Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00432/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00432-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL ALLEN, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0432-WS-B

 )

BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSION, )

 et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendant

Baldwin County Commission (“the Commission”) and defendant commissioners Frank

Burt, Jr., David E. Bishop, Wayne A. Gruenloh and Albert Lipscomb (“the

Commissioners”) (collectively, “the Commission defendants”). (Doc. 7). The parties

have filed briefs in support of their respective positions, (Docs. 7, 13, 16), and the motion

is ripe for resolution. After carefully considering the foregoing and other relevant

materials in the file, the Court concludes that the motion is due to be denied.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff’s complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges in pertinent

part as follows: that the plaintiff was an inmate at the Baldwin County Corrections

Center (“the Jail”) in August 2004; that portions of the Jail’s ceiling were then being

painted by correctional officers with a product capable of causing respiratory, nervous,

digestive and other disorders; that the plaintiff was required to scrape and sand old paint,

and perform other work in connection with the painting process, in confined areas in

which the paint was being used; that the plaintiff requested and was denied a respirator or

other protective equipment; that he was hospitalized as a result of his exposure to the

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The complaint alleges that Baldwin County acts by and through the Commission

defendants. (Doc. 1 at 9). The Commission defendants do not challenge this assertion. (Doc. 7

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paint’s fumes; and that he continues to experience physical issues as a result of the

exposure. (Doc. 1 at 3-8).

The complaint describes the painting as a maintenance function and alleges that

Jail personnel carried out this function on behalf of the Commission defendants. The

complaint alleges that the Commission defendants violated the plaintiff’s Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by their deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm. In particular, the complaint alleges that the Commission defendants: (1)

“failed and neglected to use qualified personnel to plan and perform the painting work at

the jail”; (2) “failed and neglected to provide adequate ventilation or personal protective

gear”; and (3) “failed and neglected to provide Plaintiff access to Material Safety Data

Sheets.” (Doc. 1 at 9-10). 

“A local government ... will be liable under section 1983 only for acts for which

the local government is actually responsible.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014,

1027 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The Commission defendants argue that they cannot be

responsible on a theory of respondeat superior for any constitutional violation visited by

Jail employees, because Section 1983 liability can never be so based. The plaintiff

agrees. The Commission defendants further argue that they cannot be responsible on a

theory of having personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation, because

the complaint does not allege such participation. Again, the plaintiff agrees.

Instead, the plaintiff argues that the Commission defendants are responsible

because they violated their duty under Alabama law to maintain the Jail. This is a

potential basis of liability. Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d at 1027 (“Therefore, the

County will have violated Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights if its failure to maintain

the Jail constituted deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the

prisoners.”).1

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at 3). Thus, “the liability analyses for the two entities are identical.” Marsh v. Butler County,

268 F.3d at 1023 n.3.

2

See also Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d at 1027 n.7 (“Under Alabama law, a county

might be liable when the physical conditions of the jail have deteriorated and pose a serious

threat to the safety of inmates and when those conditions have caused the injury to the

inmates.”). 

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DISCUSSION

“A motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim] may be granted only when a

defendant demonstrates beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Kirwin v. Price Communications

Corp., 391 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotes omitted). “When

considering [such] a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint are to

be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and the exhibits

attached thereto.” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)

(internal quotes omitted). 

Under Alabama law, “[e]ach county within the state shall be required to maintain a

jail within their county.” Ala. Code § 11-14-10. “We hold that, by using the phrase

‘maintain a jail’ in § 11-14-10, the Legislature intended to require the county commission

to keep a jail and all equipment therein in a state of repair and to preserve it from failure

or decline.” Keeton v. Fayette County, 558 So. 2d 884, 886 (Ala. 1989). That is, a

county “ha[s] a legal duty to keep the jail in a reasonably safe state of repair.” King v.

Colbert County, 620 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1993). This is an “affirmative duty” that

exists even when the county “did not actively cause a condition of disrepair.” Id. Thus,

for example, the county in King had the responsibility to repair a faulty overhead light

fixture which was not reasonably safe, even though the county did not actively cause the

unsafe condition. See id. at 624, 625 (reversing a grant of summary judgment to the

county on this basis).2

 

The duty to maintain extends only to the “jail and all equipment therein,” Keeton v.

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It may be that they rely on this quote from Turquitt, which their brief highlights but does

not address: “Section 11-14-20 places upon the County the duty to make available adequate

funds, while § 11-14-21 passes the mantle of responsibility to the sheriff who must spend those

funds ....” 137 F.3d at 1290. However, those sections, as well as Section 11-12-15(a)(1) to

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Fayette County, 558 So. 2d at 886, that is, “to the physical plant.” Turquitt v. Jefferson

County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Thus, the county was not

responsible for a liquid puddle on a bathroom floor, absent an allegation that the puddle

“resulted from the condition or the repair of the jail and the equipment contained therein.” 

Stark v. Madison County, 678 So. 2d 787, 788 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). 

A county’s duties with respect to maintaining a jail facility must be distinguished

from those with respect to operating the jail. “Madison County’s duty is to provide

adequate facilities and equipment to house the jail and to provide funding for certain

aspects of operating the jail.” Stark v. Madison County, 678 So. 2d at 788. “Alabama

counties are not charged with the duty of operating jails; instead, it is the county sheriffs

who are vested with that responsibility.” Ex parte Sumter County, 2006 WL 2790036 at

*3 (Ala. 2006). Consequently, “[t]he County cannot be liable for the harms that befall jail

inmates due to improper operation of the jail or negligent supervision of its inmates

because the County has no responsibility in that area.” Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137

F.3d at 1291. 

The Commission defendants concede that painting the Jail constitutes maintenance

of the facility, acknowledging that the Jail was “undergoing regular maintenance.” (Doc.

7 at 8; Doc. 16 at 2). They offer several arguments why they nonetheless can have no

liability for the plaintiff’s injuries, but none is sufficiently supported to allow its adoption

by the Court.

First, the Commission defendants argue that their only duty with respect to

maintenance is to provide funding for it. (Doc. 7 at 5, 8; Doc. 16 at 2-3). They identify

no authority supporting such a limited duty, however, offering only their ipse dixit. (Doc.

7 at 5).3

 

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which they refer, address the funding of certain aspects of jail operation, not maintenance of the

facility. See also Stark v. Madison County, 678 So. 2d at 788 (“Section 11-14-20, Code 1975,

directs the county to make appropriations for the costs associated with the operation of the

jail.”). 

4

The Commission defendants coin a new phrase to describe such a function: 

“maintenance operations.” (Id. at 5). The Court has been unable through computerized research

to locate any state or federal case from Alabama utilizing the term in a jail context.

5

It appears that the Commission defendants’ argument is based on the unexamined and

questionable assumption that, because only jail personnel can perform operational functions,

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Moreover, their position appears inconsistent with governing law. A county has a “legal

duty to keep the jail in a reasonably safe state of repair,” King v. Colbert County, 620 So.

2d at 625, and it is difficult to see how simply appropriating funds for maintenance, of

itself, “keep[s]” a facility in good repair; all the appropriated funds in the world will not

prevent a jail from collapsing if maintenance is not actually performed. 

Second, the Commission defendants note that the plaintiff, unlike the plaintiff in

King, was not injured by a poorly maintained structure but by the act of maintenance

itself. (Doc. 7 at 8; Doc. 16 at 2). They do not explain why this is a meaningful

distinction, and it is at least plausible that a duty to perform maintenance includes a duty

to perform maintenance safely. That the Court in Stark found significance in the

complaint’s failure to allege that the puddle “resulted from the condition or the repair of

the jail,” 678 So. 2d at 788 (emphasis added), further suggests that dangerous conditions

created in the course of maintenance fall within the county’s scope of responsibility.

Third, the Commission defendants argue that, even though painting is a

maintenance function, the “manner” in which the painting is performed is an operational

function and thus beyond the scope of their duties and responsibilities. (Doc. 7 at 4, 8).4

 

This position as well is supported only by the Commission defendants’ ipse dixit. It also

appears in tension with Stark’s suggestion that a condition created during

maintenance/repair work (and thus resulting from the manner in which the work was

performed) can form the basis of county liability.5

 

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whatever jail personnel do must be operational in nature. 

6

The Commission defendants also ignore the complaint’s allegation that they should not

have allowed Jail personnel to perform the maintenance to begin with. That is, the plaintiff’s

claim is based in part on conduct preceding the inmates’ involvement.

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Finally, the Commission defendants argue that this case involves the assignment of

inmates to work details, acts that implicate the “supervision of inmates” for which the

county has no responsibility under Turquitt. (Doc. 7 at 4; Doc. 16 at 2). Generally, of

course, this is true, but the Commission defendants have not attempted to show that it is

true in the circumstances here presented. As noted above, the complaint alleges that Jail

personnel performed the county’s maintenance responsibility of painting the Jail and that

they enlisted inmates to assist in this maintenance work. Employing inmates to perform a

county’s maintenance obligation does not obviously convert the task to an operational

one.6

It is true that “local governments can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of

those whom the local government has no authority to control.” Turquitt v. Jefferson

County, 137 F.3d at 1292. It is also true that “Alabama counties have no duties with

respect to the daily operation of the county jails and no authority to dictate how the jails

are run.” Id. at 1291. But there is no obvious reason to assume that, when a sheriff steps

out of his operational role and undertakes the county’s maintenance obligation, the county

has no authority to tell the sheriff how to perform the work, including what safety

equipment, personnel and warnings to utilize. 

The Court does not hold that the Commission defendants, as a matter of law, can

be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The Court rules only that their cursory briefing

on issues of considerable subtlety and complexity does not satisfy the stringent standard

governing dismissal for failure to state a claim. 

CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, the Commission defendants’ motion to dismiss is

denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of December, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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