Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07034/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07034-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-7034 September Term, 2023

 FILED ON: JANUARY 12, 2024 

LARRY ELLIOTT KLAYMAN, 

APPELLANT

v. 

JULIA PORTER, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:22-cv-00953) 

Before: MILLETT and RAO, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

J U D G M E N T

This case was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District 

of Columbia and on the briefs of the parties. The court has afforded the issues full consideration 

and determined they do not warrant a published opinion. See FED.R. APP. P. 36; D.C.CIR.R. 36(d). 

For the following reasons, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the appeal be DISMISSED. 

* * * 

Larry Klayman sued District of Columbia Bar officials in Florida state court. After the 

officials removed the case to federal court, Klayman asked the district court to either dismiss the 

suit or remand to state court. The district court dismissed, but not for the reasons Klayman sought. 

He now appeals those reasons. But we review judgments, not reasons. Klayman lacks standing to 

appeal from the judgment he requested, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

I.

The District of Columbia Bar’s Board on Professional Responsibility oversees lawyer 

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discipline and appoints counsel to prosecute disciplinary matters. D.C. BAR RULE XI, §§ 4(e), 6. 

Julia Porter and Hamilton Fox III, two officials in the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, prosecuted 

several ethics complaints against Klayman. See, e.g., In re Klayman, 282 A.3d 584, 587 (D.C. 

2022); Klayman v. Lim, 830 F. App’x 660, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Klayman v. Porter, 

No. 22-13025, 2023 WL 2261814, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023) (per curiam).

Klayman maintains these disciplinary proceedings were politically motivated. He sued 

Porter, Fox, and Matthew Kaiser, who was Chair of the Board, in Florida state court, alleging 

tortious interference, abuse of process, and violations of Klayman’s state constitutional rights. He 

sought injunctive relief and damages of less than $75,000.

Invoking diversity jurisdiction, the defendants removed the case to federal court and moved 

to transfer the case to the District of Columbia. Klayman sought remand to state court, arguing the 

amount in controversy was insufficient. The District Court for the Southern District of Florida 

denied Klayman’s motion to remand and transferred the case to the District of Columbia.

After the transfer, Klayman filed a new motion objecting to subject matter jurisdiction, 

again focusing on the amount in controversy. He sought either of two judgments: he asked the 

court to remand the case back to Florida state court or to “dismiss this case, without prejudice, for 

lack of ... subject matter jurisdiction.” 

The Bar officials moved to dismiss with prejudice because official immunity barred the 

claims for damages and, under the abstention doctrine recognized in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 

37 (1971), the court should abstain from enjoining ongoing bar disciplinary proceedings. 

The district court gave Klayman the judgment he sought: it dismissed the case without 

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court adopted the Bar officials’ arguments, 

holding that immunity and Younger abstention precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction. 

Klayman now appeals from the judgment he sought, objecting to how “favorable” the opinion was 

to the Bar officials while agreeing with the district court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 

II.

We “review judgments, not statements in opinions.” California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 

311 (1987) (cleaned up); see McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 603 (1821) (“The 

question before an appellate Court is, was the judgment correct, not the ground on which the 

judgment professes to proceed.”); 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD 

H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3902 (3d ed. 2022) (“[A] prevailing party 

cannot appeal simply to secure review of unfavorable findings.”). As a result, we lack “power” to 

“revise opinions”; we instead “correct wrong judgments.” Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 

(1945). Therefore, the prevailing party in district court generally “is not entitled to prosecute an 

appeal from the decree in its favor, for the purpose of reviewing the portions of the decree” to 

which it objects. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U.S. 645, 646 (1934) (per curiam). 

We have repeatedly applied this rule of appellate standing to bar appeals, like Klayman’s, 

from a judgment the appellant sought in district court. See, e.g., In re Reps. Comm. for Freedom 

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of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 

F.3d 640, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Because Klayman requested and received a dismissal without 

prejudice, there is no adverse judgment that could give him standing to appeal. 

This rule is subject to narrow exceptions, but none apply here. The Supreme Court has

allowed appeals where the party is suffering collateral legal consequences from the district court’s 

judgment, or where he suffers a cognizable injury that might allow him to appeal notwithstanding 

a judgment in his favor. Cf. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S 692, 702–04 (2011) (allowing appeal of 

precedential constitutional ruling despite official prevailing on qualified immunity). A prevailing 

party, for example, has a cognizable injury, and thus standing to appeal, when she receives only 

partial relief. Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 271 (1998). But Klayman has made no argument, 

either in the district court or here, for why—given his already re-filed state court suit—dismissal 

is not complete relief.

1

Absent these exceptions, we lack jurisdiction to hear Klayman’s appeal from the judgment 

he requested. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal without considering the district court’s reasoning

or judgment.2

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36(d), this 

disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until 

seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. 

See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41(a)(1).

Per Curiam

1 While Klayman did not raise it in his appeal, we take judicial notice of the fact that Klayman’s thenpending state court suit was later dismissed for claim splitting. See Porter, 2023 WL 2261814, at *1. This 

subsequent event, however, is irrelevant to the question of whether Klayman was “den[ied] ... part [of] the 

remedy [he] requested.” Forney, 524 U.S. at 271 (quoting United States v. Jose, 519 U.S. 54, 56 (1996) 

(per curiam)).

2 We express no view on whether official immunity warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 

12(b)(6), nor on whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) requires remand rather than dismissal in this circumstance. 

Cf. Hammer v. United States, 989 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (allowing dismissal for sovereign immunity). 

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FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk

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