Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02389/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02389-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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05cv2389-LAB (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IGNACIO LICON,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden; BILL

LOCKYER, Attorney General of

the State of California,

Respondents. 

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Case No. 05cv2389-LAB (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Larry Alan Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil

Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California.

On December 24, 2005, Petitioner Ignacio Licon, a state prisoner

appearing pro se, commenced these habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1. Petitioner challenges his convictions

of misdemeanor child molestation, making terrorist threats, and

obstructing or resisting an executive officer, as well as his twelveyear state prison sentence. Id.

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1 The instant petition names both John Marshall and Bill Lockyer as Respondents.

Petition at 1. Lockyer, the Attorney General of the State of California, is not a

proper respondent in this case. Rule 2 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides

that the state officer having custody of a habeas petitioner shall be named as

respondent. Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Because Petitioner is currently

incarcerated at the California Mens Colony, only John Marshall, warden of that

facility, was properly named. The Attorney General neither moved to dismiss Respondent

Lockyer as an improper party, nor filed an Answer on Respondent Lockyer’s behalf. See

Answer at 1, 22. This Court therefore refers only to Respondent Marshall throughout

this Report and Recommendation. Because Respondent Lockyer is an improper respondent,

however, this Court RECOMMENDS that the allegations against Respondent Lockyer be

dismissed.

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This Court has considered the Petition (Petition), Respondents’1

Answer (Answer), and all supporting documents submitted by the parties.

Based on the evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set

forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion in People v. Licon, No. D039707, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. July

16, 2003). See Answer Ex. A. This Court presumes the state court’s

factual determinations to be correct absent clear and convincing

evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S.

20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including

inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness).

A. Prosecution Case

On the evening of March 18, 2001, 11-year-old Julie M.

rode her bicycle to her parents’ doughnut shop in El Centro.

Appellant came out of a liquor store and approached Julie in

the doughnut shop’s parking lot. He addressed her in

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Spanish, a language she did not understand. Julie attempted

to avoid appellant but he blocked her path, grabbed her

bicycle and backed her up against the wall of a building.

As Juan Garcia drove his taxi into the shop’s parking

lot, he saw appellant holding Julie’s bike and blocking her.

Garcia told appellant to let her go. As Garcia started to

get out of the cab, appellant approached him in a menacing

manner and grabbed his wrist. As Garcia got out, he again

told appellant to let Julie go. Appellant asked: “What do

you care? What is it to you?” Garcia stated he was a friend

of Julie’s family. Appellant replied he wanted to go to the

bus depot and wanted Garcia to take him. Appellant stated

that first he “wanted to fuck this little girl.”

Garcia told Julie to go into the doughnut shop, drove to

another part of the parking lot and called the police.

Appellant followed Julie into the shop where he bought coffee

and doughnuts and went back outside. Within five to ten

minutes police officers arrived and contacted appellant.

Julie and Garcia were interviewed and appellant was placed

under arrest.

Appellant was transported to the police station. As

Officer Shannon Fox was reading him his rights, appellant

told the officer to listen. Appellant told the officer to

“let him sleep it off in the jail and he would leave [Fox’s]

children alone.” Appellant stated he knew where the officer

lived because a friend did the officer’s gardening.

Appellant stated his friend told him that Fox’s wife “was a

pretty little blonde.” Appellant threatened to kill the

officer’s family when he was not at home.

Appellant’s stepsister Elizabeth V. testified that

between 1975, when she was six or seven years old, and 1980

appellant raped and sexually assaulted her on a weekly or

monthly baiss [sic]. Diana C., appellant’s stepdaughter,

testified that from 1982 to 1986, when she was eight to 12

years old, appellant repeatedly sexually molested her.

B. Defense Case

Appellant testified he was not present at the doughnut

shop at the time of the incident and that he did not threaten

Officer Fox’s family. In argument counsel stated appellant

did not remember being present or making threats because he

was intoxicated. Counsel argued Garcia overreacted to

appellant’s actions. Appellant was not molesting Julie.

Counsel argued that if appellant did threaten Officer Fox’s

family, he did so because he was intoxicated and lacked the

specific intent to commit the crime.

Answer Ex. A at 2-3.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2001, the District Attorney of Imperial County filed

a four-count criminal complaint charging Petitioner with terrorist

threats in violation of California Penal Code (Penal Code) § 422,

misdemeanor child molestation in violation of Penal Code § 647.6(A),

obstructing or resisting an executive officer in violation of Penal Code

§ 69, and battery in violation of Penal Code § 242. Clerk’s Transcript,

(CT), Lodgment 1 at 1-3. On April 16, 2001, the District Attorney filed

an information charging Petitioner with these same four counts. Id. at

5-7.

Petitioner’s criminal trial began on October 31, 2001. Id. at 128;

Reporter’s Transcript, (RT), Lodgment 3, Volume dated October 31, 2001.

On November 8, 2001, after jury deliberations began, the State moved to

amend the information to allege a prior conviction of criminal threats

as an enhancement pursuant to Penal Code §§ 667(a)(1), (b)-(i) and Penal

Code §§ 1170.12(a)-(d). CT, Lodgment 1 at 173-79. The trial court

granted the State’s motion to amend on November 9, 2001. Id. at 180.

That same day, a jury found Petitioner guilty of criminal threats,

obstructing or resisting an executive officer, and misdemeanor child

molestation. Id. at 185-87. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the

battery charge. Id. at 184. In a bifurcated proceeding on the amended

information’s prior conviction allegation, the jury found that

Petitioner suffered a prior conviction of criminal threats in violation

of Penal Code § 422. Id. at 181-83. On February 26, 2002, the trial

court imposed a total sentence of twelve years, which was comprised of

consecutive sentences of six years on the criminal threats charge, one

year for the misdemeanor child molestation charge, and five years for

the prior conviction enhancement. Id. at 211-12, 240-41. The trial

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court also ordered Petitioner to pay a total of $500.00 in restitution.

Id. at 212, 241.

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One. Appellant’s Opening Brief, Lodgment

5. On direct appeal, Petitioner argued, among other things, that the

trial court erroneously admitted evidence of two prior sexual offenses,

improperly permitted the filing of an amended information after the jury

reached its verdict, and failed to give sua sponte a standard jury

instruction regarding the weighing of conflicting evidence. Id. at 10-

20, 44-49, 61-68. On July 16, 2003, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions in an unpublished opinion. Answer Ex.

A. Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court, see Petition for Review, Lodgment 8, which was summarily

denied without citation of authority. Order of the California Supreme

Court, Lodgment 9.

Between April 13, 2003 and September 6, 2004, Petitioner sought

collateral review of his convictions and sentence in the California

Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the California

Supreme Court. Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nos. D041996,

D045136, and S129069, Lodgments 11-14. In these state habeas petitions,

Petitioner alleged an ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated

on his defense counsel’s failure to call various alibi witnesses, see

Lodgment 11 at 3-3f; Lodgment 12 at ¶ 6; Lodgment 13 at ¶ 6; Lodgment

14 at ¶ 6, a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to conflict free

counsel, see Lodgment 12 at ¶ 6; Lodgment 13 at ¶ 6; Lodgment 14 at ¶

6, and a violation of his right to self-representation as described in

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Lodgment 12 at ¶ 7;

Lodgment 13 at ¶ 7; Lodgment 14 at ¶ 7. The California courts denied

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2 The appellate court also noted that to the extent Petitioner asserted the

trial court erroneously denied his People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (Cal. 1970) motion,

such a claim was not cognizable on habeas absent special circumstances, none of which

were presented in his state habeas petition. Answer Ex. B at 1. With regard to

Petitioner’s self-representation claim, the appellate court similarly underlined that

the issue could have been raised on appeal and thus was not cognizable on habeas

review. Id. at 2. The appellate court further explained that were it to reach the

merits of Petitioner’s self-representation claim, it would deny the petition under the

circumstances presented. Id.

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the petitions. In particular, on August 11, 2004, the California

Superior Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition “for lack of proof

of proper service upon the proper real party in interest.” Lodgment 13

Ex. J-1. The California Court of Appeal issued a denial on October 22,

2004, reasoning that (1) Petitioner failed to establish how any alibi

witness testimony would have benefitted his defense, (2) Petitioner made

no showing that his defense counsel suffered from a conflict of

interest, and (3) the trial court correctly denied as untimely

Petitioner’s during-trial request to represent himself.2 Answer Ex. B.

at 1-2. On October 12, 2005, the California Supreme Court summarily

denied the last of Petitioner’s state habeas petitions. Lodgment 15.

On December 24, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1.

Respondent filed an Answer on March 22, 2006. Doc. No. 7. Between May

4, 2006 and August 8, 2006, Petitioner filed one request to file a

traverse in excess of ten pages, see Doc. Nos. 10, 13, one request for

an evidentiary hearing, see Doc. No. 20, two requests for appointed

counsel, see Doc. Nos. 10, 12, 20, three requests for an extension of

time in which to file his traverse, see Doc. Nos. 10, 13, 16, 22, and

one motion to disqualify the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Doc. No. 24.

This Court denied Petitioner’s requests for appointed counsel, for an

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evidentiary hearing, and to disqualify the undersigned Magistrate Judge,

see Doc. Nos. 11, 21, 25, granted in part Petitioner’s request to file

a traverse in excess of ten pages, see Doc. No. 11, and granted each of

Petitioner’s three requests for an extension of time to file a traverse.

Doc. Nos. 11, 18, 23. By Order dated August 1, 2006, this Court

instructed Petitioner to file a traverse on or before August 16, 2006.

Doc. No. 23. To date, Petitioner has not filed a traverse. As a

result, this Court reviews Petitioner’s habeas claims as presented in

his petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus

on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim—

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Summary denials do constitute adjudications on the

merits. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). Where

there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established

federal law if the state court: (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached” by the Supreme Court on a question of law; or (2)

“confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant

Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme

Court’s].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law where the state court “identifies the

correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. .

. . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.”

Andrade, 538 U.S. 75-76 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Clearly established federal law “refers to the

holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme]

Court’s decisions.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

Finally, habeas relief is also available if the state court’s

adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

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decision will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this Court

finds that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This Court will presume

that the state court’s factual findings are correct, and Petitioner may

overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of his criminal

convictions and subsequent sentence on five separate grounds. Petition

at 6-10. First, Petitioner argues that the trial court erroneously

admitted evidence of his prior sexual offenses against minors in

violation of California Evidence Code § 352 and his rights to due

process and a fair trial. Id. at 6. Second, Petitioner alleges that

the trial court disregarded its duty to instruct the jury on weighing

conflicting evidence as provided in CALJIC No. 2.22. Id. at 7. Third,

Petitioner claims that the trial court improperly permitted amendment

of the information, adding a prior serious felony allegation while the

jury was deliberating, in violation of his federal and state due process

rights. Id. at 8. Fourth, Petitioner contends that defense counsel’s

failure to call certain alibi witnesses and an unspecified conflict of

interest deprived him of effective assistance of counsel, and that that

unspecified conflict of interest also deprived him of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 9. Fifth, Petitioner asserts that

the trial court improperly denied his request to represent himself. Id.

at 10.

Respondent argues that the state courts’ resolution of Claims One,

Three, Four, and Five was neither contrary to nor involved an

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3 Similarly, Respondent argues that to the extent Petitioner alleges in Claim

One that the trial court violated the requirements of California Evidence Code § 352,

he fails to present a federal question. Answer at 12-13.

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unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented. Answer

at 11-12, 13-16, 19-21. Respondent argues that Claim Two fails to state

a cognizable federal claim.3 Id. at 12-13. Respondent also argues that

Claim Five is procedurally barred. Id. at 16-19. For these reasons,

Respondent maintains that the instant habeas petition must be denied in

its entirety. Id. at 22.

A. Admission Of Prior Sexual Offense Evidence

In his first claim for habeas relief, Petitioner argues that the

trial court’s admission of testimony regarding prior sexual offenses not

only violated his rights to due process and to a fair trial, but also

ran afoul of California Evidence Code § 352. Petition at 6. In

particular, Petitioner alleges that the trial court failed to assess the

probative value and the prejudicial nature of the prior offense

testimony as required under California Evidence Code § 352. Id.

Respondent contends that the appellate court properly affirmed the

trial court’s admission of this evidence. Answer at 11. In support,

Respondent notes that the Ninth Circuit has determined that the federal

equivalent of California Evidence Code § 1108—the provision under which

the evidence was admitted—comports with federal due process standards.

Id. (citing United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir.

2001)). Respondent also argues that Petitioner fails to make the

requisite showing that the evidence’s admission had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”

Answer at 12 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)).

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4 California Evidence Code § 352 endows the court with broad discretion to

exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability

that its admission will” create undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the

jury. California Evidence Code § 352.

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Finally, Respondent asserts Petitioner’s claim with respect to

California Evidence Code § 352 fails to state a federal question.

Answer at 12.

As referenced above, prior to trial, the prosecution sought to

admit the testimony of Elizabeth V. and Diana Y., Petitioner’s

stepsister and stepdaughter, to support the child molestation charge.

RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated October 26, 2001 at 28-98. Both women

offered testimony that between the approximate ages of seven and twelve,

Petitioner sexually assaulted each of them on a regular basis. Id. at

42-81. Over Petitioner’s objection, the trial court permitted the

prosecution to present this testimony at trial pursuant to California

Evidence Code § 1108, which creates an exception to the prohibition

against the admission of character evidence to demonstrate a defendant’s

propensity to commit a particular crime. Id. at 978; see also RT,

Lodgment 3, Volume dated November 2 and 5, 2001 at 124-65. That section

provides in pertinent part:

[i]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of

a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of

another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible

by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant

to Section 352.

California Evidence Code § 1108(a).4

 In deciding whether to admit prior

sexual offense evidence, a trial court may consider such factors as its

nature, relevance, remoteness, likelihood of confusing the issues,

similarity to the charged offense, and prejudicial impact. See People

v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 916-17 (Cal. 1999).

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The California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s request

for review with respect to this claim, so this Court must look through

to the last reasoned state court decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-

06. The last reasoned state court decision on this issue came from the

California Court of Appeal. Answer Ex. A at 4-8. After a thorough

discussion of a trial court’s duty to assess whether the probative value

of a defendant’s prior sexual offenses outweighs undue prejudice

concerns, see id. at 5-6, the appellate court rejected Petitioner’s

claims:

Appellant was charged with molesting a child. (Pen.

Code, § 647.6, subd. (a).) That offense requires proof that

the defendant’s conduct was motivated by an unnatural or

abnormal sexual interest in the victim. (People v. McFarland

(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 489, 494.) In a prosecution for that

offense, therefore, evidence of a propensity to the

commission of sexual offenses against children is, in light

of section 1108, relevant.

In deciding whether the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting propensity evidence over appellant’s

section 352 objection, we review a series of factors. First,

we ask whether the uncharged acts were more or less

inflammatory than the charged conduct. (People v. Harris

(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, 736-737.) While it is, of course,

difficult to evaluate such matters, and while sexual offenses

against children always have a high potential for inflaming

a jury, we do not believe the uncharged conduct in this case

was significantly more inflammatory than the charged conduct.

The uncharged conduct involved serious sexual offenses over

extended periods of time and on repeated occasions. On the

other hand, the victim of the charged offense was a stranger

to appellant and his conduct was extremely disturbing. While

no actual touching occurred, the evidence was that appellant

intended to rape the child. We conclude the charged and

uncharged acts equally distressing.

Next, we review the probability of confusion of issues

inherent in the presentation of propensity evidence. In this

regard courts have considered whether the defendant was

convicted of the uncharged offenses. The concern is that if

the defendant was not convicted of those offenses, the jurors

may wish to punish the defendant in the case presently before

them for that earlier conduct. Such desire confuses the

jury’s consideration of the charged offenses. (People v.

Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 284; People v. Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 738-739.)

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In this case there was no testimony at trial concerning

whether appellant was charged or convicted with regard to

either of the claimed earlier sex offenses. Elizabeth V. did

testify that it was not until three months before trial that

she told the authorities about appellant’s sexual assaults on

her.

With no knowledge that appellant had been charged with

or convicted of the uncharged prior sexual offenses, there

was at least some possibility the jury might wish to punish

him for his sexual crimes against all three victims. Some

confusion might, therefore, have been caused by introduction

of the uncharged offenses. Still, it is certainly not the

case that only prior charged offenses resulting in

convictions are admissible under section 1108 or for that

matter any section allowing the introduction of prior bad

acts. Under the facts of this case we conclude that while a

danger of confusion existed, it did not require exclusion of

the offered other crimes evidence.

Next, we consider the remoteness of the uncharged

offenses. Courts have reasoned that as the time between the

charged and uncharged offenses grows longer, it is less

likely the defendant has a propensity to commit the charged

offense. Thus, as the uncharged offense becomes more remote,

it becomes less probative and more prejudicial. (People v.

Branch, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at. pp. 284-285.)

Here, the crimes against Elizabeth V. ended

approximately 21 years before trial and those against Diana

C. approximately 14 years before. The offenses were remote.

Nonetheless, there were multiple victims who were repeatedly

assaulted over a lengthy period of time. A court could

reasonably believe that the uncharged offenses in this case

retained strong probative value.

While the matter is a close one, we cannot say the trial

court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of

appellant’s prior sexual assaults.

Id. at 6-8.

1. Rights To Due Process And To A Fair Trial

The admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law, and is not

reviewable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085

(9th Cir. 1985). Notwithstanding this general proposition, a trial

court’s admission of prejudicial evidence may warrant habeas relief if

the admission was fundamentally unfair and resulted in a denial of due

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process. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. The failure to comply with state

rules of evidence alone, however, is neither a necessary nor a

sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief on due process

grounds. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir.

1991). Only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may

draw from the evidence can its admission rise to the level of a due

process violation. Id. at 920. Even then, the evidence in question

must “be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” Id.

(quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The appellate court’s review of the admission of Elizabeth V.’s and

Diana Y.’s testimony was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. As an initial matter,

the Supreme Court has expressly left open the question whether the

admission of propensity evidence of this kind violates due process. See

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5 (expressing “no opinion on whether a state

law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of

‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime”).

Thus, to the extent Petitioner attempts to allege that California

Evidence Code § 1108 violates due process by allowing admission of prior

sexual offense evidence for the purpose of proving disposition to commit

the present offense, Petitioner is mistaken. As such, the appellate

court’s decision with respect to this claim was not contrary to clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent.

Next, as Respondent correctly underlines, the Ninth Circuit’s

rejection of a due process challenge to Federal Rule of Evidence 414,

the federal equivalent of California Evidence Code § 1108, guides this

Court’s consideration of similarly patterned California law. See LeMay,

260 F.3d at 1024, 1030. In LeMay, the Ninth Circuit determined that

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application of Federal Rule of Evidence 403—the federal analog of

California Evidence Code § 352—eliminates any due process concerns posed

by Federal Rule of Evidence 414 because Rule 403 provides a filtering

mechanism through which a trial court may exclude evidence that is so

prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of his right to a fair trial. Id.

at 1026-27. Modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 414, California

Evidence Code § 1108 functions in an analogous fashion to this federal

rule, and is similarly subject to a protective filtering mechanism,

namely, California Evidence Code § 352.

In this case, the trial court thoroughly considered the prior

sexual offense testimony before authorizing its admission, holding a

lengthy in limine hearing during which the court repeatedly acknowledged

its obligations under California Evidence Code § 352. RT, Lodgment 3,

Volume dated October 26, 2001 at 14-21, 26-32, 35-97. Even then, the

trial court limited the testimony to the witnesses’ accounts of sexual

abuse, and allowed the defense to present testimony to impeach the

witnesses’ credibility. Id. at 97. Moreover, as the above excerpt

confirms, the appellate court conducted a careful review of both the

probative value and the prejudicial nature of the evidence in question,

assessing a number of individualized factors to determine whether the

evidence was properly admitted. Answer Ex. A at 6-8. For example,

while recognizing the considerable potential for inflaming the jury that

accompanies sexual offenses against children, the appellate court found

that the uncharged acts of other sexual abuses were not significantly

more inflammatory than the charged conduct. Id. at 6. The appellate

court also found that any danger that the testimony would confuse or

mislead the jury was minimal, and did not mandate the evidence’s

exclusion. Id. at 7. In addition, the appellate court explained that

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the prior incidents of sexual abuse, however remote, retained strong

probative value. Id. After considering all such factors, the appellate

court concluded that the nature of the evidence, although prejudicial,

was highly probative to the child molestation charge, and as a result,

the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.

Id. at 8. Given the trial court’s thorough assessment of the evidence

under California Evidence Code § 352, coupled with the appellate court’s

equally thorough review of that decision, this Court cannot conclude

that Petitioner’s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair because of the

admission of Elizabeth V.’s and Diana Y.’s testimony.

Moreover, even assuming the prior sexual offense evidence was

improperly admitted, Petitioner is entitled to relief only if the

evidentiary error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Here, the

victim, an independent eyewitness, and the arresting police officer

provided direct evidence separate from Elizabeth V.’s and Diana Y.’s

propensity testimony that Petitioner committed the offenses charged.

RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated November 2 and 5, 2001 at 16-37, 38-67, 88-

123. As Respondent notes, this direct evidence was contradicted only

by Petitioner’s own testimony, which, given the verdict, the jury found

less than credible. Id., Volume dated November 6, 2001 at 203-352;

Volume dated November 7, 2001 at 398-404. As such, even if the trial

court erroneously admitted the prior sexual offense evidence, the error

was harmless, and does not provide a basis for habeas relief.

2. Compliance With California Evidence Code § 352

Again, Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted Elizabeth

V.’s and Diana Y.’s testimony in violation of California Evidence Code

§ 352. Petition at 6. Petitioner insists that the trial court failed

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to weigh the probative value and prejudicial nature of this testimony,

despite its obligation to do so under that evidentiary rule. Id.

To the extent Petitioner argues that the trial court failed to

adhere to the requirements of California Evidence Code § 352, he alleges

an error in the application of state law not cognizable on federal

habeas. See McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (emphasizing that “it is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions”); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,

780 (1990) (noting that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

errors of state law”). Even assuming that Petitioner successfully

stated a federal claim with respect to California Evidence Code § 352,

as explained above, the record belies Petitioner’s contentions.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for habeas relief on this basis is

without merit.

In conclusion, this Court finds that the admission of the prior

sexual offense evidence did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally

unfair, and did not deprive him of any due process right. This Court

also finds that to the extent Petitioner alleges the trial court

disregarded its duties under California Evidence Code § 352, he fails

to present a question cognizable on federal habeas. As such, this Court

finds that the California Court of Appeal’s decision upholding the

admission of this evidence was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S.

at 412-13. For these reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

first ground for habeas relief be DENIED.

B. The Trial Court’s Failure To Provide CALJIC No. 2.22

In his second claim for habeas relief, Petitioner argues that the

trial court erred by failing sua sponte to instruct the jury in

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5 California Jury Instruction Number 2.22 admonishes jurors as follows:

You are not required to decide any issue in accordance with the testimony

of a number of witnesses, which does not convince you, as against the testimony

of a lesser number or other evidence, which you find more convincing. You may

not disregard the testimony of the greater number of witnesses merely from

caprice, whim or prejudice, or from a desire to favor one side against the other.

You must not decide an issue by the simple process of counting the number of

witnesses [who have testified on the opposing sides]. The final test is not in

the [relative] number of witnesses, but in the convincing force of the evidence.

CALJIC No. 2.22.

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accordance with CALJIC No. 2.22, which details how to weigh conflicting

evidence.5 Petition at 7. Petitioner contends that a trial court is

obligated to utilize this standard instruction “in every case in which

conflicting evidence has been presented.” Id. Petitioner also

maintains that the appellate court incorrectly characterized the trial

court’s failure as harmless error. Id. Respondent counters that this

claim fails to present a federal question. Answer at 12-13.

The California Court of Appeal, the last state court to issue a

reasoned decision with regard to this claim, acknowledged that this

standard instruction “must be given sua sponte in cases in which

conflicting evidence is presented.” Answer Ex. A at 10.

Notwithstanding this observation, the appellate court declared that this

standard instruction “expresses mere matters of common sense and

intelligent appraisal,” and as such, the trial court’s failure to give

the instruction was harmless error. Id.

Petitioner references neither federal law nor cites any

constitutional provision in support of his instructional error claim.

See Petition at 7. As previously noted, when reviewing claims for

habeas relief, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a

petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also McGuire,

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502 U.S. at 67-68. Here, Petitioner fails to allege that either the

trial court’s failure to issue CALJIC No. 2.22 or the appellate court’s

characterization of this failure as harmless error violated any federal

constitutional provision or other federal law. Absent such an

assertion, Petitioner fails to state a claim cognizable in a federal

habeas petition, and this Court is without authority to grant habeas

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d); see also McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68;

Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780.

In a final note, assuming that Petitioner’s second claim for habeas

relief properly stated a cognizable claim, and assuming that conflicting

evidence was presented at trial, Petitioner correctly asserts that the

trial court’s failure to instruct the jury in accordance with CALJIC No.

2.22 was error. Nevertheless, Petitioner’s jury was thoroughly

instructed how to evaluate both witness testimony and other evidence

with CALJIC No. 2.11 (production of all available evidence not

required), CALJIC No. 2.20 and CALJIC No. 2.23 (believability of

witnesses), and CALJIC No. 2.27 (sufficiency of testimony of one

witness). Lodgment 4 at 17-20. The jury was instructed that Petitioner

was to be presumed innocent until his guilt was proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. at 25 (CALJIC No. 2.90, presumption of

innocence/reasonable doubt burden of proof). The jury was also told to

consider all instructions “as a whole and each in light of all the

others.” Id. at 6 (CALJIC No. 1.01, instructions to be considered as

a whole). When viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole,

and given that Petitioner presents no record evidence that the jury

actually engaged in the conduct prohibited by CALJIC No. 2.22, the trial

court’s failure to give that instruction was harmless. See Brecht, 507

U.S. at 637; see also People v. Snead, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1088, 1097 (Cal.

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6 In particular, Petitioner claims that had his defense counsel been made aware

of these allegations earlier in the proceedings, counsel would have more strenuously

advised Petitioner either to submit to a psychologist’s examination to explore a mental

defense, or to enter a plea. Petition at 8.

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Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the

jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.22 was not “prejudicial error”

considering all other instructions given). Consequently, Petitioner’s

complaints with respect to the appellate court’s harmless error finding

are unfounded.

Because Petitioner seeks habeas relief solely on the basis of an

alleged violation of state law, this Court finds this claim fails to

present a question cognizable on federal habeas review. See McGuire,

502 U.S. at 67-68. Moreover, even assuming Petitioner had stated a

federal claim, this Court finds that the claim cannot survive harmless

error scrutiny. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

second claim for habeas relief be DENIED.

C. Amendment Of The Information

In his third claim for habeas relief, Petitioner argues that the

trial court violated his federal and state rights to due process when

it allowed the state to amend the information to add a prior serious

felony allegation after the jury began to deliberate. Petition at 8.

Petitioner asserts that had the prior serious felony allegation—and the

potential exposure to an increased prison term that accompanies such an

allegation—been brought to his attorney’s attention earlier, counsel

would have pursued a different defense.6 Id. Having learned of the

prior serious felony allegation after he presented his case, Petitioner

claims that the amendment deprived him of due process. Id.

Respondent contends that Petitioner fails to show the amendment

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resulted in a denial of due process. Answer at 13-15. Respondent

declares that in evaluating Petitioner’s claim, the appellate court

properly assessed whether the amendment impermissibly interfered with

Petitioner’s adequate notice of the prior serious felony charge, or

denied him the opportunity to present an informed defense. Id. at 15

(citing Scott v. Roberts, 777 F. Supp. 897, 900 (D. Kan. 1991)).

Respondent therefore claims that the appellate court’s decision was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Answer at 15. Moreover, Respondent claims

that even assuming the trial court erroneously allowed the information’s

amendment, such error was harmless. Id. Accordingly, Respondent

maintains that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim. Id.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s due process

claims. Answer Ex. A at 17-20. After a detailed explanation of the

sequence of events culminating in the information’s amendment, see id.

at 17-18, the appellate court reasoned:

Penal Code section 969a states that when it is

discovered that an information fails to allege all of the

defendant’s prior felony convictions, the information may,

upon order of the court, be amended to charge them. Such

amendment may be made at anytime before the jury is

discharged. (People v. Tindall (2000) 24 Cal.4th 767, 769-

770.) In deciding whether to allow amendment, the trial

court should consider, among any other relevant factors, the

reason for the late amendment, whether the amendment is a

surprise to the defendant, whether the initial failure to

charge the prior affected the defendant’s decisions during

plea bargaining, and whether other felony convictions were

charged originally. (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th

590, 607-608.) Our Supreme Court has made clear such

decisions are best left to the trial court. (Ibid.)

Ultimately, granting or denying an amendment pursuant to

Penal Code section 969a requires the trial court act with due

regard for the administration of justice and fairness to the

defendant. Here, the prosecutor readily conceded she was

aware of appellant’s prior Penal Code section 422 conviction

from the beginning of the case. She was unaware, however,

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that it could be charged as an enhancement under Penal Code

sections 667, subdivision (a)(1), or 667, subdivisions (b)

through (i). While such ignorance is not to be condoned,

neither should it alone prevent amendment of the information.

The important question is whether appellant was

prejudiced by the late amendment of the information.

Prejudice in this context, of course, does not consider the

greater sentence appellant received based on the amendment.

The sentence appellant received was the one specified by the

law. The issue is whether the defense proceeded in any

fashion to its detriment based on the failure of the

prosecution to include in the original information allegation

of the recidivist enhancements.

The omission could not have affected appellant’s plea

bargaining decisions since there was no plea bargaining in

this case. Nor does it appear the defense would have

proceeded differently in trying the case had the enhancements

been included in the original information. Counsel argued

below that had he known this was a strike case he would have

tried harder to convince appellant to be examined by a

psychologist and accept a mental defense. We find this hard

to accept. Appellant was facing a prison term for serious

crimes based on the original information. There was

sufficient reason for counsel to use his strongest arguments

in convincing appellant to accept a mental defense even

without knowledge of the enhancing allegations. In any

event, given appellant’s obstinate nature, there is no reason

to believe he would have accepted counsel’s suggestion.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing

amendment of the information.

Id. at 18-20.

The Sixth Amendment “guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental

right to be clearly informed of the nature and cause of the charges

against him.” Calderon v. Prunty, 59 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1995).

To determine if a defendant has received fair notice of the charges

against him, reviewing courts first look to the information. See James

v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir. 1994). “The principal purpose of the

information is to provide the defendant with a description of the

charges against him in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his

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7 The Ninth Circuit recognizes that a criminal defendant can receive

constitutionally adequate notice by means other than the charging document. See

Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236, n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that “other

means” of adequate notice include a complaint, an arrest warrant, a bill of

particulars, or even information gathered during the course of a preliminary hearing).

8 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000), the Supreme Court left

intact its holding in Almendarez-Torres, and confirmed that “[o]ther than the fact of

a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

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defense.”7 Id. Nevertheless, the federal constitution does not require

the government to identify in the charging document the prior

convictions it intends to use solely for sentencing purposes. See

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228, 230 (1998)

(explaining that an indictment must set forth each element of the crime

charged but “need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing

of an offender found guilty of the charged crime,” and underlining that

the “prior commission of a serious crime” is a typical sentencing

factor).8

Federal law authorizes amendment of the information “at any time

before the verdict or finding” so long as no “additional or different

offense is charged” and if the amendment does not prejudice the

defendant’s substantial rights. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(e). Moreover, as

noted by the California Court of Appeal, California law permits court

ordered amendment of an information to include prior convictions if the

amendment occurs before the jury has been discharged. See Penal Code

§ 969a; see also People v. Tindall, 24 Cal. 4th 767, 782 (Cal. 2000)

(explaining that an “information may not be amended to add prior

conviction allegations after the jury has been discharged”); People v.

Valladoli, 13 Cal. 4th 590, 608-09 (Cal. 1996) (finding post-verdict

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amendment of the information permissible under Penal Code § 969a and in

accordance with due process). With regard to such amendments, however,

the “key question is whether an error or omission in an indictment [or

information] worked to the prejudice of the accused.” United States v.

Normandeau, 800 F.2d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1986).

As an initial matter, this Court finds that the trial court’s

decision to allow the information’s amendment comported with the

requirements of the federal constitution. Both the criminal complaint

and the subsequent information set forth in detail each element of the

crimes charged. See CT, Lodgment 1 at 1-3, 5-7. The charging documents

therefore provided Petitioner with a description of the charges against

him sufficient to enable the preparation of his defense. Because the

prior conviction was added solely for use in connection with sentencing,

under Almendarez-Torres, no federal constitutional violation occurred

when the trial court permitted the amendment pursuant to Penal Code §

969a. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228, 230. As such, the trial

court’s amendment of the information to add the sentence enhancement did

not violate any federal constitutional right Petitioner possessed.

Moreover, the record contradicts any contention by Petitioner that

the late filing of the amended information impermissibly interfered with

his adequate notice of the prior conviction charge. For example, during

cross-examination, Petitioner acknowledged having previously pled guilty

to making criminal threats in violation of Penal Code § 422. RT,

Lodgment 3, Volume dated November 6, 2001 at 286-87; compare id., Volume

dated January 21, 1994 at 3-11 (Petitioner’s January 21, 1994

disposition hearing in which he enters a plea of no contest to the 1994

criminal threats charge). The State’s inquiries with regard to

Petitioner’s criminal history on cross-examination thus alerted both

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Petitioner and his attorney to the prior conviction. See Sheppard, 909

F.2d at 1236, n.2. In fact, Petitioner’s attorney conceded knowledge

of the prior serious felony conviction, but simply maintained he was

unaware the prior conviction constituted a strike for sentencing

purposes. RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated November 8-9, 2001 at 485-86.

As a result, Petitioner’s suggestion that both he and his attorney were

either unaware or had insufficient notice of his earlier criminal

threats conviction is unfounded. See Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425,

428-29 (9t Cir. 1992); Stephens v. Borg, 59 F.3d 932, 935-36 (9th Cir.

1995).

In addition, Petitioner fails to demonstrate how his defense would

have differed had the information been amended earlier. First, the

State’s failure to amend the information until after the jury began to

deliberate could not have affected Petitioner’s decision to enter into

a plea agreement because, as the California Court of Appeal emphasized,

the State neither attempted to negotiate with nor offered any plea

agreement to Petitioner at any time. Id. at 480 (prosecution explaining

that “from the beginning, no attempts or offers of plea bargaining would

be made and they have not been made”); see also Answer Ex. A at 19.

Perhaps more importantly, the record—from the preliminary hearing,

throughout trial, and during sentencing—is rife with Petitioner’s

assertions of innocence and requests to present his alleged alibi

witnesses. RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated April 3, 2001 at 111; id.,

Volume dated July 10, 2001 at 4-5; id., Volume dated July 26, 2001 at

4, 22, 26; id., Volume dated October 26, 2001 at 23-24, 31-32, 39-40;

id., Volume dated November 2 and 5, 2001 at 99, 106, 114, 127-28, 148-

49, 156, 174, 191-92; id., Volume dated November 6, 2001 at 196, 210-16,

226-29, 273-83, 286-89, 298-301, 307-10, 338-52; id., Volume dated

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November 7, 2001 at 394-95, 402-04, 441; id., Volume dated November 8-9,

2001 at 487, 516-17; id., Volume dated February 26, 2002 at 9-11. As

such, the record undermines Petitioner’s claim that any earlier notice

of the prior conviction would have influenced his plea bargaining

decisions in any way, or would have caused him to seek a plea agreement

at all. Second, Petitioner presents no evidence to support his claim

that his refusal to submit to a psychological examination, and therefore

his intention to pursue a mental defense, was in any way prompted by

sentencing considerations. Again, any such claim by Petitioner is

refuted by his countless claims of innocence and repeated requests that

his alibi witnesses be called to testify, see id., as well as his

statements during sentencing that he refused to submit to a

psychological exam because he did not suffer from any kind of mental

defect. Id., Volume dated February 28, 2002 at 5, 8. Moreover, this

Court is unconvinced by Petitioner’s allegations that had defense

counsel known of the prior strike earlier, counsel would have sought to

persuade Petitioner to submit to a psychological examination with more

vigor. Answer Ex. A at 19. As the appellate court noted, prior to the

information’s amendment, Petitioner faced a prison sentence for serious

felony offenses, which, regardless of counsel’s knowledge of the

enhancement allegation, compelled counsel’s use of the most influential

arguments. Id. at 19-20. In any event, even assuming defense counsel

had more strenuously argued in favor of a mental defense, Petitioner’s

adamant denials of any incapacity and his repeated claims of innocence

strongly suggest that counsel’s efforts would have been futile. Id. at

20. As a result, the record undermines Petitioner’s claims that the

timing of the amendment, however late in trial proceedings, denied him

the opportunity to present an appropriate defense.

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9 According to Petitioner, his defense counsel originally told the Flemings that

they would testify at trial. Petition at 9. Sometime later, however, counsel

allegedly informed them that their testimony would no longer be needed. Id.

Petitioner represents that the Flemings nonetheless appeared in court to provide

testimony on Petitioner’s behalf, but that counsel never called them as witnesses. Id.

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In conclusion, this Court finds that the timing of the amendment

denied Petitioner of neither adequate notice of the prior serious felony

conviction nor the opportunity to present a defense, and as such, did

not “so infuse the trial with unfairness as to deny [Petitioner] due

process of law.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 75. This Court therefore finds

that the California Court of Appeal’s decision upholding the trial

court’s amendment of the information was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. For these reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner’s third ground for habeas relief be DENIED.

D. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel And Conflict Of Interest

1. Failure To Call Alibi Witnesses

In his fourth claim for habeas relief, Petitioner first contends

that his defense attorney’s failure to call certain alibi witnesses

deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. Petition at 9.

Petitioner complains that although he provided his attorney with a list

of twelve alibi witnesses, only four such witnesses were allowed to

testify on his behalf. Id.; see also Lodgments 13-14, Ex. E at 1-2

(attaching list of proposed witnesses to be called by Petitioner at

trial). Petitioner takes particular issue with his attorney’s failure

to call Arnold and Elvia Fleming, both of whom Petitioner contends were

ready and willing to provide testimony confirming his innocence.9

Petition at 9. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the Flemings’

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10 In both his Petition and throughout the trial transcript, Petitioner’s

allegations with regard to his purported alibi witnesses, and, more specifically, the

substance of the Flemings’ testimony, is not at all clear. At trial, Petitioner denied

ever having gone to the incident site on the evening of March 18, 2001 and insisted

that he was arrested at the home of Hermano Ramos, and not the doughnut shop in

question. See RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated November 6, 2001 at 244-45, 280, 339.

Still, Petitioner never alleges that he was with either the Flemings or any other

alleged alibi witnesses at the time of the incident, rather, he seems only to suggest

that he was not arrested at the doughnut shop and that multiple people—who he could not

identify by name—witnessed his arrest at that location. Id. at 271-75. Thus, even

assuming the Flemings would have provided testimony corroborating Petitioner’s

characterization of events, such testimony could serve to undermine the credibility of

Officer Fox, but would not provide Petitioner with an alibi. Accordingly, and for the

reasons set forth more fully below, counsel’s failure to call the Flemings as potential

alibi witnesses does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance.

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testimony would have rebutted statements made by prosecution witness

Officer Shannon Fox regarding the location of the incident and the site

of Petitioner’s arrest, and therefore claims his attorney’s refusal to

present such testimony constituted ineffective assistance.10 Id.

Respondent maintains that this ineffective assistance of counsel

claim fails due to lack of factual support. Answer at 15. Respondent

argues that Petitioner’s allegations regarding his alleged alibi

witnesses are nothing more than mere speculation, emphasizing that the

record lends little support to such claims and that Petitioner failed

to provide exhibits or witness affidavits to explain the subject matter

of these witnesses’ testimony. Id. at 15-16. Finally, Respondent

insists that such unsupported and conclusory allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel do not justify the relief Petitioner seeks, and

must be dismissed in their entirety. Id.

The California Court of Appeal, the last state court to issue a

brief but reasoned decision on this claim, rejected Petitioner’s

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arguments on habeas review. Id. Ex. B at 1. Addressing the alibi

witnesses issue, the appellate court explained:

Petitioner claims that the witnesses’ testimony would have

clarified where he was arrested. Petitioner does not

establish how this purported testimony would have helped his

defense. Moreover, he does not provide declarations from the

witnesses as to what they would have testified.

Id. For these reasons, the appellate court denied Petitioner his

requested habeas relief. Id. Ex. B at 2.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686

(1984). The purpose of the right is to ensure a fair trial, and the

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness is “whether counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.”

Id. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a habeas

petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient,

specifically, that counsel’s “representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms, see id.

at 687-88, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have been

different. Id. at 691-94. The relevant inquiry under Strickland is not

what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether counsel’s

choices were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173

(9th Cir. 1998).

The Ninth Circuit has found violations of the Sixth Amendment’s

guarantee to effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure

either to investigate or to present testimony from an available witness

where such testimony corroborates the defendant’s testimony. See, e.g.,

Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding deficient

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performance and prejudice where counsel failed to investigate and

present testimony of corroborating alibi witnesses where defendant’s

only defense was his own testimony that he was home asleep at the time

of the crime); Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1093-96 (9th Cir. 1999)

(finding deficient performance where counsel failed to interview

personally and put on the stand three possible alibi witnesses who would

have testified that they saw the victim alive the day after she was

purportedly murdered); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.

1998) (finding failure to investigate and present alibi witnesses to be

deficient performance and prejudicial where, without corroborating

witnesses, defendant’s defense rested only on his own bare testimony).

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacks merit

because he fails to provide any evidence of prejudice resulting from

his defense attorney’s alleged error. See Young v. Runnels, 435 F.3d

1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)

(explaining that courts may consider either prong of the Strickland test

first, and need not address both prongs if the defendant fails under

one). Although Petitioner represents that the Flemings would have

offered testimony regarding the true location of the incident and the

actual site of his arrest—testimony that Petitioner argues would have

contradicted in court statements made by arresting officer Shannon

Fox—he does not explain how such purported testimony would have

supported his defense. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161

(9th Cir. 1989) (noting that conclusory allegations of prejudice are

insufficient to show ineffective assistance). For example, Petitioner

does not allege that the Flemings would have testified that he could not

have committed the charged crimes because he was with them when the

crimes allegedly were committed (or for any other reason). Indeed,

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other than those cursory representations, Petitioner makes no effort to

clarify how the Flemings’ purported testimony would have been favorable

to him, or how it would have served to exonerate him of the criminal

threats, child molestation, and obstructing or resisting an executive

officer charges he faced. See McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1494

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the failure to present alibi witnesses did

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when their testimony

would not have affected the verdict). Moreover, as Respondent correctly

highlights, Petitioner fails to provide supporting declarations or

affidavits from any alleged alibi witness detailing the subject matter

of their purported testimony so it is pure speculation as to what the

Flemings or any other alleged alibi witnesses would have stated. See

Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (no showing of

ineffective assistance where petitioner failed to present witness

affidavit to establish that witness would have presented helpful

testimony). Absent any such reliable evidence by Petitioner, this Court

finds there exists no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

failure to call the alleged alibi witnesses, the jury would have

returned a different verdict. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

This Court also finds that the allegations Petitioner includes in

his Petition are insufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s performance

was deficient. Id. at 687-89. For example, this Court’s review of the

record reveals that defense counsel presented testimony from five

different witnesses in support of Petitioner’s defense. See RT,

Lodgment 3, Volume dated November 2 and 5, 2001 at 170-76, 181-91; id.,

Volume dated November 6, 2001 at 199-366; id., Volume dated November 7,

2001 at 398-405. Defense witnesses Valdez, German, and Howard responded

to questioning related to Petitioner’s alleged history of sexual abuse

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11 In addition, defense counsel repeatedly advised both Petitioner and the trial

court that he did not support Petitioner’s decision to testify at trial. RT, Lodgment

3, Volume dated November 2 and 5, 2001 at 179-80; id., Volume dated November 6, 2001

at 196-97.

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of minor children, presumably in an attempt to prove that the prior

molestations never occurred and to undermine the prosecution’s efforts

to establish Petitioner’s propensity to commit the present molestation

offense. Id., Volume dated November 2 and 5, 2001 at 170-76; id.,

Volume dated November 6, 2001 at 199-201, 353-55, 362-65. Defense

witness Rivera provided testimony to support Petitioner’s claims that

he never threatened Officer Fox. Id., Volume dated November 2 and 5,

2001 at 181-91. Moreover, counsel guided Petitioner through his own

testimony, during which Petitioner provided a rambling explanation of

his innocence. Id. at 203-352; id., Volume dated November 7, 2001 at

398-405. Petitioner testified that he spent the day drinking, walking

around, and attempting to talk to a religious advisor. Id. Petitioner

denied having gone to the incident site on the evening in question,

claimed he was arrested not at the incident site but at the home of a

third party, insisted he was physically incapable of molesting any child

due to prolonged use of various medications that rendered him impotent,

and denied having made threats of any kind to his arresting police

officer. Id. Although Petitioner describes several people who

allegedly were present when he was arrested at the residence, Petitioner

does not identify the Flemings. Id. As such, it is unclear how the

Flemings’ testimony would have supported Petitioner’s defense. Compare

Luna, 306 F.3d at 961-67; Lord, 184 F.3d at 1093-96. Thus, although

defense counsel exhibited a preference to pursue a mental defense,11 see

id., Volume dated November 6, 2001 at 193-97, the record confirms that

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counsel presented testimony at trial that supported Petitioner’s chosen

defense. As a result, defense counsel’s strategic decision not to call

the Flemings, or any other alleged alibi witness who would have provided

testimony similar to that described in the Petition, cannot be

characterized as falling below reasonable professional assistance. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no basis for concluding

that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable

level or prejudiced Petitioner’s defense. Id. at 687-88. Accordingly,

this Court finds that the California Court of Appeal’s decision denying

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

2. Conflict Of Interest Claims

Second, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel because his “attorney suffered from a conflict of interest.”

Petition at 9. Petitioner complains that he was forced to proceed to

trial represented by an attorney with whom he was dissatisfied, and with

whom he refused to communicate or cooperate. Id. Petitioner also

contends that this complete inability to communicate with his appointed

attorney was a conflict of interest sufficient to justify the

substitution of new counsel, and that the trial court’s denial of his

request for new counsel constituted an abuse of discretion. Id.

Respondent counters that Petitioner fails to explain his conflict

of interest claim in sufficient detail. Answer at 16. Respondent

characterizes Petitioner’s reference to a conflict of interest as “a

bare conclusion, unsupported by allegations of underlying fact,” and as

such, argues that the claim should be dismissed. Id. (citation

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omitted).

As with the claim regarding counsel’s failure to call alleged alibi

witnesses, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s conflict

of interest allegations:

[Petitioner] also makes no showing counsel suffered from a

conflict of interest. To the extent he is arguing the court

erred in not granting his People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d

118 motion, issues that could have been, but were not, raised

on appeal are not cognizable on habeas corpus absent special

circumstances warranting departure from the rule. (In re

Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765.) No special circumstances

warranting departure from the rule are presented in the

petition. Moreover, the record submitted does not

demonstrate any error in denying the motion. Rather, it

demonstrates a defendant refusing to cooperate with counsel

in order to manipulate the court into appointing different

counsel.

Id. Ex. B at 1.

As presented, Petitioner’s conflict of interest claim is somewhat

ambiguous in that it appears to be based on two separate but related

theories: that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance and

that the trial court’s refusal to appoint substitute counsel violated

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. For the reasons set forth more

fully below, this Court finds that Petitioner’s conflict of interest

claim does not merit habeas relief under either theory.

a. Denial Of Effective Assistance

Within the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of

counsel exists a correlative right to representation unhindered by any

conflict of interest. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1981);

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-48 (1980). In order to establish

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict of

interest, a habeas petitioner must show that an actual conflict of

interest adversely affected his attorney’s performance. See Mickens v.

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348-50. An

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“actual conflict of interest” only occurs when counsel “actively

represented conflicting interests.” Strickland, 446 U.S. at 450.

Without this factual showing of inconsistent interests, an alleged

conflict is merely possible or speculative, and is therefore

“insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at

350.

Unlike ineffective assistance claims based on counsel’s

incompetence, conflict of interest-based ineffective assistance claims

require no showing of prejudice in order for a habeas petitioner to

obtain relief. Id. at 349-50; see also Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976,

981 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, a petitioner “must demonstrate that

his attorney made a choice between possible alternative courses of

action that impermissibly favored an interest in competition with those

of the [petitioner].” McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1248 (9th

Cir. 2003); see also Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir.

2001) (petitioner must establish that “the attorney’s behavior seems to

have been influenced” by the conflict of interest). In other words, the

adverse effect caused by the alleged conflict “must be one that

significantly worsens counsel’s representation of the client before the

court or in negotiations with the government.” United States v. Mett,

65 F.3d 1531, 1535 (9th Cir. 1995). In contrast, a conflict which

causes problems in some facet of the attorney-client relationship, but

which ultimately has no significant impact on counsel’s representation,

does not cause the requisite adverse effect. Id. at 1535-36.

Accordingly, not every conflict or disagreement between the defendant

and counsel implicates Sixth Amendment rights. See Wheat v. United

States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (noting that the “essential aim of the

[Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each

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criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will

inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers”); Morris v.

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment

requires competent representation, but does not guarantee a “meaningful

relationship” between a defendant and his counsel).

Petitioner fails to identify any specific conflict of interest from

which his primary trial counsel, Donald Scoville, suffered. Petitioner

does not claim Scoville’s efforts on his behalf were threatened in any

way by Scoville’s responsibilities to another client or other third

person. Petitioner does not claim Scoville’s own interests somehow

impaired the manner in which he conducted Petitioner’s defense, or his

representation of Petitioner in general. Moreover, the record does not

reflect any actual conflict between Petitioner and Scoville, rather, it

reveals that counsel advocated for Petitioner and thoroughly assisted

in his defense. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)

(underlining the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that an “accused have

‘counsel acting in the role of an advocate’”); Plumlee v. Sue del Papa,

426 F.3d 1095, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that in evaluating

conflict, courts should consider whether counsel was an advocate for the

accused and whether he provided actual assistance to the accused’s

defense). Absent any specific facts supporting Petitioner’s conflict

of interest claims, this Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner’s

allegations are merely conclusory and simply exhibit Petitioner’s

general dissatisfaction with his defense attorney. See Sullivan, 446

U.S. at 350; James, 24 F.3d at 26 (noting that “conclusory allegations

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant

habeas relief”). As such, this Court finds that Petitioner’s

allegations cannot form the basis for habeas relief.

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12 To the extent Petitioner claims that the trial court improperly denied his

request for substitute counsel, this Court notes that this claim could be procedurally

barred. Indeed, the appellate court cited a specific California procedural rule in

rejecting this claim, a rule that undeniably gives rise to a potential procedural bar

on federal habeas. Answer Ex. B at 1. Respondent, however, fails to plead any such

affirmative defense in his Answer, see Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir.

2002) (procedural default is an affirmative defense which must be plead and proven by

the government), and in fact, fails to address this aspect of Petitioner’s conflict of

interest claim at all. This Court therefore declines to raise and/or evaluate any such

affirmative defense on Respondent’s behalf. In light of Respondent’s failure to raise

this affirmative defense, and because Petitioner’s conflict of interest claim should

be construed to assert a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this Court

will assess this conflict of interest theory on the merits.

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b. Denial Of Petitioner’s Request For New Counsel

As noted above, Petitioner maintains that his complete inability

to communicate and cooperate with his appointed counsel created a

conflict of interest sufficient to warrant the substitution of new

counsel. Petition at 9. Petitioner therefore asserts that the trial

court’s July 26, 2001 denial of his request for new counsel constituted

an abuse of discretion, and violated his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel. Id. Again, the California Court of Appeal rejected

Petitioner’s Marsden argument, noting that “issues that could have been,

but were not, raised on appeal are not cognizable on habeas corpus

absent special circumstances warranting departure from the rule.”12

Answer Ex. B at 1.

The Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants who can afford to

retain counsel a qualified right to hire counsel of their choice. See

Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. A criminal defendant who cannot afford to

retain counsel has no right to counsel of his own choosing. Id. Nor

is he entitled to an attorney whom he likes and with whom he feels

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comfortable. The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of

counsel, not a “meaningful relationship” between an accused and his

counsel. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 14.

In California, People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970) requires the

trial court to permit a criminal defendant requesting substitution of

counsel to specify the reasons for his request and to hold a hearing.

See Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d at 123-24. The denial of a motion to substitute

counsel implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and

is properly considered in federal habeas. See Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d

1017, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2000). In reviewing the state courts’ rejection

of such a Sixth Amendment claim, the “ultimate constitutional question”

on federal habeas review is whether the state trial court’s denial of

the Marsden motion

actually violated [Petitioner’s] constitutional rights in

that the conflict between [the defendant] and his attorney

had become so great that it resulted in a total lack of

communication or other significant impediment that resulted

in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of

that required by the Sixth Amendment.

Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026.

In this case, from the April 3, 2001 preliminary examination to the

trial’s conclusion, Petitioner was represented by at least four

different attorneys. See RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated April 3, 2001 at

3 (Petitioner represented by Timothy Reilly); id., Volume dated July 10,

2001 at 3 (Petitioner represented by James A. Johnson), and at 14 (trial

court noting that Petitioner fired retained counsel, Mr. Bacho); id.,

Volume dated July 26, 2001 at 2, 4 (Petitioner represented by Donald

Scoville); id., Volume dated November 2 and 5, 2001 at 85 (confirming

that Petitioner had a total of four different attorneys since the case’s

inception). On July 10, 2001, Petitioner made an oral motion to

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represent himself, which the trial court granted. Id., Volume dated

July 10, 2001 at 13. By July 26, 2001, however, Petitioner was again

represented by counsel, namely, Donald Scoville. Id., Volume dated July

26, 2001 at 4. On that same day, Petitioner voiced his dissatisfaction

with Scoville, requesting substitute counsel pursuant to Marsden:

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I got my lawyer. I got

proof here there is a lady here who can prove that I got

letters here for you that two witnesses had information but

the investigator and my lawyer went in the visiting room,

they were there, my two witnesses, they came back to me and

said that they don’t know nothing. But then the witness

said, “No, he’s lying. They are lying to you. We want to go

to court.” Here is an example of what we want to say.

MR. SCOVILLE: Your Honor, may I suggest -- I’m not

trying to stop him from talking. I would suggest that this

be done in the form of a Marsden hearing if that is what he

wishes, in privacy.

THE COURT: Mr. Licon, what your attorney is pointing

out, if you do things in open court, you are saying things

which could possibly be used against you.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Okay.

THE COURT: That could create a problem for you, Mr.

Licon.

THE DEFENDANT: If you want that in private, okay.

THE COURT: Mr. Licon, I wasn’t actually suggesting it

be done anytime. The question of whether or not it would be

appropriate for you to talk to me about that is one that

would be discussed between you and your attorney.

We’re here for pretrial. I understand that there is not

a disposition at this time.

MR. SCOVILLE: Right.

THE COURT: Donald Scoville is appearing on behalf of

Mr. Licon.

THE DEFENDANT: I don’t want him anymore. He lied to

me. He’s going to lie. I’m afraid he’s going to lie to me,

hiding more information. Here is the proof if you want to

read it.

THE COURT: Mr. Licon, you said, “I don’t want him

anymore.”

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13 The Marsden hearing was held in chambers. RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated July

26, 2001 at 6. The record of the trial court’s discussions with Petitioner during that

Marsden hearing, however, was sealed. Id.

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THE DEFENDANT: Because he lied to me.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Licon, what are you requesting?

THE DEFENDANT: I want a real lawyer. They are all

real. I mean, I want a lawyer who can explain to me the

things and comply without lying to me. If I let this go --

THE COURT: Mr. Licon, there is a procedure called a

“Marsden hearing” in which you come in to chambers and we

talk about the matter outside the presence of the general

public and other counsel. We’re going to recess at this time

to have a brief Marsden hearing.

RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated July 26, 2001 at 4-6.

Following the Marsden hearing,13 the Court denied the request for

substitute counsel over Petitioner’s objections. Id. at 21-24. In

denying the request, the trial court explained that Petitioner had

failed to present good cause for another appointed attorney. Id. at 21-

22. Nevertheless, Petitioner insisted that the ruling violated his

constitutional rights. Id. at 21-24. Petitioner also represented that

he planned to refuse to cooperate with Scoville, and repeatedly

instructed Scoville not to represent him. Id. (multiple statements by

Petitioner directing Scoville to “get off [his] case”). Ultimately,

Scoville represented Petitioner throughout trial and during sentencing.

See generally id., Volumes dated July 26, 2001 through February 26,

2002.

To the extent Petitioner claims that the trial court improperly

denied his request for substitute counsel in violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights, he is mistaken. On July 26, 2001, Petitioner moved

for substitution of counsel and, in accord with the dictates of the

Sixth Amendment, the trial court inquired into Petitioner’s concerns.

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See Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that

state court conducted adequate hearing when it invited defendant to make

a statement and listened to defendant’s reasons for wanting new

counsel). The trial court considered Petitioner’s allegations that

Scoville was purposefully withholding evidence favorable to his defense,

was lying to him, and was unwilling to defend him “to the fullest,” and

determined that there was no legal basis to justify substitution on the

evidence presented. RT, Lodgment 3, Volume dated July 26, 2001 at 21-

24. Given Petitioner’s practice of voicing his dissatisfaction with

appointed attorneys, and without evidence supporting Petitioner’s

allegations, the trial court reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s

complaints exhibited a general dissatisfaction with Scoville, not

evidence of an irreconcilable conflict between attorney and client. Id.

In addition, Petitioner’s repeated refusals to cooperate with

counsel—possibly to coerce the trial court into appointing a new

attorney—suggests that Petitioner’s frustration with Scoville’s exercise

of his professional obligations would continue with any other attorney,

and therefore did not warrant a new appointment. Even assuming the

trial court had appointed new counsel, the record suggests that the

appointment would not have alleviated Petitioner’s concerns, which were

likely more a product of his predicament as a criminal defendant rather

than counsel’s conduct. In other words, the alleged conflict was of

Petitioner’s own making, see Plumlee, 426 F.3d at 1106 (defendant not

entitled to new counsel when conflict is of defendant’s own making or

defendant’s allegations are objectively unreasonable), and seemingly

arose over decisions that are committed to the judgment of the attorney

and not the client. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966)

(noting that an attorney “may properly make a tactical determination of

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how to run a trial even in the face of his client’s incomprehension or

even explicit disapproval”). Considering that the “purpose of providing

assistance of counsel ‘is simply to ensure that criminal defendants

receive a fair trial,’” see Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, this Court discerns

no evidence that this purpose went unfulfilled here, or that a Sixth

Amendment violation occurred in this case.

In conclusion, this Court finds that counsel’s failure to call the

alleged alibi witnesses did not amount to ineffective assistance of

counsel. This Court also finds that Petitioner’s failure to identify

any specific facts in support of his conflict of interest claim

precludes this Court’s recommendation of habeas relief on ineffective

assistance grounds. Finally, this Court finds that the trial court’s

denial of Petitioner’s request for substitute counsel was in accordance

with the Sixth Amendment. As such, this Court concludes that the

California Court of Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established law. See Williams, 529

U.S. at 412-13. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

fourth claim for habeas relief be DENIED.

E. Petitioner’s Right To Self-Representation

In his final claim for habeas relief, Petitioner argues that the

trial court improperly denied his pretrial and trial requests to

represent himself. Petition at 10. Petitioner reiterates that his

requests were prompted by his lack of confidence in defense counsel

Scoville’s abilities, and insists that the trial court’s rulings placed

him in “the untenable position of being represented by an attorney he

no longer trusted.”14 Id. Petitioner claims that the trial court’s

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denials were an abuse of discretion and prejudiced his defense. Id.

Respondent contends that this claim is procedurally barred due to

Petitioner’s failure to present it to the California courts on direct

appeal. Answer at 16-19. In the alternative, Respondent argues that

this claim must be denied because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that the state courts’ decisions were contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that

the decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

presented. Id. at 19-21.

On habeas review, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

petition with respect to this issue without explanation or citation of

authority. Lodgment 15. Thus, this Court must look through to the last

reasoned state court decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803 (presuming

that “where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or

rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground”). The last reasoned

state court decision on this issue came from the California Court of

Appeal. Answer Ex. B at 2. In rejecting Petitioner’s selfrepresentation claim, the appellate court explained:

Petitioner also contends his constitutional right to

self-representation was violated when the court denied pretrial and during trial requests to represent himself. The

submitted reporter’s transcripts indicate petitioner was

represented by four different counsel. He fired retained

counsel and had an appointed counsel relieved at his request.

At one point, a request to represent himself was granted and

petitioner acted in propria persona in at least some pretrial proceedings. In some manner that is unclear, he

obtained one or two additional counsel. He attempted to have

yet another counsel removed leading to the Marsden hearing

discussed above. During the course of that hearing

petitioner several times demanded that another new counsel be

appointed and occasionally made reference to representing

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himself. However, it is unclear whether these references

were simply a tactic to further his request for appointment

of new counsel or whether they were actually a request to

represent himself. After denial of the Marsden motion,

petitioner did not file a motion to represent himself.

During the jury trial petitioner demanded that he be allowed

to represent himself. The court correctly denied that

request as untimely. This issue could have been raised on

appeal and it is not cognizable on a petition for writ of

habeas corpus. Were we to reach the merits, moreover, we

would deny the petition under the circumstances presented.

Answer Ex. B at 2 (emphasis added).

1. Procedural Default

The procedural default rule is based on the principle that federal

courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state

court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). “For the

procedural default rule to apply, however, the application of the state

procedural rule must provide ‘an adequate and independent state law

basis’ on which the state court can deny relief.” Park v. California,

202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-

30). If the federal court finds an independent and adequate state

procedural ground, “federal habeas review is barred unless the prisoner

can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice,

or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802,

804-05 (9th Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Procedural default is an affirmative defense which must be plead

and proven by the government. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586

(9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “because it is the State who seeks

dismissal based on the procedural bar, it is the State who must bear the

burden of demonstrating that the bar is applicable-in this case that the

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state procedural rule has been regularly and consistently applied in

habeas actions”). In response, the burden shifts to the habeas

petitioner to place that defense in issue by alleging facts that

demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure. Id. The ultimate

burden of proof, however, is on the government. Id.

Respondent argues that the California Court of Appeal imposed a

procedural bar when it tacitly referenced the rule set forth in Ex parte

Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (Cal. 1953) in its denial of Petitioner’s selfrepresentation claim. Answer at 17-18. The Dixon bar prohibits the use

of habeas corpus as a substitute for the appeal process, and explains

that “in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for

failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed

errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from

a judgment of conviction.” Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759.

As an initial matter, it is worth noting that at no point in its

decision did the California Court of Appeal expressly cite to Dixon.

Answer Ex. B at 1-2. Instead, the appellate court rejected Petitioner’s

claim using language conveying the substance of the Dixon rule. Id. at

2 (summarizing that because the self-representation “issue could have

been raised on appeal . . . it is not cognizable on a petition for writ

of habeas corpus”). Similarly, in analyzing Petitioner’s Marsdenrelated conflict of interest claim, the appellate court noted that

“issues that could have been, but were not, raised on appeal are not

cognizable on habeas corpus absent special circumstances warranting

departure from the rule,” but only cited to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750,

765 (Cal. 1993). Answer Ex. B at 1. Nevertheless, the appellate

court’s Clark citation directly refers to Dixon in support of this

procedural principle. See Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 765. Accordingly, this

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Court accepts Respondent’s argument that the California Court of Appeal

predicated its denial of Petitioner’s self-representation claim on the

Dixon bar. Answer Ex. B at 2.

In this case, Petitioner was well aware of his right to selfrepresentation, as exhibited by his repeated references to that right

and his multiple motions to represent himself. See RT, Lodgment 3,

Volume dated July 10, 2001 at 4-5; id., Volume dated July 26, 2001 at

21-22; id., Volume dated October 26, 2001 at 27; id., Volume dated

November 2 and 5, 2001 at 87. Moreover, Petitioner pursued numerous

claims on direct appeal, but elected not to allege any violation of his

right to self-representation. See Lodgments 5, 7-8. Because the Dixon

bar prohibits Petitioner from raising a claim on habeas review that was

available but not raised on direct review, Dixon equally bars Petitioner

from raising this claim in federal court. As a result, this Court finds

that Petitioner defaulted on his Sixth Amendment self-representation

claim.

a. Independence And Adequacy Of The Dixon Bar

Respondent argues that the Dixon bar is an adequate and independent

state ground to bar federal review. Answer at 17-18. “For a state

procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the

decision must not be interwoven with federal law.” La Crosse v. Kernan,

244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

1032, 1040-41 (1983)). “A state law ground is so interwoven if ‘the

state has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent

ruling on federal law [such as] the determination of whether federal

constitutional error has been committed.’” Park, 202 F.3d at 1152

(quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)).

In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit held that the Dixon bar was not

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interwoven with federal law, and as such, is independent. See Bennett,

322 F.3d at 582-83. Moreover, the Court previously has found the Dixon

bar to be adequate. See Protsman v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1014

(S.D. Cal. 2004) (Whelan, J.). Because Respondent has plead that the

state court imposed an adequate and independent state procedural bar to

deny Petitioner’s self-representation claim, this Court may not review

the claim unless Petitioner demonstrates that the Dixon bar is not an

adequate and independent state ground, or that this Court may somehow

excuse his default. See Wells v. Maas, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir.

1994).

In his Petition, Petitioner fails to challenge the adequacy of the

Dixon bar. He does not argue that the Dixon bar is inconsistently

applied, and does not supply any facts or legal authority to support

such an argument. Similarly, Petitioner fails to (1) claim that the

Dixon bar is not independent of federal law, (2) identify facts

supporting such an argument, or (3) cite any authority finding that the

Dixon bar is somehow interwoven with federal law. In fact, Petitioner

cites no case law of any kind to support his self-representation claim,

and unfortunately failed to file a Traverse addressing Respondent’s

procedural bar argument. Petitioner has therefore failed to carry his

burden of demonstrating that his self-representation claim is not

procedurally barred by Dixon. Moreover, both this Court’s review of the

record and the relevant authorities fail to support any such argument.

See Protsman, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1008, 1014 (finding Dixon bar

independent and adequate). Accordingly, this Court finds that the Dixon

bar is adequate and independent, that Petitioner procedurally defaulted

his self-representation claim when he failed to raise it on direct

appeal, and that absent some legal excuse, such procedural default bars

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this Court from reviewing the merits of this final claim for habeas

relief.

b. Cause And Prejudice Or Actual Innocence

In light of Petitioner’s procedural default, this Court may only

reach the merits of the self-representation claim if Petitioner can

demonstrate either cause and prejudice, or actual innocence. See Wells,

28 F.3d at 1009. “‘Cause’ under the cause and prejudice test must be

something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be

attributed to him . . . .” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (emphasis in

original); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (explaining

that “cause” requires a showing of some external impediment such as

“government interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual

basis for the claim”). In his Petition, Petitioner makes no reference

to any external factor or other impediment which caused him to default

on this claim. This Court therefore finds that Petitioner has failed

to establish cause sufficient to excuse his default. See Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). Given Petitioner’s failure, this Court

need not address prejudice. Id.

With regard to actual innocence, this Court may reach the merits

of Petitioner’s claim if he can demonstrate that its failure to consider

it would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Noltie,

9 F.3d at 804-05. To satisfy this actual innocence exception, a habeas

petitioner must offer new, reliable evidence of an alleged

constitutional error that probably resulted in the conviction of an

innocent person. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995).

This evidence must be factual and indicate actual innocence, “as opposed

to legal innocence as a result of legal error.” Gandarela v. Johnson,

286 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321).

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As with “cause and prejudice,” Petitioner offers no new evidence to

support his self-representation claim that was not presented at trial.

Nor does this Court find anything in the record to indicate that such

evidence exists. This Court therefore finds that Petitioner has not

adequately demonstrated a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse

his procedural default.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Petitioner’s claim

that the trial court improperly denied his request for selfrepresentation is procedurally barred. This Court also finds that

Petitioner fails to present any argument with regard to this procedural

bar, let alone an argument sufficient to overcome his default of this

claim. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s final claim

for habeas relief be DENIED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In sum, this Court finds that Petitioner has failed to present any

evidence suggesting that the California Court of Appeal’s decision as

to his claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor has

Petitioner made any supported argument that further factual development

is necessary, such that an evidentiary hearing would be warranted. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (exceptions where an evidentiary hearing may be

appropriate). As such, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and the case dismissed with

prejudice.

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report

and Recommendation and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying

the Petition.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

November 3, 2006. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than November

27, 2006. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

Dated: October 13, 2006

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

 COPY TO: 

HONORABLE LARRY A. BURNS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

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