Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00791/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00791-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRIAN DEVERICK LEWIS, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

CATES, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: 15-cv-791-DMS-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

PARTIAL MOTION TO 

DISMISS COMPLAINT 

[ECF No. 9] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Dana M. Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and that Claims 

One and Three be dismissed with leave to amend as specified below. 

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Federal Proceedings 

Plaintiff Brian Deverick Lewis (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 3). On April 9, 

2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF 

No. 1). Plaintiff also asserts jurisdiction under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), the Religious Land 

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et 

seq. (“RLUIPA”), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. (Id. at 1). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth three claims alleging his 

constitutional rights were violated when prison personnel: (1) assigned 

him to Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”) for twenty days because 

the prison lacked proper accommodations for his disability and denied 

release despite his repeated requests; (2) denied him a religious meal 

despite his repeated requests; and (3) returned him to Ad-Seg for an 

additional thirty-two days because the prison again lacked proper 

accommodations for his disability. (Id. at 3-11). Plaintiff asks the 

Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1367 over an additional negligence claim arising from the denial of his 

religious meal. (Id. at 1, 9). 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring Defendants to 

accommodate his religious diet, damages in the sum of $50,000 and 

declaratory relief that he is entitled to receive a religious meal while he 

is a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) 

inmate. (Id. at 13). 

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On September 14, 2015, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to 

Dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 9). Defendants do not challenge 

Plaintiff’s second claim, negligence claim, RLUIPA or ADA claims. On 

October 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File 

Opposition. (ECF No. 12). The Court granted the Motion and gave 

Plaintiff until October 30, 2015, to file an opposition. (ECF No. 13). On 

November 8, 2015, the date of his signature on the proof of service, 

Plaintiff filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 14 at 7). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (internal 

quotations omitted). The pleader must provide the Court with “more 

than an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements will not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] 

must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [a court 

is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). 

A pro se pleading is construed liberally on a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 

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895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cnty., 88 F.3d 804, 807 

(9th Cir. 1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in his 

complaint that bring his claims “across the line from conceivable to 

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A court “may not supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. 

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

III. DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff claims he exhausted all available administrative 

remedies and complied with the California Government Tort Claims 

Act. (ECF No. 1 at 12). Defendants do not challenge these assertions. 

A. Claim One: Due Process 

 1. Background Facts 

 All facts are taken from the Complaint and are not to be construed 

as findings by the Court. 

On June 19, 2012, CDCR staff designated Plaintiff as disabled. 

(Id. at 3 ¶ 1). Plaintiff does not specify the exact nature of his disability 

but claims he has a mental illness requiring medication. (Id. at 5 ¶ 33, 

11 ¶ 97). Plaintiff was transferred from California Men’s Colony State 

Prison to Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) due to his 

disabled designation. (Id. ¶ 2). Plaintiff was placed in Ad-Seg upon his 

arrival at RJD on September 14, 2012. (Id. ¶ 3, 4). Plaintiff claims he 

was placed in Ad-Seg because RJD did not have the space available in 

the general prison population housing to accommodate Plaintiff’s 

disability. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges his disability requires him to be in 

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“Lower Bunk Lower Tier” housing. (Id. ¶ 2). Plaintiff does not allege 

that his Ad-Seg cell was not handicap accessible. 

 On September 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Form 3030 religious meal 

request and a Form 22 appeal requesting a religious meal, clothing, 

reading and writing materials and release from Ad-Seg. (Id. ¶ 5). 

Plaintiff addressed these appeals to Defendants RJD Warden Daniel 

Paramo and CDCR Chaplain Alan Khan. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7, 6 ¶ 35). Neither 

Paramo nor Khan responded. (Id. ¶ 8). 

 On September 17, 2012, Captain Sanchez spoke with Plaintiff 

about his Ad-Seg placement. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff requested immediate 

release from Ad-Seg. (Id. at 4 ¶ 10). Sanchez told Plaintiff that due to 

RJD’s inability to properly accommodate his disability in the general 

population he would remain in Ad-Seg. (Id. ¶ 11). 

 Plaintiff alleges San Diego, California experienced two heat waves 

between September 14 and September 30, 2012. (Id. ¶ 16). RJD AdSeg does not have an air-conditioning system and Plaintiff alleges that, 

during the heat waves, the temperature in Plaintiff’s cell would rise 

above ninety degrees for several hours each day. (Id. ¶¶ 17-20). 

Plaintiff asserts that RJD had a heat plan to mitigate heat problems 

but Ad-Seg staff failed to implement it. (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff claims he 

began to experience migraine headaches, as reflected in his medical 

records. (Id. ¶ 22). 

On September 26, 2012, Plaintiff became “intensely distraught” 

about his Ad-Seg confinement. (Id. ¶ 14). On September 27, 2012, 

Plaintiff submitted a Form 22 appeal to Paramo requesting release from 

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Ad-Seg and a religious meal. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff also submitted Form 

602 grievances to the Ad-Seg lieutenant and sergeant requesting 

release from Ad-Seg. (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff contemplated suicide. (Id. at 

5 ¶ 23). Plaintiff notified Correctional Officer Russell during a security 

check that he was suicidal but was ignored. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25). 

 On October 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in state court complaining of his Ad-Seg confinement. (Id. ¶ 26). 

In his petition, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants confined him to AdSeg, denied him a religious meal and were deliberately indifferent to his 

mental health. (Id. ¶ 27, 6 ¶ 36). Plaintiff served Paramo with a copy 

of the petition on October 2, 2012, and also filed a Form 602 grievance 

requesting immediate release from Ad-Seg and a religious meal. (Id. ¶¶ 

28-29). 

 After twenty days in Ad-Seg, Plaintiff was released into the 

general prison population on October 2, 2012, and he reported to CDCR 

medical staff. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31). Plaintiff claims medical staff determined 

his mental condition had deteriorated during his stay in Ad-Seg and 

doubled his psychotropic medications. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33). 

2. Summary of Arguments 

 Plaintiff claims prison personnel violated his Due Process rights 

by placing him in Ad-Seg due to his disability. (ECF No. 1 at 3). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1983 because 

prisoners do not have a protected liberty interest in avoiding Ad-Seg 

placement. (ECF No. 9 at 4). 

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 3. Analysis 

To plead a civil rights violation under § 1983, Plaintiff must 

allege: (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and United 

States law; and (2) that a person acting under color of state law 

committed the violation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Plaintiff adequately alleges the second element because all Defendants 

are California state employees and acted in the course of their 

employment at CDCR. His claim turns on whether his Due Process 

rights were violated by his Ad-Seg placement. 

A plaintiff alleging his Due Process rights were violated must 

meet two elements: (1) there is a protected liberty interest; and (2) the 

plaintiff was deprived of that interest without due process. Bd. of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The “range of interests 

protected by procedural due process is not infinite . . . . Due Process is 

required only when a decision of the State implicates an interest within 

the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ingraham v. Wright, 

430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-571). 

In Claim One, Plaintiff raises three Due Process challenges: the 

non-response to his grievances, the denial of his religious meal and the 

twenty-day Ad-Seg placement. 

 a. Grievance Process 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Paramo and Khan failed to respond to 

his grievances within the specified three-day time period regarding his 

Ad-Seg placement and denial of his religious meal. (ECF No. 1 at 3 ¶¶ 

5-8). 

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It is well established that state prisoners do not have a recognized 

liberty interest in prison grievance procedures. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding failure of prison officials to 

properly implement administrative appeals process in the prison does 

not give rise to constitutional concerns). A prisoner has “no legitimate 

claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure.” Mann v. Adams, 855 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (reh’g denied). Plaintiff’s claim for denial 

of Due Process resulting from the failure of Paramo or Khan to respond 

to his grievances fails as a matter of law. Because Plaintiff cannot add 

new allegations that would establish a liberty interest in the grievance 

process, leave to amend this claim as to the grievance process should 

not be granted. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Claim One without leave to 

amend to the extent it rests upon Defendants’ failure to respond to 

Plaintiff’s grievances. 

 b. Religious Meal 

To the extent Plaintiff has a liberty interest in receiving a 

religious meal, this claim is subsumed within Plaintiff’s second claim 

for violation of his freedom of religion. Because Defendants do not 

challenge Claim Two, this Court does not address it. 

 c. Ad-Seg Placement 

Plaintiff claims that his placement in Ad-Seg violated his Due 

Process rights. (ECF No. 1 at 3-5). 

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 i. Liberty Interest 

“Confinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the 

normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized 

the State to impose.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). 

“Typically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate 

a protected liberty interest.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 

(9th Cir. 2003). “It is plain that the transfer of an inmate to less 

amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well 

within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison 

sentence . . . . [A]dministrative segregation is the sort of confinement 

that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in 

their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) 

(abrogated on other grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). 

But a protected liberty interest is properly pled when a Plaintiff 

alleges facts showing that his confinement in Ad-Seg “imposes atypical 

and significant hardship on [] [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; and see Serrano, 345 F.3d at 

1079. 

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts in his pleading to show he 

endured an atypical and significant hardship. Specifically, he does not 

allege what his disability is, that his Ad-Seg housing was not handicap 

accessible, or that he endured anything different from and worse than 

non-disabled Ad-Seg inmates endured. The Court is left to guess that 

the alleged disability is his mental condition, and his description of how 

Ad-Seg placement aggravated his mental condition is threadbare. 

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Further, the United States Supreme Court has found that a stay 

in Ad-Seg of one month or less does not implicate a protected liberty 

interest. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (citing Sandin, 

515 U.S. at 485). Plaintiff admits that his stay in Ad-Seg lasted only 

twenty days. (ECF No. 1 at 5 ¶ 30). Plaintiff’s stay in Ad-Seg does not 

implicate a liberty interest based solely on the length of his confinement 

there. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (stating that a prisoner’s 

confinement to Ad-Seg for thirty days is neither atypical of confinement 

in Ad-Seg nor causes major disruption in a prisoner’s environment); see 

also Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (stays in Ad-Seg of one month or less 

without more do not give rise to a protected liberty interest). Because 

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show he had a protected 

liberty interest in avoiding Ad-Seg placement, his Due Process claim 

fails. 

ii. Deprived of Due Process 

 Further, Plaintiff’s own admissions establish he received the due 

process that he alleges he was entitled to receive. When a prisoner is 

confined to Ad-Seg, prison officials are required to provide the prisoner 

with "an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting 

[his] administrative confinement, including whatever statement [he] 

wishe[s] to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to 

administrative segregation." Helms, 459 U.S. at 472. In the prison 

context, providing a prisoner such notice and hearing satisfies Due 

Process. Id. 

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 Plaintiff argues that prison officials were required to respond to 

his grievances concerning his Ad-Seg placement within three days. 

(ECF No. 1 at 3-4 ¶ 8). By Plaintiff’s own admission, Sanchez notified 

Plaintiff why he was in Ad-Seg within three days of being placed there. 

(Id. ¶¶ 9-11). Sanchez’s review was informal and non-adversarial; he 

informed Plaintiff why he had been temporarily confined to Ad-Seg, 

when he could reasonably expect to be released and took Plaintiff’s 

statement that he wanted to be immediately released. (Id. at 3-4 ¶¶ 9-

11). Plaintiff’s allegation that prison officials did not respond to his 

grievance within three days is contradicted by Plaintiff’s statement that 

Sanchez spoke to him about the complaints in his grievance regarding 

Ad-Seg placement within two days. (Id. at 3 ¶¶ 6, 9). Defendants gave 

Plaintiff the notice and hearing Due Process would require in this 

context if he had stated a protected liberty interest. See Helms, 459 

U.S. at 472. Because Plaintiff’s own admissions establish he was not 

deprived of Due Process for the wrongs alleged in the pleading, his 

claim fails. 

 iii. Proposed Amendments 

 In his Opposition, Plaintiff alleges new facts which could 

potentially revive his claim regarding his liberty interest in avoiding 

Ad-Seg placement. (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff’s proposed amendments 

allege that the CDCR has policies and rules in place prohibiting the 

placement of disabled inmates in Ad-Seg due to lack of bed-space. (Id. 

at 2-3). He alleges in his Opposition that these policies and rules create 

a liberty interest. (Id.). Further, Plaintiff identifies procedures that 

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CDCR is required to follow when such an event occurs that would 

expedite release from Ad-Seg. (Id. at 2); see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 

480, 488 (1980) (“[S]tate statutes may create liberty interests that are 

entitled to procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment.”). Plaintiff’s proposed amendments suggest 

amendment of Claim One may not be futile. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Claim One and that Claim One 

be DISMISSED with leave to amend to the extent it alleges a liberty 

interest in avoiding administrative segregation placement that imposes 

an atypical and significant hardship on Plaintiff. 

B. Claim Two: Freedom of Religion 

 Defendants do not challenge Claim Two for violation of Plaintiff’s 

freedom of religion. 

C. Claim Three: Due Process against Defendants Cates and 

Paramo

 1. Statement of Facts 

 On May 9, 2013, Plaintiff was returned to Ad-Seg pending 

availability of housing in the general population that could 

accommodate his disability. (Id. at 10 ¶¶ 82-83). Plaintiff objected and 

requested immediate release. (Id. ¶¶ 84-85). 

 Between May 9 and June 10, 2013, Plaintiff requested to be 

released from Ad-Seg at least ten times. (Id. ¶ 90). On May 30, 2013, 

Plaintiff tried to facilitate his release from Ad-Seg by having his 

disabled designation removed. (Id. ¶ 88). Plaintiff claims he was 

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willing to suffer physical pain to facilitate his release. (Id. ¶ 89). RJD 

granted Plaintiff’s reclassification to non-disabled and released Plaintiff 

from Ad-Seg on June 10, 2013. (Id. ¶ 91). 

2. Summary of Arguments 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants CDCR Director Mathew Cates 

and RJD Warden Paramo implemented a classification system that 

resulted in his Ad-Seg placement based solely on his disability. (Id. at 

11 ¶ 93). Plaintiff further alleges that both Cates and Paramo knew 

about RJD’s housing problem prior to his transfer and that Plaintiff 

would have to be placed in Ad-Seg because of his disability. (Id. ¶ 94). 

Plaintiff also claims Cates and Paramo never took him to classification, 

thereby denying him certain privileges which “inmates that were 

housed in Ad-Seg for disciplinary reason[s] were able to enjoy.” (Id. ¶ 

95). Plaintiff alleges that Cates and Paramo intentionally 

discriminated against him by placing him in Ad-Seg solely because of 

his disability and that they were aware that if they placed him in AdSeg his mental illness would worsen. (Id. ¶¶ 96-97). 

Defendants argue that the claim against Cates should be 

dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege Cates’ personal involvement 

in the alleged constitutional violations and also argue Plaintiff fails to 

plead a liberty interest in avoiding Ad-Seg placement. (ECF No. 9 at 3, 

4). 

Plaintiff names Cates in his individual and official capacities and 

Paramo only in his individual capacity. (ECF No. 1 at 2). Plaintiff 

identifies Paramo as “acting under color of law As Warden of A State of 

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California Prison.” (Id.). Given the duty of the Court to liberally 

construe pro se pleadings, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as 

naming Paramo in his official capacity as well. Thompson, 295 F.3d at 

895. 

3. Analysis 

 a. Individual Capacity 

A state official may be held liable for his own conduct when sued 

in his individual capacity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991). 

Individual liability in a § 1983 action attaches only if the plaintiff can 

show the defendant personally participated in the constitutional 

violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the actions of their 

subordinates under § 1983. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 

469, 479 (1986). Vague or conclusory allegations of supervisory 

misconduct are insufficient. Ivey, 376 F.2d at 268. It is not enough for 

a plaintiff to allege that a supervisory official is liable as an individual 

because he knew about the constitutional violation or created policies 

and procedures that resulted in the violation. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 

F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff must allege a “specific 

policy” or “specific event” instigated by the defendant official which gave 

rise to the constitutional violation. Id. 

 Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Cates was personally 

involved in his Ad-Seg placement. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Cates 

and Paramo created a “dangerous” classification system that resulted in 

Plaintiff’s Ad-Seg placement solely on the basis of his disability, refused 

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him access to certain privileges, knew RJD did not have adequate 

accommodation prior to his transfer, “intentionally” discriminated 

against him and were aware that if Plaintiff was housed in Ad-Seg his 

mental illness would worsen. (ECF No. 1 at 11 ¶¶ 93-97). But Plaintiff 

alleges no facts which could give rise to the inference that Cates was 

directly involved in his Ad-Seg placement or had any specific knowledge 

of his circumstances. The Court cannot provide the missing allegations. 

Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Plaintiff must provide the Court with “more than 

an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Plaintiff’s bald and conclusory allegations are 

insufficient to establish individual liability under [] § 1983.” Hydricks, 

669 F.3d at 942 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 In his Opposition, Plaintiff makes a new allegation that 

Defendant Cates’ office was required to review the placements of all 

prisoners placed in Ad-Seg due to their disabilities. (ECF No. 14 at 2). 

Plaintiff explains that the “Local Operating Procedure,” the “Armstrong 

Remedial Plan” and the “2007 Armstrong Injunction” required Cates’ 

office to perform an expedited review procedure for each disabled AdSeg prisoner. (Id. at 2-3). If Defendant Cates had to review each 

placement personally, then Plaintiff’s proposed amendment may be 

sufficient to revive his claim against Cates as an individual. 

Accordingly, amendment is not futile. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss this claim against Defendant Cates in his individual 

capacity be GRANTED without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

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 b. Official Capacity 

 State officials who impose allegedly harmful policies may only be 

sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief. Hafer, 

502 U.S. at 27. Money damages are not available against state officials 

for implementing allegedly harmful policies. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 170 (1985). 

 Plaintiff fails to request the appropriate relief. Plaintiff seeks 

$50,000 in money damages against Defendants. (ECF No. 1 at 13). 

Plaintiff cannot seek money damages from Defendants Cates or Paramo 

for acting in their official capacities. Will v. Michigan Dep’t. of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71; Graham, 473 U.S. at 170. Plaintiff’s request 

for money damages fails as a matter of law. 

 In addition, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief 

pertaining only to the denial of his religious meal. (ECF No. 1 at 13). 

Plaintiff does not seek injunctive and declaratory relief pertaining to 

this claim concerning his Ad-Seg placements. Even if Plaintiff had 

requested such relief, his request would be moot because “[o]n or about 

June 10, 2013 . . . [P]laintiff was released from Ad-Seg.” (Id. at 10 ¶ 

91); see McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 

2004) (holding a prisoner’s release from custody generally terminates 

his legal interest in prospective injunctive or declaratory relief as a 

matter of law). 

 In his Opposition, Plaintiff pinpoints CDCR policies that 

Defendants allegedly violated when they placed him in Ad-Seg based on 

his disability and the prison’s lack of bed space. (ECF No. 14 at 2-3). 

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Plaintiff names the policy, how it operates to protect disabled inmates 

from Ad-Seg placement and how Defendants violated the policy, thereby 

violating Plaintiff’s rights. (Id.). Plaintiff’s proposed amendments 

allege that it was Defendants’ “practice” to engage in such conduct. (Id. 

at 2). “[I]n an official-capacity suit the entity's policy or custom must 

have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 

166. Plaintiff’s new allegations, if added to an amended pleading, 

strengthen his claim but do not address the defect in his requested 

relief. Nevertheless, the Court recommends permitting leave to amend 

to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to seek prospective relief, such as an 

injunction requiring Defendants to restore his disability status without 

requiring Ad-Seg placement. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss Claim Three be GRANTED with leave to amend. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this 

Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING Defendants’ Partial 

Motion to Dismiss; and (3) DISMISSING:

 Claim One against all Defendants for denial of Due Process 

arising out of Plaintiff’s first Ad-Seg placement without 

leave to amend to the extent it alleges a liberty interest in 

the prison grievance process, but with leave to amend to the 

extent it alleges a liberty interest in avoiding administrative 

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segregation placement that imposes an atypical and 

significant hardship on Plaintiff; 

 Claim Three against Defendants Cates and Paramo for 

denial of Due Process arising out of Plaintiff’s subsequent 

Ad-Seg placement with leave to amend; and 

 Defendant Cates from the action without prejudice. 

If the Court’s recommendations are adopted, the following claims 

will remain PENDING: 

 Claim Two for violation of Plaintiff’s freedom of religion 

against Defendants Khan and Ojeda arising out of the denial 

of his religious meal; 

 Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Khan and Ojeda arising 

out of the denial of his religious meal; 

 Plaintiff’s claims arising under RLUIPA against Defendants 

Khan and Ojeda; and 

 Plaintiff’s claims arising under the ADA against Defendant 

Paramo. 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than December 23, 2015. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

January 4, 2016. The parties are advised that the failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

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objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 2, 2015 

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