Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00218/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00218-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE THORNS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07-CV-0218 H (AJB)

ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION

TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

EXHAUST AND (2) GRANTING

WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO

AMEND MOTION TO DISMISS

BY DEFENDANTS RYAN AND

ALVAREZ

vs.

S. RYAN, Warden, et al.,

Defendants.

On February 1, 2007, Bruce Thorns (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the warden and numerous correctional officers at

Calipatria State Prison, the institution where Plaintiff was confined at the time of the events

giving rise to Plaintiff’s complaint in this case. (Doc. No. 1.) Currently before the Court are

two separate motions to dismiss.

On July 3, 2007, all defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on the

ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 32.) Plaintiff filed

a response in opposition, Doc. No. 45, and Defendants filed a reply on September 24, 2007.

(Doc. No. 52.) 

The second motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September 21, 2007

by defendants Ryan and Alvarez. (Doc. No. 51.) In addition to joining the previous motion

to dismiss for failure to exhaust, Ryan and Alvarez seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint

Case 3:07-cv-00218-H-AJB Document 58 Filed 02/26/08 Page 1 of 7
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1 The Court had some difficulty discerning the page numbers on Plaintiff’s complaint.

In this Order, citations to the complaint are to the page numbers as the document appears in the

Court’s electronic filing system.

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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff filed a response

in opposition on November 9, 2007. (Doc. No. 55.) Defendants Ryan and Alvarez have not

filed a reply. On January 16, 2008, Plaintiff notified the Court of his “willingness for the

motions to be heard without oral argument.” (Doc. No. 57.) The Court exercises its discretion

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1) to decide this matter on the papers. For the following

reasons, the Court (1) denies the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust and (2) grants the

motion to dismiss by defendants Ryan and Alvarez. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend

the complaint with respect to defendant Ryan.

Background

The complaint alleges that prison officials used excessive force on Plaintiff during

an October 13, 2004 altercation between prisoners and correctional officers at Calipatria

State Prison. (Compl. at 22-24.)1

 Plaintiff’s complaint further alleges that prison officials

conspired to cover up the alleged use of excessive force. (See id. at 25-26.)

Following the incident on October 13, 2004, defendant Rivas submitted a rule

violation report stating that Rivas observed Plaintiff attacking Officer Neal during the

October 13, 2004 incident between inmates and correctional officers. (Id.; see Mem. Pts. &

Auths. ISO Plf’s. Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Plf’s. Oppo.”), Doc. No. 55-2, at 15.) 

Plaintiff disputed Rivas’s account. On December 25, 2004, Plaintiff appeared before a

Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”) for adjudication of the rules violation report. (Id.) Prior

to the hearing Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to question Officer Neal, who indicated

that Plaintiff did not attack him. (See id. at 17.) At the hearing, the SHO found Plaintiff

guilty of battery on a peace officer and imposed a term of confinement in administrative

segregation. (Id. at 18.)

Plaintiff appealed the SHO’s decision and his punishment. (Id. at 21.) On April 5,

2005, the Chief Deputy Warden granted Plaintiff’s appeal at the second level, on the

ground that due process was not afforded to Plaintiff. (See Plf’s. Opp. at 21-29.) 

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With respect to his allegations of excessive force and a cover-up, Plaintiff asserts

that he filed two “Form 602” grievances which the appeals office never processed. (See

Doc. No. 45-3, Decl. of Bruce Thorns ISO Plf’s. Oppo. to Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Plf’s.

Decl.”) ¶¶ 3, 4.) On January 17, 2005, Plaintiff sent a letter with another Form 602 to the

Warden asking him to answer the appeal because the appeals office had failed to do so. 

(Id. ¶ 4; see id., Ex. A.) On November 10, 2005, Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at the

second level of review. (Plf’s. Decl. ¶ 5.) Shortly thereafter, on November 22, 2005,

Plaintiff was transferred to a new facility. Plaintiff asserts that despite several attempts to

obtain a copy, several months elapsed before he received the denial of his second level

appeal. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 17; see id., Exs. B, C.) Plaintiff submitted a copy of a statement filed

by defendant Rivas, in which Rivas recounts his own unsuccessful attempts to obtain a

copy on Plaintiff’s behalf. (See Plf’s. Decl., Ex. D.) Plaintiff asserts that he received the

second level response on June 29, 2006. (Plf’s. Decl. ¶¶ 10-11; see id., Exs. F, G.)

On July 2, 2006, Plaintiff submitted the appeal to the third level of review with a

letter explaining why it was late. (Id. ¶ 11, Ex. G.) The appeal was screened out as

untimely and returned to Plaintiff on August 27, 2006. Plaintiff resubmitted the appeal

and, on October 30, 2006, it again was returned to him as untimely. (Id. ¶ 12; see also

Doc. No. 32-2, Decl. of N. Grannis ISO Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss Compl. ¶ 8.)

Discussion

I. Motion to Dismiss - Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal of a claim

either where that claim lacks a cognizable legal theory, or where insufficient facts are

alleged to support plaintiff's theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696,

699 (9th Cir. 1990). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.

1996). However, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion a complaint must contain factual

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). A plaintiff’s obligation under Rule

8(a)(2) “to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions . . . .” Id. In a civil rights action under § 1983 where the plaintiff is

proceeding pro se, courts liberally construe the complaint. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, this does not discharge the

plaintiff’s obligation to allege specific, overt acts that support the claims asserted in the

complaint. See Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C § 1997e(a) 

to provide that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983,

or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a). Under the PLRA, exhaustion is no longer within the discretion of the district

courts but is mandatory. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct,. 2378, 2382 (2006). “Prisoners must

now exhaust all available remedies, not just those that meet federal standards.” Id. “Proper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural

rules.” Id. at 2386. However, once no remedy remains “available,” a prisoner need not

further pursue the grievance. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005); see id. at

936 (declining to insist that prisoners “continue to make appeals to administrators who will

not read or consider them”); see also Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006)

(“remedy becomes unavailable if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed

grievance”).

A plaintiff who fails to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit

is subject to dismissal on an “unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, rather than a summary

judgment motion.” See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003.) The Ninth

Circuit, however, has stressed that § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense and, therefore, that

defendants asserting it “have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” 

Id.; see Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d at 936 (“it is of central importance that § 1997e(a) is an

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2 Defendants argue, alternatively, that even if prison officials improperly screened out

Plaintiff’s grievance before it reached Director-level review, Plaintiff prior to filing this suit was

obligated to seek a writ of mandate in California Superior Court compelling prison officials to

complete the review. The Court rejects this argument. Section 1997e(a) requires exhaustion of

available administrative, not judicial, remedies. See O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056,

1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that the PLRA requires a prisoner to

exhaust the prison’s internal grievance process.” (emphasis in original).)

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affirmative defense”). A complaint should not be dismissed where the plaintiff submits

evidence showing, and the defendants do not disprove, that no remedy was available. 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d at 937. “Relevant evidence in so demonstrating would include 

. . . documentary or testimonial evidence from prison officials who administer the review

process; and information provided to the prisoner concerning the operation of the grievance

procedure . . . , such as [] response memoranda.” Id. 

The administrative review process of the California Department of Corrections

consists of a grievance system for prisoner complaints, in which “any inmate or parolee

under the department’s jurisdiction may appeal any departmental decision, action,

condition, or policy which they can reasonably demonstrate as having an adverse effect

upon their welfare.” See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1(a). Four levels of appeal exist:

(1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal via a Form 602 grievance, (3) second

level appeal to the institution head, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections. At each level, the inmate must submit the appeal

within 15 working days of the event or decision being appealed, or of receiving an

unacceptable lower level appeal decision.” Id. at § 3084.6(c); see Woodford v. Ngo, 126

S.Ct. at 2382-83. Defendants here argue that Plaintiff failed to secure Director-level review

of his complaints.2

 Plaintiff responds with evidence showing that on several times he

submitted appeals to the Director but that he never received any response.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s complaint survives Defendants’ motion to

dismiss based on non-exhaustion. Defendants contend that the date written on the

document establishes that Plaintiff’s second level appeal was returned to him on November

17, 2005. However, Plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates that he was transferred to another

facility only five days later, see Plf’s. Decl. ¶ 5, and Plaintiff asserts that in fact he did not

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receive the second level response until June 29, 2006. (Plf’s. Decl. ¶ 11.) This assertion

finds support in Plaintiff’s evidence documenting several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a

copy of that appeal. (Plf’s. Decl., Exs. B, D, F.) Plaintiff’s evidence further demonstrates

that when he ultimately filed his third level appeal – in July of 2006, soon after Plaintiff

states he received the second level response – he attached a letter explaining that he only

recently received the second level response. (See Plf’s. Decl., Ex. G.) Defendants’

evidence confirms that Plaintiff’s third level appeal was received, but screened out as

untimely, in July of 2006 and again in September of 2006. (Grannis Decl. ¶ 8.)

Faced with the evidence submitted by Plaintiff, the Court concludes that to be

entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint Defendants must establish that Plaintiff

actually received the second level response in November of 2005 (or, at least, earlier than

June of 2006). On the record before it, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff actually

received the response on the earlier date, and therefore cannot conclude that he failed to

timely exhaust all available administrative remedies. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 at 

§ 3084.6 (inmate must submit appeal “within 15 working days of receiving an unacceptable

lower level appeal decision” (emphasis added)). The Court therefore denies Defendants’

motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust. 

B. Failure to State a Claim - Defendants Ryan and Alvarez

Defendants Ryan and Alvarez argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them should be

dismissed because the complaint fails to sufficiently allege their personal involvement in

the injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff. Defendant in his opposition brief agrees that

defendant Alvarez should be dismissed. (See Doc. No. 55-2 at 2.) The Court therefore

grants the motion as to Alvarez. For the following reasons, the Court also grants the

motion (with leave to amend) as to defendant Ryan.

To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) a

violation of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law, that was (2) proximately

caused by defendants acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,

1420 (9th Cir. 1991). However, section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability

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to be imposed on a supervising officer. E.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1563 (9th Cir.

1995). To state a claim against a supervisor, such as a warden, a plaintiff must allege that

the supervisor had personal involvement in the alleged wrongful acts, or that a sufficient

causal connection existed between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation. See id.; Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendant Ryan is the warden of Calipatria

State Prison and therefore “legally responsible for the overall operation of the prison where

Plaintiff was confined.” (Compl. at 4.) The complaint contains general allegations that

defendant Ryan “and his subordinates” conspired to cover up information of retaliation and

discrimination against Plaintiff, and that defendant Ryan illegally retained Plaintiff in

administrative segregation. (Id.; see id. at 28.) Without additional, more specific

allegations regarding the involvement of defendant Ryan, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim against defendant Ryan upon which relief may be

granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Since the Court grants the motion to dismiss by Ryan

and Alvarez, the Court need not address those defendants’ contention that they are entitled

to qualified immunity.

Conclusion

The Court denies the motion by all defendants to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on

grounds of non-exhaustion. (Doc. No. 32.) The Court grants the motion to dismiss filed by

defendants Ryan and Alvarez. (Doc. No. 51.) 

With respect to Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Ryan, the Court grants leave to

amend the complaint. Within 30 days of the date this Order is stamped “filed,” Plaintiff

may file an amended complaint that corrects the deficiencies identified in this Order. The

Court in its discretion grants all remaining defendants leave to file their answer(s) within 30

days after the filing by Plaintiff of an amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 26, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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