Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01262/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01262-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Sherrors appeal was consolidated with that of his co-defendant, James Willard Hall. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONNIE JERMAINE SHERRORS, Civil No. 05-1262 IEG (LSP)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE CONDITIONALLY GRANTING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

vs.

A.K. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Ronnie Jemaine Sherrors, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court

conviction in case number SCD148249 for first degree murder with the special circumstance of

murder during the course of a robbery.

The Court has considered the Petition and Exhibits, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s

Traverse and all the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents,

and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition be conditionally

GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion,

People v. Hall,

1

 No. D038857, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2003). This Court gives deference

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to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct; Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical

fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption

of correctness). The facts as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

Foth was a songwriter-musician who lived in San Francisco and ran a

record store there (Rocket Records). Having grown up in San Diego, Foth had

close friends here, including Grace Ko, Steve Poltz and Ken Horne. By the late

1990's, Rocket Records’ business began to decline; Foth began to experience

financial problems and by 1999 had started using crack cocaine and “hanging

around” with prostitutes. (All further dates are in 1999 except as otherwise noted.)

After Ko became aware of Foth’s problems, she convinced him to come to San

Diego for a couple of months to stay with her and try to get his life back in order.

In early September, Foth moved into Ko’s home in Mission Hills; he was

depressed and slept a lot.

On the afternoon of Wednesday, September 29, Ko and Foth drove to the

Oceanside home of Louis and Christine Mello. Ko and Christine went shopping;

Foth planned to spend time with Louis, visit some other friends and then return to

Ko’s house to pick up Horne to join Ko and the Mellos for dinner at a Chevy’s

restaurant in Carmel Mountain Ranch. Ko left the keys to her car, a black Audi

A4, and her cell phone with Foth, as well as her Visa card so that Foth could put

some gasoline in the car.

Foth visited with Louis until sometime between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. and

then drove to Poltz’s apartment. Although Foth professed that he was not using

drugs anymore, Poltz declined to give Foth any money because he was

unconvinced by Foth’s statements, in part because Foth had spent a night away

from Ko’s home in the first week after his arrival in San Diego and lied to his

friends about where he was. Poltz offered, however, to pay for Foth to see a

therapist he knew to help Foth deal with his problems. Foth told Poltz that he

would think about it, but was antsy because he wanted to “get laid.” While Foth

was with Poltz, he called a couple of women with whom he had been sexually

intimate in the past. Foth left Poltz’s apartment about 5:30 p.m. Foth was wearing

faded black Levi’s, a black T-shirt, Doc Marten wingtip shoes and a cheap plastic

watch.

After Foth arrived back at Ko’s house, he spoke on the phone with Horne,

saying that he was going to see another friend to borrow some money but would

be back. Foth had not returned by the time Horne arrived but had left a note. At

6:50 p.m. (according to cell phone records), Horne called Ko’s cell phone,

expecting to reach Ko, but Foth answered and told Horne that he would be back

“in a bit.” It sounded like Foth was driving at the time. After 15 minutes passed,

Horne tried the cell phone again, but got no answer.

Ko and the others waited for Foth to arrive at Chevy’s and, by 7:00 p.m., she became

concerned about where Foth was. Ko called her cell phone number every 10 minutes or

so for the rest of the evening but only got the voice mail. Someone unsuccessfully

attempted to use Foth’s ATM card at 8:56 p.m. and someone used Ko’s cell phone [at

11:46 p.m.]to call a pager owned by Michael Washington, a friend of Sherrors’s and

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Hall’s.

In the late afternoon of September 30, a worker at the Pinery Tree Farms

discovered Foth’s naked body in a brushy area near a work site on Highland

Valley Road and pointed it out to his manager, Laurence Prindle. Although

Prindle had come by the site several times that day, he had not seen the body

earlier. Prindle called 911. Responding officers determined that Foth was dead

and found a number of items at the scene, including a shirt, a pair of size eight

sneakers, a Seiko wristwatch with a metal face, a broken fingernail and a pair of

bloodstained white socks. They also found a circular bloodstain, one foot in

diameter and two inches deep, near the fence and marks on the ground leading

from the stain to the place where they found Foth’s body, suggesting that the body

had been dragged. They also found a shoe print in the soil.

An autopsy showed that Foth, who was six feet, one-half inch tall and

weighed 183 pounds, had bled to death. The body had approximately 83 stab

wounds, many of which were in the upper chest and neck area, as well as

abrasions on the back, defensive wounds to the right hand and wrist and a blunt

force trauma to the head. It also had streaks of seminal fluid across the right thigh,

an occurrence that is not unusual for a male homicide victim and that did not

necessarily indicate the victim had been engaged in sex. The body tested negative

for the presence of drugs.

On October 9, Lena Hixon told her close friend, Eric Bazile, that she had

witnessed “something . . . pretty bad” and that two guys had threatened her life.

Bazile and his friend Shahyid told Hixon to call the police. Hixon refused, so

Shahyid made the call. Hixon left Bazile’s apartment and Shahyid followed her.

The two argued, attracting the attention of the police, and Shahyid told the officers

what Hixon had said. The officers arrested Hixon, who was carrying a razor blade.

Hixon falsely told police that she had committed this crime with two men

named Benjamin Wilson and Terrence Smallgreen and that Smallgreen had lost

his watch and left his shirt at the scene. A few days later, Hixon told Bazile that

Sherrors and Hall were involved in the murder and asked Bazile to notify the

police. Hixon repeated her statements in her subsequent police interview.

At trial of the charges against Sherrors and Hall, Hixon testified as follows:

In the late afternoon or early evening of September 29, Foth approached

Hixon near University and Euclid Avenues and asked if she knew where to buy

some rock cocaine. Although Hixon initially hesitated because she suspected that

Foth was an undercover agent, she ultimately told him she knew where to get

some; they drove in Ko’s Audi to an apartment on Wightman Street, where

Sherrors and Hall were living. At the time, Sherrors, Hall and Hixon were

handling drug sales for Hixon’s boyfriend, Michael Washington.

When Hixon whistled loudly, Hall and Sherrors came out of the apartment.

Hixon told Sherrors that Foth was looking for cocaine and Sherrors spoke briefly

to Foth, who was still sitting in the car. Sherrors and Hall got into the vehicle with

Foth. Sherrors told Hixon they would be right back and the three men drove off.

After 15 to 20 minutes, Sherrors drove up in the Audi with Hall sitting in

the back seat; Foth did not appear to be with them. Sherrors and Hall told Hixon

that they had “hooked [Foth] up” and he was letting them use the car in exchange

for drugs, a practice that is not uncommon for drug dealers. Sherrors told Hixon

to get in the car to go smoke some “weed” and Hixon complied.

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Sherrors initially had difficulty driving with the car’s stick shift but seemed

to have it figured out by the time he got onto the I 15 freeway. After awhile,

Hixon became concerned because it was unusual for a dealer to keep a customer’s

car for that period of time; Sherrors responded by explaining that he and Hall had

robbed Foth, but Hixon thought he was kidding.

They continued to drive north until they neared Lake Hodges and exited the

freeway onto a dark street. Sherrors parked the car in a dirt lot, told Hixon to stay

there and said he and Hall would be right back. The men opened the trunk and

Foth climbed out. Foth was clothed, but he was holding his hands as if they were

tied. Hixon got out of the car and demanded to know what was happening;

Sherrors grabbed her hands, breaking two of her acrylic fingernails. Sherrors told

Hixon to “shut the f--- up” and threatened to kill her and everybody she knew.

Sherrors turned back toward Hall and Foth, who were tussling, and started

to stab Foth. Foth did not appear to put up a fight but merely said, “Let me die.”

Sherrors continued to stab Foth for several minutes and then walked back to Hixon

with the knife and told her to stab Foth. Hixon initially refused, but stabbed Foth

once after Sherrors insisted they were not going to just let her walk away;

according to her testimony, Hixon believed that Foth was already dead. Sherrors

and Hall stripped Foth and threw his body into the bushes. Hall put Foth’s clothes

into the trunk and Sherrors, Hall and Hixon got into the Audi. Sherrors was

wearing a different shirt than he had had on earlier.

With Sherrors at the wheel, the threesome got back onto the freeway and

headed southbound. At some point, Sherrors muttered that he had dropped his

watch at the scene. They drove for about five or 10 minutes and got off the

freeway to stop at an AM PM convenience store/gas station. Hall purchased some

cigarettes at the store and attempted unsuccessfully to use Foth’s ATM card.

(Although Hall had used the correct PIN number for Foth’s account, the bank had

“frozen” the account six days earlier.) Sherrors and Hall dropped Hixon off at a

liquor store at University and Euclid Avenues. Sherrors held up a picture of

Hixon’s five-year-old daughter and said, “She’s growing up to be real pretty. I

think you’d like to keep it that way.”

In addition to Hixon’s testimony, the prosecution introduced evidence of

the following:

Sherrors eventually returned to the Wightman Avenue apartment, wearing

his sister’s “old laundry shirt” inside out and backwards. There were blood marks

on the front side of the shirt (as worn normally) and a significant amount of blood

on Sherrors’s white Fila tennis shoes. Sherrors later left the apartment with a bag

and, when asked where he was going, responded, “Don’t worry about it.” He was

wearing gray Nike shoes at the time. Sherrors’s sister never saw her shirt again.

Shortly after Sherrors left the apartment, a neighbor called the fire department because

her downstairs unit at the same complex was filled with smoke that smelled of burnt

plastic. She directed the responding firefighters to the complex’s dumpster area, where

they found a smoldering pile of debris. The firefighters stomped out the remains of the

fire.

Sherrors and Hall kept the car for several days, claiming it belonged to

Hixon’s mother. On October 2, the men saw a newscast regarding the murder that

mentioned the car and, early the next morning, the car burned in a fire as it sat in

a nearby alley. After the fire was extinguished, police inspected the car, but did

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not find any of the defendants’ fingerprints on the car exterior or any detectable

bloodstains in the trunk.

On October 14, police searched the Wightman apartment and arrested

Sherrors, Hall and Jimmie Washington. They took saliva, blood and other

samples from Sherrors, Hall and Jimmie. They found Foth’s high school class

ring in a pair of Hall’s pants and found Michael Washington’s pager number in

Sherrors’s pocket. They ultimately re-arrested Hixon, who was charged with

Sherrors and Hall for Foth’s murder.

While Hixon was being held at the Los Colinas Women’s Detention

Center, she spoke several times to inmate Kathrine Davis about the incident.

Hixon told Davis that she had approached Foth to see if he wanted her services as

a prostitute and that she, Sherrors and Hall had robbed Foth and killed him. Hixon

also told Davis that although she did not initially realize that Foth was in the trunk

of the Audi, she found that out as the three were driving north. She indicated to

Davis that she stabbed Foth several times and held him down as Sherrors and Hall

stabbed him. Hixon said that “her old man” had destroyed the shoes she wore on

the night of Foth’s murder and that her clothes from that night were burned in the

car. Hixon was hesitant to testify against Hall, who was an old friend, and she

was also concerned about her safety as a result of threats Sherrors had made

against her.

In November, Michael Washington stored some items at the house of

Mikiisha Perine. Several months’ later, when Perine was preparing to move, she

looked through the items and found a blue purse containing Hixon’s social

security card, Ko’s Visa and Costco cards, Foth’s ATM card and three of Foth’s

business cards. Perine called Ko, who alerted the police.

Hixon entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors in which she agreed

to plead guilty to conspiracy to sell cocaine and assault with a deadly weapon and

to testify truthfully in these criminal proceedings against Sherrors and Hall. In

accordance with the agreement, the court sentenced Hixon to 12 years in prison.

Counsel for Sherrors and Hall responded to the prosecution’s evidence by

attacking Hixon’s credibility through evidence that she was a prostitute and drug

user, had changed her story about the events of the evening in question, had made

statements to Kathrine Davis indicating that she had significant involvement in the

murder, had lied in saying that she never used Ko’s cell phone and had not been

in the Audi at all after Sherrors and Hall dropped her off. Defense counsel also

argued that it was not possible for the events of September 29 to have happened

as Hixon testified.

(Resp’t Lodgment 4 at 2-10.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2000, the District Attorney for the County of San Diego filed an Amended

Information charging Ronnie Sherrors with one count of murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)), and

further alleged the use of a deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code §12022(b)(1)) and a special

circumstance of murder during the commission of a robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)).

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(Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 66-70.)

On June 7, 2001, a jury found Sherrors guilty of murder in the first degree and found true

the deadly weapon allegation as well as the murder during commission of a robbery special

circumstance. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 299-300.) On September 28, 2001, the trial court

sentenced Sherrors to life without the possibility of parole, plus one year. (Resp’t Lodgment No.

15 at 329-330.) 

Sherrors appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division

One. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1.) On July 16, 2003, the appellate court affirmed Sherrors’

conviction in an unpublished decision. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 4.) On August 15, 2003, Sherrors

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 5) The court

denied the petition without comment on October 1, 2003. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 6.) 

On October 25, 2004, Sherrors filed a petition for habeas corpus in the San Diego

Superior Court, raising fifteen claims. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 9.) The court denied the petition

in a reasoned decision on December 9, 2007. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 10.) Sherrors then filed

a sixteen-claim petition for habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal, which was denied

on February 24, 2005. (Resp’t Lodgment Nos. 11 & 12.) Finally, Sherrors filed a seventeenclaim habeas petition with the California Supreme Court on March 28, 2005, which was denied

on March 15, 2006. (Reps’t Lodgment Nos. 13 & 14.) 

Sherrors filed the instant Petition in this Court on June 20, 2005 [Doc. No. 1].

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on September 12, 2005 [Doc. No. 8]. The

Court denied the motion on March 23, 2006. Respondent filed an Answer [Doc. No. 29], and

Petitioner filed his Traverse on October 25, 2006 [Doc. No. 42].

IV. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

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28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added).

The current petition is governed by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Sherrors must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds

by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus

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claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result

of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision

will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

Sherrors raises fourteen grounds for relief in his petition, some of which contain two or

even three distinct federal claims: (1) his federal due process rights were violated when the trial

court instructed the jury that witness Hixon was an accomplice and there was no other evidence

presented to corroborate her testimony and he was denied effective assistance of appellate

counsel when counsel failed to raise this claim on appeal; (2) his right to due process was

violated when the trial court failed to instruct the jury that Hixon’s plea agreement did not

exempt her from the corroboration requirement and trial counsel and appellate counsel were

ineffective for failing to object at trial and raise the claim on appeal; (3) his right to due process

and to confront witnesses against him was violated when the trial court precluded evidence

related to witness Walker’s mental capacity and propensity to be dishonest, he also claims his

counsel was ineffective for failing to cite to the appropriate Constitutional provisions during the

hearing regarding Walker’s testimony, failing to acquire additional records regarding Walker’s

mental capacities and an expert examination of Walker and failing to argue that Walker waived

her privilege; (4) his right to due process and an impartial jury were violated by pre-trial

publicity, racial and class bias, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately voir

dire prospective jurors; (5) his right to due process was violated when the state tested a cigarette

butt for DNA and in the process consumed the entire sample, leaving nothing for a defense

expert to test independently, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for

dismissal as a result; (6) his rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were

violated when the court found Walker competent to testify and counsel failed to adequately

challenge her competency; (7) his rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were

violated when the court erroneously instructed the jury as to the special circumstance allegation

and counsel failed to object; (8) his rights to due process, a jury trial and effective assistance of

counsel were violated when the jury was given defective verdict forms and counsel failed to seek

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correction of the forms; (9); his rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were

violated when the court erroneously instructed the jury and counsel failed to seek curative

instruction (10) his due process rights were violated when he was convicted without sufficient

evidence; (11) his due process rights were violated when the prosecutor committed misconduct

during closing argument; (12) his right to due process was violated by the introduction of

perjurious testimony; (13) his rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were

violated when the police and prosecutor coerced witness Lena Hixon into giving false testimony;

(14) his right to due process was violated when the prosecution failed to discover and turn over

records concerning witness Trina Walker’s disability and therapy. (See Pet. at 9A-9F.)

The court will address each ground for relief as Sherrors raised it and address each

individual claim included therein. However, because many of the grounds for relief are similar

or overlap, the Court has grouped similar grounds together. 

1. Claims Regarding Witness Lena Hixon’s Testimony

Sherrors argues that several errors occurred related to the testimony of Lena Hixon, the

prosecution’s principle witness. Hixon was originally charged, along with Sherrors and Hall,

with first degree murder with special circumstances. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17, vol. 7 at 906-08,

909-10.) However, after her preliminary hearing, she agreed to assist the prosecution and

entered into a plea agreement. In exchange for her testimony against Sherrors and Hall, she

would plead guilty to conspiracy to sell cocaine (Cal. Penal Code § 182) and assault with a

deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)) and receive a sentence of twelve years’

imprisonment. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 912-13.) Under the terms of the agreement, if Hixon

did not testify truthfully, she could be prosecuted for first degree murder and also prosecuted for

perjury. (Id. at 911.) 

Five of Sherrors’ grounds for relief stem from alleged errors regarding Hixon’s testimony.

More than one constitutional claim is raised in a single ground for relief. (See Pet. at 9A-9F.)

a. Ground One:

Sherrors first argues the jury was improperly instructed that Lena Hixon was an

accomplice as a matter of law and the other evidence presented at trial failed to corroborate her

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2

 Cal. Penal Code § 1111 states:

A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be

corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the

commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the

commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.

An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the

identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the

testimony of the accomplice is given.

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testimony. Sherrors alleges this amounted to a violation of both Cal. Penal Code § 11112 and

his federal due process rights. He also claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing

to raise this claim on appeal. (Pet. at 9A.)

(1) Due Process

Sherrors raised the due process claim in a petition for review of a habeas corpus filed in

the California Supreme Court, which denied it without citation of authority. (See Lodgment No.

14.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address

the claim, the superior court opinion denying his habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. The superior court denied the claim, stating there was no

violation of section 1111 because “it is clear from the appellate decision that there was ample

evidence connecting Petitioner to the murder beyond Hixon’s testimony.” (Resp’t Lodgment

No. 10 at 2.) 

The state court’s denial of Sherror’s claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established law. Although the state court did not discuss the federal

aspect of Sherror’s claim, the Supreme Court has noted a state court need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither

the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]”

the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

First, Sherrors’ claim is without merit because there is no clearly established federal law

requiring the standard set forth in Cal. Penal Code § 1111 be met. “As a statutory rule, and to

the extent that the uncorroborated testimony is not ‘incredible or insubstantial on its face,’ [Cal.

Penal Code § 1111] is not required by the Constitution or federal law.” Laboa v. Calderon, 224

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3

 Another witness, seven-year-old Douglas Griffey (who was five at the time of the murder) also

testified to seeing blood on Sherrors’ shirt and shoes. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 876-78.) However,

Douglas also testified to witnessing patently fantastical things that night. For instance, he testified that

he witnessed the victim being murdered and dismembered in the back of the alley by men wielding

ninja swords and seeing a car being blown up by a bomb. (Id. at 878-85.)

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F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th

Cir. 1993).

Thus, clearly established law requires only that the testimony be not be “incredible or

insubstantial on its face.” Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979.) Here, as the state court found, Hixon’s

testimony was not incredible or insubstantial. Further, there was ample evidence to corroborate

her testimony. Trina Walker testified that when Sherrors returned that night, he was wearing one

of her “laundry” shirts, backward and inside out. She stated that she saw blood on Sherrors’

shoes and shirt when he returned home on the night of the murder.3

 (Id. at 1347-1349, 1371-72,

1372-74.) Walker also identified a watch found at the crime scene as Sherrors. (Id. at 1342-44.)

She also stated that she saw Sherrors leave with a bag soon after he came home and changed out

of his clothes. (Id. at 1352). Moments later, there was a fire near the dumpster. (Id. at 1352,

382-85, 366-71, 374-75.) In addition, at least one witness saw Sherrors and Hall driving the

Audi in the days after the murder (Id. at 890-83.) Several witnesses also had seen the Audi

parked in the alley behind the apartment in which Hall and Sherrors’ were staying. (Id. at 750-

52, 752-54, 754, 57.) The Audi was ultimately set on fire in an alley very close to the apartment

where the two defendants were staying. Finally, a phone number written on Sherrors’ Social

Security card was called at 11:46 p.m. on the night of the murder by someone using Ko’s stolen

cell phone. (Id. at 1247-58, 1284, 1405-07.) This call was made right around the time Sherrors

had returned to the apartment wearing the bloody shirt and shoes and then left holding a bag.

Shortly after, the dumpster fire was called in at 11:47 p.m. (Id. at 378-79.)

Other evidence introduced by the defense also corroborated her testimony. Katherine

Davis was a fellow inmate of Hixon’s. Although much of Davis’ testimony was related to

discrepancies between what Hixon told Davis and what Hixon told the police, other portions of

Davis’ testimony corroborated Hixon. For instance, Hixon consistently told Davis that she

(Hixon), Sherrors and Hall had all participated in the murder. (Id. at 1629-34.) Davis also

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testified that Hixon told her that she had lost a fingernail at the murder scene and that Foth had

asked Hixon if she knew where he could get some crack cocaine. (Id. at 1611, 1635.)

Thus, in light of the above, it was reasonable for the state court to find there was ample

evidence, beyond that of Lena Hixon’s testimony, to satisfy California Penal Code section 1111.

Any uncorroborated testimony was not incredible or insubstantial on its face. See Laboa, 224

F.3d at 979. Thus, the state court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established law.

 Further, to the extent Sherrors is attempting to establish a due process violation, because

the state “arbitrarily deprive[d] [him] of a state law entitlement, Sherrors’ claim fails. See

Laboa, 224 F.3d 979; see also Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). Here, as the state

court found, (and discussed above) there was no violation Penal Code § 1111 because there was

ample evidence corroborating Hixon’s testimony. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 2.) Thus,

Sherrors was not “arbitrarily” denied a state law entitlement. Accordingly, he was not denied

due process and the state court’s denial of his claim was neither contrary, nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established law.

(2) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Sherrors argues next that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because

counsel did not raise the above due process issue on appeal. (Pet. at 9A.) Sherrors raised this

issue in his state habeas petition to the California Supreme Court and it was denied without

comment. Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision to

address the claim, the superior court opinion denying his habeas corpus petition, as the basis of

its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. That court rejected Sherrors’ ineffective appellate counsel

claim, concluding that he could not satisfy either prong set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 2.) 

It is clearly established that “[t]he proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate

counsel was ineffective . . . is that enunciated in Strickland.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,

285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986)). A petitioner must first show

that his appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He must then establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id.

at 694. To establish prejudice, Sherrors must demonstrate that he would have prevailed on

appeal absent counsel’s errors. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. 

The Ninth Circuit has observed that:

[Strickland’s] two prongs partially overlap when evaluating the

performance of appellate counsel. In many instances, appellate counsel will fail

to raise an issue because she foresees little or no likelihood of success on that

issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the

hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. . . . Appellate counsel will therefore

frequently remain above an objective standard of competence (prong one) and

have caused her client no prejudice (prong two) for the same reason-because she

declined to raise a weak issue.

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1989).

Such is the case here. First, Sherrors’ appellate counsel was not unreasonable in declining

to raise this issue on appeal because it lacked merit. Under state law, the accomplice instruction

was required. And, as the state court found, there was sufficient corroborating evidence to

satisfy Penal Code section 1111. Thus appellate counsel’s performance did not fall below an

objective level of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 688. Second, because there was no

error, Sherrors would not have prevailed on appeal and therefore he cannot show prejudice. Id.

at 694; Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. Accordingly, the state court’s opinion denying this claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law.

(3) Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court finds the state court’s decisions on the claims raised in

Ground One were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law. Therefore, the Court recommends both claims raised in Ground One be denied. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

b. Ground Two:

Sherrors further claims that his due process rights were violated when the trial court failed

to instruct the jury that Hixon’s plea agreement did not exempt her testimony from the

corroboration requirement and with the instruction to view accomplice testimony with caution.

 He alleges also that this amounted to a deprivation of state created liberty interest. Finally, he

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argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request such and instruction and appellate

counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these issues on appeal. (Pet. at 9A.)

(1) Due Process

Sherrors concedes that the jury was instructed that if Hixon was subject to prosecution

as an accomplice, then her testimony had to be corroborated and viewed with caution. Sherrors

argues that, because Hixon pleaded guilty to lesser charges pursuant a plea agreement, the jurors

might have been confused about whether she was an “accomplice.” He suggests the trial court

should have specifically instructed the jury that the plea agreement did not exempt Hixon from

being deemed an accomplice as a matter of law and thus subject to precautionary instructions.

He suggests that without such clarification, the jury might not have applied the accomplice

instructions appropriately to Hixon’s testimony. (See Pet. at 9A.)

Sherrors raised this claim in his habeas petition to the California Supreme Court and it

was denied without comment or citation Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last

reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the superior court opinion denying his habeas

corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. That court denied the

claim, concluding that the trial court did, in fact, instruct the jury properly as to the need for

corroborating evidence. (Resp’t Lodgment 10 at 4.)

To the extent Petitioner claims the jury instructions were incorrect under state law, his

claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72

(1991). To merit relief, clearly established law provides that a petitioner must show the

instructional error so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.

Id. at 72; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147

(1973). The allegedly erroneous instruction must be considered in the context of the trial record

and the instructions as a whole. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 156; Cupp, 414 U.S.

at 146-47. The instructions must be more than just erroneous, Sherrors must show that there was

a reasonable likelihood that in light of the instructions as a whole, the jury applied the challenged

instruction in such a way that his constitutional rights were violated. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971

F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

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4

 CALJIC No. 3.16, as read to the jury, states: “If the crime of murder was committed by

anyone, the witness Lena Hixon was an accomplice as a matter of law and her testimony is subject to

the rule requiring corroboration.” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 15, vol. 2 at 255.)

5

 CALJIC No. 3.18 states:

To the extent that an accomplice gives testimony that tends to incriminate a

defendant, it should be viewed with caution. This does not mean, however, that you may

arbitrarily disregard that testimony. You should give that testimony the weight it

deserves after examining it with care and caution in the light of all the evidence in this

case.

(Resp’t Lodgment No 15, vol. 2 at 256.)

6

 CALJIC No. 3.11 states:

You cannot find the defendant guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice

unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect that

defendant with the commission of the offense. Testimony of an accomplice includes any

out-of-court statement purportedly made by an accomplice received for the purposes of

proving what the accomplice stated out-of-court was true.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 15, vol. 2 at 253.)

CALJIC No. 3.12 states:

To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice there must be evidence of some

act or fact related to the crime which, if believed, by itself and without any aid,

interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the

defendant with the commission of the crime charged.

However, it is not necessary that the evidence of corroboration be sufficient in

itself to establish every element of the crime charged, or that it corroborate every fact to

which the accomplice testifies.

In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first

assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then

determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant

with the commission of the crime.

If there is no independent evidence which tends to connect defendant with the

commission of the crime, the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated.

If there is independent evidence which you believe, then the testimony of the

accomplice is corroborated.

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 There is no likelihood that the instructions rendered Sherrors’s trial fundamentally

unfair. First, there was no error. The court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 3.16, that

Lena Hixon was an accomplice as a matter of law.4 Accordingly, the trial court instructed the

jury that Hixon’s testimony should be viewed with caution (CALJIC No. 3.18)5

 and as such, that

her testimony needed to be corroborated. (CALJIC Nos. 13.11 & 13.12)6

. Additionally, the jury

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(Resp’t Lodgment No. 15, vol. 2 at 254.)

7

 It is also notable that the judge even discussed the need for corroboration of accomplice

testimony when questioning the entire jury venire to be sure that prospective jurors would be willing

and able to abide by such an instruction. The court stated, in part, 

“I anticipate that something else is going to up into play in this case, and that’s the

subject of an accomplice and the legal requirement of corroboration of an accomplice.

. . .You cannot find a defendant guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless

that testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to connect such defendant

with such crime. In other words, there has to be some evidence independent of the

testimony of the accomplice that connects [the defendant] to the . . . alleged crimes. . .

charged. Is there anybody who would hesitate or be reluctant to apply these instructions

to evidence that may arise during the course of the trial. . . .[in addition] the jury is asked

to look seriously at the credibility of that witness.. . ..At this time is there any reason why

any of you wouldn’t undertake that task?” 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 29.)

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was instructed to view all instructions as a whole (CALJIC No. 1.01). (Resp’t Lodgment 15, vol.

2 at 222.) Courts presume that jurors follow the instructions given. See Francis v. Franklin, 471

U.S. 307, 324 n. 9 (1985); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 913 (2006). Therefore, in light of all

the instructions given the jury regarding Hixon’s accomplice testimony, there was no error in

declining to instruct the jury that Hixon’s plea agreement did not affect her status as an

accomplice.7

 

Further, even if the court should have instructed the jury that her plea agreement had no

affect on her accomplice status, Sherrors cannot show how failure to do so could have rendered

his trial fundamentally unfair. Viewing the instructions discussed above as a whole, there is no

likelihood the jury would have been confused about whether Hixon was covered by the

accomplice instructions, regardless of whether she had a plea agreement. Her name was inserted

in the instruction regarding the definition of accomplice. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 255.) In

addition to having the instructions read to them, both the prosecutor and defense counsel made

it clear during closing arguments that Hixon was an accomplice and thus her testimony required

corroboration and should be viewed with caution. See States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239, 1248 (9th

Cir.1990) (noting significance of counsel argument when combined with general instruction).

The prosecutor stated:

Lena Hixon is an accomplice. Lena Hixon was actually at the scene and told you

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what happened at the crime scene. Now the law says when you have testimony

from an accomplice, this type of testimony falls in a particular area of law. In fact,

it means that you have to have some corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony.

In other words, you can’t find someone guilty based solely on the testimony of an

accomplice. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 17, vol. 11 at 1728)

Defense counsel reiterated the point:

Now, the prosecutor talked to you about the accomplice line of jury instructions.

I’m going to spend about two minutes on that. What that means is that the law

recognizes the danger of using somebody who is involved in a crime to testify

against others allegedly involved in a crime. And the law recognizes there’s so

much danger there, because an accomplice could testify just to save their own skin

and lie, that the law requires that the testimony be corroborated in some fashion.

(Id. at 1790.)

Thus, there no reason to believe that the jury did not properly apply the instructions

regarding Hixon’s accomplice testimony. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 255.) See Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72; Carriger, 971 F.2d at 334.

Finally, to the extent Sherrors argues that he was deprived of a state created liberty

interest, that argument fails for the same reasons discussed above in Ground One. To establish

a due process violation, Sherrors must show that the state “arbitrarily deprive[d] [him] of a state

law entitlement.” Laboa, 224 F.3d 979; see also Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980).

Here, as the state court found, there was no violation Penal Code § 1111 because there was

ample evidence corroborating Hixon’s testimony. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 2.) Thus,

there was no violation of section 1111 and as such Sherrors was not “arbitrarily” denied a state

law entitlement. Accordingly, Sherrors due process rights were not violated. 

(2) Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

Next, Sherrors argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a special

instruction that would have made it clear to the jurors that Hixon’s testimony was subject to the

corroboration and cautionary requirements.

Sherrors rasied this claim in a state habeas petition to the California Supreme Court which

denied the claim without comment or citation. Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last

reasoned state court decision to address the claim. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. However, the 

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superior court opinion did not discuss Sherrors’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Therefore, this Court reviews the claim de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th

Cir. 2002).

As discussed above, clearly established Supreme Court law regarding ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 688. Strickland requires a two-part

showing. First, an attorney’s representation must have fallen below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Id. at 688. Second, a defendant must have been prejudiced by counsel’s errors.

Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id.; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). The Ninth Circuit has

held that failure to file a motion will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless the

trial court would have granted the motion. Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, defense counsel’s failure to request such an instruction was not unreasonable

because it would have merely been redundant of the instructions already given to the jury,

namely that Hixon was an accomplice (CALJIC No. 3.16), her testimony should be viewed with

caution (CALJIC No. 3.18), and her testimony required corroboration (CALJIC Nos. 3.11 &

3.12.). (Resp’t Lodgment No. 15, vol. 2 at 253-56.) In addition, the court instructed the jury on

how it may evaluate the believability of a witness, stating, in part, that the jury was free to

consider whether the witness was testifying under a grant of immunity in assigning what weight

it would give that individual’s testimony. (CALJIC No. 2.20) (Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 234.)

A second, suprefluous, instruction that Hixon was an accomplice despite her plea deal was

unneeded and could likely have confused the jury. Accordingly, defense counsel’s performance

did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. 688.

Moreover, counsel’s failure to request the instruction was not prejudicial because the jury

was properly instructed that her testimony need to be corroborated and should be viewed with

caution. No further instruction was necessary and any request by defense counsel for further

instruction would have almost certainly been denied. The jury instructions combined with 

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reference to them by both counsel is more than sufficient to satisfy due process. See States v.

Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239, 1248 (9th Cir.1990) (noting significance of counsel argument when

combined with general instruction). Thus, there is no reasonable probability that, if the

instruction Sherrors suggests would have been given, the outcome of the proceedings would

have been affected. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 694.

Accordingly, Sherrors fails to satisfy either prong of Strickland and therefore the state

court’s denial of Sherrors’ ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was neither contrary to,

nor and unreasonable application of clearly established law. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 688, 692.

(3) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Sherrors argues next that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because

counsel did not raise this issue on appeal. Sherrors raised this issue in his state habeas petition

to the California Supreme Court and it was denied without comment. Thus, this Court must

“look through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the superior court

opinion denying his habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

That court rejected Sherrors’ ineffective appellate counsel claim, stating that “the failure of this

claim on the merits is fatal to . . . [Sherrors’] claim that his appellate attorney was ineffective.

(See Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 4.) 

The state court’s decision is a reasonable application of clearly established law. See

Strickland 466 U.S. at 688. As discussed above in section C(1)(b)(1) Sherrors’ due process

claim on failure to instruct the jury that Hixon’s plea agreement did not affect her status as an

accomplice, lacks merit. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for appellate counsel fail to raise

it on appeal. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 688. Likewise, and it was not prejudicial because the

claim would have been denied. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. Thus, Sherrors is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

(4) Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court finds the state court’s decisions on the claims raised in

Ground Two were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law. Therefore, the Court recommends all three claims raised in Ground Two be denied. See

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Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

c. Ground Ten:

In Ground Ten, Sherrors argues his due process rights were violated because conviction

was based on insufficient evidence. He argues that he was convicted “almost solely on the

testimony of [Hixon]. He argues that her testimony was “proven impossible by the timeframe

established by other evidence” and that Hixon was “a proven, repeated liar.” In addition, he

argues that the testimony that the watch found at the crime scene belonged to him and the

testimony that blood was seen on his shoes was “disproven” by DNA and luminol testing. (See

Pet. at 9E.) 

Sherrors raised this claim in his petition for review of his direct appeal to the California

Supreme Court. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 5.) The petition was denied without comment or

citation. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 7.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last

reasoned state court decision to address the claim, appellate court’s opinion on direct review.

See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In denying Sherrors’ sufficiency of evidence claim, the California

Court of Appeal stated:

Sherrors challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction, arguing that Hixon’s testimony describing the series of events has to

be disregarded because (1) it was physically impossible for the events to have

occurred as she indicated and (2) as a prostitute and drug user, and based on her

repeated lies prior to and at trial and her statements to Katherine Davis implicating

herself more substantially, she was inherently unreliable as a witness. Hall joins

in this contention.

In addressing this argument, we note that our role in reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is limited. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th

1199, 1206.) Although we must ensure that the evidence adduced at trial in support of

the verdict is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive

province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the truth or

falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. (People v. Jones (1990) 51

Cal.3d 294, 314.) Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must defer

to the findings of the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s

credibility for that of the fact finder. (Ibid.)

A reviewing court may reject statements of a witness who was believed by

the trier of fact only if it is physically impossible that the statements are true or if

the falsity of the statements is apparent without resorting to inferences or

deductions. (Id. at p. 1259; see People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608.) The

trier of fact’s reliance on testimony revealing unusual circumstances and even

testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion will not support a reversal of the

judgment on appeal. ( People v. Franz (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1447; People

v. Meals (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 215, 221-222.)

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With these principles in mind, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence

to support the defendants’ convictions. Sherrors’s counsel argued at length about

Hixon’s credibility and, in particular, that the events of the evening in question

could not have happened as Hixon said. However, the jury was not required to

accept or reject Hixon’s testimony in its entirety, but was instead entitled to credit

some portions and reject other portions of that testimony. (People v. Flores

(1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 452, 457.) In so doing, the jury could have concluded that

Hixon had a reason to lie in stating that Foth was in the trunk of the car during the

drive north and thus rejected that testimony, concluding instead that Foth rode

inside the car with Sherrors, Hall and Hixon. If Horne made the 6:50 p.m. phone

call during that drive, it would not have been physically impossible for Sherrors

and Hall to commit the murder and drive back to the AM PM, as Hixon testified,

by 7:36 p.m. when the first attempt to withdraw money from Foth’s bank account

occurred. Alternatively, the jury may have accepted the prosecutor’s argument

that Hixon was mistaken that the stop at the AM PM was made on the return trip,

but was in fact made on the way up to Highland Valley Road. Again, doing so

would avoid the physical impossibility on which the defendants base their

sufficiency argument.

Under the circumstances, the defendants have not shown that there was

insufficient evidence to support their convictions.

(Respt’s Lodgment No. 4 at 20-22.)

In a sufficiency of the evidence claim, clearly established law requires the court determine

whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d

353, 356 (9th Cir. 1991). In making this determination, the Court is not “to ask itself whether

it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson,

443 U.S. at 318-19. Rather, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, and must presume the trier of fact resolved conflicting evidence in favor of the

prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 908-09 (9th Cir.

1994). Under Jackson, this court must look to the state criminal law in determining whether a

factfinder could have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 324.

Here, Sherrors was convicted of murder in the first degree in that he unlawfully killed

Foth with “malice aforethought” or he killed Foth “during the commission or attempted

commission of a robbery.” (See Resp’t Lodgment 15 at 260, CALJIC No. 8.10.) The jury also

had to find that Sherrors personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (id. at 285, CALJIC

17.16); and that the murder was committed by Sherrors while he was engaged in the commission

or attempted commission of a robbery, and in furtherance of that robbery. (See Resp’t Lodgment

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8

 Sherrors’ defense counsel attempted to suggest the murder had actually been committed by

Hixon and Jimmie Washington (and possibly another). Jimmie Washington was originally expected to

testify for the prosecution in this case but the trial court found him incompetent to testify because he

could not understand the oath and seemed delusional.

9

 Hixon testified that when she asked where Foth was, Sherrors told her they had exchanged

drugs for the use of his car. She stated that did not surprise her because it was not unusual for dealers

to “rent” a customer’s car, temporarily, in return for drugs. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 955-56.)

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No. 15 at 276.)

The crux of Sherros’ argument centers on the implausability of Hixon’s testimony,

particularly with regard to the timing of events.8 He argues it was not possible for the murder

to have happened as Hixon testified because it was physically impossible for the murder to have

taken place in the amount of time between Foth’s final cell phone conversation with Horne,

which occurred at 6:50 p.m., and the first attempt to use Foth’s ATM card, which occurred at

7:36 p.m. 

Hixon testified that the entire time she was with Foth, she never saw him using a cell

phone, thus implying that Foth approached her sometime after 6:50 p.m. Hixon stated that after

Foth approached her and asked her for drugs, she got in his car and they drove a few blocks

away to the apartment where Sherrors and Hall were staying. (Id. at 944-46.) She whistled for

them to come out, and after they did, she got out of the car and Foth left with Sherrors and Hall.

(Id. at 948-55.) Sherrors and Hall returned a few minutes later, with Sherrors driving the Audi.

Foth was nowhere in sight. (Id. 955.) Sherros told Hixon to get in, and trio drove off together.9

(Id. at 955-58.)

According to Hixon, the group drove north on I-15 and exited in the Lake Hodges area.

They came to a dirt lot next to a pumpkin patch. Sherrors parked the car, and both men got out.

They told Hixon to wait in the car and they would be right back. (Id. at 962-64.) She then

noticed the trunk open and saw Foth getting out of the trunk. He was fully clothed and his hands

were tied in front of his body. (Id.) 

Hixon then got out of the car, asking “what the Hell is going on?” As Hall stood by Foth,

Sherrors approached her grabbed her hands and told her to shut up or he’d kill her. (Id. at 964-

65.) When Sherrors grabbed Hixon, she broke an arcrylic fingernail, which was later found at

the scene. (Id. at 439-40, 492-93, 970.)

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10 Foth was stabbed a total of 83 times. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 167.)

11 The second attempt to use the ATM card occurred at 8:56 p.m. at a Wells Fargo bank branch’s

ATM on El Cajon Boulevard. (Id. at 717-18.)

12 Hixon, who did not wear a watch, estimated it took three minutes to drive from the taco shop

to the apartment. She then estimated that 15-20 minutes passed between the time Sherrors and Hall

drove off with Foth and when Sherrors and Hall returned, apparently alone. (Id. at 948, 955, 1120-21.)

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Hall then wrestled Foth to the ground and Sherror began stabbing Foth, numerous times.10

After a while, Sherrors walked over to Hixon and ordered her to stab him. When she refused,

Sherrors warned Hixon, “What do you think, we’re just going to let you walk away? If I go

down, your going down with me.” (Id. at 965-67.) Hixon testified that she only complied out

of fear for her safety and that of her children.

Sherrors and Hall then removed Foth’s clothing and flung the body over a fence. Sherrors

ordered Hixon to get back in the car and they drove off, getting back on I-15, headed south

toward San Diego. After driving five or ten minutes, they pulled off the freeway at an exit with

“Scripps” in the sign and pulled into an ARCO AM/PM. Hall went in and came out with a pack

of cigarettes, shaking his head. (Id. at 977.) Wells Fargo Bank records showed two unsuccessful

attempts to use Foth’s ATM card that evening. The first occurred at 7:36 p.m. at an ATM on

Mira Mesa Boulevard. While the correct PIN number was used and the account had a positive

balance of $130.33, no cash was dispersed because the bank’s loss prevention department had

frozen Foth’s account six days earlier.11 (Id. at 714-17.) 

Defense counsel argued strenuously that it would be physically impossible for all that

Hixon testified to, to occur in 46 minutes. According to Hixon’s testimony, they spent about 30-

45 minutes at the pumpkin patch alone. (Id. at 1073-75, 1148.) She also stated that it had taken

about 45 minutes for them to reach the pumpkin patch. (Id. at 960, 1083.) They did not even

start driving until 15 or 20 minutes after Sherrors and Hall originally left with Foth.12 (Id. at 948,

955, 1120-21.) Given these inconsistencies, Sherrors argues that Hixon’s testimony should be

disregarded in its entirety.

While a reading of the transcript may suggest inconsistencies in Hixon’s testimony, the

“jury had an opportunity to hear [Hixon’s] inflections and witness [her] demeanor, and it had the

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right to credit some parts of [her] testimony and to discredit other parts based on these

observations.” See United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1980) (overruled on

other grounds in United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc).

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is possible that the jury

credited the testimony regarding who murdered Foth and how it happened, but disregarded some

testimony that Hixon may have seemed unsure of, or inconsistent about, such as timing. In fact,

the jury was instructed that it may do just that. (See e.g. CALJIC No. 2.21.1; Resp’t Lodgment

No. 14 at 237.) For instance, Hixon testified that she never saw Foth on the cellphone. It is

possible the jury discredited that testimony based on Hixon’s possibly faulty memory. It is also

possible that Foth took the 6:50 p.m. call when he was alone in the car with Sherrors and Hall

(and before the situation became violent). Or, it is possible that the jury simply did not find

Hixon’s time estimates to be credible, given that she stated she never wore a watch and gave

some innacurate estimates as to the amount of time between events. Or, the jury could have

believed it more likely that the attempt to use Foth’s ATM card occurred before they got to the

pumpkin patch and before he was murdered. 

Even with the inconsistencies apparent in Hixon’s testimony, a “rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 324. Hixon testified that Sherrors commented on losing his watch at the crime scene. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 17 at 972.) Latrina Walker corroborated Hixon’s testimony when Walker

testified that she saw Sherrors come home on the night of the murder in a bloody shirt and shoes,

and with his watch missing. (Id. at 1348, 1360, 1371-74.) Walker identified the watch found

at the scene as one belonging to Sherrors. (Id. at 1342-44.) After he changed clothes he left the

house and minutes later a small fire was reported next to the dumpster in the apartment complex

parking lot. (See id. at 1352, 1360, 382-85, 388-89.) This corroborates Hixon’s testimony that

Sherrors stabbed Foth numerous times and, and a reasonable juror could infer that Sherrors

attempted to get rid of the tainted clothing by setting it on fire.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was also sufficient

evidence that Sherrors killed Foth during the commission of a robbery. Neighbors testified they

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saw Hall and Sherrors either driving or standing near the Audi in the days after the murder. This

corroborated Hixon’s testimony that the men had killed Foth and taken his car. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 17 at 752-54, 890-93.) Further, two cigarette butts were found in the Audi and

tested for DNA. The first butt from the rear floorboard contained a mixture of DNA. Foth,

Jimmie Washington and Hall were all excluded. (Id. at 660-64.) The other cigarette butt found

on the driver’s side floorboard revealed Sherrors as the very likely source of the DNA - with an

estimated odds of one and 1.6 trillion. (Id. at 666.) The evidence that Sherrors and Hall were

seen in and around the Audi suggests they killed Foth in an attempt to steal his car or his money.

This is ample evidence to corroborate a large part of Hixon’s testimony, and remaining issues

of credibility are for the jury to decide. See United States v. Sisack, 527 F.2d 917, 921 (9th Cir.

1975).

Sherrors seems to argue that Walker’s testimony that the watch found at the crime scene

belonged to Sherrors was “disproven” by DNA testing. That is a mischaracterization of the

evidence. Brian Burritt testified that he originally tested the watch for DNA in three places.

Sherrors, Hall and Hixon were excluded as the primary sources of the DNA obtained from those

three areas, while Foth could not be excluded. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 340.) However,

Burritt testified that there was a trace secondary source taken from the back of the watch.

Sherrors could not be excluded as the source of the trace result. (Id. at 350.) Although Sherrors

could not be excluded, Burritt testified that the trace was “exceedingly small amount, an amount

that is really almost too weak for us to – even if he was there, to make any conclusions based on

that.” (Id.) Thus, Burritt’s testimony did not “disprove” Walker’s testimony that the watch

belonged to Sherrors. It merely failed to find any conclusive evidence of Sherrors’ DNA on the

watch except for a trace amount on one area tested. As Burritt testified “[Sherrors] is excluded

from the vast majority of the DNA, the main result. We have this trace 2. We have a potential

mixture of DNA.” (Id. at 350.) The jury was free to give this evidence the weight it deemed

appropriate.

Finally, Sherrors alleges that luminol testing was negative for blood in the bedroom in

which he changed his clothing on the night of the murder. He seems to argue that the failure to

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claim. Sherrors joined Hall’s argument on appeal. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 66.)

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find blood traces “disproves” Walker’s testimony that she saw blood on his shirt and his shoes

when he returned to the apartment on the night of the murder. Again, these discrepancies

between witness testimony and scientific evidence are for the jury to resolve. This court must

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. A rational juror could certainly

have Walker’s testimony despite that failure to find any blood.

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was enough

evidence for a rational trier of fact could have found Sherrors guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Thus, the Court recommends this claim

be denied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

d. Ground Twelve:

In Ground Twelve, Sherrors argues that his due process rights were violated by the

introduction of Hixon’s testimony because the prosecutor knew her testimony was perjurious.

As he did in his sufficiency of evidence claim, Sherrors argues that Hixon’s testimony was

“conclusively disproven” by other evidence regarding the timing of events on the night in

question. He claims there was evidence the prosecutor knew Hixon was lying.

Sherrors raised this claim his petition for review of his direct appeal to the California

Supreme Court. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 5.) The petition was denied without comment or

citation. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 7.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last

reasoned state court decision to address the claim, appellate court’s opinion on direct review.

See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In denying Sherrors’ claim,13 the appellate court stated:

Hall claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct here by using Hixon

as a witness in light of the inherently improbable or physically impossible nature

of her testimony. Where a conviction is based on the introduction of testimony

known by the prosecution to be false, it may constitute a denial of due process of

law. (People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 473.) However, to succeed on a

claim that the prosecutor engaged in such misconduct, the defendant must show,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prosecutor adduced perjured

testimony at trial, that the prosecutor knew of the perjurious nature of the

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testimony and that the testimony may have affected the outcome of the trial.

(Ibid.)

Hall has not met this burden here. The prosecution simply presented its

evidence and allowed a fully informed jury to evaluate it. Hall has not shown that

Hixon’s testimony was in fact perjured rather than the result of faulty memory or

that the prosecutor knew Hixon’s testimony was false in any particular respect.

Allowing Hixon to testify subject to cross-examination and impeachment by

available evidence, as was done here, afforded Hall a fair trial and comported with

due process. (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1181-1182.)

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at 15.)

It is clearly established that “[t]he knowing use of perjured testimony by a prosecutor

generally requires that the conviction be set aside.” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).) “The same result obtains

when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it

appears.” Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, the

presentation of conflicting versions of events, without more, does not constitute knowing

presentation of false evidence. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1989).) Rather, “[i]t [i]s within

the province of the jury to resolve the disputed testimony.” Id. 

Prosecutors will not be held accountable for discrepancies in testimony where there is no

evidence from which to infer prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d

1420, 1423 (9th Cir.1995). A factual basis for attributing knowledge to the government that the

testimony was perjured must be established. See Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1179 (9th

Cir. 2004). In sum, in order to prevail on a claim based on Agurs and Napue, a petitioner must

show that (1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should

have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the false testimony was material.

United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-

71.)

The state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established law. Although Hixon’s version of events did not entirely comport with

other evidence or other testimony, there is no indication that the testimony was actually false,

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as opposed to just a matter of Hixon’s poor memory. At most, two conflicting versions of the

incident were presented to the jury. It was within the province of the jury to resolve the disputed

testimony. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir.1979) (recognizing that

credibility determinations are for the jury). Further, there is nothing to indicate that the

prosecutor knowingly presented perjured testimony. While the prosecutor was aware that some

of the details of Hixon’s testimony were inconsistent with other evidence, particularly with

regard to her time estimates, there was nothing to indicate he knew she was lying, rather than

simply mistaken or had forgotten certain details. 

Sherrors argues that Hixon’s testimony was “conclusively disproven” by other evidence

regarding the timing of events on the night in question. This is not the case. There were simply

two conflicting versions of the evidence regarding the timing of certain events. This, without

more, does not constitute knowing presentation of false evidence. United States v. Geston, 299

F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002).

Sherrors has not shown the Hixon’s testimony was false, nor has he shown that the

prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. Thus,

the Court recommends this claim be denied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. 

e. Ground Thirteen

In Ground Thirteen, Petitioner claims his due process rights were violated because

Hixon’s testimony was coerced by the police and prosecution. He claims Hixon was encouraged

to lie by police officers, who told her she would receive leniency if she altered her story. He

alleges that Hixon fabricated the story in order to reach the plea agreement and get the murder

charges against her dismissed. She was compelled to testify falsely out of fear that she would

lose her plea deal. Finally, he claims Hixon was intoxicated during her interview with police.

(Pet. at 9E-9F.)

Sherrors raised these claims for the first time in his petition for writ of habeas corpus to

the California Supreme Court (Resp’t Lodgment No. 13) which denied them without comment

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14 The police had intercepted a phone call Hixon made from jail, during which she told her

friend, Eric Bazile, that she had lied when she told the police that the murder was committed by Ben

Wilson and Terrence Smallgreen. She told Bazile that it was really Hall and Sherrors. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 15 at 169-70.)

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or citation of authority. (See Lodgment No. 14.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the

last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the appellate court’s opinion denying his

habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In denying the

claim, the appellate court stated: “[Sherrors] provides no proof to support the [claim that a

witness was coerced by police and prosecutor.] (Resp’t Lodgment No. 12 at 1.)

It is clearly established that, although Sherrors lacks standing to complain about

infringements of Hixon’s constitutional rights, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40

(1978), he is entitled to habeas relief if the trial court’s admission of Hixon’s testimony rendered

the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. See Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117,

1129 n. 5 (9th Cir.2002); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 988 F.2d 923, 934-35 (9th Cir.1993).

The admission of Hixon’s testimony did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. First,

the police tactics used to encourage her to tell the truth were not coercive. An interrogating

agent’s suggestion that a suspect’s cooperation with the government will have a positive effect

on the suspect’s possible sentence is not an improper inducement that causes the suspect’s later

testimony for the government to be involuntary. United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363,

1366 (9th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (9th Cir.1985)

(witness testimony provided pursuant to a plea agreement was not involuntary or coerced).

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, the police merely suggested that Hixon needed to tell the truth or any chance of

making a deal with the district attorney would be lost. On October 12, 1999, Hixon was

interviewed by the police for the second time. (See generally Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 169-

202.) It was during this interview that she admitted she had lied about who committed the

murder and implicated Sherrors and Hall.14 (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 170-72.) During

the interview, the officers pushed her to tell the truth, telling her that if she continued to lie, there

would be no chance of her striking a deal with the district attorney. At one point, the officer told

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Hixon, “this is absolutely your last chance. . . [t]here is a good possibility that the district

attorney that’s gonna look at this case may not believe any story you tell, and with the evidence

we have, you might just have. . . .to take the whole damn rap for this case. If you’re not careful

and you don’t tell the truth, then there’s a good possibility that we may not be able to arrest

anybody else and you may just be sittin’ here by your lonesome, going to court, going to

prison . . . .” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 179-80.) 

The interviewing officer here was merely encouraging her to tell the truth by indicating

that, if she did so, she may be able to make a plea agreement with the district attorney; and that

failure to do so, would likely mean she would spend the rest of her life in prison. The officer’s

actions here did not amount to “improper inducement” sufficient to render the trial

fundamentally unfair. See Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d at 1366; see also Moody, 778 F.2d at

1384-85.

Furthermore, the prosecutor did not improperly “coerce” Hixon’s into testifying against

Sherrors and Hall. Hixon did not meet with prosecutors until after her preliminary hearing, to

ascertain whether she could make a deal. As she testified at trial, she was told the conditions of

the agreement and that, in exchange for her truthful testimony, she would be permitted to plead

to lesser charges and receive a 12 year sentence. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 906-15.) There

is “no indication that [Hixon] was told at any time by anyone what she should say on the witness

stand.” See United States v. Mattison, 437 F.2d 84, 85 (9th Cir. 1970). Moreover, Sherrors’

defense counsel had the opportunity at trial to test the voluntariness and veracity of Hixon’s

testimony through a vigorous cross-examination. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 596. Thus, the

prosecutor’s offer of a plea agreement in exchange for the truth did not amount to “improper

inducement.” See Moody, 778 F.2d at 1384-85; Williams, 384 F.3d at 595.

In addition, clearly established Supreme Court law does require the disclosure of a plea

agreement which bears on the credibility of a prosecution witness. Giglio v. United States, 405

U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]n agreement that requires a witness

to testify truthfully in exchange for a plea is proper so long as ‘the jury is informed of the exact

nature of the agreement, defense counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the

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agreement, and the jury is instructed to weigh the accomplice’s testimony with care.’” Allen v.

Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 995 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134, 163 (2005) (quoting United

States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir. 1988).); accord Morris v. Woodford, 273

F.3d 826, 836 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Allen’s requirements were satisfied in this case. The jury was informed that Hixon

testimony had entered an plea agreement which allowed her to plea to lesser charges in exchange

for her testimony. The prosecutor began his questioning of Ms. Hixon with a discussion of the

agreement.

MR. BOWMAN: Miss Hixon, you were formally charged with murder in this case,

correct?

MS. HIXON: Yes.

Q. And you have since pled guilty and agreed to testify on behalf of the

People of the State of California in this case; is that correct?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. All right. Did you enter into an agreement with the People the was

memorialized in a written document to that effect?

A. Yes.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 17, vol. 7 at 906-07.) A copy of the agreement was then introduced into

evidence. (Id.) The prosecutor then questioned Hixon at length about every detail of the

agreement. (Id. at 906-915.)

Further, Defense counsel cross-examined Hixon at length about her testimony and the

plea agreement. Rather than arguing that Hixon was coerced by the police or prosecutor, defense

counsel attempted to suggest that Hixon had only decided to enter into an agreement after she

heard the damaging testimony of Katherine Davis (another prisoner housed with Hixon), who

testified against her at the preliminary hearing.

Q: Okay. Now, how much – when did you first decide that you wanted to

cooperate with the prosecution?

A: Um, I can’t really pinpoint a time.

Q: Well, you weren’t cooperating with them at the - - before the preliminary

hearing, right?

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[ . . .]

A: Can you repeat [the question]?

Q: Okay. Remember the preliminary hearing in this matter where Katherine

Davis testified against you, basically?

A: Yes.

Q: That was on April 3 of 2000, okay?

A: Yes.

Q: Before that time you weren’t cooperating with the prosecutor, were you?

A: I don’t think I had a conversation with the prosecutor to cooperate with

him.

Q: You hadn’t.

A: No.

Q: Okay. So sometime after Katherine Davis’s testimony at the preliminary

hearing you contacted or had your attorney contact the prosecutor and

inform them that you were willing to now cooperate, correct?

A: I believe that’s how it happened.

Q: And that happened between - - sometime after the preliminary hearing,

which took place on April 3, of 2000, and before you had your free talk,

which was May 17th of 2000. So, in that approximately a month and twoweek period, that’s when you decided to cooperate, correct?

A: Yes

Q: Okay. And it was after Katherine Davis came forward and testified at the

preliminary hearing that you approached the prosecutor?

A: No. Well, basic- -- I mean, technically, yes.

Q: I mean, you didn’t approach them before Katherine Davis testified?

A: No. 

Q: Okay. Then you had what’s called a free talk with Mr. Bowman and others,

and your lawyer was there, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: That was May 17th. And then on June 7th, a little less than a month later,

you signed an agreement, correct?

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A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And you signed an agreement with the prosecutor, correct?

A: Yes. 

Q: Where you would plead guilty to something other than murder, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. In return for your testimony against these two men, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And you would get a 12 year sentence, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And, in fact, you have been sentenced to 12 years, correct?

A: Yes, I have.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1087-94.)

Through this exchange the defense attempted to show that Hixon only decided to

cooperate when she realized that Katherine Davis would testify that she had participated much

more fully in the murder than Hixon admitted to police. Moreover, Sherrors’ defense counsel

tested the voluntariness and truthfulness of Hixon’s testimony through a vigorous

cross-examination. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 991-1087.) See Williams, 384 F.3d at 596.

Finally, it is worth noting that Hixon’s decision to enter into a plea agreement came over

six months after her interview with police. And her trial testimony did not take place until

almost a year later. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Hixon was coerced, “with this passage

of time, the physically and psychologically coercive atmosphere of the interrogation had

certainly dissipated.” See Mattison, 437 F.2d at 85 (finding that the coercion of the witness’s

illegal post-arrest interrogation had dissipated by the time of trial). Thus, the introduction of

Hixon’s testimony at trial did not render it fundamentally unfair. 

Sherrors has not shown his due process rights were violated. Therefore, the state court’s

denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law. Accordingly, the Court recommends this claim be denied. See Williams, 529

U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

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2. Claims Related to Witness Latrina Walker’s Tesimony

Sherrors also raises several claims related to the testimony of Latrina “Trina” Walker.

Walker was Sherrors’ 24 year-old, mentally disabled sister. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1362.)

She was from Long Beach, but was visiting Sherrors at the time the murder took place. (Id. at

1340-42.) She testified that the watch found at the murder scene was the same one she had seen

Sherrors wearing during the time of the murder. She also testified that on the night of the murder

took place, when Sherrors returned to the apartment, she noticed what appeared to be blood on

his shoes and his shirt. (Id. at 1348, 1357, 1360, 1371-72, 1372-74.) Sherrors then went into

his room, changed his clothes and shoes and left the apartment soon thereafter, carrying a bag.

(Id. at 1352, 1360.) Moments after Sherrors left with the bag, a small fire near the trash

dumpster was reported. (Id. at 1352.)

Sherrors raises three grounds for relief related to Trina Walker’s testimony. (See Pet. at

9A-9B, 9C.) As with previous grounds, Sherrors often includes two or three separate claims

within each ground for relief. The Court will address each ground and all the claims included

therein, in turn.

a. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Sherrors raises several constitutional claims stemming from the trial

court’s decision to preclude defense counsel from (1) asking Walker about “specific instances

of dishonesty and theft”; (2) calling Walker’s former therapists to testify as to her psychiatric

condition; (3) cross-examining Walker about her mental condition and its effect on her veracity.

(Pet. at 9A.) He claims this amounted to a violation of Due Process and the Confrontation

Clause. In addition, he argues trial counsel was ineffective in handling the issues raised.

Sherrors raised these claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California

Supreme Court. (Respt’s Lodgment No. 14.) Because that court did not furnish a basis for its

denial of the claim, the Court must look through to the last reasoned decision to address this

claim, the superior court order denying Sherrors habeas relief. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In denying this claim, the court stated:

The trial court precluded expert testimony that Trina Walker was retarded

pursuant to Evidence Code § 352 on the ground that it was cumulative as that fact

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was already before the jury. (RT 1597-98.) The trial court also precluded

evidence of specific incidents of theft and dishonesty pursuant to that section. (RT

1583.) It is clear from the record provided for the Court’s review that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. Moreover, the trial court allowed

testimony that Ms. Walker had a reputation for being untruthful. (RT 1584.)

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 4.)

The state court decision did not address the constitutional aspects of Sherrors claims

However, as the Supreme Court has noted, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent

when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning

nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court

decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

(1) Background

After hearing Walker’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, defense counsel sent an

investigator to meet with Walker about the possibility of releasing her medical records.

(See Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 66-68.) The investigator met with Walker and her aunt and both

ultimately signed the waiver of privilege form allowing Walker’s juvenile records to be released

to the defense. (Id. at 68-69.) Among these records were reports regarding psychological

evaluation of Walker which took place in 1993, 1994, and 1997. Some of these reports

contained conclusions that, due to Walker’s disability, she seemed prone to making things up.

(Id. at A6, A8.) The defense sought to introduce these reports in order to impeach Walker’s

testimony. 

Before trial, however, Walker complained that she did not wish the contents of her

medical and psychological reports to be made public. She then asserted that her waiver of

privilege, which she had signed in the presence of the defense investigator, was invalid because

it was not knowing and voluntary. The trial court held a hearing to determine that issue. (Id. at

56-91.) At the hearing Walker and her aunt testified that they did not understand what they

were signing when they signed the waiver. (Id. at 51-52, 58) Further, they testified that they

thought the defense investigator actually was working for the District Attorney’s Office. (Id.)

Ultimately, in light of this testimony, the court concluded the waiver was not knowing and

voluntary. Thus, the court ruled that the reports were subject to patient-psychotherapist

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privilege. (Id. at 1597-99.) 

(2) Cross-Examination of Walker and Confrontation Clause

Sherrors claims the trial court improperly precluded defense counsel from thoroughly

impeaching Walker’s testimony through cross-examination – specifically because it precluded

defense counsel from asking Walker about specific instances of theft and dishonesty and

questioning about how Walker’s disability affected her veracity. (Pet. at 9A-B.) The trial court

precluded defense counsel from asking Walker about specific instances of theft and dishonesty

based on Cal. Evid. Code § 352 on the basis that the probative value did not outweigh the

prejudicial effect. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1599.) The trial court precluded crossexamination about her disability because of privilege and pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 352,

ruling that it was cumulative because Walker had already admitted she had been diagnosed with

mental retardation. (Id. at 1597-1599.) 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to confront and cross-examine

adverse witnesses. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). However, “trial judges retain wide

latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,

confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally

relevant. . . .the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,

not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense

might wish.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679; Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1549

(9th Cir. 1992); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A Sixth Amendment violation exists when cross-examination is limited only if the trial

court abuses its discretion. Wood, 957 F.2d at 1550. To determine whether cross-examination

was limited in violation of the Sixth Amendment, it is necessary to examine: 1) the relevance of

the excluded evidence; and 2) whether other legitimate interests outweighed the defendant’s

interest in presenting the evidence. United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549-50; Hughes, 641 F.2d at 792. Even assuming the defense witness’s

proffered testimony was relevant, the court’s ruling [does] not violate the Sixth Amendment if

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the jury had sufficient information to appraise the prosecution witness’s motivation. See

Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1980); Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381,

1389 (9th Cir. 1977).

Here, Sherrors argues defense counsel should have been permitted to ask Walker about

specific instances of dishonesty and theft and the affect her disability had on her ability to tell

the truth. This evidence was certainly relevant, because it went to Walker’s credibility as a

witness. Since Walker had provided key testimony against Sherrors, it was important to the

defense to discredit her to the extent possible. Walker had testified that she saw blood on

Sherrors’ shirt and shoes and she also identified the watch found at the scene as belonging to

Sherrors. Without Walker’s testimony, it would have been much more difficult to corroborate

Lena Hixon’s testimony. Thus, the testimony was quite relevant.

However, while the court precluded cross-examination regarding specific instances of

dishonesty and theft and how Walker’s disability affected her ability to testify truthfully, the jury

did hear evidence regarding Walker’s tendency to make things up. Walker’s aunt, Brenda Earle

testified that Walker was “unreliable and “not truthful at all.”15 (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17, vol.

11 at 1581.) Defense counsel also called Walker’s mother, Joyce George, to testify as a witness.

George testified that stated that “[Walker] has a way of distorting the truth. She doesn’t

understand reality from illusion, you know. She somewhat gets it mixed up. She doesn’t

understand on the level that we do.” She went on to state that “[Walker] distorts a lot of things.

She exaggerates. She believes something happened sometimes that it didn’t.” (Id. at 1714.)

Given this testimony, the jury had sufficient information, even without the proffered evidence,

to appraise the Walker’s motivation. See Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1980);

Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1977).

Moreover, defense counsel was able to cross-examine Walker, to a certain extent,

regarding her mental disability.

 Q: Let me ask you this, Trina: You’re receiving disability now from the Social

Security Administration, correct?

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A: I have that for the rest of my life.

Q: I understand. And that’s because you’ve been diagnosed as developmentally

disabled, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you’ve also been diagnosed as mentally retarded, correct?

A: I’m not mentally retarded. I know some things. But, yes, that’s what’s on my

records.

[. . . .]

Q. You were taken to see some doctors at some point in your life; isn’t that right.

A: Yes, a psychiatrist when I was younger.

Q: And one of the reasons why you were taken to see the doctors was because you

made things up, isn’t that true?

A: No. What I just remember in my past is that – – 

COURT: Wait a minute. You can either answer that question “yes” or “no.” No

one’s going to probe into discussions with doctors. Those are personal and

confidential and can’t be invaded. So I’m not going to permit it.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1362, 1364.)

Although the court prevented defense counsel from asking about Walker’s disability and

her tendency to make things up, as discussed above, this testimony was elicited by the defense

through the testimony of Earle and George. Thus, the jury was able to sufficiently assess

Walker’s credibility. In sum, Sherrors had an “opportunity for effective cross-examination”

despite the limitations imposed by the trial court. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.

Accordingly, there was no violation of the Confrontation Clause. Thus, the state court’s denial

of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established law.

(2) Exclusion of Expert Testimony of Former Therapists

Sherrors also claims his due process rights were violated when the trial court excluded

expert testimony regarding Walker’s disability and its affect on her ability to be truthful. Here,

the trial court precluded testimony of therapists who had generated the reports discussed above,

because it found the evidence cumulative and an invasion of Walker’s psychotherapist-patient

privilege. (Resp’t Lodgement No 17 at 1598-99.) 

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A state court’s erroneous evidentiary ruling cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief

unless federal constitutional rights are affected. Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1211

(9th Cir. 2000) citing Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 816 (9th Cir.1987). “‘The state court’s

decision to exclude certain evidence must be so prejudicial as to jeopardize the defendant’s due

process rights.’” Id., (quoting Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir.1985), amended on

other grounds, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit has identified five factors a

court should consider when deciding whether a court’s exclusion of defense evidence violates

the Constitution: “(1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its

reliability; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole

evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the

attempted defense.” Id. (citing Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.1990)). The court

“‘must then balance the importance of the evidence against the state interest in exclusion.’” Id.

citing Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530.

Here, the first Tinsely factor weighs in Sherrors’ favor. The testimony of psychologists

regarding Walker’s ability to be truthful would have been probative on the issue of Walker’s

credibility because Walker’s testimony arguably provided the most significant corroboration of

Hixon’s testimony, any evidence that would impugn her credibility would have been highly

probative.

The second factor weighs in favor of Sherrors. The therapist testimony would tend to be

reliable, these therapists evaluated Walker in 1993, 1994, and 1997 – when Walker was still a

juvenile. However, their recollection may have been hampered by the lapse in time. Moreover,

their diagnoses and determinations as to Walker’s disability when she was as young as teenager

would not necessarily be applicable to Walker’s current abilities. The third factor also weighs

in Sherrors’ favor. The therapist’s testimony would be susceptible to evaluation by the jury.

Again, however, given the passage of time between the evaluations and the testimony regarding

those evaluations it could prove difficult to assess the probative value of it to the Walker’s

present testimony.

The fourth factor, however, weighs heavily in favor of precluding the evidence. The

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court had permitted the testimony of George and Earle, who both testified that Walker had a

tendency to “make things up.” Both George and Earle raised Walker and were in as good (or

better) position to testify to Walker’s general credibility. Thus, even if the memories of the

therapists had been clear, unequivocal and concise, the testimony would have been cumulative,

and more notably, likely inferior to the testimony of Earle and George, who were family, and in

possibly the best position to evaluate Walker’s credibility.

Finally, the fifth Tinsley factor weighs in favor of the defense. The defense’s theory was

murder. This required showing that Hixon was lying. Thus, undercutting any testimony that

corroborated Hixon’s testimony was a significant part of the defense. 

In balancing these factors, this court finds that the state court’s exclusion of the therapists’

testimony was reasonable. The state has a strong interest in protecting patient-therapist

privilege. The defense was permitted to present strong testimony about Walker’s tendency to

be untruthful from the two women who had raised her. It is entirely reasonable to conclude that

a family member, one who has lived with and nurtured the witness and is willing to undermine

the credibility of the witness, provided more than enough impeachment testimony. Further, it

is hard to conclude that testimony of a therapist who had only limited exposure to Walker and

had not had contact with her for several years, would have been more compelling than that of

Earle and George. On balance, this Court finds that the trial court’s exclusion of the expert

testimony was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law.

 (3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Sherrors claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to properly impeach Walker’s

testimony with the psychological reports, specific instances of dishonesty and presented expert

testimony that would support the claim that Walker had difficulties being truthful.

As discussed above, Sherrors must show that counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s

defective performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. Sherrors has not shown that

counsel’s performance was defective. First, defense counsel argued strenuously that the reports

should be admissible and that Walker’s waiver of privilege was knowing and voluntary. (Resp’t

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Lodgment 17, at 45-46, 82-89). He also argued that he should be permitted to ask about specific

instances of dishonesty and theft. (Id. at 1582-83.) The trial court, however, ruled that these

questions were not permitted. (Id. at 1583, 1599.) There is no indication that counsel did

anything other than vigorously defend his client by attempting to introduce evidence concerning

the reports. 

Furthermore, defense counsel attempted to have expert testimony introduced to show that,

due to her disability, Walker tended to make things up. (Id. at 137-38.) Finally, when the trial

court ruled that neither the reports, instances of dishonesty, nor expert testimony would be

permitted, defense counsel called two witnesses to testify to Walker’s general tendency to be

dishonest. Thus, Sherrors cannot show that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. 

In addition, defense counsel adequately cross-examined Walker. He pointed out

inconsistencies in her testimony and attempted to show that she did not actually see some of the

things to which she testified. He also had to make a tactical decision as to how forcefully to

challenge Walker during cross-examination. At one side bar conference during the crossexamination of Walker, the judge noted that “[W]ith this particular witness, I don’t think she

understands, and as a consequence there’s going to be a sympathy factor that develops, correctly

or incorrectly, with the jury, and it works for both sides. So I’m not here to advise people on

strategies. I’m just here to say I’ve already picked up on it.” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1363.)

 Even after the judge’s comment, counsel continued to attempt to impeach Walker about

inconsistent statements she made at the preliminary hearing. However, he focused on the more

relevant inconsistencies. While counsel likely could have been more forceful in his crossexamination, he did not hold back when it came to important inconsistencies. Any decision to

keep the tone of the cross-examination civil was assuredly a tactical one, to avoid alienating the

jury be being perceived as overbearing on an obviously mentally challenged witness. 

Sherrors has not overcome the presumption that his attorney exercised sound trial

strategy. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991). Review of counsel’s

performance is “highly deferential” and there is a “strong presumption” that counsel rendered

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adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. United States v. FerreiraAlameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1987); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690.

The court need not determine the actual reason for an attorney’s actions, as long as the act falls

within the range of reasonable representation. Id. at 456-57. It does so here. Accordingly,

defense counsel’s performance did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness.

See id. at 688. 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of his claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. Sherrors is not entitled to relief as to this

claim. 

b. Ground Six

Sherrors claims his due process rights were violated because Trina Walker was permitted

to testify despite her incompetency. He also argues his trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to challenge Walker’s competency under the California Code of Evidence § 701. Finally, he

claims defense counsel should have cross-examined Walker about how she was affected by

intoxication on the night of the murder. (See Pet. at 9C.)

(1) Due Process

Sherrors raised his due process claim in a petition for habeas corpus to the California

Supreme Court and it was denied without comment or citation. Since that court did not furnish

a basis for its denial of the claim, the Court must look through to the last reasoned decision to

address this claim, the superior court order denying Sherrors habeas relief. See Ylst, 501 U.S.

at 801-06. The superior court, however, did not address Sherrors’ due process claim. Thus, this

Court reviews the claim de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

As discussed above, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether Walker’s consent

to the waiver of privilege to her psychiatric reports was voluntary. (See Resp’t Lodgment No.

17 at 56-91.) After Walker and the other witnesses testified at the hearing, the trial court and

attorneys from both sides discussed whether the waiver was valid. After Walker’s testimony at

the hearing, defense counsel raised the issue of whether Walker was competent to testify. (Id.

at 64.) After hearing all the witnesses, and while the court was considering whether to allow the

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reports to be admitted into evidence, the judge commented on the possibility that Walker might

be incompetent to testify – noting particularly that she seemed to answer any question posed in

the affirmative. (Id. at 87.) He asked both counsel for further briefing on the subject on whether

she was competent to testify. (Id. at 89.) During the discussion, the trial judge stated: 

COURT: I’m also looking at the competency of a person who may be

mentally and/or developmentally disabled. Now, that came out at

the preliminary hearing, as I remember.

In an endeavor to keep this as simple as possible, but with

the real understanding that the real issue in this case might boil

down to competency, shouldn’t I be receiving points and authorities

on that issue from counsel? Because this, to me, sort of is a

subissue of that.

[. . . .]

COURT: I don’t know the extent of her retardation. I know the extent to

which she seems to go along with whoever the questioner is, as

manifested in the preliminary hearing. . . . So, I’m going to request

some help from you gentlemen on that. I don’t know whether the

general rules on competency of witnesses apply to somebody in her

particular stead, because I don’t know the extent of her past

problems and present problems.

 [. . . .]

COURT: Is she competent as a witness in this trial?

[Prosecutor]: That’s a separate issue form the one we were just talking about, I

believe.

COURT: I think one is included in the other, though. If she isn’t competent

to testify, I’m not sure realistically that I could hold her competent

to execute that waiver.

COURT: . . . Part of the manifestation, for example, is shown in her testimony

at the preliminary hearing, where it seemed to me - - this is the

subject of various views, and therefore susceptible to different

arguments. It seems to me that whoever was questioning her got the

answers that that person wanted.

[Prosecutor]: Well, actually, Judge Kronberger commented on that, and it wasn’t

so much put in those terms. It was stated that when she was asked

a leading question, the attorney who asked the leading question got

what they wanted. But when she was asked open-ended questions,

where the answer was not suggested, credible testimony was

elicited.

COURT: I caught that. But then there’s the realistic, pragmatic reality that on

cross-examination leading questions is the rule.

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[Prosecutor]: I agree. That does not mean that she’s not competent to testify. . .

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 81-83, 86-87) (emphasis added.) 

Due process may be violated if a court permits an incompetent witness to testify, but only

if the state court’s action rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Batchelor v. Cupp, 693

F.2d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 1982). Here, there was no indication that Walker was “incompetent” to

testify. California Code of Evidence section 701, states: 

(a) A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is:

(1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter

so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by

one who can understand him; or

(2) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.

(b) In any proceeding held outside the presence of a jury, the court may

reserve challenges to the competency of a witness until the conclusion of

the direct examination of that witness

Cal. Evid. Code § 701. This standard is consistent with the federal standard. See Fed. R. Evid.

601. Under the federal standard, every witness is presumed to be competent to testify unless it

can be shown that the witness does not have personal knowledge of the matters about which he

is to testify, that he does not have the capacity to recall, or that he does not understand the duty

to testify truthfully. See United States v. Lightly, 677 F.2d 1027, 1028 (4th Cir. 1982). “There

is no provision in the rules for the exclusion of testimony because a witness is mentally

incompetent. The question of competency goes to the issue of credibility, which is for the trier

of fact.” United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Lightly,

677 F.2d 1027, 1028 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 185-86 (5th

Cir.1979).)

Here, despite the judge’s comments that she may be incompetent to testify, there is

nothing to suggest Walker was incapable of understanding the oath, or incapable of expressing

herself so as to be understood by the jury. Further, Walker clearly had personal knowledge of

highly relevant matters. Accordingly, Walker was competent to testify. The state court’s denial

of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law.

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16 Cal. Evid. Code § 402 states:

(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence

shall be determined as provided in this article.

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(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Challenge Competency of Walker

Sherrors claims that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to argue Walker was

incompetent under Cal. Evid. Code § 701. He also claims counsel was ineffective in in failing

to appoint experts to testify to the affect Walker’s admitted intoxication had on her ability to

observe and recollect. (Pet. at 9C-9D.) 

Sherrors raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a petition for habeas corpus

to the California Supreme Court, which denied it without comment or citation. Since that court

did not furnish a basis for its denial of the claim, the Court must look through to the last reasoned

decision to address this claim, the superior court order denying Sherrors habeas relief. See Ylst,

501 U.S. at 801-06. The court denied the claim, stating “Nothing in the record suggests that Ms.

Walker was incompetent to testify in this case. In addition, as previously noted, her limitations

and reputation for dishonesty were disclosed to the jury.” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 6.) 

Again, the state court decision failed to cite to any federal law in denying the claim. 

However, as the Supreme Court has noted, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent

when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning

nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court

decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

As discussed above, under clearly established law, Sherrors must show that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that he was prejudiced as

a result of counsel’s defective performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. Sherrors can

show that neither that counsel’s performance was deficient, nor that he was prejudiced. 

First, counsel did challenge Walker’s competency after Walker’s testimony at the hearing

regarding the waiver of privilege. Counsel stated, “Your Honor, actually, what I would like to

do at this point is expand – I would like to make a motion under 402 that this witness is not

competent to testify before the jury.”16 Soon thereafter, the prosecutor pointed out that the

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(b) The court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out

of the presence or hearing of the jury; but in a criminal action, the court shall hear and

determine the question of the admissibility of a confession or admission of the defendant

out of the presence and hearing of the jury if any party so requests.

(c) A ruling on the admissibility of evidence implies whatever finding of fact is

prerequisite thereto; a separate or formal finding is unnecessary unless required by

statute.

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proper section for determining the competency of a witness was California Evidence Code

section 701. (Id. at 84.) After which, counsel for the defense argued Walker should be deemed

incompetent under section 701, stating: “I would submit that understanding [the oath] and being

able to relay it are also the issue. You can be competent to understand the obligation of the oath,

but if you’re mentally incapable of relaying it or understanding what it is – well, I’ll save that

until after we file our points and authorities. There’s no reason to argue it right now.” (Id. at

87-89.)

While there is nothing in the record to indicate that counsel did ultimately file points and

authorities on the matter, that does not render his performance deficient because, as discussed

above, there was nothing in the record to suggest Walker was incompetent under section 701.

She was able to express herself clearly before the jury. There was no indication that she did not

understand the oath. Although Walker sometimes had trouble understanding the questions, upon

clarification, she was able to answer. 

Petitioner does not allege Walker was unable to express herself clearly or incapable of

understanding her duty to tell the truth. He merely alleges that because of her mental disability,

she had a tendency to exaggerate, or make things up. This goes to her credibility and the weight

of her testimony, not her competency. See United States v. Mills, 597 U.S. 693 (9th Cir. 1079);

see also United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that witnesses were at

least minimally capable of offering reliable evidence despite their psychiatric problems, and

rather than excluding their testimony on grounds of incompetency, any possible weaknesses in

their testimony went to its credibility, and so were to be assessed by the jury.) 

Since any motion to have Walker deemed incompetent to testify would have failed,

Petitioner cannot show trial counsel’s actions were unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

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688. Sherrors cannot show prejudice for the same reason. Id. at 694. Thus, the state court’s

rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law. 

(3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Effectively Cross-Examine

Walker Regarding Her Intoxication on the Night of the MurderAnd Failing

to Call Expert Witness on Effect of Intoxication on Recollection

Finally, Sherrors alleges counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine Walker about

being intoxicated on the night of the murder. He also claims counsel should have presented an

expert witness to testify as to the effects of intoxication on the ability to observe and recollect.

(Pet. at 9C-9D). 

Sherrors raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a petition for habeas corpus

to the California Supreme Court and it was denied without comment or citation. (Resp’t

Lodgment Nos. 13 & 14.) Since that court did not furnish a basis for its denial of the claim, the

Court must look through to the last reasoned decision to address this claim. See Ylst, 501 U.S.

at 801-06. However, Sherrors raised this claim for the first time in his petition for habeas corpus

to the California Court of Appeal. Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 11 at 4c.) That court did not

address this claim in its order denying the petition. Thus, the Court must review this claim de

novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

As discussed above, under clearly established law, Sherrors must show that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that he was prejudiced as

a result of counsel’s defective performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. Sherrors has

shown neither that counsel’s performance was deficient, nor that he was prejudiced. 

Sherrors’ claim that counsel failed to cross-examine Walker on her drinking and smoking

of marijuana is belied by the record. On cross-examination, Sherrors’ attorney questioned

Walker as follows:

Q: At what time do you recall being with Leticia Moore’s apartment smoking

pot that night?

A: I don’t remember what time it was. I just remember it was nighttime and

we was hanging out.

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Q: So the night you say that you saw Ronnie come home with blood on his

shirt and sneakers, do you recall what time it was that you first went to

Leticia Moore’s?

A: I just remember it was late, like around ten o’clock or so. It was dark

outside. So I don’t remember.

Q: Okay. And were you also drinking beers that night with Leticia Moore?

A: Yes, I was.

Q: And do you remember how many beers you were drinking?

A: Probably like about just two beers.

Q: Okay. And do you recall what kind of beers they were, the brand?

A: Miller’s Genuine Draft.

Q: And do you recall how much pot you smoked?

A: No, I don’t.

(Resp’t Lodgment at 1370-71.)

Thus, defense counsel elicited testimony that Walker had been drinking and likely

smoking marijuana on the evening of the murder. It was not unreasonable for defense counsel

not to further question Walker regarding her intoxication and/or drug use. Sherrors seems to

argue that counsel should have gone further by asking Walker how her intoxication affected her.

However, Sherrors has not overcome the presumption that his attorney exercised sound trial

strategy. See Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991). Defense counsel may

have made a tactical decision not to question her too vigorously if it was not necessary. This

is particularly true in light of the judge’s comments, outside the presence of the jury, that the

body language of some of the jurors seemed to suggest sympathy for Ms. Walker. (See Resp’t

Lodgment No. 17 at 1363.) Defense counsel got Walker to admit she had been drinking and

smoked some marijuana on the night in question. That was certainly enough for the jury, using

its common sense, to make a determination on the extent, if any, her alcohol and drug use

affected her observations and memory.

Review of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential” and there is a “strong

presumption” that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional

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judgment. United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1987); see

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690. The court need not determine the actual reason for

an attorney’s actions, as long as the act falls within the range of reasonable representation. Id.

at 456-57. It does so here. Accordingly, defense counsel’s performance did not fall below the

objective standard of reasonableness. See id. at 688. Since Sherrors cannot show counsel’s

performance was deficient, it is not necessary to discuss whether he was prejudiced. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

As for Sherrors’ claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to call an expert on the

effects of marijuana and alcohol on Walker’s ability to observe and recollect, Sherrors has not

shown prejudice. The jury was capable of using its common sense in determining the effect

alcohol and marijuana may have had on Walker. Even if expert testimony were deemed

admissible, Sherrors has not shown that there was a likelihood that the outcome would have been

different with the testimony. Counsel introduced evidence of Walker’s possible intoxication as

well as impeached her credibility in general. There is no reasonable likelihood that the addition

of an expert to testify on a topic that jurors were capable of evaluating as lay people, would have

changed the outcome of the proceedings. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 694.

In sum, the denial of Sherrors’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established law.

(4) Conclusion

 For the above reasons, the Court finds the state court’s decisions on the three claims

raised in Ground Six were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law. Therefore, the Court recommends the claims raised in Ground Six be denied.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

c. Ground Fourteen

Sherrors asserts his due process rights were violated by the prosecution’s failure to

acquire and disclose records related to Latrina Walker’s psychiatric treatment and therapy. He

claims these records contained information about Walker’s tendency to lie and fabricate stories.

(Pet. at 9F.)

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Sherrors raised this claim for the first and only time in his petition for habeas corpus to

the California Supreme Court. It was denied without comment or citation. (Resp’t Lodgment

Nos. 13 & 14.) Since this Court has a dispositive state court order which does not “furnish a

basis for its reasoning,” it must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982; Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either

to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Although this rule originally covered only exculpatory

evidence, the Supreme Court has extended the Brady rule to include impeachment evidence as

well. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).

In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show three things: (1) the

evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently, (2)

the withheld evidence must be either exculpatory or impeachment material, and (3) the evidence

must be material to the defense. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 678 and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).)

“Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or material, only if it undermines confidence in the outcome

of the trial.” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111-12).

 “Moreover, we analyze all of the suppressed evidence together, using the same type of analysis

that we employ to determine prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel cases.” Id. (citing

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 and United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1986).)

Here, Sherrors has not satisfied the first prong of the Brady requirements. He points to

nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecution suppressed evidence, willfully or not,

regarding Walker’s mental disabilities. Indeed, the defense had access to a plethora of reports

and medical records pertaining to Walker’s disabilities. (See Pet. at Attachment, Ex. A1-A8.)

All of this information was reviewed by the trial court. Ultimately, the trial court found that

Walker’s consent to give the defense access to her privileged medical files, was not knowing and

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voluntary. Thus, the trial court ruled that the defense could not introduce the reports into

evidence. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1597-99.)

Second, except for the reports that the defense obtained, Sherrors has not shown that any

additional reports existed, much less that they would have been helpful in impeaching Walker’s

testimony. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, Agurs, 427 U.S. at

111-12). Sherrors appears to argue that the prosecution should have taken it upon itself to

retrieve the same files that the defense had procured from state agencies that held them.

However, that would not have resolved the issue of privilege. 

Finally, Sherrors has not shown prejudice. Even if these reports existed, they would have

been subject to the same patient-psychotherapist privilege as the reports defense counsel

obtained. Moreover, Sherrors offers nothing but his own speculation that any such reports would

have supported his claim that Walker’s testimony was not credible given her disability. Sherrors

also fails to show prejudice because testimony of Walker’s disability and propensity to lie were

introduced at trial. Both George and Earle, Walker’s mother and aunt, each of whom had cared

for Walker for significant periods of time, testified that she tended to “make things up” and could

not be trusted. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17, at 1581, 1714.) Walker herself admitted that she

suffered from a mental disability. (Id. at 1362, 1364.) Thus, even assuming such reports exist

and would have been admissible despite the doctor-patient privilege, Sherrors cannot succeeded

on this claim because he has not shown prejudice. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (citing Bagley,

473 U.S. at 682 and United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1986).)

Accordingly, after an independent review of the record, the Court concludes that Sherrors

has not satisfied the Brady requirements. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Thus, Sherrors is not

entitled to relief as to this claim.

3. Jury Selection

Ground Four:

Sherrors claims that his right to due process, a fair and impartial jury and effective

assistance of counsel were violated when the Court and counsel failed to adequately question

potential jurors during voir dire and excuse or move to excuse specific jurors. He also claims

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28 17 In his state petitions for habeas corpus, Sherrors consistently raised a Batson claim. However,

even under liberal construction, Sherrors has not raised a Batson claim in this instant petition. 

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jurors were biased because of the pre-trial publicity, race and class, and the jurors’ own personal

experiences. Sherrors also points to two jurors who he believes should have been removed

during voir dire.17 (Pet. at 9C.)

Sherrors raised these claims in a petition for review of a habeas corpus filed in the

California Supreme Court, which denied them without citation of authority. (See Lodgment No.

14.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address the

claim, the superior court opinion denying his habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis.

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

The court denied the claims, stating “Petitioner also purports to challenge the sufficiency

of voir dire regarding pretrial publicity and racial prejudice. However, the examples cited do

not appear to involve either issue. In addition, Petitioner mischaracterized these jurors’

responses and/or omitted relevant assurances that they could be fair and impartial.” (Lodgment

No. 10 at 5.) The court did not cite any legal authority for its decision. (Id.) However, as the

Supreme Court has noted, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving

a habeas corpus claim. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result

of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will

not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

(1) Impartial Jury and Due Process

It is clearly established that “ [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime

shall have been committed[.]” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. A state court defendant has a federal

constitutional right to an impartial jury. Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir.

1986). In the context of juror impartiality, due process means a juror capable and willing to a

decide a case solely on the evidence presented, and a trial judge who is careful to prevent

prejudicial occurrences. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).

In a habeas action regarding juror impartiality, the state court’s finding of impartiality is

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a finding of fact that is accorded a presumption of correctness. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.

412, 429 (1985); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,

218 (1982). The overwhelming majority of claims of violations of the right to a fair and impartial

jury involve pretrial publicity, see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), ex parte communications

with jurors, see Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), or the jury selection process. See

Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). However, “[t]he goal of the Sixth Amendment is

‘jury impartiality with respect to both contestants.’” McCollum, 505 U.S. at 58 (quoting Holland

v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990)). The Supreme Court has explained that “an impartial jury

consists of nothing more than ‘jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.’”

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423

(1985)). 

As for Sherrors’ general complaint that jurors were biased by prejudicial publicity, the

trial court questioned the entire venire regarding pretrial publicity at the beginning of jury

selection. Specifically, the judge stated: 

You’ll note that I read to you that these events are alleged to have occurred

back in September, the 30th of September, or on or about that date, of 1999. So

little time has passed since this incident or alleged incident occurred. But at the

time of the incident, counsel reminded me that there was pretrial publicity in the

case. I believe it was carried in the local newspapers and on local television.

Very briefly, it involved finding the victim, Steven Foth, up in the Lake

Hodges area in a pumpkin patch. And there were indications about Mr. Foth and

also about the defendants who are on trial and another individual who I’ll be

talking about in a few minutes. Anybody recall having read or heard anything

about this incident?

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 18 at 24.) None of the potential jurors responded that they had seen

anything in the media about the case. The judge added that if, during the course of the

questioning, something came to mind that caused a potential juror to recall having read or heard

something about the case, then to let him know. (Id.) None did. And Sherrors points to nothing

else in the record to support his claim that any one of the jurors was biased due to pretrial

publicity. 

Sherrors’ case is nothing like Irvin, 366 U.S. at 727, one of the lead cases on pre-trial

publicity. In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant was deprived an impartial

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jury when eight of the 12 impaneled jurors stated that, due to pretrial publicity, they thought

defendant was guilty. Id. One juror had said that he could not give the defendant the benefit of

the doubt that he was innocent. Another stated that he had a “somewhat certain” fixed opinion

that the defendant was guilty. Id. at 728. Here, none of the jurors even admitted to hearing or

reading any pre-trial publicity, much less fixing a pre-conceived notion as to Sherrors guilt.

Thus, Sherrors cannot show that he was deprived of an impartial jury based on pretrial publicity.

Sherrors also complains, generally, that the jurors were biased by “racial and class

prejudice.” (Pet.at 9C.) Sherrors’ counsel, however, questioned the jury regarding racial bias,

stating:

Now, obviously, Mr. Sherrors is African American. And we have to talk

about that. Race is an issue in this country. Race has always been an issue in this

country. And as the judge has already told you, Mr. Sherrors is entitled to a crosssection of the community, as Judge Kennedy said. People of different ethnic

backgrounds, people of different colors, people of different socioeconomic groups

that can look at the evidence and weigh the evidence fairly without giving any

consideration to his color. Can everybody do that?

The victim in this case is white. He’s a young – he was a young,

handsome, talented white male. Mr. Sherrors is a young poor, African American

male.

Does everyone promise Mr. Sherrors that those dynamics will not come

into play when they go back and deliberate this case?

Everyone seems to be shaking their head.

(Resp’t Lodgment No.18 at 113.) No juror expressed any difficulty in being fair and impartial,

regardless of Sherrors race and/or socioeconomic background. (Id.) Thus, Sherrors has not

supported his general claim that the jurors were biased based on race and economic class.

The only specific complaints Sherrors has are related to two jurors - Juror No. 5 and

Juror No. 10. He seems to argue that these jurors should have been excused for cause. Under

California law, challenges for cause are defined in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 225, which states:

(1) A challenge for cause, for one of the following reasons:

(A) General disqualification--that the juror is disqualified from

serving in the action on trial.

(B) Implied bias--as, when the existence of the facts as ascertained,

in judgment of law disqualifies the juror.

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18 “Challenges for cause are the means by which partial or biased jurors should be eliminated.

To disqualify a juror for cause requires a showing of either actual or implied bias- that is ... bias in fact

or bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law.” United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.

2000).

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(C) Actual bias--the existence of a state of mind on the part of the

juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will

prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without

prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

This standard is consistent with the federal standard.18

First, Sherrors argues that the court should have excused Juror No. 5 for cause. Juror No.

5's uncle had been murdered in 1985. The suspect was caught and the case tried in San Diego

Superior Court, with the defendant being convicted. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 18 at 182.) The

Court inquired as follows: 

BY THE COURT:

Q. Were you able to hear the questions that the Court and counsel addressed

to the other jurors yesterday and today?

A. Yes.

Q. Thinking back on those and without necessarily repeating them, do you

recall any question that you would want to address or that you would

answer differently from the lion’s share of the jurors presently in the box?

A. Not at this time.

Q: Is there any reason that you know of why you could not sit as a fair an

impartial juror in this case?

A: No.

[ . . . .]

Q: And I just want to find out, have you or any member of your family ever

been the victim of a crime of violence like some of the ones that are

charged in this case or others that are not charged?

A: Yes, I have. I - - I was raised by my uncle, who was murdered. The case

was heard in San Diego in front of Judge Gill. The crime occurred in ‘85.

It went to trial in 1990.

Q: Was that because he was not apprehended until close to when the trial was

rather than closer to the incident.

A: Um, he was apprehended within six months of the crime but, ah, he, um,

went through a couple of public defenders and wound up representing

himself. So - -

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Q: Okay.

A: - - there was a lot of - -

Q: Did you attend the trial?

A: I did.

Q: And were you satisfied with the outcome and the performances of the

various individuals during the trial?

A: Yes, I was very pleased about it.

Q: Anything about the police investigation of that case which may be on your

mind.

A: Only that they did an excellent job.

Q: Okay. Which, I guess, kind of leads me into – I didn’t want to go through

all these question and I don’t intend to – if a police officer was called in

this case – we’ve heard questions about your attitudes about officers about

hearing their testimony. Would they have a leg up in credibility in your

mind as a result of your experience involving your uncle’s case? Not your

uncle’s case but the case in which you uncle was a victim?

A: No. . . .

(Resp’t Lodgment No 18 at 180-82.)

The trial judge then turned the questioning over to defense counsel. Counsel asked Juror

No. 5 if how she felt about the presumption of innocence and the criminal justice system in

general. She responded that she believed strongly in the presumption of innocence and that she

thought, generally, the criminal justice system was fair. She assured counsel that there was no

reason why she could not be a fair and impartial juror. (Id. at 184-186.)

The trial court did not err in failing to discharge Juror No. 5 for cause. Juror No. 5 stated

more than once that she could be fair and impartial. There is nothing to suggest Juror No. 5

would not “conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.’” Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178.

Sherrors points to the fact that her uncle was murdered. However, Juror No. 5 stated that her

experience would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial. It is notable, as well, that the

murder of her uncle had happened 15 years prior. There was simply no reason to disbelieve her

statements that she could remain unbiased if selected as a juror. She was honest and forthcoming

about having a family member as a victim of murder, the same crime Sherrors was charged. See

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Fields v. Brown, 431 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that juror who was honest and

forthcoming was not impliedly biased despite having wife had been a victim of crimes similar

to those charged against defendant); cf. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)

As for Juror 10, Sherrors claims she should not have been permitted to sit as a juror

because she had worked in law enforcement, had friends and family in law enforcement.

Sherrors claims she stated was “unsure if her law enforcement connections would affect her

impartiality.” Sherrors also claims she indicated she would deem someone who was merely

present at a crime scene, an accomplice. Finally, Sherrors states she had had a personal

experience with domestic abuse. (Pet. at 9C).

As the state court noted in denying this claim, Sherrors has mischaracterized Juror 10's

testimony and taken statements out of context. Juror No. 10, a kindergarten teacher, stated that

15 years prior, she had worked at with the Fresno County Sheriff’s department in their crime lab.

She also stated that she had done a year internship as a federal probation and parole officer.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 18 at 247.) She also admitted that she had two cousins and a friend who

all worked as correctional officers, and a friend who was married to an ATF officer. (Id. at 247-

48.) When questioned by the court, she stated that she could be fair, regardless of her ties to law

enforcement. (Id. at 248-49.)

When questioned by the prosecutor, Juror No. 10 mentioned that, as a kindergarten

teacher, she sometimes dealt with “accomplices” – with regard to a fight or some other

infraction. She stated that, as a teacher, she had to listen to all who were there and involved, to

determine what happened. She stated, in part:

Q: . . . I know you refer to your kindergartners as accomplices, right?

A: Yes.

Q: I never heard a kindergartner referred to as an accomplice. What do you

mean by that?

A: I meant that sometimes people that were also involved, you have to use

them, you have to listen to what they’re saying, because they were there.

They too were there. And you weigh that with all the other people that

were or were not there, but now what happened or heard.

Q: Okay. Now, do you view the statement of a kindergartner accomplice the

same as you would any other person?

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A: I view by definition what an accomplice is.

Q: Pardon me?

A: I said I view the same definition. Maybe it’s applied differently - - not

applied. What I consider an accomplice is - - maybe a fight takes place on

campus, like they’re in my room, somebody was involved. I think I would

also think of a person who was involved in there as the same, regardless of

whether they were 5 or 25 or what it was. But in a playground situation or

in a robbery situation, an accomplice somebody who was there or had a

part or was a witness of, but was there . . . and involved in some way.

Q: Involved in the crime at the crime scene, right?

A: They may not have been the principal person, but they were there.

[. . . .]

Q: But obviously we’re dealing with a murder case and you will have an

accomplice who was there at the crime scene involved in some respect in

that crime, and you will hear about the involvement of that accomplice,

right? We talked a little bit about labels and some jurors have talked about,

for example, be suspicious of the testimony of an accomplice.

What I need to know from you, is when that witness gets on the stand,

when an accomplice gets on the stand, are you automatically going to say,

you know, “This person was there at the crime scene. They were involved

in this. I don’t care what they have to say, I’m just not going to listen to

them”? Would you do that.

A: No.

Q: Okay. Would you consider the surrounding circumstances and all the other

evidence in the case to determine if that person is telling the truth.

A: Yes, I would.

Q: And you would observe their demeanor to see how they’re acting while

they testify to see if you believe them?

A: Yes, I would.

(Id. at 268-70.)

Reading the statements in context, it is clear that Juror No. 10 did not think that anyone

who was merely present during a crime was an accomplice. She stated that an accomplice was

someone who was “involved” somehow in the crime. There is nothing in the exchange

regarding accomplices that suggests Juror No. 10 could not be fair and impartial. She stated she

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prosecution case relied heavily on the credibility of the testimony of Lena Hixon, an accomplice.

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would not automatically discredit accomplice testimony, rather she assured the prosecutor that

she would evaluate the accomplice testimony to determine its credibility. Thus, there is no

reason to believe she would be biased against Sherrors.19

Finally, Sherrors’ statement that Juror No. 10 had “personal experience with domestic

abuse” is inaccurate. Juror No. 10 stated that she had a co-worker who was in an abusive

marriage fifteen or sixteen years prior. (Id. at 271.) When asked, she described the person as

merely a co-worker, not a friend. Furthermore, she did not talk to her very often about her

situation. (Id.) Again, there is nothing about this testimony that suggests Juror No. 10 could not

be fair and impartial. There was no basis for which to discharge her for cause. As such,

Sherrors cannot show that the jurors at his trial would not “ conscientiously apply the law and

find the facts.” Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178. 

In sum, Sherrors has not shown that he was denied an impartial jury based on pretrial

publicity and racial and socioeconomic bias. Moreover, he has not shown that the two jurors he

points to specifically were incapable or unwilling to “ conscientiously apply the law and find the

facts.” Id. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. 

(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Sherrors also argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to thoroughly voir dire

potential jurors and failing to use peremeptory challenges to remove Jurors No. 5 and 10 from

the jury. 

It has long been recognized that “[peremptory challenges] are auxiliary; unlike the right

to an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, peremptory challenges are not of

federal constitutional dimension. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) (citing

Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988); see Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586

(1919) (“There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress

to grant peremptory challenges.”). In California, a peremptory challenge to a juror may be

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exercised for no reason at all. (See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 231; but see Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that jurors may not be challenged on the basis of their race). 

To prevail under Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, Sherrors must show that his “counsel’s

performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at

687. There could be any number of tactical reasons why defense counsel would have wanted

Juror Nos. 5 and 10 on the jury, but whether counsel had a strategic reason or not is immaterial,

because Sherrors was not prejudiced. Id. at 697 (observing that a court may determine prejudice

without first deciding deficiency). As discussed above, prejudice exists if “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. Here there is no such reasonable probability, because, as discussed

above, neither juror was biased. 

Furthermore, as discussed above, the jury was adequately questioned about pre-trial

publicity and racial biases. There is no indication that any impaneled juror was biased by

publicity or racial bias, or any other reason. Thus, again, Sherrors has not shown prejudice.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established law. 

(3) Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court finds the state court’s decisions on the two claims raised

in Ground Four were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law. Therefore, the Court recommends the claims raised in Ground Six be denied. See Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

4. DNA Evidence

Sherrors raises two claims related to DNA evidence. First, he argues his due process rights

were violated when the prosecutor committed misconduct by distorting the DNA evidence during

closing argument. Next, he argues that this due process rights were violated when the state’s

experts consumed the entire sample of DNA, precluding the defense from testing the evidence

with its own expert. He also claims defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move for

dismissal due to the consumption of DNA evidence. 

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a. Ground Eleven:

Sherrors argues that his due process rights were violated when the prosecutor improperly

argued that DNA evidence found at the crime scene proved Sherrors’ guilt. (Pet. at 9E.) Sherrors

raised this claim his petition for review of his direct appeal to the California Supreme Court. (See

Resp’t Lodgment No. 5.) The petition was denied without comment or citation. (See Resp’t

Lodgment No. 7.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision

to address the claim, appellate court’s opinion on direct review. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In denying this claim, the court stated:

The defendants also contend that the prosecutor committed misconduct

during his closing argument by misstating that Sherrors’s DNA was on the watch

found at the scene of the murder. In making a closing argument, a prosecutor is

given “wide latitude” and may engage in vigorous advocacy so long his or her

summation amounts to a fair comment on the evidence, including the inferences

that may reasonably be drawn therefrom. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal .4th

153, 221; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.) In reviewing a challenge to

the propriety of the prosecutor’s comments to the jury, the paramount question is

whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied the

challenged comments in an objectionable fashion. (People v. Morales (2001) 25

Cal.4th 34, 44.)

At trial, prosecution witness Brian Burritt testified that he tested three small

areas of the watch, two of which appeared from a visual inspection to have blood

(but only one of which tested positive for the presence of blood), and determined

that Sherrors, Hall and Hixon could be excluded, but that Foth could not be

excluded, as the source of the DNA found in those areas. Burritt also testified,

however, that the area on the back of the watch face showed a trace result

consistent with Sherrors’s DNA and that the result could indicate Sherrors was a

secondary source of that DNA, although it was “extremely weak” and he was “not

comfortable” relying on it as a basis for determining whether Sherrors was such a

secondary source.

In his closing argument, the prosecutor did not argue that Burritt’s testimony

established Sherrors’s ownership of the watch, but instead cited to the testimony

of Sherrors’s sister for that purpose. Sherrors’s counsel responded by arguing that

the DNA testing would have resulted in a mixture of DNA if the watch was

Sherrors’s and that thus the DNA testing conclusively established that the watch

had belonged to Foth, not to Sherrors. In rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed the

defense argument by summarizing the witness testimony that the watch belonged

to Sherrors and did not belong to Foth and citing Burritt’s uncontradicted testimony

that the DNA evidence was inconclusive on whether Foth was the “habitual

wearer” of the watch.

In the portion of argument that the defendants now challenge, the prosecutor

also referred to Burritt’s testimony about the trace DNA on the back of the watch,

arguing that the trace DNA came from a source other than Foth. After the trial

court overruled a defense objection, the prosecutor argued that the trace DNA was

consistent with Sherrors’s DNA, that Sherrors was the source of the trace DNA and

that the reason Sherrors’s DNA was on the watch was because it was his watch.

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The prosecutor’s argument regarding the state of the DNA evidence from

the watch was, in large part, a fair summation of Burritt’s trial testimony. Burritt

testified that the trace result was an allele that was consistent with Sherrors’s DNA

and could indicate that Sherrors was a secondary source of the DNA from the back

of the watch face, although it was too weak to permit him to give a conclusive

opinion on the subject. Sherrors now argues that the trace result was not sufficient

to implicate him as a source of the DNA “as a matter of science” based on other

aspects of the DNA testing results. However, this argument appears to be

contradicted by Burritt’s testimony that the result could indicate that Sherrors was

 a secondary source; further, Sherrors does not cite to any expert testimony in the

record to support his assertion. In light of Burritt’s testimony, the prosecutor was

entitled to argue that the DNA on the watch was Sherrors’s.

Further, even if we assume that Burritt’s testimony was too equivocal to

support the prosecutor’s argument, we would nonetheless conclude that there was

no prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor’s brief rebuttal argument regarding

the trace DNA evidence was not an egregious misstatement of the evidence and it

did not constitute a pattern of misbehavior. (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th

894, 979 [a single instance of error during closing argument generally will not

establish a pattern of egregious behavior sufficient to constitute misconduct].) In

addition, in light of Sherrors’s counsel’s arguments that the DNA evidence

conclusively excluded Sherrors as a source of the DNA and that the prosecution’s

characterization of Burritt’s testimony was “totally and completely disingenuous

and intellectually dishonest,” it is not reasonably likely that the jury was confused

or misled by the prosecutor’s characterization of the trace DNA evidence. The

prosecutor’s argument does not establish a basis for reversal of the judgment.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 16-18.)

It is clearly established that, a prosecutor commits misconduct during closing argument

when he or she manipulates or misstates the evidence presented during the trial. Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986). However, a prosecutor may argue reasonable

inferences based on the evidence. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986);

United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991). “Counsel are given latitude in the

presentation of their closing arguments, and courts must allow the prosecution to strike hard

blows based on the evidence presented and all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ceja v. Stewart,

97 F.3d 1246, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1415 (9th

Cir. 1993).) 

The ownership of the watch was hotly disputed. The prosecution submitted that Sherrors

was the owner/wearer of the watch, while it was the defense’s position that the watch was Foth’s.

In arguing this point during closing, as the appellate court stated, the prosecutor did not mention

Burritt’s testimony regarding the trace DNA on the watch. Instead, he argued that Trina Walker’s

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testimony proved the watch found at the crime scene was Sherrors’. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17

at 1729-30.) He also noted that Hixon had testified that after leaving the crime scene, Sherrors

had said “Man, I can’t find my watch.” (Id. at 1730.)

In defense co-counsel’s closing, he argued that the DNA regarding the watch tended to

show that Foth, not Sherrors, was the wearer of the watch. He stated in part:

We had Brian Burritt. He was the DNA guy who attempted to link the

watch to Mr. Sherrors. I submit that his testimony was suspect at best. He couldn’t

say one way or the other that any DNA was found on this – actually, he could say

that there was no DNA linked to Sherrors on this watch, and that there was some

DNA extracted from this watch, from the back of the watch, that was linked to Mr.

Foth. He could not rule out that Mr. Foth may have been the habitual wearer of the

watch. So I don’t know that he adds a whole lot to this case.

(Id. at 1746.)

Then Sherrors’ counsel addressed the watch in his closing, stating initially, “[Hixon]

testified that the watch was Ronnie Sherrors’. The San Diego Police Department’s own crime

lab excluded Ronnie Sherrors as the habitual wearer of the watch.” (Id. at 1782.) He later

returned to the issue, arguing:

The watch found at the crime scene is not Ronnie Sherrors’ watch. The

watch found at the crime scene was Mr. Foth’s watch. . . . .Now, Brian Burritt

testified that he – and remember when I cross examined him on his rough notes:

You were specifically trying to get habitual wearer DNA evidence from the watch,

right? 

“Yes”

“And you went about it by taking a swab from the cover plate, the back of the

watch?”

I see some of you wearing watches. It’s the back of the watch which comes

into contact with your wrist. Why? Because that’s where the epithelial cells are,

the skin cells on the surface which rub off on the back of the watch. So when you

swab it, the swab will capture the those cells, and from those cells are extracted

DNA, and from the DNA a profile is obtained.

Now, from the back of the cover plate where there was no blood – and this

whole idea, the prosecution’s whole approach to the testimony of Brian Burritt was

totally and completely disingenuous and intellectually dishonest. It was designed

to confuse you. It was designed to blow smoke in from of this clear and

uncontroverted evidence. There was no blood on the back of the cover plate where

Brian Burritt took that swab, no invisible blood, no thin layer of blood, no blood.

Now, as a result of that DNA testing Ronnie Sherrors was excluded as the

genetic donor of the DNA on the back of the watch. That’s it. Now, there was no

mixture. There was no mixture of DNA. . . .

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Steven Foth could not be excluded as the genetic donor of an unmixed

genetic profile on both the stained and unstained portion of the watch. This DNA

evidence puts to rest once and for all who the habitual wearer of the watch is.

There’s no mixture. This watch belonged to Steven Foth, and Ronnnie Sherrors

is excluded by state-of-the-art forensic DNA evidence.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1820-21, 23.)

Finally, when it came time for the prosecution’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor spent

a good deal of time pointing to witness testimony that the watch found at the scene did not belong

to Foth. Several of Foth’s friends who had seen him on the day of his death testified that Foth

did not own such a watch. (Id. at 1884-85.) Finally, the prosecutor addressed the defense’s

assertions that the DNA showed that the watch belonged to Foth, and not Sherrors. 

[Prosecutor]: Then we get to the DNA results that were

discussed, that defense counsel relies on to establish

that that is the watch that belonged to Mr. Foth. Well,

you heard the testimony from Brian Burritt. There is–

from the swabbing on the back of the watch, item 4A,

in the DQ-Alpha, DQA1 section here, there is a trace

2. You’ve heard this testimony.

Now, when you look at Mr. Foth, the’s a 1.2

and a 1.3. Where did that 2 come from? It came from

another source. There is another source of DNA on

the back of the watch.

Mr. Wadler: I’m going to object. That misstates the testimony, your Honor.

The Court: Overruled.

[Prosecutor]: Trace 2, People’s 22. This is the testimony

that’s in this case, trace 2. We look at Ronnie

Sherrors, and what does he have in the DQA1 section?

He has a 2. There’s another source of DNA on that

watch , and the reason is because it was Mr. Sherrors’

watch. He was wearing that watch.

(Id. at 1890-91.) Sherrors now claims the prosecutor committed misconduct with this statement,

by mischaracterizing Burritt’s testimony.

Burritt’s testimony regarding the trace DNA evidence on the watch was equivocal. Burritt

testified, in relevant part:

Q: Okay. I’m not sure we described all the areas [of the watch that were

tested]. There was 4A, which was where?

A: 4A was the back of the watch face, the side opposite where the dials are

that’s in contact with the arm, the wrist.

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Q: What was the test result [for the presence of blood]?

A: Negative.

[. . . .]

Q: But can you interpret those [DNA] results [from the watch] for us?

A: Yes. Well, I tested three – three areas of the watch and I also tested

reference samples from Steven Foth, Ronnie Sherrors, Willard Hall and

Lena Hixon, and I actually did not do the testing for Jimmie Washington.

That was done at a later time. And what these reference samples are is these

are just samples of known DNA that were collected from these people for

comparison purposes.

For all three areas of the watch that I tested Steven Foth could not be

excluded as the source of DNA obtained from these three different areas.

And Ronnie Sherrors, Willard Hall, and Lena Hixon were excluded as the

sources of DNA that I obtained from these three areas of the watch.

[. . . .]

Q: Okay. And what were the population frequencies with respect to the typing

of Mr. Foth.

A: . . .[F]or Caucasians it’s approximately 1 in 3,200 people. . .. . . . .

Q: Now, when you swabbed the back of the watch, why was it that you were

even doing this testing to begin with? 

A: Well, my intent was to try to obtain DNA from the wearer of the watch. So

I swabbed an area that – even though I didn’t see any bloodstains, I went

ahead and swabbed that area.

Q: Now, how does one’s DNA get on the back of a watch?

A: That would most likely be on there if you’re the wearer of the watch. It

would be on there from DNA that’s in sweat, the cells that come out

through our sweat pores that would end up on the watch.

[. . . .]

Q: Okay. Then in the results for 4A [the sample taken from the back of the

watch] there also, in the DQA1 locus – let’s just talk about those columns.

There’s six columns, correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: What does each column represent.

A: Each column is a different test that I performed. It’s a different region of

the DNA that we’re looking at. They’re six independent regions we’re

testing.

Q: Okay. Now, with respect to the DQA1 locus, which is in the first column

there, in the 4A item there is a result that says “trace 2”; is that correct?

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A: Yes.

Q: What does that mean?

A: That means there was a very weak signal for the 2 allele, the 2 type that I

detected.

Q: Okay. Now, does Mr. Foth have a 2 allele in the DQ-Alpha-1 locus?

A: No, he does not.

Q: Does Ronnie Sherrors?

A: Yes, he does.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 339-41, 344-45.)

On cross-examination, Burritt admitted that because the signal was so weak, he could not

make a conclusive statement as to whether Sherrors DNA was present in the sample. This is

consistent with his report, which specifically stated that “no interpretation is provided for trace

results.” (See id. at 348.) Burritt stated that Sherrors was “certainly excluded as to the vast

majority of the DNA on 4A, and if he was there on 4A he would have to be at such a low level

that I’m not comfortable making that conclusion whether he’s there or not and we just don’t – I

try not to even go there. I don’t give those interpretations in my report.” (Id.)

In light of Burritt’s equivocal testiomony, the state court’s denial of Sherrors claim was

reasonable. Although at one point Burritt stated that Sherrors was excluded as a possible source,

he then testified that because of the trace 2, he could not definitively exclude Sherrors as being

a contributor of the trace DNA. When taken in context, the prosecutor’s argument during rebuttal

was simply pointing out that the trace 2 result on the back of the watch was consistent with the

testimony of Foth’s friends, that the watch did not belong to Foth; and with Trina Walker, who

stated the watch was Sherrors’. This is not a misstatement or manipulation of the evidence, but

rather a reasonable inference based on all the evidence. See Darden, 477 U.S. at181-82; United

States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established law and therefore should be denied. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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b. Ground Five:

Sherrors claims his right to due process was violated because the prosecution experts

consumed the certain samples of DNA, thus precluding the defense an opportunity to have its

own expert conduct DNA testing. He also claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move

for dismissal under “Youngblood v. Arizona” and failing to call an expert in support of the claim.

(Pet. at 9C.)

Sherrors raised these claims in a petition for review of a habeas corpus filed in the

California Supreme Court, which denied them without citation of authority. (See Lodgment No.

14.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address the

claim, the superior court opinion denying his habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis.

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

The court denied the claim, stating:

The record provided for the Court does not support these claims. First,

Petitioner’s attorney did seek exclusion of the DNA evidence at issue (CT 415 et,

seq. Although the motion was based on Prince v. Sup.Ct. (1992) 8 Cal. App.4th

1176 rather than Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, the record does not

establish that Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective in relying on the Prince decision.

If material evidence is destroyed, a defendant may seek sanctions under

California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 and Arizona v. Youngblood, (1988)

488 U.S. 51. However, one of the requirements of such a motion is that the

prosecution acted in bad faith in destroying the it. Nothing in the record establishes

that this evidence was destroyed in bad faith.

Furthermore, whether this evidence had been destroyed, i.e., tested by

prosecution experts in a manner that precluded defense testing, was disputed and

this dispute was to be decided by the jury. (RT 141-144.) The trial court indicated

its intent to entertain a renewal of the motion brought on Petitioner’s behalf

following the jury’s resolution of the issue. (RT 144.) However, Petitioner failed

to submit ay subsequent proceedings [sic] or the Court’s review. 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 5-6.)

(1) Due Process

 Sherrors claims the prosecution experts consumed samples of DNA extracted from two

cigarette butts found in the Audi. As a result, he argues, the defense an did not have an

opportunity to have its own expert conduct DNA testing. 

Under clearly established law, the prosecution has a duty not to destroy material evidence.

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). Material evidence is evidence that might be

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expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. It must possess an exculpatory value

that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant

would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Id. at 489.

A defendant must show the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve potentially useful

evidence. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). The presence or absence of bad faith

turns on the whether the police had knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the

time it was destroyed. Id. at 56 n.*; see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984).

As an initial matter, Sherrors’ claim fails because he cannot even establish evidence had

been destroyed. As the state court noted, the question of whether the samples were “consumed”

and thus not able to be tested by defense experts, was a matter of great dispute. (See Resp’t

Lodgment No. 17at 40-44. The defense expert Dr. Edward Blake, reported that he could not

conduct testing on the cigarette butts because a prosecution expert consumed the entire sample.

(See Respt’s Lodgment 15 at 439-443) He reported that the ends of both butts which contact the

lips during smoking, were cut off laterally on the diameter, instead of “longitudinally” along the

length.” Id. at 440. However, it was the prosecution’s position that the samples were not

consumed and still capable of testing. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 141-142, see also Resp’t Lodgment

No. 15 at 117-25.) For this reason, the judge decided to leave the decision of whether there was

a sample or not, for the jury to decide when the time came. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 144.)

When Blake testified, there was no mention of the “consumed” evidence. It seems the defense

decided not to pursue that strategy. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1513-46.)

Even assuming the evidence was consumed during testing, Sherrors alleges nothing to

show the prosecution experts acted in bad faith. Although Dr. Blake reported that cutting the

cigarettes on the diameter was not the normal procedure, there is nothing else in the record to

support the allegation that this was done in bad faith to consume the sample. Finally, Sherrors

provides nothing to show that the evidence he seeks would have been exculpatory.

For the above reasons, the state court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established law.

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(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Sherrors also claims counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the introduction of the

DNA evidence under “Youngblood v. Arizona” and failing to call an expert in support of the

claim. As discussed above, to prevail under Strickland, Sherrors must show that his “counsel’s

performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at

687, 694. As discussed above, defense counsel did attempt to exclude the DNA evidence

related to the cigarette butts. Thus, Sherrors has not shown counsel’s performance was deficient.

Id. at 688. Furthermore, he has not shown prejudice because, as discussed above, his claim

lacked merit. Id. at 694.) 

As to counsel’s purported failure to call an expert as to this claim, counsel did call Dr.

Blake to testify as to other DNA testing. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1513-62.) That he did

not testify as to whether the sample was consumed or not was likely as strategic one, given that

there was nothing to indicate that, even if there was a testable sample, the result would have been

different. Sherrors has not overcome the presumption that his attorney exercised sound trial

strategy. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d at 456. The court need not determine the actual reason

for an attorney’s actions, as long as the act falls within the range of reasonable representation.

Id. at 456-57. It does so here. Therefore, Sherrors cannot show denial of his effective assistance

of counsel claim was contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly establish law.

(3) Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the state courts’ denials of the claims presented in

Ground 5 were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law.

Thus, the Court recommends they be denied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. §

2254.

5. Other Jury Instructions

a. Ground Seven:

In Ground Seven, Petitioner argues his right to due process, a jury trial and effective

assistance of counsel were violated when the trial court improperly instructed the jury with regard

to the special circumstance allegation. He claims the court erroneously instructed the jury that

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28 20 The opinion refers to this as Hall’s claim. However, Sherrors’ joined Hall’s argument on

appeal. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 66.)

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it could find the special circumstance allegation true if the jury found the killing took place while

“a” defendant (rather than “the” defendant) was engaged in a robbery. Sherrors claims trial

counsel was ineffective because he failed to seek a curative instruction. (Pet. at 9D.)

(1) Due Process and Right to Jury Trial

Sherrors raised the substantive aspect of this claim in his petition for review of his direct

appeal to the California Supreme Court. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 5.) The petition was denied

without comment or citation. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 7.) Thus, this Court must “look

through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, appellate court’s opinion

on direct review. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In denying Sherrors’20 claim, the appellate court stated:

Penal Code section 190.2 imposes a sentence of death or life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole where the defendant is found guilty of first degree

murder committed while the defendant was engaged in or an accomplice to

specified felonies, including robbery. (Id., subd. (a)(17).) This special circumstance

is distinguishable from the felony-murder rule in that it requires that the defendant

“commit[ ] the act resulting in death in order to advance an independent felonious

purpose” (People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 850), whereas the felony-murder

rule requires only that the killing occur during the commission or attempted

commission of the underlying felony (here, robbery). (People v. Bolden (2002) 29

Cal.4th 515, 554; People v. Williams (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1762.)

The special circumstance instruction, CALJIC No. 8.81.17, informs the jury

that in order for the special circumstance allegation to be true, the prosecutor must

prove: “[1a. The murder was committed while [the] [a] defendant was [engaged in]

[or] [was an accomplice] in the [commission] ... of a [robbery]] ... [and] [2. The

murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the

crime of [robbery] or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. In

other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not

established if the ... [robbery] was merely incidental to the commission of the

murder.]” (Boldface added.)

Here, the special circumstance instruction read to the jury referred in

paragraph 1a to “a” defendant and omitted any reference to accomplice liability (as

boldfaced above), defects that Hall contends render the modified instruction fatally

flawed. He contends that the omission of the reference to accomplice liability,

combined with the limitation of the jury’s consideration to whether “a” defendant

rather than “the” defendant was engaged in robbery, essentially invited the jury to

find a special circumstance based on a simple felony-murder finding and that the

jury was not required to find that Hall was engaged in or was an accomplice to the

robbery.

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We need not reach the issue of whether the instruction as given was fatally

flawed because in any event Hall cannot demonstrate prejudice from the asserted

instructional error since “ ‘the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was

necessarily resolved adversely to defendant under other, properly given

instructions.’ “ (People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 726-727.) Here, the court

instructed that the use of the word “defendant” in the instructions referred to each

defendant unless otherwise specified and that the jury could not find the

robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation true unless the particular defendant

was engaged in the robbery at the time of the killing. (See CALJIC Nos. 1.11,

8.80.1 (1997 rev.).)

Pursuant to these instructions, the jury was required, as a condition of

finding the special circumstance allegation true as to Hall, to find that he was

engaged in the robbery at the time Foth was killed, in addition to finding that he

was an actual killer, an aider and abettor in the murder who acted with the intent

to kill or an aider and abettor and major participant in the robbery who acted with

reckless indifference to human life. These instructions thus required the precise

findings that Hall contends were omitted as a result of the modification of CALJIC

No. 8.81.17 and thus any error in modifying the latter instruction was harmless.

Having found that there was no reversible error here, we nonetheless feel

compelled to note that instructional problems similar to those that occurred here

happen all too often in criminal cases. We urge counsel and the trial courts to spend

a bit more time preparing and reviewing proposed instructions so that any such

problems can be identified and remedied before submission to the jury. In light of

the public resources involved in trying (and potentially, retrying) defendants in a

case such as this, the amount of time that would be required to take preventive

steps is de minimis and well justified.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at 12-14) (emphasis in original).

As discussed above, to the extent Petitioner claims the jury instructions were incorrect

under state law, his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle , 502 U.S. at 71-72.

Clearly established law provides that a petitioner must show the instructional error so infected

the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. Id. at 72; Henderson, 431 U.S.

at 154. The allegedly erroneous instruction must be considered in the context of the trial record

and the instructions as a whole. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. The instructions must be more than just

erroneous. Sherrors must show that there was a reasonable likelihood that in light of the

instructions as a whole, the jury applied the challenged instruction in such a way that his

constitutional rights were violated. See Carriger, 971 F.2d at 334.

Here, the instruction erroneously stated that the special circumstance enhancement for

Sherrors could be found true if the jury found the murder of Foth was committed while “a

defendant was [engaged in] [or] in the [commission] ... of a [robbery]].” (See Resp’t Lodgment

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No. 15 at 276.) As the state court noted, the instruction should have referred to “the” defendant.

The instruction should have stated that the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the

commission of a robbery.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.2. Thus, the jury could have found the special

circumstance allegation to be true with respect to Sherrors if it found that the murder was

committed while his co-defendant was engaged in robbery. 

In finding any error harmless, the state court pointed, in part, to CALJIC No. 1.11. The

court instructed the jury as follows: “The word ‘defendant’ applies to each defendant unless you

are instructed otherwise.” CALJIC No. 1.11 (emphasis added). This additional instruction,

however, does not help here because under the erroneous modified version of CALJIC 8.81.17,

jury was instructed otherwise. The jury was specifically instructed it could find the special

circumstance true if “a,” defendant committed the murder during the course of a robbery. By

using the article “a” the instruction clearly indicates the that the jury could find the circumstance

true if either Hall or Sherrors were engaged in a robbery, when in fact, the law requires the

instruction to apply the named defendant who is the subject of that particular instruction.

Although the Court of Appeal’s reference to CALJIC No. 1.11 does nothing to cure the

instructional defect here, this Court must still decide whether the erroneous instruction so infected

the trial as to render Sherrors’ conviction fundamentally unfair. In doing so, the Court looks to

the other instruction cited by the court of appeal, CALJIC No. 8.80.1. Under that instruction, the

jury was advised that 

[I]f you found a defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree,

you must determine if the following special circumstance is true or not true: The

murder of Steven Foth was committed by the defendant while the defendant was

engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery, in

violation of Penal Code section 211 within the meaning of Penal Code section

190.2 . . .

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 274.) 

The above instruction is partially correct. It refers to “the” defendant. Although it does

not mention accomplice liability, it is irrelevant because the jury did find that both defendants

committed murder during the course of a robbery. The special verdict form indicates that the

jury found that “the murder of STEVEN FOTH was committed by defendant RONNIE

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21 In addition, given the jury’s finding that Sherrors committed the murder during the

commission of a robbery or attempted robbery, Sherrors cannot show the instructional error had a

substantially injurious affect on the verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993).

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JERMAINE SHERRORS while the said defendant was engaged in the commission and attempted

commission of the crime of Robbery. . .” Thus, the jurors found the special circumstance true as

to Sherrors individually. (Id. at 300.) The error contained in the modified CALJIC No. 8.81.17

did not prejudice Sherrors. There is no reasonable likelihood that, in light of the instructions as

a whole, the jury applied the challenged instruction in such a way that his constitutional rights

were violated.21 See Carriger, 971 F.2d at 334. 

Therefore, Sherrors due process rights were not violated. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. The

state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of

clearly established law.

(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Sherrors also claims counsel was ineffective in failing to request a curative instruction to

the Modified CALJIC 8.81.17. Sherrors raised this in his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the

California Supreme Court, and it was denied without comment. (See Lodgment No. 14.) Thus,

this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the

superior court opinion denying his habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501

U.S. at 801-06. In denying the claim, the court stated: 

Although the instruction was found to be deficient in the abstract, the error was

determined to be harmless since ‘the factual question posed by the omitted

instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to defendant under other, properly

given instructions’. . . .the failure of Petitioner’s claim on the merits precludes an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim on that basis’” 

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 6-7.)

The state court’s denial of this claim is consistent with Strickland. There is no need to

consider whether counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland because, as discussed

above, Sherrors cannot show prejudice. “There is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. 

(3) Conclusion

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For the reasons discussed above, the state courts’ denials of the claims presented in

Ground 7 were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law.

Thus, the Court recommends they be denied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. §

2254.

b. Ground Eight:

Sherrors claims the special verdict form provided to the jurors was defective because it

only required the jury to find that he committed the murder during the course of a robbery –

omitting the requirement that it be found that he committed the murder to facilitate a robbery.

He also claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a corrective instruction or correct

the verdict forms. (Pet. at 9D.)

As noted above, the trial court provided the jury with a special verdict form which stated:

We, the jury in the above entitled cause, find the special circumstance that the

murder of STEVEN FOTH was committed by defendant RONNIE JERMAINE

SHERRORS while the said defendant was engaged in the commission and the

attempted commission of the crime of Robbery, in violation of Penal Code sections

211 or 212.5, within the meaning of Penal code section 190.2(a)(17).

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 300.) 

(1) Due Process 

Sherrors argues the form omitted an essential element of the special circumstances

allegation because, under Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17), a jury must find (1) that the murder

was committed while a defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of

a robbery and (2) the murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of

the crime of Robbery or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. Sherrors claims

the error amounted to a violation of his due process rights. He claims his due process rights were

therefore violated.

Sherrors raised the substantive aspect of this claim in his petition for review of his direct

appeal to the California Supreme Court. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 5.) The petition was denied

without comment or citation. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 7.) Thus, this Court must “look

through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, appellate court’s opinion

on direct review. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

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28 22 The opinion refers to this as Hall’s claim. However, again, Sherrors’ joined Hall’s argument

on appeal. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 66.)

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In denying Sherrors’22 claim, the appellate court stated:

Hall contends that the felony murder special circumstance verdict form was

defective because it only required the jury to make a finding that he committed

Foth’s murder during the commission of a robbery, but omitted the requisite

finding that he committed the murder to advance the commission of the robbery or

to facilitate escape therefrom or avoid detection. Hall argues that this error was

prejudicial because when taken in conjunction with the prosecutor’s closing

argument, the verdict form would convince the jury that there was no distinction

between first degree felony murder and the felony-murder special circumstance.

In light of the fact that the special verdict form was incomplete rather than

an inaccurate statement of the law, it is not clear whether Hall properly preserved

this issue for appellate review as he did not raise any objection to the special

verdict form in the proceedings below. However, even if we reach the merits of

Hall’s argument, we nonetheless reject his contention that the incompleteness of

the special verdict form constitutes reversible error.

In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must

instruct on the general principles of law relevant to and governing the case. (People

v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988.) In accordance with this principle, it

certainly is preferable that the elements of a special circumstance allegation be

completely stated in the special verdict submitted to the jury, although there is a

split of authority on whether the omission of an enhancement element from the

verdict form is error. (Compare People v. Chevalier (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 507,

513-516; People v. Garcia (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 582, 586.)

Even if we assume, however, that it was error for the court to give the jury

a correct but incomplete special verdict form, any such error was harmless. (See

People v. Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 314 [generally, a judgment may be

overturned for an instructional error relating to special sentencing allegations only

if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have received a more favorable

result in the absence of the error]; compare People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26

Cal.4th 316, 325-326 [failure to instruct on an element of a non-strike sentence

enhancement provision that increases the penalty for the underlying crime “beyond

the ‘prescribed statutory maximum’ “is reversible unless harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt].)

Hall admits the court properly instructed the jury that the special

circumstance allegation required a finding that he committed the murder to advance

the commission of the robbery. He nonetheless argues that the improper special

verdict form-when coupled with the prosecutor’s passing comment that although

the special circumstance allegation required a finding that the murder was

committed during the robbery, “it’s the same elements basically” as those required

for felony murder-rises to the level of prejudicial error. However, in light of the

propriety of the court’s instruction regarding the omitted element and its general

admonition that the jury must follow the instructions rather than counsel’s

arguments regarding the applicable law, we conclude it is not reasonably likely that

the jury was misled by the incomplete special verdict form.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at 18-20.)

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23 The special verdict form did not suffer the same deficiency as the first portion of the special

circumstance instruction because Sherrors’ name was inserted where “a defendant” appeared the jury

instruction. 

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Although a special verdict form is not a jury instruction, if the defective form so infected

the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process, Sherrors may be entitled to

relief. See Estelle, 502 at 72; Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154. This must be considered in the context

of the trial record and the instructions as a whole. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Unless Sherrors can

show that there was a reasonable likelihood that the verdict form was so defective his

constitutional rights were violated, he is not entitled to relief. See Carriger, 971 F.2d at 334.

The verdict form was both incomplete and inaccurate. It omitted an entire element of the

robbery special circumstance. Indeed, as it was presented on the form, it was simply the

definition of first degree felony murder with robbery. When the jury entered “true” on the verdict

form, it is unclear if it was doing so based on the wording on the special verdict form, or the

actual jury instruction – which, as discussed above, was also erroneous for another reason.

The errors were compounded by the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument, that

the special circumstance was essentially the same as the felony murder instruction. This is

incorrect. The prosecutor stated:

So, have we proven each and every element of felony murder beyond a

reasonable doubt, all three, including robbery or attempted commission of the

robbery. . . .Now, the special circumstances does require that you find the murder

was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, and

it’s basically the same elements that I just described to you. So, I won’t rehash all

that and go through the elements of robbery and so forth. We’ve proven that

whoever committed this crime did so with the intent or during the commission of

committing a robbery. So we’ve proven that.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1723, 1725.) The prosecutor later highlighted the incomplete

instruction, stating that only the first element must be found true. (Id. at 1741.)

Contrary to the prosecutor’s argument, the special circumstance requires something that

felony murder does not. There are two elements to the special circumstance instruction: The first

element reads: “The murder was committed while [the] defendant was [engaged in] [or] [was an

accomplice] in the [commission] ... of a [robbery]].23 (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 276.)

This is where the special verdict form left off. And this is presumably what the prosecutor was

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referring to. 

But there is also a second element, which was omitted entirely from the special verdict

form, and not mentioned by the prosecutor during closing, that requires the jury find that “the

murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of [robbery]

or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. (See Respt’s Lodgment No. 15 at 276,

CALJIC No. 8.81.17) (emphasis added). In other words, the special circumstance referred to in

these instructions is not established if the robbery was merely incidental to the commission of the

murder. 

Looking to the instructions as a whole, however, the jury did receive the proper instruction

as to the second element of the special circumstance under CALJIC No. 8.81.17. While is true

that the court erred in instructing the jury on the first element of the special circumstance, the

second element was a correct statement of the law. (See id.) Thus, while there are problems with

both the instructions and the special verdict form related to the special circumstance allegation,

the Court finds that, when viewing the instructions as a whole, the error was not such that it so

infected the trial that as to violate Sherrors’ due process rights. Accordingly, the state court’s

denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established law.

(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Sherrors also claims counsel was ineffective in failing to correct the defective special

verdict form. Sherrors raised this in his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California

Supreme Court, and it was denied without comment. (See Lodgment No. 14.) Thus, this Court

must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the superior

court opinion denying his habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at

801-06. 

In denying the claim, the court stated: 

Petitioner contends the verdict forms were defective and that his attorney

failed to seek their correction. The sufficiency of the verdict form was also raised

by Hall on appeal. The Court of Appeal found any error harmless. This

determination applies equally to Petitioner and precludes any prejudice resulting

from his attorney’s failure to seek the correction of the form.

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(Resp’t Lodgment No. 10 at 7.)

As discussed above, to prevail under Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, Sherrors must show that

his “counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense.” Id. at 687. Here, the court need not address whether counsel’s performance was

deficient because Sherrors has not shown prejudice. Given the discussion above, there is no

reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different had the verdict form been

accurate. See id.

(3) Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the state courts’ denials of the claims presented in

Ground 8 were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law.

Thus, the Court recommends they be denied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. §

2254.

c. Ground Nine:

Sherrors alleges his he was denied due process and the right to a fair trial when the trial

court instructed the jury on a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.15. He argues that the faulty

instruction effectively lessened the prosecution’s standard of proof by permitting the jury to find

him guilty upon the mere conclusion that he was in possession of stolen property, namely, the

Audi. He also claims counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the instruction. (Pet. at 9D.)

The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.15, as follows:

If you find that a defendant was in possession of recently stolen property,

the fact of that possession is not by itself sufficient to prove an inference that the

defendant is guilty of the crime of murder. Before guilt may be inferred, there must

be corroborating evidence tending to prove a defendant’s guilt. However, this

corroborating evidence need only be slight and need not by itself be sufficient to

warrant an inference of guilt.

As corroboration, you may consider the attributes of possession, time, place, and manner;

that the defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime charged; the defendant’s

conduct; his false or contradictory statement, if any; and other statements that may have

been made with reference to the property.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 15 at 233.)

Sherrors argues this instruction violated his due process rights because it “lightened” the

prosecutor’s burden of proof. (Pet. at 9D.)

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Sherrors raised this claim in his Petition for review to the California Supreme Court and

it was denied without comment. (See Lodgment No. 14.) Thus, this Court must “look through”

to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the superior court opinion denying

his habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

In denying Sherrors’ claim, the appellate court stated:

Hall contends, and Sherrors joins in the contention, that the trial court erred

in instructing the jury with the modified instruction, arguing that corroborated

evidence that he possessed property recently stolen from Foth supports only an

inference that he committed theft, but does not permit an inference that he was

guilty of murder.

The California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Prieto (2003)

30 Cal.4th 226 (Prieto) holds that CALJIC No. 2.15 is inapplicable to nontheft

offenses, including murder. (Prieto, at pp. 248-249, citing People v. Barker, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.) Although the Attorney General suggests that the

analysis of Prieto does not apply in cases “where the murder is directly and

causally related to and emanating from the same facts as the theft offense and the

only issue is identity,” the unequivocal language of Prieto does not support such

a conclusion. Further, in light of the jury’s special circumstance robbery-murder

finding in Prieto, the opinion cannot be read as holding that the fact the murder

emanates from the same facts as the theft renders its analysis inapplicable. In

accordance with Prieto, we conclude that the court erred in instructing the jury

with CALJIC No. 2.15.

The question then becomes whether the error is prejudicial, i.e., whether it

is reasonably likely the jury would have reached a different result if the court had

not given the instruction. (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 249.) We answer this

question in the negative. CALJIC No. 2.15 specifically instructed the jurors that

they could not infer guilt of murder from the defendants’ possession of recently

stolen property absent corroborating evidence of guilt. The inference of guilt

addressed in CALJIC No. 2.15 is permissive, not mandatory, and thus the jury was

entitled to credit, or reject, the inference based on its evaluation of the evidence.

(People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 430.) The court also instructed

the jury on the elements of murder, felony murder and the special circumstance of

murder during the commission of a robbery, and told the jurors that the prosecution

had to prove these elements and the special circumstance beyond a reasonable

doubt. Most notably, the jury’s special circumstance finding that the defendants

committed the murder during the commission of a robbery makes clear that the jury

accepted the substance of Hixon’s testimony regarding the defendants’

involvement in the incident. Based on the jury’s acceptance of Hixon’s testimony,

there is no reasonable likelihood that it would have rendered a verdict more

favorable to the defendants had the court omitted this instruction.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at 10-12.)

As discussed above, to the extent Petitioner claims the jury instructions were incorrect

under state law, his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72

(1991). To merit relief, clearly established law provides that a petitioner must show the

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instructional error so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.

Id. at 72;. The allegedly erroneous instruction must be considered in the context of the trial

record and the instructions as a whole. Id. at 72; Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 156; Cupp, 414 U.S. at

146-47. The instructions must be more than just erroneous, Sherrors must show that there was

a reasonable likelihood that in light of the instructions as a whole, the jury applied the challenged

instruction in such a way that his constitutional rights were violated. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971

F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

An instruction that requires the jury to infer a finding, shifting the burden of proof from

the prosecutor to defendant, violates a defendant’s due process rights. See Carella v. California,

491 U.S. 263, 265 (1989). However, where that inference is permissive, the instruction may be

constitutionally sound. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).

The inference that a jury can draw from CALJIC No. 2.15 is a permissive one, neither

required by the mere possession of stolen property nor mandated by the existence of other

corroborating factors such as proximity to the crime scene, opportunity to commit the crime, or

subsequent conduct. Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir.1992). 

When the inference is permissive, allowing the jury to infer an essential fact from proof

of another fact is lawful so long as “the inferred fact is more likely than not to flow from the

proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Id., (citations and internal quotations omitted). In

Preito, the California Supreme Court held that “‘proof that a defendant was in conscious

possession of recently stolen property simply does not lead naturally and logically to the

conclusion the defendant committed’ a rape or murder.” 30 Cal. 4th 226, 248-49.

 Similarly, the inferred fact here, Foth’s murder, is not more likely than not to flow from

mere possession of Audi. See Schwendeman, 971 F.2d at 316 (stating that “we cannot say with

substantial assurance that the inferred fact of reckless driving more likely than not flowed from

the proved fact of excessive speed.”) Thus, the instruction was “constitutionally deficient.” See

Id., citing Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 166 n.28. The instruction violated Sherrors’ due process

rights. Id.

Having found error, the Court must now look to the state court’s decision that the error

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was harmless. There are two standards applied by California Courts in determining whether an

error is harmless. The standard set forth in People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956), is applied in

reviewing “non-constitutional magnitude, trial type errors.” See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964,

971 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). Under Watson, the court must determine whether “it is reasonably

probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the

absence of the error.” Watson, 46 Cal.2d at 836. The clearly established federal standard set

forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) is applied in reviewing errors of

constitutional magnitude. Under Chapman, the court must determine whether the error was

“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 24.

In this case, the court of appeal determined that the error in instructing the jury as to the

modified CALJIC No. 2.15 was not “reasonably likely the jury would have reached a different

result if the court had not given the instruction.” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at 11.) Thus, state

court did not find the error to be of constitutional magnitude and thus applied the harmless error

the standard set forth in People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956). See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d

964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that, “by applying the Watson harmless error standard rather

than the Chapman standard, [the state court] impliedly found the [error] was not of constitutional

magnitude.”) Although the state court of appeal found error, it “failed to select the appropriate

standard in evaluating the harmlessness of [that] error[].” Id. at 975.

Since the state court failed apply Chapman, along with its more stringent standard, to the

constitutional instructional error, its decision amounted to an unreasonable application of

clearly established law. See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Court must now decide whether the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial

influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). See Bains, 204 F.3d at 977 (holding that the federal court “should

apply the Brecht standard when conducting their own independent harmless error review,

regardless of what, if any, type of harmless error review was conducted by the state court.”); see

also Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 1996). If a reviewing court is in “grave

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doubt” as to whether the error had such an effect, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. Coleman

v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000).

In determining whether there was Brecht error, a judge must consider, “‘Do I, the judge,

think that the error substantially influenced the jury’s decision?’” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S.

432, 436 (1995). If a federal habeas judge is in “grave doubt” about whether a constitutional trial

error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” the error

is not harmless and “the petitioner must win.” O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436, 445. “By ‘grave doubt’

we mean that, in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual

equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.” Id. at 435.

Here, the Court has “grave doubt.” The Court, having reviewed all the evidence presented

at trial, cannot say that the instruction did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the

verdict. 

First, the prosecution’s case relied overwhelmingly on the testimony of Lena Hixon, an

accomplice whose statements under oath were, at times, simply unbelievable. She admitted to

having lied numerous times about the identity of the murderers and the circumstances of the

incident. Her story was constantly changing. She first told detectives that the killers were Benny

Wilson and Terrence Smallgreen. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 1007, 1020.) Then she said it was

Hall and Sherrors. (Id. at 1021.) She told detectives that Foth approached her for rock cocaine,

but she told Kathrine Davis that he approached her for sex. (Id. at 1025.) Testing done at the San

Diego crime lab revealed the presence of semen on Foth’s right thigh. She also testified that the

shirt found at the crime scene was Sherrors’, (Id. at 1033, 1075, 1147, 1273-75) but DNA testing

eliminated Sherrors (as well as Hall and Hixon) as the habitual wearer of the shirt. (Id. at 1524.)

 Hixon first denied stabbing Foth. (Id. at 1020.) But then, after being pressed by

detectives, stated that she had stabbed Foth one time, because Sherrors forced her to. (Id. at 965,

1130-32.) To Davis, however, she described stabbing Foth, holding her shirt over the knife to

avoid leaving fingerprints. (Id. at 1612-23.) Davis testified that Hixon had told her she was

surprised at how the knife felt going into the body. (Id. at 1613.) In addition, Hixon testified that

she lost her fingernail when Sherrors shook her after she first got out of the car when they arrived

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24 The appellate court was asked to take judicial notice that the distance from 4699 Wightman

Street (where Hixon testified that Sherrors and Hall picked up Foth) to University Avenue is 1.24 miles.

The I-15 University Avenue ramp to Pomerado Road is 21.78 miles and it is another .39 miles from the

exit to the pumpkin patch where the body was found. In order to get back to the freeway from the

murder scene, it is another .58 mile (with a stop sign and a traffic light). From the on-ramp of I-15 south

to the Mira Mesa Boulevard exit is 10.11 miles, and it is another .43 miles from there to the AM/PM

where the attempt was made to use the ATM card. This distance also included traffic signals. (See

Resp’t Lodgment No. 2 at 59-60 n.31.) After considering driving time, there seems little time left for

Hixon to bring Foth to Wightman from the taco shop, to wait for Hall and Sherrors to return after

leaving with Foth (with Foth now in the trunk), stab Foth 83 times, disrobe Foth and throw his body

over a fence.

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at the pumpkin patch. (Id. at 970.) However, Davis testified that Hixon told her that she must

have lost her fingernail while she was holding the victim down, or helping drag the body. (Id.

at 1610-11.)

Hixon denied ever seeing or using Foth’s cell phone (id. at 1036) but phone records

showed that days after the murder she used the phone to call one of her customers after he paged

her. (Id. at 1036, 1671.) She testified that she never saw, took or touched any of the victim’s

property (id. at 1036), but the victim’s ATM card was found in her purse and her fingerprints

were on it, along with other items from the car. (Id. at 1567.) She claimed she did not see the

Audi again after Hall and Sherrors dropped her off the night of the murder. (Id. at 1041.) Others

testified, however, that they saw her in or around the car several times in the days after the

murder. (Id. at 861, 868, 1185-86, 1189.) 

Her testimony on the stand was often in direct conflict with other, more objective evidence

presented at trial. According to Hixon’s testimony, the entire incident, from the time she was

approached by Foth, drove to meet Sherrors and Hall, drove from City Heights to Lake Hodges,

stabbed Foth 83 times, hid the body and drove back down the interstate to the AM/PM, took place

in well of over an hour and a half. (See id. at 944-977.) However, her story is simply

incompatible evidence that Foth’s last cellphone conversation with Horne took place at 6:50 and

the first failed attempt to use the ATM card was only 46 minutes later. (See id. at 227, 231-32,

1283, 714-17.) Even assuming that Hixon was a poor estimator of time, it is nearly impossible

to believe that the murder she described could have taken place in that short of a time period.24

Given Hixon’s often incredible testimony, it is hard for this Court to credit much of anything she

said. 

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25 Both Sherrors and Hall wore size 13 shoes. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 17 at 608-09, 616.)

Prosecution expert Melvin Kong originally testified that the shoe print was about 12 1/2 inches long,

corresponding to a man’s size 12 to 13 1/2. However, on cross-examination, Kong admitted that his

rough notes indicated that the length of the print was 28.5 centimeters, which would convert to a man’s

shoe size of 7 to 8 1/2. (Id. at 612-616.) 

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Other than Hixon’s weak performance on the stand, the jury was left with very little to tie

Sherrors to the murder of Foth. There was no authoritative physical evidence. Indeed, evidence

found at the scene, such as the bloody shirt, the Gatorade bottle, the shoe print, size 8 shoes, could

not be tied to Sherrors or his co-defendant.25 (Id. at 431-32, 679-80,1462-63, 1513-16,1521-25.)

Although Burritt testified as to “trace” DNA on the watch, his testimony was so equivocal as to

add nothing to the prosecution’s assertions about the watch belonging to Sherrors. (Id. at 339-41,

344-45.)

This leaves the testimony of Trina Walker, Sherrors’ mentally disabled sister. She stated

that she recognized the watch found at the scene as Sherrors’. She also stated that when her

returned to the apartment that evening, she saw blood on his shirt and his shoes, as if he had

stepped in something all over the front and side of his shoes. (Id. at 1348, 1375.) Although

Walker described the shoes as covered in blood, luminol testing of the areas where Walker stated

she saw Sherrors standing in the bloody shoes, was negative for blood. (Id. at 1465-66, 1469-71,

1480-82.) Moreover, her testimony was also subject to harsh impeachment. Her own family

members testified that she could not be believed. (Id. at 1581, 1714.) 

Given the equivocal evidence tying Sherrors to the murder itself, the erroneous instruction

that permitted the jury to infer his guilt based upon his possession of the Audi, upon only “slight”

corroboration leaves this Court in grave doubt about its affect on the outcome of the trial. This

is all the more true because, while the evidence tying Sherrors to the murder was based on

questionable testimony, the evidence that he was in possession of the Audi in the days after the

murder was strong. Several witnesses, with no interest or bias, testified that they saw Sherrors

and Hall in or near the car during those days. (See Resp’t Lodgement No. 17 at 752; 861.) And

the car was parked in the alley outside the apartment where the two were staying. Most

importantly, Sherrors’ DNA was found on cigarette butts found inside the Audi. Thus, the jury

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26 Douglas Griffey stated that he saw Hixon getting out of the Audi. Thus, while there was

testimony that Sherrors was in possession of the Audi, there was testimony that Hixon was as well. (Id. at 861.) 

27 Although, as discussed above, the special circumstance instruction, CALJIC No. 8.81.17, was

erroneous, as was the special verdict form for the special circumstance allegation. (See Sections IV

(B)(5)(a)(1) & IV(B)(5)(b)(1).

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had strong, almost indisputable evidence that Sherrors was in possession of stolen property.26 It

is impossible to say that, to allow the jury to use that strong evidence, to infer murder, with only

“slight” corroboration did not affect the jury’s verdict. 

Moreover, the instruction given defined “slight corroboration” as only “the attributes of

possession, time, place, and manner; that the defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime

charged; the defendant’s conduct; his false or contradictory statement, if any; and other

statements that may have been made with reference to the property.” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 15

at 233.) Thus, the jury could have inferred Sherrors committed the murder based the “time, place

and manner” of his possession, that is, on the mere fact that he was seemingly in possession of

the Audi in the days after the murder. 

The jury could also have found its “slight corroboration” in the fact that Sherrors

seemingly lied about the ownership of the car. Thus, finding that Sherrors made “false or

contradictory statement.. . regarding the [car]. See id. Emildre Moore stated that she saw

Sherrors and Hall get into the car. She asked them whose car it was, and they replied that it was

Lena Hixon’s mother’s car. (Id. at 894.) With this simple “corroborative” testimony, under

CALJIC No. 2.15, the jury could have inferred that Sherrors was therefore guilty of murder.

It is true that the jury was instructed on the required elements of murder, robbery, first

degree felony murder based upon a murder committed during the commission of a robbery, and

on the special circumstance of murder in the commission of a robbery.27 (See Resp’t Lodgment

No. 15 at 260, 263, 276.) The jurors were also told the elements of each must be proved beyond

a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 248, CALJIC No. 2.90.) However, even with these instructions, there

is a serious likelihood that CALJIC No. 2.15 could have lead to juror confusion because of the

“multiple deductions needed to rationally make the permissive inference.” See People v. Barker,

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91 Cal.App. 4th 1166, 1177 (2001). CALJIC No. 2.15 was also highlighted during closing

argument by defense counsel, thus the jurors were specifically directed to it. (See Resp’t

Lodgment No. 17 at 1818-20.)

Similarly, while the jury did find the special circumstance allegation of murder committed

in the course of a robbery to be true, this does not necessarily mean that it credited the testimony

of Lena Hixon. Because of the likely confusion caused by the erroneous instruction, this Court

cannot say whether the jury’s special circumstance determination was part of the “multiple

deductions” made as a result of the unconstitutional inference. Given this, the court finds the

matter is so evenly balanced that it is in “virtual equipoise” as to the harmlessness of the error.

O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436, 445. 

After reviewing the transcripts and all the evidence as a whole, this Court has grave doubt

as whether the violation of Sherrors’ due process rights had a substantial influence on the

conviction. Thus, under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, this Court recommends

habeas relief as to this claim be GRANTED.

(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Sherrors argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to CALJIC No. 2.51.

He raised this claim in petition for habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court. It was denied

without comment or citation. (See Lodgment No. 14.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to

the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the superior court opinion denying his

habeas corpus petition, as the basis of its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In denying this claim the court stated “Both defendants raised this instruction on appeal.

The determination by the Court of Appeal that the trial court’s error in giving the instruction was

not prejudicial, precludes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this ground.” (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 10 at 7.)

 To show that an attorney’s representation of a client was ineffective under Strickland, the

petitioner must establish that (1) the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness; and (2) the deficient representation prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687;

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000).

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28 In 2001, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division one decided People

v. Barker, 91 Cal.App. 4th 1166, 1177 (2001) (holding that it was error to instruct jury under CALJIC

No. 2.15 that it could infer murder, upon slight corroboration, if it found the defendant was in conscious

possession of stolen property.)

-87- 05cv1262

Given the above discussion and conclusion that the instruction was a violation of Sherrors’

due process rights, it follows that counsel’s failure to object to the instruction was unreasonable.

It is unclear, however, whether Sherrors was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object because

one cannot know whether the trial judge would have given the instruction regardless. At the time

of the trial, the California Supreme Court had not decided Prieto, and the law in the superior

court’s appellate district did not become settled until a year after the trial.28 On the other hand,

as discussed above there was clearly established Supreme Court law, stating that such a

“presumption must be regarded as ‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary,’ and hence unconstitutional, unless

it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to

flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Ulster County, 442 U.S. at166 n.28

quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).

Because this Court finds Sherrors is entitled to relief as to the substance of his due process

claim, this Court need not decide whether, had counsel objected to the instruction, the instruction

would have nonetheless been given and Sherrors prejudiced. 

(3) Conclusion

The Court finds that Sherrors’ due process rights were violated when the trial court

instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 2.15. The state court’s denial of the claim was an

unreasonable application of clearly established law. Further, this Court finds the error had a

substantially injurious affect on the jury’s verdict. Therefore, Sherrors is entitled to relief as to

his due process claim. Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s failure to object to the instruction. The Court recommends Sherrors’ petition for habeas

corpus be GRANTED for the above reasons.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the Chief Judge of the United

States District Irma Gonzalez, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the

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United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined

above, IT HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and

adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered

conditionally granting the Petition unless the State decides to retry Petitioner within a reasonable

time. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 25, 2007, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than July 9, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 24, 2007

Hon. Leo S. Papas

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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