Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05456/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05456-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 7, 2007 Decided February 29, 2008

No. 05-5456

KIKI IKOSSI,

APPELLANT

v.

DEPARTMENT OF NAVY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv01392)

Michael D. Kohn argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was David K. Colapinto. Stephen M. Kohn entered

an appearance.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellees. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Michael J. Ryan and Wyneva Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorneys,

entered appearances.

USCA Case #05-5456 Document #1101959 Filed: 02/29/2008 Page 1 of 18
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*

 Circuit Judge Ginsburg was Chief Judge at the time of oral

argument.

Before: GINSBURG*, ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal arises from the

termination of Dr. Kiki Ikossi’s employment at the Navy

Research Lab (“NRL”) where she was an electrical engineer.

After appealing to the Merit System Protection Board (“MSPB”)

and filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

(“EEO”) office, Dr. Ikossi sued the Secretary of the Navy and

the NRL in the district court, alleging gender, age, and national

origin discrimination and unlawful retaliation as well as

violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and

the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”). The district court

dismissed her non-discrimination claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, dismissed her pre-termination claims as

untimely, and granted summary judgment to the Secretary on

her discrimination and retaliation claims. We affirm in part and

reverse in part. Because Dr. Ikossi did not administratively

appeal the dismissal by the EEO office or file a civil action on

those claims within ninety days, we affirm the dismissal of the

pre-termination claims. However, because 5 U.S.C.

§ 7702(e)(1) provided subject matter jurisdiction over the

entirety of Dr. Ikossi’s “mixed case” under the CSRA when the

MSPB failed to issue a final decision within 120 days, id.

§ 7702(a)(1), and because summary judgment was premature in

view of her request for discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(f), we reverse and remand the case to the district court. 

I. 

In view of the controlling legal questions that resolve this

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appeal, we limit our statement of the evidence to highlight the

procedural history. 

Dr. Ikossi joined the staff at the NRL in 1998 after having

been a tenured professor at Louisiana State University and an

NRL summer research fellow for eight years. Her job

description called for her to work on research teams as well as

conduct independent research, and she was expected to “define,

execute and publish the results of a personal research agenda.”

For much of her employment, Dr. Ikossi was directly supervised

by Dr. Harry Dietrich, her second level supervisor was Dr.

Dennis Webb, and her third level supervisor was Dr. Gerald

Borsuk. 

Between 1999 and 2002, Dr. Ikossi received an array of

awards from the NRL and consistently good reviews. However,

Dr. Ikossi became increasingly concerned that she was not

receiving proper credit for her work. For example, she was not

assigned to lead a project to which her research had made

substantial contributions, and she believed that her contributions

had not been properly acknowledged by male colleagues in

publications and presentations. Concluding this was a result of

gender discrimination, she met in December 2000 with Dr.

Webb and contacted the NRL’s Human Resources Office

(“HRO”). 

As a result of a reorganization initiated by Dr. Webb in

March 2002, Mr. Brad Boos became Dr. Ikossi’s immediate

supervisor. As part of the reorganization, Dr. Ikossi was to

move her office and share space with another full-time scientist,

an arrangement she considered inadequate to meet her

professional needs and inferior to that provided to her male

colleagues, some of whom were permitted to set up private

offices in unused laboratory space. On April 23, 2002, Dr.

Ikossi complained to Mr. Boos, Dr. Webb, and the HRO that she

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was being subjected to a hostile work environment. On

September 16, 2002, Mr. Boos issued her a letter of reprimand

for yelling at a colleague, a level of discipline that Dr. Webb

could not recall having ever been used and one more severe than

that used in a case of sexual harassment, where the employee

was issued a letter of caution, which does not become part of an

employee’s personnel record.

On June 3, 2002, Dr. Ikossi filed a formal EEO complaint

alleging gender, age, and national origin discrimination. The

EEO office accepted the complaint for investigation on July 19,

2002. She amended her complaint on November 17, 2002 and

February 6, 2003 to add a retaliation claim and to allege that her

supervisors had treated younger males with inferior

qualifications substantially better than they treated her. On

November 20, 2002, an EEO investigator held a fact-finding

conference. By fall 2002, Dr. Ikossi was often on medical leave,

and by the end of the year her health had deteriorated to the

point she advised that she would not be able to work anytime

soon. She took approved leave under the FMLA between

December 23, 2002 and February 28, 2003, at which time she

began to work part-time. On December 2, 2002, Mr. Boos

proposed that she be suspended for 14 days; Dr. Webb converted

the proposal into a proposed removal of Dr. Ikossi from federal

employment. Dr. Borsuk terminated Dr. Ikossi’s employment

on April 23, 2003.

On May 20, 2003, Dr. Ikossi filed a mixed-case appeal with

the MSPB, contending that the termination of her employment

violated Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (“ADEA”) as well as the CSRA and the FMLA. In a

statement of jurisdiction, she noted that she had not included her

termination claims in her pending EEO complaint. An

administrative judge held a one-day hearing on August 28, 2003.

The EEO office dismissed her complaint on September 16, 2003

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on the ground that she had been afforded the opportunity to

litigate those claims before the MSPB; she was advised that she

had the right to appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) or to file a civil action within ninety

days. On December 17, 2003, the administrative judge

dismissed her MSPB appeal in light of a tentative settlement

between Dr. Ikossi and the NRL. Subsequently, after the

administrative judge forwarded Dr. Ikossi’s letter advising that

she had withdrawn from the settlement, the MSPB treated the

letter as a petition for review and remanded the case to the

administrative judge on August 23, 2004 to determine whether

she had timely withdrawn from the settlement.

Meanwhile, on October 10, 2003, Dr. Ikossi filed suit

against the Secretary in federal district court alleging that the

termination of her employment violated Title VII and the

FMLA; on May 14, 2004 she moved to amend her complaint,

including adding a hostile work environment claim. She filed a

second lawsuit on August 16, 2004 that included her CSRA

claims, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7702(e)(1), and added the NRL

as a defendant. In this complaint she alleged that she had been

the victim of a hostile working environment due to

discrimination based on age, gender, and national origin, that

she had been, in effect, denied leave under the FMLA due to

requests to continue to work while on approved medical leave,

and that her termination violated Title VII, the ADEA, the

FMLA, and the CSRA. The district court granted her motion to

dismiss her initial complaint on August 24, 2004. On December

27, 2004, the administrative judge granted her motion to dismiss

her administrative appeal without prejudice because her claims

were pending before the district court on de novo review; on

May 18, 2005, the MSPB denied the NRL’s petition challenging

the administrative judge’s jurisdiction to issue a dismissal

without prejudice. 

 

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The district court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss

the CSRA and FMLA claims for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, dismissed the pre-termination claims as time barred,

and granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment on

the discrimination claims related to Dr. Ikossi’s termination,

concluding that she had failed to rebut the NRL’s lawful reason

for terminating her employment and denying her Rule 56(f)

request for discovery. Ikossi v. England, 406 F. Supp. 2d 23

(D.D.C. 2005). Dr. Ikossi appeals, except for the dismissal of

her FMLA claim. Our review is de novo, see Wilson v. Pena, 79

F.3d 154, 160 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996), except for the denial of

discovery, which we review for abuse of discretion, see

Carpenter v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 174 F.3d 231, 238

(D.C. Cir. 1999).

II.

 

Section 7702 of Title 5 of the United States Code governs

the adjudication of mixed cases, which both challenge adverse

personnel actions otherwise appealable to the MSPB and allege

that discrimination played a part. See Butler v. West, 164 F.3d

634, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As relevant to district court

jurisdiction, section 7702(e)(1) provides that:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if at any

time after - 

. . .

(B) the 120th day following the filing of an appeal

with the [MSPB] under subsection (a)(1) of this

section, there is no judicially reviewable

action . . . , 

. . .

an employee shall be entitled to file a civil action to the

same extent and in the same manner as provided in

section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42

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U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)), section 15(c) of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.

633a(c)), or section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards

Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 216(b)).

5 U.S.C. § 7702(e)(1) (emphasis added).

The district court ruled that the “to the same extent and . . .

same manner” clause limited judicial review under section

7702(e)(1)(B) to claims that would otherwise arise under the

listed civil rights statutes. Ikossi, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30.

Therefore, it determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Dr.

Ikossi’s non-discrimination claims until the MSPB had issued a

final decision, at which point Dr. Ikossi could appeal pursuant

to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b), which provides for judicial review based

on an administrative record. Dr. Ikossi’s challenge to the district

court’s interpretation of its jurisdiction over her mixed case is

well taken because the district court’s ruling is inconsistent with

the plain text and legislative history of section 7702. While the

district court may “stay the case, or hold it in abeyance, for a

reasonable period of time” to allow the administrative process

to conclude, Butler 164 F.3d at 643, it errs in dismissing nondiscrimination claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

because there is not a final decision by the MSPB. 

The plain text of the concluding clause of section

7702(e)(1) — “to the same extent and in the same manner as

provided in section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,. . .

section 15(c) of the [ADEA], . . . or section 16(b) of the Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938” — demonstrates that it is not a

limitation on the type of claims that may be pursued under

section 7702(e)(1). The three referenced statutory provisions

are procedural in nature: section 717(c) addresses the time for

bringing a civil action and requires that the “head of department,

agency, or unit” be named the defendant, 42 U.S.C. § 2000eUSCA Case #05-5456 Document #1101959 Filed: 02/29/2008 Page 7 of 18
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16(c); section 15(c) creates jurisdiction in the federal district

court and provides for both legal and equitable relief, 29 U.S.C.

§ 633a(c); and section 16(b) authorizes damages and identifies

federal or state court as the proper venue, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

Thus, the concluding clause of section 7702(e)(1) merely

specifies the procedure that governs mixed cases brought

pursuant to section 7702(e)(1). An illustration of the operation

of this clause appears in Kienlen v. MSPB, 687 F. Supp. 461,

463 (D. Minn. 1988), where the district court dismissed the

MSPB as a defendant upon ruling that section 7702(e)(1), by

incorporating section 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act, only

permitted the plaintiff to name the Postmaster General as a

defendant. And as is further illustrated by section

7702(a)(1)(B), which describes the kinds of discrimination

claims that may be brought before the MSPB, Congress knew

how to invoke the substantive provisions of the civil rights

statutes. That provision references the entire “section 717 of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964” rather than only section 717(c). 

The procedural nature of the concluding clause of section

7702(e)(1) also accords with its omission of any reference to the

Rehabilitation Act, which is listed in section 7702(a) as a basis

for a discrimination claim protected under section 7702. See 5

U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1)(B)(iii). Although the Rehabilitation Act

provides substantive protection against discrimination, 29

U.S.C. § 791, it does not include procedural requirements for

judicial review, incorporating instead the requirements of

section 717 of the Civil Rights Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 794a;

because section 7702(e)(1) already incorporates section 717(c),

reference to the Rehabilitation Act would have been

superfluous. Reading section 7702(e)(1) to impose a

jurisdictional requirement would create the odd result that a

plaintiff alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, unlike

a plaintiff alleging a violation of any other civil rights law

identified in section 7702(a)(1)(B), would be foreclosed from

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seeking judicial review after the MSPB had failed to render an

appealable decision after 120 days. Moreover, interpreting the

concluding clause of section 7702(e)(1) as more than a

procedural limitation is incompatible with Congress’s intent to

set a timetable for the MSPB to decide “both the issue of

discrimination and the appealable action,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 7702(a)(1)(B), as it would deny the complainant a right to

enforce this timetable with respect to a portion of her claim. 

Construing section 7702 to confer jurisdiction over all

elements of a mixed case is also consistent with the section’s

“treatment of mixed cases in previous stages of the process:

section 7702 explicitly requires the Board in appealable cases

alleging both discrimination and non-discrimination claims to

decide both issues,” Wiggins v. U.S. Postal Serv., 653 F.2d 219,

221-22 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks

omitted). This holding also reflects the legislative history,

which states that “questions of the employee’s inefficiency or

misconduct, and discrimination by the employer, [are] two sides

of the same question and must be considered together,” Doyal

v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1526, 1537 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. Rep.

No. 95-969, at 53 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2723, 2775); see also Williams v. Dep’t of the Army, 715 F.2d

1485, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (quoting same). As this

court has observed, “discrimination and nondiscrimination

claims . . . are closely related both logically and as a factual

matter.” Hayes v. U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 684 F.2d 137, 140

(D.C. Cir. 1982).

While this court has not yet addressed whether a district

court has jurisdiction over non-discrimination claims under

section 7702(e), it has long viewed “[t]he plain language of [5

U.S.C. §§ 7702-03] [to] suggest[] that a mixed case is to be

treated as a unit, and is to be brought before the district court.”

Id. at 139. The court in Hayes held that the district court rather

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than the court of appeals has jurisdiction over both

discrimination and non-discrimination claims when an employee

appeals a final decision by the MSPB. See id. at 139, 140 & n.2.

In Butler, the court similarly concluded that section 7702(e)

“clearly express[es] Congress’ desire that mixed cases should be

processed expeditiously, and that complainants should have

access to a judicial forum should their claims languish

undecided in the administrative machinery.” 164 F.3d at 640.

So long as “the complainant has neither deliberately abandoned

the administrative regime, . . . nor refused to cooperate in its

processes, . . . section 7702(e)(1)(B) explicitly sanctions a civil

action in the federal district courts once 120 days have passed

without a final decision from the MSPB.” Id. at 643. The court

reached this conclusion after observing that “[t]he MSPB and

EEOC regulations that structure the prosecution of mixed cases

are extremely complicated,” id. at 638, and outlining the

statutory “decision tree” to be applied, id. at 638-39.

Subsequently, in Evono v. Reno, 216 F.3d 1105, 1109 (D.C. Cir.

2000), the court followed this decision tree and again concluded

that “[s]ection 7702(e)(1) provides an employee with a right to

file a ‘mixed case’ in the district court.” Neither Evono nor

Butler, however, involved non-discrimination claims. 

The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly held that the

district court has jurisdiction over non-discrimination claims

when agencies fail to meet the 120-day time line established by

section 7702(e)(1)(B). See Valentine-Johnson v. Roche, 386

F.3d 800, 808, 811, 813 (6th Cir. 2004); Seay v. TVA, 339 F.3d

454, 472 (6th Cir. 2003); Doyal, 777 F.2d at 1533, 1535-37.

Thus, in Seay, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court had

subject matter jurisdiction over non-discrimination claims where

the employer’s EEO office failed to act within 120 days and that

the plaintiff was not required to develop an administrative

record by appealing to the MSPB. 339 F.3d at 471-72.

Following Seay, the Sixth Circuit in Valentine-Johnson “rejected

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the argument that ‘nondiscrimination claims must always be

reviewed on an administrative record.’” 386 F.3d at 813

(quoting Seay, 339 F.3d at 472). In Doyal, the Eleventh Circuit

held that “the entire mixed case complaint was properly before

the district court,” 777 F.2d at 1537, and stated that “Congress,

through [] section [7702(e)(1)], has explicitly given the

employee certain rights and options, one of which is to file a

civil action based on his mixed case complaint before resorting

to the MSPB,” id. at 1536.

The Secretary’s analysis of Valentine-Johnson and Seay

hardly compels a contrary interpretation. Valentine-Johnson is

not a “solitary decision,” Appellee’s Br. at 27, and Seay does not

support his position that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Dr. Ikossi’s complaint. In Seay, the Sixth

Circuit correctly stated that “[o]n-the-record review is required

for nondiscrimination claims . . .[that are] appealed from the

MSPB,” 339 F.3d at 472 (emphasis added), which would occur

under section 7703 addressing appeals where the MSPB has

ruled on the complainant’s claims. But Dr. Ikossi is not

appealing an MSPB decision but rather proceeding pursuant to

section 7702(e)(1) because the MSPB did not render a final

decision within 120 days of the filing of her administrative

appeal, and under that provision the district court may review

her entire mixed case without an administrative record. The

Secretary does not mention the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in

Doyal (nor does Dr. Ikossi), and he has not cited any circuit

court of appeals decision (or, for that matter, any district court

opinion other than the one under review here) holding that the

district court lacks jurisdiction over the non-discrimination

aspects of a mixed case when a lawsuit is filed pursuant to

section 7702(e)(1). In Vanover v. O’Leary, 967 F. Supp. 1211,

1221 (N.D. Okla.1997), cited by the district court, Ikossi, 406 F.

Supp. 2d at 29, but not the parties here, the district court held it

could address the non-discrimination claims in a mixed case

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brought pursuant to § 7702(e)(1) only if the MSPB issued a final

decision before the district court disposed of the discrimination

claims. 967 F. Supp. 1220-21. Although we credit the district

court’s concern that it did not “have the expertise to address the

issue of whether a federal employee’s termination was for the

efficiency of the service,” id. at 1221; see Butler, 164 F.3d at

643, the appropriate action in that situation is not to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction but rather to “stay the case, or hold it in

abeyance, for a reasonable period of time,” id. Insofar as

Vanover suggests that the district court lacks jurisdiction to

consider de novo the non-discrimination claims in a mixed case,

we disagree with its conclusion. 

Moreover, the MSPB’s grant of Dr. Ikossi’s motion to

dismiss her mixed case does not, as the Secretary suggests, oust

the district court of jurisdiction. Dr. Ikossi cannot be deemed to

have abandoned her non-discrimination claims by filing a

motion in her administrative proceeding after she had filed her

civil suit; to the contrary, her motion was designed to avoid the

burden of concurrently litigating the same claims before both the

district court and the MSPB. The Secretary’s reliance on

Vinieratos v. U.S. Department of Air Force, 939 F.2d 762 (9th

Cir. 1991), is misplaced. In Vinieratos, the Ninth Circuit

affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because the plaintiff,

having elected an administrative remedy, failed to exhaust it by

“wholly obstruct[ing] both the previously initiated EEO efforts

and the MSPB’s efforts” and thus had effectively abandoned the

administrative proceedings. Id. at 770. Nothing in Vinieratos

suggests that filing a motion to dismiss in an administrative

forum can divest the district court of jurisdiction over a

previously filed complaint. 

III.

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termination claims, however, fails. To be timely, she was

required within ninety days of the EEO dismissal of her

complaint either to appeal to the EEOC or to file a civil suit.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). She did not appeal to the EEOC,

and although her initial complaint in district court was filed

within ninety days of the EEO dismissal, it did not raise her pretermination claims. Her second complaint, which did raise her

pre-termination claims, was filed on August 16, 2004, long after

the ninety-day period had expired. 

Dr. Ikossi advances no persuasive argument that waiver,

estoppel, or equitable tolling applies. See Colbert v. Potter, 471

F.3d 158, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2006). She contends that her motion to

amend her initial complaint to add her pre-termination claims

should excuse her delinquency. But this motion was not filed

within ninety days of the dismissal. Alternatively she contends

that the MSPB was obligated to extend its jurisdiction over her

pre-termination claims after the EEO office dismissed her case,

and therefore the district court can exert jurisdiction over them

pursuant to section 7702(e)(1). Yet she never requested the

MSPB to consider these claims; her only filing with the MSPB

with respect to her pre-termination claims stated that they were

before the EEO office. Even assuming that the MSPB would

have had jurisdiction once the EEO office dismissed her pretermination claims on the stated assumption that she could raise

them as part of her mixed case, Dr. Ikossi still had to raise them

before the MSPB in order for section 7702(e)(1) to apply. Dr.

Ikossi’s contention that her termination claim, which was timely

filed, sufficed under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002), to raise the panoply of her

pre-termination hostile work environment claims is also to no

avail, for Morgan does not suggest that a plaintiff can obtain

judicial review of an EEO decision outside of the ninety-day

period or raise a hostile work environment claim without first

exhausting her administrative remedies, see, e.g., Greer v.

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Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Rather,

Morgan held merely that “[t]he timely filing provision only

requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a certain

number of days after the unlawful practice happened. It does

not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the

component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the

statutory time period.” 536 U.S. at 117.

IV.

Dr. Ikossi’s challenge to the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the Secretary before permitting discovery

pursuant to Rule 56(f) might present a closer question in the

absence of the district court’s jurisdictional error and with the

benefit of a complete administrative record, but we conclude

that she sufficiently demonstrated a need for discovery. 

Rule 56(f) provides that: 

If a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment]

shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot

present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court

may: (1) deny the motion; (2) order a continuance to

enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be

taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue

any just order.

In Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1975),

the court rejected the notion that a district court can ordinarily

resolve a Title VII complaint based on the administrative record,

noting the “substantial interests served by a fair and complete

judicial fact-finding process, replete with the tools of discovery

and compulsory process.” The court stated: 

Rather than presuming that the record is properly the

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sole basis for decision, and that the plaintiff must

affirmatively establish his need for supplementation,

courts should focus on the employee’s complaint. The

administrative record should be admissible as one

piece of evidence concerning the issues raised in the

complaint, but the employee should have the right to

conduct discovery and compel the attendance of

witnesses to furnish additional evidence. The Federal

Rules accord the trial judge sufficient control over the

conduct of discovery and the trial that duplication of

proceedings — which serves no party’s interest —

should be minimal.

Id. at 151. More recently, in Chappell-Johnson v. Powell, 440

F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the court concluded that the district

court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment in a

Title VII case where the plaintiff had been afforded no

discovery, citing cautioning instruction from the Supreme Court

against premature grants of summary judgment, id. at 488

(citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002));

see also Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333

F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003); First Chi. Int’l v. United Exch.

Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

Nonetheless, Dr. Ikossi had the burden to state with

“sufficient particularity to the district court — or, for that

matter, to this court — why discovery was necessary.” Strang

v. U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, 864 F.2d 859,

861 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The affidavit filed by Dr. Ikossi’s

attorney identifies four individuals whom he wished to depose:

her supervisors at the NRL (Drs. Webb and Borsuk and Mr.

Boos) and a staff member at the NRL’s HRO. Although the

affidavit states that discovery is sought regarding their

motivations in taking disciplinary action against Dr. Ikossi, it

does not identify precisely what evidence it is hoped will be

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discovered. This lack of precision does not make any less selfevident, however, the nature of the evidence Dr. Ikossi seeks;

Dr. Ikossi believes that the depositions of those four individuals

will produce additional evidence that the termination of her

employment was in retaliation for her pursuing an EEO

complaint and for exercising her FMLA rights and was

unlawfully motivated by gender, age, or national origin

discrimination. By providing an explanation for their actions,

the four individuals, all of whom were involved in the NRL’s

disciplinary process, may reveal their motives, which lie at the

heart of Dr. Ikossi’s discrimination claims. 

In denying Dr. Ikossi discovery for failing to show that the

requested depositions would be “essential to justify [her]

opposition,” Ikossi, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(f)) prior to the 2007 amendment) (alteration in original),

the district court concluded that “[t]he record in this case is

extensive, and all of the major factual disputes appear to be quite

well fleshed out. Further, plaintiff . . . has already had at least

two opportunities to examine her three most promising proposed

witnesses under oath.” Id. at 36. However, neither reason

survives analysis. First, the record in the district court does not

appear to be as comprehensive as the district court’s conclusion

suggests. Fewer than twenty pages of the transcript of over 300

pages of the hearing before the administrative judge is in the

district court record. Of those pages, all but three are testimony

by Dr. Ikossi. The district court record also does not contain

affidavits from any of the four individuals named in the Rule

56(f) affidavit. Further, one of them did not testify before the

administrative judge and no testimony from a second appears in

the district court record. 

Second, the pages of the transcript of the administrative

judge’s hearing before the district court do not indicate the scope

of the one-day hearing. Dr. Ikossi asserts that the hearing was

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“tightly constrained . . . so that the hearing could be completed

in one day,” Reply Br. at 13, an assertion the Secretary did not

contest during oral argument. Although her attorney’s affidavit

stated that none of the four individuals had been deposed, Dr.

Ikossi does not deny that three of them testified at the hearing.

Still, the district court record does not indicate whether Dr.

Ikossi was afforded a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine

those three. The other examination opportunity referenced by

the district court presumably was the EEO fact-finding hearing

on November 20, 2002 on Dr. Ikossi’s pre-termination claims.

But this hearing could not provide her with an opportunity to

elicit evidence about the termination of her employment because

it occurred months before Dr. Webb had proposed her removal

from federal service. Also, the district court record contains

only twenty-three pages of the EEO transcript, all but five of

which are testimony by Dr. Ikossi. Additionally, Dr. Ikossi

notes that the district court record contained a transcript of a

reference check conducted after the MSPB hearing, during

which Dr. Webb made comments about her national origin, and

she has never had an opportunity to question him about his

motives in view of this comment. 

Further, because the district court ruled that it lacked

jurisdiction over Dr. Ikossi’s non-discrimination claims, it never

considered her request for discovery in light of all of the claims

that were properly before it. Although the claims in a mixed

case may be “closely related both logically and as a factual

matter,” Hayes, 684 F.2d at 140, they are not identical. It is true

that the district court record includes numerous documents and

reveals that Dr. Ikossi filed responses to Dr. Webb’s proposal to

terminate her employment. For example, Dr. Ikossi has

proffered emails authored by Dr. Webb, Dr. Dietrich, and Mr.

Boos. However, self-generated emails are hardly comparable to

testimony under oath. Given the key nature of testimony by the

witnesses whom Dr. Ikossi sought to depose, the limited record

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of the administrative proceedings before the district court and

the limited scope of those hearings, and the district court’s

misunderstanding of the claims properly presented to it, the

district court abused its discretion in denying Dr. Ikossi’s

request for reasonable discovery in this trial de novo.

Consequently, the grant of summary judgment was premature.

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the pre-termination claims as untimely filed, and we

reverse the dismissal of the MSPB non-discrimination claims

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and the grant of summary judgment on

the discrimination claims pursuant to Rule 56 and remand the

case to the district court.

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