Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02144/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02144-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1446bc Notice of Removal - Breach of Contract

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APR l S 2019 

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHlZRN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

B~.:_ ,Y--: OEPUTY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALBERT L. EDWARDS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

C4 PLANNING SOLUTIONS, LLC and 

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02144-BEN-AGS 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 4] 

15 Plaintiff Albert L. Edwards filed this lawsuit against Defendants C4 Planning 

16 Solutions, LLC and DOES 1 through 50 for nine state law claims related to his employment 

17 with C4 Planning. C4 Planning moves to dismiss the Complaint for forum non conveniens 

18 or, in the alternative, for transfer to the Southern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 

19 1404(a). [Doc. 4.] The motion is GRANTED. 

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I. BACKGROUND1 

This case concerns Mr. Edwards's employment dispute with C4 Planning, related to 

22 work he performed in California between 2013 and 2018. In January 2013, C4 Planning's 

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25 1 The Court accepts as true the facts alleged in Mr. Edwards's Complaint, Doc. 1. 

See Vivendi SA v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 691 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 

26 Aguas Lenders Recovery Group v. Suez, S.A., 585 F.3d 696, 697 (2d Cir. 2009) (accepting 

27 the facts alleged in the complaint as true where the case was dismissed on forum non 

conveniens grounds without a factual hearing). 28 

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1 owner and president, James Fennell, recruited Mr. Edwards to work at C4 Planning. At 

2 the time, Mr. Fennell and Mr. Edwards had already known one another for approximately 

3 ten years. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Edwards began working for C4 Planning as its Vice 

4 President of Business Development and Strategy. In that position, he reported directly to 

5 Mr. Fennell, supported C4 Planning's headquarters, and developed new business and 

6 increased existing contract values for C4 Planning. See [Doc. 1-2 at if 11.] 

7 Around the same time that C4 Planning sent an Offer Letter to Mr. Edwards, C4 

8 Planning also sent an Employment Agreement, which he signed on January 25, 2013. 

9 Paragraph 8( c) of the Employment Agreement contained a bold, capitalized forum 

10 selection clause: 

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( c) This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the 

laws of the State of Georgia. IN THE EVENT OF DISPUTE 

HEREUNDER, IT IS AGREED THAT VENUE LIES EXCLUSIVELY 

IN A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN BURKE 

COUNTY, GEORGIA AND SUCH COURT SHALL BE A PROPER 

FORUM IN WHICH TO ADJUDICATE SUCH DISPUTE. THE 

PARTIES AGREE TO WAIVE ANY DEFENSE THAT THEY MAY 

HA VE BASED UPON IMPROPER VENUE OR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION, AND TO SUBJECT THEMSELVES TO THE 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF ANY SUCH AFORESAID COURT. 

[Doc. 4-1, P. 9 if 8( c) (emphasis in original).] 

At the time he signed the Employment Agreement, Mr. Edwards alleges that he did 

20 not know the location of C4 Planning's headquarters or that Mr. Fennell lived in Burke 

21 County, Georgia. Since beginning his employment with C4 Planning, Mr. Edwards has 

22 visited both Mr. Fennell 's home in Burke County, Georgia and C4 Planning's headquarters 

23 in Richmond County, Blythe, Georgia. During his employment, Mr. Fennell often 

24 remarked in Mr. Edwards's presence that "no one wanted to go to court in Burke County, 

25 Georgia." 

26 Mr. Edwards's employment with C4 Planning ended in February 2018. Mr. 

27 Edwards brought suit in the Superior Court of California, San Diego County, for nine 

28 claims related to C4 Planning's alleged refusal to pay commissions and compensation 

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1 owed to him under the parties' Employment Agreement: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach 

2 of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) failure to pay commission wages 

3 in violation of the Labor Code§§ 221 and 223; ( 4) failure to provide accurate and itemized 

4 wage statements in violation of Labor Code §§ 226(e); (5) failure to maintain accurate 

5 wage records in violation of Labor Code §§ 1174; (6) failure to pay all wages due upon 

6 separation of employment in violation of Labor Code §§ 202 and 203; (7) violation of 

7 California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200; (8) accounting; and (9) declaratory 

8 relief. On September 14, 2018, C4 Planning removed to this Court. [Doc. l.] C4 

9 Planning's Motion to Dismiss followed. [Doc. 4.] 

10 II. DISCUSSION 

U C4 Planning argues the forum selection clause m the parties' Employment 

12 Agreement requires dismissal for forum non conveniens or, in the alternative, transfer 

13 under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. 

14 A. Legal Standard 

15 A federal court sitting in diversity applies federal law to determine the enforceability 

16 of a forum selection clause. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 85 8 F .2d 509, 513 

17 (9th Cir. 1988). "The appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a 

18 state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens." Atlantic Marine 

19 Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013). "[B]ecause 

20 both§ 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens doctrine from which it derives entail the same 

21 balancing-of-interests standard, courts should evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing 

22 to a nonfederal forum in the same way that they evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing 

23 to a federal forum [through 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)]." Id. at 61. 

24 On a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, the moving party must establish: 

25 "( 1) that venue is proper in the transferor district; (2) that the transferee district is one where 

26 the action might have been brought; and (3) that transfer will serve the convenience of the 

27 parties and witnesses and will promote the interest of justice." Goodyear Tire & Rubber 

28 Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F. Supp. 503, 506 (C.D. Cal. 1992). Once venue is 

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I found proper in both districts, a court must consider public factors relating to "the interest 

2 of justice" and private factors relating to "the convenience of the parties and witnesses." 

3 Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). When 

4 there is a valid forum selection clause, however, "[t]he calculus changes," and the court 

5 must modify its§ 1404(a) analysis in three ways. Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 63. "First, 

6 the plaintiffs choice of forum merits no weight," and the plaintiff, who is defying the 

7 forum selection clause, "bears the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for 

8 which the parties bargained is unwarranted." Id. Second, the court should only consider 

9 public interest factors, not private ones. Id. Finally, "a § 1404( a) transfer of venue will 

10 not carry with it the original venue's choice-of-law rules-a factor that in some 

11 circumstances may affect public-interest considerations." Id. at 64. A forum-selection 

12 clause is "given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases." Id. at 60. 

13 Generally, a forum selection clause is "prima facie valid" and thus enforceable, 

14 absent a strong showing "that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the 

15 clause [is] invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off16 Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). "The party seeking to avoid the forum selection clause 

17 bears a 'heavy burden of proof."' Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th 

18 Cir. 1998) (en bane). Federal courts have recognized only three grounds for declining to 

19 enforce a forum selection clause: (1) where the inclusion of the clause in the contract was 

20 the result of"fraud or overreaching," (2) ifthe party seeking to avoid the clause would be 

21 effectively deprived of its day in court in the forum specified in the clause, or (3) if 

22 enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum where the suit was filed. 

23 Murphy v. Schneider Nat'! Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003). 

24 B. Analysis 

25 C4 Planning argues dismissal is warranted because the forum selection clause 

26 ("FSC") is valid and requires the suit to be heard in Georgia state court in Burke County. 

27 In contrast, Mr. Edwards argues the FSC is unenforceable because (1) it is the result ofC4 

28 Planning's fraud or overreach, and (2) it violates California public policy. Mr. Edwards 

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1 further contends that regardless of the FSC's validity, the FSC does not cover the vast 

2 majority of his claims, which cannot be transferred. Finally, as to C4 Planning's alternative 

3 argument, Mr. Edwards contends that transfer under § 1404(a) is not appropriate. The 

4 Court addresses each argument in turn.2 

5 1. Lack of Fraud or Overreach 

6 Mr. Edwards argues the FSC was the product of fraud or overreach because neither 

7 C4 Planning nor the FSC disclosed to Mr. Edwards that C4 Planning "had no connection 

8 to Burke County." [Doc. 5 at p. 11.] The Court disagrees. Although C4 Planning is 

9 headquartered in Richmond County, Georgia, C4 Planning still has at least some 

10 connection to Burke County, Georgia: C4 Planning has used the same business address in 

11 Burke County since at least 2007 (9528 Highway 56, Midville, Georgia 30441), and C4 

12 Planning's owner and President, Mr. Fennell, lives in Burke County where he conducts 

13 substantial business.3 Given that connection, the Court cannot find C4 Planning's selection 

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2 In conjunction with his Opposition, Mr. Edwards requested judicial notice of three 

16 types of documents: property tax statements assessed by Richmond County where C4 

Planning is headquartered, map data showing C4 Planning's headquarters in Richmond 

County, and property records for 9528 Highway 56, Midville, Georgia 30441. [Doc. 5-2.] 

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In conjunction with its Reply, C4 Planning requested judicial notice of the Georgia 

Secretary of State websites reflecting C4 Planning's business address and corporate 

registration since 2013. [Doc. 6-3.] Because the Court need not rely upon any of these 

documents, the requests are both DENIED as moot. There is no dispute that C4 Planning 

has a business address registered at the Midville, Georgia address or that C4 Planning's 

headquarters are in Richmond County, Georgia. 

3 After briefing on this motion, Mr. Edwards filed a supplemental brief, arguing that 

C4 Planning misrepresented its principal office's location in Burke County because C4 

Planning changed its "Registered Office County" with the Georgia Secretary of State from 

24 Emanuel County, Georgia to Burke County, Georgia shortly after Mr. Edwards filed his 

Opposition. See [Doc. 11.] C4 Planning responded that Mr. Edwards's new argument was 

not relevant to the Court's analysis. Specifically, C4 Planning argued that, since 2007 and 

26 well before Mr. Edwards began his employment in 2013, C4 Planning's business address 

was and continues to be in Midville, Georgia, which is located in Burke County. C4 

Planning expressed its confusion about why the business's county listing changed on the 

website from Burke to Emanuel, but regardless, the "County of Registered Office" box did 

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1 of Burke County was somehow a product of bad faith. See, e.g., Madanat v. First Data 

2 Corp., 2011 WL 208062, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011) (finding defendants' facilities in 

3 New York to be sufficient to undermine plaintiffs bad faith allegations); Carnival Cruise 

4 Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (finding any suggestion of bad faith motive 

5 for Florida forum selection clause was belied by business's principal place of business 

6 there and the fact that many of its cruises use Florida ports). 

7 Mr. Edwards's argument that C4 Planning obtained the forum selection clause by 

8 overreaching because it "failed to disclose key facts" is also misplaced. Mr. Edwards 

9 argues that C4 Planning should have disclosed its inclusion of an FSC favoring Burke 

10 County, Georgia and the fact that C4 Planning was not headquartered there. The alleged 

11 "failure" to disclose such facts to Mr. Edwards, however, does not amount to overreaching. 

12 First, Mr. Edwards does not contend that C4 Planning somehow concealed these facts or 

13 prevented him from inquiring about or negotiating the FSC. Moreover, the Court is unclear 

14 about why Mr. Edwards could not have identified his future company's headquarters. 

15 Indeed, at the time of the job offer, C4 Planning was likely not a new company to Mr. 

16 Edwards; he had known the company's president and owner, Mr. Fennell, for at least ten 

17 years prior to accepting employment. Further, C4 Planning hired Mr. Edwards as its Vice 

18 President of Business Development and Strategy, a position he described in his Complaint 

19 as directly reporting to Mr. Fennell and, indeed, "support[ing] [its] headquarters." [Doc. 

20 1-2 at i-f 11 (emphasis added).] 

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not undermine the undisputed fact that C4 Planning's business address was and is in Burke 

County, Georgia. 

The Court finds Mr. Edwards's supplemental argument inconsequential to the 

analysis at hand. The discrepancy appears to be related to the address's zip code, which 

covers both counties. Regardless of what county is listed in the website's "County of 

27 Registered Office" box, however, C4 Planning's registered business address is and was 

located in Burke County, Georgia. Mr. Edwards could have determined C4 Planning's 

Burke County location prior to signing the Employment Agreement. 

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1 Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by Mr. Edwards's contention that the FSC 

2 should have been disclosed to him. The parties' Employment Contract did disclose the 

3 FSC by emphasizing the clause in all capital letters and balded font. See, e.g., Madanat v. 

4 First Data Corp., 2011 WL 208062, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011) (finding no 

5 overreaching because agreement offered adequate notice of the FSC by including an 

6 electronic link to the FSC document available online ). 

7 Finally, Mr. Edwards's conclusion that Mr. Fennell is attempting to "home town" 

8 him in Burke County is both unsupported and not relevant to the analysis. See, e.g, Murphy 

9 v. Schneider Nat'!, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A] differential in power or 

10 education ... will not vitiate a forum selection clause.). Because Mr. Edwards' s allegations 

11 of fraud and overreach fall far short of the types of allegations other courts have found 

12 sufficient, the FSC is not invalid on this ground. Cf Randhawa v. Skylux Inc., 2009 WL 

13 5183953, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (finding FSC unenforceable for fraud where 

14 parties orally negotiated the contract's terms, defendants did not inform him of the FSC 

15 provision, and then when plaintiff objected to the FSC, defendants assured him it had been 

16 deleted); Petersen v. Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276, 283 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding FSC 

17 unenforceable for fraud and overreach where plaintiff alleged he signed an initial 

18 employment contract that did not contain an FSC, traveled to his new workplace in Saudi 

19 Arabia, and upon arrival, was forced to sign a new employment contract containing the 

20 FSC or immediately return to the United States at his own expense). 

21 2. California Public Policy 

22 In support of his public policy challenge to the FSC, Mr. Edwards points to 

23 California Labor Code § 925, which prohibits an employer from requiring a California 

24 resident employee "to agree to a provision ... [r]equiring the employee to adjudicate 

25 outside of California a claim arising in California" or "[ d]epriv[ing] the employee of the 

26 substantive protection of California law." As Mr. Edwards concedes, however, the 

27 legislature did not enact Section 925 until January 1, 2017, four years after he agreed to the 

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L FSC. Further, the statute expressly provides that it is not retroactive, stating that it "shall 

2 apply to a contract entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 1, 2017." 

3 Although Mr. Edwards argues Section 925's public policy invalidates the FSC, he 

4 offers no other authorities for that contention. Section 925 cannot retroactively apply to 

5 invalidate an FSC agreed to more than four years before its enactment. Nor does Mr. 

6 Edwards raise any additional public policy that would invalidate the FSC. Therefore, the 

7 Court is not persuaded that enforcement of the parties' FSC contravenes California public 

8 policy. 

9 3. Claims Subject to the FSC 

10 Mr. Edwards further argues that the FSC does not cover most of his claims, and thus, 

11 most of his claims are not subject to transfer. Specifically, Mr. Edwards emphasizes the 

12 FSC's application to any "dispute hereunder," which he argues must be narrowly construed 

13 to not apply to his California Labor Code claims. In diversity actions, federal contract law 

14 governs the interpretation of an FSC 's scope. See Sun v. Advanced China Healthcare, Inc., 

15 901 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2018). As Mr. Edwards argues, the Ninth Circuit has 

16 narrowly construed provisions using the phrase, "arising hereunder," to "cover only those 

17 disputes 'relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself."' LaCross v. 

18 Knight Transportation, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Cape 

19 Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

20 Still, even construing the language narrowly, the FSC applies to each of Mr. 

21 Edwards's claims because each of them is expressly connected to his allegation that he is 

22 owed commissions under the Employment Agreement. Therefore, each of his claims 

23 "relat[ es] to the interpretation and performance of the [Employment Agreement]." Id. Mr. 

24 Edwards does not identify any cases showing that, by virtue of claiming violations of the 

25 California Labor Code, his claims arising out of the performance and interpretation of the 

26 parties' employment contract no longer "arise hereunder." Nor does Mr. Edwards allege 

27 misclassification of his employment status, an allegation that courts have found to be 

28 outside the coverage of the FSC's "arising hereunder" language. See, e.g., Ronlake v. USS 

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1 Reports, Inc., 2012 WL 393614, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) (finding claim of 

2 misclassification as non-employee to be a dispute that did not arise under the interpretation 

3 and performance of the employment contract); see also Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 

4 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding choice oflaw provision did not apply to claims regarding 

5 misclassification because those claims "do not arise out of the contract, involve the 

6 interpretation of any contract terms, or otherwise require there to be a contract"). 

7 Accordingly, the Court finds the FSC covers all of Mr. Edwards's claims. 

8 4. Public Interest Factors 

9 Mr. Edwards further argues that, even ifthe FSC is enforceable, the public interest 

10 factors disfavor transfer. Public interest factors include: "(1) administrative difficulties 

11 flowing from court congestion; (2) imposition of jury duty on the people of a community 

12 that has no relation to the litigation; (3) local interest in having localized controversies 

13 decided at home; (4) the interest in having a diversity case tried in a forum familiar with 

14 the law that governs the action; [and] (5) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in 

15 conflicts oflaw." Loya v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 583 F.3d 656, 664 

16 (9th Cir. 2009). 

17 First, the Court agrees with Mr. Edwards's contention thatthe local interest in having 

18 the case decided in San Diego disfavors transfer. C4 Planning reached into San Diego 

19 County to recruit Mr. Edwards to work for them in San Diego. C4 Planning hoped to 

20 establish "a meaningful presence" in California with Mr. Edwards's help. Finally, Mr. 

21 Edwards supported C4 Planning's government contracting efforts at Camp Pendleton in 

22 San Diego County. Second, the Court also agrees with Mr. Edwards that the federal district 

23 court in the Southern District of California is presumably more familiar with Mr. 

24 Edwards's California Labor Code claims than a state court in Burke County, Georgia. 

25 Mr. Edwards additionally contends that a third factor disfavors transfer-the 

26 imposition of jury duty on Burke County, Georgia jurors. As already discussed, C4 

27 Planning has at least some connection to Burke County, and thus, the Court rejects Mr. 

28 Edwards argument to the contrary. 

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1 Finally, Mr. Edwards argues that because the bulk of his claims are not covered by 

2 the FSC, there would be two trials in two jurisdictions. For the reasons discussed 

3 previously, however, all of Mr. Edwards's claims are covered by the FSC, and this factor 

4 carries no weight. 

5 Here, two public interest factors do weigh in favor of maintaining the case in the 

6 Southern District of California. When balanced against the enforceable FSC, however, 

7 those factors do not defeat C4 Planning's motion. See Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. 

8 US. Dist. Ct. for Western Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 64 (2013) ("Because [public interest] 

9 factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion, the practical result is that forum-selection 

10 clauses should control except in unusual cases."). Without more, the present case is not 

11 the type of unusual case in which public interest factors outweigh the counterweight of an 

12 FSC. See id. ("Although it is conceivable in a particular case that the district court would 

13 refuse to transfer a case notwithstanding the counterweight of a forum-selection clause, 

14 such cases will not be common.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

15 Accordingly, Mr. Edwards has not carried his "burden of showing that public-interest 

16 factors overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer." Id. at 67. 

17 5. Remedy 

18 Having determined that the parties' FSC is valid and outweighs any public interest 

19 factors favoring Mr. Edwards's choice of venue, the Court must determine whether transfer 

20 or dismissal is the appropriate remedy. Here, the FSC provides the venue shall be 

21 "exclusively in a court of competent jurisdiction in Burke County, Georgia." [Doc. 4-1 at 

22 p. 5, if 8(c).] Although the Southern District of Georgia covers Burke County, it is not 

23 physically located there. Rather, a Georgia state court in Waynesboro, Georgia is the only 

24 court located in Burke County. Accordingly, the parties' FSC clearly designates a Georgia 

25 state court. 

26 Where a valid FSC points to a state venue, dismissal is the appropriate remedy. See, 

27 e.g., Sun v. Advanced China Healthcare, Inc., 901 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming 

28 district court's dismissal for forum non conveniens where parties' FSC designated 

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1 California state court); S&J Rentals, Inc. v. Hilti, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 3d 978, 990 (E.D. Cal. 

2 2018) (granting motion to dismiss without prejudice because of parties' FSC pointing to 

3 Oklahoma state court); In re Zynga S'holder Deriv. Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83536, 

4 at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2018) (granting motion to dismiss without prejudice because of 

5 parties' FSC pointing to Delaware Court of Chancery). To be sure, dismissal for forum 

6 non conveniens is a harsh result "[t]hat inconveniences plaintiffs in several respects." 

7 Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 68, n. 8. Here, however, "dismissal would work no injustice 

8 on [Mr. Edwards]" because it was Mr. Edwards who "violated a contractual obligation by 

9 filing suit in a forum other than the one specified in a valid forum-selection clause." Id. 

10 Accordingly, C4 Planning's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is GRANTED. 

11 The action is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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