Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08099/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08099-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

· FILED United States C 

ourt of A. 

Tench Cira!ir P.Peals 

KEVIN WINSTON OSBORN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

DUANE SHILLINGER, Warden of the Wyoming) 

State Penitentiary; JAMES FERGUSON, ) 

Deputy Warden of the Wyoming State ) 

Penitentiary; C.M. JOHNSON, Associate ) 

Warden of the Maximum Security Unit at ) 

the Wyoming State Penitentiary; BLAKE ) 

SMITH, Sergeant of the Maximum Unit at ) 

the Wyoming State Penitentiary; LAURIE ) 

LEE CRAWFORD, Counselor in the Maximum ) 

Security Unit at the Wyoming State ) 

Penitentiary; MARVELLE JOCHIM, Social ) 

Worker, Department of Health and Social) 

Services, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

fi 1AY {] 1997 

ROBERTL HO 

CI;rk 'ECI<BR 

No. 90-8099 

(D.C. No. C90-28-J) 

(D. Wyo.) 

Before MCKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-8099 Document: 010110106494 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 1 
Kevin Winston Osborn appeals the district court's dismissal 

of his complaint based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 

(1988) as frivolous. We grant Mr. Osborn's motion for leave to 

proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees because we 

conclude that he sets forth a rational argument on the law and 

facts in support of some of the issues raised on appeal. See 

Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989); Yellen v. 

Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1987). We reverse as to 

the dismissal of the section 1983 claim, and affirm with respect 

to the claims brought under sections 1985(3) and 1986. 

Mr. Osborn contends that defendants denied him his 

constitutional right to access to the courts by refusing to allow 

him to contact his attorney the day of a hearing to determine 

whether his daughter was a child in need of supervision by the 

state as defined by Wyo. Stat.§ 14-6-20l(a)(iv) (1977), and by 

prohibiting him from attending that judicial proceeding to which 

he was a party. Mr. Osborn claims that because defendants 

prohibited him from contacting his attorney, Juan L. DeHerrara, he 

could not give Mr. DeHerrara documentary evidence that would have 

aided in his attempt to prove that his daughter was not in need of 

supervision. He also contends that defendants would not allow Mr. 

DeHerrara to visit with him to discuss the hearing because he was 

under disciplinary restrictions. Mr. Osborn further alleges that, 

on the day of his daughter's hearing, defendants told him that the 

hearing was cancelled, that his presence at the hearing was not 

necessary, and that he could not telephone his attorney. The 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-8099 Document: 010110106494 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 2 
district court dismissed the complaint without the issuance of a 

summons, ruling that it was frivolous. 1 

"The test for determining if an action is frivolous is 

whether plaintiff can make a rational argument on the facts or law 

in support of his claim .•.. " Dolence v. Flynn, 628 F.2d 1280, 

1281 (10th Cir. 1980); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 828 (10th 

Cir. 1979). The standard for dismissing a claim as frivolous 

under 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d) is more stringent than the standard for 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Neitzke, 109 S. Ct. at 1833-

34; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). "When a 

complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district 

court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the 

plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, but 

dismissal on the basis of frivolousness is not." Neitzke, 109 

S. Ct. at 1833. "Dismissal under§ 1915(d) is appropriate when 

the claims are based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or 

on clearly baseless factual contentions." Wilson, 878 F.2d at 

774. 

Our review of Mr. Osborn's section 1983 claim convinces us it 

is not frivolous. The Constitution guarantees prisoners 

"adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. 

1 Mr. Osborn originally filed this case on January 25, 1990, 

without prepayment of fees. He amended his complaint on June 7 

without leave of court. He then petitioned this court for a writ 

of mandamus compelling the district court to decide the case. On 

September 18, this court issued an order to the district court to 

respond to Mr. Osborn's petition. On October 5, the district 

court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(d)(l988). 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-8099 Document: 010110106494 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 3 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 

559, 583 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). 

"This right is one of the privileges and immunities 

accorded citizens under article 4 of the Constitution 

and the Fourteenth Amendment. It is also one aspect of 

the First Amendment right to petition the government for 

redress of grievances. Finally, the right of access is 

founded on the due process clause and guarantees the 

right to present to a court of law allegations 

concerning the violation of constitutional rights." 

Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990), (citing 

Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

474 U.S. 1032 (1985). States must 'assure the indigent defendant 

an adequate opportunity to present [her or] his claims fairly.'" 

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823 (quoting Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 616 

(1974)). The right of access is applicable to civil, as well as 

criminal, matters. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-80 

(1974). "[A] prisoner's right of access to the courts includes 

contact visitation with [her or] his counsel." Ching v. Lewis, 

895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Nees v. Bishop, 730 

F.2d 606, 613 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[T]here might well be a violation 

of the right of access to the courts by refusal of contact with an 

attorney."). Indeed, "an inmate's opportunity to confer with 

counsel is a particularly important constitutional right which the 

courts will not permit to be unnecessarily abridged." Dreher v. 

Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141, 1146 (7th Cir. 1980). A prisoner must be 

afforded a reasonable opportunity to receive professional legal 

assistance. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-8099 Document: 010110106494 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 4 
"The constitutionally relevant benchmark is meaningful, not 

total or unlimited, access." Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 

226 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986) (emphasis in 

original). When an institutional restriction infringes on a 

prisoner's constitutional right, a court must balance its duty to 

protect that right with the prison's legitimate penological 

objectives, including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation, and 

security. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 

(1987); Ramos, 639 F.2d at 579. A court also must consider in the 

balance the cost to the prison of removing any infringement on the 

prisoner's constitutional rights. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 

90 (1987); Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 244 (1989). The standard of review is 

whether the infringement on the prisoner's right "is reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests." Safley, 482 U.S. at 

89. 

The district court summarily held that Mr. Osborn's initial 

contact with Mr. DeHerrara by mail two weeks before the hearing 

and by mail and in person after the hearing, as well as Mr. 

Osborn's two previous appearances before the juvenile court, 2 

amounted as a matter of law to constitutionally sufficient access. 

We disagree that the issue can be decided so easily. When a party 

to a judicial hearing is not allowed to supply to her or his 

2 Mr. DeHerrara was appointed to represent Mr. Osborn in the 

state proceedings after Mr. Osborn had appeared prose at the 

first two hearings. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-8099 Document: 010110106494 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 5 
attorney evidence that would further that party's interests at the 

hearing, that party's access can not, as a matter of law, be 

characterized as "adequate, effective, and meaningful." Cf. 

Ching, 895 F.2d 609 (denial of opportunity to communicate 

privately with attorney abridges prisoner's meaningful access to 

courts); Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(prisoner unjustifiably prevented from contacting attorney); 

Dreher, 636 F.2d at 1143 (opportunity to communicate privately 

with an attorney important part of meaningful access); Bach v. 

Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 

910 (1974)(same); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 

1973)(prison security precautions designed to provide prisoners 

with "minimal access" to their attorneys unconstitutional); 

Johnson v. Galli, 596 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Nev. 1984) (no 

legitimate governmental purposes in denying inmate reasonable 

access to telephone to contact attorney). Most significantly, the 

district court reached its conclusion by balancing Mr. Olson's 

access to the court against abstract penological interests set 

forth in a Seventh Circuit case, none of which were asserted by 

defendants. Indeed, defendants could proffer no countervailing 

interests because they were not even summoned to respond to the 

complaint. 3 Because we conclude that Mr. Osborn's section 1983 

3 We do not imply that the mere allegation by prison officials 

of competing interests will automatically defeat a prisoner's 

claim. Rather, in certain instances, these claims will not be 

appropriate for summary disposition, especially when the 

infringement is the product of a restriction on a particular 

prisoner rather than of a regulation applicable to the entire 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-8099 Document: 010110106494 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 6 
. . . 

claim is not frivolous, we vacate the district court's judgment 

and remand for further proceedings. If the section 1983 claims 

survive to trial, the district court should reconsider its 

dismissal of Mr. Osborn's pendant state claims. 

It is not clear whether Mr. Osborn has abandoned his claim 

under section 1985(3). We therefore address it and hold that his 

assertion of this claim is frivolous because he does not contend 

that the alleged conspiracy to deny him his constitutional rights 

was motivated by classed-based discriminatory animus. See Griffin 

v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Moreover, prisoners are 

not a class protected by section 1985(3). Nakao v. Rushen, 542 F. 

Supp. 856, 859 (N.D. Cal. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 766 

F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1985). Finally, a cause of action will not lie 

under section 1986 absent a valid claim for relief under section 

1985. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 733 (1990). The 

district court therefore properly dismissed Mr. Osborn's section 

1985(3) and 1986 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART. 

prison population. 

-7-

Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-8099 Document: 010110106494 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 7