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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press.

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 14, 2007 Decided July 3, 2007

No. 06-5354

CITIZENS EXPOSING TRUTH ABOUT CASINOS,

A MICHIGAN NON-PROFIT CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

 OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv01754)

John J. Bursch argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs

were Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Robert J. Jonker, Daniel P.

Ettinger, and Joseph A. Kuiper.

Aaron P. Avila, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees Dirk Kempthorne, et al. With

him on the brief was Todd S. Aagaard, Attorney. Lisa E. Jones,

USCA Case #06-5354 Document #1051153 Filed: 07/03/2007 Page 1 of 21
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Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered appearances.

Reid Payton Chambers argued the cause for appellee

Nottawaseppi Band of Huron Potawatomi Indians. With him on

the brief were Mary J. Pavel, Arthur Lazarus, Jr., and Addie C.

Rolnick. Vanessa L. Ray-Hodge entered an appearance.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Attorney General’s

Office of the State of Michigan, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor

General, and Todd B. Adams, Assistant Attorney General, were

on the brief of amici curiae State of Michigan and Michigan

Governor Jennifer M. Granholm in support of appellee.

Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In 2002, the Assistant Secretary of

the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior

decided to take 78.26 acres of farmland in Calhoun County,

Michigan into trust for use by the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of

Potawatomi Indians (“the Band”) to construct and operate a

Class III gambling casino under the Indian Gaming Regulatory

Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. This followed federal

recognition of the Band in 1995. A non-profit Michigan

membership organization — Citizens Exposing Truth About

Casinos (“Citizens”) — sued the Secretary and Assistant

Secretary (hereafter, “the Secretary”), in part challenging the

Secretary’s determination that the proposed site was within the

“initial reservation” exception, id. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii), to

IGRA’s general prohibition on gaming on trust land acquired

after October 17, 1988, id. § 2719(a), and thus exempting it

from the community protection provision in § 2719(b)(1)(A)

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before opening a casino at the site. Citizens now appeals the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Secretary,

contending that in deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation of

the exception the district court ignored both the letter and intent

of Congress. We affirm.

I.

Two statutes are relevant to this appeal, the first authorizing

the Secretary to acquire lands for Indian tribes and the second

authorizing the Secretary to regulate gaming on Indian

reservations. After reviewing these statutes, we turn to the

proceedings underlying this appeal.

A.

Under the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), the Secretary

may acquire lands for the purpose of providing land for Native

Americans. 25 U.S.C. § 465. Title to such land is “taken in the

name of the United States in trust for the . . . tribe or individual

. . . for which the land is acquired.” Id. The Secretary is

authorized to designate such lands as part of the tribe’s

reservation. Id. § 467. Interior Department regulations provide

that the Secretary may make in-trust acquisitions “[w]hen the

Secretary determines that the acquisition of the land is necessary

to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, or

Indian housing.” 25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a)(3). The regulations, as

well as the Secretary’s Guidelines on proclamation of

reservations, define a “reservation” as “that area of land over

which [the] tribe is recognized by the United States as having

governmental jurisdiction.” Id. § 151.2(f); 1997 Dep’t of the

Interior Guidelines for Proclamations (“Guidelines”). The

Guidelines state that once such land is granted trust status, the

Secretary can proclaim it to be a reservation and the tribe then

may take advantage of special federal assistance; the

proclamation also clarifies tribal jurisdiction over the trust

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property. Guidelines at 2. 

IGRA, enacted in 1988, was designed “in large part to

‘provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian

tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development,

self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments,’” TOMAC,

Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852,

865 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1)), and “to

ensure that the . . . tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming

operation.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2). A tribe may conduct gaming

only on “Indian lands” within its jurisdiction. Id. § 2710(b)(1),

(d)(1)(A)(I). “Indian lands” are defined as: 

(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian

reservation; and 

(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the

United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or

individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual

subject to restriction by the United States against

alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises

governmental power. 

Id. § 2703(4). However, gaming regulated under IGRA may not

be conducted on lands the Secretary acquired in trust for a tribe

after October 17, 1988, unless one of the exceptions applies.

One exception allows gaming when “lands are taken into trust

as part of . . . the “initial reservation” of an Indian tribe

acknowledged by the Secretary under the Federal

acknowledgment process.” Id. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). The statute

does not define “reservation” or “initial reservation.” In 2001,

Congress clarified that the Secretary is authorized under IGRA

to determine whether specific land is a reservation for purposes

of IGRA. See 2002 Dep’t of the Interior and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-63, § 134, 115 Stat. 414,

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1

 Section 134, Clarification of the Secretary of the Interior’s

Authority Under Sections 2701-2721 of Title 25, United States Code,

provides:

The authority to determine whether a specific area of

land is a “reservation” for purposes of sections

2701-2721 of title 25, United States Code, was

delegated to the Secretary of the Interior on October

17, 1988: Provided, That nothing in this section shall

be construed to permit gaming under the Indian

Gaming Regulatory Act on the lands described in

section 123 of Public Law 106-291 or any lands

contiguous to such lands that have not been taken

into trust by the Secretary of the Interior.

Appropriations Act, § 134, 115 Stat. at 442-43. 

442-43 (2001) (“Appropriations Act”).1 Afterward, by

Memorandum of Agreement, the Secretary and the National

Indian Gaming Commission, which administers IGRA, 25

U.S.C. § 2706(b)(10), agreed that the Secretary is to determine

whether a tribe meets one of IGRA’s exceptions when the

Secretary decides to take land into trust for gaming. See Mem.

of Agreement between the Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n and

the Dep’t of the Interior (Feb. 26, 2007). 

IGRA also addresses the effects on the local community

where gaming will be conducted. Unless one of the exceptions

applies, when a tribe wishes to conduct gaming on newly

acquired lands, it must obtain the prior concurrence of both the

Secretary and the appropriate State Governor that operating a

casino on the tribe’s land “would not be detrimental to the

surrounding community.” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A). 

B.

The Band is a descendent of the Potawatomi Tribe of

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Huron, Michigan, which signed treaties with the United States

from 1795 through 1833. It unsuccessfully petitioned for federal

recognition in 1934. Prior to federal recognition in 1995, the

Band had been living on a 120-acre piece of property in Athens

Township, Michigan since the mid-1840s. The property, Pine

Creek, was privately acquired by the Band in the 1840s; as of

1995, fifteen members of the Band were living on it and 183

other members lived within a twenty mile radius of it. From

1845 the Governor of Michigan has arguably held title to the

Pine Creek property on behalf of the Band, but the status of the

property is in dispute because the State claims that it lacks

authority to hold land in trust as a reservation for an Indian tribe.

See Amicus Br. of the State of Mich. at 4. Although the Band

calls the property home, the Band does not exercise

governmental jurisdiction over the Pine Creek property, such as

authority over land use, law enforcement, building codes,

zoning, education, fire service, or judiciary. Neither the

Secretary nor the State has recognized the property as Indian

lands.

On December 11, 1999, the Band submitted an application

for the Secretary to acquire several parcels of land under the

IRA in trust for the Band. Ultimately, the Band only proceeded

with one parcel, a 78.26 acre property known as the Sackrider

property, located in Emmett Township in Calhoun County,

Michigan. In May 2000, the Secretary sent consultation letters

to the state and local governments with regulatory jurisdiction

over the land, and three months later gave notice in the Federal

Register of the intention to acquire the Sackrider property in

trust for the Band, see 67 Fed. Reg. 51,867 (Aug. 9, 2002). The

notice stated that the Band had no trust property at the time of its

federal recognition in 1995 and that on December 13, 2000, the

Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs had opined that the

Sackrider property was “within the geographical region

anticipated as part of the Band’s land base” and could be

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included in the initial proclamation of reservation because it

would meet the requirements of the “initial reservation”

exception in IGRA under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). 67 Fed.

Reg. at 51,867 (citing Trust Acquisition for the Huron

Potawatomi, Inc., Letter of Assoc. Solicitor at 2-3 (Dec. 13,

2000) (“2000 Op. Ltr.”)).

On August 30, 2002, Citizens sued the Secretary, alleging

that: (1) the Secretary had failed to comply with the National

Environment Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; (2) there

was no valid compact between the Band and the State with

regard to acquisition of the 78.26 acre site; (3) the Secretary’s

authority to acquire land in trust for the Indians violated the nondelegation doctrine; and (4) the Sackrider property did not

qualify for any of the exceptions to IGRA’s general prohibition

on gaming on trust lands acquired after October 17, 1998. On

motions for summary judgment by the Secretary and by the

Band, as intervenor, the district court granted the Secretary’s

motion on the statutory interpretation issue that is raised by

Citizens on appeal. Observing that Citizens’s “objective is to

delay or, if possible, prevent the construction of the [Band’s]

proposed casino altogether,” Mem. Op. of Apr. 23, 2004 at 5,

the district court noted that Pine Creek’s status as a state

reservation is a matter of some disagreement but that it is

“undisputed that the [Pine Creek] property is not a reservation

under federal law, and therefore does not fall under the purview

of IGRA,” id. at 7. The district court concluded that inasmuch

as the Secretary acts under the IRA in taking land into trust, the

Secretary could reasonably conclude, upon applying the

definition of “reservation” under the IRA regulations, that the

Sackrider property qualified as an “initial reservation” under

IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). See id. The district court

rejected Citizens’s argument that the Sackrider property could

not be a “reservation” because it was not going be a residence

for the Band, noting the absence of any such statutory or

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regulatory requirement for land designated a reservation. See id.

Citizens appeals, and our review of the grant of summary

judgment is de novo. See Wilson v. Peña, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n.1

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

 

II.

The Band, an appellee, contends that Citizens lacks

prudential standing to challenge the Secretary’s decision to take

the Sackrider property into trust as the Band’s “initial

reservation,” asking the court to revisit the decision in TOMAC

v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 433

F.3d 852, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In that case, “Taxpayers of

Michigan Against Casinos” included as members residents who

lived adjacent to another tribe’s proposed casino site. Through

TOMAC they sought injunctive and declaratory relief against

the Secretary on grounds similar to those relied on by Citizens.

TOMAC, 433 F.3d at 857-58. The district court rejected the

challenge to TOMAC’s prudential standing, TOMAC, 193 F.

Supp. 2d at 187, citing Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94

F.3d 658, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), and Humane Society

of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 53-59 (D.C. Cir.

1988). This court summarily affirmed this ruling, TOMAC, 433

F.3d at 860, also citing National Credit Union Administration v.

First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 492 (1998).

The court is bound by its precedent absent en banc review.

LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).

The Band maintains that private citizens seeking to restrict

tribal gaming because of its impact on surrounding communities

are not within the zone of interests protected by IGRA’s “initial

reservation” exception. In its view, the exception was intended

to ensure that tribes not recognized in 1988 were not

disadvantaged relative to tribes with established land bases in

their ability to conduct gaming, and it is not concerned with

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impacts on surrounding communities. The Band focuses on the

fact that Congress did not require the Secretary in applying this

exception to determine whether gaming on lands taken into trust

would “be detrimental to the surrounding community.” 

Contrary to the Band’s view, Citizens’s claim is sufficiently

congruent with congressional purpose because it seeks to

enforce the provision that Congress included regarding affected

communities. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d

1060, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Inclusion of this provision

demonstrates that Congress could not have intended to preclude

efforts to enforce it, even if enforcement might prevent a

landless tribe from gaining the benefits of IGRA. See Block v.

Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984). The rigors of

prudential standing are not so onerous as to preclude Citizens’s

challenge. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400-

01 (1987). The Band’s reliance on Grand Council of the Crees

v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950 (D.C. Cir. 2000), is misplaced; in that

case, the court held that the non-economic, non-competitive

injury alleged by the Council was outside the zone of interests

of the Federal Power Act, 15 U.S.C. § 824d, an entirely different

statutory scheme that did not include a provision for community

protection comparable to that in IGRA, see Grand Council, 198

F.3d at 956; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175-76

(1997). 

Accordingly, we hold that Citizens has prudential standing

to challenge the Secretary’s interpretation of IGRA’s “initial

reservation” exception.

III.

Citizens contends that it simply seeks to ensure that the

Band complies with the community protection provision of

IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A), before operating a casino.

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For that provision to apply, Citizens must demonstrate that the

Secretary’s decision to take the Sackrider Property into trust

under the IRA and designate it under IGRA as the Band’s

“initial reservation” was based on an impermissible

interpretation of the statute. We first address the nature of the

deference due to the Secretary’s interpretation of the “initial

reservation” exception before turning to Citizens’s reasons for

contending that no deference is due.

A.

Usually, where the agency is interpreting a statute that

Congress has authorized it to implement, the court’s review

follows the familiar two-step analysis in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.

v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). If Congress has spoken to the

question at issue, then that is the end of the matter. Id. at 842-

43. But if Congress has left a gap in the statute or the text of the

statute is ambiguous, then the court must determine if the

agency’s interpretation is permissible, and if so, the court must

defer to it. Id. at 843. Citizens contends, however, that no

Chevron deference is due to the Secretary’s interpretation of

IGRA’s “initial reservation” exception for several reasons. 

First, Citizens maintains no Chevron deference is due

because the Gaming Commission, not the Secretary, is charged

with administering IGRA. This ignores both the Secretary’s

substantial role in administering IGRA, most relevantly here in

determining whether an exception to IGRA’s gaming ban

applies, and Congress’s action in 2002 eliminating any doubt

about the Secretary’s authority to determine whether specific

land is a “reservation” and overruling the legal premise of the

Tenth Circuit’s decision in Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton, 240

F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001), not to defer to the Secretary. See

Appropriations Act, supra note 1. To the extent that Citizens

relies on Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie County v.

Kempthorne, 471 F. Supp. 2d 295 (W.D.N.Y. 2007), which

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relied on Sac & Fox, it is without persuasive force. This court

has declined to follow the Tenth Circuit’s lead. See City of

Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

Second, Citizens maintains that no Chevron deference is

due because the Secretary’s interpretation does not carry the

force of law. Citizens relies on Christensen v. Harris County,

529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000), where the Supreme Court held that an

opinion letter was due no Chevron deference because it did not

constitute the official exercise of delegated authority to enforce

the Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) against a particular

employer. In that case, employees had sued their employer for

alleged violations of the FLSA and sought to rely on the opinion

letter to the employer from the Acting Administrator of the

Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department that stated

that in the absence of an agreement with the employees,

employers could not require employees to use compensatory

time. The Supreme Court observed:

[W]e confront an interpretation contained in an opinion

letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal

adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.

Interpretations such as those in opinion letters – like

interpretations contained in policy statements, agency

manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack

the force of law – do not warrant Chevron-style

deference. 

Id. at 587. 

Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has read

Christensen to have limited Chevron deference to rulemakings

and formal adjudications only, much less to preclude Chevron

deference to situations involving application of an agency’s

delegated authority to particular facts. In United States v. Mead

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Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001), the Court acknowledged that

even in the absence of notice and comment or administrative

formality there may be reasons for according Chevron deference

where an agency action has the force of law; see also id. at 231

n.13 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life

Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995)). See Barnhart v. Walton,

535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). In FEC v. National Rifle Ass’n of

America, 254 F.3d 173, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2001), this court held that

advisory opinions of the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”)

that reflected its considered judgment made pursuant to

congressionally delegated lawmaking power and that had

binding legal effect were due Chevron deference. Contrasting

the formality of the FEC opinion letters, the court noted that the

Labor Department letter in Christensen neither bound the agency

nor the requesting party and was not the result of a statutorilycreated decision-making process. Id. The court further noted

that virtually every post-Christensen decision that had declined

to give Chevron deference did so in view of the informal agency

procedures that were involved. Id. (citing cases). Other circuits

have similarly understood the limits of Christensen’s holding.

See Heimmermann v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 305 F.3d

1257, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2002); Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v.

Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2002); Schuetz v. Banc

One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002); see

also Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 285 F.3d

864, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d en banc on other grounds, 325

F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Christensen is not controlling here. The Secretary’s

determination that the “initial reservation” exception applied to

the Sackrider property was intended to have the force of law, as

it formed the basis for the Secretary’s decision under the IRA to

acquire the property in trust for the Band. Citizens challenges

the Secretary’s exercise of express authority under the IRA and

IGRA to acquire land in trust and proclaim reservations and to

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determine what constitutes a “reservation.” Cf. Pharm. Research

& Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 822 (D.C. Cir 2004).

The Secretary gave formal public notice in the Federal Register

of the determination and the basis for it, including the opinion

letter on which the Secretary relied. Although publication in the

federal register is not in itself sufficient to constitute an agency’s

intent that its pronouncement have the force of law, see

Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587, where, as here, that publication

reflects a deliberating agency’s self-binding choice, as well as a

declaration of policy, it is further evidence of a Chevron-worthy

interpretation. As such, given the formal decision making

process involved, Chevron applies. 

 B.

In deciding to acquire the Sackrider property in trust for the

Band, the Secretary relied on the opinion of the Acting Associate

Solicitor of the Division of Indian Affairs. The opinion, set forth

in a letter to the Midwest Regional Director of the Bureau of

Indian Affairs, stated that the first time a federal reservation is

proclaimed for the Band, it constitutes the “initial reservation”

under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). 2000 Op. Ltr. at 2-3. The

land must be placed in trust at or before the time of initial

proclamation, and an “initial reservation” may only be requested

once. The opinion letter explained that these procedures would

put a newly recognized tribe in a position similar to tribes that

had land in trust before the ban established in IGRA for lands

acquired in trust after October 17, 1988. On appeal the Secretary

maintains that this analysis rests upon the plain meaning of the

phrase “initial reservation” to mean the first land taken into trust

for a tribe under federal law and proclaimed a “reservation”

under 25 U.S.C. § 467. This reading is consistent, the Secretary

points out, with IGRA’s purpose and the “initial reservation”

exception because, as this court has recognized, IGRA’s

exception “ensur[es] that tribes lacking reservations when IGRA

was enacted are not disadvantaged relative to more established

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ones.” City of Roseville, 348 F.3d at 1030. It is also consistent,

the Secretary notes, with the “Indian canon of construction,”

which provides that ambiguous provisions enacted for the benefit

of the Indians are to be liberally construed in their favor. Id. at

1032. 

Against this interpretation Citizens offer two reason why the

Secretary’s interpretation of the “initial reservation” exception

is impermissible: First, the Sackrider property is not a

“reservation” because a “reservation” is only land used for

residences of tribal members, and the Band intends to use the

property for gaming; second, the Pine Creek property is the

Band’s “initial reservation,” making the Sackrider property its

second “reservation” at best. Neither reason survives scrutiny.

As support for its first reason, Citizens purports to find

support for its interpretation of “reservation” as meaning the

tribe’s residence in Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal

Indian Law (1982 ed.) (“HANDBOOK”). The Secretary observes

that that edition does not reflect the official position of the

United States or the Secretary because it was contracted to the

University of New Mexico School of Law, which ultimately

privately copyrighted it. Appellees’ Br. at 40. In any event,

Citizens relies on a sentence stating that in the 1850s “the

modern meaning of Indian reservation emerged, referring to land

set aside under federal protection for the residence of tribal

Indians.” HANDBOOK, supra, at 34. In doing so Citizens does

not acknowledge that the sentence is part of a historical

discussion about the genesis of the term “Indian country” as used

in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), which governs criminal jurisdiction and

does not limit a “reservation” to land with houses. The

Handbook explains that the term ”reservation” originally meant

land a tribe “reserved” to itself under a treaty, HANDBOOK,

supra, at 34-35 & n.66, and that the term broadened to include

lands that the United States set aside from public lands not

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originally owned by the tribes for the tribes’ use and occupation.

Id. The term thus expanded to include “land set aside under

federal protection for the residence of tribal Indians.” Id. 

Although this explanation appears at first to lend some

support for Citizens’s interpretation of “reservation,” the

Handbook concludes that the “use of the term ‘reservation’ from

public land law soon merged with the treaty use of the word to

form a single definition describing federally-protected Indian

tribal lands without any particular dependence on source. This

definition of the term ‘reservation’ has since been generally used

and accepted.” HANDBOOK, supra, at 34-35 n.66. Tellingly, in

the “generally used and accepted” definition of “reservation,”

there is no reference to a requirement that the land be used as

housing in order to qualify as a “reservation.” 

Second, Citizens relies on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in

Sac & Fox, 240 F.3d 1250, not to defer to the Secretary’s

interpretation of “reservation.” But Congress overturned that

decision, see supra note 1, and even if Congress has not so acted,

this court has declined to follow Sac & Fox, see City of

Roseville, 348 F.3d at 1029-30. Contrary to Citizens’s

suggestion that a later public law cannot amend an earlier

enactment without actually changing the language of the statute,

Section 134 is a free-standing statute that is to be given legal

effect. See Mail Order Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 986

F.2d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Third, in Citizens’s view, the “established meaning” of

“reservation” as meaning residence is consistent with Congress’s

intent. It says IGRA was designed to help minimize the “illeffects of gambling,” protect surrounding communities from

gaming on Indian lands, and prohibit gaming on after-acquired

lands unless the Secretary and the State governor determine

gaming will not have a detrimental effect on the surrounding host

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community. Appellant’s Br. at 31-33. It is true that Congress

intended for the Secretary to take into account the concerns of

affected communities by requiring, in certain situations

involving newly-acquired tribal land, that the Secretary and State

governor concur that a casino on the tribe’s land “would not be

detrimental to the surrounding community.” 25 U.S.C.

§ 2719(b)(1)(A). But this court has recognized that Congress’s

overarching intent was “in large part to ‘provide a statutory basis

for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of

promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and

strong tribal governments,” TOMAC, 433 F.3d at 865, and to do

so “to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of

the gaming operation,” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1)-(2). Congress’s

primary purpose in enacting IGRA is evident as well from the

inclusion of several exceptions to the gaming prohibition on

after-acquired lands in order to allow newly acknowledged or

restored tribes to engage in gaming on par with other tribes. See

City of Roseville, 348 F.3d at 1030. So understood, as the

Secretary points out, Citizens has overemphasized one provision

in the overall structure of IGRA, which is insufficient to

demonstrate no deference is due to the Secretary’s statutory

interpretation. 

Fourth, Citizens maintains that the Secretary improperly

seeks to incorporate regulations promulgated under the IRA into

IGRA. But Citizens offers no reason, and we find none, why the

Secretary could not reasonably view the two statutes in tandem.

Congress enacted IGRA against the backdrop of its prior

authorization in the IRA to the Secretary to take lands in to trust

and to proclaim them a “reservation” for a tribe. As the district

court pointed out, because the Secretary takes the lands in trust

for a tribe under the IRA, it is consistent with IGRA for the

Secretary to look to the IRA implementing regulations in

concluding that a federally proclaimed “reservation” under the

IRA would be a “reservation” for the purpose of IGRA’s “initial

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reservation” exception. Cf. TOMAC, 433 F.3d at 864-65;

Roseville, 348 F.3d at 1031. To the extent that Citizens contends

that applying the IRA’s definition of “reservation” is inconsistent

with IGRA’s definition of “Indian lands,” because Congress

intended the terms to have different meanings, it fails to show

that the Secretary treats the concepts of “reservation” and trust

lands interchangeably. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(d) (defining

“trust land”), with id. § 151.2(f) (defining “Indian reservation”).

As the Secretary points out, “the Sackrider property would not

qualify as a reservation until the Band applied for and obtained

a reservation proclamation under 25 U.S.C. § 467.” Appellees’

Br. at 48.

Fifth, Citizens maintains that the Secretary “upset[s] the

careful parity intended by IGRA” because “a newly

acknowledged tribe would be in a far better position than an

existing tribe from the standpoint of selecting a casino site.”

Appellant’s Br. at 35. This argument might be more problematic

had Congress not made clear its intent in enacting IGRA. As the

court noted in City of Roseville, without the exceptions a tribe

recognized prior to IGRA’s enactment would have had

opportunities to acquire new trust lands that a post-IGRA newlyfederally recognized tribe would not have had. 348 F.3d at 1030.

The Secretary persuasively explains that the purpose of the

“initial reservation” exception is not to create parity in selecting

a casino site, but rather “to ‘grandfather’ certain lands acquired

after IGRA by treating them similarly to lands held by tribes

already recognized at the time IGRA was adopted.” 2000 Op.

Ltr. at 3. This thereby ensures that such tribes are not precluded

from gaming. The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs reported

in describing IGRA’s exceptions that they were meant to set

“forth policies with respect to lands acquired in trust after

[IGRA’s] enactment.” S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 20 (1988),

reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3090; no House Report on

this legislation was submitted. Citizens’s interpretation thus

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misconstrues the purpose of the “initial reservation” exception

and incorrectly suggests that a newly recognized tribe may select

any piece of land for its casino site; under the IRA, the land must

still be acquired in trust by the Secretary whose determination is

based on a number of factors. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 151.

In rejecting Citizens’s first reason for denying deference to

the Secretary’s interpretation, then, we conclude that Citizens

fails to demonstrate that the word “reservation” has an

established meaning that would limit it to lands used for tribal

housing. We find no basis on which to conclude that the word

“reservation” is unambiguous and has the asserted rigid meaning

in the United States Code, Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d

1280, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Because IGRA was designed

primarily to establish a legal basis for Indian gaming as part of

fostering tribal economic self-sufficiency, not to respond to

community concerns about casinos, see TOMAC, 433 F.3d at

865; City of Roseville, 348 F.3d at 1030, it would appear to

follow that the Secretary’s interpretation that the “initial

reservation” exception includes lands acquired in trust by the

United States for a tribe and proclaimed a “reservation” by the

Secretary under the IRA for use for a casino is permissible under

Chevron.

Citizens’s second reason for not according deference to the

Secretary’s interpretation focuses on the fact that the Pine Creek

property has functioned as the Band’s “reservation” for more than

120 years, thus making Sackrider property the Band’s second

reservation. This reason conflates the question of the Band’s

historical home with the inquiry into the land’s status for the

purposes of IGRA, which are two distinct inquiries. While the

Band lived on the Pine Creek land during that time, there is some

dispute, as the district court noted, with regard to the status of the

Pine Creek property. Apparently, the land was given to the

Governor of Michigan to hold for the Band, but the State claims

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that the Governor has no authority to hold land as a “state

reservation” for a tribe. See Amicus Br. of the State of Michigan

at 4. Citizens points to no legal basis on which this court could

conclude that there is such a thing as a “state reservation” under

Michigan law. Although Citizens points to statements by the

Interior Department during the course of considering whether to

grant the Band’s application for federal recognition that the Pine

Creek property is an official state reservation, see DEP’T OF THE

INTERIOR,HISTORICAL REPORT ON HURON POTAWATOMI,INC.4,

66 (1995), the Secretary points out that at that time the

Department was not making an official finding regarding the state

trust status of the Pine Creek property and the Department was

aware of the long-standing controversy over the status of the Pine

Creek property, id. at 66-67, 139-44.

The relevant inquiry is the status of the Pine Creek property

under federal law. Citizens has failed to show that Pine Creek

has any. It is undisputed that the United States does not hold the

Pine Creek property in trust, that it is neither a federal reservation

nor has it been proclaimed a “reservation” pursuant to 25 U.S.C.

§ 467, and that the Band does not exercise governmental

authority over the property as is required, see id. § 2703(4)(B).

In enacting the “initial reservation” exception, Congress did not

indicate that it intended to include a state reservation over which

a tribe did not exercise governmental jurisdiction. To the

contrary, the structure of IGRA’s prohibition on gaming on afteracquired lands and its exceptions indicate that Congress’s frame

of reference was federal reservations. The gaming prohibition in

Section 2719(a) applies to lands acquired by the Secretary in trust

for the benefit of a tribe after October 17, 1988, while

Section 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii) makes subsection (a) inapplicable when

such lands are taken, by the Secretary, as part of an “initial

reservation” “under the Federal acknowledgment process,” 25

U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). This statutory structure is

incompatible with Citizens’s position that Congress intended the

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2

 See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 101(a)(25) (referring to “nontaxable

Indian Lands, or other Federal reservations”); id. § 202(b)(1)(A)

(same); 25 U.S.C. § 1644(a) (referring to “Federal Indian reservations

and trust areas”); id. § 1678(b)(referring to “Federal reservations”); id.

§ 1683 (referring to “Federal Indian reservation”); 30 U.S.C.

§ 1291(9) (same); id. § 185(b)(1) (referring to “Federal reservation”).

3

 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1985(e)(1)(A)(ii) (referring to “any

Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States”); 18

U.S.C. § 1151 (same); 23 U.S.C. § 402(i)(4)(A) (same); 25 U.S.C. §

3902(3)(A) (same); 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h)(1) (same). 

“initial reservation” exception to include state reservations, and

would leave the Band without an “initial reservation” on which

to game under IGRA — a result contrary to the rationale of the

exception. Whether or not the Pine Creek property is held in trust

by the State for the Band thus becomes irrelevant. 

Moreover, Citizens’s view would lead to anomalous results.

It would be a remarkable proposition, the Secretary suggests, to

conclude that lands to which the State of Michigan holds title,

assuming Pine Creek were a state reservation within IGRA’s

“initial reservation” exception, would be subject to IGRA.

Where Congress intended statutes to apply to both federal and

state reservations, it has so stated in the statutory text. See, e.g.,

7 U.S.C. § 1926(a)(1); id. § 2662(a); 29 U.S.C. § 741(a); 42

U.S.C. § 2991b(a). Although Citizens points to provisions that

refer to “federal Indian reservations”2

 or “Indian reservations

under the jurisdiction of the United States,”3

 Citizens has pointed

to no federal statute that uses the term “reservation” that has been

applied to both federal and state reservations. As such, the

Secretary has the better argument: When Congress intends a

statute to apply to state reservations it ordinarily says so. 

Ultimately, however, Citizens’s view that the Sackrider

property is a second “reservation” illustrates that Congress’s use

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of the word “reservation” is ambiguous. The Secretary could

reasonably conclude that the “initial reservation” exception of

IGRA is to be read together with the “new Indian reservations”

provision of Section 467 and that the “initial reservation” for

purposes of Section 2719 is the land identified in the initial

reservation proclamation under Section 467 after the tribe

receives federal recognition. Here, the Sackrider property is

included in the proposed reservation proclamation under Section

467 and thus qualifies as an “initial reservation” under Section

2719. Further, as IGRA is designed to promote the economic

viability of Indian Tribes, the Indian canon of statutory

construction requires the court to resolve any doubt in favor of

the Band. See City of Roseville, 348 F.3d at 1032. See generally

County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima

Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992); Montana v. Blackfeet

Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). Doing so avoids what the

Secretary characterizes as another remarkable proposition

whereby a state, not the Secretary, could create a tribe’s “initial

reservation” for the purposes of IGRA notwithstanding the

“independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on Indian

lands” created in IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3).

Accordingly, because the Secretary’s interpretation of

IGRA’s “initial reservation” exception is due deference under

Chevron and is a permissible interpretation that is consistent with

the Indian canon of statutory construction, we affirm the grant of

summary judgment to the Secretary.

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