Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02457/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02457-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOANG MINH TRAN,

CDCR # AA-5994 Civil

No. 

10cv2457 BTM (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

WITHOUT PREJUDICE; AND 

(3) DISMISSING CLAIMS FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

WILLIAM GORE; SCHROEDER; OMAR

ORTEGA; MICHAEL DALBRATT;

NICHOLAS RAMIREZ,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at California Men’s Colony in San Luis

Obispo, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493

F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further

orders the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in this case, collect and forward them

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [ECF No. 3]

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil action.

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, unless an

indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are

granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be exercised only

under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A

finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success

on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be

viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

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The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A).

Plaintiff brings this Complaint based on allegations of facts arising from three days that

he spent at UCSD Medical Center undergoing a hernia operation while a pre-trial detainee. (See

Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff claims he was under the custody of the San Diego Sheriff’s Department

during this three day period. (Id. at 4.)

First, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied the right to telephone his family or his lawyer

following the hernia operation. (Id.) While Plaintiff may have stated a claim, he fails to identify

the Defendant whom he claims is responsible for this action. Instead Plaintiff only refers to

“deputy guard” and “San Diego Central Jail Deputies.” (Id.) If Plaintiff chooses to amend this

action, he must identify with more specificity the Defendants whom he claims refused to allow

him to use a telephone for three days.

Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ortega refused to comply with a Physicians’

order directing Plaintiff to walk after his surgery, claiming Plaintiff is a “high risk escape.” (Id.)

While Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the time, the Ninth Circuit has held that a “pretrial

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detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the

Eighth Amendment,” and therefore, “the same standards apply.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). In order to assert a claim for inadequate medical care, Plaintiff must allege

facts which are sufficient to show that each person sued was “deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To be liable, prison officials must purposefully ignore or fail to respond

to Plaintiff’s pain or medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. The “deliberate indifference’

standard applies to claims that correction facility officials failed to address the medical needs

of pretrial detainees.” Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir.

2010).

 If Plaintiff is attempting to allege that there was a delay in treatment based on Defendant

Ortega’s actions in which he allegedly refused to comply with a Physician’s orders to walk

following his surgery, there are no facts in the Complaint from which the Court can determine

whether he has suffered any injury as a result of Defendant Ortega’s action. Plaintiff was only

in the hospital for three days and he fails to allege any facts to show that he was harmed by not

being able to walk around the hospital following his surgery. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State

Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (a prisoner can make “no claim for

deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.”)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dalbratt and Ramirez “left [Plaintiff] starving for three

(3) days” while he was hospitalized at UCSD Medical Center. (Compl. at 5.) Defendants

Dalbratt and Ramirez are Deputy Sheriffs. (Id. at 2-3.) However, in another portion of his

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges San Diego Sheriff William Gore and San Diego Sheriff Lieutenant

E. Schroeder were responsible for the alleged deprivation of food for the three days he was in

the hospital. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff does not allege any facts as to what role, if any, that medical

staff played in this alleged complete deprivation of food while he was hospitalized following his

surgery. A “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Here, the claims that two Deputy

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Sheriffs could have completely deprived Plaintiff of food for three days while under the care of

hospital medical staff does not rise to level of “facial plausibility.” Id. Plaintiff must plead more

facts surrounding the circumstances of this alleged deprivation in order for the Court to find that

he has adequately stated a claim. In other words, Plaintiff must plead more facts to “nudge” his

claim of deliberate indifference “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. (citing Bell

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007)).

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Ortega, Dalbratt and Ramirez used excessive

force while handcuffing him causing his wrists to bleed and bruise in retaliation for his “alleged’

high profile escape.” (Compl. at 4-5.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient

to state an excessive force claim against these Defendants. However, to the extent that Plaintiff

is attempting to allege a retaliation claim against these Defendants, the Court dismisses these

claims as duplicative. A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and

without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at

issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244,

248 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff has filed ten cases pursuant to § 1983 and several involve the same

Defendants. In addition, many of Plaintiff’s other lawsuits involve allegations arising from the

day before and the days immediately following the claims that are in the action currently before

the Court. See Tran v. Gore, et al., 10cv0464 DMS (POR); Tran v. Gore, et al., 10cv1323 BTM

(WMc) and Tran v. Gore, et al., 10cv1751 JAH (WVG). In these matters, Plaintiff often refers

to the same Defendants and claims that their actions were taken in retaliation for the fact that he

was being charged with attempting to escape from the San Diego Central Jail. Thus, Plaintiff

cannot proceed with a retaliation claim in this action based on the same set of facts against the

same Defendants because it would lead to inconsistent rulings. The Court will dismiss

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims without leave to amend but also without prejudice to pursue in the

other actions. 

Plaintiff will have the opportunity to file an Amended Complaint or notify the Court that

he intends to proceed as to those claims that the Court has determine survive the screening

process.

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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 3] is DENIED without

prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Plaintiff has thirty (30) days to either: (1) notify the Court of his intention to

proceed with the claims that the Court has determined survive the sua sponte screening process;

or (2) file an amended complaint which addresses each deficiency of pleading noted above. If

Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended Complaint it must be complete in itself without reference

to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CA. CIV.LR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims

not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff chooses the first option, the Court will

issue the appropriate Order directing the United States Marshal to effect service as to the

remaining Defendants and claims.

DATED: May 2, 2011

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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