Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04025/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04025-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

JEFFREY D. NOIEL PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-4025 

JACK JONES, Arkansas Parole

Officer; MARTY NODURTH, 

Assistant Parole Administrator; and

A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas

Department of Correction DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Jeffrey D. Noiel filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 11,

2006. He proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP). The case is before the undersigned for

a determination of whether it should be served upon the defendants.

I. Background

Noiel is currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Correction. On December 4,

1981, in criminal case no. CR-81-346, Noiel pled guilty in the Miller County Circuit Court to

the crime of aggravated robbery. Noiel was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty years

in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), fifteen years of which was suspended during

good behavior. Exhibit A. 

According to the allegations of the complaint, Noiel was paroled from the ADC on

October 6, 1987. On May 19, 1988, while on parole, Noiel alleges he was arrested by the

Texarkana, Texas, police and charged with aggravated sexual assault. Noiel maintains there was

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an unnecessary delay in the police officer taking him before a Texas judicial officer because he

was on parole in Arkansas.

Noiel alleges that on September 21, 1988, he was convicted of aggravated sexual assault

in Bowie County, Texas, and sentenced to serve a term of twenty-five years in the Texas

Department of Correction. By letter dated February 8, 1989, Noiel was advised by defendant

Marty Nodurth, Assistant Parole Administrator, of the ADC, Parole Services, that the Arkansas

Board of Pardons and Paroles had voted to allow Noiel’s Arkansas sentence to run concurrent

with his Texas sentence. Exhibit C. Consequently, Noiel was told he would be placed on parole

supervision if he wasreleased from incarceration in Texas prior to his Arkansas parole discharge

date of August of 1994. Exhibit C. 

Noiel indicates he filed a civil action, case number 93-4039, in this district against Jack

Jones and Marty Nodurth. Exhibit D. Noiel claimed that defendants had failed to provide him

with a parole revocation hearing. Exhibit D. He sought monetary damages and a declaratory

judgment that denying him a parole revocation hearing violated his rights. Exhibit D. 

Civil action 93-4039 was filed under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Noiel alleged

he was denied bond after arrest because defendant Jones had placed a parole detainer on him.

Exhibit D. Because Noiel contested his parole status, the court ruled the action was in reality a

habeas corpus claim. Exhibit D. The case was stayed and administratively terminated in order

to allow Noiel to pursue a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Exhibit D. 

Noiel then filed a habeas corpus action, civil no. 94-4092. Civil action 94-4092 was

a habeas corpus action brought pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The case was

filed on August 25, 1994. Noiel named Jack Jones, a parole officer, as the respondent. On

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Note was made of the fact that it was unclear whether Noiel’s Arkansas parole had expired prior to the filing of case 1

number 94-4092 on August 25, 1994. (Doc. 14 at page 2 in case no. 94-4092). However, as of the date of the report and

recommendation, November 28, 1994, the undersigned noted that the “[p]etitioner’s Arkansas parole has expired.” Id. 

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September 12, 1994, Larry Norris, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, was

substituted as a defendant and service was directed on him (Doc. 3 in case 94-4092). Norris filed

a motion to dismiss and on November 28, 1998, a report and recommendation was entered

recommending dismissal of the case because Noiel did not satisfy the in custody requirement of

the habeas corpus statute since his Arkansas parole had expired, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (Doc. 14

in case 94-4092). See also Exhibit I. Noiel filed objections and the Honorable Harry F. Barnes, 1

the United States District Judge to whom the case was assigned, adopted the report and

recommendation and dismissed the case (Doc. 17 & 18 in case 94-4092).

Noiel appealed the dismissal (Doc. 22 in case 94-4092). On May 9, 1995, the dismissal

was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Doc. 32 in case 94-4092). Noiel

continued to file various documents in that case and on two more occasions appealed various

actions.

Although not mentioned by Noiel, he also filed another civil action in this district which

he asked the court to treat as a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Noiel v. Barnes,

et a., Civil No. 04-4016. In that case, Noiel challenged the failure of officials in Arkansas to take

any steps towards revoking his Arkansas parole despite his imprisonment in Texas. He also

contended a conditional liberty interest was created when his Arkansas sentence was improperly

shortened and then the altered sentence was run concurrently with the Texas sentence. 

It was concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition

challenging the failure of Arkansas state officials to take action to revoke Noiel’s parole. (Report

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and Recommendation entered April 15, 2005 (Doc. 5 in case 04-4016) and adopted on May 10,

2004 (Doc. 11 in case 04-4016)). The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge,

was held to be immune from suit in a civil rights action. Id. Finally, to the extent Noiel was

challenging his Texas conviction or imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of Texas court, he

was told he must file the action in the district in which he was confined or in which his custodian

could be found. Id. 

Noiel appealed the dismissal in case 04-4016. By order entered on October 4, 2004, he

was denied a certificate of appealability and the appeal was dismissed. (Doc. 21 in case 04-

4016). 

In the current case, Noiel asserts that: (1) he is “in custody” pursuant to a conspiracy that

resulted in his being maliciously prosecuted under a parole detainer placed on him while he was

being illegally held on May 19, 1988, by Texas authorities; (2) the May 19, 1988, parole detainer

is the equivalent of a police officer’s warrantless arrest; and (3) the May 19, 1988, arrest and

parole detainer were not based upon the same allegation upon which he was subsequently

convicted in Texas on September 21, 1988. Noiel asks that the court order respondent to provide

further portions of the proceedings concerning his parole to establish whether or not he has been

discharged from parole in Arkansas and the date of such discharge.

II. Discussion

This case is subject to dismissal. First, to the extent Noiel asserts claims under § 1983

based on activities that occurred on May 19, 1988, the claims are barred by the statute of

limitations. Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitation. Instead, causes of

action under § 1983 are governed by “the most appropriate or analogous state statute of

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limitations.” Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987)(§ 1981 case). See also

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985)(§ 1983 case); Bell v. Fowler, 99 F.3d 262, 265-266

(8th Cir. 1996)(§ 1985 case). In Arkansas, this is the three year personal injury statute of

limitations, Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-105(3) (2005). See Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 739 (8th

Cir. 2001)(Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3) is the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983

cases).

Plaintiff’s’ civil rights causes of action accrued when he knew or had reason to know of

harm constituting the basis of the action. Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corrections, 64

F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995). Noiel has alleged that in May of 1988, he was not brought

promptly before a judicial officer because of an Arkansas parole detainer. By no later than

November 28, 1994, when the undersigned wrote in a report and recommendation that Noiel’s

“parole has expired,” Noiel knew that the Arkansas authorities took the position in documents

filed in this court that he had been discharged from parole in Arkansas. 

This case was not filed until April 11, 2006. Noiel has not alleged the existence of any

new facts or alleged that he has received further communications from the Arkansas parole

authorities. This action was therefore filed well after the expiration of the applicable limitation

period. 

Plaintiff’s bare assertion that the defendants conspired together does not toll the running

of the statute of limitations. A conspiracy claim requires allegations of specific facts showing

a meeting of the minds among the alleged conspirators. Snelling v. Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199, 200-

01 (8th Cir. 1992)(en banc). No such specific factual allegations are found in the complaint. 

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To the extent this action is construed to be a habeas corpus action, this court lacks

jurisdiction. Section 2254 provides for jurisdiction when the petitioner is “in custody” pursuant

to a judgment of a State court. The “in custody” concept does not extend to a “situation where

a habeas petitioner suffers no present restraint from the challenged conviction” at the time of the

filing of the habeas petition. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491-92, 109 S. Ct. 1923, 104 L. Ed.

2d 540 (1989).

Noiel does not allege he has been served with a warrant on an Arkansas parole violation.

See e.g., Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86-87, 97 S. Ct. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1976)(Parolee

imprisoned for a crime committed while on parole is not entitled to a prompt parole revocation

hearing upon the filing of a parole violator warrant with the institution of his confinement.

“[L]oss of liberty as a parole violator does not occur until the parolee is taken into custody under

the warrant.”). In fact, Noiel has not alleged Arkansas has taken any steps towards revoking his

parole, has altered its position that he has been discharged from parole, or that the Arkansas

parole authorities have contacted him in anyway since the dismissal of case 94-4092. As such,

his current custody is not affected in any way by the Arkansas parole officials. Benny v. United

States Parole Com’n., 295 F.3d 977, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2002)(“The Commission’s impropriety lies

in being late in determining whether to terminate Benny’s parole supervision under the Parole

Act’s early termination provision. This procedural violation does not affect Benny’s current

custody.”).

III. Conclusion

I therefore recommend that this case be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of

limitations and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP action, or any portion thereof, may be dismissed on such grounds at

any time). 

Noiel has ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which to file

written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections

may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Noiel is reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

DATED this 2nd day of June 2006.

 

 /s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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