Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02161/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02161-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision *

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

On November 17, 2005, Plaintiff filed objections to evidence 1

submitted by Defendants in support of their motion for summary

judgment. The objections were filed only four days before the

November 21, 2005, hearing on the motion. Local Rule 78-230 requires

that all opposition to a motion be filed not less than fourteen days

before the hearing date. Therefore, the objections are not considered

in opposition to the motion for summary judgment because Plaintiff did

not comply with the Local Rule. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA A. BERG, )

) 02:04-cv-2161-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER 

*

)

CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING BOARD, ) 

ROY C. WOOD, JR., ROY MINAMI, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move for summary judgment and/or summary

adjudication on Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion.1

BACKGROUND 

Defendant California Horse Racing Board (“CHRB”) is a state

agency responsible for overseeing all wagered horse racing in the

State of California. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 19420. The CHRB has

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all powers necessary and proper to enable it to effectuate its

purpose, including the authority to adopt and enforce rules and

regulations, adjudicate disputes arising from the enforcement of those

rules and regulations, and license individuals involved in horse

racing. Id. §§ 19440, 19510. The CHRB has the authority to delegate

its powers and duties to individuals licensed as horse racing Stewards

by the State of California. Id. Pursuant to this authority, the CHRB

delegated control over every aspect of a horse racing meet to licensed

Stewards. 4 Cal. Code Reg. § 1527. 

Plaintiff Pamela Berg is a licensed Steward. (Pl.’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“PSF”) ¶ 4; Berg Decl. ¶ 1.) Since

1991, Plaintiff has entered year-long contracts with the CHRB to work

as an Associate Steward and Steward. (PSF ¶ 32; Berg Decl. ¶ 2.) Her

employment contracts do not contain specific work assignments, i.e.

the contracts do not specify when or where Plaintiff will work, or

whether Plaintiff will work as a Steward or as an Associate Steward. 

(Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 7, 10,

20; Minami Decl. ¶ 2; Berg Decl. ¶ 6.) Instead, Defendant Roy Wood,

the former Executive Director of the CHRB, and Defendant Roy Minami,

the Assistant Executor of the CHRB, issued separate assignment sheets

each December for the upcoming year. (SUF ¶¶ 11; Defs.’ Ex. C; Minami

Depo. 35:17-36:3.) Defendant Minami drafted the assignment sheets

based on the assignments issued the previous year, and Defendant Wood

occasionally made changes before the assignments were issued. 

(SUF ¶ 82; Minami Depo. 37:7-14.) As a result, the assignments

typically did not change from year to year. (SUF ¶ 80; Defs.’ Ex. C;

Berg Depo. 40:2-6.) 

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In 1997, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in California Superior

Court against the CHRB, Defendant Wood, and other defendants alleging,

inter alia, she had been subjected to discriminatory treatment because

of her gender. (SUF ¶ 21; Defs.’ Ex. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff

alleged she was primarily given assignments as an Associate Steward,

was denied Steward assignments at two particular venues, Golden Gate

Fields and Bay Meadows, was excluded from work-related telephone

calls, meetings, and social functions, and was refused permission to

change her work schedule. (SUF ¶ 21; Defs.’ Ex. 1.) The parties

settled this lawsuit in January 1999, and judgment was entered in

favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $79,999.99. (SUF ¶ 22; Berg Decl.

¶ 10.) 

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Wood told

her the judgment would not affect her assignments. (PSF ¶ 64; Berg

Decl. ¶ 11.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff continually requested

assignments as a Steward at Golden Gate Fields or Bay Meadows. (PSF

¶ 1; Decl. Berg ¶ 16.) Plaintiff “never received a positive response”

regarding these requests. (PSF ¶ 2; Berg Decl. ¶ 16.) Instead,

Plaintiff continued to receive the same assignments, primarily as an

Associate Steward, from 1999 through 2004. (PSF ¶¶ 21, 39; Defs.’

Ex. C; Pl.’s Ex. F.) 

In addition, Plaintiff asserts that in 1999 she was denied

permission to work “dark days,” i.e. non-racing days, and was refused

other supplemental work. (PSF ¶¶ 44-59; Berg Decl. ¶¶ 13, 19-22.) In

2001, Plaintiff asserts she was excluded from a Steward meeting, and

was removed without cause from an assignment at the Sonoma County

Fair. (PSF ¶¶ 85-86; Berg Decl. ¶¶ 30-31.) In 2002, Plaintiff

asserts she was not advised of a conference call among all the

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The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment are 1

well known and need not be repeated here.

Although Defendants argue in their Motion for Summary 2

Judgment that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims should be dismissed because

she failed to exhaust contractual remedies, (Defs.’ Mot. at 8),

Defendants’ Reply “concede[s] that Plaintiff is not required to

exhaust her contractual remedy for her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . causes

of action,” (Defs.’ Reply at 2, n.1). 

4

Stewards to discuss a rule amendment. (PSF ¶ 87; Berg Decl. ¶ 30.) 

In October 2003, the position of Associate Steward was suspended for

the remainder of the year due to budget constraints. (Berg Decl.

¶ 5.) Plaintiff asserts she was the only Associate Steward affected

because the other Associate Stewards were provided with Steward

assignments. (Id. ¶ 26.) However, Plaintiff acknowledges Defendants

offered her Steward assignments at Cal Expo, but she declined the

offer because it would cause her personal hardship. (PSF ¶ 88-91;

Berg Decl. ¶ 26.) 

Plaintiff seeks to recover for the actions of Defendants

after judgment was entered in her 1999 lawsuit. Plaintiff asserts

federal claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983") and state

claims for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act,

California Government Code 12940 et seq., and breach of contract.

Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 

DISCUSSION1

I. § 1983 Claims2

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the

United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,

887 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Plaintiff alleges

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Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot sue Defendants Wood and 3

Minami “in their official capacities . . . .” (Defs.’ Mot. at 15.) 

However, Plaintiff asserts “Defendants Wood and Minami are not sued in

their official capacities, but rather “in their individual capacities

arising from their official acts.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 37.) 

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Defendant Wood and Defendant Minami violated § 1983 by (1) denying her

right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, (2)

retaliating against her for engaging in speech protected by the First

Amendment, and (3) denying her procedural due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 3

(“Pls.’s Opp’n”) at 7, 19, 38.)

A. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred in

whole or in part by the statute of limitations. (Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 11.) Claims brought under § 1983 “are

governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal

injury actions.” Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Therefore, California’s personal injury limitation statute “determines

the length of the limitations period.” Id.; Neveu v. City of Fresno,

392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2005). In California, personal

injury actions that accrue prior to January 1, 2003, are governed by a

one-year statute of limitations. Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro Bay,

115 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1028 (2004) (citing former California Code of

Civil Procedure § 340). However, personal injury actions that accrue

on or after January 1, 2003, are governed by a two-year statute of

limitations. Id. (citing California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1

and holding that it does not apply retroactively). 

Although California state law “determines the length of the

limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim

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accrues.” Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013. Under federal law, “a claim

accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury

which is the basis of the action.” Id. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are

premised on the allegations that (1) from 1999 through 2004 she was

given primarily Associate Steward assignments, (2) in 1999 she was

denied permission to dark days, (3) in 1999 she was refused

supplemental work, (3) in 2001 she was excluded from a meeting, (4) in

2001 she was removed from an assignment at the Sonoma County Fair, (4)

in 2002 she was not advised of a conference call, (5) in 2003 she was

denied Steward assignments when the Associate Steward position was

suspended. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 23-26, 38-39.) Since Plaintiff knew

or had reason to know of these events when they happened, a claim for

each act accrued in the year it occurred. Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013; see

also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002)

(a “discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occur[s]’ on the day

that it happened”). Therefore, all of the events that occurred prior

to January 1, 2003, would appear to be barred by the one-year statute

of limitations.

However, Plaintiff argues that the continuing violation

doctrine “is a viable theory to toll the statute of limitations on her

claim[s] from 1999 to the present.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 34.) The

continuing violation doctrine allows a plaintiff “to seek relief for

events outside the limitations period.” Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013. 

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan, a plaintiff could

establish a continuing violation by showing “a series of related acts

one or more of which are within the limitations period,” or by showing

“a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in

part, within the limitations period - a systematic violation.” See

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Although Plaintiff asserts that she is invoking the 4

systematic pattern-or-practice method of proving a continuing

violation, Plaintiff cites to the legal standard for the “related

acts” method of proving a continuing violation. (See Pl.’s Opp’n

at 35.) 

7

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 107. However, in Morgan the Supreme Court

invalidated the “related acts” method of proving a continuing

violation, stating “discrete acts such as termination, failure to

promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire are easy to identify

. . . and constitute a separate actionable “unlawful employment

practice.” Id. at 114. Therefore, “[d]iscrete discriminatory acts

are not actionable if time barred even when they are related to acts

alleged in timely filed charges.” Id. at 113. However, the Supreme

Court did not address the second method of proving a continuing

violation, i.e the systematic pattern-or-practice method. Id. at 115,

n.9; Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th. Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff argues the “systematic pattern-or-practice method

of the continuing violation doctrine” allows her to seek relief for 

events outside the limitations period. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 34.) 4

“[P]attern-or-practice claims . . . must be based on discriminatory

conduct that is widespread throughout a company or that is a routine

and regular part of the workplace.” Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d

1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff argues the “pattern-or-practice

method” applies because she personally “has been subjected to the

discriminatory assignments for over a decade.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 35.) 

However, “individualized decisions are best characterized as discrete

acts, rather than a pattern or practice of discrimination.” Cherosky,

330 F.3d at 1247. Furthermore, “[t]he allegation that these discrete

acts were undertaken pursuant to a discriminatory policy does not

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Defendants also argue Plaintiff cannot recover for events 5

that occurred within the statute of limitations because under Knox,

260 F.3d at 1013, Plaintiff cannot recover for “[s]ubsequent and

repeated denials of the same privilege.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 11; Defs.’

Reply at 2-3.) In Knox, the plaintiff sought relief for events

(continued...)

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extend the statutory limitations period . . . .” Id.; Lyons, 307 F.3d

at 1107 (holding “discrete acts [that] flow[] from a company-wide, or

systemic, discriminatory practice . . . [do not establish] liability

for acts occurring outside the limitations period”). 

Plaintiff also argues the “pattern-or-practice method”

applies because “women were given unfavorable assignments over the men

for many years.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 35.) Plaintiff supports this

assertion citing the deposition testimony of Ingrid Fermin, a former

Steward and the current director of the CHRB, who testified that women

received “damaging” assignments in 1994-1995. (PSF ¶ 82; Fermin Depo.

28:19-25; 104:19-25.) However, Plaintiff has produced no other

evidence, statistical or otherwise, from which a reasonable inference

could be drawn that the CHRB widely or routinely discriminated against

females up to a point in time that falls within the applicable

limitations period, i.e. January 1, 2003, and onward. See Douglas v.

Cal. Dept. of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2001) (the

continuing violation doctrine only “extends the accrual of a claim if

a continuing system of discrimination violates an individual’s rights

up to a point in time that falls within the applicable limitations

period”). Therefore, no genuine issue of material facts exists as to

whether a pattern-or-practice of discrimination existed at the CHRB

during the relevant time period. Consequently, the events that

occurred prior to January 1, 2003, cannot be the basis for Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claims because they are barred by the statute of limitations. 

5

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(...continued) 5

outside the limitations period by relying on the continuing violations

doctrine. 260 F.3d at 1009. The Knox court held that the continuing

violations doctrine was inapplicable because the plaintiff only

suffered a continuing impact from an event that occurred outside the

limitations period. Id. Unlike Knox, Plaintiff seeks relief for

events within the statute of limitations that are separate and

distinct from the events outside the statute of limitations.

9

B. Equal Protection

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

that she was discriminated against in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Defs.’ Mot. at 8.) 

To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, “a plaintiff

must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a

protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th

Cir. 2001). 

A plaintiff may establish discriminatory intent through the

burden shifting framework utilized in Title VII disparate treatment

actions. Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 265 F.3d

741, 754 (9th Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff may establish discriminatory

intent in a § 1983 action through the burden-shifting framework of

Title VII because both claims require a showing of intentional

discrimination). “In a Title VII disparate treatment case, a

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then

shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for its employment decision.” Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775

F.2d 998, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 1986). If the defendant provides a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must demonstrate

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that the reason “is a pretext for another motive which is

discriminatory.” Id. at 1005. 

“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a

disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must offer evidence that gives

rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Id. A plaintiff

can “establish an inference of discrimination” if (1) she belongs to a

protected class, (2) she was performing according to her employer’s

legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment

action, and (4) other employees with qualifications similar to her own

were treated more favorably. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric.

Improvement and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot establish she suffered an

adverse employment action. (Defs.’ Reply at 7.) An adverse

employment action is an action which causes the employee to suffer “a

tangible job detriment.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.

742, 768 (1998). Plaintiff argues she suffered an adverse employment

action when the Associate Steward position was suspended in October

2003 because she “was the only Associate Steward affected . . . since

the two male Associate Stewards were being provided full Steward

assignments.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 26-27.) However, Plaintiff

acknowledges Defendants offered her Steward assignments, but that she

declined their offer. (PSF ¶¶ 88-91; Berg Decl. ¶ 24.) Therefore,

Plaintiff has not demonstrated she was treated differently than other

employees when the Associate Position was suspended. “Absent a

showing of disparate treatment,” Plaintiff cannot establish she

suffered an adverse employment action. Brooks v. City of San Mateo,

229 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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However, Plaintiff also argues she suffered an adverse

employment action because she was primarily given assignments as an

Associate Steward in 2003 and 2004, rather than assignments as a

Steward. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 23-26.) Defendants counter Plaintiff did

not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not entitled

to particular assignments. (Defs.’ Reply at 8.) However, even if

Plaintiff was not entitled to Steward assignments, if the assignments

she did receive were disadvantageous, Plaintiff suffered an adverse

employment action. See Wyatt v. Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir.

1994) (disadvantageous work assignments constitute adverse employment

actions). Plaintiff argues the Associate Steward assignments were

disadvantageous because they were less prestigious and paid less

money. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 23-24; Berg Decl. ¶ 8.) Therefore, a genuine

issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff suffered an

adverse employment action. 

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has established the other

elements of a prima facie case, Defendants must articulate a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory

actions. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1004-05. Defendants assert Plaintiff was

not given assignments as a Steward because “[t]he existing Stewards

were qualified and doing a good job, and there was no reason to

displace them.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 13; Wood Depo. 160:6-163:2.) 

Therefore, Defendants have satisfied their burden of articulating a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the alleged adverse

employment action. See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.

Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (the employer’s burden is satisfied if

[it] simply “explains what [it] has done”). 

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As a result, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that

this reason is a pretext for discrimination. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1005. 

A plaintiff may prove pretext with direct evidence, by showing that

unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer, or with

circumstantial evidence, by showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence because it is internally

inconsistent or otherwise not believable. Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2004). Direct evidence is

evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus

without inference or presumption, while circumstantial evidence is

evidence that requires an additional inferential step to demonstrate

discrimination. Coghlan v. American Seafoods Company LLC, 413 F.3d

1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff argues Defendants’ proffered explanation, i.e.

that the existing Stewards “were qualified and doing a good job,”

“smacks of deceit” because Defendants never formally evaluated her own

performance. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 29-30.) Thus, Plaintiff infers that

because her performance was never evaluated, Defendants never

evaluated the performance of the other Stewards, and then further

infers that if Defendants never evaluated the existing Stewards, they

did not know whether they were “doing a good job.” (See id. at 30.) 

The fact Plaintiff’s work performance was not evaluated is

circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent because it requires

additional inferential steps to demonstrate Defendants discriminated

against Plaintiff because of gender. See Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095. 

When a plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence of discriminatory

intent, the evidence must be specific and substantial to create a

triable issue of fact. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642; Coghlan, 413 F.3d at

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1095 (“when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must be ‘specific and substantial’ to defeat . . . [a] motion

for summary judgment”). Although Plaintiff’s proffered evidence

suggests the other Stewards were not formally evaluated, the evidence

is too attenuated to infer the Defendants had no knowledge of their

work performance. Therefore, the lack of Plaintiff’s evaluation does

not specifically or substantially demonstrate that Defendants’

proffered reason for the alleged adverse employment action is a

pretext for gender discrimination. 

Next, Plaintiff argues Defendant Wood was motivated by

discriminatory intent because he told her “that the [1999 settlement]

would not change how the CHRB would make assignments to her for

Associate Steward and Steward.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 28.) Although

Plaintiff argues this statement is direct evidence of discriminatory

animus, the statement constitutes circumstantial evidence because it

requires an additional inferential step to demonstrate that the reason

the assignments would not change was because of Plaintiff’s gender. 

See Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095 (“Direct evidence typically consists of

clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or

actions by the employer.”); Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d

1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998) (the plaintiff presented direct evidence of

discriminatory intent because her supervisor said he “did not want to

deal with [a] female”). Therefore, the statement must be specific and

substantial evidence of discriminatory intent to establish pretext. 

Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642. 

Plaintiff asserts that “[g]iven the fact that her prior

lawsuit was litigated over discriminatory assignments, the statement,

if the trier of fact believes that it was made, shows sufficient

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indicia of animosity as to create triable issues of fact regarding

discrimination.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 29.) Although the statement may

suggest Defendant Wood harbored some “animosity” toward Plaintiff

after the lawsuit settled, the statement does not demonstrate that his

animosity was due to Plaintiff’s gender. Therefore, the statement

does not specifically or substantially demonstrate that Defendants’

proffered reason for the alleged adverse employment action is a

pretext for gender discrimination. 

Plaintiff next argues Defendant Minami harbors “contempt for

women in general as he admits to giving a female [employee] an

unsolicited kiss on the lips.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 32.) Evidence of

“discriminatory animus toward the class to which the plaintiff

belongs” may create an inference of discriminatory intent toward the

plaintiff. See Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095, n.6. However, the act of

kissing a female employee does not create a strong inference of

discriminatory intent towards women in general or Plaintiff

particularly. See Cordova v. State Farm Ins., 124 F.3d 1145, 1149

(9th Cir. 1997) (an “egregious and bigoted insult, one that

constitutes strong evidence of discriminatory animus on the basis of

national origin . . . could be proof of discrimination” against the

plaintiff even though the remarks were directed at another employee). 

Therefore, the “unsolicited kiss” does not specifically or

substantially demonstrate that Defendants’ proffered reason for the

alleged adverse employment action is a pretext for gender

discrimination. 

Next, Plaintiff argues she can establish pretext though a

statistical analysis of the Steward and Associate Steward assignments

in Northern California. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 31.) The statistics reveal

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Plaintiff received twenty seven percent Steward assignments in 2003,

and seventy two percent Steward assignments in 2004, while five male

Stewards received one hundred percent Steward assignments during the

same time period. (Id.; Pl.’s Ex. F.) Defendants argue these

statistics are not accurate because the “tabulations do not account

for missed assignments, additional days worked, . . . substitutions,

. . . . the Steward position rejected by Plaintiff, and the dark days

that Plaintiff refused to work.” (Defs.’ Reply at 9.) Defendants

further contend “the statistics fail to incorporate assignments given

to those in Southern California, and thus artificially limits those

‘similarly situated’ to Stewards in Northern California.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff rejoins “that the comparable group of similarly situated

male Stewards are those who received their assignments in Northern

California” because Defendants “accommodated the geographic location

of where the Stewards resided . . . when making assignments.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 20, n.5; PUF ¶ 25.) 

Although statistics “could constitute circumstantial

evidence of discrimination demonstrating pretext . . . their utility

depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Aragon v.

Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2002)

(noting “statistics will, in at least many cases, have little direct

bearing on the specific intentions of the employer”). For example, if

the “statistical evidence [is] derived from an extremely small

universe,” the evidence “has little predictive value and must be

disregarded.” Id. Plaintiff’s statical evidence, which includes one

woman and five men, has little predictive value because of the small

sample size. See id. Furthermore, “slight changes in the data

[might] drastically alter the result” because the statistics do not

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account for the Steward assignments Plaintiff was offered, but

rejected, or other “dark days” Plaintiff refused to work. See id. 

Furthermore, the statistics fail to incorporate assignments

given to men and women in Southern California. “The impact of a

practice on the protected class should generally be measured against

the actual pool of employees affected by that practice.” Sengupta v.

Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that

the plaintiff’s “ability to prove discriminatory intent based on

statistical evidence depends upon selecting the proper labor pool”). 

When all of the assignments for both Northern and Southern California

are combined, no clear pattern of sexual discrimination is apparent. 

See Aragon, 292 F.3d at 663 (stating “the statistics must show a stark

pattern of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than [sex]”). 

The only other female Steward, Ingrid Fermin, received one hundred

percent Steward assignments during the relevant time period. (Defs.’s

Reply at 9; Defs.’ Ex. C.) Therefore, the “statistics fall short of

constituting substantial and specific evidence of [sexual]

discrimination.” See Aragon, 292 F.3d at 664. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues “the most damaging evidence of

discrimination comes from the current Director of the CHRB, Ingrid

Fermin.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 32.) Plaintiff asserts Ingrid Fermin “took

a leave of absence [in 1998] due to the stress she experienced based

upon her own victimization based on gender discrimination.” (Id. at

32.) Defendants argue Plaintiff “completely misrepresents Ingrid

Fermin’s testimony . . . .” (Defs.’ Reply at 10.) 

During her deposition, Ingrid Fermin testified she took a

leave of absence, and when asked if her leave was “a result of what

[she] perceived to be disparate treatment,” she responded “[i]t was a

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combination of things.” (Fermin Depo. 33:23-34:11.) When asked

“[w]as one of the factors disparate treatment,” she responded

“[p]robably,” and then stated she “just did not get along with

[Defendant Wood] at all.” (Id.) This testimony does not establish

Ingrid Fermin took a leave of absence “based on gender discrimination”

as Plaintiff asserts, but rather that one of the reasons she took a

leave of absence was because she believed she had “probably” been

subjected to discrimination. Ingrid Fermin’s subjective belief as to

whether she was discriminated against does not raise a genuine issue

of material fact as to pretext. See Schuler v. Chronicle Broadcasting

Co. Inc., 793 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating “subjective

personal judgments do not raise a genuine issue of material fact”);

Goberman v. Washington County, 2001 WL 34045881, *10 (D. Or. 2001)

(stating that the plaintiff’s “subjective belief that he has been

discriminated against is insufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact”). 

Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the

Defendants’ proffered reason for the alleged adverse employment

actions is a pretext for gender discrimination. Consequently,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 equal

protection claim is granted. 

B. First Amendment

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim 

that she was retaliated against for engaging in speech protected by

the First Amendment. (Defs.’ Mot. at 17.) To prevail on a First

Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she

suffered an adverse employment action, (2) the speech at issue was

constitutionally protected, and (3) the speech was a substantial

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motivating factor for the adverse employment action. Huskey v. City

of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot show that her previous

lawsuit was a substantial motivating factor for an adverse employment

action because “plaintiff admits that the actions of defendants after

her previous lawsuit was [sic] the same as prior to the lawsuit.” 

(Defs.’ Mot. at 18.) Plaintiff argues the comment by Defendant Wood

that the judgment in her previous lawsuit would not affect how the

CHRB made assignments “shows sufficient indicia of animosity that the

trier of fact could conclude . . . [adverse employment actions were]

motivated by an intent to chill her petitioning conduct.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 43.) 

To establish that her speech was a substantial motivating

factor for an adverse employment action, Plaintiff must demonstrate a

casual nexus between the protected speech and the alleged adverse

employment action. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th

Cir. 2000). A plaintiff cannot demonstrate a casual nexus if the same

adverse employment actions occurred before and after she engaged in

protected speech. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th

Cir. 1996) (no causal connection when the alleged retaliatory conduct

occurred both before and after plaintiff filed her complaint); Johnson

v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 2001) (“If there was

‘no ratcheting up of the harassment’ after the complaint was filed,

the complaint could not have been the cause of the allegedly

retaliatory conduct.”). Plaintiff acknowledges that “the actions of

Defendants after her previous lawsuit was [sic] the same as prior to

the lawsuit.” (SUF ¶ 24; Ex. A.) Therefore, the lawsuit could not

have been a substantial motivating factor for the adverse employment

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Although Defendants argued summary judgment should be 6

granted on Plaintiff’s procedural due process and substantive due

process claims, Plaintiff states she “does not assert a substantive

due process claim.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7, n.1.) 

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actions. See Johnson, 260 F.3d at 735. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 retaliation claim is

granted. 

C. Procedural Due Process

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

that she was denied procedural due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Defs.’ Mot. at 8.) To establish a procedural due process 6

claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants (1) deprived her of a

property interest, and (2) did so without due process of law. Huskey

v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2000); Thorton v. City of

St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164, (9th Cir. 2005). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff does not have a property interest

in specific job assignments, (Defs.’ Mot. at 12), while Plaintiff

argues she has a property interest in her Steward license, (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 8). “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person

clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it

. . . [and] more than a unilateral expectation of it . . . [but] must,

instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Board of

Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). An

entitlement is not created by the Constitution, but rather by

“existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source

such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits

and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” (Id.) 

Defendants argue Plaintiff does not have a property interest

in particular assignments because her annual contracts do not

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guarantee any assignments. (Defs.’ Mot. at 12; Defs.’ Reply at 4.) 

An employment contract that “secure[s] no interest” in a benefit,

creates “no possible claim of entitlement” to that benefit. Roth, 408

U.S. at 577 (holding the plaintiff did not have a property interest in

re-employment because his contract did not guarantee re-employment

after his contract expired). Plaintiff’s contracts secured absolutely

no interest in particular assignments because the contracts did not

guarantee any such assignments. (See UF ¶ 10; Defs.’ Ex. B.) 

Therefore, Plaintiff does not have a property interest in her

assignments. 

Plaintiff argues she has a property interest in her Steward

license. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 10.) Although an individual may have a

property interest in a professional license, Plaintiff does not allege

she has been deprived of her license or the ability to engage in her

specific profession. See Gallo v. U.S. Dist. Court For Dist. of

Arizona, 349 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff was deprived

of a property interest when the court revoked his admission to the

court bar); c.f. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir.

1999) (plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest when a government

regulation created a “complete prohibition” on her entry into a

profession). Rather, Plaintiff argues she was deprived of “the full

benefits of her license” because she was unable to negotiate the terms

of her contracts with Defendants. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 10.) 

Plaintiff contends she is entitled to negotiate the terms of

her contracts with Defendants because California Business and

Professions Code § 19518(a)(1) provides that “[c]ontracts shall be

upon any terms that the [CHRB] and stewards may mutually agree

upon . . . .” (Id.) “A property interest may be created if

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‘procedural’ requirements are intended to operate as a significant

substantive restriction on the basis for an agency’s actions.” 

Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980). Therefore,

Plaintiff has a property interest in negotiation with Defendants if

California Business and Professions Code § 19518(a)(1) imposes

“significant limitations on the discretion of the decision maker.” 

Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 873 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

California Business and Professions Code § 19518 states that

contracts will be formed upon terms the CHRB and Plaintiff “may”

mutually agree upon, but does not affirmatively require Defendants to

negotiate with Plaintiff or agree to the terms proposed by Plaintiff. 

Therefore, the permissive language of the statute does not impose

“significant limitations on the discretion” of Defendants. See id. 

Consequently, Plaintiff does not have a property interest in

negotiation because the statute does not create a “legitimate claim of

entitlement to it.” See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Therefore,

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983

procedural due process claim is granted because no genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was deprived of a

property interest.

II. State Law Claims

Since Defendants’ motion for summary judgment has been

granted on all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the issue is reached

whether supplemental jurisdiction should continued being exercised

over Plaintiff’s state claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), when all

federal claims are eliminated before trial, the court has a measure of

discretion when deciding whether to continue exercising supplemental

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jurisdiction over remaining state claims. Les Shockley Racing, Inc.

v. National Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1989). “[W]hen

deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal

court should consider and weigh in each case, . . . the values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago

v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). However,

“[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated

before trial, the balance of factors to be considered . . . will point

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims.” 

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Wade v.

Regional Credit Assoc., 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where a

district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims

for resolution, it should decline jurisdiction over the state claims

and dismiss them without prejudice.”). 

One of Plaintiff’s state law claims involves an alleged

violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California

Government Code 12940 et seq. Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot

maintain a claim under the FEHA because she is an independent

contractor pursuant to California Business and Professions Code

§ 19518. (Defs.’ Mot. at 19.) However, “it is not settled that

independent contractors cannot sue under the FEHA” because “[t]he

California Supreme Court has not squarely ruled that independent

contractors do not have standing.” Plute v. Roadway Package System,

Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2001). “Because the

California Supreme Court has not addressed this question, . . . [this

court would have to] ‘predict how the highest state court would decide

the issue . . . .’” Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F. 3d 1114, 1125

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Calkins, 187

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F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999)). However, “[n]eedless decisions of

state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote

justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed

reading of applicable law.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383

U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Therefore, “as a matter of comity” and to

provide the parties with “a surer-footed reading of applicable law,”

the Court declines to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s state claims. Plaintiff’s state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice as of the date on which this order is

filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 1, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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