Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02090/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02090-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. TURNER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

CASE No. 13cv2090 BEN (JLB)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION: DENYING

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 33]

vs.

GEORGE BAILEY DETENTION, et

al.

Defendants.

Plaintiff David Turner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brought this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 8.) On July 2, 2014, Plaintiff moved for

summary judgment. (ECF No. 33.) Defendants Captain John Madsen (“Madsen”) and

Sergeant Jill Farris (“Farris”) filed a Response in Opposition on December 1, 2014. 

(ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff filed a Reply on January 2, 2015. (ECF No. 40.) The Court

has considered the parties’ submissions and the supporting documentation, and for the

reasons set forth below hereby RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be DENIED without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background 

Plaintifffiled his Complaint on September 6, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) TheComplaint

was dismissed without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fees and for failure to

move to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff’s subsequent Motion to

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Proceed in Forma Pauperis was granted (ECF No. 5), and Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint was dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an

amended complaint. The Second Amended Complaint(“SAC”) was filed on December

12, 2013. (ECF No. 17.) 

TheCourt dismissed sua sponte several claims and defendants for failure to state

a claim and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 9.) On

February 24, 2014, the remaining Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the SAC. 

(ECF No. 16.) On April 10, 2014, the Court denied without prejudice Defendants’

Motion. (ECF No. 20.) The Court’s Order informed Defendants that, based on new

9th Circuit precedent, a motion for summary judgment wasthe proper vehicle in which

to raise the failure to exhaust argument. (Id.) Defendants were instructed to file a

motion for summary judgment on or before April 25, 2014, should they wish to proceed

with the exhaustion argument. (Id.) No such motion was filed. The remaining two

Defendants - Madsen and Farris - filed their Answer to the SAC on April 24, 2014. 

(ECF No. 25.) On July 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary

Judgment. (ECF No. 33.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

In his two remaining claims, Plaintiff assertsthat Defendants Madsen and Farris

violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights when they acted with deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. (ECF No. 8.) 

In his first claim, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Madsen “denied, delayed, and

intentionally interfered with the weekly clothing exchange.” (Id. at 4.) As a result,

Plaintiff received unsanitized clothing on July 19, 2013, causing Plaintiff to develop

breathing problems, facial swelling, and skin irritation. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that

Defendant Madsen’s deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs amounted to

cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) 

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In his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants Madsen and Farris

intentionally denied and interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to obtain emergencymedical

care. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims that on the morning of September 1, 2013, Plaintiff

“could not eat at all because of great pain to his head and chills that made it hard to

breath[e], and [Plaintiff] could not sleep.” (Id.) Plaintiff made verbal grievances to

prison officials under the command of Defendants Madsen and Farris. (Id.) Each

verbal grievance was denied. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he made a grievance to the

nurse at pill call in the morning, but that his grievance was interfered with by the

deputy on duty at the time. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that he wasin need ofserious medical

care and that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that need. (Id.) Plaintiff

continued to seek medical care all day and even spoke with Defendant Farris, who

continued to deny Plaintiff’s request for emergency medical care. (Id.) “After great

delay and great injury to [Plaintiff’s] health . . . [Plaintiff] was taken to medical . . . and

[eventually] to the emergency room . . . for treatment.” (Id.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate on “all or any part” of a claim if there is an

absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, the fact

could affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986); see also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A

dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. One of

the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or

defenses. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U .S. at 323. “The burden then shifts

to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue

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for trial.” Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

“When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof

at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict

if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the

initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue

material to its case.” C.A.R. Transportation Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Darden

Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoted by Miller, 454 F.3d at

987).

“In contrast, when the non-moving party bears the burden of proving the claim

or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by pointing out the absence of

evidence from the non-moving party. The moving party need not disprove the other

party’s case.” Miller, 454 F.3d at 987 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). “Thus,

‘[s]ummary judgment for a defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case, and

on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Miller, 454 F.3d at 987 (quoting

Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999) (internal

quotations omitted)).

A genuine issue at trial cannot be based on disputes over “irrelevant or

unnecessary facts . . . .” See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence in support ofthe nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient.” Triton Energy

Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 252). To successfully rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

nonmoving party “must point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine

issue of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the [nonmoving

party’s] favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the [nonmoving party].” 

Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249). 

More than a “metaphysical doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material

fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

While the district court is not required to search the entire record for an issue

of fact, the court may nevertheless exercise its discretion to consider materials in the

record that are not specifically identified. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,

237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). 

III. DISCUSSION

In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff assertsthat “all of[his] pleadings

are true and cannot be disproved by any named defendant” and that he is entitled to the

relief sought. (ECF No. 33 at 2.) 

In their opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendants argue that “the burden of

offering evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment has not shifted to

them because [Plaintiff] fails to support the motion with any evidence.” (ECF No. 37

at 3.) Additionally, Defendants contend that their declarations and supporting

documentation raise triable issues of material fact, such that the Motion should be

denied. (Id.) 

The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause “is specifically

concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions” and

is only applicable to prisoners. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). A prison

official’s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmates’

health violates the Eighth Amendment because it constitutes the “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see also

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-106 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

1059 (9th Cir.1992) (overruled on other grounds). “[A] prison official cannot be found

liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of

confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the

inmate’s health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Even if a prison official

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“should have been aware of the risk, but was not, the [official] has not violated the

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” See Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). Accidents, inadvertent failures to provide

medical care, malpractice, and even gross negligence will not suffice to demonstrate

deliberate indifference. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Wood

v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, a mere delay in

medical treatment, absent a showing of resulting substantial harm, is insufficient to

support an Eighth Amendment violation. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).

A. Claim One for Deliberate Indifference - Defendant Madsen 

Plaintiff contends Defendant Madsen acted with deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs when Defendant Madsen furnished Plaintiff with unsanitary

clothing. (ECF No. 8 at 4.) 

Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to support his claim. While Plaintiff 1

purportsto attach an affidavit as Exhibit One to his Motion for Summary Judgment, no

such document is attached. Instead, Exhibit One to Plaintiff’s Motion is a letter from

the County of San Diego providing Notice of Rejection of Claim. (See ECF No. 33 at

1, 4.) Additionally, Plaintiff’s Reply states “the defendants [were] employed at all 

relevant times and acted within the scope of their employment at all relevant times

. . . .” (ECF No. 40 at 1.) “The records in this case show[] that [Plaintiff] was shown

disrespect and deliberate indifference by the defendant[] . . . .” (Id. at 2.) However,

Plaintiff fails to attach any supporting records, documents, or evidence of any kind.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met his burden of setting forth evidence that

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Instead, Plaintiff relies

solely on the allegations in his unverified Second Amended Complaint. 

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is not a verified pleading. (ECF 1

No. 8.) “A pleading counts as ‘verified’ if the drafter states under penalty of perjury that the contents

are true and correct.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Schroeder v.

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

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Although the burden has not shifted to them, Defendants have produced

supporting documentation that raise genuine issues of material fact. Defendant

Madsen’s verified declaration states that his “duties as facility commander do not

include the distribution of clothing to inmates or supervision of deputies distributing

clothing . . . .” (ECF No. 37-3 at 1.) Furthermore, Defendant Madsen’s declaration

indicatesthat he was on vacation from July 15, 2013 through July 19, 2013 and did not

have any contact with Plaintiff on any of those days. (Id. at 1-2, 4.) This evidence

raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant Madsen knew of the alleged

conduct, let alone personally participated, and thus whether he can be liable under

Section 1983 individually or in his supervisory capacity. 

Additionally,Defendants have furnished a document titled “Sheriff’s Department

Area Activities Summary Laundry Exchange.” (ECF No. 37-1 at 4.) Defendants

contend that this record shows that Plaintiff “had his old clothing . . . exchanged on

July 18, 2013 for laundered clothing and linen . . . .” (ECF No. 37 at 6.) Defendants

argue that this evidence raises a triable issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff

actually received unsanitary clothing and linens. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff’s medical

records also raise an issue of material fact as to whether the medical conditions

Plaintiff complained of were in fact caused by the allegedly unsanitary clothing

exchange. (ECF No. 37-1 at 6-10.) The records indicate that Plaintiff was treated for

an allergic reaction to something he had eaten. (Id. at 10.) 

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Furthermore, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Defendants, the Court finds that Defendants have provided

the evidentiary support necessary–beyond mere denial–that is required to defeat a

motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED as to Claim One.

//

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B. Claim Two for Deliberate Indifference - Defendants Madsen and Farris

In his second claim, Plaintiff argues that Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF

No. 8 at 5.) Plaintiff claims that prison officials under the command of Defendants

Madsen and Farris denied him medical care and that Defendant Farris personally

denied and intentionally interfered with his ability to receive medical assistance. (Id.)

1. Defendant Farris 

Plaintiff has again failed to provide documentation or evidence of any kind to

support his claims. Instead, Plaintiffrelies solely upon the allegations of his unverified

pleading.

Although the burden has not shifted to them, Defendants have produced

supporting documentation that raise genuine issues of material fact. In arguing that

Plaintiff’s claim fails, Defendants provide evidence demonstrating that Defendant

Farris was not present at the time of the alleged conduct and was not aware of

Plaintiff’s medical needs. (ECF No. 37 at 5.) Defendant Farris has provided a verified

declaration stating thatshe “was not working or on duty in the George BaileyDetention

Facility either on August 31, 2013 or September 1, 2013” and thatshe did not have any

personal contact with Plaintiff on either of those days. (ECF No. 37-2 at 1.) Attached

as exhibits to the declaration are deployment rosters for the two dates in question. (Id.

at 4-8.) Defendant Farris is not listed on either roster. (Id.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving the

absence of disputed material facts. Furthermore, Defendants have made a sufficient

showing that genuine issues of material fact remain. Accordingly, the Court

RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED asto Claim

Two against Defendant Farris.

//

//

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2. Defendant Madsen

Plaintiff does not claim that Defendant Madsen personally denied him medical

care. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical care by “each prison official

that was under the command of [Defendant] Madson (sic) . . . .” (ECF No. 8 at 5.) 

Supervisory officials “may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct

of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Rather, a plaintiff must establish that each individual

“Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.” Id. In other words, supervisory officials “cannot be held

liable unless they themselves . . .” violated a constitutional right. Id. at 683. Thus,

supervisory liability can only be imposed if (1) the supervisor was personally involved

in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between

the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black,

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). “The requisite causal connection can be established 

. . . by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refus[ing] to

terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should

have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652

F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 

To support his allegations of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must produce some

evidence demonstrating a causal connection between Defendant Madsen’s conduct as

a supervisor and Plaintiff’s injury. Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. Plaintiff has provided

no such evidence and thus has not met his burden as the moving party. Accordingly,

the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED

as to Claim Two against Defendant Madsen. 

IV. CONCLUSION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing

analysis, this Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

DENIED without prejudice. 

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This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(d). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than February 19, 2015, any party

may file and serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. 

The documents should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and

served no later than March 2, 2015. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specific time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 2, 2015

JILL L. BURKHARDT

United States Magistrate Judge

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