Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00486/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00486-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KHALIFAH E.D. SAIF’ULLAH, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. CIV 2:07-cv-00486-ALA P

vs.

D.K. SISTO, et. al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Khalifah E.D. Saif’ullah, Larry Hamza Din Galbert, Tasnim Abul Rasheed Sandifer,

Abul Hasan Grim, Abdul Hassan Halfin, Kolfani Smith, Shabah Harry Cooks, Hamza Patrick

Scott, and Lemont Williams (“Plaintiffs”) are state prisoners proceeding pro se. Plaintiffs seek

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and have filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), when the litigant is a prisoner, this Court must screen

complaints brought against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental

entity. The Court must dismiss the complaint if the claims contained in it, even when read

broadly, are legally frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek money damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(A)(b). A claim “is frivolous [if] it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “At this stage of the litigation, [this Court] must accept

[Plaintiffs’] allegations as true.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). “A court

Case 2:07-cv-00486-ALA Document 6 Filed 09/05/07 Page 1 of 8
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 Here, as detailed in Exhibit “D” and “E”, the prison has a general policy of closing the

dayroom to activities after 21:30 due to penological interests involving the safety and security of

the institution. See Docket No. 1.

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may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts

that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Id.

“To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the

conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Hydrick v. Hunter,

466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cr. 2006). This Court will examine each of Plaintiffs’ claims to

determine if they are sufficient under § 1915(A)(b).

I

Plaintiffs’ first set of claims appears to be based on alleged discrimination by prison

officials and employees in not allowing them to pray in the dayroom after the last count at 21:30. 

Complaint at 4-9. Plaintiffs contend that this violates their rights under the First, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).

A

To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a prisoner must present evidence

of discriminatory intent or purpose. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976)

(explaining that disparate impact merely has evidentiary value and as a result, absent a “stark”

pattern of invidious discrimination, impact is not determinative). Plaintiffs have not pleaded

sufficient facts to allege an invidious discriminatory intent or that the prison’s regulation1

 was

applied in such a way.

B

Plaintiffs also assert that their right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First

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Amendment was violated when they were not allowed to present their final prayer in the

dayroom. However, free exercise rights are “necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and

may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.”

O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1997). Thus, to prevail on a free exercise claim, the

prisoner “must show [that] the defendants burdened the practice of his [or her] religion . . . by

preventing [the prisoner] from engaging in conduct mandated by his [or her] faith.” Freeman v.

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, Plaintiffs made no such showing because they

were able to perform their evening prayers in their individual dorms by their bed. Complaint at

16. Also, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Muslim religion requires that all five daily prayers

be conducted in a group setting. See Exhibit “A” (“The Muslim inmates do not need to attend a

place of worship to complete these prayers, however, the prayer ritual does have a need for the

inmate to stand, bend and kneel in a stationary location.”). Thus, Plaintiffs have not alleged that

prison officials substantially burdened their ability to perform their evening prayers.

C

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ conduct violated RLUIPA. Section 3(a) of

RLUIPA states that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise

of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The burden

is on the plaintiff “to establish prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the

Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); see also,

Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2007) (stating that an inmate “bears the

burden of establishing prima facie that [RLUIPA] has been violated and that his religious

exercise has been substantially burdened.”). As explained above in discussing the free exercise

claim, Plaintiffs were able to pray individually in their cells. Thus, they have not demonstrated

that prison officials substantially burdened one of their religious exercises. 

// 

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D

Plaintiffs further assert that prison officials violated the Establishment Clause of the First

Amendment by depriving them of their final prayer in the dayroom. The Establishment Clause

bans the preference of one religion over another. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)

(“[A]t a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to

support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a

state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”). Prison officials violate the Establishment

Clause if they give special treatment to certain religious groups. Here, no such special

preference has been alleged. The dayroom is closed to all inmates at 21:15. Inmates of other

religions are not permitted to hold religious services after the 21:30 count. See Exhibit “E.” 

E

Plaintiffs’ final claim arising from their inability to pray in the dayroom after hours is

that their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated. The

procedural guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses apply only

when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. See Ingraham v. Wright,

430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (explaining that to be constitutionally protected, the asserted individual

interests must be encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty or

property”). Plaintiffs have failed to allege that a protected liberty interest was impeded when

prison officials refused to allow them to pray in the dayroom after hours.

Because Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not state a cognizable claim for relief for the denial of

their final prayer in the dayroom after the last count, it will be dismissed without prejudice

against named defendants Fry, Fernandez, Hernandez, Karlson, Deberry, Zuniga, Nastale, and

Baggs. 

//

//

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II

Plaintiffs’ second set of claims arises out of the lack of availability of special religious

foods (i.e. “Religious Mandated Qur’anic Dietary Food” or Halal Food). See Complaint at 10. 

Plaintiffs assert in their Complaint that “the present no meat substitute is a vegetarian diet” and

“is a violation of Shari’s [Islamic Law] for Muslim’s to partake in and that Muslim’s are

prohibited from being vegetarians . . . .” Id. Plaintiffs contend that this violates their rights under

the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under the

RLUIPA.

A

Plaintiffs allege that prison officials violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment by serving a vegetarian diet to Muslims. As explained above, to assert

a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the prisoner must present evidence of discriminatory

intent or purpose. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976). Plaintiffs have failed

to allege facts that demonstrate that Defendants had a discriminatory intent. 

B

Plaintiffs’ also argue that their free exercise rights guaranteed by the First Amendment

have been violated by prison officials offering a vegetarian diet in lieu of a Halal diet. As stated

above, “[i]n order to establish a free exercise violation, [the prisoner] must show the defendants

burdened the practice of his [or her] religion . . . by preventing [the prisoner] from engaging in

conduct mandated by his [or her] faith.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). 

To satisfy these requirements, a plaintiff must allege that the practice is important to the plaintiff

and is motivated by his or her sincere religious belief. Coronel v. Paul, 316 F.Supp.2d 868, 879

(D. Ariz. 2004) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.

707, 715-16 (1981)). Here, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the non-Halal/vegetarian diet

directly conflicts with and substantially burdens their own religious belief that Islamic law

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requires Muslims to eat meat.

C

Similarly, Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants’ violated RLUIPA. They contend that

§ 2000cc “Protection of land use as religious exercise” was violated. They have failed to assert

any facts, however, in support of that contention. Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot proceed under §

2000cc because it is not applicable to institutionalized individuals. Section 2000cc deals with

land use regulation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Plaintiffs have also asserted a violation of 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) “Protection of religious exercise of institutionalized persons.” A plaintiff’s

initial burden under § 2000cc-1(a) is to establish a prima facie showing of a substantial burden

on his or her religious exercise. See § 2000cc-1(a). As under the free exercise clause, various

activities, whether or not central to an individual's belief system, will qualify as a “religious

exercise” within the meaning of RLUIPA. See, e.g., Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1028,

1034-36 (D. Ariz. 2007) (explaining that a “substantial burden” on religious exercise for

purposes of RLUIPA must impose a significantly great restriction upon such exercise; however, 

where the plaintiff conceded that his ability to practice his religion was not altered in any way by

repeatedly listening to the same tapes, the plaintiff was found not able to recover under

RLUIPA). Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that a religious exercise or belief held by them has

been substantially burdened in violation of section 3(a) of RLUIPA. 

D

The final claim contained in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges a violation of their Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights in being denied religiously acceptable

meat in their diet. However, this constitutional provision does not seem to be applicable from

the facts asserted by the Plaintiffs as the facts go towards establishing their free exercise and

RLUIPA claims. Specifically, this claim fails to satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a short and plain statement of the claim that will give a defendant fair

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2

Plaintiffs are provided Halal meat on the two major Muslim holidays. See Exhibit “G”. 

The vegetarian alternative also appears to occasionally include fish. See Exhibit “I”.

3

 It appears from the Complaint and exhibits that Plaintiffs would accept some of the

Kosher foods provided to Jewish inmates as those foods comply with the Muslim religion

requirements and are allegedly even labeled “Halal food”. See Complaint at 10 and Exhibit “G”.

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notice of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957); see also, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (stating “[a] pleading . . . shall contain . . . a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .”). Plaintiffs’

Complaint fails to set forth any facts to give sufficient notice to the defendant as to the basis of

the alleged due process violation.

Plaintiffs will be granted leave to proceed on their claims that some of the Defendants

violated their free exercise rights and RLUIPA by forcing the Plaintiffs to maintain a vegetarian

diet while also depriving them of religiously acceptable meats.2

 At this stage in the proceedings,

it cannot be said with certainty that Plaintiffs might not adduce evidence in support of these

claims. 

Consequently, Plaintiffs will be given leave to proceed against Defendants Sisto and

Stiles for denying their appeals to provide Halal food. Plaintiffs will also be given leave to

proceed against Defendants Ward, Alacade, Fandler and Nasir who, based on the allegations in

the Complaint, acted to prevent Plaintiffs from receiving Kosher foods3

 even though their

application for the Kosher special religious diet had been granted. Complaint at 12-13. If that

allegation is proved, Plaintiffs have a reasonable opportunity to prevail against defendants Ward,

Alacade, Fandler and Nasir on the merits of this claim. 

III

Plaintiffs will not be granted leave to proceed against the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as

well as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d

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245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating Board of Corrections is agency entitled to

immunity); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada

Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). 

Accordingly, this Court must dismiss the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation as a defendant in this action.

This Court will issue a separate order on the merits of the in forma pauperis application

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Defendants Fry,

Fernandez, Hernandez, Karlson, Deberry, Zuniga, Nastale, and Baggs.

2. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice as to the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

DATED: September 5, 2007

/s/ Arthur L. Alarcón________________

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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