Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00391/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00391-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tristan Desmond Rossum, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-00391-TUC-CKJ

ORDER 

 On July 29, 2013, Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman issued a Report and 

Recommendation, (Doc. 11), in which she recommended dismissing Petitioner’s Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. §2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (Doc. 

1). Magistrate Judge Bowman advised the parties that written objections to the Report 

and Recommendation were to be filed within fourteen days of service of a copy of the 

Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b). 

 On August 19, 2013, Petitioner filed a document entitled Petitioner Requests New 

Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed Based on Equitable Tolling Statute and Atkins Claims. 

(Doc. 12). On October 24, 2013, the Court Ordered Respondents to file a Response to 

Petitioner’s Request. (Doc. 14). Respondents filed their Response on November 12, 

2013. (Doc. 15). 

I. Background 

 On May 13, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and two 

counts of aggravated assault. (Doc. 10-1 at p. 6). After his conviction, the trial court 

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sentenced Petitioner to 35 years of imprisonment. (Doc. 10-1 at p. 10-15). Petitioner 

appealed and on January 29, 1998, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Doc. 10-1 at p. 5-8). Petitioner did not file a petition for 

review before the Arizona Supreme Court. 

 On March 23, 1998, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 10-1 at p. 17-19). On June 

5, 2001, appointed Rule 32 counsel filed a Notice informing the court that after reviewing 

the record, he was unable to find any meritorious claims to raise in a post-conviction 

proceeding. (Doc. 10-1 at p. 21-23). On March 10, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 

32 petition raising five separate claims for relief. (Doc. 10-1 at p. 25-37). On December 

8, 2003, the trial court denied Petitioner’s post-conviction Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 10-1 at 

p. 61-66). Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 9, 2004, (Doc. 10-2 

at p. 2-4), which was denied by the trial court on January 16, 2004. (Doc. 10-2 at p. 6-7). 

 Petitioner appealed the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 10-2 at p. 

9-12). On December 16, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted Petitioner’s petition 

for review but denied relief. (Doc. 10-2 at p. 26-27). Then, on June 23, 2008, Petitioner 

filed a Second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 10-3). On May 26, 20091

, the 

trial court denied Petitioner’s second Rule 32 Petition. (Doc. 10-4 at p. 35-36). 

Petitioner did not seek review of that order. Approximately three years later on May 21, 

2012, Petitioner filed the pending Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §2254 for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. (Doc. 1). In his Petition, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to secure a plea bargain with the state and failing to object to the consecutive 

sentences he received for the two aggravated assault charges, his appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue that Petitioner had no attorney present when he made 

incriminating statements to police, and the prosecutor committed misconduct by meeting 

with a witness and suggesting the witness change his story prior to testifying. 

 

1

 While the minute entry indicates that the order was issued on May 22, 2009, it was not filed until May 26, 2009. 

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 On July 30, 2012 Respondents filed their Answer. (Doc. 10). Petitioner did not 

file a reply. On July 29, 2013, Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman issued a Report and 

Recommendation in which she recommended dismissing Petitioner’s Petition because it 

is time barred. (Doc. 11). Petitioner objected arguing that his Petitioner was entitled to 

equitable tolling due to his mental impairment. (Doc. 12). 

II. Standard of Review 

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), if a party makes a timely objection to a magistrate judge's 

recommendation, then this Court is required to “make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.” See also 

Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (reading the Ninth 

Circuit's decision in Reyna-Tapia as adopting the view that district courts are not required 

to review “any issue that is not the subject of an objection”); United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.2003) (disregarding the standard of review employed by 

the district court when reviewing a report and recommendation to which no objections 

were made). 

III. Statute of Limitations 

 The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to applications 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Generally, the limitation period begins to run from “the date on which the judgment 

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1

 “The time during which a properly filed 

 

1

The AEDPA mandates that the limitation period begins to run from the latest of four 

possible dates; however, none of these are applicable to the instant case, and are therefore 

not considered here. 

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application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

 Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. Petitioner’s initial Rule 32 Petition proceedings 

ceased to be pending on December 16, 2004 after the Arizona Court of Appeals denied 

relief. Petitioner did not file his second Rule 32 Petition until June 23, 2008 over three 

years later. His second Rule 32 Petition ceased to be pending thirty (30) days after the 

trial court’s May 22, 2009 denial of relief. Petitioner then took no action for nearly three 

years until May 21, 2012. Additionally, Petitioner does not argue in his objections that 

his Petition for habeas relief was timely filed. As such, after an independent review of 

the record, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 is 

untimely. See Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412-413 (2005). 

IV. Equitable Tolling 

 In his Objection, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to a 

severe mental impairment. “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the 

burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, 

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Mental incompetency may be an extraordinary circumstance 

that justifies equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). A determination of whether the limitations period 

should be tolled due to Petitioner’s alleged mental illness is dependent on whether he was 

prevented from making a timely filing due to the severity of his mental illness. Laws v. 

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922-923 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Eligibility for equitable tolling due to mental impairment requires the petitioner to: 

(1) ... show his mental impairment was an ‘extraordinary 

circumstance’ beyond his control, by demonstrating the 

impairment was so severe that either (a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file, or (b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him 

unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate 

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its filing. 

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could understand them, but that the 

mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing 

deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance. 

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 

“The relevant question is: Did the mental impairment cause an untimely filing?” Bills, 

628 F.3d at 1100 n.3 citing Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). In 

evaluating whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the court must 

(1) find the petitioner has made a non-frivolous showing that he had a severe mental impairment during the filing period that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing; (2) determine, after considering the record, whether the petitioner satisfied his burden that he was in fact mentally impaired; (3) 

determine whether the petitioner's mental impairment made it impossible to timely file on his own; and (4) consider whether 

the circumstances demonstrate the petitioner was otherwise 

diligent in attempting to comply with the filing requirements. 

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1100-1101 (9th Cir. 2010). The mere allegation of 

mental incompetency by Petitioner in a verified pleading or affidavit may be enough to 

satisfy the “non-frivolous showing.” See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 

2003). However, an allegation of mental incompetency does not require the court to hold 

evidentiary hearings or permit discovery if the record was amply developed with 

evidence to indicate that Petitioner’s alleged mental incompetence was not so severe as to 

cause his untimely filing. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 The record in this case establishes that Petitioner’s alleged mental impairment was 

not so severe as to cause his untimely filing. Petitioner asserts that he has been in special 

education all his life. However, being in special education while in school does not 

sufficiently demonstrate a non-frivolous showing that Petitioner had a severe mental 

impairment during the filing period that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. 

 Petitioner also argues for the first time in his Request for a New Writ of Habeas 

Corpus that his prior appellate counsel indicated that seizures in Petitioner’s brain may be 

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caused by different neurological or medical problems including head injury, infection or 

some other reason and that his counsel attempted to have a physician examine Petitioner 

for the purpose of an Atkins hearing.2

 However, Petitioner does not argue that he actually 

suffers from a mental impairment or that any alleged mental impairment caused his 

untimely filing. Petitioner only argues that if he was examined, a physician may have 

found that Petitioner had a mental and developmental disability. As such, Plaintiff has 

failed to make a non-frivolous showing that he suffered from a mental impairment or 

satisfy his burden that he was mentally impaired during the filing period. 

 Moreover, the record demonstrates that Petitioner understood the need to timely 

file his petition. The State record reveals that after Petitioner’s direct appeal concluded, 

Petitioner timely filed a pro se Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. Petitioner then filed a 

pro se Motion for Appointment of Counsel, which was granted by the court. (Doc. 15-1, 

p. 2-9). After Petitioner’s appointed counsel was unable to find any meritorious claims to 

raise in a post-conviction proceeding, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion requesting an 

extension of time to file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In his Motion, 

Petitioner noted that he had filed two prior pro se motions for extensions of time and 

requested a ruling on his prior motions so that he could have a clear due date for his 

petition. (Doc. 15-2, p. 7-8). 

 Subsequently, Petitioner filed 8 pro se Motions to extend the time to file his 

Petition. (Doc. 15-2, p. 11-35). Then, on March 10, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 

32 Petition raising 5 claims for relief. After his pro se Rule 32 Petition was denied, 

Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to extend his time to file a Motion for Reconsideration. 

(Doc. 15-2, p. 51-52). Later Petitioner timely filed a pro se Motion for Reconsideration 

on January 9, 2004. After his pro se Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Petitioner 

filed a Motion to extend the time to file a petition for review of his Rule 32 Petition. 

(Doc. 15-2, p. 59-60). 

 2

 Petitioner’s reference to Atkins, likely implies the Supreme Court case, which held that capital punishment for the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 

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 Accordingly, the record demonstrates that throughout Petitioner’s post-conviction 

relief proceedings, he was aware of and understood the impending deadlines and made 

efforts to comply with those deadlines. In those instances, where he could not comply 

with the deadline, Petitioner filed motions seeking to extend the deadline. Further, the 

Court notes that in Petitioner’s numerous motions for extensions of various deadlines in 

state court, Petitioner never once asserted that he suffered from any mental impairment. 

His requests for extensions primarily relied on his limited access to the prison’s law 

library and his failure to timely receive necessary documentation. 

V. Conclusion 

 After an independent review of the record, the Court finds that there is no 

indication that any mental impairment prevented Petitioner from understanding the need 

to file his Petition within the prescribed deadline or rendered him unable to prepare a 

habeas petition and effectuate its filing. See Bills v. Clark, 628 F.2d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 

2010). In fact, the record establishes that Petitioner did factually and rationally 

understand the need to timely file documents as evidenced by his numerous prior filings 

during his post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner paid close attention to his filing 

deadlines and submitted over ten motions seeking to extend various filing deadlines. 

 Further, in one motion, Petitioner specifically asked the State court to rule on two 

pending motions to extend deadlines so Petitioner would have a clear due date for his 

petition. (Doc. 15-2, p. 7-8). As such, it is evident that Petitioner understood the need 

to timely file his Petition and there is no evidence in the record or non-frivolous assertion 

by the Petitioner that a mental impairment prevented him from timely filing the instant 

Petition. Further, any lack of knowledge of the AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations, 

is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 

311 (2005). 

 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. The Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 11), is ADOPTED. 

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 2. Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

 3. Petitioner’s Request for New Writ of Habeas Corpus filed Based on 

Equitable Tolling Statute and Atkins Claim, (Doc. 12), is DENIED. 

 4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in this matter and close the file. 

 Dated this 18th day of December, 2013. 

 

 

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