Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03035/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEF ROBINSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

DIGNITY HEALTH D/B/A CHANDLER 

REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 

 Defendant. 

Case No.: 16-CV-3035 YGR

ORDER GRANTING STAY; VACATING CASE 

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE; SETTING 

COMPLIANCE HEARING 

DKT. NO. 64 

Defendant Dignity Health dba Chandler Regional Medical Center (“Chandler”) moves for 

an order staying this action pending the resolution by the United States Supreme Court of 

Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., No. 16-273, on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s 

resolution of one of the questions would decide an issue central to the complaint of Plaintiff Josef 

Robinson, and a stay would affect efficient administrative of justice while imposing no harm on 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff opposes the motion. 

Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, and for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Stay.1

Plaintiff Josef Robinson, a transgender employee of Chandler, filed a lawsuit against 

Chandler on June 6, 2016. The complaint alleges that Chandler discriminated against Robinson on 

the basis of sex by excluding coverage for “sex transformation” surgery from Chandler’s health 

plan. Robinson alleges that the exclusion violates the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII 

section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Section 

1557 expressly incorporates the sex discrimination prohibition of Title IX. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116 

 1

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 

finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the Court VACATES

the hearing set for December 13, 2016.

Case 4:16-cv-03035-YGR Document 72 Filed 12/06/16 Page 1 of 5
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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

(“Except as otherwise provided for in this title ... an individual shall not, on the ground[s] 

prohibited under ... title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) ... be 

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, 

any health program or activity” receiving federal funds). 

On September 27, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on Chandler’s still-pending motions 

to dismiss and to change venue. 

On October 28, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gloucester County, on two 

of the three questions posed: 

2. If [the] Auer [doctrine concerning deference to an agency opinion] is 

retained, should deference extend to an unpublished agency letter that, 

among other things, does not carry the force of law and was adopted in 

the context of the very dispute in which deference is sought? 

3. With or without deference to the agency, should the Department's 

specific interpretation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 be given 

effect? 

Gloucester County School Bd. v. G.G., 2016 WL 4610979 (U.S.); see Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. 

G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 16-273, 2016 WL 4565643, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016). Dignity argues 

that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gloucester County will decide the issue of whether Title IX’s 

ban on sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity, and therefore the 

meaning of the sex discrimination prohibition for purposes of section 1557 of the ACA as well. 

Thus, Dignity contends that this action should be stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision. 

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD 

A district court has discretionary power to stay proceedings in its own court under Lockyer 

v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 

U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). “A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and 

the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of 

independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 

593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). “This rule ... does not require that the issues in such 

proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” Id. at 863–64. While a 

court’s discretion to stay matters pending before it is broad, such discretion is not unfettered. See 

Case 4:16-cv-03035-YGR Document 72 Filed 12/06/16 Page 2 of 5
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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007). “[I]f 

there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to someone else,” 

the party moving for a stay “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to 

go forward.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. The length of a stay must be proportionate to “the strength 

of the justification given for it.” See Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). A greater 

showing is required to justify especially long stays, or those of “indefinite” term. Id.; Dependable 

Highway Exp., 498 F.3d at 1066. Thus, in determining whether to exercise its discretion to stay the 

case, a court must weigh: 

[1] the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, [2] the 

hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, 

and [3] the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or 

complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to 

result from a stay. 

CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). 

III. ANALYSIS

Here, Plaintiff’s claim under the ACA would be directly affected by an interpretation of 

Title IX addressed to the meaning of “on the basis of sex,” since that definition is expressly 

incorporated into the text of section 1557. The meaning of that phrase is the subject of Question 3 

in the Gloucester County petition for certiorari, on which review was granted. While it is true that 

Question 3 concerns one of the exceptions under Title IX, which permits recipients of federal funds 

to provide separate but comparable facilities shower and bathroom facilities on the basis of sex (as 

stated in 34 C.F.R. § 106.33), the central issue there, as here, is whether “sex” encompasses gender 

identity for purposes of anti-discrimination protection under the statute. Further, the Ninth Circuit 

has held that Congress meant similar substantive standards to apply under Title IX and Title VII 

when interpreting the meaning of “on the basis of sex.” Emeldi v. University of Oregon, 698 F.3d 

715, 724 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1997 (2013). Certainly, the 

Supreme Court could decide the two questions it has certified for review more narrowly, reaching 

only issues of administrative law and deference, the questions under consideration indicate that the 

issue in this case is squarely before it for decision as well. Thus, a stay to await the Supreme 

Case 4:16-cv-03035-YGR Document 72 Filed 12/06/16 Page 3 of 5
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United States District Court 

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Court’s decision would serve the orderly administration of justice and simplify the issues in the 

litigation, given the high likelihood that the decision in Gloucester County would affect the 

decision of one or both of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court notes that, unlike the cases cited by the 

parties in which a sister court or administrative proceeding could have an effect, here the key 

question posed by this litigation is before our highest court, making its pronouncements far more 

significant to the outcome here. 

 In terms of harm that might result from granting a stay while awaiting the decision, such 

harm is minimized if not completely eliminated by the change in Chandler’s policy that will go into 

effect in less than one month. Chandler has offered evidence that it will change the policy at issue 

in this litigation as of January 1, 2017, such that it will no longer exclude from coverage treatment, 

drugs, service, and supplies for or leading to, sex transformation surgeries, such as the hormone 

therapy, chest surgery, and phalloplasty for which Plaintiff sought coverage here. (Declaration of 

Eva-Marie Palermo at ¶ 4.) Chandler acknowledges that it will and must make this change due to 

the ACA’s implementing regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 92.207, which provide that a covered entity 

shall not 

[d]eny or limit coverage ... for any health services that are ordinarily or 

exclusively available to individuals of one sex, to a transgender individual based 

on the fact that an individual's sex assigned at birth, gender identity, or gender 

otherwise recorded is different from the one to which such health services are 

ordinarily or exclusively available; [h]ave or implement a categorical coverage 

exclusion or limitation for all health services related to gender transition; ... or 

[o]therwise deny or limit coverage ... for specific health services related to 

gender transition if such denial, limitation, or restriction results in 

discrimination against a transgender individual. 

45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (b) (3)-(5). Thus, the policy challenged in the instant case will be eliminated. 

While this leaves for decision questions of whether Chandler’s previous denial of coverage was a 

violation of Title VII and the ACA, with this change in policy the harm Robinson suffered from 

those past denials will not be compounded during a temporary stay of the litigation awaiting the 

Supreme Court’s decision this term. 

 As to the factor considering hardship or inequity to Chandler, the Court agrees that normal 

costs of litigation or risks that a decision could be affected by a contrary Supreme Court 

Case 4:16-cv-03035-YGR Document 72 Filed 12/06/16 Page 4 of 5
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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

determination are not sufficient to justify a stay. See Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (“[B]eing required 

to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute a ‘clear case of hardship or inequity’ within the 

meaning of Landis.”) Consequently, this factor does not weigh in favor of a stay, but leaves the 

equities as between the parties essentially in equipoise. As a consequence, the Court finds that 

considerations of the orderly and efficient administration of justice counsel a stay under the 

circumstances. 

 Based upon the foregoing, the Motion to Stay is GRANTED. 

 The case management conference set for December 13, 2016, is VACATED. This matter is 

set for a compliance hearing regarding the status of the Gloucester County case on March 17, 2017, 

on the Court’s 9:01 a.m. calendar. Five business days prior to the compliance hearing, the parties 

shall file a joint status report of no more than three pages. Upon review of the status report, the 

Court may vacate the compliance hearing. 

This terminates Docket No. 64. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 6, 2016 _______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:16-cv-03035-YGR Document 72 Filed 12/06/16 Page 5 of 5