Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-02389/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-02389-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: FACEBOOK PRIVACY 

LITIGATION Case No. 10-cv-02389-RMW 

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 163

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a third amended complaint (“TAC”) to add “one or more”

additional class representatives. Dkt. No. 163, at 1. Plaintiff also seeks an order pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 amending the Scheduling Order to permit discovery related to 

the additional class representatives. Id. For the reasons explained below, the court treats the 

motion as one to add Wendy Marfeo as a named representative in a TAC and to amend the 

scheduling order, and the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion, so construed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Katherine Pohl brings this suit on behalf of herself and all others whose 

confidential user information was allegedly disclosed by defendant Facebook to its advertising 

partners in violation of Facebook’s own privacy policy, Facebook’s promises to users, accepted 

industry standards, and federal law. Dkt. No. 144, at ¶ 1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 

(“SAC”) alleges that Facebook’s policies state that Facebook “never share[s] [users’] personal 

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ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

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information with [Facebook’s] advertisers” and does “not give [users’] content of information to 

advertisers without [users’] consent.” Id. ¶ 2. According to the SAC, Facebook, despite these 

policies, intentionally and knowingly transmitted confidential user identifiable information, 

including users’ full names, to third party advertisers without user consent. Id. ¶ 3.

Several separate actions were originally filed against Facebook, and the cases were 

consolidated on August 10, 2010 under the caption In re Facebook Privacy Litigation. Following 

consolidation, plaintiffs’ counsel elected to name only Mike Robertson and David Gould as 

plaintiffs and putative class representatives. See Dkt. No. 36. The court thereafter granted 

Facebook’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 91, and plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint 

(“FAC”), Dkt. No. 92. Facebook again moved to dismiss and the court granted Facebook’s motion 

and dismissed the FAC with prejudice. Dkt. No. 106. After the dismissal, Robertson appealed to 

the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. No. 116. Gould did not file a notice of appeal and the judgment against him

became final on November 22, 2011. Dkt. No. 107. Accordingly, when the Ninth Circuit reversed 

the court’s dismissal order on two of the eight dismissed claims, the case was remanded to this 

court with Robertson as the sole named plaintiff.

After remand from the Ninth Circuit, the parties commenced discovery. On August 14, 

2015, the court entered the parties’ stipulated scheduling order. Dkt. No. 135. The scheduling 

order set the deadline for completion of class certification fact discovery for March 25, 2015, the 

deadline for disclosure of plaintiff’s class certification witnesses for April 8, 2014, and the 

deadline to file a class certification motion for July 22, 2014. Id. The scheduling order does not set 

a deadline for amendment of the pleadings.

After remand, Facebook propounded interrogatories, requests for production, a notice of 

deposition, and a demand for inspection. Dkt. No. 163, at 5. Facebook’s demand for inspection 

included a request that Robertson produce the devices from which he had accessed Facebook 

during the relevant time period. Id. at 6. Robertson responded by informing Facebook that the only 

device from which he had accessed Facebook was his work laptop computer, which he had 

returned to the former employer who had issued it to him. Id. Facebook sought the identity of 

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Robertson’s former employer so that it could issue a subpoena for inspection of the computer. Id. 

at 7. Plaintiff refused to identify the employer on the ground that Facebook had not explained the 

relevance of any data that might be on the computer. Id.

While discovery was ongoing, on January 7, 2015 plaintiff moved for leave to amend the 

FAC. Dkt. No. 138. Plaintiff sought to add Katherine Pohl as an additional named plaintiff, and to 

“clarify” the damages sought in the compliant, including adding a request for nominal damages 

and disgorgement for the breach of contract claim. Dkt. No. 138. On February 13, 2015, the court 

granted plaintiff leave to file a SAC. See Dkt. No. 142. The court found that although plaintiff’s 

delay in seeking leave to amend the compliant was significant, there was no evidence of any 

dilatory motive in plaintiff’s proposed amendments. Id. The court further found that the proposed 

amendments would not subject Facebook to unfair prejudice. Id. However, in so ruling, the court 

imposed the following conditions: (1) additional class certification fact discovery by plaintiffs was 

to be narrowly tailored to Ms. Pohl’s standing as a class representative, and limited to five 

interrogatories and five production requests with each having no subparts; and (2) Facebook’s 

class certification fact discovery deadline was extended to April 1, 2015. Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s SAC 

was deemed filed and served as of the date of the court’s order, February 13, 2015. Id.

Facebook deposed Robertson on March 11, 2015. Dkt. No. 163, at 8. At the deposition, 

Robertson testified that he had used Facebook on “one or more work-issued computers.” Dkt. No. 

177, at 7. Robertson refused to answer questions by Facebook that sought the identities of former 

employers. Dkt. No. 163, at 8. Robertson based his refusal on both a concern for his privacy and 

the possibility that Facebook’s subpoenas to his former employers “could just create employment 

difficulties” for Robertson, and harm his “ability to earn a living.” Id. Robertson’s attorney, Mr. 

Nassiri, stated that Robertson’s refusal to answer was based on “privacy grounds and on the 

grounds that your need for this information, whatever it might be, which you haven’t articulated 

once, is outweighed by the potential risk and harm to him and his ability to make a living when 

you go out and you issue subpoenas to every third party that may have had some relationship with 

Mike Robertson.” Id. Despite his asserted privacy concerns, Robertson admitted that he publicized 

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information about his former employers on his public LinkedIn profile. Dkt. No. 177, at 8. After 

Facebook’s counsel presented Robertson with a copy of his public LinkedIn profile, Robertson’s 

counsel informed Facebook that Robertson intended to seek a protective order to prevent 

Facebook from issuing subpoenas to Robertson’s previous employers. Dkt. No. 163, at 9. Counsel 

for both parties met and conferred after the deposition and, according to Robertson, Facebook 

agreed to an “informal standstill.” Id. Robertson understood this to mean that Facebook had 

agreed that it would not issue any subpoenas to Robertson’s former employers or clients without 

giving Robertson sufficient notice to seek a protective order. Id. However, the following day, 

March 12, 2015, Facebook’s counsel sent Robertson an email stating that Facebook had never 

agreed to give Robertson sufficient notice to seek a protective order should Facebook intend to 

issue the subpoenas. Id.

Robertson did not elect to seek a protective order, and on March 17, 2015, Facebook 

informed Robertson that if he did not identify the relevant previous employers within two days, 

Facebook would serve subpoenas on two of his previous employers listed on his LinkedIn profile. 

Id. at 9–10. However, Facebook never issued any subpoenas, because on March 20, 2015, the 

parties filed a stipulation to the voluntary dismissal of Robertson from the case, with prejudice. 

Dkt. No. 146. Plaintiff alleges that Robertson’s voluntary dismissal was “indisputably submitted 

under duress.” Dkt. No. 163, at 1. Following Robertson’s withdrawal, plaintiff Pohl became the 

sole class representative in this case.

On March 27, 2015, plaintiff filed this motion for leave to file a TAC to add one or more

class representatives who plaintiff had not yet identified. Dkt. No. 148.1 Facebook filed an 

opposition on April 10, 2015, Dkt. No. 177, and plaintiff filed a reply on April 17, 2015, Dkt. No. 

189.2

 1 Plaintiff later moved to remove several incorrectly filed documents from the docket, including 

this motion. Dkt. No. 160. Plaintiff subsequently re-filed her motion for leave to file a TAC on 

April 6, 2015. Dkt. No. 163. Throughout this order, the court’s citations to plaintiff’s motion are to 

the later filed document at Docket No. 163.

2 Facebook also filed objections to new evidence in plaintiff’s reply brief and plaintiff’s

declaration in support thereof. Dkt. No. 203. However, because the court does not rely on any of 

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Plaintiff also filed a motion to compel before Magistrate Judge Grewal, seeking to compel 

Facebook to identify and provide contact information for some or all of the putative class 

members. Dkt. No. 172. As of the date of this order, plaintiff’s motion to compel is outstanding, 

and Judge Grewal has deferred ruling until the court rules on this motion. Dkt. Nos. 173, 224.

On April 29, 2015, plaintiff’s counsel filed a declaration stating that Wendy Marfeo had 

agreed to serve as a class representative in this case. Dkt. No. 211. Ms. Marfeo had previously 

been the named plaintiff in one of the four cases consolidated into this action. See Dkt. No. 36. 

When the cases were consolidated, however, plaintiff’s counsel elected to proceed with only Mr. 

Gould and Mr. Robertson as named plaintiffs. Ms. Marfeo and the other named plaintiff, Zetha 

Noble, were dropped from the case. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend its pleading once as a 

matter of course within 21 days of serving it. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(1). After that initial period 

has passed, amendment is permitted only with the opposing party’s written consent or leave of the 

court. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 instructs that “[t]he court should freely give leave when 

justice so requires.” Id. Although this rule “should be interpreted with extreme liberality, leave to 

amend is not to be granted automatically.” Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Courts commonly consider four factors 

when determining whether to grant leave to amend: (1) bad faith on the part of the movant; (2) 

undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; and (4) futility of the proposed amendment. 

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “[I]t is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 

party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

“The party opposing leave to amend bears the burden of showing prejudice.” Serpa v. SBC 

 

the evidence to which Facebook objects, the court finds Facebook’s objection moot.

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Telecomms., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 865, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 

187).

“Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists 

a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. (citation omitted). While 

“[d]elay alone is insufficient to justify denial of leave to amend,” Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 

847 (9th Cir. 1997), “late amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when the 

facts and the theory have been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception of the 

cause of action,” Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th 

Cir. 1986); see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir.

1999) (“A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings supports a district court's 

finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend the complaint.”). The decision to grant or 

deny a request for leave to amend rests in the discretion of the trial court. See California v. Neville 

Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 2004).

In its opposition, Facebook asks the court to evaluate plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend 

the SAC under the “good cause” standard from Rule 16(b)(4), which governs amendment of 

scheduling orders. Dkt. No. 177, at 13. Facebook relies on Osakan v. Apple Am. Grp., which 

applied the good cause standard to a motion for leave to amend the pleadings. Case No. 08-4722, 

2010 WL 1838701, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010). Osakan read Ninth Circuit precedent as 

requiring application of the good cause standard to motions for leave to amend filed after entry of 

a Rule 16 scheduling order. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit cases cited in Osakan make clear that 

Rule 16’s good cause standard applies to motions for leave to amend which are filed after the 

deadline set in a pretrial scheduling order for amendment of the pleadings has passed. See Johnson 

v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Once the district court had 

filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to [Rule 16] which established a timetable for amending 

pleadings that rule’s standards controlled.”); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 

(9th Cir. 2000) (district court correctly applied Rule 16 good cause standard “because it had filed a 

pretrial scheduling order that established a timetable for amending the pleadings, and the deadline 

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had expired before [plaintiffs] moved to amend.”). Because the stipulated scheduling order entered 

by the court in this case set no deadline for amendment of the pleadings, see Dkt. No. 135, the 

court finds that plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is governed by the standard for amendment 

under Rule 15.3

III.DISCUSSION

At the hearing on this motion, Facebook argued that the case should be dismissed because

the sole remaining named plaintiff lacks standing. The court requested briefing from both parties 

on this question. Dkt. No. 220. Having considered the parties’ papers, see Dkt. Nos. 221, 223, 225, 

and the relevant law, the court finds that the case need not be dismissed on this basis. Robertson’s 

voluntary dismissal rendered his claims moot. Where a named plaintiff’s claims become moot, 

courts in the Ninth Circuit permit the substitution of a proper class representative to allow the suit 

to proceed. See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1023 n.6 (9th Cir. 

2003). Accordingly, the court treats the instant motion to amend to add Marfeo as a class 

representative as one seeking the substitution of a named plaintiff following the mooting of a prior 

plaintiff’s claims. The court therefore proceeds to analyze whether the requested amendment to 

add Marfeo is proper under Rule 15.

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a TAC to add Wendy Marfeo as a named plaintiff and to amend 

the scheduling order to permit further discovery related to her addition as a new class 

representative.

4 Dkt. No. 163, at 2. Plaintiff argues that the court should grant her leave to amend 

the SAC because justice requires her proposed amendment and none of the Foman factors weighs

against amendment. Id. at 13. More specifically, plaintiff asserts that she has “proceeded 

expeditiously and in good faith,” the amendment would not be futile, and would not subject 

Facebook to any undue prejudice. Id. at 13–14. In response, Facebook contends that plaintiff’s 

 3 However, plaintiff’s motion to amend the scheduling order is governed by the good cause 

standard under Rule 16.

4 In fact, in her motion for leave to amend plaintiff seeks to add “one or more additional class 

representatives.” Dkt. No. 163, at 2. Plaintiff has since identified only Wendy Marfeo as an 

additional class representative. The court therefore treats plaintiff’s motion as seeking leave to 

amend to add only Marfeo as a class representative.

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request is untimely, threatens further delays, would be futile, and is unduly prejudicial. Dkt. No. 

177, at 19–24. On balance, the court finds that the request for amendment is untimely but not 

brought in bad faith, and the prejudice to Facebook is not so unfair as to justify denial of the

motion. Further, the court finds that the amendment would not be futile. The court therefore 

GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to file a TAC.

A. Prejudice to Defendant

Facebook asserts that granting plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend would be unfairly 

prejudicial. Id. at 19. Plaintiff asks the court to extend the discovery period for three additional 

months, which Facebook contends is likely to be unrealistically short. Facebook argues that this 

will force Facebook “to take discovery of the new plaintiff, including discovery regarding any 

unique defenses that may impact his or her typicality and adequacy, and reevaluate the defenses 

and arguments that it has been developing throughout the previous discovery period.” Id. at 20. 

Facebook notes that it has already had to conduct such additional discovery because of the recent 

addition of Pohl as a class representative, and argues that permitting plaintiff’s requested 

amendment would force Facebook to do so again. Id. According to Facebook, plaintiff is seeking 

new categories and avenues of discovery, and will use expanded discovery to pursue new 

arguments in support of class certification. Id. Facebook asserts that this will force Facebook to 

redevelop its “class certification defenses and arguments based on this new discovery and new 

theories, mooting the very substantial time, expense, and effort it has already expended.” Id.

Facebook also argues that the pending motion to compel before Judge Grewal indicates that 

plaintiff intends to contact putative class members in an effort to prove commonality and 

predominance, reliance, or a damages theory by surveying a sample of the class. Id.

In response, plaintiff argues that she is not seeking new categories or avenues of discovery, 

either in this motion or in the motion to compel before Judge Grewal. Dkt. No. 189, at 6. Plaintiff 

contends that Facebook “readily could have anticipated Plaintiff might seek to prove damages by 

surveying a sample of the putative class.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff further notes that 

the expert discovery cutoff is not until July 1, 2015. Id. According to plaintiff, the impact of 

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granting plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the SAC would be “limited to the discovery burdens 

associated with any newly-identified named plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff argues that Facebook has not 

identified any new issues or new defense strategies that would stem from granting plaintiff’s 

motion.

The court agrees that Facebook’s arguments regarding damages theories do not bear on the 

question of prejudice because expert discovery is ongoing and the addition of a new plaintiff is 

unlikely to result in new or altered damages theories. However, the court does recognize that 

adding a new class representative may introduce new issues and may necessitate altered defense 

strategies. Plaintiff brought this action on a class basis under Rule 23. To maintain a class action, 

plaintiff must show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class,” “the claims or 

defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and the 

“representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a) (2)-(4). These questions necessarily require consideration of Marfeo’s ability to serve as a 

class representative. See Osakan, 2010 WL 1838701, at *5 (citing Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 

1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named 

plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class”)).

As an example, Facebook may need to ascertain whether Marfeo is subject to unique defenses, 

which would bear upon the typicality requirement of Rule 23. See Osakan, 2010 WL 1838701, at 

*5; see also Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992).

While Marfeo’s addition as a class representative will saddle Facebook with some 

additional discovery, the court is not convinced that this burden will be so unfair as to justify 

denial of plaintiff’s motion. First, plaintiff is not seeking new categories or avenues of discovery. 

Second, Facebook has not identified any new issues or defenses that may arise out of Marfeo’s 

addition as a class representative. Finally, any additional discovery by the parties in this case will 

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be limited to Marfeo, as discussed below. Class certification fact discovery is otherwise closed and 

will remain closed.5

In sum, the court finds that amendment will not subject Facebook to unfair prejudice, and 

that this Foman factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend.

B. Undue Delay

Plaintiff asserts that she has exercised due diligence in seeking this amendment soon after 

Robertson withdrew from the case. Dkt. No. 163, at 14. Facebook argues that plaintiff’s 

amendment is untimely, as the court recently granted plaintiff leave to amend to add Pohl as a 

class representative, and class certification fact discovery has now closed. Dkt. No. 177, at 19–23. 

The court recognizes that the addition of Marfeo is untimely, but as with plaintiff’s prior motion, 

the court finds no evidence of a dilatory motive. See, e.g., AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist 

W., Inc., 465 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff contends that Robertson withdrew from the case 

under the threat that Facebook would subpoena his former employers to obtain the computers 

from which Robertson had accessed Facebook during the relevant time period. See Dkt. No. 163, 

at 8–10. Robertson’s reluctance to discovery of his past employers may have been foreseeable to 

an extent, and plaintiff’s failure to seek leave to add Marfeo earlier may demonstrate a degree of 

inattentiveness on the part of plaintiff’s counsel, but the court cannot conclude that the instant 

motion for leave to amend is the result of bad faith or dilatory motive. Accordingly, the court finds 

that this Foman factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend.

C. Futility of Amendment

Facebook also asserts that amendment would be futile. Dkt. No. 177, at 21–22. Facebook 

argues that plaintiff will be unable to certify a class because she will be unable to show 

commonality under Rule 23. Id. at 21. Similarly, Facebook argues that neither Robertson nor Pohl 

was able to identify how they had been harmed by the alleged fraud and breach of contract. Id. at 

 5 However, this order should not be understood to preclude any discovery that may result from 

plaintiff’s motion to compel before Judge Grewal. If plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted, the

parties may conduct further discovery in accordance with Judge Grewal’s ruling.

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22. According to Facebook, amendment would therefore be futile. Id. However, because these 

issues are not yet before the court, these arguments are now premature, and Facebook raises no 

other arguments regarding futility of amendment. Consequently, the court finds that Facebook has 

failed to show that the proposed amendment would be futile, and that this Foman factor weighs in 

favor of granting leave to amend.

D. Plaintiff May File a TAC

The court finds that three Foman factors weigh in favor of granting plaintiff leave to file a 

TAC. Although plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a TAC adding Marfeo as a new class 

representative is untimely, there is no evidence that plaintiff’s delay in seeking to add Marfeo is 

the result of bad faith or dilatory motive. The court recognizes that granting the motion will

impose the burden of further discovery on Facebook, but the court is not convinced that the

limited additional discovery outlined herein will result in unfair prejudice. Finally, amendment 

does not appear that it will be futile. Accordingly, the court in its discretion GRANTS plaintiff’s 

motion to file a TAC adding Marfeo as a new class representative.

E. Amendment of the Scheduling Order

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), a pretrial scheduling order “may be 

modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Good cause exists where the parties 

cannot meet the deadlines set forth in a scheduling order despite the exercise of due diligence. 

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. As noted above, the deadline for class certification fact discovery has 

now passed, and neither party has had the opportunity to conduct discovery related to Marfeo. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Marfeo’s addition as a named plaintiff after the close of 

discovery constitutes good cause to amend the Scheduling Order to permit limited additional

discover on the subject of Marfeo’s adequacy to be a representative plaintiff. Any discovery 

conducted by plaintiff is further limited to five interrogatories and five production requests with 

each having no subparts. Subject to these conditions, the class certification class discovery is 

extended by 90 days to July 1, 2015. All other deadlines are also extended by 90 days, as set forth 

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in plaintiff’s motion to amend the Scheduling Order. Within seven days of this order, the parties 

shall file a Scheduling Order which reflects these dates and conditions.

IV.ORDER

For the reasons explained above, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a 

TAC to add Wendy Marfeo as a named plaintiff. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the standing order is 

GRANTED, subject to the conditions set forth above. The TAC will be deemed filed and served 

as of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

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