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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 15, 2003 Decided February 27 , 2004

No. 02-7063

ERIC GLASCOE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(00cv03118)

Aaron Cooper, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae on the side of appellants. With him on the

briefs was Robert D. Wick.

Eric Glascoe, Jibril L. Ibrahim, and Bobby Morgan, appearing pro se, were on the brief for appellants.

Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-7063 Document #806002 Filed: 02/27/2004 Page 1 of 5
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Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: RANDOLPH, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Precisely how long is an individual’s life span minus, say, five years and 10 days? One

cannot give a firm answer if the person is still alive. No

matter, say the three petitioners here, each of whom seeks a

deduction of good time credits from his maximum sentence of

life imprisonment. If we agree with their position, counters

the government, we will have converted indeterminate sentences into determinate sentences. The case turns on the

meaning of two provisions of the District of Columbia Code.

While serving terms of imprisonment of at least 15 years to

life, Eric Glascoe, Jibril L. Ibrahim and Bobby Morgan filed a

joint pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Each

petitioner had been convicted in the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia, and sentenced pursuant to the D.C.

Code in the 1980’s. Good time credits were applied to their

minimum sentences. The district court, Friedman, J., rejected their claim that the D.C. Good Time Credits Act of 1986,

D.C. CODE § 24–428 (repealed), also required good time credits to be applied to their maximum life sentences. Five

months after the district court denied their petition, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration under FED. R. CIV. P.

60(b). The district court denied the motion and petitioners

filed a notice of appeal. We referred to the district court the

question whether to grant them a certificate of appealability.

The court issued the certificate, certifying two issues: ‘‘(1)

whether institutional good time credit must be applied to a

maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and (2) whether a

maximum sentence of life imprisonment is deemed a term of

45 years for purpose of applying institutional good time credit

to the maximum sentence.’’ Glascoe v. United States, Civ.

Action No. 00–3118, Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, at 3 (D.D.C. July 11, 2002).

The government questions the timeliness of the appeal.

There is no doubt that the notice of appeal came too late to

USCA Case #02-7063 Document #806002 Filed: 02/27/2004 Page 2 of 5
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bring up the district court’s judgment denying the habeas

petition. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). But the order denying

reconsideration is properly before us. See Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). In

rejecting the motion the court again addressed the merits of

their case and granted a certificate of appealability on the

underlying issues. We may therefore decide those issues,

although we are confined to determining whether the district

court abused its discretion in resolving them against petitioners. Id.; see also Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia,

841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Enacted in 1987 and repealed in 1994, the Good Time

Credits Act, § 24–428, provided in relevant part:

(a) Every person who is convicted of a violation of

a District of Columbia (‘‘District’’) criminal law by a

court in the District of Columbia, imprisoned in a

District correctional facility, and whose conduct is in

conformity with all applicable institutional rules is

entitled to institutional good time credits in accordance with the provisions of this section.

TTTT

(b) Good time credits authorized by the provisions

of this section shall be applied to the person’s minimum term of imprisonment to determine the date of

eligibility for release on parole and to the person’s

maximum term of imprisonment to determine the

date when release on parole becomes mandatory.

The time credited per month depended on the length of

sentence. Good time credits of five days per month applied

to a sentence of ‘‘not less than 30 days and not more than 1

year,’’ the shortest term covered. § 24–428(a)(1). Credits of

ten days per month applied to a sentence of ‘‘10 years or

more,’’ the longest term covered. § 24–428(a)(5).

Petitioners, through the amicus curiae we appointed for

them (hereinafter ‘‘petitioners’’), argue that § 24–428 applied

to life sentences because it made ‘‘[e]very person’’ convicted

of violating D.C. criminal law eligible for good time credits

USCA Case #02-7063 Document #806002 Filed: 02/27/2004 Page 3 of 5
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and because it stated that good time credits ‘‘shall be applied

TTT to the person’s maximum term of imprisonment.’’ § 24–

428(a) & (b). The argument is quite implausible and the

district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting it.

Section 24–428 stated that good time credits were to be

granted ‘‘in accordance with the provisions of this section.’’

No such provision mentioned life imprisonment. This is

telling. It would be meaningless for prison authorities to

award a prisoner serving a life sentence 10 days of good time

credit each month, unless there is a reduction in the time he

must serve. In the usual case, the amount of the reduction is

easily calculated: the prisoner’s sentence minus good time

credits yields his release date. But imprisonment for life

supplies no fixed term from which to deduct good time

credits; the length of the sentence is indefinite. For this

reason, other courts have rejected arguments like petitioners’.

See, e.g., Hunt v. Warden, 903 P.2d 826, 829 (Nev. 1995);

Escalanti v. Dep’t of Corr., 851 P.2d 151, 153 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1993); Robinson v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 559, 560 (N.D. Ga.

1967). The rule of lenity, from which petitioners seek support for their interpretation of § 24–428, cannot assist them

in view of the implausibility of their position. United States v.

Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

To overcome the indeterminacy of life sentences, petitioners propose that they be treated as if they had been sentenced to a term of years. They invoke the Indeterminate

Sentence Act, D.C. CODE § 24–403(a). Under this provision, a

judge imposing a felony sentence must set a ‘‘minimum period

not exceeding one-third of the maximum sentence imposed’’;

if ‘‘the maximum sentence imposed is life imprisonment, a

minimum sentence shall be imposed which shall not exceed 15

years [sic] imprisonment.’’ § 24–403(a). Putting the two

clauses together, petitioners reason that they are entitled to

mandatory parole after 45 years; hence, 45 years is the fixed

term from which good time credits should be subtracted.

The argument assumes that one may calculate the maximum

term by tripling the minimum term. The equation holds true

for determinate sentences. It does not hold true for life

sentences. Three times 15 is 45; but one third of life is not

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necessarily 15. The life imprisonment clause, as the district

court rightly stated, is merely a default provision, added in

light of the impossibility of coming up with any definite term

of years when life is divided by three. Section 24–403 does

not convert life sentences into 45 year sentences. Still less

does it provide a fixed term from which to calculate a

prisoner’s release date by subtracting good time credits.

Petitioners’ alternative proposal is that we direct the government to employ an actuarial approach, estimating the

prisoner’s lifespan and deducting good time credits from that

figure. Whatever the merits of this idea as a matter of

policy, no statute supports it. To order it would be to

legislate.

We have considered and rejected petitioners’ other arguments.

Affirmed.

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