Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-99018/USCOURTS-ca9-09-99018-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES ERIN MCKINNEY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-99018

D.C. No.

2:03-cv-00774-DGC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 6, 2012—Pasadena, California

Filed September 16, 2013

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Carlos T. Bea,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Wardlaw

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2 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging a murder

conviction and capital sentence.

The panel held that the use of dual juries, one for

petitioner and one for his co-defendant, did not violate clearly

established federal law, despite petitioner’s claim that this

method led to a prejudicial courtroom layout where petitioner

sat facing the jurors throughout trial. The panel held that

petitioner procedurally defaulted on his other dual juries

challenges.

The panel held that petitioner procedurally defaulted on

his claim that the trial court violated his rights by requiring

him to wear a leg brace during trial.

The panel rejected petitioner’s claim, under Lockett v.

Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1987), and Eddings v. Oklahoma,

455 U.S. 104 (1982), that the trial court did not adequately

consider mitigating factors in imposing the death penalty,

explaining that these cases only hold that a sentencer must

fully consider proffered mitigating evidence, and do not

affect a sentencer’s determination of the weight of the

evidence.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 3

Judge Wardlaw concurred in part and dissented in part. 

She agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the denial of

relief as to petitioner’s dual juries and shackling claims must

be upheld for failure to exhaust them. However, she

disagreed with the majority’s analysis of the Eddings claim,

and would reverse the district court’s denial of relief and

instruct that court to grant the petition as to that claim.

COUNSEL

Ivan K. Mathew (briefed and argued) and Susan T. Mathew

(briefed), Mathew & Associates, Phoenix, Arizona, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

Jon G. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Capital

Litigation Division, Phoenix, Arizona, for RespondentAppellee.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner James Erin McKinney, an Arizona state

prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 habeas corpus petition. The Arizona state court

sentenced McKinney to death on each of two counts of firstdegree murder for the 1991 killings of Christene Mertens and

Jim McClain. We affirm the district court.

In this opinion we address three claims raised in

McKinney’s petition: (1) the trial court’s use of dual juries at

trial; (2) the trial court’s use of a leg brace as a security

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4 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

measure during trial; and (3) whether the sentencing judge

properly considered all mitigating evidence under Lockett v.

Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma,

455 U.S. 104 (1982).1 McKinney failed to exhaust each of

these claims except one of his several dual juries claims and

the Lockett/Eddings claim. McKinney’s unexhausted claims

are procedurally defaulted, because he would now be barred

from raising them to the Arizona state courts. See Beaty v.

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.2(a)). As to the remaining claims, the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision to deny relief was not contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished federal

law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

before that court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Background2

On February 28, 1991, McKinney and his half brother,

co-defendant Michael Hedlund, committed the first in a string

of five residential burglaries. Before this first burglary,

1 McKinney raises other uncertified claims on appeal. Because

McKinney has not shown that the district court’s resolution of the other

claims is “debatable amongst jurists of reason,” Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003), we decline to expand the certificate of

appealability to review the claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Hiivala v.

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1102–04 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

2 These facts are drawn substantially from the Arizona Supreme Court’s

opinion in State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214, 1218–19 (Ariz. 1996) (en

banc), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v.

Martinez, 999 P.2d 795, 806 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc). We presume the

correctness of the Arizona court’s findings unless rebutted by clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 5

McKinney and Hedlund (collectively, “Defendants”) were

driving in Hedlund’s car with Chris Morris and Joe Lemon,

discussing potential targets. Brandishing his gun, McKinney

stated that he would shoot anyone that they found at home

during the burglaries. Hedlund said that he would beat

anyone that he encountered in the head.

At the time, Defendants had learned from Morris and

Lemon that Christene Mertens supposedly kept thousands of

dollars in an orange juice container in her refrigerator. 

Therefore, Defendants and Morris and Lemon intended to

burglarize Mertens’s home on the first night of the burglary

spree. However, Mertens came home and scared the wouldbe burglars away. As a result, the four of them chose a

different house to burglarize, but obtained nothing of value

from the burglary.

The next night, McKinney, Hedlund, and Morris

committed two more burglaries. Lemon was not involved. 

McKinney and Morris stole a .22 revolver, twelve dollars,

some wheat pennies, a tool apron, and a Rolex

watch—splitting the “proceeds” with Hedlund after the

crimes. When the homeowner returned home during the third

burglary, McKinney and Morris ran away, leaving the

homeowner unharmed. However, after the burglary,

McKinney remarked that he and Morris “should have stayed

and [McKinney] would have shot [the homeowner].”

On March 9, 1991, McKinney and Hedlund returned to

the Mertens home for the fourth burglary. When they entered

the residence, Defendants found Mertens home alone and

attacked her. After the attack Mertens had both gunshot and

stab wounds. However, the medical examiner certified the

cause of death as “a penetrating contact gunshot wound to the

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6 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

head.” Defendants ransacked the house and stole $120 in

cash.

Defendants committed the fifth burglary and second

murder at the home of Jim McClain on March 22, 1991. 

Defendants knew McClain, because Hedlund had bought a

car from him about six months before the murder. McClain’s

house was ransacked during the course of the burglary, and

he was shot in the back of the head while sleeping. 

Defendants stole a pocket watch, three handguns, and

McClain’s car. Defendants later tried to sell the stolen guns.

McKinneywas tried on two counts of first degree murder,

two counts of burglary, one count of theft, and one count of

attempted theft. The trial court tried Defendants together, but

empaneled separate juries to decide the guilt of each

Defendant. The trial court required both Defendants to wear

a leg brace as a security measure throughout the trial. 

McKinney’s jury found him guilty of all charges, except the

attempted theft charge. The trial judge sentenced McKinney

to death on each first degree murder conviction. State v.

McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc),

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v.

Martinez, 999 P.2d 795, 806 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc).

B. Post-conviction proceedings

The Arizona Supreme Court upheld McKinney’s

convictions and sentence on direct appeal. McKinney,

917 P.2d at 1234.

McKinney thereafter challenged his convictions and

sentence in post-conviction collateral proceedings. The

Maricopa County superior court (the “State PCR Court”)

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 7

concluded that none of the claims raised in McKinney’s

operative petition for post-conviction relief (the “PCR

Petition”) presented material issues of fact or law to warrant

further proceedings. The State PCR Court summarily

dismissed the petition. McKinney appealed the dismissal of

the PCR Petition to the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied

review on all claims relevant to this appeal.

Thereafter, McKinney raised 26 claims in his petition for

writ of habeas corpus to the U.S. District Court for the

District of Arizona. The district court denied relief on a

number of these claims in 2006 and on the remaining claims

in 2009. In its order denying relief, the district court granted

a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the issues of

whether the trial court’s use of dual juries or a leg brace

violated McKinney’s rights. The district court denied a COA

on the remaining issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant

or deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” Rhoades v.

Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this case. See Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336–37 (1997); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d

1029, 1036–38 (9th Cir. 2007). A petitioner must overcome

a high threshold to obtain relief under AEDPA:

Federal habeas relief may not be granted for

claims subject to § 2254(d) unless it is shown

that the earlier state court’s decision was

contrary to federal law then clearly

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8 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

established in the holdings of [the Supreme]

Court, § 2254(d)(1); or that it involved an

unreasonable application of such law,

§ 2254(d)(1); or that it was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the record before the state court,

§ 2254(d)(2).

Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785

(2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The “only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of

the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision.” 

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003),

overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63 (2003)). If Supreme Court “cases give no clear answer to

the question presented, . . . it cannot be said that the state

court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” 

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In other words, “‘[i]t is not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law

for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by [the Supreme Court].’” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance,

556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)).

In cases where a petitioner identifies clearly established

federal law and challenges the state court’s application of that

law, our task under AEDPA is not to decide whether a state

court decision applied the law correctly. See id. at 785. 

Rather, we must decide whether the state court decision

applied the law reasonably. See id. (“‘[A]n unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 9

application of federal law.’” (quoting Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)). If the state court applied the law

reasonably, we must deny relief. See id. Thus, we grant

relief only “in cases where there is no possibility fairminded

jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts

with [the Supreme Court’s] precedents.” Id. at 786.

DISCUSSION

I. Dual Juries Claims

McKinney raises a number of claims based on the trial

court’s use of dual juries. However, McKinney exhausted3

only one of them in the state courts, as AEDPA requires—his

claim that the use of dual juries led to a prejudicial courtroom

layout where McKinney sat facing the jurors throughout trial. 

McKinney’s “courtroom layout” claim fails, because he has

failed to identify clearly established federal law that would

provide the basis for relief under § 2254(d)(1). McKinney

failed to exhaust any of the other potential dual juries claims

and would now be barred from raising these claims in state

court. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(a)). Accordingly, McKinney’s “other” dual juries

3 The exhaustion doctrine requires a petitioner to provide the state courts

with the opportunity to rule on his federal constitutional claims before

presenting these claims to a federal habeas court. See King v. Ryan,

564 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9thCir. 2009); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (proving that

a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless “the applicant has

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State”).

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10 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

claims are procedurally defaulted,4and he has not shown

cause or prejudice to excuse the default. See id.

A. Background and procedural history

Before trial, Hedlund moved to sever his case from

McKinney’s, and the State did not oppose the motion. The

trial court initially granted the motion to sever. The trial

court later asked the parties for briefing on the idea of using

dual juries.

Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the use of dual

juries. The State opposed the practice based on a perceived

state procedural obstacle set forth in State v. Lambright,

673 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc), overruled by Hedlund v.

Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc). McKinney

shared the State’s Lambright concern and argued that it

would be improper for the court to employ an untested dual

jury procedure. McKinney also argued that severance was

required to avoid the introduction of impermissible,

incriminating testimony under Bruton v. United States,

391 U.S. 123 (1968).

The trial court concluded that the use of the dual juries

would not impede Defendants’ right to fair trial, and found no

inherent prejudice in the use of dual juries. At trial, both

4 A state prisoner procedurally defaults federal claims if he fails to raise

them as federal claims in state court or if, in raising the claims, he fails to

comply with applicable state procedural rules. Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1991). The state can successfully assert a

procedural default defense to federal habeas review unless the prisoner

can show both “cause” for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or

the prisoner demonstrates that failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 11

Defendants’ juries were present in the courtroom, except

during “the reading of charges, opening statements, closing

arguments, and testimony related to a particular defendant’s

inculpatory statements.” Both before and during trial, the

trial court reminded counsel to preserve the integrity of the

dual jury procedure and to avoid eliciting testimony nonadmissible against the other codefendant under Bruton.

Before trial, McKinney challenged the use of dual juries

in a special action to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See

Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1009. The court of appeals reversed,

holding that the trial court exceeded its authority under the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision in Lambright. Id. The Arizona

Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the

trial court’s decision to use dual juries. Id. at 1011.

On direct appeal of his conviction and sentence,

McKinney claimed that the dual juries caused the courtroom

layout “with Defendants facing the jurors, [to be]intimidating

and resulted in fundamental error requiring reversal.” 

McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1232. The Arizona Supreme Court

rejected this argument, concluding that McKinney could not

demonstrate prejudice and provided no authority for “a

constitutional right to a standard American courtroom

arrangement.” Id.

McKinney raised the “courtroom layout” issue again in

his PCR Petition. The State PCR Court rejected McKinney’s

argument that the courtroom layout “tainted” the proceedings. 

McKinney also argued in the PCR Petition that the use of the

dual juries violated his “right to a fundamentally fair trial” for

a number of other reasons. However, McKinney did not

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invoke the U.S. Constitution, nor did he cite to any state or

federal cases.

McKinney raised the same “courtroom layout” claim in

his federal habeas petition. McKinney also made a number

of other arguments that the use of the dual juries prejudiced

his right to a fair trial. The federal district court addressed

each sub-part of McKinney’s dual juries claim. Of those, the

district court concluded that only McKinney’s “courtroom

layout” claim was even “arguably exhausted in state court.” 

Despite this conclusion, however, the district court rejected

all of McKinney’s arguments on the merits.

B. “Courtroom layout” claim

McKinney exhausted his “courtroom layout” claim. “To

exhaust his Arizona remedies, [a petitioner must] give the

Arizona courts a fair opportunity to act on his federal due

process claim before presenting it to the federal courts.” 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, a petitioner

must apprise the state court that he is “making a claim under

the U.S. Constitution, and describe both the operative facts

and the federal legal theory on which [the] claim is

based . . . .” Id. at 999 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). This can be accomplished by citing “specific

provisions of the federal constitution or . . . federal or state

cases involving the legal standard for a federal constitutional

violation.” Id. “Mere ‘general appeals to broad

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial,’ do not establish

exhaustion.” Id. (quoting Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098,

1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)); see also Fields v.

Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 13

that a petitioner failed to exhaust a federal due process claim

where petitioner’s briefing to the state court mentioned the

federal constitution only twice and due process only once). 

In short, a petitioner must “alert the state courts to the fact

that he [is] asserting a claim under the United States

Constitution.” Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106.

McKinney set forth the “federal legal theory” underlying

his prejudicial courtroom layout claim in his opening brief to

the Arizona Supreme Court. McKinney claimed: “The

bizarre and prejudicial seating arrangement deprived the

appellant of due process under the Arizona and Federal

Constitutions.” The brief’s table of contents also cites the

page containing that sentence under its entry for the “Fifth

Amendment.” Taken together, the argument and the table of

contents allude to a specific provision of the U.S.

Constitution. McKinney’s brief also invokes the U.S.

Constitution numerous times in reference to other claims. 

Accordingly, McKinney’s brief was sufficient to alert the

Arizona Supreme Court that McKinney raised a federal

claim. See Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th

Cir. 2010) (“This is not a case where the petitioner failed to

make clear that he was invoking a federal right, or where the

petitioner’s general appeal to a constitutional guarantee was

too vague to put the state court on notice of the federal

claim.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted));

Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106. Thus, we conclude that McKinney

exhausted his “courtroom layout” claim.

Turning to the merits of McKinney’s “courtroom layout”

claim, we must determine whether the Arizona Supreme

Court’s decision rejecting this claim was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

We conclude that it was not. McKinney cites no Supreme

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14 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

Court case, and our search reveals no case, that would

provide the basis for relief under § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly,

we echo the Arizona Supreme Court’s McKinney opinion,

which held: “McKinney has not demonstrated any prejudice

and provides no authority for his argument that there is a

constitutional right to a standard American courtroom

arrangement, and we decline to invent such a right.” 

917 P.2d at 1232. McKinney is not entitled to relief on his

prejudicial courtroom layout claim.

C. McKinney’s “other” dual juries claims

In addition to the “courtroom layout” claim, McKinney

makes several arguments in federal court that the use of the

dual juries denied him his right to a fair trial. McKinney

claims the dual juries prejudiced him, because: (1)

Defendants presented antagonistic defenses, which led to

prejudicial leading questions, limited cross-examination, and

Bruton violations; and (2) the procedure necessitated

increased security and the use of a leg brace during trial. The

State argues that McKinney procedurally defaulted these

claims by failing to fairly present them to the state court. We

agree.

1. McKinney failed to exhaust his “other” courtroom

layout claims.

McKinney’s Arizona Supreme Court briefing did not set

forth the operative facts or federal legal theory for any dual

juries claim apart from the “courtroom layout” claim. The

same is true of the PCR Petition. While the PCR Petition

makes a general appeal to McKinney’s right to “due process”

and a “fair trial,” this is insufficient to exhaust. See Castillo,

399 F.3d at 998; Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106. Accordingly,

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 15

McKinney failed to exhaust any potential claim arising out of

the trial court’s use of dual juries, except the “courtroom

layout” claim.

McKinneyargues that his claims were exhausted, because

Hedlund raised the claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

However, “[t]he questions raised by [McKinney] involve

constitutional privileges which are personal to him, and

therefore an appeal by his co-defendant can not exhaust [his]

remedies in the state courts.” Williams v. Nelson, 431 F.2d

932, 932–33 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).5 Accordingly,

McKinney failed to exhaust these claims because he failed to

raise them personally to the state court.

2. McKinney’s unexhausted dual juries claims are

procedurally defaulted.

“A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if the petitioner failed

to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims

procedurally barred.’” Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (quoting

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991)). 

McKinney’s dual jury claims are procedurally defaulted,

because he is barred “under Arizona law from going back to

state court.” Id.; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a).6

5 Contrary to McKinney’s argument, the subsequent case, Harris v.

Superior Court of the St. of Cal., Los Angeles Cnty., 500 F.2d 1124, 1126

(9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), did not affect this portion of Williams.

6 Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) and 32.4(a) provide

alternate bases for our conclusion that McKinney’s claims would now be

barred. Rule 32.2(a)(3) precludes “any claim that could have been

brought on direct appeal or in a prior PCR petition.” Henry v. Ryan, ___

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16 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

“Nonetheless, we will review the merits if [McKinney]

can show cause and prejudice or, alternatively, a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987. While

McKinney mentioned these exceptions in his briefing, he

made no argument that they apply to excuse the procedural

default of his dual juries claims. At oral argument, when

asked whether he could show cause, McKinney argued that

he could establish cause under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.

1309 (2012). McKinney’s invocation of Martinez suggests

that McKinney argues that the ineffective assistance of his

PCR counsel constitutes cause to overcome the procedural

default of his other dual juries claims. However, it is wellsettled that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel does not

establish cause. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753–57. While

Martinez created a “narrow exception” to this rule, 132 S. Ct.

at 1315, the Martinez exception does not apply to

McKinney’s dual juries claims. The Supreme Court made

clear that the exception applies only when the underlying

constitutional claim is ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Id. Thus, McKinney cannot show cause and his dual juries

claims are procedurally defaulted.

II. “Shackling” Claim

McKinney failed to exhaust his “shackling” claim. 

Because McKinney would now be barred from bringing the

claim in state court, Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987, the claim is

procedurally defaulted. McKinney has failed to show cause

and prejudice to overcome the default.

F.3d ___, 2013 WL 3027404, at *13 (June 19, 2013). Rule 32.4 bars

untimely claims. See, e.g., Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 17

A. Background and procedural history

The trial court required both McKinney and Hedlund to

wear a leg brace during trial. The trial court rejected

Defendants’ numerous objections to the use of the leg braces. 

The trial court reasoned that the Defendants’ close proximity

to jurors and court staff, the violent nature of the crimes, and

evidence of McKinney’s previous escape attempt and a

subsequent escape plot warranted the extra securitymeasures. 

The trial court later asked the State to make a specific record

of the security concerns. Although McKinney’s motion for

a new trial is silent on this issue, Hedlund raised the

“shackling” issue at the post-trial phase. Similarly,

McKinney did not raise the “shackling” issue to the Arizona

Supreme Court on direct appeal. However, Hedlund did raise

the claim, which was rejected. See McKinney, 917 P.2d at

1222–23. McKinney also failed to raise the issue in his PCR

Petition.

The district court noted that McKinney did not raise the

“shackling” issue on direct appeal or in his PCR Petition. 

The district court rejected McKinney’s argument that the

Arizona Supreme Court decided the issue as part of its

“fundamental error review.” However, rather than decide that

the claim was procedurally defaulted, the district court denied

the claim as meritless.

B. McKinney’s “shackling” claim is procedurally

defaulted.

McKinney’s “shackling” claim is not exhausted, because

he failed to raise it to the Arizona Supreme Court or in his

PCR Petition. As with the dual jury claims, we reject

McKinney’s argument that the claim was exhausted by virtue

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18 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

of Hedlund raising it on direct appeal. See Williams,

431 F.2d at 932–33. We also reject McKinney’s argument

that this claim was exhausted due to the Arizona Supreme

Court’s fundamental error review. “Where the parties did not

mention an issue in their briefs and where the court did not

mention it was considering that issue sua sponte, there is no

evidence that the appellate court actually considered the

issue, regardless of its duty to review for fundamental error,

and the issue cannot be deemed exhausted.” Moormann v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005); see also

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir.

1996) (“Under Arizona law, fundamental error review does

not prevent subsequent procedural preclusion.”).

This unexhausted claim is now procedurally barred,

because McKinney would be barred from raising it to the

state court. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(a), 32.4. Further, McKinney makes no argument for

“cause” to excuse the default. Although McKinney makes

numerous arguments of prejudice and injustice, he does not

support these arguments with citations to any evidence in the

record.7 Thus, McKinney’s “shackling” claim is procedurally

barred.

7 The only evidence offered to the state court on prejudice were

statements from members of Hedlund’s jury. Even if this evidence were

probative of the McKinney jury’s prejudice, it actually cuts against a

prejudice finding. While jurors clearly saw the leg brace, the only jurors

interviewed stated that the leg brace had no bearing on their verdict. 

While not “dispositive” of the prejudice issue, see Holbrook v. Flynn,

475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986), the jurors’ statements arguably have some

weight. Unlike the juror statements that were given “little stock” in

Holbrook, the jurors gave their impressions of the leg brace in this case

after the trial was over, not during voir dire. See id.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 19

III. Lockett/Eddings Claim.

8

McKinney claims that the trial court did not adequately

consider mitigating factors in imposing the death penalty,

thereby violating McKinney’s rights under Lockett, Eddings,

and their progeny. McKinney argues that the trial court failed

to consider mitigation evidence,9

finding that McKinney’s

abusive childhood and its psychological effects did not affect

McKinney’s “ability to perceive, comprehend or control his

actions.” The State counters that the Arizona state courts

fully considered all mitigating evidence and did not apply an

unconstitutional nexus test. The State argues that the

Lockett/Eddingsline of cases holds only that a sentencer must

fully consider proffered mitigation evidence and does not

affect a sentencer’s determination of its weight. We agree. 

Because the record makes clear that the trial court adequately

considered and weighed McKinney’s mitigation evidence, we

deny relief.

8 The district court declined to grant a COA on this issue. However,

because McKinney exhausted this claim and because we conclude that the

district court’s resolution of the issue is “debatable amongst jurists of

reason,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003), we address it.

9

In addition to evidence of childhood abuse and psychology, McKinney

argues that the trial court failed to consider McKinney’s level of

participation in the murders. He develops this argument, without citation,

in a single sentence: “The trial judge noted there is no proof McKinney

killed Ms. Mertens at the Hedlund sentencing but not at Mr. McKinney’s

sentencing.” Even assuming this properly characterizes the record, the

record elsewhere reveals that the judge specifically considered

McKinney’s level of participation in the crimes at sentencing. The trial

court specificallyfound “substantial participationin the McClain homicide

by Mr. McKinney.”

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20 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

A. Background and procedural history

McKinney had a traumatic childhood. At sentencing, the

trial court heard evidence from McKinney’s aunt and halfsister of various abuses against McKinney by his father and

step-mother. McKinney’s would-be care givers neglected

him by forcing him to live in appalling conditions. 

McKinney did not have adequate clothing or food. 

McKinney was also frequently beaten and locked out of the

house in extreme weather.

The trial court also heard evidence that these abuses led

McKinney to develop Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

(“PTSD”). After administering a number of tests,

McKinney’s expert, Dr. McMahon, testified that McKinney

could be “emotionally overwhelmed by environmental stress

and act in poorly-judged ways.” Dr. McMahon concluded

that McKinney had “learning disabilities” but tested negative

for “significant neuropsychological dysfunction.” Dr.

McMahon testified that McKinney began abusing drugs and

alcohol to distract him from his environmental stressors. 

Finally, Dr. McMahon opined that a sudden confrontation by

Mertens during the course of the burglary could trigger a

violent response from McKinney and that McKinney would

have a “high likelihood” of diminished capacity in such an

instance.

The trial court credited the testimony establishing

McKinney’s “traumatic childhood.” The trial court also

accepted, for the purpose of sentencing, Dr. McMahon’s

PTSD diagnosis. Nevertheless, the trial concluded:

[A]fter considering all of the mitigating

circumstances, the mitigating evidence that

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 21

was presented by the defense in this case as

against the aggravating circumstances, and

other matters which clearly are not set forth in

the statute which should be considered by a

court, I have determined that given . . . the

aggravating circumstances which have been

proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the

State with respect to each of these homicides

in Counts I and III have concluded that the

mitigating circumstances simply are not

sufficiently substantial to call for a leniency

under all the facts of this case.

The Arizona Supreme Court rejected McKinney’s

argument that the trial court did not adequately take into

account McKinney’s abusive childhood and its effects. 

McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234. The court reasoned that “the

judge gave full consideration to McKinney’s childhood and

the expert testimony regarding the effects of that

childhood . . . .” Id. The court explained that evidence of a

traumatic childhood “does not necessarily have substantial

mitigating weight absent a showing that it significantly

affected or impacted the defendant’s ability to perceive,

comprehend, or control his actions.” Id. (emphasis added).

The federal district court concluded that the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the sentence was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

Lockett/Eddings.

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22 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

B. McKinney has failed to show that the Arizona

SupremeCourtunreasonably appliedLockett/Eddings.

In Lockett, the Supreme Court held:

[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded

from considering, as a mitigating factor, any

aspect of a defendant’s character or record

and any of the circumstances of the offense

that the defendant proffers as a basis for a

sentence less than death. . . .

Given that the imposition of death by public

authority is . . . profoundly different from all

other penalties, . . . [the sentencer must be free

to give] independent mitigating weight to

aspects of the defendant’s character and

record and to circumstances of the offense

proffered in mitigation . . . .

438 U.S. at 604–05 (finding Ohio death penalty statute

invalid where it permitted consideration of only three

mitigating circumstances).

Later, in Eddings, the Supreme Court applied Lockett in

a case where the trial judge found he could not consider in

mitigation evidence of the defendant’s family history.

10

10

In Eddings, the sentencing judge made clear, on the record, that he

could not consider certain evidence as a matter of law. He stated: “[T]he

Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact that the youth was

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 23

455 U.S. at 112–13. The appeals court affirmed the trial

court, finding that the mitigation evidence was “not relevant

because it did not tend to provide a legal excuse” for

responsibility for the crime. Id. at 113. The Supreme Court

reversed, explaining that “[j]ust as the State may not by

statute preclude the sentencer from considering any

mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to

consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating

evidence. . . .The sentencer . . . may determine the weight to

be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give

it no weight by excluding such evidence from their

consideration.” Id. at 113–15.

In Tennard v. Dretke, the Supreme Court rejected a

“nexus test” that would find mitigating evidence relevant only

where it bears a causal nexus to the crime. 542 U.S. 274, 287

(2004) (“[W]e cannot countenance the suggestion that low IQ

evidence is not relevant mitigating evidence . . . unless the

defendant also establishes a nexus to the crime.”). Citing

Lockett and Eddings, the Court cautioned that the jury must

be given an effective vehicle with which to weigh mitigating

evidence so long as the defendant has met a “low threshold

for relevance,” which is satisfied by “evidence which tends

logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance

which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating

value.” Id. at 284–85.

In Smith v. Texas, the Court again considered the use of

a nexus test to determine whether mitigating evidence is

relevant. 543 U.S. 37, 45 (2004). The Court “unequivocally

sixteen years old when this heinous crime was committed. Nor can the

Court in following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact of this young

man’s violent background.” 455 U.S. at 109 (alterations in original).

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24 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

rejected” any test requiring a causal nexus between mitigating

evidence and the crime. Id.

We have held that Tennard and Smith are retroactively

applicable to decisions such as the Arizona Supreme Court’s

1996 decision in this case. See Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708,

723 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 432

(2012). Thus, under clearly established federal law, we

review (1) whether the trial court considered all relevant

mitigating evidence, as required by Lockett and Eddings; and,

(2) whether the Arizona Supreme Court applied an

unconstitutional causal nexus test to exclude evidence

proffered in mitigation, contrary to Tennard and Smith.

In this case, the Arizona courts did not improperly

exclude any of McKinney’s mitigating evidence. Further, the

Arizona courts did not employ an unconstitutional nexus test. 

Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision to affirm

McKinney’s sentence was not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

1. All mitigating evidence was considered as required

by Eddings.

The Arizona Supreme Court did not violate Eddings when

it concluded that the trial court considered all the mitigation

evidence before it. The Arizona Supreme Court clearly

understood and applied the controlling Supreme Court

precedent. See McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1227. It concluded:

“[T]he judge considered McKinney’s abusive childhood and

its impact on his behavior and ability to conform his conduct

and found it insufficiently mitigating to call for leniency.” Id.

at 1234 (emphasis added)). The Arizona Supreme Court did

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 25

not say that the evidence was irrelevant or could not be

considered.11Id.

We reject McKinney’s and the dissent’s implication that

the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision merelypaid lip service

to Eddings, and the trial judge did not actually consider the

evidence. As an initial matter, the trial court’s certification

that it considered all the mitigation evidence is entitled to

some weight. See Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1037 (“‘We must

assume that the trial judge considered all this evidence before

passing sentence. For one thing, he said he did.’” (quoting

Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 314 (1991))). In addition,

the record shows that the trial court’s commitment to Eddings

was more than semantic—the trial judge genuinely weighed

the mitigation evidence’s persuasive value. The trial judge

expressly credited the evidence of childhood abuse,

describing it as “beyond the comprehension and

understanding of most people who have not grown up under

those circumstances.” The trial court also accepted, for the

purpose of sentencing, Dr. McMahon’s PTSD diagnosis. 

Further, even when the court discussed the possible link

between McKinney’s PTSD and the crimes, the record shows

that it considered all the evidence and weighed the evidence’s

probative value. The trial judge stated:

I found it interesting Dr. McMahon also

indicated that one of the techniques—or the

11 Other cases pre-dating or contemporaneous with McKinney also

demonstrate that the Arizona Supreme Court was well-aware of the

Lockett/Eddingsline of cases and the requirement that the sentencing court

fully consider all mitigating evidence. See, e.g., State v. Towery, 920 P.2d

290, 310–11 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc); State v. Gonzales, 892 P.2d 838, 851

(Ariz. 1995) (en banc).

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26 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

manifestations of Post-traumatic Stress

Syndrome that might be expected were that

the individual be depressed, would be

withdrawn. It appears to me that defense

attempted to demonstrate that in their

presentation of mitigating circumstances and

that such an individual would expect to avoid

contacts which would either exacerbate or

recreate the trauma that would bring on this

type of stress from childhood. And yet, rather

than continue to avoid any of these

circumstances after the Mertens homicide, it

appears that the same thoughtful, reflective

planning went into, then, the burglary of a

known target to both the defendant and the codefendant, Mr. McClain.

Other portions of the sentencing transcript similarly

demonstrate the judge’s deliberative process as he considered

the PTSD evidence and weighed it against the other evidence

presented. This careful analysis of Dr. McMahon’s testimony

contradicts McKinney’s and the dissent’s claim that the

sentencing judge excluded the evidence, or refused to

consider it, as a matter of law.12

 

12 This obvious deliberation is in sharp contrast to the sentencing court

record in Towery. In that case, we upheld the Arizona Supreme Court’s

decision to deny relief under Eddings despite some language in the

sentencing transcript indicating that mitigating evidence was excluded, or

not considered. See 673 F.3d at 936–37, 946–47. For example, the

sentencing judge stated: “[A] difficult family background in and of itself,

is not a mitigating circumstance.” Id. at 936. The sentencing court went

on to explain that “[a] difficult family background is a relevant mitigating

circumstance, if a defendant can show that something in that background

had an [e]ffect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the defendant’s

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 27

The dissent selectively quotes passages from the

sentencing transcript to argue that the Arizona state courts did

not properly consider evidence of PTSD. There are two

problems with the dissent’s approach. First, it reads too much

into certain passages, notably the sentencing judge’s

discussion of the psychological study submitted as Exhibit 3. 

Contrary to the dissent’s view, nothing in the sentencing

judge’s discussion of PTSD shows that he believed it was

“irrelevant” as a matter of law. At most, the discussion of

PTSD shows that the sentencing judge was equivocal about

what effect in mitigation the PTSD diagnosis should have. 

This strengthens the conclusion that the sentencing judge

considered the evidence and did not simply exclude it. 

However, even if the sentencing judge created some

ambiguity in the record by “thinking out loud” as he

considered the PTSD evidence, that ambiguity should be cast

in favor of the state. See Poyson v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 1087,

1099 (9th Cir. 2013).

Similarly, the dissent overlooks passages where the

sentencing judge clearly stated that he considered “all of the

mitigating circumstances.” Contraryto the dissent’s view, we

do not fail to take into account the difference between the

sentencing judge’s treatment of the PTSD and other

mitigation evidence. There is no difference in treatment. The

record clearly shows the sentencing judge’s deliberation as he

considered each piece of mitigation evidence. Thus, the

record as a whole contradicts the dissent’s view that the

control.” Id. (emphasis added) (second alteration in original). Here, the

record makes clear that both the sentencing court and the Arizona

Supreme Court fully considered all mitigating evidence. Thus, the proper

resolution of the Eddings issue in this case is even clearer than it was in

Towery.

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28 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

Arizona state courts rejected the PTSD evidence as a matter

of law.

Because the record shows that the sentencing judge

considered all the potential mitigation evidence, we reject

McKinney’s and the dissent’s reliance on a number of our

past cases granting relief. See, e.g., Williams v. Ryan,

623 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2010); Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d

1026, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2008); Lambright v. Schriro,

490 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007). Those cases provide

little guidance to inform our AEDPA review. For example,

in Williams, we granted relief under Lockett/Eddings. 

However, unlike the state courts here, the state courts in

Williams held that the mitigating evidence “could not be

considered as a mitigating factor of any kind.” 623 F.3d. at

1270 (internal quotation marks omitted). This statement

resembles the clear statement from Eddings that the trial

judge excluded mitigation evidence as a matter of law. See

Eddings, 455 U.S. at 109. Styers and Lambright, also cited

byMcKinney and the dissent, contain similar statements. See

Styers, 547 F.3d at 1035–36 (granting relief under Eddings

where Arizona Supreme Court analysis made clear that

mitigating evidence was not considered); Lambright,

490 F.3d at 1115 (granting relief under Lockett where the trial

court did not consider “any evidence without an explicit

nexus to the crime, or . . . gave such evidence de minim[i]s

weight”).

The record in this case does not contain the same clear

statement of exclusion that appears in those cases, rendering

them inapposite. See Schad, 671 F.3d at 724 (distinguishing

Styers and Lambright, because “[i]n both of those cases . . .

it was clear from the record that the lower court had applied

the unconstitutional nexus test and had excluded mitigation

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 29

evidence” (emphasis added)). We will not second-guess the

Arizona state courts’ application of Eddings where the record

shows that the courts considered and weighed all mitigation

evidence13and did not make a clear, affirmative statement of

exclusion. See id. (“Absent a clear indication in the record

that the state court applied the wrong standard, we cannot

assume the courts violated Eddings’s constitutional

mandates.”); see also Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1036–38 (denying

relief under Eddings where “the sentencing court did not

prevent [the petitioner] from presenting any evidence in

mitigation, nor did it affirmatively indicate that there was any

evidence it would not consider”).

13 The dissent argues that the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that

the sentencing judge “gave full consideration to” McKinney’s PTSD

evidence, see McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234, was based on an unreasonable

determination of fact under § 2254(d)(2). The dissent also argues that the

sentencing judge never accepted Dr. McMahon’s PTSD diagnosis, nor

made a finding of PTSD, which tainted the Arizona Supreme Court’s

review.

As demonstrated above, the record contradicts both arguments. As

the dissent acknowledges, “the sentencing judge did quite a bit of talking

about PTSD . . . .” This discussion demonstrates the sentencing judge’s

deliberative process—his weighing of the evidence. There would have

been little need to do so much “talking” about the PTSD diagnosis if he

planned to exclude it as a matter of law. Further, the record demonstrates

that the sentencing judge assumed that the PTSD diagnosis was true. 

Nothing required the sentencing judge to make a particular finding that the

diagnosis was accurate, because the record shows that he was able to

adequately weigh the evidence by assuming that it was true.

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30 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

2. The Arizona Supreme Court did not apply an

unconstitutional nexus test to McKinney’s

mitigating evidence.

As we have previously recognized, state courts are free to

consider a nexus to determine the weight to give mitigation

evidence. See Schad, 671 F.3d at 723 (“The United States

Supreme Court has said that the use of the nexus test in this

manner is not unconstitutional because state courts are free to

assess the weight to be given to particular mitigating

evidence.”). For example, we upheld the Arizona Supreme

Court’s exercise of this discretion in Towery v. Ryan,

673 F.3d 933, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012). In Towery, we reviewed the Arizona

Supreme Court’s rulings that (1) the sentencing court “must

consider the defendant’s upbringing if proffered but is not

required to give it significant mitigating weight” and (2) the

question of “[h]ow much weight should be given proffered

mitigating factors is a matter within the sound discretion of

the sentencing judge.” Id. at 938. We concluded that these

were “correct statements of the law.” Id. at 944. We also

affirmed the ruling that “a difficult family background is not

always entitled to great weight as a mitigating circumstance,”

and “where the defendant fails to connect his family

background to his criminal conduct, a trial judge could give

it little or no weight or value.” Id. at 944–45.

Here, like in Towery, the Arizona Supreme Court

concluded that “a difficult family background, including

childhood abuse, does not necessarily have substantial

mitigating weight absent a showing that it significantly

affected or impacted the defendant’s ability to perceive,

comprehend, or control his actions.” McKinney, 917 P.2d at

1234. While the Arizona Supreme Court ultimately decided

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 31

that the cumulative weight of the mitigating evidence did not

call for leniency, the court based this conclusion on the

weight assigned to mitigating factors. Nothing in the record

suggests that the Arizona Supreme Court outrightly rejected,

or otherwise did not fully consider, those factors due to a lack

of nexus to the crime. Accordingly, the Arizona Supreme

Court did not apply an unconstitutional nexus test when it

affirmed the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion over the

weight to assign the evidence that it considered.

We reject the dissent’s argument that other Arizona

Supreme Court cases applying an unconstitutional nexus test

demonstrate that the Arizona Supreme Court “followed suit”

in this case. We have formerly rejected the argument that

“the Arizona Supreme Court’s historical use of an

unconstitutional causal nexus test” creates a presumption of

error. See Poyson, 711 F.3d at 1099. Any such presumption

would be especially inappropriate here, because the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that it did not apply an

unconstitutional nexus test.14

McKinney makes much of the Arizona Supreme Court’s

citation to State v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1994). In Ross,

the Arizona Supreme Court stated “[a] difficult family

background is not a relevant mitigating circumstance unless

‘a defendant can show that something in that background had

an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the

defendant’s control.’” Id. at 1363 (emphasis added) (quoting

14 We also reject the dissent’s view that the sentencing court (as distinct

from the Arizona Supreme Court) impermissibly applied a causal nexus

test. As discussed above, the record makes clear that the sentencing court

did not exclude any evidence due to a lack of causal nexus to the crime,

or for any other reason.

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32 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

State v. Wallace, 773 P.2d 983, 986 (Ariz. 1989)). McKinney

argues that the Arizona Supreme Court’s citation to Ross

demonstrates that it held the mitigation evidence irrelevant

and unconstitutionally excluded it for its lack of causal nexus

to the crime.

We reject this argument, just as we rejected a similar

argument in Towery, where the Arizona Supreme Court

supported its decision with a citation to Wallace. See Towery,

673 F.3d at 946. While the Towery court deemed Wallace

(and, by extension, Ross) “constitutionally suspect,” this does

not end the analysis. See id. We must review the record in

McKinney’s case to determine whether the sentencing court

and the Arizona Supreme Court actually applied the

unconstitutional test. See id. For the reasons stated above,

we conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court did not apply an

unconstitutional nexus test, notwithstanding the citation to

Ross.15 Thus, McKinney has failed to establish that the

Arizona Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the trial court

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Lockett/Eddings.

CONCLUSION

The district court properly denied relief on McKinney’s

“courtroom layout” and Lockett/Eddings claims, because the

Arizona Supreme Court’s decision denying relief was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law or based on an unreasonable

15 At least one Arizona Supreme Court case decided after McKinney

recognizes that McKinney discussed “weighing” the mitigating evidence,

notwithstanding McKinney’s citation to Ross. See State v. Greene,

967 P.2d 106, 118 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc).

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 33

determination of the facts. The district court also properly

denied relief on McKinney’s remaining dual juries and

“shackling”claims, because the claims are procedurally

defaulted.

AFFIRMED.16

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, concurringin part and dissenting

in part:

Because McKinney failed to exhaust the dual juries and

shackling claims, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that

denial of relief on these claims must be upheld. However, I

disagree with its analysis of McKinney’s Eddings claim1

and,

therefore, dissent from Part III of the majority’s opinion. It

is clear from the record that the sentencing judge improperly

refused to consider the mitigating effect of McKinney’s post

traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) evidence specifically

because the judge concluded that this evidence was not

causally linked to McKinney’s crimes, contrary to the U.S.

Supreme Court’s decisions in Eddings and its progeny. The

Arizona Supreme Court repeated that legal error, resulting in

16 On December 3, 2012, McKinney filed a “Motion to File Late

Supplemental Authorities.” While we see no reason that these authorities

could not have been presented in a 28(j) letter, we nevertheless “grant” the

motion. However, none ofthe authorities referenced provide any basis for

relief under AEDPA.

1 The panel majority agrees that we should address McKinney’s

uncertified Lockett/Eddings claim because the resolution of this issue is

“debatable amongst jurists of reason.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 330 (2003).

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34 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

a decision that “was contrary to . . . clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Further, the Arizona

Supreme Court’s characterization of the sentencing judge’s

decision was factually inaccurate, resulting “in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). McKinney has demonstrated that he

is entitled to habeas relief regardless of whether Eddings

violations are deemed structural error or are reviewed for

harmless error. I would therefore reverse the district court’s

denial of all relief and remand with instructions to grant

McKinney’s habeas petition based on this claim.

I.

It was well established in 1993, when McKinney was

sentenced, that “[j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude

the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither

may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any

relevant mitigating evidence.” Eddings v. Oklahoma,

455 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1982). The Supreme Court has

clarified that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

specifically require the sentencer to fully consider all

mitigating evidence, regardless of the lack of a causal

connection between the evidence and the defendant’s crime

of conviction:

There is no disputing that this Court’s

decision in Eddings requires that in capital

cases the sentencer . . . not be precluded from

considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect

of a defendant’s character or record and any

of the circumstances of the offense that the

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 35

defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence

less than death. Equally clear is the corollary

rule that the sentencer may not refuse to

consider or be precluded from considering any

relevant mitigating evidence. These rules are

now well established . . . .

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added); see

also Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110. In Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37

(2004), the Court explained that such causal “nexus

requirements” are “a test we never countenanced and now

have unequivocally rejected.” Id. at 45 (citing Eddings,

455 U.S. at 114); see also Smith, 543 U.S. at 45 (holding that

it was “plain under [Supreme Court] precedents” that

evidence lacking a “nexus” to the crime of conviction “was

relevant for mitigation purposes”). Accordingly, the

Constitution forbids sentencers in capital cases from refusing

to consider any mitigating evidence on the basis that the

evidence lacks a nexus to a defendant’s crime of conviction.

It was also well established when McKinney was

sentenced that Eddings and its progeny require that the

sentencer give “independent mitigatingweight” to all relevant

mitigating evidence. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110. This has

been a cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence

since Lockett was decided in 1978:

[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all

capital cases from giving independent

mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s

character and record and to circumstances of

the offense proffered in mitigation creates the

risk that the death penalty will be imposed in

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36 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

spite of factors which may call for a less

severe penalty. When the choice is between

life and death, that risk is unacceptable and

incompatible with the commands of the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (emphasis added). 

The Court has recognized that the sentencer must perform an

individualized analysis of each piece of relevant mitigating

evidence: “the sentencer must be free to give ‘independent

mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and

record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in

mitigation . . . .’” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (quoting Lockett,

438 U.S. at 605). Supreme Court precedent thus requires the

sentencer to give adequate and independent consideration to

all relevant evidence that a defendant proffers in mitigation

of his crimes.

Finally, the rule announced in Eddings requires that the

sentencer actually consider each independent piece of

relevant mitigating evidence. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113. 

Lockett and Eddings both emphasize the significance of “the

type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors”

required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See

Eddings, 455 U.S. at 105; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606. 

Certainly, the appropriate degree of care or caution that must

be accorded to each independent piece of mitigating evidence

will vary. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

483 (1986) (defining “consider” as “to reflect on: think about

with a degree of care or caution”). However, it is clear that

whether a sentencer “said he did” enough to comply with the

Constitution is irrelevant for constitutional purposes; the true

test is whether the sentencer actually exercised “the type of

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 37

individualized consideration” required by the Constitution. 

Eddings, 455 U.S. at 105.

II.

McKinney argued at sentencing that he should not be

sentenced to death due to his difficult childhood, alcohol

addiction, good behavior while incarcerated, and residual

doubt concerning his role in the offenses. In addition,

McKinney specifically raised his PTSD diagnosis as a

mitigating factor independent of the underlying childhood

trauma he suffered and as a factor to be given separate weight

at sentencing.

As support for imposition of a noncapital sentence,

McKinney presented evidence at sentencing as to what even

the sentencing judge found to be an “extraordinary” and

“traumatic childhood,” which would be “beyond the

comprehension and understanding of most people . . . .” 

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 26, July 23, 1993. McKinney’s sister,

Diana McKinney, and aunt, Susan Sestate, both testified at

length concerning McKinney’s horrific childhood. They

testified that McKinney grew up in extreme poverty, living in

filth, lacking adequate clothing, and suffering constant

physical and emotional abuse, largely at the hands of his

stepmother. He and his three siblings shared a single

bedroom and were expected to do all of the cleaning and

cooking in the home. McKinney consistently arrived at

school poorly dressed, dirty, and covered in welts and bruises

from beatings he received at home. Unsurprisingly,

McKinney ran away repeatedly, appearing at the homes of

relatives and friends bearing signs that he had been beaten. 

The sentencing judge found this testimony credible,

determining that as a child McKinney was “abused, beaten,

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38 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

and deprived of the necessary care, clothing, and parental

love and affection.”

In addition to enduring a horrific childhood, as an adult

McKinney suffered serious psychological problems. At

sentencing, Dr. Mickey McMahon, a clinical psychologist,

testified to his opinion that McKinney suffered from PTSD,

writing in his expert report that McKinney “underwent a

massive amount of neglect and abuse during his

developmental years which in my opinion was sufficient to

create a case of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.” Dr.

McMahon also described numerous ways in which this

disorder could have affected McKinney and impaired his

ability to control his behavior on the nights of the murders. 

Specifically, Dr. McMahon testified that McKinney’s PTSD

may have caused him to have a “reflexive” and “emotional”

response to any confrontation during the burglary, which

could have led to his having “diminished capacity” at the time

of the murders. Dr. McMahon concluded by testifying that he

had no doubt that McKinney suffered from PTSD. In

addition to Dr. McMahon’s testimony that McKinney

suffered from PTSD, another doctor testified on McKinney’s

behalf concerning his below-average intelligence.

Despite this evidence, the sentencing judge refused to

give McKinney’s PTSD diagnosis any weight in mitigation

because McKinney failed to show that the PTSD had any

direct effect on his crimes. In fact, the sentencing judge

declined even to make a finding as to whether McKinney

actually suffered from PTSD because he concluded that this

was irrelevant to his sentencing decision. The sentencing

judge initially discussed McKinney’s PTSD in two sentences,

which, although nearly incoherent, express the view that the

expert’s PTSD diagnosis was, at a minimum, suspect:

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 39

However, in viewingExhibit 3, which defense

introduced and Dr. McMahon acknowledged

either reviewing or relying upon, it appeared

that in reviewing that exhibit that even those

experts who agree that Post-traumatic Stress

Syndrome can result from childhood abuse

and be a lingering problem of individuals who

have been abused, beaten and deprived of the

necessarycare, clothing, and parental love and

affection that Mr. McKinneywas – obviously,

through the testimony, was deprived of in this

case – nevertheless have concluded as Dr.

McMahon indicated, there was a cognitive

impairment of the defendant. There was no

evidence presented of any organic brain

damage or disease of the defendant; that in

Exhibit 3, it appears at least in the sample of

individuals in that case and comparing those

individuals with cognitive impairment, with

abuse, where there was not psychotic episodes

or neurological damage to a defendant, where

at least two or three of those things were

present, that if only cognitive impairment and

abuse were present, if there was nothing

significantlysignificant in the violent offenses

expected to be committed by those

individuals, the experts found that there was

no significant difference between an

individual with cognitive impairment who

suffered with child abuse with no history of

cognitive abuse or those who had only been

abused or only had a cognitive deficit.

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 27–28, July 23, 1993.

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Exhibit 3, to which the sentencing judge refers, is a paper

prepared in 1989 by researchers at the New York University

School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, which

attempts to predict which violent delinquents will go on to

commit adult aggressive offenses. Dorothy Otnow Lewis,

M.D. et al., Toward a Theory of the Genesis of Violence: A

Follow-up Study of Delinquents, 28 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD &

ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 431 (1989). The paper concludes

that “a constellation of interacting clinical and environmental

variables is a far better predictor of future violent behavior

than is early aggression alone.” Id. at 436. In this passage of

the sentencing transcript, the sentencing judge is stating that

because there was no evidence that McKinney suffered

certain of the clinical variables identified in the paper, i.e. a

psychotic episode or neurological damage, there was no

correlation between his diagnosis of PTSD and the

commission of his crimes. And because the sentencing judge

so concluded, he unconstitutionally screened out PTSD as a

matter of law, before it could be weighed along with the other

mitigating and aggravating factors. Of course, doing so was

nonsensical as well, because the study only purports to

predict which abused adolescents will become violent adults

who commit murder. At this point, McKinney had been

convicted of two murders, so he had already committed what

the paper describes as “the most serious of crimes.” Id. at

435. The issue for the sentencing judge was not whether

McKinney’s crimes were predictable; it was whether the fact

that McKinney suffered from PTSD reduced his culpability

for the murders—an issue the judge declined to address

because his reading of the study caused him to conclude that

the PTSD diagnosis was not causally related to McKinney’s

crimes.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 41

Having done so, the sentencing judge explicitly declined

to make a finding as to whether McKinney actually suffered

from PTSD, because he viewed this as irrelevant given the

lack of a nexus between the PTSD and McKinney’s crimes:

But, I think more importantly than that,

certainly not trying to dispute him as an

expert on what all that meant, it appeared to

me that Dr. McMahon did not at any time

suggest in his testimony nor did I find any

credible evidence to suggest that, even if the

diagnoses of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome

were accurate in Mr. McKinney’s case, that in

any way significantly impaired Mr.

McKinney’s conduct.

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 28 (emphasis added). If this

articulation of an impermissible nexus test were not clear

enough, the sentencing judge next confirmed that he excluded

the PTSD evidence from his mitigation analysis because there

was no evidence linking the PTSD to McKinney’s criminal

conduct:

[I]t appeared to me that based upon all these

circumstances that there simply was no

substantial reason to believe that even if the

trauma that Mr. McKinney had suffered in

childhood had contributed to an appropriate

diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome

that it in any way affected his conduct in this

case.

Id. at 29. The sentencing judge reaffirmed for a third time

that he excluded the PTSD diagnosis from his consideration

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42 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

of whether to sentence McKinney to life or death because he

did not believe this evidence had a causal relationship with

McKinney’s crimes under Arizona’s death penalty statute:

I’ve determined that even though there may

be some evidence by Dr. McMahon that

would demonstrate under [Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 13–751](G)(1) a capacity by the

defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of

conduct, it was not significantly impaired,

either by the use of drugs, alcohol or the

possibility of a diagnosis of Post-traumatic

Stress Syndrome.

Id. at 30. There can be no doubt that the sentencing judge

disposed of McKinney’s PTSD diagnosis by concluding that

its validitywas irrelevant because the lack of a nexus between

the PTSD and McKinney’s criminal conduct made it

nonmitigating as a matter of law. As discussed more fully

below, McKinney presented this evidence for two reasons: to

suggest that he had diminished capacity on the night of the

murders and to demonstrate that he was less culpable for his

crimes than someone who did not suffer from PTSD. The

sentencing judge addressed the first argument, finding that

McKinney’s capacity was not diminished. However, he

failed to address whether the PTSD diagnosis had any impact

on McKinney’s culpability for his crimes. This serious

Eddings/Lockett error violated the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 43

III.

On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court2agreed with

the sentencing judge that the absence of a causal relationship

between McKinney’s PTSD diagnosis and his crimes

rendered this evidence nonmitigating as a matter of law.

Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was “contraryto

. . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). In addition, the Arizona Supreme Court failed

to accurately describe or analyze the sentencing judge’s

rationale in sentencing McKinney. As a result, the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision also was “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). These legal and factual errors satisfy

§ 2254(d), entitling McKinney to habeas relief under

AEDPA.

First, the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion repeats the

sentencing judge’s unconstitutional treatment of McKinney’s

PTSD diagnosis:

[T]he record shows that the judge gave full

consideration to McKinney’s childhood and

the expert testimony regarding the effects of

that childhood, specifically the diagnosis of

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

2 As Judge Thomas makes eminently clear in his dissent in Poyson v.

Ryan, 711 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013), “At the time it decided this case, the

Arizona Supreme Court applied a causal nexus test similar to the one the

U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Tennard [v. Dretke, 542 U.S.

274 (2004)].” Poyson, 711 F.3d at 1105 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing

Arizona cases).

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Assuming the diagnoses were correct, the

judge found that none of the experts testified

to, and none of the evidence showed, that such

conditions in any way significantly impaired

McKinney’s ability to conform his conduct to

the law.

State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214, 1234 (Ariz. 1996)

(emphasis added). In doing so, the court agreed with the

sentencing judge that McKinney’s PTSD evidence was

nonmitigating as a matter of law because McKinney failed to

show a relationship between the diagnosis and his crimes. As

discussed above, this was contrary to then-clearly established

constitutional law and therefore meets the requirements of

§ 2254(d)(1).3

Second, the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was based

on two independent “unreasonable determination[s] of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Contrary to the court’s

3

In concluding that the “Arizona Supreme Court did not apply an

unconstitutional nexus test to McKinney’s mitigating evidence,” the

majority fails to distinguish between Arizona’s unconstitutional treatment

of McKinney’s PTSD diagnosis and its permissible treatment of other

mitigation evidence. However, we have never held that a state’s

permissible treatment of some mitigation evidence can somehow “cure”

the unconstitutional treatment of other mitigating evidence. Nor could we

have, as Eddings and Lockett make clear that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments require that all relevant evidence must be given

“independent mitigating weight.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (emphasis

added). Therefore, it is irrelevant for constitutional purposes that the

sentencing judge adequately considered some of McKinney’s mitigation

evidence; that he failed to adequately consider independently the PTSD

diagnosis is sufficient to establish that McKinney is entitled to habeas

relief.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 45

bald statements, the sentencing judge never “gave full

consideration to” McKinney’s PTSD diagnosis as a possible

mitigating factor favoring a life sentence over death. 

McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234. In fact, while the sentencing

judge did quite a bit of talking about PTSD, much of this

discussion related to the predictive analysis in Exhibit 3 as his

reason for screening out the PTSD diagnosis as a mitigating

factor, and refusing to weigh it with other relevant factors. 

Certainly, nothing in the record indicates that the sentencing

judge exercised “the type of individualized consideration of

mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 105 (quoting Lockett,

438 U.S. at 606). Instead, the sentencing judge only

“considered” McKinney’s PTSD evidence in the sense that he

determined that there was no causal relationship between it

and McKinney’s crimes. As discussed above, this is

insufficient under Eddings and Lockett. Thus, the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision was based on the unreasonable

factual determination that the sentencing judge fully

considered McKinney’s PTSD evidence as a mitigating

factor. This factual error satisfies § 2254(d)(2).

The Arizona Supreme Court’s second unreasonable

factual determination concerns the sentencing judge’s refusal

to accept McKinney’s PTSD diagnosis for sentencing

purposes. While the sentencing judge expressly declined to

determine whether McKinney suffered from PTSD on the

basis that the question was irrelevant to his sentencing

determination, the Arizona Supreme Court incorrectly stated

that the sentencing judge “assum[ed] the diagnoses were

correct” when sentencing McKinney. McKinney, 917 P.2d at

1234. However, as set forth above, the record contradicts this

statement. In fact, the sentencing judge specifically declined

to make a finding on this point on the grounds that “even if

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46 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

the diagnoses of [PTSD] were accurate in Mr. McKinney’s

case, [I do not believe that it] in any way significantly

impaired Mr. McKinney’s conduct.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at

28, July 23, 1993; see also id. at 30 (“[E]ven though there

may be some evidence [demonstrating] a capacity by the

defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct [sic], it

was not significantly impaired [by] the possibility of a

diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome.”(emphasis

added)). Thus, the sentencing judge never accepted the

diagnosis as correct. Instead, he did not believe it was

necessary to determine whether McKinney suffered from

PTSD because the absence of a causal relationship between

the PTSD and McKinney’s crimes rendered this evidence

nonmitigating as a matter of law. Given this, the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision was based on two “unreasonable

determination[s] of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d)(2).

While unconstitutional, the Arizona courts’ inconsistent

treatment of McKinney’s childhood and PTSD mitigation

evidence is explicable as consistent with then-operative

Arizona state law. Section 13-751 of the Arizona Revised

Statutes sets forth the factors which permissibly may be

considered as mitigating under state law. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 13-751(G)(1). At the time, § 13-751(G)(1) permitted

sentencers to give mitigating effect to mental impairments,

such as PTSD, only when “[t]he defendant’s capacity to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly

impaired but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to

prosecution.” Given the language of this statute, it is not

surprising that both Arizona courts’ decisions track that

language when discussing McKinney’s PTSD evidence. Just

compare the sentencing judge’s statement that “even if the

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 47

diagnoses of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome were accurate

in Mr. McKinney’s case, [I do not believe] that in any way

significantly impaired Mr. McKinney’s conduct,” and the

Arizona Supreme Court’s statement that “none of the

evidence showed . . . that such conditions in any way

significantly impaired McKinney’s ability to conform his

conduct to the law,” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234, with the

language of § 13-751(G)(1). Further, as discussed above, the

sentencing judge went so far as to make his reliance on § 13-

751(G)(1) explicit, stating that McKinney’s PTSD evidence

was irrelevant because “even though there may be some

evidence . . . that would demonstrate under (G)(1) a capacity

by the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct,

it was not significantly impaired [by] the possibility of a

diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome.” Sentencing

Hr’g Tr. at 30, July 23, 1993.

It was not until 2006, over a decade after McKinney was

sentenced, that the Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged

that the United States Constitution required it to construe

§ 13-751(G)(1)’s nexus requirement as useful to only the

determination of how much weight to give mitigating

evidence—as opposed to excluding it from consideration. 

See Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 723 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing

State v. Newell, 132 P.3d 833, 849 (Ariz. 2006)). However,

prior to 2006, Arizona state courts routinely imposed an

unconstitutional nexus requirement on mental impairments. 

See, e.g., Williams v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2010)

(finding a constitutional violation where Arizona courts

refused to consider drug use as mitigating due to lack of a

nexus); Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008)

(per curiam)(finding a constitutional violation where Arizona

courts refused to consider PTSD evidence as mitigating due

to lack of a nexus). We can infer from the Arizona state

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48 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

courts’ pre-2006 treatment of mental impairment mitigation

evidence in capital sentencings that the Arizona state courts

here simply followed suit. However, regardless of the

explanation for the Arizona Supreme Court’s various factual

and legal errors, these constitutional violations establish that

McKinney is entitled to habeas relief under AEDPA. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

IV.

There is no question that McKinney’s PTSD evidence is

“relevant mitigating evidence” for constitutional purposes. 

Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114; see also Tennard v. Dretke,

542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (“[T]he meaning of relevance is no

different in the context of mitigating evidence introduced in

a capital sentencing proceeding than in any other context, and

thus the general evidentiary standard—any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence—applies.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has

confirmed that disorders like PTSD are relevant for

mitigation purposes:

[E]vidence about the defendant’s background

and character is relevant because of the belief,

long held by this society, that defendants who

commit criminal acts that are attributable to a

disadvantaged background, or to emotional

and mental problems, may be less culpable

than defendants who have no such excuse.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 49

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted) abrogated on other

grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

We have also specifically held that PTSD evidence is

relevant mitigation evidence. See Styers, 547 F.3d at 1035. 

In Styers, we granted a habeas petition when the Arizona

courts refused to consider PTSD mitigation evidence under

circumstances virtually identical to those presented here. 

Styers, convicted of murder, had produced evidence at

sentencing that he suffered from PTSD. Id. The Styers

sentencing judge refused to consider the evidence on the basis

that “two doctors who examined defendant could not connect

defendant’s condition to his behavior at the time of the

conspiracy and the murder.” Id. (citing State v. Styers, 865

P.2d 765 (Ariz. 1993)). As in the present appeal, the Arizona

Supreme Court in Styers ignored this language, instead

asserting, like here, that the sentencing judge had “considered

all of the proffered mitigation.” Id. (citing Styers, 865 P.2d

at 778). However, unlike the majority here, in Styers, we

refused to accept this conclusory statement as dispositive. Id.

Instead, we recognized that the Arizona courts had failed to

weigh Styers’s PTSD as evidence in mitigation on the basis

that the experts did not connect the PTSD to his behavior at

the time of the murder. Id. We held that the Arizona court

had applied an unconstitutional “nexus test to conclude that

Styers’s post traumatic stress disorder did not qualify as

mitigating evidence,” and granted Styers’s petition on the

ground that this was “directly contrary to the constitutional

requirement that all relevant mitigating evidence be

considered by the sentencing body.” Id.

Here, as in Styers, the State of Arizona has sentenced an

individual to death without complying with the constitutional

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50 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

requirement that the sentencer adequately consider “any

relevant mitigating evidence.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114. In

both cases, the Arizona courts refused to consider the

mitigating impact of PTSD evidence because the defendant

failed to establish a causal relationship between the disorder

and his criminal conduct. However, unlike the majority here,

in Styers we correctly recognized that this legal error was

contrary to clearly established constitutional law, and granted

habeas relief accordingly. I would grant McKinney relief on

the Eddings/Lockett claim. It is abundantly clear on this

record that McKinney is entitled to a new sentencing

proceeding in which the sentencer actually considers his

PTSD diagnosis as a mitigating factor as required by the

Constitution.

V.

Whether McKinney must also demonstrate actual

prejudice for the writ to issue is an unsettled question in the

Ninth Circuit. Historically, we have treated Eddings errors as

structural, granting the writ without inquiring as to the

likelihood of a different sentencing result. See, e.g.,

Williams, 623 F.3d 1258; Styers, 547 F.3d 1026; see also

Stokley v. Ryan, 705 F.3d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 2012) (Paez, J.,

dissenting). However, recently a panel of our Court refused

to grant the writ despite assuming that an Eddings error had

occurred at the state level. Stokley, 705 F.3d at 405. Instead,

the panel examined whether the petitioner could demonstrate

actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619

(1993). Stokley, 705 F.3d at 403–05. Concluding that the

petitioner could not do so, the panel refused to grant the writ. 

Id. Despite this, the Stokley panel majority stopped well short

of overruling our precedent, which, in any event, it was

without the power to do. See United States v. Parker,

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 51

651 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Only the

en banc court can overturn a prior panel precedent.”); see also

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding that a three-judge panel “may reexamine normally

controlling circuit precedent” only “where the reasoning or

theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable

with the reasoning or theoryof intervening higher authority”). 

As a result, Stokley has created an intra-circuit split

concerning whether Eddings errors are structural or are

reviewed for actual prejudice. Absent an en banc call to

correct this issue, I would maintain the uniformity of our

prior precedents by remaining faithful to the numerous cases

that have treated Eddings/Lockett errors as structural, and not

following the one outlier decision that failed to do so. See,

e.g., Williams, 623 F.3d 1258.

However, even assuming that Eddings/Lockett violations

are reviewed for “actual prejudice,” I would conclude that the

Eddings/Lockett error in this case had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence” upon the sentencer’s decision. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 627. The Brecht standard examines

whether the constitutional error substantially influenced the

outcome of a case:

[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after

pondering all that happened without stripping

the erroneous action from the whole, that the

judgment was not substantially swayed by the

error, it is impossible to conclude that

substantial rights were not affected. The

inquiry cannot be merely whether there was

enough to support the result, apart from the

phase affected by the error. It is rather, even

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so, whether the error itself had substantial

influence.

Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 454 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). 

“Where the record is so evenly balanced that a judge ‘feels

himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the

error’ and has ‘grave doubt about whether an error affected a

jury [substantially and injuriously], the judge must treat the

error as if it did so.’” Id. (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch,

513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995)) (alteration in original) (internal

quotations omitted).

McKinney has argued that he is entitled to a new

sentencing proceeding because the sentencing judge’s failure

to appropriately consider his PTSD diagnosis resulted in a

death sentence when a life sentence was called for based on

his lessened culpability. Here, McKinney’s sentence was

“substantially swayed” by the sentencing judge’s error. 

Merolillo, 663 F.3d at 454. A sentencer who appropriately

considered all the relevant mitigating evidence as required by

Lockett could easily have concluded on the basis of Dr.

McMahon’s testimony that McKinney’s PTSD was a

substantial mitigating factor. Instead, the sentencing judge’s

unconstitutional refusal to consider the effect of McKinney’s

PTSD on his culpability for his crimes “creates the risk that

the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which

may call for a less severe penalty.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. 

Given the significant non-PTSD mitigation evidence that

McKinney presented at sentencing, it cannot be said “with

fair assurance” that a sentencer who also appropriately

considered the PTSD evidence would have sentenced

McKinney to death. Merolillo, 663 F.3d at 454. I would

therefore reverse the district court and remand with

 Case: 09-99018, 09/16/2013, ID: 8782784, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 52 of 53
MCKINNEY V. RYAN 53

instructions to grant McKinney’s habeas petition, and to

require that the state court hold a new sentencing hearing

within ninety days.

 Case: 09-99018, 09/16/2013, ID: 8782784, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 53 of 53