Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-04084/USCOURTS-ca10-19-04084-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED GOVERNMENT SECURITY 

OFFICERS OF AMERICA 

INTERNATIONAL UNION and UNITED 

GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICERS 

OF AMERICA INTERNATIONAL 

UNION LOCAL 320, 

 Plaintiffs–Appellants, 

v. 

AMERICAN EAGLE PROTECTIVE 

SERVICE CORP. and PARAGON 

SYSTEMS, INC., 

 Defendants–Appellees. 

No. 19-4084 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 2:18-CV-00183-DN)

_________________________________ 

Dennis M. Coyne, McDonald Lamond Canzoneri, Southborough, Massachusetts (Lauren 

I. Scholnick, Strindberg & Scholnick, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the briefs), 

appearing for Appellants. 

Frank D. Davis (Ron Chapman, Jr., with him on the brief), Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, 

Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Dallas, Texas, appearing for Appellees. 

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 21, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Plaintiffs-Appellants United Government Security Officers of America 

International Union and its local, United Government Security Officers of America, 

Local 320 (collectively, the Unions) sued American Eagle Protective Services 

Corporation and Paragon Systems, Inc. (collectively, the Employers) under § 301 of 

the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), seeking declaratory relief under the 

Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and to compel arbitration of a terminated 

employee’s grievance. The district court granted summary judgment to the 

Employers because it determined the six-month statute of limitations from the 

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 10(b) applied to the Union’s claim. 

Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

I 

The Unions are labor organizations and at all relevant times were the exclusive 

bargaining agent in a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the Employers. 

App. at 48–49, 56–78. The Employers terminated Michael Reid, a Salt Lake City 

union member, by letter received on January 6, 2014. Id. at 49, 80.1

 The Unions 

grieved the termination on January 24, 2014, alleging that the member was 

terminated without just cause. Id. at 84. The Employers denied the grievance on 

January 29, 2014, alleging the member was terminated with just cause, id. at 161, and 

 1

 The letter terminating the union member is dated January 3, 2013; the parties 

agree it should read 2014. Aplt. Br. at 6 n.1, Aple. Br. at 2; see also App. at 48. 

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maintained during exchanges throughout June, August, and September 2015, that 

terminations with just cause like the member’s were not subject to arbitration under 

the exceptions listed in the CBA. Id. at 162, 163–64 (“[a]s a result of the plain 

language in the CBA, [the individual in charge of the relevant government contract at 

the Employers] concluded that the decision to discharge Reid was not subject to 

arbitration.”), and 272 n.22. On February 27, 2018, the Unions filed this action 

pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA, seeking to compel arbitration of the grievance of the 

wrongful discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to the Employers, 

ruling that the action was time-barred. 

II 

 Section 301 of the LMRA extends federal jurisdiction to “[s]uits for violation 

of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in 

an industry affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). However, no federal statute of 

limitations expressly applies to LMRA § 301 actions. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). “In such situations . . . our task is to ‘borrow’ 

the most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source.” Id. 

The parties to the present action debate whether a six-year or a six-month 

statute of limitations should apply to a § 301 claim. The Unions contend Utah’s sixyear statute of limitations for breach of contract claims should apply; the Employers 

contend § 10(b) of the NLRA’s six-month period for the filing of unfair labor 

practice claims is more appropriate. “We have generally concluded that Congress 

intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under 

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state law. . . . In some circumstances, however, state statutes of limitations can be 

unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law.” Id. at 158, 161. 

The Supreme Court defined those circumstances in DelCostello. Addressing a 

“hybrid” suit brought by a union member under both § 301 and the NLRA against the 

employer and the union, the Court applied the NLRA’s § 10(b) statute of limitations. 

In determining whether to apply the federal statute of limitations as opposed to a 

state statute of limitations applied in contract cases, the Court held: “[W]hen a rule 

from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state 

statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation 

make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we 

have not hesitated to turn away from state law.” Id. at 172. 

When viewed in context, a claim to compel arbitration is more analogous to 

one brought pursuant to NLRA’s § 10(b) than it is to a state law claim for breach of 

contract. First, the underlying grievance is similar to an unfair labor practice as 

governed by the NLRA,2

 and “because many grievances involve activity that may 

also constitute an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, it 

makes sense to have a common statute of limitations for claims arising under Section 

10(b) and actions to compel arbitration.” Associated Brick Mason Contractors of 

 2

 The Unions, citing 29 U.S.C. § 158, claim that a termination of employment 

under a CBA is “simply a level of discipline,” “not in and of itself an unfair labor 

practice.” Aplt. Br. at 27. While technically accurate with respect to the termination, 

the termination is not the issue: submitting the grievance to arbitration is. As the 

Employers note, the Unions filed a NLRB charge on that point. Aplt. Br. at 3, citing 

App. at 169. 

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Greater N.Y., Inc. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing DelCostello, 

462 U.S. at 171); see also Fed’n of Westinghouse Indep. Salaried Unions v. 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 736 F.2d 896, 902 (3d Cir. 1984) (“grievances often 

involve an alleged activity which is also an unfair labor practice over which the 

National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction . . . Thus it makes a great deal of 

sense to have a common statute of limitations for unfair labor practice charges and 

for suits to compel arbitration.”) (internal citation omitted); McCreedy v. Local 

Union No. 971, UAW, 809 F.2d 1232, 1238 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Just as the employee’s 

unfair representation claim is a creature of labor law, so too, we believe, is a union’s 

action to compel arbitration.”). Second, “[a]rbitration clauses are . . . sui generis and 

cannot, as a matter of federal law, be viewed as equivalent to more ordinary 

contractual provisions for limitation purposes . . . [thus] a suit to compel arbitration is 

not much analogous to a garden-variety suit for breach of contract.” Commc’ns 

Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1137, 1141 (1st Cir. 1988). 

Not only is § 10(b) a closer analogy to an action to compel arbitration, federal 

policies underpinning labor law and the practicalities of litigation weigh in favor of 

applying § 10(b)’s limitations period in cases brought to compel arbitration of a 

grievance. As the Court noted in DelCostello, federal labor policy relies heavily upon 

“grievance, arbitration, and the law of the shop.” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, by seeking to compel arbitration, 

the Unions’ action lies at the heart of federal labor law. See McCreedy, 809 F.2d at 

1238; see also W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d at 1141 (“[A]rbitration clauses in collective 

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bargaining agreements implicate important federal interests not present in ordinary ex 

contractu litigation.”). “[B]ecause it involves a motion to compel arbitration in a 

wrongful discharge case, this case is irrevocably tied to federal labor policy . . . 

There is a strong [federal] policy favoring settlement of labor disputes by private 

arbitration.” United Food & Commercial Workers Local 100A, AFL-CIO & CLC v. 

John Hofmeister & Son, Inc., 950 F.2d 1340, 1348 (7th Cir. 1991). 

In addition, applying a longer breach-of-contract statute of limitations would 

“disserve[] the federal interest in ‘the relatively rapid final resolution of labor 

disputes.’” Aluminum, Brick & Glassworkers Int’l Union Local 674 v. A.P. Green 

Refractories, Inc., 895 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. 

at 168). “When the grievance, as here, is the discharge of a union member, and his 

remedy is arbitration, it is important that the remedy be promptly invoked and 

promptly administered—important to the named parties and especially important to 

the aggrieved employee union member, and to those in management who have had 

direct relationships with the grievant. They all need to know where they stand.” 

Teamsters Union Local 315 v. Great W. Chem. Co., 781 F.2d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 

1986). “Six years is simply too long to allow industrial disputes to fester.” 

Harrington, 820 F.2d at 37; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 736 F.2d at 901 

(“Application of a six-year state statute of limitations stretches out industrial disputes 

far longer than most recent cases have deemed desirable.”). 

Finally, “there is a certain value in achieving uniformity among the federal 

circuits in applying the same time limitations to suits to compel arbitration.” 

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Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 887, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

Federal policy favors that uniformity, and ten other circuits3

 have held that § 10(b) 

applies under these circumstances. 

We conclude § 10(b) is a better fit for actions brought under § 301 than Utah’s 

statute of limitations for breach of contract because § 10(b) is a closer analogy to an 

action to compel arbitration and more aligned with federal labor policy. A six-month 

statute of limitations sets “the proper balance between the national interests in stable 

bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements,” and a party’s right to 

seek a court’s resolution. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (internal citations and 

 3

 These circuits include: the D.C. Circuit, see Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d at 

888; the First Circuit, see W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d at 1145; the Second Circuit, see 

Harrington, 820 F.2d at 37; the Third Circuit, see Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 736 

F.2d at 901; the Fifth Circuit, see A.P. Green Refractories, Inc., 895 F.2d at 1055; the 

Sixth Circuit, see McCreedy, 809 F.2d at 1237; the Seventh Circuit, see John 

Hofmeister & Son, Inc., 950 F.2d at 1347; the Eighth Circuit, see United Rubber, 

Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, CLU, Local 164 v. Pirelli 

Armstrong Tire Corp., 104 F.3d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1997) (“There is no dispute that 

an action to compel arbitration is governed by the 6–month limitations period set 

forth in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,” although this case does not 

analyze the issue); and the Ninth Circuit, see Great W. Chem. Co., 781 F.2d at 769. 

Finally, at least when faced with a lengthy statute of limitations like Utah’s, 

the Eleventh Circuit has also followed the reasoning of other circuits. See Int’l Ass’n 

of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge No. 1688 v. Allied Prod. Corp., 

786 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Because we find that state law affords no 

reasonably applicable rule as to the proper time limitation for the union's action to 

compel arbitration, we adopt the six month limitation period of § 10(b) in this case.”) 

and Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1985), but see 

United Paperworks Int’l, Local No. 395 v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 931 F.2d 832, 838 

(11th Cir. 1991) (applying Florida’s one year contract statute of limitations, largely 

because it only extended the filing period for six additional months).

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quotations omitted). Thus, we conclude that § 10(b)’s six-month statute of limitations 

applies. 

III 

Our prior precedent also aligns with this conclusion. In two previous cases, 

Garcia v. Eidal Int’l Corp., 808 F.2d 717, 719 (10th Cir. 1986) and Trs. of Wyo. 

Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Const. Co. of Wyo., 850 F.2d 

613, 621 (10th Cir. 1988), we have applied a state’s statute of limitations to labor 

cases; but both cases involve true breach-of-contract claims, unlike the arbitration 

dispute presented here. 

In Garcia, the employer in question was trying to avoid the entire CBA—not 

just the arbitration provision. 808 F.2d at 722 (“When the contract has been 

completely repudiated and the employer has closed down its business, the labor law 

policies that persuaded the Court in DelCostello to adopt the uniform six-month 

statute of limitation are not applicable.”). While Garcia mentions “complete” 

repudiation only once, the opinion makes clear that applying the state breach-ofcontract limitations period is only appropriate when the issue is whether the entire 

contract would be repudiated. 808 F.2d at 719 (“We reverse and remand, concluding 

that the holding of DelCostello does not extend to cases in which an employer has 

repudiated all of its obligations under a bargaining agreement, including the duty to 

arbitrate.”). Here, as the Employers note, the CBA was cited as the basis for not 

arbitrating the grievance; which contradicts the Unions’ characterization of the 

Employers’ behavior as “repudiating” the arbitration provision. Thus, Garcia does 

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not govern the fact pattern presented here, where a union seeks to compel arbitration 

of a grievance in accordance with the CBA, and an employer declines to arbitrate on 

the basis of the CBA itself. 

Trs. of Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan presents an even less analogous 

fact pattern. 850 F.2d at 615–17. While again we applied the state statute of 

limitations for breach of contract, the action was brought under the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act, not § 301. The employer did argue that breaching 

the agreement could be an unfair labor practice, and that the six month limitations 

period thus applied under DelCostello. But we made clear that, because “the Trustees 

are not employees, and have not sued the relevant union for a breach of the duty of 

fair representation,” DelCostello did not apply. Id. at 619. 

IV 

Because § 10(b)’s six-month statute of limitations applies and the Unions 

brought suit nearly two years after the Employers’ final refusal to arbitrate the 

grievance, this suit is time-barred. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge 

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