Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01087/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kenneth Dean Haley, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Terry L. Stewart, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 02-1087-PHX-DGC(CRP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a pro se petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Kenneth Dean Haley. (Docket #1). Petitioner is being

held at the Arizona Department of Corrections based on convictions in Pinal County Superior

Court for first degree murder and aggravated assault. Petitioner alleges four grounds for

relief:

1. Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when

the State introduced undisclosed rebuttal evidence from Petitioner's sister,

Cheryl Martin;

2. The State's use of Arizona's Victims' Bill of Rights impeded disclosure of

evidence and witnesses, and prevented him from having a pretrial conference

with Cheryl Martin in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

Rights;

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1

Complete record of the trial contained in Notice, Exhibits A-K (Docket # 30-35)

hereinafter "Notice."

2

The Court's holding that a jury instruction on premeditation did not require proof of

actual reflection was overruled by the Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Thompson, 204

Ariz. 471, 65 P.3d 420 (2003).

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3. The trial court's instruction on premeditation violated his right to due process

of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to distinguish

between first and second degree murder;

4. Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Charles R. Pyle for a report and recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends

the District Judge, after independent review of the record, enter an order dismissing the

Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner stood trial for the murder of his father and attempted murder of his mother.

The trial1

 began on May 6, 1997, and culminated in guilty verdicts as to first degree murder

of his father and aggravated assault of his mother on May 19, 1997. Petitioner filed a timely

appeal with the Arizona Court of Appeals in which his conviction was upheld. State v. Haley,

194 Ariz. 123, 978 P.2d 100 (1999)2

. Petitioner then filed a timely notice of post conviction

relief. An evidentiary hearing was held on October 11, 2000, regarding Petitioner's petition

for post conviction relief. (Reply, Exhibit D; Notice, Exhibit M). The trial court issued a

minute entry denying post-conviction relief. (Answer, Exhibit M). The Arizona Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of post conviction relief by memorandum decision

on October 23, 2001. (Petition, Exhibit 2). Petitioner next filed this timely petition for writ

of habeas corpus.

The charges at trial arose from an incident on October 21, 1994. (Notice, Exhibit C,

pg. 168). On that day, Petitioner went to the home of his parents where an argument began

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between Petitioner and his father. Petitioner's mother was at the house where she was

recovering from an incident in May 1994 where her other son, Wesley Haley, had gouged

her eyes out. (Answer, Exhibit B, pg. 19-20). During the dispute between Petitioner and his

father, Petitioner took a knife from a nightstand in the bedroom and stabbed his father. (Id.,

Exhibit A). Petitioner grabbed his mother when she attempted to get out of bed and stabbed

her in the neck. (Notice, Exhibit D, pg. 36, 40).

At some point during the incident, a telemarketer phoned the home. (Id., Exhibit G,

pg. 82). The telemarketer testified that he overheard someone in the background asking for

help. (Id.). When the phone disconnected, the telemarketer called the house again and

attempted to keep Petitioner on the phone, successfully doing so until the arrival of the

police. (Id. at 83-84, 91). During this time, the telemarketer had the company owner's wife

call the police while he remained on the line with Petitioner. (Id. at 84). The telemarketer

testified that Petitioner told him that he had killed his father and was going to kill his mother.

(Id. at 87).

When Pinal County Sheriffs arrived, they found Marvin Haley, Petitioner's father,

dead, lying face down in a pool of blood with multiple stab wounds. (Notice, Exhibit C, pg.

175; Exhibit F, pg. 22-23). Marvin Haley's eyes had been gouged out. (Id. at Exhibit C, pg.

195; Exhibit F, pg. 33). Sheriffs also discovered after the paramedics had left that Mrs.

Haley had been stabbed in the neck, and the paramedics were called back. (Id. at Exhibit E,

pg. 196-197, 203). Petitioner admitted to Sheriff's officers that he had in fact gone to the

nightstand, removed a knife and stabbed his father with it. (Answer, Exhibit A). 

The day of the incident, a Sheriff's detective obtained an order to draw the blood of

Petitioner. (Reply, Exhibit A). A Sheriff's detective also later obtained a search warrant to

test the blood obtained for any medications or narcotics. (Id., Exhibit B). Subsequent tests

on the blood sample showed the existence of methamphetamine. (Notice, Exhibit G, pg. 63-

64).

. . . . . . . . .

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3

Dr. Esplin's testimony is contained in Notice, Exhibit H, pg. 4-108.

4

Dr. LaWall's testimony is contained in Notice, Exhibit I, pg. 118-231.

5

Cheryl Martin's testimony is contained in Notice, Exhibit I, pg. 24-67.

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At trial, Petitioner presented an insanity defense. In support of his defense, Dr. Esplin

testified.3

 Dr. Esplin testified that it was his opinion that Petitioner suffered from a serious

thought disorder, independent of any methamphetamine use. (Notice, Exhibit H, pg. 40, 54).

Dr. LaWall testified as the expert for the state.4

 Dr. LaWall's initial report had listed

schizophrenia as the number one possibility for Petitioner's actions with the number two

possibility being drugs. (Notice, Exhibit I, pg. 160). During trial Dr. LaWall was made

aware of the levels of methamphetamine in Petitioner's system and he changed his opinion

to "mental condition at the time of the alleged offense was due to methamphetamine abuse

as opposed to some preexisting underlying mental illness..." (Id. at 146).

At trial, Petitioner's sister, Cheryl Martin, testified.5

 Martin testified about a

conversation that she had with Petitioner before the October 21, 1994, incident. (Id. at 36-

38). Martin testified that Petitioner recounted a conversation between him and his brother

Wesley after Wesley had attacked their mother, as follows: "And Wesley looked at Kenny

and told Kenny that: Well, I did mom. Now you have to do dad. Because Wesley had

thought he had killed mom." (Id. at 38). Trial counsel for Petitioner moved for a mistrial

after Martin's testimony, arguing that the state knew about this testimony a year prior to trial,

had a duty to disclose this information and failed to do so. (Id. at 74-77). That motion was

denied by the trial court. (Id. at 87).

The jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder and aggravated assault. Petitioner

was sentenced on July 2, 1997. (Notice, Exhibit L). The trial judge sentenced petitioner to

a term of natural life for the first degree murder conviction and a term of 15 years on the

aggravated assault conviction to run consecutively. (Id. at 51-52).

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as the petitioner has a right under state law to raise the claim by available

procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

A habeas petitioner may exhaust his claims in one of two ways. First, a claim is

exhausted when no remedy remains available to the petitioner in state court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). Second, a claim is exhausted if there is an absence of available state

corrective process, or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B).

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have "fairly present[ed] his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 30; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal basis

for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the...[petitioner is] asserting

claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Tamalini v.

Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.2001). Mere similarity between a claim raised in state

court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66.

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state court one full

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's

established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal claim has

been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. See Picard

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v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those concerning life

sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted if they have

been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on appeal of conviction or

through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999).

In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court did

not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on

the merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state court and it is clear

the state could now refuse to address the merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id. The

procedural bar provides an independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and

sentence and, thus, prevents federal habeas corpus review unless the petitioner can

demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claim in the state proceedings. Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-

495 (1986); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine

prevents state prisoners from obtaining federal review by allowing the time to run on

available state remedies and then rushing to federal court seeking review. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-732 (1991).

If the claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-

270 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination often involves

consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governing postconviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies when a petitioner

may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal constitutional challenges to

convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on any claim which could have

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Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his sentence

has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there

has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's conviction

if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P.32.2(b)

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P.32.1(d)-(h)).

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been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain

claims6

 which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P.32.2.

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default are different concepts. Franklin,

290 F.3d at 1230. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required to refuse to hear

a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner fails to exhaust,

he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id. In contrast,

"[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show cause and

prejudice for the default, however, the district court dismisses the petition because the

petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id. at 1231.

Review of Merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the AEDPA, the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus

only if the state court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied __

U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 484 (2005). Therefore, the question whether a state court erred in

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7

"[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the

Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied." Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original).

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applying the law is a different question from whether it erred in determining the facts. Rice

v. Collins, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 969 (2006).

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the "contrary to" test and the

"unreasonable application" test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir.2003).

Under the first test, the state court's "decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.2003)

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-414 (2000)). Additionally, a state court's

decision is "'contrary to' Supreme Court case law if the state court 'applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in' Supreme Court cases."7 Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d

735, 738 (9th Cir.2003) cert. denied 541 U.S. 1037 (2004) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S.

3, 8 (2002)). "Whether a state court's interpretation of federal law is contrary to Supreme

Court authority...is a question of federal law as to which [the federal courts]...owe no

deference to the state courts." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original)

(distinguishing deference owed under the "contrary to" test of section (d)(1) with that owed

under the "unreasonable application" test).

Under the second test, "'[a] state court's decision involves an unreasonable application

of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle...but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738

(quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the "'unreasonable application clause...a federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

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judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly...[r]ather that application must be objectively unreasonable.'"

Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)). When evaluating

whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable application of federal law, "[f]ederal

courts owe substantial deference to state court interpretations of federal law." Cordova, 346

F.3d at 929.

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, "the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record."

Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th cir.), cert.

denied 534 U.S. 1038 (2004) ("a federal court may not second-guess a state court's factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable."). Section (d)(2) "applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court's findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective,...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citations omitted). In

examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court "must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues.'...[M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court's

findings of fact is insufficient; 'we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court's fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court's fact-finding process was adequate.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 266 F.3d at 1000) (emphasis in original). Once the federal court is satisfied

that the state court's fact-finding process was reasonable, or where the petitioner does not

challenge such findings, "the state court's findings are dressed in a presumption of

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

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Under section 2254(e) "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct." "State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new

evidence presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to

clear and convincing proof that the stat-court finding is in error...Significantly, the

presumption of correctness and the clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into

play once" it is found that the state court did not unreasonably determine the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state proceeding. Taylor, 966 F.3d at 1000.

9

Calculation of time under AEDPA excludes the time during which properly filed state

post-conviction applications are pending. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2).

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correctness [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254(e)8], which then helps steel them against any

challenge based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal

court." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000.

Section 2254(d)(1) and section 2254(d)(2) may both apply where the petitioner raises

issues of mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions "receive similarly mixed review;

the state court's ultimate conclusion is reviewed under 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded under 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978.

DISCUSSION

Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Respondents concede that Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed within the

one year statute of limitations.9

 (Answer, pg. 4).

Exhaustion

Respondents concede that Petitioner properly exhausted Grounds One, Two, and Four.

(Answer, pg. 5). Respondents however, contend that Ground Three was not properly

exhausted because in his direct appeal, Petitioner raised the claim solely based on state law

and as such did not fairly present his federal claim to the state court. (Id.).

. . . . . . . . .

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10In support of this position Respondents cite Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820,

825, 116 S.Ct. 1777 (1996).

11In 1997, the time of trial, Rule 15.1(a)(1) would have been the applicable rule

governing disclosure of witnesses and witness statements. That rule has since been

redesignated as Rule 15.1(b)(1). 

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Ground One: Undisclosed Rebuttal Evidence from Cheryl Martin

Petitioner asserts that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

when the State introduced undisclosed rebuttal evidence from Petitioner's sister, Cheryl

Martin. Martin testified at trial that Petitioner told her that after Wesley had gouged their

mother's eyes out, Wesley told Petitioner "Well, I did mom. Now you have to do

Dad."(Notice, Exhibit I, pg.38). Martin also testified that Wesley believed that he had killed

his mother when he told Petitioner this. (Id.). On cross-examination, Martin testified that she

had provided this statement to the prosecution a year before the trial. (Id. at 46-48).

Petitioner's trial counsel sought a mistrial on the basis that Martin's statement had not been

disclosed. (Id. 74-77). The motion was denied. (Id. at 87).

Respondents argue that the state was not obligated by Arizona law to disclose oral

statements made by Martin. Respondents also indicate that on both April 29, 1997 and May

2, 1997, Cheryl Martin was listed as a potential witness in either their case-in-chief or

rebuttal. (Answer, pg. 9). Respondents argue that there is no existing federal rule of law

allowing a defendant in a criminal case to obtain the statements of government witnesses

prior to their testimony.10 Respondents contend that Petitioner is thus proposing a new rule

of constitutional procedure which is barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060

(1989).

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure require that the state disclose the names and

addresses of witnesses as well as their relevant written or recorded statements.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 15.111. Here the rule clearly requires the disclosure of written or recorded

statements. There is no indication that the statement made by Martin was written or

recorded. In fact, Martin testified that she told prosecutor Rourke of Petitioner's recounting

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12In 1997 the applicable Rule was 15.1(a)(2). Today this same rule is set out at Rule

15.1(b)(2).

13The current rule is the same as the rule in 1997.

14The rules in 1997 with regard to prior bad acts would have been 15.1(a)(6) and with

regard to mitigating information 15.1(a)(7). The current rules are 15.1(b)(7) and 15.1(a)(8)

respectively.

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of the conversation between Wesley and himself as Rourke was walking to his car after a

meeting at her house. (Notice, Exhibit I, pg. 82). The Arizona Rules also require that the

state disclose all statements of the defendant. Id.12 According to Rule 15.4(a)13, in all

discovery statement shall mean 

"(i) A writing signed or otherwise adopted or approved by a person; (ii) A

mechanical, electrical or other recording of a person's oral communications or a

transcript thereof; and (iii) A writing containing a verbatim record or a summary of

a person's oral communications."

Airz.RCrim.P.; See State v. Pavao, 23 Ariz.App. 65, 530 P.2d 911 (1975).

In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the statement made by Petitioner

to Martin was in any way recorded or memorialized. As such, Petitioner was not entitled to

disclosure of it prior to trial. As noted by the state appellate court, Rule 15.1 also would

require the state to disclose a list of prior bad acts that it intended to use and any information

tending to mitigate or negate the defendant's guilt.14 The appellate court held that

"The record shows that before trial the state disclosed its intent to call Haley's

sister...we find nothing to suggest, nor does Haley claim, that any of the sister's

conversations with or regarding her brothers had been written down or

otherwise recorded. Furthermore, we do not find Wesley's statement to Haley

nor Haley's reiteration of Wesley's statement to his sister to be a 'prior act' on

the part of Haley within the meaning of [the] Rule...we do not find, and Haley

does not suggest, how Wesley's statement could be used to mitigate or negate

his guilt..." Haley, 978 P.2d at 102.

The state appellate court having found that Arizona law does not require disclosure of this

non-recorded statement, the question becomes whether there is a Federal right to such

disclosure.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords defendants a right to

disclosure of exculpatory material or information and relevant impeachment evidence. Brady

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v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct.

1936 (1999) (the duty to disclose under Brady includes impeachment evidence). The

Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant is entitled to limited discovery and has no

right to obtain the statements of government witnesses prior to their testimony. Degen v.

United States, 517 U.S. 820, 825, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 1781-2 (1996) citing Fed.R.Crim.P.

16(a)(2). Since the statement made by Martin was not exculpatory in nature, nor was it

impeachment evidence, Petitioner did not have a federal right to its disclosure prior to trial.

Thus, the state appellate court's ruling is not contrary to or an objectively unreasonable

application of federal law. 

Petitioner seems to suggest that the Court should adopt a new rule that would grant

criminal defendants discovery of the testimony of an adverse witness prior to trial. A new

rule is announced "when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States of

Federal Government." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1070

(1989)(plurality opinion). In Teague, the Supreme Court held that a new rule requested on

collateral review, as in this case, will not be applied retroactively unless it falls within an

exception to the general rule. Id. at 311. The first exception in which a rule should be

applied retroactively is where it places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct

beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority." Id. quoting Mackey v. United

States, 401 U.S. 667, 91 S.Ct. 1160(1971). This exception does not apply in Petitioner's case

as the rule he proposes does not propose to decriminalize a class of conduct nor apply to a

particular class of people. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494-495, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1263-

64 (1990).

The second exception exists when a new rule "requires the observance of those

procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. (internal citations omitted).

This exception applies to "watershed" rules of criminal procedure implicating the

fundamental fairness and accuracy of trial. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S.151, 156, 117 S.Ct.

1969, 1973 (1997); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 113 S.Ct.892 (1993); Teague, 489 U.S.

at 311. "A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also

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alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the

proceeding." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 2831(1990) quoting

Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis original). This two part test

must be met before a rule may overcome the Teague bar. Furthermore, the Court has

cautioned that this exception is meant to apply only to a small core of rules. Graham, 506

U.S. at 478. Those rules of procedure "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. quoting

Teague, 489 at 311. In Teague the Court specifically cautioned that it is unlikely that such

rules applying to the basic tenets of due process have not yet emerged "[b]ecause we operate

from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of

innocence and guilt..." Teague, 489 U.S. at 313; Graham, 506 U.S. at 478.

Petitioner's proposed rule is not that of a "watershed" nature as the Court envisioned.

See O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 167 (sweeping rules like that of Gideon are of the character

envisioned by Teague). To be of such a nature the rule must be more than abstractly

fundamental, it must be one "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is

seriously diminished." Schriro v. Summerlin, 542, U.S. 348, 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523

(2004)(holding that the new rule in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 583(2002) was not of a

watershed nature so as to be retroactive under Teague analysis). The scope of the second

Teague exception is so limited that the Court has yet to find a rule that falls under this

exception. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 2513-14 (2004).

Petitioner has not established how this proposed rule would improve the accuracy of

convictions at trial. Established law already requires the government to produce relevant

exculpatory evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. 83. Criminal defendants retain their right to confront

a witness through cross-examination. A criminal defendant may motion for mistrial after a

witness's testimony, as trial counsel did in this case. (See Notice, Exhibit I, pg. 77-87). Given

these existing safeguards it is clear that the proposed rule is not of the primacy and centrality

that would characterize a watershed rule of procedure. As such, Petitioner's proposed rule is

Teague barred.

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15The Arizona Court of Appeals declined to decide whether Martin was a victim under

the Victims' Bill of Rights. (Petition, Exhibit 2, ¶7). However, trial counsel testified at the

evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner's post conviction proceedings, that he believed

Martin would have qualified as a victim under the Victims' Bill of Rights because she was

the child of deceased victim. (Notice, Exhibit M. pg. 32-33; Reply, Exhibit D, pg. 32-33).

A.R.S § 13-4401(19) defines victim as "a person against whom a criminal offense has been

committed, or if the person is killed...the person's spouse, parent, child..." (emphasis added).

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Ground Two: State's Use of the Arizona Victims' Bill of Rights to Impede Disclosure

Petitioner contends that the state used the Victim's Bill of Rights to impede disclosure

and pretrial confrontation of Cheryl Martin in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Respondents contend that there is no federal constitutional right to

discovery in a criminal case. The state appellate court held that the state was under no

obligation to disclose the testimony of Martin. Haley, 978 P.2d 101. Petitioner contends that

designation of Martin as the victim representative was in error as A.R.S. § 13-4403(A)

provides that the representative should not be a bona fide witness15. The question this Court

must decide is whether the state courts' decisions are contrary to established federal law. 

Federal law also does not impose an obligation on the state or government to disclose

this type of testimony. The Confrontation and Due Process Clauses do not normally afford

a criminal defendant the right to pretrial discovery. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107

S.Ct. 989(1987)(plurality opinion). A defendant's right to confront a witness testifying

against him is satisfied by his right to cross-examination of the witness. Id.; See S.A. v.

Superior Court in and for the County of Maricopa, 831 P.2d 1297 (1992) (applying Ritchie

to Arizona's Victim's Bill of Rights). A criminal defendant does not have a right to the

statements of government witnesses prior to trial. Degen, 517 U.S. at 825. Absent a federal

right to pretrial discovery by a criminal defendant this Court finds that the state court

decision is not contrary to established federal law. Because the central crux of this claim is

the right to pretrial discovery of the testimony of government witnesses, the Teague analysis

of Ground One applies to this ground as well. 

. . . . . . . . .

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16Respondents support their position citing Joseph v. Angelone, 184 F.3d 320, 330 (4th

Cir.1999); Parker v. Champrion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir.1998).

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Ground Three: Jury Instruction on Premeditation

In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that he was denied due process as guaranteed by

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the premeditation jury instruction failed to

distinguish between first and second degree murder. Respondents argue that Petitioner has

failed to exhaust this claim because it was presented on direct appeal solely as an issue of

state law and as such has failed to fairly present his federal claim to the state court. (Answer,

pg. 5-6). Respondents also contend that this third ground is procedurally barred because the

appellate court held that Petitioner had requested the erroneous instruction and that any

resulting error was thus invited and the right to challenge it was waived16. (Id. at 6 citing

State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 30 P.3d 631).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), habeas relief shall not be granted unless the claim was

exhausted in state court, there is an absence of available state corrective process to exhaust

the claim, or circumstances exist which render the state process ineffective to protect the

petitioner's rights. A federal court will not review a claim where a petitioner procedurally

defaulted a claim in state court, unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for

not presenting the constitutional claim or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence.

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996).

In the present case, Petitioner failed to phrase his claim regarding the premeditation

jury instruction as a federal constitutional claim on his direct appeal in state court. Petitioner

does not demonstrate or allege any prejudice nor present any cause for failing to present his

claim in state court. Nor does Petitioner assert a claim of actual innocence. As such, his

claim is barred.

Furthermore, the state appellate court's review of Petitioner's claim regarding the jury

instruction on premeditation found that Petitioner had requested the language and had thus

invited the error. Haley, 978 P.2d at 102. Invited error may not be challenged on appeal. Id.

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citing State v. Diaz, 168 Ariz. 363, 813 P.2d 728 (1991); State v. Moreno, 173 Ariz. 471, 844

P.2d 638 (App.1992). When a state reviewing court's decision rests upon the invited error

doctrine, consideration of the issue is barred on habeas review. Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d

809, 832 (9th Cir.2004). Thus, review of this claim is barred.

Ground Four: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

in violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Petitioner asserts that his trial

counsel was ineffective when he (1) failed to interview Cheryl Martin prior to trial, (2)failed

to supply the State's expert, Dr. LaWall, with Petitioner's medical records prior to trial, and

(3) failed to file a motion to suppress the results of the blood test.

Petitioner presented his three ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his Rule 32

proceeding (Answer, Exhibit M; Reply, Exhibit 2) and to the Arizona Court of Appeals

following those proceedings (Petition, Exhibit 2). Petitioner is entitled to relief if the state

court's decision rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was either "contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of," established law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 391 (2000). The established law governing the merits of ineffective assistance of

counsel claims is expressed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The general

standard for attorney performance is that of "reasonably effective assistance." Id. The

Strickland test requires a petitioner to establish both deficient performance by counsel and

prejudice resulting from that performance to obtain relief. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d

954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 311 F.3d 928. 

The trial court denied Petitioner's Rule 32 petition by minute entry dated October 11,

2000. In denying the petition the court found that 

"1. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to provide Dr. LaWall with all of the

medical records and the Court finds that no prejudice was suffered by the petitioner.

2. The Court further finds that trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to

interview Cheryl Martin prior to trial, and that counsel did request an interview with

the victims (Martin) and this Court finds that Martin was a victim in the case.

3. The Court further finds that trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to move

to suppress the results of the blood test for the reason that the blood test is authorized

under the Rules..."

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17Memorandum decision issued by Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals

2CA-CR01-0140-PR (October 23, 2001).

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(Answer, Exhibit M). The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that trial counsel's failure

to provide Dr. LaWall with medical records was not conduct that fell below the prevailing

professional norms nor did it prejudiced Petitioner. (Petition, Exhibit 217). The court also

found that Petitioner did not suffer prejudice based on counsel's failure to interview Cheryl

Martin prior to trial. (Id.). And finally, the court concluded that based on the October 21,

1994, order and the October 24, 1994, search warrant, trial counsel would have had no basis

for moving to suppress the blood evidence. (Id.).

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court or the appellate court

applied an inappropriate legal standard in their review of Petitioner's ineffective assistance

of counsel claims. See Clark, 331 F.3d 1062; See Lynn, 347 F.3d 735. Both applied the test

established in Strickland. Thus the question is whether the state court unreasonably applied

the legal principle to the facts of this case. Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d

at 1067). In looking at the state court's application of the law to the facts, a federal court may

not second-guess the fact finding process unless the state court was not merely wrong but

actually unreasonable. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999.

Failure to interview Martin prior to trial

In denying Petitioner's claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to interview

Cheryl Martin, the trial court found that Petitioner's trial counsel did in fact request an

interview with Martin. (Answer, Exhibit M). The trial court also found that Martin was a

victim in the case. (Id.) In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court noted that

there was little that trial counsel could have done to suppress Martin's statement even had he

known about it prior to trial. (Petition, Exhibit 2, ¶ 7). The appellate court also noted that

efforts to suppress the statement would more than likely have been futile. (Id.) Thus, both

courts found that Petitioner had failed to establish prejudice.

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The trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner's post conviction relief

proceedings on October 11, 2000. (Reply, Exhibit D; Notice, Exhibit M). At that hearing

Petitioner's trial counsel testified that he had requested an interview with Martin but had been

informed by the prosecution that Martin was unavailable because she had invoked her rights

as a victim. (Id. at 14, 33). Counsel further testified that he believed that Martin did satisfy

the definition of victim in the Victim's Bill of Rights and he believed that any motion to

interview her would have been denied. (Id. at 32-33). Finally counsel testified that while

Martin's testimony was damaging to the case all he could have done had he known about it

prior to trial was make a motion to suppress the statement. (Id. at 19). Furthermore, counsel

motioned for a mistrial after Martin's testimony. (Notice, Exhibit I, p. 74-87). There are no

facts to suggest that the trial court or appellate court were unreasonable in finding that trial

counsel's representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, this

Court may not second-guess the facts as found by the state courts but must apply the normal

standards of appellate review and determine whether or not the finding could reasonably be

supported by the record. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978. This Court finds

that the state courts' findings are reasonably supported by the record and that the appropriate

legal standard was applied to the facts with respect to trial counsel's failure to interview

Martin prior to trial.

Failure to supply medical records to state's expert

In denying Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to supply

Dr. LaWall, the state's expert witness, with all of Petitioner's medical records, the trial court

found that Petitioner had failed to show that he suffered any prejudice. (Answer, Exhibit M).

In upholding the trial court's decision, the state appellate court found that Petitioner failed

to show that "but for any assumed deficiency in counsel's performance, the outcome of the

case would have been different." (Petition, Exhibit 2, ¶ 5). The appellate court also found

that counsel performed within the prevailing norms. (Id.). 

At the post conviction relief evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that while he did

not personally provide a copy of the records to Dr. LaWall, he disclosed all medical records

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involving Petitioner's case to the state on December 12, 1996. (Reply, Exhibit D, p.9-10;

Notice, Exhibit E, p.9-10). Counsel also testified that he did not believe that the records

provided were the basis for the doctor's change in opinion but rather that the change in

opinion was based on the state providing him with information about its theory of the case.

(Id. at 12). Counsel further testified that he was prepared for Dr. LaWall when he changed

his testimony and he did impeach Dr. LaWall regarding the change in opinion. (Id. at 18;

Notice, Exhibit I, p. 151-222 (Cross-Examination of Dr. LaWall by trial counsel)). 

Dr. LaWall was not the only expert to testify about Petitioner's mental state at trial.

Trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Esplin to support the insanity defense. (Notice,

Exhibit H). Dr. Esplin testified that in his opinion Petitioner suffered from a serious thought

disorder independent of drug use. (Id., p. 40, 54). He also testified that it was his opinion that

Petitioner was not capable at the time of this incident of "rational thoughts, of understanding

or appreciating the quality of his acts." (Id. at 62). Both Dr. Esplin and Dr. LaWall noted the

similarity between their reports. (Id. at 62, 161). 

Based on these facts, this Court cannot say that the state courts were unreasonable in

determining that trial counsel performed within the prevailing norms. Nor can this Court say

that it was an unreasonable for the state courts to determine that no prejudice had been shown

by Petitioner. As the appellate court noted, "[w]hether the materials were provided before

trial or not, Dr. LaWall would ultimately have had the information and would have changed

his initial opinion." (Petition, Exhibit 2, ¶ 5).

Failure to suppress blood evidence

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to file a motion to

suppress the results of the blood test performed on October 28, 1994 of the blood taken on

October 21, 1994. The trial court found that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective.

The appellate court in upholding the trial court's decision found that "it is clear that trial

counsel had no basis for moving to suppress the blood results." (Id. at ¶ 10).

On October 21, 1994, the day of the incident, Detective Keith Cisewski submitted an

affidavit in support of an order for a blood sample. (Reply, Exhibit A). That same day a

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Justice of the Peace issued an order authorizing the taking of a blood sample from Petitioner.

On October 28, 1994, Detective Ed Schweitzer submitted an affidavit for a search warrant

to perform relevant tests on the blood sample taken on October 21, 1994, to determine

whether Petitioner was on any type of prescription drug or illegal narcotic at the time of the

incident. (Id., Exhibit B). The search warrant was issued by a Pinal County Superior Court

Judge on October 28, 1994. (Id.)

When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is rooted in failure to litigate a Fourth

Amendment issue, a petitioner must show (1) the overlooked motion to suppress would have

been meritorious and (2) a reasonable probability exists that the jury would have reached a

different verdict. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clark, 323 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir.2003)(citing

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986)). Thus Petitioner would need to show

that a motion by his trial counsel would have been meritorious. As noted above, the state

appellate court concluded that such a motion would have been denied. Furthermore, no facts

exist to suggest that the requisite probable cause did not exist as foundation for the order to

draw the blood and the warrant to test the blood. See State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 49 P.3d 273

(Ariz. 2002); A.R.S. § 13-3905. Based on the fact that the blood was initially drawn

pursuant to a valid court order and was then tested pursuant to a valid search warrant, this

Court finds that the state courts were not unreasonable in their findings. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge,

after independent review of the record, deny Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Docket # 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(B), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 02-1087-PHX-DGC.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 6th day of March, 2006.

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