Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00276/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frank Miguel Leon, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-10-276-RCC-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Frank Miguel Leon has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are the Petition

(Doc. 1), Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 9), and Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 13). The Magistrate

Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, dismiss the

Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2005, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of negligent homicide and one

count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death. (Doc. 9, Ex. B at 52.) Petitioner’s

Presentence Report (PSR) listed multiple prior convictions: one felony drug conviction, one

misdemeanor drug conviction, and two nonviolent or property misdemeanors. (Doc. 1, App.

1, Ex. D.) At sentencing, the judge individually identified the four prior convictions

contained within the PSR as the basis for a criminal history aggravating factor. (Doc. 9, Ex.

B at 51.) Trial counsel did not contest the accuracy of the felony drug charge. Petitioner was

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sentenced to the presumptive term on each count – six years for negligent homicide and three

and a half years for leaving the scene of the accident – to be served consecutively. (Id. at 52-

53.)

On March 17, 2008, Petitioner filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition in the Pima

County Superior Court, citing two grounds for relief, ineffective assistance of trial counsel

and a due process violation, both arising from the trial judge’s reliance on inaccurate

information at sentencing. (Doc. 9, Ex. E at 2.) The PCR judge, who was also the sentencing

judge, acknowledged that Petitioner’s prior marijuana conviction was a misdemeanor not a

felony as erroneously identified at sentencing. (Doc. 9, Ex. F at 1.) However, the court

concluded the error did not prejudice Petitioner:

In imposing sentence, the Court cited the defendant’s prior criminal record as

one of three aggravating factors. The Court also found as aggravating factors

the great emotional harm the defendant caused his victims and the risk of

physical harm he created for non-victims. Thus, the marijuana conviction at

issue was only a subpart of one aggravating factor. Had the Court known at the

time that the marijuana offense had been designated as a misdemeanor instead

of a class 6 felony, it still would have found the defendant’s “criminal record”

to be an aggravating factor. More importantly, the Court would have weighed

the aggravating and mitigating factors in the same manner.

(Id. (internal citations omitted).) The court denied relief on Petitioner’s PCR petition. (Id.)

Petitioner sought relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which concluded the

sentencing record supported the PCR court’s ruling that “the marijuana conviction at issue

was only a subpart of one aggravating factor and that its erroneous designation as a felony

did not alter the overall aggravating effect of Leon’s criminal record.” (Doc. 9, Ex. C at 4-5.)

The appellate court denied relief finding that Petitioner did not “demonstrate that false

information formed part of the basis of the sentence.” (Id. at 5.) The Arizona Supreme Court

denied review. (Doc. 9, Ex. J.)

DISCUSSION

Petitioner alleges that his right to due process was violated by the judge’s use of

erroneous information as the basis of his sentence, and that his counsel was ineffective for

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failing to correct the error. Respondents concede the Petition is timely and properly

exhausted (Doc. 9 at 5-6) but argue it fails on the merits.

AEDPA Standard

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) established a

“substantially higher threshold for habeas relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of

‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences.’” Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206

(2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . . .

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7

(1997)).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664

(9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. Clearly established federal law consists of

the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction became

final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Clark v.

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Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).

However, a state court decision is not rendered contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

law solely by lack of citation to that law. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (noting

that a state court need not even be aware of controlling Supreme Court law as long as

“neither the reasoning nor the result” of its decision contradicts that law). Under the

“unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant relief

where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or “unreasonably

extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should

not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should

apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. 

Due Process

The Supreme Court holds that a sentence based on materially untrue assumptions

concerning a defendant’s criminal history violates due process. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.

736, 741 (1948). Thus, a sentence founded on “misinformation of constitutional magnitude”

cannot stand. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972). The ultimate question is

whether Petitioner’s sentence might have been different if the judge had known that he did

not have a felony drug conviction but, rather, a second misdemeanor drug conviction. See

id. at 448. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, a petitioner is required to establish that the

challenged information “demonstrably made the basis for the sentence.” Jones v. United

States, 783 F.2d 1477, 1480 (9th Cir. 1986). In answering the question posed by Tucker,

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courts may consider the judge’s own recollection. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339,

1353 (9th Cir. 1978).

As pointed out by the sentencing judge, the felony was one of four prior convictions

comprising the criminal history aggravating factor, which was one of three aggravating

factors. (Doc. 9, Ex. F at 1.) However, when balanced with the mitigation, Petitioner was

sentenced only to the presumptive term. (Doc. 9, Ex. B at 52.) Most significantly, in deciding

the PCR petition, the sentencing judge determined that there would have been no change in

Petitioner’s sentence if the court had known that the conviction at issue was a misdemeanor

rather than a felony. (Doc. 9, Ex. F at 1.) Based on this evidence, Petitioner’s sentence would

not have been different absent the erroneous information in the PSR, and his right to due

process was not violated. Further, because the sentencing judge already considered

Petitioner’s corrected criminal history and concluded that it would not have changed the

sentence he imposed, to send the case back for resentencing “would be a looking-glass

exercise in folly.” Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997). The relief

Petitioner seeks in this Court – reconsideration of his sentence based on accurate information

– has already been given by the state courts. See id.

The state court’s denial of this claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims are governed by Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the

deficiency prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

Because an IAC claim must satisfy both prongs of Strickland, the reviewing court

“need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id. at 697 (“if it

is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice

. . . that course should be followed”). A petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at

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693. To demonstrate prejudice, he “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Id. at 694. The calculus involved in assessing prejudice “should proceed on the assumption

that the decision-maker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards

that govern the decision.” Id. at 695.

In arguing this claim, Petitioner conceded he could not satisfy the reasonable

probability standard when he argued that “it is impossible to say with certainty what sentence

might have been imposed.” (Doc. 1 at 24.) Further, as concluded in Claim 1, if counsel had

corrected Petitioner’s criminal history at sentencing the court would not have changed the

term of his imprisonment. Because he cannot establish a reasonable probability that the

outcome of his sentencing would have been different, he fails to demonstrate actual

prejudice. The state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland in denying this claim.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an

order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-10-276-RCC.

DATED this 9th day of August, 2011.

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