Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02804/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02804-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK NOBILI,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; 

OFFICER GALLEY; OFFICER 

MANCIU; and CALIFORNIA 

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR 

VEHICLES,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-02804-MCE-GGH

ORDER

On February 23, 2013, Mark Nobili (“Plaintiff”) filed a First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”) alleging a 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights action against the California Highway 

Patrol (“CHP”), the California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), Officer Galley

(“Galley”) and Officer Manciu (“Manciu”).

1

 (ECF No. 10.) On March 12, 2013, Galley 

and Manciu filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 12.) 

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 1 Officer Galley and Officer Manciu will be collectively referred to as “Defendants” throughout this 

Order. 

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2

The Court previously dismissed CHP and DMV with prejudice because states cannot be 

defendants in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; thus, this Order will only analyze 

whether Plaintiff stated a claim against Galley and Manciu. (ECF No. 8.)2

BACKGROUND3

On June 26, 2010, Galley and Manciu stopped Plaintiff’s vehicle for Plaintiff’s

failure to wear a seat belt. During the traffic stop, Galley and Manciu arrested Plaintiff for

driving under the influence of alcohol. On May 18, 2011, Plaintiff challenged the 

constitutionality of the traffic stop in state court through a suppression motion. The state 

court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to stop Plaintiff’s car on June 26, 

2010. As a result, the blood and breath alcohol samples the officers took from Plaintiff 

when they arrested him would not be admitted as evidence in the State’s criminal 

prosecution. Thus, on June 1, 2011, the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office 

dismissed the case because there was insufficient evidence to proceed. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.4 Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the [. . .] claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

 2 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court orders this matter submitted 

on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

3 The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s FAC unless stated otherwise. (ECF No. 10.) 

4 All future references to Rule or Rules refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted. 

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3

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

does not require detailed factual allegations. 

However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A court is 

not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must contain 

something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 

cognizable right of action.”)). 

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2). . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, 

of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how 

a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature 

of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have 

not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint 

must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery 

is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974)).

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4

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the 

complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that Galley and Manciu violated his right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of 42 U.S. C. § 1983. While state 

agencies may not be sued under § 1983, the officers may be sued under §1983. “To 

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988). State employment usually makes the Defendant a state actor. Id at 49. 

However, officers may be entitled to qualified immunity under §1983. Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 

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The Ninth Circuit’s qualified immunity test is a two-step test. Kee v. Mersch, 

297 F. App’x 615, 617 (9th Cir. 2008). First, a Court must determine whether the 

officer’s conduct violated a federal right. Next, the Court must determine whether the 

right was clearly established at the time. Id. at 617-618. Qualified immunity protects “all 

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 

475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The Supreme Court has cautioned Courts from judging an 

officer’s decisions related to search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment with the 

benefit of hindsight because police officers “mak[e] split-second judgments in 

circumstances that are tense, and uncertain.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 

(1989). 

Based on Plaintiff’s Complaint, it is impossible to know whether Galley and 

Manciu “knowingly violated the Fourth Amendment.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. The Court 

understands that the officers stopped Plaintiff’s vehicle, but the Court does not know 

anything else about the traffic stop other than the criminal charges resulting from the 

stop were ultimately dismissed by the State. Plaintiff failed to provide any new facts to 

support his conclusion that Galley and Manciu stopped Plaintiff under “false pretenses.” 

(ECF No. 10.) In fact, the facts Plaintiff alleged in the FAC are nearly verbatim to the 

facts Plaintiff alleged in the Complaint. Compare ECF No. 2 at ¶ 6-10 with ECF No. 10 

at ¶ 12-15. As alleged, both Manciu and Galley testified at a suppression hearing 

regarding their June 26, 2010 stop; however, Plaintiff failed to include any details about 

that suppression hearing. Plaintiff’s FAC makes a legal conclusion that Manciu and 

Galley acted unreasonably; however, Plaintiff failed to include any facts that support his 

conclusion that Manciu and Galley acted unreasonably when they stopped Plaintiff’s 

vehicle. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). It is unclear if a reasonable officer in 

Galley’s or Manciu’s position would have known that the stop was illegal at the time the 

officers stopped the car. 

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The Supreme Court has directed courts to resolve qualified immunity questions 

“at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryan, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint against Galley and Manciu will be DISMIEED with one final 

opportunity to amend. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 10) is dismissed. 

Plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to amend the complaint in order to state a legally 

cognizable cause of action. If no amended complaint is filed within twenty (20) days of 

the electronic filing of this order, this dismissal shall become final with no further leave to 

amend and without further notice to the parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 23, 2013

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