Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01568/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01568-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Harris, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Ivan Bartos, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 04-1568-PHX-EHC (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Anthony Harris filed a timely, fully exhausted petition for writ of habeas corpus on

July 30, 2004 (Doc. #1). He raises five grounds: 1) trial counsel was ineffective by not

impeaching a state witness on rebuttal; 2) trial counsel did not request a mistrial or the

suppression of certain evidence based upon the State's failure to preserve exculpatory

evidence; 3) trial counsel neglected to argue the State's failure to utilize the copiers'

"fingerprint pattern" to link the copiers to the counterfeit bills; 4) trial counsel did not

investigate whether the copiers were equipped with anti-counterfeit detection technology,

and thereby neglected to learn that the State had disposed of the copiers; and 5) appellate

counsel did not withdraw from representation when notified of Harris's intent to assert the

ineffective assistance of the Public Defender's Office, and neglected to raise requested claims

on direct appeal. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Harris's petition

be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:04-cv-01568-EHC Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

BACKGROUND

The facts surrounding Harris's convictions for two counts of forgery and one count

of possession of a forgery device, and the trial court's imposition of concurrent 12 and six

year prison terms, are summarized in the court of appeals' memorandum decision:

Glendale Police Officer Brandon Blanco testified that on December 21,

1996, he responded to an emergency call involving several men with weapons

in a condominium complex. Upon his arrival, he encountered and detained

two men, including appellant, who were arguing in a condominium doorway.

When additional officers arrived, Officers Blanco and Garcia proceeded to

appellant's condominium, unit #209, from which the emergency call

originated. The callers, appellant's girlfriend and a friend, were found next

door in unit #210. The two women told the officers that they had opened their

front door and found four or five men with guns in appellant's condominium.

The officers, believing that only two of the armed men had been

detained, searched units #209 and #210 for additional suspects. Finding

nothing in unit #210, the officers searched appellant's condominium, which

appeared to have been ransacked. Furniture and appliances were knocked

over, stacks of bundled money and a green leafy substance that looked like

marijuana strewed the floor.

After searching each room of appellant's condominium, the officers

reached the locked garage. Unable to find a key, Sergeant Trammel, the

supervising officer, forcibly opened the door and found inside a copy machine

and a large covered item located in the middle of the garage. Because the

covered item, which turned out to be another large copy machine, was large

enough to conceal a hiding person, Sergeant Trammel removed the cover. On

top, he saw a stack of $100 bills, a pack of copy machine paper, and paper with

several different colors and the outline of paper money on it. Lifting one of

the $100 bills to see if it contained a watermark, Sergeant Trammel saw that

it was blank on the other side. Upon finding this evidence, Sergeant Trammel

immediately ordered everyone out of the condominium, contacted his superior,

and waited until a search warrant was obtained.

During the subsequent search of appellant's condominium and garage,

officers found counterfeit money in each room, some of it in a dresser drawer

that also contained appellant's driver's license. Police also found a paper

cutter, uncut counterfeit copies, stacks of copy paper, toner cartridges with

colors that match those typically used in making counterfeit money, and nylon

security threads that are used in valid currency.

Detective Jones, who interviewed appellant at the scene prior to the

search and again later at the police station, testified that during the first

interview, appellant stated that he knew nothing about any counterfeiting or

the copy machines in the garage and that his fingerprints would not be found

on the copiers. When confronted with the evidence found during the search

in the second interview, however, appellant admitted to using counterfeit

money to purchase marijuana in two separate transactions, stating that the

drugs were to be sold later for "real" cash. Appellant also indicated that,

although he had never made any counterfeit money, he knew it was being

made and by whom and that his fingerprints would be found on one of the

Case 2:04-cv-01568-EHC Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

copy machines, "because he had done some work on it." At trial, Diana

Molina, an identification supervisor for the Glendale Police Department,

testified that appellant's latent fingerprints were found on one of the copier

glass bays and on that copier's lid.

(Doc. #1, Attachment 1, memorandum decision at 2-4).

Appellate counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), indicating to the court of appeals that she had searched the record on appeal and had

found "no arguable question of law that is not frivolous" (Doc. #9, Exh D at 10). She asked

the court of appeals to search the record for fundamental error, and, at Harris's request, listed

the following as issues for appellate review:

1. Statements were involuntary;

2. When the prosecutor went to the grand jury, the prosecution did not possess

the copy machine;

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel;

4. Newly discovered material facts;

5. County Attorney Jon Wendell had witnesses Chuck Jones and William Sentner

produce false statements;

6. Agent Sentner wanted to interview Harris but was notified by Glendale police

officers that Harris had refused to speak without the presence of an attorney;

7. Agent Sentner made no reference in his report to the copy machines being

found after the search warrant was obtained;

8. The copy machines would leave a special signature;

9. Sentner testified as an expert on color copiers but he never examined the

copiers himself;

10. Officer Jones' testimony violated Harris's rights under the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments;

11. There were no witnesses to Officer Jones' interview with Harris; 

12. The evidence did not coincide with the alleged statements;

13. There was no way to connect Harris to the counterfeit money;

14. Officer Jones did not turn in his report until December 26, 1996;

Case 2:04-cv-01568-EHC Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

15. At the first interview, Harris requested an attorney and refused to answer

questions until after an attorney was present;

16. The judge decided the voluntariness issue and left the invocation of rights for

the jury; and

17. It was Harris's word against Officer Jones' word.

(Id. at 10-11). Harris was granted additional time to file a supplemental brief, but he chose

not to do so. In its memorandum decision, the court of appeals addressed the issues raised

by Harris and concluded that none had merit (Doc. #1, Attachment 1). In his petition for

post-conviction relief, Harris raised inter alia the ineffective assistance claims that he now

reurges in his federal petition (Doc. #9, Exh F). The trial court dismissed his post-conviction

petition, finding as follows as to his ineffective assistance claims:

As [to] Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel, Defendant has filed to show counsel's performance was

deficient or that there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the case

would have been different, i.e. no showing of prejudice.

(Doc. #1, Attachment 2) 

The petition for review from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief was denied by

the court of appeals (Id., Attachment 3). 

DISCUSSION

Harris first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Detective

Jones regarding his testimony that Harris made incriminating statements during his interview

with Jones. Harris contends that the evidence shows that Detective Jones and Sergeant

Lekan were interviewing someone else at the time Harris supposedly made the confession.

He therefore contends that trial counsel should have recalled Sergeant Lekan to rebut Jones'

testimony. 

The record reflects that Sargeant Lekan testified before Detective Jones, and that trial

counsel did cross-examine Sargeant Lekan about the order of the interviews, and the fact that

in order to keep continuity, he and Detective Jones decided to separate some of the

interviews; Sargeant Lekan testified that he did not interview Harris or speak with him at all.

Detective Jones testified about his two interviews with Harris: one transpired at 10:00 p.m.

Case 2:04-cv-01568-EHC Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2

The charges were initially filed in federal court, but dismissed in part because the

search warrant was issued by a Justice of the Peace, not a recognizable state court of record,

and evidence obtained as a result would be inadmissible . See Doc. #24, Exh P at 95-96.

- 5 -

while Harris was seated in the back of a police car at the scene, and a later one took place

at 6:00 a.m. the next morning in the booking area at the police station. The second interview

occurred following Detective Jones' participation in the execution of a search warrant at

Harris's condominium, including the garage, where the copiers were seized. Detective Jones

testified that no one else was present at the second interview. He also testified that Harris

never asked for an attorney, never refused to answer questions, and during the second

interview made statements which were inconsistent with his earlier interview and were also

incriminating. Agent Sentner testified concerning his interviews, and was cross-examined

about their chronology, and which officers were present during those interviews. He also

testified that he never interviewed Harris because of information he had received that Harris

had invoked his right to counsel.

Harris testified that Jones questioned him at the scene, and that Lekan, Sentner and

Jones were all present at some point during the second interview at the station. On rebuttal,

Jones testified that he interviewed Harris alone on both occasions, and Agent Sentner

reiterated that he did not participate in any interview with Harris. The Court agrees with the

State that it would have served no purpose to recall Lekan on rebuttal when both Lekan and

Sentner had testified that they had no contact with Harris. Based upon the evidence before

the jury, and the cross-examination by defense counsel of Jones, Lekan and Sentner, the trial

court reasonably applied Strickland1

 in failing to find counsel's performance was deficient

or that there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the case would have been different.

Harris also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to request exclusion,

suppression or mistrial upon discovery that the State had disposed of the copiers prior to the

charges being refiled in state court.2

 The copiers were not disposed of, but released to a

Canon representative, identified by serial number. In addition, in light of Harris's expressed

Case 2:04-cv-01568-EHC Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

desire to contest the copiers' counterfeiting capability, it would have been inconsistent for

trial counsel to argue for suppression of the copiers. Finally, considering the evidence before

the jury of Harris's fingerprints on one of the copiers, and stacks of counterfeit bills on the

other, and his incriminating statements made to Detective Jones and general lack of

credibility on the stand, he has shown no prejudice, and the state court's ruling was a

reasonable application of Strickland. 

Next, Harris contends that trial counsel should have advised the jury that the State

failed to present fingerprint pattern evidence linking the copier to the counterfeit bills. In

order to convict Harris of a violation of A.R.S. § 13-2002(A)(1),with intent to defraud, either

falsely making, completing or altering a written instrument, or knowingly possessing a

forged instrument, and § 13-2002(A) (2), criminal possession of a forgery device, the State

was not required to link the two offenses. In addition, it is within the broad range of

competent representation for trial counsel to not make an argument that would dilute Harris's

primary theory of defense: that he was innocent and had been framed. See United States v.

Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1975). . 

In a related argument, Harris contends that counsel should have investigated whether

the copiers were equipped with anti-counterfeit detection technology. However, such an

investigation would not have produced any relevant evidence. The items recovered from

Harris's condominium, seized pursuant to a search warrant, proved that counterfeit bills had

been forged and circulated to individuals who recognized that they were not genuine

currency. In addition, as the testimony at trial indicated, anti-counterfeiting technology

consists of a unique identifying signature pattern or splatter mark that is imprinted on every

copy made, which allows the copier to be traced. It does not, as its name might suggest,

recognize genuine currency and prevent it from being reproduced. See Doc. #24, Exh P.,

R.T. 8/27/98 at 84-86. The trial court reasonably applied clearly established Federal law

because the copiers were not destroyed, and in any event an examination of them would not

have produced exculpatory evidence. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 

Case 2:04-cv-01568-EHC Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Finally, Harris argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not withdrawing from

representation when notified that Harris would pursue an ineffectiveness claim against the

Public Defender's office, and for failing to raise the requested issues on appeal. Harris

correctly did not ask counsel to withdraw until he filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief;

counsel in turn immediately moved to withdraw. Both events occurred after the completion

of direct review. See Doc. #24, Exh T, U. Ineffective assistance claims will not be addressed

on appeal, and can only be asserted in post-conviction proceedings. State v. Spreitz, 202

Ariz. 1, 3 (2002). His argument that counsel was ineffective for filing an Anders brief is also

without merit; counsel is not required to present frivolous claims. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744-

745. The court of appeals reviewed the record for fundamental error, and found none. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Anthony Harris's Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2006.

Case 2:04-cv-01568-EHC Document 26 Filed 05/31/06 Page 7 of 7