Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_14-cv-00426/USCOURTS-ared-4_14-cv-00426-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Auto Negligence

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MANDATE 

BY: _______ _.....CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED 

tAarHfJ~'IO~i~ PROCEEDINGS OF APRIL 14, 2016 ~ 

SUPREME COURT CASE NO. CV-15-677 

CORINA MENDOZA 

V. CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS, WESTERN DIVISION 

(4:14CV00426 JM) 

WIS INTERNATIONAL, INC., ANTHONY ADAMS, AND 

WASHINGTON INVENTORY SERVICES, INC. APPELLEES 

THIS CERTIFIED QUESTION WAS SUBMITTED TO THE ARKANSAS SUPREME 

COURT ON THE RECORD OF THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS, WESTERN DIVISION, AND BRIEFS OF THE 

RESPECTIVE PARTIES. AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS THE DECISION OF THE 

COURT THAT THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IS ANSWERED AS SET OUT IN THE 

ATTACHED OPINION. 

BAKER, HART, AND WOOD, JJ., DISSENT. 

IN TESTIMONY, THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 

JUDGMENT OF THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT, I, STACEY PECTOL, 

CLERK, SET MY HAND AND AFFIX MY OFFICIAL SEAL, ON THIS 3RD DAY OF 

MAY, 2016. 

STA~ 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 1 of 26
.. 

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 

No. CV-15-677 

CORINA MENDOZA Opinion Delivered April 14, 2016 

PETITIONER 

v. 

CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

ARKANSAS, WESTERN DIVISION 

WIS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

ANT H 0 NY AD AMS, AND HONORABLE JAMES M. MOODY,JR. 

WASHINGTON INVENTORY 

SER VICES, INC. 

RESPONDENTS CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. 

PAULE. DANIELSON, Associate Justice 

This case involves a question oflaw certified to this court by the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in accordance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 

6-8 and accepted by this court on September 17, 2015. See Mendoza v. WIS Int'l, Inc., 2015 

Ark. 321. 

The certified question is: 

Under the facts of this case, does Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703, 

which restricts the admissibility of seat belt-nonuse evidence in civil actions, violate 

the separation-of-powers doctrine found in article IV, section 2, of the Arkansas 

Constitution? 

We conclude that the answer is yes. Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703 is 

unconstitutional. 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 2 of 26
According to the district court's order, the certified question arises from a car accident 

that occurred on August 1, 2011, on Interstate 630 in Little Rock, Arkansas. Petitioner 

Corina Mendoza was a passenger in the backseat of a vehicle operated by respondent Anthony 

Adams when Adams fell asleep at the wheel and ran into the back of a parked excavator. 

Mendoza filed an amended complaint seeking damages for significant and permanent personal 

injury. Mendoza alleged that Adams was acting in the course of his employment with 

respondents WIS International, Inc., and Washington Inventory Services, Inc. (collectively 

"WIS"), at the time of the accident. WIS and Adams filed answers and pled the affirmative 

defense of comparative fault, specifically including Mendoza's failure to wear a seat belt at the 

time of the accident. 

WIS and Adams filed motions in the district court challenging the constitutionality of 

section 27-3 7-703 on the basis that the statute purports to limit or otherwise dictate what 

evidence is admissible at trial and is, therefore, unconstitutional. The arguments of Adams and 

WIS are based on article 4, § 2 and amendment 80, § 3 of the Arkansas Constitution. They 

contend that, under amendment 80, § 3 of the Arkansas Constitution and the scparation-ofpowers doctrine, section 27-37-703 is unconstitutional. Specifically, respondents argue that 

section 27-37-703(a)(1) is unconstitutional because it is a legislative attempt to impose a rule 

of evidence. American Trucking Associations, Inc., and Arkansas Trucking Association, Inc., 

filed amicus cunac briefs asserting that the statute is unconstitutional. The Arkansas Trial 

Lawyers Association filed ;m amicus brief asserting that the statute is constitutional. 

2 CV-15-677 

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It is well settled that there is a presumption of validity attending every consideration 

of a statute's constitutionality; every act carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, and 

before an act will be held unconstitutional, the incompatibility between it and the constitution 

must be clear. Joh11son v. Rockwell Automatio11, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 (citing 

Shipp u. Fra11klin, 370 Ark. 262, 258 S.W .3d 744 (2007)). Any doubt as to the 

constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. See id. The 

heavy burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality is upon the one attacking it. See id. 

Finally, when possible, we will construe a statute so that it is constitutional. See id. 

In determining the constitutionality of the statutes, we look to the rules of statutory 

construction. Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 . When construing a statute, the basic 

rule is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. (citing Rose v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 363 

Ark. 281, 213 S.W.3d 607 (2005)). Where the language of a statute is plain and 

unambiguous, we detem1ine the legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language 

used. See id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving 

the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. See id. 

As a threshold issue, Mendoza asserts that respondents' motions challenging the 

constitutionality of section 27-37-703 are premature. She contends that this matter is not ripe 

because respondents did not introduce evidence of her non use of a seat belt. Respondents 

argue in their briefs that they cannot introduce evidence of Mendoza's nonuse of a seat belt 

because it is prohibited by section 27-37-703(a)(1), thereby placing respondents in a "catch22" situation. We accepted the request from the district court to detem1ine the certified 

3 CV-15-677 

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question of whether section 27-37-703 is unconstitutional. We have not been asked to 

determine whether respondents' motions are premature; therefore, we will not address 

Mendoza's argument on this point. 

We now turn to respondents' challenge to the constitutionality of section 27-37-703, 

which provides as follows: 

(a)(1) The failure of an occupant to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat 

belt shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action. 

(2) Provided, that evidence of the failure may be admitted in a civil action as 

to the causal relationship between noncompliance and the injuries alleged, if the 

following conditions have been satisfied: 

(A) The plaintiff has filed a products liability claim other than a claim 

related to an alleged failure of a seat belt; 

(B) The defendant alleging noncompliance with this subchapter shall 

raise this defense in its answer or timely amendment thereto in accordance with 

the rules of civil procedure; and 

(C) Each defendant seeking to offer evidence alleging noncompliance 

has the burden of proving: 

(i) Noncompliance; 

(ii) That compliance would have reduced injuries; and 

(iii) The extent of the reduction of the injuries. 

(b)(l) Upon request of any party, the trial judge shall hold a hearing out of the 

presence of the jury as to the admissibility of such evidence in accordance with the 

provisions of this section and the rules of evidence. 

(2) The finding of the trial judge shall not constitute a finding of fact, and the 

finding shall be .limited to the issue of admissibility of such evidence. 

Ark. Code Ann.§ 27-37-703 (Repl. 2014). 

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Mendoza argues that the statute is a matter of substantive law, defining what is 

negligent for purposes of comparative fault and is therefore within the province of the 

legislature. She asserts that section 27-37-703 is a substantive alteration to the law of 

comparative fault or contributory negligence and not rules of pleading, practice, or procedure. 

Respondents assert that the statute is a matter of procedural law. which is exclusively in this 

court's domain. 

Law is substantive when it is "[tJhe part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates 

the rights, duties, and powers of the parties." See Johnson, 2009 Ark. at 8, 308 S. W .3d at 141 

(quoting Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 237, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419-20 (2007) (citing 

Black's Law Dictionary 1443 (7th ed. 1999))). Procedural law is defined as "[t]he rules that 

prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that 

defines the specific rights or duties themselves." Summerville, 369 Ark. at 237, 253 S.W.3d 

at 420 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1221 (7th ed. 1999)). 

It is undisputed that the rules of evidence are "rules of pleading, practice and 

procedure." See Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 10, 308 S.W.3d at 142. We have held that the 

rules of evidence fall within this court's domain. See id., 308 S.W.3d 135 (citing Ricarte v. 

State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986)). Accordingly, under our holding inJohnson, if 

the statute is a rule of evidence, then it violates separation of powers and is unconstitutional. 

In Johnson, we held that the non party provision of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-

212(b ), which limited the evidence that may be introduced at trial relating to the value of 

medical expenses, was unconstitutional. We held that the provision clearly dictated what 

5 CV-15-677 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 6 of 26
evidence is admissible and therefore found the statute to be unconstitutional. The statute in 

Johnson provided as follows: 

Any evidence of damages for the costs of any necessary medical care, treatment, or 

services received shall include only those costs actually paid by or on behalf of the 

plaintiff or which remain unpaid and for which the plaintiff or any third party shal1 be 

legally responsible. 

2009 Ark. 241, at 10, 308 S.W.3d at 142 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. 

§ 16-55-212(b) (Supp. 2003)). 

In Jolmson, we held that because the provision clearly limited the evidence that may 

be introduced relating to the value of medical expenses, thereby dictating what evidence is 

admissible, the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, 

308 S.W.3d 135. In the seat-belt statute, section 27-37-703(a), the trial court is given the 

discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible in product-liability actions only and 

is barred from detemlining admissibility in other actions. 

Mendoza contends that section 27-37-703 is a matter of substantive law defining what 

is negligence for purposes of comparative fault. In support of her contention, Mendoza relies 

on Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1989), where the Eighth Circuit held that a 

statute modifying the content of state tort-law doctrines of contributory and comparative 

negligence was a classic example of"the type of substantive rule oflaw binding upon a federal 

court in a diversity case." Id. at 1324. In Potts, the Eighth Circuit addressed Arkansas Code 

Annotated section 27-34-106, the statute regarding the use of evidence of failure to place 

6 CV-15-677 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 7 of 26
children in child-restraint seats. The Eighth Circuit stated that section 27-34-106 established 

a rule of substantive law. 

·However, section 27-34-106 is distinguishable from section 27-37-703. The seat-belt 

statute states that evidence of nomtse may not be admitted, whereas section 27-34-106 

provides that the failure to place children in child-restraint seats may not be admitted as 

evidence of comparative or contributory negligence. 

Moreover, section 27-37-703 originally contained the same language found in the 

child-restraint statute. In 1991, section 27-37-703 provided in part as follows: 

The failure to provide or use a seat belt shall not be considered under any 

circumstances as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence, nor shall such 

failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to 

negligence. 

In 1995 Ark. Acts 1118, the language "shall not be considered under any circumstances as 

evidence of comparative or contributory negligence" and "with regard to negligence" was 

removed from section 27-37-703 by the legislature. However, the analogous language found 

in the child safety-seat statute was not removed. 

Mendoza also argues that even if section 27-37-703 is strictly a rule of evidence, it is 

still valid based on Rule 402 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, which reads "all relevant 

evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules or by other 

rules applicable in the courts of this State." Mendoza contends that Rule 402 specifically 

empowers the legislature to determine relevance by statute and that the legislature properly 

exercised this power in the seat-belt statute. Mendoza relies on our holding in Bedell v. 

7 CV-15-677 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 8 of 26
Williams, 2012 Ark. 75, 386 S. W .3d 493, wherein this court considered the constitutionality 

of a statute giving medical-care providers the privilege to refuse to testify as to certain matters. 

The issue in Bedell was whether Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-114-207 was 

unconstitutional. In Bedell, we held the following: 

This court has specifically given the General Assembly the power to enact statutes 

regarding testimonial privilege. See Ark. R. Evid. 501 (no person has a privilege to 

refuse to testify or prevent another from being a witness "except as otherwise provided 

by constitution or statute") (emphasis added). Therefore, this section does not violate 

the separation-of-powers doctrine. 

Bedell, 2012 Ark. 75, at 17. 386 S.W.3d at 505. Mendoza asserts that our holding regarding 

Rule 501 should be applied to Rule 402, with the end result being that the legislature is 

empowered to determine relevance by statute based on the language "except as otherwise 

provided by statute." Ark. R. Evid. 402. Mendoza's argument contradicts our holding in 

Johnson that the legislature cannot enact a statute that "clearly limits the evidence that may be 

introduced." Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 11, 308 S.W.3d at 142. 

Bedell and Johnson arc distinguishable. We have previously ruled that a statute granting 

a privilege is substantive law. See Cato v. Craighead Cnty. Circuit Court, 2009 Ark. 334, at 9, 

322 S.W.3d 484, 489 (2009) (holding that a statute granted a "privilege" to members of the 

organized militia serving military duty by granting them exemption from civil process). We 

held that the creation of such a privilege was substantive legislation. 

In Rule 501 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, we granted the legislature the 

authority to enact statutes regarding privilege because the power of the legislature to enact 

statutes regarding privilege is substantive law and does not conflict with amendment 80 and 

8 CV-15-677 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 9 of 26
the sep:mHion-of-powers doctrine. Rule 402, however, is procedural in that it dictates what 

evidence is relevant. Just as we will not interpret a statutory provision so as to reach an absurd 

result, neither will we interpret a court mle in such a manner. Jo11esboro Healthcare Ctr., LLC 

v. Eaton-Moery Envtl. Servs., Inc., 2011 Ark. 501, 385 S.W.3d 797. If we were to grant 

authority to the legislature to determine the relevancy of evidence in court proceedings, we 

would be depriving the trial courts of their exclusive authority to determine the relevancy of 

evidence. Such an interpretation of Rule 402 would create an absurd result. 1 

Prior to the passage of amendment 80, this court and the legislature shared authority 

to prescribe procedure. Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990). In State v. 

Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 7, 800 S.W.2d 402, 404 (1990), we held that when conflicts arise between 

legislation and rules of evidence and procedure, "our rules remain supreme." Conversely, 

since the passage of amendment 80, we held that "so long as a legislative provision dictates 

procedure, that provision need not directly conflict with our procedural rules to be 

unconstitutional. This is because rules regarding pleading, practice, and procedure are solely 

the responsibility of this court." Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141. 

The seat-belt statute is procedural and therefore offends the principle of separation of 

powers and the powers specifically prescribed to this court by amendment 80. See Johnson. 

Accordingly, we hold that Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703 violates separation 

'We request our Civil Practice Committee to review Rule 402 in light of this opinion. 

To the extent that any other rules of evidence conflict withjolmson v. Rockwell, we refer those 

mies to the Committee for review as well. 

9 CV-15-677 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 10 of 26
of powers under article 4, § 2 and amendment 80. § 3 of the Arkansas Constitution and is 

therefore unconstitutional. 

Certified question answered. 

BAKER, HART, and WOOD, JJ., dissent. 

10 CV-15-677 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 11 of 26
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 

No. CV-15-677 

CORINA MENDOZA Opinion Delivered April 14, 2016 

PETITIONER 

v. 

WIS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

ANTHONY ADAMS, AND 

WASHINGTON INVENTORY 

SERVICES, INC. 

RESPONDENTS DISSENTING OPINION. 

KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice 

Based on the record before the court, I cannot join the m<tjority opinion, and I 

therefore respectfully dissent. The question oflaw certified to this court is as follows; 

Under the facts of this case, does Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703, which 

restricts the admissibility of seatbelt-nonuse evidence in civil actions, violate the 

separation-of-powers doctrine found in article IV, section 2, of the Arkansas 

Constitution? 

The answer to this certified question oflaw should be answered in the negative. 

A particular provision in a statute must be construed with reference to the statute as 

a whole. Flowers v. Norman Oaks Constr. Co., 341 Ark. 474, 17 S.W.3d 472 (2000) (citing 

Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993)). 

At issue is Chapter 37 of Title 27, which governs equipment regulations. Subchapter 

7 is entitled "Mandatory Scat Belt Use." Section 27-37-702, "Seat belt use required -

Applicability of subchapter," provides in pertinent part: 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 12 of 26
Each driver and front seat passenger in any motor vehicle operated on a street or highway 

in this state shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt properly secured to the 

vehicle. 

Ark. Code Ann.§ 27-37-702(a) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to the plain language of 

Ark. Code Ann. section 27-37-702, Subchapter 7 is only applicable to "each driver and front 

seat passenger." Turning to the facts of this case, the certification order states that " [Mendoza] 

was a passenger in the backseat of a vehicle operated by Defendant Anthony Adams when Adams 

fell asleep at the wheel and ran into the back of a parked excavator." (Emphasis added.) 

Accordingly, because Mendoza was neither a driver nor a front-seat passenger, Subchapter 7 

is inapplicable under the facts of this case. It is well settled that this court does not render 

advisory opinions or answer academic questions. Wilson v. Pulaski Ass'n of Classroom Teachers, 

330 Ark. 298, 954 S.W.2d 221 (1997). Thus, because Subchapter 7 is inapplicable, the 

majority errs in its consideration of the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. section 27-37-

703. 

Therefore, under the facts in this case, I would answer the certified question in the 

negative and must respectfully dissent from the majority's consideration of a statutory 

provision that is clearly inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

2 CV-15-677 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 13 of 26
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 

No. CV-15-677 

CORINA MENDOZA Opinion Delivered April 14, 2016 

PETITIONER 

v. 

WIS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

ANTHONY ADAMS, AND 

WASHINGTON INVENTORY 

SERVICES, INC. 

RESPONDENTS 

CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

HON. JAMES M. MOODY, JR., 

JUDGE 

DISSENTING OPINION. 

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice 

This court accepted a very specific certified question from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The very first clause in the certified question 

expressly limits the inquiry to the "facts of this case." There is no dispute that Ms. Mendoza, 

at the time of the accident, was asleep m the back seat of the vehicle being driven by Anthony 

Adams. Likewise, in clear language, the Arkansas Mandatory Seat Belt Use Law requires only 

the occupants of the front seat of a vehicle to wear seat belts. Because Arkansas Code 

Annotated section 27-37-703 applies only to the driver and the front seat passengers, it is 

inapplicable to the factual situation that confronted the district court. Accordingly, the 

majority's opinion regarding the provision of section 27-37-703 can have no practical effect 

on the outcome of Ms. Mendoza's case. Thus this court's musings are purely advisory or the 

answer to an academic question, tasks which this court has repeatedly said it would not 

untertake. vVoodrome v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 244, 370 S. W.3d 190; Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 14 of 26
547, 898 S.W.2d 43 (1995); Walker 11. McCuen, 318 Ark. 508, 886 S.W.2d 577 (1994); 

Dougan 11. Cray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S. W.2d 239 (1994); Gladden v. Bucy, 299 Ark. 523, 772 

S.W.2d 612 (1989); Neeley v. Barber, 288 Ark. 384, 706 S.W.2d 358 (1986). 

Under these circumstances, this court must remain true to its rules and well-established 

practices and decline to answer this certified question. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 

(2012), contemplates just such a disposition: 

(a)(5) In its discretion, the Supreme Court may at any time rescind its decision to 

answer a certified question. The Clerk shall promptly mail notice to the certifying 

court, counsel of record, and parties appearing without counsel. 

I contend that it is only prudent to rescind this court's acceptance of the certified question. 

In my view, the majority was not only wrong for agreeing to answer this question, it 

is wrong in its answer as well. Although the majority recognizes it, it fails to honor the 

presumption of validity attending every consideration of a statute's constitutionality. Johnson 

v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135. Before this court can declare 

an act to be unconstitutional, the incompatibility between it and the constitution must be 

clear. Id. Any doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in favor of its 

constitutionality. Id. When possible, we must construe a statute so that it is constitutional. 

Id. There is ample basis to construe this statute so as to find it constitutional. 

Amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution gives this court the authority 

to make rules regarding pleading, practice, and procedure for the courts of this state. It states, 

"The Supreme Court shall prescribe the rules of pleading, practice and procedure for all 

courts; provided these rules shall not abridge, enJarge or modify any substantive right and shall 

2 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 15 of 26
preserve the right of trial by jury as declared in this Constitution." In Rockwell Automation, 

supra, this court cited this provision of the Arkansas Constitution as authority for striking 

down the nonparty-fault provision of the Civil Justice Refom1 Act as violative of the 

separation-of-powers clause found in article 4, section 2. 1 The Rockwell court acknowledged 

that the legislature has the power to enact "substantive" law, which it defined as "the part of 

the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties." 2009 

Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141 (internal citations omitted). Conversely, it defined 

procedural law, which is the exclusive province of the supreme court, as "the mles that 

prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that 

defines the specific rights or duties themselves." Id. 

With the substantive/procedural dichotomy in mind, we tum to the. challenged 

"Failure to Comply" provision of our Mandatory Seat Belt Use law, codified at Arkansas 

Code Annotated section 27-37-703 (Repl. 2014): 

(a)(1) The failure of an occupant to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt shall 

not be admissible into evidence in a civil action. 

(2) Provided, that evidence of the failure may be admitted in a civil action as to the 

causal relationship between noncompliance and the injuries alleged, if the following 

conditions have been satisfied: 

(A) The plaintiff has filed a products liability claim other than a claim related to an 

alleged failure of a seat belt; 

(B) The defendant alleging noncompliance with this subchapter shall raise this defense 

1 No person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall 

exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter 

expressly directed or permitted. 1 

3 

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in its answer or timely amendment thereto in accordance with the rules of civil 

procedure; and 

(C) Each defendant seeking to offer evidence alleging noncompliance has the burden 

of proving: 

(i) Noncompliance; 

(ii) That compliance would have reduced injuries; and 

(iii) The extent of the reduction of the injuries. 

(b)(1) Upon request of any party, the trial judge shall hold a hearing out of the 

presence of the jury as to the admissibility of such evidence in accordance with the 

provisions of this section and the rules of evidence. 

(2) The finding of the trial judge shall not constitute a finding of fact, and the finding 

shall be limited to the issue of admissibility of such evidence. 

When we interpret a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. 

Colvin, 2013 Ark. 203, 427 S.W.3d 635. The process requires us to place the statute beside 

other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question so that we can derive the meaning 

and effect from the whole. Id. Statutes relating to the same subject must be construed 

together and in harmony, if possible. Id. 

As stated previously, section 27-37-703 is part of the Arkansas Mandatory Seat Belt 

Use Law. From its inception as Act 562 of 1991, the law was intended by the legislature to 

be strictly a penal statute, making the failure of front-seat occupants of a motor vehicle to 

wear a seat belt a traffic violation. See Ark. Code Ann. § 27-37-706. Section 27-37-706 

states, 

(a) Any person who violates this subchapter shall be subject to a fine not to exceed 

twenty-five dollars ($25.00). 

4 

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(b) When a person is convicted, pleads guilty, pleads nolo contendere, or forfeits bond 

for violation of this subchapter, court costs under § 16-10-305 shall be assessed, but 

other costs or fees shall not be assessed. 

Further, the original version of section 27-37-703, as it appeared in section 5 of Act 562, was 

the expression of the legislature's intent to not concomitantly create a civil cause of action for 

failure to wear a seatbelt: 

SECTION 5. The failure to provide or use a seat belt shall not be considered under 

any circumstances as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence, nor shall 

such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to 

negligence. Neither shall the failure to provide or use seat belts be considered under 

any circumstances as evidence in any prosecution for negligent homicide. 

As such, this section is substantive law because it "defines and regulates the rights, duties, and 

powers of parties," relative to the newly created requirement to use seat belts. See Rockwell 

Automation, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141. While the original version of this statute 

was amended by Act 1118 of 1995 so as to not foreclose the use of evidence of seat belt 

nonuse in products-liability cases, the legislature's intent to keep the Arkansas Mandatory Seat 

Belt Use Law from creating a civil cause of action, or having pecuniary consequences for an 

injured person pursing a civil cause of action, has remained. 

When the Rockwell court struck down the nonparty-fault provision of the Civil Justice 

Reform Act, it noted that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-202 "established its own 

procedure by which the fault of a nonparty shall be litigated." 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 

S.W.3d at 141. In essence, the substantive right to have fault apportioned already existed, and 

the legislature unconstitutionally invaded the province of the courts to prescribe how the 

parties' relative fault may be proved in a court oflaw. In contrast, through section 27-37-

5 

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703, the legislature has expressed its intention that its requirement that motorists use seat belts 

shall not be a basis for diminishing an injured person's recovery of damages in a simple motorvehicle negligence case, regardless of how the case is tried. Accordingly, because section 27-

37-703 is substantive law, it does not offend the separation-of-powers clause in article 4, 

section 2 of the Arkansas Constitution. 

I am mindful that the plain language of section 27-3 7-703 proscribes admitting into 

evidence a party's non use of seat belts in a civil case. I am likewise mindful that the Rockwell 

court also struck down the medical-costs provision of the Civil Justice Reform Act, which 

stated as follows: 

Any evidence of damages for the costs of any necessary medical care, treatment, or 

services received shall include only those costs actually paid by or on behalf of the 

plaintiff or which remain unpaid and for which the plaintiff or any third party shall be 

legally responsible. 

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-212(b) (Supp. 2013). The Rockwell court reasoned, 

It is undisputed that the rules of evidence are '"rules of pleading, practice and 

procedure." Moreover, we have held that the rules of evidence are rules falling within 

this court's domain. See Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986). Our 

review of the plain language of the medical-costs provision reveals that the instant 

statute promulgates a rule of evidence. Here, the provision clearly limits the evidence 

that may be introduced relating to the value of medical expenses to the amount of 

medical expenses paid or the amount to be paid by a plaintiff or on a plaintiff's behalf, 

thereby dictating what evidence is admissible. Because rules regarding the admissibility 

of evidence are within our province, we hold that the medical-costs provision also 

violates separation of powers under article 4, § 2 and amendment 80, § 3 of the 

Arkansas Constitution and, therefore, is unconstitutional. 

Rockwell Automotive, 2009 Ark. 241, at 10-11, 308 S. W.3d at 142. Nonetheless, I contend 

that Rockwell does not control the question before us. 

The mere use of the word "evidence" in the statute does not make the statute a rule 

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of evidence. "Evidence" appears in more than 4000 sections and subsections of the Arkansas 

Code, and it is tmly absurd to think that each and every time the legislature enacted one of 

these statutes it violated the separation of powers. A more searching analysis is required. 

While amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution gives this court the 

authority to make rules regarding pleading, practice, and procedure for the courts of this state, 

our constitutional rule-making authority does not give us the power to "abridge, enlarge or 

modify any substantive right." Id. As noted previously, section 27-37-703 is substantive law, 

which, under our separation-of-powers doctrine, is the province of the legislature. Our mles 

of evidence substantiate this analysis. Rule 402 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence 

contemplates the legislature's power to identify certain matters of substantive law that will 

affect the admissibility of certain pieces of evidence. Rule 402 states, "All relevant evidence 

is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules or by other mies applicable 

in the courts of this State. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." (Emphasis 

supplied.) The question therefore becomes whether it was this court that violated the 

separation of powers when we drafted Rule 402 or the legislature when it accepted the rule's 

plainly stated invitation for the legislature to input substantive law. I submit that neither 

violates the separation-of-powers clause. 

In Bedell v. Williams, 2012 Ark. 75, 386 S.W.3d 493, this court held that the legislature 

did not violate the separation-of-powers clause when it created by statute, Arkansas Code 

Annotates section 16-114-207 (3), a privilege to not testify at a trial involving certain matters. 

The Bedell court held that an equivalent clause in Rule 501 of the Arkansas Rules of 

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Evidence, "Except as otherwise provided by constitution or statute," justified the legislature's 

creation of the privilege as a specific grant of authority. The majority's effort to distinguish 

the case before us falls well short. In both instances, the net result is that there will be no 

evidence presented for a particular purpose. 

In my view, section 27-3 7-703 is also like our rape-shield law, codified at Arkansas 

Code Annotated section 16-42-101: 

(b) In any criminal prosecution under§ 5-14-101 et seq. or§ 5-26-202, or for 

criminal attempt to commit, criminal solicitation to commit, or criminal conspiracy 

to commit an offense defined in any of those sections, opinion evidence, reputation 

evidence, or evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the 

defendant or any other person, evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual 

conduct with the defendant or any other person, which allegations the victim asserts 

to be true, or evidence offered by the defendant concerning prior allegations of sexual 

conduct by the victim with the defendant or any other person if the victim denies 

making the allegations is not admissible by the defendant, either through direct 

examination of any defense witness or through cross-examination of the victim or 

other prosecution witness, to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove consent or 

any other defense, or for any other purpose. 

This court has upheld the constitutionality of section 16-42-101. Sera v. State, 341 Ark. 415, 

17 S.W.3d 61 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 998. In short, the rape-shield law, like section 

27-37-703 in the Arkansas Mandatory Seat Belt Use Law, involves a broad prohibition on 

the admission of certain evidence that the legislature has determined to be not relevant in civil 

actions. 

In comparison, the medical-costs provision of the Civil Justice Reform Act that was 

struck down by the Rockwell court dictated not only what evidence could be admitted, but 

also what foundational predicates would be required before that evidence could be admitted, 

which essentially invaded the circuit court's discretion in admitting evidence, which conflicts 

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with the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Ark. R. Evid. 403. I am mindful that 

whenever a statute conflicts with a rule of evidence, it is a violation of the separation of 

powers. Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys, Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385. 

However, there is nothing in section 27-37-703 that conflicts with the Arkansas Rules of 

Evidence. Thus, in my view, the majority has clearly erred in finding that, by enacting 

section 27-37-703, the legislature violated the separation-of-powers clause. 

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 

No. CV-15-677 

CORINA MENDOZA 

PETITIONER 

v. 

WIS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

ANTHONY ADAMS, AND 

WASHINGTON INVENTORY 

SER VICES, INC. 

RESPONDENTS 

Opinion Delivered: April 14, 2016 

CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

ARKANSAS, WESTERN DIVISION 

HONORABLE JAMES M. MOODY, JR. 

DISSENTING OPINION. 

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice 

Because I think the majority's analysis is inherently flawed and only further confuses 

this court's application of amendment 80, § 3 of the Arkansas Constitution, I dissent. 

Arkansas Rule of Evidence 402 reads, "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 

provided by statute . ... " Ark. R. Evid. 402 (2015) (emphasis added). Therefore, our Rule 

of Evidence, which this court alone may promulgate, permits the General Assembly to pass 

statutes regarding the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. 

Inexplicably, the majority finds that our rules do not mean what they say. Instead of 

giving the words of Rule 402 their ordinary meaning, the majority incorrectly interprets 

Rule 402 as stating "all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 

statute [unless it is a Rule of Evidence which is solely the province of the supreme court]." Ark. R. 

Evid. 402. The majority's interpretation renders the language "except as otherwise provided 

by statute" meaningless. 

Case 4:14-cv-00426-JM Document 85 Filed 05/05/16 Page 23 of 26
In addition, the majority attempts to rectify its ruling with conflicting precedent by 

rewriting its analysis in Bedell v. Williams. 2012 Ark. 75, 386 S.W.3d 493. In Bedell, we 

held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-114-207, which provides medical-care 

providers the privilege of refusing to testify to certain matters, did not violate the separationof-powers doctrine. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, we explained that the 

court, via a Rule of Evidence, had provided the General Assembly the power to enact such 

statutes: 

This court has specifically given the General Assembly the power to enact statutes 

regarding testimonial privilege. See Ark. R. Evid 501 (no person has a privilege to 

refuse to testify or prevent another from being a witness "except as otherwise 

provided by constitution or statute") (emphasis added). 

Bedell, 2012 Ark. 75, at 17, 386 S.W.3d at 505. Thus, despite our holding in Johnson in 

2009 that the General Assembly cannot enact a statute that "clearly limit[s] the evidence 

that may be introduced," our court more recently held in Bedell that our words mean what 

they say. 

Despite this clear precedent, the majority now concludes that the statute in Bedell is 

distinguishable from the statute for the following reason: 

In Rule 501 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, we granted the legislature the 

authority to enact statutes regarding privilege because the power of the legislature to 

enact statutes regarding privilege is substantive law and docs not conflict with 

amendment 80 and the separation-of-powers doctrine. Rule 402, however, is 

procedural in that it dictates what evidence is relevant. 

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What the majority docs not explain, because it cannot, is that Rule 402 and Rule 501 have 

virtually identical language. 1 If we did not intend to give the General Assembly the 

authority to modify or supplement Rule 402 then why would we have a rule that states 

exactly that? I believe this court should follow the plain meaning of its own rules. 

Furthermore, I believe the majority opinion only further confuses practitioners and 

legislators. Accordingly, I dissent. 

In addition to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 402 and 501, Rules 508(b), 901 (10), 

902(10) and 1002 also contain language that permits the General Assembly to modify or 

supplement the evidentiary rules. 

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IN TESTIMONY, That the above is a true.copy of the opinion of said Supreme Court rendered 1.n the case therein stated, 

I, Stacey Pectol, Clerk of said Supreme Court, hereunto set my hand and affix the Seal of said Supreme Court/ at my '1,.Y"""~ 

office in the City of Little Rock this J _... day of M"-<-- · ~ 1, , 

fi) Cierk 

D.C. 

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