Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02394/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02394-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ELISEO ALATORRE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WASTEQUIP MANUFACTURING 

COMPANY LLC, and DOES 1-50, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-02394-MCE-DAD 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Through this action, Plaintiff Eliseo Alatorre (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief for various 

violations of California state law arising from the termination of his employment with 

Defendant Wastequip Manufacturing Company LLC (“Defendant”). Plaintiff originally 

filed suit in the Superior Court of California, County of San Joaquin, alleging violations of 

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and common law causes of 

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful termination in violation 

of public policy. Defendant removed the action to this Court on September 19, 2012, 

invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) Presently before the Court is 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8), which Defendant timely opposed (ECF 

No. 10). Defendant also filed a Motion to Amend Notice of Removal (ECF No. 9), which 

Plaintiff timely opposed (ECF No. 16). 

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For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Amend Notice of Removal is 

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.1 

BACKGROUND2

Prior to June 4, 2004, Plaintiff was an owner and operator of McLaughlin Refuse 

Equipment, Inc. The company designed and manufactured refuse dumpsters and 

similar products. On June 4, 2004, Plaintiff sold his business to Wastequip. Following 

the sale of his company, Plaintiff became an employee of Wastequip. Plaintiff remained 

an employee in good standing for eight years with Wastequip. He was recognized for 

his superior performance and received increased job duties and responsibilities within 

the company. While employed with Wastequip, Plaintiff met or exceeded all of 

Wastequip’s performance expectations. 

On January 31, 2012, as a result of minor medical concerns, Plaintiff had an MRI 

performed on his brain. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff learned that he had a tumor on his 

pituitary gland, and was told to schedule an appointment with a specialist. On 

February 23, 2012, Plaintiff consulted with a specialist. The specialist informed Plaintiff 

that Plaintiff would need brain surgery as soon as possible. 

On March 14, 2012, two of Plaintiff’s superiors—Chuck Worley, Wastequip’s 

General Manager of the West Coast, and Vince Tabb, Wastequip’s CEO—were at 

Plaintiff’s work location. Neither Worley nor Tabb regularly worked out of Plaintiff’s 

facility. Near the end of the day, Plaintiff informed Worley and Tabb that he had been 

diagnosed with a brain tumor. The following day, March 15, 2012, at 4:45 PM, Worley 

sent Plaintiff an email stating: 

/// 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court orders these matters 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g). 

2

 The following factual background is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 

No. 1 at 14-15) unless otherwise stated. 

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Please note the attached prescription form and job description. If you are 

going to be taking medication during your treatment, we need these 

completed please. This is a safety precaution, to let your doctor know your 

work environment, and approve your prescriptions for use in this 

environment . . . . Would like these back by Monday [March 19, 2012] if 

they apply.” 

Plaintiff provided these forms, indicating that Plaintiff’s medication did not interfere with 

his performance of his job duties. 

 On March 21, 2012, Plaintiff was terminated from employment. Defendant 

informed Plaintiff that he was being terminated for “performance.” Plaintiff’s medical 

benefits were terminated that same day. As a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff 

suffered loss of earnings and benefits, humiliation, and embarrassment, as well as 

severe mental and emotional distress and discomfort. 

STANDARD 

A. Removal 

When a case “of which the district courts of the United States have original 

jurisdiction” is initially brought in state court, the defendant may remove it to the federal 

court “embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There 

are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A district 

court has federal question jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 1331. A district court has diversity 

jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 

. . . and is between citizens of different states, or citizens of a State and citizens or 

subjects of a foreign state . . . .” Id. § 1332(a)(1)-(2). 

A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to federal district court if 

the district court has original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

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“The party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing federal 

jurisdiction.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(internal citations omitted). Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal 

jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations 

omitted). “[I]f there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance,” the 

motion for remand must be granted. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Therefore, if it appears “at 

any time before final judgment that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 

case shall be remanded” to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

If the district court determines that removal was improper, then the Court may 

also award the plaintiff costs and attorney fees accrued in response to the defendant’s 

removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court has broad discretion to award costs and fees 

whenever it finds that removal was wrong as a matter of law. Balcorta v. TwentiethCentury Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000). 

ANALYSIS 

A. Defendant’s Motion to Amend Notice of Removal 

A defendant seeking to remove a case to federal court must do so within thirty 

days of being served with the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). “The Notice of 

Removal ‘cannot be amended to add a separate basis for removal jurisdiction after the 

thirty day period.’” ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C., 213 F.3d at 1117 (quoting 

O'Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, the Court 

may allow a defendant to amend the Notice of Removal after the thirty day window has 

closed to correct a “defective allegation of jurisdiction.” 

/// 

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Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1653; 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 107.30[2][a][iv] 

(“[A]mendment may be permitted after the 30-day period if the amendment corrects 

defective allegations of jurisdiction, but not to add a new basis for removal jurisdiction.”)); 

see also Lindley Contours, LLC v. AABB Fitness Holdings, Inc., 414 F. App'x 62, 64 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1653, [the Court has] the authority to grant leave to 

amend a complaint in order to cure defective allegations of jurisdiction.”). The rationale 

for permitting amendment to correct allegations of jurisdictional facts is that “[i]n 

determining whether a removal petition is incurably defective, the [C]ourt not only 

examines the specific allegations of the petition itself, but also must scrutinize the record 

of the state court proceedings” for omitted jurisdictional facts. ARCO Envtl. 

Remediation, LLC, 213 F.3d at 1117 (quoting N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 

676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1982)). 

Defendant’s original notice of removal states that “Defendant . . . is a Ohio 

corporation with its principal place of business is [sic] Charlotte, North Carolina. Thus, 

Wastequip Manufacturing Company LLC is not a citizen of the State of California.” (ECF 

No. 1 at 2.) Defendant seeks to amend the notice of removal to state that “Wastequip 

Manufacturing LLC is 100% owned by Wastequip LLC. Wastequip LLC is incorporated 

in Ohio and its principal place of business is at 1901 Roxboough Road, Suite 300, in 

Charlotte, North Carolina. Thus, Wastequip Manufacturing Company LLC is not a citizen 

of the State of California.” (ECF No. 9-1 at 50.) Defendant seeks the amendment to 

correct a defective allegation of jurisdiction; Defendant does not seek to add a new basis 

for removal jurisdiction. See ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C., 213 F.3d at 1117. 

Defendant’s purported basis for federal jurisdiction remains diversity—that is, Defendant 

still contends that federal jurisdiction is appropriate only because there is complete 

diversity between Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant simply seeks to clarify its 

jurisdictional allegations to aid the Court in determining Defendant’s citizenship for the 

purposes of diversity. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Amend Notice of Removal is GRANTED. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand argues that Defendant has failed to establish that the 

parties are diverse and that Defendant filed a defective notice of removal. Specifically, 

Plaintiff contends that because Defendant attempts to apply the test for diversity used for 

corporations, Defendant fails to put facts before the Court sufficient for the Court to 

determine Defendant’s citizenship. By way of response, Defendant argues that 

Defendant is a limited liability company “fully owned by Wastequip LLC, which has the 

exact same state of incorporation and principal place of business as Defendant” and 

thus “the allegation about the state of incorporation and principal place of business of 

Wastequip Manufacturing LLC is actually correct.” (ECF No. 10 at 1.) Defendant also 

argues that its amended notice of removal cures whatever defect may have existed in 

the original notice of removal because “if Wastequip Manufacturing LLC’s citizenship is 

determined by its sole owner, the result is the same because Wastequip Manufacturing 

Company LLC is still ‘a Ohio corporation with its principal place of business is [sic] 

Charlotte, North Carolina . . . .’” (ECF No. 10 at 3.) 

However, as Plaintiff points out, Defendant’s amended notice of removal remains 

defective, as Defendant fails to make jurisdictional allegations sufficient for the Court to 

determine Defendant’s citizenship under the citizenship test for limited liability 

corporations (“LLCs”). According to the Ninth Circuit, “LLCs resemble both partnerships 

and corporations. Notwithstanding LLCs' corporate traits, however, every circuit that has 

addressed the question treats them like partnerships for the purposes of diversity 

jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

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“This treatment accords with the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to extend the 

corporate citizenship rule to non-corporate entities, including those that share some of 

the characteristics of corporations.” Id. (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 

189 (1990) (treating a limited partnership as having the citizenship of all its members); 

Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456-57 (1900) (refusing to extend 

the corporate citizenship rule to a “limited partnership association” although it possessed 

“some of the characteristics of a corporation”)). “This treatment is also consistent with 

the common law presumption that unincorporated associations are not legal entities 

independent of their members.” Id. (citing Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 300 

F.3d 1129, 1133 n. 2 (9th Cir.2002)). Thus, “like a partnership, an LLC is a citizen of 

every state of which its owners/members are citizens.” Id. 

Here, Defendant’s owner, Wastequip LLC, is itself a limited liability corporation.3 

Wastequip LLC’s citizenship is therefore determined not by reference to its principal 

place of business and “state of incorporation,” as Defendant suggests, but by the 

citizenship of its owners and members. See Johnson, 437 F.3d at 899. Thus, 

Defendant must also identify the owner of Wastequip LLC in its removal papers, and 

provide information regarding Wastequip LLC’s owner’s citizenship. See id.; Lindley 

Contours, LLC, 414 F. App’x at 65 (finding that when an LLC’s members are themselves 

limited partnerships or LLCs, jurisdictional allegations must “identify of what state [the 

members] are a citizen or whether they are composed of another layer of partnerships.”). 

Defendant’s amended Notice of Removal includes no such allegations. It is insufficient 

for Defendant to make allegations regarding Wastequip LLC’s principal place of 

business and “place of incorporation.”4

 

 3

 Although Defendant’s Amended Notice of Removal states that Wastequip LLC is “incorporated” 

in Ohio, the Court assumes that Wastequip LLC is, in fact, an LLC due to the presence of “LLC” in the 

company’s name, and Defendant’s Corporate Disclosure Statement which states that “Wastequip 

Manufacturing Company LLC is wholly owned by Wastequip, LLC (an Ohio limited liability company).” 

(ECF No. 9-1 a7 47.) 

4

 The Court notes that while an LLC may have a place of formation, it has no place of 

“incorporation,” as an LLC is, by definition, not incorporated. 

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The Court uses information about a party’s principal place of business and place of 

incorporation to determine the citizenship of a corporation, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); such 

information is useless in determining an LLC’s citizenship. See supra. The Court is 

therefore unable to determine Defendant’s citizenship from the jurisdictional allegations 

contained in Defendant’s amended Notice of Removal. 

Defendant does provide the Court with the Declaration of Steve Svetik, the Chief 

Financial Officer of Patriot Container Acquisition Corp. and Wastequip LLC, in support of 

its Motion to Amend. (ECF No. 9-2.) Svetik’s Declaration states: “Wastequip 

Manufacturing LLC is incorporated in Ohio and its principal place of business is in 

Charlotte, North Carolina. Wastequip Manufacturing LLC is 100% owned by Wastequip 

LLC. Wastequip LLC is incorporated in Ohio and its principal place of business is at 

1901 Roxborough Road, Suite 300 in Charlotte, North Carolina. Wastequip LLC is 

100% owned by Patriot Container Acquisition Corp., which is a Delaware Corporation, 

whose principal place of business is in Charlotte, North Carolina.” Defendant thus 

attempts to demonstrate that Wastequip LLC owns Defendant, and Wastequip LLC is 

owned in turn by Patriot Container Acquisition Corporation, which has its principal place 

of business in North Carolina and is incorporated in Delaware. Under these facts, 

Defendant appears to be a citizen of both North Carolina (Patriot Container Acquisition 

Corporation’s principal place of business) and Delaware (Patriot Container Acquisition 

Corporation’s state of incorporation). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (citizenship of 

corporations); Johnson, 437 F.3d at 899 (citizenship of LLC). 

However, Svetik’s Declaration is problematic for several reasons. First, the 

Declaration includes statements regarding “Wastequip Manufacturing LLC,” which is not 

the named Defendant in this case. The named Defendant is “Wastequip Manufacturing 

Company LLC.” The Court cannot simply assume that “Wastequip Manufacturing LLC” 

is meant to be Defendant Wastequip Manufacturing Company LLC, and thus the Court 

cannot use this information to determine that Defendant is, in fact, diverse from Plaintiff. 

/// 

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Second, Svetik states that Wastequip LLC and Wastequip Manufacturing LLC are each 

“incorporated in Ohio.” These statements are clearly incorrect, as both of these 

companies are limited liability companies, not corporations, and thus have no place of 

incorporation. 

Thus, Defendant’s amended Notice of Removal fails to provide the Court with 

information sufficient to determine Defendant’s citizenship—namely, the information 

about Patriot Container Acquisition Corporation’s citizenship. For the reasons stated 

above, Svetik’s Declaration is similarly unhelpful to the Court’s determination whether 

diversity jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant, as the removing 

party, has failed to meet its “burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” Ethridge, 

861 F.2d at 1393. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons just stated, it is hereby ordered that: 

1. Defendant’s Request to Amend Notice of Removal is GRANTED. (ECF No. 9.) 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (ECF No. 8.) 

3. Defendant is ordered to show cause why the Court should not remand this 

case to California Superior Court, County of San Joaquin. Defendant has ten (10) days 

from the date this Order and Memorandum is issued to demonstrate to the Court why 

diversity jurisdiction exists. Should Defendant fail to file a response to the Order to Show 

Cause, the Court will remand the case sua sponte, without further notice to the parties. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 19, 2012 

_______________________________________ 

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., CHIEF JUDGE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

d6b0d3 

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