Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02979/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02979-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

IXL LEARNING, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-02979-VC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

INTERVENE

Re: Dkt. No. 19

In ordinary circumstances, the stipulated dismissal of the prior lawsuit with prejudice 

would bar Adrian Scott Duane's intervention in this lawsuit by the EEOC, and would preclude 

the EEOC from seeking damages on Duane's behalf. See California v. IntelliGender, LLC, 771 

F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014); Leon v. IDX Systems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 962-63 (9th Cir. 

2006); Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 923 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Owens v. 

Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 714-15 (9th Cir. 2001). However, concurrent 

with the voluntary dismissal of the prior lawsuit, Duane and IXL agreed that Duane would be 

permitted to intervene in this lawsuit notwithstanding dismissal of the prior lawsuit with 

prejudice. See Dkt. No. 24-3. By agreeing to Duane's intervention, IXL was agreeing that 

Duane could engage in "claim-splitting," and that a res judicata defense would not apply to 

Duane's participation as a party in the EEOC's lawsuit. See Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., 

Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004); Int'l Union of Operating Engineers-Employers 

Const. Indus. Pension, Welfare & Training Tr. Funds v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 

1993); Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C., No. 11-CV-03323-LHK, 2012 WL 1029425, at 

*3-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).

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Now, Duane has moved to intervene in this case. Duane is asserting a claim under Title 

VII that IXL retaliated against Duane for posting a negative comment about the company on 

Glassdoor.com – the same claim that the EEOC is bringing. Pursuant to the prior agreement, 

IXL does not oppose intervention to this extent. But Duane also seeks to add a state law claim 

(one that he didn't assert in the prior lawsuit). And he seeks to assert a different factual theory in 

support of the Title VII claim. See Dkt. No. 20-1. IXL opposes these additions, arguing that the 

dismissal of Duane's prior lawsuit with prejudice bars him from asserting any claims or theories 

in this case beyond what the EEOC has included in its complaint, because IXL didn't agree to 

claim-splitting with respect to the additions. Duane responds that the dismissal and the parties' 

claim-splitting agreement only bar claims he actually brought in the prior lawsuit, meaning that 

he may intervene now to pursue not only the claims brought by the EEOC, but also any other 

claims he didn't previously assert. 

The current record suggests that IXL is likely correct. In the email exchange where the 

lawyers for Duane and IXL agreed to dismiss the first case, IXL's counsel stated that IXL would 

not oppose Duane's intervention in the EEOC case. See Dkt. No. 24-3. The emails appear to

reflect IXL's consent to Duane's participation in the case that the EEOC had already filed, rather 

than consent for Duane to expand the case. This is illustrated, for example, by the assertion by 

IXL's counsel that he believed Duane had the "right" to intervene. Id. This was in reference to 

the fact that Title VII claimants generally have a statutory right to intervene in cases brought by 

the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). But that statutory right is to intervene to assert Title 

VII claims; it is not a statutory right to intervene to bring other claims, such as the state law 

claim Duane attempts to add. There must be an independent basis for bringing such an 

additional claim. And the state law claim Duane wishes to bring appears to be barred, under res 

judicata principles, by the dismissal of the prior lawsuit with prejudice.

The EEOC has filed a brief in support of Duane's attempt to assert the additional state 

law claim. In so doing, the EEOC argues that the stipulated dismissal of the prior lawsuit 

reflects an intent by Duane and IXL to allow Duane to assert any claim in this lawsuit that was 

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not actually asserted in the prior lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 37. It is difficult to understand how this 

could be true. The stipulation to dismiss did not specify which claims Duane was preserving. 

And it used the kind of language one would normally use to dismiss a lawsuit in its entirety, 

referencing dismissal of "all claims pending in this action." Dkt. No. 22-3. The EEOC interprets

this language as reflecting an intent to avoid the dismissal of other claims not pending in the 

action. But one can't dismiss claims that are not pending in an action, so it makes little sense to 

interpret the language of the stipulation as attempting to avoid dismissing hypothetical claims not 

pending in the action.

The problem with the EEOC's argument is that it seems to assume that the claim-splitting 

agreement between Duane and IXL is reflected in the stipulated dismissal. But that dismissal is 

simply a dismissal. The agreement regarding claim-splitting (that is, the agreement about the 

effect of the dismissal) is in the email exchange between the lawyers for Duane and IXL 

regarding Duane's ability to intervene. And that email exchange does not appear to reflect a 

meeting of the minds between Duane's counsel and IXL's counsel to allow Duane to expand the 

EEOC lawsuit. It appears to show that although Duane's counsel (to the extent he was thinking 

about it at all) may have believed he was preserving Duane's right to assert additional claims in 

this lawsuit, IXL's counsel (to the extent he was thinking about it at all) believed he was agreeing 

only to allow Duane to intervene to assert the claims the EEOC was already asserting. In other 

words, it appears that the best Duane can hope for is a conclusion that there was no meeting of 

the minds on whether res judicata would bar Duane from pursuing any claims beyond those 

which the EEOC was already pursuing. This would mean that IXL didn't waive its res judicata 

defense as to those claims.

However, the record with respect to the agreement between Duane and IXL regarding the 

preclusive effect of the prior dismissal is messy and potentially incomplete. The email exchange 

about intervention is ambiguous, in no small part because both lawyers approached the issue 

with little care, thought, or precision. And the briefing submitted by Duane and IXL in 

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connection with this issue has thus far been of poor quality, raising still more questions.

1

 These 

failures mean that it would be premature, in the context of this motion to intervene, to 

definitively adjudicate IXL's res judicata defense. Therefore, the motion to intervene is granted 

in full, with the understanding that IXL may further pursue its res judicata defense in discovery, 

and raise it again (with a properly developed record) at the summary judgment stage of the case, 

with the likely result being that Duane will be precluded from asserting his state law claim and 

any factual theories in support of the Title VII claim not asserted by the EEOC.

2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 4, 2017

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

 

1

For example, in connection with a supplemental brief to which Duane has not had a chance to 

respond, IXL submits a declaration from its counsel about a phone conversation he had with 

Duane's counsel before the email exchange that allegedly sheds light on the meaning of the 

exchange. IXL's counsel states in his declaration that he memorialized the phone call in writing, 

but does not attach the writing, apparently out of some misguided effort to protect the attorneyclient privilege or attorney work-product. See Dkt. No. 39-1 at 2. The document does not, at 

least based on counsel's description of it, appear to be privileged or subject to the work-product 

protection, and even if it were, counsel's description of it in the declaration appears to be a 

waiver.

2

IXL may also renew its argument that the state law claim is time-barred, although that 

argument appears much weaker than the res judicata argument.

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