Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00494/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00494-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY KNOX, SR., No. CIV S-08-0494-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

M. MARTEL, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition raises two claims: (1) the trial court

erred by not advising petitioner of his rights prior to accepting stipulations of facts, and (2) trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Pending before the court is petitioner’s motion

for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 6).

Petitioner states in his motion that “the Third District Court of Appeals held an

oral argument hearing in this matter and determined that, ‘although the trial courts erred in not

advising defendant of his Boykin/Tahl rights before accepting the stipulations, the error is

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:08-cv-00494-TJH Document 15 Filed 02/27/09 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Referring to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) and In re Tahl, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1

577 (Cal. 1969).

2

 harmless.’” (Motion at 4). He then argues that the denial of his appeal “was contrary to and 1

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the

United States Supreme Court.” (Id.) He further states that he was denied an opportunity to be

heard by the California Supreme Court. He is requesting an evidentiary hearing “to resolve the

following issues in dispute:”

1. Did the trial courts obtain the jury trial waiver and the

stipulations of guilt in violation of clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Federal Rules governing acceptance of guilty

pleas and waivers?

2. Was the trial courts prejudiced by the erroneously obtained

stipulations of guilt when stating, “Do you understand all of those

issues will be ‘assumed’ before we even get started, ‘assumed to be

true’ before we even get started? [sic]” 

3. When the trial courts stated, “Mr. Miller, I did want to put

on the record, ‘actually I meant’ to do it before he waived, what

you told him about [what] the consequences were of any guilty

verdicts by the courts.” . . . Does this demonstrate “plain error” of

petitioner’s “substantial rights” to be personally addressed in open

court by the courts to determine that the agreed upon stipulations

and waiver was voluntary and was the understanding of the penal

consequences of doing so?

4. Does defense counsel, trial judge, and the prosecution

calculating and miscalculating petitioners time to be served in

prison “after” obtaining the jury trial waiver and the incriminating

stipulations of guilt, demonstrate that under the “totality of

circumstances,” petitioner could not have made a knowing,

voluntary, and understanding decision to stipulate? When the trial

courts as a whole were not themselves aware of the direct penal

consequences? As they were doing the math in open court and on

the record. . . .

5. Should petitioner have been afforded the same opportunity to

withdraw from the incriminating stipulations of guilt, as was afforded the

opportunity withdraw from the jury trial waiver? As they both were

obtained in violation of the Federal Rules governing guilty pleas and

waivers? . . . 

/ / /

Case 2:08-cv-00494-TJH Document 15 Filed 02/27/09 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

6. The effectiveness of the court appointed public defender?

Generally:

To obtain an evidentiary hearing on [a habeas corpus] claim, a

habeas petitioner must establish that (1) his allegations, if proven,

would constitute a colorable claim, thereby entitling him to relief

and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair

hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). If, of course,

petitioner’s facts cannot stand as the basis for a federal claim, e.g., the alleged error is not

prejudicial as a matter of law, no evidentiary hearing is required. If petitioner’s claim can be

resolved on the existing record, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. See Baja v. Ducharme,

187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition “an evidentiary hearing is not required on issues

that can be resolved by reference to the state court record.” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172,

1176 (citing Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1994)). An evidentiary hearing is also

not appropriate where there are no disputed material facts or where the claims present purely legal

questions. See Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing where he was at fault for

failing to develop the record in state court, unless one of the exceptions outlined in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(2) is met. Thus, a petitioner must demonstrate due diligence with respect to

developing the factual record in state court. “Diligence . . . depends upon whether the prisoner

made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and

pursue claims in state court.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435, 437 (2000). To

demonstrate diligence a petitioner must, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court. 

See id. Whether the petitioner has been diligent is a question of fact for the district court that

cannot be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. See Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1087

(9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, petitioner’s motion fails to meet the standard required for obtaining an

evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas proceeding. Specifically, petitioner fails to articulate what

Case 2:08-cv-00494-TJH Document 15 Filed 02/27/09 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

facts are in dispute and how an evidentiary hearing will further his claim. See McKnight v.

Comstock, 445 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1971) (“Denial of the petition without an evidentiary hearing

was not error, since there are no disputed facts”). Plaintiff’s motion even states that the above

“issues” need to be resolved, and sets forth basically the same claims he has made in his petition. 

He has not, however, articulated any facts which are disputed, nor has he identified what facts he

wishes to develop. 

Also significant to petitioner’s motion is his failure to raise these issues in state

habeas proceedings. It appears that petitioner filed direct appeals of his conviction to the state

appellate and supreme courts, but failed to file any state habeas proceedings. While this does not

necessarily render his claims unexhausted, it does raise the question whether he was diligent in

developing the record in the state courts for the purpose of deciding whether to hold an

evidentiary hearing. See Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding

petitioner failed to explain why he could not have developed the record during the course of his

state proceedings where he failed to support his ineffective assistance claim with any evidence). 

As ineffective assistance of counsel claims are better suited for habeas proceedings, petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim should have been brought in a state habeas

proceeding where it could have been better developed. See United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d

947, 960 (9th Cir. 1992). Petitioner has failed to explain why the evidence he needs to support

his claim could not have been developed in state court proceedings.

In connection with petitioner’s petition, the court has before it all of the lodged

documents from petitioner’s state trial proceedings (including the proceedings in state court

during which petitioner entered into the alleged involuntary stipulations). Petitioner does not set

forth any additional facts he wishes to bring into this matter, nor does he indicate how those facts

are necessary for his claim. He essentially is requesting the court hold a hearing on the claims

raised in his petition, not an evidentiary hearing to establish any disputed facts. Even with a broad

reading of petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, the undersigned is unable to determine

Case 2:08-cv-00494-TJH Document 15 Filed 02/27/09 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

any factual dispute. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s motion for

an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 6) be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 27, 2009

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:08-cv-00494-TJH Document 15 Filed 02/27/09 Page 5 of 5