Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-02563/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-02563-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Angel Santa Maria Bonillas,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-02563-TUC-CKJ

ORDER 

 Petitioner Angel Santa Maria Bonillas filed an pro se Amended Petition Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death 

Penalty). (Doc. 25.) Respondents filed an Answer, and Petitioner filed a Reply 

(Traverse). (Docs. 26, 53.) This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie Bowman 

for a Report and Recommendation (R & R) pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local 

Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 10.) Magistrate Judge Bowman issued an R & R on 

March 23, 2016 recommending that this Court deny the Petition. (Doc. 57.) After 

numerous extensions, Petitioner submitted his Objections to the R & R on July 5, 2016, 

and Respondents filed a Response on August 29, 2016. (Docs. 69, 71.) 

 The Court has reviewed the amended petition (Doc. 25 and exhibits), 

Respondents’ response (Doc. 26) and exhibits, Petitioner’s traverse (Doc. 53), the R & R 

(Doc. 57), Petitioner’s objections to the R & R (Doc. 69), and Respondents’ response to 

the Objections (Doc. 71.) After de novo review, the Court finds no error and will adopt 

the R & R in its entirety. 

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I. Summary of the Case 

 The R & R states the following summary of the case: 

Bonillas was found guilty of second-degree murder after a jury trial. (Doc. 

26-1, p. 2) He was convicted of killing his nephew, Adan, after they got 

into an argument at a birthday party for Bonillas’s mother. (Doc. 26-1, pp. 

3-4); (Doc. 26, pp. 3-4) The party was held at the home of Adan’s brother, 

Adrian. Id. When the argument became heated, Adrian noticed Bonillas had 

a gun and a knife and became concerned. Id. He summoned the police and 

another brother, Abram, for help. Id. He then separated Adan and Bonillas 

by taking Adan outside and locking Bonillas in the house behind a metal 

security screen door. Id. Shortly after Abram arrived in his car, Bonillas 

shot twice through the metal security door fatally wounding Adan. Id.

Adan’s brothers drove him away from the house and called for an 

ambulance. Id. The brothers testified at trial that Adan was unarmed. (Doc. 

26-9, pp. 15, 51); (Doc. 26-10, pp. 25, 43); (Doc. 26-13, p. 22) Forensic 

pathologist Cynthia Porterfield testified that Adan was killed by a bullet, 

which was deformed when it passed through a metal screen door. (Doc. 26-

9, pp. 67-68) She opined that because the bullet’s trajectory was affected by 

its collision with the metal screen door, it was not possible to determine the 

location of the gun in relation to the victim. (Doc. 26-9, p. 71); (Doc. 26-10, 

pp. 5-6) 

 When Deputy Loza arrived at the scene of the shooting, he found 

Bonillas in a nearby alley. (Doc. 26-11, p. 12) Deputy Loza asked, “What’s 

going on?” Id., p. 13 Bonillas told the deputy “he did it and he was turning 

himself in.” Id. Loza put Bonillas in handcuffs and escorted him toward his 

patrol car. Id., p. 14 Bonillas explained “someone was trying to punk him 

. . . so he had to do him.” (Doc. 26-11, p. 14) He saw detectives in the 

alleyway and stated “there is a .45 in the alley.” (Doc. 26-11, p. 16) He 

continued, “He’s a pretty tough kid; I think he’s going to make it; I was 

trying to wing him.” Id., p. 17 He explained, “I think he had a gun, I’m 

pretty sure.” (Doc. 26-11, p. 17) 

 A neighbor testified that she heard a shot and saw two men in the 

carport. (Doc. 26-12, p. 39) One of the men was holding a gun. Id. The men 

got in a car and drove off. Officers later found two guns on the floor of 

Abram’s car. Abram admitted one of the guns belonged to Adan, the 

victim. (Doc. 26-10, p. 41) 

 Bonillas’s theory at trial was that he shot in self-defense because 

Adan had a gun, which ended up in Abram’s car when the brothers drove 

Adan from the scene of the shooting. (Doc. 26-13, p. 30). Trial counsel 

argued Abram and Adrian testified falsely in order to have Bonillas 

wrongfully convicted. (Doc. 26-13, pp. 28-29) 

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 The trial court sentenced Bonillas to a sixteen-year term of 

imprisonment. (Doc. 26-1, p. 3) On direct appeal, Bonillas argued (1) his 

statements to the police should have been suppressed as a violation of 

Miranda and (2) he should have been given a new trial because Deputy 

Loza’s report was inadvertently sent to the jury for use in its deliberations. 

(Doc. 26-1, p. 3) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and 

sentence on June 17, 2010. Id. Bonillas did not seek review from the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 26, p. 4); (Doc. 26-1, p. 12) 

 On January 29, 2010, Bonillas filed notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 26-1, p. 16) In his petition, he argued (1) he found evidence that 

Deputy Loza testified inaccurately in another trial, (2) the state committed 

prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose that evidence, (3) trial 

counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify at trial, (4) trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to secure testimony from the jurors 

establishing that they relied on Loza’s report during deliberations, and 

(5) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 

introduction of Loza’s report to the jury. (Doc. 26-1, pp. 21-25) The trial 

court denied the petition on July 15, 2011. (Doc. 26-16, p. 10) The trial 

court denied Bonillas’s motion for reconsideration on August 11, 2011. 

(Doc. 26-16, p. 14) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief on 

January 27, 2012. (Doc. 26-1, p. 27) 

 The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on July 11, 2012. (Doc. 

26-1, p. 35) 

 Bonillas filed a second notice of post-conviction relief on September 

18, 2012. (Doc. 26-2, p. 2) The notice was dismissed on July 24, 2014 on 

the defendant’s motion. (Doc. 26-16, p. 27) 

(Doc. 57 at 1-3.) 

 Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 3, 

2014, raising the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

interview Francisco Santamaria who could have testified that Adan told Santamaria that 

he, Adan, was going to kill Bonillas because Bonillas had Adan’s father sent to prison; 

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct DNA tests of the black gun later 

found in Abram’s car and for failing to impeach witnesses; (3) trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to hire a ballistics expert; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to argue self-defense; (5) the state failed to disclose Loza’s history of perjury; 

(6) trial counsel, appellate counsel, and PCR (post-conviction relief) counsel were 

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ineffective in their handling of his motion for a new trial, which was based on the fact 

that Loza’s report was inadvertently given to the jury to use during deliberations; and (7) 

the prosecutor gave false testimony concerning how the bullet was broken by the metal 

screen. (Doc. 25.) In their answer, Respondents argue Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

defaulted or should be denied on the merits. (Doc. 26.) Petitioner filed a Traverse on 

March 17, 2016. (Doc. 53.) 

II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS 

 A. In General

 The federal courts shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus 

by a person in state custody: 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). Correcting 

errors of state law is not the province of federal habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 

1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims 

have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013). 

Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must “presume the correctness of 

state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and 

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convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473–74 (2007) (citing 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider 

whether the state court’s determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. 

Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). A 

determination is unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal 

principles delineated by the Supreme Court, but when applying the principles to the facts 

before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011); 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 

(9th Cir. 2004). “AEDPA requires ‘a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling 

on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was 

an error . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 10 

(quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103 (alterations in original). 

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must 

exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 

“provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims 

to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982). 

 Section 2254(c) provides that claims “shall not be deemed . . . exhausted” so long 

as the applicant “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 

procedure the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has 

been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Fair presentation requires that a state prisoner must 

alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” in his petition; simply labeling a 

claim “federal” or expecting the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition 

is insufficient. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33 (2004). The Petitioner must explicitly 

alert the state court that he is raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan v. Henry, 513 

U.S. 364, 366 (1995); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2004).

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 Furthermore, in order to “fairly present” his claims, the prisoner must do so “in 

each appropriate state court.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. “Generally, a 

petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) 

throughout the entire direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire 

judicial postconviction process available in the state.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 

916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and 

Procedure, § 23.3b (9th ed. 1998)). But for non-capital cases in Arizona, “review need 

not be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” 

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Crowell v. Knowles, 

483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 2007); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 

(1998). 

 In Arizona, there are two procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to 

exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a 

petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or 

in a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). 

C. Procedural Default 

With limited exception, where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review. Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. 288, 298 (1989). 1

 A procedural default may preclude a prisoner’s habeas petition from federal 

review in two ways. First, the petitioner may be precluded where he presented his claims 

 1

 “A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the 

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ 

to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 

650 (1991). 

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to the state court, which denied relief based on independent and adequate state grounds. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728. 

 Second, the petitioner may be precluded where he “failed to exhaust state 

remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in 

order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally 

barred.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (citations omitted). 

 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result of the violation. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298 (holding that failure 

to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless 

petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 

534 (1986) (recognizing “that a federal habeas court must evaluate appellate defaults 

under the same standards that apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial.”). 

“[T]he existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the 

prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 

(1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his 

claims.”). 

 In addition, a habeas petitioner must show actual prejudice, meaning that he “must 

show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked 

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted). Without a showing of both cause and prejudice, a habeas petitioner 

cannot overcome the procedural default and obtain review by the federal courts. Id.

 The Supreme Court has recognized that “the cause and prejudice standard will be 

met in those cases where review of a state prisoner’s claim is necessary to correct ‘a 

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fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Coleman, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991) (quoting Engle 

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception 

is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a 

colorable showing of factual innocence.’” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) 

(emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986)). Thus, 

“‘actual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through 

which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim 

considered on the merits.” Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404. Further, in order to demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must “establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would 

have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). 

 In addition, for certain claims, a limited avenue to excuse procedural default exists 

under Martinez v. Ryan. 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). Because “[t]here is no 

constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings . . . a petitioner 

cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (internal citations omitted). Consequently, any ineffectiveness 

of PCR counsel will ordinarily not establish cause to excuse a procedural default. The 

Supreme Court, however, has recognized a “narrow exception” to Coleman’s procedural 

default principle: “inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral 

proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of 

ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. The Ninth Circuit has 

expanded Martinez’s scope to include procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective 

appellate counsel. Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1294–96 (9th Cir. 2013). 

 Under Martinez a petitioner may establish cause for the procedural default of an 

ineffective assistance claim “by demonstrating two things: (1) ‘counsel in the initialreview collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective 

under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . . . (1984),’ and (2) ‘the 

underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to 

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say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan,

688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318); see Clabourne 

v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319–20 

(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); 

Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 The court examines whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 

substantial under the standard stated in Strickland. 466 U.S. 668. Petitioner must show 

that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and that counsel’s errors “deprive[d] 

the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. 

In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court 

can be certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or 

whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if 

counsel acted differently.... Instead, Strickland asks whether it is 

‘reasonably likely’ the result would have been different.” [466 U.S.] at 

696. This does not require a showing that counsel’s actions “more likely 

than not altered the outcome,” but the difference between Strickland's 

prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and 

matters “only in the rarest case.” Id., at 693, 697. The likelihood of a 

different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. Id., at 693. 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111–12 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 

 A court need not address both components of the inquiry or follow any particular 

order in assessing deficiency and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. If it is easier to 

dispose of a claim on just one of the components, a court may do so. Id. Additionally, 

not just any error or omission of counsel will be deemed “deficient performance” that 

will satisfy Martinez; if post-conviction counsel “in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding did not perform below constitutional standards,” that attorney’s performance 

does not constitute “cause.” 132 S.Ct. at 1319. Most notably, counsel “is not necessarily 

ineffective for failing to raise even a non-frivolous claim,” much less a frivolous claim. 

Sexton, 679 F.3d at 1157 (emphasis added). 

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D. Review of R & R 

 The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the R & R, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), and reviews for clear error the unobjected-to portions 

of the R & R. Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); see 

also, Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner has filed an 80-page Objection to the R & R. (Doc. 69.) Petitioner’s 

objections include disputes of almost every finding made by the Magistrate Judge, 

including the Magistrate Judge’s characterizations of Petitioner’s claims and her 

summaries of the evidence. Generally, the objections simply repeat Petitioner’s 

arguments made in the amended petition and his traverse and provide no explanation of 

the precise dispute and why it is material to Petitioner’s claim and no analysis to show 

how the Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions are erroneous. The objections also 

include 14 pages of objections to the R & R’s summary of the case; the Court will turn 

first to these objections. (Doc. 69 at 3-17; ref. Doc. 57 at 1-4.) 

 The Magistrate Judge’s summary relied on the trial transcripts and the Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ findings of fact, which are entitled to a presumption of correctness. 

(Doc. 57, at 1–2 (citing memorandum decision and transcripts)); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) 

(“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be 

correct.”); see Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981) (presumption of correctness 

“requires deference by federal courts to factual determinations of all state courts”). 

Petitioner does not explain how the claimed discrepancies between the facts in the R & R 

and the state court memorandum decision or the record are material to his claims. The 

objections are overruled. 

 For example, Petitioner claims that the Magistrate Judge erroneously stated that 

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder for “killing his nephew, Adan, after 

they got into an argument at a birthday party for [Petitioner’s] mother.” (Doc. 69 at 3.) 

The objection does not identify the specifically disputed fact or facts. Petitioner cites 

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language in the Respondents’ answer to his habeas petition and exhibits attached to his 

traverse. (Doc. 69 at 3–4; ref. Doc. 26 and Doc. 53.) But these documents state that 

Petitioner was, in fact, convicted of second-degree murder. Likewise, Petitioner claims 

error regarding the statement that “[t]he party was held at the home of Adan’s brother 

Adrian”; Petitioner cites the affidavit of his mother, which he presented with his traverse, 

stating that she is the owner of the house and that Petitioner lived there. (Doc. 69 at 4–5; 

ref. Doc. 57 at 1–2.) But Adrian testified that, at the relevant time, Adrian “was living at 

[his] grandma’s house and it was just [him] and [his] aunt living there.” (Doc. 26–8 at 

26–27.) Adrian further testified that Petitioner lived in another state and was staying at 

the house while in town for his mother’s birthday celebration. (Id. at 27–29.) 

Respondents asserts that Petitioner did not contest these facts at trial. Moreover, even if 

the mother’s affidavit establishes a discrepancy in the identity of the owner and 

occupants of the house, it is immaterial to Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner certainly does 

not explain why the identity of the owner is relevant. These objections are frivolous and 

are overruled. 

 Petitioner disputes the Magistrate Judge’s description of the events immediately 

before the shooting when Petitioner’s argument with his nephew “became heated.” (Doc. 

69 at 5–6.) It is unclear what specific facts Petitioner objects to, but the facts stated in the 

R&R are consistent with the evidence presented at trial. (Doc. 26–1, Ex. A; Doc. 26-8 at 

38–44; Doc. 26-9 at 1–2; Doc. 26-10 at 23– 28.) 

 Petitioner also contends that the record does not support the Magistrate Judge’s 

statement that he “shot twice through the metal security door fatally wounding” his 

nephew. (Id. at 6; Doc. 57, at 2.) It is unclear what part of this statement Petitioner finds 

objectionable.2

 The Court finds this statement is consistent with evidence presented at 

trial, including the medical examiner’s testimony that, “I was told there was a . . . screen 

door that the bullet went through before it hit [Adan], which is what caused the bullet to 

 

2

 If he is objecting to the language “shot twice,” the Court notes that elsewhere 

Petitioner cites to his amended habeas petition and trial counsel’s Motion to Suppress that asserted that Petitioner filed two warning shots. (Doc. 69 at 44; ref. Doc. 25 at 8.) 

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become deformed.” (Doc. 26-9 at 68.) It is also consistent with the police reports that 

Petitioner cites, as well as the declaration from his ballistics expert.3

 (Doc. 69 at 6–8; ref. 

Doc. 53, Exs. A, E, Q.) Petitioner’s ballistics expert opines that “the bullet struck the 

steel structure” and “deflected toward the victim.” (Doc. 53 at 7.) 

 Petitioner asserts that the Magistrate Judge’s account of the testimony of the 

forensic pathologist, Dr. Cynthia Porterfield, is incorrect. (Doc. 69 at 8-9.) He argues 

that Dr. Porterfield’s testimony has “no credence or expert opinion value” because she 

testified that she was told there was a screen door that the bullet went through. (Id.) He 

appears to be arguing that the deformity to the bullet was not just from hitting the screen 

door. But it is unclear why this is significant. Dr. Porterfield later testified that she could 

not determine the trajectory of the bullet. (Doc. 57 at 10.) But Petitioner does not 

dispute that Dr. Porterfield testified consistently with the Magistrate Judge’s account of 

her testimony. (Doc. 69 at 8–12.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge’s summary of Dr. 

Porterfield’s testimony is supported by the record, and Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate error. (See Doc. 26-9 at 68.) 

 Petitioner also disputes the Magistrate Judge’s account of his confession to Deputy 

Loza. (Doc. 69 at 13–15; Doc. 57 at 2.) The record, however, supports the Magistrate 

Judge’s description of Loza’s and Petitioner’s statements. (Doc. 26-11 at 12–17.) 

Petitioner notes that Deputy Loza’s testimony conflicts with the statements of other 

officers concerning the point at which Loza made contact with Petitioner; in doing so he 

also disputes the veracity of Loza’s testimony concerning his statements. (Doc. 69 at 13–

14.) He does not dispute, however, that the Magistrate Judge correctly summarized 

Loza’s testimony. (Id.) 

 Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s description of the testimony of a 

neighbor. (Doc. 69 at 15–17.) While Petitioner elaborates on the Magistrate Judge’s 

summary by reciting testimony regarding the guns that were later found in the car in 

which Adan was transported, he does not explain how he believes the Magistrate Judge’s 

 

3

 Petitioner presented these to this Court for the first time with his Traverse. 

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summary is incorrect. The Court finds it is not incorrect; as the R&R accurately 

summarizes the neighbor’s testimony. (Doc. 26-12 at 38–41.) Further, the Magistrate 

Judge’s statement that two guns were found on the floor of the car and that one of the 

guns belonged to the victim, is consistent with the testimony of Abram, another brother 

of Adan and Adrian, and Detective Montano, which Petitioner quotes. (Doc. 69 at 16–

17.) The Magistrate Judge’s description of these events is not erroneous. 

 These objections are overruled. 

A. Claim One 

 In Claim One, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

interview a witness, Francisco Santamaria; specifically, Petitioner asserts that Santamaria 

would have testified that Adan told Santamaria that “he, Adan, wanted to kill [Petitioner] 

because [Petitioner] . . . had sent Adan’s father to prison.” (Doc. 57 at 7–8.) Petitioner 

argues that this testimony would have supported his self-defense theory by showing that 

Adan wanted to kill him. (Doc. 69 at 20.) The Magistrate Judge found the claim 

procedurally defaulted and recommended dismissal because Petitioner failed to 

demonstrate cause and prejudice pursuant to Martinez, and therefore, the default was not 

excused. (Doc. 57 at 7–8.) 

 Petitioner raises numerous objections on this claim. Petitioner objects to the 

Magistrate Judge’s characterization of Santamaria “questioning” Adan because, 

according to Petitioner, they only had a conversation. (Doc. 69 at 20.) This objection is 

frivolous and is overruled. 

Petitioner also disputes the conclusion that Santamaria’s statement of what Adan 

told him would not be relevant and would be inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. 57 at 8; Doc. 69 

at 18.) Petitioner argues that the statement would have been offered “to show (prove) 

Adan wanted to kill [Petitioner],” and not to prove “that [Petitioner] sent Adan’s father to 

prison,” and that the statement “would have shown Adan had the premeditated intention 

of killing [him].” (Doc. 69 at 18, 20.) He claims that the alleged statement by Adan that 

he, Adan, would not do anything stupid at his grandmother’s party meant that Adan 

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would wait till the party was over. (Doc. 69 at 20-21.) As to relevance, the Magistrate 

Judge found that the issue was whether Adan had a gun, not whether they were in a 

heated argument. (Doc. 57 at 8.) Petitioner disputes this, claiming that at least in part, 

the issue is whether they were fighting. (Doc. 69 at 21.) 

 This Court finds that even if the statement would have been admissible to show 

Adan’s state of mind at the time he made the statement, it would likely not have been 

admissible to establish his state of mind at the time he was killed, which was hours later. 

See Ariz. R. Evid. 803(3) (permitting “[a] statement of the declarant’s then existing state 

of mind”). Although Arizona courts have admitted statements considerably more remote 

in time to show the state of mind of the declarant, see e.g. State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 

481, 566 P.2d 273, 282 (Ariz. 19770, overruled on other grounds, Mincey v. Ariz.,437 

U.S. 385 (1978), those cases have involved statements by the criminal defendants 

themselves. 

 But most importantly, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination 

that the jury would not have assigned significant weight to Adan’s alleged statement. 

(Doc. 57 at 8.) The record shows that Adan’s shooting resulted after an altercation 

between Petitioner and Adan. Petitioner’s theory of premeditation would require a jury 

to believe that Adan’s “plan” to kill Petitioner was to stay up all night drinking with him 

until early in the morning, and then to get into an altercation with witnesses present and 

attempt to kill Petitioner. (See Doc. 26–8, at 31–51.) These actions do not suggest 

premeditation.4

 The relevant question as to premeditation was whether Adan had a gun. 

The claim is without merit because there is no reasonable probability that the statement 

would have resulted in a different outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 

 4

 Petitioner did not know about Adan’s statement, and therefore, the statement 

could not have influenced Petitioner’s actions in killing Adan. See State v. Hernandez, 

823 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Ariz. App. 1991) (“Words offered to prove the effect on the hearer 

are admissible when they are offered to show their effect on one whose conduct is at 

issue.”) 

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 The Magistrate Judge found that the jury concluded Adan did not have a gun 

during the altercation “based on testimony from [Adan’s] brothers and based on 

[Petitioner’s] statements to police.” (Id.) Petitioner objects, citing testimony referring to 

guns found in the car after Adan was shot and to a neighbor’s testimony that Adan had a 

gun. (Doc. 69 at 22–25.) But it is beyond dispute that evidence was presented from which 

the jury could conclude that Adan did not have a gun; specifically, Adan’s brothers 

testified that Adan did not have a gun when he was killed. (Doc. 26-8 at 43; Doc. 26-9 at 

1; Doc. 26-10 at 25.) The jury was not required to conclude, based on Detective 

Montano’s testimony, that Adan’s brothers were lying about whose gun was loaded.5

 

(See Doc. 69 at 24-25.) Likewise, the jury was not required to accept the testimony of a 

neighbor who Petitioner claims said that Adan had a gun in the carport.6

 (Doc. 26-12, at 

36, 39–40.) Petitioner cites no testimony that Adan was seen threatening Petitioner with 

a gun; testimony that guns were found in the car after Adan was shot would not establish 

that Adan had a gun and was threatening Petitioner. Moreover, Petitioner fails to connect 

this line of argument to the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview 

Santamaria; there is no evidence that Santamaria claimed to have seen Adan with a gun 

or threatening Petitioner with a gun the night or morning of the shooting. In other words, 

this objection is both without merit regarding the jury’s conclusion about Adan’s 

possession of a gun and it does not support the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in 

Claim One. 

 

5

 Monsanto testified that it was the gun in the front passenger seat (Adan’s gun) that had a live round of ammunition, contrary to Abram’s testimony that he put a round of ammunition in his, Abram’s, gun. 

6

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had guns. (Doc. 26-12 at 36-44.) But one of those people was likely Petitioner; the neighbor said the man went into the alley after the car drove off with the victim and 

within minutes the police arrived. (Id. at 38.) After the shooting, the police encountered Petitioner as he left the alley. And Abram testified that after he heard a shot, he went to 

his car, retrieved his gun, and put a round of ammunition in it. (Doc 26-10 at 28-31.) 

Thus, Abram could have been the second person with a gun. Even Petitioner’s statement 

to Deputy Loza was equivocal, Petitioner stated something to the effect that “I think he 

had a gun” or as Petitioner claims he said: “he had a gun too, man. I’m pretty sure.” (Doc. 69 at 25; ref. Doc. 26-11 at 18.) 

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 Petitioner further argues that the jury “was not completely convinced that Adan 

was not armed” because it found him guilty of second-degree murder rather than firstdegree. (Doc. 69, at 25.) Whether or not Adan had a gun is not relevant because the jury 

found that Petitioner did not act in self-defense when he killed Adan. As noted, 

Petitioner points to no evidence showing that even if Adan had a gun, Adan threatened 

Petitioner with it. 

 Petitioner fails to demonstrate error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions or any 

ineffective assistance of counsel as to the claim raised in Claim One. The objections are 

overruled. 

B. Claim Two 

 Petitioner asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “test critical 

evidence,” –specifically, to submit a gun found in the car for DNA testing—and for 

failing to impeach the testimony of the victim’s brothers. (Doc. 25, at 12.) Petitioner does 

not contest the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that this claim is procedurally defaulted. 

(Doc. 57 at 9; Doc. 69, at 28–41.) Rather, he challenges the Magistrate Judge’s finding 

that the claim is insubstantial and that the default may not be excused pursuant to 

Martinez. (Doc. 69 at 41.) 

 The Magistrate Judge stated that Petitioner “argues DNA tests would prove the 

gun was Adan’s.” (Doc. 57 at 9.) Petitioner submits that he actually argued that such 

tests would “prove Adan had the gun.” (Doc. 69 at 28, 34–35.) But the Magistrate Judge 

also stated that “[Petitioner] argues that blood on the gun would prove that the gun was in 

Adan’s hand when he was shot, but that is not true.” (Doc. 57 at 10.) The Court finds 

that it is clear that the Magistrate Judge understood the thrust of Petitioner’s argument to 

be that the testing would show Adan was threatening Petitioner with a gun before 

Petitioner shot him. 

 Petitioner argued that “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have the black 

gun subjected to scientific testing”; the Magistrate Judge stated that this claim “is not 

entirely clear.” (Doc. 57 at 9.) The Magistrate Judge noted that testimony was presented 

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at trial that “no usable prints were found” on the gun and that “there is no evidence that 

any blood was found on the gun” such that DNA testing would be appropriate. (Id.) 

Petitioner objects. (Doc. 69 at 28; Doc. 57 at 9.) He contends that the testimony that “no 

usable prints” were found on the gun indicates that prints were found but that the prints 

were not adequate for comparison. (Doc. 69 at 28–29.) This Court finds that the R & 

R’s conclusion is not inconsistent with this; the objection is overruled. 

 Petitioner argued in his traverse that “counsel should have called a fingerprint 

expert to confirm that there were no usable fingerprints” (Doc. 69 at 29; ref. Doc. 53–1, 

at 33) and that counsel was ineffective in failing to “hire, to call, our own specialist to 

secure and scrutinize the laboratory materials.” (Doc. 69 at 29.) But these claims were 

not raised in the amended petition; the claim regarding testing was limited to blood and 

DNA testing. (Doc. 25 at 12.) “A Traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional 

grounds for relief.” Cacoperdo v. Demonsthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 Petitioner also challenges as erroneous the Magistrate Judge’s statement that there 

was no evidence that any blood was found on the gun; he cites to Exhibit K to his 

Traverse, a “Scientific Examination Report” referencing the guns, as establishing that 

blood was, in fact, found on the gun. (Doc. 69 at 29–30; Doc. 57 at 9.) Petitioner argues 

that the test request was for serology, which means blood, so the swabbings were of 

blood. (Doc. 69 at 30.) 

 Assuming that Petitioner is correct, the Magistrate Judge also found that even if 

Adan’s blood been found on the gun, it would not prove that the gun was in Adan’s hand 

when he was shot because Adan was “transported away from the scene in the car in 

which the gun was found.” (Doc. 57 at 10; Doc. 69 at 35.) Petitioner objects to the 

Magistrate Judge’s statement that Adan’s blood could have been deposited on the gun in 

the car, after the shooting was over. (Doc. 69 at 36.) He cites testimony showing that 

Adan was placed in the back seat of the car but that the gun was later found “in the frontpassenger’s seat where there is no blood visible that could have tainted the gun.” (Id. at 

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36.) He argues that photographs of the front seat “shows there is no blood near nor where 

the gun is.” (Id. at 37.) 

 In fact, testimony showed that the gun was on the floorboard under the car’s front 

passenger seat. (Doc 26-10 at 42.) Respondents argue that it is possible that the gun was 

on the floorboard of the back seat when Adan was placed there. The Court finds that 

Petitioner has not established that any blood on the gun, including Adan’s, was deposited 

at the time of the shooting. There is no dispute that the gun in question was Adan’s gun; 

therefore, if his blood was on the gun, it could have been deposited there sometime 

before the shooting. Moreover, the presence of Adan’s blood on the gun would not show 

that Adan used the gun to threaten Petitioner.7

 Thus, there is no reasonable probability 

that testing the gun for Adan’s blood would have changed the outcome of the trial, and 

Petitioner has not established that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 

 The amended petition also asserts that counsel was ineffective in failing to 

impeach and remove witnesses Adrian and Abram with the 911 calls from Adrian on the 

morning of the shooting and with other claimed inconsistencies in their testimonies.8

(Doc. 25 at 13-15.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that “trial counsel spent considerable 

time impeaching” Adan’s brothers. (Doc. 57 at 10; Doc. 69 at 39.) Petitioner cites to 

arguments he made for the first time in his Traverse that counsel “provided an avenue for 

the perjurors [sic] to make excuses and change what they had initially told officers.” 

(Doc. 69 at 39.) Petitioner fails to establish deficient performance as to the cross-

 

7

 For this reason, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s interpretation of a note made by defense counsel. (See Doc. 69 at 31; ref. Doc. 

57 at 9 and Doc. 53-2 at 66.) 

8

 Petitioner argues in his objections that counsel should have moved to strike the 

testimony of Adan’s brothers “when they admitted to perjuring to [sic] law-enforcement agent” and should have impeached Adrian by calling the 911-operator to testify.” (Doc. 69 at 38.) But neither of these claims appears in Petitioner’s amended petition, and therefore, the Court need not consider them. Even if they were raised, Petitioner fails to establish a reasonable probability that the 911 operator’s testimony would have resulted in a different outcome or that failing to make a motion to strike the witnesses’ testimony was ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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examination of the witnesses by trial counsel or otherwise establish ineffective assistance 

of counsel. 

 As for Petitioner’s complaint that counsel failed to call Detective Montano to 

impeach Abram, Abram admitted that he lied to police when he told them Adan did not 

own a gun, so there was no need to call the Detective. (Doc. 69 at 40; Doc. 26-10 at 54–

55.) Petitioner fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 In sum, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

test the gun or in his impeachment of the witnesses. The objections regarding the 

findings on this claim are overruled. 

C. Claim Three 

 In this claim, Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a 

ballistics expert who would have shown that Petitioner was not aiming at Adan when he 

pulled the trigger; rather, “he was aiming off to the side to warn Adan off.” (Doc. 57 at 

11.) Petitioner’s counsel argued at trial that Petitioner shot the victim intentionally in 

self-defense; Petitioner asserted in his amended petition that trial counsel should have 

pursued the theory that Petitioner was not aiming at Adan when he pulled the trigger, but 

instead he was aiming to the side to warn him off. (Doc. 57 at 11-12.) Petitioner asserts 

that counsel should have engaged an expert to testify from the appearance of the bullet 

and the condition of the security door that he was not aiming at Adan and therefore 

Adan’s death was “an accident not murder.” (Doc. 25, p. 19) The Magistrate Judge found 

the claim procedurally defaulted and that Martinez did not apply. (Doc. 57 at 11.) 

Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that trial counsel’s decision not to pursue this 

“accidental shooting” theory was not deficient performance and that Petitioner did not 

prove he was prejudiced because, inter alia, the “accidental killing” theory is not a 

defense to the charge of second degree murder in Arizona. (Doc. 57 at 12.) 

 The objections raised to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions on this claim are 

particularly difficult to follow as they contradict other claims and rely largely on 

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frivolous “discrepancies” between the Magistrate Judge’s statements and Plaintiff’s 

claims and arguments. The objections will be overruled. 

 Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s description of his claim but he fails to 

demonstrate it is inaccurate; as Respondents note, Petitioner merely provides more detail 

of his claim. (Doc. 69 at 42.) Petitioner asserts that “no where in any filing do[es] [he] 

state [he] was aiming to the side.” But the Magistrate Judge’s description is consistent 

with Petitioner’s claim that he was not aiming at Adan when he shot him. (Doc. 69 at 

45.) He points to his amended petition where he argued that a ballistics expert would 

have showed he was not aiming at Adan. Any discrepancy between “not aiming at 

Adan” and “aiming to the side” is immaterial.9

 

 As to the finding of procedural default, Petitioner argues it is clearly erroneous 

because under Dickens v. Ryan, a court can entertain a new claim based on new 

evidence.10 (Doc. 69 at 43.) Petitioner misunderstands Dickens. In Dickens v. Ryan, the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court is nonetheless unexhausted, and may be 

procedurally defaulted, if it is fundamentally altered by new facts alleged in a federal 

habeas petition. 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). In such a case, Dickens

requires a Court to apply Martinez. Id. at 1319-20. Dickens does not guarantee an 

evidentiary hearing on the new claim. In the present case, Martinez does not save the 

claim because, as discussed below, the ballistics expert’s testimony would not be likely to 

have produced a different result. 

 9

 Petitioner also claims that counsel knew that shooting in self-defense was false 

because counsel knew Petitioner had fired two warning shots through the door. (Doc. 69 

at 44; ref. Doc. 57.) He objects to the Magistrate Judge’s characterization of the warningshot argument as a “theory” because counsel knew it to be “the truth, not a theory.” 

(Doc. 69 at 44.) Petitioner’s objection is overruled. 

10 He also claims this argument applies to “p.7, line 5-9; p.9, line 6-10; p. 11, line 13-17 and; p. 17, line 19-20.” (Doc. 69 at 43.) The Court will not consider objections set forth in this manner and overrules them. 

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 The Magistrate Judge states that Petitioner “maintains counsel should have 

engaged an expert to testify from the appearance of the bullet and the condition of the 

security door that he was not aiming at Adan and therefore Adan’s death was ‘an accident 

not murder.’” (Doc. 57 at 11–12; Doc. 69 at 45.) Petitioner objects to the “accident” 

characterization, arguing that he never claimed an “accidental killing.” (Doc. 69 at 51.) 

But an accidental killing is exactly what Petitioner is arguing. Petitioner cites to his 

habeas petition; the citation supports the Magistrate Judge’s statement of the claim, 

explaining in detail how an expert would have aided his defense by showing he was not 

aiming at Adan. (Doc. 69 at 45.) According to Petitioner, the shots ricocheted off the 

metal security door, accidentally killing Adan. (Doc. 25 at 18-19.) These objections are 

utterly frivolous. 

 Petitioner also challenges the Magistrate Judge’s statement that she “assumes 

without deciding that an expert could be found to testify that [Petitioner] was not aiming 

his gun at Adan.” (Doc. 57 at 11 n.1.) To the extent that Petitioner is objecting because he 

has actually found an expert to so testify, the Magistrate Judge assumed the validity of 

the expert opinions. (Doc. 69 at 46–47; ref. Doc. 52, Exs. A, B.) The Magistrate Judge 

explained that, even if the shooting was accidental as Petitioner claims, Petitioner was 

nevertheless properly convicted of second-degree murder under Arizona law because he 

“manifest[ed] extreme indifference to human life.” (Doc. 57 at 12 (citing A.R.S. § 13– 

1104(A)(3)).) Petitioner argues that he “show[ed] extreme value of human life” by firing 

warning shots to ward off Adan’s alleged attack. (Doc. 69 at 48–49.) Petitioner claims 

that “A.R.S. [§ 13–1104(A)(3)] only applies when there is no provocation by the victim” 

or that Arizona’s justification statutes “provide for a person firing a warning shot justified 

[sic] when not wanting to cause harm.” (Doc. 69, at 48–49.) But he cites no authority in 

support. As the Magistrate Judge pointed out, second-degree murder does not require an 

intent to kill. A person is also guilty of second degree murder “if without premeditation 

[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, the person 

recklessly engages in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby causes the

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death of another person . . . .” A.R.S. § 13-1104. Respondents argue that “given 

Petitioner’s intoxicated state, the jury would likely have found that the firing of warning 

shots through a closed, locked security door into a carport manifested ‘extreme 

indifference to human life’ or was provocation that would have rendered self-defense 

unavailable.” (Doc. 71 at 16, citing A.R.S. § 13–1104(A)(3).) 

 Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on Deputy Loza’s testimony 

regarding statements Petitioner made, calling Loza a “perjuror [sic].” (Doc. 69 at 53; ref. 

Doc. 57 at 13.) But Loza’s testimony was presented at trial; the testimony cited is 

Petitioner’s statement to Loza that “I think he [Adan] had a gun, I’m pretty sure.” (Id.)

 Petitioner disputes the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that counsel reasonably 

chose to present a theory of self-defense rather than accident. (Doc. 69, at 53–54.) But 

Petitioner has not established that he was prejudiced. The Court agrees with the 

Magistrate Judge that this theory was unlikely to succeed. Deputy Loza testified that after 

the shooting, Petitioner said that “someone was trying to punk him . . . so he had to do 

him.” (Doc. 26-11, p. 14) Petitioner further stated, “I was trying to wing him.” (Doc. 26-

11, pp. 17-18) “Trying to wing” the victim is not consistent with Petitioner’s argument 

that he was not aiming at him. As the Magistrate Judge observed, in light of these 

statements, counsel could have concluded it would be difficult to convince the jury of an 

“accidental shooting.” (Doc. 57 at 12.) Moreover, if trial had counsel presented the 

evidence Petitioner contends should have been presented, the jury was still likely to have 

found him guilty of second-degree murder based on Petitioner having fired two shots 

through a locked door, and into a carport, with someone inside and while he was 

intoxicated. 

 Petitioner argues in his objections that his counsel “refused to let [him] testify” in 

support of the self-defense theory. (Doc. 69 at 54.) But he did not raise this claim in his 

amended habeas petition, and he has not provided facts in support—he does not even 

show what his testimony would have been. In addition, the Magistrate Judge correctly 

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found the defense could be presented “without the need for putting the defendant on the 

stand.” (Doc. 57 at 13.) Petitioner fails to demonstrate any prejudice. 

 Petitioner also notes that he hired a forensic pathologist and presented that expert’s 

opinions with his Traverse. (Doc. 69 at 56–57.) Petitioner incorrectly asserts, however, 

that these experts would have demonstrated that he “was not manifesting extreme 

indifference to human life” when he killed Adan—those experts could not have known 

Petitioner’s state of mind or the circumstances surrounding the murder. (Id. at 58.) This 

Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that these experts’ opinions 

“would not have prevented his conviction for second degree murder.” (Doc. 57 at 13.) 

 Petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show that had defense counsel obtained 

the ballistics report, it is reasonably probable that the result would have been different. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 

D. Claim Four 

In this claim, Petitioner asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

present a self-defense theory. (See Doc. 25 at 21–24.) The Magistrate Judge found that 

“[t]his claim is not particularly clear,” noting that counsel did, in fact, argue self-defense, 

and recommended this claim be dismissed as “too ambiguous for relief.” (Doc. 57 at 13.) 

 In his objections, Petitioner argues that his claim is actually that “trial counsel 

presented a false-version of what happened.” (Doc. 69 at 59.) The amended petition, 

however, designates this claim as “Ineffective Assistance—Failure to present self 

defense,” and this is the claim argued in the amended petition. (Doc. 25 at 21-24.) 

Moreover, even if the Court assumes that Petitioner is referring to the warning-shots 

argument, the Court has disposed of that, finding no merit and therefore, no ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

 The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the claim is ambiguous is not erroneous. 

The objection is overruled. 

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E. Claim Five 

In Claim Five, Petitioner asserted that in violation of Brady, the State failed to 

disclose evidence impeaching Deputy Loza. (Doc. 25, at 26–30.) The Magistrate Judge 

found that this claim was properly exhausted in the state courts. But Petitioner now 

asserts that his claim is actually an “IAC—Violation of Brady,” which was not 

exhausted. (Doc. 69 at 61(“This claim is a ‘new’ IAC claim of PCR counsel for failure to 

raise IAC of trial counsel relative to Brady.”).) 

 The Court finds that the amended petition does not raise a claim that counsel was 

ineffective “relative to Brady;” rather it raised a substantive Brady claim. (Doc. 25 at 

26–30.) The Court will not permit Petitioner to re-characterize this claim to one of 

ineffective assistance by asserting it in his Traverse. Moreover, he does not identify any 

deficient performance by trial counsel; instead he claims that “[f]irst PCR counsel was 

ineffective in not raising this in the first PCR.” (Id. at 66.) But PCR counsel did raise the 

Brady claim. (Doc. 57 at 13–14; see Doc 26-3 at 16–17; Doc. 26-5 at 13–15.) To the 

extent that Petitioner asserts a substantive claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, 

that claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). The Magistrate Judge did not err in finding 

the Brady claim exhausted. 

 As to the Brady claim, Petitioner asserts that Deputy Loza lied at a court hearing 

on February 25, 2009, a few months before Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner maintains that if 

the state had disclosed this information as required by Brady, his counsel would have 

used it impeach Loza, and he would have won his motion to suppress his statements. He 

argues that the state’s failure to disclose this information violated Brady v. Maryland, 

which provides that a defendant has a due process right to material exculpatory evidence 

in the possession of the prosecution at the time of trial. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 

 The record here shows that the January 2010 internal affairs report finding that 

Loza gave false information at a traffic hearing “did not exist at the time of the trial 

which occurred in May of 2009.” (Doc. 57 at 14.) Therefore, it could not have been 

disclosed at trial. Petitioner argues that the prosecutor should have disclosed the 

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underlying incident in which Loza “admitted to internal affairs that he was removed from 

the stand at least twice.” (Doc. 69 at 63.) But the admissions are in the January 2010 

internal affairs report, and there is no evidence suggesting that the prosecutor could be 

imputed with knowledge at the time of Petitioner’s trial. (Doc. 57 at 15.) The Magistrate 

Judge properly ruled that the state court’s denial of relief on this claim was not contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of federal law. (Doc. 57 at 15.) 

 The Magistrate Judge also ruled that Petitioner may not present additional 

evidence supporting this claim. (Doc. 57 at 15 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 

181 (2011); Doc. 69 at 68–71.) Petitioner objects and argues that this claim is actually 

one of ineffective assistance, not the Brady claim that was exhausted. He claims that 

Pinholster does not bar a hearing. (Doc. 69, at 68–71.) But this Court has already 

determined that the claim raised in the amended petition was not ineffective assistance of 

counsel; the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was first raised in the traverse, and 

the Court will not consider it. 

 The Magistrate Judge also ruled that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s 

failure to present other officers to impeach Loza’s testimony; Petitioner objects. (Doc. 69 

at 71; ref. Doc. 57 at 15.) The Magistrate Judge acknowledged inconsistencies between 

Loza’s testimony and the accounts of the other officers but concluded that the 

discrepancies in the testimony were minor and could not have affected the outcome of the 

trial. (Doc. 57, at 15.) Even if the allegation in the amended petition—that trial counsel 

aggravated the situation by not calling the officers—was sufficient to raise a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard, Petitioner fails to establish that there is a 

reasonable probability that the additional testimony would have resulted in a different 

outcome at trial. 

 The Court overrules the objections. 

F. Claim Six 

 Petitioner asserts that the jury committed misconduct by receiving a copy of 

Deputy Loza’s report during its deliberations, and trial and appellate counsel were 

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ineffective in failing to properly address the issue. (Doc. 25, at 31.) The Magistrate Judge 

found that Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel were 

properly exhausted and are not defaulted. (Doc. 57 at 16; see Doc. 69 at 74–75.) 

 Nevertheless, Petitioner argues in his objections that default of these should be 

excused pursuant to Dickens “for neither trial nor PCR counsel properly raised this 

claim.”8 (Doc. 69, at 75.) But default is not the issue. The Magistrate Judge held that the 

state courts’ ruling that trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective “was not contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of federal law.” (Doc. 57 at 17 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).) The Court agrees and overrules the objections. 

G. Claim Seven 

 In Claim Seven, Petitioner alleged that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 

“knowingly disregarding facts and concealing fact witnesses.” (Doc. 25, at 35.) The 

Magistrate Judge found that this claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not 

raised in the state courts (Doc. 57 at 17) and that that the default of this claim could not 

be excused under Martinez because Martinez can excuse only the default of an 

ineffective-assistance claim, not a claim for prosecutorial misconduct. See Hunton v. 

Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2013). 

 Petitioner now argues in his objections that this claim is actually one of ineffective 

assistance by trial and appellate counsel for “fail[ing] to raise this issue,” and thus, it can 

be excused under Martinez. (Doc. 69, at 77.) 

 But Petitioner did not raise such a claim in his habeas petition, and a conclusory 

statement that “appellate and PCR counsel were aware of this fact and failed to raise the 

issue,” is insufficient to allege a claim of ineffective assistance. (See Doc. 25 at 41.) The 

Court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding 

Claim Seven procedurally defaulted. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 57) issued on March 23, 2016 is 

adopted. 

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 (2) The Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 25) is denied, and the 

case is dismissed. 

 (3) A certificate of appealability is denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), (c)(2). 

 Dated this 18th day of November, 2016. 

Honorable Cindy K. Jorgenson

United States District Judge 

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