Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01536/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01536-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY BERNARD HENDERSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-CV-1536-DMC-P

ORDER 

 

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 

initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 

Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 

portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 

Case 2:23-cv-01536-DJC-DMC Document 10 Filed 01/19/24 Page 1 of 7
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complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 

concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 

of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 

1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 

overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 

to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 

required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff Tommy Bernard Henderson, Jr., names the following as Defendants: (1) 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), (2) John Grant, Canteen 

Manager, (3) DOES 1 through 50, Canteen Administrators/Personnel. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. 

Plaintiff alleges Canteen access/fraud in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

and § 1983. See id. at 1.

In his claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants falsely advertised the April 2023 

Canteen price listings. See id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to adequately 

communicate that Plaintiff would be charged according to the increased prices listed in March 

2023 rather than the decreased prices advertised in the April 2023 edition. See id. at 3. Plaintiff 

asserts that this failure to communicate and false advertisement were due to Plaintiff’s 

vulnerability as a qualified inmate/patient with a disability. Plaintiff alleges that he applied for 

canteen items for the month of April 2023. Plaintiff requested shredded beef, listed at $3.25, and 

mackerel, listed at $1.50 in the April canteen price listing. See id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, he 

was charged the prices for the March canteen price listing – shredded beef listed at $5.65, and 

mackerel listed at $1.85. See id. at 3. Plaintiff claims that he was intentionally overcharged for 

the items listed on the April canteen form and was instead charged according to the higher March 

canteen price listing. See id. at 3. 

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Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a “request for interview” form to the Canteen 

Manager concerning the charge discrepancy and was told that Defendant John Grant was 

“depleting old inventory at old prices.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Grant did not provide 

notice regarding the canteen’s increased pricing during the month of April. Plaintiff asserts that 

had Defendant Grant issued notice regarding the pricing inconsistencies, it would have put 

Plaintiff and other inmates on notice the products would not be sold at the reduced prices noted in 

April 2023 price listings. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Grant knowingly, intentionally, and 

willingly misled inmate/patients assigned to psychiatric care. Plaintiff further asserts that 

Defendant Grant’s failure to provide adequate notice of the decision to sell inmates/patients 

products at the increased March prices in turn failed to provide aids and services that Plaintiff is 

entitle to under the ADA as a qualified individual with a disability. 

II. DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects. First, Plaintiff cannot 

maintain suit against the CDCR, which is immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Second, 

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts relating to the nature of his disability to sustain a claim 

under the ADA. The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim against 

Defendant Davis based on denial of equal protection arising from disparate treatment of Plaintiff 

due to his disability. Plaintiff will be provided the opportunity to proceeding on the original 

complaint against Defendant Davies only on his equal protection claim or amending the 

complaint to address the defects discussed further below which are susceptible to amendment. 

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought 

against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. 

Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition 

extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t 

of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state 

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agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 

(1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 

 Here, Plaintiff names as defendant the CDCR, which is a state agency responsible 

for incarceration and correction of prisoners and is, therefore, immune. This defect cannot be 

cured by amendment. 

B. Causal Link

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 

specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 Here, Plaintiff names as defendants DOES 1 through 50. To proceed against such 

defendants, Plaintiff must first identify their names and then amend the complaint to substitute 

fictitious defendants for true defendants. Finally, Plaintiff must allege facts to show how each 

named defendant caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights. 

C. ADA

 Title II of the ADA covers state prison inmates. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. 

Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998). To present an ADA claim, an inmate must show: (1) they are 

an individual with a disability; (2) they are qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of 

some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) they were either excluded from 

participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or 

was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of 

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benefits, or discrimination was by reason of their disability. Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 

609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010) overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. County of 

Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). 

 For the purposes of the ADA, a disability is a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities. Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 

1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014). To qualify, a disability must limit the ability of an individual to 

perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. See Shields v. 

Credit One Bank, N.A., 32 F.4th 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 2022). “[M]ajor life activities include, but 

are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 

walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, 

thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)). 

 To be cognizable, a Title II claim for compensatory damages must allege that 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s need for accommodation. See Duvall v. 

Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh'g (Oct. 11, 

2001). To show deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must have provided notice to Defendants by 

identifying specific reasonable and necessary accommodations. Id. (citing Memmer v. Marin 

County Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir.1999)). But providing notice is unnecessary if the 

need for accommodation is “obvious” or is required by statute or regulation. Id. Plaintiff must 

also show that once notice was provided, Defendants failed to “undertake a fact-specific 

investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.” Id. Upon receiving 

notice, Defendants “have a duty to gather sufficient information from [Plaintiff] and qualified 

experts as needed to determine what accommodations are necessary.” Id. (citing Wong v. 

Regents of the University of California, 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir.1999). Ultimately, the 

“failure to act must be a result of conduct that is more than negligent and involves an element of 

deliberateness.” Id.

 Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Grant failed to provide adequate notice 

regarding the decision to sell canteen items at the increased price in order to deplete old 

inventory. Plaintiff has not, however, provided sufficient facts to indicate that Plaintiff provided 

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Defendant Grant with adequate notice identifying specific reasonable and necessary 

accommodations. Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts to show that he has a qualifying disability. 

Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants failed to undertake an investigation to determine 

what constituted a reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend to cure 

these defects and clarify his pleadings as to these claims. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 

prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 

amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

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Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 

complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 

recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 

further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended 

complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. 

Dated: January 18, 2024

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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