Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00306/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00306-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 38:4311 Uniformed Service Employment/Reemployment Rights Act

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JERRY LEON DEES, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:07cv306-MHT

) (WO) 

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING )

ALABAMA, LLC, and HYUNDAI )

MOTOR AMERICA, INC., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Jerry Leon Dees, Jr.,

asserts the following claims against defendants Hyundai

Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (HMMA) and Hyundai Motor

America, Inc. (HMA): termination and harassment claims

under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment

Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4334, and

outrage and conversion claims under Alabama law.

Jurisdiction over the USERRA claims is proper under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(3), and the stateCase 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 1 of 29
1. A district court "ha[s] the power to vacate the

summary judgment because a final judgment had not been

entered in the case.” In re Saffady, 524 F.3d 799 (6th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273,

1282 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also Marconi Wireless v.

United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47 (1943) (stating that the

2

law claims may be heard under supplemental jurisdiction,

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

On May 21, 2008, this court entered summary judgment

against Dees on his USERRA-termination claim and statelaw outrage claim against HMMA and on all claims against

HMA, with the result that Dees’s USERRA-harassment claim

and state-law conversion claim against HMMA were to go to

trial. Dees v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Alabama, LLC, 2008 WL

2157009 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (Thompson, J.). This case is

again before the court, this time on Dees’s and HMMA’s

motions asking the court to reconsider its summary

judgment-decision. For the following reasons, the court

will grant the reconsideration motions, vacate its entire

May 21 summary-judgment opinion and accompanying

judgment, and enter this new opinion, with a companion

judgment, in their place.1

 The court now holds that HMMA

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 2 of 29
court has the “power at any time prior to entry of its

final judgment ... to reconsider any portion of its

decision and reopen any part of the case").

3

and HMA are entitled to summary judgment on both of

Dees’s USERRA claims (retaliation and harassment) and

that both of Dees’s state-law claims (outrage and

conversion) should be dismissed with the right to refile

them in state court.

I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 3 of 29
4

II. FACTS

Dees began working at HMMA as a maintenance

technician in the Stamping Maintenance Department in

November 2005. At that time, he was also a Staff

Sergeant and Combat MP in the Alabama Army National Guard

and had previously served two tours in Iraq.

Dees’s direct supervisors at HMMA were Stamping

Maintenance Assistant Manager Greg Prater and Team Leader

Kevin Hughes. Prater and Hughes began to harass Dees

almost immediately upon learning about his military

service. Prater required that Dees provide nonexistent

military orders for Guard monthly weekend training;

forbade Dees from missing work for training; made

derogatory comments about the Guard in the presence of

Dees and other employees; and attempted to coerce Dees’s

coworkers to state, falsely, that Dees had violated

company policies and procedures. Additionally, Prater

and Hughes assigned Dees to difficult and dangerous work

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 4 of 29
5

more frequently than they did for other employees. In an

effort to stem the harassment, Dees asked the sergeant of

his Guard unit to send a letter to HMMA’s Human Resources

Department that explained the lack of monthly military

orders. The sergeant did so and also offered to confirm

Dees’s presence at the weekend trainings. Instead of

quelling the harassment, however, the sergeant’s letter

caused the harassment to escalate.

In February 2007, Production Stamping Manager Jim

Brookshire accused Dees of sleeping on the job, and a

HMMA committee terminated Dees’s employment. After his

termination, Dees recovered most of his personal items

from his locker but did not recover military pay stubs

and notes that he had made about his harassment. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. USERRA Claims

As stated, Dees has two USERRA claims: a termination

claim and a harassment claim. USERRA provides that a

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 5 of 29
6

member of the Armed Services “shall not be denied initial

employment, reemployment, retention in employment,

promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on

the basis of that membership.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). 

1. “Employer” within the meaning of USERRA

Before turning to the substance of Dees’s two USERRA

claims, it is necessary to determine whether both HMMA

and HMA may properly be sued as Dees’s “employer” or, as

the defendants argue, only HMMA may be deemed Dees’s

employer.

HMMA manufactures Hyundai automobiles, while HMA

distributes, markets, and sells Hyundai automobiles in

the United States. The parent company of both is Hyundai

Motor Company, Ltd. (HMC), which is traded on the Korean

Stock Exchange. Defs.’ Corporate/Conflict Disclosure

Statement (Doc. No. 14). 

In USERRA, “employer” means “any person, institution,

organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 6 of 29
7

for work performed or that has control over employment

opportunities, including a person, institution,

organization, or other entity to whom the employer has

delegated the performance of employment-related

responsibilities.” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(i). This

definition suggests that the statute is concerned only

with the “person, institution, organization, or other

entity” that carries out “employment-related

responsibilities,” and not with who controls the overall

enterprise. 

The entity carrying out employment-related

responsibilities was HMMA alone. The totality of the

circumstances demonstrate that HMMA is a start-up that

HMC (not HMA) is assisting in getting off the ground.

See Second Warner Decl. (Doc. No. 58), at 2. In

particular, HMMA has a number of Korean expatriates “on

loan” from HMC (including its President, Chief Operating

Officer, and Chief Financial Officer) but these persons

are employed by HMC, not HMA, and were also not on the

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 7 of 29
8

HMMA payroll. Warner Depo. (Doc. No. 69), at 12. No HMA

employees work in Alabama, id. at 27, and all members of

the committee overseeing Dees’s termination were HMMA

employees. Defs.’ Br. (Doc. No. 69), at 20. All

personnel decisions, including hiring, training, and

firing, were undertaken by HMMA’s Human Resources

Department, with no involvement by HMA. Warner Depo

(Doc. No. 69), at 24, 35; Parker Decl. (Doc. No. 69), at

2. The companies are undeniably linked, but their

relationship does not indicate that HMA handled any of

HMMA’s employment-related duties such that HMA could be

found liable under USERRA.

HMA is therefore entitled to summary judgment on both

of Dees’s USERRA claims. However, even if HMA could be

liable to Dees for a USERRA violation, Dees could still

not recover from it because, as explained next, he cannot

recover on his USERRA claims for other reasons. 

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 8 of 29
9

2. USERRA-termination claim

Dees claims HMMA and HMA terminated his employment

because of his Guard membership. As this court explained

in an earlier opinion on a discovery dispute between Dees

and the defendants, Congress enacted USERRA to encourage

“noncareer service in the uniformed services by

eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civil

careers and employment which can result from such

service” and to minimize “the disruption to the lives of

persons performing service in the uniformed services as

well as to their employers.” Dees v. Hyundai Motor Mfg.

Ala., LLC, 524 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1351 (M.D. Ala. 2007)

(Thompson, J.) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)). In the

legislative history of a predecessor statute to USERRA,

it was observed that, “[i]f these young men are essential

to our national defense, then certainly our Government

and employers have a moral obligation to see that their

economic well being is disrupted to the minimum extent

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 9 of 29
10

possible.” H.R.Rep. No. 1303, 89th Cong. (1966) (quoted

in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 561 (1981)).

USERRA prohibits discrimination in employment if the

employee’s membership in the armed services “is a

motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the

employer can prove that the action would have been taken

in the absence of such membership.” 38 U.S.C.

§ 4311(c)(1). To proceed under USERRA, Dees must show by

a preponderance of the evidence that his protected status

was a motivating factor in terminating him, although that

status need not be the sole cause as long as “it is one

of the factors that a truthful employer would list if

asked for the reasons for its decision.” Coffman v.

Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th

Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

Dees has presented evidence that Prater, his direct

supervisor, may have harbored some animus as a result of

Dees’s membership in the Guard. See, e.g., Archer Decl.

(Doc. No. 108), at ¶ 3 (“Based on my personal

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 10 of 29
11

observations, Prater wanted to get rid of Leon because of

the ongoing dispute over Leon’s Guard obligations.”);

Bomberg Decl. (Doc. No. 108), at ¶ 5 (“It looked like

Leon had a target on his back because of his Guard

obligations.”). Nevertheless, Dees has not shown that

his protected status was a motivating factor in

terminating him. Prater’s actions, taken by themselves,

could constitute circumstantial evidence from which

Prater’s discriminatory motivation could be inferred, see

Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1238, but Prater’s discrimination

cannot be imputed to HMMA and HMA, for Prater played no

role in Dees’s termination. Discriminatory remark by

non-decisionmaker is insufficient to satisfy a

plaintiff’s burden under USERRA to show employer’s

discriminatory motive. See Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon

Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir.

2007) (in USERRA case, “the remarks that [the plaintiff]

testified to were not made by those who participated in

the decision to fire him, and this does limit their

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 11 of 29
12

probativeness”); cf. Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc.,

131 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir. 1997) (in case under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17, discriminatory

remark by non-decisionmaker is insufficient to satisfy

plaintiff’s burden to show discriminatory employment

motive by employer). 

Dees emphasizes that another supervisor, John

Applegate, also harassed him on the basis of his Guard

membership; recommended his termination; and attended the

meeting of the termination committee. Again, Dees has

presented no evidence that his protected status actually

played a part in the decision to terminate him. Dees was

found sleeping by Stamping Production Manager Jim

Brookshire, and HMMA considers “intentional sleeping” to

be serious conduct meriting termination. 2d Warner Decl.

(Doc. No. 68) at ¶ 15; Employee Handbook (Doc. No. 68),

at 34. Dees’s sleeping was deemed “intentional,” rather

than accidental, because he was found in an isolated area

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 12 of 29
13

and was thought to have set up the area to avoid

detection. Importantly, it was Brookshire who reported

Dees, and the termination decision was ultimately made by

a committee. There is no evidence that either Brookshire

or the committee harbored any bias against those in the

military. Moreover, the termination proceeding was based

solely on the allegations that Dees was asleep on the

job. 2d Warner Decl. (Doc. No. 69), at ¶ 14; Clevenger

Decl. (Doc. No. 69), at ¶ 11. 

However, even if, as Dees contends, the allegations

against him were fabricated, there is no evidence

whatsoever that the termination committee was not acting

in good faith when it terminated him on the basis of

those allegations. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (regardless of truth

of allegations against the plaintiff, the inquiry is

limited to whether the decisionmakers believed the

allegations when they discharged him). And, even if Dees

could show that his military status was a motivating

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 13 of 29
14

factor in his termination, the committee would have made

the same decision without regard to Dees’s military

service, as intentional sleeping is an infraction that

merits termination. See Ontario King Investigation File

(Doc. No. 108).

HMMA and HMA are entitled to summary judgment on

Dees’s USERRA-termination claim. 

3. USERRA-harassment claim

Dees alleges that HMMA and HMA violated USERRA by

“creating an environment of harassment.” Compl. (Doc.

No. 2), at ¶¶ 20-21. 

a. Abandonment of USERRA-harassment claim

Dees, in his opposition to summary judgment,

repeatedly referred to HMMA’s “harassment,” Pl.’s Br.

(Doc. No. 107), at 2-3, 5-6, 10, 12, 17-21, but did not

specifically address HMMA and HMA’s legal argument that

a harassment claim is non-cognizable under USERRA or show

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 14 of 29
15

that his allegations are legally sufficient for a

harassment claim. HMMA and HMA now argue that this nonresponsiveness shows that Dees has abandoned his USERRAharassment claim. Defs.’ Reply Br. (Doc. No. 115), at 8-

9. The court disagrees.

HMMA and HMA correctly note that, in “opposing a

motion for summary judgment, a party may not rely on his

pleadings to avoid judgment against him. ... [G]rounds

alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary

judgment are deemed abandoned.” Resolution Trust Corp.

v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995).

There appears to be no question that a complete omission

of the claim in response to summary judgment is

sufficient for a finding of abandonment. See Wilkerson

v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001)

(claim that was included in complaint but not again

raised until the plaintiff’s supplemental reply brief is

abandoned); Robinson v. Regions Financial Corp., 242

F.Supp.2d 1070, 1075 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (Thompson, J.)

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 15 of 29
16

(where plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment

addresses discrimination with respect to only four

positions, claims with regard to the other 25 positions

in the defendant’s brief are deemed abandoned). In the

instant case, however, the omission is not total: Dees

refers to the facts of his USERRA-harassment claim

without refuting HMMA and HMA’s legal arguments. 

The frequency with which Dees mentions harassment in

his brief strongly suggests that he did not intend to

abandon the harassment claim and, indeed, underscores the

claim’s centrality to his lawsuit. Moreover, it would be

an unduly harsh punishment to deem the claim abandoned

based on Dees’s failure to make legal arguments despite

his consistent reiteration of his harassment claim.

While Dees failed to argue the question fully, he did in

fact raise it in response to summary judgment. Cf. Road

Sprinkler Fitters Local Union N. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler

Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (court may

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 16 of 29
17

dismiss as abandoned a claim “alleged in the complaint

but not even raised as a ground for summary judgment”).

b. Whether USERRA provides cause 

of action for harassment

USERRA provides that a uniformed servicemember may

not be denied “any benefit of employment.” 38 U.S.C.

§ 4311(a). The courts have not yet resolved whether

freedom from harassment properly constitutes a “benefit

of employment” under the statute. The Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has not weighed in on the question;

indeed, only a smattering of courts nationwide has done

so. Some courts considering the issue have assumed

arguendo that a cause of action for harassment exists but

determined that the plaintiff’s claimed harassment was

insufficiently severe and pervasive. Miller v. City of

Indianapolis, 281 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2002); Figueroa

Reyes v. Hosp. San Pablo del Este, 389 F.Supp.2d 205, 213

(D.P.R. 2005) (Fuste, J.). Others have based their

decisions on the existence of an anti-harassment

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 17 of 29
2. As will be discussed below, the court in Vickers

found a cause of action for harassment under USERRA, but

it also held that a plaintiff can succeed on a USERRA

harassment claim only if he can show an employment policy

prohibiting the conduct about which he is complaining.

368 F.Supp.2d at 845. 

18

employment policy, Vickers v. City of Memphis, 368

F.Supp.2d 842, 845 (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (McCalla, J.), or

the content of a consent decree, Church v. City of Reno,

168 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1999) (table), without reaching

the question of whether the statute itself supports a

harassment claim.2

 

One case to address the question squarely is Petersen

v. Department of Interior, 71 M.S.P.R. 227 (1996). In

Petersen, the plaintiff contended that he had been

harassed as a result of his prior military service.

Petersen examined the legislative history of the term

“benefit of employment” and found that Congress intended

the phrase to be interpreted expansively in order to

support veterans, id. at 236, and also noted that the

Supreme Court has broadly construed predecessor statutes.

Id. at n.8 (citing Coffy v. Rep. Steel Corp., 447 U.S.

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 18 of 29
19

191, 196 (1980) (“The statute is to be liberally

construed for the benefit of the returning veteran.”)).

Petersen then stated that, “Although the appellant’s

hostile environment claim does not clearly fall within

the term ‘benefit,’ we are persuaded that an ‘expansive

interpretation’ of that term, as intended by Congress,

leads to the conclusion that it does.” Id. at 237.

Petersen’s conclusion was bolstered by courts’ consistent

holdings that other anti-discrimination statutes lacking

anti-harassment language (including Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112) nevertheless proscribe harassment as a kind of

discrimination. Id. at 238-39. The Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has also acknowledged the prohibition on

harassment into other anti-discrimination statutes.

See., e.g., Davis v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d

1367 (11th Cir. 2000) (school district may be liable

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 19 of 29
3. At least three other courts have been similarly

persuaded by Petersen. See Maher v. City of Chicago, 406

F.Supp.2d 1006, 1023 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (Cole, M.J.)

(“Harassment on account of prior military service can be

a violation of USERRA.”); Steenken v. Campbell County,

2007 WL 837173, at *3 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (Bunning, J.)

(“Because the right to be free from a hostile work

environment, broadly construed, is a benefit of

employment, the Court ... concludes that Plaintiff’s

hostile work environment claim is cognizable under

USERRA.”). Another case, Vickers v. City of Memphis,

also adopted Peterson’s conclusion that “USERRA provides

a cause of action for harassment due to prior military

service” but also held that a plaintiff may succeed only

if an employer’s policy prohibits the conduct about which

he complains. 368 F.Supp.2d at 844. 

20

under Title IX for teacher’s sexual harassment of a

student).

The court agrees with Petersen’s logic and, in the

absence of Eleventh Circuit precedent to the contrary,

concludes that a claim for harassment on account of

military service is cognizable under USERRA.3

 Notably,

harassment is cognizable under other anti-discrimination

statutes, and USERRA is intended to be construed broadly

for the benefit of returning veterans. This conclusion

is consistent with the purpose of USERRA-–namely, to

encourage individuals to join the military by assuring

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 20 of 29
21

them that their jobs are not at risk. 38 U.S.C.

§ 4301(a)(1). An assurance that employees cannot be

fired on account of their military service is meaningless

without assurance that the work environment will not be

so intolerable that they will feel forced to quit. This

protection is especially necessary at a time when demand

for deployment of non-career servicemembers in the

National Guard and Reserves has reached an unprecedented

level; such persons now account for nearly 50% of the

active military. Konrad S. Lee, “When Johnny Comes Home

Again” Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 247,

248 (2008). 

c. Dees’s harassment claim

Having found that a harassment claim is cognizable

under USERRA, the court now turns to the viability of

Dees’s harassment claim. USERRA-harassment claims, like

those under Title VII, should be analyzed using the

principle announced by the Supreme Court in Meritor

Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986):

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 21 of 29
22

harassment is actionable when it is “sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter conditions of [the victim’s]

employment and create an abusive working environment.”

See Peterson, 71 M.S.P.R. at 239 (harassment violates

USERRA if it is “sufficiently pervasive to alter the

conditions of employment and create an abusive working

environment”); Maher, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1023 (same); see

also Baldwin v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d

1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Meritor standard in

Title VII case). Among the factors to be considered in

assessing a harassment claim are “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Allen

v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23

(1993)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Dees, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 22 of 29
23

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the court finds that Dees has

shown the existence of genuine issues of material fact as

to the hostility of his work environment that are

sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Prater, Dees’s

supervisor, made frequent derogatory comments about

Dees’s Guard service and engaged in discriminatory

behavior that went beyond mere words. By demanding that

Dees produce orders for every Guard training weekend and

insisting that he put his civilian job ahead of his

military service, Prater was implicitly threatening

Dees’s continued employment at HMMA. This behavior

occurred with some frequency, not merely on a few

isolated incidents. Furthermore, Prater unfairly overassigned Dees to more dangerous work, suggesting that he

punitively assigned Dees to work that is more physically

threatening. These allegations meet the standard for

“severe or pervasive harassment,” under both the

subjective and the objective components. See Mendoza v.

Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (en

banc). Dees subjectively perceived the harassment to be

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 23 of 29
24

severe and pervasive, and a reasonable person in his

position would agree. Id. Dees reports frequent

derogatory remarks and over-assignment to physically

threatening tasks, and Prater gave him reason to fear for

his job. In light of the totality of the circumstances,

the court finds that a reasonable jury could find that

the harassment Dees faced was sufficiently severe and

pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of his

employment. 

Furthermore, HMMA may be held liable for the

harassment, as Prater was Dees’s supervisor and HMMA has

raised no affirmative defense that it exercised

reasonable care to correct the harassment and that Dees

failed to avoid the harm. See Burlington Industries,

Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 

Nevertheless, HMMA and HMA are entitled to summary

judgment on Dees’s USERRA-harassment claim. USERRA

provides that a court may award three kinds of relief: it

may require the employer to “(A) ... comply with the

provisions of this chapter,” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d)(1), “(B)

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 24 of 29
25

... compensate the person for any loss of wages or

benefits suffered by reason of such employer’s failure to

comply with the provisions of this chapter,” id., and

“(C) ... require the employer to pay the person an amount

equal to the amount referred to in subparagraph (B) as

liquidated damages, if the court determines that the

employer's failure to comply with the provisions of this

chapter was willful.” Id. The statute further provides

that, “The court shall use, in any case in which the

court determines it is appropriate, its full equity

powers, including temporary or permanent injunctions,

temporary restraining orders, and contempt orders, to

vindicate fully the rights or benefits of persons under

this chapter.” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(e). This remedial

scheme conspicuously omits any recovery for mental

anguish, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.

See Vander Wal v. Sykes Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.Supp.2d

738, 746 (D.N.D. 2005) (Hovland, J.). 

Because Dees suffered no loss of wages or other

benefits as a result of the alleged harassment against

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 25 of 29
26

him, he would not be entitled to loss of wages or other

benefits or any commensurate liquidated damages were he

to prevail on his harassment claim. And because he is no

longer working for HMMA, an injunction requiring HMMA and

MHA “to comply with the provisions of [USERRA],” 38

U.S.C. § 4323(d)(1)(A), would be of no benefit to him.

In short, there is no relief the court can give Dees for

the harassment he may have suffered.

As a result, Dees does not meet the minimum

constitutional requirements for standing as to his

harassment claim. In order to have standing (1) “the

plaintiff must have suffered ... an invasion of a legally

protected interest resulting in a “concrete and

particularized” injury,” (2) “the injury must have been

caused by the defendant’s complained-of actions,” and (3)

“the plaintiff’s injury or threat of injury must likely

be redressible by a favorable court decision.” Fla.

State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d

1153, 1159 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Dees cannot meet

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 26 of 29
27

this third requirement because a decision in his favor

would not bring him any relief. Cf. Tanner Advertising

Group, L.L.C. v. Fayette County, 451 F.3d 777, 786 (11th

Cir. 2006) (“A request for damages that is barred as a

matter of law cannot save a case from mootness.”).

The court emphasizes that it is not saying that there

is no remedy for USERRA-prohibited harassment. If Dees

were still working for HMMA and if the fact-finder were

to find that Dees had suffered harassment as claimed,

there would be the question of whether an injunction

prohibiting HMMA and MHA from harassing him would be

appropriate. See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d)(1)(A) (“The court

may require the employer to comply with the provisions of

this chapter.”). But, because Dees is no longer working

for HMMA, the court need not reach this issue. 

B. State-Law Claims

Having determined that summary judgment should be

granted in favor of HMMA and HMA on Dees’s termination

and harassment claims under USERRA, the court now

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 27 of 29
28

considers what to do with Dees’s state-law claim for

outrage and his state-law claim for conversion of his

notes and military pay stubs. Because summary judgment

is being granted on Dees’s federal claims, this court

“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over

his state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The

language of the statute is discretionary, but case law

leans toward dismissing state-law claims in the absence

of a federal claim to tether them to federal court. See

Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)

(“This court has noted that if the federal claims are

dismissed prior to trial, [precedent] strongly encourages

or even requires dismissal of state claims.”) (internal

quotation omitted); see also Carnegie-Mellon University

v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (“when the federal-law

claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early

stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal

court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by

dismissing the case without prejudice”). The court thus

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 28 of 29
4. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the applicable

statute of limitations under state law will be tolled 30

days so as to allow Dees time to refile his state-law

claims in state court.

Dees’s state-law outrage and conversion claims. See City

of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-

73 (1997); Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998).4

* * *

In conclusion, the court will, as stated, grant the

reconsideration motions, vacate its previous summaryjudgment opinion and accompanying judgment, and enter

this new opinion, with a companion judgment, in their

place. Pursuant to this new opinion, the court will

enter summary judgment in favor of HMMA and HMA on both

of Dees’s USERRA claims (retaliation and harassment) and

will dismiss both of his state-law claims (outrage and

conversion) with the right to refile then in state court.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 25th day of March, 2009.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-00306-MHT-CSC Document 226 Filed 03/25/09 Page 29 of 29