Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00235/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00235-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Defendant White has not been served.

11cv235

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO SOTO,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. GINES, RN, et al.,

Defendants.

 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 11-CV-235-LAB (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS [Doc. No. 13]

Plaintiff Francisco Soto (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at

California State Prison, Los Angeles County, in Lancaster, California, proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(Doc. No. 1.) In his original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Gines, Hunt,

White, and Stout failed to provide him with adequate medical care, violated his right to

be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and violated his right to due process. Id.

On August 8, 2011, Defendants Gines, Hunt, and Stout (“Defendants”) filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 13.)1

Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on October 3, 2011. (Doc. No. 21.) 

On October 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) naming only

Gines, Hunt, and White as defendants and alleging only one claim for violation of his

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 11cv235

right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. No. 23.) On October 12,

2011, Defendants, in response to an order of the Court issued on October 7, 2011,

requested that their motion to dismiss apply to the FAC. (Doc. No. 25.) On October 27,

2011, Plaintiff requested that his opposition, filed prior to his FAC, also apply to the

motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 29.) On October 31, 2011, Defendants filed a reply to

Plaintiff’s opposition. (Doc. No. 30.) 

For the following reasons, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to

dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 

be DENIED, and that the motion to dismiss be DENIED AS MOOT as the remainder of

Defendants’ arguments. The Court further recommends that Defendant Stout be

DISMISSED and that Plaintiff be ordered to show cause why Defendant White should

not be dismissed for failure to serve a summons and complaint. 

I. Background

The FAC alleges that on February 11, 2010, Plaintiff, while incarcerated at the

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”), was injured when a food cart fell

on him, causing a visible fracture to the orbital bone on the left side of his face as well

as two additional fractures. (FAC, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was taken to the Facility III Medical

Clinic where he requested an x-ray and pain medication. (Id., ¶ 2.) Defendants Gines,

White, and Hunt considered Plaintiff’s injuries to be minor and accused Plaintiff of lying

about his pain. (Id., ¶ 4 & Ex. A.) Plaintiff was forced to return to his housing unit

without any medical assistance. (Id., ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff turned in several medical slips requesting medical assistance, none of

which were answered. (Id., ¶ 6.) On February 18, 2010, Plaintiff was seen by a

Primary Care Provider (“PCP”) for a separate medical issue. (Id., ¶ 7.) The PCP sent

Plaintiff to be x-rayed. (Id., ¶ 9.) The x-ray technician told Plaintiff that his facial

fractures were visible and that he should receive a CAT scan. (Id.) The x-ray confirmed

numerous fractures. (Id., ¶ 14 & Ex. B.) None of the prison physicians would see

Plaintiff on an emergency basis, and he was again forced to return to his housing unit

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 11cv235

without any medical assistance. (Id., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff continued to turn in numerous

requests for medical assistance, but was again ignored. (Id., ¶ 11.) 

On March 2, 2010, a PCP referred Plaintiff for a CAT scan. (Id., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff

was sent to Alvarado Hospital. (Id., ¶ 15.) The medical staff there was shocked that his

injuries were three weeks old and said he should have received treatment right away. 

(Id.) He received morphine for his extreme pain. (Id., ¶ 16.) On March 8, 2010, Plaintiff

underwent surgery at Alvarado Hospital, at which time three titanium plates were

inserted into his face. (Id., ¶ 17 & Ex. C.) 

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and

12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

before filing suit, failed to file a government tort claim thus barring any negligence claim

under state law, and failed to state a claim against Defendant Stout, the warden, for

supervisory liability.

A. Exhaustion

1. Legal Standards

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, “No action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] . . . by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement applies

regardless of the relief sought. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). In

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), the Supreme Court stated, “Proper exhaustion

demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . .

.” Id. at 90. This is so “because no adjudicative system can function effectively without

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91.

Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement creates an affirmative defense. 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants have the burden of

pleading and proving the failure to exhaust. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). 

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The sections of the California Code of Regulations concerning the prisoner appeal

process were amended effective January 28, 2011. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 §§ 3084-

3084.9 (2011). The time for filing an appeal is presently thirty calendar days from the

occurrence of the event or decision being appealed, upon first having knowledge of the action

or decision being appealed, or upon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response to an

appeal filed. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.8(b). 

4 11cv235

Defendants may properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust

administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. In deciding such a motion, “the

court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20

(citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th

Cir. 1988)). 

Prisoners in California who seek to challenge their conditions of confinement

must proceed through several levels of appeal to exhaust available administrative

remedies within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)’s

grievance system: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDCR 602

inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4)

third level appeal to the Director of the CDCR. See Ngo, 548 U.S. at 85-86 (citing Cal.

Code. Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(c), 3084.5, 3084.6(c) (2004)). At the time Plaintiff

proceeded through this administrative appeal process, prisoners were required to

submit their appeals to each level of review “within 15 working days of the event or

decision being appealed, or of receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal decision.” 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2009).2 

The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the exhaustion requirement can be excused

in certain limited instances. See Ngo v. Woodford, 539 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008)

(providing that exceptions to the exhaustion requirement include the unavailability of

administrative procedures, obstruction by prison officials, or prison’s failure to follow

procedures for processing grievances); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217,

1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (excusing prisoner’s failure to timely exhaust his administrative

remedies because he was precluded from exhausting by a mistake by the Warden). 

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

For purposes of clarity, the page number references to Exhibit D of the FAC herein

refer to the page numbers applied by the Court’s electronic case filing system. 

5 11cv235

2. Discussion

On March 21, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a CDCR Form 602 in which he requested,

inter alia, monetary compensation, additional pain medication, that the matter be

investigated, that medical staff be reprimanded and admonished, and that it be

explained why it took three weeks for him to receive surgery for a serious injury. (FAC,

¶ 20 & Ex. D at 27-29.)3 In a decision signed on May 5, 2010, Plaintiff’s grievance was

partially granted in that an investigation was conducted into the matter and Plaintiff’s

pain medications were adjusted. The decision noted that monetary compensation could

not be granted at the 602 level. (Id., Ex. D at 28.) Plaintiff then sought a second level

review on May 24, 2010, in which he stated that he was in severe pain. (Id., Ex. D at

28, 34.) The appeal was partially granted in a decision dated July 2, 2010 as Plaintiff

had been examined by a PCP and had received pain medications. The decision noted

that Plaintiff’s request for monetary compensation was beyond the scope of the appeals

process and would not be addressed. (Id., Ex. D at 31-32.) On August 16, 2010,

Plaintiff appealed to the Director’s Level, again stating that he was in severe pain. (Id.,

Ex. D at 28, 33.) The appeal was screened-out for being untimely and returned to

Plaintiff in a decision dated September 8, 2010. (Id., Ex. D at 30.) Plaintiff alleges that

the untimeliness of his Director’s Level appeal was not his fault but rather was due to

his grievances being returned to him late on numerous occasions. (Id., ¶ 21.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

because he did not receive a decision from the Director as his third level appeal was

screened out due to untimeliness. Mot. at 7. Defendants have provided a declaration

by J. Rivera, Health Care Appeals Coordinator at Donovan, to support their argument. 

According to Rivera, “At each level of review . . ., the original appeal shall be returned to

the inmate with a written response stating the appeal issue, the decision, and the

reasons for the decision.” Rivera Decl., ¶ 4. Further, 

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 11cv235

When an appeal is returned to an inmate, the

Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form (CDCR Form 602) is datestamped and directly placed in the prison mail system either

on the day of the date-stamp or the next day. In my

experience, the internal mail system typically takes 1-2 days

to be delivered to an inmate. 

Id., ¶ 5. Here, the decision on Plaintiff’s second level appeal was dated July 2, 2010. 

(FAC, Ex. D at 31-22.) The date stamp on the CDCR Form 602 indicates that the

decision was returned on July 8, 2010. (Id. at 28.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff

had fifteen working days thereafter, to July 29, 2010, to resubmit his appeal for third

level review. Reply at 3. Defendants argue that because Plaintiff did not file his appeal

to the third level until August 16, 2010, the appeal was properly screened-out as

untimely, and as a result, he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Id.

In response, Plaintiff contends that throughout the administrative review process,

his appeals were not returned to him on the dates indicated on the date stamps. Opp’n

at 7. He argues that he made all attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies, but

that prison officials violated their own policies on time regulations and his appeal was

thus screened out, denying him the right to exhaust all his remedies. Id. at 2. Plaintiff

specifically noted, at the time he filed his third level appeal, “For the record, I was not

issued the second level appeal response on July 8, 2010 as indicated on the 602. It

was issued to me on August 4, 2010.” (FAC, Ex. D at 33.) If this date is accurate,

Plaintiff’s third level appeal would have been due by August 25, 2010, and his August

16, 2010 submission would have been timely. 

Although Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not file his third level appeal within

fifteen working days of receipt of the second level appeal decision, making that appeal

untimely, their supporting evidence, namely, the Rivera Declaration, does not

conclusively establish when Plaintiff received the second level response. Moreover,

there is evidence in the record rebutting Defendants’ evidence that the response to

Plaintiff’s second level appeal was returned on July 8, 2010 and supporting Plaintiff’s

assertion that the response to his second level appeal was not returned until August 4,

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The Court also notes the date on which Plaintiff asserted he received the response to

his first level appeal, May 20, 2010, is consistent with the date he filed his second level appeal,

May 24, 2010. (FAC, Ex. D at 28, 34.)

7 11cv235

2010. (FAC, Ex. D at 33.)4 Thus, the record presently before the Court does not

conclusively refute Plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive the second level response

until August 4, 2010. Given that Plaintiff’s third level appeal was screened out as

untimely notwithstanding that he asserted in that appeal that he did not receive the

second level appeal response until August 4, 2010, it was not unreasonable for him to

believe that he had no further administrative remedies available to him. Because

Defendants have not conclusively established that Plaintiff cannot be excused from his

obligation to exhaust administrative remedies, their motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies should be DENIED. See Ngo, 539 F.3d at 1110; see

also Collier v. Brown, 635 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1154-55 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (denying

summary judgment on failure to exhaust administrative remedies because genuine

issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff’s Director’s Level appeal was submitted

timely despite being screened out by the Inmate Appeals Branch). 

B. Defendants’ Other Arguments Are Moot 

Defendants also argue that any negligence claim asserted by Plaintiff should be

dismissed because he failed to file a government tort claim, and that Defendant Stout

should be dismissed as Plaintiff failed to state a claim against him for supervisory

liability. These arguments were made prior to the filing of the FAC. “All causes of

action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint

are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). As Plaintiff alleges only

one claim in the FAC for violation of his right to freedom from cruel and unusual

punishment pursuant to section 1983, that is the only claim in the case. The FAC does

not allege a state law negligence claim, and Plaintiff himself concedes that he does not

allege such a claim. Opp’n at 10-11. Additionally, the FAC does not name Stout as a

defendant nor does it contain any allegations against him. Plaintiff has thus waived any

claim against Stout. See Jones v. Bradford, 2011 WL 5007214, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2011)

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 11cv235

(citing King, 814 F.2d at 567). The Court therefore recommends that Defendant Stout

be DISMISSED, and that Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the above grounds be

DENIED AS MOOT.

III. Defendant White

A summons was returned unexecuted as to Defendant White, named as a

defendant in both the original complaint and the FAC, on May 18, 2011. Doc. No. 18. 

The docket reflects no other attempts, either successful or unsuccessful, to serve

Defendant White. Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

defendants to be served within 120 days after the complaint is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(m). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be ordered to show cause why

Defendant White should not be dismissed for failure to serve. 

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned magistrate

judge recommends that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss be DENIED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss be DENIED AS MOOT as the remainder of

Defendants’ arguments; 

3. That Defendant Stout be DISMISSED; and

4. That Plaintiff be ordered to show cause why Defendant White should not be

dismissed for failure to serve a summons and complaint within 120 days after the filing

of the complaint as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Larry Alan

Burns, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than February 21, 2012, any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 11cv235

than March 6, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 30, 2012

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00235-LAB-JMA Document 33 Filed 01/30/12 Page 9 of 9