Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00157/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00157-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 1

 The Honorable Eileen Willett presided.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Guy Briggs,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CV-05-157-PHX-JWS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in

State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (document # 1) Respondents filed an Answer to

the Petition asserting that it should be dismissed as untimely or, in the alternative, for failure to

exhaust state remedies. (document # 12) Petitioner opposed Respondents' assertion regarding

the timeliness of his petition. (document # 15) Thus, the Court ordered supplemental briefing

regarding the timeliness issue. Respondents filed Supplemental Briefing (document # 22) in

which they concede that the Petition is timely and withdraw their argument that the Petition is

untimely. (Id.) The Court, therefore, will proceed to Petitioner's claims. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 3, 2001, the Maricopa County Grand Jury returned an indictment

charging Petitioner with commission of 14 sex-related offenses against two victims: (1) his

biological daughter; and (2) his step-daughter. (Respondents' Exh. A at 1; Exh B) The case

proceeded to trial and at the close of the State's case, the trial court1

 granted Petitioner's motion

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for a directed verdict of acquittal on Count 11. (Respondents' Exh. B at 39; Exh. G: Tr. 3/25/02

at 71-72) The jury subsequently convicted Petitioner of Counts 1-9 and 12-14, but acquitted him

of Count 10. (Respondents' Exh. A at 66-76, 90-91; Exh. B at 59) On May 17, 2002, the trial

court imposed nine consecutive prison sentences for Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 13, three

concurrent terms for Counts 3 and 9, and a consecutive 5-year term of probation for Count 14.

(Respondents' Exh. B at 101; Exh. K: Tr. 5/17/02 at 11-14) 

On that same day, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (Respondents' Exh. A at 105)

In his opening brief, Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) trial counsel was incompetent;

(2) trial counsel disregarded Petitioner's decisions; (3) trial counsel did not keep Petitioner

informed of the allegations; (4) Petitioner is legally blind and trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to read the pre-sentence report to Petitioner; (5) the trial court erred in permitting the jury

to visit the crime scenes; (6) the trial court erred in instructing the jury to disregard the fact that

Petitioner is blind; (7) the trial court erred in excluding "a large body of defense evidence"

regarding the crime scenes; (8) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial; (9)

the trial judge was biased against Petitioner; (10) the trial judge appeared to be unaware of the

sentencing guidelines; (11) the trial judge erred in failing to permit testimony regarding

suppressed memories; (12) the trial judge erred in admitting evidence regarding the prior sexual

molestation of one of the victims; and (13) the evidence was insufficient to support Petitioner's

convictions. (Respondents' Exh. L at 6-7) 

With leave of court, Petitioner filed a supplemental appellate brief raising the

following issues: (1) when the detective was questioned about the interviews he conducted, he

claimed that he only spoke to Petitioner's grandchildren, however, he also spoke to Petitioner's

niece, son's ex-girlfriend, and brother-in-law; (2) trial counsel failed to offer a witness to vouch

for Petitioner's credibility; (3) the trial court erred in permitting hearsay testimony by one of the

victim's mothers; and (4) trial counsel erred in failing to call a witness to testify on Petitioner's

behalf regarding an alleged incident in a swimming pool involving Petitioner's step-daughter.

(Respondents' Exh. M at 2-3)

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On March 6, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions,

but vacated his sentence on Count 1 because the sentencing court erroneously described Count

1's 20-year prison term, an aggravated sentence, as the presumptive term. (Respondents' Exh.

N at 4-5) With respect to Petitioner's other claims, the Court of Appeals stated that:

Defendant raises an additional seventeen issues on appeal. Issues 1, 2, 3,

4, and 8 of the opening brief and issue 2 of the supplemental brief all raise

the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. We do not address the issue

of ineffective assistance of counsel on a direct appeal. State v. Spreitz, 202

Ariz. 1, 3, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002). The proper procedure is a Rule 32 motion

pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

With respect to the remaining eleven issues raised by defendant, they consist

primarily of unsubstantiated allegations of errors made by the trial judge by

admitting/precluding evidence, sentencing errors and bias towards defendant.

Defendant also attacks the credibility of testimony offered by certain 

witnesses and defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support

his convictions.

Our review of the record discloses no errors other than the one sentencing 

error previously addressed. We also find there was sufficient evidence to 

support defendant's convictions. The victims testified regarding the sexual

abuse and their relevant ages. In addition, Dr. Coffman corroborated [Heather

Norgard's] abuse by testifying that HN had injuries that were consistent with 

sodomy and repeated vaginal penetration. We therefore reject defendant's

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 

(Respondents' Exh. N at 5-6) 

Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review (Respondents' Exh.

O) Thereafter, on June 6, 2003, the trial court re-sentenced Petitioner on Count 1. (document

# 22 at 3) Petitioner did appeal his re-sentencing on Count 1. (Id. at 3) 

The same day as his resentencing, June 6, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of postconviction relief in state court. (Respondents' Exh. P) The court appointed counsel who filed

a Rule 32 petition raising two issues: (1) Petitioner's post-arrest statements to Detective Dobson

on September 26, 2001 were involuntary; and (2) appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to raise this issue on appeal. (Respondents' Exh. Q) The State opposed

the Rule 32 petition. (Respondents' Exh. R) The State argued that Petitioner had waived any

challenge to his post-arrest statements because he failed to file a motion to suppress within the

time prescribed by the Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1(c). (Respondents' Exhs. R, B

at 39, G at 3, 54-57, 65-66) The State further argued that appellate counsel was not ineffective.

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(Respondents' Exh. R at 3-4) Petitioner filed a Reply asserting that the Arizona Court of

Appeals did not reach the merits of Petitioner's claim that his confession was involuntary.

(Respondents' Exh. S at 2) 

On January 14, 2004, the trial court denied Petitioner's petition for post-conviction

relief stating that:

Defendant argues that he is entitled to Post-Conviction Relief because his

counsel failed to raise the issue of whether Defendant's confession was 

voluntarily made on appeal.

Counsel for Defendant filed an Anders brief on appeal and additionally included

issues Defendant wished to be raised in a supplemental pleading. As the Court

of Appeals found upon its review of the record, no fundamental error [occurred],

except the sentencing issue, the issue of whether Defendant's confession was

 voluntarily made was decided on the merits of the appeal. See Rule 32.2(a)(2) 

and (3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, Defendant fails to 

raise a colorable claim for post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served

by further proceedings. 

(Respondents' Exh. T) Petitioner did not seek review of the denial of his petition for postconviction relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Respondents' Exh. V) 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus raising the

following claims:

Claim 1: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because (a) he did not 

file any pre-trial motions; (b) he did not request any hearings to preclude 

evidence; (c) he did not submit jury instructions to the court regarding the 

limited admissibility of other-act evidence; (d)he did not move to sever counts; 

(e) he did not file a timely motion to suppress Petitioner's post-arrest statements; 

(f) he did not conduct an adequate cross-examination of Robert Emerick and 

Dr. Coffman; (g) he did not call an expert witness; (h) he did not object to 

the allegedly inflammatory portions of Emerick's testimony; and (i) he did 

not zealously represent Petitioner at trial.

Claim 2: Petitioner's post-arrest confession was obtained illegally.

Claim 3: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a

timely motion to suppress Petitioner's post-arrest statements. 

Claim 4: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a 

motion to sever counts.

Claim 5: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object 

to inflammatory aspects of Dr. Emerick's testimony.

Claim 6: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by vouching for Dr. 

Emerick's credibility.

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Claim 7: Appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by filing an

Anders brief, failing to supplement the record on appeal with Petitioner's 

motion for a mistrial, and failing to raise the suppression issue. 

(document # 1 at 5-8) 

Respondents filed an Answer asserting that the Petition should be dismissed as

untimely, or in the alternative, for failure to exhaust state remedies. (document # 12)

Respondents subsequently withdrew their argument that the § 2254 petition is untimely.

(document # 22) Respondents concede that the Petition was timely filed. The Court, therefore,

will consider Petitioner's claims. 

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state

prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must have exhausted, in state

court, every claim raised in his petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must have afforded the state courts the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of his federal claims by "fairly presenting" them to the state

courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989);

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)(stating that "[t]o provide the State with the necessary

'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court . . .

thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.")

It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were

before the state court or that a "somewhat similar" state law claim was raised. Reese, 541 U.S.

at 28 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel in general does not alert the

court to federal nature of the claim.) Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the

specific constitutional guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v.

Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to

establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v.

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Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)(insufficient for prisoner to have made "a general

appeal to a constitutional guarantee," such as a naked reference to "due process," a

"constitutional error" or a "fair trial.") Similarly, a mere reference to the "Constitution of the

United States" does not preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63

(1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is "self-evident" or if the claim would be decided

"on the same considerations" under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal

nature of the claim "explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts .

. . ." Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court

if the court must read beyond the petition or brief filed in that court to discover the federal

claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

When a prisoner fails to "fairly present" a claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, state court remedies may, nonetheless, be "exhausted." This type of

exhaustion is often referred to as "procedural default" or "procedural bar." Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). There are

two ways in which procedural default may occur.

First, a state court may have applied a procedural bar when the prisoner attempted

to raise the federal claim in state court. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05; Bonin v. Calderon,

59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995)(failure to raise contemporaneous objection at trial in state court

to a violation of federal rights constitutes a procedural default of that issue in federal court);

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991)(finding claims procedurally defaulted

where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise

issues on direct appeal or in his first petition for post-conviction relief.) If the state court also

addressed the merits of the underlying federal claim, the "alternative" ruling does not vitiate the

independent state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989); Carringer v.

Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)(state supreme court found ineffective assistance of

counsel claims "barred under state law," but also discussed and rejected the claims on the

merits, en banc court held that the "on-the-merits" discussion was an "alternative ruling" and

the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review.) A higher court's

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subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court's application of a procedural bar.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

In the second situation, the state prisoner may not have presented the federal claim

to the state courts, and pursuant to the state courts' procedural rules, such as waiver or time bars,

a return to state court would be "futile." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989).

Generally, any claim not previously presented to the Arizona courts is procedurally barred from

federal review because any attempt to return to state court to properly exhaust a current habeas

claim would be futile. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975,

987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3)(relief is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review

must be filed within thirty days of trial court's decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997)(recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of

an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). 

In either procedural default scenario, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley,

541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate

cause, a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986). The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials,

(2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3)

constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.

The Ninth Circuit has held that ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings does

not establish cause because "the right to counsel does not extend to state collateral proceedings

or federal habeas proceedings." Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996).

To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional

violation "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error

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of constitutional dimension." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Where

petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice prong. 

To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). 

Where petitioner fails to establish cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage

of justice, his state-law procedural default may constitute an independent and adequate state

ground which bars federal habeas review of Petitioner's claims. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. 

To "constitute adequate and independent grounds sufficient to support a procedural default, a

state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner's

default." Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). Arizona courts have consistently

applied their procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002)(holding that Rule

32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar); Ortiz, 149 F.3d 931-32 (rejecting

argument that Arizona courts have not "strictly or regularly followed" Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)(rejecting assertion that

Arizona courts' application of procedural rules had been "unpredictable and irregular.") 

I. Application of Law to Petitioner's Claims

Petitioner raises seven claims for relief. (document # 1) Respondents assert that

Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review. The Court

will address this argument below.

A. Claims 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1f, 1g, 1h, 1i, 4, 5, 6, 7a, and 7b

Respondents assert that Petitioner did not present claims 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1f, 1g, 1h,

1i, 4, 5, 6, 7a, and 7b to any Arizona court either on direct appeal or post-conviction review

As stated above, before a federal court may decide a petition for habeas corpus

relief, the state prisoner must have fairly presented every federal claim to the state courts in a

procedurally proper manner. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. For a claim to be fairly presented

in state court, petitioner must describe the operative facts and legal theories upon which his

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 2 As previously stated, on direct appeal Petitioner raised the following claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel: (1) counsel was incompetent, (2) counsel disregarded Petitioner's decisions, (3)

counsel failed to keep Petitioner informed about the allegations, (4) counsel failed to read the PSR to

Petitioner, and (5) counsel failed to request a mistrial. (Respondents' Exh. L at 6-8)

On post-conviction review, Petitioner claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing

to challenge the voluntariness of Petitioner's confession. (Respondents' Exh. Q)

 3

 As previously discussed, in the pending petition, Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in

failing to: (1) file pre-trial motions, (2) request a hearing to preclude evidence, (3) submit a jury

instruction regarding the limited purpose of other-act evidence, (4) file a motion to sever counts, (5)

conduct a sufficient cross-examination of Drs. Emerick and Coffman, (6) call an expert witness, (7)

object to inflammatory parts of Emerick's testimony, and (8) zealously represent Petitioner. (document

# 1) 

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claim is based. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29-30. The federal nature of the claim must be explicit

at all levels. Id. General appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal

constitutional claim. Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. 

Petitioner did not present claims 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1f, 1g, 1h, 1i, 4, 5, 6, 7a, and 7b to

the state courts. Petitioner's failure to present these federal claims to the State courts results in

a procedural bar because Petitioner is time-barred from returning to State court to obtain review

of such claims. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.4(a); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(3) (precluding postconviction relief on any ground "that has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding.); Mata, 185 Ariz. at 332, 916 P.2d at 1048(defendant waived claim that

defendant's counsel at sentencing was ineffective where defendant did not raise claim in either

first or second petition for post-conviction relief.) Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas review of his claims unless he establishes cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice which the Court will discuss in Section II below. 

Petitioner raised several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the state

courts2

, however he did not raise the same claims that he presents in the pending habeas corpus

petition.3

 (Respondents' Exh. L, Q, document # 1) Although Petitioner raised different claims

of ineffective assistance in his brief on direct appeal and in his Rule 32 petition, presentation

of one specific ground of ineffective assistance of counsel in state court does not entitle a habeas

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petitioner to raise other grounds in support of a claim of ineffective assistance on federal habeas

review. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 989-990 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Additionally, the fact that the Arizona Court of Appeals conducted fundamental

error review does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987. Accordingly,

Petitioner's procedurally defaulted claims 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1f, 1g, 1h, 1i, 4, 5, 6, 7a, and 7b by

failing properly to present those claims to the state courts. 

B. Claims 1e and 3

In Claims 1e and 3, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

file a timely motion to suppress Petitioner's post-arrest statements. In sections of his habeas

petition, Petitioner claims that he presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals because

the eighth claim in his brief on direct appeal states that "Defense counsel refused to request a

mistrial and failed to follow up on the mistrial issue." (Respondents' Exh. L at 7) 

Petitioner, however, failed to properly exhaust his claim regarding trial counsel's

failure to file a motion to suppress Petitioner's post-arrest statement. First, the eighth claim in

the appellate brief only alleged that trial counsel should have filed a motion for a mistrial. The

reference to counsel's failure to move for a mistrial was not sufficient to put the State court on

notice that Petitioner intended to challenge trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress.

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)(a state prisoner "must include reference to a

specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitled the

petitioner to relief.") Because Petitioner did not raise the same claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel in state court that he wishes to raise in his § 2254 petition, he failed to fairly present

that claim. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file

a motion to suppress is procedurally defaulted. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner's claim in his appellate brief that counsel was

ineffective in failing to file a mistrial could be construed as also challenging counsel's failure

to file a timely motion to suppress, Petitioner still failed to properly exhaust that claim. First,

on direct appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals did not consider the merits of Petitioner's claim

of ineffective counsel in view of the Arizona Supreme Court's holding in Spreitz that

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ineffectiveness claims must be presented, not on direct appeal, but in post-conviction

proceedings. (Respondents' Exh. N) Specifically, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that:

Defendant raises an additional seventeen issues on appeal. Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, and

8 of the opening brief and issue 2 of the supplemental brief all raise the issue 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. We do not address the issue of ineffective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal. State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, 39 P.3d

525, 527 (2002). The proper procedure is a Rule 32 motion pursuant to the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

(Respondents' Exh. N at 5) 

Under Arizona law, Petitioner's presentation of his claims of ineffective assistance

on direct appeal was procedurally improper because he raised such in the wrong context – on

direct review to the Court of Appeals. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. at 3; State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 51

n. 9, 116 P.3d 1193, 1211 n. 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). Despite the Court of Appeals instruction

that Petitioner should raise his claims of ineffective assistance in a Rule 32 petition for postconviction relief, on post-conviction review, Petitioner only raised one claim of ineffective

assistance — that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the admission of

Petitioner's post-arrest statements on direct appeal. (Respondents' Exh. Q at 3-5) Petitioner did

not claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of Petitioner's

post-arrest statements at trial. Petitioner's presentation of a claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel was not sufficient to exhaust a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Carriger, 971 F.2d at 333. The United States Supreme Court has held that a habeas petitioner's

presentation of an ineffective-assistance of trial counsel claim in state court does not exhaust

a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective even when the same act or omission allegedly

renders both counsel ineffective. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). This holding

applies to here. Petitioner's claim in his post-conviction petition that appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise a claim on direct appeal does not exhaust a claim that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to present that same issue to the trial court. Id.

Finally, even if Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective

encompassed Petitioner's claim that trial counsel was also ineffective, Petitioner still failed to

properly exhaust this claim because he did not petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for review

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of the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845

(stating that "[b]ecause the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair

opportunity to resolve constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal

courts, we conclude that state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve

any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate

review process.") 

Because Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(3) would prevent Petitioner from

raising his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in any subsequent post-conviction

proceedings, Claims 1e and 3 are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review.

Mata, 185 Ariz. at 332, 916 P.2d at 1048. 

C. Claim 2

In his second claim, Petitioner argues that the state court improperly admitted an

illegally-obtained confession during trial. Federal habeas review of this claim is procedurally

barred as discussed below. First, during trial, the court ruled that Petitioner waived this issue

because he waited until the fourth day of trial to challenge the admissibility of his post-arrest

statements. (Respondents' Exh. B at 39, Exh. F at 58-60, Exh. G at 3, Exh. R at 38A) In so

ruling the trial court relied on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1 which provides in

pertinent part that: 

b. Making of Motions before Trial: All motions shall be made no later than

20 days prior to the date set for trial. Lack of jurisdiction may be raised

at any time.

* * *

c. Effect of Failure to Make Motions in Timely Manner. Any motion, defense,

objection, or request not timely raised under Rule 16.1(b) shall be precluded,

unless the basis therefor was not then known, and by the exercise of reasonable

diligence could not then have been known, and the party raises it promptly upon

learning it. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 16.1. Arizona courts have consistently applied this procedural bar to preclude

consideration of claims that were not timely raised in the trial court, but which were known, or

could have been known, before the filing deadline. State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 535, 633 P.2d

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335, 344 (1981)(stating that "[i]ssues concerning the suppression of evidence which were not

raised in the trial court are waived on appeal.") 

Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal. (Respondents' Exh. L) On postconviction review, Petitioner claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to

challenge the voluntariness of Petitioner's post-arrest statements. (Respondents' Exh. Q)

Petitioner, however, did not challenge the trial court's or trial counsel's actions with regards to

Petitioner's post-arrest statements. Thus, Petitioner has not presented his pending claim to the

State courts. 

Moreover, even if the post-conviction petition were construed as raising a challenge

to the trial court's admission of evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest statement at trial and trial

counsel's failure to object thereto, Petitioner failed to properly exhaust Claim 2 because he never

sought appellate review of the denial of that claim on post-conviction review. Boerckel, 526

U.S. at 845. Because Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) would prevent Petitioner

from raising this claim in any subsequent post-conviction proceedings, Claim 2 is procedurally

defaulted and cannot be considered on federal habeas review. Mata, 185 Ariz. at 332, 916 P.2d

at 1048. 

D. Claim 7c

In Claim 7c, Petitioner argues that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to challenge on direct appeal the admission of Petitioner's post-conviction arrest

statements to Detective Dobson. Although Petitioner raised this issue in his Rule 32 petition,

he did not properly exhaust it in state court because he failed to petition the Arizona Court of

Appeals for review of the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. (Respondents' Exh. V)

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)(stating that "[t]o provide the State with the necessary

'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court . . .

thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.") Because Arizona Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) would prevent Petitioner from raising this ineffectiveness claim

in any subsequent post-conviction proceedings, Claim 7c is procedurally defaulted and not

properly before this Court on habeas review. Mata, 185 Ariz. at 332, 916 P.2d at 1048. 

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/ / /

II. Cause and Prejudice or Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Because Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claims federal habeas review is barred

absent a showing of "cause and prejudice" or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman,

501 U.S. at 750-51; Teague, 489 U.S. at 298; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. Petitioner fails to make

either of these showings. 

A. Cause and Prejudice

Petitioner argues that his procedural default should be excused because he is blind,

lacks legal knowledge, and lacks legal assistance. 

As a general matter, Petitioner's status as a prison inmate does not establish cause.

Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Likewise, Petitioner’s lack of

familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do not constitute cause. Hughes v. Idaho

State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)(finding that a pro se prisoner’s

illiteracy was not sufficient to satisfy the standard of an objective, external factor amounting to

“cause” for purposes of avoiding the procedural bar on his habeas claim); Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 351 (1996)(holding that there is no "freestanding right to a law library or legal

assistance.") 

Additionally, Petitioner's allegation that he is blind does not constitute cause. Pham

v. Garcia, 2004 WL 3263485, * 5(S.D.Cal, Sept. 16, 2004)(concluding that petitioner's alleged

"handicap in understanding, speaking, writing and reading English" was an insufficient basis

for equitable tolling.)(citing Cobas v. Burgess, 306 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 2002)("where a

petitioner's alleged lack of proficiency in English has not prevented petitioner from accessing

the courts, that lack of proficiency is insufficient to justify equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations.")). Petitioner has filed several pleadings with this Court which indicate that despite

his limitations, he is able to pursue his claims. Additionally, the Arizona Department of

Corrections has procedures in place for assisting the visually impaired. See Ariz. Dep't Corr.,

Dep't Order Manual § 902.08–1.1 ("Accommodations shall be made, as needed, to ensure access

to the courts for inmates with special needs, to include inmates who are . . . disabled); §

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908.03–1.1 ("Wardens, Deputy Wardens and Administrators shall provide interpreters for

inmates in need of such services, which may include interpreters for . . . the blind"). 

Based on this record, Petitioner cannot establish that his blindness constitutes an

objective factor external to Petitioner that prevented him from properly presenting his claims

to the State courts. Allen, 255 F.3d at 799. See, Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th

Cir. 2005)(concluding that petitioner's mental disabilities and multiple sclerosis were not

extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling of AEDPA limitations period where

petitioner had been able to file habeas petitions before and after limitations period had expired.)

Liberally construed, the Petition also asserts that the ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel constitutes cause for Petitioner's procedural default. The Supreme Court has

held that "a claim of ineffective assistance must be presented to the state courts as an

independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for procedural default [of another

claim]." Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). 

As previously discussed, Petitioner never presented his claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Respondents' Exh. V)

Because Petitioner did not properly exhaust his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel in state court, he cannot rely on appellate counsel's allegedly ineffective assistance to

establish cause. Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 451-52 (stating that "[i]n other words, ineffective

assistance adequate to establish cause is itself an independent constitutional claim. And we held

in Carrier, that the principles of comity and federalism that underlie our longstanding exhaustion

doctrine . . . require that constitutional claim, like others, to be first raised in state

court.)(emphasis in original). 

However, Petitioner may be able to satisfy the "cause and prejudice" standard with

respect to his procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 453 ("To hold, as we do, that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim

asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted

is not to say that the procedural default may not itself be excused if the prisoner can satisfy the

cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to the claim.")(emphasis in original). 

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In his Reply, Petitioner argues that post-conviction counsel failed to petition the

Arizona Court of Appeals for review of the denial of his Rule 32 petition, which included the

claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. This argument fails because "there is no

constitutional right to an attorney in post-conviction proceedings." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-

53. Similarly, Petitioner cannot challenge the performance of post-conviction counsel on

habeas review because the "ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State

collateral post-conviction relief shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under

section 2254." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). Thus, even assuming that post-conviction counsel rendered

ineffective assistance during Petitioner's Rule 32 proceedings, such deficient performance

would not constitute cause for Petitioner's failure to present the ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757. 

B. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Additionally, Petitioner does not establish that failure to review his claims will result

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. Petitioner does not point to

any new evidence and, therefore, does not establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup 513 U.S. at 327 ).

In summary, Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal

habeas review. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (document # 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72,

6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which

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to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation

by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna- Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s

recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 25th day of April, 2006.

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