Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00176/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00176-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY SMITH,

 Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT COBB, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-0176-GPC (WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF Nos. 24 and 25]

Plaintiff Gregory Smith, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. 

Section 1983 against officials of the California Department of Correction and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) alleging violations of his rights under the First and Eighth 

Amendments. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment 

claim on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust available CDCR administrative 

remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (ECF No. 24.) 

Defendants have also moved to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim on res judicata 

grounds and the First Amendment claim on statute of limitations grounds. (ECF No. 25.)

Plaintiff has filed responses in opposition to both motions, (ECF Nos. 34 and 41) and 

Defendants have filed a reply in further support of their motion for summary judgment, 

(ECF No. 35). The motions are before the undersigned magistrate judge for preparation of 

a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1); CivLR 72.1(c).

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BACKGROUND

I. The CDCR Appeals Process

Inmates in CDCR custody may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition,

or policy which [an inmate] can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon [his or her] 

welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15 § 3084.1. The regulations in effect in 2010 required an 

inmate to proceed through one informal level and three formal levels to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Id. § 3084.5 (2010). At the informal level, the inmate was required 

to submit his appeal1 on a CDCR Form 602 to prison staff directly involved in the action 

or decision. Id. If the issue was not resolved at the informal level, the inmate could appeal 

to the first formal level of review, which was conducted by the appeal coordinator. Id.

§3084.5 (2010). At the second level, the inmate’s unsatisfied appeal was reviewed by the 

“hiring authority or designee.” Id. If the inmate was unsatisfied by the second-level review, 

the inmate could then appeal to the third level by submitting an appeal to the Office of 

Appeals in Sacramento. Id. The third-level review exhausted administrative remedies. Id.

(See Cobb Decl. ¶¶ 2-4; Lozano Decl. ¶ 6, attached as Ex. B to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.)

II. Summary of Facts and Procedural Chronology

Plaintiff is an inmate at Folsom State Prison, in Folsom, California. At all times 

relevant to this action, however, Plaintiff was housed at the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 4.) 

Defendant S. Perez was a correctional sergeant in the mental health department at that 

facility. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant S. Daroglou was a clinical psychiatrist. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant N.

Beduhi was a correctional officer. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant R. Cobb was the appeal coordinator. 

(Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant F. Sharpe was a correctional counselor. (Id. ¶ 5.)

On September 29, 2010, Plaintiff reported to Perez, Daroglou, and Beduhi that his 

cellmate was displaying “bizarre behavior.” (Id. ¶ 39.) This included walking about the cell

naked and talking about wanting to watch Plaintiff use the toilet, sex with men, and rape.

 

1 The regulations refer to inmate grievances, even those at the first level, as “appeals.”

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(Id.) Perez, Daroglou, and Beduhi informed Plaintiff that they would “take care of the 

problem.” (Id. ¶ 40.) The following day Plaintiff was assaulted by his cellmate. (Id.) He

suffered second degree burns on his right arm, neck and back, a broken left shoulder, left 

eye damage, two stab wounds, and a fractured disc. (Id.) Plaintiff was hospitalized for ten 

days at U.C. San Diego Medical Center. (Id.) Plaintiff claims to suffer continuing mental 

and physical trauma as a result of the assault. (Id.)

On October 29, 2010, Plaintiff submitted an appeal regarding the September 30, 

2010 incident to Appeal Coordinator Cobb. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 4, attached to Pl.’s Opp’n to 

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 34, p. 43.2) The appeal was received by the Appeal 

Coordinator’s office on November 5, 2010. (Cobb Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff requested 

continuation of his single cell status, compensation for his injuries, and copies of all reports 

related to the assault. (Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B, pp. 17-18.) On 

November 8, 2010, Appeal Coordinator Cobb rejected and “screened back” Plaintiff’s 

appeal for failure to seek informal review with his counselor. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5; Cobb. Decl. 

¶ 6.) 

On November 9, 2010, Plaintiff gave his appeal to Correctional Counselor Sharpe 

for informal review. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 6.) On December 9, 2010, Sharpe told Plaintiff that he 

was unable to provide Plaintiff with the relief requested and that Plaintiff’s appeal was 

inappropriate for informal review. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-20; Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7.) Sharpe told 

Plaintiff that he (Sharpe) “would take the appeal back to [the] appeal coordinator” so that 

Plaintiff would not be at fault for the appeal being late. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20; Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7.)

Several months passed. On March 18 and May 1, 2011, Plaintiff sent requests to

Appeal Coordinator Cobb seeking an update on the status of his appeal. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶¶ 8, 

9.) Cobb responded in writing on May 5, 2011, stating, “you [sic] appeal is not in the 

appeals office.” (Id. ¶ 9; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D; Def.’s Mot. for 

Summ. J. Ex. D.) On May 23, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Chief of the Office 

 

2 Page numbers in record citations refer to the numbers stamped on documents by ECF.

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of Appeals in Sacramento explaining that his appeals had “gone unheard and unnoticed” 

and asking for assistance “in the resolution of the 602 appeal.” (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 10; Pl.’s Opp’n 

to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. E, at 24-25; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D, at 17-18.) 

The Office of Appeals responded on June 16, 2011, rejecting Plaintiff’s appeal on the 

grounds that Plaintiff had bypassed lower levels of appeal. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 11; Lozano’s Decl. 

¶ 9; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. F, at 29-30.) On June 30, 2011, Plaintiff

sent another request to Cobb asking that his appeal be moved in the “right direction.” (Pl.’s

Decl. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. F, at 31.) Cobb responded that 

Plaintiff’s request was improper under the regulations. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for

Summ. J. Ex. F, at 31.)

On February 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in California state court in the County 

of San Diego alleging failure to protect and loss of property claims based on the September 

30, 2010 incident. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A.) On September 7, 2012, the state court 

sustained a demurrer without leave to amend for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 

and failure to timely file a claim under the Tort Claim Act, Cal. Gov’t. Code § 810, as to 

Defendants A. Clark, J. Clarey, E. Solis, S. Daroglou, and R. Perez. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. 

J. Ex. E.) On January 11, 2013, the state court sustained a second demurrer without leave 

to amend against Plaintiff for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to 

timely file a claim under the Tort Claims Act as to Defendant Michael Cate. (Id.) Plaintiff

filed an appeal on March 29, 2013. (Am Compl. ¶ 35.) The appeals court affirmed the 

judgment on August 15, 2014. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. F.) The court held that 

Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that he had paid, or secured a waiver of, the filing fee 

required by Tort Claims Act and that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust internal CDCR 

remedies. (Id.) The court specifically rejected Plaintiff’s argument that prison officials had 

mishandled his appeal, holding that Plaintiff’s proper avenue of redress, were he to believe 

“that his appeal was not being properly considered,” was to “petition for a writ of mandate 

ordering the Department to perform its duty by completing the review.” (Id. at 45.)

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 26, 2015. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff 

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filed the operative First Amended Complaint on March 23, 2015. In that pleading, Plaintiff

alleges that Appeal Coordinator Robert Cobb and Correctional Counselor Frank Sharpe 

obstructed his access to the courts in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Am. Compl.

¶ 47.) Plaintiff also alleges that prison clinical psychiatrist S. Daroglou, Correctional 

Sergeant R. Perez, and Correctional Officer Nazar Buduhi failed to protect him from 

assault by his cellmate in violation of his Eight Amendment rights. (Id. ¶¶ 57-59.)

Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on October 8, 2015. (ECF No.

24.) Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on October 9, 2015. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff

filed an opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on November 20, 2015.

(ECF No. 34.) Defendants filed a reply on December 7, 2015. (ECF No. 35.) On January 

15, 2016, this Court granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file his Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss on February 16, 2016. (ECF No. 41.)

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on res judicata 

grounds. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim on statute of 

limitations grounds. The Court will address each argument in turn.3

 

3 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is not a model of clarity. A careful reading of the motion 

indicates that Defendants’ res judicata argument is directed at Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claim, while Defendants’ statute of limitations argument is directed at 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. But, at several points, Defendants appear to argue that 

both their res judicata and statute of limitations arguments are directed at the Amended 

Complaint as a whole. See, e.g., Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to. Dismiss 8, 

22, ECF No. 25-1 (“The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Plaintiff from relitigating 

his claims herein”); (“The Court should also dismiss the Amended Complaint on statuteof-limitations grounds”); (“Plaintiff is now precluded from asserting this action”) 

(emphasis added). Defendants’ lack of precision is most starkly on display in their request 

that the Court “dismiss the Complaint because Plaintiff is time-barred from asserting an 

access-to-courts claim.” (Id. at 17.) (emphasis added again). This sloppiness is extremely 

unhelpful. 

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A. Res Judicata Does Not Bar Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim.

State judicial proceedings are accorded “the same full faith and credit in every court 

within the United States ... as they have by law ... in the courts of [the] State ... from 

which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Federal courts therefore “must give to a statecourt judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law 

of the State in which the judgment is rendered.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 

Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012)

(federal courts apply preclusion rules of state in which the prior judgment was entered).

The term “res judicata” encompasses two distinct preclusion doctrines in California 

law: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Corp., 51 P.3d 

297, 301 (Cal. 2002); Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1125 n.3 (Cal. 1990).

Claim preclusion, also known as true res judicata, bars further litigation on a claim that has 

previously resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Mycogen, 51 P.3d at 301-02. Claim 

preclusion applies when: (1) the claims decided in the prior action are identical to those in 

the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the 

party against whom claim preclusion is invoked was a party or was in privity with a party 

to the prior action. Pollock v. Univ. of S. Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 132 (Ct. App. 2003).

Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, bars relitigation of issues

actually decided in prior proceedings. Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1225. Issue preclusion applies 

only when the party asserting the bar meets its burden of showing that: (1) “the issue sought 

to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding”;

(2) the issue to be precluded “must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding”;

(3) the issue to be precluded “must have been necessarily decided in the former 

proceeding”; (4) “the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits”;

and (5) “the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity 

with, the party to the former proceeding.” Id. Issue preclusion must also serve the public 

policies of “preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial 

economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation.” Id. at 1227.

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Defendants do not distinguish clearly between claim and issue preclusion.

4 The 

Court will therefore address both preclusion doctrines. 

The Court first addresses claim preclusion, or true res judicata. A threshold 

requirement for the assertion of claim preclusion is that the prior judgment must have been 

entered “on the merits.” Pollock, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 132. Under California law, a dismissal 

on jurisdictional grounds is generally not considered to be “on the merits” for purposes of 

claim preclusion. Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

675, 682 (Ct. App. 2002); Nichols v. Cangoa Industries, 148 Cal. Rptr. 459, 466 (Ct. App. 

1978). Defendants concede that the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state court action was

jurisdictional and therefore not a judgment on the merits. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of 

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 21 (“In California, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a 

jurisdictional prerequisite to state-court litigation, and dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is 

not a final judgment on the merits.”)). Claim preclusion therefore does not bar Plaintiff 

from asserting his Eighth Amendment claim in this action, even though it is, for res judicata 

purposes, the same claim that he asserted unsuccessfully in state court. 

Defendants’ true argument appears to be that issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, 

bars Plaintiff from relitigating the exhaustion issue already passed on by the California 

 

4 Defendants not only muddle the two preclusion doctrines together, they also misstate the 

law. On page eighteen of their memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, 

Defendants declare that “collateral estoppel (claim preclusion) applies when the following 

three elements are satisfied: (1) the claims decided in the prior action are identical to those 

brought in the subsequent action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior 

action; and (3) the party against whom the claim is brought was a party to, or was in privity 

with a party to, the prior adjudication. Pollock v. Univ. of S. California.” (Mem. of P. & A. 

in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 11) (emphasis added). The actual language in Pollock, 

however, is quite different: “The doctrine of res judicata—or claim preclusion—adheres 

when (1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical with those presented in 

the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the 

party against whom the plea is raised [i.e., against whom claim preclusion is asserted] was 

a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 132 

(emphasis added). 

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courts. But, issue preclusion only bars the relitigation of issues actually decided in prior 

proceedings. At a minimum, therefore, the law applied in deciding the issue in the prior 

case must be materially identical to the law applied in the subsequent case. See Cal. Hosp. 

Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 583 (Ct. App. 2010); U.S. Golf Assn. v. 

Arroyo Software Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 714 (1999). 

Here, the state exhaustion requirement is significantly different from the exhaustion 

requirement imposed by the PLRA. The PLRA mandates that prisoners exhaust “available” 

administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. Under Ninth Circuit law, 

however, prisoners are excused from attempting to exhaust generally available 

administrative remedies when the actions of prison officials render such remedies 

“effectively unavailable.” McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(recognizing that threat of retailiation may render administrative remedies effectively 

unavailable); see also Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (no 

remedies available where officials failed to inform inmates of availability of grievance 

procedure); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that improper 

screening of grievance renders remedies effectively unavailable); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 

F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (warden sent prisoner on “wild goose chase” in search of 

irrelevant regulation). A prisoner for whom no administrative remedies are available may 

proceed directly to federal court. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 n.10 (9th Cir. 2005).

Courts applying California’s exhaustion requirement, in contrast, direct prisoners 

who believe that prison officials are improperly delaying or obstructing their grievances to 

file suit for a writ of mandate ordering the CDCR to perform its duty. Wright v. State, 19 

Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 97 (Ct. App. 2004). A prisoner who fails to seek a writ of mandate is not 

excused from further attempts to exhaust administrative remedies, and any state court 

action filed on the prisoner’s underlying claim is subject to dismissal. See Id. at 97, 100.

That is precisely what happened in this case. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. F., at 45 

(holding that Plaintiff’s proper course, if he believed that official’s had impeded the 

processing of his grievance, was to seek a “writ of mandate ordering the [CDCR] to 

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perform its duty by completing the review”)). 

California’s writ of mandate requirement is foreign to the PLRA, which “requires 

exhaustion of available administrative, not judicial, remedies.” Thorns v. Ryan, No. 07-

CV-0218H (AJB), 2008 WL 544398, at *4 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008) (Huff, J.) 

(rejecting prison officials’ argument that prisoner whose appeal was improperly screened 

out by prison officials was required to seek a writ of mandate in state court before filing 

his federal lawsuit); see also Andrews v. Whitman, No. 06CV2447-LAB (NLS), 2008 WL 

878466, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) (Burns, J.) (same). The determination of the 

exhaustion issue in state court was therefore grounded on a requirement that is not present 

in the PLRA, and Plaintiff is not barred from arguing that he exhausted available remedies

as required by the PLRA.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on res judicata 

grounds therefore should be denied.

B. The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

Claim.

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment access-to-courts claim 

on statute of limitations grounds. 

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s general or residual statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249 (1989); see also 

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). Federal courts also borrow the forum state’s 

tolling principles when not inconsistent with federal law. Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 

650, 653 (9th Cir. 2000). While state law determines the statute of limitations period for 

Section 1983 claims, federal law determines when the claim accrues. Id. A Section 1983 

claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the basis 

of the cause of action.” Id.

The residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims in California is two 

years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. The statute is tolled for up to two years for prisoners 

who at the time the cause of action accrued were either imprisoned on a criminal charge or 

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serving a sentence of less than life for a criminal conviction. Id. § 352.1(a). Defendants 

concede that the statute of limitations, including the two year tolling period, is four years. 

(Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 25.) Defendants contend, however,

that Plaintiff’s access-to-courts claim accrued on November 8, 2010, the date on which 

Cobb is alleged to have improperly screened Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff 

commenced this action on March 23, 2015. If Defendants are correct, and Plaintiff’s 

access-to-courts claim accrued on November 8, 2010, then that claim would be barred by 

the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that his access-to-courts claim accrued on the 

date that he “suffered an actual injury” through dismissal of his state court action. (Pl.’s

Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 16, ECF No. 41 (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 

403 (2002))). Plaintiff’s state court action was dismissed on September 7, 2012, less than 

four years before the commencement of this action. (Am. Compl. ¶ 33.) Thus, by Plaintiff’s 

reckoning, his First Amendment access-to-courts claim is timely. 

In Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit 

addressed the question of when a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes 

in an action in which the plaintiffs alleged that police perjury and other misconduct 

occurring in a previous civil rights lawsuit caused them to lose that case and thus deprive 

them of their constitutional right of access to the courts. The court held that the plaintiffs’ 

access-to-courts claim accrued on the date that an adverse judgment was entered against 

plaintiffs in the prior state court civil proceeding. Id. at 1154 (citing Delew v. Wagner, 143 

F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (access-to-courts claim based on alleged police cover-up 

does not ripen until underlying state court proceeding is terminated adversely to 

plaintiffs)); cf. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (holding that access-to-courts 

claims are only cognizable when the plaintiff can show that he suffered a concrete injury 

such as an adverse judgment or that he was so stymied by official misconduct that he was 

“unable even to file a complaint”). Applying principles borrowed from California law, the 

Morales court also held that the statute of limitations was tolled from the date on which an 

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appeal in the prior case was filed and the date on which the state appellate court issued a 

remittitur. 214 F.3d at 1155.

Here, Plaintiff’s access-to-the-courts claim accrued on September 7, 2012, the date 

on which Plaintiff’s state court action was dismissed. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. E, at 

32.) The statute began to run on that date. The statute was then tolled from March 29, 2013, 

the date on which Plaintiff filed his appeal, until August 15, 2014, the date on which the 

appeals court issued its decision. (Am Compl. ¶ 35.; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. F, at 

37.) Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on January 26, 2015. The statute of 

limitations at that time had nearly three years left to run. Therefore, Plaintiff’s access-tothe-courts claim was timely.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment access-to-the-courts 

claim on statute of limitations grounds should be denied.

II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on 

the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to properly exhaust CDCR administrative remedies. as 

required by the PLRA. 

A. Legal Standards on Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party and may not resolve disputed issues of material 

fact by crediting one party’s version of events and ignoring another. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 

S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam); Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th 

Cir. 2004). A fact is material if it is one which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A party seeking to establish or disprove 

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must do so by citing to “particular parts of 

materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence 

or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 

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evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The court may consider materials in 

the record not cited by either party, but is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

B. The PLRA Exhaustion Requirement

The PLRA provides that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 

under [42 U.S.C. Section 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 

are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to 

reduce the number and increase the quality of inmate lawsuits, and to afford prison officials 

an opportunity to address complaints internally before the initiation of a federal lawsuit. 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). Under the PLRA, a prisoner must complete 

the administrative review process in accordance with the prison system’s “deadlines and 

other critical rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). This exhaustion requirement 

applies to all inmate suits about prison life, Porter, 534 U.S. at 532, regardless of the relief 

sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 

532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

Although the PLRA requires exhaustion of all available administrative remedies, the 

Ninth Circuit has consistently held that exhaustion is excused when prison officials render 

administrative remedies “effectively unavailable.” See McBride, 807 F.3d at 987 (holding 

that a threat of retaliation that actually and reasonably deters an inmate from pursuing an 

appeal excuses the inmate’s failure to exhaust); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1176 (exhaustion of 

administrative remedies was effectively unavailable when inmate complained orally about 

beatings but was not provided with complaint forms or properly informed of his right to 

submit complaints); Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823 (“Improper screening of an inmate’s 

administrative grievance’s renders administrative remedies “effectively unavailable” such 

that exhaustion is not required.”); Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1226 (warden’s mistake in referring 

inmate to an unobtainable and irrelevant policy document excused failure to timely 

exhaust). 

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense as to which the 

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defendant bears the burden of proof. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Unless it is clear on the face 

of the complaint that the inmate has failed to exhaust, “defendants must produce evidence 

proving failure to exhaust in order to carry their burden.” Id. “A defendant must prove that 

there was an available administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust that 

remedy.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). The burden then shifts 

to the plaintiff to show that in the plaintiff’s particular case the generally available 

administrative remedies were “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or 

obviously futile.” Id. However, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant. 

Id. The court may grant summary judgment sua sponte to the plaintiff if, viewing the 

evidence in light most favorable to the defendant, the moving defendant has not shown a 

genuine dispute of fact on the issue of exhaustion. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1176.

C. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment.

Defendants have submitted evidence in the form of declarations by J.D. Lozano, 

former Chief of the Office of Appeals, and by R. Cobb, the appeals coordinator at Donovan. 

These declarations describe the process that existed in 2010 for the submission and 

processing of appeals. (Cobb Decl. ¶¶ 2-4; Lozano Decl. ¶ 6.) The declarations also 

describe the record keeping protocols established by the CDCR and by prison staff. (Cobb

Decl. ¶ 4; Lozano Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) Finally, the declarations describe records relating to 

appeals submitted by Plaintiff during the relevant time period. (Cobb Decl. ¶ 6; Lozano

Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) According to these records, Plaintiff never fully exhausted his appeal related 

to the September 30, 2010 attack. (Cobb Decl. ¶ 7; Lozano Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.)

Plaintiff has responded by submitting a declaration in which he avers that he 

submitted an appeal to the appeal coordinator on October 29, 2010. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 4.) The 

appeal was screened back to him for informal review on November 8, 2010. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶

5.) Plaintiff gave the appeal to Correctional Counselor Sharpe on November 9, 2010. (Pl.’s 

Decl. ¶ 6.) Sharpe told Plaintiff that no relief was available at the informal level and that 

Sharpe would file Plaintiff’s appeal on his behalf. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7.) On March 18, 2011, 

Plaintiff sent a request to the Appeal Coordinator to inquire about the whereabouts of his 

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appeal. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 9.) On May 1, 2011, Plaintiff made a second such request to the 

Appeal’s Coordinator. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 10.) Cobb responded by informing Plaintiff that there 

was no record of Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id.) On May 23, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a letter to 

the Chief of the Office of Appeals seeking assistance. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also sent 

a copy of this letter to the Inspector General’s office. (Id.) On June 16, 2011, the Office of 

Appeals rejected Plaintiff’s appeal for bypassing the lower levels. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 12.)

The evidence submitted by Defendants “at most meets their burden of demonstrating 

a system of available administrative remedies at the initial step of the Albino burdenshifting inquiry.” Williams, 775 F.3d at 1192. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, however, the Court concludes that Defendants have failed to carry 

their burden of showing that administrative remedies were actually available to Plaintiff. 

Critically, Plaintiff alleges that Sharpe took charge of Plaintiff’s appeal and promised to 

file it on Plaintiff’s behalf. However, the office of the appeal coordinator at Donovan has 

no record of having received this appeal. Accepting Plaintiff’s allegation as true, therefore, 

a trier of fact could reasonably infer that Sharpe either failed to file Plaintiff’s appeal, or 

that the appeal coordinator lost Plaintiff’s appeal. In either case, the fault would lie with 

the prison system, not with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff would be entitled to prevail on the issue 

of exhaustion. Plaintiff’s allegation therefore at a minimum raises an issue of fact regarding 

whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable in his particular case.

Defendants reply that under CDCR regulations, the prisoner, rather than the prison 

official, is responsible for filing an appeal with the appeals coordinator’s office after the 

matter has been addressed at the informal level. (Reply in Further Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for 

Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 35.) This argument misses the mark because, although Sharpe may 

not have had a general responsibility to file the appeal, Plaintiff’s argument is that, in this 

particular case, he took on the responsibility of doing so. Defendants also argue that 

Plaintiff has failed to submit evidence showing that he appealed Sharpe’s alleged 

mishandling of the appeal. (Id.) But an inmate whose appeal has been mishandled to the 

degree that administrative remedies may be said to be “effectively unavailable” is not also

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required to exhaust a separate appeal concerning that mishandling in order to exhaust 

administrative remedies with regard to the claims contained in the original appeal. Brown, 

422 F.3d at 935 n.10. Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.

Defendants request that the Court, if it denies their motion for summary judgment, 

permit Defendants to produce witnesses at a preliminary proceeding for the purpose of 

resolving any factual issues bearing on exhaustion. (Memo. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. 14.) As Defendants note, Albino held that where summary judgment on 

the issue of exhaustion is not appropriate, “the district judge may decide disputed questions 

of fact in a preliminary proceeding.” 747 F.3d at 1168. But Albino also held that “[i]f the 

record is sufficiently developed to permit the trial court to consider summary judgment, 

and if the court finds that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to a 

moving party the movant has not shown a genuine dispute of fact on the issue of 

exhaustion, it may be appropriate for the district court to grant summary judgment sua 

sponte for the nonmovant on this issue.” Id. at 1176. The court observed that “great care 

must be exercised to assure that the original movant has had an adequate opportunity to 

show that there is a genuine issue and that his [or her] opponent is not entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Id. at 1176. Nevertheless, the court found that notice concerns are 

“satisfied in a case such as this one, where, after having had a full opportunity to gather 

evidence, a defendant moves for summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust under 

the PLRA.” Id. at 1177. Holding that the defendants had not carried their burden of proving 

the availability of an administrative remedy, the panel remanded with instructions that the 

district court enter summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of exhaustion. Id.

In this case, despite having an opportunity to do so, Defendants have failed to rebut 

Plaintiff’s sworn allegation that Sharpe took charge of his appeal and promised to file the 

appeal on Plaintiff’s behalf. Had Defendants submitted a declaration by Sharpe denying 

this allegation, then a material issue of fact would have existed, and Defendants would 

have been entitled to a preliminary hearing. However, Defendants did not submit a 

declaration by Sharpe, nor have they denied, whether in a declaration on personal 

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knowledge or otherwise, Plaintiff’s simple, but obviously critical, allegation regarding 

Sharpe’s handling of his appeal. Nor were Defendants caught off guard by this allegation, 

which Plaintiff made in his opposition to the demurrer in state court as long ago as June 

30, 2012, (Def. Mot for Summ. J. Ex. D, p. 5), and which Plaintiff repeated both in his 

pleadings and in his opposition to Defendants’ motion in this action. Defendants have had 

ample opportunity to challenge Plaintiff’s account of Sharpe’s involvement in Plaintiff’s 

appeal. Defendants have not taken advantage of that opportunity. There being no material 

issue of fact apparent on this record, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the issue 

of exhaustion. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment be denied and that summary judgment be granted to Plaintiff on the issue of 

exhaustion. The Court further recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be denied 

in its entirety.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 25, 2016, any party to this action may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than June 15, 2016. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 6, 2016

 

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