Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01937/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01937-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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28 1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RICHARD LYTEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

JANET SIMPSON, 

Defendant.

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AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

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Case No.: C 05-1937 (JF) PVT

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

EARLY LIMITED DISCOVERY

On July 12, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Early Limited Discovery.1 Having reviewed

the papers submitted by the parties, the court finds it appropriate to rule on the motion without oral

argument. Based on the briefs and arguments presented,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. The limited discovery

outlined in Plaintiff’s motion may commence.

Rule 26(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes an automatic stay on discovery

pending the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference. Rule 26(d) allows for earlier discovery either by

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 34 Filed 08/22/05 Page 1 of 2
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2 Since the express language of Rule 26(d) does not mention any“good cause” requirement

to obtain an order allowing early discovery as it does in other contexts (such as to obtain a protective

order under Rule 26(c)), the rules of statutory construction appear to require a finding that the drafters

did not intend to impose any good cause requirement for early discovery. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker,

533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (Where language is included in one section of a statute, but omitted from

another section, it is presumed that the drafters acted intentionally in authoring the disparate inclusion

or exclusion). Furthermore, Rule 26(d) anticipates that the parties will conduct their Rule 26(f)

conference, and thus discovery will commence, “as soon as practical.” See FED.R.CIV.PROC. 26, Adv.

Comm. Notes (1993 amendments to subdivision (d)). Where, as here, a reasonable amount of time for

the parties to initiate their Rule 26(f) conference has already elapsed, imposition of a “good cause”

requirement would run counter to the Advisory Committee’s notation that courts can “assure that

discovery is not unduly delayed.” Ibid. This language suggests that the burden should be on the party

opposing early discovery to show that further delay is warranted.

ORDER, page 2

agreement of the parties or order of the court. Rule 26(d) does not appear to require a showing of

“good cause” to obtain an order allowing early discovery.2 However, even assuming Rule 26(d)

requires “good cause,” Plaintiff has adequately made such a showing based on his medical condition

and the possibility that further deterioration of his health may impede his ability to actively

participate in the discovery process in the future. And Defendant’s recent filing of her Anti-SLAPP

motion creates an additional need to allow the limited discovery requested by Plaintiff.

Dated: 8/22/05

 /s/ Patricia V. Trumbull 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 34 Filed 08/22/05 Page 2 of 2