Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00586/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00586-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Blas Rivera,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-0586-PHX-DLR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Buckeye, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on April 1, 2015 (Doc. 1). On September 4, 2015 Respondents filed their 

Response (Doc. 13). Petitioner filed a Reply on September 23, 2015 (Doc. 18). 

Respondents filed a Supplemental Answer on January 19, 2016 (Doc. 24), and Petitioner 

filed a Supplemental Reply on January 28, 2016 (Doc. 25).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual background as follows:

Prior to the events at issue, Rivera was a security guard with 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 1 of 41
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Securitas. In March 2006, he was assigned to work as a security 

guard at Pitney Bowes in Phoenix. His duties included monitoring 

the employee parking lot and ensuring that the building was secure 

at the end of the work day. On October 19, 2006, Rivera entered the 

office of Jack Fisher, his immediate supervisor at Pitney Bowes, and 

quit. Two weeks later, on November 2, 2006 at approximately 7:30 

a.m., Steven P., an employee of Pitney Bowes, was standing outside 

the Pitney Bowes building talking with the morning security guard. 

As the two talked, Steven heard a loud explosion and felt a shock. 

He turned and saw a large man with dark hair that he recognized as 

Rivera shooting at him and the guard with an assault rifle. Steven 

was hit in the shoulder and began to run away. As he did so, he was 

shot again in the leg, causing him to fall. In total, Steven sustained 

eight gunshot wounds. Meanwhile, the guard, who had been shot in 

the arm, took cover underneath a truck. While under the truck, the 

guard observed that the shooter was Rivera and that he was running 

away carrying the same gun that the guard had previously seen in 

Rivera's truck.

(Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. 3/31/11 at 2-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 13, are referenced 

herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On February 23, 2007, Petitioner was indicted (Exhibit A) in Maricopa County 

Superior Court on eight charges of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, 

and endangerment. He proceeded to a jury trial, which included evidence of a series of 

occurrences in the course of Petitioner’s employment at the Pitney Bowes building, 

including: (1) a sudden alteration in Petitioner’s demeanor in May and June, 2006, 

resulting in complaints to Petitioner’s supervisor who related Petitioner was having 

family issues; (2) Petitioner cursing at a delivery truck driver speeding through the 

parking lot; (3) accusations against Petitioner of “keying” an employee’s car, to which 

Petitioner responded abruptly; and (4) Petitioner abruptly quitting, referencing needing 

to leave before he hurt someone. (Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. 3/31/11 at 2-5.) 

After Petitioner testified in his own defense with a detailed alibi (exhibit J, R.T> 

5/26/09 at 35-50), the prosecution offered testimony by a police officer of an 

uncounseled custodial interrogation conducted without Miranda warnings in which 

Petitioner did not offer the detailed alibi offered at trial (Exhibit K, R.T. 5/27/09 at 7-11.)

Petitioner was convicted as charged, and was sentenced to 15 years on the first 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 2 of 41
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

attempted murder charge, a consecutive term of 18 years on the second attempted murder 

charge, concurrent with terms of 15 years on the aggravated assault charges, and 

consecutive (but concurrent with each other) 3 year terms on the endangerment charges, 

resulting in a cumulative effective sentence of 36 years in prison. (Exhibit M, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and filed through counsel an Opening Brief 

(Exhibit N), presenting a single issue for review: whether the trial court’s admission of 

“other act” evidence (the confrontations at Petitioner’s workplace) was a violation of 

Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b), and resulted in a violation of Petitioner’s rights to a 

fair and impartial jury under the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, and related state authorities. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the evidence was 

improperly admitted, concluding that it was properly introduced for purposes of 

establishing motive, and that it was not unfairly prejudicial. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences were affirmed. (Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. 3/31/11.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review, and on May 18, 2011, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals issued its Mandate (Exhibit P). 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

1. First PCR Proceeding

Petitioner commenced his first PCR proceeding on October 15, 2009, during the 

pendency of his direct appeal, by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit Q). 

Counsel filed a Motion to Stay (Exhibit R), seeking to stay the proceeding pending 

resolution of his direct appeal. The court denied the motion and dismissed the 

proceeding with leave to refile it upon conclusion of the direct appeal. (Exhibit S, M.E. 

6/4/10.) 

(Because no claims were presented or adjudicated in this first PCR proceeding, 

general references hereinafter to Petitioner’s state PCR proceeding are intended to refer 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 3 of 41
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to his second PCR proceeding.) 

2. Second PCR Proceeding

Petitioner commenced his second PCR proceeding on April 19, 2011, after the 

denial of his direct appeal, by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit T). 

Counsel was appointed, who filed a Notice of Completion (Exhibit U) on September 28, 

2011, evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. 

Petitioner then filed a Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit V)

arguing: (1) his 4th Amendment rights were violated when officers entered his home 

without a search warrant, and improperly collected evidence, and counsel failed to 

investigate the matter; (2) failure by the prosecution/investigators/defense counsel to 

secure exculpatory evidence; (3) false identifications of Petitioner because eye witnesses 

testified they never saw the shooter; (4) defense counsel’s failure to secure a gun expert; 

and (5) failure to advise Petitioner of his Miranda rights.

Following a response and reply, the PCR court determined that additional 

information and records were required, appointed new Rule 32 counsel, and directed 

briefing on the claims of “inadequate trial and/or appellate counsel.” (Exhibit Y, M.E. 

3/6/12 at 2.)

Counsel then filed a Report (Exhibit Z) addressing various claims, arguing that 

the admission of Petitioner’s un-Mirandized statements without a limiting instruction 

was error, and requesting the preparation of additional transcripts. 

Counsel then filed a Motion to Permit Self-Representation (Exhibit AA), 

appending a letter from Petitioner terminating counsel. The PCR court granted the 

motion, appointing counsel as advisory counsel, setting a deadline for a supplemental 

“motion,” and directing the State to respond to counsel’s argument on the instructional 

error regarding the un-Mirandized statements. 

Petitioner filed a supplemental pro per petition (“Pleadings to the Court in regards 

to Pro per Post Conviction Relief”) (Exhibit CC). Petitioner (1) raised a claim of perjury 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 4 of 41
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

by a prosecution witness; and (2) re-urged the Miranda instructional error raised by 

counsel.

On December 24, 2012, the PCR court dismissed the petition, finding a number of 

claims precluded by Petitioner’s failure to raise them previously, alternatively found 

some claims to be without merit, and found Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance 

of trial and appellate counsel to be without merit. (Exhibit HH.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit II) with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, arguing: (1) the search of Petitioner’s home and car without a warrant (and the 

keys disposed of) resulting in the violation of his 4th and 5th Amendment rights and 

counsel failed to investigate the issue; (2) Petitioner was denied a fair trial because 

evidence was not collected from his apartment, and counsel failed to investigate; (3) 

false identifications of Petitioner because eye witnesses testified they never saw the 

shooter, and counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an eye witness expert; (4) 

counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a gun expert to rebut the prosecutions’ 

expert; (5) his constitutional rights were violated when he was not advised of his 

Miranda rights; (6) error in failing to issue a limiting instruction on the use of 

Petitioner’s un-Mirandized statements; (7) the state failed to provide notice of its intent 

to use prior acts evidence, and that such evidence was unduly prejudicial, resulting in a 

denial of Petitioner’s right to due process and a fair trial under the 5th and 14th

Amendments; (8) a non-representative jury in violation of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th

Amendments; and (9) the sentence was excessive.

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief, adopting the trial 

court’s reasoning. (Exhibit LL, Mem. Dec. 4/22/14.)

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit MM), 

which summarily denied review on October 1, 2014.

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 5 of 41
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 1, 2015 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following grounds for relief:

In Ground One, he alleges that the State violated his Fourth, Fifth, 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by introducing highly 

prejudicial and unfair evidence. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges 

that his Miranda rights were violated. In Ground Three, he alleges 

that his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated where police took his keys and conducted illegal searches 

and tampered with evidence without obtaining a search warrant. In 

Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated where the police failed to recover 

evidence that would have excluded him as the perpetrator. In 

Ground Five, he alleges that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 

were violated where the victims never actually saw the perpetrator 

but nevertheless identified Petitioner as the perpetrator. In Ground 

Six, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated where jurors talked to the 

prosecutor outside of court and a State witness was coerced into 

falsely testifying at his trial. In Ground Seven, Petitioner alleges 

that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.

(Service Order 6/8/15, Doc. 7 at 2.) Petitioner appends to his Petition a “Supplemental 

Brief” (Doc. 1 at 82, et seq.) addressing the merits of his claims.

Response - On September 4, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 13). Respondents argue that Ground 3 is not cognizable on habeas 

review, Petitioner procedurally defaulted his state remedies on Grounds 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, 

and Grounds 2, 3, 4, and 5 were procedurally barred on independent and adequate state 

grounds. 

Reply - On September 23, 2015 Petitioner filed a Reply (“Response to 

Respondents’ Limited Answer) (Doc. 18). Petitioner argues that Ground 3 is cognizable, 

he fairly presented his claims to the state courts, and failure to properly exhaust should 

be excused because he is actually innocent.1

Supplemental Answer – In an Order filed November 25, 2015 (Doc. 19), the 

Court directed Respondents to address the merits of Ground 1 (Prior Bad Acts), and the 

 

1

Petitioner also mounts an argument regarding the application of the non-retroactivity 

rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). (Reply, Doc. 18 at 8.) The undersigned 

has discerned no portion of Respondents’ Answer dependent upon a non-retroactivity 

analysis, and thus does not address this issue.

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 6 of 41
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

independence and adequacy of the procedural bar applied to Ground 2(b) (Jury 

Instruction), and the merits of that claim.

In response, on January 19, 2016, Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer 

(Doc. 24). Respondents argue that Ground 1 is without merit because the evidence was 

relevant to matters other than propensity, and/or was not unduly prejudicial, any error 

was harmless (id. at 12, et seq.), and that Ground 2(b) is without merit because it is 

vague, and any error was harmless (id. at 18, et seq.).

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that all of Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally defaulted 

and/or were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and thus 

are barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 7 of 41
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petitioner must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 8 of 41
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Fair Presentation - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim 

to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) 

that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a 

lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached 

to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 9 of 41
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

13 at 14-15.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – Under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, 

a claim may not be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief if the claim was 

“[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 10 of 41
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 11 of 41
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 12 of 41
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011).

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

a) Presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court

Petitioner asserts in his Petition that a variety of his claims were presented to the 

Arizona Supreme Court in his PCR Petition for Review. The Arizona Supreme Court 

did not actually consider any of Petitioner’s claims, but simply denied review. (Exhibit 

NN, Order 10/1/14.) Thus, to result in exhaustion, Petitioner must have fairly presented 

his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

However, the presentation of a claim for the first time in a petitioner’s petition for 

review to the Arizona Supreme Court is not sufficient to fairly present the claim to the 

Arizona courts. The Arizona Supreme Court generally will not consider issues raised for 

the first time before it, although it has the discretion to do so. See Town of South Tucson 

v. Board of Supv’rs of Pima County, 52 Ariz. 575, 84 P.2d 581 (1938). Raising “federal 

constitutional claims for the first and only time to the state’s highest court on 

discretionary review” is not fair presentation. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 918 (9th 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 13 of 41
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 2004).

In Casey, the court reiterated that to properly exhaust a claim, "a petitioner must 

properly raise it on every level of direct review." Id. at 916.

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas 

corpus states, “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion 

requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire 

direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire 

judicial postconviction process available in the state.” 

Id. (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b 

(4th ed. 1998) (emphasis added)).

Thus, Petitioner’s presentation of a claim for the first time to the Arizona 

Supreme Court would not result in exhaustion. Accordingly, the undersigned addresses 

hereinafter only Petitioner’s presentation of his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

b) Ground One (Prior Bad Acts)

Arguments - In Ground One of his Petition, Petitioner argues that his 

constitutional rights were violated when Petitioner’s unfairly prejudicial prior bad acts 

(workplace demeanor, “keying” incident, etc.) were introduced to establish Petitioner’s 

guilt. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner “reiterates the points of the brief which was filed 

in the Arizona Court of Appeals” on his direct appeal. (Supplemental Brief, Doc. 1 at 3.) 

He argues he presented this issue on direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.)

Respondents argue that a claim based on the same facts was raised on direct 

appeal, but Petitioner raised it only on state law grounds, and that the passing reference 

to “The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution” was not fair presentation of a federal claim. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 17.) 

Respondents argue that the claim is now procedurally defaulted. 

Petitioner replies generally asserting the fair presentation of his claims, but fails to 

proffer any argument related to any of his specific claims, and does not point to any 

particular portion of his briefs in which his claims were fairly presented.

Record – On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court’s admission of 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 14 of 41
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“other act” evidence was a violation of Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) (prior acts 

evidence), and 403 (unfair prejudice). (Exhibit N, Opening Brief at 7, et seq.) Petitioner 

argued:

The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and Art. 2, § § 4 and 24 of the Arizona 

Constitution guarantees defendants the right to a trial by a fair and 

impartial jury and to the fair determination of guilt or innocence. 

Appellant was denied his constitutional right to these guarantees 

because the State was allowed to present evidence that was 

inadmissible under the plain language of Arizona Rule of Evidence 

404 (b).

(Exhibit N, Opening Brief at 8.) Petitioner argued that the result of the admission of the 

evidence was that he “was denied his right to a fair trial and due process.” (Id. at 10.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed Petitioner’s claims under the state 

statutes, and then opined: “Similarly, Rivera's claim that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated because the admitted testimony violated Rule 404 (b) 

fails under the same reasoning.” (Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. 3/31/11 at 11.) 

Analysis – Petitioner presented the facts and federal constitutional basis for his 

claim in his opening brief, albeit with little argument. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s arguments were insufficient because they 

amounted to nothing more than “general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such 

as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,” (Answer, Doc. 13 at 17 

(quoting Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000)), or “a mere reference to 

the ‘Constitution of the United States,” (id. (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 

162-163 (1996)). 

Here, however, Petitioner did not make a mere reference to the Constitution or 

general appeals to broad constitutional principles. He laid out a factual background, a 

legal theory with well-established constitutional dimensions (unfairly prejudicial 

evidence) and cited to specific provisions of the Constitution. See e.g. McKinney v. 

Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1993), as amended (June 10, 1993) (acknowledging 

Supreme Court’s previous avoidance of the issue, but deciding unfairly prejudicial 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 15 of 41
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence denied due process); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 

1991) (discussing due process limits on unfairly prejudicial evidence). 

In contrast, in Lyons upon which Respondents rely, the Petitioner “referred 

neither to provisions of federal law nor to the decisions of federal courts” and merely 

made “general reference in his state habeas petition to insufficiency of evidence, his 

‘right to be tried by an impartial jury,’ ‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ and being 

‘shammed’ into waiving a preliminary hearing.” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669-70, as amended 

and superseded, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit noted that 

one claim had been deemed exhausted because he had identified one claim “as ‘violating 

the 6th Amendment[ ] and den[ying] the defendant due process’. ”Id. at 670. See also 

Casey v. Mmore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004) (no fair presentation from reference 

to “fair trial” or “right to present a defense” with no reference to “specific federal 

constitutional violation”). 

Moreover, the Arizona Court of Appeals explicitly addressed Petitioner’s federal 

claim, albeit tersely, and rejected it on the merits. A state court's actual consideration of 

a claim satisfies exhaustion. See Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th 

Cir.1984) ("[t]here is no better evidence of exhaustion than a state court's actual 

consideration of the relevant constitutional issue"); see also Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 

1352, 1356-57 (8th Cir.1990) (state court's sua sponte consideration of an issue satisfies 

exhaustion). 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s claim in Ground 1 was 

fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and thus his state remedies on this 

claim have been properly exhausted.

c) Ground Two (Miranda and Jury Instruction)

Arguments - In Ground 2 of his Petition, Petitioner argues that he was never 

advised of his Miranda rights, the jury relied upon a video of his interrogation, and no 

limiting jury instruction was given, resulting in the denial of his rights under the 5th, 6th, 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 16 of 41
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and 14th Amendments. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) This claim functionally consists of two 

parts: (a) the absence of Miranda warnings; and (b) the lack of a limiting instruction on 

the use the un-Mirandized statements. Petitioner asserts these claims were raised in his 

PCR proceedings. (Id.) 

Respondents argue that the entirety of Ground Two was presented in his PCR 

proceeding, but was barred on the basis of Arizona’s waiver bar, and thus is barred from 

federal habeas review. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 19.) 

Petitioner does not counter that argument, but instead argues his actual innocence. 

(Reply, Doc. 18 at 5.)

State Court Record – The only claim raised by Petitioner on direct appeal was 

his prior bad acts claim in Ground 1. Accordingly, hereinafter, the undersigned focuses 

solely on Petitioner’s PCR proceedings to identify exhaustion.

Petitioner’s counsel raised his Ground 2(a) (Miranda warnings) in Issue Five in 

his original Pro Per PCR Petition (Exhibit V). Petitioner’s counsel raised Ground 2(b) 

(instructional error) in the Successor PCR Counsel’s Report (Exhibit Z), and Petitioner 

again argued it in his supplemental PCR petition (Exhibit CC at 2, et seq.). 

The PCR court held Ground 2(a), Petitioner’s claims based on the failure to 

advise him of his Miranda rights, precluded for failure to raise it at trial or on direct 

appeal. (Exhibit HH, M.E. 12/24/12 at 2.) The PCR court separately addressed the 

related instructional error claim, Ground 2(b), by noting no instruction had been 

requested at trial, and thus review was limited to “fundamental error analysis.” (Id. at 2-

3.) 

Petitioner raised these claims in issue five in his Petition for Review. (Exhibit II 

at 6.) The Arizona Court of Appeals, although granting review, “adopt[ed] the trial 

court’s ruling” without further discussion of the claim. (Exhibit LL, Mem. Dec. 4/22/14 

at ¶ 4.) Accordingly, this Court evaluates this claim on the basis of the decision of the 

PCR court, the “last reasoned decision.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th 

Cir. 2004). 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 17 of 41
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Analysis – The portion of Petitioner’s claim based solely on the failure to advise 

him of his Miranda rights was procedurally barred on the basis of Arizona’s Rule 32.2 

waiver bar. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that this rule is not an independent and 

adequate state ground sufficient to bar federal habeas review. Accordingly, absent cause 

or prejudice, or actual innocence, review of this claim is barred.

The portion of Petitioner’s claim based on the failure to properly instruct was not 

procedurally barred under Rule 32.2. Instead, the PCR court observed that the 

instruction had not been raised at trial, and opined that the claim was “judged solely 

under a fundamental error analysis. (Exhibit HH, M.E. 12/24/12 at 2.) Rule 32.2 

contains no exceptions for fundamental error. It is plain that instead, the PCR court was 

applying Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 21.3(c), which provides:

No party may assign as error on appeal the court's giving or failing 

to give any instruction or portion thereof or to the submission or the 

failure to submit a form of verdict unless the party objects thereto 

before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 

matter to which the party objects and the grounds of his or her 

objection.

Despite this apparently absolute bar, the Arizona courts have adopted an exception 

where the error amounts to fundamental error. See State v. Whittle, 156 Ariz. 405, 407, 

752 P.2d 494, 496 (1988). 

In their Answer, Respondents had not argued that Rule 21.3 is an independent and 

adequate state ground sufficient to bar federal habeas review. Further, it appeared that 

the application of the rule may be intertwined with a consideration of the merits of the 

claim because of the exception for fundamental error, and thus would not be independent 

and therefore would not bar habeas review. Accordingly, Respondents were given an 

opportunity to supplement their response and the record to address the issue (as well as 

the merits of the claim). (Order 11/25/15, Doc. 19.) In their Supplemental Answer, 

Respondents proffer no argument that Rule 21.3 is an independent and adequate state 

bar, and instead address only the merits of the claim.

By failing to respond to the Court’s direction for argument on this issue, 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 18 of 41
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondents have waived their argument that Ground 2(b) was procedurally barred on 

an independent and adequate state ground. Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude 

that it was properly exhausted, and will proceed to address it on the merits.

Summary regarding Ground Two – Ground 2(a) (Miranda rights) was 

procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground. Ground 2(b) (no 

limiting instruction) was presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, but Respondents 

have waived their argument that it was procedurally barred on an independent and 

adequate state ground. 

d) Ground Three (Illegal Search)

Arguments – In his Ground 3, Petitioner argues that police officers removed his 

car and apartment keys from his pocket, entered the car and apartment without a warrant 

and without his permission, and removed and contaminated evidence, and then left the 

keys under the apartment stairs. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) Petitioner asserts this claim was 

raised in his PCR proceeding. (Id.)

Respondents argue that, like Ground 2(a), this claim was raised in Petitioner’s 

PCR proceeding, but was precluded from review under Arizona’s waiver bar.

State Court Record – Ground Three was raised by Petitioner in Issue #1 of his 

original pro per PCR petition (Exhibit V). The PCR court dismissed the claim as waived 

by failure to raise it previously. (Exhibit HH, M.E. 12/24/12.) 

Petitioner again raised this claim in his Petition for Review. (Exhibit II at “1”.) 

Analysis - Like Ground 2(a) (Miranda) this claim was procedurally barred on an 

independent and adequate state ground. 

e) Ground Four (Exculpatory Evidence)

Arguments – In his Ground 4, Petitioner argues that the failure of the police to 

gather and preserve exculpatory evidence from his apartment violated his 5th and 14th

Amendment rights. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) Petitioner asserts this claim was raised in his 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 19 of 41
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PCR proceeding. (Id.)

Respondents argue that while Petitioner raised the facts underlying this claims in 

his PCR proceedings, he failed to raise them as federal claims, thus did not fairly present 

the claim, and has now procedurally defaulted his state remedies. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 

21.)

State Record- In his PCR Petition for Review, Petitioner argued that he failure to 

gather and preserve evidence from his apartment, resulting in a denial of “a fair trial.” 

(Exhibit II, at 3.) Petitioner did not cite any federal cases or constitutional provisions in 

support of this claim. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Analysis – Petitioner was obligated to fairly present this claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. “[T]he petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit 

either by specifying particular provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by 

citing to federal case law,” Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 668, or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson, 319 F.3d at 1158. Petitioner 

did neither, and thus failed to fairly present his claim in Ground 4. For the reasons 

discussed hereinabove, that claim is now procedurally defaulted.

f) Ground Five (Unreliable Identifications)

Arguments – In his Ground 5, Petitioner argues that his 5th, 6th, and 14th

Amendment rights under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 1811 (1972) were violated because 

the victims never saw the shooter, and yet identified Petitioner. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 12.) 

Petitioner asserts this claim was presented to the state appellate courts in his PCR 

proceedings. (Id.)

Respondents argue that while Petitioner raised the facts underlying this claims in 

his PCR proceedings, he failed to raise them as federal claims, thus did not fairly present 

the claim, and has now procedurally defaulted his state remedies. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 

21.)

State Record- In Issue #3 in his PCR Petition for Review, Petitioner argued that 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 20 of 41
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the victims testified they had not seen the shooter and yet identified him a trial. (Exhibit 

II, at 4, et seq.) But, Petitioner did not cite any federal cases or constitutional provisions 

in support of this claim. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Analysis – Petitioner was obligated to fairly present this claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals by explicitly asserting the federal basis of his claim. Insyxiengmay, 

403 F.3d at 668; Peterson, 319 F.3d at 1158. Petitioner did not do so, and thus failed to 

fairly present his claim in Ground 5. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, that claim is 

now procedurally defaulted.

g) Ground Six (Juror Misconduct/Prosecutorial Misconduct)

Arguments – In his Ground 6, Petitioner argues that: (a) jurors talked to the 

prosecutor outside the courtroom, and (b) a prosecution witness was coerced to testify 

falsely, in violation of Petitioner’s 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment rights. (Petition, Doc. 1 

at 13.) Petitioner asserts this claim was raised to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his 

PCR proceedings. (Id.) 

Respondents argue that Ground 6(a) (juror misconduct) was not presented to the 

state courts. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 26.) Respondents argue that the facts of 6(b) were 

presented in Petitioner’s PCR proceeding, but he did not raise them as a federal claim. 

(Answer, Doc. 13 at 21.) 

State Record – Petitioner argued in his first supplemental PCR petition (Exhibit 

CC) that his mother had observed the conversation between the witness and the 

prosecutor. He then submitted his Supplement to PCR (Exhibit GG), a statement from 

this mother regarding the discussions among the jurors. 

However, Petitioner did not argue in his PCR Petition for Review to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals either of the claims in Ground 6. At best, Petitioner appended a 

statement from his mother that the prosecutor had been observed directing a witness to 

read some documents, even though the witness protested he had seen nothing, and that 

three jurors were observed discussing their intended verdicts. (Exhibit II, Pet. Rev. at 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 21 of 41
22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Attachment.) 

Analysis – Petitioner was required to fairly present his claims in Ground 6 to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. His bare presentation of the facts in his mother’s statement, 

devoid of reference to federal law, was not fair presentation of the federal claims now 

raised. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed hereinabove, these claims are 

procedurally defaulted.

h) Ground Seven (Excessive Sentence)

Arguments – In his Ground 7, Petitioner argues that his sentence was excessive, 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Petition, Doc. 1at 17.) Petitioner asserts this 

claim was presented to the Arizona appellate courts in his PCR proceedings. (Id.)

Respondents argue that this claim was never presented to the state courts. 

(Answer, Doc. 13 at 26.) 

State Court Record – In his PCR Petition for Review, Petitioner argued for the 

first time that he was given “an excessive amount of time.” Petitioner cited no federal 

authority or constitutional provisions in support of that argument. (Exhibit II at 9.) 

Analysis - Presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals for the first time is not 

sufficient to exhaust an Arizona state prisoner’s remedies. "Submitting a new claim to 

the state's highest court in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered 

absent special circumstances does not constitute fair presentation." Roettgen v. 

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 

(1989)). In Arizona, review of a petition for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court 

of Appeals is governed by Rule 32.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 

clarifies that review is available for “issues which were decided by the trial court.” Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii). See also State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 

928 (Ariz.App., 1980) (issues first presented in petition for review and not presented to 

trial court not subject to review).

Moreover, Petitioner failed to provide the federal legal basis for his claim. 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 22 of 41
23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim has never been fairly 

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and for the reasons given hereinabove, his 

state remedies are now procedurally defaulted. 

i) Summary Re Exhaustion

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner properly 

exhausted his remedies as to: (1) Ground 1 (unfairly prejudicial evidence); and (2) 

Ground 2(b) (no limiting instruction).

Also based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted on: (1) Ground 4 (exculpatory evidence); (2) Ground 5

(unreliable identification); (3) Ground 6 (juror misconduct/prosecutorial misconduct); 

and (4) Ground 7 (excessive sentence).

Finally, based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner was 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds from asserting Ground 

2(a) (Miranda warning) and Ground 3 (Illegal Search).

5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 23 of 41
24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner offers no cause to excuse his procedural default. At most, he argues 

that there is prejudice because his claims have merit. (Reply, Doc. 18 at 7.)

Although both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural 

default, although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner 

fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of “cause and prejudice.”

6. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). A petitioner 

asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence" 

presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A showing 

that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not sufficient. Rather, 

the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant 

guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup gateway.” Gandarela v. 

Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner asserts that barring his claims will result in a miscarriage of 

justice because his claims have merit and show that his conviction was legally void. 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 24 of 41
25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Reply, Doc. 18 at 5-6.) 

Although not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has 

not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Moreover, the inadmissibility of evidence that underlies the substance of most of 

Petitioner’s claims is irrelevant to the actual innocence determination.

[T]he prisoner must “show a fair probability that, in the light of all 

the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted 

(but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably 

claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available 

only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a 

reasonable doubt of his guilt.” 

Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 455, n. 17 (1986) (quoting Friendly, Is Innocence 

Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). 

Further, Petitioner proffers no new evidence which would show that no reasonable 

juror would have found him guilty. 

Accordingly his procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred claims must be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

7. Conclusion regarding Exhaustion

Based on the foregoing, all but Ground 1 (unfairly prejudicial evidence) and 

Ground 2(b) (no limiting instruction) are procedurally defaulted or were procedurally 

barred on independent and adequate state grounds, and must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. MERITS OF GROUND 1 (UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE)

1. Parties Arguments

In Ground One of his Petition, Petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were 

violated when unfairly prejudicial evidence of Petitioner’s prior bad acts (workplace 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 25 of 41
26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

demeanor, “keying” incident, etc.) were introduced to establish Petitioner’s guilt. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Respondents argue that the evidence was properly admissible 

under state law to show motive was not unfairly prejudicial, any error was harmless, and 

the state courts’ rejection of the claim was not contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. (Supp. Ans., Doc. 24 at 12, et seq.) Respondents further 

argue that any error was harmless because of the overwhelming evidence against 

Petition. Petitioner replies that other evidence would refute the inferences of motive, 

intent, etc. and that the evidence of guilt was not so overwhelming as to make the error 

harmless. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 25 at 5, et seq.) 

2. Standard Applicable on Habeas 

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in custody pursuant to the judgment a State 

court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 26 of 41
27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

3. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented his claim in Ground 1 on direct appeal. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals summarized the pertinent evidence at trial as follows:

The admitted testimony detailed four events involving 

Rivera. The first event involved Rivera's change of attitude at work 

and the subsequent confrontation regarding the change. Fisher 

testified that in May .and June of 2006, Rivera's attitude at work had 

shifted "dramatically." He stated that although Rivera had 

previously been "very polite” and "very professional," in May and 

June Rivera had done "a direct about face." Fisher described the 

"about face," by stating, "No more waving hello, no more waving 

goodbye, no more coming up to me and having just chit-chat 

conversation. More of a straight face, avoiding eye contact with 

other employees, myself." Fisher confronted Rivera about his 

attitude and told him that the employees at Pitney Bowes were 

"getting antsy and nervous'''' and that Rivera was scaring them. 

Rivera assumed a "military rest position with his arms behind his 

back looking straight out" and said that it was not his responsibility 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 27 of 41
28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to socialize with the employees. Rivera then began "rattling off like 

a soldier what his duties were and responsibilities were.” Fisher 

contacted Rivera's supervisor at Securitas and later received a 

message stating that Rivera was having family issues but that the 

problem had been resolved. Fisher testified that when he later saw

Rivera, "everything was back to normal.”

The second event was another confrontation between Fisher 

and Rivera. Fisher had asked Rivera about an incident involving a 

delivery truck driver speeding through the parking. Rivera related to 

Fisher the details of the incident and then said, with his head down, 

"I cursed at him." Fisher testified. that he was surprised by Rivera's 

reaction to his inquiry because he had intended to simply ask Rivera 

about the incident, but Rivera reacted like he was being 

reprimanded. The conversation concluded with Fisher telling Rivera 

that “he [could not] do that and that he was supposed to bring these 

things directly to [Fisher]." 

The third event occurred in October, approximately one week 

prior to Rivera quitting. One of the victims, Steven P., testified that 

in September he noticed that his car had been "keyed." When he 

questioned Rivera about: it, Rivera appeared indifferent and 

responded with mostly one word answers. Steven later sent an 

email to Fisher stating that he "wouldn't put it past [Rivera] to have 

keyed the car. Fisher testified that when he asked Rivera about the 

incident, Rivera "went back to the almost military protocol,” and 

said "file a report, I told him to file a report, he needs to file a 

report. I don't know what happened, he just needs to file a report." 

The fourth event occurred when Rivera quit on October 19, 

2006. Fisher testified that while he was on the phone, Rivera 

entered his office and threw his phone, keys, and clipboard on the 

desk. Rivera was visibly upset, and said, "[T]hese people, I have to 

get out of here before I hurt somebody." Rivera left Fisher’s office 

before Fisher could get off the phone and talk to him.

(Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. 3/31/11 at 3-5.) Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that this 

was not a correct recitation of the objected to evidence.

The state court addressed Petitioner’s claims under the state evidentiary statutes, 

and concluded that the evidence was properly admissible under Rule 404(a) as relevant 

to establishing guilt through motive rather than solely for establishing propensity, and 

thus was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 404(b), and then opined: “Similarly, 

Rivera's claim that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because 

the admitted testimony violated Rule 404(b) fails under the same reasoning.” (Exhibit P, 

Mem. Dec. 3/31/11 at 11.) 

4. Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence

Petitioner complained to the state courts that the evidence was admitted in 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 28 of 41
29

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

violation of the state rules of evidence. A state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or 

treaties of the United States. Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in 

the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). 

See Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986) (dispositive issue is not 

whether introduction of the evidence violated state law evidentiary principles, but 

whether the trial court committed an error which rendered the trial so arbitrary and 

fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process). Thus, if Petitioner is to be 

entitled to relief, he must show that the admission of the evidence resulted in a 

constitutional violation.

Unfairly prejudicial evidence can amount to a denial of due process. In the course 

of addressing the latitude of the states to permit victim impact evidence at a capital 

sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court has opined: 

In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial 

that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief. See 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179–183, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 

2470–2472, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986).

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). The cited opinion in Darden involved 

prosecutorial misconduct in the nature of inappropriate argument in closing, and 

observed that the relevant question was “whether the prosecutors' comments ‘so infected 

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process’” and 

that the appropriate standard was “’the narrow one of due process, and not the broad 

exercise of supervisory power.’” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974). See Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 644 

(2016) (citing Payne for the proposition that the Due Process Clause prohibits the 

introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that would render the trial fundamentally 

unfair); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court 

has established a general principle that evidence that ‘is so extremely unfair that its 

admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice’ may violate due process.”). 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 29 of 41
30

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

It is axiomatic that evidence is not a violation of due process merely because it is 

prejudicial. “[A]ny evidence that tends to show guilt admitted against a defendant 

charged with crime may cause prejudice because the relevant evidence of guilt increases 

the likelihood of a conviction.” United States v. Ramos-Atondo, 732 F.3d 1113, 1124 

(9th Cir. 2013). It is only when evidence is unfairly prejudicial, i.e. because it is relevant 

only because of an impermissible inference, that due process concerns arise. In Jammal 

v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit summarized the 

standard regarding evidence with both permissible and impermissible inferences:

Evidence introduced by the prosecution will often raise more than 

one inference, some permissible, some not; we must rely on the jury 

to sort them out in light of the court's instructions. Only if there are 

no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can 

its admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence must “be 

of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.”

Id. at 920. 

Petitioner does not make clear the impermissible inference he applies to the 

disputed evidence. Before the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner’s counsel argued 

that the evidence was impermissible because it was used to establish guilt by showing 

prior bad acts, or a propensity for violence. (See Exhibit N, Opening Brief at 9.) 

However, the Ninth Circuit has opined that there is no clearly established Supreme Court 

law on either prior bad act evidence, see Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769 (9th 

Cir.2001), rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 202 (2003), or propensity evidence, see 

Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 2006), because the Supreme Court has 

expressly declined to rule on both of these assertions. In Albernini, the Ninth Circuit 

rejected arguments that a habeas court could ignore those reservations by the Supreme 

Court and instead rely upon the general principle that unfairly prejudicial evidence 

results in a denial of due process. 

5. Application of Law to Facts

Petitioner complains that the prosecution introduced evidence of the various 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 30 of 41
31

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

workplace events which did not establish motive or intent, but did improperly infer his 

guilt. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6; Supp. Reply, Doc. 25 at 3-4.) He argues that the first 

incident (his response when confronted about the change in his demeanor), did not show 

motive or intent because he was not reprimanded, the issue was between him and his 

employer (not the manager at the client’s site), and his demeanor was the result of a 

family matter. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 25 at 5.) He argues the second incident involving the 

speeding truck did not show motive or intent because he was obligated to report the 

matter. (Id.) He argues the third incident involving the keying of the car simply 

involved the reporting of the keying and his indication to the employee that a police 

report should be made. (Id. at 5-6.) Finally, he argues that fourth incident, upon his 

resignation, was just that, a resignation with no further contact. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner 

argues that the prosecution tried to paint him as an aggressive, angry employee, when he 

was not. (Id.)

Petitioner fails to offer anything to show that the evidence was not relevant to 

motive or intent. At best, Petitioner argues alternative explanations for the events. But 

relevance does not turn upon the sufficiency of evidence in establishing the material fact, 

but upon it making the existence of the fact more or less likely. See e.g. Ariz. R. Evid. 

401 (“Evidence is relevant if...it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence”); Fed. R. Evid. 401 (same). “Evidence need not 

be conclusive of a material issue in order to be admitted.” United States v. Madera, 574 

F.2d 1320, 1322 (5th Cir. 1978). 

Despite Petitioner’s proffers of favorable inferences, the negative inferences 

relied upon by the state court were not unsupported or unreasonable. The first incident 

raised a reasonable inference of a diminution of Petitioner’s workplace demeanor, and 

his abrupt response. The second incident raised a reasonable inference of Petitioner’s 

volatility and defensiveness. The third incident raised a reasonable inference of 

Petitioner’s defensive and abrupt demeanor in the workplace, resulting in a sense of fear 

of Petitioner by employees. The fourth incident raised a reasonable inference that 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 31 of 41
32

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner was disgruntled upon leaving the workplace. The four incidents combined 

painted a reasonable (if not compelling) inference that Petitioner was increasingly 

unhappy with the employees and the workplace, defensive and abrupt. These inferences 

established a motive for Petitioner’s attack, a relevant fact. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals aptly described the import as follows:

The testimony showed that Rivera had a negative attitude towards 

his co-workers and job and that he had been involved in multiple 

confrontations regarding his work, which he may have perceived as 

reprimands. This in turn tended to prove that: Rivera had a motive 

to return to his place of emp1oyment and attack former co-workers. 

Had the attack occurred in a location and on people unconnected to 

Rivera’s employment, we would agree with Rivera that the 

testimony was only relevant as propensity evidence. But such was 

not the case here. Instead, the evidence showed that Rivera carried

out an attack on the very people and at the very location toward 

which he had animosity.

(Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. 3/31/11 at 8-9.) Because these inferences were permissible, any 

impermissible inference (e.g. that Petitioner had a propensity to violence, etc.) was 

irrelevant. 

Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner relies upon an assertion that the evidence 

was unduly prejudicial because it permitted an inference of guilt from a prior bad act or 

propensity, Petitioner fails to show clearly established Supreme Court law finding such 

evidence to be a violation of due process. Therefore, even if Petitioner could establish 

such a constitutional violation, e.g. under Ninth Circuit precedent, he would not be 

entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Accordingly, because Petitioner fails to establish the absence of a permissible 

inference from the evidence, and fails to show a constitutionally impermissible inference 

cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), his Ground One is without merit. 

C. MERITS GROUND 2(B) (NO LIMITING INSTRUCTION)

1. Parties Arguments

In his Ground 2(b), Petitioner argues that the lack of a limiting instruction on the 

use his un-Mirandized statements violated his rights under the 5th, 6th and 14th

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 32 of 41
33

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Amendments. Petitioner argues that such statements could only be used for 

impeachment, and not substantive evidence of guilt. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to argue any prejudice from the 

omission, and that the overwhelming evidence against Petitioner and the limited use of 

the objectionable statements (which only impeached Petitioner on his chronology) 

precludes a finding of prejudice. (Supp. Ans., Doc. 24 at 18-21.) 

In his Supplemental Reply, Petitioner argues that the error was not harmless 

because the jury was permitted to view the video of the interrogation during 

deliberations. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 25 at 12-13.) 

2. Factual Background

After being arrested, Petitioner was interviewed and made several 

statements to the police, but was not provided Miranda warnings. (Exhibit K, R.T. 

5/27/09 at 16.)

As a result, at trial, the State did not offer any of Petitioner’s statements 

during its case-in-chief. Petitioner thereafter testified in his own defense, and 

offered an extremely detailed chronological account of his whereabouts on the day 

of the shooting. (Exhibit J, R.T. 5/26/09 at 35-50.) The State subsequently 

presented rebuttal impeachment testimony reflecting that, when Petitioner spoke to 

police during his police interview, he had been vague regarding his activities on 

the day of the shooting, and offered none of the particularity that he had during his 

trial testimony. (Exhibit K, R.T. 5/27/09 at 7-11.) Defense counsel did not object

to the limited evidence (but did object when it appeared to go beyond the point), 

nor request a limiting instruction, and the trial court did not thereafter sua sponte 

issue a limiting instruction on the use of the evidence. (Id.) 

3. State Court Decision

In disposing of this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the decision and 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 33 of 41
34

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reasoning of the PCR court. (Exhibit LL, Mem.Dec. 4/22/14.) The PCR court disposed 

of this claim by ruling:

The error brought to the attention of the court by advisory counsel 

Mr. Dew wherein the court at the trial did not give a limiting 

instruction regarding his pre-Miranda statements (to advise the jury 

defendant's statements were admitted solely for impeachment and 

not as substantive evidence and to only make such limited use of 

this evidence) also does not justify relief for defendant. Where no 

such request for the instruction is made, the court's failure to do so 

is judged solely under a fundamental error analysis, even if 

considered plain error under the cases. This court holds that the 

statements given pre-Miranda (chronology of the day of the

shooting) were neither critical to the prosecution nor extremely 

damaging to defendant.

(Exhibit HH, M.E. 12/24/12 at 2.) 

Respondents argue that the state court’s finding of no fundamental error is a 

merits determination entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and a factual 

determination entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). (Supp. 

Ans., Doc. 24 at 19 and n. 5.) 

4. Limiting Instructions on Un-Mirandized Statements

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that uncounseled 

statements made by a suspect in response to custodial interrogation made without benefit of a 

warning of various constitutional rights are not admissible for purposes of establishing the 

suspect’s guilt. However, the exclusion does not preclude the use of such statements for 

purposes of impeachment. “The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license 

to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent 

utterances.” Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).

2

 Thus, where a defendant has

testified in his own defense, statements made in violation of Miranda may be admitted 

so long as they are considered for impeachment purposes and not evidence of guilt. Id.

 

2 Although application of the exclusionary rule applicable to Fourth Amendment 

violations is generally precluded from habeas review under Stone v. Powell, 428 US. 465 

(1976), the same is not true of the exclusionary rule applicable to violations of Miranda

warnings. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993). 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 34 of 41
35

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Generally, that requires a limiting instruction by the court on the permissible use of the 

uncounseled statements. Id.

Here, of course, no such instruction was given. That was constitutional error.

However, not every constitutional error justifies relief. Rather, on habeas review 

(except in limited situations not applicable here3) “petitioners...are not entitled to habeas 

relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Thus, the habeas court must ascertain 

whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict.” Id. This standard is more favorable to sustaining the conviction than that 

applied on direct review. Id. 

As the Supreme Court has explained, under the Brecht standard, we 

ask, “Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially influenced 

the jury's decision.” In a case where the record is so evenly balanced 

that a “conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness 

of an error,” the petitioner must prevail. Thus, in the course of a 

Brecht inquiry, the state bears the “risk of doubt.” 

Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Moreover, “federal district courts always should apply the Brecht standard when 

conducting their own independent harmless error review, regardless of what, if any, type 

of harmless error review was conducted by the state courts.” Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 

964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, even if the habeas court would conclude the 

error harmful under Brecht, a state court’s finding of harmlessness must be afforded 

deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 878 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

 

3

Some constitutional errors are deemed “structural” and thus mandate automatic 

reversal. This has been applied in very limited circumstances such as complete denial of 

counsel, biased trial judge, racial discrimination in selection of grand jury, denial of self 

representation at trial, denial of public trial, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction. 

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999). The Brecht Court also recognized a very 

limited, hybrid type of trial error involving "a deliberate and especially egregious error 

of the trial type, or one that is so combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct" 

as to "infect the integrity of the proceedings" and "warrant the grant of habeas relief even 

if it did not substantially affect the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638, n. 9. None of 

these apply to the Miranda instructional error alleged by Petitioner. 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 35 of 41
36

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, the undersigned finds that the admission of the uncounseled statements, 

even without benefit of a limiting instruction, did not substantially influence the jury’s 

decision. The undersigned reaches this conclusion for three reasons.

First, the uncounseled statements proffered no direct evidence or admission of 

Petitioner’s guilt. They were merely impeaching of Petitioner’s exculpating description 

of his activities. 

Second, the uncounseled statements were impeaching only to the extent that the 

statements to police were devoid of the details offered by Petitioner in his expansive 

description at trial. 

Third, the direct evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was substantial, if not 

overwhelming. The victim, Steven P., testified that upon being shot, he turned and saw 

the shooter who he immediately recognized as Petitioner. (Exhibit D, R.T. 5/13/09 at 

85-86; 122.) Similarly, the other victim, Robert, testified that after being shot he took 

cover under a vehicle and saw the shooter running away, carrying the rifle with red tape 

holding an extra clip that he had previously seen on several occasions in Petitioner’s car, 

and he recognized the shooter as Petitioner. (Exhibit E, R.T. 5/19/09 at 11, 16-18.) A 

subsequent investigation revealed that a shoe print found at the scene matched the type 

of shoe Petitioner was wearing. (Exhibit H, R.T. 5/21/09 at 8–10.) Shortly after the 

shooting, Petitioner appeared at his step-father’s home. Although at trial, the step-father 

denied anything unusual about that visit, when interviewed at the time he told police 

Petitioner had acted strangely, washing his hands and face in vinegar. Petitioner then

asked his step–father for an extra pair of shoes, but when told that there were none, 

Petitioner asked for a knife and cut the soles from the bottom of his shoes. As Petitioner

left, his step–father noticed a box in Petitioner’s car that he believed might contain a 

weapon. (Exhibit F, R.T. 5/20/09 at 36-40, 69-73.) During the search of Petitioner’s 

home, officers discovered: (1) an April 29, 2006 receipt reflecting a purchase of a 7.62 

by .39 W.A.S.R – 10 assault rifle; (2) an empty box of 7.62 by .39 millimeter shells, 

which were the type of shells found at the scene; and (3) a spent 7.62 by .39 shell casing, 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 36 of 41
37

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

which matched the type of shell that was found at the scene. (Exhibit G, R.T. 5/21/09 at 

16-20, 48-51; Exhibit H, R.T. 5/21/09 at 42-48.) The State’s expert testified that the 

casing found in Petitioner’s home and the one found at the scene were fired from the 

same weapon or another one just like it. (Exhibit H, R.T. 5/21/09 at 48.)

Thus, the prosecution presented substantial, credible evidence of motive, 

identification of Petitioner at the time of the shootings by two witnesses very familiar 

with him, inculpating behavior afterwards, and evidence of Petitioner’s purchase and 

possession of a weapon uniquely matching the one used at the shootings. 

Petitioner’s defense consisted of his alibi testimony, and the corroboration from 

his wife. Petitioner presented testimony from his wife that he was in their apartment until 

after 7:30 (the time of the shooting), that he regularly cut the soles off worn out shoes 

and washed with vinegar, and that he had sold his rifle before the shooting. (Exhibit I, 

R.T. 5/26/09 at 16-19, 27-28.) However, she previously told police he had left between 

6:30 and 7:00, earlier enough to be at the scene at the time of the shooting, and she had 

not told police about the sale of the rifle. (Id. at 45-51; Exhibit J, R.T. 5/26/09 at 136-

137.) 

Petitioner argues that the impact of the violation was worsened by the fact that the 

jury was permitted to review the video of his jailhouse interrogation during deliberations. 

(Supp. Reply, Doc. 25 at 12-13.) Petitioner fails to establish that the video was viewed 

during deliberations. None of the record reflects that it was viewed during deliberations. 

At most, the record reflects that during the testimony of the interviewing officer, 

approximately five minutes of the video was played. Only the beginning portions the 

five minutes played are recorded in the transcript. (Exhibit K, R.T. 5/27/09 at 10-11.) 

Petitioner fails to explain the harm of viewing the video. Petitioner proffers nothing to 

suggest that the video extended beyond the description provided by the testimony of the 

interviewing officer, or that it somehow was more incriminating than the mere 

description. Given the limited nature of the statements reflected by the testimony of the 

witness, there appears no reason to believe that viewing the actual video altered the 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 37 of 41
38

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

limited effect of the testimony about the uncounseled statements.

Under all these circumstances, the undersigned concludes that the addition of the 

limited impeachment of Petitioner’s alibi testimony by the uncounseled statements 

would not have substantially impacted the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the error in 

admitting the uncounseled statements without a limiting instruction was harmless.

In the course of arguing prejudice, Petitioner argues that the failure to give a 

limiting instruction had the effect of altering the prosecutions’ burden of proof. (Supp. 

Brief, Doc. 1 at 8-9.) Petitioner fails to explain how this was so. In support of his 

argument he cites Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), and Ho v. Carey, 332 F.3d 587 

(9th Cir. 2003). Cage simply stands for the proposition that the jury must be properly 

instructed on the standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and Ho simply applied 

that principle where a jury instruction on its face omitted an element of the offense. 

Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that the jury in his case was not properly instructed 

on the burden of proof or the elements of the offense. He simply complains that there 

was a risk that his uncounseled statements were put to a purpose other than impeachment 

without benefit of a limiting instruction. There is no reason to believe that the absence 

of such an instruction left the jury to believe that they could convict without proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because the undersigned concludes that the error was harmless, there is no need 

to evaluate whether the state court reached the merits of the claim, nor whether the 

court’s decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts or contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Therefore, Ground 2(b) is without merit and must be denied. 

D. SUMMARY

Ground 1 (unfairly prejudicial evidence) and Ground 2(b) (no limiting instruction) 

are without merit and must be denied. The remainder of Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally defaulted or were procedurally barred on independent and adequate state 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 38 of 41
39

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

grounds, and must be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 39 of 41
40

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ground 1 (unfairly prejudicial 

evidence) and Ground 2(b) (no limiting instruction) of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, filed April 1, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 1, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 40 of 41
41

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 2, 2016

15-0586r RR 15 11 18 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00586-DLR Document 26 Filed 03/02/16 Page 41 of 41