Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00184/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00184-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:754 Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

APRIL WHITSETT

Plaintiff,

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vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-0184-KD-M

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STATE OF ALA. BOARD OF PARDONS 

AND PAROLES and ALFONZO McCOY,

Defendants.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 17) filed by Defendant Alfonzo McCoy under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)1. This Motion has been referred to the 

undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. 

GenLR 72. Plaintiff has filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 

22) and Defendant McCoy has filed a Reply to that Response (Doc. 

23). After careful consideration of the record, it is 

recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and all claims 

against Defendant Alfonzo McCoy be dismissed with prejudice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 2, 2016, the Plaintiff filed the instant action, 

alleging several claims. (Doc. 1 at 5-6.) The Defendants filed 

a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9). On September 21, 2016, the 

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) as of right, 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 The Motion to Dismiss references both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 

12(b)(6) (Doc. 17 at 1, 3), but explicates a standard for Rule 

12(b)(6) (Id. at 3), so the Court assumes that the Motion is 

brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

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which became the operative complaint and mooted out the previous 

Motion to Dismiss. (See Doc. 16.) The Amended Complaint 

alleges a Title VII hostile work environment claim against the 

State of Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles (hereafter, “the 

Board”) and three tort causes of action against Defendant 

Alfonzo McCoy (hereafter, “McCoy”). (Doc. 11 at 5-6.) On 

October 5, 2016, McCoy filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, 

alleging that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because 

the statute of limitations has run without tolling as to all 

three tort actions. (Doc. 17 at 4-9.) Plaintiff filed a 

Response in Opposition (Doc. 22) and McCoy filed a Reply to the 

Response (Doc. 23).

The Amended Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff, a female, 

was hired as a security guard by Weiser Security Services, Inc. 

in March 2013. (Doc. 11 at 2-3.) She was hired to work in the 

L.I.F.E. Tech Transition Center, where she was supervised by the 

Board. (Id. at 3.) McCoy was a maintenance employee who worked 

at the same location during the same shift as the Plaintiff. 

(Id.) McCoy allegedly made inappropriate comments to Plaintiff 

of a sexual nature and inappropriately touched her, including 

throwing a clipboard at the Plaintiff and grabbing her hand. 

(Id. at 4.) The Plaintiff does not allege any conduct which 

took place after March 2014. (See id. at 2-5.)

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must first satisfy the 

pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), which provides that "[a] 

pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 

8 establishes a regime of "notice pleading," Swierkiewicz v. 

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 513-14, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. 

Ed. 2d 1 (2002), it does not eliminate all pleading 

requirements.

First, the complaint must address all the elements that 

must be shown in order to support recovery under one or more 

causes of action. "At a minimum, notice pleading requires that 

a complaint contain inferential allegations from which we can 

identify each of the material elements necessary to sustain a 

recovery under some viable legal theory." Wilchombe v. TeeVee 

Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 960 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis and 

internal quotes omitted).

Pleading elements is necessary, but it is not enough to 

satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). The rule "requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do" to satisfy that rule. Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 

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2d 929 (2009). In addition, there must be a pleading of facts. 

Though they need not be detailed, "[f]actual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level 

...." Id. That is, the complaint must allege "enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 

570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level” and must be a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft 

to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 1966 (second brackets 

in original). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

The court treats as true factual allegations, but it does 

not treat as true conclusory assertions or a recitation of a 

cause of action’s elements. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681, 129 S. Ct. 

at 1951. When considering whether a complaint states a claim

for relief, the Court "should assume, on a case-by-case basis, 

that well pleaded factual allegations are true and then 

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determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 

relief." Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010). 

A statute of limitations defense is not typically 

appropriate to a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, “inasmuch as 

the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense around 

which plaintiffs are not required to plead in the complaint.” 

McMillan v. AMC Mortg. Serv., Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 

(S.D. Ala. 2008). Thus, “a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute 

of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is ‘apparent 

from the face of the complaint’ the claim is time-barred.” La 

Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 

2004) quoting Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’n Co., 12 F.3d 717, 

718 (7th Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

Defendant McCoy argues that the tort claims against him 

should be dismissed because the statute of limitations has 

passed as to each of them and has not been tolled. (Doc. 17 at 

4-8.) The undersigned addresses each of the tort causes of 

action in turn.

I. CLAIM II: INVASION OF PRIVACY

The first claim in the Amended Complaint is alleged only 

against the Board. (Doc. 11 at 5.) “Claim II” is the first 

claim directed against McCoy and alleges that “[t]he actions 

[of] the defendant amounted to an invasion of the plaintiff’s 

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privacy.” (Id. at 6.) Parties disagree as to which limitations 

period applies to this claim. (Doc. 17 at 4-5 compare Doc. 22 

at 2.) McCoy argues (Doc. 17 at 4-5) that the Code of Alabama’s 

two-year statute of limitations applies:

All actions for any injury to the person or rights of 

another not arising from contract and not specifically 

enumerated in this section must be brought within two 

years.

ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l) (1975). Plaintiff argues that limitations 

period for trespass actions, which is six years (ALA. CODE § 6-2-

34 (1975)), applies to claims for invasion of privacy. (Doc. 22 

at 2.) Plaintiff does not cite any authority for this 

proposition. (Id.) The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 

held that the two-year limitations period applies to invasion of 

privacy claims. Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 481 F.3d 

1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2007) citing ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l) (1975). 

The undersigned has not found any rulings on the issue by State 

of Alabama courts. Thus, the two-year limitations period is 

applied here.

Generally, “a statute of limitations begins to run when the 

cause of action ‘accrues’—that is, when ‘the plaintiff can file 

suit and obtain relief.’ ” Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Acc. 

Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 610 (U.S. 2013) quoting Bay Area 

Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of 

Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997). The latest date alleged in the 

Amended Complaint for any conduct giving rise to this cause of 

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action is “March 2014.” (Doc. 11 at 4.) Thus, by the end of 

March 2014, Plaintiff’s cause of action—as alleged—was complete 

and she could file suit and obtain relief. See Heimseshoff, 134 

S. Ct. at 610. The Plaintiff makes no allegation that she is 

entitled to any type of tolling, and “[i]t is well-established 

that the statute of limitations for a plaintiff’s state law 

claims is not tolled while the plaintiff is pursuing 

administrative remedies with the EEOC.” Simmons v. Mobile Inf. 

Medical Center, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1131 (S.D. Ala. 2005) 

citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 

466 (1975) (limitations period for § 1981 claim not tolled 

during the time the EEOC conducted an administrative hearing on 

the Title VII claim as the two claims are separate and 

distinct). Plaintiff filed the present suit on May 2, 2016. 

See Doc. 1. Thus, the limitations period for the Plaintiff’s 

invasion of privacy claim fully ran between the end of March 

2014 and May 2, 2016. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l) (1975).

II. CLAIM III: ASSAULT AND BATTERY

“Claim III” is directed against McCoy and alleges that 

“[t]he actions of the defendant constituted an assault and 

battery on the plaintiff.” (Doc. 11 at 6.) Parties again 

disagree as to which limitations period applies to this claim. 

(Doc. 17 at 5-6 compare Doc. 22 at 2.) McCoy again argues that 

the Code of Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations applies. 

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(Doc. 17 at 5 citing ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l) (1975).) Plaintiff 

argues the Court should apply the six-year statute of 

limitations, which reads in relevant part that 

[t]he following actions must be commenced within six 

years . . . [a]ctions for any trespass to person or 

liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and 

battery.

ALA. CODE § 6-2-34 (1975). The Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme 

Court of Alabama agree that the two-year statute of limitations 

applies. Chambless, 481 F.3d at 1350 compare Wright v. Wright, 

652 So. 2d 542, 544 (Ala. 1995)(citing ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l) 

(1975) for the proposition that plaintiff’s assault and battery 

claim “is barred by the statute of limitations).

Generally, “a statute of limitations begins to run when the 

cause of action ‘accrues’—that is, when ‘the plaintiff can file 

suit and obtain relief.’ ” Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 610. As 

discussed above, the Plaintiff could file suit and obtain relief 

by the end of March 2014 and is not entitled to any tolling for 

a state-law claim. Thus, the limitations period for the 

Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim fully ran between the end 

of March 2014 and May 2, 2016. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l) (1975).

III. CLAIM IV: TORT OF OUTRAGE

“Claim IV” is directed against McCoy and alleges that 

[t]he actions of the defendant were so outrageous in 

character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all 

possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized 

society causing emotional distress so severe that no 

reasonable person could be expected to endure it.

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(Doc. 11 at 6-7.) The relevant limitations period for the tort 

of outrage is imposed by § 6-2-38(l) of the Code of Alabama. 

Archie v. Enterprise Hosp. and Nursing Home, 508 So. 2d 693, 695 

(Ala. 1987). Thus, the two-year limitations period is applied.

Generally, “a statute of limitations begins to run when the 

cause of action ‘accrues’—that is, when ‘the plaintiff can file 

suit and obtain relief.’ ” Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 610. As 

discussed above, the Plaintiff could file suit and obtain relief 

by the end of March 2014 and is not entitled to any tolling for 

a state-law claim. Thus, barring any tolling (which the Court 

takes up below), the limitations period for the Plaintiff’s tort 

of outrage claim fully ran between the end of March 2014 and May 

2, 2016. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l) (1975). Since the limitations 

period has run for all of the claims alleged against McCoy, the 

Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted.

CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the record, and for the 

reasons stated herein above, it is recommended that the Motion 

to Dismiss (Doc. 17) be granted and all claims against Defendant 

Alfonzo McCoy be dismissed with prejudice.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

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(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72(c). The 

parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a]

party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the 

party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of 

a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for 

plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th 

Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An 

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the 

briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

 DONE this 22nd day of November 2016. 

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.

BERT W. MILLING, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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