Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-01794/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-01794-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

MELODIE HUGHES,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MENDOCINO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01794-NJV

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 13

Plaintiff Melodie Hughes (“Plaintiff”) proceeds pro se in this action filed against the 

County of Mendocino and Sherriff Thomas Allen (together “the County Defendants”), California 

Forensic Medical Group, and Dr. Taylor Fithian. Defendants California Forensic Medical Group, 

and Dr. Taylor Fithian filed an answer to the Complaint, while the County Defendants filed a 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion (Doc. 29), to which the County Defendants filed a Reply 

(Doc. 33). The court took the matter under submission on the papers. (Doc. 35). For the reasons 

that follow the court will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part. Additionally, 

Plaintiff will be given time to file a first amended complaint.

BACKGROUND

The Complaint is predicated on the events surrounding the death of Plaintiff’s son, Ivan 

Slater (“Slater”). Slater was arrested on March 22, 2014 and taken to the Mendocino County Jail. 

Comp. (Doc. 1) at ¶15. When Slater was arrested, he was suffering “heroin withdrawals.” Id. at 

¶16. Slater requested medical attention, but did not receive it until March 24, 2014. Id. at ¶¶17-

19. Slater was also not given sufficient time “to receive his meals for three days.” Id. at ¶20.

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On March 26, 2015, Slater was released on his own recognizance. Id. at ¶22. On March 

27, 2014, Slater died. Plaintiff continues to suffer emotional distress as a result of Slater’s death. 

Id. at ¶27. Other inmates within the Mendocino County Jail witnessed Slater’s need for medical 

attention due to the “heroin withdrawals.” Id. at ¶¶17, 25, & 28. 

CLAIMS

Plaintiff presents six claims for relief in the Complaint: (1) the First Claim is pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution; (2) the Second Claim is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on 

alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution for 

deprivation of the liberty interests in the parent-child relationship; (3) the Third Claim is for 

failure to furnish/summons medical care arising under California state law; (4) the Fourth Claim is 

for negligent supervision, training, hiring and retention under California state law; (5) the Fifth 

Claim is a negligence claim under California state law; and (6) the Sixth Claim is for wrongful 

death under California state law. County Defendants seek dismissal of all but the Third Claim. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

is to test the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint. A motion to dismiss may be 

brought under Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed 

factual allegations,’” a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 

1937,1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 

1955, 1955 (2007)). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. Thus, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party must 

allege facts that are “enough to raise a right to above the speculative level . . . on the assumption 

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that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555.

Dismissal of a complaint can be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

lack of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a 

claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

DISCUSSION

A. The Complaint Generally

County Defendants assert generally that the Complaint fails to adequately state any causes 

of action. Specifically, the County Defendants argue that the facts in support of the Complaint are 

insufficient. Each claim is discussed individually below. However, as to the general assertion that 

the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead facts to state a cause of action, the court finds that the 

Complaint does contain “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable 

the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011). 

B. The First Claim

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a “deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs and failure to protect from harm in violation of the Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendments.” Comp. (Doc. 1) at 6. County Defendants move for dismissal on 

the basis that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference and because Plaintiff 

has failed to establish standing. Plaintiff’s Response does not directly address the deliberate 

indifference argument as to this claim and, more importantly, Plaintiff does not address the issue 

of standing.

County Defendants point out that Plaintiff brings this action “suing individually,” Comp. 

(Doc. 1) at 3, and the allegations in the First Claim are related to injuries sustained by Plaintiff’s 

son. Therefore, County Defendants are challenging Plaintiff’s Article III standing; that is, whether 

Plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact. See e.g. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–

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61 (1992). “Article III standing is a threshold jurisdictional question.” Pirozzi v. Apple, Inc., 966 

F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Accepting the allegation in the Complaint as true and 

liberally construing those allegations, Plaintiff has not established standing, because she has not 

shown that she has personally suffered the injury of deliberate indifference of medical care while 

in custody.

Accordingly, the First Claim is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of standing, as to 

all Defendants.

C. The Second Claim

County Defendants seek to dismiss the Second Claim for deprivation of “liberty interests 

in the parent-child relationship” on the basis that the facts pled in the Complaint do not allege 

causation between an alleged failure to provide medical care and Slater’s death. County 

Defendants state that the facts in the Complaint allege that: 

Slater was arrested on March 22, 2014. (Complaint, 4) Slater was not given 

adequate medical care while he was in jail related to withdrawal symptoms. 

(Complaint, 4). Then, Slater was released from jail on March 26, 2014 and then 

died on March 27, 2014. (Complaint, 4). Plaintiff alleges that Slater died as a 

proximate result of defendant’s conduct while Slater was in jail. (Complaint, 6). 

However, in the documents attached to the Complaint, in a letter written by 

Plaintiff, she states that the death certificate indicates that Slater’s cause of death 

was heroin intoxication and a disseminated fungal infection. (Complaint, 

Attachment 2, p.2). Slater’s death certificate corroborates this statement, listing 

Slater’s cause of death as “Heroin Intoxication with other significant conditions 

being Disseminated Fungal Infection.” Request For Judicial Notice In Support Of 

Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 13) at 12. The court does not agree with County Defendants’ assessment.

“The fact that [Slater] did not die until several hours after he [was released] neither 

precludes liability by the [County] Defendants nor undermines Plaintiff[’s] causation allegations 

against them.” Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. Cnty. of Sutter, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1111 

(E.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1313–14 (9th Cir. 1989) (per 

curiam) (reversing grant of summary judgment for jail nurses and doctor where inmate died ten 

days after he was transported from jail to the hospital); see generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (contemplating § 1983 liability where lack of 

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medical care produces prisoner’s “‘lingering death’”) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447, 

10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890))). Accordingly, County Defendants’ request that the Second 

Claim be dismissed for failure to allege causation is DENIED. 

County Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims on the basis that 

Plaintiff has not stated a Monell Cause of Action against the County. Relying on the Monell v. 

N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), holding that “a public entity cannot be 

held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory,” County Defendants state that:

Even under the liberal pleading practice followed in federal courts, to maintain a 

section 1983 action against a governmental entity, plaintiff must first plead facts 

that there was a constitutional violation and that the allegedly unconstitutional 

activities of the entity’s official were pursuant to a “policy statement, ordinance, 

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the entity’s] officer”.

Cnty. Defs.’ Mot (Doc. 13) at 15 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.). While this is true, “[a] 

plaintiff can allege that through its omissions the municipality is responsible for a constitutional 

violation committed by one of its employees, even though the municipality’s policies were facially 

constitutional, the municipality did not direct the employee to take the unconstitutional action, and the 

municipality did not have the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation.” Gibson v. 

Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). “However, because 

Monell held that a municipality may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior, a plaintiff 

must show that the municipality’s deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the omission 

caused the employee to commit the constitutional violation.” Id. The Second Claim specifically 

alleges “omissions of Defendants in being deliberately indifferent” to “Slater’s serious medical needs” 

and that Plaintiff suffered injury “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts and/or 

omissions of Defendants.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at 8. Moreover, the Complaint describes the County of 

Mendocino as “responsible for ensuring the provision of emergency and medical and mental health 

services” and that Defendant Sherriff Allen “is and was responsible for the promulgation of the 

policies and procedures and allowance of the practices/customs to which the acts of the Mendocino 

County Sherriff’s Office alleged herein were committed.” Id. at 2. Further, the Complaint alleges that 

the County was on notice that “their provision of medical care to inmates” was “inadequate,” thus, 

pleading “an actual or constructive notice that [the municipalities] omission would likely result in a 

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constitutional violation.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1186. Accordingly, the court finds that the claim is 

sufficiently pled and the request for dismissal on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to properly plead a 

Monell cause of action is DENIED.

D. The Fourth & Fifth Claims

County Defendants seek to dismiss the Fourth and Fifth Claims as they are “common law 

negligence claims” and California “Government Code section 815 abolishes all common law or 

judicially declared forms of liability for public entities.” Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 13) at 13. 

Additionally, County Defendants seek the dismissal of these claims for failure to comply with the 

California Government Claims filing requirement. Id. at 14.

As to the common law claims, Sherriff Allman is “not immune under section 815 because 

that section affords immunity only to public entities and does not affect a public employee’s 

liability for common law claims.” Via v. City of Fairfield, 833 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 

2011). As for the County of Mendocino, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public 

entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public 

entity or public employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. “All government tort 

liability must be based on statute.” Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 

(1998). The Complaint does not identify a statute on which these two claims rely. However, it 

appears from the Complaint that Plaintiff is attempting to allege respondeat superior liability 

against the County of Mendocino.1 Both claims allege that negligence was the direct or proximate 

cause of the injuries. California Government Code § 815.2(a) states that a “public entity is liable 

for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the 

scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a 

cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a). 

Thus, § 815.2(a) “expressly makes the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable to public 

employers.” Hoff, 19 Cal.4th at 932. However, the Complaint neither identifies § 815.2(a), nor 

pleads that Sherriff Allman acted within the scope of his employment as a municipal employee. 

 

1

 The Fourth and Fifth Claims both allege negligent hiring, supervision, training and failure to 

properly hire, supervise and train. 

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Thus, this claim is violative of § 815 and insufficiently pled. See e.g. Young v. City of Visalia, 687 

F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Further, there are no allegations under the Fourth cause 

of action that the individual officers where acting within the course and scope of their employment 

as municipal employees. In the absence of either citation to Government Code § 815.2(a) or 

allegations that the Visalia Officers acted in the course and scope of their employment with the 

City, Plaintiffs have failed to properly plead vicarious liability against the City.”). Accordingly, 

these claims are DISMISSED as to the County of Mendocino. However, because these 

deficiencies can be cured, they are dismissed without prejudice.

As to County Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff failed to exhaust under the Tort Claims 

Act, the court finds these to be without merit. Plaintiff did file a tort claim pursuant to the Act. 

County Defendants point the court to Castaneda v. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 212 Cal. App. 4th 

1051, 1062 (2013) to argue that Plaintiff’s tort claims filing against the County contained no 

negligence claims , while the Fourth and Fifth Claims of the present Complaint allege negligent 

supervision, training, and retention. County Defendants argue that because Plaintiff did not 

specifically allege negligence in the tort claims filing, any negligence claims are barred for failure 

to comply with the Government Claims Act, which requires a claim to be filed with the 

government entity prior to suit for money or damages. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4.

Castaneda, the case upon which County Defendants rely, addressed and rejected a very 

similar argument. In Castaneda, the plaintiff pled a cause of action for failure to summon medical 

care, a claim not specifically raised in the plaintiff’s government tort claim filing. In upholding 

the lower court’s denial of the state’s motion, the Castaneda court agreed that the “tort claim 

provided the State with adequate information to investigate [the plaintiff’s] charges.” Castaneda, 

212 Cal. App. 4th at 1062. Explaining further, the court stated:

“[A] claim need not contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading, but 

need only ‘fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.’ [Citations.] As 

the purpose of the claim is to give the government entity notice sufficient for it to 

investigate and evaluate the claim, not to eliminate meritorious actions [citation], 

the claims statute ‘should not be applied to snare the unwary where its purpose has 

been satisfied’ [citation].” (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 446, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 

176, 99 P.3d 500.) To be fortified against a demurrer, the complaint should allege 

the factual basis for recovery that fairly reflects the written claim. (Id. at p. 447, 20 

Cal.Rptr.3d 176, 99 P.3d 500.)

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Id. See also, Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“The factual 

allegation that a claim based on the events alleged in the complaint was presented to and rejected 

by [the government entity] gives muscle to the skeletal assertion that all prerequisites of the Tort 

Claims Act have been fulfilled.”) (emphasis added). Similarly, in the present case, the facts pled 

in Plaintiff’s tort claim filing provided the County Defendants notice to investigate and evaluate 

Plaintiff’s claims, regardless of the filings specific mention of the term “negligence.” 

Accordingly, the request to dismiss the Fourth and Fifth Claims on this basis is DENIED. 

E. The Sixth Claim

County Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s wrongful death cause of action on the 

basis that “Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to adequately plead causation. See supra pp. 7-8.” Cnty. 

Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 13) at 15. However, as discussed supra, the court rejected Defendants’ 

causation arguments and, therefore, the request to dismiss the Sixth Claim is DENIED.

D. Sherriff Allman

1. Individual Capacity

County Defendants seek to dismiss the claims against Defendant Sherriff Allman in his 

individual capacity. Defendants base this on the argument that there are no allegations against 

Sherriff Allman that he individually participated in unlawful conduct. Defendants specifically 

point this court to Tandel v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 2015 WL 1291377, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 

2015), and its holding that “a plaintiff cannot demonstrate the liability of a particular officer 

‘without a showing of individual participation in the unlawful conduct.’ Jones v. Williams, 297 

F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must ‘establish the integral participation of the officers in 

the alleged constitutional violation,’ which requires ‘some fundamental involvement in the 

conduct that allegedly caused the violation.’” Cnty. Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 13) at 16. However, the 

Complaint does not allege that Sherriff Allman was simply a police officer. Instead, the 

Complaint alleges that Sherriff Allen is in the “highest position” in the Sherriff’s Office. Indeed, 

County Defendants assert that there is “no doubt that the Sheriff has ‘final policymaking 

authority’ in operating the Mendocino County jail.” Id. at 17. Thus, for purposes of § 1983, 

Sherriff Allman is a supervisor. “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity ‘for his own 

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culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation ...; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 

indifference to the rights of others.’” Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (internal quotations, citations and corrections omitted).

As our sister court in Tandel v. Cnty. of Sacramento thoroughly explained:

Under § 1983, government officials acting as supervisors may be liable under 

certain circumstances. “[W]hen a supervisor is found liable based on deliberate 

indifference, the supervisor is being held liable for his or her own culpable action 

or inaction, not held vicariously liable for the culpable action or inaction of his or 

her subordinates.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.2011). A defendant 

may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists “either (1) his or her 

personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation; or (2) a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989); Starr, 652 F.3d at 

1207.

A supervisor’s physical presence is not required for supervisory liability. Starr, 652 

F.3d at 1205. Rather, the requisite causal connection between a supervisor's 

wrongful conduct and the violation of the prisoner's Constitutional rights can be 

established in a number of ways. The plaintiff may show that the supervisor set in 

motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts 

by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would 

cause others to inflict a constitutional injury. Dubner v. City & County of San 

Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir.2001); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 

F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991). Similarly, a supervisor's own culpable action or 

inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates may establish 

supervisory liability. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208; Larez, 946 F.2d at 646. Finally, a 

supervisor's acquiescence in the alleged constitutional deprivation or conduct 

showing deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of 

the task may violate the rights of others, may establish the requisite causal 

connection. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208; Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 

(9th Cir.2005).

Tandel, 2015 WL 1291377 at *9-10. The Complaint sufficiently sets forth claims against Sherriff 

Allman in his individual capacity and the request for his dismissal in his individual capacity is 

DENIED.

2. Official Capacity

Finally, County Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against Sherriff Allman in his 

official capacity as duplicative of the claims against the County of Mendocino. “‘[I]f individuals 

are being sued in their official capacity as municipal officials and the municipal entity itself is also 

being sued, then the claims against the individuals are duplicative and should be dismissed.’” Roy 

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v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 15-CV-02672-TEH, 2015 WL 5698743, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 

2015) (quoting Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).

All of the claims within the Complaint are against all Defendants. As such, each claim is 

against both the County of Mendocino and Sherriff Allman in his official capacity and therefor 

duplicative. Accordingly, the request to dismiss Sherriff Allman in his official capacity is 

GRANTED as duplicative.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that the motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

1). The First Claim is DISMISSED for lack of standing, without prejudice as to all 

Defendants;

2). The request to dismiss the Second Claim is DENIED;

3). The Fourth and Fifth Claims are DISMISSED without prejudice as to Defendant 

County of Mendocino. 

4). The request to dismiss the Sixth Claim is DENIED;

5) The request to dismiss Sherriff Allman in his individual capacity is DENIED, and 

the request to dismiss Sherriff Allman in his official capacity is GRANTED.

Plaintiff shall have until on or before November 16, 2015, in which to file a first amended 

complaint. A Case Management Conference in this case is set for January 26, 2015. As per the 

Scheduling Order (Doc. 3) all deadlines are continued accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2015

______________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

MELODIE HUGHES,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MENDOCINO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01794-NJV 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee of U.S. District Court, Northern

District of California.

That on October 26, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Melodie Hughes

P.O. Box 207

Willits, CA 95490 

Dated: October 26, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Robert Illman, Law Clerk to the 

Honorable NANDOR J. VADAS

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