Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01589/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01589-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD RONJE, 

Plaintiff,

v.

KING, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01589-LJO-JLT (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DISMISS CASE AS BARRED BY 

HECK V. HUMPHRY, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

(Docs. 1, 8, 11)

30-DAY DEADLINE

I. Findings

A. Procedural History

 Plaintiff, Edward Ronje, is a civil detainee who is currently proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action 

on October 10, 2014. (Doc. 1.) Upon review initial review, it was discovered that Plaintiff was 

challenging the assessment protocol which resulted in his civil detention. Thus, on December 29, 

2014, an order issued giving Plaintiff thirty days to show cause ("OSC") why this action should 

not be dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994). (Doc. 8.) On 

March 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed his objections. (Doc. 11.) The Complaint is before the Court for 

screening. 

B. Screening Requirement

ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

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shall dismiss [a case brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983] at any time if the court determines that . . . 

the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. '

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

C. Summary of the Complaint

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”). He names the following 

Defendants: (1) Audrey King, Executive Director of CSH, (2) Cliff Allenby, Director of 

California Department of State Hospitals, (3) Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, Division 

Three, and (4) the Orange County District Attorney's Office. 

Plaintiff alleges that the 2009 standardized assessment protocol ("SAP"), under which he 

was determined to be a sexually violent predator so as to cause his detainment, was illegally 

enacted and violates section 6601 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, and that he 

identified the error before the probable cause determination. Plaintiff asserts that the 2009 SAP 

was not a valid standardized assessment and that his commitment based thereon deprived him of 

due process and violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that his due 

process rights were violated; both preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the 

defendants and their agents from arguing that Plaintiff is a dangerous sex offender who requires 

indeterminate commitment and from applying a diagnosis of pedophilia as a justification for 

Plaintiff's false imprisonment; and monetary damages. 

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As previously stated in the order to show cause and discussed in greater detail below, 

Plaintiff is not able to pursue claims challenging his confinement that will lead to his earlier 

release under section 1983. These claims are proper fodder for a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. Thus this action is appropriately dismissed.

A. Analysis

1. Overview of Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)

The SVPA, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600 et seq., provides for the civil commitment of 

“a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and 

who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of 

others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” Cal. 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). The SVPA codifies a process involving several administrative 

and judicial stages to determine whether an individual meets the requirements for civil 

commitment. 

First, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and Board of 

Parole Hearings (BPH) screens inmates who may be sexually violent predators at least six months 

prior to their scheduled release dates. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(a)(1), (b). The screening is 

conducted in accordance with a structured screening instrument developed by the State 

Department of State Hospitals (“SDSH”). Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(b). If CDCR and BPH 

determine that an individual “is likely to be a sexually violent predator,” CDCR refers the 

individual to the SDSH for a full evaluation. Id.

The SDSH employs a standardized assessment protocol to determine whether a person is 

a sexually violent predator under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(c). If two SDSH evaluators, or 

in some circumstances, two independent evaluators, determine that the person has “a diagnosed 

mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate 

treatment and custody,” the Director of SDSH forwards a request for a petition for commitment to 

the applicable county. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(d)-(h).

If the county’s designated counsel agrees with the request, a petition for commitment is 

filed in Superior Court. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(i). “The filing of the petition triggers a 

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new round of proceedings” under the SVPA. People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 27 Cal. 4th 

888, 904 (Cal. 2002). The petition is reviewed by a superior court judge to determine whether the 

petition “states or contains sufficient facts that, if true, would constitute probable cause to believe 

that the individual named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal 

behavior upon his or her release.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601.5. If so found, a probable 

cause hearing is conducted, at which the alleged predator is entitled to the assistance of counsel. 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6601.5, 6602(a). If, at the hearing, no probable cause is found, the 

petition is dismissed. Id. However, if probable cause is found, a trial is conducted. Id.

At trial, the individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel, to retain experts or other 

professionals to perform an examination on his or her behalf, and to access all relevant medical 

and psychological records and reports. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6603(a). Either party may 

demand a jury trial. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6603(a)-(b). The trier of fact must determine 

whether the person is a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt. Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code § 6604. “If the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the 

person shall be committed for an indeterminate term to the custody of [SDSH] for appropriate 

treatment and confinement in a secure facility designated by the Director of State Hospitals.” Id.

Once committed, sexually violent predators must be reevaluated at least annually. Cal. 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(a). The annual report must include consideration of whether the 

person “currently meets the definition of a sexually violent predator and whether conditional 

release to a less restrictive alternative, pursuant to Section 6608, or an unconditional discharge, 

pursuant to 6605, is in the best interest of the person and conditions can be imposed that would 

adequately protect the community.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(b). If SDSH has reason to 

believe the person is no longer a sexually violent predator, it shall seek judicial review of the 

commitment. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(c). If SDSH determines that conditional release or 

unconditional discharge is appropriate, it shall authorize the committed person to petition the 

court for conditional release or unconditional discharge. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(d). 

The committed person also may petition the court for conditional release without the 

recommendation or concurrence of SDSH. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a).

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The court may deny a petition for conditional release without a hearing if it is based on 

frivolous grounds. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a). If the petition is not based on frivolous 

grounds, the court shall hold a hearing to determine “whether the person committed would be a 

danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually 

violent criminal behavior due to his or her diagnosed mental disorder if under supervision and 

treatment in the community.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(g). The committed person has the 

right to counsel and the appointment of experts for the hearing. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 6608(a), (g). The committed person bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the 

evidence, unless the SDSH’s annual reevaluation determines that conditional release is 

appropriate, in which case the State bears the burden of proof. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(k). 

If the court determines that the committed person would not be a danger while under supervision 

and treatment, the person shall be placed in a conditional release program for one year. Cal. 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(g). Thereafter, the committed person may petition the court for 

unconditional discharge. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(m).

If, upon receiving a petition for unconditional discharge, the court finds probable cause to 

believe that the committed person is not a danger to the health and safety of others and is not 

likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if discharged, a hearing is conducted. Cal. 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(a)(2). At the hearing, the committed person is entitled to the same 

constitutional protections afforded at the initial trial. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(a)(3). Either 

party may demand a jury trial. Id. The state bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the committed person remains a danger to the health and safety of others and is likely 

to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if discharged. Id. If the petition is resolved in the 

committed person’s favor, he is unconditionally released and unconditionally discharged. Cal. 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(b). 

2. Claims Cognizable Only in Habeas Corpus

The exclusive method for challenging the fact or duration of Plaintiff’s confinement is by 

filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Such claims may not be brought in a section 1983 action. Nor may Plaintiff 

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seek to invalidate the fact or duration of his confinement indirectly through a judicial 

determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody. Wilkinson, 544 

U.S. at 81. A section 1983 action is barred, no matter the relief sought, if success in that action 

would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82; Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (unless and until favorable termination of the conviction or 

sentence, no cause of action under section 1983 exists); Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 

1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to SVPA detainees with access to habeas relief). 

Because of this, an order issued for Plaintiff to show cause why this action should not be 

dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey. (Doc. 8.) In his response/objections, Plaintiff argues 

that, since he received a writ of habeas corpus on his civil detention which was based on invalid 

2007 protocols, and the 2009 protocols under which he was reassessed are also invalid, it 

undermines his rights guaranteed by the federal constitution for him to be required to pursue a 

writ of habeas corpus again. (Doc. 11, 1:28-2:6.) 

Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment that the Defendants violated his rights without due 

consideration of the harm they caused, that they violated Plaintiff's due process rights, and denied 

him of his liberty interests and injunctive relief to prohibit Defendants from advocating that 

Plaintiff is a dangerous sex offender who requires an indeterminate commitment, from applying a 

diagnosis of pedophilia to Plaintiff as a justification for the false imprisonment that Plaintiff has 

endured because of the unreliable and misapplied protocol used to classify sex offenders' past 

criminal behavior, from diagnosing Plaintiff with an improperly adopted SAP based on an unpromulgated protocol, and from applying an un-promulgated protocol to re-litigate actions against 

Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, pp. 33-34.) While a claim for prospective relief often does not call into 

question the validity of a plaintiff’s confinement, see Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 

(1997), Plaintiff’s claims here directly challenge the basis for his custody. He may not bring 

these claims in a section 1983 action. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that the assessment methodology violated his Due Process rights, 

and his request for a declaration to that effect, are barred on the same ground. See Huftile, 410 

F.3d at 1141 (concluding that challenge to SVPA assessments would imply invalidity of civil 

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commitment and therefore could only be brought in habeas corpus). To the extent his claims are 

based on the use of the assessments in his civil commitment proceedings, they present a direct 

challenge to the validity of his confinement, and may not be brought in this action. Wilkinson, 

544 U.S. at 81. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert due process rights in this assessment 

process itself, any claim as to the propriety of the assessments is so related to the civil 

commitment proceeding that success thereon would imply the invalidity of his confinement: 

absent the allegedly deficient assessments, no petition for commitment would have been filed, 

and there would have been no basis for the Superior Court to proceed on the petition to civilly 

commit Plaintiff under the SVPA. Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141. 

In sum, until Plaintiff’s civil detention has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or 

called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” Plaintiff is barred 

from bringing his claims under section 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 

3. Prospective Relief from Future Assessments

Edwards leaves open the possibility for Plaintiff to seek prospective relief in a section 

1983 action to prevent future injury caused by future assessments. 520 U.S. at 648. However, 

Plaintiff has not specifically articulated such a claim. Moreover, even if he wishes to do so, his 

allegations would not be cognizable. 

Plaintiff alleges the assessments violated his procedural and substantive Due Process 

rights. However, Plaintiff does not identify any process due to him, under the SVPA or 

otherwise, that was denied in the assessment process. Significantly, the assessments are not 

determinative of whether Plaintiff’s detention should continue. Rather, Plaintiff may petition the 

court for conditional release without the recommendation or concurrence of SDSH. Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6608(a). Plaintiff’s continued detention is determined by a judge at a hearing in 

which Plaintiff has the right to counsel and to retain experts to rebut the State’s assessments. Cal. 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608. His ultimate release from commitment is determined by a judge or 

jury in a proceeding in which Plaintiff maintains the right to counsel, to retain experts, and where 

the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605. 

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The SVPA provides sufficient procedural mechanisms for Plaintiff to challenge the assessments

and to demonstrate that he no longer qualifies for civil detention. These protections are such that 

any flaws in the assessment process do not rise to a due process violation.

II. Conclusion & Recommendations

Plaintiff’s claims, either directly or indirectly, challenge the validity of his confinement, a 

challenge which may be brought only in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, Plaintiff has 

failed to state any claims that are cognizable under section 1983. To the extent Plaintiff could 

amend to seek relief that is not no so barred, his allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for the 

reasons stated. These deficiencies are not capable of being cured through amendment. Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend his 

section 1983 claims.

It is recommended that the Court direct the Clerk’s Office to provide Plaintiff with a 

habeas petition form for Plaintiff to file a habeas petition setting forth facts supporting his 

challenge to the fact and/or the duration of his confinement/detention. Alternatively, if Plaintiff 

no longer wishes to pursue this action, he should file a notice of voluntary dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within 30 

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s 

Findings and Recommendations.@ 

Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the 

waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) 

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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