Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01830/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01830-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

2

 The State claims that under Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing

Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section § 2254, the proper respondent is

A.P. Kane, the warden at the Correctional Training Facility where

Petitioner is incarcerated. (Answer at note 2, citing Stanley v.

California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding

that the warden where petitioner is incarcerated is the proper

respondent).) In its October 26, 2006 Order, the Court noted that

it was the State's practice in prisoner petitions challenging

parole decisions to designate James Davis, the Chairman of the

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY SMITH,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, Warden,

JAMES DAVIS, Chairman,

Board of Parole Hearings,

Respondents. /

No. C 06-1830 CW (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Gary Smith, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging as a violation of his constitutional rights the denial

of parole by the California Board of Parole Hearings (Board).1

 

Respondents have filed an answer.2 Petitioner has filed a

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Board of Parole Hearings as the proper Respondent. Accordingly,

the Court substituted him as Respondent. The Court directs the

Clerk of the Court to include Kane and Davis as Respondents in this

action. 

2

traverse. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

At Petitioner's initial parole suitability hearing on July 31,

2003, the Board considered the following information, derived from

the Los Angeles County Probation Officer's Report, about the murder

of Mauritious Shaw:

On May 10, 1985 at about 9:00 p.m., a car

pulled up in front of a liquor store located on 

106th Street and Normandie Avenue in Los

Angeles where . . . Shaw, accompanied by two of

his relatives, was walking out. Smith got out

of the car holding a handgun, spoke to Shaw,

and then fired about five shots at him hitting

him several times. Smith left the scene. Shaw

was taken to the hospital where he died shortly

thereafter. 

Smith denied any involvement in this case. The

Los Angeles Sheriff's Department investigating

-- investigating officer, however, describes

Smith as cold-blooded killer who was dealing in

rock cocaine, and believed that the murder was

an act of revenge against Shaw who had ripped

Smith off. The probation officer's report, in

his evaluation of the report, page nine, stated

that Smith sought out Shaw, burglarized [sic]

his murderous intentions, and then shot Shaw in

a public place in view of witnesses. 

Smith, known in the community as a rock cocaine

dealer, felt that he had been wronged, and used

this act not only as a means of seeking

revenge, but also as a warning (inaudible) the

community that he would not tolerate any

impertinence in his illegal activities.

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(Resp't Ex. 2, Initial Parole Suitability Hearing Transcript at 9-

10.)

Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-seven years to life in

prison with the possibility of parole for his 1986 conviction for

one count of first degree murder, plus a firearm enhancement. 

(Resp't Ex. 1, Abstract of Judgment at 1.) He started serving his

sentence on September 10, 1986, and his minimum eligible parole

date was May 28, 2004. (Resp't Ex. 2 at 1.)

Since his incarceration, Petitioner has had a primarily

positive record. His only disciplinary infraction was a rules

violation report (CDC-115) on November 16, 1995 for a Division "F"

offense for disrupting and delaying institutional count. (Id. at

31.) He received five disciplinary memos (CDC-128) while

incarcerated, including for disobeying orders, making unauthorized

telephone calls, refusing to perform duties, and displaying

offensive materials. (Id. at 49-50.) He completed a personal

growth seminar with a Catholic chaplain in June, 1995, the Life

Skills Group program on July 1, 1998, and an Anger Management

course on February 20, 2002. (Id. at 30.)

While incarcerated, Petitioner also completed various

vocational courses in air conditioning, refrigeration and welding. 

(Id. at 26-27.) Petitioner worked in culinary maintenance from

1997 to 1998 and received above average and exceptional ratings in

that assignment. (Id. at 27.) At the time of the initial parole

suitability hearing, Petitioner was working as a warehouse clerk. 

(Id. at 29.)

Petitioner was represented by counsel at his initial parole

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suitability hearing. (Id. at 2.) In addition to Petitioner's

prison record, the Board considered his prior criminal record. 

Petitioner had been arrested multiple times for grand theft, but he

was not convicted of any charges stemming from these arrests. (Id.

at 18-19, 49.) He had also been arrested for possession and sales

of a controlled substance, but the charge was dismissed for lack of

evidence. (Id. at 19.) Prior to his 1986 conviction, Petitioner

had graduated from high school and attended a junior college. (Id.

at 21.) The Board noted that he "subsequently became involved in

the selling of drugs (inaudible) results of peer pressure and of

his materialistic goals." (Id.) 

The Board considered a report by Petitioner's correctional

counselor. Upon considering Petitioner's commitment offense, prior

record and positive prison adjustment over time, the counselor

found that Petitioner would pose a low degree of threat to society

only if he remained drug and alcohol-free and if he stayed away

from the community drug culture. (Id. at 33.)

Petitioner's 2003 mental health evaluation stated that he had

"genuinely reformed himself over the years with the help of

vocational training, as well as his religious commitment over the

last five years" and that "his violence potential is estimated to

be no higher than the average citizen in the community." (Resp't

Ex. 5, Psychological Evaluation at 4.) The evaluation took into

account Petitioner's lack of any prior arrests for violent

behavior, and the lack of evidence of any violent behavior since he

committed the commitment offense. (Id.) 

The Board also considered a letter from Petitioner's mother,

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Anna Smith, who said that he would be welcome to stay with her in

Los Angeles if he was granted parole. The letter stated, in part,

"I intend to provide any housing and or transportation needed by

Gary to assist him in getting on his feet." (Resp't Ex. 2 at 37.) 

Further, the Board noted that Petitioner's two sisters, Peggy Webb

and Sharon Pointer, also offered Petitioner a place to reside if

released on parole. (Id. at 36-37.) Petitioner's father, Ernest

Smith, Sr., offered to assist Petitioner financially because

Petitioner did not have any job offers in the Los Angeles area. 

(Id. at 37.)

Finally, the Board considered the Los Angeles County District

Attorney's Office opposition to Petitioner's parole. (Id. at 41-

42.) The Deputy District Attorney pointed out that Petitioner

denied under oath any involvement in Shaw's murder:

It is bad enough when you take someone's life in cold

blood, and then to try to get away with it by deceiving

and misleading the jury and trying to walk out the door

free (inaudible). So, I think it's a double (inaudible)

that he is not only taking a human life and all the

tragedy that goes with that and the manner that it

occurred, but also trying to get away with it and beating

the system. . . .

(Id. at 41.) 

After a brief deliberation, the Board concluded that

Petitioner was not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety

if released. (Id. at 48.) The Board issued a four-year denial of

parole. (Id. at 51.) In support of its decision, the Board stated

that the commitment offense "was carried out in an especially cruel

and callous manner" and noted that the motive for the crime "was

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inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the offense." (Id.

at 49.) Further, the Board found that Petitioner had a previous

record which "escalated to the pattern of being a drug dealer" and

that he had not sufficiently "participated in beneficial self-help

and therapy." (Id.) Although the Board did commend Petitioner for

having received only one disciplinary infraction, for learning

various vocational trades, and for participating in self-help

programming, the Board found Petitioner's gains were recent and

that he must demonstrate "the ability to maintain those gains for

an extended period of time." (Id. at 50-51.) The Board also found

that it was not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted

at a hearing during the next four years. (Id. at 51.) In the

interim, the Board directed Petitioner to remain disciplinary-free

and to continue to "upgrade vocationally, educationally, as well

as . . . to participate in beneficial self-help programming." (Id.

at 52.) 

On December 21, 2004, Petitioner filed in Los Angeles County

Superior Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging

the Board's decision. (Resp't Ex. 4, Dec. 21, 2004 Los Angeles

County Superior Court Order at 1.) In a reasoned opinion, the

court denied the petition, finding that some evidence supported the

Board's denial of parole. (Id.) However, it held that no evidence

supported the Board's findings that Petitioner is unsuitable for

parole because of his prior criminal history, his unstable social

history, or his failure to demonstrate a positive change in his

conduct. (Id. at 1-2.) The court found that the Board's denial of

parole was justified in that the "commitment offense was especially

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cruel in that it was carried out in a manner which demonstrated an

exceptionally insensitive disregard for human suffering, was

dispassionate and calculated, and that the motive was inexplicable

or very trivial," and that Petitioner "failed to participate

sufficiently in beneficial self-help programming and still needs

therapy in order to understand the factors which lead him into a

lifestyle of drug dealing and murder." (Id. at 2.) Further, the

court rejected Petitioner's argument that the Board did not

properly consider the mandates of California Penal Code § 3041. 

(Id.) The court found that the proportionality requirement of

§ 3041(a) does not apply until Petitioner is found suitable for

parole. (Id. at 2-3.) The court noted that the Board acknowledged

Petitioner's institutional gains but found that the positive

aspects did not outweigh the indications of unsuitability and that

Petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or

a threat to public safety if released from prison. (Id. at 3.) 

Therefore, the court found the Board did not abuse its discretion

by denying Petitioner's parole. (Id.) 

After the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme

Court issued summary denials, Petitioner brought a federal habeas

petition in this Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge

to a state parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is

contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

2002). 

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Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief

unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of

the state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Respondents concede that Petitioner has exhausted his state

remedies by filing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. Where, as here, the highest state court

to reach the merits issued a summary opinion which does not

explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under

§ 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits.

Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In

this case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner's claim is the opinion of the Los Angeles County

Superior Court. 

DISCUSSION

I. Due Process Claim

Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated

by the Board's decision to deny parole because that decision was

not supported by "some evidence." (Pet. at 4(a).) Petitioner's

claim fails.

Because California prisoners have a constitutionally

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protected liberty interest in release on parole, they cannot be

denied a parole date without the procedural protections necessary

to satisfy due process. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902. A parole

board's decision must be supported by "some evidence" to satisfy

the requirements of due process. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 455 (1985); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Morales v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir.

1994), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). The evidence

underlying the board's decision must have some indicia of

reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd.

of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In denying Petitioner's request for parole, the Board first

opined that the commitment offense demonstrated that Petitioner

displayed an "exceptionally insensitive disregard for human

suffering." (Resp't Ex. 2 at 48.) The Board noted that

Petitioner murdered Shaw in a dispassionate and calculated manner

and that the motive for the crime was trivial in relationship to

the offense. The Board stated:

The prisoner pulled up in a car, and the victim -- spoke

to the victim while holding a handgun, and then fired

some five shots at the victim striking him numerous

times. The prisoner left the scene . . . . The victim

had taken -- ripped off the prisoner of his illicit drug

business (inaudible) cocaine. These conclusions are

drawn from the Statement of Facts wherein the prisoner

caused the demise of Mr. Shaw as he shot him some

multiple times (inaudible).

(Id. at 48-49.) 

The Board also cited Petitioner's escalating pattern of

arrests prior to his conviction for the commitment offense. (Id.

at 49.) However, the Board acknowledged that Petitioner was not

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convicted of any of those previous arrests. (Id.)

Additionally, the Board cited Petitioner's unstable social

history and need for more self-help programming before release. 

(Id. at 49.) The Board noted that Petitioner had failed to

demonstrate evidence of a positive change while incarcerated

because of his six instances of misconduct, including one CDC-115

and five CDC-128s. (Id.) The Board was pleased that Petitioner

completed various vocational programs and participated in personal

self-help programming. (Id.) However, the Board noted that the

positive aspects of Petitioner's profile were relatively recent

and stressed the importance of continuing to "participate in

beneficial self-help programming so he can better understand . . .

the drug lifestyle that caused [him] to take another human being's

life." (Id. at 50-52.) 

Petitioner argues that the Board's finding that the nature of

his offense outweighed the positive aspects of his profile was not

supported by the evidence. He relies on Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit found that parole denial based

solely on the gravity of the commitment offense can initially

satisfy due process requirements, and that the "some evidence"

standard could be satisfied by the Board's consideration of the

gravity of the offense. However, in dicta, the Biggs court held

that courts may also consider the parole board's decision-making

process over time: "The Parole Board's decision is one of

'equity' and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the

factors considered . . . . A continued reliance in the future on

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an unchanging factor . . . runs contrary to the rehabilitative

goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation." Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

Nevertheless, the Board's decision at issue here does not

constitute a due process violation. Although the Ninth Circuit

has stated that, over time, continuous denial of parole based on

the commitment offense could result in denial of due process, see

id. at 916-17, it has not specified the number of denials or the

length of time served beyond the minimum sentence that would

constitute a due process violation. Petitioner has only been

denied parole by the Board once; this was his initial parole

suitability hearing. District courts which have granted habeas

petitions challenging the Board's decisions addressed situations

involving more denials of parole than in the instant case. See

e.g., Irons v. Carey, 358 F. Supp. 2d 936, 947 (E.D. Cal. 2005)

(finding due process violation in denial of parole at fifth parole

suitability hearing after petitioner had served sixteen years of a

seventeen-years-to-life sentence for second degree murder with a

two-year enhancement for use of firearm where all factors

indicated suitability for parole), rev'd, 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir.

2007) (given the egregiousness of the commitment offense, due

process not violated when Board deemed petitioner unsuitable for

parole prior to expiration of his minimum term); Johnson v. Finn,

2006 WL 195159, *12 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (finding due process

violation in denial of parole at twelfth parole suitability

hearing after petitioner had served twenty-four years of sentence

of life with the possibility of parole for first degree murder

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where all factors indicated suitability for parole). The Ninth

Circuit has recently reversed a district court's habeas denial

upon finding a due process violation based on the governor's

reliance on the "unchanging factor" of the gravity of the

commitment offense to reverse the Board's grant of parole. See

Hayward v. Marshall, No. 06-55392, slip op. 35, 56 (9th Cir. Jan.

3, 2008). The Board had granted parole at the petitioner's

eleventh parole suitability hearing after he had served twentyseven years of a fifteen-years-to-life sentence for second degree

murder. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the governor's decision

was not supported by any evidence that the petitioner's release

would threaten public safety. Id.

The Board here relied on more than the single "unchanging

factor" of Petitioner's commitment offense in denying him parole. 

Although the cruel nature of Petitioner's commitment offense

weighed heavily in the Board's determination, his "history of

unstable and tumultuous relationships with others" also counseled

against parole. (Resp't Ex. 2 at 49.) The motive for the crime,

Petitioner's participation in drug dealing, was trivial. (Id.) 

His misconduct while incarcerated also failed to demonstrate

evidence of positive change. (Id.) Petitioner's relatively

recent participation in beneficial self-help programming led the

Board to conclude that Petitioner "must demonstrate the ability to

maintain those gains for an extended period of time." (Id. at

50.) The conclusion that he needed more exposure to self-help

programming contributes to "some evidence" for denying him parole. 

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The Ninth Circuit's evolving guidance in Biggs, Sass, Irons,

and Hayward suggests that the Board can continue to evaluate

static factors, including the nature of the commitment offense and

pre-conviction criminality, in deciding whether to grant parole. 

See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. The weight to be attributed to those

immutable events, however, should decrease as a predictor of

future dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner

demonstrates favorable behavior. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17;

Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. Should Petitioner continue to follow the

Board's advice by attending self-help programming and maintaining

a positive disciplinary record, continued parole denials based on

Petitioner's commitment offense alone could eventually give rise

to a due process violation. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

The Los Angeles County Superior Court concluded that the

record contained "some evidence" to support the Board's finding

that Petitioner is unsuitable for parole. (Resp't Ex. 4, Los

Angeles County Superior Court Order at 1.) The California state

courts' denial of Petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, controlling federal law, nor based on

an unreasonable determination of facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief, and his due

process claim is DENIED.

II. Apprendi Claim

Petitioner further asserts that his due process rights were

violated by the Board's decision to deny parole because that

decision was based on factors not specifically found by a jury. 

(Pet. at 6(a).) Petitioner's claim is without merit. 

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The United States Supreme Court has ruled that "[o]ther than

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000). For example,

an allegation that a criminal defendant personally used a firearm

in the commission of the underlying offense may not be adjudicated

by a judge alone where doing so could alter the maximum penalty of

the crime committed. Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 773 (9th Cir.

2001) (additional fact found by trial judge was an element that

transformed the offense for which petitioner was charged and

convicted into a different, more serious offense that exposed him

to greater and additional punishment). 

However, Apprendi does not apply here because the statutory

maximum for first degree murder in California is an indeterminate

life sentence. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 182, 190(a). Accordingly,

because the decision to deny parole neither increases the maximum

penalty for first degree murder nor Petitioner's sentence, his

Apprendi claim is DENIED.

III. State Law Claims

Finally, Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to a set

parole date under the Board's regulations and under the California

Penal Code requirement that the Board set uniform terms. However,

Petitioner supports his argument only with state statutes and case

law. "In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

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3 On April 18, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for the Court

to take judicial notice of Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856

(2007), holding that California's determinate sentencing law

violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed the sentencing

court to impose an elevated sentence based on aggravating facts

that it found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at

860, 870-71. Petitioner claims that "the same Sixth Amendment

principles applies [sic] to indeterminate sentenced prisoners where

aggravation such as special circumstances was assessed to the

offense without any facts established by a jury." This claim is

unexhausted. Even if his claim was exhausted, it lacks merit

because Cunningham does not apply retroactively on habeas review to

Petitioner's 1986 conviction and sentence at issue here. Unlike

the instant case, Cunningham was a decision on direct review. 

Because Cunningham relied heavily on the new procedural rule

announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 298 (2004), several

district courts in this circuit have held that Cunningham does not

apply retroactively to convictions that were final prior to its

publication. Rosales v. Horel, 2007 WL 1852186, at *2-3 (S.D.

Cal.); see also Fennen v. Nakayema, 2007 WL 1742339, at *6 (E.D.

Cal.) (if Blakely is not retroactive on collateral review, then

there is no reason to find Cunningham would be retroactively

applied to cases which have already become final). Therefore,

Petitioner's motion (docket no. 6) is DENIED. 

P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.06\Smith1830.denyHC.wpd 15

67 (1991). Federal habeas relief is not available for violations

of state law or for alleged errors in the interpretation or

application of state law. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner's state

law claims are DISMISSED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED.3 

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all

pending motions, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/23/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.06\Smith1830.denyHC.wpd 16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY SMITH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

A.P. KANE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-01830 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on January 23, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Gary Smith D-39109

P.O. Box 689 (Z)246up

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Jessica N. Blonien

Attorney General’s Office

for the State of California

1300 I Street, Suite 125

P.O. Box 944255

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

Dated: January 23, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-01830-CW Document 8 Filed 01/23/08 Page 16 of 16