Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05379/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05379-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 2006 Decided February 16, 2007

No. 05-5379

MOUNT ROYAL JOINT VENTURE ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv02728)

Steven J. Lechner argued the cause for the appellants.

William Perry Pendley was on brief.

John L. Smeltzer, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. Matthew J. Sanders,

Attorney, United States Department of Justice, was on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion filed for the court by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The

appellants, Mount Royal Joint Venture (Mount Royal) and Pete

and Maxine Woods (Woods family), challenge a district court

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decision upholding certain actions taken by the Department of

the Interior (DOI) in managing federal public lands in the Sweet

Grass Hills of Montana (Hills) under the Federal Land Plan and

Management Act of 1976, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82

(FLPMA). Specifically, the appellants challenge the Interior’s

Board of Land Appeals’s (IBLA) affirmance of the Board of

Land Management’s (BLM) decision declaring void ab initio the

appellants’ mining claims located within 19,764.74 acres of land

in the Hills segregated from mineral location and entry. They

claim that DOI effected consecutive two-year segregations in

violation of FLPMA. The appellants also challenge as arbitrary

and capricious Public Land Order 7254 (PLO 7254) in which the

DOI Secretary (Secretary) withdrew from mineral location and

entry 19,685 acres of land in the Hills for 20 years. As detailed

below, we hold that the IBLA’s interpretation of FLPMA

section 1714(b) to allow consecutive segregation periods with

different purposes is reasonable, that the IBLA’s conclusion that

the two segregation periods were not identical was not arbitrary

or capricious and that the Secretary’s withdrawal was not

arbitrary or capricious and does not violate the Establishment

Clause of the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution. 

I.

We first outline the statutory framework that governs the

withdrawal of public lands. We then set forth the facts that led

to this appeal.

A. Statutory Background

FLPMA provides that “it is the policy of the United States

that . . . the Congress exercise its constitutional authority to

withdraw . . . Federal lands for specified purposes and that

Congress delineate the extent to which the Executive may

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withdraw lands without legislative action.” 43 U.S.C.

§ 1701(a)(4). A “withdrawal” means:

withholding [of] an area of Federal land from settlement,

sale, location, or entry, under some or all of the general

land laws, for the purpose of limiting activities under

those laws in order to maintain other public values in the

area or reserving the area for a particular public purpose

or program.

Id. § 1702(j). 

Section 1714 outlines the withdrawal authority of the

Executive. Section 1714(a) authorizes the Secretary “to make,

modify, extend, or revoke withdrawals but only in accordance

with the provisions and limitations of this section.” Id.

§ 1714(a). Subsection (b) of 1714 sets out the withdrawal

process as follows:

Within thirty days of receipt of an application for

withdrawal, and whenever he proposes a withdrawal on

his own motion, the Secretary shall publish a notice in

the Federal Register stating that the application has been

submitted for filing or the proposal has been made and

the extent to which the land is to be segregated while the

application is being considered by the Secretary. Upon

publication of such notice the land shall be segregated

from the operation of the public land laws to the extent

specified in the notice. The segregative effect of the

application shall terminate upon (a) rejection of the

application by the Secretary, (b) withdrawal of lands by

the Secretary, or (c) the expiration of two years from the

date of the notice. 

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1

Although the “application for withdrawal” mentioned in

subsection (b)(1) is not otherwise described, the regulations define a

“withdrawal proposal” as a “withdrawal petition approved by the

Secretary,” 43 C.F.R. § 2300.0-5(q), and a “withdrawal petition” as

“a request, originated within the [DOI] and submitted to the Secretary,

to file an application for withdrawal,” id. § 2300.0-5(p) (emphasis

added). Consequently, a “withdrawal petition” approved by the

Secretary becomes a “withdrawal proposal” that results in a

“withdrawal application.” Publication of a “withdrawal proposal” in

the Federal Register initiates a segregation period lasting up to two

years during which period the activities specified in the notice are

restricted. Id. § 2310.2(a). “Before [an] authorized officer can take

action on a withdrawal proposal, a withdrawal application in support

thereof shall be submitted.” Id. § 2310.1-2(b). An application for

withdrawal may be submitted simultaneously with “the making of a

withdrawal proposal,” id., or with a “withdrawal petition,” id.

§ 2310.1-3(c). 

Id. § 1714(b)(1).1 According to FLPMA’s implementing

regulations, a “segregation” is “the removal for a limited period,

subject to valid existing rights, of a specified area of the public

lands from the operation of the public land laws . . . pursuant to

the exercise by the Secretary of regulatory authority to allow for

the orderly administration of the public lands.” 43 C.F.R.

§ 2300.0-5(m). 

Subsections (c) and (d) of section 1714 describe the

procedures by which the Secretary implements a withdrawal.

With respect to a land tract aggregating 5,000 acres or greater,

section 1714(c) imposes a 20-year withdrawal maximum and

requires the Secretary to “notify both Houses of Congress of

such a withdrawal no later than its effective date.” Section

1714(c) further states, “[T]he withdrawal shall terminate and

become ineffective at the end of ninety days . . . beginning on

the day notice of such withdrawal has been submitted to the

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Senate and the House of Representatives, if the Congress has

adopted a concurrent resolution stating that such House does not

approve the withdrawal.” As we stated in New Mexico v.

Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1992), “[t]he reporting

requirement is not just a formality. It is instead a fundamental

part of the scheme by which Congress has reserved the right to

disapprove administrative withdrawals.” With respect to a land

tract aggregating fewer than 5,000 acres, subsection (d)

authorizes the Secretary to approve a withdrawal without

congressional notification or approval: 

(1) for such period of time as he deems desirable for a

resource use; or 

(2) for a period of not more than twenty years for any

other use . . . ; or 

(3) for a period of not more than five years to preserve

such tract for a specific use then under consideration by

the Congress. 

43 U.S.C. § 1714(d). A “resource use” is “a land use having as

its primary objective the preservation, conservation,

enhancement or development of” any “natural resource . . .

including, but not limited to, mineral, timber, forage, water, fish

or wildlife resources” or “[a]ny resource value” in a particular

land area “including, but not limited to, watershed, power,

scenic, wilderness, clean air or recreational values.” 43 C.F.R.

§ 2300.0-5(g).

B. Factual Background

The United States owns 7,731 surface acres and 19,765

subsurface acres in the Sweet Grass Hills, an area of plains and

volcanic buttes located in Montana near the Canadian border.

The Hills are within the West HiLine planning area, a land tract

in north central Montana encompassing over 11 million acres.

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2

Under FLPMA, the Secretary must “develop, maintain, and,

when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or

areas for the use of the public lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a). A

“resource management plan” is “a land use plan as described by the

Federal Land Policy and Management Act.” 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(n).

3

Mineral “location” is “the act or series of acts whereby the

boundaries of [a] claim are marked.” Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286,

296 (1920). “Mineral entry” refers to “[t]he right of entry on public

Most of the West HiLine planning area is privately owned, with

BLM managing only 626,098 surface acres and 1,328,014

subsurface acres. 

In 1988, BLM issued the “West HiLine Resource

Management Plan and Final Environmental Impact Statement”

(West HiLine Plan), a land use plan2 for all BLM-managed

tracts in the West HiLine area. The West HiLine Plan

designated 7,640 surface acres of the Hills as an area of critical

environmental concern (ACEC) and in January 1992, BLM’s

Montana State Director (State Director) issued a Record of

Decision (ROD) adopting the West HiLine Plan for the Hills.

With the ACEC designation, BLM sought “to protect high value

potential habitat for reintroduction of endangered peregrine

falcons; protect areas of traditional religious importance to

Native Americans; and protect seasonally important elk and deer

habitat.” Record of Decision for the Sweet Grass Hills and the

Upper Missouri National Wild and Scenic River of the Final

West HiLine Resource Management Plan and Environmental

Impact Statement 4 (Jan. 1992) (hereinafter 1992 ROD),

reprinted in Joint Appendix (JA) at 211. Nevertheless, “[t]o

ensure the orderly development of locatable mineral resources

while protecting the ACEC values,” id., BLM kept the ACEC

open to mineral location and entry.3

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land to mine valuable mineral deposits.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th

ed. 2004). 

4

Section 1719 indicates that a “mineral estate” is a property

interest in subsurface mineral deposits. See 43 U.S.C. § 1719(a) (“All

conveyances of title issued by the Secretary . . . shall reserve to the

United States all minerals in the lands . . . except that if the Secretary

makes the findings specified in subsection (b) of this section, the

minerals may then be conveyed together with the surface to the

prospective surface owner . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

Pursuant to the ROD’s requirements, Mount Royal and

Manhattan Minerals (USA), Ltd. (Manhattan Minerals) filed a

plan of operations in 1992 (Mount Royal/Manhattan Plan or

Plan) to begin gold mining operations in the Hills. BLM

withheld approval of the Mount Royal/Manhattan Plan until it

completed a second environmental impact statement (EIS)

specifically assessing the Plan’s effect on non-mineral resources

in the Hills. In January 1993, BLM released a draft EIS in

which it analyzed, inter alia, the Hills’s religious significance to

various Native American tribes and whether its aquifers

provided potable water to local residents. Based on its analysis,

BLM proposed three alternatives for action, recommending as

its preferred alternative the Mount Royal/Manhattan Plan. After

receiving public comments of unequivocal opposition to the

proposed mining activity, however, BLM decided to reevaluate

the West HiLine Plan and, in particular, its recommendation to

keep the Hills open to mineral location and entry. 

To protect the Hills while it reassessed the West HiLine

Plan, BLM filed with the DOI Assistant Secretary (Assistant

Secretary) a petition/application to withdraw 19,684.74 acres of

public mineral estate4

 in the Hills from mineral location and

entry for 20 years pursuant to section 1714(c). On July 28,

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5

Pursuant to FLPMA’s implementing regulations, “All . . .

resource management authorizations and actions . . . shall conform to

[an] approved plan.” 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a). “If a proposed action

is not in conformance [with an approved plan], and warrants further

consideration before a plan revision is scheduled, such consideration

shall be through a plan amendment in accordance with the provisions

1993, the Assistant Secretary approved BLM’s petition and six

days later, BLM published notice of the withdrawal proposal in

the Federal Register (First Proposal), declaring that the proposed

withdrawal sought “to protect high value potential habitat for

reintroduction of endangered peregrine falcons, areas of

traditional religious importance to Native Americans, aquifers

that currently provide the only potable water in the area, and

seasonally important elk and deer habitat.” 58 Fed. Reg. 41,289,

41,290 (Aug. 3, 1993). Publication of the First Proposal

effected a two-year segregation period (First Segregation)

during which mineral location and entry in the Hills was

prohibited. Id.; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b)(1). As a result, on

August 9, 1993, BLM suspended action on the Mount

Royal/Manhattan Plan to “reassess[] long-term management

options for the Sweet Grass Hills through preparation of an

amendment to the [West HiLine Plan],” Letter from David L.

Mari to Andrew Carstensen, Manhattan Minerals (US) Ltd. &

Ernest K. Lehmann (Aug. 9, 1993), reprinted in JA at 305, and

five weeks later, Manhattan withdrew from the joint venture

with Mount Royal.

On August 26, 1993, BLM published notice of its intent to

issue an amended West HiLine Plan and EIS (Amendment/EIS)

in order “to address the proposed withdrawal” which was “not

in conformance with the [RODs] for the [West HiLine Plan]”

because the RODs permitted mineral location and entry. 58 Fed.

Reg. 45,117, 45,117 (Aug. 26, 1993).5

 The amendment process

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of § 1610.5-5 of this title.” Id. § 1610.5-3(c). Section 1610.5-5

provides: “An amendment shall be initiated by . . . new or revised

policy, a change in circumstances or a proposed action that may result

in a change in the scope of resource uses or a change in the terms,

conditions and decisions of the approved plan.” Id. § 1610.5-5.

6

Section 1714(e) permits “emergency withdrawals” if “an

emergency situation exists and . . . extraordinary measures must be

taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost.” 43 U.S.C.

§ 1714(e).

7

A withdrawal “in aid of legislation” is one “for a specific use then

under consideration by the Congress.” 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d)(3).

proceeded slowly and, in 1994, BLM became concerned that it

could not complete the Amendment/EIS before the First

Segregation terminated on August 2, 1995. It therefore sought

alternative means to protect the Hills while the Amendment/EIS

was pending. Initially, BLM considered attempting to withdraw

the Hills by, in effect, extending the First Segregation time limit

but DOI’s Assistant Solicitor, believing that such action would

violate FLPMA, instead recommended that BLM consider

petitioning for an emergency withdrawal6 or a withdrawal “in

aid of legislation.”7 

On February 10, 1995, almost eighteen months after BLM

decided to amend the West HiLine Plan, it released its draft

Amendment/EIS to the public “address[ing] future management

options for land tenure adjustment, off-road vehicle use, oil and

gas leasing, and locatable mineral development for lands and

minerals.” 60 Fed. Reg. 8056, 8056 (Feb. 10, 1995). The

Amendment/EIS proposed four alternatives for locatable mineral

development in the Hills and recommended a 20-year

withdrawal from mineral location and entry of 6,328 acres of

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8

Section 1610.5-2(a) provides: “Any person who participated in

the planning process and has an interest which is or may be adversely

affected by the approval or amendment of a resource management plan

may protest such approval or amendment.” 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2(a).

The section also sets out the procedure for filing a protest. 

public mineral estate located in the ACEC portion of the Hills.

BLM scheduled public meetings and received written comments

regarding the draft Amendment/EIS. 

But BLM determined it would be unable to complete the

Amendment/EIS before August 2, 1995; as a result, on February

17, 1995, it again published notice of its intent to amend the

West HiLine Plan, this time proposing an amendment and

environmental assessment (Amendment/EA) that addressed only

mineral withdrawal. BLM planned to complete the

Amendment/EA before the First Segregation expired on August

2, 1995, in order to stop mineral development and subsequently

to complete the Amendment/EIS on all remaining issues. On

May 11, 1995, it issued a draft Amendment/EA with two

alternatives for mineral development, recommending a

withdrawal of 19,685 acres of public mineral estate in the Hills

(including the 6,328 acres in the ACEC) from mineral location

and entry for 20 years. BLM informed the public that the draft

Amendment/EA could be protested pursuant to 43 C.F.R.

§ 1610.5-28

 and on June 14, 1995, Mount Royal did just that,

delaying the Amendment/EA’s implementation.

On June 29, 1995, BLM published a notice in the Federal

Register that the First Segregation was due to expire on August

2nd. 60 Fed. Reg. 33,845, 33,845 (June 29, 1995). Realizing

that it needed to take immediate action to protect the Hills, BLM

began preparing an application for an emergency three-year

withdrawal. In the meantime, the Congress became involved,

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9

Apparently, the Congress took no further action on the bill. See

Thomas (The Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited

Nov. 28, 2006) (stating “Last Major Action” taken on bill was DOI

request for comment on July 25, 1995). 

when, on July 19, 1995, Congressman Pat Williams of Montana

introduced legislation to permanently prohibit mineral location

and entry “within the Bureau of Land Management’s Sweetgrass

Hills [ACEC] as identified in the West HiLine Resource

Management Plan in the State of Montana.” H.R. 2074, 104th

Cong. § 2 (1995), reprinted in JA at 401. The bill recited: “For

the purpose of conserving, protecting, and enhancing the

exceptional scenic, wildlife, water quality, and cultural

characteristics of lands along the Sweetgrass Hills in north

central Montana, there is hereby established the Sweetgrass

Hills Natural Area.”9 Id., JA at 400-01. In response to the

proposed legislation, BLM scrapped the emergency withdrawal

and instead petitioned for an application to withdraw 19,764.74

acres in the Hills for two years “in aid of legislation” pursuant

to section 1714(c). BLM published notice of the Secretary’s

approval of the petition in the Federal Register on July 28, 1995

(Second Proposal), declaring that the withdrawal proposal’s

“purpose” was to “preserve the status quo” and that its “specific

objective” was: 

to protect high value potential habitat for reintroduction

of endangered peregrine falcons, areas of traditional

religious importance to Native Americans, aquifers that

currently provide the only potable water in the area, and

seasonally important elk and deer habitat, pending

consideration of proposed withdrawal legislation

introduced into the 104th Congress, 1st Session.

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60 Fed. Reg. 38,852, 38,853 (July 28, 1995). The publication of

the Second Proposal effected a second two-year segregation

from mineral location and entry in the specified acreage of the

Hills (Second Segregation). On August 2, 1995, BLM withdrew

the Amendment/EA, stating that it did “not consider all relevant

alternatives.” Memorandum from Tom Walker, Acting

Assistant Director, Resource Assessment & Planning, to State

Director, Montana (Aug. 2, 1995), reprinted in Supplemental

Joint Appendix (Supp. JA) at 3. 

Also in early August 1995, Mount Royal located six mining

claims within the segregated area, and by September 15, 1995,

the Woods family also located one mining claim within the

segregated area. Both parties recorded the claims and paid the

necessary fees but BLM declared all seven claims null and void

ab initio because they had been located on land included in the

Second Segregation. See IBLA 96-77; IBLA 96-112. In a

consolidated appeal, IBLA affirmed BLM’s declarations. See

Mount Royal Joint Venture, 144 IBLA 277 (June 11, 1998). 

In May 1996, BLM issued its final Amendment/EIS to the

West HiLine Plan. BLM considered four alternatives,

recommending that the Secretary withdraw from mineral

location and entry 19,765 acres of public mineral estate in the

Hills for 20 years. On January 30, 1997, BLM issued a ROD

that approved withdrawal of 19,685 acres consistent with the

First Proposal, stating, “A petition/application for withdrawal of

the other 80 acres of public minerals will be submitted when

necessary.” Record of Decision and Resource Management Plan

Summary for the approval of the Sweet Grass Hills Resource

Management Plan Amendment and Environmental Impact

Statement 1 (Jan. 1997), reprinted in JA at 633. Two months

later, the Secretary issued PLO 7254, which withdrew from

mineral entry and location 19,685 acres in the Hills for 20 years.

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On October 15, 1999, Mount Royal and the Woods family

filed suit in the district court challenging the Second Segregation

and PLO 7254. The appellants and DOI both filed motions for

summary judgment. The district court granted DOI’s motion,

Mount Royal Joint Venture v. Babbitt, No. 1:99cv02728 (D.D.C.

filed Aug. 26, 2005), and this appeal followed. 

II.

In reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on DOI’s administrative decisions, we directly review

those decisions. Castlewood Prods., LLC v. Norton, 365 F.3d

1076, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Under the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, we must affirm an

agency’s action unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id.

§ 706(2)(A). “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and

capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its

judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Rather,

we will reverse an agency decision only if “the agency has relied

on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,

offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not

be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency

expertise.” Id.

A. The Second Segregation

Following the Secretary’s approval of its July 15, 1993

withdrawal petition, BLM, on August 3, 1993, published notice

in the Federal Register of its proposal to withdraw 19,684.74

acres of public mineral estate located in the Hills for 20 years

“to protect high value potential habitat for reintroduction of

endangered peregrine falcons, areas of traditional religious

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importance to Native Americans, aquifers that currently provide

the only potable water in the area, and seasonally important elk

and deer habitat,” 58 Fed. Reg. at 41,290, thus commencing the

First Segregation. On July 28, 1995, after the Secretary

approved its July 24th withdrawal petition and before the

expiration of the First Segregation (on August 2, 1995), BLM

published notice in the Federal Register of its proposal to

withdraw 19,764.74 acres of public mineral estate located in the

Hills for two years to “preserve the status quo” and to protect the

same resource uses and values “pending consideration of

proposed withdrawal legislation introduced into the 104th

Congress, 1st Session,” 60 Fed. Reg. at 33,853, thus

commencing the Second Segregation. In upholding the

Secretary’s approval of two consecutive withdrawal petitions

which triggered two consecutive segregation periods, the IBLA

interpreted FLPMA as permitting (1) consecutive segregations

initiated by withdrawal proposals with different stated purposes

and (2) withdrawal of a land tract aggregating 5,000 acres or

more for the purpose of aiding legislation. Mount Royal Joint

Venture, 144 IBLA at 281. The IBLA also upheld the Second

Segregation because the Second Proposal—which resulted in the

Second Segregation—“was not identical” to the First Proposal

in that the First Proposal sought “to protect the unique resources

within the Sweet Grass Hills ACEC” with a 20-year withdrawal

and the Second Proposal “was in aid of recently introduced

Congressional legislation designed to protect the same

resources” by means of a two-year withdrawal only. Id.

The appellants assert that approval of consecutive

withdrawal petitions (i.e. consecutive proposals)—whether with

identical or with ostensibly different purposes—contravenes

FLPMA’s purpose to limit a segregation to two years,

Appellants’ Br. at 17 (citing Public Land Law Review

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10In 1964, the Congress created the Public Land Law Review

Commission (PLLRC) “to study existing laws and procedures relating

to the administration of the public lands of the United States.” Pub.

L. No. 88-606, § 2, 78 Stat. 982 (1964). In 1970, the PLLRC

submitted its findings to the Congress in a report entitled, “One Third

of the Nation’s Land.” PLLRC, One Third of the Nation’s Land, iii

(1970). The Congress enacted FLPMA six years later. See Lujan v.

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 876-77 (1990) (outlining history

of public land management and describing PLLRC and subsequent

enactment of FLPMA). 

Commission, One Third of the Nation’s Land 56 (1970));10 21.

Alternatively, they contend that even if the statute permits

consecutive proposals with genuinely different purposes, the

First and Second Proposals are “identical” in that the Second

Proposal seeks “to preserve the status quo,” Appellants’ Br. at

20-21, and, under section 1714(c) and (d), the Secretary may not

withdraw a land tract aggregating more than 5,000 acres “in aid

of legislation.” Id. at 23-24. Finally, the appellants argue that

even if FLPMA permits a second segregation “in aid of

legislation,” the IBLA’s decision upholding the Second

Segregation was arbitrary and capricious because Congressman

Williams’s proposed legislation “was introduced simply to

provide the BLM with an excuse to unlawfully extend the twoyear segregation period.” Id. at 27. 

In reviewing an agency’s interpretation of the laws it

administers, we apply the principles of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

First, we analyze the statute applying customary rules of

statutory interpretation. Id. at 843. “If the intent of Congress is

clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the

agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent

of Congress.” Id. at 842-43. If we conclude that “the statute is

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11Because Mount Royal and the Woods family challenge the

IBLA’s voiding of their mining claims rather than the Secretary’s

approval of the second withdrawal petition, we analyze the IBLA’s

decision in order to discern DOI’s interpretation of FLPMA. If

instead we analyzed the Secretary’s decision to approve the second

withdrawal petition and thereby initiate the Second Segregation,

however, it would not affect our Chevron analysis. While the

Secretary’s approval does not constitute formal adjudication or noticeand-comment rule-making, it merits Chevron deference because the

Secretary acted with the force of law. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs.

of Am. v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “[T]he

Congress expressly conferred on the Secretary authority” to approve

silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” id. at

843, however, we must next determine the deference, if any, we

owe the agency’s interpretation of the statute, United States v.

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). If the agency enunciates its

interpretation through notice-and-comment rule-making or

formal adjudication, we give the agency’s interpretation

Chevron deference. Id. at 230-31. That is, we determine

whether its interpretation is “permissible” or “reasonable,”

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 844, giving “controlling weight” to

the agency’s interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or

manifestly contrary to the statute,” id. at 844. On the other

hand, if the agency enunciates its interpretation through informal

action that lacks the force of law, we accept the agency’s

interpretation only if it is persuasive. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235

(citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000);

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 

Section 1714(b) is silent regarding consecutive segregations

and, because the IBLA hearing constitutes a formal agency

adjudication, we give its interpretation of section 1714(b)

Chevron II deference.11 See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526

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a withdrawal petition and thereby initiate a segregation period under

section 1714(b) and “[t]hrough this express delegation of specific

interpretive authority, the Congress manifested its intent that the

Secretary’s determinations . . . should have the force of law.” Id. at

822 (internal quotation omitted). 

U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999). Reviewing under Chevron II the

IBLA’s interpretation of section 1714(b) as authorizing the

Secretary to approve consecutive withdrawal petitions with

different stated purposes thereby triggering consecutive twoyear segregation periods, we believe its interpretation is both

“reasonable” and “permissible.” Section 1714(b) does not

prohibit consecutive withdrawal proposals with different stated

purposes. Moreover, contrary to the appellants’ argument,

permitting such proposals does not undermine FLPMA’s twoyear cap on segregations. A consecutive withdrawal proposal

with a different stated purpose neither renews a pending

proposal nor extends a segregation period beyond two years.

Rather, it responds to new developments, e.g., the introduction

of legislation regarding the tract or the discovery of additional

resource uses or values, and, correspondingly, the resulting

segregation period gives the Secretary time to evaluate whether

the withdrawal should be modified. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1163,

at 10 (1976) (“[FLPMA] specifically grants the Secretary the

authority, by regulation, to provide procedures (segregation of

the lands) for protection of values in lands from nonconforming

uses and for other purposes while he is considering their

possible withdrawal.”).

Next, the appellants argue that because section 1714(d)

expressly permits a withdrawal aggregating fewer than 5,000

acres “to preserve [a land] tract for a specific use then under

consideration by the Congress” and section 1714(c) does not

expressly permit a withdrawal aggregating more than 5,000

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acres for that purpose, a section 1714(c) withdrawal in aid of

legislation is unauthorized pursuant to the rule of statutory

construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the

“mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing”).

Halverson v. Slater, 206 F.3d 1205, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(internal quotations omitted). Unlike subsection (d), however,

subsection (c) permits the Congress to veto the Secretary’s

withdrawal decision with respect to a land tract aggregating

5,000 acres or more irrespective of purpose. Specifically, the

Secretary must notify the Congress of the withdrawal and

“submit a report addressing the twelve issues set forth in

subsection (c)(2),” New Mexico, 969 F.2d at 1136 (citing 43

U.S.C. § 1714(c)), including “an analysis of the manner in

which existing and potential resource uses are incompatible with

or in conflict with the proposed use,” 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2)(4).

The Congress may then nullify the withdrawal by adopting a

concurrent resolution disapproving the Secretary’s decision. Id.

§ 1714(c). Because a withdrawal aggregating 5,000 acres or

more is subject to congressional oversight, FLPMA permits the

Secretary to withdraw such a land tract for any purpose so long

as the Congress does not disapprove. See Indep. Ins. Agents of

Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[I]f

there are other reasonable explanations for an omission in a

statute, expressio unius may not be a useful tool.”).

Finally, the IBLA’s conclusion that the Second Proposal

“was not identical to,” Mount Royal Joint Venture, 144 IBLA at

281, the First Proposal because the Second Proposal was in fact

“in aid of legislation” pursuant to section 1714(c) was neither

arbitrary nor capricious. BLM first petitioned to withdraw

19,684.74 acres of public mineral estate for the statutory 20-year

maximum to protect the Hills’s non-mineral resource uses and

values. The Secretary’s approval of BLM’s withdrawal petition

began a two-year segregation period during which DOI was to

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take the necessary administrative steps to permit the Secretary

to withdraw the tract. As the two-year period was nearing

expiration, however, it became apparent the Secretary could not

withdraw the land by that date. Congressman Williams, who

had been lobbying to protect the Hills’s non-mineral resources

for at least two years, Letter from Pat Williams to Bruce Babbitt,

Secretary of the Interior (June 1, 1993), reprinted in JA at 267-

68, introduced legislation to permanently prohibit mineral

location and entry within the ACEC portion of the Hills. At that

point, BLM petitioned for a shorter, two-year withdrawal to

maintain “the status quo” in the Hills “pending” the Congress’s

consideration of a permanent prohibition on mining. 60 Fed.

Reg. at 38,853. That is, BLM’s Second Proposal differed from

its First Proposal—the Second sought to assist the legislative

attempt to prohibit mineral location and entry in the Hills

permanently rather than to withdraw the Hills for only 20 years.

Congressman Williams’s introduction of withdrawal legislation

promoted FLPMA’s purpose by asserting the Congress’s power

to manage federal lands. In enacting FLPMA, the Congress

delegated to the Secretary considerable withdrawal authority,

see 43 U.S.C. § 1714, but it also reaffirmed its own final

authority over the withdrawal of public lands, see id.

§ 1701(a)(4). In the absence of a constitutional challenge, we

will not interfere with congressional actions expressly

authorized by statute. 

Because we affirm the IBLA’s decision upholding the

Second Segregation, we also affirm its decision declaring the

appellants’ mining claims null and void ab initio. See Dean

Staton, 136 IBLA 161, 164 (July 25, 1996) (“[M]ining claims

located on lands not open to appropriation are null and void ab

initio.”) (citing Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 825

F.2d 216, 219 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] mining claim is void ab

initio when it is located on land which at the date of location

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12As noted earlier, under the original West HiLine Plan and the

accompanying ROD, mineral location and entry were permitted in the

Hills. See supra p. 5.

was included in an application for withdrawal which has been

noted on the land records.”)). Accordingly, we affirm the grant

of summary judgment to DOI on this claim.

B. PLO 7254

 The Secretary must manage the public lands under

“principles of multiple use and sustained yield.” 43 U.S.C.

§ 1732(a). “‘Multiple use management’ is a deceptively simple

term that describes the enormously complicated task of striking

a balance among the many competing uses to which land can be

put, ‘including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber,

minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and [uses serving] natural

scenic, scientific and historical values.’” Norton v. S. Utah

Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 58 (2004) (quoting 43 U.S.C.

§ 1702(c)) (alteration in original). “Sustained yield” requires the

Secretary “to control depleting uses over time, so as to ensure a

high level of valuable uses in the future.” Id. (citing 43 U.S.C.

§ 1702(h)). 

Mount Royal and the Woods family argue that the Secretary

did not utilize “multiple use” management principles in issuing

PLO 7254 and thus his decision was arbitrary and capricious.

They contend that DOI had developed an “anti-mining agenda,”

Appellants’ Br. at 41, as early as 1993 and that the decision to

issue PLO 7254 was “predetermined,” id. at 30-34. In support

of their argument, the appellants suggest that the First Proposal

represented a “complete ‘about face,’” id. at 31, from previous

BLM policy regarding the Hills and that, by proposing a

withdrawal that did not conform to the West HiLine Plan,12

BLM “‘put the cart before the horse,’” id. at 32, in violation of

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FLPMA and implementing regulations. Mount Royal and the

Woods family also contend that the withdrawal violates the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution by seeking to protect an area of religious

significance to Native Americans at the expense of mineral

development. 

In attempting to make the First Proposal conform to the

West HiLine Plan, BLM drafted the Amendment/EIS utilizing

principles of “multiple use management.” BLM considered four

alternatives for managing the Hills. After analyzing the

“pertinent natural resources and economic and social conditions

found in the study area,” Final Sweet Grass Hills Resource

Management Plan Amendment and Environmental Impact

Statement 13, reprinted in JA at 485, the “environmental, social,

and economic consequences of implementing the [four]

alternatives,” id. at 31, JA at 502, and feedback from “interest

groups and individuals[,] . . . Federal, state, local agencies and

Native American tribes,” id. at 56, JA at 527, it recommended

withdrawing the entire public mineral estate. Subsequently, in

its 1997 ROD, BLM approved the “preferred alternative”

contained in the Amendment/EIS. JA at 631. 

Consistent with BLM’s recommendations, the Secretary

issued PLO 7254 “to protect unique resources within the Sweet

Grass Hills [ACEC] and surrounding areas,” including “areas of

traditional spiritual importance to Native Americans, habitat

which has high potential for reintroduction of the endangered

peregrine falcon, seasonally important elk and deer habitat, and

aquifers that provide potable water to local residents.”

Notification to Congress as Required by FLPMA 204(c)(2),

Sweet Grass Hills 20-Year Withdrawal 1, reprinted in JA at 654.

In the statutorily-required “Notification to Congress,” the

Secretary addressed all twelve factors listed in 43 U.S.C.

§ 1714(c)(2), explaining in detail the proposed withdrawal’s

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effects on current natural resource uses in the Hills, see id.

§ 1714(c)(2)(2), its effects on current land users, see id.

§ 1714(c)(2)(3), its “incompatib[ility]” with current land uses,

see id. § 1714(c)(2)(4), and its effect on state and local

government interests and the regional economy, see id.

§ 1714(c)(2)(8). Most important, after receiving the Secretary’s

notification, the Congress chose not to exercise its reserved

power under FLPMA to veto the withdrawal. That is, the

Congress did not adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving the

withdrawal, id. § 1714(c), but instead let it stand. 

With respect to the appellants’ argument that the decision in

PLO 7254 was “predetermined,” the record demonstrates that,

while the 1988 West HiLine Plan and subsequent draft EIS

regarding the Mount Royal/Manhattan Plan recommended

allowing mineral location and entry in the Hills, strong public

opposition to mining in the wake of the draft EIS’s release rather

than any BLM “anti-mining agenda” influenced its decision to

consider a withdrawal. BLM’s 1993 Application for

Withdrawal concludes:

[T]he public was not as cognizant of the significance of

the conflict between hardrock mining and the ACEC

designation until recently when exploration and possible

mining was presented as a reality. Similar activity in

other areas of Montana contributed to this public

awareness. As a result of these most recent public

inputs, local residents, as well as Native Americans,

have provided new information concerning the

importance of the resource values, particularly cultural

and hydrologic. 

Petition/Application for Withdrawal of Sweet Grass Hills 12

(July 15, 1993), reprinted in JA at 298. Furthermore, the

appellants ignore FLPMA’s implementing regulations which

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expressly allow for the simultaneous issuance of a withdrawal

proposal and preparation of a West HiLine Plan amendment to

conform to the proposal. See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-5 (“If the

amendment is being considered in response to a specific

proposal, the analysis required for the proposal and for the

amendment may occur simultaneously.”). 

Finally, PLO 7254 does not violate the Establishment

Clause. Supreme Court precedent makes clear that government

action conforms to the Establishment Clause if: (1) the action

has a “secular . . . purpose,” (2) the “primary effect” of the

action “neither advances nor inhibits religion” and (3) the action

does “not foster an excessive government entanglement with

religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)

(internal citation and quotation omitted). The Secretary

enunciated several secular purposes for withdrawing the Hills,

including protection of aquifers and the environment.

Furthermore, PLO 7254 does not primarily affect religious

interests; on the contrary, it protects all non-mineral resources

in the Hills. Id. Finally, the land order does not foster excessive

government entanglement with religion because it neither

regulates religious practices nor increases Native American

influence over management of the Hills. See Appellee’s Br. at

46. 

In sum, DOI followed FLPMA’s land management

guidelines in withdrawing 19,685 acres of public mineral estate

located in the Hills from mineral location and entry for 20 years

and, accordingly, its withdrawal decision contained in PLO 7254

is neither arbitrary nor capricious.

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant

of summary judgment to the Department of the Interior.

So ordered.

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