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Nature of Suit Code: 138
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CGI FEDERAL INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5143

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00355-MCW, Judge Mary Ellen 

Coster Williams.

______________________ 

Decided: March 10, 2015 

______________________ 

SCOTT M. MCCALEB, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

DANIEL PATRICK GRAHAM, CHRISTINE ALICE REYNOLDS,

GARY SCOTT WARD. 

WILLIAM PORTER RAYEL, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. 

Also represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., KIRK MANHARDT. 

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2 CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US

MICHAEL J. SCHAENGOLD, Greenberg Traurig LLP, 

Washington, DC for amicus curiae. Also represented by 

MELISSA PAIGE PRUSOCK, AARON S. RALPH. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

In this pre-award bid protest appeal, CGI Federal Inc. 

challenges the payment terms of requests for quotes 

(“RFQs”) issued by the United States Department of 

Health and Human Service’s Centers for Medicare and 

Medicaid Services (“CMS”). CGI argues that the payment

terms violate certain statutory and regulatory provisions. 

The government responds, as it did below, that CGI did 

not have standing to bring its bid protest because it did

not qualify as an “interested party” within the meaning of 

28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). Because the Court of Federal 

Claims correctly held that CGI qualified as an interested 

party at the time it filed its bid protest, but erred in 

holding that the payment terms do not violate the applicable regulations, we reverse and remand. 

BACKGROUND

In the contracts at issue, CMS uses contractors, such 

as CGI, to determine if Medicare claims were correctly

paid. If the contractor identifies an overpayment, CMS 

sends a demand letter to the provider seeking repayment

and pays the contractor a contingency fee. Pursuant to 

the original contracts from 2008, the contractors invoiced 

CMS for the contingency fee when the overpayment was 

collected from the provider, typically 41 days after the 

demand letter. In 2014, CMS issued new RFQs for these 

recovery services. The 2014 RFQs included additional 

payment terms requiring the contractors to wait to invoice CMS until a provider’s challenge to the repayment 

request passed the second level of a five-level appeal 

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CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US 3

process, which typically occurs somewhere between 120 

and 420 days after the demand letter. 

Five different contractors bid on the 2014 RFQs, but 

CGI did not. Instead, before bidding closed, CGI filed a 

timely pre-award protest at the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) challenging the revised payment terms. 

While the GAO protest was pending, the bidding period 

closed. The GAO subsequently denied the protest. Three 

business days later, CGI filed a protest in the United 

States Court of Federal Claims. CGI and the government 

then filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record, and the government moved to dismiss for lack 

of standing. The Court of Federal Claims denied the 

government’s motion to dismiss but granted its motion for 

judgment on the administrative record, holding that the 

modified payment terms do not violate statutory or regulatory provisions. CGI Fed. Inc. v. United States, No. 14-

cv-00355-MCW, slip op. at 9-10, 18-21 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 15, 

2014) (“Opinion and Order”). It also held that the payment terms do not unduly restrict competition. Id. at 22. 

CGI appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

I. Standing

Whether a party has standing is an issue of law that 

we review de novo. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. United 

States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“AFGE”). To 

have standing to bring a bid protest in the Court of Federal Claims, a plaintiff must be an “interested party.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). While § 1491(b)(1) does not define 

“interested party,” we have construed the term in accordance with the definition provided in the Competition in 

Contracting Act (“CICA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-56, “an 

actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the 

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4 CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US

contract or by failure to award the contract.” AFGE, 258 

F.3d at 1299 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3551(2)). Thus, to 

demonstrate that it has standing, CGI must show that it 

is (1) an actual or prospective bidder, and (2) that it has a 

direct economic interest. Digitalis Educ. Solutions, Inc. v. 

United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

A. Prospective Bidder

CGI never submitted a bid in response to the 2014 

RFQs and thus is not an actual bidder. CGI must therefore show that it was a prospective bidder at the time it 

filed its protest in the Court of Federal Claims. We hold 

that it has made such a showing. 

The parties primarily debate the implications of four 

cases in which we have opined on the meaning of “prospective bidder.” A brief description of each case is helpful. In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States, 

we considered the meaning of “prospective bidder” within 

the now-defunct Brooks Act, 40 U.S.C. § 759(f)(9)(B), 

which included a definition of “interested party” identical 

to the definition in CICA. 878 F.2d 362 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 

There, we held that MCI was not a prospective bidder 

because it did not participate in the bidding process and 

did not file the protest at issue until after the contract 

had been awarded. Id. at 364-65. We noted that MCI 

could not “achieve prospective bidderhood” via its postaward protest because “the opportunity to qualify either 

as an actual or prospective bidder ends when the proposal 

period ends.” Id. at 365. 

One year later in Federal Data Corp. v. United States, 

we held that Federal Data was not a “prospective bidder” 

within the meaning of the Brooks Act because it withdrew 

from the bidding process prior to filing a protest. 911 

F.2d 699, 702-05 (Fed. Cir. 1990). “Federal Data knowingly took itself out of the bidding prior to filing its 

amended protest,” and therefore “relinquished any chance 

of receiving the contract by that action.” Id. at 703-04. 

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CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US 5

We noted that Federal Data “could have continued to 

compete for the contract award . . . and could have utilized the protest procedures available to an interested 

party to correct any deficiencies it perceived in the procurement process,” but did not. Id. at 705. We stated 

that a “prospective bidder” “does not include one who only 

intends to bid in the event of a reprocurement.” Id. at 

704. 

We considered the meaning of “prospective bidder” in 

the context of an interested party under § 1491 in Rex 

Service Corp. v. United States, 448 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 

2006). Rex initially filed a pre-award protest with the 

agency. Id. at 1307. The agency denied its protest, and 

Rex, having not submitted a bid, did not pursue the 

matter further. Id. The agency subsequently awarded 

the contract to another party and—two months after the 

award and three months after the agency denied its 

initial protest—Rex filed a post-award protest in the 

Court of Federal Claims, raising issues entirely different 

from those raised in its agency protest. Id. We held that 

Rex was not a prospective bidder because it “could have 

bid, but chose not to.” Id. at 1308. We noted that in Rex’s 

case, its pre-award agency protest was “not relevant” to 

determining its prospective bidder status. Id. We again 

noted that “‘the opportunity to qualify either as an actual 

or a prospective bidder ends when the proposal period 

ends.’” Id. (quoting MCI, 878 F.2d at 365). We held that 

“In the end, Rex did not submit a bid; nor did it file a 

timely bid protest in the Court of Federal Claims.” Id. 

Finally, in Digitalis, we held that a protestor that 

failed to submit the required statement of capability to 

the agency in the allotted time period and filed its Court 

of Federal Claims protest more than two months after the 

contract was awarded was not a prospective bidder. 664 

F.3d at 1383-86. Citing to both MCI and Rex, we again 

noted that “the opportunity to become a prospective 

bidder ends when the proposal period ends.” Id. at 1385.

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While none of these cases is directly on point, together 

they are instructive. In each case, the party failed to

obtain prospective bidder status because it did not diligently pursue its protest rights, e.g., by failing to file any 

protest until well after a contract award (MCI, Digitalis), 

affirmatively abandoning any interest in the contract 

(Federal Data), or delaying months after both denial of a 

timely protest and the award of a contract before filing 

the protest at issue (Rex). 

The same cannot be said of CGI, which diligently and 

continuously pursued its rights in the GAO and then, 

immediately upon dismissal by the GAO, in the Court of 

Federal Claims.1 Neither party disputes that CGI qualified as a prospective bidder on the day that it filed its 

GAO protest. Thus, it “achieve[d] prospective bidderhood” 

at that time. MCI, 878 F.2d at 365. The fact that—as 

MCI, Federal Data, and Digitalis all make clear—CGI’s 

opportunity to qualify as a prospective bidder ends when 

the solicitation period ends does not doom CGI because it 

had already achieved prospective bidder status with its 

timely GAO protest. It seems equally clear that CGI 

retained its prospective bidder status throughout the 

pendency of its GAO protest because it was continuously 

pursuing its challenge to the payment terms in the 2014 

1 The government argues that our precedent precludes standing for “‘one who only intends to bid in the 

event of a reprocurement.’” Appellee’s Br. at 24 (quoting 

Federal Data, 911 F.2d at 704) (emphasis added). CGI is 

not one who only intends to bid in the event of a reprocurement. CGI is a prospective bidder who filed a protest 

during the bidding period. CGI diligently pursued its 

interests and rights in the process from GAO protest (filed 

prior to the expiration of the bidding period) to present 

day. 

 

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RFQs.2 The question, then, is whether CGI lost its prospective bidder status during the three business days 

between the GAO denial and filing the Court of Federal 

Claims protest. In other words, has this brief passage of 

time or some affirmative act stripped CGI of its prospective bidder status? In this case, the answer is no. 

While we recognize that the government has been 

guided in its view by language in Rex, we agree with the 

Court of Federal Claims, which concluded that CGI’s 

position is readily distinguishable from the protestor in

Rex. In Rex, the protestor waited nearly three months 

after the agency denied its initial protest before filing the 

protest at issue and, in the interim, the agency awarded 

the contract to another bidder. Rex, 448 F.3d at 1307. 

Here, CGI filed its Court of Federal Claims protest within 

three business days of receiving its dismissal from the 

GAO and before CMS had awarded the contract.3 CGI, 

2 The government argued that CGI’s prospective 

bidder status dissolved on the day bidding ended in the 

middle of its GAO protest. Oral Argument 23:10-24:15, 

25:55-26:29, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.

uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2014-5143.mp3. We do not 

agree. CGI was a prospective bidder by virtue of filing a 

timely protest and its status did not dissolve in the midst 

of this protest while it was diligently pursuing its rights. 

The government presents no authority or good reason for 

concluding otherwise. Indeed, in discussing statutory 

standing in court, it states that “the proper inquiry is 

whether CGI had or was expecting to submit quotes at the 

time it filed its lawsuit” in court. Appellee’s Br. at 25. We 

see no basis for a different view for the GAO process. 

3 The Court of Federal Claims also distinguished 

Rex by noting that the subsequent Court of Federal 

Claims protest “had nothing to do with” the earlier agency 

protest. Order and Opinion at 13. It is correct that the 

 

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8 CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US

having secured prospective bidder status by filing its 

timely GAO protest, did not lose it in the three business 

days it took to file in the Court of Federal Claims.4 We 

acknowledge that Rex explained that the timely filed 

agency protest was “not relevant to Rex’s status” as a 

prospective bidder at the time that it filed its Court of 

Federal Claims protest. This, we conclude, is because Rex 

failed to continue to pursue its rights in a diligent fashion, 

and thus ceased to be a prospective bidder. Rex’s agency 

denial was met with inaction. That inaction persisted for 

months, and during that time the government awarded 

the contract. By the time Rex filed its Court of Federal 

Claims protest, its agency protest was no longer relevant. 

Were we to adopt the government’s argument that 

CGI is not a prospective bidder, it would create a chasm 

between an actual bidder and a prospective bidder in 

terms of the review rights accorded to each. For example, 

two protests in Rex were unrelated; they were premised 

upon different grounds of alleged illegality. It is also 

correct that CGI made the same arguments before the 

Court of Federal Claims as it did before the GAO. It has 

diligently pursued its claim that the solicitation’s terms 

were illegal in both fora. It is not immediately apparent, 

and given the facts here we need not decide, how any 

change in arguments by a continuously diligent protestor 

affects prospective bidder status—an issue distinct from 

whether a protestor waived arguments. See, e.g., Blue & 

Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 

(Fed. Cir. 2007). 4 A longer delay than necessary may be a factor in 

the Court of Federal Claims declining to exercise jurisdiction. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1291(b)(3) states that “[i]n 

exercising jurisdiction under this subsection, the courts 

shall give due regard to . . . the need for expeditious 

resolution of the action.”

 

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an actual bidder would undisputedly have the right to 

serially file a protest in the GAO and then, if the GAO 

protest were denied, in the Court of Federal Claims. If we 

accepted the government’s position, this sequence of 

redress would not be available to a prospective bidder. It 

would be virtually impossible to file a timely GAO protest, 

wait for a GAO decision, and then file a protest in the 

Court of Federal Claims prior to the close of bidding. By 

the time the GAO protest concluded, bidding would almost certainly be closed. Oral Argument 30:30-31:15. 

And the two cannot proceed simultaneously. 4 C.F.R. 

§ 21.11(b) (“GAO will dismiss any case where the matter 

involved is the subject of litigation before . . . a court of 

competent jurisdiction.”). We see nothing in this statute, 

CICA (from which we derived the actual or prospective 

bidder requirement), or any policy justification for differing treatment among actual and prospective bidders. We 

have been presented no indication that Congress intended 

different review rights for actual and prospective bidders. 

CGI was a prospective bidder when it promptly initiated and diligently pressed its protest in the GAO forum, 

which Congress has encouraged protestors to use before 

suing in court. Unsuccessful in the GAO, it immediately 

filed for relief in court. We do not think that Congress 

meant for a protestor in CGI’s position to lose its entitlement to sue just because delays engendered by the GAO 

adjudicatory process pushed completion past the closing 

date for bid submissions. Concluding, as we do, that CGI 

filed a protest prior to the close of bidding and thereby 

established its prospective bidder status, and that CGI 

thereafter diligently pursued its rights, CGI has prospective bidder status to pursue its Court of Federal Claims 

protest. 

B. Direct Economic Interest

To have standing, CGI must also have a direct economic interest affected by the award of the contract. 

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Digitalis, 664 F.3d at 1384. CGI can satisfy this requirement by showing that it suffered “a non-trivial competitive injury which can be redressed by judicial relief.” 

Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1361-

62 (Fed. Cir. 2009). CGI has made such a showing. CGI 

argues that the payment terms in the 2014 RFQs are 

illegal and that they caused CGI to protest instead of bid. 

Reply Br. at 26. This injury is both non-trivial and competitive, and CGI has sought judicial relief via its protest 

in the Court of Federal Claims. As the Court of Federal 

Claims correctly concluded, “CGI had ‘a definite economic 

stake in the solicitation being carried out in accordance 

with applicable laws and regulations.’” Opinion and 

Order at 17 (quoting Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1362). 

The government argues that the revised payment 

terms are not a competitive injury because the payment 

terms “‘equally disadvantaged’ all prospective bidders.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 32 (quoting Opinion and Order at 24). 

This argument is unavailing. The government made the 

same argument in Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1360, and 

we implicitly rejected it by concluding that the protestor 

in that case demonstrated a non-trivial competitive 

injury, id. at 1360-62. 

* * * * *

Because CGI was a prospective bidder with a direct 

economic interest affected by the award of the contract, 

we conclude that CGI had standing to file its protest in

the Court of Federal Claims. We therefore turn to the 

merits. 

II. Challenge to Payment Terms

A. Background

The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 

(“FASA”) was implemented to “revise and streamline the 

acquisition laws of the federal government” and “facilitate 

the acquisition of commercial products.” S. Rep. No. 103-

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CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US 11

259, at 1 (1994). To that end, FASA reformed government 

procurement by requiring the federal government to 

purchase commercial items under commercial terms to 

the extent practicable. In particular, FASA provides that 

the Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”) include “a 

list of contract clauses to be included in contracts for the 

acquisition of commercial end items,” and that the list, to 

“the maximum extent practicable . . . shall include only 

those contract clauses that are . . . determined to be 

consistent with standard commercial practice.” 41 U.S.C. 

§ 3307(e)(2)(B). FASA also requires that, “[t]o the maximum extent practicable, only the contract clauses [in the 

above-mentioned list] may be used in a contract . . . for 

the acquisition of commercial items.” Id. § 3307(e)(2)(D). 

FAR Part 12 was created to implement FASA. FAR 

Part 12 states that it “shall be used for the acquisition of 

supplies or services that meet the definition of commercial 

items.” 48 C.F.R. § 12.102(a). FAR Part 12 implements 

FASA’s mandate by requiring that “contracts for the 

acquisition of commercial items shall, to the maximum 

extent practicable, include only those clauses” required by 

law or “[d]etermined to be consistent with customary 

commercial practice.” Id. § 12.301(a). It precludes the 

inclusion of “any additional terms or conditions in a 

solicitation or contract for commercial items in a manner 

that is inconsistent with customary commercial practice 

for the item being acquired unless a waiver is approved in 

accordance with agency procedures.” 48 C.F.R. 

§ 12.302(c). 

The Federal Supply Schedule (“FSS”) program provides a simplified process for the government to obtain 

commercial supplies by negotiating underlying FSS 

contracts with suppliers of commercial products and then 

allowing executive agencies to issue orders for those 

commercial products pursuant to the underlying FSS 

contract. See Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. McHugh, 707 F.3d 

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12 CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US

1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013). FAR Subpart 8.4 governs the 

FSS program. 48 C.F.R. §§ 8.401-8.406. 

B. Whether the 2014 RFQ Payment Terms 

Violate FAR Part 12

The 2014 RFQs being challenged here were issued 

pursuant to the Financial and Business Solutions Schedule, an underlying FSS contract. The Court of Federal 

Claims found, and neither party disputes, that the services solicited in the 2014 RFQs are commercial items and 

that the revised payment terms therein are inconsistent 

with customary commercial practice. Opinion and Order

at 9, 19; see Oral Argument 37:45-41:45. We affirm these 

undisputed fact findings.5 Thus, the only issue is whether 

FAR Part 12’s proscription against terms that are inconsistent with customary commercial practice applies to the 

2014 RFQs. If it applies, the payment terms are in violation. 

Before the Court of Federal Claims, the government 

does not appear to have disputed that FAR Part 12’s 

proscription against terms inconsistent with customary 

commercial practice applies to solicitations for the underlying FSS contracts themselves. Opinion and Order at 

12. However, the government argued that FAR Part 12’s 

proscription does not apply to orders made pursuant to 

the existing FSS contracts. The Court of Federal Claims 

agreed. Opinion and Order at 19-22. It reasoned that 

FAR Subpart 8.4, which governs the FSS program, does 

5 The government, in response to oral argument 

questions, indicated that the Court of Federal Claims was 

without authority to find that the revised payment terms 

were inconsistent with customary commercial practices. 

We deem this issue waived by the government. See 

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 

1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

 

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not expressly state that FAR Part 12 applies to orders 

made pursuant to an existing FSS contract. Opinion and 

Order at 20. It similarly found that FAR Part 12 does not 

expressly state that its provisions apply to such orders. 

Opinion and Order at 20-21. We review the Court of 

Federal Claims interpretation of the applicable regulations de novo. Abbott Labs. v. United States, 573 F.3d 

1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

We conclude that FAR Part 12’s proscription against 

terms inconsistent with customary commercial practice 

applies to the 2014 RFQs and therefore that the RFQs 

violate that proscription.6 On a general level, FAR Part 

12 applies to the 2014 RFQs because it makes clear that it 

“shall be used for the acquisition of [commercial items].” 

48 C.F.R. § 12.102(a). The 2014 RFQs meet the broad 

definition of an “acquisition” under FAR: 

Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs 

are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation 

and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract 

administration, and those technical and management functions directly related to the process of 

fulfilling agency needs by contract. 

Id. § 2.101. More specifically, FAR § 12.302(c)’s proscription against any “solicitations or contracts” including 

terms “inconsistent with customary commercial practice”7

6 CGI alternatively argues that the revised payment terms violate FASA and are illegal for unduly 

restricting competition. We need not reach these alternative grounds because we find that the terms violate the 

applicable provisions in FAR Part 12.

7 FAR § 12.302(c) provides a limited exception to 

this proscription against terms inconsistent with custom-

 

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14 CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US

applies to the 2014 RFQs because the RFQs are a “solicitation” and the resulting order is a “contract” as those 

terms are defined by FAR. FAR expressly defines a 

solicitation to include requests for proposals: “Solicitation

means any request to submit offers or quotations to the 

Government. . . . Solicitations under negotiated procedures are called ‘requests for proposals.’” Id. § 2.101 

(emphasis added). Similarly, FAR defines a “contract” as 

including orders: “[C]ontracts include (but are not limited 

to) awards and notices of awards; job orders or task 

letters issued under basic ordering agreements; letter 

contracts; orders, such as purchase orders . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). FAR § 12.302(c) thus applies, on its face, 

to the 2014 RFQs.

The government and the Court of Federal Claims are 

correct that FAR Subpart 8.4 does not explicitly state that 

FAR Part 12 applies to orders made pursuant to existing 

FSS contracts. We conclude, however, that FAR Part 12 

applies to this situation expressly by its terms. To the 

extent there is any perceived inconsistency between FAR 

Subpart 8.4 and FAR Part 12, FAR Part 12 controls. 48 

C.F.R. § 12.102(c) (“When a policy in another part of this 

chapter is inconsistent with a policy in this part, this part 

12 shall take precedence.”). 

CONCLUSION

Because FAR Part 12 applies to the 2014 RFQs and 

the revised payment terms violate FAR Part 12’s prohibition against including contract terms inconsistent with 

customary commercial practice, we reverse the Court of 

Federal Claims grant of judgment on the administrative 

ary commercial practice if a waiver is obtained in accordance with agency procedures. 48 C.F.R. § 12.302(c). No 

such waiver was obtained in this case and thus that 

exception is not applicable here. 

 

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CGI FEDERAL INC. v. US 15

record to the government. We remand to the Court of 

Federal Claims for proceedings consistent with this 

decision. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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