Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01520/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01520-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAMES KOTROUS, individually

and doing business as THE

MATTRESS FACTORY,

NO. CIV. S-02-1520 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

GOSS-JEWETT COMPANY OF

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC., et

al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on motion to dismiss filed

by defendant Bayer Cropscience, Inc., (“Bayer”). The motion

seeks dismissal of the First, Third and Fourth Claims in

Plaintiff, James Kotrous’ (“Kotrous”) First Amended Complaint for

failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In the event the court grants this

motion, Bayer requests that the court decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Kotrous’ remaining state law

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 147 Filed 06/16/05 Page 1 of 8
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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230.

2

claims. For the reasons stated herein, Bayer’s motion is

DENIED.1

BACKGROUND

The instant litigation concerns certain real property

located at 4301 Power Inn Road in Sacramento, California (“the

Site”). From approximately 1970 until 1996, the Site was leased

by Goss-Jewett Company of Northern California (“Goss-Jewett”), a

defendant in this action. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 8.)

Goss-Jewett sold and distributed chemicals used by dry cleaning

establishments, including the chemical perchloroethylene (“PCE”). 

As part of its operations at the Site, Goss-Jewett installed

an above-ground storage tank, which was used to store up to 1,000

gallons of PCE prior to its delivery by truck to local dry

cleaning businesses. Stauffer Chemical, a predecessor in

interest to Bayer, supplied PCE to Goss-Jewett and delivered it

by truck to the storage tank. (FAC ¶ 39.) During one or more of

these deliveries, Stauffer Chemical “suddenly and accidentally

released PCE to the soil and groundwater at the site . . .

[resulting in] contamination of the environment.” (FAC ¶ 40.) 

During the period that Goss-Jewett operated its dry cleaning

chemical supply business, ownership of the Site transferred on

two occasions. From approximately 1968 to 1976, Albert and

Estelle Evans, Esther Volz, Robert and Frances Carmany, and John

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2 According to the FAC, Albert Evans, Estelle Evans,

Esther Volz, Robert Carmany, Frances Carmany, and John Spurlock

are deceased. Their respective estates have been named as

defendants in this action. 

3

and Mildred Spurlock co-owned the Site.2 In 1976, ownership

transferred to defendant Edward Anselmo (“Anselmo”), who sold the

Site to Kotrous in October of 1995. 

In August of 1996, after Kotrous acquired ownership of the

Site, hazardous substance contamination was discovered in soil

beneath the storage tank. (FAC ¶ 41.) In 1998, Goss-Jewett

conducted a well survey, which identified 35 water wells within

2,000 feet of the Site, including one private well used for

domestic water supply. (FAC ¶ 42.) Goss-Jewett then sampled the

private well and found it contained heightened levels of PCE.

(Id.) The well was removed from service. (Id.) 

In or about February of 2000, the California Regional Water

Quality Control Board (“CRWQCB”) sent Goss-Jewett a letter

requesting a work plan for site assessment and evaluation of

groundwater monitoring wells on property down-gradient from the

Site. (FAC ¶ 43.) However, Goss-Jewett did not comply and has

performed no further work at the Site since it sampled the

domestic well in June of 1998, despite repeated requests by the

CRWQCB. (Id.) 

In November of 2001, the CRWQCB issued Cleanup and Abatement

Order No. 5-01-714, which required Goss-Jewett and one of its

officers, defendant Steven Lamanet (“Lamanet”), to investigate

and remediate soil and groundwater contamination at the Site. 

(FAC ¶¶ 9, 44.) Kotrous was directed to conduct the work if

Goss-Jewett and Lamanet failed to do so. (FAC ¶ 44.)

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3 All further references to the “Rules” are to the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted. 

4

When Goss-Jewett and Lamanet failed to comply with deadlines

in the first Cleanup Order, the CRWQCB rescinded that order and

issued Cleanup and Abatement Order No. R5-2002-0707, which

imposed obligations for site investigation and cleanup on

Kotrous, Anselmo and Goss-Jewett. (Id.) 

Kotrous commenced this action on July 15, 2002, asserting

claims for contribution under CERCLA and the California Hazardous

Substance Account Act; declaratory relief under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(g)(2), the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and

state law; public and private nuisance; trespass; equitable

indemnity; and injunctive relief. On April 26, 2005, Bayer filed

the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(c).3

STANDARD

Rule 12(c) provides in relevant part that,

After the pleadings are closed but within such time as

not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment

on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented

to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be

treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as

provided in Rule 56 and all parties shall be given

reasonable opportunity to present all material made

pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted may be made by motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Rule 12(h)(2). In considering a motion for judgment on the

pleadings presenting a defense of failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, this court should employ those

standards normally applicable to a motion to dismiss for failure

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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure, Civil § 1367 at 515-16 (2d ed. 1990).

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Given that the

complaint is construed favorably to the pleader, the court may

not dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim unless it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of the claim which would entitle him or her to

relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957); NL Indus.,

Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover, the court

“need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form

of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v.

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

Bayer contends that Kotrous’ First Claim for contribution

under CERCLA must be dismissed because Kotrous is not entitled to

assert a claim under either of the two sections of CERCLA which

authorize private actions for damages, § 107(a) and § 113(f). 

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Section 107(a) of CERCLA authorizes private entities to

recover costs incurred in cleaning up hazardous waste disposal

sites from responsible parties (“PRPs”) as defined in the

statute. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 

Section 113(f), which Congress added to CERCLA through the

1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”),

provides PRPs with an express right to contribution from other

responsible parties. Under § 113(f), a responsible party may

seek contribution, (1) “during or following any civil action

under § 106 of this title or under § 107(a) of this title” or (2)

where the PRP “has resolved its liability to the United States or

a State for some or all of a response action . . . in an

administrative or judicially approved settlement.” 42 U.S.C. §

9613(f). 

In Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 125 S. Ct.

577, 583 (2004), the Supreme Court held that a PRP who

“voluntarily” incurs response costs (i.e., is not subject to a

civil action under § 106 or § 107 and who has not entered into an

administrative or judicially-approved settlement) cannot assert a

claim for contribution under § 113(f). The court found that the

clear language of the statute precluded any contrary result. Id.

Bayer contends that, in light of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Aviall, Kotrous cannot maintain a CERCLA contribution

claim under § 113(f) because he was not subject to a civil action

under § 106 or § 107(a), nor did he enter into a settlement with

the federal or state government. The court need not decide

whether the Kotrous could meet § 113(f)’s standing requirements

because the Ninth Circuit recognized an implied right of

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4 The Court in Aviall expressed considerable skepticism

regarding whether courts should find an implied right to

contribution in § 107. See Aviall, 125 S. Ct. at 586 (noting

that “[t]o the extent that Aviall chooses to frame its § 107

(continued...)

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contribution in § 107. Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d 1298, 1301 (citing

Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814-815 (1994)

and Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 n.3

(1986)); Western Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d

678, 685. The enactment of § 113 in 1986 did not replace the

implicit right of contribution in § 107. Western Props., 358

F.3d at 685. SARA contained a savings clause, which provides

that “[n]othing in this subsection shall diminish the right of

any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of

a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607

of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) Thus, under controlling

Ninth Circuit precedent, a PRP may maintain a claim for

contribution under § 107(a).

Bayer’s argument that Kotrous’ status as a PRP bars him from

seeking any relief under § 107(a) is based on a mistaken

interpretation of Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pinal Creek. Pinal

Creek held only that a PRP cannot maintain an action under §

107(a) for joint and several liability. Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at

1302 (concluding that the PRP plaintiff was “foreclosed from

imposing joint and several liability [on other PRPs] . . ..”) 

However, nothing in Pinal Creek suggests that the court intended

to abrogate its prior decisions finding an implied right to

contribution in § 107(a). To the contrary, Pinal Creek clearly

recognizes that § 107 incorporates such a claim.4 Id. at 1301

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4(...continued)

claim on remand as an implied right of contribution (as opposed

to a right of cost recovery) we note that this Court has visited

the subject of implied rights of contribution before,” and citing

cases rejecting the creation of such rights). However, the

Aviall Court expressly did not decide this issue. Id. (“. . . we

decline to decide whether Aviall has an implied right to

contribution under § 107.”). Because Aviall does not overrule

the cases from this circuit that recognize an implied right to

contribution in § 107, they remain good law and are binding on

this court. 

8

(finding that a claim for contribution is implicitly embedded in

 the text of § 107); Western Props., 358 F.3d at 685. 

Kotrous’ First Claim for contribution expressly invokes §

107(a). (See FAC ¶¶ 47, 49, 56.) Thus, Kotrous has stated a

claim for contribution under CERCLA. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Bayer’s motion to dismiss

Kotrous’ First Claim for contribution under CERCLA is DENIED.

Bayer’s motion to dismiss Kotrous’ Second through Fourth Claims

is predicated on this court dismissing Kotrous’ CERCLA claim. 

Accordingly, Bayer’s motion to dismiss is DENIED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 16, 2005.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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