Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-03225/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-03225-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 15:1121 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 1/22/08*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CANTER & ASSOCIATES, LLC, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

TEACHSCAPE, INC.,

Defendant. /

NO. C 07-3225 RS

ORDER RE DISCOVERY

DISPUTES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Laureate Education, Inc. and its subsidiary, plaintiff Canter & Associates, LLC

(collectively “Canter”) moved to compel defendant Teachscape, Inc to make its initial disclosures

under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Teachscape served those disclosures the

same day it filed its opposition to the motion; the only question remaining, therefore, is whether

Teachscape was substantially justified in refusing to make those disclosures at an earlier time. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Teachscape was mistaken in its view of when

initial disclosures were due, but that it did not act in a manner that would support imposing

Case 5:07-cv-03225-RS Document 56 Filed 01/22/08 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Canter has not moved for sanctions. As Canter appears to recognize, under Civil Local

Rule 7-8, it would have to do so via separately-noticed motion. Canter’s reply brief, however,

expressly requests a determination at this juncture as to whether Teachscape’s conduct was

substantially justified. While that determination ordinarily would be made only in the context of a

sanctions motion, the parties will not be put to the expense and burden of briefing such a motion,

given the Court’s view that sanctions are not warranted.

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 This does not mean, however, that a party may avoid its initial disclosure obligations by

interposing a frivolous objection. While such an objection might technically excuse the initial

disclosure obligation until a court ruling issues, the assertion of a frivolous objection will have

consequences. In this instance, it is unlikely that the Court would have accepted an argument that

initial disclosures could be delayed until federal jurisdiction is established. The pendency of a

motion to dismiss almost never serves to excuse compliance with initial disclosure obligations. The

objection, however, would not appear to have been frivolous. In any event, the Court need not

decide the issue because Teachscape elected not to stand on the objection.

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sanctions.1 Canter’s further motion seeking entry of a protective order to govern the production of

confidential information in this action will be denied without prejudice, and the parties will be

directed to renew their efforts to reach an agreement as to the form of such an order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Initial Disclosures

There appears to be no dispute that Teachscape was reluctant to provide initial disclosures in

this action (or to engage in other discovery) based in part on its belief that there is no basis for

federal jurisdiction over this controversy. Teachscape initially proposed that it would object to

providing initial disclosures on grounds that they would not be “appropriate in this action.” Rule 26

(a) (1) (C) expressly permits a party to make such an objection “in the proposed discovery plan,”

and, when such objection is made, the rule provides that the Court “must determine what

disclosures, if any, are to be made and must set the time for the disclosures.” Thus, Teachscape

would have been within its rights to refuse to make any initial disclosures until obtaining a court

ruling on the validity of its objections that proceeding with initial disclosures would be inappropriate

under the particular circumstances of this action.2

Teachscape ultimately chose not to seek a court ruling on its objection that initial disclosures

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Teachscape portrays this choice as having been made as an attempt to compromise and to

avoid unnecessary law and motion practice. Nothing in this order should be construed as either

accepting or rejecting that characterization.

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 In the ordinary course, the Court would expect parties to be able to resolve issues like this

between themselves. Although any delay may be significant under particular circumstances, it is

difficult to understand why parties would be unable to reach some compromise as to when initial

disclosures will be served when the Court, for whatever reasons, has chosen to continue a CMC for

some short period of time.

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should be stayed pending resolution of the jurisdictional issue.3

 Instead, Teachscape took the

position that its initial disclosures were not due until whatever day the parties’ joint Case

Management Conference (“CMC”) Statement ultimately became due. Thus, even though

Teachscape at one point promised to serve its initial disclosures on October 31, 2007, (the day the

joint CMC statement was then due), it revoked that offer when the Court sua sponte continued the

CMC.

Canter vigorously complains that nothing in the Federal Rules, the Local Rules, or standing

orders, supports Teachscape’s contention that it was permitted to delay its initial disclosures until the

date that the joint CMC statement ultimately became due. Canter is correct that the Court’s initial

form scheduling order set September 26, 2007 as a date certain for serving initial disclosures. Canter

is also correct that none of the subsequent Clerk’s notices continuing the date of the CMC

conference made any express mention regarding the time for serving initial disclosures. Finally,

Canter may be correct that Teachscape could or should have sought clarification from the Court, if

the parties were unable to agree as to the effect of the continuation of the CMC on their disclosure

obligations.4

 

Nonetheless, Teachscape was not wholly without justification for believing that the deadline

for serving initial disclosures should be deemed to move automatically with the deadline for filing a

joint CMC statement. Among other things, the Court’s initial scheduling order draws a clear

association between the deadline for serving initial disclosures and the filing of a joint CMC

statement and there was at least some logic to Teachscape’s position that the events should go hand

in hand. If, for instance, Teachscape had chosen to stand on its objection to initial disclosures going

forward at all, that would have been presented to the court as part of the CMC statement. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Under these circumstances, while the more appropriate course of action for Teachscape to

take would have been either to adhere to the original deadline or to seek relief from the Court, the

position it took does not serve as a basis for imposing sanctions. Because there is no dispute that

Teachscape has now provided its initial disclosures, there is nothing to compel and Canter’s motion

is denied on that basis. 

B. Protective order

Canter seeks entry of a generalized protective order that would govern the production of

confidential information in this action. Teachscape’s oppostion to the motion effectively concedes

that it has been unwilling to neogotiate the terms of any such protective order, based on its argument

that discovery in this action should not proceed until the Court has definitively concluded there is a

basis for federal jurisdictions. To the extent Teachscape in good faith believed that negotiating for a

protective order might undermine its arguments that there is no basis for federal jurisdiction over

this dispute, Teachscape is hereby advised that it may and must engage in good faith meet and

confer negotiations over the terms of a protective order, and that doing so will in no way prejudice it

with respect to the jurisdictional arguments it has made. Accordingly, Canter’s motion for a

protective order is denied, without prejudice. The parties are hereby ordered to meet and confer to

attempt to reach a stipulated form of protective order, to be submitted to the Court within 15 days of

the date of this order. In the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement, they may

simultaneously submit their respective proposals, under the cover of letter briefs, not to exceed three

pages each, outlining their disagreements and the basis of their respective positions. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER RE DISCOVERY DISPUTES

C 07-3225 RS

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the motion to compel is denied, and the motion for a

protective order is denied, without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2008 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER RE DISCOVERY DISPUTES

C 07-3225 RS

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Gayle M. Athanacio gathanacio@sonnenschein.com, clepera@sonnenschein.com,

hkalay@sonnenschein.com, pcranmer@sonnenschein.com

Elena Maria DiMuzio Elena.DiMuzio@hellerehrman.com

Annette L. Hurst annette.hurst@hellerehrman.com, brett.stone@hellerehrman.com,

dluster@hellerehrman.com, patti.johnsen@hellerehrman.com, schilds@hellerehrman.com

Daniel N. Kassabian daniel.kassabian@hellerehrman.com, allen.rose@hellerehrman.com,

harriette.louie@hellerehrman.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 1/22/08 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Chambers 

Case 5:07-cv-03225-RS Document 56 Filed 01/22/08 Page 6 of 6