Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02552/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02552-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

JDDL

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peter John Adams, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-2552-PHX-MHM (JRI)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petitioner, who is confined in the South Unit in the Arizona State Prison Complex in

Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The Court will require Petitioner to show cause within thirty days why his

action should not be dismissed.

A. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Petitioner’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis indicates that his inmate trust

balance is less than $25.00. See Local Rule of Civil Procedure 3.5(b) (excess of $25.00

requires payment of the filing fee). Accordingly, the Application to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (Doc. #1) will be granted. 

B. Procedural Background

On February 22, 2000, after Petitioner pled guilty to sexual conduct with a minor and

sexual conduct with a minor, he was sentenced to terms of twenty and twelve years. His state

post-conviction proceedings were unsuccessful.

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In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises four grounds for relief: (1) his due process

rights were violated because the State of Arizona lost personal and subject matter jurisdiction

over him by failing to file a timely complaint after his arrest; (2) his due process rights were

violated because he was not released when his preliminary hearing was not timely held;

(3) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the illegal detention raised in grounds one

and two; and (4) his counsel was ineffective by failing to contend that the State lacked

jurisdiction. 

C. Summary Dismissal

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, promptly after the

filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the

petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any

exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” RULES

GOVERNING § 2254 Cases, Rule 4; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be

summarily dismissed. Id.; see Obremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming

district court’s summary dismissal as a matter of law, but relying upon Rule 4 instead of Rule

12(b)(6)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1096 (1991). 

Rule 4 shows that “Congress envisioned district courts taking an active role in

summarily disposing of facially defective habeas petitions.” Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d

1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). Under Rule 4, courts may sua sponte raise issues that are

identifiable from the face of the petition, including issues such as procedural default, Boyd,

147 F.3d at 1127-28, and the one-year limitation period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), Herbst v.

Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2001). “It would waste scarce judicial resources for the

district court to cause the facially defective petition to be served on the State and to entertain

the State’s ensuing motion to dismiss.” Boyd, 147 F.3d at 1128.

This summary dismissal power is not without limits. Boyd, 147 F.3d at 1128. A court

must give a petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond to the argument for dismissal.

Id.; accord Herbst, 260 F.3d at 1043. When the petitioner is pro se, the court must make

clear the issue and the consequences for failing to respond. Boyd, 147 F.3d at 1128. 

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Because the Court finds that Petitioner’s application is facially defective, Petitioner is hereby

given notice that his action will be dismissed unless he is able to file a response showing

good cause why it should not be dismissed. 

D. Petitioner’s Claims

In his first three grounds, Petitioner challenges his conviction on the basis that the

detention prior to his guilty plea was illegal. It is well settled that illegal arrest or detention

of a suspect does not void a subsequent conviction. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119

(1975) (“a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained

pending trial without a determination of probable cause”); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519,

522 (1952) (due process is satisfied when a person is convicted after having been fairly

apprized of the charges and after a fair trial, regardless whether the person is forcibly brought

within the court’s jurisdiction”); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (“forcible

abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the

jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offense, and present no

valid objection to his trial in such court”); Myers v. Rhay, 577 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1978)

(citing foregoing line of authority). Accordingly, even assuming that Petitioner correctly

claims that the detention prior to his guilty plea was illegal, that illegal detention does not

serve as a basis to invalidate his conviction.

Petitioner’s fourth ground, ineffective assistance of counsel, is based upon counsel’s

failure to contend that the illegal detention resulted in the lack of jurisdiction to prosecute

Petitioner. For a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove (1) that

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or

fundamentally unfair outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

Under this standard, a defendant suffers no prejudice when there is a reasonable probability

that counsel would not have prevailed on an issue even if it had been raised. Rupe v. Wood,

93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient

performance”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir.

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1994) (showing of prejudice required when counsel fails to object), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

925 (1994). 

Petitioner’s initial appearance was on August 7, 1999, and the complaint was filed on

August 10, 1999. Rule 4.1(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that for

a warrantless arrest, the person must be released unless a complaint is filed within forty-eight

hours from the time of the initial appearance. Petitioner believes he should have been

released on August 9 because no complaint had been filed.

Also, Rule 5.1(a) and (c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a

person be released if the preliminary hearing is not held within ten days following the initial

appearance, unless certain exceptions apply. Petitioner’s initial appearance was on August

7, 1999, and he believes he should have been released on August 16; however, a supervening

indictment was filed on August 17.

There is a simple answer to Petitioner’ dilemma. Rule 1.3 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides that for computing any period of time of more than twenty-four

hours, “the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is

not to be included.” Considering this rule, the complaint was timely filed and the

supervening indictment was filed before the time period for a preliminary hearing expired.

An objection by counsel on either of these grounds would have been futile, and counsel is

not required by the Constitution to engage in an exercise in futility.

Moreover, even if Petitioner could show that state law somehow had been violated,

the prosecution could refile the charges against Petitioner. Under Rule 16.6 of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, dismissal “shall be without prejudice to commencement of

another prosecution, unless the court finds that the interests of justice require that the

dismissal be with prejudice.” Thus, even if counsel had been successful in having the

prosecution dismissed, a new prosecution would not have been precluded. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective fails to warrant relief.

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E. Show Cause

In light of the foregoing, Petitioner is ordered to show cause within thirty days why

his action should not be summarily dismissed. Petitioner’s response shall be in the form of

a pleading entitled “Response,” and his response must contain the reasons why his habeas

action should not be dismissed. If he fails to respond within the thirty-day timeframe, his

action will be dismissed.

F. Warning of Possible Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41

Petitioner should take notice that if he fails to timely comply with every provision of

this Order, or any order of the Court entered in this matter, the action and Complaint will be

dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.) (district court may dismiss action for failure to comply

with any order of the court), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That Petitioner’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted;

(2) That Petitioner is ordered to show cause within thirty days of the date of filing

of this Order why his action should not be dismissed; and

(3) That the Clerk of Court shall close this action and enter a judgment of dismissal

of this action without prejudice and without further order of the Court if a response to this

Order to Show Cause is not filed within thirty days of the date this Order is filed.

DATED this 21st day of October, 2005.

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