Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905-75/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF

E-filed: 3/10/2008 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR U.K. LTD., and

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

DEUTSCHLAND GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAMBUS INC.,

Defendant.

No. CV-00-20905 RMW

ORDER DENYING THE

MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION

REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY

DESIGNATIONS

[Re Docket No. 3340]

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For the Northern District of California

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1 For purposes of this order, the court collectively refers to the Hynix, Micron, and Nanya entities as "the

Manufacturers."

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 2

 RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC., 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P., 

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

U.S.A.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-00334 RMW

[Re Docket No. 1381]

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., and

MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,

INC.

Defendants.

No. C-06-00244 RMW

[Re Docket No. 988]

The Manufacturers1

 have rested their case-in-chief in these three consolidated cases in which

they are seeking to prove that Rambus monopolized or attempted to monopolize six technology

markets by enforcing patents covering products containing features complying with standards

adopted by JEDEC, a standard setting organization. The technology markets cover various

technologies essential for making DRAMs. The Manufacturers have also alleged that Rambus

committed fraud based on its actions and statements while JEDEC was developing standards for

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2 The litigation has not been confined to this court, or to these specific DRAM manufacturers. When the

court consolidated these cases, the court defined a list of eleven "Rambus Related Actions" from across the country. The

eleven actions defined as "Rambus Related Actions" in the Joint Case Management Order are:

1. Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., et al.; Samsung Electronics Co., et al.; and Nanya

Technology Corporation, et al., Case No. C 05-00334 RMW in the District Court for the

Northern District of California;

2. Rambus Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., et al., Case No. C 05-02298 RMW in the District

Court for the Northern District of California;

3. Rambus Inc. v. Micron Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. C 05-00244 RMW in the District

Court for the Northern District of California;

4. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., et al. v. Rambus Inc., Case No. C 00-20905 RMW in the District

Court for the Northern District of California;

5. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, et al., Case No. 3:00CV524 in the District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia;

6. Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., Case No. 00-792-JJF in the District Court for the

District of Delaware;

7. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. et al v. Rambus Inc., Court of Chancery of the State of

Delaware, Case No. 1454-N;

8. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. et al v. Rambus Inc. Case No. 3:05-cv-00406-REP in the

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia;

9. Alberta Telecommunications Research Centre v. Rambus Inc., U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of California, Case No. C-06-02595;

10. Rambus Inc. v. Micron Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 04-431105 in the Superior Court

of the State of California; and

11. In the Matter of Rambus Inc., Docket No. 9302 before the Federal Trade Commission.

See Joint Case Management Order, C-00-20905-RMW, Docket No. 2555, at Attachment E (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2007)

(hereinafter "JCMO"). An identical joint case management order was entered in C-05-00334 and C-06-00244.

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 3

commodity memory chips.

Rambus has begun to present its defense. After its first witness finishes his testimony,

Rambus seeks to play or read portions of the deposition testimony of a number of third party

witnesses beyond the court's subpoena power, namely Willibald Meyer, Kevin Kilbuck, and Howard

Kalter. The Manufacturers object, arguing that such prior testimony is inadmissible hearsay. The

court has reviewed the papers and considered the arguments of counsel. For the following reasons,

the court denies the Manufacturers' motion that all the testimony is inadmissible hearsay.

I. CASE MANAGEMENT BACKGROUND

 On April 4, 2007, the court held a case management conference regarding consolidating

discovery and trial in the Rambus matters before this court.2

 The hearing began at two o'clock and

ran for an hour and a half, at which point the court took a recess to allow the parties to meet and

confer for about an hour. The process produced a case management schedule, but it did not produce

agreement regarding discovery. The parties "really only talked about depositions" and could not

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3 The difference between Rambus's proposal and the court's order is that the court imposed a production

deadline of May 8, 2007.

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C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 4

reach agreement about limits on deposition discovery. Tr. 74:2-7 (Apr. 4, 2007). The parties

therefore proposed to submit competing proposals regarding discovery management. Id. 74:11-75:1;

76:21-77:2.

The court received the parties' competing proposals, including proposals regarding discovery

protocols, with each side's comments on the other side's proposals. E.g., [PROPOSED] Joint Case

Management Order, C-00-20905-RMW, Docket No. 2550, at 9-19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2007)

(hereinafter "Proposed JCMO"). The court adopted some of each side's suggestions and issued the

case management order five days later. Two provisions of the court's case management order were

based on two of Rambus's proposals regarding the cross-use of discovery materials:

(2) All depositions or other sworn testimony in the Rambus Related Actions may

be used by any party in the Rambus NDCal Cases as if taken in each of the

Rambus NDCal Cases. A party shall be allowed to take a further deposition

with respect to new issues with which it is concerned. A party shall not

repeat prior lines of questioning of a deponent.

(3) To facilitate the provisions of Paragraph (b)(2), each Party is ordered to

produce by May 8, 2007 transcripts and deposition exhibits for all

non-privileged prior depositions or other sworn testimony of its current or

former officers or employees as well as all depositions of its experts in the

Rambus Related Cases. For testimony from witnesses not affiliated with any

party to the Rambus NDCal Cases (i.e., third parties), the parties shall meet

and confer to promptly agree upon a process for disseminating transcripts of

such third-party testimony to parties not in possession of those transcripts.

Compare id. at 10 with JCMO, ¶¶ 5(b)(2)-(3).3

 Paragraph (2), the focus of the current controversy,

requires the parties to treat all prior testimony "as if taken" in the cases before this court. The court

adopted this "cross-use provision" to minimize the expense and unnecessary repetition of

depositions.

Rambus's statement in support of its proposal did not specifically refer to the cross-use

provision, but it did mention it. Rambus's statement expressed concern that if depositions being

taken in cases before other courts were not counted against the discovery limits in this case, the

limits would be meaningless because the deposition transcripts would be useable in this case. 

Specifically, Rambus said:

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 5

Third, the parties disagree regarding whether depositions taken in San Francisco

Superior Court, the District of Delaware, or the Chancery Court in Delaware on

issues found in the 05-06 Cases should count against the deposition time allocated

for the 05-06 Cases. Rambus urges the Court to find that this “Other Rambus Cases”

deposition time be counted against the Manufacturers’ 125 hour limit. Without such

a provision, the discovery limits set here could be rendered meaningless if the

Manufacturers choose to proceed with discovery of Rambus witnesses in one of the

Other Rambus Cases on claims or defenses pending in the 05-06 Cases, following

which the transcript will be useable in the 05-06 Cases pursuant to the

provisions herein.

Proposed JCMO, at 15-16 (italics in original, bold added).

The Manufacturers' proposal regarding depositions did not include the "cross-use" provision

contained in Rambus's proposal. See id. at 16-17. The proposal did include a number of the same

limits on deposition discovery proposed by Rambus, including recommending that "No witness

previously deposed by Rambus or any Manufacturer may be examined on matters already covered in

the prior deposition(s)." Id. at 17 (emphasis added); compare with JCMO at ¶ 5(b)(2). The

Manufacturers' proposal also required the parties to share all third-party deposition transcripts and

trial testimony within 10 days. Id., compare with JCMO ¶ 5(b)(3).

In their comments on Rambus's proposal regarding how depositions being taken in other

cases would be treated, the Manufacturers voiced no objection to a cross-use provision, despite the

provision being set off from other text in Rambus's proposal and being referenced in Rambus's

comments on deducting deposition time used in related actions. The Manufacturers did object to the 

deduction proposal, noting, "Additionally, under Rambus’s proposal, depositions taken in

completely different cases, in which some Manufacturers are not even parties and which are not

coordinated with the NDCal Rambus Cases, would count against the Manufacturers’ deposition time

in this case." Id. at 19 (emphasis in original). While the Manufacturers objected to how depositions

in related litigation would be accounted for, they did not raise an objection to the use of those

depositions in this case. They also included in their proposal that a witness could not be examined

on a matter already covered. 

II. THE USE OF PRIOR TESTIMONY AT TRIAL

Rambus has disclosed its intent to play or read portions of the depositions of Willibald

Meyer, Kevin Kilbuck, and Howard Kalter. The Manufacturers object, and move for an order

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28 4 See Tr. 3922:24-3923:5; 3925:22-3927:12.

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 6

barring Rambus from using such testimony at trial because it is inadmissible hearsay under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 32 and Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).

A. The Legal Effect of the Joint Case Management Order

The Manufacturers acknowledge the terms of the Joint Case Management Order, but argue

that the provision stating that "[a]ll depositions or other sworn testimony in the Rambus Related

Actions may be used by any party in the Rambus NDCal Cases as if taken in each of the Rambus

NDCal Cases" is "for discovery purposes only." However, treating all prior depositions as if taken

in the current cases for "discovery purposes only" does not make sense. The provision, under the

heading "Cross-Use of Discovery," is plainly intended to permit the parties to make joint use of prior

testimony at trial to reduce expenses in this sprawling litigation by obviating the need to depose

various witnesses again. Indeed, both parties proposed, and the court ordered, that no witness be

reexamined on prior lines of questioning. This bar on reexamination would be unworkable (and

mischievous) if a witness could not be reexamined on a particular subject because previously

deposed in a related action on that subject but then the testimony could not be used at trial. 

Tellingly, the Manufacturers do not explain what conceivable purpose would be served by limiting

paragraph 5(b)(2) to "discovery purposes only."4

 The plain text of the case management order is

clear — "All depositions or other sworn testimony in the Rambus Related Actions may be used by

any party in the Rambus NDCal Cases as if taken in each of the Rambus NDCal Cases."

Given the plain meaning of the case management order, the Manufacturers next argue that

the court's case management order cannot trump the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that because

none of the Manufacturers were present for the testimony of Mr. Meyer (only Micron was present

for Kilbuck and Halter's), the testimony is inadmissible hearsay. See FRE 804(b)(1). Before

addressing this issue, the court notes that relying on testimony from prior proceedings as a method

of reducing discovery costs and delay is expressly contemplated and endorsed. See FEDERAL

JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION FOURTH § 11.455 (4th ed. 2004) ("Parties in

related cases may also stipulate to the use of depositions taken in one particular case."). The Manual

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5 The Manufacturers' presumably became aware of Rambus's intent to use the prior testimony no later than

when the parties exchanged designations on January 4, 2008. See Docket No. 565, C-06-00244-RMW, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Dec.

19, 2007). In reviewing the record, the court has noticed that the Manufacturers did lodge an "overriding objection" to

Rambus's use of this prior testimony when filing their objections and counterdesignations regarding Rambus's deposition

designations. See, e.g., Docket No. 692, C-06-00244-RMW, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008). The Manufacturers did not

apprise the court of this fermenting issue at any of the pretrial conferences held on January 17, 2008, January 22, 2008,

January 29, 2008, or at any point in the trial before now.

6 While emphasizing that whether "good cause" exists to modify the terms of a case management order turns

on the diligence of the party requesting modification, the Ninth Circuit noted that "the existence or degree of prejudice to

the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion." Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. Needless

to say, preventing Rambus from presenting the bulk of its case now that the Manufacturers have rested constitutes extreme

prejudice. One of Rambus's arguments is that third party JEDEC members had notice of the scope of Rambus's patent claims.

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 7

for Complex Litigation urges that in dealing with new parties, courts should "institut[e] procedures

to facilitate the use of depositions against similarly situated parties later added to the litigation" and

that "discovery that has already been competently conducted need not be reopened for later-added

parties, absent a showing of specific need." See id. § 22.84.

As detailed above, the court held a lengthy case management conference and received

competing case management proposals (which included each side's objections and comments on the

other side's proposals). The Manufacturers voiced no objection to the use of prior testimony in these

actions. Since the court entered the case management order almost eleven months ago, the

Manufacturers have raised no objection regarding the language in the case management order

permitting the use of depositions from the Related Rambus Actions in these cases. Rambus,

presumably relying on the plain text of the case management order, did not renotice the depositions

of Messrs. Meyer, Kilbuck, and Halter and elected to rely on their transcripts to present its case. 

Only now, at the beginning of Rambus's case, do the Manufacturers object to the use of prior

testimony as though it were taken in these cases.5

In Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992), the trial court's

scheduling order imposed a deadline for joining additional parties. Id. at 606-07. The Ninth Circuit

held that once the deadline has passed, the plaintiff could only join an additional defendant by

showing "good cause" to modify the scheduling order, and that "the focus of the ["good cause"]

inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent,

the inquiry should end." Id. at 610 (internal citation omitted).6

 In applying the "good cause" inquiry

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This evidence is vital to Rambus's defense in two ways: (1) those third parties' failure to disclose this information tends to

negate the broad disclosure duty urged by the Manufacturers, and (2) tends to negate that JEDEC as an organization was

defrauded by Rambus's conduct. Rambus has indicated its desire to introduce prior testimony of employees from Toshiba

(Kilbuck), Siemens/Infineon/Qimonda (Meyer), IBM (Kalter) and various Samsung employees. This substantial prejudice

to Rambus is an independent ground for finding a lack of good cause to modify the court's case management order.

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 8

described, the court rejected the argument that Rule 15's liberal provisions for amending a pleading

should apply. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 607-08. To be clear, "[o]nce the district court had filed a

pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 which established a

timetable for amending pleadings that rule's standards controlled." Id. In this case, the court filed a

Rule 16 case management order to deal with the myriad complexities of this litigation, and in so

doing, issued an order under Rule 16 that may conflict with Rule 32 and FRE 804(b)(1). 

Nonetheless, once a Rule 16 scheduling order is in place, it "shall control the subsequent course of

the action" unless modified for good cause. Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d

1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002). While an alleged violation of another provision of the federal rules

might warrant relief from the case management order, the sine qua non of relief from prejudice

caused by a case management order is diligence. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610.

Further authority allowing a case management order to govern in place of a federal rule

exists specific to the use of deposition testimony under Rule 804(b)(1). Manley v. AmBase Corp.,

337 F.3d 237, 248 (2d Cir. 2003). In Manley, the witness had been deposed twice: once in

discovery, and once again de bene esse. Id. at 246-47. The court affirmed the district court's ruling

forbidding a party from using the earlier, discovery deposition testimony (which was theoretically

admissible under Rule 804(b)(1)) because of the court had ordered the parties to use only testimony

developed at the later deposition de bene esse. Id. at 248.

Against the backdrop of the Manufacturers' silence and Rambus's presumed reliance

described above (and the general concerns discussed below), the court believes that the

Manufacturers have failed to be diligent in seeking relief from the case management order, failed to

show good cause to modify the court's scheduling order and have waived any objections to the

cross-use provision.

Finally, at a hearing during the trial proceedings, the Manufacturers suggested that their lack

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7 The court has the utmost faith in Mr. Nissly's personal representation that he did not notice the implication

of the cross-use provision. Nonetheless, in effectively managing cases, a court must be mindful of the potential for

opportunism. When faced with a provision in a case management order that raises evidentiary issues, a litigant could wait

until trial to voice a concern that a provision in the order that the parties have relied upon violates principles of evidence law.

If the objection were successful, this tactic would hamstring the opposing party's ability to put on its case or indefinitely delay

trial (possibly forcing a retrial) while discovery was reopened. Indeed, if such a tactic were successful, it would incentivize

not disclosing weaknesses in a case management order in the hope of gaining an advantage at trial. 

Courts receive the behavior they encourage. In the interest of encouraging prompt disclosure of case management

concerns and the efficient use of resources and discouraging the gamesmanship described above, a court must hew to its case

management order to ensure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 

ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 9

of a prior objection was due to an oversight.

The court: Why then, didn't you, at the time that it was discussed at the case

management conference say, hey, wait a minute, we can't agree to

have these depositions be utilized in this case because we can't take

a further deposition [of the foreign witnesses]?

Mr. Nissly I don't think anybody looked – honestly, I don't think anybody looked

down the road that far to perceive that Rambus would pick up these

depositions from another case where we hadn't had a chance to

participate and say, well, now that these people are in a position

where you can't get to them again to take their further depositions,

now we get to use that.

Tr. at 3925:8-20 (Mar. 3, 2008). On this point, the court is not sympathetic. In complex litigation, a

case management order is the case's constitution; it is the single most important document governing

the conduct of the parties. Cf. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION

FOURTH § 11.212 (4th ed. 2004) ("Scheduling orders are a critical element of case management."). 

Failing to review the case management order's plain text, consider the order's implications, or raise a

timely objection ensures later chaos. To be sure, had the Manufacturers voiced their concerns at any

point during discovery, or apprised the court of their concern before trial began, the issue could have

been addressed. At this point, however, the court considers any objection to the provision of the

order treating some depositions as though they were taken in this case waived and the Manufacturers

have not shown good cause for relief.7

B. Substantial Compliance with FRE 804(b)(1)

In the circumstances of this case, the use of the former testimony is in substantial compliance

with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). That section allows the use of former trial or deposition

testimony of an unavailable witness if a "predecessor in interest" of the party against whom the

testimony is offered had a similar opportunity and motive to develop the testimony. Here, the

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8 The Ninth Circuit has not decided this issue. See Hub v. Sun Valley Co., 682 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1982)

("We too believe that the two lawsuits needs not involve identical issues and parties, though we reserve for another day

deciding whether the presence of an adversary with the same motive to cross-examine is sufficient.").

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witnesses are unavailable. The question then is whether Infineon and Micron and the FTC can be

considered "predecessors in interest" with similar motives and opportunities to develop the

testimony as the Manufacturers' motives in the current consolidated cases. The modern test does not

require privity between the current party and the party who participated in the prior proceeding. "A

previous party having like motive to develop the testimony about the same material facts is a

predecessor in interest to the present party [citations omitted]—'privity is not the gravamen of (Rule

804(b)(1)) analysis.'" Jones, Rosen, Wegner & Jones, RUTTER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL

CIVIL TRIALS & EVIDENCE ¶ 8:3061(The Rutter Group 2007).8 Instead of a formalistic privity-based

test of whether a party is a "predecessor in interest," the test is "inherently factual" and depends on

the similarity of issues and context of questioning. Id. ¶ 8:3067.

With respect to Mr. Kalter and Mr. Kilbuck, the issues and motives were identical. Rambus,

Micron, and the FTC were deposing third-party witnesses regarding Rambus's conduct at JEDEC. 

Since the witnesses were under the control of none of the parties, each side had a motive to fully

develop his testimony in the deposition.

With respect to Mr. Meyer, the issues remained identical – Infineon was seeking testimony

regarding Rambus's conduct at JEDEC. At trial, Infineon had every incentive to examine him

thoroughly. His depositions raise a closer issue. Because Mr. Meyer was under Infineon's control

(as an employee), Infineon had a reduced motive to thoroughly cross-examine him in deposition

because it could presumably compel him to testify at trial as well as question him outside the

deposition context. Nonetheless, a party's failure to cross-examine in a discovery deposition is "a

strategic choice and does not preclude his adversary's use of the deposition at a subsequent

proceeding." Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985) (Tjoflat,

J.). While Infineon was likely less vigorous in cross-examining Mr. Meyer in his discovery

depositions, that does not bar the transcripts' use at trial.

Further, the court gave the Manufacturers the opportunity to further question the witnesses if

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

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TSF 11

they felt that there were new issues with which they were concerned. See JCMO, ¶ 5(b)(2) ("A party

shall be allowed to take a further deposition with respect to new issues with which it is concerned."). 

Therefore, not only were the Manufacturers' interests protected by Infineon, Micron and the FTC,

the Manufacturers were given the opportunity to do further questioning themselves. The court finds

that the purposes behind the requirements of Rule 804(b)(1) were met and the Manufacturers'

hearsay objection to use of the witnesses' former testimony is overruled.

III. ORDER

Accordingly, the court denies the Manufacturers' motion to exclude prior testimony from the

Rambus Related Actions because the Manufacturers have failed to show good cause to modify the

court's case management order, which provided that "[a]ll depositions or other sworn testimony in

the Rambus Related Actions may be used by any party in the Rambus NDCal Cases as if taken in

each of the Rambus NDCal Cases." Obviously, Rambus must still demonstrate that any prior

testimony it seeks to introduce is relevant and satisfy that court that such evidence is not

substantially more prejudicial than probative.

DATED: 3/9/2008 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 3437 Filed 03/10/08 Page 11 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

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TSF 12

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Rambus Inc., all actions Counsel for Hynix entities, C-00-20905 and C-05-00334

Burton Alexander

Gross

Burton.Gross@mto.com Allen Ruby ruby@allenrubylaw.com

Carolyn Hoecker

Luedtke

carolyn.luedtke@mto.com Belinda Martinez Vega bvega@omm.com

Catherine Rajwani crajwani@sidley.com Daniel J. Furniss djfurniss@townsend.com

Craig N. Tolliver ctolliver@mckoolsmith.com Geoffrey Hurndall Yost gyost@thelenreid.com

David C. Yang david.yang@mto.com Jordan Trent Jones jtjones@townsend.com

Douglas A. Cawley dcawley@mckoolsmith.com Joseph A. Greco jagreco@townsend.com

Erin C. Dougherty erin.dougherty@mto.com Kenneth Lee Nissly kennissly@thelenreid.com

Gregory P. Stone gregory.stone@mto.com Kenneth Ryan

O'Rourke 

korourke@omm.com

Jennifer Lynn Polse jen.polse@mto.com Patrick Lynch plynch@omm.com

Keith Rhoderic Dhu

Hamilton, II

keith.hamilton@mto.com Susan Gregory

VanKeulen 

svankeulen@thelenreid.com

Kelly Max Klaus kelly.klaus@mto.com Theodore G. Brown, III tgbrown@townsend.com

Miriam Kim Miriam.Kim@mto.com Tomomi Katherine

Harkey 

tharkey@thelen.com

Peter A. Detre detrepa@mto.com Counsel for Micron entities, C-06-00244

Pierre J. Hubert phubert@mckoolsmith.com Aaron Bennett Craig aaroncraig@quinnemanuel.com

Rosemarie Theresa

Ring

rose.ring@mto.com David J. Ruderman davidruderman@quinnemanuel.co

m

Scott L Cole scole@mckoolsmith.com Harold Avrum Barza halbarza@quinnemanuel.com

Scott W. Hejny shejny@sidley.com Jared Bobrow jared.bobrow@weil.com

Sean Eskovitz sean.eskovitz@mto.com John D Beynon john.beynon@weil.com

Steven McCall

Perry 

steven.perry@mto.com Leeron Kalay leeron.kalay@weil.com

Thomas N Tarnay ttarnay@sidley.com Linda Jane Brewer lindabrewer@quinnemanuel.com

William Hans

Baumgartner, Jr

wbaumgartner@sidley.com Rachael Lynn Ballard

McCracken

rachaelmccracken@quinnemanuel.

com

Robert Jason Becher robertbecher@quinnemanuel.com

Yonaton M

Rosenzweig 

yonirosenzweig@quinnemanuel.co

m

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 3437 Filed 03/10/08 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING THE MANUFACTURERS' TRIAL MOTION REGARDING PRIOR TESTIMONY DESIGNATIONS

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TSF 13

Counsel for Nanya entities, C-05-00334 Counsel for Samsung entities, C-05-00334 and C-05-

02298

Chester Wren-Ming Day cday@orrick.com Ana Elena Kadala anita.kadala@weil.com

Craig R. Kaufman ckaufman@orrick.co

m

Claire Elise Goldstein claire.goldstein@weil.com

Glenn Michael Levy glevy@orrick.com David J. Healey david.healey@weil.com

Jan Ellen Ellard jellard@orrick.com Edward Robert Reines Edward.Reines@weil.com

Jason Sheffield Angell jangell@orrick.com Matthew D. Powers matthew.powers@weil.com

Kaiwen Tseng ktseng@orrick.com 

Mark Shean mshean@orrick.com

Robert E. Freitas rfreitas@orrick.com

Vickie L. Feeman vfeeman@orrick.com

Counsel for intervenor, Texas Instruments, Inc., C-05-00334

Kelli A. Crouch kcrouch@jonesday.com

Counsel for intervenor, United States Department of Justice, C-00-20905

Eugene S. Litvinoff eugene.litvinoff@usdoj.gov

May Lee Heye may.heye@usdoj.gov

Nathanael M. Cousins nat.cousins@usdoj.gov

Niall Edmund Lynch Niall.Lynch@USDOJ.GOV

Counsel for intervenor, Elpida Memory, Inc., C-00-20905 and C-05-00334

Eric R. Lamison elamison@kirkland.com

John J. Feldhaus jfeldhaus@foley.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program in each action.

Dated: 3/10/08 TSF

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 3437 Filed 03/10/08 Page 13 of 13