Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00792/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00792-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, all referenced exhibits are those attached to Respondent’s Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dennis Robert Smith,

Petitioner,

v. 

Deputy Warden Bock, et al.,

Respondents. ______________________________________

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CV 08-792 PHX-SRB (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Dennis Robert Smith’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (Docket No. 1). In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United

States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was

referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. Respondents filed their

answer on September 4, 2008. (Docket No. 12). Petitioner filed a reply on October 7, 2008

(Docket No. 14). As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2003, the State filed an indictment in Maricopa County Superior Court

charging Petitioner with three counts of sexual conduct with a minor and four counts of

sexual exploitation of a minor. (Ex. A at 1).1

 On June 3, 2003, upon written motion of

defense counsel, the trial court ordered that Petitioner be evaluated for “sanity as well as

competency.” (Ex. C). The Order for Competency Screening Evaluation Report ordered

counsel to provide the Superior Court Forensic Services Unit with copies of police reports,

charging documents and criminal history. (Id.) It also ordered that the Correctional Health

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Services permit the mental health expert to view Petitioner’s jail medical file. (Id.) On June

6, 2003, the court found that based on the Psychological Pre-Evaluation, further evaluation

was not warranted. (Ex. D). 

On June 23, 2003, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to one count

of sexual conduct with a minor and dangerous crime against a child in the first degree (count

1) and two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor and dangerous crime against a

child in the second degree (counts 2 and 3 as amended). (Ex. E). On September 16, 2003,

the trial court made a finding that Petitioner “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived

all pertinent constitutional and appellate rights and entered a plea of guilty.” (Ex. F). He was

sentenced to 20 years on count 1 and lifetime probation on counts 2 and 3 as amended. (Id.)

On September 24, 2003, Petitioner filed his notice of post-conviction relief (Ex. H)

and counsel was appointed (Ex. I). On February 2, 2004, counsel informed the trial court

that she had reviewed all minute entries, transcripts and correspondence from the Petitioner

and was not able to find any claims for relief to raise in post-conviction relief proceedings.

(Ex. J). Counsel requested that the Court extend the time for filing for 45 days so Petitioner

could file a Rule 32 in propria persona. (Id.) The trial court acknowledged counsel’s

notice, ordered counsel to remain on the case as advisory counsel and gave Petitioner until

March 23, 2004, to file a pro per petition for post-conviction relief. (Exs. K and L). On April

13, 2004, the trial court dismissed the action because the deadline had passed and Petitioner

had not filed a petition. (Ex. L). Petitioner did not file a motion for rehearing or

reconsideration of that dismissal. 

On November 30, 2005, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief

alleging that his sentence was excessive and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. (Ex.

M). On December 8, 2005, the trial court dismissed the action noting that relief was

precluded because Petitioner should have raised the issue in the first Rule 32 proceeding.

(Ex. N). On April 19, 2006, Petitioner filed a third notice of post-conviction relief alleging

that ineffective counsel (Ex. O) and on May 11, 2006, the court dismissed the action on

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similar grounds. (Ex. P). Petitioner’s motions for reconsideration of the dismissals were

denied by the trial court (Exs. Q and R) as were Petitioner’s requests for review by the

Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court (Exs. U and V). 

On April 4, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant Petition alleging three bases for relief:

Fifth Amendment due process deprivation of property; Fourth Amendment unreasonable

search and seizure; and Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel. (Docket No. 1.)

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A petition for

writ of habeas corpus must be filed within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). The one

year limitations period begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction became final

in state court or the expiration of the time available to seek direct review. 28 U.S.C. §

2241(d)(1)(A). In Arizona, Rule 32 of-right proceedings are a form of direct review, thus

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the

Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time

for seeking such proceeding or review. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir.

2007). A Rule 32 of-right proceeding is commenced by filing a notice of post-conviction

relief with the court in which the conviction occurred within ninety days after the entry of

judgment. Ariz.R.Crim.P.32.4(a).

Here, Petitioner filed his first notice of post-conviction relief on September 24, 2003.

Counsel was appointed but was unable to find any viable claims for relief and after informing

the court continued to represent Petitioner on an advisory basis. The trial court gave

Petitioner until March 23, 2004 to file a pro per petition. He did not file the petition and on

April 13, 2004, the trial court dismissed his post-conviction proceeding. Petitioner did not

file a motion for rehearing within the required 15 days, or by April 28, 2004. Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.9(a). Instead, he filed two untimely post-conviction proceedings, neither of which tolled

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the running of the one-year limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir. 2003) (A state petition filed after the expiration of AEDPA’s one year period

does not reinstate the limitations period that ended before the state petition was filed.); and

Cordle v. Guarino, 428 F.3d 46, 48, n.4 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Section 2244(d)(2) only stops, but

does not reset, the [AEDPA] clock from ticking and cannot revive a time period that has

already expired.”) 

Petitioner was therefore required to file his federal habeas petition on or before April

28, 2005. He filed this Petition on April 24, 2008, almost three years after the limitations

period expired. Thus, the instant petition is untimely, unless Petitioner can establish

equitable tolling. 

Equitable tolling is applicable only when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)). Equitable

tolling is justified in few cases: “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

the AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule." Id. A petitioner bears the

burden of showing that equitable tolling is warranted. Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1065. A

petitioner must show that the extraordinary circumstances “were the cause of his

untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, Petitioner does not challenge Respondent’s assertion that his habeas petition

was not timely filed. He does explain, however, that he could not file his Petition because

he “does not understand law and legal research and . . . could not find a jail house lawyer that

he could trust with his information about his case.” (Docket No. 14). The Ninth Circuit has

held that a petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary measure

warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006)

(Raspberry was unable to correctly calculate a limitations period). Other circuits have made

similar findings. See United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (ignorance of

the law is not a basis for equitable tolling, even in the case of an unrepresented prisoner);

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Accord Felder v. Johson, 204 F.3d 168, 171-72 n. 10 (5th Cir. 2000); and Marsh v. Soares,

223 Frd. 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000).

 Petitioner also argues that equitable tolling should be allowed because he is “not

competent to defend himself in this legal system.” (Docket No. 14). Whether mental illness

warrants tolling depends upon whether the illness during the relevant time “constituted the

kind of extraordinary circumstances beyond his control, making filing impossible.” Laws

v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.2003). While Laws permits equitable tolling for

mental incompetence, it does not mean that every mental illness automatically tolls the

limitation period. “Any other conclusion would perpetuate the stereotype of the insane as

raving maniacs or gibbering idiots and impair their employment opportunities, thus

stigmatizing [petitioner’s] own class. Most mental illnesses today are treatable by drugs that

restore the patient to at least a reasonable approximation of normal mentation and behavior.

When his illness is controlled he can work and attend to his affairs, including the pursuit of

any legal remedies that he may have.” Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189. 192 (7th Cir.1966).

Petitioner has not presented any evidence to indicate that he was ever mentally ill

much less any evidence that an illness made it impossible for him to timely file a habeas

petition. The only reference in the record to Petitioner’s mental state occurred shortly after

indictment when defense counsel made a motion for a competency evaluation. The trial

court immediately ordered a competency screening evaluation and based on the preevaluation report, found that no further evaluation was warranted. Petitioner was offered a

plea agreement, he accepted it and pled guilty. Before sentencing, the trial court found that

Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea. He was sentenced and began serving

his lengthy prison sentence. There is no evidence that since his incarceration, Petitioner has

had to take medications for a mental illness. Nor is there any evidence that Petitioner has

ever seen a mental health provider. Petitioner is not entitiled to equitable tolling on this basis.

Compare Laws, 351 F.3d at 922 (trial court reversed and remanded for evidentiary hearing

where prior to trial, based on conflicting opinions from three psychiatrists and two

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psychologists, the trial judge found Laws competent to stand trial “for the present at least”)

with Lopez v. Citbank, N.A., 808 F.2d 905, 906 (1st Cir. 1987) (trial court affirmed where

Lopez, who was represented by counsel during his period of mental illness, alleged no

specific facts to show that his illness caused the delay). 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. His habeas petition must be

dismissed as time-barred.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For all of the above reasons, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS that

the District Court, after its independent review, DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed October 5, 2007 [Docket No. 1].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b) and 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 08-792-PHXSRB. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 23rd day of October, 2009.

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