Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05124/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05124-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR M. YEPEZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JOE McGRATH, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 04-5124 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, filed a pro se petition for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed on April 11,

2005, this Court found that the petition stated four cognizable claims under §

2254 and ordered Respondent to show cause. On January 23, 2006, this Court

dismissed the Petition as not fully exhausted. However, this Court found the

Petition to be fully exhausted, and on May 18, 2006 the dismissal was vacated

and the order to show cause reinstated. Respondent filed an answer. Petitioner

has not filed a traverse. This order denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus

on the merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 14, 2001, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an

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information charging Petitioner with one count of murder, Cal. Penal Code § 187,

and one count of attempted murder, Cal. Penal Code § § 187/664(a). The

information alleged that both counts involved use of a firearm, Cal. Penal Code

§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12021.5, subd. (a), and were committed for the benefit of a

street gang, Cal. Penal Code § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).

On May 14, 2002, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted on both

counts. The jury found all the charged enhancements to be true. On June 21,

2002, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 25 years to life plus 12 years for the

murder, and a consecutive life term plus six years for the attempted murder. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal, Sixth

Appellate District. On September 15, 2003, the court affirmed his conviction. 

The California Supreme Court denied review on November 15, 2003. Petitioner

did not pursue collateral challenges in state court. Petitioner filed the instant

matter on December 3, 2004. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Court of Appeals summarized the factual background of the case as

follows:

Defendant was a member of a gang known as the

VTG (Varrio Tami Lee Gang), which was affiliated with the

Surenos. He joined several gang members in a three-car

caravan that set out to find and shoot members of the rival

Norteno gang. The group saw Eduardo Rangel and Roberto

Torres walking toward a convenience store. Torres wore a

red shirt, which ostensibly identified him as a Norteno. 

Defendant's group stopped, exited the vehicles, and

confronted the two victims with knives. The victims ran

away. Defendant shot a gun at Rangel but missed. Several

gang members caught Torres and beat him to the ground. 

Defendant then shot Torres twice. Torres later died.

After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant gave the

police a tape-recorded statement, which essentially attested

to the above. The tape recording was played to the jury over

defendant's objection grounded on the involuntariness of the

confession.

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Fellow gang member Juan Aguilar testified that he

had given defendant a gun just before he and the group set

out to find Nortenos and that defendant had shot at Rangel

and Torres. He also admitted that he had been charged with

murder and attempted murder for his part in the incident but

had later agreed to a plea bargain in which he pleaded guilty

to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for an eight-year

sentence and a promise to give truthful statements and

testimony about the shooting incident. On crossexamination, Aguilar affirmed that, in his mind, if he did not

tell everyone in the courtroom that defendant was the man

responsible for the shooting, the district attorney would take

back the plea agreement.

People v. Yepez, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8751, at 1–3 (Cal. Ct. App.

Sept. 15, 2003) (footnotes omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court

on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

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clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court’s decision

can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that

is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established

legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other grounds;

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-

07). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state

court’s application of governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but

objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per

curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect”

application of law). 

In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks

to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the Petitioner’s

claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000).

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for the

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

In his petition, Petitioner raises four grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner’s

statements to the police should have been suppressed as involuntarily made; (2)

Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately raise the violation of

Petitioner’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (3) the trial

court’s use of the jury instruction CALJIC No. 2.11.5 violated Petitioner’s rights

to due process and a fair trial; and (4) cumulative error. 

DISCUSSION

1. Admission of Petitioner’s Confession

Petitioner alleges that his tape-recorded confession was involuntary, and

that it should have been suppressed by the trial court. Petitioner offers three

arguments: (1) the officers promised that he would help himself and receive a

lesser sentence if he admitted being the gunman; (2) the officers used “deception

and subterfuge” by falsely claiming that Petitioner had already been identified by

civilian witnesses, and that scientific tests had been performed on the gun; and (3)

Petitioner was youthful and unsophisticated in the law. These claims are without

merit. 

Following his arrest and at the start of his custodial interrogation,

Petitioner waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, and agreed

to speak with Police Officers Torres and Brown. Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal

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(“CT”), 210 (Resp’t. Ex. 1(B)). 

Petitioner acknowledged that he was a former member of the VTG gang

and that he had been present at the time of the shootings. CT 210-211. The

officers informed Petitioner that they had a clear idea of what happened because

they “talked to a lot of people,” including non-gang witnesses. Officer Torres

further told Petitioner to be “completely honest with us.” CT 212. This led to the

following exchange:

[Officer Torres]: You need to be man enough to stand up and be

responsible for what occurred. Down the road, believe it or not, it’s

gonna help you. It really will. I’m telling you. Because I mean

there’s some undisputable facts, that no matter what you say. No

matter what lies you say, if you decide to go that route it’s just

gonna look very bad for you. At least if you come clean and say,

‘you know what? I made a mistake. I apologize for what I did. I

was young and dumb’ or whatever the case may be in your mind

but you need to come clean with us. Okay. How did this thing all

start?

[Defendant]: And that’s gonna help me?

[Officer Torres]: It will, yes it will. I have nothing to lose. You

have to trust us.

[Officer Brown]: We already know what happened. We talked to

too many people. More than your homeboys.

[Officer Torres]: Okay. I know right now you’re sitting over there

thinking, ‘oh man, I’m gonna . . . you know, if I tell the truth I’m

fucked.’ Or whatever the case you got, you know, you know.

That’s not the case. Now’s your opportunity . . . like I told you,

now’s your opportunity to tell us your story but tell us the truth.

Okay. Be responsible and tell us, ‘You know what? Hey, I’m [sic]

made a mistake and here is the mistake I made and here’s why I

made that mistake at the time. I apologize for making that mistake.’

Continue on with your life. You’re a young man. You got . . .

[Defendant]: Continue my life in jail?

[Officer Torres]: That’s not, that’s not necessarily true. That is not

true.

[Defendant]: That I did it.

[Officer Brown]: You did what?

[Defendant]: That shooting.

[Officer Brown]: We need to know exactly what happened from

beginning to end. Okay?

[Officer Torres]: It’s hard. I know it is. But you know what,

Detective Brown and I have been doing this for years. We can tell

you you’re gonna feel a lot better once you get this off your chest.

Okay. (inaudible) Why don’t you start and tell us where it started

and what happened? We knew you shot him. There’s no doubt in

my mind. See, that at least shows us that you are at least

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responsible enough to admit. Okay, you shot this guy. Okay. Now

let’s continue to move forward. What happened that day? Where’d

you guys all meet up at?

CT 212-214.

 Petitioner then told them that he and the other VTG members had decided

to look for Norteno gang members to “go throw a show.” CT 238. The officers

inquired about the gun Petitioner used in the shooting, and Petitioner stated that

someone had given him the gun that evening. CT 239. Petitioner eventually

inquired about his possible sentence: 

[Defendant]: How many years am I looking forward to?

[Officer Torres]: Well, you know what? That’s all up to the

courts.

[Defendant]: But what do you think? You know . . . .

[Officer Torres]: Okay, okay, I’ll . . .

[Defendant]: . . . tell me the truth.

[Officer Torres]: I’ll, I’ll be straight up with you. Okay.

Somebody gets convicted of this type of crime, they can do a

minimum of maybe four to seven years up to life in prison and

I’ll tell you what determines where they go. The most important

thing is responsibility, truth and remorse. When I say remorse . . .

feel sorry for what that, what they did. Okay, I’ll give you an

example. If somebody comes in here all together different. Okay?

If somebody come [sic] in here and they stab somebody to death.

Okay and we have witnesses that say, ‘They did it. They did it.’

You know, everything and we know they did it. And that person

says, ‘hey fuck you,’ umm, ‘I don’t know what you’re talking

about.’ And of course all the evidence comes in court and this

person looks like, you know, hey he’s a bad person. Okay. I think

you just made a mistake. It was one mistake that you made and if

you wind up like you say, telling us the truth. You’ll probably

look at the low end of it. I can’t guarantee you that cause I’m not

the judge and I’m not the D.A. All I am, we’re just the

investigators.

[Officer Brown]: See we can’t make you promises like that. We

can tell you what the range of things is but to nail it down to one

thing, we’re not allowed to promise you anything. Straight up.

[Officer Torres]: The only thing I will promise you is that when

we get done here and I talk to the D.A., if you tell us the

complete truth, I’m gonna tell him. I’m gonna go ‘hey listen. Mr.

Yepez was young. He came in, he spoke to us. He told us the

complete truth. He’s responsible for the act and he was truly

sorry for what happened out there.[’] That can only help you

down the road. Okay. So that’s why we’re asking you this [sic]

kind of questions. We know, we know what the answers are

gonna be. As far as the true answer, okay. But this thing, as far as

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trying to uh, slam you or jam you. We’re not trying to do that,

Victor. All we’re trying to do is get the truth. If the courts and the

D.A. say, ‘hey you know what, we’re gonna give this guy four

years, fine. Let them give you four years.’ But you know what

you have to look at Victor is that you’re very young. You have a

long life to live. You have some wonderful kids that you need to

take responsibility for. Okay? So let’s thing [sic] about that.

Think about yourself. Think about your family. Your life’s not

over, Victor. You’re [sic] life’s just starting. There’s some people

out there that don’t have a life anymore. And I can tell by your

reaction that you are sorry for what happened out there. But you

can’t undue [sic] what’s already occurred. Right?

CT 240-242.

During pre-trial hearings, defense filed a motion to exclude Petitioner’s

confession as involuntary. Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (“RT”), 6 (Resp’t.

Ex. 2(A)). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the entire statement

“was not coercive in any fashion.” RT 9. 

On appeal, Petitioner argued that the statements by the officers amounted

to promises of lenient treatment if Petitioner told them about his role in the

shootings. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It found that the officers did not make

any promises to Petitioner, and had in fact affirmatively emphasized that they

could not make any promises. Yepez, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8751 at

*10-11 (2003). Moreover, the court noted that Petitioner acknowledged to the

officers that “You told me that you guys can’t make promises.” Id. at *11.

The court also rejected Petitioner’s claim that the officers engaged in

coercive conduct by painting a false picture of the criminal justice system and

falsely suggesting that Petitioner would earn a four-to-seven year sentence if he

confessed. Id. The court found that Petitioner’s argument was undermined by the

officers’ statement that Petitioner could receive “up to life in prison,” and their

acknowledgment that his cooperation would not earn him a lower-end sentence. 

Id. The court also noted that to the extent that the evidence of voluntariness was

conflicting, the appellate court was required to defer to the trial court’s

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determination that Petitioner’s incriminating statements were voluntary. Id.

The court similarly failed to find any element of coercion in the officers’

claimed deception about the non-gang witnesses and the scientific tests on the

gun. Because it found no causal connection between the confession and the

subterfuge, the court found that Petitioner’s will was not overborne in violation of

the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Id, at *12 (citing Colorado v.

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)). Absent any element of coercion, the court

declined to examine what role Petitioner’s personal characteristics might have had

on the totality of the circumstances. Id.

A. Legal Standard

Involuntary confessions in state criminal cases are inadmissible under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). The

voluntariness of a confession is evaluated by reviewing both the police conduct in

extracting the statements and the effect of that conduct on the suspect. Miller v.

Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985); Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th

Cir. 1999). Absent police misconduct causally related to the confession, there is

no basis for concluding that a confession was involuntary in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (1986); Norman v.

Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1031, and

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1061 (1990).

To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the

effect that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant. 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). “The test is whether,

considering the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the

statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so

that the suspect’s will was overborne.” United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d

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1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14

(1963)). 

A confession is only involuntary if the police use coercive activity to

undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will. Derrick v. Peterson, 924

F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 853 (1991). Personal

characteristics of the defendant are therefore irrelevant absent proof of coercion. 

Id. (citation omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Huynh, 60 F.3d 1386, 1388 (9th

Cir. 1995) (cultural background did not make defendant incapable of free and

voluntary choice). Encouraging a suspect to tell the truth is not coercion. AmayaRuiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1997). Nor is it coercive to recite

potential penalties or sentences, including the potential penalties for lying to the

interviewer. United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The suspect’s age may be taken into account in determining whether a

confession was voluntary. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1015-16 (9th Cir.

2004). However, it is not enough, even in the case of a juvenile, that the police

indicate that a cooperative attitude would be to the benefit of an accused unless

such remarks rise to the level of being threatening or coercive. Juan H. v. Allen,

408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,

727 (1979)).

Voluntariness of a confession is not a factual issue entitled to a

presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but is a legal question

meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Miller

v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 116; Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1991)

(en banc) (federal court not bound by state court finding that confession is

voluntary), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1031 (1992). A federal habeas court must

review de novo the state court’s finding that a confession was voluntarily given. 

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Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d at 818. But a state court’s subsidiary factual

conclusions are entitled to the presumption of correctness. Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d

1434, 1444 (9th Cir. 1996) (deferring to state appellate court's conclusion that

challenged statement did not constitute threat or promise).

The erroneous admission of a coerced confession is subject to harmless

error analysis. Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991). In other

words, habeas relief is appropriate only if the coerced confession had a

“‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’” 

Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

B. Analysis

After examining the record of the interrogation and the resulting

confession, this Court concludes that the police officers’ conduct was not

sufficiently “coercive” such that Petitioner’s will was overborne, rendering the

confession involuntary. See Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d at 1366 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Because Petitioner’s confession was not involuntary, the California Court of

Appeal’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. 

This Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s determination that the officers’

statements about Petitioner’s potential sentence did not have the effect of

overcoming Petitioner’s will was not contrary to or an unreasonable interpretation

of established Supreme Court precedent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

218, 226-27 (1973). At the start of the interview, the officers indicated that the

evidence against Petitioner was strong, that they already had a clear idea of what

happened, and that if he told the truth, it would help him “down the road,” and he

would “feel a lot better.” CT 213, 214. At this stage in the interrogation, the

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officers merely assured Petitioner that he would not “necessarily” spend the rest

of his life in prison. Their assurances were not accompanied by any explicit

promises that Petitioner would receive a more lenient sentence in exchange for his

confession. Merely encouraging a suspect to tell the truth does not amount to

coercion. Amaya-Ruiz, 121 F.3d at 494. 

The subject of potential sentences came up again after Petitioner had

provided more details about his participation in the shooting. Petitioner inquired

about the potential sentence he faced, at which point the officers indicated he

could receive a “minimum of maybe four to seven years up to life in prison,” but

they emphasized that Petitioner’s sentence was “up to the courts.” CT 240. 

Petitioner clearly understood this when he later responded, “You told me that you

guys can’t make promises, right?” CT 283. Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, the

officers’ conduct here does not amount to physical or psychological coercion,

because the officers disclaimed any power to guarantee lenient treatment, and the

discussion of the potential sentence was responsive to Petitioner’s question.

Petitioner further alleges that the officers painted a false picture of the

criminal justice system by suggesting that he would receive a “low-end” sentence

if he accepted responsibility for his actions. However, this interpretation is

undercut by the officers’ simultaneous recognition that they could not guarantee

anything, that they could only indicate “the range of things” and that Petitioner

could still face “up to life in prison.” CT 240-241. Moreover, these statements

were made long after Petitioner had voluntarily incriminated himself. Absent

police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for

concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process

of law. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.

The same analysis attaches to Petitioner’s argument that the officers

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deceived or misled him when they claimed that they had conducted tests on the

gun, and that they had eyewitness identifications from non-gang members. CT

212, 249-251. The Court of Appeal’s determination that there was insufficient

basis to conclude that these statements undermined Petitioner’s ability to exercise

free will is not contrary to established federal law. See Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d

1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Because Petitioner fails to show any basis for concluding that his will was

overborne, his age and lack of sophistication regarding the law have no bearing

on the totality of the circumstances. Personal characteristics of the defendant are

irrelevant absent proof of coercion. Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813, 818 (9th

Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 853 (1991). 

Petitioner also suggests that his rights under Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 were

violated by the admission of the statement. By inference, this argument was

rejected by the Court of Appeal, which noted that Petitioner waived his Miranda

rights without suggesting that this waiver was invalid. This Court finds that

Petitioner was properly advised of his Miranda rights prior to the interrogation,

and that his waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Miranda 384

U.S. at 475. Therefore, the admission of the statement did not violate Petitioner’s

constitutional rights under Miranda. 

After reviewing the evidence and considering the totality of the

circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that the confession was produced by

“physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the

suspect’s will was overborne.” Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d at 1366 (9th Cir. 1988)

(citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963)). The confession was

produced by legitimate police interrogation techniques which were far from

physically or psychologically coercive.

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Nor can this Court conclude that the admission of the statement constituted

a violation of Miranda. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s determination that the

statement was properly admitted was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court. 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner argues in the alternative that if his trial counsel failed to

specifically move to suppress the confession on the grounds Petitioner raises here,

and that his trial counsel’s error deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. 

This argument was raised and implicitly rejected by the state appellate court on

direct appeal, which decided the merits of Petitioner’s claims regarding the

voluntariness of his confession. This decision was not unreasonable, and

therefore this Court has no reason to find that Petitioner’s trial counsel was

ineffective.

A. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). See Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). In order to prevail on a Sixth

Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner must establish two

things. First, Petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient

and fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing

professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, Petitioner must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance and that

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel

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claims is considered to be “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

analysis. See Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000).

B. Analysis

A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the

alleged deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52

F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996).

This Court finds that Petitioner’s confession was voluntary for purposes of

the 14th Amendment, and that there was no violation of Petitioner’s Miranda

rights. The trial court similarly found that the statement was not coerced. RT 9. 

Any failure by Petitioner’s trial counsel to raise a constitutional challenge to the

confession would have been harmless under the prejudice prong of Strickland,

because it would not have been reasonable to expect the trial court to grant the

motion. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-374 (1986) (no prejudice

where trial court would have been unreasonable to grant motion to suppress

evidence), Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (to show prejudice

under Strickland for failure to file motion, petitioner must show that (1) had his

counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable that the trial court would have granted it

as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that there

would have been an outcome more favorable to him.)

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel was not contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

3. Instructional Error

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in giving CALJIC No. 2.11.5,

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which instructs the jury that they are not to give any consideration to the fact that

other involved persons are not being tried for the charged crime. Petitioner

contends that this instruction prevented the jury from taking into account the

possibility that Juan Aguilar’s favorable plea agreement influenced his testimony. 

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s error deprived him of his right to due

process and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Because this Court finds that the instruction did not violate Petitioner’s federal

constitutional rights, the Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply federal law

when it found that the instruction was proper. 

The instruction was presented to the jury as follows:

There has been evidence in this case indicating that a person other

than defendant was or may have been involved in the crime for

which the defendant is on trial. 

There may be many reasons why that person is not here on trial.

Therefore, do not discuss or give any consideration as to why the

other person is not being prosecuted in this trial or whether he has

been or will be prosecuted. Your sole duty is to decide whether the

People have proved the guilt of the defendant on trial.

CALJIC No. 2.11.5, RT 599-9 (Resp’t. Ex. 2(C)). The California Court of

Appeal found that the instruction was not erroneous for two reasons. 

First, the instruction was not relevant to Aguilar’s testimony, because it

only relates to non-prosecuted witnesses, and the jury knew that Aguilar had been

prosecuted for his involvement in the crime. Yepez, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub.

LEXIS 8751, at *13-14. The Court of Appeal held:

Courts should not give CALJIC No. 2.11.5 in an unmodified

form when ‘a person who might have been prosecuted for the

crime has testified at trial.’ [Citations.] This rule follows because

‘the purpose of the challenged instruction is to discourage the jury

from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution's reasons for not

jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have

participated in the perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to

discourage speculation about the eventual fates of unjoined

perpetrators.’ [Citations.] Thus, the instruction ‘“should not be

given when a nonprosecuted participant testifies because the jury is

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entitled to consider the lack of prosecution in assessing the

witness's credibility.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]

Id. Because the jury was informed that Aguilar had received a plea bargain, the

instruction did not logically apply to his testimony. Id.

Second, the jury received the full panoply of witness credibility and

accomplice instructions, which under California law ameliorates the impact of the

instruction, even where it has been given in error. The Court of Appeal held:

Here, the trial court gave proper instructions that in

assessing the credibility of a witness the jury could consider the

existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive and

the witness’ prior conviction of a felony. (CALJIC No. 2.20.) It

also instructed that the fact that a witness has been convicted of a

felony may be considered for the purpose of determining the

credibility of the witness. (CALJIC No. 2.23.) And it finally told

the jury that the testimony of an accomplice should be viewed with

caution. (CALJIC No. 3.18.)

Id. at *16. In light of the totality of the instructions, the defense was free to refer 

to the plea agreement in attacking Aguilar’s credibility; in fact defense counsel

did make such a claim during closing arguments. Therefore, the Court of Appeal

found that the trial court did not err by giving CALJIC No. 2.11.5.

A. Legal Standard

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not

state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors

in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Id. at

72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“‘[I]t must be established not merely

that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even “universally condemned,”

but that it violated some [constitutional right].’”). 

The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be

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considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions

in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v.

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988).

In reviewing a challenged instruction, the inquiry is not how reasonable

jurors could or would have understood the instruction as a whole; rather, the court

must inquire whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury has applied

the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72 & n.4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); see, e.g., Ficklin

v. Hatcher, 177 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (harmless error when certain

that jury did not rely on constitutionally infirm instruction). A determination that

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction

in a way that violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred,

however. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). 

If an error is found, the court also must determine that the error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, see

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), before granting relief in habeas

proceedings. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. at 146-47. In other words, state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief may obtain plenary review of

constitutional claims of trial error, but are not entitled to habeas relief unless the

error resulted in “actual prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted); see, e.g., Coleman v.

Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Analysis

Reading CALJIC No. 2.11.5 in conjunction with the other instructions

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given at Petitioner’s trial, this Court cannot conclude that there was a reasonable

likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violated Petitioner’s

due process rights under the Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 & n.4; Boyde,

494 U.S. at 380.

As the Court of Appeal pointed out, the jury was fully instructed that it

could consider a witness’s bias, interest or motive in evaluating his credibility

(CALJIC No. 2.20), as well as any prior felony convictions (CALJIC No. 2.23). 

Moreover, they were instructed that accomplice testimony was to be viewed with

caution, and was subject to the rule requiring corroboration (CALJIC Nos. 3.18,

3.16). RT 599-9, -11, -22. 

In light of these other instructions, CALJIC No. 2.11.5 properly informed

the jury that they were not to speculate about the possible reasons why other

participants were not prosecuted; however, there is no reasonable likelihood that

the instruction misled the jury into discounting Aguilar’s plea agreement when

evaluating his bias or credibility. See Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 996 (9th

Cir. 2005) (giving CALJIC No. 2.11.5 harmless error given the totality of the

instructions). Thus, the court’s use of the challenged instruction did not render the

trial fundamentally unfair so as to violate due process.

Nor can this Court conclude that any alleged error in the instruction would

have been serious enough to affect the outcome of the trial. Therefore, considering

all of the instructions as a whole, the alleged instructional error did not have a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence” in determining the jury’s verdict. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

Because the challenged instruction did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional

rights, the Court of Appeal’s adjudication of this issue was neither contrary to, nor

involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

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4. Cumulative Error

Petitioner alleges that his convictions should be reversed based on the

cumulative effect of the various errors alleged above. This argument was

implicitly dismissed by the Court of Appeal, when it rejected each of Petitioner’s

claims of trial court error. Similarly, because this Court concludes that Petitioner’s

constitutional rights were not violated by any of the alleged errors, there was no

prejudice to Petitioner, cumulative or otherwise.

A. Legal Standard

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to

warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a

defendant so much that his conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v.

Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where

multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to challenge every

important element of proof offered by prosecution).

Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when the

government’s case is weak. See id.; see, e.g., Thomas, 273 F.3d. at 1180 (noting

that the only substantial evidence implicating the defendant was the

uncorroborated testimony of a person who had both a motive and an opportunity to

commit the crime); Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 961-62, 968 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 464 U.S. 951 (1983). However, where there is no single constitutional

error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. 

See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Fuller v. Roe, 182

F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996).

B. Analysis

Petitioner has failed to make a showing that the state courts committed error

in denying his claims regarding the trial court’s admission of the videotaped

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confession or its use of the challenged jury instruction. Any potential errors were

deemed by this Court to be harmless. Accordingly, there is no single

constitutional error which could have accumulated to the level of a constitutional

violation. Petitioner’s case was not one of the rare cases in which cumulative

errors denied him a fair trial. Cf. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d at 893-95. The

state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s cumulative prejudice claim was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, governing law. 

CONCLUSION

The court is satisfied that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on his federal claims. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2007

 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YEPEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOE McGRATH, Warden,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV04-05124 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 25, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Nancy Hsiao-Hui Tung

Peggy S. Ruffra

CA State Attorney’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Victor M. Yepez

T58557

CSP High Desert

P.O. Box 3030 D5-129

Susanville, CA 96127

Dated: October 25, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:04-cv-05124-JSW Document 14 Filed 10/25/07 Page 22 of 22