Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-md-02672/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-md-02672-126/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN “CLEAN DIESEL” 

MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND 

PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

_____________________________________/

This Order Relates To:

Dkt. No. 1672

______________________________________/

MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC)

ORDER DENYING RONALD CLARK

FLESHMAN JR.’S MOTION TO 

INTERVENE

The Court preliminarily approved the Amended Consumer Class Action Settlement 

Agreement (“Settlement”) on July 26, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1688; see Dkt. No. 1698.) The day before, 

Ronald Clark Fleshman Jr. moved to intervene as a matter of right to object to the Settlement on 

behalf of Virginia class members. (Dkt. No. 1672.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

78 and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court VACATES the August 26, 2016 hearing. Having 

considered the parties’ arguments and the relevant legal authority, the Court DENIES Fleshman’s 

Motion to Intervene. Fleshman does not need to intervene to object to the Settlement; he may do 

so in accordance with the terms of the Settlement. 

BACKGROUND

Between 2009 and 2015, Volkswagen sold consumers nearly 500,000 Volkswagen- and 

Audi-branded turbocharged direct injection (“TDI”) diesel engine vehicles that were secretly

installed with a defeat device—software designed to cheat federal and state emissions regulations 

and test procedures. After Volkswagen’s use of the defeat device became publicly known, 

consumers nationwide filed hundreds of lawsuits, including numerous putative class actions. 

Those lawsuits were transferred to this Court in the above-captioned multi-district litigation. (See 

Dkt. No. 1.) 

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On behalf of consumers, Court-appointed Lead Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Plaintiffs’ Steering 

Committee (“PSC”) filed a Consolidated Consumer Class Action Complaint (“Class Action 

Complaint”) on February 22, 2016 (Dkt. No. 1230) and a proposed Consumer Class Action 

Settlement Agreement on June 28, 2016 (Dkt. No. 1606). They subsequently filed a proposed 

Amended Consumer Class Action Settlement Agreement (Dkt. No. 1685), which the Court 

preliminarily approved (Dkt. No. 1698). 

Fleshman owns a 2012 diesel-engine Volkswagen Jetta. Dkt. No. 1673-1. In April 2016, 

he sued VWGoA in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia and asserted claims arising out 

of Volkswagen’s use of the defeat device (the “Virginia action”). (Dkt. No. 1673 at 1; see Dkt. 

No. 1673-1.) He brings his claims under (1) the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement 

Act, Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-207.9; (2) the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. § 

59.1-196, et seq.; (3) and fraud, public nuisance, and unjust enrichment. (Id. ¶¶ 48-64.) Fleshman 

also seeks rescission and temporary and permanent injunctive relief. (Id. ¶¶ 39-45.)

LEGAL STANDARD

In a class action context, courts may allow class members “to intervene and present claims 

or defenses, or to otherwise come into the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(B)(iii). Intervention of 

right exists where (1) a federal statute gives the movant an unconditional right to intervene, or (2) 

the movant “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the 

action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 

the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that 

interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1)-(2). To prevail on a motion for intervention of right, the 

movant must demonstrate 

(1) it has a significant protectable interest relating to the subject of 

the action; (2) the disposition of the action may, as a practical 

matter, impair or impede its ability to protect its interest; (3) the 

application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately 

represent its interest.

Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 940 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted). Courts 

“evaluating whether Rule 24(a)(2)’s requirements are met . . . normally follow practical and 

equitable considerations and construe the Rule broadly in favor of proposed intervenors.” 

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Wilderness Soc. v. United States Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Despite this liberal construction, “it is incumbent on the 

party seeking to intervene to show that all the requirements for intervention have been met.” 

Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets 

omitted). “Failure to satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to the application[.]” Perry v. 

Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2009). 

DISCUSSION

A. Significant Protectable Interest

“To demonstrate a significant protectable interest, an applicant must establish that the 

interest is protectable under some law and that there is a relationship between the legally protected 

interest and the claims at issue.” Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 

893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). “An applicant generally satisfies the ‘relationship’ requirement only if 

the resolution of the plaintiff’s claims actually will affect the applicant.” Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 

410 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

Fleshman argues that he has a protectable interest in this action because if he is not allowed 

to intervene in this action, the Court will improperly adjudicate his and other Virginia class 

members’ claims even though those claims are under a Virginia state court’s exclusive 

jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1672 at 8.) His argument is premised on the “prior exclusive jurisdiction” 

doctrine which “holds that ‘when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second 

court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res.’” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l 

Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 

(2006)), certified question answered sub nom. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 129 

Nev. Adv. Op. 34, 302 P.3d 1103 (2013). Fleshman’s assertion fails. 

First, the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine applies when the parallel state and federal 

actions are in rem or quasi in rem. Id. at 1044. “If either action is in personam, then the prior 

exclusive jurisdiction doctrine will not apply.” Id. at 1044 n.3. Both the MDL and the Virginia 

action are in personam, as Fleshman and Plaintiffs seek judgments against Volkswagen for 

damages and injunctive relief. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) (“If a court’s 

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jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant’s person, the action and judgment are 

denominated ‘in personam’ and can impose a personal obligation on the defendant in favor of the 

plaintiff.”). In contrast, “a proceeding in rem is one taken directly against property, and has for its 

object the disposition of the property, without reference to the title of individual claimants[.]” 

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877); see Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining 

an in rem action as one “[i]nvolving or determining the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of 

persons generally with respect to that thing”). 

There are four types of in rem actions: “[a]n admiralty libel in rem; a proceeding in which 

a thing is forfeited to the government; a title clearance or registration proceeding; and a 

proceeding to settle an estate, such as probate or a final accounting and discharge of a trustee or 

administrator.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 6 (1982) cmt. b. Neither the MDL 

Consolidated Class Action nor the Virginia action fall into any of these categories. There is no res

over which a court may exercise jurisdiction, as the disposition of Fleshman’s vehicle is not at 

issue. There is no evidence the Virginia state court or any other government entity has seized 

Fleshman’s vehicle, and Fleshman raises no other issues concerning his vehicle’s possession or 

title. See Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 84 (1992) (“[I]t long has 

been understood that a valid seizure of the res is a prerequisite to the initiation of an in rem civil 

forfeiture proceeding.”). Neither action is part of a proceeding to settle an estate. See Glass v. 

Police Jury of Par. of Concordia, 176 U.S. 207, 210 (1900) (“[P]roceeding in settlement of estates 

in probate courts are in themselves proceedings in rem[.]”). And, at the risk of stating the obvious, 

these are not admiralty actions. 

Second, even if the Virginia action and the MDL Consolidated Class Action were in rem

proceedings, the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine would still not apply. Under the prior 

exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, “the court first acquiring jurisdiction shall proceed without 

interference from a court of the other jurisdiction.” Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 

(1922) (emphasis added). Thus,“[t]he doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction applies to a federal 

court’s jurisdiction over property only if a state court has previously exercised jurisdiction over 

that same property and retains that jurisdiction in a separate, concurrent proceeding.” Sexton v. 

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NDEX W., LLC, 713 F.3d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added); see Colo. River Water 

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976) (“It has been held . . . the court first 

assuming jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other 

courts.”). The MDL Consolidated Consumer Class Action precedes Fleshman’s Virginia action. 

Plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint in February 2016; Fleshman did not initiate his action 

until April 2016. As such, if the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine applied, it would deprive the 

Virginia state court, not this Court, of jurisdiction over Fleshman’s claims. 

Even though Fleshman’s prior exclusive jurisdiction argument is meritless, he is a member 

of the settlement class and therefore does have a significant protectable interest in the Consumer 

Class Action. See Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 474936, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 

2007), aff’d, 331 F. App’x 452 (9th Cir. 2009) (“As [the putative intervenor] is a member of the . . 

. class, he has a significant protectable interest relating to the subject of the instant action.” (citing 

In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Loan Litig., 418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005)); Cohorst v. BRE 

Props., Inc., 2011 WL 3489781, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 19, 2011), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2011 WL 3475274 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (“[S]ince [the putative intervenor] is a class 

member there is no dispute that she has a significant protectable interest relating to the property or 

transaction that is the subject of this action. As a class member she has a clear relationship 

between her claims and those of the class.”). Moreover, both Fleshman and Plaintiffs assert 

claims under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-196 et seq., for 

violations during the same time period. This overlap is further evidence that Fleshman has a 

significant protectable interest in the Consumer Class Action. See Munoz v. PHH Corp., 2013 WL 

3935054, at *12 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2013) (“Plaintiffs’ [first amended complaint] alleges claims 

that span a class period encompassing [the putative intervenor’s] claims. These claims provide a 

significant protectable interest relating to the subject of the instant action.” (citing UBS Fin. Servs., 

Inc., 2007 WL 474936, at *2)). 

Thus, while the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not divest the Court of 

jurisdiction over his claims, Fleshman still has a significant protectable interest because he is a 

class member. 

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B. Practical Impairment of Fleshman’s Ability to Protect His Interests

Fleshman fails to show that the Settlement impairs his ability to protect his interests. “[A] 

prospective intervenor ‘has a sufficient interest for intervention purposes if it will suffer a practical 

impairment of its interests as a result of the pending litigation.’” Wilderness Soc., 630 F.3d at 

1179 (quoting Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2006). But 

“intervention of right does not require an absolute certainty that a party’s interests will be 

impaired[.]” Citizens for Balanced Use, 647 F.3d at 900; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (requiring 

intervention where, in part, “disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 

movant’s ability to protect its interest . . . .” (emphasis added)). That said, a putative intervenor’s 

rights may be affected but not necessarily impaired if it has other means to protect them. Cal. ex 

rel. Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 442 (citing United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th 

Cir. 2004)). 

Fleshman may opt out of the Settlement and litigate his claims independently, or he may 

instead object to it. These options adequately protect his interests. See Zepeda v. PayPal, Inc., 

2014 WL 1653246, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014), objections overruled, 2014 WL 4354386 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (If putative intervenors are class members, they “do have means to 

protect their interests. That is, they may object to the settlement during the hearings on motions 

for preliminary or final approval, or they may opt out of the class and pursue their claims 

separately.”); Hofstetter v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 2011 WL 5415073, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 

2011) (“[The putative intervenor] had an opportunity to opt out of the [class action] settlement 

after he read the release of claims printed in the settlement notice. This opportunity adequately 

safeguarded his rights and interests.” (citing Cal. ex rel. Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 442.)). Thus, he has 

not made the showing required for intervention of right.

Fleshman may not object on behalf of all Virginia class members. Objecting to a 

settlement is an individual right that Fleshman cannot usurp from others. Hanlon v. Chrysler 

Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998). In fact, 

[t]here is no class action rule, statute, or case that allows a putative 

class plaintiff or counsel to exercise class rights en masse, either by 

making a class-wide objection or by attempting to effect a groupCase 3:15-md-02672-CRB Document 1742 Filed 08/17/16 Page 6 of 7
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wide exclusion from an existing class. Indeed, to do so would 

infringe on the due process rights of the individual class members, 

who have the right to intelligently and individually choose whether 

to continue in a suit as class members. 

Id. (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173–77 (1974)). Virginia class members 

can evaluate the Settlement and decide for themselves if they should participate, object, or opt out. 

Fleshman cannot choose for them.

Because there is no practical impairment of Fleshman’s ability to protect his interests, the 

Court need not consider the remaining Rule 24(a) requirements. See Perry, 587 F.3d at 950. 

CONCLUSION

Fleshman fails to show the Consumer Class Action and the Settlement practically impair 

his interests; he therefore does not meet the requirements of intervention of right. Accordingly, 

the Court DENIES the Motion to Intervene. In any event, Fleshman does not need to intervene to 

object to the Settlement. If he does not opt out of the Settlement, the Court will consider his 

objections provided he submits them by September 16, 2016 as is required of all other class 

members. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2016

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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