Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00128/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00128-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Marine-Exoneration from/or Limitation of Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN THE COMPLAINT OF ARDEN A. )

JOHNSON, etc., )

 ) CIVIL ACTION 04-0128-WS-B

Petitioner. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc.

133). The parties have filed briefs and evidentiary materials in support of their respective

positions, (Docs. 134-36, 156-58, 169), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After carefully

considering all the foregoing materials, the Court concludes that the motion is due to be denied. 

BACKGROUND

The petitioner’s vessel was berthed at claimant Dog River Marina and Boat Works, Inc.

(“Dog River”). Vessels belonging to claimants Conrad Armbrecht, Sam Haginas and Duncan

Greenwood were also berthed there. On September 6, 2003, a fire broke out on the petitioner’s

vessel, damaging or destroying that vessel and those of the claimants, as well as Dog River’s

facility. The petitioner brought this action seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability.

DISCUSSION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1333. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of

a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

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 The petitioner at one point suggests that the claimants have no evidence with which to

establish the privity or knowledge requirement. (Doc. 134 at 7). Because the burden as to

privity and knowledge is on the petitioner, the claimants’ asserted lack of evidence is irrelevant,

especially on motion for summary judgment. “When the moving party has the burden of proof at

trial, that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must

support its motion with credible evidence ... that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not

controverted at trial. [citation omitted] In other words, the moving party must show that, on all

the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof, no reasonable jury could

find for the nonmoving party.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428,

1438 (11th Cir. 1991)(en banc) (emphasis in original); accord Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2

F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). The petitioner has not attempted to meet this burden. 

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317 (1986))(footnote omitted).

“There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could

be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.” Resolution Trust Corp. v.

Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). The Court therefore confines its consideration

to those arguments the parties have elected to assert expressly. 

The petitioner seeks exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §

183. “A shipowner is entitled to exoneration from all liability for a maritime collision [or other

maritime loss] only when it demonstrates that it is free from any contributory fault. [citation

omitted] The determination of whether a shipowner is entitled to limit liability ... involves a twostep analysis .... First, the court must determine what acts of negligence or conditions of

unseaworthiness caused the accident. Second, the court must determine whether the shipowner

had knowledge or privity of those same acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness.” 

American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 81 F.3d 127, 129 (11th Cir. 1996)(internal quotes omitted). 

“The damage claimants bear the initial burden of establishing liability, and the shipowner then

bears the burden of establishing the lack of privity or knowledge.” Beiswenger Enterprises

Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1036 (11th Cir. 1996). The petitioner argues that the claimants

cannot meet their initial burden, entitling him to exoneration. The petitioner expressly declines

to hinge his motion on the privity or knowledge requirement. (Doc. 169 at 18-19).1

The claimants, relying on their expert, Frederick Franklin, assert that the vessel was

unseaworthy due to defective wiring. (Doc. 156 at 7, 10-11). The petitioner responds that

Franklin can only speculate as to whether the wiring was defective and as to whether any defect

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The claimants assert there is evidence that these wires were energized at the time of the

fire. (Doc. 156 at 7). Although the cited deposition excerpt appears somewhat obscure,

(Henderson Deposition at 72), absent challenge from the petitioner the Court will assume that

the claimants’ description of this testimony is accurate. 

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in the wiring caused the fire. (Doc. 169 at 3-9).

Franklin’s report is in evidence, (Doc. 157, Exhibit F), and has drawn no objection from

the petitioner. Franklin’s inspection revealed a single area of massive copper melting, consistent

with short circuit arcing. Witnesses reported that the fire first appeared in and directly above this

precise area. Upon investigation, Franklin ruled out other electrical causes of the fire, as well as

ignition of flammable liquids (the engine was cold), smoking or cooking (the vessel had been

unoccupied for days), arson (the fire occurred in broad daylight with workers nearby), and

lightning (it was a sunny day). Franklin concluded that one of the six wires in the melted area

short circuited and arced, compromising the insulation on the adjoining wires, leading to

additional arcing and the fire.2

The petitioner has challenged neither Franklin’s qualifications nor his methodology, and

his efforts to neutralize Franklin’s conclusions as speculation are unavailing. The petitioner’s

objections are as follows: (1) that Franklin cannot state which of the six wires first arced; (2) that

Franklin cannot tell, simply from looking at the copper melt, whether arcing caused the fire or

whether the fire, sprung from other causes, caused the arcing; and (3) that Franklin found no

physical evidence that any wire’s insulation was compromised before the fire. (Doc. 169 at 3-7). 

As for the first objection, the petitioner does not challenge the claimants’ assertion that

defective wiring can constitute an unseaworthy condition, and it can hardly matter for limitation

purposes which of the six melted wires was the defective one. As for the second, Franklin did

not rely on the mere existence of the copper melt to determine an electrical cause, but also on the

absence of other possible causes of the fire and on the reports of eyewitnesses that the fire began

in this location. See Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1138 (3rd Cir. 1983)

(“Where a fire investigator identifies the cause of fire in terms of probabilities (as opposed to

mere possibilities) by eliminating all but one reasonable potential cause, such testimony is highly

probative.”); cf. Hartley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 118 Fed. Appx. 914, 919 (6th

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Cir. 2004)(“By the very nature of a fire, its cause must often be proven through a combination of

common sense, circumstantial evidence, and expert testimony ....”)(internal quotes omitted). 

And as for the third, the petitioner has offered no authority for the unlikely proposition that an

expert may not opine as to a fire’s cause if the fire — as fire usually does — destroys the most

direct evidence of causation. Cf. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 522 (8th Cir. 1999)

(“Fire cases differ from most accident cases because fires tend to destroy evidence of

causation.”)(Bright, J., dissenting).

The petitioner presents Rooney v. Nuta, 267 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1959), as “remarkably

similar” to this case. (Doc. 169 at 7). In Rooney, the claimants tried to prove that the fire in the

vessel’s salon was caused by defective wiring, based on a previous electrical fire in the engine

room and on the difficulty experienced in keeping the vessel’s batteries charged. Id. at 144. The

Fifth Circuit held that the previous fire could not support an inference of negligence because all

wiring at issue in the previous fire — which occurred elsewhere on the vessel — had been

replaced. Id. at 145. Nor could the draining batteries support an inference of negligence when

the strongest support for that theory was an electrical engineer’s testimony that the discharging

batteries “likely could” cause a fire in the circuit, which the Court interpreted as meaning

“possibly” — a qualifier far short of “reasonable probability.” Id. at 146-47. The Court also

discounted this testimony as “more of the nature of argument than of testimony,” since the

hypothetical question to which it responded assumed the absence of any other cause of the fire,

rendering the witness’s testimony a mere tautology, a display of his “reasoning powers” but not

his knowledge of fire causation. Id. at 147 n.10. Rooney is thus worlds removed from this case,

where an expert of unchallenged qualifications and methodology has affirmatively stated that,

based on his knowledge of short circuiting, the physical evidence, the reports of eyewitnesses,

and the absence of any other potential cause, “I am of the definite opinion that a short circuit arc

in the wiring installed in the Dover by Sea Ray was the cause of this fire.” (Doc. 157, Exhibit F

at 9). 

As the Court prepared to sign this order, the third party defendants — but not the

petitioner — filed a motion under Rule 702 to strike Franklin’s ultimate conclusion that the fire

was caused by short circuit arcing. (Doc. 182). Even were the petitioner to file a similar motion,

it could not alter the outcome of his motion for summary judgment. Franklin’s qualifications as

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The Court will rule on the motion to strike by separate order.

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However, the Court warns the parties that it does not expect its time and theirs to be

wasted at trial by the presentation of evidence concerning the petitioner’s alleged negligence, if

such evidence is unaccompanied by any showing that the fire was caused thereby.

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an expert remain unchallenged, as do his expert opinions that the copper melt is consistent with

massive arcing sufficient to cause a fire and that all other possible causes of the fire were

eliminated. That testimony, especially when combined with the eyewitness reports that the fire

was first observed in just the area containing the copper melt, would be sufficient to create a

genuine issue of material fact as to the cause of the fire even were Franklin’s ultimate conclusion

excluded.3

Because the claimants have demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether the fire was caused by an unseaworthy condition, it is unnecessary to consider their

alternative arguments as to negligence and res ipsa loquitur.4 For the reasons set forth above, the

petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

 

DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of January, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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