Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04987/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04987-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD STYPMANN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MAYOR GAVIN NEWSOM, CHIEF

HEATHER FONG, CITY AND COUNTY OF

SAN FRANCISCO, AUTO RETURN, 

Defendants.

 /

No. C-04-4987 MMC

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

REMAND; GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS; VACATING HEARING

(Docket Nos. 24, 27, 36)

Before the Court are three motions: (1) a motion filed February 22, 2005 by

defendant TEGSCO, LLC dba San Francisco Auto Return (sued as “Auto Return”) to

dismiss the above-titled action or, alternatively, for a more definite statement; (2) a motion

filed February 24, 2005 by defendant City and County of San Francisco (“City”) to dismiss

the above-titled action; and (3) a motion filed March 11, 2005 by plaintiff Richard Stypmann

(“Stypmann”) to remand the action to state court, each noticed for hearing April 15, 2005. 

Stypmann has filed a single opposition to the motions filed by Auto Return and the City, to

which Auto Return and the City have filed separate replies. In their replies, the City and

Auto Return have included their arguments in opposition to Stypmann’s motion to remand. 

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1

 To the extent Stypmann’s reply contains arguments relating to the motions to

dismiss, the Court has not considered such arguments. Once Auto Return and the City

filed their replies, Stypmann was not entitled to submit additional written argument without

first obtaining permission from the Court to do so. See Civil L.R. 7-3(d).

2

 There is no indication that either Mayor Newsom or Chief Fong has been served,

and, to date, neither has appeared in the action.

2

Stypmann has filed a single reply in support of his motion to remand.1 Having considered

the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court finds the matters

appropriate for decision without oral argument, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), hereby VACATES the

April 15, 2005 hearing, and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On November 24, 2004, the City, joined by Auto Return, removed the instant action

to federal court from San Francisco Superior Court. Stypmann’s pro se complaint asserted

claims against the City, Auto Return, Mayor Gavin Newsom (“Mayor Newsom”), and Chief

of Police Heather Fong (“Chief Fong”)2

 based on the City’s allegedly improper towing of

Stypmann’s vehicle in 2002 and 2004, as well as claims based on the City’s alleged refusal

to repair a broken sewer line at 701 Randolph Street.

On December 2, 2004, the City filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a

more definite statement. On December 6, 2004, Auto Return separately filed a motion to

dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement. On January 25, 2005, the Court

issued an order granting the motions. As Stypmann, in his opposition to the motions,

stated that he did not wish to pursue his federal RICO claims and conceded that he was not

pursuing any claims as to “arrests and tows” that occurred in 2002, the Court dismissed all

such claims with prejudice. The Court dismissed Stypmann’s § 1983 claim against the

City, with leave to amend, because Stypmann failed to allege that he suffered any injury as

a result of an unlawful policy or custom of the City. The Court dismissed all claims against

Auto Return, with leave to amend, because Stypmann failed to allege any factual basis for

his claims. Finally, the Court remanded Stypmann’s claim that the City failed to repair the

broken sewer line at 701 Randolph Street, as it raised no federal claim and had no factual

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3

relationship to his § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure of his vehicle. The Court afforded

Stypmann the opportunity to file an amended complaint, no later than February 12, 2005, to

assert the following claims only:

a. A section 1983 claim against all defendants based on events surrounding

the allegedly unlawful towing of Stypmann’s recreational vehicle in November

2004: [and]

b. State law claims against Auto Return for conversion, negligence, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(See Order Granting Motions to Dismiss; Remanding “Broken Sewer” Claim, filed Jan. 25,

2005, at 2.) Stypmann timely filed an amended complaint on February 11, 2005.

DISCUSSION

A. Motions to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) cannot be granted unless “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal can be

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1990).

Generally, a district court, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, may not consider any

material beyond the pleadings. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner And Co.,

Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). Material that is properly submitted as part

of the complaint, however, may be considered. See id. Documents whose contents are

alleged in the complaint, and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading, also may be considered. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14

F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the Court may consider any document “the

authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily

relies,” regardless of whether the document is referred to in the complaint. See Parrino v.

FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). Finally, the Court may consider matters that

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3

 The declaration submitted by Stypmann in support of his opposition to the motions

to dismiss does not fall within the above-cited exceptions to the general rule precluding the

Court from considering material beyond the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court has not

considered Stypmann’s declaration in ruling on the instant motions to dismiss.

4

are subject to judicial notice. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d

1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).3

In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The Court may disregard factual allegations if such allegations are contradicted by the facts

established by reference to exhibits attached to the complaint. See Durning v. First Boston

Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by the

facts alleged, need not be accepted as true. See Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115,

1121 (9th Cir. 1992). 

2. New Claims Pleaded Without Permission of Court

Stypmann has included certain new causes of action in his First Amended Complaint

without first obtaining leave of court, which claims the City and Auto Return move to

dismiss. First, Stypmann has included causes of action against three new defendants:

Department of Motor Vehicle Director J. Borouki, California Governor Arnold

Schwarzenegger, and San Francisco District Attorney Kamala Harris. (See First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) at 1.) Second, Stypmann now purports to assert a class action on

behalf of a class of motorists, the definition of which consists of nearly two pages of text. 

(See id. ¶ 1.) Third, Stypmann asserts a variety of new claims based on the City’s alleged

suspension of Stypmann’s driver’s license, its allegedly false arrest of Stypmann for driving

with a suspended license, and the allegedly improper enforcement of various California

statutes relating to the suspension of drivers’ licenses. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 3, 7 and prayer for

relief ¶¶ 4(f), 4(g).) Fourth, Stypmann asserts various claims based on use of taxpayer

funds and the raising of taxes, including “wast[ing] taxpayer funds by using the police or

other governmental agencies and employees to illegally harass houseless persons in San

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4

 The Court further notes that Stypmann may not assert any new claims without first

obtaining Court approval to do so, pursuant to the numerous vexatious litigant orders

issued against Stypmann by judges in the Northern District of California. 

5

 The Court expresses no opinion as to whether any of the dismissed causes of

action states a claim.

6

 The California Vehicle Code authorizes peace officers to remove or impound

vehicles under certain circumstances. See Cal. Veh. Code § 22651. Section 22851

provides that whenever a peace officer has authorized removal of a vehicle, the garage

keeper in custody of the removed vehicle shall have a “lien dependent upon possession for

5

Francisco” and “continuing to raise general fund and tax revenues under the guise of

criminal enforcement.” (See, e.g., id. prayer for relief ¶ 4(e), 4(l).)

As Stypmann included all such claims in the First Amended Complaint in violation of

the Court’s January 25, 2005 order,4

 they are hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice.5 The

Court will consider the allegations of the First Amended Complaint only as they relate to the

causes of action the Court permitted Stypmann to assert, as set forth in the Court’s

January 25, 2005 order.

3. City’s Motion to Dismiss

The City, relying on Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978), moves to dismiss Stypmann’s § 1983 claim to the extent such claim is based on the

allegedly unlawful towing of his vehicle on November 11, 2004, on the ground that

Stypmann has failed to allege sufficient facts in support of his claim that he was injured by

an unlawful policy or custom of the City. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (holding cities may

be sued under § 1983 only “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury” on the plaintiff).

 Stypmann alleges that he is a “homeless motorist,” (see FAC ¶ 1) who lives in “his

22 foot long recreational vehicle,” (see id. ¶ 5). According to Stypmann, the City has a

policy of “harass[ing] homeless residents living in their vehicles such as Plaintiff by towing,

impounding and participating in attachment of possessory liens of Vehicle Code section

228516

 by their tow operators and contractees, holding and selling said vehicles and

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his or her compensation for towage and for caring for and keeping safe the vehicle[.]” See

Cal. Veh. Code § 22851. Section 22852 requires that the vehicle’s owner of record be

provided notice, within 48 hours, of “the opportunity for a poststorage hearing to determine

the validity of the storage.” See Cal. Veh. Code § 22852. 

7

 In Stypmann v. San Francisco, Stypmann filed a class action challenging the

constitutionality of the provisions of § 22851 that established a possessory lien for towage

and storage fees without a hearing before or after the lien attached. See id. at 1340. The

Ninth Circuit found § 22851 did not comply with the requirements of due process because it

did not provide for a prompt post-seizure hearing and remanded the action for further

proceedings. See id. at 1344. The record before the Court does not reflect the relief

ultimately ordered by the district court on remand. In 1979, the California legislature

enacted § 22852, which, as noted, provides for notice to the vehicle owner of the

availability of a poststorage hearing to determine the validity of the storage. See Cal. Veh.

Code § 22852. Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he constitutional deficiency which

Stypmann identified in section 22851 was remedied when Cal. Vehicle Code § 22852 was

enacted in 1979.” See Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir.

1982).

6

refusing to release them on demand when such possessory liens attachment [sic]

unconstitutionally.” (See id. ¶ 3.) Stypmann also alleges the City has a practice and

custom of “civil rights violations arising from improper training of personnel with a callous

disregard of the civil rights of persons in California and San Francisco with respect to

towing of their vehicles, tow lien attachment validity hearings and attachments of

possessory liens under Vehicle Code section 22851 and tow lien attachment validity

hearings under VC 22852 . . . [and] denying said towed motorists prompt, properly noticed,

post-seizure hearings in conformance with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment

of the U.S. Constitution, particularly when defendants knew or should know such practices

to be unconstitutional and in violation of the permanent injunction and judgment as well as

declaratory relief issued by the United States District Court in San Francisco arising from

Stypmann v. San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. Ca. 1977).”7

 (See id.)

Stypmann alleges that on November 11, 2004, he moved his vehicle across the

street, from 1 Byxbee to 2 Byxbee, “not realizing that as a holiday that day, no street

sweeper would be coming by,” (see id. ¶ 12); later that day, when he started to move his

vehicle back to his regular parking space at 1 Byxbee, three officers “swooped down,”

arrested Stypmann for having a suspended driver’s license, and towed and impounded his

vehicle. (See id. ¶ 13.) The following day, Stypmann went to the Hall of Justice to demand

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8

 No such injunction appears in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Stypmann. In a

subsequent opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that, in Stypmann, it did not hold § 22851 to be

“wholly void,” but rather “held the statute invalid as applied, or in other words, that private

vehicles could not be towed and stored pursuant to it without at least some sort of hearing.” 

See Goichman, 682 F.2d at 1323. As noted, the Ninth Circuit has held that the postseizure hearing provided in § 22852 remedied the constitutional deficiency in § 22851 that

the Ninth Circuit had identified in Stypmann. See id. 

7

a tow lien attachment validity hearing. (See id. ¶ 15.) According to Stypmann, “[t]he

hearing officer upheld the validity of the tow and would not allow any relevant arguments as

to the tow validity, unconstitutionality of the charges leading to the suspended license and

impoundment for suspended license.” (See id. ¶ 15.) Stypmann alleges that the hearing

was not in conformance with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United

States Constitution and also violated the “permanent injunction” issued in Stypmann v. San

Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1977).8 (See id.)

The City argues that Stypmann’s § 1983 claim, as asserted against the City, is

subject to dismissal because Stypmann does not allege that he was a victim of the City’s

alleged policy of harassing homeless persons by unlawfully seizing their vehicles. Rather,

the City argues, Stypmann alleges in his complaint that he is being targeted by the San

Francisco Police Department because of his work as a “police watch activist and organizer

and public interest advocate.” (See FAC ¶¶ 5-8.) The Court previously dismissed

Stypmann’s § 1983 claim against the City on the ground that he failed to allege that he was

homeless or that his vehicle was towed because of his status as a homeless person. 

Although Stypmann has amended his complaint to allege he is a homeless individual, (see

FAC ¶ 1), he has not alleged that his vehicle was towed because he is homeless, but,

rather, because of his work as an activist, (see id. ¶¶ 5-8), and because his driver’s license

previously had been suspended, (see id. ¶ 7, 13).

With respect to Stypmann’s contention that the City has a policy of denying towed

motorists “prompt, properly noticed, post-seizure hearings,” (see FAC ¶ 3), Stypmann does

not contend that he did not receive such a post-seizure hearing; indeed, Stypmann alleges

he received such a hearing the day after his vehicle was towed. (See FAC ¶ 14.) In

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9

 Although Stypmann contends the suspension of his driver’s license was unlawful,

(see FAC ¶ 7), such allegations are, as noted above, not properly part of the instant lawsuit

because Stypmann added those allegations to the complaint without seeking and obtaining

prior court approval to do so.

8

addition, as the City correctly points out, to the extent Stypmann contends there were

improprieties in the manner in which the hearing was conducted, he has not alleged that

the hearing officer was an employee of the City or that the hearing officer’s allegedly

improper actions were conducted pursuant to a practice or custom of the City. 

Moreover, Stypmann concedes that prior to the date his vehicle was towed, his

driver’s license had been suspended,9 and that he was cited for driving with a suspended

license on the date his vehicle was towed. (See id. ¶¶ 7, 17.) Peace officers are

authorized to tow a vehicle that is being driven by a person with a suspended driver’s

license. See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 22651(p), 14601.1. Consequently, the peace officer did

not err in ordering the towing of Stypmann’s vehicle, and the hearing officer did not err in

upholding the tow lien. See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 22651(p), 14601.1, 22851. 

Stypmann nonetheless alleges that his due process rights were violated because the

hearing officer refused to hear his arguments as to “the unconstitutionality of the charges

leading to the suspended license and impoundment for suspended license.” (See FAC ¶

15.) The tow lien validity hearing was not the appropriate venue for Stypmann to challenge

the legality of the suspension of his driver’s license, however. Stypmann concedes that his

driver’s license was suspended pursuant to California Vehicle Code §§ 13365 and 40509.5,

(see FAC ¶ 7), which statutes provide for suspension when a driver fails to appear at a

court hearing on certain specified offenses or to pay a fine imposed for such an offense. 

(See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 40509.5, 13365.) If Stypmann believed the charges leading to the

suspension of his driver’s license were unwarranted, the place to challenge them was in the

court proceedings on those charges, not in the subsequent tow lien validity hearing. See

People v. Bailey, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 15 (1982) (holding that “[i]f the defaulting citee

has a valid excuse for his nonappearance [at a court hearing on a traffic citation], the place

to submit his explanation is in [that] court”). Consequently, the hearing officer did not err by

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declining to hear Stypmann’s arguments that the suspension of his driver’s license was

unconstitutional.

Stypmann also contends that his due process rights were violated because the

officer who ordered the tow did not appear at the hearing, thus denying Stypmann the

opportunity to cross-examine him. As noted, however, Stypmann concedes that his driver’s

license had been suspended prior to the towing of his vehicle. Consequently, there was no

factual dispute about the validity of the tow, and cross-examination would have served no

purpose. See David v. City of Los Angeles, 307 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002), rev. on

other grounds, City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003) (finding no due process

violation as a result of denial of opportunity to cross-examine officer who issued towing

order where plaintiff did not dispute violation that resulted in tow).

As no due process violation occurred as a matter of law, amendment of the

complaint would be futile, and the Court will dismiss Stypmann’s § 1983 claim, as asserted

against the City, with prejudice.

4. Auto Return’s Motion to Dismiss

The Court previously has dismissed all of Stypmann’s claims against Auto Return for

failure to allege any factual basis for such claims. See Order Granting Motions to Dismiss;

Remanding “Broken Sewer” Claim, filed Jan. 25, 2005, at 3. Auto Return now moves to

dismiss all claims asserted against it in the First Amended Complaint on the ground that

Stypmann again fails to allege any facts that could support any claim for liability against

Auto Return.

First, Stypmann alleges that when he went to Auto Return “to demand return of his

vehicle without charge, as per his permanent, federal court injunction, he was threatened

with arrest by Stephanie, the Auto Return Vice President of Customer Relations.” (See

FAC ¶ 16.) Second, Stypmann alleges that Auto Return “still refuses to return Plaintiff’s

vehicle to him without charge” and retains possession of his vehicle. (See id. ¶¶ 16, 21.) 

Finally, Stypmann alleges, Auto Return has sued him in small claims court for the towing

and storage charge. (See id.) 

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10 The Court further notes that because Stypmann concedes his driver’s license had

been suspended, he was not entitled to retrieve his vehicle “except upon presentation

of . . . his . . . currently valid driver’s license to operate the vehicle and proof of current

vehicle registration, or upon order of a court.” See Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(p).

11 In light of the above ruling, the Court does not reach Auto Return’s alternate

motion for a more definite statement.

10

Stypmann also alleges, however, that the hearing officer upheld the validity of the

tow lien on his vehicle. (See id. ¶ 15.) California Vehicle Code § 22852 provides that the

towing and storage costs will be paid by the agency authorizing the tow only if “it is

determined in the poststorage hearing that reasonable grounds for the storage are not

established.” See Cal. Veh. Code § 22852(e). The Court finds nothing in the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Stypmann that entitles Stypmann to retrieve his vehicle, free of charge,

when the towing of the vehicle is upheld at a post-seizure tow lien validity hearing. As the

tow lien had been upheld by the hearing officer at a post-seizure hearing, Auto Return was

entitled to retain Stypmann’s vehicle until he paid the appropriate fee. See Cal. Veh. Code

§ 22851(a).10

Accordingly, the Court finds that Stypmann has failed to set forth any claim against

Auto Return and will dismiss all claims against Auto Return, with prejudice.11

B. Motion to Remand

Stypmann moves to remand the instant action on the ground that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over the state taxpayer issues raised in his First Amended Complaint. As such

issues were included in his First Amended Complaint in violation of the Court’s January 25,

2005 order, however, they have been dismissed, as stated above. Accordingly, no such

issues remain in the First Amended Complaint, and Stypmann’s motion to remand the

action is hereby DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

1. All new claims asserted in the First Amended Complaint in violation of the Court’s

January 25, 2005 order are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

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2. The City’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim asserted against it based on the

allegedly unlawful towing of Stypmann’s vehicle on November 11, 2004, is hereby

GRANTED, and such claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. Auto Return’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and all claims against Auto

Return are DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. Stypmann’s motion to remand is hereby DENIED.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2005. 

/s/ Maxine M. Chesney 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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