Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_02-cv-01511/USCOURTS-alnd-2_02-cv-01511-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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The victim’s name has been variously spelled “Gach” and “Gash” throughout the record 1

in this case. For consistency, the court will refer to her as Stephanie Gach.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JACK TRAWICK, )

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV02-S-1511-S

 )

DONAL CAMPBELL, Commissioner )

of the Alabama Department of )

Corrections; and the ATTORNEY )

GENERAL OF THE STATE )

OF ALABAMA, )

 )

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeks habeas corpus relief with

respect to petitioner’s state court conviction and death sentence on a charge of capital

murder. 

Procedural History

The Jefferson County, Alabama, grand jury indicted petitioner, Jack Trawick,

on March 5, 1993, charging him with the intentional murder of Stephanie Gach

1

during a kidnaping that occurred on October 9, 1992, in violation of Alabama Code

§ 13A-5-40(a)(1) (1975). Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of the

FILED

 2006 Sep-29 PM 01:20

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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charge on March 23, 1994. The next day, during the penalty phase of the trial, the

jury voted 10 to 2 to recommend a sentence of death. The trial court judge conducted

a formal sentencing hearing on May 5, 1994, and, in accordance with the jury’s

recommendation, sentenced petitioner to death. Petitioner was represented at trial by

attorneys William DelGrosso and Kittren Walker.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner’s conviction and

death sentence on November 9, 1995, in a published opinion. See Trawick v. State,

698 So. 2d 151 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). Rehearing was denied on April 9, 1996. The

Supreme Court of Alabama subsequently granted petitioner’s application for

certiorari and, on February 28, 1997, affirmed his conviction and sentence in a

published opinion. See Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 1997). The Alabama

Supreme Court modified its opinion when denying rehearing on June 13, 1997. In

the Court of Criminal Appeals, petitioner was represented by DelGrosso, but during

the certiorari proceedings in the Alabama Supreme Court, he was represented by both

DelGrosso and his current lawyer, Randall S. Susskind. The United States Supreme

Court denied certiorari review on December 1, 1997. Trawick v. Alabama, 522 U.S.

1000 (1997).

Almost a year later, on November 19, 1998, and with the assistance of attorney

Randall S. Susskind, petitioner filed his state post-conviction petition under Rule 32

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of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The petition was denied without an

evidentiary hearing on March 21, 2001. (Tab R-62). The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed the denial of Rule 32 relief in an unpublished memorandum opinion

on January 25, 2002. (Tab R-63). Rehearing was denied on February 15, 2002, and

certiorari was denied by the Alabama Supreme Court on June 14, 2002. (Tab R-64).

The present § 2254 petition was filed with the assistance of counsel on June 21, 2002.

The Offense

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the evidence relevant to

petitioner’s crime in its opinion on direct appeal as follows:

The state’s evidence tended to show that on October 10, 1992, the

partially nude body of Stephanie Gash was found on the side of Grants

Mill Road in Birmingham. Her mouth and nose were covered with duct

tape. Dr. Joseph Embry, medical examiner for the state of Alabama,

testified that she died as a result of a three-inch knife wound that entered

her heart and as a result of asphyxiation caused by strangulation.

The appellant gave a detailed statement to the police in which he

confessed to having murdered Stephanie Gash. He stated that he

followed Gash from Eastwood Mall to her apartment. As Gash was

walking from her parking space to her apartment, the appellant pulled

up beside her in a van, pointed a toy gun at her, and ordered her to enter

the van. As the appellant was pushing Gash into the van she hit her

head on the side window of the van, and her glasses fell off. After she

got in the van, the appellant tied the victim’s hands with rope and put

duct tape over her mouth. He drove to a secluded area where he beat

Gash about the head with a hammer, strangled her, and stabbed her in

the chest at an upward angle so that the knife would enter her heart. The

appellant then disposed of the body by throwing it on the side of Grants

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Mill Road. The appellant confessed that he threw the contents of the

victim’s wallet out of the window as he was driving down Alton Road.

He then cleaned the blood from the van at his house. The appellant’s

confession was corroborated by the following facts.

Police identified the body as a result of a missing persons report

filed by the victim’s mother on the morning the body was found. When

Stephanie did not come home on the night of October 9, 1992, her

mother, Mary Gash, telephoned her friends and tried to locate her.

Rebecca Henderson, a friend of the victim’s, came to the victim’s

apartment after talking with Stephanie’s mother. Henderson found a

pair of eye glasses, identified as belonging to the victim, lying on the

ground by where she customarily parked her automobile.

Jeremy Burns testified that on October 10, 1992, he was walking

with a friend down Alton Road, approximately three miles from where

Gash’s body was found, when he discovered a Texaco gasoline credit

card with the name “Gash” on it. A search of this area resulted in the

discovery of a college identification card issued to the victim and a

health insurance card bearing the victim’s name.

Gary Harris, an evidence technician for the Jefferson County

Sheriff’s Department, testified that he found a large brown-colored stain

in the parking lot in front of the victim’s apartment on October 22, 1992

after the appellant was questioned by police.

The appellant’s Toyota van was towed to the police station on

October 26, 1992. Police found in the van a piece of carpet, a tarpaulin,

ball-peen hammer, and a plastic bucket that contained an 11-inch knife.

Using luminol spray, police discovered blood traces on the tarpaulin, the

piece of carpet, the ball-peen hammer, the tailgate of the van, and on the

knife. A Ford station wagon which the appellant was known to drive

was also impounded. A toy gun was found in the passenger’s floorboard

of that vehicle.

Steven Drexler, of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences,

testified that two fibers found on the victim’s sweater, which was

Case 2:02-cv-01511-CLS-TMP Document 25 Filed 09/29/06 Page 4 of 181
 At page 118 of the brief on the merits of his claims (doc. 23), petitioner expressly withdrew 2

certain claims pleaded in the petition. The claims withdrawn by petitioner were set forth at

paragraphs 43-53, 57, 63-64, 65-68, 71, 73-76a, 77-80, 84-86, and 92-93 of the petition.

5

recovered from the crime scene, were consistent with fibers from the

carpet of the Toyota van. Also, fibers found on the duct tape that

covered the victim’s mouth were the same as the fibers from the carpet

of the Toyota van.

Trawick v State, 698 So. 2d 151, 153-154 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (footnote omitted).

The Claims

The § 2254 petition alleges multiple grounds for granting habeas corpus relief.

Listed below are those remaining claims asserted by petitioner, after withdrawing

several in the brief submitted in support of his petition. Referring to the specific 2

paragraphs of the petition, petitioner appears to be asserting the following claims for

habeas relief:

I. The prosecution engaged in gender discrimination during jury

selection by using eleven of its fourteen peremptory strikes

against women, in violation of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127,

114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994). (Paragraphs 11-12 of

the petition).

II. Petitioner’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated

when certain inculpatory statements made by him were not

suppressed and were admitted into evidence, as follows:

a. The use of the statements violated the Fourth Amendment

because there was no probable cause to arrest petitioner

prior to his interrogation. (Paragraph 14 of the petition).

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b. The use of the statements violated the Fifth Amendment

because he requested and was denied access to a lawyer

during interrogation. (Paragraphs 15-17 of the petition).

c. The use of the statements violated the Fifth Amendment

because they were induced by promises from police

interrogators, making the statements involuntary.

(Paragraph 18 of the petition).

III. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in the

following specific instances:

a. Alabama provides inadequate funding and compensation

for capital defense counsel and defense experts.

(Paragraphs 20 - 24a of the petition).

b. Trial counsel failed to investigate adequately petitioner’s

history of mental illness. (Paragraph 25 of the petition).

c. Trial counsel failed to investigate adequately evidence for

mitigation of the sentence. (Paragraph 26 of the petition).

d. Trial counsel failed to investigate and object to gender

discrimination in jury selection. (Paragraph 27 of the

petition).

e. Trial counsel failed to challenge the admissibility of

inculpatory statements made by petitioner to the police.

(Paragraph 28 of the petition).

f. Trial counsel failed to cross-examine adequately the State’s

mental health expert, Dr. Ronan. (Paragraph 29 of the

petition).

g. Trial counsel failed to object to the admissibility of

inflammatory photographs of the victim. (Paragraph 30 of

the petition).

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h. Trial counsel failed to object to the petitioner’s absence

from certain trial proceedings. (Paragraph 31 of the

petition).

i. Trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s failure to

assure that bench conferences were transcribed.

(Paragraph 32 of the petition).

j. Trial counsel failed to object to certain improper and

prejudicial comments by the prosecutor. (Paragraph 33 of

the petition).

k. Trial counselfailed to request correctly jury instructions on

the definition of reasonable doubt, the definition of “clear

and convincing evidence,” and for lesser included offenses

of capital murder. (Paragraph 34 of the petition).

l. Trial counsel failed to adequately support a motion for

change of venue. (Paragraph 35 of the petition).

m. Trial counsel failed to move for recusal of the trial judge.

(Paragraph 36 of the petition).

n. Trial counsel failed to object to the imposition of the death

sentence as the product of a racially biased system.

(Paragraph 37 of the petition).

o. All of trial counsel’s failures cumulatively deprived

petitioner of the effective assistance of counsel.

(Paragraph 38 of the petition).

IV. Petitioner’s right to due process of law under Brady/Giglio was

violated when the prosecution failed to reveal to petitioner that

members of the state team evaluating petitioner’s mental health

were under investigation for misconduct relating to petitioner,

and that this investigation caused the state’s mental health expert

to be biased against petitioner. (Paragraph 39 of the petition).

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V. Petitioner’s right to an unbiased jury was violated because two

jurors failed to answer fully during voir dire that they or their

family members had been victims of violent crime. (Paragraphs

40-42 of the petition).

VI. Petitioner was deprived of due process of law because the trial

court failed to give proper jury instructions in the following

specific respects:

a. The trial court misdefined the concept of “reasonable

doubt,” making the prosecution’s burden of proof easier

than required by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

(Paragraphs 54-56 of the petition).

b. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury that

petitioner’s mental health defense had to be proven by

“clear and convincing evidence,” not merely a

preponderance. (Paragraph 58 of the petition).

c. The trial court failed to instruct the jury that, if petitioner

were found not guilty due to a mental disease or defect, the

State would commence proceedings to have him civilly

committed. (Paragraphs 59-60 of the petition).

d. The trial court failed to instruct the jury during the penalty

phase that it could consider mercy as a mitigating factor.

(Paragraphs 61-62 of the petition).

e. The trial court failed to instruct the jury during the penalty

phase that aggravating factors must outweigh mitigating

factors, and that an equal balance of the two requires a

sentence of life without parole, not death. (Paragraphs 69-

70 of the petition).

VII. The trial court erroneously granted a prosecution challenge for

cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), with

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respect to potential juror Porter. (Paragraphs 81-83 of the petition).

VIII. Petitioner was deprived of a fair and impartial trial when the trial

judge failed to recuse himself, even though the judge had once

prosecuted someone other than the petitioner for a murder now

admitted by petitioner, and because the trial judge attended high

school with the petitioner. (Paragraphs 87-88 of the petition).

IX. The death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the

trial court erroneously placed the burden of proving mitigating

circumstances on the petitioner and erroneously failed to find any

statutory mitigating factors. (Paragraphs 89-90 of the petition).

X. Petitioner was deprived of a fair trial when the trial court denied

his motion for change of venue. (Paragraph 91 of the petition).

XI. Petitioner was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights

to be present at all trial proceedings when certain proceedings

took place without him being present. (Paragraphs 94-95 of the

petition).

XII. Petitioner was deprived of due process of law when the death

sentence was imposed by the trial judge, not the jury, contrary to

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). (Paragraphs 95-100 of the

petition).

XIII. The cumulative effect of all of these errors deprived petitioner of

his constitutional rights. (Paragraph 101 of the petition).

This court will discuss each of these claims in turn, addressing questions of

procedural default, as well as, where appropriate, the merits of each claim. 

Discussion

Claim I — Gender Discrimination in Jury Selection

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Petitioner contends that the prosecution violated the principals of J.E.B. v.

Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), by engaging in discrimination against women during

selection of the petit jury in his case. He points out that the prosecution used eleven

of its fourteen peremptory strikes to remove women, including the first seven

consecutive strikes. Although defense counsel at trial objected to perceived

discriminatory striking on the basis of race, no objection was made that the gender

discrimination motivated the prosecution’s strikes. Similarly, the trial court ruled

that the defense had established a prima facie showing of race-discriminatory

striking, and required the prosecutors to state their race-neutral reasons for each

strike. Because gender as a motive for discrimination was not raised by trial counsel,

however, the trial court did not require any statement of gender-neutral reasons by the

prosecutors.

Petitioner raised his race-based Batson discrimination claim again on direct

appeal. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the claim,finding explicitly

that the stated reasons for the State’s strikes were race neutral. On certiorari review,

however, the Alabama Supreme Court said this:

Trawick first argues that the State used its peremptory challenges

to discriminate against female jurors, in violation of J.E.B. v. Alabama,

511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994), and that the trial

court erred by not requiring the State to articulate its reasons for its

strikes of females. He points out that the State used 11 of its 14

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peremptory strikes to remove women from Trawick’s jury, resulting in

a petit jury that was composed of 7 men and 5 women. He also argues

that the prosecutor had a history of striking venire members based upon

race. He thus concludes that his case should be remanded for a hearing

on the State’s reasons for striking women.

In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court extended

the principles of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90

L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), to apply to gender discrimination in jury selection.

A party making a Batson or J.E.B. challenge bears the burden of proving

a prima facie case of discrimination and, in the absence of such proof,

the prosecution is not required to state its reasons for its peremptory

challenges. Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1987); Ex parte

Bird, 594 So. 2d 676 (Ala. 1991). In Branch, this Court discussed a

number of relevant factors a defendant could submit in attempting to

establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination; those factors are

likewise applicable in the case of a defendant seeking to establish

gender discrimination in the jury selection process. Those factors,

stated in a manner applicable to gender discrimination, are as follows:

(1) evidence that the jurors in question shared only the characteristic of

gender and were in all other respects as heterogenous as the community

as a whole; (2) a pattern of strikes against jurors of one gender on the

particular venire; (3) the past conduct of the state’s attorney in using

peremptory challenges to strike members of one gender; (4) the type and

manner of the state’s questions and statements during voir dire; (5) the

type and manner of questions directed to the challenged juror, including

a lack of questions; (6) disparate treatment of members of the jury venire

who had the same characteristics or who answered a question in the

same manner or in a similar manner; and (7) separate examination of

members of the venire. Additionally, the court may consider whether

the State used all or most of its strikes against members of one gender.

At trial, Trawick objected to the State’s peremptory strikes, but

objected solely on the basis of race, not gender. Trawick has offered no

evidence that the female venire members shared only the characteristics

of gender, that anything in the type or manner of the prosecutor’s

statements or questions during the extensive voir dire indicated an intent

Case 2:02-cv-01511-CLS-TMP Document 25 Filed 09/29/06 Page 11 of 181
 See Tab R-46 of the Record. 3

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to discriminate againstfemale jurors, that there was a lack of meaningful

voir dire directed at the female jurors, or that female jurors and male

jurors were treated differently. He has offered no evidence that the

prosecutor had a history of using peremptory challenges in amanner that

discriminated against venire members of either gender. Instead, Trawick

has merely emphasized that the State used many of itsstrikes to remove

women from the venire. Without more, we do not find that the number

of strikes this prosecutor used to remove women from the venire is

sufficient to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 162, 167-168 (Ala. 1997). This claim was not raised in

petitioner’s post-conviction Rule 32 proceedings; therefore, there were no additional 3

hearings or findings of fact on this claim after direct appeal.

In response to the claim, the State argues, among several defenses, that the

findings and resolution of this claim by the Alabama Supreme Court are entitled to

deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because the Court’s conclusions are neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, existing Supreme Court precedent.

This court agrees.

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), the petitioner can obtain relief on this claim only if he shows that the

Alabama Supreme Court’s adjudication of his claim “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

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law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or that the Court’s rulings “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).

See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S.

133 (2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d

1223, 1241 (11 Cir. 2001). th

“Moreover, a state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct unless

rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291,

1297 (11 Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 th

S. Ct. 1828, (2006). 

The foregoing standards of review are strict, and federal courts are required to

give “greater deference to the determinations made by state courts than they were

required to under the previous law.” Verser v. Nelson, 980 F. Supp. 280, 284 (N.D.

Ill. 1997) (quoting Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1441 (7 Cir. 1997)). th

A state court’s determination of an issue will be sustained under § 2254(d)(1),

unless it is “contrary to” clearly established, controlling Supreme Court precedent,

or it is an “unreasonable application” of that law. These are two different inquiries,

not to be confused, nor conflated, as the Supreme Court explained in Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), saying: 

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Section 2254(d)(1) defines two categories of cases in which a state

prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under the statute, a federal

court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the relevant state-court

decision was either (1) “contrary to ... clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2)

“involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”

(Emphases added.)

Williams, 529 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added). The statute limits the source from which

“clearly established Federal law” can be drawn to “holdings, as opposed to the dicta,

of the [Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”

Id. at 412; see Jones v. Jamrog, 414 F.3d 585 (6 Cir. 2005); Sevencan v. Herbert,

th

342 F.3d 69 (2 Cir. 2003); Warren v. Kyler, 422 F.3d 132, 138 (3 Cir. 2005) nd rd

(“[W]e do not consider those holdings as they exist today, but rather as they existed

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

A state-court determination can be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme

Court precedent in either of two ways:

First, a state-court decision is contrary to this Court’s precedent if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court

on a question of law. Second, a state-court decision is also contrary to

this Court’s precedent if the state court confronts facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent

and arrives at a result opposite to ours.

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 The record also reflects that the defendant was present during the private, individual voir 4

dire. See Trial Record p. 567.

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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

Likewise, a state-court determination can be an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established Supreme Court precedent in either of two ways:

First, a state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this

Court’s precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of

the particular state prisoner’s case. Second, a state-court decision also

involves an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the

state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our

precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.

Id. at 407; see also Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223 (11 Cir. 2001). The question of

th

whether a particular application was “reasonable” turns not on subjective factors, but

on whether the application of Supreme Court precedent at issue was “objectively

unreasonable.” The question is not whether the state court “correctly” decided the

issue, but whether its determination was “reasonable,” even if incorrect. See Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).

The trial record in this case reveals that the trial court and lawyers engaged in

a detailed voir dire of the venire, both publicly, in open court, and privately, in

chambers. Upon completion of the voir dire and the excusing of some jurors for 4

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cause, the prosecution and defense each exercised fifteen peremptory strikes.

Initially, the State struck fifteen jurors in the following order: Bonny Benefield (Juror

19), a white woman; Constance Harrison (Juror 128), a black woman; Beth Hummel

(Juror 152), a white woman; Rose Lawyer (Juror 178), a white woman; Martha Lee

(Juror 179), a black woman; Evelyn A. Mauldin (Juror 194), a white woman; Janice

Thorson (Juror 297), a white woman; Floyd Curenton (Juror 68), a black man; Judy

K. Vines (Juror 309), a white woman; Jimmy Gaines (Juror 100), a black man; Bertha

Jones (Juror 166), a black woman; Billy Bentley (Juror 20), a black man; Richard

Harris (Juror 126), a white man; Tyeshia Johnson (Juror 164), a black woman; and

Jerald Pettit (Juror 236), a white man. The defense raised an explicit Batson

objection, contending that the State used seven of its fifteen strikes against black

jurors due to their race. That pattern of striking resulted in seven of twelve black

venire members being removed, leaving five to serve on the petit jury. The trial court

required the prosecutors to state race-neutralreasons for each of the seven strikes, and

found that only three could not be justified as race neutral. As a result, the trial court

overruled the State’s strikes of Bertha Jones, Billy Bentley, and Tyeshia Johnson,

returning them to the trial jury. The trial court then instructed the prosecution to

Case 2:02-cv-01511-CLS-TMP Document 25 Filed 09/29/06 Page 16 of 181
 Alabama uses a “strike down” system of jury selection. This requires that a certain number 5

of strikes be exercised in order to reduce the jury pool to the final number serving on the trial jury.

Unlike the peremptory strike system used in federal court and other states, in which strikes may or

may not be exercised, the “strike down” system mandates that all strikes be exercised. This may

require a party to strike an otherwise acceptable juror. In the Batson/J.E.B. context, this may also

increase the appearance of discriminatory striking because the striking party is forced to choose

jurors to strike even when there is no desire to remove the juror. Whatever the race or gender of

jurors struck in this manner, it cannot be said that the striking party did so out of purposeful

discrimination. For this reason, it is more difficult to conclude that a prima facie showing of

discriminatory striking exists merely from the relative numbers of blacks versus whites or women

versus men removed from the venire. Some of those removed were removed for no more reason

than that the “strike down” system required additional strikes to be exercised. The last three strikes

exercised by the State in this case are an example of that. The prosecution was reluctant to exercise

more strikes, but the trial court insisted because of the need to “strike down” to the proper jury size.

17

exercise three more strikes in lieu of those overruled. Expressing reluctance to 5

exercise additional strikes, the State then struck Patricia Binkley (Juror 22), a white

woman; Doris Sayers (Juror 266), a white woman; and Anita Linder (Juror 182), a

white woman. Thus, of the fifteen strikes exercised by the State and not overruled,

eleven were against women, for a percentage of more than 73% female out of the

strikes used. If one counts all strikes exercised by the State, including those

overruled on race grounds, the State used thirteen of eighteen strikes (72%) against

women.

Although no objection was lodged at the trial court level that the State

exercised its strikes in a gender-discriminatory manner, the trial judge made detailed

findings concerning the Batson race objection, some of which shed light on the

motives of the prosecutors. The trial court wrote as follows:

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Venire called up from jury assembly — 42 principal jurors and 16

alternates for total of 58 venire persons (initially planned for 22

alternates but space limitations precluded more than 16).

After extensive voir dire, strikes for cause, and agreed upon

strikes, the next panel of 42 included twelve black persons — 

State strikes seven blacks, Powers motion heard in chambers —

State gives race neutral reasons for striking 128 a B/F, Ms. Harrison —

son treated in the mental health community with positive results, had

been juror in a hung jury criminal case, expressed no hard feelings

towards man who killed her husband; race neutral reasons are given for

striking # 179, B/F, Ms. Lee, a woman who expressed inability to

participate in sequestrated jury because of sole caretaker of three small

children, ages 12, 10, and 8 — no surrogate caretaker available; race

neutral reasons re # 68, a B/M Mr. Curenton are given, likewise

expressed problems with sequestration, is on medication, had previously

voted not guilty in a criminal jury trial; race neutral reasons given for

striking # 100, a B/M, Mr. Gaines, only juror who stated he had bad

experience with law enforcement officer — officer took bullits [sic]

from his pistol, would not return bullits [sic], juror complains to chief of

police & had gone to school with the mayor — case at bar features an

Edwards v. Arizona “confession,” veracity of law enforcement officer

is critical on question of voluntariness — jurors, white and black, who

have had bad experience with law enforcement are peremptorily struck

in all criminal cases conducted by undersigned.

With reference to Ms. Harrison above # 128, it is noted that white

jurors # 297, Ms. Thorson, whose sons are receiving positive treatment

in the “mental medical” community via use of ritilyn [sic, Ritalin] was

struck as was white f/m #19 Ms. Benefield via her experiences in the

mental medical community — 

It must be noted that case at bar features the “insanity” or severe

mental disease or defect defense & that Defense will offer testimony of

a mental health specialist(s) as well as medical records from mental

health professionals —

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19

With reference to Ms. Lee above # 179 re problems with 3 small

children & sequestration — note that white jurors # 194 Ms. Mauldin,

expressing problems with sequestration due to children ages 13 & 15 &

white f/mJudyVines # 309, expressing problems with sequestration due

to 10 yr. old daughter performance at a school function were struck by

State — Defense struck other jurors with sequestration problems such

as w/m Mr. Bacon, # 10; # 181 w/f Sallie Lewis, # 249 Mr. Quinn;

jurors eliminated from principal panel by agreement because of

sequestration problems include # 333 Lee Williams w/f w/sick child,

husband unable to care for child; B/F Carolyn Harris, children with

chicken pox; # 27, Ms. Briscoe, problems with children unattended at

night; # 186 w/F Edith Long, heart patient; w/F Ms. Hicks, 15 yr. old

son unattended at night — father travels.

Undersigned requested attys to strike sequestration problem type

jurors —

Further it is noted that each of the aforementioned black

vernirepersons struck by the State were individually voir dired

concerning their special subject areas: experience in the mental/medical

field, experiences in the criminal justice system, sequestration problems,

problems with law enforcement.

State peremptory strikes of B/F # 166, Ms. Jones; # 20 B/M Mr.

Bentley & B/F # 164 Ms. Johnson — all are placed back in the jury

pool & thus will sit on the petit jury of twelve.

State substitutes with striking three white vernirepersons — 

Thus, petit jury that will hear the case is comprised of 

Five Black females

Three Black males

One White female

Five White males

Case 2:02-cv-01511-CLS-TMP Document 25 Filed 09/29/06 Page 19 of 181
 This reference to the alternate jurors is confusing. Although this written finding by the trial 6

judge suggests that Jurors 236 and 34 would sit as alternates, a strike sheet at page 142 of the Trial

Clerk’s Record indicate that they were struck. In any event, it does not appear that either alternate

participated in deliberations.

 At page 35 of his appeal brief, the following claim is asserted as a heading, but with 7

absolutely no argument accompanying it:

THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING BLACK VENIREPERSONS TO BE

STRUCK BY THE PROSECUTION’S USING PEREMPTORY STRIKES TO

EXCLUDE THEM FROM THE JURY FOR NON-RACE NEUTRAL REASONS

Tab R-32, p. 35. 

20

State’s alternate juror is white male # 236, defense alternate is # 34, a

white female ,

6

Therefore eightBlack jurors are projected to deliberate at close of

the case — 

See Trial Clerk’s Record, pp. 5-11.

On direct appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, petitioner raised,

but did not argue, the same Batson race objection. At page 35 of his appeal brief, the

following claim is asserted as a heading, but with absolutely no argument

accompanying it. See Tab R-32, p. 35. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

7

addressed the issue as a race-discrimination Batson claim, saying:

The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in

allowing the state to strike black prospective jurors without providing

race-neutral reasons. The appellant makes no argument in his brief

concerning this issue, except to cite it as an issue; however, because this

case involves the death penalty, this court is obliged under Rule 45A,

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21

Ala. R. App. P., to review this issue under the plain error doctrine. The

plain error doctrine states:

“In all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed,

the court of criminal appeals shall notice any plain error or

defect in the proceedings under review, whether or not

brought to the attention of the trial court, and take

appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever

such error has or probably has adversely affected the

substantial right of the appellant.”

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d

69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that black prospective

jurors could not be struck from a black defendant’s jury based solely on

their race. The United States Supreme Court extended its ruling in

Batson to apply to white defendants in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,

111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991); to civil cases in Edmonson

v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L. Ed. 2d

660 (1991); and to defense counsel in criminal cases in Georgia v.

McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992). The

Alabama Supreme Court held in White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v.

American Liberty Insurance Co., 617 So. 2d 657 (Ala.1993), that Batson

applies to the striking of white prospective jurors. In 1994, the United

States Supreme Court extended Batson to apply to gender in J.E.B. v.

Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994).

“A defendant claiming a Batson violation must make a

prima facie showing that the prosecution used its

peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner. Jackson v.

State, 594 So. 2d 1289 (Ala. Cr. App.1991). Only when

the defendant establishes facts and circumstances that raise

an inference of discrimination must the state give its

reasons for its peremptory strikes. Carter v. State, 603

So. 2d 1137 (Ala. Cr. App.1992).”

Stokes v. State, 648 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Ala. Cr. App.1994).

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22

This court had held that “[u]nder Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,

106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), the clear, specific, and

legitimate race-neutral reason must be related ‘to the particular case to

be tried.’” Lane v. State, 625 So. 2d 1178, 1181 (Ala. Cr. App.1993),

quoting Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 623 (Ala.1987) (emphasis in

Branch). However, the United States Supreme Court recently in Purkett

v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995),

defined the term “legitimate reason.” The Court stated:

“The Court of Appeals appears to have seized on our

admonition in Batson that to rebut a prima facie case, the

proponent of a strike ‘must give a “clear and reasonably

specific” explanation of his “legitimate reasons” for

exercising the challenges,’ Batson, 476 U.S., at 98, n. 20,

106 S. Ct., at 1724, n. 20 (quoting Texas Dept. of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.

Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981)), and that the

reason must be ‘related to the particular case to be tried,’

476 U.S., at 98, 106 S. Ct., at 1724. See [Elem v. Purkett]

25 F. 3d [679], at 682, 683 [(8th Cir. 1994)]. This warning

was meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could

satisfy his burden of production by merely denying that he

had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his

good faith. What it means by a ‘legitimate reason’ is not

a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny

equal protection. See Hernandez [v. New York, 500 U.S.

352] at 359, [111 S. Ct. 1859] at 1866, [114 L. Ed. 2d 395

(1991)]; cf. Burdine, supra, at 255, 101 S. Ct., at 1094

(‘The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to

justify a judgment for the defendant ’).”

(Emphasis added.)

Since the release of Purkett a party’s burden of proving that

strikes were not violative of Batson is not as great as it was before the

release of Purkett.

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23

In this case the appellant contends that the state’s strikes of four

black prospective jurors violated Batson. The prosecutor stated that she

struck prospective juror number 128 because the prospective juror

served as a juror on a prior criminal case that resulted in a hung jury.

Also, she gave as another reason for striking this prospective juror the

fact that his son had been treated for a psychiatric illness, and the

appellant was raising the insanity defense. These reasons are

nonviolative of Batson. See Watkins v. State, 551 So. 2d 421 (Ala. Cr.

App.1988), and Freeman v. State, 651 So. 2d 576 (Ala. Cr. App.1994).

The prosecutor stated that she struck prospective juror number

179 because the juror indicated that service on the jury would be a

hardship if the jury was sequestered because she had three children for

whom she was responsible during the day. A prospective juror’s

indication that service on a jury would be a hardship is a legitimate

reason for striking that person. Harvey v. State, 579 So. 2d 22

(Ala. Cr. App.1990).

The prosecutor stated that she struck prospective juror number 68

because sequestration would be a hardship for him. The prospective

juror was on medication that he took at home. Additionally, the

prospective juror had served on a prior criminal jury that had returned

a not guilty verdict. These explanations for striking the prospective

juror are legitimate reasons. Harvey; Williams, supra.

Finally, the prosecutor stated that she struck prospective juror 100

because he had had a prior bad experience with law enforcement. The

prospective juror had previously complained to the chief of police. A

prospective juror’s dissatisfaction with law enforcement constitutes a

valid reason for striking that person. Gaston v. State, 581 So. 2d 548

(Ala. Cr. App.1991).

The trial court found that the state’s reasons for striking the

prospective jurors were race-neutral. We will reverse a trial court’s

ruling that no Batson violation occurred only if the ruling is “clearly

erroneous.” Williams v. State, 634 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. Cr. App.1993). 

The trial court’s ruling in this case was not clearly erroneous.

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24

Trawick v State, 698 So. 2d 151, 156-158 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). Clearly, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not read petitioner’s claim as asserting a

gender-discrimination claim. Neither the trial court judge, nor the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals was presented with the necessity of evaluating whether petitioner

had stated a prima facie showing of gender-based striking and, consequently, neither

undertook to examine whether the strikes were gender-neutral.

Petitioner focused on gender discrimination for the first time in his petition for

writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of Alabama. See Tab R-37, p. 1. Despite this,

the Alabama Supreme Court appears to have addressed the J.E.B. genderdiscrimination claim on the merits, rather than finding it procedurally defaulted. The

question presented here is whether the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that

petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing of gender discrimination in jury

selection, so as to require the State to articulate gender-neutral reasons for its strikes,

was “contrary to,” or an “unreasonable application of,” clearly established United

States Supreme Court precedent existing at the time of the Alabama Supreme Court’s

decision. This court finds that it was not.

First, the findings of fact made by the Alabama Supreme Court are not

unreasonable in light of the record in this case. It is true that the State used its first

seven consecutive strikes to remove women from the jury, and eleven of its fourteen

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 Whether the State exercised fourteen or fifteen strikes is unclear. Both petitioner and the 8

Alabama Supreme Court refer to fourteen, but a strike sheet at page 142 of the Trial Clerk’s Record

(Tab R-1, p. 142) seems to show that fifteen strikes were exercised.

See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005) (“[W]e presume the 9

Texas court’s factual findings to be sound unless Miller-El rebuts the ‘presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.’”). 

25

strikes against women, but, beyond this showing, there is nothing else to establish 8

gender bias in the state’s pattern of strikes. There is nothing in the voir dire

questioning — either the types of questions asked by the state prosecutors, or their

pattern of questioning — that suggests any differential treatment of female venire

members by the prosecution. Petitioner has not attempted to offer any “clear and

convincing evidence” that refutes the conclusion by the Supreme Court of Alabama 9

that no conduct by the prosecutor, except the manner in which the strikes were

exercised, demonstrates prejudice by the prosecutor. Thus, this court must accept and

defer to these findings of fact by the state court.

Further, the Alabama Supreme Court clearly applied the correct Supreme Court

precedent to this issue, relying on J.E.B., Powers, and other cases in the Batson line.

Likewise, the requirement that the defendant first is required to make a prima facie

showing of discrimination before the prosecution is forced to articulate race-neutral

reasons is well-established. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), the

Supreme Court explained:

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26

In Batson, we outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a

prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the

Equal Protection Clause. 476 U.S., at 96-98, 106 S. Ct., at 1722-1724.

The analysis set forth in Batson permits prompt rulings on objections to

peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury

selection process. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing

that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of

race. Id., at 96-97, 106 S. Ct., at 1722-1723. Second, if the requisite

showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate

a race- neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Id., at

97-98, 106 S.Ct., at 1723-1724. Finally, the trial court must determine

whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful

discrimination. Id., at 98, 106 S. Ct., at 1723. 

Id. at 358-359 (emphasis added). In J.E.B., the Supreme Court repeated the allocation

of the burdens of proof, requiring the challenging party first to make a prima facie

showing of gender discrimination before the striking party must proffer genderneutral reasons. “As with race-based Batson claims, a party alleging gender

discrimination must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before

the party exercising the challenge is required to explain the basis for the strike.” 

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144-145 (1994); see also Purkett v.

Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court’s analysis of this

question clearly was not “contrary to” established Supreme Court precedent in the

sense that the state court applied the wrong rule. The correct rule was applied.

A state-court determination can be “contrary to” controlling Supreme Court

precedent in another way, if “the state court confronts facts that are materially

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27

indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result

opposite to” that reached by the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405 (2000). Surveying Supreme Court precedent existing at the time, the Alabama

Supreme Court’s determination that petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing

of gender discrimination is problematic. In essence, the state supreme court

concluded that petitioner’s showing that the prosecution used eleven of its fourteen

strikes against women, including its first seven consecutive strikes, was not a

sufficient prima facie showing of sex discrimination under Batson and J.E.B. Several

Supreme Court cases, however, indicate that such a pattern of striking, within the

petitioner’s case alone, may be enough to make a prima facie showing. For example,

in J.E.B., the very case stating the rule against gender discrimination in jury selection,

the Court examined whether the prosecution’s use of nine of its ten peremptory

strikes against men was constitutional. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the

Court found that the prosecution used seven of ten peremptory strikes to remove

black jurors in a case against a white defendant. In Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411

(1991), the Court seemed to find a Batson violation when the prosecution used nine

of ten strikes to remove black jurors in a case against a black defendant accused of

raping and murdering a white woman. Likewise, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete

Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the use of two of three peremptory challenges to

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28

remove black jurors in a civil case by a black plaintiff appeared to be sufficient. On

the surface, therefore, these cases seem to suggest that the Alabama Supreme Court

confronted facts not materially different from the facts in these cases, yet reached the

opposite conclusion: that no prima facie showing was made by evidence of eleven

of fourteen strikes being used against women.

The strictures of § 2254(d), however, require the court to very carefully

examine the basis of the state court’s ruling in light of Supreme Court precedent

existing on the date of the state-court decision. Indeed, as mentioned already, the

statute limits the source from which “clearly established Federal law” can be drawn

to “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the [Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the

time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412

(2000); see also Jones v. Jamrog, 414 F.3d 585 (6 Cir. 2005); Sevencan v. Herbert,

th

342 F.3d 69 (2 Cir. 2003); Warren v. Kyler, 422 F.3d 132, 138 (3 Cir. 2005). nd rd

Thus, for a state-court determination to be “contrary” to “clearly established”

Supreme Court precedent, the precedent must exist as holdings in Supreme Court

decisions, not merely dictum.

None of the Supreme Court cases existing at the time of the Alabama Supreme

Court’s decision holds that the pattern of striking that occurred in the present case

was a sufficient prima facie showing of discrimination to trigger the second step in

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29

the Batson analysis. In J.E.B., for example, the state courts had held that Batson

simply did not extend to gender-based strikes. Consequently, neither the state courts

nor the Supreme Court had the opportunity to assess whether a prima facie showing

of discrimination occurred. For that reason, the Supreme Court remanded the case

for further proceedings, including assessment of the Batson analysis. In Ford v.

Georgia, the question was whether the Georgia Supreme Court’s promulgation of a

procedural rule could bar consideration of a Batson claim. As in J.E.B., the courts

had not had the opportunity to determine whether a prima facie Batson violation

occurred. In Powers and Edmonson, the courts again had categorically denied

application of Batson to the proceedings before them. In Powers, the trial court

denied that a white defendant had standing to challenge the striking of black jurors,

and in Edmonson, the trial court held simply that Batson did not apply to civil

proceedings. Once again, neither lower court attempted to determine whether a prima

facie showing of discrimination in a particular pattern of striking had been made and,

thus, that precise issue was neither before, nor explicitly decided by, the Supreme

Court. Stated differently, none of these cases hold that a particular factual pattern of

exercising peremptory strikes was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of

discriminatory striking. Consequently, it cannot be said that any particular fact

pattern in relation to jury striking was “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent

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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), does 10

not change this result, as it came after the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision.

 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94, 96 (1986); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 11

S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005). 

30

to which the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision was contrary. Thus, again, the

Alabama Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue was not “contrary to” established

Supreme Court precedent.10

Nor can the court say that the Alabama Supreme Court’s resolution of this

claim was “objectively unreasonable.” Regardless of whether the state supreme court

correctly determined that a prima facie case of gender discrimination had not been

shown, its conclusion is not plainly and objectively unreasonable. As noted earlier,

other than the fact that the prosecutors used eleven of their fourteen strikes against

females, in the “totality of the relevant facts” relating to jury selection, nothing else 11

suggested a discriminatory animus. Nothing in the voir dire questioning indicated a

bias against women. Indeed, given that petitioner was charged with the kidnaping

and murder of a young woman, it is difficult to imagine why the prosecution would

have had a tactical or strategic reason for wanting to remove women from the trial

jury. Compare, for example, so many of the other cases in the Batson line. In J.E.B.,

a paternity prosecution, the State struck men, seeking to seat as many women as

possible, obviously due to the nature of the case. Likewise, in Ford v. Georgia, 498

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31

U.S. 411 (1991), the prosecution used nine of ten strikes to remove black jurors in a

case against a black defendant accused of raping and murdering a white woman. One

of the factors tending to support a prima facie showing is whether the strikes seem

to correlate with a prosecutor’s stereotypical view of how certain groups of jurors

might view the case. In this case, there is no such correlation; there is no reason to

assume that the prosecutor wanted to strike female jurors in a case in which a man is

accused of kidnaping and murdering a young woman. Such strategic and tactical

considerations are plainly part of the “totality of the relevant facts” concerning the

prosecutor’s conduct. But in the absence of apparent strategic or tactical reasons for

a certain pattern of striking, the correlation with discrimination is reduced, and the

prima facie showing becomes more questionable.

Also, it should be noted that, even without the J.E.B. objection being stated,

there were obvious gender-neutral reasons for the State to strike many of the female

jurors who were removed. Several (Lee, Mauldin, and Vines) expressed concerns

about being sequestered, because they had minor children to care for — a fact that

could have interfered with their attention to the case. Others (Benefield, Harrison,

and Thorson) indicated that they had positive experiences with mental-health

treatment for themselves or family members. Because the defendant was asserting

a mental-health defense, the prosecution might have worried that such jurors would

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32

be more favorably disposed to such a defense. Yet another juror (Binkley) revealed

that she worked at the School of Health Behavior at the UAB College of Public

Health, which might concern the prosecution due to the defendant’s mental-health

defense. Although these gender-neutral reasons were never articulated by the

prosecution in response to a J.E.B. motion, they were known to the trial court. These

facts fit within the “totality of the relevant facts” used by the trial court and the

Alabama Supreme Court in assessing whether a prima facie showing could be made.

In light of these reasons for striking certain female jurors, the state courts might

reasonably conclude that a prima facie showing of purposeful gender discrimination

was not, and could not be, made.

Additionally, one of the prosecutors — indeed, the prosecutor exercising the

final three strikes against women — was a woman. This relevant fact also tends to

undermine an initial finding of a prima facie showing of gender discrimination.

These factors do not establish that the Alabama Supreme Court correctly determined

that a prima facie showing was not made, but they do tend to show that the court’s

conclusion was not “objectively unreasonable.”

Thus, having concluded that the Alabama Supreme Court’s determination that

petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing of gender discrimination in striking

was not “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application of,” Supreme Court precedent

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33

in this area, the state court’s resolution of this claim is entitled to deference under §

2254(d). Federal habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.

Claim II — Use of Inculpatory Statements

Petitioner has alleged three distinct, but interrelated claims for relief based

upon the admission of certain inculpatory statements. He alleges that:

a. The use of his statements violated the Fourth Amendment because

there was no probable cause to arrest petitioner prior to his

interrogation. (Paragraph 14 of the petition).

b. The use of his statements violated the Fifth Amendment because

he requested and was denied access to a lawyer during

interrogation. (Paragraphs 15-17 of the petition).

c. The use of his statements violated the Fifth Amendment because

they were induced by promises from police interrogators, making

the statements involuntary. (Paragraph 18 of the petition).

Before trial, petitioner filed a motion to suppress the statements (see Tab R-1,

pp. 79-87), in which he asserted as the only basis for suppression that promises were

made to induce him to make the statements, thereby rendering them involuntary. The

trial court conducted a suppression hearing on July 26, 1993. At the hearing, both a

police investigator and petitioner testified that, after his October 26, 1992 arrest,

petitioner had invoked his right to legal assistance during questioning and

questioning had ceased. Thereafter, however, petitioner directed his mother to

contact the investigator, because petitioner wanted to talk to him. When the police

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34

investigator went to the jail on October 29, 1992, petitioner indicated that he wanted

to make a statement under certain conditions, specifically that he would be charged

with a capital offense, that he would be sentenced to the electric chair, that the news

coverage of the case would be kept to a minimum, and that the case would be

expedited as much as possible. (See Tab R-5, pp. 126-127). The trial court denied

the motion to suppress with respect to petitioner’s inculpatory statement made on

October 29, 1992.

In his initial brief on direct appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,

petitioner argued that his statements were used in violation of the Fifth Amendment

because they were induced by promises made to him by police interrogators. (See

Tab-32, pp. 13-19). There is no mention of the assertion that the statements were

tainted by a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In resolving this claim, the court of

criminal appeals wrote:

The appellant initially contends that evidence of his confession

should have been suppressed. Specifically, he contends that his

confession was not voluntary because, he says, he confessed only after

he placed certain conditions on his agreement to confess that he was

promised would be met. He asserts that he confessed only after he was

promised that the case would be a capital case and there would be a

minimum of publicity.

At the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Steven Greene, of the

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, testified that he took the

appellant’s statement on five occasions. In the fourth statement, which

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35

was introduced at trial, the appellant confessed to murdering Gash.

Greene testified that before he made the statement the appellant was

advised of his Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.

Ed. 2d 694 (1966), rights, and that no threats or promises were made in

order to get the appellant to make a statement. Greene further testified

that he did not promise that he could or would meet the conditions set

by the appellant.

The appellant himself testified at the suppression hearing that the

officers did not promise that any “conditions” would be met before he

made his statement.

All extrajudicial statements are deemed involuntary. If the

statement is to be received as evidence, the state has the burden of

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statement was

voluntary and that the accused was advised of his Miranda rights.

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522, 93 L. Ed.

2d 473 (1986). See also Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954 (Ala. Cr. App.

1992); Jackson v. State, 562 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990).

The appellant does not argue that he was not advised of his

constitutional rights as articulated in Miranda. Thus, our inquiry centers

on whether the appellant’s statement was voluntary. To determine

whether a statement is voluntary, this court must examine the

“totality-of-the-circumstances.” Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89

S. Ct. 1138, 22 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1969); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,

77 S. Ct. 281, 1 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1957).

Here, the appellant maintains that his giving the statement was

conditioned on the granting of certain requests that he outlined to police.

As the state contends, a similar issue was addressed by this court in

Siebert v. State, 555 So. 2d 772 (Ala. Cr. App.), aff'd, 555 So. 2d 780

(Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S. Ct. 3297, 111 L. Ed. 2d

806 (1990). In Siebert, this court stated:

“The appellant also argues that his statements should

not have been allowed into evidence because, he says, they

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36

were involuntary; specifically, he says they were

conditioned on Captain Hurst’s alleged promise that he

would not be asked certain questions concerning ‘details’

of the murders. Captain Hurst, however, testified that

appellant told him that he would admit to the killings, but

would not go into any details until he got back to Alabama,

a condition to which Captain Hurst agreed. Appellant now

claims that Captain Hurst’s agreement to this condition

constituted a ‘promise’ or inducement for his statement,

thereby rendering his statements involuntary and

inadmissible.

“The question of undue influence in obtaining

admissions or confessions is determined by an examination

of all attendant circumstances, with the inquiry focusing on

whether the accused’s free will and rational intellect were

overborne at the time of his confession. Hubbard v. State,

500 So. 2d 1204, 1220 (Ala. Cr. App.), aff'd, 500 So. 2d

1231 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct.

1591, 94 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1987); McCammon v. State, 499

So. 2d 811, 815 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986); Seawright v. State,

479 So. 2d 1362, 1367 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985); Agee v. State,

465 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984). ‘The factual

inquiry centers on (1) the conduct of law enforcement

officials in creating pressure and (2) the suspect’s capacity

to resist that pressure.’ Seventeenth Annual Review of

Criminal Procedure, 76 GEO.L.J. 676 (1988). ‘If an

individual’s “will was overborne” or if his confession was

not “the product of a rational intellect and a free will,” his

confession is inadmissible because coerced.’ Townsend v.

Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307, 83 S. Ct. 745, 754, 9 L. Ed. 2d

770 (1963). ‘The types of promises which may make a

defendant’s statement involuntary are, e.g., promises of

leniency, promises to bring the defendant’s cooperation to

the attention of the prosecutor, the disclosure of

incriminating evidence to the accused, and silence in

response to the defendant’s offer to talk if his statement

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37

would not be used against him.’ Siebert v. State, [562 So.

2d 586 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989)]. However, this court has

made it clear that a statement ‘is not rendered involuntary

by a promise of benefit that was solicited freely and

voluntarily by the defendant himself.’ Rowe v. State, 421

So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982); Eakes v. State,

387 So. 2d 855, 860 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978).

“Although appellant has attempted to transform

Captain Hurst’s actions into a promise of benefit or

inducement, it is readily apparent from the testimony that

this was simply a condition placed by the defendant on the

extent of his confession at that time. Captain Hurst neither

promised appellant anything nor induced him in any way.

He was merely acknowledging the terms which the

appellant had unilaterally imposed. Appellant had the right

to remain silent. He also had a right to limit any statement

which he [chose] to make. Captain Hurst was only

honoring this right. Any benefit which may have accrued

from this agreement was solicited freely and voluntarily by

the appellant himself, and thus, failed to render his

confession involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court

correctly received the offered portions of appellant's

confession into evidence.”

Siebert, 555 So. 2d at 776-77.

This court will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on the

voluntariness of a statement unless it is “‘manifestly contrary to the

great weight of the evidence.’” Barbour v. State, 673 So. 2d 461 (Ala.

Cr. App. 1994), quoting Malone v. State, 452 So. 2d 1386, 1389 (Ala.

Cr. App. 1984). The trial court’s ruling was not contrary to the great

weight of the evidence. The appellant’s confession was correctly

received into evidence.

Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 151, 154-155 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).

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38

Petitioner then sought review in the Supreme Court of Alabama, and there

raised all three of the claims asserted now with respect to the admissibility of his

statements. (See Tab R-37, pp. 34-40). The Alabama Supreme Court resolved the

claims with the following opinion:

Trawick next argues that his confession to Gach’s murder was

elicited after he had requested an attorney and in response to improper

promises made to him by the police; thus, he argues that the confession

should have been suppressed at trial, relying on Edwards v. Arizona, 451

U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981).

To address these issues, we must note the following sequence of

events fromthe record: Trawick gave several interviews to the Jefferson

County Sheriff’s Department personnel in October 1992. The first

interview was not in direct relation to Gach’s murder; rather, Trawick

was brought in for questioning as part of the Department’s investigation

of several reported attempts by an unknown man to abduct women or to

lure them into his vehicle. The police did not ask Trawick about Gach’s

murder, and no statements from the first interview were admitted at his

trial.

In a second interview, on October 26, 1992, Lt. Steven S. Green

specifically asked Trawick whether he had had any involvement in

Gach’s abduction and murder; however, Trawick did not admit guilt at

that time. During that interview, Lt. Green asked Trawick if he would

take a polygraph test; Trawick replied, in part, “[I]f I’m either being

charged with or, you know highly suspected of a murder, I need to get

legal assistance all the same.” The interview stopped, although a police

officer did ask Trawick if he or his mother would object to a search of

his residence.

A third interview occurred on October 29, 1992, after Lt. Green

received a telephone call from Trawick’s mother, who told him that

Trawick wanted to speak with him. Lt. Green went to the jail and asked

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39

if Trawick wanted to see him. Lt. Green again advised Trawick of his

Miranda rights; Trawick then stated that he understood those rights, and

he signed a waiver form. Trawick gave an oral statement; he did not

indicate that he wished to speak with an attorney before giving his

statement.

During the third interview, Trawick told Lt. Green that he knew

about Gach’s murder and that he could tell Lt. Green what he needed to

know to finish his investigation of the case. Trawick indicated that he

wanted to minimize the publicity about the case, for his mother’s sake,

but that he wanted to make sure that the case would be tried as a capital

murder and that he would be sentenced to death. Trawick did not ask to

speak with an attorney. Lt. Green told Trawick that he would set up a

meeting between Trawick and an assistant district attorney, and the

interview ended.

A fourth interview occurred later that day, when Trawick met with

Lt. Green and another police officer, along with Deputy District

Attorney Roger Brown. After being advised of his Miranda rights,

which he again waived, Trawick gave an oral statement, which was

audiotaped, confessing to the abduction and murder of Stephanie Gach.

While giving the statement, Trawick reiterated that he wanted the case

to be tried as a capital murder and that he wanted the death penalty.

Brown told Trawick that he would have to know the circumstances of

the case before he could know whether Trawick could be tried for

capital murder.

Trawick argues that, after he requested an attorney during the

second interview, all questioning should have stopped until he was

provided one. Thus, because he was not provided with an attorney

before giving the oral statements in the third and fourth interview, he

argues that evidence of those statements should have been suppressed.

When a suspect expresses a desire to deal with the police only

through counsel, the suspect should not be subject to further

interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available,

unless the suspect himself initiates further communication, exchanges,

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40

or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, supra. The

record shows that the second interview effectively ended after Lt. Green

asked Trawick if he would take a polygraph test and Trawick indicated

that he would want legal counsel before he would do so. According to

Trawick’s own testimony in the pre-trial suppression hearing, he asked

his mother the next day to tell Lt. Green that he wanted to make a

statement. When Lt. Green arrived at the jail, Trawick wanted to talk to

him and, after being properly read his Miranda rights, he waived those

rights and gave the statement. The evidence clearly shows that Trawick

himself initiated further communication with Lt. Green, after indicating

in the second interview that he might want legal counsel; thus, the

statements that he gave in the third and fourth interviews were not given

in violation of Edwards v. Arizona.

Trawick also argues that the assistant district attorney and the

police promised him that, in return for his statement, they would assure

that he would be expeditiously tried for capital murder, that he would be

sentenced to death, and that they would keep news media coverage of

the case to a minimumout of respect for Trawick’s mother. He contends

that he gave his statement only after he was promised that these

conditions would be met, and that his statements were thus coerced, in

violation of his due process rights.

At the pre-trial suppression hearing, Lt. Green confirmed that,

before giving his statement at the fourth interview, Trawick told the

distract [sic] attorney and police officers that he wanted to be tried for

capital murder and to receive the death penalty. Lt. Green testified that

Brown responded merely by saying that he would not know whether the

case could be made capital until he knew the circumstances of it. Brown

also testified that he only told Trawick, in effect, that he did not know

whether the case was a capital case because he did not know the facts.

At the pre-trial hearing on his motion to suppress the confession,

Trawick himself testified that Brown and the police officers only

“promised that they would listen” to his statement and that if the facts

they heard in the statement fit the facts necessary for a capital case, then

his case would be tried as such.

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41

The kinds of promises that may make a defendant’s statement

involuntary are promises of leniency, promises to bring the defendant’s

cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor, and the disclosure of

incriminating evidence to the accused and silence in response to the

defendant’s offer to talk if his statement would not be used against him.

Siebert v. State, 562 So. 2d 586 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989), affirmed, 562 So.

2d 600 (Ala.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 963, 111 S. Ct. 398, 112 L. Ed. 2d

408 (1990). There is no evidence that the police or the deputy district

attorney made any promises of this sort to Trawick. The deputy district

attorney’s mere promise to listen to Trawick’s statement of the facts of

the case and to then to take whatever action was appropriate under the

law as applied to those facts was merely a promise that he would do his

job; certainly, it was no special privilege or favor for Trawick.

 The true test for determining whether extrajudicial confessions

are voluntary is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time

he confessed so that the confession was not the product of a rational

intellect and free will. Ex parte Weeks, 531 So. 2d 643 (Ala. 1988). The

evidence, including Trawick’s own testimony, shows that Trawick

himself initiated the contact that led to his confession, that he

legitimately waived his right to an attorney before confessing, and that

he did so without the inducement of special promises of the sort

described in Siebert. We therefore find no merit in his argument that his

confession was not voluntary.

Trawick v State, 698 So. 2d 162, 175-176 (Ala. 1997).

II(a) — Admissibility under the Fourth Amendment

Petitioner’s first habeas attack on the admissibility of his inculpatory statement

asserts that there was no probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, his October 29,

1992 statement was tainted by his illegal arrest three days earlier, on October 26,

1992. In response to this claim, respondents contend that it is procedurally defaulted,

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42

that relief is barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and that the claim is

meritless in any event.

It is clear that petitioner never raised a Fourth Amendment challenge to the use

of his inculpatory statement until he sought certiorari review in the Alabama

Supreme Court. Before that, petitioner’s only contention was that his statement was

involuntarily induced by promises made to him by police investigators. Although the

Fourth Amendment claim is argued in petitioner’s brief on certiorari, the Alabama

Supreme Court did not address it at all, either on the merits or to reject it on

procedural grounds. In that sense, no state court has ever expressly relied on a

procedural ground to decline to consider the claim. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255

(1989). In the absence of an express reliance on a procedural rule, the court can only

conclude that the claim is exhausted, and that it was considered and rejected on the

merits by the Alabama Supreme Court.

This court agrees that the rule in Stone v. Powell precludes habeas

consideration of this claim. In Stone, the Supreme Court concluded that the costs

associated with the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures were too high

to justify consideration of such an issue in the post-conviction context of a habeas

petition, as long as the defendant was given a full and fair chance to litigate the issue

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43

prior to trial. The Court held that, when “the State has provided an opportunity for

full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be

granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an

unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428

U.S. 465, 494 (1976); see also United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 563 n.20

(1982) (“After Stone v. Powell, . . . the only cases raising Fourth Amendment

challenges on collateral attack are those federal habeas corpus cases in which the

State has failed to provide a state prisoner with an opportunity for full and fair

litigation of his claim, analogous federal cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and collateral

challenges by state prisoners to their state convictions under postconviction relief

statutes that continue to recognize Fourth Amendment claims.”); Withrow v.

Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 686 (1993) (“We simply concluded in Stone that the costs of

applying the exclusionary rule on collateral review outweighed any potential

advantage to be gained by applying it there.”). In Cardwell v. Texas, 461 U.S. 571

(1983) (per curiam), the Supreme Court extended the rule in Stone to confessions

allegedly tainted by an illegal arrest. See Agee v. White, 809 F.2d 1487, 1490 (11th

Cir. 1987); Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756 (11 Cir. 1989); Peoples v. Campbell,

th

377 F.3d 1208 (11 Cir. 2004). th

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In sum, insofar as a state prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to challenge

the admissibility of his inculpatory statement, he may not subsequently raise the

Fourth Amendment arrest issue in a federal habeas action.

In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner had a full and fair

opportunity to raise any issue he desired with respect to the admissibility of his

October 29, 1992 statement. Indeed, petitioner did challenge it on Fifth Amendment

voluntariness grounds, and obtained a hearing on that issue. Although the

suppression hearing did not address the probable cause to arrest petitioner on October

26, 1992, that was only because petitioner did not raise that question in either his

motion or at the hearing. He plainly had a full and fair opportunity to do so.

Consequently, under Stone and Cardwell, the assertion that the October 29, 1992

statement was tainted by petitioner’s illegal arrest fails to state a ground for habeas

relief.

Even if the question could be considered, it is meritless. An illegal arrest

without probable cause unquestionably can taint statements obtained from the

defendant after the arrest, unless circumstances indicate that the taint has been

attenuated by subsequent events. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490

(1963) (holding that confession of defendant who had been illegally arrested, released

on his own recognizance, and returned voluntarily several days later to make

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 The court does not concede that the arrest was illegal. There is evidence in the record 12

suggesting that petitioner was arrested for a possible parole violation in connection with using a gun

in an attempt to coerce women into his car.

45

incriminating statements need not be suppressed because the connection between the

arrest and the statement had “‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’”); Brown

v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). “‘[T]he temporal proximity of the arrest and

the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and particularly, the

purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct’ are all relevant considerations in

determining whether a confession is the fruit of an illegal detention.” Devier v. Zant,

3 F.3d 1445, 1459 (11 Cir. 1993) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04

th

(1975)).

In this case, the court has little difficulty concluding that petitioner’s October

29, 1992 statement was sufficiently attenuated from his alleged illegal arrest, and 12

that it was not the product of that arrest. First, the October 29, 1992, confession

occurred three days after his arrest on October 26, 1992. The arrest was not an

example of flagrant official misconduct. Petitioner was properly arrested for a

possible parole violation that was being actively investigated. Petitioner was advised

of his Miranda rights, and already had invoked his right to the assistance of counsel

during interrogation; indeed, interrogation had been terminated effectively by

petitioner’s invocation of his right to counsel. Three days later, petitioner himself

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undertook to have his mother contact police investigators to request that they come

to see him in the jail. This indicates not only that petitioner’s October 29, 1992,

statement was the product of a free will and conscious choice by him, but also that he

was not isolated from assistance, but in contact with his mother. When officers

arrived at the jail on October 29, 1992, petitioner engaged them in negotiations over

the terms under which he would make a statement to them. All of these factors

indicate that there was no causal link between the purportedly illegal arrest and the

confession three days later. Circumstances and subsequent events had completely

attenuated the taint of the supposedly illegal arrest and subsequent confession. This

claim does not merit habeas relief.

II(b) — Edwards v. Arizona claim

Petitioner’s second claim related to the use of his October 29, 1992, inculpatory

statement alleges that the statement was obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona,

451 U.S. 477 (1981), because it occurred after he invoked the right to counsel during

interrogation. In considering this claim on direct appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court

found that petitioner initiated the interview with officers by having his mother contact

police investigators, to tell them that petitioner wanted to speak to them. Petitioner

requested counsel during his second interview on October 26, 1992, at which time the

interview was terminated without his having made any inculpatory statements to

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police. Three days later, petitioner asked his mother to tell police investigators that

he wanted to speak to them. When they arrived at the jail, investigators again

administered Miranda warnings to petitioner, which he acknowledged. During this

third interview, he admitted kidnaping and murdering Stephanie Gach. Petitioner’s

own testimony at the suppression hearing confirms this sequence of events. 

The state court’s determination that this confession did not violate Edwards v.

Arizona is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court

precedent. In Edwards the Supreme Court held as follows:

[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have

counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that

right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further

police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his

rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having

expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not

subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been

made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.

Id. at 484-485 (emphasis added); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146

(1990); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). In a subsequent case, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule in Edwards, saying:

The rule of the Edwards case came as a corollary to Miranda’s

admonition that “[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the

interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” 384 U.S., at 474,

86 S.Ct. at 1627-1628. In such an instance, we had concluded in

Miranda, “[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an

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attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the

government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and

intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right

to retained or appointed counsel.” Id., at 475, 86 S. Ct., at 1628. In

Edwards, we “reconfirm[ed] these views and, to lend them substance,

emphasize[d] that it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the

authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he

has clearly asserted his right to counsel.” 451 U.S., at 485, 101 S. Ct.,

at 1885. We concluded that reinterrogation may only occur if “the

accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or

conversations with the police.” [Italics added].

Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680-681 (1988).

These cases make clear that, notwithstanding an invocation of the Fifth

Amendment right to counsel that terminates a police interrogation, an accused may

initiate further communication with police. If, during the re-initiated conversation,

the accused makes a free and knowing waiver of his right to counsel, his subsequent

inculpatory statements do not violate Edwards. That is precisely what occurred in

this case, as determined by the Alabama Supreme Court. After terminating his

interrogation on October 26, by invoking his right to counsel, petitioner then initiated

further communication with police three days later, when he instructed his mother to

tell police investigators that he wanted to talk to them. When police visited petitioner

as he requested, they again advised him of his right to remain silent, and of his right

to the assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, petitioner made a knowing and free

decision to waive those rights and talk to police. The conclusion that these events,

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and the subsequent use of petitioner’s inculpatory statements on October 29, 1992,

did not violate Edwards is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

Supreme Court precedent. The resolution of this claim by the Alabama Supreme

Court is entitled to deference under § 2254(d), and petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief on this claim.

II(c) — Voluntariness of inculpatory statements

Petitioner’s third claim relating to the admission of his confession alleges that

his statement of October 29, 1992, was involuntarily induced by promises made to

him by police. Specifically, petitioner contends that police and an assistant district

attorney promised him that: (1) he would be charged with a capital offense; (2) he

would be sentenced to the electric chair; (3) media publicity would be kept to a

minimum; and (4) the case against him would be expedited. These promises, he

contends, constitute inducements to get him to speak, rendering his confession

involuntary under the Fifth Amendment.

Again, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the

only promises made to petitioner were to listen to his version of the facts, and then

to charge him under those facts. The state court noted that there were no promises of

leniency or assistance. Nothing said by state agents suggested to petitioner that

speaking to police would be a benefit to him in relation to the crime or charges. The

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court observed that “[t]he deputy district attorney’s mere promise to listen to

Trawick’s statement of the facts of the case and to then to [sic] take whatever action

was appropriate under the law as applied to those facts was merely a promise that he

would do his job; certainly, it was no special privilege or favor for Trawick.”

Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 162, 176 (Ala. 1997).

The Alabama Supreme Court correctly determined that petitioner’s statement

of October 29, 1992, — the only one used as evidence at trial — was not

involuntarily made in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. This conclusion

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

The Supreme Court established a standard for Fifth Amendment “voluntariness” in

Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987), saying that:

A statement is not “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth

Amendment if an individual “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently”

waives his constitutional privilege. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 444,

86 S. Ct., at 1612. The inquiry whether a waiver is coerced “has two

distinct dimensions.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct.

1135, 1141, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986):

“First the relinquishment of the right must have been

voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and

deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or

deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with

a full awareness both of the nature of the right being

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to

abandon it. Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances

surrounding the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced

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51

choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a

court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been

waived.” Ibid. (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,

725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)).

There is no doubt that Spring’s decision to waive his Fifth

Amendment privilege was voluntary. He alleges no “coercion of a

confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to

break [his] will,” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312, 105 S. Ct. 1285,

1295, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985), and the trial court found none. His

allegation that the police failed to supply him with certain information

does not relate to any of the traditional indicia of coercion: “the duration

and conditions of detention ..., the manifest attitude of the police toward

him, his physical and mental state, the diverse pressures which sap or

sustain his powers of resistance and self-control.” Culombe v.

Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037

(1961) (opinion of Frankfurter,J.). Absent evidence that Spring’s “will

[was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically

impaired” because of coercive police conduct, ibid.; see Colorado v.

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-164, 107 S. Ct. 515, ___, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473

(1986), his waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege was voluntary

under this Court’s decision in Miranda. 

Spring, 479 U.S. at 573-574 (emphasis added).

The conclusion reached by the Alabama Supreme Court that the “promises”

purportedly made to petitioner were notsuch as would overwhelm his power to make

a free choice whether to speak to police is not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court law. Consequently, the resolution of the claim is

entitled to deference under § 2254(d), and petitioner is not due any relief.

Claim III — Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

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The petitioner has alleged fifteen claims of ineffective assistance by trial

counsel. The United States Supreme Court has established a national standard for

judging the effectiveness of criminal defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial

cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The Court elaborated:

A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective

as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two

components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance

was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning asthe “counsel” guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Id. at 687. 

Further, in order to show ineffectiveness of counsel, the movant must

demonstrate that his or her attorney’s performance fell below “an objective standard

of reasonableness,” id. at 688, and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694. When making such an evaluation, “the court should recognize

that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all

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significant decisionsin the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690.

The effectiveness or ineffectiveness must be evaluated by consideration of the totality

of the circumstances. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 962 (11 Cir. 1983). The court th

must remember that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right only to

adequate counsel; he is not entitled to the very best legal representation. Stone v.

Dugger, 837 F.2d 1477 (11 Cir. 1988). th

The second requisite element in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

a showing of prejudice. Even if counsel made an error so egregious as to be outside

the broad scope of competence expected of attorneys, a movant can obtain relief only

if the error caused actual prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, supra. Prejudice

means a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different had the errors not occurred.

Against this standard, the court will examine each of petitioner’s fifteen

distinct allegations of ineffective assistance.

III(a) — Inadequate defense funding

Petitioner first contends that Alabama provides inadequate funding and

compensation for capital defense attorneys and defense experts. (Paragraphs 20 to

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 At paragraph 23 of the petition, Trawick alleges that the severe caps on the amount of 13

compensation paid to capital defense counsel amounts to an unconstitutional taking of property

without just compensation, a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, and a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause by discriminatorily denying indigent defendants their Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of counsel. As to the takings claim, petitioner has no standing to assert

a claim for the loss of his lawyers’ property. Petitioner is not being denied just compensation; it is

his lawyers who labor under the severe compensation caps, depriving them of fair compensation for

their work. Similarly, even if the compensation caps amount to a violation of the separation-ofpowers doctrine (and the court does not believe that they do), petitioner has no standing to object to

it. As with the takings claim, it is his lawyers who suffer injury as a result of the violation, not

petitioner, and they, not he, would have standing to assert such a claim. Finally, petitioner’s equal

protection claim seems to assert that the compensation caps deprive him and other indigent

defendants of equal protection because the caps result in a denial of effective assistance of counsel.

This pleads nothing more, however, than that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel

because he received ineffective assistance of counsel; a tautology at best. In short, paragraph 23 adds

nothing to the analysis of the claim that petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, which

necessarily turns on counsel’s actual performance at trial, not on what he might have done if he had

had unlimited resources.

54

24a of the petition). But, aside from the vague assertion that the compensation 13

limits hindered petitioner’s defense, the only specific allegation of a link between

inadequate compensation and ineffective assistance charges that the compensation

limits prevented counsel from retaining and using experts to explore petitioner’s

mental health history and other mitigating factors. As these allegations appear

independently as ineffectiveness Claims III(b). and III(c)., the question of whether

counsel was ineffective in these ways due to inadequate funding, or other reasons,

will be discussed in relation to those specifications.

Inadequate funding of counsel appointed to represent capital defendants, as

unfair as it might be to the attorneys, does not itself amount to ineffective assistance

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 Petitioner does not contend that United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), requires a 14

different result. The compensation caps are not the type of circumstances that make it unlikely that

any lawyer could render effective assistance. Indeed, despite the compensation limits in various

states, counsel can and do provide effective representation of capital defendants. Petitioner makes

no contention that his case fits either of the two other Cronic circumstances — complete denial of

counsel at a critical stage and the complete failure of counsel to subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002).

55

of counsel unless it contributes to actual errors or shortcomings in the performance

of counsel. The Strickland standard requires an analysis of specific errors or

shortcomings by counsel. The Strickland Court wrote: 14

A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must

identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have

been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must

then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified

acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. In making that determination, the court should

keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing

professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in

the particular case.

Id. at 690 (emphasis added). Thus, the allegation that compensation caps hindered

the ability of counsel to represent a capital defendant has meaning only by reference

to specific errors orshortcomings purportedly caused by inadequate defense funding.

Only by examining specific errors or shortcomings can it be determined, first, that it

was an error outside the broad scope of competence expected of counsel, and second,

whether the error caused real prejudice to the defendant. Consequently, as a claim

of ineffectiveness divorced from analysis of particular errors or omissions, the

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56

assertion that the State of Alabama provides inadequate compensation for capital

defense counsel and experts fails to state a basis for habeas relief, and it is due to be

denied.

III(b) — Inadequate investigation of mental health history

At paragraph 25 of his Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleges that:

Trial counsel failed to investigate adequately evidence of Mr.

Trawick’s mental illness and failed to present adequately such evidence

at the guilt phase of his trial. Mr. Trawick has suffered from a severe

mental illness his entire life. It has been well documented that from an

early age, he has been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid

schizophrenia. Moreover, for the past twenty-five years psychiatrists

have attempted to rehabilitate him with many different treatments

ranging from anti-psychotic medication to electric shock treatment and

even female hormones. This evidence was not presented by counsel

adequately. Counsel did not conduct sensitive and detailed interviews

with family members such as his mother, his sister, his cousins or his

aunts and uncles, or even with other witnesses such as childhood

friends, who could have provided information about Mr. Trawick’s

severe and longstanding mental illness. In addition, counsel failed to

secure and present adequately Mr. Trawick’s institutional and medical

records, including records from correctional facilities, hospital and the

parole board, documenting his mental illness. Counsel also failed to

prepare adequately independent mental health experts to evaluate,

diagnose and testify about Mr. Trawick’s mental illness. Because of

these deficiencies, trial counsel failed to show the jury the severity of his

mental illness, how longstanding it is, and how it rendered Mr. Trawick

not guilty of capital murder.

Petitioner alleged the same claim at paragraph 11(A) of his Second Amended Rule

32 Petition in Alabama state court (Tab R-46, pp. 4-5), with the exception that, in the

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57

state petition, he added the allegation that “But for counsel’s ineffectiveness in this

regard, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Mr. Trawick’s trial would

have been different.” This additional allegation is missing from the federal habeas

petition.

In reaching the conclusion that petitioner had not adequately pled this claim

under the standard required by Rule 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the Rule 32 court explained:

In paragraph 11(A) of the second amended petition, Trawick

contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate

evidence of Trawick’s mental illness and failing to present such

evidence during the guilt phase of the trial. More specifically, Trawick

asserts that trial counsel did not conduct “sensitive and detailed

interviews” with “family members” who could have provided

information about his “severe and longstanding mental illness.”

Trawick contends that trial counsel “failed to secure and present

adequately [his] institutional and medical records, including records

fromcorrectional facilities, hospitals and the parole board, documenting

his mental illness.” Trawick contends that the mental health experts that

he called as witnesses were not prepared adequately to testify. Trawick

then contends that “[b]ecause of these deficiencies, trial counsel failed

to the [sic] show the jury the severity of his mental illness, how

longstanding it is, and how it rendered [him] not guilty of capital

murder.”

Trawick did not plead any facts with the specificity required by

ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.6(b). The claim makes a list of conclusory

allegations, but contains no supporting facts. For example, Trawick

contends that trial counsel did not adequately present a guilt phase

defense, but does not state any facts regarding how the evidence that

was presented at the guilt phase was inadequate. He asserts that counsel

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58

should have conducted “sensitive and detailed interviews” with “family

members” who could have provided information about his mental

illness, but does not state what information these interviews would have

provided or which family members were not interviewed by trial

counsel. The contention that trial counsel failed to secure Trawick’s

institutional and medical records does not include information regarding

what records are being referenced and whether or not they are any

different from the records presented at trial. Trawick contends that the

mental health experts called as witnesses were not adequately prepared

to testify, but does not state how their testimony or trial counsel’s

preparation was inadequate. Trawick concludes this claim by stating

that but for the listed “deficiencies” he would have been found “not

guilty of capital murder.” He provides, however, no factual basis for

this conclusory statement. There is no need to conduct an evidentiary

hearing on the basis of these conclusory allegations and summary

dismissal of this claim is warranted.

Moreover, the fact that trial counsel did present evidence to

support the guilt phase defense of insanity, makes it even more

incumbent on Trawick to allege specific factual allegations regarding

how trial counsel’s performance was ineffective. During his opening

statement, trial counsel detailed the information that would be presented

to the jury to support the insanity defense. R. 608-632. Trial counsel

presented two mental health experts at the guilt phase of the trial, Dr.

Kathleen Ronan and Dr. Alan Blotcky. Dr. Ronan, a psychologist on

staff at Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility, was called as a witness

by trial counsel to testify about Trawick’s extensive mental health

history. R. 915-966. Dr. Ronan, who was familiar with Trawick’s

voluminous medical file, testified that Trawick began his long history

of psychiatric disturbances in 1968 when he struck a female co-worker

in the head with a screwdriver and showed symptoms of confusion,

memory loss, depression, and anxiety. R. 920-21. Dr. Ronan also told

the jury that two years after this incident Trawick was referred to a

Birmingham psychologist who made a diagnosis that Trawick was

having a paranoid schizophrenic reaction with homicidal impulses. R.

923. This contact with mental health professionals continued unabated

until the time of the crime in 1992. Dr. Ronan detailed for the jury that

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59

during this time Trawick periodically received anti-psychotic

medication, that Trawick received electric shock therapy while at

Hillcrest Hospital, and that Trawick took Depo-Provera, a medication

which reduced his sexual urges. R. 915-966. All of the records that Dr.

Ronan had reviewed and specifically mentioned in her testimony was

admitted into evidence. Supplemental record at 41-95. Dr. Blotcky, a

psychologist in private practice in Birmingham, testified that Trawick

does not know right from wrong and that he cannot distinguish facts

from fantasy. R. 978. During the closing argument, Trawick’s counsel

argued that the jury find Trawick not guilty by reason of insanity. R.

1029-1037.

This claim is summarily dismissed because it has been

insufficiently pleaded. The claim is based on factually unsupported

allegations and conclusions. Therefore, Trawick has not met either the

burden of pleading imposed byRule 32.3 orthe specificity requirements

of Rule 32.6(b), ALA. R. CRIM. P. Trawick has not presented a claim

that would establish that trial counsel’s performance was outside “the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689. Nor has Trawick shown that there is a reasonable probability

that the result of the trial would have been different.

See Tab R-62, pp. 9-13. 

On appeal from denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals agreed that petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not

properly pled. Rejecting petitioner’s argument that his Rule 32 petition was

sufficiently detailed to merit an evidentiary hearing, the court of appeals wrote:

The appellant’s argument is without merit. “A petition is ‘meritorious

on its face’ only if it contains a clear and specific statement of the

ground upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the facts

relied upon (as opposed to a general statement concerning the nature and

effect of those facts) . . . sufficient to show that the petition [sic] is

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 Alternatively, respondents also seem to assert that the claim was resolved on the merits 15

by the state courts, which is entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It is clear, however,

that both the Rule 32 court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals resolved the claim solely

on the basis of inadequate pleading under Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., and never reached the

merits of the claim. Absent a determination of a claim “on the merits,” § 2254(d) simply does not

apply. Wright v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 278 F.3d 1245, 1255-56 (11 Cir. 2002) (“In th

§ 2254(d) Congress meant to, and did, mandate deference to state court adjudications on the merits

of federal constitutional issues, and a decision that does not rest on procedural grounds alone is an

adjudication on the merits regardless of the form in which it is expressed.”) cert. denied, 538 U.S.

906 (2003); Ventura v. Attorney General, Fla., 419 F.3d 1269, 1286 n.7 (11 Cir. 2005). Because

th

the resolution of this claim rested solely on a procedural ground, there was no adjudication “on the

merits,” and § 2254(d) does not come into play.

 He also contends that the state courts did not expressly rely on this procedural bar, but 16

considered the claim on the merits. If so, this court may also consider the merits of the claim under

60

entitled to relief if those facts are true.” Ex parte Clisby, 501 So. 2d

483, 486 (Ala. 1986). Moreover, the appellant’s argument that an

abundance of details would have been revealed at the evidentiary

hearing is without merit. An evidentiary hearing is required only if the

petition is “meritorious on its face.” Alderman v. State, 647 So. 2d 28,

33 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).

Tab R-63, p. 7. When the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review, this

became the final substantive discussion of the resolution of this claim.

In response to the present habeas petition, respondents press most vigorously

the assertion that petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted and, thus, cannot be

considered on the merits. Petitioner replies to this argument, however, that the 15

purported procedural default grounded on the pleading-specificity requirements of

Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) is neither “independent” nor “adequate,” and, in any event, he

met the pleading requirements. 

16

Case 2:02-cv-01511-CLS-TMP Document 25 Filed 09/29/06 Page 60 of 181
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989). For the reasons explained in the preceding footnote, however,

this court believes that the state courts expressly and exclusively relied on a procedural ground for

rejecting the claim, and, thus, Harris does not authorize the court to ignore the procedural default

and move on to the merits of the claim. See also Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549 (11 Cir. th

1994) (“[W]here a state court has ruled in the alternative, addressing both the independent state

procedural ground and the merits of the federal claim, the federal court should apply the state

procedural bar and decline to reach the merits of the claim.”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1061 (1995)

61

A state procedural rule that precludes consideration of the merits of a claim is

due to be honored only if it is both “independent” and “adequate.” Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989).

These issues are determined by reference to federal, not state, law.

A state procedural rule is “independent” when it “rests solidly on state law,”

and it “is not intertwined with an interpretation of federal law.” Judd v. Haley 250

F.3d 1308, 1313 (11 Cir. 2001) (citing and quoting Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494 th

(11 Cir. 1990)). th

A state procedural rule is “adequate” if it is “firmly established and regularly

followed.” Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 858 (11 Cir. 2005) (“In order to serve th

as the basis for a procedural bar in federal habeas proceedings, a state rule must be

firmly established and regularly followed.”); Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 1023 (11th

Cir. 1996); Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1408, modified on reh’g, 61 F.3d 20

(11 Cir. 1995); see also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002). This does not

th

mean that the procedural rule must be applied rigidly in every instance, or that

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62

occasional failure to do so eliminates its “adequacy.” Rather, the “adequacy”

requirement means only that the procedural rule “must not be applied in an arbitrary

or unprecedented fashion.” Judd v. Haley 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11 Cir. 2001). th

In addition to the foregoing requirements, the “state court’s procedural rule

cannot be ‘manifestly unfair’ in its treatment of the petitioner’s federal constitutional

claim to be considered adequate for the purposes of the procedural default doctrine.”

Id.

The question in this case, therefore, is whether the pleading-specificity

requirement of Alabama Rule of Criminal procedure 32.6(b) was both “independent,”

and so “firmly established and regularly followed” when the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals relied upon it to deny consideration of petitioner’s claim in January

2002, that it is entitled to deference here. If so, petitioner can obtain consideration

of the merits of the claim only by showing either “cause and prejudice” to excuse the

procedural default, or that this court’s refusal to consider the claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice,” in the sense that he is factually innocent either

of the crime or of the death penalty itself.

First, there can be little question that the pleading-specificity requirement of

Rule 32.6(b) is “independent” of federal law; indeed, it is explicitly grounded in the

Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. It does not require any reference to federal

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law, nor does it involve an inevitable interpretation or construction of federal law.

Second, it is clear that Alabama courts have regularly followed and applied this

requirement of Rule 32.6(b) since well before petitioner’s Rule 32 petition was filed

in 1998. See Wilson v. State, 650 So. 2d 587 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); Johnson v.

State, 675 So. 2d 85 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); McNair v. State, 706 So. 2d 828 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1997); Bryant v. State, 739 So. 2d 1138 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). The

Alabama courts also have consistently applied Rule 32.6(b) in the interim, since

petitioner’s collateral petition was filed. See Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2005); Thomas v. State, 908 So. 2d 308 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Taylor

v. State, 879 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); Burgin v. State, 857 So. 2d 162

(Ala. Crim. App. 2002). Thus, the rule appears to be “firmly established and

regularly followed.”

The application of Rule 32.6(b) to this case does not involve some

extraordinary use of the rule, nor is it unfairly used here. The requirement that facts

supporting a claim be pled with specificity is particularly apt where petitioner does

not deny that substantial evidence of his mental-health history was presented to the

jury, but, instead, only alleges vaguely that it was not “adequately” investigated and

presented. The factual basis for the assertion of inadequacy must be made clear. As

the Rule 32 court explained, petitioner is required to allege what records trial counsel

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failed to obtain and present, what information counsel failed to elicit in “sensitive”

interviews with petitioner’s family members, and how counsel failed to adequately

prepare petitioner’s two psychologists to testify. Without these specific factual

allegations, the respondents have no way of answering the petition, and the courts

have no way of assessing what impact, if any, the alleged inadequacies had on the

trial’s fairness.

This court concludes, therefore, that the procedural default found by the

Alabama state courts is both “independent” and “adequate,” as those terms are

defined by federal law, and due to be honored in this habeas proceeding. The state

rule is both “firmly established and regularly followed,” and not unfairly applied in

this case. Because petitioner failed to comply with this state procedural rule, the

claim is procedurally defaulted and cannot be considered on the merits without a

showing by petitioner of either “cause and prejudice” to excuse the default, or that

this court’s failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice.

If a petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a constitutional claim, he is barred

from litigating it in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless he can show adequate

“cause” for, and “actual prejudice” resulting from, the default. Wilson v. Jones, 902

F.2d 923, 925 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982);

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Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The “cause and prejudice” test of Engle

v. Isaac and Wainwright v. Sykes is in the conjunctive; therefore, petitioner must

prove both cause and prejudice. The United States Supreme Court summarized the

“cause” standard in the following manner:

In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), this Court adopted

the “cause and prejudice” requirement of Francis v. Henderson, supra,

for all petitioners seeking federal habeas relief on constitutional claims

defaulted in state court. The Sykes Court did not elaborate upon this

requirement, but rather left open “for resolution in future decisions the

precise definition of the ‘cause-and-prejudice’ standard.” 433 U.S. at

87. Although more recent decisions likewise have not attempted to

establish conclusively the contours of the standard, they offer some

helpful guidance on the question of cause. In Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1

(1984), the Court explained that although a “tactical” or “intentional”

decision to forgo a procedural opportunity normally cannot constitute

cause, id. at 13-14, “the failure of counsel to raise a constitutional issue

reasonably unknown to him is one situation in which the [cause]

requirement is met.” Id. at 14. The Court later elaborated upon Ross

and stated that “the existence of cause for a procedural default must

ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with

the State's procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986). We explained that “a showing that the factual or legal basis for

a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, . . . would constitute

cause under this standard.” Ibid. (Citations omitted.)

Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1988).

Petitioner also must demonstrate that he was prejudiced; he must show “not

merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to

his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

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constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)

(emphasis in original).

On the other hand, a federal habeas court, will consider a procedurally

defaulted claim in the absence of cause if a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” has

“probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Smith v.

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986) (quoting, respectively, Engle, 456 U.S. at 135,

and Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). 

Here, petitioner has failed to show “cause and prejudice” to excuse his failure

to plead this claim more specifically. He has failed to explain what has prevented him

from pointing to specific facts showing that his trial counsel’s investigation and

presentation of evidence relating to his mental-health history was “inadequate.”

Further, he has not shown how he was prejudiced by the purported inadequacy.

Petitioner must allege and also demonstrate that the supposed shortcomings of

counsel made a difference in his case. Not only has he failed to allege with

reasonable specificity how counsel was “inadequate,” he has not shown how it made

any difference in the outcome of his case. Finally, petitioner also has not alleged any

facts, or attempted to make any showing, that he is factually innocent of the brutal

murder with which he was charged. It would not be a fundamental miscarriage of

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justice to enforce the procedural bar in this case. This claim, therefore, is due to be

denied.

III(c) — Inadequate investigation of mitigating circumstances

Petitioner alleges the following in paragraph 26 of his Second Amended

Petition:

Trial counsel failed to investigate adequately mitigating evidence

for Mr. Trawick’s sentencing hearing before the jury and judge. Many

mitigating circumstances existed that trial counsel failed to investigate

and present. Mr. Trawick has suffered from a severe mental illness his

entire life. It has been well documented that from an early age, Mr.

Trawick has been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.

Moreover,for the past twenty-five years psychiatrists have attempted to

rehabilitate him with many different treatments ranging from antipsychotic medication to electric shock treatment and even female

hormones. This evidence was not presented by counsel adequately

during the penalty phase of Mr. Trawick’s trial. Counsel did not

conduct sensitive and detailed interviews with family members such as

his mother, his sister, his cousins or his aunts and uncles, or with other

witnesses such as childhood friends, who could have provided

information about Mr. Trawick’s severe and longstanding mental illness

and other compelling mitigating evidence. In addition, counsel failed

to secure and present adequately Mr. Trawick’s institutional and medical

records, including records from correctional facilities, hospitals and

from the parole board, documenting his mental illness. Counsel also

failed to prepare adequately independent mental health experts to

evaluate, diagnose, and testify about Mr. Trawick’s mental illness and

other mitigating evidence. Because of these deficiencies, trial counsel

failed to the [sic] show the jury and the judge the severity of Mr.

Trawick’s mental illness, how longstanding it is, and how it should have

been weighed heavily as mitigating evidence.

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Petitioner alleged this same claim in virtually identical language at paragraph 11(B)

of his Second Amended Rule 32 Petition in Alabama state court (Tab R-46, pp. 5-6),

with the exception that, in his state petition, he added the allegation that: “But for

counsel’s ineffectiveness in this regard, there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of Mr. Trawick’s sentencing hearing before the jury and judge would have

been different.” This additional allegation is missing from the federal habeas

petition.

In reaching the conclusion that petitioner failed to plead this claim with

sufficient specificity under Rule 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure,

the Rule 32 court said:

In paragraph 11(B) of the second amended petition, Trawick

contends that trial counsel failed to investigate for mitigating evidence

to present at the sentencing hearing before the jury and the trial judge.

To support this claim, Trawick lists the same conclusory allegations that

he made in paragraph 11(A) of the second amended petition.

Trawick’s trial counsel began the penalty phase of the trial by

requesting that the jury consider the portions of Dr. Ronan’s and Dr.

Blotcky’s testimony at the guilt phase relevant to sentencing issues. R.

1094. Additionally, trial counsel requested that the jury also consider

the medical records generated by Dr. Miree and Dr. Logue. Trial

counsel presented the testimony of Dr. James Mays, an assistant

professor in the school of social work at the University of Alabama. R.

1102-1128. Dr. Mays’s testimony was based upon his interviews with

Trawick and of Trawick’s family members and from his review of

Trawick’s psychiatric and prison records. Trawick’s mother also

testified at the sentencing phase before the jury. R. 1128-1133. She

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69

stated that she recognized early that her son needed professional

psychiatric help because he did not know how to show emotions. R.

1130. The examples she provided were that her son never cried, even

when his father died, a person to whom Trawick was very close. Id.

Due to her belief that Trawick was emotionally restricted, Mrs. Trawick

took him to Dr. Elmore, a child psychiatrist. Id. Trawick’s trial counsel

did not present additional testimony at the sentencing hearing before the

trial judge but the trial judge did consider letters from Gay Trawick,

Trawick’s wife, and from Trawick himself. R. 1221.

This claim is summarily dismissed because it has been

insufficiently pleaded. The claim is based upon unsupported factual

allegations and conclusions. In fact, this claim merely restates the same

litany of items stated in the previous paragraph. Therefore, Trawick has

not met either the burden of pleading imposed by Rule 32.3 or the

specificity requirements of Rule 32.6(b), ALA.R.CRIM. P. Trawick has

not presented a claim that would establish that trial counsel’s

performance was outside, “the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Nor has Trawick shown that

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have

been different.

Tab R. 62, pp. 13-14. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that

consideration of the claim on the merits was barred by petitioner’s procedural failure

to allege the claim with requisite specificity, as required by Rule 32.6(b). (See Tab

R. 63, p. 6).

Respondents assert in the instant action that this claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel — grounded as it is on the somewhat vague allegation that counsel failed

to investigate and present “adequately” mitigating evidence — is procedurally

defaulted and cannot be considered on the merits. For all the reasons explained in the

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preceding section of this opinion, the court finds that Rule 32.6(b)’s specificity

requirement is an “independent” and “adequate” state procedural rule for purposes

of the procedural-default doctrine, and that petitioner procedurally defaulted this

claim by failing to plead it with the necessary specificity in state court. As

demonstrated in this case, the Alabama rule is more than mere semantics or hypertechnical. Petitioner acknowledges that his attorneys investigated and presented

extensive mental-health evidence as mitigating circumstances. He alleges facilely

that they simply failed to do so “adequately,” without ever attempting to identify

specific facts showing faults or shortcomings in either their investigation or

presentation of this evidence. Without some factually explicit explanation of what

his attorneys did, or failed to do, that made their representation “inadequate,” courts

analyzing such claims are placed in the very position that Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984), says they must avoid; that is, second-guessing the decisions of

counsel after the fact. Strickland very clearly mandates that courts are to presume

that the actions of counsel were reasonable, and that court review of counsel’s

representation should be “highly deferential.” Id. at 689; Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.

3d 1285, 1293 (11 Cir. 2006). Absent some clear explanation by petitioner about th

how his attorneys “inadequately” investigated and presented mitigating evidence —

something more and different from what they, in fact, did — the court may not

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71

speculate about the factual basis of the claim. Consequently, the failure to plead such

a claim with factual specificity undermines the very heart of the Strickland analysis.

Simply put, there is no Strickland claim for the court to consider when the petitioner

fails to plead sufficiently the facts underlying his assertion that counsel failed to do

something “adequately.” Such an assertion simply is too vague to state a Strickland

claim.

Having found that this claim is procedurally defaulted, petitioner may obtain

consideration of it on the merits only if he can show “cause and prejudice” to excuse

the default, or that refusal to consider the claim would result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. To prove the latter, petitioner must show that he is factually

innocent of either the crime or the death sentence, and he has not attempted either.

Petitioner also has not attempted to show “cause and prejudice” to excuse the default.

Consequently, the court finds that this claim is due to be denied as procedurally

defaulted.

III(d) — Failure to investigate and object to gender discrimination in

jury selection

Petitioner alleges at paragraph 27 of the Second Amended Petition that his

lawyers rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance because they failed to object

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 As a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this claim is distinct from the gender17

discrimination/Batson claim alleged as Claim I in the Second Amended Petition.

72

to discrimination against women by the State’s prosecutors when exercising jury

strikes. Paragraph 27 states: 17

Trial counsel failed to object adequately to the state’s gender

discrimination in its use of peremptory challenges. J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127.

Counsel should have argued that a prima facie case of discrimination

existed. Counsel should have argued that the fact that the prosecution

used eleven of its fourteen peremptory strikes against women was

sufficient to show a prima facie case under state and federal law. See

Allen v. State, 659 So. 2d 135 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (remand required

where state used eleven of fifteen peremptory strikes against men).

Counsel should also have argued that there was a prima facie case

because the prosecution used all of its first seven strikes against women.

See Ex parte Jackson, 516 So. 2d 768, 773 (Ala. 1986) (Houston, J.,

concurring in result) (pattern indicating systematic exclusion shown by

fact that ten out of first eleven strikes used against blacks). Counsel

should also have argued that the prosecutors in Jefferson County have

a history of discriminatory jury selection. See, e.g., Ex parte Bankhead,

625 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. 1993) (reversing capital conviction from

Jefferson County because of Batson violation); Ex parte Williams, 571

So. 2d 987 (Ala. 1990) (reversing conviction from Jefferson County

because of Batson violation); Miesner v. State, 665 So. 2d 978 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1995) (reversing conviction from Jefferson County because

of Batson violation); Hodge v. State, 665 So. 2d 959 (Ala. Crim. App.

1995) (affirming Jefferson County Circuit Court finding a Batson

violation); Richmond v. State, 590 So. 2d 384 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)

(reversing conviction from Jefferson County because of Batson

violation). Counsel should also have argued that the prosecution

treated male and female venire members differently despite the fact that

they shared the same characteristics. The state’s discriminatory use of

its peremptory strikes resulted in a predominantly male petit jury of

seven men and five women. There is no question that a prima facie case

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 But see Ex Parte Taylor, ___ So. 2d ___, 2005 WL 2403729 (Ala. 2005), in which the 18

Alabama Supreme Court rejected and overruled the rationale of Williams.

73

of gender discrimination existed, and counsel was ineffective for failing

to make a J.E.B. objection.

Petitioner asserted this same claim, verbatim, at paragraph 11(C) of his Second

Amended Rule 32 petition in state court. (Tab R. 46, pp 6-8). The Rule 32 court

concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance failed to comply with the pleading

and specificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of

Criminal Procedure. The court also noted that petitioner had not “shown that there

is a reasonable probability that, if trial counsel had filed an objection based upon

J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), the result of the trial would have been

different.” (Tab R. 62, pp 14-17). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals agreed,

and concluded further that this claim was barred from consideration by the rule in

Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), that there could be no 18

ineffective assistance of counsel if the underlying issue to which counsel failed to

object was considered under the plain error rule on direct appeal and found not to be

error or objectionable. (See Tab R. 63, pp. 7-8).

The basis of the state courts’ decision on this claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is not so much a procedural default as it is a finding that petitioner failed to

state a claim. Citing Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), the

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state courts concluded that there could be no claim of ineffective assistance based on

counsel’s failure to object to something that was not objectionable, as found on direct

appeal of the case. Certainly, the Alabama Supreme Court considered and rejected

on direct appeal petitioner’s gender discrimination in jury selection claim, finding that

he had failed to show a prima facie case of discrimination. That being the case —

that is, that no illegal gender discrimination occurred — it could not be said that

counsel was ineffective in failing to object to it.

Regardless of whether this court agrees with the state courts’ reasoning, or

finds that, under federal law, such a rule is not “adequate” for procedural-default

purposes, the claim simply is meritless. At the time petitioner’s lawyers were striking

the jury for his trial, March of 1994, the Supreme Court had yet to extend the racebased rule of Batson to gender discrimination in jury selection. That occurred about

a month later, on April 19, 1994, when the Supreme Court announced its decision in

J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). The Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel assures criminal defendants that they will be represented by

competent counsel, not the very best counsel. See Stone v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1477

(11 Cir. 1988). Counsel are not required to be creative, or to anticipate all th

developments in the law, in order to meet the wide range of competence expected of

attorneys. For example, in Baldwin v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 1304 (11 Cir. 1998), the th

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75

Eleventh Circuit held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to anticipate the

Supreme Court’s decision in Batson itself. Similarly, counsel in this case cannot be

said to have rendered representation outside the broad range of competence expected

for attorneys because they did not anticipate that the Supreme Court would extend the

rationale of Batson to gender-based jury strikes. Prior to J.E.B., that was a much

debated question, and one that arguably could have been decided either way.

Even if counsel could be faulted for failing to make a J.E.B. objection in March

of 1994, petitioner has not shown any evidence of prejudice from their failure to do

so and, thus, cannot prove the second prong of the Strickland standard for ineffective

assistance of counsel. First, it must be remembered that, even if counsel had made

the objection, there is no evidence indicating whether the trial court would have

found a prima facie showing to require the prosecution to state its gender-neutral

reasons for its strikes. This is particularly true in light of the fact that, at the time of

the jury selection, the Supreme Court had not announced J.E.B. There is no

indication suggesting that the trial court itself would have extended Batson to genderbased strikes in the absence of a Supreme Court directive to do so. Further, even if

the trial court had found a prima facie showing of gender-based strikes, the

prosecution stated gender-neutral reasons for many of its strikes, as discussed in more

detail under Claim I, above. The jury that was seated contained seven men and five

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76

women, hardly a gender-skewed jury. Most importantly, in the context of the

evidence against petitioner, it is inconceivable that a more balanced jury — or even

one dominated by women — would have made a difference in the outcome of either

the finding of guilt or the sentencing recommendation. In short, there simply is no

reason to believe that counsel’s failure to raise a J.E.B. objection would have resulted

in any difference in the case, and, thus, petitioner suffered no prejudice. Compare

Baldwin v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 1304 (11 Cir. 1998), where the court of appeals th

explained:

Even if we assume that Baldwin’s trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in failing to challenge the prosecutor’s use of peremptory

strikes, Baldwin has not demonstrated any prejudice therefrom.

Although “[w]e would have more confidence in the verdict had it been

delivered by a constitutionally composed jury, with both black and white

members[,]” overwhelming evidence supported Baldwin’s conviction in

this case. Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1362 (11 Cir.), cert. th

denied, 515 U.S. 1189, 116 S. Ct. 38, 132 L. Ed. 2d 919 (1995). Having

conducted a thorough review of the record, however, “we cannot

conclude there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel[s’] . . .

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”

Jackson, 42 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct.

2052) (alteration in original); ....

Baldwin, 152 F.3d at 1315-16. The same is true here. Consequently, this claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is due to be denied.

III(e) — Failure to adequately challenge statements made to police

Paragraph 28 of petitioner’s Second Amended Petition reads as follows:

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Trial counsel failed to challenge adequately the constitutionality of the

statements obtained by law enforcement officers and used against Mr.

Trawick at trial. The state coerced statements from Mr. Trawick and

unconstitutionally used them against him at his capital trial. Counsel

failed to adequately argue that law enforcement officers violated Mr.

Trawick’s rights under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85

(1981), because an officer admitted that he continued to interrogate Mr.

Trawick after he requested counsel. (R. 75) Counsel also failed to

adequately argue that law enforcement officers obtained statements from

Mr. Trawick by making improper promises to him. (R. 128);

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Mr. Trawick did not

give the statements freely and voluntarily and counsel failed to

adequately present evidence and make arguments that the use of these

involuntary statements against him violated his right against selfincrimination and his rights to due process and a fair trial.

Petitioner asserted thissame claim, verbatim, at paragraph 11(D) of his Second

Amended Rule 32 Petition in state court. (Tab R. 46, p. 8). The Rule 32 court

concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance failed to comply with the pleading

and specificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of

Criminal Procedure, and that the underlying substantive issue had been found

meritless on direct appeal. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals agreed, and

concluded further that this claim was barred from consideration by the rule in

Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), that there could be no

ineffective assistance of counsel if the underlying issue to which counsel failed to

object was considered under the plain error rule on direct appeal and found not to be

error or objectionable. (See Tab R. 63, pp. 7-8).

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78

For all the reasons explained in earlier sections of this opinion, the court finds

that Rule 32.6(b)’s specificity requirement is an “independent” and “adequate” state

procedural rule for purposes of the procedural-default doctrine, and that petitioner

procedurally defaulted this claim by failing to plead it with the necessary specificity.

Without some factually explicit explanation of what his attorneys did or failed to do

that made their representation “inadequate,” courts analyzing such claims are placed

in the very position that Strickland v. Washington says they must avoid; that is,

second-guessing the decisions of counsel after the fact. Strickland very clearly

mandates that courts are to presume that the actions of counsel were reasonable, and

that the review of counsel’s representation is “highly deferential.” 466 U.S. at 689;

see also Jones v. Campbell, 436 F. 3d 1285, 1293 (11 Cir. 2006). Petitioner th

acknowledges that his attorneys sought to suppress the statements (see Tab R. 1, pp.

79-87); he merely contends they did not do so “adequately,” without attempting to

explain the nature of that inadequacy. Absent some clear explanation by petitioner

as to exactly how his attorneys “inadequately” challenged the statements petitioner

made to law enforcement officers — something more and different from what his

attorneys, in fact, did — the court may not speculate about the factual basis of the

claim. Consequently, the failure to plead such a claim with factual specificity

undermines the very heart of the Strickland analysis. Simply put, there is no

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 The court has no occasion to consider whether the rule stated in Williams v. State, 783 19

So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), is “adequate” under federal law to form the basis of a procedural

default, and the court expresses no opinion on that point. However, for the same reasons expressed

in Ex parte Taylor, ___ So. 2d ___, 2005 WL 2403729 (Ala. 2005), the court has concerns whether

the Williams rule, even if still the law in Alabama, is “adequate” as a basis for a procedural default.

79

Strickland claim for the court to consider when the petitioner fails to plead

sufficiently the facts underlying his assertion that counsel failed to do something

“adequately.” It is simply too vague to state a Strickland claim.19

Having found that this claim is procedurally defaulted, petitioner may obtain

consideration of it on the merits only if he can show “cause and prejudice” to excuse

the default, or if he shows that this court’s refusal to consider the claim would result

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To prove the latter, petitioner must show that

he is factually innocent of either the crime or the death sentence, but he has not

attempted to show either. Petitioner also has not attempted to show “cause and

prejudice” to excuse the default. Consequently, the court finds that this claim is due

to be denied as procedurally defaulted.

III(f) — Failure to examine adequately state mental-health expert

At paragraph 29 of his Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleges that: 

Trial counsel inadequately examined the state’s witnesses including but

not limited to the state’s mental health expert Kathleen Ronan. (R. 955-

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 This claim is somewhat confusing. Dr. Ronan was the Certified Forensic Examiner 20

employed at the state’s Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility who evaluated petitioner and filed a

report concerning his competence to stand trial. Petitioner’s attorneys called Dr. Ronan as an

adverse witness during their defense case. The instant claim of ineffective assistance does not

question the decision to call Dr. Ronan as a witness, but, instead, asserts that petitioner’s trial

attorneys were ineffective because they failed to cross-examine her “adequately.” 

80

962) Counsel should have cross examined Kathleen Ronan, for 20

example, to bring out facts about Mr. Trawick’s mental illness and life

history that would have proven that mitigating circumstances existed.

Because of these deficiencies, trial counsel failed to show the jury and

the judge the severity of Mr. Trawick’s mental illness, how longstanding

it is, and how it should have been weighed heavily as mitigating

evidence.

Petitioner asserted this same claim, verbatim, at paragraph 11(E) of his Second

Amended Rule 32 Petition in state court. (Tab R. 46, p. 8-9). The Rule 32 court

concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance also failed to comply with the

pleading and specificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules

of Criminal Procedure, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. (Tab R.

63, p. 5).

For all the reasons explained in the preceding sections, the court finds that Rule

32.6(b)’s specificity requirement is an “independent” and “adequate” state procedural

rule for purposes of the procedural-default doctrine, and that petitioner procedurally

defaulted this claim by failing to plead it with the necessary specificity. Without

some factually explicit explanation of what his attorneys did or failed to do that made

their representation “inadequate,” courts analyzing such claims are placed in the very

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81

position that Strickland v. Washington says they must avoid; that is, second-guessing

the decisions of counsel after the fact. Strickland very clearly mandates that courts

are to presume that the actions of counsel were reasonable, and that the review of

counsel’s representation is “highly deferential.” 466 U.S. at 689; see also Jones v.

Campbell, 436 F. 3d 1285, 1293 (11 Cir. 2006). Petitioner acknowledges that his th

attorneys examined Ronan; he merely contends they did not do so “adequately,”

without attempting to explain the nature of that inadequacy. Absent some clear

explanation by petitioner about how his attorneys “inadequately” questioned Ronan

about petitioner’s mental health — something more and different from what they, in

fact, did — the court may not speculate about the factual basis of the claim.

Consequently, the failure to plead such a claim with factual specificity undermines

the very heart of the Strickland analysis. Simply put, there is no Strickland claim for

the court to consider when the petitioner fails to plead sufficiently the facts

underlying his assertion that counsel failed to do something “adequately.” It is

simply too vague to state a Strickland claim.

Having found that this claim is procedurally defaulted, petitioner may obtain

consideration of it on the merits only if he can show “cause and prejudice” to excuse

the default, or if he shows that refusal to consider the claim would result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. To prove the latter, petitioner must show that he

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82

is factually innocent of either the crime or the death sentence, and he has not

attempted to show either. Petitioner also has not attempted to show “cause and

prejudice” to excuse the default. Consequently, the court finds that this claim is due

to be denied as procedurally defaulted.

III(g) — Failure to object adequately to inflammatory photographs

Paragraph 30 of the Second Amended Petition alleges the following:

Trial counsel failed to object adequately to the introduction of improper

evidence, particularly inflammatory photographs. Photographs or

videotapes that serve little or no purpose except to arouse the passion,

prejudice, or sympathy of the jury should be excluded from evidence.

At trial, the state introduced autopsy slides and other pictures of the

victim after she was killed. (R. 662-63, 897-903) Showing the jury

these slides and pictures seriously prejudiced Mr. Trawick, and trial

counsel failed to object adequately to them. Counsel should have

argued that photographs that “serve little or no purpose except to arouse

the passion, prejudice, orsympathy of the jury” should be excluded from

the evidence. Ott v. Smith 413 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Ala. 1982). Counsel

should also have argued that the photographs that are more prejudicial

than probative cannot be admitted at trial. Caylor v. State, 353 So. 2d

8 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977). Counsel should also have argued that the

introduction of cumulative and prejudicial photographs is not only a

violation of state law, but that it also infringes on Mr. Trawick’s rights

to due process and a fair trial. Futch v. Dugger, 874 F. 2d 1483, 1487

(11 Cir. 1989). th

Petitioner asserted this same claim, verbatim, at paragraph 11(F) of his Second

Amended Petition under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Tab

R. 46, p. 9). The Rule 32 court concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance also

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83

failed to comply with the pleading and specificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and

32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals agreed and concluded that this claim was barred from consideration

by the rule in Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), that there

could be no ineffective assistance of counsel if the underlying issue to which counsel

failed to object was considered under the plain error rule on direct appeal and found

not to be error or objectionable. (See Tab R. 63, pp. 5-6).

Unlike the issues discussed in preceding sections, where petitioner simply left

the court in the dark about what he contends trial counsel should have done better or

differently, here he specifically states that counsel’s objection to the allegedly

inflammatory photographs was “inadequate” because counsel failed to argue that the

photographs lacked any purpose other than to arouse passion and prejudice, and that

the probative value of the photographs was outweighed by the prejudice they caused.

He also notes that counsel’s objection was “inadequate” because it did not invoke

petitioner’s constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial, in addition to state

rules-of-evidence grounds. Thus, this court has a more difficult time agreeing with

the state courts’ conclusion that this ground failed to meet the pleading and specificity

requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure,

or that such was an “adequate” and “independent” state-law ground for disposing of

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84

the claim. For purposes of applying the procedural-default doctrine, this court cannot

say that the state-court resolution of this claim was “adequate” under federal law.

Nevertheless, turning to the merits of the claim, petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance on this basis is meritless. As explained previously, the standard for

assessing ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington is highly

deferential to counsel’s trial decisions. It must be shown that no competent attorney

would have made the same choice or mistake under the circumstances, and that the

professionally unreasonable error by counsel prejudiced the defense. In this case,

counsel’s failure to object to the introduction of the photographs identified by the

petitioner caused no prejudice to the defense because the photographs were properly

admissible.

Although the actual photographs are not part of the record presented to this

court, they are adequately described in the testimony found in the record. Beginning

at page 652 in the trial transcript, a police detective described various photographs

of the crime scene, leading up to Exhibits 7 through 11, all of which are photographs

of the condition and positioning of the victim’s body as it was found at the crime

scene. Plainly, such photographs, while undoubtedly lurid, had real evidentiary

value, and were not offered merely to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury.

Similarly, beginning at page 897 of the trial transcript, Exhibits 39 through 47 were

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 Photographs of a crime victim taken after the alleged homicide or assault, such as autopsy

21

photographs, can be extremely prejudicial. Nevertheless, they are admissible if they tend to illustrate

or elucidate some relevant issue, such as “the identity of the victim, the manner of death, the murder

weapon,” United States v. DeParias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Photographs of

homicide victims are relevant in showing the identity of the victim, the manner of death, the murder

weapon, or any other element of the crime.”), or if they corroborate (or dispute) other evidence in

the case. Id. (approving admission of photographs of badly decomposed body of murder victim for

the reason, among others, that they corroborated the testimony of a witness “whose credibility was

central to the government’s case”). 

The “gruesomeness” of a photograph becomes objectionable only when there is distortion

of two kinds: (1) distortion of the subject matter, as where necrotic or other surgery causes exposure

of nonprobative views (e.g., massive mutilation); or (2) focal or prismatic distortion, where the

position of the camera vis-a-vis the scene or object to be shown gives an incongruous result (e.g.,

a magnification of wound to eight times its true size). See, e.g., Acklin v. State, 790 So.2d 975, 997-

98 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); Wesley v. State, 32 Ala. App. 383, 26 So. 2d 413 (Ala. Ct. App. 1946).

See also II Charles W. Gamble, MCELROY’S ALABAMA EVIDENCE § 207.01(2), at 1023 (5th ed.

1996) (collecting cases). 

85

offered and displayed to the jury. These exhibits were photographs taken by the

medical examiner before and during the autopsy of the victim. As with the earlier

photographs, these had true evidentiary value by portraying the victim’s wounds and

cause of death. Although counsel did not object to the introduction of either set of 21

photographs, their admission was not improper, and did not deprive the petitioner of

due process or a fair trial. Such photographs are common evidence in murder

prosecutions. There simply is no indication that this limited number of photographs

was offered for anything other than legitimate evidence. Defense counsel therefore

were not ineffective for failing to object to their admission. 

III(h) — Failure to object adequately to proceedings outside the

petitioner’s presence

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86

At paragraph 31 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleged that

counsel was ineffective because they failed to object to two pretrial hearings “during

which the parties outlined the case against Mr. Trawick” and “discussed the

admissibility of parts of Mr. Trawick’s statement.” He specifically identifies these

proceedings as occurring at pages 142 and 161 of the trial transcript. 

Petitioner asserted this same claim, verbatim, at paragraph 11(G) of his Second

Amended Petition under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Tab

R. 46, pp. 9-10). The Rule 32 court concluded that this claimof ineffective assistance

was barred from review under the reasoning in Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2000), because the underlying issue had been considered on direct appeal

under the plain error rule and found meritless. The court reasoned that there could

be no ineffective assistance of counsel if the basis for counsel’s failure to object was

not error or objectionable. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. (Tab

R. 63, pp. 5-6). 

Regardless of whether this court finds the grounds enunciated by the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals to be “adequate” under federal law for purposes of

procedural default, this claim is meritless. The transcript of proceedings shows that

the trial court conducted a pretrial motions hearing, beginning at page 138 and

continuing to page 181, at which the petitioner was present the entire time. At pages

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87

141 and 162, the trial court acknowledged that the attorneys met with the court in

conference before the hearing, and that petitioner was not present during that

conference. The trial judge described the conference this way:

THE COURT: Mr. Trawick, I won’t ask you to say anything but

I would like to tell you that we talked — Ms. Petro is here and Mr.

Russell, the prosecution team, Mr. Del Grosso is here and Mr. Walker

was here and we talked for a few minutes before you were brought down

from the jail facility and had an informal discussion and it was very

productive in terms of outlining what one might expect the trial to

concern in terms of time, and so forth.

What we will do now on the record is somewhat rehash what was

said summarily just a few minutes ago. I have got my court file here and

I see on the 15 of February Mr. Del Grosso and Mr. Walker filed a th

motion to call Dr. Ronan as an adverse witness. There’s no problem

with that. I would prefer to call her a Court’s witness, but you may

cross-examine Dr. Ronan, as the state may.

(Tab R. 6, p. 142). Later in the same hearing, still with petitioner present, the trial

judge stated:

THE COURT: Let’s go to the statement. We talked, Mr. Trawick,

at some length, much of our discussion we discussed the concept of

redaction or elimination of what the Court might deem to be

inadmissible evidence. That means that would apply essentially, most

significantly, to the statements made priorto the 29 of October, starting th

at 11:42 in the morning, I think. Many of your comments to the officers

included remarks about collateral offenses. So, to cut this to the essence

of what I want to say, Mr. Russell and Ms. Petro have adopted the

strategy of going straight to the statement of the 29 of October at 11:42 th

in the morning. And even that statement has a point that — paragraph

or so that should be redacted. That’s cured, though, by the State has

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88

elected [sic] in their case in chief to go to the taped portion of the

afternoon session only, is that right, Don?

MR. RUSSELL: Yes, sir.

(Tab R. 6, pp. 161-162).

The constitutional right to be present during all critical stages of trial arises

from the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers. See United States v.

Vasquez, 732 F.2d 846 (11 Cir. 1984). “The confrontation clause guarantees the th

accused the right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.” Id. at 848;

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370

(1892).

Nevertheless, that right does not extend to in-chambers conferences involving

the judge and lawyers and dealing with legal or trial-management issues. In United

States v. Vasquez, 732 F.2d 846 (11 Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit rejected a th

similar claim where the scope of the defendant’s cross examination by the prosecution

was discussed with counsel, but not defendant, during a chambers conference. The

Court wrote:

The right to be present at every stage of trial does not confer upon the

defendant the right to be present at every conference at which a matter

pertinent to the case is discussed, or even at every conference with the

trial judge at which a matter relative to the case is discussed. See United

States v. Howell, 514 F.2d 710, 714 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914,

th

96 S. Ct. 220, 46 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1975). In Howell, the Court stated that

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 The admissibility of the statement already had been resolved by a ruling on petitioner’s 22

motion to suppress the statement. The conference dealt with the separate evidentiary question of

89

the defendant had no right to be present at a conference with the judge

and a juror on the subject of the attempted bribery of the juror, or at an

in camera conference with the judge and all counsel in the case at which

the earlier conference was discussed. Id. The Court concluded that

these in camera conferences were not critical stages in the trial

proceedings and therefore the defendant had no right to be present. Id.;

see also United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516, 521 (10 Cir. 1971), th

cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922, 92 S. Ct. 959, 30 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1972)

(defendant has no right to be present at in camera conference on

evidentiary matters when his lawyer was present at the conference).

Similarly, we conclude that a bench conference, attended by appellant’s

counsel and called to discuss an evidentiary matter relative to

appellant’s own cross-examination, is not a critical stage of the trial

proceedings at which appellant has a right to be present.

Vasquez, 732 F.2d at 848-849. See also In re Shriner, 735 F.2d 1236, 1241 (11 Cir. th

1984) (“Shriner had no constitutional right to be present at the bench during

conferences that involved purely legal matters, nor does the absence of recorded

bench conferences constitute a constitutional deprivation unless it renders our review

impossible.”) (citation omitted). 

The conference described in the record of this case was similar to that in

Vasquez. The trial court judge met with counsel while waiting for petitioner to be

brought to the courtroom by deputies, and discussed such administrative matters as

how long the trial would take, the sequence of witnesses, and the proper redaction of

a statement by the petitioner to be offered by the prosecution. Although the 22

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eliminating arguably irrelevant and prejudicial parts of the statements.

90

conference dealt with evidentiary matters, it was not a critical stage of the trial. No

evidentiary rulings were made, although counsel reached agreement about certain

evidentiary disputes. In any event, all of the matters discussed in the conference were

then “rehashed” on the record with the petitioner present. In the end, there simply

was no violation of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right. Consequently,

counsel’s failure to object to the conference was not ineffective assistance.

III(i) — Failure to object adequately to court’s failure to transcribe

bench conferences

At paragraph 32 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleges that:

Trial counsel failed to object adequately to the trial court’s failure to

transcribe all of the proceedings. At Mr. Trawick’s trial, crucial bench

conferences were not transcribed, (R. 293, 727, 967), and there is no

transcript of Mr. Trawick’s confession that was admitted into evidence,

(R. 728, 737). Trial counsel should have objected to the failure to

transcribe all proceedings.

Petitioner asserted this same claim, verbatim, at paragraph 11(H) of his Second

Amended Petition under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Tab

R. 46, p. 10). The Rule 32 court concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance

also failed to complywith the pleading and specificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and

32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals agreed. (Tab R. 63, p. 5). 

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91

Regardless of whether this court finds the grounds enunciated by the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals to be “adequate” under federal law for purposes of

procedural default, this claim is meritless. The failure to transcribe bench

conferences results in a constitutional violation only if it hinders the defendant’s right

to appellate review. In re Shriner, 735 F.2d at 1241 (“[T]he absence of recorded

bench conference [does not] constitute a constitutional deprivation unless it renders

[appellate] review impossible.”). The function of the transcript is to provide a record

for appellate review. Thus, petitioner must establish that the failure to record these

conferences deprived him of meaningful appellate review, and he simply has not

shown that. None of the bench conferences at the pages specifically identified by

petitioner resulted in any prejudice to his right to a fair trial. As a result, counsel’s

failure to object to the off-the-record proceedings was not ineffective assistance of

counsel.

At page 293, during the voir dire of the jury pool, lawyers were asking

prospective jurors about the sex and ages of their children. The following transpired:

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, Kitt [one of the

defense lawyers]. Don [one of the prosecutors], come up here, please.

(Whereupon, the attorneys approached the

bench and there was a brief off-the-record

discussion out of the hearing of the reporter,

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92

after which the following was had and done

before court and jury:)

THE COURT: What we were talking about, to save a lot of

time, at some point I will ask you each to write your name on a little

piece of scratch paper and just tell us about the kids’ ages and gender,

if you will. And that will save us a whole lot of time.

(Tab R. 7, pp. 293-294). Here, the subject of the bench conference is reported

immediately afterward. The court simply discussed with counsel a quicker procedure

for obtaining information about the gender and age of the prospective jurors’

children. The subject of the conference was so innocuous, and so readily apparent,

that the absence of a transcript of it did not deprive petitioner of meaningful appellate

review, nor was counsel ineffective for failing to object to the lack of a transcript.

At pages 966 and 967 of the trial transcript, Dr. Kathleen Ronan, a Certified

Forensic Examiner employed by the State, but called as an adverse witness by the

defense, was being cross-examined by the prosecutor about her written report on the

petitioner’s competency to stand trial when the following transpired:

Q. Let me ask you this: Dr. Ronan, in your summary and

recommendations at the bottom of page twenty-seven in that statement

down there, is that what Jack Trawick told you? That entire paragraph

starting at the bottom of the page, summary and recommendation.

A. He reported —

MR. DEL GROSSO: I would ask —

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 At page 27 of Dr. Ronan’s evaluation report, she stated, “Mr. Trawick did report that if 23

he is convicted and given a life without parole sentence, he will harm or kill a DOC [Department of

Corrections] staff in order to get the death sentence.” See Supplemental Record on Appeal, Vol. 2,

p. 321. The off-the-record conference prevented the prosecution from bringing out this statement.

Although the transcript does not reveal what was said during the bench conference, it is obvious that

counsel objected to the prosecution revealing this statement, at least during the guilt phase of the

trial, and the trial court sustained it.

93

THE COURT: Yes, we have got to talk about that. If you

want to go into this in detail we can talk about it.

(Whereupon, the attorneys approached the

bench and there was a brief off-the-record

discussion out of the hearing of the reporter,

after which the following was had and done

before court and jury:)

THE COURT: Any other questions of Dr. Ronan?

MR. RUSSELL: No other questions.

MR. DEL GROSSO: No questions.

(Tab R. 11, pp. 966-968). Although the record does not disclose the words spoken

during the bench conference, it is obvious that the discussion benefitted petitioner by

precluding the prosecution from going into certain statements petitioner had made to

Dr. Ronan during her evaluation of him. Far from prejudicing petitioner’s right to

23

a fair trial, the off-the-record conference benefitted him; and, thus, counsel’s failure

to object to the absence of a transcript was not ineffective assistance of counsel.

Finally, at pages 727, 728, and 737, the prosecution offered into evidence two

tape-recorded statements made by the petitioner during police questioning. While

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94

the tape recordings were played to the jury, the court reporter did not attempt to

transcribe them. Both of the actual tape recordings, however, were made part of the

record for appellate review purposes as trial Exhibits 56 and 57. (See Tab. R. 10, pp.

724-728 and 734-737). Plainly, the lack of a transcript of the contents of the

recordings did not deprive petitioner of a full, fair, and meaningful appellate review,

because the actual tapes were part of the record. Instead of the court reporter

attempting to transcribe the tapes as they played, subject to all the errors of

transcription that can occur, the original recordings were simply made exhibits. This

preserved petitioner’s right to appeal, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to

object to the court not ordering the court reporter to take down the contents of the

recordings as they played.

III(j) — Failure to object adequately to prejudicial comments by

prosecutor

The Second Amended Petition for writ of habeas corpus alleges at paragraph

33 that:

Trial counsel failed to object adequately to a variety of prosecutorial

comments and actions which deprived Mr. Trawick of a fair trial and

sentencing. For example, at the suppression hearing, the prosecutors on

more than one occasion resorted blatantly to leading their witnesses in

order to establish the admissibility of Mr. Trawick’s statements. (R. 74-

75) In addition, the prosecutors deprived Mr. Trawick of a fair trial by

insisting that the jury focus not on the defendant’s culpability but rather

on the victim’s death. Twice during closing arguments the prosecutor

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95

exhorted the jury not to forget her, (R. 1025), and to “think of her, think

of this young girl and what she went through before she died at his

hands.” (R. 1028) Remarks as to suffering undergone by the victim

were certainly calculated to inflame the jury. The prosecutors also

denied Mr. Trawick his rights to due process and a fair trial. Mr.

Trawick’s lawyers failed to object adequately to those instances of

prosecutorial misconduct.

This claim was raised, verbatim, in paragraph 11(I) of the petitioner’s Second

Amended Rule 32 petition, and apparently resolved on the merits without an

evidentiary hearing. (Tab R. 46, p. 10). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

commented: “The trial court also found to be without merit the appellant’s argument

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial

misconduct.” (Tab R. 63, p. 6).

On appeal from denial of Rule 32 relief, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals wrote the following about this claim:

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in rejecting one of

his ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the merits without

conducting an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, he argues that

counsel’s failure to adequately object to prosecutorial misconduct which

included “leading their witnesses in order to establish the admissibility

of Mr. Trawick’s statements”, [sic] and “exhorting the jury not to forget

[the victim], and to ‘think of her, think of this young girl and what she

went through before she died at his hands.’”

The trial court, in denying the claim, [sic] on its merits stated:

“[T]he part of the transcript referenced by Trawick, [T]R.

74-75, does not support the allegation that the prosecutor

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96

was ‘blatantly leading’ Lt. Greene in order to establish the

admissibility of Trawick’s statements. Rather, the

prosecutor is reading from Trawick’s second statement

taken by Lt. Greene to show the chronology of events when

Trawick asked for counsel which stopped the interrogation.

[T]R. 74-75. The prosecutor was not asking leading

questions as Trawick’s second amended Rule 32 petition

incorrectly asserts.

* * *

“Trawick has not established that trial counsel’s failure to

make a ‘leading the witness’ objection constituted deficient

performance or that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s

performance. Nor has he shown that trial counsel’s

performance was outside ‘the wide range or [sic]

reasonable professional assistance,’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689, or that there is a reasonable probability that, if trial

counsel had made these objections, the result of the trial

would have been different.”

Additionally, the record reveals that the trial court found that trial

counsel objected and moved for a mistrial in response to the

prosecutor’s statement in closing argument to never “forget” the victim.

In response to the prosecutor’s argument admonishing the jury to

remember the victim’s suffering prior to her death, the trial court stated

as follows:

“‘A prosecutor’s statement must be viewed in the

context of all the evidence presented and in the context of

the complete closing arguments to the jury.’ Roberts v.

State, 735 So. 2d 1244, 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), aff’d

735 So. 2d 1270 (Ala.). Moreover, ‘statements of counsel

in argument to the jury must be viewed as delivered in the

heat of debate; such statements are usually valued by the

jury at their true worth and are not expected to become

factors in the formation of the verdict.’ Bankhead v, State,

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97

585 So. 2d 97, 106 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). In addition,

this court instructed the jury before the lawyers began their

closing arguments that ‘what counsel says is not

evidence.’”

Additionally, the trial court found that the appellant had failed to meet

the two prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), i.e.,

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced

thereby, because the prosecutor’s remarks were not inappropriate, and

merely “a comment on the horrible crime and what the victim must have

suffered.”

Because the trial court presided over both the appellant’s Rule 32

hearing and his trial, and made detailed findings of fact denying the

claim on the merits, an evidentiary hearing was not required for a

resolution of this claim. See Ex parte Hill, 591 So. 2d 462, 463 (Ala.

1991) (“[A] judge who presided over the trial or other proceedings and

observed the conduct of the attorney at the trial or other proceeding need

not hold a hearing on the effectiveness of those attorneys based upon

conduct he observed.”)

(Tab R. 63, pp. 10-12).

Because the state courts resolved this claim on the merits, the determination

made by them is entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), unless it is clearly

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133,

(2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223,

1241 (11 Cir. 2001). “[A] state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct th

unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d

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98

1291 (11 Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1828

th

(2006). This standard of review is strict, and federal courts are required to give

“greater deference to the determinations made by state courts than they were required

to under the previous law.” Verser v. Nelson, 980 F. Supp. 280, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1997)

(quoting Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1441 (7 Cir. 1997)). th

Having reviewed the record, and particularly those portions cited by petitioner,

this court cannot say that the determination made by the state courts is either contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. The court also

agrees that no evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the claim, because the

alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct were recorded plainly in the record.

Whether they constituted true misconduct could be judged from the record, and there

was no need to examine facts outside the record. Thus, the fact-finding was not

unreasonable.

The state courts found that there was no objectionable misconduct by the

prosecution, or at least misconduct that had any significant impact on the fairness or

outcome of the trial. That being the case, counsel’s failure to object to the alleged

instances of misconduct was either not professionally unreasonable, or resulted in no

prejudice under the Strickland test. Petitioner is entitled to no relief on this claim.

III(k) — Failure to request adequately certain jury instructions

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99

At paragraph 34 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleged that trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance because they failed to request “adequately”

certain jury instructions regarding the definition of “reasonable doubt,” the definition

of “clear and convincing evidence,” the consequences of a “not guilty by reason of

mental disease or defect” verdict, and the lesser-included offense of non-capital

murder. Paragraph 34 reads:

Trial counsel failed to request adequately jury instructions regarding the

proper definitions of reasonable doubt and clear and convincing

standards. Because of this, the trial court never gave the jury a

definition of clear and convincing evidence, and failed to informthe jury

that clear and convincing evidence is a lower standard than reasonable

doubt. That is, the trial court never adequately explained Mr. Trawick’s

burden to the jury, and never even told the jury that his burden of proof

was lower than the state’s. Counsel also failed to request an instruction

as to the consequences of a not guilty verdict — that if Mr. Trawick

were acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect, the state would

immediately commence commitment proceedings to confine Mr.

Trawick to a psychiatric hospital. Counsel also failed to request an

instruction on the lesser included offense of non-capital murder.

This same claim was presented, verbatim, at paragraph 11(J) of the Second Amended

Rule 32 Petition. (Tab R. 46, pp. 10-11). The Rule 32 court concluded that this claim

of ineffective assistance failed to comply with the pleading and specificity

requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Alabama Court ofCriminal Appeals agreed, and concluded further that the claim

was barred from consideration by the rule in Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala.

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100

Crim. App. 2000): i.e., there could be no ineffective assistance of counsel if the

underlying issue on which counsel failed to object was considered under the plainerror rule on direct appeal and found not to be error or objectionable. (See Tab R. 63,

pp. 5-6).

Regardless of whether this court finds the grounds enunciated by the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals to be “adequate” under federal law for purposes of

procedural default, this claim is meritless. On direct appeal, the Alabama Supreme

Court addressed some of the questions raised concerning jury instructions this way:

Trawick next raises a series of issues challenging the propriety of

several instructions the trial court gave the jury. We note from the

outset that these issues are raised for the first time in Trawick’s brief to

this Court; they were not preserved before the trial court. We therefore

review these issues only within the confines of the plain error rule, and

we again note that this rule is to be applied to correct errors solely in

those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise

result. Ex parte Taylor, 666 So. 2d 73 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1120, 116 S. Ct. 928, 133 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1996).

Trawick argues that the trial court failed to properly instruct the

jurors that he was required to prove by “clear and convincing evidence”

his defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Trawick

contends that this failure left the jury to believe that he had to meet the

higher standard of proving his mental disease or defect beyond a

reasonable doubt and thus sabotaged his defense.

The record shows that the trial court gave the following jury

instruction as to Trawick’s defense of not guilty by reason of mental

disease or defect:

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101

“By entering his plea of not guilty by reason of

severe mental disease or defect, the defendant does assume

the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence to

the reasonable satisfaction of you jurors, one, that at the

time of the commission of the alleged acts constituting all

or essential elements of the crime for which he is charged,

that he was suffering from a severe mental disease or

defect. And two, that as a result of such severe mental

disease or defect, he either was unable to appreciate the

nature and quality of his acts or was unable to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his acts.

“Whether or not the defendant was suffering from

such severe mental disease or defect is for you people to

determine from all of the evidence to your reasonable

satisfaction. In making the determination of whether or not

defendant Trawick here, at the time of the commission of

the crime charged, was unable to appreciate the nature and

quality or wrongfulness of his acts, the law provides some

guidance to you in this respect.

“The phrase ‘severe mental disease or defect’ does

not include an abnormality of the mind which is manifested

only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.

That is to say this: any repeated criminal or other

antisocial conduct ofthe defendant standing alone does not

constitute sufficient evidence that he suffered from a severe

mental disease or defect.”

We note that the instruction in the Alabama Pattern Jury

Instructions: Criminal[,] defining the defense of mental disease or

defect[,] does not contain any definition of the clear and convincing

evidence standard to be applied in cases where the defendant asserts that

defense. The instruction set out above is, in essence, the same as the

pattern instruction as to the defense of mental disease or defect that is

contained in the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions. Taken as a whole,

the instructions given by the trial court properly defined how the jury

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102

was to weigh the evidence of Trawick’s allegedmental disease or defect.

The trial court clearly stated that the jurors needed only to find to their

“reasonable satisfaction” that such a disease or defect existed in order

to find Trawick not guilty, and we find nothing in this that would have

misled the jury as to the standard of proof that Trawick was required to

meet in order to establish his defense.

Trawick also argues that the trial court improperly failed to

instruct the jury as to what the consequences for him would be if they

found him not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. He states

that the trial court should have told the jury that such a verdict would

mean that he would be confined to a mental hospital, perhaps for the rest

of his life. He speculates that, without this instruction, the jury “may

well have believed” that a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental

disease or defect, like a regular verdict of not guilty, would result in his

complete freedom. He concludesthat the instruction left the impression

that he would be left to go free and unfettered if the jury found him not

guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and thus impermissibly

influenced the jury to find him guilty.

We find no error in the trial court’s silence as to the consequences

for Trawick if the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of

mental disease or defect. On the contrary, its silence was entirely

proper; it was not within the jury’s sphere of concern to determine what

these consequences would be, and statements as to such consequences

should not be thrown into a case to influence the verdict, Ivery v. State,

686 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Cr. App. 1996), citing Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212,

154 So. 575 (Ala. 1934). The trial court correctly refrained from

making statements regarding those consequences.

Trawick next argues that in instructing the jury the trial court

erroneously defined “reasonable doubt,” as that term is used in regard

to the standard of proof, as “an actual substantial doubt,” and that this

violated Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S. Ct. 328, 112 L. Ed. 2d

339 (1990). In Cage, the United States Supreme Court reversed a

criminal conviction because the Court concluded that the trial court’s

instruction impermissibly suggested a higher degree of doubt than is

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103

required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard established

by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).

Trawick likens the instruction given in this case to that at issue in Cage,

and he concludes that his conviction likewise must be reversed.

In Cage, the trial court instructed, in pertinent part, that

reasonable doubt “must be such doubt as would rise to a grave

uncertainty [and that] it is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that

a reasonable man can entertain. What is required is not an absolute or

mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.” 498 U.S. at 40, 111 S.

Ct. at 329. The United States Supreme Court held that the words

“substantial” and “grave,” as they are commonly understood, suggest a

higher degree of doubt than is required for an acquittal under the

reasonable doubt standard. The Court determined that these words,

when considered with the reference to “moral certainty” rather than

evidentiary certainty, could have led a reasonable juror to believe that

a finding of guilty could be based on a lesser degree of certainty.

The portion of the jury instruction to which Trawick now objects

is as follows:

“I am going to suggest to you that proof beyond a

reasonable doubt would be proof of such a convincing

character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it

without hesitation in the most important of your own

personal affairs.”

Trawick argues that this statement lowered the burden of proof because,

he says, it “guid[ed] the jurors’ understanding about the State’s burden

in terms of their own personal affairs.” We do not agree; on the

contrary, we find that the statement effectively highlighted the high

degree of proof that was necessary to prove Trawick’s guilt, by

describing it in a way that made it more personal for the jurors.

Moreover, in the balance of its instruction, the trial court consistently

emphasized the presumption of Trawick’s innocence, the burden the

State had in overcoming this presumption, and the definition of

“reasonable doubt” as a product of the jury’s common sense and reason.

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We find no error in the court’s definitions of the reasonable doubt

standard and the State’s burden of proof.

Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 162, 171-173 (Ala. 1997).

Although the claim now before this court is whether trial counsel were

ineffective for failing to raise objections to the court’s instructions at trial, the

Alabama Supreme Court dealt with the propriety of the instructions now claimed to

be objectionable. In resolving those underlying claims, the determinations made by

the Alabama Supreme Court are entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

even with respect to the now-pending ineffective-assistance claims, unless they are

clearly contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133

(2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223,

1241 (11 Cir. 2001). “[A] state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct th

unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d

1291 (11 Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1828

th

(2006). This standard of review is strict, and federal courts are required to give

“greater deference to the determinations made by state courts than they were required

to under the previous law.” Verser v. Nelson, 980 F. Supp. 280, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1997)

(quoting Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1441 (7 Cir. 1997)). th

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III(k)(i) — reasonable doubt

Turning first to the reasonable-doubt instruction, the court cannot say that the

conclusions reached by the Alabama Supreme Court were either “contrary to,” or an

“unreasonable application of,” Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner first points to the

language in the instruction that defined the standard of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt as “proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and

act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own personal affairs.” 

No Supreme Court precedent has addressed similar language used to define or

describe “reasonable doubt.” In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), the

constitutional concern was equating “reasonable doubt” with a “substantial” doubt

creating “grave uncertainty” as to the guilt of the accused. Later, in Victor v.

Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994), the Supreme Court found nothing wrong with defining

“reasonable doubt” in terms of “actual and substantial doubt” when those terms relate

to the existence, rather than the quantum, of doubt. Unlike Cage, and even Victor,

the instruction in this case emphasized the high level of certainty jurors must possess

in order for the state’s evidence to meet the reasonable doubt standard of proof. The

instruction in this case does not attempt to quantify whether a juror’s doubt is

“reasonable.” Rather than undermining the reasonable doubt standard by suggesting

that the doubt must be “substantial,” or create a “grave uncertainty,” the contested

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 The instruction read in pertinent part, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be proof 24

of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation

in the most important of your own personal affairs.”

 This is not the same rationale used by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in Williams 25

v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). In that case, the court of appeals concluded that

if a substantive issue merely passed the plain-error standard, there could be no prejudice under

Strickland for ineffective-assistance purposes. This case is different. Here, the Alabama Supreme

Court applied not merely the plain-error rule, but affirmatively determined that the instruction was

not erroneous. Presumably, the state appellate court would have found the same thing about the

instruction whether considered under plain-error review or preserved-error review. Thus, if the

instruction was not error — i.e., it correctly stated the standard the jury was to apply — counsel’s

failure to object caused no prejudice because there never was any error to preserve.

106

instruction focused the jury’s attention on the high level of certainty required before 24

the state’s evidence can be said to be sufficient for a conviction.

Under § 2254(d), the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that the instruction

used in this case did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights is entitled to

deference if it is not “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application of,” Supreme

Court precedent. Because there is no Supreme Court precedent addressing a

reasonable doubt instruction similar to this, it cannot be said that the Alabama

Supreme Court’s resolution was contrary to it, or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court doctrine. The finding by the Alabama Supreme Court that the

instruction was not error necessarilymeans that counsel was not ineffective in failing

to object to the instruction. Stated another way, if the instruction was correct, the 25

lack of an objection caused no prejudice under Strickland.

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Furthermore, the absence of any Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the

language used here raised constitutional concerns means that counsel had no reason

to make an objection. Strickland is very deferential to counsel: errors must be so

egregious that it can be said defense counsel were not acting as Sixth Amendment

counsel when the mistake was made. The mistake must be so professionally

unreasonable that it is beyond the scope of competence expected of counsel. Here,

there was no Supreme Court case law suggesting to counsel that the use of language

similar to this instruction created constitutional issues. It was, thus, not

professionally unreasonable for counsel to fail to object to the instruction — they had

no reason to suspect anything was wrong with it. 

III(k)(ii) — clear and convincing

The same reasoning applies to petitioner’s claim that his attorneys were

ineffective for failing to object to the lack of an instruction defining the “clear and

convincing” standard of proof that applied to petitioner’s defense of not guilty by

reason of mental disease or defect. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the

instruction given was proper, and there is no U.S. Supreme Court precedent

suggesting otherwise.

Furthermore, the absence of an objection by counsel actually led to an

advantage for petitioner. Although the trial court initially described the burden of

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proof he must meet on the mental-disease defense as “clear and convincing

evidence,” the court later told jurors that the proof need only meet their “reasonable

satisfaction,” a somewhat less onerous burden of proof. Cf. Hayes v. Luckey, 33 F.

Supp. 2d 987, 994 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (Smith, J.) (concluding that “clear and

convincing evidence” is a higher standard for gauging the persuasive effect of

evidence than either a “preponderance of the evidence,” or the traditional Alabama

phraseology of the preponderance standard, “sufficient evidence to ‘reasonably

satisfy’ the jury”). Thus, by not objecting and insisting on a more precise definition

of “clear and convincing evidence,” counsel’s failure actually resulted in submitting

the mental-disease defense to the jury on a lesser standard of proof than petitioner

otherwise would have faced. Therefore, the failure to object caused no prejudice to

the petitioner’s defense.

III(k)(iii) — not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect

Next, petitioner argues that histrial attorneys were ineffective because they did

not insist that the trial judge explain to the jury that a finding of “ not guilty by reason

of mental disease or defect” would not have caused petitioner to be freed, but to be

civilly committed. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s

silence on this point was completely proper, because the jury played no role, and

should not consider such consequences; “statements as to such consequences should

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not be thrown into a case to influence the verdict.” This conclusion is not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law. Petitioner has cited no

Supreme Court case holding or suggesting that, when a capital defendant asserts an

insanity defense, due process or the Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be told

about the civil consequences of returning a verdict on that defense. Absent clearly

established law from the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the resolution of this

claim was “contrary to,” or an “unreasonable application” of, Supreme Court

precedent. Thus, for the reasons explained above, counsel’s failure to insist that the

trial court judge explain to the jury the consequences of such a verdict was not

ineffective assistance.

III(k)(iv) — lesser included offense

Finally, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance when failing to

request a lesser-included-offense instruction on non-capital murder. The evidence at

trial more than plainly established that petitioner abducted the victim and then killed

her, by strangling and bludgeoning her with a hammer. The capital offense with

which he was charged required the state to prove an intentional killing during the

course of a first-degree kidnaping. Two ways in which Alabama Code § 13A-6-43

(1975) defines first-degree kidnaping are when a person “abducts another person with

intent to . . . (4) Inflict physical injury upon him, or to violate or abuse him sexually;

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[or] (5) Terrorize him or a third person . . .” The evidence in this case more than

plainly established that petitioner abducted the victim with the intent to injure her,

sexually abuse her, or, at least, terrorize her — any one of which is sufficient to

establish the requisite elements of first-degree kidnaping for purposes of the capital

statute. There simply was no factual or evidentiary basis for instructing the jury on

a lesser or different charge.

On direct appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the question of

whether petitioner was entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction. That court,

considering the question under the plain-error standard because it had not been raised

at trial, found that the evidence did not support any charge other than an intentional

killing during a first-degree kidnaping. This finding is entitled to a presumption of

correctness here, as it is neither “contrary to,” nor an “unreasonable application of,”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Alabama Supreme Court wrote:

A capital murder defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser included

offense only where there is a reasonable theory from the evidence that

would support such a charge. Anderson v. State, 507 So. 2d 580 (Ala.

Cr. App. 1987). Trawick confessed that he first kidnapped, then

murdered, his victim; this confession was properly admitted into

evidence at trial. No reasonable interpretation of the evidence contained

in the record would contradict Trawick’s confession and support an

inference that he killed Gach before he put her into his van; thus, there

is no merit in Trawick's argument on this issue.

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Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 177 (Ala. 1997). See also Hopper v. Evans, 456

U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (“Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction

be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction.”) (emphasis in

original); Ritter v. Smith, 726 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11 Cir. 1984) (same). Indeed, at trial th

petitioner did not dispute that he kidnapped the victim before killing her; instead, his

defense was insanity. There was no evidentiary basis for a different or lesser charge

and, thus petitioner would not have been entitled to a lesser-included-offense

instruction even if one had been requested. Petitioner therefore suffered no prejudice

from counsel’s failure to request one. Without prejudice, there was no ineffectiveness

under Strickland.

None of petitioner’s specifications of ineffectiveness with respect to jury

instructions has merit. Thus, this claim of ineffective assistance does not warrant

habeas relief and must be denied.

III(l) — Failure to move adequately for a change of venue

Petitioner alleges the following at paragraph 35 of his Second Amended

Petition, petitioner alleges the following:

Trial counsel failed to move adequately the trial court to change the

venue of the trial. Counsel should have argued that Mr. Trawick was

entitled to a trial by an impartial jury “free from outside influences,”

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966), and that due process

mandates a change in venue when there is pervasive, inflammatory preCase 2:02-cv-01511-CLS-TMP Document 25 Filed 09/29/06 Page 111 of 181
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trial publicity, Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), as there was

in this case. Counsel failed to argue adequately that both the written and

the broadcast media extensively covered the tragic murder and the

investigation and Mr. Trawick. (R. 178-180) Counsel also failed to

adequately argue that over forty of the jurors in the jury pool had heard

about the case. Counsel failed to argue adequately that a venue change

was required under both state and federal law.

This claim was asserted, verbatim, as claim 11(K) in his Second Amended Rule 32

Petition. (See R-46, p. 92). On appeal from denial of the Rule 32 petition, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that the claim was

unsupported by any factual allegations and, therefore, inadequate under the pleadingspecificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b). 

At the outset, it appears the claim is procedurally defaulted. But even if not,

his attorneys were not constitutionally ineffective. Petitioner concedes that his

attorneys, in fact, filed and pressed a motion for change of venue. The issue was

raised on direct appeal as well, at which time the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

wrote the following:

The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for a change of venue. The appellant alleged that extensive

pretrial publicity rendered it impossible for him to obtain a fair trial in

Jefferson County.

The record indicates that the appellant produced a copy of only

one newspaper article in support of his motion for a change of venue.

The article appeared in the November 27, 1993, edition of the

Birmingham Post-Herald. The appellant’s trial began on March 21,

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1994. The appellant’s counsel stipulated that only two articles were

printed after the first article — one appearing on January 2, 1994, and

one on January 30, 1994. The appellant admits that there was no news

coverage for more than one and one-half months before his trial began.

Moreover, of the 58 potential jurors in the venire panel, 17

indicated that they had heard nothing about the case. The potential

jurors were questioned individually, and only one was struck for cause

based on pretrial publicity. In denying the appellant’s motion, the trial

court stated:

“I disagree vehemently. [J.M.]is the only juror who cannot

set aside his impressions and bring us a fair verdict and he

was struck for cause. We talked to all of these people

individually. These people impressed me as very

conscientious people that will indeed abide by the Court’s

instructions and set aside whatever impressions they may

have formed and bottom their verdict on the case in court.

And I will be repeating that throughout the course of the

litigation.”

The Alabama Supreme Court has issued explicit guidelines for a

trial court’s determination of a motion for a change of venue based on

pretrial publicity.

“In order to grant a motion for change of venue, the

defendant must prove that there existed actual prejudice

against the defendant or that the community was saturated

with prejudicial publicity. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.

333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966); Franklin v.

State, 424 So. 2d 1353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). 

Newspaper articles or widespread publicity, without more,

are insufficient to grant a motion for change of venue.

Anderson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1296, 1298 (Ala. Crim. App.

1978). As the Supreme Court explained in Irvin v. Dowd,

366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L. Ed. 2d

751 (1961):

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“‘To hold that the mere existence of any

preconceived notion as to the guilt or

innocence of an accused, without more, is

sufficient to rebut the presumption of a

prospective juror’s impartiality would be to

establish an impossible standard. It is

sufficient if the juror can lay aside his

impression or opinion and render a verdict

based on the evidence presented in court....’

“The standard of fairness does not require jurors to be

totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. Murphy

v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800, 95 S. Ct. 2031,

2035-2036, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1975). Thus, ‘[t]he proper

manner for ascertaining whether adverse publicity may

have biased the prospective jurors is through the voir dire

examination.’ Anderson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1296, 1299

(Ala. Crim. App.1978).”

Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 80 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865,

106 S. Ct. 189, 88 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1985).

The appellant has not satisfied the requirements set forth in

Grayson. The venire panel was examined individually and there was no

evidence that the prospective jurors remaining after one juror was struck

for cause could not try the case based solely on the evidence presented

at trial. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for a change of

venue.

Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 151, 155-156 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). Although the

claim now before the court is concerned with the effectiveness of trial counsel in

making these arguments, rather than the merits of the venue arguments themselves,

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the findings of fact made by the state courts still are binding on this court in this

context. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Petitioner has offered nothing to show what more trial counsel could have done

to press the change of venue. Indeed, in the brief he filed in this action, petitioner

says the following concerning how the motion was presented in the trial court:

In support of his motion, Mr. Trawick detailed both newspaper articles

and accounts of television broadcasts that not only provided explicit

details about the crime, but also reported that police officers had

obtained inculpatory statements from Mr. Trawick. (C. 46). The trial

court, however, declined to order a change of venue. Mr. Trawick

renewed his motion during jury selection after voir dire revealed that

more than forty of the fifty-eight prospective jurors in his venire had

heard about the case. (R. 561.) The trial court again declined to order

a change of venue. (R. 563.)

In his motion, Mr. Trawick showed that both the Birmingham

News and the Birmingham Post-Herald, the two major newspapers in

the Birmingham metropolitan area and Jefferson County at large,

frequently published articles about Mr. Trawick on their front pages,

often with prominent banner headlines and photographs. (C. 45-46.)

Both newspapers began providing intensive coverage when Ms. Gach’s

body was discovered, and maintained it through Mr. Trawick’s arrest

and until his trial began. (C. 46.) The Birmingham metropolitan area

television stations[,] Channel 6, Channel 13, and Channel 42[,] also

provided extensive coverage of Mr. Trawick’s case. (C. 46.) Each

station offered prominent feature stories on Mr. Trawick’s case. Id.

Petitioner’s Brief (Doc. 23), pp. 105-106. Petitioner’s own description of the manner

in which his motion for change of venue was presented and litigated makes clear that

trial counsel pressed the motion vigorously, marshaling evidence in support of it, and

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renewing the motion during jury selection, based on the answers obtained from venire

members. In this action, petitioner has pointed to nothing that he claims they failed

to do, or that they could have done better. Although he contends the motion for

change of venue was not presented “adequately,” he has not identified how it was

inadequate. Without some showing of a professionally unreasonable error or failure

by counsel, petitioner cannot meet the Strickland standard. Furthermore, for the

reasons discussed below at Claim X by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,

petitioner was not prejudiced by the pretrial publicity surrounding his case; thus, he

fails to meet the “prejudice prong” of the Strickland test as well. Accordingly, this

claim is meritless and due to be denied.

III(m) — Failure to move adequately for recusal of the trial judge

At paragraph 36 of the Second Amended Petition, it is alleged that:

Trial counsel failed to move adequately the trial judge to recuse himself.

The trial judge at Mr. Trawick’s capital trial had previously prosecuted

a murder case as a deputy district attorney that is closely related to Mr.

Trawick’s current case. The case is related because the victim in that

case is someone about whom Mr. Trawick had allegedly made

incriminating statements. (R. 15-18, 146-151). Moreover, the

defendant in the case the judge prosecuted was acquitted, (R. 16), thus

providing more of a reason for the judge to be interested in securing the

conviction for that murder. These facts created an appearance of bias

and trial counsel failed to argue adequately that the judge should have

recused himself. In addition, counsel failed to argue adequately that the

judge should have recused himself because he went to high school with

Mr. Trawick.

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This claim was asserted, verbatim, as claim 11(L) in his Second Amended Rule 32

Petition. (See R-46, p. 93). On appeal from denial of the Rule 32 petition, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that the claim was

unsupported by any factual allegations and, therefore, was inadequate under the

pleading-specificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b). 

It appears that this claim is procedurally defaulted. But even if not, petitioner

concedes that trial counsel filed a motion for the trial judge to disclose possible bases

for recusal, and to urge him to recuse himself due to his participation as a prosecutor

in a case involving the murder of Betty Jo Richards. (See Tab R-1, pp. 88-93). The

motion was denied, but the issue was not raised on direct appeal. Petitioner now

argues that trial counsel did not “adequately” argue the motion, and that this was so

professionally unreasonable as to be ineffective assistance. Petitioner has not

identified how counsel might have more adequately argued the motion, nor has he

pointed to any prejudice that undermines confidence in the outcome of the case.

Keeping in mind that the instant claim focuses on counsel’s alleged

inadequacy, the following comment by the Eleventh Circuit is illuminating:

In light of the Canons governing judicial conduct, we do not believe that

an attorney conducting a reasonable investigation would consider it

appropriate to question a judge, or the court personnel in the judge’s

court, about the judge’s lack of impartiality. Canon 3E(1) requires a

judge to sua sponte disqualify himself if his impartiality might

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reasonably be questioned. The Commentary to Canon 3E(1) provides

that a judge should disclose on the record information which the judge

believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the

question of disqualification. We conclude that both litigants and

attorneys should be able to rely upon judges to comply with their own

Canons of Ethics. A contrary rule would presume that litigants and

counsel cannot rely upon an unbiased judiciary, and that counsel, in

discharging their Sixth Amendment obligation to provide their clients

effective professional assistance, must investigate the impartiality of the

judges before whom they appear. Such investigations, of course, would

undermine public confidence in the judiciary and hinder, if not disrupt,

the judicial process — all to the detriment of the fair administration of

justice.

Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11 Cir. 1995) (footnotes omitted). This th

passage makes clear that counsel cannot be faulted for failing to undertake a more

probing investigation of the trial judge’s impartiality. Counsel simply have no Sixth

Amendment duty to investigate the possibility of judicial bias. It falls to the trial

judge himself, pursuant to his own allegiance to his oath and controlling canons of

judicial ethics, to determine whether he should recuse. Although the failure of a

judge to recuse under circumstances calling for such action may violate the

defendant’s right to due process before an impartial tribunal, defendant’s counsel

cannot be faulted for not more vigorously pressing for a judge’s recusal. Placing on

counsel some Sixth Amendment duty to be relentless in the pursuit of recusal would

have the same detrimental effect on the administration of justice identified by the

Eleventh Circuit in Porter. Having brought to the trial judge’s attention the

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possibility of the need for recusal, counsel fulfilled whatever Sixth Amendment duty

they had. There was no ineffectiveness.

Even if counsel had a Sixth Amendment duty to do more than bring the

possibility of recusal to the judge’s attention, the allegations here simply do not

mandate the recusal of the judge who presided at trial. First, petitioner contends that

Judge Hard had been a prosecutor in a case involving the murder of Betty Jo

Richards. Although that case did not involve petitioner, and did not result in a

conviction of that defendant, it is alleged that petitioner confessed to killing Richards:

thus, according to petitioner, giving Judge Hard an interest in the outcome of his trial

for the murder of Stephanie Gach. Plainly, Judge Hard had no personal or financial

interest in the outcome of this case. The speculation that he had an interest arising

out of his prosecution of someone else for the murder of another person is nothing

more than remote speculation, and certainly not one for which counsel can be faulted

for not pursuing. Ineffective assistance under Strickland focuses on whether

counsel’s decisions and actions were “professionally unreasonable,” and it was

simply not professionally unreasonable for counsel to do no more than raise this issue

with the judge.

Petitioner also argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they did

not seek recusal on the basis that Judge Hard attended high school with petitioner.

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There is no allegation that they knew each other in high school and, even if they did,

that alone would not warrant recusal. Particularly in small towns and rural settings,

judges are frequently called upon to judge the cases of people they know. If that

alone were a ground for recusal, the wheels of justice — which grind slowly, in order

to grind exceedingly fine — would grind to a stop. Something more — bias — must

be alleged and shown, and petitioner has not alleged that shared high school

experiences caused Judge Hard to be biased against him. Thus, it was not

professionally unreasonable for counsel to fail or refuse to seek recusal on this

ground. This claim of ineffective assistance is due to be denied.

III(n) — Failure to object to capital sentencing as part of a pattern of

racial bias

Petitioner alleges at paragraph 37 of his Second Amended Petition that his

attorneys were ineffective because they did not object to his capital sentence as the

product of a racially biased system. He alleges: 

Trial counsel failed to object to the imposition of the death penalty in

this case because it was imposed as part of a pattern of racial bias. The

victim in this case was a member of the white community in Jefferson

County. The death penalty was sought and imposed against Mr.

Trawick because of the victim’s race and status in the community. Had

the victim in this case been poor or black, petitioner would not now be

under a sentence of death. The death penalty is sought in Jefferson

County and the State of Alabama in an arbitrary and capricious fashion

and pursuant to a racially discriminatory pattern. Counsel failed to

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argue that, for these reasons, Mr. Trawick’s death sentence is

unconstitutional.

This claim was asserted, verbatim, as claim 11(M) in his Second Amended Rule 32

Petition. (See R-46, p. 93). On appeal from denial of the Rule 32 petition, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that the claim was

unsupported by any factual allegations and, therefore, inadequate under the pleadingspecificity requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b). 

To begin, the claim is procedurally defaulted, and petitioner has not shown

cause and prejudice to excuse the default. But even if the claim was not procedurally

defaulted, counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise this ground as a basis for

avoiding the death sentence. Counsel were faced with a case in which a white man

was accused of kidnaping and murdering a white woman. On its face, counsel had

no reason to believe that racial bias played any role whatsoever in the prosecution of

petitioner’s case. Absent some evidence that racial bias played some part in his

conviction and sentence, petitioner cannot establish that his conviction and sentence

violated the Equal Protection Clause. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93

(1987) (holding that, to establish that petitioner’s death sentence was rendered in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause, petitioner “must prove that the

decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose,” and concluding that

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the petitioner’s claim failed because he “offer[ed] no evidence specific to his own

case that would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his

sentence”);see also Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 967 (11 Cir. 2000). More to the th

point, absent such proof, petitioner cannot show that counsel’s failure to raise this

issue resulted in any prejudice to him. 

The argument now advanced by petitioner is that he should not have received

the death penalty because the system disproportionately imposes the death penalty

upon murderers whose victims are neither poor nor black. He makes the truly

perverse and cruel allegation that, “[h]ad the victim in this case been poor or black,

petitioner would not now be under a sentence of death,” as if the law countenances

some license to murder poor and black victims. The converse of his argument is that

petitioner should not be sentenced to death precisely because his victim was white.

It is not surprising that trial counsel either did not recognize, or chose to forego, such

a truly abominable argument. There simply is no proof — alleged, shown, or

imagined — that the race of this victim played any part whatsoever in the assessment

of the death penalty on petitioner. It was not professionally unreasonable for counsel

not to advance this argument, nor is there any probability that it would have changed

the outcome of the case if it had been made. This claim of ineffective assistance is

due to be denied.

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III(o) — Cumulative ineffective assistance

Petitioner’s final claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, found at

paragraph 38 of the Second Amended Petition, is the contention that all of the

individual allegations of ineffectiveness discussed above cumulatively combined to

create ineffectiveness where none of the individual allegations did so. For the

reasons already addressed at length above, none of petitioner’s individual allegations

of ineffectiveness cast doubt on the constitutional adequacy of his trial representation.

Merely combining insufficient allegations of ineffectiveness does not cause the sum

to ripen into a genuine claim. Without a showing that he suffered prejudice as a

result of some professionally unreasonable act or omission of counsel, petitioner

cannot meet the Strickland standard. Nor may petitioner stitch together questionable

acts or omissions by trial counsel that are factually and logically unrelated to any

harm to his defense in order to show some overarching ineffectiveness of counsel.

The two-pronged Strickland test is very clear: to prevail, petitioner must show both

a professionally unreasonable act or omission by counsel, and, that such act or

omission caused sufficient prejudice to the petitioner’s defense to undermine

confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Because he has failed to meet that test

with respect to his several individual claims of ineffectiveness, looking at the

collection of allegations as a whole adds nothing. This claim also is without merit.

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Claim IV — Brady/Giglio Violation

At paragraph 39 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleges a violation

of his constitutional right not to be denied access to favorable or exculpatory

evidence. The petition alleges:

Law enforcement and prosecuting officials did not make available to the

defense the complete prosecution file in violation of federal

constitutional requirements. Exculpatory material and crucial mitigating

evidence were [sic] withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963), including evidence that the state’s psychological

evaluation was the product of an institution that was biased against Mr.

Trawick. Specifically, mental health professionals who were part of the

evaluation team at Taylor Hardin were investigated for improper

conduct related to Mr. Trawick’s evaluation, and evidence of the

investigation was never disclosed to defense counsel. In this case,

disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have made a different

result reasonably probable. The state’s withholding of this information

denied Mr. Trawick his rights to due process, a fair trial and a reliable

sentencing proceeding in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667

(1985); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979). The state court

adjudication of this claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, and

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established United

States Supreme Court precedent.

In response to this claim, respondents contend that it is procedurally defaulted, and

that its rejection by the state courts was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court precedent. See Respondents’ Brief (Doc. 14), pp. 77-

79.

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This claim was raised in petitioner’s Rule 32 petition, where it was rejected by

the trial court without a hearing. Affirming denial of Rule 32 relief, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals wrote the following:

The appellant argues in his second amended petition that “[l]aw

enforcement and prosecuting officials did not make available to the

defense the complete prosecution file in violation of state and federal

requirements in capital cases.” In support of his argument, the appellant

contends that the exculpatory material and crucial mitigating evidence

were withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

including evidence that the state’s psychological evaluation was the

product of an institution that was biased against him. Additionally, he

claims that mental health professionals who were part of the evaluation

team at Taylor Hardin were investigated for improper conduct related to

the appellant’s evaluation, and evidence of the investigation was never

disclosed to defense counsel. Additionally, the appellant argues that the

trial court’s denial of his discovery request prevented him from proving

his Brady claim.

In summarily dismissing this claim, the trial court stated the

following:

“Three elements must be proven in order to establish

a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

These elements include: (1) the prosecutor’s suppression of

evidence, (2) the favorable character of the suppressed

evidence for the defense; and (3) the materiality of the

suppressed evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. 87. Trawick does

not allege that he can meet any of these requirements.

Trawick has therefore not alleged facts that, if proved,

would entitle him to relief and no further proceedings are

warranted.

“Moreover, Trawick’s allegations do not amount to

a Brady claim because he had not asserted that the

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Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office ever had

possession of the requested file or information, but

suppressed it. A file in possession of Taylor Hardin Secure

Medical Facility cannot be imputed constructively to the

prosecution. See Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030 (11 Cir. th

1994) (Even though Bryce Hospital is a state hospital, the

information contained in a Bryce Hospital file cannot be

imputed constructively to the prosecution). In addition,

there has been no showing that Trawick himself would not

have had knowledge of the ‘improper conduct’ relating to

his psychological evaluation. Trawick does not allege that

he can establish any of the elements of proving a Brady

claim. He has not met either the burden of pleading

imposed by Rule 32.3 or the specificity requirements of

Rule’ [sic] 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P. Trawick’s Brady

claim is therefore summarily dismissed.

An examination of the record supports the trial court’s summary

dismissal of this claim.

Lastly, the appellant’s claims that the trial court’s denial of his

discovery request prevented him from proving his Brady claim is

unsupported by the record and without merit. More particularly, the

record reveals that the appellant had personal knowledge of the facts

regarding the Taylor Hardin investigation because the investigation

began at his request and concerned his relationship with a nurse at

Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility. Because the appellant, however,

failed to sufficiently plead any facts supporting a Brady claim, the trial

court was correct in finding that the claim was barred pursuant to Rule

32.3 and 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.

See Tab R-63, pp. 9-10.

Petitioner now contends that the state courts’ resolution of this claim is not

entitled to a presumption of correctness because it is “based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254((d)(2). He points out that the state courts did not

conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claim, and that the factual matters recited by

those courts comes not from evidence, but from the statements and representations

of counsel.

The record reflects, at Tab R-49, that the Rule 32 court conducted a hearing on

January 3, 2001, at which petitioner and counsel were present. Although no evidence

or testimony was presented at that time, the following statements and representations

were made to the court:

THE COURT: Have y’all gotten together and discussed the

protocol this morning? Ever how you want to

proceed is fine with me.

MR. SUSSKIND: We haven’t discussed protocol. The Court on

December 12 dismissed all the claims in our

petition, so there’s nothing else standing before the

Court. I just want to say a couple of comments

about that for the record.

THE COURT: You have the floor.

(Tab R-49, p. 2)

* * *

[MR. SUSSKIND]: In addition, there’s a Brady claim that’s been

dismissed. The reason for the dismissal is

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that the information we were seeking related

to a discovery dispute. We have filed a

motion for a court order getting access to an

investigator’s file at Taylor Hardin, the law

enforcement branch at Taylor Hardin that

investigated some wrongdoing related to Mr.

Trawick’s stay there prior to trial. We asked

for access to those files. The Court denied

access for two reasons.

One, that the information is not in the possession of

the district attorney’s office. Under Alabama law

Brady material doesn’t have to be in possession of

the district attorney’s office. All state agencies are

imputed to have information.

Second, that the information in this file was

developed after Mr. Trawick’s trial. Our position on

that is that the Brady information was in the

possession of State actors at the time of Mr.

Trawick’s trial. This investigative file investigated

the incident or incidents. We’re not sure what they

are. Mr.Crenshaw [counsel for Respondents] spoke

to the folks over there. There is a file. There was an

investigation. We think we’re entitled. The file in

and of itself is discoverable in that it will lead to

information that is Brady material. Simply because

the file was developed, reports were written, an

investigation was conducted after Mr. Trawick’s

trial doesn’t negate the fact that the incident

happened before. We’re entitled to get access to

information to substantiate our Brady claim.

(Tab R-49, pp.3-4).

* * *

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[MR. CRENSHAW] Now, if I could respond to the Brady v.

Maryland claim that has been raised. Your

Honor, the way I understand the claim is that

there’s some allegation that Trawick had

improper contact, maybe even a sexual

contact with a nurse while he was being

evaluated at Taylor Hardin before the trial

occurred in this case, which would have been

at some point in 1994. Apparently whatever

happened came to light — and I’m basing this

upon a conversation I did have with the

investigator at the Department of Mental

Health — but the only way this came to light

was Trawick wrote a letter to Taylor Hardin

where he made these allegations. Again,

according to what I have been told, that letter

was written at a point a year and half after the

trial happened. Apparently an investigation

was conducted. I don’t know whether any of

the allegations were substantiated or not.

Now, this allegation that just because Taylor Hardin

is a state agency that any information at Taylor

Hardin is imputed to the trial prosecutor is not

supported by any case law whatsoever. Just because

Taylor Hardin is a state agency doesn’t mean that

any document that it contains has to be imputed to

the prosecutor. Any DA’s office or any attorney

general’s office is separate and apart from Taylor

Hardin. When the attorney general’s office

discovers any information from Taylor Hardin it

needs court orders just like I’m sure the DA’s office

does. The people at Taylor Hardin don’t call up the

DA offices or the attorney general’s office and give

them information that they don’t give to the other

side. The suggestion being made that Taylor Hardin

somehow is a law enforcement agency is just not

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supported, just as files that the Department of

Transportation have shouldn’t be imputed to any

kind of criminal prosecution. Just as files retained

by the Department of Human Resources.

Now, in the motion to reconsider, Trawick’s lawyers

have submitted some cases that they claim stand for

the proposition that the files contained at Taylor

Hardin should be imputed to the prosecutor. I just

want to distinguish those very briefly.

(Tab R-49, pp. 11-13).

* * *

[MR SUSSKIND] With respect to the Brady claim, Mr. Crenshaw

revealed for the first time something that we didn’t

know, that the investigation was about sexual

contact. He appears to have more information than

we do about the claim. All the arguments that he

made would go to the merits of the claim. He’s

basically defending the Brady allegation before the

Court based on information that we don’t have

access to. State agents do have access to. Mr.

Crenshaw has access to. The information is in

existence. We think we should be given an

opportunity to prove our claim and not have to —

this Court not to rely solely on the assertion, not in

evidence, of Mr. Crenshaw to reject our Brady

claim. There is information out there. He suggested

the only way this information came to light was

through Mr. Trawick. Well, that’s a defense to the

claim on the merits. We should first be able to get

access to the information so that we can develop the

claim. If he wants to defend against it later, he

obviously has the opportunity to do that.

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The State asserted that there’s no case law

whatsoever to support our position that Taylor

Hardin, a secure medical facility, is not a State agent

with respect to Brady claims, and then tried to

distinguish McMillan v State, for example, where

the Court of Criminal Appeals clearly held that the

appellant’s rights in that case were violated because

Taylor Hardin, a secure medical facility, had

information about a co-defendant, not even about the

defendant himself, containing exculpatory

information that was in existence prior to trial, and

that it was a violation of the defendant’s due process

rights for that not to have been disclosed.

(Tab R-49, pp. 20-21).

* * *

[MR. CRENSHAW]: Mr. Trawick is only being denied an

opportunity to present evidence because the

Rule 32 petition is so deficient that it doesn’t

warrant any further proceedings. That’s the

main point in all of this, especially with these

claims that have been dismissed because the

same grounds were raised. They’re being

dismissed because Your Honor can make a

decision based upon what is already in the

record. The allegations contained in the Rule

32 position [sic] don’t warrant any further

proceedings. Evidentiary hearings in these

cases are not automatic. A petition has to be

meritorious on its face. Under Alderman

versus State, which is a Court of Criminal

Appeals decision, to be meritorious on their

face they have to — each claim has to contain

a clear, specific statement with a full factual

disclosure of each of those claims. In these

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claims that Your Honor has dismissed as a

matter of law, because the same grounds are

raised in this Rule 32 petition that the

Alabama Supreme Court has already rejected,

Your Honor is just saying that those claims

don’t warrant any further proceedings, and

that Your Honor can go ahead and rule on that

claim and evidentiary hearing is warranted.

Now, on this Brady claim, Trawick knows what

happened. Trawick knows what allegations he

made. The Rule 32 petitioner himself can certainly

tell his lawyer what allegations he made. If Mr.

Susskind is claiming that he’s surprised by some

kind of information, he needs to turn to the person at

his left and ask him what he alleged in any letter that

he wrote to the Department of Mental Health. The

elements of a Brady claim, they all have to be met,

is that there has to be suppression, favorable

information, and that this favorable information has

to be material to the outcome of the case. None of

those elements are met by anything that’s alleged on

this particular Brady claim. We don’t even have to

get past the first element of suppression. 

Suppression hasn’t been established. There has been

no allegation that the prosecutor knows anything

about anything, or that the prosecutor knew anything

about what was happening at Taylor Hardin.

Your Honor, I also want to point out in the record, in

Dr. Runin’s [Ronan’s] report, she was the

psychologist who evaluated Trawick before trial and

wrote a pretty lengthy report as contained in the trial

record, and that’s Volume II of the supplemental

record, Page 312. She notes in her report that

Trawick became rapidly, heavily, emotionally

invested in one of the nurses at this facility. So, you

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know, whatever that means. You know some of this

was known before trial. Again, whatever did happen

is known to Trawick himself. Again, there has been

absolutely no allegation that the prosecutor, trial

prosecutor in this case suppressed information.

(Tab R-49, pp. 23-25).

* * *

[MR. SUSSKIND] The same argument I would like to make with

respect to the Brady claim. All the arguments

Mr. Crenshaw is making goes to the merits of

the claim. I can’t respond to anything he’s

saying because I don’t have access to the

information. I still haven’t heard any reason

why we shouldn’t be given the investigator’s

file. If there’s nothing in there that’s Brady

material, than I assume we wouldn’t be able

to prove a Brady claim. If we could just get

access to this file which exists. The Court

earlier had granted us access generally to this

kind of file. We submitted that order to the

investigator who we contacted at Taylor

Hardin. He said he needed a more specific

order. That’s the only reason we asked for

another order. It was the second one that was

rejected by the Court. The investigator

informed us he would be willing to turn over

the file. All he wanted was the court order.

This is not something that is costly to the

State, or time-consuming to the State, it’s a

very simple matter. There’s no way that I can

respond without access to this file. If Mr.

Crenshaw is right, that there’s absolutely no

Brady material in the file, then we won’t be

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able to prove our claim. We should at least be

given the opportunity to try.

(Tab R-49, pp. 27-28).

Although it probably is true that the statements made by counsel do not

constitute “evidence” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2), the transcript clearly

reflects why the Rule 32 court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the

Brady claim: i.e., the claim was insufficiently pled to justify a hearing. While

alleging that exculpatory evidence was withheld at the time of trial, petitioner

identifies the nature of the evidence only by saying:

Specifically, mental health professionals who were part of the evaluation

team at Taylor Hardin were investigated for improper conduct related to

Mr. Trawick’s evaluation, and evidence of the investigation was never

disclosed to defense counsel. In this case, disclosure of the suppressed

evidence would have made a different result reasonably probable.

Plainly, the fact that this allegation was made indicates that petitioner and his

attorneys became aware of the investigation at some point, yet they were not candid

with either the state courts or this court about the source and limitations of that

information. They did reveal that they knew enough about the investigation to make

it the centerpiece of a Brady claim, but they did not reveal that it was petitioner

himself who was the source of their knowledge. If petitioner informed them of the

existence of the investigation, he also could have informed them that he precipitated

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the investigation by writing a letter complaining about something that happened

during his evaluation, and that the investigation did not begin until more than a year

and half after petitioner’s trial. In pleading his Rule 32 motion in state court,

petitioner did not deny that he was aware ofthe investigation, orthat the investigation

came long after the trial was complete, and, therefore, did not exist as “exculpatory”

or “favorable” information that could have been revealed during trial.

Brady v. Maryland does not authorize a free-wheeling, untethered romp

through prosecution files based on nothing more than the hope of turning up

something that can be made into a claim. Particularly in the habeas context, where

an extant conviction is being challenged, the petitioner must allege with some

specificity the nature of the alleged favorable information and its materiality. The

same pleading deficiency that existed in his Rule 32 petition defeats petitioner’s

Brady claim in this action. He has not alleged the nature of the allegedly

“exculpatory” or “favorable” information that was not disclosed at trial. Without that

allegation, the court cannot assess whether the information was material or, indeed,

even existed at the time of trial. Plainly, there was no Brady violation for failing to

disclose the existence or fruits of an investigation that did not even take place until

long after petitioner’s trial. If he alleges that some favorable or exculpatory

information actually existed at the time of trial, he must allege what it was, or else his

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Brady claim is nothing more than a hope that something might turn up if he is

allowed to conduct enough discovery. Neither a hearing nor habeas relief is

warranted on such vague, conclusory, and insubstantial allegations. See Spinkellink

v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5 Cir. 1978). This claim is due to be denied. th

Claim V — Juror Misconduct

Beginning at page 22 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleges that

he was deprived of the right to exercise peremptory challenges, the right to challenges

for cause, and the right to an impartial jury because two jurors failed to accurately

answer voir dire questions. At paragraph 41, petitioner alleges:

Two jurors at Mr. Trawick’s trial failed to disclose important

information about victimization in response to the trial court’s question,

“[H]ave any of you ever been the victim of a crime or any member of

your family or any friends ever been a victim of crime?” (R. 249.) One

juror failed to disclose that he was the victim of an armed robbery

several years before trial. Another juror failed to disclose that his sisterin-law had been murdered just a few years before Mr. Trawick’s trial.

He alleged this same claim at paragraphs 37 and 38 of his Second Amended Rule 32

Petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the finding by the Rule

32 court that this claim was procedurally barred from consideration because it could

have been raised at trial and on direct appeal, but was not. See Tab R-63, p. 4; Ala.

R Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) and (5). Petitioner explicitly alleges here that the state courts’

resolution of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

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established Supreme Court precedent. Further, and more to the point, petitioner

contends that the procedural bar identified by the state courts is not regularly

followed and, therefore, not binding on this court. He does not offer any showing of

“cause and prejudice” to excuse the default.

The Alabama Rule 32 court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals both

concluded that the assertion of this claim by petitioner was barred from consideration

by Rule 32.2(b)(3) and (5), which preclude post-conviction consideration of any

claim that could have been, but was not, asserted at trial or on direct appeal. As a

matter of federal law, federal habeas courts will not consider or grant relief with

respect to claims procedurally defaulted under “independent and adequate” state

procedural rules. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-86 (1977); Siebert v.

Allen, 455 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 Cir. 2006). To be “independent and adequate,” the th

state procedural rule violated by a petitioner must be “firmly established” and

“regularly followed” in the state court system. See Siebert, 455 F3d at 1271; Hurth

v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 858 (11 Cir. 2005). The determination of whether a state th

procedural rule is “independent and adequate” is a question of federal law. See Lee

v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Baker v. Holt, No. 05-13984, 2006 WL 1130811

(11 Cir. Apr. 27, 2006). A rule is not “firmly established” if it is novel, or one that th

cannot be gleaned from existing law. “Novel procedural requirements or those of

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whose existence the defendant could not reasonably be deemed to have been

apprised, cannot be permitted to thwart review of cases seeking vindication in state

courts of federal constitutional rights.” Hansbrough v. Latta, 11 F.3d 143, 146 (11

th

Cir. 1994).

This court has serious questions about whether application of the Rule

32.2(a)(3) and (5) limitations on collateral relief were firmly established and regularly

followed at the time of petitioner’s trial and subsequent proceedings. As noted above,

to have a preclusive effect in federal habeas proceedings, the state’s procedural

requirement must be one that a criminal defendant reasonably could know about, and,

more importantly, comply with in having his claim considered. In this case, that

means that it must have been reasonably possible for petitioner to know in 1994 that

he had to present his juror-misconduct claim at trial, or on direct appeal, in order to

comply with Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5). While it is true that the substance of Rule

32.2(a)(3) and (5) predated petitioner’s trial (and provided as a general proposition

that claims not presented at trial and on direct appeal could not be considered in a

post-conviction Rule 32 proceeding), these provisions were not clearly applied to the

claims relating to jurors’ failure to answer voir dire questions until 2000 — long after

petitioner’s trial. Alabama law did not become reasonably clear on that point until

September 1, 2000, the date on which the Alabama Supreme Court handed down its

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decision in Ex parte Pierce, 851 So. 2d 606 (Ala. 2000). As the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals subsequently stated:

The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Pierce, 851 So. 2d 606 (Ala.

2000), recognized that a juror-misconduct claim may be procedurally

barred in a Rule 32 petition. The Supreme Court stated: “Although Rule

32.1(e) [newly discovered evidence] does not preclude [the petitioner’s]

claim, Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5) would preclude [the petitioner's] claim if

it could have been raised at trial or on appeal.” 851 So. 2d at 614.

Jenkins v. State, No. CR-97-0864, 2005 WL 3120110, at *2 (Ala. Crim. App., Nov.

23, 2005).

Indeed, all of the cases applying Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5) preclusion grounds

to claims that a juror failed to answer correctly during voir dire have come since

2000, even though the trials in these cases occurred much earlier. See Ex parte

Dobyne, 805 So. 2d 763 (Ala. 2001); Jenkins v. State, supra; Duncan v. State, 925

So. 2d 245 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); McGahee v. State, 885 So. 2d 191, 203 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2003) cert. denied, 885 So. 2d 230 (Ala. 2004).

Further, in each of these instances, unlike the present case, the petitioner was

afforded the opportunity to try to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was

not reasonably possible to assert the claim at trial and on appeal because the

underlying facts — i.e., the falsity of the juror’s answers — could not be sooner

discovered.

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In the present case, however, the Rule 32 court expressly denied petitioner an

evidentiary hearing. In doing so, that court wrote:

There is one procedurally barred claim raised by Trawick that

warrants further discussion. In Claim I at page 22-23 of the second

amended petition, Trawick contendsthat one juror failed to disclose that

he was a victim of an armed robbery “several years before trial,” and

that another juror failed to disclose that his sister-in-law had been

murdered “just a few years” before trial. This Court notes that this claim

was not raised in the initial Rule 32 petition or in the amended Rule 32

petition. Apparently Trawick’s present counsel interviewed jurors after

the amended Rule 32 petition was filed in March 1999 and before the

second amended petition was filed in December 2000. Trawick has not

alleged that the information pleaded in this claim could not have been

discovered in time to raise in a motion for new trial. Trawick must make

a showing that this information could not have been discovered in time

to raise it at trial or in a motion for new trial, otherwise this claim is

procedurally barred. [Citation omitted]. Because Trawick has made no

such allegation, this claim is procedurally barred.

See Rule 32 Court’s Order Summarily Denying Trawick’s Rule 32 Petition, dated

March 21, 2001, pp. 35-36.

The outcome of this case in state court, perhaps, may be understood best in

light of the language of Rule 32.3, which states:

The petitioner shall have the burden of pleading and proving by a

preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the

petitioner to relief. The state shall have the burden of pleading any

ground of preclusion, but once a ground of preclusion has been pleaded,

the petitioner shall have the burden of disproving its existence by a

preponderance of the evidence.

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It appears that the Rule 32 court concluded that petitioner failed in his “burden of

pleading . . . facts necessary to entitle [him] to relief,” in that he never pleaded any

facts showing why he was not able to present his juror-misconduct claim at trial and

on direct appeal. Stated another way, he failed to plead (and thus could not prove)

facts showing that neither he nor his trial attorneys could reasonably have discovered

or obtained the information necessary to allege the voir dire misconduct, either during

trial, in a motion for new trial, or on direct appeal. It is not clear, however, whether

such a failure should be regarded as a procedural default under Rule 32.3 (relating to

pleading), or under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5) (relating to claims not raised at trial and

on direct appeal). Moreover, this is not a mere academic point since the state courts

explicitly relied on Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), and this court is not allowed to rest its

decision on a different procedural rule or ground. See Peoples v. Campbell, 377 F.3d

1208, 1234-35 (11 Cir. 2004). th

In any event, the clear thrust of the state courts’ resolution of this claim is that

petitioner never attempted to explain why he waited until December 2000, in his

Second Amended Rule 32 Petition, to assert for the very first time this claim that

jurors failed to answer correctly at voir dire and, without that explanation, the claim

was barred by Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5). This is an “independent and adequate” state

procedural ground for resolution of the claim, and it is, therefore, procedurally

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defaulted here. As petitioner has not attempted to offer a “cause and prejudice”

explanation for the default, it cannot support habeas relief.

Alternatively, even if the claim were not procedurally defaulted, it is meritless.

Although criminal defendants certainly have a federal constitutional right to a fair and

impartial jury, subsidiary to which is the right to receive truthful and complete voir

dire answers from prospective jurors, the fact that a juror may fail to fully answer a

voir dire question does not result automatically in a new trial. The United States

Supreme Court established the standards to be used in analyzing such a case in

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), holding

that:

to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate

that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,

and then further show that a correct response would have provided a

valid basis for a challenge for cause. The motives for concealing

information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror’s

impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial. 

Id. at 556. As further elaborated by the Eleventh Circuit, the second prong of this test

requires a showing of “actual bias” on the part of the juror. The court of appeals

explained:

We now turn to the second prong of the McDonough test: whether a

correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for

cause. A party who seeks a new trial because of non-disclosure by a

juror during voir dire must show actual bias. United States v. Tutt, 704

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F.2d 1567, 1569 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 855, 104 S. Ct. 174,

th

78 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1983). Actual bias may be shown in two ways: “by

express admission or by proof of specific facts showing such a close

connection to the circumstances at hand that bias must be presumed.”

United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5 Cir. 1976) (citations th

omitted).

United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1532 (11 Cir. 1984). th

Even assuming, therefore, that petitioner could prove that one juror failed

dishonestly to disclose that he was a victimof an armed robbery “several years before

trial,” and that another juror failed dishonestly to disclose that his sister-in-law had

been murdered “just a few years” before trial, these facts show neither an express

admission of bias by either juror, nor “such a close connection to the circumstances

at hand that bias must be presumed.” While this would establish that the two jurors

were, indeed, crime victims, or related to crime victims, it would not show that either

was actually biased against the petitioner or in favor of the prosecution. The

circumstances of the crimes they experienced were not shown to be similar to, or

connected with, those charged against petitioner; and, there was no showing of how

recent or remote in time they were. In short, merely asserting that a juror is, or was

related to, a crime victim does not necessarily mean that the juror had “actual bias”

such that he could be removed for cause.

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Because petitioner has not shown that he was deprived of his right to an

impartial jury, his claim that two jurors failed to answer completely or correctly voir

dire questions put to them is meritless.

Claim VI — Improper Jury Instructions

Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of due process of law because the trial

court improperly instructed the jury in five different ways, each of which will be

discussed separately below.

VI(a) — Reasonable doubt instruction

Petitioner first contends that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the

definition of “reasonable doubt.” At Paragraphs 54-56 of the petition, he alleges that

the trial court’s jury instructions misdefined the concept of “reasonable doubt,”

making the prosecution’s burden of proof easier than required by In re Winship 397

U.S. 358 (1970). This claim was raised by petitioner on direct appeal and addressed

by the Alabama Supreme Court.

Much the same issue was addressed above as Claim III(k), alleging ineffective

assistance. There, petitioner alleged that his trial attorneys were ineffective for the

very reason that they failed to object to the trial court’s instruction on the definition

of “reasonable doubt.” This court already has concluded, in that context, that the

Alabama Supreme Court’s resolution of the issue of whether the instruction ran afoul

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of Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court precedent. The same is true here. The state trial

judge’s “reasonable doubt” instruction was not erroneous and, consequently, it was

not objectionable for purposes of ineffective assistance. Thus, because the Alabama

Supreme Court’s resolution ofthis claimwas neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court law, this claim is meritless and due to be denied.

VI(b) — Mental illness proved by “clear and convincing evidence”

Petitioner next contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that

petitioner’s claim of mental disease or defect as a defense must be proven by “clear

and convincing evidence.” At Paragraph 58 of the petition, he alleges that the trial

court erroneously instructed the jury that petitioner’s mental health defense had to be

proven by “clear and convincing evidence,” not merely a preponderance. This issue

was raised by petitioner on direct appeal and considered by the Alabama Supreme

Court. 

This issue is somewhat similar to the petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim addressed by the court as part of petitioner’s Claim III(k), but there is

a fundamental difference. In this claim, petitioner argues that requiring a defendant

to prove the defense of mental disease or defect by “clear and convincing evidence”

creates an unconstitutionally heavy burden of proof, depriving the defendant of due

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 Of course, if this court’s interpretation of the proceedings and issues addressed in the state 26

courts is mistaken, and the Alabama Supreme Court did address this claim on its merits, the

subsequent discussion makes clear that the resolution of the claim by the Alabama Supreme Court

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent, which

would also preclude habeas relief.

146

process of law. By contrast, petitioner acknowledges that his trial attorneys objected

to the court’s use of the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, but he contends

that, after the court overruled their objections, counsel were ineffective because they

failed to request the court to instruct the jury on the definition of “clear and

convincing evidence.” Thus, what is at issue here is the more fundamental claim that

the “clear and convincing evidence” burden of persuasion for insanity defenses is

unconstitutional. 

On direct appeal, petitioner argued that application of this burden of persuasion

violated the petitioner’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. (See Tab R-32, p. 30). This claim, properly understood, was not

addressed by the Alabama Supreme Court, which focused its discussion entirely on

the correct definition of the adjectival phrase “clear and convincing,” and not on the

question of whether the standard was an unconstitutionally heavy burden of proof for

insanity defenses. Thus, while petitioner exhausted his present due process claim by

raising it on appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court did not resolve the claimnow before

this court for purposes of the presumption of correctness under § 2254(d).26

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Regardless, the claim is meritless. Since at least 1952, the United States

Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality ofstate laws requiring a defendant to

prove an insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt — a standard even higher and

more onerous than the “clear and convincing” standard at issue here. In Leland v.

Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the Supreme Court upheld against constitutional attack

an Oregon statute that required defendants to prove insanity as a defense by “proof

beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court explained:

Today, Oregon is the only state that requires the accused, on a plea of

insanity, to establish that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Some

twenty states, however, place the burden on the accused to establish his

insanity by a preponderance of the evidence or some similar measure of

persuasion. While there is an evident distinction between these two

rules as to the quantum of proof required, we see no practical difference

of such magnitude as to be significant in determining the constitutional

question we face here. Oregon merely requires a heavier burden of

proof.

Id. at 798. Leland has been cited as authority by the Supreme Court itself as recently

as this year, in Clark v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (June 29, 2006), and

Dixon v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2437 (June 22, 2006). In Clark, the

court cited Leland for the proposition that “a jurisdiction may place the burden of

persuasion on a defendant to prove insanity as the applicable law defines it, whether

by a preponderance of the evidence or to some more convincing degree.” Clark, 126

S. Ct. at 2731 (emphasis added).

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Moreover, it must be observed that the federal statute dealing with the defense

of insanity in federal prosecutions also requires the defendant to prove the defense

by “clear and convincing evidence.” See 18 U.S.C. § 17(b). Numerous courts have

upheld the constitutionality of this allocation of the burden of persuasion. As the

Eleventh Circuit observed in United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11 Cir. th

1986),

[t]he Supreme Court . . . has repeatedly reaffirmed the Leland holding.

See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 97 S. Ct. 226, 50 L. Ed. 2d 160

(1976) (request to overrule Leland dismissed for want of substantial

federal question); see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 n.

17, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3051 n. 17, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983) (citing Leland

with approval); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 122 n. 23, 102 S. Ct. 1558,

1568 n. 23, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982) (citing Leland with approval);

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2325, 53 L.

Ed. 2d 281 (1977) (citing Leland with approval); Williams v.

Wainwright, 712 F.2d 1375 (11 Cir. 1983) (indicating that a state may th

make insanity an affirmative defense to be proved by defendant).

Id. at 1576. The Freeman court concluded: “Therefore, Leland compels a holding

that the aspect of the Insanity Reform Act of 1984 requiring a defendant to prove

insanity by clear and convincing evidence is constitutional.”

Finally, this court is unpersuaded by petitioner’s invocation of Cooper v.

Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), which determined that Oklahoma’s procedural rule

requiring a defendant to prove his mental incompetency to stand trial by clear and

convincing evidence was unconstitutional. Distinguishing Patterson v. New York,

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432 U.S. 197 (1977), the Court in Cooper observed that a defendant’s right to not be

compelled to stand trial while mentally incompetent (and, thus, unlikely to be able to

invoke other fundamental trial rights) stands on different grounds from a statutory

defense to a crime. The same is true here. The issue of a person’s competence to

understand the nature of the criminal proceedings against him implicates the viability

of all of the other trial rights a defendant may invoke and, thus, has a much more

profound effect upon the ability of the accused person to claim his constitutionallyprotected rights. The defense of insanity, however, stands like any other statutory

defense subject to the quantum of proof allocated to the defendant. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s instruction to petitioner’s jury that he must prove

his defense of mental disease or defect by clear and convincing evidence was not only

consistent with Alabama law, as explicated by the Alabama Supreme Court on direct

appeal, but it also did not violate the petitioner’s federal due process rights. This

claim is meritless and due to be denied.

VI(c) — No instruction on the consequences of acquittal on the defense

of mental disease

At Paragraphs 59 and 60, petitioner alleges that he was deprived of a fair trial

and due process of law because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that, if

petitioner were found not guilty by reason of a mental disease or defect, the State

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would commence proceedings to have him civilly committed. On direct appeal, the

Alabama Supreme Court rejected this claim, saying:

We find no error in the trial court’s silence as to the consequences for

Trawick if the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental

disease or defect. On the contrary, its silence was entirely proper; it was

not within the jury’s sphere of concern to determine what these

consequences would be, and statements asto such consequences should

not be thrown into a case to influence the verdict, Ivery v. State, 686 So.

2d 495 (Ala. Cr. App.1996), citing Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 154 So.

575 (Ala. 1934). The trial court correctly refrained from making

statements regarding those consequences.

Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 172 (Ala. 1997).

Petitioner cites Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980), and Simmons v

South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), in support of his argument that, unless the

jurors were informed about the proceedings that would follow an acquittal on insanity

grounds, they would likely convict him out of fear that an insanity acquittal would

result in his release to freedom.

The Alabama Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent. First,

petitioner cites no Supreme Court case expressly holding that, in death-penalty

prosecutions, the jury must be instructed that the defendant will be civilly committed

if found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Both Beck and Simmons are

distinguishable. Beck requires that the jury be instructed on applicable lesserCase 2:02-cv-01511-CLS-TMP Document 25 Filed 09/29/06 Page 150 of 181
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included offenses, and Simmons requires an instruction that the defendant is subject

to a sentence of life-without-parole when the prosecution argues his “future

dangerousness” as a basis for assessing the death penalty. Neither of these cases

deals with whether the jury must be instructed that an acquittal on mental-illness

grounds leads to civil commitment. Indeed, at least in the context of the federal

Insanity Defense Reform Act (“IDRA”), the Supreme Court has held that neither the

IDRA, nor general federal criminal practice,requires that the jury be instructed on the

consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGI”). The Court has

instead said:

Shannon argues that the instruction he proposes is required as a matter

of general federal criminal practice. Presumably, Shannon asks us to

invoke our supervisory power over the federal courts. According to

Shannon, the instruction is necessary because jurors are generally

unfamiliar with the consequences of an NGI verdict, and may

erroneously believe that a defendant who is found NGI will be

immediately released into society. Jurors who are under this mistaken

impression, Shannon continues, may also fear that the defendant, if

released, would pose a danger to the community. Shannon concludes

that such jurors, in order to ensure that the defendant will not be

released, may be tempted to return a guilty verdict in a case in which an

NGI verdict would be appropriate.

Even assuming Shannon is correct that some jurors will harbor the

mistaken belief that defendants found NGI will be released into society

immediately — an assumption that is open to debate — the jury in his

case was instructed “to apply the law as [instructed] regardless of the

consequence,” and that “punishment . . . should not enter your

consideration or discussion.” . . . That an NGI verdict was an option here

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gives us no reason to depart from “the almost invariable assumption of

the law that jurors follow their instructions.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481

U.S. 200, 206, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1987). Indeed,

although it may take effort on a juror’s part to ignore the potential

consequences of the verdict, the effort required in a case in which an

NGI defense is raised is no different from that required in many other

situations. For example, if the Government fails to meet its burden of

proof at trial, our judicial system necessarily assumes that a juror will

vote to acquit, rather than to convict, even if he is convinced the

defendant is highly dangerous and should be incarcerated. We do not

believe that the situation involving an NGI verdict should be treated any

differently.

We also are not persuaded that the instruction Shannon proposes

would allay the fears of the misinformed juror about whom Shannon is

concerned. “[I]f the members of a jury are so fearful of a particular

defendant’s release that they would violate their oaths by convicting [the

defendant] solely in order to ensure that he is not set free, it is

questionable whether they would be reassured by anything short of an

instruction strongly suggesting that the defendant, if found NGI, would

very likely be civilly committed for a lengthy period.” United States v.

Fisher, 10 F.3d 115, 122 (CA3 1993), cert. pending, No. 93-7000.

Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584-586 (1994); see also United States v.

Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573 (11 Cir. 1993). Thus, as a general rule, federal statutory law th

does not require the giving of such an instruction, and there is no Supreme Court

precedent holding that any constitutional provision requires it.

Finally, it should be noted that petitioner does not allege or argue that such an

instruction was necessary to correct a misleading impression conveyed to the jury

during trial. Certainly the Supreme Court recognized in Shannon that an instruction

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concerning the consequences of an NGI verdict may be necessary in some

circumstances, such as when the jury has been affirmativelymisled into believing that

such a verdict will result in the defendant being freed immediately. That is not the

case here. Petitioner has not argued, nor has this court found in the trial record, any

instance or circumstance that might have misled the jury about the consequences of

such a verdict. The resolution of the claim by the state courts, therefore, was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. Consequently, § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief on this claim, and it is

due to be denied.

VI(d) — Failure to instruct on mercy as a mitigating factor

At paragraphs 61 and 62 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleges

that the trial court violated his right to due process by denying his request for an

instruction to the jury that it could consider mercy as a mitigating factor in weighing

the aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to his punishment. Petitioner raised

this claim on direct appeal, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals spoke

directly to the question, while the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the argument

summarily. The Court of Criminal Appeals wrote:

The appellant also contends that the court erred in refusing to give a

requested jury instruction during the penalty phase of the trial. The

appellant’s requested jury instruction read:

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“If you see fit, whether mitigating circumstances exist or

not, you may recommend mercy for Jack Harrison Trawick.

This recommendation is solely in your discretion and not

controlled by any rule of law. You may make such

recommendation with or without reason.”

This court in Morrison v. State, 500 So. 2d 36 (Ala. Cr.

App.1985), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 57 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1007,

107 S. Ct. 1634, 95 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1987), addressed the propriety of the

trial court’s refusal to give the same jury instruction. This court stated:

“In Whisenhant v. State, 482 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. Cr.

App.1982), this Court discussed the propriety of this

precise charge and held that it was properly refused as an

erroneous statement of the law in Alabama. This holding

was specifically affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court

in Ex parte Whisenhant, 482 So. 2d 1241 (Ala.1983).

“This court in Whisenhant stated that the correct

principle underlying this issue was stated in Beck v. State,

396 So. 2d 645 (Ala. 1980), as follows:

“‘The court shall instruct the jury that in

determining whether to fix a punishment of

death, the jury must weigh the aggravating

and mitigating circumstances in determining

whether to fix the punishment at death. The

trial court shall instruct the jury to avoid any

influence of passion, prejudice or other

arbitrary factor while deliberating and fixing

the sentence.’

“We noted that while it is clearly the duty of the jury to

weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances it is not,

as this charge implies, free to arbitrarily ignore any factor

either positive or negative in arriving at the correct

sentence. We also noted that we viewed Proffitt v. Florida,

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155

[428 U.S. 242 (1976)], as having tacitly held that such a

mercy option is not a constitutional requirement. In

Proffitt, Mr. Justice White, in his concurrence, noted that

in Florida when the aggravating circumstances outweigh

the mitigating circumstances the sentencing authority is

required to impose the death penalty. We therefore noted

that the required imposition of the death penalty, regardless

of mercy, was determined to be constitutional in Proffitt,

and that this was in keeping with the interest that arbitrary

and capricious imposition of the death penalty be avoided.

Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S. Ct. 2049, 72 L. Ed.

2d 367 (1982). Here again, for the above stated reasons,

we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant

appellant’s requested charge number five.”

500 So. 2d at 43.

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the court

committed no error in denying appellant's jury instruction.

Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 151, 161-62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), aff’d, Ex parte

Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 1997). Respondents contend that, under § 2254(d),

this conclusion is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and that habeas relief

cannot be granted unless it is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme

Court precedent.

First, the petitioner has not identified any Supreme Court cases mandating that

the jury be instructed explicitly on mercy as a mitigating factor, nor has this court

found any. Although juries may not be instructed to disregard mercy or sympathy,

the focus of sentencing instructions is the guided consideration and balancing of

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aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Alabama recognizes that mercy can be a

proper mitigating factor to be considered by the jury, but it is found implicitly in the

law’s instruction that the jury consider “any aspect of a defendant’s character or

record in any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant offers as a basis

for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole instead of death, and any other

relevant mitigating circumstance which the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence

of life imprisonment without parole instead of death.” Ala. Code § 13A-5-52; Nelson

v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549, 1556 (11 Cir. 1993). A proper instruction with respect to th

this statutory definition of mitigating circumstances, therefore, places before the jury

mercy and sympathy as mitigating factors to be considered. There is no allegation

that Alabama law prohibits the consideration of mercy.

As a matter of state law, the Alabama courts found the instruction requested by

petitioner to be incorrect because it would have instructed the jury to disregard its

duty to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. While mercy and

sympathy are proper mitigating factors to put into the balance, the weighing process

may not be wholly disregarded. Federal constitutional law also does not allow juries

to exercise utterly unguided discretion with respect to mitigating factors. See Kansas

v. Marsh, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (June 26, 2006) (“[W]hile the Constitution

requires that a sentencing jury have discretion, it does not mandate that discretion be

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unfettered; the States are free to determine the manner in which a jury may consider

mitigating evidence.”); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled

on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Thus, the instruction was

incorrect as a matter of state law, and its denial by the trial court did not prohibit the

jury from weighing mercy as a mitigating factor in the petitioner’s favor in violation

of federal law. There is no Supreme Court case mandating a specifically worded

instruction on mercy, so it cannot be said that the resolution of this issue by the

Alabama courts was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, “clearly

established” Supreme Court precedent. This claim is due to be denied.

VI(e) — Failure to instruct on the effect of “ties” when weighing

aggravating and mitigating factors

At paragraphs 69-70 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner contends that

the trial court denied him due process of law and his Eighth Amendment right to

individualized sentencing by failing to instruct the jury explicitly that, in the event the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances are equally balanced, the jury must

recommend life without parole. Petitioner raised this issue on direct appeal, and the

Alabama Supreme Court rejected it, saying:

Trawick next argues that during the penalty phase of the trial the

court failed to instruct the jurors as to how they were to weigh the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances of Trawick’s case. The trial

court instructed the jury that, if it found that the mitigating

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 In his brief, petitioner argues that the Alabama Supreme Court has mischaracterized the 27

record by saying that the trial court instructed the jury that it could recommend death “only” if the

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Petitioner contends that such an

instruction was never given. Although it is true that the trial court never considered the possibility

of a tie in the weighing process (see Tab R-28, pp. 1208-9), part of the court’s actual instruction to

158

circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances, it was

required to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

However, Trawick points out that the trial court did not further instruct

the jury that if the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were

equally balanced, the jury was likewise required to recommend a

sentence of life imprisonment. Trawick concludes that, because

Alabama law requires that aggravating circumstances must outweigh

mitigating circumstances in order for a jury to recommend the death

sentence, the trial court’s instructions misstated Alabama law and

improperly created an inference that the jury was required to recommend

the death penalty if it found that the circumstances were equally

balanced.

Because Trawick did not raise this issue at trial, we must consider

it in accordance with the plain error rule. We note that the jury

instructions as to the weighing of aggravating circumstances and

mitigating circumstances were materially the same as those set out in the

Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal for use in the sentencing

stage of a capital murder trial in this state, and this Court has held that

no reversible error will be found when the trial court follows the pattern

jury instructions adopted by this Court. Kuenzel v. State, supra. The

trial court correctly instructed the jury to recommend the death penalty

only if it found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the

mitigating circumstances, obviously implying that in all other

circumstances the jury was required to recommend a sentence of life

imprisonment without parole. We do not agree with Trawick that this

instruction could have misguided the jury as to its responsibility and

function in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances; on

the contrary, the instruction clearly explained that the jury could

recommend the death penalty under only one circumstance. 

Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 173-74 (Ala. 1997) (emphasis added). 

27

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the jury reads:

The law also provides that whether death or life imprisonment without parole should

be imposed upon the defendant, it depends upon whether any aggravating

circumstances exist and if so whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the

mitigating circumstances. [Emphasis added].

(See Tab R-28, pp. 1175-6). Although other parts of the instructions failed to address the possibility

of equally balanced aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the instruction taken as a whole,

including this part, informed the jury that the aggravating circumstances must outweigh those

submitted in mitigation in order for death to be imposed.

159

Insofar as this claim raises only an issue about the adequacy of the instruction

under Alabama law, it does not allege a basis for federal habeas relief. Habeas lies

only to correct errors of federal law. To the extent petitioner claims that federal

constitutional law requires an explicit instruction to the jury that “ties go to life,” the

Supreme Court recently made clear that such an instruction is not required by the

Constitution. In Kansas v. Marsh, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (June 26, 2006), the

Supreme Court held that the Kansas death penalty statute was not unconstitutional

because it mandated the imposition of the death penalty when the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances are equally balanced. The Court opened its opinion with

the following:

Kansas law provides that if a unanimous jury finds that aggravating

circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances, the

death penalty shall be imposed. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4624(e) (1995).

We must decide whether this statute, which requires the imposition of

the death penalty when the sentencing jury determines that aggravating

evidence and mitigating evidence are in equipoise, violates the

Constitution. We hold that it does not.

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Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2520 (emphasis suppled). Relying upon Walton v. Arizona,

497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002), the Supreme Court in Marsh concluded that the Constitution leaves open to

the states how the burden of proving mitigating circumstances is allocated. As in

Walton, states may constitutionally place on the defendant the burden of proving that

mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances proven by the

prosecution. It follows, of course, as noted in Marsh, that states may direct that death

be imposed if the aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise.

For purposes of the instant case, it must follow logically that federal

constitutional law does not mandate an explicit jury instruction requiring something

that federal law does not require. If federal law does not require that aggravating

circumstances outweigh mitigating factors before death can be imposed, a jury

considering penalties need not be so instructed. Thus, in this case, it cannot be said

that the Alabama court’s resolution of this constitutional claim is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. The claim is due to be

denied.

Claim VII — Witherspoon Error

At paragraphs 81-83 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleges that

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when a prospective juror

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was excused for cause by the court for expressing reservations about the death

penalty. Petitioner contends that Juror Porter was unconstitutionally excused from

the venire in violation of Witherspoon v Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). This issue was

raised on direct appeal, and the Alabama Supreme Court expressed the following

opinion on it:

Trawick next argues that in granting one of the State’s challenges

for cause the trial court violated Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,

88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968). Trawick correctly states that,

under Witherspoon, it is unconstitutional to exclude venire persons for

cause when they express general objections to the death penalty; the

juror may be excluded only if his or her view on capital punishment

would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her

duties as a juror. Before deciding whether a juror is excludable under

Witherspoon, the trial court must first determine whether the juror, given

his or her stated objections to capital punishment, could nevertheless

consider the evidence and instructions of the court and in an appropriate

case return a verdict of guilty although that verdict could result in the

imposition of the death penalty.

During voir dire, the trial court asked the veniremembers whether

any of them, because of religious, moral, or philosophical scruples, were

unalterably opposed to capital punishment — specifically whether

anyone was so opposed to it “that you know now before you hear a

stitch of testimony, before you have heard anything about the legal

components, that you know right know [sic] to a certainty that you

would not vote for the death penalty.” Juror [Porter] answered in the

affirmative. The trial court then conducted individual voir dire with

[Porter], wherein the following was said:

“QUESTIONS BY THE COURT:

“Q. Could you impose the death penalty?

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“A. I don’t know that I could. To be truthful, I don’t

know that I could.

“Q. . . . [I]s that to say you could not or you just don’t

know, you might could? You could hypothesize-

“A. Theoretically you’ve got — truthfully, I don’t think I

would. I really don’t think — I’m very strongly opposed

to the death penalty. Personally, I don’t — I don’t think it

— I don’t think that it’s constitutional, on my own — my

own mind. And I have gone around and around and

around on that subject with people as well.

“. . . .

“Q. . . . Now, can you play the role of the conscientious

juror, or are your feelings about the death penalty so

hardened that you cannot conscientiously consider death by

electrocution in spite of the law and what facts might

emerge in the course of the trial?

“A. Put . . . to me that way, I would still have to come

down that I would not. I do not think that I would. I know

that’s vague — 

“Q. You said two things. You said that you would not and

then you qualified and said you didn’t think you could.

And because you are a lawyer I am going to pick on you.

“A. I understand that.

“Q. How could I read this?

“A. I would not. I feel — I can tell you that my feelings

on the death penalty are stronger than — that my feelings

— my feelings on death in general and death penalty are

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stronger than my feelings of obligation perhaps to — to

that oath.”

We conclude that [Porter’s] statements regarding his feelings against the

death penalty, and his statement of allegiance to his own feelings against

it, were sufficient to justify granting the State’s challenge for cause.

Throughout repeated questioning, [Porter] consistently indicated that his

own feelings of conscience against the death penalty would outweigh his

obligation to any oath to consider recommending it. We therefore find

no plain error in the trial court’s decision to exclude [Porter] from the

jury.

Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 170-71 (Ala. 1997). This conclusion is not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has described its Witherspoon jurisprudence this

way:

Witherspoon limited a State’s power broadly to exclude jurors hesitant

in their ability to sentence a defendant to death, but nothing in that

decision questioned “the power of a State to execute a defendant

sentenced to death by a jury from which the only venire men who were

in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear that

. . . they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital

punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at

the trial of the case before them. . . .” 391 U.S., at 522, n. 21, 88 S. Ct.,

at 1777, n. 21 (emphasis in original); see also id., at 513-514, 88 S.Ct.,

at 1772-1773.

In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d

841 (1985), we revisited footnote 21 of Witherspoon, and held

affirmatively that “the State may exclude from capital sentencing juries

that ‘class’ of veniremen whose views would prevent or substantially

impair the performance of their duties in accordance with their

instructions or their oaths.” 469 U.S., at 424, n. 5, 105 S. Ct., at 852, n.

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5; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-596, 98 S. Ct. 2954,

2959-2960, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978). Indeed, in Lockhart v. McCree we

thereafter spoke in terms of “‘Witherspoon-excludables’” whose

removal for cause “serves the State’s entirely proper interest in obtaining

a single jury that could impartially decide all of the issues in [a capital]

case.” 476 U.S., at 180, 106 S. Ct., at 1768. From Witt, moreover, it

was but a very short step to observe as well in Lockhart:

“[T]he State may challenge for cause prospective jurors

whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it

would prevent them from impartially determining a capital

defendant’s guilt or innocence. Ipso facto, the State must

be given the opportunity to identify such prospective jurors

by questioning them at voir dire about their views of the

death penalty.” 476 U.S., at 170, n. 7, 106 S. Ct., at 1763,

n. 7.

This passage in Lockhart expanded but briefly upon what we had

already recognized in Witt: 

“As with any other trial situation where an adversary

wishes to exclude a juror because of bias, then, it is the

adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate,

through questioning, that the potential juror lacks

impartiality. It is then the trial judge’s duty to determine

whether the challenge is proper.” 469 U.S., at 423, 105

S. Ct., at 852 (citation omitted; emphasis added).

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 732-33 (1992).

The Alabama Supreme Court’s analysis employed the correct legal standard,

addressing whether Porter’s views on the death penalty would “prevent or

substantially impair the performance of [his] duties” in accordance with instructions

given him by the court and his oath. Not only was the state court’s resolution not

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165

“contrary” to Supreme Court precedent, it also was not an unreasonable application

of it. Juror Porter unmistakably expressed the view that his opposition to the death

penalty was even stronger than the obligations imposed by his oath as a juror. This

is precisely the type of juror envisioned by the Supreme Court when upholding the

right of the state to have an impartial jury composed of people not automatically

predisposed against the death penalty.

There was no Witherspoon error in this case. Consequently, it cannot be said

that the Alabama Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. As such, petitioner cannot

obtain habeas relief on this claim under § 2254(d). This claim is due to be denied.

Claim VIII — Trial Judge’s Failure to Recuse

At paragraphs 87 and 88 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner asserts

that the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself from petitioner’s trial violated the

plaintiff’s constitutional right to an impartial judge. He argues that there are two

reasons the trial judge should have recused: first, the judge had formerly prosecuted

and lost a murder case in which the victim had been allegedly threatened by

petitioner; and second, the trial judge attended high school with petitioner. Although

raised on direct appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court did not explicitly address this

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166

claim in its opinion, finding only generally that this and other claims did not

constitute plain error.

Much was written about this issue in the previous discussion of Claim III(m),

dealing with the related assertion that petitioner’s trial attorneys were ineffective for

not “adequately” seeking the recusal of the trial judge. It was noted there that neither

of the grounds for recusal advanced by the petitioner warranted recusal. There is no

allegation that the trial judge had any personal or financial interest in the outcome of

petitioner’s trial. What is suggested is the possibility of personal bias against

petitioner. The mere fact, however, that the trial judge attended the same high school

as petitioner hardly creates any inference of bias. That alone would raise no

concerns. 

More troubling, perhaps, is the argument that, as a young prosecutor, the trial

judge had prosecuted another person (not this petitioner) for the murder of Betty Jo

Richards; that the defendant in that case was acquitted; and that subsequent

information came to light indicating that petitioner had threatened or harmed the

victim. While these circumstances may indicate that the trial judge harbored more

than the usual interest in the trial before him, it hardly rises to the level of mandating

the trial judge’s recusal.

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 In Bracy, the Court also explained: 28

Of course, most questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case are not

constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1588-1589, 89 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1986).

Instead, these questions are, in most cases, answered by common law, statute, or the

professional standards of the bench and bar. See, e.g., Aetna, id., at 820-821, 106 S.

Ct., at 1584-1585; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S. Ct. 437, 441, 71 L. Ed.

749 (1927); 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455; ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1)(a)

(1980).

Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904. As this is a habeas action involving a state prosecution, only the

constitutional right to an impartial tribunal comes into play. None of the other standards by which

the impartiality of judges may be measured supports the invocation of federal habeas relief because

they are not grounded in federal law.

167

The touchstone of the constitutional right to an impartial tribunal is whether the

trial judge harbors actual bias for or against parties in the litigation. In Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997), the Supreme Court noted that “the floor established

by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal,’. . ., before

a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his

particular case.” Id. at 904-05. Although there may be many other standards by

which the impartiality ofjudges may be measured, only the constitutional minimum 28

is implicated in habeas. 

Nothing in this case suggests any actual bias or interest in the outcome of

petitioner’s trial on the part of the trial judge. In a similar situation, the Eleventh

Circuit rejected the notion that previous involvement in an unrelated prosecution of

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168

a defendant requires a trial judge to recuse. In Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242

(11 Cir. 1984), the trial judge presiding at that habeas petitioner’s trial had th

previously prosecuted that very petitioner in an unrelated matter, yet the court of

appeals found no basis for disqualifying the trial judge, noting:

The trial judge in the instant case was a former district attorney who had

prosecuted the defendant in a case involving assault with intent to rape.

Defendant was 15 years old at the time, but was prosecuted as an adult.

Defendant entered a guilty plea. In the instant case, petitioner’s counsel

at trial specifically stated that he did not wish to move for

disqualification. (T.T. at 83). Petitioner’s present counsel, however,

maintains that the judge’s failure to recuse himself sua sponte was error.

The mere fact that a judge acted as prosecutor in an unrelated case

is insufficient to constitute reversible error. Goodspeed v. Beto, 341

F.2d 908, 909 (5 Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 926, 87 S. Ct. 867,

th

17 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1967). Petitioner has cited no prejudicial rulings, nor

has he cited to any area in which the judge appeared to be biased in his

rulings. Additionally, cases cited by petitioner which hold that the trial

judge deprived the defendant of his constitutional due process rights

involved cases where the judge was the trier of fact. See, e.g., United

States v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 374 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S.

978, 83 S. Ct. 1112, 10 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1963). The instant case,

however, was a trial by jury. We find no error in the judge’s failure to

recuse himself.

Jarrell, 735 F.2d at 1258-1259. If anything, petitioner’s argument is even more

remote than in Jarrell. Here, petitioner argues that the judge should have recused

because he prosecuted a different defendant, who was acquitted, for a murder in

which petitioner later claimed some involvement. That alone would not indicate any

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actual bias or interest in the outcome of petitioner’s case necessitating the judge’s

disqualification.

Because petitioner has not shown that the determination of this claim by the

Alabama Supreme Court was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme

Court precedent, § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief. This claim is due to be denied.

Claim IX — Improper Weighting of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

At paragraphs 89 and 90 of the Second Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus,

petitioner alleges that the Alabama state courts committed two crucial, interrelated

errors in the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances leading

to the imposition of the death penalty. First, he contends that the state trial court

erroneously placed the burden of proving the existence of statutory mitigating

circumstances upon him, rather than on the state. This led to the second error, the

failure of the trial court to find the existence of the statutory mitigating circumstance

that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts was substantially impaired.

The court first notes that, although raised in the Second Amended Petition,

petitioner did not argue or brief this claim. (See doc. no. 23). The court reads this

claim as being focused on the trial court’s findings and sentencing order, rather than

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 Indeed, the court’s instructions to the jury during the penalty phase of the trial explicitly

29

stated:

When the factual existence of a mitigating circumstance is in dispute, the State shall

have the burden of disproving the factual existence of that circumstance by a

preponderance of the evidence. The burden of disproving it by a preponderance of

the evidence means that you are to consider that the mitigating circumstance does

exist unless taking the evidence as a whole it is more likely than not that the

mitigating circumstance does not exist.

Therefore, if there is a factual dispute, you see, over the existence of a

mitigating circumstance, then you should find and consider that mitigating

circumstance, unless you find that it is more likely true than not that the mitigating

circumstance does not exist.

(See Tab R.28, pp. 1187-8).

170

upon its instructions to the jury. Also, as noted elsewhere, to the extent that 29

petitioner contends that the trial court violated Alabama state law, such cannot be a

basis for federal habeas relief, as habeas relief under § 2254 is available only for

violations of federal law. This claim was raised on direct appeal, and rejected by the

Alabama Supreme Court, which definitively concludesthe question whether an error

of state law occurred. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court said about this claim:

Trawick next argues that, in sentencing him, the trial court

improperly placed on him the burden of proving mitigating

circumstances and erred in failing to find the existence of mitigating

circumstances. He first points out that, under Ala.Code 1975, §

13A-5-45(g), a defendant has only the burden of interjecting the issue

of mitigating circumstances, and the burden then shifts to the State to

disprove the existence of the mitigating circumstances, by a

preponderance of the evidence. He argues that the trial court improperly

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required him to prove the existence of mitigating circumstances, rather

than requiring the State to disprove their existence.

In considering what Trawick offered as a mitigating circumstance

— his contention that he had an impaired capacity to appreciate the

criminality ofthis conduct orto conformhis conduct to the requirements

of law – the trial court stated:

“[It] does not apply. Dr. Ronan finds that the defendant

has serious characterologic and personality defects and

paraphilia or sexual sadismto an extreme degree NOR [sic]

Dr. Ronan’s findings summarized at page 25 of her

28-page report nor do any of the other evidences (written

or testimonial) persuade me that the defendant did not

appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or that his

capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the

law was substantially impaired.”

(Emphasis added.)

Trawick argues that this indicates that the trial court placed the

burden of persuasion upon him, rather than upon the State. We disagree.

The trial court did not state that Trawick had failed to persuade it of the

existence of the sixth statutory mitigating circumstance (set out at §

13A-5-51); rather, it indicated that the evidence rebutted Trawick’s

contention regarding the mitigating circumstance and that it was

therefore not persuaded to find the existence of that mitigating

circumstance. Moreover, the record shows that the trial court properly

instructed the jury as to the burden of proof on mitigating circumstances,

and it is presumed to follow its own correct instructions. Ex parte

Harrell, 470 So. 2d 1309 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935, 106 S. Ct.

269, 88 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1985). We therefore find no plain error in the

trial court’s finding as to this mitigating factor.

Trawick also claims that although the trial court did find a

nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, based upon Trawick’s

“characterological defects,” it should have found as a statutory

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mitigating circumstance that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of

his actions was impaired. While the trial court was required by the

United States Constitution to consider all the evidence Trawick

presented in mitigation, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954,

57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978), it was not required to determine that mitigating

circumstances existed. Ex parte Harrell, supra. The record contains

sufficient evidence, presented by the various experts who testified at the

guilt and sentencing stages of the trial, from which the trial court could

conclude that, while Trawick may have suffered from a mental illness,

his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions was not

impaired by that illness. In view of this, we find that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in failing to find the existence of the sixth

mitigating circumstance.

Ex parte Trawick, 608 So. 2d 162, 176-77 (Ala. 1997). This conclusion is not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. Indeed,

there is nothing in the arguments presented by the petitioner even to establish any

error. It simply appears that the trial court did not believe that petitioner’s

“characterological defect” impaired his ability to understand the criminality of his

acts and, therefore, it was not included as a mitigating factor to be weighed in the

balance against aggravating factors. Petitioner is not entitled to any habeas relief on

this claim, and it is due to be denied.

Claim X — Denial of Change of Venue

At paragraph 91 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner asserts that his

constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and an impartial jury were violated

when the trial court refused to change the venue of his trial, despite extensive pretrial

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publicity of the crime, the investigation, and his arrest. He notes that, of 58

prospective jurors summoned for duty at his trial, 40 admitted to having heard or read

something about the case.

This claim was raised and argued on direct appeal, and the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals rejected it. That court wrote:

The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for a change of venue. The appellant alleged that extensive

pretrial publicity rendered it impossible for him to obtain a fair trial in

Jefferson County.

The record indicates that the appellant produced a copy of only

one newspaper article in support of his motion for a change of venue.

The article appeared in the November 27, 1993, edition of the

Birmingham Post-Herald. The appellant’s trial began on March 21,

1994. The appellant’s counsel stipulated that only two articles were

printed after the first article — one appearing on January 2, 1994, and

one on January 30, 1994. The appellant admits that there was no news

coverage for more than one and one-half months before his trial began.

Moreover, of the 58 potential jurors in the venire panel, 17

indicated that they had heard nothing about the case. The potential

jurors were questioned individually, and only one was struck for cause

based on pretrial publicity. In denying the appellant’s motion, the trial

court stated:

“I disagree vehemently. [J.M.]is the only juror who cannot

set aside his impressions and bring us a fair verdict and he

was struck for cause. We talked to all of these people

individually. These people impressed me as very

conscientious people that will indeed abide by the Court’s

instructions and set aside whatever impressions they may

have formed and bottom their verdict on the case in court.

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And I will be repeating that throughout the course of the

litigation.”

The Alabama Supreme Court has issued explicit guidelines for a

trial court’s determination of a motion for a change of venue based on

pretrial publicity.

“In order to grant a motion for change of venue, the

defendant must prove that there existed actual prejudice

against the defendant or that the community was saturated

with prejudicial publicity. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.

333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966); Franklin v.

State, 424 So. 2d 1353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).

Newspaper articles or widespread publicity, without more,

are insufficient to grant a motion for change of venue.

Anderson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1296, 1298

(Ala.Crim.App.1978). As the Supreme Court explained in

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1642-43,

6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961):

“‘To hold that the mere existence of any

preconceived notion as to the guilt or

innocence of an accused, without more, is

sufficient to rebut the presumption of a

prospective juror’s impartiality would be to

establish an impossible standard. It is

sufficient if the juror can lay aside his

impression or opinion and render a verdict

based on the evidence presented in court....’

“The standard of fairness does not require jurors to be

totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. Murphy

v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800, 95 S. Ct. 2031,

2035-2036, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1975). Thus, ‘[t]he proper

manner for ascertaining whether adverse publicity may

have biased the prospective jurors is through the voir dire

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 The court notes that a reading of the voir dire of the jury reveals that newspaper articles 30

and television and radio news reports reported on the upcoming trial just days before. See Tab R-7,

pp. 327, 328, 331, 334, 343, 348, 350, 359, 361, 363, 368, 378-79, 391-92. This does not, however,

change the correctness of the state courts’ analysis under Sheppard and Irvin.

175

examination.’ Anderson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1296, 1299

(Ala. Crim. App. 1978).”

Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 80 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865,

106 S. Ct. 189, 88 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1985).

The appellant has not satisfied the requirements set forth in

Grayson. The venire panel was examined individually and there was no

evidence that the prospective jurors remaining after one juror was struck

for cause could not try the case based solely on the evidence presented

at trial. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for a change

of venue.

Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 151, 155-56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), aff’d, 698 So. 2d

162 (Ala. 1997).

The resolution of this claim by the Alabama Court ofCriminal Appeals was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. The state

appellate court expressly cited the standards articulated in Sheppard and Irvin, and

reasonably applied them to the facts of this case. Notwithstanding petitioner’s

assertion of extensive pretrial publicity, the findings by the state court that there were

only a few news articles about the case, and none for several weeks before trial, are

entitled to a presumption of correctness. Petitioner has not proffered any evidence, 30

much less clear and convincing evidence, to rebut these findings. While there was

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176

some pretrial publicity relating to petitioner’s case, the state courts concluded that it

fell far short of the overwhelming and pervasive publicity involved in Sheppard and

Irvin, and that careful, individualized voir dire sufficiently protected petitioner’s

rights to a fair and impartial jury. This was not an unreasonable application of

Sheppard and Irvin, and § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief on this claim.

Claim XI — Defendant’s Presence at All Proceedings

At paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner contends

that his constitutional right to be present at two pretrial proceedings was violated. At

Claim III(h) above, petitioner also alleged that his trial counsel were ineffective in

failing to object to his absence from these two proceedings.

This claim was asserted on direct appeal, and the Alabama Supreme Court said:

Trawick next argues that in regard to two pre-trial hearings he was

improperly denied his constitutional right to be present. He points out

that in Ex parte Jackson, 674 So. 2d 1365 (Ala. 1994), this Court held

that state law and federal law secure the right of a defendant accused of

a capital crime to be present during all stages of the trial. According to

Trawick, he was excluded from two hearings wherein the parties

outlined the case against him and discussed the admissibility of parts of

his oral statements to the police. He therefore concludes that his

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered, under Jackson.

In Jackson, the defendant was allowed to leave the courtroom

twice during the sentencing portion of his trial, without having displayed

a level of misconduct that would have constituted a forfeiture of his

right to be present at the proceeding. This Court has not held, however,

that a defendant has the right to be present at all pre-trial proceedings

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177

without regard to whether the defendant’s absence will prejudice the

defendant.

The record does not support Trawick’s contention that he was

denied the right to be present at a pre-trial hearing; rather, it shows

merely that Trawick arrived late at one such proceeding and that, when

he did arrive, the trial court fully apprised him of what had occurred in

his absence. Trawick has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by

this, or how his presence at the entire proceeding might have changed

the outcome of the trial. Because Trawick did not raise this issue before

the trial court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, or before this Court in his

certiorari petition, we review it only for plain error. We find none.

Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 177 (Ala. 1997). The respondents contend that

petitioner has not shown that this determination by the Alabama Supreme Court is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

The essential legal issues underlying this claim were discussed extensively in

that portion of this opinion addressing Claim III(h). Although a defendant has a right

to be present at “all critical stages” of the prosecution, this does not extend to inchambers conferences and bench conferences for the discussion of purely legal or

evidentiary questions. See United States v. Vasquez, 732 F.2d 846 (11 Cir. 1984); th

see also In re Shriner, 735 F.2d 1236, 1241 (11 Cir. 1984) (“Shriner had no th

constitutional right to be present at the bench during conferencesthat involved purely

legal matters,, nor does the absence of recorded bench conferences constitute a

constitutional deprivation unless it renders our review impossible.”) (citation

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178

omitted). As discussed in relation to Claim III(h), petitioner was not excluded from

any critical stage of pretrial or trial proceedings. Rather, what the record shows is

that the trial judge and lawyers held brief discussions about petitioner’s case on two

occasions, concerning generally administrative matters. On both occasions, the

outcomes of those discussions generally were beneficial to the petitioner: i.e., on one

he was granted the right to call a state psychologist as an adverse witness, and on the

other, two of his inculpatory statements were eliminated from evidence and a third

was redacted. There simply is no showing how petitioner could have been prejudiced

by these administrative discussions in his absence, and the court re-affirms its earlier

holding that these did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be

present at all critical proceedings in his case. This claim is due to be denied.

Claim XII — Ring v. Arizona

At pages 52 through 55 of the Second Amended Petition, petitioner contends

that his death sentence is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002), because certain predicate facts necessary for the imposition of the death

sentence were found by the trial judge and not the jury. Respondents contend that this

claim is procedurally defaulted because it has never been presented to any Alabama

court and, in any event, Ring does not apply retroactively to petitioner’s sentence.

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179

The court agrees that Ring does not apply retrospectively to petitioner’s habeas

action. In Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004), the Supreme Court flatly

held: “Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to

cases already final on direct review.” Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct

appeal when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of

certiorari on December 1, 1997. See Trawick v. Alabama, 522 U.S. 1000 (1997).

Consequently, the holding in and rationale of Ring cannot be applied to petitioner’s

case. See Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292 (11 Cir. 2005) (Ring does not apply

th

retroactively to cases final before it was decided); Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196

(11 Cir. 2004) (same). th

Even if Ring could be applied to this case, the court agrees with respondents

that the claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner never presented this Sixth

Amendment claim on direct appeal or in his Rule 32 petition, leaving it unexhausted.

The one-year limitation for filing Rule 32 petitions defined by Rule 32.2(c), and the

prohibition against successive petitions found at Rule 32.2(b), now preclude him from

seeking to file a new petition to present this argument to the state courts. See Collier

v. Jones, 910 F.2d 770 (11 Cir. 1990). It would be futile for petitioner to return to th

state court to seek exhaustion of a Ring claim, because these two rules preclude its

consideration. Thus, the claim is procedurally defaulted, and petitioner has not

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180

attempted to show “cause and prejudice” to excuse the default. Moreover, petitioner

has not attempted to, and cannot, show that he is actually innocent of either the

capital crime he has been convicted of, or of the death sentence. Therefore, it is not

a fundamental miscarriage of justice to refuse consideration of this defaulted claim.

This claim is due to be denied.

Claim XIII — Cumulative Effect of Errors Violated Constitutional Rights

Petitioner’s final claim is that the cumulative effect of all of the errors alleged

by him resulted in the denial of his constitutional rights. It cannot be true that, where

none of the individual claims asserted amounts to a basis for habeas relief, the sum

of them together can create a remedy. In a somewhat different § 2241 habeas

context, involving a federal prisoner’s challenge to the United States Parole

Commission’s denial of parole, the Eleventh Circuit refused to consider the

cumulative effect of multiple claims of error when none of the individual claims

showed any error. The court said, “Shakur also argues on appeal that his claims of

error should be reviewed cumulatively in assessing whether the Commission abused

its discretion. Because we find no error asto the individual claims, we do not address

his argument as to cumulative effect.” Shakur v. Wiley, 156 Fed. Appx. 137 (11 Cir. th

2005) (unpublished). Because § 2241 and § 2254 writs of habeas corpus are really

the same remedy, see Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049 (11 Cir. 2003), cert. th

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181

denied, 541 U.S. 1032 (2004); Peoples v. Chatman, 393 F.3d 1352 (11 Cir. 2004), th

this reasoning would apply with equal weight to the instant action. It would be

anomalous, indeed, to conclude that, while none of petitioner’s individual allegations

of relief show any constitutionally prejudicial error, in combination they do. This is

not the law, and petitioner has not pointed to any authority saying it is. This claim

is due to be denied.

Conclusion

Having now carefully reviewed the record, pleadings, briefs, and arguments

presented, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to relief from his conviction

or sentence. Accordingly, by separate order, the court will deny the petitioner’s

request for an evidentiary hearing, and deny his petition for habeas corpus. A

separate order will enter.

DONE this 29th day of September, 2006. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

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