Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17489/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17489-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY WHITE; MARGARET

SCHOENINGER; ROBERT L.

BETTINGER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA;

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA; JANET NAPOLITANO;

MARYE ANNE FOX, in her individual

and official capacity as Chancellor

of the University of California, San

Diego; GARY MATTHEWS, in his

individual and official capacity as

Vice Chancellor of the University of

California, San Diego; KUMEYAAY

CULTURAL REPATRIATION

COMMITTEE,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-17489

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-01978-

RS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 3, 2013—San Francisco, California

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 1 of 44
2 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Filed August 27, 2014

Before: Stephen S. Trott, Sidney R. Thomas,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Sidney R. Thomas;

Dissent by Judge Murguia

SUMMARY*

Native Graves Protection and Repatriation Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an

action under the Native Graves Protection and Repatriation

Act on the basis that the affected tribes and their

representatives were indispensable parties and could not be

joined in the action.

The action concerned the “La Jolla remains,” two human

skeletons discovered during an archaeological excavation on

the property of the Chancellor’s official residence at the

University of California-San Diego. The tribes claimed the

right to compel repatriation of the La Jolla remains to one of

the Kumeyaay Nation’s member tribes. Repatriation was

opposed by the plaintiffs, University of California professors

who wished to study the remains. The professors sought a

declaration that the remains were not “Native American”

within the meaning of NAGPRA, which provides a

framework for establishing ownership and control of newly

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 2 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 3

discovered Native American remains and funeraryobjects, as

well as cultural items already held by certain federally funded

museums and educational institutions.

The panel held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing

to bring suit because if the La Jolla remains were repatriated,

the plaintiffs would suffer a concrete injury that was fairly

traceable to the challenged action. In addition, this injurywas

likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.

The panel held that NAGPRA does not abrogate tribal

sovereign immunity because Congress did not unequivocally

express that purpose. The panel held that the “Repatriation

Committee,” a tribal organization, was entitled to tribal

sovereign immunity as an “arm of the tribe.” In addition, the

Repatriation Committee did not waive its sovereign immunity

by filing a separate lawsuit against the University or by

incorporating under California law.

The panel held that the tribes and the Repatriation

Committee were necessary parties under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) and were indispensable under Rule

19(b). In addition, the “public rights” exception to Rule 19

did not apply. Accordingly, the district court properly

dismissed the action.

Dissenting, Judge Murguia agreed with the majority that

the plaintiffs had Article III standing, that NAGPRA did not

abrogate the sovereign immunity of the tribes, and that the

Repatriation Committee was entitled to sovereign immunity. 

She would hold, however, that the Committee was not a

necessary and indispensable party because it was neither

necessary nor indispensable to resolution of the question

whether the University properly determined that the La Jolla

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 3 of 44
4 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

remains were Native American within the meaning of

NAGPRA.

COUNSEL

Lauren Coatney (argued), James McManis, Michael Reedy,

and Christine Peek, McManis Faulkner, San Jose, California,

for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Michael Mongan (argued) and Michelle Friedland, Munger,

Tolles & Olson LLP, San Francisco, California; Charles F.

Robinson, Karen J. Petrulakis, and Margaret L. Wu, Office of

the General Counsel, University of California, Oakland,

California; Bradley Phillips, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP,

Los Angeles, California; Dennis Klein, Office of the Campus

Counsel, University of California San Diego, La Jolla,

California, for Defendants-Appellees Regents of the

University of California, Mark G. Yudof, Janet Napolitano,

Marye Anne Fox, and Gary Matthews.

Dorothy Alther (argued), California Indian Legal Services,

Escondido, California, for Defendant-Appellee Kumeyaay

Cultural Repatriation Committee.

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider whether the Native American

Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA” or “the

Act”) abrogates tribal sovereign immunity and, if not,

whether the district court properly dismissed this declaratory

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 4 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 5

judgment action because the tribes and their representatives

were indispensable parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and could

not be joined in the action. We conclude that NAGPRA does

not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and that the affected

tribes and their representatives were indispensable parties. 

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I

In 1976, Gail Kennedy, a professor at the University of

California-Los Angeles (“UCLA”), led an archaeological

field excavation project on the property of the Chancellor’s

official residence at the University of California-San Diego

(“UCSD” or “the University”). During the excavation, the

archaeological team discovered a double burial site and

uncovered two human skeletons (the “La Jolla remains”). 

Scientists estimate that the La Jolla remains are between 8977

to 9603 years old, making them among the earliest known

human remains from North or South America.

The property on which the La Jolla remains were

discovered was aboriginally occupied by members of the

Kumeyaay Nation, which consists of a number of federally

recognized Indian tribes.1 The Kumeyaay, also known as the

Ipai, Tipai, or the Diegueño, aboriginally occupied areas of

the southwestern United States and northwest Mexico. The

KumeyaayNation currentlyoccupies various lands extending

1 These tribes include the Barona Band of Mission Indians; Campo Band

of Kumeyaay Indians; the Ewiiaapaayp Band of Kumeyaay Indians; the

Inaja-Cosmit Band of Mission Indians; the Jamul Indian Village; the La

Posta Band of Mission Indians; the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians;

the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel; the Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay

Nation; and the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians (collectively “the

Tribes” or the “Kumeyaay Nation”).

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 5 of 44
6 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

from San Diego and Imperial Counties in California to 75

miles south of the Mexican border.2

Since their discovery, the University has maintained

custody of the La Jolla remains, but they have been stored at

multiple locations, including UCLA, the San Diego Museum

of Man, the National Museum of Natural History, and the

Smithsonian Institution. The La Jolla remains are presently

in the physical custody of the San Diego Archaeological

Center.

The present dispute is over the custody of the La Jolla

remains. The Tribes and their representatives claim the right

to compel repatriation of the La Jolla remains to one of the

Kumeyaay Nation’s member tribes. Repatriation is opposed

by Plaintiffs Timothy White, Robert L. Bettinger, and

Margaret Schoeninger (“Plaintiffs” or “the Scientists”),

professors in the University of California system, who wish

to study the La Jolla remains.

Resolution of the dispute is largely governed by

NAGPRA, which was passed by Congress in 1990. 

NAGPRA provides a framework for establishing ownership

and control of (1) newly discovered Native American remains

and funerary objects (collectively “cultural items”) and

(2) cultural items already held by certain federally funded

2 Aboriginal interest in land generally is described as a tribe’s right to

occupy the land. It is not a property right, but “amounts to a right of

occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by

third parties.” Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279

(1955). The right, which is residual in nature, comes from the legal theory

that discovery and conquest gave conquerors the right to own the land but

did not disturb the tribe’s right to occupy it. See Johnson v. M’Intosh,

21 U.S. 8 Wheat 543, 588–91 (1823).

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 6 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 7

museums and educational institutions. See 25 U.S.C.

§§ 3001–3013. NAGPRA was enacted in response to

widespread debate surrounding the rights of tribes to protect

the remains and funerary objects of their ancestors and the

rights of museums, educational institutions, and scientists to

preserve and enhance the scientific value of their collections. 

See, e.g., Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 874 n.14

(9th Cir. 2004); S. Rep. No. 101-473, at 3 (1990) (describing

testimony “indicat[ing] the need for a process in which

meaningful discussions between Indian tribes and museums

regarding their respective interests in the disposition of

human remains and objects in the museum[s’] collections

could be discussed and the resolution of competing interests

could be facilitated”).

NAGPRA applies only to “Native American” cultural

items, and it defines “Native American” to mean “of, or

relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the

United States.” 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9). In Bonnichsen, we

interpreted NAGPRA’s definition of “Native American” to

mean of or relating to a “presently existing Indian trib[e],”

people, or culture. 367 F.3d at 875.

The Department of the Interior is the agency charged with

administering NAGPRA. Under NAGPRA, the Secretary

must establish a review committee for the purpose of making

findings and recommendations related to “the identity or

cultural affiliation of cultural items” or “the return of such

items.” See 25 U.S.C. § 3006(c)(3). The Review

Committee’s recommendations are “advisory only and not

binding on any person.” 43 C.F.R. § 10.16(b).

NAGPRA contains, among other things, an “ownership”

provision and a set of “repatriation” provisions. The

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 7 of 44
8 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

ownership provision applies onlyto Native American cultural

items excavated on federal or tribal lands after the effective

date of the Act. 25 U.S.C. § 3002. The provision generally

vests ownership and control over the cultural items in the

lineal descendants of a deceased Native American. 

§ 3002(a)(1). If lineal descendants cannot be identified, then

the provision vests ownership in the tribe on whose land the

remains were discovered (if they were discovered on tribal

lands), or in the tribe having the closest “cultural affiliation”

with the remains (if they were discovered on non-tribal

federal lands). § 3002(a)(2)(A)–(B). If the remains are

discovered on non-tribal federal lands and no cultural

affiliation can be established, then the ownership provision

vests ownership and control in the tribe “that is recognized as

aboriginally occupying the area in which the objects were

discovered.” § 3002(a)(2)(C)(1). NAGPRA defines “cultural

affiliation” as “a relationship of shared group identity which

can be reasonably traced historically or prehistorically

between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian

organization and an identifiable earlier group.” § 3001(2). 

NAGPRA permits tribes to prove aboriginal occupation by

way of a final judgment from the Indian Claims Commission

or the United States Court of Federal Claims, a treaty, an Act

of Congress, or an Executive Order. 43 C.F.R.

§ 10.11(b)(2)(ii).

NAGPRA’s repatriation provisions apply to Native

American cultural items already held by a federal agency or

museum at the time that NAGPRA was enacted, and therefore

apply to the La Jolla remains, which at that time were already

in the University’s possession. The Act’s repatriation

provisions require the agency or museum to compile an

inventory of the “Native American” cultural items within its

possession and to determine each item’s “geographical and

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 8 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 9

cultural affiliation.” 25 U.S.C. § 3003(a). Upon the request

of a culturally affiliated tribe or organization, the agency or

museum must “expeditiously return” culturally affiliated

items to the tribe. § 3005(a)(1). If no cultural affiliation is

established, then the provisions provide that “such Native

American human remains and funerary objects shall be

expeditiously returned where the requesting Indian tribe . . .

can show cultural affiliation by a preponderance of the

evidence based on geographical kinship, biological,

archaeological, anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral

traditional, historical, or other relevant information or expert

opinion.” § 3005(a)(4).

The repatriation provisions also permit the agency or

museum to delay the return of culturally affiliated items if the

items are “indispensable for completion of a specific

scientific study, the outcome of which would be of major

benefit to the United States.” § 3005(b). The repatriation

provisions do not, however, provide a course of action for

circumstances in which the remains are “culturally

unidentifiable.” See generallyRebecca Tsosie, NAGPRA and

the Problem of “Culturally Unidentifiable” Remains: The

Argument for a Human Rights Framework, 44 Ariz. St. L.J.

809, 817 (2012) (describing Congress’s intent to permit the

Secretaryof the Interior to promulgate regulations addressing

culturally unidentifiable remains).

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 9 of 44
10 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

As a “museum” subject to NAGPRA,3the University

promulgated “Policy and Procedures on Curation and

Repatriation of Human Remains and Cultural Items.” 

Pursuant to that policy, the University also established a

systemwide “Advisory Group on Cultural Affiliation and

Repatriation of Human Remains and Cultural Items” (“the

University Advisory Group”) to facilitate compliance with

NAGPRA. The University Advisory Group reviews campus

decisions regarding cultural affiliation and repatriation and

assists in the resolution of disputes that arise involving

cultural items in the University’s possession. It is made up of

at least “one University faculty member delegated principal

responsibility for compliance with [the University’s] policy”

and “two Native American members to be selected by the

President or designee from among nominees submitted by

each campus.” The Vice Provost for Research is the liaison

to the University Advisory Group from the University’s

Office of the President.

The Native American Heritage Commission (“Heritage

Commission”) is the California state agency charged with

identifying and cataloging Native American cultural

resources. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 5097.91, 5097.94. 

Pursuant to its authority under state law, the Heritage

Commission notifies the “most likelydescend[ant]” of Native

American remains and provides that descendant an

opportunity to inspect the site from which the remains were

removed. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5097.98. It also makes

3 Section 3003 requires “[e]ach Federal agency and each museum” to

compile an inventory of Native American cultural items. The University,

as an “institution of higher learning,” is a “museum” under NAGPRA. 

See § 3001(8). If the University does not comply with NAGPRA’s

provisions, it may incur a penalty. § 3007.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 10 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 11

recommendations “for treatment or disposition, with

appropriate dignity, of the human remains.” Id. The statelaw “most likely descend[ant]” determination does not

resolve any questions of affiliation under NAGPRA.

In March 2007, the Heritage Commission identified the

KumeyaayCultural Repatriation Committee (“the KCRC” or

the “Repatriation Committee”) as the “most likely

descendant” for the La Jolla remains. The Repatriation

Committee is a tribal organization that was formed in 1997 by

tribal resolutions from each of its twelve Kumeyaay Nation

member tribes. The organization describes itself as “an

outgrowth of tribal leaders and members [sic] concerns over

the repatriation efforts, or lack thereof, under [NAGPRA] in

San Diego.”

In August 2006, the Repatriation Committee sent a letter

to the University requesting that the La Jolla remains be

repatriated to one of its member tribes. In late 2007, the

Universitybegan consultingwith the Repatriation Committee

to determine the geographical and cultural affiliation of the

La Jolla remains. Concurrent to those consultation efforts,

the University also conducted, pursuant to its policy for

complying with NAGPRA, an academic assessment to

determine the cultural affiliation of the La Jolla remains. The

assessment was completed in May 2008.

The academic assessment concluded that the La Jolla

remains are “culturally unidentifiable.” The assessment

found “that there is not a preponderance of evidence to

support an affirmation of cultural identification or affiliation

with any modern group.” With respect to the Kumeyaay, the

assessment concluded,

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 11 of 44
12 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Although there is evidence from material

culture that people have lived in the San

Diego region since the late Pleistocene or

early Holocene, the linguistic analyses and

archaeological evidence indicate that the

Kumeyaay moved into the region within the

last few thousand years. Kumeyaay folklore

and oral tradition emphasize water (both fresh

and marine) and a specific region within the

Mohave Desert as their places of origin. 

Given the earlyHolocene age ofthe skeletons,

we placed less emphasis on the evidence from

these sources. . . . [H]aplogroups present in a

terminal Pleistocene skeleton from the Pacific

Northwest and in extant coastal Native

Californians are rare or absent in the few

Kumeyaay mitochondrial genomes so far

analyzed. The burial pattern of the 2

skeletons recovered from the UCSD property

differs from that of the Kumeyaay as reported

in early ethnographies.[4]

The assessment also concluded that “[a]ll that can be said

conclusively is that the skeletal morphology of the two

skeletons provides no support for a finding of cultural

affiliation between the two and the Kumeyaay.” Based on the

4 The Pleistocene is the time period spanning 2.6 million to 11,700 years

ago, and the Holocene is the time period spanning 11,700 years ago to the

present. A “haplogroup” is a population sharing a common ancestor. The

mitochondrial genome is the DNA string found in mitochondria, which is

normally inherited only from the mother. See International Science

Times, Tracing the Earliest Americans Through Mitochondrial DNA,

http://www.isciencetimes.com/articles/6344/20131119/tracing-earliestamericans-through-mitochondrial-dna.htm (last visited July 23, 2014).

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 12 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 13

assessment, the University filed its required Notice of

Inventory Completion and inventory with the Department of

the Interior listing the La Jolla remains as not culturally

identifiable with the Tribes. The inventory was silent

regarding any determination of whether the La Jolla remains

are “Native American” as that term is defined under

NAGPRA.

After the academic assessment was completed, it was

forwarded to the University Advisory Group for use in

preparing a recommendation. At the same time, the

University’s Vice Chancellor for Resource Management and

Planning, Gary Matthews, wrote to University Provost and

Executive Vice President Rory Hume describing the 2006

repatriation request and urging the Provost to repatriate the

La Jolla remains. Matthews noted that “[t]here are no

competing requests for repatriation, and the KCRC is the

legally recognized [most likely descendant] in San Diego, as

confirmed by the State of California Native American

Heritage Commission.” Matthews went on to note that

“Native Americans comprise less than 1% of the students at

UC San Diego with not one Kumeyaay student represented in

those meager numbers,” and concluded that “[o]ne strategic

and meaningful step forward would be to address the spirit of

the law and required actions contained within NAGPRA” by

repatriating the remains to the Repatriation Committee. “This

action would have a profound effect on bridging the gap that

is clearly evident between the Native American Community

and the University of California.”

In February 2009, the University prepared a proposed

request form asking the Department of the Interior’s

NAGPRA review committee to act on an agreement between

the University and the Repatriation Committee that would

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 13 of 44
14 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

permit transfer of the La Jolla remains to the Tribes. In that

request for action, the University stated that the La Jolla

remains were “determined to be Native American” based on

their age, the location in which they were excavated, and oral

traditional and folkloric information provided by the Tribes. 

Specifically, the form stated,

[T]he Kumeyaay firmly believe that their

people have lived in this region since the

“beginning.” For example, the Viejas Band

considers the Kumeyaay (referred to as

Digueno) to be the original native inhabitants

of San Diego County – having lived in this

region for more than 10,000 years. See

http://www.viejasbandofkumeyaay.org/html

/tribal_history/kumeyaay_history.html. 

Similarly, the Sycuan Band states that their

ancestors have lived in the San Diego area for

12,000 years – “[t]he earliest documented

inhabitants in what is now San Diego County

are known as the San Dieguito Paleo-Indians,

dating back to about 10,000 B.C.” See

http://sycuan.com/history.html. In addition,

the local Kumeyaay “avow a deep sense of

personal and communal responsibility for the

recovery and proper reburial of all human

remains of people who predate European

settler society.” (modification in original).

The form was submitted to the Department of the Interior, but

was later withdrawn for reasons that are unclear from the

record before us.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 14 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 15

In May 2010, while the University Advisory Group was

considering the academic assessment and developing a

recommendation, the Department of the Interior promulgated

regulations pertaining to the disposition of “culturally

unidentifiable” remains and funerary objects. See 43 C.F.R.

§ 10.11. The regulations apply to “human remains previously

determined to be Native American under § 10.9 [the

regulation setting forth the inventorying process], but for

which no lineal descendant or culturally affiliated Indian tribe

or Native Hawaiian organization has been identified.” 

§ 10.11(a). Culturally unidentifiable remains removed from

federal lands must be transferred to “[t]he Indian tribe or

tribes that are recognized as aboriginal to the area from which

the human remains were removed.” See § 10.11(c)(1)(ii).

In June 2010, the Repatriation Committee wrote to the

University presenting its legal position that the new

NAGPRA regulations required the transfer of the La Jolla

remains to the Repatriation Committee. According to the

Repatriation Committee,

The human remains are “Native American.” 

NAGPRA is only concerned with Native

American remains. By its own actions,

UCSD has treated the human remains as

“Native American.” UCSD submitted the

human remains in its NAGPRA inventory;

submitted the inventory to the UCSD

NAGPRA Working Group and has had

several interactions with the NAGPRA

Designated Federal Officer regarding the

disposition of the human remains. This

action, coupled with meetings with KCRC

regarding the human remains, demonstrates

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 15 of 44
16 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

that UCSD has and continues to treat the

human remains as “Native American.” 

KCRC also points to the work of Dr. Mayes

that shows through her analysis that a tooth

from the female human remain has a

prominent shoveling, which is a characteristic

still present in modern day Native American

populations.

The Repatriation Committee concluded that, because the

La Jolla remains are “Native American” but “culturally

unidentifiable,” the new Department of the Interior

regulations required the University to transfer the La Jolla

remains to the Repatriation Committee, the group

“recognized as aboriginal to the area from which the human

remains were removed.” See 43 C.F.R. § 10.11(c)(1)(ii).

In March 2011, the University Advisory Group issued its

report and recommendations pertaining to the La Jolla

remains. Among other things, the UniversityAdvisoryGroup

addressed “whether the remains were ‘Native American’ as

defined by NAGPRA and case law” and noted that the

University may have “implicitly concluded that the remains

were Native American” by filing a Notice of Inventory

Completion and undergoing the process of establishing

“cultural affiliation.” Some members of the University

Advisory Group “voiced strong concern that there had not

been adequate review/analysis” of that question and “totally

opposed the idea that UCSD should proceed as though the

remains are Native American, even though they might not

be.” The University Advisory Group’s discussion pertaining

to disposition of the remains was “fractured,” and so its

recommendation “focused mostly on the issue of consultation

and not on the issue of ultimate disposition.” In its report, the

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 16 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 17

University Advisory Group recommended additional

consultation, re-analysis of certain funerary objects listed

with the La Jolla remains, and revisions to the Notice of

Inventory Completion on the issue of whether the La Jolla

remains were indeed “Native American.” On the last issue,

[o]ne suggested approach for addressing the

uncertainty surrounding the matter of whether

the remains are “Native American” was to

insert language into the UCSD’s new Notice

of Inventory Completion acknowledging that

given the age of the remains, there is some

uncertainty on the matter of whether they

meet the legal definition of “Native

American,” but that the campus has decided to

proceed under the presumption that they are,

given that the campus already circulated a

previous NAGPRA inventory listing these

remains, given that the campus wishes to

make a disposition, and given that doing so

will ensure that there is adequate notice to the

public and to potentially interested tribes that

a disposition is going to be made. This

approach would avoid having to re-open an

issue that already was dealt with in the

previous inventory, but would partially

address concerns expressed by experts about

the scientific uncertainty that the remains are

“Native American,” and avoid taking a

definitive possibly precedent-setting position

in a high profile matter.

In May 2011, the University President, Mark Yudof,

wrote to the Chancellor at UCSD, Marye Anne Fox,

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 17 of 44
18 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

authorizing disposition of the La Jolla remains subject to

certain conditions and recommendations. Specifically,

President Yudof requested that UCSD engage in broader

consultation efforts and revise its Notice of Inventory

Completion to reflect the “deep division of opinion within the

[University] Advisory Group, with regard to the status of the

remains as Native American under NAGPRA.”

In December 2011, the University issued its final Notice

of Inventory Completion, which stated, “The human remains

are Native American.” It further stated,

Pursuant to 43 C.F.R. 10.11(c)(1), and based

upon request from the Kumeyaay Cultural

Repatriation Committee, on behalf of The

Tribes, disposition of the human remains is to

the La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission

Indians of the La Posta Indian Reservation,

California.[5]

The Plaintiffs, who teach at the University of CaliforniaBerkeley, University of California-Davis, and University

of California-San Diego, allege that they requested an

opportunity to study the La Jolla remains in 2009 and 2010

5 The Repatriation Committee’s policy is that the member tribe

geographically closest to the location in which the remains were found

should act as the tribe for the purposes of repatriation. According to the

Repatriation Committee, the La Posta Band is geographically closest to

the La Jolla remains. The land area of the La Posta reservation is

approximately 3500 acres, and the reservation is located in and around

Boulevard, California. The tribe has 18 members. See University of San

Diego, San Diego Native Americans–Indian Reservations in San

Diego County, http://www.sandiego.edu/nativeamerican/

reservations.php#LaPosta (last visited July 23, 2014).

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 18 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 19

but were never granted permission to do so by Chancellor

Fox. The Scientists believe that they will have opportunities

to study the La Jolla remains–which they allege hold the

highest “degree of research potential” in the “New World”–if

the University does not transfer the La Jolla remains to the La

Posta Band.

Between December 2011, when the University filed its

final Notice of Inventory Completion, and January 2012,

Plaintiffs and the University attempted to resolve outside of

court their dispute over the La Jolla remains. After those

settlement discussions failed, the Repatriation Committee

filed a complaint against the University in the U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of California seeking

declaratory relief and an injunction compelling the transfer of

the La Jolla remains to the La Posta Band.6

Afterward, the Scientists filed a Petition for Writ of

Administrative Mandamus and an initial complaint in

California state court alleging causes of action for

(1) violations of NAGPRA, (2) breach of the public trust, and

(3) violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. On all of

their claims, the Scientists alleged that the University failed

to make a formal and adequate finding that the La Jolla

remains were “Native American” within the meaning of

NAGPRA, and that the University’s decision to transfer the

La Jolla remains pursuant to NAGPRA was therefore

arbitrary and capricious and not supported by the evidence. 

The University removed the action to the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California, and the

6 After the district court denied the Repatriation Committee’s and

Defendants’ joint motion to stay the proceedings in the Southern District

of California, the parties stipulated to a dismissal without prejudice.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 19 of 44
20 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Scientists later amended their complaint to add the

Repatriation Committee as a defendant.

The University moved to dismiss the complaint on the

ground that the district court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over the claim because (1) the Repatriation

Committee and the twelve Kumeyaaytribes are necessaryand

indispensable parties who cannot be joined under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 19 because they are immune from

suit, (2) Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III, and

(3) Plaintiffs’ public trust and First Amendment claims are

unripe.

The district court granted the University’s motion to

dismiss, concluding that the Repatriation Committee is a

necessary and indispensable party under Fed R. Civ P. 19 that

could not be joined because it is immune from suit. Plaintiffs

timely appealed.

II

The first question we must decide is whether Plaintiffs

have Article III standing to bring this lawsuit. In order to

establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) a

concrete injury, (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action

of the defendant, (3) that is likely to be redressed by a

favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560–61 (1992).

Plaintiff White is a professor of integrative biology at the

University of California-Berkeley. He holds Bachelor of

Science degrees in biology and anthropology from the

University of California-Riverside, along with a Master of

Arts and Ph.D in biological anthropology from the University

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 20 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 21

of Michigan-Ann Arbor. His field research concentrates on

the study of ancient humans.

Plaintiff Bettinger is a Professor of Anthropology at the

University of California-Davis. He holds a Bachelor of Arts

and a Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of

California-Riverside. His scholarship and fieldwork have

focused on hunter-gatherers and the population expansions of

hunter-gatherers.

Plaintiff Schoeninger is a professor of anthropology at the

University of California-San Diego. She holds a Bachelor of

Arts in anthropology from the University of Florida, a Master

of Arts in anthropology from the University of Cincinnati,

and a Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Michigan.

Her research centers on the subsistence strategies of early

humans.

The University does not contest that if the La Jolla

remains are repatriated, the Scientists will suffer a concrete

injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged action. 

Instead, the University contends that the injury is not likely

to be redressed by a favorable decision. We therefore focus

on only the third Lujan factor.

To establish redressability under Article III, a plaintiff

“must show only that a favorable decision is likely to redress

his injury, not that a favorable decision will inevitably redress

his injury.” Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir.

1994). A showing that is “merely speculative” is insufficient. 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Scientists seek a declaration that the La Jolla remains

are not “Native American” within the meaning of NAGPRA. 

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 21 of 44
22 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

In their complaint, Plaintiffs seek the opportunity to study the

La Jolla remains. In response, the University argues that,

even if the remains are not Native American, the University

would still have “unfettered discretion” to decide whether and

how to dispose of them. Therefore, the University argues, the

Scientists have not shown that they would likely be able to

study the La Jolla remains even if they obtained relief.

As Plaintiffs point out, however, the University is bound

by its “Human Remains and Cultural Items” policy. That

policy requires the University to maintain human remains for

the public trust for such purposes as “education[] and

research.” It also requires that “[r]emains . . . covered by this

policy shall normally remain accessible for research by

qualified investigators, subject to approval by the curator of

the relevant campus collection.” Taken together, those two

provisions of the policy suggest that it is “likely” that

qualified researchers would have the opportunity to study the

remains if they are not “Native American” and subject to

NAGPRA.

The University does not dispute that Plaintiffs are

qualified researchers employed by the University of

California system. And we assume that the University

follows its established policies. Thus, if the La Jolla remains

are not “Native American” and subject to NAGPRA, then the

University’s own policy suggests that Plaintiffs likely would

be able to study them. A favorable judicial decision is

therefore likely to redress Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. 

Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to establish Article III

standing to maintain this lawsuit.

The University relies on Glanton v. AdvancePCS Inc.,

465 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), but Glanton is

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 22 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 23

distinguishable. The plaintiffs in Glanton claimed that the

defendant had charged the employee welfare benefit plans too

much for drugs, which caused the plans to demand higher copayments and contributions from participants. Therefore, the

plaintiffs contended their suit, if successful, would ultimately

decrease the plans’ co-payment or contribution requirements. 

We held that this assertion of redressability was too

speculative because the plan was not bound to change its copayment or contribution policy and there was no indication

that it would do so. In contrast, here, the University does not

possess unfettered discretion as to the La Jolla remains

because the University’s handling of remains is subject to the

“Human Remains and Cultural Items” policy.

III

The next question we must decide is whether NAGPRA

abrogates the sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes. The

district court properly concluded that it does not. Indian

tribes are entitled to immunity from suit, particularly on

matters integral to sovereignty and self-governance. See

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–58 (1978)

(citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). 

Congress has plenary authority, however, to “limit, modify or

eliminate the powers of local self-government which the

tribes otherwise possess.” Id. at 56. Suits against Indian

tribes are therefore barred absent congressional abrogation or

a clear waiver from the tribe itself. Okla. Tax Comm’n v.

Citizen Band of Potowatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.

505, 509 (1991). “[T]o abrogate such immunity, Congress

must ‘unequivocally’ express that purpose.” Michigan v. Bay

Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (quoting

Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58) (second modification

and second internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, when

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 23 of 44
24 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Congress intends to abrogate tribes’ sovereign immunity, that

intent cannot be implied, but must be “unequivocally

expressed” in “explicit legislation.” Krystal Energy Co. v.

Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

NAGPRA, by its terms, does not explicitly abrogate tribal

sovereign immunity. Thus, the Act does not contain an

“unequivocal expression” of abrogation.

Plaintiffs argue that NAGPRA’s enforcement clause does

so. It confers on district courts the “jurisdiction over any

action brought by any person alleging a violation of this

[Act].” 25 U.S.C. § 3013. However, that section does not

contain any language expressly abrogating tribal sovereign

immunity. A similar argument was rejected by the Supreme

Court in Santa Clara Pueblo. In that case, the Court held that

a statutory provision providing federal courts with

“jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be

commenced by any person” did not abrogate tribal sovereign

immunity. 436 U.S. at 53 & n.4, 59.

The Scientists also argue that because NAGPRA waives

sovereign immunity on the part of the United States,

NAGPRA must also have abrogated tribal sovereign

immunity because immunities of the two sovereigns are

“coextensive.” Plaintiffs misperceive the nature of tribal

sovereign immunity. “Indian tribes are “ domestic dependent

nations” that exercise “inherent sovereign authority.” Bay

Mills Indian Cmty, 134 S. Ct. at 2030 (quoting Okla. Tax

Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 509. “The tribes’ status as distinct,

independent political communities qualified to exercise

powers of self-government arises from their original tribal

sovereignty over their members rather than from any

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 24 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 25

constitutional source.” Montana v. Gilham, 133 F.3d 1133,

1137 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, “tribes retain whatever inherent

sovereignty they had as the original inhabitants of this

continent to the extent that sovereignty has not been removed

by Congress.” Id. Therefore, the sovereignty of the United

States and the Indian tribes are not “coextensive” in the sense

that the waiver of one byCongress necessarily constitutes the

waiver of the other. Nothing in a Congressional waiver of

sovereign immunity on behalf of the United States alters the

rule that abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity byCongress

must be “unequivocally expressed” in “explicit legislation.” 

Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1056.

Further, suits concerning the United States under

NAGPRA are not authorized by any specific portion of that

statute, but rather under the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”), which contains an express limited sovereign

immunity waiver for suits seeking non-monetary relief

against the United States. 5 U.S.C. § 702. No court has held

that the sovereign immunity waiver in the APA by the United

States also serves as a general abrogation of tribal sovereign

immunity.

Plaintiffs also make the policy argument that permitting

tribes to invoke sovereign immunity would frustrate the

purpose of NAGPRA, highlighting the district court’s

statement expressing that concern. However, when properly

asserted, sovereign immunity applies regardless of the merit

of the action or overarching policy considerations. Indeed,

the Supreme Court recently rejected such a holistic statutory

argument in Bay Mills Indian Community. 134 S. Ct. at

2033–34. And, as the Supreme Court observed, “it is

fundamentallyCongress’s job, not ours, to determine whether

or how to limit tribal immunity.” Id. at 2037. Moreover, as

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 25 of 44
26 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

the University points out, the United States retains the right

to bring an action against a tribe, see United States v. Yakima

Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986), so that it

could act to litigate issues under NAGPRA if necessary.

For all these reasons, we conclude that the district court

properly determined that NAGPRA does not abrogate tribal

sovereign immunity.

IV

A

The district court also properly concluded that the

Repatriation Committee was entitled to tribal sovereign

immunity as an “arm of the tribe.” Tribal sovereign

immunity not only protects tribes themselves, but also

extends to arms of the tribe acting on behalf of the tribe.

Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.

denied, 133 S. Ct. 2829 (2013); Cook v. AVI Casino Enters.,

Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Bay Mills

Indian Cmty, 134 S. Ct. at 2031 (describing the rule that tribal

sovereign immunity extends to suits arising from a tribe’s

commercial activities, even when they take place off Indian

lands).

In determining whether an entity is entitled to sovereign

immunity as an “arm of the tribe,” we examine several factors

including: “(1) the method of creation of the economic

entities; (2) their purpose; (3) their structure, ownership, and

management, including the amount of control the tribe has

over the entities; (4) the tribe’s intent with respect to the

sharing of its sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial

relationship between the tribe and the entities.” 

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 26 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 27

Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino

and Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2010).

As the district court found, the Repatriation Committee

was created by resolution of each of the Tribes, with its

power derived directly from the Tribes’ sovereign authority. 

The Repatriation Committee is comprised solely of tribal

members, who act on its behalf. KCRC tribal representatives

are appointed by each tribe. The process by which the

Repatriation Committee designates the particular tribe to

receive remains under NAGPRA is defined and accepted by

the Tribes. The Repatriation Committee is funded

exclusively by the Tribes. As the district court noted, the

whole purpose of the Repatriation Committee, to recover

remains and educate the public, is “core to the notion of

sovereignty.” Indeed, “preservation of tribal cultural

autonomy[and] preservation of tribal self-determination,” are

some of the central policies underlying the doctrine of tribal

sovereign immunity. Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 629

F.3d at 1188 (quoting Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 772 P.2d

1104, 1111 (Ariz. 1989)).

Given these undisputed facts, the district court properly

concluded that the Repatriation Committee was an “arm of

the tribe” for sovereign immunity purposes and, given only

speculative arguments, did not abuse its discretion in denying

the Plaintiffs further discovery on the question.

B

The district court also properly concluded that the

Repatriation Committee did not waive its sovereign immunity

by filing suit against the University in the Southern District

of California or by incorporating under California law. A

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 27 of 44
28 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

voluntary waiver by a tribe must be “unequivocally

expressed.” Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass’n v. United

States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing California

ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Quechan Tribe of

Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1979)). Waiving

immunity as to one particular issue does not operate as a

general waiver. Thus, when a tribe files suit, it submits to

jurisdiction only for purposes of adjudicating its claims, but

not other matters, even if related. Okla. Tax Comm’n,

498 U.S. at 509.

We have previously rejected the Plaintiffs’ alternative

argument that a tribe’s decision to incorporate waives its

sovereign immunity. Am. Vantage Cos., Inc. v. Table

Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002).

The district court did not err in concluding that the

Repatriation Committee had not waived its sovereign

immunity.

V

Given that NAGPRA did not abrogate tribal sovereign

immunity, and that tribal immunity extends to the

Repatriation Committee, the question is whether the Tribes

and the Repatriation Committee were necessary parties under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) and, if so, whether

under Rule 19(b) the party is indispensable such that in equity

and good conscience the suit should be dismissed. We

conclude that the district court properly dismissed the action

pursuant to Rule 19.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 28 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 29

A

Rule 19(a) provides a two-pronged inquiry for

determining whether a party is “necessary.” Confederated

Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d

1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1991).7 First, the court must determine

whether complete relief can be afforded if the action is

limited to the existing parties. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(a)(1)(A). Second, the court must determine whether the

absent party has a “legally protected interest” in the subject

of the action and, if so, whether the party’s absence will

“impair or impede” the party’s ability to protect that interest

or will leave an existing party subject to multiple,

inconsistent legal obligations with respect to that interest. Id.

If the answer to either of those questions is affirmative, then

the party is necessary and “must be joined.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(a)(1). The inquiry under Rule 19(a) “is a practical one and

 

7

 FRCP 19(a) provides, in full,

A person who is subject to service of process and

whose joinder will not deprive the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction must be joined if:

(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord

complete relief among existing parties; or

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject

of the action and is so situated that disposing of the

action in the person’s absence may:

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the

person’s ability to protect the interest; or

(ii) leave an existing party subject to substantial

risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise

inconsistent obligations because of the interest.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 29 of 44
30 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

fact specific.” Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555,

558 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Provident Tradesmens Bank &

Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118–19 (1968)).

There is no doubt that the Tribes and the Repatriation

Committee have a legally protected interest within the

meaning of Rule 19. Indeed, the language of the rule

contemplates that a party need only have a “claim” to an

interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). Rule 19 is designed to

protect “a party’s right to be heard and to participate in

adjudication of a claimed interest, even if the dispute is

ultimately resolved to the detriment of that party.” Shermoen

v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1992).

Here, the RepatriationCommittee has made formal claims

to the La Jolla remains on behalf of the Kumeyaay Tribes. 

The Heritage Commission, the California state agency

charged with making the determination, identified the

Repatriation Committee as the “most likely descendant” for

the La Jolla remains. The University has filed a Notice of

Inventory Completion with the Department of the Interior

indicating that the Tribes are the designated recipients. The

Tribes and the Repatriation Committee unquestionably have

a sufficient claim to a legally protected interest to satisfyRule

19. Indeed, their claim is at the heart of the dispute.

The Scientists argue that the Tribes and the Repatriation

Committee do not have a “legally protected interest” because

the La Jolla remains have not been established to be “Native

American” within the meaning of NAGPRA and, in fact, are

not. However, that argument misses the point of the Rule

19(a) inquiry. The question is whether the Tribes and the

Repatriation Committee have a claim that is not “patently

frivolous.” Shermoen, 982 F.2d at 1318.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 30 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 31

The interest of the Tribes and the Repatriation Committee

would also unquestionably be “impaired or impeded” if the

suit were allowed to proceed without the Tribes or the

Repatriation Committee as parties. If the Scientists prevail in

their claim that the La Jolla remains are not “Native

American” within the meaning of NAGPRA and succeed in

their efforts to enjoin transfer of the remains to the La Posta

Band, then the claims of the Tribes and the Repatriation

Committee will be extinguished without the opportunity for

them to be heard.

Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ assertions, the University

cannot sufficiently represent the interests of the Tribes or

Repatriation Committee. At present, their interests are

aligned. There is some reason to believe that they will not

necessarily remain aligned. However, as the district court

pointed out, the University “has a broad obligation to serve

the interests of the people of California, rather than any

particular subset, such as the people of the Kumeyaay tribes.” 

Thus, the different motivations of the two parties could lead

to a later divergence of interests. For example, if a court were

to determine that the La Jolla remains should not be

transferred to the Kumeyaay under NAGPRA, it is

questionable whether–perhaps even unlikely that–the

University and the Kumeyaay would pursue the same next

course of action.

Thus, the district court properly concluded that the Tribes

and theRepatriation Committee were necessaryparties within

the meaning of Rule 19(a).

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 31 of 44
32 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

B

The district court also properly determined that the Tribes

and the Repatriation Committee were indispensable parties

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). There are four factors for

determining whether a party is indispensable:

(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in

the person’s absence might prejudice that

person or the existing parties;

(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be

lessened or avoided by:

(A) protective provisions in the judgment;

(B) shaping the relief; or

(C) other measures;

(3) whether a judgment rendered in the

person’s absence would be adequate; and

(4) whether the plaintiff would have an

adequate remedy if the action were dismissed

for nonjoinder.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).

Obviously, a judgment in favor of the Scientists would

prejudice the Tribes and the Repatriation Committee. It

would declare that they had no rights to the La Jolla remains

and prevent transfer of the remains to the La Posta band. 

Because the Tribes and the Repatriation Committee seek

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 32 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 33

custody, there is no provision that could be included in such

a judgment that would protect their interests or serve to lessen

the effect. The Plaintiffs claim that the University can protect

the interest of the Tribes and the Repatriation Committee;

however, as we have discussed, their interests are distinct

and, although they are aligned at present, their interests could

quickly diverge. A judgment rendered in the absence of the

Tribes and the Repatriation Committee would be inadequate

because, as the district court noted, the necessary parties

would not be included and an injunction would not be

effective against absent parties. The fourth factor strongly

favors the plaintiffs, who would be prevented from obtaining

redress for their claims.

Although Rule 19(b) contemplates balancing the factors,

“when the necessary party is immune from suit, there may be

‘very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because

immunity itself may be viewed as the compelling factor.’” 

Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir.

1994) (quoting Confederated Tribes, 928 F.2d at 1499). As

the district court correctly noted, “virtually all the cases to

consider the question appear to dismiss under Rule 19,

regardless of whether a remedy is available, if the absent

parties are Indian tribes invested with sovereign immunity.”

(citing Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015

(9th Cir. 2002); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric.

Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002);

Manybeads v. United States, 209 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2000);

Clinton v. Babbit, 180 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 1999); Kescoli v.

Babbit, 101 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 1996); McClendon v. United

States, 885 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1989).)

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 33 of 44
34 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Given this wall of circuit authority, the district court

properly concluded that the Tribes and the Repatriation

Committee were indispensable parties under Rule 19(b).

C

The district court correctly concluded that the “public

rights” exception to Rule 19 did not apply. The Supreme

Court has explained that “[i]n a proceeding . . . narrowly

restricted to the protection and enforcement of public rights,

there is little scope or need for the traditional rules governing

the joinder of parties in litigation determining private rights.”

Nat’l Licorice Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S.

350, 363 (1940). In order for the public rights exception to

apply, (1) “the litigation must transcend the private interests

of the litigants and seek to vindicate a public right” and

(2) “although the litigation may adversely affect the absent

parties’ interests, the litigation must not destroy the legal

entitlements of the absent parties.” Kescoli v Babbitt,

101 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted). As the district court properly observed, the public

rights exception cannot apply here because the rights of the

Tribes and the Repatriation Committee will be extinguished

if the Plaintiffs prevail in their claims.

VI

In sum, as qualified scientists, the Plaintiffs have standing

to assert the claims. The district court properly concluded

that NAGPRA did not abrogate the Tribes’ sovereign

immunity; that, as an arm of the Tribes, the Repatriation

Committee was entitled to sovereign immunity, and had not

waived it by filing a separate lawsuit or by incorporating in

California; that the Tribes and the Repatriation Committee

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 34 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 35

were necessary and indispensable parties under Fed.R.Civ. P.

19; and that the public interest exception to Rule 19 did not

apply. Therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing

the action.

AFFIRMED.

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I agree with the majority that Plaintiffs’ complaint

contains sufficient factual allegations, which we must accept

as true, to establish that a favorable judicial decision is likely

to redress their alleged injuries. Plaintiffs therefore have

Article III standing to bring this lawsuit. I also agree that the

Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act

(NAGPRA) does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the

Indian tribes, and that the district court properly exercised its

discretion when it denied Plaintiffs’ request to conduct

additional discovery on the question whether the Kumeyaay

Cultural Repatriation Committee (KCRC) could properly be

considered an “arm” of the Kumeyaay tribes. And, I agree

that the district court properly concluded that the KCRC did

not waive its immunity when it sued the University in the

Southern District of California or when it incorporated under

California state law.

The majority and I part ways, however, on the question

whether the KCRC is a necessary and indispensable party

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Our precedents

require us to resolve that question in light of the nature and

scope of the parties’ dispute—which, as I see it, is whether

the University properly determined that the La Jolla remains

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 35 of 44
36 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

are “Native American” within the meaning of NAGPRA and

therefore whether, as a threshold matter, NAGPRA applies

here at all. Because I read those precedents to compel the

conclusion that the KCRC is neither necessary nor

indispensable to the resolution of that particular question, I

respectfully dissent.

Plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of administrative

mandamus under California state law directing the University

“to make a formal determination whether or not the La Jolla

Skeletons are ‘Native American’ within the meaning of

NAGPRA.” In the alternative, Plaintiffs sought declaratory

and injunctive relief, likewise requesting that the court

“declar[e] . . . that the La Jolla Skeletons are not ‘Native

American.’ ” The parties’ dispute is therefore limited to

the correctness of the University’s administrative

determination—it is not, as it was framed in the district court,

a “property dispute, in which the parties assert conflicting

ownership interests” in the La Jolla remains. In other words,

this case is not about whether NAGPRA compels repatriation;

instead, it is about whether NAGPRA, which concerns only

Native American remains, applies in the first place.

Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) makes an absent party “necessary” if

the party “claims an interest relating to the subject of the

action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the

[party’s] absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or

impede the [party’s] ability to protect the interest.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). Although the party’s claimed interest

must be more than speculative, Dawavendewa v. Salt River

Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150,

1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002), it need merely be a “claim”—that is,

“[j]ust adjudication of claims requires that courts protect a

party’s right to be heard and to participate in adjudication of

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 36 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 37

a claimed interest, even if the dispute is ultimately resolved

to the detriment of that party.” Shermoen v. United States,

982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1992).

In this case, Defendants characterize the tribes as

“paradigms of ‘necessary parties’ ” because the KCRC and

the tribes have a nonfrivolous claim to—and therefore a

“legally protected interest” in—the La Jolla remains. 

Defendants contend that the tribes’ interest would be

impaired or impeded if the lawsuit were to proceed in their

absence because the tribes’ “claim to the ownership and

control of the Remains lies at the very core of” the parties’

dispute. What is more, they allege, the University cannot

adequately represent the tribes’ interest in this action because

of the University’s “broad obligation to serve the interests of

the people of California, rather than any particular subset,

such as the people of the Kumeyaay tribes.”

As I see it, Defendants’ argument fails first on its

premise. Contrary to the way in which the tribes frame it, this

is not a property dispute over the La Jolla remains—indeed,

the University has already found that the remains are

culturally unidentifiable because there is “[s]imply . . . not a

preponderance of evidence to support an affirmation of

cultural identification or affiliation with any modern group.” 

Neither party suggests any problem with respect to the

University’s procedural or substantive determination

surrounding cultural affiliation, nor does either party take

issue with the Department of the Interior’s 2010 regulations

requiring culturally unidentifiable human remains to be

transferred to the tribe or tribes “recognized as aboriginal to

the area from which the human remains were removed.” See

43 C.F.R. § 10.11. Thus, this action will not resolve whether,

under NAGPRA, the Kumeyaay tribes are entitled to

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 37 of 44
38 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

“ownership or control” of the La Jolla remains—assuming

NAGPRA applies, that question has already been resolved.1

Plaintiffs instead take issue with the procedures

underyling the University’s determination that the remains

are “Native American” as that term is defined under

NAGPRA. As the tribes readily concede, “NAGPRA is only

concerned with Native American remains.” So, to the extent

that Plaintiffs’ claims are limited to that single administrative

determination, any “interest” the tribes have in this litigation

is identical to the interest of any other party: all parties “have

an equal interest in an administrative process that is lawful.” 

Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 559.2 The KCRC’s interest

is no different from the generalized, nonspecific interest of

any other “presently existing tribe, people, or culture.” 

Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir.

2004).

To be sure, as the majority correctly notes, for the

purposes of Rule 19, the tribes need only assert a “claim” to

an interest, not an actual or vested one. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(a) (defining a “required” party as one who “claims an

interest relating to the subject of the action” (emphasis

added)). Here, the tribes would be entitled to compel

repatriation of the La Jolla remains if they are in fact “Native

1 The majority similarly misstates the relief that Plaintiffs seek. 

According to the majority, a judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor would “declare

that [the tribes] had no right to the La Jolla remains and prevent transfer

of the La Jolla remains to the La Posta Band.” That is not so. A judgment

in Plaintiffs’ favor would merely declare that NAGPRA does not compel

repatriation.

2 Generally, there is no legally protected interest in an agency’s

procedures. See Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 558.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 38 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 39

American.” Thus, the tribes have, at the very least, a

nonfrivolous “claim” to an interest in the subject matter of

this dispute.

But the nature of Plaintiffs’ claim is not such that, “as a

practical matter,” proceeding with this litigation in the tribes’

absence would “impair or impede the [tribes’] ability to

protect” that interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). We

have previously held that the level of impairment resulting

from a party’s absence “may be minimized if the absent party

is adequately represented in the suit.” Makah Indian Tribe,

910 F.2d at 558. Because the KCRC’s interest in the process

leading to the University’s administrative determination that

the La Jolla remains are “Native American” is no different

from any other party’s, see id. at 559, the University, as an

existing party, is in a position to adequately protect the

interest of the KCRC and the tribes.

In determining whether an existing party can adequately

represent the interests of an absent party, we are to consider

three factors: (1) whether the interests of the existing party

“are such that it will undoubtedly make all of the absent

party’s arguments,” (2) whether the existing party “is capable

of and willing to make such arguments,” and (3) “whether the

absent party would offer any necessary element to the

proceedings that the present partywould neglect.” Shermoen,

982 F.2d at 1318 (stating the factors that courts consider

under Rule 24(a) in the context of determining adequacy

under Rule 19(a)).

The University’s interest in this litigation is almost

identical to that of the tribes: the interest in properly and

lawfully determining the “Native American” status of the La

Jolla remains. Because that is so, it is difficult to imagine any

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 39 of 44
40 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

argument the KCRC might make that the University has not

already made and will not ultimately make if the action

proceeds. Either the University’s determination that the

remains are “Native American” was arbitrary and capricious

or it was not—in any event, the evidence on which that

determination was based was evidence that the KCRC itself

provided. In that sense, practically every argument the

KCRC could make is an argument that the University will

likewise offer to defend its determination. The first factor of

the Shermoen adequacy test therefore suggests that the tribes

will adequately be represented by the University.

The second and third Shermoen factors likewise favor a

finding that the tribes will adequately be represented. With

respect to the second, there is no suggestion in the record that

the University is incapable of making or unwilling to make

the arguments that the KCRC would likely make. And as to

the third, no party identifies a “necessary element” of this

lawsuit that the tribes could offer but that the University

would neglect. Applying Shermoen, I would accordingly

conclude that the KCRC is not “so situated that disposing of

the action in [its] absence may . . . as a practical matter impair

or impede [its] ability to protect” its claimed interest in this

litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i).

Nor is the KCRC an indispensable party. If an absent

party is necessary and cannot be joined,3

then the court must

3

I agree with the majority that, because NAGPRA does not abrogate the

sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes, the KCRC and the tribes are

immune from suit and therefore “cannot be joined” for the purposes of

Rule 19(b). See Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v.

Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, because the district

court concluded that the KCRC was a necessary party under Rule 19(a),

it properly reached the “indispensability” inquiry under Rule 19(b).

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 40 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 41

determine whether “in equity and good conscience, the action

should proceed among the existing parties or should be

dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). That determination

requires a four-part inquiry, which is set forth under the Rule:

When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person

who is required to be joined if feasible cannot

be joined, the court must determine whether,

in equity and good conscience, the action

should proceed among the existing parties or

should be dismissed. The factors for the court

to consider include:

(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in

the person’s absence might prejudice that

person or the existing parties;

(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be

lessened or avoided by:

(A) protective provisions in the judgment;

(B) shaping the relief; or

(C) other measures;

(3) whether a judgment rendered in the

person’s absence would be adequate; and

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 41 of 44
42 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

(4) whether the plaintiff would have an

adequate remedy if the action were dismissed

for nonjoinder.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).4

The first factor, prejudice, is essentially the same as the

“necessary” inquiry under Rule 19(a). Confederated Tribes,

928 F.2d at 1499. As I explained above, because the tribes’

interests in this litigation are no different than the interests of

any other party, and because those interests can adequately be

represented by the University, I would conclude that the first

factor favors proceeding with the litigation in the tribes’

absence.

The remaining factors similarly favor proceeding with the

litigation. On the second, the extent to which prejudice could

be lessened or avoided, I see no partial or compromise

remedy that would lessen potential prejudice, but because of

my conclusion on the first factor, I would conclude that the

second factor likewise favors proceeding. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(b)(2). On the third, whether a judgment in the KCRC’s

absence would be adequate, again, the inquiry in this case is

limited to the correctness of the University’s determination

4 The majority suggests that there may be “little need for balancing Rule

19(b) factors” in cases in which the absent party is entitled to immunity

from suit. Indeed, a few of our sister circuits have concluded as much. 

See, e.g., Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1496 (D.C.

Cir. 1995); Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542, 549

(2d Cir. 1991); Enterprise Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States,

883 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1988). “Cognizant of these out-of-circuit

decisions, the Ninth Circuit has, nonetheless, consistently applied the four

part balancing test [under Rule 19(b)] to determine whether Indian tribes

are indispensable parties.” Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1162.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 42 of 44
WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 43

that the La Jolla remains are “Native American”—a

determination in which the KCRC has no specific, legally

protected interest. Thus, nothing suggests that a judgment

rendered in KCRC’s absence would be inadequate. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 19(b)(3); Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851,

870 (2008) (“[A]dequacy refers to the ‘public stake in settling

disputes, whenever possible.’ ”). And finally, on the fourth

factor, it seems clear, in light of the sovereign immunity of

the Indian tribes, that Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy if

this lawsuit is dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(4). 

Because, on balance, the factors we generally consider under

Rule 19(b) disfavor dismissal, I would conclude that the

KCRC is not an indispensable party in whose absence this

lawsuit could not proceed.

Although the majority suggests otherwise, my conclusion

in this respect is not inconsistent with a “wall of circuit

authority.” In each of the cases the majority and the district

court cite to support that assertion, the absent tribe was a

party or signatory to a contract sought to be enforced. See

Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.

2002) (lawsuit seeking termination of gaming compacts to

which the tribe was a party and that would otherwise

automaticallyrenew); Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.

2002) (lawsuit challenging a provision of a lease agreement

to which the tribe was a signatory); Manybeads v. United

States, 209 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (lawsuit challenging

settlement agreement to which the tribe was a party); Clinton

v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Kescoli v.

Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); McClendon v.

United States, 885 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1989) (lawsuit seeking

to enforce a lease agreement to which the tribe was a party). 

As we have observed, “[N]o procedural principle is more

deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 43 of 44
44 WHITE V. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

set aside a lease or a contract, all parties who may be affected

by the determination of the action are indispensable.” 

Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1156. This is not such a case,

however; I therefore disagree that the reasoning or outcomes

of those cases compel the same conclusion here.

Plaintiffs’ complaint takes issue with a specific, threshold

question: whether the University properly determined that the

La Jolla remains are “Native American” within the meaning

of NAGPRA and therefore whether, as a threshold matter,

NAGPRA applies at all. I would conclude that the KCRC is

neither necessary nor indispensable to the resolution of that

question and that this lawsuit may therefore proceed in its

absence. I would not reach the question whether the public

rights exception to Rule 19 applies in this case, and I would

instead reverse the district court’s judgment and remand this

case for further proceedings.

 Case: 12-17489, 08/27/2014, ID: 9220348, DktEntry: 56-1, Page 44 of 44