Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-270/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION 

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MDL No. 1917 

Case No. C-07-5944-SC 

ORDER RE: DELL'S AND 

SHARP'S ADMINISTRATIVE 

MOTIONS TO CONFIRM THEIR 

OPT OUT REQUESTS OR, IN THE 

ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN 

ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO OPT 

OUT 

This Order Relates To: 

Sharp Electronics Corp., et al. v. 

Hitachi, Ltd., et al., 13-cv-1173-

SC 

Dell Inc., et al. v. Hitachi, 

Ltd., et al., 13-cv-02171-SC 

ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Now before the Court are administrative motions by Sharp 

Electronics Corporation and Sharp Electronics Manufacturing Company 

of America, Inc. ("Sharp") and Dell Inc. and Dell Products L.P. 

("Dell") to confirm their request to opt out from the Direct 

Purchaser Plaintiffs' ("DPPs") proposed settlement with the SDI and 

Hitachi Defendants1

 ("Proposed Settlements") or for a retroactive 

 

1

 The SDI Defendants include Samsung SDI Co. Ltd. (f/lk/a Samsung 

Display Devices Co., Ltd.), Samsung SDI America, Inc., Samsung SDI 

Brasil, Ltd., Tianjin Samsung SDI Co., Ltd., Samsung Shenzhen SDI 

Co., Ltd., SDI Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., and SDI Mexico S.A. de C.V. 

(collectively "SDI"). The DPP's proposed settlement with Hitachi 

includes Hitachi, Ltd., Hitachi Displays, Ltd. (n/k/a Japan Display 

Inc.), Hitachi America, Ltd., Hitachi Asia, Ltd., and Hitachi 

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extension of the time to opt out. ECF Nos. 2696 ("Dell Mot."), 

2698 ("Sharp Mot."). Hitachi opposes the motion. ECF Nos. 2712 

("Dell Opp'n"), 2713 ("Sharp Opp'n"). DPPs also filed a responsive 

brief in support of the motion. ECF No. 2715 ("DPP Br."). The 

motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition without oral 

argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b); 7-11. For the reasons set forth 

below, Dell's motion is GRANTED and Sharp's motion is DENIED. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The parties are familiar with the factual and procedural 

background of the case, so an exhaustive review is unnecessary. 

The facts relevant to the motion are set forth below. Defendants 

are allegedly manufacturers of cathode ray tubes ("CRTs") and, in 

some cases, of finished products as well. In March 2013, Sharp 

filed a direct action suit against a host of defendants including 

the Settling Defendants. ECF No. 1604-2. In June 2013, Dell filed 

its First Amended Complaint, also asserting claims against the 

Settling Defendants. ECF No. 1726. 

On April 14, 2014 the Court granted provisional certification 

to a class in the Proposed Settlements. ECF No. 2534. 

Subsequently, the Settlement Administrator set the deadline to opt 

out of the Proposed Settlements for June 12, 2014. The Settlement 

Administrator mailed notice to the class members including two 

addresses for Dell and eight addresses for Sharp. ECF Nos. 2712-1 

("Murray Dell Decl.") ¶¶ 3-4; 2713-1 ("Murray Sharp Decl.") ¶¶ 3-4. 

One of Dell's notices was returned as undeliverable. Murray Dell 

 

Electronic Devices (USA) Inc. (collectively, "Hitachi"). SDI and 

Hitachi are collectively referred to as the "Settling Defendants." 

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Decl. ¶ 4. None of the Sharp notices were returned. Murray Sharp 

Decl. ¶ 4. The Settlement Administrator also published notice in 

the Wall Street Journal, established a website with copies of the 

relevant notices and a Frequently Asked Questions page with the 

June 12 deadline, and activated a toll-free telephone line with 

customer service representatives available to answer questions 

related to the class settlement. Id. at ¶ 6-8. 

Before, during, and after the June 12 deadline, both Dell and 

Sharp have been actively litigating against the Settling 

Defendants. See Dell Mot. at 1-2 (describing Dell's active 

participation in discovery); Sharp Mot. at 1-2 (discussing Sharp's 

litigation against the Settling Defendants). Nonetheless, neither 

Dell nor Sharp sent an opt out notice to the Settlement 

Administrator by the June 12 deadline. Instead, on June 26, 2014, 

after DPPs' counsel contacted counsel for Dell and Sharp and 

pointed out that opt out requests had not been received from either 

company, Dell and Sharp immediately submitted opt-out requests. 

ECF No. 2715-1 ("Saveri Decl.") ¶¶ 3, 6. As a result, both Dell 

and Sharp were included on the list of opt-outs filed by the DPPs 

on the court-ordered deadline of June 26, the earliest date on 

which the Settling Defendants were notified of the list of optouts. Id. at ¶ 6. Twelve days later, counsel for both Sharp and 

Dell contacted SDI and Hitachi's counsel seeking to stipulate to an 

extension of the opt-out deadline, but Hitachi refused. ECF No. 

2698-1 ("Benson Decl."), ¶ 6. 

Sharp and Dell now bring these motions seeking alternatively 

to confirm that their June 26 opt-out was effective or to 

retroactively extend the opt-out deadline. Hitachi opposes. 

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III. DISCUSSION 

 Sharp and Dell make two largely identical arguments in support 

of their motions. First, they argue that their actions before, 

during, and after the opt-out deadline sufficiently demonstrated 

their intent to be excluded from the settlement class. Sharp Mot. 

at 3-4; Dell Mot. at 3-4. Accordingly, they ask the Court for an 

order confirming their status as opt-outs from the Proposed 

Settlements. Alternatively they contend that even if their 

demonstration of intent to opt out is insufficient, this is a case 

of excusable neglect and good cause exists for the Court to order 

an enlargement of time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). 

Sharp Mot. at 4-5; Dell Mot. at 4-5. The Court will analyze 

Sharp's and Dell's second argument first. Finding Sharp's neglect 

inexcusable but Dell's excusable, the Court then turns to the 

parties' first argument. 

A. Excusable Neglect 

District Courts have discretion to grant retroactive 

enlargements of time under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b) 

and 60(b)(1) provided a party shows their neglect in missing the 

applicable deadline was excusable. In determining whether the 

parties have shown excusable neglect, the Court considers four 

factors (the "Pioneer factors"): (1) the danger of prejudice to the 

nonmoving parties, (2) the length of delay, (3) the reason for the 

delay, and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer 

Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 

(1993); Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Dell and Sharp both argue they have satisfied each of these 

factors. First, Dell and Sharp argue that because they were 

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included in the report on exclusions, the first time the Settling 

Defendants received information regarding the identify of the optouts, the Settling Defendants will not be prejudiced if they are 

permitted to opt out. Furthermore, Dell and Sharp argue that their 

delay was minimal -- their opt-out request was postmarked and 

received 14 days after the opt-out deadline. As to the third 

factor, the reason for the delay, Dell argues that while they 

repeatedly checked the Settlement Administrator's "dates to 

remember" page, the page was never updated to include the opt-out 

deadline for this particular settlement. Coupled with the 

ostensible failure of Dell's in-house counsel's to receive notice 

of the Proposed Settlements, Dell contends their delay resulted 

from "confusion" and "reasonable mistake." Dell Mot. at 5. Sharp 

offers no explanation for its failure to opt out prior to the 

deadline. Finally, it is undisputed that the parties acted in good 

faith, and did not fail to opt out seeking a tactical advantage. 

Hitachi argues that neither party has successfully 

demonstrated excusable neglect. Specifically, Hitachi argues that 

extending the opt-out deadline retroactively will be prejudicial as 

it will undermine certainty and deadlines in the case and that the 

length of the delay weighs in their favor. Furthermore, they argue 

that the third factor, the explanation for the delay, does not 

weigh in either Sharp's or Dell's favor. Specifically they note 

that Sharp's failure to offer any explanation "'largely moots any 

further inquiry into the other pertinent factors.'" Sharp Opp'n at 

3 (quoting Demint v. NationsBank Corp., 208 F.R.D. 639, 642 n.5 

(M.D. Fla. 2002)). As to Dell, they contend that "Dell knew or 

should have known about the deadline," particularly in light of the 

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numerous other requests for exclusion. Dell Opp'n at 4. 

1. Adequacy of Notice 

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the notice 

provided in this case was constitutionally adequate. Notice was 

sent to (and apparently received at) at least one Dell address and 

multiple Sharp addresses, published in the Wall Street Journal, and 

posted on the Settlement Administrator's website. The fact that 

Dell arguably did not receive the class notice does not render the 

notice constitutionally inadequate. Brannon v. Household Int'l 

Inc., 236 F. App'x 285, 287 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 

neither actual nor "individually tailored" notice is 

constitutionally required). Furthermore, while the success of the 

procedures is not dispositive, the fact that eighteen corporate 

families filed timely opt-out notices further indicates notice was 

adequate. 

2. Sharp 

As to Sharp, two of the Pioneer factors weigh in their favor. 

First, it is undisputed that Sharp acted in good faith. Second, 

Hitachi's suggestion that Defendants will be prejudiced by reduced 

certainty in deadlines is vague and unconvincing. On the other 

hand, the DPPs point out that members of the settlement classes may 

well be prejudiced by including Sharp, a large purchaser of CRTs. 

This may well be true, but neither Sharp nor the DPPs provide any 

detail above generalized assertions of prejudice. See DPP Br. at 

3-4; Saveri Decl. ¶ 9. Without more, the Court does not ascribe 

significant weight to this factor. 

On the other hand, the remaining factors weigh strongly 

against a finding of excusable neglect. First, and most 

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importantly, Sharp has offered no explanation as to why it missed 

the applicable opt-out deadline aside from mentioning that notice 

was "inadvertently not . . . sent to outside counsel for the Sharp 

Plaintiffs." See Benson Decl. ¶ 5. Inadvertence and 

miscommunication are insufficient excuses. See, e.g., In re Static 

Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-01819 CW, 

2009 WL 2447802, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (declining to find 

excusable neglect due to "miscommunications"); see also Pioneer, 

507 U.S. at 392 (stating that "inadvertence . . . [does] not 

usually constitute 'excusable' neglect."). Sharp received notices 

(sent to the same address used for other settlements Sharp opted 

out of), and had every opportunity to review the Settlement 

Administrator's website or publication notice. While Sharp points 

out that the Settlement Administrator's "dates to remember" page 

omitted the opt-out deadline, they do not claim they viewed that 

page or relied on it for notice of the applicable deadline. See 

Sharp Mot. at 2. Finally, while Sharp characterizes the two week 

delay in filing a request for exclusion as "de minimis," they fail 

to note that after filing their request for exclusion, counsel 

waited an additional twelve days before contacting opposing counsel 

seeking their position on Sharp's exclusion from the class. These 

facts are simply insufficient to justify a finding of excusable 

neglect. Accordingly, Sharp's motion for a retroactive extension 

of the opt-out period is DENIED. 

 3. Dell 

Unlike Sharp, Dell's motion provides sufficient detail to 

demonstrate its neglect was excusable. As with Sharp, the parties 

agree that Dell has acted in good faith. Similarly, the Court 

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finds that Defendants will not be prejudiced by permitting Dell to 

opt out of the class. There is at least some support for the DPPs' 

contention that the members of the settlement class will be 

prejudiced if Dell, unlike Sharp, is included in the class. The 

DPPs suggest that Dell's purchases from SDI "exceed $1.6 billion," 

although they provide no source for that number other than stating 

the information was gleaned from a conversation with Dell's 

counsel. Saveri Decl. ¶ 9. While the Court has no way to 

determine what percentage of the $1.6 billion in purchases Dell 

considers to be overcharges, and accordingly what amount of that 

$1.6 billion would constitute recoverable damages in SDI 

settlement, the Court finds this is enough detail to tip the 

prejudice factor further in Dell's favor. 

Also unlike Sharp, Dell offers an explanation for missing the 

opt-out deadline. Dell contends that "confusion regarding the optout deadline created by the class administrator's settlement 

website not being properly updated to reflect the opt-out 

deadline," the alleged "failure to serve Dell with actual notice of 

the opt-out deadline," and "reasonable mistake regarding the optout deadline" caused them to miss the opt-out deadline. Dell Mot. 

at 5. Furthermore, unlike Sharp, which points to the confusion 

regarding the Settlement Administrator's "dates to remember" page 

but does not claim to have ever visited the page or relied on it, 

Dell states that their counsel visited several pages on the 

Settlement Administrator's website during the opt-out period and 

include internet browsing history from the relevant period to prove 

it. ECF Nos. 2696-2 ("Kent Decl.") ¶ 3; 2696-3 ("Mahurin Whitehead 

Decl.") ¶¶ 5-9, Ex. 9. While some of Dell's explanations are 

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inapposite, see Silber, 18 F.3d at 1453 (noting that Rule 23 does 

not require actual notice, only the best notice practicable), the 

Court finds this explanation shows an appreciable level of 

diligence and rises above the vague assertions of miscommunication 

and inadvertence other courts have rejected. See Pioneer, 507 U.S. 

at 392; SRAM, 2009 WL 2447802, at *2. Accordingly, Dell has also 

tipped the balance of this factor in its favor. 

While the Court finds the length of delay factor weighs 

against Dell for the same reasons it weighed against Sharp, the 

Court finds Dell has demonstrated excusable neglect. Accordingly, 

Dell's motion for a retroactive enlargement of the time to opt out 

is GRANTED. 

B. Confirmation of Sharp's Opt-Out Attempt 

Having found that Sharp's neglect is inexcusable, the Court 

must now determine if Sharp can demonstrate some other ground for 

its exclusion from the Proposed Settlements. Specifically, Sharp 

argues that its litigation conduct throughout the relevant period 

is sufficient to have effectively opted them out of the Proposed 

Settlements. As a preliminary matter, however, Hitachi disputes 

whether such an inquiry is even appropriate. Instead, Hitachi 

contends that the excusable neglect standard is the sole test for 

determining the efficacy of an opt-out in the Ninth Circuit. In 

doing so, Hitachi relies on Chief Judge Wilken's statement in In re 

Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litigation that "[t]he 

standard for determining whether [a plaintiff] should be allowed to 

opt-out of the class after the applicable deadline is whether its 

failure to comply with the deadline is the result of 'excusable 

neglect.'" 2009 WL 2447802, at *2; see also Silber, 18 F.3d at 

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1455 (remanding to the district court to analyze whether the party 

seeking to opt out could show excusable neglect). 

 In SRAM, the Court denied Intel's motion for a retroactive 

enlargement of time to opt out of the certified class. Despite 

numerous electronic, mail, and publication notices by the 

Settlement Administrator, at least one of which was received before 

the opt-out deadline, Intel failed to timely return an opt-out 

notice. Id. at *1. After being informed of its failure to opt out 

by a supplier, Intel immediately contacted outside counsel and 

several defendants to inform them they intended to opt out, and 

filed an unopposed motion to do so. Id. The Court denied the 

motion, reasoning that Intel's only explanation -- an "honest 

mistake" resulting from "miscommunications" -- was insufficiently 

detailed to justify granting a retroactive enlargement of the 

deadline. Id. at *2-3. 

 Sharp disagrees that excusable neglect is the sole basis for 

concluding it has effectively opted out of the class, instead 

arguing that the continued prosecution of its case throughout the 

opt out period was sufficient to express "the operating 

understanding of all relevant parties: Sharp is not a member of the 

settlement class." Sharp Mot. at 3. In support of this 

proposition Sharp relies primarily on two cases, In re Brand Name 

Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 171 F.R.D. 213 (N.D. Ill. 

1997) and McCubbrey v. Boise Cascade Home & Land Corp., 71 F.R.D. 

62 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In McCubbrey, the Court granted final 

approval and class certification to a settlement releasing class 

member's claims against a homebuilding company. 71 F.R.D. at 64-

65. Prior to doing so, notice was sent via mail and publication to 

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absent class members that "suggest[ed] that inaction will result in 

barring future litigation, not automatic termination of present 

suits." Id. at 68. The Defendant sought an order enjoining twenty 

state court actions filed by members of the putative class before, 

during, and after opt-out period. Id. at 65. Pointing to the due 

process implications of binding absent class members, Judge Peckham 

concluded that "it seems clear that institution of litigation . . . 

constitutes an effective -- indeed, strident -- expression of a 

desire not to acquiesce in an impending class settlement." Id. at 

71. 

 In opposition, Hitachi suggests that, even under Sharp's 

preferred view, Sharp cannot prevail. Sharp Opp'n at 5. 

Specifically, Hitachi notes the existence of cases holding that the 

"mere pendency and continued prosecution of a separate suit, which 

the litigant instituted before commencement of the 'opt-out' period 

in a related class action, neither registers nor preserves a 

litigant's 'opt out' of the related class action." Demint v. 

NationsBank Corp., 208 F.R.D. 639, 641 (M.D. Fla. 2002); see also 

Bowman v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. C-04-3525, 2007 WL 1456037, at 

*1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2007) (quoting the language from Demint, 

and citing McCubbrey for the narrower position that filing suit 

"during [the] opt-out period" was sufficient to express the desire 

to opt out) (emphasis added); In re Prudential Secs. Inc. Ltd. 

P'ships Litig. ̧164 F.R.D. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("It is wellestablished that pendency of an individual action does not excuse a 

class member from filing a valid request for exclusion."), aff'd 

107 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1996); Holmes v. CSX Transp., No. Civ.A. 97-

3863, 1999 WL 447087, at *4 (E.D. La. 1999) ("Simply continuing 

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with the present lawsuit, in a different court than the class 

action suit, is not sufficient to provide the court with notice of 

plaintiff's intent to opt-out of the class."). 

 Hitachi is right. Assuming arguendo that in some cases a 

party's litigation conduct may sufficiently demonstrate its intent 

to be excluded from the class, this is not such a case. First, 

unlike in McCubbrey, the notice in this case was constitutionally 

sufficient, and Sharp's case against the Settling Defendants was 

filed prior to the opt-out period. See Bowman, 2007 WL 1456037, at 

*1 ("Here, unlike the notice at issue in McCubbrey, the Class 

Notice complies with the due process requirement that 'the options 

available to class members and the consequences of their elections 

be detailed with sufficient clarity to afford absent members a 

realistic opportunity to evaluate alternative options available to 

them.'") (quoting McCubbrey, 71 F.R.D. at 67). Second, the weight 

of authority cited by Hitachi is clear: filing an individual case 

prior to the opt-out period and continuing to litigate that case 

through the opt-out period is insufficient. Id. at *2 (collecting 

cases); see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Pracs. 

Litig., 177 F.R.D. 216, 238 (D.N.J. 1997); In re VMS Secs. Litig., 

No. 89 C 9448, 1992 WL 203832, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1992); cf. Brannon, 

236 F. App'x at 287 (concluding that ongoing negotiations between 

the individuals and defendants "did not exclude [plaintiffs] from 

compliance with the judicially ordered exclusion procedures"); 

Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., Inc., 634 F.2d 989, 996 (5th Cir. 

1981) (rejecting the argument that an individual's filing of an 

EEOC charge prior to the entry of a consent decree prevented the 

application of claim preclusion). Finally, Sharp's reliance on 

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Brand Name Prescription Drugs is misplaced. In that case, the 

party seeking to confirm the effectiveness of its opt-out request 

mistakenly sent the required opt-out notice to the court rather 

than the appropriate post office box. 171 F.R.D. at 215-16. 

Furthermore, to the extent the case concluded that "[t]he clearest 

evidence of a desire to pursue its own litigation against the 

defendants is the filing of its case against the same 23 

defendants," it is contrary to the clear weight of authority 

identified above. 

 Accordingly, Sharp has failed to show that its actions during 

the opt-out period sufficiently demonstrated its intent to be 

excluded from the Proposed Settlements. As a result, their motion 

is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Dell's 

motion for a retroactive enlargement of time to opt out of the 

Proposed Settlements. Dell's alternative motion to confirm its 

prior opt-out is DENIED as moot. The Court DENIES Sharp's motions 

to confirm its opt-out request and its alternative motion for a 

retroactive enlargement of time to opt out of the Proposed 

Settlements. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: August 20, 2014 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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