Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00984/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00984-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Khalafala Khalafala,

Plaintiff

-vsTravis Miller, et al.,

Defendants

CV-10-0984-PHX-ROS (JRI)

consolidated with member case:

 CV-10-0985-PHX-ROS(JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

regarding Motion to Consolidate or

alternatively Motion to Sever

Khalafala Khalafala,

Plaintiff

-vsUnknown Parties, et al.,

Defendants

CV-10-0986-PHX-ROS(JRI)

Khalafala Khalafala,

Plaintiff

-vsR. Ybarra, et al.,

Defendants

CV-10-1259-PHX-ROS(JRI)

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Under consideration is Defendants Babeu et al.'s Motion to Consolidate Cases or

alternatively Motion to Sever, filed January 5, 2011 (Doc. 41). Plaintiff, an immigration

detainee, has filed a string of civil suits on issues arising out of his detention in the Florence

Detention Center and in the Pinal County Jail. 

Defendants Babeu, et al. (the Pinal County Defendants) seek to consolidate two

additional cases filed by Plaintiff (CV-10-0986, CV-10-1259, with the two already

consolidated cases (CV-10-0984, CV-10-0985), asserting a common core of facts and

savings to be had by litigating the cases together. Alternatively, Defendants seek to have the

claims against Pinal County Defendants severed from the new cases, and then to have those

Case 2:10-cv-00984-ROS Document 48 Filed 02/08/11 Page 1 of 9
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1

 Apart from this local restriction on motions to consolidate, it appears that motions

to consolidate are considered non-dispositive and are within the pre-trial authority of the

magistrate judge. See e.g. Carcaise v. Cemex, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Pa. 2002);

and Buckenberger v. Reed, 2007 WL 1139619, *3 (E.D.La.,2007).

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claims consolidated with the other cases.

Defendants Ybarra et al. in CV-10-1259 (the Federal Defendants) have responded

(Doc. 42), opposing the consolidation on the basis that the claims against them are distinct,

and their claims are likely to be resolved on summary judgment. They do not oppose

severance.

Plaintiff has responded in case CV-10-1259 (Doc. 47), opposing any consolidation

or severance on the basis that delay will result.

Pinal County Defendants have replied re-urging a common core of facts, at least with

respect to the Pinal County Defendants. 

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 42.1(b), motions to consolidate are to be decided by “the

District Judge assigned the lowest case number.”1

 Accordingly, the undersigned makes the

following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 72(b),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of

Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

CV-10-0984 - In the case Khalafala v. Miller, CV-10-0984-PHX-ROS (JRI), Plaintiff

filed his Complaint (Doc. 1) on May 5, 2010, alleging various civil rights violations arising

during his incarceration at the Pinal County Jail. A service Order (Doc. 5) was filed on May

25, 2010, directing service on Defendants Miller, Babeu, and Kellerman, and an answer as

to Counts I, III, V, VI and IX. The screening Order described those counts as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

when Defendant Miller confiscated Plaintiff’s paper,

highlighter, family pictures,

* * * 

(3) Plaintiff is denied access to newspapers, magazines, and

hardback books, in violation of the First Amendment;

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* * * 

(5) Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when

Defendant Unknown Detention Officer Two subjected Plaintiff

to strip and body cavity searches without a legitimate

government purpose and with the intent to harass, intimidate,

and punish Plaintiff;

* * * 

(6) Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were violated when

Defendants Miller, Kellerman, Butler, and Unknown Detention

Officers Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven retaliated against

Plaintiff for filing grievances and complaints, and assisting

another inmate;

* * * 

(9) Plaintiff’s First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights were

violated by Defendant Babeu’s failure to train his detention

officers.

(10-0985, Doc. 5 at 3-4.) The Court also found that claims were stated against Defendants

Unknown Detention Officers Two through Seven in Counts V and VI, but declined to direct

service on the fictitiously named defendants.. Answers were filed July 9, 2010 (Doc. 11,

Defendants Babeu and Keller man), and on September 7, 2010 (Doc. 17, Defendant Miller).

A scheduling Order (Doc. 12) was filed July 20, 2010. Plaintiff has recently filed a Motion

to Amend (Doc. 38), seeking to name his unknown defendants, and to correct deficiencies

in his equal protection claims. Plaintiff and Defendants have filed motions concerning

scheduling (Docs. 39, 40, 45 and 46). 

CV-10-0985 - In the case Khalafala v. Babeu, CV-10-0985-PHX-ROS (JRI), Plaintiff

also filed his original Complaint (Doc. 1) on May 5, 2010. That complaint was dismissed

with leave to amend. (Order 5/26/10, Doc. 5.) On June 21, 2010, Plaintiff filed his First

Amended Complaint (Doc. 6), alleging various civil rights violations arising during his

incarceration at the Pinal County Jail. A service Order (Doc. 7) was filed on July 1, 2010,

directing service on Defendant Babeu, and an answer as to Counts I and II. The screening

Order described those counts as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights are violated by

Defendant Babeu’s policy of confining Plaintiff in unsanitary

conditions of confinement; providing Plaintiff with insufficient

clothes, food, and outdoor recreation; denying Plaintiff shoes,

access to television, newspapers, magazines and religious

services; subjecting Plaintiff to random, arbitrary cell, strip, and

body cavity searches; and requiring Plaintiff to be handcuffed or

shackled whenever Plaintiff leaves his cell;

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(2) Plaintiff’s Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights were violated

when Defendant placed Plaintiff in administrative segregation

for non-punitive reasons, without due process, thereby punishing

Plaintiff without due process;

(Order 7/1/10, Doc. 7, at 2-3.) An Answer was filed September 9, 2010 (Doc. 12.). A

scheduling Order (Doc. 14) was filed September 15, 2010. An order consolidating this case

with CV-10-0985 was filed December 9, 2010. 

CV-10-0986 - In the case Khalafala v. Unknown Parties, et al., CV-10-0986-PHXROS (JRI), Plaintiff also filed his original Complaint (Doc. 1) on May 5, 2010. A service

Order (Doc. 5) was filed on June 2, 2010. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 13),

and a service order was filed on September 3, 2010 (Doc. 12), directing service on

Defendants Real, Garfras, Fender, Mayo, Pounce, Kains, and Johnson. Service was not

ordered as to Defendant Unknown ICE Official. The screening Order described Plaintiff’s

claims as follows:

(1) Plaintiff reasserts his claim against Defendant Unknown ICE

Official that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection rights were violated when he ordered Plaintiff

transferred to the Pinal County Jail based in part on Plaintiff’s

race and religion.

(2) Defendant Real retaliated against Plaintiff for filing grievances

by threatening to assault Plaintiff or to arrange for other

detainees to assault him. Defendant Garfras retaliated against

Plaintiff for filing grievances by threatening to transfer Plaintiff

to the general population. Plaintiff claims a chilling effect, and

the absence of a legitimate penological goal.

(3) Defendant Fender retaliated against Plaintiff for filing

grievances by searching his cell, confiscating his property, filing

false disciplinary charges, etc. Defendant Mayo retaliated

against Plaintiff for filing grievances by threatening to house

Plaintiff with another inmate despite Plaintiff’s medical

segregation status. Defendant Pounce retaliated against Plaintiff

for filing a civil complaint against other officers by: confiscating

Plaintiff’s legal documents; inflicting pain while handcuffing

Plaintiff; and leaving Plaintiff handcuffed behind his back

during a discovery planning meeting.. Plaintiff claims a chilling

effect, and the absence of a legitimate penological goal.

(4) Defendants Johnson, Pounce, and Kains conspired to deny

Plaintiff due process and equal protection by denying Plaintiff

access to his legal materials in retaliation for Plaintiff’s attempts

to enforce his constitutional rights, and on the basis of Plaintiff’s

race and religion. His legal materials were taken from him,

searched, and some documents removed. Defendants Johnson,

Pounce, and Kains overtly acted in furtherance of that

conspiracy by removing the legal materials. 

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(Order 9/3/10, Doc. 12 at 3-4.) Answers were filed October 13, 2010 (Doc. 15) and

November 4, 2010 (Doc. 26). A scheduling Order (Doc. 19) was filed October 22, 2010.

Plaintiff and Defendants have both filed pending motions regarding scheduling (Docs. 35,

36, 37 and 38). 

CV-10-1259 - - In the case Khalafala v. R Ybarra, et al., CV-10-1259-PHX-ROS

(JRI), Plaintiff also filed his original Complaint (Doc. 1) on June 14, 2010. A service Order

(Doc. 5) was filed on June 29, 2010. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 10), and

a service order was filed on September 3, 2010 (Doc. 19), directing service on Defendants

Ybarra, Herd, Moore and Chacon. Service on Defendants Unknown ICE Official and

Unknown Health Care Provider was not ordered. The screening Order described Plaintiff’s

claims as follows:

(1) Plaintiff reasserts his threat to safety claim in Count I that his

Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights were violated when

Defendants Ybarra and Unknown ICE Official transferred him

from protective medical segregation at the Florence Detention

Center to a general population yard at the Pinal County Jail,

knowing that Plaintiff would be in danger; and when Defendant

Butler, knowing that Plaintiff was in protective custody,

nevertheless placed Plaintiff with general population detainees;

(2) Plaintiff reasserts his claims in Count II that his First

Amendment rights were violated when Defendants Ybarra, Unknown ICE Official, and Butler, retaliated against Plaintiff

for filing grievances and lawsuits by transferring Plaintiff to,

and housing Plaintiff in, a general population unit in the Pinal

County Jail; Plaintiff adds a claim that Defendant Sebastian

retaliated against Plaintiff for filing grievances and complaints

by threatening to transfer Plaintiff to general population or

placing another detainee in Plaintiff’s cell;

(3) In Count III, Plaintiff deletes his dismissed claim based on

disciplinary proceedings, and reworks his medical care claim

from the previously dismissed Count IV, alleging that Defendant

Sebastian failed to treat Plaintiff’s schizophrenic paranoia,

claustrophobia and sensory deprivation despite being aware of

the conditions recommending instead masturbation, and

asserting that the harsh conditions on Plaintiff’s unit were

helping Plaintiff deal with his mental conditions, with the result

that Plaintiff’s condition has declined, and that Defendant

Unknown Health Care Provider knew of Plaintiff’s need for

treatment, but failed to act to provide such treatment, instead

transferring Plaintiff to a disciplinary cell;

(4) In Count IV, Plaintiff deletes his dismissed claims based on

denial of medical care, and substitutes a reworking of his

previously dismissed Count III, this time based on conditions of

confinement, asserting that Defendants Herd and Moore

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placed Plaintiff in administrative segregation by falsely asserting

Plaintiff was a danger to himself and others, thereby punishing

Plaintiff without due process;

(5) In Count V, Plaintiff adds a new claim that he was denied equal

protection when Defendant Chacon decline to provide health

care services to Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s race and religion.

(Order 9/3/10, Doc. 9 at 4-5.) The service order was subsequently amended to provide for

service the United States Attorney and United State Attorney General (Doc. 12). Answers

were filed on October 27, 2010 (Doc. 18), and November 4, 2010, Doc. 24). Service on

Defendant Chacon was completed on December 12, 2010 (Doc. 34), but Defendant Chacon

has not yet appeared. Defendant Ybarra has pending an unbriefed Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

42), and Defendant Herd and Moore have pending and unbriefed Motion to Dismiss/Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43). Responses to those motions are due February 28, 2010.

Defendants and Plaintiff both have scheduling motions pending (Docs. 37 and 38). 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

Consolidation Standard - Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) states: “When

actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it ... may

order all the actions consolidated....” “The district court has broad discretion under this rule

to consolidate cases pending in the same district.” Investors Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court

for Cent. Dist. of California, 877 F.2d 777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989). “The consent of the parties

is not required by the rule. Rather, it is for the court to weigh the saving of time and effort

that consolidation would produce against any inconvenience, delay, or expense that it would

cause.” Wright & A. Miller, 9C Federal Practice and Procedure § 2383 (2007). 

Severance Standard - Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) states: “For

convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a

separate trial of one or moreseparate issues [or] claims. 

The provision for separate trials in Federal Rule 42(b) is

intended to further many significant policies—the parties' convenience,

the avoidance of delay and prejudice, and the promotion of the ends of

justice. It is the interest of efficient judicial administration that is to be

controlling under the rule, rather than the wishes of the parties.

Wright & Miller, 9A Fed. Pract. & Proc.§ 2388 (3d ed.)

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Consolidation of Additional Cases in Toto - It is true that all of the claims in the

four actions are centered around Plaintiff’s detention as an alien in removal proceedings,

either in the Florence Detention Center or the Pinal County Jail. It is also true that those

detentions are interrelated, and that there is some crossover among the claims (in particular

those related to the reasons for Plaintiff’s transfer to the Pinal County Jail), which could yield

some savings by having consolidated discovery, etc. However, the claims among these

various cases extend beyond events involving the Pinal County Jail, and touch upon events

occurring solely in the Florence Detention Center.

Moreover, in the previously consolidated cases CV-10-0984 and CV-10-0985, all of

the identified Defendants are associated with the Pinal County Jail and are all represented

by attorneys from Iafrate and Associates. In contrast, case CV-10-0986 also includes

defendants Real and Garfras, contract security officers at the federal detention center, who

are represented by attorneys from Littler Mendelson, P.C., as well as an unnamed ICE

official upon whom service has not yet been ordered. And, case CV-10-1259 involves

federal Defendants Ybarra, Herd and Moore (and presumably Chacon) who are represented

by the U.S. Attorneys Office, and Defendant Sebastian, represented by Sanders & Parks P.C.

The opposition by counsel for the federal defendants is instructive on the loss of

efficiency to be imposed on the non-Pinal County Defendants by consolidation.

Moreover, Plaintiff has pending a number of other cases, including CV-09-0974, CV09-1148, CV-10-1512, CV-10-2552, and CV-10-2553, all arising out of the same

incarceration. At some point the rationale for consolidation could be continued to these other

cases, with the result of a completely unwieldy case. 

Further, the intricacies of manipulating separate pleadings, parties, defenses, etc. is

hampered by Plaintiff’s pro se status. While Plaintiff certainly is not a novice litigator, and

has on his own complicated the proceedings by combining multiple claims and defendants

into multiple actions, further consolidation can only be expected to further complicate the

matter.

Under these circumstances, consolidation of all four cases in toto would likely cause

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greater delay and expense than it would avoid, and thus consolidation is not appropriate.

Severance - The Defendants seem to be in accord on the potential for segregating out

the claims against the Pinal County Defendants in CV-10-0986 and CV-10-1259. Plaintiff

opposes.

In case CV-10-0986, Plaintiff’s claims are similar, but compartmentalized. In Counts

One and Two, he asserts claims of retaliation against the federal defendants (Unknown ICE

Official, Real and Garfras), based upon various events at the Florence Detention Center. In

Counts Three and Four, he makes claims of retaliation and a related conspiracy against the

Pinal County Defendants (Fender, Mayo, Johnson, Pounce, and Kains) based upon various

events at the Pinal County Jail. 

On the other hand, in case CV-10-1259, the claims against the Pinal County

Defendant (Butler) and the other defendants are intertwined, and assert common facts,

generally arising out of Plaintiff’s transfer from protective medical segregation at the

Florence Detention Center to the general population at the Pinal County Jail. While some

efficiency would be achieved for the two sets of defendants by allowing them to litigate these

issues separately, Plaintiff would bear a mirrored decrease in efficiency by having to litigate

the same factual issues twice. Moreover, there is the potential, suggested by the pending

dispositive motions, that the federal defendants will be absolved in that case long before trial.

Thus, barring other considerations, severance would appear facially appropriate in

CV-10-0986, but not in CV-10-1259. Again, however, the Court must consider the effects

of Plaintiff’s pro se status. Severing actions poses special problems in pleadings, particularly

if amendments are sought. Further, severance would add to the already long list of cases that

Plaintiff, the Defendants, and this Court must manage. The marginal benefit of severance

at this juncture does not offset these concerns. 

Conclusion - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned will recommend denial of

the motion, both as to consolidation and severance. Because future developments in the case,

and/or the advent of trial may shift the balance in the opposite direction, the recommendation

will be to deny without prejudice.

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendants Babeu et al.'s Motion to

Consolidate Cases or alternatively Motion to Sever, filed January 5, 2011 (Doc. 41) be

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

(14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections

to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of

a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th

Cir. 2007). 

DATED: February 7, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\10-0984-41r RR 11 01 31 re MConsolidate.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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