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Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

SUSAN DOROTHY MARTIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

KENNETH P. BURRES; KENNETH P. 

BURRES, M.D., P.C.; KENNETH BURRES, 

M.D., P.C., Retirement Plan, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

JEFF BURRES; LEONARD P. BURKE, M.D.; ) 

COLORADO NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C.;) 

PENSION & RETIREMENT PLAN, ) 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

OCT 10 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1292 

(D.C. No. 88-B-1372) 

( D. Colo. ) 

Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App. P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1292 Document: 010110059542 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 1 
1 Defendants-appellants (defendants) appeal from a district 

court order denying their motion to vacate a default judgment that 

was entered because they had not filed a timely answer with the 

court as reflected on its docket. Plaintiff brought this action 

to redress defendants' alleged wrongful failure to pay over to 

plaintiff, upon her termination from their employ, monies due 

plaintiff as a participant in defendants' pension and profit 

sharing plans. 

On October 27, 1988, plaintiff served defendants with the 

summons and complaint. More than three months then passed without 

any record of a responsive pleading filed with the district court 

clerk. On February 27, 1989, plaintiff moved for default 

judgment, citing defendants' failure "to respond in accordance 

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The following day, 

the clerk issued a notice of default, and the district court 

simultaneously ordered the entry of judgment against defendants. 

Less than a week later, defendants (i.e., defendant Kenneth P. 

Burres, acting prose) filed a response to the notice of default 

protesting that they had filed with the court and served on 

opposing counsel a timely answer, which they attached. This 

latter document addressed the allegations of the complaint in 

informal but plain and intelligible fashion. 

1 In light of the district court's certification under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), secured in accordance with this court's 

order of August 8, 1990, we recognize our jurisdiction over this 

appeal despite the incompleteness, and consequent nonfinality, of 

the challenged order, which effected a final disposition of only 

those claims asserted against the defendants who now appeal. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1292 Document: 010110059542 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 2 
On March 14, 1989, judgment was entered by the clerk, without 

any indication of the district court's consideration of 

defendants' response to the notice of default. Some two weeks 

later, the district court received a second response from 

defendants, who objected that plaintiff had been awarded damages 

without a hearing of defendants' side of the controversy and 

requested that the court "[p]lease allow [defendants'] arguments." 

This document was treated as a notice of appeal and forwarded to 

the clerk of this court, initiating an appeal that, due to the 

absence of any follow-up action by defendants, including payment 

of filing fees, was dismissed within a month for lack of 

prosecution. 

Sometime thereafter, defendants retained counsel and moved to 

set aside the default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). After 

briefing by the parties, the district court entered an order 

denying the motion. In this, its first and only consideration of 

the various materials defendants had filed in response to the 

notice and entry of default judgment, the district court stated: 

Here, justification for relief is that defendants 

timely mailed a response to plaintiff's complaint to the 

court and to opposing counsel. Having done so, 

defendant believed that "all action necessary to 

preserve my rights in the pending lawsuit" was taken. 

Both plaintiff and defendants submitted affidavits to 

this Court upon Kenneth Burres' Motion to Set Aside 

Default Judgment. Having reviewed both parties 

affidavits and in light of the facts of the case, this 

Court is of the opinion that Kenneth Burres' excuse does 

not constitute a good cause or acceptable reason for 

failing to take action in his defense. Kenneth Burres 

is an M.D.; not an unsophisticated litigant. He was 

given an opportunity to appeal the entry of default 

judgment, but his case was dismissed due to defendants' 

failure to prosecute. His lack of knowledge of court 

procedures and his failure to hire an attorney until 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1292 Document: 010110059542 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 3 
after entry of default judgment does not constitute 

excusable neglect. 

District court order of August 3, 1989, at 3-4. 

We review the district court's refusal to vacate the default 

judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. Barta v. Long, 

670 F.2d 907, 910 (10th Cir. 1982); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. 

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure,§ 2692 at 469 (2d ed. 1983). 

On the other hand, default is a disfavored exception to the 

general preference for adjudication on the merits, see Barta, 670 

F.2d at 909; Federal Practice and Procedure,§ 2693 at 480, and, 

consequently, in a case such as this any doubts should be resolved 

in favor of the defaulted party, Federal Practice and Procedure, 

§ 2693 at 485 and numerous cases cited therein. 

It is significant here that although the district court 

docket would support the finding that defendants failed to file 

their answer with the court--a finding that appears to be assumed 

but is never made explicit in the district court's order--there is 

no evidence in the record specifically disputing defendants' 

repeated and, finally, sworn affirmation that they had served a 

timely answer on plaintiff's counsel, in fulfillment of the sole 

procedural requirement recited in the summons. Under these 

circumstances, a number of authorities support excusal of 

defendants' apparent failure to comply with the formal filing 

requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. S(d). See A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. 

M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 42-43 (7th Cir. 

1972)(default judgment vacated where defendant's counsel had 

failed to file answer with the court but had served opposing 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1292 Document: 010110059542 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 4 
party); Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49 F.R.D. 3, 5-8 

(D. S.C. 1970)(default judgment vacated where defendant, acting 

without counsel, had not filed answer with court but had sent 

letter "answer" to plaintiff addressing subject matter of 

complaint); Dalminter, Inc. v. Jessie Edwards, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 

491, 492-93 (S.D. Tex. 196l)(same); Woods v. Severson, 9 F.R.D. 

84, 86-87 (D. Neb. 1948)(same). Cf. Charlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. 

v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 

1977)(phone call and letter "responsive to plaintiff's formal 

court action" sufficient to constitute formal appearance 

necessitating notice under Fed. R. Civ. P. SS(b)(2) prior to 

hearing on default application; default judgment entered without 

such notice vacated under Rule 60(b)); H.F. Livermore Corp. v. 

Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 690-92 (D.C. 

Cir. 1970){written correspondence between parties' counsel 

indicating intent to defend sufficient to constitute appearance 

necessitating Rule SS(b)(2) notice; default judgment entered 

without such notice vacated). 

However, "[a] party requesting relief from default must 

[also] show 'a meritorious defense to the action.'" Republic 

Resources Corp. v. ISI Petroleum West Caddo Drilling Program, 836 

F.2d 462, 464 (10th Cir. 1987), quoting Gomes v. Williams, 420 

F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970). This does not mean defendants 

must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, United 

Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th 

Cir. 1983); see also Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 

1989)(same point made in Rule SS(c), rather than Rule 60(b), 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1292 Document: 010110059542 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 5 
context), but rather only the existence of a "colorable" or "prima 

facie" defense, see United States v. Forty-Eight Thousand, Five 

Hundred Ninety-Five Dollars, 705 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 1983); 

Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 

1982); see also Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 742 

F.2d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1984)(relevant test is whether "defendant 

cannot come forward with a defense of sufficient merit to raise 

the possibility of a change of outcome"). 

The defense raised by defendants is two-dimensional. First, 

because plaintiff's state law causes of action all in one way or 

another relate to defendants' employee benefit plans, these claims 

are preempted by section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). There is substantial 

authority to support this point. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 

Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987); Straub v. Western Union Tel. 

Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 1988). Second, defendants 

maintain plaintiff pled an entitlement to ERISA plan benefits 

pursuant only to an ancillary (employment) contract promise, not 

to the written terms of the plans themselves. Defendants argue 

that the former is not a cognizable basis for an ERISA claim, 

citing cases holding that because ERISA plans must "be established 

and maintained pursuant to a written instrument," 29 u.s.c. 

§ 1102(a)(l), secondary oral agreements or representations cannot 

modify the written terms of an ERISA-governed employee benefit 

plan. See Straub, 851 F.2d at 1265; Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 

F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1986). 

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Appellate Case: 89-1292 Document: 010110059542 Date Filed: 10/10/1990 Page: 6 
As defendants emphasize, the complaint does allege that 

defendants agreed to contribute to the benefit plans certain sums 

on plaintiff's behalf "as part and parcel of the employment 

contract between Plaintiff and Defendants," Complaint at paragraph 

12, but it also alleges "[.t]hat Plaintiff, upon termination of her 

employment by Defendants, had a balance of vested monies under the 

terms of the plan, due her on termination," id. at paragraph 26 

(emphasis added). We are concerned that the final resolution of 

this case not turn on the (im)provident, and quite possibly 

fortuitous, choice of particular phraseology in the initial 

articulation of plaintiff's ERISA claim. The evidence relating to 

the plans and plaintiff's substantive rights thereunder should 

control. Accordingly, while we need not and do not hold that 

defendants have conclusively established a valid defense on the 

strength of the authorities cited and language quoted above, we 

reverse the district court's denial of Rule 60(b) relief and 

remand with directions to vacate the default judgment and reopen 

the proceedings. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent herewith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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