Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00646/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00646-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

VINCEQUELLA JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:14cv646-SRW

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Vincequella Johnson commenced this action on July 1, 2014, pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner 

denying his claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. On August 7,

2012, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an adverse decision.1 The Appeals 

Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner. This case is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 

1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the Magistrate Judge, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons stated herein, the court finds that the 

Commissioner’s ruling is due to be reversed and this cause remanded for further 

proceedings.

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		Plaintiff had two hearings before the ALJ. The first was held on June 10, 2011. After the hearing, the 

ALJ could not locate the digital recording. Therefore, a second hearing was conducted on April 26, 2012. 

(Doc. # 14-2 at p. 13). The ALJ’s written decision refers only to the events and record of the second 

hearing. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the second hearing before the ALJ.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. The 

function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is 

supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 

(11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the 

decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. 

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It 

is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id. A reviewing court “may not 

decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] decision for that of the 

[Commissioner].” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). In other words, 

this court is prohibited from reviewing the Commissioner’s findings of fact de novo even 

where a preponderance of the evidence supports alternative conclusions.

While the court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial 

evidence, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of 

validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. 

Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ’s 

application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for 

determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s 

decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).

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To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of 

disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the 

Regulations promulgated thereunder. The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability 

to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant must provide 

evidence about a “physical or mental impairment” that “must result from anatomical, 

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. 

The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment 

listed by the Commissioner;

(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the 

national economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable C.F.R. 

section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 

1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). The sequential 

analysis goes as follows:

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Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will 

automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment. If 

the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, 

the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can 

perform some other job. 

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The 

Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy in 

significant numbers. Id.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges a disability onset date of August 11, 2009. He was 42 years old 

when the ALJ issued his adverse decision. At the first step of the sequential process, the 

ALJ determined that plaintiff met the insurance requirements of the Social Security Act 

through December 31, 2014. At step two, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date. Proceeding to the third 

step, the ALJ found that plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: lumbar 

degenerative disc disease; mild to moderate left carpal tunnel syndrome; mildly active post 

traumatic ulnar neuropathy, status post-stab wound; headaches; and obesity. Plaintiff’s 

ulnar neuropathy and stab wound affect his left arm. At step four, the ALJ concluded that 

none of the plaintiff’s severe impairments, individually or collectively, meets a listed 

impairment in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (2014). 

At step five, the ALJ developed a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment 

limiting plaintiff to light work with certain exceptions. The exceptions material to the 

disposition of this appeal are that plaintiff “cannot perform activities requiring fingering 

with the non-dominant [left] hand ... [and] [h]e can engage in only occasional reaching, 

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handling and feeling with the non-dominant hand.” (Doc. # 14-2 at p. 26). Based on the

RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that there are jobs 

existing in significant numbers in the national and local economy that plaintiff can perform 

given his RFC limitations. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled.

At the time of plaintiff’s hearing before the ALJ, the medical evidence of record 

included opinions and records from five physicians – Dr. James Anderson, Dr. Michael 

Edward Davis, Dr. Wael Hamo, Dr. Karen Mockler, and Dr. Al Vester. Dr. Anderson is a 

consultative examiner who never personally examined the plaintiff. The ALJ afforded 

“great weight” to Dr. Anderson’s opinion. (Doc. # 14-2 at p. 29). Dr. Davis, an orthopedist, 

treated plaintiff following a back injury, and the ALJ gave substantial weight to his 

opinions. (Id.). Dr. Davis did not treat plaintiff for ulnar neuropathy or other effects from 

the stabbing injury. Dr. Hamo is plaintiff’s treating neurologist; he treated plaintiff’s stab 

wound and the complications arising from that injury, including ulnar neuropathy, since 

the date of the injury. Dr. Vester, who practices in the area of internal medicine, examined 

plaintiff on only one occasion. The ALJ gave “some weight” to Dr. Hamo’s and Dr. 

Vester’s opinions, rejected Dr. Vester’s medical source statement, and rejected Dr. Hamo’s 

medical source statement dated February 23, 2012. (Doc. # 14-2 at p. 30). The ALJ gave 

little to no weight to Dr. Mockler’s opinions and rejected her medical source statements. 

Dr. Mockler is plaintiff’s treating physician, and she practices internal medicine. 

The medical source statements provided by Dr. Hamo, Dr. Mockler, and Dr. Vester 

include opinions about the limitations and severity of plaintiff’s back issues and the 

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complications from plaintiff’s stab wound. Those physicians’ opinions and medical source 

statements discuss the limitations on plaintiff’s ability to use his left arm and left hand.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to provide a specific basis to reject 

the consistent medical opinions of Drs. Mockler, Hamo and Vester regarding the 

limitations caused by [the claimant’s] severe chronic mildly active left ulnar neuropathy.” 

(Doc. # 12 at p. 6). In essence, the plaintiff’s contention is that the ALJ’s RFC 

determination is not supported by substantial evidence and is contrary to law because the 

ALJ did not afford the opinions of Drs. Mockler, Hamo and Vester substantial weight and

did not explain his reasons for assigning less credibility to those doctors’ opinions. 

According to plaintiff, had the three physicians’ opinions been correctly credited by the 

ALJ, the only factual determination that could have been made on the medical evidence of 

record is that plaintiff has little to no use of his left arm and hand. In response to a 

hypothetical question posed by the ALJ, the vocational expert testified that, if plaintiff were

limited to the extent of those doctors’ opinion testimony, there are no jobs he could 

perform. In summary, plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed an error of law with regard 

to the weight he assigned to the medical sources’ opinions, and the error led to incorrect 

factual conclusions that, in turn, resulted in an erroneous adverse disability finding. The 

court disagrees. 

The following legal principles govern the disposition of the instant case. The 

Commissioner must specify what weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion and any 

reason for giving it no weight at all. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 

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1986) (citing Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 961-62 (11th Cir. 1985) and Wiggins v. 

Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1982)). Failure to do so is reversible error. 

Id. (citations omitted). The opinion of a treating physician “must be given substantial or 

considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v. Barnhard, 357 

F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th 

Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Good cause” exists when:

• the treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, 

• the evidence supported a contrary finding; or 

• the treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with his or her 

own medical records. 

Id. at 1241 (citation omitted). The ALJ must clearly articulate his or her reasons for 

disregarding a treating physician’s opinion, and the failure to do so is reversible error. 

Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440 (citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (“We will 

always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give 

your treating source’s opinion.”). However, when the ALJ adequately states specific 

reasons for doing so, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence, there is no 

such error. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

Only treating sources’ opinions are granted substantial weight. A specialist is 

entitled to greater weight in that physician’s area of specialization. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527d(5); 416.927d(5). One-time examiners’ opinions are not entitled to the 

substantial weight afforded to treating medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 

404.1527(c). “Generally, [the Commissioner] give[s] more weight to the opinion of a 

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source who has examined [the claimant] than to the opinion of a source who has not 

examined [the claimant].” Ware v. Colvin, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1218 (N.D. Ala. 2014) 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)) (bracketed text in original). 

The ALJ articulated good cause that is supported by substantial evidence for not 

affording Dr. Mockler and Dr. Vester substantial weight. The ALJ rejected Dr. Mockler’s 

medical source statement and gave less weight to her opinion testimony because she is not 

a specialist, she did not have the opportunity to review the entire medical record before 

forming her opinions, and her testimony conflicts with her own medical records. The ALJ 

explained that Dr. Vester examined plaintiff on only one occasion, he is not a specialist, 

and he, like Dr. Mockler, did not review the entire medical record. 

The medical evidence to which the ALJ refers, and which Drs. Mockler and Vester

did not review, are test results and findings within Dr. Davis’s records. However, those 

records are not relevant to plaintiff’s severe impairment of ulnar neuropathy because Dr. 

Davis only treated plaintiff’s back injury. Thus, the fact that Dr. Mockler and Dr. Vester 

did not have access to Dr. Davis’s records does not provide good cause or substantial 

evidence to reject those physicians’ opinions and medical source statements, as they pertain 

to plaintiff’s ulnar neuropathy. Nevertheless, the ALJ’s remaining reasons satisfy his 

obligation to explain what weight he assigned to Dr. Mockler and Dr. Vester and his 

rationale for his decisions. Those explanations conform with controlling law and are 

supported by substantial evidence.

The same is not true for the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Hamo’s opinions and his medical 

source statement dated February 23, 2012. The ALJ’s universal rejection of the subject 

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medical source statement and his choice to give only “some weight” to Dr. Hamo’s findings 

and opinions regarding plaintiff’s ulnar neuropathy is unexplained in the written decision. 

Because Dr. Hamo is a treating source, and the ALJ did not articulate reasons for failing to 

afford Dr. Hamo’s opinions and testimony “substantial weight,” the ALJ did not apply the 

proper substantive law. The error is not harmless and necessitates reversal because Dr. 

Hamo’s medical source statement, which is also entitled to substantial weight, places 

limitations on plaintiff that are contrary to the RFC. The Commissioner must reassess Dr. 

Hamo’s opinion evidence and medical source statement in accordance with proper legal 

standards.

The court notes that this opinion should not be read to imply that it has determined 

that the plaintiff is or is not entitled to benefits, or that Dr. Hamo’s opinions should or 

should not be given substantial weight. The court expresses no opinion on those subjects. 

Reversal is warranted so that the Commissioner can apply the correct legal standards and 

either (1) reassess plaintiff’s RFC, should the Commissioner assign substantial weight to 

Dr. Hamo’s opinions and medical source statement as to the limitations resulting from the 

severe impairment of ulnar neuropathy, status post stab wound, or (2) articulate legally 

sufficient reasons based on substantial evidence for giving less than substantial weight to 

Dr. Hamo’s opinions and medical source statement as to left ulnar neuropathy, status post 

stab wound. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, and for the reasons discussed, the decision of the Commissioner will 

be REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by

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separate judgment for the Commissioner to conduct additional proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

DONE, this the 31st day of March, 2016.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

Susan Russ Walker

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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