Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00540/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00540-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

KENNETH WAYNE PATTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JONATHAN SHADWRICK,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 4:15-CV-540-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kenneth Wayne Patton (“Patton”) initiated this civil rights case on

April 1, 2015, for injuries he sustained on April 9, 2013, after being arrested and

placed into custody at the Etowah County Detention Center (“ECDC”). (Doc. 1).1

On October 8, 2015, Patton filed an amended complaint against Defendants

Jonathan Shadwrick (“Shadwrick”), Scott Hassell (“Hassell”), Mike O’Bryant

(“O’Bryant”), and Todd Entrekin (“Entrekin”). (Doc. 20). Defendants Hassell,

O’Bryant and Entrekin filed a Motion To Dismiss on October 19, 2015 (doc. 23)

and were dismissed from the action on January 5, 2016. (Doc. 27). Defendant

Shadwrick’s Motion To Dismiss was denied in the same Memorandum Opinion

1

 Any page references to (“Doc. __”) correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering

system.

FILED

 2016 Dec-13 PM 03:23

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 1 of 46
and Order on January 5, 2016. (Doc. 27). 

Currently pending before the court is Shadwrick’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (the “Motion”) filed on August 22, 2016. (Doc. 37). Shadwrick filed his

evidentiary materials and supporting brief on this same date. (Doc. 38). Patton

opposed the Motion on September 12, 2016. (Doc. 42). Shadwrick filed his reply

on September 23, 2016. (Doc. 46). Accordingly, the Motion is now under

submission and, for the reasons explained below, is due to be GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART. 

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment Generally

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.

R . CIV. P. 56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable

inferences are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.

Ed. 2d 202 (1986). “Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for

summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to ‘come forward

2

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with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” International

Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587,

106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).

Finally “[i]f the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, because, as a

defendant, it is asserting an affirmative defense, it must establish that there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to any element of that defense.” International

Stamp, 456 F.3d at 1274 (citing Martin v. Alamo Community College Dist., 353

F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003)). 

B. Qualified Immunity

Shadwrick asserts that qualified immunity bars Patton’s federal claims

brought against him. (Doc. 38 at 21). “The defense of qualified immunity

completely protects government officials performing discretionary functions from

suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th

Cir. 2003)). “To receive qualified immunity, a government official first must prove

that he was acting within his discretionary authority.” Id. 

3

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This is a two-part test. Under the first step, “the defendant must [prove that

he or she was] performing a function that, but for the alleged constitutional

infirmity, would have fallen within his legitimate job description.” Holloman ex

rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004)(emphasis in

original). Next, the defendant must prove that he or she was “executing that

job-related function.” Id. at 1266. “Once a defendant establishes that he was acting

within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the

defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358.

Until 2009, the Supreme Court had required a two-part inquiry to determine

the applicability of qualified immunity, as established by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). Under the Saucier test,

“[t]he threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is

whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.”

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2513,153 L. Ed. 2d 666

(2002).

If, under the plaintiff’s allegations, the defendant would have violated a

constitutional right, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was

clearly established.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201,

121 S. Ct. at 2156). The “clearly established” requirement is designed to assure

4

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 4 of 46
that officers have fair notice of the conduct which is proscribed. Hope, 536 U.S. at

739, 122 S. Ct. at 2515. This second inquiry ensures “that before they are

subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.” Saucier, 533

U.S. at 206, 121 S. Ct. at 2158.

The “unlawfulness must be apparent” under preexisting law.2 Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)

(citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097-98, 89 L.

Ed. 2d 271 (1986)). Therefore, a temporal requirement exists related to this

inquiry. More particularly, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable public officer

would not have believed his actions to be lawful in light of law that was clearly

established at the time of the purported violation. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at

639,107 S. Ct. at 3038 (“[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity

may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally

turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action[,] assessed in light of

the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken[.]”)

(emphasis added) (citation omitted); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125

2

 Only Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, and Alabama Supreme Court cases can “clearly

establish” the law in this litigation. See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“In this circuit, rights are ‘clearly established’ by decisions of the Supreme Court, this court, or

the highest court of the state in which the case arose.” (citing Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525,

1532 n.7 (11th Cir. 1996))).

5

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S. Ct. 596, 599, 160 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2004) (“If the law at that time did not clearly

establish that the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer

should not be subject to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.”)

(emphasis added); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198, 125 S. Ct. at 599 (“Because the

focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful,

reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the

conduct.”) (emphasis added).

However, the Saucier framework was made non-mandatory by the Supreme

Court in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818, 172 L. Ed.

2d 565 (2009), in which the Court concluded that, “while the sequence set forth

[in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”

Thus, “judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted

to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances

in the particular case at hand.” Id.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

On April 9, 2013, Etowah County deputy sheriffs arrested Patton on charges

3

 This statement does not represent actual findings of fact. See In re Celotex Corp., 487

F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). Instead, the court has provided this statement simply to place

the court’s legal analysis in the context of this particular case or controversy. 

6

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 6 of 46
of domestic violence and then transported him to the ECDC. AF No. 1.

4

Corrections Officer Shadwrick was working the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift at the

jail and was assigned to the booking room along with Corrections Officer Karen

Cook (“Officer Cook”). AF No. 2. Shadwrick had been employed at the ECDC as

a detention deputy since March 2012. AAF No. 2.

5,6

 

4

 The designation “AF” stands for admitted fact and indicates a fact offered by

Shadwrick that Patton has admitted in his written submissions on summary judgment, in his

deposition testimony, or by virtue of any other evidence offered in support of his case. Under

Appendix II of the court’s uniform initial order (Doc. 2) entered on April 1, 2015, “[a]ll

statements of fact must be supported by specific reference to evidentiary submissions.” (Id. at

16). For Patton, more specifically, this means that “[a]ny statements of fact that are disputed by

the non-moving party must be followed by a specific reference to those portions of the

evidentiary record upon which the dispute is based.” (Id. at 17). Consequently, whenever Patton

has inadequately asserted a dispute over a fact that Shadwrick has otherwise substantiated with

an evidentiary citation, the court has reviewed the cited evidence and, if it in fact fairly supports

Shadwrick’s factual assertion, has accepted Shadwrick’s fact. On the other hand, whenever

Patton has adequately disputed a fact offered by Shadwrick, the court has reviewed the evidence

cited by Patton and, if it in fact fairly supports Patton’s factual assertion, has accepted Patton’s

version. The court’s numbering of admitted facts (e.g., AF No. 1) corresponds to the numbering

of Shadwrick’s statement of undisputed facts as set forth in Doc. 38 and responded to by Patton

in Doc. 42. A number following a decimal point corresponds to the particular sentence within the

numbered statement of facts. For example, (AF No. 1.2) would indicate the second sentence of

paragraph 1 of Shadwrick’s facts is the subject of the court’s citation to the record. 

5

 In his Response (doc. 42) to Shadwrick’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 37),

Patton proffered fifty-three additional undisputed facts. Shadwrick did not dispute any of these

additional proffered facts in his Reply brief (doc. 46). Therefore, these facts are also deemed to

be admitted in accordance with Appendix II of the Court’s Uniform Initial Order. The court’s

numbering of these additional admitted facts (e.g., AAF No. 1) corresponds to the numbering of

the facts as set forth in Patton’s Response brief (doc. 42).

6

 Patton has offered additional facts regarding Shadwrick’s termination from employment

at the ECDC in September 2015. However, since his termination occurred more than two years

after the incident which gave rise to this litigation, the court has deemed these facts irrelevant for

the purposes of this analysis. See AAF Nos. 3, 4. 

7

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 7 of 46
Shadwrick’s contact with Patton started in the report room, a separate area

from the booking room, where Shadwrick took Patton’s medical history. AF No. 3.

In the report room, Shadwrick warned Patton about his use of profanity when he

cursed at the arresting officer and in front of the intake nurse. AF No. 4.

Shadwrick testified that he overheard Patton have an outburst of profanity directed

towards another deputy, an arresting officer, in the report room. AF No. 5; (Doc.

38-2 at 51:4-8). 

Patton told Officer Shadwrick twice that he was a corrections officer for St.

Clair Correctional Facility and that he could not be in general population. AF No.

6; AAF No. 5. As of the date of his deposition in April 2016, Patton had been

employed at St. Clair Correctional Facility for 13 years. AAF No. 1. Patton

testified that he told Shadwrick he did not want to go into general population and

wanted to go to a single cell, fearing that the other inmates would recognize and

harm him. AAF No. 6. He also testified that he told Shadwrick he had been

hospitalized with cysts in his stomach. AAF No. 8. Shadwrick testified that he

understood this information to mean that Patton could not be placed in the general

population housing unit, not that he needed to be segregated from all inmates. AF.

8

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 8 of 46
No. 7.

7

 Shadwrick did not seek advice from his superiors on how to respond to

Patton’s request for segregation. AAF No. 7. 

ECDC polices and procedures contain guidance for placing inmates in

administrative segregation. AF No. 86. “Administrative segregation is a nonpunitive form of separation from the general population used when the continued

presence of the detainee in the general population would pose a threat to self, staff,

other detainees, property, or the security or orderly operation of the facility.” AF

No. 87. Administrative segregation status includes detainees who require

protective custody, those who are holdovers en route to another facility, and those

who require separation for medical reasons. AAF No. 10; (Doc. 38-13 at 2).

According to ECDC Policy, “A detainee requires protection. Protective custody

(PC) may be initiated at the detainee’s requests . . . . [such as] ‘Detainees who seek

protection claiming to be former law enforcement officers or to have held a

sensitive law enforcement position, whether or not there is official information to

verify the claim.’” AF No. 88. Shadwrick was trained on ECDC’s policy regarding

7

 The ECDC policy on Administrative Segregation “does not distinguish between

inmates/detainees in holding cells versus other inmates in the facility.” (Doc. 42 at 2, ¶ 7); (Doc.

38-13). The policy also states that, except when exigent circumstances make it impracticable, “a

written order shall be completed and approved by a supervisory officer before a detainee is

placed in administrative segregation,” and the Officer in Charge (OIC) shall “complete the

Administrative Segregation Order, detailing the reasons for placing a detainee in administrative

segregation, before actual placement.” (Doc. 38-13 at 4).

9

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 9 of 46
Administrative Segregation. AAF No. 9. 

Shadwrick sat at the desk and began booking Patton into the jail. AF No.

9.1. Shadwrick asked Patton questions and then entered his responses. AF No. 9.2.

During the booking process, Patton stood on the other side of the desk facing

Shadwrick with his hands on the counter. AF No. 10. Eventually, two inmate

workers, Denzel Beck (“Beck”) and Henry Kicklighter (“Kicklighter”) entered the

booking room and occupied the area just behind where Shadwrick sat. AF. No 11.

As inmate workers, Beck and Kicklighter would perform duties such as laundry

and cleaning the intake area, booking area, hallways, and laundry area. AF. No.

12. Patton recognized Beck, whom Patton knew from a marriage to one of his

cousins.

8

 AF No. 13. Although it had been some time since they had seen each

other, Patton and Beck had apparently never gotten along well. AF. No. 14. 

Patton looked in Beck and Kicklighter’s direction, who were both seated

behind Shadwrick, and said, “What are you looking at f*** boy?” AF No. 15.

Shadwrick heard the outburst of profanity and believed that Patton’s outburst of

profanity was directed toward Beck and Kicklighter rather than him. AF No. 16;

8

 Beck stated during the internal review of the altercation that Patton had directed the

vulgarity at him and that Patton was his ex-wife’s cousin. AF No. 96;(Doc. 38-10 at 3, ¶ 12).

Although it could not be substantiated, the investigation also suggested that there may have been

some type of extra marital history between the two men. AF No. 97; (Doc. 38-10 at 3, ¶ 13). 

10

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 10 of 46
AAF No. 11. At deposition, Patton agreed that his outburst was directed at the

inmates rather than at Shadwrick. AF No. 17.

Shadwrick did not hear Beck or Kicklighter say anything in response to

Patton’s outburst. AF No. 18. On video,

9

 neither inmate Beck nor Kicklighter

appeared to react to Patton’s outburst and remained seated until Patton was placed

into the holding cell. AF No. 19. Shadwrick looked up at Patton and told him to

watch his language and that he had already “told him about his language and his

attitude” and then said, “it was starting to piss me off.” AAF No. 12; AF Nos. 20,

21.

10 Patton testified that he believed Shadwrick was aggravated with him. AAF

No. 13.

The booking area had seven holding cells and two larger bullpen-type cells.

AF No. 29, 71. All holding cells other than Holding cell 2, which was reserved as

a female holding cell, were full at the time that Shadwrick booked Patton into the

jail. AF No. 30.

11

 Shadwrick testified that Patton was placed in Holding cell 7

9

 Shadwrick has conventionally filed with the court an audio/video copy of his booking

on CD-Rom. (Doc. 38-1). This CD-Rom includes 3 different jail videos on Channels 3, 4, 5.

Accordingly, all future references to segments from these videos will include the CM/ECF

number, the video channel (CH) number(s), and the relevant time segment. 

10

 Patton asserts that the jail video shows Shadwrick get visibly angry and have an

outburst directed towards Patton. AAF No. 25; (Doc. 38-1, Channel 3 at 20:38:56). 

11

 According to ECDC cell assignment history, at the time of the incident the holding

cells were occupied as follows: Holding cell 2 was unoccupied but was reserved as a female

holding cell. AF No. 72, 73. Holding cell 3 contained an individual who was charged with capital

11

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 11 of 46
because it was the only place that had room. AAF No. 14. Shadwrick opened the

door to Holding cell 7 and Patton entered without incident. AF No. 22.1.

Shadwrick closed the cell door, walked away momentarily, and then returned to

his seat behind the desk. AF No. 22.2. 

At the time Patton was placed in Holding cell 7, the cell was occupied by

inmate Moses Reyes (“Reyes”), who had been brought in earlier that evening. AF

No. 23. At deposition, Shadwrick testified that he was familiar with inmate Moses

Reyes based on prior incarcerations and knew that Reyes would sometimes get

into trouble. AF No. 25. He testified that he knew that Reyes had been in trouble

“a few times” while an inmate at the ECDC, but at his deposition he could not

remember exactly what the incidents were and stated that he was aware of only

one previous altercation involving Reyes and another inmate. AF Nos. 26, 27;

AAF No. 23. 

In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Shadwrick entered Moses

Reyes’ past incident reports into evidence. (Doc. 38-12). These reports describe

the following incidents:

murder. AF No. 74. Holding cell 6 contained an individual who was a known security risk. AF

No. 75. Holding cell 7 contained Moses Reyes who had been arrested on drug-related charges.

AF. No. 76. Holding cell 8 contained an individual who had been placed in a holding cell for

medical reasons. AF. No. 77. Isolation Holding cell 1 contained a mentally ill individual charged

with capital murder. AF. No. 78. Isolation Holding cell 2 contained a mentally ill individual. AF.

No. 79. 

12

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• On January 1, 2013, the SOD team responded to Reyes’ refusal

to obey orders to return to his cell for lock down. AF No. 65;

AAF No. 22; (Doc. 38-12 at 21-22). 

• On October 19, 2012,

12 Reyes and another inmate were observed

fighting. A code red was called and the SOD team, which

included Officer Shadwrick and two other deputies, responded.

AF No. 66; AAF No. 16; (Doc. 38-12 at 2-3).

13

• On May 1, 2012, a code blue was called and the SOD team and

nurses responded when Reyes cut his arm with a razor blade that

was later found in his cell. Reyes’ injury required that he be sent

to the hospital for stitches. AF No. 67; AAF No. 21 (Doc. 38-12

at 17-20). 

• On March 21, 2012, a code yellow was called when Reyes

refused orders to hang up a telephone and return to his cell for

lockdown after learning his mother had passed away. Reyes

became combative and resisted a deputy. After being restrained

with a minimal amount of force, Reyes was brought to booking

and put in a holding cell. AF No. 68; AAF No. 20; (Doc. 38-12 at

11-16). 

• On December 31, 2011, a tattoo pen and ink were recovered from

Reyes’s cell. AF No. 69; AAF No. 18; (Doc. 38-12 at 6).

• On December 30, 2011, Reyes and his cellmate screamed and

12

 Defendant Shadwrick incorrectly lists this incident as occurring on September 19,

2012. The correct date is October 19, 2012. (Doc. 38-12 at 2-3). 

13

 Shadwrick stated in his deposition that Reyes was not the instigator of the inmate-oninmate violence and was merely defending himself on October 19, 2012. (Doc 38-2 at 62:15-20).

Shadwrick based this claim on a statement allegedly made by another officer that the other

inmate jumped on Reyes. (Doc. 38-2 at 63:2-5). However, Shadwrick was not himself present at

the outset of the fight on October 19, 2012, and he has not provided evidence of another officer’s

statement to substantiate his claim. The incident report from October 19, 2012, does not describe

who started the altercation. (Doc. 38-12 at 2). Accordingly, the court disregards Shadwrick’s

inadmissible hearsay statement. 

13

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 13 of 46
beat on the vent and door of their cell, making a loud commotion

and continuing to do so despite orders to stop. AF No. 70; AAF

No. 17; (Doc. 38-12 at 5). 

After placing Patton with Reyes in Holding cell 7, Shadwrick returned to his

desk and continued the booking process on the computer, such as entering the

charges and placing an entry into the daily committed report. AF No. 31. On

video, as Shadwrick worked at his desk, Beck stood up, looked in Holding cell 7

as he walked past, and then got a drink at a water fountain next to the cell. AF No.

32. As Beck returned back to his seat, he looked toward Holding cell 7, nodded,

and then continued walking back to his chair. AF No. 33. As he walked away,

Beck pointed at the holding cell while Shadwrick continued to work at the desk.

AF No. 34. Beck sat back down in the chair behind Officer Shadwrick. AF No. 35. 

As Officer Shadwrick continued looking forward at the computer screen,

Beck quickly made hand gestures in the direction of Holding cell 7 in what

appeared to be a message to Reyes to assault Patton. AF No. 36, 98. Beck’s hand

gestures occurred behind Officer Shadwrick’s back while he faced the other

direction. AF No. 37. At his deposition, Shadwrick testified that he did not see

Beck give any hand signals to Reyes. AF No. 38.

14

14

 While Patton claims the jail video shows that Beck was in Shadwrick’s line of sight

when Beck pointed towards Holding cell 7, the video evidence does not show that Shadwrick

reacted or responded in any way that would indicate he acknowledged or even noticed Beck’s

14

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 14 of 46
At his deposition, Patton likewise testified that he did not see Beck give any

hand signals to Reyes, and having seen the jail video, agreed Beck was sneaky

about the hand signals. AF No. 39. On video, Beck stood up from his chair and

both Beck and Kicklighter began looking toward Holding cell 7. AF No. 40. As

Shadwrick continued working at his desk, Beck and Kicklighter remained focused

on the holding cell. AF No. 41. Beck and Kicklighter then reacted to something.

AF No. 42. Reyes hit Patton in the nose, causing him to fall back against the door,

which caused a loud noise. AF No. 44; AAF No. 48.

15

According to his narrative summary of the incident, Shadwrick “heard what

appeared to be a verbal argument in Holding Cell #7” at some point in time

between when he put Patton in the holding cell and when he stood up and looked

hand signals. AAF No. 31; (Doc. 42 at 3, ¶ 38); (Doc. 38-1, Channel 4, at 20:40:04). 

15

 In his narrative summary of the incident, Reyes wrote that Patton started the fight.

(Doc. 38-10 at 4, ¶ 20). Shadwrick offers this assertion as an admitted fact. AF No. 104. Patton

disputes this fact as inadmissible hearsay and cites to his own testimony at deposition that Reyes

suddenly attached him without warning as soon as the cell door closed. (Doc. 42 at 5, ¶ 104);

(Doc. 38-3 at 43:4-20). Accordingly, the court will not consider this specific evidence in the

context of the Motion for Summary Judgment. See Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-23

(11th Cir. 1999) (stating that hearsay evidence may not be considered on summary judgment

unless it can be “reduced to admissible form”). Regardless, it does not matter whether Reyes’s

statements are inadmissible hearsay because, even taking them into consideration, they are not

probative of the question at hand: whether Shadwrick was subjectively aware of a substantial risk

to Patton. See Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1333 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013). 

15

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in the direction of the cell. AF No. 28; (Doc. 38-11 at 10).16

 Shadwrick and Officer

Cook suddenly stood up and looked in the direction of the holding cell. AF No.

45; AAF Nos. 27, 28, 29, 33. At deposition, Shadwrick testified that he heard a

bump sound and then heard one of the inmate workers say “they’re fighting.” AF

No. 46.1 (Doc. 38-2 at 65:2-10). He then stood up to look through the window of

the cell. AF No. 46.2; AAF Nos. 34, 35, 49. Shadwrick called a “Code Red” into

his radio. AF No. 47.

 At Section III, Subsection A, the ECDC Policy and Procedure on Use of

Force states, “When a detainee acts violently or appears on the verge of violent

actions, if necessary, staff shall use reasonable force and/or restrains to prevent

him/her from harming self, others, and/or property.” AAF No. 50; (Doc. 43-2 at 2).

Shadwrick testified that, in the event a fight breaks out between two inmates, he

was trained to assess the situation, call a “Code Red,” advise the responding

deputies on the situation, wait until the Special Operations Detail (“SOD”) team

arrives, and then provide assistance as needed. AF No. 48; (Doc. 38-2 at 20-24).

He further testified that once a “Code Red” is called, SOD officers respond and

take control of the situation. AF No. 49; (Doc. 38-2 at 20-24). 

16

 Patton asserts that the jail video shows that Shadwrick does not check on Patton after

placing him in the cell with Reyes. AAF No. 29 (citing Doc. 38-1, Channel 4 at 20:39:16). 

16

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 47 Filed 12/13/16 Page 16 of 46
According to Detention Center Administrator Scott Hassell, Shadwrick

quickly responded to the altercation by calling a “Code Red,” which caused the

SOD team to arrive and respond to the incident. AF Nos. 80, 93; (Doc. 38-10 at 4,

¶¶ 9,24). The SOD is a two-man team that works around the clock to respond to

emergencies and incidents within the ECDC. AF No. 81. SOD officers have

special training that allows them to handle such situations in a safe and

appropriate manner. AF No. 82. The SOD team can generally respond to any

location in the facility in three minutes or less. AF No. 83. 

Accordingly to Hassell, ECDC correction officers are taught that if they

observe an altercation within a cell, their first priority is to call a Code Red and

then secure the scene as such fights are commonly a ruse to get an officer to open

the cell door to facilitate an escape. AF No. 84; (Doc. 38-10 at 4, ¶28). The

security risk from such ruses is greater during the night shift, which runs 6:00 pm

to 6:00 a.m., as there are fewer correctional officers on duty than during the day

shift. AF No. 85; (Doc. 38-10 at 5, ¶29). 

Shadwrick went to the holding cell door. AF No. 50. At his deposition,

Shadwrick testified that through the cell window he could see Reyes standing over

Patton and hitting him while Patton covered his head with his arms and did not

fight back. AF No. 51; AAF No. 53. Inmate Beck walked over to Kicklighter and

17

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gave him a fist bump as Shadwrick faced the other direction looking into the cell. 

AF Nos. 52, 100. Shadwrick waited and watched the altercation between Patton

and Reyes before he heard the buzzer signaling that the SOD team had arrived. AF

No. 53; (Doc. 38-1, Channel 4 at 20:41:33 to 20:42:16).17

 Shadwrick was carrying

pepper spray, which he shook up. AAF No. 36, 51. He testified that did not use the

pepper spray to stop the beating because “that’s two inmates, and I’m one deputy.”

AAF No. 52. 

Shadwrick realized there was another inmate on the phone in the booking

room and went to assist the other corrections officers in placing him in a holding

cell. AF No. 54. Shadwrick saw the SOD officers coming through the sally port

and ran to the security door to let the officers into the booking room. AF No. 55;

AAF No. 41. Once the SOD officers were in the booking area, Officer Shadwrick

rushed to meet them at the holding cell door. AF No. 56. Officer Shadwrick

opened the cell door for the SOD officers on their command. AF No. 57; AAF No.

42. The SOD officers entered and separated Patton and Reyes. AF No. 58. The

SOD officers removed Patton from the cell and told him to sit on a chair until

medical arrived. AF No. 59. 

17

 Patton asserts that the jail video shows Shadwrick make some small kicking

movements towards the door of Holding cell 7. AAF No. 40 (citing Doc. 38-1, Channel 4 at

20:42:05). 

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Medical staff arrived to assess Patton’s injuries. AF No. 60. Patton was then

taken to Riverview Regional Medical Center for treatment and later returned to the

detention center. AF No. 61. A search of Holding cell 7 revealed a cell phone case

which was removed from the cell. AF No. 62. During the attack, Patton suffered a

broken nose, a cut over the left eye, a concussion, and two broken teeth. AF No.

63. 

Under ECDC policy and procedure, any time there is a use of force or any

incident that requires medical treatment for an inmate, an internal review is

conducted into the situation. AF No. 89. Pursuant to procedure, such a review was

conducted into the incident by Captain Shane Hartley, who then provided his

findings to Detention Center Administrator Hassell. AF No. 90. The review

included viewing the video of the booking room, interviewing involved parties,

and taking their written statements. AF No. 91.

Review of the video and conversations with those involved revealed that the

altercation was likely initiated, or at the least encouraged, by inmate worker

Denzil Beck, who was in the booking room when Patton was placed into Holding

cell 7. AF No. 94. Beck denied any involvement, and Kicklighter denied any

knowledge of Beck initiating the fight. AF Nos. 101,102. Beck was ultimately

disciplined for his involvement in possibly instigating the fight. AF No. 103. 

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The investigation also revealed that Patton had identified himself as a

corrections officer to Officer Shadwrick. AF No. 105. Administrator Hassel

counseled Officer Shadwrick on the importance of constant monitoring and

securing of all inmate workers under his charge. AF No. 106; AAF No. 32.

IV. ANALYSIS

Count One of Patton’s Amended Complaint (doc. 20) asserts a deliberate

indifference claim against Shadwrick pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

18,19

 Patton

makes three primary arguments that Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference.

First, Patton argues that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm when he was

placed in a cell with another inmate, despite multiple requests for segregation due

to his employment as a corrections officer. Second, Patton argues that his

placement in a holding cell with a known violent inmate, who had previously been

involved in an inmate-on-inmate altercation, constituted a substantial risk of

18

 As a result of this court’s prior ruling (doc. 27), Count One is the only claim now

pending. 

19

 Section 1983 provides a vehicle for bringing claims for constitutional violations

committed under color of state law. To survive summary judgment on his § 1983 claim, Patton

must demonstrate both that Shadwrick deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington

v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). “A person acts under color of state law when

he acts with authority possessed by virtue of his employment with the state.” Griffin v. City of

Opa–Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). There is no dispute that Shadwrick acted

under color of state law. Instead, the focus on summary judgment is whether Patton has adduced

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Shadwrick acted with

deliberate indifference in his placement of Patton in the same cell block as Reyes. 

20

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serious harm. Third, Patton argues that Shadwrick acted with deliberate

indifference by waiting for the SOD team to intervene in the altercation after he

called the “Code Red.” 

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Prison officials have an obligation to protect prisoners from violence

inflicted upon them by other prisoners. “It is not, however, every injury

suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into

constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's

safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977,

128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). Prison officials must “take reasonable

measuresto guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468

U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984). Only

“[a] prison official’s deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk

of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Marsh v.

Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).20

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). 

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment “when a substantial

risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists

and the official does not respond reasonably to the risk.” Carter v.

Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.2003) (internal quotation

20

 Patton’s Amended Complaint (doc. 20) invoked both the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Where the inmate is merely detained pretrial, rather than pursuant to a lawful

sentence, it is the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth, that provides protection for the

prisoner against deliberate indifference by prison officials to a substantial risk of bodily harm.

Compare Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003) (pretrial and Fourteenth

Amendment), with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (post-conviction and Eighth

Amendment). Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment governs Patton’s claims. That conclusion

makes little difference to the analysis on summary judgment, however, because “the standard for

providing basic human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under both the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n. 5

(11th Cir. 2001). 

21

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marks omitted) (alterations adopted) (emphasis added); see also Farmer,

511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 1974 (“A prison official's ‘deliberate

indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates

theEighth Amendment.”). To survive summary judgment on a deliberate

indifference failure-to-protect claim, “a plaintiff must produce sufficient

evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants'

deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Goodman v.

Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir.2013) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

When examining the first element—a substantial risk of serious

harm—the court uses an objective standard. See Marsh v. Butler Cnty.,

Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028–29 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc), abrogated on

other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The second element—the defendant's

deliberate indifference to thatrisk—hastwo components: one subjective

and one objective. To satisfy the subjective component, a plaintiff must

produce evidence that the defendant “actually (subjectively) kn[ew]that

an inmate [faced] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Rodriguez, 508

F.3d at 617 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 837, 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1974,

1979, 1982–83, and other cases) (footnote omitted). To satisfy the

objective component, a plaintiff must produce evidence that the

defendant “disregard[ed] that known risk by failing to respond to it in

an (objectively) reasonable manner.” Id.

With regard to the subjective component of the second element—i.e.,

the defendant's actual knowledge that an inmate faced a substantial risk

of serious harm—the defendant “must both be aware of facts fromwhich

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837,

114 S.Ct. at 1979. “Whether a prison official had the requisite

knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to

demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from

circumstantial evidence.” Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617 (quoting Farmer,

511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. at 1981) (quotation marks omitted).

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 2014).

22

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With respect to evaluating a defendant’s failure to act, the “known risk of injury

must be ‘a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility.’” Brown v. Hughes,

894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271,

1276 (11th Cir. 1989)). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has “stress[ed] that ‘a

prison custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety.’” Purcell ex rel. Estate

of Morgan v. Toombs County, Ga, 400 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990)).

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized, however, that inmate-on-inmate

violence can amount to serious harm. Scott v. Miami Dade County, 2016 WL

4073246 (11th Cir. Aug. 1, 2016) (unpublished)(citing Purcell ex rel. Estate of

Morgan, 400 F.3d at 1320 (“We accept that an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate

violence at a jail creates a substantial risk of serious harm.”)).21 In order to succeed

on his deliberate indifference claim, Patton must first establish that the risk of

serious harm was substantial. 

To satisfy the subjective component of the second element of a deliberate

indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that would allow a jury to conclude

that the defendant actually knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of

21

 In the Eleventh Circuit, unpublished decisions are not binding precedent, but they

may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2. 

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serious harm. See Caldwell, 718 F.3d at 1099. However, a jury does not have to

infer that the defendants “intended” or “actually believed” that an inmate would

harm the plaintiff; rather, “it is enough that a jury be able to infer from the

evidence that the defendants actually knew of a substantial risk that another

inmate would seriously harm the plaintiff.” Id. at 1102 (emphases in original). To

satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must provide evidence that the

defendant failed to respond to the substantial risk in an objectively reasonable

manner. Id.

The third requirement for a Section 1983 deliberate indifference claim to

succeed is that the plaintiff demonstrate a causal connection between the prison

official’s conduct and the constitutional violation. As previously stated, a prison

official may be liable only if he “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994). 

The critical question for the causation analysis is whether the defendant was

“in a position to take steps that could have averted” the incident through his

“duties, discretion and means” but, through his deliberate indifference, failed to do

so. Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 622 (11th Cir.

2007)(citing Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1384 (11th Cir. 1982); see also

24

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Id. at 622-23 (citing LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1539 (11th Cir. 1993)

(“[A] plaintiff demonstrates the ‘necessary causal link’ in this context where he is

able to show that the prison official (1) ‘had the means substantially to improve’

the inmate’s safety, (2) ‘knew that the actions he undertook would be insufficient

to provide [the inmate] with reasonable protection from violence,’ and (3) had

‘other means [ ] available to him which he nevertheless disregarded.”). 

The Eleventh Circuit in Rodriguez took into consideration that the facility

“had an established protocol for handling an inmate’s life-threatening security

concerns - immediate administrative segregation, combined with a thorough

protective management review” when it concluded that the prison official had

other means available to him that he “nevertheless disregarded and that those

means were means that could have averted the substantial risk of serious harm

facing [the plaintiff].” Id. at 623 (internal citations omitted). 

A. Shadwrick’s Failure to Segregate Patton

Patton’s first two deliberate indifference arguments relate to Shadwrick’s

failure to segregate Patton. Because the same analysis informs this court’s

discussion of both these arguments, the court will discuss them together. In order

to prevail on either of his claims based on Shadwrick’s failure to segregate him,

Patton must initially show that Shadwrick possessed more than a “generalized

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awareness of risk” to Patton. Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.

2003). Ultimately, the court concludes that Shadwrick’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is due to be GRANTED as to Patton’s deliberate indifference claim

based on Shadwrick’s failure to totally segregate Patton from all other inmates.

However, Shadwrick’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be DENIED as to

Patton’s deliberate indifference claim based on Shadwrick’s placement of Patton

in a holding cell with Reyes, an inmate that Shadwrick knew had been involved in

inmate-on-inmate violence.

The undisputed material facts in this case are similarly situated to those in

Caldwell and in Scott v. Miami Dade County, 2016 WL 4073246 (11th Cir. Aug.

1, 2016)(unpublished) (“Miami Dade”). In Caldwell, the plaintiff was also

involved in an inmate-on-inmate assault. The plaintiff presented evidence that he

feared for his health and safety because his cellmate, who had a history of violence

and disruption, used the personal belongings of the plaintiff to start a fire. Id. at

1100, 1101. The plaintiff also presented evidence that, after the fire but before he

was returned to his cell, defendants were made aware of the fire and of the

plaintiff’s concern for his safety. Id. at 1101. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that

“a reasonable jury could infer from these facts that the defendants actually knew

that [the plaintiff] faces a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.

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In Miami Dade, the plaintiff similarly alleged that he informed the

defendants that he “feared for his safety if he was not kept separate from other

inmates.” 2016 WL 4073246 at *5. On multiple occasions, the plaintiff filed

written and verbal grievances that he feared assault from former gang members

and requested that he be kept “separate from all inmates at all times.” Id. at *1.

However, on one occasion, the plaintiff was transported to the courthouse for an

appearance and was temporarily placed in a holding cell with an inmate who had

previously threatened him. Id. Despite re-informing an officer that “he had to be

housed separately from all inmates at all times,” he was informed that this

restriction was not on his jail card and that, accordingly, he would not be

segregated. Id. at *2. The plaintiff was soon thereafter involved in an assault with

his inmate. Id. The Eleventh Circuit determined that a reasonable jury could

conclude that the risk was substantial. Id. at *3. 

Shadwrick relies on Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.

2003) to support his claim that he possessed only a generalized awareness of

Reyes’s violent history. He argues that his vague recollection of Reyes’s past

incidents does not “satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.” Carter, 352

F.3d at 1350. In Carter, the plaintiff was placed in a cell with a high-security

inmate, who informed the plaintiff that he intended to fake a hanging in order to

27

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obtain a transfer and would require the plaintiff’s assistance “one way or another.”

Id. at 1348. Though the plaintiff conveyed this information to prison officials, they

took no action; subsequently, the plaintiff was stabbed in the stomach with a shank

by his inmate. Id. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, although the plaintiff’s

inmate “was a ‘problem inmate’ with a well-documented history of prison

disobedience and had been prone to violence,” the prison officials possessed only

a “generalized awareness” of his propensity for violence and could not actually

draw the inference that the inmate created a serious risk of harm to the plaintiff. Id.

at 1349-50. 

Carter differs from the facts of this case in two key ways. First, while the

plaintiff’s inmate in Carter had a record of violence and disturbances while

incarcerated, “he had never previously assaulted a cellmate.” Id. at 1348 n. 6.

Second, while the plaintiff in Carter reported the inmate’s faked hanging

statement to the defendants, he did not make a request for protective custody. Id.

at 1350. Thus, Carter actually supports denial of summary judgment as to Patton’s

deliberate indifference claim relating to his being placed in a cell with Reyes. 

Shadwrick’s reliance on Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir.

2013) is similarly inapposite as to Patton’s “placement with Reyes” claim but

supports summary judgment as to Patton’s claim based on a failure to totally

28

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segregate him from all inmates. In Goodman, the court found that the jail’s

deactivation of call buttons and failure to conduct required cell checks was

egregious but did not amount to more than either negligence or gross negligence

because there was no evidence “indicating that the officers knew [the plaintiff]

was in danger and, equipped with that knowledge, deliberately disregarded that

risk.” Id. at 1333. Further, there was no evidence before the Eleventh Circuit that

the inmate who assaulted the detainee in Goodman had a prior history of violence.

The court upheld the district court’s determination that the plaintiff’s deliberate

indifference claim was not viable because, despite troubling evidence of the

officers’ dereliction of duty and policy deviations, a reasonable jury could not find

that the defendants subjectively “knew of a substantial risk of serious harm” to the

plaintiff. Id. at 1332 (emphasis in original).

i. Shadwrick’s Failure To Totally Segregate Patton from all

Other Inmates Did Not Rise to the Level of Deliberate

Indifference

Patton relies on ECDC policy to argue that Shadwrick acted with deliberate

indifference by failing to totally and immediately segregate him. The ECDC policy

on administrative segregation does not require that a prison guard verify the

employment status of an arrestee who claims he is a member of law enforcement.

Rather, the policy dictates that a detainee claiming protection as a law enforcement

29

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officer may request segregation “whether or not there is official information to

verify the claim.” (Doc. 38-13 at 4). However, the policy also states,

A written order shall be completed and approved by a supervisory

officer before a detainee is placed in administrative segregation, except

when exigent circumstances make this impracticable. In such cases, an

order shall be prepared as soon as possible. A copy of this order shall be

given to the detainee within 24 hours, unless delivery would jeopardize

the safety, security, or orderly operation of the facility.

(Doc. 38-13 at 4). In an emergency, the detainee’s placement in administrative

segregation may precede the paperwork.” (Id.). 

Shadwrick argues that ECDC’s policy on administrative segregation applies

only to placement in the “general population” and does not apply in the context of

a temporary holding cell. (Doc. 38 at 30). Although it is true that Shadwrick

concedes that Patton informed him that he was a corrections officer for another

correctional facility and could not be placed in general population, Patton cites no

authority for the proposition that a prison guard possesses more than a

“generalized awareness of risk” when incarcerating a correctional officer. Rather,

the cases cited by Patton illustrate those facts which support a finding of specific

awareness and those which do not. Further, Patton has not cited, nor has this court

independently found, any authority abrogating – in the case of an incarcerated law

enforcement officer – the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that “a prison custodian is not

30

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the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety.” Purcell, op. cit., 400 F.3d at 1321 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, a failure to totally segregate Patton amounted to no more than

a generalized22

 awareness of the risk, and the court finds that a reasonable jury

could not conclude that Shadwrick drew the inference that failing to totally

segregate Patton from all other inmates created a serious risk of substantial harm

to Patton. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED

as to Patton’s claim that Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference by not

totally segregating Patton from all other inmates.

ii. A Reasonable Jury Could Determine That Shadwrick’s

Placement of Patton in a Cell With Reyes Rose to the Level of

Deliberate Indifference

Patton’s second deliberate indifference claim does not meet the same fate as

his first. Shadwrick had personal knowledge that Reyes had previously been

involved in inmate-on-inmate violence because he was a member of the SOD team

that responded to the incident on October 19, 2012, which occurred approximately

six months prior to the altercation with Patton. While Shadwrick claims he did not

remember the specifics of Reyes’s prior history and past incidents, a reasonable

22

 After all, arguing that “all inmates in a detention center are dangerous to all

incarcerated law enforcement” is about as general as a statement can be. 

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jury could infer from the evidence that his willingness to place another inmate in a

cell with Reyes amounted to more than even gross negligence.23

Additionally, the parties dispute whether Shadwrick failed to take measures

to prevent or mitigate the substantial risk. For example, they debate whether

Shadwrick could have, even temporarily, placed Patton into the holding cell which

was designated for female inmates rather than place him in a cell with Reyes.

While Deputy Administrator Hassell’s affidavit supports Shadwrick’s statement

that Holding cell 2 is reserved as a female holding cell, it is not clear to the court

that this policy prevented Patton from being temporarily kept in that cell. It is also

not clear whether there were other alternatives available to Shadwrick that would,

unlike placing Patton in Holding cell 7 with Reyes, not have created a substantial

risk of injury to Patton. 

Ultimately, the question of Shadwrick’s deliberate indifference does not

turn on whether or not Beck instigated the violence between Patton and Reyes,

particularly as there is insufficient evidence that Shadwrick was aware of any

communication or hand signals between Beck and Holding cell 7. Beck’s

23

 The court also notes that Reyes’ violent history includes several instances where Reyes

was discovered in possession of contraband, including a situation where Reyes harmed himself

with a razor blade, causing a severe enough injury to require stitches. (Doc. 38-12 at 17-20). In

the altercation between Patton and Reyes, contraband was yet again removed from the cell after

the two inmates were separated. (Doc. 38-2 at 60:3-21). 

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involvement in and awareness of a potential altercation between Patton and Reyes

also cannot be imputed to Shadwrick under a collective awareness theory. See

Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (“As such, imputed or

collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate

indifference.” )(citing Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005)).

Regardless of what prompted the altercation, the altercation would not have

happened at all if Patton had not been placed by Shadwrick in a cell with Reyes,

an inmate with a known-to-Shadwrick history of inmate-on-inmate violence.

Based on the evidence presented, Patton has shown that Shadwrick had

more than “a generalized awareness of risk,” Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349-50.

Therefore, a jury could reasonably conclude that Patton faced a substantial risk of

serious harm, determine that Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference to that

risk, and find that the necessary “causal link” existed between Shadwrick’s actions

and Patton’s injury. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be

DENIED as to Patton’s claim that Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference in

placing Patton in a cell with Reyes.

B. Shadwrick’s Failure To Stop the Altercation Between Reyes and

Patton Once It Began Did Not Rise to the Level of Deliberate

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Indifference24

Patton further asserts that Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference by

failing to stop the altercation between Patton and Reyes once it began. However,

the video evidence presented demonstrates that Shadwrick’s actions after the

assault began did not constitute deliberate indifference. 

In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court emphasized that,

at the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to

a nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute surrounding those facts. 550

U.S. at 380. Furthermore, 

“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of

material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48,

106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When opposing parties tell

two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (italicized emphasis in original; underline emphasis

24

 In his reply brief, Shadwrick argues that Patton should have characterized his alleged

failure to enter the holding cell and stop the altercation as a “failure to intervene” claim. (Doc. 46

at 5-6). As Patton has not presented his claim in this light, the court will assess his deliberate

indifference claim in the manner chosen by Patton. 

34

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supplied).25

In his deposition, Patton testified that “as soon as the cell door closed,

Reyes assaulted him.” (Doc. 42 at 10, ¶ 47); (Doc. 38-3 at 41:10-12). Patton

claims that Shadwrick admitted in his statement following the altercation that “he

heard an argument between Patton and Reyes before the beating started.” (Doc. 42

at 17). However, a close reading of Shadwrick’s narrative summary of the incident

does not reveal that Shadwrick was aware of any altercation between the two

inmates that began as soon as the cell door closed. (Doc. 38-11 at 10). Instead, the

summary, without going into detail regarding the time that passed between when

the holding cell door closed and when the altercation began, merely states that

Shadwrick and Officer Cook both heard a verbal argument and collectively stood

to address the problem. Id.

While the video evidence does not show the attack itself, it does

25

 In Scott v. Harris, the Court considered whether an officer could take actions that place

“a fleeing motorist at risk of injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from

endangering the lives of innocent bystanders.” 550 U.S. at 372. The plaintiff’s testimony, which

was taken as true during summary proceedings in the lower courts, argued that the plaintiff drove

responsibly and presented no threat. Id. However, the defendant presented a video tape of the

police chase that depicted the plaintiff driving inappropriately fast and endangering the lives of

others. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that, “with regard to the factual issue whether [the

plaintiff] was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life,” the plaintiff’s “version of

events [was] so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed

him.” Id. at 380. Consequently, the lower courts “should not have relied on such visible fiction;

[they] should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 380-81

(emphasis added).

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demonstrate the almost simultaneous reaction by Shadwrick, Officer Cook, Beck,

and Kicklighter approximately two minutes after Patton was placed in Holding cell

7. Starting approximately at 20:41:20 on all three jail cell videos, a commotion can

be heard on the video. Almost simultaneously, Shadwrick and Officer Cook stand

up and look in the direction of Holding cell 7. Shadwrick then called a “Code

Red” within a few seconds of hearing the commotion. Viewing these facts in the

light depicted by the videotape, Patton’s version of events is blatantly

contradicted; all four individuals in the booking room reacted almost

simultaneously approximately two minutes after Patton was placed in the cell.

Further, the video evidence shows that Shadwrick acted with haste in

calling the SOD team and giving them access to the booking room once they

arrived. In response to Shadwrick’s established facts that he quickly called a

“Code Red” after the altercation began, Patton repeatedly asserts that “there is no

specific ‘code red’ policy at the ECDC as it is merely an announcement used to let

corrections personnel know that a physical altercation is in progress. The ECDC

Policy and Procedure on Use of Force is the Official Policy.”26 (Doc. 42 at ¶¶ 48,

26

 At Section III, Subsection A, the ECDC Policy and Procedure on Use of Force states,

“When a detainee acts violently or appears on the verge of violent actions, if necessary, staff

shall use reasonable force and/or restraints to prevent him/her from harming self, others, and/or

property.” AAF No. 50; (Doc. 43-2 at 2). 

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49, 80, 84, 93). However, despite the fact that there was no written policy on

calling a “Code Red,” Detention Center Administrator Hassel’s affidavit supports

Shadwrick’s contention that corrections officers are trained to call a Code Red

when an altercation between inmates occurs so that the SOD team can

appropriately respond. (Doc. 38-10 at 4-5, ¶¶ 24-29).

 Patton does not dispute that Shadwrick called a “Code Red”within a few

seconds after he stood up and looked toward Holding cell 7. Patton also does not

dispute that, between the time that Shadwrick called the SOD team and when the

team arrived, Shadwrick acted in three ways: he realized there was another inmate

on the phone in the booking room and assisted other correctional officers in

putting that inmate in a holding cell; he ran to the security door to let the SOD

officers into the booking room; and, after letting the SOD team into the booking

area, he rushed to meet the team at the door of Holding cell 7.

Additionally, Patton does not proffer any evidence disputing Shadwrick’s

testimony he properly followed his training - even if unwritten - by calling “Code

Red” and then waiting for a properly-trained SOD team to respond.

27

 Instead,

Patton relies on Shadwrick’s possession of pepper spray and the presence of

27

 The fact that Shadwrick was a member of the SOD team that responded to the October

19, 2012 incident between Reyes and another inmate bolsters Shadwrick’s testimony that he

received “Code Red” training. (Doc. 38-12 at 2-3).

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Officer Cook to argue that Shadwrick violated the ECDC use of force policy by

not acting when he had the means to do so. (Doc. 42 at 14). However, the ECDC

policy does not mandate intervention under the circumstances present. (See Doc.

43-2 at 2)(“An ‘immediate-use-of-force’ situation is created when a detainee’s

behavior constitutes a serious and immediate threat to self, staff, another detainee,

property, or the security and orderly operation of the facility. In that situation, staff

may respond without a supervisor’s direction or presence.”)(emphasis added). 

Therefore, the court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that

Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference in failing to stop the altercation -

once it began - before the SOD team arrived. Accordingly, Shadwrick’s Motion

for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED as to this aspect of Patton’s

deliberate indifference claim. However, because the court also finds that a

reasonable jury could conclude that Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference

in placing Patton in the holding cell with Reyes to begin with, Patton’s deliberate

indifference claim survives Shadwrick’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to such

placement.

C. Qualified Immunity

Because the court finds that factual issues preclude summary judgment in

part, the remaining issue is whether, as of April 9, 2013, pre-existing law clearly

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established that Shadwrick’s conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Out of

an abundance of caution, the court will address this issue as to all of Patton’s

deliberate indifference claims. 

i. Legal Summary

To receive qualified immunity, “the government official must first prove

that he was acting within his discretionary authority.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d

1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff must then show that the law was clearly

established that the defendant’s acts rose to the level of deliberate indifference.

See Schmelz v. Monroe Cnty., 954 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1992); Montoute v.

Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he qualified immunity standard is

broad enough to cover some ‘mistaken judgment’”). 

Here, it is clear that Shadwrick was acting within the scope of his

discretionary authority. At the Motion To Dismiss stage, the parties did not

dispute that Shadwrick was acting within his discretionary capacity. (See Doc. 27

at 9-10). However, Patton now argues that while Shadwrick had discretionary

authority in responding to Patton’s request for administrative segregation, he did

not have discretionary authority “in how he responded when he became aware of

Reyes’ violent beating of Patton.” (Doc. 42 at 12). 

This argument is unavailing, particularly because Patton offers no basis for

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challenging Shadwrick’s conduct as non-discretionary in nature. “To determine

whether an official was engaged in a discretionary function, [courts] consider

whether the acts the official undertook ‘are of a type that fell within the

employee’s job responsibilities.’” Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332

(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 70 F.3d 1252,

1265 (11th Cir. 2004)). As Shadwrick’s brief correctly states, Patton’s claim arise

from Shadwrick’s duty as a correctional officer in fulfilling the sheriff’s statutory

duty to operate the jail. (Doc. 38 at 23 (citing Ala. Code § 14-6-1)).28

 Therefore,

the court finds that Patton was at all relevant times acting within the scope of his

discretionary authority as a corrections officer. 

Accordingly, Patton bears the burden to show that Shadwrick is not entitled

to qualified immunity. Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th

Cir. 2010); see also Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“Once the defendants have established that they were acting within their

discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff[] to show that qualified

28

 Ala. Code § 14-6-1 states as follows: “The sheriff has the legal custody and charge of

the jail in his or her county and all prisoners committed thereto, except in cases otherwise

provided by law. The sheriff may employ persons to carry out his or her duty to operate the jail

and supervise the inmates housed therein for whose acts he or she is civilly responsible. Persons

so employed by the sheriff shall be acting for and under the direction and supervision of the

sheriff and shall be entitled to the same immunities and legal protections granted to the sheriff

under the general laws and the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as long as such persons are

acting within the line and scope of their duties and are acting in compliance with the law.”

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immunity is not appropriate.”). 

To oppose qualified immunity, a plaintiff “must prove the existence of a

clear, factually defined, well-recognized right of which a reasonable police officer

should have known . . . [t]he right must be sufficiently particularized to put

potential defendants on notice that their conduct probably is unlawful.” Barts v.

Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original); see also

Santamorena v. Georgia Military College, 147 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 1998)

(“To overcome this immunity, Plaintiff has the burden of pointing to case law

which ‘pre-date[s] the offic[ial]’s alleged improper conduct, involve[s] materially

similar facts, and ‘truly compel[s]’ the conclusion that the plaintiff had a right

under federal law.’” (quoting Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir.

1998))). 

Determining whether a right has been clearly established turns on “whether

it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quotation marks omitted). The determinative inquiry for the court is “whether the

state of the law gave the [defendants] fair warning that their alleged conduct was

unconstitutional.” Id. 

As the Eleventh Circuit recently explained, 

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a plaintiff can demonstrate that the contours of the allegedly violated

constitutional right were clearly established in at least two ways. Id. at

1255. First, a plaintiff “may show that ‘a materially similar case has

already been decided.’” Id. (quoting Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407

F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005)). Second, a plaintiff “can point to a

‘broader, clearly established principle [that] should control the novel

facts [of the] situation.’” Id. (quoting Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159);

accord United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137

L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (“[G]eneral statements of the law are not inherently

incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a

general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may

apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.”); Hope,

536 U.S. at 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (stating that a violation can be clearly

established even absent a case “involving the [ ] action in question”).

Here, the broader principle laid down in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), “control[s] the novel

facts” pleaded in Plaintiff's complaint. See Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles,

797 F.3d 654, 664 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Farmer setsforth the contours of the

right to be free from violence at the hands of other inmates with

sufficient clarity to guide a reasonable officer.”); Young v. Selk, 508

F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2007) (same). In short, the Supreme Court made

clear in Farmer that prison officials have a duty “to protect prisoners

from violence at the hands of other prisoners,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833,

114 S.Ct. 1970, and that an official may be liable if he knows of and

disregards a substantial risk of an inmate-on-inmate attack “by failing

to take reasonable measures to abate [the risk].” Id. at 847, 114 S.Ct.

1970; see also id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Miami Dade, 2016 WL 4073246, at *6. The court in Miami Dade concluded that

as of May 2013, the time the events underlying the suit took place, “it was clearly

established that a prison official violates an inmate’s constitutional rights where

the official is aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, including an

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inmate-on-inmate attack, and takes no action.” Id. at *7.

ii. Analysis

Even if this court erred in finding that Patton failed to demonstrate that a

reasonable jury could find Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference by not

totally segregating Patton from all other inmates, the law is not clearly established

as to this claim. Indeed, as explained above, this court believes the law is to the

contrary. Therefore, Shadwrick is entitled to qualified immunity as to Patton’s

claim that he should have been totally segregated from all inmates, and Shadwrick

is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim on this independent and

alternative basis.

Similarly, even if this court erred in finding that Patton failed to

demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find Shadwrick acted with deliberate

indifference by not intervening once the altercation between Patton and Reyes

began, the law is not clearly established as to this claim. Indeed, as explained

above, the court believes that the law contradicts this claim. Therefore, Shadwrick

is entitled to qualified immunity as to Patton’s claim that Shadwrick should have

intervened in the altercation, and Shadwrick is entitled to summary judgment as to

this claim on this independent and alternative basis. 

However, Shadwrick’s qualified immunity defense does not fare as well

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against Patton’s claim that Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference by placing

Patton in a cell with Reyes. The Eleventh Circuit has previously explained that a

prison guard is not entitled to qualified immunity for violating a prisoner’s

constitutional rights if the guard “actually (objectively and subjectively) knows

that one prisoner poses a substantial risk of serious harm to another, yet fails to

take any action to investigate, mitigate, or monitor that substantial risk of serious

harm.” Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1102 (11th Cir. 2014)

(citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358–60 (11th Cir. 2003)(finding a lack

of supervision of known violent inmates, which led to inmate-on-inmate violence,

constituted clearly established impermissible constitutional conduct); see also

Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1325 (11th Cir.

2016)(finding that as of March 2010, “the law of this Circuit, as expressed in

Cottone, clearly established that the defendants’ total failure to investigate–or take

any other action to mitigate–the substantial risk of serious harm that [the cellmate]

posed to [the plaintiff] constituted deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff’s

Fourteenth] amendment rights.”)(internal citation omitted). 

While the opinions in Miami Dade, Caldwell, and Bowen were handed

down after April 9, 2013, and were therefore not clearly established law at the

time of the altercation, the binding Eleventh Circuit authority of Farmer,

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Rodriguez, and Cottone was established with sufficient clarity to guide Officer

Shadwrick. At the summary judgment stage of this litigation, based on the facts as

presented and analyzed in this opinion in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

Shadwrick is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Patton’s deliberate

indifference claim based on the inmate-on-inmate violence between Patton and

Reyes.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Shadwrick’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Shadwrick’s Motion

is GRANTED as to Patton’s deliberate indifference claim based on Patton’s

failure to totally segregate Patton from all other inmates and as to Patton’s

deliberate indifference claim based on Shadwrick’s alleged failure to stop the

altercation between Patton and Reyes once it began. Shadwrick’s Motion is

DENIED as to Patton’s claim that Shadwrick acted with deliberate indifference in

placing Patton in a cell with Reyes. The case will be set for pretrial conference and

jury trial by subsequent notice. 

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DONE and ORDERED this the 13th of December, 2016. 

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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