Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04058/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04058-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL RAY KITTERMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JERMEL THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-04058-SI 

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 13

On August 3, 2016, Magistrate Judge Laporte granted pro se plaintiff Michael Kitterman’s 

application to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 5. On August 24, 2016, prior to ordering 

service of process, Judge Laporte issued a report and recommendation (the “Report”) in this case, 

recommending that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety, with leave to amend 

only as to plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Dkt. No. 10. The Court adopted 

Judge Laporte’s Report on September 9, 2016. Dkt. No. 12. Plaintiff timely filed an Amended 

Complaint, Dkt. No. 13, which is now before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

BACKGROUND

The Antioch Police Department seized Plaintiff Michael Kitterman’s personal computer on 

August 22, 2013, and the police continued to hold his computer while they “were investigating 

Plaintiff’s sister who was arrested for drug sales.” Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 13) at 4. Defendant 

Jermel Thomas, a public defender, represented Plaintiff in the related state court criminal case in 

Contra Costa County. Id. at 3. Defendant argued “in a Motion to Traverse and Quash Document” 

filed in Plaintiff’s state criminal case “that there was never a showing of probable cause for 

suspicion of her client Michael Kitterman, the Plaintiff, and that police had illegally seized the 

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computer in question and other property owned by the Plaintiff.” Id. at 4.

“[I]n the midst of plea bargain negotiations,” on June 12, 2015, Plaintiff emailed 

Defendant and asked whether the district attorney had agreed to return his personal computer upon 

a guilty plea. Id. at 3-4. Defendant “informed . . . Plaintiff several days later that she had 

‘ordered’ the police to search his computer and the police had decided that the computer would not 

be returned . . . .” Id. at 4. The search took place after Plaintiff met with Defendant and she

“questioned [him] regarding the existence of any information on the seized computer that . . . 

Plaintiff might be able to use for criminal activity.” Id. Defendant “initiated the search without 

seeking the consent of the Plaintiff[,] . . . without [his] knowledge,” and the search was of no value 

to his defense. Id. at 5. Defendant “ordered” officers to conduct the search “without judicial 

authority or a valid search warrant.” Id. 

LEGAL STANDARD

When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court may screen the complaint and 

dismiss the action where the action is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal on these grounds often occurs prior to the issuance of 

process, “so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such 

complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a 

frivolous claim is one that lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Id. at 325. 

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff must allege “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires plaintiff to allege facts that add up to 

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” plaintiff 

must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555, 570. In deciding whether plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, the court must assume that plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable 

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inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (“[W]here the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, 

[our obligation is] to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any 

doubt.”). “A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it 

is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 

1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). When dismissing a pro se complaint with leave to 

amend, “the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint 

in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 

1212 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint did so 

with prejudice as to Plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Dkt. 

Nos. 10, 12. Accordingly, the Court hereby STRIKES the 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(6) claims in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. The Court will focus its discussion on 

Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, his attorney in a prior state court criminal case, ordered 

“the Antioch police . . . to conduct a search of [his] computer in violation of federal law” during 

those state criminal proceedings. Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 13) at 6. Plaintiff further alleges that 

Defendant conspired with Antioch Police to deprive him of his constitutional rights under the 

Fourth Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983. See id. at 5-6.

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 

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violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant ordered police to search his 

computer without a warrant and without his consent in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As 

such, the Court's analysis focuses on the second element; namely, whether Plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient facts to state a plausible claim that Defendant was acting under color of state law.

“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s 

traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding” and is therefore not 

subject to suit under section 1983 based on actions performed in this capacity. Polk Cnty. v. 

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Even if a public defender was negligent in her representation 

of a defendant, the public defender is not liable under section 1983. See Miranda v. Clark Cnty., 

Nev., 319. F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding state public defender, although grossly 

deficient in performing traditional lawyer functions, was not state actor subject to liability under 

section 1983).

However, public defenders are not immune from liability under section 1983 for certain 

intentional misconduct, such as conspiring with prosecutors to wrongfully convict a defendant. 

See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984); see also Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (“A private individual may be liable under § 1983 if she conspired or entered joint 

action with a state actor.”). To state a claim for conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights 

under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “specific facts to support the existence of the claimed 

conspiracy.” Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989); Buckey v. Cnty. of L.A., 

968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). To prove a conspiracy, the plaintiff “must show an agreement 

or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know 

the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the 

conspiracy.” Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 

1541 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant conspired with Antioch Police in executing an unlawful 

search of his personal computer nearly two years after police seized the computer. Plaintiff 

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alleges that Defendant willfully participated in this violation of Plaintiff’s rights because 

Defendant “ordered” the purportedly unlawful search.

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff 

has failed to state a facially plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. From the 

allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, it is unclear whether Defendant ordered the search of 

Plaintiff’s computer in the course of performing traditional lawyer functions. See Polk Cnty., 454 

U.S. at 325. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing an agreement or meeting of the minds 

between Defendant and police in conducting the unlawful search, or the existence of a common 

conspiratorial objective. Plaintiff’s allegations as to the existence of a conspiracy are merely 

conclusory. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED, with leave to 

amend.

If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he must allege additional facts, to 

the extent he is able, describing his state court criminal proceeding, the seizure and subsequent 

search of his personal computer during the state court proceeding, and facts demonstrating a 

conspiracy between police and Defendant to conduct the unlawful search that forms the basis of 

Plaintiff’s complaint.

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1985

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 1985 proscribes

conspiracies to interfere with or intimidate public officials, jurors, or voters, and conspiracies to 

deprive certain persons of equal protection rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiff alleges no such 

conspiracy or violation of his rights and his claim in this regard is frivolous. Neitzke, 490 U.S. 

at 325. The Court finds that permitting amendment as to Plaintiff’s section 1985 claim would be 

futile and, accordingly, DISMISSES this claim with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead his claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1983 and 1985. Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is hereby DISMISSED, with leave to 

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amend. Amendment of Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim would be futile and, therefore, this 

claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

If he wishes to amend his complaint in accordance with this order, Plaintiff must file 

his second amended complaint no later than October 21, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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