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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

EDWARD RAGELIS, JR. 

 PLAINTIFF

V.

THEODORE HAASE, individually 

and in his official capacity;

CHARLES “DOC” HOLLADAY, 

individually and in his official 

capacity; PULASKI COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; and ERIC 

HIGGINS, in his official capacity, 

 DEFENDANTS

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 CASE NO. 4:19CV00166 SWW

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Edward Ragelis, Jr. (“Ragelis”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, claiming that Defendants Theodore Hasse (“Hasse”), a Pulaski County 

Sheriff’s Office (“PCSO”) officer, and Charles “Doc” Holladay (“Holladay”), a 

former Pulaski County Sheriff, caused him to be wrongfully arrested and subjected 

to excessive force in violation of the United States Constitution. Ragelis sues 

Hasse and Holladay in their individual and official capacities, and his official 

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capacity claims are claims against Pulaski County.1 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 

159, 165 (1985). Ragelis also brings a supplemental state law claim against Hasse.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 17, 18, 

19], Ragelis’s response in opposition [ECF No. 22], and Defendants’ reply [ECF 

No. 25]. After careful consideration, and for reasons that follow, Defendants’ 

motion is granted. 

I. Summary Judgment Standard 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a 

moving party must demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once

the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the 

non-moving party must “do more than simply show there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)

 

1

Ragelis names defendant Eric Higgins, the current Pulaski County Sheriff, but he sues Higgins 

in his official capacity only. Ragelis also names the Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office as a 

defendant, but a sheriff’s office is not a person or entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

See Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the West 

Memphis Police Department and Paramedic Services are departments or subdivisions of the city 

government and not separate jurisdictional entities).

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The non-moving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his 

pleading but must come forward with ‘specific facts showing a genuine issue for 

trial. Id. at 587. “[A] genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a dispute 

of fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the 

dispute is genuine, that is, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.” 

RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995). 

II. Background 

 On May 10, 2017, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Ragelis, Charlotte Davis 

(“Davis”), and Dustin Thomas (“Thomas”) were inside Ragelis’s residence in 

Sherwood, Arkansas. Davis lived at the residence with Ragelis, and one of her two 

sons had recently died. Thomas, Davis’s remaining son, had been staying at the 

residence for a few days following his brother’s death. According to Ragelis’s 

affidavit and deposition testimony, Thomas had been drinking and began cursing at 

his mother, and he refused Ragelis’s orders to leave his property. Ragelis further 

testifies that when he intervened and attempted to defuse the situation, Thomas 

approached him in anger and invaded his personal space. At some point, Ragelis 

called 911 and reported that Thomas had a firearm. 

 Hasse was the first PCSO officer to arrive at the scene. When he arrived, 

Ragelis was standing outside, near his garage, and Thomas and Davis were in the 

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driveway, near a vehicle. Hasse determined that there was no firearm at the scene, 

and he and PCSO deputies Johnathan Parker (“Parker”) and Dennis Atkins, who 

arrived at the scene after Hasse, interviewed Ragelis, Davis, and Thomas. Each 

witness told the officers, among other things, that Ragelis had twice grabbed 

Thomas by his shirt collar and pinned him to the ground. The officers also 

observed that Thomas had red scratch marks on his neck, and Ragelis had a scrape 

on his elbow. Parker arrested Ragelis on charges of domestic battery in the third 

degree and placed him in handcuffs, and Ragelis was transported to the Pulaski 

County Regional Detention Facility. The charges against Ragelis were eventually 

nolle prossed. Subsequently, Ragelis filed a complaint with the PCSO against 

Hasse, charging wrongful arrest. Following an internal investigation, the PSCO 

determined that Hasse’s actions were proper.

III. Discussion 

 For his individual-capacity claims against Hasse, Ragelis charges that Hasse, 

not Parker, made the decision to arrest him without probable cause, in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment. Ragelis further charges that Hasse directed Parker to 

handcuff him behind his back, despite Ragelis’s request to be handcuffed in front.

According to Ragelis, the handcuffs were painful and too tight, which amounted to 

excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. For his individual-capacity 

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claims against Holladay, Ragelis claims that the former sheriff failed to properly 

train and supervise Hasse, which caused him to suffer a deprivation of 

constitutional rights. Finally, for his official-capacity claims, Ragelis charges that 

the County’s policies and customs were the moving force behind his Fourth 

Amendment deprivations.2

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that 

(1) Hasse is entitled to qualified immunity, (2) Ragelis fails to allege facts to 

support a claim against Holladay, and (3) Ragelis’s claims against the County must 

fail for lack of an underlying constitutional violation and/or evidence of an official 

policy, practice, or custom. The Court will address each argument separately.

 

2

With his amended complaint, Ragelis claims that his arrest also violated the substantive portion 

of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Ragelis does not pursue this claim in 

opposition to summary judgment, but to the extent that he has not abandoned it, the Court finds 

that the Due Process Clause have no application in this case. “Where a particular amendment 

provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of 

government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due 

process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 

(1989). When an officer allegedly makes a warrantless arrest without probable cause or uses 

excessive force in making an arrest, the text of the Fourth Amendment, which addresses 

unreasonable searches and seizures, provides the pertinent source of constitutional protection. 

Id. If a plaintiff cannot prevail under the Fourth Amendment’s standards, “it is a certainty he 

cannot win it under the seemingly more burdensome, and clearly no less burdensome, [shockthe-conscience] standard that must be met to establish a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 

process claim.” Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2000).

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A. Individual Capacity Claim Against Hasse: Wrongful Arrest 

 In analyzing Hasse’s claim to qualified immunity, the Court considers 

whether the allegations, viewed in a light most favorable Ragelis, demonstrate that 

Hasse’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and if so, whether the constitutional 

right was “clearly established” at the time in question, such that a reasonable 

person in Hasse’s position would have known his or her actions were 

unconstitutional. Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 2013). 

“‘Qualified immunity is appropriate only if no reasonable factfinder could answer 

yes to both of these questions.’” Id.(quoting Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 

522, 528 (8th Cir.2009). For reasons that follow, the Court finds that Hasse did 

not violate Ragelis’s constitutional rights, and he is therefore entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

 “A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it is 

supported by probable cause, and an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if 

there is at least ‘arguable probable cause.’” Gilmore v. City of Minneapolis, 837 

F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2016)(quoting Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 522-23 

(8th Cir. 2011)(quoting Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 

2005)). An officer has probable cause when the totality of the circumstances at the 

time of the arrest are enough to lead a reasonable person to believe that the 

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defendant has committed or is committing an offense. Id. “If an officer arrests a 

suspect under the mistaken belief that there is probable cause, arguable probable 

cause exists ‘if the mistake is objectively reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Borgman, 646

F.3d at 523)(quoting Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir. 2008)). 

 At the time of Ragelis’s arrest, Arkansas law provided that a person commits 

domestic battery in the third degree if: 

 (1) With the purpose of causing physical injury to a family or household 

 member, the person causes physical injury to a family or household member; 

(2) The person recklessly causes physical injury to a family or 

household member; 

(3) The person negligently causes physical injury to a family or 

household member by means of a deadly weapon; or 

(4) The person purposely causes stupor, unconsciousness, or physical 

or mental impairment or injury to a family or household member by 

administering to the family or household member, without the family 

or household member's consent, any drug or other substance. 

Ark. Code Ann. 5-26-305(a)(1)-(3). A “family or household member” under the 

statute includes “[p]ersons who presently or in the past have resided or cohabitated 

together,” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-302(F), and “family or household member” 

status does not require cohabitation at the time of the battery, nor does it require 

cohabitation for a certain length of time. See Wheeler v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 

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540, 8, 532 S.W.3d 602, 608 (2017)(citing Williams v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 287, 

at 2, 524 S.W.3d 5, 7 (2017)).

 It is undisputed that when Ragelis called 911, Thomas had been staying at

Ragelis’s residence for a few days. In deposition, Ragelis recalled that he told 

Hasse that in the past, Thomas had come to stay for two days, “and two days 

turned into two weeks . . . until [Ragelis] mentioned the four-letter word—r-e-n-t . 

. . . ”3

 It is also undisputed that Thomas, Davis, and Ragelis each told the 

responding officers that Ragelis had grabbed Thomas by the collar and pinned him 

to the ground two times. Additionally, the officers observed that Thomas had two 

red scratch marks on his throat and that Ragelis had a scraped elbow.

 The Court finds that the undisputed facts show that the totality of the 

circumstances known to Hasse at the time of the arrest gave him an objectively 

reasonable basis to believe that Ragelis had either purposely or recklessly caused 

physical injury to Thomas, who qualified as a “family or household member.” 

 Ragelis makes four arguments in opposition to summary judgment. First, he 

insists that this is a classic case of “he said, she said.” It is true that Ragelis and 

Thomas gave Hasse different accounts of what happened. Thomas told the officers 

 

3

ECF No. 22, at 104 (Ragelis Dep. at 69).

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that after Ragelis pinned him to the ground inside the house, he managed to break 

free and run outside, but Ragelis chased him to the garage, where he forced him to 

the ground a second time. Davis confirmed Thomas’s account of events. Ragelis, 

on the other hand, recalled that Thomas refused to leave the property and 

continued to shout obscenities from the garage, which caused Ragelis to take 

Thomas to the ground a second time. These conflicting statements could not be 

resolved at the scene, and they did not negate probable cause to arrest Ragelis. 

Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523 (8th Cir. 2011)(citing Amrine, 522 F.3d 823, 832–33 

(8th Cir. 2008))(“When an officer is faced with conflicting information that cannot 

be immediately resolved, . . . he may have arguable probable cause to arrest a 

suspect.”).

 Second, Ragelis claims that Hasse demonstrated unprofessional conduct at 

the scene and that he was determined, no matter what, to arrest someone. 

According to Ragelis, when Hasse arrived, he was very aggressive and said he 

would make an arrest based on who had the most scars. Ragelis states that he told 

Hasse that he was merely defending himself, but Hasse refused to give any 

consideration to Ragelis’s claim. He further recalls that Hasse referred to Thomas 

as Ragelis’s son and threatened to charge Ragelis with a felony after he discovered 

that Ragelis was a retired military officer with security clearance. Even if Hasse 

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made these statements and behaved unprofessionally, the issue of probable cause is 

an objective question of law, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at 

the scene, and the undisputed facts show that a reasonable officer would have 

probable cause to believe that Ragelis had committed domestic battery. 

 Third, Ragelis argues that no reasonable officer would have arrested him as 

an improper aggressor because the facts showed that he was justified in using force 

to evict Thomas from his property. Ragelis also contends that the circumstances at 

the scene presented “a classic, simple case of self-defense.” In making a probable 

cause determination, an officer cannot ignore or avoid plainly exculpatory 

evidence, but he need not conduct a “mini-trial” before making an arrest. See

Kuehl v. Burtis et al., 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir.1999). Here, the responding 

officers interviewed all witnesses at the scene, and Thomas’s and Davis’s report of 

events was that Ragelis pursued, physically overpowered, and injured Thomas 

even as he was attempting to exit the residence. Furthermore, nothing in the record 

indicates that Hasse turned a blind eye to plainly exculpatory evidence.

 Fourth, Ragelis attempts to graft state-law arrest limitations onto the Fourth 

Amendment probable cause requirement. He argues that state law required Hasse 

to consider evidence that “a party to the act of domestic abuse acted in selfdefense[.]” See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-113(c). Additionally, Ragelis argues that 

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Arkansas law required an imminent threat of further injury to support his arrest.4

These arguments are without merit. “[A] police officer who makes an arrest based 

on probable cause but who is prohibited by state law from doing does not violate 

the Fourth Amendment.” Rose v. City of Mulberry, Arkansas, 533 F.3d 678, 680 

(8th Cir. 2008)(citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1607, 170 

L.Ed.2d 559 (2008)). 

B. Individual-Capacity Claim Against Hasse: Excessive Force 

 In support of is excessive force claim, Ragelis alleges that Hasse directed 

Parker to handcuff him behind his back, despite Ragelis’s request to be handcuffed 

in front. By affidavit, Ragelis testifies: 

The handcuffs were put on very tight[,] and they hurt. As I was driven 

to the detention center, some 40 minutes away, the handcuffs got tighter 

and tighter and more painful.5

 Ragelis’s excessive force claim is properly analyzed under the Fourth 

Amendment and its "reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 

395, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). The test is whether the amount of force used was 

objectively reasonable under the circumstances that confronted Hasse. See Littrell 

 

4

Arkansas retains the common law rule permitting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors only if 

the crime occurs in the presence of the officer, but in the case of domestic abuse, a warrantless 

arrest is permissible if, among other things, there is reason to believe that an imminent threat of 

further injury exists. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-106(b)(2)(B).

5

ECF No. 22, at 10.

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v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 583 (8th Cir.2004)(quoting Greiner v. City of Champlin,

27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir.1994)). A court may consider the results of the use of 

force in determining whether a defendant used excessive force, but the degree of 

injury is not dispositive. Instead, the inquiry must focus on whether the force 

applied was reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at 

the time the force was used. Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 906 (8th Cir. 

2011)(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865). 

 Ragelis argues that restraint by handcuffs amounted to excessive force 

because he was calm and cooperative, and Hasse knew that he was a retired 

military officer with top security clearance. However, Hasse had probable cause 

to believe that Ragelis had recently committed domestic abuse in the context of 

heated altercation, and despite Ragelis’s apparent calmness, it was reasonable to 

suspect that he could pose a safety threat. Furthermore, Ragelis does not claim that 

he requested to be handcuffed from the front due to preexisting physical condition, 

nor does he claim that complained that the handcuffs were too tight and caused 

him pain. The undisputed facts show that the use of handcuffs was objectively 

reasonable under the circumstances and did not amount to excessive force. 

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C. Individual-Capacity Claim Against Holladay: Failure to Train

 Holladay served as the Sheriff of Pulaski County at the time of Ragelis’s 

arrest, and Ragelis seeks to hold him liable under a failure-to-train or failure-tosupervise theory. As a threshold matter, a supervisor can be liable under § 1983 

for failure to train or supervise only if that failure caused a constitutional 

deprivation, see Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 

2007), and the undisputed facts in this case fail to show a constitutional violation.

Furthermore, supervisory liability arises only where the supervisor had notice that 

training procedures or supervision were inadequate and likely to result in a 

constitutional violation. See Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 

2001)(quoting Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996)). Ragelis 

neither alleges facts nor comes forward with evidence showing that Holladay was 

on notice that poor training or a lack of supervision was likely to result in wrongful 

arrests or the use of excessive force. The Court finds no genuine issues for trial 

with respect to Ragelis’s individual-capacity claim against Holladay. 

D. Claims Against the County (Official-Capacity Claims) 

It is fundamental that when the underlying conduct does not deprive a 

plaintiff of a federally protected right, an attendant '1983 claim against a 

municipal employer must fail. See Olinger v. Larson, 134 F.3d 1362, 1367 (8th

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Cir. 1998) (AIn light of our ruling that Detective Larson and Chief Satterlee did not 

violate Olinger=s fourth amendment rights, Olinger=s claims against the City . . . 

must also fail.@). Because Ragelis presents no facts showing that his constitutional 

or federally protected rights were violated, his claim against the County must fail. 

E. Supplemental, State Law Claim 

Ragelis alleges that Hasse negligently and recklessly caused him personal 

injuries, and he seeks damages under Arkansas’s crime victim civil liability statute, 

Ark. Code § 16-118-107, which provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person injured 

or damaged by reason of conduct of another person that would constitute a felony 

under Arkansas law.” Because the Court finds no issues for trial with respect to 

claims over which it has original jurisdiction, those claims will be dismissed with 

prejudice, and the Court will dismiss Ragelis’s supplemental state law claim 

without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)(“The district courts may decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has 

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . . ”). 

IV. Conclusion 

 For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 

17] is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims arising under federal law are DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claim is DISMISSED 

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WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Pursuant to the judgment entered together with this 

order, this action is DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 3rd DAY OF MARCH, 2020.

/s/Susan Webber Wright 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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