Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02220/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OP 

TBN'.l'B CIRCUIT 

STANLEY SAAVEDRA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ALBUQUERQUE, THE CITY OF; ALBUQUERQUE ) 

PERSONNEL BOARD; THE CITY OF ) 

ALBUQUERQUE EMPLOYEE HEALTH CENTER; ) 

ARTHUR A. BLUMENFELD, Chief ) 

Administrative Officer; LINDA ) 

LOGAN-CONDON, Former Chairperson of the ) 

Personnel Board; T. ZANE REEVES, ) 

Personnel Hearing Officer, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

FILED APPBALiflllttd lfatll Coart of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

JAN 1 7 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-2220 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-1043-JB) 

Paul s. Livingston, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for appellant. 

Randy M. Autio, Assistant city Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

for appellee City of Albuquerque; Todd M. Stafford (David A. Rammelkamp with him on the brief) of Kelly, Rammelkamp, Muehlenweg & 

Lucero, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for appellees city of Albuquerque 

Personnel Board, Linda Logan-Condon and T. Zane Reeves. 

Before BRISCOE, COFPIN* and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

*The Honorable Frank M. Coffin, Senior Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sitting by designation. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-2220 Document: 01019287517 Date Filed: 01/17/1996 Page: 1 
Stanley Saavedra (Saavedra), plaintiff-appellant, appeals 

from orders of the district court granting summary judgment in 

favor of defendants-appellees, T. Zane Reeves, the Personnel 

Hearing Officer (PHO), the Albuquerque Personnel Board (Board) 

and the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico (City), and dismissing 

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. 

Facts 

Saavedra commenced working for the City as a fire-fighter and 

emergency medical technician on or about September 20, 1982. His 

employment with the City was governed, in part, by the City's 

Merit System Ordinance (MSO) adopted pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 

3-13-4 (1978), and a collective bargaining agreement between the 

City and the International Association of Firefighters Local 244 

(Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement, "[a]ll actions involving discipline and terminations shall provide due 

process as described by the Merit System Ordinance and existing 

applicable law." (Appellee's Supplemental Appendix, Vol. I at 

000063) . 

Section 2-9-25(D) of the City's MSO provided in part: management actions questioned by an employee which result in dismissal are designated as Class I grievances; PHO's have the authority to hear and render decisions in Class I grievances; a 

PHO's decision is reviewable by the Board; and, "[t]he decision of 

the Personnel Board shall be reviewable in District Court . . . " 

§ 2-9-25(0) (5). Under the City's MSO, "safety-sensitive" employees, such as Saavedra, could be dismissed for justifiable 

cause, including testing positive for drugs. 

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• 

In granting individual appellees' motion for summary judgment, the district court found/concluded: 

Proceeding to the matter of contention, the next 

issue is whether Defendant Reeves and members of the 

Board are entitled to absolute immunity from liability . 

In Butz v. Economou ... the Supreme Court held 

that federal hearing officers are examiners and administrative judicial officials are entitled to absolute 

immunity. The Court noted the longstanding absolute immunity protection accorded to judges . . . . and found 

the same rationale equally applicable to administrative 

judicial officers. 'Judges have absolute immunity not 

because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities.' [Butz at 511]. 

* * * 

Absolute immunity applies, therefore, where (1) the 

defendant's duties and the procedures employed are 

functionally comparable to those of a court of law; (2) 

maintenance of the impartiality and effectiveness of the 

adjudicatory process in question requires eliminating 

any threat of personal liability; (3) the defendant's 

actions are more likely than other governmental actions 

to result in disappointed parties' institution of lawsuits; and (4) procedural safeguards exist and are ad 

equate to correct or prevent erroneous or intentional 

constitutional violations. See Horwitz v. Bd. of Med. 

Examiners, 822 F.2d 1508, 1513 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 484 u.s. 964 (1987). Application of these principles to the case at bar compels the conclusion that 

the Defendants' acts are shielded by absolute immunity. 

The hearing before the PHO is adversary in nature. 

Employees have the right to counsel and the opportunity 

to present evidence, provide testimony, and crossexamine witnesses. The PHO is a professional hearing 

officer, is not considered an employee of the City, and 

is sufficiently independent. His decisions are insulated from political pressure. The PHO makes written 

findings of fact and issues a recommendation. The 

Board's review of the PRO's determination is limited to 

the record. The Board either affirms, denies, modifies, 

or remands the PRO's decision, similar to a reviewing 

court of law. The nature of the process is such that 

the terminated employee will often have a strong incentive to sue the PHO or the Board should either issue an 

adverse decision, and therefore a strong likelihood of 

lawsuits could deter others from desiring to perform 

these functions and might produce a hidden bias in favor 

of the aggrieved employee. In any event, constitutional 

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Appellate Case: 94-2220 Document: 01019287517 Date Filed: 01/17/1996 Page: 3 
violations can be corrected on appeal to the state district court. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's contrary assertions, all of the factors deemed dispositive in Butz 

are present here. The PHO and the Board must be free to 

exercise their discretion uninhibited by a looming 

threat of personal liability. 

859 F.Supp. 529-31. 

We hold that the district court properly applied Butz and 

Horwitz in granting individual appellees absolute judicial immunity. 

II. 

Saavedra contends that the district court erred when it 

granted summary judgment in favor of the City on his Fourth 

Amendment claims set forth in Count I of his complaint, i.e., that 

the suspicionless drug test-urinalysis, undertaken by the City, 

was in violation of his right to be free of unreasonable searches 

and seizures. 

At the time Saavedra self-referred himself to the City's Employee Health Center, he was asked to give a urine sample. The 

specific gravity test applied to his first urine sample established that the sample was essentially the same as water. Saavedra gave a second urine sample several days later which tested 

positive for the presence of metabolites of marijuana. He was 

subsequently terminated solely because his urine sample had tested 

positive for the presence of metabolites of marijuana. 

Following Saavedra's post-termination hearing, PHO Reeves 

concluded that the City had just cause to discharge Saavedra based 

on several aggravating factors, including the fact that Saavedra 

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• 

had "warned his supervisors that he might become violent if provoked and only a few months earlier [he] had lost his temper while 

in uniform and had engaged in a public alteration with his girlfriend," and that "a reasonable person assessing the preponderance 

of the evidence would conclude that [Saavedra] substituted or diluted his first urine sample with tap water." (Appellee's 

Supplemental Appendix, Vol. I at 000056). 

In Count I of his complaint, Saavedra alleged that a "suspicionless drug test will not be upheld unless it is reasonable under the circumstances and the legitimate governmental interests 

involved are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the employee's 

right to privacy." (Appellant's Appendix, Vol. I at 000005-6). 

He further alleged that since the City was "unable to enunciate 

any real, valid, or reasonable purpose for testing its employees 

in general and Stanley Saavedra in particular .... the drug test 

[was] in violation of his right to be free of unreasonable search 

and seizure as protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 6. 

In granting the City summary judgment on Saavedra's Fourth 

Amendment claims, the district court found, inter alia: 

When Plaintiff provided his first urine sample, he 

filled the cup with water in lieu of urine. Plaintiff 

does not dispute this fact, by affidavit or otherwise in 

his response to Defendant's motions for summary judgment .... the City directed Plaintiff to provide another urine sample. He did so and the test revealed the 

previous use of marijuana. When asked about the posi~ 

tive test result, Plaintiff admitted smoking marijuana. 

Plaintiff does not dispute these facts amounting to 

reasonable suspicion. Instead, Plaintiff contends that 

"reasonable suspicion testing should only ... have been 

based on observable phenomena, such as direct observation of drug use or possession and/or physical evidence 

of Plaintiff being under the influence " 

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.. 

* * * 

Plaintiff's position might have merit in the case 

of public employees who are not performing safetysensitive functions . . . . however . . . Plaintiff does 

not dispute Defendant's characterization of Plaintiff as 

a safety-sensitive employee. 

* * * 

The Court finds that the City had reasonable suspicion to test Plaintiff for drug use. Plaintiff admitted to smoking marijuana, and he exhibited erratic, 

and even threatened violent, behavior towards his supervisors. 

(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 000253). 

Normally, a search is considered reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment only if it is supported by a warrant issued on probable 

cause; therefore reasonable suspicion, standing alone, is insufficient. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 

602, 619 (1989). Even where the warrant requirement is relaxed, 

the existence of probable cause is required to make a full-scale 

search constitutional. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 

(1985). To this general rule requiring a search warrant on probable cause, or exigent circumstances justifying a probable cause 

based warrantless search, the Supreme Court has recognized a 

"special needs" exception. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. 

Under the exception recognized in Skinner, no warrant nor 

probable cause is required by the Fourth Amendment "when 'special 

needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'" Id. (quoting 

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). We evaluate the 

constitutionality of a "special needs" search under the Fourth 

Amendment's more general requirement of reasonableness, National 

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Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 u.s. 656, 665-66 (1989), 

by "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the 

search entails." Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1017 (lOth Cir.) 

(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 

537 (1967)), cert. denied, U.S. (1995). Whether a particular search is "reasonable depends on the context within which 

[the] search takes place." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. Thus, the 

appropriate inquiry in each case is "whether the government's need 

outweighs the individual's privacy interest." Romo, 46 F.3d at 

1017 (quoting Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1193 (lOth Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990)). We assess whether the asserted government interest "justifies the privacy intrusions at 

issue absent a warrant or individualized suspicion." Skinner, 489 

u.s. at 621. 

In Skinner, the Court, after concluding that urinalysis 

testing of railroad employees for alcohol and drugs constituted 

the search of a person subject to the Fourth Amendment, held that 

the regulations authorizing the tests were reasonable even though 

there was no requirement of a warrant or reasonable suspicion that 

an employee might be impaired, because the compelling governmental 

interest outweighed the employee's privacy concerns. 489 U.S. at 

633. The Court noted that it was undisputed that the covered employees were engaged in safety-sensitive tasks and that the restrictions necessary to procure the urine sample were quite minimal when compared to significant restrictions in freedom of movement the employees consented to as part of their jobs. Id. at 

620, 624. See also Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347 (lOth Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2220 Document: 01019287517 Date Filed: 01/17/1996 Page: 7 
1994) (Holding that a random urine collection and testing of 

prisoners is a reasonable means of combating the unauthorized use 

of narcotics and does not violate the Fourth Amendment) . 

In Von Raab, the Court reached a similar conclusion. There 

tne Court upheld suspicionless drug testing of certain United 

States Customs Agents where there was no triggering event. 489 

U.S. 656. The Court approved drug testing of Customs Service employees having a direct involvement in drug interdiction or those 

required to carry a firearm. Id. at 677. The Court weighed the 

government's interest on the one hand, against the Customs Service 

employees' expectations of privacy on the other, and struck the 

balance in favor of the government. Id. 

There can be little doubt that the search conducted by the 

City in this case was executed pursuant to special needs independent of traditional criminal law enforcement. However, the district court did not rely upon or address the "special needs" 

standard; instead, the court relied upon the City's own reasonable 

suspicion drug testing policy and found that the City had 

reasonable suspicion to test Saavedra for drug use. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in 

finding that the City had reasonable suspicion to test Saavedra 

for drug use, nor did the district court err in granting summary 

judgment in favor of the City on Saavedra's Fourth Amendment 

claims. We reject Saavedra's contentions that the City's claim 

of reasonable suspicion was not based on objective, specific observations or findings when, as here, it is uncontested that 

Saavedra was employed in a safety-sensitive position, Saavedra 

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,. 

self-referred himself to the City's Employee Health Center for an 

evaluation, Saavedra had warned his supervisors that he might 

become violent if provoked, and Saavedra had lost his temper while 

in uniform and had engaged in a public altercation with his girlfriend. Significantly, Saavedra acknowledges that "[o]f course 

the Fourth Amendment allows reasonable suspicion drug testing of 

safety-sensitive employees." (Opening Brief of PlaintiffAppellant at 28). 

III. 

Saavedra contends that the district court erred when it 

granted the City's motion for sununary judgment on his Count II due 

process claims. 

The City's substance abuse policy provided in part that if an 

"employee fails the substance abuse test, he/she may appeal the 

results to City's Medical Review Officer whose determination regarding the results shall be final. A positive drug test . 

shall result in the termination of the employee." 

On appeal, Saavedra argues that "[b]ecause there was nothing 

[he] could do or say that would mitigate or alter the City's use 

of the positive test to terminate his employment, he was denied a 

meaningful hearing" and that the "opportunity to offer explanations for the positive test presented by the pre-termination and 

post-termination hearings was nothing more than an exercise in 

futility." (Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 41). He also 

contends that: the City's hearing policy, whereby the grievant 

goes first as the moving party, violates common notions of adequate due process; the use of a non-rebuttable presumption (there 

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J 

was just cause for termination based on the positive test for metabolites of marijuana) placed an unconstitutional burden on him. 

The City responds that: Saavedra's contentions fail factually; although Saavedra could have challenged the validity of the 

drug test at his pre-termination hearing or during the course of 

his four-day post-termination hearing, he opted not to do so; 

Saavedra's assertion that he was not allowed to challenge his 

termination is simply untrue and belied by the procedure provided 

him; and when PHO Reeves inquired into Saavedra's drug use, 

Saavedra admitted that he smoked marijuana just a few days prior 

to the test. 

The essential elements of due process are notice and an opportunity to respond, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 

u.s. 532, 546 (1985): 

The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or 

in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a 

fundamental due process requirement. . . . The tenured 

public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of 

the charges against him, an explanation of the 

employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his 

side of the story .... To require more than this prior 

to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on 

the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. 

We hold that the district court properly applied Louder.mill 

in granting the City's motion for summary judgment on Saavedra's 

due process claims. The City provided Saavedra with pretermination notice and hearing where he was represented by the 

president of his Union. Thereafter, Saavedra participated in the 

City's post-termination grievance process which included hearings, 

the benefit of counsel, the opportunity to present evidence, and 

the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. 

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.. 

Saavedra was terminated solely because he tested positive for 

marijuana use. Even though Saavedra had the opportunity to challenge the validity of the drug test during both his pretermination and post-termination hearings, he opted not to do so. 

In this regard, the district court found that "the reason Plaintiff in all likelihood did not take such measures to challenge the 

positive test result is because he openly admitted to smoking 

marijuana. Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain that he 

wasn't given a chance to contest the outcome of the drug test when 

it was his own admission which confirmed its validity." 

{Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 000259). 

IV. 

The City argues that Saavedra's constitutional claims are 

barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 

Saavedra responds that res judicata and collateral estoppel principles do not preclude his constitutional claims because "[t]he 

District Court ruled only on the City's Motions for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II, and expressly found that the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on Collateral Estoppel . . . [and] Res 

Judicata ... were moot." {Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 

14 n.3). Although the district court did not reach this issue, it 

was raised by the City and "we are free to affirm a district court 

on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit 

conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district 

court." United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 {lOth 

Cir. 1994) {citation omitted). 

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As set forth, supra, § 2-9-25(D) (5) of the City's MSO provided that "[t]he decision of the Personnel Board shall be reviewable in District Court ... [w]here the decision is in violation of applicable constitutional provisions or is otherwise 

illegal." Notwithstanding this section, Saavedra did not appeal 

his termination to a state district court. Rather, he brought 

this action in federal district court seeking declaratory and compensatory relief for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and substantive due process. 

The City argues that under University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 

478 U.S. 788 (1986) (Elliot), Saavedra's failure to appeal his 

discharge in state district court bars consideration of his constitutional claims in federal district court. In Elliott, when 

the University of Tennessee (University) informed Elliott, a black 

employee, that he would be discharged for inadequate work performance and misconduct on the job, Elliott requested an administrative hearing. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, however, 

Elliott filed a Title VII action in federal district court. The 

federal district court allowed the administrative proceedings to 

go forward. 

The administrative proceedings resulted in an administrative 

law judge (ALJ) ruling, affirmed by a University Vice-President on 

appeal, that Elliott's proposed discharge was not racially motivated. Elliott did not seek state court review of the administrative proceedings. Rather, he returned .to federal district 

court. 

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In federal district court, the University moved for summary 

judgment asserting that principles of res judicata prevented relitigation of claims of racial discrimination in federal court. 

The district court granted the University's motion and entered 

judgment in its favor. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, 

holding that the full faith and credit statute, 28 u.s.c. § 17382 

"does not require federal courts to defer to the unreviewed findings of state administrative agencies." Elliott v. University of 

Tenn., 766 F.2d 982, 990 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd 

in part, 478 U.S. 788 (1986). 

On appeal, the Court held: 

A state Administrative Law Judge determined that 

petitioner University of Tennessee . . . was not motivated by racial prejudice in seeking to discharge respondent. The question presented is whether this finding is entitled to preclusive effect in federal court 

where respondent has raised racial discrimination claims 

under various civil rights laws, including 42 

u.s.c. § 1983. 

* * * 

[W]e hold that when a state agency "acting in a 

judicial capacity . . . resolves disputed issues of fact 

properly before it which the parties have had an opportunity to litigate," ... federal courts must give 

the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to 

which it would be entitled in the State's courts. (Emphasis added) . 

Elliot, 478 u.s. at 790, 799. 

"To summarize the holding in Elliott, a federal district 

court in a proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must give a state 

2 28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides in part: Such acts, records and 

judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated shall 

have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 

United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of 

such State . . . from which they are taken. 

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t 

agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would 

be entitled in the state's court if the state agency" while acting 

in a judicial capacity resolved disputed issues of fact properly 

before it and the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate 

the issues in dispute. Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 988 F.2d 1013, 

1019 (lOth Cir. 1993) (emphasis original). 

Similarly, courts "have long favored application of the 

common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res 

judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of administrative 

bodies that have attained finality." Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass'n v. Solimine, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991). The principle that 

"a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered in adversarial proceedings, on an issue identical 

stance to the one he subsequently seeks to raise . 

true when a court has resolved an issue, and should do so 

in sub-

. holds 

equally 

when the issue has been decided by an administrative agency, be it 

state or federal ... which acts in a judicial capacity." Id. at 

107-08. 

Under Solimine, the constitutional claims raised in 

Saavedra's federal district court action are barred under the 

common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel on those "issue[s] 

identical in substance to" those considered during the City's 

post-termination proceedings. However, inasmuch as our appellate 

record does not include an adequate record of the administrative 

proceedings, we cannot determine what constitutional claims may 

have been asserted by Saavedra, if any. See King v. Unocal Corp., 

58 F.3d 586, 587-88 (lOth Cir. 1995) (failure to include trial 

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transcript necessary to review challenge to jury instructions); 

United States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d 1548, 1559 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, U.S. (1995) (failure to include, and refer- ---- --- ---

ence to, portion of record wherein objections, properly preserving 

issues for appeal, may be found). 

AFFIRMED. 

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