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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 4, 2004 Decided November 2, 2004

No. 03-5264

B. J. BUCHEIT,

APPELLEE/CROSS–APPELLANT

v.

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND

THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY,

APPELLANTS/CROSS–APPELLEES

Consolidated with

03-5293

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01455)

Maher Hanania argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants/cross-appellees.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-5293 Document #857364 Filed: 11/02/2004 Page 1 of 10
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Michael H. Selter argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellee/cross-appellant.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: This appeal arises from a conversion action brought by plaintiff Bernard J. Bucheit in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Bucheit alleges that the defendants, the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA), converted property and money associated with a concrete plant

that his company operated in Gaza. After a bench trial, the

district court found the defendants liable for over $1.5 million,

basing its valuation in part on offers to buy the converted

property. At the same time, the court denied Bucheit’s

request for prejudgment interest. The defendants now appeal the court’s valuation of the converted property, while the

plaintiff cross-appeals the court’s denial of prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

Bucheit is the president of Bucheit International Limited

(BIL), a construction firm with offices in the United States

and Great Britain.1

 In 1994, BIL built and began to operate

a precast concrete plant in Gaza. During the plant’s first

year of operation, BIL imported equipment and materials

into Gaza via Haifa, Israel. The equipment included a Grove

crane, two high trailers, a lowboy trailer, and a tractor truck.

At the border, BIL filed customs declarations totaling $56,200

for these items. By contrast, in November 1995, BIL valued

the same items at $542,590 for insurance purposes.

In 1994, Bucheit appointed a Gaza resident, Ghassan Abdel

Aziz Abu Ramadan, as manager of the concrete plant. In

January 1996, BIL dismissed Ramadan due to disagreements

concerning his management and representation of BIL in

1 The facts set forth in this Part are taken from the district

court’s findings of fact.

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Gaza. Notwithstanding his dismissal, Ramadan continued to

contract with the PA for BIL’s services and the use of BIL’s

equipment. In August 1997, for example, the PA’s Military

Financial Administration leased BIL’s Grove crane for use in

Gaza Emergency Harbor, paying a total of $77,000 to Ramadan rather than to BIL.

BIL had obtained financing for the concrete plant from the

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a U.S.

government agency that provides loans and political risk

insurance to U.S. companies for private investments abroad.

BIL obtained a $1,100,000 loan from OPIC, which it secured

with BIL’s Gaza assets. In addition, Bucheit’s three children,

through the Bucheit Children’s Trust, guaranteed the loan

with real estate located in the District of Columbia.

In May 1997, after experiencing financial and other difficulties operating in Gaza, BIL defaulted on the OPIC loan. In

order to repay OPIC, BIL began efforts to liquidate its Gaza

assets. A company named Avi Cranes offered BIL $105,000

for the Grove crane and lowboy trailer, but BIL was unable

to complete the sale because the PA’s Military Financial

Administration was using the crane in Gaza Emergency Harbor — pursuant to the lease with Ramadan. Another company, Gulf Global, submitted a bid of $1,630,000 for all of BIL’s

assets in Gaza, but that sale could not be completed, both

because the crane was still being used at the harbor, and

because the defendants would not provide the necessary

documentation for the plant and other assets. Later, Gulf

Global made another bid of $106,000 for the crane alone, but

that sale fell through as well: the crane needed repairs after

its detour to the harbor project.

Finally, in the fall of 1999, a non-profit corporation called

Builders for Humanities (BFH) submitted a letter of intent to

purchase BIL’s plant and machinery for $1,600,000. BIL

accepted the letter of intent. But that deal failed as well,

again because BIL could not obtain the necessary authorizing

documentation from the defendants.

Because BIL was unable to liquidate its Gaza assets, the

Bucheit Children’s Trust had to satisfy its guarantee of the

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OPIC loan by selling its District of Columbia real estate.

The Trust did so in December 1999, and wired the proceeds

to OPIC. OPIC declared the loan paid in full and assigned

all rights arising out of the interference with its secured

collateral to the Trust, which, in turn, assigned its rights to

Bucheit.

In June 2000, Bucheit sued the PA and the PLO in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Bucheit alleged that he had succeeded to all of OPIC’s

interest in the secured assets by virtue of the assignments,

and charged that the defendants had wrongfully converted

OPIC’s money and property by interfering with its lien on the

Gaza assets. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matter under the commercial activity exception

to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,

1605(a)(2). It further concluded that Bucheit was an ‘‘equitable subrogee’’ of OPIC’s rights under the BIL loan, and that

he was entitled ‘‘to those remedies and damages’’ — but only

those remedies and damages — ‘‘that OPIC could have

asserted.’’ Bucheit v. Palestine Liberation Organization,

No. 00-1455, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 14

(D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2003). Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation

that District of Columbia law would apply unless it differed

from ‘‘the relevant Palestinian commercial law,’’ and finding

that the defendants had not identified any applicable portions

of the latter, the court relied on District of Columbia law

without objection by the parties. Id. at 12-13.

The district court conducted a two-day trial to determine

whether the defendants were liable for conversion for interfering with OPIC’s rights to BIL’s assets, and, if so, the

amount of damages OPIC suffered as a consequence of such

conversion. With respect to liability, the court concluded that

the defendants had indeed converted OPIC’s property. Noting that conversion is ‘‘any unlawful exercise of ownership,

dominion or control over the personal property of another in

denial or repudiation of his rights thereto,’’ id. at 14 (quoting

Duggan v. Keto, 554 A.2d 1126, 1137 (D.C. 1989)), the court

found that the defendants were ‘‘liable for conversion of any

funds paid [to Ramadan] under contracts for use of BIL

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assets and for impeding liquidation sales’’ of those assets. Id.

at 18.

In calculating the amount of damages, the district court

‘‘rel[ied] primarily on documentary evidence of valuation and

on the amounts BIL was prepared to accept for the attempted sales of these assets.’’ Id. at 19. The court found that the

total value of the converted assets was $1,782,000 — $77,000

in lease payments to Ramadan, $105,000 for the crane and

lowboy (the amount of Avi Cranes’s accepted offer), and

$1,600,000 for the plant and machinery (the amount of BFH’s

accepted offer). The court declined to rely on either of Gulf

Global’s offers, noting that there were ‘‘problems’’ with the

proposed $106,000 sale of the crane, and that the $1,630,000

bid for the plant and other assets lacked documentary support. Id. at 20.

Finally, because Bucheit brought the conversion action as

the ‘‘subrogee of OPIC’s rights,’’ the court held that Bucheit

was ‘‘entitled only to those remedies and damages that OPIC

could have asserted.’’ Id. at 21. It thus reduced Bucheit’s

recovery from $1,782,000 to $1,531,053.34, the amount that

OPIC had accepted in satisfaction of BIL’s debt (including

interest and fees).2

Although the court awarded Bucheit damages for conversion, it denied his request for prejudgment interest. The

court noted that ‘‘under District of Columbia law, courts have

a ‘wide range of discretion’ to determine whether prejudgment interest should be awarded,’’ id. at 22 (quoting Edmund

J. Flynn Co. v. LaVay, 431 A.2d 543, 550 n.6 (D.C. 1981)), and

that in a conversion action, ‘‘pre-judgment interest may be

included as part of the damages TTT to the extent that it will

make the injured party whole.’’ Id. (quoting Duggan, 554

2 The district court appears to have included in its valuation of

BIL’s Gaza assets approximately $180,000 worth of equipment that

BIL leased but did not own. Although the parties dispute the

impact this had on the validity of the valuation, the defendants

concede that, even if the court’s $1,782,000 valuation were reduced

by that amount, the adjusted total would still exceed the amount at

which the court capped Bucheit’s recovery — and hence would not

affect the size of the plaintiff’s award.

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A.2d at 1140). The court read D.C. law as providing that

‘‘plaintiffs bear the burden of proof that prejudgment interest

is necessary to compensate them fully,’’ and concluded that

Bucheit had failed to carry that burden. Id. Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Bucheit filed a motion

for reconsideration of the denial of prejudgment interest,

which the court denied.

On this appeal, the defendants do not challenge the court’s

determination that they converted the plaintiff’s Gaza assets.

They do, however, appeal the court’s calculation of damages.

Bucheit cross-appeals from the denial of prejudgment interest. We consider these two appeals in Parts II and III,

respectively.

II

The ‘‘traditional standard for calculating damages for conversion is the fair market value of the property at the time of

the conversion.’’ Bowler v. Joyner, 562 A.2d 1210, 1213 (D.C.

1989) (quoting Duggan, 554 A.2d at 1137). ‘‘Fair market

value,’’ in turn, ‘‘is generally defined as that price at which a

willing seller and a willing buyer will trade.’’ Williams v.

United States, 376 A.2d 442, 444 (D.C. 1977); see Reservation

Eleven Assocs. v. District of Columbia, 420 F.2d 153, 155

(D.C. Cir. 1969). Under District of Columbia law, ‘‘ ‘[a]n

injured party will not be precluded from recovering damages

because he cannot prove his exact damages’ so long as there

is a reasonable basis for approximation.’’ Bowler, 562 A.2d at

1214 (quoting R.S. Willard Co. v. Columbia Van Lines Moving & Storage Co., 253 A.2d 454, 456 (D.C. 1969)). This court

regards damage awards as ‘‘findings of fact’’ governed by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), ‘‘which will not be

disturbed unless clearly erroneous.’’ Eureka Inv. Corp. v.

Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see

Safer v. Perper, 569 F.2d 87, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also

Bowler, 562 A.2d at 1213–14 (D.C. 1989).

In this case, the district court relied upon accepted offers to

purchase property (by Avi Cranes and BFH) as the measure

of the property’s fair market value. As a theoretical matter,

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it would be difficult to conclude that such offers represent a

clearly erroneous basis for valuing the ‘‘price at which a

willing seller and willing buyer’’ will trade, as that is exactly

what such accepted offers profess to be.3

 While the defendants suggest that the $56,200 BIL listed on its customs

declaration was a better measure of valuation for the crane

and lowboy than the $105,000 offered by Avi Cranes, the

court did not clearly err in accepting the plaintiff’s testimony

that ‘‘BIL purposely used low declaration values upon advice

of those familiar with Israeli and Palestinian customs practices.’’ Bucheit at 3. That is particularly so in light of BIL’s

subsequent valuation of the same equipment at $542,590 for

insurance purposes.

The defendants also challenge the court’s decision to rely

on BFH’s $1,600,000 offer for the concrete plant. That

challenge is based on the trial testimony of Leonard Loch,

who represented BFH in its bid. Loch testified that BFH

was not actually committed to purchasing the plant, and that

Bucheit had misrepresented its value. But the district court

discredited Loch’s testimony, noting that the defendants’

failure to include Loch on their witness list had deprived the

plaintiff of the opportunity to depose him, and that Loch had

sat in the courtroom listening to the testimony of the other

witnesses prior to taking the stand himself. Trial Tr. at 43-

44; cf. FED. R. EVID. 615 (authorizing the exclusion of wit3 See Basiliko v. Pargo Corp., 532 A.2d 1346, 1350 (D.C. 1987)

(holding that, to determine fair market value, ‘‘the trial court may

consider as evidence the price at which [appellant] had agreed to

sell the property’’); cf. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,

520 U.S. 725, 741-42 (1997) (noting that ‘‘the very best evidence of

the value’’ of particular items ‘‘might be their actual selling price

(assuming, of course, that the sale were made in good faith and at

arm’s length)’’); Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir.

2000) (‘‘If, fortunately, the asset [to be valued] has a sales history,

then despite the lack of a traditional market, it is easier for the

court to determine the asset’s market value as of the time it was

lost. Indeed, it is well-established that a recent sale price for the

subject asset, negotiated by parties at arm’s length, is the ‘best

evidence’ of its market value.’’ (quoting Suitum, 520 U.S. at 742)).

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nesses ‘‘so that they cannot hear the testimony of other

witnesses’’). The court further concluded that Loch’s testimony was inconsistent with the documentary evidence, including Loch’s October 13, 1999 letter of intent to purchase the

assets. Bucheit at 21 n.9. That letter did not qualify BFH’s

commitment in any way, stating instead that:

LML [Leonard M. Loch] TTT shall purchase the equipment through a non-profit entity TTT called Builders for

Humanities (‘‘BFH’’)TTTT The purchase price of the

equipment from BFH to Bucheit TTT shall be determined

in coordination with OPIC and outside consultant, but in

no event shall it be less than $1,600,000.

Pl.’s Ex. 71. The district court, which was in the best

position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to

compare their testimony to the documentary evidence, did not

clearly err in relying on the latter.

III

Bucheit’s complaint included a request for prejudgment

interest on the amount of any damages awarded for conversion. Although the district court found that the defendants

had converted the plaintiff’s property, and that the plaintiff

was entitled to damages for that conversion, it denied the

request for prejudgment interest. We review that denial for

abuse of discretion. See Frederick County Fruit Growers

Ass’n, Inc. v. Martin, 968 F.2d 1265, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The district court read an opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Duggan v. Keto, 554 A.2d 1126, 1140

(D.C. 1989), as holding that a court may include prejudgment

interest as part of the damages in a conversion case only to

the extent that such interest is required to make the injured

party whole, and declared that the plaintiff bears the burden

of proving the latter. See Bucheit at 22. Because Bucheit

had offered no evidence to prove that prejudgment interest

was necessary to compensate him fully, the court concluded

that interest was unwarranted. That conclusion was not an

abuse of discretion. Indeed, the court was generous in its

description of Bucheit’s litigation efforts: over two days of

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trial, Bucheit not only failed to offer any evidence regarding

the need for prejudgment interest, he failed to mention the

subject at all.

On appeal, Bucheit argues that the district court employed

the wrong legal standard in ruling on the interest issue. In

support, he insists that the D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision in

Federal Marketing Co. v. Virginia Impression Products Co.,

823 A.2d 513 (D.C. 2003), supercedes Duggan. Under Federal Marketing, he contends, the award of prejudgment interest

is presumptively warranted, unless there is an affirmative

reason that counsels against it.

Bucheit’s theory that Federal Marketing marks a new path

in the District of Columbia’s treatment of prejudgment interest could be correct. While acknowledging that ‘‘the ‘general

rule’ may be that prejudgment interest is usually unavailable

in breach of contract cases involving unliquidated claims,’’ the

D.C. Court of Appeals stated:

[T]he court has ample discretion to include prejudgment

interest as an element in the damages awarded, if necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff. The court usually

should award such ‘delay damages’ TTT absent some

justification for withholding such an award.

Federal Marketing, 823 A.2d at 532 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). This could suggest that courts should

award prejudgment interest more frequently, and that it is

the defendant’s burden to establish a justification for withholding such an award.

We need not conclusively divine the meaning of Federal

Marketing, however, because even if the plaintiff’s theory is

correct, he never drew that case to the attention of the trial

court. Although the D.C. Court of Appeals did not issue

Federal Marketing until after the parties completed their

briefing in the district court, five months passed between the

issuance of Federal Marketing and the release of the district

court’s decision. Bucheit did not take advantage of that

opportunity to advise the court of the decision — much less to

advance his theory that Federal Marketing supercedes DugUSCA Case #03-5293 Document #857364 Filed: 11/02/2004 Page 9 of 10
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gan for prejudgment interest in conversion cases — by filing

a supplemental brief. Moreover, although Bucheit filed a

motion to reconsider the denial of prejudgment interest on

August 25, 2003, more than three months after Federal

Marketing was issued, that motion likewise failed to mention

his new theory of entitlement to prejudgment interest under

Federal Marketing.

In short, Bucheit never advised the district court of his

theory — which he presents for the first time on appeal —

that Federal Marketing changed the course of District of

Columbia law regarding prejudgment interest. As we have

previously held, ‘‘while a court may draw upon its own

knowledge of applicable precedents TTT, it is not required to

unearth theories and precedents not cited by a partyTTTT

Bringing those precedents and theories to the attention of the

district judge is the job of the party’s attorneys.’’ Ned

Chartering & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan, 294 F.3d

148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In any event, given the district

court’s view that both parties’ ‘‘evidence of valuation’’ was

‘‘weak,’’ Bucheit at 19, it was hardly unreasonable for the

court to conclude that the damages award was sufficient to

fully compensate Bucheit. See Federal Marketing, 823 A.2d

at 532 (affirming the denial of prejudgment interest because

the ‘‘court reasonably could view an award without such

interest as sufficient to compensate’’ the plaintiff).

IV

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in

calculating the value of the property converted by the defendants, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest.4

 Its

decision is therefore

Affirmed.

4 The district court’s ruling on Bucheit’s Rule 59(e) motion to

reconsider is also reviewable only for abuse of discretion, Ciralsky

v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and we find no such

abuse here.

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