Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05453/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05453-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 10, 2006 Decided February 10, 2006

No. 04-5453

TRIPOLI ROCKETRY ASSOCIATION, INC. AND

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ROCKETRY,

APPELLANTS

v.

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND

EXPLOSIVES,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00273)

Joseph R. Egan argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were Martin G. Malsch, Robert J. Cynkar, and

Charles J. Fitzpatrick.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R.

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an

appearance.

USCA Case #04-5453 Document #948832 Filed: 02/10/2006 Page 1 of 15
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Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellants Tripoli

Rocketry Association and National Association of Rocketry are

non-profit organizations whose members are hobby rocket

enthusiasts. They challenge the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms & Explosives’ (“ATFE”) refusal to alter its

classification of ammonium perchlorate composite propellant

(“APCP”) as an “explosive” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 841(d)

(2000). (ATFE is currently charged with administering the

statute at issue. Until recently, those duties rested with the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (“ATF”), and, before

that, with the Internal Revenue Service. For the sake of

simplicity, we will refer only to “ATFE,” except when quoting

material that refers to one of its predecessors.) 

APCP is commonly used as fuel in hobby rockets, and

classification as an explosive imposes regulatory controls on the

handling of APCP by appellants’ members. The statutory

definition of “explosive” encompasses materials whose “primary

or common purpose” is to “function by explosion.” ATFE

determines whether a material fits this definition by

characterizing the speed at which the material burns: materials

with the fastest burn rates detonate, the slowest ones burn, and

substances in between deflagrate. In other words, under

ATFE’s characterization, a substance that deflagrates burns

more rapidly than something that simply burns (like paper or a

candle wick), but less rapidly than something that detonates (like

dynamite). And ATFE treats a material as explosive if it

functions by detonation or deflagration.

Appellants challenge ATFE’s determination that APCP

deflagrates. Appellants contend that ATFE’s determination was

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arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000), because there is no

evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that APCP

functions by deflagration and there is some evidence in the

record suggesting a contrary conclusion. In response, ATFE

points to evidence relating to the properties of “rocket

propellants.” ATFE also argues that, in a case of this nature –

involving the agency’s expertise in deciding a highly technical

question – the court should defer to ATFE’s judgment.

This court routinely defers to administrative agencies on

matters relating to their areas of technical expertise. We do not,

however, simply accept whatever conclusion an agency proffers

merely because the conclusion reflects the agency’s judgment.

In order to survive judicial review in a case arising under

§ 7006(2)(A), an agency action must be supported by “reasoned

decisionmaking.” Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB,

522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of

the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463

U.S. 29, 52 (1983)). “Not only must an agency’s decreed result

be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process by

which it reaches that result must be logical and rational. Courts

enforce this principle with regularity when they set aside agency

regulations which, though well within the agencies’ scope of

authority, are not supported by the reasons that the agencies

adduce.” Id. The problem in this case is that ATFE’s

explanation for its determination that APCP deflagrates lacks

any coherence. We therefore owe no deference to ATFE’s

purported expertise because we cannot discern it. ATFE has

neither laid out a concrete standard for classifying materials

along the burn-deflagrate-detonate continuum, nor offered data

specific to the burn speed of APCP when used for its “common

or primary purpose.” On this record, the agency’s decision

cannot withstand judicial review. We therefore remand the case

for further consideration. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970

(“OCCA”) regulates the manufacture, distribution, and storage

of explosive materials. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1102, 84 Stat.

952 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (2000)). Under

the statute, “explosive materials” include “explosives, blasting

agents, and detonators,” 18 U.S.C. § 841(c); and, for purposes

of the provisions at issue here, “explosives” include: 

any chemical compound mixture, or device, the primary or

common purpose of which is to function by explosion; the

term includes, but is not limited to, dynamite and other high

explosives, black powder, pellet powder, initiating

explosives, detonators, safety fuses, squibs, detonating cord,

igniter cord, and igniters. 

18 U.S.C. § 841(d). 

Until recently, the statute required the Secretary of the

Treasury or his delegate to compile an explosives list, 18 U.S.C.

§ 841(d), (k) (2000), but this responsibility was reassigned by

the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 1112(e), 116

Stat. 2135, 2276 (2002). The current version of OCCA requires

the Attorney General to “publish and revise at least annually in

the Federal Register” the explosives list, including “any

additional explosives which he determines to be within the

coverage of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 841(d) (Supp. 2002).

Potential users must obtain a license or permit from ATFE to

import, manufacture, or deal in explosive materials. 18 U.S.C.

§ 842(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 843 (2000) (outlining

requirements for obtaining licenses). Users are also subject to

certain requirements governing the manufacture, storage,

transportation, transfer, and sale of explosive materials. 18

U.S.C. § 842(b)-(k). Violators of these statutory provisions face

the possibility of criminal sanctions. 18 U.S.C. § 844(a)(1), (b)

(2000). 

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It has always been the case that the agency regulations

implementing these OCCA requirements have exempted, inter

alia, “propellant actuated devices . . . manufactured, imported,

or distributed for their intended purposes.” See 27 C.F.R.

§ 555.141(a)(8) (2005) (current exemption); 26 C.F.R.

§ 181.141(i) (1972) (initial exemption). “Propellant actuated

device” is defined to mean: “Any tool or special mechanized

device or gas generator system which is actuated by a propellant

or which releases and directs work through a propellant charge.”

27 C.F.R. § 555.11 (2005). 

Appellants claim that there is no known purpose for using

APCP other than as a rocket propellant. According to

appellants, hobby rocket enthusiasts use APCP in one of two

fashions. The material is sometimes shipped already in a rocket

motor and then used once in a model rocket. Alternatively, the

material is shipped as part of a reloadable motor kit in the form

of propellant modules, from which the rocket enthusiast

assembles the motor. Upon ignition, APCP in rocket motors is

designed to release its energy in a controlled, predictable, and

focused fashion to power the flight of the hobby rocket. 

APCP was placed on the first “Explosives List” issued in

1971, see Commerce in Explosives, 36 Fed. Reg. 658, 675 (Jan.

15, 1971), and has remained on the list ever since, see

Commerce in Explosives; List of Explosive Materials, 70 Fed.

Reg. 73,483, 73,484 (Dec. 12, 2005). In April 1994, ATFE sent

a letter to Aerotech, Inc., a company that produces hobby

rockets, replying to the company’s inquiries regarding the

regulatory constraints affecting its business. ATFE explained

that “[d]uring the early 1970's when [ATFE] was assigned the

responsibility of enforcing the Federal explosives laws, it was

clear that [the agency] did not intend to regulate toy model

rockets which did not constitute a public safety hazard,” but that

“[i]t is also clear that ammonium perchlorate composite

propellants are explosives since they have been on the

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explosives list since the first list was published in 1971.” Letter

from ATFE to Gary C. Rosenfield, President, Aerotech, Inc.

(Apr. 20, 1994) at 1, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 106. The agency

declared that the exemption for propellant actuated devices

applies only to rocket motors that, inter alia, contain no more

than 62.5 grams of propellant, thus excluding APCP from

exemption. Id. ATFE also announced that, while fully

assembled rocket motors could qualify for the exemption, rocket

propellent prior to assembly cannot. 

Appellants challenged this decision in a September 7, 1999

letter to ATFE, asserting that APCP does not function by

explosion and, therefore, ATFE lacked statutory authority to

regulate the material as an explosive. Appellants also argued

that any type of rocket motor, regardless of the amount of fuel,

is a propellant actuated device and therefore exempt from

regulation. Finally, appellants criticized what they considered

procedural defects in the promulgation of the explosives list,

arguing that ATFE had never enunciated any “criteria (specific

or general) for determining why the listed materials were

‘explosives,’ ‘detonators,’ or ‘blasting agents’” and that the

“absence of any criteria by which to make a determination that

APCP should be on the list . . . renders the explosives list both

over-inclusive and under-inclusive.” Letter From Appellants’

Counsel to ATFE (Sept. 7, 1999) at 12-13, J.A. 99-100.

In response, ATFE sent appellants a letter denying their

request that APCP be removed from the explosives list. In this

letter, ATFE declared that, because it functions by deflagration,

APCP is an explosive:

An item can “function by explosion” not only by

detonating, but also by deflagrating. While APCP does not

generally function by detonation, it most definitely

functions by deflagration; therefore, APCP is properly

deemed by ATF to “function by explosion” and is properly

classified as an “explosive.”

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Letter from ATFE to Appellants’ Counsel (Dec. 22, 2000) at 2

(“December 2000 Letter”), J.A. 73. The agency first noted that

some of the substances specifically itemized as explosives in

§ 841(d) burn too slowly to be characterized as detonating, thus

providing “a clear manifestation of Congress’s intention that

both detonating and deflagrating ‘compounds, mixtures, and

devices’ are to be considered” explosives. Id. at 4, J.A. 75. The

agency further stated that treating deflagrating materials as

explosives places the statutory definition in line with the

scientific definition, which ATFE recapitulated as follows:

While deflagration produces a reaction that is slower than

the reaction achieved through detonation, the deflagration

reaction is much faster than the reaction achieved by what

is more commonly associated with burning (such as with

the burning of a candle or with the burning that occurs in a

typical building- or forest-fire). 

Id. (emphasis added). The agency never defined the threshold

for “much faster,” but it did cite a pyrotechnics text to further

articulate the relative measurements that distinguish various

forms of combustion:

Dr. Conkling indicates that the approximate reaction

velocity associated with detonation (he cites as examples

dynamite and TNT) is greater than one kilometer per

second; he indicates that the approximate reaction velocity

associated with deflagration (he cites as examples rocket

propellants, and confined black powder) is in the range of

“meters per second” [typically, the speed of deflagration

will be less than 326 meters per second – the velocity of

sound]; and he indicates that the approximate reaction

velocity associated with the more-common [sic] type of

burning is in the order of “millimeters per second.”

Id. at 5 n.5, J.A. 76 (first alteration in original) (quoting JOHN A.

CONKLING, CHEMISTRY OF PYROTECHNICS 2 (1985)). 

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ATFE’s letter concludes that “[u]pon ignition . . . APCP

deflagrates,” because it “burns with oxidation taking place at a

rate slower than the oxidation rate in a detonation (though at a

rate much faster than is associated with typical burning).” Id. at

5, J.A. 76. To bolster this determination, the agency quoted the

National Fire Protection Association’s definition of “propellant”

as “an explosive material which normally functions by

deflagration,” and claimed that other expert organizations adhere

to similar definitions. Id. at 6-7, J.A. 76-77 (quoting NATIONAL

FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, FIRE PROTECTION HANDBOOK

5-69 (16th ed. 1986)). After finding that APCP deflagrates,

ATFE rejected appellants’ argument that rocket motors are

propellant actuated devices and thus exempt from regulation.

Appellants brought suit against ATFE in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the

agency decisions rendered in the December 2000 Letter.

Appellants contended that § 841(d)’s definition does not extend

to deflagrating materials and that, in any event, APCP does not

function by deflagration. Appellants also objected to the

agency’s decision to deny sport rocket motors an exemption as

propellant actuated devices. And they contested ATFE’s

decision to establish thresholds for the regulation of certain

APCP rocket motors based upon their weight, design, and

intended use without first affording the public an opportunity to

comment on those thresholds. 

On March 19, 2004, the District Court issued an opinion

addressing the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.

Tripoli Rocketry Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms & Explosives, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004). The

District Court noted that “a court should review scientific

judgments of an agency ‘not as the chemist, biologist or

statistician that we are qualified neither by training nor

experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising our

narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal

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standards of rationality.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,

541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)). After reviewing the

statute and the record, the District Court “conclude[d] that the

ATF’s decision that APCP is a deflagrating explosive is

permissible.” Id. at 9. The District Court then granted summary

judgment to the agency on the issue of whether APCP is a

deflagrating explosive. However, the trial court invalidated

ATFE’s decision that sport rocket motors are not propellant

actuated devices, because it was rendered without

notice-and-comment rulemaking as required by the APA and

OCCA. Id. at 13. The court also noted that the agency had

commenced rulemaking on the disputed non-exempt status of

sport rocket motors that use more than 62.5 grams of APCP. Id.

at 14-15. The District Court delayed issuing any final judgment

on these two matters pending the agency’s completion of the

notice-and-comment rulemakings. 

On October 21, 2004, appellants filed a motion requesting

the District Court to enter a final judgment, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), on the issue of whether APCP is

properly classified as an explosive. The District Court

concluded that there was no just reason for delaying a final

judgment and granted appellants’ motion. See Tripoli Rocketry

Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &

Explosives, CA No. 00-273 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2004). Appellants

then filed a timely appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

This court reviews the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo. Egan v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 381 F.3d

1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Appellants raise one issue in this appeal:

whether the administrative record supports ATFE’s decision to

characterize APCP as a deflagrating material, and thus an

explosive under § 841(d). Appellants do not challenge the

District Court’s decision that deflagrating materials are properly

defined as explosives under the statute. See Appellants’ Br. at

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17 (“[F]or purposes of this appeal it is assumed that a substance

whose primary or common purpose is to function by

deflagration is an ‘explosive.’”). The simple question before

this court is whether ATFE’s determination that APCP functions

by deflagration is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

ATFE’s decision cannot be sustained on the basis of the

current administrative record. The agency has never provided

a clear and coherent explanation for its classification of APCP.

We do not mean to suggest that the record mandates a

conclusion contrary to the agency’s. Rather, we simply find that

ATFE has never articulated the standards that guided its

analysis. “To survive review under the ‘arbitrary and

capricious’ standard, an agency must ‘examine the relevant data

and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including

a rational connection between the facts found and the choice

made.’” PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194,

1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43

(internal quotation marks omitted)). ATFE has not met this

standard.

The fatal shortcoming of ATFE’s position is that it never

reveals how it determines that a material deflagrates. Scientific

sources reproduced in the record suggest that the defining

characteristic is burn velocity, but the agency never defines a

range of velocities within which materials will be considered to

deflagrate. We understand that it may be necessary for AFTE

to define a range flexibly, accounting for gray areas where

expert discretion is necessary to characterize a particular

substance. But, as a reviewing court, we require some metric for

classifying materials not specifically enumerated in the statute,

especially when, as here, the agency has not claimed that it is

impossible to be more precise in revealing the basis upon which

it has made a scientific determination. Yet, in this case, ATFE

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has provided virtually nothing to allow the court to determine

whether its judgment reflects reasoned decisionmaking.

AFTE’s unbounded relational definition – i.e., “the

deflagration reaction is much faster than the reaction achieved

by what is more commonly associated with burning” – does not

suffice, because it says nothing about what kind of differential

makes one burn velocity “much faster” than another. Ten

millimeters per second? A hundred? A thousand? The record

certainly suggests that expansive differentials are possible, even

among compounds containing APCP. One source in the

administrative record describes compounds containing APCP

with burn rates ranging from 3.81 to 101.6 millimeters per

second, see 8 SEYMOUR M. KAYE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

EXPLOSIVES AND RELATED ITEMS 416, 433 (1978), and there is

no reason to assume that the range illustrated in the record is

even exhaustive. 

Appellants focus on the range of burn speeds illustrated in

the Encyclopedia of Explosives, arguing that “the administrative

record relied on by BATFE establishes without contradiction

that the highest burn rate for APCP rocket motors (101.6

millimeters per second) is a factor of ten below BATFE’s own

burn rate threshold for deflagration (1000 millimeters (or one

meter) per second).” Appellants’ Br. at 18-19. The agency’s

brief says virtually nothing in response to this. See ATFE’s Br.

at 13 (“Crucially, ATF did not draw the same conclusion as

appellants from the information there.”). Moreover, the burn

rates that ATFE attributes to detonation support appellants’

contention that detonation occurs at a speed representing a

different order of magnitude than the speeds reflected in the

Encyclopedia of Explosives. 

In its December 2000 Letter, ATFE suggests that the upper

bound of burn velocity for a deflagrating material is 326 meters

per second – the speed of sound. See J.A. 76-77. In the same

letter, the agency also indicates “the approximate reaction

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velocity associated with detonation . . . is greater than one

kilometer per second.” Id. at 5 n.5, J.A. 76. What is one to

make of this? Obviously, there is such a wide potential for

disparity among the substances potentially classified as

explosives that the vague description “much faster” conveys no

information at all. 

ATFE’s relational definition suffers from a further

methodological flaw: it designates no points of comparison. In

order to say that one item burns “much faster” than another, one

would need to know the speed at which each item burns. But

ATFE has never pointed to evidence establishing the data points

necessary to make a comparison. For one thing, ATFE has not

stated the burn velocity of APCP in the form relevant to this

regulation. The sections of the Encyclopedia of Explosives

reproduced in the record include tables displaying the burn

speeds of several compounds containing APCP in varying

proportions. SeeENCYCLOPEDIA OF EXPLOSIVES AND RELATED

ITEMS, supra, 412-16, 433-36, J.A. 199-203, 220-23. Whether

the compositions listed in those tables approximate the features

of APCP when used for its “primary or common purpose” is

entirely unclear. Similarly, whether the conditions under which

these compositions were observed match those under which

APCP commonly functions is not ascertainable. Even if the

agency had provided representative measurements for APCP, it

would still need to identify the speed at which normal burning

occurs, which it has not done.

In defense of its unbounded comparative analysis, ATFE

insists that it had no burden to make more particularized

findings. The agency concedes that it “certainly could have

conducted experiments or otherwise researched burn rates

specific to APCP used in model rocket motors to bolster its

conclusion that APCP is capable of deflagration,” but claims

that “nothing in the OCCA or the APA required it to do so.”

ATFE’s Br. at 15. Unsurprisingly, then, rather than resting on

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concrete evidence to support its judgment, ATFE simply points

to evidence relating to the properties of “rocket propellants” and

claims deference on the basis of its presumed technical expertise

and experience. The purported evidence cited by the agency

does not support its determination in this case, and the cry for

deference is hollow. 

ATFE makes three arguments, none of which are

persuasive. First, ATFE points to fire safety texts describing

“propellants” as deflagrating. See December 2000 Letter at 6-7,

J.A. 77-78. ATFE appears to assume, as a matter of simple

syllogism, that if some propellants deflagrate, and APCP is a

propellant, then APCP deflagrates. It is quite obvious that this

argument lacks a critical premise: nothing in the record shows

that all propellants burn at comparable rates. It may be that

“rocket propellant” is such a precise technical term that, once a

feature is attributed to it generally, the feature inheres in every

specific instance where the term applies. But nothing in this

record supports that conclusion. Generic statements about

“rocket propellants,” then, are not informative. 

Second, the agency seeks to invoke its institutional

expertise as a licence for making unarticulated findings. It

accuses appellants of “quarrel[ling] only over a matter of

degree,” and asserts that determining the burn speeds definitive

of deflagration “requires a level of scientific expertise and

judgment that Congress has appropriately delegated to ATF and

which is particularly poorly suited for the judiciary to secondguess.” ATFE’s Br. at 12. As noted above, ATFE has

overstated the degree of deference owed to it by the courts in a

case arising under the APA challenging an agency action as

arbitrary and capricious. Faced with a reasoned judgment about

what conclusions to draw from technical evidence or how to

adjudicate between rival scientific theories, we will not override

an agency’s discretion. “Particularly when we consider a purely

factual question within the area of competence of an

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administrative agency created by Congress, and when resolution

of that question depends on ‘engineering and scientific’

considerations, we recognize the relevant agency’s technical

expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is

without substantial basis in fact.” Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla.

Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972). But where an

agency has articulated no reasoned basis for its decision – where

its action is founded on unsupported assertions or unstated

inferences – we will not “abdicate the judicial duty carefully to

‘review the record to ascertain that the agency has made a

reasoned decision based on reasonable extrapolations from some

reliable evidence.’” Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179,

1187 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v.

EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Because ATFE has articulated no

“‘satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational

connection between the facts found and the choice made,’” id.

(quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (internal quotation marks

omitted)), it is owed no deference for the action taken in this

case on this record. 

Finally, ATFE directs our attention to the affidavit of John

A. Conkling, the author of the pyrotechnics text quoted in the

December 2000 Letter. In his affidavit, Conkling states that he

“consider[s] APCP to be a deflagrating material because it is

capable of rapid burning and can accelerate to deflagration

under pressure or confinement.” Conkling Aff. ¶ 11, J.A. 57.

For obvious reasons, this affidavit in no way aids the agency’s

cause in this case. For one thing, the affidavit was not taken

until after litigation in this case commenced. It is therefore not

a part of the agency record under review. It is well understood

in administrative law that the “focal point for judicial review

should be the administrative record already in existence, not

some new record completed initially in the reviewing court.”

Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 284 (D.C. Cir.

1981). The chief exception to this rule – situations “where

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‘there was such a failure to explain administrative action as to

frustrate effective judicial review’” – does not apply here,

because any “new materials should be merely explanatory of the

original record and should contain no new rationalizations.” Id.

at 285 (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973)).

Moreover, even if we were inclined to credit the affidavit, it

proves nothing of consequence in this case. Conkling merely

offers a conclusory assertion that APCP deflagrates. But this

view in no way remedies ATFE’s problem in this case, namely,

the agency’s complete absence of standards for determining

when a particular material deflagrates. 

III. CONCLUSION

ATFE’s authority to designate deflagrating materials as

explosives under § 841(d) is undisputed by appellants. But for

the agency to so designate a particular material, APCP, it must

establish that it is indeed a deflagrating substance. In this case,

the agency has articulated no standard whatsoever for

determining when a material deflagrates. We therefore remand

the case so that ATFE may reconsider the matter and offer a

coherent explanation for whatever conclusion it ultimately

reaches. Because ATFE’s designation of APCP as an explosive

was in place long before the present challenge, we will not

vacate the designation without first affording the agency an

opportunity to reconsider this matter. The case is hereby

remanded to the District Court with instructions to remand the

case to the agency for further consideration consistent with this

decision.

 

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