Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02341/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02341-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

LACY WINZER,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BILL CURREY, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 08-2341 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For

the reasons set out below, the petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second degree robbery and petty theft with a prior. He

was sentenced to prison for five years. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to

the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review.

Petitioner was seen on a Target store video system stuffing a pack of T-shirts down

the front of his pants. When he tried to leave the store without paying for them, he was

accosted by an “assert protection specialist.” Petitioner hit the security person twice in the

face. Petitioner’s defense was that because Target had not retained the T-shirts, there was

no evidence that he tried to take them; and that because the guard was not uniformed, and

because, according to petitioner (the evidence is conflicting), the guard did not identify

himself when trying to apprehend him, he was acting properly in self-defense when he hit

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28 1 Citations to “Ex.” are to the record lodged with the court by the Attorney General.

2

the guard. Ex. 2 (opinion of the California Court of Appeal) at 2-6.1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

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light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts that: (1) The trial court’s failure to instruct on battery/assault as a

lesser included offense violated his right to an instruction on his theory of defense; and (2)

his counsel was ineffective. 

1. Lesser Included Offense Instruction

Petitioner contends that the trial court should have instructed on what he contends

are the lesser included offenses of battery and assault. While the failure to instruct on a

lesser included offense in a capital case is constitutional error if there was evidence to

support the instruction, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980), the Ninth Circuit has

held that in non-capital cases the general rule is that a state trial court's failure to instruct on

a lesser included offense does not present a federal constitutional claim, Solis v. Garcia,

219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Solis did note, however, the possibility of an exception: "[T]he defendant's right to

adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the case might, in some cases, constitute

an exception to the general rule." Id. (citing Bashor v. Riley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.

1984). Due process requires that “‘criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). A criminal defendant

therefore is entitled to adequate instructions on the defense theory of the case. Conde v.

Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (error to deny defendant's request for instruction

on simple kidnaping where such instruction was supported by the evidence). 

The California Court of Appeal set out the arguments as to whether in this particular

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case battery and assault are lesser included offenses of robbery under the California

accusatory pleading test – they are not lesser included offenses under the alternative

“elements test” – and concluded that it need not resolve that question because there was

not sufficient evidence to support an instruction on those offenses. Ex. 2 at 10-13. It also

held that any error was harmless. Id. at 14-16. 

In discussing whether there was sufficient evidence to support the instruction, the

court of appeal noted that although the only independent witness said that he did not hear

the Target security person identify himself, that witness also did not see or hear the entire

confrontation, and testified that he did not remember what the security man yelled to

petitioner. Id. at 11-12. This might seem to be dispositive, but on appeal petitioner argued

that the witness’s testimony that he did not hear the security man identify himself and did

not remember what the guard said could be construed to mean that although the witness

could not remember what the guard did say, he knew that he did not identify himself. Id. at

12. The court of appeal remarked that “[a]s such, we question whether Mahoney's

testimony can be considered credible and of solid value, as required of substantial

evidence, on the assertion that Winzer was unaware that Rogers was Target security when

he hit him in the face.” Id. at 12-13. The court went on to say:

Moreover, in deciding whether the evidence cited by Winzer

constitutes substantial evidence, we must determine whether the jury could

reach the conclusion that Winzer was not motivated by an intent to steal when he hit

Rogers in light of all the evidence at trial. The undisputed evidence showed that Winzer

took a package of T-shirts off of a shelf, turned his back to the security camera as his

companion acted as a lookout, secreted the package down the front of his pants, and then

walked out the door of the store without paying for it. The undeniable inference is that

Winzer harbored an intent to steal the T-shirts, including at the point he crossed the

threshold and was confronted by Rogers. Given this evidence, no reasonable juror could

conclude, even if Rogers was in plain clothes, had not announced himself as Target

security, and had grabbed Winzer's arm, that Winzer's reaction in repeatedly striking

Rogers' face was unrelated to Winzer's intent to steal the T-shirts he had concealed in his

pants.

Id. at 13. The court concluded that there was not substantial evidence to support giving the

instruction for which petitioner contended, and that the trial court therefore was not required

to instruct on battery or assault. Id. at 14.

A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his defense theory only “if the theory is

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legally cognizable and there is evidence upon which the jury could rationally find for the

defendant.” United States v. Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations omitted). For the reasons set out by the California Court of Appeal, this court

concludes that there was not evidence upon which the jury could rationally rely to find that

petitioner was guilty of only battery or assault, rather than robbery. He had no

constitutional right to instructions on those offenses. 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to

prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish

that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

It is unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas ineffective assistance

claim to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot even

establish incompetence under the first prong. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737

(9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the

alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective in not requesting a custom jury

instruction that would have told the jury that he could not be found guilty of robbery unless

his specific intent in striking the guard was to retain the property. The instructions that the

trial court did give included one that told the jury:

The requisite force or fear needed to establish a robbery need not

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occur at the time of the initial taking. Assuming all the other required elements

have been proven, the use of force or fear to escape with or otherwise retain

even temporary possession of the property constitutes robbery.

It is not an essential element to the crime of robbery that the use of

force or fear be used to gain direct physical possession of the property taken. Again, assuming all other elements have been proven, a robbery is

committed if an individual uses force or fear to retain possession of the

property prior to reaching a place of relative safety. 

Ex. 5 (reporter’s transcript), pt. 4 at 281-82. This instruction adequately covers the point

petitioner urges, in that it requires the jury to find that the force or fear was used “to retain

possession.” It therefore was not deficient performance for counsel not request the

suggested instruction, nor did the failure prejudice petitioner. This claim is without merit. 

APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28

U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

without first obtaining a certificate of appealability (formerly known as a certificate of

probable cause to appeal). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A judge shall

grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate must indicate

which issues satisfy this standard. See id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has

rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). 

This was not a close case. For the reasons set out above, jurists of reason would

not find the result debatable or wrong. A certificate of appealability will be denied. 

Petitioner is advised that he may not appeal the denial of a COA, but he may ask the court

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of appeals to issue a COA under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

A Certificate of Appealability also is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases (eff. Dec. 1, 2009). 

The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 9, 2010. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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