Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00352/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00352-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH A. BUGGS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

Acting Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-0352 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

After a court trial in the Superior Court of the State of California in and

for the County of Contra Costa, petitioner was found guilty of inflicting cruel and

unusual corporal punishment on a child, Cal. Penal Code § 273d(a). The court

also found true an allegation that petitioner personally inflicted great bodily

injury on the victim, id. § 12022.7(a). Trial testimony established that petitioner

whipped his step-son with an electrical cord and stepped on his arm and hand,

causing a fracture of his left wrist. On January 24, 2002, petitioner was

sentenced to seven years in state prison – four years for the section 273d offense

and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement.

Petitioner appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment of conviction and the Supreme Court of California denied review. The

state courts also rejected his request for state collateral relief.

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Petitioner then filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that there is insufficient evidence to support the

great bodily injury enhancement . Per order filed on April 18, 2005, the court

found that the petition, liberally construed, stated a cognizable claim under §

2254 and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should

not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause and

petitioner has filed a traverse. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as

follows:

[Petitioner's] victim was his 11-year-old stepson, who is

referred to in the record as "John Doe." On February 4, 2001, Doe

was living in Antioch with his mother, Pamela, and [petitioner]. 

That night, Pamela was at work and Doe was at home with

[petitioner] and one of [petitioner's] friends, Sonia. Sonia prepared

hamburgers for dinner. She told Doe that he could eat one but that

he was also to leave one for Pamela to eat when she came home

from work. Doe saw only one hamburger; he ate it and went to

bed. At approximately 2:00 a.m., [petitioner] awakened Doe. As

Doe awoke, he saw that [petitioner] had an electrical cord in his

hand. [Petitioner] ordered Doe, who was wearing only his

underwear, to come into the kitchen. [Petitioner] questioned Doe

about eating the hamburger. [Petitioner] did not believe what Doe

told him and started hitting him with the electrical cord. Doe ran to

the front door. [Petitioner] followed. [Petitioner] pushed Doe

against the wall, causing Doe to fall on the ground, and resumed

hitting him with the electrical cord. When Doe attempted to block

the blows with his hands, [petitioner] began to use a longer length

of cord to strike Doe on the back.

At some point during the beating, [petitioner] stepped on

Doe's left wrist. Doe heard a crack as [petitioner] stepped on it. 

After [petitioner] stepped on Doe's wrist, he resumed hitting Doe

with the cord. Doe testified that [petitioner] struck him with the

cord at least 10 times but did not know if [petitioner] hit him as

many as 20 times. [Petitioner] eventually allowed Doe to return to

bed; however, he later made Doe get out of bed and wait on the

couch for his mother to return. The beating occurred on a Sunday

night. [Petitioner] kept Doe home from school for two days to soak

in salt and rubbing alcohol in the bathtub. On Wednesday, Doe

went to school. He told a vice-principal what had happened to him. 

 A police officer then came to school, and a "CPS" worker took him

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to the hospital. His arm was x-rayed at the hospital; the arm was

placed in a splint, which was later replaced by a cast. Dr. Bailey

Tong Lee evaluated the x-ray taken of Doe's left wrist on February

7, 2001, and determined that the wrist was fractured. By the time

Doe testified at trial on November 28, 2001, he still had scars on

his shoulders, arms and chest as a result of the blows struck by

[petitioner] on February 4 or 5, 2001.

Antioch Police Officer Rod Garcia interviewed Doe at the

hospital on February 7. He saw at least 15 whip marks on Doe's

back and more than 50 total marks on various parts of Doe's body. 

The nature of the wounds indicated that they had been made with a

looped cord or a rope. He also noticed that Doe's left wrist was

swollen. He looked at Doe's back before testifying in November

2001 and saw "at least" two scars.

[Petitioner] testified in his own defense. He admitted

striking Doe with a computer cord on the night of February 4, 2001. 

He did so after Doe admitted eating a hamburger that was intended

for Pamela. He struck Doe several times on the arm, the front of

his body and his back. However, he did not recall stepping on

Doe's arm or hand. He testified that he struck Doe in order to

discipline him and to help him avoid "winding up in a bad place." 

However, after seeing the kinds of injuries he inflicted, he did not

feel that the beating was "justified."

After the trial court found that [petitioner] violated section

273d, the court turned to the great bodily injury enhancement. 

Because it had not been able to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that [petitioner] intended to step on Doe's hand, the court

stated that it had looked at the question of whether the fact that an

injury occurs accidentally during the course of a felony had an

impact on whether the enhancement should properly be imposed. 

The court cited People v. Guzman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 761

(Guzman) for the proposition that the accidental nature of the injury

did not affect whether the enhancement was applicable "because

the 1995 amendment to [section] 12022.7 deleted the requirement

that the defendant act with the intent to inflict the injury." The

court then found that the injury to Doe's wrist occurred during the

course of the beating. The court specifically determined that the

wrist was broken "in the process of steeping on the hand, although I

cannot find that was intentional."

The court concluded: "Just so that the record is clear as to

what factual findings I'm making on the record, nevertheless that

does find that – I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

enhancement of great bodily pursuant to 12022.7(a), that

[petitioner] in the commission of the offense, personally inflicted

great bodily injury, is true." 

People v. Buggs, No. A097986, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2003).

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the

claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’

a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state

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court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively

unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Analysis

Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's

finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Doe. He specifically

claims that there was no evidence that he intended to injure Doe's wrist.

The relevant inquiry on review of a constitutional challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is “whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in

original). The reviewing court “faced with a record of historical facts that

supports conflicting inferences must presume – even if it does not affirmatively

appear on the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of

the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326. 

In light of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal habeas court applies the standard

of Jackson with an additional layer of deference. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d

1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). A federal habeas court must ask whether the

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operative state court decision reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson to

the facts of the case. Id. 1275. A writ may be granted only if the state court's

application of the Jackson standard was "'objectively unreasonable.'" Id. at 1275

n.13 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).

Under California law, "[a]ny person who personally inflicts great bodily

injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or

attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of

imprisonment in the state prison for three years." Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a). 

For purposes of section 12022.7, "'great bodily injury' means a significant or

substantial physical injury." Id. § 12022.7(f). 

Here, the California Court of Appeal found that there was sufficient

evidence to support the great bodily injury enhancement under section

12022.7(a). The court specifically found that there was sufficient evidence to

support the enhancement "without relying on [the trial court's] statements about

the cause of Doe's broken wrist." People v. Buggs, slip op. at 5. The court

explained:

A victim need not "suffer 'permanent,' 'prolonged' or

protracted' disfigurement, impairment, or loss of bodily function" in

order to support a finding of great bodily injury under section

12022.7, subdivisions (a) and (f). (People v. Escobar (1992) 3

Cal.4th 740, 750.) In the case before us, Doe suffered numerous

injuries that qualify as "significant" or "substantial." Doe sustained

a severe beating that left more than 50 marks on his body two days

after [petitioner] inflicted it. Further, more than nine months after

[petitioner] inflicted the injuries, Doe still had scars on his

shoulders, arms, chest and back. Moreover, Doe's non-wrist-related

injuries were at least as severe as – if not more severe than – those

suffered by victims in cases where findings of great bodily injury

have been upheld. (See People v. Jaramillo (1979 98 Cal.App.3d

830, 836 [child suffered "multiple contusions" that caused

"swelling and left severe discoloration; injuries "visible the day

after infliction to at least two lay persons"]; People v. Sanchez

(1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 718, 726-727, 734 [teenage victim suffered

bruises and swelling on her face and "multiple superficial abrasions

and lacerations, primarily on her back and neck"].) In sum, even

without considering Doe's broken wrist, substantial evidence

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supports the conclusion that [petitioner] personally inflicted great

bodily injury on Doe.

Id. at 5-6. 

The California Court of Appeal also specifically found that there was

sufficient evidence to support the enhancement regardless of whether petitioner

injured Doe's wrist accidentally, rather than intentionally. The court explained:

. . . .The fact that the [trial] court could not determine that

[petitioner] intentionally stepped on Doe's wrist does not affect its

finding that [petitioner] broke Doe's wrist while administering a

severe beating with an electrical cord. The latter finding is

sufficient to sustain the court's conclusion that [petitioner]

personally inflicted great bodily harm on Doe. (People v. Guzman

(2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 761, 763-764.) In Guzman, the defendant

was driving with a blood-alcohol level of .10 percent; he made an

"unsafe left turn in front of another vehicle. Due to [Guzman's]

action, a collision occurred and [Guzman's] passenger, Amy

Quinonez, was injured." (Guzman, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p.

763.) In a court trial, Guzman was convicted of driving under the

influence and causing bodily injury to another; the court also found

that Guzman had personally inflicted great bodily injury on

Quinonez. On appeal, Guzman challenged the latter finding,

arguing that he did not personally inflict great bodily injury on

Quinonez; rather, the driver of the other car "directly performed the

act that caused the injury." (Id. at p. 764.) The court of appeal

rejected the argument. The court noted that Guzman "turned his

vehicle into oncoming traffic." This volitional act was the direct

cause of the collision and therefore was the direct cause of the

injury." (Ibid., italics added.) The court further noted that "the

accidental nature fo the injuries suffered does not affect this

analysis." (Ibid.)

Here, of course, [petitioner's] beating of Doe was a

volitional act, similar to Guzman's act of turning into oncoming

traffic; and the injury to Doe's wrist occurred as a direct

consequence of [petitioner's] decision to beat Doe. For purposes of

determining the propriety of a finding that [petitioner] personally

inflicted great bodily injury pursuant to section 12022.7,

subdivision (a), it is of no consequence if [petitioner] accidentally,

rather than intentionally, stepped on Doe's arm in the course pf the

beating. (Cf. Guzman, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at 764.)

Id. at 6-7. 

The California Court of Appeal's decision was not objective unreasonable.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 n.13. The state

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appellate court reasonably determined that there was ample evidence to support

the trial court's finding that petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury on

Doe, even without considering Doe's broken wrist. In light of the severe and

long-lasting scars caused by petitioner whipping Doe with an electrical cord

some ten to twenty times, it simply cannot be said that no rational trier of fact

could have found that Doe's whipping injuries were significant or substantial. 

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Moreover, this court is bound by the state

appellate court's determination that, under California law, it matters not whether

petitioner accidentally, rather than intentionally, broke Doe's wrist in the course

of the beating. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 126 S. Ct. 602, 604 (2005) (a state

court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of

the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim of insufficiency of

the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 8, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge 

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