Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06433/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06433-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DWAYNE E. MERDIA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RON DAVIS, et al., 

Defendant(s). 

Case No. 18-cv-06433-CRB (PR) 

 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

(ECF No. 2) 

While plaintiff was incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison (SQSP), he filed this pro se 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that SQSP officials improperly refused to review a VIO 

administrative determinant (a classification score additive for a prisoner who has a current or prior 

conviction for a violent felony) at his initial classification hearing on February 15, 2018 on the 

ground that the VIO administrative determinant could not be reviewed until plaintiff’s annual 

classification hearing. At plaintiff’s annual classification hearing on August 10, 2018, the VIO 

administrative determinant was reviewed and removed, lowering plaintiff’s classification score 

and entitling him to earn more good time credits. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief 

and leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is dismissed as moot because he recently was released 

on parole. But based solely on his affidavit of poverty, plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP 

(ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

The court “shall” dismiss any case brought IFP if it “determines” that the allegation of 

poverty is untrue, or that the action is “frivolous or malicious;” “fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted;” or “seeks monetary against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

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United States District Court 

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

The gravamen of plaintiff’s action is that SQSP officials improperly applied title 15, 

section 3375.2(b)(29)(J) of the California Code of Regulations to refuse to review his VIO 

administrative determinant until his annual classification hearing. Section 3375.2(b)(29)(J), now 

3375.2(b)(28)(J), provides in pertinent part that “[a]n inmate who has a VIO administrative 

determinant currently or who is determined to require review for consideration of a VIO 

administrative determinant . . . shall be eligible for consideration of removal of an existing VIO 

during the annual classification review.” But according to plaintiff, SQSP officials instead should 

have applied section 3491 which, pursuant to Proposition 57, requires the Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to conduct a parole eligibility review “within 60 calendar 

days of an inmate’s admission to the department.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3491(c). Plaintiff 

argues that if SQSP officials properly had applied section 3491 and reviewed his VIO at his initial 

classification hearing, they would have removed the VIO earlier than they did and he would have 

earned more good time credits and been eligible for parole consideration earlier than he was. 

It is well-established that there is no constitutional right to time credits or to parole. See 

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). A state nonetheless may create a protected 

liberty interest in time credits and/or parole that may not be forfeited without procedural due 

process protections. For example, time credits earned by a prisoner under California law generally 

may not be forfeited without the procedural protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard, 

see Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1986), and a prisoner found eligible 

for parole consideration under California law may not be denied parole without a hearing and a 

statement of reasons for the parole board’s decision, see Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219-

20 (2011). But plaintiff’s claim that he would have earned more good time credits and been 

eligible for parole consideration earlier than he was had prison officials applied section 3491, 

rather than section 3375.2(b)(29)(J), and removed his VIO earlier than they did, is simply too 

attenuated to implicate the deprivation of a protected liberty interest without procedural due 

process protections. It instead amounts to no more than a claim of misapplication of state law not 

cognizable as a violation of a federal right under § 1983. See West, 487 U.S. at 48. That plaintiff 

asserts violations of federal due process and equal protection does not compel a different 

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conclusion. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997) (in federal habeas case, 

noting that petitioner may not “transform state law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a 

violation of due process”); see also Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, (9th Cir. 

1997) (finding that federal question jurisdiction cannot be sustained where plaintiff alleged state 

law claims which only incidentally referenced federal statute or constitution). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 14, 2019 

______________________________________ 

CHARLES R. BREYER 

United States District Judge 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DWAYNE E. MERDIA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RON DAVIS, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:18-cv-06433-CRB 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California. 

That on February 14, 2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 

Dwayne E. Merdia

2231 N. Hanover Avenue 

Fresno, CA 93727 

Dated: February 14, 2019 

Susan Y. Soong 

Clerk, United States District Court 

By:________________________ 

Lashanda Scott, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable CHARLES R. BREYER 

Case 3:18-cv-06433-CRB Document 8 Filed 02/14/19 Page 4 of 4