Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-05421/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-05421-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LOUIS VUITTON MALLETIER, S.A., et 

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GLAMORA BY SADIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-05421-BLF 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AND 

DISSOLVING TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

[Re: ECF 76, 82]

Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction freezing Defendants’ assets pending a 

determination of liability and damages in this case. The Court has considered the briefing, the 

applicable legal authorities, and the oral argument presented at the hearing on November 12, 2015. 

For the reasons discussed below, the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED and the 

temporary restraining order issued on October 26, 2015 is DISSOLVED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A., Celine, S.A., and Christian Dior, S.A. are French 

fashion companies that manufacture and distribute luxury goods such as apparel, handbags, and 

other accessories. Plaintiffs filed this action on December 12, 2014, alleging that Defendant Sadia 

Barrameda (“Barrameda”), individually and doing business as Glamora By Sadia (“Glamora”), 

sells counterfeit purses and other goods that are represented to be manufactured by Plaintiffs. 

Compl., ECF 1. The complaint alleged federal trademark and copyright claims and related state

law claims. Id. 

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In conjunction with filing the complaint, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application seeking: 

(1) a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining Barrameda and Glamora from infringing or 

diluting Plaintiffs’ trademarks and copyrights; (2) a seizure order for the impound of all 

unauthorized merchandise or packaging bearing Plaintiffs’ trademarks or copyrights, the means 

for making same, and records regarding such merchandise; (3) a TRO freezing the assets of 

Barrameda and Glamora; (4) an order to show cause (“OSC”) why a preliminary injunction should 

not issue extending any TRO throughout the pendency of this lawsuit; and (5) expedited 

discovery. Pls.’ Ex Parte Applic., ECF 5. On December 16, 2014, the Honorable Samuel Conti, 

then assigned to the case, granted all relief requested by Plaintiffs except the asset freeze. Order 

Granting Ex Parte Motions, ECF 17. Judge Conti concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to present 

facts showing a likelihood of dissipation of assets, noting among other things that Barrameda’s 

Filipino heritage did not automatically make her likely to flee the country and that she almost 

certainly had some assets in California that would be difficult to hide or dissipate. Id. 

Pursuant to Judge Conti’s seizure order, numerous handbags, wallets, and accessories 

bearing counterfeits of Plaintiffs’ trademarks and designs were seized from Glamora. Revised 

Keats Decl. ¶ 6, ECF 88-1; Barrameda Decl. ¶ 9, ECF 84-6.1 The Glamora store closed its doors 

in December 2014 shortly after the seizure. Barrameda Decl. ¶ 9. 

In January 2015, the parties stipulated to entry of a preliminary injunction enjoining 

Barrameda and Glamora from infringing or diluting Plaintiffs’ trademarks and copyrights. 

Stipulation, ECF 22. Judge Conti issued an order approving that stipulation on January 9, 2015. 

Order Re Stipulation Re Preliminary Injunction and Expedited Discovery, ECF 23. 

On March 24, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”), adding 

Defendant New Compendium Corporation (“NCC”), a corporation allegedly wholly owned and 

controlled by Barrameda, used to pay expenses of Barrameda and Glamora, and used to facilitate 

the sales of counterfeit goods. FAC, ECF 35. 

On October 26, 2015, Plaintiffs again sought a TRO freezing Defendants’ assets and an 

 

1 Barrameda’s declaration has been sealed in part. This order makes specific references only to 

the unsealed portions of the declaration.

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OSC re preliminary injunction. Pls.’ Ex Parte Applic., ECF 62. Based upon Plaintiffs’ showing in 

that application, Judge Conti issued the requested TRO and OSC without notice to Defendants. 

TRO Freezing Defendants’ Real Property and Financial Accounts and Assets and OSC Re: 

Preliminary Injunction, ECF 76. A few days later, the case was transferred to the undersigned 

judge. Order Reassigning Case, ECF 78. 

This Court extended the TRO issued by Judge Conti for an additional fourteen days and set

a hearing on the OSC re preliminary injunction for November 12, 2015. Order Extending TRO 

and Setting Hearing on OSC re Preliminary Injunction, ECF 82. The Court also approved the 

parties’ stipulation to modify the TRO to permit Barrameda to expend funds sufficient to pay 

ordinary monthly living expenses and to permit NCC to expend funds sufficient to pay ordinary 

monthly business expenses. Stipulation and Order to Modify TRO, ECF 81. 

Some irregularities occurred during the briefing of this matter. First, although the Court 

ordered that opposition to Plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief be filed on or before 

November 4, 2015, NCC did not file opposition until November 6, 2015.

2

 The Court has been 

informed that NCC contacted Court staff on November 4, 2015 about a technical problem

regarding upload of NCC’s opposition, but the problem was not resolved until November 6, 2015. 

Plaintiffs have not objected to NCC’s late filing. The Court in the exercise of its discretion has 

considered NCC’s late-filed opposition.

Second, on November 10, 2015, Plaintiffs filed both a reply brief and a Notice of Errata

purporting to correct “ministerial” errors in the TRO application that was filed on October 26, 

2015. Pls.’ Notice of Errata, ECF 88-89. The Notice of Errata is accompanied by revised versions 

of the TRO application, supporting declaration, and exhibits. On November 11, 2015, Defendants 

filed an objection to the Notice of Errata, pointing out that the revisions to the TRO application 

encompass not only clerical corrections but also substantive additions to the supporting 

declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel and a new exhibit that was not included in Plaintiffs’ original 

 

2 Barrameda and Glamora submitted their opposition on November 4, 2015 in conjunction with an 

administrative motion to seal portions of the opposition brief and supporting declaration of 

Barrameda. Glamora and Barrameda Opp., ECF 84. The sealing motion and a related motion to 

remove inadvertently filed documents have been granted in separately filed orders.

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filing. Defs.’ Objection to Plaintiffs’ Notice of Errata, ECF 93. Defendants also filed an objection 

to evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in support of the reply. Defs.’ Objection to Plaintiffs’ Reply 

Evidence, ECF 92. Those objections are addressed below in section III.A.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary 

remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” 

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. When making a showing of 

irreparable harm, “[a] party seeking an asset freeze must show a likelihood of dissipation of the 

claimed assets, or other inability to recover monetary damages, if relief is not granted.” Johnson v 

Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 III. DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Objections

Both sides have made a number of evidentiary objections, addressed as follows. 

1. Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

a. Objections Raised in Opposition

The opposition filed by Barrameda and Glamora contains several objections which, 

unfortunately, are not called out as such but rather are tossed into the argument almost in passing. 

See Defs.’ Opp. at 3, 10, ECF 84-5. The objections refer only to Plaintiffs’ moving brief, not to 

any documentary evidence that Plaintiffs have submitted to the Court. Id. Defendants appear to

be under the mistaken impression that the Court will scour the referenced portions of Plaintiffs’ 

brief to determine what evidence is cited therein that Defendants might find objectionable. The 

objections are OVERRULED. See Gunther v. Xerox Corp., No. 13-cv-04596-HSG, 2015 WL 

5769619, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2015) (overruling objections to opposing party’s “brief as 

opposed to the specific evidence”).

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b. Objections to Reply Evidence

Defendants do raise specific objections to Plaintiffs’ reply evidence, which are 

SUSTAINED. See Defs.’ Objections to Plaintiffs’ Reply Evidence, ECF 92. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

states in his reply declaration that Exhibit 2 comprises notebook pages in Barrameda’s 

handwriting but he provides no foundation for that statement. See Keats Reply Decl. ¶ 5 and Exh. 

2, ECF 91. Counsel’s statement that Defendants’ insurance policy does not cover trademark 

infringement claims is a legal conclusion. See Keats Reply Decl. ¶ 7, ECF 91. 

c. Objections to Notice of Errata

Plaintiffs’ Notice of Errata was submitted on Tuesday, November 10, 2015. Because the 

following day, November 11, was a holiday, the Court did not receive courtesy copies of the 

revised documents (comprising more than 600 pages) prior to the hearing on November 12, 2015. 

Thus it has taken the Court several days after the hearing to become familiar with the relevant 

evidence, which is contrary to the Court’s practice of preparing fully before oral argument. 

Plaintiffs’ conduct placed Defendants at a significant disadvantage by depriving Defendants of an 

opportunity to respond substantively to Plaintiffs’ submission. At the hearing, the Court offered 

Defendants additional time to review the documents, but conditioned that offer on an agreement to 

extend the TRO beyond the statutory limit. Defendants declined.

Given these circumstances, the Court ordinarily would be inclined to strike the Notice of 

Errata in its entirety. In this instance, however, the Notice of Errata primarily corrects the 

mistaken identification of previously submitted documents. Insofar as those documents are wellknown to Defendants and, in fact, derive from their records, there is no real prejudice. As to the 

newly submitted evidence, it is stricken. Accordingly, Defendants’ general objection to the Notice 

of Errata is SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART. In light of that ruling, 

Defendants’ specific objections to new material submitted with the Notice of Errata – in particular 

new paragraph 9 of counsel’s revised declaration and new Exhibit 32 – are moot.

2. Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary Objections

In their reply, Plaintiffs assert numerous objections to portions of Defendants’ opposition 

brief. See Pls.’ Reply at 12-14, ECF 90. Plaintiffs do not identify the evidence to which they 

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object. The Court will not scour Defendants’ brief to discover what evidence is cited therein that 

Plaintiffs may find objectionable. The objections are OVERRULED. See Gunther v. Xerox 

Corp., No. 13-cv-04596-HSG, 2015 WL 5769619, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2015) (overruling 

objections to opposing party’s “brief as opposed to the specific evidence”).

Plaintiffs do identify one piece of evidence to which they object – Exhibit 2 to 

Barrameda’s declaration. That document is represented to be “Glamora’s sales summary.” 

Barrameda Decl. ¶ 10. As Plaintiffs point out, however, the document is hearsay and Barrameda 

does not indicate that it was prepared in the ordinary course of business so as to fall within the 

business records exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay); Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) 

(defining business records exception). A district court may give even hearsay statements some 

weight in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction when doing so would serve the 

purpose of preventing irreparable harm. See Johnson, 572 F.3d at 1083. Barrameda has not 

demonstrated that consideration of the hearsay “Glamora sales summary” is necessary to prevent 

irreparable harm here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ objection to Exhibit 2 to Barrameda’s declaration 

is SUSTAINED.

B. Analysis

Having disposed of the above procedural issues, the Court turns to the substance of 

Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The standard for issuing a preliminary injunction 

is the same as the standard for issuing a temporary restraining order. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales 

Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001); Rovio Entm’t Ltd. v. 

Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Judge Conti determined 

that Plaintiffs were entitled to an asset freeze under that standard when he issued the TRO. 

However, Defendants had not yet had an opportunity to submit argument or evidence. This Court 

must determine whether a preliminary injunction is warranted based upon the fuller record now 

before it. 

As an initial matter the Court notes that “Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

governs the procedure for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: the authority for the 

injunction . . . must arise (if at all) elsewhere.” Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 

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F.2d 552, 558 (9th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court has held that a preliminary injunction may not 

issue to prevent the dissipation of assets pending an adjudication of a claim for legal damages. 

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999). The 

Supreme Court’s ruling was grounded in “the historical principle that before judgment (or its 

equivalent) an unsecured creditor has no rights at law or in equity in the property of his debtor.” 

Id. at 330. “However, by its very terms, the holding of Grupo Mexicano is limited to cases in 

which only monetary damages are sought.” Johnson, 572 F.3d at 1083. The holding does not bar 

the issuance of an asset freeze when the plaintiff seeks both legal and equitable remedies. 

Takaguchi v. MRI Int’l, Inc., 611 Fed. Appx. 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2015).

The Ninth Circuit has held that where, as here, a plaintiff brings trademark claims under 

the Lanham Act, the district court has “inherent equitable power to issue provisional remedies 

ancillary to its authority to provide final equitable relief” under the Act. Reebok, 970 F.2d at 559. 

Under the Lanham Act, a district court has authority to grant the plaintiff an accounting of the 

defendant’s profits as a form of final equitable relief. Id. Thus in Reebok the Ninth Circuit held 

that the district court had acted within its discretion in issuing an asset freeze that “was designed to 

preserve the possibility of an effective accounting of [the defendant’s] profits and the return of 

profits fraudulently obtained.” Id. at 560. 

Under Reebok, this Court clearly has authority to freeze Defendants’ assets to the extent 

necessary to preserve the possibility of an effective accounting of Defendants’ profits from the 

alleged Lanham Act violations and the return of profits fraudulently obtained. Having satisfied 

itself that it has the authority to issue a preliminary injunction under Rule 65, the Court must 

evaluate whether Plaintiffs have established an entitlement to that extraordinary remedy under the 

Winters factors.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court has no difficulty in concluding that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of 

success on the merits of their Lanham Act claims against Barrameda and Glamora. Judge Conti’s 

first TRO order, enjoining Barrameda and Glamora from infringing or diluting Plaintiffs’ 

trademarks and copyrights, describes investigators’ purchases of counterfeit merchandise at 

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Barrameda’s store, Glamora, on several occasions. Order Granting Ex Parte Motions, ECF 17. 

Plaintiffs’ investigation and purchase of counterfeit merchandise also is described in the 

declaration of John Maltbie, Director of Intellectual Property, Civil Enforcement, for Louis 

Vuitton North America, Inc., which was submitted to Judge Conti at the time Plaintiffs initially 

sought a TRO. See Maltbie Decl. ¶¶ 12-51, ECF 8. Pursuant to Judge Conti’s seizure order, 

numerous handbags, wallets, and accessories bearing counterfeits of Plaintiffs’ trademarks and 

designs were seized from Glamora. Revised Keats Decl. ¶ 6, ECF 88-1. In addition, shop bags, 

cloth dust covers, and care instructions and authentication cards bore counterfeits of Plaintiffs’ 

marks. Id.

Plaintiffs’ showing of likelihood of success is less compelling with respect to NCC, which 

was not a defendant at the time Judge Conti issued the first TRO in this action. Plaintiffs added 

NCC when they filed the FAC in March 2015, alleging that “Barrameda has been the sole officer, 

director and stockholder of NCC since 2007, and exercises control thereof, and has used funds 

originating from NCC’s accounts to pay Defendant Glamora and Defendant Barrameda’s expenses 

and to facilitate Defendant Glamora and Defendant Barrameda’s infringing activities complained 

of herein.” FAC ¶ 11, ECF 35. Plaintiffs thus appear to be asserting liability against NCC under 

an alter ego theory, although the FAC does not actually use the phrase “alter ego.” 

Much of Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding alter ego is inadequate or inadmissible. For 

example, Plaintiffs’ counsel states in paragraph 8 of his revised declaration that that NCC 

“allegedly made loans to Glamora, though it simply was Barrameda acting in alter ego.” Revised 

Keats Decl. ¶ 8, ECF 88-1. Paragraph 8 does not provide any factual basis for the legal conclusion 

that NCC is Barrameda’s alter ego. Paragraph 9 of counsel’s revised declaration contains several 

assertions regarding NCC’s role as “the main company among the various companies,” and “the 

primary source of money” for Barrameda and Glamora, and purports to support those statements 

with a cash flow chart spanning several pages and a lengthy exhibit constituting photocopies of 

cancelled checks. See Revised Keats Decl. ¶ 9 and Exh. 32. As discussed in section III.A. above, 

the Court has sustained Defendants’ evidentiary objections to paragraph 9 and the exhibit in 

question. Plaintiffs do present evidence that Barrameda withdrew $991,640.69 in cash from an 

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NCC account and that shortly thereafter she paid almost that exact amount of cash for her home. 

See Revised Keats Decl. ¶ 12 and Exhs. 4-5. That evidence does give rise to an inference that 

Barrameda uses NCC as her personal piggy bank. Thus although Plaintiffs’ evidence of alter ego 

is not robust, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown some likelihood of success on the 

merits against NCC on an alter ego theory of liability.

2. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm 

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction freezing Defendants’ assets, Plaintiffs “must 

show a likelihood of dissipation of the claimed assets, or other inability to recover monetary 

damages, if relief is not granted.” Johnson, 572 F.3d at 1085. The Ninth Circuit has taken pains 

to make clear that a possibility of dissipation will not suffice – a showing of likelihood of 

dissipation is required. Id. at 1085 n.11. 

Plaintiffs have not made such a showing here. Plaintiffs point to the fact that Barrameda 

placed her home on the market for $1,200,0003after the start of this litigation. See Revised Keats 

Decl. ¶ 16 and Exh. 9. The timing of Barrameda’s decision to list her home is somewhat 

suspicious. However, there is no evidence that Barrameda made any attempt to conceal the listing 

of her home or that she intended to hide the sale proceeds. Barrameda states in her declaration 

that she listed her home for sale because she wished to relocate to an area with better schooling 

options for her son. Barrameda Decl. ¶ 19, ECF 84-6. Plaintiffs speculate that Barrameda would 

move the proceeds from the sale of her home overseas. See Revised TRO Applic. at 12, ECF 88-

1. However, that speculation is without factual support.

Plaintiffs present evidence that Barrameda took out an equity loan on her home in the 

amount of $625,000 in March 2015. Revised Keats Decl. ¶ 14 and Exh. 7, ECF 88-1. Plaintiffs 

assert that they do not know where that money went and therefore that Barrameda has 

dramatically dissipated the value of her home. Barrameda acknowledges the home equity loan 

and states in her declaration that she loaned $575,000 of the loan proceeds to a public company in 

 

3 While Plaintiffs assert that the home was listed for “$1,200,000,” the evidence indicates that it 

was listed for $1,299,700, almost $100,000 more than the figure Plaintiffs use in their briefing. 

See Revised Keats Decl. Exh. 9.

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which she holds shares, in exchange for a promissory note. Barrameda Decl. ¶ 20, ECF 84-6. 

Plaintiffs assert that in making that loan Barrameda put the $575,000 in question out of their 

reach. The Court finds that the loan could be viewed as evidence of possible dissipation of assets 

insofar as the ready ability to liquidate the equity is impaired.

Plaintiffs assert that Barrameda has caused to be created “a British privately-held company 

in the name of New Compendium Corp., Ltd. obviously for the purpose of transferring and 

holding assets from her Colorado corporation of the same name.” See id. While Plaintiffs do 

present evidence that Barrameda incorporated a private limited company called New Compendium 

Corporation Ltd. in England on April 16, 2015, see Revised Keats Decl. ¶ 8, they present no 

evidence whatsoever to support a conclusion that Barrameda did so for the purpose of transferring 

NCC’s assets to the new company. Barrameda explains in her declaration that she formed New 

Compendium Corporation Ltd. in England to access trading on European markets. Barrameda 

Decl. ¶ 16, ECF 84-6. She declares that she has invested a total of $100 to form the entity, that it 

does not have any bank accounts or brokerage accounts, and that it is totally separate from NCC. 

Id. Barrameda states that after forming New Compendium Corporation Ltd. in England, she has 

continued to operate NCC as always, that she could not transfer NCC’s holdings to the 

English company without actually selling NCC’s assets for valid consideration, and that in fact 

many of NCC’s investments are restricted such that the shares may be sold only after the 

restrictions expire. Id. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to dispute Barrameda’s 

declaration statements on these points.

Plaintiffs contend that Barrameda “has also been transferring increments of $10,000 to 

China for the last several years thereby possibly bypassing bank reporting requirements.” Revised 

TRO Applic. at 12, ECF 88-1. In support of that contention, Plaintiffs cite to their counsel’s 

declaration statement that “beginning no later than October 2013, and continuing through the 

present, Defendant Barrameda has been withdrawing substantial funds from her NCC Account at 

Bank of America, often in the amount of $10,000, and was repeatedly sending those funds 

overseas, and in particular, China.” Revised Keats Decl. ¶ 13. However, the bank records relied 

upon by Plaintiffs’ counsel in making that assertion show that the last significant transfer to China 

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occurred on November 24, 2014, before this action was filed on December 12, 2014. Revised 

Keats Decl. ¶ 13 and Exh. 6. The proffered records show a single transfer to China, in the amount 

of $1,000, after the commencement of this action. Id. Barrameda explains in her declaration that 

while Glamora was open she purchased merchandise from China for resale at Glamora. 

Barrameda Decl. ¶ 6, ECF 84-6. As noted, Plaintiffs’ evidence shows only a single $1,000 

transaction following the closure of Glamora in December 2014.

Plaintiffs make much of the fact that Barrameda and NCC trade in penny stocks. 

Barrameda makes no secret of the fact that she considers her primary occupation to be stock 

trading. See Barrameda Decl. ¶ 13, ECF 84-6. She states that she has been investing in public 

companies for more than ten years, most of them traded on United States markets, and that her 

investments generate most of her income. Id. ¶¶ 13, 17. The Court is at a loss to understand how 

those trading activities would support a finding that Barrameda is likely to hide or dissipate assets. 

The Court notes that Judge Conti also was puzzled by this argument when it was presented to him. 

In denying Plaintiffs’ first request for an asset freeze, Judge Conti stated: “Nor does the Court 

understand why her ownership of penny stocks makes it easier for her to secret assets. Indeed, 

Plaintiffs found out about Ms. Barrameda’s stock holdings through a public SEC filing. 

Presumably, the public nature of her holdings will actually make it more difficult to hide those 

assets.” Order Granting Ex Parte Motions at 15, ECF 17 (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs also reference transactions in which an entity called Alpine Securities 

Corporation (“Alpine”) transferred more than $8,000,000 to NCC. See Revised Keats Decl. Exh. 

31. Plaintiffs do not explain the significance of those transactions. Barrameda explains in her 

declaration that Alpine is a registered securities brokerage and clearing firm that handles her 

trading, and that she has never had an ownership interest in Alpine. Barrameda Decl. ¶ 13, ECF 

84-6. 

After considering all of the admissible evidence, with particular attention to the evidence 

regarding Barrameda’s listing of her home and home equity loan, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiffs have not established a likelihood that Defendants will dissipate or hide assets absent the 

requested preliminary injunctive relief.

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3. Balance of Equities

As noted above, Barrameda’s primary source of income is stock trading. She states in her 

declaration that since issuance of the TRO freezing her assets, she has been prevented from 

making profitable stock trades. Barrameda Decl. ¶ 26, ECF 84-6. Plaintiffs point out that the 

TRO has been modified to permit Barrameda and NCC to pay ordinary monthly expenses, but 

Plaintiffs do not dispute Barrameda’s statement regarding the impact of the asset freeze on her 

ability to trade stocks. An extension of the asset freeze clearly would have a significant adverse 

impact upon Barrameda. 

In contrast, because Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood that Defendants are likely to 

dissipate or hide assets, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will be harmed if the asset 

freeze is dissolved. Accordingly, the balance of equities tips sharply against issuance of the 

requested injunction.

4. Public Interest

The public interest factor is not particularly relevant here. Plaintiffs cite authorities for the 

proposition that in trademark cases the public has the right “not to be deceived or confused.” 

CytoSport, Inc. v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 

However, the present motion does not seek an injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing 

to sell counterfeit goods – that injunction already is in place. The issue before the Court at this 

time is whether Defendants’ assets should remain frozen throughout the litigation. Plaintiffs have 

not cited, and the Court has not discovered, any cases indicating that the public would have an 

interest in that determination. 

C. Conclusion

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the admissible evidence, and the relevant legal 

authorities, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate an entitlement to a 

preliminary injunction freezing Defendants’ assets. Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood that 

Defendants will dissipate or hide assets absent the requested relief, and the balance of hardships 

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tips sharply against the requested asset freeze.

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IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction freezing Defendants’ assets is 

DENIED; and

(2) The TRO issued on October 26, 2015 is DISSOLVED.

Dated: November 20, 2015 

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

 

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In light of the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs are not entitled to an asset freeze, the Court need 

not address the parties’ disputes regarding the amount of profits resulting from sales of counterfeit 

goods and whether an insurance policy held by Barrameda would provide adequate coverage if 

Defendants were found liable. Those issues would be relevant if the Court were inclined to grant 

an asset freeze and were attempting to determine the appropriate scope of such freeze. 

Case 5:14-cv-05421-BLF Document 97 Filed 11/20/15 Page 13 of 13