Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01444/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01444-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFRED TOLIVER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-1444 MCE DAD P

vs.

K. MENDOZA POWERS, Warden, ORDER AND

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an amended petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On May 9, 2007, the undersigned ordered

respondent to file a response to the petition. On June 7, 2007, respondent filed a motion to

dismiss on the grounds that petitioner failed to comply with the applicable statute of limitations

and did not present any cognizable federal claims that had been properly exhausted in state court

as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). On June

29, 2007, petitioner filed a timely opposition to the motion. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner alleges that in January 1977 he was convicted and sentenced to seven

years to life in prison for murder under California’s old indeterminate sentencing law. (Am. Pet.

at 2.) He claims that on November 7, 1985, after California enacted the determinate sentencing

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law, he received an established parole date of June 2, 1994 from the Board of Prison Terms. 

Petitioner alleges that his release date was rescinded in 1986, evidently due to a prison rule

violation conviction he suffered. (Id. at 6; Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 2.) Petitioner now

contends that he has been illegally confined since 1994. 

On August 15, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

Los Angeles Superior Court in which he claimed that his release date had never been “refixed”

and that he should have been released, presumably on parole, in 1997. (Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss, Ex. 1.) On October 14, 2003, the Superior Court denied the petition on the merits,

holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion by failing to find petitioner suitable for parole. 

(Id., Ex. 2.) On January 9, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. (Id., Ex 3.) On May 11, 2004, the Court of Appeal summarily

denied his petition. (Id.) On June 24, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in the California Supreme Court. (Id.) On June 22, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied

the petition, citing the decisions in People v. Duvall and In re Robbins. (Id., Ex. 10.) Petitioner

filed his original petition in this court on July 18, 2005 and his amended petition on April 16,

2007. 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent moves to dismiss the amended petition on the grounds that: (1)

petitioner is not entitled to relief with respect to his untimely claims that are barred by the

applicable statute of limitations; (2) petitioner failed to exhaust his claims in state court; (3)

petitioner’s claim that the Parole Board is required to fix his release date is not a cognizable

federal claim; and (4) petitioner fails to state a cognizable ex post facto claim based on the Parole

Board’s refusal to release him on parole. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6-9.) 

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I. Respondent’s Arguments

A. Petitioner’s Claims are Untimely

Respondent has construed petitioner’s amended petition as raising the following

claims: (1) “everything after October 1994 is a Deprivation of Petitioner’s Liberty and Illegal

Confinement,” (2) California’s Indeterminate Sentence Law is no longer applicable to his

sentence after he received a parole grant in 1985 because, at that time, he became a determinately

sentenced prisoner, (3) the rescission of his parole grant in 1986 was illegal, and (4) the

application of California’s Determinate Sentencing Law in determining petitioner’s suitability for

release on parole constitutes an ex post facto violation. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) 

Respondent contends that, nowhere in his amended petition does petitioner claim that a specific

parole consideration hearing after 1986 violated his federally protected rights. (Id.) 

Respondent argues that the AEDPA applies to this habeas action. (Resp’t’s Mot.

to Dismiss at 6.) Respondent notes that the AEDPA provides a one-year statute limitations for

the filing of a federal habeas petition, which begins to run from the latest of “the date on which

the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence,” or one year after April 27, 1996, the day AEDPA was enacted. (Id.) 

Because petitioner alleges various violations of his rights in 1985, 1986 and October of 1994, 

respondent contends that petitioner should have discovered the factual predicate for these claims

no later than November 1, 1994. Accordingly, respondent argues that the statute of limitations

began to run on April 27, 1996, and expired April 28, 1997. However, respondent points out,

petitioner did not file his first petition in this court until 2005. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) 

Respondent also contends that petitioner did not even begin process of seeking collateral review

in state court until 2003, and is therefore is not entitled to any statutory tolling since the filing of

a state collateral action after expiration of the limitations period does not restart the statute of

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 Respondent contends that the somewhat vague petition is time barred no matter how it 1

is construed by the court. In this regard, respondent argues that if the amended petition were

construed as raising claims arising from the Parole Board’s 2001 decision, those claims are also

time barred. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 7.) Respondent notes that the Parole Board denied

petitioner parole on July 25, 2001, and rejected his appeal of that decision on June 11, 2002. 

According to respondent, the AEDPA statute of limitations on claims stemming from the Parole

Board’s decision began to run on June 12, 2002, and expired on June 13, 2003, while petitioner

did not commence this action until 2005. Moreover, respondent argues, were the amended

petition construed as raising claims arising from any other Parole Board decision on or before

2004 denying petitioner parole, those claims would also be barred by the statute of limitations. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 7.) Respondent observes that petitioner filed his habeas petition

with the California Supreme Court on June 24, 2004 and that court denied the petition as

untimely, citing In re Robbins, on June 22, 2005. Respondent contends that petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling while this untimely filed petition was pending before the California

Supreme Court. (Id.) (citing Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643-45 (9th Cir. 2007)). Respondent

contends that the AEDPA statute of limitations therefore began to run after the Court of Appeal

denied petitioner’s application for habeas relief on May 11, 2004. More than a year lapsed

between May 11, 2004, and the filing of the first federal petition in July of 2005, rendering the

pending petition untimely. 

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limitations clock. (Id.) Accordingly, respondent concludes that the petition before this court is

time barred.1

Finally, respondent argues that if the court construes petitioner’s amended petition

as claiming an entitlement to equitable tolling between 1986 and the filing of the first federal

petition in July of 2005, the court should reject such an argument. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at

7.) Respondent contends that equitable tolling only applies if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time” and petitioner has not 

even suggested that respondent’s conduct caused his delay in filing his petition. (Id. at 8.) 

According to respondent, petitioner alone made the choice of when and how to pursue state and

federal collateral relief with respect to his claims and is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

AEDPA statute of limitations. 

B. Petitioner Failed to Exhaust His Claims 

Next, respondent argues that petitioner failed to fairly present his federal claims to

the state’s highest court as required. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) Respondent contends that

the AEDPA exhaustion requirement is not satisfied by the filing of a petition in state court that is

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denied as procedurally defective. Rather, fair presentation of a claim for exhaustion purposes

requires that the state court be informed of both the legal and factual basis of the claim. 

Respondent argues that here the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s state habeas

petition with a citation to People v. Duvall in which the court held that a petitioner must include

copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent

portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations. Respondent contends that petitioner

failed to comply with this state procedural requirement and therefore did not fairly present his

claims to the California Supreme Court. (Id. at 8-9.) 

C. Petitioner’s Claim that the Parole Board is Required to Fix His Release Date Is Not a

Cognizable Federal Claim

Petitioner, who was sentenced to seven years to life in prison, generally alleges

that California law requires that his term be fixed and that he be released at the expiration of that

fixed term. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 9.) Respondent argues that, because this claim is

predicated solely on state law, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Respondent

contends that by simply alleging that he has a due process right in the correct application of state

law, petitioner cannot convert a state law claim into a cognizable federal claim. (Id.) 

D. Petitioner’s Ex Post Facto Claim Is Not Cognizable

Finally, respondent argues that petitioner’s claim that failing to release him on

parole is an ex post facto violation is also not cognizable in this federal habeas action. (Resp’t’s

Mot. to Dismiss at 9.) Respondent contends that this same claim was rejected by the Ninth

Circuit in Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1992) where the court held that a

prisoner sentenced under California’s indeterminate sentencing law was not disadvantaged for ex

post facto purposes by application of California’s determinate sentencing law in determining his

parole suitability. (Id.)

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In sum, respondent concludes that petitioner has failed to present this court with

any timely, exhausted and cognizable federal claims. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 10.) 

Accordingly, respondent contends that the court should dismiss the amended petition. (Id.) 

II. Petitioner’s Arguments

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioner first argues that respondent has

not properly characterized the procedural history in this case. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 5.) Specifically, petitioner contends that he was sentenced to seven years to life in

prison under California’s old indeterminate sentencing law in January 1977. (Id.) On November

7, 1985, after California enacted its determinate sentencing law, a panel composed of

commissioners and deputy commissioners representing the Board of Parole fixed petitioner’s

term at 228 months confinement with credit for 214 months applied. (Id.) According to

petitioner, he received an established parole date of June 2, 1994. (Id.) Petitioner contends that

in 1986, however, the Parole Board rescinded that parole date and have not refixed it since. (Id.

at 6.) 

Petitioner argues that the claims presented in his amended petition are timely. 

(Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) Specifically, petitioner contends that he is

“appealing his August 2003 hearing in which [he] received another 2-year denial thus furthering

the deprivation of [his] liberty/illegal confinement. . . .” (Id.) More generally, petitioner notes

that all of his parole hearings from 1996 to the present have resulted in a deprivation of his

liberty. (Id.) Petitioner represents that he has filed numerous administrative appeals, challenging

his parole denials, but they have all been denied. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner concludes that he has been

denied his liberty through fraud and with malice and oppression. (Id. at 8.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion of State Remedies

State courts must have the first opportunity to decide a state prisoner’s habeas

corpus claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273-74 (2005) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

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 On the other hand, “new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim 2

unexhausted.” Beatty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 989 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 538 U.S. 1053

(2003). A claim is unexhausted only if new factual allegations "fundamentally alter the legal

claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See

also Beatty, 303 F.3d at 989-90; Weaver, 197 F.3d at 364. It is not necessary that “every piece of

evidence” supporting federal claims have been presented to the state court. Chacon v. Wood, 36

F.3d 1459, 1469 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). The introduction of new evidence

effects the fair presentation requirement when it “substantially improves the evidentiary basis”

for petitioner’s claims. Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1988). New factual

allegations that are merely cumulative of those presented to the state court do not transform the

claim and thus do not require exhaustion. Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 1189, 1200-02 (E.D.

Cal. 1982), aff'd, 733 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). See also Weaver, 197

F.3d at 364 (acknowledging that although the “precise factual predicate” for a claim had changed

after the evidentiary hearing in federal court, the claim remained rooted in the same incident and

was therefore exhausted).

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509, 518-19 (1982)). In general, a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus will not

be granted unless “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state will not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement

unless the state, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A

petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting to the highest state court all

federal claims before presenting the claims to the federal court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 865 (9th

Cir. 1996). A federal claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts

and the federal legal theory upon which his claim is based. Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359,

364 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Bland v. California Department of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473

(9th Cir. 1994). Thus, a claim is unexhausted where the petitioner did not fairly present the

factual or legal basis for the claim to the state court. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 275. “[I]t

is not enough ... that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459

U.S. 4, 6 (1982). As a rule, the “mere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust.” Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66.2

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II. Discussion

Although petitioner’s amended petition includes a series of broad allegations

regarding his allegedly unlawful confinement from “1986 to the present,” petitioner has clarified

in his opposition to the pending motion that he is seeking to challenge the Parole Board’s August

2003 decision denying him parole. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) However,

petitioner made no specific reference to the Parole Board’s August 2003 decision in his state

habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court on June 24, 2004. (Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss, Ex. 3.) Rather, much like in his amended petition before this court, petitioner set forth

in that state petition only overly-broad and vague arguments that continued confinement was

unlawful. (Id.) Moreover, even if petitioner had referenced the Parole Board’s August 2003

decision in his state petition, the California Supreme Court clearly denied petitioner’s habeas

petition on the ground that he had not presented his claims with sufficient particularity. (Resp’t’s

Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 10.) In this regard, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s habeas

petition citing the decision in People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995), which outlines the

various procedural requirements for a habeas petition in California. In that case the California

Supreme Court stated that a habeas petition must 

both (i) state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is

sought [citations omitted], as well as (ii) include copies of

reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim,

including pertinent portions of the trial transcripts and affidavits or

declarations. [citations omitted]. 

Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474. 

 In addition to failing to state in his petition before the California Supreme Court

that he was challenging the Parole Board’s August 2003 decision, petitioner failed to submit to

that court any documentary evidence regarding the 2003 decision. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex.

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 Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner ever mentioned the August 2003 Parole Board 3

decision in his petition submitted to the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss,

Ex. 3.) Liberally construed, it appears that, if anything, the petition submitted to the California

Supreme Court was a challenge to the Parole Board’s consideration of California’s then new 

determinate sentencing law in fixing petitioner’s term in November of 1985. (Id.) 

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3.) Thus, it is clear from a review of the petition submitted to the California Supreme Court 3

that petitioner did not fairly present the factual or legal basis for his federal claim to the highest

state court by describing the operative facts and the federal legal theory upon which that claim is

based. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 275; Weaver, 197 F.3d at 364; Bland, 20 F.3d at 1473. 

The conclusion that petitioner has failed to exhaust the federal claim presented to this court is

further supported by the California Supreme Court’s citation to Duvall in denying his state

petition. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized:

If the denial of the habeas corpus petition includes a citation of an

authority which indicates that the petition was procedurally

deficient ..., then the available state remedies have not been

exhausted as the California Supreme Court has not been given the

required fair opportunity to correct the constitutional violation. 

Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc). See also Kim v.

Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); McQuown v. McCartney, 795 F.2d 807,

809 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). Here, petitioner has not provided this court with any evidence

suggesting that he filed an amended petition with the California Supreme Court attempting to

cure the defect. Nor has petitioner alleged that state court remedies are no longer available to

him. 

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 The court need not address respondent’s arguments regarding the timeliness of the 4

federal petition or petitioner’s failure to state cognizable claims under § 2254 given the court’s

recommendation that the petition be dismissed due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust his federal

claims in state court. 

 Petitioner is advised that the habeas corpus statute imposes a one-year statute of 5

limitations for filing non-capital habeas corpus petitions in federal court. The one-year period of

limitation “applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons in ‘custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court,’ even if the petition challenges an administrative decision rather than a state court

judgment.” Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004). The limitation period

begins to run on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The

statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). However, since petitioner seeks to challenge

a 2003 parole denial, any federal application for writ of habeas corpus may well be time barred. 

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Accordingly, the court concludes that respondent’s motion to dismiss should be

granted, and petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed due to 4

petitioner’s failure to comply with the exhaustion requirement.5

OTHER MATTERS

Both parties have requested that the court take judicial notice of the exhibits

attached to their briefing. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts is appropriate with respect to

matters that are beyond reasonable dispute in that they are either generally known or capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 and advisory committee notes. Respondent’s request for

judicial notice will be denied as unnecessary. Petitioner’s request for judicial notice will be

denied because he seeks judicial notice of matters that fail to meet the requirements of the

applicable rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Finally, respondent has notified the court that the proper respondent in this case is

K. Mendoza Powers, Warden at Avenal State Prison, not K.M. Power. Respondent is only

partially correct. In both his original petition and in his amended petition, petitioner names K.M.

Powers as the respondent. Therefore, the court will direct the Clerk of the Court to amend the

docket and substitute K. Mendoza Powers as respondent in this action.

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CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s June 7, 2007 request for judicial notice is denied;

2. Petitioner’s June 29, 2007 request for judicial notice is denied; and 

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the docket and substitute K.

Mendoza Powers, Warden at Avenal State Prison, for K.M. Powers, as respondent in this action.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s June 7, 2007 motion to dismiss be granted; and

2. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed due to his 

failure to exhaust his available state remedies with respect to the claims presented. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 8, 2008.

DAD:9

toli1444.157

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