Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03734/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03734-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ERIC ALLEN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, ET AL., 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 18-cv-03734-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 55

Plaintiff Eric Allen’s second amended complaint asserts eight causes of action against 

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), Deutsche 

Bank National Trust Company (“DB”), and Does 1-100 arising out of a loan on the property at 

424 Violet Road, Hercules, CA 94547 (“Subject Property”).1 (Dkt. No. 54 (“SAC”).) 

On June 12, 2019, the Court granted motions by Wells Fargo as well as Ocwen and DB to 

dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint and provided plaintiff leave to amend with respect to 

select claims.2

 (Dkt. No. 51 (“MTD Order”).) Now before the Court is Wells Fargo’s motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint (“SAC”).3 (Dkt. No. 55 (“MTD”).) Having 

1

 These claims include: (1) breach of written contract; (2) breach of verbal contract; (3) 

negligent misrepresentation; (4) negligence; (5) promissory estoppel; (6) violation of Cal. Civ. 

Code § 2923.7; (7) violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2605; and (8) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1601. (SAC at 

¶¶ 53-110.) 

2

 Defendants Ocwen and DB have answered plaintiff’s SAC. (Dkt. No. 57.) 

3

 In connection with its motion to dismiss, Wells Fargo requests that the Court take judicial 

notice of eleven federal bankruptcy court filing and orders. (Dkt. No. 56 (“RJN”) at 1-3.) Each of 

these documents were filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 

California and are available on the court’s website. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this 

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carefully considered the pleadings and the papers submitted, and for the reasons set forth more 

fully below, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

I. BACKGROUND

The background giving rise to this action is well-known, and the Court will not repeat it 

here. (See MTD Order at 2-7.) Plaintiff’s SAC includes a handful of additional allegations. 

(Compare Dkt. No. 35 with SAC.) The SAC includes the following new introductory allegations: 

1. Plaintiff homeowner has filed suit seeking redress for claims arising out of 

breaches of contract (written and verbal agreements), negligent 

misrepresentation, negligence, promissory estoppel, violation of Cal. Civil 

Code § 2923.7, violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1601; and violation of 12 U.S.C. § 

2605, as will be set forth below. 

2. This action is of a civil nature. Plaintiff is informed and believes that this 

Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

3. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) because the unlawful 

conduct is alleged to have occurred in Contra Costa County, California and 

Plaintiffs’ home which is the subject of this litigation is located in Contra 

Costa County, California. Therefore, jurisdiction and venue is [sic] properly 

with this Court. 

(SAC ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiff adds only one new assertion to the “General Allegations” section of his 

SAC: “Plaintiff was an account holder and customer of Wells Fargo at the time of the payment 

incident on June 23, 2014 should have called him and been able to call him to tell him my 

payment was not credited toward his loan. Although Wells Fargo claimed they did not have his 

telephone number or any way to contact him about his payment, that is a false, and knowingly 

false statement.” (Id. ¶ 18 (quoted verbatim).) The Court addresses plaintiff’s additional causeof-action-specific allegations as it evaluates each of those claims below. 

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unopposed request for judicial notice. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 

2001) (noting “a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record” and documents whose 

“authenticity . . . is not contested” and upon which a plaintiff’s complaint relies) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). However, the court only affords them their 

proper evidentiary weight. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the ground upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Id. at 556–57. Moreover, a 

plaintiff suing multiple defendants “must allege the basis of his claim against each defendant to 

satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) . . . .” Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 

1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988). “Specific identification of the parties to the activities alleged by the 

plaintiff[] is required . . . to enable [a] defendant to plead intelligently.” Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan 

Servicing, LLC, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A complaint that falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 

is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to 

support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 

1104 (9th Cir. 2008). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] 

factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most 

favorable to a nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 

1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially 

noticeable facts, see Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look 

beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Nor must the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the 

form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2004).

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If a court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it should give leave to amend 

unless “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & 

Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). In making this 

determination, a court must bear in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decisions 

on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges eight causes of action, the first six of which arise 

under California state law – (1) breach of written contract; (2) breach of verbal contract; (3) 

negligent misrepresentation; (4) negligence; (5) promissory estoppel; (6) violation of Cal. Civ. 

Code § 2923.7 – and the final two of which constitute federal causes of action – (7) violation of 12 

U.S.C. § 2605, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, (“RESPA”); and (8) violation of 15 

U.S.C. § 1601, the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). (SAC ¶¶ 53-110.) 

Because plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (SAC ¶ 

2) and federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must dismiss an action if no such 

jurisdiction exists, the Court turns first to plaintiff’s federal law causes of action. See Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

A. Federal Claims 

1. RESPA Claim (Violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2605) 

RESPA provides that servicers of federally related mortgage loans must “notify the 

borrower in writing of any assignment, sale, or transfer of servicing of the loan to any other 

person.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1). Plaintiff’s SAC now includes additional allegations to address 

two issues. First, the SAC alleges that it was Ocwen and Wells Fargo who “failed to properly or 

timely inform” plaintiff. Second, the notification concerned “a change in servicer to Ocwen or 

Wells Fargo, and [that such] transfer was not excluded from RESPA’s notice requirements.”4 

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 Plaintiff also alleges that Ocwen failed to properly notify him of another, more recent 

transfer. (SAC ¶ 89.) 

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(SAC ¶ 88.) In light of the new allegations, the Court analyzes plaintiff’s notification-based 

RESPA claim.5 

First, RESPA’s notice requirements apply only to “[e]ach servicer” of any federally 

related mortgage loan. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1) (emphasis supplied). Although plaintiff’s SAC 

contends that defendants failed to properly notify plaintiff “of a change in services to Ocwen or 

Wells Fargo,” plaintiff does not otherwise allege that Wells Fargo was a servicer of the loan at 

issue.6 (SAC ¶ 88 (emphasis supplied).) Instead, plaintiff alleges that “at all times referred to 

herein, except as otherwise stated herein, Ocwen was the loan servicer on plaintiff’s loan with 

Wells Fargo, that is the subject of this lawsuit.” (Id. ¶ 14; see also id. ¶ 18 (alleging that in June 

2014 plaintiff informed a Wells Fargo employee “that ‘Ocwen’ was the loan servicer on his 

mortgage with Wells Fargo”).) With respect to Wells Fargo, plaintiff’s SAC identifies Wells 

Fargo as “claim[ing] to be the beneficial interest holder and Lender[.]” (Id. ¶ 7.) Thus, plaintiff 

has failed to allege a notification-based RESPA claim against Wells Fargo. See Crawford v. CalWestern Reconveyance Corp., No. CV 12-10598 DSF (VBKx), 2013 WL 12131585, at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ RESPA claim against one defendant 

because plaintiffs did not “plead[] or otherwise establish[] that [defendant] [was] a loan servicer 

and [defendant] ha[d] provided documents indicating that it [was] merely the substituted trustee, 

not a loan servicer”). 

Second, RESPA has a three-year statute of limitation for violations of Section 2605. 12 

U.S.C. § 2614. In his SAC, plaintiff alleges that because “no notice [was] provided, . . . the 

statute of limitations had not yet begun to run until the filing of the instant matter such that and 

tolling is not implicated[.]” (SAC ¶ 88.) Plaintiff also contends, in the alternative, “that the Court 

should apply the doctrine of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in the interests of 

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 The Court notes that in light of the ambiguity of plaintiff’s first amended complaint, its 

prior order discussed a qualified written response (“QWR”)-based claim. (MTD Order at 11.) 

However, plaintiff’s additional allegations demonstrate that he does not allege a QWR-based 

claim. 

6

 Plaintiff’s opposition to the instant motion does not acknowledge or otherwise respond 

to this argument. (See Opp. at 10-11.) 

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justice.” (Id.) In support thereof, plaintiff asserts that “[w]ithout service of a legal notice, [he] 

lacked knowledge of what kinds of transfer had occurred or whether it was the type of transfer to 

which the notification requirement applied, until retaining counsel for the filing of the instant 

matter.” (Id.) The Court disagrees. 

Plaintiff’s SAC alleges elsewhere that he knew in 2013 and 2014 that Ocwen was the 

servicer of the loan and Wells Fargo the lender. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that at the time of 

the 2013 execution of the Share Appreciation Modification Agreement (“SAMA”), he and his wife 

“were told by their Servicer OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC . . . that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 

. . . was the lender.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Additionally, plaintiff alleges “[o]n or about June 23, 2014, 

plaintiff entered a Wells Fargo Bank . . . [and] advised [employee of Wells Fargo Bank] Mr. 

Mercado that ‘Ocwen’ was the loan servicer on his mortgage with Wells Fargo.” (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run at least as early as June 2014 and, thus, 

expired June 2017. Plaintiff filed his initial complaint a year later on June 22, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

Accordingly, because, in light of these allegations, plaintiff cannot amend his complaint to allege 

that he was unaware of the alleged transfer of the loan to Ocwen and/or Wells Fargo, plaintiff’s 

notification-based RESPA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 

178, 182 (1962) (identifying factors that may justify denying leave to amend, including futility). 

2. TILA Claim (Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1601) 

In its June 12 Order, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s TILA claim as time-barred and 

provided plaintiff leave to amend, to the extent plaintiff seeks only damages, “to allege why the 

statute of limitations should be tolled” beyond the one-year for which the statute provides. (MTD 

Order at 11-12.) In response, plaintiff’s SAC contends that “[e]quitable tolling should apply due 

to the fact that [d]efendants did not comply with the notice requirements for assignment to 

Deutsche Bank or of receipt and application of his June 23, 2014 payment leading to the failure of 

[d]efendants to complete the modification pursuant to conditional terms of the SAMA which still 

has not yet been rectified.” (SAC ¶ 102.) Based thereon plaintiff asserts that “because [he] was 

deprived of statutory notices he was unable to take action sooner.” (Id.) Plaintiff further contends 

that he “did not have knowledge of his rights to receive notice of any assignment and within 30 

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days until retaining counsel for the preparation of the filing of this lawsuit, and in fact, due to the 

circumstances that servicers were employed to manage his loan account, [p]laintiff had no direct 

contact with the beneficial interest holder of his deed of trust and would not have been privy to 

knowledge of assignment unless statutory notice requirements were complied with, which they 

were not.” (Id.) However, as the Court advised plaintiff in its June 12 Order, “the mere existence 

of TILA violations does not support equitable tolling of TILA’s statute of limitations.”7 Quach v. 

Bank of Am., N.A., 5:13-CV-00467-EJD, 2013 WL 3788827, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013); see 

also MTD Order at 12. 

As noted above, allegations in the complaint as well as judicially noticeable Bankruptcy 

documents show plaintiff’s awareness in at least 2014. As such, plaintiff has failed to allege 

circumstances justifying tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff’s TILA claim. Quanch, 2013 WL 3788827, at *3; see also 

Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (identifying factors that may justify denying leave to amend, including 

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed and futility). 

B. State Law Claims 

With respect to all remaining eight state law causes of action against Wells Fargo, plaintiff 

ignores most of Wells Fargo’s arguments, namely (1) that plaintiff’s breach of contract claims fail 

because plaintiff has failed to identify which contract forms the basis of the claim and how Wells 

Fargo is a party thereto; (2) that, with r 

espect to the promissory estoppel claim, plaintiff does not allege that Wells Fargo said anything 

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 Plaintiff’s SAC also elaborates on his allegation that defendants “violated TILA for 

failing to apply partial payments and the June 2014 payment to his loan balance under the 

provision requiring notice of the deposit of partial payments into suspense accounts on the period 

statement and treatment of such funds as a periodic payment[,]” for failing to credit a nonconforming payment (the June 23, 2014 payment) within five days[,]” and failing “to provide 

requisite advisements regarding partial payments[.]” (SAC ¶ 104.) Plaintiff further alleges that he 

“was entitled to received notices about such payments and his rights to have these types of 

payment deposited and credited to his loan, but he did not receive these at all or in a timely 

manner as is required, at or around the assignment to Deutsche Bank, or with regard to the June 

23, 2014 payment within the time constraints required by TILA[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff does not 

provide any additional allegations beyond those discussed herein and previously alleged as to why 

the Court should toll the statute of limitations and so this portion of his TILA claim similarly fails. 

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about satisfactory performance of the SAMA and any promise relating to the SAMA could not 

support a claim because promissory estoppel is not available when an existing contract covers the 

same subject; and (3) that Section 2923.7 imposes obligations only on mortgage servicers. 

Therefore the Court views the silence as a concession that the motion is well taken with respect to 

those arguments and claims. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff’s 

Section 2923.7 claim against Wells Fargo as he has alleged that Ocwen, not Wells Fargo, was the 

mortgage servicer. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. 

Plaintiff does argue generically that the motion should be denied as to all claims because 

(1) Wells Fargo fails “to set forth a defense that they were not an alter ego of Ocwen . . .”; and (2) 

all applicable statutes of limitation should be tolled. (Opp. at 9, 12-13.) Before the alter ego 

doctrine can be invoked two elements must be alleged; “First, there must be such a unity of 

interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate 

personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist. Second, there must be 

an equitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.” Sonora 

Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 526 (2000); see also Mesler, 39 Cal.3d at 

300 (“There is not litmus test to determine when the corporate veil will be pierced; rather the 

result will depend on the circumstances of each particular case. There are, nevertheless, two 

general requirements: ‘(1) that there can be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 

personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are 

treated as those of the corporation alone, an equitable result will follow[.]’”); see also AT&T v. 

Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996). Factors showing such a 

relationship include: “[1] the commingling of funds and other assets of the entities, (2) the holding 

out by one entity that it is liable for the debts of the other, [3] identical equitable ownership of the 

entities, [4] use of the same offices and employees, [5] use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the 

affairs of the other, [6] inadequate capitalization, [7] disregard of corporate formalities, [8] lack of 

segregation of corporate records, and [9] identical directors and officers.” Corcoran v. CVS 

Health Corp., 169 F.Supp.3d 970, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Nothing in the SAC alleges the same nor 

is any proffer made that such allegations could be made. This argument fails. 

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Additionally, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s argument with respect to the tolling 

of statute of limitations of his state law claims similarly fail. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES

WITH PREJUDICE the following claims as time-barred: breach of oral contract, negligent 

misrepresentation, negligence, and promissory estoppel. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Further, 

plaintiff’s only remaining state law claim, breach of written contract, is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE for failure to allege a contract between plaintiff and Wells Fargo. See Foman, 371 

U.S. at 182. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss 

and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff’s claims against Wells Fargo. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 55. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated:

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

August 29, 2019

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