLF sent HFM a cease and desist letter explaining that 

Trupp would soon be seeking bankruptcy protection. Trupp then filed his Chapter 

7 petition on November 29, 2014. Thereafter, Trupp’s bankruptcy case proceeded 

in the normal course with discharge entered on March 9, 2015. HFM received notice 

of the discharge’s entry on March 12, 2015. The case was closed on the following 

day.

On May 13, 2015, HFM, through its attorney Catherine Morrison (“Ms. 

Morrison”), brought suit against Trupp in the San Diego Superior Court for breach 

of contract for failure to pay $158,534 in legal fees (“State Court Action”). On May 

20, 2015, Trupp was served with the summons and complaint. Two days later, Trupp 

and DLF entered into a fee agreement to prosecute a discharge injunction violation 

against HFM.2

 On June 1, 2015, DLF filed a general demurrer in the State Court

Action, citing Trupp’s discharge. Prior to filing the demurrer, DLF did not contact 

HFM regarding the State Court Action constituting a violation of the discharge 

injunction. HFM was served with a notice of the demurrer on June 4, 2015. Ms. 

 1 The bankruptcy court’s order presents the relevant factual background and 

procedural history of this case, which the parties do not dispute. For purposes of 

brevity, the Court will summarize only the facts relevant to this appeal.

2 The parties agreed that DLF would receive a 40% contingency fee for any sum 

recovered, including damages and attorneys’ fees, plus unpaid costs. In addition, 

regardless of whether Trupp discharged DLF or DLF withdrew from representation, 

DLF could file an application for fees and costs in the bankruptcy court based on 

$495/hour for partners, $400/hour for associates, and $125/hour for paralegal staff.

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Morrison reviewed the demurrer on June 16, 2015, and requested the State Court 

Action’s dismissal with prejudice on the following day. 

On August 19, 2015, Trupp filed an application for order to show cause

(“OSC”) as to why HFM should not be held in contempt for its alleged violation of 

the discharge injunction. In the application, Trupp asserted HFM intentionally 

violated the discharge injunction by bringing the State Court Action. As a result, 

Trupp claimed he (1) incurred actual damages exceeding $5,300, (2) experienced 

extreme emotional distress, sleepiness nights, anxiety, and other anguish, (3) spent 

over 100 hours responding to the complaint and locating paperwork, (4) delayed his 

search for employment due to the need to reschedule an industry certification 

examination, and (5) experienced stress when taking his tests. Trupp contended the 

stress caused by the State Court Action “was far worse than his lengthy divorce and 

all the combat missions he flew over Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan while under 

enemy fire.” (Record on Appeal (“ROA”) at 226.) 

After hearing Trupp’s application, the bankruptcy court issued an OSC, 

concluding Trupp had made a prima facie showing of a discharge injunction 

violation. Following the evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court issued an order, 

finding that HFM willfully violated the discharge injunction and should face civil 

contempt sanctions under § 105(a). The court, however, found that Trupp failed to 

conspicuously mitigate his damages for the following reasons:

Simply put, there was no need to file the demurrer when the entire 

matter could have been resolved by calling or writing HFM. HFM and 

Ms. Morrison stated convincingly that they would have acted 

immediately had DLF notified them of their violation. The court 

accepts that. Indeed, the entire matter could have been resolved in 

about an hour: (1) 30 minutes to analyze the facts (HFM received notice 

of the bankruptcy filing; its debt was scheduled; no nondischargeability 

suits were filed; HFM received notice of the discharge’s entry; and 

HFM filed a post-discharge collection action); and (2) 30 minutes to 

explain to Debtor. This could have been done as soon as Debtor 

contacted DLF on May 22, 2015. Instead, DLF prepared the demurrer 

and filed it ten days later....

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(Record on Appeal at 236.) 

The bankruptcy court awarded Trupp civil contempt damages in the amount 

of $1,067.50, consisting of $500 in general damages, $217.50 in demurrer filing fees, 

and $350 in attorneys’ fees. The order was entered on September 28, 2016, and 

Trupp timely appealed.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The bankruptcy court’s decision to impose civil contempt sanctions for a 

violation of the discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. In re Nash, 464 B.R. 874, 878 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). On 

appeal, the district court reviews the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear 

error and reviews its conclusions of law de novo. In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc., 503 

F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2007). Under the abuse of discretion standard, the first step 

is to determine de novo whether the court applied the correct legal rule. United 

States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). If it failed to 

do so, it abused its discretion. Mujica v. AirScan, Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 589 (9th Cir.

2014). If the court applied the correct legal rule, the second step is to determine 

whether the court’s application of the law to the facts was: “(1) ‘illogical,’ (2) 

‘implausible,’ or (3) without ‘support in inferences that may be drawn from the 

record.’” Id. (quoting Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262). “To reverse for abuse of 

discretion [the Court] must have a definite and firm conviction that the bankruptcy 

court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached.” In re 

Hansen, 368 B.R. 868, 875 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 

III.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in determining 

the amount of civil contempt damages. Initially, Appellant argues the bankruptcy 

court applied an incorrect legal standard when it held that he had a duty to mitigate 

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his damages. The Court disagrees because “the law is well established that in 

determining reasonable damages, the bankruptcy court ‘must examine whether the 

debtor could have mitigated the damages....’” Lumetta v. Arborlake Homeowners 

Ass’n, No. 16CV1817-AJB (JLB), 2017 WL 1967327, at *6 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 

2017) (quoting In re Roman, 283 B.R. 1, 12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)); see also In re 

Oh, No. ADV. 03-05342-ASW, 2008 WL 8448837, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 16, 

2008); In re Cutting, No. 14-60309-7, 2015 WL 4331152, at *3 (Bankr. D. Mont. 

July 15, 2015); In re Moreno, 479 B.R. 553, 570 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 

Specifically, bankruptcy courts consider the following two factors when awarding

attorneys’ fees as sanctions: “‘(1) what expenses or costs resulted from the violation 

and (2) what portion of those costs was reasonable, as opposed to costs that could 

have been mitigated.’” In re Roman, 283 B.R. at 12 (quoting In re GeneSys, Inc., 

273 B.R. 290, 296 (Bankr. D.C. 2001) (applying contempt sanctions under § 105)). 

Therefore, Appellant’s argument is without merit.

Moreover, Appellant argues the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by 

“fail[ing] to properly apply the legal standard of ‘duty to mitigate,’ assuming one 

exists.” (Opening Br. at 32.) Appellant, however, fails to identify the bankruptcy 

court’s misapplication of such legal standard. He merely states the bankruptcy court 

misunderstood In re Roman. Appellant’s argument is devoid of any “citations to the 

authorities and parts of the record on which the Appellant relies.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 

8014(a)(8). The Court therefore declines to address this argument because it is 

waived. See Lumetta, 2017 WL 1967327, at *5. Appellant also contends the 

bankruptcy court applied an incorrect legal standard by second-guessing his legal 

strategy in filing the demurrer when it found that he did not mitigate his damages. 

In support, he relies on language taken out of context from In re Roman and case 

law irrelevant to the present action. As stated above, In re Roman held that when 

awarding attorneys’ fees as sanctions, the bankruptcy court must determine whether 

the fees or costs resulting from the violation were reasonable or could have been 

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mitigated. The bankruptcy court did just that. The court evaluated the requested 

costs and fees and determined these expenses could have been mitigated. Based on 

the bankruptcy court’s findings, it has been made sufficiently clear that any brief 

communication by DLF with HFM regarding the discharge injunction would have 

led to the prompt and full resolution of the State Court Action, and there would have 

been no need to incur additional attorneys’ fees and costs. The court found that Ms.

Morrison stated convincingly that HFM would have acted immediately had DLF 

notified them of their violation. In fact, when Ms. Morrison discovered Appellant’s 

discharge, she dismissed the State Court Action with prejudice the following day. 

Subsequently, DLF engaged in settlement negotiations with HFM for two months, 

without success, thereby further incurring more attorneys’ fees. The bankruptcy 

court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in applying In re Roman to find that 

Appellant failed to mitigate his damages.

Lastly, Appellant contends the bankruptcy court misapplied the proper legal 

standard for determining reasonable attorneys’ fees when it reduced the requested 

hourly rate from $495 to $350.3

 Specifically, Appellant claims the court misapplied 

11 U.S.C. § 330 when it compared the requested hourly rate with those charged by 

comparably skilled practitioners in bankruptcy cases rather than non-bankruptcy 

cases. Section 330(a) provides that courts may determine “reasonable 

compensation” by considering “the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, 

taking into account all relevant factors, including ... (F) whether the compensation 

is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled 

 3 Appellant also contends without any analysis the Court misapplied the legal 

standard when it reduced DLF’s requested hours to one hour. The Court deems this 

argument waived because it is devoid of any “citations to the authorities and parts 

of the record on which the Appellant relies.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8014(a)(8); see In re 

Sedgwick, 560 B.R. 786, 792 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“an issue has been waived if it is 

merely listed in the opening brief without being addressed in the argument section.”) 

(citation omitted).

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practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) & 

(a)(3)(F). The court, however, “may ... award compensation that is less than the 

amount of compensation that is requested.” Id. at § 330(a)(2). As both parties 

recognize, “It is well settled that the burden is on the attorney claiming a fee in a 

bankruptcy proceeding to establish the value of his services.” Bayer Wishman & 

Leotta v. Danielson, No. EDCV 13-01430 DDP, 2014 WL 4187815, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 

Aug. 22, 2014) (quotation omitted). A party seeking fees must provide “satisfactory 

evidence” that its fees “are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar 

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” 

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). Typically, “[a]ffidavits of the [party’s] 

attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate 

determinations in other cases ... are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market 

rate.” U. Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 

1990). “Where a party seeking fees has not provided sufficient evidence of the 

reasonableness of its fees, a trial court is entitled substantial discretion in 

determining appropriate fees and costs.” Danielson, 2014 WL 4187815, at *3

(citations omitted); see Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Group Property Management, Inc., 

295 F.3d 1065 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Where a district court does not have before it 

adequate evidence of prevailing market rates, the court may use other relevant 

factors, including its own knowledge, to establish the rate”). 

Here, Appellant requested an hourly rate of $390 for Mr. Doan. The record, 

however, shows Appellant has failed to produce satisfactory evidence that the 

requested rate is in line with those prevailing in the community of comparable 

services in non-bankruptcy cases. All that Appellant has produced are an affidavit 

of Mr. Doan, which says nothing about the prevailing market rate in the community,

billing entries, and a fee agreement between DLF and Appellant. See Carson v. 

Billings Police Dep’t, 470 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the prevailing 

market rate—not the individual contract between the attorney and the client—

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“provides the standard for lodestar calculations”). In the absence of such evidence, 

the bankruptcy court considered Mr. Doan’s experience and qualifications and 

determined a reasonable hourly rate for his services rendered based on the court’s 

own assessment of the appropriate value of the services. Because Appellant failed 

to meet his burden of establishing reasonable hourly rate and the bankruptcy court 

has wide discretion in the award of fees, the bankruptcy court did not err in 

determining a reasonable hourly rate of $ 350/hour.4

 Accordingly, the court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining the amount of civil contempt damages. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the order of the bankruptcy court is hereby affirmed. The 

Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19, 2017

 4 Appellant contends DLF’s hourly rates should have been subject to a multiplier. 

As Appellant acknowledges, however, he failed to raise this argument before the 

bankruptcy court. The Court therefore declines to address it because it is waived. 

See Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not hear an issue raised for the first time on 

appeal.”); In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 

2010) (an issue will generally be deemed waived on appeal if the argument was not 

raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it).

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