Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-04098/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-04098-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MERCER, FRASER CO. et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT, CALIFORNIA,

Defendant. /

No. C 08-4098 SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND

PRELIMINARILY ENJOINING

ENFORCEMENT OF MEASURE T

On September 22, 2008, this Court heard argument on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary

injunction enjoining Humboldt County from enforcing Measure T, an initiative ordinance adopted by

Humboldt County votersin 2006. Measure T prohibits non-local corporations, labor organizations, and

non-profit groups from making campaign contributions and expenditures in Humboldt County local

elections. After carefully reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record, the Court hereby GRANTS

plaintiffs’ motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Requests for preliminary injunctive relief require the movant to demonstrate either (1) a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that

serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. See Bernhardt v. Los

Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.2003). The irreparable harm requirement can be met by

demonstrating the existence of a colorable First Amendment claim. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,

373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably

constitutes irreparable injury.”); see also Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, 303 F.3d 959,

973 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Case 3:08-cv-04098-SI Document 32 Filed 09/22/08 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION

The Court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated a colorable claim that Measure T violates the

First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Measure T likely violates the First Amendment because it

burdens corporations’ First Amendment right to make political expenditures and campaign

contributions, yet it is neither narrowly tailored nor closely drawn as the case law requires. The

ordinance is not narrowly tailored because, unlike the Michigan law at issue in Austin v. Michigan State

Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), it does not allow for corporate expenditures through

segregated funds. Even if Measure T did allow corporations to form segregated funds, it may also be

unconstitutionally underinclusive: Measure T regulates non-local corporations more stringently than

non-local incorporated unions. See § 11. At the same time, Measure T is likely overinclusive: it

regulates corporations based on their status as “local,” incorporating its own peculiar definition of

“local,” see § 5, but this distinction does not further the compelling goal of “preventing corruption,

avoiding the appearance of corruption, and averting the circumvention of provisions intended to combat

corruption.” See Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, Measure T allows

no exemption for political corporations or for corporate speech on ballot initiatives. See § 5. Nor is

Measure T likely to be found closely drawn, in accordance with the case law, because unlike the federal

law at issue in F.E.C. v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 157 (2003), it does not allow corporations to form

political action committees. 

At oral argument, defendant urged that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jacobus would save at

least the ban on contributions, if not the ban on expenditures. This Court is not persuaded. The court

in Jacobus examined the constitutionality of an Alaska statute restricting various types of campaign

spending by corporations, unions, other business associations and individuals. The portion of Jacobus

on which defendant relies is its discussion of “soft money contributions” to political parties by

individuals, corporations, business associations, and unions. Jacobus, 338 F.3d at 1100. The court

labored to define “soft money contributions,” as opposed to other “hard money” contributions,

ultimately settling on “all money contributed to a political party not expressly earmarked to influence

the nomination or election of a candidate.” Id., at 1098. In this context, the court in Jacobus approved

Case 3:08-cv-04098-SI Document 32 Filed 09/22/08 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Nor did the Alaska statute distinguish “local” from “non-local” corporations, labor

organizations and non-profits, as does Measure T. As already noted, these idiosyncratic distinctions

may independently cause constitutional infirmity. 

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Alaska’s ban on “soft money contributions” by corporations. However, the provisions of Measure T

are not limited to such “soft money contributions,” but rather apply across the board to all contributions,

including contributions going directly to candidates. Jacobus neither discussed nor approved such a

sweeping ban.1

Measure T is also likely to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

because it burdens corporations’ right to engage in political expression but, as described above, it is not

narrowly tailored.

Measure T contains a severability clause (§ 14), but this Court finds no way to render the

challenged prohibitions (§§ 5, 5(a), 5(b)) constitutional. 

Accordingly, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and 65 and Local Civil Rule 65.1, the Court hereby

ORDERS as follows:

Defendant, and its agents, officer, representatives and employees, are ENJOINED from

enforcing or giving legal effect to Measure T, until further order of the Court. The Court finds that the

preliminary injunction will require defendant to incur little or no monetary costs and that the injunction

is sought to vindicate constitutional rights and the public interest, so no bond or security will be imposed

under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(c).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 22, 2008 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-04098-SI Document 32 Filed 09/22/08 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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