Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00209/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Andrew N. Milsap, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 06-0209 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

U-Haul Truck Rental Co; )

Republic Western Ins )

Co, )

)

Defendants. )

)

 _______________________ )

Currently there are three motions pending before the court:

(1) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by

defendant Republic Western Insurance Company ("Republic") (doc. 6);

or alternatively, a motion for a more definite statement pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e); (2) a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) by defendant UCase 2:06-cv-00209-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/20/06 Page 1 of 36
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1 This defendant was incorrectly named in the complaint as

"U-Haul Truck Rental Co."

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Haul Company of Arizona1

 ("U-Haul") (doc. 8); and (3) a "Motion to

Amend Pleadings" pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 by plaintiff pro se

Andrew N. Milsap (doc. 11). 

Only defendant U-Haul requests oral argument. Doc. 8. 

Finding oral argument unnecessary, the court denies this request.

Discussion

I. Request for Summary Disposition

Plaintiff Milsap did not file his response to Republic's March

20, 2006, motion to dismiss until May 8, 2006. Local Rule 7.2(c)

mandates that responsive memorandum be filed within ten days after

service of a motion. Even allowing plaintiff an additional three

days to respond to service by mail in accordance with Fed. R. Civ.

P. 6(e), clearly his May 8th response was not timely under LRCiv

7.2(c). 

Pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i) the court could, as Republic requests

(doc 13), deem plaintiff's failure to timely respond to its

dismissal motion as "consent to the . . . granting of" such relief. 

See LRCiv 7.2(i). Given plaintiff's pro se status, however, and

because Republic has not been prejudiced by this late filing, the

court denies Republic's request to summarily grant its motion to

dismiss. 

II. Motion to Amend

At the outset it is necessary to address plaintiff's motion to

amend because the outcome of this motion will determine whether the

dismissal motions by Republic and U-Haul should be deemed

Case 2:06-cv-00209-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/20/06 Page 2 of 36
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2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) defines "[p]leadings" exclusively as

"a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as

such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a crossclaim; a third party-complaint if a person who was not an original

party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party

answer, if a third-party complaint is served." 

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challenges to the original complaint or to the amended complaint. 

Rule 15(a) provides that a party has the right to amend its

"pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a

responsive pleading is served[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Once a

responsive pleading is served, however, Rule 15(a) provides that

"a party may amend [his] pleading only be leave of court or by

written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely

given when justice so requires." Id. Presuming that its motion to

dismiss is a responsive pleading, Republic contends that the court

should deny plaintiff Milsap's motion to amend because leave to

amend would be futile. U-Haul did not file a response to this

motion to amend. 

Republic's opposition is unavailing because it is based upon

an incorrect reading of Rule 15(a). Despite Republic's assumption

to the contrary, "a motion to dismiss is not a Rule 15(a)

'responsive pleading.'"2

 Paulson v. Carter, No. CV-04-1501-HU,

2005 WL 35856, at *4 (D.Or. January 6, 2005) (citing Shaver v.

Operating Eng'rs Local 428 Pension Trust Fund, 332 F.3d 1198, 1201

(9th Cir. 2003)) (emphasis added). Therefore, because "the filing

of a [motion to dismiss] before [an] answer [does not] terminate

the right to amend[,] . . . a motion for leave to amend (though

unnecessary) must be granted if filed." Knauss v. Bank of America,

No. CV 06-0952-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2640411, at *1 (D.Az. Sept. 11,

Case 2:06-cv-00209-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/20/06 Page 3 of 36
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3 Hereinafter, unless indicated to the contrary, "defendants"

shall be read as referring to U-Haul and Republic.

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2006) (quoting Breir v. N. Ca. Bowling Proprietors' Ass'n, 316 F.2d

787, 789 (9th Cir. 1963)). Given that defendants Republic and UHaul filed motions to dismiss rather than responsive pleadings,

plaintiff Milsap retained his right to amend his complaint once "as

a matter of course" pursuant to Rule 15(a). Under these

circumstances, the court grants plaintiff's motion to amend. See

Knutson v. Winco Foods, Inc., No. CV-02-1145-ST, 2002 WL 31972183,

at *1 (D.Or. Nov. 27, 2002) (although plaintiff retained the right

to amend her complaint without leave of court because no responsive

pleading had been filed, since she requested leave, the court

granted such relief). Granting plaintiff's motion to amend means

that his amended complaint becomes the "operative pleading" for

purposes of resolving the present motions to dismiss. See Paulson

v. Carter, No. CV-04-1501-HU, 2005 WL 35856, at *4 (D.Or. Jan. 6,

2005). 

An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and so

"in some instances the filing of an amended pleading moots a motion

to dismiss[.]" Robinson v. California, No. CIVS041888GEBDADPS, 2005

WL 1561524, at *1(E.D.Cal. June 29, 2005). The court declines to

find that the pending motions to dismiss are moot, however, because

for the most part "plaintiff's amended complaint does not cure the

deficiencies detailed in [those] motion[s]." Id. Moreover, given

the substantial similarity between the original and amended

complaints, requiring Republic and U-Haul3 to serve another set of

dismissal motions specifically directed at the amended complaint

Case 2:06-cv-00209-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/20/06 Page 4 of 36
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4 Plaintiff did not, as LR15.1(a)(1) requires, separately

"attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit" to his

motion to amend. Nor did he comply with Local Rule 15.1(2) requiring

him to lodge with the Clerk of the Court an original of his proposed

amended complaint. See LRCiv 15.1. Instead, plaintiff filed a

document entitled "Motion to Amend Pleadings," which basically

amounts to a proposed amended complaint. Given plaintiff's pro se

status, the court will this time overlook plaintiff's failure to

comply with the Local Rules; and it will deem his motion to amend to

be his proposed amended complaint. Accordingly, the facts recited

above are taken from that document.

5 For ease of reference, the court took the liberty of

numbering the pages in plaintiff's motion to amend.

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would be a waste of resources. Thus, the court will "consider"

the current "motion[s] to dismiss as directed at plaintiff's

amended complaint[,]" rather than at his original complaint. See

id. (footnote omitted) (citing Schwarzer, Tashima and Wagstaffe,

Federal Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 9:262 (The Rutter Group 2004)).

A. Amended Complaint4

In his amended complaint plaintiff alleges that on January 17,

2004, while "driving a rental U-Haul Truck[,]" defendant Albert

Valencia backed into plaintiff's vehicle. Doc. 11 at 2,5 ¶ 2. 

Allegedly the truck which Valencia was driving hit plaintiff's

vehicle "with such speed and force that the trailer hitch went

through the door of plaintiff['s] vehicle on the driver[']s side to

the inside." Id. Based on the foregoing, plaintiff alleges that

Mr. Valencia was "negligent, reckless, and careless[]" in several

ways." Id. at 2, ¶ 5; and at 3, ¶ 6. Plaintiff further alleges

that he sustained injuries to his left knee and back, which "were

caused solely by reason of" Valencia's negligence. Id. at 2, ¶ 4.

After the accident, plaintiff explicitly contends that U-Haul

"quickly contact[ed]" him about the accident. Id. at 3, ¶8. 

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Republic acknowledges however that it "is, in fact, the insurer

which dealt with" plaintiff. Doc. 6 at 2 n.2. Thus for purposes

of the present motions Republic is assuming, as is the court, "that

the allegations relating to actions alleged to have been taken by

the insurer . . . actually refer to Republic [as U-Haul's carrier]

. . . and not [to] 'U-Haul[.]'" Id. 

In any event, after being contacted by Republic, plaintiff

filed a "claim report," to which Republic responded by paying

plaintiff $4,400.00 for property damage to his vehicle. Doc. 11,

at 3, ¶ 8. At that time plaintiff asserts that he did not "feel

[that] he was hurt bad enough[] to need medical treatment[,]" so

"he . . . told the agent" that he "only had soreness of the back

and . . . on his left side." Id. But "two or three months" after

the accident plaintiff began "experiencing . . . mid to lower back

pain[,]" which he attributed to a prior work-related injury. Id.

at 3-4, ¶ 8. 

A few weeks later plaintiff developed problems with his left

knee. See id. It "would give out on him without warning and

[plaintiff] would fall down in pain, and [be] unable to stand." 

Id. In the ensuing months plaintiff went through a series of

diagnostic tests, culminating in a medical resonance image test

("MRI") in October 2005. The MRI revealed that plaintiff had "a

large tear in his ligaments on his left knee[,]" which did require

surgery. Id. at 4, ¶ 8. 

After his doctors advised plaintiff that "the type of injury

he had was usually the result of a car accident," he "attempted to

get [Republic] to re-open his claim and investigate it." Id. at 4,

¶ 9. Republic informed him that it would refer his claim to "agent

Case 2:06-cv-00209-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/20/06 Page 6 of 36
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6 Plaintiff's reference to section 12-542 in this context is

puzzling given that that statute sets forth a two year statute of

limitations for personal injury actions in Arizona. See A.R.S. § 12-

542. Thus, despite plaintiff's assertion to the contrary, on its

face that statute of limitations has nothing to do with "the laws

that govern ins[urance] co[mpanies] in . . . Arizona." Doc. 11 at ¶

10. 

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Joe Lascola" for investigation. Id. After several weeks passed

and he did not hear from Lascola, plaintiff called to "explain" his

injuries to Lascola, including the results of the MRI. Id. at 5, 

¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Lascola "became very bias[ed] and

ar[r]ogant and discriminatory[.]" Id. Plaintiff further alleges

that Mr. Lascola told him that Lascola was aware that plaintiff had

filed personal injury complaints in other courts. See id.

Supposedly Lascola then informed plaintiff that he did not think

this particular claim had any merit, and thus it did not warrant

any investigation. See id.

Among other things, plaintiff responded by telling Lascola

that "as an agent his job was to investigat[e] [plaintiff's]

claim[.]" Id. When Lascola retorted that it had "been to[o] long

since the accident," plaintiff told him that he intended to "seek

legal action." Id. Plaintiff contends that as a result of the

foregoing Lascola "deprive[d] . . . plaintiff of his right to have

his claim investigated in accordance [with] the laws that govern

ins[urance] co[mpanies] in . . . Arizona." Id. at 5-6, ¶ 10

(citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-5426). 

Next plaintiff expands upon his discrimination claims against

Mr. Lascola. More specifically, plaintiff alleges that he "is on

disability and indigent" and Lascola knew this from plaintiff's

file pertaining to the property damage claim, and that Lascola 

Case 2:06-cv-00209-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/20/06 Page 7 of 36
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"use[d] this and the fact that the plaintiff ha[s] [previously]

litigated" to "further discriminate against plaintiff[.]" Id. at 7,

¶14. Plaintiff concludes his allegations against Lascola by

averring that "when . . . Lascola refuse[d] to investigate . . .

plaintiff['s] claim," Lascola "[d]enied . . . plaintiff the . . .

rights and protection[s] that [are] guaranteed for [sic] all

cit[i]zen[s]." Id.

Plaintiff goes on to allege that "under 42 USC and [T]itle VII

of the American[s] with Disability Act of 1964[,] disable[d]

persons are to be treated equally as to any priv[i]le[]ges, laws,

polic[ies], and fairness as any other persons are." Id. In a

similar vein plaintiff alleges that Republic or Lascola or both

"deni[ed] [him] of a right to be treated the same as any other

client or person that[']s filing or has file[d] a claim[.]" Id. at

6, ¶ 13. Plaintiff further alleges that Republic or Lascola or

both have "violate[d] [his] rights to the same treatment,

priviledges [sic], and law, that[']s afforded all person[s]

according to Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann 12-542 for personal injury

claims." Id. 

Following these factual allegations, plaintiff's complaint

includes a muddled jurisdictional statement, which reads as

follows: "The plaintiff is bring[ing] his claim[s] under 42 USC &

Title VII of the American[s] With Disability Act of 1964, and the

Ariz Rev Stat. Ann 12-542 for personal injury claim and 

discrimination." Id. at 7. Plaintiff is seeking $800,000.00 for

damages "for the long suffering and pain and medical expenses"

which he has incurred "due to the neg[ligence] and actions

mention[ed] in []his complaint." Id. 

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III. Motions to Dismiss

As mentioned at the outset, both defendants are moving to

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). U-Haul, but not

Republic, is also moving to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

on the theory that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

"Customarily, a federal court first resolves doubt about its

jurisdiction over the subject matter," and so, too, will this

court. See Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578

(1999). The court will first address U-Haul's jurisdiction

argument because if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it

"must dismiss the complaint in its entirety." Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006) (citation omitted).

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

As defendants read the complaint, plaintiff is alleging

federal question jurisdiction based upon claimed violations of the

Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.

("ADA"), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e et seq. U-Haul contends that because plaintiff did not

allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies, this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his ADA and Title VII claims

because exhaustion is a "necessary condition[] precedent" to the

exercise of this court's jurisdiction over such claims. See Doc.

16 at 2-3. Plaintiff did not address this requirement. 

1. Rule 12(b)(1) Legal Standard

Fundamentally, federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375,

377 (1994). Thus, "[l]imits upon federal jurisdiction must not be

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disregarded or evaded." Association of Irritated Residents v. C &

R Vanderham Dairy, 435 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2006)

(citing Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374

(1978)). "A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be either facial, where the

inquiry is confined to the allegations in the complaint, or

factual, where the court is permitted to look beyond the complaint

to extrinsic evidence." Id. (citing, inter alia, Wolfe v.

Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)). Regardless of the

nature of the inquiry, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish

that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Id. (citing, inter

alia, Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377). 

"This burden, at the pleading stage, must be met by pleading

sufficient allegations to show a proper basis for the court to

assert subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Id. (citing

McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). "The pleading must show

'affirmatively and distinctly the existence of whatever is

essential to federal jurisdiction, and if [it] does not do so, the

court, on having the defect called to its attention or on

discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless the defect can

be corrected by amendment.'" Id. (quoting Tosco Corp. v.

Communities for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001))

(emphasis added). Where, as here, U-Haul "challenges jurisdiction

facially, all material allegations in the complaint are assumed

true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal

jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading itself." Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). 

. . .

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2. Exhaustion

Before considering U-Haul's exhaustion argument, it should be

noted that the ADA is a broad and remedial statute, applicable in

several different contexts. The ADA prohibits "discrimination

against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, among

them employment (Title I of the Act), public services (Title II),

and public accommodations (Title III)." PGA Tours, Inc. v. Martin,

532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001) (footnotes omitted). Additionally, "Title

IV of the ADA precludes retaliation against employees who seek to

enforce their statutory rights under the ADA." Head v. Glacier

Northwest Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1064 n.54 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted). When discussing plaintiff's putative ADA claims, U-Haul

did not uniformly distinguish between these various theories of

liability. That distinction is important though because not only

do the elements of proof differ somewhat depending upon the theory

of ADA liability, but exhaustion is not a jurisdictional

prerequisite for all types of ADA claims. 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I the ADA

"contain[] the identical requirements for filing an administrative

charge of discrimination[.]" See Sumner v. Sacred Heart Medical

Center, No. CV-04-0285-EFS, 2005 WL 2415969, at *2 (E.D.Wash. Sept.

30, 2005) (citations omitted). Under both statutes, "[a] plaintiff

exhausts h[is] administrative remedies by timely filing h[is]

charge with the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] or

the appropriate state agency[]" within the statutorily prescribed

time limits. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, where a plaintiff does

not timely file such a charge, the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to consider either his Title VII claims, Vasquez v.

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County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted) ("To establish subject matter jurisdiction over [a] Title

VII . . . claim, [a plaintiff] must exhaust] his administrative

remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC."); or his claims

brought pursuant to Title I of the ADA. Sumner, 2005 WL 2415969,

at *2 (citations omitted) ("[F]or a federal court to have subject

matter jurisdiction over [an] ADA [Title I] claim[], the plaintiff

must have exhausted all administrative remedies.") Likewise, to

the extent a plaintiff may be asserting a retaliation claim under

Title IV of the ADA, if the underlying basis of such a claim is the

exercise of his rights under Title I, "exhaustion procedures must

be followed." See Schneider v. City and County of San Francisco,

No. C-97-2674-CAL, 1999 WL 144878, at *11 (N.D.Cal. March 10, 1999)

(citations and footnote omitted). 

What U-Haul fails to take into account, however, is that this

exhaustion requirement does not come into play when a plaintiff is

seeking to recover under Title II (public services) of the ADA. 

Banks v. Modesto City Schools Dist., No. CVF046284RECSMS, 2005 WL

2233213, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2005) (citation omitted). Nor

is exhaustion a jurisdictional predicate when a plaintiff is

seeking to recover under Title III (Public Accommodations) of the

ADA. Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 831-32 (9th

Cir. 2000). By extension then, exhaustion is not a condition

precedent to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over a

Title IV retaliation claim for which the underlying basis is an

alleged violation of either Title II or III of the ADA. 

Conspicuously absent from plaintiff Milsap's complaint are any

allegations that he filed a charge, timely or otherwise, with the

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EEOC or with the Arizona Civil Rights Division. Clearly then

plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that this court

has subject matter jurisdiction over his Title VII claim or over

his ADA claims to the extent that they are premised upon alleged

violations of Title I of that Act. As a pro se litigant,

ordinarily the court would give plaintiff Milsap an opportunity to

amend his complaint to cure his failure to plead exhaustion, or to

state a cognizable basis for being excused from exhaustion with

respect to these claims. See Mullin v. Las Lomitas Elementary

District, No. 03-5268 MMC, 2004 WL 2848021, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April

13, 2004). Even if plaintiff Milsap could amend his complaint to

show exhaustion, as will be more fully discussed below, his Title

VII and, with one exception, his ADA claims otherwise would be

barred. Thus, there is no need to allow plaintiff to further amend

his complaint to cure this jurisdictional defect. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Rule 12(b)(6) Legal Standard

In contrast to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for dismissal, a motion

brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency

of a complaint. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-2000

(9th Cir. 2003). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "[a]ll allegations and

reasonable inferences are taken as true, and the allegations are

construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but

conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Simpson v. AOL Time

Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Dismissal is proper under

Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the non-movant can

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prove no set of facts to support its claims." Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). "The court may dismiss a

complaint as a matter of law [pursuant to that Rule] for (1) lack

of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a

cognizable legal claim." SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental

Plan of California, Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At the same time,

however, courts have a "duty to construe pro se . . . pleadings

liberally[.]" United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 938

n.2 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Hughes v. Rowe,

449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (Pro se complaints, "however inartfully

pleaded[,] are held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]") With these standards firmly in

mind, the court has carefully examined defendants' motions to

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. 

2. ADA

To the extent plaintiff's complaint can be read as asserting

claims under the ADA, Republic contends that it is entitled to

dismissal of them because plaintiff has not alleged discriminatory

conduct of the type which the ADA proscribes under Titles I, II or

III of that statute. In its reply Republic further contends, with

no analysis, that plaintiff's ADA claim cannot survive this motion

to dismiss because he has not alleged that he is "an individual

with a disability[]" within the meaning of that Act. Doc. 17 at 3

(citation omitted). 

Construing plaintiff's complaint as asserting an employment

discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA, U-Haul, like

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Republic, alleges that plaintiff has failed to state such a claim

because he has not alleged that he is an individual with a

disability within the meaning of that Act. Like Republic, U-Haul

fails to offer any legal support for this argument. Unlike

Republic, however, U-Haul contends that plaintiff's Title I claim

is deficient for a second reason. U-Haul points out that to

succeed on a Title III ADA claim plaintiff "must establish himself

as an employee[,]'" which he cannot do. See Doc. 8 at 3. Next, to

the extent that plaintiff's complaint can be read as asserting a

claim for discrimination in "public accommodation" in violation of

Title III of the ADA, U-Haul contends that plaintiff has not

"allege[]d any facts whereby [it]s Arizona[] office lacked access

for [plaintiff] as an alleged disabled person." Id. For all of

these reasons, U-Haul contends that it is entitled to dismissal of

plaintiff's ADA claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiff did not directly respond to any of these defense

arguments. Instead, plaintiff points out that in his motion to

amend he did "identify[] which defendant did what and under what

circumstances they did. . . [it]." Doc. 15 at 5, ¶ 5(B). 

a. Disabled

 U-Haul limits its argument that plaintiff is not an

"individual with a disability" to Title I of the ADA. However,

regardless of which Title of the ADA forms the basis for

plaintiff's claims thereunder, he must allege that he is disabled

within the meaning of that Act. See Allen v. Pacific Bell, 348

F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) ("[T]o establish

a prima facie case [of employment discrimination] under the . . .

ADA . . . , [plaintiff] must first demonstrate that . . . he is

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disabled[.]"); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.

2002) (citation omitted) (same to establish a Title II (public

services) claim); Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, No. CIV. S-04-1339, 

2006 WL 1686511, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2006) (citations

omitted) (same to establish a Title III (public accommodations)

claim). Therefore, if plaintiff Milsap has not alleged that he has

a disability within the meaning of the ADA, defendants would be

entitled to dismissal for failure to state a claim irrespective of

which Title of that Act forms the basis for plaintiff's claims

thereunder. 

The ADA defines the term "disability" to "mean[] . . . a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more

. . . major life activities. . . [;] . . . a record of such an

impairment; or, . . . being regarded as having such an impairment." 

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). The EEOC regulations

interpreting the ADA state, inter alia, "Major Life Activities

means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual

tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and

working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). By the same token though,

"[t]emporary, non-chronic impairment of short duration, with little

or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities." 

29 C.F.R. §1630, App. at p. 339. "Such impairments may include,

but are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions,

appendicitis, and influenza." Id. "In conformity with th[ose]

Regulations, . . . courts . . . have uniformly held that back

sprains, broken ankles, knee injuries, ligament damage and bone

spurs are minor, temporary conditions which do not constitute ADA

disabilities even where the plaintiff is required to take a lengthy

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medical leave." Haynal v. Target Stores, No. 96-1599-K(RBB), 1996

WL 806706, at *2 (S.D.Cal. Dec. 19, 1996) (citations omitted)

(emphasis added). 

It is a close call, but liberally construing plaintiff

Milsap's pro se complaint as the court must, see Rodriguez-Lara,

421 F.3d at 938 n.2, it finds that he has sufficiently alleged

that he has a "disability" as the ADA defines that word. To be

sure, on a continuum some of plaintiff's alleged injuries fall

closer to "temporary, non-chronic impairment[s] of short duration,"

than they do to a "disability." For example, supposedly the MRI

revealed a "large tear in [plaintiff's] ligament[] on his left knee

[] and a sprain like tear to [that] knee." Doc. 11 at 4, ¶ 8. The

court cannot ignore the fact, however, that plaintiff's complaint

also includes an allegation that his knee and back injuries caused

him to be "disabl[ed] to function or walk [due to] constant pain in

his leg . . . and his knee giving out on him constantly." Id. at

3, ¶ 7. Further, plaintiff alleges that he has been "informed that

. . . his injury may be permanent." Id. (emphasis added). 

Moreover, even if plaintiff Milsap had not sufficiently alleged

that he has a disability, because it is not "absolutely clear that

[such a] deficienc[y] . . . could not be cured by amendment[,]" he

would be entitled to amend his complaint. See Hanft v. United

States, No. CV-04-258, 2005 WL 1863321, at *2 (D. Idaho Aug. 4,

2005) (quoting Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

In light of the foregoing, for purposes of the present motions, the

court will proceed on the assumption that plaintiff is disabled

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7 The court hastens to add, however, that without more it is

not convinced that plaintiff's allegation that he is "on disability"

is necessarily synonymous with having a disability under the ADA.

Similarly, also without more, the allegation that plaintiff is "on

disability" is too vague and conclusory to satisfy the ADA's

particularized statutory and regulatory definition of disability. 

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within the meaning of the ADA.7

b. Discriminatory Conduct

Even operating from that assumption, the defendants' argument

that plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA is well taken. 

Plaintiff's ADA claims cannot survive these motions to dismiss

because even assuming arguendo that he has properly pled that he

has a disability, with one exception which will be discussed below,

nowhere in his complaint does plaintiff allege that Republic or UHaul engaged in discriminatory conduct of the type which the ADA

prohibits. This is so whether plaintiff's purported ADA claims are

analyzed in the context of employment, public services, public

accommodations, or retaliation. 

i. Title I (Employment)

Plaintiff alleges that when he spoke with Mr. Lascola on the

telephone about his injuries, Lascola "became very bias and

ar[r]ogant and discriminatory[.]" Doc. 11, at 5, ¶ 9. Plaintiff

further alleges that during that conversation Lascola mentioned

that plaintiff had previously filed personal injury claims in

court. See id. When plaintiff informed Lascola that he was going

to "seek legal action[,]" purportedly Lascola told him, "go right

ahead, have at it[;] you don't have a case." Id. Plaintiff

retorted that "the two year statute [of limitations] was not up[.]"

Id. Allegedly Lascola said, "so what," ending that telephone

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conversation. Id. Based upon this conversation plaintiff claims

that Lascola, in his "capacity as a representative for Republic[,]

. . . deprived . . . plaintiff of his right to have his claim

investigated[.]" Id. at 5-6, ¶ 10. 

The court assumes, as it must, the truth of these allegations. 

See Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1046. Nevertheless, they are legally

insufficient to state a claim for relief under Title I of the ADA. 

"To state a prima facie case for discrimination under [Title I] of

the ADA, [plaintiff] must prove that he is a qualified individual

with a disability who suffered an adverse employment action because

of his disability." Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co.,

302 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted) (emphasis added). Obviously then, a critical

element of such a claim is the existence of an employee-employer

relationship. Haverly v. C.R. England, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:03 CV 363

S, 2005 WL 1168387, at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 17, 2005) (Plaintiffs "must

first show that they were either employees or applicants of

[defendant] to be protected by Title I of the ADA.") Plaintiff

Milsap's complaint lacks any allegations that he had an employment

relationship with U-Haul or Republic. Therefore, to the extent

plaintiff is relying upon Title I of the ADA as a basis for relief

herein, these defendants are entitled to dismissal for failure to

state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Link v.

Rhodes, No. C 06-0386 MHP, 2006 WL 1348424, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May

17, 2006) (despite the fact that defendant law firm "likely

qualifie[d] as an 'employer' under the ADA[,]" court dismissed ADA

claim against it for "fail[ure] to allege or establish that the

firm acted as [plaintiff's] employer[]"). 

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ii. Title II (Public Services)

Plaintiff fares no better with his purported Title II ADA

claim. Among other things, to state such a claim plaintiff must

allege that "he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive

the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or

activities; [and that] he was either excluded from participation in

or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs,

or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public

entity[.]" McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th

Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

(emphasis added). The ADA defines "public entity" in relevant part

as "any State or local government" or "any department, agency,

special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or

States or local government." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(A)-(B). Plaintiff

has not alleged any facts indicating that either U-Haul or Republic

meet that definition of public entity. Thus, once again, even

accepting all of the allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true

and liberally construing them, the court finds that he has failed

to state a claim under Title II of the ADA. Consequently,

defendants are entitled to dismissal of this claim under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as well. 

iii. Title III (Public Accommodations)

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against persons

with disabilities in places of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(a). "'Discrimination' under [that Title] encompasses the

denial of the opportunity, by the disabled, to participate in

programs or services, and providing the disabled with separate, but

unequal, goods or services." National Federation of the Blind v.

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Target Corporation, No. C 06-01802 MHP, 2006 WL 2578282, at *3

(N.D.Cal. Sept. 6, 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(a)(A)(iiii)). "To ensure that the disabled have full and equal enjoyment

of the goods and services of places of public accommodation, [Title

III] requires 'reasonable modification' of 'policies, practices,

and procedures,' the provision of auxiliary aids to ensure

effective communication with the disabled, and the removal of

architectural and communications barriers." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii-iv)). 

U-Haul contends that plaintiff fails to state a Title III ADA

claim because he has not "allege[d] any facts whereby [its] . . .

Arizona[] office lacked access for [plaintiff] as an alleged

disabled person." Doc. 8 at 4. Similarly, U-Haul points out that

"the complaint does not set forth any facts that involve physical

access to any place of public accommodation." Id. (emphasis

added). U-Haul further contends, albeit implicitly, that because

there is no connection between plaintiff's complaints of

discriminatory treatment in the investigation of his personal

injury claim and U-Haul's physical office in Arizona, his Title III

ADA claim is not cognizable. The court will separately address

these arguments. 

U-Haul is correct that plaintiff does not allege that he was

denied physical access to its offices, or to any place of public

accommodation for that matter. That omission in and of itself does

not entitle U-Haul to dismissal of plaintiff's Title III ADA claim,

however. "[C]onsistent with the plain language of the [ADA], no

court has held that . . . a plaintiff has a cognizable claim only

if the challenged service prevents physical access to a public

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accommodation." National Federation of the Blind, 2006 WL 2578282,

at *5 (emphasis added). "Further, it is clear that the purpose of

the [ADA] is broader than mere physical access -- seeking to bar

actions or omissions which impair a disabled person's 'full

enjoyment' of services or goods of a covered accommodation." Id.

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). "Indeed, the statute expressly

states that the denial of equal 'participation' or the provision of

'separate benefit[s]' are actionable under Title III." Id. (citing

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)). In light of the foregoing, the court

declines to dismiss plaintiff's Title III claim, as U-Haul urges,

based upon his failure to allege a denial of physical access to its

Arizona office.

On the other hand, there is merit to U-Haul's alternative

argument. U-Haul cites to Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film

Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000), for the proposition

that to state a claim under Title III of the ADA, there must be "a

connection between the good or service complained of and the actual

physical place[,]" but U-Haul does not explain Weyer's

applicability here. There is no need to speculate as to how

Weyer impacts the present case, however, because there is an

obvious deficiency in plaintiff's complaint insofar as he is

attempting to assert a Title III claim against U-Haul. That

deficiency arises from the fact that the conduct of which plaintiff

is complaining, i.e., discriminatory treatment in the handling of

an insurance claim investigation, is not, as Republic concedes, a

service which U-Haul provides. See Doc. 6 at 2, n.2 (The "actions

alleged to have been taken by the insurer actually refer to

Republic, and not 'U-Haul Trucking Company.'") Given that

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concession, plainly there is no connection between the services of

which plaintiff is complaining and U-Haul. Thus, to the extent the

complaint can be read as alleging a claim against U-Haul pursuant

to Title III of the ADA, U-Haul is entitled to dismissal of it for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Republic, in contrast to U-Haul, did not separately address

the possibility that plaintiff is attempting to assert a Title III

ADA claim against it. Again, assuming for the sake of argument

that plaintiff is "disabled," arguably his complaint can be read as

alleging that Republic denied him "full enjoyment" of the insurance

services which it provides by not investigating his claim because

he is disabled. This is an extremely attenuated theory of

liability. Nonetheless, the court is mindful that at this juncture

the test is not whether "it may appear on the face of the

[complaint] that a recovery is very remote and unlikely[.]" See

Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Rather the test is

whether plaintiff is entitled "to offer evidence to support the

claims." See id. Plaintiff meets that test, although the court

does have serious reservations as to whether this particular claim

would survive an adequately briefed dismissal or summary judgment

motion.

iv. Title IV (Retaliation)

Evidently defendants do not read plaintiff's complaint as

alleging a claim under Title IV of the ADA as they did not address

this possibility. To be thorough this court has considered the

possibility and finds that to the extent plaintiff may be relying

upon Title IV, this claim fails too. As mentioned earlier, "Title

IV . . . precludes retaliation against employees who seek to

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enforce their statutory rights under the ADA." Head, 413 F.3d at

1064 n.54 (emphasis added). And, as discussed in connection with

plaintiff's Title I claim, the complaint is void of any allegations

that plaintiff is or was an employee of either U-Haul or Republic. 

Furthermore, there is nothing in the complaint which could even

remotely be construed as retaliatory conduct by either of these

defendants. Consequently the court finds that as with nearly all

of his other ADA claims, plaintiff has failed to state a claim

under Title IV of that Act. 

To summarize as to the ADA claims, even if plaintiff could

amend his complaint to satisfy that Act's exhaustion requirement,

with one exception, his ADA claims are legally insufficient for a

host of other reasons. More specifically, plaintiff's Title I ADA

claim fails because he has not alleged that the actions of which he

is complaining arose out of an employment relationship. Similarly,

plaintiff does not state a claim for retaliation under Title IV of

the ADA because he has not alleged that he is an employee of either

U-Haul or Republic, which is a necessary factual predicate to such

a claim. Further, his Title II ADA claim fails because plaintiff

has not alleged any facts demonstrating that either of those

defendants is a "public entity" within the meaning of that statute. 

Finally, plaintiff's claim under Title III of the ADA is legally

insufficient as to U-Haul because he has not alleged any connection

between the discriminatory conduct complained of and U-Haul. It is

readily apparent that these particular deficiencies cannot be cured

by amendment. Therefore, with one exception, the court grants the

defense motions to dismiss plaintiff's ADA claims for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The exception is

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as to Republic's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title III ADA claim. 

The court denies this aspect of Republic's motion because there is

a possibility, albeit remote, that plaintiff can proceed against

Republic on this theory of liability. 

C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Assuming arguendo that plaintiff could amend his complaint to

satisfy Title VII's exhaustion requirement, nonetheless, this claim

cannot survive defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Nor

can this Title VII claim be saved by further amendment.

"Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment

discrimination based on 'race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin[.]'" Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126

S.Ct. 2405, 2408 (2006) (emphasis added). As previously discussed,

there are no allegations in plaintiff's complaint that he had an

employee-employer relationship with either Republic or U-Haul. 

Also missing from plaintiff's complaint are any allegations that he

is a member of any of the protected classes just enumerated. While

the latter could possibly be cured by amendment, the former could

not. Therefore, the court grants the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII cause of action.

D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Consistent with its obligation to afford a pro se complaint a

more liberal reading than one filed by counsel, see Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), it can be inferred that

plaintiff Milsap is asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as

well. This inference is bolstered by the fact that in his response

to defendants' motion to dismiss, as the "jurisdictional basi[s] of

[his] claim[,]" plaintiff recites that statute in its entirety. 

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See Doc. 15 at 3, ¶3. Thus, although inartfully plead, because the

court is able to "discern" from plaintiff's complaint a section

1983 cause of action, it will address the viability of that claim. 

See Athans v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. CV-06-1841-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL

2934307, at *1 (D.Az. Oct. 12, 2006)(internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against

"[e]very person" who under color of state law, deprives another of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim under section 1983

two elements must be alleged: "(1) the conduct complained of was

committed by a person acting under color of state law and . . . (2)

the conduct deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Hopper

v. Morrison, No. C06-5058, 2006 WL 2993045, at *2 (W.D.Wash. Oct.

17, 2006) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981),

overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327

(1986)). 

To satisfy the first prong, "the party charged with the

constitutional deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said

to be a 'state actor.'" Nelson v. Smith, No. C06-00432RSM, 2006 WL

2690981, at * 2 (W.D.Wash. Sept. 19, 2006) (quoting Lugar v.

Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). "This requirement is

necessary because '§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private

conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.'" Id. (quoting

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). 

"Therefore, when determining whether a private party acted under

color of law, a court 'start[s] with the presumption that private

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conduct does not constitute governmental action.'" Id. (quoting

Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th

Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added); see also Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d

702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[P]rivate parties are not generally

acting under color of state law."); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d

1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Only in rare circumstances can a

private party be viewed as a 'state actor' for section 1983

purposes.") The same is true when the private party is a

corporation. Thus, "[c]orporations are generally not acting under

color of state law and alleged violations of the Constitution by a

corporation do[] not provide a plaintiff with a private cause of

action against the corporation." Thomas v. Hickman, No. CV F 06-

0215 AWI SMS, 2006 WL 2868967, at *34 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 6, 2006)

(citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924). "The only way to proceed with an

action against a corporation for violations of the Constitution is

to show that the corporation's action[s] were fairly attributable

to the federal or state government." Id. (citing, inter alia,

Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936). 

The allegations in plaintiff Milsap's complaint do not meet

the foregoing standards. From the face of the complaint it

appears that both U-Haul and Republic are private corporations or,

at the very least, private entities. Further, the complaint does

not include any allegations to overcome the presumption that these

private parties are not state actors and did not act under color of

state law. Nor can the complaint be read as alleging that the

actions of either Republic or U-Haul are fairly attributable to the

federal or state government. For example, plaintiff Milsap has not

alleged or even hinted at "a sufficiently close nexus between the

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state and the challenged action of [either] entity so that the

action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the state

itself." See id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-12

(1982)). Likewise, plaintiff has not alleged that "the state has

exercised coercive power or has provided such significant

encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law

be deemed to be that of the state[.]" Id. Plaintiff Milsap also

has not alleged that either Republic or U-Haul "exercised powers

that are traditionally those of [the] state." Id.

According to the Ninth Circuit, when a plaintiff alleges an

action under section 1983, "a defendant is entitled to more than

the bald legal conclusion that there was action under color of

state law." Price, 939 F.2d at 708. As the foregoing

demonstrates, the allegations in plaintiff Milsap's complaint do

not even go that far. Thus, given the complete lack of any

allegations that defendants Republic or U-Haul were either state

actors or acting under color of state law, they are not amenable to

suit under section 1983. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464

F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (affirming

dismissal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim due to lack of "allegations

that any defendant was acting under the color of state law[]"). 

Moreover, because it is "absolutely clear" that plaintiff Milsap

could not cure this defect by alleging that Republic and U-Haul are

state actors, the court grants their motion to dismiss plaintiff's

section 1983 cause of action for failure to state a claim

thereunder. See Holst v. Oregon, No. 06-113-KI, 2006 WL 973051, at

*1 (D.Or. April 6, 2006) (citation omitted).

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8 In addition to the federal statutes discussed above,

plaintiff alleges "jurisdiction" based upon Arizona Revised Statutes

Annotated § 12-542. Among other things, that statute provides for a

two year statute of limitations for various causes of action in

Arizona, including those for personal injury. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 

§ 12-542(1) (West 2003). Obviously a statute of limitations, state

or federal, does not operate to confer subject matter jurisdiction

upon this court.

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E. Supplemental Jurisdiction8

 Plaintiff appears to be alleging a state law based cause of

action over which he wants this court to exercise its supplemental

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Subsection (a) of that

statute provides in relevant part that "in any civil action of

which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district

courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims

that are so related to claims in the action with such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C.

§1367(a). 

Having found that plaintiff Milsap has failed to state a claim

for relief under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under Titles I, II

and IV of the ADA, as opposed to having found that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over those particular claims, the court

"retains discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over pendent state-law claims." See Arbaugh,

126 S.Ct. at 1244-45 (citation omitted). In the exercise of that

discretion, the court will next address the respective arguments of

U-Haul and Republic that plaintiff fails to state a negligence

claim against either of them under Arizona law.

. . . 

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1. U-Haul

Based upon a provision of the federal Transportation Equity

Act ("TEA"), which was enacted on August 10, 2005, U-Haul is taking

the position that plaintiff has failed to state a negligence claim

against it under a theory of vicarious liability. To support this

argument, U-Haul accurately points out that that Act expressly

provides as follows:

(a) In general. – An owner of a motor 

vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle 

to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) 

shall not be liable under the law of any State

or political subdivision thereof, by reason 

of being the owner of the vehicle (or an 

affiliate of the owner) for harm to persons 

or property that results or arises out of 

the use, operation, or possession of the 

vehicle during the period of the rental 

or lease, if –

(1) the owner . .. is engaged in the 

trade or business of renting or leasing motor 

vehicles; and

(2) there is no negligence or criminal 

wrongdoing on the part of the owner . . . .

49 U.S.C.A. §§ 30106(a)(1) and (2) (West Supp. 2006) (emphasis

added). By its terms, section 30106 "appl[ies] with respect to any

action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this section

[August 10, 2005] without regard to whether the harm that is the

subject of the action, or the conduct that caused the harm,

occurred before such date of enactment." 49 U.S.C. §30106(c). 

Based upon the foregoing, U-Haul reasons that because plaintiff

Milsap filed his complaint on January 27, 2006, after the enactment

of the [TEA,] he "cannot state a claim that [it] is vicariously

liable for [plaintiff's] personal injuries due to any alleged

negligence of the driver of the leased vehicle [Mr. Valencia]." 

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Doc. 8 at 6. 

Without citing to any legal authority, plaintiff baldly

asserts to the contrary, i.e. that "U-Haul . . . is liable for

injuries obtain[ed] through there [sic] Drivers of there [sic]

rental Trucks." Doc. 15 at 2, ¶2 (emphasis added). Given the

unequivocal language of the TEA, however, the court agrees with UHaul: Plaintiff has not and cannot state a negligence claim

against U-Haul based upon a theory of vicarious liability. Thus,

U-Haul is entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's supplemental state

law negligence claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

2. Republic

Republic contends that it, too, is entitled to dismissal of

plaintiff's supplemental negligence claim, but for a different

reason than U-Haul offers. According to Republic, plaintiff fails

to state a negligence cause of action because "'Arizona follows

the general rule that, in the absence of a contractual or statutory

provision to the contrary, an injured person has no direct cause of

action against a tortfeasor's insurance company.'" Doc. 6 at 4

(quoting Maricopa County v. Barfield, 75 P.3d 714, 717 (App. 1003))

(emphasis added). Republic observes that that "rule is consistent

with the required elements of a tort action for personal injury,

which include the existence of a duty and a breach thereof." Doc.

6 at 4 (citations omitted). Plaintiff did not respond to this

argument at all.

IV. Defendant Joseph Lascola

In his amended complaint plaintiff names Joseph Lascola as a

defendant. As previously discussed, the court allowed plaintiff to

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amend his complaint because he was entitled to "once as a matter of

course" given that no responsive pleading has yet been filed. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Although it has allowed plaintiff to amend

his complaint to add Mr. Lascola, the court now sua sponte

dismisses all claims against this defendant. For the reasons set

forth below, dismissal is mandated because plaintiff "'cannot

possibly win relief[]'" as to any of those claims. See Hanson v.

Bush, No. CV F 06-1398 AWI LJO, 2006 WL 2949298, at *1 (E.D. Cal.

Oct. 16, 2006) (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d

986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987)) (other citation omitted). The fact that

plaintiff "cannot possibly win relief" obviates the need for

notice. See id. In a similar vein, it should be noted that

dismissal is appropriate even though defendant Lascola has not been

served. See id. (citations omitted). 

Assuming that there are no other obstacles to plaintiff's

claims against Mr. Lascola (such as failure to exhaust), such

claims would otherwise be barred, rendering dismissal appropriate. 

First, insofar as plaintiff is attempting to assert ADA claims

against Mr. Lascola, dismissal is mandated because "district courts

within the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly held that an individual

cannot be liable under the ADA, including an ADA retaliation

claim." Link v. Rhodes, No. C 06-0386 MHP, 2006 WL 1348424, at *5

(N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Second, to the extent the complaint can be read as

asserting that defendant Lascola violated Title VII, dismissal also

is proper because the complaint does not include any allegations of

employment discrimination -- the essence of any Title VII claim. 

See Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2408. Third, plaintiff also

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fails to state a section 1983 claim against Lascola because he does

not even suggest, let alone allege, that Lascola is not a private

party. And, as discussed in section III(D)above, section 1983

"excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how

discriminatory or wrongful." See Nelson, 2006 WL 2690981, at *2

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In light of the

foregoing, the court sua sponte dismisses all claims against Mr.

Lascola. 

V. Joseph Valencia

The reasons outlined above for dismissing plaintiff's ADA,

Title VII and section 1983 claims against defendant Lascola apply

with equal force to defendant Valencia. Therefore, the court also

sua sponte dismisses these claims as alleged against defendant

Valencia. After dismissing those federal claims, the only

remaining claim against defendant Valencia is for negligence. 

In sharp contrast to the federal claims, at this early stage in the

litigation it is not clear that plaintiff "cannot possibly win

relief" against defendant Valencia on a negligence theory. Thus,

the court will allow plaintiff's negligence claim against defendant

Valencia to stand. 

VI. Further Amendment

If plaintiff Milsap elects to continue this litigation, and to

do so pro se, he is advised that he must become familiar with, and

follow, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona ("Local

Rules"), a copy of which may be obtained from the Clerk of the

Court's Office. Despite plaintiff's pro se status, he is

nonetheless "bound by the rules of procedure." Ghazali v. Moran,

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46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Plaintiff is

further advised that if he elects to file and serve a second

amended complaint, he must do so in conformity with the court's

rulings herein. Furthermore, plaintiff should be aware that he

will waive "'[a]ll causes of action alleged in [his] [first

amended] complaint which are not alleged in [his] [second] amended

complaint[.]'" Athans, 2006 WL 2934307, at *3 (quoting King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)). By the same token,

however, plaintiff may not allege again those causes of action

which have been dismissed.

VII. Motion for a More Definite Statement

To the extent the court denies Republic's motion to dismiss

plaintiff's ADA and "Civil Rights Act of 1964" claims,

alternatively, Republic is moving for a more definite statement

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The court denies this Rule

12(e) motion in its entirety. First, granting the motion to

dismiss plaintiff's Title VII and section 1983 based causes of

action renders moot Republic's motion for a more definite statement

as to those claims. Second, although the court is not dismissing

plaintiff's ADA claims altogether, it likewise finds Republic's

motion for a more definite statement moot. This aspect of

Republic's motion is moot because allowing plaintiff to amend his

complaint with respect to his Title III ADA claim against Republic

is the functional equivalent of a more definite statement in that

it will apprize Republic of the bases for that claim. See Athans,

2006 WL 2934307, at *3 (denying as moot motion for a more definite

statement where court dismissed pro se complaint with leave to

amend). Republic will then, of course, be free to make whatever

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motion it deems necessary and appropriate. 

To summarize, in light of the court's rulings herein, at this

juncture the following causes of action remain: (1) a claim under

Title III of the ADA against Republic; and (2) a supplemental state

law based negligence claim against defendant Joseph Valencia.

Conclusion

To conclude, the court hereby: 

(1) GRANTS the motion by plaintiff Andrew N. Milsap to amend

his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (doc. 11); 

(2) DENIES defendant Republic Western Insurance Company's

request for summary disposition (doc. 13);

(3) DENIES defendant U-Haul Company of Arizona's motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (doc. 8);

(4) GRANTS defendant U-Haul Company of Arizona's motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (doc. 8); 

(5) GRANTS defendant Republic Western Insurance Company's

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as to the

claims premised upon Titles I, II and IV of the ADA; Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; but DENIES this

motion as to the claims premised upon Title III of the ADA and

plaintiff's supplemental state law based claim;

(6) sua sponte DISMISSES all claims against defendant Joseph

Lascola for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 

(7) sua sponte DISMISSES all federal law based claims against

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defendant Albert Valencia;

(8) DENIES the alternative motion by defendant Republic

Western Insurance Company for a more definite statement pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (doc. 6;) 

(9) ORDERS that if plaintiff desires to proceed with this

action, he must file and serve his second amended complaint within

thirty (30) days of the date of this order and such amended

complaint must be in full conformity with the court's rulings

herein; and 

(10) ORDERS that plaintiff shall not reallege claims which

have been dismissed herein.

 DATED this 18th day of December, 2006.

Copies to plaintiff, pro se, and counsel of record

Case 2:06-cv-00209-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/20/06 Page 36 of 36