Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01806/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01806-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WEI LIN,

Petitioner,

v.

RICHARD VALINKEN, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 1:19-cv-01806-EPG-HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR STAY OF REMOVAL

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(ECF No. 4)

Petitioner Wei Lin is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner alleges violations of his right to due process in connection with 

his expedited removal proceedings and credible fear determination. (ECF No. 1). , Petitioner also 

moves for stay of removal. (ECF No. 4). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a 

United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF Nos. 11, 13).

On January 8, 2020, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response to both the petition 

and Petitioner’s motion for stay of removal within sixty days. (ECF No. 10). On February 28, 

2020, Respondent filed a status report, informing the Court that although Petitioner was 

scheduled for removal in early February 2020, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 

has temporarily suspended all removals to China due to the coronavirus outbreak. (ECF No. 12 

at 1). DHS indicates that Petitioner’s removal will be rescheduled as soon as the temporary 

suspension has been lifted. Respondent requested a ninety-day extension of time to file its 

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answer to the petition because the “habeas petition challenging petitioner’s immigration 

detention will become moot once the removal order is executed.” (ECF No. 12 at 2).1

The Court denied Respondent’s request for a ninety-day extension of time. The Court 

ordered that Respondent file a response to Petitioner’s motion for stay or removal on or before 

March 9, 2020. (ECF No. 14). To date, Respondent has failed to file a response to the motion, 

and the time for doing so has passed.

In evaluating whether to issue a stay, a court considers the following factors: 

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay

will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 

556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). “The first two factors . . . are the most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 

434. Further, “if the petitioner has not made a certain threshold showing regarding irreparable 

harm . . . then a stay may not issue, regardless of the petitioner’s proof regarding the other stay 

factors.” Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 965 (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). 

[A] petitioner seeking a stay of removal must show that irreparable 

harm is probable and either: (a) a strong likelihood of success on 

the merits and that the public interest does not weigh heavily 

against a stay; or (b) a substantial case on the merits and that the 

balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor. As has 

long been the case, “[t]hese standards represent the outer extremes 

of a continuum, with the relative hardships to the parties providing 

the critical element in determining at what point on the continuum 

a stay pending review is justified.” Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514.

Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 970.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

“There is some uncertainty as to the exact degree of likely success that stay petitioners 

must show, due principally to the fact that courts routinely use different formulations to describe 

this element of the stay test.” Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 966. “What is clear, however, is that to 

justify a stay, petitioners need not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that they will win on 

the merits.” Id.

1 Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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There are many ways to articulate the minimum quantum of likely 

success necessary to justify a stay—be it a “reasonable 

probability” or “fair prospect,” as Hollingsworth, 130 S.Ct. at 710, 

suggests; “a substantial case on the merits,” in Hilton’s words, 481 

U.S. at 778, 107 S.Ct. 2113; or, as articulated in Abbassi, 143 F.3d 

at 514, that “serious legal questions are raised.” We think these 

formulations are essentially interchangeable, and that none of them 

demand a showing that success is more likely than not. Regardless 

of how one expresses the requirement, the idea is that in order to 

justify a stay, a petitioner must show, at a minimum, that she has a 

substantial case for relief on the merits.

Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 967–68 (footnote omitted).

In his petition, Petitioner alleges violations of his right to due process in connection with 

his expedited removal proceedings and credible fear determination. The Ninth Circuit recently 

held that the Suspension Clause requires habeas review of claims that the government “failed to 

follow the required procedures and apply the correct legal standards when evaluating [a 

petitioner’s] credible fear claim” in an expedited removal proceeding. Thuraissigiam v. U.S.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court granted 

certiorari, and oral argument was held on March 2, 2020. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.

Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 427, 205 L. Ed. 2d 244 (2019). Given that the instant petition 

implicates law that is evolving,2the Court finds that “serious legal questions are raised.”

B. Irreparable Harm

“[T]o obtain a stay of removal, an alien must demonstrate that irreparable harm is 

probable if the stay is not granted.” Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968. “Although removal is a serious 

burden for many aliens, it is not categorically irreparable.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. “Instead, a 

noncitizen must show that there is a reason specific to his or her case, as opposed to a reason that 

would apply equally well to all aliens and all cases, that removal would inflict irreparable harm.” 

Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 969. A nonexhaustive list of irreparable harm factors to consider 

include: whether removal would effectively prevent a noncitizen from pursuing a petition for 

review, physical danger to the noncitizen if removed to his home country, separation from family 

members, medical needs, and potential economic hardship. Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 969–70.

2

In Thuraissigiam, the Ninth Circuit did not “decide in this opinion what right or rights [the petitioner] may

vindicate via use of the writ.” 917 F.3d at 1119.

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Here, Petitioner states that he will suffer irreparable harm because “he cannot argue on 

his own if he is removed to China without any resources and/or access to the courts.” (ECF No. 4 

at 3). Petitioner’s statement is conclusory, and he does not provide sufficient factual allegations 

to establish that he will be unable to effectuate the filing of papers from abroad either through the 

mail or by electronic means.

Petitioner also asserts that he “is afraid to go back to China because of the fear of being 

tortured, put in prison by the government due to implicating a former senator in the Northern 

Marianas . . . as the leader of a prostitution ring” and due to filing a motion to disqualify the 

Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands because the former senator is 

the judge’s brother. (ECF No. 4 at 3). Although Petitioner states “Adi di brother3that also 

worked for the Chinese government,” it is unclear how Petitioner’s implication of a former 

senator in the Northern Mariana Islands4as the leader of a prostitution ring puts Petitioner in fear 

of being tortured or put in prison by the government if Petitioner is removed to China. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has not established that irreparable harm is 

probable. 

C. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest

The third and fourth factors merge where the government is the opposing party. LeivaPerez, 640 F.3d at 970 (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 435). The Supreme Court recognized the 

“public interest in preventing aliens from being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries 

where they are likely to face substantial harm,” but also acknowledged “[t]here is always a 

public interest in prompt execution of removal orders,” especially if the noncitizen “is 

particularly dangerous, or has substantially prolonged his stay by abusing the processes provided 

to him.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 436. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized, however, “that although 

petitioners have the ultimate burden of justifying a stay of removal, the government is obliged to 

3

It is unclear from Petitioner’s motion who “Adi di brother” is.

4

“From 1947 until 1986, what is now the [Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands] was a trust territory

administered by the United States pursuant to an agreement with the Security Council of the United Nations. In 

1972, the Islands entered into formal negotiations with the United States to finalize and make permanent the 

relationship between the entities.” Armstrong v. N. Mariana Islands, 576 F.3d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

citations omitted).

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bring circumstances concerning the public interest to the attention of the court.” Leiva-Perez, 

640 F.3d at 970.

Here, Respondent has made no argument that Petitioner is particularly dangerous or has 

prolonged his stay by abusing the processes provided to him. Indeed, Respondent failed to 

respond to the motion at all despite the Court ordering Respondent to do so. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that the public interest in preventing noncitizens from being wrongfully removed 

weighs in favor of a stay of removal.

D. Conclusion

As set forth above, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that irreparable harm is 

probable and thus, a stay is not warranted based on the allegations currently before the Court. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for stay of removal (ECF No. 

4) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner renewing his motion for stay of removal if 

he believes he can provide additional true factual allegations that would establish irreparable 

harm is probable.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2020 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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