Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03544/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03544-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3544

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Billy Joe Smith; Delores Smith, *

*

Appellants, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Dick Busby, individually and in his * Eastern District of Arkansas.

capacity as Sheriff of Crittenden *

County; Ed Laxton, Chief * [UNPUBLISHED]

Investigator, individually and in his *

capacity with Crittenden County *

Sheriff’s Department; Jason Oliver, *

individually and in his capacity as Lead *

Detective with Crittenden County *

Sheriff’s Department; Gary Banks, *

Sgt., individually and in his capacity *

with Crittenden County Sheriff’s *

Department; Tommy Martin, *

individually and in his capacity as *

Deputy with Crittenden County *

Sheriff’s Department; Crittenden *

County, Arkansas; Kent Hale, *

individually and in his capacity as *

Coroner of Crittenden County; Sam *

Koons, individually and as an officer *

of the Arkansas State Police; Mike *

Fuller, individually and as an officer *

of the Arkansas State Police; Wayne *

Appellate Case: 04-3544 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/14/2006 Entry ID: 2009675
1

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas. 

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Fawcett, individually and as Principal *

of the Marion High School, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: February 7, 2006 

Filed: February 14, 2006

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Before ARNOLD, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Billy Joe and Delores Smith (plaintiffs) appeal from the district court’s1

 order

dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging fourth and fifth amendment

violations in connection with the response to, and investigation of, the shooting death

of their teenage son. We affirm.

In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that, after law enforcement

officers received a report of a shooting in their home, the officers unlawfully entered

the home and allowed members of the public to enter, roam about, and steal property

from the home, which caused an invasion of their privacy and subjected them to an

unreasonable search and seizure of property in violation of the fourth amendment.

Plaintiffs also alleged that they were deprived of property without due process of law,

in violation of the fifth amendment, as a result of the third-party stealing and

defendants’ retention, loss, or destruction of property in connection with the

investigation of plaintiffs’ son’s death and the removal of his body from the home. 

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Plaintiffs assert no argument on appeal regarding their fourth amendment claim

against Wayne Fawcett, the principal of their son’s high school, whom they sued for

releasing their son’s grades to authorities. The dismissal as to Mr. Fawcett is affirmed

on the basis of waiver. See Watson v. O’Neill, 365 F.3d 609, 614 n.4 (8th Cir. 2004)

(claim not addressed on appeal deemed waived).

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On appeal, plaintiffs no longer rely on their allegations that the third parties

who entered their home caused fourth amendment violations, nor do they challenge

the officers’ initial entry into the home. Rather, plaintiffs allege for the first time that,

after entering the home, the officers themselves engaged in an expansive search and

seizure of property in violation of the fourth amendment. Because plaintiffs did not

assert these allegations in the amended complaint, we decline to consider them on

appeal. See Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 926-927 & n.2 (8th Cir.

2002) (declining to consider argument made for first time on appeal based on

allegation not made in district court); U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Rapid Roberts, Inc.,

130 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging appellate court’s discretion to

consider matters raised for first time on appeal, but noting that court ordinarily will

not do so). The district court correctly concluded that no viable fourth amendment

claim was stated against the officers in the amended complaint because the officers

lawfully entered the home and merely allowed third parties to enter during exigent

circumstances, which was at most mere negligence. See Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d

975, 978 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (mere negligence insufficient to establish

culpability under § 1983). The district court appropriately distinguished this case

from the case upon which plaintiffs relied, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-18

(1999) (officers violated homeowners’ fourth amendment rights by intentionally

bringing third parties into their home during execution of arrest warrant, where third

parties’ presence did not aid warrant execution). Plaintiffs therefore cannot establish

section 1983 liability for failure to supervise or train, see McCoy v. City of

Monticello, 411 F.3d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2005), and we need not address the issue

of qualified immunity, see Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir.

2003). The dismissal of plaintiffs’ fourth amendment claims is affirmed.2

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Regarding the fifth amendment due process claims, plaintiffs did not allege in

the amended complaint, nor do they assert now, that they were deprived of property

as a result of Arkansas’s established post-deprivation procedures. They merely

challenge the adequacy of those state procedures, of which they have not attempted

to avail themselves. We hold that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ fifth

amendment claims. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538-44 (1981) (concluding

that respondent failed to state due process claim where he had not alleged that

deprivation of property resulted from established post-deprivation state procedure),

overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling

prior recognition that constitutional deprivation may be caused by negligent conduct);

see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 & n.14 (1984) (deprivation of property

by state employee did not violate due process clause where meaningful postdeprivation remedy was available); Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 874 (8th Cir.

1998) (in § 1983 action, holding that plaintiffs’ due process rights were not violated

because, even if property was unreasonably seized during search, Arkansas provides

adequate state post-deprivation remedies that satisfy due process).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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