Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02986/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02986-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN GARY THOMAS,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02986-WQH-NLS

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER

DENYING PETITIONER’S WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Steven Thomas, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner raises a single ground for relief, namely, that his sentence of life without the

possibility of parole, for a crime he committed while aged 20, violates the Eighth

Amendment proscription against cruel and usual punishment. Petitioner’s argument is

premised upon the retroactive effect of Miller v. Alabama, which holds life without the

possibility of parole is an Eighth Amendment violation for juveniles (those under 18);

coupled with California’s Senate Bill 261, which extends juvenile treatment for the

purposes of parole to persons aged under 23 years at the time of their offense. 

Respondent filed an answer to the Petition and argues that Petitioner fails to meet the

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). ECF No. 8. Petitioner filed a Traverse, expanding

upon his claim. ECF No. 13. 

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This Court reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s answer, the Traverse, and all

supporting documents. After a thorough review, this Court finds that Petitioner is not

entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

This Court quotes verbatim the following background from the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion. Lodgment 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“a determination of a

factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct”); Sumner v. Mata,

449 U.S. 539, 545−47 (1981) (deference is owed to factual findings of state trial and

appellate courts); Garvin v. Farmon, 258 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 2001) (paraphrasing

facts from the state court opinion). Petitioner may rebut the presumption of factual

correctness only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Slovik v.

Yates, 545 F.3d 1181, 1183 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008).

“In 1996, a jury convicted Petitioner Steven Thomas of first degree murder and

found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during the

commission of a robbery and during the commission of a kidnapping. Thomas was

sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. Thomas was 20 years

old at the time of the offense.” 

Petitioner does not raise a challenge to any of these facts, and does not challenge

his conviction.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996 governs

this Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Traverse, pg. 3:4-5. Under

AEDPA, a federal court will not grant a habeas petition with respect to any claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless that adjudication was (1) contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) based on

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an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.1 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). “This is a difficult to meet

and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt[.]” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.

170, 181 (2011) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

In applying these standards, a federal court looks to the “last reasoned decision”

from a lower state court to determine the rationale for the state courts’ denial of the

claim. See Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). There is a presumption that a claim that has

been silently denied by a state court was “adjudicated on the merits” within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and that AEDPA’s deferential standard of review therefore

applies, in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principle to the contrary. 

See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 (2013) (citing Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011)).

Petitioner initially raised his claim in a petition for habeas corpus in the San Diego

Superior Court. Lodgment 9. The Superior Court denied the petition in a reasoned

decision. Lodgment 10. Petitioner appealed the denial to California Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District. Lodgment 11. The Court of Appeal denied the petition in a

reasoned decision. Lodgment 12. Petitioner appealed to the California Supreme Court,

which summarily denied the Petition. Lodgment 13-14. Accordingly, under the “look

through” doctrine, this Court reviews the decision of the California Court of Appeal to

determine whether the decision “unreasonably applied” or was “contrary to” Supreme

Court law or “unreasonably determined” the facts. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

1 Petitioner’s relies only on 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), that the decision of state court “was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Petition, pg. 4, ¶ 7(b).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner’s argues his sentence is in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Petition,

pg. 3. Petitioner asserts that clearly established Federal law holds mandatory sentencing

a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment. Miller v. Alabama (“Miller”), 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469

(2012). Petitioner also points to the recent change to California’s state law that grants a

parole hearing to a “youth offender,” defined as a person serving a sentence for an

offense committed when under 23 years of age. Cal. Penal Code § 3051. 

Petitioner acknowledges that California Penal Code § 3051(h) excludes offenders,

such as himself, who were sentenced to LWOP from participation in parole eligibility. 

Traverse, pg. 5. However, Petitioner argues that Penal Code § 3051(h) was invalidated

by Montgomery v. Louisiana (“Montgomery”), 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016) (holding

Miller applies retroactively) and that the combined effect of these laws results in the need

for his resentencing. Traverse, pg. 8. 

B. The Court of Appeal Decision is Not Contrary to Clearly Established

Federal Law

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if: (1) the

state court applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court law; or (2) the state

court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the

Supreme Court but nevertheless arrives at a result that is different from the Supreme

Court precedent. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (citing Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)).

Clearly established Federal Law continues to define a juvenile as a person under

age 18. Accord, 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (“a ‘juvenile’ is a person who has not attained his

eighteenth birthday”). As the California Court of Appeal noted, “Miller and its progeny

expressly state that the holding in Miller applies only to criminal defendants under the

age of 18.” Lodgment 12. 

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The California Court of Appeal’s decision was consistent with Federal law. 

Petitioner, whose crime was committed at age 20, cannot rely on Supreme Court

authority applicable to juveniles. Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s decision neither

contradicts governing Supreme Court law, nor does Petitioner’s case present a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from Supreme Court precedent because the relevant

Supreme Court cases all address offenders under the age of 18. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at

2469; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74

(2010) (as modified July 6, 2010); Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725. 

C. The Court of Appeal Decision is Not an Unreasonable Application of

Clearly Established Federal Law

A state court’s decision is based upon an “unreasonable application” of clearly

established federal law if it applies the correct governing Supreme Court law but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at

412-13. A federal court may not grant habeas relief “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

Here, the Court of Appeal’s application of federal law as prohibiting LWOP

sentences for only juveniles, defined as those under the age of 18, is reasonable. No

federal authority has extended the protections provided to juveniles to those over the age

of 18 at the time of committing their respective offenses. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574

(“...a line must be drawn ... The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for

many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the

line for death eligibility ought to rest.”). See also, In re Garner, 612 F.3d 533, 535 (6th

Cir. 2010) (denying habeas request of petitioner aged 19 at time of crime where petitioner

argued he had the mental age of 14, stating, “the Roper Court clearly held that a sentence

of death may not be imposed upon an offender with a chronological age of less than 18.”)

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(emphasis in original); Pritchard v. Wetzel, No. CIV.A. 13-5406, 2014 WL 199907, at

*3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014) (collecting District Court cases within the Third Circuit). 

The Court of Appeal applied the correct governing law, and came to a reasonable

conclusion. As the Court of Appeal notes, California’s modification of a statute

applicable only to parole eligibility does not alter the federal definition of a juvenile. 

Lodgment 12 (“Penal Code section 3051 did not create a new definition of ‘juvenile’ for

purposes of the constitutionality analysis under Miller.”). 

D. California’s Penal Code § 3051 Does Not Alter Federal Authority or

Application of Federal Law 

Petitioner’s argument improperly attempts to combine California law with the

Constitutional substantive law outlined in Montgomery. Petitioner offers several

intertwined arguments in this regard. However, that California may treat persons aged

under 23 as juveniles does not change or extend the applicable substantive federal law

that treats only those under the age of 18 as juveniles. For this reason, Petitioner fails to

state a valid basis for federal habeas review.

Petitioner argues that California Penal Code § 3051(h), which excludes Petitioner

from parole eligibility because he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,

was invalidated by Montgomery because, as currently written, it denies parole eligibility

to even those under the age of 18 who were sentenced to life without the possibility of

parole. Traverse, pgs. 5, 8. Petitioner goes on to argue that the remainder of Penal Code

§ 3051 placed the Petitioner into a certain category of punishment,” specifically, the

category of persons under age 23 who should receive consideration of the factors of

youth. Traverse, pg. 6. Petitioner argues that because California has placed him into this

category, and that Montgomery addresses categories—not a specific age—and is applied

retroactively, that these combine to direct that Petitioner be resentenced so that these

factors may be considered. Traverse, pgs. 5-7. 

In Montgomery, the Supreme Court affirmed that substantive rules of constitutional

law apply retroactively. 136 S. Ct. at 729-730 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

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(1989)). The Court explained that a substantive law is one that “prohibits ‘a certain

category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’” Id.

at 732 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)). The Court held that Miller

announced a substantive rule of constitutional law that must be given retroactive effect in

collateral state court proceedings. Id. at 736. Specifically, that Miller held that life

without parole was an unconstitutional penalty for the class of offenders with the status of

juveniles, i.e., under the age of 18 and with all the attendant characteristics of youth,

because a mandatory LWOP sentence would not permit the consideration of the

“transient immaturity” of a juvenile offender. Id. at 733-34. Thus, to the extent

Montgomery is retroactive, it applies only to those under the age of 18. 

Federal habeas review does not confer jurisdiction on Federal Courts to alter State

law. State legislatures are free to enact policy choices in their sentencing schemes. 

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“Selecting the sentencing rationales is

generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.”) Senate

Bill 261, codified at California Penal Code § 3051, expressly excludes persons sentenced

to life without the possibility of parole, like Mr. Thomas, from participation in the new

parole procedure. Cal. Pen. Code, § 3051(h). The effect of Montgomery does not alter

this outcome for persons over the age of 18 at the time of their offense, including

Petitioner. 

Nor does the remainder of Penal Code § 3051 and the “category” analysis aid

Petitioner’s argument because the category at issue in Montgomery extends only to the

category it addressed: juveniles as defined in federal law. The federal law definition of

juvenile is well developed and includes only those who are under the age of 18. Accord,

18 U.S.C. § 5031; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Roper, 543 U.S. at 568; Graham v. Florida,

560 U.S. at 74. It was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law for the

California Court of Appeal to decline to extend the definition of “juvenile” farther than

the bounds of the Supreme Court precedent, all of which only address cases of

individuals under the age of 18. While California may have placed persons under the age

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of 23 into the category of “juvenile” for the purposes of parole, California’s

categorization is not a “substantive rule of constitutional law” that must be given

retroactive effect under Montgomery. For this reason, Petitioner’s argument fails.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

In sum, Petitioner’s claim is reliant on federal law addressing protections afforded

to juveniles. Clearly established federal law continues to define a juvenile as a person

under age 18, excluding Petitioner whose crime was committed at age 20. 

For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner is not entitled to relief and this Court

RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DENY it the Petition.

V. CONCLUSION

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted

to the United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 23, 2017, any party to this action may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections must be filed with

the court and served on all parties no later than July 7, 2017. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

Dated: June 2, 2017

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