Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05371/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05371-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN R. GHOLAR, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

ALLEN K. SCRIBNER, WARDEN, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:03-cv-05371-AWI-DLB-HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 35)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ENTER

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On January 31, 2005, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and

Recommendations that recommended the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED, and judgment be entered in favor of Respondent. 

These Findings and Recommendations were served on all parties and

contained notice that any objections were to be filed within thirty

(30) days from the date of service of that order. On February 10,

2005, Petitioner filed a motion to extend time. On March 7, 2005,

the court granted Petitioner an additional thirty (30) days within

which to respond. On April 14, 2005, Petitioner filed objections

to the Findings and Recommendations.

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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de novo review of the case. 

Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including Petitioner's

objections, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendation are supported by the record and proper

analysis. Petitioner's objections present no grounds for

questioning the Magistrate Judge's analysis.

Petitioner contends in his objections, as he did in his

petition, that there was insufficient evidence to convict him

because the victim lacked credibility. Viewing the evidence as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was

sufficient evidence such that a rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The court

must respect the jury's determination of the credibility of

witnesses, to resolve evidentiary conflicts, and to draw reasonable

inferences from proven facts by assuming the jury resolved all

conflicts in a manner supporting the verdict. Walter v. Maass, 45

F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Goode, 814 F.2d

1353, 1355 (9th Cir.1987); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

330 (1995) (stating that under Jackson, "assessment of the

credibility of witnesses is generally beyond the scope of review").

Thus, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on the ground

that there was insufficient credible evidence to support the

verdict. 

Petitioner also contends that his prior conviction for sodomy

should not have been used to enhance his sentence. Petitioner

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 Three Justices in Lackawanna recognized two additional

exceptions: (1) when a state court refuses, "without justification,"

to rule on a constitutional claim that has been properly presented to

it and (2) when a defendant obtains "compelling evidence that he is

actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted" after the

time for direct or collateral review has expired that could not have

been uncovered in a timely manner. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 405

(plurality opinion). Because these additional exceptions were not

agreed on by a majority of the Supreme Court, they cannot serve as the

basis for habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (allowing habeas

relief if the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court).

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points out that the victim in Petitioner's prior case testified in

this action that no sodomy ever occurred. As explained by the

Magistrate Judge, where, as here, a petitioner's state court

conviction is used to enhance a criminal sentence, the petitioner

"may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under §

2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally

obtained." Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394,

403-04 (2001). A habeas petitioner may not collaterally challenge

a prior conviction which is "no longer open to direct or collateral

attack in its own right," unless "there was a failure to appoint

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 404.1 Because

Petitioner's challenge to his prior conviction is based on

sufficiency of the evidence and there is no argument Petitioner was

not represented by counsel, Lackawanna's "failure to appoint

counsel" exception does not apply. Petitioner is precluded from

collaterally attacking his prior conviction through this section

2254 petition.

Petitioner also objects to the Magistrate Judge's findings

regarding the testimony of the victim in the prior case. 

Petitioner claims that allowing the victim in the prior case to

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 The court notes that Petitioner is challenging the admission of

the prior victim's testimony and not the jury instructions given

regarding her testimony. See Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9th

Cir. 2004) (discussing legality of CALJIC No. 2.50.01). Regardless

of whether such a claim could be implied, a claim concerning the jury

instructions has never been presented to the California Supreme Court

and is thus unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (petition for writ

of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless the petitioner has

“exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). 

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testify improperly influenced the jury to convict in this case.2

The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the state trial

court's admission into evidence of Petitioner's prior sexual

offenses did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. The

evidence was admitted under California Evidence Code § 1108 to show

Petitioner's propensity to commit the charged offense. The prior

offences were factually similar to the current charge of a lewd

act with a child under fourteen, they were not too remote in time,

and the evidence of them was reliable. See United States v. LeMay

III, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027-29 (9th Cir.2001). Thus, the court agrees

that the admission of evidence of prior sexual assaults did not

violate Petitioner's constitutional rights.

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that the

prosecutor did not commit misconduct by introducing false

testimony. Petitioner cites to alleged inconsistencies in the

victim's testimony. As explained by the Magistrate Judge, a

petitioner is only entitled to habeas corpus relief if the

prosecutor’s misconduct so infected “ the trial with unfairness as

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). “To

constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct

must be "of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the

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defendant's right to a fair trial." Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756,

765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 (1987). A conviction obtained by the

knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and must be

set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony affected the judgment of the jury. United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80 (1985). Mere inconsistencies in

testimony do not establish that the prosecution presented false

testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420,

1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (inconsistencies between testimony at trial

and retrial did not amount to presentation of false testimony);

United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1992)

(inconsistencies with testimony of witnesses did not amount to

presentation of false testimony). "Lawyers in criminal cases, for

prosecution and defense, sometimes swim in a sea of lies, and must

necessarily trust the jury to determine what is true, or whether

reasonable doubt remains about what is true." Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d at

1423. The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the

prosecutor did not knowingly present false testimony by allowing

the victim to testify despite inconsistences in her statements.

Accordingly, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that

Petitioner has not shown the state court's adjudication of

Petitioner's claims was contrary to, involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law, or resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendation, filed January 31, 2005,

are ADOPTED IN FULL;

2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED; and,

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3. The Clerk of Court ENTER judgment in favor of Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2005 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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