Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01157/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01157-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 23, 2015*

Decided October 26, 2015

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14-1157 Appeal from the 

United States District Court

KEVIN A. BIRDO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LEAH URBANOSKY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 9219

Ronald A. Guzmán,

Judge.

O R D E R

Kevin Birdo, an Illinois inmate, broke a finger in August 2012. By his account the 

prison medical staff waited three weeks before treating the injury and then, after 

acknowledging that surgery was needed because the delay had caused the break to heal 

improperly, put off the surgery for nearly seven weeks while he waited in pain. As a 

result, Birdo says, he suffers from painful arthritis and cannot bend the finger. He filed 

this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the defendant physicians and 

administrators were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need in violation of the 

 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14-1157 Page 2

Eighth Amendment. The district court screened Birdo’s complaint and allowed the 

action to proceed, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and for a year the litigation proceeded without 

incident. Without warning or notice to Birdo, however, the district court dismissed the 

suit with prejudice as a sanction after a shard of mirror glass was found in one of Birdo’s 

mailings to the court. Birdo moved for reconsideration, explicitly denying responsibility 

for the glass in the envelope. The court denied that motion without explanation, and 

Birdo then filed this appeal. We conclude that the court abused its discretion.

Birdo filed his lawsuit in November 2012. In the year that the litigation was 

pending in the district court, he submitted more than 25 documents to the clerk of court, 

including his original and amended complaints, an application to proceed 

in forma pauperis, requests for appointment of counsel, motions to compel discovery, 

responses to motions filed by the defendants, and letters to the district judge. Birdo also 

mailed service copies to the defendants. Nothing in the record suggests that court 

personnel or any defendant felt threatened because of the language or manner of 

delivery of Birdo’s submissions.

Then in November 2013, Birdo moved for a default against several defendants 

who had missed the deadline to answer his complaint. The motion itself contains no 

threatening language, but inside the envelope was a shard of mirror glass. Two days 

after the clerk’s office had received the motion and shard of glass, the district court, 

sua sponte and without notice to Birdo, dismissed his lawsuit with prejudice, explaining:

The Court can think of no reason for the intentional inclusion of such a 

dangerous item in a case-related filing other than as a threatening gesture 

to this chambers specifically and the Court in general. Such actions are 

unacceptable. As a sanction, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s second 

amended complaint with prejudice.

The district court did not say under what authority it was dismissing the lawsuit 

as a sanction (though later in denying Birdo leave to file this appeal in forma pauperis, 

the court made reference to the “inherent authority” of a judge to “sanction conduct that 

abuses the judicial process”).

Birdo promptly filed an “emergency motion for reconsideration.” He declared 

under penalty of perjury, see 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that he had not sent the shard of glass and

did not know anything about it. In fact, Birdo said that his cellmate had witnessed him 

seal the envelope (with nothing threatening inside). Birdo emphasized that he had never 

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“expressed any ill-will to any member of the court,” that the motion in the envelope with 

the glass shard was in no way threatening, and that he did not have a history of 

threatening the court. Birdo had worked hard on his case and thought he was close to 

winning, he said, and would not have jeopardized the suit by threatening the court. He 

added that as an inmate he does not have control over his mail, which even when sealed, 

can be tampered with by prison staff or others. The district court did not address Birdo’s 

contentions and denied his motion in a minute entry without elaboration.

On appeal Birdo argues that before dismissing the case, the district court should 

have conducted a hearing to determine if, in fact, he was responsible for the glass being 

sent to the court. We review a sanction imposed under a district court’s inherent 

authority for abuse of discretion. Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 793 

(7th Cir. 2009).

Before a court invokes its inherent authority to impose sanctions, the court must 

provide the affected party with due process by giving notice that sanctions may be 

imposed and allowing the party to be heard. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50

(1991); Larsen v. City of Beloit, 130 F.3d 1278, 1286–87 (7th Cir. 1997); Koehl v. Bernstein, 

740 F.3d 860, 862–63 (2d Cir. 2014). We have said explicitly that a court’s “inherent 

power to sanction is to be exercised by means of a rule to show cause or similar

procedure, rather than by the sudden imposition of sanctions with no opportunity to 

respond.” Larsen, 130 F.3d at 1286–87. An opportunity for the party to be heard is 

unnecessary only if sanctionable conduct is apparent from the record and a hearing (or 

other opportunity to be heard) would not assist the court. Compare Philos Techs., Inc. v. 

Philos & D, Inc., Nos. 12-3446, et al., 2015 WL 5562178, at *10–11 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 2015)

(vacating sanctions since “murky record” on disputed issues did not support imposition 

of sanctions), with Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & O Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1495 (7th Cir. 1989)

(explaining that if “sanctionable conduct occurred in the presence of the court, there are 

no issues that a hearing could illuminate and hence the hearing would be pointless”).

But where there are contested factual issues, the court must offer an opportunity to be 

heard and must resolve factual disputes. See Philos Techs., 2015 WL 5562178, at *10; 

Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2005).

Birdo’s case illustrates the “fundamental problem” with imposing sanctions 

without the required notice and opportunity to be heard: Only after the district court 

had dismissed his case with prejudice did Birdo even have a chance to deny involvement 

in sending the shard of glass. See Johnson, 422 F.3d at 551. And even then—contrary to 

the defendants’ contention—Birdo did not receive a hearing in any meaningful sense

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because the district court, without any further inquiry, ignored Birdo’s sworn denial of 

involvement. In the face of that denial, the district court could not simply assume, as it 

did, that Birdo was the one who placed the glass in the envelope. Rather, a hearing, 

including the taking of evidence if necessary, was essential to resolve whether he was 

responsible, for his involvement is not apparent from the record. Under these 

circumstances the court abused its discretion by sanctioning Birdo without giving him

an opportunity to be heard and without first determining that he was responsible for 

sending the glass. As Birdo points out, he was not the last person to handle the envelope 

with his motion before it was delivered to the postal service, and whether or not the 

court thought it likely that someone else had tampered with the envelope, the court 

could not rely on speculation to resolve the matter.

The judgment is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings 

consistent with this order.

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