Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01804/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01804-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tamara Sue DeBinder, et al. ) No. CV 06-1804-PCT-PGR

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

)

Albertson’s, Inc., et al. )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________)

Currently pending before the Court is the Defendants Don Wagner, D.O., P.C. and

Sandra Lubinski’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 67). After considering the

arguments of the parties through the papers submitted, the Court now rules on the motion.

I. BACKGROUND 

On December 8, 2005 Defendant Albertson's dba Sav-On Drugs ("Sav-On Drugs")

received a telephone refill prescription. Upon arriving at work on December 9, 2005 at

approximately 8:00 a.m., Sav-On Drugs’ employee Rachel Brown was provided with a

"post-it" note regarding a prescription for Plaintiff Tamara DeBinder. Brown found the

prescription suspicious for the following reasons: (1) The prescription had been called in

after a doctor's office's normal business hours; (2) all the required information was not

entered in the system; and (3) Sav-On Drugs's records indicated that "Wagner" had never

before prescribed Fiorinal with Codeine for Debinder.

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

In light of the suspicious nature of the prescription, Brown allegedly contacted Don

Wagner, D.O., P.C. and spoke with someone from Wagner's office. Brown was informed

that Wagner had no record of ever seeing Tammy DeBinder, that DeBinder was not Wagner's

patient, and that Wagner had not authorized a refill prescription for DeBinder. However,

Sav-On Drugs's records did indicate that DeBinder had been prescribed Fiorinal with

Codeine by Anne Bums, M.D. 

After calling Wagner's office, Brown contacted Burns' office with regard to the

prescription. Brown was informed that Burns was on maternity leave and had not authorized

a refill prescription for DeBinder. After speaking with Burns' office, Brown called Wagner's

office a second time and spoke with Wagner's nurse-office manager, Defendant Sandra

Lubinski ("Lubinski") about the prescription. Brown told Lubinski that Dr. Burns had not

authorized the Debinder prescription and Lubinski reconfirmed that Wagner had no record

of Debinder, that Debinder was not Wagner's patient, and that Wagner had not authorized

a refill prescription for Debinder. 

 Lubinski also told Brown about prior problems Wagner's office had had with

fraudulent prescriptions. Lubinski informed Brown that on multiple occasions prior to

December 9, 2005, someone had telephoned fraudulent prescriptions into pharmacies under

Wagner's name. Fearful that he would be subject to Arizona criminal liability or sanctions

by the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Defendant maintains that Dr. Wagner initiated a strict

protocol with regard to prescriptions, which included the rare use of telephone prescriptions,

limiting the number of employees authorized to call in telephone prescriptions, and the use

of a code word. Based on the recent incidences of fraud and the information provided to her,

Lubinski advised Brown that "she [Debinder] had been calling in prescriptions all over town"

and that Wagner "wanted her arrested." 

 On the afternoon of December 9, 2005, Bullhead City Police Department Corporal

Eric Clevinger was dispatched to Sav-On Drugs with regard to a potential violation of A.R.S.

§ 13-3408(A)(6) (knowingly obtaining a narcotic by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

Upon arriving at Sav-On Drugs, Clevinger met with Brown at which time Brown informed

Clevinger that on the evening of December 8, 2005, a telephone refill prescription for

Fiorinal with Codeine for T. DeBinder had been received along with the unusual

circumstances involved. Brown told Clevinger that Lubinski believed Debinder may be the

person who had been going around obtaining fraudulent prescriptions.

 After speaking with Brown, Clevinger approached Debinder who was sitting in a

chair in the pharmacy waiting area. Clevinger identified himself and informed DeBinder that

he was investigating her prescription. During the course of their discussion, DeBinder

confirmed to Clevinger that she had not seen Wagner, that she was not Wagner's patient, and

knew that a person was required to see the prescribing doctor in order to obtain a

prescription. Debinder also told Clevinger that her doctor, Burns, was on maternity leave and

that perhaps Wagner had authorized the prescription on behalf of Bums. 

Clevinger obtained Burns' phone number from Brown and then contacted Bullhead

City Police Department Dispatcher Karen Vaughan and requested that she contact Bums'

office with regard to the information provided by DeBinder. However, Vaughan apparently

called the wrong number. After Vaughan’s inadvertent error, the Bullhead City Police

Department dispatch informed Clevinger that the number had been disconnected. Clevinger

then arrested DeBinder at approximately 4:30 p.m. for a violation of A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(6),

and transported her to the Bullhead City jail. However, prior to making this arrest, it is

undisputed that Clevinger did not speak with Lubinski or anyone else from Wagner’s office.

An investigation subsequent to DeBinder’s arrest established that her detainment was

in error. DeBinder’s prescription was authorized by John Weidner on behalf of DeBinder’s

physician, the aforementioned Burns. Her arrest resulted in the present lawsuit through

which the Plaintiffs have asserted a defamation cause of action and loss of consortium claim

against Lubinski (Count Sixteen and Seventeen respectfully). The Plaintiffs have also

asserted that Wagner is vicariously liable for Lubinski’s acts (Counts Eighteen and Nineteen)

and also name him liable for false arrest (Count Thirty-Six) and loss of consortium (Count

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

Thirty-Seven). Brown, Bullhead City, Vaughan, Clevinger and Sav-On Drugs are all CoDefendants in this action but have not joined in this motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

The standard for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Under this rule, summary judgment is properly granted when, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no genuine issues of

material fact remain for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-

23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987).

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to summary

judgment. Mur-ray Mgmt. Corp. v. Founders Title Co., 819 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1991). If the moving party makes a prima facie case showing that no genuine issue of

material fact exists, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce sufficient competent

evidence to show that a triable issue of fact does remain. Ancell v. United Station Assocs.,

Inc., 803 P.2d 450, 452 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). The Court must regard as true the non-moving

party's evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324. However, the non-moving party may not merely rest on its pleadings, it must

produce some significant probative evidence tending to contradict the moving party's

allegations and thereby creating a material question of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 256-57(1986)(holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in

order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz.

v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968). 

Defendants Wagner and Lubinski request that this Court enter summary judgment in

their favor and against the Plaintiffs for the following reasons: (1) All the statements made

by Defendants Wagner-Lubinski were true, or subject to an absolute or qualified privilege;

(2) Defendants did not abuse any qualified privilege; (3) Defendants did not arrest or cause

Plaintiff Tamara DeBinder to be arrested; and (4) Co-Defendant Clevinger arrested the

Plaintiff based on his independent professional judgment.

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

A. Defamation

"Defamation is the publication to a third party, of a false, defamatory statement of and

concerning the plaintiff that is not privileged." Spratt v. Northern Automotive Corp., 958 F.

Supp. 456, 465 (D. Ariz. 1996) citing Yetman v. English, 811 P.2d 323 (1991). "Arizona

views the Restatement as authority for resolving questions concerning rules in defamation

cases." Burns v. Davis, 993 P.2d 1119, 1126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999), see also Green Acres

Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617 (Ariz. 1984) (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 595), Selby

v. Savard, 655 P.2d 342 (Ariz. 1982) (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 598) and Miller

v. Servicemaster by Rees, 851 P.2d 143 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)(citing Restatement

(Second)Torts § 594).

The parties agree that Wagner-Lubinski made three statements about DeBinder: (1)

Wagner had no records indicating DeBinder was a patient; (2) Wagner had not authorized

a prescription for DeBinder; and (3) that DeBinder was calling in prescriptions all over town

using Dr. Wagner’s name. It is undisputed that the first two statements are not defamatory

as truth and substantial truth are an absolute defense to a defamation claim. Read v. Phoenix

Newspapers, Inc., 819 P.2d 939, 941 (Ariz. 1991). However, the third statement, that “she

was calling in prescriptions all over town using Dr. Wagner’s name” referred to DeBinder

and, as conceded by the Defendants for purposes of this motion only, was defamatory. Thus

the Court turns to the next issue before it: Whether the Defendants’ statement is privileged.

1. Absolute Privilege

“As a defense to an action for defamation, the law recognizes that ‘conduct which

would otherwise be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in

furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to protection even at the

expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.’” Green Acres Trust v. London,

688 P.2d 617, 620 (Ariz. 1984) (citing Prosser, Law of Torths (4th Ed. 1971) Section 114, p.

776.) This protection from liability is described as privilege. Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d

at 620. As the Arizona Supreme Court goes on to explain, there are two classes of privileges,

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

“absolute” and “qualified.” Id. The absolute privileges created by law are based upon

recognition that certain persons, because of their special position or status, should be as free

as possible from fear that their actions in that position might have an adverse effect upon

their own personal interest. Id. When statements are absolutely privileged, the speaker is

immune from civil liability and courts do not inquire into the declarant’s motives or whether

the statements were made in good faith. Sobol v. Alarcon, 131 P.3d 487, 490 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2006). 

The Defendants rely on Ledvina v. Cerasani to support their position that the

defamatory statement made is subject to an absolute privilege because it relates to the report

of a crime. 146 P.3d 70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). In Ledvina, the defendant reported to law

enforcement that the plaintiff had slashed the tires of his car and the plaintiff subsequently

sued the defendant for defamation. Id. at 71. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that

a person who reports an alleged crime to the police is not subject to a defamation suit as such

statements are absolutely privileged. Id. at 76. Accordingly, the Court would not inquire

into whether the statements were made in good faith. Id. at 72. The Ledvina Court “adopted

the rule that treats both formal and informal complaints and statements to a prosecuting

authority as part of the initial steps of a judicial proceeding, and as such entitled to absolute

immunity to an action for defamation.” Id. at 74. The Court also stated, with no elaboration,

that the same absolute immunity or privilege applies to statements made to the city or county

attorney or those investigating a suspected crime. Id.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Ledvina decision is inapplicable to the case before the

Court. The Plaintiffs note that the Ledvina opinion consistently refers to “encouraging the

free and unhindered communications to law enforcement authorities” and simply does not

apply in cases where one private individual makes a defamatory statement to another private

individual. The Plaintiffs emphasize that Wagner-Lubinski’s defamatory statement was not

made to a police officer, but rather to a private citizen not acting in a law enforcement

capacity; therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity.

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

The Defendant counters that the Ledvina Court noted that absolute immunity applies

to those statements made to one investigating a suspected crime and therefore applies in this

case. Defendants point out that the defamatory statement was made to Brown, a pharmacy

technician, when she contacted Wagner-Lubinski to investigate the possibility of a forged

prescription by Plaintiff DeBinder. The Defendants argue that professional and licensed

private citizens, such as a pharmacy technician and a registered nurse employed by a doctor’s

office, should be free to communicate with one another regarding potential criminal activity

without fear of civil liability. According to the Defendant, any limitation on legitimate

inquiries by private citizens regarding suspected criminal activity is contrary to the policy

of the State of Arizona and the United States of America as such a limitation would chill the

average citizen’s involvement in crime detection and reporting.

Although the Court finds merit with both the Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ arguments,

the Court will not rule that an absolute privilege exists in this case as the communications

took place between two private individuals. The Ledvina Court offered no discussion

regarding whether an absolute privilege exists for one reporting a suspected crime to another

private individual which then resulted in an arrest. As such, the Court will consider whether

a qualified or conditional privilege is applicable to the facts before it.

2. Qualified or Conditional Privilege

The qualified or conditional privilege is another defense to a defamation action, and

it is also raised by the Defendant. Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d at 624. This privilege is

based on the social utility of protecting statements required to be made in response to a legal,

moral or social duty. Aspell v. American Contract Bridge League, 595 P.2d 191 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1979); Prosser, Section 115, at p. 786. It differs from the defense of absolute privilege

in that “the interest which the defendant is seeking to vindicate is regarded as having an

intermediate degree of importance, so that the immunity conferred is not absolute, but is

conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose.” Green Acres

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 8 -

Trust, 688 P.2d at 624. Absent a proper purpose or reasonable manner of publication, the

defense fails. 

In general, Arizona law establishes a two-part analysis for determining whether a

qualified privilege exists. Id. The Court must first determine whether a privileged occasion

arose, and, if so, whether the occasion for the privilege was abused. Id.; Roscoe v.

Schoolitz, 464 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1970). Whether a privileged occasion arose is a question of

law for the Court, and whether the occasion for the privilege was abused is a question of fact

for the jury. Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d at 624. To establish that a privileged occasion

arose, a defamation defendant must establish that the circumstances in which the

communication was made created an obligation to speak. Id. Once a defendant demonstrates

that a conditional privilege may apply, the plaintiff may then prove abuse of that privilege

either by proving publication with “actual malice” or by demonstrating excessive publication.

Selby v. Savard, 655 P.2d 342 (Ariz. 1982). An abuse through actual malice occurs when

the defendant makes a statement knowing its falsity or actually entertaining doubts about its

truth. Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d at 624. Abuse from excessive publication results from

publication to an unprivileged recipient not reasonable necessary to protect the interest upon

which the privilege is grounded. Id.

In Green Acres Trust, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed three qualified privileges

set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Defendant argues that two of these

qualified privileges are applicable to this action: Section 594, entitled “protection of the

Publisher’s Interest,” and Section 595, entitled “Protection of Interest of Recipient or a Third

Person.” Furthermore, the Defendant notes that two other qualified privileges identified in

the Restatement are also applicable to this action: Section 596 entitled “Common Interest”

and Section 598 entitled “Communication to One who May Act in the Public Interest.” 

In general, the Plaintiffs argue that a qualified privilege does not apply in this case.

The Plaintiffs maintain that a qualified privilege may exist as to the statements made that (1)

Ms. DeBinder was not a patient of Dr. Wagner, and (2) that he had not written the

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 9 -

prescription as these were a necessary part of the communication between a pharmacy and

a doctor. However, the Plaintiffs contend that Wagner-Lubinski provided unnecessary and

false information which was not privileged as their statements were not limited solely to the

prescription in question at the time. Rather, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants asserted

that DeBinder had committed numerous crimes in numerous places when they told Brown

at Sav-On that DeBinder had been going all over Bullhead City and Needles, California with

false prescriptions. According to the Plaintiffs, this information was not relevant to the

situation at hand as Sav-On had contacted the doctor’s office to investigate whether

DeBinder was a patient and if he had written the prescription in question. The Plaintiffs

assert that once those questions were answered in the negative, this exhausted all the useful

information at Wagner-Lubinski’s disposal. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that the fact

that part of the conversation might have been privileged did not create a situation whereby

Wagner-Lubinski could submit anything with no regard for its accuracy. 

The Court is unpersuaded by the Plaintiffs’ argument opposing the existence of a

qualified privilege. For the reasons advanced below, the Restatement (Second) of Torts

provides occasions where a publisher’s statements are shielded from liability. The Court will

address separately address each.

The Court will separately address each below.

a. Restatement § 598 - “Communication to One Who May Act in

Public Interest”

Restatement Section 598 states as follows:

An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the

circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that:

(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important

public interest, and

(b) the public interest requires the communication of the

defamatory matter to a public officer or a private citizen who is

authorized or privileged to take action if the defamatory matter

is true.

Furthermore, Comment f to Section 598 adds:

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 10 -

Communications to private citizen to prevent crime or

apprehend criminal. The privilege stated in this Section affords

protection to a private citizen who publishes defamatory matter

to a third person even though he is not a law enforcement

officer, under circumstances which, if true, would give to the

recipient a privilege to act for the purpose of preventing a crime

or of apprehending a criminal or fugitive from justice.

The Defendant argues that this particular qualified privilege exists as the public interest being

protected was the prevention of a crime, i.e., fraudulently obtaining prescription drugs. As

noted by the Defendant, Comment f to § 598 specifically addresses the situation at bar. The

Defendant asserts that Wagner-Lubinski’s statement was made to a private citizen, pharmacy

technician Brown. If the statement had been true, then Brown would have the privilege to

inform law enforcement for the purpose of preventing a crime. The Court agrees with the

Defendant that a qualified privilege exists pursuant to § 598 as the information given was

provided in an effort to prevent the commission of a crime.

b. Restatement § 596 – “Common Interest”

Restatement § 596 provides:

An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the

circumstances lead one of several persons having a common

interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to

believe that there is information that another sharing the

common interest is entitled to know.

The Defendant argues to the Court that Sav-On and Wagner-Lubinski had a common interest

in the issue of DeBinder’s prescription, and Wagner-Lubinski had a reasonable belief that

Sav-On was entitled to know the information concerning Wagner’s prior problem with

fraudulent prescriptions. As such, the Defendants argue that the statement made is

conditionally privileged under this section as well. The Court agrees. Lubinski, as a

registered nurse and employee of Wagner, and Brown, as a pharmacy technician and

employee of Sav-On, shared a common interest in preventing crimes involving fraudulent

prescription drugs along with the protection of their respective employers’ legitimate

business and professional interests.

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 11 -

c. Restatement § 594 – “Protection of Publisher’s Interest”

This section of the Restatement reads as follows:

An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the

circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that

(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important

interest of the publisher, and

(b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of

service in the lawful protection of the interest.

The Defendant proffers that the lawful pecuniary interest Wagner-Lubinski sought to protect

was Wagner’s ability to earn a living, i.e., to practice medicine and prescribe drugs.

According to the Defendant’s position, the information provided to Wagner-Lubinski by

Brown induced a reasonable belief that Wagner’s interest was involved, and Brown’s receipt

of the knowledge would be of service in protecting that interest. Again, the Court agrees

with the Defendant that a conditional privilege exists under § 594 to shield the Defendants

from liability for defamation. The apprehension of criminals using Wagner as the

authorizing physician on a fraudulent prescription clearly protects Wagner’s interest.

d. Restatement § 595 – “Protection of Interest of Recipient or a

Third Person”

Restatement § 595 provides:

(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged

if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief

that:

(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently

important interest of the recipient or a third

person, and

(b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is

under a legal duty to publish the defamatory

matter or is a person to whom its publication is

otherwise within the generally accepted standards

of decent conduct.

(2) In determining whether a publication is generally

accepted standards of decent conduct it is an important

factor that:

(a) the publication is made in response to a request

rather than volunteered by a publisher or

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 12 -

(b) a family or other relationship exists between the

parties.

Furthermore, Commend d to § 595, Subsection (1) adds:

The class of interests of third persons that are legally protected

by a privilege to publish defamatory matter concerning another

for their protection is in general similar to that which will

support a conditional privilege when the defamatory publication

is made for the protection of the publisher's interest. (See § 594,

Comment d). Thus, a statement made for the protection of a

lawful business, professional, property or other pecuniary

interest and in some instances, a domestic interest, comes within

the rule stated in this Section. (Cf. § 594, Comment f). As in the

case of a publication made for the protection of the publisher's

interest (cf. § 594, Comment h), it is unnecessary that the

interest in question be actually in need of protection. It is

enough that the circumstances are such as to lead to the

reasonable belief that the third person's interest is in danger. If

the publisher does not believe in the necessity of the publication

for the protection of the interest, the privilege is abused. (See §

603).

The Defendant maintains that the Wagner-Lubinski statements were made, in part, for the

protection of Sav-On’s lawful business interest, i.e., to avoid fraudulent prescriptions. The

Defendant reasons that for a doctor to communicate with a pharmacy in order to prevent

fraudulent prescriptions is within generally accepted standards of decent conduct. The

Defendant argues that the statements were made in response to request for information from

Sav-On through pharmacy technician Brown. The Court is persuaded that a conditional or

qualified privilege also exists under § 595. As noted by the Defendants, the lawful business

and professional interests of pharmacies and physicians are protected when they

communicate with one another regarding fraudulent prescriptions.

Once the Court has determined that a privileged occasion arose, the next inquiry is

whether the Defendants abused that privilege and thus may be liable for defamation. The

Plaintiffs may assert an abuse of that privilege by proving publication with actual malice or

by demonstrating excessive publication. As previously noted, an abuse through actual malice

occurs when the defendant makes a statement knowing its falsity or with reckless regard as

to whether it is false. Green Acres Trust, 688 P.3d at 624; Burns v. Davis, 993 P.2d 1119,

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 13 -

1126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). An abuse through excessive publication results from

publication to an unprivileged recipient not reasonably necessary to protect the interest upon

which the privilege is grounded. Id. As Green Acres Trust instructs, whether the occasion

for the privilege was abused is a question of fact for the jury. Id. 

The Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants abused any privilege that may have existed

as Lubinski’s statements that Ms. DeBinder had been going all over the place with forged

prescriptions was without any foundation. Although Dr. Wagner had been having a problem

with various persons forging prescriptions, the Plaintiffs maintain that there is no evidence

to suggest that there was one woman who was the sole perpetrator. Nonetheless, the

Plaintiffs argue that Lubinski was quite specific in convincing Brown at Sav-on that Ms.

DeBinder was on a crime spree. The Plaintiffs contend that Lubinski knew or should have

known that her statements would have an effect on whether Ms. DeBinder received the

needed medicine and on whether she might be arrested. At the very least, the Plaintiffs

maintain that there are enough questions of fact to require that a jury decide whether

Lubinski-Wagner was acting in good faith when she falsely accused Ms. DeBinder of forging

prescriptions.

In opposition, the Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue

of material fact, and that no rational trier of fact could conclude that Lubinski knew her

statement was false or actually entertained doubts as to its falsity simply on the basis that

there was no evidence that one woman was the sole perpetrator of the fraudulent

prescriptions. The Court disagrees with the Defendant. According to Burn v. Davis,

“[u]nless only once conclusion can be drawn from the facts, the determination of the question

of whether the privilege was abused is for the jury.” 993 P.2d at 1128. There is no evidence

in the record before does not lend itself to only one conclusion on the issue of abuse of the

qualified privilege. A jury could conclude that Defendants Wagner-Lubinski named Ms.

DeBinder as the individual responsible for forging prescription with reckless regard for its

truth. As noted by the Plaintiffs, there is no evidence that there was only one woman

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 14 -

responsible for the forgeries. The Court concludes that the issue of whether the qualified

privilege was abused must be determined by a jury. 

B. False Arrest

The tort of false imprisonment, a lineal descendant of the old action of trespass, is

sometimes called false arrest. Deadman v. Valley Nat. Bank of Ariz., 743 P.2d 961, 965-66

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); see also Prosser & Keaton on Torts § 11 at 47, (5th ed. 1984). “The

essence of false imprisonment is the direct restraint of personal liberty or freedom of

locomotion, either by actual force or the fear of force.” Deadman, 743 P.2d at 66; Wisniski

v. Ong, 329 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. 1958). Furthermore, one who instigates or participates in the

unlawful confinement of another is subject to liability to the other for false imprisonment.

Deadman, 743 P.2d at 966.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts 45A, Comment C states in part:

Instigation. If the confinement is unprivileged, the one who

instigates it is subject to liability to the person confined for the

false imprisonment. Instigation consists of words or acts which

direct, request, invite or encourage the false imprisonment itself.

In the case of an arrest, it is the equivalent, in words or conduct,

of “officer, arrest that man!” It is not enough for instigation that

the actor has given information to the police about the

commission of a crime, or has accused the other of committing

it, so long as he leaves to the police the decision as to what shall

be done about any arrest, without persuading or influencing them.

Commend d states:

One who instigates a false imprisonment becomes liable as if he

had himself done the act causing the confinement. He is not

protected by his reasonable belief that the officer or other person

who makes the arrest has legal authority to make it, or that the

arrest is fully justified.... Probable cause, which will prevent

liability for malicious prosecution, ... is not a defense to an

action for false imprisonment.

Comment e states in part:

Participation. One who takes part in a false imprisonment, by

aiding another to make it, becomes liable as if he had acted by

himself. 

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 15 -

See Sarwark Motor Sales, Inc. v. Woolridge, 354 P.2d 34 (Ariz. 1960); Prosser & Keaton,

§ 11 at 52. 

The Defendants maintain that they cannot be liable for false arrest under the

undisputed facts as it is clear that they did not instigate the arrest at issue. The Defendants

state they the arresting officer never spoke with Wagner or Lubinski prior to making the

decision to arrest DeBinder, that his decision to arrest DeBinder was based on his

independent professional judgment, and that Lubinski’s statements had no impact on his

decision to arrest DeBinder. 

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants rely on Deadman v. Valley National Bank of Arizona,

to support their respective positions. 743 P.2d at 961. In Deadman, the plaintiff went to

defendant Valley National Bank to get a cashier’s check for $2,000 in order to purchase a

truck. Id. at 963-64. The defendant erroneously concluded that the plaintiff was attempting

to commit fraud and was a member of the gang currently operating in the Phoenix area using

stolen or forged credit cards to get cash advances. Id. The police were called and the plaintiff

was taken into custody. Id. The plaintiff later sued the bank and asserted a claim for false

arrest. Id. at 965. The trial court denied the Bank’s motion for a directed verdict on the false

arrest claim, and instead, on its own motion, directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the

issue of liability. Id. The trial court stated:

I am also compelled to find as a matter of law that the bank acting through its

employees was without probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was

engaged in the felony. And since it cannot be found that the arrest that

followed was anything but the natural and understandable result of that

erroneous belief, and the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in his favor against the

bank for a fair, just compensation. 

Id. The issue of damages was submitted to the jury and the plaintiff was awarded $25,000

in compensation. Id.

The Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that the court should have

directed a verdict in favor of the bank. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the trial

court’s denial of the bank’s motion for a directed verdict was proper because the record

contained evidence upon which a jury might reasonably find that the bank’s employees (1)

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 16 -

engaged in conduct that directly resulted in the plaintiff’s arrest, and, that in doing so, they

did not act “reasonable” under the circumstances, or (2) that they in fact participated in the

arrest. Id. at 971. However, the court reversed the directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff

and held that the claim for false arrest was a question of fact for the jury to determine. Id.

According to the Court, a jury might have found that, the bank instigated or participated in

the plaintiff’s arrest, but that does not mean that no reasonable juror could have found

otherwise. Id.

The Deadman opinion specifically notes that “although strong public policy favors

encouraging private citizens to report suspected criminal activity, the falsely and

unreasonably accused individual ought not to be without a legal remedy.” Id. at 970. The

court also notes that “that it is thoroughly settled law that a person is liable for a false arrest

made by another if he ‘directed, advised, countenanced, encouraged or instigated’ such

arrest. Id. at 967.

In this case, Defendant Wagner stated to his employee, Defendant Lubinski, that he

“wanted [DeBinder] arrested.” The request was then passed on to Sav-On Drug’s employee

who initiated the process. As noted by the Plaintiffs, such was not a vague request to further

investigate the possibility of a fraudulent prescription. The statements made by the

Defendants could be construed as instigating an arrest as the words and acts did direct,

request, invite and/or encourage the arrest of the Plaintiff DeBinder. 

According to Deadman, “[a] defendant may be held liable as instigator of an arrest,

even though there is no evidence that he expressly requested or demanded it, as long as the

facts surrounding the arrest reasonably create a permissible inference of instigation.” Id.;

Crescent Amusement Co. v. Scott, 40 So. 2d 882 (Ala. Ct,.App. 1949). In this case, the fact

that Defendant Wagner said he wanted DeBinder arrested is undisputed. As previously

noted in this opinion, the Deadman Court makes clear that a person is liable for a false arrest

made by another if he instigated such arrest. 743 P.2d at 967. As such, a genuine of issue

of material fact precludes the Court from entering judgment in Defendants Wagner and

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 17 -

Lubinski’s favor on the claim for False Arrest. As the Deadman court discussed, rather than

conclude that the Defendants merely gave conclusory or erroneous information , a jury might

reasonably find that the Defendants persuaded or encouraged the police to arrest DeBinder

 

III. CONCLUSION 

Based on the above analysis, the Court concludes that summary judgment in favor of

the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs will be entered as to Counts 16,17,18,and 19 on the

Plaintiffs’ Complaint. However, summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiffs’ claim for false

arrest as a genuine issue of material fact remains and must be resolved by a jury.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 67) is

GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

DATED this 25th day of March, 2008.

Case 3:06-cv-01804-PGR Document 110 Filed 03/26/08 Page 17 of 17