Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01729/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01729-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIMS, et al., 

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:14-cv-01729 DLB

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Daniel Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) is an inmate in the Fresno County Jail proceeding 

pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed 

this action on November 6, 2014. He names Fresno County Sheriff Margaret Mims, Corizon 

Health Director of Nursing K. Nunez, and “To Be Named” Fresno County Sheriff’s Deputies as 

Defendants.1

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on November 13, 2014.

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions 

or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 

2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Fresno County Jail. 

He alleges that on April 29, 2013, an unnamed Fresno County Sheriff’s Deputy shot him in 

the face with a less-than-lethal “O.C. paintball gun.” ECF No. 1, at 3. Plaintiff states that at the 

time, he was a non-participant in a riot on the ninth floor of the Fresno County Jail. During the 

riot, several officers entered the sally port and then opened fire through the feed door of the pod,

without warning. Plaintiff was struck in the eye at a range of less than fifteen feet, and continued 

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to be hit as he fell to the ground and attempted to crawl away. He alleges that the use of force was 

“reckless, at best and outside of departmental procedures for such a scenario.” ECF No. 1, at 3.

Plaintiff contends that the shot caused severe damage to his eye. He was transported to 

Community Regional Medical Center after the incident, where he was discharged after several 

surgeries. Plaintiff states that he was discharged with specific orders for care and medication. 

However, as of the date of his complaint, Corizon Health has failed to transport Plaintiff to 

specialist appointments for his vision issues and neurological conditions. 

Plaintiff contends that he continues to request medical care for his eye and headaches, but 

he has been told that he will not receive care. 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that research conducted by family members has revealed that 

while he was hospitalized, eye specialists wanted to “explore more surgeries to repair [his] eye, 

but a representative from Corizon deemed the procedure as costly and unneeded.” ECF No. 1, at 

4. He states that he has not even received a prosthetic eye and is suffering from an empty eye 

socket, nerve damage and headaches. 

C. DISCUSSION

1. Defendant Mims

Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of 

subordinate employees based on respondeat superior, or vicarious liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 

734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 

F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 

2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow, 681 

F.3d at 989) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 

F.3d at 915-16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal 

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional 

violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) 

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(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff names Defendant Mims, but fails to allege any facts linking her to the 

conduct at issue. Instead, Plaintiff contends that an unnamed deputy fired the shot that hit him in 

the eye. As explained above, Defendant Mims cannot be held liable for the acts of her 

subordinates.

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Mims.

2. Defendant Nunez 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nunez is the Director of Nursing at Corizon Health.2 

However, he does not link Defendant Nunez to any of the conduct at issue. While he states that 

Corizon Health failed to transport him to appointments, and determined that certain procedures 

were unnecessary, he does not explain if, or how, Defendant Nunez was involved in any of these 

events.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Nunez.

3. Use of Excessive Force

As an initial matter, it is unclear whether Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner or a pretrial 

detainee at the time of the events in question. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 

and unusual punishment only protects convicted prisoners. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 

S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989). It is the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that protects pretrial detainees from the use of 

excessive force which amounts to punishment, Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 

1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10), and the Fourth Amendment sets the 

applicable constitutional limitations for considering such claims, Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 

F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1198) (quotation marks omitted). 

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) 

(citations omitted). For claims of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether force was applied 

 

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Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Corizon Health provided medical care to inmates at the Fresno County Jail. 

Corizon Health would therefore be acting under color of state law for purposes of section 1983.

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in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, 

the malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates the Eighth Amendment, 

regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Oliver v. 

Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In resolving claims of excessive force brought by pretrial detainees, the Fourth 

Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard applies. Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415. The inquiry is 

whether Defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Id. (citing Graham, 490 

U.S. at 397) (quotation marks omitted). The nature and quality of the intrusion on Plaintiff’s 

Fourth Amendment interests must be balanced against the countervailing governmental interests at 

stake. Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397) (quotation marks omitted). Factors may include the 

severity of the incident giving rise to the use of force, whether Plaintiff posed an immediate threat 

to the safety of Defendant or others, and whether Plaintiff was actively attempting to avoid being 

subdued or brought under control. See Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1198 (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff contends that an unknown deputy shot through the feed door, without 

warning, during a riot. While Plaintiff alleges that he was not a participant in the riot, he does not 

include sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to determine if he states a claim under either the 

Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment. Under Plaintiff’s facts, deputies were presented with a riot 

situation and acted to end the danger. That Plaintiff may have been injured during the riot, 

without more, does not state a claim under either standard. Indeed, Plaintiff states that the 

deputy’s actions were “reckless, at best,” but reckless behavior does not necessarily rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation. Similarly, actions taken in contravention of established policies 

don’t necessarily rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either the Eighth or Fourteenth 

Amendments.

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4. Denial of Medical Care

Again, it is unclear whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the 

time of the events at issue. However, while pretrial detainees’ rights are protected under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard for claims brought under the Eighth 

Amendment has long been used to analyze pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement claims. 

Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1017-18; Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1242; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 

(9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the analysis is the same regardless of Plaintiff’s status.

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 

2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 

2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that 

failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain 

or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 

(citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which 

entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

According to Plaintiff’s allegations, he sustained an eye injury during a riot. He states that 

he has asked for medical care, but has been told he will not receive any. He also alleges that 

Corizon Health has failed to transport him for medical appointments.

Without additional facts, however, Plaintiff has not alleged that any Defendant has acted 

with deliberate indifference. The acts that he complains of, alone, do not state constitutional 

claims. For example, Plaintiff alleges that he has not been transported to appointments, but he 

does not provide facts surrounding the failure. He also alleges that procedures have been denied 

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as unnecessary or expensive, but the denials alone do not state a claim.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims for which relief may 

be granted. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. In amending, Plaintiff should also clarify 

whether he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time of the events at issue.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and liability may 

not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 

2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2014 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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