Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01272/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01272-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MICHAEL R. INGRAM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FEB 1 31991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs.· 

H. GANTZ; T. GALLARDO, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 90-1272 

(D.C. No. 89-Z-1460) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Plaintiff-appellant Michael R. Ingram, a state prisoner, 

appeals prose from the district court's dismissal of his 42 

u.s.c. S 1983 action against Colorado court personnel. On appeal, 

he challenges the district court's finding that his action was 

time-barred and its referral of the case to a United States 

Magistrate Judge. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-1272 Document: 010110099962 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 1 
I. 

In 1986, plaintiff allegedly brought two actions in Colorado 

state court seeking misdemeanor summonses against state 

corrections employees pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. S 16-2-105 

(1986). See rec. vol. I, doc. 2. According to plaintiff, the 

state trial court dismissed his complaints, whereupon he filed a 

notice of appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 3. 

Plaintiff alleged that on August 25, 1986, he received a letter 

from Defendant Gantz informing him that in order to file his 

notice of appeal he either had to pay a $150 filing fee or else 

file a motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. Id. at 

3(a). On September 22, 1986, plaintiff claims to have received a 

letter from Defendant Gallardo declining to prepare the record for 

appeal until he either paid his filing fee or else moved for leave 

to appeal in forma pauperis. Id. at 3(b). 

On August 25, 1989, plaintiff filed the instant 42 u.s.c. 

S 1983 action alleging that requiring him to file a motion to 

proceed on appeal in forma pauperis when he already had been 

accorded such status by the trial court constituted an 

unconstitutional violation of his right to court access. 

Plaintiff sought $6,000 compensatory and punitive damages as well 

as declaratory relief. The district court adopted the magistrate 

judge's recommendation that plaintiff's action be dismissed as 

untimely filed. See rec. vol. I, docs. 7 & 8. 

When a plaintiff brings a civil rights action against state 

authorities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, the state's general or 

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residual statute of limitations for tort actions applies. Owens 

v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 248-51 (1989). Colorado imposes a twoyear statute of limitations for civil actions against public or 

governmental employees, actions resting upon liability created by 

federal statute where no federal limitation is provided, and all 

other actions for which no limitation period is specified. Colo. 

Rev. Stat. SS 13-80-102(f)-(i) (1987). Section 13-80-102 became 

effective July 1, 1986. Tenney v. Flaxer, 727 P.2d 1079, 1081 n.3 

(Colo. 1986) (citing 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws. 695, 706). 

In the instant case, the conduct giving rise to plaintiff's 

S 1983 claim took place in August and September of 1986. 

Consequently, plaintiff's cause of action was governed by 

Colorado's two-year limitations period. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 

S 13-80-102. Moreover, plaintiff's complaint failed to allege 

that the conduct complained of was part of an ongoing practice 

which continued past August, 1987-. Thus, plaintiff was not 

entitled to have the two-year statute of limitations tolled on a 

continuing violation theory. See Corbitt v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 

1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 1985). 

II. 

A district court may designate a United States Magistrate to 

conduct hearings and submit dispositional recommendations on 

"prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement." 28 

U.S.C. S 636(b)(l)(B). In Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1246 (10th 

Cir. 1990), an opinion released after the district court's 

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dismissal of plaintiff's action, this court adopted a narrow 

definition of confinement conditions for purposes of 

S 636(b)(l) (B): 

Conditions of confinement have been described as 

"ongoing prison practices and regulations with regard to 

matters such as placement in maximum security, 

deadlocks, unhealthy living conditions, unnecessary 

exposure to violence-prone inmates, overcrowded physical 

environments, and cruel or unusual punishment by prison 

authorities." 

Id. at 1429 (quoting Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th 

Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., concurring)). But see McCarthy v. 

Bronson, 906 F.2d 835, 839 (2d Cir. 1990) (prisoner actions 

alleging specific episodes of unconstitutional conduct challenge 

"conditions of confinement" under S 636(b)(l)(B) and may be 

referred to magistrate judge), cert. granted, 111 s. Ct. 587 

(1990). Plaintiff's allegation that he was denied access to the 

Colorado courts plainly falls outside this restrictive definition, 

thus barring referral of his cause to a magistrate under 

S 636(b)(l)(B). See Clark, 914 F.2d at 1431. Nor can the 

magistrate's handling of this case be upheld under 28 U.S.C. 

S 636(c) as the record does not show that plaintiff consented to 

such handling. See id. The district court consequently erred 

when it referred plaintiff's case to a magistrate judge pursuant 

to S 636(b)(l)(B). However, because plaintiff's action clearly is 

barred by the statute of limitations, no purpose would be served 

by a remand. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 

& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755-57 (1986) (courts not required 

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to remand in futility). 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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