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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 20, 1997 Decided June 20, 1997 

No. 96-7078

MICHAEL SWANKS,

APPELLANT

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv02421)

Karen E. McDonald argued the cause for appellant.

David R. Keyser, Assistant General Counsel, Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, argued the cause for 

appellee. With him on the brief were Robert L. Polk, General 

Counsel, and Robert J. Kniaz, Deputy General Counsel. 

Vincent A. Jankoski entered an appearance.

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Frank A. Rosenfeld, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for amicus curiae United States. With him 

on the brief were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney 

General, William G. Kanter, Deputy Director, and Eric H. 

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney.

Joseph R. Terry, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Robert J. Gregory,

Attorney, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission.

Before: WILLIAMS, SENTELLE and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this action we must decide whether appellant, alleging he was fired because of his disability, is 

barred from seeking relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act because he receives Social Security disability benefits. Because the Social Security Act and the ADA employ 

quite different standards and objectivesthe ADA requires 

employers reasonably to accommodate the needs of otherwise 

qualified disabled individuals, while the Social Security Act 

awards benefits to persons who, because of their disability, 

cannot perform "work which exists in the national economy," 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1994), without regard to reasonable 

accommodationwe hold that the receipt of Social Security 

disability benefits does not preclude ADA relief.

I

For several years, ending October 1, 1992, appellee Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority employed appellant Michael Swanks as a Special Police Officer. Swanks 

suffers from spina bifida, a congenital spinal abnormality that 

in his case causes chronic urinary infections and incontinence. 

Because of his disability, Swanks was regularly absent from 

work and sometimes had an unpleasant body odor about 

which supervisors and coworkers complained. Swanks informed several supervisors of his disability and requested job 

duties requiring more exercise, which he claims would have 

accommodated his condition by reducing the frequency of his 

infections. A WMATA official rejected Swanks's request. 

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WMATA never discussed or explored possible alternative 

accommodations. 

On September 22, 1992, while Swanks was on duty, a 

supervisor asked him to produce his Special Police Certification. WMATA requires Special Police Officers like Swanks 

to have and maintain such certifications. Def.'s Mot. for 

Summ. J. Ex. B at 2. Unable to provide the certification, 

Swanks explained to the supervisor that he had left his 

certification along with his wallet in his brother-in-law's car. 

In fact, his certification had expired. During the following 

week, Swanks applied for a new certification, but before he 

could undergo the necessary physical examination, WMATA 

fired him.

Claiming discrimination in violation of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Swanks filed suit in 

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 

Swanks contended that WMATA refused to accommodate his 

disability, then fired him because of his disability. WMATA 

moved for summary judgment, arguing that it fired Swanks 

because he lacked certification and lied, and that in any event, 

Swanks's application for and receipt of Social Security disability benefits barred ADA relief. Finding genuine issues of 

material fact, the magistrate judge denied summary judgment with respect to WMATA's claim that it fired Swanks 

because his certification expired and because he lied. 

Swanks v. WMATA, No. 94cv02421, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 

5, 1996). However, holding that Swanks's application for and 

receipt of disability benefits barred his ADA claims, the 

magistrate judge entered summary judgment for WMATA: 

"Swanks claimed and was found disabled from employment as 

of October 1, 1992, the same date he was orally terminated 

from employment by WMATA. This disability determination 

renders the plaintiff unqualified for the position which he held 

either as it was or with a reasonable accommodation by the 

defendant." Swanks, slip op. at 6.

Swanks appealed. Because this case raises an important 

question regarding the effect of Social Security disability 

determinations on ADA claims, we invited the Social Security 

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Administration and the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (the agency charged with enforcing the ADA) to 

file amici curiae briefs. Our review is de novo. Tao v. Freeh,

27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

II

The ADA provides "a clear and comprehensive national 

mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Among other things, the ADA protects against discrimination in employment, including hiring, firing, and advancement. Id.

§ 12112(a). This protection extends to "qualified individual[s] 

... with disabilit[ies]"persons who "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 

the employment position that [they] hold[ ] or desire[ ]." Id.

§ 12111(8). Under the ADA, reasonable accommodation 

"may include ... job restructuring, part-time or modified 

work schedules, reassignment to ... vacant position[s], ... 

and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." Id. § 12111(9).

The central question presented by Swanks's claim is whether he could have performed the essential duties of his job 

with reasonable accommodation. Instead of resolving this 

issue, the magistrate judge concluded that because Swanks 

sought and obtained Social Security disability benefits, he 

could not maintain an ADA claim. This conclusion rests on a 

misunderstanding of Social Security disability determinations; 

in assessing eligibility for disability benefits, the Social Security Administration gives no consideration to a claimant's 

ability to work with reasonable accommodation. Under the 

Social Security Act, an individual is entitled to disability 

benefits:

if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are 

of such severity that he is not only unable to do his 

previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, 

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immeUSCA Case #96-7078 Document #280368 Filed: 06/20/1997 Page 4 of 11
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diate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job 

vacancy exists for him.... For the purposes of the 

preceding sentence, ... "work which exists in the national economy" means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in 

several regions of the country.

Id. §§ 423(a), 423(d)(2)(A). This inquiry focuses on the general availability of work and says nothing about reasonable 

accommodation, nor does the Act elsewhere address the effect 

of accommodation on a claimant's disability status.

The Social Security Administration, as authorized by the 

Social Security Act, id. at § 405(a), has established a five-step 

process to evaluate whether a claimant is disabled. 20 CFR 

§ 404.1520 (1996); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 

140 (1987). The agency begins by determining whether the 

claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 CFR 

§ 404.1520(b). If the answer is negative, the agency proceeds 

to step two, where it determines whether the claimant has a 

"severe" impairment. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant is 

found to have a severe impairment, the agency moves to step 

three, determining whether the claimant's disability is "listed" 

at 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. If, as in Whitbeck v. 

Vital Signs, Inc., --- F.3d ---, No. 96-7193, (D.C. Cir. June 

20, 1997), a decision we also issue today, the claimant has a 

listed impairment, e.g., certain disorders of the spine, amputation of both hands, loss of speech, chronic heart failure, 

sickle cell disease, epilepsy, the agency finds the claimant 

disabled and awards benefits. 20 CFR § 404.1520(d).

For a claimant not having a listed impairment, the Social 

Security Administration proceeds to step four, determining 

whether the claimant can perform his or her past work. If 

the claimant can perform past work, the agency denies the 

claim. Id. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant cannot do his or 

her past work, the agency proceeds to step five, where, 

considering the claimant's age, educational experience, past 

work experience, and residual functional capacity, it determines whether the claimant can do "other work"jobs "that 

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exist in significant numbers in the national economy." Id.

§§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c).

Nowhere in this five-step process does the Social Security 

Administration take account of the possible effect of reasonable accommodation on a claimant's ability to work. At step 

three, for example, claimants who are not working and who 

have listed disabilities automatically receive benefits. Steps 

four and fivethe levels after which Swanks was awarded 

disability benefitslikewise do not consider reasonable accommodation. For past relevant work (step four), the Social 

Security Administration considers only "the physical and 

mental demands of ... work [the claimant] ha[s] done in the 

past." Id. at § 404.1560(b). Where, as here, a claimant had 

no accommodation in his or her past work, a Social Security 

Administration determination that the claimant cannot do 

past work says nothing about the claimant's ability to perform 

his or her former job with reasonable accommodation. In an 

Information Memorandum the Social Security Administration 

explains:

The fact that an individual may be able to return to a 

past relevant job, provided that the employer makes 

accommodations, is not relevant.... A finding of ability 

to do past relevant work is only appropriate if the 

claimant retains the capacity to perform either the actual 

functional demands and job duties of the particular past 

relevant job ... or the functional demands and job duties 

of the occupation as generally required ... throughout 

the national economy.

DANIEL L. SKOLER, ASSOC. COMM'R, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITIES 

ACT INFO. MEM. at 2 (June 2, 1993) (No. SG3P2). The step five 

determinationwhether the claimant qualifies for "jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy," 20 CFR 

§ 404.1560(c)also inquires about the general availability of 

particular types of work. According to Social Security regulations, "[i]solated jobs that exist only in very limited numbers" are not sufficient to demonstrate that a claimant can do 

"other work." Id. § 404.1566(b); see Overton v. Reilly, 977 

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F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992). In its Information Memorandum, the Social Security Administration explains:

[T]he fifth-step assessment is based on the functional 

demands and duties of jobs as ordinarily required by 

employers throughout the national economy, and not on 

what may be isolated variations in job demands (regardless of whether such variations are due to compliance 

with anti-discrimination statutes or other factors). 

Whether or how an employer might be willing (or required) to alter job duties to suit the limitations of a 

specific individual would not be relevant.... To support 

a fifth-step finding that an individual can perform "other 

work," the evidence ... would have to show that a job, 

which is within the individual's capacity because of employer modifications, is representative of a significant 

number of other such jobs in the national economy.

DISABILITIES ACT INFO. MEM. at 3; see also Eback v. Chater, 94 

F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 1996) (relying on same language).

Both the Social Security Administration and the EEOC 

agree that the receipt of Social Security disability benefits 

does not automatically bar ADA claims. In its Information 

Memorandum, the Social Security Administration points out 

that the definitions of disability under the Social Security Act 

and the ADA are not synonymous: "[T]he ADA and the 

disability provisions of the Social Security Act have different 

purposes, and have no direct application to one another." 

DISABILITIES ACT INFO. MEM. at 3; see also 20 CFR § 404.1504 

("A decision by any nongovernmental agency or any other 

governmental agency about whether you are disabled ... is 

based on its rules and is not [the Social Security Administration's] decision.... [A] determination made by another 

agency that you are disabled ... is not binding on us."). 

Taking the same position, the EEOC states in a recently 

issued Enforcement Guidance: "representations made in connection with an application for disability benefits ... are 

never an absolute bar to a finding that a person is a 'qualified 

individual with a disability' for purposes of the ADA." EEOC

ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE EFFECT OF REPRESENTATIONS 

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MADE IN APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS ON THE DETERMINATION OF 

WHETHER A PERSON IS A "QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY" UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 at 3 

(Feb. 12, 1997). Explaining further, the Enforcement Guidance states:

[B]ecause of the fundamental differences in the definitions used in the ADA and the terms used in disability 

benefits programs, an individual can meet the eligibility 

requirements for receipt of disability benefits and still be 

a "qualified individual with a disability" for ADA purposes. Thus, a person's representations that s/he is 

"totally disabled" or "unable to work" for purposes of 

disability benefits are never an absolute bar to an ADA 

claim.

Id. at i.

From the standards and procedures of the Social Security 

Administration and the EEOC, it is thus clear that Social 

Security disability determinations take no account of reasonable accommodationthe critical ADA issue. Awards of 

disability benefits, therefore, cannot bar ADA relief. The 

contrary viewthat Social Security disability benefits preclude ADA reliefwould force disabled individuals into an 

"untenable" choice between receiving immediate subsistence 

benefits under the Social Security Act or pursuing discrimination remedies. Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 

F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Forcing such a choice 

would undermine the pro-employment and anti-discrimination 

purposes of the two statutes. See, e.g., § 42 U.S.C. 422(c) 

(allowing Social Security benefits during nine-month trial 

work period); id. § 12101(b)(1) (naming provision of "a clear 

and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 

discrimination against individuals with disabilities" as a purpose of the ADA); id. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination in 

employment). Claimants choosing benefits would sacrifice an 

opportunity for reinstatement while simultaneously shielding 

their employers from liability for allegedly unlawful discrimination. Individuals choosing instead to seek ADA relief 

would, by doing so, forego their entitlement to Social Security 

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disability benefits. Nothing in either statute requires disabled individuals to make this choice.

In holding that the receipt of disability benefits does not 

preclude subsequent ADA relief, we join three of our sister 

circuits. See Robinson v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 

502 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that Social Security Administration determinations are "[a]t best ... evidence for the trial 

court to consider in making its own independent determination"); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1480-82 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (relying on entire evidentiary record, not just 

appellant's statements on state and Social Security benefit 

forms, to conclude that appellant failed to raise genuine issue 

of material fact); D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 3-

5 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding, despite appellant's application for 

disability insurance, that genuine issue of material fact remained as to appellant's ability to work); cf. Overton, 977 

F.2d at 1196 (observing in Rehabilitation Act case that Social 

Security Administration "determination of disability may be 

relevant evidence of the severity of [the party's] handicap, but 

it can hardly be construed as a judgment that [the party] 

could not do his job"). Only the Third Circuit has reached a 

contrary conclusion, relying on the doctrine of judicial estoppel to hold that an individual's statement, made to the Social 

Security Administration, among others, that he was disabled 

and unable to work barred his subsequent ADA claim. 

McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997). With all due respect, we 

think the Third Circuit's decision suffers from the same 

defect as the magistrate judge's: it disregards the fact that 

Social Security disability determinations take no account of 

reasonable accommodation.

The conclusion we reach today does not mean that claimants' statements in support of disability claims are never 

relevant in ADA suits. For example, ADA plaintiffs who in 

support of claims for disability benefits tell the Social Security Administration they cannot perform the essential functions 

of a job even with accommodation could well be barred from 

asserting, for ADA purposes, that accommodation would have 

allowed them to perform that same job. See, e.g., Pyramid 

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Sec. Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991) (holding that parties' prior sworn statements must 

be given "controlling weight" at summary judgment unless 

"the shifting party can offer persuasive reasons for believing 

the supposed correction"). Here, however, the record contains no evidence of Swanks's position before the Social 

Security Administration; we know nothing about what he 

said in his application for Social Security disability benefits, 

what evidence he provided to support his claim, or what 

statements he or any of his witnesses made in the course of 

the proceedings.

WMATA argues that allowing Social Security disability 

beneficiaries to pursue ADA suits could produce double recoveriesbackpay awards covering the same period the beneficiary received disability benefits. At oral argument, however, Swanks and the Social Security Administration agreed 

that should Swanks prevail on his ADA claims against 

WMATA, any backpay award could be reduced to the extent 

necessary to avoid double recovery. See, e.g., EEOC v. 

Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425, 1431 (10th Cir. 

1985) ("Deduction of collateral sources of income from a back 

pay award is a matter within trial court's discretion."); Orzel 

v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir. 

1983) (noting that deduction of collateral source benefits is 

"normally a matter within the discretion of the district 

court"); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 700 (9th Cir. 

1981) (holding district court has discretion to deduct unemployment compensation from Age Discrimination in Employment Act backpay award). But see Thurman v. Yellow

Freight Sys. Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1171 (6th Cir.) (holding that 

district court does not have discretion to set off collateral 

source income), amended by 97 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1996); 

Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 793-95 (3d Cir. 1985) 

(holding that ADEA award should not be offset by Social 

Security benefits). Although the issue of remedy is not now 

before us, we think such set-offs may provide a way to 

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prevent windfall recoveries while guaranteeing disabled persons the full protection of both Acts.

III

Reviewing the record ourselves, we find no other basis for 

sustaining the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment. WMATA advanced two rationales for summary judgmentone directed at both Swanks's reasonable accommodation and discriminatory discharge claims, and the other 

directed at his discriminatory discharge claim alone. We 

have answered WMATA's first argument; Swanks's receipt 

of disability benefits does not, as a matter of law, prevent 

him from arguing that he is a "qualified individual with a 

disability" under the ADA. As to WMATA's second argumentthat it fired Swanks for legitimate nondiscriminatory 

reasonswe see no basis for upsetting the magistrate 

judge's conclusion that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on this ground. Swanks, slip. op. 

at 3.

Nor finally can summary judgment rest on the magistrate 

judge's conclusion, set forth in a footnote at the end of his 

opinion, that Swanks sought an accommodation not required 

by the ADA: " 'more sick leave' with or without pay[,] as he 

was sick 'more than half the time.' " Swanks, slip. op. at 7 

n.1 (quoting Swanks Dep. at 28-29 (Aug. 21, 1995)). While 

Swanks testified that he suffered as a result of his sickness 

more than half of the time, separately stating he would need 

additional sick leave, he never testified that he had requested 

additional leave to accommodate his disability. Swanks Dep. 

at 28-29; see Whitbeck, slip op. at 7 (holding that magistrate 

judge erred in concluding that unrequested accommodation 

was unreasonable under the Act). The reasonable accommodation Swanks sought was an opportunity for more exercise. 

Pl.'s Compl. at 3; Appellant's Br. at 13.

IV

We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

So ordered.

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