Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06148/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06148-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment by the 1

court in an order filed on February 6, 2004. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). (Doc. 13.)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHADID AL-BARR aka

DWAYNE X. HARMON,

Plaintiff,

v.

GAIL LEWIS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-cv-06148-LJO-SMS PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

(Doc. 74)

I. Findings and Recommendations Addressing Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Shadid Al-Barr aka Dwayne X. Harmon (“plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s complaint, filed August 25, 2003, against defendants Lewis, Bonilla, and Smith

(“defendants”) for violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Docs. 1, 10, 26.) On December 27, 2006,

defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 74.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on May

29, 2007. (Doc. 80.) 1

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 B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solelyon the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Discussion

At the time of the events in question, plaintiff was a state prisoner housed at Pleasant Valley

State Prison (“PVSP”) in Coalinga, California. At issue in this action is whether or not defendants

denied plaintiff access to religious services, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment, and discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his religion, in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that in 1999, he and other Nation of Islam (“NOI”)

members were denied access to the prison chapel for religious studygroups, and were excluded from

Ramadan, and other special Islamic events. Plaintiff alleges that in February and March of 2003, he

and NOI members were again excluded from special Islamic events. Defendant Lewis, who was the

Warden of PVSP at the time, defendant Bonilla, who was the Community Resources Manager at

PVSP at the time, and defendant Smith, who was the Community Resources Manager at the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation headquarters in Sacramento at the time,

deny that they violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

1. Free Exercise Claims

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make

no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S.

Const., amend. I. Prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,” including the free

exercise of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987).

However, “‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many

privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’” Id.

(quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060 (1948)). “In order to establish

a free exercise violation, [a prisoner] must show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion,

by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th

Cir. 1997). “In order to reach the level of a constitutional violation, the interference with one’s

practice of religion ‘must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an

interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.’” Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737

(quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987)).

“To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, . . . prison regulations

alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than

that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.” O’Lone, 382

U.S. at 349. Under this standard, “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional

rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner

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v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). First, “there must be a valid, rational connection

between the prison regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it,” and

“the governmental objective must itself be a legitimate and neutral one.” Id. A second consideration

is “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”

Id. at 90 (internal quotations and citation omitted). A third consideration is “the impact

accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation

of prison resources generally.” Id. “Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the

reasonableness of a prison regulation.” Id.

a. Exclusion from Chapel and Privilege Programs in 1999, and Eid-ulAdha Festival in 2003

Defendants argue, supported by the declaration of PVSP Muslim chaplain Michael Salaam,

that plaintiff’s inability to access the prison chapel for religious study groups did not burden

plaintiff’s practice of religion because “[s]tudy groups are not central to the observance of Islam,”

and the inability to participate in study groups “is not a substantial burden to Muslim prisoners.”

(Doc. 74-6, Salaam Dec., ¶14.) Further, special events, called privilege programs because attendance

is a privilege, are not essential to the observance of the Muslim religion, and nonattendance is not

a burden on prisoners’ religious observance. (Id., ¶5.) Due to a restriction barring participation in

privilege programs, imposed in 1998 and 1999 due to safety and security concerns following an

event at which NOI members were disruptive, plaintiff and other NOI members were excluded

participation in Ramadan services and the Eid celebration in 1999. (Id., ¶8.) However, while

“[f]asting from dawn to dusk is essential to the observance of Ramadan,” it is not essential to attend

services or the Eid celebration. (Id., ¶¶8, 9.) Prisoners were provided with sack lunches as a predawn meal to facilitate the observance of Ramadan. (Id., ¶10.) Inmates wishing to receive a sack

lunch could ask Chaplain Salaam to be put on the list, and no inmates were denied sack lunches by

Salaam during 1999. (Id., ¶¶11, 12.)

The restriction against NOI members participating in privilege groups was lifted after the

Reverend Louis Farrakhan, leader of the NOI, announced changes which harmonized NOI doctrine

with mainstream Islam, and plaintiff was allowed to participate in Ramadan in 2000, 2001, and 2003.

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 However, verified complaints and oppositions constitute opposing affidavits for purposes of the summary 2

judgment rule if they are based on facts within the pleader’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d

1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998). 

6

(Id., ¶13; Al-Barr Depo., 64:4-21.) In 2003, plaintiff was not allowed to participate in the Eid-ulAdha festival in 2003, but does not know why he was not on the ducat list. (Doc. 74-3, Al-Barr

Depo., 64:25-65:65:5.) Chaplain Salaam and all three defendants deny acting to exclude plaintiff

from this festival. (Salaam Dec., ¶16; Lewis Dec., ¶7; Bonilla Dec., ¶11; Smith Dec., ¶6.) Salaam,

who was responsible for ducating inmates to the celebration, denies excluding plaintiff or NOI

members in general. (Salaam Dec., ¶16.)

The court finds that defendants have met their initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for their motion, and identifying those portions of the record which they believe demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish

that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As stated above, in attempting to establish the

existence of this factual dispute, plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474

F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). Plaintiff must do more than attack the credibility of defendants’

evidence, see National Union Fire. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983)

(“[N]either a desire to cross-examine an affiant nor an unspecified hope of undermining his or her

credibility suffices to avert . . . judgment.”), and arguments or contentions set forth in a responding

brief do not constitute evidence, see Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 762

(9th Cir. 1987) (recitation of unsworn facts not evidence). 

2

Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that in denying plaintiff access to the prison chapel

for religious study groups, and excluding plaintiff from Ramadan services and other special events

in 1999, defendants substantially burdened the practice of plaintiff’s religion and interfered “‘with

a tenet or belief . . . central to religious doctrine.’” Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737 (quoting Graham, 822

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F.2d at 851). Defendants have submitted evidence that exclusion from these activities was not

central to the observance of Islam and did not substantially burden Muslim prisoners, and because

plaintiff has not submitted any evidence raising a dispute of material fact as to that issue, defendants

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s free exercise claim arising from the

exclusion from these activities in 1999.

Plaintiff also has not submitted any evidence supporting a claim that defendants were

responsible for his exclusion from the Eid-ul-Adha festival in 2003. Section 1983 plainly requires

that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation

alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466

F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). Absent

evidence that defendants Lewis, Bonilla, and Smith were responsible for his exclusion from this

festival, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s free exercise claim.

2. Equal Protection Claims

“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (citing

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “[P]rison officials cannot discriminate against particular

religions.” Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. “‘To state a claim . . . for a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause . . . a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)).

“Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s

protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City

of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original). “To avoid summary

judgment, [plaintiff] ‘must produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by

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a preponderance of the evidence that [defendants’] decision was . . . motivated’” by plaintiff’s

membership in a protected class. Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Bingham v. City of Manhattan

Beach, 329 F.3d 723, 732 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and alterations omitted)). 

“Where the challenged governmental policy is ‘facially neural,’ proof of its disproportionate

impact on an identifiable group can satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends to show that some

invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 687 (citing Village of

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (264-66) (1977) (internal citations

omitted)). “Themere fact that [a] facially neutral polic[y] had a foreseeably disproportionate impact

on an identifiable group does not mean that [it] violated the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 687.

a. Exclusion From Chapel in 1999

Defendants argue, supported by the declaration of defendant Lewis, who implemented the

policy in question, that the plaintiff and other NOI members were excluded from accessing the

chapel for religious study groups pursuant to the prison’s policy that inmates wishing to meet in the

chapel must be supervised by a chaplain or a volunteer representative of a religious organization

from outside the prison. (Doc. 74-4, Lewis Dec., ¶3.) The policy was instituted to preserve the

safety and security of the institution in response to a fight between Muslim inmates and members

of the Crips street gang that took place in the chapel when inmates were allowed to meet without

supervision. (Id., ¶4.) There are no cameras or guards in the chapel, so a staff person or volunteer

must be present to supervise the inmates. (Id., ¶3.) Volunteers are considered temporary staff, and

are trained to report violations of prison rules to prison authorities. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed an appeal in 1999 requesting access to the chapel for study groups, but it was

partially denied because there were no staff or volunteer chaplains available to provide leadership

and supervision for an NOI study group. (Doc. 74-3, Exhibit B; Doc. 74-5, Bonilla Dec., ¶4.)

Plaintiff was encouraged to fill out a questionnaire regarding his religious beliefs so that defendant

Bonilla could try to find a volunteer to lead an NOI study group. (Bonilla Dec., ¶4.) Defendant

Bonilla received the questionnaire on February 7, 2000, and although plaintiff listed one NOI figure

who could lead religious services or study groups, that person was unavailable to lead study groups

at PVSP. (Id., ¶5.) In September 2001, Chaplain Salaam tried to get an NOI representative, General

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Muhammed, to lead a study group for NOI members, but unfortunately, General Muhammed was

unable to come to the prison on days when Salaam worked. (Salaam Dec., ¶14.)

Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence bringing into dispute defendants’ position that the

policy restricting inmates from chapel access unless there is a chaplain or a religious volunteer

available to supervise is applicable to all inmates. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that this

facially neutral policy had a disproportionate impact on NOI members and even assuming for the

sake of argument that it did, the record is devoid of any evidence that the defendants implemented

or enforced this neutral policy in order to intentionally discriminate against NOI members.

Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication on plaintiff’s equal protection claim arising from

denial of access to the prison chapel in 1999.

b. Exclusion From Privilege Programs in 1999

Defendants argue that plaintiff was excluded participation in Ramadan services and the Eid

celebration in 1999 due to a restriction barring participation in privilege programs, imposed in 1998

and 1999 due to safety and security concerns following an event at which NOI members were

disruptive. (Lewis Dec., ¶5; Bonilla Dec., ¶6-9; Salaam Dec., ¶3-7.) Defendants contend that on

February 19, 1998, Eid-ul-Fitr, a Muslim celebration marking the end of the Ramadan fast, was held

at the prison for the benefit of Muslim prisoners. (Salaam Dec., ¶3.) Defendants contend that NOI

members displayed disruptive behavior, including addressing each other by military rank, saluting

each other in military fashion, standing at attention in a military fashion, and demanding that their

inmate minister be allowed to address the audience on an equal basis with the Muslim chaplain. (Id.)

Defendants contend that some of the Orthodox Muslims were upset by the behavior of NOI

members, and told this to Chaplain Salaam. (Id.) Chaplain Salaam reported this behavior to

defendant Bonilla, and in light of the behavior of NOI members on February 19, 1998, Salaam and

defendant Bonilla believed it would be a threat to the safety and security of the institution to allow

NOI members to attend privilege programs held for the benefit of Muslim inmates. (Salaam Dec.,

¶4; Bonilla Dec., ¶6.) This restriction against participation in privilege programs by NOI members

was lifted in 2000. (Salaam Dec., ¶13.)

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In response, plaintiff has submitted the declarations from two inmate witnesses attesting that

they were present at the 1998 Eid-ul-Fitr celebration and did not witness any disruptive behavior by

NOI members. (Doc. 80, Thompson Dec., ¶¶2, 3; Williams Dec., ¶1, 3.) These declarations are

sufficient to bring into dispute defendants’ contention that the restriction against participation in

privilege groups by NOI members was necessary to preserve the safety and security of the institution

as a result of disruptive behavior by NOI members on February 19, 1998. See Freeman, 125 F.3d

at 737-38. Defendants Lewis and Bonilla are not entitled to summary adjudication on plaintiff’s

equal protection claim arising out his inability to participate in privilege programs in 1999.

However, defendants have submitted evidence that defendant Smith, who was the

Community Resources Manager at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

headquarters in Sacramento at the time, responded to a letter from plaintiff that had been forwarded

to him by Senator Dianne Feinstein’s office in 2000. (Doc. 74-7, Smith Dec., ¶¶2, 3.) Defendant

Smith denies participating in any decision to exclude plaintiff or other NOI members from Ramadan

or any other privilege program at the prison, and attests that he took no further action after sending

plaintiff a letter in 2000. (Id., ¶6.) There is no evidence that defendant Smith was responsible for

the decision to exclude NOI from privilege programs in 1998 and 1999, or was otherwise involved

in the events which caused plaintiff to be barred from participation in privilege programs in 1999.

Indeed, plaintiff’s own allegations do not address any involvement by defendant Smith until 2003,

when plaintiff contacted defendant Smith by letter in April of 2003. (Doc. 1, Comp., 7:23-27.)

Accordingly, defendant Smith is entitled to summary adjudication on plaintiff’s equal protection

claim arising from these events. 

c. Exclusion From Eid-ul-Adha Festival in 2003

Finally, as previously discussed, although plaintiff was not allowed to participate in the Eidul-Adha festival in 2003, plaintiff does not know why he was not on the ducat list, and all three

defendants deny acting to exclude plaintiff from this festival. Plaintiff has not submitted any

evidence that defendants were responsible for excluding him from participating in the Eid-ul-Adha

festival in 2003. Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary adjudication on plaintiff’s equal

protection claim against them.

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3. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s claims against

them. Because the court recommends granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all

claims except the equal protection claim against defendants Lewis and Bonilla arising out of

plaintiff’s inability to participate in privilege programs in 1999, the court addresses defendants’

qualified immunity argument as to only that claim.

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct

violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In ruling upon the issue of qualified

immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established. Id. The inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2002). “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’

in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (citation omitted). 

In resolving the issue of qualified immunity, the court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. Martinez

v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). It is undisputed that NOImembers were restricited

from participating in privilege groups in 1999. Plaintiff has presented evidence that NOI members

were not disruptive at the 1998 Eid-ul-Fitr celebration, bringing into dispute defendants’ proffered

explanation that the restriction was imposed for safety and security concerns following NOI

members’ disruptive behavior at that celebration. These facts are sufficient to show a violation of

the Equal Protection Clause. Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. 

At the time the restriction against NOI members participating in privilege groups was

imposed, the law was “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand,” Saucier, 533

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U.S. at 202 (citation omitted), that he could not intentionally treat a group of inmates differently

based on their religion and that if he did so, the inmates’ constitutional right to equal protection

would be violated, Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. Due to the existence of material factual disputes

concerning whether the restriction was imposed due to disruptive behavior by NOI members or not,

defendants Lewis and Bonilla are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. 

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, filed December 27, 2006, be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as

follows:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s free exercise and equal

protection claims arising from plaintiff’s inability to access the prison chapel for

religious study groups in 1999 be GRANTED;

2. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s free exercise claim

arising out of exclusion from the privilege programs in 1999 be GRANTED;

3. Defendant Smith’s motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s equal protection

claim arising out of exclusion from the privilege programs in 1999 be GRANTED;

4. Defendants Lewis and Bonilla’s motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s

equal protection claim arising out of exclusion from the privilege programs in 1999

be DENIED; 

5. Defendants Lewis and Bonilla’s motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s

equal protection claim arising out of exclusion from the privilege programs in 1999

on qualified immunity grounds be DENIED; 

6. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on plaintiff’s free exercise and equal

protection claims arising from plaintiff’s exclusion from the 2003 Eid-ul-Adha

festival be GRANTED; and

7. This matter be set for jury trial on plaintiff’s surviving equal protection claim against

defendants Lewis and Bonilla.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 3, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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