Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01779/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01779-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Daniel Patterson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Pima County Sheriff's Department, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01779-TUC-RM (EJM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Defendants Pima County Sheriff’s Office 

and Sheriff Clarence Dupnik as parties to this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

(Doc. 8). Also before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the complaint against Defendants 

City of Tucson and Michael Rankin pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 9). 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the 

undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 15). 

In this § 1983 action, Plaintiff Daniel Patterson alleges Defendants violated his 

civil rights when they served him with civil process and charged him with four 

misdemeanors while he was serving as an active member of the Arizona legislature. 

Patterson claims he was immune from civil process under Arizona’s legislative immunity 

statute. Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 6. 

Because oral argument would not aid the Court’s decisional process and the 

briefing is adequate, Defendants City of Tucson and Michael Rankin’s request for oral 

argument will be denied. See generally Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 

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F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Both motions have been fully briefed by the parties. For the reasons stated below, 

the Magistrate Judge recommends that both motions to dismiss be granted. First, the 

Pima County Sheriff’s Office is a non-jural entity incapable of being sued. Second, the 

complaint fails to allege a cause of action against Sheriff Clarence Dupnik in either his 

individual or official capacities because there is no allegation of his personal involvement 

or of an official government policy or practice. Third, Michael Rankin is entitled to 

absolute prosecutorial immunity because the charging decision falls within the scope of 

official prosecutorial functions. Finally, the complaint fails to state a valid § 1983 claim 

against the City of Tucson or Rankin because it fails to allege an official policy or 

practice that lead to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

Plaintiff Daniel Patterson filed this action on November 14, 2013, alleging claims 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 

States Constitution. (Doc. 1). Patterson is a former member of the Arizona Legislature. 

Patterson’s claims concern an alleged domestic violence incident that took place 

on February 24, 2012. Id. at 4, ¶ 13. Patterson states that after he called Tucson Police 

Department officers to his home, no arrests were made, and the officers informed the 

media that no charges would be filed. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. However, Patterson was later 

served with two orders of protection and was charged with four misdemeanors related to 

the incident. Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 19, 23-24. Patterson alleges that because he was a member of 

the legislature at the time these events transpired, he was granted immunity from civil 

process while the legislature was in session. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 25. Thus, Patterson alleges 

Defendants violated his civil rights when they served him with civil process and charged 

him with four misdemeanors while he was serving as an active member of the Arizona 

Legislature. 

In lieu of filing an answer, Defendants filed their respective motions to dismiss. 

II. Legal Standard 

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 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may grant a motion to dismiss when the 

plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

 A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the 

court’s jurisdiction,” a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief,” and “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 

8 does not demand factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must allege facts 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A claim must be plausible, allowing the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

 The Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, with every doubt resolved on his behalf, and with that party’s allegations taken as 

true. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, the 

court only considers the face of the complaint when deciding a motion under Rule 

12(b)(6). See Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

III. Discussion 

a. Defendants Pima County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Clarence Dupnik’s 

Motion to Dismiss 

Defendants Pima County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Clarence Dupnik request 

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that the Court dismiss them as parties pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 8). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief because Defendants 

are not parties who may properly be sued in this action. Specifically, Defendants argue 

that Pima County Sheriff’s Office is a non-jural entity incapable of being sued, that 

Plaintiff has failed to allege Sheriff Dupnik was personally involved in or caused the 

alleged constitutional violation, and that Plaintiff has failed to identify an official 

municipal policy allegedly causing the constitutional violation. 

Plaintiff devotes the majority of his response (Doc. 18)1

 to discussing the Rule 8 

pleading standard and reiterating his claims that the Arizona constitution forbids service 

of process on members of the legislature while the legislature is in session. Plaintiff fails 

to specifically address Defendants’ arguments that the Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff 

Dupnik, in his individual capacity, should be dismissed as parties. See LRCiv 7.2(i). 

i. Dismissal of Pima County Sheriff’s Office 

Whether a government entity has the capacity to be sued is determined by state 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). “Governmental entities have no inherent power and possess 

only those powers and duties delegated to them by their enabling statutes.” Braillard v. 

Maricopa Co., 224 Ariz. 481, 487 (2010). “In Arizona, a government entity may be sued 

only if the legislature has given that entity the power to be sued.” Payne v. Arpaio, 2009 

WL 3756679, *3 (D. Ariz.). In Braillard, the court found that “[a]lthough A.R.S. § 11-

201(A)(1) provides that counties have the power to sue and be sued through their board 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s Responses (Docs. 18 and 19) to both motions to dismiss were filed 

late, thus the District Court could strike the responses and summarily grant both motions due to Plaintiff’s failure to timely file his responsive memorandums. Pursuant to the 

Local Rules, responsive memorandums to Category One motions are due 17 days (14 days plus 3 days mailing time) after the motion is filed. (LRCiv App. A). The first motion to dismiss was filed February 28, 2014, thus Plaintiff’s response was due March 17, 2014. However, Plaintiff did not file his response until April 28, 2014. The second 

motion to dismiss was filed March 19, 2014, thus Plaintiff’s response was due April 7, 2014. However, Plaintiff did not file his response until April 27, 2014. Plaintiff did not 

file a motion for extension of time to file his responses or a motion for permission to late- file the responses. A plaintiff’s failure to oppose a motion is deemed to be his consent to 

it being granted. LRCiv 7.2(i). However, should the District Court wish to reach the 

merits of Plaintiff’s arguments despite his untimely filings, the Magistrate Judge will address the issues Plaintiff raises herein. 

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of supervisors, no Arizona statute confers such power on MCSO [Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office] as a separate legal entity.” 224 Ariz. At 487. The court further noted that 

“there is a consensus among Arizona federal decisions that city police departments 

generally are nonjural entities.” Id. Accordingly, a number of Arizona court decisions 

have found that sheriff’s offices are non-jural entities. See Payne, 2009 WL 3756679 at 

*8 (“the dispositive factor here is the Arizona legislature’s failure to confer separate jural 

status on [MCSO]”); Braillard, 224 Ariz. at 487; see also Gotbaum v. City of Phoenix, 

617 F.Supp.2d 878, 886 (D. Ariz. 2008) (finding Phoenix Police Department is not a 

separate entity for purposes of suit); Duqmaq v. Pima Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2012 WL 

1605888 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2012) (dismissing Pima County Sheriff’s Department as nonjural entity); Phillips v. Salt River Police Dep’t, 2013 WL 1797340 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 

2013) (Pima and Maricopa County Sherriff’s Departments are non-jural); Tarantino v. 

Dupnik, 2012 WL 1718893 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2012) (noting Pima County Sheriff’s 

Department is non-jural entity). 

Based on the lack of an Arizona statute granting sheriff’s offices the capacity to 

sue and be sued, prior court decisions dismissing sheriff’s departments as non-jural 

entities, and Plaintiff’s failure to address Defendants’ argument on this point (see LRCiv 

7.2(i)), the undersigned recommends dismissal of the Pima County Sheriff’s Office as a 

party to this action. 

ii. Dismissal of Sheriff Dupnik (individual capacity) 

“[T]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, [the plaintiff must] show that 

the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Further, “[u]nder Section 1983, 

supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious 

liability.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989). In order for a 

supervisor to be liable for the actions of his employees, there must be “either (1) his or 

her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” 

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Id. at 646. Thus, “a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through 

the official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

675. 

As Defendants note in their motion, Plaintiff’s complaint makes a general 

allegation that Dupnik is “responsible for the operation of the Pima County Sheriff’s 

Department and for all officers/deputies,” but the complaint does not allege that Dupnik 

was personally involved in the incident or that there is some causal connection between 

Dupnik’s alleged wrongful conduct and the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. (Doc. 8 at 4, quoting Doc. 1 at 3, ¶ 6); see Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (“Even from 

the point of view most favorable to [plaintiff], there is no allegation that the police chief 

was personally involved in the incident.”); see also Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 

(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that allegation of a specific policy for which a personal-capacity 

defendant is responsible is necessary to survive at 12(b)(6) motion). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet the standard set forth in Hansen, and fails to plausibly 

allege that Dupnik is personally liable for the actions of his employees. 

Based on the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint, as well Plaintiff’s failure to 

address Defendants’ argument on this point (see LRCiv 7.2(i)), the undersigned 

recommends dismissal of Dupnik in his personal capacity as a party to this action. 

iii. Dismissal of Sheriff Dupnik (official capacity) 

Official-capacity suits against an officer are generally treated as “an action against 

an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165 (quoting Monell v. 

New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). Further, “Section 

1983 suits against local governments alleging constitutional rights violations by 

government officials cannot rely solely on respondeat superior liability.” AE ex. rel. 

Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). “Instead, plaintiffs 

must establish that the local government had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that 

was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [they] suffered.” Id. (internal 

quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 

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166 (“in an official-capacity suit the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part 

in the violation of federal law”) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); Pembaur v. City of 

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (“The ‘official policy’ requirement [is] intended to 

distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and 

thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality 

is actually liable.”) (emphasis in original). A “bare allegation that government officials’ 

conduct conformed to some unidentified government policy or custom” is insufficient to 

state an official-capacity claim. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637 (conclusory allegation that 

defendant county had policies, customs, or practices relating to the custody and care of 

dependent minors failed to state a claim). 

Plaintiff asserts that “[l]ocal governing bodies ... can be sued directly under §1983 

for monetary ... relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 

implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially 

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” (Doc. 18 at 3-4, quoting Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)) (alterations in original). 

However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to identify any policy or regulation implemented by 

the sheriff’s office that lead to the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff merely 

makes the general claim in his response that, to the best of his knowledge, “Defendants 

Pima County Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff Clarence Dupnik have a policy or 

procedure in place that allowed individual deputies to unconstitutionally serve Plaintiff as 

a member of the Arizona Legislature while the legislator was in session.” (Doc. 18 at 4). 

Even if this statement did appear in Plaintiff’s complaint, as the court noted in 

Hernandez, this kind of bare allegation is insufficient to state an official-capacity claim. 

See also Nevels v. Maricopa County, 2012 WL 1623217, * 3 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2012) 

(quoting Hernandez, and finding the plaintiff’s complaint insufficient where it failed to 

“identify any specific policies or customs ... or explain how those policies led to the 

deprivation of his constitutional rights.”); Fernandez v. City of Phoenix, 2012 WL 

2343621, *2 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2012) (“Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts concerning 

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the City’s particular policies, practices or customs surrounding excessive force. Their 

non-specific allegation is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”); Muhammed v. 

Pima County Sheriff’s Dept., 2012 WL 1605888, * 3 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2012) (“to prevail 

on § 1983 claim ... Plaintiff must show a formal departmental policy or a longstanding 

practice causing the alleged civil rights violation.”). 

Further, the Magistrate Judge finds Plaintiff’s argument that his official-capacity 

claim against Dupnik should be allowed to proceed so that he may undertake discovery 

regarding the two Doe Defendants unpersuasive. Plaintiff notes that these two individuals 

are currently unknown to him, but that he believes their identities will become known 

during the discovery process. (Doc. 18 at 4). While Plaintiff may certainly undertake 

discovery to learn the identities of the officers, there is no reason that Dupnik must 

remain as a party in order for Plaintiff to discover the Defendant Does. Moreover, as 

Defendants point out, this information is likely already available to Plaintiff through 

either a public records request or by obtaining a copy of the affidavit of service. (Doc. 20 

at 4). In any event, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff will sufficiently be able to 

discover the identities of the Doe Defendants without Dupnik being sued in his official 

capacity. 

Based on the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint and its failure to identify a 

specific government policy or custom that allegedly resulted in the denial of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights, the undersigned recommends dismissal of Dupnik in his official 

capacity as a party to this action. 

b. Defendants City of Tucson and Michael Rankin’s Motion to Dismiss 

 Defendants City of Tucson and Michael Rankin request the Court dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 9). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief because Defendant 

Rankin has absolute prosecutorial immunity. Defendants also argue Plaintiff has not 

stated a proper claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Plaintiff has (1) “fail[ed] to 

identify any unconstitutional custom or policy of the City of Tucson or of Rankin ... that 

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can be brought under Section 1983[;]” (2) that there is no § 1983 cause of action “for an 

alleged violation of a right provided in the Arizona Constitution[;]” and (3) that § 1983 

“is not a source of substantive rights.” (Doc. 9 at 4-6). 

Plaintiff’s response focuses only on the issue of Defendant Rankin’s immunity,2

arguing that Rankin did not have colorable authority to file charges against Plaintiff while 

he was an active member of the legislature. (Doc. 16 at 2-3). 

i. Prosecutorial Immunity 

 “Prosecutors performing their official prosecutorial functions are entitled to 

absolute immunity against constitutional torts.” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 

912 (9th Cir. 2012); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(prosecutors “functioning in their official capacities” are entitled to absolute immunity). 

“A state prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for 

violating a person’s federal constitutional rights when he or she engages in activities 

‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Broam v. Bogan, 

320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 

(1976)). “A prosecutor is granted only qualified immunity, however, if he or she is 

performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a 

police officer or detective.” Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028. Thus, as long as the prosecutor’s 

action is part of the judicial process, he is entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 1029. 

Though “[d]eterming what functions are prosecutorial is an inexact science[, t]he 

functions are those ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,’ 

in which the prosecutor is acting as ‘an officer of the court.’” Lacey, 693 F.3d at 912 

(quoting Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009)). “Absolute immunity also 

protects those functions in which the prosecutor acts as an ‘advocate for the State,’ even 

if they ‘involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart 

from the courtroom.’” Id. (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)). “Functions 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s conclusion specifically asks the Court only “to allow the action against Defendant Rankin to proceed,” suggesting Plaintiff concedes to dismissal of Defendant 

City of Tucson. (Doc. 16 at 3). 

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for which absolute prosecutorial immunity have been granted include the lawyerly 

functions of organizing and analyzing evidence and law, and then presenting evidence 

and analysis to the courts and grand juries on behalf of the government; they also include 

internal decisions and processes that determine how those functions will be carried out.” 

Id. at 913; see e.g. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (prosecutor’s preparation 

and filing of an information and motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute 

immunity); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 (absolute immunity for initiating a prosecution and 

presenting the state’s case); Roe v. City & County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 584 

(9th Cir. 1997) (“prosecutor’s professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the 

police is entitled to absolute immunity”); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 n. 5 

(1993) (absolute immunity shields “prosecutor’s decision to bring an indictment, whether 

he has probable cause or not”). Further, “[t]he intent of the prosecutor when performing 

prosecutorial acts plays no role in the immunity inquiry.” McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 

1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Here, Plaintiff argues that he should not have been charged with the four 

misdemeanor crimes related to the domestic violence incident. However, the charging 

decision is one of the prosecutor’s main responsibilities, and certainly falls within the 

scope of “official prosecutorial functions.” Lacey, 693 F.3d at 912; see also Hansen v. 

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 464 (9th Cir. 1989) (absolute prosecutorial immunity for charging 

decision). The fact that Plaintiff was later found not guilty is irrelevant to the fact that, 

when Rankin made the decision to file charges, he was engaged in one of the core 

activities “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Broam, 

320 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). 

Plaintiff also argues the applicable standard for prosecutorial immunity is based on 

a case from the Second Circuit, which uses an “acting under colorable authority” test. 

Bernard v. Co of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495 (2nd Cir. 2004). In that case, the court stated that 

“as long as a prosecutor acts with colorable authority, absolute immunity shields his 

performance of advocative functions regardless of motivation.” Id. at 498. Thus, the 

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Second Circuit’s test focuses on “whether the acts at issue are beyond the prosecutor’s 

authority.” Id. at 504 (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiff uses Bernard to reason that, because Rankin knew Plaintiff was a state 

legislator and that the legislature was in session, and because the Arizona Constitution 

grants legislators privilege from arrest, “Rankin did not have colorable authority” to file 

charges against Plaintiff. (Doc. 16 at 3). However, the court in Bernard also noted that 

“if an act is within a prosecutor’s jurisdiction as a judicial officer, absolute immunity 

attaches to his actions, regardless of his motivation.” 356 F.3d at 504 (internal quotations 

and citation omitted). Not only has there been no allegation that Rankin acted on 

improper motivation, but certainly it is within Rankin’s prosecutorial jurisdiction to file 

criminal charges when it appears someone has violated the law. Furthermore, Plaintiff 

fails to point out that Bernard favorably cites the Ninth Circuit on the issue of intent and 

immunity: 

In [Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986)], the 

court ruled that “[i]ntent should play no role in the immunity analysis,” and that even self-interested prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity because the initiation of 

criminal proceedings is conduct well within the advocative 

function. 

Bernard, 356 F.3d at 505 (quoting Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078). 

 Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on a Second Circuit case that applies a wholly different 

standard than that applied by the Ninth Circuit is misplaced. There has been no allegation 

of improper motive by Rankin, and even if there was, motive plays no role in the 

immunity analysis when the prosecutor is acting within the scope of his prosecutorial 

duties (under both the Second and Ninth Circuit standards). Moreover, the “colorable 

authority” test has no place in the courts of our circuit, and it does not apply to the case at 

hand. 

 Further, even if the colorable authority test applied here, the legislative immunity 

statute Plaintiff cites specifically excludes immunity for certain categories of crimes: 

“Members of the legislature shall be privileged from arrest in all cases except treason, 

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felony, and breach of the peace, and they shall not be subject to any civil process during 

the session of the legislature... ”Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 6. Here, the Court lacks 

specific information as to the crimes Plaintiff was charged with, other than the fact that 

they were related to the domestic violence incident at Plaintiff’s home. Under Arizona 

law, “domestic violence” includes crimes ranging from violent felonies against children 

to such crimes as endangerment, threatening or intimidating, assault, aggravated assault, 

custodial interference, unlawful imprisonment, kidnapping, trespass, disorderly conduct, 

and criminal damage. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-3601. While there is no specific definition 

of “breach of the peace” in the Arizona Criminal Code or the Arizona Constitution, the 

term has “long been understood to mean disruption of public order by acts that are 

themselves violent or that tend to incite others to violence.” State v. Starsky, 106 Ariz. 

329, 331 (1970); see also State ex rel. Williams v. Superior Court In & For Pima Cnty., 

20 Ariz. App. 282, 283 (1973) (“A ‘disturbance of the peace’ is a disturbance of public 

tranquility or order and may be created by any act which molests inhabitants in the 

enjoyment of peace and quiet or excites disquietude or fear.”). Moreover, the Ninth 

Circuit has noted that “the Supreme Court has read the ‘breach of the peace’ exception to 

federal legislators’ immunity from arrest to encompass ‘all criminal offenses.’” Picray v. 

Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Williamson v. United States, 207 

U.S. 425, 446 (1908)). 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that even if Rankin was not 

entitled to prosecutorial immunity, which the undersigned finds he is, and even if the 

Second Circuit’s colorable authority test did apply, that test is met here because the 

charges brought against Plaintiff fall under the legislative immunity statute’s exception 

for crimes related to “breach of the peace.” Accordingly, the undersigned recommends 

dismissal of Rankin as a party to this action. 

ii. Failure to Identify A Specific Policy or Custom 

 As discussed above in section III. a. iii., to maintain a § 1983 action against a local 

government, a “plaintiff[] must establish that the local government had a deliberate 

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policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation 

[he] suffered.” AE ex. rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 

2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Although Plaintiff’s complaint makes a 

general allegation that “[t]he constitutional violations and torts committed by the 

Defendants resulted from policies and customs of the City of Tucson,” Plaintiff fails to 

identify any such policy or custom that caused the alleged deprivation of his rights under 

§ 1983.3

 (Doc. 1 at 2, ¶5). This type of bare allegation is insufficient to state a § 1983 

claim against Rankin or the City of Tucson.4 See Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637 (conclusory 

allegation that defendant county had policies, customs, or practices relating to the custody 

and care of dependent minors failed to state a claim); see also Nevels, 2012 WL 1623217 

at * 3 (quoting Hernandez, and finding the plaintiff’s complaint insufficient where it 

failed to “identify any specific policies or customs ... or explain how those policies led to 

the deprivation of his constitutional rights.”); Fernandez, 2012 WL 2343621 at *2 

(“Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts concerning the City’s particular policies, practices 

or customs surrounding excessive force. Their non-specific allegation is not sufficient to 

 

3

 Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for parties deprived of constitutional rights by officials acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in order to state a 

valid § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must show that he or she has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and ... laws of the United States and that the deprivation was under color of state law.” Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Plaintiff seeks relief under § 1983 based on an alleged violation of the Arizona Constitution— the right of members of the legislature to be exempt from arrest while the legislature is in session. Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 6. Section 1983 only applies to rights secured by the United States Constitution; thus, Plaintiff cannot seek relief for violation 

of an Arizona Constitution provision. Further, although Count One of Plaintiff’s complaint seeks § 1983 damages, Plaintiff does not name any federal constitutional rights that Defendants allegedly violated as the basis for these damages. Accordingly, Count One could also be dismissed for this reason as well. 

4

 Further, a bare and conclusory allegation fails to comply with the Rule 8 

pleading standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly. See Iqbal, 129 

S.Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions”). 

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survive a motion to dismiss.”). 

Because the complaint fails to identify a specific policy or custom of Rankin or the 

City of Tucson that led to the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the 

undersigned recommends dismissal the lawsuit against Defendants Rankin and City of 

Tucson. The Court also notes Plaintiff’s lack of opposition to Defendants’ arguments on 

this point may be deemed consent to granting Defendants’ motion. See LRCiv 7.2(i). 

IV. Recommendation 

 The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT 

Defendants Pima County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Clarence Dupnik’s Motion to 

Dismiss them as parties. (Doc. 8). 

 The Magistrate Judge further RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT 

Defendants City of Tucson and Michael Rankin’s Motion to Dismiss the claims against 

them. (Doc. 9). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the District 

Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 7th day of August, 2014. 

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