Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05255/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05255-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND MARSHALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

T.D. STARK, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 5255 REC LJO P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.) 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM 

Raymond Marshall (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The instant action was filed on December 22, 2003, in the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of California. The action was subsequently transferred to this Court where it

was received on February 9, 2004. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his rights under the American’s With Disabilities

Act and is seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

In this case, plaintiff alleges his rights under the American’s with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) were violated by the defendants because they have refused to acknowledge an

“approved ADA 1845" in his medical file. Plaintiff also asserts that he has been denied medical

care. 

B. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. LINKAGE REQUIREMENT

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

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constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

2. ADA

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides that:

No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits

of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Because Title II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, “[t]here is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created

by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle v. Regents of the University of California, 166

F.3d 1041, 1045, n. 11 (9th Cir. 1999). To establish a claim under the ADA and RA, plaintiff

must demonstrate that (1) he is a person with a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified; and

that the defendants’ actions either (3) excluded his participation or denied him the benefits of a

service, program, or activity; or (4) otherwise subjected him to discrimination on the basis of his

physical handicap. See Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 477, 455 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The term “public entity” is defined under Title II as any state or local government or any

department, agency, or other instrumentality of state or local government. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12131(1)(A), (B). Individuals are not proper defendants under Title II of the ADA. Walker v.

Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005

n.8 (8th Cir. 1999); Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240-41 (D. Colo. 1999) (finding

that individual liability does not exist under the ADA); see also Butler v. City of Prairie Village,

172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996);

Gallo v. Bd. of Regents of the University of California, 916 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (S.D. Cal.

1995). 

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In this case, Plaintiff’s complaint clearly indicates that each individual engaged in activity

that violated his rights. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff brings this action against

defendants in their individual capacities. Because plaintiff cannot maintain an action against

individuals under Title II of the ADA, the claim must be dismissed.

Even assuming Plaintiff were not suing the defendants in their individual capacities,

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim under the ADA as he alleges no facts that he

was denied participation in or the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

entity on account of his disability. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable

claim for relief under the ADA. 

3. EIGHTH AMENDMENT

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment

unless the mistreatment rises to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves an

objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very

purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a

deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Id.

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere 'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause

of action." Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle,

429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating

a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the

victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern,

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45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en

banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s

mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate

indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or

delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving

medical treatment, the prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997); Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs,

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

In this case, other than a general assertion that plaintiff was denied medical care, Plaintiff

presents no facts that would give rise to a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that his administrative appeals were improperly denied

by the defendants his claim also fails. Prisoners have no constitutional right to an inmate

grievance system. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). Thus, the non-existence of,

or the failure of prison officials to properly implement an administrative appeals process within

the prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495

(8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991). "[A prison] grievance procedure is a

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley, 997

F.2d at 495 (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Mann v.

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty

interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment." Azeez

v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Thus, the failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation, and a prison

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official’s involvement and actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as

the basis for liability under a section 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

Because plaintiff does not have a liberty interest at stake with respect to the inmate

appeals process, the rejection and/or denial of plaintiff’s appeals do not give rise to a claim for

relief under section 1983. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860; Massey, 259 F.3d at 647. Even had

plaintiff a liberty interest, the allegations do not state a claim for relief because Plaintiff fails to

link any of the named defendants to an action or omission giving rise to a constitutional

violation. 

C. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the defendants. The Court will provide plaintiff with

time to file a first Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he wish to

do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Amended Complaint how the conditions complained of

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 

1980). The Amended Complaint must specifically state how each defendant is involved. 

Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423,

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference the

appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

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D. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within THIRTY

(30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint or pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss the

case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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