Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01174/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01174-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG L. HINTON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-1174 MCE JFM P

vs.

CHERYL PLILER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his July 14, 1998,

convictions for murder in the second degree, CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a), and using a firearm

during the commission of an offense, CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.5(a), and the sentence of 34

years to life in prison imposed thereon on July 14, 1998. Petitioner raises three claims in his

third amended petition, filed June 22, 2005. Petitioner alleges that the application of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) cannot be constitutionally applied

because it violates the principle of separation of powers. Assuming AEDPA applies, Petitioner

raises two challenges in the alternative. First, Petitioner argues that federal habeas relief is

warranted as a result of the Government’s intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence. 

Second, Petitioner states that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court directed

further deliberations after jurors had declared themselves to be deadlocked.

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Hinton, No.# C030069 (March 31, 1999) (hereinafter Opinion), a

copy of which was lodged with the clerk of the court on March 20, 2002.

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FACTS1

Richard Jones drove defendant and Ravinesh Singh to West

Sacramento in the late evening of August 15 or early morning of

August 16, 1997. The three got out of the car near Maple Street. 

Defendant went ahead of the other two to meet with a man he

claimed owed him money. Jones and Singh heard defendant

arguing with a man later identified as the victim and heard

defendant tell the victim to “pay up.” The victim started walking

away from defendant, and defendant shot him several times. 

Police found the body of the victim, Maurice Drye, in a parking lot

on Maple Street. He had been shot six times. The murder weapon

belonged to defendant. Defendant’s fingerprint was on the

magazine inside the weapon. There were no other identifiable

prints on the gun or magazine.

Defendant was charged with the first degree murder of Drye. He

was also alleged to have personally used a firearm within the

meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a)[], and to

have previously suffered a conviction for a serious felony (robbery)

within the meaning of [Penal Code] section 667, subdivisions (c)

and (e)(1). The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder

and found he personally used a firearm during the commission of

the crime. The court found true the prior conviction allegation and

sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 30 years to life,

plus an additional four years on the firearm enhancement. 

(People v. Hinton, slip op. at 2-3). 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. The Constitutionality of AEDPA

Petitioner’s first claim is that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA) is unconstitutional as it impermissibly violates the separation of powers

doctrine. (Pet.’s Third Amended Br. 3-7.) This argument is without merit. The legislative

preclusion found in AEDPA regarding the sources of judicial review do not violate the doctrine

of separation of powers.

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Article III of the Constitution directs that the judicial power shall lie within the

Supreme Court and other federal courts that Congress may designate. As such, the Constitution

vests within the “judicial department” the exclusive power “to say what the law is.” Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Congress’ direction that the source of

clearly established law in AEDPA shall be that “determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” does not impinge upon this constitutionally directed separation of powers. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). 

The Supreme Court has consistently refused to disturb lower court rulings

affirming the constitutionality of AEDPA. See Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 874-75 (4th Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090, 119 S.Ct. 844, 142 L.Ed.2d 698 (1999); Lindh v. Murphy, 96

F.3d 856, 867-70 (7th Cir. 1996)(en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). While Plaintiff correctly notes that oral argument has been requested

by the Ninth Circuit as to the constitutionality of AEDPA, see Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d 1165 (9th

Cir. 2005), no decision has issued in that case. As a result, the court finds that the circuit’s

previous rejections of claims that AEDPA violates Article III of the Constitution remain binding. 

See Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006). 

B. Timeliness of Habeas Petition 

The Respondent claims that Petitioner’s petition must be dismissed as untimely. 

(Resp’t Answer Third Am. Pet. 31-33.) According to Respondent, Petitioner’s delay of 551

days between the denial of his petition for review by the California Supreme Court and the filing

of his habeas petition violates the one year statute of limitations under AEDPA. (Id. at 33.) As

the period of delay between Petitioner’s state filings was not unreasonable, the court recommends

that Respondent’s request for dismissal be denied.

California’s collateral review system differs from other states in that it evaluates

timeliness on a reasonable standard as opposed to an absolute standard. Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 221, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2139, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002); compare Ala. Rule App. Proc. 4

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(2001)(declaring a 42 day window within which to appeal). In order to promote “comity,

finality, and federalism,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d

435 (2000), a petitioner must first exhaust his state remedies prior to filing in federal court,

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). During those

periods in which state remedy is pending, AEDPA is tolled. Carey, 536 U.S. at 220; 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). Upon completion of state review, AEDPA grants petitioners one year to file their

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Petitioner waited approximately six and a half months between the denial of his

direct appeal by the Superior Court and filing in the Court of Appeals and three months between

his denial by the Court of Appeal and filing in the Supreme Court. This 10 month period of time

was not unreasonable and must be excluded from the AEDPA statute of limitations calculation. 

The Court of Appeal did not find the six and one half month delay to be unreasonable. 

Furthermore, while Plaintiff filed essentially identical applications in the Superior Court and

Court of Appeal, given the realities of the prison system, a cumulative 10 month delay is not

unreasonable. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999)(quoting Barnett v.

Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999), which tolled “all of the time during which a

state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court

remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application”). Excluding this period of

reasonable delay, Petitioner’s filing, made 245 days after the denial of the last of his state claims

was timely under AEDPA.

C. Suppression of Evidence

Petitioner’s second claim is that the prosecution intentionally suppressed

exculpatory evidence that a key prosecution witness was mentioned in connection with a murder

investigation. During pre-trial proceedings in this case, the prosecutor learned that a witness was

connected with an ongoing investigation. (Doc. 6, lodged on August 23, 2005.) Over a year

later, the prosecutor notified Petitioner of this fact. Id. According to Petitioner, this failure of the

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prosecutor to notify the defense of potential exculpatory evidence violated due process under 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The court finds no

support for this alleged violation and recommends denial of Petitioner’s claim.

There was no reasoned rejection of this Brady claim by the state courts. Rather,

upon presentment of this particular claim by Petitioner, both the Court of Appeal for the State of

California, Third Appellate District and the California Supreme Court issued “post-card” denials,

stating simply that the “petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.” (Docs. 3, 5, lodged on

August 23, 2005.) Petitioner contends that the failure by the state courts to specifically review

and discuss this claim requires application of the pre-AEDPA standards of review. (Pet.’s Third

Amended Br. 7-10.) Such a claim is without merit. 

A terse “post-card” denial is an adjudication on the merits. Gaston v. Palmer, 417

F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002), mandate

recalled and reissued as amended by 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002); Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d

344, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 887, 114 S.Ct. 240, 126 L.Ed.2d 194 (1993). 

There is nothing in the record that indicates that either denial was procedural or not on the merits

of Petitioner’s claim. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This court is

obligated to apply AEDPA standards as a result of the fact that there has been an adjudication on

the merits, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), however, given the lack of reasoning provided in the previous

denials, it must conduct an “independent review of the record...to determine whether the state

court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976,

982 (9th Cir. 2000). Upon review of the record, it is clear that the state court decision was

objectively reasonable. See Williams, 529 U.S. 409.

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held “that the suppression

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith

of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87; see also Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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The duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the

accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and encompasses impeachment

evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 

There are three components of a Brady violation: “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to

the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; the evidence must have

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691

(2004); Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to establish prejudice,

Petitioner must demonstrate that “‘there is a reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial

would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense.”

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289. “The question is not whether petitioner would more likely than not

have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether “in its absence he received a fair

trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id.(quoting Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)); see also Silva, 416 F.3d at 986 (“a Brady violation is

established where ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in

such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’”) Once the materiality of the

suppressed evidence is established, no further harmless error analysis is required. Kyles, 514

U.S. at 435-36; Silva, 416 F.3d at 986. “When the government has suppressed material evidence

favorable to the defendant, the conviction must be set aside.” Silva, 416 F.3d at 986.

It is clear that the withheld evidence did not result in prejudice to Petitioner. 

Petitioner cannot show that there was a “reasonable probability” that the verdict in this trial

would have been different had the prosecutor disclosed the fact that Mr. Jones was named in

connection with a different murder under investigation. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289 (quoting Kyles

v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). Indeed, given the

nature of the withheld evidence, and the other facts surrounding this case, there is nothing to

“‘undermine [the court’s] confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 298 (Souter, J., concurring in part

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and dissenting in part)(quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435); see also Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892

(9th Cir. 2006)(“In determining materiality under Brady, we focus our inquiry on our confidence

in the verdict.”)

Nothing in the record demonstrates that Mr. Jones was ever charged, convicted, or

called in for questioning or to testify in the other investigation. Petitioner argues that information

about Mr. Jones’ potential involvement in a different murder investigation would have permitted

greater investigation of the case by defense counsel and impeachment during cross-examination. 

However, in speculating as to what might have occurred, Petitioner ignores the significant

impeachment of Mr. Jones’ testimony that was in fact elicited by defense counsel during trial. 

See Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 2006)(finding other significant impeachment

evidence to be one factor in determining materiality). 

Petitioner argued that Mr. Jones appeared to receive favorable treatment from the

State as a result of his cooperation during Petitioner’s murder trial. This treatment included a

lowering of Mr. Jones’ bail following his testimony at the preliminary hearing and a grant of use

immunity for his testimony. (RT 433). However, the record fails to demonstrate any connection

between the benefits conferred upon Mr. Jones and any activity in the other case in which Mr.

Jones was involved.

Mr. Jones’ grant of immunity became a rich source of material for crossexamination, as Petitioner elicited testimony from Mr. Jones that he had lied or omitted facts in

previously immune sworn statements and testimony, casting doubt upon the veracity of his

immune trial testimony. (RT 433-38.) Notable inconsistencies highlighted by Petitioner

included Mr. Jones’ recollection of when he first encountered Petitioner on the evening prior to

the murder, (RT 463-64), and his remembrance about seeing the murder weapon returned to

Petitioner, (RT 479). Any additional evidence regarding Jones’ credibility was likely to be

cumulative. See Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 599 (9th Cir. 2004)(holding no Brady

violation when State failed to turn over tape recording in which one person claims witness

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committed perjury in another, unrelated criminal case); United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724,

732 (9th Cir. 1990). The jury was clearly well-informed of the problems with Mr. Jones’

testimony and the withheld evidence would have done little to “cast [Mr. Jones] in a significantly

worse light.” Williams, 384 F.3d at 599 (quoting Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 1013

(C.D.Cal.1998)). Their lack of knowledge about any suspected involvement Mr. Jones had in an

unrelated crime does nothing to undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. 

Furthermore, there existed substantial corroboration for many of the key elements

of Mr. Jones’ testimony. Hovey, 458 F.3d at 920 (noting that corroborating testimony rendered

the withheld impeachment evidence immaterial); but see Silva, 416 F.3d at 980 (holding

withheld impeachment evidence material where, among other factors, witness was the only

witness who provided information about how murder took place and identified petitioner as the

killer). Arlene Hobbs, Mr. Jones’ mother, confirmed that Petitioner knocked on her door and

that Petitioner asked her son if he would drive Petitioner to West Sacramento. (RT 539-40.)

Several witnesses confirmed Mr. Jones’ statements about Petitioner’s emotional state upon his

release from Sacramento County jail on August 15, 1997. (Testimony of Aaron Johnson at RT

242; testimony of Ms. Hobbs at RT 541, 562; testimony of Ravinesh Singh at RT 595; testimony

of Audrey Celest Taylor at 1323, 1324.) As it concerned the return of Petitioner’s gun, multiple

witnesses confirmed the key details in Mr. Jones’ statement about the exchange between Mr.

Johnson and Petitioner. (Testimony of Mr. Johnson at RT 239; testimony of Ms. Hobbs at RT

555; testimony of Mr. Singh at RT 597.) In addition, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Singh testified about

Petitioner getting into Mr. Jones’ car with Mr. Singh immediately after receiving his gun. (RT

240, 599). Officer Bruce Wanner described seeing Petitioner leaving the scene of the murder

with two others behind him, both of whom fit the description of Petitioner. (RT 766-67.) 

Mr. Singh provides the greatest corroboration for Mr. Jones’ testimony. While

Petitioner elicited significant impeachment evidence about Mr. Singh, it is undeniable that Mr.

Singh’s testimony confirmed many of the details described by Mr. Jones. Both witnesses

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testified consistently about their drive to West Sacramento and Petitioner’s motivation for

making the trip, (RT 599-602, 604, 639, 665); about Petitioner’s leadership of the trip to West

Sacramento, directing where to park and stating that he wanted both Mr. Jones and Mr. Singh to

accompany him while he confronted the deceased, (RT 602, 604-05, 639, 665-66); about their

encounter with the victim immediately prior to the shooting, (RT 612-15); about the

confrontation between Petitioner and the victim, consistently describing it as lasting no longer

than 30 seconds, (RT 616-17, 623); and about the flight from the murder scene following the

shooting, (RT 626-30). Most importantly, both Mr. Singh and Mr. Jones stated without

equivocation that they saw Petitioner shoot the victim. (RT 617, 623.) 

There was also physical evidence linking Petitioner to the crime. See Strickler,

527 U.S. at 293 (finding the “considerable forensic and other physical evidence linking petitioner

to the crime” as one reason to deny habeas petition based upon Brady claim). The murder

weapon was identified as Petitioner’s. (RT 239, 1459.) Petitioner’s fingerprint was found on

the magazine inside the murder weapon. (RT 1089-90.) A substance consistent with gunshot

residue was recovered from Petitioner’s hand. (RT 1138-40.) Each of these objective factors

supports Mr. Jones’ recollection of events and argues against the materiality of the withheld

evidence.

There is compelling evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. See Morris, 447 F.3d at 741

(holding that evidence of guilt influenced the materiality of withheld evidence). The statements

of Mr. Jones, corroborated by additional testimony from other witnesses, as well as physical

evidence recovered from the murder scene, demonstrates that the withheld evidence was not

material. Given the evidence at trial, as well as the preliminary nature of the withheld

investigation, the absence of any connection between the withheld evidence and the crime at

issue in this case, and the fact that at the time of the trial, no indictment was pending, nor has any

indictment issued, it is difficult to see how the withheld information about Mr. Jones can be

considered material. See United States v. Steinberg, 99 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1996), disapproved

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on other grounds, (finding habeas violation when government withheld information about

criminal activity by witness that occurred at the time he witnessed the events to which he

testified). The state’s failure to reveal their investigative suspicions about Mr. Jones’

involvement in an unrelated crime does not implicate this verdict. The court finds that denial of

Petitioner’s claim by the state court is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

federal law.

D. Direction by Court to Continue Deliberations Following Declaration that Jury Was

Deadlocked 

Petitioner’s third claim is that the trial judge improperly directed jurors to

continue deliberations after eight of nine polled jurors indicated that further deliberations would

be fruitless.

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision on Petitioner’s direct

appeal by the Court of Appeal for the State of California, Third Appellate District. The state

appellate court rejected this claim on the ground that:

A jury cannot be discharged unless “it satisfactorily appears that

there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree.” ([Penal

Code] § 1140.) The determination whether there is a reasonable

probability of agreement rests with the sound discretion of the trial

court. (People v. Neufer (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 244, 254.) In the

present case, the court was well within its considerable discretion

in determining that after only three days of deliberation, part of

which was spent rehearing testimony, and with one juror stating

that further deliberations might be helpful, a reasonable possibility

of agreement still existed.

The court must, however, exercise its power without coercing the

jury. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 539.) In the present

case the court did not know what part of the split vote favored

guilt, and the court did not put any pressure on the minority to

change its vote. The court did not tell the jury that it could not

come back without a verdict. (See People v. Pride (1992) 3

Cal.4th 195, 265.) Rather, it instructed the jurors to come back

with a verdict or a note that a verdict could not be reached. There

were no coercive remarks. In fact, the court phrased its comments

to the jury in the form of a request, saying, “I am going to ask you

to deliberate further[,]” and “I’ll ask you to go with the bailiff....” 

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The Court of Appeal’s failure to cite to the Supreme Court does not indicate that their 2

opinion is contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Court’s precedent. See Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002). Rather, what is required

from the state courts is concurrence with the reasoning and result of the Supreme Court’s

decisions. Id. (“Avoiding these pitfalls does not require citation of our cases – indeed, it does not

even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them.”) The California Court of Appeal decision meets that standard.

12

 (Emphasis added [in slip opinion].) The record does not establish

jury coercion.

(People v. Hinton, slip op. at 4-5.)2

A jury verdict requires unanimity. Upon a signal from the jury that an impasse

has been reached, a judge may properly charge the jury to resume deliberations. Allen v. United

States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). The propriety of this supplemental

charge must be judged “in its context and under all the circumstances.” Jenkins v. United States,

380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 1060, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965). These adjudicative norms are

clearly established because the Supreme Court has “set forth a working constitutional standard by

which to evaluate [the claim at issue.]” Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001). The

result is a fact-intensive inquiry into the extent of any coercive statements made by the trial

judge. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002). The facts in this case, cited by the

Court of Appeal, show no basis for relief. 

The jury received this case on Thursday, May 21, 1998, more than five weeks

after jury selection began and following 12 days of testimony, argument, and instructions. At 4

p.m. that day, the jury asked for four things; a list of exhibits, clarification of the meaning of the

word “connect” as it is used in the accomplice instruction found at section 3.12 of the California

Jury Instructions (CALJIC), a review of the stipulations made in the case, and a reading of the

testimony of Officer Wanner. (RT 1536-40.) Following discussion with counsel and the jury,

the judge explained on Friday, May 22, 1998, that he and his staff were preparing the requested

materials and would provide them as soon as they were ready. (RT 1540.) The judge sent the 

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jury to deliberate while those preparations were made and dismissed them following the lunch

recess. (RT 1540, 1542.) 

Due to a holiday on Monday, May 25, 1998, the jury resumed deliberations on

Tuesday, May 26, 1998. On that day, the foreperson of the jury sent a note to the judge

indicating that the jurors were unable to come to a unanimous decision. (RT 1544.) According

to the note, the jurors felt “that further deliberations would be futile.” Id. In response, the judge

questioned the foreperson of the jury, asking if further deliberations might resolve the impasse,

(“no,” RT 1545), how many votes had been taken (“three,” id.), and if there was anything that

might assist the jury in reaching a verdict (“no,” id.). In addition, the judge asked for the vote

total in the last vote taken, (“nine-three,” id.), specifically admonishing the foreperson not to

reveal the direction of the vote. 

The judge then polled the jury in an attempt to learn if “further deliberations could

lead to a verdict in this case.” (RT 1546.) In addition to the foreperson, seven other jurors said

that further deliberation would not be helpful. (RT 1546-47.) However, juror number 9

answered that further deliberation would assist. (RT 1547-48.) As a result, the judge ordered the

jury to continue deliberations. (RT 1548.)

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based upon the eight “no” responses. (RT

1549.) The judge ordered argument on the issue following the lunch recess; however, no

argument appears in the record. On the morning of Thursday, May 28, 1998, the jury found

Petitioner guilty of murder in the second degree and guilty of having personally used a firearm

within the meaning of Penal Code Section 12022.5(a). 

When examined in the context of this trial, the Court of Appeal correctly found

the trial judge’s instruction not to be coercive and his denial of Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial

proper. At the time of their declared impasse, jurors had deliberated for no more than three days,

with a significant part of the time spent hearing 70 pages of Officer Wanner’s testimony. Given

that this case had 26 prosecution witnesses and nine defense witnesses, dozens of admitted pieces

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of evidence, and spanned 12 days over the course of five weeks, the judge’s single instruction to

continue the relatively short deliberation was not unreasonable. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484

U.S. 231, 238 (1988)(noting that one of the purposes of the Allen charge is to avoid the societal

cost of retrial); but see Jimenez v. Myers, 40 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 1993). The fact that jurors

considered this extensive evidence for the next two days indicates that reasoned deliberations led

to the breakthrough as opposed to judicial coercion. See United States v. Lorenzo, 43 F.3d 1303,

1307 (9th Cir. 1995)(holding there was no coercion when the jury deliberated an additional five

and a half hours following an Allen charge); see also United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 766

(9th Cir. 1980)(holding that three hours of additional deliberation indicated that the Allen charge

was not coercive). 

Furthermore, the judge avoided acquiring any information about the direction of

the vote, learning only that the last vote had been nine to three, but knowing nothing about the

identities of those in the minority. See Lorenzo, 43 F.3d at 1307 (upholding Allen charge where

the judge knew nothing about the identity of the hold-out or whether the majority sought to

acquit or convict); but see United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984)(finding that

judge’s polling of jury and awareness of the identity of hold-out was impermissible coercion). 

The Court has held that it is improper for the trial judge in a federal trial to inquire as to the

numerical division of a deadlocked jury. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 449-50, 47

S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926). “If a trial judge inquires into the numerical division of a jury and

then gives an Allen charge, the charge is per se coercive and requires reversal.” United States v.

Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1992). However, such a rule does not implicate any

constitutional considerations relevant to a habeas petition because it is based upon the court’s

supervisory power over proceedings in the federal courts, rather than its constitutional power

over both federal and state courts. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2004). As such,

this prohibition cannot be considered “clearly established.” See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10,

123 S.Ct. 362, 366, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002)(holding that application of United States v. Gypsum

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Co., 438 U.S. 422, 462, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2884, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978), in habeas petitions cannot

be considered “clearly established” as it did not interpret any provision of the Constitution, but

rather, relied upon the supervisory power of the court over federal prosecutions)). 

It is true that the trial judge did not admonish jurors that they should not

“surrender conscientiously held beliefs simply to secure a verdict for either party.” U.S. v.

Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1981). However, there is no requirement under the

Court’s jurisprudence for such a statement from the bench. As a result, it can hardly be

considered clearly established under § 2254(d). See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 241 (upholding

lower courts ruling that the combination of polling the jury and issuing a supplemental

instruction was not coercive). Given the circumstances in this case, the Court of Appeal’s belief

that one juror with doubt was sufficient to warrant further deliberation was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of federal law. See Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 407 (9th

Cir. 1983)(refusing to apply Brasfield to habeas petition brought by state prisoner because,

among other factors, the jury polling was not coercive, did not inquire into how jurors were

voting, and did not implore the jury to reach any decision). The court finds that habeas relief is

not warranted because there is nothing to indicate that the California Court of Appeal’s

determination was objectively unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). 

For the foregoing reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 29, 2006.

13/habeas

Hinton.1174.F&R.wpd

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