Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00828/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00828-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alturo Beltran Beltran,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents

CV-08-0828-PHX-NVW (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Buckeye,

Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

on November 26, 2008 (#13). Respondents have filed an Answer (#15) and a Supplemental

Answer (#19). Petitioner did not reply, but filed a “Supplemental Reply (#24)..

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized

the factual background as follows:

Beltran, a drug dealer, was robbed by the victim, Jennifer C., on July

14, 1999. The next day Beltran sent three women to capture Jennifer

and bring her back to him. The three women held Jennifer at gunpoint,

bound her with duct tape, and delivered her to Beltran and two other

men. The three men placed Jennifer into another vehicle and drove

away. Jennifer's body was found in the desert on August 25, 1999 with

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a gunshot wound to the head, and was identified through fingerprint

analysis. One witness testified that when asked what had happened to

Jennifer, Beltran, indicated they had killed her.

(Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. At 2.) (Exhibits to the Answer, #15, are referenced herein as “Exhibit

___.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On October 24, 2002, Petitioner was charged in an Indictment (Exhibit A) with one

count of first degree murder and one count of kidnaping. The jury convicted him on both

counts, and on September 17, 2004, he was sentenced to natural life in prison without the

possibility of parole for the first degree murder, and a consecutive presumptive term of 10.5

years for kidnaping. (Exhibit D, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, and counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), voicing an inability to find an issue for appeal. (Exhibit E.)

 Despite being given leave to do so, Petitioner failed to file a supplemental brief. The

Arizona Court of Appeals thus undertook a review of the record for “fundamental error,” and

found none. (Exhibit B.) The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on October 13, 2005.

Petitioner did not seek reconsideration or further appeal, and on December 2, 2005,

the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Order and Mandate (Exhibit F). 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On November 8, 2005, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit G).

Counsel was appointed (Exhibit H, M.E. 11/17/05), and eventually filed a Notice of

Completion of Review (Exhibit I), voicing an inability to find an issue for review and

advising Petitioner of his right to file a pro se petition. On March 17, 2006, Petitioner filed

his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit J). 

That petition was a form petition with the introductory instructions:

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In order for this petition to receive consideration by the court,

each applicable question must be answered fully but concisely in

legible handwriting or by typing. When necessary, an answer to a

particular question may be completed on the reverse die of the page or

on an additional blank page.

(Exhibit J at 1.) In the section (4) for describing his basis for relief, Petitioner marked the

paragraph “The unconstitutional use by the state of perjured testimony.” (Id. at 3.) Section

5 of the form directed:

The facts in support of the alleged (error(s) upon which this

petition is based are contained in Attachment A. [State facts clearly and

fully; citations or discussions of authorities need not be included].

(Id.) There was no “Attachment A” submitted by Petitioner. On March 21, 2006, the state

responded (Exhibit K), arguing that the failure to provide facts in support of his petition

called for dismissal. Petitioner did not reply. (Exhibit R, Docket, at 2.)

On May 1, 2006, the trial court issued a minute entry that dismissed the Petition,

finding that it “fails to set forth any specific basis for his allegations and his claims are not

supported by affidavits, records, or other evidence as required by Rule 32.5 of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure.” On that basis, the court found that the petition failed to assert

a “a material issue of fact or law which would entitle the Defendant’s relief under Rule 32"

and ordered the petition dismissed. (Exhibit L, M.E. filed 5/10/06.)

Petitioner then filed a petition for review (Exhibit M), arguing that PCR counsel was

ineffective, and that as a result of that ineffectiveness and Petitioner’s lack of understanding

of English and lack of a translator, he had been denied due process. Petitioner requested a

remand for a new PCR proceeding or a new trial. On June 19, 2007, the Arizona Court of

Appeals summarily denied review.

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court on the same issues

(Exhibit O), which was summarily denied on September 10, 2007.

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner commenced the instant proceeding by filing his original Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 30, 2008 (#1). Service was ordered

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on October 27, 2008 (#7), but on November 26, 2008, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition

(#13). 

Petitioner’s original petition asserted a single ground for relief: Petitioner’s

constitutional rights were violated when coerced, false, and perjured testimony was

introduced by the state during Petitioner’s trial. The amended petition raises the same single

ground for relief, with added clarification of the dates and results of his appeal to the Arizona

Court of Appeals.

On January 12, 2009, Respondents filed their Answer (#15), arguing that Petitioner’s

state PCR Petition was not “properly filed” and thus failed toll the running of the statute of

limitations, and that it failed to fairly present his federal claims, and thus failed to properly

exhaust his state remedies which are now procedurally defaulted.

Reply - Petitioner did not reply.

Supplemental Answer - On July 28, 2009, the undersigned advised the parties of a

preliminary determination that the Petition is not barred by the statute of limitations, and

though unexhausted, Respondents had not shown a basis for a finding of procedural default

nor shown that the Petition was so devoid of merit that it should be denied rather than simply

dismissed without prejudice. Respondents were granted leave to supplement their response,

and Petitioner was granted leave to reply. (Order 7/28/9, #16.) 

On August 11, 2009, Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer (#19), arguing that

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted under Arizona’s preclusion bar (Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.2) and time bar (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4). Respondents further argue that Petitioner’s

claims are without merit because the referenced testimony was, at best, inconsistent or

impeachable, and that the impeaching characteristics were presented and argued to the jury.

Supplemental Reply - On September 30, 2009, Petitioner filed his “Supplemental

Reply” (#24). Petitioner argues that his petition should be liberally construed, he has

inadequate legal assistance in prison, and he has been improperly denied discovery, and

requires an evidentiary hearing to establish his claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Respondents argue that the petition is untimely.

Normal Running of Statute - Congress has provided a 1-year statute of limitations

for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed “by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A)

Here, Petitioner’s direct review ended on October 13, 2005, when the Arizona Court

of Appeals denied his direct appeal. (Exhibit F.) However, “direct review" includes the

period within which a petitioner can seek further review, whether or not the petitioner

actually files a petition for such review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th

Cir.1999). Petitioner had 30 days after entry of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision, or

until Monday, November 14, 2005, to file a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme

Court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Petitioner did not do so, and thus his conviction became

final on that date.

The limitations period would have begun running thereafter, and expired on

November 14, 2006, making even the original Petition (#1), filed April 30, 2008, over 17

months delinquent. 

Statutory Tolling - Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2) for all the time that a "properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral relief with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." Here, Petitioner

commenced his state PCR proceeding on November 8, 2005, by filing his Notice of Post

Conviction Relief (Exhibit G). 

Respondents argue that this proceeding was not “properly filed” because it was

dismissed pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5 for failure to allege sufficient facts. Because

both the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court issued “postcard denials,”

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1

 The undersigned is additionally troubled by the fact that the proceeding was

allowed to continue for some time through the appointment of counsel, counsel’s notice of

inability to find issues for review, etc. To find that the whole proceeding was not “properly

filed” months after a properly filed PCR notice, because the petitioner failed to adequately

support a subsequent petition, seems to leave a trap for the defendant who finds himself left

to litigate pro se. However, the Supreme Court has apparently concluded that the potential

for such unfairness may only be mitigated by “filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court

and asking the federal court to stay and abey.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416

(2005).

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the trial court’s decision is the “last reasoned decision” and is the decision looked to by this

Court to ascertain the nature of the state courts’ rulings. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

804 (1991). The trial court’s ruling provided in pertinent part:

Defendant’s Petition fails to set forth any specific basis for his

allegations and his claims are not supported by affidavits, records or

other evidence as required by Rule 32.5 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure.

Upon reviewing the Petition and Response,

THE COURT FINDS that there is no claim which presents a

material issue of fact or law which would entitle the Defendant’s relief

[SIC] under Rule 32 and no purpose would be served by any further

proceedings.

IT IS ORDERED the Defendant’s Petition is hereby dismissed.

(Exhibit L, M.E. 5/10/06.)

For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that this was a dismissal on the merits

and not a finding that the application was not “properly filed.”

First, in Arizona a post conviction relief proceeding is not commenced by the filing

of the petition. Rather, the Notice of Post-Conviction Relief is the filing which commences

the proceeding. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th

Cir. 2004). There is no suggestion that Petitioner’s PCR Notice was not properly filed.1

Second, although the trial court referenced Rule 32.5, it did not dismiss pursuant to

Rule 32.5. Rule 32.5 provides, in pertinent part:

The defendant shall include every ground known to him or her for

vacating, reducing, correcting or otherwise changing all judgments or

sentences imposed upon him or her, and certify that he or she has done

so. Facts within the defendant's personal knowledge shall be noted

separately from other allegations of fact and shall be under oath.

Affidavits, records, or other evidence currently available to the

defendant supporting the allegations of the petition shall be attached to

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it. Legal and record citations and memoranda of points and authorities

are required. . . . A petition which fails to comply with this rule shall

be returned by the court to the defendant for revision with an

order specifying how the petition fails to comply with the rule. A

petition that has been revised to comply with the rule shall be returned

by the defendant for refiling within 30 days after defendant's receipt of

the non-complying petition. If the petition is not so returned, the court

shall dismiss the proceedings with prejudice. The period for response

by the state shall begin on the date a returned petition is refiled.

Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.5 (emphasis added). Here, the trial court did not return the petition

to Petitioner specifying its inadequacies, nor did it permit Petitioner to refile the petition

within 30 days. Thus, a dismissal pursuant to Rule 32.5 would not have been authorized.

Third, in dismissing the petition, the trial court referenced the substance of Arizona

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(c), which provides in pertinent part:

If the court, after identifying all precluded claims, determines that no

remaining claim presents a material issue of fact or law which would

entitle the defendant to relief under this rule and that no purpose would

be served by any further proceedings, the court shall order the petition

dismissed. If the court does not dismiss the petition, the court shall set

a hearing within thirty days on those claims that present a material issue

of fact or law. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(c).

Thus, the discussion of Rule 32.5 was not the basis for the dismissal, but an

explanation of the types of additional information Petitioner could have supplied to support

his petition. The application of Rule 32.6(c) was not a rejection of the petition as

procedurally barred, but simply a finding that no hearing was required for the court to

dispose of the merits. See State v. Carriger, 132 Ariz. 301, 305, 645 P.2d 816, 820 (1982)

(Rule 32.6(c) is an “exception[] to the general rule” requiring a hearing before disposing of

a PCR petition).

Thus, the trial court’s summary dismissal was based upon a determination of the

merits of the claim, and was not a determination that the petition was not properly filed. In

Gaston v. Palmer, the Ninth Circuit considered the effect of a similar ruling by the California

Supreme Court on a state habeas petition, and concluded that the court’s ruling was “in

effect, the grant of a demurrer, i.e., a holding that Gaston had not pled facts with sufficient

particularity.” 417 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005), modified by 447 F.3d 1165 (2006), cert.

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denied, 549 U.S. 1134 (2007). Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[w]hile Gaston's sixth

application was thus procedurally deficient under California law, it was not improperly filed

within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. Like Gaston, here “[t]here is no indication that the

application was time-barred, lodged in the wrong court or office, or formatted improperly.”

Id.

Therefore, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s PCR application was “properly

filed” and resulted in statutory tolling. That application remained “pending” until September

10, 2007, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied further review. (Exhibit O.) The

“AEDPA statute of limitations [is] tolled for ‘all of the time during which a state prisoner is

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with

regard to a particular post-conviction application.’ ” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1999)). 

Thus, Petitioner’s one year was tolled from before its inception, until September 10,

2007, and began running thereafter until September, 2008. Thus, Petitioner’s original

Petition (#1), filed April 30, 2008, was timely.

Effect of Amended Petition - However, on November 26, 2008, Petitioner filed an

Amended Petition (#13). This was after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The

statute of limitations is not tolled by the pendency of the federal petition. See Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Nonetheless, as with any other pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c),

an amended habeas petition can relate back in time to the filing of the original petition. 

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2000). Such relation back is permitted

under Rule 15(c)(1)(B) if “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction or occurrence set out - or attempted to be set out - in the original

pleading.” As noted above, Petitioner’s Amended Petition asserted the same claim as that

set forth in his original Petition. The only change was to the recitation of the procedural

history. Thus, the undersigned finds that the Amended Petition relates back in time to the

filing of the original Petition, and therefore is also timely.

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2

 Respondents are correct that “[a] state court's application of a procedural rule is not

undermined where...the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.” Bennett

v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003). However, here there was no procedural bar

applied, just a decision on the merits.

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B. EXHAUSTION / PROCEDURAL BAR / PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

1. Procedural Bar by Trial Court

Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s grounds for relief must be dismissed because

the underlying claims were disposed of by the trial court by the application of a procedural

bar which constituted an independent and adequate state ground.

Respondents couch their discussion of this issue in terms of a failure to exhaust.

However, though the distinct concepts of procedural bar and procedural default are related,

only the latter results in a failure of exhaustion. A procedurally barred claim has been

exhausted, but as a matter of comity, the federal courts will decline to address the merits of

the claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-732 (1991). 

 However, as discussed above, the trial court did not apply a procedural bar in

disposing of Petitioner’s claims. Rather, the trial court disposed of the claim on its merits.2

2. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Forum/Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

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3

 Respondents argue (Answer, #15 at 9, n. 1) that presentation to the Arizona

Supreme Court (not just the Arizona Court of Appeals) is required for exhaustion, citing

Baldwin v. v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 30–33 (1999). The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent reliance on

Swoopes in Castillo, notwithstanding Baldwin, dispels this argument. Moreover, nothing in

Baldwin precludes the reasoning in Swoopes. Nor does the language cited by Respondents

from State v. Ikirt, 160 Ariz. 113, 117, 770 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1989), which predated the

Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220

(Ariz.1989), on which Swoopes is based.

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1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).3

b. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

c. Application to Petitioner’s Claim

At best, Petitioner fairly presented his claim (of prosecutorial misconduct by the

presentation of perjured testimony) to the trial court in his PCR petition. However, Petitioner

did not make any reference to federal law in asserting that claim. At best, the checked line

on the form identified the claim as “unconstitutional use by the state of perjured testimony.”

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There was no indication whether the purported violation was of the state or federal

constitution.

More importantly, Petitioner did not reassert this claim to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Rather, in his Petition for Review (Exhibit M), he raised new claims of: (1)

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel; (2) denial of due process as a result of the failure to

serve the PCR response on him, and the denial of adequate assistance in the PCR proceeding;

and (3) failure of the trial court to perform its duties under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(c) to

review the file, and therefore an abuse of discretion in the summary dismissal. Petitioner did

not present his prosecutorial misconduct claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, nor did he

address its merits. Those same claims were repeated in his Petition for Review (Exhibit O)

to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Thus, Petitioner failed to fairly present his federal claim to the Arizona Court of

Appeals (and Arizona Supreme Court), and thus failed to exhaust that claim.

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis,

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

(1984).

Respondents argue in their Supplemental Answer (#19) that Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted under Arizona’s preclusion bar (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2) and time bar

(Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4). Because of the limited development of Arizona law on the

exception to the preclusion bar for claims of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," see

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002), and the applicability of clear timeliness bars, the

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4

 The undersigned has seen one case where the Arizona courts permitted a delayed

second appeal under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(f) based upon the failure (but not ineffective

assistance) of appellate counsel to raise a claim which had been hotly litigated in the trial

court, and which turned upon a precise definition of state law (e.g. whther the intent to

commit sexual assault must occur at time of original restraint to establish offense of

kidnapping), and “should have been raised on the original appeal.” See Hoffert v. Schriro,

CV-08-1268-PHX-JWS (JRI), Answer #12, Exhibit Q, M.E. 3/17/03. That seems outside

the scope of Rule 32.4(f)’s reference to a simple failure to file a timely “notice of appeal”

(emphasis added). That case is apparently an aberration. Moreover, here Petitioner’s current

claim was not litigated at trial, nor was it founded upon a limited question of state law.

Thus, the undersigned finds no reason to expect Rule 32.4(f) to be applied to Petitioner.

Further, that singular aberration does not lead the undersigned to question the adequacy of

Rule 31.3 to bar federal habeas review. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir.

2000) (singular deviation in application of Washington procedural rule did not render it

inadequate); and Federal Habeas Manual § 9B:32.

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undersigned does not reach Respondents' argument on the applicability of the preclusion bar.

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.4

 Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a

subsequent PCR Petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for post-conviction

relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after the entry of

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in

the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357

(App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition of pleading

defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). 

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Order and Mandate on December 2,

2005 (Exhibit F). Accordingly, Petitioner’s time to file a PCR petition expired on January

3, 2006. 

While Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of

claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any

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of these exceptions are applicable to his equal protection claim. Nor does it appears that

such exceptions in Rule 32.1 would apply to this claim. The rule defines the excepted claims

as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a claim

is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state

courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application.

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. 5

Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in the law.

Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application to

Petitioner’s procedural claims. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404, 166 P.3d 945, 959

(App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where petitioner had “ not established that trial error

...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”). 

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Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that review through Arizona’s postconviction relief process is no longer possible for Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Summary re Procedural Default - Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies

on the claim in the Petition, and is now procedurally barred from doing so. Accordingly, the

claim is procedurally defaulted, and absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual

innocence, must be dismissed with prejudice. 

3. Miscarriage of Justice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

Moreover, the standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be

flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may

be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted

in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496

(1986) (emphasis added). However, it is not sufficient that the petitioner point to some legal

insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623(1998) (“‘actual innocence’ means

factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency”). Rather, a petitioner asserting his actual

innocence of the underlying crime must show "it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence" presented in his habeas

petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 

 Petitioner makes no argument of having cause and prejudice to excuse any procedural

default, nor does he proffer any showing of actual innocence.

C. DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING

In his Supplemental Reply (#24), Petitioner argues that he is entitled to discovery and

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an evidentiary hearing to establish his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Such discovery

and hearing would only be relevant to establishing the merits of the claim in the Petition. 

Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted,

the merits may not be reached, and accordingly there is no basis for pursing such discovery

and/or an evidentiary hearing. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, on November 26, 2008 (#13) be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: October 27, 2009 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\08-0828-013r RR 09 06 12 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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