Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01251/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01251-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW SMELTZER,

Petitioner,

v.

AUDREY KING,

Respondent. 

 

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Civil No. 14-CV-1251-WQH (WVG)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

PETITON FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

[DOC. NO. 8]

I.

INTRODUCTION

Matthew Smeltzer (“Petitioner”), a civil committee, has filed a Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 

indeterminate civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) under California 

Welfare and Institutions Code, § 6600 et. seq. (Doc. No. 8.) Petitioner asserts five 

grounds for relief, all of which were raised on direct appeal in state court. (Doc. No. 8 at 

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6-9.) Respondent’s Answer concedes that the Petition is timely and that Petitioner 

properly exhausted each of his claims in state court. (Doc. No. 14.)

The Court has considered the Petition and Exhibits, Respondent’s Answer, 

Petitioner’s Traverse and all supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon 

the documents and evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, 

the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct unless Petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992)

(holding that findings of fact, including inferences properly drawn from these facts, are 

entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the 

California Court of Appeal’s opinion on Petitioner’s direct appeal, affirming the 

judgment of the trial court. (Doc. No. 15-5.)

[Petitioner’s] civil commitment arose from his 

repeated acts of molestation of young children and his 

diagnosis of pedophilia. In 1985 when [Petitioner] was 29 

years old, the 10-year-old daughter of his first wife 

accused him of digitally penetrating her vagina; these 

allegations were investigated but not pursued by the 

authorities. In 1991 when [Petitioner] was 34 years old, he 

sustained three convictions of lewd acts against a child 

under age 14, which formed the predicate offense for his 

SVP status.

The 1991 offenses were committed on multiple 

occasions during a four-to-six-week period after 

[Petitioner] distributed a letter at his apartment complex 

inviting children, ages five to 10, to his apartment for 

“movie night.” While his pregnant wife was at home in 

another room, [Petitioner] molested two seven-year-old 

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girls and a four-year-old girl while they were sitting on his 

lap covered with a blanket, including touching their genital 

areas over or under their underwear. With one of the 

seven-year-old victims, he also digitally penetrated her 

vagina and made her touch his penis while she was on his 

bed. Three other girls at the apartment complex also 

reported that [Petitioner] touched their genital area over 

their clothing; these charges were not part of his guilty 

plea but he later admitted to an interviewer that he 

molested four girls at his apartment. [Petitioner] told the 

probation officer that he would fantasize about these 

touchings while masturbating. [Petitioner] told the 

probation officer that he was afraid of being caught, but 

his desire to molest overcame his fear.

[Petitioner] was granted probation for the 1991 

offenses, with a suspended 10-year sentence. While 

released on probation, he at times participated in sex 

offender treatment. In 1994, he violated probation by 

being with his children without supervision; this occurred 

when his wife felt it was safe to leave him alone with their 

infant twin sons because he had never molested boys and 

the boys were infants. After this violation, his probation 

was modified and reinstated. A few months later, he 

violated probation a second time by possessing obscene 

material about sexual acts with “quasi human/animal 

figures” that his therapist determined were “pedophilic in 

nature.” Based on this second violation, his probation was 

revoked and he was sent to prison to serve the 10-year 

term.

[Petitioner] commenced his prison term in 1995, 

and he was released on parole in 1999. In 2000, he was 

caught walking out of his residence with a VCR and 

cartoon videos that would appeal to children, which was 

in violation of his parole. In this same year, he was found 

in possession of a list of names of children from Kenya 

and their ages; he stated he had been corresponding with 

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these children since 1997 through a pastor. He was sent to 

prison for violating parole and released in December 2000.

In 2002, he wrote letters to three 15-year-old girls 

using the name and address of a friend (also a convicted 

sex offender) who lived in the same hotel where he was 

residing. Also in 2002, he committed a child pornography 

offense by using a key to go into the friend’s room and 

going online on the friend’s computer. He admitted that 

over a five-to-eight month period he viewed 20 to 100 

images of nude children in provocative poses and 

engaging in sexual acts. He said that “he knows it was not 

good to do, but he continued.” After committing the child 

pornography offense, in 2003 he was determined to be an 

SVP and committed to a state hospital.

(Doc. No. 15-5 at 2-4.)

III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State Court Trial and Appeal

On June 25, 2010, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office filed an Amended 

Petition for Involuntary Treatment of a Sexually Violent Predator seeking an 

indeterminate commitment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. 

(Doc. No. 15-1 at 20-23.) The Amended Petition alleged that Petitioner was a sexually 

violent predator with a mental disorder and that he was likely to engage in sexually 

violent predatory criminal behavior in the future. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 22.) The Amended 

Petition requested the court commit Petitioner for an indeterminate term. (Doc. No. 15-

1 at 22.)

After a first trial resulted in a hung jury, a second jury trial commenced on June 

4, 2012 before the Honorable Howard H. Shore. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 119.) On June 20, 

2012, the jury found that Petitioner was a sexually violent predator. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 

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136.) On June 21, 2012, the trial court ordered that Petitioner be committed to the 

Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 133-34.)

On June 22, 2012, Petitioner filed a direct appeal of the commitment in the 

California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 

92.) Petitioner argued that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to 

Due Process by limiting his presentation of expert testimony and declining to modify a 

jury instruction. (Doc. No. 15-3 at 37, 56.) Petitioner also argued that his indeterminate 

commitment violated his constitutional right to equal protection, denied him due process, 

subjected him to ex post facto violations and double jeopardy, and violated the ban on 

cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. No. 15-3 at 37-130.) On August 7, 2013, the 

California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s rulings in an unpublished opinion.

The court held that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by the trial court’s 

ruling to preclude experts from expounding on case law and that any error in declining 

to modify the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. No. 15-5

at 14, 17.) The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claims of denial of due 

process, ex post facto violation, cruel and unusual punishment, and double jeopardy 

citing People v. McKee, 223 P.3d 566 (Cal. 2010); People v. McKee, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

308 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); People v. McDonald, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2013); People v. Landau, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); People v. McCloud, 

153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); and People v. McKnight, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 132 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2012), without a narrative explanation. (Doc. No. 15-5 at 19.) The court 

of appeal rejected Petitioner’s equal protection claim procedurally and on the merits. 

(Doc. No. 15-5 at 19-20.)

On September 9, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California 

Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 15-6.) The petition for review was denied on October 16, 

2013, without comment. (Doc. No. 15-7.)

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B. Habeas Petition in Federal Court

On May 19, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 in this Court. (Doc. No. 1). On June 5, 2014, this 

Court construed the petition to be under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, and dismissed the 

petition without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee and failure to name a proper 

respondent, allowing Petitioner until August 4, 2014 to correct the errors. (Doc. No. 2). 

On March 24, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file an amended petition (Doc. 

No. 6) and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 4). On April 9, 2015 this 

Court granted the motion for leave to file an amended petition no later than June 1, 2015,

and denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 7.) On May 4, 2015, 

Petitioner filed a first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

Section 2254. (Doc. No. 8.) Respondent filed an answer on July 29, 2015. (Doc. No. 15.) 

On August 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (Doc. No. 16.)

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”) because it was filed after April 24, 1996 and Petitioner is in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 

(1997). Under AEDPA, a court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d), unless the state court’s judgment “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause “if ‘the state 

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases.’”

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Andrews v. Davis, 798 F.3d 759, 774 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). The court may grant relief 

under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the 

governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those 

decisions to the facts of a particular case. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct.

1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). However, “an unreasonable application of Supreme 

Court precedent is not one that is merely ‘incorrect or erroneous’ [citation omitted], 

rather, ‘the pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the relevant 

Supreme Court precedent was unreasonable.’” Andrews, 798 F.3d at 774 (quoting 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) and

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011))

(emphasis in original). Precedent is not “clearly established” law under section

2254(d)(1) “unless it ‘squarely addresses the issue’ in the case before the state court 

[citation omitted] or ‘establishes a legal principal that clearly extends’ to the case before 

the state court.” Id. at 773 (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26, 128 

S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2008)).

In deciding a habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether 

it agrees with the state court’s determination. Rather, Section 2254(d) “sets forth a 

‘highly deferential standard, which demands that state-court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt.’” Id. at 774 (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 1398, 131 

S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)). While not a complete bar on the relitigation of 

claims already rejected in state court proceedings, Section 2254(d) merely ‘“preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [Supreme Court precedent]’ and 

‘goes no further.’” Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the highest state court to which the 

claim was presented, the court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision 

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and presumes it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); 

Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013), as amended on denial of 

rehearing, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, − U.S. −, 134 S.Ct. 1001, 187 

L.Ed.2d 863 (2014). If the dispositive state court does not furnish an explanation for its 

decision, a federal habeas court must “engage in an independent review of the record 

and ascertain whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable.” Murray 

v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early v. Packer, 

537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning 

nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the 

state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly 

established federal law, for purposes of Section 2254(d), means “the governing principle 

or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its 

decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. Ninth Circuit cases may be persuasive authority for 

purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court law and may be relevant to determining what Supreme 

Court law is clearly established. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 

2000).

V.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s five grounds for relief are as follows: (1) his Fourteenth Amendment 

right to due process was violated when the trial court precluded his expert witness from 

discussing case law; (2) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated 

when the trial court declined to modify jury instructions; (3) his Fourteenth Amendment 

right to equal protection was violated when he was committed to an indeterminate term; 

(4) his indeterminate commitment violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 

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process, the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution, and the 

Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment; and (5) his indeterminate 

commitment violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In support

of each of these claims, Petitioner incorporates by reference his brief on direct appeal to 

the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 8 at 6-9.)

Respondent argues that the California Court of Appeal reasonably rejected each 

of the claims. First, Respondent argues that “[a] defendant’s right to present evidence is 

not absolute for the defendant must comply with established rules of evidence and 

procedure,” citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-411, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d

798 (1988). (Doc. No. 14-1 at 11.) Second, Respondent argues that “federal habeas relief 

may only be had when an erroneous jury instruction has infected the trial process to the 

point that the resulting conviction violates due process,” citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). (Doc. No. 14-1 at 13.) Lastly, 

Respondent argues that the California Court of Appeal’s succinct rejection of 

Petitioner’s remaining constitutional claims was reasonable. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 16.)

A. Due Process Claims

Petitioner’s first two claims under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause 

attack the trial judge’s decision to limit the testimony of Petitioner’s expert and refusal 

to modify a jury instruction. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution prohibits a state from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty or property 

without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “Civil commitment for any 

purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process

protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 

(1979). “Beyond the enumerated protections contained in the Bill of Rights, the Due 

Process Clause has limited operation,” and violations of fundamental fairness have been 

“very narrowly” defined. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668, 

107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). State court proceedings normally do not offend the Due Process 

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Clause unless they offend “some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 

conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Patterson v. New York, 432 

U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).

During collateral attacks on the judgment, “habeas petitioners ‘are not entitled to 

habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual 

prejudice.’” Davis v. Ayala, − U.S. −, −, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (quoting Brecht 

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). Thus, 

relief is only proper when a federal habeas court has ‘“grave doubt about whether a trial 

error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.”’ Id. at 2198 (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)).

i. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process Was Not 

Violated By the Limitation of Testimony of the Defense Expert Witness

Petitioner contends that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was 

violated by the trial court ruling limiting the testimony of defense expert witness, Dr. 

Alan Abrams. Specifically, Petitioner argues that this ruling “precluded [Petitioner] from 

confronting the prosecution’s experts about their misunderstanding of the standard, [and] 

presenting his expert’s testimony on a key issue,” and thus violated his right to due 

process. (Doc. No. 8 at 23.)

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s limitation 

on expert testimony. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Petitioner then 

filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied 

his petition. The last reasoned state court decision, which addresses the merits of the 

claim, is the California Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming the trial court’s ruling on 

expert witnesses. It is to that decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. 

at 805-06.

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The court of appeal found the following facts regarding the expert testimony:

At several points while pursuing the control impairment 

issue, defense counsel asked the People’s experts about the 

case law, including the Burris case. In response, the court 

admonished counsel not to get into a discussion of the 

witness’s interpretation of the case law; however, the 

witness could state what standards he used to form his 

opinion, and the jury could determine whether the 

standards used by the witness comported with the court’s 

instructions on the law. Based on this ruling, the court told 

defense counsel not “to go any further into discussion of 

specific cases” while questioning Dr. Owen about the 

seriousness requirement, and the court sustained an 

objection to defense counsel’s questioning of Dr. Simon 

about the factual details of the Burris case.

During the defense case, the defense expert witness 

(psychiatrist Alan Abrams) testified that SVP case law 

requires that the person have serious difficulty controlling 

his or her sexual violence. When defense counsel sought 

to elicit testimony from Dr. Abrams about the Burris case, 

the trial court reiterated that the expert witness could state

the definition he used and the jury could compare it with 

the definition given by the court, but the questioning could 

not involve “a legal discussion.”

 (Doc. No. 15-5 at 13.)

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling limiting the 

testimony of Dr. Alan Abrams. (Doc. No. 15-5 at 2.) The court reasoned:

Contrary to [Petitioner’s] contention, he was not precluded 

from challenging the People’s experts’ reliance on 

recidivism as a factor showing control impairment.

Defense counsel elicited testimony from the defense 

expert that the correct standard was whether the person 

had serious difficulty controlling sexual misbehavior, and 

recidivism was simply one relevant factor to consider. 

[Petitioner] has not explained how testimony from the 

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defense expert on the specifics of the Burris decision 

would have meaningfully augmented the defense expert’s 

testimony on this point.

The record shows [Petitioner] had a full opportunity to 

present testimony from his expert witness on the definition 

of volitional impairment, and his due process rights were 

not impeded by the trial court’s ruling precluding both the 

People’s and the defense experts from expounding on the 

case law underlying the volitional impairment definition.

(Doc. No. 15-5 at 14.)

This Court agrees with the California Court of Appeal. Trial judges may “exclude

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Holmes v. South 

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006); see also United 

States. v. Espinoza-Baza, 647 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, it is the court, 

and not a witness, not even an expert witness, that establishes the law of the case to be 

used by the trier of fact through the use of jury instructions, and witnesses are typically 

prohibited from testifying about the law. Summers v. AL Gilbert Co., 69 Cal. App. 4th 

1155, 1178-84 (1999); see also Nationwide Transport Finance v. Cass Information 

Systems, Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, errors in the admission or 

exclusion of evidence are generally not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Charlton 

v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 457, 33 S.Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913). A habeas petitioner 

“is entitled to relief if the evidentiary decision created an absence of fundamental 

fairness that ‘fatally infected the trial.’” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th

Cir. 1996) (quoting Keaohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Petitioner argues that the government’s expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Owen and 

Dr. Eric Simon, were able to testify about People v. Burris, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 113 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 2002), in regards to their determination of volitional impairment but that 

Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Abrams, was precluded from explaining how Burris applied in 

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Petitioner’s case. (Doc. No. 8 at 27-28.) Petitioner is correct in stating that the 

government’s experts did testify to some extent about the Burris decision. However, 

much of this discussion was elicited from Petitioner’s counsel on cross-examination and 

not from the government.

When cross-examining Dr. Owen, the government’s expert witness, Petitioner’s 

counsel inquired as to Dr. Owen’s knowledge of volitional impairment requirements. 

When asked about volitional impairment, the following discussion occurred:

A: I think it’s wider than that. I think really it has to do 

with impulsivity. You mentioned me knowing the law. I 

think the Burris decision in talking about failure to be 

deterred by prior consequences is really a great definition 

here of volitional impairment.

Q: And what is that definition?

A: The definition is that if a man is basically placed on 

community supervision and fails it, he has not been 

detoured by a prior consequence. That’s volitional 

impairment according to that decision.

Q: Another important – I’m going to come back to that in 

a minute.

(Doc. No. 15-12 at 77-78.) Petitioner’s counsel then clarified another aspect of the 

SVP requirements before returning to the volition impairment question. Again, 

Petitioner’s counsel continued to confront the prosecutor’s evaluators about their 

impression of the volitional impairment standard:

Q: So one of the criteria we look for, as you indicated just 

now, that the court’s indicated you can look for to see if 

someone has this volitional impairment is to see if they, 

after they commit the offense and, you know, get some 

kind of sanction, they continue to commit that offense 

again, right?

A: I think it’s wider than that. I think we’re looking at their 

whole adjustment in the community, not just whether 

they’ve gone out and committed a similar offense.

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Q: Isn’t it true that the case you referred to indicates that 

if there is a sanction for the offending behavior and they 

continue to offend, that can be considered a basis for 

viewing they had some kind of volitional impairment?

A: Yes.

(Doc. No 15-12 at 78-79.) Petitioner’s counsel continued the examination without 

interruption in regards to the Burris case, and again sought further clarification regarding 

the volitional standard set out in Burris:

Q: The law for S.V.P. inclusion requires a higher standard 

than that, correct?

A: The law requires emotional or volitional impairment.

Q: Serious emotional or volitional impairment?

A: True.

(Doc. No. 15-12 at 153.) The government objected that this testimony was a 

misstatement of law because the word ‘serious’ is not in the statute. (Doc. No. 15-12 at 

154.) The court overruled the objection, allowing the witness to testify as to what 

standard they used to form an opinion but not a discussion of the law because that would 

come from the court. (Doc. No. 15-12 at 153.) Petitioner’s counsel continued the crossexamination of Dr. Owen and further clarified the volitional impairment standard used 

in his examination of Petitioner.

Q: Doctor, what standard did you use?

A: I’m using the standard of the initial law, the 6600 

statute, and I’m relying upon the Crane and Burris

discussion of volitional impairment.

Q: What do those cases tell you that relied upon as far as 

determining your standards? [sic]

A: Well, Crane basically looks at the fact that volitional 

impairment has to be present and spells that out. Burris

talks about what it entails, what is volitional impairment, 

and, again, the Burris decision says that if a man has not 

been deterred by a prior consequence such as going to 

prison, this is an example of volitional impairment.

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(Doc. No. 15-12 at 156-57.) The cross-examination concluded without further 

objections from the government and the court regarding the discussion of case law and 

the prosecutor did not ask about case law on redirect. (Doc. No. 8 at 168.) It is clear from 

the record that Petitioner was not precluded from confronting government expert witness

Dr. Owen about his understanding of the standard for volitional impairment.

Similar to the examination of Dr. Owen, the examination of Dr. Simon and his 

understanding of the Burris case was elicited primarily from Petitioner’s counsel on 

cross-examination. However, on direct examination by the government, Dr. Simon was 

asked if Petitioner’s crimes were evidence of Petitioner’s volitional impairment. Dr. 

Simon testified:

My opinion is based on two things: It’s based on – with all 

these repeated data points, this suggests to me that there is 

a driven quality to his actions. He is driven to do this by 

something kicking around inside of him, I.E., pedophilia. 

The other reason for my opinion is that I rely on the People 

vs. Burris case law, which instructed as I understand it, 

that volitional impairment by that court was defined as

someone who evidences a pattern of detection followed by 

punishment followed by new sex offenses, that that is 

evidence of a – that the person’s not likely to be deterred 

by the threat of future criminal punishment and that that 

would indicate volitional impairment.

(Doc. No. 15-13 at 52.) The government’s examination continued without further 

discussion of Burris. On cross-examination, Petitioner’s counsel confronted Dr. Simon 

on his understanding of the Burris case. Dr. Simon stated:

My understanding is – I don’t remember the whole case, 

but as it applies to this issue, my understanding is that if 

the individual has shown by way of a pattern of detection 

followed by reoffending, that they’re unlikely to – that the 

threat of future criminal punishment is unlikely to deter 

them, that that constitutes volitional impairment.

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(Doc. No. 15-13 at 151.) Petitioner’s counsel began to question Dr. Simon about 

his knowledge of evidentiary issues from Burris before the government objected. (Doc. 

No. 15-13 at 151.) The court sustained the objection stating the witness could testify as 

to what they used to form their opinion but that analysis of appellate court decisions was 

improper. (Doc. No. 15-13 at 151.) On numerous other occasions, Petitioner’s counsel 

questions the government’s witness, Dr. Simon, about the volitional impairment issue. 

(Doc. No. 15-13 at 154, 159-61.) Redirect and re-cross examinations continued without 

further discussion of Burris or volitional impairment. It is clear from the record that 

contrary to Petitioner’s claim, Petitioner’s counsel was not precluded from confronting 

either of the government’s experts about their understanding of the volitional impairment 

standards.

Petitioner also claims the court precluded him from presenting his expert’s 

testimony about the volitional impairment standard. Petitioner’s attorney began to ask 

about volitional impairment by asking how Dr. Abrams, Petitioner’s expert witness,

comes to the definitions he uses when analyzing an individual. After Dr. Abrams stated

that he relied in part on case law, Petitioner’s counsel asked:

Q: And what are the basic landmark cases that you utilize 

in coming into your determinations?

A: Well, I think in the federal constitutional arena, Kansas 

v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane set the minimal 

constitutional criteria. In California, of course, Euberg and 

Ghilotti are some of the cases that lay out the framework 

regarding the issue of volitional impairment. We also have 

the case of Burris and other cases.

(Doc. No. 15-16 at 79.) Petitioner’s counsel then asked if the cases Dr. Abrams 

just named stated the requirement for volitional impairment. The court intervened and 

reminded counsel that the witness can state “whatever definition he uses” but the 

instruction on the law will come from the court. (Doc. No. 15-16 at 80.) After a sidebar 

discussion, Petitioner’s counsel continued his examination of Dr. Abrams including a 

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lengthy discussion of Dr. Abrams’ definition of volitional impairment. (Doc. No. 15-16 

at 81.) Notably, Petitioner’s counsel never directly asked what standard or definition of 

volitional impairment was used as Petitioner’s counsel had done with the government’s 

expert witnesses. Petitioner’s counsel was not precluded from presenting expert witness 

testimony on the issue of volitional impairment. Thus, Petitioner has not established that 

the “evidentiary decision” to preclude Dr. Abrams from testifying about case law

“created an absence of fundamental fairness that fatally infected the trial.” OrtizSandoval, 81 F.3d at 897 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

as to this claim.

ii. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right Was Not Violated 

When the Trial Court Declined to Modify the Jury Instruction

Petitioner contends that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was 

violated when the trial court denied defense counsel’s request to modify jury 

instructions. Petitioner’s counsel requested the jury be instructed that any mental 

disorder must seriously affect the person’s ability to control behavior, instead of 

instructing the jury that the person’s mental disorder must affect the person’s ability to 

control behavior. (Doc. No. 8 at 32.) (emphasis added).

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s rejection 

of defense counsel’s request to modify the jury instruction. The court of appeal affirmed 

the trial court’s ruling. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the California 

Supreme Court, which summarily denied his petition. The last reasoned state court 

decision, which addresses the merits of the claim, is the California Court of Appeal’s 

opinion affirming the trial court’s ruling declining to modify the jury instruction. It is to 

that decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06.

The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling declining to modify the jury 

instruction regarding the volitional impairment standard. (Doc. No. 15-5 at 17.) The 

court reasoned:

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In appropriate circumstances a defendant is entitled upon 

request to an instruction that clarifies the law. Assuming 

arguendo the court erred by declining to add the word 

“serious” to the instruction, any error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing the record as a whole, 

we have no doubt the jury understood the control 

impairment must be serious. The SVP instructions told the 

jury that (1) the disorder must make it likely the person 

will engage in sexually violent predatory behavior; (2) the 

disorder includes conditions affecting the ability to control 

that create a predisposition to commit sexual acts to such 

an extent that the person is a menace to safety; and (3) 

there is a likelihood of sexually violent predatory behavior 

if there is a substantial, serious, and well-founded risk of 

such conduct. An instruction requiring that the person 

must constitute a menace to society and pose a substantial 

and serious risk of misconduct undoubtedly conveyed to 

the jury that the control impairment must be serious.

Further, the serious control impairment requirement was 

conceded during the testimony of People’s expert Dr. 

Simon, who acknowledged that persons who meet the SVP 

criteria have a “serious deficiency” in their ability to 

control themselves. In closing arguments, although 

counsel for both parties sought to define the term “serious” 

in the manner most favorable to their positions, there was 

no claim that seriousness was not a requirement. The 

prosecutor argued that [Petitioner’s] control was impaired 

to such a degree that he acted even though he knew he 

might suffer criminal consequences: “Volitional capacity, 

he was able to override his fears that told him ‘Don’t do 

this behavior... You’re going to get caught.’ He did it 

anyways. So that shows the volitional capacity that’s 

impaired, that it’s affected.” Defense counsel emphasized 

that an SVP finding requires a “serious impairment” of 

ability to control to “such an intensity of urge and effect 

on the person that they lose control of their volition,”; an 

“inability to control” such that the person poses a “serious, 

substantial and well-founded risk...”; “we’re looking for 

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those people that can’t control themselves...” In rebuttal 

the prosecutor argued that [Petitioner’s] pedophilia 

affected his ability to control, he could not control his 

behavior, and he posed a serious, nontrivial risk of 

reoffending. “Does he have a disorder that affects his 

ability to control his behavior? Yes. Is he likely to reoffend 

again? Yes... And what’s the other bit of evidence that we 

have that shows that he cannot control his behavior? We 

have the investigation in ’85, arrest in ’91, crime-arrest, 

crime-arrest cycle... Is the risk presented serious? Yes?

What’s the antonym? Trivial or meaningless. Are we 

talking meaningless risk here? No. Even his own experts 

say he presents a risk. All the instruments...place him in 

either the moderate-high or the high-risk component.”

The record as a whole shows the jurors were presented 

with testimony, instructions, and closing argument that 

repeatedly informed them that the control impairment 

must be serious. There is no reasonable possibility the jury 

thought [Petitioner] could qualify as an SVP if he did not 

have serious difficulty controlling his pedophilia. 

Accordingly, any error in failing to clarify the seriousness 

requirement in the jury instructions was harmless.

(Doc. No. 15-5 at 17-19.) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

This Court agrees with the California Court of Appeal. “Instructional error will 

not support a petition for federal writ of habeas relief unless it is shown ‘not merely that 

the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ [citation 

omitted], but ‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process.’ [citation omitted].” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 

926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 

38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 

52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997). Moreover, the allegedly erroneous jury instruction cannot be 

judged in isolation. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 

(1991). Rather, it must be considered in the context of the entire trial record and the 

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instructions as a whole. Id.; see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 343-44, 113 S.Ct.

2112, 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993) (finding that the right to present a complete defense does 

not entitle a defendant to a particular set of jury instructions). Where the alleged error is 

the failure to give an instruction, the burden on the petitioner is “especially heavy.” 

Henderson, 431 U.S. at 145.

Petitioner argues that the instruction provided to the jury was inadequate because 

the proper question for jurors was whether the prosecution had proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s disorder seriously affected his ability to control 

behavior. (Doc. No. 8 at 35.) However, when considered in the context of the entire trial 

record, it is clear that the seriousness required was conveyed to the jurors. The level of 

seriousness required was conveyed to the jury during the State’s case in chief, during 

Petitioner’s case in chief, and during closing arguments. In addition, the jury instructions 

as a whole properly conveyed to the jury that Petitioner’s disorder must seriously affect 

his ability to control behavior. No reasonable juror having heard the instructions in their

entirety as well as all of evidence would have concluded that a disorder which does not 

seriously affect behavior would satisfy the SVP requirements. The prosecutor did 

nothing to even suggest to the jury that Petitioner’s disorder need not seriously affect his 

behavior to qualify under the SVP requirements. Petitioner has not established that any 

jury instruction error occurred nor that any error “so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.” Murtishaw, 255 F.3d at 971 (internal citations 

omitted). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

B. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment Rights To Equal Protection And Due 

Process Were Not Violated When He Was Committed For An 

Indeterminate Term

Petitioner contends that his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and 

due process were violated when the trial court committed him to an indeterminate term. 

Petitioner argues that he has a more difficult burden to regain freedom than similarly 

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situated persons committed under other civil commitment schemes, such as those 

committed as a mentally disordered offender (“MDO”) or an individual found not guilty 

by reason of insanity (“NGI”), without justification. (Doc. No. 8 at 38.) Further, 

Petitioner argues he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that he should 

not receive disparate treatment violating his due process right. (Doc. No. 8 at 39.) 

Respondent argues that the court of appeal was reasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s 

claims. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 11-12.)

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s 

indeterminate commitment. The court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s equal protection 

claim both procedurally and on the merits. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in 

the California Supreme Court, which summarily denied his petition. The last reasoned 

state court decision, which addresses the merits of the claim, is the California Court of 

Appeal’s opinion rejecting Petitioner’s equal protection claim. It is to that decision this 

Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06.

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s equal protection challenge to his 

indeterminate commitment. (Doc. No. 15-5 at 19-20.) The court reasoned:

In McKee I, the California Supreme Court stated that on 

remand the People would have an opportunity to prove 

that SVP’s “as a class” pose a greater risk than similarlysituated offenders so as to justify indefinite, commitment 

“at least as applied to McKee.” (McKee I, supra, 47 

Ca1.4th at pp. 1208, 1210.) At the remand hearing, after 

an extensive evidentiary presentation, the trial court found 

the People had made the requisite showing, and on appeal 

our court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. (McKee II,

supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1330-1331, 1348.) In our

decision on appeal, we concluded that the information 

presented by the People supported that SVP’s as a class 

pose distinct dangers that permit them to be treated 

differently from other types of offenders, and our holding 

was not premised on McKee’s particular characteristics.

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(Id. at pp. 1340-1348.) Given the scope of our holding, we 

reject [Petitioner’s] contention that he is entitled to an 

individualized determination of his equal protection 

challenge. (Accord, People v. McKnight, supra, 212 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 863-864 [McKee II’s equal protection 

holding applies to “class of SVP’s as a whole,” not to Mr. 

McKee alone]; People v. McDonald, supra, 214 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1377-1378.)

(Doc. No. 15-5 at 20.)

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no 

State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ 

which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” 

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 

L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). However, the Equal Protection Clause does not require identical 

treatment, rather, it “guarantees that the government will not classify individuals on the 

basis of impermissible criteria.” Coal. For Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 

(9th Cir. 1997). Further, a “legislative classification will deny equal protection only if it 

is not ‘rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’” Id. (quoting City of Cleburne, 

473 U.S. at 440). Thus, Petitioner must show either (1) that the court was objectively 

unreasonable in holding that SVPs are not similarly situated to MDOs and NGIs or, (2) 

show “that it was objectively unreasonable to conclude, [citation omitted], that there was 

a rational relationship between the differential treatment and a legitimate government 

purpose, [citation omitted]. Seeboth v. Allenby, 789 F.3d 1099, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409) (citing Coal. For Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 702).

It has been held repeatedly, in both state and federal courts, that SVPs are not 

similarly situated to other civilly committed individuals. See Taylor v. San Diego 

County, ─ F.3d ─ (9th Cir. 2015), WL5234755 at *6 (holding that individuals who are 

committed under the California Lanterman-Petris Short Act are not similarly situated to 

those committed under the California Sexually Violent Predators Act); Litmon v. Harris, 

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768 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “neither mentally disordered offenders 

nor mentally disordered sex offenders are similarly situated to sexually violent 

predators.”); Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 782 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 

California state courts reasonably found that sexually violent predators were not denied 

equal protection when compared to other civilly committed offenders.) People v. 

McKee, 223 P.3d 566, 581 (Cal. 2010) (noting that “those who are reasonably 

determined to represent a greater danger may be treated differently.”) The facts in this 

Petition are nearly identical to the cases cited. The court of appeal reasonably could have 

found the SVPs are not similarly situated to MDOs or NGIs. Petitioner has made no 

attempt to distinguish this precedent, nor does Petitioner attempt to show that the court 

of appeal was unreasonable in rejecting his claims. Accordingly, the holding of the court 

of appeal was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent or objectively unreasonable.

Petitioner was unable to show that it was unreasonable to find that SVPs are not 

similarly situated to MDOs or NGIs, and Petitioner must now show that the court of 

appeal was objectively unreasonable in concluding that there was a rational relationship 

between differential treatment and a legitimate government purpose. In Seeboth v. 

Allenby, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently examined this relationship 

regarding California’s SVP statutes. The court stated:

The state’s interest in preventing violent crime is more 

than legitimate; it is compelling. United States v. Salerno, 

481 U.S. 739, 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). 

The narrower question is whether it was objectively 

unreasonable for the state courts to hold that the state 

legislature had a rational reason to distinguish between 

individuals who have been found to be mentally ill and 

dangerous (MDOs and NGIs) and individuals who have 

been found to be mentally ill and sexually dangerous 

(SVPs). With respect to the procedural steps in the civil 

recommitment process that are at issue here, the state court 

reasonably concluded that California may make such a 

distinction. See Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 485 (7th 

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Cir.2002) (“[I]t is not unreasonable for the State to believe 

that a person with a mental disorder of a sexual nature is 

qualitatively more dangerous than another mental patient 

who nonetheless threatens danger to himself or others.”); 

see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364–65, 117 

S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (upholding Kansas’

civil commitment law for sexually violent predators 

against a due process challenge, in part because the law 

applied to a “narrow class of particularly dangerous 

individuals”).

Seeboth, 789 F.3d at 1106. The facts of that case also are nearly identical to the 

facts in the instant Petition. The state court of appeal reasonably could have found there 

was a rational relationship between the differential treatment and a legitimate 

government interest. Petitioner has made no attempt to distinguish this precedent, nor 

does Petitioner attempt to show that the court of appeal was unreasonable in rejecting 

his claims. Therefore, the court of appeal was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent 

or objectively unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief as to this claim.

C. Petitioner’s Remaining Constitutional Claims Regarding His 

Indeterminate Commitment

In his remaining three claims, Petitioner contends that the indeterminate 

commitment violates several constitutionally protected rights as follows: (1) denial of 

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; (2) violation of the Ex Post Facto 

Clause, (3) violation of Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment; and 

(4) violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. No. 8 at 8-

9.) Petitioner challenged the trial court’s indeterminate commitment on the above listed 

grounds in the California Court of Appeal. The court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s 

challenges, stating the following:

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[Petitioner] raises several constitutional challenges to his 

indeterminate commitment that have been repeatedly 

rejected by the courts, including denial of equal protection, 

denial of due process, ex post facto violation, cruel and 

unusual punishment, and double jeopardy. (People v. 

McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1193, 1195 (McKee I) 

[rejecting due process and ex post facto challenges]; 

People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1347-

1348 (McKee II) [rejecting equal protection challenge]; 

People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1383 

[rejecting cruel and unusual punishment and double 

jeopardy challenges]; accord People v. Landau (2013) 214 

Cal.App.4th 1, 8, 44-45; People v. McCloud (2013) 213 

Cal.App.4th 1076, 1085-1086; People v. McKnight (2012) 

212 Cal.App.4th 860, 863-864.) We agree with this case 

authority, and it is not necessary for us to repeat the 

extensive analyses set forth in these decisions that respond 

to [Petitioner’s] challenges. Based on this precedent, we 

reject [Petitioner’s] various constitutional challenges.

(Doc. No. 15-5 at 19). Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the California 

Supreme Court, which summarily denied his petition. This Court must direct its analysis 

to the last reasoned state court decision. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06.

i. Petitioner’s Civil Commitment of an Indeterminate Term Does Not 

Violate Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process

Petitioner contends that his indeterminate commitment violates his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to due process, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the ban against cruel 

and unusual punishment. Specifically, Petitioner claims that California Health and 

Wellness Section 6600 et seq violates due process because (1) the detainee is not entitled 

to the assistance of an expert and (2) has the burden of proof in any hearing ordered by 

the trial court. (Doc. No. 8 at 48, 50-51, 53.) 

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s 

indeterminate commitment. The court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s due process and 

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cruel and unusual punishment claims without a narrative explanation, citing People v. 

McKee, 223 P.3d 566, 577-78 (Cal. 2010) and People v. McDonald, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

823, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the 

California Supreme Court, which summarily denied his petition.

Petitioner first argues that he is denied due process because indigent civil 

committees are not appointed an expert when attempting to obtain release from civil

commitment. However, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, indigent civil committees are 

appointed an expert when attempting to obtain release from civil commitment. The 

California Supreme Court has ruled that experts must indeed be provided to indigent 

civil committees. The court stated:

Given that the denial of access to expert opinion when an 

indigent individual petitions on his or her own to be 

released may pose a significant obstacle to ensuring that 

only those meeting SVP commitment criteria remain 

committed, we construe section 6608, subdivision (a), 

read in conjunction with section 6605, subdivision (a), to 

mandate appointment of an expert for an indigent SVP 

who petitions the court for release.

People v. McKee, 223 P.3d 566, 576 (Cal. 2010). Thus, Petitioner’s first argument fails.

Petitioner next argues that his indeterminate commitment violates his right to due 

process because he has the burden of showing he is no longer a SVP. The Supreme Court 

has “consistently upheld such involuntary commitment statutes provided the 

confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards.” 

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357, (1997) 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (citing

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, (1992) 112 S.Ct., at 1785–1786; Addington v. 

Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–427, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809–1810, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). The 

Supreme Court has never held in the context of individuals involuntarily civilly 

committed that the Constitution bars the state from shifting the burden of proof to the 

civil committee. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rejected due process challenges to 

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a statute that shifted to a defendant “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that he [was] no longer mentally ill or dangerous. [citation omitted]” Jones v. 

United States, 463 U.S. 354, 357, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983). Although 

Jones dealt with a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, the statutory 

requirements are similar. The NGI scheme in Jones “establishe[d] two facts: (i) the 

defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the 

act because of mental illness.” Id. at 363. Similarly, a SVP in California is one who has 

“been convicted of a sexually violent offense” and “has a diagnosed mental disorder that 

makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others.” Calif. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§6600(a)(1). Thus, the court of appeal rejecting Petitioner’s due process claim was not 

contrary to Supreme Court precedent.

The state court of appeal reasonably could have found Petitioner’s case to be 

analogous to the Supreme Court precedent stated in Jones. Petitioner argues that the 

Supreme Court in Foucha forbade such burden shifting schemes because of the risk of 

continued commitment once a civil committee is free from mental illness. (Doc. No. 8 

at 49.) Petitioner is correct that a SVP may be held “as long as he is both mentally ill and 

dangerous, but no longer.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77. However, Foucha states that 

individuals may not be committed after they are no longer suffering from a mental illness 

and does not address burden shifting schemes. In California, the Department of Mental 

Health may file for release if it determines a SVP’s “diagnosed mental disorder has so 

changed that he or she is not a danger to the health and safety of others.” Calif. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6605(a). Further, “[a] person who has been committed as a sexually violent 

predator shall be permitted to petition the court for conditional release with or without 

the recommendation or concurrence of the Director of State Hospitals.” Id. § 6608(a). 

Both of these mechanisms of release greatly mitigate the concerns raised in Foucha. 

Therefore, the court of appeal was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent or 

objectively unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s claim.

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ii. Petitioner’s Indeterminate Civil Commitment Does Not Violate The Ex 

Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses

Petitioner contends that the modification to Section 6600 et seq by Proposition 83 

violates the Ex Post Facto clause and his indeterminate commitment violates the Double 

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In regards to the double jeopardy claim, 

Petitioner argues that the “requirement for an indeterminate commitment with the 

offender having the burden of proving his fitness for release converts the Act, in practical 

purpose and effect, into the old Indeterminate Sentencing Law.” (Doc. No. 8 at 55.) 

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s 

indeterminate commitment. The court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s double jeopardy 

and ex post facto claims without a narrative explanation, citing People v. McDonald, 

154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) and People v. McKee, 223 P.3d 566, 577-78 

(Cal. 2010). Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, 

which summarily denied his petition.

The Ex Post Facto Clause prevents legislatures from “retroactively alter[ing] the 

definition of crimes or increase[ing] the punishment for criminal acts.” Collins v. 

Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). The Ex Post Facto 

Clause pertains “exclusively to penal statutes.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 370. The Double 

Jeopardy Clause states that no person shall be “be subject for the same offence to be 

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. However, “[t]he Clause 

protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same 

offense.” Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997) (citing Helvering v. 

Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L. Ed. 917 (1938) (emphasis in 

original). Thus, a necessary prerequisite for both ex post facto and double jeopardy 

challenges is the punitive nature of the statute.

When determining if a statute is punitive, the test is the same for an ex post fact 

claim and a double jeopardy claim. Russel v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 

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1997.) (noting the Court in Hendricks used the same test for both the double jeopardy 

and ex post facto claims. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-71.). This Court must first consider 

the legislative intent of the challenged statute then, if the purpose is not found to be 

punitive, the Court must analyze the effects of the statute by applying the seven-factor 

Kennedy test to determine whether the effects of the statute are punitive. See Smith v. 

Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (articulating the analytical 

framework for determining whether a statute is punitive); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 

955 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the two-part Smith test to determine whether a statute 

requiring sex-offenders to register with the state is punitive for Ex Post Facto purposes); 

Young v. Weston, 344 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2003)(applying the two-part Smith test to the 

Washington sexual violent predator statute for ex post facto and double jeopardy 

purposes). The Kennedy factors are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative 

disability or restraint; (2) whether the sanction has historically been regarded as a 

punishment; (3) whether the sanction comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) 

whether the sanction’s operation will promote the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is 

already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which the sanction rationally may 

be connected is assignable to it; and (7) whether the sanction appears excessive in 

relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 

144, 168-69 (1963).

In evaluating the ex post facto and double jeopardy claims, the Court must first 

determine if the legislature intended the statute to be civil or punitive. Smith, 538 U.S. 

at 92. Deference is given to the legislature’s stated intent and only the clearest proof will 

be sufficient to override legislative intent and transform a civil remedy into a criminal 

penalty. Id. Applying this analysis, the Court finds that the legislature did not intend 

Section 6600 et seq to be punitive. The California legislature plainly stated the statute 

was “not for any punitive purpose[]” but that “individuals be committed and treated for 

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their disorders” so long as their disorder exists. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 763 (A.B. 

888) (WEST). Additionally, the Sexually Violent Predator Act was placed in the Welfare 

and Institutions Code, with other schemes concerned with the care and treatment of 

various mentally ill and disabled groups. See, e.g., §§ 5000 (LPS Act), 6500 (Mentally 

Retarded Persons Law). Moreover, the California Supreme Court has held that Section 

6600 et seq is a “civil scheme designed to protect the public from harm.” Hubbart v. 

Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 606 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.).

In 2006, California voters passed Proposition 83 which modified Section 6604 of 

the Sexually Violent Predator Act to civilly commit those found beyond a reasonable 

doubt to an indefinite term, rather than the two year term as previously required by the 

Act. Nothing suggests that the legislative intent of civil commitment and treatment is 

different as a result of Proposition 83 and Petitioner offers no evidence to suggest the 

legislature’s intent changed. Further, the California Supreme Court has held that “the 

Proposition 83 amendments do not make the [Sexually Violent Predator Act] punitive.” 

People v. McKee, 223 P.3d 566, 578 (Cal. 2010).

Having determined the California legislature did not intend Section 6600 et seq to 

be punitive, the Court next analyzes whether the effects of the statute are punitive by 

applying the seven-factor Kennedy test. The Court considers each factor in turn.

As to the first, whether Section 6600 et seq imposes an affirmative disability or 

restraint, it is clear that a civil commitment imposes an affirmative restraint on liberty. 

However, “[t]he State may take measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously 

mentally ill. This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been 

historically so regarded.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363. This factor weighs towards a 

finding that the statute has a nonpunitive effect.

Second, the Court considers whether the sanction has historically been regarded 

as a punishment. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69. Civil commitments have been 

historically held as being nonpunitive. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 (noting that

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authorized civil commitment have been traced to 18th century). This factor weighs 

towards a finding that the statute has a nonpunitive effect.

Third, the Court considers whether the statute comes into play only on a finding 

of scienter. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69. Section 6600 et seq applies after one has been 

adjudicated to be a sexually violent predator. A sexually violent predator includes those 

found not guilty by reason of insanity. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(2)(F). 

Therefore, the statute does not apply only on a finding of scienter. This factor weighs 

towards a finding that the statute has a nonpunitive effect.

Fourth, the Court considers whether the sanction’s operation will promote the 

traditional aims of punishment, namely deterrence and retribution. Kennedy, 372 U.S. 

at 168-69. It can be conceived that an indeterminate commitment may serve as a 

deterrent to commission of a sexually violent offence. However, “[a]ny number of 

governmental programs might deter crime without imposing punishment. To hold that 

the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions ‘criminal’ ... would 

severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation.” Smith, 

538 U.S. at 102. (internal quotations omitted). Further, people committed under Section 

6600 et seq are, by definition, suffering from a mental disorder that prevents them from 

controlling their behavior. Therefore, they are not likely to be deterred by the threat of a 

civil commitment. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362-63. Additionally, the California 

legislature repeatedly states that the statute’s purpose is to treat those with a mental 

disorder and to protect the public, suggesting the statute is not for retributive purposes. 

See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 763 (A.B. 888) (WEST); see also Hatton, 356 F.3d at 

965 (finding a sex-offender registration statute was not retributive in part because of the 

stated intent of the California legislature). Nothing suggests Section 6600 et seq was 

intended to promote the traditional aims of punishment. This factor weighs towards a 

finding that the statute has a nonpunitive effect.

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Fifth, the Court considers if the behavior of the sanction is already criminalized.

Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69. Section 6600 et seq generally applies to behavior that is 

already criminalized under California law. However, Section 6600 et seq is also 

triggered by those found not guilty by reason of insanity. Therefore, Section 6600 et seq 

does not apply only to those who have been convicted of a crime. See Hatton, 356 F.3d 

at 965-66 (finding the fifth prong of the Kennedy test to be nonpunitive where a sexoffender registry law applied to those not convicted of a crime). Further, previous 

conduct is used solely for evidentiary purposes to demonstrate that someone is a sexually 

violent predator. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(3); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-

62 (finding a civil commitment statute not to be retributive because prior acts were used 

for evidentiary purposes only). “An absence of the necessary criminal responsibility 

suggests that the State is not seeking retribution for a past misdeed. Thus, the fact that 

the Act may be tied to criminal activity is insufficient to render the statut[e] punitive.”

Id. This factor weighs towards a finding that the statute has a nonpunitive effect.

Sixth, the Court analyzes whether the challenged statute has a rational connection 

to a nonpunitive purpose. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69; see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 

(stating this is “a most significant factor” in the Kennedy test). The stated nonpunitive 

purpose is public safety. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 763 (A.B. 888) (WEST). Civilly 

committing individuals with a mental disorder making them particularly dangerous is 

rationally related to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. 

at 361-62 (finding that an indefinite civil commitment is linked to the stated purpose “to 

hold the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to 

others”). This factor weighs towards a finding that the statute has a nonpunitive effect.

Seventh, the Court analyzes whether the sanction appears excessive. ‘“A statute 

is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive 

aims it seeks to advance.’ Instead, the question is ‘whether the regulatory means chosen 

are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.’” Hatton, 356 F.3d at 965 (quoting 

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Smith, 538 U.S. at 103, 105). Here, commitment lasts only as long as the civil committee 

has a mental disorder and no longer. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6604.9(d) 

(authorizing petition for release by the hospital if the civil committee no longer meets 

the sexually violent predator definition); 6607 (authorizing treatment outside of 

confinement if the hospital believes the civil committee is no longer a threat to society); 

6608 (authorizing the civil committee to petition for release if the person believes they 

no longer meet the definition for a sexually violent predator). A civil commitment statute 

designed to detain an individual only until they are no longer a threat to public safety is 

not excessive. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-64. This factor weighs towards a finding that 

the statute has a nonpunitive effect.

The balance of the factors strongly weigh in favor of finding that the Section 6600 

et seq is non-punitive. In rejecting Petitioner’s ex post facto and double jeopardy claims, 

the court of appeal ruling was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Further, the 

court of appeal could have reasonably found that Petitioner’s civil commitment was not 

punitive in nature by utilizing the Kennedy seven-factor test and thus outside the scope 

of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. Accordingly, Petitioner’s argument 

fails on this point.

iii. Petitioner’s Indeterminate Civil Commitment Does Not Violate The 

Eighth Amendment Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Finally, Petitioner argues that his indeterminate commitment violates the Eighth 

Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 

held that the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment protects those 

convicted of crimes from being punished inhumanely. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 

312, 318, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (stating “[t]he Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause ‘was designed to protect those convicted of crimes...’” (quoting 

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1408, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)))

(emphasis added); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d

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59 (1981) (stating, “[t]he Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the 

constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be cruel and unusual.) (emphasis 

added); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) 

(holding that the Eighth Amendment protects those convicted of crimes from being 

physically punished by barbarous methods, the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain and ensures the penal measures represent concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

humanity, and decency.) (emphasis added).

In rejecting Petitioner’s argument that his indeterminate commitment violates the 

Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment, the holding of the court of 

appeal was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Further, the court could have 

reasonably held that Petitioner’s civil commitment was not punitive in nature and 

therefore it did not fall within the Eighth Amendment ban. Petitioner simply states that 

his commitment is punitive in nature without citing to any case authority to support this 

contention. (Doc. No. 8 at 51.) Petitioner is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.

VI.

RECOMMENDATION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED without prejudice. This Report and 

Recommendation is submitted to U.S. District Judge William Q. Hayes, pursuant to the 

provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 25, 2016 any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than April 8, 2016. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

 Dated: February 23, 2016

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