Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01388/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01388-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ALVIN LARUE PINKOSON, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 08-01388 PHX ROS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

ADW DAVENPORT, ARIZONA )

ATTORNEY GENERAL, and )

DORA SCHRIRO, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

On July 21, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 12) on November 6, 2008. 

I Procedural History

On November 24, 2003, Petitioner was convicted by a

jury on two counts of burglary in the third degree. Answer,

Exh. A. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated, concurrent

term of twelve years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on

each of these two counts. Id., Exh. B & Exh. C. In aggravating

his sentences the trial court noted Petitioner’s lengthy

criminal history and prior violations of both parole and

probation. Id., Exh. B & Exh. C. When imposing the sentences,

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1The sentencing court cited a presentence report indicating

Petitioner had previously been convicted of a total of seven prior

felony convictions and several misdemeanors, and that he had a

criminal history going back to 1980. Answer, Exh. B. However, as a

matter of law, the state alleged and the trial court found that

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault in 2001 and was

convicted of burglary in 1997. Id., Exh. C.

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the court stated: 

...if it weren’t for these two priors, I

would put you on intensive probation when you

got out of prison because, quite frankly,

that’s the help I think you would find that

you need... but I can’t because the State has

alleged the two priors, I have found them,

and I have to send you to prison under the

law on both Counts 1 and 2.

Id., Exh. B at 17.1

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentences. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. Petitioner asserted in his

direct appeal that the trial court erred by trying him in

absentia and that his sentences violated the United States

Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,

124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. The Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

in a decision issued October 7, 2004. Id., Exh. G. The Arizona

Supreme Court denied review on April 20, 2005. Id., Exh. I. 

Petitioner filed a timely action for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Id., Exh. J. Petitioner raised six distinct ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in this action. Id., Exh. K.

Petitioner also asserted the state failed to prove his prior

offenses and that his sentences violated the Blakely doctrine.

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Id., Exh. K. The state trial court summarily denied relief on

January 12, 2006. Id., Exh. M. Both the Arizona Court of

Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of this

decision. Id., Exh. O & Exh. R. 

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because his federal constitutional rights

were violated by the in absentia trial. Petitioner also

contends that his sentences violate Blakely, i.e., that he was

sentenced to an aggravated term of imprisonment based on facts

not found by a jury. Petitioner also maintains that he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at

trial, at sentencing, and during a hearing regarding the

allegation of prior convictions.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion

Absent particular circumstances, the Court should not

entertain the merits of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

before the petitioner’s state remedies have been “exhausted.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c) (2006 & Supp. 2008). Although it

may deny relief on the merits of an unexhausted claim, the

District Court may not grant federal habeas relief on the merits

of a claim which has not been exhausted in the state courts.

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728,

1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S.

Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). 

To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the

petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule

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upon the merits of the constitutional claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, including cases in which a term of

life imprisonment is actually imposed, the “highest court” test

of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough and well-reasoned

discussion of what constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona

for purposes of exhausting a non-capital conviction or

sentence).

Respondents allow that Petitioner properly exhausted

most of his federal habeas claims in the state courts.

Respondents assert that Petitioner did not properly exhaust his

claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to allege

that the state had not properly proven his two prior felony

convictions. See Answer at 23.

B. Standard of review with regard to properly exhausted

claims for relief

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

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2

For the “contrary to” clause, appellant would

have to demonstrate that the state court decision

“‘arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of

law,’” or when faced with “materially

indistinguishable” facts. The “unreasonable

application” clause requires not merely that we

disagree with the state court's application,FN12

but beyond that, that the state court decision is

objectively unreasonable. Even if we think the

state court erred, the state court decision

stands if the error was not an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court holdings. State

court factual determinations stand, even if we

would not reach them on the same record, unless

there is “clear and convincing evidence” that

they are “objectively unreasonable.”

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court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2008); Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007);

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74-75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653

(2006); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456,

2467-68 (2005); King v. Schriro, 537 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir.

2008)2; Cook v. Schriro, 516 F.3d 802, 816 (9th Cir. 2008).

United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the

state court’s decision are the source of “clearly established

federal law” for the purpose of federal habeas review. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000);

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). Unless

United States Supreme Court precedent has clearly established a

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rule of law, the writ will not issue based on a claimed

violation of that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066,

1069 (9th Cir. 2001), because federal courts are “without the

power” to extend the law beyond Supreme Court precedent. See

Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000). If the United

States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue raised by

Petitioner in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication of

the issue cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. See Stenson v. Lambert,

504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom.,

Stenson v. Uttecht, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008), citing Kane v.

Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006). Therefore,

if the issue raised by the petitioner “is an open question in

the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a

writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the state court

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by

rejecting the precise claim presented by the petitioner. Cook,

516 F.3d at 818, quoting Carey, 549 U.S. at 76, 127 S. Ct. at

654; Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007),

cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).

When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim,

the Court must analyze the last “reasoned” decision to determine

if the state’s denial of relief on the claim was clearly

contrary to federal law. See Barker, 423 F.3d at 1091-92 & n.3.

When there is no “reasoned” state court decision explaining the

state’s denial of a claim presented in a federal habeas

petition, the District Court must perform an independent review

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of the record to ascertain whether the state court’s decision

summarily denying the claim was objectively reasonable. See

Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 863 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2007),

cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1878 (2008); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 890.

C. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief because

his Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by the in absentia trial. 

Petitioner raised this issue in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding the trial

court did not abused its discretion in finding Petitioner waived

his right to be present at trial. See Answer, Exh. G. 

In July of 2003, Petitioner was released on bond

pending resolution of the charges against him. See id., Exh. D.

Petitioner’s trial was continued until July 29, 2003, after he

rejected a plea agreement, and the case was transferred to a

different trial judge. Id., Exh. D. Confusion ensued with

regard to Petitioner’s presence at his counsel’s office at the

time set for trial. Id., Exh. D. The trial court issued a

bench warrant for Petitioner and ordered the trial to proceed

notwithstanding Petitioner’s absence. Id., Exh. D. Several

witnesses testified against Petitioner at his in absentia trial

and the defense did not call any witnesses. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner was arrested on the bench warrant six days after his

trial ended in his in absentia conviction. Id., Exh. D.

The state court’s conclusion was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law because the right

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to be present is properly deemed waived if the defendant fails

to assert this right by appearing at his trial. See United

States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528-29, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1485-86

(1985); United States v. Houtchens, 926 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.

1991); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1994);

Brewer v. Raines, 670 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1982). 

2. Petitioner maintains that his sentences violate

Blakely, i.e., that he was sentenced to an aggravated term of

imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. 

In denying Petitioner’s Blakely claim, the Arizona

Court of Appeals concluded Petitioner’s sentences did not run

afoul of Blakely because the aggravated sentences were

predicated on prior convictions admitted by Petitioner. See

Answer, Exh. G at 7-8. 

The Arizona court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s

sentence did not violate his rights pursuant to the holding in

Blakely was not clearly contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of federal law. The fact that Petitioner’s sentence

was aggravated by prior felony convictions and that he admitted

these convictions removes his circumstance from the umbrella of

Blakely. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S.

Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004) (“‘Other than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (emphasis added),

quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct.

2348, 2362 (2000)); Hunter v. Werholtz, 505 F.3d 1080, 1082

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(10th Cir. 2007). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on this claim because the state court’s

decision was not clearly contrary to federal law.

3. Petitioner also maintains that he was denied his

right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Respondents allow that Petitioner exhausted most of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims by raising them in his

state Rule 32 action. The state court summarily denied

Petitioner’s claims that he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel. The state court’s decision was

not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

federal law.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id.

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002) (internal quotations

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omitted). “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable....” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added).

To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance

was deficient because counsel failed to raise a particular

argument the petitioner must establish the argument was likely

to be successful, thereby establishing that he was prejudiced by

his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135,

1144 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 722 (2007); Weaver v.

Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128

S. Ct. 177 (2007). A defendant has no constitutional right to

compel counsel to raise particular objections if counsel, as a

matter of professional judgment, decides not to raise those

objections. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct.

3308, 3312 (1983) (declining to promulgate “a per se rule that

the client, not the professional advocate, must be allowed to

decide what issues are to be pressed”).

Petitioner asserts his counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective because his counsel’s motion to sever his offenses

for trial was not filed on time, i.e., within twenty days of the

date set for trial. Petitioner has not established, however,

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3 See Arizona v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 384, 453 P.2d

951, 955 (1969). Pursuant to state law, a trial court conducts a

“Dessureault” hearing to determine if the proposed identification of

the defendant as the perpetrator of the alleged crimes was unduly

suggestive, i.e., if it was likely that the procedure had caused a

witness to misidentify the defendant. At the hearing, the trial court

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that any such error was prejudicial because the motion to sever

was denied on the merits. See Answer, Exh. A at 14-19.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision that the alleged error

did not violate Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights was not

clearly contrary to federal law. 

Petitioner also contends his trial counsel’s

performance was deficient because his counsel failed to

interview a police officer within twenty days of the trial date.

Petitioner maintains that interviewing the officer earlier would

have allowed counsel to file a timely pre-trial motion to

suppress evidence. Petitioner contends the alleged deficiency

was prejudicial because the evidence was “clearly” inadmissible.

The state court’s decision denying Petitioner’s claim

that his counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial in

this regard was not clearly contrary to federal law because

Petitioner has not established that any alleged failure to file

a motion to suppress the evidence was prejudicial to Petitioner.

Petitioner further alleges that his trial counsel’s

performance was deficient because counsel withdrew a request for

a “‘Dessureault’ hearing.” Petitioner asserts this error was

prejudicial because the “Dessureault Hearing was very important

concerning the unduly suggestive nature of the pre-trial

identification.”3 Petitioner further asserts his trial counsel

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is required to examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding

the proposed identification of the defendant, unless the prosecution

proved by clear and convincing evidence that the procedure regarding

the identification is not unduly suggestive. See Arizona v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 496, 707 P.2d 289, 294 (1985).

4

 See Arizona v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 190-91, 393 P.2d

274, 277-79 (1964). To be entitled to a jury instruction pursuant to

the holding in Willits, a defendant must prove both that the state

failed to preserve exculpatory, material, accessible evidence, and

resulting prejudice. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 503,

975 P.2d 75, 93 (1999).

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“convinced the trial judge that exculpatory evidence (green

towel) did not exist and as a result my motion for Willits

Instruction concerning that the State lost or destroyed evidence

was denied.”4

Respondents argue that, because the facts of his case

did “not warrant a Dessureault hearing, it was not unreasonable

for counsel to withdraw the motion.” Respondents also contend

that Petitioner has not established that any such error was

prejudicial, “because he has not demonstrated a reasonable

likelihood that the motion would have succeeded if counsel had

not withdrawn it.” Respondents further maintain that Petitioner

was not entitled to a Willits instruction and, accordingly, that

any deficiency which resulted in the “failure” to give the

instruction was not prejudicial. Respondents note Petitioner

provides no evidence that the police ever had custody of a green

towel, or that the towel could have exonerated him.

Counsel’s decisions regarding jury instructions are

fairly construed as a strategic decision. See Scott v. Elo, 302

F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2002). “A fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the

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distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.’”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Indeed,

“strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and

facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent

that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations

on investigation.” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Therefore, the state court’s decision was not contrary to

clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding, and

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim

that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. 

Petitioner further alleges his counsel “failed to

interview any witnesses for defendant, and counsel failed to

adequately argue motions in limine concerning the use of

spontaneous statements made by me prior to Miranda, that the

State avowed they would not use.” However, Petitioner offers

nothing but conclusory allegations regarding his counsel’s

alleged failure to interview “any witnesses” or evidence of how

any failure to interview a specific witness would have resulted

in a different outcome at trial. Vague or conclusory claims do

not establish evidence sufficient to conclude the state court’s

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decision was clearly contrary to federal law. See Jones v.

Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d

20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The evidence presented against Petitioner at his trial

from eyewitnesses was overwhelming. See Answer, Exh. D. The

undersigned notes the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held

the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant from counsel’s

failure to adequately investigate is more likely when the

prosecutions’ case against the defendant is weak. See, e.g.,

Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting

the cases discussed infra so holding).

4. Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel during a hearing regarding the

allegation of prior convictions.

Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to effective

assistance of counsel “during trial on priors. The State was not

able to prove two felony priors. The State’s expert witness,

Carl Speckels, was not able to compare my thumb print to

exhibits “6” and “7”, which refer to a Class “3” Felony the

State was alleging I committed on January 22, 1995.”

Respondents contend Petitioner did not properly exhaust

this claim by fairly presenting both the factual and legal

predicate for the habeas claim in the state courts. “Although

Petitioner claimed that the State had failed to prove his two

priors in his PCR petition, he did not raise it as an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Because Petitioner

has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his

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procedural default of the claim, Respondents argue, federal

habeas relief on the claim is precluded. 

The undersigned concludes Petitioner did not properly

exhaust this claim in the state courts by fairly presenting it

as a Sixth Amendment claim to the state courts. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding a

petitioner could not argue ineffective assistance of counsel

claims in a habeas action if they had not raised the specific

factual basis for the claim in the state courts); Carriger, 971

F.2d at 333-34; Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir.

2004). Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding

timeliness, waiver, and preclusion, prevent Petitioner from now

exhausting this claim in the state courts, the claim has been

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has failed to show cause

for, or prejudice arising from, his procedural default of the

claim. Accordingly, habeas relief on the merits of this claim

is precluded.

III Conclusion

Petitioner properly exhausted all but one of his

federal habeas claims in the state courts. The state courts’

decisions that Petitioner was not entitled to relief from his

convictions or sentences on the bases asserted by Petitioner

were not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

federal law. Additionally, with regard to Petitioner’s claim

regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to

the finding of prior felony convictions, Petitioner failed to

exhaust this claim in the state courts. Petitioner has not

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shown cause for nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default of the claim and, accordingly, relief on the merits of

the claim is precluded.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Pinkoson’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

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appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 23rd day of January, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-01388-ROS Document 13 Filed 01/26/09 Page 17 of 17