Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-03379/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-03379-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Further Scheduling Order

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.03\Murphy379msj 1

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONRELL DONAVAN MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

ROY PEREZ,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 03-3379 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

FURTHER SCHEDULING

ORDER

(Docket No. 23)

Plaintiff, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison, filed a pro se civil rights 

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the California Tort Claims Act against

Officer Roy Perez concerning an altercation at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) on

November 19, 2002. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a

separate order. The Court initially dismissed three of Plaintiff’s claims because they were

not cognizable under §1983. The Court ordered service of the remaining claim of

excessive force on the Defendant and directed Defendant to file a motion for summary

judgment or other dispositive motion, or notify the Court that Defendant is of the opinion

that this case cannot be resolved by such a motion. On April 24, 2006, Defendant filed a

notice stating that he will not file a dispositive motion. Plaintiff filed a motion for

**Original filed 9/27/06**

Case 5:03-cv-03379-JF Document 39 Filed 09/27/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Further Scheduling Order

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.03\Murphy379msj 2

summary judgment, Defendant filed an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply. Based upon

the papers submitted, the Court concludes that there are triable issues of fact as to whether

Defendant subjected Plaintiff to excessive force or was acting in a good faith effort to

restore order and discipline and will DENY the motion. The Court will order the parties

to submit status conference statements, as set forth below, within thirty days of the date of

this order. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Version

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to unnecessary and excessive force by

Defendant Perez on November 19, 2002. Plaintiff and his cell mate were escorted by

Defendant and Correctional Officer Lopez to the “mini yard” for program. Plaintiff and

his cell mate were first handcuffed behind their backs for the escort. As Defendant was

escorting Plaintiff, he took hold of Plaintiff’s left elbow. Defendant suddenly tightened

his grip of Plaintiff’s elbow, and shook his arm. When Plaintiff turned to look at

Defendant, Defendant allegedly said “You think you hard, I’ll slam your black ass like I

did your homeboy.” Plaintiff replied that he was not going to do shit. Defendant

suddenly slammed Plaintiff forcefully against the staff bathroom door, placing

Defendant’s forearm on the back of Plaintiff’s neck. Plaintiff was then placed in the

building rotunda holding cage. While Plaintiff was in the holding cell, Defendant

approached him and said, “You thought I was playing with your monkey ass.” Plaintiff

told Defendant that he would not get away with beating Plaintiff. Defendant told Plaintiff

that he was going to write him up for resisting his escort. See Complaint, attached

Affidavit of Plaintiff, at 1-2. 

Plaintiff received medical treatment for a swollen eye, loose tooth, and back and

neck spasms. A video taped interview of Plaintiff was taken. Defendant wrote a rule

violation report against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was later found not guilty after a

disciplinary hearing. Id. 

\\\

Case 5:03-cv-03379-JF Document 39 Filed 09/27/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Further Scheduling Order

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.03\Murphy379msj 3

Defendant’s Version

Defendant and Officer T. Lopez were escorting Plaintiff from D2 “B” Section to

the D2 Mini Yard. While walking through the rotunda area, Plaintiff tried to pull away

from Defendant’s control and stated, “Let me fucken go mother fucker!” Defendant

maintained control with his right hand on Plaintiff’s left elbow forearm area and placed

him on the bathroom door. Defendant gave Plaintiff a direct order to stop pulling away,

which Plaintiff complied with. Defendant and Officer Lopez placed Plaintiff in a holding

cell without further incident. See Decl. of J.G. Perkell In Support of Def’s. Opp.,

Attachment (Rules Violation Report, R. Perez) at 1.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits

demonstrate that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). Material facts are

those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the

moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof

at trial the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go

beyond the pleadings and, by its’ own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only

Case 5:03-cv-03379-JF Document 39 Filed 09/27/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Further Scheduling Order

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.03\Murphy379msj 4

concerned with disputes over material facts and “factual disputes that are irrelevant or

unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. It is

not the task of the court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. 

Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the

burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary

judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323.

B. The Merits

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be,

objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently

culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct was wanton. See Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citation omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in

violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . .

whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7

(1992). In determining whether the use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or

restoring discipline, or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court

may evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the

amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by

the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful

response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 

As evident in the “Background” section above, the parties’ versions of the

Case 5:03-cv-03379-JF Document 39 Filed 09/27/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Further Scheduling Order

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.03\Murphy379msj 5

November 19, 2002 incident differ markedly. If believed, Defendant’s description of

maintaining control of Plaintiff while Plaintiff tried to resist and pull away would support

a conclusion that the force used was not excessive. If believed, however, Plaintiff’s

version of being slammed into the bathroom door while handcuffed behind his back,

while he was not resisting, would lead to a conclusion that the force used was excessive. 

In his opposition, Defendant points out that the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries were

minimal. See Def.’s Opp. at 3. While the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one of

the factors to be considered in determining whether the use of force is wanton and

unnecessary, the absence of serious injury does not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Whether the alleged wrongdoing is objectively “harmful enough”

to establish a constitutional violation is contextual and responsive to contemporary

standards of decency. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103

(1976)). Such standards are always violated when prison officials maliciously and

sadistically use force to cause harm whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.; see

also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (no lasting injury required

for sexual assault because sexual assault was deeply offensive to human dignity); Felix v.

McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1991) (it is not degree of injury which makes

out violation of Eighth Amendment but use of official force or authority that is

intentional, unjustified, brutal and offensive to human dignity). There is a split in the

circuits on whether a prisoner must prove that he suffered more than a de minimis injury

in order to prevail on an excessive force claim. Although the Ninth Circuit has not

addressed the issue, it has strongly suggested that a prisoner need only prove that the use

of physical force was more than de minimis. See Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th

Cir. 2002) (clarifying that in embracing physical injury standard under 28 U.S.C. §

1997e(e) adopted by several circuits, Ninth Circuit does not subscribe to reasoning of

some of those circuits that Eighth Amendment claims require that “the injury must be

more than de minimis;” standard used for Eighth Amendment excessive force claims only

examines whether the use of physical force is more than de minimis). 

Case 5:03-cv-03379-JF Document 39 Filed 09/27/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Further Scheduling Order

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.03\Murphy379msj 6

Summary judgment is not the place for credibility determinations. Because a trier

of fact could believe Defendant’s version of the relevant events, Plaintiff cannot establish

his entitlement to summary judgment at this time. The Court cannot grant judgment in

Plaintiff’s favor without accepting Plaintiff’s version and disbelieving Defendant’s

version of the events that transpired. A trier of fact must hear both versions and decide

whom to believe. Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court concludes that Plaintiff

is not entitled to summary judgment on his excessive force claim.

 ORDER

Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s excessive

force claim cannot be adjudicated on summary judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment (docket no. 23) is DENIED. 

In order to move this case toward resolution, the parties shall submit status

conference statements indicating what discovery remains to be done, the amount of time

needed for discovery, whether any further motions will be filed, and when they will be

ready for trial. The status conference statements need not be jointly prepared. The status

conference statements are due no later than thirty days from the date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: JEREMY FOGEL 

United States District Judge

9/26/06 /s/jeremy fogel

Case 5:03-cv-03379-JF Document 39 Filed 09/27/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Further Scheduling Order

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.03\Murphy379msj 7

A copy of this ruling was mailed to the following:

Monrell Donavan Murphy

P-24634

Calipatria State Prison

P.O. Box 5006

Calipatria, CA 92233

Jennifer Perkell

CA State Attorney General’s Office 

455 Golden Gate Ave.,

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Case 5:03-cv-03379-JF Document 39 Filed 09/27/06 Page 7 of 7