Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01575/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01575-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

KENDRA D. BERNARD, 

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

DEBORAH K. JOHNSON, Warden, 

 Respondent. 

Case No: C 07-1575 SBA (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner Kendra D. Bernard (“Petitioner”) brings the instant pro se habeas action 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge her murder conviction and sentence rendered in the 

Contra Costa County Superior Court. Petitioner’s Amended Petition is the operative 

pleading in this action. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this 

matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby DENIES the Amended Petition for the 

reasons set forth below. 

Case 4:07-cv-01575-SBA Document 77 Filed 07/25/16 Page 1 of 53
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Case 4:07-cv-01575-SBA Document 77 Filed 07/25/16 Page 2 of 53
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of vandalism in and around the condominium. By early 2001,6

Margaret made it clear that she did not want Cunningham to 

come to the condominium, but sometimes he came anyway. 

Sometimes, Bernard did not want to let him in or talk with him 

on the telephone, even after he called repeatedly in a short time. 

 Margaret had asked her son Phil to fix up her 

condominium, which she decided to sell. He repaired or 

replaced doors and walls with holes in them and Bernard’s 

writing on them. During the weekend before Easter7

—the 

weekend of April 7-8—he returned to the condominium and 

discovered that some of the repairs he had completed had to be 

redone because of new damage. Angrily, he kicked in the door 

of Bernard’s bedroom.8

 He saw that her room was piled high 

with garbage. Phil saw a gun inside Bernard’s room where a 

knife stuck out of the door jamb.9

B. Missing Person’s Investigation

One of Margaret’s neighbors noticed that Bernard’s dog 

was alone at the condominium and contacted authorities. On 

April 21, an Antioch police officer went to the condominium to 

check on the dog’s welfare. He forced his way into the locked 

condominium and found the dog inside. It appeared that the 

dog had been left unattended for several days, although 

someone had left food for the animal. The dog was taken by 

animal control. Police boarded up the condominium door and 

left a card on it. 

When Margaret did not keep her Easter weekend plans 

on April 14 and 15 and did not go to work during the week of 

April 16 to 20, her family became concerned. Margaret’s 

daughter Kim went to the condominium and found that the 

police had been there. Neither Margaret nor Bernard were 

there. 

By April 24, Antioch police had received missing 

persons reports from Margaret’s daughter Kim. The police 

returned to the condominium to make a more thorough search 

of the home. A maintenance worker for the condominium 

association told Officer Brown that he had last seen Margaret 

on the Friday before Easter—April 13. Margaret had not kept 

an appointment on Tuesday, April 17. He thought that he saw 

Bernard in a maroon Fairmont in front of the condominium on 

 6 All subsequent dates refer to the 2001 calendar year unless otherwise indicated. 

7 We take judicial notice of the April 2001 calendar, including the fact that April 15 

was Easter Sunday. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a).) 

8 Bernard testified that her brother’s version of events was backwards—that he 

kicked in her door, prompting her to kick a hole in the wall. 

9 Bernard admitted that she owned guns that she kept in her room. 

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Monday, April 16 or Tuesday, April 17. Antioch police 

questioned Margaret’s son Phil, who characterized Bernard as a 

psychopath. At this point, police suspected that Cunningham 

might also be involved with Margaret’s disappearance.10

C. Sierra County and Solano County Discoveries

By this time, Antioch police knew that a dismembered 

body had been found in Northern California, but the identity of 

the body was not certain. A few days earlier, on Friday, April 

20, a Sierra County sheriff found a nude female torso on a rural 

road near the town of Alleghany. The torso was missing its 

head, hands and feet. No clothing or identifying indicia was 

found with the remains. A sheetrock knife, pieces of fabric and 

various bits of plastic were found nearby. 

On the same day, a Solano County sheriff received a 

report that a woman’s severed head had been seen inside a 

sleeping bag left on a road beside an orchard near Putah Creek. 

At this site, the sheriff found a mound of items 15 to 20 feet 

from the road. In the mound, police found a sleeping bag 

containing a severed head, two hands and two feet wrapped in 

plastic with some rope, an axe, a machete, two knives, and a 

sweatshirt. Teal plastic bags and other pieces of plastic were 

also found in the mound or in the nearby orchard. Antioch 

police believed that Margaret’s body was dismembered in order 

to dispose of evidence of her murder. 

D. Murder Investigation

On April 25, Antioch police confirmed Margaret’s death. 

Bernard was arrested at the San Leandro home of Loren Dale 

Barton, who was Larissa’s father. Bernard was limping, but 

had few other obvious injuries. At the time of her arrest, 

Bernard’s purse had been seized. It contained pine needles and 

a granite rock more common to the Sierra Nevada than to the 

local area.11 Receipts dated April 14 and April 16 were also 

found in her purse. Two of these receipts were from Antioch 

and Pittsburg Wal-Mart stores.12 One showed that a machete 

had been purchased on April 16. The indicated item was akin 

to a machete found at the Solano County crime scene. Another 

April 16 receipt evidenced a visit to an Oakley Albertson’s 

 10 Throughout the investigation, Antioch police conducted various inquiries at the 

request of Bernard’s defense counsel. 

11 The jury had evidence of sample foliage from Sierra County—pine needles, a 

dried leaf and cedar twigs—that had been collected near where Margaret’s torso was found. 

12 One April 16 purchase at a Pittsburg Wal-Mart was paid by Bernard using one of 

Margaret’s checks. She used Margaret’s driver’s license as identification for this 

transaction. 

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store.13

 That same day, Modesto police formally notified 

Margaret’s son Phil of the fact—but not the circumstances—of 

Margaret’s death. Spontaneously, he characterized Bernard as 

having a violent temper. He told police that Margaret had been 

afraid of Bernard, who had repeatedly threatened her. 

According to Phil, Margaret wanted Bernard to move out, but 

was afraid to ask her to do so. Bernard had threatened his sister 

and himself, too. Phil was sufficiently concerned for his own 

safety that he planned to leave his home in order to avoid 

confronting Bernard. 

 On April 25, the Fairmont had been found parked near 

Margaret’s condominium. Part of its front left grill and the 

light were missing. The car was impounded. The vehicle was 

searched two days later, on April 27. A tent, shovel and teal 

plastic bags were found among a jumble of items in the back 

seat. The front seat was covered by a cloth. Under the cloth, 

inked writing14 was found on the center of the front seat. The 

writing was covered over with heavy black ink. A marking pen 

was also found in the car. Teal and black plastic were found in 

the trunk, along with some pine needles and leaves. Several 

items in the trunk were stained with what was later determined 

to be Margaret’s blood. 

Also on April 27, Antioch police searched Margaret’s 

condominium. They found the living room and bedrooms in 

disarray. Among the items found were black plastic bags, 

syringes, a length of rope, and indicia belonging to Bernard and 

to Cunningham. A purse that appeared to belong to Bernard 

contained a dagger that had been sharpened on both sides of the 

blade. In front of the condominium, a garbage can held a 

plastic bag containing a potholder with a clump of blond hair on 

it.15

The metal front door of the condominium had a small 

puncture in it, as if someone had pushed a knife through the 

outer layer. The authorities looked for hardened glue or a 

broken key in the locks, but found none. Police also observed 

 13 A surveillance videotape from the time indicated on this receipt showed a man 

resembling Cunningham at the Oakley store. He appeared to be alone. Bernard’s image 

did not appear on the videotape. 

14 The visible writing on the front seat seemed to be “ELC,” “Cunningham” and 

either “kidnapped” or “chopped.” A forensics expert was able to make out the words 

underneath the obliteration—references to “Angie Bernard”; “my mom”; “ELC”; “He 

chopped”; “Help Me My Mom”; “Hwy 49”; “Allegan Inn, Nevada City”; and “Edward Lee 

Cunningham.” Another part seemed to read: “Ed made me do myself.” There was also 

two seven-digit numbers that might have been telephone numbers. 

15 According to Margaret’s driver’s license, she had blond hair. 

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the initials ELC16 scratched into the curb in front of the 

condominium. In all, the detailed search of the condominium 

took 14 hours to complete. 

Law enforcement officials gradually established forensic 

links among evidence found at Margaret’s condominium, in the 

Fairmont, and at the Sierra County and Solano County crime 

scenes. The various body parts were identified as belonging to 

Margaret’s body. The sleeping bag, the rope found in the 

plastic bags with the severed hands and feet, a knife and a bed 

sheet17 that were all found in Solano County were tied to 

Margaret’s condominium. Teal plastic bags found in the 

Fairmont and at the Sierra County crime scene matched plastic 

that had been wrapped around the body parts that were found in 

Solano County. Foliage that was not natural to the Solano 

County crime scene was found in the hair on the severed head.18 The forensics evidence also suggested that Margaret’s body had 

been taken from the condominium to an outdoor location where 

it had been dismembered using the axe, machete and knives. 

The police also began to piece together a chronology of 

events in the days leading up to Margaret’s death and the time 

of Bernard’s arrest. On Wednesday, April 18, Bernard was 

trying to locate Barton, Larissa’s father. On Thursday, April 

19, Barton went with a friend to Vallejo where they found 

Bernard asleep in the Fairmont. She was filthy, crying, and 

disoriented. Barton thought that she was on methamphetamine 

and was sleep-deprived. She told Barton that the police could 

be looking for her because Margaret was dead. When he 

appeared not to believe that her mother was dead, she said “just 

smell the trunk.” Bernard was unclear on some of the details of 

how her mother died, but the way she described the situation 

led Barton to believe that she woke to find her mother’s neck 

cradled in her arm. When he returned to his friend, Barton said 

that Bernard’s mother was dead.19

Barton went back home to San Leandro and Bernard 

followed him. Bernard talked with their daughter Larissa in 

private and later recounted some details of Margaret’s death to 

 16 These are Cunningham’s initials. Bernard testified that Cunningham admitted to 

her that he carved them in the curb. Larissa testified that she saw these same initials 

marked on the hood of Bernard’s car once when Cunningham had come to the 

condominium and they did not answer his knock, hoping he would go away. 

17 At the Sierra County and Solano County crime scenes, two matching pieces of 

fabric were found. They had formed a single bed sheet that had belonged to Margaret. 

18 See footnote [11], ante. 

19 Barton’s friend later told police that Barton had told him that Bernard said she had 

strangled her mother. Barton later admitted that he had told his friend this, having made 

this assumption based on what Bernard told him. However, Barton insisted that Bernard 

never actually said that she had strangled Margaret. 

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Barton. Bernard said that she and Cunningham had been at the 

condominium drinking. She was uncertain, but thought that she 

lost consciousness at some point.20 She woke to feel 

Cunningham nudging her foot. She was on the kitchen floor 

with her arm underneath Margaret, whose fingernails were blue, 

suggesting that Margaret was dead. Cunningham told Bernard 

that he had to give her an injection to wake her up; that he was 

going to help her out of this because he loved her; and that he 

took photographs. 

Bernard said that she and Cunningham put Margaret’s 

body in the Fairmont. She told Barton that she held onto 

Margaret’s body while Cunningham cut off her head, hands and 

feet.21 She said that she did not want to do this, but he had an 

axe and turned it on her, making her fear for her own safety if 

she did not do as he instructed. Bernard also said that 

Cunningham cut off one of Margaret’s fingers in order to 

remove a ring.22 Bernard also admitted cashing some of 

Margaret’s checks.23 She seemed convinced that she had lost 

control of herself, but did not think that she killed Margaret—

she could not be certain. Bernard seemed to think that 

Cunningham had set her up for the crime. 

Bernard stayed with Barton for almost a week before she 

was arrested. She seemed fearful of both her boyfriend and the 

police. She slept much of the first two days. She wanted to 

flee, but Barton persuaded her to consult the public defender 

instead. On April 23 and again on April 24, Bernard went to 

Martinez with Larissa for this purpose. On the way to her first 

meeting with the public defender, Bernard picked up Margaret’s 

second car in Pittsburg24 and left the Fairmont in Antioch near 

the condominium. 

E. Pretrial Procedure

In October, a five-day preliminary hearing was 

conducted. Bernard sought to introduce evidence of 

 20 Bernard told Barton that she believed that she had been given an injection that 

caused her to lose consciousness. 

21 Bernard herself testified that Barton was mistaken—that she did not actually see 

Cunningham dismember Margaret’s body. 

22 See footnote [40], post. 

23 The day before Margaret died, Bernard wrote one of Margaret’s checks to herself 

for $213. Bernard told the jury that her mother allowed her to do this after Margaret 

contacted her bank for approval. 

24 Bernard later testified that she and Cunningham moved the car to Pittsburg on 

Monday, April 16, before disposing of Margaret’s body so that it would appear that 

Margaret had gone to work as usual. 

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Cunningham’s propensity to violence on various grounds—as a 

common plan to intimidate or terrorize people, as evidence of 

the identity of Margaret’s killer, and to support her own 

credibility. The trial court ruled that the evidence was 

inadmissible. (See Evid. Code,25 § 1101.) Bernard was held to 

answer on the murder charge. In December, Bernard was charged by information with 

first degree murder. (See Pen. Code, § 187.) Her motion to set 

aside the information—again, grounded in her claim that 

Cunningham was the real murderer—was denied in January 

2002. (See Pen. Code, § 995.) Her motions to exclude her 

pretrial statement as involuntary and to compel specific 

performance of an agreement entitling her to take a polygraph 

test in order to establish her innocence26 were also denied. In March 2002, Bernard filed a motion in limine to admit 

evidence of 30 separate incidents of Cunningham’s prior 

uncharged violent conduct—evidence that she reasoned would 

tend to prove that he had killed Margaret. After hearing, the 

trial court granted the request to admit evidence of nine of these 

incidents—those involving Bernard herself—but refused to 

admit evidence of the other 21 incidents—those involving third 

parties. In so doing, it reasoned that any Cunningham incidents 

involving Bernard, her mother or their home were relevant to 

explain Bernard’s state of mind before and after the murder. 

This state of mind evidence was thought to be relevant to 

Bernard’s defense that Cunningham actually killed Margaret—

that she did not kill her mother but merely accompanied him 

and helped to dispose of her mother’s body. The trial court 

found that the incidents involving third parties were 

inadmissible and were excludable on the ground that they were 

 25 All subsequent statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise 

indicated. 

26 Bernard gave a statement to prosecutors and took a polygraph test, to further the 

public defender’s suggestion that she testify for the prosecution against Cunningham. She 

passed a polygraph test, but prosecutors wanted her to take a second one. Before Bernard 

could take the second polygraph test, the prosecution decided to prosecute Bernard instead. 

Afterward, defense counsel argued—without success—that Bernard was entitled to specific 

performance of an agreement entitling her to take a second polygraph test. He did not 

argue that Bernard was entitled to have the case against her dismissed. 

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more prejudicial than probative.27 (See § 352.) The parties 

were also barred from referring to Cunningham’s anticipated 

exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination before the 

jury.28

F. Trial and Sentencing

1. The Prosecution’s Evidence

At the hearing on the motion in limine, Bernard argued 

that Cunningham’s prior violence made him a more likely killer 

than she was, making the proffered evidence relevant. Even if 

the evidence was not admissible under section 1101, she 

reasoned that due process considerations compelled that this 

evidence be admitted in order to allow her to defend against the 

murder charge. The prosecution argued that due process did not 

make otherwise inadmissible propensity evidence admissible. 

Trial began in mid-March 2002. Throughout the trial, 

Bernard asserted that only two people could have committed the 

murder. She contended that she was innocent and that 

Cunningham had killed her mother. Her own actions after 

Margaret was killed were done under duress, she argued, 

making evidence of her fear of Cunningham relevant and 

admissible. The prosecutor reasoned that this defense was 

inconsistent with Bernard’s initial belief that she had killed her 

mother. The jury saw and heard a part of a taped statement in 

which Bernard said that initially, she thought she had killed her 

mother and acted in the days immediately after Margaret’s 

death to cover up her apparent crime. During trial, the 

prosecution and the defense made repeated attempts to persuade 

 27 We have already determined a related petition in this case. In March 2002, 

Bernard petitioned this court for a writ of mandate or prohibition, challenging inter alia the 

constitutionality of the trial court’s denial of her motion in limine to admit evidence of 

Cunningham’s uncharged offenses committed against third parties. She also sought a stay 

of the trial soon after jury selection had been completed. (Bernard v. Superior Court, 

A098036.) We denied both the request for stay and the petition for an extraordinary writ. 

Our summary denial of Bernard’s petition for a writ of mandate is not res judicata on the 

questions presented in this appeal. (See People v. Medina (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 484, 491, fn. 6, 

disapproved on other grounds in Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 888, 899; People v. 

Venghiattis (1986) 185 Cal. App. 3d 326, 329, fn. 3.) Thus, we address the merits of these 

issues on appeal, despite the fact that many of them were raised in the petition for 

extraordinary writ. 

28 Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court heard that Cunningham was not 

under arrest nor had he been charged with Margaret Bernard’s murder. Apparently, he was 

jailed for six months on a parole or probation violation and was not released until 

November 2001. The November 2004 presentence report stated that Cunningham had not 

been arrested for Margaret Bernard’s murder. The jury heard hearsay evidence that 

Cunningham had been interrogated about the crime, but not arrested for it. (See also fn. 

[40], post.) 

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the trial court to expand or contract its ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence of Cunningham’s uncharged conduct, 

without success. 

The prosecution established that Margaret died by 

strangulation. Her head showed evidence of blunt force applied 

to it—the result of either a blow or a fall. Her other injuries—

including a broken jaw and a broken ankle—also suggested that 

Margaret struggled before she died. However, the lack of 

bruises on her neck suggested two possible scenarios—either 

that Margaret lost consciousness and stopped struggling before 

she was strangled or that she was strangled with an arm rather 

than with someone’s hands. A forensic pathologist opined that 

Margaret fell or hit her head, causing her to lose consciousness 

before she was strangled. Margaret died sometime after she 

was last seen alive on April 13 and before her body was found 

on April 20. Authorities could not determine the exact date and 

time of death from the physical evidence in this case. 

Outside the presence of the jury, Cunningham was called 

by the defense and questioned about his part in Margaret’s 

death. He declined to answer these questions, asserting his 

privilege against self-incrimination. (See U.S. Const., 5th 

Amend.) He came into court in the presence of the jury and 

stood beside Bernard for the panel to view him. 

 A rancher and his partner who lived in Sierra County 

near Alleghany Ridge Road testified that late one night in midApril, a strange man and woman appeared at their rural home, 

saying that they had run out of gas. The two visitors seemed to 

be high on drugs. The rancher and the man went to siphon 

some gas into a can while the woman returned to their car to get 

money to pay for the gas. She was gone for no more than five 

minutes. Walking back from the car, the woman fell into a 

creek, injuring her leg. The strange man helped the woman out 

of the creek; in the process, he fell into the creek, too. The 

woman did not seem to be afraid of the man she was with. The 

ranch offered many places for concealment, but she made no 

attempt to flee. She did not ask for help or indicate in any way 

that she was being held against her will. 

A day or two later, the rancher learned that a torso had 

been dumped less than 20 miles from his ranch. Hearing this, 

he wondered if the night visitors were involved in this incident 

and he called the local sheriff about it. He and his partner later 

identified Bernard and/or Cunningham from photographic 

lineups, but the identifications were not particularly solid. 

2. Cunningham’s Alibi

Evidence was offered tending to demonstrate that 

Cunningham had an alibi for the hours when Bernard had told 

police that he was with her immediately before Margaret died.29

 29 See part I.F.1., ante. 

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Annette Hardcastle30 testified that Cunningham was at her 

home on Friday and Saturday, April 13 and 14, trying to fix her 

car. On the afternoon of Saturday, April 14, he made two 

telephone calls to Bernard from Hardcastle’s house—one 

lasting about five minutes and another lasting at least an hour. 

The second call was made about 5:00 p.m. After the second 

call, Cunningham told Hardcastle that Bernard was fighting 

with Margaret. 

Cunningham asked Bernard to come over to Hardcastle’s 

house. He left about 6:30—approximately an hour and a half 

after the second telephone call. Cunningham was upset because 

Hardcastle did not have money that he asked her to give him. 

She expected that Cunningham would return the following day 

when she offered to pay him, but he did not return on Sunday, 

April 15. Later that evening, Hardcastle discovered her car’s 

license plates had been removed and left near her house. She 

noted one of the telephone calls to Bernard and the incident 

involving her license plates31 on her April 14 calendar. She 

also noted on her April 15 calendar that Cunningham did not 

return as she had expected. 

Hardcastle told the jury that Cunningham returned to see 

her a day or two later. On April 18, her calendar noted that she 

saw Cunningham on the news about Bernard being arrested for 

killing Margaret. Hardcastle was questioned about how this 

event could have occurred on April 18, when Bernard was 

not—in fact—arrested until a week later on April 25. She told 

the jury that she might have gotten the April 18 date wrong, but 

denied that Cunningham had asked her to give him an alibi. 

She had been sought out by police, Hardcastle told the jury—

she denied seeking out law enforcement officials to offer 

Cunningham an alibi. 

3. The Defense Case

At the close of the People’s case-in-chief, the trial court 

denied Bernard’s motion for acquittal. (See Pen. Code, 

§ 1118.1.) Bernard put on numerous witnesses who testified in 

her defense. Many witnesses who testified that they had known 

Bernard for many years also told the jury that they did not think 

that she was capable of murdering Margaret.32 Bernard also 

tried to establish that Cunningham struck her, rendering her 

unconscious during the time when Margaret was killed. She 

offered evidence of a head injury suffered at that time. The 

prosecution countered with evidence that at the relevant times, 

 30 In fact, Bernard called Hardcastle as a witness for the defense. 

31 This event may actually have been noted on Hardcastle’s April 15 calendar. 

32 There was contrary evidence that Bernard sometimes used extreme methods to 

control a willful teenage daughter. Several witnesses testified that Bernard was capable of 

violence. 

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Bernard did not have cuts or bruises that would have been 

expected if she had been struck on the forehead or temple hard 

enough to be rendered unconscious. 

 Bernard also put on evidence that she feared 

Cunningham and that this fear was reasonable. There was 

evidence from several witnesses that in the early part of 2001, 

Cunningham had threatened Bernard, that he frightened her and 

that she sometimes slept in her car to avoid him. She had been 

too afraid to leave her car to go to the bathroom, urinating in 

her pants instead. After she stayed overnight at the home of a 

male friend, someone slashed two tires on his car. There was 

evidence that someone had damaged her car, too, raising the 

specter that Cunningham had retaliated against her. Friends 

advised Bernard to get a restraining order against Cunningham. 

On January 26, Bernard actually pressed charges against 

Cunningham. He punched his fist through Bernard’s car 

window while she was locked inside, cutting her face with the 

broken glass. Bernard’s car was later found with a smashed 

driver’s side window. 

A defense expert testified about his research involving 

cases of children who kill their parents. He testified that only 

about 20 of the estimated 20,000 homicides in the United States 

each year were killings of mothers by daughters. The expert 

witness—who was not a statistician—admitted that he was not 

qualified to offer an opinion about the statistical probabilities of 

any particular person committing murder. 

4. Bernard’s Testimony

Bernard testified in her own defense, offering her 

explanation of the events surrounding Margaret’s death. In the 

summer of 2000, Bernard and Cunningham had begun an 

intimate relationship. Both of them were using 

methamphetamine. By December 2000 or early in the new 

year, the relationship became troubled. On January 26, 

Bernard’s face was cut as Cunningham punched his fist through 

Bernard’s car window. Cunningham harassed Bernard on the 

telephone or standing outside the door of the condominium. 

Bernard testified that even though she thought she did 

not want to see Cunningham again, she did continue to be 

involved with him. During this time, Cunningham was 

sometimes loving one minute and angry the next. Bernard 

called the police several times to report things he did around the 

condominium. In one incident, Cunningham pounded on her 

front door seeking entry. While she stood inside the metal door, 

he stabbed a knife all the way through it. The blade protruded 

through the door into the house about where Bernard stood. On 

February 5, he forced his way into the condominium and ripped 

telephone cords out while Bernard was making a call. On a 

third occasion, the electrical power and telephone lines were cut 

after Bernard refused to answer the door to him. 

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Rather than stay at home alone, Bernard would 

sometimes go to a friend’s house. Cunningham had threatened 

to burn any unfamiliar car that he saw near the condominium, 

apparently suspecting that Bernard was seeing someone else. 

When she got a new car in late January or early February, 

Bernard slept in it several times with her dog, hoping to catch 

Cunningham before he set fire to it. Bernard believed that on 

several occasions Cunningham put glue into the condominium’s 

door locks. Once, a key had been broken off in the lock. 

Cunningham did other things that made Bernard uneasy. 

One night, Cunningham explained that he knew how to cut up 

bodies with a chainsaw. Bernard took this as a threat. Another 

night, after Cunningham had made repeated calls to the 

condominium, Margaret came home and answered the 

telephone. She told Bernard that Cunningham had said “You 

three bitches are dead.” After she received this threat, Bernard 

said that Margaret wanted to sell the condominium so that they 

could move. 

Bernard only saw Cunningham twice from mid-March 

until the day when her mother was killed. During this time, 

Bernard was using methamphetamine three or four times in 

some weeks, sometimes with Cunningham, sometimes on her 

own. She told the jury that she still feared Cunningham, whom 

she claimed was terrorizing her. 

Bernard told the jury that on Friday, April 13, her 

relationship with Cunningham reached a breaking point. 

Cunningham came to the condominium while Margaret was 

away and Bernard let him in. She told him that if he really 

loved her, he would leave her alone. After almost an hour, 

Bernard had had enough. She began yelling at him, telling 

Cunningham that she could not stand the sight of him. Bernard 

told him to get out and not to come back—to take his “little 

dick” away. She loudly disparaged the quality of their sex life 

and his manhood. Cunningham left quietly. Soon, Bernard also 

left, staying out all night on Sherman Island with a man with 

whom she used drugs. 

The next day—Saturday, April 14—Cunningham called 

the condominium several times. Bernard used 

methamphetamine and quarreled with Margaret, who wanted 

her to clean up the condominium. The argument escalated until 

Margaret threatened to call the police. Early in the afternoon, 

Margaret left. 

In the late afternoon, Cunningham came over while 

Margaret was out. He brought Yukon Jack whiskey. He was 

not angry and Bernard wanted a drink, so she let him in. The 

two of them began drinking, apparently consuming two pints of 

whisky between them. 

When Bernard saw Margaret approach the 

condominium, she told Cunningham to leave in order to avoid a 

confrontation. Bernard testified that he had left by the back 

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door before, but this time he did not leave. She told the jury 

that she was not really bothered by any potential confrontation 

with Margaret. In retrospect, Bernard suspected that the alcohol 

and drugs dulled her emotions. When Margaret came in and 

saw Cunningham, she screamed “What the hell are you doing in 

my house?” Margaret commanded him to leave. 

At the same time, Margaret was arguing with Bernard, 

blaming her for letting Cunningham into the condominium. 

Bernard followed Margaret into the kitchen, saying that they 

were about to leave. However, Bernard was not able to walk or 

talk very well. Bernard saw Cunningham off to one side, saw 

something come at her head from the right, and then saw a flash 

of white light. 

The next thing that Bernard could remember, she was on 

the kitchen floor with Margaret lying beside her. Her arm was 

under Margaret’s shoulders. Cunningham was kicking her, 

saying “Look what you did . . . . [Y]ou can’t control your 

temper.” Seeing that her mother’s fingernails were blue, 

Bernard assumed that Margaret was dead.33 She was uncertain 

what had happened, but assumed that she had killed Margaret. 

Bernard had difficulty getting up off the floor, as if she 

was hung over. Her pants were unzipped and unbuttoned. She 

heard Cunningham laughing, saying that he took pictures. A 

camera sat on the table.34 Cunningham told Bernard that he had 

sodomized her and that she had enjoyed it. He held a syringe 

with a plastic cover on it. Still laughing, Cunningham said that 

he gave her an injection to wake her up. 

Sobbing, Bernard made her way to the living room, 

where she fell on the floor. She did not know how long she lay 

there listening as Cunningham ransacked the house. When he 

returned to the living room, he told her that he had given her 

another injection to wake her up. He told Bernard not to 

worry—that he intended to help her—but he did not explain his 

plans to her. 

Cunningham asked Bernard to help him remove 

Margaret’s clothing. She did so, then watched him wrap her 

mother’s body in plastic. Cunningham put Margaret’s body 

under a bed after Bernard refused to help him with this. 

That night, after dark, Bernard and Cunningham left 

together in the Fairmont. They stayed overnight at a friend’s 

home. Neither Cunningham nor Bernard seemed to have slept 

much that night. She continued drinking. She watched as 

Cunningham put plastic bags into the car trunk. Bernard did 

 33 Margaret’s fingernails were not blue when an autopsy was conducted. 

34 Bernard testified that she knew it did not have film in it, but forgot this detail. She 

never saw any photographs, nor did she ask him to see those that Cunningham told her that 

he took. 

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not ask Cunningham for any details about how her mother died. 

The next morning—Easter Sunday, April 15—Bernard 

drove the Fairmont to a store and Cunningham bought alcohol. 

She dropped him back at the friend’s home and returned to the 

condominium by herself. Cunningham had told her to go there, 

cautioning her not to answer the telephone or the door. He 

intended to come over a few hours later. Bernard did not see it, 

but she knew that Margaret’s nude body was still where they 

had left it. Bernard sat all day and did nothing. 

After dark on the evening of Sunday, April 15, 

Cunningham reappeared at the condominium. He brought 

drugs with him and Bernard took some. When the drugs ran 

out, Bernard drove Cunningham to get more, which they used 

later that night back at the condominium. Cunningham told 

Bernard that he intended to bury Margaret’s body the following 

day. She found a tent and a shovel to take with them and they 

provided for her dog, which she would leave at the 

condominium while they were gone. Bernard could not sleep 

again that night. 

On Monday, April 16, Margaret’s body was still at the 

condominium. Cunningham placed it in a sleeping bag and 

dragged it out to the living room. He told Bernard that he had 

kicked Margaret’s body in the head twice because she pissed 

him off. He said that he had kicked it hard—that he probably 

kicked a hole in her head. Cunningham took Bernard’s 

mountain bike and slammed it onto Margaret’s body as hard as 

he could. Then, he jumped up and down on the body several 

times, calling her a “fucking bitch,” saying that he hated her 

guts, and complaining that she was heavy. Bernard was 

frightened by this behavior. 

In the morning, Cunningham moved the Fairmont closer 

to the condominium door. Bernard helped him put the sleeping 

bag containing Margaret’s body into the car trunk after the local 

children had gone to school. Cunningham had her drive the car, 

but told Bernard to pull over after she drove a short distance. 

He put the car in park mode, set the brake, pulled her key ring 

out of the ignition, removed the trunk key and returned the rest 

of the keys to Bernard. He told her to act as if they did not have 

a trunk key. 

Bernard drove to two Wal-Mart stores, where she forged 

some of Margaret’s checks using her mother’s driver’s license 

as identification. At Cunningham’s order, she purchased small, 

expensive items that she could return later for cash. The couple 

also visited an Albertson’s grocery store, where Cunningham 

bought potato salad and whiskey. Several times, she had 

opportunities to escape or seek help, but she did not do so. 

Bernard told the jury that she could not drive away because 

Cunningham kept the car keys. 

That night, she and Cunningham camped at Sherman 

Island. Bernard was still having difficulty standing and 

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walking. She told the jury that she almost fell into the campfire 

as she cooked their dinner.35 Bernard testified that she did not 

drink or use drugs that night. By this time, she realized that she 

had a bump on her head and that she was not thinking clearly. 

Cunningham gave her something to drink and she finally fell 

asleep. 

The next morning—Tuesday, April 17—Bernard had a 

hard time waking up. Before leaving Sherman Island, she 

watched Cunningham burn bags of Margaret’s clothing that had 

been in the car trunk. Cunningham wanted to go up to a gold 

mining area in Alleghany. Bernard drove the two of them up 

toward Lodi. After stopping to get gas, Cunningham went into 

a Wal-Mart36 and came out with a machete. Bernard asked 

what he intended to do with it, but he was silent. She asked if 

he was going to kill her, but Cunningham did not respond. At 

one point, Cunningham left Bernard alone for over an hour, but 

she did not try to escape or seek help. Together, they headed up 

into the mountains, arriving in Alleghany that night. 

Stopping the car after dark, Cunningham pulled Bernard 

out of the car. She was on her knees, unable to stand. He 

ordered her to open a plastic bag and then threw something at 

her. The object hit her and landed on the ground. When 

Bernard picked it up, she saw that it was a hand. 

Bernard dropped the hand and fled into the car. 

Suddenly, she was unable to see or breathe. Yelling, 

Cunningham pulled her out of the car on the passenger side by 

her hair or her head. She ripped at a plastic bag that she 

discovered was over her head, but it then became wrapped 

around her neck. On her knees again, Bernard saw 

Cunningham come up behind her holding an axe over her head. 

He told her to open up a bag and forced her to look at a foot. A 

second foot landed on her. Cunningham called her a “fucking 

bitch” and told her to open the bag. 

Bernard was terrified, believing that Cunningham was 

going to kill her. He wanted a knife, so she returned to the car 

to look for one. As she handed him a pair of scissors, she saw 

Margaret’s headless body, which Cunningham apparently 

kicked down the hill. Bernard told the jury that Cunningham 

dismembered Margaret’s body—she did not actually see him do 

it, nor did she do it herself. 

Cunningham drove away with Bernard in the car. He 

was driving like a maniac, sideswiping a guardrail as the car 

 35 In an apparent inconsistency, Bernard later suggested that she did not cook dinner 

that night, but that they ate the prepared potato salad that Cunningham had purchased 

earlier. 

36 Bernard’s testimony was somewhat confusing about where Cunningham bought 

the machete—it may have been in a Pittsburg Wal-Mart or a similar store in the 

Sacramento area. She was also uncertain whether the machete was purchased on April 16 

or April 17. 

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almost went off the road. At Cunningham’s instruction, 

Bernard took off the bag that was around her neck and she 

threw it out the window of the moving car. They rode on until 

the car ran out of gas. 

Bernard recounted their stop at the rancher’s home to ask 

for gas. She testified that she was frightened that Cunningham 

would kill her, but she did not seek any help or seek to escape, 

even when she returned to the car to get gas money. Bernard 

told the jury that while she was at the car, she found a pen, 

wrote on the seat. She covered the writing with some clothing, 

found some money in the car and walked back toward the 

house. Along the way, she fell into some water and was 

completely soaked, hurting her ankle in the process. She told 

the jury that Cunningham helped her out, calling her a “stupid 

bitch” as he did. He was about to hit her when the rancher 

reappeared. Cunningham left Bernard and the rancher alone 

while he went to put the gas in the car. Bernard spoke with the 

rancher, but she was too afraid to ask him for help. 

Cunningham returned in the car, picked up Bernard and the two 

of them set off again. 

The car ran out of gas again near a freeway in Auburn or 

Placerville while it was still dark. Cunningham got out of the 

car, screaming at Bernard that he hated her. He left her in the 

car for hours with the car keys. She was unable to start the car 

or to walk. Bernard continued writing on the seat of the car, 

writing that he had “chopped up my mom,” going over the 

words she had written again and again. She covered the seat 

with a blanket before he returned. 

When Cunningham returned to the car, they waited until 

it got light out on Wednesday, April 18. He walked a few 

blocks away to get more gas. Bernard followed him briefly, but 

could not continue walking on her ankle. She was scared of 

Cunningham and frightened not to be with him, too. When he 

returned to the car, he discovered the writing on the car seat. 

Cunningham was angry, so Bernard used mascara to obscure 

the writing. 

They drove off again until they almost ran out of gas in 

Roseville or Sacramento. Cunningham stopped at a Wal-Mart 

store where he returned merchandise for cash that he then used 

to buy gasoline and alcohol. He left Bernard in the car, but 

again, she did not try to escape or get help. Bernard testified 

that Cunningham also purchased a 50- or 60-pound bag of 

cement and a bucket, which he placed on the front seat between 

them, covering her writing. He told her that he was headed for 

a place where he would find water. Cunningham did not tell 

her what he planned to do with this cement, but Bernard was 

scared that he meant her harm. 

After a nap, Bernard woke as Cunningham pulled the 

Fairmont up to a fruit stand. He left her in the car by herself 

with the car keys, so Bernard scooted over to the driver’s seat 

and quickly drove away. Driving along, she recalled how they 

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had heard something rolling around in the trunk, prompting 

Cunningham to laugh and say “I hope it ain’t her head.” About 

10 miles away from the fruit stand, Bernard stopped the car by 

an orchard and looked in the truck. Margaret’s head was lying 

inside. Bernard emptied the trunk of its contents, including the 

head. 

Bernard guessed that she was so intoxicated that she was 

numb at this time. She told the jury that she started driving 

away from the orchard, using her sore foot to propel the car. 

She almost crashed into a tree when she kicked the 50- or 60-

pound bag of cement out of the passenger door of the car with 

her right foot.37 She also threw the bucket out. After driving to 

a more urban area, Bernard stopped the car, parked in a Vallejo 

shopping center parking lot and called for help. She finally 

reached Barton, who met her in Vallejo. 

At trial, Bernard repeatedly denied killing Margaret—at 

least, she stated that she believed that she had not killed her 

mother. She told the jury that originally, she believed that she 

had killed her mother, because Cunningham had convinced her 

of this. She thought that he had taken photographs of her 

killing Margaret with which he intended to blackmail her. 

Bernard denied having any difficulty keeping her temper under 

control,38 even when using methamphetamine.39

Bernard admitted that at the time that Margaret died, she 

was intoxicated from alcohol and drugs. The use of alcohol and 

drugs resulted in slowed reflexes, poor judgment, a loss of 

perception, and a decreased ability to think or reason clearly. 

During the days between Margaret’s death and her escape from 

Cunningham, Bernard did not have her wits about her. When 

she spoke with Larissa after meeting up with Barton, she made 

her first coherent attempt to set out what had happened. At that 

point, she first realized that Cunningham hit her. She began to 

suspect that she did not kill her mother, but that Cunningham 

had done so after causing Bernard to lose consciousness.40 She 

 37 The prosecutor later challenged Bernard’s credibility by arguing that disposal of 

the cement in this manner was physically impossible for someone who had suffered a 

broken ankle. 

38 During closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that the jury saw Bernard lose 

her temper repeatedly while she was in court. 

39 An expert witness disagreed, testifying that methamphetamine gives the user a 

sense of great strength. The use of methamphetamine over several days makes the user 

likely to be more enraged or violent, especially as the drug is wearing off. A user who has 

aggressive tendencies when not using methamphetamine would likely find those tendencies 

enhanced during drug use. 

40 One witness testified that Cunningham told her that he cut off her finger for a ring. 

He said that he spent the night when the body was under the bed, but that he had not known 

that at the time. The witness reported this conversation to police shortly before trial began. 

No fingers appear to have been cut off of Margaret’s hands. 

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reference the 145-page habeas petition which she filed in the California Supreme Court.41 

Pursuant to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, Dkt. 61, Respondent has filed an Answer to 

the Amended Petition, and Petitioner has filed a Traverse.42 Dkts. 69, 74, 75. The matter is 

fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The Court may entertain such a writ petition “in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction 

on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) resulted in a decision that was 

 41 Although Petitioner did not attach a copy of the state petition to her Amended 

Petition, a disorganized and jumbled version of that petition, along with the supporting 

exhibits, were appended to the original federal Petition. See Dkts. 19-2, 19-3. 

Respondent’s Answer includes a complete and organized copy of Petitioner’s state habeas 

petition, to which Court will refer when citing to Petitioner’s claims. See Resp’t Ex. I. 

However, Respondent’s copy of the state petition does not include the supporting exhibits; 

therefore, the Court will refer to the exhibits submitted by Petitioner in support of her 

original Petition. See Dkts. 19-4 through 19-14. 

42 Petitioner’s “Traverse” is largely a verbatim handwritten copy of the “Facts” 

section from the opinion of the Court of Appeal, along with a few attachments, including 

Petitioner’s picture, a copy of the results from the first polygraph examination, and a twopage letter requesting pro bono representation. Dkt. 74. Petitioner’s “Points and 

Authorities in Support of the Traverse” contains summaries of the same claims and 

arguments as those in her state habeas petition. Dkt. 75. Because Petitioner’s traverse 

mirrors previously-filed documents and contains no new arguments in support of her 

claims, the Court will cite only to the complete claims and arguments outlined in the state 

habeas petition. See Resp’t Ex. I. As for her request for counsel, the Court, in its 

discretion, finds that the appointment of counsel is not warranted in this case. See 

Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard for appointing counsel 

in habeas cases). 

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Case 4:07-cv-01575-SBA Document 77 Filed 07/25/16 Page 21 of 53
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unclear or ambiguous trial court ruling—are entitled to the same presumption of correctness 

that we afford trial court findings.”). 

Section 2254(d)(2) applies to an intrinsic review of a state court’s fact-finding 

process, or situations in which the petitioner challenges a state court’s fact-findings based 

entirely on the state court record, whereas § 2254(e)(1) applies to challenges based on 

extrinsic evidence, or evidence presented for the first time in federal court. See Taylor, 366 

F.3d at 999-1000. In Taylor, the Ninth Circuit established a two-part analysis under 

§§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1). Id. First, federal courts must undertake an “intrinsic 

review” of a state court’s fact-finding process under the “unreasonable determination” 

clause of § 2254(d)(2). Id. at 1000. The intrinsic review requires federal courts to examine 

the state court’s fact-finding process, not its findings. Id. Once a state court’s fact-finding 

process survives this intrinsic review, the second part of the analysis begins by addressing 

the state court finding of a presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1). Id. According 

to the AEDPA, this presumption means that the state court’s fact-finding may be 

overturned based on new evidence presented by a petitioner for the first time in federal 

court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof a state court finding 

is in error. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “Significantly, the presumption of correctness and 

the clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once the state court’s factfindings survive any intrinsic challenge; they do not apply to a challenge that is governed 

by the deference implicit in the ‘unreasonable determination’ standard of section 

2254(d)(2).” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only if the error had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v. 

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 

(1993)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner asserts the following claims, which include numerous sub-claims: 

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”); (2) judicial misconduct; (3) prosecutorial 

Case 4:07-cv-01575-SBA Document 77 Filed 07/25/16 Page 23 of 53
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mis

add

and

gov

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con

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te court’s ap

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 43 Becau

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itioner. See

nd (4) juror

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AC CLAIM

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a strong pr

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pplication o

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use Petition

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ssistance.” 

must be ‘so

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ndard applie

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federal cour

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tions were r

counsel sat

5 (2011). In

of the Strick

ounsel’s pe

 

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ent filing sy

x. I. 

24

ct. See Res

e IAC claim

rse. Id. at 2

Strickland 

hat (1) coun

diced the de

r representa

side “the ra

ternal quota

that counse

 Id. at 689.

o serious as 

ington, 562

es to trial an

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rt’s review 

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reasonable. 

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ystem, page

sp’t Ex. I at 

ms as to her 

0-80. The 

v. Washing

nsel’s perfo

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ation “fell b

ange of com

ation marks

el’s conduct

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to deprive 

2 U.S. at 10

nd appellate

2 F.2d 1428

of a state c

63 U.S. 170

 The questi

ckland’s def

ds, “[t]he p

ard was unr

fell below S

tion was not

e number ci

20-138.43 

trial counse

clearly esta

gton, 466 U

ormance wa

d. at 687. C

below an ob

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s omitted). 

t falls withi

ficient perf

the defenda

1 (quoting S

e counsel. 

8, 1433 (9th

court’s decis

0, 190 (201

ion is wheth

ferential sta

ivotal quest

reasonable.

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t scanned in

itations refe

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el, William 

ablished fed

U.S. 668 (19

as deficient 

Counsel is 

bjective stan

emanded of 

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in the wide 

formance is 

ant of a fair

Strickland, 

Smith v. M

h Cir. 1989)

sion on an I

1). “[T]he 

her there is 

andard.” H

tion is whet

 This is dif

s standard.”

nto the Cou

er to those a

ms are 

W. Veale,

deral law 

984). Under

and that 

ndard of 

attorneys 

g courts 

range of 

r trial, a 

466 U.S. at

Murray, 477 

). 

IAC claim 

question is

any 

Harrington v

ther the 

fferent from

” Griffin v

urt’s 

assigned by

r

t

. 

m

.

y

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Harrington, 727 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2013)) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101). 

Applying this doubly deferential standard, the Court now reviews Petitioner’s IAC claims. 

1. Battered Woman’s Syndrome Expert 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel erred in failing to present evidence at trial from 

a Battered Woman’s Syndrome (“BWS”) expert. Resp’t Ex. I at 22.44 Such evidence, 

Petitioner claims, would have “corroborate[d] [her] duress defense after the murder, as [the] 

prosecution used [her] actions after the murder as motive to cover up murder, as a 

consciousness of guilt for what she had done, as there was no direct evidence that [she] had 

killed her mother or dismembered her.” Id. As support, Petitioner has attached pages from 

the Reporter’s Sealed Transcript (RT 2273 to RT 2280) from the closed proceedings 

(outside the presence of the prosecutor and the judge) held on April 2, 2002. During that 

proceeding, the trial court addressed Petitioner and her trial counsel regarding Petitioner’s 

desire to present evidence from a BWS expert. Dkt. 19-8 at 97-106. Trial counsel 

represented to the trial court that he had consulted a BWS expert, Dr. Kathleen O’Meara, 

who had opined that Petitioner did not meet the criteria for the syndrome. Based on the 

expert’s opinion, trial counsel decided not to pursue that issue. Id. at 100-01. 

Since the California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s IAC claim without 

explanation, the Court must independently review the state court record to determine 

whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 

U.S. at 98. Here, the record shows that trial counsel did not offer a BWS expert because he 

concluded Petitioner did not satisfy the criteria for BWS. As such, the California Supreme 

Court could have reasonably construed trial counsel’s conscious decision not to call a BWS 

expert as a strategic or tactical matter, which is entitled to substantial deference. See 

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The choice of what type of expert 

to use is one of trial strategy and deserves ‘a heavy measure of deference.’”); Wiggins v. 

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (holding that evidence that the challenged trial conduct 

 44 At the time of trial, California law permitted the admission of BWS evidence. 

Cal. Evid. Code § 1107 (effective Jan. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2004). 

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resulted from inattention rather than from strategic considerations may also be relevant to 

the inquiry of whether a decision was a tactical one). While Petitioner may believe that 

trial counsel should have presented BWS evidence notwithstanding the opinion of Dr. 

O’Meara, a mere difference of opinion is insufficient to establish an IAC claim. See United 

States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a difference of opinion as 

to trial tactics does not constitute denial of effective assistance). Relief on this claim is 

DENIED. 

2. Coerced Interview 

Petitioner contends that after she passed two polygraph tests, her trial counsel 

coerced her into agreeing to be interviewed by the prosecutor. According to Petitioner, 

counsel told her that she had to speak with the prosecutor or else “they would come and 

drag [her] across the street, strap [her] to a chair and make [her] talk.” Resp’t Ex. I at 31. 

Petitioner acknowledges that, before meeting with the prosecutor, she signed a waiver of 

her right to remain silent. She then spoke to the prosecutor and gave a statement that was 

admitted in evidence. Petitioner later moved to exclude that statement, but was 

unsuccessful. Petr’s. Exh. XX. 

During a closed session outside the presence of the prosecution and jury, trial 

counsel revealed that his plan was for Petitioner to undergo another polygraph test, and 

thereafter testify as a witness against Cunningham in exchange for an accessory after the 

fact charge. Dkt. 19-10 at 111. That plan did not materialize. Nonetheless, in view of the 

record presented, the California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded that trial 

counsel’s advice to Petitioner to speak with the prosecution was a tactical matter that did 

not amount to ineffective assistance. Dkt. 19-10 at 111.45 Therefore, relief on this claim is 

DENIED. 

 45 Even if Petitioner’s statement had not been admitted in evidence, the other 

evidence implicating her was significant. The homicide occurred in her presence, she had a 

motive, and she afterwards fled and tried to conceal the body. 

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3. Threats by Cunningham 

Petitioner alleges, in a completely discursive manner, that trial counsel failed to 

conduct an adequate investigation or present evidence regarding Cunningham’s threats to 

her and others, which she claims would have been germane to his culpability for the 

murder. Resp’t Ex. I at 37-42. 

“[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to 

present a complete defense,’” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting 

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)), which includes the right to present evidence 

and the testimony of witnesses, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). But the 

right is only implicated when the evidence the defendant seeks to admit is “relevant and 

material, and . . . vital to the defense.” Id. at 16. The exclusion of evidence may give rise 

to a federal claim only when it is “arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [the 

exclusionary rule applied is] designed to serve.” Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted). 

At trial, the court allowed Petitioner to present evidence regarding Cunningham’s 

conduct to establish Petitioner’s state of mind and that her actions after her mother’s death 

were committed because she feared Cunningham, not because she had a consciousness of 

guilt. Bernard, 2006 WL 449017, at *13. The jury heard testimony regarding incidents 

such as Cunningham’s setting fire to vehicles and a fence near Petitioner’s home, breaking 

the window of her car while she sat inside it, ripping out telephone lines, putting glue in her 

door locks, slashing a friend’s car tires after she spent the night at his home, cutting the 

transmission lines on her car, and scratching his initials into the sidewalk in front of 

Margaret’s condominium. Id. The trial court, however, disallowed evidence regarding 

Cunningham’s behavior as it pertained to third parties. Id. On direct appeal, the California 

Court of Appeal held that the third party evidence was properly excluded as irrelevant 

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under state law, id. at *16-17, and that Petitioner lacked “a constitutional right to present a 

defense that was inconsistent with her own testimony,” id. at *17.46 

The record demonstrates that there is no merit to Petitioner’s claim that her trial 

counsel was ineffective with respect to investigating and presenting evidence of 

Cunningham’s culpability. The jury heard substantial evidence that Petitioner was afraid of 

Cunningham, that Cunningham had made threats and had the potential for violence. As for 

the incidents involving other parties, trial counsel made repeated, albeit unsuccessful, 

efforts to present such evidence. Bernard, 2006 WL 449017, at *13. Trial counsel cannot 

be faulted for not presenting evidence that was ruled irrelevant by the trial court. See Rupe 

v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996) (“[T]he failure to take a futile action can never 

be deficient performance . . . .”). To the extent that Petitioner is challenging the state 

court’s exclusion of evidence pertaining to Cunningham’s conduct toward individuals other 

than her, such a claim is not cognizable in this federal habeas proceeding. See Langford v. 

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.1996) (“[A]lleged errors in the application of state law 

are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.”). Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

4. Failure to Elicit Testimony 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence 

from two witnesses, Terry George and his mother, Alice George. According to Petitioner, 

testimony from these individuals “could put Ed Cunningham at the crime scene at the 

alleged time of [the] murder.” Resp’t Ex. I at 44. As support for this claim, Petitioner cites 

an undated letter addressed to her from trial counsel summarizing a conversation between 

his private investigator and Mr. George. Mr. George told the investigator that his mother 

had stated that on the day of the murder, Cunningham came by and asked to use the 

telephone, though she rejected his request. Dkt. 19-10 at 96. In the letter, trial counsel 

informed Petitioner that he believed that such testimony might be “helpful,” but that 

Ms. George “does not want to be involved” and will no longer speak to the investigator. Id. 

 46 A state appellate court’s determination of state law is binding in a federal habeas 

action. See Estelle, 502 U.S.at 67-68. 

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Petitioner now faults trial counsel for not eliciting the aforementioned information from 

Mr. George or Ms. George at trial in order to establish that Cunningham was coming from 

Petitioner’s residence, which was located approximately about six houses away from the 

George home. Resp’t Ex. I at 44.47

Upon independent review, the Court finds that the California Supreme Court’s 

summary denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. Testimony from Mr. 

George regarding what his mother had relayed about Cunningham would likely have been 

excluded as inadmissible hearsay. As for Ms. George, counsel believed that she had no 

desire to assist the defense. The failure of defense counsel to take a futile action does not 

constitute ineffective assistance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 

1996). Moreover, the California Supreme Court could have reasonably construed trial 

counsel’s decision not to call either witness as a tactical decision, which is not reviewable 

in a federal habeas action. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (reasonable, strategic choices by 

counsel such as this are “virtually unchallengeable” on federal habeas corpus review); see 

also Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (the court may “neither 

second-guess counsel’s decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision of 

hindsight . . . .”). 

The above notwithstanding, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that testimony 

regarding Ms. George’s interaction with Cunningham would have altered the outcome at 

trial. Though not entirely clear, Petitioner appears to argue that Ms. George’s testimony 

would have placed Cunningham near the victim’s home around the time of the murder. 

However, as the California Court of Appeal noted in its decision affirming the judgment on 

direct appeal, the “[a]uthorities could not determine the exact date and time of death from 

the physical evidence in this case.” Bernard, 2006 WL 449017, *5. The victim’s time of 

 47 Petitioner also cites a “Witness Memorandum,” dated March 30, 2002, addressed 

to trial counsel from his investigator, summarizing a conversation she had with Ms. 

Hardcastle (i.e., Cunningham’s alibi witness). Id. Ms. Hardcastle recalled that 

Cunningham had worked on her car the day before Easter and left in the evening. Id. Such 

information, Petitioner contends, was important because it showed that Cunningham was 

“at the scene at the alleged time of the murder.” Resp’t Ex. I at 45. 

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death to could only be narrowed to “sometime after [she] was last seen alive on April 13 

and before her body was found on April 20.” Id. In view of the uncertainty surrounding 

the exact time and date of the murder, Ms. George’s putative testimony (i.e., that 

Cunningham was seen at or near the victim’s residence on April 14) would not have 

conclusively established that Cunningham, as opposed to Petitioner, committed the murder. 

Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

5. Lack of “Direct Evidence” 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence 

“that there was no direct evidence against Petitioner due to Antioch Police Department 

‘messing up’ crime scene.” Resp’t Ex. I at 48-49. This claim is entirely speculative, as 

Petitioner does not delineate what particular evidence should or should not have been 

elicited or how the admission and/or failure to present such evidence prejudiced her at trial. 

To the extent that Petitioner is suggesting that the lack of direct evidence necessarily 

compelled her acquittal, she is incorrect. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (“Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to 

sustain a conviction.”) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). The Court finds 

that the California Supreme Court had an objectively reasonable basis for rejecting 

Petitioner’s IAC claim. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

6. Failure to Raise Claims on Appeal 

Petitioner claims that she was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel 

because Attorney Morse only raised one claim on direct appeal, as opposed to all of the 

claims alleged herein. Resp’t Ex. I at 53-55. Appellate counsel, however, has no 

constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by a defendant. See Jones v. 

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983). Indeed, the ability to weed out weaker issues is 

widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. Miller, 882 

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F.2d at 1434.48 In any event, Petitioner has made no showing that she would have 

prevailed on appeal on any of the claims she asserts that appellate counsel should have 

raised. Indeed, the fact that the California Supreme Court rejected all of Petitioner’s habeas 

claims on the merits strongly suggests that the result would have been no different had 

Attorney Morse raised those claims on direct appeal. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

7. Cumulative Error/Bank of the West Videotape 

In her habeas petition, Petitioner’s characterizes this claim in terms of cumulative 

prejudice from trial counsel’s alleged errors; however, the body of her argument discusses 

the failure to obtain a videotape from the Bank of the West. Resp’t Ex. I at 59. In either 

event, Petitioner has not stated a claim for habeas relief. 

The cumulative effect of several errors may sufficiently prejudice a defendant for 

purposes of habeas relief, even if a single error, standing alone, is insufficient. See Alcala 

v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003). Because Petitioner has not shown a 

single constitutional error by trial counsel, her cumulative error claim necessarily fails. See 

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the California 

Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, relief 

on this claim, insofar as it is predicated upon cumulative error, is DENIED. 

Petitioner’s claim regarding the videotape also fails. According to Petitioner, the 

videotape would have shown that the victim was at the Bank of the West in the early 

afternoon of April 14, 2001—ostensibly the day of the murder. Resp’t Ex. I at 59-60. The 

probative value of the tape is unclear, as it does not involve the murder scene or exculpate 

Petitioner. That aside, Petitioner does not contend that she furnished the tape to the 

 48 In a letter dated February 1, 2006, Attorney Morse explained why he chose to 

raise only one issue on direct review. He stated: “I assure you that I carefully considered 

your case and concluded that any potential issue I was aware of that would involve 

prosecutorial misconduct, the jury, DNA testing, ineffective assistance of counsel, or 

anything else, not only had absolutely no chance of success in your appeal, but would 

probably just distract the Court of Appeal from concentrating on the one issue that actually 

does have a chance of convincing the Court to reverse your conviction.” Dkt. 19-11 at 50-

51. 

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California Supreme Court or otherwise demonstrated that such a tape actually exists. 

Consequently, there is no basis for concluding that the California Supreme Court applied 

the Strickland standard in an unreasonable manner. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

8. Surveillance Tapes 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain 

surveillance tapes of various stores, including 7-Eleven and Walmart, “in 2 different 

counties where Cunningham was on video entering stores and would have placed him 

buying objects [admitted] in evidence . . . .” Resp’t Ex. I at 60. 

The record shows that at the time Petitioner was arrested, police searched her purse 

and found various receipts dated April 14 and 16. Bernard, 2006 WL 449017, *2. Two of 

these receipts were from the Antioch and Pittsburg Walmart stores, and one indicated that a 

machete (akin to the one found at the crime scene) had been purchased on April 16. Id. 

Another April 16 receipt evidenced a visit to an Oakley Albertson’s store. Id. 

A surveillance videotape from the Oakley Albertson’s at the time indicated on this receipt 

showed a man resembling Cunningham in the store. He appeared to be alone and 

Petitioner’s image did not appear on the videotape. Id. at *2 fn. 14. 

The California Supreme Court appropriately rejected Petitioner’s IAC claim 

regarding the failure to obtain store videotapes. Aside from the Oakley Albertson’s store 

tape, Petitioner does not allege that any other tapes actually existed or were provided to the 

California Supreme Court. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 180-84 (a habeas petitioner cannot 

supplement the record in federal court). Moreover, even if trial counsel had obtained such 

surveillance videotapes, there is no evidence or allegation that anything disclosed therein 

would have exculpated Petitioner. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

9. Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s Closing Argument 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel erred in failing to object to the prosecutor’s 

claim during closing argument that she was not afraid of Cunningham. Resp’t Ex. I at 60. 

The prosecutor made these remarks in response to Petitioner’s testimony that she suffered 

from BWS. However, as Respondent correctly points out, the prosecutor tethered her 

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comments regarding Petitioner and Cunningham to the evidence presented at trial. RT 

2941-2946, 3008-3025. Although defense counsel repeatedly objected during rebuttal 

when the prosecutor was discussing Petitioner’s alleged fear of Cunningham, the trial court 

consistently overruled the objections on the basis that the prosecutor’s statements were 

legitimate argument. RT 3010, 3014, 3016, 3023, 3025.49 

In any event, even if trial counsel failed to object to certain of the prosecutor’s 

statements, Petitioner has failed to make any showing to overcome the presumption that the 

failure to object was a matter of trial strategy. See Morris v. Cal., 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (“[a]n attorney’s failure to object to the admission of inadmissible evidence is 

not necessarily ineffective” but is presumed to be sound trial strategy which the movant 

must overcome); People v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th 153, 221 (1997) (a defense attorney’s 

failure to object at trial rarely establishes ineffectiveness). In the instant case, defense 

counsel may have chosen not to object to all of the prosecution’s statements to avoid 

drawing undesired attention to them. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 

(9th Cir. 1991) (“From a strategic perspective . . . many trial lawyers refrain from objecting 

during closing argument to all but the most egregious misstatements by opposing counsel 

on the theory that the jury may construe their objections to be a sign of desperation or 

hyper-technicality.”). Nor has Petitioner made any showing that any additional 

objections—assuming they would have been sustained—would have altered the outcome at 

trial. See Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven if [counsel’s] 

 49 Certain pages from the Reporter’s Transcript were missing from the exhibits 

initially filed by Respondent. See Resp’t Ex. B (Vols. 14 (ends at RT 2919), 15 (starts at 

RT 3140). Among the missing pages were those that Respondent had cited relating to the 

prosecutor’s closing argument. Dkt. 69-1 at 20 (citing RT 2941-2946, 3008-3025). 

However, Respondent has since filed a new “Exhibit B,” which now contains the missing 

pages from the prosecutor’s and trial counsel’s closing arguments, which begins with the 

prosecutor’s continuation of her closing argument at RT 2920 and ends after the 

prosecutor’s rebuttal at RT 3038. See Dkt. 76. The new “Exhibit B” contains RT 2920 

through RT 3116. Id. Respondent’s counsel has informed Clerk’s office staff that he has 

been unable to retrieve the other missing pages, RT 3117 through RT 3139, and therefore 

he could not provide them to the Court. Because these missing pages relate to post-verdict 

proceedings that have not been cited to by either party, the Court need not consider them in 

order to issue its ruling. 

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failure to object was deficient, we cannot find that, but for his errors, there is a reasonable 

probability that the jury would not have still convicted [petitioner].”). Because the 

California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland, relief on this claim is 

DENIED. 

10. Other Cases with Cunningham 

Petitioner contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that 

the prosecutor and the trial judge had previously been involved in cases where Cunningham 

was the defendant. Resp’t Ex. I at 61. In relation to this claim, Petitioner has attached a 

motion to disqualify the trial judge that trial counsel allegedly chose not to file. Dkt. 19-10 

at 60-63. Citing this particular exhibit, Petitioner asserts, somewhat inconsistently, that 

trial counsel sought to disqualify the trial judge but was unsuccessful. Dkt. 69-1 at 21. 

It is unclear from the record presented whether a disqualification motion was, in 

fact, made. Nevertheless, Petitioner has not identified any clearly established Supreme 

Court authority requiring disqualification of a prosecutor or judge who previously 

prosecuted another suspect or presided over a case involving that suspect, respectively. 

Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that the result at trial would have been different had 

defense counsel successfully brought such a motion. As such, the California Supreme 

Court had an objectively reasonable basis under Strickland for rejecting Petitioner’s IAC on 

either of these bases. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

11. Failure to Investigate Whether Cunningham Was an Informant 

Petitioner accuses trial counsel of failing to investigate whether Cunningham was an 

informant. Resp’t Ex. I at 62. There is no evidence that Cunningham was, in fact, an 

informant. Nonetheless, it is unclear what purpose an investigation would have served, 

since Cunningham did not provide any substantive testimony at trial and information 

regarding informants is privileged. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1041.50 The Court finds that the 

 50 As noted, the California Court of Appeal’s decision notes that outside the presence 

of the jury, Cunningham was questioned about his part in Margaret’s death. He declined to 

answer these questions, asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. Bernard, 2006 

WL 449017, at *5. 

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California Supreme Court had an objectively reasonable basis for rejecting Petitioner’s 

claim that defense counsel erred in failing to investigate Cunningham, and therefore, relief 

on this claim is DENIED.51

12. Processing the Crime Scene 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel should have informed the jury that the crime 

scene was not processed until three days after Margaret’s body had been removed. Resp’t 

Ex. I at 64. Petitioner also claims that the investigation was “sloppy” and had jurors been 

advised as such, they would have questioned the “authenticity” of the charges alleged 

against her. Id. With regard to Petitioner’s first contention, the jury was informed as to the 

sequence of events relevant to the murder investigation. As to her other claim, there is no 

evidence that the investigation was “sloppy.” But even if there were, Petitioner’s 

suggestion that the jury would have weighed that information more heavily than the 

inculpatory evidence presented at trial is entirely speculative. See Gonzalez v. Knowles, 

515 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that speculation regarding the impact an 

investigation into the defendant’s mental health condition would have had at sentencing 

was “plainly insufficient to establish prejudice” under Strickland). Because there is no 

basis for concluding that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland, 

relief on this claim is DENIED. 

13. Failure to Question Corporal Delavan 

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to examine Corporal 

Delavan, who investigated the murder, about an alleged conversation he had with 

Cunningham. In that conversation, Cunningham allegedly did not deny being at 

Petitioner’s residence at the time of the murder. Resp’t Ex. I at 65. According to 

 51 The record shows that on July 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a pro se post-trial motion 

entitled, “Motion to Question Ed Cunningham Being an Informant for the District 

Attorney.” CT 1178. That motion was set for hearing on July 26, 2004 at 8:30 a.m. The 

record shows that, according to the handwritten minute notes on July 26, 2004, the motion 

was “denied [as] untimely” and for lack of jurisdiction. CT 1183. Even if the motion were 

granted, Petitioner is not allowed to supplement the record to support his federal habeas 

claims. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 180-84 

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Petitioner, this information is contained “in police reports,” which she has not submitted as 

an exhibit because they are “lost.” Id. 

The record does not support Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient or that she suffered any prejudice as a result of his failure to ask Corporal Delavan 

about his conversation with Cunningham. In fact, trial counsel sought to make such an 

inquiry, but was foreclosed from doing so upon a sustained objection from the prosecutor. 

RT 2124-25. Defense counsel can hardly be faulted for not interposing questions which the 

trial court ruled he could not ask. That aside, there is no documentation to substantiate 

Petitioner’s claim regarding what Cunningham purportedly stated. For these reasons, relief 

on this claim is DENIED. 

14. Petitioner’s Charges Against Cunningham 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was remiss in failing to elicit evidence that 

Petitioner had pressed charges against Cunningham for assault. Resp’t Ex. I at 66. But 

according to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion, such evidence had, in fact, been 

elicited. See Bernard, 2006 WL 449017, *7 (“On January 26, Bernard actually pressed 

charges against Cunningham. He punched his fist through Bernard’s car window while she 

was locked inside, cutting her face with the broken glass. Bernard’s car was later found 

with a smashed driver’s side window.”). Given the lack of factual (or legal) foundation for 

her IAC claim, it was objectively reasonable for the California Supreme Court to reject it. 

Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

15. Petitioner’s Fear of Cunningham 

Petitioner contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit evidence 

that, after the murder, Petitioner was fearful of Cunningham because he had access to a 

shotgun in their car. Resp’t Ex. I at 67. However, Petitioner has failed to cite any record 

evidence demonstrating that Cunningham, in fact, had access to a shotgun. As such, it was 

objectively reasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude that Petitioner had 

failed to demonstrate deficient performance by defense counsel or resulting prejudice. 

Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

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16. Involuntary Manslaughter Instruction 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an 

instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Resp’t Ex. I at 69-70. Involuntary manslaughter 

is a homicide “in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the 

commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without 

due caution and circumspection.” Cal. Penal Code § 192(b). By its nature, involuntary 

manslaughter is an unintentional or “accidental” killing in the sense that the death is caused 

by reckless or criminally negligent, rather than intentional conduct by the defendant. 

People v. Broussard, 76 Cal. App. 3d 193, 197 (1977); People v. Velez, 144 Cal. App. 3d 

558, 566 (1983). 

Under California law, “a trial judge has no duty to instruct on any lesser offense 

unless there is substantial evidence to support such instruction.” People v. Cunningham, 25 

Cal. 4th 926, 1008 (2001). In this case, the Court of Appeal noted that the prosecution 

established that the victim’s death was the result of strangulation for a period long enough 

to produce death. Bernard, 2006 WL 449017, *5. Furthermore, “[a] forensic pathologist 

opined that Margaret fell or hit her head, causing her to lose consciousness before she was 

strangled.” Id. Evidence of Margaret’s death by strangulation—possibly while 

unconscious—is inconsistent with a finding that the homicide either occurred (1) in the 

course of an unlawful act that is less than a felony or (2) was due to Petitioner’s mere 

negligence or recklessness. Thus, given the lack of substantial evidence at trial to warrant 

an involuntary manslaughter instruction, any request for such instruction would have failed 

under California law. Under those circumstances, the failure to request such an instruction 

does not amount to deficient performance. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 

1994) (finding no ineffective assistance where the motion that allegedly should have been 

made would have been futile).52 Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

 52 Even if there were a basis for such an instruction, there was no need to request 

one, since the trial court would have been required to provide one sua sponte. 

Cunningham, 25 Cal.4th at 1008. Moreover, there was no prejudice, since the jury, which 

had the option of convicting Petitioner of second degree murder, found her guilty of first 

degree murder. 

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17. Taped Conversation with Polygraph Examiner 

Petitioner maintains that trial counsel should have sought to introduce a taped 

conversation she had with the first polygraph examiner, W. Michael Floyd, M.S., J.D. 

Resp’t Ex. I at 71-72. Petitioner claims that she is certain that her responses to Mr. Floyd’s 

questions would have exculpated her. Id. To the extent Petitioner desired to introduce 

statements from the tape for the truth of the matter asserted, such statements would have 

been inadmissible hearsay. As such, defense counsel cannot be faulted for failing to 

introduce evidence that would likely have been disallowed. See James, 24 F.3d at 27. Nor 

has Petitioner shown that the tape—assuming the trial court would have allowed its 

admission—would have altered the outcome at trial. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

18. “Accessory After the Fact” 

Petitioner avers that trial counsel should have objected on relevancy grounds to 

evidence allegedly showing that she was an accessory after the fact, given that she was not 

charged with that offense (i.e., California Penal Code § 32). Resp’t Ex. I at 73. She 

allegedly told trial counsel that he should ask for a jury instruction for accessory after the 

fact “so they would know what it was.” Id. at 74. Because Petitioner had not been charged 

with that offense, defense counsel declined to make such a request. Petitioner claims that 

defense counsel’s failure to raise an evidentiary challenge or to request the aforementioned 

jury instruction demonstrates that he provided ineffective assistance. 

The California Supreme Court did not unreasonably reject Petitioner’s IAC claim. 

First, evidence pertaining to Petitioner’s post-murder conduct was relevant to whether she 

committed the killing. People v. Jones, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1258 (1993) (evidence of 

defendant’s post-murder “lying and covering up” was potentially relevant to show 

“consciousness of guilt of [murder]”). Second, trial counsel’s decision not to request an 

accessory after the fact instruction was reasonable in view of the fact that Petitioner was not 

charged with that offense, coupled with the absence of any evidence that the prosecution 

would have agreed to such an instruction. People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 (2010) 

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(“California law does not permit a court to instruct concerning an uncharged lesser related

crime unless agreed to by both parties.”) (emphasis added). 

The objective reasonableness of trial counsel’s decision not to seek an accessory 

after the fact instruction is further supported by the Court of Appeal’s reasoned opinion on 

direct appeal: 

Bernard’s defense—grounded in her claim that she acted under 

duress, out of fear of Cunningham when she helped him dispose 

of Margaret’s body—is weak, for two reasons. First, she was 

not charged with any offense other than the murder itself. 

Bernard’s defense to that charge was not that Cunningham 

compelled her to kill Margaret, but that she did not do so at all. 

Second and more importantly, Bernard’s claim that her acts 

after the murder were the result of her fear of Cunningham is 

inconsistent with her own testimony that until she escaped from 

Cunningham, she actually believed that she had killed 

Margaret. The clear implication of her statement that—at all 

relevant times—she believed that she had killed her mother was 

that she participated in the disposal of Margaret’s body in order 

to conceal evidence of what she then believed was her crime, 

not that committed by Cunningham. 

Bernard, 2006 WL 449017, *17 (emphasis added). Thus, it is evident that trial counsel, in 

fact, presented Petitioner’s defense theory, i.e., that Petitioner only disposed of Margaret’s 

body under duress—but did not participate in the murder, and therefore, could not be found 

guilty of murder. Because being an “accessory after the fact” was not a lesser included 

offense of murder, nor was it a legal defense to any charged crime, and because Petitioner 

was able to thoroughly argue her aforementioned defense, it was not constitutional error for 

the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on “accessory after the fact.” Cf. Hopkins v. 

Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) (holding that the Constitution does not require the jury to be 

instructed on offenses that are not lesser-included offenses of the charged crimes); Solis v. 

Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses is 

not a constitutional error). Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

19. “Newly Discovered Evidence” and Repeated IAC Claims 

Petitioner contends that she has “newly discovered evidence” that Corporal Delavan 

testified at trial in a manner inconsistent with the information in his police report. See 

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3d 1057, 10

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ost of which

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. 

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“almost never” be demonstrated solely on the basis of a judicial ruling. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 

555. 

1. Denial of Post-Verdict Motion for Law Library Access 

Petitioner contends that post-verdict, while she was pro se, the trial court committed 

judicial misconduct by denying a motion for access to an allegedly “male only law library.” 

According to Petitioner, had such access been provided, she could have filed a more 

effective motion for new trial. However, Judge Brady found that Petitioner had the same 

library access as any other inmate at the West County Detention Facility, where access to 

legal materials is facilitated through librarians, as opposed to physical access to the library. 

RT 3202-3203. Judge Brady also confirmed “with the commander who’s in charge of the 

facility at West County as well as the law librarian,” and concluded that “there was nothing 

about [Petitioner’s] access that was . . . different than anyone else at the main detention 

facility nor was there any delay in getting . . . the materials . . . .” RT 3203. 

Here, Petitioner fails to point to any evidence in the record, aside from the ruling on 

her motion of law library access, to support her claim of judicial bias. An adverse court 

ruling, standing alone, is insufficient to sustain a claim for habeas relief. See Larson, 515 

F.3d at 1067 (affirming denial of habeas relief on judicial misconduct claim “[b]ecause [the 

petitioner] has provided no evidence of the trial court’s alleged bias outside of these rulings 

and remarks—which themselves revealed little more than the occasional mild frustration 

with Larson’s pro se lawyering skills—his claim that he was denied a fair trial also fails.”). 

Relief on this claim is DENIED.53

2. Conflict of Interest 

Petitioner alleges that Judge Brady had a “conflict of interest” based on having 

previously presided over a case in which Cunningham was charged with possession of 

 53 Petitioner’s reliance on Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2000), is 

misplaced. In that case, the court noted that “[a]n incarcerated criminal defendant who 

chooses to represent himself has a constitutional right to access to ‘law books . . . or other 

tools’ to assist him in preparing a defense. Id. (quoting Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 

1446 (9th Cir. 1985)). Bribiesca concerned the issue of self-representation, not judicial 

misconduct. 

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methamphetamine. Petitioner alleges that Judge Brady ordered Cunningham’s release in 

2001. Resp’t Ex. I at 90-91. In addition, Petitioner claims that, in this case, “Cunningham 

was offered immunity in exchange for testimony, thus depriving petitioner of the right to 

cross examine, which is a violation of the U.S. Constitution Amend. 6 & 14 also due 

process,” and that Judge Brady “ordered Cunningham released from jail . . . .” Id. 

The record does not support Petitioner’s claim of judicial misconduct based on a 

conflict of interest. The mere fact that Judge Brady presided over a case in which 

Cunningham ostensibly was a party is not proof of bias or judicial misconduct, particularly 

where, as here, the record is devoid of information regarding the circumstances surrounding 

the prior case. There also is no evidence that Cunningham was granted immunity, which, 

under California law, is determined in the first instance by the prosecutor, not the trial 

court. People v. Williams, 43 Cal.4th 584, 622 (2008). Moreover, the record shows that 

Cunningham asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declined to 

answer questions at trial regarding his involvement in the murder. Bernard, 2006 WL 

449017, at *5. Even if the record supported a claim that Judge Brady was biased in favor 

of Cunningham—which it clearly does not—Petitioner has made no showing that it 

“rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the 

United States Constitution.” Duckett, 67 F.3d at 740. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

3. Denial of Post-Conviction Motion to Appoint BWS Expert 

Petitioner contends that the trial judge erred in denying a post-conviction motion to 

appoint a BWS expert. The purpose of the expert, according to Petitioner, was to establish 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for new trial. Resp’t Ex. I at 93-94. 

As discussed above, an adverse ruling, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate judicial 

misconduct. See Larson, 515 F.3d at 1067. 

Nor does the Court find any merit to Petitioner’s assertion that Judge Brady’s denial 

of her motion “violated [her] constitutional right to present a defense.” Resp’t Ex. I at 94. 

Whether construed under the Fourteenth or Sixth Amendments, the Constitution guarantees 

defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 

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476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citation omitted). Here, the record does not support a finding 

that Petitioner’s constitutional right to present a complete defense was infringed upon. The 

proposed BWS evidence would not have provided a complete defense to murder. Rather, 

its purpose was to explain why Petitioner continued to associate with Cunningham after the 

murder. In any event, as more fully discussed above, trial counsel’s decision not to proffer 

a BWS expert was a matter of trial strategy and falls far short of establishing that his legal 

representation was ineffective. The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim of 

judicial misconduct did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

4. Denial of Post-Verdict Motion Relating to DNA Testing 

Petitioner contends that the trial judge committed judicial misconduct by denying 

her post-conviction motion to pay for DNA testing.54 Resp’t Ex. I at 96-98. Petitioner 

alleges that no DNA tests were performed on physical evidence, such as hair, fibers and 

blood, found at the crime scene. Id. It is unclear what federal right Petitioner alleges was 

violated as a result of the apparent lack of such testing. To the extent that Petitioner is 

alleging the denial of her right to a complete defense, there is no indication as to what the 

DNA evidence would have shown, let alone that such evidence would have exonerated her. 

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim of judicial misconduct did not 

involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Relief on this claim 

is DENIED. 

5. Marsden Motions 

Petitioner contends that the trial court engaged in judicial misconduct by denying her 

first two Marsden motions to relieve trial counsel from representing her. Resp’t Ex. I at 

100-101. The record shows that Petitioner made three Marsden motions: one pre-verdict 

 54 Petitioner phrases this claim in terms of the trial judge’s abuse of discretion when 

she “den[ied] [the] post-conviction motion to appoint counsel for DNA testing . . . .” 

Resp’t Ex. I at 96. However, Petitioner does not raise such an issue in the supporting facts 

associated with her claim. See id. at 96-98. Therefore, the Court construes her claim to be 

alleged judicial misconduct for denying a post-conviction motion to fund DNA testing. 

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motion on April 3, 2002, and two post-verdict motions on April 17, 2002 and July 19, 

2002.55 RT 2285-2301, RT 3056-3080, RT 3093-3111. The trial court conducted hearings 

on each Marsden motion, denied the first two motions, RT 2300, RT 3076, and granted the 

final post-verdict motion, RT 3107-3110. The trial court thereafter appointed Lawrence 

Kaplan as Petitioner’s new attorney. Over a year later at a hearing conducted on August 8, 

2003, the trial court denied Petitioner’s Marsden motion to substitute Attorney Kaplan for 

another attorney. RT 3127. Later, at that same hearing, the trial court granted Petitioner’s 

Faretta motion to proceed in pro per. RT 3132; see also Dkt. 19-14 at 44. 

In the instant matter, Petitioner does not challenge the trial court’s handling of her 

Marsden motions, but simply claims that she had a “huge conflict” with trial counsel. See 

Resp’t Ex. I at 100-101 (“Veale did not have [my] best interest at heart, he played the role 

as some attorneys do, Petitioner was a bargain[ing] chip [and] Veale intentionally threw the 

case.”); see also RT 2285-2301, RT 3056-3080, RT 3093-3111. Since Petitioner does not 

allege that the trial court mishandled her motions, the Court finds that the California 

Supreme Court’s rejection of her judicial misconduct claim was not objectively 

unreasonable. To the extent Petitioner is attempting to claim that her trial counsel was 

ineffective, such a claim fails for the same reasons set forth above in this order in the 

section addressing Petitioner’s numerous IAC claims. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

6. Extension of Time to File Motion for New Trial 

Petitioner contends that the trial court committed misconduct by denying her request 

for an extension of time to file her motion for new trial. Resp’t Ex. I at 103-104. The 

matter of continuance falls within the discretion of the trial judge. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 

U.S. 575, 589 (1964). An abuse of discretion will be found only if “the denial was arbitrary 

or unreasonable.” Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). Even if there was an abuse of discretion, habeas relief is 

available only if the denial of a continuance resulted in actual prejudice to the petitioner. 

 55 As mentioned above, the jury reached its verdict on April 10, 2002. CT 920. 

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Id.; see Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, Petitioner has 

made no showing that the denial of her request for an extension was an abuse of discretion 

or that she would have prevailed on her motion had the extension been granted. Relief on 

this claim is DENIED. 

7. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Petitioner contends that the trial court committed judicial misconduct by upholding 

her conviction (presumably by denying her motion for new trial) based on insufficient 

evidence. Resp’t Ex. I at 106. To obtain federal habeas relief, it must be shown that a state 

court’s rejection a sufficiency of the evidence claim was objectively unreasonable. 

Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011). The critical question is “whether the record 

evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). Petitioner merely contends that the evidence at trial 

was circumstantial and therefore insufficient to support a conviction for murder. However, 

the Ninth Circuit has held that “‘[c]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it 

may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.’” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citation omitted). Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

8. Denial of Request for Transcripts 

Petitioner faults Contra Costa County Superior Judges Theresa Canepa and Diana 

Becton Smith by denying her two separate motions for access to transcripts of postconviction motions. Resp’t Ex. I at 108, 110. The transcripts allegedly were necessary for 

Petitioner to prepare her habeas petition. Petitioner has not stated a prima facie case of a 

constitutional violation. The sine qua non of a right to transcripts is a need related to retrial 

or appeal. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 

12, 17-20 (1956) Petitioner has failed to cite—and the Court is unaware of—any authority 

holding that there is a clearly established federal right to transcripts for use in preparing a 

habeas petition. See Goldsberry v. Long, No. 2:13-CV-01358 AC, 2015 WL 3609350, at 

*11 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (“Petitioner’s difficulty in obtaining documents for his own 

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use in state habeas does not violate any clearly established constitutional right.”). Relief on 

this claim is DENIED. 

9. Autopsy Photographs 

Petitioner contends that the trial court committed judicial misconduct by allowing 

jurors to see the photos of the victim’s autopsy “for [the] purpose of describing 

dismemberment.” Resp’t Ex. I at 112. No showing has been made by Petitioner that the 

admission of the photographs rendered her trial fundamentally unfair. That aside, the 

Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly 

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the 

writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Because the Supreme 

Court has left this question unanswered, this Court cannot conclude that the state court 

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by admitting the autopsy photographs. 

See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (where Supreme Court precedent gives no 

clear answer to question presented, “it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonab[ly] 

appli[ed] clearly established Federal law’”); Gebrezgiabher v. Mike, No. C 06-7864 RMW, 

2009 WL 2705931, *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) (denying habeas relief based on the 

admission of autopsy photographs on the ground that there was no clearly established 

federal law on point). Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

10. Victim’s Driver’s License 

Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jurors to 

see the driver’s license of the murder victim, Margaret, in order to show the jury her 

weight. Resp’t Ex. I at 114. She adds that both the prosecutor and a witness, Arnold 

Josselson, “lied” by stating that Bernard was “never weighed.” Id. The import of this 

argument is entirely unclear. To the extent that Petitioner is challenging the admission of 

evidence, such claim fails to state claim for habeas relief. See Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. 

Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

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habeas corpus relief in the absence of a due process violation even if the prosecutor’s 

comments were “undesirable or even universally condemned.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 

416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974). 

1. Closing Argument 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting a 

“crucial element” of its theory for the first time in her closing argument. Resp’t Ex. I at 

122. In particular, she claims that “[t]he prosecution . . . was allowed to postpone any 

statement of its theory regarding Cunningham’s participation in the victim’s death until the 

defense had no opportunity to respond.” Id. Petitioner does not, however, identify any 

particular statement by the prosecution that she alleges amounts to misconduct. See Tak 

Sun Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder Darden, the first issue 

is whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper and, if so, whether they infected the trial 

with unfairness.”). Moreover, Petitioner’s vague assertions of misconduct do not suffice to 

show that the prosecutor’s unspecified remarks had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence on the jury’s verdict. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(vague and conclusory allegations of misconduct do not warrant habeas relief).56 Relief on 

this claim is DENIED. 

2. Conflict of Interest 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to recuse 

herself from the case due to an alleged conflict of interest in that she had previously 

prosecuted Cunningham in “felony possession cases,” and that Cunningham had been 

“ordered released by Judge Brady.” Resp’t Ex. I at 124. The prosecutor’s prior 

prosecution of Cunningham does not demonstrate a conflict of interest. To the extent that 

 56 Even if Petitioner had sufficiently identified the objectionable statements by the 

prosecutor, her claim of prosecutorial misconduct is procedurally barred by virtue of her 

failure to show that she made a timely objection at trial and requested a limiting instruction. 

See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We may not review his six 

other prosecutorial misconduct claims because [petitioner] procedurally defaulted by failing 

to make contemporaneous objections, and the California court consequently invoked a 

procedural bar to their consideration, the validity of which Rich has failed to overcome”). 

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Petitioner takes issue with the prosecutor’s decision to charge her and not Cunningham, 

Petitioner has failed to present “exceptionally clear proof” to overcome the presumption 

that the prosecutor’s charging decision is lawful. Nunes v. Ramirez-Palmer, 485 F.3d 432, 

441 (9th Cir. 2007). Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

3. Comment on Cunningham’s Relationship with Petitioner 

Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor erred in stating that “Petitioner had no fear of 

Cunningham whatsoever, that he was not stalking her, never threatened her life, and that he 

loved her and [the prosecutor] showed [the] jury a romantic card dated 11-00 (for 

Thanksgiving).” Resp’t Ex. I at 126. Petitioner has not provided citations to the record to 

support any of her aforementioned assertions. Without specific claims and facts, a Court is 

unable to determine whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated. See Donnelly, 

416 U.S. at 643. On this basis alone, habeas relief may be denied. Jones v. Gomez, 66 

F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that relief on a habeas claim made “[w]ithout 

reference to the record or any document” was properly denied). 

The above notwithstanding, the Court’s independent review of the record reveals 

that Petitioner’s allegations lack foundation. The record shows that the prosecutor argued 

that there were no witnesses to Cunningham’s alleged stalking of Petitioner, and that the 

evidence did not otherwise support Petitioner’s claim that Cunningham was stalking her. 

RT 2942-2946. The prosecutor argued that while Cunningham’s feelings for Petitioner 

motivated him to help her dispose of the victim’s body, any evidence that Cunningham 

committed the murder (as opposed to being an accessory after the fact) was based on 

Petitioner’s testimony, and was not supported by any other evidence. The prosecutor also 

pointed out that Cunningham had an alibi based on Ms. Hardcastle’s testimony. RT 2946-

2955. In view of the record presented, the California Supreme Court had an objectively 

reasonable basis for rejecting Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Relief on this 

claim is DENIED. 

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4. Contact with Jurors 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor had “contact with jurors during trial . . . on 

more than one occasion,” telling them she needed a conviction so she would have leverage 

to make Petitioner testify against Cunningham.” Resp’t Ex. I at 128. As support, Petitioner 

cites an “interview with Phillip Goff, juror #1,” id., which consists of his handwritten notes 

of a telephone conversation Petitioner’s trial counsel, Mr. Veale, allegedly had with juror 

Goff. Dkt. 19-6 at 41-49. Under the heading “After verdict,” the notes state: “D.A. 

Cashman said – I need a murder conviction to force K[endra Bernard] to cooperate – now I 

have leverage to cooperate.” Id. at 47.57 

The quoted statement attributed to the prosecutor is insufficient to demonstrate 

prosecutorial misconduct. The record does not indicate any details regarding the alleged 

conversation, such as the parties to or date and time of the conversation, or when or who 

created the notes. There likewise is no proof, such as a declaration that Goff, in fact, made 

such statements, which, in any event, are double hearsay. Evidentiary flaw aside, the 

prosecutor’s alleged remarks appear to have been made post-verdict. As such, they could 

not have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

5. Suppression of Statements by Terry and Alice George 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor improperly suppressed the statements by 

Terry George and his mother, Alice George, regarding Cunningham’s whereabouts at the 

time of the murder. Resp’t Ex. I at 130. As more fully discussed in the section above 

discussing Petitioner’s IAC claims, Petitioner alleges that her trial counsel learned from his 

own investigation that both of these individuals had made statements that would have 

impeached Ms. Hardcastle’s alibi for Cunningham. However, Petitioner fails to point to 

anything in the record to establish that the prosecutor knew of those statements, let alone 

 57 In the ECF version of this exhibit, the sentence is obscured by highlighting. Dkt. 

19-6 at 49. The original hard-copy of the exhibit, however, is legible. See Pet’r Ex. Z to 

Dkt. 19 at 9. 

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 solely on t

v. Scribner

y where it is

e if the misc

s do not war

ury’s verdic

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or Complai

hat a witnes

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Resp’t Ex. I 

ration of an

claims that 

rt for Petitio

3d 20, 26 (9

of specific 

6 (9th Cir. 1

 

laims that t

house until 

his assertion

ow that a 7:3

ury’s verdic

51

t was theref

his claim. R

that the juro

arantees the

Const. amen

hat a crimina

the evidence

r, 512 F.3d 

s reasonably

conduct had

rrant habeas

ct or trial pro

t to juror m

int Regard

ss, Lee Elli

urder beef,”

at 136. Pet

ny juror or M

such docum

oner’s alleg

9th Cir.1994

facts do no

991) (“[U]n

the prosecut

7:30 p.m., 

n, which un

30 p.m. as o

ct. 

fore for obj

Relief on th

ors commit

e criminally

nd. VI; see

al defendan

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1227, 1238

y likely that

d not occurr

s relief unle

oceedings);

misconduct c

ding Jury D

son, overhe

” and that o

titioner has 

Mr. Ellison.

ment has be

ations is fat

4) (“Conclu

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nsupported 

tor incorrec

after Berna

ndermines th

opposed a 6

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his claim is 

tted miscon

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Irvin v. Do

nt be tried b

” Smith v. 

8 (9th Cir. 2

t the petitio

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; Lawson v

claim). 

Duty 

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. Although

een “lost.” 

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ard had been

his claim. 

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DENIED.

nduct. Resp

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owd, 366 U

by “a jury ca

Phillips, 45

2008). Habe

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ve substanti

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complain th

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usory claim

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U.S. 717, 

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55 U.S. 

eas relief is

have 

U.S. at 637 

ial and 

F.3d 608, 

hat “they 

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would have

s

 

r

e

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sufficient to show error.”). Even if supporting evidence was presented, no showing has 

been made that the jury or were otherwise incapable of being fair and impartial or that their 

alleged displeasure with serving on the jury had a substantial and injurious effect on their 

verdict. Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

2. Misconduct by Juror No. 1 

Petitioner contends that juror number 1, Phillip Goff, “ma[d]e up his mind” before 

hearing the defense case. Resp’t Ex. I at 138. A juror who prejudges a case before 

considering all of the evidence violates his or her duty to decide the case solely on the 

evidence presented. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 653 (9th Cir. 2004) (“What is 

crucial is . . . that each juror keep an open mind until the case has been submitted to the 

jury.’”) (citation omitted); Grobeson v. City of Los Angeles, 190 Cal.App.4th 778, 792 

(2010) (noting that it is well established that “[f]or a juror to prejudge the case is serious 

misconduct.”) (internal quotation mark and citation). A habeas petitioner “must allege facts 

which, if proved, would show that the premature deliberations prejudiced him to the extent 

that he did not receive a fair trial.” Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

Here, Petitioner has not shown that juror Goff engaged in any misconduct. The only 

evidentiary support offered by Petitioner is the aforementioned handwritten notes of a posttrial telephone conversation between defense attorney Veale and Mr. Goff. Dkt. 19-6 at 41-

49. Specifically, the notes indicate: “Goff [juror number 1] made up his mind – GUILT, 

but not 1 or 2 until Kendra testified.” Id. at 47. Setting aside that the statement is doublehearsay and lacks foundation, it is plainly incomplete and ambiguous. At best, the notes 

seem to relate to juror Goff’s thought process, which may not be used to impeach a verdict. 

See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Jurors may testify 

regarding extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influences. They may not 

be questioned about the deliberative process or subjective effects of extraneous 

information, nor can such information be considered by the trial or appellate courts.”); Cal. 

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Evid. Code § 1150(a) (a verdict may not be impeached by inquiry into the juror’s mental or 

subjective reasoning processes). Relief on this claim is DENIED. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. For the reasons set out 

above, jurists of reason would not find this Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims debatable 

or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not appeal the 

denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. All claims from the Amended Petition are DENIED, and a certificate of 

appealability will not issue. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment, terminate any pending matters, and close the 

file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 22, 2016 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

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