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Nature of Suit Code: 740
Nature of Suit: Railway Labor Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 2002 Decided July 19, 2002

No. 01-7068

General Committee of Adjustment, GO-386, et al.,

Appellees

v.

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway

Company, et al.,

Appellants

Consolidated with

01-7069

---------

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00043)

(No. 99cv03117)

Ralph J. Moore, Jr. argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Donald J. Munro.

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Mark W. Pennak, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for amicus curiae United States of America, urging reversal. With him on the brief was William G.

Kanter, Deputy Director, U.S. Department of Justice.

Robert J. DeLucia and Harry A. Rissetto were on the brief

for amicus curiae Airline Industrial Relations Conference,

urging reversal.

John O'B. Clarke, Jr. argued the cause for appellees General Committees of Adjustment.

Clinton J. Miller III argued the cause for appellee United

Transportation Union.

Jeffrey A. Bartos was on the brief for amici curiae Transportation Communications International Union and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, urging affirmance. Joseph

Guerrieri, Jr. entered an appearance.

Before: Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from summary

judgments entered in two separate actions consolidated by

the District Court. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe R.R.

Co. v. United Transp. Union, 141 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C.

2001). In District Court case No. 99-cv-3117, the Burlington

Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co., et al. (collectively

"BNSF" or "the carriers") sued the United Transportation

Union and the International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (collectively "UTU") seeking an injunction ordering

the unions and subdivisions thereof to bargain with each

plaintiff railroad on a craft-wide basis with respect to issues

in the current round of bargaining. In District Court case

No. 00-cv-0043, three "general committees of adjustment" of

the UTU sued BNSF, et al., seeking a declaratory judgment

of the right of the committees to decline to participate in

multi-employer bargaining along with further declarations on

related points. Each litigating side moved for summary

judgments in both cases. The District Court entered sumUSCA Case #01-7069 Document #690734 Filed: 07/19/2002 Page 2 of 7
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mary judgment in favor of the UTU and against the carriers

in both cases, ordering entry of final judgment against the

carriers and, in an amended judgment, declaring that "general committees are the parties with whom the defendant

[BNSF] must bargain." Because the District Court's application of law departed from binding Circuit precedent, specifically Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast

Line Railroad, 383 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967), we vacate the

judgments below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

Negotiations between carriers and their employees are

governed by provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.

ss 151-188 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("RLA" or "the Act").

Negotiations between them in the current controversy are

part of a national "movement" in the railroad industry for

changes in wages and other conditions of employment. Under the RLA, each party in collective bargaining is to designate a representative. 45 U.S.C. s 152 Third. The UTU is

the designated representative of the crafts of conductors,

trainmen, and firemen on each of the nation's major railroads,

including BNSF. The UTU, by its constitution, includes

within its organizational structure "committees of adjustment" authorized by the union constitution to deal with

grievances. The chairs or in some cases other representatives of local committees of adjustment are collected into

"General Committees of Adjustment," which operate above

the local level and "have authority to make and interpret

agreements with representatives of transportation companies

covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions," UTU

Const. art. 85. Eleven such General Committees represent

BNSF employees. The three General Committees that are

parties to this litigation announced their election to opt out of

"national handling" of negotiations with all carriers and

sought instead to "bargain locally" with BNSF.

BNSF insisted on national handling and refused to bargain

separately with the General Committees. BNSF sued the

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union, seeking a declaratory judgment and compulsion of the

union to bargain with it on a national level. The General

Committees sued BNSF, seeking declaratory judgment and

compulsion of the carrier to bargain with them separately.

The District Court ordered the cases consolidated. The

parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District

Court ruled in favor of the General Committees and against

the carrier in both cases and entered judgment against

BNSF. 141 F. Supp. 2d at 60. BNSF appealed.

II. Analysis

Although both parties submitted complex briefs and arguments in the District Court and before us, the issue is a

relatively straightforward one: when and under what circumstances may a carrier or union under the RLA compel an

opposing party to bargain on a national or local level, as

chosen by the party seeking to compel the negotiations?

Negotiations under the RLA historically have included both

national and local negotiation. See, e.g., American Railway

and Airway Supervisors Ass'n v. Soo Line R.R., 891 F.2d 675

(8th Cir. 1989); Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad, 383 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Alton

and Southern Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance

Way Employees, 928 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 96-7104 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 1997). At

various times and under various circumstances, unions and

carriers have attempted to impose one method or the other

on each other. See, e.g., Soo Line, 891 F.2d at 677-78 (union

seeking to require national bargaining); Atlantic Coastline,

383 F.2d at 228 (carrier seeking to impose national handling);

Alton and Southern, 928 F. Supp. at 20 (carrier seeking to

impose "bargain[ing] on a multi-employer basis").

The District Court viewed the issue as involving "[t]he

relationship between sections 2 First and Third" of the RLA.

141 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (citing 45 U.S.C. s 152 First and

Third). Section 2 First makes it "the duty of all carriers ...

to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements ... to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the

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operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between

the carrier and the employees thereof." Section 2 Third

declares the right of representation and states that "[r]epresentatives, for the purposes of this chapter, shall be designated by the respective parties without interference, influence,

or coercion by either party over the designation of representatives of the other...." Because Atlantic Coastline had not

addressed the question of bargaining methodology in terms of

Section 2 Third, and because the District Court saw that

subsection as governing the issue before it, the court concluded that Atlantic Coastline did not govern the issue. It

therefore deemed the issue to be an open one in this Circuit,

and ruled that the railroads were attempting to interfere with

the selection of a bargaining representative by the employees.

141 F. Supp. 2d at 53. It further ruled that the General

Committees were the designated representatives of the employees for Section 2 purposes and entered judgment in favor

of the Committees. Id. at 58. The railroads, arguing that

the union itself, not the Committees, was the certified representative of the employees, appealed.

Upon review, we conclude that Section 2 Third is not the

governing provision. While the railroad is correct that the

employees have designated the union as their representative,

we further do not conclude that this fact by itself resolves this

dispute. The union, by its constitution, does contemplate

bargaining by the General Committees. Arguably, the contents of that constitution change nothing, but the relevance

and weight of that particular fact is not yet ripe for decision.

The issue before us, however, is the scope of bargaining--that

is, whether it is locally or nationally handled--not the related

but distinct question of designation of the bargaining representative. Thus, our decision in Atlantic Coastline provided

governing precedent on the question before the District

Court. Under Atlantic Coastline, the propriety of imposing

national or local handling of bargaining issues is to be determined by "an issue-by-issue evaluation of the practical appropriateness of mass bargaining on that point and of the

historical experience in handling any similar national movements." Atlantic Coastline, 383 F.2d at 229. As the District

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Court in this case correctly understood, Atlantic Coastline

has been interpreted "to mean that the court should make an

objective assessment of the parties' past bargaining practices." 141 F. Supp. 2d at 56. This was the interpretation

applied in Alton and Southern, and, in our view, it is the

correct one. The District Court in the present case departed

from that test by applying a subjective good faith test arguably consistent with the Eighth Circuit's treatment of the

issue in Soo Line, because it saw Section 2 Third as potentially inconsistent with a result applying Section 2 First under

Atlantic Coastline. But the recognition of designated representatives and the prohibition against interference with that

designation under Section 2 Third do not control. Rather,

the issue is the scope of bargaining (national or local). Atlantic Coastline, while relatively old, remains the law of this

Circuit and "binds us, unless and until overturned by the

court en banc or by Higher Authority." Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43, 54 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, J., concurring). Therefore,

rather than basing its determination on the subjective good

faith of one of the parties, the District Court should have

employed the test of Atlantic Coastline and reviewed objectively the bargaining history of the parties. Only after

application of the Atlantic Coastline test should the court

have determined whether there was no genuine issue of

material fact, such that summary judgment was appropriate.

As a result, we hold that the District Court improvidently

applied a subjective test inconsistent with Circuit law.

Because the District Court decided this case on summary

judgment we review de novo the issues before the District

Court, and determine whether there is any genuine issue of

material fact. See, e.g., Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots

Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This review

naturally entails our determining whether the District Court

correctly identified and applied the governing law. Because

the District Court did not apply the test under Atlantic

Coastline, we hold that it did not properly apply the governing law. We therefore vacate the judgment below and remand the matter to the District Court. While theoretically

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we could determine de novo the question of the existence of

genuine issues of material fact, in this case remand is appropriate rather than de novo determination, because the parties

may make further submissions conforming to the Atlantic

Coastline test. Cf. Summers v. Department of Justice, 140

F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declining to decide de novo

summary judgment issues in a FOIA case involving extensive

record review). On remand, we would remind the parties

that in actions for declaratory judgment invoking the RLA,

jurisdiction of the court is limited by general declaratory

judgment law, and that a dispute appropriate for resolution

under the declaratory judgment act "must not be nebulous or

contingent, but must have taken on fixed and final shape."

Atlas Air, 232 F.3d at 227 (quoting Danville Tobacco Ass'n v.

Freeman, 351 F.2d 832, 833-34 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).

Conclusion

The judgment below is vacated and the case remanded to

the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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