Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04411/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04411-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Insurance Contract

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLOBALSANTAFE DRILLING COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF

PENNSYLVANIA; et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF

PENNSYLVANIA, 

Counter-Claimant and 

 Cross-Claimant,

v.

GLOBALSANTAFE DRILLING COMPANY; et

al.,

Counter-Defendants and

Cross-Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-4411 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff GlobalSantaFe Drilling Co. moves to remand this

removed action to State court. Removing Cross-Defendants The

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 1 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Mutual Insurance Association Gard (Gard), Associated Electrical and

Gas Insurance Services Limited (AEGIS) and The United Kingdom

Mutual Steamship Assurance Association (Bermuda) Ltd. (UK Club)

(collectively, Removing Defendants) oppose this motion. Defendant

The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania takes no

position on whether the Court should exercise its discretion and

remand this litigation to State court, but it objects to Removing

Defendants' assertion that its claims against Removing Defendants

are subject to arbitration. The hearing scheduled for January 6,

2006, is vacated. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion and remands this case

to State court.

BACKGROUND

William Lightbown died of mesothelioma in 2002. He was an

employee of Plaintiff and had worked on Plaintiff's vessels from

1969 through 2001. A year after his death, his widow brought a

wrongful death action against Plaintiff and others, alleging that

her husband was exposed to, and ultimately killed by, asbestos

while working on Plaintiff's vessels. In October, 2004, Plaintiff

settled the suit for an undisclosed, but substantial, amount of

money. 

Various insurers had issued liability insurance coverage

policies to Plaintiff that were in effect during the years that

Plaintiff employed Mr. Lightbown. Three of these policies

contained foreign arbitration agreements. Plaintiff's contract

with Gard included a Norwegian choice of law clause and an

agreement to arbitrate any disputes in Oslo, Norway. Plaintiff's

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 2 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

contract with AEGIS and UK Club had English choice of law clauses

with agreements to arbitrate any disputes in London. 

 Although there were numerous policies, Plaintiff selected the

policy issued by Defendant, and demanded full indemnity under that

policy alone. Defendant refused to indemnify Plaintiff fully,

arguing that, under California law, Plaintiff cannot obtain the

entire amount of the settlement from Defendant. Under a complete

reservation of rights, Defendant has paid Plaintiff only a share of

the settlement.

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant and the other insurers

in State Court. Plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract

and insurance bad faith against Defendant and sought declaratory

relief against the other insurers, including Removing Defendants,

who had provided liability coverage to Plaintiff between 1969 and

2002. Plaintiff sought a declaration that if it is not entitled to

be fully indemnified by Defendant, then the remaining insurer

Defendants are obliged to indemnify Plaintiff for any remaining

balance.

On October 28, 2005, the Removing Defendants removed this

action to this Court. The notice of removal states that the Court

has original jurisdiction of this action under 9 U.S.C. § 203 and

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that it may be removed to this Court pursuant

to 9 U.S.C. § 205, because it involves an arbitration agreement

subject to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of

Foreign Arbitral Awards. All of the Defendants in this action

consented to the removal.

Five days after Removing Defendants removed this action,

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 3 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against Removing

Defendants. That same day, Defendant brought counter-claims for

declaratory relief against Plaintiff and cross-claims for equitable

contribution and equitable subrogation against the other

Defendants, including Removing Defendants.

DISCUSSION

Removal from State court is proper where the federal court has

original jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). Title 9 U.S.C. § 203 provides that district courts have

original jurisdiction over an action falling under the Convention

on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 

Section 205 provides for the removal of such actions, stating that

where the subject matter of an action "relates to an arbitration

agreement or award falling under the Convention," the defendants

may remove the action to the district court. 9 U.S.C. § 205. 

Plaintiff does not argue that removal was improper in this

case. Rather, Plaintiff argues that, because it dismissed all

claims against Removing Defendants, there is no longer any basis

for federal jurisdiction, and the Court should exercise its

discretion to remand the case to the Superior Court for the City

and County of San Francisco. Plaintiff notes that, besides this

motion, the Court has not addressed the merits of any issue in this

case. The interests of judicial economy, fairness and comity,

Plaintiff asserts, dictate that this case, which now consists of

only State law claims, should be returned to State court. 

Removing Defendants do not address directly Plaintiff's

arguments regarding whether the Court should exercise its

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 4 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

discretion to remand the remaining State law claims to State court. 

They do not address relevant cases cited by Plaintiffs, such as

Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997),

where the Ninth Circuit stated, 

The Supreme Court has stated, and we have often

repeated, that "in the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the

balance of factors ... will point toward declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims." 

114 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484

U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Instead, Removing Defendants argue

that, because subject matter jurisdiction existed at the time of

removal, and because subject matter jurisdiction still exists, the

Court has no discretion to remand in this case. The Court first

addresses Removing Defendants' argument that subject matter

jurisdiction existed at the time of removal and then addresses

their arguments regarding current subject matter jurisdiction.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction at Time of Removal

All parties agree that removal was proper. But Removing

Defendants contend that because removal was proper and subject

matter jurisdiction existed at the time of removal, then

Plaintiff's argument for remand must fail. Their reliance on

Sparta Surgical Corporation v. National Association of Securities

Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998), to support this contention

is misplaced.

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 5 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

In Sparta, the plaintiff filed suit in State court based upon

alleged violations of security exchange rules. After the

defendants removed the case, the plaintiff amended its complaint

and deleted most references to the exchange rules. The Ninth

Circuit held that the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa,

which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts for

suits brought to enforce the Securities Exchange Act and the rules

and regulations promulgated thereunder. 159 F.3d at 1212. The

amended complaint was of "no moment" to the court because subject

matter jurisdiction must be decided at the time of removal without

reference to subsequent amendments. Id. 

Sparta does not hold that a court cannot remand a case that

was properly removed even if the plaintiffs amend their complaint,

or, in this case, dismiss certain defendants. The plaintiff in

Sparta argued that the district court did not have subject matter

jurisdiction and thus removal was improper, an issue not contested

in this case. 

Removing Defendants cite no case holding that if subject

matter existed at the time of removal, then the case cannot be

remanded. And they do not address Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc.,

64 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1995), discussed by Plaintiffs in their

moving papers. In Baddie, the plaintiffs filed in State court and

the defendants removed. The Ninth Circuit found that in first

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 6 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

choosing State court and then, after removal, dismissing their

federal claims and moving for remand with all due speed, the

plaintiffs did not engage in manipulative pleading practices but,

rather, made a legitimate tactical decision. The court explained,

"A plaintiff is entitled to file both state and federal causes of

action in state court. The defendant is entitled to remove. The

plaintiff is entitled to settle certain claims or dismiss them with

leave of the court. The district court has discretion to grant or

deny remand." 64 F.3d at 490.

Thus, the Court finds that Removing Defendants' argument that

the Court has no discretion to remand this case because removal was

proper is without merit.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)

Removing Defendants next argue that, although they did not

remove the case on this basis, the Court had jurisdiction at the

time of removal because this case involves disputes over marine

insurance contract rights and obligations, and thus the Court

cannot remand this case. They cite no case, however, to support

this argument. Nor do they disclose the relevant Ninth Circuit

authority that discredits their argument.

As the Ninth Circuit explains,

28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) provides that "[t]he district courts

shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the

courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of

admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 7 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise

entitled." The latter clause, known as the "savings to

suitors" clause, "leave[s] state courts 'competent' to

adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings 'in

personam,' that is, where the defendant is a person, not

a ship or some other instrument of navigation."

Ghotra by Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1054

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556,

560-61 (1954)). The Ninth Circuit has further noted "that saving

clause claims brought in state court are not removable under 28

U.S.C. § 1441 absent some other jurisdictional basis, such as

diversity or federal question jurisdiction." Morris v. Princess

Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Romero

v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371 (1959); Alleman

v. Bunge Corp., 756 F.2d 344, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1984)). 

Thus, while the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

this case, removal under § 1333 would not have been proper. 

Triton Container Int'l Ltd. v. Institute of London Underwriters,

1998 WL 750941 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 1998). Removing Defendants'

argument that the Court has no discretion to remand this case

because it involves marine insurance contracts is without merit. 

III. Subject Matter Under 9 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 205

Removing Defendants' final argument is that the Court has no

discretion to remand this case because Defendant's cross-claims

against Removing Defendants raise the same federal subject matter

jurisdiction which was the basis for removal in the first place,

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 8 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

i.e., 9 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 205. Thus, according to Removing

Defendants, it is irrelevant that Plaintiff dismissed its claims

that involved foreign arbitration agreements against Removing

Defendants. This is the argument that Defendant responds to,

arguing that because it was not a party to any arbitration

agreements with Removing Defendants, it does not have to arbitrate

any of its claims against Removing Defendants based on Plaintiff's

arbitration agreements with Removing Defendants. 

A. "Relates to an arbitration agreement"

Removing Defendants read 9 U.S.C. § 205 broadly and cite

Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2002), in support of their

interpretation of § 205. Although Plaintiff and Defendant address

Beiser as it relates to whether Defendant's cross claims against

Removing Defendants are subject to arbitration, neither Plaintiff

nor Defendant addresses the Beiser court's interpretation of § 205. 

As noted above, § 205 provides for the removal of a pending action

that "relates to an arbitration agreement" under the Convention. 

In Beiser, the court found that "whenever an arbitration agreement

falling under the Convention could conceivably affect the outcome

of the plaintiff's case, the agreement 'relates to' to the

plaintiff's suit." 284 F.3d at 669. Removing Defendants argue

that their foreign arbitration agreements with Plaintiff could

conceivably affect the outcome of Defendant's cross-claims against

them.

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 9 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

The Beiser court's interpretation of "relates to" is not

binding precedent, and it is distinguishable. As noted in AtGames

Holdings Ltd. v. Radica Games Ltd., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1255 n.1

(C.D. Cal. 2005), the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue. 

The court in AtGames, however, found that the "plain meaning of

§ 205 is clear that a state court action is removable if (1) the

parties to the action have entered into an arbitration agreement,

and (2) the action relates to the agreement." 394 F. Supp. 2d at

1255. The court noted that the Supreme Court has stated that

"arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required

to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to

submit." Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers

of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 647 (1986)). And the AtGames court further

noted that its decision was consistent with Beiser, because in

Beiser the plaintiff, who was the sole director and employee of a

corporation, had signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of the

company and, as the Fifth Circuit recognized, was arguably the

alter ego of the corporation. Id. at 1256.

The Court finds that the interpretation of § 205, explained in

AtGames, that requires a party to have entered into an arbitration

agreement, is consistent with established Supreme Court precedent

that non-parties to an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to

arbitrate their claims. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 647. 

Thus, unless Defendant, who is not a party to any arbitration

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 10 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

agreements with Removing Defendants, is required to arbitrate his

cross-claims with Removing Defendants, the cross-claims are not

"related to" Plaintiff's foreign arbitration agreement with

Removing Defendants.

B. Defendant's Cross-Claims and Arbitration

Plaintiff and Defendant both argue that Defendant is not

required to arbitrate its cross-claims against Removing Defendants. 

They both note that Defendant was not a party to any arbitration

agreement with Removing Defendants. Plaintiff further notes the

language of the arbitration clauses: the Gard clause explicitly

applies only to "disputes between the Association [Gard] and a

Member or an Assured who is not a Member, or a former Member or a

former Assured who was not a Member"; the UK Club clause explicitly

applies to disputes arising between an Owner of a Vessel and the

Association [UK Club]; and the AEGIS clause applies only to

disputes between "a Member and the Club [AEGIS]." 

Plaintiff and Defendant both cite cases establishing that,

with very limited exceptions, none of which are applicable to this

case, the Federal Arbitration Act, which favors private arbitration

of disputes, does not apply to those who are not themselves parties

to an arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc.

v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) ("we have recognized

that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have

not agreed to do so"). 

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 11 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

As the Supreme Court has directed, "the first task of a court

asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether

the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. The court is to make

this determination by applying the 'federal substantive law of

arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the

coverage of the Act.'" Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler

Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (quoting Moses H.

Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 

That body of law counsels "that questions of arbitrability must be

addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring

arbitration. . . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a

matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of

arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Id.

(quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25). But,

"as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control." Id. 

And, here, even generously construing those intentions as to the

issues of arbitrability, the Court finds that Defendant did not

agree to arbitrate its cross-claims against Removing Defendants.

Removing Defendants cite Mitsubishi Motors for its language

regarding the strong federal policy favoring arbitration; but they

do not address the Supreme Court's directions in Mitsubishi Motors

regarding the first task of a court in determining whether to

compel arbitration. Instead, they attack Defendant's argument that

it is not bound by arbitration agreements that it did not sign. 

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 12 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

Removing Defendants argue that a non-signatory seeking the benefit

of an arbitration agreement can be compelled to arbitrate disputes

in accordance with the terms of the arbitration contract. But the

cases Removing Defendants cite in support are distinguishable. For

example, in Letizia v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 802 F.2d

1185 (9th Cir. 1986), employees of a brokerage firm sought to

compel arbitration, even though the customer agreement containing

the arbitration provision was signed by the plaintiff and not by

the employees. The court concluded that because the brokerage firm

indicated its intention to protect its employees through its

customer agreement with the plaintiff, and the employees' allegedly

wrongful acts related to their handling of the plaintiff's account,

the arbitration clause was applicable to the employees. 802 F.2d

at 1188. There, the employees were seeking to enforce an agreement

signed by the plaintiff, whereas here Removing Defendants seek to

bind Defendant to an arbitration agreement it never joined in or

agreed to in any way. Furthermore, as Plaintiff notes, Defendant

is not a third-party beneficiary of any policy between Plaintiff

and Removing Defendants and is not seeking any benefits from

Removing Defendants as an unnamed insured; instead, Defendant

asserts that it has provided benefits to the Removing Defendants by

advancing funds to Plaintiff that are ultimately Removing

Defendants' responsibility to pay. 

Removing Defendants provide no case that would allow the Court

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 13 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

to compel arbitration against Defendant, even though under

Defendant's equitable subrogation claim, it does "stand in the

shoes" of Plaintiff, the insured, who would be compelled to

arbitrate claims against Removing Defendants. See Fireman's Fund

Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1292 (1998). 

The estoppel exception that could allow non-signatories to a

contract to compel arbitration is inapplicable, because here it is

a signatory to a contract seeking to compel arbitration against a

non-signatory. See, e.g., MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177

F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999). Nor is there a preexisting relationship

between Defendant and Removing Defendants, or Defendant and

Plaintiff, that would allow Removing Defendants to bind Defendant

to an arbitration agreement without its permission. In sum,

Defendant did not agree to and thus cannot be compelled to

arbitrate its cross-claims against Removing Defendants.

Because the Court finds that Defendant's cross-claims are not

"related to" the foreign arbitration agreements and thus there is

not current federal subject matter jurisdiction, the Court now

addresses whether it should exercise its discretion and remand the

remaining claims to State court.

III. Discretionary Remand

As noted above, the Supreme Court has stated that in the usual

case in which all federal law claims are eliminated before trial,

the balance of factors will point toward declining to exercise

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 14 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

jurisdiction over the remaining State law claims. Carnegie-Mellon,

484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Factors the Court should consider when

determining whether to remand such a case to State court include

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, comity and whether the

plaintiff has engaged in manipulative tactics. Id.; Acri, 114 F.3d

at 1001.

In Millar v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 236 F. Supp. 2d

1110 (N.D. Cal. 2002), the court found that the factor of judicial

economy weighed in favor of remand when the court had "expended

only modest efforts in supervising this case. There were no

motions of any kind filed by either plaintiff or defendant prior to

motions" regarding remand. 236 F. Supp. 2d. at 1119. The court's

involvement in that case was limited to holding two case management

conferences and issuing a pre-trial order. Id. Here, Plaintiff

notes, there has been no case management conference, no motions

have been filed other than this motion to remand and less than

three weeks elapsed between the removal of the case and the filing

of the remand motion. The Court finds that the factor of judicial

economy weighs in favor of remand. 

The factor of comity (respect for our sister State

institutions) also weighs in favor of remand; having dismissed

claims against Removing Defendants, Plaintiff now proceeds

exclusively on its State law claims. See id. at 1120 (noting it is

preferable as a matter of comity "for state court judges to apply

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 15 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 16

state law to plaintiff's state-law claims"). Furthermore,

Plaintiff notes that Defendant's primary defense is based on

California Insurance Code § 1996. Plaintiff contends that this is

a little known section of California's Insurance Code, and a search

on Westlaw confirms Plaintiff's contention: § 1996 has only been

cited in one case, a case from 1899 that was reversed two years

later. Thus, the case potentially raises "cutting edge issues with

potentially far-reaching implications for many other California

litigants. In these circumstance, it is unusually important to

permit California courts to address these significant questions of

California law in the first instance." Id. at 1114.

The factors of convenience and fairness, as in Millar, "cut

markedly in neither direction." Id. at 1120. Given San

Francisco's close proximity with Oakland, both forums are equally

convenient to the parties. As Plaintiff notes, the federal court

in Oakland is less than ten miles from the State court in San

Francisco. And a State forum will provide just as fair a

proceeding as a federal forum. Id. 

Finally, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit has found that

plaintiffs, in a similar situation, did not engage in manipulative

conduct when the plaintiffs "dismissed their federal claims and

moved for remand with all due speed after removal." See Baddie, 64

F.3d at 491. 

Therefore, having considered all of the factors, the Court

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 16 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 17

determines that the factors weigh in favor of remand. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion

to remand (Docket No. 11) and REMANDS this case to State court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/3/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-04411-CW Document 46 Filed 01/03/06 Page 17 of 17