Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00238/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00238-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 210
Nature of Suit: Land Condemnation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOUTH TAHOE PUBLIC UTILITY No. 2:02-cv-0238-MCE-JFM

DISTRICT, a public utility

entity,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

1442.92 ACRES OR LAND IN

ALPINE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA; 

F. HEISE LAND & LIVESTOCK

COMPANY, INC., a Nevada

corporation, WILLIAM WEAVER;

EDDIE R. SNYDER; CROCKETT

ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada

corporation,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present motion, Defendant Integrated Farms, LLC

(“Integrated Farms”) asks the Court to increase the amount of its

previous $5.2 million deposit of probable compensation in this

eminent domain proceeding by the difference between that amount

and the $12,659,439.00 judgment rendered, on April 28, 2006, in

accordance with the jury’s verdict following trial. 

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Case 2:02-cv-00238-MCE -JFM Document 647 Filed 08/28/06 Page 1 of 8
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All further statutory references are to the California Code 1

of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

While the District also argued that Integrated Farms’ 2

Motion was premature pending the Court’s ruling on its two posttrial motions, the District’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of

Law and its Motion to Amend the Judgment have now been decided,

making that contention moot.

2

The shortfall between the deposit made by Plaintiff South Tahoe

Public Utility District (“District”) and the judgment totals

$7,459,439.00.

Integrated Farms argues that because the District has

already obtained possession of the property in question through a

so-called “quick take” proceeding under California law,

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1255.030(a) and (c)1

require that the District’s deposit be increased commensurate

with the jury’s determination of just compensation as reflected

in its verdict and the resulting judgment. The District does not

dispute that California law governs in resolving the issue of

whether or not its deposit should be increased. Its sole

argument against Integrated Farms’ request rests with the 2

contention that under the terms of the parties’ March 7, 2003

Stipulation Regarding Order of Possession, Integrated

specifically waived its right to “challenge” the amount of the

District’s deposit pursuant to Section 1255.030 or otherwise.

Section 1255.030 provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) At any time after a deposit has been made pursuant to

this article, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff

or of any part having an interest in the property for which

the deposit was made, determine or redetermine whether the

amount deposited is the probable amount of compensation that

will be awarded in the proceeding. The motion shall be

supported with detail sufficient to indicate clearly the

basis for the motion...

...

Case 2:02-cv-00238-MCE -JFM Document 647 Filed 08/28/06 Page 2 of 8
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3

(c) If the plaintiff has taken possession of the property

and the court determines that the probable amount of

compensation exceeds the amount deposited, the court shall

order the amount deposited to be increased to the amount

determined to be the probable amount of compensation...

In providing that a court shall increase the amount of

probable compensation at any time after the deposit made by a

party in possession of property subject to eminent domain

proceedings is deemed inadequate, the statute makes such increase

mandatory upon determination, whether pre or post-judgment, that

the deposit made is less than the probable amount due the

landowner.

This conclusion is underscored by California caselaw. In

Whittier Redevelopment Agency v. Oceanic Arts, 33 Cal. App. 4th

1052 (1995), like this case, the court was faced with a plaintiff

who obtained prejudgment possession of condemned property upon

deposit of a sum ultimately found to be less than the value of

the property as determined by the jury. The landowner moved,

post-judgment, to increase the amount of probable compensation in

light of the jury’s verdict even though the plaintiff had filed a

notice of appeal. The Whittier court ordered an increase in the

deposit amount, interpreting Section 1255.030 as follows:

“We interpret the phrase “at any time” to mean exactly what

it says: at any time. There, section 1255.030, subdivisions

(a) and (c) read together not only authorize, but require,

the trial court to order a plaintiff which has obtained

prejudgment possession to increase the amount of its deposit

of probably compensation following a judgment in excess of

the amount deposited.”

Id. at 1058, emphasis in original.

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Significantly, too, another state appellate decision, Dept. 3

of Transp. v. Zivelonghi, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1045 (1986),

holds that irrespective of the provisions of Section 1255.030 the 

court has the inherent party to redetermine the amount of

probable compensation post-judgment. Hence, although Zivelonghi

found that Section 1255.030 did not apply in a post-judgment

context, the court nonetheless found adjustment of the probable

compensation deposit following a jury verdict in excess of the

deposit to be appropriate.

While agreeing with the result of Zivelonghi, the Whittier

court disagreed with Zivelonghi’s finding that Section 1255.030

only applied on a prejudgment basis, pointing to the fact as

indicated above that the statute’s terms provide for an increase

in the deposit “at any time.” Whittier, 33 Cal. App. 4th at

1058. This Court finds Whittier’s reasoning more persuasive and

determines that Section 1255.030 is applicable to the

circumstances confronted herein. Even were that not the case,

however, Zivelonghi still offers an alternative basis for

requiring an additional deposit in this instance. 

4

Whittier thereby rejected the plaintiff’s contention that

the phrase “at any time” means “at any time prior to judgment,

explaining that “[i]f the Legislature had intended to so limit

the trial court’s authority to increase the amount of the

deposit, it easily could have said so. Id. at 1058-59. Whittier

interpreted the statute as requiring an increase in the deposit

of probable compensation under circumstances akin to those

confronted in this case.3

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5

Having determined that both the terms of the statute and its

interpretation by California courts authorize, and indeed

require, this Court to increase the amount of the District’s

deposit given the jury’s determination as to the value of the

subject property (such determination is virtually undisputed by

the District), we now turn to the District’s argument that under

the terms of the Stipulation and Order Regarding Possession,

Integrated Farms nonetheless specifically waived all rights to

challenge the amount of the deposit under Section 1255.030 or

otherwise.

On or about March 7, 2003, the parties entered into a

Stipulation Regarding Order of Possession. The terms of that

agreement both permitted the District to take possession of the

property and authorized Integrated Farms (as well as the prior

owner, Heise) to withdraw the District’s probable compensation

deposit. The stipulation streamlined the pretrial process in

this eminent domain by allowing both transfer of possession and

withdrawal of the deposit without a challenge to the adequacy of

the deposit pursuant to Section 1255.030(b), which provides that

the court may order a deposit increased if the eminent domain

plaintiff has not taken possession of the property and the court

determines that the probable compensation for the property

exceeds the amount of the deposit. 

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Pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) and (2), that data includes, 4

but is not limited to, information pertinent to the date of

valuation, highest and best use, and applicable zoning of the

property, as well as the principal transactions or comparables

supporting the property’s value.

6

In permitting withdrawal of the initial $4,850,000.00

deposited by the District, the District wanted to ensure that

Integrated Farms would not then proceed to nonetheless challenge

the deposit amount through a potentially time-consuming

evaluation procedure as to the property’s probable value,

including complete appraisal data as set forth in Section

1255.030(a). Moreover, as Integrated Farms points out, it 4

wanted to both secure a release of the deposit and preserve its

resources by avoiding two separate determinations of fair market

value for the same case. Decl. of G. David Robertson, ¶ 3. 

Consequently, the Stipulation contains the following provision:

6. Heise and Integrated Farms waive any and all rights they

may have, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §

1255.030 or otherwise, to challenge the amount of the

Deposit of Probable compensation made by District.

March 7, 2003 Stipulation Regarding Order of Possession, ¶ 6,

attached as Exhibit “A” to the Decl. Of Robin L. Lewis.

The District now argues that despite the jury’s

determination of just compensation in this case, any attempt to

increase the amount of the deposit in the wake of that verdict

would constitute a “challenge” to the amount of the deposit

precluded under the terms of the Stipulation as enumerated above. 

The Court disagrees.

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7

As Integrated Farms points out, since the actual value of

just compensation has been determined by the jury, it no longer

needs to “challenge” the amount of the deposit as being an

incorrect estimate of the likely probable compensation to be

awarded by the jury. Instead, once judgment was entered in

accordance with the jury’s determination, in accordance with the

plain language of the statute (which authorizes a deposit

increase “at any time” as set forth above), Integrated needs only

to request that the deposit be increased to the actual final

value as assessed by the jury. It has done just that through the

present motion, which is not in itself a “challenge” to probable

compensation but rather a request that the deposit be increased

following a “challenge” already adjudicated through trial. 

Integrated Farms clearly did not waive its right to proceed to

trial in challenging the amount of just compensation, and the

context of the parties’ March 7, 2003 Stipulation makes it

evident that any “challenge” as encompassed by the Stipulation

necessarily related only to pretrial proceedings and not, as

here, to a post-judgment increase squaring the deposit with the

ultimate judgment. Integrated Farms did not waive its right to

bring a motion to require the District to deposit just

compensation after that amount had been determined.

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Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 5

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

8

Given all the above, Integrated Farms’ Motion for an Order

Requiring Plaintiff to Increase its Deposit of Probable

Compensation is GRANTED. The District shall deposit, in 5

accordance with the provisions of Section 1255.010, et seq., an

additional an additional $7,169,980.55 not later than sixty (60)

days following the date of this Order. That increase represents

the $7,459.439.00 difference between the District’s total deposit

of $5.2 million and the $12,659.439.00 jury verdict, less

$289,458.45, which represents remediation costs and delinquent

property taxes operating as an offset against the judgment

pursuant to the Court’s Order on the District’s Motion to Amend

Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 25, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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