Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00573/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00573-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Floyd Smith, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-04-0573-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc.

30), respondents' answers (docs. 33, 49), petitioner's replies (doc. 44, 54), the Report and

Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (doc. 55), and petitioner's objections

(doc. 59). After de novo consideration of the issues, we accept the recommended decision

of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

Petitioner was accused of slipping the drug Halcion into his fifteen-year-old

employee's drink. He was convicted of "[a]dministering a dangerous drug to another person"

in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(5). In his first claim for relief, petitioner contends that

his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when the trial court

failed to instruct the jury on A.R.S. § 13-1205(A), which also prohibits the administration

of a dangerous drug to another person, but contains an additional element that the drug be

administered without the person's consent. Alternatively, he argues that the trial court erred

Case 2:04-cv-00573-FJM Document 61 Filed 08/31/06 Page 1 of 3
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in failing to imply an element of consent in § 13-3407(A)(5). We agree with the magistrate

judge that neither the clear language of § 13-3407(A)(5), nor its legislative history, contains

an element of consent. Nor is there a conflict between § 13-3407(A)(5) and § 13-1205(A).

The trial judge did not err in denying petitioner's request to instruct the jury on § 13-1205(A)

because that statute contains an additional element and thus is not a lesser included offense

of § 13-3407(A)(5). In sum, we adopt the recommendation of the magistrate judge denying

petitioner's first claim for relief with prejudice.

In his second claim for relief, petitioner asserts that his right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment was violated when the trial court issued a reasonable doubt

instruction derived from State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995). We

accept the magistrate judge's conclusion that the use of the Portillo instruction was not

contrary to clearly established federal law, and accordingly deny petitioner's second claim

for relief with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Petitioner's third claim for relief alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation when the trial court admitted statements by the victim's treating physician

without an opportunity to cross-examine him. In his treatment notes, the physician stated

"[t]he urine drug screen, however, was positive for Benzodiazepines, confirming suspicion

that she had 'indeed' been slipped some sort of drug in the sparkling cider." Amended

Petition at 7 (doc. 30). The magistrate judge concluded that there was no Confrontation

Clause violation because the physician's statements were not testimonial, and alternatively

were admissible pursuant to the business records, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), and medical records,

Fed. R. Evid. 803(4), exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Magistrate Judge also concluded

that even if the facts presented a Confrontation Clause violation, petitioner failed to

demonstrate that the physician's statements produced a "substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict." Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1180 (9th

Cir. 2004). The Magistrate Judge concluded that "the evidence presented at trial supported

the jury's guilty verdict." Report and Recommendation at 20 n.17. We agree with the

Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny petitioner's third claim for relief with prejudice.

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Petitioner concedes that his fourth claim for relief is procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner's Objections at 14. Therefore, we deny this claim with prejudice.

Finally, petitioner contends that he was denied his constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object on "foundational grounds" to the

admission of the victim's medical records, including the statement by the victim's treating

physician that "she had 'indeed' been slipped some sort of drug in the sparkling cider." The

Magistrate Judge concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate either prong of the standard

set forth in Strickland v. Wahington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984).

First, counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness where

he fought vigorously to exclude the victim's medical records. Second, even assuming

counsel should have objected to the physician's statement on foundational grounds, petitioner

cannot show prejudice because the overwhelming evidence of guilt sufficiently supported

the jury's verdict. We agree and accordingly accept the recommendation to deny petitioner's

fifth claim for relief with prejudice.

Based on the foregoing, the court accepts the recommendation of the United States

Magistrate Judge (doc. 55). Therefore, IT IS ORDERED DENYING petitioner's amended

petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc. 30). 

DATED this 30th day of August, 2006.

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