Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03252/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03252-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE HARRY PAMER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPT. 

OF CORRECTIONS; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-3252 SI (pr)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT MOTIONS

INTRODUCTION

This action is now before the court for consideration of two defense motions for summary

judgment, plaintiff's motion to file a third amended and supplemental complaint, and plaintiff's

motion for injunctive relief. Defendants Lucine, Wittenberg and Jimenez urge in their motion

that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the action is time-barred, as well

as on the merits of plaintiff's claim and their defense of qualified immunity. Defendant Clark

urges in his separate motion that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of

plaintiff's claim and the defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff opposes both motions. For the

reasons discussed below, defendants' motions for summary judgment will be granted and

plaintiff's motions denied. Judgment will be entered in favor of the defendants. 

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 1 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Pamer also alleged a claim that several correctional officials were deliberately indifferent

to a risk to his safety by not granting his request for a cell move before the cell fight. The

defendants on the deliberate indifference to safety claim (as well as one doctor) were dismissed

earlier after service of process was unable to be accomplished on them. 

2

BACKGROUND

Lawrence Harry Pamer was involved in a cell fight during which he suffered injuries. In

this action, he claims that several members of the medical staff were deliberately indifferent to

his serious medical needs in their response to his injuries after the cell fight.1

 This action was

filed 4 years and 11 months after the cell fight, and more than four years after he was transferred

out of the prison at which defendants' allegedly deficient medical care occurred. The following

facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted:

A. Medical Care Facts

Pamer was involved in a cell fight on August 23, 1999, while incarcerated at Salinas

Valley State Prison. His cellmate struck him several times and Pamer inflicted harm on his

cellmate. Prison staff used pepper-spray on the fighting inmates and stopped the fight. His

cellmate broke free of guards and kicked Pamer in the head. Pamer and his cellmate were taken

to wash off the pepper spray. Pamer was then taken for medical evaluation.

Pamer's initial medical evaluation was conducted by defendant medical technical assistant

("MTA") Jimenez. Jimenez noted on the form that Pamer had multiple contusions on the left

forehead and left occipital skill, abrasion and contusion on the nose, contusions and abrasions

on his torso, and a 5th finger deformity. Her notes indicated that she gave him an ice pack for

his right hand. When asked what he told MTA Jimenez, Pamer testified: "I don't remember what

I told her, but, I mean, you could – I was pretty – I mean this thing is hanging out like that,"

referring to his pinkie finger. Pamer Depo., RT 59:9-13. 

Pamer was transported to the correctional treatment center ("CTC"), a hospital on the

prison grounds, later that day. His chief complaint was that his finger was dislocated and he had

multiple contusions. There also was evidence of trauma to his head and extremities, and that he

suffered multiple minor abrasions on his face and head. Pamer denied losing consciousness.

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 2 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

At the CTC, Dr. Wittenberg noted that Pamer was "alert + oriented x 3," which meant Pamer

was awake and in normal mental state. Dr. Wittenberg also noted that Pamer had superficial

bruises, abrasions and cuts on his body, had no visual disturbances and no tenderness in his neck.

Dr. Wittenberg gave Pamer local anaesthesia and reduced his fractured finger. He prescribed

800 mg. of ibuprofen for pain and recommended that Pamer be scheduled for an x-ray the next

day. Pamer was returned to custody. Pamer testified his head was sore and "like mush for like

six months." Pamer Depo., RT 52:9-12. 

The next day (i.e., August 24), Pamer's finger was x-rayed; the x-ray showed a displaced

fractured finger on his right hand. His x-ray was reviewed by Dr. Lucine that day. Pamer was

sent to Natividad Medical Center in Salinas for further reduction of the fracture. The prison

medical notes stated that he was sent to Natividad "for evaluation & possible reduction &

pinning." Pamer Decl. (docket # 54), Exh. B. The notes for August 24, 1999, also stated that

Pamer was returned from Natividad, with the right fifth "phalanges reduced by ortho & splint

applied. RTC F/U [with] ortho as ordered." The notes did not indicate that Pamer complained

of significant pain in his head or that he was suffering from a significant head injury. (Neither

party submitted any records from Natividad.) 

Pamer states that he returned to Natividad for further evaluation on August 31, 1999, and

was told to return in another three weeks for a possible pinning of his fractured finger.

Pamer was evaluated again on September 21, 1999, at the prison. The notes on the form

"report of injury or unusual occurrence" by MTA Jimenez stated that Pamer complained, "my

fingers displaced in the splint. The pain's read bad. I took the splint off yesterday." Pamer Decl.,

Exh. D. The treatment notes stated that the inmate was given a sling and counseled about

removing his splint. Id. The notes did not indicate any complaint of a head injury. 

Dr. Lustman referred Pamer to radiology on September 23, 1999. The doctor's orders for

that day reflected that the doctor ordered Toradol, Motrin for five days and for "follow up

orthopedic on 9-28-99." Pamer Decl., Exh. E. Pamer's finger was x-rayed at the prison on

September 23, 1999. The radiologist's impression was that there was "a healing fracture at the

base of the proximal phalanx of the fifth digit." Pamer Decl., Exh. C. Pamer states that he had

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 3 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

to kick on his cell door to obtain this medical response. Pamer Decl., ¶ 15-16 and Exh. C; Pamer

Depo. RT 73, 81.

The records indicated that was the end of Pamer's medical care at Salinas Valley. There

are no medical notes indicating any request for or provision of medical care in the period after

September 23, 1999, through June 2000. 

In June, Pamer was transferred to the California Men's Colony in San Luis Obispo

("CMC"). The outpatient interdisciplinary progress notes indicated that, on June 29, 2000,

Pamer was a "new arrival to CMC-E from SVSP." Pamer Decl., Exh. B. The medical file

review on June 29, 2000, noted no current medical problems when Pamer arrived at his new

prison. 

The medical records indicated that Pamer complained to the medical professionals at

CMC on November 6, 2000, that he had suffered a fractured finger a year ago and had not

received follow-up care for the injury. Pamer received medical care at his new prison. While

at his new prison, Pamer complained of ongoing chronic lower back pain for at least six years

that he attributed to a 1992 motorcycle accident or when a truck landed on him. On March 12,

2001, Pamer told medical staff at the orthopedic clinic that he was injured in a fight 1-1/2 years

earlier. He was examined by a medical staff member who determined that Pamer did not need

additional treatment to his hand or wrist. Pamer also complained about lower back pain that he

attributed to causes other than the cell fight. 

 MRIs of Pamer's brain and of his cervical spine were done on May 7, 2002. In the report

on the brain MRI, the radiologist wrote, "clinical history: 46-year-old male with headaches."

5/7/02 brain MRI radiology report. The radiologists's impressions were: "1. Multiple small

cystic lesions probably representing encephalomalacia within the anterior aspect of the left

frontal lobe. 2. Several nonspecific white matter lesions are also present. 3. Ethoid and frontal

sinusitis." Id. In the report on the cervical spine MRI, the radiologist wrote, "clinical history:

neck and right arm pain." 5/7/02 cervical spine MRI radiology report. The radiologist's

impressions were: "1. Moderate to moderately severe cervical spondylostenosis and foraminal

narrowing at C5-6 and C6-7. Severe spondylitic narrowing of the right lateral recess and

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 4 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

neuroforamen at C3-4. 3. Additional bilateral foraminal stenosis is present at C4-5 and C7-T1.

Small disk protrusion at T2-3." Id. The radiology reports did not state whether the brain or

spine abnormalities were attributable to the cell fight injuries.

Defendants presented the declaration of a medical doctor who opined that, based on his

review of the records, "Drs. Wittenberg and Lucine and MTA Jimenez appropriately treated

inmate Pamer's injuries that he suffered as a result of the August 23, 1999, cell fight. Inmate

Pamer's most significant injury appears to have been his fractured finger and the medical

professionals at Salinas Valley ensured that he received prompt diagnosis and treatment for this

injury (i.e., ice pack to control swelling, referral to the Correctional Treatment Center, reduction

of the fracture, pain mediation [sic], application of sling and split, and repeated x-rays). His

superficial injuries of abrasions, contusions, and lacerations were duly noted and would have

healed in a few weeks." Roche Decl., ¶ 18. 

B. Facts Regarding Dr. Clark

During the relevant time period of August 1999 - June 2000, defendant David Clark was

a medical doctor on staff at Salinas Valley. Dr. Clark did not provide any medical care to Pamer

during that time period. 

Dr. Clark was employed as a staff physician and surgeon. Dr. Clark's duties as a staff

physician and surgeon generally included "examining patients and diagnosing their illnesses;

prescribing and administering medical treatment; ordering laboratory examinations and analysis,

x-rays and special diets; and writing prescriptions." Clark Decl., ¶ 2. It was his custom, and

required by virtue of his medical license, to write physician's note and/or a physician's order

documenting medical visits and the medical care rendered to a patient. Dr. Clark did not write

any physician's notes or physician's orders in Pamer's medical records during the August 1999 -

June 2000 time period. Based on his recollection and review of Pamer's medical records, Dr.

Clark concluded that he did not provide any medical care or treatment to Pamer during that time

period. 

During the August 1999 - June 2000 time period, Dr. Clark was not employed as the chief

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 5 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

physician and surgeon or as the chief medical officer at Salinas Valley. He also did not hold any

supervisory job title or act as a supervisor during that time period. He was not required to and

did not supervise the medical care or treatment Pamer received at Salinas Valley during that time

period. 

When pressed to identify why he sued Dr. Clark, Pamer initially stated that it was because

Dr. Clark was in charge of directing medical care at the prison and Pamer thought he was the

chief medical officer. See Pamer Depo., RT 99, 103, 105. Pamer said he thought he had seen

that written on some medical record, but was unable to find it and eventually conceded that "[i]t

might be my mistake." Id. at 104. Pamer then speculated that he "might have even seen him."

Id. at 109. When questioned about what exactly his claim against Dr. Clark was, Pamer gave

this testimony at his deposition:

Q. So after the fight in 1999, you know, what is your complaint against Dr. Clark?

A. I don't know if I had seen him after that. I think I might have seen him after that.

I believe I did see him. I think he was working on the A yard for a minute there,

too, I think I talked to him. I think I spoke to him on the yard.

Q. When?

A. In '99.

Q. When in '99?

A. After the fight.

Q. A day after the fight, a week, a month?

A. It was way after, months after. Because I was still trying to get – I was over there

trying to get treatment for this.

Q. And what did you see him for?

A. I just seen him walking down the way. He didn't even want to acknowledge me.

Q. So you didn't see him in regards to medical care, you just saw him walking in the

yard?

A. Yeah, I was asking him about this, though, when am I going to see an orthopedic

specialist?

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 6 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Q. That wasn't in the context, though, of –

A. I believe that was him, though.

Q. You don't even know it was Dr. Clark?

A. I know I seen him somewhere around there.

Q. Did you ever see Dr. Clark for medical treatment?

A. No.

Id. at 109-110.

C. Statute of Limitations Facts

None of the defendants were involved with Pamer's treatment after he transferred out of

Salinas Valley to another prison in June 2000, ten months after he suffered his injuries in the cell

fight. Indeed, the medical notes indicate no care was provided at Salinas Valley after September

23, 1999. 

Pamer's complaint in this action was stamped "filed" in this court on August 11, 2004.

His proof of service shows that he put the complaint in the prison mail on July 29, 2004, to be

sent to the court.

Pamer was right-handed. His injured pinkie finger was on his right hand. He was able

to write a letter, albeit a short one, to his brother shortly after the fight. He wrote to his brother

that he was injured and probably needed help with medical matters.

Pamer was interviewed by correctional lieutenant Washington on October 2, 1999,

regarding the August 23, 1999, cell fight. The oral interview was videotaped. The videotape

showed Pamer speaking coherently, answering questions and describing the fight as well as his

injuries in detail. Pamer complained during that interview that, although his finger had been set

within a day after the injury and he returned to Natividad the next week to have his finger rechecked, an institutional lock-down caused him not to be taken back to Natividad three weeks

later as scheduled. He claimed he had not received pain pills since September 2, 1999. He also

claimed that his head hurt when he opened his jaw for a while after the incident, but it was just

"sore a little bit" at the time of the interview and was "almost gone." 

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 7 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Pamer later testified that he told Lt. Washington he wanted to get his hand fixed and knew

that "something was wrong, because I could feel it." Pamer Depo., RT 70:19-23. When asked

in his deposition why he didn't mention a head injury to Lt. Washington, Pamer testified: "I

didn't talk – I didn't even think about it being a head injury at the time." Id. at RT 70:24 - 71:1.

In other words, he didn't connect hand/wrist pain to the kick in the head. 

Pamer filed an inmate appeal on August 23, 2001, in which he complained of the medical

care he had received. The appeal was 1-1/2 pages long and handwritten by Pamer. This appeal

complained about the care provided for his hand and did not mention any deficiency in the care

of his head injury. 

Pamer filed an inmate appeal on August 24, 2001, in which he complained that he had

"been awaiting approximately 1 year to be fitted for eye glasses." Second Amended Complaint,

Exh. B. He complained that he was unable to read without the glasses and that was interfering

with his daily activity. This appeal was about a paragraph long and handwritten by Pamer.

Pamer filed a typed inmate appeal on June 25, 2002, complaining about the medical care

he received after the cell fight. In this appeal, Pamer focused on his head injury, noting that he

had been advised by a doctor on May 22, 2002, of abnormalities noted on a brain MRI done in

May 2002. Pamer attributed the abnormal MRI results to being kicked in the head during the

cell fight. 

Pamer sent letters to try to obtain legal representation. He received a letter dated October

18, 2001, from the law firm of Pillsbury Winthrop in which the author referred to Pamer's

October 4, 2001, letter, said the firm was "unable to represent [him] individually" and would

forward the materials to the Prison Law Office without any guarantee that office would act on

his information. He received a letter dated December 4, 2001, from the law firm of Fisher &

Carrasco in which the author referred to Pamer's letter of November 29, 2001, and declined to

represent him. He received a letter dated May 21, 2002, from the L.A. Gay & Lesbian Center

in which the author referred to Pamer's letter of June 30, 2002, and declined to represent him.

 He received another letter dated June 13, 2002, from the law firm of Fisher & Carrasco in which

the author referred to Pamer's letter of June 10, 2002, and declined to represent him. At least

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 8 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

several of the law firm letters mentioned statute of limitations deadlines and the need to take

action to avoid adverse legal consequences. Pamer also hand-wrote a letter in April 2003 to the

First District Appellate Project asking for information about his "writ" on his "three strikes case"

and asserting that he had sustained a brain injury in 1999 and "had to learn to write all over

again." Pamer Decl., Exh. I. 

Other inmates provided some scribe services for Pamer. Inmate Daniel Delicino helped

Pamer "by typing a number of medical appeals (CDC 602) while [he] was at CMC State Prison

from 2000 thru to 2002" due to Pamer's "disability with his right hand and arm." Pamer Decl.,

Exh. I. Inmate Normal Sjonborg typed a letter to a lawyer on August 19, 2002, on Pamer's

behalf, enclosing various documents from Pamer's medical and prison files and seeking

representation for "a personal injury/violation of civil rights/medical malpractice case against

the State of California." Pamer Decl., Exh. I. 

Defendants' expert, Dr. Roche, stated that his review of the medical records did not

uncover any record that demonstrated that Pamer was cognitively impaired, disoriented or

confused. To the contrary, Pamer was awake, alert and oriented after the fight. Dr. Roche also

found no medical record that reflected that Pamer complained to medical professionals that his

head injury was soft, mushy or swollen, although Pamer said he did tell them. Dr. Roche also

opined that Pamer's reported vision problems would not have made his uncorrected vision such

that he could not read and write, even if he did not have eyeglasses. 

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because the events or omissions

giving rise to the claims occurred in Monterey County, which is located within the Northern

District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1391(b). This Court has federal question jurisdiction over this

action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 9 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

DISCUSSION

A. The Action Against Lucine, Wittenberg and Jimenez Is Time-Barred

The motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Lucine, Wittenberg and Jimenez

argues that the action is time-barred. This requires the court to determine the date this action

commenced, the date on which the cause of action accrued, the applicable limitations period, and

the applicability of statutory or equitable tolling. 

This action was deemed filed on July 29, 2004, the date on which the proof of service

attached to the complaint states that Pamer put the complaint in the prison mail to be mailed to

the court. See generally Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

The deliberate indifference cause of action against the defendants accrued no later than

October 2, 1999 – i.e., the date of the interview by Lt. Washington – because by that point,

Pamer stated that he knew he had not been given the further follow-up care that he allegedly was

supposed to receive at Natividad 3-4 weeks after the August 23, 1999, cell fight. A cause of

action generally "accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is

the basis of the action." Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted) The medical records showed no requests for medical care

and no medical care for Pamer after September 23, 1999. Pamer states that he kicked on the cell

door seeking medical care because he wanted to see the doctor at Natividad and was in so much

pain. He dates that door-kicking incident at about September 23, 1999. Pamer knew of the

critical facts that formed the basis of his action against defendants in late 1999. He knew by

September 23, 1999, when he allegedly was denied follow-up treatment at Natividad that he may

have a claim against prison officials for problems with his medical care. That he knew he hadn't

received his follow-up appointment was confirmed in his oral videotaped interview on October

2, 1999, when he complained about that very problem. 

At the relevant time, the limitations period was one year. Section 1983 does not contain

its own limitations period. The appropriate period is that of the forum state's statute of

limitations for personal injury torts. Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802. Because California has multiple

statutes of limitations for different torts, the court borrows the general or residual statute for

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 10 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The limitations period for personal injury actions is now two years. See Cal. Code Ci.

Proc. § 335.1. The two-year period "applies to actions not already time-barred by the one-year

statute of limitations [in former §340(3)] when section 335.1 became effective on January 1,

2003." Andonagui v. May Dept. Stores Co., 128 Cal.App.4th 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The

enactment of § 335.1 did not revive Pamer's claim because it was already time-barred before §

335.1 became effective. 

11

personal injury actions to use for a § 1983 action. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th

Cir. 1999). The general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions was the oneyear period set forth at former California Civil Procedure Code § 340(3) and was the applicable

statute in § 1983 actions. See. id.2

 

The court must give effect to a state's tolling provisions. See Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802.

California recognizes imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations for a

maximum of two years when a person is "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under

the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for life." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a).

The tolling allowed for the disability of imprisonment applies because Pamer's sentence is less

than for life in prison. See Grasso v. McDonough Power Equip, 264 Cal. App. 2d 597, 601

(Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 

Using the accrual date of October 2, 1999, plus the one-year limitations period plus the

two-year tolling period for Pamer's imprisonment, Pamer's deadline to file this action was no

later than three years later on October 2, 2002. The change in the limitations period effective

January 1, 2003, did not aid him because his claim was already time-barred and could not be

revived. 

"Where the danger of prejudice to the defendant is absent, and the interests of justice so

require, equitable tolling of the limitations period may be appropriate." Azer v. Connell, 306

F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002). Pamer claims that his failure to meet the deadline should be

excused or he should receive equitable tolling for several reasons: his writing hand was in a cast,

he suffered a severe brain injury, he was unable to obtain eyeglasses, he could not access the law

library for legal research, and he could not find anyone to assist him in writing his complaint.

 None of his arguments are persuasive.

Assuming for purposes of argument that a litigant's physical and mental impairment may

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 11 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

support equitable tolling, there is not enough evidence of such impairment here. Pamer's

contention that his impairments warrant equitable tolling are not persuasive because of the

extensive evidence of the various activities he did undertake during the time he contends he was

physically and mentally unable to file suit. The court need not credit a party's version of the

facts that is "blatantly contradicted by the record." Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007).

Writing may have been difficult, but it was not impossible even in the time immediately after

the injury. He hand-wrote a short letter immediately after the fight, thus indicating he was not

unable to write. He hand-wrote inmate appeals on August 23 and 24, 2001, and hand-wrote a

letter in April 2003 to the First District Appellate Project. Not only was he demonstrably able

to write by himself, he could and did have other inmates help him. Another inmate sent a letter

seeking legal representation for Pamer on August 19, 2002, and yet another inmate helped him

by typing a number of medical appeals in 2000 - 2002. Either Pamer or someone helping him

sent letters trying to retain lawyers in October 2001, November 2001, and June 2002. None of

the documentary evidence supports any contention that he was unable to think clearly. The

medical notes indicated he was alert and oriented immediately after the kick in the head. Neither

the videotape of the October 2, 1999, interview with Lt. Washington nor the content of the

documents written by Pamer in 2001 and later reflected a confused and disoriented inmate.

Lastly, even if one assumes that Pamer needed but did not have eyeglasses, the various

documents that were prepared by him and on his behalf undermine any serious argument that

vision problems precluded the filing of this action in a timely manner. Pamer's physical and

mental problems were not such that equitable tolling is warranted. Further, there is a dearth of

evidence explaining the 2-year delay immediately preceding the filing of this action in July

2004. The record shows sporadic activity and does not support a finding that Pamer acted

reasonably and with diligence in asserting his rights. 

Pamer complains that there was limited law library access. That limited access apparently

was at Salinas Valley and he left that prison four years before he filed this action. See Pamer

Depo., RT 126. Pamer also complains that he lacked a legal education, id. at 127, but that is not

an exceptional circumstance and instead is a characteristic shared by most prisoners. The

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 12 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Pamer stated in his declaration that some of his medical records disappeared when he

turned them over to a defense attorney who turned them over to the litigation coordinator for

copying. Pamer Decl., ¶ 23; but see Pamer Depo., RT 110-111 (Pamer blaming cell searches

by custodial staff for documents missing from his medical files on day of deposition). Even if

his contention is true, it would not aid Pamer because it is not relevant to the timeliness question

and therefore does not warrant a continuance under Rule 56(f). Pamer reports that the

documents "refer to possible pinning of plaintiff's fractured finger which would be consistent

with follow up treatment." Id. at ¶ 24. The defendants' threshold summary judgment argument

is that, even if Pamer was not sent for the follow-up treatment at Natividad for possible pinning,

the claim is time-barred. Because the complaint is time-barred and because of the allegation of

missing records, the court will not proceed to adjudicate the alternative arguments made in

defendants' motion for summary judgment.

4

See, e.g., Pamer Depo., RT 70-71 (Pamer didn't tell Lt. Washington in October 1999

because he "didn't even think about it being a head injury at the time;" he knew he had been

kicked in the head and it was mushy but "didn't think it was affecting" his hand/wrist.); RT 125

(Pamer referring to his first appeal "after I found out that it was a brain injury, when I finally got

13

statutory tolling for the disability of imprisonment is at least in part a recognition that prisoners

sometimes need extra time to prepare their claims due to the limits on them in custody.

See Elliott, 25 F.3d at 803. "Disability statutes are meant to 'protect those who are incapable of

protecting themselves;' . . . they apply to prisoners in recognition of their more limited ability

to investigate their claims, to contact lawyers and to avail themselves of the judicial process."

Id. (citation omitted). It is at least doubtful that equitable tolling would be proper for the same

conditions essentially covered by the statutory provision that allowed two extra years for the

disability of imprisonment. The limitations period will not be equitably tolled. 

The undisputed evidence shows that Pamer knew of the allegedly deficient medical care

by September 1999, was complaining to prison officials about it by August 2001, and was trying

to find a lawyer to represent him by October 2001. Nonetheless, he waited until the end of July

2004 to file his civil rights complaint. The complaint was filed inexcusably late. The statute

of limitations had expired in September or October 2002, almost two years before Pamer filed

this action. The complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants are entitled to

judgment in their favor as a matter of law.3

 

Pamer only focused on the "brain injury" angle to his hand/wrist problems after an MRI

of his brain in May 2002 showed abnormalities and a neurologist apparently indicated that

Pamer's hand/wrist problems had a neurological source.4

 This does not help Pamer because the

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 13 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to see the neurosurgeon and he ordered MRIs"); RT 133 (after being asked whether he is saying

that the head injury was actually manifesting itself on the right side of his body, Pamer

responded: "Right. It's all down here. That's what the neurosurgeon found out three years later.

He said, yes, it's focal dystonia. It's in the cerebral cortex, nerve center"); RT 134 (neurosurgeon

consultation occurred after he wrote inmate appeals at CMC, not Salinas Valley, complaining

that something was wrong); Complaint, Exh. A (attachment to CDC-602 filed June 25, 2002)

(explaining 2-year delay as due to the fact that he had just received the test results).

14

accrual of the cause of action (and the commencement of the limitations period) did not depend

upon him finding out that his hand/wrist problems had a neurological basis; he knew the facts

critical to his deliberate indifference claim years earlier. He knew in late September 1999 that

he had not been returned to Natividad as ordered for a 3-week follow-up appointment and never

sought further care while he was in Salinas Valley, except on one occasion on or about

September 23, 1999, when he kicked on his cell door because of his pain. 

Alternatively, if the cause of action did not accrue until a connection was made between

the kick to the head and the hand/wrist problems, the claim would run into a different problem

in that Pamer has no evidence that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The record is

devoid of any evidence that, in 1999, defendants or Pamer connected the dots between

hand/wrist pain and the head injury. The records for the care provided within a day of the cell

fight showed that the bruises and abrasions to Pamer's nose, left forehead and occipital skull

were noted, as was a possible dislocation/fracture/deformity of his finger. The records also

showed that Pamer was alert and oriented after the incident and believed he had not lost

consciousness. His broken and dislocated finger would have been an obvious cause of

hand/wrist pain. Nothing in the records reflected that medical care professionals connected any

wrist/hand pain to a kick in the head nor that Pamer attempted to tell them there was a

connection or described symptoms suggesting such a connection. Pamer himself stated on

October 2, 1999, that his head pain was diminishing. Pamer has not provided any evidence that

a medical care professional confronted with a patient who had hand/wrist pain who had just had

his finger broken and dislocated in a fight would have thought there to be a connection between

that pain and a kick in the head the patient also had suffered. To be liable for an Eighth

Amendment violation, a prison official must act with deliberate indifference to a known risk of

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 14 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

serious harm to inmate health. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994). The

official must both know of “facts from which the inference could be drawn” that an excessive

risk of harm exists, and he or she must actually draw that inference. Id. Pamer has not raised

a triable issue of fact that any defendant knew of the alleged neurological source of hand/wrist

problems in 1999, or that any defendant knew that not treating the hand/wrist problem as a

neurological problem presented an excessive risk of harm to Pamer's health, or that any

defendant actually drew the inference that not treating the hand/wrist problem as a neurological

problem presented an excessive risk of harm to Pamer's health. 

B. Dr. Clark's Motion For Summary Judgment

Defendant Dr. Clark moves for summary judgment on the ground that he never provided

medical care to Pamer and therefore cannot be found to have acted with deliberate indifference

to a serious medical need. Pamer has failed to raise a triable issue of fact that Dr. Clark acted

with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. The evidence is undisputed that Dr.

Clark did not treat Pamer during the months following the cell fight. The evidence also is

undisputed that Dr. Clark was not in charge of the medical department and had no supervisory

powers or duties in general or with respect to Pamer's case in particular. 

Pamer contends that he told Dr. Clark in passing that he needed an orthopedic

consultation. Pamer testified under oath that he was not even certain that it was Dr. Clark to

whom he spoke. But even accepting as true – as the court must on summary judgment – Pamer's

evidence that he made a statement to Dr. Clark, the vagueness of his statement and the context

in which it was made are such that Pamer has not raised a triable issue of fact that Dr. Clark

acted with deliberate indifference. Pamer stated at his deposition that he saw Dr. Clark walking

in the prison yard and said "when am I going to see an orthopedic specialist." Pamer Depo., RT

110. In his declaration in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Pamer stated that he

"did approach Dr. Clark addressing the issue of not having any further follow-up treatment. [¶]

That plaintiff was having serious problems with something being wrong, and that he was in

severe pain and needed care." Pamer Decl., filed Aug, 27, 2007, ¶¶ 1-2 (docket # 62). Pamer's

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 15 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

inability to identify when he talked to Dr. Clark and what he specifically said to him are

significant. During at least part of the time, Pamer's hand was bandaged and his arm was in a

sling, so that telling a doctor that he was in pain would not have put a doctor on notice of a need

for further care. Pamer has not shown that a doctor hearing a prisoner complaining that he hadn't

received care but seeing him with a sling and bandages would believe there was any need to act.

Pamer also has failed to provide any evidence that Dr. Clark knew anything about Pamer's thencurrent condition such that Pamer's complaint that he was had a medical problem would have

made any sense to Dr. Clark as he walked through the prison yard. That is, there is no evidence

that Dr. Clark knew that Pamer had his finger dislocated and fractured or had been kicked in the

head, that Dr. Clark knew that Pamer allegedly had been scheduled for a follow-up at Natividad,

or that he knew there was any neurological problem. Pamer also has failed to provide any

evidence that the procedure for obtaining non-emergency medical care was to call out to doctors

as they walked through the prison yard, as opposed to submitting a sick call request. Cf. Resnick

v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 2003) (prison had a legitimate governmental interest in

the orderly administration of a program that allowed prisons to accommodate the needs of

thousands of prisoners and that "[a]llowing inmates to make requests outside this system by

letters sent to various prison officials would frustrate the orderly administration" of the

program). On the meager statement Pamer provides, no reasonable juror could find in his favor

and against Dr. Clark on the claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Dr.

Clark is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

C. Pamer's Pleading Motion

Last month, Pamer filed a "motion to file amended & supplemental complaint." He

explained in his motion that he wanted to amend and supplement his pleading "due to minor

discovery findings, inadvertance [sic] and occurrences of events that have transpired since the

filing of the original complaint." Motion, p. 1. He confusingly submitted both a proposed

supplemental complaint and a separate document called "proposed changes for third amended

complaint." Neither will be permitted. The motion to file an amended and supplemental

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 16 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Although Pamer and defendant Clark earlier stipulated to allow Pamer to amend to

change the Clark's job title, the proposed amended pleading doesn't change Clark's title in the

way the parties stipulated. 

17

complaint is DENIED. 

The "proposed changes for third amended complaint" deleted some claims the court

already determined to be time-barred and made minor factual amplifications in the allegations

against the existing defendants.5

 These proposed additions of factual information were

unnecessary, as they were already covered by the allegations in the existing second amended

complaint. He also included a new request for injunctive relief in his proposed third amended

complaint which could not be granted against the existing defendants because they are all at

Salinas Valley and Pamer was transferred out of that prison seven years ago. Additionally, the

"proposed changes for third amended complaint" document does not comply with the court's

order that Pamer attach his proposed amended complaint to his motion. See July 31, 2007 Order,

p. 2. The document is, at best, a proposed amendment to the existing second amended complaint

but the amendments sought to be made are unnecessary. The interests of justice do not require

that leave to file the unnecessary document at this late date be granted. 

Pamer also submitted a proposed "Prisoner's Supplemental Civil Rights Complaint," that

seeks to add new defendants and new claims about events that occurred after he was transferred

out of Salinas Valley. The court earlier dismissed the claims concerning events at the California

Men's Colony and instructed Pamer to file a separate complaint in the proper district if he wanted

to pursue them. See Order Of Partial Dismissal And For Further Amendment, p. 5. His

supplemental complaint seeks to add 42 new defendants – none of whom are employed at

Salinas Valley – and assert claims concerning classification, retaliation and other medical issues

based on acts and omissions that occurred at prisons outside this district. The claims in the

proposed supplemental complaint do not appear properly joined with the claims in the second

amended complaint. The lateness of the proposed supplemental complaint plus the fact that

there was already pending a defense motion for summary judgment plus the different focus of

it convince the court that the interest of justice would not be served by permitting the filing of

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 17 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

a supplemental complaint. 

Finally, the motion to file an amended and supplemental complaint is denied for the

separate and independent reason that Pamer did not serve a copy of it on either defense counsel.

Early in this case the court gave a standard admonition to plaintiff that he must serve on defense

counsel a copy of every document he filed with the court, see Order Of Service And Partial

Dismissal, p. 10, and less than two months ago, the court reminded the parties of the duty to

serve copies on all other parties and plaintiff's obligation to serve copies on both defense

attorneys, see July 31, 2007 Order, p. 3. It is a waste of judicial resources for the court to have

to decide a motion and then reconsider the decision when it turns out that the motion was not

properly served on the opponent and the opponent wants to be heard on the motion. Plaintiff's

failure to comply with the court's orders is sufficient reason alone to deny his motion. 

D. Pamer's Injunctive Relief Request

Within the last week, Pamer filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction in which he requested that the court order him to be single-celled and

given access to certain medications. Pamer's request was unrelated to the subject of this action

– i.e., medical care he received eight years ago – and he is no longer at the prison where the

defendants work. Injunctive relief is improper because the proposed TRO/preliminary injunction

does not pertain to the issues as framed by the second amended complaint, it is sought against

persons who are not defendants (or, if it is sought against defendants, would be ineffectual

because Pamer is no longer at Salinas Valley), and the granting of summary judgment for

defendants in this order shows that there is no likelihood of success on the merits of the

complaint so that injunctive relief might be appropriate. See Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fl., 122

F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1138 (1998) ("A district court should not

issue an injunction when the injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with

a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit"); Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471

(8th Cir. 1994) ("a party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a

relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 18 of 19
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

complaint"). Lastly, the proof of service indicates that the motion was not served on either

defense attorney, although Pamer previously has been advised of the need to serve both defense

attorneys with copies of anything he files. The motion for a TRO/preliminary injunction is

DENIED. (Docket # 65.) 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Lucine,

Wittenberg and Jimenez is GRANTED and the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant

Clark is GRANTED. (Docket # 45 and # 58.) Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a third amended

and supplemental complaint is DENIED. (Docket # 60.) Plaintiff's motion for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction is DENIED. (Docket # 65.) Judgment will now be

entered in favor of all defendants and against plaintiff. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2007 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-03252-SI Document 69 Filed 09/21/07 Page 19 of 19