Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06075/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT SEP 4 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

CLYDE EARL HOLLOWAY, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

STEVEN KAISER, Warden; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, State of Oklahoma, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

No. 90-6075 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-1112-A) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

Petitioner Clyde Earl Holloway, Jr.'s application for a 

certificate of probable cause is granted. After examining the 

briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner appeals the district court's dismissal of his 

application for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted, 

by a jury in an Oklahoma state court, of first degree murder. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6075 Document: 010110041904 Date Filed: 09/04/1990 Page: 1 
Petitioner's many contentions distill down to essentially three 

grounds for vacating his conviction: 1) that his trial counsel 

was ineffective in that he failed to preserve error and to 

competently investigate and present petitioner's self-defense 

theory; 2) that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support 

a conviction for first degree murder; and 3) that the trial court 

failed to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence and selfdefense (and presumably that trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to object and preserve these errors). Only the adequacy 

of the trial court's instructions on circumstantial evidence and 

self-defense were challenged by petitioner in his direct appeal. 

The state courts, in considering post-conviction challenges, and 

the federal district court below held that petitioner's other 

arguments were procedurally barred. 

The district court considered and rejected petitioner's 

arguments that the jury instructions given at his trial were 

inadequate. Because trial counsel failed to object 

contemporaneously to the instructions, the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals noted that, technically, all objections were 

waived. The Oklahoma court, however, also considered and rejected 

on the merits petitioner's assertion of error in the instructions. 

The district court, therefore, also considered the merits of the 

challenge and rejected petitioner's contention that an instruction 

on circumstantial evidence was required. We find no error in that 

holding; Oklahoma law does not require an instruction on 

circumstantial evidence in the circumstances of this case. 

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The district court held that petitioner's collateral attack 

on the sufficiency of the evidence at his trial was procedurally 

barred. We agree. By failing to raise the argument on direct 

appeal, and in the absence of a showing of "cause" and 

"prejudice," Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977), 

petitioner is barred from raising the contention for the first 

time in federal court in a writ of habeas corpus petition. 

The district court also held that petitioner's failure to 

raise his ineffective assistance of counsel argument on direct 

appeal prevents him from raising the argument in a collateral 

attack on his conviction. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 84-85. 

Ordinarily a petitioner attempting to raise a new argument in a 

collateral attack must show "cause" for having failed to raise it 

on direct appeal, and "prejudice" sufficient to cast the result of 

his trial into doubt. Id. 

Nevertheless, in the past we have held that a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised for the first time 

in a collateral action, without a showing of cause and prejudice, 

if the same attorney represented the defendant at trial and on 

direct appeal. Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 623 (10th Cir. 

1988). Petitioner argues that his claim falls under this 

exception to the cause and prejudice requirement because, although 

his trial and appellate counsel were different individuals, they 

were public defenders working out of the same public defenders 

office. Petitioner contends that such a relationship made it 

impossible for his appellate counsel to vigorously argue the 

ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. For purposes of this appeal 

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we assume that public defenders working out of the same, 

apparently small, office must be considered a single attorney for 

the purpose of applying a procedural bar to an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. Cf. Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979, 

984-85 (7th Cir. 1980) (conflict exists when law partners 

represent criminal defendants with possibly adverse interests); 

United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1042 (1st Cir. 1977) 

(same); United States v. Cheshire, 707 F. Supp. 235, 240-42 (M.D. 

La. 1989) (same). But we deny relief on other grounds. 

After petitioner lost in his direct appeal, he filed the 

first of three applications for post-conviction relief in the 

Oklahoma state district court. In his initial application 

petitioner was represented by retained counsel. Although 

petitioner did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel as an 

issue, he did complain that a self defense argument was not made 

at trial. See R. tab 19, ex. D. Petitioner's application for 

relief was denied. In his third state post-conviction 

application, petitioner's own brief acknowledged that his retained 

counsel failed to perfect an appeal of that first post-conviction 

order. R. PC-89-173 at 2. 

Petitioner did not specifically allege ineffective assistance 

of counsel until he filed his second or third post-conviction 

application. In deciding both his second and third applications, 

the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that petitioner was 

barred from raising in those applications any issue not raised 

earlier. It therefore declined to consider petitioner's 

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Appellate Case: 90-6075 Document: 010110041904 Date Filed: 09/04/1990 Page: 4 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument. Order Affirming 

Denial of Post-Conviction Relief, R. PC-88-1030; R. PC-89-173. 

Petitioner, through his retained counsel, had the opportunity 

in his first state post-conviction proceeding to raise his claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the second and third 

post-conviction proceedings, the Oklahoma courts treated the 

inadequacy of counsel issue as one that had not been raised 

before. This constitutes a fact finding to which we must give 

deference under Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981). So 

treated, petitioner's failure to raise the issue through his 

retained counsel barred him from thereafter raising the issue in 

either state court or federal court. Thus, the Wainwright 

procedural bar applies and we may not consider the issue. 

Even if we treat petitioner's complaint about his trial 

counsel's failure to make a self defense argument as having raised 

the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel in his initial postconviction proceeding, petitioner's failure to appeal the denial 

of his application makes his subsequent petitions subject to 

dismissal as successive, see United States v. Talk, 597 F.2d 249 

(10th Cir. 1979), unless the failure to appeal is excused. We 

apply a deliberate bypass standard to a failure to appeal. See 

Osborn, 861 F.2d at 623-24. Given that petitioner had retained 

counsel different from the public defender who handled his trial, 

and that he gives no explanation for the failure to appeal the 

dismissal of his first post-conviction petition, we may not find 

the state court's refusal to consider the issue on procedural 

grounds to be in error. Under these circumstances we must honor 

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Appellate Case: 90-6075 Document: 010110041904 Date Filed: 09/04/1990 Page: 5 
the state court's determination. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 

(1989). 

AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

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