Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02189/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02189-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

DIANA PAYNE PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-2189

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH BY AND THROUGH THE

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS; JOEL

STUBBLEFIELD, UAFS CHANCELLOR,

in his official and personal

capacities; and SANDI SANDERS,

UAFS SENIOR VICE CHANCELLOR

AND CHIEF OF STAFF, in her

personal capacity DEFENDANTS 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Now on this 26th day of July, 2006, there comes on for

consideration Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

supporting documents (Docs. 32-34) and Plaintiff’s Response and

Supplement (Docs. 42-44). 

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

Court must view the facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. See Rabushka v. Crane Co.,

122 F.3d 559 (8 Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the burden th

of establishing the absence of issues of material fact in the

record and of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986). To defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond

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the pleadings and designate specific facts showing a genuine

issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324. Thus, the “basic

inquiry” for purposes of summary judgment is “whether the

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Quick v. Donaldson Co.,

Inc., 90 F.3d 1372 (8 Cir. 1996)(citation omitted). Further, th

the Court is mindful that the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly

recognized that summary judgment should be used sparingly in

employment cases. E.g., Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262

(8 Cir. 1995). th

Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint on January 21,

2005. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff alleges gender discrimination in

violation of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.) and the

Equal Pay Act (EPA); sexual harassment in violation of Title

VII; retaliation in violation of Title VII and the First

Amendment; and violations of her right to procedural and

substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In her

response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff

states that she is no longer pursuing a claim for sexual

harassment. Accordingly, that claim is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

remaining claims.

Initially, as set forth in Plaintiff’s Response, Defendants

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bear the initial burden of informing the court the basis for its

motion, and identifying the portions of the record that

establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact.

Defendants’ Motion, Brief and Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts do not address the issues as directly as they should. The

Court has attempted with some difficulty to sort through the

voluminous materials submitted in support of Defendants’ Motion

in an effort to determine whether summary judgment is

appropriate.

Background

Diana Payne was employed at the University of Arkansas -

Fort Smith (UAFS) or its predecessor, Westark College, from 1981

until January 3, 2005, when she was terminated. Ms. Payne

received a grant of tenure in 1986. 

Joel Stubblefield was hired by Westark College in 1980, as

Dean of Business Affairs. He was named president of the school

in October 1983, and later became Chancellor. From October 1983

until his untimely death in October, 2005, he was the

administrative head of the school.

Sandi Sanders was employed by UAFS in 1979. After a series

of promotions, Sanders became Provost in 1998. In 2004, she was

promoted to Senior Vice Chancellor and Chief of Staff. She also

served as the Interim Chancellor following Stubblefield’s death.

After merging into the University of Arkansas system, an

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Initial Rank Review team was created for the purpose of

recommending the rank to be assigned to each faculty member.

The team recommended that the plaintiff be awarded an Initial

Rank Assignment of Assistant Professor. (Doc. 32, Ex. E-6A).

On May 6, 2002, Sanders notified Plaintiff that she intended to

recommend to Chancellor Stubblefield that her initial rank be

Instructor, a lower rank than that of Assistant Professor.

(Doc. 32, Ex. E-6A). On June 6, 2002, Stubblefield notified

Plaintiff that she would receive the rank of Instructor.

Plaintiff’s subsequent appeals to Sanders and Stubblefield were

denied. (Doc. 32, Exs. E & I).

In November of 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging gender

discrimination in connection with her pay and rank, hostile work

environment and retaliation. (Doc. 32, Ex. A). On February 25,

2004, the EEOC issued its determination finding no evidence of

wage discrimination or hostile work environment. Id. However,

the EEOC found evidence indicating that UAFS retaliated against

Plaintiff for filing her EEOC charge. Id. In a letter dated

August 5, 2004, Plaintiff’s counsel notified UAFS that she

intended to file a lawsuit based upon the issues set forth in

her EEOC charge. Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on

August 17, 2004. 

In August 2004, Plaintiff applied for a promotion to

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Assistant Professor. In connection with this application, Ms.

Payne was accused of plagiarism by the College of Business

Promotion Committee consisting of two faculty members. (Doc.

32, Ex. D-K). An Ad Hoc Committee conducted a hearing to

determine whether the plagiarism allegation could be

substantiated. On November 18, 2004, the Ad Hoc Committee found

Plaintiff committed plagiarism by “fail[ing] to cite copyrighted

material on the Internet and in faulty paraphrasing”, but only

recommended that Plaintiff be suspended through the Spring

semester 2005. (Doc. 32, Exs. H-11 & 13). On December 15,

2004, Stubblefield issued his preliminary decision stating his

intent to terminate Plaintiff. (Doc. 32, Ex. H-15). One member

of the Ad Hoc Committee responded urging Stubblefield to adopt

the Committee’s recommendation of suspension further stating his

opinion that “Ms. Payne’s mistakes were far more the result of

ignorance on her part regarding standards of academic writing

and scholarly activity and misinterpretation of the concept of

common knowledge than the result of a willful intent to

deceive.” (Doc. 32, H-17). Plaintiff also responded. (Doc.

32,Ex. H-16). On January 3, 2005, Stubblefield terminated

Plaintiff. (Doc. 32, Ex. H-19). 

Gender Discrimination (Title VII and the Equal Pay Act)

Plaintiff contends that she was paid less than similarly

situated male employees in violation of Title VII and the Equal

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Pay Act. To evaluate a claim for unequal pay for equal work on

the basis of gender, a court uses the same standard without

regard to whether the plaintiff raises the claim under Title VII

or the EPA. See Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707

(8th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie case of wage

discrimination, Plaintiff must show that she was paid less than

male employees for equal work in jobs that required equal skill,

effort, and responsibility, and that were performed under

similar conditions. Id. at 719. To be considered equal, jobs

need not be identical; substantial equality suffices. See Hunt

v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 282 F.3d 1021 (8 Cir. 2002). th

“Whether two jobs are substantially equal ‘requires a practical

judgment on the basis of all the facts and circumstances of a

particular case,’ including factors such as level of experience,

training, education, ability, effort, and responsibility.” Hunt

at 1030 (quoting Buettner, 216 F.3d at 719). Differences in job

titles or classifications are not dispositive. Id. at 1029.

Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that she

was paid less than Jerry Peerbolte and Robert Sell for work that

a jury could conclude was substantially equal. (Doc. 42, pp.

17-19). Taking all facts presented in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, as the Court must do, the Court finds there are

genuine issues of material fact, including but not limited to,

whether Plaintiff was paid less than similarly situated male

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employees and whether Defendants’ proffered reasons for the

differences in pay are merely pretext for gender discrimination.

Retaliation (Title VII)

To prevail on a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must prove

that : (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the

employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3)

that the two situations are causally connected. See Okruhlik v.

Univ. of Arkansas, 395 F.3d 872 (8 Cir. 2005)(citations th

omitted). Plaintiff contends that she was terminated in

retaliation for filing her initial EEOC charge, as well as this

lawsuit. Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot show any

causal relationship between either event and her termination.

However, Plaintiff has presented evidence of alleged comments by

Stubblefield that could be considered as a retaliatory motive.

After taking all facts presented in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of

material fact, including but not limited to, whether Plaintiff’s

termination was causally connected to the filing of her initial

EEOC charge and/or this lawsuit and whether Defendants’

proffered reasons are merely pretextual.

First Amendment Retaliation (18 U.S.C. § 1983)

Plaintiff contends that Stubblefield and Sanders retaliated

against her for criticizing a University policy by assigning her

a lesser rank of Instructor, rather than Assistant Professor.

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Public employees have a First Amendment right to speak freely on

matters of public concern. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378

(1987). This protection only extends to speech regarding

matters of public concern, and must be balanced against the

efficient operation of the workplace. Connick v. Myers, 461

U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

At the same time, the Government has an interest in regulating

the speech of its employees to promote "efficiency and integrity

in the discharge of official duties, and [in maintaining] proper

discipline in the public service." Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51.

These interests must be balanced against the employee's interest

in addressing matters of public concern and enabling the

electorate to make informed decisions. Pickering, 391 U.S. at

572.

Under the Pickering analysis, a public employee must

establish three elements to state a retaliation claim under the

First Amendment: (1) that the speech involved a matter of public

concern; (2) that his or her interest in the speech outweighed

the government employer's countervailing interest in providing

efficient and effective services to the public; and (3) that the

speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged

retaliatory action. See Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d

1337 (8 Cir. 1993); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. Of Ed. v. th

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). As a defense, the employer may show

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that it would have taken the adverse action even if the employee

had not engaged in protected conduct. See Shands, supra. The

employer's defense and the third factor are questions of fact;

however, the first two factors are questions of law. See Kincade

v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389 (8 Cir. 1995) th .

The United States Supreme Court recently held that "when

public employees make statements pursuant to their official

duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First

Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their

communications from employer discipline." Garcetti v. Ceballos,

126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). The Court found that "Government

employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of

control over their employees' words and actions [,]" and

therefore, "the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial

discipline based on an employee's expressions made pursuant to

official responsibilities." Id. at 1958. Accordingly, courts

have an additional consideration when reviewing a First

Amendment retaliation claim under the Pickering analysis. If the

alleged protected speech involves a matter of public concern,

the court must next determine if the employee was speaking as

part of his or her official duties or instead as a citizen. Id.

If the former, the speech is not protected under the First

Amendment. If the latter, the Court must determine whether the

employee's interest in the speech outweighs the government's

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countervailing interest in providing efficient and effective

services to the public.

In determining whether an employee's speech addresses

matters of public concern, courts must review the content, form,

and context of the speech. Green v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth.,

105 F.3d 882 (3d Cir. 1997). A public employee's speech

involves a matter of public concern if it can " 'be fairly

considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or

other concern to the community.'" Id. at 886 (quoting Connick

v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Plaintiff's motives do not

negate the import of the content of the statements. "The private

nature of the statement does not ... vitiate the status of the

statement as addressing a matter of public concern." Rankin v.

McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 

The speech at issue here is an email from Plaintiff to

Sanders regarding a new policy that increased the minimum number

of hours that faculty members, including Plaintiff, were

expected to be present on campus. (Doc. 32, Ex. E-2). In the

email, Plaintiff expresses her understanding that she could

fulfill this requirement by working in places other than

physically being on campus. Id. While Plaintiff states she

believes requiring the faculty to be on campus is “a huge

disservice to the community” and her belief that it would affect

future donations to the university, the crux of Plaintiff’s

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email is her dissatisfaction with an internal employment policy

and not an issue of public concern. See Phares v. Gustafsson,

856 F.2d 1003 (7 Cir. 1988)(the mere fact that the speech th

tangentially raises issues of public concern cannot transform a

purely private personnel matter into a matter of public

concern). We find that Plaintiff’s email and subsequent

discussion with Sanders regarding the policy was a criticism of

a condition of employment, not of public concern. Accordingly,

the Court finds that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's speech

does not relate to matters of public concern for the purposes of

Pickering and, therefore, is not protected speech under the

First Amendment. Plaintiff further contends that her filing of

the EEOC charge and this lawsuit are protected speech entitled

to First Amendment protection. The Court agrees, however, they

may not serve as the basis for Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim as they were not filed until after Sanders’

recommendation and Stubblefield’s decision that Plaintiff

receive the ranking of Instructor rather than Assistant

Professor. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation

claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Substantive Due Process

Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim. However, this is not

substantiated anywhere in Defendants’ Motion or supporting

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documents. In any event, Plaintiff responds that her

substantive due process rights were violated as the decision to

terminate her was “arbitrary and capricious”, “without a

rational basis” and “made in bad faith”. (Doc. 42, pp. 53-54).

However, Plaintiff’s tenured public employment, while a property

interest, is not so “fundamental” as to be protected by

substantive due process. See Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419

(8 Cir. 1999); Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d th

133 (3 Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED rd

as to Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, and that claim

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Procedural Due Process

Once it is determined that some process is required, it

remains to be determined if due process was afforded. Cleveland

Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Due process

generally requires that certain procedures be met; a plaintiff

must receive adequate notice and “‘the opportunity to be

heard’... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)(citation omitted). The

requirements of procedural due process are: (1) clear and actual

notice of the reasons for termination in sufficient detail to

enable him or her to present evidence relating to them; (2)

notice of both the names of those who have made allegations

against the teacher and the specific nature and factual basis

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for the charges; (3) a reasonable time and opportunity to

present testimony in his or her own defense; and (4) a hearing

before an impartial board or tribunal. See King v. Univ. of

Minn., 774 F.2d 224 (8 Cir. 1985). th

Plaintiff contends that she was not provided specific

information regarding what she allegedly plagiarized, that

Defendants changed the charges without notice, prevented her

from presenting certain evidence and allowed a biased

Stubblefield to make the decision to terminate her. (Doc. 42,

pp. 55-56). After a four-day hearing in which Plaintiff was

represented by counsel, the Ad Hoc Committee found that

Plaintiff committed plagiarism. Defendants also provided

Plaintiff with a letter advising her that she was charged with

falsifying a promotion application and plagiarism. (Doc. 32,

Ex. H-6). Defendants further provided Plaintiff with a copy of

the Employee Handbook and offered to make documents available at

her request. (Doc. 32, Ex. H-8). It appears that the

fundamental purposes of due process - notice and an opportunity

to respond- were served. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s procedural

due process claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Court determines Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims under

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Title VII and the EPA and retaliation claim under Title VII is

DENIED. Summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim and substantive/procedural due process claims

is GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. As

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are asserted against UAFS only,

Separate Defendants Joel Stubblefield and Sandi Sanders, in

their official and individual capacities are DISMISSED as

defendants in this case. Accordingly, the hearing set for

Thursday, July 27, 2006 at 3:00 p.m. is CANCELLED, and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Substitution of Parties (Doc. 49) is

DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 26 day of July, 2006. th

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

Honorable Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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