Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00469/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00469-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID WILSON, 

 Plaintiff,

v. 

GARDINER, et al., 

 Defendants.

 Case No.: 17cv469-JLS-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[ECF No. 7] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Plaintiff David Wilson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 3). On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint sets 

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forth various claims against six individuals working at the San Diego Central 

Jail Facility (“Central Jail”) alleging that they violated his civil rights by: (1) 

retaliating against him in violation of the First and Eighth Amendment; (2) 

imposing cruel and unusual punishment against him in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment; (3) failing to provide Plaintiff his due process rights in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) intentionally inflicting emotional 

distress on him; and (5) negligently disregarding their duty owed to Plaintiff. 

(See Id.). 

 On August 21, 2017, Defendants Gardiner and Poirier filed a Motion to 

Dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 7). Defendants contend that: (1) Plaintiff’s 

state tort claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to submit a 

California Government Code damage claim before bringing his lawsuit; (2) 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Poirier must be dismissed because she 

had no personal involvement in any alleged violation; (3) Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment claim must be dismissed because “the complaint does not allege 

any facts showing that [P]laintiff was engaged in a protected activity[;]” (4) 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is precluded because it should have 

been brought under the Fourth Amendment; (5) Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff did not allege that 

Defendants use of force was objectively unreasonable; and (6) the entire 

Complaint fails because Plaintiff did not first exhaust his administrative 

remedies, which is clear on the face of the Complaint. (ECF No. 7-1). 

 Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: (1) he did 

file a claim with the Government Claims Board on September 3, 2016; (2) 

Defendant Poirier was the responding supervisor to the events giving rise to 

the lawsuit; (3) Plaintiff was engaged in his right to peacefully advocate for 

soup as a “necessity to Plaintiff’s health and wellbeing[;]” (4) as a pretrial 

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detainee, Plaintiff may present a claim for excessive force during an unlawful 

cell extraction; (5) Defendants were malicious and sadistic in their use of 

excessive force; and (6) Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Citizen Law 

Enforcement Review Board (“CLERB”), who told Plaintiff they would file an 

administrative complaint on his behalf and any failure to exhaust his 

administrative remedies was due to state created impediment. 

 Defendants reply that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed 

because: (1) Plaintiff brought his state tort claims up with the wrong entity; 

(2) the claims against Defendant Poirier do not allege she had direct 

involvement or issued direct orders during the incident; (3) no Doe 

defendants were named with respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims; 

(4) the Fourteenth Amendment is unavailable to Plaintiff; (5) Plaintiff 

concedes that there is no excessive force claim in his Complaint; and (6) the 

CLERB is a board of volunteers unaffiliated with the County of San Diego. 

(ECF No. 21). 

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

 The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are not to be 

construed as findings of fact by the Court. 

 Plaintiff, at the time of the incidents giving rise to the Complaint, was 

an inmate at the San Diego County Central Jail Facility. (See ECF No. 1 at 

3-5). Plaintiff states that he suffers from a psychiatric disability. (Id. at 5). 

Plaintiff’s claims arise from a series of events that occurred on April 5, 2016, 

while he was a pretrial detainee. (ECF Nos. 1 at 2, 20 at 7). Plaintiff alleges 

that that day’s lunch was served to inmates in their cells because the jail 

facility was on lockdown. (ECF No. 1 at 6). After Plaintiff received his sack 

lunch, he asked Defendant Gardiner if there was any soup available, to which 

Gardiner replied, “[t]here ain’t no soup dumb-ass.” (Id.). Plaintiff then 

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challenged Gardiner, both on being called a “dumb-ass” and because Plaintiff 

contended that there was available soup in the dayroom. (Id. at 7). Gardiner 

then placed a radio call to have Plaintiff’s cell door opened and instructed 

Plaintiff to “[g]o down stairs and look in the soup container fuckin’ stupidass!” Plaintiff declined the invitation. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff then alleges that Defendant Gardiner entered Plaintiff’s cell 

and grabbed Plaintiff by his shirt collar with both hands in attempt to 

remove Plaintiff from the cell to verify that it was empty. (Id.). Plaintiff 

stepped back into the cell and asked “What’s wrong with you?” Gardiner 

continued pursuing Plaintiff, throwing punches in Plaintiff’s general 

direction. Plaintiff was struck in the eye, neck, and upper torso. (Id.). 

 Defendant then removed Plaintiff from his cell and handcuffed him. 

(Id.). Defendant Gardiner, while walking Plaintiff out of the housing unit 

and into the rotunda, began kicking Plaintiff in the calf and stepping on his 

heels and pant leg, forcing Plaintiff’s pants to fall down. (Id. at 8). Because 

Plaintiff was unable to stop walking, and because he did not want to appear 

to be resisting Defendant Gardiner, Plaintiff was forced to walk out of his 

pants entirely. (Id.). Plaintiff was waked through the jail, wearing a torn 

shirt and no pants, to the medical unit where he was given a blood pressure 

test. Guards at the medical unit laughed at Plaintiff’s state of undress. (Id.). 

Plaintiff asked Gardiner why he did this to Plaintiff, to which Gardiner 

responded “[i]t’s not like I’m going to lose my job.” (Id.). 

 Plaintiff was then taken to a dirty cell on the fourth floor. (Id. at 9). 

Plaintiff was still partially undressed and without shoes, and this new room 

had feces smeared on the wall and trash on the floor. Plaintiff had no bed 

linens or cleaning supplies. (Id.). Plaintiff asked passing guards for cleaning 

supplies, replacement clothes, and linens, all of which were refused. 

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Plaintiff alleges that at this time he began experiencing a great deal of 

physical anxiety and psychiatric post-traumatic and emotional distress, as 

well as nausea. (Id.). Plaintiff began sweating and experienced an elevated 

heart rate and rapid breathing. (Id.). After being held in the dirty cell for 

over two hours, Plaintiff stopped Defendant Joe Doe #1 and again requested 

clothing and supplies, saying “I[‘d] rather be dead than live like this.” (Id. at 

10). Joe Doe #1 immediately ordered Plaintiff to “cuff up” telling Plaintiff 

that he interpreted Plaintiff’s statement as a suicidal declaration. (Id.). 

Plaintiff repeatedly told Doe #1 that he did not want to kill himself, that he 

simply did not want to be housed in unsanitary conditions. 

Plaintiff then turned around and put his wrists outside of the stillclosed and locked cell to be cuffed. (Id.). As Doe #1 was cuffing Plaintiff, he 

dug the jagged edge of the handcuff into Plaintiff’s right hand above his 

thumb, causing excruciating pain and instant bruising. Plaintiff then asked 

for a sergeant. Doe #1 refused Plaintiff’s request and pepper sprayed 

Plaintiff, causing him to choke and gag. (Id.). Plaintiff was told to cuff up 

again while he repeatedly asked for a sergeant. (Id.). Plaintiff was then 

pepper sprayed a second time causing Plaintiff’s skin and eyes to burn. (Id.). 

Defendant Poirier arrived, stating “[t]hat’s a hell-of-a-lot of pepper 

spray, and it’s making me choke.” (Id. at 11). Poirier then told Plaintiff that 

he had better exit his cell, or corrections officers were going to have to extract 

him. Plaintiff explained that he was being falsely accused of being suicidal 

and that he simply did not want to be housed in a filthy cell. Defendant 

Poirier told Plaintiff to exit the cell and that the two of them would then talk 

about it. (Id.). Plaintiff left the cell without further incident and was 

immediately transported to a suicide/safety cell, while still covered in pepper 

spray. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff was released by a psychiatric doctor within 

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twenty-four hours. Plaintiff reported experiencing burning for several days 

after the incident. (Id.). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The pleader must 

provide the Court with “more than an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully 

harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements will not suffice.” Id. 

“Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of 

the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [a court is] not bound to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. 

(internal quotations omitted). 

A pro se pleading is construed liberally on a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cnty., 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 

1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in his complaint that bring 

his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570. 

A court “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Nor 

may a plaintiff supply missing elements in his opposition. See Schneider v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining 

the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the 

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complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in 

opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis in original)). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint 

and an opportunity to amend, unless the deficiencies cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. State Tort Claims 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims for assault and 

battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence are barred 

because Plaintiff failed to submit a California Government Code damages 

claim before bringing his lawsuit. (ECF No. 7-1 at 3-4). Plaintiff argues that 

he filed a Government Board claim on September 3, 2016, and has not yet 

received a response. (ECF No. 20 at 4). Plaintiff attached his Government 

Claims Form with the California Victim Compensation and Government 

Claims Board as an attachment in his opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. (Id. at 21-36). 

 Compliance with California’s Government Tort Claims Act (“the Act”) is 

a prerequisite to filing a state law claim against a state official. A claim 

under the Act must be presented to the Victim Compensation and 

Government Claims Board (Board) within six months of the alleged tortious 

conduct. CAL. GOV’T CODE §911.2. Compliance with the Tort Claims Act is an 

element of the cause of action, State of Cal. V. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 

4th 1234, 1240 (2010), is required, Mangold v. California Public Utilities 

Com'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995), and “failure to file a claim is fatal 

to a cause of action.” Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dist. of Los Angeles 

v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 1992). 

 Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s obligation was not met because 

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he failed to bring his government claim to the County. In their Motion, 

misidentified the claim Plaintiff filed as a complaint with the Law 

Enforcement Review Board. (ECF No. 7-1 at 4). Defendants corrected this 

error in their reply. (ECF No. 21 at 2-3). Defendants, however, point to no 

law requiring Plaintiff to file his claims with the county. Further, 

Defendants do not outline the procedure available to Plaintiff in order to file 

a claim with the county, merely arguing that the state tort claims must be 

dismissed. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s supporting library log entry dated 

September, 2017 contradicts Plaintiff’s contention that he filed his 

government claim in September of 2016, however that is insufficient grounds 

on which to dismiss Plaintiff’s state tort claims, at this stage in the 

proceedings. The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the 

state tort claims of Plaintiff’s Complaint be DENIED. 

B. Claims Against Defendant Poirier 

Defendants contend that the claims against Sgt. Alma Poirier (sued as 

“Sergeant Poiter”) should be dismissed because she had no personal 

involvement in any alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF 

No. 7-1 at 4-5). Plaintiff argues that as the responding supervisor, it was 

Defendant Poirier’s responsibility to ensure that Plaintiff was properly 

decontaminated after Plaintiff was pepper sprayed. (ECF No. 20 at 5). 

Defendants argue Defendant Poirier cannot be held personally liable under § 

1983 for alleged violations caused by a subordinate absent her direct 

participation or specifically issuing directions to a subordinate regarding the 

alleged deprivation. (ECF No. 21 at 3). 

To be liable under § 1983, a person acting under color of state law must 

cause the plaintiff to suffer the violation of a constitutional right. 42 U.S.C.A. 

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§ 1983. “A person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional 

right ... if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative 

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes 

the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 

743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976)). 

Thus, the plaintiff must allege that each of the defendants committed some 

act, or failed to act in a particular way, that was the cause of the purported 

constitutional injury. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1385 (11th Cir. 

1982). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the 

duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or 

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. 

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act does not authorize a plaintiff to 

bring a cause of action based on respondeat superior liability. Monell v. Dep't 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (“[T]he fact that Congress did 

specifically provide that A's tort became B's liability if B ‘caused’ A to subject 

another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to 

attach where such causation was absent.”). State officials are subject to suit 

in their personal capacity if “they play an affirmative part in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th 

Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 

896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply 

conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the 

deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 

(9th Cir. 1998). 

“The required causal connection between supervisor conduct and the 

deprivation of a constitutional right is established either by direct personal 

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participation or by setting in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor 

knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict constitutional 

injury.’” Little v. Pena, No. C 94-0671 MHP, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9068, at 

*9 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1994) (quoting Bergquist v. Cty. of Cochise, 806 F.2d 

1364, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986)); see K'Napp v. Adams, CASE NO. 1:06-cv-01701-

LJO-GSA (PC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2009). 

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege sufficient factual allegations 

against Defendant Poirier to survive a motion to dismiss. The Complaint 

alleges that Poirier’s involvement began after Plaintiff had been pepper 

sprayed. Plaintiff then indicates that Poirier advised Plaintiff that he would 

be wise to cooperate with the correctional officers and gave Plaintiff an 

opportunity to discuss his concerns. The Complaint does not allege any 

personal involvement in the pepper spraying incident by Defendant Poirier, 

or any personal involvement in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional 

rights, other than asserting a theory of respondeat superior with respect to 

Defendant Gardiner and Doe #1. Further, Plaintiff does not plead any facts 

that indicate Poirier knew of or acquiesced to the wrongful conduct of others. 

Therefore, Plaintiff states no claim to which he can receive relief against 

Defendant Poirier and the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss be GRANTED without prejudice as to Defendant Poirier. 

C. First Amendment Retaliation Claim 

In claim one, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gardiner retaliated 

against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 15). In 

the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a 

First Amendment violation because Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege facts 

demonstrating that Plaintiff was engaged in a protected activity. (ECF No. 7-

1 at 6). In his objection, Plaintiff argues that he was “engaged in his First 

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Amendment right of advocating peacefully” in inquiring about soup and that 

Defendants’ actions “chilled” Plaintiff’s action. (ECF No. 20 at 6-7). 

The First Amendment protects against “deliberate retaliation” by prison 

officials against an inmate’s exercise of his right to petition for redress of 

grievances. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 

1989). Such conduct is actionable even if it would not otherwise rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation because retaliation by prison officials may 

chill an inmate’s exercise of legitimate First Amendment rights. Thomas v. 

Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989). A prisoner suing prison officials 

for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his 

constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance 

legitimate penological goals. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 

1995); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994); Rizzo v. 

Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The Ninth Circuit has set forth five basic elements for a viable claim of 

First Amendment retaliation: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took some 

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege that he 

was engaged in protected conduct. Plaintiff did not allege that his soup 

request was due to a specific religious meal plan or approved medical 

treatment, for example. Plaintiff may be correct in his assertion that he was 

“peacefully advocating” for soup as part of his lunch, however, this does not 

establish that eating soup or inquiring about soup is protected conduct giving 

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rise to a First Amendment retaliation claim. For this basic reason, the Court 

RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss claim one of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint be GRANTED without prejudice. 

D. Excessive Force Claims 

 In claims one and two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gardiner 

subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1 at 15-16.) In claim three, Plaintiff 

alleges the same events deprived Plaintiff of his rights without due process in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as to all Defendants. (Id. at 16). 

Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to state an excessive force 

claim under the Eighth Amendment because the allegations do not indicate 

that Defendants’ behavior was objectively unreasonable. (ECF No. 7-1 at 7). 

Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is 

duplicative, as Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force are properly pled under 

Fourth Amendment. (ECF No, 7-1 at 6). 

In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, the 

analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly 

infringed by the challenged application of force. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. 

Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). The specific constitutional right is determined by the 

plaintiff's custodial status. Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1042 

(9th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive force 

during a seizure of a free citizen. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871. In the Ninth 

Circuit, this protection lasts until arraignment. Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043. The 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees 

from excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 

n.10 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1871-74 (1979)). After conviction, 

the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment 

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governs the use of force against a prisoner. Whitley v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 

1084 (1986). 

In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), the Supreme Court 

clarified the applicable standards governing pretrial detainees' excessive 

force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court granted 

certiorari in that case to resolve a disagreement among the circuits regarding 

whether § 1983 claims brought by pretrial detainees must satisfy a subjective 

standard, that takes into account the defendant's state of mind, or only an 

objective reasonableness standard. Id. at 2471-72. The Supreme Court held 

that “the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim 

is solely an objective one.” Id. at 2473. “[A] pretrial detainee must show only 

that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively 

unreasonable.” Id.

“[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of 

each particular case.’” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting Graham, 109 S. 

Ct. at 1872). Objective reasonableness must be assessed from the perspective 

of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the 

time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. The court must also account 

for the legitimate interests that stem from the government's need to manage 

the facility in which the individual is detained. Id. The following nonexclusive factors “may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the 

force used: the relationship between the need for the use of force and the 

amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by 

the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the 

security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and 

whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. However, unlike a convicted 

prisoner proceeding under the Eighth Amendment, a pretrial detainee does 

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not need to show that the force was applied maliciously and sadistically for 

the purpose of causing harm. Id. at 2475-76. 

At this stage in the proceedings, Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to him. He alleges that he was 

challenging Defendant Gardiner’s name calling when Gardiner grabbed 

Plaintiff by the collar and attempted to force Plaintiff to verify for himself 

that there was no soup, and then began punching him. He alleges that he 

was repeatedly kicked and forced to jettison his pants because he was unable 

to continue being escorted by Gardiner with his pants falling down. 

Additionally, he indicates that Doe #1, without provocation, twice pepper 

sprayed Plaintiff while he was complying with a request to cuff up. Plaintiff 

asserts that this incident caused high levels of stress and anxiety, 

exacerbating his already present mental health issues, humiliation, and 

physical pain. 

Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to support a plausible inference that 

Defendant Gardiner used force for the malicious and sadistic purpose of 

causing harm, rather than for the purpose of maintaining or restoring 

discipline, because, if taken as true, Plaintiff's allegations establish that at 

the time force was applied, Plaintiff could not reasonably be perceived as a 

threat. Defendants’ counter that Plaintiff was confrontational about soup 

availability and that his behavior “adversely impacted management of the 

facility.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 7). Defendants do not indicate how Plaintiff’s soup 

request was disruptive or how pepper spraying Plaintiff twice while he was 

complying with an order was in furtherance of maintaining or restoring 

discipline. As stated above, at this stage in the proceedings Plaintiff's 

allegations must viewed in the light most favorable to him. When these 

allegations are taken as true, there was no justification for the use of any 

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force – let alone justification for Defendant Gardiner to enter his cell and 

repeatedly hit Plaintiff – over a soup request, or for Doe #1 to twice pepper 

spray Plaintiff while he was complying with the order to cuff up. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations establish beyond a speculative level 

that the force applied by Defendant Gardiner was not de minimis. Plaintiff 

therefore states a cognizable claim and the Court RECOMMENDS that the 

Motion to Dismiss claims one and two for excessive force under the Eighth 

Amendment be GRANTED with prejudice and claim three for excessive force 

under the Fourteenth Amendment DENIED as to Defendant Gardiner. 

E. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative 

remedies is clear on the face of the Complaint and therefore Plaintiff is 

precluded from bringing this lawsuit in its entirety. (ECF No. 7-1 at 8-9). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action 

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or 

any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is “mandatory.” Porter v. 

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 

(2001)); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200–01 (9th Cir.2002). Failure 

to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). “In a typical PLRA case, a defendant 

will have to present probative evidence [in a Rule 56 motion for summary 

judgment] ... that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies 

under § 1997e(a).” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir.2014) (en 

banc). However, “in ... rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the 

face of the complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss under 

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Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (citing 

Jones, 549 U.S. at 215–16; Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th 

Cir.1984) (per curiam) (“[A]ffirmative defenses may not be raised by motion 

to dismiss, but this is not true when, as here, the defense raises no disputed 

issues of fact.”); Aquilar–Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th 

Cir.2007) (“[O]nly in rare cases will a district court be able to conclude from 

the face of the complaint that a prisoner has not exhausted his 

administrative remedies and that he is without a valid excuse.”)). 

Here, Defendants argue that is it clear from the face of the Complaint 

that Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, 

Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). However, Plaintiff 

alleges that he “has satisfied all exhaustions required for issues raised in this 

lawsuit.” (ECF No. 1 at 15.) Thus, it is not evident from the face of the 

Complaint that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Moreover, the Court cannot consider the evidence Plaintiff presented in his 

opposition to the Motion to Dismiss to find a failure to exhaust. (ECF No. 

20at 15-16). Schneider v. California Dep't of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 

(9th Cir.1998) (“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a 

court may not look beyond the Complaint to a plaintiff's moving papers, such 

as a memorandum in opposition to a defendants' motion to dismiss.”). 

Therefore, the Court finds this case is not among the “rare cases” where 

dismissal for failure to exhaust is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6), and would 

be more proper as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the 

Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies be DENIED. 

/// 

/// 

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V. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s state tort claims 

(claims four and five); 

2) Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED without prejudice as to all claims 

against Defendant Poirier (claims three and five); 

3) Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s 

First Amendment Retaliation claim against all Defendants (claim one); 

4) Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED with prejudice as to Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment claims against all Defendants (claims one and two); 

5) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment Claim (claim three); and 

6) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust 

his administrative remedies. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United 

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the court and 

serve a copy on all parties by February 26, 2018. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the 

objections shall be served and filed by March 5, 2018. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 12, 2018

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