Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02338/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02338-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Curtis R. Davis, Jr., who is confined in the Arizona State Prison, has 

filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner’s convictions became final on January 11, 1996. The deadline to file this 

habeas petition was April 24, 1997. Petitioner did not begin habeas proceedings until 

March 26, 2013. This petition is untimely and there is no evidence to suggest the 

untimeliness should be excused. Petitioner’s reliance on Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 

1376 (2012) is unavailing because Martinez does not excuse untimeliness. 

 Petitioner also admits he has procedurally defaulted. He cannot establish (and 

does not argue) cause and prejudice to excuse the default. Petitioner’s procedural default 

argument under Martinez also fails for the same reasons, mutatis mutandis, as his 

Curtis R. Davis, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-13-2338-PHX-ROS (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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untimeliness argument: there is no justification for Petitioner’s default and filing of the 

petition more than 15 years after it was due. Petitioner further fails to establish a 

reasonable probability he would have taken a 14-year plea offer when he told the 

sentencing court that “I am innocent...and will remain adamant in this all the way to the 

end.” (Doc. 8, Exh. T at 10.) For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely, procedurally barred from review, and fail on their 

merits. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the petition be denied. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 

 In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the facts and procedural history as follows: 

 Defendant was indicted on fourteen counts of child 

molestation, class two dangerous felonies, and one count of 

sexual abuse, a class three dangerous felony. The indictment involved six victims. Pursuant to the state’s motions, the 

count for sexual abuse (count three) was dismissed prior to 

trial and two counts of child molestation (counts eight and 

nine) were dismissed during trial. One count of child 

molestation (count fifteen) was dismissed by the court pursuant to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Before the Verdict. The jury found Defendant guilty on the remaining eleven counts of child molestation, involving five victims. Defendant received a mitigated sentence of twelve years imprisonment on each count, each count to be served 

consecutively to the others. 

(Doc. 8, Exh. A.)1

 Petitioner appealed. (Id.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL 

 In a timely direct appeal, Petitioner raised four issues: indictment duplicity, denial 

of severance, prosecutorial misconduct, and sufficiency of the evidence. (Id.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on December 

12, 1995. (Id.) Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for discretionary 

 

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 Five pages of detailed facts that are contained in the appellate decision are not recounted here. 

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review. (Id.) 

C. FIRST PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

 On April 15, 1998, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

(Doc. 8, Exh. B at 1.) On April 29, 1998, the trial court dismissed the notice of PCR as 

“clearly untimely.” (Doc. 8, Exh. C.) Petitioner appealed, and the Arizona Court of 

Appeals reinstated the notice because the dismissal was premature. (Doc. 8, Exh. E.) On 

December 18, 2000, counsel appointed for Petitioner filed a Notice of Completion of 

Post-Conviction Review. Counsel advised the trial court that “counsel is unable to find 

any claims for relief to raise in post-conviction relief proceedings.” (Doc. 8, Exh. F at 1-

2.) 

 On April 11, 2001, Petitioner filed a partially complete pro se PCR petition (Doc. 

8, Exh. G), which was followed by a completed petition filed on April 27, 2001 (Doc. 8, 

Exh. H). He raised three issues: (1) his appeal should be reinstated so that he could 

petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review, (2) both trial and appellate counsel were 

ineffective, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective by advising Petitioner to reject the 

State’s plea offers. (See Doc. 8, Exh. G at 2–8; Exh. H at 2–12.) For the third issue, 

Petitioner alleged: “My defense attorney advised me to reject the State’s proffered plea 

bargains because of his skill as an attorney. He provided me this advice without even 

asking me about the events that transpired or asking me to explain the circumstances that 

the State alleged to exist.” (Doc. 8, Exh. H, Attch. C at 1.) 

 The trial court denied Petitioner’s petition. (Doc. 8, Exh. I at 2.) The trial court 

wrote, in part: 

 The convictions were affirmed in 1996. Mr. Davis 

filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in 1998.... The 

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is not timely, and there is 

no mention as to why there was a delay of over two years in filing the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 

 The petition merely states generalization on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. For example, it mentions plea agreements, but not one fact about the plea offer or one fact about the alleged inadequate advice. The Court cannot speculate. 

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 There is nothing in the Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief to indicate that defense counsel’s performance was unreasonable or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged unreasonable conduct, the result or 

outcome would be different. 

(Doc. 8, Exh. A.) 

 Petitioner unsuccessfully petitioned both the Arizona Court of Appeals (November 

27, 2002) and the Arizona Supreme Court (May 20, 2003) for discretionary review. (Doc. 

8, Exhs. J–M.) 

D. SECOND PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

 On November 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a second PCR petition, alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel relating to advice regarding his plea offer. In this second petition, 

Petitioner wrote: 

 In April 1993 Attorney Neal Bassatt advised defendant 

not to accept a plea agreement for 14 years flat (see attached affidavits of petitioner and his parents). Attorney Bassatt simply stated not to accept the plea; he failed to explain the facts of a refusal, and the results of a conviction at trial. 

Petitioner’s trial counsel Lawrence Kazen failed to advise 

him about the 14 year plea agreement or the fact that a loss at 

trial would result in a sentence in excess of 100 years. Therefore, defendant’s sentence should be set aside, and the 

plea should be pro-offered to the defendant. 

(Doc. 8, Exh. N at 21.) 

 The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s second petition on November 29, 2011, 

finding it “successive and untimely filed.” (Doc. 8, Exh. O at 1.) The court additionally 

found: 

 Review of the Petition reveals that Defendant’s claims 

mirror those raised in his initial petition for post-conviction 

relief, and further that Defendant has lifted, verbatim, large swaths of the original petition and has incorporated them into his current petition. In view of the fact that such claims were 

previously raised and dismissed, the Court will not entertain 

them again. 

(Doc. 8, Exh. O at 2.) 

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E. THIRD PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

 On May 11, 2012, Petitioner filed a third PCR petition, alleging that Martinez, 

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), 

created a significant change in the law that entitled Petitioner to relief under his plea 

agreement claim. (Doc. 8, Exh. P at 1; Exh. Q at 1.) Subsequently, the court ruled that 

“Contrary to Defendant’s claim, Frye and Cooper did not change the law concerning 

effective assistance of counsel; they merely applied the right to counsel in a factual 

context. Therefore, Frye and Cooper are not changes in the law that would apply to 

defendant’s case.” (Doc. 8, Exh. R at 1.) The court fu rther held that “Defendant fail[ed] 

to state a claim for which relief may be granted in an untimely and successive Rule 32 

proceeding.” (Id.) 

F. FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 Petitioner filed his first habeas corpus petition on March 26, 2013, asserting an 

ineffective assistance claim regarding the pretrial plea offer. Davis v. Ryan, CIV 13-614-

PHX-ROS (LOA). After Respondents filed a limited answer, Petitioner moved to dismiss 

his petition without prejudice. The motion was granted. 

 Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition on November 14, 2013. (Doc. 1.) He 

alleges one count of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and during 

the PCR proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 6.) He cites Martinez to excuse his procedural default. 

(Doc. 1 at 6, 11; Doc. 2 at 5–7.) Petitioner alleges the following facts: 

 Petitioner’s attorney Neal Bassatt, presented the Petitioner with the State’s offer in “April or May of 1993.” Exhibit A, Affidavit of Curtis R. Davis Jr., at 1. Mr. Bassatt 

failed to explain the offer, the rights Petitioner would surrender, and the adviseability of accepting the offer compared to his chances at trial on emotionally charge sex offenses. 

 After a hearing on an unrelated issue, Mr. Bassatt 

produced a piece of paper and stated to the Petitioner, “The 

prosecutor is offering you a plea deal. It is for 14 years flat and lifetime probation. I recommend that you don’t take it as 

she doesn’t want to take this to trial and she will come back 

with something better. She doesn’t want to drag this kid and 

her family through a trial.” (Exhibit A, at 2-3.) 

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 Because of Mr. Bassatt’s recommendation and advice 

that the prosecutor would “come back with something better,” Petitioner was unduely influenced; and believed Mr. Bassatt’s 

assertion of the prosecutor not wanting to go to trial, Petitioner rejected the plea. 

 Subsequent investigation by the State revealed more 

alleged victims and resulted in additional charges being added. Petitioner was convicted, after a trial, on 11 of 14 

Counts of Molestation of a Child, on March 1, 1994. 

(Doc. 2 at 2.) 

 Respondent filed a limited answer on April 18, 2014. (Doc. 8.) Respondent 

asserted that the petition was untimely, procedurally barred, and failed on the merits. (Id.) 

 Petitioner filed a reply on May 2, 2014. (Doc. 9.) Petitioner conceded “he is 

procedurally defaulted and he is beyond time frames of the AEDPA” and “is not entitled 

to statutory or equitable tolling.” (Id. at 1-2.) Petitioner reasserted that he “relies upon a 

showing of an IAC claim” to “excuse any procedural bar” under the holding of Martinez. 

(Id. at 2.) 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).2

 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

 A. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY. 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). The AEDPA, and the timeliness provision codified at § 2241(d), took 

effect on April 24, 1996. However, the limitation periods provided by the statute cannot 

be applied retroactively to bar claims by petitioners whose convictions were final prior to 

 

2

 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date, 

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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the effective date of the AEDPA. United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 

1998). Such petitioners are afforded a one-year grace period, or until April 24, 1997, to 

file an application for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 

F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001).

 Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences on December 12, 1995. (Doc. 8, Exh. A at 1.) Petitioner then had 30 days to 

file a petition for discretionary review with the Arizona Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 31.19(a) (“Within 30 days after the Court of Appeals issues its decision, any party may 

file a petition for review with the clerk of the Supreme Court . . . .”). Because Petitioner 

did not do so, the judgment became final on January 11, 1996. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 

132 S. Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (“[W]ith respect to a state prisoner who does not seek review 

in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the 

time for seeking such review expires . . . .”). The mandate issued on January 30, 1996. 

(Doc. 8, Exh. A at 1.) Petitioner’s conviction was final before the AEDPA’s effective 

date, which was April 24, 1996. As a result, Petitioner had until April 24, 1997, to file a 

habeas petition in federal court or toll the limitations period with a properly filed PCR 

petition. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246. Petitioner filed his first habeas petition on 

March 26, 2013. Absent tolling, Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely.3

 

 Petitioner’s state post-conviction motions did not toll his time to file a federal 

habeas petition because they were all untimely. The one-year deadline to file a federal 

habeas will be tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction . . . 

review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner, however, never filed a timely 

post-conviction motion in state court. Petitioner filed his first notice of state PCR on 

April 15, 1998. (Doc. 8, Exh. B at 1.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s petition, finding 

 

3

 As noted previously, Petitioner repeatedly concedes that his petition is untimely. “Petitioner is inarguably in procedural default pursuant to AEDPA and is not entitled to 

statutory or equitable tolling to extend such time limit.” (Doc. 2 at 4.) “Petitioner has 

conceded he is procedurally defaulted and he is beyond time frames of the AEDPA. He is 

not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.” (Doc. 9 at 1.) 

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it “is not timely, and there is no mention as to why there was a delay of over two years in 

filing the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Doc. 8, Exh. I at 1.) The untimely state 

petitions do not toll Petitioner’s deadline because his untimely petitions are not “properly 

filed.” See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“[W]e hold that time limits, 

no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner’s 

PCRA petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory 

tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that § 2244(d) “does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has 

ended before the state petition was filed”). 

 Petitioner does not assert grounds for equitable tolling, nor can the Court find 

tolling in the record. A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling “only if he shows 

‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). The petitioner bears the burden of 

showing that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 

1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Again, Petitioner does not argue for equitable tolling. 

 Petitioner also does not argue for statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) and he 

concedes that this habeas petition is untimely. Petitioner instead “relies upon a showing 

of an IAC claim” to “excuse any procedural bar” under the holding of Martinez. (Doc. 9, 

at 2.) Petitioner’s citation to Martinez is unavailing for tolling. 

 In Martinez, the Supreme Court recognized a narrow means by which a prisoner 

can show “cause” to excuse a state procedural default of a claim based upon alleged 

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. The Ninth 

Circuit extended the holding in Martinez to apply to procedurally defaulted claims of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 

1294–95 (9th Cir.2013). In Martinez, the Court created a narrow exception to the wellestablished rule in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) that ineffective 

assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings cannot serve as cause to 

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excuse the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Under 

Martinez, a petitioner may establish cause for the procedural default of a claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel by demonstrating two things: (1) “counsel in the 

initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was 

ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),” and 

(2) “the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, 

which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Cook 

v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318). 

Martinez does not address or create an exception to the AEDPA statute of 

limitations. Federal courts have consistently rejected the argument that Martinez provides 

relief for time-barred petitions in the form of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 

See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corr., 742 F.3d 940, 945 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Chavez’s 

initial § 2254 petition was dismissed as untimely because it was filed more than one year 

after his convictions became final on direct review, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), and 

nothing in Martinez alters that fact.”); Manning v. Epps, 688 F.3d 177, 189 (5th Cir. 

2012) (Martinez does not extend statute of limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(B)). See also, Madueno v. Ryan, No. CV-13-01382-PHX-SRB, 2014 WL 

2094189, at *7 (D.Ariz. May 20, 2014) (“Martinez has no application to the statute of 

limitations in the AEDPA which governs Petitioner’s filing in federal court.”); 

Wheelwright v. Wofford, No. 2:13–cv–0787 GGH (HC), 2014 WL 3851155 at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Aug. 5, 2014) (“Although the rule in Martinez is an equitable one, it applied only to 

procedural default issues and does not apply to equitable tolling principles pertinent to 

the AEDPA limitations issue.”); Perry v. Uribe, No. SACV 11–0692 RGK (RNB), 2014 

WL 4463120 at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2014) (“Martinez dealt solely with the state 

procedural default doctrine, which is entirely different from the issue presented here of 

whether Petitioner herein (including the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim 

alleged in Ground 2) was time barred under the AEDPA statute of limitations.”); White v. 

Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2010) (the adequacy analysis used to decide 

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procedural default issues is inapplicable to the determination of whether a federal habeas 

petition was barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations). Consequently, regardless of 

the merits of Petitioner’s procedural default argument, his petition must be dismissed 

because it is time barred. 

B. THE PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED. 

 Petitioner’s claim was barred on independent and adequate state procedural 

grounds. Petitioner argues no cause and prejudice to excuse this default. 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court... thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief ... that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in 

order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id.at 31–

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum ... 

(2) through the proper vehicle, ... and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis 

for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir.2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

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(2001); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731. Principles of comity also require federal courts to 

respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. See Coleman, 501 

at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded 

from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir.2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n. 1. 

 Second, and applicable here, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner 

raised a claim in state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural 

grounds. See Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has 

failed to meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has 

deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731–32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded 

if the state court opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the 

merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74–75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” See 

Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir.1994). If the state court occasionally excuses 

non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar inadequate. 

See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410–12 n. 6 (1989). “The independent and adequate 

state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes is 

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respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a procedurally 

barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court will decline to 

consider the merits of that claim. See id.at 729–32. 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, 

“if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as 

a result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as well as to those 

represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-

89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, the court need 

not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1999); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 fn. 13. Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental 

miscarriage of justice’ exception to the procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show 

that a constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was 

‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 

496). See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible 

showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new 

evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory 

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scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that 

was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

 1. Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred. 

 A claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in state court, 

but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See Beard, 558 

U.S. at 60. “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State’s procedural 

requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state courts of an 

opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731–32. 

In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court opinion relies 

“on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an 

‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). 

Here, the state court found that Petitioner’s first PCR was “not timely, and there is no 

mention as to why there was a delay of over two years in filing the Petition for PostConviction Relief.” (Doc. 8, Exh. I.) The state court found the second and third PCR 

petitions were both untimely and successive. (Doc. 8, Exhs. O, R.) Therefore, Petitioner’s 

claim is procedurally barred. See Martinez–Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir.1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on which to address the 

merits of his claims.”). 

 2. Petitioner cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 Under AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to 

“any claim that was adjudicated on the merits4

 in State court proceedings” unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

 4

 The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party’s claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In applying these standards, the federal habeas court reviews “the 

last reasoned state court decision addressing the claim in question.” Henry v. Ryan, 720 

F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 

2005). “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation,” the 

petitioner bears the burden to show that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court 

to deny relief” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 

770, 784 (2011). See also Johnson v. Williams, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013) 

(“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a 

federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits—

but that presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.”). 

 Petitioner does not satisfy his burden to establish an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Henry, 720 F.3d at 1084 (court may deny a 

habeas claim on the merits, even if petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies); 

Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 777 fn. 10 (9th Cir. 2012); Simmons v. Blodgett, 

110 F.3d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1997) (exhaustion is not jurisdictional). The trial court, in its 

opinion denying the first PCR petition wrote that “[t]here is nothing in the Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief to indicate that defense counsel’s performance was unreasonable 

or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged unreasonable 

conduct, the result or outcome would be different.” (Doc. 8, Exh. I, at 1-2.) Petitioner 

has not demonstrated that the decision of the state court was contrary to clearly 

established federal law, was based on an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts considering the 

evidence presented in state court. 

 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under § 2254(d)(1), a 

petitioner must show that “the state-court decision unreasonably applied the more general 

standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims established by” Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Saesee v. McDonald, 725 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 

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2013). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance, in that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) 

prejudice, in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. A defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel when considering 

whether to accept or reject a plea offer. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) 

(holding that the same two-part standard announced in Strickland is applicable to 

ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea process.”). Where a petitioner alleges 

that counsel’s ineffective performance led to the rejection of a plea offer, he “must show 

that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea 

offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted 

the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening 

circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or 

sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the 

judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.” Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1385. 

 Petitioner has not met his burden to show that there was no reasonable basis for 

the state court to deny relief based on this claim. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. In his 

habeas petition, Petitioner avers that “had counsel properly informed him of the 

possibility of additional charges being lodged and that the conviction rate at trial is high 

for sexually-based cases, he would have accepted the plea.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) The record 

does not demonstrate, however, that there is a reasonable probability Petitioner would 

have accepted the 14-year plea offer he affirmatively rejected. First, Petitioner denied his 

guilt at sentencing when he told the court that “I still say I’m not guilty.”5

 He added that 

 

5

 At sentencing (Doc. 8, Exh. T at 10-11), Petitioner made the following statement to the trial court: 

I still remain—I still say I’m not guilty. As far as the plea agreements go, I was offered two plea agreements and I was told by a previous attorney not to take those agreements. And that was on his accord and not mine. He adamantly told 

me not [to] take them based on the opinion that he thought 

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he “may have gone ahead and taken one of those agreements, not necessarily stating that 

I’m guilty of these things....” (Exh T, at 10-11.) Petitioner’s statements do not establish 

a reasonable probability that Petitioner would (rather than may) have admitted his guilt. 

Importantly, Defendant also told the court at sentencing that “I am innocent” and “I will 

remain adamant in this all the way to the end.” (Doc. 8, Exh. T, at 10.) See Smith v. 

United States, 348 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir.2003) (stating that, although not dispositive, 

“[p]rotestations of innocence throughout trial are properly a factor” in determining 

whether a defendant would have accepted a plea agreement). 

 Second, Petitioner’s statements at sentencing reflect that he was aware of two plea 

offers by the state and that he rejected both. The first offer required a term of two years 

imprisonment.6

 The “second plea” offer required a term of 14 years imprisonment. (Doc. 

9 at 4.) The record does not reflect that Petitioner would have accepted a 14-year plea 

offer when he previously rejected a two-year offer. Petitioner was obligated to show both 

deficient performance and prejudice. In the context of a rejected plea offer, the latter 

requires a showing of a reasonable probability that but for the deficient performance “he 

would have accepted the plea offer.” Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th 

Cir.2003). Petitioner has not satisfied this burden. Undoubtedly, Petitioner would prefer 

a lesser sentence than the one he received, and he may have achieved that had he 

 if I did take the plea agreement, then the prosecution would come back with a lighter sentence or something different. Modified position. 

And that’s exactly what he told me. If I had known differently at the time, I may have gone ahead and taken one 

of those agreement[s], not necessarily stating that I’m guilty of these things but stating the fact to get this out of the court system and so that everyone would not have to face what 

everyone’s had to face during these proceedings. 

6

 In his Reply, Petitioner asserts that counsel “failed to inform the Petitioner of a 

plea offer by the State of two (2) years incarceration.” (Doc. 9 at 4.) First, this 

acknowledgement is sufficient to establish that a two-year offer was conveyed. Second, Petitioner’s statement at sentencing demonstrates that he affirmatively rejected both offers. He stated that “I was offered two plea agreements and was told by a previous attorney not to take those plea agreements.” The prosecutor’s statement that “the State 

could not offer any plea agreement with a stipulation to probation” is also consistent with 

Petitioner affirmatively rejecting prior offers rather than being unaware of one of them. 

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accepted a plea offer instead of going to trial. Nonetheless, Petitioner has not satisfied his 

burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are untimely, 

procedurally barred from review, and Petitioner has not satisfied the burden to establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 18th day of December, 2014. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

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