Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00775/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00775-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David B. Jones,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Wal-Mart Stores

East, L.P.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-775-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.’s (“Defendant”)

Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 6), Plaintiff David B. Jones’s (“Plaintiff”) Response (Dkt. 7), and

Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. 8). Defendant alleges that Plaintiff failed to timely file his claims in

this matter and seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a truck driver from March 2001 to May 2005

(Compl. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff, an African-American, alleges that he was falsely charged with

harassing female co-workers and was treated worse than other employees. (Compl. at ¶¶ 10,

13.) Plaintiff further alleges that this disparate treatment, and the termination of his

employment, are due to his race. (Compl. at ¶¶ 10-12.)

In May 2005, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On November 22, 2006, the EEOC mailed Plaintiff a

right-to-sue letter, along with a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue form (collectively,

Case 2:07-cv-00775-SMM Document 14 Filed 09/27/07 Page 1 of 5
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“Notice”), informing Plaintiff that the EEOC dismissed his claim. (Compl. at ¶ 16; Pl.’s Ex. B.)

The Notice informed Plaintiff of his rights under federal law to pursue the matter in federal

court, and that he had only ninety (90) days “from the date that delivery of the Notice was

attempted at your last known address of record or 90 days of receipt of the Notice, whichever

is earlier ....” (Pl.’s Ex. B.)

The EEOC sent the Notice to the address Plaintiff provided on the claim form he filed.

However, Plaintiff changed addresses between the filing of the claim and the mailing of the

Notice. Plaintiff alleges that he had informed the EEOC investigator assigned to his case of his

change of address both verbally and in writing. (Compl. ¶ 17, Pl.’s Ex. C.) As a result, Plaintiff

alleges, he did not learn of the existence of the Notice until February 22, 2007. (Compl. at ¶

18.) 

Plaintiff filed this claim on April 13, 2007, 142 days after the Notice was mailed, and 50

days after Plaintiff allegedly learned of the existence of the Notice. Defendant seeks to dismiss

the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to file within 90 days.

Plaintiff argues that February 22, 2007 marks the beginning point of the 90-day time period,

and, in the alternative, that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency

of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) is proper only when a complaint exhibits a "lack of a cognizable legal theory or the

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Although its review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, the Court may

consider documents referenced extensively in the complaint or attached as exhibits. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 10(c); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9th Cir.2003). Consideration of

documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in a ruling on a

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment.

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Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith

v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint as well as all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such allegations. LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d

1146, 1150 n.2 (9th Cir.2000). The Court must also construe the allegations of the complaint

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435

(9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, the Court may only grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

if it is certain that Plaintiff will not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be

proven under the allegations of the complaint. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338

(9th Cir.1996).

DISCUSSION

Before a claimant can file a Title VII civil action, a timely charge of discrimination must

first be filed with the EEOC. Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 383 (9th Cir.

1996). If the EEOC dismisses the charge, a claimant has ninety days to file a civil action. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“[W]ithin ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may

be brought against the respondent named in the charge [] by the person claiming to be

aggrieved.”)(emphasis supplied). The ninety day period is not jurisdictional, but rather acts as

a statute of limitations. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982). As such,

it is subject to waiver as well as equitable tolling. Id.

When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of limitations, it must

appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the

timeliness of the claim. Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.

1995). The motion can be granted “only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the

required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.”

Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). Because the equitable

tolling doctrine often depends on matters outside the pleadings, it is not generally amenable to

resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. at 1276. 

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Principles of equitable tolling do not apply to “garden variety claim[s] of excusable

neglect.” Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). The person

claiming to be aggrieved has the responsibility to provide the EEOC with notice of any change

in address. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(b). This responsibility is placed on the claimant because “[i]t

is unreasonable to expect the EEOC to pore over its files ... in an effort to ascertain which of the

addresses contained therein is correct.” St. Louis v. Alverno College, 744 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th

Cir. 1984). If a claimant fails to notify the EEOC of an address change, the limitations period

begins running once delivery to the address of record is attempted. Nemilda, 112 F.3d at 384.

According to Plaintiff’s verified amended complaint, Plaintiff informed the EEOC

investigator of his change of address both verbally and in writing. (Compl. ¶ 19.) The alleged

written notification does not call attention to the change of address, and merely includes

Plaintiff’s updated address below the signature line. (See Pl.’s Ex. C.) Such notification

apparently expects that the EEOC will “pore over its files,” automatically cross-referencing the

address listed on the claim form every time a claimant sends a letter. However, 29 C.F.R. §

1601.7(b) does not specify how a claimant should notify the EEOC of a change of address, and

Plaintiff alleges that he provided verbal notice in addition to the written “notice.” (Compl. at

¶ 19.)

The Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint. Stroh, 205 F.3d

at 1150 n.2. The assertions in Plaintiff’s complaint, if accepted as true, suggest that the EEOC

prevented Plaintiff from timely filing his complaint and that Plaintiff diligently pursued his

claim. Under those circumstances, the doctrine of equitable tolling might be appropriate; the

assertions of the complaint would permit Plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.

Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1275. As such, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach Plaintiff’s

alternative argument that the 90 day limitations period began to run from the date Plaintiff

actually received the Notice.

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The Court wishes to make it clear that it does not find that equitable tolling applies in this

case. Rather, the Court only finds that the issue in this case is not a proper subject for a 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 6).

DATED this 27th day of September, 2007.

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