Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02685/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02685-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ABAN ABIEL, 

Petitioner,

v. 

R.J. RACKLEY, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 16cv2685-MMA (JMA) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

[Doc. No. 1] 

AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner Aban Abiel (“Petitioner” or “Abiel”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, 

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 

second degree murder conviction in San Diego Superior case number SCD244879. (Pet. 

at 1, ECF No. 1 “Pet.”)1

 The Court has reviewed the Petition, the Answer and 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, the Traverse, the 

lodgments, and all supporting documents submitted by both parties. For the reasons set 

                                                                

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Order refer to those imprinted by the court’s 

electronic case filing system. 

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forth below, the Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and DECLINES 

to issue a certificate of appealabilty. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from those facts, are entitled to a statutory presumption of correctness). 

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion: 

Prosecution Evidence 

On February 17, 2012, Abiel attended an event at “Club Kabanas” in 

Clairemont (the club), a location used for parties and gatherings. Also there 

were Faroog Maluahi, Madol Wiir, Kedid Manon and victim Marko Aluat. 

All of the men were friends from the Sudanese community. Aluat and Wiir 

were best friends. At some point, Abiel told Manon and Kuol Monythot, 

who was acting as a security guard, that Aluat had pushed him. Abiel was 

visibly upset. Manon told Abiel not to take it seriously; that Aluat was just 

playing around. After Manon returned to the club, he heard a fight erupt, 

and when he went outside he saw Abiel and Wiir fighting. Abiel was 

screaming and angry, exclaiming at one point, “You a bitch homie.” 

[Footnote 2: Manon identified Abiel’s voice on a 911 call recorded at 3:34 

a.m. on February 18, 2012. In that call, an unidentified man (No. 1) says, 

“Hey, stop. Aban,” and tells everyone to go home. Another unidentified 

man says, “I’m not the one (unintelligible). He trying to do this because 

Marko [Aluat] get mad and whatever then he try to come (unintelligible) 

mother fucker (unintelligible) tonight.” The first unidentified man says, 

“Aban, Aban, Aban, Aban, Aban, Aban, c’mon man (unintelligible)

everybody gotta leave, man (unintelligible) just leave.” He then urges Abiel 

to get in the car to leave because he did not want to get arrested.] Police 

arrived and told everyone to go home. 

Manon and Maluahi left the club and drove to Maluahi’s apartment. 

While in the car, Abiel called Maluahi and asked to speak with Manon. 

Abiel was cussing at Manon and told him, “I’m going to beat you if I get 

you.” Manon asked what he had done; he did not understand why Abiel was 

acting hostile toward him. When Maluahi and Manon got to Maluahi’s 

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house, Abiel was there. As Manon was getting out of the car, Abiel came 

running up yelling and cussing, and started to attack him. The men argued, 

shoving each other, with Manon trying to get Abiel off of him. Monythot 

and Maluahi broke up the fight, and police eventually arrived. A police 

officer took Manon home. Manon was crying and upset. Abiel, Maluahi, 

Monythot and Maluahi’s girlfriend returned to Maluahi’s apartment, where 

they looked unsuccessfully for Abiel’s car keys. Because Abiel had parked 

on the sidewalk illegally, he decided to sleep in his car so it would not get 

towed. Maluahi gave Abiel a blanket and returned to his apartment to sleep. 

After Manon got home, he called several people, including Aluat and 

Abiel, to find out why Abiel was acting in such a way. Abiel accused 

Manon of taking his car keys and hung up. Manon denied taking Abiel’s 

keys, but later realized he in fact had them in his pants pocket. Manon 

decided to return to Maluahi’s house to return a parking ticket and end his 

association with the men. He planned to walk there, but while he talked to 

Aluat on the phone, Aluat told him he wanted to go with him. [Footnote 3 

omitted.] 

At around 4:00 a.m. or 5:00 a.m. on February 18, 2012, Aluat called 

his girlfriend, Tonisha Alexander, to pick him up from Wiir’s house. 

According to Alexander, Aluat received multiple phone calls from the time 

he got in her car; his phone was “constantly ringing.” Aluat was not angry, 

upset or drunk. After several hours, Aluat instructed Alexander to drive to 

Manon’s house to pick up Manon, who Alexander noticed was anxious. 

Aluat then told her to go to Maluahi’s house. When they arrived, Manon left 

the car first and started walking to Maluahi’s house. Aluat spoke briefly 

with Alexander, who drove away when Aluat waved her off. 

Before Manon got to Maluahi’s door, he heard Aluat and Abiel 

yelling and rushed back to them. Abiel had a knife and was standing next to 

Aluat, who was on the ground. Alexander, who had returned to the scene 

after looking back and seeing Aluat lying in the street, was screaming, “He 

had a knife, he had a knife.” Manon asked Abiel if he wanted to stab him 

with it. Abiel punched Manon and walked toward Maluahi’s apartment. 

Manon followed and when Abiel got close to Maluahi’s door, Abiel yelled 

for Maluahi to come out and said, “These people, they come to jump me.” 

Manon told Abiel they had not come there to jump him. Abiel called 911 

while he walked into the alley and threw the knife into a dumpster, then 

returned and punched Manon again. Abiel denied to the 911 operator having 

any weapons, but claimed he had been attacked in his car and that he had hit 

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Aluat, who went down and needed an ambulance. Police arrived while 

Abiel was still speaking with the 911 operator. An officer handcuffed Abiel, 

who had a small abrasion on his thumb and a small cut on the inside of his 

lip. Abiel complained to the officer that his face hurt, but he declined 

medical assistance. 

Nineke Koopman, who lived in the area, was awoken early in the 

morning of February 18, 2012, by loud yelling and called police. She saw 

four to six black individuals, mostly men, yelling back and forth. When 

police arrived, some of the individuals left and an officer offered one of the 

men a ride home. Koopman heard yelling again at about 6:45 that morning. 

She looked out to see the same three or four individuals yelling at each 

other. One of the men, who she identified at trial as Abiel, advanced and 

took a swing at the other, who had been backing away. The man who was 

trying to get away fell to the ground and never got up. A third man was 

watching the fight and another was off to the side on his phone. The woman 

did not see the falling man hit kick or shove Abiel, or physically attack him. 

Koopman saw Alexander drive up and jump out of her vehicle while Abiel 

walked back toward the apartment complex. 

Aluat suffered a stab wound to his chest, and was in a coma from the 

time of the stabbing until his feeding tube was removed, resulting in his 

death. Aluat would not have died but for the stabbing, and the medical 

examiner ruled his death a homicide. 

Defense Evidence 

Abiel testified in his own defense. He claimed that while at the club, 

Aluat approached him and he extended his hand but that Aluat responded by 

punching him in the head. Abiel asked him to stop, but Aluat pushed him. 

Abiel then spoke to Monythot, who removed Aluat from the club. Abiel 

testified he left the club at about 3:00 a.m. and while he walked to his car, 

was approached by Wiir, Manon and Aluat. Abiel told Wiir that Aluat had 

punched him, and the men began pushing and punching each other. Aluat 

and Manon also punched Abiel, who fought back. Police eventually arrived. 

While Abiel was heading home, he called Manon to ask why he was

fighting with him but Manon ended the call. He then called Maluahi, who 

was with Manon. Abiel asked to speak with Manon, but Manon again ended 

the call. Abiel went to Maluahi’s house, and when Manon eventually 

arrived there and saw him, Manon “rushed” him. Abiel grabbed Manon, 

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who started throwing punches. Police arrived and Manon walked away, but 

as soon as police left, he returned and tried to engage in another fight with 

Abiel. Police returned and gave Manon a ride home. After police left, Abiel 

could not find his car keys, and tried to call Manon to beg for his keys. 

Manon cussed at him and ended the call. Abiel decided to sleep in his car, 

which was blocking the sidewalk. While he was resting, he texted his 

employer and went through his phone. 

Abiel testified that at around 7:00 a.m., his driver’s side door opened. 

When Abiel opened his eyes, he saw Aluat moving toward him. According 

to Abiel, Aluat punched him and said, “I got you now, motherfucker.” Aluat 

punched Abiel two or three times while Abiel tried to fight his way out of 

the car. Manon jumped in to punch Abiel with his left hand, and Abiel saw 

a knife in his right hand. Abiel grabbed Manon’s right hand, hit it, and the 

knife fell to the ground. As soon as Abiel picked up the knife, Aluat closed 

in on him, punching him and grabbing him by the neck. The men were 

yelling and Abiel was screaming for help. When Aluat choked him, Abiel 

jabbed him in the back with the knife, then jumped back and slashed at Aluat 

when Aluat closed in on him again. Manon walked away, and Abiel called 

911. He testified he did not tell the 911 operator about the knife because he 

panicked, the incident was still fresh, and everything happened fast. 

On cross-examination, Abiel admitted that he walked to a dumpster in 

the alley and tossed the knife in it. He also admitted that he lied to police 

about using a knife and stabbing Aluat. 

(Lodgment No. 7 at 2-7.) 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On June 10, 2013, the San Diego District Attorney filed a one-count amended 

information charging Petitioner with murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)). (Lodgment No. 

2 at 6-7.) In the amended information, it was also alleged that Abiel personally used a 

deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of the murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 

1192.7(c)(23) & 12022(b)(1)). (Id.) 

 On June 25, 2013, a jury convicted Abiel of second degree murder, and found the 

deadly weapon allegation to be true. (Id. at 198; see also Lodgment No. 1, vol. 9 at 1016.) 

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On September 6, 2013, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 16 years-to-life in prison.2

 

(Lodgment No. 2 at 195; see also Lodgment No. 1, vol. 10 at 1026.) 

 Abiel appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, arguing (1) the 

trial court improperly instructed the jury on the mutual combat exception to self-defense, 

under CALCRIM No. 3471; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support an instruction on 

mutual combat; (3) the instruction erroneously prevented the jury from considering selfdefense and imperfect self-defense; and (4) the cumulative effect of the errors required 

reversal of his conviction. (See Lodgment No. 4.) On December 17, 2014, the appellate 

court denied Abiel’s claims and affirmed the conviction. (See Lodgment No. 7.) On 

January 22, 2015, Abiel filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, 

raising the same four claims. (Lodgment No. 8.) The court denied the petition on March 

13, 2015, without comment or citation. (Lodgment No. 9.) 

 Abiel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal 

on April 18, 2016. (Lodgment No. 10.) In it, Petitioner raised the same four claims 

presented in his direct appeal and added three additional, but related, claims: his 

conviction was unconstitutional because there was overwhelming evidence presented at 

trial that he acted in self-defense; he was denied his right to present a defense when the 

trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury on self-defense; and trial counsel was 

ineffective by failing to develop exculpatory evidence regarding self-defense and 

imperfect self-defense. (See id.) On April 9, 2016, the appellate court denied the petition 

in a short, reasoned opinion. (Lodgment No. 11.) 

 Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme 

Court on May 17, 2016. (Lodgment No. 12.) The court denied the petition with an order 

which stated: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. See People v. Duvall, 9 

                                                                

2

 The trial court sentenced Abiel to 15 years-to-life on the second degree murder count plus one year for 

the deadly weapon enhancement. (See Lodgment No. 2 at 198; see also Lodgment No. 1, vol. 10 at 

1026.)

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Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995); In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 225 (1965); In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 

2d 756, 759 (1953); In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949); In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 

709, 723 (1947).” (Lodgment No. 14.) 

On October 5, 2016, Abiel filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus.3

 (ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer and Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities on March 10, 2017. (ECF No. 19.) On April 12, 2017, Petitioner filed a 

Traverse. (ECF No. 22.) On August 18, 2017, the Court determined that neither a 

Report and Recommendation nor oral argument were necessary for disposition of this 

case. (ECF No. 23.) 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

 Abiel’s Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: (1) resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

 A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the Court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring 

only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

order to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an 

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably 

conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). 

                                                                

3

 Abiel originally filed the petition in the District Court for the Central District of California. That 

Court transferred the case to this District on October 28, 2016. (ECF No. 11.) 

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 A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 

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8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

[Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. 

DISCUSSION

 In his Petition, Abiel raises claims related to jury instruction, sufficiency of 

evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the claims are not consistently 

enumerated in the Petition and its attachments and some of the claims overlap and/or are 

repetitive,4

 the Court has grouped Petitioner’s claims as follows: (1) whether the trial 

court improperly instructed the jury on “mutual combat” and self-defense, in violation of 

his right to present a defense and his due process rights; (2) whether there was 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction, in violation of his due process rights; and 

(3) whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in violation of his 

Sixth Amendment rights. (See generally, Pet. at 5-6, 9-13, 33-34.) 

 Respondent argues that, as to claims one and two, the state court’s denial was 

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. (See 

Mem. of P.&A. Supp. Answer at 18-28, ECF No. 19-1.) As to claim three, Respondent 

argues that Petitioner has failed to state a claim with sufficient legal and factual 

specificity. (See id. at 28-29.) 

1. Right to Present a Defense and Jury Instructions 

Abiel argues that his right to present a defense and his right to due process were 

violated when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on “mutual combat” and selfdefense. Specifically, he contends there was insufficient evidence to support instructing 

                                                                

4

 For instance, Petitioner lists two specific grounds for relief in the form petition while simply directing 

the Court to “see attachment” for three additional grounds. (See Pet. at 5-6.) In various attachments he 

lists seven errors (many of which overlap or are repetitive) in one document, and in another section 

enumerates four claims. (See Pet. at 30-31, 33-34.) 

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the jury regarding “mutual combat” pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3471. Further, he claims 

that by erroneously instructing the jury on “mutual combat,” the trial court prevented the 

jury from properly considering his self-defense theory. (See Pet. at 9, 33, 50-52, see also

Traverse at 10, 18-19.) 

Abiel raised this claim in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court 

and it was denied without comment or citation. (See Lodgment Nos. 8 & 9.) The Court 

therefore looks through to the last reasoned decision to address the claim, that of the 

California Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The appellate court denied the 

claim, stating: 

A. Standard of Review

“We review de novo whether a jury instruction correctly states the 

law. [Citations.] Our task is to determine whether the trial court ‘“fully and 

fairly instructed on the applicable law.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] When 

instructions are claimed to be conflicting or ambiguous, ‘we inquire whether 

the jury was “reasonably likely” to have construed them in a manner that 

violates the defendant’s rights.’ [Citation.] We look to the instructions as a 

whole and the entire record of trial, including the arguments of counsel. 

[Citations.] We assume that the jurors are ‘“‘intelligent persons and capable 

of understanding and correlating all jury instructions . . . given.’”’ 

[Citation.] If reasonably possible, we will interpret the instructions to 

support the judgment rather than to defeat it. [Citation.] Instructional error 

affects a defendant’s substantial rights if the error was prejudicial under the 

applicable standard for determining harmless error.” (People v. Franco, 

supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 720; italics omitted; see also People v. Bryant

(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433.) 

B. Contentions

 Abiel contends CALCRIM No. 3471 does not accurately reflect the 

law with regard to the mutual combat exception to the right of self-defense. 

He argues the instruction, which he maintains has two “critical flaws,” 

includes language that permits a finding of mutual combat even when the 

prearrangement, mutual consent or agreement to fight did not precede the 

initiation of hostility. Abiel argues the first flaw in the instruction is its 

language indicating a fight is mutual combat when it is continued by express 

or implied mutual consent, and not merely when the mutual consent 

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precedes the initiation of hostilities. He argues the second flaw is that the 

instruction states the agreement must occur “before the claim to self-defense 

arose.” According to Abiel, based on the evidence, the jurors could 

reasonably have concluded that the final confrontation between Abiel and 

Aluat, culminating in Aluat’s stabbing, was a continuation of the fight or 

fights that occurred at the club and that the men’s conduct evinced an 

implied agreement to continue the fight before Manon introduced his knife. 

Thus, Abiel argues, the jury would have found under the given self-defense 

and mutual combat instructions that the continuation of the fight preceded 

the moment when he reasonably feared death or great bodily injury, and he 

therefore “forfeited his right to self-defense by the very exercise of that right 

because he did not first refuse to fight, communicate his peaceful intentions 

to Aluat and give Aluat an opportunity to desist.” Abiel argues this is an 

“absurd” result under People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033 (Ross). 

C. Ross

In Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, the defendant and a woman 

“engaged in a hostile verbal exchange, at the culmination of which she 

slapped [the defendant, who] responded with a blow that fractured her 

cheekbone.” (Ross, at p. 1036.) The defendant was convicted of aggravated 

assault and battery after the trial court instructed the jury, over defense 

objection, that a person charged with assault cannot successfully plead selfdefense if he was engaged in mutual combat with the alleged victim. (Id. at 

p. 1042 & fn. 8.) The trial court refused the deliberating jurors’ request for a 

legal definition of “mutual combat,” telling them there was no legal 

definition and instead to rely on the common, everyday meaning of those 

words. (Id. at p. 1042.) The appellate court held this was error; that the 

phrase mutual combat was “too broad to convey the correct legal principle” 

and the jury was therefore “left . . . free to suppose that any exchange of 

blows disqualifies both participants from claiming a right of self-defense. In 

fact the doctrine applies only to a violent confrontation conducted pursuant 

to prearrangement, mutual consent, or an express or implied agreement to 

fight.” (Id. at pp. 1036, 1047, 1056.) 

The Ross court explained: “Here the jury was told that participation 

in ‘mutual combat’ conditionally bars the participants from pleading selfdefense if either is prosecuted for assaulting the other. The ‘combat’ 

element of this rule is clear enough, at least for present purposes. It suggests 

two (or more) persons fighting, whether by fencing with swords, having a go 

at fisticuffs, slashing at one another with switchblades, or facing off with 

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six-guns on the dusty streets of fabled Dodge City.” (Ross, supra, 155 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1043, fn. omitted.) The court cautioned that under the 

ordinary meaning of the words mutual combat, “any combat may be

correctly described as ‘mutual’ so long as it is seen to possess a quality of 

reciprocity or exchange. . . . If A walks up to B and punches him without 

warning, and a fight ensues, the fight may be characterized as ‘mutual 

combat’ in the ordinary sense of those words. But as this example 

demonstrates, the phrase so understood may readily describe situations in 

which the law plainly grants one of the combatants a right of self-defense.” 

(Id. at p. 1044.) Thus, the court observed, “the phrase ‘mutual combat’ is 

not only ambiguous but a misnomer. The mutuality triggering the doctrine 

inheres not in the combat but in the preexisting intent to engage in it. Old 

but intact caselaw confirms that as used in this state’s law of self-defense, 

‘mutual combat’ means not merely a reciprocal exchange of blows but one 

pursuant to mutual intention, consent, or agreement preceding the initiation 

of hostilities. . . . ‘Both before and since [the 1872 enactment of Penal Code 

section 197] the phrase “mutual combat” has been in general use to 

designate the branch of the law of self-defense relating to homicides 

committed in the course of a duel or other fight begun or continued by 

mutual consent or agreement, express or implied. [Citations.]’ (Italics 

added.) In other words, it is not merely the combat, but the preexisting 

intention to engage in it, that must be mutual.” (Id. at p. 1045, fn. omitted.) 

In a footnote at this point, the Ross court stated: “Respondent glosses over 

this requirement by asserting that the doctrine requires only that both parties 

‘want to fight.’ Missing is the critical requirement that this common 

intention or desire must precede the first assaultive conduct, or at least the 

first conduct sufficient to trigger a right of self-defense in its target. If A 

triggers such a right in B by striking him, B does not forfeit that right merely 

because the blow makes him ‘want to fight.’ Hot blood may cause him to 

exercise the right unreasonably, and to that extent he will forfeit it. But his 

‘want[ing] to fight’ does not make it a case of mutual combat.” (Id. at p. 

1045, fn. 14.) The court finally summarized: “We are satisfied that ‘mutual 

combat’ consists of fighting by mutual intention or consent, as most clearly 

reflected in an express or implied agreement to fight. The agreement need 

not have all the characteristics of a legally binding contract; indeed, it 

necessarily lacks at least one such characteristic: a lawful object. But there 

must be evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that both 

combatants actually consented or intended to fight before the claimed 

occasion for self-defense arose.” (Id. at pp. 1046–1047.) 

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In Ross, the evidence was insufficient to establish any such 

arrangement or agreement. That is, the appellate court held the evidence 

showed “an exchange of belligerent comments culminating in an impulsive 

and unexpected blow by [the woman] to which defendant responded with a 

combination, flurry, or barrage of blows,” and therefore no reasonable juror 

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that when the blows were 

exchanged, both parties had formed the intent to engage in a fight. (Ross, 

supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) Furthermore, the appellate court 

concluded a properly instructed jury would have understood that the 

defendant was entitled to defend himself if he actually and reasonably 

anticipated “that a further blow -- even a slap -- was imminent.” (Id. at p. 

1055.) And the jury’s question about the instruction suggested it 

misunderstood it in precisely the way the appellate court outlined, and thus 

misapplied it to improperly disqualify the defendant from asserting his right 

to defend himself. (Id. at p. 1056.) For these reasons, the court concluded 

the error was prejudicial. (Id. at pp. 1057-1058.) 

D. Analysis 

We agree with the People that CALCRIM No. 3471 is a legally 

accurate and unambiguous instruction that did not mislead the jury or require 

it to conclude that Abiel was somehow precluded from asserting a claim of 

self defense. As the People point out, the instruction, as read to the jury, 

included a definition of mutual combat as a fight that “began or continued by 

mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or 

implied and must occur before the claim to self defense arose.”

Under that definition and the instruction as a whole, we conclude a 

reasonable jury would not read it as Abiel proposes: that a person’s conduct 

in responding in self defense may become mutual combat simply because 

the person exercising his self-defense right “continues” the fight by fighting 

back. The instruction makes clear that there must be proof of an agreement 

to commence the fight or continue it if it was already in progress. Thus, the 

jury would not have been misled by the instruction in this manner; stated 

another way, there is no “reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or 

misapplied [CALCRIM No. 3471’s] words.” (People v. Campos (2007) 156 

Cal.App.4th 1228, 1237; see also People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 

777.) Abiel criticizes the instruction for informing the jury that the 

agreement must occur before the claim of self-defense arose, rather than, as 

Ross assertedly requires, before the “‘initiation of hostilities.’” He 

maintains those are two different tests. But Ross does not support that 

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assertion or restrict the inquiry to one test; as summarized above, Ross

explains that a “critical requirement” of mutual combat is that the common 

intention precede “at least the first conduct sufficient to trigger a right of 

self-defense in its target” (Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045, fn. 14) 

and the court concluded that “there must be evidence from which the jury 

could reasonably find that both combatants actually consented or intended to 

fight before the claimed occasion for self-defense arose.” (Id. at p. 1047.) 

Thus, using Ross as a guide as Abiel does, the language of CALCRIM No. 

3471 is not legally erroneous. 

Nor does CALCRIM No. 3471 lead to absurd results, as Abiel 

maintains. In Ross, the absurdity arose because the trial court told the jurors 

to apply an everyday meaning of the phrase “mutual combat,” which without 

further definition allowed them to conclude that “any violent struggle 

between two or more people, however it came into being” was a situation of 

mutual combat. (Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1044.) However, the 

instruction used in the present case, which was applied to facts entirely 

different from those in Ross, complies with the law. Abiel’s self-serving 

version of events was that Aluat and Manon ambushed him while he was 

sleeping in his car, and that during Abiel’s scuffle with Aluat, Manon later 

produced a knife, which Abiel knocked from Manon’s hand, grabbed and 

used on Aluat, who was choking him. As the People point out, if we adopt 

that version of events, CALCRIM No. 3471 made clear that Abiel, who 

initially responded to Aluat with nondeadly force, was permitted to use 

deadly force when Manon responded with such sudden and deadly force 

(i.e., producing the knife) that Abiel could not withdraw from the fight, and 

in those circumstances, Abiel “was not required to try to stop fighting or 

communicate the desire to stop to the opponent, or give the opponent a 

chance to stop fighting.” (CALCRIM No. 3471.) If the jury was to adopt 

Abiel’s version of events, it would not conclude, given the entirety of the 

jury instructions, that Abiel forfeited his right to self-defense by acting in 

response to Manon’s production of a knife without giving Aluat an 

opportunity to desist. Our conclusion does not change by the fact that only 

one of the two men who assertedly attacked Abiel produced a knife. 

Furthermore, the court instructed the jury about Abiel’s right to 

defend himself (CALCRIM No. 505); specifically, that Abiel would act in 

lawful self-defense if he “reasonably believed that he was in imminent 

danger of being killed or suffering bodily injury or was in imminent danger 

of being killed or suffering great bodily injury”; he “reasonably believed that 

the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that 

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danger”; and he “used no more force than was reasonably necessary to 

defend against that danger.” [Footnote 5 omitted.] It further instructed that 

the jury could find Abiel guilty of voluntary manslaughter based on 

imperfect self-defense if he had an actual but unreasonable belief in the need 

to use deadly force to defend himself. And, it instructed the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 200 that “[s]ome of these instructions may not apply 

depending on your findings about the facts of the case. Do not assume just 

because I give a particular instruction that I am suggesting anything about 

the facts. [¶] After you have decided what the facts are, follow the 

instructions that do apply to the facts as you find them.” 

Under all of the instructions, if the jury found mutual combat did not 

occur under the facts of the case, they were told to disregard the reference to 

mutual combat. But this did not eliminate from the jury’s consideration 

evidence of self-defense or imperfect self-defense, on which the jury was 

instructed. We presume the jurors understood and were able to correlate all 

of the court’s instructions, and that their own intelligence and expertise 

prevented them from relying on a factually inadequate theory. (People v. 

Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1131 [“jurors’ ‘own intelligence and expertise 

will save them from’ the error of giving them ‘the option of relying upon a 

factually inadequate theory’”].) Accordingly, the circumstances demonstrate 

that the jury was in fact permitted to consider Abiel’s claim of self defense 

under proper instructions. 

(Lodgment No. 7 at 9-19.) 

 As an initial matter, to the extent Abiel contends the jury instructions regarding 

mutual combat and self-defense were erroneous under California state law, his claim in 

not cognizable. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (finding issues 

regarding state law are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review). An 

instructional error “does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus 

proceeding.” Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Van 

Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986) (claims that merely challenge 

correctness of jury instructions under state law cannot reasonably be construed to allege a 

deprivation of federal rights). 

To merit relief when an allegedly erroneous jury instruction is given, or an 

instruction is omitted, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so 

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infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 71-72; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). For instructional error to 

amount to a due process violation Petitioner must show both that the instruction was 

defective and that there was a “reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction 

in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009)

(quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“‘[I]t must be established not 

merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even “universally condemned,” 

but that it violated some [constitutional right].’”). 

In addition, due process requires that “‘criminal defendants be afforded a 

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 

904 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he right to present a defense ‘would be empty if it did not entail 

the further right to an instruction that allowed the jury to consider the defense.’” Bradley 

v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 

448 (7th Cir. 1995)). It is therefore well established that a criminal defendant is entitled 

to adequate instructions on the defense’s theory of the case. Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 

734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000). Failure to instruct on the theory of defense violates due process 

if “‘the theory is legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable.’” Clark, 450 

F.3d at 904-05 (quoting Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

However, a defendant is not entitled to have jury instructions phrased in his or her precise 

terms where the given instructions adequately embody the defense theory. United States 

v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 As noted above, Abiel argues that the jury was improperly instructed on selfdefense and mutual combat, thereby preventing him from presenting his theory of the 

case. The jury was given three instructions related to self-defense which are relevant 

here. First, it was instructed on justifiable homicide and self-defense under CALCRIM 

No. 505. In short, when a defendant has a reasonable belief that he is in imminent danger 

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of being killed or severely injured, that person may use reasonable force to defend him or 

herself.5

 Next, the trial court instructed the jury on “imperfect self-defense” and the 

lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, under CALCRIM No. 571, as follows: 

A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary 

manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because he acted in imperfect 

self-defense. If you conclude the defendant acted in complete self-defense 

his action was lawful and you must find him not guilty of any crime. The 

difference between complete self-defense and imperfect self-defense 

depends on whether the defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force 

was reasonable. The defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if: 

1. The defendant actually believed that he was in imminent danger 

                                                                

5

 The trial court’s instruction on self-defense under CALCRIM No. 505, in relevant part, as follows: 

The defendant is not guilty of murder or manslaughter if he was justified in killing 

someone in self-defense. The defendant acted in lawful self-defense if: 

1. The defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of 

being killed or suffering great bodily injury or was in imminent danger of being killed or 

suffering great bodily injury; 

2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force 

was necessary to defend against that danger; AND 

3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to 

defend against that danger. 

.... 

When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the 

circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a 

reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If 

the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually 

existed. . . . 

 . . . If you find that Marko Aluat threatened or harmed the defendant or others in 

the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct 

and beliefs were reasonable. 

Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past is justified in 

acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures against that person. 

(Lodgment No. 3 at 12-13.) 

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of being killed or suffering great bodily injury; and 

2. The defendant actually believed that the immediate use of 

deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger; but 

3. At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable. 

Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how 

likely the harm is believed to be. In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs, 

consider all the circumstances as they were known and appeared to the 

defendant. If you find that Marko Aluat threatened or harmed the defendant 

in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant’s 

beliefs. If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else 

that he reasonably associated with Marko Aluat, you may consider that 

threat in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs. . . 

. . .The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant was not acting in imperfect self-defense. If the People 

have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder. 

(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 9 at 952; see also Lodgment No. 3 at 15-16.) And finally, the trial 

court instructed the jury on “mutual combat” pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3741, as 

follows: 

 A person who engages in mutual combat has a right to self-defense 

only if: 

1. He actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting; 

2. He indicated, by word or by conduct, to his opponent, in a way 

that a reasonable person would understand, that he wanted to stop fighting 

and that he had stopped fighting; AND 

3. He gave his opponent a chance to stop fighting. 

If the defendant meets these requirements, he then had a right to selfdefense if the opponent continued to fight. 

However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and the 

opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant 

could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to defend 

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himself with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting or 

communicate the desire to stop to the opponent, or give the opponent a 

chance to stop fighting. 

A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by mutual 

consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied 

and must occur before the claim to self-defense arose. 

(Lodgment No. 3 at 18-19; see also Lodgment No. 1, vol. 9 at 965-57.) 

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM No. 3741 because 

(1) the instruction misstated California law, and (2) there was insufficient evidence of 

“mutual combat” to support giving the instruction. He also appears to argue that by 

giving CALCRIM No. 3471, the trial court effectively negated the other self-defense 

instructions provided under CALCRIM Nos. 505 and 571. (See Pet. at 33, see also 

Traverse at 18-19.) 

Upon review of the relevant record, the Court concludes that the giving of 

CALCRIM No. 3471 in the context of this case did not violate petitioner’s right to due 

process. First, as the California Court of Appeal concluded, CALCRIM No. 3471 

accurately described California law regarding self-defense and mutual combat. 

California Penal Code section 197(3) qualifies the right to self-defense by stating that if a 

defendant is “the assailant or engaged in mutual combat, [he] must really and in good 

faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was 

committed.” Cal. Penal Code § 197(3). Further, CALCRIM No. 3471 properly states 

that mutual combat must have begun “or continued by mutual consent or agreement” and 

that the agreement, whether express or implied, must occur prior to the self-defense 

claim. See People v. Ross, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1046-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 

(stating that both combatants must have “actually consented or intended to fight before 

the claimed occasion for self-defense arose”); see also People v. Johnson, 180 Cal. App. 

4th 702, 704-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). The Court must defer to the state’s interpretation 

of its own laws. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; see also Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 

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88 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal habeas courts must defer to state courts’ interpretations of 

their own state laws). 

Petitioner further argues that, even assuming the instruction was an accurate 

reflection of state law, the trial court erred in giving it because there were insufficient 

facts to support the prosecution’s “mutual combat” theory. The Court notes that 

Petitioner points to no clearly established Supreme Court authority which “prohibits a 

trial court from instructing a jury with factually inapplicable but accurate statement of 

state law.” Fernandez v. Montgomery, 182 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see 

also Steele v. Holland, 2017 WL 2021364, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2017) (“Petitioner 

does not cite, and the Court is not aware of any clearly established law that 

constitutionally prohibits a trial court from instructing a jury with a factually inapplicable 

but accurate statement of state law.”); Martinez v. Hollond, 2015 WL 10044281, at *18 

(C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2015) (Giving “an instruction which is not supported by the evidence 

is not a due process violation.” (citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted 

by, 2016 WL 552679 (C.D. Cal. 2016). As such, the state court’s rejection of this claim 

cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (“Given the lack of holdings from this

Court. . . , it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly 

established Federal law.’” (citation omitted)). 

Furthermore, even assuming that due process requires factual support for a jury 

instruction, in this case the prosecution presented ample evidence to support its theory 

that Abiel engaged in “mutual combat” with Aluat. (See generally, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 

9 at 980-82, 986-87.) Earlier in the evening, Abiel was in a fight with Wiir, Aluat’s best 

friend. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 376-78, 380-81; vol. 7 at 771-72, 809-10, 812-13.) 

After leaving the club (and a few hours before the stabbing), Abiel got in a fight with 

Manon. Several witnesses testified that when Manon arrived at Maluahi’s apartment, he 

got out of the car and Abiel immediately grabbed him and started yelling and swearing. 

A fight ensued between Abiel and Manon. Maluani, Monythot and Kafi had to break it 

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up. (Id., vol. 4 at 345-46, 352-53, 388, vol. 5 at 434-35.) Police arrived and the crowd 

dispersed. An officer drove Manon home. (Id., vol. 5 at 491.) The officer testified that 

Manon was very emotional and, at times, crying. (Id. at 490-91, 496-97.) 

Later that morning, Manon returned to Maluahi’s apartment, this time 

accompanied by Aluat. An eyewitness, Nineke Koopman, testified that she heard 

shouting outside her apartment. She looked out her window and saw three men, two of 

whom got into a physical altercation in the street. She later identified these two men as 

Abiel and Aluat. (Id., vol. 6 at 530, 533-34, 540.) She stated that Abiel was advancing 

toward Aluat while Aluat was “backing away trying to get away” from him. (Id. at 535.) 

Kooman noted that Aluat did not have his fists up in a combative stance. (Id. at 535-36.) 

Koopman testified that she saw Abiel hit Aluat, causing Aluat to fall to the ground. (Id.

at 534, 565.) She never saw Aluat with a knife. (Id. at 536.) Koopman stated that the 

third man was not involved in the physical fight and was standing 25 to 30 feet away. 

(Id. at 536, 540.) 

Based on this and other evidence presented at trial, it was the prosecution’s theory 

that when Manon and Aluat arrived, Abiel saw or heard them and got out of his car to 

confront them. A fight ensued between Abiel and Aluat during which Abiel stabbed 

Aluat two times. When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution’s theory, 

there is sufficient evidence to warrant giving the mutual combat instruction. See People 

v. Cole, 33 Cal. 4th 1158, 1206 (Cal. 2004) (“A trial court must instruct the jury on every 

theory that is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence that would allow a 

reasonable jury to make a determination in accordance with the theory presented under 

the proper standard of proof.”) 

Petitioner argues the jury should not have been instructed pursuant to CALCRIM 

No. 3471 because there was no evidence of a preexisting “mutual agreement or consent” 

to fight prior to the altercation. See CALCRIM No. 3471 (stating that a “fight is mutual 

combat when it began or continued by mutual consent or agreement”). He points to his 

own testimony that he was reclined on the front seat of his car with his eyes closed when 

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Aluat and Manon suddenly opened the door and began beating him. (Lodgment No. 1, 

vol. 7 at 786-87, vol. 8 at 832-35.) He testified that Manon had a knife, which Abiel 

managed to take from him. Petitioner only used the knife to defend himself from Aluat 

who continued to come at him. (Id., vol. 7 at 792-94; vol. 8 at 838, 841-42, 865.) In 

short, Abiel argues that, contrary to the prosecution’s theory, he was ambushed by Manon 

and Aluat. As such, he claims the mutual combat instruction rendered his trial 

fundamentally unfair. 

That Petitioner presented a different plausible theory at trial does not render the 

instruction regarding “mutual combat” erroneous. It was for the jury to evaluate the 

evidence and make the factual determination. Even assuming arguendo that the “mutual 

combat” instruction was not warranted by the facts, the trial court’s decision to give the 

challenged instruction did render Abiel’s trial fundamentally unfair. The instruction did 

not prevent the jury from finding that Abiel acted in self-defense or imperfect selfdefense. Rather, the instruction stated only that he could not legitimately claim selfdefense under specified circumstances. Indeed, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, 

CALCRIM No. 3471 did nothing to negate the jury instructions on perfect and imperfect 

self-defense. The jury was free to disregard the mutual combat instruction if it credited 

Petitioner’s version of the facts. The trial court specifically instructed the jury to follow 

only the instructions that applied to the facts of the case as they found them, stating: 

Some of these instructions may not apply, depending on your findings about 

the facts of the case. Do not assume just because I give a particular 

instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts. After you have 

decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that do apply to the facts 

as you find them. 

(Lodgment No. 3 at 2; Lodgment No. 9 at 934; see also CALCRIM No. 200.) The jury is 

presumed to have followed these instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 226 

(2000). 

Under the facts presented here, the mutual combat instruction did not “so infuse[ ] 

the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 

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219, 228 (1941). As such, the California Court of Appeal’s denial of the Petitioner’s jury 

instruction claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. 

Moreover, based on review of the entire record, the state court’s decision was not based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the 

state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) see also Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES habeas relief as to Petitioner’s jury instruction claim. 

2. Sufficiency of Evidence 

Next, Abiel claims there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction, in 

violation of his due process rights.6

 (Pet. at 5, 9-10, 52-54 see also Traverse at 2-3, 18-

19.) Specifically, he argues there is insufficient evidence to show a mutual agreement to 

fight before the physical altercation began. He contends there was insufficient evidence 

prove he had the requisite mental state required to support his second degree murder 

conviction. (See id.) 

Abiel raised this issue in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court, 

which was denied without comment or citation. (See Lodgment Nos. 8 & 9.) As such, 

the Court looks through to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, the last 

reasoned state court decision to address this issue. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The 

appellate court denied the claim, stating: 

Abiel contends that notwithstanding his arguments as to the legal 

correctness of CALCRIM No. 3471, we should reverse his conviction 

because there was insufficient evidence an agreement to fight existed before 

the initiation of hostilities to warrant giving the instruction. Abiel relies on 

the principles that the court errs by giving an instruction that, though correct, 

has no application to the facts of the case (People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 

at p. 1129) and that a judgment should be reversed when a review of the 

                                                                

6

 Petitioner also references the Eighth Amendment in his Petition. (See Pet. at 5.) The substance of his 

claim, however, is the insufficiency of the evidence to convict him of second degree murder, rather than 

disproportionality of his sentence. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (stating that 

the Eighth Amendment forbids “only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the 

crime”). 

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record demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury found a defendant 

guilty solely on the unsupported theory. (Id. at pp. 1129-1130.) According 

to Abiel, “[t]here can be no question but that the jury convicted [him] ‘solely 

on the unsupported theory’ that [he] did not act in lawful self defense”; he 

argues the evidence shows Manon and Aluat came to the scene of Aluat’s 

stabbing knowing about Abiel’s presence and only after Manon already had 

fought with Abiel and others at that location. 

In making this argument, Abiel disregards evidence from which the 

jury could have reasonably inferred that Abiel and Aluat, who were involved 

in the original dispute over Aluat pushing Abiel at the club, had mutually 

agreed to continue the earlier altercation and fight out their differences 

outside Maluahi’s apartment. Though Abiel and Wiir had scuffled outside 

of the club, Wiir and Aluat were best friends, and according to Manon, Aluat 

offered to insert himself back into the situation when Manon expressed his 

interest in returning to Maluahi’s house. By that time, Manon was aware 

that Abiel did not have his car keys, and could not leave the area. Koopman, 

who was a neutral witness, saw a group of men yelling at each other early 

that morning, and several hours later heard the second altercation among the 

men in which Abiel advanced on Aluat, who was backing up before he fell 

to the ground. Koopman’s testimony, which Abiel disregards in his 

analysis, supports a theory that Abiel was at least equally engaged, if not the 

aggressor, in the fight with Aluat and not merely defending himself. Though 

the inference to be drawn is a slim one, it is not unreasonable to infer the 

men fought the second time at Maluahi’s apartment by prearranged mutual 

intention or consent. Under the circumstances, there was sufficient evidence 

to support the giving of CALCRIM No. 3471 as to mutual combat. 

(Lodgment No. 7 at 18-19.) 

The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause is violated “if it is found 

that upon the evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof 

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); see 

also Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Cavazos v. Smith, 

565 U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (per curiam). The Court must review the state court record and view 

the evidence in the “light most favorable to the prosecution and all reasonable inferences 

that may be drawn from this evidence.” Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1276 (citing Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319). A petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim must be examined “with 

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reference to the elements of the criminal offense as set forth by state law.” Juan H., 408 

F.3d at 1275. 

 Furthermore, “[c]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence 

may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir.) amended on 

denial of reh’g, 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1986)). A petitioner faces a “heavy burden” 

when seeking habeas relief by challenging the sufficiency of evidence used to obtain a 

state conviction on federal due process grounds. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. 

 Here, as the California appellate court found, there was ample evidence to support 

a second degree murder conviction. Under California law, second degree murder is the 

“unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but without the additional 

elements -- i.e., willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation -- that would support a 

conviction of first degree murder.” People v. Neito Benitez, 4 Cal. 4th 91, 102 (Cal. 

1992) (citing Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a), 189). Malice may be either express or implied. 

Cal. Penal Code § 188. Express malice requires an intent to kill; implied malice does not. 

See People v. Gonzalez, 54 Cal. 4th 643, 653 (Cal. 2012). Malice is implied when a 

person “willfully does an act, the natural and probable consequences of which are 

dangerous to human life, and the person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the 

danger to life that the act poses.” Id. (citing People v. Knoller, 41 Cal. 4th 139, 152 (Cal. 

2007)). Finally, under California law, self-defense is not available for actions taken 

during mutual combat unless a there was a clear attempt by the defendant to stop the 

fighting. See CALCRIM No. 3471; see also Cal. Penal Code § 197(3). 

 As discussed above, the prosecution presented evidence to show that Abiel had 

been involved in a series of physical altercations with several individuals that evening. 

First, Abiel was in a fight with Wiir in the parking lot of Club Kabanas. (Lodgment No. 

1, vol. 4 at 376-78, 380-81; vol. 7 at 771-72, 809-10, 812-13.) Kedid Manon testified 

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that Petitioner was screaming and acting crazy.7

 (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 381-81.) 

Police were called to break it up. (See Lodgment No. 3 at 22-24.) 

After the fight broke up, Manon left with Maluahi and another friend, and the three 

drove to Maluahi’s apartment. During the drive, Abiel called Manon and threatened to 

beat him up. (Id., vol. 4 at 384-85.) Manon testified that upon arriving at Maluahi’s 

house, Manon got out of the car and Abiel came running up to him and initiated another 

fight. (Id. at 387-89.) Other witnesses saw Abiel and Manon yelling and shoving each 

other. At one point, Malauhi grabbed Abiel and tried to hold him back but Abiel broke 

free and started fighting with Manon again. (Id., vol. 8 at 875-76.) A neighbor, Nineke 

Koopman, saw the fight from her window and called police. (Id., vol. 6 at 529.) 

The crowd dispersed when the police arrived. An officer drove Manon, who was 

emotional and crying, home. (Id., vol. 5 at 490-91, 496-97.) After he got home, Manon 

called several people in an effort to figure out why Petitioner was so upset with him. (Id., 

vol. 4 at 391, 395, vol. 5 at 454 464.) Manon eventually called Abiel, who accused him 

of taking his car keys.8

 (Id., vol. 4 at 392-93.) Back at Maluahi’s, Petitioner searched in

vain for his car keys. His car was parked illegally and in order to avoid getting a ticket, 

Petitioner decided to sleep in his car. (Id. at 349-51, 365-66, 368.) 

Later that morning, Tonisha Alexander, Aluat’s girlfriend, drove Manon and Aluat 

to Maluahi’s house. (Id. at 390, 396-97, vol. 5 at 440-41.) Manon told Aluat he wanted 

to give Maluahi a parking ticket he had received, return Abiel’s keys and try to figure out 

what happened the previous night. (Id., vol. 4 at 383-84, 390, 394-95, 409-10, vol. 5 at 

441-42, 451.) Manon testified that he got out of Alexander’s car and walked ahead to 

Maluahi’s apartment. Aluat lagged behind, talking with Alexander in the car. As 

                                                                

7

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leave. (See Lodgment No. 3 at 22-23.) 

8

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have Abiel’s keys. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 372, 393.) 

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Manon reached Maluahi’s door, he heard Abiel and Aluat fighting.

9

 (Id., vol. 4 at 400-

02, 406, vol. 5 at 456-57, 459, 464, 467, vol. 6 at 530-33, 541, 564.) Manon turned back 

and ran toward the street. When he arrived, Aluat was lying on the ground and Abiel was 

standing next to him with a knife in his hands. (Id., vol. 4 at 402-04, 407, vol. 5 at 457-

59, 467.) 

Meanwhile, Koopman, the same witness who had called the police hours earlier, 

heard the fight and looked out her window. As noted above, Koopman saw Abiel coming 

toward Aluat, as if Abiel was the aggressor. Aluat had his hands up and appeared to be 

backing away. Then she saw Abiel strike Aluat, who fell to the ground and did not get 

up. (Id., vol. 6 at 530, 533-35, 540.) She never saw Aluat with a knife. (Id. at 536.) 

Petitioner testified that he stabbed Alaut in the back first, and then in the chest. 

(Id., vol. 7 at 792-94, vol. 8 at 842, 845-51.) Abiel then threw the knife in a nearby 

dumpster. (Id., vol. 7 at 795, 797-98, vol. 8 at 852-53.) He called 911 but failed to tell 

the dispatcher that Aluat had been stabbed. (See Lodgment No. 3 at 25-27.) He stated 

only that he had hit Aluat and he had fallen down. (Id.) When first interviewed by 

police, Petitioner denied stabbing Aluat and claimed he had no idea how Aluat had 

received the chest wound. He also denied knowing where the knife was. (See Lodgment 

No. 1, vol. 7 at 799, vol. 8 at 853-57, 865, 858; see also Lodgment No. 2 at 106-07, 109-

11.) 

 When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented 

at trial, along with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, was sufficient to support the 

verdict. The jury could have inferred from Petitioner’s conduct earlier in the evening and 

the accounts of witnesses that Abiel was a willing participant in the fight with Aluat. 

Koopman stated that Abiel appeared to be the aggressor. Although it may have been 

                                                                

9

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testifying he was unable to describe what the prosecutor, who was standing 14 feet away from him, was 

wearing or discern whether the prosecutor had facial hair. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 411-12.) 

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possible to draw a different inference from the evidence, the Court is required to resolve 

that conflict in favor of the prosecution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. As noted above, 

Abiel maintains that he was ambushed while laying down in his car. But a reasonable 

juror could have discredited Petitioner’s testimony, particularly in light of his hiding the 

knife and his failure to be truthful with the 911 dispatcher and police. Moreover, a 

reasonable juror, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

could infer that Abiel saw or heard Manon and Alaut get dropped off by Aluat’s 

girlfriend. Given the two previous fights Abiel participated in that evening, a reasonable 

juror could conclude that the ensuing fight between Abiel and Aluat was a result of 

mutual combat. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the Court finds a reasonable juror could conclude this was sufficient to find 

Abiel stabbed Aluat during mutual combat, and that he stabbed Aluat with implied malice 

and not in self-defense. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes the state appellate court’s denial of 

Abiel’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his second degree murder 

conviction was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. Moreover, based on review 

of the entire record, the state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) see also Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES habeas relief as to Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Lastly, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation 

of his Sixth Amendment rights, when trial counsel failed to develop “exculpatory” 

evidence regarding self-defense. (Pet. at 5, 9-10, 52-54 see also Traverse at 2-3, 18-19.) 

Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to raise an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim with adequate specificity. (Mem. of P.&A. Supp. Answer at 28-29.) 

The Court must construe Abiel’s pro se petition liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 

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U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ 

and a ‘pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Pro 

se habeas petitioners may not be held to the same technical standards as litigants 

represented by counsel.”); United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“Pro se complaints and motions from prisoners are to be liberally construed.”). 

Here, Petitioner makes several references to “ineffective assistance of counsel” in 

his Petition. While some of the references are general statements of law, the Petition 

does include some specific factual allegations. A careful review of the attachments to the 

Petition (referenced in the Petition) and Petitioner’s Traverse make clear that Petitioner 

attempted to raise such a claim regarding defense counsel’s purported failure to develop 

exculpatory evidence to show he acted in self-defense. 

 Petitioner raised this claim a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with the 

California Supreme Court. The court denied the petition with citation to People v. 

Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995); In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 225 (1965); In re 

Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759 (1953); In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949); In re 

Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 723 (1947). (See Lodgment No. 14.) The Court therefore looks 

through to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. 

In denying Abiel’s habeas petition raising the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

appellate court noted that the petition was filed two-and-a-half years after sentencing and 

without any explanation for the delay. As such, the court found the petition was 

barred as untimely.10 (Lodgment No. 11 at 2 (citing In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 459 

                                                                

10 The Court need not decide whether Petitioner is procedurally barred from raising his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim because even if his claim is not defaulted, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (noting that, in the interest of judicial 

economy, courts may resolve easier matters where complicated procedural default issues exist); see also 

See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (federal habeas court is not required to sua sponte raise 

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(2012); Swain, 34 Cal. 2d at 302).) The court went on to also address the merits of 

Petitioner’s claim, stating: 

Abiel has not established that his trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient or that, but for such deficiency, he would have obtained a better 

outcome at trial, as he must do to obtain habeas corpus relief based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 

668, 687, 693-94; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 171, 215-218.) 

Abiel testified at trial regarding self-defense; his attorney argued selfdefense and imperfect self-defense to the jury; and the trail court instructed 

the jury on both matters. Abiel has neither identified any evidence regarding 

self-defense counsel failed to present at trial nor shown he would have 

obtained a more favorable outcome at trial had counsel presented such 

evidence. (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 750, 766.) 

(Lodgment No. 11 at 2.) 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. He must also show he was prejudiced 

by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing that “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 

506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Further, Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance . . . be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is a 

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Id. at 686-87. The Court need not address both the deficiency 

prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either 

                                                                

procedural bar issue); Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (procedural default is an

affirmative defense). 

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one. Id. at 697. 

 “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are 

both highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (citations omitted). These standards are 

“difficult to meet” and “demand[] that state court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Federal habeas relief functions 

as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” and not 

simply as a means of error correction. Richter, 562 U.S. 102-03 (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 332 n.5.) “Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so undermined 

the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was denied a fair 

trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

 As discussed above, Abiel claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 

“develop exculpatory evidence.” (See Pet. at 11-12, 33.) He appears to argue 

specifically that defense counsel failed “to present a legal defense using [an] expert [to] 

develop [an] opinion” about how a person would react when “suddenly attacked.” (Id. at 

8.) 

 Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691. Counsel’s performance, however, “must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 

counsel’s judgments.” Id. at 691. “A lawyer who fails to adequately investigate, and to 

introduce into evidence, records that demonstrate his client’s factual innocence, or that 

raise sufficient doubt as to that question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders 

deficient performance.” Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Petitioner contends defense counsel should have hired and presented testimony 

from an expert witness to support a claim of imperfect self-defense. He suggests that an 

expert could have shown that, given Abiel’s personal background and the circumstances 

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of the incident, Abiel would have believed he was in imminent danger, regardless of 

whether it was reasonable or not. “[T]he presentation of expert testimony is not 

necessarily an essential ingredient of a reasonably competent defense.” Bonin v. 

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). An attorney’s decision to call an expert is a 

matter of trial strategy. See id. at 834-35. Abiel has offered nothing but his own 

speculation that an expert would have testified, what an expert witness would have said, 

and whether it actually would have supported his defense. As such he has failed to show 

his attorney’s performance was deficient. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 

(9th Cir. 2001) (no ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to retain expert where 

petitioner did not offer evidence that expert would have testified). Furthermore, any 

speculation by Petitioner as to what an expert would have said is insufficient to show 

prejudice. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding speculation 

about how an expert might have testified is not enough to establish prejudice). Just like 

other decisions that occur when preparing for and presenting a defense, the decision to 

call an expert witness is left to the discretion of trial counsel. See id. 

 With regard to Petitioner’s general allegations that defense counsel “failed to 

develop exculpatory evidence,” Petitioner fails to explain in his Petition or Traverse, how 

counsel’s performance fell below an “objectively reasonable” standard under prevailing 

professional norms. Likewise, Abiel fails to allege facts to establish that had counsel 

done all the things about which Petitioner now complains, the result of his trial would 

have been different. Instead, Abiel merely asserts in conclusory terms that he is entitled 

to relief based on counsel’s purported failure to present an adequate defense. 

Conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, however, do not entitle 

petitioner to relief. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Thus, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Furthermore, the state court’s 

decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

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evidence presented at the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) see also 

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001. Accordingly, the Court DENIES habeas relief as to 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a 

district court that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny a 

certificate of appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a). Granting 

such a certificate is appropriate “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court 

has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy 

§ 2253(c) is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists 

would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In this case, Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the petition with prejudice. 

Furthermore, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 The Clerk of Court is instructed to terminate the case and enter judgment in favor 

of Respondent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 3, 2017 

_____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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