Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02684/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02684-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE GUTIERREZ,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2684 LKK EFB P

vs.

D. K. BUTLER, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel suing for alleged civil rights violations. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on the January 11, 2007, first amended complaint, in which

plaintiff alleges that on August 25, 2002, defendant Vickrey filed a false rules violation report

(“RVR”) in retaliation for plaintiff’s refusal to become an informant. Pending before the court is

defendants’ July 5, 2007, motion to dismiss this action as untimely, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

and plaintiff’s opposition thereto. For the reasons explained below, the court finds this action is

untimely.

I. Facts

Plaintiff alleges that on August 14, 2002, defendant Vickrey threatened plaintiff that he

would issue an RVR against plaintiff if he did not agree to gather information about prisoners

who had weapons or drugs, or who were “aggressors.” Am. Compl., at 6-7. Plaintiff 

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refused, and on August 25, 2002, he received an RVR charging him with threatening staff. Am.

Compl., at 7. Plaintiff alleges that Vickrey signed the RVR in retaliation for plaintiff’s refusal to

become an informant. Plaintiff pursued available administrative remedies, and exhausted them

on December 23, 2002. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 2-3. For purposes of defendant’s motion, the court

deems the initial complaint filed on November 20, 2006, the date plaintiff gave his complaint to

prison officials to be mailed to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)

(prisoner’s notice of appeal deemed timely filed on the date it was delivered to prison staff for

delivery to the court). The court deems the amended complaint filed on January 11, 2007, the

date plaintiff gave his complaint to prison officials for mailing to this court. See Id.

II. Standards on Motion to Dismiss

In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic

Corporation v. Twombly, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 1970 (2007) (stating that the

12(b)(6) standard that dismissal is warranted if plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its

claims which would entitle plaintiff to relief “has been questioned, criticized, and explained

away long enough,” and that having “earned its retirement,” it “is best forgotten as an

incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard”). Thus, the grounds must amount

to “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action. Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Instead, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the

compliant are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Ibid. Dismissal may be based either on the lack

of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal

theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). That an action

is untimely may be raised by a motion to dismiss as long as “the running of the statute is

apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

Cir. 1980).

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The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true. Church of Scientology of

California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1984). The court construes the pleading in the light

most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Parks School of Business,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). General allegations are presumed to

include specific facts necessary to support the claim. NOW, 510 U.S. at 256 (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 

The court may disregard allegations contradicted by the complaint’s attached exhibits. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987); Steckman v. Hart Brewing,

Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.1998). Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as true

allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828

F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may consider matters of public record, including

pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors,

798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Federal Savings

and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)). “The court is not required to accept legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be

drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Unless it is clear that no amendment can cure

its defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend the complaint before

dismissal. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Noll v. Carlson,

809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

III. Standards Governing the Statute of Limitations

In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the law of the forum state determines

the applicable limitations period. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1995). Federal law

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 On August 25, 2002, when plaintiff’s cause of action accrued, a one-year limitations

period applied to personal injury actions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3) (West 1982). 

Defendant assumes that the two-year limitation period applies, without addressing the question

of retroactivity. See Two Rivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1999) (federal law governs

the question of whether a limitation period is given retrospective application). Since defendant

prevails applying the longer limitation period, he obviously would prevail under the shorter

period. Therefore, the court does not consider retroactivity.

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governs when a claim accrues. See Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir.

1994). Thus, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is

the basis of the cause of action. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). The

forum state’s law governs both statutory and equitable tolling. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S.

536, 537-39 (1989); Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1988).

In California, the limitation period for an action based on a personal injury is two years. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §351.1 (West 2006).1

 For a person who is serving a prison term of less than

life at the time the cause of action accrues, the limitation period does not run for up to two years

while the plaintiff is in prison. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a) (West 2006). This exclusion,

however, applies to actions by prisoners concerning the conditions of their confinement, or

portions thereof, in which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 352.1(c) (West 2006). Moreover, when a party cannot commence an action because of a

statutory prohibition, the time of the prohibition “is not part of the time limited for the

commencement of the action.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 356 (West 2006). A limitation period is

not suspended by a disability or impediment to suit arising after the period commenced running. 

Rose v. Petaluma & S.R. Ry. Co., 64 Cal. App. 213, 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923). Therefore, the

basis for extending the time for commencing the limitation period must exist at the time the

cause of action accrues. When a plaintiff operates under two or more coexisting disabilities, the

limitation period does not attach until they are removed. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 358 (West

2006). However, one disability cannot be “tacked” onto another so as artificially to extend the

time the limitations period commences. Rose, 64 Cal. App. at 217. With these standards in

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mind, the court turns to the facts of this case.

IV. Analysis

Vickrey contends that plaintiff’s action is untimely. He also asserts that even if the initial

complaint was timely filed, dismissal is still warranted because the only claim from the amended

complaint on which the screening order permitted plaintiff to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A does not relate back to any claim in the original complaint. Plaintiff contends that he is

entitled to tolling for the time it took him to exhaust available administrative remedies. Pl.’s

Opp’n, at 2-3.

Defendant concedes that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on August 25, 2002, and that

the two-year limitations period applies. Def.’s Mot. to Dism., at 5-6. The parties agree that with

respect to his demand for damages, plaintiff benefits from the statutory disability of

imprisonment because he was a prisoner serving a term of less than life on August 25, 2002. If

no other tolling or disability provisions apply, plaintiff had to commence this action no later than

August 25, 2006, and the November 20, 2006, complaint is two months and 26 days late. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on the nearly four months it took him to exhaust does not save this action. 

There is no question that federal law prohibited him from commencing this action until after

December 23, 2002, when he exhausted the available administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). Moreover, the prohibition existed at the time the cause of action accrued because state

regulations permit prisoners to submit a grievance about any problem, see Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1, and limit the time for doing so to no later than 15 days from the time the event

giving rise to the problem grieved. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3086.6.

Thus, plaintiff operated under a statutory prohibition for which California suspends

operation of the limitation period. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 356 (West 2006). But the nearly

four months it took to exhaust the administrative remedy coexisted with the two year statutory

disability based on imprisonment. While the limitation period could not commence running until

the disabilities ceased to exist, under Rose plaintiff cannot extend the two-year statutorilyCase 2:06-cv-02684-LKK -EFB Document 23 Filed 02/14/08 Page 5 of 6
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recognized disability of imprisonment by the time it took to exhaust. Therefore, the court finds

that the few months it took for plaintiff to exhaust was subsumed by the longer, two-year

statutorily-created disability for his imprisonment. Plaintiff had no more than four years from

the date the cause of action accrued to commence this action. As noted above, this gave him

until August 25, 2006. The court therefore finds that plaintiff filed the November 20, 2006,

initial complaint nearly three months late. 

Because the initial complaint was late, there is no timely complaint to which any claims

in the amended complaint could relate back. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Therefore, the court does

not consider whether plaintiff’s claims in the amended complaint satisfy the relation-back

doctrine.

V. Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, the court finds that this action is untimely and must be

dismissed.

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendant’s July 5, 2007, motion to

dismiss be granted and that this action be dismissed as untimely.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 14, 2008.

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