Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05088/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05088-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise noted. 

1

 This count additionally alleged that Petitioner had suffered six prior convictions for driving with a 2

suspended license. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT RAY EMERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-5088 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is represented by Victor Haltom, Esq. 

 BACKGROUND

On August 13, 1998, the district attorney filed information number 22701 in the Merced

County Superior Court, charging Petitioner with, in count 1, murder (Ca. Penal Code, § 187); in 1

count 2, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5); in count 3, felony driving

under the influence with injury (Ca. Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)); in count 4, possession of

drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364); and in count 5, driving with a suspended

license (Ca. Veh. Code, § 14601.1). (CT 115-118.) As to count 3, the information alleged three

2

multiple victim enhancements (Ca. Veh. Code, § 12183). (CT 116.) The information further

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alleged that counts 2 and 3 constituted serious felonies within the meaning of sections 667 and

1192.7. (Id.) 

 On September 29, 1998, Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial. (CT 150.) Following a

court trial on November 4 through 5, 1998, the court found Petitioner guilty as charged. (CT

335-336.) 

On December 16, 1998, the court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of twenty-one

years to life in prison, calculated as follows: fifteen years to life for second degree murder (§

187); three years for felony driving under the influence with injury (Ca. Veh. Code, § 23153,

subd. (a)), with an additional three years for the three multiple victim enhancements (Ca. Veh.

Code, § 23182); ten years for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Ca. Veh. Code, §

23140), stayed pursuant to section 654; a concurrent six-month sentence for possession of drug

paraphernalia (Ca. Health & Saf. Code, § 11364); and a concurrent one-year sentence for driving

with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1). (CT 375-378.)

On March 29, 2000, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, with the

exception of vacating Petitioner’s conviction for gross vehicular manslaughter, and striking one

of the multiple victim enhancements. As a result, Petitioner’s term was reduced to twenty years

to life in prison. (Lodged Doc. 1.) 

On April 18, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court,

which was denied on June 14, 2000. (Lodged Doc. 2.)

On October 18, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Merced

County Superior Court. The petition was denied on November 15, 2000. 

On or around March 15, 2001, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the Merced County Superior Court. The Merced County District Attorney filed a response. 

(Lodged Doc. 4.) On November 5, 2001, the petition was denied. (Court Doc. 38.) 

On April 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus. On this

same date, the Merced County Superior Court denied the petition. (Exhibit D, attached to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Court Doc. 8.) 

On May 15, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District

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 The Court finds the Court of Appeal correctly summarized the facts in its March 29, 2000 opinion. Thus, 3

the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. 

 Ohleyer’s passenger’s testimony was consistent with Ohleyer’s. 4

3

Court of Appeal, which was denied on June 13, 2002. (Id., Exhibit E.)

On December 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, which was denied in October of 2003. (Lodged Doc. 3.)

On December 19, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on August 4, 2005, and Petitioner filed a

traverse on September 12, 2005. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS3

On March 27, 1998, [Petitioner] was driving on Highway 99 while under

the influence of methamphetamine. He traversed the median, drove into

oncoming traffic, and collided with two vehicles. Killed in the collision was 22-

year old Christopher Owens and injured were three German tourists, the Winters.

I. PROSECUTION TESTIMONY

Shortly after 2:00 p.m. on March 27, 1998, Kenneth Ohleyer was driving

in the fast lane on Highway 99 in the area of Worden Road when he saw in his

rear view mirror [Petitioner’s] black pickup approaching behind him. When

Ohleyer moved into the slow lane, [Petitioner] passed him, pulled into the slow

lane, then twice crossed the fog line on the right side of the slow lane and

returned back to the center of the lane. The third time [Petitioner] crossed the fog

line, he overcorrected, crossed over the grassy center divide and drove directly

into oncoming traffic. Ohleyer saw what looked like an explosion. He

immediately slowed and pulled to the right while his passenger called 911.4

Tom Valles also observed [Petitioner] approaching behind him. Valles

moved into the slow lane, then [Petitioner] passed his car and pulled into the slow

lane in front of him. Valles saw [Petitioner] straddle the fog line for a few

hundred feet. Valles passed [Petitioner] at approximately 70 miles per hour and

returned to the slow lane. [Petitioner] then pulled into the fast lane and passed

Valles. [Petitioner] looked at Valles as he passed, revved his motor, and “took

off” at approximately 90 miles per hour. As Valles watched [Petitioner’s] pickup,

he saw it straddle the fog line, shoot across the fast lane and center divider and

into oncoming southbound traffic. The pickup collided with two vehicles, one

containing three people, the other containing one. 

The parties stipulated that, if called as a witness at trial, forensic

pathologist James A. Wilkerson would have testified consistently with his twopage final pathological diagnosis of the cause of death of Owens, whose car was

hit by [Petitioner’s] vehicle.

California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Lawrence Gale investigated the

collisions. He testified that [Petitioner’s] pickup sustained major front-end

damage, as well as a side impact at the driver’s door. The two other vehicles, a

Pontiac and a white Plymouth, both suffered major front-end damage. Gale

estimated that [Petitioner’s] pickup was traveling at a speed of 62 miles per hour

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28 [Petitioner’s] blood also contained mendazaline, a pharmaceutical related to Valium often given in 5

emergency rooms. 

4

when it crossed into oncoming traffic. Gale did not see any evidence that

[Petitioner] had applied his brakes when he crossed the median.

CHP Officer Mike Colodeizey inspected [Petitioner’s] pickup following

the collision and determined the tires and brakes were in good condition.

CHP Officer Sean Hart contacted [Petitioner] in the hospital emergency

room. At 8:20 p.m., Hart directed hospital personnel to draw a blood sample from

[Petitioner]. Hart also received a glass pipe that hospital personnel had found in 

[Petitioner’s] pocket while he was in the emergency room.

The parties stipulated that an initial scraping of a substance found on the glass pipe tested

positive for methamphetamine. They further stipulated that additional scrapings sent to the

Department of Justice were found to contain 0.01 grams of methamphetamine. 

CHP Officer Jesse Diaz described the glass pipe as the type commonly

utilized by drug users to smoke methamphetamine. He explained that drug users

place the methamphetamine, in rock form, into one end of the pipe, burn it with a

match, and inhale the smoke. 

Forensic toxicologist Kenji Ota testified that [Petitioner’s] blood sample

contained methamphetamine (350 nanograms per milliliter) and amphetamine.5

Ota stated that [Petitioner’s] blood contained the amount of methamphetamine

found in the blood of a person abusing the drug. Ota observed that [Petitioner’s]

blood pressure and heart rate in the emergency room remained high for quite a

long time, a finding consistent with methamphetamine use. These facts, and

[Petitioner’s] erratic driving and possession of the glass pipe, led Ota to conclude

[Petitioner] was driving under the influence of methamphetamine.

On cross-examination, Ota admitted it was possible [Petitioner] was

coming down off a methamphetamine high and was falling asleep at the time he

crossed the center divide and drove into oncoming traffic. However, he observed

that [Petitioner] was awake prior to being med-flighted to the hospital. Ota

testified that, even if [Petitioner] had been falling asleep at the time of the

collisions, he would still have been under the influence of methamphetamine and

his driving would have been impaired as a direct result of his use of

methamphetamine. Ota also believed that, because a methamphetamine user

would have to use a fair amount of methamphetamine to get to the point where he

or she would suddenly “crash’ or fall into a heavy sleep while driving, the user

would be aware that a “crash” potentially could occur.

On March 29, 1998, CHP Officer Michael Morris advised [Petitioner] of

his rights at the hospital. At first, [Petitioner] did not say anything, then he told

Morris, ‘”Just tell them I didn’t do any stuff that day. I was clean.’” When Morris

asked [Petitioner] what he meant, he said, “‘Just tell them I”m sorry. I didn’t

mean to kill anyone. I hadn’t done any dope for two days.’” 

On April 2, 1998, CHP Officer Gerald Elrod contacted [Petitioner] at the

hospital. [Petitioner] agreed to talk with Elrod. [Petitioner] told him that on the

morning of March 17, 1998, he had changed the oil in his pickup. He drove to a

friend’s house and watched a movie. Then he and his friend decided to drive to

Modesto to pick up one of [Petitioner’s] trailers so [Petitioner] could haul some

walnut burl. [Petitioner] left for his father’s house to pick up some burls.

[Petitioner] and his friend drove separately toward Modesto on Highway 99. At

some point, the two stopped to get gas; [Petitioner] also bought a burrito, some

potatoes, and milk. The two friends continued driving toward Modesto.

[Petitioner] told Elrod he was driving 65 to 70 miles per hour, and as fast as 80

miles per hour at times.

[Petitioner] admitted his driver’s license was suspended and that he had a

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prior DUI conviction. He told Elrod he had been ordered to attend a DUI class,

but had failed to finish it. He said he was aware of the consequences of driving

under the influence of drugs, stating: “‘I’m fully aware of the consequences of

doing that. It’s a bad thing. I do drugs sometimes but I never drive.’” He stated

that he had lost a cousin in a DUI accident.

[Petitioner] explained he was eating when the collisions occurred. He

believed he was rear-ended by another vehicle and lost control as a result. He

denied using drugs on the day of the accident and claimed he had not used drugs

since a few days before the incident, at which time he had ingested alcohol and

snorted two lines of cocaine.

CHP officer Shane McConnell also investigated the collisions and viewed

the three vehicles. He testified that [Petitioner] committed multiple traffic

violations, including exceeding the basic speed law (Veh. Code, § 22349, subd.

(a)), making unsafe lane changes (Veh. Code, § 21658, subd. (a)), failing to

maintain the right half of the roadway (Veh. Code, § 21650), cutting through the

center median (Veh. Code, § 21460, subd. (a)), and tailgating (Veh. Code, §

21703). Based on these violations and the additional information he obtained

during his investigation, McConnell believed [Petitioner] directly caused the

collisions as a result of driving recklessly while under the influence of

methamphetamine. 

McConnell also confirmed that [Petitioner’s] cousin had died as a result of

a fatal collision involving alcohol.

II. DEFENSE TESTIMONY

[Petitioner] testified on his own behalf. He stated that two days prior to

the accident he had taken some drugs. However, he did not feel as if he were

under the influence of those drugs on the day of the collisions. He only felt tired. 

He remembered thinking he would stop in Merced to wait for his friend and tell

him he was too tired to drive. [Petitioner] did not remember falling asleep, driving

off the roadway, or colliding with any other vehicles. The last thing he

remembered was driving down Highway 99 and eating his lunch. He testified he

had been driving to Modesto to pick up some walnut burls and another man who

worked for him was in another truck driving behind him.

On cross-examination, [Petitioner] acknowledged that his statements to

the police regarding the events of the day in question had been accurate. He

denied knowing that injury or death could be consequences of driving under the

influence of drugs. He said that if he had known something like that was going to

happen, he never would have driven that day. He admitted he was aware others

had died as a result of drivers who were under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

[Petitioner] denied owning the glass pipe that was found in his clothes. He

believed the pipe might have been in the truck when he bought it. He denied ever

smoking methamphetamine, but admitted he had snorted it. He explained that

two days before the collisions, he snorted what he believed was cocaine, but the

drug must have been methamphetamine. He stated he had used methamphetamine

quite a bit during the time period proceeding the collisions. He admitted he had

prior convictions for being under the influence of methamphetamine, receiving

stolen property, and grand theft. 

(Lodged Doc. 1; Opinion, at 3-8.) 

///

///

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DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Merced County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

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proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

In the instant petition, Petitioner raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Specifically, Petitioner sets forth twelve different instances in which he claims defense counsel

was ineffective. The Court will address each claim separately. 

Petitioner raised these claims to the California Supreme Court, which issued a summary

denial. The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as to the basis for the state court

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9 Cir. 2002) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 th

U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)). Where, as here, the state court reaches a decision on the merits but

provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the

record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. 

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9 Cir. 2000). th

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

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purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe,

151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective th

assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, th

the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s

alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment

considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348

(9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court indulges

th

a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive

defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must

also evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356,

1461 (9 Cir. 1994). More precisely, petitioner must show that (1) his attorney’s performance

th

was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and, unless prejudice is presumed, that

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would

have been different. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since it is necessary to prove

prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d

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1058, 1062 (2000). 

1. Failure to Investigate and Present Exculpatory Evidence

Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to investigate and present potential

exculpatory evidence showing the victim was very likely killed by another vehicle and not by

Petitioner’s vehicle. (Petition, at 14.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that counsel did not conduct

an adequate investigation by neglecting to hire an accident reconstruction expert to examine the

crime scene or the prosecution’s evidence. (Petition, at 15-16.) Petitioner further claims, “Had

trial counsel conducted any investigation he would have discovered the potential exculpatory

evidence of the third vehicle that very likely caused the fatal injury to the victim, because the

prosecution’s evidence shows that the third vehicle rear-ended the victim’s vehicle after

petitioner’s vehicle hit the victim’s vehicle (CT 23-24).” (Id.) 

Despite Petitioner’s claim that counsel should have hired and presented an accident

reconstruction expert, Petitioner has not attached a declaration from such an expert or made any

showing of what opinion a reconstruction expert would have rendered that would have aided in

Petitioner’s case. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9 Cir. 2001) (mere speculation th

about what expert might say is not sufficient.) To the contrary, the evidence presented at trial

established that Petitioner, while driving northbound on Highway 99, crossed the center median

and drove head-on into the vehicle driven by the victim Christopher Owens. (RT 32, 53-54.) 

Eye Witnesses Kenneth Ohleyer, Judy Ortiz and Tom Valles all testified that they saw

Petitioner’s vehicle driving northbound on Highway 99, cross over the fog line on the right side

of the slow lane, overcorrect and cross over the center divider heading directly into oncoming

southbound traffic. (RT 28-32, 39-40, 49; see also CT 29-30.) 

CHP Officer Lawrence Gale measured the tire friction marks from where Petitioner drove

his vehicle across the freeway, and found no evidence of Petitioner having used his brakes. (RT

111, 116.) It was estimated that Petitioner was traveling at a speed of 60 miles an hour. (RT

115-116.) The CHP report written by Officer McConnell, stated that Petitioner’s vehicle spun

clockwise around the victim (Owen’s) vehicle. Andrea Winter was following behind Owen’s

vehicle, and was immediately confronted with and collided with Petitioner’s vehicle, she braked

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abruptly but struck Petitioner’s vehicle broadside. (CT 29-30.) 

Thus, this evidence amply establishes that Petitioner’s vehicle, and not Andrea Winter’s

vehicle, was the cause of the collision as he had crossed the center lane and drove into oncoming

traffic. Accordingly, there is simply no merit to Petitioner’s theory that defense counsel should

have investigated that a third vehicle was the cause of the collision. 

Petitioner also contends that counsel failed to compel discovery from the prosecution

regarding whether Officer McConnel had any citizen’s complaints for falsifying police reports or

any other complaints that would effect his credibility. (Petition, at 16.) 

Pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 531 (1971), in certain circumstances,

the defendant may compel discovery of an officer’s personnel files, including citizen complaints.

Here, however, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Petitioner’s counsel failure to

seek such discovery fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. To the contrary, there is

no evidence that defense counsel had any knowledge of what was in Officer McConnell’s

personnel records. Simply stated, Petitioner has failed to met his burden under Strickland, that is

that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that had counsel

filed such a motion, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have

been different. Petitioner’s claim is meritless.

Lastly, with regard to Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to make a

discovery motion to obtain scientific analysis as to a blood or alcohol test, Petitioner has failed to

offer any proof to substantiate his claim that this testing would have shown that his blood and/or

drug usage was not to the level alleged by the prosecution. (Petition, at 16.) Petitioner’s claim is

nothing more than a vague unsubstantiated allegation, which is insufficient to warrant habeas

relief. See Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9 Cir. 1989) (en banc). th

2. Failure to Bring a Motion to Suppress Evidence

Petitioner next claims that trial counsel failed to make a motion to suppress evidence

obtained by Officer Hart. (Petition, at 17.) Petitioner contends that Officer Hart lacked probable

cause to arrest him for being under the influence of a controlled substance because he utilized the

medical blood analysis that was done at the hospital which was protected by disclosure of state

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 It was stipulated that the blood was drawn in a medically approved manner and the chain of custody was 6

proper. (RT 62-63.) 

 In a supplemental police report, Officer Hart he 7

waited for a blood draw to be taken from [Petitioner] as the medical personnel performed

a CAT scan and several X-rays. While waiting in the emergency room, [he] was notified that

Manuel Keaton (Trauma Team, Clinical Nurse II) had found [a] clear glass cylindrical object on

the back board of [Petitioner] when he arrived at the emergency room. 

Manual related that he contacted [Petitioner] as he was laying in a supine position and the

clear glass cylindrical object was laying on his left side on the background. Due to the nature of

the collision, the severity of the injuries of the parties involved and the discovery of the clear glass

cylindrical object. I placed John [sic] under arrest for 23153(a) V.C.-Driving under the influence

of drugs or alcohol. A blood sample was drawn from the top of [Petitioner’s] right hand by Molly

Allison, Registered Nurse at 2020 hours. Due to the extent [of] [Petitioner’s] injuries, this was the

only test available.

(CT 34.) 

11

and federal law, particularly the physician-patient privilege. (Id.) 

a. State Court Record

At trial, Officer Hart testified that on March 27, 1998, he went to Memorial North

Hospital in Modesto, California, to investigate a traffic collision. (RT 60.) He made contact with

Petitioner in the emergency room, at approximately 5:00 p.m.. (RT 61-62.) In response to the

question as to whether he “cause[d] a blood sample to be drawn from [Petitioner],” he stated

“yes” at approximately 8:20 p.m. (Id.) The blood test was performed by a nurse. (RT 62.) 6

Officer Hart then stated that he retrieved some money and a “glass sloped object” from medical

personnel that was found with Petitioner. (RT 63-64.) It was stipulated that the there was an 7

initial scraping of the pipe which tested positive for methamphetamine, and the Department of

Justice testings established that the scraping contained .01 grams of methamphetamine. (RT 65-

66.) 

In his answer, as previously stated, Respondent cites to Officer McConnell’s police report

which states:

P-1 [Petitioner] was immediately transported to Memorial Hospital in

Modesto. Officer Hart #14906 responded to Memorial North Hospital in Modesto

to conduct follow up on the traffic collision. Upon Officer Hart’s arrival at the

hospital, he was made aware of a cylindrical object (pipe) that was in P-1's

possession while at the hospital. The pipe was determined to be the type used to

smoke amphetamines or similar types of drugs. Emerson was sedated for medical

treatment and was unable to provide a statement. A medical blood analysis was

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done at the hospital. The results indicated that Emerson had amphetamines in his

system. Based on the pipe the nature of the collision, the erratic driving of

Emerson, and the medical blood analysis indicating the presence of amphetamines

in Emerson’s system, Officer Hart formed the opinion that Emergson was under

the influence of drugs. Officer Hart placed Emerson under arrest for driving

under the influence of drugs. . . .

(CT 30.) 

At trial, Officer McConnell testified that on March 27, 1998, he responded to the scene of

the collision. (RT 142.) He made contact with several of the witnesses at the scene. (RT 143-

145.) Based on his investigation at the scene of the incident, he opined that the cause of the

collision resulted 

From the erratic driving that proceeded northbound from 99 and then the accident

itself, and the pipe found in his possession and the medical analysis from the

hospital, I determined that the defendant was under the influence of drugs at the

time of the collision.

(RT 145.) 

 In a declaration submitted to the state court, dated August 30, 2001, Officer McConnell 

stated the following:

When I was investigating this case, I did become aware that some

unidentified medical personnel at Memorial Hospital had voluntarily disclosed

that Petitioner, while being treated at the hospital, had undergone a preliminary

screen medical blood analysis test which showed positive for methamphetamine. 

I also knew, as I had written in my report, that the record of this preliminary

screen medical blood analysis test including its result was retained by Memorial

Hospital and was not given or taken by myself or any other officer of the

California Highway Patrol during the investigation of this case.

I received no information that the actual blood sample taken by medical

personnel which was used in the aforementioned preliminary screen medical

blood test was retained by hospital personnel. I also did not receive any

information as to the identity of the hospital personnel who took that blood

sample or the circumstances under which that sample was taken. 

(Lodged Doc. 4, Exhibit 1; Declaration of Officer Shane McConnell, at 3-4.) 

On December 14, 2006, the undersigned found that the trial record was lacking of

competent evidence for this Court to make a determination as to whether Officer Hart had

probable cause to warrant the ordering of a blood test. Specifically, it was unclear what evidence

Officer Hart used to establish probable cause in making a determination to order medical

personnel to draw blood testing. Therefore, on the basis of good cause, the undersigned ordered

an evidentiary hearing to be conducted addressing this single claim. (Court Doc. 39.) 

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b. Evidentiary Hearing

The evidentiary hearing was conducted on July 25, 2007. The Court heard testimony

from California Highway Patrol Officers Shane McConnell and Sean Hart. The following is a

summary of the testimony presented at the hearing. 

Officer McConnell testified that on March 27, 1998, he responded to the scene of a traffic

collision that occurred on Highway 99, just south of the City of Merced. (7/25/97 RT 6.) When

he arrived at the scene he observed that three vehicles had collided blocking the lanes of traffic

and emergency personnel were on the scene. (Id. at 7.) The vehicles were located in the

southbound lane of Highway 99. (Id. at 8.)

Officer McConnell discovered that Petitioner was the driver and sole occupant of the

GMC pickup. (7/25/07 RT 9-10.) McConnell observed that the pickup sustained major frontend damage. (Id. at 12.) 

McConnell spoke to a few witnesses at the scene of the collision. (7/25/07 RT 13.) He

recalled speaking with Mr. Mesa, an off-duty highway patrol officer who had witnessed the

collision. (Id. at 13.) He indicated that he was traveling southbound on Highway 99 in the

number 2 lane, which was the slow lane adjacent to the Pontiac Grand Am. (Id. at 13-14.) As he

was passing the Grand Am, he observed the GMC pickup cross over the center divider and

collide head-on into the Pontiac. (Id.) He immediately pulled off the road and rendered aid to

the victims. (Id.)

After observing the scene and speaking with other officers present, Officer McConnell

opined that as Petitioner was driving the GMC pickup in an erratic manner, he lost control of the

vehicle when he passed over the center divider causing the head-on collision. (7/25/07 RT 14.) 

Officer McConnell’s investigation of the collision was limited to the accident scene; he

never went to the hospital where the blood was taken. (7/25/07 RT 16.) 

On the afternoon of March 27, 1998, Officer Sean Hart received a dispatch of an injury

accident in the vicinity of Highway 99 and Merced County. (7/25/07 RT 36.) Prior to receiving

this dispatch, he received a dispatch directing officers to be on the lookout for a vehicle driving

in a reckless manner. (Id.) Officer Hart never responded to the scene of the accident. (Id.)

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Through dispatch, Officer Hart was informed that Petitioner was the driver of the GMC

pickup that had caused the collision and who had previously been driving recklessly. (7/25/07

RT 37.) 

Officer Hart was instructed to respond to Memorial North Hospital in Modesto, and he

arrived there at approximately 5 p.m. (7/25/07 RT 37.) Upon arrival at the hospital, Officer Hart

made contact with Petitioner who was unconscious in the emergency room, where he was being

attended to by medical personnel. (Id. at 37-38.) At this time, medical staff were preparing

Petitioner to process and move him into the x-ray room. (Id. at 38.) While he waited nearby, a

nurse showed him an “eight-and-a-half-by-11 sheet of paper on a clipboard that showed an initial

blood draw”, which indicated the blood contained amphetamines. (Id.) 

After Petitioner had been taken into the x-ray room, Officer Hart was notified by nurse

Manuel Keaton that a glass methamphetamine pipe was located on the backboard of Petitioner’s

left side as they took him out of the helicopter. (7/25/07 RT 39.) 

 Officer Hart waited for approximately over three hours while Petitioner was being treated

by hospital staff. (7/25/07 RT 44.) During this time he telephone his sergeant and learned

additional information about the collision. (Id. at 56.) Specifically, he learned that Petitioner had

driven across the center divider causing the head-on collision into another vehicle, resulting in a

fatality. (Id. at 56-58.) Based on Petitioner’s erratic driving causing the fatality collision, the

methamphetamine pipe found on Petitioner after the collision, and the fact that his blood tested

positive for methamphetamine, Officer Hart determined that Petitioner had been driving under

the influence of methamphetamine. (Id. at 41.) As a result, Officer Hart believed there was

probable cause to arrest Petitioner for felony DUI causing injury. (Id.) 

Officer Hart explained that he was not able to arrest Petitioner until 8:15 p.m., after

Petitioner’s condition had been stabilized. (7/25/07 RT 41-42.) Although Petitioner was

unconscious, Officer Hart placed him under arrest for violating California Vehicle Code section

23153. He then directed a nurse to perform a legal blood draw, who took three vials of blood

from Petitioner. (Id. at 42-43.) Officer Hart explained the additional blood draw was necessary

to establish a chain of custody with respect to the preliminary screen, and due to privacy laws, he

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felt that he would not be able to lawfully obtain the initial blood screen or results that had been

obtained by the hospital. (Id. at 43.) 

c. Analysis of Claim

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. 

A blood test constitutes a search of the person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,

767 (1966), the Supreme Court found that blood tests constitute a “search and seizure” under the

Fourth Amendment. The Schmerber Court held that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment for

the police, upon probable cause but absent a warrant, to test a blood sample drawn from a

hospitalized DUI, suspect who had declined to take a breathalyser test and did not consent to a

blood test. Id. at 772; see also United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9 Cir. 1995) th

(holding that under the Fourth Amendment, “before a law enforcement officer may lawfully take

a blood sample without consent or a warrant, he or she must have probable cause to believe that

the suspect has committed an offense which the current state of one’s blood will constitute

evidence.”). Probable cause is found when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting

officer are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that the person arrested has

committed or was committing an offense. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also Barry

v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9 Cir. 1990). th

In Schmerber, the Supreme Court reasoned that the officer requesting the blood sample

from the DUI suspect “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an

emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened

the ‘destruction of evidence.’” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, citation omitted. The Court noted

that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the

body functions to eliminate it from the system. Id. at 770-771. The Court pointed out:

Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the

accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no

time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we

conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case

was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest. 

Id. at 771.

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It was also determined that the blood test chosen in Schmerber to measure the DUI

suspect’s blood-alcohol was reasonable:

Extraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means of

determining the degree to which a person is under the influence of alcohol. See

Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. [432], at 436, n. 3, 77 S.Ct. at 410, 1 L.Ed.2d 448

[1957]. Such tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical

examination and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted

is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk,

trauma, or pain.

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. Finally, the Schmerber Court found that the record showed that the

test was performed in a reasonable manner and according to accepted medical practices. Id.

In order to determine whether Petitioner’s counsel’s decision was reasonable, the Court

must examine the strength of a motion to suppress on the bases alleged by Petitioner. See

Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). Specifically, in order to demonstrate

prejudice, Petitioner must demonstrate that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable

that the trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is

reasonable that there would have been an outcome more favorable to Petitioner. Id. 

Under Schmerber, Officer Hart’s actions in arresting Petitioner for DUI with injury, and

subsequent blood sample, were reasonable and did not violate Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment

rights. Officer Hart clearly had probable cause to arrest Petitioner for DUI based on the

information he obtained from his sergeant that Petitioner had engaged in erratic driving and

caused the head-on collision that resulted in a fatality. Morever, he had knowledge that the

initial preliminary screen of Petitioner’s blood tested positive for amphetamines and a glass pipe

commonly used to smoke methamphetamine had been found on Petitioner following the

collision. (7/25/07 RT 38-39, 56.) This information clearly supported Officer Hart’s

determination that there was probable cause to arrest Petitioner for DUI with injury. The

subsequent blood draw was authorized pursuant to Petitioner’s arrest.

In addition exigent circumstances existed to obtain a blood sample from Petitioner. At

trial, forensic toxicologist Kenji Ota explained that the amount of methamphetamine in one’s

system decreases over time. (RT 80.) In addition, Ota opined that the level of methamphetamine

in Petitioner’s body could have been twice the level that was he found in Petitioner’s blood at the

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time of the collision six hours earlier. (RT 81.) 

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Officer Hart acted properly in arresting Petitioner

and obtaining the blood sample, and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring a

motion to suppress this evidence. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9 Cir. 1994); see also Shah v.

th

United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9 Cir. 1989) ("The failure to raise a meritless legal

th

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.") (quotation marks and citation

omitted.) 

3. Failure to Bring a Motion to Suppress Petitioner’s Statements

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to make a motion to suppress

his statements to law enforcement. (Petition, at 20.) Petitioner contends that “because of his

numerous injuries, brain damage, pain medications, and police harassment and coercion to make

a statement,” he did not exercise his free will to make a statement to the police. (Id.) 

The first statement was given to Officers on March 29, 1998. The statement at issue

given by Petitioner is: “Tell them I didn’t do any stuff, I was clean.” (RT 97-98.) “I didn’t mean

to kill anyone, I hadn’t done dope for two days.” (RT 98.)

Respondent argues that because voluntarily gave his statement regarding his involvement

in the collision and did not invoke his Miranda rights, and therefore the statement was not

involuntary and properly admitted. 

Petitioner’s first statement was made on March 29, 1998, two days after the accident, and

although he was released from the ICU unit sometime that same day and was undergoing medical

care for his injuries, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his statement was rendered

involuntary due to his medical condition. When Officer Morris visited Petitioner on March 29,

1998, and read him his Miranda rights, Petitioner did not answer him. (RT 95-96.) Then as

Officer Morris was leaving, Petitioner spontaneously stated, “Just tell them I didn’t do any stuff,

I was clean.” (RT 97-98.) When the officer asked what he was referring to, Petitioner stated

“Just tell them I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to kill anyone, I hadn’t done any dope for two days.” (RT

98.) Petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence demonstrating that Petitioner’s medical

condition on March 29, 1998, in any way influenced or rendered involuntary his spontaneous

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statement to Officer Morris. To the contrary, Petitioner’s statement regarding his culpability for

the collision evidences a conscious of his surroundings and awareness of the events leading to the

collision. 

The second statement was given to Officers on April 2, 1998. During this interview,

Petitioner acknowledged that he had previously been convicted of driving under the influence

and was sentenced to attend a D.U.I. class and he failed to finish the class. As a result, he was

sentenced to jail. (RT 138.) Petitioner told officers that his cousin had been killed in an accident

involving a driver who was under the influence. (Id.) Petitioner further acknowledged that he

aware of the consequences of driving under the influence. (RT 139.) Specifically, Petitioner told

officers, “I’m fully aware of the consequences of doing that [driving under the influence]. It’s a

bad thing. I do drugs sometimes but I never drive.” (Id.) Petitioner stated that at the time of the

collision he felt okay to drive, and denying having used any drugs that day, but acknowledged

that he had used drugs a few days prior to the incident. (RT 140.) 

Officers McConnell and Elrod went to the hospital on April 2, 1998, prior to meeting

with Petitioner, they spoke with the nurse on duty who advised them that Petitioner was

conscious, alert and coherent and had been making phone calls. (See Lodged Doc. 4, Exhibit 1,

at 2.) 

When the Officers made contact with Petitioner, they too opined that Petitioner was

conscious, alert and coherent. (Id.) Petitioner began asking questions regarding the traffic

collision. (RT 132-133.) Petitioner was then read his Miranda rights, in response he stated he

understood and wished to speak with the officers. (RT 131-132; Lodged Doc. 4, Exhibit 1, at 2.) 

In his traverse, Petitioner argues that due his medical condition he was unable to give a

voluntary statement to Officers. Petitioner argues that the instant case is comparable to Mincy v.

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 

In Mincy, the defendant was questioned in an intensive care unit with a hip wound he

sustained a couple hours before being questioned. 437 U.S. at 398. Unlike Petitioner, Mincy

could not talk and had to write down his answers to the officer’s questions. Again, unlike

Petitioner, Mincy repeatedly asked the police to stop the interrogation, requested his lawyer,

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stated he was in pain, slipped in and out of consciousness, and complained of being confused and

unable to think clearly. Id. at 399-401. To the contrary, Petitioner, according to the nurse and

both officers, was conscious and alert, responsive to officers and agreed to questioning, and

freely answered all of the officer’s questions. He never expressed a desire to cease the

questioning, or stated that he was in pain, unconscious, or confused. Thus, because the extreme

facts presented in Mincy are clearly distinguishable from the instant case, Mincy is not

controlling. 

Although Petitioner states that his statement was involuntary because he had taken 148

milligrams of Morphine on April 2, 1998, from 12 a.m. to 9:30 p.m., Petitioner fails to

demonstrate how the effect or amount of the medication, caused his statements to officers to be

rendered involuntary and against his free will. In fact, to the contrary, the evidence presented

establishes that Petitioner was conscious and alert, and willingly answered the officer’s

questions. 

4. Failure to Present Evidence of Petitioner’s Incompetence

Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence that

Petitioner was not competent to assist in his defense or to stand trial. (Petition, at 23.) 

The conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process. 

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). Competency requires that the defendant have “the

capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with

counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). 

The due process clause requires a state trial court to inquire sua sponte into a defendant’s

competence if “‘a reasonable judge would be expected to have a bona fide doubt as to the

defendant’s competence.’” Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 489 (9 Cir. 1997) (citation th

omitted). A bona fide doubt exists if there is “substantial evidence of incompetence, id., and

evidence is “substantial” if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s competence to

stand trial. Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9 Cir. 1972). th

Several factors are relevant to determining whether a competency hearing is necessary,

including evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior and historical conduct, his demeanor at

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trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180-81;

Amaya-Ruiz, 121 F.3d at 489. The trial court is required to hold a competency hearing only

where the record as a whole creates a genuine doubt about the defendant’s competence to stand

trial. Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9 Cir. 1977). th

Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated, nor does the record establish, that he was

incompetent at the time of his preliminary hearing or trial, as to require counsel to present

evidence that Petitioner was incompetent to assist in his own defense or to stand trial. (See e.g.

CT 44-113, Transcript Preliminary Hearing.) At trial, Petitioner competently testified in his own

behalf, which greatly belies Petitioner’s claim of incompetency. (RT 151-169.) Thus, the state

courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. 

5. Failure to Conduct Discovery or Interview Prosecution’s Witnesses

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct discovery or

interview any of the prosecution’s witnesses. (Petition, at 24.) Petitioner claims that counsel

failed to discover any evidence that could be used to impeach the prosecution witnesses. 

Petitioner also claims that counsel failed to request a conditional examination of Andrea Winters

and the individuals in her vehicle before they returned to Germany. (Id.) Lastly, Petitioner

contends that trial counsel did not discover from the prosecution what impeachment evidence it

was going to use against Petitioner. (Id.)

As Respondent correctly argues, Petitioner was provided with discovery of his 1997

misdemeanor conviction for being under the influence of methamphetamine and was given

notice that he had been convicted of two felonies, grand theft and receiving stolen property prior

to his trial. (Lodged Doc. 4, Exh. 7.) Petitioner’s other claims are meritless, Petitioner has failed

to demonstrate counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness or that he prejudiced as a result. Conclusory

allegations do not warrant habeas relief. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9 Cir.1995) th

(holding that conclusory allegations made with no reference to the record or any document do not

merit habeas relief); see also United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9 Cir. 1987) th

(appellant failed to meet prejudice prong of ineffectiveness claim because he offered no

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indication of what potential witnesses would have testified to). Therefore, this claim is without

merit, and the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

6. Failure to be Present in Court

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective when he failed to be present in court at a

“critical stage” in the proceedings. (Petition, at 24.) Specifically, Petitioner contends that on

August 14, 1998, the date of his arraignment, defense counsel Mr. Heusdens was not present in

court to represent him. As Respondent submits, the minute order for August 14, 1998, indicates

that Roland Howard was present in court appearing for Mr. Heusdens. (Exhibit B, attached to

Petition.) 

At the August 14, 1998 arraignment, Petitioner was furnished with a copy of the

Information and he plead not guilty. (CT 119.) The case was set for a pretrial conference and a

jury trial. (Id.) Accordingly, Petitioner has not and cannot demonstrate any resulting prejudice

by the presence of Mr. Howard in the place of Mr. Heusdens. Petitioner’s claim fails on the

merits. 

With regard to Mr. Heusden’s absence at the September 4, 1998, discovery hearing, the

record reveals that the prosecution’s motion was brought pursuant to California Penal Code

section 1054.3. This section entitles the prosecution to discovery from the defendant prior to

trial. (CT 120-121.) Thus, as Respondent correctly argues, the motion would have been granted

regardless even had Mr. Heusdens appeared and objected. Petitioner presents no evidence

otherwise. Although the court granted the prosecution’s motion for discovery, it ordered that the

discovery compliance was to be mutual, thereby compelling the prosecution to also provide

discovery. (CT 126.) 

7. Advice to Waive Right to Jury Trial

 Petitioner next contends that defense counsel was ineffective when he advised him that if

he waived his right to a jury trial, he would receive less prison time as a result of a court trial. 

(Petition, at 25.) Petitioner contends that counsel informed him that if he waived his right to a

jury trial, he would only receive two to four years in prison. Petitioner further argues that his

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waiver was unknowing. (Petition, at 25-26.)

The record in this case belies Petitioner’s claim. The trial court advised Petitioner of the 

nature of a jury trial and of the consequences of waiving it. Petitioner freely indicated his desire

to waive a jury trial. (Lodged Doc. 4, Exh. 5.) In a letter written to the trial court on December

26, 2000, Mr. Heusdens explained his tactical reasons for advising Petitioner to waive a jury trial.

I, James Heusdens, represented, [Petitioner], in the above-entitled matter. 

After reviewing the evidence and the nature of the case, I met with [Petitioner] to

discuss with him whether or not this case should be a jury trial or a trial by the

court. In view of the facts in the case, I felt that [Petitioner] had better prospects

of getting a fair trial if he had a court trial, rather than a trial by jury. At the time

of the incident, [Petitioner] had in his possession evidence of narcotic use. That,

together with the facts of the case of there being the death of a young man, and

severe injuries to others, created a highly charged emotional climate, giving me

concern that my client would be crucified in front of a jury. In light of such an

atmosphere, and due to all the emotions it engendered, I felt that [Petitioner’s]

chance of receiving a fair and impartial trial by jury was not possible.

In my opinion, I thought that a judge would review the evidence in an

unbiased manner and make his judgment based solely on the evidence. As a

result, [Petitioner] chose to go ahead with a court trial, which was held in Merced

County. I believe that [Petitioner] had a decent case, and I believe that the

evidence in the case did not justify the conviction of a second-degree murder

charge.

(Exhibit D, attached to Petition.)

Based on the facts and charges in this case, it is unreasonable for Petitioner to expect a

two to four year prison term if he waived a jury trial. The main issue at trial was whether

Petitioner would be convicted of second degree murder as opposed to gross vehicular

manslaughter while intoxicated. Petitioner was also charged with felonious driving under the

influence causing injury (Vehicle Code § 23153(a)), with enhancements pursuant to Vehicle

Code section 23182(a). A conviction for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated carries

a range of punishment of four, six, or eleven years. A conviction for Vehicle Code section

23153(a), with two Vehicle Code section 23182(a) enhancements, exposed Petitioner to an

additional five years in prison. (See Petitioner’s driving record at CT 354-356.) Based on the

substantial evidence and charges filed in this case, Petitioner’s claim that he expected to receive a

sentence of two to four years is simply incredible and contrary to the record in this case. 

Accordingly, because defense counsel had sound tactical reasons for advising Petitioner

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to waive his right to a jury trial and Petitioner’s claim of a two to four year sentence is incredible,

the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

8. Failure to Challenge Admissibility of Prosecution’s Evidence

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the admissibility of

the prosecution’s evidence. (Petition, at 26.) Petitioner raises several instances in which he

believes counsel should have challenged the State’s evidence at trial. The Court, as did

Respondent, will address each claim separately.

First, Petitioner contends that counsel should not have stipulated that Debbie Owens, the

victim’s mother, was talking with her son at 2:14 p.m. on March 27, 1998, when the collision

occurred. (See RT 17-18.) Petitioner argues that counsel should have objected on the ground

that it was immaterial and irrelevant, as well as, misleading and highly prejudicial. (Petition, at

26.) 

As Respondent correctly argues, the time of the traffic collision was relevant and

probative. Forensic toxicologist Kenji Ota used this stipulated time of the traffic collision, along

with the time the blood sample was drawn from Petitioner at the hospital (RT 61), to give an

opinion as to the level of methamphetamine that was in Petitioner’s system at the time of the

collision. It was Ota’s opinion that the level of methamphetamine in Petitioner’s system at the

time of driving would have been much higher than the actual level detected in the blood sample

drawn approximately six hours after the collision. (RT 80-81.) By entering into the stipulation

counsel avoided the victim’s mother from having to give likely emotionally charged testimony

regarding her last conversation with her son. Counsel had a valid tactical reason for the

stipulation, and the evidence was clearly relevant. 

Second, Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the glass

pipe being admitted into evidence on the ground that there was a lack of adequate foundation. 

(Petition, at 26.) (See CT 335; RT 19-27, 63-64, 66-67, 124-127.) This contention lacks merit. 

Both trial witnesses Manuel Keaton and Officer Sean Hart testified as to how the pipe was found

and collected. (See RT 19-21, 24-26, 63-64, 67.) Their testimony satisfied the foundational

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requirements of California Evidence Code section 402, and any objection would have been futile. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate ineffectiveness under Strickland. 

Third, Petitioner argues that trial counsel erred by stipulating to the chain of custody for

the blood sample drawn from Petitioner. (Petition, at 26.) Petitioner’s claim is unfounded. 

Petitioner has not produced any evidence to demonstrate that the blood sample introduced at trial

(People’s Exhibit No. 100) is not the blood sample drawn from Petitioner. Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that the blood sample was tampered or tainted. Accordingly, Petitioner has simply

failed to demonstrate that the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

Fourth, Petitioner contends that trial counsel erred in not objecting to Officer Diaz’s

testimony on the ground that it was cumulative to the stipulation of the glass pipe testing positive

for methamphetamine. (RT 68-73.) At trial, counsel stipulated that the initial scraping of the

substance found on the pipe tested positive for methamphetamine, and was subsequently sent to

the Department of Justice and tested positive for .01 grams of methamphetamine. (RT 65-66.) 

During examination, Officer Diaz testified that the glass pipe is commonly used by drug users to

smoke methamphetamine. (RT 69.) He explained that the drug user places the

methamphetamine, which is in rock form, into one end of the glass pipe and then burns it with a

match and inhales the smoke in order to get a high. (RT 70.) Officer Diaz’s description of the

use of the pipe was not cumulative of the stipulation regarding the testing procedure performed

on the pipe. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to such testimony. 

Fifth, Petitioner contends that trial counsel did not cross-examine Officer Michael Morris,

who testified that Petitioner told him, “Just tell them I didn’t do any stuff that day. I was clean. 

Just tell them I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to kill anyone. I hadn’t done any dope for two days.” 

(Petition, at 26.) Petitioner argues that 

had trial counsel cross-examined this witness, the trial court would have learned

that Petitioner exercised his right to remain silent, and any reasonable jurist would

agree that the Edwards Rule is well known, where the trial court would have sua

sponte required the prosecution to show Petitioner’s statements were voluntarily

made and not obtained in violation of the Edwards Rule.

(Petition, at 27.) 

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In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the defendant voluntarily submitted to

questioning, but later stated that he wished to have an attorney before the discussions continued. 

The following day, detectives approached the defendant in the county jail, and when he refused

to speak with them, he was told that “he had” to talk. The Supreme Court held that the

subsequent incriminating statements made without the present of his attorney violated the

defendant’s rights under the Fifth And Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 484-485.) 

As previously stated, Officer Morris visited Petitioner at the hospital on March 29, 1998,

and advised him of his Miranda rights. (RT 95-97.) After reading Petitioner his rights,

Petitioner did not say anything. (RT 97.) However, when Officer Morris was on his way out of

the hospital, Petitioner spontaneously remarked, “Just tell them I didn’t do any stuff that day. I

was clean.” (RT 98.) When Officer Morris asked Petitioner what he meant, Petitioner answered,

“Just tell them I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to kill anyone. I hadn’t done any dope for two days.” 

(Id.) 

These facts establish that Petitioner made the above statements to Officer Morris on his

own volition. He never explicitly expressed his right to remain silent or requested an attorney to

be present, and his statement was clearly voluntarily given to Officer Morris this case is

distinguishable from Edwards. Petitioner has not established how counsel’s cross-examination

of Officer Morris would have changed or demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the result

would have been different. As such, the California Supreme’s denial of this claim was a

reasonable application of Strickland. 

Sixth, Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately crossexamine the prosecution’s accident expert. (Petition, at 27.) He argues “had trial counsel done

so, the evidence would show that Petitioner lost control of his vehicle when he was on the fog

line (or curb), and then shot across the median to cause the accident.” (Id.)

Petitioner’s claim is conclusory in nature, as Petitioner fails to specify what questions

counsel should have asked. Nonetheless, during cross-examination of Officer Gale he did admit

that Petitioner had most likely lost control of his vehicle when he crossed the median, as the

officer agreed that no driver would intentionally cross from side of the freeway to the other. (RT

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119-120.) The trial court also concurred with Officer Gale’s statement, stating “I don’t think

anybody would drive across there on purpose.” (RT 119.) Moreover, witnesses Kenneth

Ohleyer, Judy Ortiz and Tom Valles indicated that Petitioner’s vehicle crossed the fog line,

overcorrected, then crossed over the center divider and drove into oncoming southbound traffic. 

(RT 28-32, 39-40, 49.) It appears that the point Petitioner claims counsel should have presented

was already in evidence.

 Next, Petitioner claims that counsel did not object to the introduction of the alleged prior

convictions into evidence. (Petition, at 27; see Exhibit F, attached to Petition; RT 120-121.) As

Respondent points out, the only prior convictions alleged in the information were the six prior

convictions set forth in Count 5, charging Petitioner with driving on a suspended license. 

Petitioner fails to identify what legal ground should have been raised to exclude the prior

convictions, or that such objection would have been meritorious. In fact, under Vehicle Code

section 14601, subdivisions (b) and (c), prior convictions for driving with a suspended license are

relevant for enhancing the sentence on a subsequent violation. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed

to demonstrate the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of 

his medical records regarding the treatment he received as a result of the traffic collision, and the

medical records of “the prosecution witnesses.” 

Initially, as Respondent points out, no medical records of prosecution witnesses who

testified at trial were introduced into evidence. The medical reports of Petitioner, Andrea

Winter, Paul Winter, Drunhild Winter, and Christopher Owens were properly introduced

pursuant to California Evidence Code section 1270, the business record exception to the hearsay

rule. Petitioner’s claim that the records contain “improper medical opinion” is vague and

conclusory and does not warrant habeas relief. Specifically, Petitioner has failed to cite to the

specific portion of those medical records that contain the “improper medical opinion.” As such,

Petitioner’s vague and conclusory allegation is insufficient to warrant habeas relief. Jones, 66

F.3d at 205. 

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Petitioner’s medical records had probative value as it established that he had a

preliminary screen for the presence of methamphetamine, as well as high blood pressure and a

high heart rate for a fair length of time. Prosecution witness Kenji Ota relied on these factors to

support his opinion that Petitioner was driving under the influence of methamphetamine at the

time of the collision. (See RT 77-79.) 

The medical records of Andrea Winter, Paul Winter and Drunhild Winter were probative

to prove the enhancements charging Petitioner with driving under the influence and causing

injury to these individuals. In addition, the medical records of Christopher Owens established

that a human being was killed (§ 187), Petitioner committed gross vehicular manslaughter (§

191.5), and Owens suffered bodily injury (Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(a)). The medical records

regarding the victim’s cause of death were admissible as they were relevant and not prejudicial,

because the cause of death was not in dispute. See People v. Beeler, 9 Cal.4th 953, 980-981

(1995). 

Petitioner further contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

introduction of a certified copy of a Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) abstract of

Petitioner’s driving record on the ground that it was cumulative to the prior convictions,

irrelevant, and prejudicial. (Petition, at 27.) As Respondent correctly argues, the DMV records

were introduced to establish that Petitioner’s license had been suspended, and he had knowledge

of this when he was driving his vehicle on March 27, 1998. The prosecution had to prove these

two elements in order to find Petitioner guilty of Count 5 (Veh. Code § 14601.1; see CALJIC

No. 16.640.) Therefore, the DMV records were undoubtedly relevant and were not cumulative as

it established that Petitioner’s license was suspended at the time of the collision.

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective in stipulating that Dr. Wilkerson is a

licensed pathologist who would testify consistently with his findings in the pathology report. 

(Petition, at 27.) Petitioner’s claim is meritless. As Respondent submits, had defense counsel

not stipulated or objected to the stipulation, the People would have simply called Dr. Wilkerson

as a witness and had him testify as to the autopsy performed and the victim’s cause of death. 

Moreover, the cause of death was undisputed, and by entering into the stipulation counsel

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reasonably avoided graphic live testimony as to the injuries the victim sustained as a result of the

collision. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit and counsel was not ineffective and

Petitioner was not prejudiced.

Petitioner next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony

given by Michael Walter’s regarding the glass pipe (RT 124-127), on the ground that it was

cumulative to the testimony of witness Manuel Keaton. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the

evidence was not cumulative. As evidenced by defense counsel’s vigorous cross-examination of

Michael Keaton, his testimony was equivocal as to whether he actually observed the pipe on

Petitioner’s person or merely on the gurney next to Petitioner’s body. (See RT 22-25.) This fact

was important because in order to convict him of Count 4 (possession of controlled substance

paraphernalia) the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner actually possessed the glass pipe. Michael Walters, a flight paramedic, testified that he

arrived at the scene of the collision and transported Petitioner to Memorial Hospital. (RT 124-

125.) The pipe was found on Petitioner’s person in his pants while the paramedics were

rendering aid in transport to the Hospital. (RT 126-127.) Walters stated that the glass pipe was

taken to the emergency room, and left with Petitioner in the same spot it was found. (RT 126.) 

Walters testimony therefore provided the necessary evidence to establish that Petitioner

possessed the glass pipe, and was not cumulative of Michael Keaton’s equivocal testimony. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

Next, Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine

prosecution witness Officer Mike Coldeizey, who testified that the brakes on Petitioner’s truck

appeared to be in good condition. (RT 129.) Petitioner contends this testimony was inconsistent

with the report on the day of the collision, March 27, 1998, in which Coldeizey stated, “the

drums and shoes appeared in good condition except the front shoe of the right wheel was cracked

horizontally in three spots.” (CT 33.) Petitioner argues that the cracks probably occurred when

he hit the fog line and lost control and shot across the median. (Petition, at 28.) 

As to the latter claim, it is purely speculative. The record does not support Petitioner’s

contention that hitting the fog line caused the three horizontal cracks on the front shoe of the

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right rear wheel. In fact, officer Gale described the area to the right of the fog line as consisting

of dirt and gravel. (RT 108.) Furthermore, Petitioner has not demonstrated that these cracks had

any effect on the brakes. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that the brakes were in fact in

good working condition on the day of the collision. (RT 129.) Moreover, whether the brakes

were in good working condition on the day of the collision, was irrelevant to Petitioner’s defense

that he was falling asleep at the time of the collision. Petitioner has simply failed to demonstrate

how counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine on this superficial point, or that he was

prejudiced thereby. 

Petitioner contends that trial counsel did not object to Petitioner’s statement, introduced

through prosecution witness Officer Elrod, on the ground that it was involuntary. Petitioner

further contends that counsel failed to adequately cross-examine Officer Elrod. (See RT 140-

141.) 

On April 2, 1998, Officer Elrod, along with Officer McConnell, went to the Hospital to

talk with Petitioner. (RT 130-131.) Officer McConnel read Petitioner his Miranda rights, and

Petitioner freely stated that he would answer the questions. (RT 131-132.) Officer Elrod

proceeded to question Petitioner regarding the events that transpired on the day of the collision. 

(RT 132-138.) Officer Elrod further questioned Petitioner regarding the consequences of driving

while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, to which Petitioner stated “that he

was aware of what could happen. He brought up the fact that his cousin was killed in an accident

involving a driver that was under the influence.” (RT 139.) Specifically, Petitioner stated, “I’m

fully aware of the consequences of doing that. It’s a bad thing. I do drugs sometimes but I never

drive.” (RT 139.) Petitioner’s voluntary statements were admissible at trial as a party admission

(Ca. Evid. Code, § 1220), and counsel was not ineffective for failing to further cross-examine

Officer Elrod. 

Next, Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

prosecution’s stipulation that Petitioner was ordered to go to a Diversion Class and did not go

and went to County Jail instead. (See CT 336; RT 174-175.) Petitioner contends that this error

was compounded 

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by the prejudicial error of trial counsel not objecting to the prosecution improperly

impeaching petition with a “non-felony act,” where he was under the influence of

Methamphetamine, (Exhibit F, RT 164) because the trial court construed this

“prior act” as driving under the influence to find that petitioner had actual

awareness of the dangers of drinking and driving and to find petitioner guilty of

Second Degree Murder and Gross Vehicular Manslaughter. (Exhibit F, RT 186,

187; CT 336.) 

Officer Elrod testified that Petitioner admitted to previously being convicted of driving

under the influence. Petitioner told Officer Elrod that he had been sentenced to attend a DUI

class, but he had failed to complete the class. As a result, the judge had sentenced Petitioner to

jail. (RT 138.) 

When Petitioner took the stand, the prosecutor confronted him with the fact that he had

been convicted of being under the influence of methamphetamine in 1997, approximately a year

before the current trial. (RT 164.) The cross-examination went as follows:

Q. Now, you’ve been convicted of being under the influence of crank before, haven’t

you?

A. Once.

Q. And that was in 1997, correct?

A. No. That was in ‘95, ‘95 or ‘96.

Q. But you were convicted in ‘97?

A. Yes.

Q. Sometime after you were caught, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you admitted that you used crank then, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So you know what it is?

A. Yes.

(RT 164.)

As Respondent correctly argues, this cross-examination shows that the prosecutor

questioned Petitioner about his prior conviction for being under the influence of crank or

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methamphetamine to show that Petitioner had previously used the drug and was familiar with it. 

This evidence was also relevant to show that Petitioner had a prior history of using

methamphetamine. As Respondent submits, this evidence was also relevant to call into question

Petitioner’s claim that he had not taken any drugs before the collision, even though he had a pipe

with methamphetamine residue in his pocket. (See RT 162.) 

Furthermore, at trial, Petitioner admitted that he had been a heavy user of

methamphetamine prior to the collision. (RT 166-167.) Based on Petitioner’s own admissions,

he was not prejudiced by evidence that he a conviction for being under the influence of

methamphetamine. During his trial testimony, Petitioner also admitted that he was aware that

individuals can die as a consequence of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (RT

160.) Based on the trial record, Petitioner simply has not, and cannot show, that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s inactions. Accordingly, the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

9. Failure to Adequately Advise Petitioner Regarding Consequences of Testifying

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately advise him of

the consequences of testifying. (Petition, at 29.) Specifically, Petitioner contends that counsel

did not advise him that by testifying he could incriminate himself, and the prosecution could

impeach him with prior felony convictions of receiving stolen property, or for a misdemeanor

under the influence conviction. (Id.)

In the instant case, Petitioner’s declaration indicates that he and defense counsel

discussed whether Petitioner should testify, and it was agreed that Petitioner should take the

stand because “it would look good” for his case. (See Exhibit A, attached to Petition.) Defense

counsel had a valid tactical reason for advising Petitioner to testify. Petitioner’s defense at trial

was that he accidentally fell asleep while driving, and he did not feel that he was under the

influence of narcotics at the time. Petitioner’s testimony attempted to establish just that. On

direct examination, the following was elicited from Petitioner:

Q. Did you, yourself, feel like you were under the influence on that day?

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A. No.

Q. As you were driving north on Highway 99, did you–were you feeling

any different or unusual?

A. I was tired.

Q. You were tired?

A. (Witness nodding head up and down).

Q. How long had it been since you slept?

A. The night before.

Q. The night before. And you were tired as you were driving up the

highway?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember falling asleep?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember going off the roadway?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember going across the roadway and then running into any

another [sic] vehicle?

 A. No.

Q. All right. What is the last thing you remember prior to the accident?

A. I remember driving down 99 and I was eating.

Q. Were you eating as you were driving?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know whether you fell asleep or not?

A. No.

Q. So you can’t tell us what was happening, how you went off the

roadway or anything like that you, if you did?

A. The last thing I remember I woke up in the hospital.

(RT 152-154.)

Petitioner’s testimony attempted to establish that the collision was a horrific accident,

caused by Petitioner’s sleepiness. Thus, counsel had a reasonable tactical basis for advising

Petitioner to testify as his testimony was critical evidence necessary to his defense. 

It is noteworthy that Petitioner’s claim is strongly negated by his numerous encounters

with law enforcement and the legal system, in which Petitioner was advised of his right to remain

silent and his right against self-incrimination. 

In any event, Petitioner has not shown that had he not testified there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome of his case would have been different. Accordingly, the state courts’

determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. 

10. Failure to Object to Impeachment of Petitioner

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution

impeaching him with a misdemeanor conviction of being under the influence of drugs. (Petition,

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at 30.) He contends that counsel could have objected under Evidence Code section 352 or on due

process grounds. (Id.) 

Initially, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that an objection under Evidence Code

section 352 would have been successful, given the relevancy of the prior conviction of being

under the influence of drugs. Therefore, it is mere speculation that such an objection would have

been successful, and Petitioner simply has not, and likely cannot, demonstrate that there is a

reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 

First, counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the impeachment of Petitioner with the

prior conviction as it was relevant to the instant offense, and any objection would have been

futile. See e.g. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9 Cir. 2000); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d th

20, 26 (9 Cir. 1994); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 345 (9 Cir. 1994). Second, as Respondent th th

submits, as discussed above, Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged inactions. Thus,

even assuming that counsel was somehow ineffective in failing to object to the impeachment,

Petitioner’s own trial testimony admitting that he was heavily using methamphetamine at the

time prior to the collision, demonstrates that Petitioner was not prejudiced by admission of the

prior conviction. 

Petitioner continues to argue that had he not been impeached with the conviction, “the

trial court would not have an adequate factual basis for finding petitioner had an actual awareness

of the dangers of drinking and driving for the trial court to conclude petitioner was guilty of

Second Degree Murder under People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290.” Petitioner’s claim is

meritless, as counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, nor was Petitioner prejudiced as he

clearly testified at trial that he was aware of the lethal consequences of driving under the

influence of drugs and he had a cousin who had been killed as a result of such an incident (RT

160), which amply supported the court’s conclusion that Petitioner intentionally drove while

under the influence of drugs, despite his awareness of the high risk of harm it involved to others. 

(RT 186.) 

///

///

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11. Failure to Object to Petitioner’s Inability to Confront and Cross-Examine The

Winters Witnesses

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the absence of

Andrea, Druhild and Paul Winter, thereby violating his right to confront and cross-examine. 

As Respondent points out, Petitioner has failed again to demonstrate how the testimony

of these witnesses would have helped his case. To the contrary, it is highly probable that the

witnesses testimony would have bolstered the prosecution’s theory of the case. 

Andrea Winter was interviewed by law enforcement and stated that as she was driving

south on Highway 99 in the number one lane, she observed a traffic collision involving

Christopher Owen’s (the victim’s) vehicle directly in front of her. (CT 28.) Because it happened

so quickly, she had no time to react and struck the vehicle in front of her. (Id.) She believed she

had struck Owen’s car; however, the evidence established that she actually struck Petitioner’s

vehicle. (See CT 29-30.) Based on the record in this case, there was no concrete evidence that

Andrea Winters’s vehicle caused the collision, rather the undisputed evidence established that

Andrea Winters and the two passengers in her vehicle were victims of the collision caused by

Petitioner crossing over the median into oncoming traffic. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to

met his burden under Strickland, and the state courts’ determination of this issue was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

12. Failure to Provide Adequate Representation

 Finally, Petitioner claims that counsel did not render effective representation due to his

poor health. Petitioner further contends that counsel had a conflict of interest in defending

Petitioner because his wife was also killed by a drunk driver. Lastly, Petitioner contends that

counsel erroneously conceded the fact that Petitioner was guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter

and driving under the influence of drugs with injuries. (Petition, at 32.) 

As Respondent submits, Petitioner has made no showing that counsel’s representation

was affected by his poor health or that counsel had a conflict of interest. Such vague

unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to warrant habeas relief, and Petitioner has simply

failed to sustain his burden under Strickland. 

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 The Court notes that Respondent has failed to address Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate 8

counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims in his answer. However, because there is no merits to these claims, and

in the interest of justice, the Court will resolve them on the existing record before it, without the needless necessity of

requiring Respondent to file a response to the claims. 

35

Counsel reasonably made a tactical decision to concede that Petitioner was guilty of gross

vehicular manslaughter and driving under the influence of drugs with injuries as the evidence

strongly supported such charges, and argued vigorously against a finding of second degree

murder. See e.g. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 (great deference is owed to counsel’s methods of

case presentation and tactical decisions). 

With regard to Petitioner’s claim that cumulative error deprived him of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, it is likewise without merit. Although no single alleged error may

warrant habeas corpus relief, the cumulative effect of errors may deprive a petitioner of the due

process right to a fair trial. See Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1254 (9th Cir.1996). Cumulative

error will be found where "there are several substantial errors," and their cumulative effect is "so

prejudicial as to require reversal." Killian v. Poole 282 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002).

However, where there is no single constitutional error, there is nothing to accumulate to a level

of a constitutional violation. Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).

No single error was made at Petitioner’s trial that was sufficiently prejudicial on an

individual basis so as to warrant relief. Likewise, even considering the cumulative effect of each

of Petitioner’s allegations, this Court is not left with the impression that the errors were so

prejudicial as to require reversal. Petitioner’s claim of cumulative error is without merit and

must be denied. 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner contends that appellate counsel did an unprofessional and prejudicial job that

he was effectively denied of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

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Effective assistance of appellate counsel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to Strickland 's two-pronged test. Miller

v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9 Cir.1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9

th th

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Cir.1986); See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 353-54 (1988) (holding that

where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the assistance of appellate counsel

altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is presumed; the implication is

that Strickland does apply where counsel is present but ineffective).

To prevail, Petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that appellate

counsel's deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052,

2064 (1984). Second, Petitioner must establish that he suffered prejudice in that there was a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, she would have prevailed on

appeal. Id. at 694. A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome. Id. The relevant inquiry is not what counsel could have done; rather, it is whether

the choices made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th

Cir.1998). The presumption of reasonableness is even stronger for appellate counsel because he

has wider discretion than trial counsel in weeding out weaker issues; doing so is widely

recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate assistance. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d

1428, 1434 (9 Cir.1989). Appealing every arguable issue would do disservice to the Petitioner th

because it would draw an appellate judge's attention away from stronger issues and reduce

appellate counsel's credibility before the appellate court. Id. Appellate counsel has no

constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by petitioner. Id at 1434 n.10

(citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983)). 

Because defense counsel was not deficient and there was no resulting prejudice,

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, but for counsel’s alleged deficiencies, there was a

reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal. The state courts’ determination

of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. Petitioner’s claim is without merit and must be denied.

E. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by violating his duty to

prosecute Petitioner fairly when he “impugned the defense counsel’s character and integrity by

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inferring that defense counsel fabricated a defense, suborned perjury, and assumed that defense

counsel did not believe his client.” (Petition, at 48.) Petitioner merely cites to Exhibit F, in

support of his claim. Exhibit F contains examination by both counsel of prosecution witnesses,

and the Court’s finding in rendering its verdict. 

A habeas petition will be granted for prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct

"so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 171, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974)); see, Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d

815, 843 (9 Cir. 1995). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct

th

must be "of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial." 

Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 (1987) (quoting United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985)). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that

there is a reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial -

i.e., that absent the alleged impropriety, the verdict probably would have been different. To the

contrary, an error is harmless if the court, after reviewing the entire trial record, decides that the

alleged error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

Petitioner’s claim is nothing more than a vague unsubstantiated allegation devoid of

specific factual support in the record. Conclusory allegations do not warrant habeas relief. See

Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9 Cir.1995) (holding that conclusory allegations made th

with no reference to the record or any document do not merit habeas relief). Although Petitioner

cites to Exhibit F, he does not point to what in that Exhibit establishes that the prosecution

committed misconduct. Further, the Court has reviewed the entire record in this case and does

not find that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct so as to violate Petitioner’s right to due

process. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated or this Court found that even if such error occurred it

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” so as to

warrant reversal of Petitioner’s conviction. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

///

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 30, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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