Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01871/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01871-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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SRM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edwardo Jose Leyva,

Petitioner

-vsDora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondent(s)

CV-04-1871-PHX-SRB (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on

September 8, 2004 (#1). On May 26, 2005, Respondents filed their Response (#22). 

Petitioner filed a Reply on June 3, 2005 (#26).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Because this matter may be resolved on the basis of the statute of limitations, the

recitation of the background is limited to addressing general background and those matters

relevant to a determination of the timeliness of the Petition.

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his first state Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner summarized the factual

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 Exhibits (#10) to the Answer (#9), are referenced herein as “Exhibit __.”

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background as follows:

During the early morning hours of November 18, 1994 Harold Bridges

was driving his thirteen-year-old son home to Prescott. After yielding

for red light, they proceeded through an intersection on a green light and

reached a speed approximately 35 miles per hour before the Defendant

reared their vehicle. The Defendant was traveling at an estimated speed

of 80 miles per hour, causing Mr. Bridges [sic] vehicle to run off the

road, hit a tree to his final point of rest. The Defendant also ran off the

road striking a building. Police Officers witnessed the accident and

responded immediately. Mr. Bridges was taken to the hospital. Travis

his son had minor injuries, laceration on his forehead requiring stitches

and a cut knee. Mr. Bridges died December 25, 1994 from blunt force

injuries. The Defendant was also hospitalized and his blood-alcohol

level was .18%

(Exhibit F, 1st PCR Pet., Attach. A, at 1.)1

 On May 22, 1995, the Maricopa County Grand Jury returned an indictment of

Petitioner on one count of manslaughter and one count of aggravated assault. (Exhibit A,

Indictment.)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner entered into two plea agreements in which he agreed to plead to both charges

of the indictment, in exchange for agreements that any sentences would be concurrent and a

waiver of any allegation that the offenses were committed on probation or that Petitioner had

a prior felony conviction. The plea agreement also included a waiver of the right to appeal.

(Exhibit B, Plea Agreements.) 

Petitioner was sentenced on March 29, 1996 to concurrent terms of 15 years on the

manslaughter count, and 7 years on the assault count. (Exhibit C, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner, having waived his right to appeal in the plea agreement (Exhibit B), did not

file a direct appeal. (Petition, #1 at 2.)

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D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

1. First PCR Petition

Petitioner filed his first Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on April 2, 1996. (Exhibit

D, PCR Notice.) Trial counsel withdrew, and new PCR counsel was appointed. (Exhibit E,

M.E. 8/28/96.) PCR counsel subsequently withdrew and sought an extension of time for

Petitioner to file a PCR petition pro per. (Exhibit E, M.E. 2/5/97.) On May 12, 1997,

Petitioner filed his pro per PCR petition (Exhibit F). The Court denied the petition on August

4, 1997. (Exhibit G, Order.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Exhibit H) on

August 21, 1997, which was denied on September 16, 1997. (Exhibit I, M.E. 9/10/97.)

Petitioner did not timely seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Beginning September 25, 1997, and prior to filing his Petition for Special Action (see

below), Petitioner unsuccessfully sought an extension of time to seek review and for

appointment of appellate counsel. (Exhibits J, K, and L.) After the denial of his Petition for

Special Action, he again on February 4, 1998 sought an extension of time, couched in terms

of a request for delayed petition for review. (Exhibit Q.) This request was also denied, by an

Order (Exhibit R) filed March 9, 1998.

On March 26, 1998, Petitioner filed in the Superior Court a Petition for Review by the

Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit S), seeking review of the denial of his motions to extend

and motion for delayed petition. This Petition for Review was consolidated with the petition

for review from the denial of Petitioner’s second PCR Petition (see below), and was

summarily denied on August 12, 1998. (Exhibit W, Order 8/5/98; Exhibit X, 8/12/98.)

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit Y), which was summarily

denied on April 20, 2000 (Exhibit Z).

Petitioner did not ever file a petition for review seeking review of the denial of his

petition for post-conviction relief.

2. Petition for Special Action

On December 18, 1997, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action (Exhibit N) with

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the Arizona Court of Appeals, challenging the denial of Petitioner’s 1st PCR petition. In an

Order (Exhibit O) filed January 13, 1998, the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept

jurisdiction over the special action. 

2. Second PCR Petition

On March 17, 1998, Petitioner signed and mailed a second Petition for PostConviction Relief (Exhibit T). This petition included an argument of newly discovered

evidence based upon the existence of a civil suit by the victim’s survivors that asserted a

defective seat in the vehicle had been a proximate cause of the victim’s death. (Id. at 6.) That

petition was denied by an Order (Exhibit U) filed April 6, 1998. 

On May 4, 1998, Petitioner mailed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of

Appeals (Exhibit V), seeking review of the denial of his second PCR petition. This Petition

for Review was consolidated with the petition for review from the denial of Petitioner’s

attempts to extend the time for review of his first PCR Petition (see above), and was

summarily denied on August 12, 1998. (Exhibit W, Order 8/5/98; Exhibit X, 8/12/98.)

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit Y), which was summarily

denied on April 20, 2000 (Exhibit Z).

3. Third PCR Petition

On August 23, 2000, Petitioner filed, through counsel, his third Petition for PostConviction Relief (Exhibit AA). That petition was dismissed on March 9, 2001. (Exhibit DD,

M.E. 3/9/01.) Petitioner filed a pro per Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of Appeals

(Exhibit EE), which was summarily denied on March 19, 2002 (Exhibit FF). Petitioner then

filed a pro per Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit GG), which was

granted on September 26, 2002 (Exhibit HH). 

The Arizona Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court for an

evidentiary hearing. (Id) The evidentiary hearing was held on January 12, 2004. (Exhibit II,

M.E. 1/14/04.) On rehearing, the petition was dismissed. (Exhibit MM, M.E. 3/22/04.)

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Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit NN) by the Arizona Court of Appeals. That

Petition was summarily denied by an Order filed May 26, 2005. (Reply, #26, Exhibit B.)

4. Subsequent PCR Petitions

On June 13, 2001, Petitioner filed a fourth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which

was dismissed on July 2, 2001. (Exhibit QQ, M.E. 7/2/01.) Petitioner filed a fifth PCR

petition on October 25, 2001, which was dismissed on November 28, 2001. (Exhibit QQ,

M.E. 11/28/01.) Petitioner filed a sixth PCR petition on May 6, 2002, which was dismissed

on June 3, 2002. (Exhibit QQ, M.E. 6/3/02.) 

E. FIRST FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDING

Petitioner’s first federal habeas proceeding was filed in this District on April 23, 2001,

in Case CV-01-0718-SRB(JI), but was subsequently dismissed without prejudice on

Petitioner’s motion. 

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner commenced the present proceeding by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 8, 2004 (#1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts

eight grounds for relief, including: involuntary plea; ineffective assistance of trial counsel;

ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal via post-conviction relief proceedings;

denial of equal protection based on denial of PCR counsel; cruel and unusual punishment;

prosecutorial misconduct from failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; prosecutorial

misconduct from cruel and unusual punishment; denial of right of appeal.

On May 26, 2005, Respondents filed their Response (#22). Respondents argue that

Petitioner’s Petition is untimely, and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

Petitioner filed a Reply on June 3, 2005 (#26), arguing the merits of his claims, and seeking

to excuse any tardiness on the basis of a variety of circumstances arising during the

presentation of his state claims.

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Having made a preliminary determination that the petition did not appear to be time

barred, the undersigned entered an Order (#31) on August 2, 2005, granting Respondents an

opportunity to supplement their response to address the merits of the Petition. On September

1, 2005, Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer (#32). Respondents argue that because

all of Petitioner’s state proceedings after his first PCR petition were untimely, the Petition

is time barred. (#32 at 3.) 

On September 12, 2005, Petitioner filed his Supplemental Reply (#33) and related

Exhibits (#34). The Supplemental Reply does not argue the merits of the timeliness issues,

but does argue the merits of Petitioner’s substantive claims.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the Anti-Terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Prior

to the AEDPA’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in deciding when

to file a federal habeas petition" and that "delays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar

a prisoner from seeking relief." In Calderon v. U.S. District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (real party-in-interest

was Rodney Gene Beeler)(hereinafter "Beeler"). Now, however, petitions filed beyond the one

year limitations period are barred and must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on "the

date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

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Direct Review - As noted above, the statute only runs upon the conclusion of direct

review, not upon sentencing. In Arizona, however, a pleading petitioner's conviction becomes

final at sentencing, because he has waived his right to direct appeal. In some jurisdictions, the

proposition might be suspect in light of the ability of a defendant to challenge the voluntariness

of an appeal, despite a waiver of the right to appeal. In Arizona, however, the denial of the

right to appeal following a guilty plea is absolute and statutorily mandated. 

B. In noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or

sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement or an admission to

a probation violation.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033 (2001). See also Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e) (waiver of appeal by guilty

plea). This limitation was made effective on September 30, 1992. State v. Stevens, 173 Ariz.

494, 495, 844 P.2d 661, 662 (App. 1992). Thus, by virtue of his guilty plea, Petitioner had no

right of direct appeal, but was relegated to seeking review by way of post-conviction relief,

even of a claim that the plea was involuntary. See State v. Jimenez, 188 Ariz. 342, 344, 935

P.2d 920, 922 (App. 1996). 

Writ of Certiorari - Likewise, although direct review is normally not deemed

complete until the time for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court has expired,

Petitioner is not entitled to this additional delay. It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that

“direct review" includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files

such a petition. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir.1999). However, certiorari

review with the U.S. Supreme Court may only be sought following a decision or denial of

discretionary review by the state court of last resort, i.e. the Arizona Supreme Court. Flynt vs.

Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981). Accordingly, the time for seeking a writ of certiorari with the

U.S. Supreme Court cannot be considered in determining when Petitioner's judgment became

final when review by the state court of last resort was not sought. Eisermann vs. Penarosa,

33 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Hawaii 1999). See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (certiorari jurisdiction limited

to highest available state court); Sup. Ct. Rule 13 (timeliness from decision of highest state

court). See also Foreman v. Dretke, 383 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2004) (“If a criminal

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defendant has pursued his direct appeal through the highest state court, then this period

includes the 90 days for filing a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. If not, then it

includes the time for seeking further state-court direct review.”).

AEDPA Effective Dates - Accordingly, Petitioner having had no right to direct appeal,

and no right to seek certiorari, his conviction became final upon sentencing, on March 29,

1996. However, the Beeler court held the period of limitations "did not begin to run against

any state prisoner prior to the statute's date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d

at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims concerning state court judgments finalized

prior to April 24, 1996, had to be filed by April 23, 1997, or they were barred by the statute

of limitations absent a showing that the circumstances surrounding the filing of the petition

fell into one of the categories listed in § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Accordingly, Petitioner’s

limitations period commenced running on April 24, 1996 and would ordinarily have expired

one year later on April 23, 1997. 

Filing Date And the Prisoner Mailbox Rule - Here Petitioner’s Petition (#1) was

not filed until September 8, 2004. However, for purposes of calculating time under § 2244(d),

the federal prisoner “mailbox rule” applies. Under this rule, a prisoner’s filings are deemed

“filed” when they are delivered to prison officials for mailing. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d

568 (9th Cir. 2000). Pre-requisites to application of the mailbox rule include: (1) that the

petitioner is not represented by counsel; and (2) the petition is delivered to prison officials for

forwarding to the courts within the limitations period. Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199

(9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner, who is appearing pro se, plainly meets the first criteria in this

proceeding. It is not clear, however, whether he delivered his petition to prison officials for

mailing. His certificate of service simply reflects that the Petition was “mailed/delivered.”

(Petition, #1 at 14.) Because it does not alter the outcome, the Court presumes Petitioner is

entitled to application of the “mailbox rule,” and will treat September 6, 2004 as the filing date

of his Petition. 

Even with application of the “mailbox rule,” Petitioner’s habeas petition, deemed filed

September 6, 2004 was filed well beyond the expiration of the one year and would ordinarily

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be barred. 

Discovery Exception - Although the conclusion of direct review normally marks the

beginning of the statutory one year, section 2244(d)(1)(D) does provide an alternative of “the

date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Thus, where despite the exercise of due

diligence a petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate of his claim, the statute does

not commence running on that claim until the earlier of such discovery or the elimination of

the disability which prevented discovery. The discovery of evidence to support a claim is not

the relevant time to begin the statute of limitations. Rather, such evidence is not the “factual

predicate” of the claims, it is the evidence of those facts. See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d

196, 198-99 (5th Cir.1998) (receipt of trial counsel’s affidavit irrelevant where knowledge

of facts supporting claim ineffectiveness previously known to defendant). 

Here, Petitioner argues that he was unaware of the defense of a superseding cause of

the victim’s death. However, in his Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner

established that he was aware of this suit on July 28, 1996, when he received the summons and

complaint. By February 22, 1997, he had received the Plaintiff’s disclosure statement.

(Exhibit T, 2nd PCR Pet. at 6.) Accordingly, at least as of this time, Plaintiff would have been

aware of the factual predicate of his claim of superseding causation. At the latest, then, the

statute of limitations on Petitioner’s claim based upon that newly discovered evidence would

have commenced running on February 22, 1997. It would, then, have expired on February 22,

1998, and Petitioner’s Petition would have been late.

2. Statutory Tolling

Despite the expiration of the one calendar year from commencement of Petitioner’s

limitations period, the AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This statutory tolling applies

during the entire time during which the application is pending, including interludes between

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various stages of appeal on the application. The “AEDPA statute of limitations [is] tolled for

‘all of the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction

application.’ “ Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v.

Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1999)). 

Tolling from First PCR Petition - Petitioner’s first state Petition for PostConviction Relief was filed April 2, 1996. (Exhibit D.) That state application remained

pending until September 16, 1997, when Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

(See Exhibit I, M.E. 9/10/97.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s one year, whether counted from the

effective date of the AEDPA (April 24, 1996) or from discovery of his claim based upon

superseding causation (February 22, 1997), was tolled from its inception until September 16,

1997.

Petitioner subsequently sought to extend the time to petition for review of that denial,

and even sought review of the denial of an extension (Exhibits J,K,L,Q, R, S, W, X, Y, and Z).

However, only “properly filed” post-conviction applications count. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408 (2005), the Supreme Court made clear that a petition which is rejected on

timeliness grounds is not “properly filed.” Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner’s

attempts to seek further review could be deemed part of his first Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, their rejection on timeliness grounds precludes this Court from applying statutory

tolling on the basis of their pendency. Likewise, to the extent that these efforts could be

deemed a separate application for post-conviction relief, their rejection on timeliness grounds

means the underlying requests for relief were not “properly filed,” even if the requests for

extension were themselves “properly filed.” 

Thus, Petitioner’s statutory one year was wholly unused as of September 16, 1997, but

began running again on that date.

Tolling from Special Action - On December 18, 1997, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Special Action (Exhibit N) with the Arizona Court of Appeals, challenging the denial of

Petitioner’s 1st PCR petition. As of the filing of that Petition, 93 days of the limitations period

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had expired. In an Order (Exhibit P) filed January 13, 1998, the Arizona Court of Appeals

declined to accept jurisdiction over the special action, and Petitioner’s limitations period again

began to run.

Although Respondents argue in their Supplemental Answer that this state petition

provides no tolling because it was time barred, the undersigned finds nothing in the record to

evidence the application of a time bar. To the contrary, the Order clearly states that “the court

of appeals, in the exercise of its discretion, declines to accept jurisdiction in this special

action.” (Exhibit P.) 

Upon denial of the special action on January 13, 1998, Petitioner had 272 days

remaining on his one year limitations period. Barring further tolling, that one year would

expire on October 12, 1998.

Second PCR Petition - On March 17, 1998, Petitioner signed and mailed a second

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit T). As of this date, Petitioner had used 156 of

his 365 days. 

Respondents made no argument in their Answer that this Petition was not timely filed.

(See Answer, #22 at 9-10.) However, in their Supplemental Answer, Respondents argue that

Petitioner’s second and subsequent PCR petitions provide no tolling because they were

untimely. 

Indeed, the trial court concluded that this second PCR petition was “untimely filed.”

(Exhibit U at 1.) Granted, the trial court did proceed to discuss various principles of claims

preclusion, and other bases for disposing of the petition, but these do not alter the conclusion

that the petition was untimely. The “postcard denials” by the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit

X) and Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit Z) must be presumed to be denials on the same basis.

See Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) (“the ruling of the last state court to

articulate a reason governs”)(applying Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797(1991) to statutory

tolling issue). As declared in Pace, the dismissal of this post-conviction proceeding as

untimely precludes this Court from finding it to have been properly filed. Thus, this state

petition did not toll the running of Petitioner’s habeas statute of limitations. 

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Accordingly, Petitioner’s one year continued to run from March 17, 1998, despite the

pendency of his second PCR Petition, and the balance of 209 days expired on October 12,

1998.

Subsequent PCR Petitions - Petitioner then proceeded file a series of subsequent

Petitions for Post Conviction relief, including: his third on August 23, 2000 (Exhibit AA), his

fourth on June 13, 2001 (Exhibit QQ, M.E. 7/2/01), his fifth on October 25, 2001 (Exhibit

QQ, M.E. 11/28/01), and his sixth on May 6, 2002 (Exhibit QQ, M.E. 6/3/02). However, these

state petitions were all filed long after Petitioner’s one year had already expired on October

12, 1998. Once the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing

does not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.

2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, despite

these state filings, Petitioner’s one year expired on October 12, 1998.

Federal Habeas Petition - Petitioner’s first federal habeas petition also had no impact

on the timeliness of the current petition. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001)(only

“state” applications toll the running of the statute, and that Federal habeas petitions do not toll

the running of the statute). 

3. Timeliness of Petition

Petitioner’s Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was “filed” September 6, 2004.

This was almost six years after his one year limitations period had expired. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s Petition, is untimely, and absent a basis for equitable tolling must be dismissed.

4. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner argues in his Reply that any tardiness in filing this habeas petition must be

excused for a variety of reasons. The Beeler Court held that § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." 128 F.3d at 1288-89. When

equitable tolling applies, its effect is to suspend the running of the statute of limitations.

Benge v. U.S., 17 F.3d 1286, 1289 (10th Cir. 1994). The application of equitable tolling does

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not mean that the limitations period begins over again. Id. Rather, upon expiration of the

equitable tolling period, the remainder of the unexpired limitations period begins to run again,

subject to whatever further statutory or equitable tolling may apply. 

Moreover, because equitable tolling merely acts to suspend the running of the statute,

it cannot revive a claim after the limitations period has already expired. Accordingly, only

those factors complained of by Petitioner which occurred or were in existence prior to the

October 12, 1998 expiration of the statute have any bearing on the timeliness of Petitioner’s

Petition.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial and PCR Counsel - Petitioner argues that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and was denied counsel in his post-conviction relief

proceedings. (Reply, #26 at 3.) However, Petitioner’s limitations period did not begin to run

until after trial and his first PCR petition had already terminated. Petitioner does not explain

how any failure or absence of such counsel prevented him from timely filing his habeas

petition. 

Incomplete Record - Petitioner argues that he had an incomplete record on which to

file his first and second state post-conviction relief petitions. (Reply # 26 at 4.) In support of

this claim, Petitioner points to portions of the Answer (#22 at 4, 12-13) where Respondents

discuss the delivery of medical records and police records to Petitioner in January and

February 1998. That delay in delivery of records may have impacted Petitioner’s ability to file

his state petitions, but would not have prevented Petitioner from filing his federal petition in

the ensuing eight months until October 12, 1998 when his one year expired. 

Due Diligence - Petition argues that he was diligent in attempting to bring his claims

to the state courts. (Reply, #26 at 4-5.) However, that diligence does not establish diligence

in filing a federal habeas petition. Indeed, Petitioner evidences no efforts to file his federal

petition in the time period prior to October 12, 1998 that his one year was running. 

It might be argued that Petitioner was diligent with regard to his federal petition, to the

extent that his state filings could be seen as efforts to exhaust state remedies so as to preserve

them for federal review. Petitioner does not explain, however, why he did not seek to file his

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federal petition, and then stay consideration while he exhausted his unexhausted claims. See

e.g. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of California (“Taylor”), 134 F.3d 981,

982 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court may allow a habeas corpus petitioner to amend his petition

to delete unexhausted claims and hold the amended petition in abeyance subject to further

amendment reincorporating the deleted claims once they are litigated in state court). But see

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (questioning whether Taylor procedure

remains viable after Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005)). 

Judicial Misconduct. - Petitioner argues that the state courts have engaged in judicial

misconduct in failing to allow Petitioner to present his claims to them. (Reply #26 at 5-6.)

Petitioner argues that the state courts failed to take note of his lack of effective counsel and

a complete record. Again, however, Petitioner ignores that it was not the barriers to bringing

his state claims which is relevant to this Court’s equitable tolling determination. Rather,

Petitioner must show that he was precluded by such circumstances from bringing his federal

petition. Because his time to present his federal claims occurred after his first PCR petition

was decided, the difficulties in bringing that proceeding do not explain a failure to promptly

pursue his federal habeas proceeding thereafter.

Improper Dismissal of Second PCR Petition - Petitioner argues that the state court

improperly dismissed Petitioner’s second state petition for post-conviction relief by applying

claims preclusion and failing to see the merits of his claims. (Reply #26 at 6-7.) However,

Petitioner ignores that this second PCR petition was also dismissed as untimely. Any error

in the alternative determinations on preclusion or the merits would not alter the untimeliness

of the petition, or consequently it’s failure to provide Petitioner with statutory tolling. Neither

would it explain Petitioner’s failure to file a timely habeas petition.

Timeliness of Third PCR Petition - Petitioner argues that his third state petition for

post-conviction relief was not untimely. (Reply #26 at 8.) However, nothing about

Petitioner’s third PCR petition would explain his failure to file a timely habeas petition two

years earlier, when his habeas limitations period was expiring. Moreover, even if the Third

PCR Petition were improperly dismissed as untimely, that would not serve to revive

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Petitioner’s federal limitations period, which had long since expired at the time the Third PCR

Petition was filed.

Errors of State Law - Petitioner argues that the state courts have improperly applied

state precedent to Petitioner in rejecting his claims. (Reply #26 at 9-10.) However, this does

not explain Petitioner’s failure to seek timely federal review of any such errors.

Invalidity of Plea - Petitioner argues that his plea was null and void, because it was not

entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. (Reply, #26 at 10-11.) However, this does

not explain Petitioner’s failure to seek timely federal review of any such issues. 

Denial of Counsel - Petitioner argues that he was denied counsel in his first state postconviction relief proceeding when counsel was permitted to withdraw. (Reply #26 at 11.)

Again, Petitioner ignores that it was not the barriers to bringing his state claims which is

relevant to this Court’s equitable tolling determination. Rather, Petitioner must show that he

was precluded by such circumstances from bringing his federal petition. 

Validity of Third PCR Petition - Petitioner argues that his third state post-conviction

relief petition was not untimely or precluded and continued to be pending through the

evidentiary hearing on March 22, 2004. (Reply #26 at 12-13.) However, any errors in this

state proceeding would not affect the fact that Petitioner’s federal limitations period had run

long before that proceeding commenced.

Summary re Equitable Tolling - In sum, Petitioner fails to point to any

circumstances occurring during the running of his limitations period, from September 16,

1997 until October 12, 1998, which precluded him from filing his federal habeas petition in

a timely manner. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any equitable tolling, and his

Petition is therefore untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed September 8, 2004 (#1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section

2254 proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: April 28, 2006 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\04-1871-1r RR 06 04 07 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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