Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00227/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00227-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Guy Garten, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

John Baldwin, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-13-227-PHX-ROS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Second Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which Petitioner challenges his

criminal convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court, State of Arizona, Case No. CR

2008-009415-001 DT. (Doc. 6) Respondents have filed an Answer to the Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Docs. 13, 14) As

explained below, this undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends the Second Amended

Petition be denied as untimely. 

I. Background

A. Trial and Sentencing

On December 24, 2008, the State of Arizona indicted Petitioner on seven counts of

Sexual Conduct with a Minor, Class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children

(Counts 1 and 6-11); two counts of Molestation of a Child, Class 2 felonies and dangerous

crimes against children (Counts 2 and 3); one count of Sexual Abuse, a Class 3 felony and

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Honorable Christopher T. Whitten presided over Petitioner’s change of plea and

sentencing hearings.

2

 Under Arizona law, by pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal.

See A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). 

- 2 -

and dangerous crime against children (Count 4); one count of Furnishing Obscene or

Harmful Items to Minors, a Class 4 felony (Count 5); and ten counts of Sexual Exploitation

of a Minor, Class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children (Counts 12-21). (Doc.

13, Exhibit (“Exh.”) A) The facts underlying the charges were derived from a police

investigation that revealed Plaintiff had sexual contact with a twelve and thirteen year old

girl. (Doc. 13, Exh. K) A summary of the Phoenix Police Departmental Reports regarding

the investigation is contained in the Presentence Investigation prepared by the Maricopa

County Adult Probation Department and need not be repeated here as it has no bearing on

the timeliness of the Second Amended Petition. (Id.)

On November 18, 2010, Petitioner entered a plea agreement in which he pled guilty

to Count 2, Molestation of a Child, amended Count 6, Attempted Molestation of a Child and

amended Count 12, Attempted Sexual Exploitation of a Minor. (Doc. 13, Exhs. H, I and J)

On December 21, 2010, the trial court1

 sentenced Petitioner to seventeen years in prison on

Count 2 and ordered the prison sentence to run consecutively to a twenty year prison

sentence previously imposed by the State of Iowa. (Doc. 13, Exhs. M, N) Additionally, the

trial court ordered Petitioner to serve concurrent terms of lifetime probation on Counts 6 and

12 to begin upon Petitioner’s discharge from prison. (Id.) 

B. State Post-Conviction Proceedings2

 On February 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 13,

Exh. Q) After the trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner, counsel requested, and

was granted, two extensions of time to file a petition because Petitioner had been moved back

to an Iowa prison. (Doc. 13, Exhs. S, U, V, W and X) On September 1, 2011, Petitioner’s

counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction Review by Counsel; Request for

45 Day Extension of Time to Allow Defendant to File Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 The docket reflects the petition was actually filed on February 4, 2013. (Doc. 1) The

January 18, 2013 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the petition, doc. 1 at 11, and

reflects the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date

it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149

n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003).

- 3 -

Relief. (Doc. 13, Exh. Y) In the Notice, counsel explained that after reviewing the record,

including the trial court’s minute entries, transcripts of the change-of-plea and sentencing

hearings, and correspondence from Petitioner, he could find no colorable claims to raise in

a post-conviction petition. (Id.) Pursuant to counsel’s request, the trial court then granted

Petitioner a forty-five day extension to file a pro se petition for post-conviction. (Doc. 13,

Exh. AA) When Petitioner failed to file a pro se petition, the trial court dismissed the postconviction proceeding in an order filed on November 25, 2011. (Doc. 13, Exh. EE)

Petitioner did not seek review of the trial court’s decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

(Doc. 13, Exh. FF) 

C. Federal Habeas Petition

On January 18, 2013, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

District Court.3

 (Doc. 1) After the assigned District Judge dismissed the original petition and

an amended petition, Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Docs. 3, 5 and 6) Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in the Second Amended Petition.

(Doc. 6 at 6-8) In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that, after he signed the plea agreement,

it was altered to require the Arizona prison sentence to begin after the Iowa prison sentence

is completed. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges his attorney told him there was a plea offer

that called for a ten-year prison sentence. Petitioner claims he was never given a copy of that

agreement. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on his

lawyer’s failure to raise at the sentencing hearing the issues Petitioner identifies in Grounds

One and Two. On August 20, 2013, Respondents filed their Answer to the Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 13) Petitioner then filed his Reply on October 4,

2013. (Doc. 14)

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 The AEDPA, which was signed into law on April 24, 1996, governs federal habeas

petitions filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327

(1997).

- 4 -

II. Discussion

Respondents argue the Second Amended Petition should be dismissed as time-barred

because it was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations period. Alternatively,

Respondents contend Petitioner failed to fairly present his claims in State court, rendering

them procedurally defaulted. Because the information presented clearly establishes the

Second Amended Petition was filed after the limitations period expired, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge finds the Second Amended Petition is barred and recommends it be denied

on that basis. It is, therefore, unnecessary to address Respondents’ alternative arguments.

A. Legal Standards

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”4

) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

“direct review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, in plea agreement cases, the judgment of

conviction becomes final upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review

of that proceeding or [upon] the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or

review.” Id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An application for post-conviction relief remains

“pending” for purposes of the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) until it achieves final

resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedure. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

219-220 (2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state

court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921,

925 (9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of postconviction relief is filed even though the petition itself may not be filed until later. Isley v.

Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that

Isley’s state petition was “pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and he was

entitled to tolling from the date when the Notice was filed. The district court erred in

dismissing his petition as untimely.”).

The AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner

must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way” that prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Limitations Period

Here, after Petitioner was sentenced on December 21, 2010, he filed a timely Notice

of Post-Conviction Relief on February 3, 2011. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (providing that

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Because Petitioner’s original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely, it is

unnecessary to decide whether Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus relates back to the date of the original under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

- 6 -

a petitioner has ninety days from the entry of judgment and sentence to file an “of-right”

petition for post-conviction relief). The post-conviction proceeding remained pending until

the trial court issued a dismissal order on November 25, 2011 after Petitioner failed to file

a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner then had thirty days to seek review of

the trial court’s decision, which he failed to do. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c) (providing that

a petitioner has thirty days from the trial court’s decision to file a petition for review). Thus,

the judgment of conviction became final, and the limitations period began to run, on

December 26, 2011, the day after the thirty-day period for seeking review expired. See

Summers, 481 F.3d at 711 (holding that a judgment of conviction pursuant to a guilty plea

becomes “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) upon the conclusion of a Rule 32 of-right

proceeding and review of that proceeding or upon the expiration of the time for seeking such

proceeding or review). The limitations period ran uninterrupted until it expired one year later

on December 26, 2012. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on January 18, 2013, more than

three weeks after the limitations period expired. The habeas petition is, therefore, untimely.5

2. Equitable Tolling

As referenced above, the limitations period set forth in § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling where a petitioner shows he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that

extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition. Holland, 130 S.Ct.

at 2562. Equitable tolling is applied sparingly, as reflected by the “extraordinary

circumstances” requirement. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.

2009). Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”) (citation omitted). An “external

force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely ‘oversight,

miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part.’” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

1011(quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)). A pro se petitioner’s

ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication do not constitute “extraordinary

circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006) (collecting cases from other circuits and holding that “a pro se petitioner’s lack

of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance”); see also Johnson v.

United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (in the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 context, rejecting

movant/prisoner’s attempt to justify his lack of diligence on his pro se status and lack of legal

sophistication and stating: “we have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural

ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for

promptness”); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n. 4 (“a pro se petitioner’s confusion or

ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling”), cert. denied,

558 U.S. 897 (2009). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of demonstrating

it is warranted in his habeas case. Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing,

inter alia, Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562).

Here, Petitioner fails to explicitly request equitable tolling in the Second Amended

Petition or in the Reply. In the section of the Second Amended Petition that directs Petitioner

to explain why the statute of limitations does not bar the petition, Petitioner states that

because he is in an Iowa prison, he has limited access to Arizona legal materials. (Doc. 6 at

11) He states he has to rely on others outside the prison to obtain addresses and other

information so he can send papers to the District Court. Petitioner repeats this explanation

in his Reply. (Doc. 14)

The undersigned Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner has failed to show he is entitled to

equitable tolling. Petitioner had from December 26, 2011 to December 26, 2012 to file his

habeas petition in this District Court. The only reasons he provides for his failure to file a

timely petition are that, as an Iowa prisoner, he has limited access to Arizona legal materials,

and he has to rely on people outside the prison for help. These reasons are insufficient to

satisfy the high standard for equitable tolling. These explanations fail to demonstrate

Petitioner has been pursuing his rights diligently and that extraordinary circumstances

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

prevented him from filing a timely petition. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the limitations period. 

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner submitted his initial

habeas petition after the limitations period expired, and the circumstances do not support the

application of equitable tolling. Consequently, the Second Amended Petition is barred by the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 6, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Second

Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find

the procedural ruling debatable.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

DATED this 14th day of March, 2014.

Case 2:13-cv-00227-ROS Document 18 Filed 03/14/14 Page 9 of 9