Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00170/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Neale E. Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Steven D. Leach, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-0170-TUC-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it several confused and interrelated filings.

I.

We note at the outset that all of plaintiff’s claims against Judge Collins in this case

arise out of Smith v. DPS Officer, CV-05-00676-TUC-RCC, over which Judge Collins

presided. It is undisputed that Judge Collins had jurisdiction in that case. Therefore, we

summarily dispose of all of the claims against Judge Collins based on the doctrine of judicial

immunity. See, e.g., Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.

1987). Also, because Plaintiff has appealed the final judgment entered in CV 05-676-TUCRCC, plaintiff’s claims here constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the judgment in

CV 05-676-TUC-RCC. See United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1981)

(stating that a court may entertain a collateral motion during the pendency of a direct appeal

Case 4:07-cv-00170-FJM Document 41 Filed 08/16/07 Page 1 of 6
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1

 Judge Collins may also be represented by a U.S. Attorney in non-FTCA cases. See

28 U.S.C. § 516. 

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only when “ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ outweigh the considerations of administrative

convenience and judicial economy”) (citations omitted). 

II.

Because the government has gone out of its way to accord plaintiff more than he is

due, we address the issues raised by the government. 

A.

We first turn to the United States’ “Notice of Substitution of United States of America

as Federal Defendant as to Common Law Tort Claims against Judge Raner C. Collins” (doc.

3). In Counts III, IV, VII and IX of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that Judge Collins falsely

imprisoned him. See Notice of Removal (doc. 1) Exhibit A (“Complaint”). Count III also

alleges that Judge Collins violated plaintiff’s A.R.S. Const. Art. II, § 2.1 rights. See

Complaint at 2. Therefore, the United States is substituted as the defendant with respect to

these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). 

Plaintiff objects to the United States’ substitution by arguing that a United States

Attorney may not represent a federal judge. See Response to United States [sic] Motion to

Dismiss Entered by Daniel G. Knauss, United States Attorney, and Response to Notice of

Substitution of United States of America as Defendant (doc. 15). We reject this baseless

assertion. United States employees are immunized from liability for their torts “ ‘while

acting within the scope of [their] office or employment.’ ” Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698

(9th Cir. 1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). When a government employee is sued in

tort, Section 2679(c) provides that the Attorney General “shall defend” the employee.1

 

Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Collins was not acting within the scope of his

employment at all times relevant to the complaint’s claims. Response to United States [sic]

Motion to Dismiss Entered by Daniel G. Knauss, United States Attorney, and Response to

Notice of Substitution of United States of America as Defendant at 2. This unsupported

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allegation does not rebut the certification. See Green, 8 F.3d at 698 (providing that a party

seeking review of a scope of employment certification “bears the burden of presenting

evidence and disproving” the certification decision “by a preponderance of the evidence.”).

B.

We next address the United States’ motion to dismiss (doc. 5) and “Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of United States’ Motion to Dismiss” (“United States’

Motion to Dismiss”) (doc. 6) and plaintiff’s “Renewed Motion that Motions Made in

Absence of Answer by Defendants be Ruled Moot” (doc. 29).

The United States’ substitution does not alter the fact that plaintiff’s claims against

Judge Collins are barred based on principles of judicial immunity. 

Alternatively, the false imprisonment claims brought against Judge Collins are barred

by the FTCA. See Motion to Dismiss at 6-7; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (exempting “[a]ny claim

arising out of . . . false imprisonment,” so long as the claim does not pertain to “to acts or

omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government”).

The false imprisonment claims pertain to conduct that allegedly occurred during a deposition

in a case over which Judge Collins presided. See Complaint at 2-5. Therefore, the false

imprisonment claims against Judge Collins are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

Defendants alternatively argue that these claims fail because plaintiff has not

exhausted his administrative remedies. See Motion to Dismiss at 1-2. Plaintiff’s complaint

is devoid of any allegation regarding compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Therefore, we

also dismiss the false imprisonment claims on this ground.

Plaintiff’s only response to the United States’ motion to dismiss is that the motion is

moot because Judge Collins has not filed an answer. See Renewed Motion that Motions

Made by Defendants be Ruled Moot. Plaintiff is wrong. The United States’ Motion to

Dismiss was filed on April 17, 2007, one day after this action was removed, see Notice of

Removal (doc. 1). The motion to dismiss was timely pursuant to Rule 81(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.,

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2

 We deny plaintiff’s motion as to all defendants. Each defendant timely filed a

motion to dismiss, tolling the time for filing an answer. No affirmative defenses were

waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(a)(4). 

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and tolled the filing of an answer pursuant to Rule 12(a)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P. Therefore,

plaintiff’s motion is denied.2

III.

The court also has before it Judge Collins’ “Motion to Dismiss Constitutional Tort

Claims” (doc. 9) and supporting memorandum (doc. 10), plaintiff’s “Motion that Raner C.

Collins be Declared in Default and that Judgment be Rendered Against Him” (doc. 16),

Judge Collins’ response to the motion for default (doc. 19) and plaintiff’s “Reply to Response

that Motion in Default of Raner C. Collins be Denied” (doc. 20).

We have already concluded that each of plaintiff’s claims against Judge Collins are

barred by judicial immunity. Therefore, Judge Collins’ motion to dismiss is granted.

Instead of responding to defendant’s motion, plaintiff moved for default judgment.

See Motion that Raner C. Collins be Declared in Default and that Judgment be Rendered

Against Him. Judge Collins is an officer of the United States. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson,

541 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 (D.D.C. 1982). Plaintiff has not established “a claim or right to

relief” against him; therefore, may not enter default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(e). 

Plaintiff also argues that Judge Collins has waived his affirmative defenses “by rolling

the [state] case into federal court” on April 16, 2007. Motion that Raner C. Collins be

Declared in Default and that Judgment be Rendered Against Him at 1. Although plaintiff

contends that Judge Collins was served with a summons and complaint on February 16,

2007, the record is devoid of any evidence that Judge Collins was actually served. 

The time for answering or presenting defenses under Rule 81(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., are

the same as the timing requirements of Rule 12, Fed. R. Civ. P. “Rule 12(b) states that a

motion raising the specific defenses listed ‘shall be made before pleading if a further

pleading is permitted,’ ” but “does not limit the period to 20 days.” Bechtel v. Liberty Nat'l

Bank, 534 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976). Therefore, “such a motion may be made at any

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time prior to such a pleading.” Id. The United States’ April 17, 2007 motion to dismiss the

tort claims against Judge Collins tolled the time for filing Judge Collins’ answer pursuant to

Rule 12(a)(4). As of April 26, 2007, the United States’ motion to dismiss was still pending;

as a result, Judge Collins’ answer was not yet due. We reject plaintiff’s assertion that

12(b)(6) defenses were waived. 

IV.

We next turn to plaintiff’s “Motion that Appearance of U.S. Attorney, Daniel K.

Knauss in this Court as Defense Attorney of a Federal Judge be Vacated” (doc. 21), “Motion

that Appearance of U.S. Attorney, Richard Glenn Patrick in this Court as Defense Attorney

of Federal Judge be Vacated” (doc. 25), “Renewed Motion that Appearance of any U.S.

Attorney of any Name in this Court as Defense Attorney of Federal Judge be Vacated” (doc.

33), notice of appearance and substitution of counsel (doc. 32) and plaintiff’s “Response to

Memorandum of Maggie H. Abuhaidar of July 6, 2007" (doc. 36). 

Plaintiff argues that United States Attorneys should not represent federal judges

because such representation violates, among other things, the doctrine of separation of

powers. See, e.g., Motion that Appearance of U.S. Attorney, Daniel K. Knauss in this Court

as Defense Attorney of a Federal Judge be Vacated at 1. Plaintiff’s motion is without merit.

As noted above, both 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 516 authorize the representation

at issue in this case.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED SUBSTITUTING the United States of America

as the defendant to the common law tort claims against Judge Raner C. Collins. 

IT IS FURTHERMORE ORDERED GRANTING:

(1) the United States’ motion to dismiss (doc. 5) and 

(2) Judge Collins’ “Motion to Dismiss Constitutional Tort Claims” (doc. 9).

FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED DENYING:

(1) plaintiff’s “Motion that Raner C. Collins be Declared in Default and that

Judgment be Rendered Against Him” (doc. 16); 

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(2) plaintiff’s “Renewed Motion that Motions Made in Absence of Answer by

Defendants be Ruled Moot” (doc. 29); 

(3) plaintiff’s “Motion that Appearance of U.S. Attorney, Daniel K. Knauss in this

Court as Defense Attorney of a Federal Judge be Vacated” (doc. 21); 

(4) plaintiff’s “Motion that Appearance of U.S. Attorney, Richard Glenn Patrick

in this Court as Defense Attorney of Federal Judge be Vacated” (doc. 25); and

(5) plaintiff’s “Renewed Motion that Appearance of any U.S. Attorney of any

Name in this Court as Defense Attorney of Federal Judge be Vacated” (doc.

33).

DATED this 15th day of August, 2007.

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