Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04927/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04927-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM SNYDER and JADE SANTORO,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

EARL SANDERS, ALEX FAGAN, SR.,

GREG CORRALES, JOHN SYME, DAVID

ROBINSON and DOES 1 through 20,

inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 03-04927 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE AND

QUESTIONS RE DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON DECEMBER 16, 2005 AT 9:00 A.M.:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ papers and, thus, does not wish to hear the parties

reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to rely on authorities not

cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing counsel of these

authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at the hearing. If

the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the citations to the

authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-3(d). The

parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance on such authority.

The Court tentatively GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Case 3:03-cv-04927-JSW Document 277 Filed 12/15/05 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The parties shall have 25 minutes to address the following questions:

1. How do Plaintiffs distinguish the facts and holding in Van Ort v. Stanewich, 92

F.3d 831, 835-37 (9th Cir. 1996)? Is the fact that the alleged affirmative act at

issue in that case was inadequate hiring, training or supervision as opposed to the

alleged affirmative act in this case (failure to discipline) significant in the

causation analysis?

2. What specific, admissible evidence is there in the record before this Court

indicating that the County had a custom or practice of failing to discipline its

officers for misconduct? The Court is cognizant that post-incident conduct is

uniformly considered probative evidence of policy or custom. See, e.g, Larez v.

City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645 (9th Cir. 1991); Henry v. City of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1997). However, the Court also notes that

Plaintiffs’ injury must result from a “permanent and well-settled” practice. See

Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989).

3. Ultimately, Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the necessary causal link

between the County’s policy and the Plaintiffs’ injuries. See Van Ort, 92 F.3d at

836 (holding that the policy must by the proximate cause of the injury). An

unforeseen and abnormal intervention will break the chain of causation and

shield the County from liability. However, causation is a fact-intensive inquiry. 

How can the Court decide as a matter of law that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate

that the alleged policy of enabling officers to act violently with impunity was not

the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries here?

4. On what basis do Plaintiffs contend that the opinions submitted by Bouza and

Martinelli constitute expert testimony? How do Plaintiffs respond to

Defendants’ contentions that the opinions are premised upon inadmissible

evidence and fail to create a genuine issue of material fact?

5. The basis of Plaintiffs’ contention that former Assistant Chief of Police Alex

Fagan, Sr. is individually liable is based upon their statement that he

“affirmatively acted to protect his son from discipline.” (Opp. at 21.) What

specific evidence in the record supports Plaintiffs’ statement (beside Officer

Stansberry’s Deposition, Newdorf Declaration, Ex. J at 298-300 and Scott

Declaration, Ex. E at 200-203)?

6. On what basis in the record do Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are liable under

California Civil Code Section 52.1, which requires that the employee act within

the scope of employment and interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion or

attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion? 

7. Do the parties have anything further they wish to address?

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 15, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:03-cv-04927-JSW Document 277 Filed 12/15/05 Page 2 of 2