Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02335/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Polston,

Petitioner

-vsDora B. Schriro,

Respondent

CV-07-2335-PHX-PGR (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, incarcerated at the time of his petition and presently by the Arizona

Department of Corrections, filed through counsel a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 28, 2007 (#1). On April 14, 2008, Respondents

filed their Answer (#14). Petitioner filed a Reply on June 4, 2008 (#16).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

In 1991, Petitioner was convicted of 19 criminal offenses stemming from a string of

seven armed robberies or attempts he committed in July and August 1990. (Petition, #1,

Exhibit 20, Mem. Dec. at ¶ 2.) (Exhibits to the Petition, #1, are hereinafter referenced as

“Exhibit ___.”) He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms on all the convictions, ranging

from ten and one-half to twenty-eight years. (Id.)

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C. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE BOARD OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

In 1994, Petitioner applied to the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency (“Board”)

for commutation of his sentence under the Disproportionality Review Act, 1994 Ariz. Sess.

Laws, ch. 235. (Exhibit 20, Mem. Dec. at 2-3, ¶ 3.) In disposing of Petitioner’s subsequent

special action appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals described the nature of that Act as

follows:

The Act was an attempt to mitigate the disparity in sentencing between

those convicted of crimes before 1994, when the sentencing statutes

were amended, and those convicted of offenses occurring in 1994 or

later. Those convicted of certain offenses prior to 1994 had been treated

more harshly than those convicted of the same offenses after the

statutes had been amended. The Act became effective in July 1994 and

was repealed on June 30, 1996. 

(Id. at 3, ¶ 3, n. 3 (citations omitted).) The Arizona court described the operation of the act

as follows:

Under the Act, inmates meeting certain initial qualifications were

entitled to a disproportionality review hearing. After a hearing, the

Board was required to recommend commutation if it determined that

the sentence was excessive and that a substantial probability existed

that if the offender was released the offender would conform to the law.

The Board then sent recommendations for commutation to the governor

for action. If the Board made a unanimous recommendation for

commutation and the governor failed to act within ninety days of

receiving the recommendation, the recommendation automatically

became effective.

(Id. at 3, ¶ 3 (citations omitted).) 

On January 13, 1995, the Board issued Petitioner a letter notifying him that they had

determined he was eligible for consideration of commutation on 17 of his 19 sentences,

specifically counts “A03-A18, B01.” (Exhibit 1.) This referenced the Arizona Department

of Corrections system of notation, which had designated the 19 counts as “A01 to A18 and

B01.” (Exhibit 20, Mem. Dec. at 2, ¶ 2.) The Board’s letter further outlined a process of two

hearings, one in absentia to address the excessiveness of the sentence, and one with

Petitioner present to address likelihood of Petitioner’s good behavior upon release. (Exhibit

1.) 

At the conclusion of the last of those two hearings, held May 10, 1995, the Board

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1

 Counts A01 and A02 had been excluded from eligibility in the Board’s initial

determination letter. (Exhibit 1.) 

2

 “The reader will note that the letter [to the Board] is on plain paper and bears no

indication, by letterhead or any other form of imprint, that it came from Governor

Symington's office. The letter has a signature line under which are typed the words

‘Governor or Representative.’ Finally, the letter is signed with an illegible signature. Nothing

in the letter indicates the name of the person who actually signed it or, if the person was a

‘representative’ of Governor Symington, who that representative might have been or what

official position, if any, he or she might have held.” McDonald, 202 Ariz. at 39, 40 P.3d at

823 (2002).

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issued a notice of the results, dated May 12, 1995. That notice advised that the Board would

make the following recommendation to the Governor: 

RECOMMEND TO COMMUTE A03, A06, A09, A12, A15, A18

FROM 20 YRS. TO 12.5 YRS,

RECOMMEND TO COMMUTE A04, A07, A10, A13 FROM 28

YRS. TO 17. 5 YRS.

RECOMMEND TO COMMUTE A05, A08, A11, AI4 AI7 FROM 20

YRS. TO 12.5 YRS. 

(Exhibit 2, Notice 5/12/95.) 

Unfortunately, the Board failed to address counts A16 and B01.1

 (Exhibit 20, Mem.

Dec. at 4, ¶ 4.) Count A16 was for attempted armed robbery with a 20 year sentence, and

count B01 was for armed robbery and carried a sentence of 28 years. (Id.) 

Eventually, the Board’s incomplete recommendation was submitted to the Governor’s

Office. Governor Symington apparently issued a letter denying the recommendation, but

failed to personally sign the denial.2

 Subsequently, in McDonald v. Thomas, .202 Ariz. 35,

38, 40 P.3d 819, 822 (2002), the Arizona Supreme Court held “that to be effective as an

official act, the governor's denials of the Board's commutation recommendations had to bear

the governor's own signature as well as the attestation of the Secretary of State.” (Exhibit

20, Mem. Dec. at 4, ¶ 5.) Consequently, the governor’s denial was ineffective, and the

passage of the ninety days required by the Act resulted in the automatic approval of the

Board’s recommendation. (Id.) On April 23, 2002, the Board issued it’s Notice (Exhibit 4),

advising Petitioner that the Board’s recommendation had become effective. That notice again

omitted any reference to counts A16 and B01.

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Petitioner subsequently discovered the omission of the two counts, and in January

2004, began correspondence with the Board, the Arizona Department of Corrections, and the

State in an effort to have the omitted sentences commuted. On February 17, 2004,

Petitioner’s counsel was advised that Petitioner’s request was being denied. (Exhibit 12,

Decl. of Bartels at 1-2.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON SPECIAL ACTION

Trial Court -, and on March 23, 2004, he filed a Special Action Complaint (Exhibit

9) in the Arizona Superior Court. That complaint alleged that the omission of the counts was

an “inadvertent clerical error,” perpetuated from the May 12, 1995 notice through the April

23, 2002 notice, and that the true decision of the Board had been to recommend commutation

of all seventeen eligible sentences. Petitioner alleged that the refusal to commute the omitted

sentences was a violation of “the Due Process and Equal Protection guarantees of the United

States Constitution.” (Id. at 11, ¶ 39.)

In support of his complaint, Petitioner submitted affidavits of the Chairman of the

Board (Exhibit 5) and the two other panel members involved (Exhibits 6 and 7), all avowing

their belief that the Board’s true recommendation was commutation on all sentences, and that

the oral pronouncement should govern the written notices. Unfortunately, the tape

recordings of the hearings had been destroyed in the interim. (Exhibit 5, Chair Affid. at 3,

¶ 8.)

On July 28, 2004, the trial court issued a Minute Entry (Exhibit 13), concluding that

the proper remedy was to deny the request for declaratory and injunctive relief and to remand

the matter to the Board for reconsideration of the application as to the omitted counts.

Judgment to that effect was entered September 10, 2004. (Exhibit 14, M.E. 9/10/4.) 

Arizona Court of Appeals - Petitioner appealed the denial of his special action.

(Exhibit 15, Not. of Appeal 10/8/04.) The appeal was stayed while the Board and the

Governor reconsidered the commutation of the omitted sentences. (Exhibit 17, Order

12/30/04.) Eventually commutation was denied, and the appeal was reinstated. (Exhibit 19,

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Order 2/28/05.)

On May 23, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision

(Exhibit 20), concluding that the Governor solely possessed the power of clemency and the

Board’s omission of the two counts had denied the Governor the opportunity to exercise that

power, and therefore the failure to issue a proper denial of the Board’s recommendation

could not be deemed a grant of clemency. The court concluded that thus the trial court’s

decision to direct a new hearing on the omitted sentences was a proper remedy. 

Arizona Supreme Court - Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on January 10, 2007. (Exhibit 21, Order.)

C. REHEARING BEFORE BOARD

During the pendency of Petitioner’s appeal, the Board revisited his application, and

on December 7, 2004, recommended commutation of the omitted sentences. (Exhibit 16,

Letter 12/7/04.) On February 22, 2005, Governor Napolitano issued a properly signed and

attested denial of clemency (Exhibit 18).

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner instituted the present federal proceedings by filing through counsel a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 28, 2007

(#1). The Petition contains a single ground for relief: that the State’s refusal to correct the

effects of the failure to comply with the statutory procedures was arbitrary and capricious and

resulted in a denial of Due Process. In support of his claim, Petitioner replies primarily upon

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987).

On April 14, 2008, Respondents filed their Answer (#14). Respondents concede that

the Petition is timely, that the claim is properly exhausted, and even that the result seems

unfair. Nonetheless, Respondents argue that: (1) the state courts’ determination turned upon

state law (i.e. the separation of powers as to executive clemency), and thus is not subject to

judicial review and definitely not federal habeas review; (2) that the proper remedy is not

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commutation but rehearing, which was granted; (3) the loss of the windfall from the

defectiveness of the governor’s original denial occurred from Petitioner’s failure to seek a

timely rehearing on the omitted counts; and (4) the Board’s actions were a mere oversight.

Petitioner filed a Reply on June 4, 2008 (#16), arguing: (1) that federal habeas review

is not limited to reviewing judicial decisions, and thus the Arizona courts’ lack of power to

direct commutation does not preclude habeas relief; (2) that the Governor’s subsequent

denial of clemency on the omitted counts is not controlling; (3) that the Board’s use of

cryptic references to the counts precluded discernment of the error, and does not excuse the

Board’s error.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE STATE GROUND

Petitioner’s claim is not reviewable by this habeas court, because the Arizona courts

disposed of it on the basis of an independent and adequate state ground, i.e. is that the Court

was without authority to direct a grant of clemency. The Court reasoned:

The Arizona Constitution gives the governor the exclusive authority to

commute a sentence and the governor may exercise that authority only

subject to conditions and restrictions imposed by law. The Board's

mistake cannot deprive the governor of the exclusive power under the

constitution to grant or deny commutations. Nor does our equitable

power allow us to exercise discretion constitutionally assigned to other

branches of government.

(Exhibit 20, Mem. Dec. at 8-9, ¶ 13.) 

Discretion to Raise Sua Sponte - Respondent has not expressly invoked the mantra

of “independent and adequate state grounds.” However, the gist of their argument is plainly

that the state court’s decision was founded upon state law and is thus unreviewable in this

Court. The related defense of procedural default is an affirmative defense and is generally

waived if not raised. Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying to procedural

bar. Although the federal courts retain discretion to raise the matter sua sponte, that

discretion is generally limited to situations where the defense appears from the face of the

petition or where “principles of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency” call for it to be

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applied. Id. at 1073.

Here, the defense appears from the face of the petition. Petitioner argues that despite

presenting his federal claims, his special action was disposed of by the trial court and the

Arizona Court of Appeals without reaching the federal issues. (Petition, #1 at 19-20, ¶ 34,

and at 21, ¶ 40.)

In addition, the interests of comity and federalism call for application of the principle

despite any waiver. To the extent that Petitioner invites this Court to find a due process

violation in the state court proceeding, it would be unseemly for this Court to find the state

court to have acted improperly in failing to do what that court found it could not do under

Arizona law, i.e. undertake to exercise the governor’s clemency discretion.

Application to Substantive Bar to Relief - Where a state court has denied a

Petitioner’s claim based upon state law which is independent of the federal issue and

sufficiently well developed and regularly applied so as to be adequate, then the federal courts

will not disturb that judgment by revisiting the federal issue. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729 (1991). While ordinarily the independent and adequate state ground is applied

to procedural defaults, e.g. filing deadlines, waiver rules, etc., “[t]he rule applies with equal

force whether the state-law ground is substantive or procedural.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S.

362, 375 (2002). 

Independence and Adequacy - Although Petitioner has not addressed the issue, the

undersigned finds no basis for finding that the Arizona law was not independent and

adequate. 

The Arizona court’s decision was independent of federal law. There was no decision

on Petitioner’s due process claim undertaken or necessary to the Arizona court’s decision.

Indeed, the nature of the Petitioner’s challenge was irrelevant to that court’s analysis based

on the application of the separation of powers principles under Arizona law. 

To be “adequate,” the state law or rule upon which the state court's ruling rests must

be “firmly established” and “regularly applied” at the time of its application. Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255 (1989). In reaching its decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals cited to a series

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of cases noting the limits on the Arizona courts’ power to “exercise discretion

constitutionally assigned to other branches of government.” (Exhibit 20, Mem. Dec. At 9,

¶ 13 (citing Mecham v. Gordon, 156 Ariz. 297, 301-02, 751 P.2d 957, 961-62 (1988);

Cardon Oil Co. v. City of Phoenix, 122 Ariz. 102, 104 n.2, 593 P.2d 656, 658 n.2 (1979) and

Shelby Sch. v. Ariz. State Ed. of Educ., 192 Ariz. 156, 164, g[ 26, 962 P.2d 230, 238 (App.

1998).) While the cases cited by the Arizona court may not have directly addressed

executive authority over clemency decisions, the extension was not unknown. See e.g.

Wigglesworth v. Mauldin, 195 Ariz. 432, 436, 990 P.2d 26, 30 (App.1999) (“courts

traditionally have taken the position that clemency lies outside the adjudicative process and

generally escapes review by the courts”); and McDonald v. Thomas, 198 Ariz. 590, 596, 12

P.3d 1194, 1200 (Ariz.App. 2000), opinion vacated on other grounds, 202 Ariz. 35, 40 P.3d

819 (2002) (”governor's commutation decisions generally fall outside the purview of the

adjudicatory process”).

B. PROTECTED LIBERTY INTEREST

Even if this Court could reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim, the claim is without

merit both because Petitioner fails to show a protected liberty interest and because Petitioner

fails to show a denial of substantive due process.

Petitioner argues that the violation of his due process rights occurred on February 17,

2004, when the Board, the Arizona Department of Corrections, and the State arbitrarily and

capriciously refused “to correct the effects of the Board's error (by commuting sentences A16

and B01) [thereby violating] Petitioner's Due Process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Petition, #1 at 22, 29 ¶ 6.) 

Petitioner presents a claim of denial of substantive due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. “Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary deprivation of

their liberty by government.” Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). However,

the existence of a right of due process is dependent upon the existence of a protected interest.

In Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983), the Supreme Court held that when a

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state's laws “place no substantive limitations on official discretion[, they] create no liberty

interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 249. Conversely, in

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.s 369 (1987), the Court held that where state statutes made

a grant of parole mandatory “upon certain findings,” it did create a protected liberty interest.

However, the Ninth Circuit has long held that “Arizona places no substantive

limitations on official discretion over the ultimate decision to grant or deny clemency,” and

thus they “‘create no liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause.’”

Woratzeck v. Arizona Bd. of Executive Clemency, 117 F.3d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Olim, 461 U.S. at 249). 

With specific regard to clemency under the Disproportionality Review Act, the

Arizona Court of Appeals has concluded that in the ordinary course there are no restrictions

on the Governor’s discretion, and thus the Act “fails to create a protected liberty interest

regardless of the Board's recommendation of commutation.” Wigglesworth v. Mauldin, 195

Ariz. 432, 436, 990 P.2d 26, 30 (Ariz.App. 1999).

Ordinarily, it would seem that would end the discussion. However, there is the

additional provision under the Act that provides for automatic approval where there is no

denial within 90 days. In Wigglesworth, the Arizona court acknowledge that provision, but

dismissed any effect, finding in that case that delivery of the Board’s decision to the

Governor had been delayed for some three months, so that the Governor’s denial another two

months later was timely and still discretionary. 195 Ariz. at 436 n. 3, 990 P.2d at 30 n. 3.

The instant case is not much different. In Wigglesworth, the Board reached a decision

in March, but failed to deliver it until June. Had they timely delivered it, the Governor’s

August denial would have been untimely and the recommendation would have automatically

become effective in June. In Petitioner’s case, the Board reached a decision on the omitted

counts in 1995, but effectively failed to deliver it until after the rehearing in December 2004.

Had they timely delivered it, the Governor’s February, 2005 denial would have been

untimely, and the recommendation would have automatically become effective in 1994. 

Petitioner protests that he should have the benefit of the Board’s decision despite their

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3

 If this Court were authorized to engage in a purely equitable resolution, disregarding

the legal technicalities, and to give effect to the intents of the participants, the result would

be a denial of relief, inasmuch as both Governor Symington in 1995 and Governor

Napolitano in 2006 evidenced an intent to deny Petitioner clemency. “[H]e who seeks equity

must do equity in the transaction in respect to which relief is sought.” McQuiddy v. Ware,

87 U.S. 14, 19 (1873).

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failure to express it and deliver it to the Governor, and that failure to grant him that benefit

is a denial of due process. Had the Board in fact delivered its recommendation on the

omitted counts in 1994, and had the Governor failed to act in a timely fashion, then arguably

there would have been no discretion permitted in the Governor’s act, and a protected liberty

interest could have arisen in the automatic approval. 

But the recommendation was not delivered. This Court, like the Arizona Court,

cannot deprive the Arizona Governor of his right to exercise discretion over clemency

decisions by retroactively deeming a recommendation delivered that in fact was not

delivered.

The Arizona statutes granted Petitioner a protected liberty interest in having the Board

consider his case and make a recommendation, and to have the Arizona Governor exercise

his discretion over that recommendation. Petitioner has not been denied those rights, albeit

they were not fulfilled until the 2004 Board proceeding.

What Petitioner did not have a protected liberty interest in was a windfall from the

combined oversights of the Board and the Governor, the former in its communication of its

recommendation, and the latter in the usual manner of communicating his denial.3

 While

Petitioner convincingly opines that had the Board issued its recommendation, the Governor

would have issued a defective denial. However, “a mere expectation of a benefit-even if that

expectation is supported by consistent government practice-is not sufficient to create an

interest protected by procedural due process.” Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 382

(1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).

As the Court put it when discussing the prejudice standard in evaluating the effectiveness

of counsel, “[a] defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker . . . [t]he

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4

 It is undisputed that the Board initially violated the Disproportionality Review Act

by failing to issue a decision on the omitted counts. The Act mandated that “[a]fter a hearing

. . . the board of executive clemency shall recommend” clemency if the requisite findings are

made.” Ariz. Sess. Laws 1995, Ch. 365 § 1(F). However, federal habeas relief is not

available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). To qualify for federal habeas relief, an error of state law must

be “sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). To

sustain such a due process claim founded on state law error, Petitioner must show that the

state court "error" was "so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due

process." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reiger v.

Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1986)). Here, there was nothing egregious,

arbitrary or surprising about the Board’s conduct. In Petitioner’s own words, it was merely

an “inadvertent clerical error.” (Exhibit 9, Complaint at 7, ¶ 24.) Clerical errors do not

amount to a denial of due process. See e.g. U.S. v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir.

1988) (clerical error resulting in seven year delay in commencement of sentence); and U.S.

v. Mendez-Casillas, 272 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001) (due process standard “hardly met

by a clerical error on his deportation papers”). Thus the Board’s conduct in the original

commutation proceedings cannot be deemed a denial of due process.

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assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is

reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.

It should not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984). 

Without a protected liberty interest, Petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to due

process of law, and cannot now obtain habeas relief based upon its purported denial.

C. DUE PROCESS NOT DENIED

Even if Petitioner had a protected liberty interest, Petitioner has not shown a denial

of due process. Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated on February 17,

2004, when his requests to honor a commutation of the omitted sentences was

administratively denied.4

 Petitioner argues that this decision was “arbitrary and capricious.”

 “[T]he due process guarantee does not entail a body of constitutional law imposing

liability whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm.” County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998). The Supreme Court’s “cases dealing with

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5

 That is the fundamental difference between Petitioner’s case and McDonald, where

the Arizona Courts ordered the delivery of the commutation, rather than a rehearing. In

McDonald, the recommendation had been delivered and the Governor had been given the

opportunity to properly deny it. In Petitioner’s case, the Governor received no such

opportunity, thus justifying the requirement that Petitioner, as he puts it, “run the gauntlet

of the Board’s recommendation and the Governor’s review and signature again in 2004.”

(Reply, #15 at 5-6.)

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abusive executive action have repeatedly emphasized that only the most egregious official

conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense’.” Id. at 846. Establishing that

an executive abuse of power is constitutionally cognizable, requires a showing of an abuse

of power “which shocks the conscience.” Id. “Thus, in a due process challenge to executive

action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so

egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.”

Id. at 847, n.8.

Here, there was no arbitrary or conscience shocking action by the Board, ADOC, or

the state. To the contrary, as evidenced by the decision of the Arizona Courts in the special

action proceedings, there was no legal basis under Arizona law for acknowledging a grant

of clemency. Wrongful or unfair as it might have been, the failure of the Board to have

issued its recommendation precluded there from having been an exercise of the Governor’s

clemency power, whether by affirmative grant or by dilatory denial.5 The Board, ADOC and

the state were left without a legitimate grant of clemency to justify a release of Petitioner.

The action of an executive official motivated by a refusal to violate state law can hardly be

deemed arbitrary, nor can it be deemed to shock the conscience. A contrary result would

saddle executive officials with the untenable position of having to determine whether a state

statute passed constitutional muster before they complied with it. 

Even if the decision to refuse to acknowledge a grant of clemency had turned out to

be incorrect under state law, that would not render the act arbitrary. “We do not require

police officers to act as legal experts to avoid violating the Constitution; substantive due

process secures individuals from ‘arbitrary’ government action that rises to the level of

‘egregious conduct,’ not from reasonable, though possibly erroneous, legal interpretation.”

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 The undersigned does not reach Respondent’s arguments that the remedy of

rehearing selected by the state court is all to which Petitioner is entitled. That argument

would only be relevant if Petitioner just challenged the original failure to issue a

recommendation. Instead, Petitioner challenges the refusal to imply a defective denial of an

undelivered recommendation. If that refusal were wrongful, then a mere grant of rehearing

would seem to be no remedy at all.

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Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir. 2006).6

D. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s claims were rejected by the state courts on the independent and adequate

state grounds of the delegation of the clemency powers. Accordingly, consideration of his

claim in this habeas court is barred. Alternatively, Petitioner has failed to show the existence

of a protected liberty interest in the issuance of a default grant of clemency. Further

Petitioner has failed to show that the denial of such a grant was arbitrary and capricious or

otherwise a denial of substantive due process. Having found no constitutional violation, this

Court need not consider the limitations on habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“contrary

to or unreasonable application of federal law” or “unreasonable determination of the facts”).

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed November 28, 2007 (#1) be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

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Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file

a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: September 11, 2008 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\07-2335-001r RR 08 09 05 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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