Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02371/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02371-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRIPLE A MACHINE SHOP INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THOMAS G. OLSEN,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-02371 CRB

ORDER

This case arises from a certification of facts filed by Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) Paul Mapes pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 927(b), setting forth facts justifying sanctions

against the defendant, Thomas Olsen. Olsen, proceeding pro se, moves to dismiss the

certification, which was incorporated into a complaint filed by the plaintiff Triple A Machine

Shop, or in the alternative for summary judgment. In addition, Olsen moves for a

competency hearing to determine whether he is sufficiently competent to proceed pro se. 

Because Olsen’s arguments in favor of dismissal are unpersuasive, his motion to dismiss is

DENIED. Although the Court is dubious of Olsen’s claim of incompetence, Olsen will be

permitted to present evidence of incompetence when the Court holds a hearing to consider

the evidence warranting sanctions on Wednesday, January 9, 2008 at 3:30pm. The hearing

scheduled for Friday, December 14, 2007 is VACATED.

Case 3:07-cv-02371-CRB Document 61 Filed 12/11/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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BACKGROUND

The factual background underlying this case is amply laid out in Judge Mapes’

certification of facts. See Certification of Facts (hereinafter “Certification”). In sum, Olsen

filed a claim for injuries allegedly suffered while working for Triple A under the Longshore

and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in 1978 (hereinafter “LHWCA”). Id. at 2. In 1982,

Olsen was awarded permanent disability benefits, but in the late 1990s, Triple A obtained

information suggesting that Olsen was not in fact totally disabled and that he had been

profitably operating various businesses. See id. Accordingly, in 1999, Triple A filed a

request seeking to have Olsen’s payments reduced or terminated pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 922,

which permits a modification of disability benefits “on the ground of a change in conditions

or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner.”

Almost immediately after Triple A requested a modification in the award, Olsen

began engaging in a series of acts that the ALJ concluded were “plainly intended to prevent

or at least delay Triple A’s efforts to exercise its statutory right to have a hearing on its

claim.” Certification at 3. This conduct included, inter alia: (1) falsely alleging that Triple

A’s counsel had privileged discussions with Olsen about possible representation, in an

attempt to disqualify the attorney; (2) attempting to force the recusal of the ALJ by filing a

civil complaint against the judge; (3) attempting to intimidate the ALJ by threatening to

cause the judge “various types of harm”; (4) making false allegations about statements made

by a retired ALJ in Olsen’s favor; (5) making false allegations about statements made by a

physician, in an effort to bolster the merits of his case; (6) altering, without authorization or

notification, forms drafted on Department of Labor letterhead that would have released

necessary medical records belonging to Olsen; (7) failing to submit telephone records in

response to the ALJ’s order; (8) failing to identify the physician who allegedly diagnosed

Olsen as having cancer; (9) failing to promptly report discharge from a hospital; (10)

repeatedly filing frivolous complaints and appeals for the purpose of delay; (11) making

allegations about opposing counsel’s ethical integrity and abuse of substances; (12) and

threatening witnesses. See id. at 3-11. 

Case 3:07-cv-02371-CRB Document 61 Filed 12/11/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Judge Mapes attempted to impose sanctions on Olsen by requiring that he obtain a

lawyer before proceeding and by suspending Olsen’s disability benefits until a trial on the

proposed modification could be held, but the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board

held that because § 927(b) provides a mechanism for punishing disruptive conduct, ALJs do

not have the authority to impose other or additional sanctions on litigants and must instead

refer all sanctionable conduct to federal district courts. See id. at Attachment 7. 

Accordingly, Judge Mapes certified the underlying facts to this Court in order to obtain

appropriate sanctions.

The Certification was filed in this Court on January 3, 2007. On May 1, 2007, Triple

A filed a complaint for sanctions, which incorporated the Certification as an exhibit. 

DISCUSSION

 A. Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment

Olsen forwards three arguments in favor of dismissing Triple A’s complaint, none of

which are persuasive. First, Olsen argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

actions brought under the LHWCA. Second, Olsen submits that any action for sanctions can

only be prosecuted by the federal government, not by a private party. Finally, Olsen argues

that the doctrine of res judicata precludes relief in this case because identical relief has been

requested and rejected in prior cases.

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Citing Thompson v. Potashnick Construction Co., 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1987),

Olsen asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction over LHWCA actions. In Thompson, the

Ninth Circuit explained that workers’ compensation claims subject to the LHWCA are filed

with the deputy commissioner and disputes requiring a hearing are referred to ALJs. Id. at

575-76 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 919). The role of district courts within this scheme “is limited.” 

Id. at 576. However, Congress has provided three bases for a district court to exercise its

jurisdiction to enforce orders issued by an ALJ pursuant to LHWCA. A-Z Int’l v. Phillips,

323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003). Of particular relevance here, a district court has

jurisdiction to “punish as contempt of court any disobedience or resistance to a lawful order

Case 3:07-cv-02371-CRB Document 61 Filed 12/11/07 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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or process issued in the course of administrative procedures under [LHWCA]” pursuant to §

927(b). Id. at 1145-46 (quoting Stevedoring Services of America, Inc. v. Eggert, 953 F.2d

552, 555 (9th Cir. 1992)) (bracket in original). Thus, Congress has expressly created subject

matter jurisdiction where, as here, the ALJ certifies facts to the appropriate district court

demonstrating that “any person in proceedings before a deputy commissioner or Board [has]

disobey[ed] or resist[ed] any lawful order or process, or misbehave[d] during a hearing or so

near the place thereof as to obstruct the same, or neglect[ed] to produce, after having been

ordered to do so, any pertinent book, paper, or document.” 33 U.S.C. § 927(b). 

2. Form of Complaint

Olsen takes issue with the fact that Triple A, rather than the United States

government, is prosecuting this action for sanctions. According to Olsen, the LHWCA

precludes parties other than the federal government from pursuing legal matters in district

court and does not permit “a party to substitute itself in place stead of the U.S. Attorney or

the Attorney General.” Motion at 3.

The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the procedure to be employed as to how the

ALJ’s certified facts should be brought to the attention of the relevant district court. 

However, in dicta, the Ninth Circuit concluded that since the federal rules of civil procedure

provide that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the [district] court,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, “[i]t would . . . appear that someone – the Board, the Director, or a party –

must file an initial pleading with the district court which incorporates the ALJ’s certified

facts.” A-Z Int’l v. Phillips, 179 F.3d 1187, 1194 n.9 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 

Olsen sets forth no persuasive arguments explaining why the Ninth Circuit’s analysis

is off the mark. Triple A, as the party currently paying Olsen’s benefits, has a direct and

tangible interest in seeing civil sanctions imposed to compel Olsen to submit to a hearing on

the merits of their claim.

Moreover, § 927(b) states that when an ALJ properly certifies facts to the district

court, the court “shall thereupon in a summary manner hear the evidence as to the acts

complained of.” 33 U.S.C. § 927(b) (emphasis added). Congress’ use of an imperative verb

Case 3:07-cv-02371-CRB Document 61 Filed 12/11/07 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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– without providing for additional criteria before the certification must be heart – suggests

that imposing a limitation on the parties who can prosecute a case for sanctions would

contravene Congressional intent. Therefore, Olsen’s argument that Triple A cannot

prosecute this action must be rejected.

3. Res Judicata

Olsen requests that the Court dismiss Triple A’s lawsuit on the basis of res judicata. 

According to Olsen, the sanctions sought in this proceeding “were sought word-fir[sic]-word

in the 10th circuit, then again twice in front of the 9th circuit, where the circuit court rules

[sic] no monetary sanctions.” Motion at 4. 

Res judicata applies when an earlier suit “(1) involved the same ‘claim’ or cause of

action as the later suit, (2) reached a final judgment on the merits, and (3) involved identical

parties or privies.” Sidhu v. Flecto Co., 279 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). Olsen has not

identified a prior suit that involved the same claim or cause of action as this case. Olsen’s

statement that the same sanctions were sought in other cases is a blatant misrepresentation. 

Triple A did seek sanctions in the 10th Circuit against Olsen in 2002, but they have

submitted a copy of their brief before that court, which plainly establishes that Triple A

sought sanctions for Olsen’s decision to file a potentially-frivolous appeal. See Opposition at

Exh. 1. Triple A did not seek sanctions pursuant to the ALJ’s certification of facts in this

case.

In a related argument, Olsen states that because sanctions have already been sought,

“jeopardy has already attached.” Motion at 5. According to Olsen, “even the ALJ who

referred these alleged contemptible acts notes in his own ruling that” jeopardy attached. See

id. at 4-5. Again, this allegation appears to be a baseless misrepresentation. Nowhere did

Judge Mapes suggest that the double jeopardy clause barred sanctions in this case, nor would

he since jeopardy does not attach in civil proceedings. See Hudson v. United States, 522

U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (“The Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal

punishments for the same offense, and then only when such occurs in successive

proceedings.”) (emphasis in original, citations omitted).

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United States District Court

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In sum, none of the arguments forwarded by Olsen in his motion to dismiss are

persuasive. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

B. Motion for a Competency Hearing

Olsen has also filed a motion for a competency hearing, requesting that these

proceedings be stayed “until such time as I become medically able to rationally and

intelligently, knowingly, and timely address the order(s) of the court.” Motion at 2. 

Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court shall

appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in

an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or

incompetent person.” “The preferred procedure when a substantial question exists regarding

the mental competence of a party proceeding pro se is for the district court to conduct a

hearing to determine whether or not the party is competent, so that a representative may be

appointed if needed.” Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989).

After reviewing the content of Olsen’s pleadings submitted to this Court, the Court

concludes that there is not a substantial question regarding Olsen’s mental competence. As

Judge Mapes found, Olsen’s goal since 2000 has been to prevent or at least delay Triple A’s

efforts to exercise its right to have a hearing on its claim that Olsen’s disability benefits

should be reduced or terminated. See Certification at 3. In light of that goal, it is hard to

imagine an advocate who could have more competently and successfully forwarded Olsen’s

interests. Through a series of cumbersome – yet capable – filings and delay tactics, Olsen

has successfully delayed a hearing on Triple A’s claim for seven years. The competence of

Olsen’s representation cannot be questioned.

Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court will allow Olsen to present

evidence of incompetence at the Court’s hearing on Judge Mapes’ certification of facts on

Wednesday, January 9, 2008 at 3:30pm. Unless Olsen presents persuasive evidence and

testimony demonstrating that he is mentally incompetent, the Court will conclude that the

appointment of a guardian ad litem is unnecessary.

Case 3:07-cv-02371-CRB Document 61 Filed 12/11/07 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

The defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. Although the Court is inclined to

conclude that Olsen is competent, Olsen will be permitted to present evidence of

incompetence on January 9, 2008 when the Court, in a “summary manner,” “hear[s] the

evidence as to the acts complained of.” 33 U.S.C. § 927(b). At the January 9 hearing, the

parties shall be prepared to address whether and why the Court should not adopt the facts

certified by Judge Mapes. The parties shall also be prepared to present evidence regarding

the amount and frequency of disability benefits received by Olsen pursuant to the 1982

benefits award, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs claim number 13-056511.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 11, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-02371-CRB Document 61 Filed 12/11/07 Page 7 of 7