Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00291/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00291-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE FLORES, an individual;

and CONNIE FLORES, an

individual, 

 Plaintiffs,

v. 

EMERICH & FIKE, a

professional corporation, et

al.

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-0291 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

TO VACATE JUDGMENT (DOC. 169); 

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR CERTIFICATION OF PARTIAL

JUDGMENT FOR APPEAL UNDER RULE

54(b) AND ORDERING ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE FIKE

DEFENDANTS ONLY (DOC. 171); AND

(3) STAYING AND TAKING OFF

CALENDAR DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES (DOC. 140)

I. BACKGROUND

This is the third case filed by Joe and Connie Flores

(“Plaintiffs”) concerning a series of packing and marketing

agreements entered into between Plaintiffs and DDJ, Inc., DDJ

LLC, and related entities and individuals. 

Plaintiffs’ filed their initial complaint against DDJ, Inc.,

DDJ LLC, and others in 1999, asserting claims under the

Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (“PACA”), along with

state law contract and tort claims. See Flores et al v. DDJ,

Inc., et al., 1:99-cv-5878 AWI DLB (“Flores I”). In 2003, a jury

found for the Flores’ on all claims against DDJ Inc. and DDJ LLC

(“the Judgment Debtors”).

On October 15, 2004, the Flores’ filed a second lawsuit,

alleging that individual officers of the Judgment Debtors

fraudulently transferred assets from the Judgment Debtors into

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their own names. See In Re Joe Flores, et a. v. Dennis Hagobian,

et al., 1:04-cv-6405 OWW DLB (“Flores II”). 

On January 3, 2005, DDJ, Inc. and DDJ, LLC filed for Chapter

7 bankruptcy protection. Further proceedings in Flores I and

Flores II were stayed pursuant to the automatic stay provision of

the Bankruptcy Code. (Flores I, Doc. 408 at 2; Flores II, Doc.

19 at 3.)

On March 1, 2005, Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint in

this lawsuit (Flores III), naming as defendants a number of

individuals involved with DDJ and affiliated corporate entities

(the “DDJ Defendants”). The Flores III complaint also named as

defendants the law firm of Emerich & Fike and several individual

attorneys at that firm (collectively, the “Fike Defendants”) who

represent many of the DDJ Defendants. The complaint contained a

single federal claim, for Civil RICO, and numerous state law

claims alleging, among other things, that the DDJ Defendants

misappropriated funds from the Judgment Debtors and that the Fike

Defendants assisted in this misappropriation. 

Because of the pending bankruptcy proceeding, Flores III was

briefly stayed as to all claims against DDJ Defendants and as to

certain claims against the Fike Defendants. Other claims against

the Fike Defendants were permitted to proceed. (Docs. 72 & 89.) 

The district court later lifted the stay as to all claims against

all defendants in light of the fact that the Chapter 7 Trustee

does not intend to pursue any of the claims in this case. (Doc.

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The Flores’ suggested during oral argument on the 1

instant motions that this ruling, lifting the stay as to all of

the remaining claims against the remaining defendants, was

subsequently “corrected” (i.e., altered) by the district court. 

But, the record does not reflect any order (written or oral)

containing any subsequent ruling on the status of the stay. It

appears that Plaintiffs are referring to a different series of

orders regarding the pending attorney’s fee petition, filed on

October 13, 2006. Plaintiffs filed their appeal on November 19,

2006. On November 13, 2006, the district court erroneously

entered a minute order indicating that it no longer had

jurisdiction over the fee petition because an appeal was pending. 

The Fike Defendants moved for reconsideration of that ruing,

pointing to Ninth Circuit authority indicating that a district

court retained discretion to exercise jurisdiction over a fee

petition while an appeal was pending. In light of this

authority, the district court granted the motion for

reconsideration and set the fee petition for hearing. (See Doc.

157.) This ruling had nothing to do with the operation of the

stay as to the remaining claims in this case, which was lifted

according to the minute order entered on September 16, 2005. 

3

92.)1

The Fike Defendants moved to dismiss the single federal

claim in Flores III (for Civil RICO) and to strike the numerous

state law claims against them pursuant to California’s Anti-SLAPP

statute, Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 425.16. The district court

granted both motions as to all claims. (Doc. 108, filed February

21, 2006.) Specifically, with respect to the Anti-SLAPP motion

to strike, the district court found that the Anti-SLAPP statute

applied to all of the state law claims against the Fike

Defendants, including the malicious prosecution claim. The

district court then found that the litigation privilege, Cal.

Code Civ. Pro § 47, barred all of the state law claims as pled,

with the exception of the malicious prosecution claim, to which

the litigation privilege does not apply. The district court then

examined the evidence presented by Plaintiffs regarding the

malicious prosecution claim and concluded that Plaintiffs had not

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met their burden of establishing a prima facie case for malicious

prosecution under the Anti-SLAPP burden-shifting framework. At

the time, Plaintiffs made no formal request for further time to

conduct discovery on this claim, nor did they represent that they

had previously propounded any discovery to the Fike Defendants. 

The district court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend the RICO

claim and the state law claim for malicious prosecution. 

Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, re-alleging all of

their original state claims, without amending the RICO claim as

to the Fike Defendants. (Doc. 113, filed March 13, 2006.) 

The Fike Defendants again moved to strike all of the state

law claims from the amended complaint, arguing that it had been

inappropriate for the district court to grant Plaintiffs leave to

amend claims stricken pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute. 

Plaintiffs opposed this motion on various grounds, but, again,

never raised the issue of pursuing further discovery. (See Doc.

121.) In an August 24, 2006 decision, the district court granted

the Fike Defendants’ renewed motion to strike the claims without

leave to amend, agreeing that granting leave to amend state law

claims stricken pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute undermined the

purpose of the Anti-SLAPP statute. Judgement was entered against

Plaintiffs and in favor of the Fike Defendants on November 12,

2006. (Doc. 139.) 

Plaintiffs timely appealed the August 24, 2006 ruling, but

their appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth

Circuit explained: 

A review of the record demonstrates that this

court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the

order challenged in the appeal is not final or

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appealable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (b); Chacon v.

Babcock, 640 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1981)(order is not

appealable unless it disposes of all claims as to all

parties or judgment is entered in compliance with rule;

see also Frank Briscoe Co., Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen

Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir.

1985)(certification of final judgment should contain

“express determination that there is no just reason for

delay”). Consequently, this appeal is dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction. 

(See Doc. 158, Order, Flores v. Emerich & Fike, No. 06-17047 (9th

Cir., Dec. 26, 2006).) Plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, which was denied on

February 22, 2007. (See Doc. 179.) 

Now before the court for decision are three motions. First,

Plaintiffs move to vacate the partial judgment in favor of the

Fike Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b)(3). Second, Plaintiffs move for “clarification” of certain

“procedural issues still pending before this court,” which “are

prohibiting Plaintiffs in this matter from perfecting their

appeal.” Finally, Defendants move for attorneys fees under

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16(c). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Judgment.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),

Plaintiffs move to vacate the judgment, entered November 12, 2006

in favor of the Fike Defendants. Plaintiffs assert that, for the

period of time between November 11, 2002 and July 23, 2003, which

included the entire Flores I jury trial, the State of California

had stripped DDJ, Inc. of its corporate powers, rights, and

privileges for nonpayment of taxes, pursuant to California

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Revenue and Tax Code § 23301. Under § 23301, a corporation’s

rights may be suspended for nonpayment of taxes, rendering the

corporation incapable of participating in litigation activities.

See Palm Valley Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Design MTC, 85 Cal.

App. 4th 553, 560 (2000). 

In their opening brief, Plaintiffs indicated that they had

only recently learned of the temporary suspension. (Doc. 169-3

at 4.) However, in a subsequent filing, Plaintiffs acknowledge

that they were aware of the suspension of DDJ’s corporate status

during the underlying PACA litigation. (Doc. 182.) 

Specifically, Mr. Flores brought the issue to the attention of

Judge Ishii and the Fike Defendants during the PACA trial. 

(Trial Tr. at 1241, Doc. 183, Request for Judicial Notice, Ex.

4.) Mr. Fike indicated that he had been unaware of the

suspension and would undertake to correct the situation

immediately. (Id. at 1241-42.) 

Plaintiffs invoke Rule 60(b)(3), asserting that the Fike

Defendants committed “fraud or misconduct” justifying relief from

the judgment entered in this case, because they defended DDJ Inc.

during the Flores I trial, even though DDJ’s corporate status had

been suspended for a period of time. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(3) provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court

may relieve a party or a party's legal representative

from a final judgment, order, or proceeding

for....fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic

or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct

of an adverse party....

Plaintiffs’ invocation of Rule 60(b)(3) is misplaced for several

reasons. First, Plaintiffs totally fail to explain why the issue

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 The remaining state law claim was for malicious 2

prosecution, to which the litigation privilege does not apply as

a matter of law. This claim was stricken on other grounds. 

7

of DDJ’s corporate status was never raised in this litigation

prior to the instant motion to vacate. Mr. Flores explained

during oral argument that he had “forgotten.” But, this is not a

valid legal excuse. 

Second, even if this information had been discovered

yesterday, the logic of Plaintiffs’ argument does not withstand

scrutiny. In order to understand Plaintiffs’ logic, it is

important to note that the district court struck all but one of 2

the state law claims against the Fike Defendants on the ground

that the Fike Defendants were protected by California’s

litigation privilege, Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b), which provides an

absolute privilege for any “publication or broadcast” made in

connection with any judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that

the Fike Defendants should not benefit from protection under the

litigation privilege because their client, DDJ Inc., did not have

standing to sue during at least part of the underlying PACA

litigation. This argument is without merit. California courts

have held that “the focus of the applicability of the [litigation

privilege under § 47] lies in whether the publication was

connected to or related to the underlying proceedings...even lack

of standing does not vitiate the privilege.” Obos v. Scripps

Psychological Assoc., Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 103, 108

(1997)(emphasis added). 

We believe that the judicial privilege protects the []

motions made here, despite the possible lack of

standing. We see no reason why mere lack of standing

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should have the effect of necessarily vitiating the

privilege. The movant's lack of standing can only be

relevant to the issue of privilege in two ways.

First, lack of standing could constitute such lack of

connection with the lawsuit as to make a motion

tortious, as for instance if a complete stranger to the

action filed irrelevant but scurrilous matter in a

proceeding. The lack of connection, not the lack of

standing, would be the reason for denying the privilege

in such a case. But here, as pointed out, there was

ample connection; relevant evidence was offered; but

arguably the wrong party did the offering. Accordingly

the reason for denying the privilege-lack of connection

with the proceeding-does not apply here.

Second, standing could be relevant in the sense that

lack of standing could be the reason a filing in an

action was unwarranted or “wrongful.” But the lack of

standing, though making the filing “wrongful,” does not

necessarily vitiate the privilege. Cases hold that the

judicial privilege applies broadly to publications in a

proceeding that are connected in some way to that

proceeding, to protect the rights of litigants and

interested parties to communicate with the court. (See

Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 211-212,

266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365.) Here, the connection

exists, and therefore the privilege applies. 

Adams v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 521, 529-530 (1992). 

Accordingly, actions that would otherwise be covered by the

litigation privilege are not stripped of that privilege simply

because the litigant lacked standing. The covered action must

simply be connected in some way to the proceeding. Id. Here,

all of the challenged actions taken by the Fike Defendants were

directly connected to the underlying PACA litigation and are

therefore covered by the litigation privilege, even though DDJ

Inc. had been stripped of its corporate privileges for a period

of time. 

Plaintiffs’s reliance on Palm Valley Homeowners Association

v. Design, 85 Cal. App. 4th 553 (2000), is also misplaced. In

Palm Valley, a law firm admitted having knowledge that its

corporate client’s rights had been suspended under the California

Corporations Code, yet pursued litigation activities without

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disclosing this fact to opposing counsel or the court. The Palm

Valley court affirmed the trial court’s imposition of sanctions

upon the firm for acting in bad faith because it “knew or should

have known that [the company] was disqualified from representing

itself in the litigation.” Id. at 561. Here, in light of

Plaintiffs’ acknowledgment that the suspension was raised by them

and discussed during the underlying PACA trial, it is not clear

how the Fike Defendants acted in bad faith or made

misrepresentations to either Judge Ishii or this court regarding

the suspension. Rather, it is Plaintiffs who misrepresented the

record to this court in their opening brief.

Plaintiffs emphasize the fact that DDJ Inc did not actually

obtain its certificate of corporate revival until after the trial

was concluded and the jury returned its special verdict. 

Plaintiffs cite Alhambra-Shumway Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold

Mine Corp., 155 Cal. App. 2d 46, 49-51 (1957). In Alhambra

judgment was entered in favor of a corporation while its

corporate powers were suspended. On appeal, the judgment was

reversed because the corporation had not been revived prior to

entry of judgment. Id. But, Alhambra simply stands for the

proposition that Plaintiffs could have appealed a jury verdict

returned against Plaintiffs if such judgment had been entered

before DDJ’s corporate status was revived. Here, however,

judgment was entered against DDJ Inc. and in favor of Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs cannot challenge the judgment they obtained in the

prior case, in this case as having been obtained through fraud or

misconduct without calling into question their favorable judgment

in the underlying PACA litigation. 

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Plaintiffs expressly cite these cases to explain why 3

they should not be punished for failing to earlier discover

information concerning DDJ’s suspension. (See Doc. 180 at 4-5.) 

But, as discussed above, Plaintiffs later acknowledged that they

knew about DDJ’s suspension during the underlying PACA trial,

raising the entirely separate question of why they failed to

raise the issue in this case prior to this motion to vacate. 

10

Plaintiffs next cite language from Rogers v. Home Shopping

Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Cal. 1999), and

Metabolife v. Int’l, Inc. v. Womick, 264 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.

2001). To the extent that these cases are cited to suggest that

the judgment should be vacated because Plaintiffs’ were never

afforded an opportunity for discovery, this argument is also

without merit. Plaintiffs are correct that Rogers and 3

Metabolife stand for the proposition that, where an Anti-SLAPP

motion to strike is based on a plaintiff’s alleged failure of

proof, the motion must be treated as a motion for summary

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, except that

the attorney’s fee provision of the Anti-SLAPP statute applies. 

Plaintiffs are also correct that, when a nonmoving party has not

had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to

their opposition to such an Anti-SLAPP motion to strike, the

court must allow such discovery. See Aeroplate v. Arch Ins. Co.,

2006 WL 3257487 (E.D. Cal.)(summarizing relevant authorities). 

Here, at least with respect to the malicious prosecution claim,

the Fike Defendant’s motion to dismiss was based on an alleged

failure of proof. However, at no time prior to the district

court granting the motion to strike did Plaintiffs ever formally

request a stay to permit them to conduct discovery, nor did they

propound discovery requests upon the Fike Defendants or move to

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compel the Fike Defendants to answer any such discovery requests.

Discovery is a process that must be initiated by the parties, not

the court. The time for Plaintiffs to have requested discovery

was prior to the ruling on the Fike Defendants’ first motion to

strike. 

Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)

is DENIED.

B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification of Procedural

Issues Preventing Plaintiffs’ from Perfecting Their

Appeal.

Plaintiffs next request “clarification” of certain

procedural issues that are preventing Plaintiffs from perfecting

their appeal. In its order indicating that it lacked

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal from the October 10, 2006

judgment in favor of the Fike Defendants and against Plaintiffs,

the Ninth Circuit explained: 

A review of the record demonstrates that this

court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the

order challenged in the appeal is not final or

appealable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (b); Chacon v.

Babcock, 640 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1981)(order is not

appealable unless it disposes of all claims as to all

parties or judgment is entered in compliance with rule;

see also Frank Briscoe Co., Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen

Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir.

1985)(certification of final judgment should contain

“express determination that there is no just reason for

delay”). Consequently, this appeal is dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction. 

(See Doc. 158, Order, Flores v. Emerich & Fike, No. 06-17047 (9th

Cir., Dec. 26, 2006).) The Court of Appeals’ order clearly

explains that a judgment is not appealable unless it disposes of

all claims as to all parties, or if judgment is entered in

compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which

provides:

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Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple

Parties. When more than one claim for relief is

presented in an action, whether as a claim,

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or

when multiple parties are involved, the court may

direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more

but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon

an express determination that there is no just reason

for delay and upon an express direction for the entry

of judgment. In the absence of such determination and

direction, any order or other form of decision, however

designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims

or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the

parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the

claims or parties, and the order or other form of

decision is subject to revision at any time before the

entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the

rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Here, partial judgment was entered in favor of the Fike

Defendants and against the Plaintiffs, but was not accompanied by

the finding required by Rule 54(b) that “there is no just reason

for delay.” Although Plaintiffs have not formally moved for

certification under 54(b), their motion for clarification can

reasonably be interpreted as such a request. 

In deciding whether there is no just reason to delay the

appeal of a partial final judgment, a court “must take into

account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities

involved.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S.

1, 8 (1980).

Consideration of the [issue of judicial administrative

economy] is necessary to assure that application of the

Rule effectively “preserves the historic federal policy

against piecemeal appeals.” [Citation] It was therefore

proper for the District Judge here to consider such

factors as whether the claims under review were

separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated

and whether the nature of the claims already determined

was such that no appellate court would have to decide

the same issues more than once even if there were

subsequent appeals.

Id. Accordingly, Rule 54(b) certification would be appropriate

if the claims to be reviewed are separable from the remaining

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The district court has not thoroughly analyzed the 4

applicability of the Anti-SLAPP statute or the litigation

privilege to the remaining claims and need not decide the issue

here. 

13

claims in the case. The claims against the Fike Defendants

satisfy this requirement. All of the allegations directed at the

Fike Defendants concern acts taken in connection with their role

as counsel to the DDJ Defendants and were therefore covered by

the Anti-SLAPP statute. For similar reasons, the district court

found that the litigation privilege barred all but one of the

state law claims against the Fike Defendants. The remaining

claim, for malicious prosecution, was stricken because Plaintiffs

had not pleaded a prima facie showing that the Fike Defendants

lacked probable cause to file counterclaims against Plaintiffs in

the underlying PACA lawsuit. Nevertheless, the Anti-SLAPP

statute was applied to the malicious prosecution claim, in part

because of the Fike Defendants’ role as counsel to DDJ. (See

Doc. 108 at 18-20.) 

In contrast, the allegations against the other Defendants,

which include claims of alter ego liability, violation of the

uniform fraudulent transfer act, fraud, conversion, and civil

RICO, focus on conduct that is only tangentially related to court

proceedings, if at all. (See First Amended Complaint, Doc. 113.) 

It is unlikely that either the Anti-SLAPP statute or the

litigation privilege would apply to the bulk of these claims.4

The legal issues that will be raised in the imminent appeal from

judgment in favor of the Fike Defendants is unlikely to resurface

in subsequent or concurrent litigation concerning the claims

against the remaining defendants. The interests of judicial

economy will not be offended by certification under Rule 54(b). 

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It is well-settled that an award of attorney’s fees and 5

costs to a successful Anti-SLAPP movant is mandatory. Ketchum v.

Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131 (2001). “[A]bsent circumstances

rendering an award unjust, the fee should ordinarily include

compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including those

relating solely to [obtaining] the fee [award].” Serrano v.

Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 624 (1982)(applying Cal. Code Civ. Pro §

1021.5)(cited in Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1141). The fee

provision of the Anti-SLAPP statute has been applied in federal

court. Metabolife Intern., Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220

(S.D. Cal. 2002).

14

The Fike Defendants oppose certification, either under Rule

54(b) or 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (interlocutory appeal), primarily

because the instant lawsuit has spawned a separate legal dispute

between the Fike firm and their former clients, which has been

stayed pending resolution of this lawsuit. The Fike Defendants

are concerned that certification of the Anti-SLAPP decision for

immediate appeal would remove any incentive for Plaintiffs to

promptly pursue their claims against the remaining defendants,

thereby delaying the ultimate resolution of the separate lawsuit. 

Although this is a legitimate concern, the Fike Defendants did

not suggest that any serious prejudice would result from delaying

the outcome of that lawsuit. 

In the final analysis, Plaintiffs are pro se litigants

facing the possibility of a having a large attorney’s fee award

entered against them under the Anti-SLAPP statute. As noted in 5

the November 29, 2006 order on Fike Defendants’ motion for

reconsideration, a district court may hear and decide an

attorney’s fee petition while an appeal is pending. (Doc. 157

(citing Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th

Cir. 1983).) But, the parties do not point to any cases

suggesting that the district court must do so. Here, under the

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In exercising its discretion to stay decision on the 6

attorney’s fee petition, the district court is not accepting

Plaintiffs’ argument that such a stay is required under Varian

Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal. 4th 180 (2005), in

which the California Supreme court held that the perfecting of an

appeal from the denial of an Anti-SLAPP motion to strike

automatically stays all further proceedings on the merits. The

Varian court reasoned that “an appellate reversal of an order

denying [an Anti-SLAPP motion] may [] result in a dismissal.” 

Id. at 193. Therefore, proceeding with the case on the merits

while such an appeal is pending would be inconsistent with the

appeal “because the appeal seeks to avoid that very proceeding. 

Indeed, the point of the Anti-SLAPP statute is that you have a

right not to be dragged through the courts because you exercised

your constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotations and

citations omitted)(emphasis added). Varian is wholly

inapplicable to the present circumstances, where Plaintiffs

appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss. The purpose

of the Anti-SLAPP statute, to prevent parties from being dragged

through the courts because they exercised their constitutional

rights, does not protect Plaintiffs, who filed the state law

claims that are the subject of the Anti-SLAPP motion. 

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circumstances, fairness suggests that Plaintiffs should be

afforded an opportunity to immediately appeal the partial

judgment in favor of the Fike Defendants prior to resolution of

the attorney’s fee petition.6

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Although Plaintiffs will now be free to appeal the partial

judgment entered against the Fike Defendants, there is no stay in

effect as to the claims against the remaining defendants. 

Plaintiffs must move those forward with reasonable dispatch.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the partial judgment is

DENIED.

(2) Plaintiffs’ motion for clarification of procedural

issues, construed as a motion for certification under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), is GRANTED.

There is no just reason for delay of entry of final

judgment in favor of the Fike Defendants. The Clerk of

Court is directed to enter final judgment in favor of

the Fike Defendants and against Plaintiffs. This does

not close the case, as there are outstanding claims

against other defendants.

(3) Plaintiffs’ request to delay decision on the Fee

Petition while they attempt to perfect their appeal is

GRANTED. The fee petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

but, should the Fike Defendants’ prevail on appeal, the

fee petition may be re-noticed at that time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00291-AWI -DLB Document 189 Filed 03/29/07 Page 16 of 16