Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01044/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01044-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Arizona Public Integrity Alliance Incorporated, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Ken Bennett, in his official capacity as 

Secretary of State for the State of Arizona, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-01044-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 

 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4). The Motion was argued on May 29, 2014. The Motion 

will be denied because it is bared by laches, as Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking injunctive 

relief is unreasonable and prejudicial. A preliminary injunction will also be denied 

because it is unnecessary to prevent any harm to the Plaintiffs in the 2014 primary 

election. This order states the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 

Rule 52(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND THE PARTIES 

 This application for a preliminary injunction is brought by Arizona Public 

Integrity Alliance Incorporated and four Maricopa County voters who are members of the 

Republican Party. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State Ken Bennett is the state officer 

responsible for administering Arizona elections. Party-affiliated candidates seeking to be 

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placed on the primary election ballot for statewide office are required to file nomination 

petitions with the Secretary of State. See A.R.S. §§ 16-311, 16-314. Plaintiffs seek to 

enjoin enforcement of part of the statute that sets the minimum number of signatures on 

the nominating petitions. A.R.S. § 16-322(A)(1). Plaintiffs do not challenge the 

requirement that the petitions be signed by at least one-half of one percent of the total 

voter registration of the candidate’s party in the state. Id. A Republican candidate for 

this election needs 5,660 signatures. 

 Plaintiffs do challenge the requirement of signatures of at least one-half of one 

percentage of the voter registration of the party of the candidate in at least three of the 

fifteen counties in the state. Id. The number of signatures for the county-distribution 

requirement is included within the total state-wide signature requirement. Due to 

variations in county population, the absolute number of signatures to qualify a county 

varies from county to county, though the percentage is the same for every county. Id. 

 Plaintiffs contend this minimum county-distribution requirement violates the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They say it dilutes signatures 

from more populous counties and enhances the value of signatures from less populous 

counties. For example, for Greenlee County, which has only 1,115 registered Republican 

voters, six signatures suffice toward the three-county requirement. Plaintiffs object that 

each one of the six Republican signatures from Greenlee County satisfies 1/6 of onethird, or 5.6%, of the total county-based signature requirement. In contrast, 3,553 

signatures are needed for Maricopa County, which has 710,487 registered Republicans. 

Plaintiffs object that for Maricopa County, each of the 3,553 signatures satisfies 1/3,553 

of one-third, or less than .01%, of the total county-distribution signature requirement. 

Again, these are Plaintiffs’ computations and arguments. 

 The individual plaintiffs are residents of Maricopa County. They all signed 

primary nomination petitions this election season, and some of their candidates used 

Maricopa County as one of the three qualifying counties in their nomination petition. 

The individual plaintiffs claim that, as residents of Arizona’s most populous county, the 

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county-distribution signature requirement has diminished the relative value of their 

signatures as compared to the signatures of residents of less inhabited counties. They 

seek to enjoin application of that requirement for candidates in the 2014 primary election. 

II. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS BARRED BY PLAINTIFFS’ 

UNREASONABLE AND PREJUDICIAL DELAY 

 Nomination petitions for the primary election ballot had to be filed between April 

28 and May 28, 2014. Challenges to the sufficiency of nomination petitions were due by 

June 11, 2014, and early primary voting begins on July 28, 2014. Plaintiffs began 

looking seriously at the constitutionality of the county-distribution requirement in 

December 2013. They gave notice to the State on May 2, 2014, that they intended to 

seek an injunction, but they did not do so until May 15, 2014. The Court set accelerated 

briefing and a hearing for May 29, 2014. 

 Laches—unreasonable and prejudicial delay—requires denial of injunctive relief, 

including preliminary relief. “In the context of election matters, the laches doctrine seeks 

to prevent dilatory conduct and will bar a claim if a party's unreasonable delay prejudices 

the opposing party or the administration of justice.” Lubin v. Thomas, 213 Ariz. 496, 497 

¶ 10, 144 P.3d 510, 511 (2006) (holding that the laches doctrine applies to actions 

challenging candidate nomination petitions); Beltran v. Razo, 163 Ariz. 505, 507, 788 

P.2d 1256, 1258 (App. 1990); Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83 ¶ 6, 13 P.3d 1198, 

1200 (Ariz. 2000). Such delay “strains the quality of decision making and is ultimately 

unfair to all involved.” Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 456, 460, 851 P.2d 81, 85 (1993). 

 No relief can be granted that would delay the printing of the ballots. Lubin, 213 

Ariz. at 497 ¶ 10, 144 P.3d at 512. A plaintiff’s delay can “prejudice the administration 

of justice by compelling the court to steamroll through delicate legal issues in order to 

meet the ballot printing deadlines.” Id. The defendant is also entitled to reasonable time 

to consider and develop his case. McCarthy W. Constructors, Inc. v. Phoenix Resort 

Corp., 169 Ariz. 520, 525, 821 P.2d 181, 187 (App. 1991). That includes “the 

opportunity to develop and present their own evidence, hire an expert, or prepare their 

cross-examination.” Mathieu, 174 Ariz. at 459-60, 851 P.2d at 84-85. 

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 Plaintiffs’ delay until two weeks before the Secretary begins signature validation 

is unreasonable. The statue they challenge is not new. Earlier iterations of the countydistribution signature requirement have existed since statehood. See Ariz. Sess. Laws 

1912, 1st. S.S., Ch. 84, § 6. The present version has been in effect since 1980. See Ariz. 

Sess. Laws 1979, Ch. 209, §§ 2 to 5. Plaintiffs say they delayed their filing because it 

took a long time to obtain Plaintiffs’ certified voting records. As they conceded at oral 

argument, they could have attested in sworn affidavits that they are qualified electors. 

The time it took to obtain certified voting records does not justify a delay. 

 Plaintiffs also say they had no cause to discover the county-distribution signature 

requirement before they signed this year’s petitions. But Plaintiffs’ counsel 

acknowledged they began looking seriously at the constitutionality of the statute in 

December 2013. Had Plaintiffs filed suit promptly, a motion for preliminary injunction 

could have been briefed and decided without unreasonable burden on the Defendant, the 

Court, and the election process. 

 Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ unwarranted delay prevented him from defending 

against the injunction. He does not respond on the merits for inability to marshal facts 

and authorities in the short time left. That is plainly true. Plaintiffs’ response that 

Defendant did not need time to prepare a response because Plaintiffs’ case is obviously 

meritorious is not a valid response to laches. A defendant and the court are entitled to a 

meaningful response precisely to determine the strength of the case. Plaintiffs’ 

unreasonable delay in filing this Motion unduly prejudiced the State’s ability to defend 

on the merits. 

III. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WOULD NOT PREVENT ANY HARM 

IN THE 2014 ELECTIONS 

 An injunction may be granted only when the movant shows that “he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see 

also Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005). A preliminary 

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injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless 

the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 

520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis in original) (per curiam) (citation omitted). 

 When Plaintiffs filed this action and when it was heard on May 29, 2014, it was 

extremely unlikely that a preliminary injunction would have prevented any injury to the 

Plaintiffs in the 2014 elections. The nomination petition filing period ended on May 28, 

2014, and the Secretary had qualified all the primary candidates whose nominating 

petitions they signed. In doing so, the Secretary certified that they all satisfied the 

county-distribution signature requirement.1

 The time for private parties to bring litigation 

to challenge the sufficiency of the signatures was June 11, 2014. That date passed and no 

candidate supported by Plaintiffs has been challenged. Those candidates’ presence on the 

primary election ballot is certain. Plaintiffs have not shown any harm to be avoided by 

preliminary injunctive relief. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4) is denied. 

 Dated this 23rd day of June, 2014. 

 

1

 Collectively, the individual plaintiffs signed nominating petitions for the following Republican candidates: (1) Scott Smith, running for Governor, qualified by satisfying the county-based signature requirement in Greenlee, Maricopa, and Santa Cruise County; (2) Justice Pierce, running for Secretary of State, qualified by satisfying the county-based signature requirement in Graham, Maricopa, and Yuma County; (3) Mark Brnovich, running for Attorney General, qualified by satisfying the county-based signature requirement in Coconino, Pinal, and Yavapai County; and (4) Wil Cardon, running for Secretary of State, qualified by satisfying the county-based signature requirement in Coconino, Maricopa, and Pinal County. 

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