Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00828/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00828-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lupe C. Hernandez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. 2:07-CV-00828-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Lupe C.

Hernandez (Dkt. # 16) and the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Michael

J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security (Dkt. # 26) . For the reasons set forth below, the

Court grants Plaintiff’s motion and denies Defendant’s cross-motion.

BACKGROUND

On March 27, 2000, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income.

(TR at 19.) She alleged a disability date of September 1, 1999. (Id.) The claim was denied

both initially and upon reconsideration. (Id.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, but that

decision was subsequently reversed by the Appeals Council. (Id.) On remand, the ALJ issued

a partly-favorable decision to the effect that Plaintiff had been disabled as of January 16,

2006. (Id. at 20.)

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Under that test:

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she is

not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) that

her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets or

equals one of the specific impairments described in the

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of the

specific impairments described in the regulations, the claimant

can still establish a prima facie case of disability by proving at

step four that in addition to the first two requirements, she is not

able to perform any work that she has done in the past. Once the

claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof

shifts to the agency at step five to demonstrate that the claimant

can perform a significant number of other jobs in the national

economy. This step-five determination is made on the basis of

four factors: the claimant's residual functional capacity, age,

work experience and education.

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

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That rule provides that a claimant is disabled if he is closely approaching advanced

age, has a limited education, and is unskilled in terms of previous work experience. MedicalVocational Rule 201.09. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff entered the “closely approaching

advanced age” category on January 16, 2006. (TR at 29.)

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In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step

sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2003).1

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff

had established a prima facie case of disability by showing that she was not engaged in

substantial gainful activity, that her disability was severe, and that she was unable to perform

any relevant past work. (TR at 29.) At step five, however, the ALJ concluded, based on the

testimony of a vocational expert, that there were a significant number of jobs in the national

economy that Plaintiff could have performed between September 1, 1999, and January 15,

2006. (Id. at 28-29.) On that basis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled during

that period. (Id. at 30.) The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff became disabled on January

16, 2006, pursuant to Medical-Vocational Rule 201.09.2

 (Id.)

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Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2004) (“Any

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action

. . . .”).

4

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to consider a variety of evidence and made

conclusions unsupported by the evidence. (Dkt. # 21 at 8-18.) Because Plaintiff’s motion

must be granted under her first argument, the Court does not address her other arguments.

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The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff filed the

instant complaint on April 20, 2007, arguing that she was physically and mentally disabled

as of September 1, 1999 (rather than as of January 16, 2006).3

 (Dkt. # 1 at 1-2.) Plaintiff filed

her Motion for Summary Judgment on December 20, 2007. (Dkt. # 16.) Defendant filed his

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement on March 31, 2008. (Dkt. # 26.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in her

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is either

unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less than a

preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which,

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred at step five of the five-step sequential evaluation

process in determining that Plaintiff could adjust to other work. (Dkt. # 21 at 2-4.) Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ failed to identify and explain differences between the vocational expert’s

testimony about what other jobs Plaintiff could perform and the standards for those jobs set

forth in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) (Id. at 5-8).4

 Plaintiff is correct.

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Social Security Rulings (“SSRs”) are binding on ALJs. Quang Van Han v. Bowen,

882 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.6 (9th Cir.1989).

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Social Security Ruling5 00-4p provides that “as part of the adjudicator's duty to fully

develop the record, the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is

such consistency [between the vocational expert and the DOT].” SSR 00-4p (Dec. 4, 2000).

When there is a conflict between the DOT guidelines and the testimony of the vocational

expert, the ALJ is required to explicate that disparity:

[B]efore relying on [vocational expert] evidence to support a

disability determination or decision, our adjudicators must . . .

[i]dentify and obtain a reasonable explanation for any conflicts

between occupational evidence provided by [the vocational

expert] and information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

. . . and . . . [e]xplain in the determination or decision how any

conflict that has been identified was resolved.

Id. The ALJ is entitled to conclude that the vocational expert’s testimony is more reliable

than the DOT in making a disability determination, but “the adjudicator must resolve this

conflict before relying on the [vocational expert’s] evidence.” Id. (emphasis added).

 The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that SSR 00-4p is mandatory and therefore that an

ALJ may not rely on a vocational expert’s testimony without inquiring into and explaining

any potential conflicts with the DOT. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.

2007). The Ninth Circuit has not foreclosed the possibility that “[t]his procedural error could

have been harmless, were there no conflict, or if the vocational expert had provided sufficient

support for her conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts . . . .” Id. at 1154 n.19. 

In this case, the ALJ never inquired into whether there was a conflict between the

vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT. Therefore, the ALJ committed legal error. See

id. at 1152. The issue, therefore, is whether that error was harmless, either because there was

no conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT or because the vocational

expert’s testimony justified any potential conflict. See id. at 1154 n.19.

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There are five terms in which the Strength Factor is expressed: Sedentary, Light,

Medium, Heavy, and Very Heavy. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Appendix C (4th rev.

ed. 1991), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/dot/references/dotappc.htm.

7

Defendant does not argue that “hand packaging” refers to a broad category rather

than to the specific job of “hand packager.”

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First, there was a conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT.

In response to the ALJ’s question about a claimant who could perform only sedentary work

(TR at 490) the vocational expert testified:

In that category, Your Honor, because of the standing being

limited to no more than four hours, they would look at sedentary

work and sedentary jobs that would exist in Arizona, [and] there

are 65 [such jobs in Arizona] . . . and 6,000 in the United States

in that category for hand packaging, in the production area there

would be 270 in Arizona, and 27,000 in the United States in that

same category of unskilled sedentary, and packaging and filling

positions there would be 12 in Arizona and 1,500 in the United

States.

(Id. at 491.) The ALJ thereupon concluded that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity

to perform a significant range of sedentary work,” (Id. at 29) and adopted the opinion of the

vocational expert that Plaintiff could adjust to other work as a “hand packager,” “production

worker,” or a “packager,” (Id. at 28).

The DOT, however, designates those positions as requiring a strength factor of

“medium,” rather than sedentary.6

 See DOT 920.587-018 (hand packager); DOT 529.686-

070 (production helper); DOT 920.685-078 (packager). Thus, there is a conflict between the

vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT.

Defendant argues that the vocational expert was referring to broad categories of

production and packaging as a whole, and not to specific jobs. (Dkt. # 28 at 3) Defendant

asserts that there are other jobs in those two areas that do not require lifting more than the

amount found by the ALJ.7

 (Id.) Defendant proffers three such jobs: advertising-service clerk

(DOT 247.387-018), order clerk (DOT 249.362-026), and charge account clerk (DOT

205.367-014). (Id.) Thus, Defendant asserts that there is no conflict between the vocational

expert’s testimony and the DOT.

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Occupational definitions are divided into three levels: overarching “categories,”subcategories called “divisions,” and finally “groups.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Parts

(4th rev. ed. 1991), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/dot/references/dotparts.htm.

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However, as Plaintiff points out, there is no such thing as a general “production area”

or “packaging and filling” area. Defendant is ostensibly referring to the “Packaging and

Materials Handling Occupations” and “Production and Stock Clerks and Related

Occupations” divisions.8

 However, none of the jobs to which Defendant refers falls in either

of these divisions. All three of the jobs are in the “Clerical and Sales Occupations” category.

The first two are in the “Miscellaneous Clerical Occupations” division and the third is in the

“Stenography, Typing, Filing, and Related Occupations” division. None of the groups

involves production or packaging and filling; rather, they are all clerical jobs. Thus, the

conflict between the DOT and the vocational expert’s testimony cannot be explained by

reference to these positions.

Second, the vocational expert did not provide sufficient support for her testimony such

that the conflict described above was justified. There may be an explanation for the disparity

between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT, but no explanation was elicited by

the ALJ or provided by the vocational expert on the record. Because the record does not

contain such an explanation, there is presently not sufficient support for the vocational

expert’s conclusion to justify the conflict between her testimony and the DOT.

Because the ALJ failed to inquire into or explain the conflict between the vocational

expert’s testimony and the DOT, the ALJ committed legal error that is not harmless. The

ALJ’s decision must therefore be vacated.

III. Remedy

Having decided to vacate the ALJ’s decision, the Court has the discretion to remand

the case either for further proceedings or for an award benefits. See Reddick v. Chater, 157

F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 1998). The rule in this Circuit is that a remand for an award of

benefits is appropriate in cases where there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved

and it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to award benefits. See id. In

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this case, the ALJ erred by not explaining the apparent inconsistency between the DOT and

the vocational expert’s testimony. Because it is uncertain how the ALJ will resolve this

inconsistency, it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to award

benefits. Therefore, the Court will remand the case for further proceedings consistent with

this order.

CONCLUSION

The ALJ made a legal error in failing to inquire into and explain conflicts between the

vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT. Because the error was not harmless, the ALJ’s

decision must be vacated and the case must be remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this order.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment.

DATED this 5th day of September, 2008.

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