Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02001/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK MEPHAM HENSLEY,

Petitioner,

 v.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD,

Warden,

Respondent. _____________________________

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No. C 06-2001 MJJ (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner, filed this pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should

not be granted on the basis of petitioner’s cognizable claims. Respondent filed an answer

accompanied by a memorandum and points of authority contending that the petition

should be denied. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 23, 2001, the San Mateo County District Attorney charged petitioner with

the 1989 murder of Kathleen Noble. On May 30, 2002, a jury convicted petitioner of first

degree murder. On July 25, 2002, the trial court sentenced petitioner to 25 years to life in

prison. 

On December 21, 2004, the California Court of Appeal modified the judgment,

reducing the crime to second degree murder and affirming the judgment of conviction. 

On March 30, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied review.

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1

The state court opinion refers to petitioner as “defendant.”

2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts come from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

On March 5, 1989, Noble's body, nude from the waist up, was found

in the front passenger seat of her Datsun, covered by a blanket. The car was

parked on a street in East Palo Alto, about six miles from the apartment

Noble was then sharing with defendant[1], and there was evidence indicating

that it had been there for about 10 days. The car had been locked and there

was no key in the ignition. Noble's blood was found on the waist of her

partially unfastened pants and on her socks, but a criminalist testified that

he did not believe she had been killed at the scene because there would have

been more blood in and around the car if she had. Both of Noble's shoes

were “abraded” in the back heel, indicating she had been dragged. A

fingerprint matching defendant's right index finger was found on the inside

of the driver's side window of the car. An open bottle of tequila and some

limejuice were found in a bag inside the car. No semen was found on any

item in the car.

Noble's autopsy revealed lacerations and bruising on the forehead

and scalp caused by at least three separate blows with a blunt object. Her

skull had numerous fractures on the right side of the forehead, which would

have required “a pretty substantial quantity of force” to inflict, and were not

likely to have been inflicted merely by a fist or a wall. The pathologist

opined that Noble died within an hour of suffering these injuries. There

were no “defensive” wounds on her body, nor were there any signs of

trauma in the genital area. Noble had a blood alcohol level of 0.19 (which

may have been due in part to organisms generating alcohol after death).

Noble and defendant both worked at Syva Electronics in Mountain

View and since early January 1989 had shared an apartment with separate

bedrooms. Noble had dated her boyfriend, Richard Schaeffer, for about two

years and the two saw and spoke to each other regularly. However,

coworkers at Syva Electronics testified that defendant was infatuated with

Noble and had said that he would make her his girlfriend. As a result of

certain incidents occurring at the apartment, Noble told a coworker that she

was concerned about defendant's temper, afraid of him, and planned to

move out of the apartment.

On Friday, February 24, 1989, Noble and Schaeffer planned to

attend a party together. After drinking some champagne and then buying

some tequila and lime juice for the party, which they left in the car, they

stopped at the home of Schaeffer's sister, where they had a minor quarrel. 

Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Noble left alone and Schaeffer went to the

party with his brother. The next day Schaeffer called Noble's apartment and

was told by defendant she was not there. The evidence described efforts

made by Schaeffer and by Noble's sister and parents to locate Noble over

the following days. During this period, these family members visited the

apartment and observed that Noble's room was clean but noticed that certain

items of bedding later found in her car were missing. On these occasions,

defendant appeared to some to be nervous and fidgety. Noble's father

thought defendant's demeanor was completely different from when he had

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previously met him. Defendant expressed no sympathy over Noble's

disappearance. He told the parents that he might have heard Noble in the

shower on the night of February 24 or the following morning.

On March 9, one of the detectives received a telephone call from

Schaeffer, who told him that he had just received a call from defendant

telling him that he had found blood on Noble's mattress. When the

apartment was later searched, two large concentrated stains of Noble's

blood and a diffuse stain that appeared as if someone had tried to clean it

were found on the underside at the foot end of the mattress on Noble's bed. 

The box spring underneath the mattress also had blood stains that the

criminologist opined had been transferred from the mattress while the blood

was still wet. The wall directly above the head of the bed was damaged and

had four small spots of blood. Indications of blood were also found at the

head of Noble's bed, the carpet near the bed, the hallway and elsewhere in

the apartment. There were signs of a bloody handprint on the mattress. On

the floor in Noble's bedroom the criminologist also found two dark-colored

buttons which could have come from the blouse found in the car with

Noble's body, with its sleeves inside out as if someone had pulled it off

without unbuttoning the cuffs.

Two days before Schaeffer's call to the police, defendant had told a

detective that at midnight on February 24 he had heard the door slam and

someone talking; he also told the detective that after Noble came back from

going out with Schaeffer, he and Noble went to a liquor store to purchase

tequila, champagne, and cigarettes. The following morning he heard the

shower. He got up at 1:00 p.m. and Noble was not in the apartment. In a

subsequent interview on April 1, defendant told detectives he had gone with

Noble to purchase beer, tequila, and champagne before she went out with

Schaeffer at 6:30 p.m. on February 24. He had gone to bed at 10:30 p.m.

but heard the apartment door close at midnight, and the shower running at

11:00 a.m. the next day. When he got up at 1:00 p.m., Noble's bed was

made. When the detectives told defendant that Noble had probably been

killed in the apartment on the night of February 24, defendant said he would

feel “pretty shitty” because he was there that night, he did not hear anything

after the door closed, and he did not remember talking to Noble when she

came home that night.

When told that a neighbor saw Noble come home that night and slam

the door, defendant said he did talk to her and that Noble was upset, drunk

and crying. Defendant at first denied being attracted to Noble. When told

there was a blood stain on the bed the same size as his hand he denied

seeing any injuries on Noble. He then said he went to bed about 10 minutes

after Noble had arrived home and, about 20 minutes after that, thought he

heard Schaeffer arrive. He heard the phone ring about 3:00 a.m. About

6:00 a.m. he said he got up to go to the bathroom and saw Noble sleeping in

her bed. He saw no blood on the walls or sheets but did see a dark spot on

the floor near the bathroom. When a detective told defendant that a sound

test showed one could hear from one bedroom to the other, he told the

detective that around 1:00 a.m. he heard Noble's voice but thought she was

on the telephone. He then said that he went into Noble's room and leaned

over her as she lay in bed, and did not see her head bleeding. Defendant

went on to say that he had heard the springs of a mattress creaking around

3:00 a.m., when he thought Noble and Schaeffer were having sex, that he

saw the outline of Schaeffer's body in Noble's bedroom when he went to the

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2

A transcript of the answering machine message was received in evidence and, in

fuller part, read: "Just calling to say I love you and I'm very sorry. And I will leave you

alone like you requested. And I will just call you periodically to let you know I love you

and if I have a bad day and get on the phone and say I miss you it's true because I'm sorry. 

I didn't mean, I'm sorry I tried to kill you basically. I didn't, I better understand all those

things when guys say I don't know what happens. But, cause I don't know what happened

but either way I know you can't stand me.... Have a great time at the rehearsal. I can't, I

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bathroom at 6:00 a.m. but did not see Schaeffer when he looked into the

room upon leaving the bathroom, and that Schaeffer was in the apartment

when he awoke at 1:00 p.m.

Defendant at first denied having sex with Noble, then said they had

sex on two occasions, but not on the night in question. When told that

fingerprints had been lifted from Noble's body, defendant said they did have

sex that night. Kathleen had unbuttoned her blouse, he had unbuttoned her

pants, and she did not remove her shoes or socks. He went on to say

(contrary to an earlier statement) that he did believe that Schaeffer had

killed Noble, that he recalled hearing a deep, masculine voice in the

apartment that he thought was Schaeffer, that he leaned over and touched

the bed when he checked on Noble at 6:00 a.m., and that he had not seen

Schaeffer leave the apartment.

One coworker at Syva Electronics testified that after Noble's body

had been found, defendant told him that on the night in question she had a

fight with her boyfriend, came home upset, and he had comforted her and

they had ended up sleeping together.

The testimony that is central to this appeal came from Dana

Margulies, who met defendant in Virginia in 1993, when they began to

date. In 1996 they became engaged, but Margulies broke off the

engagement at the beginning of 1999. Defendant told her that he had

previously been living in California with his girlfriend when she was

murdered. Defendant told her the girlfriend left to buy cigarettes after they

had sex one evening and never returned. The police found his bloody

thumbprints on the girlfriend's closet door and considered him a suspect, but

he believed the killer was her ex-boyfriend Schaeffer.

Margulies testified to an argument she had with defendant in the

spring of 1998, when defendant tried to physically remove from her finger

the engagement ring he had given her, pushing her against a door and to the

ground, where he got on top of her, still trying to remove the ring from her

finger. She also testified to an incident that occurred in 1999, when the two

were no longer engaged. After the two had lunch together and defendant

gave her a pair of dancing shoes, they parted following an argument. Soon

afterwards, defendant came to her home and demanded that she return the

shoes and everything else he had ever given her. Defendant became very

angry when Margulies three times asked him to wait outside, ultimately

lunging at her, tackling her to the ground with his hands around her neck

and choking her to the point that she lost consciousness. She regained

consciousness, but was scared and concerned for her life before defendant

left with jewelry he had previously given her. About one week later, she

returned from out of town to find a message from defendant on her

telephone answering machine, professing his love for her and saying: “I'm

sorry I tried to kill you basically.”2

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hope it's a great show. Don't worry I'm not gonna be around I'm not, I don't want to scare

you or do anything like that. I just love you very much and I hope, I hope and I pray that

I'll become a better person. And I just hope you're around to see it. And I'm sorry Da,

you have to understand that I am so, so sorry...."

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The prosecution also presented two witnesses who were friends of

defendant in the period shortly before and after the Noble killing, to whom

defendant had demonstrated his interest in the martial art of kendo. To one

he had shown his practice swords and practice sticks, which were two and

one-half to three feet long, three-quarters to one inch thick and made of flat

bamboo slabs. To the other he had demonstrated his sparring techniques,

mentioning that in kendo a person attacks by stepping forward and aiming

to strike the center of the head or either side of the head.

Defendant presented several witnesses designed to cast doubt on

various aspects of the prosecution's case. One witness testified that in 1988

he had cut himself while in Noble's apartment, leaving behind a trace of

blood. An expert on police interrogation testified that the technique of

falsely advising a person about the state of the evidence, as the police did to

the defendant, can lead to false statements, admissions and confessions.

People v. Hensley, No. A099616, slip op. at 2-7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (hereinafter “Slip

Op.”) (footnotes in original, except where noted).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus submitted by

an individual in custody pursuant to a state court judgment only if the custody violates the

United States Constitution, laws or treaties. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2005); Rose v. Hodges,

423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence

unless the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2005) (hereinafter

“AEDPA”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-403 (2000). 

A state court decision qualifies as “contrary to” federal law if it either directly

contravenes a Supreme Court decision on a question of law or reaches a conclusion

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converse to a Supreme Court decision with materially indistinguishable facts. Id. at 413. 

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it

“identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 412-13. In

determining whether a state court’s decision contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly

established federal law, a federal court examines the decision of the highest state court to

address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson,

217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the highest state court to issue a

reasoned opinion was the California Court of Appeal.

B. Legal Claims

Petitioner claims that the admission of evidence of his “other bad acts” with

Margulies constitutes a violation of Due Process because the evidence was neither

relevant nor probative, and it was highly prejudicial. Petitioner asserts that improper

instructions allowed the jury to draw an impermissible inference from such evidence. 

Without the Margulies testimony, petitioner claims, the jury could not have reasonably

returned a guilty verdict. 

The California Court of Appeal set forth the following background to this claim:

Prior to the start of trial, the court held a hearing under Evidence

Code section 402 to consider the prosecution's motion to admit the evidence

concerning defendant's attacks on Margulies. The prosecutor sought to

introduce evidence of the two attacks described above, plus testimony by

Margulies of another incident in which defendant pushed her out of his car

and evidence of an email message defendant sent her in December 1999,

after Margulies had criticized his ballet performance, to the effect that

“right now I am sorry I loosened my grip.” The evidence was offered to

prove motive, intent to kill, premeditation and deliberation, identity, and a

common design or plan. The prosecutor argued that defendant's attacks

upon Margulies, particularly in light of his admission that he had intended

to kill her, tended to show that after being similarly rejected by Noble, he

intended to kill her. After hearing Margulies testify, the court granted the

prosecution's motion in part, permitting the testimony concerning the

incident over the ring and the strangling episode, including the subsequent

answering machine message from defendant, but excluding any evidence

about the car incident or the email message. The evidence was to be

received for the limited purpose of showing defendant's intent,

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3

 Immediately prior to Margulies' testimony on the disputed subjects, the court

instructed the jury: "If you find at the close of evidence that the People have proven Mark

Hensley committed the homicide of Kathleen Noble, you will be required to make a

determination as to whether or not he acted with the intent to kill and whether or not he

premeditated and deliberated. [¶] These terms will be defined for you later in the court's

instructions. You may consider evidence of Mr. Hensley's conduct with Dana Margulies

only as it may bear upon those states of mind. You may not consider Mr. Hensley's

conduct with Ms. Margulies for any other purpose." As part of the instructions at the

close of the trial, this instruction was repeated, preceded by the following: "Evidence has

been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant committed crimes other

than that for which he is on trial. This evidence, if believed, may not be considered by

you to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to

commit crimes. [¶] It may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of

determining if it tends to show the existence of the intent or mental state which is a

necessary element of the crime charged. For the limited purpose for which you may

consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other

evidence in this case. You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other

purpose." The jury was also told that "[t]he prosecution has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed crimes other than that for

which he is on trial."

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premeditation and deliberation. During trial, Margulies testified to the

incidents that the court permitted and the jury was twice instructed that this

evidence could be considered only for the limited purpose of determining

whether defendant intended to kill Noble.3

 In closing arguments both

attorneys reminded the jury that this evidence could not be considered to

establish that defendant was the perpetrator of the killing.

Slip Op. at 7-8.

The admission of evidence is only subject to federal habeas review if the

admission violates a specific constitutional guarantee or the error is of such magnitude

that the result denied the petitioner the right to a fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by

due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). Failure to

comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for

granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. See Id. While adherence to state

evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is

certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state standards are violated; conversely,

state procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance processes that do not comport

with fundamental fairness. See id. (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir.

1983). The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of

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4

 In its opinion, the Court of Appeal also rejected Petitioner's claim that admission

of evidence of his practice of kendo constituted a harmful error. Petitioner does not raise

this claim in his current petition. 

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evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). However, only if there are no

permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate

due process. 

The California Court of Appeal held that the admission of the Margulies evidence

was in error, but that the error was harmless.4

 The Court of Appeal first noted that other

bad acts evidence is admissible only for specific uses and that it cannot be used to prove a

defendant’s propensity to commit the charged crime. (Slip Op. at 8.) The prosecution did

not offer the Margulies evidence to show Petitioner’s propensity to commit the charged

crimes, but rather to show his state of mind during the homicide, specifically his

deliberation or premeditation. (Id. at 9.) When analyzing the testimony about the

incident when Petitioner attacked Margulies and tried to pull off her wedding ring, the

Court of Appeal noted that no evidence suggested that Petitioner had the intent to kill

Margulies at the time. (Id. at 13.) Since he lacked such intent during the ring incident,

the evidence has no logical connection to his state of mind during Noble’s killing. (Id.) 

Because that evidence was prejudicial and lacked any permissible probative value, its

admission was an error. (Id.)

While it also similarly concluded that admission of testimony about the strangling

incident was error, the Court of Appeal found that such evidence presented “a closer

question.” (Id. at 13.) Petitioner’s behavior in that situation was more extreme, and in his

subsequent phone message he apologized for having “tried to kill [her] basically.” (Id.) 

At trial, the prosecutor argued that this incident tended to show that, if Noble had resisted

Petitioner’s romantic advances, he would have formed the intent to kill her. (Id.) The

Court of Appeal pointed out the absence of evidence that Noble rebuffed petitioner’s

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The Court of Appeal reduced Petitioner’s conviction for first degree murder to

second degree murder because the jury had insufficient competent evidence upon which

to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner had the requisite intent for first degree

murder. (Slip Op. at 25-26.) 

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advances before the killing. (Id.) It noted that even if the evidence supported such an

inference, the circumstances of the Margulies attack were very different. (Id.) The Court

of Appeal went on to find that the trial court’s error in admitting the Margulies evidence

was not prejudicial. (Id. at 14.) In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed to the

limiting instructions that the trial court gave to the jury and the lack of dispute over the

state of mind of Noble’s killer. (Id.) The Court also pointed to the other evidence of

Petitioner’s guilt, which it characterized as “overwhelming.”5

 (Id.)

The Court of Appeal also found the admission of evidence did not violate due

process because it did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. (Id. at 16.) Under

AEDPA, when a federal court reviews a challenge to a purely legal questions under

Section 2254, it first examines whether the state court decision contradicts clearly

established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Then it looks at whether, after

identifying the correct governing Supreme Court holding, the state court unreasonably

applied that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Id. The California Court of

Appeal tested petitioner’s Due Process claim by analyzing whether the trial court’s errors

caused fundamental unfairness. (Id. at 16) (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159,

179 (1992) and Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991)). This rule

correctly states the clearly established federal law. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,

825 (1991). Because the Court of Appeal applied the correct standard, the decision was

not “contrary to . . . clearly established federal law.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1). 

 Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s due process claim was

not an “unreasonable application” of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As

explained by the Court of Appeal, there was ample other the admissible evidence upon

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which the jury could have found defendant guilty. The forensic evidence made clear that

Noble was killed on the night between February 24 and 25, 1989 in the bedroom of the

apartment that she shared with petitioner. He was in the apartment during the killing. 

Noble’s bed and bedroom were cleaned and tidied after the killing before anyone arrived

looking for Noble. Petitioner was the only person with the opportunity to turn the

mattress, make the bed and clean up the blood. Petitioner gave a series of contradictory

accounts about what he had heard and done that evening. His statements also

contradicted other evidence – contrary to his statements that he saw Noble’s boyfriend in

the apartment and heard him having sex with Noble, and his later claim that he had sex

with Noble that night, there was no physical evidence of intercourse. Petitioner’s account

to Margulies of Noble’s death, years later, was inconsistent with the facts. His reference

to Noble as his girlfriend supports the testimony by coworkers at Syva that Petitioner

wanted that to be the case. When police searched Noble’s car, where they found her

body, petitioner’s fingerprint was on the inside driver’s side window, despite the

uncontradicted evidence that petitioner never drove Noble’s car. 

In addition, to the ample other evidence of petitioner’s guilt, the trial court gave

the jury instructions limiting the inferences that the could draw from the Margulies

evidence. Specifically, the jury was instructed that it could not infer from the evidence

that petitioner had a propensity to commit the crimes. Juries are presumed to follow a

court's limiting instructions with respect to the purposes for which evidence is admitted. 

Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In light of the ample other evidence of petitioner’s guilt, and the trial court’s

limiting instructions about the Margulies evidence, the Court of Appeal reasonably

applied federal law in finding that the admission of such evidence did not render the trial

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For the same reasons, the admission of such evidence did not have a substantial

and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict, so as to result in actually prejudice

within the meaning of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993). See Dillard v.

Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring showing of actual prejudice under

Brecht in order to obtain habeas relief based on evidentiary error). 

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fundamentally unfair so as to violate due process.6 See, e.g., Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920;

Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 910 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (admission of similar prior bad

acts to show motive and intent, coupled with limiting instructions, was appropriate);

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1990) (admission of prior bad

act testimony did not violate due process where trial court balanced probative weight

against prejudicial effect and gave jury cautionary instruction); Butcher v. Marquez, 758

F.2d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1985) (admission of uncharged offenses does not violate

constitutional rights where jury had opportunity to weigh credibility of complaining

witness and judge admonished jury to consider incident only as evidence of intent, not as

evidence of bad character).

Because the state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on his claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _______________ _______________________

MARTIN J. JENKINS

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02001-MJJ Document 8 Filed 07/11/07 Page 11 of 11