Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05004/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05004-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 1997 Decided March 27, 1998

No. 97-5004

WALTER J. THOMAS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

v.

MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

Consolidated with 

97-5018

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 86cv02850)

Cynthia A. Schnedar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellant/cross-appellee, with whom Mary Lou 

Leary, U.S. Attorney at the time the briefs were filed, John 

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D. Bates, R. Craig Lawrence, and John Oliver Birch, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the briefs.

Barbara B. Hutchinson argued the cause for appellees/cross-appellants Walter J. Thomas, et al., with whom 

Theresa L. Watson was on the briefs.

Avis E. Buchanan, argued the cause for amicus curiae 

plaintiff class, with whom Warren E. Connelly, Charles L. 

Warren, Richard P. Schlegel, and Joseph M. Sellers were on 

the briefs.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, GINSBURG, Circuit Judge,

and BUCKLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: This is a Title VII class action in 

which the plaintiffs allege that the United States Department 

of State discriminated against African-American Foreign Service Officers. The Department and a group of nine class 

members separately appeal from the district court's approval 

of the class settlement. The Department appeals the district 

court's decision to permit class members to opt out of the 

class settlement. The nine cross-appellants challenge the 

district court's approval of the consent decree as fair and 

reasonable. We affirm the district court's decision that the 

consent decree is fair and reasonable, but reverse its decision 

allowing opt-outs.

I. Background

In 1984 Walter J. Thomas, a former Foreign Service Officer, filed an administrative complaint on behalf of himself and 

other African-American FSOs, alleging racial discrimination 

in the Department's employment practices. In 1986, after 

the Department had rejected Thomas' complaint, he and 

another former FSO filed a class action complaint in district 

court alleging that the Department engaged in racially discriminatory employment practices and retaliated against 

those who complained about them. Thomas v. Christopher,

169 F.R.D. 224, 229 (D.D.C. 1996).

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The plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The court denied their 

motion but permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint adding several more plaintiffs. The parties conducted 

discovery for six years and, beginning in 1993, engaged in 

settlement negotiations, eventually under the supervision of a 

magistrate judge. In 1994 the plaintiffs filed another motion 

for class certification, in which they contended that although 

their class could be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), "it is 

more appropriately maintained as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action." The court deferred ruling upon this motion pending 

the outcome of the settlement negotiations.

In 1995 the parties reached a settlement in principle, and in 

January 1996 they signed a consent decree. The consent 

decree "resolves all claims that were or could have been 

brought" by African-American FSOs between 1984 and 1996 

based upon racial discrimination in promotions, awards, tenuring, termination, performance reviews, assignments, and 

training, or upon retaliation for complaining about such discrimination. The parties agreed that the court would certify 

the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).

The consent decree provided for the following relief:

(1) Monetary ReliefThe Department agreed to pay a 

total of $3.8 million, to be allocated as follows: (a) $125,000 

for the named plaintiffs ($40,000 to Thomas for "his leadership and coordinating role" and $85,000 divided equally 

among the 29 other named plaintiffs); (b) $2.9 million for 

those who experienced delays in and denials of promotions, to 

be allocated upon the basis of a formula specified in the 

consent decree, but not to class members who would receive a 

promotion under the consent decree or who had been promoted at the same rate as white employees; and (c) $775,000 for 

class members who had been terminated, of which at least 

$200,000 was to be distributed formulaically to those who 

were either terminated for unsatisfactory performance or 

constructively discharged, and up to $575,000 of which was 

reserved for a maximum of four recipients to be chosen upon 

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nation and the degree of economic hardship they had suffered.

(2) PromotionsThe Department agreed to give retroactive promotions to the 16 mid-level class members and to the 

one senior-level class member who had been at their current 

grade-levels for the longest time and had been recommended 

previously for promotion.

(3) ReinstatementThe Department agreed to offer a new 

five-year appointment to each of four class members who had 

been fired when they failed to get tenure within the required 

time.

(4) Injunctive and Prospective ReliefThe Department 

agreed to: (a) submit to an injunction against its discriminating on the basis of race or retaliating for equal employment 

opportunity activities; (b) create a Council for Equality in the 

Workplace to monitor the EEO activities of the Department; 

(c) modify its employee evaluation reports and engage a 

consultant to help determine whether further revisions are 

necessary; (d) revise and expand its diversity and EEO 

training; (e) establish a working group to monitor the grant 

of awards to employees; (f) use its best efforts to include an 

African-American on any board considering an AfricanAmerican for termination; (g) continue development of an 

electronic personnel database to monitor employment actions; 

(h) report employment and EEO information to class counsel 

for four years; and (i) adopt an affirmative action plan 

approved by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

(5) Attorneys' FeesThe Department agreed to pay $2.1 

million in attorneys' fees, plus an additional amount for any 

services rendered after the district court's preliminary approval of the consent decree.

Class counsel and the Department also entered into a letter 

agreement providing that (1) the consent decree would not 

address the issue of opt-outs; and (2) class counsel would (a) 

support the settlement in court as "fair and reasonable to the 

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outs other than to advise the court that it "may have the 

discretion to allow opt outs"; and (c) not advocate that class 

members opt out.

In March the district court held a two-day hearing and 

preliminarily approved the consent decree. The court then 

ordered that the consent decree and notice of the fairness 

hearing be sent to all known class members. 169 F.R.D. at 

231. The notice advised class members that the court might 

grant them the right to opt out. Of 359 class members, 34 

wrote the court in support of the consent decree and 55 wrote 

in opposition. Id. at 235.

In June class members were informed of their individual 

awards under the consent decree. The Department, as 

agreed, retroactively promoted 17 class members and reinstated four. It awarded an average of $10,900 in promotion 

damages to 265 class members. Twenty-nine class members 

received an average termination award of $16,400, and the 

four class members who had incurred the greatest injuries 

received an average termination award of $75,000. Id. at 

234-35.

At the fairness hearing later that month 14 class members 

testified; three supported the consent decree, eight opposed 

it, and three were "ambivalent or neutral." Id. at 235. The 

court required the Department to send notices to opponents 

of the agreement informing them that if they wished to opt 

out then they had to file a motion stating "the reasons for this 

request, and any law" supporting it. Of the nineteen class 

members who filed motions to opt out all but nine chose 

ultimately to remain in the class.

The court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2) and approved the consent decree pursuant to Rule 23(e). The court 

found that the settlement was "negotiated at arm's length and 

presents no danger of collusion"; it then held that the 

consent decree was fair and reasonable in light of the disputed evidence and the risks of litigation. Nonetheless, the 

court allowed those class members so desiring to opt out of 

the consent decree. Id. at 239-44.

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II. Analysis

The Department of State appeals the district court's decision permitting opt-outs, while the cross-appellants, nine 

members of the plaintiff class, object to the court's approval 

of the consent decree. Class counsel submitted a brief in 

support of the consent decree but did not take a position 

concerning the dissidents' right to opt out.

A. Fairness of the Consent Decree

Rule 23(e) states that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court." 

Before it can approve a settlement a district court "must find 

that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and is not 

the product of collusion between the parties." Cotton v. 

Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); see Isby v. Bayh,

75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996); Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 

F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir. 1988); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 

823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1987). The court's primary task is to 

evaluate the terms of the settlement in relation to the 

strength of the plaintiffs' case. See, e.g., Isby, 75 F.3d at 

1199. The court should not reject a settlement merely because individual class members complain that they would 

have received more had they prevailed after a trial. See 

EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 889 (7th

Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Trucking Employers, 

Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

The dissident members of the class in this case contend 

that for a host of reasons the district court abused its 

discretion in approving the consent decree as fair. We 

conclude, to the contrary, that the settlement is eminently 

fair and reasonable to the class as a whole.

First, with respect to the class-wide relief the dissidents 

complain that the consent decree does not (1) alter the 

Department's allegedly discriminatory assignment system, (2) 

give any "relief for retaliatory acts taken by the Department," or (3) provide for the expungement of employee 

records infected with discrimination. In making the first two 

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tary, reinstatement, and promotional relief awarded to class 

members who claim the Department discriminated or retaliated against them. Moreover, the injunction prohibits discrimination in general and in assignments in particular, forbids 

retaliation, and prescribes monitoring procedures so that 

class counsel can ensure the Department complies. Together 

these provisions of the consent decree both redress past and 

deter future discrimination in assignments and inhibit future 

retaliation. Finally, although the consent decree does not 

provide for expungement of employee records potentially 

tainted by discrimination, it does require revisions to the 

employee evaluation reporting form in order to help prevent 

racial discrimination in the future.

Second, the dissidents argue that the consent decree is 

inadequate with respect to the compromise of claims regarding discrimination in promotions. While the district court 

found no statistically significant evidence of such discrimination in the junior and senior grades, the plaintiffs did present 

statistical evidence suggesting that there had been between 

40 and 47 fewer promotions, primarily in the mid-level 

grades, than there would have been but for discrimination. 

The Department presented its own statistical evidence suggesting that the shortfall was at most 10 promotions. The 

district court reasonably determined that in view of the 

conflicting evidence, the compromise calling for 17 promotions 

was fair and reasonable. Moreover, those who were not 

awarded a promotion received monetary compensation for 

delays in and denials of promotions.

Relatedly, the court did not abuse its discretion in approving the provision of the consent decree calling for only one 

promotion to be made in the senior grades; there was no 

statistically significant evidence of any shortfall of promotions 

in those grades. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded that the consent decree was fair in 

awarding retroactive promotions only to those active FSOs 

who had been at their current grade the longest and who had 

been recommended for but not granted a promotion. To 

determine which individual class members would have been 

promoted but for discrimination would have been difficult for 

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all concerned, wherefore we cannot say that the quick and 

dirty alternative upon which the parties settled was unreasonable. We reject also the dissidents' contention that it was 

unfair not to provide any monetary award to those who 

received a promotion. A settlement necessitates compromise, 

and the agreement that some individuals would get a promotion while others would get cash is not an unreasonable 

way to allocate two scarce resources.

Third, the dissidents contend that the consent decree is 

insufficient regarding reinstatement. They argue that (1) 

four reinstatements was too few; (2) the reinstatements went 

only to employees who were terminated when they failed to 

get tenure and not to tenured employees who were terminated for allegedly poor performance; and (3) those who were 

reinstated should have received tenured positions rather than 

returning as untenured employees. The parties presented 

conflicting evidence regarding whether there was a statistically significant excess in the number of African-American 

employees terminated. The Department's expert argued that 

employees terminated when they did not get tenure should be 

treated separately from tenured employees fired for 

performance-related reasons because the two types of adverse decisions are unrelated. Nonetheless, the Department's expert opined that terminations of neither tenured nor 

untenured African-American employees were significantly 

above the norm.

We conclude that the district court properly held both that 

four was a reasonable number of reinstatements and that the 

agreement limiting reinstatement to those who were terminated for failing to reach tenure was fair in light of the 

parties' competing statistical analyses and the risks attendant 

to litigation. Further, although the number of reinstatements was limited to four, 29 of the 30 employees who applied 

for termination damages received a monetary award. Again, 

the dissidents have not shown that this division of the settlement proceeds is unreasonable considering the interests of 

the class as a whole. As for the reinstatements being without 

tenure, none of the dissidents appears to be among those 

reinstated; therefore, the dissidents do not have standing to 

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pursue this particular objection to the class settlement. See 

Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1181 

(5th Cir. 1978) ("[A]ppellants who were excluded from the 

subclass and denied back pay lack standing to contest the 

adequacy of the awards received by other class members").

Fourth, the dissidents appear to complain that they did not 

receive sufficient monetary relief. We conclude, however, 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving as fair, adequate, and reasonable the amount of the 

damages provided in the consent decree. Class counsel estimated the Department's overall exposure to liability at from 

$2.5 million to $4 million while the Department put the figure 

at from $725,000 to $1.5 million; each side had reasonable 

arguments for its position. Based upon the conflicting evidence and arguments, the risks of litigation, and the time 

value of money, the district court reasonably determined that 

the $3.8 million upon which the parties had settled was "at 

the high end" of what the class could have expected after 

trial. The dissidents complain that the settlement "unfairly 

limited monetary relief for egregious acts of discrimination to 

four persons." The dissidents provide no reason why it was 

unfair to award an average of $75,000 in damages to the four 

most significantly injured of the terminated class members. 

A claim that individual dissenters are entitled to more money 

is not, by itself, sufficient to reject the overall fairness of the 

settlement; as we indicated above, a settlement necessitates 

compromise.

Fifth, the dissidents argue that it was improper for the 

court to approve the settlement over the objections of a large 

number of class members, including several of the named 

plaintiffs. But a settlement can be fair even though a significant portion of the class and some of the named plaintiffs 

object to it. See Grant, 823 F.2d at 23; Hiram Walker, 768 

F.2d at 891-92; Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1331; Flinn v. FMC 

Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975); cf. Pettway, 576 

F.2d at 1215-17 (acknowledging general rule but holding 

settlement unfair where approximately 70% of class and all 

named plaintiffs objected). Here only 15% of the class 

members objected; 85% accepted the settlement, and many 

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of them actively supported it. The district court did not 

abuse its discretion, therefore, in approving the settlement in 

spite of some opposition.

The dissidents cite Ficalora v. Lockheed California Co.,

751 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1985), and Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976), for the 

proposition that it is an abuse of discretion for a district court 

to approve a settlement over the objection of the named class 

members. The teaching of those cases, however, is that the 

district court must consider the objections raised by the 

named plaintiffs. Ficalora, 751 F.2d at 997; Mandujano, 541 

F.2d at 836-37. In Mandujano the court also said that the 

opposition of a significant number of named plaintiffs "is a 

factor to be considered when approving a settlement." 541 

F.2d at 837. Here the district court conducted hearings and 

permitted all interested parties, including the dissidents, to 

testify. The court considered the objections of the plaintiffs 

but pointed out that "the best interests of the class as a whole 

must remain the paramount consideration even though some 

class members believe that they will not receive all the 

individual relief to which they believe they are entitled." 169 

F.R.D. at 243. The district court's decision is therefore 

consistent with the Ninth Circuit cases cited.

Finally, the dissidents argue that class counsel did not act 

in the interest of the class when counsel agreed to argue that 

the consent decree was fair and not to advocate the right to 

opt out, and agreed to the provision of the consent decree 

stating that the court may not modify the agreement. In our 

view counsel more than adequately represented the class as a 

whole. The letter agreement to which the dissidents point 

was part of a global compromise between the parties, who 

had negotiated their settlement only after significant discovery and under the supervision of a magistrate judge. In view 

of the complexity and fragility of such a compromise, the 

provision prohibiting the court from modifying the terms of 

the agreement is understandable as being in the interests of 

both parties; it is not indicative that class counsel acted in 

any way at the expense of the class.

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In sum, the dissidents complain about particular portions of 

the overall settlement and claim that they are individually 

entitled to more. It is the obligation of the district court, 

however, to evaluate the fairness of the settlement to the 

class as a whole. We conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in approving the consent decree as fair, 

adequate, and reasonable to the class as a whole.

B. Opting Out

The Department argues that our recent decision in Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1997), holding that 

a court may permit members of a class certified under Rule 

23(b)(2) to opt out of the class action and thus retain the right 

to sue on their own, is invalid after the still more recent 

decision of the Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 

Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). Alternatively, the Department contends that under the criteria of Eubanks the district 

court abused its discretion in permitting the dissidents to opt 

out. We conclude that Amchem does not affect our holding 

in Eubanks, but we agree with the Department that under 

Eubanks the district court abused its discretion in permitting 

the dissidents to opt out.

Rule 23(a) establishes four prerequisites for certifying a 

lawsuit as a class action. They are that

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 

is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact 

common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 

representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Rule 23(b) provides for three types of class actions. Subsection (b)(1) allows a class action if separate actions would 

risk inconsistent adjudications or if individual adjudications 

would "be dispositive of the interests of the other members 

not parties ... or substantially impair or impede their ability 

to protect their interests." Under subsection (b)(2) a class 

action may be maintained where

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the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 

on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby 

making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

Finally, a subsection (b)(3) class action is appropriate where

the court finds that the questions of law or fact common 

to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 

action is superior to other available methods for the fair 

and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

The requirements of predominance and superiority in subsection (b)(3) are, of course, additional to the requirements of 

subsection (a), which applies to all class actions. The right to 

opt out of a subsection (b)(3) class action is expressly provided in Rule 23(c)(2).

In Amchem the Supreme Court addressed the procedure 

for approving a class action settlement. In that case the 

parties had simultaneously filed a class action complaint, an 

answer thereto, and a settlement agreement. The district 

court certified the class action under Rule 23(b)(3) and approved the settlement. The Third Circuit reversed, holding 

that the district court should have evaluated whether to 

certify the class just as it would have done if the action were 

going to be tried. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 

610, 624-26 (1996).

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of 

appeals although it clarified that "settlement is relevant to a 

class certification" in that, if the case is surely going to be 

settled, then the "district court need not inquire whether the 

case, if tried, would present intractable management problems." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 

2248 (1997). A "settlement-only class certification" does, 

however, depend upon compliance with all the requirements 

of Rule 23(a) and (b). The Court made clear that a district 

court is to adhere closely to the rule:

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[O]f overriding importance, courts must be mindful that 

the rule as now composed sets the requirements they are 

bound to enforce.

* * *

Federal courts ... lack authority to substitute for Rule 

23's certification criteria a standard never adoptedthat 

if a settlement is "fair," then certification is proper.

Id. at 2248, 2249.

The Department contends that this court's recent decision 

in Eubanks was effectively overruled by the Supreme Court's 

direction in Amchem that courts are bound to observe strictly 

the requirements of Rule 23. Eubanks was a Title VII class 

action brought against the Librarian of Congress and certified under subsection (b)(2). The district court approved the 

parties' settlement and held that even if there were a right to 

opt out of a subsection (b)(2) class action, the individual 

plaintiffs had failed to show that they were entitled to opt out. 

Upon appeal we held that, although the district court may in 

certain circumstances permit members of the plaintiff class to 

opt out of a (b)(2) suit, the court in that case had not abused 

its discretion in declining to do so. We recognized that Rule 

23 does not "address the possible need for opt-out rights in 

non-(b)(3) actions," but we thought the Rule "sufficiently 

flexible to afford district courts discretion to grant opt-out 

rights in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions" in certain circumstances. Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 93, 94. We based that ruling 

upon Rule 23(d)(5), which specifically authorizes the court to 

make "appropriate orders" to govern "procedural matters" in 

a class action; subsection (d)(5) is broad enough, we held, to 

permit the district court to provide for opt-outs when appropriate in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. See id. at 96; see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) advisory committee's note (1966) (stating 

that subsection (d) "is concerned with the fair and efficient 

conduct of the action").

We went on to say that the district court may, when 

necessary to the fair and efficient conduct of the litigation, 

exercise its discretion to allow opt-outs in at least two ways. 

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First, if the court finds that "the assumption of cohesiveness" 

underlying certification of a (b)(2) class is inapplicable to the 

individual class members' claims for monetary damages, then 

it may certify a hybrid class action under subsections (b)(2) 

and (b)(3)the latter of which contemplates individual damages determinations. Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 96. Second, if 

the court determines that particular plaintiffs' claims are 

"unique or sufficiently distinct from the claims of the class as 

a whole," as, for example, where a member of the plaintiff 

class had filed his own civil action before the class action was 

filed, see, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co.,

907 F.2d 1295, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1990), then it may permit optouts "on a selective basis." Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 96.

Nothing in the interpretation of Rule 23 we advanced in 

Eubanks is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent 

decision in Amchem. The district court's error in Amchem

had been in substituting the fairness inquiry of Rule 23(e) for 

the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). In 

Eubanks we did not omit or even relax any requirement of 

Rule 23; rather, we held only that in certain limited circumstances the district court has discretion under subsection 

(d)(5) to permit opt-outs, notwithstanding the absence of a 

specific authorization in subsection (b)(2).

In the alternative the Department argues that the district 

court abused its discretion by permitting opt-outs because it 

did not follow either of the options for doing so outlined in 

Eubanks. When the district court issued the decision now 

before us, Eubanks had not yet been decided. Relying 

instead upon Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 

(11th Cir. 1983), the district court asserted that allowing optouts is appropriate "when the monetary relief stage ... is 

functionally more similar to a (b)(3) class than to a (b)(2) 

class." 169 F.R.D. at 244. The court was "impressed with 

the vehemence with which some members of the class have 

opposed the settlement" and noted its "concern" that "in the 

absence of allowing for 'opting out' some searing individual 

injury might be greatly under compensated." Id. at 245.

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We agree that the district court abused its discretion when 

it allowed class members to opt out of the settlement in this 

case. The district court did not pursue either of the two 

options we later approved in Eubanks, nor did it adduce any 

other tenable ground upon which opting out might be permitted. Indeed, the dissident plaintiffs do not argue that their 

case fits within either of the two circumstances instanced in 

Eubanks, nor do they suggest any alternative basis upon 

which we can uphold the decision of the district court.

First, the district court clearly did not certify a hybrid class 

action based upon a finding that "the assumption of cohesiveness for purposes of injunctive relief that justifies certification 

as a (b)(2) class is unjustified as to claims that individual class 

members may have for monetary damages." Eubanks, 110 

F.3d at 96. Class counsel repeatedly requested certification 

pursuant to (b)(2), the consent decree stated that the parties 

agreed to certification pursuant to (b)(2), and the court ultimately certified the class pursuant to (b)(2). Although the 

district court in allowing opt-outs did refer to the distinction 

between a (b)(2) and a (b)(3) class action, the court did not 

purport to hold, and did not make findings sufficient to 

support the conclusion, that a hybrid class certification was 

appropriate: The court found neither that the assumption of 

cohesiveness underlying a (b)(2) class certification was unjustified with respect to plaintiffs' individual claims for monetary 

damages, nor that the monetary or other individual claims 

were appropriate for certification under (b)(3). Nor did the 

district court address the predominance and superiority requirements for certification under (b)(3). To the contrary, 

the court made all the factual findings necessary to show that 

a hybrid class was not appropriate. The court determined 

that the plaintiffs sought "extensive injunctive and systemic 

relief in addition to monetary damages," 169 F.R.D. at 239, 

and found that the plaintiffs' "predominantly equitable claims 

... arose from a system of personnel actions that have been 

uniformly imposed on all class members," id. at 238.

We recognized in Eubanks that whenever individual plaintiffs in a subsection (b)(2) class have claims for different 

amounts of damages, their interests may begin to diverge. 

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110 F.3d at 95. As noted above, however, before hybrid 

certification is appropriate there must be some reason to 

believe that the assumption of cohesiveness underlying a 

subsection (b)(2) class action does not apply to the individual 

claims for monetary damages; for example, the amounts 

claimed by various class members may be so disparate as to 

create a conflict of interest within the class. Here the district 

court did not find that the assumption of cohesiveness had 

broken down; nor do the dissident plaintiffs so argue before 

this court.

Second, the district court did not find that the claims of the 

individual dissidents are so atypical of the claims of the class 

as to justify permitting them to opt out of the class. The 

court stated that there might be some class member(s) with a 

"searing individual injury" who would be "under compensated" if limited to the relief provided in the consent decree. 

The court did not determine, however, that there are in fact 

such persons in the class, let alone that the dissidents are 

among them. The dissidents do not even argue that they 

have suffered an unusually grave degree of injury; rather, 

they argue merely that they stand to be undercompensated 

for their injuries. As we made clear in Eubanks, however, 

that is not a sufficient justification for permitting members of 

the class to opt out:

That ... appellants received less under the settlement 

agreement than they might have expected to receive had 

they prevailed in individual lawsuits cannot alone justify 

an opt-out, as no party can reasonably expect to receive 

in a settlement precisely what it would receive if it 

prevailed on the merits.

Id. at 98. Moreover, this argument was more properly 

directed to the issue of fairness, id. at 98-99, and as such it 

was rejected both by the district court in the fairness hearing 

and by this court (in Part II.A, above). Nor are the dissidents' claims different in kind from those of other class 

members: In certifying the class the court specifically found 

that the claims of the named plaintiffs, including eight of the 

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nine cross-appellants, were "typical" of the claims of the class 

as a whole. 169 F.R.D. at 238.

Third, although the district court could properly rely upon 

Holmes before we issued Eubanks, it erred in its application 

of that case and thereby abused its discretion. See Koon v. 

United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996) ("A district court 

by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 

law"). In Holmes the court held that "[t]he presence in the 

lawsuit of a significant number of atypical claims not common 

to the class" required the district court to permit opt-outs. 

706 F.2d at 1155. The court also suggested that the assumption of cohesiveness in Rule 23(b)(2) claims for injunctive 

relief may break down when there are individual claims for 

disparate amounts of monetary damages and that in such 

cases opt-outs may be required. Id. at 1159-60. As we have 

pointed out, however, here the district court did not find (and 

the dissidents do not contend) that the dissidents' claims are 

atypical or that the assumption of class cohesiveness has 

broken down.

The dissidents argue, at least implicitly, that they should be 

permitted to opt out because several of them had individual 

discrimination complaints pending against the Department. 

In Eubanks, however, we rejected the contention that a 

pending administrative complaintas opposed to a lawsuit 

filed in courtis sufficient to support a class member's 

preference to opt out of a class action. See 110 F.3d at 97. 

One may not, by first filing an administrative charge and then 

affirmatively joining a class action as a named plaintiff or an 

intervenor, obtain the option to see whether the result in the 

class suit is satisfactory and, if not, then to take up the 

administrative charge again.

The dissidents also argue, as they emphasized at oral 

argument, that they must be permitted to opt out because 

they object to the settlement of their individual claims (as 

opposed to the class claims). This is not the law; otherwise 

members of the plaintiff class would have to be allowed to opt 

out whenever there are individual claims for monetary damages in addition to class claims for injunctive relief. Eubanks

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itself involved claims for injunctive as well as monetary relief, 

however, and we upheld the district court's decision not to 

permit opt-outs. Insofar as the dissidents mean to suggest 

that their individual claims for monetary damages are somehow unique or atypical, as noted above they give us no reason 

to accept that conclusion.

We hold, therefore, that the district court abused its discretion in permitting the dissident class members to opt out of 

this class action; the district court made no findings that 

would support opting out under Eubanks. Nor is it necessary to remand the case for the district court to make further 

findings in light of Eubanks; the Department argued in its 

brief that a remand was not necessary, and the dissidents did 

not seek a remand to develop the record further in the event 

we determined that Eubanks was not satisfied. Moreover, 

the dissidents do not allege any alternative basis that, if 

proved, would enable the district court upon remand again to 

permit them to opt out.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we hold that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in approving the fairness of 

the consent decree. We also conclude that Amchem does not 

undermine this court's holding in Eubanks, and that the 

district court abused its discretion in permitting some members of the class to opt out of the settlement of this case. 

Accordingly, we uphold the district court's approval of the 

consent decree and direct that it be made binding upon all 

members of the class.

So ordered.

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