Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03990/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03990-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GEORGE L. KIRBYSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING 

COMPANY; BRUCE SMITH; DAN PORTER; 

WILLIAM BODNAR; BILL REITZEL; 

DANIEL CARLSON; RICK RIOS; TAMMY 

MEAMBER; DIANE DANIELS; LARRY 

ANGEL; UNITED STEEL WORKERS, 

INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 5; JEFF 

CLARK; STEVE ROJEK, and DOES 1 

through 200, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 08-4966 SC 

ORDER Re: MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Now before the Court are three motions to dismiss the First 

Amended Complaint of Plaintiff George Kirbyson ("Plaintiff"). The 

first is a motion to dismiss and to strike submitted by Defendant 

Larry Angel. Docket No. 20 ("Angel MTD"). This motion has been 

fully briefed. Docket Nos. 21 ("Angel Mem. of P&A"), 24 ("Opp'n 

to Angel MTD"), 27 ("Angel Reply"). The second motion to dismiss 

has been filed by Defendants Bruce Smith ("Smith"), Dan Porter 

("Porter"), William Bodnar ("Bodnar"), Bill Reitzel ("Reitzel"), 

Daniel Carlson ("Carlson"), Rick Rios ("Rios"), Tammy Meamber 

("Meamber"), and Diane Daniel ("Daniel;" collectively, "Individual 

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United States District Court

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Defendants"). Docket No. 22 ("Smith MTD"). This motion is fully 

briefed. Docket Nos. 26 ("Opp'n to Smith MTD"), 28 ("Smith 

Reply"). Defendant Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company 

("Tesoro") has filed the third motion to dismiss, which has also 

been fully briefed. Docket Nos. 23 ("Tesoro MTD"), 25 ("Opp'n to 

Tesoro MTD"), 30 ("Tesoro Reply").1

 

Having considered the papers submitted by these parties, the 

Court concludes that this matter is suitable for determination 

without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the motions 

to dismiss submitted by Angel and the Individual Defendants are 

GRANTED. Tesoro's motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART. 

II. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff joined the U.S. Air Force in 1994, and transitioned 

into the Air Force Reserve in 1999. First Amended Complaint 

("FAC"), Docket NO. 15, ¶ 20. Upon his transition, Plaintiff began 

working as a refinery operator at the Golden Eagle Refinery, which 

Tesoro purchased at some point prior to 2003. Id. ¶ 21. In 

January of 2005, while Plaintiff was employed by Tesoro, Plaintiff 

was recalled to active duty with the Air Force and deployed to 

Iraq. Id. ¶ 22. While serving, Plaintiff was injured and 

permanently disabled -- Plaintiff does not indicate the extent of 

his injury, and only notes that it was "orthopedic" in nature. Id.

¶ 23. He was medically retired from the Air Force in November of 

 

1

 Defendants United Steel Workers, International Union Local 5 

("USW"), Jeff Clark and Steve Rojek have not submitted any motions 

to dismiss, and have instead chosen to answer the First Amended 

Complaint. Docket No. 17. 

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2008. Id.

 At the time that Plaintiff was recalled to the Air Force, he 

informed Tesoro and was placed on active military leave. Id. ¶ 22. 

Although Tesoro filled his position, Plaintiff was assured that he 

would be "taken care of" when he returned from service. Id. ¶ 24. 

However, when Plaintiff retired from the military, he was 

ultimately denied reemployment from Tesoro. 

 When Plaintiff sought reemployment with Tesoro, he initially 

met with Angel, a physician's assistant located at Tesoro's 

refinery. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff claims that Angel did not give 

Plaintiff any "formal evaluation of his physical capabilities," and 

informed Plaintiff "that he did not think that Tesoro would 

accommodate" him. Id. Plaintiff next met with Daniels, who was 

employed in Tesoro's human resources department. Id. ¶ 27. 

Plaintiff informed her of several open positions in the refinery 

which he believed he could fill, and contacted her on several later 

occasions. Id. However, on December 22, 2008, Daniels called 

Plaintiff to tell him that "the company is unable to accommodate 

you" and that he was being terminated from employment with Tesoro, 

effective immediately. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff claims that Carlson 

and Rios approved his termination. Id. 

 The next day, Plaintiff left a voicemail with Smith, the 

President and Chairmen of Tesoro, and requested a chance to speak 

with him about the termination. Id. ¶ 32. Although Smith did not 

personally respond to Plaintiff's message, Porter, the Senior Vice 

President of Refining Operations, returned Plaintiff's call the 

following day. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Porter initially claimed that he 

would contact Smith, as well as Rios and Bodnar at the refinery, to 

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"get to the bottom of the situation" -- however, Plaintiff never 

heard from Porter again. Id. ¶ 33.2

 

Plaintiff alleges a total of seven causes of action against 

Tesoro. He claims that Tesoro (1) violated the Uniformed Services 

Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 

et seq.; (2) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (3) violated California's Fair 

Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et

seq.; (4) wrongfully terminated him in violation of fundamental 

public policy; (5) violated section 389 et seq. of the California 

Military and Veterans Code ("section 389"); (6) breached the 

collective bargaining agreement with USW; and (7) was negligent in 

hiring, training, supervising, or retaining its employees. Id.

¶¶ 40-73. 

 Plaintiff's causes of action against Angel and the Individual 

Defendants are more limited. He only brings one cause of action 

against Angel, for violation of section 389. Id. ¶¶ 63-66. He 

brings two causes of action against the Individual Defendants, 

including (1) violation of section 389; and (2) negligent hiring, 

training, supervision and retention. Id. ¶¶ 71-73. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants Smith and Porter both claim that this Court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over them, and move for dismissal under Rule 

 

2

 The FAC only mentions Defendant Reitzel as the employee who 

informed Plaintiff that Tesoro had filled his position at the 

refinery, although it also alleges that Reitzel "was responsible 

for management decisions relating to the hiring, training, 

supervision, retention and termination of those employees under his 

supervision." FAC ¶¶ 7, 25. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. Where a court 

considers a 12(b)(2) motion without an evidentiary hearing, "the 

plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 

facts to withstand the motion to dismiss. That is, the plaintiff 

need only demonstrate facts that if true would support 

jurisdiction over the defendant." Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 

1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Jurisdiction must 

comport with both the long-arm statute of the state in which the 

district court sits, as well as the constitutional requirements of 

due process. Mattel, Inc., v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 

857, 863 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that 

the California long-arm statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10, 

allows Courts to exercise jurisdiction to the limits of the Due 

Process Clause of the Constitution, "so a federal court may 

exercise personal jurisdiction if doing so comports with federal 

constitutional due process." Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 

1015-16 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In addition, Individual Defendants, Angel, and Tesoro all 

claim that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted against them, and have moved for dismissal on this 

basis. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). It requires a court to 

determine whether a Complaint comports with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires that a pleading contain a "short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief." Dismissal can be based on the lack of a 

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged 

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under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Allegations of material 

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 

F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). With regard to well-pleaded 

factual allegations, the court should assume their truth, but a 

motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff fails to 

proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is 

plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

547 (2007). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions 

couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 1949-50 (2009). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Jurisdiction over Smith and Porter

Plaintiff does not allege that Smith or Porter reside, work, 

or possess property in California -- in fact, the FAC suggests 

that they both work in Bexar County, Texas. FAC ¶¶ 3-4. "It is 

the plaintiff's burden to establish the court's personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant." Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 

915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff must therefore allege some 

other basis for asserting jurisdiction over these two defendants. 

A defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction within a 

particular judicial district pursuant to theories of either 

general or specific jurisdiction. See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 

1015-16. In his Opposition, Plaintiff only suggests that Smith 

and Porter may be subject to specific jurisdiction. Opp'n to 

Smith MTD at 3-9. "[A] court may exercise specific jurisdiction 

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over a foreign defendant if his or her less substantial contacts 

with the forum give rise to the cause of action before the court." 

Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 923. Where the alleged contact with 

the forum state is limited, as in this case, "the cause of action 

must arise out of that particular purposeful contact . . . ." 

Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth 

Circuit has developed a three-pronged test to determine whether 

specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is 

appropriate: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully 

direct his activities or consummate some 

transaction with the forum or resident thereof; 

or perform some act by which he purposefully 

avails himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws; 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or 

relates to the defendant's forum-related 

activities; and 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport 

with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it 

must be reasonable. 

Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 

801). 

Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized 

that "purposeful direction of some act having effect in the forum 

constitutes sufficient contact to exert jurisdiction . . . ." 

Unocal, 248 F.3d at 923-24; see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 

U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985). Purposeful availment may therefore 

satisfy the first part of the Ninth Circuit's test. Unocal, 248 

F.3d at 924. It "requires a finding that the defendant '[has] 

performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or 

promotes the transaction of business within the forum state,'" id.

(quoting Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990)), or 

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that the out-of-state defendant performed an injurious act, 

knowing that "the brunt of that injury would be felt by" someone 

in the forum state, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). 

The alleged contact that Smith or Porter had with California 

is extremely limited. Plaintiff left Smith a voice mail. FAC 

¶ 32. Smith then instructed Porter to call Plaintiff, and Porter 

told Plaintiff that he would talk to employees at the Refinery to 

investigate and "get to the bottom of the situation." Id. ¶ 33. 

Porter told Plaintiff that he would get back to him, but he never 

did; Plaintiff was eventually called by another Tesoro employee 

and told that Porter would not be able to speak to Plaintiff about 

his termination. Id. ¶¶ 33, 36. This contact was initiated by 

Plaintiff, and neither Smith nor Porter is alleged to have 

directed any injurious communications towards the forum state. 

The quality of the only contact direct to Plaintiff -- a vague and 

presumably false assurance from Porter -- does not rise to the 

level of an "intentional and allegedly tortious act[] expressly 

aimed at the forum." C.f. Brainerd v. Governors of University of 

Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding defendant 

intentionally directed activities towards forum, where defendant 

allegedly made tortious statements during phone call initiated by 

plaintiff). The Court finds that Porter's innocuous reaction to 

Plaintiff's phone call is insufficient to establish "purposeful 

availment." 

Plaintiff also suggests that "the factual allegations 

presented by Plaintiff demonstrate that Defendants Smith and 

Porter participated in the alleged wrongful conduct against 

Plaintiff . . . at a minimum by personally ratifying and/or 

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acquiescing to the wrongful conduct by their employees . . . ." 

Opp'n to Smith MTD at 8. The FAC demonstrates nothing of the 

sort. There is no basis to conclude that Smith, the President and 

Chairman of the Board, or Porter, the Senior Vice President of 

Refining, personally ratified, or even knew about, the termination 

before it occurred. Although Porter's comments to Plaintiff 

suggest that Porter later learned of the termination and did 

nothing to remedy it, the Court finds that this type of 

acquiescence is not sufficient to establish that Porter "directed" 

his activity towards this forum in a manner sufficient to give 

rise to personal jurisdiction over him. Plaintiff has failed to 

meet his burden of establishing a basis for jurisdiction over 

Smith and Porter. 

B. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Against Angel and 

the Individual Defendants

1. California Military & Veterans Code Section 389

The remaining Individual Defendants claim that Plaintiff's 

sixth cause of action for violation of section 389 should be 

dismissed with prejudice, because individual supervisors, 

employees, and corporate agents should not be held personally 

liable for employment discrimination claims where the claims arise 

out of the performance of regular personnel management duties. 

Smith MTD at 13-15. 

Plaintiff's response is based on the plain language of section 

394(a) of the California Military and Veterans Code, which reads 

as follows: 

No person shall discriminate against any officer, 

warrant officer or enlisted member of the 

military or naval forces of the state or of the 

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United States because of that membership. No 

member of the military forces shall be prejudiced 

or injured by any person, employer, or officer or 

agent of any corporation, company, or firm with 

respect to that member's employment, position or 

status or be denied or disqualified for 

employment by virtue of membership or service in 

the military forces of this state or of the 

United States. 

Cal. Mil & Vet. Code § 394(a) ("subsection 394(a)").3 The statute 

expressly applies to the actions of "any person," in addition to 

any "employer, or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or 

firm." Id. Plaintiff claims that this language was intended to 

create liability not just as to employers, but also as to 

individual employees who were somehow involved in the acts of 

discrimination. Opp'n to Smith MTD at 10. 

 The Court is not aware of any authority specifically 

interpreting the language of subsection 394(a). However, the 

Court is persuaded that a California court would not interpret the 

statute so as to reach "persons" who are being sued for claims 

that "arise out of the performance of necessary personnel 

management duties." Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 

4th 55, 63-64 (Ct. App. 1996). In Janken, a California appellate 

panel considered whether discrimination claims could be brought 

against supervisors, in their personal capacity, under FEHA. FEHA 

makes it illegal for "an employer" to discriminate "because of the 

race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical 

 

3

 Plaintiff also suggests that the Individual Defendants might be 

liable under California Military and Veterans Code § 394(d), which 

applies only to employment discrimination based on membership in 

"the military or naval forces of this state," as opposed to "the 

military forces of this state or of the United States." Compare

Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 394(a) and id. § 394(d). The Court need 

not at this time reach the question of whether this difference 

precludes Plaintiff from relying on subsection 394(d). 

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disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, 

sex, age, or sexual orientation." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a). 

"Employer" is defined under the statute to include "any person 

regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting as 

an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly." Id. § 12926(d). 

On its face, the statute could therefore be read to apply to 

supervisors as persons acting as direct agents for an employer. 

Nevertheless, the panel concluded that there was a strong 

consensus against holding individual employees and supervisors 

personally liable for discrimination claims based solely on 

managerial acts, and further expressed concern that holding 

managers liable may chill effective management while adding, at 

best, meager additional protections or recompense to victims of 

discrimination. Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 67-71, 72-76 ("Little 

would be added to the protection of employees by the addition of 

individual supervisory employees as defendants, and what little 

would be added would be at potentially great cost."); see also

Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 645-654 (1998) (adopting reasoning 

of Janken). 

 In the context of subsection 394(a), the inclusion of the 

words "any person," in addition to "officer or agent of any 

corporation," is as ambiguous as FEHA's use of the term "employer" 

to include "any person acting as an agent of an employer." Both 

statutes are broad enough to encompass discriminatory actions 

taken by individual supervisors, but neither answers the question 

of whether that individual supervisor may be personally liable in 

his or her individual capacity. The unique language of subsection 

394(a) clearly expands the application of the subsection beyond 

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the employment context, but it does not necessarily attach 

personal liability to supervisors where the suit properly lies 

against their employers. Plaintiff has provided no rationale for 

distinguishing subsection 394(a) from FEHA in this regard. This 

Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff may not assert his 

section 389 claims against the Individual Defendants. Plaintiff's 

sixth cause of action is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to 

the Individual Defendants.4

2. Negligent Hiring, Training and Supervision

 Plaintiff's claim against the Individual Defendants for 

negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention also fails. 

"In California, an employer can be held liable for negligent 

hiring if he knows the employee is unfit, or has reason to believe 

the employee is unfit or fails to use reasonable care to discover 

the employee's unfitness before hiring him." Juarez v. Boy Scouts 

of America, Inc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 377, 395 (Ct. App. 2000). 

Liability for negligent hiring . . . is based 

upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires 

individuals with characteristics which might pose 

a danger to customers or other employees, the 

enterprise should bear the loss caused by the 

wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees. 

Negligence liability will be imposed on an 

employer if it knew or should have known that 

hiring the employee created a particular risk or 

hazard and that particular harm materializes. 

Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1139 (Ct. 

App. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 

4

 This rationale also applies to Angel, who was "a physician's 

assistant" at Tesoro's refinery and was allegedly acting as 

Tesoro's agent, although not as an "employee." See FAC ¶¶ 11, 26. 

Plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish Angel from the other 

Individual Defendants on the basis of his employment status. This 

cause of action is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Angel. 

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 Plaintiff is apparently alleging that all of the Individual 

Defendants (except Daniels) are liable because they negligently 

hired, supervised, trained, or retained the other employees who 

mistreated Plaintiff. The FAC includes general allegations that 

"Defendants" had a duty to hire, supervise, and train Tesoro's 

employees, and also includes statements that specific Individual 

Defendants had a general responsibility for the hiring or 

"management of employees." FAC ¶¶ 5-9, 72. However, Plaintiff 

does not specify which particular employee was "unfit," and in 

what way, except to say that Tesoro's employees could not properly 

abide by the various statutory requirements mentioned throughout 

the FAC.5

 Plaintiff does not identify any particular Individual 

Employees who had a duty to train that person. Instead, Plaintiff 

asserts this claim against all Individual Defendants except 

Daniels. This cause of action appears to be a shotgun attempt by 

Plaintiff to hold each Individual Defendant liable based on any 

misconduct of any of the other Defendants. The Court is not 

persuaded that this is an appropriate use of this cause of action, 

or that the FAC presents facts that render this a plausible claim 

against any particular Individual Defendant. This cause of action 

is DISMISSED as to the Individual Defendants. 

C. Whether Plaintiff has Stated a Claim Against Tesoro

1. Plaintiff's Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff pleads that Tesoro discriminated against him based 

on both his military service and his disability, and that he was 

 

5

 The single concrete basis for unfitness that the FAC seems to 

allege is against Daniels, who "had never heard of USERRA." FAC 

¶ 37. This is simply not enough to create a plausible inference 

that Daniels was unfit for her job or that any other defendant 

should have been aware that Daniels was unfit for her job. 

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terminated as a result of this discrimination. "Even though 

heightened pleading is not required in discrimination cases, the 

complaint must still 'give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" 

Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, (2002)). 

To prevail under the ADA,6 Plaintiff ultimately "must show 

that (1) [he] is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; 

(2) [he] is a qualified individual, meaning [he] can perform the 

essential functions of [his] job; and (3) [Tesoro] terminated [him] 

because of [his] disability." Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999).7 The Court finds that, although 

the FAC lacks certain details, it sufficiently notifies Tesoro of 

the claims against it. Plaintiff does not provide any description 

of his disability, except to say that it is the result of an 

"orthopedic" injury. See FAC ¶ 23. However, he does claim that he 

was declared permanently disabled and medically retired from the 

military as a result of this injury. Id. ¶ 23. The FAC sets out, 

in detail, the dates and the names of his contact with Tesoro, and 

it includes facts that clearly suggest that Plaintiff was not 

rehired on account of his disability. Plaintiff was told by Angel 

that "he did not think Tesoro would accommodate" him, and Daniels 

told him that "the company is unable to accommodate you" when she 

informed him of his termination. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28. Plaintiff has 

 

6

 "[T]he FEHA provisions relating to disability discrimination are 

based on the ADA," and courts typically examine claims under these 

statutes in conjunction with one another. See Humphrey v. Mem'l 

Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001). 

7

 Tesoro does not challenge Plaintiff's disabled status, or the 

allegation that Plaintiff was terminated due to his disability. 

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received right-to-sue letters from both the California Department 

of Fair Employment and Housing and the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission. FAC ¶¶ 38-39. The FAC is therefore more than 

sufficient to allow Tesoro to prepare its defense, and it is also 

sufficient to raise his claims for discrimination based on his 

disability, and for a failure to accommodate his disability, above 

the speculative level. 

Tesoro argues that Plaintiff should plead, with greater 

specificity, precisely what his disabilities were, the essential 

features of the position that he sought to fill, and how Tesoro was 

supposed to accommodate him. Tesoro MTD at 4-8. However, Tesoro 

fails to identify any legal authority that suggests that Plaintiff 

must plead this level of particularity at this stage of the 

litigation. To be sure, Plaintiff will later need to establish 

that he is a "qualified individual," and this will require him to 

show that he was "'an individual with a disability who, with or 

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 

functions of the employment position . . . .'" Rohr v. Salt River 

Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 862 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)). In later 

stages of this suit, "part of the plaintiff's initial burden [will] 

include[] 'showing the existence of a reasonable accommodation.'" 

Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 749 

(9th Cir. 1998)). However, were this Court to require the FAC to 

spell out precisely how Tesoro should have accommodated him, this 

would be tantamount to requiring Plaintiff to establish a prima 

facie case at the dismissal stage. No such heightened pleading 

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standard is required. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511 (rejecting 

requirement that plaintiff establish prima facie case of 

discrimination to survive motion to dismiss in Title VII suit); see

also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-570 (reaffirming substance of 

Swierkiewicz). 

Whether Plaintiff pleads a plausible cause of action for 

discrimination based on his military status is a closer question. 

Plaintiff can point to nothing in the FAC that suggests that his 

termination was in any way related to his military status -- 

instead, the allegations strongly indicate that he was terminated 

because of his disability. Plaintiff's sole argument is as 

follows: 

[I]t is reasonable to infer that Defendants 

discriminated against Plaintiff Kirbyson based on 

Kirbyson's military service since other (nonmilitary) Tesoro employees were treating [sic] 

more favorably than Plaintiff Kirbyson (i.e., 

non-military employees with disabilities were 

provided with reasonable accommodations . . . ) 

and based on the temporal proximity of 

Plaintiff's termination to his return from 

military service. 

Opp'n to Tesoro at 10-11. However, the FAC contains no fact that 

suggests that other employees with disabilities were treated 

differently than Plaintiff. Moreover, the FAC suggests that 

Tesoro's initial response to Plaintiff's recall to the military was 

appropriate -- he was placed on leave and told that he would be 

"taken care of." FAC ¶¶ 22, 24. Plaintiff was not terminated 

until after he was disabled. Id. 28. When Tesoro's reaction to 

his service is coupled with the plausible explanation for his 

termination that is articulated in the FAC, the FAC leaves no fact 

that creates a plausible inference that Plaintiff's military 

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service was a motivating factor in his termination.8 Plaintiff's 

claim that Tesoro discriminated against him on the basis of his 

military status appears to be pure speculation. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Tesoro 

discriminated against him based on his military service, 

Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for violation of section 389 is 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Tesoro. However, this does not 

preclude Plaintiff from stating a claim against Tesoro for 

violation of USERRA, to the extent that Plaintiff is asserting that 

Tesoro failed to reasonably accommodate him as a disabled service 

member returning from duty. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4312, 4313(a)(3). 

Tesoro's motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's 

first cause of action for violation of USERRA, second cause of 

action for violation of the ADA, third cause of action for 

violation of FEHA, and fifth cause of action for wrongful 

termination. 

2. Breach of Contract Claim

Plaintiff alleges that he is a beneficiary of the collective 

bargaining agreement between Tesoro and USW, and that Tesoro 

breached this agreement when it terminated him without cause. FAC 

¶¶ 68-69. "A cause of action for breach of contract requires 

pleading of a contract, plaintiff's performance or excuse for 

failure to perform, defendant's breach and damage to plaintiff 

 

8

 Plaintiff only cites the case of Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 196 

F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 1998), for the claim that the "temporal 

proximity" of his termination to his service might give rise to an 

inference of discrimination. Opp'n to Tesoro MTD at 11. However, 

Barnett was describing a retaliation claim, which was significantly 

more conducive to an inference based on the timing of the parties' 

activities. The Court finds that the inference in this case is far 

weaker -- so weak, in light of the other allegations, as to be 

implausible or merely speculative. 

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resulting therefrom." Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood 

Apartments, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1031 (Ct. App. 2009) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Tesoro rests its arguments on one 

basis for dismissal of this cause of action: that Plaintiff failed 

to sufficiently identify the terms of the contract or his damages. 

See Tesoro MTD at 14-15. 

Plaintiff pleads the existence of a contract and explains how 

Tesoro breached that contract: by terminating him without cause. 

FAC ¶¶ 68-69. "The complaint must describe the alleged terms of 

the contract in a sufficiently specific manner to give the 

defendant notice of the nature of the claim. For example, a claim 

on a written contract must either (1) quote relevant contractual 

language; (2) include a copy of the contract as an attachment; or 

(3) summarize the contract's purported legal effect." Am. Realty 

Trust, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 362 F. Supp. 2d 

744 (N.D. Tex. 2005). Although Plaintiff has not quoted directly 

from the contract, he has identified the specific contract (of 

which Tesoro has presumably kept a copy), and has sufficiently 

summarized its legal effect (protection from termination without 

cause) to allow Tesoro to prepare its response. 

3. Negligence

For the reasons identified in Part IV.B.2, supra, this Court 

is not persuaded that Plaintiff has plausibly pled a failure to use 

reasonable care in the hiring, training, supervision or retention 

of employees, based solely on an alleged failure to comport with 

certain laws. 

/// 

/// 

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court hereby GRANTS the Individual Defendants' motion to 

dismiss, as well as Larry Angel's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's 

sixth cause of action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all 

defendants except Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company. 

Plaintiff's eighth cause of action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

as to all defendants; however, Plaintiff is strongly discouraged 

from attempting to bring this claim against any Individual 

Defendant unless he can plead facts that indicate that an employee 

of Tesoro was so unfit for his or her position as to give rise to a 

plausible inference that a particular Individual Defendant was 

negligent in hiring, training, or supervising that employee. 

The Court hereby GRANTS Tesoro Refining and Marketing 

Company's motion to dismiss WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Plaintiff's 

sixth and eighth causes of action. Tesoro Refining and Marketing 

Company's motion to dismiss is DENIED as to (1) Plaintiff's first 

cause of action for violation of USERRA, (2) second cause of action 

for violation of the ADA, (3) third cause of action for violation 

of FEHA, (4) fifth cause of action for wrongful termination, and 

(5) seventh cause of action for breach of contract; these causes of 

action are undisturbed as to Defendant Tesoro Refining and 

Marketing Company. Should Plaintiff choose to submit an amended 

complaint, he must do so no later than thirty (30) days from the 

date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 2, 2010 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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