Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARTHEL DENNIS BORING, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, a 

limited liability company,

1

Defendant.

No. 2:13-CV-1404-GEB-CMK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”) seeks 

summary judgment, or alternatively, partial summary judgment on 

each claim in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). 

Plaintiff’s TAC consists of five claims alleged under California 

law: three claims are under the California Civil Code, a claim 

under the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and a claim 

that Nationstar breached the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party is entitled to summary judgment if 

“the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the 

 

1 This caption has been amended based on Plaintiff’s Stipulation of 

Voluntary Dismissal filed August 12, 2015. (ECF No. 86.) 

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movant is entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law.” . . . The moving party has 

the burden of establishing the absence of a 

genuine dispute of material fact.

City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (citing Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “A fact is ‘material’ when, 

under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome 

of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. 

Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A “dispute about 

a material fact is ‘genuine,’ . . . if the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary judgment “evidence 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of 

that party.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. 

Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001)).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is 

genuinely disputed must support the assertion 

by . . . citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record . . . or . . . 

showing that the materials do not establish 

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, 

or that an adverse party cannot produce 

admissible evidence to support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

However, if the nonmovant does not 

“specifically . . . [controvert duly 

supported] facts identified in the [movant’s] 

statement of undisputed facts,” the nonmovant 

“is deemed to have admitted the validity of 

the facts contained in the [movant’s] 

statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 

Case 2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK Document 88 Filed 08/17/15 Page 2 of 16
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(2006). A district court has “no independent 

duty ‘to scour the record in search of a 

genuine issue of triable fact.’”

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 

1996)).

II. Objections

A. Plaintiff’s Objections

Plaintiff objects to certain evidence Nationstar

presents in support of its motion. Plaintiff objects under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 to paragraphs 8-13, 15-18, and 20 

of the Declaration of Fay Janati. Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 

prescribes, “[a]n original writing . . . is required in order to 

prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute 

provides otherwise.” Janati avers in her declaration that she is 

a Litigation Resolution Analyst for Nationstar and that her 

knowledge of the information contained in her declaration is 

“based upon [her review of] the business records pertaining to 

the . . . case.” (Janati Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 75-3.)

Nationstar responds that Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 

permits consideration of the referenced paragraphs since Janati’s 

averments are a summary of multiple documents and Rule 1006

states “[t]he proponent [of documentary evidence] may use a 

summary . . . to prove the content of voluminous writings . . . 

that cannot be conveniently examined in court.” However, 

Nationstar has not shown the documents Janati avers to have 

summarized are so voluminous they cannot be conveniently examined 

in court.

///

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Plaintiff’s objections to paragraphs 8-9 are sustained, 

except as to the portions of the paragraphs Plaintiff admits are 

“undisputed” in his response to Defendant’s Statement of 

Undisputed Facts. (Pl. Resp. Def. Statement Undisputed Facts 

(“SUF”) ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 77-2.) Plaintiff’s objection to 

paragraphs 11-12 and 15 are sustained. Plaintiff’s objections to 

paragraphs 10 and 13 are overruled since Plaintiff admits in his 

response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts that the 

referenced portions of the Janati declaration are “undisputed.” 

(SUF ¶¶ 9, 11.) Plaintiff’s objections to paragraphs 16-18 and 20 

are overruled because the referenced portions of the declaration 

do not disclose the content of a writing. See United States v. 

Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding the best 

evidence rule applies when secondary evidence is offered to prove 

the content of a writing).

B. Nationstar’s Objections

Nationstar also objects to certain of Plaintiff’s 

evidence. Nationstar objects to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 3, and 5-11 

attached to the Boring Declaration and to Exhibits 18-23 attached 

to the Cho Declaration submitted in support of Plaintiff’s 

opposition to Nationstar’s motion. Nationstar argues the 

referenced exhibits were not disclosed in discovery as required 

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26 and therefore 

under Rule 37 cannot be used in support of Plaintiff’s 

opposition.2

 

2 Nationstar also argues the referenced exhibits should be disregarded 

since they do not support a claim in Plaintiff’s TAC. However, Nationstar 

fails to adequately show that the referenced exhibits are irrelevant to the 

claims in Plaintiff’s TAC. Therefore, its objection is overruled. 

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Plaintiff responds that any failure to provide the 

referenced documents in discovery was harmless since the 

documents are correspondence between Plaintiff and Nationstar 

employees and therefore would be in Nationstar’s possession even 

if not disclosed by Plaintiff. 

Nationstar replies that Plaintiff assumes Nationstar 

keeps such communications indefinitely, but does not assert such 

an assumption is incorrect or that Nationstar lacked copies of 

the relevant communications. 

Rule 26(a) and (e) state discovery disclosure 

requirements and “Rule 37(c)(1) provides that a party failing to 

provide information required by Rule 26(a) or (e) ‘is not allowed 

to use that information . . . to supply evidence on a motion... 

unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.’” 

Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 1179 

(9th Cir. 2008) (first alteration in original) (citing Rule 

37(c)(1)). 

Exhibits 3 and 5-11 attached to the Boring declaration 

are letters and e-mail correspondence between Plaintiff and 

Nationstar employees. Exhibit 18 attached to the Cho declaration 

is a proof of service demonstrating when Exhibits 9-11 were 

provided to Nationstar and Exhibits 9-11 are e-mail 

correspondence between Plaintiff and Nationstar employees. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has shown its failure to provide the 

referenced exhibits to Nationstar prior to the discovery 

completion date was harmless since Nationstar was a party to each 

correspondence. Nationstar’s objection is overruled. 

///

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III. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

The following facts concerning the motion are either 

admitted or “deemed” uncontroverted since they have not been 

controverted with specific facts as required by Local Rule 

260(b), which prescribes: 

Any party opposing a motion for summary 

judgment . . . [must] reproduce the itemized 

facts in the [moving party’s] Statement of 

Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that 

are undisputed and deny those that are 

disputed, including with each denial a 

citation to the particular portions of any... 

document relied upon in support of that 

denial.

Plaintiff obtained a loan from Countrywide Bank, FSB, 

secured by real property (“the Property”) in October 2007. (SUF ¶ 

1.) The loan was transferred to Nationstar on or about November 

15, 2011. (SUF ¶¶ 2-5.) At the time of the transfer, Plaintiff 

was past due on three payments. (SUF ¶ 6.) Plaintiff submitted an 

application to Nationstar for a loan modification in January 2012 

and provided additional documents supporting his application in 

May 2012. (SUF ¶ 11.) Nationstar assigned Foreclosure Prevention 

Specialist Amber Orebaugh as a Single Point of Contact (“SPOC”) 

for Plaintiff’s loan modification application; in a letter dated 

May 8, 2013, Nationstar notified Plaintiff his SPOC had been 

changed to Chanc Davis; in a letter dated May 10, 2013, 

Nationstar notified Plaintiff his SPOC has been changed to Ryan 

Revalski; and in a letter dated June 20, 2013 Nationstar notified 

Plainitff his SPOC had been changed to Christopher Anderson. (SUF 

¶¶ 30-33.) 

The parties dispute whether Nationstar ever issued a 

decision regarding Plaintiff’s May 2012 loan modification 

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application, but it is uncontroverted that in a letter dated May 

22, 2012, Nationstar offered Plaintiff a Home Affordable 

Unemployment Forbearance Agreement (“the Forbearance Agreement”). 

(SUF ¶ 12.) The Forbearance Agreement required Plaintiff to make 

deferral periodic payments on or before July 1, 2012; August 1, 

2012; and September 1, 2012. (SUF ¶¶ 14, 17.) Nationstar received 

deferral payments from Plaintiff in July and August 2012, but has 

no records of Plaintiff making a September payment. (SUF ¶¶ 18, 

20.) Nationstar issued a demand letter on October 10, 2012 

stating Plaintiff was in default on his loan. (SUF ¶ 23.) The 

October 10, 2012 letter also notified Plaintiff his overdue 

payments were to be made by “certified funds, cashier’s check or 

money order.” (SUF ¶ 24.) 

A Notice of Default was recorded on March 5, 2013 and a 

Notice of Sale was recorded on May 31, 2013, setting a sale date 

of June 26, 2013. (SUF ¶¶ 27-29.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. California Civil Code Section 2924(a)

Nationstar seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim 

alleging it “violated [section 2924(a)] when it recorded a Notice 

of . . . Sale [for the Property] less than three months after the 

recording of the Notice of Default for [the Property],” (TAC ¶ 

27), arguing that the Notice of Sale was recorded more than 85 

days after the Notice of Default, and the sale date was 113 days 

after the Notice of Default in accordance with section 

2924(a)(4). (Not. Mot. & Mot. Summ. J. (“Mot.”) 5:17-21, ECF No. 

75.) Nationstar cites in support of its position the 

uncontroverted facts establishing that the Notice of Default was 

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recorded on March 5, 2013; the Notice of Sale was recorded on May 

31, 2013; and the Notice of Sale set a sale date for June 26, 

2013. (SUF ¶¶ 26-28.) 

Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. 

California Civil Code section 2924(a)(2) states a 

trustee must wait at least 90 days after recording a Notice of 

Default before recording a Notice of Sale. However, section 

2924(a)(4) states the Notice of Sale may be made “up to five days 

before the lapse of the [90-day] period described in paragraph 

(2), provided that the date of sale is no earlier than [110 days] 

after the recording of the notice of default.” 

Since the uncontroverted facts establish the Notice of 

Sale was recorded 87 days after the Notice of Default and the 

date of sale was set for 113 days after the Notice of Default, 

this portion of Nationstar’s motion is granted. 

B. California Civil Code Section 2923.6

Nationstar seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim 

that it recorded the Notice of Default and Notice of Sale while 

Plaintiff’s May 2012 loan modification application was still 

pending, in violation of California Civil Code section 2923.6.

(TAC ¶ 30.) Nationstar argues Plaintiff’s May 2012 loan 

modification application was not pending when the notices were 

recorded. Nationstar also argues it denied Plaintiff’s loan 

modification application in a letter dated May 22, 2012 when it 

offered Plaintiff the Forbearance Agreement in lieu of a loan 

modification. (Mot. 7:24-26.) The May 22 letter contains two 

documents; the first states “[t]hank you for your inquiry 

regarding the Home Affordable Unemployment Program (UP) which 

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grants borrowers a forbearance plan during which regular monthly 

mortgage payments are reduced or suspended[;]” “Nationstar . . . 

will review your eligibility and contact you if more information 

is needed to qualify for participation in the UP.” (Janati Decl. 

Ex. E, ECF No. 75-3.). The second document states: 

We have received your request for the Making 

Home Affordable Modification Program. Please 

find enclosed the following documents that 

must be completed in full and returned to 

Nationstar Mortgage in order for us to fully 

evaluate your request. In order to be 

considered for this program, these documents 

must be returned (sic) 06/21/2012. During the 

evaluation period, your home will not be 

referred to foreclosure or be sold at a 

foreclosure sale if the foreclosure process 

has already been initiated.

(Janati Decl. Ex. E.) Nationstar also argues an undated e-mail 

from Amber Orebaugh to Plaintiff supports its position. The email responds to Plaintiff’s June 4, 2012 inquiry asking why 

Nationstar sent him a request for additional paperwork regarding 

his loan modification application, and states:

You are probably receiving the [application] 

packet because you have qualified for the 

unemployment program and have been set up on 

it. Once you have a job, you can apply for a 

permanent modification so hang on to that 

packet until you have a job and can apply. In 

the mean time please give me a call so I can 

go over the unemployment program with you.

(Ladi Decl. Ex. A (“Boring Dep. Tr.”) Ex. 12, ECF No. 75-2.) 

Plaintiff contends Nationstar did not provide him a 

written determination that his May 2012 loan modification 

application was denied and argues “contrary to [Nationstar’s 

position] that [it] offered the Forbearance Agreement in lieu of 

a permanent loan modification, . . . the [May 22, 2012] letter 

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specifically contemplates a contemporaneous review for a loan 

modification during a portion of the forbearance period.” (Opp’n 

1:9-10.) Plaintiff cites as support for his position the May 22, 

2012 letter from Nationstar, which states in pertinent part:

“[d]uring the Deferral Period [in the Forbearance Agreement], 

[Plaintiff] will be evaluated for the Home Affordable 

Modification Program.” (Boring Decl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 77-5.) 

California Civil Code section 2923.6 states in part: 

[i]f a borrower submits a complete 

application for a loan modification . . . a 

mortgage servicer . . . [or] trustee . . . 

shall not record a notice of default or a 

notice of sale . . . while the complete first 

lien loan modification application is 

pending. A mortgage servicer [or] trustee ... 

shall not record a notice of default or 

notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale 

until any of the following occurs: (1) the 

mortgage services make a written 

determination that the borrower is not 

eligible for a first lien loan modification . 

. . (2) the borrower does not accept an 

offered first lien loan modification within 

14 days of the offer [or] (3) the borrower 

accepts a written first lien loan 

modification, but defaults on, or otherwise 

breaches the borrower’s obligations under, 

the first lien loan modification.

Plaintiff declares he submitted “a complete application 

for a loan modification” to Nationstar in May 2012. (Boring Decl. 

¶ 9.) Therefore, the May 22, 2012 letter demonstrates that a

genuine issue of fact exists concerning whether his application 

was pending when the Notice of Default and Notice of Sale were 

recorded in 2013. Therefore, Nationstar’s motion is denied. 

C. California Civil Code Section 2923.7

Nationstar seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim 

alleging it violated California Civil Code section 2923.7(b) by 

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assigning his loan modification application to more than one 

SPOC, and because each SPOC failed to timely communicate with 

him. (TAC ¶¶ 28-29.)

1. More Than One SPOC

Nationstar argues it did not violate section 2923.7 by 

changing Plaintiff’s SPOC since “[t]here is nothing in section 

2923.7 that precludes a SPOC from changing over the course of 

time.” (Mot. 6:11-12.) 

Plaintiff responds that his section 2923.7 claim “is 

not based on the theory that the [SPOC] changed over time.” (Pl. 

Opp’n Def. Mot. Summ. J. (“Opp’n”) 10:10-21, ECF No. 77.) No 

controversy exists concerning this claim since the does not 

exist. 

2. Failure To Communicate

Nationstar argues Plaintiff’s claim that it violated 

section 2923.7 by failing to timely communicate with him about 

his May 2012 loan modification application fails since “Plaintiff 

made only minimal attempts to contact [the SPOCs who were 

responsible for his account after Amber Orebaugh]” and therefore 

“cannot affirmatively state that these [SPOCs] failed to provide 

him any information.” (Mot. 7:5-6; 7:11-13.) Nationstar supports 

its position citing a portion of position Plaintiff’s deposition 

testimony, in which he testifies that he “tried to contact Chanc 

Davis” by phone but “never got ahold of [him],” and did not 

remember if he attempted to leave a message; that he “tr[ied] to 

contact Mr. Anderson,” by phone but “did not” “get ahold of 

[him],” and did not “leave him a message” since Plaintiff 

“couldn’t get anywhere with anybody else,” and did not know 

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“[w]hy [Anderson] would be any different”; and did not recall if 

he ever tried to call Mr. Revalski or if he ever left a message 

for him. (Boring Dep. Tr. 100:12-105:21.) 

Plaintiff responds that his SPOCs “failed altogether to 

communicate with [him] regarding his loan modification 

application,” (Opp’n 10:21-23), citing his declaration in which 

he avers “each time [he] attempted to reach [his SPOC, he] was 

informed that they were in a meeting, out to lunch, or off for 

the day,” and that he “requested [his] SPOC to contact [him], 

however, [he] never received a response.” (Boring Decl. ¶ 18.) 

California Civil Code section 2923.7(a) states that 

“[u]pon request from a borrower who requests a foreclosure 

prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall promptly 

establish a [“SPOC”] and provide to the borrower one or more 

means of communication with that [SPOC].” Section 2923.7(b)(4). 

Section 2923.7(b) states in pertinent part that responsibilities 

of an SPOC include, inter alia, “[h]aving access to current 

information and personnel sufficient to timely, accurately, and 

adequately inform the borrower of the current status of the 

foreclosure prevention alternative.”

The uncontroverted facts establish Orebaugh served as 

Plaintiff’s initial SPOC, and that the SPOC role was subsequently 

reassigned to Chanc Davis on May 8, 2013; to Ryan Revalski on May 

10, 2013; and to Christopher Anderson on June 10, 2013. (SUF ¶¶ 

30-33.) Plaintiff has presented evidence from which a reasonable 

inference can be drawn that these individuals were not available 

to speak with him and did not return his phone calls during the 

time they were assigned as his SPOC. Therefore, Nationstar’s

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motion on this issue is denied. 

D. UCL

Nationstar seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s UCL 

claim alleging its conduct “constitutes unlawful business 

practices” because Nationstar’s “violation of Civil Code 2924(a) 

and 2923.6 constitutes unlawful conduct under [the UCL].” (TAC ¶¶ 

45-46.) Since Nationstar’s summary judgment motion on the section 

2924(a) claim was granted, Nationstar’s motion concerning the UCL 

claim predicated on a violation of section 2924(a) is also 

granted. Nationstar further argues Plaintiff’s UCL claim 

predicated on section 2923.6 fails since a UCL claim requires a 

showing of damage, and the damages Plaintiff claims to have 

suffered “arose from [his] own conduct” since “he did not make 

all of the required payments that were due” on his loan. (Mot. 

11:3-6.) Nationstar cites in support of its position the 

undisputed facts that when Plaintiff’s loan was transferred to 

Nationstar in 2011, Plaintiff was behind on three mortgage loan 

payments. (SUF ¶ 6.) 

Plaintiff responds that as a result of Nationstar’s 

violation of section 2923.6 he “suffered accumulation of 

foreclosure fees and the imminent loss of his [P]roperty[,] and 

had to incur attorneys’ fees and costs in bringing the instant 

lawsuit.” (Opp’n 14:25-27.) 

To succeed on a UCL claim, Plaintiff must “h[ave] 

suffered injury in fact and h[ave] lost money or property as a

result of the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 

17204. 

There are innumerable ways in which economic 

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injury from unfair competition may be shown. 

A plaintiff may (1) surrender in a 

transaction more, or acquire in a transaction 

less, than he or she otherwise would have; 

(2) have a present or future property 

interest diminished; (3) be deprived of money 

or property to which he or she has a 

cognizable claim; or (4) be required to enter 

into a transaction, costing money or 

property, that would otherwise have been 

unnecessary. 

Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 323 (2011). 

Plaintiff’s section 2923.6 claim alleges Nationstar 

acted unlawfully “when it recorded the Notice of Default on March 

5, 2013 and the subsequent Notice of Trustee Sale on May 31, 

2013” since Plaintiff’s May 2012 loan modification application 

was still under review. (TAC ¶ 30.) However, there is no genuine 

issue of material fact concerning whether Plaintiff “lost money 

or property” as a result of Nationstar’s actions since Plaintiff 

was behind in his loan payments at the time the Notice of Default 

and Notice of Sale were recorded. Therefore, Nationstar’s motion 

is granted. 

E. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 

Dealing

Nationstar seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim alleging it 

breached the covenant “in or around August 2012” by “fr[eezing] 

Plaintiff’s account and prevent[ing] him from making his monthly 

mortgage payments [online as he had previously done].” (TAC ¶ 

41.) Nationstar argues “the reason that Plaintiff could not make 

payments online . . . was because Nationstar issued a demand 

letter dated October 10, 2012 that required Plaintiff to make his 

past due payments in certified funds, cashier’s check, or money 

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order mailed to Nationstar;” Nationstar cites Little v. Pullman, 

219 Cal. App. 4th 558, 567 (2013), for the proposition that “a 

creditor who does not wish to be paid in [a particular] manner 

may refuse to accept the tender on the ground that it does not 

constitute a lawful offer of money.” (Mot. 9:3-5.) Nationstar 

supports its position citing a certified letter sent to Plaintiff 

dated October 10, 2012, which states: “Nationstar Mortgage LLC 

requests that all payments be made in certified funds, cashier’s 

check or money order(s) payable to and mailed to Nationstar 

Mortgage, LLC.” (Janati Decl. Ex. G, ECF No. 75-3.) Nationstar 

also argues Plaintiff did not suffer any damages from the account 

freeze because his “damages arose from [his] own conduct when he 

previously did not make all of the required [loan] payments that 

were due.” (Mot. 9:4-7; 10:4; 10:6-8.) 

Plaintiff responds Nationstar’s October 10 letter 

cannot justify his account freeze since Nationstar froze his 

account prior to sending the letter, citing as support for his 

position a portion of his declaration, in which he avers “[i]n or 

around August or September 2012, [he] attempted to make . . . 

online payments [toward his loan] . . . but was met with a screen 

indicating that [his] account was blocked. [He] immediately 

contacted [his] customer service manager, Ms. Orebaugh, but [he] 

was unable to reach her.” (Boring Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 77-5.) 

Plaintiff also argues he suffered damages from the account freeze 

because Nationstar assessed late fees to his account, citing

Nationstar’s “Payment History Transaction Report,” which shows a 

$40.48 late fee assessed to Plaintiff’s account. (Cho Decl. Ex. 

15, ECF No. 77-2.) 

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Plaintiff’s evidence that Nationstar froze his account 

prior to providing notice that it was changing its policy and 

would no longer accept online payments, and Plaintiff’s evidence 

that he was assessed late fees when he could not pay his mortgage 

because his account was frozen, creates disputed facts preventing 

summary judgment. See Mardikian v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 1:14-

cv-0407-LJO-SKO, 2014 WL 3615253, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2014)

(considering late fees as a adequately alleged damages); Johnson 

v. Aurora Bank, FSB, No. 14-cv-5424-JSC, 2015 WL 1306466, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015) (same). 

Therefore, Nationstar’s motion is denied. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Nationstar’s motion is GRANTED 

in part and DENIED in part. 

Dated: August 14, 2015

Case 2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK Document 88 Filed 08/17/15 Page 16 of 16