Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-07492/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-07492-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Recovery of IRS Tax

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 8/6/07*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOHN KESSLER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ESTATE OF RUTH FOUND HAKWINS, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. /

NO. C 06-07492 RS

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

In a complex probate court proceeding, the named beneficiaries to two competing wills

agreed to settle their disputes. The probate court approved the settlement agreement, which, among

other things, called for all of the attorney fees incurred by the various parties to be charged to the

estate as administrative expenses. The estate then applied to the Internal Revenue Service for a tax

refund based on the contention that the fees were deductible estate expenses. The IRS denied the

claim and this action followed. 

The IRS now moves for summary judgment, contending that as a matter of law the attorney

fees were not properly charged to the estate, and therefore were not deductible. Although the IRS

has shown that there was no apparent basis under California law to charge to the estate the fees

incurred by some of the parties, it has failed to make the requisite showing for summary judgment

that none of the fees were properly claimed as estate expenses. Accordingly, the motion will be

denied.

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1

 As is customary in cases involving numerous family members some of whom have the

same or similar surnames, the Court uses given names for clarity and convenience, intending no

disrespect.

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 II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not in substantial dispute:

Ruth Found Hawkins died on November 14, 2001. Her husband had predeceased her. 

Hawkins’ only surviving blood relative was Robert Ross, a first cousin. Robert1

 was named as the

executor and a one-third beneficiary under a will Hawkins executed in 1994. Other beneficiaries

under the 1994 will included Margaret Hawkins Dieffenbach and Herbert Hawkins, who were

children from a previous marriage of Hawkins’ deceased husband. The 1994 will also made

substantial bequests to Katherine Hawkins Humphreys and Christopher Hawkins, who were

grandchildren of Hawkins’s deceased husband through the prior marriage (hereinafter “the

grandchildren”).

In 2000, Hawkins executed another will that altered the distribution of her estate as follows:

one third to Margaret, one third to Herbert, one sixth to each of the two grandchildren, and $1,000 to

Robert. The 2000 will named Margaret as the executor of the estate. 

After Hawkins’ death, Margaret filed a petition to probate the 2000 will. Robert

subsequently challenged the 2000 will, and filed a separate petition to admit the 1994 will to

probate. In addition, Robert submitted a petition alleging that Margaret had engaged in financial

abuse of an elder and other claims. Herbert then filed a will contest maintaining that the 1994 will

was procured by undue influence and was invalid. The Santa Clara County Superior Court

consolidated these various matters. The Superior Court then held a bench trial on the claims

brought by Robert, pursuant to a bifurcation order postponing consideration of the other issues.

After approximately a two week trial, the Superior Court issued a tentative decision that

Hawkins lacked testamentary capacity from and after 1999, and that the 2000 will was therefore

invalid. In the tentative decision, the court noted it found no fault with Margaret’s decision to seek

probate of the 2000 will, as she had not been aware of Hawkins’ lack of testamentary capacity. The

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court further concluded that any undue influence by Margaret was subtle and non-egregious and did

not amount to financial abuse of an elder. The tentative decision also rejected Robert’s claims of 

intentional interference with an economic relationship.

Prior to the trial of the remaining issues, i.e. Robert’s petition to probate the 1994 will and

Herbert’s contest thereof, Robert, Margaret, Herbert, the grandchildren, and Hawkins’ conservator

reached a settlement agreement. The settlement was approved by the court in a stipulated order on

August 26, 2003. The settlement provided that John Kessler would be designated the administrator

of the estate, $19,000 would be distributed to various charities, Robert would receive 30% of the

residue, Margaret and Herbert would share 36.67% of the residue, and the grandchildren would

share the remaining 33.33%. The stipulated order recited that the administration of the estate had

been extremely complex, that substantial legal services had been performed on behalf of the estate,

which were for the benefit of, and were necessary to, the administration of the estate, that the

litigation expenses and attorney fees were properly payable out of the estate, and that, accordingly,

Kessler should file an amended federal tax return deducting the attorney fees and costs as an estate

administration expense. 

The stipulation specifically provided that each beneficiary’s share of the estate would be

reduced by the following deductions:

Robert’s Attorney Fees $726,023.00

Robert’s Litigation Costs $ 28,947.00

Margaret and Herbert’s Attorney Fees $120,000.00

Grandchildren’s Attorney Fees $ 28,102.00

 Total $903,072.00

 The stipulation also provided that once the administrator filed the amended federal estate tax

return, deducting the litigation costs and attorney fees as expenses of administration, the refund

would be distributed 83.6% to Robert, 13.3% to Margaret and Herbert, and 3.1% each to the two

grandchildren. 

 Pursuant to the stipulated order entered by the court, Kessler filed an amended federal estate

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tax return claiming a refund in the total amount of $529,103.00. On or about November 21, 2006,

the Service issued its notice of determination and Report of Estate Tax Examination Changes that

allowed $134,511.23 and disallowed $394,618.77 of the claim. The disallowed portion of the claim

for refund primarily related to the attorney fees charged to the estate. The IRS found that those fees

were not reasonable, not allowable by state law, and not necessarily incurred for the benefit of the

administration of the estate. 

III. STANDARDS

 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary

judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986).

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Id. at 323. If it meets this burden, the moving party is then entitled to judgment as a matter of

law when the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his

case with respect to which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23.

The non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party cannot defeat the moving party’s properly

supported motion for summary judgment simply by alleging some factual dispute between the

parties. To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party must bring forth

material facts, i.e., “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .

Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,

475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).

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The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, including

questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence. Masson v. New Yorker

Magazine, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2434-35 (1991) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). It is the court’s responsibility “to determine

whether the ‘specific facts’ set forth by the nonmoving party, coupled with undisputed background

or contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor

based on that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Service, 809 F.2d at 631. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if

the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, “[w]here the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there

is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

Here, Kessler contends there are substantial material issues, particularly if the reasonableness 

of the fees incurred by Robert is relevant. As noted above, however, there is no dispute as to the

facts summarized in the preceding section; thus the primary question presented by this motion is

whether, on those facts, the IRS “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

IV. DISCUSSION

Under Internal Revenue Code section 2053 (a), deductions are allowable for “administration

expenses” of an estate that are “are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . under which the

estate is being administered.” Applicable Treasury Regulations further provide that to be deductible,

administrative expenses must also be “reasonable in amount” and “appropriate or necessary to

settlement of an estate generally.” Rev. Rul. 74-509, 4-5. The regulations further explain that, “the

Federal law requirement is met where the court costs or attorney’s fees are incurred in serving

significant purposes in the collection, conservation, or effectuation of the just distribution of the

assets of the estate according to law.” Id.

Thus, analysis of the deductibility of claimed estate administrative expenses is a two-step

process. First, state law rules as to what types of expenses may be charged to the estate establish a

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2

 Kessler’s opposition characterizes the IRS as contending that fees are chargeable to the

estate only when incurred by “the appointed personal representative, as opposed to the executor[].” 

Opposition at 9:20-23. The IRS, however, does not draw a distinction between executors and

personal representatives. It appears that Kessler may have inadvertently referred to executors and

that he intended to state, “as opposed to beneficiaries.” Under California law an “executor” is one

type of “personal representative.” Cal Prob. Code § 58 (a).

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minimum threshold that must be satisfied. Then, in the event that Federal law imposes additional

requirements, those too must be satisfied. See Hibernia v. United States, 581 F.2d 741, 745 (9th Cir.

1978) (“[E]ven though an expenditure of estate funds is permitted by state law, it must in fact be an

‘administration expense’ as contemplated by section 2053(a)(2) to be deductible as such.”)

Here, the IRS contends that California state law does not allow attorney fees incurred by

beneficiaries in litigation such as took place here to be charged to the estate, notwithstanding the fact

that the probate court entered a stipulated order to that precise effect. Kessler’s response is two-fold. 

First, he points to treasury regulations providing that a state court decision sanctioning a charge

against an estate will “ordinarily be accepted as establishing the validity and amount of the claim.” 

Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1 (b)(2). As Kessler points out, that regulation applies even to consent orders

in appropriate circumstances. Id. Kessler, however, overlooks the caveat that “[t]he decree will not

be accepted if it is at variance with the law of the State.” Id. Thus, Kessler’s reliance on Regulation 

20.2053-1 (b)(2) begs the question. Deference to the probate court’s order might be appropriate as

to the “validity and amount of the claim” as a general matter, but it remains to be decided whether

that order was consistent with state law.

Kessler’s second argument is that California law in fact permits the fees at issue here to be

charged to the estate. The fees were incurred by, (1) Robert, the executor under the 1994 will; (2)

Margaret, the executor under the 2000 will that was tentatively declared invalid, and; (3) Herbert

and the grandchildren, who were only beneficiaries under both wills. The IRS argues that California

law permits attorney fees to be charged to an estate only when incurred by an executor or personal

representative, and even then only under certain circumstances.2

The IRS is correct that the California Probate Code expressly provides only for payment by the

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 Kessler’s assertion that the IRS offered “no law or evidence to support its position” is

inaccurate. The IRS cited the relevant Probate Code provisions.

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 In actuality, one aspect of Robert’s claims did seek to increase the estate–his claims of

elder abuse, if successful, would have resulted in a recovery for the estate. There is no evidence,

however, that any other beneficiaries incurred fees in support of that claim–indeed at least Margaret

presumably defended against it. Even as to Robert, the common fund doctrine cannot support his

right to fees expended in making that claim because it was not successful.

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estate of attorney fees incurred by a personal representative. See Cal. Prob. Code §§ 10810 et seq.3

Although the Code allows for the recovery of fees in excess of the statutory schedule when

“extraordinary services” have been provided, those fees also are only such fees as have been

incurred “by the attorney for the personal representative.” Cal. Prob. Code §§ 10811. The IRS

acknowledges that California cases have sometimes permitted beneficiaries to recover attorney fees

from the estate under the “common fund doctrine.” See In re Marre’s Estate, 18 Cal.2d 191, 192

(1941) (“[P]laintiffs who have succeeded in protecting, preserving or increasing a fund for the

benefit of themselves and others may be awarded compensation from the fund for the services of

their attorneys.”) The IRS, however, rejects the applicability of doctrine here because the litigation

did not involve preserving or increasing estate assets, and Kessler does not argue to the contrary.4

Thus, neither the statutory scheme nor common fund doctrine serves as a basis under

California law to permit the fees of Herbert and the grandchildren to be charged to the estate, as they

undisputedly were not personal representatives under either will. Kessler suggests those fees (and

those of Margaret and Robert) were nonetheless appropriately charged to the estate because the

entire litigation was “essential to the proper administration of the estate.” The condition that the fees

be essential to the estate administration is an additional requirement of Federal law that applies in

determining deductibility, it is not a substitute for the threshold requirement that the fees be

allowable as estate expenses under state law. See Rev. Rul. 74-509, 4-5. Thus, as persuasive a case

as Kessler may make that it was necessary to resolve issues such as which will governed before the

estate could be administered, those arguments would serve only to support deductibility of the fees if

they were properly allowable as administrative expenses of the estate under California law in the

first instance.

 For a similar reason, Kessler’s reliance on cases such as Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362 (2nd

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 The Dulles decision does not quote the language of the state statute. The substance of

former N.Y. Surrogate’s Court Act, § 278, however, now appears at N.Y. Surrogate’s Court

Procedure Act § 2302 (6). See In re Jacobsen’s Estate, 70 Misc.2d 355, 333 N.Y.S.2d 511

(N.Y.Sur. 1972) (noting recodification). That section expressly permits “any person” to recover fees

from the estate when incurred in “a proceeding to construe a will.”

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 The IRS points out that under the settlement agreement, each beneficiary’s share of the

estate was to be reduced by the amount of attorney fees he or she had incurred. In and of itself, this

would appear not necessarily to preclude deductibility See Swayne 43 T.C. at 199 (“expenses

prorated against the shares of all devisees and legatees . . .are as much administration expenses of

the estate as expenses deducted before distribution of an intestate estate.”) In one sense, however, it

means that the estate effectively did not pay the attorney fees of the various parties. Looking at it

that way arguably made the arrangement proper under California law, but then there would be no

basis to claim a deduction.

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Cir. 1959) and Estate of Swayne, 43 T.C. 190 (1964) is unavailing. In those cases, there was no

question that the underlying state statutes (non-California) expressly permitted recovery from the

estate of the kind of attorney fees in issue. See Swayne 43 T.C. at 197-198 (holding that the

executor under a will that ultimately was not admitted to probate was entitled to recover his fees

from the estate given Sec. 45-185 of the General Statutes of Connecticut that provided, in relevant

part, “[t]he court of probate . . . shall allow to the executor his just and reasonable expenses in

defending the will . . . whether or not the will is admitted to probate.”); Dulles, 273 F. 2d at 369

(holding beneficiaries entitled to recover fees from estate under N.Y. Surrogate’s Court Act, § 278.5

)

Putting aside for a moment the question of fees incurred by Robert and Margaret, all Kessler is

left with in support of his contention that the fees of Herbert and the grandchildren were allowable

as expenses of the estate under California law is the declaration of Michael Desmarais (counsel to

Robert in the underlying proceedings) that payment of beneficiaries’ fees by an estate is

“customary” and that it is “authorized by the laws of the State of California.” Desmarais Decl.¶ 6. 

Although attorney Desmarais likely is qualified to testify as to what is “customary” in local practice,

the question of what is “authorized” under state law presents a question for the Court, not an

evidentiary issue to be resolved by declarations. Accordingly, based on the present record and

briefing, the Court concludes that the fees incurred by Herbert and the grandchildren were not

properly charged to the estate as administrative expenses and that, therefore those expenses are not

deductible.6

The Court has weighed whether that conclusion warrants an order granting partial summary

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 The Court declines to decide at this juncture whether the fact that the probate court

tentatively rejected the 2000 will is dispositive. The California Probate Code may not be as

unambiguous as the Connecticut statutes that fees can be allowed to an executor when the will is not

ultimately admitted to probate, but the IRS has not clearly established that California law prohibits

the recovery of fees from the estate in such circumstances.

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judgment, as provided in subdivision (d) of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Although the IRS did not move for partial summary judgment in the alternative, the rules authorize

courts to issue orders that specify, “the facts that appear without substantial controversy.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56 (d). Here, however, the issue of whether Herbert and the grandchildren’s fees are

properly charged to the estate appears to turn more on conclusions of law than on factual issues. 

Given that, and given that the IRS did not identify the dollar amount of the claimed refund that

would be affected by a conclusion that Herbert and the grandchildren’s fees are not deductible, the

Court declines to issue partial summary judgment.

Whether Margaret’s fees were properly claimed as administrative expenses presents more

difficult questions. As the IRS acknowledges, Margaret was the named executor under the 2000

will. As such, she had a duty to offer it for probate unless, perhaps, she knew it to be invalid. The

probate court’s tentative conclusion was that Margaret did not offer the will in bad faith. Thus,

although neither party has cited California law clearly on point, there is at least some basis for

arguing that her fees were properly charged to the estate.7

 Robert’s fees present the strongest case for Kessler’s position. There is no dispute that he was

the executor under the 1994 will that was validated by the stipulated order that followed the

settlement. The IRS contends Robert was nonetheless not entitled to recover his fees from the estate

because, (1) only he stood to benefit by admission of the 1994 will to probate rather than the 2000

will, and (2) in the only part of the litigation that went to trial, he technically was contesting the

2000 will, not defending the 1994 will. As to the first point, there is some authority that where only

the executor stands to benefit from defending a will, the fees incurred in doing so cannot be charged

to the estate. See, e.g. In re Higgins Estate, 158 Cal. 355 (1910). The situation here, however,

appears to have been more complex. The estate could not have been administered absent a

determination as to which will governed. There were, apparently, reasons to believe there had been

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 As the IRS points out, for one period of time the California Probate Code set out a specific

list of “extraordinary services” for which compensation could be claimed, including the successful

defense of a will prior to its admission to probate. A similar provision now exists in Cal. Rules of

Court, Rule 7.703 (c) (f). Notably, Rule 7.703 expressly provides that the list it contains is “

nonexclusive.” Thus, it appears that California courts have at least some discretion to award fees

for extraordinary services falling outside the specific categories listed. Although that would not

apply to the fees incurred by Herbert and the grandchildren as they were not executors, it may

support the propriety of Robert’s fees being charged to the estate even if his situation does not

exactly “fit” any traditional category, and it may even have bearing on the propriety of the estate

bearing Margaret’s fees.

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undue influence, although the probate court ultimately noted that it had not been egregious in any

event. 

 In this regard, Sussman v. United States, 236 F.Supp. 507 (D.C.N.Y. 1962) is instructive, even

though it applied New York rather than California law. “If the test is benefit to the estate, the test

ought not to be incapable of embracing the idea that achieving a correct result is beneficial to the

estate.” Id. at 509. Robert had a duty as executor under the 1994 will to offer it for probate and to

defend it, absent reason to believe that it had been superceded by a valid will or otherwise revoked. 

In doing so, he was giving effect to Hawkins’ last expression of her intent made with testamentary

capacity, according to the probate court’s tentative decision. Under these circumstances, the IRS has

failed to show that the mere fact that Robert stood to benefit under the 1994 will precluded him from

charging his fees to the estate.

The IRS’s second point elevates form over substance. It may be true that the only portion of

the underlying litigation that went to trial was technically a contest of the 2000 will, but that appears

to be more a matter of procedural happenstance than otherwise. There is little doubt that the

substance of the dispute from the outset through the trial and the settlement was the same: which

will would be probated? The challenge to the validity of the 2000 will was part and parcel of the

effort to defend the 1994 will. As such, the IRS has not established the impropriety of charging

those fees to the estate.8

Finally, the IRS also argues that Robert’s fees were unreasonable in amount and that the

parties and the probate court failed to comply strictly with the statutory provisions governing the

approval of fees based on a contingency agreement. The reasonableness of the fees claimed by

Robert presents a factual issue not subject to determination in a motion for summary judgment. The

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C 06-07492 RS

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apparent failure to comply with the letter of the procedural requirements applicable to contingencybased fees does not, on this record, warrant a finding that the fees were therefore not allowable

under California law as estate administrative expenses.

V. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment is denied. The parties shall

appear for a Case Management Conference at 2:30 p.m. on September 26, 2007.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2007 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C 06-07492 RS

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Heather Halvorson Munoz heather.munoz@berliner.com, llm@berliner.com

Jerold Alan Reiton jerold.reiton@berliner.com, tammy.garcia@berliner.com

Frank R. Ubhaus fru@berliner.com, cep@berliner.com, pstallings@berliner.com

Jay R. Weill jay.weill@usdoj.gov

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 8/6/07 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

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