Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03366/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03366-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS GOOLSBY,

Plaintiff,

v.

PUGETT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-03366-JD 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 55, 65

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff 

has filed a motion to amend and has opposed the motion to dismiss and summary judgment. This 

case continues on the second amended complaint (“SAC”) with claims that defendants denied 

plaintiff access to the courts and engaged in retaliation. Plaintiff alleges that his request to 

correspond with inmates at another prison was denied and he missed four court phone calls for 

state court cases on July 10, 2012, September 27, 2012, October 31, 2012, and February 25, 2013. 

He alleges violations of federal and state law.

I. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Factual Background1

Plaintiff was transferred to Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) on March 28, 2012. Motion 

for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) at 6. During the relevant time, defendant Lewis was warden at 

the prison, defendant Puget was a supervising correctional counselor and later a captain, defendant 

Mills was plaintiff’s correctional counselor, defendant Barnts was litigation coordinator from 

 

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The following facts, unless otherwise noted, are undisputed.

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August 1, 2010, to September 27, 2012, and defendant Soderlund was litigation coordinator from 

September 27, 2012, to May 2015. Id. at 5.

Inmate Correspondence

On April 10, 2012, approximately two weeks after plaintiff arrived at PBSP, defendant 

Barnts received an email from the litigation coordinator at California Correctional Institution 

(“CCI”), plaintiff’s prior prison. Id. at 7; Barnts Decl., Ex. A. The email noted that plaintiff was a 

validated gang member in the Nazi Low Rider gang and a validated associate of the Aryan 

Brotherhood. Barnts Decl. at 2, Ex. A. It also stated that plaintiff had previously been allowed to 

correspond with other inmates who were co-litigants in a now closed court case, but the privilege 

was revoked after the gang investigator found that non-litigation content was being 

communicated. Id. It also noted that plaintiff had an extensive history of violence, weapon 

making, and gang activity, and that he was extremely litigious. Id.

On April 26, 2012, plaintiff submitted a request to correspond with several inmates at CCI

for new court cases. Opposition, Ex. G. Plaintiff sought the request for two cases: Goolsby v. 

Cate, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-266864, and Goolsby v. Stainer, California 

Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-267503. SAC at 6-7. Defendant Mills denied the request the 

following day. Opposition, Ex. G.

On May 31, 2012, non-defendant correctional counselor Ryan processed another of 

plaintiff’s requests to correspond with inmates at CCI. Decl. Ryan at 2. Ryan recommended that 

the request be approved on May 31, 2012. Id. at 3. The facility captain approved the request on 

June 13, 2012. Id. However, the request was ultimately denied because staff at CCI would not 

approve the request due to plaintiff’s previous misuse of correspondence. Id. Ryan stated that 

when he initially recommended the approval, he had not contacted staff at CCI. Id. 

Another non-defendant correctional counselor approved a request from plaintiff to 

correspond with another inmate on September 12, 2012. Opposition, Ex. H. It is unclear if this 

request was approved or rejected by the supervisor, but plaintiff states in a declaration that his 

requests to correspond with the other plaintiffs were denied. Opposition, Ex. S.

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Mills states that at some point after May 9, 2012, he denied plaintiff’s requests to 

correspond based on the information from CCI that the gang investigator found inappropriate 

communications that did not involve litigation. Mills Decl. at 3. Plaintiff does not contest that his 

permission to communicate with other inmates while at CCI was revoked or that defendants 

received this information from staff at CCI. Nor does plaintiff contest that one month later 

permission was granted by a different correctional counselor and then denied due to the objection 

from staff at CCI. Plaintiff states that Mills told him that he had spoken with defendant Barnts and 

a staff member at CCI who provided negative information about plaintiff. Opposition at 4. 

Plaintiff alleges that Mills said:

Your in the Bay now, we don’t fucking play. All these lawsuits are 

gonna stop now! We are not fucking pussies like them guys down at 

CCI. We won’t transfer you, there’s no where to send you. We’ll 

break you. I’ll strip your cell clean and burn every piece of paper in 

it. This is your warning. . . . You don’t get it, you have nothing 

coming. We will fight you every step of the way and were watching 

you. I’m not approving shit for you. Sit in your cell, shut up and 

drop your legal bullshit or else your time here is gonna get really 

rough. Our warden backs us up, he doesn’t tolerate this bullshit.

Id. Plaintiff does not provide the date this exchange occurred.

Court Calls

Court telephone calls are initiated by the courts. MSJ at 8. If the prison litigation office

receives a court order via the mail or fax indicating that an inmate has a scheduled call, the 

particular facility and housing staff for the prisoner is notified. Id. It is the responsibility of the 

housing staff to schedule the inmate to be escorted to a phone when the call occurs. Id. The 

prison litigation office can receive notice of a court telephone call from CourtCall, the company 

that coordinates calls for California state courts. Id.

There are various reasons why a court call does not occur. Id. The prison sometimes does 

not receive notice of a scheduled call, or the prison receives notice after the appointment for the 

call has passed, or there is not enough time to coordinate prison staff to escort the prisoner to the 

call. Id. A prisoner can refuse the call or there can be an emergency situation in the prison that 

prohibits inmates from being escorted to the phone due to safety reasons. Id. at 9.

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July 10, 2012

A CourtCall document shows that confirmation for the July 10, 2012 call was sent to CCI, 

not PBSP, for the case Goolsby v. Stainer, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-267503. 

MSJ at 9; Barnts Decl. Ex. B. The phone and fax numbers on the CourtCall document are for 

CCI, not PBSP. Id. Plaintiff submitted an inmate request form on June 25, 2012, stating that he 

had court calls on July 10, 2012, August 14, 2012, and December 6, 2012. Opposition, Ex. K. A 

response from a prison staff member whose name cannot be identified on the exhibit indicates that 

the prison was aware of the calls. Id. Plaintiff missed the phone call. Several other co-plaintiffs 

appeared by telephone. MSJ, Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. F at 7-8.2 No defendants 

appeared because they had not been served. Id. at 8. The case was continued for plaintiffs to 

serve defendants. Id. Goolsby v. Stainer, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-267503, was 

dismissed with prejudice on March 13, 2014, pursuant to plaintiff’s request for dismissal. RJN, 

Exs. F, H. A monetary settlement was reached between plaintiff and defendants. Id.

Defendants argue that they did not receive notice of the July 10, 2012, court call. MSJ at 

9. Plaintiff disagrees. In the complaint, plaintiff argues that prior to July 10, 2012, defendant 

Barnts made inappropriate comments to the effect that he would not permit plaintiff to participate 

in the court calls to spite plaintiff due to his legal cases, and that Barnts did not want to help 

plaintiff sue the prison. SAC at 11. Plaintiff also states in the complaint that Barnts was upset 

about a settlement of a federal court case where plaintiff received money. SAC at 10.

However, the settlement that plaintiff refers to did not occur until July 24, 2012. 

Opposition, Ex. M. Barnts’ statement could not have happened before the July 10, 2012, court 

call.3 In the opposition to summary judgment, plaintiff states that he signed the settlement papers 

in late July 2012 and that was when Barnts made the statement in reference to an August 15, 2012, 

 

2

The Court takes judicial notice of the state court records. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 

1225 (9th Cir. 2007).

3

This motion for summary judgment was filed on July 14, 2015. On July 13, 2015, plaintiff filed 

a motion to amend noting that he was mistaken about when the interaction with Barnts occurred 

and that it was not before the July 2012 phone call. He states the incidents he described in the 

complaint actually occurred in August 2012. The Court will address the motion to amend and the 

different dates below.

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phone call. Opposition at 7. Plaintiff alleges that he was not allowed to make the August 15, 

2012, phone call. 

Because the August 15, 2012, court call is not at issue in this action, defendants have not 

addressed it. The state court records provide contradictory information regarding whether plaintiff 

appeared by phone for the August 15, 2012 phone call in Goolsby v. Scarlett, California Superior 

Court No. S-1500-CL-270540. One entry in the state court docket states that plaintiff was not 

present by phone. RJN, Ex. A at 10. Another entry states that plaintiff was present. RJN, Ex. A 

at 22.4 Goolsby v. Scarlett, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-270540 was dismissed on 

December 1, 2014, because plaintiff had failed to post security, $6,500, as a precondition to 

proceed as required under California Code of Civil Procedure section 391.3. RJN, Ex. B.5

September 27, 2012

Plaintiff was scheduled for a court call on September 27, 2012, in Goolsby v. Stainer, 

California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-267503, the same case as the July 15 court call. MSJ at 

9. Defendants state that they did not receive notice of the call. MSJ at 9. Plaintiff alleges that 

defendants were aware of the call. Opposition at 8. The state court records indicate that a hearing 

was scheduled, but there is no notation that a court call notice was sent to defendants. RJN, Ex. F 

at 9-10.

Due to plaintiff’s missing the hearing, a sanction in the amount of $250 was imposed. 

RJN, Ex. F at 11. On February 21, 2013, plaintiff’s motion to quash the sanction was granted and 

the superior court decided not to impose any sanction. Id. at 13. This entire case was eventually 

dismissed with prejudice on March 13, 2014, pursuant to plaintiff’s request for dismissal after a 

settlement was reached. RJN, Exs. F, H. 

October 31, 2012

Plaintiff was scheduled for another court call in Goolsby v. Stainer, California Superior 

Court No. S-1500-CL-267503, on October 31, 2012. The superior court records indicate that 

 

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Plaintiff was also present by phone on August 14, 2012, for Goolsby v. Cate, California Superior 

Court No. S-1500-CL-266864. RJN, Ex. C at 6. 

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Plaintiff was found to be a vexatious litigant and ordered to post security. RJN, Ex. B.

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notice was sent to the prison on October 22, 2012, that the hearing would be held in Department 

17 at the superior court. RJN, Ex. F at 12. On October 29, 2012, the superior court, upon its own 

motion, moved the hearing to Department 15 and ordered that notice be resent to the prison. Id. at 

15. The court call was made to the original location, Department 17, on October 31, 2012, by 

defendant Soderlund. MSJ at 9. The judge in Department 17 told Soderlund that it was the wrong 

Department and that the judge was unable to transfer the call to Department 15, the new location. 

Id. As noted above, the sanction against plaintiff in this case was dismissed and the case was 

dismissed at plaintiff’s request after it settled.

February 25, 2013

Plaintiff was scheduled for a court call on February 25, 2013 in Goolsby v. Scarlett, 

California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-270540. MSJ at 10. Plaintiff did not make the phone 

call. Id. A few days earlier, on February 21, 2013, plaintiff completed a court call on another 

case, Goolsby v. Stainer, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-267503. Id; RJN, Ex. F at 24. 

Officer Gonzalez, a non-defendant, escorted plaintiff to the February 21, 2013, court call. MSJ at 

10. 

Defendants state that after the completed call on February 21, 2013, Gonzalez reminded 

plaintiff that he had another court call on February 25, but plaintiff responded that he did not. Id. 

Plaintiff disputes this assertion and argues that the conversation with Gonzalez never occurred. 

Opposition at 12. 

Plaintiff did not complete the court call on February 25, and prison staff noted that he had 

been overlooked. Opposition, Ex. X. The superior court ordered plaintiff to show cause why he 

should not be sanctioned for missing the call, but the order to show cause was vacated on March 

20, 2013. RJN, Ex. A at 12. This case was dismissed on December 1, 2014, because plaintiff 

failed to post security as a precondition to proceed as required under California Code of Civil 

Procedure section 391.4. RJN, Ex. B.

From the relevant period of this case, April 2012 to February 2013, while plaintiff alleges 

he missed four to five court calls, he successfully completed the following nine calls in the above 

mentioned three cases: In Goolsby v. Scarlett, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-270540, 

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there were calls on April 26, 2012, November 13, 2012, January 8, 2013, and January 10, 2013 

(RJN, Ex. A at 9, 11-12; In Goolsby v. Cate, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-266864, 

there were completed calls on August 14, 2012, September 26, 2012, November 14, 2012, and 

December 6, 2012.6 RJN, Ex. C at 6, 8, 11-12; and in Goolsby v. Stainer, California Superior 

Court No. S-1500-CL-267503, there was a completed call on February 21, 2013. RJN, Ex. F at 

24.

Plaintiff’s prison trust account reflects that he did not pay sanctions for any missed court 

calls. MSJ at 10.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party. See id. 

A court may grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial[,] . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial 

burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Id. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings 

and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See id. at 324 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (amended 2010)). 

 

6 Goolsby v. Cate, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-266864 was dismissed on April 15, 

2013, because plaintiff failed to post security, $9,100, as a precondition to proceed as required 

under California Code of Civil Procedure section 391.4. RJN, Ex. D.

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For purposes of summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v. 

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

Court Access

Legal Standard

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). To establish a claim for any 

violation of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must prove that there was an inadequacy 

in the prison’s legal access program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-

55. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the inadequacy in the prison’s program 

hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of 

confinement. See id. at 354-55. With respect to a claim regarding active interference by prison 

officials, a prisoner alleges an actual injury if, as a result of the defendants’ alleged actions, his 

pending suit was dismissed. See Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2011). A 

prisoner’s constitutional right to litigate without interference encompasses the First Amendment 

right to petition the government by filing civil actions that have a reasonable basis in law or fact. 

Id. at 1102. 

Discussion

Defendants contend that even assuming they deliberately denied the court calls, plaintiff 

cannot demonstrate an actual injury. The undisputed facts support this argument. None of the 

missed phone calls resulted in the dismissal of any of plaintiff’s three cases or any adverse 

decisions that were not reversed. When sanctions were imposed in two of the cases, those orders 

were later vacated and plaintiff never had to pay the sanctions. Two of the cases were later 

dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to post security pursuant to state law because plaintiff was deemed 

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a vexatious litigant. The third case was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff after a settlement was 

reached. While it is undisputed that plaintiff missed several phone calls, there is no genuine 

dispute as to the lack of an actual injury to plaintiff as a result of the missed calls. Similarly, 

plaintiff cannot show an injury for being prevented from corresponding with his co-litigants. One 

of the cases settled and the other two cases were dismissed for failure to post security. 

Plaintiff argues that missing the phone calls denied him the ability to argue several 

motions. He also contends that not being allowed to communicate with the other inmates 

prevented him from being able to proceed with them as litigants in his cases, which he claims 

caused him to receive an inadequate settlement in one case and forced the other cases to be 

dismissed. As stated above, those two cases were dismissed because plaintiff failed to post more 

than $15,000 in security, as required by the state courts because plaintiff was found to be a 

vexatious litigant. RJN, Ex. B, D. He states that his family would have paid the $15,000 but that 

they did not do so because he could not proceed with the other inmates. His argument cannot 

overcome summary judgment because plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated how not having 

co-litigants prevented family members from paying the security. Moreover, plaintiff missed only 

a few phone calls in multiple years of litigation during which time he filed numerous motions. 

Plaintiff also argues that he settled the third case with defendants and would have received 

more money if he had been able to continue with co-litigants. His argument in support of this 

contention is unavailing. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his 

claims of being denied court access to the results of the superior court cases. See Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (there must be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendant and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff). Summary 

judgment is granted to defendants for this claim.

Retaliation

Legal Standard

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

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exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under § 

1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional 

rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as 

preserving institutional order and discipline).

Retaliatory motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedly retaliatory act and 

inconsistency with previous actions, as well as direct evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003). However, mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not 

sufficient. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of summary 

judgment where no evidence that defendants knew about plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, or that 

defendants’ disparaging remarks were made in reference to prior lawsuit). A prisoner must at least 

allege that he suffered harm, since harm that is more than minimal will almost always have a 

chilling effect. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68 n.11.

The prisoner bears the burden of pleading and proving absence of legitimate correctional 

goals for the conduct of which he complains. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. At that point, the burden 

shifts to the prison official to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the retaliatory action 

was narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 

F.3d 454, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1995) (defendants had qualified immunity for their decision to transfer 

prisoner to preserve internal order and discipline and maintain institutional security).

Retaliation claims brought by prisoners must be evaluated in light of concerns over 

“excessive judicial involvement in day-to-day prison management, which ‘often squander[s] 

judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone.’” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting Sandin 

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). In particular, courts should “‘afford appropriate deference 

and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for 

conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482).

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Discussion

Phone Calls

The undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff missed court calls on September 27, 2012, 

October 31, 2012, and February 25, 2013. Defendants have shown that they did not purposefully 

act to ensure that plaintiff missed these calls. Even if a defendant took an adverse action against 

plaintiff, there is no evidence that any defendant specifically prevented plaintiff from missing one 

of these calls in retaliation for his lawsuits. There is no evidence that any defendant told plaintiff 

that he missed the September 27 phone call due to his litigation. The undisputed facts demonstrate 

the October 31 phone call was moved to a different court department two days before the call took 

place. A phone call was made on October 31, but it was made to the courtroom on the original 

notice, and the judge who received it could not transfer it to the new courtroom. Plaintiff does not 

allege that any defendant deliberately had the call placed to the wrong courtroom in response to 

plaintiff’s litigation. Rather, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the notice of the new call 

arrived at the prison too close in time to when the call was being made. 

Viewing the evidence of the February 25 phone call in a light most favorable to plaintiff, 

defendants are still entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff has not shown that being overlooked 

for the phone call was retaliatory. Simply missing some of these phone calls is not enough. 

Plaintiff successfully participated in at least nine court calls in his various cases, many of these

calls a few days before or after the missed calls. The evidence does not show that defendants took 

adverse action purposely against plaintiff due to his litigation history. Plaintiff’s speculation that 

defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient. Wood, 753 F.3d at 904-05.

It is undisputed that the official notice of the July 10, 2012 court call was not sent to 

defendants at PBSP, but was sent to CCI, plaintiff’s prior facility. The undisputed facts also show 

that an unidentified prison staff member was aware of the July 10 phone call. Plaintiff originally 

argued that defendant Barnts made several incriminating statements prior to the July 10 phone 

call; specifically that Barnts would not permit the phone call due to plaintiff’s many lawsuits and 

because plaintiff was paid a settlement in a separate federal civil rights action. However, the 

settlement was not reached until July 24, 2012; therefore, Barnts could not have made these 

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comments prior to the July 10, 2012 phone call. Plaintiff makes no other allegations in his 

opposition to support his argument that the July 10 phone call was missed in retaliation to his 

protected activity. Summary judgment is granted for this claim.7

Inmate Correspondence 

It is undisputed that defendants received an email from CCI on April 10, 2012, stating that 

plaintiff was a validated gang member in the Nazi Low Rider gang and a validated gang associate 

of the Aryan Brotherhood. The email also stated that plaintiff’s previous ability to correspond 

with other inmates at CCI to pursue joint litigation had been revoked after the gang investigator 

found that plaintiff abused the correspondence privilege by communicating non litigation content. 

Plaintiff does not deny these allegations. It is also undisputed that several weeks after defendants 

received this email, plaintiff submitted a request to correspond with inmates at CCI that was 

denied by defendant Mills. 

Plaintiff states that Mills threatened him if he continued with his litigation. For purposes 

of summary judgment, the Court must assume the truth of the evidence submitted by plaintiff, the 

nonmoving party. To meet his burden in demonstrating a genuine issue for trial, plaintiff must 

still meet all the elements of a retaliation claim. Assuming that defendant Mills took an adverse 

action because of plaintiff’s conduct and in doing so chilled plaintiff’s rights, plaintiff must still 

demonstrate that defendant’s action did not advance a legitimate correctional goal. 

Plaintiff has not met his burden of pleading and proving the absence of a legitimate 

correctional goal. A few weeks after plaintiff was transferred to PBSP, defendant was notified of 

his gang affiliations and the revocation of his ability to correspond with other inmates due to

plaintiff abusing the privilege. Defendant was also advised that plaintiff had an extensive history 

of violence, weapon making and gang activity. Stopping plaintiff’s communications with other 

inmates advanced a legitimate goal regarding the safety and security of inmates and staff at PBSP 

and CCI.

 

7

Plaintiff’s motion to amend to add an allegation of retaliation on August 15, 2012, will be 

discussed below.

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Plaintiff argues that the later initial approval by other correctional staff to correspond with 

the other inmates supports his claim. It is undisputed that one month after defendant denied the 

request, non-defendant correctional counselor Ryan recommended that plaintiff’s new request be 

approved. Decl. Ryan at 2. But that recommendation was ultimately denied because of plaintiff’s 

previously misuse of correspondence with inmates. Decl. Ryan at 2-3. Ryan states in his 

declaration that when he initially approved the request, he had not contacted staff at CCI. Decl. 

Ryan at 3. Another non-defendant correctional counselor also initially approved a request for 

plaintiff to correspond with another inmate on September 12, 2012, and that request was also later 

denied. Opposition, Ex. H, S. The fact that all of these requests were similarly denied due to 

concerns from staff at CCI supports defendants’ argument that preventing plaintiff from 

corresponding with other inmates advanced a legitimate correctional goal of safety.

In addition, the Court should “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison 

officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be 

retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482). Here plaintiff had a 

documented history of abusing the privilege of corresponding with other inmates, as well as a 

history of gang ties and violence. For all these reasons defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or 

those who knowingly violate the law.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting 

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, 

belief about the facts or about what the law requires in any given situation. Id. at 205. A court 

considering a claim of qualified immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the 

deprivation of an actual constitutional right and whether such right was clearly established such 

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that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling the sequence of the 

two-part test that required determining a deprivation first and then deciding whether such right 

was clearly established, as required by Saucier). The court may exercise its discretion in deciding 

which prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Pearson, 555 

U.S. at 236. 

With respect to the denial of access to courts claim, the Court found that there was no 

constitutional violation. For the same reasons, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity for the claim of retaliation related to the missed 

court calls due to the absence of a constitutional violation.

With respect to the claim of retaliation for denying plaintiff the ability to correspond with 

the inmates at CCI, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity even if there was a constitutional 

violation. Assuming that defendant Mills made the statements attributed to him by plaintiff, the 

undisputed facts demonstrate a legitimate correctional goal in his denial of plaintiff’s request to 

correspond. The information received by Mills prior to plaintiff’s request stated that plaintiff’s 

correspondence privilege has been revoked at CCI due to inappropriate communications, as cited 

by a gang investigator, and that plaintiff had an extensive history of violence, weapon making and 

gang affiliations with the Aryan Brotherhood and Nazi Low Riders. It would not be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct would be unlawful in light of the overriding need of 

institutional security which justified the denial of permission to correspond based on plaintiff’s 

history. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

II. MOTION TO AMEND

This case was initiated with the filing of the original complaint on July 18, 2013. The case 

continues on the second amended complaint filed on July 18, 2014. Defendants filed a waiver of 

reply on February 19, 2015. Plaintiff filed a proposed third amended complaint and motion to 

amend on July 13, 2015. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was filed the next day, on 

July 14, 2015.

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Legal Standard

A plaintiff may amend the complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days after 

serving it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). But if the complaint requires a responsive pleading, a 

plaintiff may amend the complaint 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after 

service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. Id. at (a)(1)(B). In all other 

cases, a plaintiff must obtain the defendant’s consent or leave of court to amend a complaint, and 

the court should freely give leave when justice so requires. Id. at (a)(2).

District courts must afford pro se prisoner litigants an opportunity to amend to correct any 

deficiency in their complaints. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc). Yet, it lies within the district court’s discretion whether a plaintiff may expand his 

complaint by adding claims raised for the first time on summary judgment. See Brass v. County of 

Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding district court’s finding that 

plaintiff waived new § 1983 arguments raised for the first time in his motion for summary 

judgment where nothing in the amended complaint had suggested he was raising those arguments 

and he offered no excuse or justification for his failure to raise them earlier). Factors to consider 

include whether there is bad faith by plaintiff, undue delay, prejudice to defendants, futility in 

amendment, and number of prior opportunities to amend. See Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 

754 F.3d 1147, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2014) (considering these factors in finding district court abused 

its discretion in failing to construe plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and opposition to 

defendants’ summary judgment motion as a motion to amend complaint to add vagueness claim,

raised for the first time, and in failing to then allow such amendment). 

Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint would cause the 

opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates 

undue delay. See Janicki Logging Co.v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994). A district 

court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the plaintiff has previously 

filed an amended complaint. Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc., 363 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2003)

(overruled on other grounds).

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Discussion

In the proposed third amended complaint, plaintiff seeks to add another instance of 

retaliation and denial of access to the courts. He states that he missed a court call on August 15, 

2012, and that the circumstances surrounding the July 10, 2012, missed call actually occurred 

prior to the missed August call. Plaintiff states that he made this mistake about which call the 

circumstances related to because he sent his legal notes to a family member for safekeeping and

the notes were not returned until recently. He does not allege that defendants were responsible for 

this mistake and it is not clear why it took more than two years for plaintiff to obtain the notes 

from his family member. The August 15 missed call concerned a different superior court case 

then the July 10 missed call.

Defendants argue that amending the complaint at this late time will improperly delay 

resolution of the pending motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. The Court notes 

that plaintiff has already been provided several opportunities to amend and granting leave to 

change the dates would essentially add a new claim and could cause undue prejudice to 

defendants, who filed an extensive dispositive motion relying on the allegations of the second 

amended complaint. “Late amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when 

the facts have been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception of the cause of 

action.” Acri v. Intern’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 

1986). 

Defendants also argue that the motion to amend should be denied because the third 

amended complaint is futile and “futility of amendment, can by itself, justify the denial of a 

motion for leave to amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Looking to the 

merits of the motion for summary judgment in light of the proposed third amended complaint, 

summary judgment would still be granted for defendants.

Plaintiff states that he missed a court call on August 15. He does not state what superior 

court case the call was for. A review of the state court records from the motion for summary 

judgment indicates the call was for Goolsby v. Scarlett, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL270540. RJN, Ex. A at 10, 22. From the records it is not certain if plaintiff missed the call. One 

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entry in the state court docket states that plaintiff was not present by phone. RJN, Ex. A at 10. 

Another entry states that plaintiff was present. RJN, Ex. A at 22. Plaintiff was present by phone 

on August 14, 2012, for Goolsby v. Cate, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-266864. RJN, 

Ex. C at 6. 

Assuming the plaintiff missed the August 15 call he is still not entitled to relief. Goolsby 

v. Scarlett, California Superior Court No. S-1500-CL-270540 was dismissed more than two years 

later because plaintiff failed to post security. RJN, Ex. B. As discussed above, summary 

judgment would be granted for defendants because plaintiff cannot demonstrate an actual injury 

from missing this call to support a denial of access to the courts claim.

Summary judgment would be granted for defendants if plaintiff were allowed to proceed 

with his retaliation claim for the August 15 phone call. Plaintiff states that on August 15, nondefendant Hardwick escorted plaintiff to the phone. Proposed Third Amended Complaint at 12. 

Hardwick twice attempted to make the phone call, but it would not go through. Id. Hardwick then 

called the litigation office and said out loud, “Barnts is giving this guy the full treatment!” and told 

plaintiff there would be no call. Hardwick later asked plaintiff, “Why is Barnts so pissed at you? 

They really don’t like you at that office.” Id. 

Assuming that plaintiff’s facts are accurate, summary judgment would be granted for 

Barnts. It is undisputed that Barnts had no involvement in the multiple phone calls that did not 

reach the superior court. Plaintiff does not allege that Hardwick deliberately prevented the calls 

from being connected, and, if so, there is no evidence that Barnts was responsible. The only 

allegations are that someone, perhaps Barnts, stated something to Hardwick about plaintiff’s 

litigiousness. Assuming Barnts made such comments, they occurred after the phone calls could 

not be connected to the court. To the extent plaintiff contends that Barnts prevented the phone 

calls from being connected based on Barnts’ statements regarding plaintiff’s settlement award, 

those statements were allegedly made several weeks before. Plaintiff cannot show that any actions 

were taken because of his protected conduct, and plaintiff was allowed to make a court call the 

previous day, August 14. 

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Even assuming there was a constitutional violation; Barnts, would be entitled to qualified 

immunity. Assuming Barnts made inappropriate comments to Hardwick, he made them after the 

phone calls could not be connected, so a reasonable officer would not know that the conduct was 

unlawful. For all these reasons, it would be futile to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint for a 

third time. Reviewing the facts of the proposed third amended complaint shows that summary 

judgment would be granted for defendants. 8

III. CONCLUSION

1. The motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 55) is GRANTED.

2. The motion to amend (Docket No. 65) is DENIED and, in the alternative, summary 

judgment is granted for the additional claim.

3. The state law claims are denied without prejudice and may be brought in state 

court.

4. The Clerk shall close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2016

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

 

8 Although federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(a), they may decline to exercise it under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Acri v. Varian Associates, 

Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). Because summary judgment has been granted to all 

defendants on all the federal claims in this case, the Court declines to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 

U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The Court will not address the motion to dismiss the state claims. The state 

law claims are dismissed without prejudice to filing in state court. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS GOOLSBY,

Plaintiff,

v.

PUGETT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-03366-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on January 19, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Thomas Goolsby

PBSP D-8-224

F-19778

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95532 

Dated: January 19, 2016

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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