Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04629/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04629-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN ARNELL PALMER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANTA CRUZ SHERIFF'S 

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-04629-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Docket No. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Steven Arnell Palmer, an inmate at the Santa Cruz County Jail, filed this pro se civil rights 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before the court for review under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A. This order requires Mr. Palmer to file an amended complaint to correct several pleading 

deficiencies. 

II. BACKGROUND

The statement of facts in the complaint consists of six short phrases, including “cruel and 

unusual punishment,” “bogus request form and grievance process,” and “bogus medical.” Docket 

No. 1 at 3. No facts are mentioned. Attached to the complaint is a letter Mr. Palmer allegedly sent 

to the Santa Cruz County Sheriff one day before the complaint was filed; the letter has very few 

details but appears to concern Mr. Palmer’s perception that other inmates and staff treat him 

poorly because of his race and because they are bullies.

III. DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

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claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The complaint has several problems. First, Mr. Palmer has not alleged enough facts to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Although a complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 

omitted).1 A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 570. Mr. Palmer’s complaint does not allege facts sufficient to plausibly show the 

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by any defendant. The 

phrases he alleges – e.g., “cruel and unusual punishment” – are just labels and conclusions that do 

not come close to providing the facts necessary to state a plausible claim. 

Leave to amend is granted so that Mr. Palmer may file an amended complaint that proffers 

enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Mr. Palmer is cautioned that he 

must provide a full statement of his claims in his amended complaint. The Court will not read 

through exhibits to the complaint or amended complaint to piece together a claim for a plaintiff.

 

1This requirement that the pleader allege enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face stems from the rule that a complaint must allege “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a)(2) “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only . . . give the defendant fair 

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 93 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Second, the complaint does not link any defendant to any constitutional violation. Mr. 

Palmer lists “all Santa Cruz County Jail deputies,” the Santa Cruz Sheriff’s Department, and Santa 

Cruz County as defendants, but does not include allegations against any of them. In his amended 

complaint, Mr. Palmer must allege facts showing his entitlement to relief from each and every 

defendant who he proposes to hold liable on the claim. With regard to the individual wrongdoers, 

it is not sufficient for Mr. Palmer to allege simply that he is suing “all” of the Sheriff’s deputies, as 

there are hundreds of deputies and almost certainly not all of them were involved in each violation 

of Mr. Palmer’s rights. He needs to identify the specific wrongdoers. Mr. Palmer may name as 

defendants those individuals whose acts or omissions caused the violation of his rights under the 

Constitution or laws of the United States. He must be careful to allege facts showing the basis for 

liability for each individual defendant. He should not refer to them as a group (e.g., “the 

defendants”); rather, he should identify each involved defendant by name and link each of them to 

his claim by explaining what each defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of his 

constitutional rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (liability may be 

imposed on individual defendant under § 1983 only if plaintiff can show that defendant 

proximately caused deprivation of federally protected right). If he wants to sue a supervisor, he 

must allege facts showing (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Mr. Palmer listed as defendants the Santa Cruz Sheriff’s Department and Santa Cruz 

County, apparently as the legal entities that operate the jail in which he is housed. Mr. Palmer

cannot hold the legal entity liable simply because it employs the individual wrongdoers. There is 

no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is 

responsible for the actions or omissions of another, such as an employee. See Board of Cty. 

Comm'rs. of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 

1128, 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Local governments, such as Santa Cruz County, are “persons” subject to liability under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort. See Monell v. Dep't of 

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Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a 

violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a 

constitutional right of which [he] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this 

policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the 

policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 

County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). For municipal liability, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts regarding the specific 

nature of the alleged policy, custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively defend itself, 

and these facts must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See AE v. County of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). It is not sufficient to merely allege that a policy, 

custom or practice existed or that individual officers’ wrongdoing conformed to a policy, custom 

or practice. See id. at 636-68. If Mr. Palmer wants to allege a Monell claim against a municipal 

entity, he must be careful to allege the specific policy, custom or practices of each municipal entity 

that he contends give rise to liability.

Third, Mr. Palmer does not have standing to allege claims about violations of other 

inmates’ rights. In his amended complaint, he may not allege claims that other inmates were 

subjected to constitutional violations at the jail. See Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th 

Cir. 1962) (“a litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than 

himself”). He can only assert claims about violations of his own constitutional rights. 

Some of the very limited information in the complaint suggests Mr. Palmer wants to 

complain about punishment, safety, health care, and discrimination. The Court assumes for 

present purposes that Mr. Palmer was a pretrial detainee at the relevant times and provides the 

following information as guidance for alleging claims in these areas. 

When a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his confinement, the proper inquiry is 

whether the conditions amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). The state may detain 

a pretrial detainee “to ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to the restrictions and 

conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to 

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punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Id. at 536-37. If a particular condition or 

restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective it does 

not, without more, amount to “punishment.” See id. at 539.

Assuming for present purposes that a pretrial detainee has the same rights as a convicted 

prisoner being put in administrative segregation, when jail officials initially determine whether an 

inmate is to be segregated for administrative reasons, due process requires that they: hold an 

informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the inmate is segregated, inform the 

inmate of the charges against him or the reasons segregation is being considered, and allow the 

inmate to present his views. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Periodic review of the inmate's confinement in segregated housing is required. See Hewitt v. 

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983). Disciplinary segregation requires more process. 

Disciplinary segregation as punishment for violation of jail rules and regulations cannot be 

imposed without complying with the procedural requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 

539 (1974). See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 523-26 (9th Cir. 1996). The procedural 

protections required in a disciplinary proceeding include written notice, time to prepare for the 

hearing, a written statement of decision, allowance of witnesses and documentary evidence when 

not unduly hazardous, and aid to the accused where the inmate is illiterate or the issues are 

complex. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-67. There also must be some evidence to support the 

disciplinary decision, see Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454, and the information that forms 

the basis for prison disciplinary actions must have some indicia of reliability. See Cato v. Rushen, 

824 F.2d 703, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1987). 

To state a claim that an individual officer failed to protect a pretrial detainee, a plaintiff 

must allege facts showing these elements: 

(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 

conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) Those 

conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious 

harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures 

to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the 

circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 

involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct 

obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused 

the plaintiff's injuries.

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Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 

S. Ct. 831 (2017). 

To state a claim that a defendant was deliberately indifferent to a pretrial detainee’s 

medical needs, a plaintiff must allege facts showing these elements, which are quite similar to the 

elements for a failure-to-protect claims:

(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 

conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those 

conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious 

harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures 

to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the 

circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 

involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct 

obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused 

the plaintiff's injuries.”

Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). For the third element on 

medical as well as safety claims, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable, “a test 

that will necessarily ‘turn[] on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. (alteration 

in original) (quoting Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071). “[T]he plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence 

but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. (quoting Castro, 833 

F.3d at 1071). 

A claim that a person has been discriminated against because of his race implicates his 

right to equal protection of the laws. “To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate 

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 

425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

IV. CONCLUSION

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file an amended complaint 

that complies with the directions in this order no later than February 24, 2020, and must include 

the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on 

the first page. Plaintiff is cautioned that his amended complaint must be a complete statement of 

his claims. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“For 

claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, we will not require that they be 

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repled in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal. But for any claims 

voluntarily dismissed, we will consider those claims to be waived if not repled.”) Failure to file 

the amended complaint will result in the dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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