Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01836/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01836-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY L. MORELAND,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR 

LB-USB COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 

2004-C6 COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 

PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 

2006-C6; LB-USB 2004-C6 

STOCKDALE OFFICE LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP; LB-USB STOCKDATE 

OFFICE GP; LNR PARTNERS 

CALIFORNIA MANAGER, LLC; LNR 

PARTNERS, LLC, and DOES 1-10, 

inclusive,

 Defendants.

No. 1:14-cv-01836-JAM-JLT

ORDER GRANTING 

COUNTERCLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

LBUSB 2004-C6 STOCKDALE OFFICE 

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Counter-Claimant,

v.

TERRY L. MORELAND; PEGGY J. 

MORELAND,

Counter-Defendants.

Counter-defendants Terry and Peggy Moreland (“the 

Morelands”) agreed to personally repay a loan secured by real 

property in the event of a default. When default occurred, they 

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refused to pay and accused Counter-claimant LBUSB 2004–C6 

Stockdale Office Limited Partnership (“LBUSB”) as well as the 

original lender and other financial institutions of improperly 

securitizing the loan. The resulting barrage of litigation has 

now been reduced to a counterclaim against the Morelands seeking 

the loan payments they indisputably agreed to pay. The Morelands

filed no answer to the counterclaim and have failed to offer any 

valid defense. The Court now grants default judgement for LBUSB 

and awards damages in the amounts described herein.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2004, UBS Real Estate Investments, Inc. made a loan to 

Stockdale Tower I, LLC (“Stockdale”) in the amount of $24,000,000 

(“the loan”). See Counterclaim ¶ 9; Kerr Decl. Exh. 1. The 

Morelands personally guaranteed that loan. See Kerr Decl. Exh. 

4. In connection to the loan, Stockdale executed a Deed of 

Trust, which encumbered Stockdale Tower, a commercial office 

building located at 5060 California Avenue, Bakersfield, 

California. Counterclaim ¶¶ 5-6; Kerr Decl. Exh.1 . In June 

2010, the rights under the loan were transferred to LBUSB 2004-C6 

Stockdale Office Limited Partnership (“LBUSB”). Counterclaim 

¶¶ 18-19, Exhs. 5-10. 

When Stockdale defaulted, LBUSB caused a Notice of Default 

to be recorded. See Counterclaim ¶¶ 20-22; LBUSB’s Request for 

Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Exh. 2. In response to Stockdale’s

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for December 16, 2015.

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filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy, LBUSB entered into an agreement 

with Stockdale and the Morelands in which LBUSB agreed to hold 

off on foreclosure if the loan was paid off by January 2013. 

Counterclaim ¶¶ 23-24. Stockdale was unable to pay, and the 

property entered foreclosure in February 2013. Counterclaim ¶

26. LBUSB bought the property at foreclosure for $20,000,000. 

Id. This amount was insufficient to cover the outstanding 

principal, accrued interest and fees on the loan. Counterclaim 

¶¶ 26-28; Kerr Decl. ¶ 25.

Litigation ensued. The Morelands claimed that the 

securitization and transfer of the loan and the encumbered 

property were improper and void. LBUSB in turn sought payment 

from the Morelands under the guarantee. By August 2013, LBUSB 

and the Morelands had ostensibly resolved the matter through a 

Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release. Counterclaim ¶ 30; Exh. 

13. In the end, LBUSB intended to sell the property. See

Counterclaim ¶¶ 31, 33. The settlement agreement permitted the 

Morelands to participate in the sale, but the agreement

specifically prohibited them from “do[ing] anything to interfere 

with the Sale and/or prevent [LBUSB] from obtaining the maximum 

sale price available for the Property.” Counterclaim ¶ 31. The 

mutual release of liability provision of the agreement also 

stated that “the release shall have no force and effect and will 

be automatically revoked should [the Morelands] or any of their 

agents, employees, assigns or affiliates interfere with the 

Sale.” Counterclaim ¶ 32.

Bidding was set to open on October 20, 2014. Counterclaim 

¶ 35; Hanson Decl. ¶ 6. But on October 14, 2014, the Morelands 

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filed a notice of lis pendens and a new lawsuit in Kern County 

Superior Court. See Counterclaim ¶¶ 36-37; Hanson Decl. ¶ 5. On 

October 16, the Morelands’ counsel notified LBUSB, LBUSB’s broker 

for the sale, and the online bidding platform where the property 

was listed, demanding that all prospective buyers be notified 

about the lis pendens. Counterclaim ¶ 38; Hanson Decl. ¶ 5. The 

online platform posted the lis pendens and the Morelands’ new 

complaint on the website. See Counterclaim ¶ 39. Bidding opened 

as scheduled, but “was characterized by limited bidding and below 

market offers.” Counterclaim ¶ 40. LBUSB was unable to sell the 

property, in large part because it could not convey insurable 

title. See Counterclaim ¶ 40-41; Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.

LBUSB thereafter removed the Kern County action to this 

Court (Doc. #1) and filed a counterclaim against the Morelands 

(Doc. #9). The Counterclaim asserted breach of guaranty, breach 

of settlement agreement, slander of title, and cancellation of 

cloud on title. This Court eventually granted LBUSB’s motion to 

expunge lis pendens as well as its motion to dismiss the

Morelands’ complaint (Doc. #56). In the same order, the Court 

denied the Morelands’ motion to dismiss the counterclaim. 

Following that order, the Morelands failed to file an 

answer, so LBUSB requested entry of default (Doc. #59). The 

Clerk entered default in May 2015 (Doc. #61).

More than a month later, the Morelands moved to set aside 

the default (Doc. #65). The Court denied the motion following a 

hearing on August 19, 2015, indicating that the Morelands’ 

proposed answer contained no valid defense to the counterclaim 

(Doc. #68). LBUSB now moves for default judgment and an award of 

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damages (Doc. #71). The Morelands have filed an opposition (Doc.

#80).

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

When a responding party (here, a Counter-defendant) fails to 

file an answer, the clerk “must enter the party’s default.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once default is entered, the complaining party

(here, a counterclaimant) may apply to the Court for a default 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The Court has 

discretion to order default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In exercising that discretion, the 

Court “may” consider the following factors:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the 

[counterclaimant], (2) the merits of [counterclaimant’s] substantive 

claim, 

(3) the sufficiency of the [counterclaim], 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action; 

(5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material 

facts; 

(6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, 

and 

(7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).

Upon ordering a default judgment, the court determines

damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). In making that 

determination, the court takes as true all factual allegations 

made in the prevailing party’s pleading, except for allegations 

concerning the amount of damages owed. Geddes v. United Fin. 

Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). The prevailing party 

must show that there is “a basis” for the amount of damages 

through “[a]ffidavits or other documentary evidence.” Molina v. 

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Creditors Specialty Serv., Inc., 2010 WL 235042, at *1-*2 (E.D. 

Cal. Jan. 21, 2010) (citing Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, 

Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir.1997)); see

Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 

494, 498-99 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Plaintiff's burden in ‘proving up’

damages is relatively lenient. . . . [A] default judgment must 

be supported by specific allegations as to the exact amount of 

damages asked for in the complaint.”). The Court may also award 

attorneys’ fees if permitted by statute or prior agreement of the 

parties. Willamette Green Innovation Ctr., LLC v. Quartis 

Capital Partners, 2014 WL 5281039, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 

2014) report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 5260921 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 10, 2014) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 

Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975)).

B. Judicial Notice

LBUSB seeks judicial notice of eight exhibits (Doc. #76). 

Four are documents that have been recorded at the Kern County 

Recorder’s Office: a Substitution of Trustee dated July 26, 2010,

a Notice of Default dated July 30, 2010, a Notice of Trustee’s 

Sale dated March 28, 2011, and a Deed of Sale dated February 4, 

2013. The remaining four are documents filed in this Court or 

the bankruptcy court: Stockdale’s bankruptcy petition, motions 

and orders filed in this case, the transcript of this Court’s 

hearing on the motion to set aside default, and a copy of the 

docket. All these documents are in the public record and could 

not reasonably be disputed. Fed. R. Evid. 201; see Santa Monica 

Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 

(9th Cir. 2006); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 662, 689 

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(9th Cir. 2001). The Court therefore takes judicial notice of 

each document. 

C. Evidentiary Objections

The Morelands make several evidentiary objections (Docs. 

##80-2, 80-3, 80-4) to the declarations of Anne Edwards, Kevin 

Hanson, and Don Kerr, which LBUSB offered in support of its

motion for default judgment.

1. Edwards Declaration

The Morelands first contend that “Ms. Edwards attempts to 

introduce facts not in evidence.” Opposition to Declaration of 

Anne Edwards at 3. These facts supposedly include that U.S. Bank 

“has an equitable ownership interest in the subject property by 

assignment;” that LBUSB also “has equitable rights as the 

beneficiary”; that the “assigned interests were secured by [the] 

real property”; and that a merger with LaSalle Bank “included 

[the] real property as an income stream.” See id.

These objections suffer from a number of misunderstandings 

about the inquiry at default judgment. First of all, the 

counterclaim contains factual allegations describing the 

ownership of the loan, the use of the property to secure the 

loan, and the assignment of that loan. See Counterclaim ¶¶ 1-5, 

8-19. Because the Morelands never filed an answer, they admitted 

these factual allegations and the Court now takes them as true. 

Molina, 2010 WL 235042, at *1 (“Entry of default effects an 

admission of all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint by the 

defaulted party.”) (citing Geddes, 559 F.2d 557). 

Second, because the Court takes the counterclaim’s facts as 

true, there is no inquiry about what facts are “in evidence.” An 

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objection that a declarant’s statement assumes facts not in 

evidence is not a valid objection in this context.

Even if these were not the rules, this Court has already 

decided that the transfers of the loan and use of the property as 

security were proper, and that LBUSB has an interest in the 

property. See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 

11-18. The Court sees no reason to revisit its prior

conclusions. The objections are overruled. 

The Morelands make further objections to Ms. Edwards’

declaration apparently on the basis of foundation. They argue 

that she “does not aver or state that she has ever worked for 

Bank of America, N.A. or for U.S. Bank, N.A. in any capacity as 

it relates to the subject real property.” Opposition to 

Declaration of Anne Edwards at 3.

The Morelands do not explain why Ms. Edwards’ declaration is 

deficient without an allegation that she worked at one of these 

banks. The Court finds such an allegation unnecessary. The 

subject matter of her declaration is the progress of the 

litigation and the amount of fees expended in clearing the cloud 

on title on behalf of LBUSB. Ms. Edwards states that she is a 

principal of the law firm that represents LBUSB. Edwards’ Decl. 

¶ 1. This allegation provides sufficient foundation of her 

knowledge about the matters declared, so the Court overrules the 

Morelands’ objection.

The final objections restate the Morelands’ contention that 

LBUSB does not have an interest in the property and that LBUSB 

“has not been harmed as a direct and proximate result of [the 

Morelands’] acts or omissions.” Opposition to Declaration of 

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Anne Edwards at 3. As discussed above, the Morelands already

admitted to the factual issues surrounding LBUSB’s interest in 

the property and the harm the Morelands’ actions and inaction

caused. Moreover, this Court has already decided these issues

against the Morelands on the merits. These objections are 

therefore overruled.

2. Hanson Declaration

The Morelands challenge Mr. Hanson’s declaration on the 

bases that he (1) “does not aver or state that he works for 

[LBUSB] in any capacity”; (2) “does not state that he received 

transmission by a person with personal knowledge of the 

‘documents’”; and (3) “does not identify exactly what the term 

‘loan documents’ means or encompasses in its scope.” Opposition 

to Declaration of Kevin Hanson at 2.

As to the first objection, Mr. Hanson declares that he works 

for LNR, the servicer used by LBUSB, and that he was personally 

responsible for handling the marketing of the property for the 

attempted October 2014 sale. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 5. The fact 

that he worked for LNR in this role provides adequate foundation 

for the facts his declaration contains. The fact that he does 

not also work directly for LBUSB is not relevant.

The Morelands’ second objection about “transmission” of 

“documents” appears to relate to the second paragraph of Mr. 

Hanson’s declaration in which he purports to authenticate 

documents as “Business Records.” See Hanson Decl. ¶ 2 (“All 

Business Records for the Property have been maintained in the 

ordinary course of business . . . and were prepared and/or 

maintained in accordance with standard industry practice at or 

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around the time of the events described therein by or from a 

person with personal knowledge of such information.”). The Court 

cannot determine whether the documents are properly 

authenticated, because Mr. Hanson does not specify what documents 

he is talking about. No documents are attached to his 

declaration. The Morelands’ objection is therefore moot.

The final objection relates to the term “loan documents,” 

but that term does not appear in Mr. Hanson’s declaration. The 

objection is overruled.

3. Kerr Declaration

As with the previous declarants, the Morelands challenge Mr. 

Kerr’s knowledge of the transfer and securitization process. See

Opposition to Declaration of Don Kerr at 3-6. For the reasons 

stated above, these objections are overruled.

Each of the other objections to this declaration also fail. 

The Morelands first argue that Mr. Kerr has not adequately 

described his role and the timeframe of his employment. Id. at 

2. However, Mr. Kerr does explain that he is an “asset manager” 

for LNR and that as part of this role he was personally 

responsible for “enforcing the rights of [LBUSB]” under the loan. 

Kerr Decl. ¶¶ 1, 2 4. The fact that he left out a date in the 

first paragraph of his declaration is sloppy, but not fatal 

because he states in paragraphs 2 and 4 that he was employed with 

LNR at the time he worked on the loan at issue in this case. The 

objections are overruled.

Next, the Morelands challenge the basis of Mr. Kerr’s 

knowledge about documents because he “does not state that he 

received records from Wells Fargo from a person with knowledge of 

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the facts contained therein.” Opposition to Declaration of Don 

Kerr at 5. However, his declaration establishes that he does 

have adequate knowledge of the documents and in fact describes in 

detail how the documents were created. See Kerr Decl. ¶¶ 2-5, 

10-12, 18, 27-30.

The Morelands’ final objection is that the declaration does 

not properly authenticate electronically-generated business 

records as described in In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437 (9th Cir. 

B.A.P. 2005). As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that only 

Exhibits 12 and 13 (a summary of the outstanding balance related 

to the loan and the “Payoff Statement,” respectively) were

electronically generated. The other exhibits contain documents 

recorded in the Kern County Recorder’s Office, of which this 

Court has already taken judicial notice, or contracts between the 

parties or their predecessors, which were not electronically 

generated. As to Exhibits 1-11, the objection is therefore 

overruled. The Court also overrules this objection as to 

Exhibits 12 and 13, because the declaration adequately 

establishes a foundation. In re Vee Vinhnee concerns 

authentication “for results of a [computer] process or system.” 

336 B.R. at 446. Mr. Kerr’s declaration describes at length how 

the exhibits were created, and indicates that both were compiled 

by Mr. Kerr or at his direction. See Kerr Decl. ¶¶ 25-30. This 

foundation is adequate and the Court overrules the objection.

///

///

D. Analysis

1. Exercise of Discretion to Grant Default Judgment

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“Courts generally disfavor default judgments, [] especially 

those involving large sums.” Molina, 2010 WL 235042, at *1 

(citing In Re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir.

1993) and 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & 

Procedure: Civil 3d § 2681). Despite the millions of dollars at 

issue in this case, the Court concludes that the unique facts of 

the case warrant a default judgment. 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court has considered the 

seven Eitel factors, enumerated above. See Eitel 782 F.2d at 

1471-72. As discussed at the hearing on August 19 at which the 

Court denied the Morelands’ motion to set aside the default, 

LBUBS’s counterclaim is meritorious and the Morelands were unable 

to offer any valid defense - even when given the opportunity to 

do so. Indeed, the counterclaim establishes through well-pleaded 

facts that Stockdale defaulted on the $24 million mortgage and 

the Morelands are liable for that default because they personally 

guaranteed the loan. Counterclaim ¶¶ 9-14, 21-26. Because 

LBUSB’s claim is meritorious, the second, third, and fifth

factors weigh in favor of granting a default judgment. 

Also discussed at that hearing was the fact that the failure 

to answer was culpable conduct on behalf of the Morelands. It 

was not excusable neglect. The sixth factor therefore weighs in 

LBUSB’s favor.

The Court also concludes that LBUSB would suffer prejudice 

if judgment were not entered in its favor (the first Eitel

factor). The facts, evidence, and history of this case 

overwhelmingly show that the Morelands agreed to pay and 

currently owe a significant sum of money and have no valid 

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defense to liability. If the Court were to deny judgment, LBUSB

would be deprived of the remedy to which it is entitled and the 

Morelands would receive a windfall. See Truong Giang Corp. v. 

Twinstar Tea Corp., 2007 WL 1545173, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 

2007) (finding prejudice because “[i]f the Court were to deny 

[plaintiff’s] motion for default judgment, [plaintiff] would have

no other recourse for recovery”); Walters v. Shaw/Guehnemann 

Corp., 2004 WL 1465721, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2004) (“To deny 

plaintiffs' motion would leave them without a remedy. Prejudice 

is also likely in light of the merits of their claim.”).

The Court acknowledges the strong policy in favor of 

deciding cases on the merits (the seventh Eitel factor), but 

concludes that this policy is not contravened here. This case 

would almost certainly resolve in the same way even if the 

Morelands had filed their answer and continued in the litigation, 

because the case is devoid of a meritorious defense. 

This leaves only the fourth factor – the amount of money at

stake. Although this factor weighs towards denying default 

judgment, the Court concludes that the other six factors outweigh 

this one. The Court therefore exercises its discretion to grant 

a default judgment.

2. Damages

Having concluded that a default judgment is proper, the 

Court next turns to the appropriate amount of damages. As 

explained above, the Court makes this determination taking all 

well-pleaded facts in the counterclaim as true, except as to the 

amount of damages. To arrive at an amount, the Court looks to 

the evidence offered by LBUSB. The Morelands, for their part, 

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offered no evidence. 

In fact, besides their evidentiary objections, the Morelands 

have offered no arguments in opposition to LBUSB’s calculation of 

damages or the evidence supporting it. The bulk of the 

Morelands’ motion is instead devoted to re-arguing the issue of 

whether LBUSB has a valid interest in the property. As explained 

above, the Morelands have admitted on default that LBUSB has such 

an interest and the Court previously decided that issue in 

LBUSB’s favor anyway. 

Despite the absence of any opposition to LBUSB’s calculation 

of damages, the Court has conducted its own examination of the 

evidence and now concludes that it provides an adequate basis to 

award damages to LBUSB in the amounts enumerated below. 

a. Outstanding Loan Balance

The outstanding principal on the loan is $2,251,428.76. See

Kerr Decl. ¶ 25. Interest is also outstanding. Since February 

2, 2013 (the day following the trustee’s sale), interest has 

accrued on the outstanding balance at a rate of $3,406.03 per 

day. Kerr Decl. ¶ 26; id. Exh. 12; id. Exh. 1 ¶¶ 1-4. 

b. Yield Maintenance Premium

The loan contract provided that in the case of a foreclosure 

sale, a “proportionate Yield Maintenance Premium” “shall” be paid

to compensate the lender for the loss of future monthly debt 

payments. See Kerr Decl. Exh. 2 ¶¶ 3(c)(ii), 48. Based on the 

date of default and the loan balance at that time, the amount of 

the premium in this case is $1,971,757.89. See Kerr Decl. Exhs. 

12-13.

c. Other Fees and Penalties Related to the Loan

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The loan contract also provided for payment of late fees, 

trustee’s fees, title expenses, and costs for environmental 

reports and property inspections. See Kerr Decl. ¶¶ 25-27. The 

evidence shows that these fees and costs totaled $421,304.42. 

See id. ¶ 25.

d. Attorneys’ Fees 

LBUSB seeks attorneys’ fees to reimburse it for the expenses 

incurred in eliminating the cloud on title. Mot. at 13-14. 

LBUSB may recover reasonable litigation expenses as damages 

pursuant to its slander of title claim. Compass Bank v. 

Petersen, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“[I]t is 

well-established that attorney fees and litigation costs are 

recoverable as pecuniary damages in slander of title causes of 

action when . . . litigation is necessary to remove the doubt 

cast upon the vendibility or value of plaintiff's property.”) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Sumner Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, 

Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC, 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1030

(2012)); Spencer v. Harmon Enterprises, Inc., 234 Cal.App.2d 614, 

622 (1965).

LBUSB requests a total of $107,516.50 in attorneys’ fees. 

The Morelands have not argued that this sum is inappropriate or 

unreasonable. Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed the hours 

billed and tasks completed for reasonableness and determines that 

it is unreasonable to have billed this amount for just over six 

months of work. See Leary Decl. Exh. 1 (enumerating fees 

accumulated between October 15, 2014 and April 17, 2015); Edwards 

Decl. Exh. 4 (same). Breaking down the various tasks reveals an 

excessive amount of time spent by multiple attorneys. For 

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example, two individuals billed a total of 22.1 hours to 

“review,” “finaliz[e],” “proofread,” and “cite-check” the motion 

to expunge lis pendens – completely separate from the hours spent 

researching and drafting the motion. See Edwards Decl. Exh. 4. 

Some of the hourly rates are also unreasonable for this district. 

For example, the Court does not find any adequate justification 

for Ms. Leary’s hourly rate of $555.00 per hour. Overall, the 

Court reduces the fees by twenty percent. See In re Smith, 586 

F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (permitting courts to reduce fees 

by a percentage across-the-board rather than considering each 

task hour-by-hour). Reducing the amount requested by twenty 

percent, the Court awards reasonable fees of $86,013.20.

Type of Damages Amount

Outstanding principal $2,251,428.76

Outstanding interest $3,739,822.17

Yield maintenance premium $1,971,757.89

Loan fees and penalties $421,304.42

Attorneys’ fees $86,013.20

TOTAL: $8,470,326.44

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court enters default 

judgment in favor of Counterclaimant LBUSB and awards 

$8,470,326.44. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2016

Case 1:14-cv-01836-JAM-JLT Document 92 Filed 02/04/16 Page 16 of 16