Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01382/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01382-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Both the Motion and the Opposition are docketed as a "motions."

2

 See Docket Nos. 11 through 15, Summonses for G. Saenz, S. Ryan, W.C. Robert, M.E.

Bourland, and M.E. Ruan, all noted returned "Unexecuted" in March 2007 for the reasons described

in the documents. Accordingly, disposition of this motion disposes of the entire case. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RELAUN DEADMON, 

CDC #D-58206,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv1382-LAB (WMC)

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART

WITH MODIFICATIONS AND

REJECTING IN PART REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION AND

DISMISSING ACTION

[Dkt No. 21, 251]

vs.

N. GRANNIS, et al.,

Defendants.

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil rights matter is before the court on defendants'

Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint ("Motion") for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Dkt No. 21. Plaintiff Relaun Deadmon ("Deadmon" or

"Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, is a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of the

proceedings associated with his confinement in administrative segregation and its conditions

as violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. He names as defendants

eleven prison officials and correctional officers, in their official and individual capacities, only

five of whom appear to have been served. The Motion is brought on behalf of those five:

Villa, Aguayo-Hunt, Grannis, Baltazar, and Jimenez, Jr. (collectively "Defendants"). The

court deems only the moving defendants to be parties to this action.2 

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3

 Neither Deadmon nor Defendants describe his underlying conviction or sentence.

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Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. prepared a Report And Recommendation

("R&R") recommending Defendants' Motion be granted in part and denied in part, and that

Deadmon be granted leave to amend all but his official capacity allegations and one

conspiracy to violate civil rights claim. Dkt No. 27. Deadmon filed no Objections to the R&R.

Defendants filed Objections to a single aspect of the R&R: the recommendation the

42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy claim be found to survive their FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

challenge. Deadmon filed no response to Defendants' Objections. Defendants argue no

conspiracy to violate civil rights cause of action can be maintained in the absence of a viable

underlying substantive civil rights violation claim, and the R&R recommends dismissal of all

the Due Process claims. Dkt No. 28. However, as the R&R also recommends granting

Deadmon leave to amend, this court construes the recommendation as predicated on the

assumption Deadmon would file an amended pleading restating a viable Due Process

violation claim that could support the conspiracy claim. Nevertheless, for the reasons

discussed below, Defendants' Objections are SUSTAINED on grounds Deadmon will not be

granted leave to restate a third time any of his claims. The R&R is ADOPTED IN PART, but

on modified reasoning, and REJECTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2005, prison officials charged Deadmon with conspiracy to assault peace

officers while he was an inmate at Calipatria State Prison.3 He was ultimately found not

guilty of that charge through institutional review procedures, but he spent fifteen months in

administrative segregation ("Ad Seg") in the meantime. His First Amended Complaint

("FAC") alleges Defendants, in their official and individual capacities, violated his procedural

due process rights associated with the instigation, investigation, and conduct of his

disciplinary proceedings by forging, falsifying, and back-dating documents, failing to disclose

exculpatory evidence, and failing to investigate his claims of misconduct during his

administrative appeal. He also summarily contends the deprivations associated with his Ad

Seg confinement caused him "mental, emotional, and physical suffering." FAC ¶ 103. 

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4

 For example, in his prayer for relief, Deadmon asks the court to "declare": documents

associated with the disciplinary proceedings giving rise to his claims be removed from his file; a

written notice be placed in his file with instructions that the Board of Prison Terms disregard any

documents that may refer to the conspiracy charge against him; and Defendants be removed from

their positions or have letters of reprimand issued against them. FAC pp. 15-16. 

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Deadmon seeks declaratory relief, but with the import of injunctive relief,4 and

compensatory damages. His FAC separately identifies two causes of action: First, a

violation of Due Process; and Second, infliction of mental, emotional, and physical suffering,

including his fear of the potential he will be seen "in a negative light before the Board of

Prison Terms, and possibly cause plaintiff to be denied for a period of five years." FAC

15:22-17:2. Defendants liberally construe the FAC to identify three due process violation

claims, a "mental anguish" claim and, although not separately enumerated as a cause of

action, a claim for conspiracy to violate Deadmon's due process rights by three of the five

named defendants. Mot. 5:2-10. The R&R enumerates four claims discernable from the

allegations in Deadmon's 17-page FAC, addressing: a "first claim" based on "an alleged

violation of his rights to due process of law in how his disciplinary hearing was held," citing

FAC ¶ 101; a "second claim" based on "an alleged violation of his rights to due process of

law based upon the length of his confinement in Ad Seg;" a "third claim" as "an alleged

violation of his rights to due process based upon the possibility that his eligibility for parole

may be effected [sic]" (although this court construes that portion of the pleading instead as

a speculative concern related to damages as part of his "mental anguish" allegations,

appearing as it does in the statement of his second cause of action); and fourth, the second

of Deadmon's two causes of action enumerated in his FAC, alleging emotional, mental, and

physical suffering, citing FAC ¶¶103-104. R&R 3:3-8. The R&R additionally addresses his

conspiracy allegations as a separate claim. 

Deadmon's Opposition to the Motion accepts Defendants' introductory statement and

the material portions of their procedural and factual background statements. Dkt No. 25,

p. 3. No party filed objections to the factual or procedural summaries provided in the R&R.

\\

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5

 Conley's "no set of facts" language "has earned its retirement. The phrase is best

forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has

been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the

allegations in the complaint." Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1969. "It is not . . . proper to assume that

[the plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Motions To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim

A FED. R. CIV. P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. Dismissal is warranted where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory.

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on

the basis of a dispositive issue of law"). A complaint may also be dismissed where it

presents a cognizable legal theory, but fails to plead facts essential to the statement of a

claim under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534; see Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so

requires." Rule 15(a); see DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.

1992) (when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, leave to amend is ordinarily denied only

when it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment);

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1988) (in civil

rights cases, courts must liberally construe the pleadings and resolve doubts in favor of the

plaintiff, and "[a] pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it

is 'absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by

amendment'"); see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations; . . . a plaintiff's

obligation to provide "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief"

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level . . . .

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, -- U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (May 21, 2007), quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).5 

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[laws] in ways that have not been alleged." Id. at 1969 n.8 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

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The Rule 12(b)(6) issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether

the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

The court assumes the truth of all factual allegations, including all reasonable inferences to

be drawn from the facts alleged, and construes them in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).

However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the

form of factual allegations, nor need the court accept conclusory allegations or unreasonable

inferences as true. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). In

construing the pleading, courts may not "supply essential elements of the claim that were

not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982) ("Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are

not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss"); see also Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287,

1290 (9th Cir. 1997) (a plaintiff must support allegations of civil rights violations with factual

allegations of overt acts or omissions with some degree of particularity). 

A sufficiency of the pleading review is confined to the complaint. Schneider v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the court

may also consider documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not

attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the court

takes judicial notice. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on

other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); MGIC

Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Actions

Deadmon seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), which provides,

in pertinent part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

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to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . ." Accordingly, to sustain a Section 1983 action, the allegations

must show (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of

state law, and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Balistreri,

901 F.2d at 699; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

3. Cognizable Due Process Violations

 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive a person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law. The procedural guarantees of due process

apply only when a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause does not trigger the need for procedural protections in every instance involving the

state's deprivation of an individual's liberty, but only when there is a cognizable liberty

interest at stake); see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). Protectable liberty

interests arise from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause itself, or from state

laws or regulations deemed to have created a liberty interest cognizable as a civil right.

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976); Wolff v McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58

(1974) (describing minimum safeguards before a state, for disciplinary reasons, seeks to

withdraw sentence credits a prisoner has already acquired, raising a liberty interest); Smith

v. Sumner, 994 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1993). 

4. R&R Review

A district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive

further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions" on a

dispositive matter prepared by a magistrate judge proceeding without the consent of the

parties for all purposes. Rule 72(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). An objecting party may

"serve and file specific objections to the proposed findings and recommendations," and "a

party may respond to another party's objections." Rule 72(b).

\\ 

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6

 The Eleventh Amendment confers sovereign immunity, barring suits against State

officials when a damages judgment would be paid by the State. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25

(1991); Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988). In contrast, "[t]he affirmative

defense of qualified immunity shields public officials performing discretionary functions from liability

for civil damages under § 1983 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

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"[T]he court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980) (when objections are made,

the court must make a de novo determination of the factual findings to which there are

objections). The court also reviews de novo the magistrate judge's conclusions of law.

Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1995). "If neither party contests the magistrate's

proposed findings of fact, the court may assume their correctness and decide the motion on

the applicable law." Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). The

statutory provision does not require that the district court conduct some lesser review when

no objections are filed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) ("It does not appear that

Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal

conclusions under a de novo or any other standard when neither party objects to those

findings"); but see Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007)

("determinations of law by the magistrate judge are reviewed de novo by both the district

court and [the court of appeals]," so "the failure to object would not, standing alone, ordinarily

constitute a waiver of the issue" on appeal) (citation omitted). Here, the court need only

address the conclusions of law and decide the ultimate disposition of Defendants' Motion,

as no party has filed objections to the R&R factual findings.

B. Immunity

Defendants move to dismiss all the FAC "official capacity" allegations against them.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages against a state employee acting in his

official capacity as an agent of the State. Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519

U.S 425, 429 (1997); Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999). In his

Opposition to dismissal of his official capacity allegations, Deadmon confuses "qualified

immunity" with sovereign immunity.6 Opp. pp. 4-5. Officials "sued in their official capacities

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statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would know.'" May v. Baldwin, 109

F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 

7

 Consequently, defendant Grannis is dismissed as a party to this action, inasmuch as

Deadmon sues her solely in her official capacity, leaving only Deadmon's claims against the

remaining four defendants, in their personal capacities. Even had Deadmon sued Grannis in her

individual capacity as well, this court would have adopted the R&R recommendation the merits of

the claim against her be dismissed. Grannis' alleged conduct involved solely acts related to

endorsing the grievance procedure used by signing the Chief Inmate Appeals Review Final Report

of Plaintiff's 602. R&R 13:17-19, quoting Opp. p. 7. Prisoners have no protected liberty interest in

a particular grievance procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Sandin

v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-85 (1995). Denial of a grievance, standing alone, does not state a

Section 1983 claim. Defendants also observe Deadmon's complaint arises out of the disciplinary

proceedings that resulted in his placement in Ad Seg, not from the appeal process. Reply 5:17-19.

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are not 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983," foreclosing any finding of liability in that

capacity. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Doe v. Lawrence

Livermore Nat'l Lab, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). The court accordingly finds

sovereign immunity bars Deadmon from suing the named Defendants in their official

capacities and ADOPTS the recommendation that portion of the Motion be GRANTED.

7

C. Due Process Claims

Defendants and Judge McCurine identify three facets to Deadmon's allegations his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated: defects in the disciplinary hearing

process originating from alleged misconduct in the initiation and prosecution of charges

against him; his confinement and conditions in Ad Seg for the 15-month duration; and

speculation his parole eligibility may be affected by the disciplinary charges made against

him, despite his ultimate exoneration. This court approaches Deadmon's due process

claims from a different perspective than that applied in the R&R. Only if a cognizable liberty

interest has first been implicated need the court reach a procedural due process safeguards

analysis. See Wolff, 418 U.S. 539. 

"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Roth, 408

U.S. at 569. Deadmon urges the court to find the fact of his confinement in Ad Seg to be a

violation of his "constitutional rights to due process, life, and liberty" because he alleges he

"was falsely imprisoned in (AD-AEG) [sic] based on [Defendants'] trumped up charges and

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falsified documents." Opp. p. 5. Changes in a prisoner's conditions of confinement can

amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest constitutionally protected under the Due Process

Clause, but only if the liberty interest in question is one of real substance. Sandin v. Connor,

515 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1995). A prisoner possesses such a liberty interest "when a change

occurs in confinement that imposes an 'atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.'" Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755, quoting Resnick v. Hayes, 213

F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). The court's threshold

inquiry, accordingly, is whether the conditions of Deadmon's confinement in Ad Seg imposed

"atypical and significant hardship" implicating a protected liberty interest. If so, the court

must then determine what process he was due and whether he received it. See, e.g.

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (holding that segregated confinement of indefinite

duration in a "supermax" prison that rendered inmates ineligible for parole consideration

created a combination of factors that implicated a liberty interest, but the state's informal,

nonadversary procedures for placement there were adequate to safeguard inmates' liberty

interest in not being assigned to supermax prison). Only in those cases where a sufficiently

substantial liberty interest is at stake must the court evaluate whether the process received

comported with minimum procedural due process requirements. If the court answers the first

question in the negative, the plaintiff has failed to state a Section 1983 claim for a Fourteenth

Amendment violation. 

1. AdminIstrative Segregation

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in

remaining housed in the general prison population. Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th

Cir. 1993); McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1986) (no liberty interest

in remaining in the general prison population rather than in administrative confinement while

information alleging misconduct affecting institutional security was investigated); Clark v.

Brewer, 776 F.2d 226, 228-30 (8th Cir. 1985) (Due Process Clause did not create a liberty

interest, notwithstanding the fact that conditions in "close management" were significantly

more harsh than conditions in the general prison population).

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8

 Deadmon's FAC cites three California Administrative Code sections he presumably relies

on for the liberty interest element essential to sustain a Section 1983 civil rights claim associated with

his challenged Ad Seg confinement. FAC ¶¶ 50-53. Title 15, § 3321 addresses the "confidential"

classification of information to be withheld from an inmate and the uses that may be made of such

information. Title 15, § 3330 addresses the manner of assignment of inmates to disciplinary

detention. Title 15, § 3335 addresses the reasons for and review of administrative segregation of

inmates whose "presence in an institution's general inmate population presents an immediate threat

to the safety of the inmate or others, endangers institution security or jeopardizes the integrity of an

investigation of an alleged serious misconduct or criminal activity. . . ." Title 15, § 3335(a). 

9

 The Ramirez court remanded the case to the district court for failure to consider whether

the multiple conditions of the prisoner's confinement in disciplinary segregation imposed an atypical

and significant hardship warranting additional Due Process protections during his hearing, but noting

his segregation for a period of two years was not necessarily a due process violation. Ramirez, 334

F.3d at 861, citing Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1089.

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In order to find a liberty interest conferred by state law, the analysis focuses on the

nature of the deprivation rather than on the language of any particular regulation, to avoid

involvement of federal courts in day-to-day prison management.8 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at

479-82; see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.1997) (convicted inmate's due

process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken

within sentence imposed, and administrative segregation falls within the terms of

confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence). Cognizable liberty interests created

by state law are limited to freedom from restraint which "imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S.

at 484 (rejecting prior test of Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) focusing on the

mandatory or discretionary language of a regulation to identify whether it created a liberty

interest); see Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996). 

"There is no single standard for determining whether a prison hardship is atypical and

significant, and the 'condition or combination of conditions or factors . . . requires case by

case, fact by fact considerations.'" Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003),9

quoting Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1089; see Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000)

(plaintiff's placement and retention in prison's special housing unit pending a disciplinary

hearing was within range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary

incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free

from that confinement). The Sandin Court structured the "atypical and significant hardship"

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inquiry. "The Court in Sandin relied on three factors in determining that the plaintiff

possessed no liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) disciplinary

segregation was essentially the same as discretionary forms of segregation; (2) a

comparison between the plaintiff's confinement and conditions in the general population

showed that the plaintiff suffered no 'major disruption in his environment'; and (3) the length

of the plaintiff's sentence was not affected." Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755, quoting Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87); see also

Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1089 (the Sandin guideposts are: (1) whether the challenged condition

"mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and

protective custody;" (2) the duration of the conditions and the degree of restraint imposed;

and (3) whether the state's action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner's

sentence). The appropriate comparison under the first consideration is conditions of

administrative segregation compared to conditions of other segregation. See, e.g., Wagner

v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1174 (7th Cir. 1997); Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755 ("Sandin requires

a factual comparison between conditions in general populations or administrative

segregation (whichever is applicable) and disciplinary segregation, examining the hardship

caused by the prisoner's challenged action in relation to the basic conditions of life as a

prisoner"). Deadmon does not allege his Ad Seg detention entailed significant (or any)

departures from restrictions imposed on any other inmate transferred to segregated

confinement, whether for administrative or protective or disciplinary reasons. 

The FAC only compares Deadmon's Ad Seg conditions of confinement to those in the

general prison population. He identifies the following hardships he experienced in Ad Seg:

deprivation of personal property; family visits behind a closed window; denial of "the normal

everyday function of the general population;" only allowed one package a year; no phone

calls; maximum ten hours per week of yard time; and one shower every three days. FAC

¶ 97. Defendants contend no liberty interest is created by virtue of Deadmon's having been

placed in segregated housing with charges affecting prison security pending against him, nor

because of the duration of that confinement, nor based on "the attendant restrictions

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10

 Defendants argue that even assuming the truth of Deadmon's allegations official

misconduct occurred in the bringing of the disciplinary charges against him, "any defect that may

have occurred during the first disciplinary hearing was cured when Plaintiff was ultimately found not

guilty at the second hearing." Reply 3:24-26, citing FAC ¶ 96; Wycoff v. Nichols, 94 F.3d 1187, 1189

(8th Cir. 1996) (reversal of prison disciplinary committee's initial decision to sanction inmate

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Deadmon enumerates in the FAC" (Mot. 10:1-4) because he was not made to suffer "an

atypical and significant hardship in light of the ordinary incidents of his incarceration" (Mot.

9:1-2). Defendants argue "[a]ny difference in the conditions simply qualify as permissible

disciplinary action as sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Sandin: 'Discipline by prison

officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of

the sentence imposed by the court of law.'" Mot. 9:2-5, quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. 

The Supreme Court has identified few protected liberty interests within the prison

context requiring procedural due process protections. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d

1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (the "healthy procedural protections" under the Due Process

Clause in the prison context discussed in Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71, when an inmate is

charged with a disciplinary infraction, "adhere only when the disciplinary action implicates

a protected liberty interest in some 'unexpected ma[nn]er"' or imposes an 'atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life'"), quoting

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. As noted in the R&R, "extreme deprivations are required to make

out a conditions-of-confinement claim." R&R 11:26-27, quoting LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d

1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted) (holding none of the practices in a

disciplinary segregation unit challenged under the Eighth Amendment (involving more

restrictive and restraining conditions than Deadmon complains of here) was unnecessary or

caused harm rising to the level of a constitutional violation). 

Deadmon concedes that a prison "inmate should reasonably anticipate receiving at

some point in their incarceration administrative segregation confinement." Opp. p. 5, citing

Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 467. His argument that he was eventually cleared of the disciplinary

allegations and released from Ad Seg cannot support the contention he never should have

been placed there, because one need not be a wrongdoer in fact to warrant placement in

Ad Seg during an investigation.10 "A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity

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constituted due process and cured alleged due process violation; also holding inmate did not have

a protected liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation because those conditions were not

atypical nor a significant departure from basic conditions of prisoner's confinement). However, such

a categorical exoneration of official misconduct based on ultimate vindication of the prisoner's

grievances cannot foreclose a properly-pled and supported claim of constitutional rights violations.

For example, applying Sandin, an atypical hardship while in Ad Seg supports a cognizable

constitutional claim, irrespective of whether the prisoner ultimately prevailed at a grievance hearing.

11

 The R&R traces the timeline of Deadmon's disciplinary proceedings to demonstrate he

received sufficient procedural due process associated with his pursuit of grievance procedures, even

though the R&R accounts only for the period from his June 8, 2005 receipt of an Administrative

Segregation Unit Placement Notice through an October 12, 2005 issuance of a new Rules Violation

Report and grant of a rehearing. R&R 9:1-10:10. While that analysis does not cover the entire

period of Deadmon's Ad Seg confinement of which he complains, the FAC and associated exhibits

substantiates a third accusatory document issued (FAC ¶ 37) following which he was permitted to

present evidence at a hearing. In November 2005 and February 2006, Deadmon's appeals were

denied, accounting for his continued detention. FAC ¶¶ 46-47.

12

 "Prisoners...of course, retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the

expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the

Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where appropriate, and may draw upon

internal prison grievance procedures and state judicial review where appropriate." Sandin, 515 U.S.

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from being wrongly or falsely accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a

protected liberty interest." Lopez v. Celaya, 2008 WL 205256 at *5 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 23, 2008),

citing, inter alia, Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989).

 None of the conditions or deprivations Deadmon alleges suggests "a dramatic

departure from accepted standards for conditions of confinement." Overton v. Bazzetta, 539

U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003) (upholding prison regulations banning visitation privileges entirely

for a two-year period for inmates with two substance abuse violations and regulating the

conditions of visitations by others as not affecting constitutional rights that survive

incarceration), citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485; see also Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d

1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) (no constitutional right implicated by restricting inmate to one

shower per week). "[T]he length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the

confinement meets constitutional standards." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1979)

(noting a "filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 'grue' might be tolerable for a few days and

intolerably cruel for a few weeks or months"). However, duration alone does not create a

liberty interest violation.11 The Sandin articulation of that consideration speaks in terms of

"degree of restraint" imposed during the confinement period.12 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87.

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at 487 n.11. The conditions Deadmon describes appear to this court to be insufficient to qualify as

either potential Eighth Amendment violations (which Deadmon does not allege) or to constitute an

atypical, significant hardship cognizable as a Due Process violation under a deprivation of liberty

standard.

13

 Deadmon's is not a case where he was placed in Ad Seg indefinitely or without a hearing

or without any meaningful review of his confinement. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9 (to justify

continued confinement in Ad Seg, prison officials must conduct periodic administrative reviews to

determine whether further confinement is warranted); see also Toussaint, 926 F.2d at 803. 

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Deadmon remained in Ad Seg pending resolution of the on-going investigation of disciplinary

charges and his appeals, with regular reviews and communication between him and prison

administration authorities.13 The court finds the FAC does not allege the type of "atypical

and significant hardship" necessary to support a cognizable Due Process interest protected

by the Fourteenth Amendment itself or created by state law. See Toussaint v. McCarthy,

801 F.2d 1080,1093-94 (9th Cir. 1986). 

2. Alleged Irregularities In Discipline Charges And Hearing Process

Defendants acknowledge the "Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause entitles

prisoners to certain due process protections when charged with disciplinary violations,"

including "the rights to call witnesses, to present evidence, and to have a written statement

of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken." Mot. 13:5-8,

citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. However, unless a plaintiff identifies the existence of a

protected liberty interest to be free from Ad Seg confinement or from the particular

restrictions placed on him while there, the prisoner may not pursue a claim based on denial

of procedural due process resulting in that confinement or those deprivations. Mere

placement in Ad Seg, with its attendant additional restrictions, pending investigation of

disciplinary charges does not implicate a protected liberty interest after Sandin, absent a

showing the conditions of confinement created "atypical and significant hardship" in relation

"to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Resnick, 213 F.3d at 448-49. The manner of the

deprivation complained of is not reviewable as a Due Process violation if the deprivation

itself does not entail infringement of a liberty interest. See, e.g., May, 109 F.3d at 565. 

Plaintiff's allegations regarding his placement into administrative

segregation based on allegedly false information suggests a due

process claim. However, the claim is not cognizable. Absent

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allegations that placement in segregated housing is, itself,

outside the range of confinement contemplated by the sentence,

a claim that placement in segregated housing pending

investigation of disciplinary charges violates due process fails as

a matter of law. There is no protected liberty interest in not being

confined in the security housing unit where placement and

retention therein were “within the range of confinement to be

normally expected” by prison inmates. Resnick v. Hayes, 213

F.3d 443, 448-49 (9th Cir.2000); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557,

565 (9th Cir.1997) (a prisoner has no protected interest in

freedom from administrative segregation). Thus, as to this claim,

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment must be denied and the

claim must be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

Smith v. King, 2007 WL 405030 (E.D. Cal. Feb.2, 2007) at *3. 

As a consequence of this court's finding the FAC fails to allege facts to support the

inference a cognizable liberty interest attached to Deadmon's Ad Seg confinement, the

allegations challenging the process leading to or perpetuating that confinement are

immaterial to Defendant's entitlement to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Unless application of the

Sandin test identifies a cognizable liberty interest at stake, the court need not reach the Wolff

analysis of the manner in which a plaintiff alleges his due process rights were violated.

 Even if a liberty interest could be found from the deprivations or duration of

Deadmon's Ad Seg confinement, his FAC allegations do not support a claim for procedural

due process violations. "[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does

not confer any substantive right upon the inmates." Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495

(8th Cir. 1993) (failure to process any of plaintiff's grievances without more is not actionable

under Section 1983); see Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1093-94 ("[d]ue

process, in the administrative context, merely requires that the prison officials provide the

inmate with 'some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present [the

inmate's] version to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer [the inmate]

to administrative segregation'") (citation omitted). Reviewing the FAC, the Motion

contentions and authority, Deadmon's Opposition, and the R&R analyses of the procedural

due process issues, this court concludes Deadmon received all the process to which he was

entitled. A prisoner must be informed of the reasons for his Ad Seg placement through a

CDC written form. He must receive periodic reviews after placement in Ad Seg. When the

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14

 For example, Deadmon cites Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) for the proposition:

"Court[s] have repeatedly recognized that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false

evidence is fundamentally unfair and violative of due process." Opp. p. 6 (emphasis added). The

Napue Court reviewed and reversed the denial of a petition by a defendant who had been convicted

of murder based on false trial testimony from a State witness. Criminal convictions obtained

through false testimony known to be false by State representatives violate due process for reasons

whollydistinguishable from testimonial irregularities in post-conviction prison disciplinary proceedings

not affecting the fact of a criminal conviction nor the duration of a sentence. Deadmon also relies

on Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), a habeas corpus case again challenging the underlying

conviction resulting in the petitioner's alleged unconstitutional imprisonmentthroughthe prosecution's

deliberate use of allegedly perjured trial testimony. See FAC pp. 8-9. Deadmon's case is a Section

1983 prisoner civil rights action challenging state action unrelated to his conviction and not affecting

his criminal sentence, involving different standards and remedies.

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prisoner receives notice and a review process associated with his placement in Ad Seg, the

prisoner has received all the process to which he is entitled for that confinement. Toussaint,

801 F.2d at 1100-01 (federal due process does not require that plaintiff be provided with

"detailed written notice of charges" or "a written decision describing the reasons for placing

the prisoner in administrative segregation" or "the disclosure of the identity of any person

providing information leading to the placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation").

The process due in proceedings subsequent to a criminal conviction and sentencing is less

demanding than before the finding of a defendant's guilt. Deadmon mistakenly attempts to

equate prison disciplinary proceedings with the process owed to accuseds associated with

criminal trials and convictions, relying on distinguishable cases.14 Opp. pp. 5-6. "Prison

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights

due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. 

Deadmon also argues the process is constitutionally "insufficient when it has been

contaminated by the introduction through state action of false inculpatory evidence,"

contending "the introduction itself violates the Due Process Clause." Opp. p. 5. While in

no way condoning "trumped up charges" or the use of "falsified documents" in any official

proceeding, even the filing of false disciplinary charges is not itself a due process violation,

provided the procedural due process requirements of Wolff are observed. See Hanrahan

v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1984) (inmate's complaint alleging prison guard planted

false evidence and issued disciplinary ticket in retaliation for failure to pay extortion demand

resulting in his loss of good time credits failed to state a claim upon which Section 1983 relief

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could be granted where procedural due process protections were provided, although failure

to give inmate a statement of the evidence against him relied on in an investigation and

disciplinary adjudication process resulting in a determination of his guilt of the infraction

stated a claim); see also Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986) (prisoners

have "no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of

conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest," but prisoners

have "the right not to be deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process of law").

Nevertheless, an inmate can state a cognizable claim for violation of his federal

constitutional rights associated with an allegedly false disciplinary report, or a conviction

based on an allegedly false disciplinary, report in two ways. First, an inmate can allege the

false report or false conviction was retaliatory. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265 (9th Cir.

1997) (jury finding that prison guard filed disciplinary report in retaliation for inmate's use of

grievance system upheld). The statement of such a claim requires pleading the defendant

"filed the disciplinary action against him in retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his

constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological

interest." Id. at 267. Deadmon's FAC allegations do not permit the inference the allegedly

false report or charges against him were retaliatory. He alleges only that the charges were

false and allegedly made with knowledge of their falsity. 

Second, an inmate can allege he was not afforded the procedural protections required

by the Due Process Clause in connection with the issuance and hearing of the disciplinary

report. See, e.g., Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1994). A procedural due

process claim arising out of a false disciplinary report, however, fails if the inmate received

particular protections. See, e.g., Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949 (2nd Cir. 1986). Those

protections are: (1) written notice of the charges at least 24-hours before the hearing; (2)

the opportunity to appear in person at the hearing, to call witnesses, and to present rebuttal

evidence; and (3) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence relied on for their

decision and the reasons for the action taken by the committee. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66.

"Although prisoners are entitled to be free from arbitrary action and conduct of prison

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15

 "[A]n allegation that a prison guard planted false evidence which implicates an inmate in

a disciplinary infraction fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted where the procedural due

process protections as required by Wolff v. McDonnell are provided." Freeman, 808 F.2d at 952,

quoting Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1140. The FAC alleges Deadmon was provided hearings, assistance

of investigators, written notice of the charges asserted in the institutional write-ups against him,

rehearing based on unavailability of witness, and appeal processes, among other things.

16

 In particular, Deadmon was placed in Ad Seg and retained there until the administrative

proceedings and appeals concluded with his ultimate exoneration of those charges on the basis of

evidence in sworn reports he had conspired with others to harm prisoner officials. He was provided

notice of the charges and permitted the opportunity to rebut them through hearing processes,

precluding any finding of a per se constitutional violation actionable under Section 1983. Defendants'

disciplinary infraction charges standing alone were not the cause of his Ad Seg confinement.

17

 When prison officials initially determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for

administrative reasons and a liberty interest of real substance is implicated, due process requires

they hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated,

inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons segregation is being considered, and

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officials, the protections against arbitrary action 'are the procedural due process

requirements as set for in Wolff v. McDonnell.'"15 Freeman, 808 F.2d at 952, quoting

Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1140. Due process is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached by the officials to place the inmate in Ad Seg.

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104-05; see also Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 (even where the punishment

is the loss of good time credits, the requirements of due process are satisfied if there is even

"some evidence" to support the prison's disciplinary decision). Deadmon's allegations and

complaint exhibits demonstrate there was "some evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455

(1985). He appears from the FAC and complaint exhibits to have received all process due

him, and he fails to state a claim under either pleading standard based on allegedly false

disciplinary reports.16 

In summary, the court finds Deadmon has not stated his claims in a manner

permitting the court to find he had a liberty interest in remaining free from Ad Seg, or from

any of the conditions of his confinement there of which he complains, and therefore he has

not stated a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action cognizable under Section 1983. Absent

a liberty interest, he was not entitled to any procedural due process protections associated

with the deprivations he complains of.17 The consequence he complains of associated with

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allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100.

18

 "Further, even if plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to establish the existence of a liberty

interest in remaining free from Ad-Seg, plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support his claim

he was deprived of the procedural due process protections he was due. In matters of internal

security, courts have accorded great deference to the decisions of prison administrators. A lesser

quantum of process is due a state prisoner placed in segregation for administrative reasons, Hewitt,

459 U.S. at 474, than is required to punish a prisoner for a disciplinary infraction, Wolff, 418 U.S. 539

. . . . An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to

present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative

segregation. So long as this occurs, and the decision maker reviews the charges and then-available

evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied." Richardson v. Bryant, 2007 WL

452427 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 19, 2007); see also, Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101.

19

 His Complaint expressly stated "there is no credit forfeiture under dispute." Compl. ¶ 10.

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the allegedly tainted proceedings – that is, confinement in Ad Seg under the conditions he

alleges – fails to implicate a protected liberty interest, foreclosing any cognizable claim of

procedural due process violations. Even reaching Deadmon's allegations he was denied

procedural due process, the pleading demonstrates the process he received satisfies the

Wolff criteria as a matter of law.18 See FAC ¶¶ 10, 22-47. For all the foregoing reasons, the

court ADOPTS the recommendation Defendants' Motion be GRANTED, but on modified

reasoning and, because the court also finds leave to amend would be futile, the court

REJECTS the recommendation leave to amend be granted.

3. Potential Parole Eligibility Consequences

Deadmon offers only bare speculation the fact or length of his Ad Seg confinement

may affect his parole eligibility. The FAC fails to state a Section 1983 claim on this inchoate

consequences theory. He was ultimately found not guilty of the original disciplinary infraction

charges, he lost no good-time credits associated with the incident,19 and the overall length

of his sentence appears to be unaffected. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87; see also

Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755. 

As the Court noted in Sandin, "[t]he decision to release a

prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations," and an inmate is

generally "afforded procedural protection at his parole hearing

in order to explain the circumstances behind his misconduct

record." 515 U.S. at 487. The Court in Sandin held "[t]he

chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is

simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guaranties of the

Due Process Clause. Id.

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20

 Conspiracy claims are distinguishable from retaliation claims. Prisoners may base

Section 1983 retaliation claims on harms that would not raise due process concerns. Resnick, 213

F.3d at 448. To prevail on a Section 1983 claim of retaliation, the prisoner must show the defendant

was motivated to punish based on plaintiff's exercise of a Constitutional right, such as filing

prison grievances or pursuing civil rights litigation in the courts implicating the First Amendment.

See, e.g., Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806-07

(9th Cir. 1995) (Sandin does not affect cases alleging retaliatory transfer or retaliatory discipline).

No such imputed motivation is stated or can be inferred from Deadmon's FAC allegations.

21

 The FAC was not filed with any attached exhibits. The court construes the FAC allusions

to specific exhibits to be references to the exhibits Deadmon filed along with his original Complaint.

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Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding, inter alia, the

possibility of denial of parole at some later date as a result of a prisoner's misconduct record

does not amount to a denial of a liberty interest triggering procedural due process

protections). The court ADOPTS the R&R recommendation Defendants' Motion be

GRANTED with respect to the parole eligibility facet of Deadmon's due process claim for

failure to demonstrate any liberty interest is implicated. 

D. Conspiracy Allegations

Although Deadmon identifies no separate cause of action for Conspiracy, Defendants

extract from his FAC allegations regarding the conduct of defendants Jimenez, Villa, and

Hunt an attempt to state a cause of action for conspiracy to violate his due process rights.20

Defendants move to dismiss any conspiracy claim on grounds his FAC states no underlying

due process violation, and he fails to allege they had any discriminatory animus or subjective

intent to violate his civil rights. Mot. 10:20-23, Reply 4:22-25. In Opposition, Deadmon

merely refers to his Complaint Exhibit C.21

A plaintiff can state a conspiracy to violate civil rights claim under either 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir.1988). In

the Ninth Circuit, a cognizable conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3) requires the pleading

of factual allegations that could support a finding the alleged conspirators' actions were

motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory

animus." Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)

(also observing civil rights statutes prohibiting conspiracies to deprive persons of their legally

protected rights are not to be construed as general federal tort law). 

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Section 1985 proscribes conspiracies to interfere with an

individual's civil rights. To state a cause of action under Section

1985, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any

person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,

(3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the

conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage or

deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United

States. Gillispie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir.1980);

see also Giffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). The plaintiff

must also demonstrate a deprivation of a right motivated by

"some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously

discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." RK

Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th

Cir.2002); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th

Cir.1992). The "plaintiff must be a member of the class

discriminated against." RK Ventures, Inc., 307 F.3d at 1056.

Pobursky v. Madera County, WL 4557090 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 21, 2007) at *15 (full cites omitted).

The R&R recommends dismissal of Deadmon's conspiracy claim under Section

1985(3) be granted because the "FAC contains no reference to race or any other protected

class" (R&R 7:9), and because the court "may not look outside the pleadings in order to

determine whether Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show discriminatory animus

required to state a § 1985(3) claim" (R&R 7:9-11, citing Rule 12(b)(6)). Combed carefully,

however, Deadmon's FAC actually alludes in two places to race. He states in passing he

concluded from his reading of another inmate's Rules Violation Report, that "other (Blk)

inmates were being arrested" (FAC ¶18) and that "staff on the B-Yard" would commonly

"plant weapons, forg[e] document, and falsify[] documents on (Blk) inmates on the B-yard"

(FAC ¶ 21). Despite the two parenthetical references to "(Blk)," his 104-paragraph FAC

neither identifies Deadmon in racial terms nor develops in any specific claim any defendant

acted toward him out of racial animus associated with the disciplinary charges or Ad Seg

incident giving rise to this litigation. He neither cites 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) nor do his

insubstantial allegations permit any reasonable inference he is proceeding under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3) on a theory Defendants intended to deprive him of equal protection arising from

"some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirator's action." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-03. Therefore, this court ADOPTS the

recommendation to dismiss any 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy claim the FAC might

obscurely suggest, on grounds the FAC omits facts essential to a statement of a cause of

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action under that theory. Courts may not supply missing elements to save any party's

pleading. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268; Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964. 

The elements of a Section 1983 conspiracy claim do not include a motivating factor

of racial or class-based animus. See Dixon, 898 F.2d at 1449 n. 6; Klingele, 849 F.2d at

413. Nevertheless, a Section 1983 conspiracy clam is subject to a higher pleading standard

than is set forth in Rule 8(a)(2) and requires the plaintiff assert nonconlusory allegations

containing evidence of unlawful intent. Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th

Cir.1997); see Olsen v. Idaho Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir.2004) (a plaintiff

must plead "specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy") (citation

omitted); see also Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (a pleading

alleging conspiracy must present specific, nonconclusory allegations of subjective intent, a

required element of such a claim); Foster v. Skinner, 70 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The R&R recommends Defendants' request for dismissal of a Section 1983

conspiracy claim be denied. Although Defendants object to that recommendation on

grounds the R&R finding the FAC states no viable Due Process cause of action precludes

survival of any conspiracy to violate due process claim, they do not object to the R&R

conclusion the technical pleading of Deadmon's conspiracy claim satisfies the heightened

pleading standard required to state a claim for conspiracy. The court construes the

recommendation a Section 1983 conspiracy claim survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in

conjunction with the recommendation he be granted leave to amend his pleading, on the

assumption he could restate a viable Due Process cause of action in an amended pleading.

The heightened pleading standard is satisfied for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes by specific

allegations of "which defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy led

to a deprivation of his constitutional rights . . . " Harris, 126 F.2d at 1196. This court concurs

with the R&R finding "Plaintiff has asserted fairly specific factual claims against the three

named defendants," alleging "his due process rights were violated by the manner in which

his disciplinary hearing was conducted" with sufficient factual particularity. R&R 6:8-13.

Deadmon identifies by name individual defendants and alleges such specific conduct as

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falsifying and back-dating disciplinary charges and Rules Violation documents. This court

also concurs with the observation "[i]t is clear Plaintiff has alleged his due process rights

were violated by the manner in which his disciplinary hearing was conducted," and the claims

"do more than offer vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations," satisfying the technical pleading specificity for conspiracy allegations. R&R 5:26-

6:16, quoting FAC ¶¶ 56, 73, 76. 

However, contrary to the R&R finding he has sufficiently pled "official participation in

civil rights violations" (R&R 6:5-8), this court finds Deadmon failed to state a claim for an

underlying, cognizable liberty interest at stake associated with his Ad Seg confinement or,

consequently, any procedural due process violation associatedwithdisciplinary proceedings,

as discussed above. Absent the element of a requisite liberty or property interest

deprivation, a plaintiff cannot state an actionable claim under Section 1983 that defendants

conspired to deprive him of civil rights. Woodrum v. Woodward County, Okl., 866 F.2d 1121,

1126-27 (9th Cir. 1989) (a "conspiracy allegation, even if established, does not give rise to

liability under section 1983 unless there is an actual deprivation of civil rights"). It is

insufficient to plead or prove one without the other. Id.; see also Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d

1392, 1395 (9th Cir.1984); Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990)

(the "essence of a § 1983 claim is the deprivation of the right rather than the conspiracy").

The fate of Deadmon's conspiracy allegations thus follows the fate of his Due Process

claims. As the court adopts the R&R recommendation the Due Process claims be

dismissed, but rejects granting leave to amend the pleading a third time to attempt to state

a cognizable violation, necessarily any claim of conspiracy to violate Due Process rights

must also be dismissed. Accordingly, Defendants' objections to the survival of any portion

of a conspiracy claim suggested by the FAC allegations are SUSTAINED, and the portion

of the R&R recommending a Section 1983 conspiracy claim that survives Rule 12(b)(6)

review be read into the FAC is REJECTED. 

\\

\\

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22

 Although the FAC supersedes Deadmon's original Complaint, the court judicially notices

in the prior pleading of his Second cause of action, he described his "suffering" exclusively in terms

of emotional distress: "The actions of Defendants have caused and continues [sic] to cause plaintiff

suffering" (Compl. ¶ 115); "The actions of Defendants . . . have caused and continues [sic] to cause

plaintiff mental and emotional stress, strain and duress" (Compl. ¶ 116). 

23

 Under a heading in his Opposition purporting to address Defendants' Motion arguments

for dismissal of his emotional distress claim, Deadmon relies on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

482 (1994), among other distinguishable cases, for inapposite argument that does not address the

pleading inadequacy of his second cause of action for emotional distress at all. Opp. pp. 6-7. 

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E. Emotional Distress Cause Of Action

"Emotional distress" standing alone is not a cognizable prisoner civil rights cause of

action. "No federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627

(9th Cir. 2002). No inference of any physical harm associated with Deadmon's Ad Seg

confinement can be drawn from the allegations as originally pled in the Complaint or as pled

in the FAC. His only allusion to any physical consequence summarily states: "The actions

of the defendants caused plaintiff[] mental, emotional, and physical suffering." FAC ¶ 103.

His only other reference to "suffering" alleges a consequence of "mental, emotional, and

psychological suffering."22 FAC ¶ 98 (emphasis added). He does not refute Defendants'

legal proposition the statement of a viable emotional distress cause of action must entail a

showing of physical injury, nor do his allegations suggest he could amend the FAC to cure

that pleading deficiency.23 Rather, he appears to be seeking emotional distress damages

associated with his Due Process violation allegations, despite his identification of Emotional

Distress as a separate cause of action. The court ADOPTS the R&R recommendation

Defendants' Motion to dismiss this claim be GRANTED, but modifies the R&R to deny

Deadmon leave to amend to attempt to restate it. See Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964. 

F. Leave To Amend Denied

A pro se litigant is entitled to receive notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and

an opportunity to amend before dismissal with prejudice is appropriate, unless the

deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th

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Cir. 2000) (en banc). In the Order associated with the sua sponte screening required under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, this court granted Deadmon's motion to proceed in

forma pauperis but dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim. That Order provided

him with notice of the specific pleading deficiencies associated with his attempted statement

of Fourteenth Amendment due process claims and granted him leave to amend. Dkt No. 3.

In particular, the Order provided him with the following explanation:

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff's Complaint

fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a

claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct

deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity

protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

[Citations omitted.] 

Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated

when prison officials failed to properly process his administrative

grievances. . . The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that: "[n]o state shall . . . deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "The requirements of procedural

due process apply to the deprivation of interests encompassed

by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and

property." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).

State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty

or property interests sufficient to invoke due process protection.

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Thus, to state

a procedural due process claim Plaintiff must allege: "(1) a

liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a

deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of

process." Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citingPortman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th

Cir. 1993)).

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the procedural

adequacy of CDC inmate grievance procedures, his Complaint

fails to state a due process claim. [Citation omitted.] This is

because the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no

protected property interest in an inmate grievance

procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause.

See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding

that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

creates "no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance

procedure"). . . .

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to

show that any named prison official deprived him of a protected

liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison

grievances in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can

arise from state law or prison regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S.

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at 223-27, due process protections are implicated only if Plaintiff

alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom

in a manner not expected from his sentence, and (2) "impose[d]

atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 484 (1995); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th

Cir. 1997). Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest how the

allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate

grievances and his sentence to "ad seg" amounted to a

restraint on his freedom not contemplated by his original

sentence or how they resulted in "atypical" and "significant

hardship." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.

Dkt No. 3, 5:5-6:14 (emphasis added).

 Deadmon accordingly filed his FAC with benefit of the required deficiencies notice.

The court finds his FAC fails to cure the pleading defects, and he still fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. In consideration of the two pleadings Deadmon has

already filed and the facts already before the court, the court finds further leave to amend

would be futile. DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The R&R recommendation all claims against Defendants in their official

capacity be dismissed with prejudice is ADOPTED.

2. The R&R recommendation defendant Grannis and claims against her

associated with the administrative grievance procedure be dismissed with prejudice is

ADOPTED.

3. The R&R recommendation Plaintiff's emotional distress cause of action be

dismissed is ADOPTED.

4. The R&R recommendation Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process

claims be dismissed is ADOPTED, on modified reasoning, but the recommendation leave

to amend those claims be granted is REJECTED.

5. Defendants' Objections to the R&R recommendation any conspiracy to violate

constitutional rights claim that may be inferred from the FAC allegations be denied in part

are SUSTAINED. Any potential conspiracy claim is DISMISSED in its entirety. 

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6. The R&R recommendation that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his

complaint for a third try to state a cognizable Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment due

process claim is REJECTED.

7. The Motion To Dismiss is GRANTED, and this case is terminated in its entirety

as to all claims and all parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 29, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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