Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01731/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01731-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EVGENIY GUBANOV, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

STANISLAUS COUNTY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-1731-JAM-EFB 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 This case was before the court on April 6, 2016, for hearing on plaintiff’s motion to be 

relieved from deemed admissions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. ECF No. 32. Attorney Julia Swanson 

appeared on behalf of plaintiff; attorney Dan Farrar appeared on behalf of defendants. For the 

reasons stated on the record, and as explained in further detail below, it is recommended that the 

court’s scheduling order be modified for the limited purpose of resolving the instant motion and 

that plaintiff’s motion be granted. 

 On December 22, 2015, defendants served plaintiff requests for admissions. Declaration 

of Julia Swanson (“Swanson Decl.”) (ECF No. 33 at 8-9) ¶ 3. On January 25, 2016, the day 

plaintiff’s responses were due, plaintiff’s counsel was in trial and was unable to mail timely 

responses. Id. The next day, January 26, Ms. Swanson was informed that defendants’ counsel 

had left for the day. Mr. Swanson emailed defendants’ counsel and requested a two-week 

extension of time to provide responses. Id. ¶ 4. Two days later, on January 28, defendants 

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responded to plaintiff’s email, denying the request for an extension of time. Id. Plaintiff’s 

counsel subsequently emailed defendants’ counsel requesting an agreement to serve responses by 

email. Id. Plaintiff’s counsel attached the discovery responses to that email. Id. In his response 

to the email, “Defendants’ counsel cordially agreed to email service.” Id. 

 Nonetheless, defense counsel now asserts that the request for admissions are deemed 

admitted. On March 22, 2016, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which is noticed 

for hearing before the assigned district judge on April 19, 2016. ECF No. 30. That motion relies, 

at least in part, on the alleged deemed admissions. See ECF No. 30-1 at 2, 6, 7. The following 

day, plaintiff filed the instant motion to withdraw his admissions.1 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 36(b) provides that “[a] matter admitted under 

this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be 

withdrawn or amended.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Whether a party is entitled to relief in the form of 

withdrawal or amendment of responses to requests for admissions lies within the discretion of the 

district court. Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007). A party may withdraw 

or amend an admission if the court finds (1) that withdrawal will aid in presenting the merits of 

the case, and (2) no substantial prejudice to the party who requested the admission will result 

from allowing the admission to be withdrawn or amended. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); see Conlon, 474 

F.3d at 625 (court must consider both factors in deciding motion to withdraw or amend). 

 Here, the first prong is satisfied. The request for admissions at issue essentially requests 

plaintiff to admit that there is no basis for his claims. See ECF No. 33 at 7-8. Plaintiff is 

requested to admit that he has no factual basis to support his claim that defendants are liable for 

the injuries alleged in the complaint. Id., RFA Nos. 1, 2, 3. The requests go to the core of 

plaintiff’s claims and if the admissions are not withdrawn, the case would be decided on a 

procedural technicality and not on the underlying merits of the case. 

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 The motion was originally filed before the assigned district judge in violation of Local 

Rule 302(c). After the original hearing date was vacated, plaintiff filed an application for an 

order shortening time, requesting that the undersigned hear the matter on April 6, 2016, as that 

was the only law an motion date available prior to the hearing on the motion for summary 

judgment. ECF No. 35. That request was granted. ECF No. 36. 

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 As to the prejudice prong, the court focuses on the “the prejudice that the nonmoving 

party would suffer at trial.” Conlon, 474 F.3d at 623-24 (stating additionally that “prejudice must 

relate to the difficulty a party may face in proving its case at trial”). The party who relies upon 

the deemed admissions has the burden of proving prejudice. Id. at 622. Here, defendants have 

failed to demonstrate any prejudice. Indeed, defendants’ opposition, rather than addressing the 

merits of plaintiff’s motion, argues that plaintiff’s motion should be denied because it is untimely 

under the court’s scheduling order. ECF No. 38. 

 The court’s scheduling order provides that all discovery shall be completed by February 

19, 2016. ECF No. 12 at 3. The order further provides that the term “‘completed’ means that all 

discovery shall have been conducted so that all depositions have been taken and any disputes 

relative to discovery shall have been resolved by appropriate order if necessary, where discovery 

has been ordered, the order has been complied with.” Id. 

 The discovery deadline has passed. Assuming that the instant motion is subject to that 

deadline rather than dispositive motion deadline, the court nonetheless finds good cause to extend 

the discovery deadline for the limited purpose of resolving the instant discovery dispute.2 See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s 

consent.”). After plaintiff’s counsel was notified that defendants would not agree to a two-week 

extension of time, counsel promptly emailed plaintiff’s discovery responses and requested that 

email service be accepted. Swanson Decl. ¶ 4. According to plaintiff, “Defendants’ counsel 

cordially agreed to email service.” Id. It was not until defendants moved for summary judgment 

that plaintiff’s counsel became aware that defendants considered the admissions untimely and 

would rely on them in moving for summary judgment. ECF No. 32 at 3. Although plaintiff 

could have moved to withdraw the admissions after defendant declined her request for an 

extension of time, given that defendants subsequently agreed to email service, it was reasonable 

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 The court notes that it is not entirely clear whether the instant motion is untimely under 

the court’s scheduling order. The motion differs from the typical discovery dispute concerning 

whether something is or is not discoverable. Here, the only issue is whether the admissions 

should be set aside, and regardless of the outcome no further discovery would be permitted. 

However, in either case, the court recommends that the scheduling order be modified to permit 

resolution of this motion. 

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for plaintiff to assume that defendants would treat the responses as timely. As plaintiff did not 

learn that defendants considered the admissions untimely after the close of discovery, good cause 

exists to modify the scheduling order. 

 More significantly, modifying the scheduling order to allow the admissions to be 

withdrawn would facilitate the strong public policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits. 

See Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 831421, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (“The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held, in a variety of procedural 

contexts, that the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits strongly counsels 

against dismissal of a case or sanctions that are ultimately case-terminating.”) (citing In re 

Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006)). Thus, good 

cause exists to modify the scheduling order. 

 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. The December 3, 2014 status (pretrial scheduling) order be modified and the discovery 

deadline extended for the limited purpose of resolving plaintiff’s motion to withdraw admissions; 

and 

 2. Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw his admission be granted (ECF No. 32) and the deemed 

admissions be set aside. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 7, 2016. 

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