Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01606/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01606-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Ronnie Hursey, Sr., who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Tucson, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). 1

BACKGROUND 

 On December 21, 2006, Petitioner was indicted in the Pinal County Superior Court 

(“Superior Court”), Case No. CR 2006-02093, with armed robbery (Count One) and 

aggravated assault (Count Two), both alleged as dangerous offenses. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. B.) 

The state filed a separate pretrial allegation of aggravating circumstances, including five 

prior felony convictions and other factors. (Doc. 9-1 at 3.) Following a jury trial, on May 

5, 2008, Petitioner was found guilty of Count Two for aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon or dangerous instrument, a class three felony and dangerous offense. (Doc. 10-2 

 

1

 The Court granted Petitioner’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on 

August 31, 2012. (Doc. 5.) 

Ronnie Hursey, Sr., 

 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-12-01606-PHX-SRB (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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at 3-4.) 2 Prior to sentencing, Petitioner admitted three aggravating factors, including one 

prior felony conviction. (Doc. 10-5 at 39-44.) On June 3, 2008, the Superior Court found 

two prior felony convictions and sentenced Petitioner to a term of twelve years of 

imprisonment. (Doc. 10-2 at 3-4; Doc. 10-6 at 7, 13.) The underlying facts of Petitioner’s 

conviction are summarized as follows: 

While attempting to leave a retail store with a computer for 

which they had not paid, Hursey and his brother were 

confronted by store employees J. and D. When D. attempted to detain the men, a physical confrontation ensued, during 

which Hursey struck D. Hursey and his brother then left the 

store, followed closely by D. and J. D. intended to try again to physically apprehend Hursey but, just outside the store, Hursey “pulled a knife, turned around and told [D. and J.] that 

he was going to cut [them] up.” 

Fearing for his own and others’ safety, D. yelled “knife,” and he and J. “backed off,” allowing Hursey and his brother to walk or run through the parking lot to their car. D. and J. 

“followed from what [D.] felt was a safe distance” and saw 

the two suspects get into their vehicle. Before they drove away, D. kicked out the red lens over one of the car's 

taillights in hopes of making the car easier for law 

enforcement officers to locate. 

(Doc. 9-1 at 3-4.)3

 In June of 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 10-2 at 8.) In his following opening brief, dated December 17, 2008, 

Petitioner raised three issues on appeal: (1) the state presented insufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s finding that the aggravated assault was a dangerous offense; (2) the 

Superior Court applied an incorrect sentencing range of ten to twenty years in enhancing 

his sentence; and (3) the Superior Court relied on improper aggravating factors in 

 

2

 Prior to trial, Count One of the indictment was dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 

9-1 at 3.) 

3

 While Petitioner articulates numerous challenges to the state courts’ actions 

throughout his criminal proceedings, he does not appear to contest the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ recitation of the facts. Therefore, the Court presumes the state court’s factual 

determinations are correct because Petitioner has not “rebut[ed] the presumption of 

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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imposing his sentence. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. C.) In a memorandum decision filed on June 24, 

2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 

9-1, Exh. A.) Petitioner did not seek review of the decision by the Arizona Supreme 

Court, and mandate was issued on August 7, 2009. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. D.) 

 On July 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Superior Court (Doc. 9-1, Exh. E), and on October 2, 2009, counsel was appointed (Doc. 

9-1, Exh. F). On February 22, 2010, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for PostConviction Relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 

9-1, Exh. G.) The petition raised one ground for relief; Petitioner alleged that trial 

counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by inadequately explaining the terms and 

benefits of a plea offer the state had extended during trial. The Superior Court issued an 

order on June 8, 2010, in which it denied all relief and dismissed the petition. (Doc. 9-2, 

Exh. H.) On July 16, 2010, Petitioner, through counsel, sought review of the ruling by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 9-2, Exh. I.) On September 16, 2010, the appellate court 

granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 9-2, Exh. J.) Petitioner did not seek review of the 

decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 

 Meanwhile, on or about August 16, 2010, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a 

second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court. (Doc. 1-1 at 68-70; Doc. 

9-2, Exh. L.) On November 28, 2011, Petitioner filed a third pro se Notice of PostConviction Relief and “Appendix.” (Doc. 10-3, Exh. R; Doc. 1-1 at 16-98; Doc. 9-3; 

Doc. 10-1.) On October 18, 2012, the Superior Court denied relief. (Doc. 10-3, Exh. S.) 

Petitioner did not seek review of the decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 

5.) 

 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 on July 26, 2012. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an Answer (Doc. 9 

and 10), and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 11). 

DISCUSSION 

 In the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner alleges four grounds for 

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relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed 

to properly advise him of the terms of a plea offer in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of due process at trial, 

sentencing, appeal, and post-conviction relief proceedings in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges his Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated by a multiplicitous indictment and prosecutorial misconduct. Lastly, in Ground 

Four, Petitioner argues that the cumulative impact of errors at Petitioner’s trial, including 

violations of the canons of judicial conduct, admission of improper testimony, and 

misapplication of the Revised Arizona Jury Instructions, violated his right to present a 

complete defense. 

 In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is timebarred. Respondents alternatively argue that the state courts did not unreasonably apply 

federal law in resolving Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground 

One, and Grounds Two through Four are procedurally barred. In his Reply, Petitioner 

essentially argues that he was diligent in bringing his claims, he is not at fault for the 

delay in filing his petition or exhausting issues before the state court, and that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel at every critical state of proceedings. 

 For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the habeas petition is barred by the 

statute of limitations, and will therefore recommend that it be denied on that basis. 

I. Legal Standard 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such petitions are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 4 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The statute provides:

 

4

 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date 

(April 24, 1996). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) 

includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari 

from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a 

petition.” Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The one-year limitation period under AEDPA is statutorily tolled during the time 

in “which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review 

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See 

also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed, even though the petition 

is not filed until later. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 

(9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A proceeding is commenced by 

timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the court in which the conviction 

occurred.”). 

 In certain limited circumstances, AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline may be 

equitably tolled. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). See also Calderon v. 

United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that 

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AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, 

not a jurisdictional bar), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States 

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). A petitioner is entitled to equitable 

tolling if he can demonstrate that “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 

(2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” to prevent him from timely 

filing a petition. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S, 408, 418 (2005)); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(generally, equitable tolling may be applied only when “extraordinary circumstances 

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”). “[T]he 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

II. Application 

Petitioner was sentenced on June 3, 2008, and timely filed a direct appeal. On June 

24, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Petitioner 

had 30 days from that date to seek review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Because no 

petition for review was filed in the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner’s judgment 

became final on July 24, 2009 within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (“with respect to a state prisoner who does 

not seek review in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ under § 

2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking such review expires”). Absent any tolling, the 

one-year limitations period would have commenced on July 25, 2009. 

A. Statutory Tolling of the Limitations Period 

 The limitations period was statutorily tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), 

when Petitioner timely filed his first Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on July 30, 2009. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). Petitioner filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on 

February 22, 2010. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c). Petitioner’s properly filed application 

remained pending until the Superior Court’s subsequent denial of the petition was 

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affirmed by the Arizona Court of Appeals on September 16, 2010. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). Because no petition for review was filed in the Arizona Supreme Court, the 

limitations period commenced on October 17, 2010, the date following the expiration of 

the time to seek such review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(g), 31.19(a). The statute of 

limitations continued to run uninterrupted for one year, until October 17, 2011. 

 Unlike the 2009 notice, Petitioner’s third notice of post-conviction relief, filed on 

November 28, 2011, was not “properly filed,” and did not statutorily toll the one-year 

limitations period. 5 (Doc. 9-3, 10-1.) “[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its 

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing 

filings,” including “the time limits upon its delivery....” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 

(2000). If a petitioner files an application after the generally applicable state time limit, 

the application may nonetheless be considered “properly filed” if it fits within any 

exception to that limit. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 413. See also Hemmerle v. 

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]here notice is filed in conformity with 

the pertinent Arizona statutory provisions and contains a specific prayer for relief ..., ‘it is 

sufficient to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.’”) (quoting Isley v. Ariz. Dep't of 

Corr., 383 F.3d at 1056). “When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, 

that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Pace, 544 U.S. at 414 (internal 

brackets and quotation marks omitted). 

 In Arizona, notices for post-conviction relief (other than in “of-right” or capital 

proceedings) “must be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence 

or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, 

whichever is the later.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). In the event that a notice is not timely 

filed, Rule 32.2(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth conditions for 

 

5

 Neither the parties nor the record reveals the Superior Court’s ruling on the second 

notice for post-conviction relief filed on August 16, 2010. (Doc. 9-2, Exh. L.) Because 

that issue is not raised by the parties, nor does the record compel a contrary conclusion, 

the Court does not find that the second notice served to toll the limitations period. 

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filing, which if met, excludes the claims contained in the untimely notice from 

preclusion. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-14 (comparing conditions of filing with conditions 

of relief) (citing Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. at 11). This rule may permit an untimely or 

successive petition if a petitioner can establish (1) he “is being held in custody after the 

sentence imposed has expired,” (2) “[n]ewly discovered material facts probably exist and 

such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence,” (3) his “failure to file a 

timely notice of post-conviction relief of right or notice of appeal within the prescribed 

time was without fault on the defendant’s part,” (4) “[t]here has been a significant change 

in the law ...,” or (5) “the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that 

no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty....” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b), 32.4(a), 6 32.1(d-h). “[T]he notice of post-conviction relief must set forth the 

substance of the specific exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in the 

previous petition or in a timely manner.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). 

 In the instant case, Petitioner’s third notice for post-conviction relief was untimely 

filed. Petitioner filed his third notice more than three years and five months after 

sentencing, well beyond the 90-day limitation period. Likewise, that notice was filed 

more than two years and three months after the direct appeal mandate, well beyond the 

30-day limitation period. Furthermore, the record does not suggest that Petitioner 

complied with Rule 32.2(b) when he submitted his untimely notice. Although Petitioner 

used the term “newly discovered evidence” to explain why untimely filing should be 

excused, see Rule 32.1(e), the circumstances cited were legally insufficient to qualify 

under that exception. Petitioner merely directed the Superior Court to pretrial hearing 

transcripts which he had obtained (Doc. 1-1 at 24); while the transcripts may have been 

newly obtained, they did not present “newly discovered material facts [that] were 

discovered after the trial.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e). See State v. Saenz, 4 P.3d 1030, 

1033 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (“Evidence is not newly discovered unless it was unknown to 

 

6

 “Any notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), 

(f), (g) or (h)” of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). 

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the trial court, the defendant, or counsel at the time of trial and neither the defendant nor 

counsel could have known about its existence by the exercise of due diligence.”) 

Therefore, under state law, the third notice for post-conviction relief was untimely and 

was not “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Pace, 544 U.S. at 

414. 

 This conclusion is supported by the Superior Court’s ruling. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. S.) 

On October 12, 2012, the Superior Court found “that all matters contained in the 

Petition... are precluded as having been previously ruled upon or untimely filed or the 

Petition lacks sufficient basis in law and fact to warrant further proceedings herein and no 

useful purpose would be served by further proceedings.”7

 (Doc. 10-2, Exh. S.) In so 

doing, the Superior Court necessarily found that the notice was untimely because his 

claims did not satisfy any exception to the time limit for filing. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 

32.2(b) (“If the specific exception and meritorious reasons do not appear substantiating 

the claim and indicating why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or in a 

timely manner, the notice shall be summarily dismissed.”). See also Bonner v. Carey, 425 

F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Examining the court’s words against the backdrop of 

California law regarding untimeliness, it is clear that the court was denying Bonner’s 

petition as untimely.”). This is evident by the summary dismissal itself. Rather than 

allowing Petitioner to file a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, see Ariz. R.Crim. P. 

32.4(c) (“[a] defendant proceeding without counsel shall have sixty days to file a petition 

from the date the notice is filed or from the date the request for counsel is denied”), the 

Superior Court relied on the timeliness procedural bar. See Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 

 

7

 The Court notes that the ruling uses the term “petition” rather than “notice.” The 

Court construes this merely as a typical error. The Superior Court previously observed 

that Petitioner had filed a “Pro-Per Successive Rule 32.1(E) Notice of Post Conviction 

Relief and Appendix to Successive Rule 31.1 (E) [sic] Notice of Post Conviction Relief 

on November 28, 2011.” (Doc. 10-2, Exh. R.) There is no indication that a petition was 

also filed on November 28, 2011. On the contrary, the notice sought “to allow petitioner 

to proceed forth and file a ‘Successive’ Rule-32.5 Petition for Post Conviction Relief.” 

(Doc. 1-1 at 28-29.) 

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983, 991 (9th Cir. 2011). The effect of the timeliness ruling is not altered because the 

decision may have also summarily offered an alternative basis for its ruling. See Bonner 

v. Carey, 658 F.3d at 1149; Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-414 (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 

214 (2002)). Accordingly, because the third notice was filed after the time limit, and did 

not fit within any exceptions to that limit, it was not “properly filed” and does not toll the 

limitations period under § 2244(d)(2). See Pace, 544 U.S. at 414, 417 (“it must be the 

case that a petition that cannot even be initiated or considered due to the failure to include 

a timely claim is not ‘properly filed.’”); Trigueros, 658 F.3d at 988 (“An untimely state 

petition is not ‘properly filed’ and does not trigger statutory tolling under AEDPA.”). 

B. Equitable Tolling of the Limitations Period

 Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify 

equitable tolling. To the extent Petitioner asserts that his lack of counsel should excuse 

his untimely filing (see Doc. 11 at 2-3), his argument is unavailing. Petitioner’s pro se

status, ignorance of the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period 

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of 

legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling.”). See also Robinson v. Kramer, 588 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“[I]gnorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not 

excuse prompt filing.” (citing Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000)). In so far 

as Petitioner contends that “it was not feasibly possible to file a petition... because 

Petitioner’s successive pleading was not ruled on until October 12, 2012” (Doc. 11 at 5), 

this argument is also without merit. Petitioner filed the instant petition on July 26, 2012, 

prior to the Superior Court’s dismissal of the third notice on October 12, 2012. 

 Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, he has also not established that he acted with 

reasonable diligence. (Doc. 11 at 3.) Petitioner has not adequately explained why he filed 

approximately nine months after the AEDPA deadline expired. For instance, even if 

Petitioner faced difficulty developing his claims without certain transcripts, “[i]f diligent, 

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he could have prepared a basic form habeas petition and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA 

deadline.” Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009). See also 

United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (even without access to his 

case file, petitioner must “at least consult his own memory of the trial proceedings.”). He 

could have outlined “arguments and the facts underlying those arguments on the form 

habeas petition, and then sought to amend his petition when he got more information.” 

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d at 1014. Petitioner “bears the burden of showing 

his own diligence and that the hardship caused by lack of access to his materials was an 

extraordinary circumstance that caused him to file his petition almost a year late.” Id. at 

1013 (citing Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner has not met 

that burden. 

 Consequently, the statute of limitations continued to run uninterrupted for one 

year, until October 17, 2011. Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition until July 

26, 2012, approximately nine months after the limitations period expired. Therefore, the 

Court finds that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely and barred by the 

statute of limitations. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within 

which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 26th day of April, 2013. 

 

Case 2:12-cv-01606-SRB Document 14 Filed 04/29/13 Page 12 of 12