Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05397/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05397-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN FOWLER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PENSKE LOGISTICS, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-05397-JD 

ORDER RE REMAND MOTION

Re: Dkt. No. 10

Plaintiffs are truck drivers employed by defendant Penske Logistics, LLC (“Penske”) and 

filed this action for California state labor code violations in Alameda Superior Court. Dkt. No. 1. 

Penske removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 

Plaintiffs move to remand the case back to state court, or, in the alternative, for leave to amend the 

complaint by adding a non-diverse defendant. Dkt. No. 10. The motion is denied. 

The remand motion is based on the timeliness of the removal petition. Plaintiffs contend 

defendants waited too long to remove the case under 28 U.S. Code Section 1446(b). Plaintiffs

filed the state court complaint on September 16, 2016, and defendants did not remove the action 

until September 18, 2017. 

The rules governing the timing of removal are straightforward. “After a defendant learns 

that an action is removable, he has thirty days to remove the case to federal court.” Durham v. 

Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). The 

removal clock “starts to run from defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading only when that 

pleading affirmatively reveals on its face the facts necessary for federal court jurisdiction.” Id. 

(internal quotation and citation omitted). Otherwise, the removal period begins when a defendant 

“receives ‘a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper’ from which it can 

determine that the case is removable.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). These rules are applied 

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in conjunction with the principle that removal statutes are “‘strictly construed’ against removal 

jurisdiction.” Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Syngenta 

Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002)). 

As plaintiffs concede, the complaint did not disclose removability on its face. Dkt. No. 1-

1. The question, then, is whether a subsequent document demonstrated the possibility of removal, 

and whether defendants acted in a timely manner in light of that disclosure. Plaintiffs suggest 

several dates by which defendants should have known removal was possible, but did not act. For 

example, they say the removal clock began to run on July 18, 2017, when the parties filed a joint 

case management statement acknowledging their agreement to mediate the action as an individual 

rather than a class proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3) (“information relating to the amount in 

controversy in the record of the State proceeding . . . shall be treated as an ‘other paper’ under 

subsection (b)(3)”). Plaintiffs overstate the import of that document. Certainly, the removal 

statute “‘requires a defendant to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in ascertaining 

removability.’” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2001)). “Multiplying 

figures clearly stated in a complaint is an aspect of that duty,” but defendants are “not obligated to 

supply information which [the plaintiff] . . . omitted,” or even to make a “plausible-enough guess” 

about the amount in controversy. Id. at 1140-41. This standard “forces plaintiffs to assume the 

costs associated with their own indeterminate pleadings.” Id. at 1141. Here, the complaint does 

not offer any numbers regarding wages or total hours worked by any plaintiff. As plaintiffs’ own 

remand motion indicates, defendant would have had to “review[] its records” in order to calculate 

potential damages. Dkt. No. 10 at 8. Circuit precedent makes clear that such reviews are not 

required by the removal statute. 

Plaintiffs also argue that the removal clock began to run on August 8, 2017, when the 

parties participated in a mediation session. Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 975 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“‘settlement letter is relevant evidence of the amount in controversy’”) (quoting Cohn 

v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002)). The mediator shared plaintiffs’ gross 

settlement demands rather than individual plaintiffs’ demands. Dkt. No. 11-1. Plaintiffs do not 

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dispute that only a gross settlement amount was discussed, see Dkt. No. 13, nor do they argue that 

the gross settlement amount evidenced at least $75,000 in controversy for a specific individual. 

See Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Consequently, Penske could not have determined removability on August 8, and the removal clock 

did not begin to run. 

The record shows that the clock properly started when Penske received a breakdown of 

individual demands on September 6, 2017. See Dkt. No. 10-1 Exh. 1. It promptly filed a notice of 

removal 12 days later. Consequently, removal was timely under Section 1446(b)(3). Plaintiffs do 

not seek remand under Section 1446(c)(1), which states that a “case may not be removed under 

subsection (b)(3) on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] more than 1 year after commencement of 

the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c). While it appears that Penske removed the case more than a year 

after the action was filed, Section 1446(c)(1) imposes “a procedural, non jurisdictional 

requirement” that is “waivable.” Smith v. Mylan Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Plaintiffs have waived the one year limitation by failing to raise it in their motion, and the Court 

lacks authority to remand sua sponte on that basis. 

In the alternative, plaintiffs ask that the Court permit joinder of Joshua Blahnick, a nondiverse defendant, and remand the action to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Plaintiffs allege 

that Blahnick was the operations manager and highest ranking supervisor at the Patterson terminal, 

where several plaintiffs worked, and was responsible for at least some of the labor code violations 

in the case. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 13-1. Plaintiffs do not contend that they have a right to 

amend as a matter of course under Rule 15(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). 

“[T]he decision regarding joinder of a diversity destroying-defendant is left to the 

discretion of the district court.” Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The standard is “permissive,” id., and the district court’s discretion to deny joinder under Section 

1447(e) is greater than in the Rule 15(a) context. See McGrath v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 298 

F.R.D. 601, 607 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (listing cases). A “trial court should look with particular care at 

[plaintiff’s motive in seeking joinder] . . . in removal cases, when the presence of a new defendant 

will defeat the court’s diversity jurisdiction and will require a remand to the state court.” Desert 

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Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing joinder 

standards under Rule 20, before enactment of Section 1447(e)). Here, plaintiffs’ proposed 

amendment appears to be motivated solely by their desire to litigate this action in state court. 

Plaintiffs represent that they sent a letter to the California Labor and Workforce Development 

Agency documenting their wage and hour allegations in July 2016. Dkt. No. 13-1 at 2. They filed 

this lawsuit in September 2016. They offer no compelling explanation for why it took them well 

over a year to identify the highest ranking supervisor at plaintiffs’ workplace. See Dkt. No. 13. 

That long delay appears even more suspect in light of plaintiffs’ insistence that Blahnick is 

“required for just adjudication of this dispute.” Id. at 8. 

Plaintiffs’ motion for remand or joinder is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2018

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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