Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00499/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wesley James Coontz, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-07-499-PCT-FJM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On March 5, 2007, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (docket # 1) The

Court dismissed the Petition with leave to file an amended petition naming the proper

respondent. (dockets ## 2-3) Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition naming the proper

Respondents, which the Court dismissed based on other deficiencies with leave to amend. 

(dockets ## 7-8) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition. (docket # 9) The

Court dismissed Count I for failure to state a cognizable claim, and ordered Respondents to

answer Counts II-IV. (docket # 11) 

On January 22, 2008, Respondents filed an Answer (docket # 18) asserting that

the Petition should be dismissed as untimely. (docket # 18) Respondents alternatively assert

that several of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. Petitioner replied on February

4, 2008 disputing Respondents’ assertions. (docket # 19) For the reasons set forth below,

the Court finds the Petition should be dismissed as untimely and, therefore, the Court does

not reach the procedural bar issue. 

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 The Honorable Robert R. Moon presided. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 14, 1996, a Mojave County grand jury indicted Petitioner on one

count of first-degree murder, a class 1 felony; one count of first-degree burglary, a class 2

felony; two counts of misconduct involving weapons, class 4 felonies; and one count of

possession of dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 1-3) 

On June 18, 1996, Petitioner and the State entered into a plea agreement whereby

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to a reduced count of second-degree murder, a class 1

felony, in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the other counts. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 4) 

The plea agreement also provided that the presumptive term of imprisonment for a

conviction of second-degree murder is “16 calendar years, which the court may increase to

22 calendar years” . . . “in the court’s discretion.” (Respondents’ Exh. B at 4) 

During the July 1, 1996 change of plea hearing, the court1

 advised Petitioner of

the possible penalties for a conviction of second-degree murder, the consequences having of

a felony conviction on his record, and the rights Petitioner relinquished, including the right

to appeal, by entering the plea agreement. (Respondents’ Exh. C at 7) The Court found that

Petitioner had read and signed the plea agreement, Petitioner’s attorney had explained the

agreement to him, no threats or promises (other than the promises contained in the plea

agreement) were made to induce Petitioner to enter the agreement, and that Petitioner was

satisfied with counsel’s representation. (Respondents’ Exh. C at 7) The court further found

that Petitioner “knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights and entered a plea

of guilty to the offense of Murder in the Second Degree, a Class 1 felony” and that there was

an adequate factual basis for the plea. (Respondents’ Exh. C at 8) 

On July 29, 1996, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel asserting that appointed counsel, James O’Haver, was “forced to represent another

whose interests conflict with those of the Defendant.” (Respondents’ Exh. D at 10) 

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During an August 5, 1996 hearing, Petitioner was represented by attorneys James

O’Haver and Gerald Gavin of the Mojave County Legal Defender’s Office. (Respondents’

Exh. E at 12) The trial court found that Petitioner no longer wanted “to pursue [his] motion

for ineffectiveness of counsel,” and that all “parties wish[ed] to proceed with sentencing.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. E at 12) In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the court

dismissed counts II through V and sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated sentence of twentytwo years of imprisonment. (Respondents’ Exhs. E at 13, F at 15) The court also imposed a

consecutive term of community supervision equal to “one day for every seven days of the

sentence imposed.” (Respondents’ Exh. F at 15) 

A. Direct Appeal

On August 23, 2996, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. (Respondents’

Exh. G at 18) On September 9, 1996, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner had waived his right to direct appeal by pleading

guilty. (Respondents’ Exh. H at 20) Petitioner did not seek review of the dismissal of his

appeal. (docket # 9 at 3)

B. Rule 32 Of-Right Proceedings 

Petitioner’s guilty plea waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law. 

Therefore, his only avenue of direct review was an “of-right” petition for post-conviction

relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4. Pursuant to

Ariz.Crim.P. 32, Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief was due within 90 days of entry

of judgment and sentence.

On September 27, 1996, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a timely petition for

Rule 32 relief without first filing a notice of post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. I at

22) The trial court found Petitioner’s petition “incomplete” because the Petition was not

signed and did not include an affidavit, other evidence, statement of facts, or legal

memorandum. (Respondents’ Exhs. I at 22, J at 23) On September 30, 1996, the court

returned the incomplete petition to Petitioner and ordered him to file a complete petition

within 30 days. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 22) 

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In accordance with the court’s order, on October 28, 1996, Petitioner filed a

timely petition for post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. J) Petitioner claimed that he

was denied the right to competent counsel at every critical stage of the proceeding, that his

guilty plea was unlawfully induced, and that counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J at 24) In support of these claims, Petitioner alleged that (1) trial

counsel agreed to assist Petitioner with post-conviction proceedings if he pled guilty; (2)

trial counsel assured him that he would receive the minimum sentence if he pled guilty; (3)

trial counsel failed to comply with Petitioners’ request “to file all appeals;” and (4)

community supervision does not apply to a sentence of “22 years flat.” (Respondents’ Exh.

J at 26) 

On October 28, 1996, the Court issued an order finding that Petitioner had

submitted a “completed Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Respondents’ Exh. K) The

Mojave County Defender’s Office had previously filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. 

The court granted the motion to withdraw and appointed John Williams to represent

Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. L) The court ordered counsel to filed “a petition raising

claims under Rule 32.1” on or before December 27, 1996. (Respondents’ Exh. K) The court

subsequently extended that deadline. (Respondents’ Exh. M)

On January 21, 1997, counsel filed a notice of completion of review and request

for extension of time to allow Petitioner to file a pro per petition. (Respondents’ Exh. M) 

Counsel advised the court that after review of Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief,

the Superior Court file, reporters transcripts from Petitioner’s change of plea and sentencing

hearings, and correspondence from Petitioner, he was unable to find any claims to raise in

post-conviction proceedings. (Respondents’ Exh. M) Counsel requested an extension of

time for Petitioner to file a pro per petition which the Court granted. (Respondents’ Exhs. 

M, N) The trial court ordered Petitioner to file a petition setting forth his claims for Rule 32

relief on or before February 21, 1997. (Respondents’ Exh. N) On Petitioner’s motions, the

court subsequently extended the deadline to March 25,1997, and then to April 24, 1997. 

(Respondents’ Exh. O at 34-35) 

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2 In accordance with the mailbox rule, Respondents calculate the filing dates of

Petitioner’s pleadings based on the date on which he signed those documents, and purportedly

gave them to prison officials for mailing, rather than the date on which the pleadings were filed

with the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-74 (1988)(discussing the mailbox rule);

(docket # 18 at 6 n. 5) Whether the mailbox rule actually applies does not affect the resolution

of this matter. Thus, the Court will use these filing dates, which are more liberal than the dates

on which the pleadings were actually filed. 

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On April 29, 1997, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right 

proceedings explaining that “[t]he deadline for filing a petition for post-conviction relief

stating a claim under Rule 32.1 has passed and [Petitioner] has not filed any additional

pleadings,” and has “failed to state a claim upon relief could be granted.” (Respondents’

Exh. P) Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the trial court’s order of dismissal. 

(docket # 9 at 5) Thus, Petitioner’s conviction became final 30 days later, on May 29, 1997,

upon the expiration of the time for seeking appellate review. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c);

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069,

1074 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2007). 

C. Post-Conviction Review 

Approximately six years later, on or about August 7, 2003,2

 Petitioner,

proceeding pro se, filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32

alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an illegal

sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 39) Petitioner challenged his sentence on two grounds:

(1) his total sentence exceeded the statutory maximum because he was sentenced to 3 1⁄2

years community supervision following release; and (2) under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), the court should have imposed the presumptive, not the maximum,

sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 39, Exh. S at 53) Petitioner conceded that his notice of

post-conviction review was untimely, but argued that his untimeliness should be excused

because his claims were based on “[n]ewly discovered material facts.” (Respondents’ Exh.

Q at 38-39) 

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3

 Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 provides that untimely claims for post-conviction relief are limited

to claims of being held in custody beyond the expiration of sentence, newly discovered material

facts, requests for delayed appeal, significant change in the law retroactively applicable that

would probably overturn conviction or sentence, and actual innocence. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-

(h).

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On September 16, 2003, the trial court ruled that, because Petitioner had

“previously filed a petition under Rule 32, and was represented by counsel,” the issues

Petitioner could raise in his Rule 32 proceeding were “limited by [the exceptions set forth

in] Rule 32.1(d)-(h).”3

 (Respondents’ Exh. R at 42) The court rejected Petitioner’s

challenge to the imposition of community supervision as not colorable because “in Arizona

the term of community supervision must be imposed, and the length of that term is not

considered part of the sentence.” (Id.) The trial court found that Petitioner’s claim that he

should have received the presumptive sentence could properly be raised “in a successive

petition and not subject to preclusion” only, as Petitioner alleged, if it was based on “newly

discovered evidence,” and thus satisfied the exception set forth in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(f). 

(Id.) The trial court appointed counsel Eric Devany to represent Petitioner and set a

November 17, 2003 deadline for filing a petition for post-conviction relief. (Id. at 42-43) 

Although he was represented by counsel, on September 24, 2003, Petitioner filed

a pro se Rule-32 petition raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Respondents’ Exh. S) Petitioner argued that the presumptive maximum sentence for

second-degree murder was either (1) 15 years “flat time” or (2) “15 years at 85%,” and, thus,

his sentence was illegal. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 47–48) Petitioner argued that he would

not have received an illegal sentence if his attorney at sentencing “would have been alert or

known the [sentencing] laws,”specifically Apprendi. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 48) 

Petitioner, however, did not note that Apprendi was not issued until three yeas after his

conviction became final. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 48, 53) Petitioner also claimed that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel because the state was seeking the death penalty

and he was denied co-counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 49) Notwithstanding the trial court’s

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dismissal of his challenge to the term of community supervision, Petitioner argued that “if

the flat time sentence is used, there is to be no further supervision, as the total sentence will

have been served in prison.” (Respondents’ Exh. S at 48)(emphasis in original).

Thereafter, appointed counsel requested leave to file a supplemental petition,

which the court granted. (Respondents’ Exh. T) On December 10, 2003, counsel filed a

notice of completion of review advising the court that after his review of the Mojave County

Legal Defenders’ trial file; the Mojave County Superior Court’s file; transcripts from

Petitioner’s change of plea and sentencing hearings, and correspondence from Petitioner, he

was “unable to find any claims appropriate to post-conviction relief proceedings.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. U at 63) Counsel also requested an extension of time for Petitioner to

file a pro se petition. (Respondents’ Exh. U at 64) 

On December 17, 2003, the trial court denied counsel’s request to provide

Petitioner an extension of time to file a supplemental petition because Petitioner had already

filed a pro se petition on September 29, 2003. (Respondents’ Exh. V) The court ordered the

State to respond to the petition filed September 29, 2003. (Respondents’ Exh. V)

The State filed a response to which Petitioner replied. (Respondents’ Exh. W, X)

Thereafter, on March 26, 2004, the court dismissed Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction

relief finding that Petitioner “has not raised any colorable claims that would entitle him to

relief” and “has not identified any newly discovered evidence which might have changed the

outcome of this case.” (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 123-24) With respect to Petitioner’s first

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court concluded that Petitioner’s “lawyers, at

[the] trial level and in [the Rule 32] proceedings, were not ineffective for failure to raise an

Apprendi or Ring challenge to the findings of aggravating circumstances or imposition of the

aggravated sentence,” because, “[t]here was no enhancement of the sentencing range under

A.R.S. § 13-604.” (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 124) The court rejected Petitioner’s second

ineffective assistance claims explaining that “the State was not seeking the death penalty,”

and thus Petitioner was not entitled to two trial attorneys. (Id.) The court also determined

that the imposition of community supervision “is not part of the sentence for purposes of

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determining whether the sentence exceeded the maximum permitted by law,” because

“community supervision is mandatory, except under limited, specific circumstances, even if

the sentence of imprisonment is for a ‘flat time’ or calendar year term.” (Id.) 

On April 9, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s

rejection of his sentencing claim. (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 126) On April 19, 2004, the trial

court denied Petitioner’s motion. (Respondents’ Exh. AA) 

On May 5, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s order

dismissing his Rule 32 petition with the Arizona Court of Appeals raising the following

issues: (1) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel due to the denial of

“certified” attorneys; (2) trial counsel did not know the sentencing laws, including Apprendi;

(3) the trial court failed to follow the law; (4) counsel was ineffective in failing to request a

Rule 11 competency hearing; (5) counsel was ineffective in “volunteering” that counsel had

committed felony murder; (6) counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial court’s

use of “mitigation evidence” of Petitioner’s drug addiction to aggravate his sentence; (7)

counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that Petitioner lacked the mens rea to be found

guilty of murder; (8) the trial court erred in failing to “accept admissions by the State;” (9)

the trial court erred in failing to fully investigate mitigating factors before sentencing; (10)

the trial court erred in failing to determine the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 13-603 as applied

to “flat time;” and (11) Petitioner’s sentence exceeds the maximum allowable without

determination of mitigating factors and without a jury. (Respondents’ Exh. BB at 146-57,

159-60). On July 17, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. 

(docket # 10, Appendix A at 6) 

On July 11, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Arizona

Court of Appeals’ order denying review of the trial court’s order of dismissal citing United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). (Respondents’ Exh. CC at 170) The appellate court

rejected Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. (docket # 10, Appendix A at 7) The Court,

thereafter, granted Petitioner an extension of time to seek review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Respondents’ Exh. DD) 

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On July 27, 2005, Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

(Respondents’ Exh. EE) Petitioner argued that the Supreme Court’s opinions in Apprendi,

Booker, and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applied retroactively to his case on

collateral review and, thus, his sentence should be vacated. (Respondents’ Exh. EE at 173-

181) On March 9, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment. 

(docket # 10, Appendix A at 9)

D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Thereafter, on March 5, 2007, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. As previously discussed, Petitioner ultimately filed a Second Amended

Petition and the following claims are before the Court: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel;

(2) Petitioner’s sentence violate the Sixth Amendment under the Supreme Court’s decision

in Apprendi and its progeny; and (3) Petitioner’s sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. 

(docket # 10) Respondents assert that the Petition is untimely by nearly nine years. 

Petitioner contends that his untimeliness should be excused. 

II. Statute of Limitations

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996

established a one year statute of limitations for filing a federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Petitioner filed his Petition after the effective date

of the AEDPA, it governs this action. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). 

A. Commencement of Limitations Period 

The AEDPA’s one-year limitations period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Under subsection (A), the AEDPA limitations period runs from “the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the

time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). This period of direct review

includes the 90-day period during which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari

from the United States Supreme Court. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

To assess the timeliness of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the

Court must first determine the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by

conclusion of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In making this determination, it is

significant that by pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under

Arizona law. A.R.S. § 13-4033(B); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e). Petitioner, however, retained

the right to seek review in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4.

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed, as a matter of first impression, the question

of when the conviction of a pleading defendant in Arizona becomes “final by the conclusion

of direct review” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit held that an “‘of-right proceeding,’available

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a

form of ‘direct review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).” Id. at 711. The

Summers court explained that “[b]ecause a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form of direct

review, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion

of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of

the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Id.

Under Summers, because Petitioner pleaded guilty, his conviction became final

upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or

[upon] the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Summers, 418

F.3d at 711. Here, Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced on August 5, 1996.

(Respondents’ Exhs. C, E, F) Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, Petitioner had ninety days from the

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4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) provides: “[I]n computing any time period

specified in these rules or in any local rule, court order, or statute: (1) Day of the Event

Excluded. Exclude the day of the act, event, or default that begins the period.”

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entry of judgment and sentence within which to file a notice of review under Rule 32. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4(a)(stating that “[i]n a Rule 32 of-right proceeding the notice must

be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days

after the issuance of the final order or mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner’s first

petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.”) Petitioner timely filed a notice of postconviction review of October 28, 1996. (Respondents’ Exhs. J, K) The court dismissed

Petitioner’s of-right post-conviction proceedings on April 29, 1997. (Respondents’ Exh. P)

Because Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the order dismissing his Rule-32

petition, his judgment became final on the date that deadline expired, May 29, 1997. 

Summers, 418 F.3d at 711; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). 

Thereafter, Petitioner had 365 days from May 30, 1997,4

 or until May 29, 1998,

to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Petitioner did not file the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus until March 1, 2007. 

(docket # 1) Thus, the pending Petition is untimely unless 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(B), (C), or

(D) operate to delay the commencement of the statute of limitations or unless tolling applies.

B. Delayed Start of Limitations Period 

Petitioner does not specifically argue that subsection (B), (C), or (D) applies and

nothing in the record supports an application of subsection (B) or (D). However, because

Petitioner asserted a claim pursuant to Apprendi and its progeny before the state courts and

re-urges that claim in his pending Petition, the Court will consider whether subsection (C)

applies. Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the limitations period commences on “the date

on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if

the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review.” Id. The Supreme Court issued Apprendi on June

26, 2000, several years after Petitioner’s conviction became final. Likewise, Blakely

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v.Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), were

decided several years after Petitioner’s conviction became final.

As previously stated, Petitioner’s conviction became final on May 29, 1997. The

Ninth Circuit has held that Apprendi and its progeny do not apply retroactively to cases that

were final on direct review before those cases were decided. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S.

348, 358 (2004); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)(holding that “the

Supreme Court announced a new rule in Blakely v. Washington that does not apply

retroactively to a conviction that was final before that decision was announced” and thus

“the state court’s sentencing decision cannot be challenged in a petition for habeas corpus.”);

Cook v. United States, 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004)(noting that “the Supreme Court has

not made Blakely retroactive to cases on collateral review.”); United States v. SanchezCervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 673 (9th Cir. 2002)(Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases

on collateral review.); Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005

)(finding that “Summerlin does not undermine the reasoning of Sanchez-Cervantes.”)

Because Apprendi and its progeny have not been made retroactive on collateral review, §

2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply. Thus, Petitioner’s petition is untimely absent tolling.

C. Tolling the Limitations Period

1. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a “properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that an application for collateral review is pending in State

court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state

court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with regard to particular post-conviction

proceedings.”) This time period includes the intervals between the disposition of an appeal

or post-conviction petition and the filing of an appeal or successive petition at the next state

appellate level. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. However, the ADEPA limitations period is “not

tolled from the time a final decision issued on a state direct appeal and the time the first state

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collateral challenge is filed because there is no case pending during that interval.” Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006. See also, Curtiss v. Mt. Pleasant Correctional Facility, 338 F.3d 851, 854 (8th

Cir. 2003)(no tolling during the time between the completion of direct review and the

initiation of post-conviction proceedings).

Petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief did not toll the AEDPA

limitations period. Petitioner did not file his second petition for post-conviction review until

August 7, 2003, more than five years after the limitations period expired on May 29, 1998. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. Q, S) Because the AEDPA statute of limitations had already run by the

time Petitioner filed his second petition for post-conviction relief, statutory tolling will not

save his Petition. Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed petition

for post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive ‘the limitation period (i.e. restart

the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Once the

limitation period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of

limitation.’” Johnson v. Galaza, No. C 00-0450 CRB (PR), 2001 WL 125312, * 1 (N.D.Ca.,

Feb. 7, 2001)(quoting Rashia v. Kuhlman, 991 F.Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). See

also, Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)(holding that “section

2244(d) does not permit reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state

petition was filed.”); Searcy v. Carter, 246 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that state

post-conviction relief action, filed after the statute of limitations had expired, “did not cause

the statute to begin running anew when the state court denied the motion.”); Fisher v.

Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001) (there is no tolling for state post-conviction

review filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d

1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (state petition filed after the expiration of the statute of

limitations does not reinitiate the statute); Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000)

(state habeas application did not toll the limitation period under § 2244(d)(2) because it was

not filed until after the period of limitations had expired); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919,

920 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 2244(d)(2) did not apply where petitioner, whose

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conviction became final prior to the effective date of AEDPA, filed for post-conviction relief

after the limitations period expired.).

Because statutory tolling is unavailable, the AEDPA limitations period expired

on May 29, 1998. Petitioner did not file his pending § 2254 petition until March 1, 2007,

nearly nine years after the AEDPA limitations period expired. Accordingly, the pending

Petition should be dismissed as untimely unless equitable tolling applies. 

2. Equitable Tolling

a. Bowles v. Russell

Respondents argue that in view of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bowles

v. Russell, ___ U.S. ___ , 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007), the AEDPA statute of limitations is

jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. In Bowles, Supreme Court held that the

timely filing of an appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 2366. The

Bowles Court reasoned that because federal statutes set forth time limits on filing a notice of

appeal and reopening the appeal period, Congress intended to preclude a court from

exercising jurisdiction over otherwise legitimate cases after a ceratin period of time had

elapsed after final judgment. Id.

Similar to the federal statutes at issue in Bowles, the AEDPA establishes time

limits on when a petitioner may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.§

2244(d)(1). On two occasions, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue of

whether these limits are jurisdictional. See David v. Hall, 540 U.S. 815 (2003); Flanders v.

Graves, 537 U.S. 1236 (2003). The Supreme Court has noted that it has never squarely

addressed whether equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

Lawrence v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007). Accordingly, whether the

AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling remains an open question. However, a recent decision

in the District of Arizona followed the Second Circuit in holding that Bowles does not apply

to the AEDPA. Hernandez v. Arpaio, CV-07-1712-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 370900, * 2

(D.Ariz., Feb. 11, 2008)(citing Diaz v. Kelly, No. 1-2687-RR, 2008 WL 199846, * 3)(2d

Cir., Jan. 25, 2008). Although the Court is inclined to follow Hernandez and hold that

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Bowles does not apply to the AEDPA, the Court need not resolve that issue because even

assuming equitable tolling remains viable after Bowles, as Respondents alternatively argue,

Petitioner does not satisfy the requirements for such tolling. 

b. Equitable Tolling Analysis 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States

Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled, in part, on other grounds

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly) 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth

Circuit has held that tolling is appropriate when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see also, Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067

(9th Cir. 2002)(stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”)(citations omitted); Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s

lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).

 The Supreme Court avoided deciding whether the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations may be equitably tolled. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

However, because the parties had argued on the basis that it could, the Court assumed that

equitable tolling applies and observed that a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must show:

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. In Pace, the Court noted that

although Petitioner’s claims were available in 1986 and 1991, he “waited years without any

valid justification” to assert those claims in an untimely state petition. Id. Because

Petitioner sat “on his rights for years before he filed his [state] petition” and “also sat on

them for five more months after his [state] proceedings became final before deciding to seek

relief in federal court, the Court concluded that Petitioner’s lack of diligence precluded

equitable relief. Id. 

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Recently in Harris v. Carter, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 341712, * 3 (9th Cir., Feb.

8, 2008), the Ninth Circuit noted that its “cases since Pace have not settled on a consistent

standard” for establishing equitable tolling. Harris, 2008 WL 341712, * 3. In Harris,

Petitioner argued that Pace “articulated a new and less strict” standard than that Ninth

Circuit’s test of “impossible to file a petition on time.” Id. at * 2. Harris did not resolve

that issue, but rather, found that on the facts of that case, the “arguable distinctions between

the two standards” was not at issue in that case. Id. at * 3. 

In this case, Petitioner does not argue that Pace established a less stringent

standard for invoking equitable tolling. Regardless of whether the Pace standard is less

stringent than the Ninth Circuit’s test of “impossible to file a petition on time,” as discussed

below, Petitioner does not satisfy the standard articulated in Pace. 

Petitioner argues that his lack of legal education and lack of access to case law

constitute extraordinary circumstances which stood in the way of filing a timely petition for

writ of habeas corpus. (docket # 19 at 3-4) 

Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. Rasberry v.

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006)(affirming denial of equitable tolling because

neither the district court’s failure to advise the petitioner of the right to amend his petition to

include unexhausted claims nor petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the limitations

period were extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling); Ballesteros v.

Schriro, CV-06-675-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927 (D.Ariz., February 26, 2007)(noting

that a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances)(citing Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 170, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v.

Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004)(holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of

state’s “rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not justify equitable

tolling.”)). “[I]t is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro

se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217,

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1220 (10th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1999). See also,

Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)(finding that a

pro se prisoner’s illiteracy was not sufficient to satisfy the standard of an objective, external

factor amounting to “cause” for purposes of avoiding the procedural bar on his habeas

claim). 

Likewise, Petitioner’s status as a prison inmate does not constitute an

extraordinary circumstance beyond his control warranting the tolling of the one-year

limitations period. Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220. The ordinary difficulties inherent in prison life

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the AEDPA limitations

period. Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(stating that “[e]ach of the

cases in which equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by

state officials or occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”). 

Petitioner also argues that the lack of legal resources available to him prevented

him from timely filing his habeas corpus petition. Prison law libraries are one

constitutionally accepted method to assure inmates meaningful access to the courts,

however, this does not preclude other methods to achieve this goal. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 351 (1996). In some cases inadequate legal materials can be an “impediment”

which justifies untimely filing, or can form a basis for equitable tolling. See, Whalem/Hunt

v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000)(en banc). However, Petitioner only states that

he lacked access to case law and does not explain how that caused his untimely filing. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated how the alleged inadequacies of the prison legal system

impeded his timely filing. 

Moreover, to show “diligence,” of the kind required for equitable tolling of the

one-year limitations period of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1), any state prisoner claiming

deficiencies in the prison law library must provide details of specific actions taken toward

filing the petition and must show when he found out about the library’s alleged deficiency,

must state any independent efforts he made to determine when the relevant limitations

period began to run, and must demonstrate how the prison thwarted his efforts. Arthur v.

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Allen, 452 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006), opinion modified on reh’g, 459 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir.

2006) and petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 11, 2007). Petitioner has not made any of these

showings. 

Even if Petitioner demonstrated extraordinary circumstances, equitable tolling is

not available because he has not met his burden of showing that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021,

1026 (9th Cir. 2005)(stating that petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating grounds for

equitable tolling); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1992). It is only when

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely habeas petition that equitable tolling may be appropriate. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling is not permissible if the claimant has failed to

exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights, Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

In Pace, the Supreme Court noted that although Petitioner’s claims were

available in 1986 and 1991, he “waited years without any valid justification” to assert those

claims in an untimely state petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Because Petitioner sat “on his

rights for years before he filed his [state] petitioner” and “also sat on them for five more

months after his [state] proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief in federal

court, the Court concluded that Petitioner’s lack of diligence precluded equitable relief. Id. 

Similar to Pace, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling on any basis

because he failed to exercise diligence in pursuing his claims. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. See

also, Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005)(finding that petitioner did not

diligently pursue his claims where he did not commence state post-conviction proceedings

until three years after judgment was entered and 21 months after the AEDPA’s effective

date); Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)(finding that petitioner was not

entitled to equitable tolling due to his lack of diligence); Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d

559, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2001)(holding that petitioner did not exercise diligence because he had

no motions or cases pending in state or federal court during three intervals totaling 364

days); Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2001)(finding no equitable tolling

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where petitioner waited over two years after his conviction became final (and ten months

after the AEDPA’s effective date) to file his first habeas petition). 

Petitioner’s first Rule 32 proceedings were dismissed based on Petitioner’s

failure to file a petition despite have been granted several extensions of time in which to do

so. (Respondents’ Exhs. N-P) The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s first Rule 32

proceedings on April 29, 1997 and Petitioner did not seek appellate review. 

Petitioner’s case lay dormant for approximately six years between the conclusion

of his first post-conviction of-right proceedings and when he filed his second notice of

post-conviction relief on August 7, 2003. Petitioner’s failure to file his first Rule 32 of -

right petition despite several extensions of the filing deadline, Petitioner’s failure to seek

appellate review of his first post-conviction proceedings, and the extended period of

inactivity between Petitioner’s first and second petitions for post-conviction relief illustrate

Petitioner’s lack of diligence.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he diligently pursued his rights and that an

“extraordinary circumstance” prevented him from filing a timely petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at

418. Accordingly, there is no basis for equitably tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations

and the Petition should be dismissed as untimely.

III. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner has not shown that an evidentiary hearing is warranted. “A habeas

petitioner . . . should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes a ‘good-faith allegation

that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.;” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th

Cir. 2006)(quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003)). Equitable tolling for a

federal habeas petition requires petitioner to show that he has been diligently pursuing his

rights and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. 

As discussed above, Petitioner’s allegations do not entitle him to equitable tolling and,

therefore, there is no basis for an evidentiary hearing. 

IV. Summary

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Because Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely under the ADEPA and equitable

tolling is not justified, the Court does not address the merits of Petitioner’s claims, or

Respondents’ contention that his claims are procedurally defaulted. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (docket # 9) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 7th day of March, 2008.

 

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