Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02021/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02021-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333in Personal Injury

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18cv2021-MMA (LL) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JANE DOE, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

JEFFRIES, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No. 18cv2021-MMA (LL) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 28] 

Plaintiff Jane Doe, proceeding pro se, has filed an amended complaint against 

various Riverside County officials based on events occurring on September 13, 2017 in 

Indian Wells, California. See Doc. No. 26. Defendants Riverside County Supervisors 

Kevin Jeffries, John Tavaglione, Chuck Washington, Marion Ashley, and V. Manuel 

Perez, former Riverside County Sheriff Stanley Sniff, Jr., and Riverside District Attorney 

Michael Hestrin (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). See Doc. No. 28. To date, Plaintiff has not 

filed a response in opposition to the motion. The Court took the motion under 

submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. and Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 78(b). See Doc. No. 32. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

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18cv2021-MMA (LL) 

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BACKGROUND1

 This action arises primarily out of Plaintiff’s alleged altercation with Defendant 

Dustin Lloyd, a Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy. The relevant factual allegations are 

set forth in detail in the Court’s December 27, 2018 Order denying Deputy Lloyd’s 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against him. See Doc. No. 24. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint contains additional factual allegations against Sheriff 

Sniff, District Attorney Hestrin, and the individual members of the Riverside County 

Board of Supervisors. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants maliciously prosecuted her to “cover up” Deputy 

Lloyd’s brutality. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. According to Plaintiff, the individual members of 

the Riverside County Board of Supervisors are “aware or should be aware, that Police 

Brutality cases in Riverside County are a conspiracy between the Sheriff [sic] department 

and District Attorney’s office to cover up the misconduct and bring further harm to the 

victim.” Id. ¶ 50. Despite this knowledge, Plaintiff alleges that the Board members 

declined to settle her claims. Plaintiff further contends that former Sheriff Sniff “knew or 

should have known, that staffing a municipality with employees, including Officer Lloyd, 

who were unsupervised, undisciplined, inadequately trained and wholly unsuited to 

interact with the public would pose an excessive risk that members of the public would 

be subjected to out of control, violent, and aggressive behavior.” Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff 

alleges that District Attorney Hestrin “agreed to conspire with the ‘Sheriff Agency’ and 

accept an invalid charge against Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 57. 

 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings causes of action for malicious 

prosecution, negligence, false arrest, violations of her civil rights, and conspiracy. 

                                               

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 Because this matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all 

material allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint and must also construe the amended complaint, and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Thompson v. Davis, 

295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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LEGAL STANDARD

 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

sufficiency of the complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A 

plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The 

plausibility standard thus demands more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint “must contain allegations of 

underlying facts sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend 

itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). In reviewing a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept as true all material allegations 

in the complaint and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 

Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the 

pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. 

Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal 

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a pro se

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are 

not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. 

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported 

by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). 

DISCUSSION

 As an initial matter, this District’s Civil Local Rules provide “[i]f an opposing 

party fails to file the papers in the manner required by Civil Local Rule 7.1.e.2, that 

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failure may constitute a consent to the granting of a motion or other request for ruling by 

the court.” SD CivLR 7.1.f.3.c. The Ninth Circuit has held a district court may properly 

grant an unopposed motion to dismiss pursuant to a local rule where the local rule 

permits, but does not require, the granting of a motion for failure to respond. See 

generally, Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court has the option of 

granting Defendants’ motion based on Plaintiff’s failure to file a written response but 

declines to do so based on Plaintiff’s pro se status. 

 Turning to the merits of Defendants’ motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff once 

again fails to state a plausible claim for relief against the individual members of the 

Riverside County Board of Supervisors. Plaintiff alleges that the Board members are 

vicariously liable based on their “direct control” over the Sheriff Department’s budget 

and the “physical and environmental safety” of the citizens of Riverside County. Am. 

Compl. ¶ 49. However, “[u]nder Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for 

actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 

F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012), 

overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (2014)). 

Plaintiff also appears to bring a cause of action against the Board members, as well 

as the former Sheriff and the District Attorney, for a conspiracy to violate her civil rights. 

To state a plausible conspiracy claim, Plaintiff must allege specific actions in furtherance 

of a conspiracy, including a “meeting of the minds” to deprive her of her constitutional 

rights and an actual deprivation resulting from the alleged conspiracy. See Woodrum v. 

Woodward County, Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff includes no such 

factual allegations. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation of a conspiracy without any factual 

support fails to constitute a cognizable claim. 

 Plaintiff fails to state a plausible cause of action against former Sheriff Sniff. 

Plaintiff alleges that Sniff, in his capacity as Deputy Lloyd’s supervisor, knew about 

Lloyd’s “history of police brutality,” “incompetence on the job,” submission of “false 

police reports,” spoliation of evidence, and inadequate training. However, supervisory 

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personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their employees. 

See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). And a supervisory defendant cannot be liable 

based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. See 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 

Finally, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against District Attorney Hestrin. 

A “prosecutor is fully protected by absolute immunity when performing the traditional 

functions of an advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). This is true 

even if the district attorney acted in a “malicious or dishonest” manner. Genzler v. 

Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2005). Prosecutorial immunity extends to 

actions during both the pre-trial and post-trial phases of a case. See Demery v. 

Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff’s allegations against Hestrin 

arise out of his official functions as Riverside County District Attorney. As such, he is 

immune from suit. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and 

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against the members of the Riverside County Board of 

Supervisors, the Riverside County Sheriff, and the District Attorney. Dismissal of these 

claims is with prejudice. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to terminate this 

action as to these Defendants. This action will proceed against Defendant Dustin Lloyd 

only. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: April 25, 2019 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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