Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01276/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES D. HAWKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN DOE , et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-01276-OWW-DLB-P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff James Reynolds (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has paid the filing fee for this action. The case

was transferred to this Court from the Sacramento Division on October 7, 2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

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exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

C. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at California Correctional Institution

(“CCI”), where plaintiff is incarcerated. Plaintiff names Sergeant W. Cribb and Lieutenant B.

Sanders as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that upon his arrival at CCI he was advised that there were

no single cell designated inmates and that he would have to “cell -up” with another inmate. When

plaintiff did not agree based on his prior single cell status, on May 9, 2005, he was placed in

administrative segregation. Plaintiff contends that as of June 5, 2005, he was still in administrative

segregation. He states that he was not interviewed or taken before a unit classification committee.

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

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interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause

itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The state does not create

protectable liberty interests by way of mandatory language in prison regulations. Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Rather, the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing

on the nature of the deprivation. Id. Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to

freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

With respect to plaintiff’s placement in Ad-Seg, the Due Process Clause itself does not confer

on inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of

Administrative Segregation, see Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68, and plaintiff does not have a statecreated liberty interest in remaining free from Ad-Seg under the circumstances described in

plaintiff’s complaint. May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due

process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within

sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted). 

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief against

defendants in that he has not alleged that he was subject to conditions imposing “atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” The court

will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

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defendant is involved. There can be no liability unless there is some affirmative link or connection

between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);

May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must file an

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 7, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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