Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00614/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00614-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXANDER D. SAMMONS,

CDCR #F-17684,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden of R. J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00614-CAB-NLS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING REQUEST TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2];

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Alexander Sammons (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, 

filed this civil rights action (ECF No. 1), together with a Request to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

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$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his request to proceed IFP, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate 

authorized by a RJD accounting official and a copy of his CDCR Inmate Statement 

Report. See ECF No. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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at 1119. These documents shows that Plaintiff had an available balance of zero at the 

time of filing. See ECF No. 3 at 1-3. Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and will assess no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 

initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). The Court will further direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his 

designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment 

payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Williams v. King, __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 5180205, at *2 (9th Cir. 

Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it 

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

On April 2, 2017, Plaintiff was walking “across a small area of grass” and “fell in 

an unseen hole that was covered up by overgrown grass.” (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff “tried 

to get up, 3 loud pops were heard, Plaintiff then collapsed.” (Id.) Two inmates informed 

Correctional Officers Juarez and Zakaryan2that Plaintiff had fallen. (See id. at 4.) Juarez 

and Zakaryan “called medical” and Plaintiff was taken to the “central treatment center.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff was given pain medication and “sent back to his cell after briefly being 

seen by a nurse.” (Id.) 

 

2 Neither Juarez nor Zakaryan are named Defendants in this action.

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Plaintiff was later given an x-ray but the “x-ray showed nothing.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

requested an MRI for “both legs.” (Id.) On June 14, 2017 and July 11, 2017, Plaintiff 

“got results showing serious injury to Plaintiff’s knees.” (Id.) Following this incident, 

Plaintiff claims Juarez and Zakaryan would “pull [Plaintiff] to the side and tell Plaintiff 

while laughing ‘that’s why you should have kept your ass on the concrete.’” (Id.) 

Plaintiff further alleges they told him that there had been an “orange cone” previously 

placed on top of the hole that Plaintiff fell in. (Id. at 5.)

C. Personal Causation

First, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and § 1915A(b)(1) to the extent it seeks relief under 

§ 1983 against Warden Paramo, the only named Defendant. “To state a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Campbell v. Washington 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Ketchum v. Alameda 

Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). The Complaint contains no factual 

allegations describing what Defendant Paramo did, or failed to do. To the extent Plaintiff 

seeks to hold him liable for the actions of his subordinates, there is no respondeat 

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 

(9th Cir. 1993). Rather, “deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring 

proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A less stringent standard of fault for a 

failure-to-train claim ‘would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on 

municipalities . . . .’”), quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), 

citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 

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460 (9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 

1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) A person 

deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does 

an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff 

complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not 

stated a claim against Defendant Paramo because he has failed to allege facts regarding 

what actions were taken or not taken by the Defendant which caused the alleged 

constitutional violations. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 (“Respondeat superior and 

vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”), citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.

D. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he fell into 

the hole on the prison yard. (See Compl. at 8.) “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 

against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods 

of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement.” Morgan v. 

Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 

However, not every injury sustained while in prison rises to the level of cruel and 

unusual punishment. See Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Instead, a prisoner claiming an Eighth Amendment violation must allege: (1) that the 

deprivation he suffered was “objectively, sufficiently serious” and (2) that prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to his health or safety in allowing the deprivation to take 

place. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citations omitted). 

As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to “contain sufficient 

factual matter,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, to show that the conditions in the prison’s yard

were so objectively serious as to deprive him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 298-300 (1991). Minor safety hazards do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See 

Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 938 (citing Tunstall v. Rowe, 478 F. Supp. 87, 89 (N.D. Ill. 1979) 

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(greasy staircase which caused a prisoner to slip and fall did not violate the Eighth 

Amendment).

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide any “further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557), which might show that any individual 

prison official acted with conscious disregard to any “known or excessive risk to inmate 

health and safety” in the prison yard. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To be deliberately 

indifferent, “the official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Id. (emphasis added); see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state plausible Eighth 

Amendment violation as to his prison conditions, and that this claim must be dismissed sua 

sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-

27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, and the 

Court has now provided him with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” it will also 

grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A;

5. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave to file an Amended Complaint 

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned, 

however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by 

itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim not realleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved form civil 

rights complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 15, 2018

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