Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05291/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05291-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FIONA TURLEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GABE BARRERA, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-05291 SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

SUBSTITUTE THE UNITED STATES 

FOR DEFENDANT DOO; GRANTING

THE UNITED STATES MOTION TO

DISMISS; REMANDING CLAIMS

AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS

On October 27, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on the motion to substitute the United States

for defendant Doo and to dismiss the claims against the United States for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Having considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby

GRANTS the motion to substitute the United States for defendant Doo, and GRANTS the United States’

motion to dismiss. As a result, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the remaining claims and hereby

REMANDS those claims to the Del Norte County Superior Court. 

BACKGROUND

On May 4, 2006, plaintiff Fiona Turley filed suit in state court against defendant Bryan Doo,

M.D., and several other defendants. Plaintiff, the daughter of decedent Mark Turley, alleges that

defendant Shoreline Seafood and Cold Storage was negligent in maintaining its business premises and

as a result, there was a chemical spill which injured the decedent and contributed to his death. Compl.

¶ 8. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Bryan Doo, M.D., was negligent in the care and treatment

of her father which resulted in his death. Id. at ¶ 16. 

On or about August 21, 2006, the United States Attorney’s Office received a copy of the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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summons and complaint from the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Notice of

Removal ¶ 2. The United States Attorney filed a notice of removal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(c) of

the Federally Supported Health Care Assistance Act, on the ground that defendant Doo is a physician

employed by the Open Door Community Health Center, which is a federal health center. Id. ¶ 3. The

United States also removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d)(2) because the Attorney General

certified that Doo was acting within the course and scope of his employment at all times relevant to

plaintiff’s claims. Id. ¶ 4. The certification states, inter alia,

Bryan Doo, M.D. was an employee of the Open Door Community Health Centers at all

times relevant to the Plaintiff’s claim. Employees of the health center are deemed to be

employees of the Public Health Service pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) and are

employees of the federal government for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2679. 

Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2679(d) at ¶ 2. 

The United States, specially appearing, now moves to substitute the United States for Doo as the

defendant and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

I. Substitution of defendant

When a federal employee is sued for a negligent act, the Federal Employees Liability Reform

and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 enables the Attorney General to certify that the employee was

“acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim

arose . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d)(1). Upon certification, the employee is dismissed from the suit, and

the United States is substituted as the defendant. As a result, the case is governed by the Federal Tort

Claims Act (FTCA). The certification by the Attorney General is subject to judicial review. See

Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1995). The party challenging the certification is

required to present evidence disproving the Attorney General’s certification by a preponderance of the

evidence. Id. at 800; see also Larsen v. Fredericksen, 277 F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that

the party challenging the Attorney General’s certification has the burden of coming forward with

specific facts rebutting the certification).

Plaintiff challenges the certification and has submitted a declaration from counsel stating that,

“[a]ccording to my review of the records Dr. Doo was performing services at the Sutter Coast Hospital

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 Additionally, this declaration was not submitted under the penalty of perjury as required by 28

U.S.C. § 1746.

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on the relevant dates in question” and that “[d]iscovery to date has not revealed whom Dr. Doo was

working for when the malpractice was committed.” Zito Decl. ¶ 5. 

The Court concludes that plaintiff has not met her burden to disprove the Attorney General’s

certification. Plaintiff’s attorney’s declaration simply asserts certain records suggest that Dr. Doo was

not working at the Open Door Center at the time of the incident.1

 Plaintiff has not submitted the records

to the Court, and Zito’s declaration neither identifies these records nor explains why the records led him

to this conclusion. The certification by the Attorney General is prima facie evidence that defendant Doo

was working in the capacity as a federal employee. See Billings, 57 F.3d at 800. Because plaintiff

failed to submit any specific evidence to rebut the Attorney General’s certification, the Court accepts

that certification and accordingly GRANTS the motion to substitute the United States for defendant

Doo. As result, plaintiff’s claims against the United States are governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act.

II. Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

A federal district court does not have the authority to adjudicate the case before it when subject

matter jurisdiction is lacking. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). The

Federal Tort Claims Act requires persons with tort claims against the federal government to file a claim

with the appropriate federal agency. See 28 U.S.C.A § 2675(a). Additionally, federal courts do not

have subject matter jurisdiction unless the agency denies the claim or six months have passed since the

claim was filed. Id.

The United States argues the complaint must be dismissed because plaintiff has not exhausted

her administrative remedies and this requirement is mandatory. Plaintiff counters that the requirement

is not mandatory in certain circumstances such as when the presentation of the claim is futile. Plaintiff

argues it is futile to proceed before the administrative agency because it is unlikely the agency would

be able to resolve the matter because it involves complex malpractice litigation. 

The Court finds that the requirement that the administrative remedies first be exhausted is

mandatory. The statute clearly states, “an action shall not be instituted . . . unless the claimant shall

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 On October 20, 2007, defendant Visicu, Inc., filed a request for remand of plaintiff’s claims

against the non-federal defendants in the event the Court granted the United States’ motion for

dismissal. 

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have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally

denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a); see also

McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Moreover, while there may be circumstances in

which it is appropriate to excuse compliance with the administrative exhaustion requirement, the record

here does not compel such a finding. See, e.g,, Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986)

(exhaustion of administrative remedies was excused where government’s secretive conduct precluded

claimants from being aware that government was routinely denying benefits pursuant to illegal internal

policy). Additionally, plaintiff’s argument that the administrative agency may be unable to resolve her

claim because it involves complex malpractice litigation is unavailing. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the United States’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

claims against the United States. As a result of such dismissal, the Court no longer has jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants, and accordingly REMANDS those claims to the

Superior Court for the County of Del Norte.2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS the United

States’ motion to substitute and for dismissal, and REMANDS the remaining claims to the Superior

Court for the County of Del Norte. (Docket Nos. 5 and 12). IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November _2___, 2006

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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