Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01673/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01673-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM E. HUTCHISON, et al., No. CIV.S-03-1673 LKK DAD PS

Plaintiffs,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or in the alternative summary

judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will

recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted and

this action be dismissed. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

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2

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Owen v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992).

The party moving for summary judgment

always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving

party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material

fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of

Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v.

County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1980). The opposing party must demonstrate

that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th

Cir. 1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed,

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1 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

2 The named defendants in the amended complaint are Jean M.

Masquelier (District Ranger); Greg Schimke (Mineral Officer); and

Steve T. Eubanks (Forest Supervisor). 

3

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor

of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); see

also United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Circle, 652 F.2d 882, 887

(9th Cir. 1981). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the

air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v.

Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs William E. and David T. Hutchison, proceeding

pro se, initiated this Bivens1 action seeking damages after the

United States removed a cabin from a mining claim located by

plaintiffs. Plaintiffs maintain that they owned the cabin, which was

present on the subject lands prior to the filing of their mining

claim, and that they were deprived of that property without due

process of law. The United States defendants2 claim that the United

States had earlier acquired ownership of the cabin when the former

claimants abandoned their mining claim upon which the cabin was

located. Because the undersigned agrees with defendants regarding

the United States’ ownership of the cabin, summary judgment for

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3 Defendants raise several other arguments in their motion, but

it is unnecessary to address those arguments, the undersigned having

determined that plaintiffs had no possessory interest in the cabin.

4

defendants on plaintiffs’ sole cause of action for a violation of due

process is appropriate.3

Resolution of the issue of which party owned the cabin at

the time of its demolition and removal is dispositive. Resolution of

that issue is in turn controlled by the decision of the Ninth Circuit

in Brothers v. United States, 594 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1979), a case

which both sides have addressed. The pertinent facts before the

court in Brothers were virtually identical to the facts presented

here. The case involved a claimant’s abandonment of a mining claim

on federal lands; the reversion of two cabins located on that claim

to the federal government; the relocation of the claim by subsequent

claimants who filed a claim coinciding with the boundaries of the

original claim; and a dispute regarding the government’s ownership of

the cabins and the subsequent claimants’ right to possess them. 594

F.2d at 740-41. The subsequent claimants, just as plaintiffs in the

case pending before this court, argued that when they relocated claim

the buildings as well as the land vested in them. Id. at 741. In

concluding that the action had been properly dismissed by the

district court the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected plaintiffs’

argument, stating

The plaintiffs had notice that the cabins had

been abandoned to the government. The fact that

the Forest Service gave [the former claimant]

permission to remove them after the abandonment

does not give the plaintiffs any rights or

interest in them.

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5

We conclude that the plaintiffs failed to

establish a possessory interest in the cabins and

we need not reach the question whether they were

unlawfully taken by the government.

Brothers, 594 F.2d at 741. 

While the decision in Brothers was announced more than

twenty years old, its holding has never been questioned. Finding the

decision in Brothers controlling in the case of another dispute over

ownership of the structures and personal property located on a

relocated mining claim, one district court stated as follows: 

Stated differently, when the Barnes' and the

Hagamans validly relocated the mining claims,

they did not get a possessory interest in the

structures and personal property. What they

received was an interest in the mining claims,

less the structures and personal property. When

Burnett subsequently purchased or received their

interests in the claims, he succeeded to just the

mining claims as well, with no possessory

interest. The Ninth Circuit case law seems to be

consistent with this view. See Brothers v.

United States, 594 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1979). In

Brothers, the plaintiffs brought an inverse

condemnation suit against the Forest Service,

claiming that the Forest Service had wrongfully

taken a mining claim and two cabins located on

the claim. The plaintiffs in Brothers argued

that once they relocated the abandoned mining

claim, the cabins, as well as the land, vested in

them. They argued this, despite conceding the

fact that the mining claims and buildings

reverted to the United States when abandoned by

the previous locator. Id. at 740-41. The Ninth

Circuit specifically disagreed and pointed out

that the plaintiffs had notice that the cabins

had been abandoned to the government and that

their predecessor was only granted permission to

remove the cabins. Based upon this, the court

found that the plaintiffs did not have any rights

or interest in the cabins. Id. at 741-42. Thus,

the court finds the Brothers case controlling.

United States v. Burnett, 750 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (D. Idaho 1990). 

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6

In arguing that they had a possessory interest in the

cabin, the Hutchisons rely on the holding of the California Supreme

Court in Watterson v. Cruse, 179 Cal. 379 (1918). However, that

state court decision concerned a dispute regarding the right to

possession of a building between conflicting locators, not between

the United States and a locator. Watterson v. Cruse therefore is

inapposite. See Brothers, 594 F.2d at 741 (finding plaintiffs’

reliance on The plaintiffs' reliance on The Yankee Lode Claim, 30

L.D. 289 (1900), misplaced because the “case dealt only with the

rights of prior and subsequent mining claimants as against each other

rather than with the rights of a claimant as against the United

States.”). 

Under the decision in Brothers the Hutchisons had no

possessory interest in the cabin. The undersigned is not persuaded

to reach a different conclusion by the three-page excerpt of a

memorandum apparently authored in 1979 by an attorney-advisor for the

United States Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor,

Anchorage Region upon which plaintiffs rely. The memorandum

addresses “Cultural Resources on Unpatented Mining Claims” and its

relevance to the issue before the court is not explained by

plaintiffs. Moreover, the excerpt of that memorandum submitted by

plaintiffs for the court’s consideration cites the decision in

Brothers with approval and for the proposition that property such as

cabins become the property of the United States upon abandonment of a

mining claim.

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Plaintiffs having failed to establish a possessory interest

in the cabin, their sole claim for violation of due process lacks

merit. See Brothers, 594 F.2d at 741; see also Coakley v. Murphy,

884 F.2d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1989)("A due process claim is

cognizable only if there is a recognized liberty or property interest

at stake."). 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, there existing no genuine issue as to any

material fact and defendants being entitled to judgment as a matter

of law, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary

judgment be granted and this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 25, 2005.

DAD:th

DDad1\orders.prose\hutchison1673.msj.f&r

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