Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00449/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00449-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID W. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00449-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO TRANSFER

Re: Dkt. No. 17

On March 20, 2015, defendant Global Tel*Link Corporation filed a motion to transfer this 

case to the Central District of California, where three other cases—two individual actions and one 

putative class action—are pending. Each accuses the same defendant of similar conduct and 

asserts claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”). (Dkt. 

No. 17 (“Mot.”).) Plaintiff David Martin opposed the motion. (Dkt. No. 28 (“Oppo.”).) A 

hearing on the motion was held on April 28, 2015. 

Having carefully considered the papers submitted,1the record in this case, and the 

arguments of counsel, and good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS the defendant’s motion.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 

A. The Instant Action 

The plaintiff instituted this action on December 5, 2014, seeking to represent a California 

class of individuals who allegedly received unauthorized calls from the defendant purportedly in 

violation of the TCPA. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 13, 2015, the plaintiff filed his first amended 

 

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The parties filed unopposed requests for judicial notice of various public filings in related 

cases. (Dkt. Nos. 19, 35.) The Court GRANTS the requests pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 

201, which allows a court to take judicial notice of “matters of public record,” but not facts that 

may be subject to a reasonable dispute. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689-90 (9th Cir.

2001). 

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complaint, seeking to represent a nationwide class and a California sub-class. (Dkt. No. 9 

(“FAC”) ¶¶ 31, 33.) 

According to the operative complaint, the defendant offers “inmate calling services” to 

thousands of prisons nationwide, including throughout California. (FAC ¶¶ 8, 12.) Inmates 

allegedly initiate calls using the defendant’s system. Thereafter, the automated system seeks to 

connect the calls and collect payments from the recipients. (Id. ¶¶ 13-18.) The plaintiff claims he 

received multiple calls on his cell phone from the defendant’s system and was unable to reach a 

live operator to prevent future calls, in violation of the TCPA. (Id. ¶¶ 19-29.) 

The plaintiff is a resident of Alameda County, California—within the Northern District. 

The defendant is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Virginia. 

B. Related Actions 

As noted above, three cases are currently pending in the Central District of California 

asserting TCPA claims against the same defendant based on substantially the same conduct at 

issue here. The two individual actions were filed before the instant action: Cohen v. Global 

Tel*Link Corp., No. 12-cv-05447 (“Cohen”) (filed on September 10, 2009 in California Superior 

Court, Los Angeles County, removed to the Central District, and currently stayed under the 

primary jurisdiction doctrine pending a ruling by the Federal Communications Commission 

regarding the defendant’s petition) and Hernandez v. Global Tel*Link Corp., No. 14-cv-01536

(“Hernandez”) (filed on September 23, 2014 and currently stayed pursuant to stipulation pending 

action by the FCC). 

The putative class action, Lee v. Global Tel*Link Corp., No. 15-cv-02495 (“Lee”), was 

filed on December 8, 2014 in Nevada state court, seeking to represent a national class and Nevada 

sub-class. Lee was subsequently removed to the District of Nevada and then transferred pursuant 

to stipulation to the Central District of California. 

Cohen and Hernandez are currently related before Judge John F. Walter. He declined to 

relate Lee to the individual actions and it remains pending before Judge Otis D. Wright II. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The defendant brings a motion to transfer on two alternative grounds: (a) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. section 1404(a); and (b) pursuant to the “first-to-file” rule. The legal standards for each 

follow. 

A. Venue Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) 

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may 

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .” 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of section 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy and 

money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and 

expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Courts considering transfer engage in a two-step analysis. Courts first determine whether the 

action could have been brought in the target district. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 

(1960). If it could have been, courts then undertake an “individualized, case-by-case consideration 

of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting 

Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622). 

In conducting the convenience and fairness analysis, the district court has broad discretion 

in deciding whether to transfer. See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 

2007); Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). In conducting this 

analysis, courts in this district commonly articulate the relevant factors as follows: 

(1) plaintiffs’ choice of forum, (2) convenience of the parties, (3) convenience of 

the witnesses, (4) ease of access to the evidence, (5) familiarity of each forum with 

the applicable law, (6) feasibility of consolidation with other claims, (7) any local 

interest in the controversy, and (8) the relative court congestion and time of trial in 

each forum. 

Vu v. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also Royal 

Queentex Enters. v. Sara Lee Corp., No. C-99-4787, 2000 WL 246599, at *2 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 

2000) (citing Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986)); 

Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-99 (“A motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) requires the court to 

weigh multiple factors in its determination [of] whether transfer is appropriate in a particular 

case.” (citing Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. at 29)). This list is non-exclusive, and courts may consider 

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other factors, or only those factors which are pertinent to the case at hand. See Williams v. 

Bowman, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that this list of factors “does not 

exhaust the possibilities” and comparing the factors in Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843, with those 

analyzed in Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-99). The burden is on the moving party to show that the 

transferee district is the more appropriate forum. Jones, 211 F.3d at 499. 

B. The First-to-File Rule 

A federal district court has discretion to dismiss, stay, or transfer a case to another district 

court under the first-to-file rule. See Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 

(9th Cir. 1982); Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods. Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The 

most basic aspect of the first-to-file rule is that it is discretionary . . . .”). The first-to-file rule is “a 

generally recognized doctrine of federal comity” permitting a district court to decline jurisdiction 

over an action. Inherent.com v. Martindale–Hubbell, 420 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 

(citing Pacesetter, 678 F.2d at 94-95). The rule is primarily meant to alleviate the burden placed 

on the federal judiciary by duplicative litigation and to prevent the possibility of conflicting 

judgments. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir.1979) 

(citations omitted). As such, the rule “should not be disregarded lightly.” See Microchip Tech., 

Inc. v. United Module Corp., No. CV-10-04241, 2011 WL 2669627, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 

2011). Courts analyze three factors in determining whether to apply the first-to-file rule: (1) 

chronology of the actions; (2) similarity of the parties; and (3) similarity of the issues. Schwartz v. 

Frito–Lay N. Am., No. C-12-02740, 2012 WL 8147135, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2012) (citing 

Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 625). 

A court may, in its discretion, decline to apply the first-to-file rule in the interests of equity 

or where the Section 1404(a) balance of convenience weighs in favor of the later-filed action. 

Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 711 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Ward v. Follett 

Corp., 158 F.R.D. 645, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Exceptions to the first-to-file rule include where the 

filing of the first suit evidences bad faith, anticipatory suits, and forum shopping. Alltrade, 946 

F.2d at 628. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that relaxing the first-to-file rule on the basis of 

convenience is a determination best left to the court in the first-filed action. Ward, 158 F.R.D. at 

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648 (citing Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 628). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Venue Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) 

1. This Action Could Have Been Brought in the Central District of California 

A proper district court is one: (1) that has subject matter jurisdiction; (2) where the 

defendant would have been subject to personal jurisdiction; and (3) where venue would have been 

proper. See Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 343-44.

The Court finds this action could have been brought in the Central District. First, the 

Central District, like this Court, would have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action, 

which asserts a claim under federal law. (See FAC ¶ 2.) Second, the complaint acknowledges (id. 

¶ 2)—and the Court finds based on a declaration submitted by the defendant2—that the defendant 

is properly subject to specific personal jurisdiction throughout California in connection with this 

case, having purposefully directed its relevant activities within the state. See Schwarzenegger v. 

Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 

1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). Third, and in light of the record including the defendant’s declaration 

referenced above, venue in the Central District would have been proper at the time this suit was 

filed under 28 U.S.C. section 1391(b)(2).3

2. Six Factor Analysis 

The Court considers in turn each of the six relevant convenience factors central to this 

analysis: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the convenience to the parties, (3) the convenience 

to witnesses, (4) ease of access to the evidence, (5) feasibility of consolidation with other claims, 

and (6) the relative court congestion and time of trial in each forum. The parties have conceded 

 

2

(See Declaration of Thomas W. Sweeney in Support of Motion to Transfer [Dkt. No. 34], 

¶¶ 2-3 (evidencing the defendant’s substantial relevant business activities involving facilities 

located throughout the Central District).) The Court notes that the plaintiff also submitted a 

declaration in opposition to the motion to transfer along with an administrative motion for leave to 

file said declaration. (Dkt. No. 38.) The Court GRANTS the administrative motion and has 

considered both parties’ declarations in connection with this ruling. 

3

Further, the Court notes that the defendant does not contest personal jurisdiction or venue 

in the three actions pending in the Central District. 

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that the factors regarding familiarity of each forum with the applicable law and local interest in the 

controversy are both neutral. 

i. The Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum 

For purposes of a section 1404(a) analysis, the plaintiff’s choice of forum always weighs 

against transfer. Thus, the question for the Court is how much weight to give this choice relative 

to the other factors. See, e.g., Vu, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-57 (balancing plaintiff’s choice against 

other factors weighing in favor of transfer); Getz v. Boeing Co., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082-83 

(N.D. Cal. 2008) (same); Inherent.com v. Martindale-Hubbell, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1100-02 

(N.D. Cal. 2006) (same). 

Generally, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to considerable weight and a defendant 

must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting this choice. Decker Coal, 805 

F.2d at 843 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the plaintiff’s choice is given less deference in a class 

action. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987); Wilson, 2011 WL 4345079, at *3. 

Not only is the instant action a putative class action, but notably, the plaintiff did not

initially choose this forum, despite residing here. To the contrary, the plaintiff instituted this 

action in the Southern District of California, and only suggested the Northern District as a fallback 

option in response to an order to show cause as to why the action should not be dismissed for 

improper venue. (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4.) Presumably the plaintiff preferred the Southern District of 

California because his lead counsel is located in San Diego. In light of these circumstances, the 

Court affords the plaintiff’s choice of forum minimal weight. 

ii. Convenience of the Parties 

“Convenience of the parties is an important factor to consider for transfer of venue.” Flint, 

2007 WL 4365481, at *3. Even though the plaintiff resides in this District, his initial selection of 

the Southern District undercuts his argument that he considers the Northern District a more 

convenient forum—and suggests his interest in maintaining the lawsuit here may instead be due to 

strategic considerations. The Central District will be a more convenient forum for the defendant, 

because it is already litigating three similar lawsuits there. Thus, this factor favors transfer. 

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iii. Convenience of the Witnesses 

The convenience to the witnesses is the most important factor in a section 1404(a) analysis, 

and the convenience of non-party witnesses is more important than the convenience of the parties. 

Clark v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. C 10-03625 SI, 2010 WL 5173872, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 

2010). Convenience of a litigant’s employee witnesses is entitled to little weight because they can 

be compelled by their employers to testify regardless of venue. Shore to Shore Props., LLC v. 

Allied World Assurance, No. C 11-01512 JSW, 2011 WL 4344177, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 

2011); STX, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1551, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 

Here, neither party has identified any third-party witnesses likely to testify. The defendant 

argues, without sufficient support, that there are a greater number of potential class members in 

the Central District, but does not specifically identify any likely third-party witnesses. See Wilson, 

2011 WL 4345079, at *4 (finding that the location of putative class members carried little weight 

in the convenience of witnesses analysis where there was no indication that class members other 

than the named plaintiffs would be needed to testify); Johns v. Panera Bread Co., No. 08–1071, 

2008 WL 2811827, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) (noting that because “‘the Court lacks any 

indication of how many people from the putative class are anticipated to be witnesses, and what 

their relevant testimony would be’ . . . the Court ‘cannot base a decision to transfer based on 

speculation as to the relevance of potential, but unnamed, witnesses.’” (quoting Flint, 2007 WL 

4365481, at *4) (citation omitted)).

Nevertheless, on balance, this factor weighs slightly against transfer. The plaintiff 

reasonably suggested—albeit without clearly stating as much—that he is a potential witness in this 

case. While the Court affords little weight to party-witnesses, the plaintiff’s residence in this 

District, and therefore his convenience in testifying here, outweighs the purported convenience to 

hypothetical witnesses raised by the defendant. See Florens Container v. Cho Yang Shipping, 245 

F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the moving party failed to establish that this 

factor favors transfer because it did not identify key witnesses to be called or present a statement 

as to the importance of their testimony); Williams, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (“To demonstrate 

inconvenience of witnesses, the moving party must identify relevant witnesses, state their location 

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and describe their testimony and its relevance.”). 

iv. Ease of Access to the Evidence 

The location of evidence may be an important factor in a convenience and fairness 

analysis. Vu, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. However, this factor is neutral or carries only minimal 

weight when the evidence is in electronic form. See, e.g., Sarinara v. DS Waters of Am. Inc., No. 

C-13-0905 EMC, 2013 WL 3456687, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2013) (finding ease of access to 

evidence to be a neutral factor “given the availability of digital records”); Friends of Scot., Inc. v. 

Carroll, No. C-12-1255 WHA, 2013 WL 1192956, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2013) (“[W]ith 

technological advances in document storage and retrieval, transporting documents does not 

generally create a burden.”). 

The parties have failed to provide sufficient guidance on this issue. Nevertheless, based on 

the information provided, the Court finds this factor to be neutral. The case is proceeding as a 

putative nationwide class action. The defendant is headquartered out of state and its relevant 

records may be in electronic form. The plaintiff’s evidence of calls received—such as phone 

bills—will likely be de minimus. The plaintiff argues there may be relevant evidence located in 

prisons within this District, to the extent calls at issue were initiated from those prisons. However, 

the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the calls he received fall within that category. 

v. Feasibility of Consolidation 

“The feasibility of consolidation is a significant factor in a transfer decision, and even the 

pendency of an action in another district is important because of the positive effects it might have 

in possible consolidation of discovery and convenience to witnesses and parties.” Cardoza v. TMobile USA Inc., No. 08-5120, 2009 WL 723843, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009); see also Cont’l 

Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960) (“To permit a situation in which two cases 

involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to 

the wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.”). 

Here, this factor strongly favors transfer. Three cases—two individual actions and one 

putative class action—are currently pending in the Central District accusing the defendant of 

substantially similar, if not identical, TCPA violations. The cases involve many common 

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questions of law and fact—for instance, as to whether the defendant’s systems and the calls at 

issue fall within the scope of the TCPA. It is possible that some or all of these cases may 

ultimately be consolidated and/or related if this case is transferred. At a minimum, discovery can 

be coordinated and/or disputes resolved by the same magistrate judge.4 Such coordination cannot 

occur if the four cases are pending in different districts. 

vi. Relative Court Congestion and Time of Trial in Each Forum 

The relative docket congestion of the respective forums may be relevant to the Court’s 

decision on whether to transfer. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C-11-00831, 2011 WL 

996343, at *8 (N.D. Cal. March 17, 2011). “This factor examines whether a trial may be speedier 

in another court because of its less crowded docket. To measure congestion, courts compare the 

two fora’s median time from filing to disposition or trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Neither party submitted data relevant to this factor in support of their 

respective positions. (Instead, they argue about the efficiencies to be gained by transferring this 

case to the Central District, where three similar actions are pending.) Thus, in the absence of any 

relevant data, the Court finds this factor to be neutral. 

vii. Balancing the Discretionary Factors 

Two factors (the plaintiff’s choice of forum and convenience of the witnesses) slightly 

weigh against transfer. Two factors (convenience of the parties and feasibility of consolidation) 

favor or strongly favor transfer. The remaining factors are neutral. Based upon the relative 

balancing of each factor, and in the interests of justice, the Court finds that the defendant has made 

a sufficiently strong showing to warrant transfer. See Wilson, 2011 WL 4345079, at *6 (citing 

Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843). 

B. The First-to-File Rule 

Having found transfer appropriate under section 1404(a), the Court need not reach the 

defendant’s argument under the first-to-file rule. 

 

4

The Court notes that Judge Wright’s scheduling orders refer discovery matters to a 

magistrate judge. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendant’s motion to transfer this action 

to the Central District of California. The defendant’s motions to strike and to stay (Dkt. No. 18) 

are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as moot. 

This Order terminates Docket Numbers 17, 18, and 38.

The Clerk is directed to transfer the file in this case to the Central District of California. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 6, 2015 

______________________________________ 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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