Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01174/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01174-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 )

)

)

RICK J. MEJIA, )

) 2:02-cv-1174-GEB-EFB

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

Pending are two motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

state law claims. One motion was filed December 11, 2003, and the

other December 12, 2003. The portion of each motion that sought

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims was granted and

Plaintiff’s state law claims were dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§1367(c)(3). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s

decision on all federal claims except Plaintiff’s federal knock-andannounce claims, which have been remanded along with the question

whether supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised over Plaintiff’s

state claims. Since the district court has decided to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims, this decision

on the motions issues. 

The Ninth Circuit’s remand decision in Mejia v. City of

Sacramento, 2006 WL 1050115 (Apr. 19, 2006) (“Mejia”) concerns some of

the state claims involved with the motions sub judice. In Mejia, the

Ninth Circuit found Defendants had probable cause to believe Albert

Marty, an individual for whom the law enforcement officer defendants 

possessed an arrest warrant, resided at Plaintiff’s residence and that

Defendants could enter the residence to search for Marty. Id. at *1. 

In addition, the Ninth Circuit determined Defendants did not use

excessive force when subduing and handcuffing Plaintiff after they

entered the residence, and that it was objectively reasonable for

Plaintiff to have been detained while the search for Marty was

conducted. Id. at *2.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that several Sacramento City police

officers and Sacramento County probation officers committed California

state torts against him when they unlawfully entered his home to

execute the arrest warrant for Marty. (Second Am. Compl.(“Compl.”) ¶¶

18-24.) One of the officers knocked on Plaintiff’s door on June 5,

2001, at about 4:30 p.m., for the purpose of executing the arrest

warrant for Marty. (Pl.’s Resp. to City Def. Statement of Undisputed

Facts (“RCitySUF”) ¶¶ 1, 9.) As Plaintiff began to turn the door

handle, the door was forced open by Officer Hinz. (Pl.’s Resp. to

County Def. Statement of Undisputed Facts (“RCountySUF”) ¶ 19.) At

issue is whether the officers announced their identity prior to entry

and whether Plaintiff was provided sufficient time to open the door. 

Mejia, 2006 WL 1050115, at *1. A shotgun and two pistols were pointed

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28 The standards for summary judgment are well known and need not 1

be repeated here.

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at his head as the officers entered Plaintiff’s house. (RCountySUF ¶

21.) Further, officers yelled questions at Plaintiff, forced him to

the ground, and handcuffed his hands behind his back. (Id. ¶ 24.)

After it was determined that Plaintiff was alone in the residence,

Plaintiff was allowed to get up and the handcuffs were removed. 

(RCitySUF ¶ 13, RCountySUF ¶ 28.)

DISCUSSION

I. City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

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A. Assault and Battery/Excessive Force

Defendants City of Sacramento, Arturo Venegas, Susan

Feenstra, P. Varozza, J. Oliver, K. Pendleton, and L. Hinz (“City

Defendants”) seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s assault and battery

claims arguing the force used in detaining Plaintiff was reasonable. 

(City Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“City Defs.’ Mot.”) at 25.) Plaintiff

counters that the force used was unreasonable. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 25.) 

In addition, City Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claims, arguing no such tort exists and these claims

are subsumed in Plaintiff’s assault and battery claims. (City Defs.’

Mot. at 27.) Plaintiff fails to counter this argument.

Plaintiff alleges in his “Excessive Force” claims that

“[w]hen defendant officers unlawfully entered [P]laintiff’s home and

illegally detained him by physically restraining him, they used

unreasonably excessive force.” (Compl. ¶ 49.) In California, “[a]

peace officer who uses unreasonable or excessive force in . . .

det[aining a person] commits a battery upon the person being . . .

detained as to such excessive force.” Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63

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Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1273 (1998). It is obvious that Plaintiff’s

excessive force claims are subsumed in his assault and battery claims. 

 Since the Ninth Circuit held the force used was neither

unreasonable nor excessive, summary judgment is granted in favor of

the City Defendants on Plaintiff’s assault and battery and excessive

force claims.

B. IIED/NIED/Invasion of Privacy

City Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), negligent

infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), and invasion of privacy 

claims arguing that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements of these

claims, they were privileged to enter Plaintiff’s home under the

authority of an arrest warrant for Marty, and they were engaged in

privileged conduct when they secured Plaintiff so they could search

for Marty. (City Defs.’ Mot. at 25, 26, 28.) Plaintiff counters that

disputed factual issues exist as to whether the City Defendants

committed these torts and whether the referenced privileges apply. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 23, 25-26.) 

The same factual disputes existing on Plaintiff’s knocknotice claims exist on Plaintiff’s IIED, NIED, and invasion of privacy

claims. Therefore, the City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on these claims is denied.

/

/

/

/

/

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Plaintiff’s Complaint states a cause of action for “False 2

Arrest and Illegal Imprisonment.” (Compl. ¶¶ 44-47.) However, the two

“are not separate torts. False arrest is but one way of committing a

false imprisonment.” Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744,

752 (1997). 

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C. False Arrest and Illegal Imprisonment2

City Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false

imprisonment claims arguing Plaintiff’s detention was lawful and the

result of privileged conduct. (City Defs.’ Mot. at 27.) Plaintiff

rejoins that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights and

therefore, their conduct was not lawful or privileged. (Pl.’s Opp’n

at 22-23). 

It was objectively reasonable for the officers “to detain

[Plaintiff] for his own safety,” since the officers anticipated a

potential armed conflict with Marty and “so that the police [could]

sweep the area for [Marty], unencumbered.” Mejia, 2006 WL 1050115, at

*2. Since Defendants acted reasonably when detaining Plaintiff,

summary judgment is entered in favor of the City Defendants on

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claims.

D. Vicarious Liability

The City Defendants assert that as supervisory employees

they are immune from Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims under

California Government Code Section 820.8 (“section 820.8”). (City

Defs.’ Mot. at 28.) Plaintiff does not allege in his Complaint that

any supervisory employees are vicariously liable; rather, Plaintiff

alleges the City of Sacramento is vicariously liable for the actions

of its police officers. (Compl. ¶¶ 31, 35, 39, 43, 47, 51, 58.) 

Since Plaintiff is not alleging a supervisory vicarious

liability claim against any police officer, this portion of the motion

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is denied because it does not involve a case or controversy. Further

the City of Sacramento’s motion is denied because it has not shown its

entitlement to immunity under section 820.8.

II. County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Statutory Immunity

Defendants County of Sacramento, Sacramento County Probation

Department, Vern Speirs, Stephen DeRoss, Sue Florence, Patti McGowan,

and Edward Horning (“County Defendants”) seek summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s state law claims arguing they are entitled to statutory

immunity under California Government Code § 820.2 (“section 820.2”). 

(County Defs.’ Mot. at 21.) Plaintiff does not respond to this

argument.

Section 820.2 provides that “a public employee is not liable

for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or

omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in

him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov. Code. §

820.2. But these movants have not shown their acts involved with

Plaintiff’s knock-notice allegations are discretionary acts under

section 820.2. Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131,

134 (1965) (stating that notwithstanding section 820.2 a police

officer can be liable for the manner in which an arrest is executed). 

Therefore, the County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under

section 820.2 is denied.

III. Sua Sponte

Because of summary judgment rulings made above, the Court

sua sponte enters summary judgment for the County Defendants on

Plaintiff’s claims of assault and battery, excessive force, and false

imprisonment. The Court is authorized to grant summary judgment to a

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party sua sponte when “the party against whom judgment [is] entered

had a full and fair opportunity to develop and present facts and legal

arguments in support of its position.” Portsmouth Square Inc. v.

S’holders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff had an opportunity to develop the facts and legal arguments

on these claims in his response to the City Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons summary judgment is granted in favor

of Defendants on Plaintiff’s assault and battery, excessive force, and

false imprisonment claims. The City Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s IIED, NIED, invasion of privacy, and vicarious

liability claims is denied. Lastly, the County Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment based on statutory immunity under section 820.2 is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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