Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05193/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05193-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2013 Decided December 13, 2013 

No. 12-5193 

HOWARD R.L. COOK & TOMMY SHAW FOUNDATION FOR 

BLACK EMPLOYEES OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INC., ET 

AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, LIBRARIAN, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:10-cv-01315) 

David L. Rose argued the cause for appellants. With him 

on the briefs was Joshua N. Rose. 

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen 

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney. Laurie J. Weinstein, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

entered an appearance. 

Before: TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 1 of 10
2 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: The Cook and Shaw 

Foundation is a non-profit organization composed of current 

and former employees of the Library of Congress. The 

Foundation helps Library employees pursue allegations of 

racial discrimination against the Library. Pursuant to Library 

policy, the Library recognizes certain employee organizations 

and gives them meeting space and other benefits. The Cook 

and Shaw Foundation requested recognition as an employee 

organization, but the Library refused. As a result, the 

Foundation was denied the benefits that are afforded to 

recognized employee organizations. 

The Library’s denial of recognition transformed the 

Foundation’s workplace request into a battle of wills. After 

the Library denied recognition to the Foundation, the 

Foundation and several individual plaintiffs – who are officers 

of the Foundation and employees of the Library – filed suit. 

Plaintiffs alleged that the Library’s refusal to recognize the 

Foundation constituted retaliation against the Foundation 

because of its activities – in particular, the assistance that the 

Foundation provides to employees in connection with 

discrimination complaints. Plaintiffs did not claim, however, 

that the Library violated the First Amendment by retaliating 

against and penalizing the Foundation on account of the 

Foundation’s speech or viewpoint. Rather, plaintiffs 

advanced a Title VII claim. 

The District Court found that the allegations in plaintiffs’ 

complaint failed to state a claim under Title VII. According 

to the District Court, the complaint did not identify any 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 2 of 10
3 

employee who engaged in statutorily protected activity such 

as filing a discrimination charge and, as a result of engaging 

in that activity, suffered retaliation in the form of the 

Library’s denial of recognition to the Foundation. Therefore, 

the District Court ruled that the complaint did not meet the 

basic requirements for a retaliation claim under Title VII. We 

agree with the District Court and therefore affirm. 

I 

The Library of Congress grants official recognition to 

Library employee organizations that are “concerned only with 

welfare, financial assistance, recreational, cultural, or 

professional activities.” Library of Congress Regulation 

2022-2 § 3(B). Recognition by the Library confers several 

benefits on employee organizations. For example, recognized 

organizations are permitted to hold an annual meeting using 

Library facilities, and employee members of those 

organizations may attend that annual meeting without using 

leave. Recognized organizations may also host other 

activities using Library facilities. The organizations may post 

materials on the Library’s bulletin boards. And in some 

circumstances, the Library will reproduce and distribute 

materials to staff and new employees on behalf of recognized 

organizations. 

The Cook and Shaw Foundation is a non-profit 

organization composed of current and former employees of 

the Library. The Foundation helps Library employees pursue 

allegations of racial discrimination against the Library. The 

Foundation sought official recognition from the Library. But 

the Library denied the Foundation’s request. The Library 

explained that the Foundation’s purpose of helping employees 

bring and maintain lawsuits against the Library is inconsistent 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 3 of 10
4 

with the Library’s policy that recognized employee 

organizations be “concerned only with welfare, financial 

assistance, recreational, cultural, or professional activities.” 

Id.

The Foundation and several of its individual officers – 

who are also employees of the Library – sued in the district 

court, asserting that the Library’s denial of recognition 

constituted retaliation in violation of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e-16(a), 2000e-3(a). The Library argued that 

plaintiffs lacked standing and that plaintiffs’ complaint failed 

to state a claim under Title VII. The District Court concluded 

that both the individual plaintiffs and the Foundation had 

standing. But the court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim of retaliation under Title VII. See Howard R.L. Cook & 

Tommy Shaw Foundation for Black Employees of the Library 

of Congress, Inc. v. Billington, 802 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 

2011).

1

Plaintiffs then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter the 

judgment and a Rule 15(a) motion for leave to file an 

amended complaint. The District Court denied both motions. 

On the latter motion, the District Court held that granting 

plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint would be futile, 

because plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint still failed to 

state a claim under Title VII. 

 1

 The District Court also dismissed without prejudice 

plaintiffs’ claim that the Library had violated Section 2000e-16(b) 

of Title 42 by failing to publish annual equal employment 

opportunity plans. Plaintiffs do not appeal that aspect of the 

District Court’s ruling. 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 4 of 10
5 

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the District Court’s 

dismissal of their initial complaint. We review de novo the 

District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. See Carter v. 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 503 F.3d 

143, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

II 

We first address the jurisdictional question whether 

plaintiffs have Article III standing to pursue their Title VII 

retaliation claim. To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs 

must demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact, 

that their injury was caused by the challenged conduct of the 

defendant, and that the requested relief is likely to redress 

their injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560-61 (1992). At the motion to dismiss stage, “general 

factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s 

conduct may suffice” to meet those three requirements. Id. at 

561. 

The Foundation and the individual plaintiffs allege that 

the Library’s denial of recognition to the Foundation has 

deprived them of certain benefits. For example, recognition 

would permit the Foundation (and its officers and members) 

to hold meetings using Library facilities, post materials on the 

Library’s bulletin boards, and distribute materials to Library 

staff and new employees. The Library argues that plaintiffs 

have failed to allege an injury in fact because “the privileges 

to employees who participate . . . in recognized organizations 

are insubstantial.” Library Br. 22. If the Library views the 

privileges of recognition as so insubstantial, perhaps it would 

have been better off granting recognition and avoiding 

litigation. In fact, however, the benefits of recognition are not 

trivial, and denial of those benefits constitutes an injury in 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 5 of 10
6 

fact. Plaintiffs further allege that the Library’s refusal to 

recognize the Foundation caused the denial of those benefits 

to plaintiffs. And plaintiffs allege that a ruling in their favor 

would redress their injury by allowing them to attain those 

benefits. The Foundation and the individual plaintiffs 

therefore have established Article III standing. 

The Library also asserts the prudential standing “zone of 

interests” requirement as a bar to this suit. But at least the 

individual plaintiffs have satisfied the zone of interests 

requirement.2

The zone of interests requirement is a way of determining 

whether Congress intended that a particular kind of plaintiff 

be able to sue for violations of a particular statute. The issue 

generally arises when a plaintiff brings a claim under the 

Administrative Procedure Act as a party allegedly 

“aggrieved” by some agency action that violated a substantive 

statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. The Supreme Court has stated 

that such an APA suit may not proceed unless the interest 

asserted by the plaintiff is “arguably within the zone of 

interests to be protected or regulated by the statute that he 

says was violated.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 

Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012) 

 2

 Members of this Court have debated whether the zone of 

interests requirement is jurisdictional or merely an element of a 

cause of action. See Grocery Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 

693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012). That debate has practical 

significance in cases where we must consider whether to address 

the zone of interests requirement on our own – that is, in cases 

when a defendant has otherwise forfeited or waived the argument 

that a plaintiff is outside the zone of interests. We need not wade 

into that debate to resolve this case, because the Library has 

affirmatively raised the zone of interests requirement. 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 6 of 10
7 

(quoting Association of Data Processing Service 

Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

To be sure, this is a Title VII suit, not an APA case. But 

the zone of interests requirement applies here as well. Title 

VII permits a “person claiming to be aggrieved” by an 

unlawful employment practice to pursue a charge. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(b), (f)(1)(A). In Thompson v. North American 

Stainless, LP, the Supreme Court held that the language 

“person claiming to be aggrieved” in Title VII is similar to the 

APA’s “aggrieved” language and thus incorporates the “zone 

of interests” requirement that the Court has found to apply in 

the APA context. 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011). 

That said, the zone of interests requirement poses a low 

bar. A plaintiff with Article III standing satisfies the 

requirement unless his “interests are so marginally related to 

or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it 

cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to 

permit the suit.” Id. (quoting Clarke v. Securities Industry 

Association, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)). As the Supreme 

Court has stressed, the zone of interests requirement “is not 

meant to be especially demanding.” Match-E-Be-Nash-SheWish Band, 132 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 

399).3

 3

 As this discussion reveals, the term “prudential standing” is 

something of a misnomer when discussing the zone of interests 

requirement. The zone of interests question focuses on whether 

Congress intended to allow certain kinds of plaintiffs to sue under a 

particular statute. That is a question of statutory interpretation, not 

prudential calculation. And it is also not a standing question, at 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 7 of 10
8 

In this case, the individual plaintiffs are employees of the 

Library. They claim that they were injured by the Library’s 

allegedly retaliatory non-recognition of the Foundation. The 

statute at issue here, Title VII, gives injured employees a right 

to sue. As employees, the individual plaintiffs’ interests 

obviously cannot be deemed “marginally related to or 

inconsistent with” the purposes of Title VII. See Thompson, 

131 S. Ct. at 870 (allowing Title VII suit by injured employee 

over prudential standing objection). The individual plaintiffs 

in this case therefore have satisfied the zone of interests 

requirement.4

 The question, then, is whether plaintiffs have 

alleged facts sufficient to constitute a retaliation claim under 

Title VII. We turn to that question now. 

III 

Did plaintiffs’ complaint allege facts sufficient to 

constitute a retaliation claim under Title VII? Title VII 

provides federal employees the same substantive protections 

afforded private-sector employees. See Ponce v. Billington, 

679 F.3d 840, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2012). As this Court has said, 

“the general provisions of Title VII apply with equal force in 

both private and federal-sector cases.” Id.

One provision of Title VII concerns retaliation and makes 

it unlawful for an employer to: 

discriminate against any of his employees or applicants 

for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice 

made an unlawful employment practice by this 

 

least not in the Article III sense of whether the plaintiff has suffered 

an injury caused by the defendant and redressable by the court. 

4

 We therefore need not consider whether the Foundation 

could satisfy the zone of interests requirement. 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 8 of 10
9 

subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in an 

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 

subchapter. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This provision protects employees 

who file discrimination charges (or engage in other statutorily 

protected activity) from materially adverse retaliation by their 

employers. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. 

v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).

Retaliation by an employer is unlawful only if that 

retaliation occurred because of actions by “employees or 

applicants for employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This 

case does not involve applicants for employment. Therefore, 

to prove their retaliation claim, plaintiffs must show (1) that 

an employee engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that 

the employee suffered a materially adverse action by the 

employee’s employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the 

two. See Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 

2009). To survive the Library’s motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ 

complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true,” to plausibly establish those three elements. Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Even accepting the facts recited in their complaint as 

true, plaintiffs have failed to allege the first element of a Title 

VII retaliation claim: that an employee engaged in statutorily 

protected activity. Nowhere does the complaint allege that a 

particular Library employee “opposed . . . an unlawful 

employment practice” or “made a charge, testified, assisted, 

or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 

or hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The complaint, in other 

words, does not allege that a particular employee – such as 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 9 of 10
10 

one of the named individual plaintiffs – engaged in one of the 

statutorily protected activities and then suffered a materially 

adverse action because he or she had engaged in that 

statutorily protected activity. Moreover, when seeking a 

second chance from the District Court in the form of a Rule 

15(a) motion for leave to amend the complaint, plaintiffs still 

failed to allege the required facts in their proposed amended 

complaint. 

To be sure, the complaint does allege that the Foundation

engaged in certain activities that led to retaliation by the 

Library. See Complaint at 5, 7, Howard R.L. Cook, No. 10-

01315 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2010). Perhaps such allegations could 

have formed the makings of a First Amendment claim by the 

Foundation. But plaintiffs advanced a Title VII claim. 

Again, Title VII makes discriminatory retaliation by an 

employer unlawful only if that retaliation occurred because of 

statutorily protected activity by “employees or applicants for 

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The statutory terms 

“employees or applicants for employment” do not encompass 

the Foundation, an employee organization. 

In short, the complaint fails to allege that the Library’s 

denial of recognition constituted retaliation for statutorily 

protected activity by “employees or applicants for 

employment.” Absent such an allegation, the complaint fails 

to state a claim under Title VII. 

* * * 

We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #12-5193 Document #1470268 Filed: 12/13/2013 Page 10 of 10