Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00873/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00873-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL GERMAINE WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CASE NO. 2:14-cv-873-MHT-TFM

v. ) [wo]

)

JIM CATON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1) this case was referred to the undersigned United 

States Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended 

findings of fact and conclusions of law (Doc. 4, filed August 21, 2014). Pending before 

the Court is Defendants= Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9, filed September 23, 2014), and 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 18, filed December 31, 2014) which this Court construes 

as a Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court has carefully reviewed the 

Complaint, Motion to Dismiss, and the briefs filed in support of and in opposition to 

Defendants’ motion (Docs. 1, 9, and 18). For good cause, it is the 

RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the Defendants= motion be 

GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

I. JURISDICTION

The case was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. '' 2000e et seq. (Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964) and 28 U.S.C. ' 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The parties do 

not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support 

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both. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1) this case was referred to the undersigned 

United States Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended 

findings of fact and conclusions of law (Doc. 4, filed August 21, 2014).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although it must accept well-pled facts as true, the court is not required to accept a 

plaintiff=s legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 

(2009) (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions”). In evaluating the sufficiency of a 

plaintiff=s pleadings, the court must indulge reasonable inferences in plaintiff=s favor, Abut 

we are not required to draw plaintiff=s inference.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 

N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, “unwarranted deductions of 

fact” in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of 

plaintiff=s allegations. Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (stating 

conclusory allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true”).

A complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pled do not state a claim for relief 

that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (explaining 

“only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss”); 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-62, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 

929 (2007) (retiring the prior “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 

no set of facts” standard). In Twombly, the Supreme Court emphasized that a complaint 

“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

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a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations in a 

complaint need not be detailed but “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even 

if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

More recently, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that although FED. R. CIV. P.

8 does not require detailed factual allegations; it does demand “more than an unadorned, 

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 

1949. A complaint must state a plausible claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The 

mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to 

dismiss. Id. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim “across the line from 

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III. BACKGROUND

The Court accepts as true all relevant facts set forth by the Plaintiff in his 

Complaint (Doc. 1). As best as this Court can discern, this Title VII claim arises out of 

the termination of Plaintiff Michael Germaine Williams’ (“Williams” or “Plaintiff”) 

employment with Andalusia Tire Company, as caused by the actions of Defendant Jessie 

Summerset (“Summerset”), and Jim Caton (“Caton”). See Doc. 1. 

Williams states that on December 20, 2013, Summerset, Williams’ supervisor, 

became aware that Williams is an atheist. See Doc. 1 at 1. Williams asserts that upon 

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this discovery, Summerset asserted that “I am God” and that there were other people who

believe in God who are praying to have Williams’ job. Id. Williams responded “while 

they were praying I was moving my feet and got it, thanks for the job.” Id. At closing 

time, Summerset terminated Williams’ employment. Id. Williams asserts that his 

religious beliefs or lack thereof, was the sole reason for his termination. Id. As a 

result of losing his job five days before Christmas, Williams was unable to provide gifts 

to his children who do believe in God, and he later became homeless. See Doc. 1 at 2.

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Caton and Summerset (collectively “Defendants”) argue that the case is due to be 

dismissed because the “Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim against these 

Defendants upon which relief can be granted.” See Doc. 9 at 1. Specifically, 

Defendants argue that “Title VII only allows recovery against the employer, not an 

individual.” Id. (citing Smith v. Capital City Club of Montgomery, 850 F. Supp. 976 

(M.D. Ala. 1996); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1996)). Additionally, 

Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to survive 

a motion to dismiss. See Doc. 9 at 2.

A. Caton and Summerset

Defendants assert that Title VII only allows recovery against the employer. Id.

(citing Smith, 850 F. Supp. 976; Mason, 82 F.3d 1007). Here, Defendants allege, 

Williams does not name the employer as a defendant in the complaint. However, it is 

clear to this Court that it was Williams’ intent to name Andalusia Tire Company as a

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Defendant. See Doc. 1 at 1. Although in Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint Williams only 

includes Caton and Summerset in the case heading, he clearly names Andalusia Tire 

Company as a defendant under the second question prompt which asks the Plaintiff to 

provide the Court the “Name and address of defendant(s).” Id. Williams’ handwritten 

notation clearly states “Andalusia Tires – Jim Caton, Jessie Summerset (supervisor), 850 

By-Pass West, P.O. Box 446, Andalusia, AL 36420.”1

 Id. Due to an inadvertent 

clerical error, Andalusia Tire Company was omitted from the docket. The Court finds 

that Andalusia Tire Company was properly named as a defendant at the time the 

Complaint was filed.

With regards to Defendants’ argument that Williams’ Title VII claims asserted 

against Caton and Summerset are due to be dismissed, the Court agrees. Caton and 

Summerset are not proper defendants in a Title VII cause of action. The Eleventh Circuit 

held that “relief under Title VII is available against only the employer and not against 

individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act, regardless of 

whether the employer is a public company or a private company.” Dearth v. Collins, 441 

F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added and removed). In this case, Summerset 

was Williams’’ supervisor, which makes him an employee of Andalusia Tire Company. 

Thus, he cannot be a defendant in a Title VII cause of action. Similarly, Caton is the 

owner of Andalusia Tire Company, and cannot be a defendant in a Title VII cause of 

action. See Dearth, 441 F.3d 931, 933-34 (holding that “there is nothing in Title VII that 

 1 The address provided matches Andalusia Tire Company’s business address.

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supports [Plaintiff’s] claim that individual capacity liability can be imposed on the basis of 

the alter ego doctrine” where the defendant was the “president, director, and sole 

shareholder”). Accordingly, Williams’ claim against Caton and Summerset under Title 

VII is due to be dismissed.

B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Defendants also argue that this case should be dismissed because Williams failed 

to make a prima facie showing of Title VII discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss. 

See Doc. 9. This Court, however, cannot discern whether Williams has satisfied the 

prerequisites of Title VII. The Plaintiff’s Complaint was completed using a standard pro 

se complaint form and not the pro se Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) complaint form. See Doc. 1. Plaintiff does not indicate whether he 

exhausted his administrative remedies through the EEOC prior to filing in this Court. 

Id. Therefore, the parties shall advise the Court whether Williams exhausted his 

administrative remedies prior to filing this case in this Court, or if not, whether any 

equitable doctrines excuse Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge as follows:

(1) To the extent Defendants move to dismiss the Title VII claim against Jim 

Caton and Jessie Summerset, the Defendant=s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) be 

GRANTED;

(2) To the extent Defendants move to dismiss the Title VII claim for failure to 

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name his employer, Andalusia Tire Company, the Defendant=s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) 

be DENIED;

(3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to add Andalusia Tire Company as a 

named defendant, and serve Andalusia Tire Company;

2

(4) To the extent Defendants move to dismiss the Title VII claim for failure to 

make a prima facie showing of Title VII discrimination, the Defendant=s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 9) be DENIED at this time; and

(5) The parties shall brief the Court on the status of the EEOC charge and 

exhaustion of administrative remedies within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this 

Order.

It is further ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to 

this Recommendation on or before September 4, 2015. Any objections filed must 

specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge=s Recommendation to which the 

party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by 

the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order 

of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

 2 As discussed above, due to an inadvertent clerical error, Andalusia Tire Company was incorrectly omitted as named 

defendants and was due service at the time the Complaint was filed. Due to the error, service will be deemed timely.

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upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981).

DONE this 21st day of August, 2015.

 /s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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