Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01405/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01405-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

11 	 CARL RUDOLPH SMALLS, 

Booking #12590339, 12 

Plaintiff, 13 

14 

vs. 

16 

17 SAN DIEGO SHERIFF'S OFFICE; 

BILL GORE; SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL; 
 18 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, 19 

Defendants. 

21 

22 

Civil No. 13cv1405 WQH (MDD) 

ORDER: 

(I) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

(ECF Doc. No.2) 

(2) DENYING MOTIONS FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

AND FOR PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION (ECF Doc. Nos. 3, 4) 

AND 

(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 

23 Carl Rudolph Smalls ("Plaintiff'), currently incarcerated at George Bailey Detention 

24 Facility ("GBDF") in San Diego, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

26 Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No.2), a Motion for Appointment of 

27 Counsel (ECF Doc. No.3), and a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (ECF Doc. No.4). 

28 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his rights to free speech, due 

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process, and to receive adequate medical attention at GBDF. See Compl. at 3-5. Plaintiffs 

Complaint seeks both monetary and injunctive relief, but his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 

focuses solely on the San Diego County Jail's restrictions on inmate mail. See PI. 's Mot. Prelim. 

Inj. (ECF No.4). 

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe United 

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(aV An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee 

only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP 

remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is 

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylorv. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844,847 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(I), and that he has attached a certified copy ofhis trust account statement pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIvLR3.2. Plaintiffs trust account statement shows that 

he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No.2) and assesses no initial partial filing 

fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further orders the Watch Commander at 

George Bailey Detention Facility to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in 

this case, collect and forward them to the Clerk ofthe Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(I). 

II. MOTION FOR ApPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil 

action. The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, 

1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013, 

must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § I9I4(a), (b); Judicial Conference 

Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May 1,2013). However, the additional $50 

administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. Id 

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unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty ifhe loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. 

o/Social Services, 452 U.S. 18,25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district 

courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be 

exercised only under "exceptional circumstances." Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 

Cir. 1991). "A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the 

'likelihood ofsuccess on the merits and the ability ofthe plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se 

in light ofthe complexity ofthe legal issues involved.' Neither ofthese issues is dispositive and 

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision." Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

The Court denies Plaintiffs request without prejudice because, for the reasons set out 

below, neither the interests ofjustice nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of 

counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 

1017. 

III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"),s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also 

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 

Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or 

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, 

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after docketing." 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua 

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who 

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,1126­

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnickv. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,446 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2000) (§ 1915A). 

"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that 

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Campbell v. 

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Washington Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ketchum v. 

Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

First, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the "San Diego County Sheriff s Office," the "San 

Diego County Jail," and the "California Department of Corrections" have violated his 

constitutional rights, his Complaint fails to state a claim because these entities are not "persons" 

subject to suit under § 1983. Neither a local law enforcement department (like the San Diego 

County Sheriffs Office), a jail (like the San Diego County Jail), or a state agency (like the 

California Department of Corrections), are proper defendants under § 1983. See Vance v. 

County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Naming a municipal 

department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a 

municipality.") (citation omitted); Powellv. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757,758 (N.D.Ill. 

1993) ("Section 1983 imposes liability on any 'person' who violates someone's constitutional 

rights 'under color oflaw.' Cook County Jail is not a 'person.'); 

While the County of San Diego itself may be considered a "person" and therefore, a 

proper defendant under § 1983, see Monell v. Department ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978); Hammondv. County ofMadera, 859 F.2d 797,801 (9th Cir. 1988), Plaintiff has not 

named the County as a Defendant. Moreover, as a municipality, the County may be held liable 

under § 1983-but only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a constitutional deprivation 

was caused by the implementation or execution of "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, 

or decision officially adopted and promUlgated" by the County, or a "final decision maker" for 

the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board ofthe County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

397,402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712,714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, 

"respondeat superior and vicarious liability are not cognizable theories of recovery against a 

municipality." Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002). 

"Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the alleged constitutional deprivation was inflicted 

in 'execution ofa government's policy or custom.'" Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which "might plausibly suggest" that either 

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the County itself, or any individual County employee (a "person"), like Sheriff Gore, violated 

his constitutional rights. See Hernandez v. County o/Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),s pleading standards to Monell claims); 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for relief only 

against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by affirmative acts, 

participation in another's affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally required duties, cause the 

deprivation of plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights). Moreover, while Plaintiff's 

Complaint broadly challenges the facial validity ofjail mail or other GBDF "policies" requiring 

"all inmates ... to wear shower shoes," it further fails to contain "sufficient allegations of 

underlying facts" to show that Sheriff Gore, in either his official or individual capacity and with 

"final decision-making authority," acted pursuant to an official municipal policy, custom or 

practice, with the requisite intent to cause a violation ofPlaintiff's First, Eighth, or Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Brown, 520 U.S. at 

403; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a viable section 1983 

claim against any of the currently named Defendants, it is therefore subject to sua sponte 

dismissal pursuantto 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Because Plaintiff is proceeding 

pro se, however, the Court having now provided him with "notice of the deficiencies in his 

complaint," will also provide him an opportunity to "effectively" amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 

698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 

1992)). 

IV. 	 MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

Plaintiff has also submitted a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction pursuant to 

FED.R.CIV.P. 65 (ECF Doc. No.4). 

"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as ofright." Winter 

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,24 (2008) (citation omitted). "The 

proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate 'that he 

is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

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preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 

public interest.'" Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Winter., 555 U.S. at 20). " "[S]erious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships 

that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long 

as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction 

is in the public interest." Alliancefor Wild Rockiesv. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 

2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable 

injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction. A plaintiff must do more than 

merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate 

immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief." Caribbean 

Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldridge, 84 F.2d 668,674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). In sum, 

an injunction "may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief." 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 

In addition, an injunction "binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by 

personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, 

employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with 

[them]." FED.R.CIV.P.65(d)(2). In general, "[a] federal court may issue an injunction ifit has 

personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not 

attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court." Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 

727 (9th Cir. 1985). One "becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that 

capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time 

within which the party served must appear to defend." Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 

Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). The court may not attempt to determine the rights of 

persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229,234-35 

(1916); Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727-28. 

In this case, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, in which he seeks to "enjoin 

Defendants from enforcing unconstitutional jail mail policies to reject or otherwise censor news 

journals, subscription materials, book catalogs, and other correspondence," Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. 

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Inj. at 1, must be denied for the same reasons his Complaint must be dismissed. In other words, 

because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any named Defendant, he necessarily cannot 

and has not yet shown that he is "likely to succeed on the merits" of any free speech claim, that 

"the balance ofequities tips in his favor," or that the issuance of an injunction in his case would 

serve the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Moreover, even if Plaintiff could satisfY all 

the Winter factors justifYing extraordinary injunctive relief under Rule 65, at this stage of the 

proceedings, it simply lacks jurisdiction over any ofthe parties Plaintiff seeks to enjoin. Zepeda, 

753 F.2d at 727-28. 

V. 	 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF Doc. No.3) and Plaintiff s 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF Doc. No.4) are DENIED. 

2. Plaintiffs Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No.2) is 

GRANTED. 

3. The Watch Commander ofGeorge Bailey Detention Facility, or his designee, shall 

collect from Plaintiffs inmate trust account the $350 balance ofthe filing fee owed in this case 

by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) 

ofthe preceding month's income and forward payments to the Clerk ofthe Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on the WATCH 

COMMANDER, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, Suite 5300, San Diego, 

California 92158. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

5. Plaintiff s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). 

However, Plaintiff is further GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is 

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filed in which to submit a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies ofpleading 

noted above. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to 

his original pleading. See S.D. CAL. ClvLR 15.1. Defendants not named and any claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F .2d 565, 

567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

DATED: ~~l HON. WILLIAM Q. YES 

United States Distr' Judge 

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