Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01423/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01423-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Marisa DeVault, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CIV 11-01423 PHX RCB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Maricopa County, et al., ) 

) 

 Defendants. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. BROOMFIELD:

This matter is before the Magistrate Judge on referral

from the District Judge, and the determination of the Magistrate

Judge is dispositive of some of Plaintiff’s claims.

Accordingly, the following proposed findings of fact, report,

and recommendation are made pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C).

Background

Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel in this

matter, filed a complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court

on March 10, 2011. The complaint alleges a state-law cause of

action for negligence, i.e., medical malpractice, and a cause of

action for violation of Plaintiff’s rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, i.e., deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious

medical needs in violation her federal constitutional rights.

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1 The complaint alleges that, due to Defendants’ negligence

in March, April, and May of 2009, the bone in Plaintiff’s leg became

infected requiring hospitalization and surgery performed in June of

2009. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of Defendants’ negligence,

Plaintiff’s leg is deformed and she is disabled and disfigured.

Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result of Defendants’ negligence,

during her hospitalization it was necessary for medical staff to

insert a “pick” line and that as a result of the pick line Plaintiff

has a pulmonary embolism and her health is permanently damaged.

-2-

Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide adequate

medical care to Plaintiff (for an infection arising from a leg

injury sustained prior to her incarceration), while Plaintiff

was a pretrial detainee in a jail operated by the Maricopa

County Sheriff’s office, in March through May of 2009.1 The

complaint seeks compensatory and consequential damages, damages

for pain and suffering, punitive damages, and an award of

attorneys’ fees. 

Defendants were served and the matter was removed to

federal court by Defendants on July 18, 2011. On July 22, 2011,

the Court ordered Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to

the complaint.

On August 8, 2011, Defendants Maricopa County, Arpaio,

Gan, Gregorio, Mitchell-Lopen, Hansen, Gaskins, Perez, and

Johnson, the “County Defendants”, filed a motion to dismiss all

claims against these Defendants. See Doc. 5. The County

Defendants argued, inter alia, that Plaintiff had not exhausted

her administrative remedies, precluding her section 1983 claim,

and that the state negligence claim was barred by Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with Arizona’s notice of claim statutes the

applicable statute of limitations. On September 1, 2011,

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Defendants Arcadia Radiology and Nocera filed an answer to the

complaint. 

On September 22, 2011, Plaintiff docketed an amended

complaint. See Doc. 10. On September 23, 2011, the County

Defendants filed a motion to strike the amended complaint. See

Doc. 12. Defendants Arcadia Radiology and Nocera joined the

motion to strike on September 27, 2011. See Doc. 13. 

In an order issued November 7, 2011, the Magistrate

Judge denied the motion to strike and granted the motion to

amend the complaint; the motion to amend was granted only

insofar as Plaintiff sought leave to assert she had complied

with the state notice of claim statute and only because this

proposed amendment was not facially futile. See Doc. 26. The

Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiff’s alleged failure to

exhaust her section 1983 claim was an issue which was more

properly resolved in a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion

to amend a complaint.

 On November 7, 2011, the District Court denied the

motion to dismiss at Doc. 5 as moot without prejudice. See Doc.

27.

On November 18, 2011, Defendants Arcadia Radiology and

Nocera filed an answer to the amended complaint. See Doc. 29.

On November 15, 2011, the County Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss the claims stated against these defendants in

the amended complaint. See Doc. 28. Plaintiff responded to the

motion and also filed a motion to strike portions of the motion

to dismiss on December 6, 2011. See Doc. 30 & Doc. 31.

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Motion to Strike

Plaintiff asserts:

 Plaintiff Marissa DeVault (“DeVault”),

through counsel undersigned, pursuant to Rule

12(d), FRCP, respectfully requests the Court

strike Defendants Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8

and all argument raised regarding same in

Defendants Motion to Dismiss for the reasons

set forth in Plaintiff Response to the Motion

to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, which is

incorporate herein by this reference. These

Exhibits and argument involve matters outside

the pleadings and should not be addressed at

this stage without an answer having been

filed or any discovery having been conducted.

In the alternative, Plaintiff requests leave

to conduct discovery and to supplement her

response upon completion of that discovery.

Doc. 31 at 1.

Defendants respond:

 Plaintiff’s Motion is not well grounded and

should be denied. The documents submitted by

the Defendants establish that Plaintiff’s

lawsuit must be dismissed; Plaintiff now goes

to great lengths to avoid that inevitable

result. Rule 12(d), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, provides that “If, on a motion

under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside

the pleadings are presented to and not

excluded by the court, the motion must be

treated as one for summary judgment under

Rule 56.” There is no requirement, as

Plaintiff argues, that the documents

submitted by Defendants be supported by

authenticating record-keeper affidavits. The

materials submitted are public records and/or

documents created by Plaintiff herself. Yet

Plaintiff tries to diminish the significant

impact of these records because they

establish that her claim is meritless and her

efforts to avoid dismissal of this lawsuit

are moribund.

Doc. 32 at 2.

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2

“When ruling on a motion to dismiss, we may

‘generally consider only allegations contained in

the pleadings, exhibits attached to the

complaint, and matters properly subject to

judicial notice.’” Id. at 899-900 []. We accept

factual allegations in the complaint as true and

construe the pleadings in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 900. We

need not accept as true conclusory allegations

-5-

Two of the exhibits Plaintiff seeks to strike, Exhibit

2 and Exhibit 8 to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, relate to the

issue of Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust her

administrative remedies prior to filing a section 1983 claim.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the issue of

whether a plaintiff’s section 1983 suit is precluded by their

failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to section

1997e(a) is a matter in abatement which is properly addressed in

an unenumerated motion pursuant to Rule 12, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). See also Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir.

2002); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2001);

Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 267 (D.C. Cir.

2001); Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999);

Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28–29 (2d Cir. 1999). Matters

outside the pleadings may be considered and factual disputes

resolved when determining whether a section 1983 claim should be

dismissed for failure to exhaust. See, e.g., Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119-20 (“In deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to

exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.”).2

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that are contradicted by documents referred to in

the complaint. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide,

Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030-31

(9th Cir. 2008).

-6-

Accordingly, with regard to Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 8 to

the motion to dismiss, the exhibits are properly considered in

the context of the motion to dismiss, without requiring

Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery to ascertain

their authenticity, which Plaintiff does not seem to actually

contest, and the Magistrate Judge will recommend that the motion

to strike be denied.

Motion to Dismiss

Count I of the amended complaint asserts a violation of

Plaintiff’s Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Plaintiff alleges the “Medical Defendants” (all Defendants

except Sheriff Arpaio and Maricopa County) are liable to

Plaintiff based on their deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs. Count I alleges Defendant Maricopa County

knowingly and intentionally allowed the other Defendants to

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and that the policies

and procedures established by Maricopa County for the medical

care of inmates is deficient, inadequate, and violates the

United States constitution. In the amended complaint Plaintiff

does not allege any action of Sheriff Arpaio which violated

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Count I seeks

punitive damage against the individual Defendants in addition to

compensatory damages, damages for pain and suffering, and

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attorneys’ fees and costs.

Count II of the amended complaint states a cause of

action against the Medical Defendants based on Arizona state

tort law for negligence and gross negligence based on the theory

of medical malpractice. Plaintiff also alleges Maricopa County

is liable for the medical malpractice of those providing medical

care to inmates and that Sheriff Arpaio is liable for failure to

train jail personnel adequately to prevent medical malpractice

in the jails. Pursuant to this claim Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and consequential damages. 

The County Defendants seek to have Plaintiff’s claims

against them dismissed. Defendants assert Plaintiff failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies before filing her federal

law claim, precluding relief on Count I. Defendants also

contend Plaintiff failed to timely serve a notice of claim

pursuant to state law, barring Plaintiff’s state-law based

claims against the County Defendants. 

Defendants assert Plaintiff failed to file suit against

the County Defendants within the one-year statute of

limitations. Defendants further argue Maricopa County cannot be

vicariously liability for negligence claims where there is no

claim for negligence against the individual medical Defendants.

Defendants also contend Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

against Sheriff Arpaio for failure to train. 

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Defendants allege:

Prior to her incarceration, Plaintiff

sustained a significant self-inflicted injury

to her ankle... Plaintiff underwent surgery

at Scottsdale Osborn Hospital for the

placement of pins and a plate to stabilize

the ankle.

 On February 20, 2009, Plaintiff was

arrested in connection with the murder of her

husband, and was transported to the Maricopa

County Sheriff’s Office Fourth Avenue Jail

Facility where she was processed and booked.

After intake, Plaintiff was transferred to

the Infirmary at the Lower Buckeye Jail. On

March 10, 2009, Plaintiff was seen by

Defendant Dr. Gan who noted and documented

that Plaintiff had redness and a greenish

stain on her leg bandages. Plaintiff was seen

again by Dr. Gan on March 26, 2009; at that

time, puss (sic) came out of Plaintiff’s

wound when Dr. Gan pushed on the wound. Dr.

Gan recognized that Plaintiff’s wound was

infected, so he cleaned out the wound and

immediately transferred Plaintiff to

Scottsdale Osborn Hospital. Plaintiff was

released from the hospital back to the Lower

Buckeye Jail Infirmary on March 30, 2009.

 While being treated at the Infirmary,

Plaintiff received her antibiotics as ordered

by the surgeon. Once she completed all of her

antibiotics on May 14, 2009, Plaintiff was

discharged from the Infirmary and transferred

to general population at the Estrella Jail

facility pursuant to the orders of Defendant

Dr. Gregorio.

 On May 24, 2009, Plaintiff slipped in her

cell and re-injured her leg. A few days

later, Plaintiff was taken to Maricopa

Medical Center wherein she was diagnosed with

having MRSA – an antibiotic resistant staph

infection. Plaintiff received treatment at

Maricopa Medical Center for the infection.

 Plaintiff’s lawsuit alleges state law

claims of negligence/medical malpractice and

federal claims based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for deliberate indifference to her medical

needs.

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Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims

The County Defendants contend Plaintiff’s section 1983

claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff did not exhaust her

administrative remedies.

Prisoners are required to exhaust all “available”

remedies before seeking relief pursuant to section 1983. See,

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382-83

(2006). The Supreme Court has noted that requiring prisoners to

exhaust their administrative remedies allows prison officials

“an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of

their responsibilities before being haled into court,” which

“has the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and

also to improve the quality of suits that are filed by producing

a useful administrative record.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

204, 127 S. Ct. 910, 914-15 (2007), citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at

94-95, 126 S. Ct. at 2387-88.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) is governed by 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). This statute provides that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2003 & Supp. 2011). This language has been

interpreted to require “that an inmate must exhaust [available

remedies] irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered

through administrative avenues.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

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731, 741 n.6, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 n.6 (2001). See also Morgan

v. Maricopa County, 259 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990 (D. Ariz. 2003).

The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122

S. Ct. 983, 992 (2002).

A plaintiff must fully exhaust their administrative

remedies before filing a section 1983 complaint. See Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006); McKinney v.

Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002). To fully

exhaust a section 1983 claim, a prisoner must pursue his inmate

grievance to the highest administrative level available to them.

See, e.g., Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 2003);

Neese v. Arpaio, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180-81 (D. Ariz. 2005).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense; establishing

exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is not a

pleading requirement or a jurisdictional prerequisite. See

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).

Therefore, section 1983 defendants “have the burden of raising

and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Id., 315 F.3d at 1119.

See also Morgan, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91 n.13. The failure to

exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is treated as a

matter in abatement and is properly raised in an unenumerated

Rule 12(b) motion. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

[A] defendant must demonstrate that pertinent

relief remained available, whether at

unexhausted levels of the grievance process

or through awaiting the results of the relief

already granted as a result of that process.

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[]. Relevant evidence in so demonstrating

would include statutes, regulations, and

other official directives that explain the

scope of the administrative review process;

documentary or testimonial evidence from

prison officials who administer the review

process; and information provided to the

prisoner concerning the operation of the

grievance procedure in this case, such as in

the response memoranda in these cases. With

regard to the latter category of evidence,

information provided the prisoner is

pertinent because it informs our

determination of whether relief was, as a

practical matter, “available.” [].

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 937 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff contends that no administrative remedy was

available because it was impossible for her to file a timely

grievance due to medical disability:

 In this case, Plaintiff would have had to

file her grievance within 48 hours of her

discovery of the infection in her leg which

occurred on May 29, 2009. When the unknown

detention officer had Plaintiff take off the

splint, and the open wound and infection was

found (Plaintiff fainted as a result and fell

to the ground), Plaintiff was immediately

provided emergency medical treatment which

resulted in her being whisked to Scottsdale

Osborn Hospital where she received at least

three surgeries from May 19, 2009 to June 13,

2009. 

 Throughout this time, until the wound was

finally closed, she lay in her hospital bed

with IV’s pumping pain killers and

antibiotics into her body with open draining

wound on her leg. Based on the MCSO grievance

policy, Plaintiff was required to file the

grievance for those causing her medical

condition (based on the discovery rule),

within 48 hours of May 29, 2009; i.e., by May

31, 2009. After that it is was late and there

is no policy that allows late grievances.

After the discovery of her infection, she

received proper and timely medical care and

treatment. There was nothing further to

grieve and all that could be done for her

medical condition was being done. There were

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no corrective actions, after the discovery of

the infection that could have taken place. 

Under these set of facts, there was no

“available administrative remedy” to

Plaintiff. Even though MCSO has an

administrative grievance policy, because of

Plaintiff’s disability and emergency

hospitalization, she had no timely access to

that administrative process. Under this set

of facts, there was in reality no grievance

policy at all that she could take advantage

of. By June 13, 2009, when she returned from

the hospital, it was too late to file a

grievance pursuant to the policy.

Doc. 30 at 5 (emphasis in original).

Defendants reply:

As established by the affidavit of MCSO Sgt.

Selethia Down, attached as Exhibit 1, an

inmate who is out of the jail facility and in

the hospital during the grievance time frame

may submit or continue a grievance upon

his/her return to the jail. This procedure is

similar to the one successfully relied upon

by the plaintiff in the Morano case. Here,

Ms. DeVault did absolutely nothing to pursue

a grievance about her medical care or the

other issues that form the basis of her

federal law claims. DeVault abandoned the

matter completely when she returned to the

jail following her hospitalization....

Doc. 32 at 4-5.

The federal courts have held that, when prison

officials have refused an inmate grievance forms or otherwise

obstructed an inmate’s access to a grievance proceeding, this

could raise an inference that the prisoner had exhausted his

“available” administrative remedies because no remedy was

“available” in such a circumstance. See Miller v. Norris, 247

F.3d 736, 738, 740 (8th Cir. 2001). However, the federal courts

have also concluded that an assertion that pursuing

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administrative remedies would be futile does not excuse an

individual’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies

prior to filing a section 1983 action on the basis that in that

circumstance no remedy was “available.” See, e.g., Nyhuis v.

Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71-75 (3d Cir. 2000); Perez v. Wisconsin

Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 536-37 (7th Cir. 1999); Neese, 397

F. Supp. 2d at 1182-83. 

 Plaintiff does not assert that, at any time subsequent

to the events giving rise to her claims and prior to the date

she filed the complaint, she inquired into the necessity or

potential for administratively grieving her complaint that she

was not provided with adequate medical care. Plaintiff does not

allege that she was told that any such grievance was not

available or that any such grievance would be denied per se as

not timely. Additionally, Exhibit 8 to the motion to dismiss

indicates that Plaintiff initiated grievances on May 23, 24, 25,

June 19 and July 15.

 Plaintiff argues that, as a matter of law, any attempt

to grieve her claim would have been declared untimely and,

accordingly, an administrative grievance procedure was therefore

“unavailable” and her failure to exhaust should be excused.

This type of post-hoc explanation for a plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust an available administrative remedy, thereby somehow

rendering it unavailable, has been found by the federal courts

to be unavailing. See Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688

(8th Cir. 2000) (concluding that section 1997e(a) does not

permit the court to consider an inmate’s subjective beliefs in

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3

Such an ex post view of “futility” would

contradict the holdings of Hallstrom and McNeil, for in both of those cases it became clear while

the suit was ongoing that nonjudicial relief

would not be forthcoming. As for the possibility

that administrative remedies could be declared

futile ex ante, without ever being tried: what

would be the point of asking judges to be seers?

Then the simplicity of § 1997e(a) would be lost,

and instead of requiring exhaustion of

administrative remedies it would lead to

guesswork about counterfactual situations. No one

can know whether administrative requests will be

futile; the only way to find out is to try. 

-14-

determining whether administrative procedures are “available.”);

Perez, 182 F.3d at 5373; Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37; Jones, 266

F.3d at 399. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

motion to dismiss be granted with regard to Plaintiff’s section

1983 claims against all Defendants named in this count of the

complaint.

The Magistrate Judge further recommends that, no

federal cause of action remaining, the Court decline to exercise

supplementary jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. See

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion to strike

(Doc. 31) be denied with regard to Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 8 to

the motion to dismiss and that the motion to strike be denied as

moot with regard to the other documents Plaintiff seeks to

strike.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion to

dismiss (Doc. 28) be granted with regard to Plaintiff’s section

1983 claim and that Plaintiff’s state-law based claim be

remanded to the Superior Court.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

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of the Magistrate Judge.

/

DATED this 31st day of January, 2012.

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