Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05092/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 19, 2007 Decided April 29, 2008

No. 07-5092

MICHIGAN GAMBLING OPPOSITION,

A MICHIGAN NON-PROFIT CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv01181)

John J. Bursch argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs were Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Daniel P. Ettinger, and

Joseph A. Kuiper.

Aaron P. Avila, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for federal appellees. With him on the brief

was Elizabeth A. Peterson, Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Nicholas C. Yost, Seth P. Waxman, Edward C. DuMont,

Demian S. Ahn, and Conly J. Schulte were on the brief for

appellee Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi

Indians.

Before: GINSBURG, ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

Opinion dissenting in part by Circuit Judge BROWN.

PER CURIAM: In 2005, the Assistant Secretary for Indian

Affairs of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of

Interior decided to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township,

Michigan, into trust for use by the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish

Band of Pottawatomi Indians (“the Tribe”), which plans to

construct and operate a Class III casino. This decision followed

federal recognition of the Tribe in 1998. A non-profit Michigan

membership organization — Michigan Gambling Opposition

(“MichGO”) — sued the Secretary of the Interior, the Bureau of

Indian Affairs (“BIA”) and the National Indian Gaming

Commission (“NIGC”) (collectively the “DOI”) alleging that

the DOI’s approval of the proposed casino violated the National

Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et

seq., and that section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act

(“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 465, was unconstitutional. The district

court granted summary judgment to the DOI, and MichGO

appeals. We hold that the DOI did not violate NEPA and that

section 5 of the IRA is not an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative authority. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi

Indians has lived in Michigan continuously since it emerged as

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3

a recognizable unit under Chief Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish at

the turn of the nineteenth century. At that time, the Tribe lived

near Kalamazoo, Michigan, along the Kalamazoo River. The

Tribe was party to several treaties with the United States, and it

was adversely affected by several others, with the result that it

lost all of its lands near Kalamazoo by the middle of the

nineteenth century. It avoided being moved to reservations

further west by taking asylum with a church mission in central

Michigan, near the town of Bradley. Around the end of the

nineteenth century, land in the church mission was distributed

to individual members of the Tribe. This distribution was in

accord, although not directly part of, broader federal policies of

the time, which emphasized breaking up tribal holdings and

distributing parcels of land to individuals. See Judith V.

Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10-12

(1995). Most of the land distributed to individual members of

the Tribe was lost because of failure to pay property taxes, as

was the case for large portions of the land distributed under

broader federal policies, id. at 12, but members of the Tribe

continued to reside around the former church mission.

The Tribe, now numbering 277 members, secured federal

acknowledgment of its existence in 1998, under the BIA’s

formal recognition procedure. The Tribe and BIA plan for BIA

to acquire land as a reservation for the Tribe, using the Secretary

of the Interior’s authority under section 5 of the IRA to take

land into trust for Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 465. They have

identified a 147-acre tract of land (“the Bradley property”) that

they find suitable for this purpose. The Bradley property is

located in Wayland township (population 3,013), a largely rural

area about twenty-five miles north of Kalamazoo and thirty

miles south of Grand Rapids. Seeking to advance the economic

well-being of its members, who suffer from unemployment rates

approximately six times the average of their surrounding area,

and to promote economic self-sufficiency, the Tribe plans to use

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the Bradley property to host a Class III gambling casino. The

planned facility would comprise approximately 99,000 square

feet of gambling, with additional floor space devoted to

restaurants, stores, and offices. The Tribe expects 8,500 visitors

per day.

As BIA studied the Tribe’s proposal, it prepared an

environmental assessment (“EA”) under the auspices of NEPA,

42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. The EA analyzed the effects the

proposed casino would have on area wildlife, air and water;

farming in the vicinity; and nearby communities. One of the

issues addressed by the EA was the possibility that the casino

would increase local traffic. The EA used the U.S. Department

of Transportation (“DOT”) grading system to assess the severity

of potential traffic delays: “Level Of Service A” means free

passage, while “Level of Service F” means a driver can expect

to wait eighty seconds or more before passing through an

unsignaled intersection. The EA defined acceptable traffic

delays to be “Level of Service C” or better. However, because

Michigan does not grade intersections, the BIA concluded that

approval by the Michigan Department of Transportation

(“MDOT”) would also qualify an intersection’s traffic levels as

acceptable.

Applying the DOT classification system, a study

commissioned as part of the EA identified two local

intersections where increased casino-related traffic would result

in Level of Service F at certain times. These intersections sit at

the junction of US-131, a limited access highway that runs north

and south along the west edge of the Bradley property, and

Michigan-179 (129th Avenue), a two-lane road that runs east

and west along the south edge of the Bradley property. The

study predicted that the casino would cause heavy traffic at the

right turn from the northbound exit onto 129th Avenue

(eastbound) and at the left turn from the southbound exit onto

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1

 The EA relied on a September 25, 2001, letter from MDOT, which

approved the dedicated right-turn lane; this letter did not expressly

mention the four-way stop or any of the traffic study’s conclusions.

Letter from Robert Coy, Region Permit Agent, MDOT, to Marc Start,

URS Corporation (Sept. 25, 2001). However, a letter from MDOT to

the Tribe on February 12, 2002, cited the completed traffic study and

approved its recommendations, which included the four-way stop.

Letter from Robert Coy, Region Permit Agent, MDOT, to D.K.

Sprague, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians,

Gun Lake Tribe (Feb. 12, 2002).

129th Avenue (eastbound). Resulting delays would be

particularly severe during afternoon rush hours.

To mitigate the traffic impact of the casino, the EA

recommended construction of a new, dedicated right-turn lane

for the northbound intersection and adding a four-way stop to

the southbound intersection. It acknowledged the southbound

left turn would still operate during peak periods at Level of

Service F, so that a traffic light might be necessary. Although

MDOT apparently will not commit to a traffic light based on

predictions of traffic volume, it apparently would approve a

dedicated right turn lane and a four-way stop.1

Having concluded that proposed measures would

sufficiently alleviate traffic delays and that other potential

problems identified in the EA would also be mitigated, the BIA

and the NIGC both issued Findings of No Significant Impact

(“FONSI”) with respect to the casino project and announced

their intent to acquire the Bradley property and allow the casino.

MichGO filed this lawsuit in June 2005, advancing four

claims. The first alleged that the preparation of a FONSI rather

than an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) violated NEPA.

The second and third alleged violations of the Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). The fourth alleged that the IRA is an

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unconstitutional delegation of authority to the Secretary of the

Interior because there is no intelligible principle limiting its

discretion on what land to acquire and hold in trust. The Tribe

was allowed to intervene as a defendant. The district court

granted summary judgment to the DOI on February 23, 2007.

Mich. Gambling Opposition (MichGO) v. Norton, 477 F. Supp.

2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2007). MichGO appeals and our review is de

novo. Sample v. Bureau of Prisons, 466 F.3d 1086, 1087 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). However, in view of Citizens Exposing Truth About

Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2007),

MichGO does not pursue its IGRA claims. Appellant’s Reply

Br. 2 n.1. 

II.

NEPA requires every agency proposing a “major Federal

action” to prepare a statement of its environmental impact if the

action will “significantly affect[] the quality of the human

environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Under regulations

promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”)

agencies must create procedures identifying “[s]pecific criteria

for and identification of those typical classes of action” that

require or do not require an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b)(2). In

considering any particular proposed action, an agency must first

determine whether, under its own regulations, the proposal

would “[n]ormally require[] an [EIS]” or “[n]ormally [would]

not require either an [EIS] or an [EA].” Id. § 1501.4(a). If the

proposed action is not covered by either of these descriptions,

the agency should prepare an EA, and based on its conclusions,

decide whether to prepare an EIS. Id. §§ 1501.4(b)-(c). The

agency may conclude that an EIS is not necessary and instead

issue a FONSI, in which it must explain why there will be no

significant impact. Id. §§ 1501.4(e); 1508.13.

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2

 OFFICE OF INDIAN GAMING MGMT., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,

CHECKLIST FOR GAMING ACQUISITIONS GAMING-RELATED

ACQUISITIONS AND IGRA SECTION 20 DETERMINATIONS 10 (2005)

(“Checklist”).

A.

MichGO contends that the Tribe’s casino is large and

controversial, and that the DOI is thus required by law to

prepare an EIS. To support this contention, MichGO relies on

the 2005 “Checklist for Gaming Acquisitions,” distributed to

regional directors by the BIA, which provides that “[p]roposals

for large, and/or potentially controversial gaming establishments

should require the preparation of an EIS.”2

 MichGO maintains

that 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a) requires an EIS to be performed if

mandated by internal DOI guidelines such as the Checklist. 

The premise underlying MichGO’s contention is flawed.

Section 1501.4(a) does not make the Checklist binding on the

DOI. The CEQ does require each agency to “[d]etermine under

its procedures” whether a project is of a type that normally

requires an EIS. Id. § 1501.4(a). But it also specifies that these

procedures will be established pursuant to section 1507.3. Id.

Section 1507.3 sets out a specific process for developing the

relevant agency procedures; as part of this process, the CEQ

must approve the procedures before they are implemented. Id.

§ 1507.3(a). The DOI complied with these requirements when

it established its NEPA procedures, now codified in its manual.

DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT MANUAL, Pt. 516, Chpt.

10 (May 27, 2004). These procedures do not encompass the

Checklist, which in any event does not appear to have been

approved by the CEQ as required by section 1507.3(a). The

manual does, however, include lists of activities that under its

procedures normally require or do not require an EIS or EA. Id.

Gaming activities are not included in these lists. In these

circumstances, the section 1501.4(b)-(c) process — EA

preparation followed by a decision on whether to prepare an EIS

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3

 MichGO’s suggestion in its brief that the Checklist is binding

independent of 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 is not appropriately developed and

thus not properly before the court. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d

190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005). MichGO also maintains that ignoring

non-binding regulations is arbitrary and capricious, but this contention

is waived as it is raised only in the reply brief. Corson & Gruman Co.

v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 47, 50 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

4

 MichGO maintains in a footnote of its initial brief and in its Reply

Brief that increased traffic in the Village of Hopkins will constitute a

significant, unmitigated impact. We do not consider this argument.

“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances . . . we do not entertain an

argument raised for the first time in a reply brief . . . or . . . a footnote.”

United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

— is applicable. The DOI followed these procedures and

lawfully determined not to prepare an EIS on the basis of the

EA.3

Because we are unpersuaded that the Checklist is binding

on the DOI, we do not reach MichGO’s contention that the

casino project at issue is “large” and “controversial” within the

meaning of the Checklist.

B.

Alternatively, MichGO contends that it was arbitrary or

capricious for the DOI to issue a FONSI without having

prepared an EIS because two intersections would continue to

experience Level of Service F at certain times, even after

mitigation measures.4

A court reviews an agency’s FONSI or EIS under the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, and “cannot

substitute [its] judgment for that of an agency if the agency’s

decision was ‘fully informed and well considered.’” Cabinet

Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir.

1982) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435

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U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). If the agency decided to issue a FONSI,

it must either have concluded there would be no significant

impact or have planned measures to mitigate such impacts. A

court must review whether the agency:

(1) has accurately identified the relevant

environmental concern, (2) has taken a hard look at

the problem in preparing its EA, (3) is able to make

a convincing case for its finding of no significant

impact, and (4) has shown that even if there is an

impact of true significance, an EIS is unnecessary

because changes or safeguards in the project

sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.

TOMAC v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal

quotations omitted).

The EA found that at least one intersection would

experience Level of Service F at certain times even after

mitigation measures. However, contrary to the assumption

underlying MichGO’s contentions, the EA’s definition of

acceptable traffic performance was not based solely on the

level-of-service classification. Rather, the EA noted that local

authorities had no standards for traffic intensity; thus the EA

deployed two separate indicators as proof of acceptable traffic

conditions: either Level of Service C or above or approval by

relevant local authorities. MDOT, the agency with jurisdiction

over these roads, found the traffic levels projected after the

DOI’s mitigation measures would be acceptable. It was not

inherently arbitrary or capricious for the DOI to rely on

MDOT’s assessment, cf. Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465

F.3d 215, 237 (5th Cir. 2006), and MichGO gives us no reason

to question that reliance. The DOI was thus justified in finding

that mitigation of the traffic impact was sufficient, and that an

EIS was unnecessary. 

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III.

Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative

Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the

United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. In considering a

challenge to a delegation of power, “the test is whether

Congress has set forth ‘an intelligible principle to which the

person or body authorized to act is directed to conform.’”

TOMAC, 433 F.3d at 866 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking

Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (alterations and internal

quotations omitted)). The Supreme Court has underscored that

“the general policy and boundaries of a delegation ‘need not be

tested in isolation’ . . . [as] the statutory language may derive

content from the ‘purpose of the Act, its factual background and

the statutory context.’” Id. (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v.

SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946)). Courts “have almost never felt

qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible

degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or

applying the law.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (internal

quotations omitted). 

MichGO contends that section 5 of the IRA is an

unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because, apart

from the DOI’s internal regulations, which cannot fill the void,

it is “completely devoid of intelligible standards to guide or

limit the Secretary’s discretion.” Appellant’s Br. at 35. We are

not convinced. An agency cannot “cure an unconstitutionally

standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some

of that power,” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473, as the district court

incorrectly suggested, MichGO, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 21-22. But

giving due consideration to the purpose and factual background

of the IRA and section 5’s statutory context, as the Supreme

Court instructs, see Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104,

and having due regard that “Congress is not confined to that

method of executing its policy which involves the least possible

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5

 Hence the court has no occasion to address the Tribe’s contention

that the non-delegation doctrine is inapplicable because section 5 of

the IRA does not involve a delegation of legislative power.

6

 Section 5 of the IRA provides in relevant part:

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his

discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment,

gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands,

water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without

existing reservations, including trust or otherwise

restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living or

deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians.

For the acquisition of such lands, interests in lands,

water rights, and surface rights, and for expenses

incident to such acquisition, there is authorized to be

appropriated, out of any funds in the Treasury not

otherwise appropriated, a sum not to exceed $2,000,000

in any one fiscal year . . . .

. . . 

Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act

. . . shall be taken in the name of the United States in

trust for the Indian tribe . . . for which the land is

acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from

State and local taxation.

25 U.S.C. § 465.

delegation of discretion,” Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,

425-26 (1944), we conclude the statute provides an intelligible

principle.5

Section 5 of the IRA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior

to obtain land “for Indians.”6

 25 U.S.C. § 465. This court has

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not previously considered whether section 5 constitutes an

unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power. But on its

face, the delegation is no broader than other statutes, which the

Supreme Court has upheld, that direct agencies to act in the

“public interest,” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.

190, 216 (1943), or in a way that is “fair and equitable,” Yakus,

321 U.S. at 420, see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473-75.

Furthermore, the courts of appeals for the First, Eighth and

Tenth Circuits have rejected challenges contending that section

5 is an unconstitutional delegation. See Carcieri v. Norton, 497

F.3d 15, 41-43 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. granted in part,

denied on non-delegation issue, 128 S. Ct. 1443 (2008); South

Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir.

2005); United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1137 (10th Cir.

1999). These courts have held “that an intelligible principle

exists in the statutory phrase ‘for the purpose of providing land

for Indians’ when it is viewed in the statutory and historical

context of the IRA.” This principle involves “providing lands

sufficient to enable Indians to achieve self-support and

ameliorating the damage resulting from . . . prior [federal

policy].” South Dakota, 423 F.3d at 799 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §

465); accord Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 42; Roberts, 185 F.3d at

1137. 

Our review of the purpose and structure of the IRA

confirms that, as our sister courts have held, and contrary to the

view of our dissenting colleague, the statute provides an

intelligible principle rather than a tautology when it authorizes

the Secretary to acquire land “for the purpose of providing land

for Indians”: the Secretary is to exercise his powers in order to

further economic development and self-governance among the

Tribes. Cf. Dissenting Op. at 7-8. The Supreme Court has

noted that “[t]he intent and purpose of the [IRA] was to

rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to give him a chance

to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression.”

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Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973)

(internal quotations omitted). This accords with the IRA’s

stated purpose of “conserv[ing] and develop[ing] Indian lands

and resources; . . . extend[ing] to Indians the right to form

business and other organizations; . . . establish[ing] a credit

system for Indians; . . . grant[ing] certain rights of home rule to

Indians; . . . and [effectuating] other purposes.” Pub. L. No. 383,

48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934). 

In addition to section 5, the IRA includes numerous other

provisions addressing land use and economic development;

among other things, these extend tribal trusts indefinitely, 25

U.S.C. § 462; restore lands previously declared “surplus” to

those trusts, id. § 463; restrict land transfers from tribal

reservations, id. § 464; and provide federal appropriations to

support Indian economic development, id. § 470. This context

underscores section 5’s role as part of a broad effort to promote

economic development among American Indians, with a special

emphasis on preventing and recouping losses of land caused by

previous federal policies. The Supreme Court has

acknowledged this emphasis, explaining that the IRA’s passage

brought “an abrupt end” to the previous federal “policy of

allotment” that had led to individuals who were not American

Indians acquiring “over two-thirds of the Indian lands allotted.”

County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima

Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 255 (1992). The Court also

emphasized that through the IRA Congress “[r]eturn[ed] to the

principles of tribal self-determination and self-governance

which had characterized” earlier federal policy. Id. 

The standards revealed by examining the purpose and

structure of the IRA are confirmed by reviewing the broader

factual context of the statute. The IRA was enacted against a

backdrop of great concern over economic and social challenges

facing American Indians, and especially over the consequences

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7

 The IRA’s provisions constitute one chapter in a long and

complicated history of interactions between the United States and

American Indians. Our dissenting colleague asserts a trust

relationship arises between the Indians and the United States only after

the Government acquires land for the Indians, Dissenting Op. at 6, but

this confuses the fiduciary relationship that arises because the United

States is to hold newly-acquired land “in trust” under section 5 of the

IRA, see Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see

also United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 1989), with

the pre-existing “special relationship” that arose by virtue of the

Government’s historical relations with the Indians, see 1 FELIX R.

COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04[4][a]

(2005) (“HANDBOOK”). That unique history informs our

understanding of section 5 of the IRA; a statute authorizing the

acquisition of land “for the purpose of providing land for Indians” is

simply not the same as a statute authorizing the acquisition of land

“for the purpose of providing land for persons taller than 6 feet.” See

generally Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal

Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).

of the federal government’s allotment policy, which had

resulted in many tribal lands being distributed to individuals

who then lost control of them, often because of fraud or inability

to pay taxes. Royster, 27 ARIZ. ST.L.J. at 12. By 1928, a report

commissioned by the Secretary of the Interior found that the

allotment policy had “destructive effects . . . on the economic,

social, cultural and physical well-being of the tribes.” Id. at 16.

As both the Supreme Court, Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S.

at 152, and circuit courts, South Dakota, 423 F.3d at 798;

Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 42, have acknowledged, the legislative

history of the IRA also underscores its purpose of addressing

economic and social challenges facing American Indians by

promoting economic development. See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1804,

at 6 (1934); S. Rep. No. 73-1080, at 1-2 (1934).7 

There is nothing to suggest that section 5 is removed from

the overall IRA purpose of advancing economic development

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15

among American Indians. While certain sections of the IRA

include more specific language than section 5, see, e.g., 25

U.S.C. § 463, this does not detract from the overall purposes of

the statute. Although, as our dissenting colleague suggests,

particular clauses of the IRA could be interpreted as not

advancing the goal of economic development, not alleviating all

the problems caused by the allotment policy, or advancing goals

more narrow than general economic development, Dissenting

Op. at 5-7, this analysis ignores the unambiguous purpose of the

IRA as a whole. 

Finally, we note that the Supreme Court has observed that

“the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies

according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.”

Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475. The scope of authority delegated to

the Secretary under section 5 — to decide whether to grant

status as “Indian Country” to specific plots of land owned by

Indians or that is acquired for them — is not so broad as to

require limiting principles more specific than pursuing Indian

economic development. Our conclusion is underscored by

examining historical and contemporary context. The Executive

has historically enjoyed extensive authority in conducting

relations with American Indians, which has included negotiating

treaties with Indian tribes and granting reservations to them by

executive order. See, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra, §§ 1.03;

15.04[4]; cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965). “[E]ven

in sweeping regulatory schemes . . . statutes [are not required to]

provide a determinate criterion” delimiting precisely how much

of a good or harm an agency must address. Whitman, 531 U.S.

at 475 (internal quotations omitted). Our dissenting colleague

asserts that the Secretary’s powers under section 5 are vast,

Dissenting Op. at 10-12, pointing to the many significant

consequences that flow from the Secretary’s decision to accept

land in trust for the Indians. But these consequences follow

from section 5 and from other statutes, not from the decision of

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8

 Nor are we concerned, for purposes of the non-delegation doctrine,

that the Secretary’s decision to take land in trust might be

unreviewable in a court of law. Dissenting Op. at 7-8 (citing State of

Fla., Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 768 F.2d 1248

(11th Cir. 1985)). Section 5 of the IRA intelligibly guides the

Secretary’s exercise of discretion, and that is all that the nondelegation doctrine requires. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425-26; 5 U.S.C. §

701.

the Secretary to acquire land in trust, for section 5 gives the

Secretary no power to regulate state taxing authority or anything

else. Our dissenting colleague further faults Congress for not

providing a narrower standard, but Congress must provide only

an “intelligible” standard, Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75. That

standard need not be utterly unambiguous, for it is settled that

Congress may delegate interstitial lawmaking authority to

executive agencies. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).8

For these reasons, we join the First, Eighth and Tenth

Circuits, Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 43; South Dakota, 423 F.3d at

799; Roberts, 185 F.3d at 1137, in upholding section 5 of the

IRA. In cases entertaining (and rejecting) challenges asserting

an unconstitutional delegation, the Supreme Court has “giv[en]

narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might

otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional,” Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989), and has done so by

looking at clauses that neighbor the delegation of power, e.g.,

Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104-05, as well as the

statute’s overriding purpose, e.g., N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v.

United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932). Congress may

legislate its goals explicitly, see, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374,

but it need not do so. We thus hold, relying upon the text,

structure, and purpose of the IRA, as well as the context of its

enactment, that section 5 contains an intelligible principle and

USCA Case #07-5092 Document #1113553 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 16 of 30
17

that it is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative

authority.

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

USCA Case #07-5092 Document #1113553 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 17 of 30
 BROWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: I join Parts I 

and II of the court’s opinion, but I cannot agree § 5 of the IRA 

is constitutional. Consequently, I dissent from Part III. 

I 

 Like other courts that have rejected nondelegation 

challenges to § 5, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 41–

43 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc); South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of 

the Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir. 2005); United States 

v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999), the majority 

nominally performs a nondelegation analysis but actually 

strips the doctrine of any meaning. It conjures standards and 

limits from thin air to construct a supposed intelligible 

principle for the § 5 delegation. Although I agree the 

nondelegation principle is extremely accommodating, the 

majority’s willingness to imagine bounds on delegated 

authority goes so far as to render the principle nugatory. 

Analyzing the statute using ordinary tools of statutory 

construction, as the Supreme Court has always done in 

nondelegation cases, I am forced to conclude § 5 is 

unconstitutional. 

 The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from 

making unbridled delegations of authority. The rule is not 

only a fundamental aspect of the separation of powers; it is an 

essential feature of democratic government. “[T]he 

delegation doctrine[] has developed to prevent Congress from 

forsaking its duties.” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 

758 (1996). “[T]he constitutional question is whether the 

statute has delegated legislative power to the agency . . . [The 

Constitution’s] text permits no delegation of those powers.” 

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); 

see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) 

(“The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of 

separation of powers . . . .”); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. 

United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“[I]t is a breach of 

USCA Case #07-5092 Document #1113553 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 18 of 30
2 

the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its 

legislative power . . . .”). The nondelegation principle is 

integral to any notion of democratic accountability. 

 Thus, when Congress directs an agency to exercise its 

judgment, it must guide that judgment in some way. I agree 

with the majority that the nondelegation principle is not an 

onerous requirement. Nevertheless, Congress must at least 

“clearly delineate[] the general policy, the public agency 

which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated 

authority.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372–73; Am. Power & 

Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). The central 

question is whether there are “limits on [an agency’s] 

discretion.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473. 

 Like the majority, I take Whitman to have identified two 

ways in which Congress may provide the necessary bounds 

on a delegation: standards to guide an agency’s judgment or, 

in their absence, stringent limits on the scope of the delegated 

authority. Standards to guide an agency are the ordinary way 

to limit its discretion. In the leading case, A.L.A. Schechter 

Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated 

§ 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which allowed 

trade associations to develop codes of fair competition the 

President could adopt as law, with conditions as he thought 

“necessary.” 295 U.S. 495, 522–23, 542 (1935). This statute 

was flawed because it “conferred authority to regulate the 

entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard 

than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’” 

Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474. Alternatively, “Congress need not 

provide any direction” if the “scope of the power 

congressionally conferred” is sufficiently small. Id. at 475. 

Either type of limit suffices on its own, but at least one must 

be present. 

USCA Case #07-5092 Document #1113553 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 19 of 30
3 

 Thus, the “intelligible principle” required of a 

constitutional delegation is fairly minimal: a statute will fail 

only if it gives an agency too broad an authority with no 

standards to guide the agency’s decisions. Section 5 is a rare 

example of a standardless delegation, allowing the Secretary 

of the Interior to take land in trust for whichever Indians he 

chooses, for whatever reasons. This power is far too broad in 

scope for Congress to have delegated without any standards. 

II 

A 

 First, § 5 lacks standards to guide the Secretary in the 

exercise of his authority. Such standards would not have to 

provide a “determinate criterion” to govern agency decisions, 

as long as they provide “substantial guidance.” Whitman, 531 

U.S. at 475. Standards need only provide some criteria, some 

guidelines, or some direction, so that when an agency 

exercises its judgment, the agency and the courts have some 

“intelligible principle” by which to gauge whether the 

agency’s decision will further the purpose of the delegation. 

For example, to guide the Sentencing Commission, “Congress 

directed it to consider seven factors,” listed in the statute. 

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 375. In Whitman, the Clean Air Act 

required the EPA “to set air quality standards at the level that 

is ‘requisite’ . . . to protect the public health with an adequate 

margin of safety.” 531 U.S. at 475–76. 

 “Whether [a] statute delegates legislative power is a 

question for the courts,” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473, and the 

purpose of an intelligible principle is to make sure it is not 

“impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the 

will of Congress has been obeyed.” Yakus v. United States, 

321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). Congress must provide legal

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4 

standards because “[p]rivate rights are protected by access to 

the courts to test the application of the policy in the light of” 

the standards. Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 105. 

Thus, since Congress must lay down these standards by 

“legislative act,” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372, we should seek 

standards for a delegation using the ordinary tools of statutory 

construction. 

 The kinds of tools the majority uses are occasionally 

appropriate aids for ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous 

statutory text. On the other hand, when a standard is not 

ambiguous, but simply absent, we may not supply one by 

ourselves. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 

254 (1992); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004). The majority not only supplies an absent 

standard, it actually invents the standard, imbuing § 5 with a 

spirit of “economic development” that somehow emanates 

from the context of the IRA. 

 In many nondelegation cases, Congress at least hints at a 

standard by directing an agency to exercise its authority “in 

the public interest”—words indicating some congressionally 

imposed limit, even if the vagueness of the phrase makes a 

court work to interpret it. Here, by contrast, the Secretary “is 

authorized” to acquire land for Indians “in his discretion.” 

Rather than an ambiguous standard that requires 

interpretation, § 5 provides an obvious, unambiguous 

direction that the Secretary is to have complete discretion. 

 The majority proceeds, in the teeth of this clear text, to 

find, in the emanation from a variety of sources, the supposed 

true intelligible principle behind § 5: promoting Indian 

economic development so Indians can achieve “self-support,” 

and recouping losses of land. But this standard arises from 

the majority’s imagination, not from the sources. 

USCA Case #07-5092 Document #1113553 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 21 of 30
5 

 First, the court cites the preamble to the IRA: “to 

conserve and develop Indian land and resources.” Maj. Op. at 

13. A policy of developing land is no more informative than 

a purpose of providing land, as a standard to help the 

Secretary decide whether to acquire a particular parcel. Nor 

do the preamble’s policies of “extending the right to form 

business[es] . . . establishing a credit system,” and the rest, 

give any better direction. 

 

 Second, the majority examines the structure of the IRA. 

Maj. Op. at 13. Among its many provisions, the IRA makes 

trust status permanent, §§ 2 and 4, and provides for the 

recovery of Indian lands that had been opened for sale, § 3. 

Ironically, the restoration of lands under § 3 is not automatic, 

but rests in the Secretary’s hands. Unlike § 5 acquisitions, the 

Secretary is to restore surplus lands “if he shall find it to be in 

the public interest.” Ordinarily, a comparison of § 3 and § 5 

would lead us, first, to conclude § 5 gives the Secretary 

authority to acquire new land, and, second, to construe § 5 to 

grant Secretary broader discretion when he acquires new land 

than when he restores surplus land. Instead the majority reads 

into § 5 an “emphasis” on recouping losses of land, an 

emphasis the text does not support. The majority also sees an 

emphasis on preventing losses of existing land, even though 

§ 8, which declares that the IRA shall not cover “Indian 

holdings of allotments or homesteads upon the public domain 

outside” of reservations, actually limits the effect of the IRA 

on existing Indian land. Nor is it plausible to find a principle 

of “self-support” in a statute that actually installs a 

paternalistic scheme of government support. See § 4 (barring 

Indians from selling or transferring their trust land); § 12 

(directing the Secretary to establish preferences for hiring 

Indians at the Indian Office); § 11 (appropriating money to 

send Indians to “vocational and trade schools” of which only 

USCA Case #07-5092 Document #1113553 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 22 of 30
6 

a limited amount may be spent for education in “high schools 

and colleges”); § 6 (establishing the Secretary’s authority over 

how Indians should manage their forests and how many cows 

they may graze on their pastures). 

 The majority also cites the special trust relationship the 

United States bears towards Indians, waving the idea of this 

relationship as a talisman to bless the statute rather than 

actually using it to interpret the text. Nor could this trust 

relationship be useful to interpret § 5, because in fact the 

government has no free-standing duty, outside of specific 

statutes, treaties, or executive orders, to ensure its actions do 

not harm Indian interests. N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 

F.2d 589, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Secretary’s trust obligations, 

if any, were coterminous with the ESA’s requirements); see 

also United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Absent . . . a fiduciary duty based on an authorizing 

document such as a statute or a regulation . . . there can be no 

trust relationship between [a tribe] and the BIA.”). The only 

trust responsibility created by § 5 exists after the government 

acquires a parcel of land and therefore cannot guide the 

Secretary’s decision whether to acquire the parcel. The 

majority adverts to the “unique history” of Indians in the 

United States, but this history gives rise only to “a moral 

obligation, without justiciable standards for its enforcement.” 

Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust 

Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1227 

(1975). At best, courts distinguish statutes relating to Indians 

by applying the Indian canon of construction, County of 

Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian 

Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992), but “[t]he canon of 

construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities in favor 

of Indians, however, does not permit reliance on ambiguities 

that do not exist.” South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 

Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986). 

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7 

 To summarize, the statutory language lacks any 

discernible boundaries. To rely on the purpose of “providing 

land for Indians” does nothing to cabin the Secretary’s 

discretion over providing land for Indians because it is 

tautological. To say the purpose is to provide land for Indians 

in a broad effort to promote economic development (with a 

special emphasis on preventing land loss) is tautology on 

steroids. Making a different selection from the same 

smorgasbord, I might posit quite different principles—to 

provide land for landless Indians; to acquire trust lands to be 

used for farming; to supplement grazing and forestry lands; to 

provide lands in close proximity to existing reservations; to 

consolidate checkerboarded reservations. All of these goals 

would be reasonable, but none can be derived from the text of 

the IRA. The very fact that so many standards can be 

proposed merely highlights the fact that the statute itself fails 

to describe how the power conveyed is to be exercised. Thus, 

the Secretary’s assertion of unguided power is not subject to 

any judicial check; nor, conversely, can he be required to act 

whenever he voluntarily refrains from using his discretionary 

power. 

 Even if this mood of economic self-sufficiency can be 

said to permeate § 5, it has never constituted a standard to 

guide the Secretary’s decisions. Courts, like the BIA, have 

consistently interpreted the statute to mean what it says: the 

Secretary has unfettered discretion over which land to take in 

trust. See, e.g., State of Fla., Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. U.S. 

Dep’t of the Interior, 768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(Secretary may waive BIA regulations to acquire land for a 

tribal museum, and the court may not review his decision 

because it is committed to agency discretion). Again and 

again, courts have rejected challenges to acquisitions as 

beyond the Secretary’s power, concluding that the 

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8 

“deliberately broad and flexible grant of power” in § 5, 

Stevens v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 452 F.2d 741, 748 

(9th Cir. 1971), encompasses any possible acquisition. E.g., 

Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1015–16 (8th Cir. 1978) 

(“Congress did not limit the Secretary’s discretion to select 

land for acquisition”; therefore, it was valid to accept land an 

Indian already owned and was giving to the United States in 

trust solely for the purpose of avoiding property taxes). The 

BIA has also regarded the Secretary’s discretion as absolute, 

and its review board may only verify whether BIA considered 

the factors laid out in its own regulations. Eades, 17 I.B.I.A. 

198, 200 (1989). Most recently, BIA has begun to deny trust 

applications for building casinos if it finds the casinos to lie 

beyond a “commutable” distance from tribes’ existing 

reservations. See Memorandum from Carl Artman, Ass’t 

Sec’y of the Interior, on Taking Off-Reservation Land into 

Trust for Gaming Purposes 1, 3 (Jan. 3, 2008) (“The decision 

whether to take land into trust . . . is discretionary with the 

Secretary.”).1

 

 In light of this history, it is a bit late for the court to claim 

there is in fact a standard, however loose, to which the 

Secretary must conform in his exercise of § 5 authority. Nor, 

given the weight of precedent, would I expect any court to 

apply the majority’s “economic development with special 

emphasis” standard in reviewing an acquisition decision. 

 

1

 BIA denies these applications because for far-away applications, 

the benefit to Indians does not outweigh the “concerns of state and 

local governments.” Id. at 5 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 151.11(b)). If the 

majority is right about the principle guiding these decisions, it 

cannot be proper for BIA to deny an acquisition because of the 

harm to local government caused by “the removal of the land from 

the tax rolls,” id. 

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9 

 My point here is not to quibble with the majority’s 

conclusion that the purpose of § 5 is to enable self-support 

rather than dependency or to prevent losses rather than 

acquire new land. Rather, the court should not be playing this 

game at all. Indeed, the court’s approach differs radically 

from the Supreme Court’s analytical process in nondelegation 

challenges. For example, in the Intermountain Rate Cases, 

the Court, recognizing that “we must be governed by the 

statute and its plain meaning,” interpreted a challenged 

section to incorporate a prohibition on “undue preference and 

discrimination” from the text of a neighboring section. 234 

U.S. 476, 485–86, 488 (1914). In American Power & Light 

Co., the Court relied on a statute’s specific standards for new 

security issues that constituted “a veritable code of rules” to 

inform the SEC’s discretion to ban “unduly or unnecessarily 

complicate[d]” corporate structures. 329 U.S. at 105. I could 

continue with examples, but they all illustrate the same point: 

even in a nondelegation challenge, a court must find meaning 

for an ambiguous phrase in some relevant text. Here, by 

contrast, the majority perceives a mood of economic 

development, which Congress did not articulate, and the 

majority justifies this mood by its own assessment of 

Congress’s good intentions. 

 In short, this court, like the First, Eighth, and Tenth 

Circuits before it, has constructed an intelligible principle for 

§ 5 that consists simply of knowing why Congress enacted the 

provision. I do not deny that Congress wanted to alleviate the 

problems faced by Native Americans. Nevertheless, this 

alleged intelligible principle is relevant only for 

nondelegation challenges. The fact that the Supreme Court 

has also acknowledged the motivation for the IRA, Maj. Op. 

at 13–14, does not make that motivation any more meaningful 

as a standard to guide the Secretary’s decisions on trust 

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10 

acquisitions.2

 If it were meaningful, it would be contrary to 

the plain text of § 5, which gives the Secretary unfettered 

discretion over such decisions. 

B 

 Given the absence of standards to govern the Secretary’s 

exercise of his § 5 authority, I conclude the authority is too 

broad to be valid. Unquestionably, a standardless delegation 

is valid if it is small; “the degree of agency discretion that is 

acceptable varies according to the scope of the power 

congressionally conferred.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475. 

While the majority recognizes that scope matters, it fails to 

acknowledge that under established nondelegation doctrine, a 

standardless delegation must be quite narrow. Whitman

provided the canonical example of a sufficiently small 

delegation: EPA can “define ‘country elevators,’ which are to 

be exempt from new-stationary-source regulations governing 

grain elevators.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7411(i) (“Any 

regulations promulgated by the Administrator under this 

section applicable to grain elevators shall not apply to country 

elevators (as defined by the Administrator) which have a 

storage capacity of less than two million five hundred 

thousand bushels.”). 

 By contrast, the § 5 power is quite broad. The majority 

blandly characterizes it as the power to grant status as Indian 

country, but the majority ignores the far-reaching 

consequences of that status.3 By taking land in trust for 

 

2

 Amusingly, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, in perhaps illconsidered dicta, recited the same legislative history as the majority 

on its way to limiting the tax immunities enjoyed by Indians. 411 

U.S. 145, 152–59 (1973). 

3

 The majority also regards the power to hold land in trust as having 

aspects of Executive authority, apparently akin to the foreign 

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11 

Indians, the Secretary removes it from the jurisdiction of the 

State in which it sits and places it under the authority of a 

tribe. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 

520, 529–31 (1998) (noting federal land held in trust for 

Indians is Indian country (citing United States v. McGowan, 

302 U.S. 535 (1938)). Thus, the trust acquisition authority is 

a power to determine who writes the law, and thus indirectly 

what the law will be, for particular plots of land. 

 The consequences of the Indian country designation are 

profound. Most obviously, Indian country and its beneficial 

owners are “exempt from State and local taxation.” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 465 para. 4. Indeed, tribal residents of Indian country are 

even exempt from motor vehicle and state income taxes. 

Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 127–

28 (1993); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 

164, 165 (1973). More generally, Indian country is subject to 

federal and tribal jurisdiction in both civil and criminal 

matters. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527 & n.1 (civil); 

DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court for the Tenth Judicial Dist., 

420 U.S. 425, 428 n.2 (1975) (civil); see United States v. 

John, 437 U.S. 634, 649, 654 (1978) (reversing state 

conviction for a crime committed on trust land). A state 

“presumptively lacks jurisdiction to enforce” its regulations in 

Indian country. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett 

Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 915 (1st Cir. 1996). A tribal 

sovereign ousts a state, unless Congress expressly provides 

otherwise. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 

 

relations powers that mitigated a delegation in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 

U.S. 1, 17–18 (1965). Maj. Op. at 14–15. Regardless of the 

Executive’s role in concluding treaties with Indians, “the 

Constitution places the authority to dispose of public lands 

exclusively in Congress,” and that includes the power to hold lands 

in trust. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 326 

(1942); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 cl. 2 (Property Clause). 

USCA Case #07-5092 Document #1113553 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 28 of 30
12 

480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).4 These consequences result not 

from other statutes, as the majority claims, Maj. Op. at 15–16, 

but from the “attributes of sovereignty” that “Indian tribes 

retain.” Id. at 207; see also Okla. Tax Comm’n, 508 U.S. at 

128, Surely we need not avert our gaze from the 

constitutional backdrop against which Congress legislates. 

 Thus, § 5 allows the Secretary, by taking land in trust for 

Indians, to oust state jurisdiction in favor of government by 

the beneficiaries he chooses. Although there are certain limits 

on the scope of this power, such as the restriction that land 

may only be held “for Indians,” they are not nearly narrow 

enough to validate a standardless delegation. By comparison 

to the EPA’s authority to define country elevators, the § 5 

power is astoundingly broad. While the EPA was allowed to 

exempt certain pollution sources, circumscribed by size, from 

pollution regulations the EPA itself had imposed under a 

specific provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7411, here the Secretary can 

completely remove areas of land from the jurisdiction of state 

and local governments. Although this power may not need 

the “substantial guidance” the Supreme Court thought 

necessary for the EPA’s broad authority to set air-quality 

standards, Whitman, 531 U.S. at 476, the power it confers is 

far too broad to survive without any guidance at all. 

C 

 

4

 The Gun Lake Band casino project nicely illustrates how 

substantially a change to Indian country status can affect both 

Indians and non-Indians in the vicinity of trust land. Local 

governments stand to lose $85,000 per year in direct property taxes, 

while the extra traffic and other activity connected to the casino 

will force local police to hire additional staff at a cost of over 

$400,000 per year. 

USCA Case #07-5092 Document #1113553 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 29 of 30
13 

 Section 5 gives the Secretary unguided authority to 

transfer areas of land from the jurisdiction of state and local 

government to that of various bands of Indians. None of the 

foregoing implies BIA has exercised its authority wantonly. 

But the question is not what it has done, but what it has 

authority to do. The authority was Congress’s to give, and the 

boundaries were for Congress to provide as well. Since it has 

failed to do so, I am forced to conclude § 5 of the IRA is an 

unconstitutional delegation. 

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