Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04412/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04412-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA NOTTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF PLEASANT HILL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.16-cv-04412-JSC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 8

Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 8.) After 

carefully reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes that oral argument is 

unnecessary, see Civ. L. R. 7-1(b), and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion as set 

forth below.

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first through third claims for relief for illegal 

search, illegal seizure, and excessive force under Section 1983 to the extent they are based on the 

Fourteenth Amendment is DENIED. As explained in Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff brings these 

claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Monell claims in the first through third claims for 

relief is GRANTED with leave to amend. The only allegation in support of Monell liability is that 

“defendants promulgated a policy, maintained a custom or practice, failed to train and/or 

supervise, and/or should otherwise be liable for the alleged conduct and proximate damages under 

principles enunciated under Monell . . . and related law.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 17, 21, 25.) Plaintiff’s 

perfunctory statement does not adequately plead that the violations of her constitutional rights 

were pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice. See AE ex rel. Hernandez, 666 F.3d 631, 

637 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012) (“naked assertions” of official “policies, customs, and practices” are 

Case 3:16-cv-04412-JSC Document 22 Filed 11/02/16 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

inadequate to state a claim for Monell liability). 

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 

(1993) does not apply. Plaintiff concedes that Leatherman pre-dates Iqbal/Twombly and the Ninth 

Circuit has clearly held that the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard applies equally to Monell

claims. See AE ex rel. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637 (holding that factual allegations in a pleading 

must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief for Monell municipal liability claims as well).

Plaintiff argues that Monell liability exists given the “sadistic behavior” of Officer Wright 

and “[t]he actions and inactivity of multiple employees of the Pleasant Hill Police Department, 

both before and after the illegal search and seizure in this case, [which] gives rise to more than a 

plausible inference of a structural problem at the Police Department.” (Dkt. No. 13 at 8.) Plaintiff 

cites to Officer Wright’s conduct at the police station and the failure of Wright’s supervisor to 

intervene. Plaintiff also suggests that the City ratified the excessive force and conduct of the 

officers involved when they denied her government claim. These allegations, however, do not 

appear in the Complaint. 

Even if alleged in the Complaint, these allegations standing alone may not be sufficient to 

establish Monell liability based on an official policy, failure to train, or ratification. Plaintiff 

cannot “simply allege[] that [s]he was arrested without probable cause, and that a search [was 

conducted] of h[er] home without probable cause, and that that translates into a ‘policy.’” Cannon 

v. City of Petaluma, No. C 11–0651 PJH, 2012 WL 1183732, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012). 

Further, a supervisor may only be liable for acts of a subordinate “if there exists either (1) his or 

her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). It is not enough to allege a failure to train based on a single 

incident; rather, Plaintiff must allege facts showing a pattern and practice of “deliberate 

indifference” to violations of constitutional rights, including allegations that “a municipal actor 

disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 

60-61 (2011); see also Cannon, 2012 WL 1183732 at *19 (“[w]here[] there is only a single 

constitutional violation alleged, such an allegation is insufficient to show a pattern and practice of 

Case 3:16-cv-04412-JSC Document 22 Filed 11/02/16 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

misconduct necessary to proceed with the Monell claim.”). Finally, with respect to ratification, “a 

policymaker’s mere refusal to overrule a subordinate’s completed act does not constitute 

approval.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). “There must [ ] be evidence of a 

conscious, affirmative choice” on the part of the authorized policymaker. Gillette v. Delmore, 979 

F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s Monell claims under Section 1983 are inadequately pled, 

the claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Bane Act claims on the grounds that Plaintiff has not 

satisfied the California Tort Claims Act is DENIED. Plaintiff filed a timely claim with the City of 

Pleasant Hill that set forth the facts upon which the Complaint is based. This claim was sufficient 

to satisfy the California Tort Claims Act even though she did not specifically identify the Bane 

Act. See Stockett v. Ass’n of California Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441 (2004); 

see also Mueller v. Cruz, No. 13-01274, 2015 WL 9455565 *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015)

(allowing a Bane Act cause of action to survive even though it was not specifically enumerated as 

a cause of action in the government claim because the claim gave the county notice of sufficient 

facts to investigate).

4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Bane Act unlawful search claim (fourth claim for 

relief) for failure to state a claim is DENIED. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged threats, coercion, 

and intimidation separate from the unlawful search itself. (Complaint at ¶¶ 11, 12.)

5. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the excessive force and unlawful seizure Bane Act 

claims (fifth and sixth claims for relief) for failure to state a claim is DENIED. See Barragan v. 

City of Eureka, No. 15-CV-02070-WHO, 2016 WL 4549130, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016); see 

also Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 978 (2013) (“Where . . . an arrest is 

unlawful and excessive force is applied in making the arrest, there has been coercion independent 

from the coercion in the wrongful detention itself—a violation of the Bane Act”) (emphasis in 

original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

6. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amendment Bane Act claim (seventh cause of 

action) is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff has not sufficiently identified the violation of 

Case 3:16-cv-04412-JSC Document 22 Filed 11/02/16 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

her First Amendment rights.

7. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state tort claims (eighth through fourteenth claims 

for relief) is GRANTED with leave to amend to specifically identify which defendant is sued on 

each claim and the statutory basis, if any, for each claim.

8. The punitive damages claim against the City is dismissed without leave to amend.

Plaintiff shall file her amended complaint on or before November 15, 2016.

The Case Management Conference remains on calendar for November 10, 2016 at 1:30 

p.m. The parties’ Joint Case Management Conference Statement is due November 3, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2016

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:16-cv-04412-JSC Document 22 Filed 11/02/16 Page 4 of 4