Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02998/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02998-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2998

___________

Anthony Phillips, Angie Phillips, *

*

Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 14, 2005

Filed: September 6, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Anthony Phillips appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on his negligence claim against the United States Postal Service (USPS). We reverse

and remand. 

I. 

In 1998, USPS contracted with trucking company Pat Salmon & Sons, Inc.

(S&S), to transport mail between USPS facilities in Little Rock, Arkansas, and

Indianapolis, Indiana. Pursuant to the contract, S&S truck drivers sort, load, and

unload mail in addition to transporting it. 

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1

It is undisputed that the contract between USPS and S&S required S&S to

maintain workers’ compensation benefits for its employees.

-2-

Phillips, a S&S mail truck driver since 1999, alleges that a USPS employee

negligently struck and injured him with a mail cage while Phillips was loading mail

at one of the Little Rock facilities. After settling a workers’ compensation claim with

S&S, Phillips filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The district court granted USPS’s subsequent

motion for summary judgment, holding that Phillips was barred from maintaining a

FTCA action against USPS because USPS was Phillips’s special employer and

because USPS was protected from tort liability by Arkansas’s “dual employment”

doctrine.

II. 

We review de novo the district’s court grant of summary judgment, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shanklin v. Fitzgerald,

397 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is proper when there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for injuries “caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while

acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the

United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with

the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

Under Arkansas law, which controls in this case, workers’ compensation is the

exclusive remedy available to employees against employers who “secure the

payment” of workers’ compensation benefits.1

 Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105. The

injured employee retains the right, however, to make a claim or maintain an action

against any non-employer third party. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-410. 

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2

We recognize that there is language in the Arkansas Supreme Court’s opinion

in Nat’l Union Fire Ins. v. Tri-State Iron and Metal, 914 S.W.2d 301 (Ark. 1996), that

might support an argument that a special employer is protected by the exclusive

remedy provision even if it does not meet the three-part dual employment test. Id. at

-3-

The issue before us is whether, with respect to Phillips, USPS is an employer

(and therefore insulated from tort liability through the operation of the exclusive

remedy provision) or a third party. Arkansas analyzes such questions under the dual

employment doctrine, which assumes that the employee has both a general employer

(here, S&S) and a special employer (putatively, USPS) for the act at issue (loading

mail) and asks whether: (1) “[t]he employee has made a contract for hire, express or

implied, with the special employer”; (2) “[t]he work being done is essentially that of

the special employer”; and (3) “[t]he special employer has the right to control the

details of the work.” Daniels v. Riley’s Health and Fitness Ctrs., 840 S.W.2d 177,

178-79 (Ark. 1992). If all three questions are answered in the affirmative, both the

general and the special employer are liable for workers’ compensation and are thus

protected by the exclusive remedy provision. Id.

 The district court found that each criterion of the dual employment test was

satisfied in Phillips’s case. We need not discuss whether the district court was correct

in its finding regarding the latter two aspects of the test, however, for we conclude

that the district court erred in finding that the first requirement—the existence of a

contract for hire—was satisfied. Simply put, there is no evidence in the record that

either an express or implied contract was formed between Phillips and USPS. In

contrast to the situation that existed in Daniels, where the employee signed a time

card which contained a contract pursuant to which the employee was provided to the

special employer, 840 S.W.2d at 177-78, there is no evidence in the present case that

Phillips had any knowledge of the details of the contract between S&S and USPS.

Nor is there evidence that Phillips in any way impliedly consented to an employeeemployer relationship with USPS.2

 See Charles v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 361 S.W.2d

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302. We note, however, that Arkansas law requires the presence of an express or

implied contract of hire or apprenticeship before an individual may be termed the

employee of a given employer. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(9)(A). Because the

record contains no evidence of a contract between Phillips and USPS, it is insufficient

to show that Phillips was USPS’s employee. 

-4-

1, 3-4 (Ark. 1962) (employee consented to special employment relationship where

employee worked on special employer’s property, received separate payment on

distinctive check from special employer, and testified that he understood that, while

on special employer’s property, he worked for special employer). See also Sharp

County Sheriff’s Office v. Ozark Acres Improvement Dist., 75 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Ark.

2002) (putative special employer cannot be liable for workers’ compensation benefits

where there is no express or implied contract for hire between special employer and

employee).

The district court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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