Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01092/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

THEOS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

NYTONE MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-01092-VKD

ORDER FOR REASSIGNMENT TO A 

DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 18

Plaintiff Theos Medical Systems, Inc. (“Theos”) moves for default judgment against 

defendant Nytone Medical Products, Inc. (“Nytone”) on Theos’ claims for false advertising and 

unfair competition. Dkt. No. 18. In the alternative, Theos asks the Court to transfer the action to 

the District of Utah. Dkt. No. 22.

Theos has consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 73. However, Nytone has not appeared and is in default. Dkt. No. 12. Because not all 

parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction, this case must be reassigned. Accordingly, 

this Court directs the Clerk of the Court to reassign this action to a district judge, with the 

following report and recommendation that Theos’s motion for default judgment be denied for lack 

of personal jurisdiction,

1

but that Theos’s alternate request for transfer to the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Utah be granted.

1 The Court does not reach Theos’s arguments regarding venue.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. BACKGROUND

This is an action for alleged false advertising and unfair competition. Plaintiff Theos says 

it is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Santa Clara, California. Dkt. 

No. 1. Theos alleges that defendant Nytone is a Utah corporation with its principal place of 

business in Provo, Utah. Id. According to the complaint, Theos and Nytone are competitors in the 

market for bedwetting alarms. Theos describes this as “a niche market with a limited number of 

competitors.” Dkt. No. 18-1 ¶ 3. Additionally, Theos claims that bedwetting alarms, as a rule, are 

sold, not in brick-and-mortar stores, but on the internet through Amazon, eBay, and 

manufacturers’ own websites. Id. ¶ 4.

Theos alleges that Nytone made a number of false statements in advertising Nytone’s 

alarm products, including that Nytone’s devices are “FDA Approved” and “Top Doctor Rated,” 

and that Nytone has “500,000+ success stories.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 8-9. Additionally, Theos claims 

that, at times, Nytone has used as an Amazon search term the word “Chummie,” a Theos brand 

name for which Theos owns a registered trademark. Id. ¶ 10;2see also Dkt. No. 18-1 ¶ 14; Dkt. 

No. 22-1 ¶ 9. Theos claims that when Nytone launched its alleged false advertising campaign in 

September 2016, Theos suffered a significant decline in sales. Dkt. No. 18-1 ¶ 9. According to 

Theos’s moving papers, “Nytone shut its website down in approximately December 2018,” 

approximately two months before the present lawsuit was filed. Id. ¶ 12. Nonetheless, Theos 

claims that during the relevant period, it lost over $3 million. Id. ¶ 19. Asserting that the 

bedwetting alarm market is “steady” and “relatively constant,” Theos maintains that the only 

explanation for its losses is Nytone’s alleged false advertising. Id. ¶¶ 3, 9.

Theos filed the present lawsuit on February 27, 2019, asserting claims under the Lanham 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), as well as California Business and Professions Code § 17200 and 

§ 17500. Dkt. No. 1. Theos seeks injunctive relief, no less than $1 million in monetary damages 

(plus trebled and punitive damages), attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.

2 The complaint contains two paragraphs numbered “10.” The Court refers here to the first 

paragraph 10.

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Although the record indicates that Nytone was served with process (Dkt. No. 7), Nytone 

failed to respond to the complaint or otherwise appear in this matter. At Theos’s request, the 

Clerk of the Court entered Nytone’s default on June 4, 2019. Dkt. No. 12.

Theos now moves for default judgment. Dkt. No. 18. Because Theos did not 

meaningfully address personal jurisdiction or venue in its motion or in its complaint, the Court 

issued an interim order directing Theos to submit supplemental briefing clarifying the basis for the

Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Nytone and relatedly, the propriety of venue in this 

district. Dkt. No. 20. In its supplemental briefing, Theos contends that Nytone’s activities, which 

occurred primarily over the internet, as well as its purported volume of business in California,

provide sufficient bases for venue and the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 22. 

Theos argues in the alternative that, instead of dismissing this matter, the Court should transfer 

this action to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Id.

Nytone has not opposed or otherwise responded to Theos’s motion for default judgment,3

and briefing is closed. Civ. L.R. 7-3(a). This Court held a hearing on the matter on December 10, 

2019. Theos appeared; Nytone did not.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Default may be entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend an action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After entry of default, a court may, in its discretion, enter default judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2);

4 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In deciding 

3 Although there is no indication that Theos served its moving or supplemental papers on Nytone, 

a party in default is not entitled to notice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 unless it has appeared, formally 

or informally, and demonstrated a clear intent to defend the suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (“If the 

party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, 

that party or its representative must be served with written notice of the application at least 7 days 

before the hearing.”); In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir.1993) (“While it is true 

that the failure to provide 55(b)(2) notice, if the notice is required, is a serious procedural 

irregularity that usually justifies setting aside a default judgment or reversing for the failure to do 

so, notice is only required where the party has made an appearance.”) (quotations and citations 

omitted); Wilson v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 564 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir.1977) (“No party in default 

is entitled to 55(b)(2) notice unless he has ‘appeared’ in the action.”). As discussed above, the 

record reflects that Nytone has not appeared, formally or otherwise, in this matter.

4

“A default judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person only if represented 

by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55(b)(2). There are no such issues presented here.

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whether to enter default judgment, a court may consider the following factors: (1) the possibility 

of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of 

the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong 

policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. 

McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). In considering these factors, all factual 

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true, except those relating to damages. 

TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may hold a 

hearing to conduct an accounting, determine the amount of damages, establish the truth of any 

allegation by evidence, or investigate any other matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Service of Process

“When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise 

defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject 

matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, federal question 

jurisdiction is based on Theos’s Lanham Act claim for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has 

supplemental jurisdiction over Theos’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Additionally, “[a] federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the 

defendant has been served properly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.” Rain Design, Inc. v. Spinido, Inc., 

No. 17-cv-03681-JSC, 2018 WL 7269019, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018) (quoting Direct Mail 

Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988)). Pursuant 

to Rule 4(h)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a domestic corporation may be served:

by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an 

officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by 

appointment or by law to receive service of process and—if the agent 

is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires—by also 

mailing a copy of each to the defendant.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Alternatively, Rule 4 provides that service on a corporation may be 

made by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general 

jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed. R. Civ. 

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P. 4(e)(1), (h)(1)(A).

California Code of Civil Procedure section 416.10 provides that a corporation may be 

served by “delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint . . . [t]o the person designated as 

agent for service of process” or “[t]o the president, chief executive officer, or other head of a 

corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a 

controller or chief financial officer, a general manager or person authorized by the corporation to 

receive service of process.” Cal. C.C.P. § 416.10(a), (b).

Theos filed a proof of service indicating that the process server personally served Cali 

Smith, identified as a person “designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of 

[Nytone].” Dkt. No. 7 at 3. The Court finds that Nytone properly was served with process.

B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction5

Theos acknowledges that it does not have enough facts to establish general jurisdiction. 

Dkt. No. 22 at 4. The only question is whether the Court may exercise specific personal 

jurisdiction over Nytone.

Because no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction in this matter, California law 

applies. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). 

“California’s long-arm statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, is coextensive with federal due 

process requirements, so the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the 

same.” Id. “For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consistent 

with due process, that defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the relevant forum 

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

“The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident 

5 As noted above, Theos acknowledges that Nytone shut down its website about two months 

before the present lawsuit was filed (Dkt. No. 18-1 ¶ 12). Theos nevertheless contends that the 

focus of the Court’s jurisdictional inquiry should be on Nytone’s contacts with California at the 

time Theos’s claims arose, and not at the time the present lawsuit was filed. Theos does cite some

support for that proposition. See Delphix Corp. v. Embarcadero Techs., Inc., 749 Fed. App’x 502 

(9th Cir. 2018). Even assuming that Theos is correct with respect to the time when Nytone’s 

contacts should be measured, for the reasons discussed above, this Court finds that Theos has not 

established specific jurisdiction over Nytone.

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defendant ‘focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,’” 

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283-84 (2014) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 

U.S. 770, 775 (1984)), and “the relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ 

creates with the forum State,” id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 

(1985)); see also Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(same). Personal jurisdiction cannot be established based on conduct of the plaintiff or of third 

parties within the forum state. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284. Nor can the plaintiff be the only link 

between the defendant and the forum. Id. at 285. “These principles apply to cases involving 

intentional torts.” Axiom Foods, Inc., 874 F.3d at 1068 (citing Walden, 571 U.S. at 286)).

Courts in the Ninth Circuit analyze specific jurisdiction under a three-prong test:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities 

or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; 

or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which 

arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum related activities; and 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears 

the burden of satisfying the first two prongs. Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 F.3d at 1228. If the plaintiff

does so, then the burden shifts to the defendant “to set forth a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise 

of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-78). 

Where jurisdictional issues are decided “on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, 

the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand 

[dismissal].” Id. at 1223. Although courts may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading 

which are contradicted by affidavit, factual disputes are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

1. Purposeful Direction

“The first prong of the specific jurisdiction test refers to both purposeful direction and 

purposeful availment.” Id. at 1228. For cases involving tortious conduct outside the forum, courts 

employ a purposeful direction analysis, applying an “effects” test. Id.; see also Freestream 

Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Group, 905 F.3d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 2018) (clarifying that the 

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“effects” test “makes more sense when dealing with out-of-forum tortfeasors.”). The “effects” test 

is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) and “requires 

that the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the 

forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” 

Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 F.3d at 1228 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

a. Intentional Act

“An intentional act refers to ‘an intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world, 

rather than an intent to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.’” DFSB Kollective Co. Ltd. 

v. Bourne, 897 F. Supp. 2d 871, 880 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806). 

Theos claims that Nytone deliberately used Theos’s trademarked name “Chummie” as a key 

search term to direct Amazon users to Nytone’s products, and also made false statements in 

advertising Nytone’s products. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 1, 18-1, 22-1. These alleged acts satisfy the 

intentional act requirement.

b. Express Aiming

This factor considers whether Nytone expressly aimed its conduct at California, the forum 

state. The Ninth Circuit has construed Calder “to require ‘something more’ than mere 

foreseeability” of harm in the forum to justify personal jurisdiction over Nytone in California. 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805. “The ‘express aiming’ analysis depends, to a significant 

degree, on the specific type of tort or other wrongful conduct at issue.” Id. at 806.

When conduct occurs through a website, the “maintenance of a passive website alone 

cannot satisfy the express aiming prong.” Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 F.3d at 1229 (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). However, “operating even a passive website in conjunction with 

‘something more’—conduct directly targeting the forum—is sufficient.” Id. (internal quotations 

and citation omitted). “In determining whether a nonresident defendant has done ‘something 

more,’ [courts] have considered several factors, including the interactivity of the defendant’s 

website, the geographic scope of the defendant’s commercial ambitions, and whether the 

defendant individually targeted a plaintiff known to be a forum resident.” Id. (internal quotations 

and citations omitted).

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The Ninth Circuit previously has held that “individualized targeting” satisfies the express 

aiming requirement. Axiom Foods, Inc., 874 F.3d at 1069. “A theory of individualized targeting 

alleges that a defendant engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant 

knows to be a resident of the forum state.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

However, in Walden, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that “Calder made clear that mere 

injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. Regardless of where a 

plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the

defendant has formed a contact with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 290. Thus, “[t]he 

proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the 

defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id. The Supreme Court 

expressly noted that Walden “d[id] not present the very different questions whether and how a 

defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘contacts’ with a particular State.” Id. at 

290 n.9.

In Axiom Foods, the Ninth Circuit applied Walden to a case concerning the email 

distribution of a newsletter, and held that “while a theory of individualized targeting may remain 

relevant to the minimum contacts inquiry, it will not, on its own, support the exercise of specific 

jurisdiction, absent compliance with what Walden requires.” 874 F.3d at 1070. At issue in Axiom 

Foods was whether defendants’ email distribution, including to some recipients in the forum state 

of California, was, by itself, sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. The defendant that emailed 

the newsletter did not conduct any business in the United States, and the emails in question were 

sent to 343 recipients, 55 of whom had companies in California, and ten of whom were physically 

located in California. Id. at 1070. Noting a lack of evidence concerning the residence of the 55 

email recipients with California companies, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the act of sending a 

single newsletter to those 55 recipients was “too attenuated” and “isolated” to establish 

jurisdiction. Id. As for the ten recipients who actually were located in California, the Ninth 

Circuit noted, “It can hardly be said that California was the focal point both of the newsletter and 

of the harm suffered.” Id. at 1071 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

At least one court in this district has observed that while “Axiom Foods did not explicitly 

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answer how Walden applies to cases where all of the alleged activity occurs online,” the “decision 

does suggest that minimal online activity, when unaccompanied by any connections to the forum 

state in the physical world, are not enough to confer personal jurisdiction.” Republic of 

Kazakhstan v. Ketebaev, No. 17-cv-00246-LHK, 2017 WL 6539897, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 

2017).

It is against this legal backdrop that this Court now considers whether Theos satisfies the 

express aiming requirement. As alleged in its complaint, Theos contends that Nytone advertises 

its products over the internet and that Nytone’s alleged false “advertising is disseminated to the 

world, including the State of California and the County of Santa Clara.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 6. The 

complaint further alleges that Nytone advertised on internet sites and search engines such as

Amazon.com, Bing, Google, YouTube and Facebook. See id. ¶¶ 8.f-8.h. In its supplemental 

briefing, Theos does not appear to rely on these allegations to establish personal jurisdiction. And, 

indeed, even assuming these allegations are true, they are, without more, insufficient to establish 

that Nytone expressly aimed its conduct at California. See, e.g., Matus v. Premium 

Nutraceuticals, LLC, 715 Fed. Appx. 662, 663 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that defendant’s 

alleged false advertising “on its public, commercial website, for all the world to see, visit, and 

consider,” without more, was insufficient to satisfy the express aiming element); DFSB Kollective 

Co. Ltd. v. Bourne, 897 F. Supp.2d 871, 883-84 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that the express aiming 

requirement was not met by defendant’s use of California-headquartered internet companies, such 

as Facebook, to direct traffic to his websites).

In its supplemental briefing, Theos instead argues that the express aiming element is 

satisfied by Nytone’s alleged interactive website and use of “Chummie,” as well as Nytone’s 

purported share of the California bedwetting alarm market. As noted above, Theos claims that 

Nytone used Theos’s trademarked brand name “Chummie” as a key word term to divert Amazon 

customers to Nytone’s products. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 10;

6 Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 9. In Theos’s briefing on the 

present motion for default judgment, Mr. Saket Bhatia, Theos’s Chief Executive Officer, states 

6 The complaint contains two paragraphs numbered “10.” This Court refers here to the first 

paragraph 10.

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that based on his experience and research, the total market for bedwetting alarms is $20 million 

per year, and that California represents approximately 25% of both the total market and Theos’s 

sales. Dkt. No. 22-1 ¶ 4.7 Mr. Bhatia further avers that the bedwetting alarm market is 

“homogenous and steady,” and that it therefore is likely that 25% of Nytone’s sales are made to

California customers. Id.

At oral argument, Theos acknowledged that its assertions that Nytone expressly targeted 

California and that 25% of Nytone’s sales were made to California residents are based on 

inference. Indeed, Theos’s sole evidence of an actual California sale by Nytone is a purchase that 

Mr. Bhatia says he himself made as part of his investigation of Nytone’s activities. Id. ¶ 7. 

However, courts within this district have held that a plaintiff cannot manufacture personal 

jurisdiction in a case by making such purchases in the forum state. See Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Link US, 

LLC, No. 18-cv-07576-CRB, 2019 WL 6682838, at * (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2019) (“This rule makes 

sense, since the personal jurisdiction analysis focuses on the defendant’s, not the plaintiff’s, 

contacts with the forum.”); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Nwubah, No. 18-cv-06063-LHK, 2019 WL 

6611096, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (stating that such “‘evidentiary buys’ . . . are simply the 

kind of ‘random, fortuitous, [] attenuated contacts that depend on Plaintiff’s contacts with the 

forum, not the contacts of Defendant.”); Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., No. 19-cv-00679-HSG, 

2019 WL 5963149 at *4 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019) (stating that where the plaintiff presented 

insufficient evidence of express aiming, the “[p]laintiff’s hiring of investigators to purchase and 

receive the products in California does not change the outcome.”); Clarus Transphase Scientific, 

Inc. v. Q-Ray, Inc., No. C06-3450 JF (RS), 2006 WL 2374738, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 

2006) (“A plaintiff cannot manufacture personal jurisdiction in a trademark case by purchasing the 

accused product in the forum state.”).

Nonetheless, relying primarily on Mavrix, Theos argues that express aiming is established 

by Nytone’s operation of an interactive, commercial website, its use of Theos’s brand name 

7 Although this Court has sealed certain financial information Theos submitted in support of its 

motion, all of the matters contained in this report and recommendation were discussed in Theos’s 

publicly filed briefs and in open court.

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“Chummie,” and by the fact that Nylon purportedly enjoyed a significant share of the California 

bedwetting alarm market. In Mavrix, a Florida-based celebrity photo agency brought a copyright 

infringement suit in California against an Ohio corporation, alleging that the defendant posted 

plaintiff’s copyrighted photos, without permission, on the defendant’s commercial, interactive 

website. Concluding that the express aiming requirement for personal jurisdiction was satisfied, 

the Ninth Circuit noted that while the defendant cultivated a nationwide audience for commercial 

gain, it specifically exploited the California market, as evidenced by its “operat[ion] [of] a very 

popular website with a specific focus on the California-centered celebrity and entertainment 

industries.” 647 F.3d at 1230. “Based on the website’s subject matter, as well as the size and 

commercial value of the California market,” the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant 

“anticipated, desired, and achieved a substantial California viewer base” that was “an integral 

component of [defendant]’s business model and its profitability.” Id.

While there are some similarities between Mavrix and the present action, Mavrix is 

materially distinguishable. Accepting Theos’s allegations as true, both cases concern the 

purported infringement of intellectual property through interactive, commercial websites that are 

generally accessible, including in California where the defendants enjoyed considerable success. 

In Mavrix, the Ninth Circuit found “most salient” the fact that the defendant used the plaintiff’s 

copyrighted photos “as part of its exploitation of the California market for its own commercial 

gain.” 647 F.3d at 1229. In the present action, by contrast, there is nothing in the record 

suggesting that Nytone’s website directly targeted the California market, or even referenced 

California. And at oral argument, Theos acknowledged that it does not have any evidence of 

direct marketing in California. Moreover, while the nature of the California-centered celebrity and 

entertainment industry was a significant factor in Mavrix, in the present action there is no 

indication that the sale of bedwetting alarms is a unique California industry or that California is a 

unique market for such alarms. See Sanho Corp. v. Cimo Techs., Inc., No. C11-2473 PJH, 2012 

WL 3075094, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2012) (concluding that the express aiming requirement 

was not met where plaintiff failed to show that the defendant’s website specifically targeted the 

California market or that the sale of iPad covers is an industry unique to California).

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Emphasizing that “Chummie” is a Theos brand name, Theos argues that Nytone must have 

been aware of Theos and that Theos is based in California. At oral argument, Theos argued that it 

would have been obvious to anyone visiting Theos’s website that Theos is a California company. 

Further, counsel asserted that bedwetting alarms are registered with the Federal Drug 

Administration (“FDA”) and that Nytone likely would have researched FDA records, in addition 

to Theos’s website, to learn about Theos and its products. Theos, however, presents no evidence 

to support its assertions that Nytone actually did any of these things. Nor does it cite any authority 

that the Court properly may assume counsel’s bare assertions to be true.

Moreover, “infringement of a plaintiff’s intellectual property rights with knowledge that 

plaintiff’s operations are based in the forum and that the harm will be felt there, is insufficient to 

establish personal jurisdiction without a further showing that the defendant otherwise expressly 

aimed its activities at the forum.” One True Vine, LLC v. Liquid Brands, LLC, No. C10-04102 

SBA, 2011 WL 2148933, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011). Courts have reached similar 

conclusions in cases involving online conduct. See, e.g., Rain Design, Inc., 2018 WL 7269019 at 

*5 (finding that, although the defendants allegedly sold infringing products online “in a large-scale 

attempt to copy nearly every aspect of [plaintiff]’s . . . product and associated business,” plaintiff 

failed to provide any facts demonstrating a connection between defendants and California, such as 

advertisements specifically targeting California residents or records showing that California 

residents purchased infringing products); Ebates, Inc. v. Cashbag.co.za, No. 18-cv-02884-EDL, 

2018 WL 6816113 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) (concluding that the express aiming requirement was 

not met, despite evidence that defendants operated an interactive website bearing an allegedly 

infringing logo, where there was no evidence that California residents were targeted; plaintiff 

merely alleged on “information and belief” that Californians made purchases using defendants’ 

services; and the complaint contained a sole allegation about one California individual who 

accessed defendants’ website to establish an account, make a purchase and receive cash back 

awards); DFSB Kollective Co. Ltd., 897 F. Supp. 2d at 880-84 (concluding in a copyright 

infringement action that although there was evidence that the defendant’s websites were very 

popular with a segment of California’s population, there was no indication that the defendant was 

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aware of a California user base or that he made any attempt to exploit it).

For the first time at oral argument, Theos cited Amazon.com, Inc. v. Huang Tengwei, No. 

C18-1399 RSM, 2019 WL 4414957 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2019) in which the district court 

concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Theos emphasizes that the case 

caption in Huang Tengwei indicates that the plaintiff, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”), is a 

Delaware corporation, and Theos correctly notes that there is no indication in the decision itself 

that Amazon presented any evidence that the defendant knew that Amazon is based in the State of

Washington. However, Huang Tengwei provides little analysis to support its finding regarding 

personal jurisdiction, and expressly notes that “Amazon is one of the most recognized brands in 

the world.” Id. at *1. Insofar as Theos suggests that this Court may simply assume that Nytone

knew that Theos is a California corporation, Huang Tengwei is not persuasive.

Closer on point is a case cited by Huang Tengwei: CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, 

Inc., 653 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2011). In CollegeSource, the plaintiff, a California corporation, and 

defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation, were competitors in a small market for college transfer

services. Plaintiff sued in California for copyright infringement, alleging that the defendant 

copied material from the plaintiff’s website and posted it on its own website. In finding that the 

defendant was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California, the Ninth Circuit noted that 

the defendant specifically targeted California students and schools, as evidenced by its use of 

“California” in its Google AdWords search terms. Id. at 1071. Additionally, before posting the 

alleged infringing material, the defendant made phone calls and sent emails and letters to the 

plaintiff seeking to purchase the copied material—indicating that the defendant was aware of the 

plaintiff’s California place of business. Id. at 1072, 1078-79. As discussed above, and

notwithstanding Nytone’s alleged use of “Chummie” as an Amazon search term, Theos has 

presented no evidence that Nytone similarly targeted California. See, e.g., Adobe Sys., Inc. v. 

Cardinal Camera & Video Ctr., Inc., No. 15-cv-02991-JST, 2015 WL 5834135 at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 7, 2015) (stating that conclusory allegations and likelihoods are insufficient to meet the 

express aiming requirement)

Accordingly, Theos has failed to show that Nytone expressly aimed its conduct at 

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California.

c. Causing Harm Likely to be Suffered in the Forum State

The third element of the Calder effects test is satisfied if Theos shows that Nytone has 

caused harm that Nytone knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. Mavrix Photo, Inc., 

647 F.3d at 1231. In Mavrix, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was foreseeable that “a 

jurisdictionally significant amount of” the plaintiff’s harm would be suffered in California because 

“[a] substantial part of the photos’ value was based on the fact that a significant number of 

Californians would have bought publications . . . in order to see the photos” and the defendant’s 

acts “destroyed this California-based value . . . .” Id. at 1231-32.

Here, Theos relies on the same arguments it made with respect to the express aiming 

requirement. For the reasons discussed above, Theos’s claims of harm are not as compelling as in 

Mavrix, where the defendant’s alleged infringement foreseeably destroyed the publication value of 

the subject photos in the California forum. Theos claims that Nytone caused harm in California by 

diverting California sales from Theos. In order for the defendant to foresee causing harm in the 

forum state, the alleged tort “must involve the forum state itself and not just have some effect on a 

party who resides there.” Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2017). As 

discussed above, Theos has not shown that Nytone knew that Theos was located in California or 

that Theos was likely to suffer harm here.

In sum, this Court finds that Theos has not established that Nytone’s actions were 

purposefully directed at California, and thus, Theos has not met its burden to establish personal 

jurisdiction over Nytone. As such, this Court need not address the other elements of the specific 

jurisdiction test more broadly, or the Eitel factors governing whether default judgment is 

appropriate. See Nwubah, 2019 WL 661096 at *8.

C. Request for Venue Transfer

Theos requests that, instead of dismissing this action, the Court transfer this case to the 

District of Utah. The Court has the authority to transfer venue, even where it lacks personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (holding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) authorizes the transfer of cases, “however wrong the plaintiff may have been 

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in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over 

the defendants or not.”). Where personal jurisdiction is lacking, courts within this district have 

variously transferred actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)8or 28 U.S.C. § 1631.9 Compare Wickline 

v. United Micronesia Dev. Ass’n, Inc., No. C14-00192 SI, 2014 WL 2938713, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 

June 30, 2014) (transferring case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)) (citing Nelson v. Int’l Paint 

Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1983)) and Castillo v. Caesars Entm’t Corp., No. 18-cv05781-EMC, 2018 WL 6199682, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018) (transferring case pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1631) (citing Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., 913 F.3d 758, 761-62 (9th 

Cir 1990)). Under either statute, cases generally should be transferred if a transfer serves the 

interest of justice. See Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466 (observing that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1406(a) was to avoid “the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their 

actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some 

elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often turn.”); Amity Rubberized Pen Co. v. 

Market Quest Group Inc., 793 F.3d 991, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that where appellate 

jurisdiction was lacking, a transfer to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 “would be 

in the interest of justice”); Castillo, 2018 WL 6199682, at *4 n.4 (noting that “the ‘interest of 

justice’ standard applies to both § 1406 and § 1631.”).

Theos argues that the District of Utah has personal jurisdiction over Nytone, as that is 

where Nytone was based. There being no apparent frivolousness or bad faith with respect to 

Theos’s claims, this Court finds that a transfer to the District of Utah therefore is appropriate.

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“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or 

district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or 

division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

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“Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title or an appeal, 

including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court 

and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of 

justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court (or, for cases within the jurisdiction 

of the United States Tax Court, to that court) in which the action or appeal could have been 

brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been 

filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually 

filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Because not all parties have consented to the undersigned’s jurisdiction, IT IS ORDERED 

THAT this case be reassigned to a district judge. For the reasons discussed above, it is 

RECOMMENDED that Theos’s motion for default judgment be denied and that this matter should 

be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Utah.

Theos shall promptly serve Nytone with this Report and Recommendation and file a proof 

of service with the Court. Any party may serve and file objections to this Report and 

Recommendation within 14 days after being served. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 

Civ. L.R. 72-3.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2020

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

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