Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00365/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON NAVA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 13-CV-365-H-JMA

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

DR. JEFFREY BEARD, WARDEN

VALLEY STATE PRISON,

Respondent.

Petitioner Ramon Nava (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 7, 2013. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 5, 2013,

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 8 & 9.) Petitioner did not file an

opposition to the Respondent’s motion to dismiss. On October 23, 2013, the magistrate

judge filed a report and recommendation that the Court grant Respondent’s motion to

dismiss. (Doc. No. 11.) On November 11, 2013, the Court granted Petitioner a thirty

day extension to file an objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 

(Doc. No. 14.) On December 20, 2013, the Court granted Petitioner a second thirty day

extension to file an objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 

(Doc. No. 16.) On January 21, 2014, Petitioner filed his objection to the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation. (Doc. No. 17.) The Court adopts the report and

recommendation of the magistrate judge and grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

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Background

On July 24, 2006, a jury convicted Petitioner of eight counts of lewd acts upon

a child under 14 years of age. (Doc. No. 10-2, Clerk’s Transcript, at 2.) The jury found

that in each of the eight counts Petitioner had substantial sexual conduct with the

victim. (Id.) The San Diego Superior Court (“Superior Court”) sentenced Petitioner

to twelve years in prison. (Id.) On October 4, 2006, Petitioner appealed the

conviction. (Doc. Nos. 10-4, Appellant’s Opening Brief, 10-5 Appellant’s

Supplemental Opening Brief.) On April 23, 2008, the state appellate court affirmed the

judgment. (Doc. No. 10-6, Opinion.) On June 5, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for

review with the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 10-7, Petitioner for Review.) On

July 28, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (Doc. No.

10-8, Order Denying Petition.) The conviction became final on October 16, 2008. 

(See id.; see also Wixom v. Washington, 264, F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001))

On November 30, 2009, Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the Superior Court (“Superior Court”). (Doc. No. 10-9, Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus.) The petition challenged the length of Petitioner’s sentence under

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), and alleged ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. (Id. at 3-4.) On January 15, 2010, the Superior Court denied the petition. 

(Doc. No 10-10, Order Denying Petition.) The Superior Court rejected Petitioner’s

Cunningham claim citing In re Harris, 55 Cal. 4th 813, 825 (1993) and In re Waltreus,

62 Cal. 2d 218, 225 (1965), and rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim citing In re Martinez, 46 Cal. 4th 945, 950 n.1, 956 (2009). (Doc. No. 10-11,

Order Denying Petitioner, at 1-2.)

On September 14, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the California Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 10-11, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.) 

On October 7, 2010, the state appellate court denied the petition citing In re Clark, 5

Cal. 4th 750, 783 (1993) and In re Martinez, 46 Cal. 4th 945, 950 n.1, 956 (2009). 

Doc. No. 10-12, Order Denying Petition, at 1.) 

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On July 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 10-13, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.) On February

29, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment. (Doc.

No. 10-15, Order Denying Petition.)

On February 7, 2013, Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standard of Review

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects

to any portion of the report, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id. 

A federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2254(a);

accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Habeas corpus is an

“extraordinary remedy” available only to those “persons whom society has grievously

wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation.” Juan H. v.

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 633-34 (1993)). Because Petitioner filed this petition after April 24, 1996, the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs the

petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d

978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any

claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§

2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). Indeed,

“[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has

denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the

merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the

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contrary.” Id. Federal habeasrelief is available, but only if the result of a federal claim

the state court adjudicated on the merits is “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable

application” of United States Supreme Court precedent, or if the adjudication is “an

unreasonable determination” based on the facts and evidence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)

and 2254(d)(2).

A federal court may grant habeasrelief under the “contrary to” clause of Section

2254(d)(1) if a state court either “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in [the United States Supreme Court’s] cases” or “confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at

a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002);

see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06 (distinguishing the “contrary to” and the

“unreasonable application” standards). “[R]eview under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is

limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the

merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(1) if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from

[the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular

state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A federal court may also grant

habeas relief “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from

[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where itshould not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. The state

court’s “unreasonable application” of binding precedent must be objectively

unreasonable to the extent that the state court decision is more than merely incorrect

or erroneous. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citation omitted); see

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).

Additionally, even if a state court decision is contrary to United States Supreme

Court precedent or rests on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the

evidence, the petitioner must show that such error caused substantial or injurious

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prejudice. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637-38); see Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d

964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). AEDPA creates a highly deferential standard toward state

court rulings. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002); see Womack v. Del Papa,

497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a petitioner has one

year from the date his conviction is final to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The AEDPA

statute of limitations to bring a habeas action is subject to both statutory and equitable

tolling. See id.; Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).

II. Analysis

Respondent contends Petitioner’s petition is untimely because it was filed on

February 7, 2013, more than three years after the statute of limitations imposed by 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d) expired on October 17, 2009. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 1, 6.) Petitioner

contends that he was unable to file a habeas corpus petition in a timely manner due to

prison transfers, the loss of his legal documents, and the lack of a trial transcript. (Doc.

No. 1 at 14-18.)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), Petitioner had one year from the date his conviction

became final to file a petition for writ of habeas corpusin federal court unlessstatutory

or equitable tolling applied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). A jury convicted Petitioner on

July 24, 2006. (Doc. No. 10-1, Clerk’s Transcript, at 2.) On April 23, 2008, the state

appellate court affirmed the conviction. (Doc. No. 10-6, Opinion.) On July 18, 2008,

the California Supreme Court denied review. (Doc. No. 10-8, Order Denying Petition.) 

On October 16, 2008, ninety days later, Petitioner’s conviction became final. See

Wixom v. Washington, 264, F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). Absent any statutory or

equitable tolling, Petitioner had until October 16, 2009 to file his federal habeas corpus

petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001) (applying to AEDPA’s statute of limitations, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

6(a), which states “[i]n computing any period of time prescribed . . . by any applicable

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statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time

begins to run shall not be included” to AEDPA). Petitioner did not file his federal

habeas corpus petition until February 7, 2013. Accordingly, the petition is untimely

by more than three years unless Petitioner is entitled to sufficient statutory or equitable

tolling to make the petition timely.

A. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not

be counted toward any period of limitations under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). On November 30, 2009, Petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus

petition. (Doc. No. 10-9.) State habeas petitions filed after the statute of limitations

period ends do not revive a limitations period that had already ended before the state

petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit re-initiation of the limitations period that has

ended before the state petition was filed.”). Petitioner’s first state habeas corpus

petition wasfiled more than one month after the October 16, 2009 deadline. Therefore,

there is no statutory tolling ofthe limitations period because it expired before Petitioner

filed an application for collateral review. 

B. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s statute of limitationsis also subject to equitable tolling. Holland, 130

S. Ct. at 2560. “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show, ‘(1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way’ and prevented him from filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327,

336-37 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Equitable

tolling is unavailable in most cases, and “the threshold to trigger equitable tolling is

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

The inability to secure transcripts is generally not considered an extraordinary

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circumstance that would prevent a diligent petitioner from filing in a timely manner,

especially when the petitioner was present at the proceedings being challenged. See

Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining the failure of petitioner’s

attorney to provide him with legal documents was not an extraordinary circumstance

which caused his untimely filing because petitioner was aware of the factual basis of

his claims and therefore did not need the documents to file a timely habeas petition). 

Petitioner did not require the trial transcripts at issue to file a federal petition for writ

of habeas corpus because Petitioner had already raised his Cunningham claim in a

direct appeal of his conviction on October 4, 2006. (Doc. No. 10-4 at 8.) Additionally,

Petitioner was present at both his trials and able to observe his attorney’s performance. 

(Id.) Petitioner has been aware of the basis of his constitutional claims since 2006. 

Therefore, the lack of trial transcripts does not constitute an extraordinary impediment

to Petitioner’s ability to raise his constitutional claims within the AEDPA statute of

limitations period. See Ford, 590 F.3d at 790.

The lack of access to legal materials may be a sufficient basis upon which to

grant equitable tolling. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002). But

Petitioner did not attempt to locate legal documents and materials until a year after the

one-year statute of limitations under Section 2244(d) had already expired. (See Doc.

No. 1 at 110-16 (stating that Petitioner first sought legal materials on June 9, 2010).) 

“A pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (formatting omitted). Without more, Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that an impediment beyond his control prevented him from filing

a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

//

//

//

//

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Conclusion

Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus more than one year after the

limitations period expired and is therefore barred by the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Accordingly, the Court grants

Respondent’s motion to dismiss and dismisses Petitioner’s complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 14, 2014

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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