Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00714/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00714-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

NATASHA S. DAVIS o/b/o N.L.C., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10CV714-CSC

) (WO)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a child impairment case. Plaintiff Natasha S. Davis filed this lawsuit on behalf

of her son, N.L.C., to review a final judgment by defendant Michael J. Astrue, 1

Commissioner of Social Security, in which he determined that N.L.C. is not “disabled” and

therefore, not entitled to supplemental security income benefits. Her application was denied

at the initial administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the

claim. The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision

consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(Commissioner). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11 Cir. 1986). The parties 2 th

 Pursuant to the E-Government Act of 2002, as amended on August 2, 2002, and M.D. Ala.

1

General Order No. 2:04mc3228, the court has redacted the plaintiff’s minor child’s name throughout this

opinion and refers to him only by his initials.

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. 2

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

Case 3:10-cv-00714-CSC Document 15 Filed 03/27/12 Page 1 of 11
have consented to the undersignedUnited States Magistrate Judge rendering a final judgment

in this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1. The court has

jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). 

In this case, the ALJ’s opinion is replete with philosophy, stereotypical observations

about children and synopses of the medical evidence contained in the administrative record;

however, it is woefully short on analysis. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes

that the Commissioner’s decision denying N.L.C. supplemental security income benefits

should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

An individual under 18 is considered disabled “if that individual has a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional

limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(C)(I) (1999). The sequential analysis for determining whether a child claimant

is disabled is as follows:

1. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is not

disabled.

2. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the

Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a physical or

mental impairment which, whether individually or in combination with

one or more other impairments, is a severe impairment. If the

claimant’s impairment is not severe, he is not disabled.

3. If the impairment is severe, the Commissioner determines whether the

impairment meets the durational requirement and meets, medically

equals, or functionally equals in severity an impairment listed in 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the impairment satisfies this

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requirement, the claimant is presumed disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)-(d) (1997).

The Commissioner’s regulations provide that if a child’s impairment or impairments

are not medicallyequal, or functionallyequivalent in severityto a listed impairment, the child

is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d)(2) (1997). In determining whether a child's

impairment functionally equals a listed impairment, an ALJ must consider the extent to

which the impairment limits the child's ability to function in the following six “domains” of

life: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting

and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself;

and (6) health and physical well-being. Shinn ex rel. Shinn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 391 F.3d

1276, 1279 (11 Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). A child's impairment functionally th

equals a listed impairment, and thus constitutes a disability, if the child's limitations are

“marked” in two of the six life domains, or if the child's limitations are “extreme” in one of

the six domains. Shinn, 391 F.3d at 1279; 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d).

In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court asks only whether his findings

concerning the steps are supported by substantial evidence. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d

1206, 1210 (11 Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla,” but less than a

th

preponderance: it “is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11

th

Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The court “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh

the evidence, or substitute . . . [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Phillips v.

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Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n. 8 (11 Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quotation marks th

omitted). The court must, however, conduct an “exacting examination of the

[Commissioner's] conclusions of law.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11 Cir. th

1990).

II. Discussion of the Issues

The plaintiff essentially raises only two issues: (1) whether the ALJ’s findings are

against the weight of the evidence and (2) whether the Appeals Council erred in failing to

remand for review of new and material evidence.

A. The ALJ’s Findings and the Weight of the Evidence. The ALJ referred NLC

to Lee Stunts, PhD, for a psychological consultantive examination which was conducted on

July 17, 2006. Dr. Stutts summarized his findings in part as follows:

N. is an eight-year-old boy who exhibited signs of anxiety and attention

problems. However, he also exhibited signs of purposefullymissing test items.

School input will be important in this case. There was no indication on

available records ofintellectual functioning impaired at the level oftoday's test

scores or even in the impaired range in general.

(R. at 162)

The ALJ reports what Dr. Stutts puts in his report but does not state the weight he

gives to it. Rather he relies on the state agency psychological evaluation justifying his

reliance on it by reference to SSR 96-6p.

The Childhood Disability Evaluation Form dated August 17, 2006, shows

impairments of ADHD; and anxiety (Exhibit 3F). William B. Meneese, Ph.D.,

a State agency reviewing psychologist, indicated that the claimant's

impairment or combination of impairments is severe but does not meet,

medically equal, of functionally equal a listing. In the Functional Equivalence

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Domains, Dr. Meneese noted that the claimant has no limitation in the areas

of acquiring and using information; moving about and manipulating objects;

caring for himself; and in health and physical well being. He has a less than

marked limitation in attending and completing tasks; and interacting and

relating with others. Although this assessment is almost 2 years old, I believe

that it remains basically accurate.

(R. at 16)

The ALJ appears to explain why he believe Dr. Meneese’s report “remains basically

accurate.”

In the present case at bar, the Administrative Law Judge as the independent

finder of the facts does not discredit the medical advisors' opinions because he

does not find fully credible substantial evidence to discredit them. In this case,

the State Agency experts' assessments are fully consistent with the reports of

the treating and examining physicians and are found to be credible for the

reasons stated therein and throughout the decision.

(Id.)

Perhaps, if the ALJ had done more than merely regurgitate the administrative record,

he might have found reason to question the stale, 2006 opinion of the medical advisor. In

an evaluation completed by N.L.C.’s 5 grade teacher on October 2, 2008, she found that he th

had marked limitations in acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks,

interacting and relating to others and moving about and manipulating objects. (R. at 123-24). 

“N. is reading at a below level. In addition to whole class instruction, he receives instruction

in two small groups of only five students. He has great difficulty in paying attention in these

small groups as well as whole class situations.” (R. at 124) In addition, N.L.C.’s grade

report for the first nine weeks of 5 grade shows F in language, science and social studies; th

D in math; C in reading and U [unsatisfactory] in work habits. A notation on the report reads

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“incomplete work; work not returned.” (R. at 127) In his opinion, the ALJ recites this

evaluation, but he discounts it because he concludes that N.L.C.’s actions are “substantially

volitional” as opposed to the consequences of an impairment. But other than disparaging the

child because there is some evidence of malingering and because the ALJ believes the child’s

answers on an IQ test were the product of a desire to obtain disability benefits, the ALJ

provides no reasons why he finds that the teacher’s conclusion are unworthy of belief. In

other words, to accept the ALJ’s conclusions, the court would have to find that N.L.C. was

able to deceive his teacher for the first nine weeks of his 5 grade school year. Even stating th

this proposition belies its probable validity. But that is not the fundamental problem in this

case.

The Commissioner’s regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a, govern how the

Commissioner determines if a child, whose severe impairment or combination of

impairments do not meet or medically equal any listing of impairments, has limitations that

functionally equal the listings. As noted above, the Commissioner considers the child’s

functioning in six domains. 

When we evaluate your ability to function in each domain, we will ask for and

consider information that will help us answer the following questions about

whether your impairment(s) affects your functioning and whether your

activities are typical of other children your age who do not have impairments.

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(2).

Those six questions are (1) What activities is the child able to perform, (2) What

activities is the child not able to perform, (3) Which of the child’s activities are limited or

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restricted compared to other children of the same age who do not have impairments, (4)

Where does the child have difficulty with activities - at home, in childcare, at school, or in

the community, (5) Does the child have difficulty independently initiating, sustaining, or

completing activities and (6) What kind of help does the child need to do activities, how

much help does the child need, and how often does the child need it. Id.

The court will now consider how, if at all, the ALJ approached resolution of these

questions. To understand that, it is unfortunately necessary to quote extensively from the

ALJ’s opinion.

After a long introduction and explanation of the ALJ’s views about the distinction

between a child’s “ability to perform successfully in and out of school” (R. at 20) and a

child’s behavior, the ALJ pronounces his finding.

Based on all of the evidence, particularly the medical, psychological and

educational evidence in this file, the ALJ finds the claimant's actual behavior

or performance to be substantially a willful, voluntary series of actions and not

the uncontrollable by product of involuntary psychological disease process. 

The ALJ finds that the impairment of the abilities of the claimant to be less

than marked.

What indicia do we have that this child has ability? There are many. For one

thing, he has gotten some very excellent grades, including 100s in the past.

That obviously indicates ability. For another, his standardized testing scores

show abilities in the average range. Of course, the claimant has tested at a full

scale IQ of 40. Obviously, this is ludicrous. A child with a full scale IQ of 40

can not even be toilet trained. The child obviouslypurposefully gave obviously

wrong and ridiculous answers, which is totally volitional. For what purpose?

The most apparent purpose would seem to be to obtain benefits under this

particular benefit program. That itself indicates intelligence.

Thus, there is evidence in the file that the claimant has malingered. It takes a

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certain amount of knowledge and intelligence to understand and appreciate

how pecuniary or financial advantage will be obtained by malingering or

faking retardation and to intentionallydo so. A child who is truly a "simpleton"

would not likely have the knowledge, understanding, insight, intelligence or

even a motive or desire to intentionally malinger on examination.

The claimant has recently made grades of D's and F's for the 1st nine weeks

while in the 5 grade . . . . However, given not only the inherent motivation th

to malinger, but the fact that the claimant already has given ridiculously false

answers on his IQ test (the most apparent motive for which seems to be the

obtaining of disability benefits under this program), the child's actual

intelligence level and past academic success, it seems quite clear that the

decline in performance is in large part volitional and not a lack of ability. . . .

I am cognizant of the recent teacher's opinions which basically suggest that the

claimant is markedly impaired. He may appear so in her class, but given the

entire history, I believe that that is substantially volitional. Perhaps if he is so

genuinely impaired, he might benefit from, as many children are, including the

non-disabled, being held back a year. However, as of this point, the claimant

has never repeated any grade according to the testimony of his mother and

evidence of record . . . The claimant has the ability to perform is he chooses

to do so as on the Alabama Reading and Mathematics Tests for the years of

2007 and 2008 which shows that the claimant achieved a level II (meets

standards) for both reading and mathematics . . .

Generally speaking, for each grade, the ultimate measurement of a child's

progress in acquiring and using information and attending and completing

tasks is whether or not the child is promoted. Ordinarily, unless something to

the contrary is noted in the child's record (which would be very unusual), the

fact that a child is promoted to the next grade is prima facie proof that the child

has acquired and used the information and attended to and completed the tasks

of the previous grade in, at the very least, an adequate manner or in an

acceptable fashion. Also, it is very common these days for non-disabled

students, to be held back a grade or more for social and/or athletic purposes.

For these reasons, it is certainly most unusual to find a child who is allegedly

"disabled" for mental reasons, who has not repeated at least two grades in

school or is not at least two years behind the grade that he or she ought to be

in based upon chronological age. Indeed, it would be almost impossible

logically to find that a child, who has not had to repeat at least one grade, is

nonetheless markedly impaired in his or her abilities to acquire and use

information and to attend to and complete tasks - since clearly, on the whole,

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that child has acquired and used information and attended to and completed the

tasks of the grades that he or she was in, to, at the very least, a reasonably

acceptable level.

(R. at 20-21)

After making these observations, the ALJ then considers each of the six domains of

functioning. The ALJ states what each domain considers, states what the Social Security

regulations provide and states what the Social Security regulations set forth as examples of

limited functioning. Then, for each domain, the ALJ states the degree of limitation he finds

N.L.C. has for that domain. What the ALJ fails to do is explain why he makes the findings

for each domain. Of course, that might not be error if elsewhere in his opinion the ALJ had

provided an explanation that provided reasons for his conclusions.

Certainly, the ALJ expressed reasons for concluding that N.L.C. does not have marked

or extreme limitations in the domain of acquiring and using information. The ALJ correctly

notes the N.L.C. met state standards in reading and mathematics, and that ability certainly

suggests that any limitations in that domain are not marked or extreme. But, with respect to

the other five domains, the ALJ provides no reasons or analysis of how he reached his

findings. As this court has often noted, the Commissioner’s regulations require that an ALJ

must state, with sufficient specificity, the reasons for his decision referencing the plaintiff’s

impairments. 

Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social Security which involves a

determination of disability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to such

individual shall contain a statement of the case, in understandable language,

setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner’s

determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is based.

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42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (emphasis added).

The best exemplar of the ALJ’s analytical failure in this case is encapsulated in one

sentence: “Generallyspeaking, for each grade, the ultimate measurement of a child's progress

in acquiring and using information and attending and completing tasks is whether or not the

child is promoted.” (R. at 21) There is absolutely no factual support for this conclusion. 

Moreover, whether a child is promoted to the next grade is a decision made by educators, and

it is certainly not an answer to any of the six questions which must be asked about a child’s

ability to function in each of the six domains. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(2). 

The fundamental error committed by the ALJ in this case is that he conflated the

analysis of the six domains. The ALJ talked about N.L.C.’s intellectual abilities as if those

abilities comprised the entirety of the domains. Manifestly, they do not. The ALJ found that

N.L.C. had severe impairments of “attention deficient hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),

inattentive type; anxiety disorder, NOS; and sexual abuse of a child, victim.” (R. at 14)

Those impairments obviously can affect a child’s ability to function in any of the six

domains. However, especially with regard to the domains of interacting and relating with

others, moving about and manipulating objects, caring for oneself and health and physical

well-being, the ALJ gives only conclusory statements of his findings which are unsupported

by reasons or analysis.

B. The Appeals Council Issue. Because this case must be remanded for further

proceedings, the court pretermits consideration of the issue concerning new evidence. The

plaintiff will have an opportunity to present that evidence to the Commissioner on remand.

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III. Conclusion

The ALJ erred because he failed to provide for each of the six domains a discussion

of the evidence and the reason or reasons for his determination as to the degree of N.L.C.’s

limitations in each of those domains. In addition, the ALJ erred because he relied on a stale

expert report of a state agency psychologist. The case will be remanded to the Commissioner

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In addition to the foregoing, the court strongly suggests but does not order that upon

remand, the Commissioner refer this case to another ALJ for further consideration. It is

evident that the ALJ in this case has lost his objectivity regarding this case. 

It is further

ORDERED that, in accordance with Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273,

1278 fn. 2 (11 Cir. 2006), the plaintiff shall have sixty (60) days after receipt of notice of th

any amount of past due benefits awarded to seek attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 

See also Blitch v. Astrue, 261 Fed. Appx. 241, 242 fn.1 (11 Cir. 2008). th

A separate final judgment will be entered.

Done this 27 day of March, 2012. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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