Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17884/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17884-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM - YES ON 8,

A PROJECT OF CALIFORNIA

RENEWAL; NATIONAL

ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE

CALIFORNIA, Yes on 8, Sponsored

by National Organization for

Marriage; NATIONAL ORGANIZATION

FOR MARRIAGE CALIFORNIA PAC;

JOHN DOE #1, an individual,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DEBRA BOWEN; ROSS JOHNSON;

CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE;

KAMALA HARRIS, in her official

capacity as Attorney General of the

State of California; EUGENE

HUGUENIN, JR.; LYNN

MONTGOMERY; RONALD ROTUNDA;

ANN MILLER RAVEL, in her official

capacity as Chair of the Fair Political

Practices Commission; SEAN

ESKOVITZ, in his official capacity as

Commissioner of the Fair Political

Practices Commission;

DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS CITY

AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO;

DENNIS J. HERRERA, City Attorney

No. 11-17884

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-00058-

MCE-DAD

OPINION

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2 PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN

for the City and County of San

Francisco; DEAN C. LOGAN; JAN

SCULLY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 11, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed May 20, 2014

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Milan D. Smith, Jr.

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;

Dissent by Judge Wallace

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PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN 3

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part the district court’s summary

judgment and dismissed in part the appeal as non-justiciable

in an action challenging California’s Political Reform Act of

1974, which requires political committees to report certain

information about their contributors to the State, specifically,

semi-annual disclosures identifying those individuals who

have contributed more than $100 during or after a campaign,

in addition to each contributor’s address, occupation and

employer.

Appellants are political committees that supported the

November 2008 passage of Proposition 8, which before it was

invalidated, amended the California Constitution to provide

that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or

recognized in California. Arguing that their donors have been

harassed as a result of Political Reform Act disclosures,

appellants asserted that the Act’s $100 reporting threshold

and post-election reporting requirements were facially

unconstitutional in the context of ballot initiatives.

The panel held that Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d

800, 809–11 (9th Cir. 2012), directly precluded appellants’

challenge to the $100 threshold. The panel further held that

the government’s interest in disclosing contributions to ballot

initiative committees was not merely a pre-election interest. 

The panel therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN

with regard to appellants’ facial challenges to the postelection reporting requirements.

The panel dismissed the appeal as non-justiciable with

regard to appellants’ as-applied challenges. The panel held

that to the extent that appellants sought an injunction

requiring the State to purge records of their past disclosures,

any claim for such relief was moot given that the information

has been publicly available on the Internet and in hard copy

for nearly five years. To the extent that appellants sought a

forward-looking exemption from the Political Reform Act’s

requirements, the panel held such claim was not ripe. The

panel remanded with instructions that the district court vacate

the portion of its opinion concerning appellants’ as-applied

challenges.

Dissenting in part, Judge Wallace disagreed with the

majority’s determination that appellants’ as-applied

challenges were non-justiciable.

COUNSEL

John C. Eastman (argued), Center for Constitutional

Jurisprudence, Orange, California; James Bopp, Jr. (argued)

and Richard E. Coleson, The Bopp Law Firm, Terre Haute,

Indiana; Benjamin W. Bull, Alliance Defense Fund,

Scottsdale,Arizona; David J. Hacker, Alliance Defense Fund,

Folsom, California; Noel H. Johnson and Kaylan L. Phillips,

ActRight Legal Foundation, Plainfield, Indiana, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Mollie M. Lee (argued), Dennis J. Herrera, Therese M.

Stewart, and Jon Givner, Office of the City Attorney, San

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PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN 5

Francisco, California; Zackery P. Morazzini (argued) and

Jack Woodside, Fair Political Practices Commission,

Sacramento, California; Kamala D. Harris, Tamar Pachter,

and Daniel J. Powell, Office of the Attorney General, San

Francisco, California; Terence J. Cassidy and Kristina M.

Hall, Porter Scott, Sacramento California, for DefendantsAppellees.

Trevor Potter, J. Gerald Hebert, Paul S. Ryan, and Megan

McAllen, The Campaign Legal Center, Washington, D.C., for

Amicus Curiae The Campaign Legal Center.

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OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Appellants bring facial and as-applied challenges to

California’s Political Reform Act of 1974, Cal. Gov. Code.

§§ 81000–91014 (PRA), and seek (1) an injunction

exempting them from the PRA’s future reporting deadlines,

and (2) declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the State to

purge all records of Appellants’ past PRA disclosures. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State

of California on all counts. We affirm the district court’s

judgment with regard to Appellants’ facial challenges. We

dismiss this appeal as non-justiciable with regard to

Appellants’ as-applied challenges. And, we remand with

instructions that the district court vacate the portion of its

opinion concerning Appellants’ as-applied challenges.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The PRA requires political committees to report certain

information about their contributors to the State. Specifically,

political committees must file semi-annual disclosures,

which, among other things, identify those individuals who

have contributed more than $100 during or after a campaign,

in addition to each contributor’s address, occupation, and

employer. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 84200, 84211(f). The State of

California then publishes this information on the website of

the California Secretaryof State (the Secretary), and produces

hard copies upon request.

Appellants, to whom we refer as the Prop 8 Committees

or the Committees, are political committees that supported

the November 2008 passage of Proposition 8. That

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PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN 7

proposition amended the California Constitution to provide

that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or

recognized in California.” Cal. Const., Art. I, § 7.5.

Proposition 8 was subsequently invalidated. See

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013) (citing

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D.

Cal. 2010)).

Prior to Proposition 8’s passage, the Prop 8 Committees

submitted disclosures to comply with the PRA’s semi-annual

reporting deadlines. These disclosures were published on the

Secretary’s website, and are available in hard copy.

Following Proposition 8’s passage, the Committees initiated

this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California, challenging the constitutionality of the

PRA’s disclosure requirements both facially and as applied to

them. The Committees argued that their donors have been

harassed as a result of the Committees’ PRA disclosures, and

they sought (1) an injunction exempting them from the PRA’s

future reporting deadlines, and (2) declaratory and injunctive

relief requiring the State to purge all records of their past

PRA disclosures.

On January 30, 2009, the district court denied Appellants’

motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellants did not

appeal the district court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).

Instead, they complied with the PRA’s January 31, 2009

disclosure deadline, reporting those contributors who donated

after October 19, 2008 and before December 31, 2008. The

Secretary published these disclosures on her website, and

made them publicly available in hard copy.

1 On November 4,

 

1 Appellant “National Organization for Marriage California PAC” was

subsequently formed, and joined in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.

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2011, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of

the State on all counts. Appellants timely appealed, asking us

to reverse the judgment of the district court and to order the

State to purge all records of Appellants’ PRA disclosures.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bias v.

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007). We review

questions of justiciability de novo. Bell v. City of Boise,

709 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

I. Facial Challenges

Appellants assert that the PRA’s $100 reporting threshold

and “post-election reporting requirements” are facially

unconstitutional in the context of ballot initiatives. Our

decision in Family PAC v. McKenna directly precludes

Appellants’ challenge to the $100 threshold. 685 F.3d 800,

809–11 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that $25 and $100

contribution disclosure thresholds survive “exacting scrutiny”

in the context of ballot initiatives). Appellants’ facial

challenge to the post-election reporting requirements fails as

well.

A. Legal Standard

Contribution disclosure requirements are subject to

“exacting scrutiny.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,

366–67 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976). In

applying exacting scrutiny, we first ask whether the

challenged regulation burdens First Amendment rights. If it

does, we then assess whether there is a “substantial relation”

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PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN 9

between the burden imposed by the regulation and a

“sufficiently important” governmental interest. Citizens

United, 558 U.S. at 366–67; Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 805–06

(citing Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990,

1005 (9th Cir. 2010)).

Although disclosure is generally “a less restrictive

alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech,”

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369, contribution disclosure

requirements may burden First Amendment rights by, among

other things, deterring “individuals who would prefer to

remain anonymous from contributing,” Family PAC,

685 F.3d at 806–07 (internal quotation marks omitted). To

justify these burdens and to survive exacting scrutiny, “the

strength of the governmental interest must reflect the

seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.”

Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818

(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court recognizes three substantial

government interests that campaign contribution disclosure

requirements may serve. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68; see also

Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2819–21. First, disclosure requirements

may serve a substantial “informational interest” by providing

the electorate with information about the source of campaign

money, the individuals and interests seeking their vote, and

where a particular ballot measure or candidate falls on the

political spectrum. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67; Family PAC,

685 F.3d at 806. This interest is particularly important in the

ballot initiative context. As we explained in Family PAC:

The governmental interest in informing the

electorate about who is financing ballot

measure committees is of great importance.

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Disclosure enables the electorate to give

proper weight to different speakers and

messages . . . by providing the voting public

with the information with which to assess the

various messages vying for their attention in

the marketplace of ideas . . . . Given the

complexityof the issues and the unwillingness

of much of the electorate to independently

study the propriety of individual ballot

measures, we think being able to evaluate who

is doing the talking is of great importance

. . . . Disclosure also gives voters insight into

the actual policy ramifications of a ballot

measure. Knowing which interested parties

back or oppose a ballot measure is critical,

especially when one considers that ballotmeasure language is typically confusing, and

the long-term policy ramifications of the

ballot measure are often unknown.

Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 808–09 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted); see also Human Life of Wash. Inc.,

624 F.3d at 1006 (“[T]he high stakes of the ballot context

only amplify the crucial need to inform the electorate . . . .”).

Disclosure requirements may also help preserve the

integrity of the electoral process by deterring corruption and

the appearance of corruption. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2819;

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (explaining that disclosure

requirements deter “those who would use moneyfor improper

purposes either before or after the election”). This interest

extends generally to “promoting transparency and

accountability in the electoral process,” and those states that

allow ballot initiatives “have considerable leeway to protect

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PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN 11

the integrity and reliability of the initiative process.” Doe,

130 S. Ct. at 2819 (citations and quotations omitted).

Finally, disclosure requirements may permit accurate

record-keeping. “[D]isclosure requirements are an essential

means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of

. . . contribution limitations.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. Such

records further enhance the public’s future associational

rights by offering voters information about which policies

those seeking their vote have previously endorsed.

Both the Supreme Court and our court have rejected facial

challenges to contribution disclosure requirements in several

cases, holding that these substantial interests outweigh the

modest burdens that the challenged disclosures impose on

First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2820

(holding that a state law authorizing private parties to obtain

copies of referendum petitions is “substantially related to the

important interest of preserving the integrity of the electoral

process”); Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 805–11; Human Life of

Wash. Inc., 624 F.3d at 1013–14; Alaska Right To Life Comm.

v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2006).

B. Application

The PRA imposes reporting requirements on ballot

committees, which require them to disclose the names of, and

other identifying information about, contributors who donate

$100 or more. The PRA’s reporting deadlines are semiannual. Accordingly, donations that are made prior to an

election, but after the final pre-election reporting deadline,

are reported after the election concludes. Appellants argue

that this requirement is unconstitutional, because a state’s

only interest in disclosure is its interest in an informed

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electorate, and this interest allegedly expires with the

election’s conclusion. We reject Appellants’ narrow view of

the government’s interest in disclosure.

A state’s interests in contribution disclosure do not

necessarily end on election day. Even if a state’s interest in

disseminating accurate information to voters is lessened after

the election takes place, the state retains its interests in

accurate record-keeping, deterring fraud, and enforcing

contribution limits. As a practical matter, some lag time

between an election and disclosure of contributions that

immediately precede that election is necessary for the state to

protect these interests. In this case, for example, Appellants’

contributions surged nearly 40% (i.e., by over $12 million)

between the final pre-election reporting deadline and election

day. Absent post-election reporting requirements, California

could not account for such late-in-the-day donations. And,

without such reporting requirements, donors could undermine

the State’s interests in disclosure by donating only once the

final pre-election reporting deadline has passed. Accordingly,

we hold that the government’s interest in disclosing

contributions to ballot initiative committees is not merely a

pre-election interest, and we affirm the district court’s

judgment with regard to Appellants’ facial challenges.

II. As-Applied Challenges 

Appellants also challenge the PRA disclosure

requirements as applied to themselves.

To the extent that Appellants seek an injunction requiring

the State to purge records of their past PRA disclosures, any

claim for such relief is moot. To the extent that Appellants

seek a forward-looking exemption from California’s PRA

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requirements, such a claim is not ripe. Accordingly, we

dismiss as non-justiciable Appellants’ appeal from the district

court’s judgment rejecting their as-applied claims, and we

direct the court to vacate this portion of its opinion.

A. Mootness

Article III’s “case-or-controversy” requirement precludes

federal courts from deciding “questions that cannot affect the

rights of litigants in the case before them.” DeFunis v.

Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam) (quoting

North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)).

1. Present Controversy

a. Legal Standard

It is not enough that a case presents a live controversy

when it is filed. FEC v. Wisc. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S.

449, 461 (2007). An actual controversy must exist at all

stages of federal court proceedings. Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). This means that, at all stages of the

litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened

with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant [that is]

likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id.

(quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477

(1990)). “[T]he judicial branch loses its power to render a

decision on the merits of [a] claim,” Nome Eskimo Cmty. v.

Babbitt, 67 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1995), when a federal

court can no longer effectively remedy a “present

controversy” between the parties, Doe, 697 F.3d at 1238

(quoting Feldman v. Bomar, 518 F.3d 637, 642 (9th Cir.

2008)).

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We are unable to effectivelyremedya present controversy

between the parties where a plaintiff seeks to enjoin an

activity that has already occurred, and we cannot “undo” that

action’s allegedly harmful effects. Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d

742, 746 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los

Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Seven

Words LLC v. Network Solutions, 260 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th

Cir. 2001). For example, “once a fact is widely available to

the public, a court cannot grant ‘effective relief’ to a person

seeking to keep that fact a secret.” Doe, 697 F.3d at 1240; see

also Islamic Shura Council of S. Cal. v. FBI, 635 F.3d 1160,

1164 (9th Cir. 2011); In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022,

1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Once information is published, it

cannot be made secret again.”). For this reason, “a case

seeking to keep a document secret is moot once third parties

have control over copies of the document.” Doe, 697 F.3d at

1239 (quoting C & C Prods., Inc. v. Messick, 700 F.2d 635,

636–37 (11th Cir. 1983)). A case is similarly moot where a

plaintiff seeks to enjoin specific parties from disclosing

information that has already been published across the

Internet. Doe, 697 F.3d at 1240.

b. Application

Appellants’ request for an injunction requiring the State

to purge all records of their PRA disclosures does not present

a live controversy.

Before commencing this lawsuit, Appellants voluntarily

complied with all PRA reporting requirements, and they have

continued to do so throughout this litigation. Appellants most

recently filed PRA disclosures on January 17, 2014—more

than two years after filing this appeal. Each PRA disclosure

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PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN 15

that Appellants have submitted is published on the

Secretary’s website, and is publicly available in hard copy.

2

The record is replete with evidence that Appellants’ PRA

disclosures have been accessed and republished by third

parties. Appellants themselves provided detailed

documentation of several websites that have published their

contributors’ names, employers, and addresses. Appellants

also represent that: (1) one site allows individuals to search

for “any city and print a map graphically illustrating the

name, address, [contribution] amount, occupation, and

employer of each individual in that city who contributed to

Prop. 8”; (2) “at least two major California newspapers have

compiled searchable databases . . . that enable easy access to

look up Prop. 8 contributors”; and (3) Time Magazine

directed its readership to a website that publishes the

information contained in Appellants’ PRA disclosures.

In light of the disclosures, and their vast dissemination,

we can no longer provide Appellants with effective relief.

The information that Appellants seek to keep private has been

2 Specifically, since the PRA’s January 31, 2009 reporting deadline,

“ProtectMarriage.com - Yes on 8, a Project of California Renewal” has

made seven additional filings. There was no committee activity between

January 2009 and June 2011, but filings were made in June 2011, July

2011, January 2012, July 2012, January 2013, and July 2013. “National

Organization for Marriage California - Yes on 8, Sponsored by National

Organization for Marriage” has made two filings since the January 2009

deadline, in July 2009 and January 2010. There has been no committee

activity since January 2010. Finally, “National Organization for Marriage

California PAC” was formed subsequent to the November 2008 election,

and joined in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. It has only made one

filing, in July 2010, and its only donor was the National Organization for

Marriage. In each instance, the information filed with the Secretary of

State was posted on the Internet, and was and is available in hard copy.

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publicly available on the Internet and in hard copy for nearly

five years. Third parties already have control over this

information. Moreover, we have no way of knowing how

many individuals have: (1) viewed Appellants’ PRA

disclosures; (2) retained copies of the disclosures or their

contents; or (3) reproduced the disclosures. Accordingly, we

cannot remedy Appellants’ alleged harms, and their request

for an injunction requiring the State to purge their past PRA

disclosures does not present a live controversy.

3

3 Our dissenting colleague does not dispute that our precedent compels

this conclusion. Rather, Judge Wallace argues that Doe was wrongly

decided in light of Church of Scientology of California v. United States,

506 U.S. 9 (1992). In Church of Scientology, the Supreme Court held that

the improper disclosure of privileged audio tapes to the IRS did not moot

a claim to destroy or return those tapes. Id. at 13. But Church of

Scientology involved a finite set of tangible records that had only been

disclosed to a party to the action. Accordingly, the Court was able to

clearly identify each person who had viewed the information, and order

that each copy be returned or purged. Conversely, in this case, as in Doe,

the challenged information is in the hands of third parties over whom we

lack jurisdiction, and it has been widely available on the Internet for

several years. It is now impossible to identify how many people have

viewed this information,locate every reproduction ofthis information, and

prevent the information’s continued disclosure. As in Doe, the widespread

disclosure ofAppellants’PRAdisclosures precludes us fromproviding the

“effective relief” that the Supreme Court recognized in Church of

Scientology. We also observe that even ifJudge Wallace were correct that

Doe was wrongly decided, we would still be bound by Doe’s holding

unless and until the Supreme Court announces a “clearly irreconcilable”

rule, or our court, sitting en banc, announces an alternate rule. Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (2003) (en banc). As noted, Church of

Scientology is not “clearly irreconcilable” with Doe.

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2. Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review

We further hold that Appellants’ request for injunctive

relief does not fall within the mootness exception for cases

that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”

a. Legal Standard

As we explain above, a federal court loses its jurisdiction

to reach the merits of a claim when the court can no longer

effectively remedy a present controversy between the parties.

Doe, 697 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Feldman, 518 F.3d at 642);

Nome Eskimo Cmty., 67 F.3d at 815. There is an exception to

this rule, however, where an otherwise moot action is

“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Lewis, 494 U.S.

at 481. Under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

exception, we will decline to dismiss an otherwise moot

action if we find that: “(1) the challenged action is in its

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or

expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the

same complaining party will be subject to the same action

again.” Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 462 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

For a controversy to be “too short to be fully litigated

prior to cessation or expiration,” it must be of “inherently

limited duration.” Doe, 697 F.3d at 1240 (emphasis added).

This is so because the “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” exception is concerned not with particular lawsuits,

but with classes of cases that, absent an exception, would

always evade judicial review. Id. at 1240–41; see also

Bunker Ltd. P’ship v. United States (In re Bunker Ltd.

P’ship), 820 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[t]he exception

was designed to apply to situations where the type of injury

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18 PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM V. BOWEN

involved inherently precludes judicial review”); 13C Charles

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedures: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 3533.8.2 (3d

ed. 2013) (collecting cases). Notably, regardless of any

injunction that might issue, a woman can only obtain an

abortion so long as she remains pregnant. Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). We can only invalidate a

temporary injunction so long as that injunction remains in

effect. Carroll v. President &Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393

U.S. 175, 178–79 (1968); Enyart v. Nat’l Conference of Bar

Exam’rs, Inc., 630 F.3d 1153, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2011). And

where a purportedly invalid law inhibits a political candidate

or party’s ability to win an election, we can only remedy that

impediment before the election occurs. Norman v. Reed,

502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992). We recognize these types of

controversies as “inherently limited in duration,” because

they will only ever present a live action until a particular date,

after which the alleged injury will either cease or no longer be

redressible. The limited duration of such controversies is

clear at the action’s inception.

Actions seeking to enjoin future conduct are different.

Such actions only become moot if the challenged conduct

actually occurs and causes an injury that cannot be reversed.

These actions are not of “inherently limited duration,”

because the challenged conduct might never occur. And, a

court can ensure that a live controversy persists until the

action is fully litigated by enjoining the challenged conduct

until the litigation concludes. See Doe, 697 F.3d at 1240–41.

Because mootness concerns whether we have power to

hear a case, we apply the “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” exception sparingly, and only in “exceptional

situations.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 481. Controversies that are not

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of “inherently limited duration” do not create “exceptional

situations” justifying the rule’s application, because, even if

a particular controversy evades review, there is no risk that

future repetitions of the controversy will necessarily evade

review as well. As we have explained, “[t]he exception was

designed to apply to situations where the type of injury

involved inherently precludes judicial review, not to

situations where . . . [review is precluded as a] practical

matter.” Bunker, 820 F.2d at 311.

For this reason, where preliminary injunctive relief is

available to maintain a live controversy, it is of no

consequence to the mootness inquiry that a particular party

has failed to actually obtain such relief. “[A] party may not

profit from the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’

exception . . . where through his own failure to seek and

obtain [prompt relief] he has prevented [an] appellate court

from reviewing the trial court’s decision.” Id. at 311; see also

Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1008–09 (D.C. Cir.

2010). In such circumstances, we have no power to hear the

action, and the controversy must be resolved in a future

action presenting a live dispute. Doe, 697 F.3d at 1241; see

also Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 893 F.2d

1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party may not

invoke the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has

prevented judicial review); Bunker, 820 F.2d at 311.

Lawsuits seeking to enjoin the disclosure of sensitive

information do not fall into the mootness exception for cases

that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” because

there is no inherent limit on the duration of such

controversies. For example, in a case challenging campaign

contribution disclosure requirements, the court can maintain

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a live controversy by issuing an order that either:

(1) temporarily excuses the plaintiffs from complying with

the challenged requirements; or (2) temporarily precludes the

state from disclosing the challenged information. Doe,

697 F.3d at 1240–41. Whether a party actually obtains such

an order in a particular case does not affect our jurisdictional

inquiry. See id.

b. Application

The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception

does not apply to Appellants’ claims, because there was no

“inherent limit” on the duration of this controversy. A court

order temporarily excusing Appellants from the PRA’s

reporting deadline or enjoining the state from publicly

disclosingAppellants’ filings could have permitted the parties

to fully litigate this case on the merits. Appellants simply

failed to obtain such an order.

After the district court denied Appellants’ motion for a

temporary restraining order, Appellants did not file an

interlocutory appeal, nor did they seek an injunction pending

appeal. By the time Appellants’ claims reached us, the

information that Appellants seek to keep private had been

publicly available for nearly five years. If Appellants were to

bring a similar action in the future, their claims would not, by

their nature, again evade review, because a different litigation

strategy could maintain a live controversy until the action’s

final resolution.4

4

In concluding that this controversy is justiciable, the dissent argues that

under Enyart, the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception

considers whether the circumstances of a particular litigation allowed a

party to fully litigate its claims before they became moot. But Enyart dealt

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In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that the

justiciability of disputes concerning the disclosure of

with an issue of an entirely different nature.

It is well established that when a party challenges a temporary

injunction and that party will likely face a similar injunction in the future,

the injury caused by that injunction is “capable of repetition, yet evading

review.” Carroll, 393 U.S. at 178–79. This is so because any injury

caused by a temporary injunction ends when the injunction expires, and

no court order can extend the duration of the controversy past the

injunction’s expiration. Enyart involved a straightforward application of

this rule. We merely held that a challenge to a temporary injunction

remained justiciable after the injunction expired because there was a

reasonable expectation that the appellants would be subject to the same

injunction in the future. 630 F.3d at 1159–60.

The dissent reasons that, because we considered the duration of the

challenged injunctions in Enyart, we should consider this litigation’s

timeline in assessing whether Appellants’ claims “evade review.” In so

doing, the dissent highlights that there was only one day between the

issuance of the district court’s order denying preliminary injunctive relief

and the PRA’s January 31, 2009 disclosure deadline.

The dissent errs with regard to the time-frame that is relevant to

whether a controversy inevitably “evades review.” As we explain above,

a controversy “evades review” only if it is of “inherently limited

duration.” Bunker, 820 F.2d at 311 (“[t]he exception was designed to

apply to situations where the type of injury involved . . . [evades review]

by [its] nature” (emphasis added)). A case is not of “inherently limited

duration” if a court order could maintain a live controversy until the action

is fully litigated.

While the timing of the district court’s order made it difficult for

Appellants to maintain a live controversy in this case, we can no longer

redress Appellants’ alleged injuries, and we therefore lack jurisdiction

over this appeal. Despite the dissent’s contrary assertions, the poor timing

of the district court’s order cannot confer jurisdiction upon us that would

not otherwise exist.

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sensitive information may well turn on whether preliminary

relief is granted at an action’s inception. As this case

demonstrates, the premature disclosure of information can 

eviscerate a live controversy. Nevertheless, the fact that

preliminary relief is technically available to maintain a live

controversy will also deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to

consider the action as one that is “capable of repetition, yet

evading review.” Accordingly, we advise courts to exercise

the utmost caution at the early stages of actions concerning

the disclosure of sensitive information, and to consider this

“mootness Catch-22” when assessing whether the denial of

preliminary relief will likely result in irreparable harm. See

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008).

B. Ripeness

Finally, Appellants urge that they are entitled to an

injunction exempting them from complying with future PRA

disclosure requirements, because they expect to participate in

future campaigns opposing same-sexmarriage. This claim for

forward-looking relief is not ripe for judicial review.

1. Legal Standard

The ripeness doctrine seeks to identify those matters that

are premature for judicial review because the injury at issue

is speculative, or may never occur. Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville

Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774, 793 (9th Cir. 2012); see also

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). “For

adjudication of constitutional issues, concrete legal issues,

presented in actual cases, not abstractions, are requisite.”

United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,

89 (1947) (internal quotations omitted). Concrete legal issues

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require more than mere “hypothetical threat[s],” and where

we can “only speculate” as to the specific activities in which

a party seeks to engage, we must dismiss a claim as

nonjusticiable. Id. at 90.

We have explained that “the ripeness inquiry contains

both a constitutional and a prudential component.” Thomas v.

Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc). The constitutional component overlaps

with, and is often indistinguishable from, the “injury in fact

prong” of our standing analysis. Id. Whether we view injury

in fact as a question of standing or ripeness, “we consider

whether the plaintiff[] face[s] a realistic danger of sustaining

a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or

enforcement . . . or whether the alleged injury is too

imaginary or speculative to support jurisdiction.” Id. at 1139

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If this

constitutional requirement is not satisfied, we lack

jurisdiction, and we need not consider the prudential

component of the ripeness inquiry.

We typically look to three factors to assess whether a preenforcement challenge is ripe for review under Article III. Id.

We first consider whether the plaintiff articulates a “concrete

plan to violate the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). With regard to this prong, “[a] general intent to

violate a statute at some unknown date in the future” is not

sufficient, id, and the plaintiff must establish a plan “that is

more than hypothetical,” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d

1045, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010).

Next, we typically look to whether the government has

“communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate

proceedings” under the statute. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139.

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Our analysis under this second prong is somewhat different,

however, in a pre-enforcement challenge that alleges a free

speech violation under the First Amendment. See Wolfson,

616 F.3d at 1059–60. In such actions, the plaintiff need not

establish an actual threat of government prosecution. Id.

Rather, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that a threat of

potential enforcement will cause him to self-censor, and not

follow through with his concrete plan to engage in protected

conduct. Id.

Finally, we consider the history of past prosecution or

enforcement under the statute. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1140.

Under this third prong, “the government’s active enforcement

of a statute [may] render[] the plaintiff’s fear [of injury] . . .

reasonable.” Id.

Weighing these factors, we will only conclude that a preenforcement action is ripe for judicial review if the alleged

injury is “reasonable” and “imminent,” and not merely

“theoretically possible.” Id. at 1141. A claim is not ripe where

“[t]he asserted threat is wholly contingent on the occurrence

of unforeseeable events,” or where the plaintiffs do not

“confront a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a

result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

The application of these principles is illustrated in Renne

v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991), in which the Supreme Court

dismissed a challenge to a provision in the California

constitution prohibiting political parties and committees from

endorsing, supporting, or opposing candidates for nonpartisan

offices. In that case, the Republican Committee submitted an

affidavit stating:

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It is the plan and intention of the Republican

Committee to endorse candidates for

nonpartisan offices in as many future

elections as possible. The Republican

Committee would like to have such

endorsements publicized by endorsed

candidates in their candidate’s statements in

the San Francisco voter’s pamphlet, and to

encourage endorsed candidates to so publish

their endorsements by the Republican

Committee.

Id. at 317.

In holding that the Republican Committee did not present

a ripe controversy, the Renne Court explained that “[the

Committee] d[id] not allege an intention to endorse any

particular candidate . . . . [and there is] no factual record of an

actual or imminent application of [the challenged provision]

sufficient to present the constitutional issues . . . .” Id. at

321–22 (citations omitted).

2. Application

At this stage, any as-applied challenge based on

Appellants’ future activity fails to “tender[] the underlying

constitutional issues in clean cut and concrete form.” Socialist

Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972) (quoting

Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)). The

only information that we have regarding Appellants’ intended

future activities is that Appellants expect to participate in

future campaigns opposing same-sex marriage, and that, in so

doing, they wish not to comply with the PRA’s disclosure

requirements.

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Appellants have not offered any information regarding

when they may next support a campaign opposing same-sex

marriage, what type of campaign they will support, where

they will support it, what their involvement will entail, or

whether their donors will likely face personal harassment.

Without this information, we cannot discern a concrete plan

to engage in protected conduct. Rather, the scant information

that Appellants provide merely demonstrates “[a] general

intent to [engage in protected conduct] at some unknown date

in the future,” along with a speculative fear that Appellants’

donors may be personally harassed as a result of disclosing

their contributions to such an effort. Wolfson, 616 F.3d at

1059. These hypothetical plans and fears do not create an

immediate threat of self-censorship. And, as in Renne, there

is no factual record of the State’s bringing PRA enforcement

actions against those who do not comply with the statute’s

disclosure requirements. Renne, 501 U.S. at 321–22.

Accordingly, any claim based on Appellants’ future activities

is not ripe under the Thomas factors.

In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that we have

“no right to pronounce an abstract opinion upon the

constitutionality of a [s]tate law,” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.

497, 504 (1961). As-applied challenges to contribution

disclosure laws are fact-specific in nature. Whether a group

will succeed in asserting such a challenge depends on factors

such as the group’s size, the nature of the campaign, the

political tenor in the community, and the actions of third

parties and government entities. See Brown v. Socialist

Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 89–92

(1982). Unlike California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman,

328 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2003) and New Mexicans for Bill

Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495 (10th Cir.

1995)—upon which the dissent relies—any opinion that we

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could issue regarding Appellants’ forward-looking claims

would require us to speculate about the nature of events that

might take place at some unknown time in the future, and to

declare the constitutionality of a state law in the context of

these uncertain circumstances. Under Article III, we lack the

authority to issue such an opinion. See Renne, 501 U.S. at 323

(“[a] determination of the . . . constitutionality of

legislation[,] in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the

context of a concrete case[,] involves too remote and abstract

an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment with regard to Appellants’ facial challenges. We

dismiss this appeal as non-justiciable with regard to

Appellants’ as-applied challenges, and we remand these

claims to the district court with instructions that the court

vacate the portion of its opinion concerning Appellants’ asapplied challenges. See Bunker, 820 F.2d at 313. Appellants

shall bear costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part; and

REMANDED with instructions.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

I do not disagree with the majority’s disposition of

Appellants’ facial challenges. The majority is correct that our

precedent, including our decision in Family PAC v.

McKenna, 685 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2012), forecloses those

challenges. However, I disagree with the majority’s

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determination that Appellants’ as-applied challenges are nonjusticiable.

The majority offers three rationales for its holding that

Appellants’ as-applied challenges are non-justiciable. First,

the majority concludes that those challenges are moot, insofar

as various Internet websites have republished the information

contained in Appellants’ disclosures. (Majority Op. at 14.) 

Second, the majority concludes that Appellants cannot avail

themselves of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

exception to mootness. The majority reaches this conclusion

on the ground that this exception only applies to cases in

which there is an “inherent limit” on the “duration of [the]

controversy,” and faults Appellants for not seeking and

obtaining immediate relief from our court after the district

court denied their motion for a temporary restraining order. 

(Id. at 17–22.) Finally, the majority concludes that insofar as

Appellants seek an injunction exempting them from

complying with future disclosure requirements, this claim is

not ripe because it rests on merely speculative contentions

from Appellants about their future activities. (Id. at 22–27.)

For the reasons stated below, I disagree with each of these

three conclusions. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from

the majority’s decision to dismiss Appellants’ as-applied

challenges as non-justiciable.

I.

The majority holds that Appellants’ request for an

injunction requiring California to purge all records of their

disclosures does not “present a live controversy.” (Majority

Op. at 14.) The majority’s reasoning as to this issue relies on

our decision in Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir.

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2012). However, I believe that Reed was wrongly decided, as

Judge Randy Smith explained in his concurrence in that case. 

See id. at 1241 (N.R. Smith, J., concurring in the judgment).

Reed involved facts much like those presented in this

appeal. The plaintiffs in that case sought an injunction

preventing the State of Washington from releasing to the

public the names of people who signed petitions supporting

a referendum. Id. at 1237. Because those petitions were

“already widely available on the [I]nternet,” the majority

dismissed the case as moot. Id.

While Judge Randy Smith concurred with the judgment,

he wrote separately to explain that “Supreme Court precedent

makes clear” that the case was not moot, insofar as

“continued government disclosure of confidential materials

can be prevented.” Id. at 1241. As he explained, our court

could have afforded the plaintiffs a “viable remedy, albeit a

much less effective remedy than they originally sought.” Id.

As he further explained, there were several respects in which

a “viable remedy” was available from us. First, our court

could have “fashion[ed] some form of meaningful relief” by

“ordering the [State] to destroy or return any and all copies

[of the petitions] it may have in its possession,” because the

State’s “continued possession of those materials” itself

constituted an “affront to the [citizen’s] privacy.” Id. at

1242–43, quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United

States, 506 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1992). Second, he pointed out that

the majority had “mistakenly assume[d] that every person in

the United States or the State of Washington has access to a

computer to search for [the] petitions,” whereas in actuality

a significant percentage of the public either lacks access to

the Internet or “would not know where to look for [the]

petitions” on the Internet. Id. at 1243. Thus, by granting the

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plaintiffs the injunctive relief they requested, our court could

have “prevent[ed] further government disclosure to

individuals without access or desire to download petitions

from non-government websites,” which would have slowed

or reduced “the dissemination of potentially private

information.” Id., citing Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S.

497, 525 (2007).

I agree with the reasoning of Judge Smith’s concurrence

in Reed. I write here to emphasize that the Supreme Court’s

decision in Church of Scientology of California v. United

States clearly states that the type of claim raised by the

plaintiffs in Reed, and by Appellants in this case, is not moot. 

There, the Court acknowledged that there are circumstances

in which the judiciary “may not be able to return the parties

to the status quo ante,” because there is “nothing a court can

do to withdraw all knowledge or information” once that

information has been disseminated. Church of Scientology,

506 U.S. at 12–13. Nonetheless, Church of Scientology held

that “a court can fashion some form of meaningful relief” in

such circumstances. Id. The Court stated that “even if the

Government retains only copies of the disputed materials,” a

citizen “still suffers injury by the Government’s continued

possession of those materials, namely, the affront to the

[citizen’s] privacy.” Id. at 13. Accordingly, Church of

Scientology held that “a court does have power to effectuate

a partial remedy by ordering the Government to destroy or

return any and all copies it may have in its possession,” and

further held that the “availability of this possible remedy is

sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot.” Id.

The majority in Reed failed to recognize that Church of

Scientology is controlling. Instead, it ignored the holding of

Church of Scientology on the basis of its “commonsense

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conclusion that once a fact is widely available to the public,

a court cannot grant any ‘effective relief’ to a person seeking

to keep that fact a secret.” Reed, 697 F.3d at 1240. It should

go without saying, however, that the “commonsense

conclusion” of two circuit judges cannot trump an express

holding of the Supreme Court. Church of Scientology is still

the controlling law of all circuits, including the Ninth Circuit. 

Reed cannot change that. Indeed, the majority should have

interpreted Reed in such a way as to render it consistent with

Church of Scientology.

As Church of Scientology makes clear, we could order the

State of California to “destroy or return any and all copies” of

Appellants’ disclosures that the State “may have in its

possession.” Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13. Thus,

under binding Supreme Court precedent, there is available to

us a “possible remedy” that is “sufficient to prevent this case

from being moot.” Id.

The majority goes the opposite direction, and attempts to

distinguish Church of Scientology by stating that Church of

Scientology involved “a finite set of tangible records that had

only been disclosed to a party to the action,” whereas this

case involves records that have been “widely available on the

Internet for several years.” (Majority Op. at 16 n.3.) Thus,

the majority concludes that we cannot provide “the ‘effective

relief’ that the Supreme Court recognized in Church of

Scientology.” (Id.) But this conclusion simply repeats the

error of the panel in Reed. As pointed out above, Church of

Scientology clearly holds that a case is not moot if we can

“effectuate a partial remedy by ordering the Government to

destroy or return any and all copies [of records] it may have

in its possession.” Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13.

The fact that records may have been “widely available” on

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the Internet is not relevant to the inquirymandated byChurch

of Scientology. Again, that inquiry is whether we can

“fashion some form of meaningful relief” by remedying the

“injury” to citizens caused by the “Government’s continued

possession” of records, where that possession is an “affront”

to the citizen’s privacy. Id. at 12–13.

Church of Scientology teaches that courts should not

declare a case moot if “any effective relief may be granted.” 

Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 461 (9th Cir.

2006) (citation omitted). As one of our sister circuits has

explained, this is a “high threshold for judging a case moot,”

insofar as it requires that we find an appeal “moot in the

constitutional sense only if events have taken place that make

it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief

whatever.” United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d

217, 226 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Both Reed and the majority in this case err by

effectivelylowering this standard, in contravention of Church

of Scientology. That opinion tells us that we should find a

case moot only if it is “impossible” for us to grant “any

effectual relief whatever.” Church of Scientology, 506 U.S.

at 12. By contrast, the majority holds that this case is moot

because it is unlikely that we will be able to provide

significant effective relief. But that is not the standard set by

Church of Scientology.

For the reasons stated above, and in accordance with the

well-reasoned concurrence of Judge Randy Smith in Reed, I

conclude that Reed was wrongly decided. Under the

governing law of Church of Scientology, Appellants’ asapplied challenges are not moot. The majority should have

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distinguished Reed and followed Church of Scientology, not

the opposite.1

II.

Having concluded that Appellants’ as-applied challenges

are moot, the majority proceeds to consider whether those

challenges may nonetheless be subject to the exception to

mootness for injuries that are “capable of repetition, yet

evading review.” As discussed above, I do not believe that

the as-applied challenges are moot. But even if they were

moot, I believe that the majority errs in concluding that the

“capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to

mootness does not apply to this case.

The majority correctly states that the “capable of

repetition, yet evading review” exception applies where:

“(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be

fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is

a reasonable expectation that the same complaining partywill

be subject to the same action again.” Fed. Election Comm’n

v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007). In my

view, Appellants satisfy both of these requirements. I

consider each in turn.

1 As the majority observes, this panel is bound by the holding in Reed

“unless and until the Supreme Court announces a ‘clearly irreconcilable’

rule, or our court, sitting en banc, announces an alternate rule.” (Majority

Op. at 16 n.3.) My purpose here is to explain the misguided reasoning of

Reed, in the hope that our court will reconsider the erroneous rule it

propounds, or distinguish Reed and follow the clear mandate of the

Supreme Court in Church of Scientology.

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A.

As to the first requirement, Appellants filed their original

complaint on January 7, 2009, two months after the election

on Proposition 8 took place. Under California law,

Appellants were required to disclose the names of their

contributors by January 31, 2009. As the majority observes,

the district court denied Appellants’ motion for a preliminary

injunction on January 30, 2009. (Majority Op. at 7.) The

next day, Appellants complied with the law and made their

disclosures. (Id.) Such a short span of time is clearly “in its

duration too short” for a claim of this nature to be “fully

litigated.” Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 462.

The majority does not contend that this claim could have

been “fully litigated” in so brief a time. Rather, it faults

Appellants for failing to seek preliminary injunctive relief,

and concludes that their failure to do so precludes this claim

from falling under the “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” exception to mootness. In reaching this conclusion,

the majority relies upon our opinions in Headwaters, Inc. v.

Bureau of Land Management, 893 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1990),

and Bunker Ltd. Partnership v. United States, 820 F.2d 308

(9th Cir. 1987). However, I believe that these opinions do not

preclude us from deciding that the “capable of repetition, yet

evading review” exception applies to this case.

In Headwaters, we stated that “[w]here prompt

application for a stay pending appeal can preserve an issue for

appeal, the issue is not one that will evade review.” 

Headwaters, 893 F.2d at 1016. Likewise, in Bunker we

stated that “a party may not profit from the ‘capable of

repetition, yet evading review’ exception to mootness, where

through his own failure to seek and obtain a stay he has

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prevented an appellate court from reviewing the trial court’s

decision.” Bunker, 820 F.2d at 311 (emphasis added). But

the abstract proposition stated in both of these cases—i.e., the

proposition that if a party “fail[s] to seek and obtain a stay,”

that party may not avail itself of the “capable of repetition,

yet evading review” exception to mootness—does not speak

to the particular facts of this case. As pointed out above, the

district court issued its order on Appellants’ motion for a

preliminary injunction on January30, 2009, while Appellants

were required to make their disclosures by January 31, 2009. 

Thus, under the majority opinion, Appellants would have had

a single day to “seek and obtain a stay” from our court in

order to “profit from the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading

review’ exception to mootness.” Id. This draconian

constraint is not established by the opinions cited by the

majority, which merely speak in general terms of a party’s

obligation to “seek and obtain a stay” so as to enable our

court to review the lower court’s decision.

A recent case in one of our sister circuits emphasizes the

unfair position in which Appellants have been placed by the

majority’s holding as to this issue. On December 20, 2013,

the District of Utah held that Amendment 3 of the Utah

Constitution is unconstitutional, and enjoined the State of

Utah from enforcing various statutory provisions that

“prohibit a person from marrying another person of the same

sex.” Kitchen v. Herbert, 2013 WL 6697874, at *30 (D. Utah

Dec. 20, 2013). A few hours after that order was issued, the

State of Utah filed a motion to stay the order. See Kitchen v.

Herbert, 2013 WL 6834634, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013). 

Although the district court ordered expedited briefing, it did

not rule on the motion to stay for three days. See id. It was

not until two weeks later that the Supreme Court issued a stay

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pending final disposition of the appeal by the Tenth Circuit. 

See Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014).

As this example illustrates, it is simply not realistic to

expect a party to “seek and obtain a stay” within the span of

a single day. Yet that is what the majority effectively

requires. On the facts of this case, I would hold that our

decisions in Headwaters and Bunker do not prohibit

Appellants from satisfying the first requirement of the

“capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to

mootness.

The majority asserts that the analysis above errs by

focusing on the wrong “time-frame” for determining whether

“a controversy inevitably ‘evades review.’” (Majority Op. at

21 n.4.) The majority’s contrary analysis hinges on its

discussion of “types of controversies” that are “inherently

limited in duration.” (Id. at 17.) The majority argues that the

mootness exception discussed here onlyapplies to “inherently

limited” controversies, which it defines as those that “will

only ever present a live action until a particular date, after

which the alleged injury will either cease or no longer be

redressible.” (Id. at 18.)

To my mind, the majority’s discussion of an “inherently

limited” controversy is somewhat metaphysical. The present

controversy unquestionably had an “inherent limit”: namely,

January 31, 2009, when Appellants were required by law to

make their disclosures. In the same way, a controversy

involving a law that “inhibits a political candidate or party’s

ability to win an election” has, as its “inherent limit,” the date

of that election. (Id. at 18.) Whatever distinction might be

drawn between these two scenarios, it cannot be that only the

latter has an “inherent limit.”

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Although the majority does not say as much, it appears to

posit a distinction between controversies whose “inherent

limit” is a real-world event and those whose “inherent limit”

is an artificial creation of the legal system. An example of

the former, which the majority regards as “[n]otabl[e],” is

pregnancy, insofar as the date on which a baby is born is

independent of anything the law might decree. (Id.) By

contrast, the limit in this case was the disclosure deadline

mandated by California state law.

This distinction is not established by the cases the

majority cites. Moreover, I believe that this distinction,

although crucial to the majority’s holding, cannot be

reconciled with our precedent. In effect, the majority has

established a new test for determining whether this exception

to mootness applies to a given case. Under the newly

invented test of the majority, in cases in which the “inherent

limit” on the controversy derives from some real-world

event— such as a pregnancy—the exception will invariably

apply. By contrast, in cases in which the “inherent limit”

derives from an event that may be delayed via court order, the

exception will never apply, because it will always be possible

for a “court [to] ensure that a live controversy persists until

the action is fully litigated by enjoining the challenged

conduct until the litigation concludes.” (Id. at 18.)

Although such a test may have a certain intuitive appeal,

it is not the law of our circuit, as the majority’s own citations

indicate. The majority relies on Bunker, which held that a

party “may not profit” from this exception to mootness

“where through his own failure to seek and obtain [prompt

relief] he has prevented [an] appellate court from reviewing

the trial court’s decision.” (Id. at 19, citing Bunker, 820 F.2d

at 31 (emphasis added).) This citation demonstrates the

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obvious novelty of the test introduced by the majority. In

Bunker, we held that the significant factor, in determining

whether this exception to mootness applies, is a party’s “own

failure to seek and obtain” relief. That is, in our analysis of

this exception to mootness we looked to the party’s own

diligence in seeking relief, rather than evaluating the case in

the abstract and determining whether it was the “type[] of

controvers[y]” that is invariably “inherently limited in

duration.” (Id. at 18.)

Put another way, the majority holds that this exception to

mootness is only available in cases whose “limited duration

. . . is clear at the action’s inception.” (Id. at 18.) But the

cases relied upon by the majority consider a party’s “failure

to obtain prompt relief” during an action. (Id. at 19.) If it

were true that the question of whether this exception to

mootness applies could be resolved solely by considering an

action in abstract form from its “inception,” then there would

have been no reason for our prior cases to consider a party’s

“failure to seek and obtain” relief over the course of litigating

the action. The new majority rule is inconsistent with our

prior case law.

Thus, the majority’s holding here clearly creates new law

for our circuit, and does so in a way that cannot be reconciled

with our court’s precedent. The majority relies on Reed for

its reasoning as to this point. (Id. at 18–20.) I quote below

the entirety of the discussion of this issue in Reed:

There was no inherent limit on the duration of

this controversy. The district court granted a

temporary restraining order the day after

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in July 2009. 

The petitions were not released until October

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2011. The release was not timed to a 27-

month deadline inherent in this type of

petition. And unlike [other] election-related

cases granting an exception . . . the issues in

this case were not moot once the election was

held. [citation omitted] Because it is

reasonably foreseeable that this type of

challenge could be fully litigated before

becoming moot, this type of challenge does

not evade review.

Reed, 697 F.3d at 1240–41.

Whatever might be said of this holding, it does not

provide a justification for the novel test that the majority has

invented.

In similar contexts, we have not relied upon the

distinction used by the majority to preclude review of this

case under this exception to mootness. Our recent decision

in Enyart v. National Conference of Bar Examiners, Inc.,

630 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2011), is instructive in this regard. In

Enyart, we considered an appealfrom preliminaryinjunctions

entered by the district court. Id. at 1159. Those injunctions

required the National Conference of Bar Examiners to allow

the plaintiff to take certain bar examinations using “assistive

software.” Id. at 1156. We held that even though those

injunctions only related to particular administrations of those

examinations, “which [had] since come and gone,” the

appeals were not moot because “the situation [was] capable

of repetition, yet evading review.” Id. at 1159. As we

explained, “[d]ue to the limited duration of [the]injunctions,”

and in particular because “little more than a month passed

between the issuance of the injunctions and the final

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execution of their terms,” it was “practically” impossible for

the appellant to obtain review of the district court’s orders. 

Id. at 1160.

Thus, in Enyart, we held that a period of “little more than

a month” rendered it “practically” impossible for a party to

obtain appellate review. Id. By the same logic, it was almost

certainly impossible for Appellants to obtain review from us

of the district court’s order on Appellants’ motion for a

preliminary injunction in the single day available to them.

The majority attempts to distinguish Enyart by stating

that it “dealt with an issue of an entirely different nature.” 

(Majority Op. at 20–21 n.4.) The point of my discussion of

Enyart, however, is that it considered whether a party could

“practically obtain appellate review” of a district court order. 

Enyart, 630 F.3d at 1160. This reinforces my point that the

relevant inquiry, when considering this exception to

mootness, is a pragmatic one—namely, whether it is

practically possible for a party to obtain the appellate relief it

needs—rather than the metaphysical one mandated by the

majority.

In sum, because it was practically impossible under the

facts of this case for Appellants to obtain appellate review, I

would hold that Appellants have satisfied the first

requirement of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

exception to mootness.

B.

In light of its conclusion that Appellants failed to satisfy

the first requirement of the “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” exception to mootness, the majority does not address

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the second requirement—namely, the requirement that there

must be a “reasonable expectation that the same complaining

party will be subject to the same action again.” Wis. Right to

Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 462. Because I believe the majority’s

conclusion as to the first requirement is erroneous, I proceed

to consider the second requirement as well, so as to

demonstrate that Appellants have completely satisfied the

requirements for this exception to mootness.

In this case, Appellants have alleged that they intend to

engage in future political activities against same-sexmarriage

and that they intend to continue soliciting donations to

advance that position. Their Third Amended Complaint

alleges that “Committee Plaintiffs believe potential

contributors have been and will continue to be discouraged

from contributing to their committees as a result of the threats

and harassment directed at any individual supporting a

traditional definition of marriage” (emphasis added). 

Moreover, at oral argument, counsel for Appellants stated that

future ballot initiatives are being circulated and that

Appellants’ committees are ready to participate in such

initiatives by filing amendment documents, at which point

they would resume soliciting donations.

Under our precedent, this is sufficient to show a

“reasonable expectation that [Appellants] will be subject to

the same action again.” Id. The case of Wolfson v. Brammer,

616 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010), is exactly on point. 

Wolfson involved an appellant who was a “candidate for

judicial office in Arizona.” Id. at 1051. The district court

had dismissed the case as moot, insofar as Wolfson had lost

his election and the district court found that he “did not intend

to seek judicial office in the next election.” Id. at 1052. We

reversed, holding that the case was not moot under the

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“capable of repetition yet evading review” exception. Id. at

1052, 1054. In particular, we observed that Wolfson had to

“establish a reasonable expectation that he [would] be

subjected to the same action or injury again.” Id. We

concluded that he had established such a “reasonable

expectation.” Id. at 1055. In reaching this conclusion, which

was predicated on our assessment that there was “more than

sufficient evidence to support a finding that Wolfson intends

to seek judicial office in the future,” we relied on two facts. 

Id. at 1054–55. First, we observed that “Wolfson’s complaint

expresses an intention to seek judicial office in the future, and

a desire to engage in prohibited conduct . . . in future judicial

elections.” Id. Second, we observed that Wolfson had

“eliminat[ed] any doubts” as to this issue by “represent[ing]

in the present appeal that he intends to seek judicial office in

a future election.” Id.

The same type of evidence is present in this case. First,

as stated above, Appellants’ complaint expresses an intention

to engage in similar conduct in the future, insofar as it alleges

that future contributors “will continue to be discouraged.” 

Second, as is also pointed out above, Appellants’ counsel

represented in the present appeal that Appellants intend to

engage in similar campaigns against same-sex marriage in the

future. Therefore, under Wolfson, Appellants have

established a “reasonable expectation” that they will be

subject to the same action again, and thus have satisfied the

second requirement of the “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” exception to mootness.

III.

Finally, the majority invokes the ripeness doctrine to

conclude that Appellants’ “claim for forward-looking relief”

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is non-justiciable. (Majority Op. at 22.) The majority

correctly identifies our guidelines for the ripeness inquiry,

which we articulated in our en banc opinion in Thomas v.

Anchorage Rights Commission. 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc); see also Alaska Right to Life Political Action

Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2007)

(following the ripeness analysis from Thomas in considering

a “preenforcement challenge” to two canons of the Alaska

Code of Judicial Conduct); Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095,

1104–05 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the ripeness analysis from

Thomasin an action involving a challenge to a state campaign

finance law). As Thomas explains, “the ripeness inquiry

contains both a constitutional and a prudential component.” 

Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138 (citation omitted). First, there is a

constitutional aspect to the ripeness inquiry, under which we

ask three questions: (1) “whether the plaintiffs have

articulated a ‘concrete plan’ to violate the law in question”;

(2) “whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated

a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings”; and

(3) “the history of past prosecution or enforcement under the

challenged statute.” Id. at 1139. Second, there is a prudential

aspect to the ripeness inquiry, under which we consider “the

fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to

the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. at 1141.

In light of the ripeness inquiry described by Thomas, and

in light of our consideration of that inquiry in a very similar

context in California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman,

328 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2003), I believe that Appellants’

claim is ripe.

In Getman, we considered a similar challenge to

California’s campaign finance disclosure laws. Id. at

1091–92. As a threshold matter, we determined whether that

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challenge was ripe. Id. at 1093–95. The district court,

following the approach set forth in Thomas, had concluded

that the action was not ripe, insofar as California was not

investigating the plaintiff for violations of the state’s

campaign finance disclosure law and had not threatened the

plaintiff with prosecution. Id. at 1094. We held that the

district court’s interpretation of Thomas “must be rejected.” 

Id. In doing so, we emphasized that in the context of First

Amendment challenges, the “Supreme Court has endorsed

what might be called a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now’

approach rather than requiring litigants to speak first and take

their chances with the consequences.” Id. (citation omitted). 

We determined that the “intended communication” that was

the subject of the litigation was “arguably subject” to the

“reporting and disclosure requirements” of California’s

Political Reform Act (PRA)—i.e., the same act that is at issue

in this case. Id. at 1095. From that fact alone, we concluded

that the plaintiff had “suffered an injury as a result of the

alleged unconstitutional statute,” which meant that its claim

was “necessarily ripe for review.” Id. Likewise, here, it is

beyond question that Appellants’ intended future activities, as

discussed above, are subject to the reporting and disclosure

requirements of the PRA, which in turn means that their

claims are “necessarily ripe for review.”

Although the majority pays lip service to our ripeness

analysis in Thomas, its actual resolution of this issue is

largely reliant on the Supreme Court’s decision in Renne v.

Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991), which predates our opinion in

Thomas. In my view, the majority’s reliance on Renne is

misguided. In the portion of Renne discussed by the majority,

the Court stated that it could “discern no ripe controversy in

the allegations that respondents desire to endorse candidates

in future elections,” insofar as the respondents did not “allege

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an intention to endorse any particular candidate, nor that a

candidate wants to include a party’s or committee member’s

endorsement in a candidate statement.” Id. at 321. The Court

went on to assert that the respondents had failed to “specify

what form [the] support or opposition [of a particular

candidate] would take.” Id. at 322. Here, by contrast, we

know that Appellants have a very particular intention, and

that they have specified the form their opposition would take:

they intend to oppose same-sex marriage via ballot measures. 

Thus, because we held that the post-Renne case of Getman

was ripe, I would hold that this case is ripe.

My view that Renne does not preclude us from holding

that this case is ripe is further supported by the Tenth

Circuit’s well-reasoned opinion in New Mexicans for Bill

Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495 (10th Cir. 1995). In

Richardson, the Tenth Circuit held that a plaintiff’s

constitutional challenge to a state campaign finance law was

ripe. Id. at 1497. In particular, the court held that the “facts

presented to the district court undoubtedly show[ed that] the

existence of the New Mexico statute [had] created a direct

and immediate dilemma with respect to [the plaintiff’s]

exercise of his First Amendment liberties.” Id. at 1500. In

this regard, the court considered affidavits submitted to the

district court showing that the plaintiff had solicited

campaign contributions in the past, and that the statute had

“reduc[ed] the likelihood” that the plaintiff would be “able to

obtain funds from contributors” in the future. Id. On the

basis of these facts, the court concluded that it was “clear to

us that the mere existence of the New Mexico statute has

caused [the plaintiff] to engage in the activity of fund raising

differently than he has in the past, rendering his ability to

raise funds, and thus exercise his constitutionally protected

rights, less effective.” Id. at 1500–01. Therefore, the court

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concluded that there was “nothing speculative or uncertain

about the harm to [the plaintiff’s] fund raising activities

brought about by” the statute, which in turn meant that the

case was ripe. Id. at 1501–02.

Just as in Richardson, in this case the record contains

ample affidavits submitted to the district court showing that

Appellants have solicited contributions in the past, and that

the State of California’s disclosure of contributors’

identifying information has reduced the likelihood that

Appellants will be able to obtain funds from contributors in

the future. Thus, as the Tenth Circuit concluded in

Richardson, I would hold here that there is nothing

“speculative or uncertain about the harm” to Appellants’

fund-raising activities caused by California’s campaign

disclosure law, and that their claim is therefore ripe.

A separate reason for concluding that Renne does not

block Appellants’ claim is also provided by the Tenth

Circuit’s opinion in Richardson. The court in Richardson

expressly considered Renne, and concluded that the case

before it was ripe notwithstanding Renne. As the Tenth

Circuit explained, Renne’s holding was largely predicated on

the particular “facts presented” in that case, and especially on

“the dubiousness of plaintiffs’ standing to bring the case.” Id.

at 1501 n.1. The Renne plaintiffs’ standing was “dubious[]”

because they were a “group of individual voters” who were

challenging a law that “regulated political parties and central

committees.” Id. That is, because the law at issue in Renne

“contained no enforcement mechanism against individual

voters and, indeed, did not even regulate the conduct of

individual voters, it follow[ed] logically that [the plaintiffs]

faced no threat of prosecution by virtue of that [law].” Id.

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The Tenth Circuit found further support for this

interpretation of Renne in Justice Stevens’s concurring

opinion. Justice Stevens stated there that “[i]f such a

challenge had been brought by a political party or a party

central committee [i.e., by the type of plaintiff to whom the

law was addressed], and if the complaint had alleged that

these organizations wanted to endorse, support, or oppose a

candidate for nonpartisan office but were inhibited from

doing so because of the [law], the case would unquestionably

be ripe.” Id., quoting Renne, 501 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J.,

concurring). Justice Stevens made it clear that his

reservations about ripeness in the case were predicated on his

belief that “an individual member of a party or committee

may [not] sue on behalf of such an organization.” Renne,

501 U.S. at 325 (citation omitted). Here, by contrast, it is

clear that the California law at issue—i.e., the

PRA—regulates Appellants’ conduct, which means that the

case “unquestionably [is] ripe.” Id.

The majority attempts to distinguish both Getman and

Richardson by asserting that, “[u]nlike” in those cases, “any

opinion that we could issue regarding Appellants’ forwardlooking claims would require us to speculate about the nature

of events that might take place at some unknown time in the

future.” (Majority Op. at 26–27.) But such “speculation”

was present in Getman. In Getman, we held that a First

Amendment challenge to a California’s PRA was ripe after

concluding that the plaintiff’s “fear” that “enforcement

proceedings might be initiated” by the State of California was

reasonable. Getman, 328 F.3d at 1094–95. That conclusion,

obviously, was “speculative,” insofar as the State had never

actually “evinced an intent to prosecute [the plaintiff] for its

voter publications.” Id. at 1093.

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Finally, the majority’s rigid approach to the ripeness

analysis errs by overlooking the well-established principle

that in the First Amendment context, courts should apply the

“requirements of ripeness . . . less stringently.” Wolfson,

616 F.3d at 1058; see also Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511

F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that “when free speech

is at issue, concerns over chilling effect call for a relaxation

of ripeness requirements”); Peachlum v. City of York, 333

F.3d 429, 434–35 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that First

Amendment claims are “subject to a relaxed ripeness

standard,” and that courts have “repeatedly shown solicitude

for First Amendment claims because of concern that, even in

the absence of a fully concrete dispute, unconstitutional

statutes . . . tend to chill protected expression among those

who forbear speaking because of the law’s very existence”);

U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1209 (10th Cir.

1999) (explaining that “any chilling effect [a] statute may

have on [a party’s] First Amendment rights counsels in favor

of ripeness”).

In sum, I conclude that Appellants’ forward-looking

claims are ripe. As discussed above, I base this conclusion on

our post-Renne precedents discussing ripeness in general,

such as Thomas; our determination in Getman that a similar

challenge to California’s campaign finance disclosure laws

was ripe; the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Richardson, along

with its crucial distinguishing of Renne; and the general

principle that the requirements for ripeness should be relaxed

in the context of First Amendment claims.

IV.

The First Amendment “bars subtle as well as obvious

devices by which political association might be stifled.” 

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NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 122 (1966) (Douglas, J.,

dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari). Regardless of

our views on the merits of the controversy, the public

marketplace of ideas should not be unnecessarily burdened. 

This case is justiciable. Therefore, I dissent.2

2 At page 6–7 of the majority opinion, a brief history of the litigation

over the merits of Proposition 8 is provided. I add here more detail

regarding the problems that arose during that litigation.

Before the district court, the Attorney General of California took the

position that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional under the federal

Constitution, while the other government defendants “refused to take a

position on the merits” and “declined to defend Proposition 8.” Perry v.

Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010). After the

district court held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional under the federal

Constitution, California’s Attorney General decided not to appeal that

decision. See generally Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659–60

(2013). Subsequently, the California Supreme Court held that California

law authorizes the “official proponents” of a voter-approved initiative to

“appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the public officials who

ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so.” 

Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1127 (2011). After the Supreme Court

granted certiorari, however, it concluded that the official proponents of

Proposition 8 lacked Article III standing to appeal the district court’s

judgment. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668. Accordingly, the Supreme

Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision which had affirmed the district

court. Id. at 2660, 2668.

As a consequence of Hollingsworth, the only federal court decision

remaining that addresses the merits of Proposition 8 is the district court’s

decision, which by definition is without precedential authority. See, e.g.,

Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998). 

Thus, the only precedential appellate decision addressing the merits of

Proposition 8 is the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Strauss v.

Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364 (2009), which held that challenges to Proposition

8 “lack[ed] merit” under California law. Id. at 391. In fact, Strauss’s

holding that Proposition 8 was a lawful amendment to the California

Constitution is the final and only appellate decision on the merits of

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Proposition 8. Id.

To my knowledge, nothing in California law requires the Attorney

General to defend the Constitution of California, and other duly enacted

laws of the State of California, from challenges in the courts. 

Nonetheless, it seems clear that the confusion created by the decisions

discussed above, and the resulting abrogation of the federal courts’

decisions due to lack ofstanding, could have been avoided if the Attorney

General of California had defended Proposition 8 on appeal in the federal

courts. This suggests that the State of California would do well to

consider legislating a process whereby the State’s elected officials would

be obliged to defend the State’s duly enacted laws in court, rather than

leaving it to the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General to pick and

choose which of the State’s laws he or she elects to defend.

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