Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01169/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1169

DONALD A. SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS J. DART, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 5034 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 2, 2015 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 2015

Before BAUER, POSNER, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant, Donald A. Smith,

a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail, brought this pro se

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that

defendant-appellee, Cook County Sheriff Thomas J. Dart

(“Dart”), violated his federal rights by paying him insufficient

wages and subjecting him to inhumane working and living

conditions. The district court dismissed Smith’s work- and

wage-related claims on preliminary review under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1951A. The court later dismissed Smith’s remaining claims

without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Smith filed two post-dismissal

motions, each of which the district court treated as a motion for

reconsideration, and each of which the district court denied.

The court then dismissed Smith’s case with prejudice under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Smith appealed. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 15, 2013, Smith filed a pro se complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois. Smith named Dart and two other

jail officials as defendants in the caption of his complaint.1 The

complaint states that Smith, as a pretrial detainee and United

States Army veteran, was placed in Division Five and enrolled

in a special program that the jail offered to veterans. As a part

of the veterans’ program, Smith was given a job in the jail

laundry. The program afforded him other benefits as well,

including the opportunity to live in a special wing for veterans,

apart from the general jail population, and to have his case

heard in veterans’ court. Smith claimed that he was paid only

$3 a day for his work in the jail laundry and not the required

federal minimum wage. He also claimed that he was subjected

to inhumane working conditions, alleging that his job in the jail

laundry required him to stand in a “hot, smelly room” from

five or six o’clock in the morning until one o’clock in the

1

 Dart is the only one of the three named defendants who was served with

process and filed an appearance in this case. 

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No. 14-1169 3

afternoon. Lastly, Smith claimed that he was subjected to

inhumane conditions of confinement. Specifically, he alleged

insufficient food portions, the presence of rodents and insects,

no mirrors, lack of outdoor recreation, and that he was forced

to drink filthy water.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1951A, the district court conducted

a preliminary review of the complaint. The court summarily

dismissed Smith’s work- and wage-related claims. The court

held that Smith had “no constitutional right to be paid for his

jail job assignment at all, let alone in accordance with minimum wage laws,” and that his “allegation that he has to work

7- and 8-hour days in a ‘hot, smelly room’ [was] insufficiently

egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 

However, the court determined that Smith had stated colorable

conditions of confinement claims.

Dart then moved to dismiss the remainder of Smith’s claims

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively, for a more definite statement

under Rule 12(e). In response, Smith submitted two letters, the

substance of which we set forth in our discussion below. The

district court did not address Smith’s first letter and treated

his second letter as a motion to introduce evidence, which it

denied. The court then granted Dart’s motion to dismiss as

uncontested and dismissed Smith’s complaint without prejudice. In doing so, the court advised Smith of the deficiencies in

his original pleading and instructed him to file an amended

complaint.

Subsequent to the district court’s dismissal order, Smith

filed a “Motion Clarifying Preivously [sic] Cited Complaint

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About Conditions At Cook County Jail; Pluss [sic] Reconcideration [sic] of Portion of Same dismissed under The Eigth [sic]

Amendment.” This motion included the date on which he was

first incarcerated in Division Five (December 12, 2012) and the

dates that he worked in the jail laundry (January 15, 2013 to

November 18, 2013). The motion also indicated that he was

“transfered [sic] against his wishes” out of Division Five (and

presumably the veterans’ program) to Division Eleven. The

district court construed this filing as a motion for clarification

(which it granted) and reconsideration of the dismissal order

(which it denied). The court specifically directed Smith, for a

second time, to file an amended pleading and granted him

additional time to do so.

Smith then submitted another filing, entitled “Amended

Motion in Support of Original Complaint.” In this filing, Smith

claimed that he was subjected to “the previously mentioned

violations of his Constitutional rights” since the date of his

incarceration in Division Five. He also set forth case law and

referenced newspaper articles and a Department of Justice

study to support the allegations he had pleaded in his original

complaint. Relevant to his conditions of confinement claims, he

alleged that the water at the jail contained radioactive chemicals, “sex[,] drugs[,] and lead,” and that corrections officers

were fully aware of this. He reiterated that he had been

transferred from Division Five to Division Eleven and further

stated that he had been housed in Division Eleven for approximately one and a half months and that there had been “very

little change for the better due to [the] transfer.” The district

court construed this filing as a second motion for reconsideration, which it denied.

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No. 14-1169 5

Two weeks later, on January 27, 2014, the district court

dismissed Smith’s case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41(b). The court explained that, despite

warning Smith that failure to amend his complaint would

result in summary dismissal, Smith did not submit an amended complaint as instructed. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Smith, represented by counsel on appeal, challenges the

district court’s dismissal of his work- and wage-related claims

under 28 U.S.C. § 1951A, as well as the court’s dismissal of his

conditions of confinement claims under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). We review de novo both a § 1951A dismissal

at the screening stage and a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure

to state a claim. Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th

Cir. 2006). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept all

facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007); Vill. of DePue v.

Exxon Mobil Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2008).

To satisfy the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must merely

provide “a short and plain statement of the claim,” which is

sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ...

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp.,

550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)),

including “some indication ... of time and place,” Thomson v.

Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970–71 (7th Cir. 2004). Although

detailed factual allegations are not required, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570);

Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010). In

other words, a plaintiff “must plead some facts that suggest a

right to relief that is beyond the speculative level.” Atkins v.

City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Because pro se pleadings are to be held to “less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972) (per curium), we accord a liberal reading to pro se

complaints, Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011).

With these general principles in mind, we turn to Smith’s

challenges on appeal.

A. Conditions of Confinement

At the outset, we note that Smith’s constitutional rights as

a pretrial detainee are derived from the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to convicted prisoners. See, e.g.,

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, _ U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015);

Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013). In the context

of a conditions of confinement claim, a pretrial detainee is

entitled to be free from conditions that amount to “punishment,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979), while a convicted prisoner is entitled to be free from conditions that

constitute “cruel and unusual punishment.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In both cases, however, the alleged

conditions must be objectively serious enough to amount to a

constitutional deprivation, and the defendant prison official

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No. 14-1169 7

must possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind.2 See, e.g.,

Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 893–94 (7th Cir. 2008); Board v.

Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005); Cavalieri v. Shepard,

321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003). An adverse condition amounts

to a constitutional deprivation when it results in the denial of

a basic human need, Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675

F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012), such as “adequate food, clothing,

shelter, and medical care,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.

The district court dismissed Smith’s conditions of confinement claims, holding that he failed to state facts indicating that

the alleged conditions were sufficiently serious enough to

implicate the Constitution. Smith challenges this decision on

appeal. We address each of his arguments in turn.

Smith first contends that, in dismissing his conditions of

confinement claims, the district court conflated the Fourteenth

Amendment with the Eighth Amendment, and thus failed to

consider whether his claims fell somewhere within the “gray

area” that exists between them. First, the district court acknowledged Smith’s status as a pretrial detainee and that his

2

 With respect to this second, subjective element, an inmate must “prove

that the defendant ‘possess[ed] a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a

reckless state of mind’ with respect to the defendant’s actions (or inaction)

toward the plaintiff.” Davis v. Wessel, 782 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472). Although the parties argue this

element in their briefs, it is not at issue in this appeal. As the district court

correctly noted, the personal involvement of senior jail officials, such as

Dart, can be inferred at the motion to dismiss stage, where, as here, the

plaintiff alleges “potentially systemic,” as opposed to “clearly localized,”

constitutional violations. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428–29 (7th

Cir. 1996). 

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rights are derived from the Fourteenth Amendment. The

district court also recognized the Supreme Court’s holding in

Bell v. Wolfish that due process protects pretrial detainees from

being subjected to conditions of confinement that amount to

punishment. The court determined, however, that Smith failed

to allege facts indicating that he was subjected to such grave

conditions. Second, the district court did not err by relying on

Eighth Amendment cases or by failing to consider whether

Smith’s conditions of confinement claims fell within some

“gray area” that exists between the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. We have held that there is little practical

difference, if any, between the standards applicable to pretrial

detainees and convicted inmates when it comes to conditions

of confinement claims, and that such claims brought under the

Fourteenth Amendment are appropriately analyzed under the

Eighth Amendment test. See, e.g., Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d

752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he protection afforded under [the

Due Process Clause] is functionally indistinguishable from the

Eighth Amendment’s protection for convicted prisoners.”);

Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he

standards applicable to complaints by convicts and by pretrial

detainees about unsafe conditions of confinement merge.”);

Farnham, 394 F.3d at 478 (“[W]e have found it convenient and

entirely appropriate to apply the same standard to claims

arising under the Fourteenth Amendment (detainees) and

Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) without differentiation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Weiss v. Cooley, 230

F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is little practical

difference between the two standards.”). Accordingly, Smith’s

generalized claim of error fails.

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No. 14-1169 9

Next, Smith argues that the district court erred in granting

Dart’s motion to dismiss as uncontested. More specifically, he

claims that the district court should have considered a pair of

letters that he submitted in response to Dart’s motion and the

additional factual allegations included therein. On this point,

we agree.

The district court held a hearing and entered Dart’s motion

to dismiss on October 1, 2013. Smith mailed his first letter,

entitled “In support of original complaint,” two days later,

which the district court received on October 7, 2013. This letter

contains factual assertions that support and elaborate on the

allegations spelled out in Smith’s original complaint (it also

contains a number of allegations that do not relate to his

original complaint). The court received Smith’s second letter,

which he labeled as an “Additional Request to intraduce [sic]

evidence,” on October 9, 2013. This letter is not as helpful to

Smith’s case as the first. The district court did not address

Smith’s first letter and denied his second letter, stating “[n]o

proof in support of Plaintiff’s claims is necessary at this time.”

We have held that facts alleged by a plaintiff in a brief in

opposition to a motion to dismiss “may be considered when

evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint so long as they are

consistent of the allegations in the complaint.” Gutierrez v.

Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1367 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997); Albiero v. City of

Kankakee, 122 F.3d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e have held that

a plaintiff may supplement the complaint with factual narration in an affidavit or brief.”). Although neither of Smith’s

letters were formally labeled as a motion in response to Dart’s

motion to dismiss, the letters were filed on the heels of Dart’s

motion and contained additional factual assertions that added

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to the allegations that Smith made in his original complaint.

Given the district court’s obligation to construe pro se pleadings

liberally, the court ought to have considered these letters when

ruling on Dart’s motion.

Dart argues that, even if the district court had considered

the two letters, Smith’s allegations are still insufficient to state

a conditions of confinement claim. We agree with respect to

some of Smith’s claims, but disagree with respect to others.

However, before addressing each claim in light of the additional facts contained in Smith’s letters, we first identify the

claims comprehended by Smith’s original complaint. The

relevant portion of Smith’s complaint states:

[D]aily given breakfast of 1 egg - 1 2% milk half cup

cereal small pak [sic] of Kool-Aid then lunch peanut

butter sandwich and cookies with 1 pak [sic] of KoolAid. Pre-trial detainees are in program and conditions

are foul roaches mice, cockroaches in food no mirrors

even to see self shave can’t go outside recreation filthy

water etc.

Smith’s conditions of confinement claims can thus be

summarized as follows: (1) inadequate food, (2) the presence

of rodents and insects, (3) no mirrors,3

 (4) lack of outdoor

recreation, and (5) contaminated water. Although a plaintiff

may assert additional facts in a motion to defeat dismissal, he

or she cannot amend his or her complaint to state new claims

3

 The district court did not address Smith’s claim regarding a lack of

mirrors. Smith does not re-raise the issue on appeal. Therefore, it is waived. 

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No. 14-1169 11

in such a motion. Am. Inter-Fid. Exch. v. Am. Re-Ins. Co., 17 F.3d

1018, 1021–22 (7th Cir. 1994). Therefore, we consider the factual

allegations contained in Smith’s letters to the extent that they

are consistent with, or add to, the deprivations concomitant

with the claims described above. We do not consider the letters

to the extent that they raise new claims, such as invasion of

privacy, understaffing, inadequate heating,4 overcrowding,

and so on.

4

 We do not reject Smith’s inadequate heat allegation. Rather, we do not

consider that allegation because it does not relate to any of the allegations

raised in his complaint, nor does it work in combination with any of the

allegations in his complaint to show the deprivation of a single, identifiable

basic human need. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)

(“[C]onditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment

violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when

they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a

single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for

example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue

blankets.”). Simply stated, it is a new claim. And as such, it cannot be raised

in a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss; it must be pleaded in a new

or amended complaint. See Am. Inter-Fid. Exch., 17 F.3d at 1021–22. Because

we ultimately end up remanding to the district court, Smith may, with leave

of the court, amend his complaint if he so chooses. Given that the allegation

in his letter in opposition to Dart’s motion to dismiss appears to state a

claim for inadequate heating, see, e.g., Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024,

1035 (7th Cir. 1994), and assuming that he continues to be represented by

counsel, we see no reason why Smith should be denied leave to amend.

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12 No. 14-1169

1. Inadequate Food

The Constitution mandates that prison officials provide

inmates with “nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and

served under conditions which do not present an immediate

danger to the health and well-being of the inmates who

consume it.” French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir.

1985) (citation omitted). The district court dismissed Smith’s

inadequate food claim on the ground that his complaint did

not suggest that meals served at the jail are nutritionally

deficient or present a substantial danger of harm. Smith’s first

letter adds to this claim by alleging, among other things, that

his “[f]ood is well below nutritional value.” At the motion to

dismiss stage, these six words make all the difference under

our precedent. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1432 (holding inmate’s

allegation of a “nutritionally deficient diet” sufficient to “state[]

a claim for a violation of the Due Process Clause or the Eighth

Amendment”). This claim, therefore, should not have been

dismissed.

2. The Presence of Rodents and Insects

Pest infestations may also form the basis of a Fourteenth or

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. Antonelli,

81 F.3d at 1431; see also Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614 (7th

Cir. 2012). The district court determined that Smith failed to

state a claim because, although he alleged that mice and

cockroaches are present in the jail, he did not allege facts from

which one could infer that the degree of infestation rose to the

level of constitutional concern. Smith’s first letter adds to the

allegations contained in his complaint, stating, “[s]piders, rats,

roaches, centerpides [sic], flys, gnats and beetles are on the

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tier[,] also there are nests of spiders under the radiators[,]

roaches and gnats make their home in the showers and toilet

area.” We do not doubt that there are rodents and insects in the

Cook County Jail, however, alleging the mere presence of a

laundry list of pests, without more, is not sufficient to state a

constitutional claim. Despite Smith’s additional allegations, we

are left in the dark as to how extensive the infestations are and

how the pests affect him. He does not allege that pests are

present in his cell, or that pests have ever come into contact

with his person or his property, or that he’s been bitten or

stung or otherwise suffered physical or psychological harm, or

that his property has been damaged. Nor does he allege how

often he observes rodents and roaches on the tier, whether it’s

continuously or only from time to time. On all of these matters

we are left to speculate. Smith’s allegations are a far cry from

those we examined in Antonelli, where the plaintiff inmate

alleged “cockroaches that were everywhere, crawling on his

body (along with mice) and constantly awakening him, and

causing the environment to be unsanitary.” 81 F.3d at 1431

(internal quotation marks omitted). His allegations also do not

approach the severity of the conditions that we considered a

“close case,” though sufficient to state a claim, in White v.

Monohan, 326 Fed. Appx. 385, 388 (7th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)

(“White claimed that for over five years the bugs, roaches,

spiders, wasps, and bees had bitten and stung him so often as

to leave multiple scars, wounds, and sores, causing him

internal injuries.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus,

even in light of Smith’s two letters, his pest infestation allegations are insufficient to state a constitutional violation.

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14 No. 14-1169

3. Lack of Outdoor Recreation

We have recognized that lack of exercise can rise to a

constitutional violation “[w]here movement is denied and

muscles are allowed to atrophy[] [and] the health of the

individual is threatened.” French, 777 F.2d at 1255; Antonelli, 81

F.3d at 1432 (“Lack of exercise may rise to a constitutional

violation in extreme and prolonged situations where movement is denied to the point that the inmate’s health is threatened.”); see also Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir.

2001); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir. 1997). As the

district court noted, there is a significant difference between a

lack of outdoor recreation and an inability to exercise. Smith

does not allege that his movements are restricted to the point

that he is unable to exercise inside his cell or in jail common

areas and his letters add nothing to this claim. Accordingly, we

agree with the district court that Smith’s allegation that he

“can[’]t go outside [for] recreation” fails to state a sufficiently

serious constitutional deprivation.

4. Contaminated Water

Just as correctional officers cannot deprive inmates of

nutritional food, they cannot deprive inmates of drinkable

water. Atkins, 631 F.3d at 830. The district court dismissed

Smith’s contaminated water claim on the ground that he

alleged no facts from which one could infer that the jail’s water

is unsafe to drink. In his first letter, Smith further alleges with

respect to this claim that “the [correctional officers] do not

drink the water yet we have to and it is a known fact that the

water in the jail is polluted and contains high levels of alpha +

beta radiation also cyanide and lead.” Certainly, the presence

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No. 14-1169 15

of contaminants such as cyanide and lead may render water

unsafe to drink. Thus, accepting Smith’s allegations as true, as

we must at this stage, we cannot say Smith’s allegations of

contaminated water fail to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.

Lastly, Smith argues that the district court should have

considered his two post-dismissal filings as amended complaints, as opposed to motions for reconsideration. These two

filings, however, do not contain allegations that remedy the

aforementioned deficiencies from which Smith’s pest infestation and lack of outdoor recreation claims suffer. Given that we

have already held that Smith may proceed on his inadequate

food and contaminated water claims, even if we were to

conclude that the district court erred in the respect he suggest,

the outcome of this appeal would remain the same. This point,

therefore, requires no further discussion.

B. Smith’s Work- and Wage-Related Claims

As recounted previously, Smith claimed in his complaint

that he was entitled to be paid in accordance with federal

minimum wage laws for his work in the jail laundry room. He

also claimed that his working conditions, which caused him to

stand seven to eight hours a day in a “hot, smelly room,” were

unconstitutional. The district court dismissed both claims

summarily on preliminary review.

On appeal, Smith first argues that he stated a valid claim

under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) based on his $3

per day, sub-minimum wage pay. He also argues that the

conditions that he was “compelled to work under” violate the

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Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. We find neither of

these arguments persuasive.

The FLSA is intended for the protection of employees,

Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 409 (7th Cir. 2005), and applies

to all employers in the free market, whether private or public,

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56

(1985). In Bennett, we held that prisoners are not protected by

the FLSA because they are not employees of their prison. 395

F.3d at 409. We explained:

[P]eople are not imprisoned for the purpose of enabling

them to earn a living. The prison pays for their keep. If

it puts them to work, it is to offset some of the cost of

keeping them, or to keep them out of mischief, or to

ease their transition to the world outside, or to equip

them with skills and habits that will make them less

likely to return to crime outside. None of these goals is

compatible with federal regulation of their wages and

hours. The reason the FLSA contains no express exception for prisoners is probably that the idea was too

outlandish to occur to anyone when the legislation was

under consideration by Congress. 

Id. at 410.

In Sanders v. Hayden, 544 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 2008), we

held that civil detainees are not covered by the FLSA, since

Bennett’s reasoning applies equally to this class of persons as

it does to prisoners. We further noted that the minimum wage

is not needed to protect civil detainees’ well-being and standard of living because, like prisoners, civil detainees have their

basic human needs provided for by the state. Id. We cannot see

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No. 14-1169 17

what difference it makes if the incarcerated person is a prisoner, civil detainee, or pretrial detainee. In all cases, the

aforementioned principles apply equally. Thus, like prisoners

and civil detainees, pretrial detainees are not protected by the

FLSA because they are not employees of their prison.

Smith argues that he should fall within the ambit of the

FLSA because the Cook County Jail is not satisfying his basic

needs and he requires the minimum wage to satisfy these

needs. True, we did hold above that Smith stated a claim for

inadequate food and contaminated water. However, this does

not mean that he is entitled to minimum wage. It is the jail’s

constitutional obligation to provide Smith with his basic needs,

including adequate food and drinkable water. When the jail

fails to do so, it is that failure that must be remedied (the

Constitution demands it); it does not entitle him to receive

minimum wage under the FLSA.

Smith’s Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments claims

require little discussion. The Thirteenth Amendment provides

that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a

punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly

convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place

subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. As

discussed in the previous section, the Due Process Clause

protects pretrial detainees from being subjected to conditions

of confinement that amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. at 535.

The glaring problem with Smith’s arguments is that he

chose on his own volition to participate in the veterans’

program and avail himself of its benefits, including the ability

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18 No. 14-1169

to work and earn wages. In other words, his “servitude” was

not involuntary, nor can it be considered punishment. Perhaps

recognizing this flaw, Smith argues that he felt compelled to

work because, if he refused, he would lose other special

privileges that he received as a participant in the veterans’

program, such as being housed apart from the general population and having his case heard in veterans’ court. Smith did not

have a right to these special privileges, however, and therefore

the loss of these privileges does not constitute punishment in

the constitutional sense.

III. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we REVERSE the district court’s decision

with respect to Smith’s inadequate food and contaminated

water claims and REMAND for further proceedings on

those claims. The remainder of the district court’s decision

is AFFIRMED.

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No. 14-1169 19

POSNER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. The 

plaintiff claims that while detained in Cook County Jail 

awaiting trial he has been subjected to intolerable living 

conditions, violative of his constitutional rights. As a pretrial 

detainee, proceeding therefore under the due process clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the cruel 

and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, 

he is entitled to be free from conditions that amount to “punishment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). One of 

those conditions is “denial of a basic human need,” Rice ex 

rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th 

Cir. 2012), such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and 

medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 

The denial of such conditions is particularly egregious when 

one is dealing with pretrial detainees, for they have not been 

convicted of a crime. (The plaintiff also claims to be underpaid for his work in the jail laundry, but the rejection of that 

claim in the majority opinion is correct for the reasons given 

in the opinion.)

His complaint, as supplemented in response to the jail’s 

motion to dismiss (which I’ll come to shortly), alleged that 

insects infest his cell and common areas, that he’s found 

cockroaches and mice in his food, that the drinking water in 

his cell is contaminated and toxic, that his cell is inadequately heated during the winter, that he isn’t allowed to go outside for recreation or exercise, and that the meals the jail 

gives him are nutritionally inadequate—breakfast is a single 

egg with a half cup of cereal with milk and a small packet of 

Kool-Aid, lunch a peanut butter sandwich and some cookies

(he doesn’t mention supper). Although theoretically he 

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20 No. 14-1169

could supplement his diet at the commissary, he alleges that

the commissary’s prices are prohibitive.

These are just allegations. They may be groundless. But I 

don’t understand the district court’s deciding to dismiss the 

complaint in its entirety, and with prejudice, for failure to 

state a claim.

The jail had filed a motion to dismiss on that ground and,

in the alternative, a motion for a more definite statement of 

the plaintiff’s claim. The motions contended that he had

failed to “provide sufficient enough [sic—“sufficient” and 

“enough” are synonyms] allegations to put the Defendant on 

notice of his claims,” that his claims lacked “factual content 

that allows the court to [infer] that the defendant [Cook 

County Sheriff Thomas Dart, the administrator of the jail] is 

liable for the misconduct alleged,” and that he had failed to 

allege “when he was housed in Division 5, for how long, and 

whether the conditions changed.” (The jail does not dispute, 

however, that the Sheriff is the proper defendant if the plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated.)

The plaintiff responded in a pair of letters, filed with the 

court, which explained when he had been assigned to Division 5 and how long he had been there (ten months), and also elaborated on the facts alleged in his complaint. Nevertheless the district judge granted the jail’s motion to dismiss, 

though with leave for the plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The judge called the jail’s motion “uncontested,” saying that the plaintiff, though she had granted him “the opportunity to file an opposing brief,” had failed to do so. She 

added that “even accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as 

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No. 14-1169 21

true, the Court finds that the complaint fails to give Defendants sufficient notice of the claims against them. Plaintiff 

must elaborate on his claims; the facts alleged are inadequate 

to satisfy even basic pleading requirements.”

Yet in response to the jail’s motion to dismiss or for a 

more definite statement, he had pleaded additional facts that 

cured the pleading deficiencies alleged by the jail. The judge 

appears to have overlooked the filings containing the additional allegations when she said for example that “the complaint states that there are mice and cockroaches, but [the 

plaintiff] offers no basis for concluding that the degree of infestation is such as to create a constitutional claim.” This 

terse turn-down gave the plaintiff no clue of what he had to

allege, regarding his having to share his cell with mice and 

cockroaches, in order to plead a constitutional violation. I 

don’t understand the judge’s remark in granting the jail’s 

motion to dismiss that “the amended complaint must include dates. ... Plaintiff must provide a time frame for the 

conditions about which he complains. ... Punishment generally requires allegations of extreme deprivations over an extended period of time.” He had already stated, in a filing 

that the district judge may well have overlooked because it 

wasn’t labeled an amended complaint, that he’d been in his 

infested cell for 10 months. To state a claim that would survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff wasn’t required to 

have kept a calendar, marking on it every day that a mouse 

or cockroach appeared in his food or scurried across the 

floor of his cell.

Instead of filing a document labeled “amended complaint,” the plaintiff filed a “Motion Clarifying Pre[vi]ously 

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Cited Complaint About Conditions at Cook County Jail; 

Plus[] Recon[s]ideration of Portion of Same Dismissed Under the Eig[h]th Amendment.” The judge treated this as a 

request for clarification of her order dismissing the complaint, and she offered by way of clarification that “if Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must state facts indicating that the food served at the jail is nutritionally inadequate 

or presents a substantial danger of harm, that the jail’s water 

is unsafe to drink, that pest infestation is so profound as to 

rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and that the denial of exercise is extreme and prolonged.” This order 

evoked from the plaintiff an “Amended Motion in Support 

of Original Complaint,” which elaborated on his allegation 

that the jail’s water was unsafe to drink but not on his other 

allegations. The district judge then dismissed his suit with 

prejudice on the ground that he had failed to file an amended complaint. This appeal followed.

The majority opinion upholds some of his claims, rejects 

others, and for the most part I agree with its rulings. But not 

with respect to the alleged infestation of his cell by mice and 

cockroaches, and the inadequate heating of his cell (although 

footnote 4 of the majority opinion leaves some room for him 

to renew the heating complaint on remand). The district 

judge directed this pro se plaintiff to file an amended complaint specifying whether the infestation of his cell by mice 

and cockroaches was “so profound as to rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation.” How could a pro se jail detainee be 

expected to answer such a question? He had alleged that the 

mice and cockroaches were in his food and that he developed scabies—a highly contagious skin infestation, producCase: 14-1169 Document: 40 Filed: 09/25/2015 Pages: 23
No. 14-1169 23

tive of severe itching, and sometimes referred to as “the seven-year itch”—from the unsanitary conditions. What more 

should be required to state a claim of punishment? That he 

keep a record of the number of his meals that he shared with 

the vermin? He alleged that his cell was inadequately heated 

during the winter; again, what more should he have been 

required to allege—does the jail give him a thermometer and 

a calendar, so that he can keep a written record of the temperature in his cell day by day to submit to a judge?

Smith responded to the defendants’ request for more information about the pest and heating allegations. That 

should have been enough to convince the district court to 

deny the motion to dismiss. The jail’s counsel would then 

have deposed the plaintiff and maybe other inmates and also 

jail employees and on the basis of the testimony elicited in 

those depositions might have moved successfully for summary judgment. Because the district judge terminated the 

case prematurely, no one will ever know whether the plaintiff’s rejected claims concerning pest infestation and (subject 

to the qualification in footnote 4) inadequate heating are indeed meritless.

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