Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01563/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01563-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 315
Nature of Suit: Airplane Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ERIC HENRIKSON, an individual;

IRIS KIEVERNAGEL, individually

and as administrator of the

estate of JOSEPH KIEVERNAGEL;

PATSY KIEVERNAGEL; JOSEPH

KIEVERNAGEL; and KATHLEEN

HAMILTON and THOMAS BLOUNT,

individually and as successors

in interest to the estate of

KEVIN BLOUNT,

NO. CIV. S-06-1563 WBS DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO INTERVENE

TURBOMECA, S.A., a French

corporation; LA SOCIÉTÉ

ANONYME TURBOMECA FRANCÉ, a

French corporation; TURBOMECA

USA, a Texas corporation; and

TURBOMECA ENGINE CORPORATION,

a Texas corporation,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs brought this action against defendants

Turbomeca, S.A., a French corporation, La Société Anonyme

Turbomeca Francé, a French corporation, Turbomeca USA, a Texas

corporation, and Turbomeca Engine Corporation, a Texas

Case 2:06-cv-01563-WBS-DAD Document 64 Filed 07/30/07 Page 1 of 11
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The County does not move for permissive intervention 1

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). 

2

corporation (together “Turbomeca”), alleging that Turbomeca

defectively designed and manufactured a helicopter engine

component which led to a helicopter crash that killed two

passengers and seriously injured a third. The County of

Sacramento (“County”) now seeks to intervene as a plaintiff

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).1

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department owned and

operated a Eurocopter EC-120-B single-engine helicopter known as

“Star VI.” (Compl. ¶ 57.) The Star VI was powered by an Arrius

2J engine, serial number 34144, containing a fuel control unit

(“FCU”), numbered 147-B, manufactured by the French Turbomeca

corporations. (Id. ¶ 54.) The FCU 147-B contains a part known

as a “constant delta-P valve diaphragm,” which acts as a seal

between two differently-pressured fuel chambers in the engine. 

(Id. ¶ 41.) Damage to the diaphragm can result in an excessive

delivery of fuel to the engine, which can cause overheating and

additional serious engine problems. (Id. ¶ 42.)

On July 13, 2005, the Star VI experienced an engine

malfunction, which caused the helicopter to crash. (Id. ¶ 77.) 

Sheriff’s Deputies Joseph Kievernagel and Kevin Blount were

killed in the crash. (Id.) Sheriff’s Deputy Eric Henrikson

survived, but sustained severe and disabling injuries. (Id.)

On July 13, 2006, plaintiffs Deputy Eric Henrikson,

Iris Kievernagel (Joseph Kievernagel’s widow), individually and

as administrator of the estate of Deputy Joseph Kievernagel,

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Patsy Kievernagel (Joseph Kievernagel’s mother), Joseph

Kievernagel (Joseph Kievernagel’s father), Kathleen Hamilton

(Kevin Blount’s mother) and Thomas Blount (Kevin Blount’s

father), individually and as successors in interest to the estate

of Deputy Kevin Blount, (together “plaintiffs”), filed a

complaint against defendants alleging: 1) strict liability--

defective design and manufacture; 2) strict liability--failure to

warn; 3) negligence--design, manufacture, and installation; 4)

negligence--failure to warn; 5) breach of implied and express

warranty; and 6) fraud. Plaintiffs contend that defendants

incorrectly installed the diaphragm inside-out in the FCU 147-B

engine, which caused it to deteriorate over time and eventually

rupture, thus causing the crash. On June 11, 2007, the County

filed this motion for leave to intervene. All plaintiffs and

defendants oppose intervention.

II. Discussion

An order granting intervention as a matter of right is

appropriate if the party seeking to intervene can demonstrate

that “(1) it has a ‘significant protectable interest’ relating to

the property or transaction that is the subject of the action;

(2) the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter,

impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect its interest;

(3) the application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may

not adequately represent the applicant’s interest.” Donnelly v.

Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Cabazon Band

of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir.

1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 926 (1998)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 

A proposed intervenor “bears the burden of showing that all the

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requirements for intervention have been met.” United States v.

Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004).

In determining whether intervention is appropriate, the

Ninth Circuit has held that courts are to be “guided primarily by

practical and equitable considerations.” Donnelly, 159 F.3d 409;

United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Courts are to “take all well-pleaded nonconclusory allegations in

the motion to intervene . . . as true absent sham, frivolity or

other objections,” Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v.

Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001), and “generally interpret

the requirements broadly in favor of intervention,” United States

v. Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996).

A. Timeliness

Timeliness of a motion to intervene depends on three

criteria: 1) the current stage of the litigation; 2) the possible

prejudice to other parties; and 3) the reason for any delay in

moving to intervene. Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d

1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d

576, 588 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991). All

three factors weigh against the County’s intervention.

1. Current Stage of the Litigation

A significant amount of litigation has occurred in this

case. On October 23, 2006, defendants filed motions to strike

portions of plaintiffs’ complaint. (Docket No. 27.) On December

13, 2006, the court granted defendants’ motion in part. (Dec.

13, 2006 Order.) On January 19, 2007, defendants answered the

complaint. (Docket Nos. 39-40.) Since that time, the parties

have been engaged in discovery. Throughout May and June of 2007,

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plaintiffs and defendants conferred and agreed upon the terms of

conducting discovery. (P. Mastagni Decl. ¶ 7.) The parties have

exchanged over 11,000 pages of discovery and one interactive DVD. 

(Id. ¶ 10.) Discovery is to be completed by January of 2008. 

(Feb. 6, 2007 Order.) Although trial is a year away, the fact

that this litigation has progressed well beyond the pleading

stages weighs against the County’s motion. 

2. Prejudice to Current Parties

Both plaintiffs and defendants argue that the County’s

intervention would prejudice them. Plaintiffs cite League of

United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir.

1997), for the proposition that when “a lot of water had already

passed underneath [the] litigation bridge,” a motion to intervene

is properly denied. Id. at 1303. In Wilson, intervenors sought

intervention after the district court had issued a preliminary

injunction, certified a class, discovery had proceeded nine

months before being suspended, and a summary judgment motion had

been heard. Although not as much water has passed under the

litigation bridge in this case, there has been a fair amount of

work done heretofore. The court has adjudicated defendants’

motion to strike portions from plaintiffs’ complaint. The

deadline for plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add

additional parties or causes of action has passed. (Id.) While

the court would entertain amendments with good cause, the

pleadings have been basically set and all pre-answer motions have

been litigated. 

If the County is permitted to intervene, the pleadings

would have to be reopened and defendants’ pre-answer motions reCase 2:06-cv-01563-WBS-DAD Document 64 Filed 07/30/07 Page 5 of 11
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In its reply, the County argues that denial of its 2

motion would prejudice the County. However, the standard for

timeliness is prejudice to other parties, not prejudice to the

intervenor. Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n, 58 F.3d at 1397. 

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litigated with respect to the County’s complaint in intervention. 

More importantly, the parties have also agreed upon the terms of

foreign discovery and schedule of the depositions to take place

in France in August and September of 2007. (P. Mastagni Decl. ¶¶

7-8.) This is particularly significant in light of the fact that

such discovery is beyond the subpoena power of this court. The

parties would be prejudiced if they had to reopen those matters

due to the County’s intervention. Further, the discovery

schedule would likely be delayed and the trial date of August 12,

2008, may have to be continued. Although the prejudice to the

parties here is not as significant as in Wilson, this factor

weighs against intervention. 

2

3. County’s Reason for Delay

The County argues that it made this motion within a

reasonable time after it determined that an agreement could not

be reached with plaintiffs’ counsel for reimbursement of its

expenditures in this litigation. (Mot. to Intervene 3:15-19.) 

Although a delay in seeking intervention is not, in and of

itself, determinative, “[a] party seeking to intervene must act

as soon as he knows or has reason to know that his interests

might be adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation.” 

Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty

Projects, 309 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (further citations

omitted). “‘Courts generally have been reluctant to allow

intervention when the applicant appears to have been aware of the

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litigation but has delayed unduly seeking to intervene.’” 

Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 7C Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil

2d § 1916, at 430 (1986)). 

The County has been aware of the potential for civil

suits since the July 13, 2005 accident because the accident

involved its employees. On December 9, 2005, plaintiff Eric

Henrikson filed a worker’s compensation claim. The County began

workers’ compensation payments to the injured and deceased

workers and families at some point shortly after the accident,

and has paid more than $2,000,000.00 in claims thus far. (Mot.

to Intervene 5; Proposed Intervenor Compl. ¶¶ 22-24.) Further,

on May 15, 2006, the County’s attorney, Charleton S. Pearse,

wrote a letter to one of plaintiffs’ counsel, David P. Mastagni,

stating that he represented the interests of the County in

connection with their claims for reimbursement of workers’

compensation benefits. (Pearse Affidavit Ex. B.) At that time,

Mr. Pearse wrote that the County “will intervene in the action to

be initiated by your office on behalf of Mr. Henrikson” and that

the “intervention will take place near simultaneously and

certainly immediately after you have filed.” (Id.) On October

18, 2006, the County filed three applications for liens with the

court relating to its worker compensation reimbursement claims

pursuant to the California Labor Code § 3586, et seq. (Docket

Nos. 23-25.) 

There was no reason the County could not have filed its

action at the same time plaintiffs filed their complaint against

defendants on July 13, 2006. The County argues that the primary

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In its reply, the County additionally argues that the 3

California statutory regime governing industrial personal

injuries specifically allows intervention up to the time of

trial. Cal. Lab. Code § 3853 (“If the action is brought by

either the employer or employee, the other may, at any time

before trial on the facts, join as party plaintiff or shall

consolidate his action, if brought independently.”) However, it

is well established that the Erie doctrine does not apply to

procedural rules. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 

Accordingly, California’s more permissive standard for

intervention as a matter of right is not controlling in federal

court. McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1070 (5th

Cir. 1970) (the timing and manner of the intervention is purely a

matter of federal law). Moreover, the court could not possibly

accept ignorance of federal procedural law as an excuse for an

unreasonable delay. 

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reason for the delay was negotiation with plaintiffs’ counsel.3

However, the record submitted with Mr. Pearse’s affidavit

indicates that the last communication between County’s counsel

and plaintiffs’ counsel occurred November 27, 2006. (Pearse

Affidavit Ex. H.) More importantly, an intervenor’s desire to

delay action to see if it could avert litigation and discovery

costs does not excuse its delay. United States v. Alisal Water

Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2004) (“An applicant’s desire

to save costs by waiting to intervene until a late stage in

litigation is not a valid justification for delay. To hold

otherwise would encourage interested parties to impede litigation

by waiting to intervene until the final stages of a case.”

(citations omitted)). Because the County was fully informed of

this pending action, waited over six months after negotiations

with plaintiffs’ counsel broke down to move to intervene, and

applied for liens seven months prior to its intervention motion,

the court does not find the County’s reason for the delay

persuasive. 

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Because all three factors weigh against a finding of

timeliness, the court concludes that the County’s motion was not

timely filed. Accordingly, the court will deny the County’s

motion. See United States v. Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th

Cir. 1996) (“If the court finds that the motion to intervene was

not timely, it need not reach any of the remaining elements of

Rule 24.” (citing United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 588

(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991))). Some

observations with respect to the remaining elements are

nevertheless in order.

B. Adequate Representation of the County’s Interest

The County argues that plaintiffs would not adequately

represent its interest since “any settlement amount would likely

represent an aggregate sum of both general and special damages

without apportionment” so that plaintiffs would “earmark most if

not all of the money received from [d]efendants towards general

damages and minimize the amount of moneys which [i]ntervenor has

a statutory right to receive.” (Mot. to Intervene 6:28-7:5.) 

However, even though the court denies intervention now, it is not

thereby precluded from considering another motion to intervene

prior to the distribution of any fund created by settlement or

judgment. See Olden v. Hagerstown Cash Register, Inc., 619 F.2d

271, 273 (3d Cir. 1980) (“In responding to the carrier’s

contention that at some time in the future plaintiff’s counsel

would attempt to compromise the compensation lien, the court

observed that, at the stage then existing, both the plaintiff and

the carrier were seeking the largest recovery possible, and the

company could protect its interests in informal settlement

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County of Sacramento v. Turbomeca, et al., Civ. No S- 4

07-1398.

10

negotiations.” (affirming district court’s denial of motion to

intervene)). 

Here, counsel for all of the parties have specifically

expressed no objection to the County entering the case after

either a verdict or a settlement had been reached. (I.

Kievernagel, Henrickson, Hamilton, & Blount Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot.

to Intervene 23.) Further, a motion to intervene made within a

reasonable time after notice of settlement or judgment would not

suffer from the untimeliness of the present motion. Such a

motion would not unduly prejudice the parties by delaying the

discovery and trial phases of the litigation. 

C. Broadening the Scope of the Litigation

While the County’s proposed complaint in intervention

arises from the same occurrence, i.e. the July 13, 2005 accident,

and seeks to protect its workers’ compensation lien, the County

also proposes to bring additional claims for breach of contract

(between the County and defendants) and property damage. That

would complicate this case. At the hearing on its motion, the

County agreed to drop its claims for breach of contract and

property damage if its motion to intervene were to be granted. 

However, the County has brought its own separate action

containing its breach of contract and property damage claims, and 4

has not agreed to dismiss that action. 

The more sensible approach, in the court’s view, is to

allow the County to go forward with its separate action against

defendants, and to consider consolidation of the actions at such

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later time as any of the parties might so move.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County of Sacramento’s

motion for leave to intervene be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: July 27, 2007

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