Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01117/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sharon Haney, ) 

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 05-1117 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Americus Logistics, L.L.C., )

)

Defendant. ) )

On April 13, 2005, Plaintiff Sharon Haney, filed an

employment discrimination suit against Americus Logistics, L.L.C.

("Americus"). Complt. (doc. 1). She asserts claims under the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.

("ADA"), and the Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 41-1401, et

seq. ("ACRA"). Id. at 1. These claims are based on Haney's

employment with and subsequent discharge from Americus. Id. at 2-

5.

Currently pending before the Court is Americus' motion for

summary judgment, filed on August 4, 2005. Motion (doc. 8). This

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1

 Both parties requested oral argument on this matter. Notice

of Errata (doc. 10); Resp. (doc. 12). The Court, finding oral

argument unnecessary, denies both requests.

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motion was fully briefed on October 26, 2005.1 Reply (doc. 18).

Having carefully considered all the arguments raised by the

parties, the Court now rules.

I. Factual Background

Haney began her employment with Americus in November 2003. 

During the time period relevant to the present litigation, Haney

worked as a security officer at the receiving dock of Fry’s

warehouse. Haney's employment duties with Americus included

checking shipping documents on warehouse truck traffic at the

warehouse. It is unclear whether Haney's position was performed

completely indoors, or if her duties required her to occasionally

leave her indoor post to inspect trucks and other vehicles

traveling to and from the warehouse.

On or about May 5, 2004, Haney was hospitalized for a heart

attack, which resulted in a one month absence from work. On or

about June 8, 2004, Haney submitted a Return to Work Permit

signed by Carrie Solodky, ND, certifying that Haney could return

to "Regular Duty." On that same day, Haney reported to work and

returned to her regular duties. 

Thereafter, Haney's supervisor at Americus informed Haney

that her employment duties were to be changed, requiring her to

perform duties in an outdoor position outside of the warehouse.

On or about July 30, 2004, Haney presented Americus a second

Return to Work Permit, signed by Solodky, again certifying that

Haney could perform "Regular Duty" work. However, in the

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"Remarks" section of the July 30, 2004 Return to Work Permit,

Solodky noted that Haney had been advised "not to do any physical

work outside - especially during the summer months - Temps >

85°F." Due to her condition, Haney requested that she be allowed

to return to her former "indoor" position at the warehouse.

Americus, however, refused this request.

On or about August 2, 2004, Haney refused to return to work.

She claimed that her doctor restricted her from all outdoor

activity. Americus advised Haney that she needed to secure an

additional medical release stating her claimed limitations or

complete a Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") application in order

to retain her position. Haney did not provide another release

form, nor did she complete an FMLA application. She explains that

she did not complete an FMLA application because "leave taken

under the FMLA is without pay." Resp. (doc. 12) at 3. 

Haney was absent from work in excess of one month. Americus

asserts that it then considered Haney to have abandoned her

position and to have voluntarily resigned. 

II. Standard of Review

To grant summary judgment, the Court must determine that the

record before it contains "no genuine issue as to any material

fact" and, thus, "that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether

to grant summary judgment, the Court will view the facts and

inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails

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to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "In such a situation, there

can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Id. at 323. In such a case, the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id.

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between

the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no

genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is any

factual dispute that might affect the outcome of the case under

the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

resolve the dispute in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest

upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but

instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine

issue for trial. See id. at 250. Finally, if the nonmoving

party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly

probative, a court may grant summary judgment. See, e.g.,

California Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan

Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

III. Discussion

Haney includes two counts in her Complaint; Count I asserts

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2

 To prevail on an employment termination claim under the ADA,

a plaintiff must establish: 

(1) that he is a disabled person within the meaning of the

ADA; (2) that he is qualified, that is, with or without

reasonable accommodation (which he must describe), he is able

to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) that

the employer terminated him because of his disability.

Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir.

1995)).

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a claim under the ADA, and Count II asserts a claim under the

ACRA. Complt. (doc. 1). Haney alleges that Americus violated

these statutes by (1) refusing to provide her reasonable

accommodation; and (2) terminating her employment because of her

alleged disability. Id. at 2-5. Americus moves for summary

judgment on both counts, arguing that Haney's claims fail because

she has not shown herself to be disabled under the ADA or the

ACRA. Motion (doc. 8) at 1.

A. Disability Under the ADA and ACRA

In order to qualify for relief under the ADA or ACRA, a

party must establish that he or she is disabled within the

meaning of the statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101;2 29 C.F.R. §

1630.4; A.R.S. § 41-1463(F). Both federal and state laws define

“disability” as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities of such

individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); A.R.S. § 41-1491 (providing that

"[d]isability shall be defined as the term is defined by the

Americans with disabilities Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-336)"). “Major

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Life Activities,” include “functions such as caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,

breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).

Even where an impairment limits a major life activity, an

ADA claimant must demonstrate that the condition "substantially

limits" the major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

Although the ADA does not define "substantially limits," the

Supreme Court interprets the term to suggest "'considerable' or

'specified to a large degree.'" Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). Furthermore, federal regulations define

“substantially limits” to mean:

(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the

average person in the general population can perform; or

(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner,

or duration under which an individual can perform a

particular major life activity as compared to the condition,

manner, or duration under which the average person in the

general population can perform that same major life

activity.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). 

When "working" is the major life activity claimed to be

substantially limited, the claimant must demonstrate that he or

she is “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either

a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as

compared to the average person having comparable training, skills

and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); Thompson v. Holy

Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1997). “The

inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute

a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

In the present case, the major life activity that Haney

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3 It is unclear to the Court whether Haney claims that other

major life activities were substantially limited by her post-heart

attack condition. Included with her response to Americus' motion

for summary judgment, Haney filed the Affidavit of Nurse

Practitioner Carrie Solodky, wherein Solodky states that "Haney is

disabled from performing manual tasks, including working, walking

or standing in temperatures exceeding 85 degrees[.]" Solodky

Affidavit (doc. 15) at 2. The activities of performing manual

tasks, walking, and standing were not specifically claimed in

Haney's complaint, nor were they further argued in Haney's response

to Americus' motion. Such activities have only been raised in

Solodky's Affidavit, and Haney's Response and Statement of Facts

citing Solodky's Affidavit. Id.; Resp. (doc. 12) at 2; PSOF (doc.

13) at 3. 

Although not explicitly listed in the implementing

regulations, the Court shall assume for purposes of this motion

only that "standing" qualifies as a major life activity. See 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). However, even if the Court finds these claims

raised and considers them in relation to Americus' motion, there is

an insufficient amount of evidence with which to establish that

Haney is substantially limited in the major life activities of

performing manual tasks or walking, or the assumed major life

activity of standing. 

An ADA claimant cannot rely solely on a medical diagnosis, but

instead must offer "evidence that the extent of the limitation

[caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience...is

substantial." Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 534

U.S. 184, 198 (2002), quoting Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527

U.S. 555, 567 (1999). Additionally, the inquiry must focus on the

effect of the impairment on the individual's daily life, not on the

individual's ability to perform a specific job. Id. at 200-01.

Even when viewing the evidence in the light that is most

favorable to Haney, the Court finds that she has not demonstrated

that her post-heart attack condition substantially limits the major

life activities of performing manual tasks or walking, or the

assumed major life activity of standing. Haney does not identify,

specifically or by class, any of the manual tasks that she is

unable to perform, nor does she point to specific facts supporting

a claim that her ability to walk and stand are substantially

limited by her condition. Furthermore, Solodky's Affidavit is also

devoid of any specific facts that support the conclusion that

Haney's ability to perform manual tasks, walk and stand is

substantially limited. Thus, the Court concludes that Haney has not

created a genuine issue of a material fact concerning whether her

post-heart attack condition substantially limits the major life

activities of performing manual tasks and walking, or the assumed

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asserts was substantially limited by her post-heart attack

condition is the activity of working.3 Resp. (doc. 12) at 4. The

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28 major life activity of standing.

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only evidence submitted by Haney that indicates any limitation on

her ability to work is a Return to Work Permit signed by Nurse

Practitioner Carrie Solodky and Solodky's affidavit. Exbt. C

(doc. 9); Solodky Affidavit (doc. 15). In the Return to Work

Permit, Solodky indicated that Haney could return to working

"regular duty" at her job with Americus. Exbt. C (doc. 9). In

addition, Solodky included the following note in the "Remarks"

section of the form:

Pt has been advised not to do any physical work 

outside - especially during the summer months - 

Temps > 85°F.

Id. Solodky clarifies this remark in her submitted affidavit.

Solodky Affidavit (doc. 15) at 2. 

As a result of her heart attack, Sharon Haney was

totally disabled and unable to work from May 5,

2004, until I released her to return to work on

June 8, 2004. When she returned to work, I advised

her not to work under physically stressful

conditions, including doing outside work when

outside temperatures exceeded 85 degrees.

Id.

The Court finds that Haney has not raised a genuine issue of

fact as to whether her condition curtails her general ability to

work. She presents absolutely no evidence regarding the class of

jobs available to her based on her training, skills, and

abilities. Moreover, she points to no evidence indicating that

the limitations incurred from her heart attack preclude her from

engaging in an entire class of jobs. Haney asserts that she has

satisfied this element by stating that she cannot perform "any

job in the Phoenix metropolitan area requiring extended duties

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outdoors, where temperatures consistently exceed 85 degrees for

most of the year." Resp. (doc. 12) at 4. This, however, does not

exclude her from performing any security job that does not

require her to be outside when the temperatures are 85 degrees

Fahrenheit or above. In actuality, Haney, herself, concedes that

she is able to conduct such work, as she argues that Americus

should have allowed her to continue working in an "indoor"

position that she asserts was given to another employee. Id. at

4-5. 

Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.

at 322. Finding no evidence that Haney is significantly

restricted in her ability to perform either a class of jobs or a

broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average

person having comparable training, skills and abilities, the

Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Haney is

disabled under the ADA or ACRA.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Americus' motion for summary judgment

(doc. 8) is GRANTED. 

DATED this 8th day of December, 2005.

Copies to counsel of record

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