Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_23-cv-00980/USCOURTS-ared-4_23-cv-00980-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

 CENTRAL DIVISION 

PROSPER ATSU AGAKPE PLAINTIFF 

V. CASE NO. 4:23-CV-980 JM 

KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION DEFENDANT 

 ORDER

Plaintiff Prosper Atsu Agakpe brought this pro se employment discrimination case against 

his former employer alleging he was fired as a result of race, national origin, and age discrimination 

in violation of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The parties have both 

moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 41 & 46). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED. Mr. Agakpe’s motion for summary judgment 

(Doc. 46) is DENIED. 

I. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, so 

that the dispute may be decided solely on legal grounds. Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 878 

(8th Cir. 1987), FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The Supreme Court has established guidelines to assist trial 

courts in determining whether this standard has been met: 

The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there 

is a need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual 

issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may 

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that summary judgment should be 

invoked carefully so that no person will be improperly deprived of a trial on disputed factual 

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issues. Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 

444 U.S. 991 (1979). The Eighth Circuit set out the burden of the parties in connection with a 

summary judgment motion in Counts v. M.K. Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1988): 

[T]he burden on the party moving for summary judgment is only to 

demonstrate, i.e., ‘[to] point out to the District Court,’ that the record does 

not disclose a genuine dispute on a material fact. It is enough for the movant 

to bring up the fact that the record does not contain such an issue and to 

identify that part of the record which bears out his assertion. Once this is 

done, his burden is discharged, and, if the record in fact bears out the claim 

that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is then the respondent’s 

burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts, showing that there is 

a genuine dispute on that issue. If the respondent fails to carry that burden, 

summary judgment should be granted. 

Id. at 1339 (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-274 (8th 

Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (brackets in original)). Only disputes over facts that may affect the 

outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

Additionally, the Local Rules of the Eastern District of Arkansas require the party moving 

for summary judgment to file (along with its motion and brief) a “separate, short and concise 

statement of the material facts” stating that there are no disputed facts. LOCAL RULE 56.1(a). These 

facts are deemed admitted when not contested by a separately filed statement of fact. LOCAL RULE

56.1(b)-(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2). Mr. Agakpe did not file this pleading. Rather, it appears 

Mr. Agakpe attempted to oppose Defendant’s statement of facts in the body of his summary 

judgment motion. (Doc. 49). Because Mr. Agakpe has not complied with the local rule, the Court 

will deem Defendant’s statement of fact admitted. 

II. Facts

Defendant Kimberly Clark employed Mr. Agakpe as a process operator at its Maumelle, 

Arkansas mill where it produces various types of Huggies baby wipes. (Doc. 43-1 at 5; Doc. 43-4 

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at 16). Mr. Agakpe, a black man born in Ghana on April 6, 1962, was 60 years old when he began 

working for Defendant on June 13, 2022. (Doc. 43-4 at 3, 11). Mike Cummings (then 53 years 

old) was instrumental in Mr. Agakpe’s hiring and training and served as Mr. Agakpe’s supervisor. 

(Doc. 43-1 at 4, 7–8; Doc. 43-4 at 6). Mr. Agakpe completed his initial on-the-job training on 

September 13, 2022. (Doc. 43-4 at 11). Almost immediately thereafter, however, Mr. Cumming’s 

began receiving reports from Plant Leader Robert Baxter of Mr. Agakpe’s workplace errors. (Doc. 

43-1 at 9). Mr. Baxter complained that Mr. Agakpe required repeated instruction on how to do 

simple tasks for which he had been repeatedly and personally trained to do. (Id.). 

One of Mr. Agakpe’s responsibilities as a process operator included running safety checks 

on the machinery. (Doc. 43-4 at 17). One such check required each shift’s process operator to run 

a small pouch containing metal pieces through the machine that made baby wipes to ensure that 

no metal could end up in the final product. (Id.). This quality check tested whether the machine’s 

metal detectors were in proper working order and was considered vital to the safety of the final 

product. (Doc. No. 43-1 at 42; Doc. 43-4 at 17). 

Mr. Agakpe was required to run the pouch through two “legs” of the machine. (Doc. 43-1 

at 9). Mr. Baxter reported seeing a machine stop after metal was detected and then seeing 

Mr. Agakpe simply reset the machine without first checking the product to ensure no 

contamination. (Doc. 43-1 at 9–10, 20–21). Mr. Baxter coached Mr. Agakpe at the time on the 

correct procedures. (Doc. 43-1 at 9–10). Mr. Baxter also reported witnessing other line mistakes 

due to Mr. Agakpe not paying attention, cutting corners on quality checks, or miscounting and 

weighing samples. (Doc. 43-1 at 11–16, 22–23). For example, Mr. Baxter reported that 

Mr. Agakpe ignored directions to complete a sanitization assignment resulting in more retraining. 

(Doc. 43-1 at 16–17, 23–24). He also reported seeing Mr. Agakpe once take an unauthorized break 

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and also not knowing how to fix equipment. (Doc. 43-1 at 18–19). Mr. Agakpe’s errors were 

witnessed not just by Mr. Baxter but also by Mr. Cummings. Mr. Cummings recalled personally 

coaching Mr. Agakpe after he caused $15,000 of loss when 3,000 cases of product was incorrectly 

produced due to Mr. Agakpe’s errors. (Doc. 43-14 at 26–28). 

At years’ end, each operator receives a performance review. (Doc. 43-1 at 30). Using his 

notes from the previous months, Mr. Cummings drafted Mr. Agakpe’s performance review and 

found that Mr. Agakpe’s overall performance did not meet the company’s standards. (Doc. No. 

43-1 at 30–33; Doc. 43-8). Mr. Cummings stood by the performance review explaining his 

conclusions were supported by Mr. Agakpe’s history of mistakes and continued need for coaching 

and supervision. (Doc. 43-1 at 33–34; Doc. 43-6; Doc. 43-7; Do. 43-9; Doc. 43-10). 

Mr. Cummings met with Mr. Agakpe on February 6, 2023, and together they went over the 

performance review. (Doc. 43-1 at 30). Mr. Cummings informed Mr. Agakpe that he was being 

placed on a Performance Improvement Plan “PIP” requiring a 30-day one-on-one retraining. (Doc. 

43-1 at 30, 36–39; Doc. 43-4 at 11; Doc. 43-8). A specialized trainer was then assigned to work 

with Mr. Agakpe on all aspects of his job and, at the end of each work week, he was required to 

have progress meetings with a team including Mr. Cummings. (Doc. 43-1 at 36; Doc. 43-10). 

Before completion of the PIP retraining, Mr. Agakpe falsified a quality check form and 

was fired as a result. (Doc. 43-1 at 42–43). Specifically, Mr. Agakpe completed a form for a quality 

check he neither witnessed nor performed. The falsification would not have been discovered had 

the metal pouch used in the check not also gone missing. Mr. Cummings recalled that there had 

been a “big quality hold because [the production line] was missing a metal detector pouch.” (Doc. 

43-1 at 41). After investigating the matter, Mr. Cummings discovered that Mr. Agakpe had not 

performed the quality check but completed the form stating that he had done so. (Id. at 41–42). 

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Mr. Cummings had Mr. Agakpe write a statement on the incident and in that statement, 

Mr. Agakpe admitted to the falsification. (Doc. 43-1 at 40; Doc. 43-11). He wrote “I found out that 

the midnight checklist still not filed, without contacting the responsible process operator[,] I went 

ahead and filed the . . . checklist without verifying whether the metal detector test was carried out.” 

(Doc. 43-11). Now, Mr. Agakpe denies falsifying the form. (Doc. 43-4 at 15). Rather, he contends 

he simply completed the form without first determining if the test had been completed—a 

distinction without an apparent difference. (Doc. 43-4 at 15). 

III. Analysis 

 Federal law protects employees from certain types of discrimination. Success on an age 

discrimination claim requires that Mr. Agakpe show: (1) he was at least forty years old; (2) was 

meeting Defendant’s expectations; (3) but nevertheless suffered an adverse employment action; 

and (4) similarly-situated younger employees were treated more favorably. Thomas v. Corwin, 483 

F.3d 516, 528 (8th Cir. 2007); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Likewise, to succeed on a claim of race or 

national origin discrimination, Mr. Agakpe must demonstrate that: “(1) he is a member of a 

protected class; (2) he met the legitimate expectations of his employer; (3) he suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees that were not members of the protected 

class were treated differently.” Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 413 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Mr. Agakpe undisputedly was a member of a protected class and suffered an adverse 

employment action. He, however, offered no direct evidence of discrimination. As a result, his 

claims will be considered under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). If Mr. Agakpe establishes a prima facie case of 

discrimination, then the burden shifts to Defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for its actions. If Defendant satisfies its burden, the burden shifts back to Mr. Agakpe to show 

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Defendant’s proffered reason was pretextual. Thomas, 483 F.3d at 528 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 

411 U.S. at 804). Under this standard, the Court finds that Mr. Agakpe has not shown a prima facie

case of discrimination. 

Mr. Agakpe’s discriminatory firing allegations fail on their face as he has neither shown 

that he was meeting Defendant’s expectations, nor has he identified a single similarly situated 

person—by race, national origin, or age—that was treated differently. Mr. Agakpe was employed 

less than a year. In that time, he received numerous correctives and negligently caused a 

production loss resulting in a finding that he was not consistently performing his job. He then was 

placed on a formal performance improvement plan and given one-on-one daily training. Any of 

these instances could have supported his termination. Further while still on the performance 

improvement plan, Mr. Agakpe signed a quality check form that he did not perform. Given this, 

Mr. Agakpe was plainly not meeting Defendant’s expectations. Even if he were, Mr. Agakpe has 

offered nothing to support his belief that he was fired because of his age, race or national origin. 

He does not name any other employee who was treated differently and, in fact, admits that he never 

heard anyone at work say anything discriminatory or biased based on age, race, or national origin. 

(Doc. 43-4 at 25). In contrast, while not similarly situated in terms of roles within the company, 

Mr. Cummings, who was over forty, recommended Mr. Agakpe for hire. Thus, Mr. Agakpe has 

not met his prima facie burden of discrimination. 

Instead, Mr. Agakpe blames Defendant for his failures. He presses that Defendant was 

required to provide him both an employee handbook and termination letter, and contends that this 

failure evidences discrimination. This is not the law. He further argues that, when he completed 

the quality check, he was following company policy to act proactively to accurately and promptly 

enter data. (Doc. 46 at 3–4, 12–13). Accepting as true that Mr. Agakpe’s motivation was to help 

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the company by completing the form without first verifying whether the quality check had been 

done, he has not shown that the Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing him 

was pretext for discrimination. It is clear that Mr. Agakpe wanted to succeed at his job and believed 

he was doing everything he could to meet Defendant’s expectations. That said, his belief that he 

acted proactively rather than deceptively does not make it so. Mr. Agakpe had no idea whether a 

quality check had been performed but completed a form stating that one had been completed 

successfully. 

It is plain that Mr. Agakpe received a fair amount of feedback on his work and the need to 

improve. He has not, however, shown that the feedback was motivated by a racial or age animus 

or that other similarly situated employees did not receive the same sort of advice and questioning. 

See Anderson v. Durham D&M, LLC, 606 F.3d 513, 519 (8th Cir. 2010). In sum, nothing in 

Mr. Agakpe’s papers support his allegations that he was fired because of his race, age, or national 

origin. Rather, Defendant fired him for cause. Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, at 935 

(8th Cir. 2006) (“violating a company policy is a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for 

terminating an employee”). 

IV. Conclusion

 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED. Mr. Agakpe’s motion 

for summary judgment (Doc. No. 46) is DENIED. The case is dismissed with prejudice. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of December, 2024. 

 ________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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