Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00036/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00036-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Delbert Wauneka has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner was sentenced on December 7, 2006. (Doc. 23, Ex. M.) Petitioner’s 

limitations period expired on March 8, 2008. Petitioner did not file this Petition until 

January 8, 2014. 

 Statutory tolling is not warranted, and no equitable tolling is merited because 

Petitioner previously filed numerous, similar motions in state court. Insufficient evidence 

is presented to merit an actual innocence exception under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 

(1995). 

 For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are 

untimely. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the petition be denied. 

Delbert Wauneka, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

No. CV-14-0036-PHX-GMS (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 1 of 18
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTS OF THE CASE 

 The facts surrounding the convictions are summarized in the presentence 

investigation report:1

 On June 10, 2005 police were dispatched to a Circle K in reference 

to a sexual assault. Upon arrival, they came into contact with [the victim] 

and her boyfriend, Roger Coley. [The victim] indicated that she and Mr. 

Coley were in the parking lot of an abandoned bar when a subject, later identified as the defendant approached them and started a conversation. The 

defendant asked them if they wanted to get a couple of beers. They accepted the offer and went inside the nearby Circle K for the beers. When they got the beers, the defendant asked them if they wanted to go to his place. They accepted and he led them into the abandoned bar, where the 

three of them went to the second floor and sat and drank beer for 

approximately one hour. After a while, Mr. Coley went outside and the defendant, who was extremely intoxicated, jumped on top of [the victim], without being provoked, and began to strike her with closed fists in the 

head and face. The defendant then began to choke her and she thought that she was going to die. She could not breathe and the defendant ripped off her shirt and bra and began grabbing her breasts. The defendant was attempting to take off her pants but was unsuccessful. [The victim] said that 

she started to scream and Mr. Coley came into the room and the defendant 

got off of her. Mr. Coley told her to get out of the room and started to 

struggle with the defendant. She ran outside and Mr. Coley came after her with a shirt and put it on her. [The victim] was transported to the hospital where it was revealed that she had also sustained seven human bite marks 

on her back and one human bite mark on her arm. 

(Doc. 23, Exh. B at 4.) 

B. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 

 1. Plea and Sentencing

 On June 14, 2005, the State indicted Petitioner on four counts: sexual abuse, a 

class 5 felony (Count 1); attempted sexual abuse, a class 2 felony (Count 2); kidnapping, 

a class 2 felony (Count 3); and aggravated assault, a class 6 felony (Count 4). (Doc. 23, 

Ex. A.) 

 On December 22, 2005 Petitioner’s counsel, Joseph W. Charles, filed a motion 

seeking a Rule 11 examination to determine whether Petitioner was competent to stand 

trial. (Doc. 23, Ex. D.) On June 13, 2006, the court found that “the [Petitioner] 

 

1

 Presentence reports are an appropriate source for the facts underlying a defendant’s convictions. See State v. Rose, 297 P.3d 906, 912 (2013). 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 2 of 18
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

understands the proceedings and is able to assist counsel with [his] defense.” (Doc. 23, 

Ex. I.) 

 On October 13, 2006, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement. (Doc. 23, Exs. J, 

K.) Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to Counts 1, 2 and 3. (Doc. 23, Ex. K.) The 

agreement recited that: (1) Count 1, sexual abuse, a class 5 felony, had a maximum 

sentence of 2 years; (2) Count 2, attempted sexual assault, a class 3 felony, had a 

maximum sentence of 7 years; and, (3) Count 3, kidnapping, a class 2 felony, had a 

maximum sentence of 10 years. (Id.) For Counts 1 and 2, Petitioner agreed to lifetime 

probation with registration as a sex offender. (Id.) For Count 3, Petitioner agreed to a 

term of imprisonment. (Id.) Petitioner agreed to waive and give up “the right to appeal.” 

(Id.) 

 On October 13, 2006, Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to his plea agreement. 

(Id.) The court and Petitioner engaged in the following colloquy: 

 

 

 COURT: Have you had any drugs, alcohol, or medication in the 

last 24 hours? 

 PETITIONER: Not at all. 

 COURT: Now your attorney has just handed me a plea agreement that tells me that you would like to plead guilty to count 1, sexual abuse, a class 5 felony, count 2, attempted sexual assault, a class 3 felony, and count 3, kidnapping, a class 2 felony, all three of these 

crimes committed June 10, 2005. Is that what you would like to do? 

 PETITIONER: I guess I have no choice, your honor 

 COURT: Well, you certainly do. Your matter is set to begin trial on Monday, so if you are not independently, free of any coercion, duress, promises, willing to enter into this plea, I cannot accept it. So I will ask you again, is it your desire to enter into this plea agreement? 

 PETITIONER: I guess I’ve made my commitment, I’ve signed it – 

 COURT: That doesn’t mean I have to accept it 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 3 of 18
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 PETITIONER: I am going to plead guilty, your honor. 

 COURT: Has anybody forced you or threatened you in any way to plead guilty? 

 PETITIONER: No. 

 COURT: Have any promises not contained within this document 

been made in order to get you to plead guilty? 

 PETITIONER: No. 

 COURT: Do you have a copy of the plea agreement in front of 

you? 

 PETITIONER: Yes I do. 

 

 (. . .) 

 COURT: Did you initial the paragraphs on all 3 pages? 

 PETITIONER: Yes, I did. 

 COURT: Did you sign your name on page 3? 

 PETITIONER: Yes, I did, your honor. 

 

 COURT: The agreements that you have with the State are set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 at the top of page 2 and they include the following: as to counts 1 and 2, you shall be place on lifetime probation, and be required to register as a sex offender. As to Count 3, that you will 

be sentenced to a term in the department of 

corrections, and any sentence received shall run 

concurrently to any prison time imposed in CR2005-

113881001DT. The state agrees to dismiss count 4 in 

this case. Is that your understanding of the agreement, sir? 

 PETITIONER: Yes, your honor 

(Doc. 23, Ex. L at 9:30-10:12.) 

 The court then asked Petitioner how he wished to plead to each of the counts: 

 

 COURT: Okay. As to count 1, sexual abuse, a class 5 felony, committed June 10, 2005, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty? 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 4 of 18
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 PETITIONER: Guilty. 

 COURT: As to count 2, attempted sexual assault, a class 3 felony committed June 10, 2005, how do you plead? 

 PETITIONER: Guilty. 

 COURT: And as to count 3, kidnapping, a class 2 felony also committed June 10, 2005, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty? 

 PETITIONER: Guilty. 

(Id. at 10:12-10:40.) 

 Petitioner’s counsel provided a factual basis for the plea, and Petitioner agreed the 

following facts were true: 

 COUNSEL: ...this occurred on or about June 10, started out at 1 

o’clock in the afternoon, at a warehouse on 43rd 

Avenue and Camelback, it was abandoned, they got 

into it, they found liquor there at the warehouse, they had also three cases of beer, the three individuals, 

which included [the victim] and another gentleman, and my client defendant. They were up on the third floor, till dark, which was approximately 8 o’clock that 

night. The police apparently were called and came to 

the scene. As a result of the police coming there was panic and [the victim] started to jump out, and he restrained her and held her in there against her will. They had been talking about sexual relationships 

earlier in the afternoon and into the evening hours. She will claim that he made sexual advances to her that he 

touched her inappropriately, or attempted to touch her inappropriately in her chest area on her breast area, she 

is over the age of 15, she would also say that he 

attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, and 

that’s why he was attempting, in her opinion, why he was restraining her and keeping her on that second floor level . . . The prosecutor has indicated that he has 

interviewed her numerous times since then he has 

avowed to me that she is ready, willing and able to testify Monday, concerning the statements that I’ve 

just given to you attributed to her as she related them 

to the police officers. 

 COURT: Sir, is the information provided by your attorney true and correct? 

 PETITIONER: Yes, it’s true your honor. 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 5 of 18
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Id. at 19:15-21:03.) 

 On December 7, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for a time-served sentence, 

two motions to change counsel, and a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement. (Doc. 

23, Exs. N, O, P.) He also appeared for sentencing later that day. (Doc. 23, Ex. M.) In his 

motion to withdraw, Petitioner claimed he was not guilty of the offense and only signed 

the plea agreement because his lawyer would not defend him and “made [him] sign” the 

agreement. (Doc. 23, Ex. P at 1.) Petitioner also asserted the police report contained lies 

and his attorney failed to file motions on his behalf. (Doc. 23, Ex. P.) The court heard 

argument from the parties and denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw and request for a 

time-served sentence. (Doc. 23, Ex. R at 6-7.) Petitioner withdrew his motion to change 

counsel and requested his sentencing proceed. (Id. at 10-11.) The court reiterated that 

Petitioner had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived all pertinent constitutional 

trial and appellate rights, and found Petitioner guilty on all three counts. (Doc. 23, Ex. Q; 

Ex. R at 12.) The court imposed a mitigated sentence of four years for Count 3 

(kidnapping), to run concurrently with Petitioner’s sentence in a prior matter (CR 2005-

113881-001 DT). (Doc. 23, Ex. Q, Ex. R at 25-26.) For Counts 1 (sexual assault) and 2 

(attempted sexual assault), the court placed Petitioner on concurrent terms of lifetime 

probation, to run consecutively to his prison sentence Count 3. (Id.) 

 In August 2008, Petitioner completed his sentence in Count 3, and began his 

probation on Counts 1 and 2. (Doc. 23, Ex. KK at 3.) 

 2. Probation violations 

 On March 10, 2009, the State filed petitions to revoke Petitioner’s probation, and 

following a disposition hearing on August 21, 2009, the court reinstated probation. (Doc. 

23, Ex. Y.) On December 2, 2009, the State moved to revoke probation on Counts 1 and 

2 based on an allegation that Petitioner committed a burglary. (Doc. 23, Ex. Z.) Petitioner 

was found in violation of probation, but probation was reinstated on July 8, 2010. (Doc. 

23, Exs. AA, BB.) On June 27, 2012, the State again filed two petitions to revoke 

probation based upon alleged violations. (Doc. 23, Ex. CC.) On July 25, 2012, the court 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 6 of 18
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

found Petitioner violated his conditions of probation, but probation was again reinstated. 

(Doc. 23, Ex. DD.) On November 14, 2012, the State moved to again revoke probation 

based on Petitioner’s guilty plea to one count of sexual abuse. (Doc. 23, Ex. EE.) On 

December 3, 2012, the court found that Petitioner had violated the conditions of 

probation and sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment. (Doc. 23, Exs. 

FF, GG.) 

 On August 14, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the court’s finding of 

a probation violation on July 25, 2012. (Doc. 23, Ex. HH.) On March 1, 2013, 

Petitioner’s counsel filed an Anders2

 brief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 23, Ex. 

II.)3

 On June 20, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision 

affirming the court’s finding of a probation violation. (Doc. 23, Ex. KK.) The court stated 

that it had “reviewed the entire record for reversible error and [found] none.” (Id. at 7.) 

On July 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. On 

November 13, 2013, the court declined to review the petition. (Doc. 23, Ex. OO.) 

 C. PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

 1. First Petition 

 On November 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant 

to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 23, Ex. PP.) On May 19, 

2010, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a Rule 32 petition challenging only the 

imposition of a bench warrant fee, claiming that there was no bench warrant. (Doc. 23, 

 

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

3

 On April 12, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals, alleging that “during his arrest for those offenses, the police failed to read his Miranda rights, illegally searched his property, used physical coercion, and violated his right against self-incrimination.” (Doc. 23, Ex. KK at 5, Ex. JJ.) Petitioner 

“also raise[d] claims of involuntary plea, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and speedy trial violations.” (Doc. 23, Ex. KK.) Petitioner “further argued[d] the superior court violated the victim’s rights and improperly denied his motions to dismiss counsel and withdraw his plea.” (Id.) The court found that, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4033(B), “None of these issues are properly before [the court] because Wauneka 

cannot challenge his original convictions and sentence entered pursuant to his guilty plea in a direct appeal.” (Id. at 5.) 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 7 of 18
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Ex. RR.) On June 11, 2010, Petitioner filed a supplement to his Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 

23, Ex. SS.) Petitioner alleged counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct a proper 

investigation of his case, failing to file a motion to suppress statements obtained in 

violation of Miranda, instructing court staff to remove the victim from the courtroom, 

telling the sentencing judge that Petitioner was a liar, and convincing the court to accept 

Petitioner’s plea despite knowing Petitioner was innocent. (Id. at 4-16.) Petitioner also 

asserted violations of due process at sentencing, actual innocence, Miranda violations, 

and that his plea was involuntary. (Id. 11-19.) On January 5, 2011, the court stated that it 

would take no action on Petitioner’s pro se supplement because Petitioner had a pending 

Rule 32 proceeding and was represented by counsel. (Doc. 23, Ex. VV.) On February 23, 

2011, the court denied the Rule 32 petition because Petitioner “failed to provide any 

facts, affidavits, records or other evidence to support his claim.” (Doc. 23, Ex. WW.) 

 2. Second Petition 

 On March 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 

23, Ex. XX.) The court found the notice was timely “only as to the probation revocation 

that took place on December 3, 2012.” (Doc. 23, Ex. ZZ.) On June 3, 2013, Petitioner 

filed a 25-page motion to supplement his Rule 32 petition, asserting similar claims to 

those in his June 11, 2010 petition. (Doc. 23, Ex. AAA.) Petitioner added numerous 

allegations to the supplement. (Id.) Petitioner also filed a signed affidavit stating he was 

questioned in violation of Miranda, he was assaulted by police officers, and that he did 

not understand the plea agreement he entered. (Doc. 23, Ex. BBB.) On June 14, 2013, the 

court found that the petition did not comply with Rule 32.5 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure because it failed “to contain a certification . . . that he has included 

every ground known to him for vacating, reducing, correcting or otherwise changing all 

judgments and sentences imposed on him.” (Doc. 23, Ex. EEE.) The court granted 

Petitioner 30 days to submit a petition that complied with the rules. (Id.) On July 18, 

2013, the court notified Petitioner that his deadline to submit the petition had expired on 

July 15, 2013. (Doc. 23, Ex. III.) The court granted Petitioner an additional extension to 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 8 of 18
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

August 23, 2013 to file a petition. (Id.) On October 9, 2013, the court dismissed 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding because Petitioner did not file a petition. (Doc. 23, Ex. 

JJJ.) 

 Petitioner did not file an appeal of the dismissal to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

D. FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 On January 8, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that 

the conduct of police officers violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 6, 12-14.) In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (Id. at 7, 15-31.) He also argues his attorney’s conduct resulted in his 

involuntary plea. (Id. at 16.) He further contends the introduction of statements in a 

police report and 911 tape violates his rights to confrontation under the Fifth 

Amendment. (Id. at 17-18.) In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor committed 

misconduct in violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (Id. at 8, 32-40.) In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges the trial court violated 

his Sixth Amendment and due process rights. (Id. at 41-46.) He also claims that his 

presentence-report interview violated his Fifth Amendment rights. (Id. at 46.) 

 On June 6, 2014, the State filed a Response to the Petition. The State argues the 

Petition is untimely, Petitioner waived his claims, his claims are procedurally defaulted, 

and his claims lack merit. (Doc. 23.) 

 On September 19, 2014, Petitioner filed a 63-page Reply. Petitioner argues 

similar claims to those presented in the Petition. (Doc. 30.) Petitioner also contends that 

actual innocence affords an exception to his untimeliness. (Id. at 26, 32, 46.) He further 

argues Arizona and federal sentencing laws are invalid (Id. at 49, 54-57), his plea 

agreement was breached (Id. at 51-52), his sentence was illegal (Id. at 54), and due 

process violations (Id. at 52-54). 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 9 of 18
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

 A. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY. 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitations period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

 1. Time Calculation 

 Petitioner pleaded guilty, and was precluded from pursuing a direct appeal in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–4033(B). Rather, Petitioner could 

seek review of his conviction and sentence in an of-right proceeding pursuant to Rule 32, 

which is the functional equivalent of a direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 

32.4.; Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715–16 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Arizona 

courts consider Rule 32 of-right proceedings a form of direct review). Petitioner’s 

conviction became “final” at the conclusion of the first “of right” post-conviction 

proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. Id. at 717. 

 On December 7, 2006, Defendant was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement. 

(Doc. 23, Ex. Q, Ex. R.) To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, Petitioner was 

required file a notice of his intent to file a Petition for Post–Conviction Review within 90 

days of conviction and sentencing. Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)). Petitioner 

did not begin post-sentence collateral relief proceedings within 90 days, which was 

March 7, 2007.4

 Barring any applicable tolling, Petitioner’s limitations period would 

 

4

 Petitioner’s first post-conviction relief proceedings began on November 27, 2009. (Doc. 23, Ex. PP.) These proceedings concerned a warrant fee that was imposed at Petitioner’s probation revocation/disposition hearing in 2009. (Doc. 23, Ex. Y.) The court 

denied this Rule 32 petition on February 23, 2011. (Doc. 23, Ex. WW.) 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 10 of 18
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

have expired one year later on March 8, 2008. Petitioner did not file this Petition until 

January 8, 2014. The Petition is untimely. 

 The Petition is untimely because it was not filed within the deadline established by 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Absent equitable tolling or other exception, the Petition will be 

dismissed with prejudice, regardless of the margin of untimeliness. See United States v. 

Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that federal habeas petition 

submitted one day late was properly dismissed as untimely under AEDPA, and noting 

that a “missed” deadline “is not grounds for equitable tolling”); Hartz v. United States, 

419 Fed. Appx. 782, 783 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of federal 

habeas petition where petitioner “simply missed the statute of limitations deadline by one 

day”); Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[w]e consistently 

have denied tolling even where the petition was only a few days late”); United States v. 

Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 100–01 (1985) (“If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late 

filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that would 

engulf the rule erected by the filing deadline . . . A filing deadline cannot be complied 

with, substantially or otherwise, by filing late––even by one day.”). 

 2. Statutory Tolling 

 Petitioner’s limitations period expired on March 8, 2008. The AEDPA provides 

for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

 Petitioner’s first post-conviction relief proceedings began on November 27, 2009. 

(Doc. 23, Ex. PP.) These proceedings did not restart the limitations period. Once the 

AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed state post-conviction proceeding 

cannot restart the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 

(9th Cir. 2003) (noting that an application for state post-conviction relief filed after 

expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations did not reinitiate the limitations period). 

Accordingly, statutory tolling does not apply. 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 11 of 18
12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Absent equitable tolling, the Petition is untimely. 

 3. Equitable Tolling 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline 

must show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, 

and (2) he has diligently pursued his rights. Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 

2015) (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, (2010)). The petitioner bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 

432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external 

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely 

habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable 

tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 

1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 

219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 Here, Petitioner asserts equitable tolling should be granted because “it took” seven 

years for Petitioner “to recover from” his head injury. (Doc. 1 at 11.) He also asserts that 

he did not have transcripts. (Id.) Petitioner’s prior ability to file numerous, similar 

pleadings undermine his claim. On June 11, 2010, Petitioner filed a 20-page “Motion to 

Supplement Rule 32 Petition” alleging similar arguments to those presented in his current 

habeas petition. (Doc. 23, Ex SS.) Petitioner filed a nearly-identical motion on October 

28, 2010. (Doc. 23, Ex. UU.) On March 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Doc. 23, Ex. XX), and a subsequent 25-page Motion to Supplement 

Rule 32 Petition on June 3, 2013 (Doc. 23, Ex. AAA). On April 12, 2013, Petitioner filed 

a 25-page “Supplemental Brief” in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 23, Ex. JJ.) On 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 12 of 18
13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

June 27, 2013, Petitioner filed a 12-page “Motion for Reconsideration” in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 23, Ex. LL.) The record does not reflect that Petitioner’s head 

injury inhibited his ability to file a timely Petition. Competency proceedings conducted 

in 2009 resulted in the trial court finding Petitioner competent. (Doc. 23, Exs. V, W.) 

Petitioner has not established that equitable tolling should apply in this case. 

 Petitioner also asserts that a lack of transcripts should be considered in this matter. 

The alleged lack of access to transcripts does not constitute grounds for equitable tolling. 

Petitioner asserts the same claims he presented in an untimely manner before the state 

court in 2010 and 2013. The lack of a transcript did not preclude Petitioner’s ability to 

file a timely petition. See Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 806–07 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating 

that prisoner’s lack of access to a transcript did not preclude the timely commencement of 

post-conviction proceedings and, therefore, did not warrant equitable tolling). Petitioner 

pleaded guilty, and most of his claims concern facts surrounding his arrest for which 

there are no transcripts. See Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 

2009) (stating that petitioner “could have prepared a basic form habeas petition and filed 

it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline.”); United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (even without access to his case file, petitioner must “at least consult his own 

memory of the trial proceedings.”). 

 4. Actual Innocence 

 To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude this Court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence. “Actual innocence, if proved, 

serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a 

procedural bar . . . [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). “When an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner 

‘presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the 

outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error,’ the Court may consider the petition on the merits. See 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 13 of 18
14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 

(1995)). 

 To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner “‘must show that 

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light 

of the new evidence.’” Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies “only when a petition 

presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the 

outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 

constitutional error.’” Perkins, 133 S.Ct. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). Such 

a claim must be founded upon “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that 

was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. However, “the habeas court’s 

analysis is not limited to such evidence,” but rather “the habeas court must consider ‘all 

the evidence,’ old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it 

would necessarily be admitted under ‘rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.’” 

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537–38 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28). 

Significantly, “[t]his is a high threshold that is rarely met.” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 

929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (“tenable actual-innocence 

gateway pleas are rare”). 

 Here, Petitioner presents no new, reliable evidence of actual innocence, and he 

fails to satisfy the “demanding” standard for a miscarriage-of-justice exception to the 

procedural bar.5 See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). Petitioner fails to present 

anything other than his unsupported assertions. Notably, there is no new information 

 

5

 The Petition alleges Petitioner’s rights were violated but does not argue actual innocence. See Ground One (conduct of police); Ground Two (ineffective assistance of 

counsel); Ground Three (prosecutorial misconduct); and, Ground Four (trial court 

conduct). The Court nonetheless considers the actual-innocence exception because Petitioner alleges that he was “[o]bedient to his parents plead guilty involuntary but maintained his innocences....” (Doc. 1 at 26.) Petitioner argues actual innocence in his Reply. (Doc. 30 at 26, 32, 46.) 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 14 of 18
15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

regarding actual innocence other than a general claim of innocence. For example, 

Petitioner’s claim that his confession was involuntary is not evidence that he is innocent. 

An involuntary confession may still be truthful. Schlup instructed that a claim of actual 

innocence must be supported by “new reliable evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

Petitioner does not meet this standard. 

 5. Martinez v. Ryan

 On October 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing arguing, in 

part, that his untimeliness should be excused due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Doc. 32 at 7.) In his Motion, Petitioner cites to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1376 

(2012). (Id.) 

Martinez does not address or create an exception to the AEDPA statute of 

limitations. Federal courts have consistently rejected the argument that Martinez provides 

relief for time-barred petitions in the form of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 

See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corr., 742 F.3d 940, 945 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Chavez’s 

initial § 2254 petition was dismissed as untimely because it was filed more than one year 

after his convictions became final on direct review, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), and 

nothing in Martinez alters that fact.”); Manning v. Epps, 688 F.3d 177, 189 (5th Cir. 

2012) (Martinez does not extend statute of limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(B)). See also, Madueno v. Ryan, No. CV-13-01382-PHX-SRB, 2014 WL 

2094189, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2014) (“Martinez has no application to the statute of 

limitations in the AEDPA which governs Petitioner’s filing in federal court.”); 

Wheelwright v. Wofford, No. 2:13-cv-0787 GGH (HC), 2014 WL 3851155 at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Aug. 5, 2014) (“Although the rule in Martinez is an equitable one, it applied only to 

procedural default issues and does not apply to equitable tolling principles pertinent to 

the AEDPA limitations issue.”); Perry v. Uribe, No. SACV 11-0692 RGK (RNB), 2014 

WL 4463120 at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2014) (“Martinez dealt solely with the state 

procedural default doctrine, which is entirely different from the issue presented here of 

whether Petitioner herein (including the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 15 of 18
16 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

alleged in Ground 2) was time barred under the AEDPA statute of limitations.”); White v. 

Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2010) (the adequacy analysis used to decide 

procedural default issues is inapplicable to the determination of whether a federal habeas 

petition was barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations). 

B. PETITIONER’S MOTIONS FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND TO 

EXPAND THE RECORD 

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 32.) An evidentiary hearing is 

not warranted regarding Petitioner’s claims, including equitable tolling, because the 

record is sufficiently developed to resolve Petitioner’s assertion that his head injury 

precluded him from filing a timely petition. A habeas petitioner asserting equitable 

tolling “should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes ‘a good-faith allegation 

that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). An 

evidentiary hearing is not mandatory. “Where the record is amply developed, and where 

it indicates that the petitioner’s mental incompetence was not so severe as to cause the 

untimely filing of his habeas petition, a district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary 

hearings to further develop the factual record, notwithstanding a petitioner’s allegations 

of mental incompetence.” Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). See 

also, Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming conclusion that 

“[b]ecause [Gaston] was capable of preparing and filing state court petitions [during the 

limitations period], it appears that he was capable of preparing and filing a [federal] 

petition during the [same time]”). 

 The state record demonstrates Petitioner filed numerous, detailed motions in state 

court. See Section III.A.3. supra (“Equitable Tolling”). The Court is also mindful that 

when evaluating a pro se habeas petitioner’s allegations of such extraordinary 

circumstances, the court must “construe pro se habeas filings liberally.” Id. (quoting 

Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

 Here, even construing his Petition liberally, Petitioner fails to allege extraordinary 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 16 of 18
17 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

circumstances that kept him from filing his federal habeas petition on time. 

 The Court further concludes that an evidentiary hearing on the Schlup gateway 

claim is not warranted. Petitioner’s claim of innocence is insufficient for the Court to 

“lose confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. See also Stewart, 

757 F.3d at 941 (noting that the “Schlup Court suggested that when considering an 

actual-innocence claim in the context of a request for an evidentiary hearing, the district 

court need not test the new evidence by a standard appropriate for deciding a motion for 

summary judgment, but rather may consider how the timing of the submission and the 

likely credibility of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that evidence”) 

(citations and quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Petitioner’s 

Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing be denied. 

 Petitioner also requests the Court grant his Motion to Expand the Record in this 

matter so that the “911 tape recording, and police report be admitted.” (Doc. 33 at 3.) 

Petitioner further requests “complete state-court” records from numerous state agencies 

(regarding competency) (Id. at 8), “all of Judge Hentze’s proceedings” (regarding claims 

in his Petition) (Id. at 11), and discs, videotapes, and “original/certified transcripts” in his 

case (Id. at 20). 

 The Court recommends the Petition be denied as untimely. Because these items 

are not germane to the issue of untimeliness, the Court will also recommend that 

Petitioner’s Motion to Expand the Record (Doc. 33) be denied. (Id. at 3.) 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are untimely, 

precluded or procedurally barred from review, and Petitioner has not satisfied the burden 

to establish actual innocence. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 17 of 18
18 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary 

Hearing (Doc. 32) and Motion for Expansion of the Record (Doc. 33) be denied. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 12th day of June, 2015. 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-00036-GMS Document 37 Filed 06/12/15 Page 18 of 18