Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05201/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05201-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE REYNOLDS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GERALD VERBECK, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-05201 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This section 1983 lawsuit arises out of defendants’ failure to provide plaintiff with his

prescription medication when he was arrested in December 2003. Now pending before the

Court are the motions of defendants Gerald Verbeck and Rosa Mineo and defendants

Michael Forbes and Bayoni Azucenas to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. 

After carefully considering the papers filed by the parties, and having had the benefit of oral

argument, the motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background

On December 13, 2003, defendant Alameda County Sheriff Deputy Gerald Verbeck

arrested plaintiff at plaintiff’s home pursuant to an outstanding warrant for plaintiff’s failure

to attend traffic school ordered by the Superior Court. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

¶ 7. According to plaintiff’s landlord, who was present at the arrest, plaintiff asked the

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 1 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

arresting officers if he could take his medication and the officers refused. Plaintiff also

asked if he could take the medication with him to the jail, or if the officers could bring it, and 

the officers again refused. Declaration of Craig Lester ¶ 4.

When plaintiff arrived at the Santa Rita Jail, Sheriff’s Intake Technician Rosa Mineo

performed plaintiff’s intake processing and learned he was taking Xanax for a nerve disorder. 

FAC ¶ 8; Declaration of Rosa Mineo (Mineo Decl.) ¶ 5. Mineo noted the information on the

Intake/Receiving Screening Form used for the processing of inmates, and summoned a nurse

from Prison Health Services to complete the intake screening. Mineo Decl. ¶ 5. Deputy

Verbeck observed plaintiff advise Mineo of his Xanax prescription. Verbeck Decl. ¶ 10-11. 

Michael Forbes of the Jail’s Prison Health Services subsequently asked plaintiff to complete

a questionnaire upon which plaintiff wrote that he was under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr.

Jung of Pleasanton Community Health Center, who had prescribed him Xanax. FAC ¶ 8. 

“Plaintiff again requested his prescribed medication, but it was refused.” Id.

During plaintiff’s court appearance on Monday, December 15, 2003, plaintiff suffered

a seizure due to the deprivation of his Xanax medication. The seizure caused him to lose

consciousness and fall, severely lacerating his face and knocking out several teeth. Id. ¶ 10. 

Plaintiff was transported to the hospital where he underwent surgery. As a result of his

injuries, he was unable to call his employer, Home Depot, to report that he would be unable

to report for work on the afternoon of December 15, 2003. Home Depot terminated

plaintiff’s employment. Id. ¶ 12.

B. Procedural History

On the last day before the statute of limitations expired, plaintiff filed a complaint

against Home Depot as well as Doe defendants. He alleged that Does I through V are

Sheriff’s employees and agents of Alameda County whose identity was unknown to him and

when known the identified parties would be substituted, and that Does VI through X are

Police Officer employees and agents of the City of Dublin whose identity was also unknown

and when known the identified parties would be substituted. 

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 2 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

As of June 2005, no parties, including Home Depot, had been served with the

complaint. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint naming the individual defendants on

June 9, 2006. After the case was reassigned to the undersigned judge, the individual

defendants moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations and improper service. At the

hearing, the Court granted the motion to quash and ordered plaintiff to properly serve

defendants. The Court also stated that it was considering imposing sanctions on plaintiff. 

The Court also intended to deny defendants’ motion to dismiss on statute of limitations

grounds, but it is apparent from the motions currently pending that defendants do not believe

the Court ruled on the issue.

Now pending before the Court is the motion of defendants Verbeck and Mineo to

dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and on the grounds that plaintiff does not have

evidence sufficient to support liability and, in any event, defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. Defendants Forbes and Azucenas join in the statute of limitations motion, and, in

the alternative, move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff has no claim against

them as a matter of law.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

“For actions under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of

limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling,

including equitable tolling, except to the extent that any of these laws is inconsistent with

federal law.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). In California, the statute of

limitations is two years. Id. at 927. Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that he was injured on December

15, 2003 as a result of defendants’ deprivation of his civil rights. See FAC ¶¶ 7-10. The

FAC, the first to name the individual defendants, was filed June 9, 2006. Such new claims

would typically be barred by the statute of limitations, unless the amendment relates back to

date of filing of the original complaint.

A federal cause of action under Section 1983 is governed by the relation back

provisions of California state law. Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 3 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Cir. 1989). The general rule in California is that an amended complaint that adds a new

defendant does not relate back to the date of the original complaint and the statute of

limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed. Woo v. Superior Court,

75 Cal. App. 4th 169, 176 (1999). A recognized exception, however, is “the substitution

under Section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original

complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint.” Id. “When

the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint

. . . and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and

when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended

accordingly. . . .” Cal. C.C.P. § 474 (2006). “If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied,

the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after

the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was

filed.” Woo, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 176 (citing Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 56

Cal.2d 596, 599 (1961)). 

Defendants contend that the FAC does not comply with section 474 because

defendants were added to the complaint rather than substituted for previously mentioned Doe

defendants. Defendants argue that because the FAC retains Does I through V, as well as

Does VI through X, along with the newly named individual defendants, it is evident that they

were added and not substituted. Defendants also emphasize that the summons issued to

Mineo and Verbeck were directed to them as individual defendants rather than as fictitious

defendants. 

Defendants rely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anderson v. Allstate Insurance Co.,

630 F.2d 677 (1980). There the court held that “the district court was not clearly wrong” in

concluding that the amendment did not relate back to the date of filing of the original

complaint because the defendants were added, not substituted. Id. at 683. The amended

complaint added defendants’ names to the list of previously named individual and corporate

defendants and retained the listing of the Doe defendants. Id. In addition, the summons

served on the defendants did not list them as Doe defendants. Id. The court rejected the

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 4 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

argument that plaintiffs’ failure to insert defendants as defendants previously named should

have been treated as a technical pleading defect. Id. The court stated that “‘some discipline

in pleading is still essential to the efficient processing of litigation.’” Id. (quoting Ingram v.

Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 483, 491 (3rd Dist. 1979)). 

Since Anderson however, California courts have been more lenient in applying the

requirements of section 474. Faced with similar facts to those in Anderson, the court in Woo

held that the defendant was substituted for a fictitious Doe defendant. Woo, 75 Cal. App. 4th

at 177. In Woo, the plaintiff did not identify the defendant as a substitute for a previously

named fictitious defendant and the summons identified him as an individual and not as a

defendant previously sued under a fictitious name. Id. at 176. The court specifically

addressed the admonition in Ingram regarding discipline in pleading and indicated that “the

courts of this state have considered noncompliance with the party substitution requirements

of section 474 as a procedural defect that could be cured and have been lenient in permitting

rectification of the defect.” Id. at 177 (citations omitted). The court, however, did indicate

that “in other cases the courts may well require strict compliance and counsel are advised to

follow the simple correct procedure for substituting a named defendant for a fictitious Doe

defendant.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has indicated that strict compliance with section 474 is not required. 

Lindley v. Gen. Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 801 (1986) (“[W]e do not agree that strict

compliance with section 474 is required”). “California’s policy in favor of litigating cases on

the merits requires that the fictitious name statute be liberally construed.” Id. (citing Barnes

v. Wilson, 40 Cal. App. 3d 199, 203 (1974)). In Lindley, however, the plaintiffs eliminated

the Doe defendants as named parties and stated in their Amended Memorandum of Points

and Authorities re Motion to Add Party Defendants that the parties were added in lieu of the

Doe designation. Id. at 801-02. 

In any event, the determination of whether the new defendants were added or

substituted is left to the Court’s discretion. Here, plaintiff did not reduce the number of Doe

defendants in the caption and did not make any reference to substituting the defendants for

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 5 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

any previously mentioned Doe defendants; indeed, the FAC still alleges that the identities of

Does I through V and VI through X are unknown and when known, the identified parties will

be substituted for the defendants Doe. See FAC ¶¶ 2-3. Additionally, the initial summons

named the defendants as individual defendants rather than as defendants previously sued

under fictitious names. 

Although plaintiff made no attempt to comply with section 474, even after defendants

brought the error to plaintiff’s attention, and in fact erroneously contends that he does not

need to comply with section 474, the Court is reluctant to dismiss the claims with prejudice. 

While plaintiff has not been diligent in prosecuting this action, the Court prefers to decide

this case, and in particular, this type of lawsuit, on the merits rather than on counsel’s failure

to follow procedural rules. Accordingly, the Court will grant plaintiff leave to file a Second

Amended Complaint that complies with section 474 and expressly substitutes the individual

defendants for the proper Doe defendants. 

B. Summary Judgment Motions

In the alternative, the individual defendants move for summary judgment on the

ground that plaintiff cannot show that they are liable for his injuries. 

1. Summary Judgment Standard

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A

party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial (usually the defendant) has the initial burden of producing evidence negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the non-moving party has no

obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. If, on the other hand,

the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then the non-moving party

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 6 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead

must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine issue of fact is one that

could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it could

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

2. Legal Standard

To prevail on a section 1983 claim based on prison medical treatment, a plaintiff must

show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1095

(9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “First, the plaintiff must

show a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”

Id. (citation omitted). “Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need

was deliberately indifferent.” Id. This prong “is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or

failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the

indifference.” Id.

In this case, it appears plaintiff was detained before being convicted of a crime; thus,

his right to adequate medical care derives from the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, N.W.,

290 F.3d 1175, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002). The due process right under the Fourteenth

Amendment, however, is at least as great as the corresponding right under the Eighth

Amendment. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187.

3. The Motions

a. Forbes and Azucenas

Defendants Forbes and Azucenas, both employees of Prison Health Services, Inc.,

move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff does not allege and cannot prove

that they were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs. Azucenas points out that

the FAC makes no allegations as to him, other than to list him as a defendant, and plaintiff

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 7 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

does not offer any evidence or even allegations against him in response to the motion to

dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. Accordingly, Azucenas’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED without leave to amend.

 The FAC alleges that defendant Forbes gave plaintiff a questionnaire “upon which

Plaintiff wrote that he” was under the care of a psychiatrist and had a prescription for Xanax. 

FAC ¶ 8. The declarations of defendants Mineo and Verbeck give rise to an inference that

Forbes was a prison nurse. Forbes does not dispute that plaintiff did not receive his

medication, despite plaintiff having notified Forbes–a nurse–that he was on such medication;

indeed, Forbes did not submit a declaration in support of his motion. In the absence of a

declaration as to what Forbes did once he learned that plaintiff was taking a prescription

medication, the Court cannot conclude that he was not deliberately indifferent as a matter of

law. Accordingly, at this early stage in the proceedings, Forbes’ motion must be denied. 

b. Verbeck and Mineo

The FAC alleges, and Deputy Mineo concedes, that while Deputy Mineo was

screening plaintiff at the Jail, plaintiff informed Mineo that he had a prescription for Xanax

for a nerve disorder. Deputy Mineo moves for summary judgment on the ground that such

allegation is wholly insufficient to support a claim for deliberate indifference, especially in

light of the undisputed evidence that once Deputy Mineo learned of plaintiff’s prescription,

the Deputy summoned a Prison Health Services nurse to complete plaintiff’s intake process. 

Such conduct does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference as a matter of law.

Plaintiff offers evidence that when Deputy Verbeck arrested plaintiff at his home,

plaintiff asked to take his medicine and Verbeck said no. He also offers evidence that when

Deputy Verbeck would not allow him to take his medicine, plaintiff asked that the medicine

be taken with him to jail and, again, Verbeck said no without any further inquiry. Indeed,

Deputy Verbeck refused even when plaintiff explained that he did not need to carry the

medicine himself, but asked the officer to carry it to the jail so that jail personnel could verify

from the bottle the name of the prescribing doctor, the dosage amount, and times that it

should be taken. Lester Decl. ¶ 4.

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 8 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Verbeck denies that plaintiff asked about his medication, but, recognizing that the

Court must accept Lester’s testimony, argues that even if he did so refuse, such conduct is

insufficient to support a finding of deliberate indifference. He declares that it was against the

policy of the Alameda Country Sheriff’s Office to allow a detainee to take medication, and

contends that under Jail policy, “medication brought by a prisoner would not be given to the

prisoner, but rather, if medication were required it would be obtained and administered from

a reliable and verifiable source such as the jail pharmacy.” Declaration of Gerald Verbeck

¶ 13. He also argues that, at a minimum, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Verbeck does not explain what the Sheriff Department’s policy was with respect to an

arrestee’s request that the officer transport his medication to the jail to facilitate the

continuation of medical care. Such a request is reasonable on its face, especially when the

detainee is arrested at home on a Saturday morning; jail personnel will most likely not be

able to contact the prescribing doctor to verify the prescription. And there is nothing in the

record that suggests that the Jail would give a detainee a prescription medicine based solely

on the detainee advising jail personnel that he had such a prescription. In any event, on the

very limited record before the Court, the Court cannot conclude that Deputy Verbeck’s flat

refusal to bring plaintiff’s medication to the jail did not amount to deliberate indifference. 

The Court recognizes that Deputy Verbeck denies that plaintiff even told him about his

medication, but in light of Lester’s declaration, the Court must assume that plaintiff did make

such a request.

Deputy Verbeck also argues that, at a minimum, he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity “provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law;”

defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law

requires in any given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (internal quotation

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 9 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G:\CRBALL\2005\5201\orderresj1.wpd 10

marks and citation omitted). In light of the absence of any evidence of the policy

surrounding prescription medications and arrests, the Court must assume that it is the

Department’s policy to transport such medication to the jail, especially when the arrest is

made on a Saturday and jail personnel will most likely be unable to reach an arrestee’s

physician until Monday. The Court makes this assumption because any policy to the contrary

would be unreasonable, at least based on the limited information before the Court. Deputy

Verbeck’s conduct, then, would amount to an intentional violation of Department policy. In

these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that Deputy Verbeck is entitled to qualified

immunity. The record is simply too thin and there are too many unknowns.

C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

At the hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court advised the parties that it

was considering imposing sanctions on plaintiff for his repeated failure to abide by orders of

the Court. Upon further reflection the Court concludes that such failures, while wasting the

Court’s time, did not prejudice defendants as they had not yet been served.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Azucenas is DISMISSED without leave to amend,

and defendant Mineo’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The motions of

defendants Verbeck and Forbes are DENIED without prejudice.

Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint which properly substitutes

defendants Verbeck and Forbes within 30 days of the date of this Order. Service may be

made on defendants’ counsel and defendants need not answer. Plaintiff is warned that his

failure to comply with the above order will result in dismissal of Verbeck and Forbes on

statute of limitations grounds.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: Dec. 15, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 10 of 11
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G:\CRBALL\2005\5201\orderresj1.wpd 11

Case 3:05-cv-05201-CRB Document 78 Filed 12/15/06 Page 11 of 11