Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05091/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05091-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

MARTIN GILZOW PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 05-5091

LENDERS TITLE COMPANY, an Arkansas

Corporation, and MICHAEL PRYOR,

Individually and as President and

Chief Executive Officer of Lenders

Title Company DEFENDANT

O R D E R

Now on this 29th day of September, 2005, come on for

consideration the following motions:

* Defendant Pryor’s Motion For Protective Order And

Stay Of Discovery (document #6);

* Motion To Dismiss Michael Pryor (document #8); and

* the parties’ Joint Motion For Protective Order

(document #10),

and from said motions, and the responses thereto, the Court

finds and orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff Martin Gilzow (“Gilzow”) alleges that he

was terminated from his employment with Lenders Title Company

(“Lenders”) because he assisted and participated in reporting

allegations of sexual harassment in a Lenders’ branch office. 

He alleges that defendants violated the Arkansas Civil Rights

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Act (the “ACRA”), specifically A.C.A. §16-123-108, dealing

with retaliation. He also makes several other allegations

against Lenders only, which are not relevant to the pending

motions and will therefore not be discussed.

2. Separate defendant Michael Pryor (“Pryor”) now moves

for a stay of discovery and for dismissal of the claim against

him for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Pryor recognizes that

a complaint “should not be dismissed for failure to state a

claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitled him to relief,” Krentz v. Robertson Fire Protection

District, 228 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2000), but asserts that the

claim against him falls within this narrow parameter.

3. The Court will first address the Motion To Dismiss,

as it is potentially dispositive of all the issues presented

by the pending motions. 

(a) Pryor first argues that no retaliation claim

“exists, whether against a supervisor, employer, or otherwise,

under §108 of the statute.” The Court rejects this argument

out of hand, since it is contrary to the clear language of

A.C.A. §16-123-108, which provides, in relevant part, as

follows:

(a) RETALIATION. No person shall discriminate

against any individual because such individual in

good faith has opposed any act or practice made

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unlawful by this subchapter or because such

individual in good faith made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.

* * *

(b) REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES. The remedies and

procedures available in §16-123-107(b) shall be

available to aggrieved persons for violations of

subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

The subchapter referred to, which is the ACRA, recognizes

as a civil right the right to “be free from discrimination

because of . . . . gender.” A.C.A. §16-23-107(a). 

From the foregoing the Court finds that the Arkansas

legislature created a cause of action for retaliation for

assisting or participating in a charge of gender

discrimination, and assigned it a set of remedies. The Court

rejects the notion that because §16-123-107(b) describes

remedies available for non-employment-related types

discrimination –- whereas §16-123-107(c) describes remedies

for employment-related types of discrimination -– §16-123-108

is rendered nugatory in employment relationships, which are,

after all, those in which the majority of retaliation claims

arise. Indeed, the Arkansas Court of Appeals has held that

§16-123-107(b) is applicable, and §16-123-107(c) is not

applicable, in such a case. Odom Antennas, Inc. v. Stevens,

61 Ark. App. 182, 966 S.W.2d 279 (1998).

(b) Pryor next argues that, even if the ACRA does

provide a cause of action for employment-related retaliation,

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it cannot be asserted against an individual supervisor, but

only against an “employer.” 

As Pryor points out, Arkansas looks to federal law for

guidance in interpreting its civil rights statutes. See,

e.g., Flentje v. First National Bank of Wynne, 340 Ark. 563,

11 S.W.3d 531 (2000). He reasons that because supervisors

cannot be held liable under Title VII in their individual

capacities, a supervisor cannot be held liable on a claim of

retaliation under Arkansas law. 

Gilzow counters that the state and federal acts are so

different in remedial structure that the federal act cannot

provide guidance in interpreting the state act; that the ACRA

does not “expressly preclude individual liability”; and that

“individual liability would be consistent with the breadth and

purpose of the Act.”

In the Court’s view, neither party has suggested the

appropriate analysis for this issue. Federal law need not be

called upon to resolve a question of statutory interpretation

where the statute itself is clear. In this case, the ACRA

directs that “no person” shall discriminate by retaliation. 

A.C.A. §16-123-108(a). While there might be debates over

whether an organization is a person for purposes of a

particular statute, there should be no such debate over

whether a person is a person for those purposes.

In addition, while the ACRA does not define “person,” it

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does define “employer,” as “a person who employs nine (9) or

more employees in the State of Arkansas in each of twenty (20)

or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar

year, or any agent of such person.” A.C.A. §16-123-102

(emphasis added). If, as alleged, Pryor is the President and

Chief Executive Office of Lenders, he qualifies as an employer

under the ACRA and would come within the ambit of the ACRA’s

provisions regarding employer-related conduct. 

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Pryor can be

subjected to individual liability for retaliation under the

ACRA if the facts support that claim. The Motion to Dismiss

will, therefore, be denied.

4. Turning to the Motion For Protective Order And Stay

Of Discovery, it is apparent from what is said in ¶3 that

discovery should not be stayed, nor should any blanket

protective order be entered to prevent discovery from being

taken of Pryor. That being said, however, the Court finds

that a narrower class of discovery requests made of Pryor is

premature.

Pryor states that certain discovery requests seek his

individual income tax returns, insurance policies, bonus

incentive plans, and financial statements. It appears to the

Court that these documents are sought in order to support an

award of punitive damages, should that issue be presented to

the jury in this case. The Arkansas Supreme Court has said,

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albeit in dicta, that “[a] claim for punitive damages is a

serious matter; private tax records and personal financial

data should not be made readily available unless clearly

relevant.” Curtis v. Partain, 272 Ark. 400, 614 S.W.2d 671

(1981), overruled on other grounds, Lupo v. Linebarger, 313

Ark. 315, 855 S.W.2d 293 (1993). Because this case arises

entirely under Arkansas law, and because the Arkansas Supreme

Court did not retreat from this dicta when it overruled

Curtis, the Court believes it appropriate to take its

cautionary language into consideration. The motion will,

therefore, be granted to the extent it seeks private tax

records, insurance policies, and personal financial records of

Pryor, subject to reconsideration if a showing can be made

that those documents bear on the issues of liability raised in

this case.

5. Finally, the parties have filed a Joint Motion For

Protective Order, seeking an order that various documents

obtained in discovery will be kept confidential by the

parties. While the Court does not disagree that this type of

confidentiality is a salutary thing during discovery, there

appears to be no dispute between the parties about it, and

therefore nothing for the Court to decide. While the parties

may choose to enter a stipulation regarding the

confidentiality of discovery materials, the Court declines to

use the powers of F.R.C.P. 26(c) to resolve a non-dispute, and

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this motion will be denied as moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Pryor’s Motion For

Protective Order And Stay Of Discovery (document #6) is

granted in part and denied in part.

The motion is granted insofar as it seeks to protect

Pryor from having to produce or disclose his private tax

records, insurance policies, and personal financial records,

subject to reconsideration if a showing can be made that those

documents bear on the liability issues raised in this case.

The motion is denied in all other respects.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion To Dismiss Michael

Pryor (document #8) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties’ Joint Motion For

Protective Order (document #10) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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