Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00714/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00714-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

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and the lodged documents in support of Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT L. HUGHES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

KEN CLARK, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-00714 DLB HC

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE

TO WITHDRAW UNEXHAUSTED CLAIMS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties having voluntarily consented to exercise of Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), by order dated March 7, 2007, this case was

assigned to the undersigned for all purposes, including entry of final judgment.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following his conviction by jury

trial on November 24, 2004, of continuous sexual abuse and lewd act with a child. See Lodged Docs. 

Case 1:06-cv-00714-DLB Document 30 Filed 03/22/07 Page 1 of 5
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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

Nos. 1, 2. Petitioner admitted he suffered a prior serious felony conviction. Id. Petitioner was

sentenced to serve a total determinate prison term of 32 years. Id.

Petitioner thereafter appealed the conviction. On May 24, 2005, the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter “5 DCA”) affirmed the conviction. See Lodged Doc.

th

No. 2.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court on July 5, 2005. See

Lodged Doc. No. 3. Review was summarily denied by the California Supreme Court on August 10,

2005. See Lodged Doc. No. 4.

Petitioner then filed two post-conviction collateral challenges in the state courts. On

March 16, 2006, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior Court;

the petition was denied on April 14, 2006. See Lodged Docs. Nos. 5, 6. On May 17, 2006, he filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5 DCA; the petition was denied on May 26, 2006. See th

Lodged Docs. Nos. 7, 8.

On June 8, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. The

petition included the following three claims: 1) Petitioner claims he was denied due process and a

fair trial when the trial court used the fact of his attempted murder conviction to give him the upper

term and then double his sentence under California’s Three Strikes law; 2) Petitioner claims he was

denied due process and a fair trial because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction;

and 3) Petitioner claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Following a preliminary

review of the petition, on August 21, 2006, the Court granted Petitioner leave to file a motion to

amend the petition to name a proper respondent. On October 4, 2006, he filed an amended petition.

He named a proper respondent and included four new claims: 1) Admission of out of court

statements of molest by defendant; 2) Admission of uncharged sex offenses; 3) Prosecutor failed to

charge 288(a) and 288.5 as alternative; and 4) The trial judge’s imposition of the upper term on

count 2 and 3 constituted Blakely error. The Court then directed Respondent to file a response to the

amended petition.

On December 26, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as a mixed petition

containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. Petitioner did not file an opposition.

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised by the

attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Ninth

Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitioner failed to

exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

§ 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d

599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). th

Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s

motion for dismissal pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full th

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the amended petition before the Court, Petitioner raises five grounds for relief. 

Respondent concedes that Ground Five is exhausted; however, Respondent argues that Grounds

One, Two, Three and Four have not been presented to the California Supreme Court and are

therefore unexhausted. The Court has reviewed the petition for review filed with the California

Supreme Court. Grounds One through Four were not presented in said petition for review; thus, they 

remain unexhausted.

The instant petition is a mixed petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. The

Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust

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A dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a dismissal on the merits, and Petitioner will not be barred from returning

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to federal court after Petitioner exhausts available state remedies by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)’s prohibition on filing second

petitions. See In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 (9 Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court has held that: th

[I]n the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate for an order dismissing a mixed 

petition to instruct an applicant that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only 

exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). Once the petitioner is made 

aware of the exhaustion requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all potential 

claims before returning to federal court. The failure to comply with an order of the court 

is grounds for dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000). Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal court

and files a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims, the petition may be dismissed with prejudice.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

the claim if he can do so. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22. However, Petitioner will be provided with

an opportunity to withdraw the unexhausted claims and go forward with the exhausted claim. 

ORDER

Accordingly, Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order

to file a motion to withdraw the unexhausted claims. In the event Petitioner does not file the motion,

the Court will grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the petition for writ of habeas

corpus without prejudice. This dismissal will not bar Petitioner from returning to federal court after

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exhausting available state remedies. However, this does not mean that Petitioner will not be subject

to the one year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Although the limitations

period is tolled while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in state court, 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v.

Walker, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 22, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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