Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00146/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL FRANK LANGE, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

JUDY L. FRIGO, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 05-0146-PHX-JWS (BPV)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Named as Respondent in the Petition is Judy L. Frigo. The

Attorney General of the State of Arizona is named as an additional Respondent. Respondents

filed an Answer (“Answer”) to the Petition on May 31, 2005, with exhibits A through T

attached. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order dismissing the Petition. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Trial court proceedings

Petitioner, Michael Frank Lange, was indicted on March 10, 2000, for three counts

of sexual conduct with a minor, class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children, and

one count of sexual abuse, a class 5 felony. (Answer, Ex. A) 

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The count of sexual abuse was dismissed on May 26, 2000. (Answer, Ex. B)

Defendant filed a motion to suppress a taped telephone conversation between Petitioner and

his brother, Paul Lange, on December 31, 1999. (Answer, Ex. C) Petitioner argued that the

taped telephone conversation was improperly obtained without a judicial order. (Id.)

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that Petitioner's

brother consented to the recording of the telephone call. (Answer, Ex. D) 

The case proceeded to trial before a jury in January, 2001. At the close of the State's

case, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss Count 3, with prejudice, for lack of

factual basis. (Answer, Ex. P, p. 140-41.) The jury convicted Petitioner on Counts 1 and 2.

(Answer, Ex. R, p. 3-4) The trial court imposed mandatory consecutive mitigated sentences

of 13 years imprisonment on each count. (Answer, Ex. S, at 11) 

State Appellate Court Proceedings

Petitioner appealed his conviction, raising two issues before the Arizona Court of

Appeals : (1) The court erred in allowing the state to present evidence of uncharged acts, and

(2) The court erred in permitting the introduction of evidence resulting from an illegally

recorded call. (Answer, Ex. E) The court of appeals issued a memorandum opinion on April

16, 2002, affirming the conviction and sentences, finding "no evidence of coercion, undue

pressure, threat or improper inducement on the part of law enforcement officer, or any other

representatives of the state. The only evidence of pressure placed on brother was through his

own personal considerations and through the actions of his wife." (Answer, Ex. F, p.6-7)

No petition for review was filed with the Arizona Supreme Court, and the court of

appeals issued its order and mandate on June 18, 2002. (Answer, Ex. G)

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a notice of petition for post-conviction relief in state court on July 9,

2002. (Answer, Ex. H) Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief in state court

on April 1, 2003 raising two issues: (1) The denial of the constitutional right to representation

by a competent lawyer at every critical stage of the proceeding; and (2) An unlawfully

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induced plea of guilty or no contest. (Answer, Ex. I) Petitioner requested appointment of

counsel, and appointed counsel submitted a notice of completion of post-conviction review

by counsel and a request for extension of time to allow defendant to file pro per petition for

post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. I, J) The trial court granted the request, allowing

petitioner until April 14, 2003 to file his petition. (Answer, Ex. K) 

On July 28, 2003, Petitioner filed a motion for enlargement of time to file an amended

Rule 32 petition and an amended petition raising the claim that the reasonable doubt

instruction given at his trial was constitutionally flawed and arguing that trial counsel was

ineffective. (Answer, Ex. L) 

On January 14, 2004, the trial court denied Petitioner's petition for post-conviction

relief filed on April 1, 2003, noting that Petitioner's motion for enlargement of time along

with the amended petition had been previously denied. (Answer, Ex. M) Respondents assert

that no petition for review was sought. (Answer, p.3) 

Petition for Federal Habeas Corpus

On January 13, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus raising the

single claim that the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress the audio-taped

confrontation call and the appellate court's affirmation of that decision were in violation of

federal law. Attached to the Petition is the transcript of the evidentiary hearing before the

trial court on July 7, 2000. Respondents filed an Answer on May 31, 2005, with exhibits AT attached. 

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The writ of habeas corpus is available to “a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The District

Courts’s standard of review is described as follows:

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An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Exhaustion

An application for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless the applicant has

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, there is an absence of available

State corrective process, or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect

the rights of the applicant. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). This requirement of exhaustion is

designed to give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations

of its prisoners' federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512

(1971). 

Generally, there are two methods by which a petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion

requirement. First, a petitioner may actually exhaust his claims by providing the state court

with an opportunity to review the facts and legal theories in a procedurally appropriate

manner. In order to actually exhaust his or her claims, a petitioner must fairly present the

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federal claims to the state courts; this means that a petitioner is required to present the state

courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts. Id, 404 U.S. at 275-276, 92

S.Ct. at 512. A state court must be alerted to the fact that a petitioner is asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S.Ct.

887, 888 (1995). It is not enough to present the state court with only the facts necessary to

state a claim for relief, nor to make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad

as due process. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163, 117 S.Ct. 2074, 2081 (1996). Mere

similarity between claims of state and federal error is also insufficient to establish

exhaustion. Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hivala v. Wood,

195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim

explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis

is "self-evident," or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Lyons v.

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.2001)

(quoting Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999)). In Arizona, "claims of

Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court

of Appeals has ruled on them." Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

A second form of exhaustion, "technical exhaustion" can be demonstrated by showing

either that a state court found a claim defaulted on procedural grounds, or, if the claim was

never presented in any forum, that no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. 

If a claim has not been "fairly presented" in the state courts, but state procedural rules

bar the petitioner from seeking relief on that claim, the exhaustion requirement is excused.

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161, 116 S.Ct. 2074 (1996). However, in such cases, the

petitioner's claim is said to be procedurally defaulted. Colemen v. Thompson, 501 US 722,

111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991). When a claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal court will not

consider the claim on the merits unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and

actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure

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1 Although the Ninth Circuit has recently suggested that under

Rule 32.2(a)(3), there are exceptions to the rule that a District

Court can make such a determination for claims which require

a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, see Cassett, v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, (9th Cir. 2005), this Court does not

address such waiver because it has not been affirmatively raised

by the petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5

(9th Cir. 2002). 

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to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. If a claim has

never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may determine whether state

remedies remain available1

. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1989); Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99. 

Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to seek postconviction relief on the ground that his conviction was in violation of the Constitution of the

United States. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, however,

governs when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings and raise federal

constitutional challenges to their convictions or sentences in state court. Under Rule 32.2,

relief is barred on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for

post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain claims which fall under sub-sections (d)

through (h) of Rule 32.1, and which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition.

Furthermore, Rule 32.4 (a) requires that a petition for post-conviction relief must be

filed within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence or 30 days after the issuance of

the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.4(a). Again, the exceptions to this requirement are claims asserted under subsections (d)

through (h) of Rule 32.1. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

Thus, in situations where a petitioner might otherwise attempt to revive an

unexhausted federal claim in state court, and the state court might invoke the procedural bars

of Rule 32.2 and 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, in rejecting such an attempt,

there is an adequate and independent state ground barring Petitioner from raising these claims

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in state court proceedings thereby creating a procedural default for purposes of federal

habeas review. 

ANALYSIS

Timeliness

Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the habeas petition. A review of the

petition suggests that it is timely. Respondents concede that the petition is timely. This

Court recommends that the District Court find that the Petition is timely filed.

Exhaustion

Respondents argue that because Petitioner did not present the claim he raises in his

habeas petition to the Arizona Supreme Court through the available procedure of a petition

for review from the court of appeals memorandum decision rejecting the claim on direct

appeal, the claim is not subject to habeas review under Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004).

In Baldwin, which was a case appealed from the Ninth Circuit out of Oregon, the

Supreme Court addressed the question of what constituted notice of the federal nature of a

claim sufficient to satisfy the fair presentment requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

In laying the groundwork for its decision, the Supreme Court states that "[t]o provide the

State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each

appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review),

thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." 541 U.S. at 29 (citations

omitted). Similarly, in Peterson, the Ninth Circuit held that "[i]n a state like Oregon, where

review in the highest court is discretionary, a prisoner must still petition the highest court for

review in order to exhaust his claim properly." 319 F.3d at 1156, citing O'Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Respondents seize on these general statements of the law of

exhaustion and assert that they support a finding that Swoopes, at least insofar as it addresses

the need for habeas petitioners to seek review in the highest state court, is no longer valid.

However, an examination of the rationale employed in the Swoopes decision readily

distinguishes that case from the general statements of law cited by the Respondents.

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Swoopes was decided on remand to the Ninth Circuit for consideration in light of the

Supreme Court's decision in the O'Sullivan case. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir.

1999) In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit, just like the Baldwin and Peterson courts did, began

by reiterating the general rule stated in O'Sullivan that, "in order to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement for federal habeas relief, state prisoners must file for discretionary review in a

state supreme court when that review is part of ordinary appellate review." Swoopes, 196

F.3d at 1009, citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at . The court recognized, however, that the

Supreme Court in O'Sullivan had "acknowledged an exception to the exhaustion

requirement," by making it clear the "'the creation of a discretionary review system does not,

without more, make review' in a state supreme court 'unavailable.'" Swoopes, 196 F.3d at

1009, quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at (emphasis added in Swoopes). The Ninth Circuit

proceeded to review Arizona's discretionary review system and found considerations that

compelled a finding that, in other than capital cases, appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court

was unnecessary. Specifically, the court found that two Arizona cases, State v. Shattuck, 140

Ariz. 582, 684 P.2d 154 (1984), and State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989),

made it clear that, "in cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, review need not

be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies." Swoopes,

196 Ariz. at 1010. Thus, the court concluded, "post-conviction review before the Arizona

Supreme Court is a remedy that is 'unavailable' within the meaning of O'Sullivan. There is

nothing in either Baldwin or Peterson that suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that this analysis

is flawed or that holding has been overruled. 

Also strongly suggestive of the continued vitality of Swoopes is that the Ninth Circuit

continues to cite the case for the very proposition Respondents suggest was overruled. In

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2005), the court stated as a matter of fact that

"[i]n cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 'claims of Arizona state prisoners

are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled

on them.'" Id. at 998 n. 3, quoting Swoopes, 196 Ariz. at 1010. At least one other circuit has

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also cited Swoopes for this proposition without questioning its continuing validity. See

Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210 (3rd Cir. 2004). These considerations make clear that

Respondents' argument that the reliability of the holding in Swoopes is questionable is

incorrect. The Magistrate Judge finds that the Petitioner properly exhausted the claim.

Scope of Habeas Relief

Citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S 465, 481-82, 96S.Ct. 3037 (1976), Respondents argue

that a Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings if the

state prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court. Respondents

are correct; Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claims are barred by Powell. The record

establishes that Petitioner filed a pretrial motion to suppress the audiotape, the trial court

conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing on the matter (Answer, Ex. N.), took the matter

under advisement and later denied the motion in a written order. Petitioner raised the issue

to the court of appeals, and, in a memorandum decision, the court of appeals found no error

from the denial of the motion to suppress. Thus, Petitioner was clearly provided a full and

fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims and therefore habeas relief on such

claims should be denied. See Powell at 489-90. See also Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81F.3d

891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner also argues that taped calls by third parties to a suspect must meet federal

and state wiretapping standards before admission, citing 18 U.S.C. § 2515 and § 2518 and

A.R.S. § 13-3010, and § 13-3012(g). Section 2515 of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control

and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("the federal wiretap statute") is essentially a codification of the

exclusionary rule, providing that evidence derived from wiretaps made in violation of the

wiretap statute shall not "be received in evidence in any trail..." 18 U.S.C. § 2515. 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that not in every instance will an asserted error of

law prompt habeas relief. Lord v. Lambert, 347 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Davis

v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). Where the error is neither jurisdictional nor

constitutional, the appropriate inquiry is whether the error is "a fundamental defect which

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inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice," or "an omission inconsistent with the

rudimentary demands of fair procedure," and whether the error "present[s] exceptional

circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is

apparent." Lord, 347 at 1094, quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)

(internal quotation marks omitted)(other citations omitted). 

In the context of Title III, the Ninth Circuit in Lord found the Seventh Circuit's

decision in Hussong v. Warden, 623 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1980) instructive. In Hussong, the

Seventh Circuit distinguished between the scope of a judicially created exclusionary rule that

might not be cognizable in a federal habeas claim pursuant to Powell, and a claim involving

an exclusionary rule of congressional origin. See Hussong, 623 F.2d at 1187. The Seventh

Circuit rejected the argument that because habeas review of the judicial rule was precluded

in Powell, habeas review of the statutory rule (Title III) should be held similarly unavailable.

Id at 1188. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit proceeded to find habeas relief unavailable to

the petitioner in Hussong, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 "does not provide a remedy for this

nonconstitutional federal claim." Id. at 1190. The Seventh Circuit noted that a violation of

the federal wiretap statute is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional, and, to state a claim

which is cognizable on habeas, must state a claim that the petitioner's custody is "a complete

miscarriage of justice" warranting exceptional relief, even if the petitioner was convicted on

the basis of evidence admitted in violation of the wiretap statute. Id. at 1190-91 (citations

omitted). 

The Seventh Circuit noted that, although the evidence obtained from an illegal wiretap

may represent substantial violations of federal law, and may be tainted by procedural

irregularities, the evidence is, like that often obtained in violation of search and seizure law

"typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence

of the defendant." Id. at 1991 (citations omitted). "Wiretap evidence, in particular, is

generally more accurate even than whatever circumstantial evidence is presented at trial."

Id. The Seventh Circuit admitted that, on direct appeal, if petitioner's allegations were

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correct, the evidence should have been suppressed at trial, but, the issue on federal habeas

review, is whether the alleged violation resulted in "a complete miscarriage of justice"

justifying habeas review." Id. 

Thus, under Hill and Lord, this Court must make an inquiry into (1) whether Petitioner

has received a full and fair hearing on his suppression claim in the state court and (2) whether

there has been a complete miscarriage of justice because (a) there is reason to believe the

wiretap evidence is unreliable or that (b) the petitioner is not guilty of the crime of which he

has been convicted. 

The first inquiry has already been affirmatively established under the Powell analysis

undertaken, supra. As to the second inquiry, there is no reason to doubt the reliability of the

wiretap evidence, and after a thorough review of the entire record, the Magistrate Judge finds

that there is no question of petitioner's guilt. The evidence obtained through the

confrontation call was corroborated through the victim's testimony at trial and through her

interviews with the police, and also through the victim's admissions when confronted in

person at his mother's house by his brother and sister-in-law when they first learned through

Melissa of the incidents. As in Hussong, there is nothing in this record to indicate that the

Petitioner in this case is not guilty of the crime for which he was convicted. 

Petitioner's sole defense, that he was unable to achieve an erection because of steroids

he was allegedly ingesting and injecting, besides being difficult to prove, was essentially

dismantled by his own admission on the tape that his conduct with the victim was the result

of an "uncontrollable urge." Further, his testimony that he would rather his brother thought

he had sex with the victim than admit that he was unable to achieve an erection was highly

implausible.

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RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(B), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 05-146-PHX-JWS.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 1st day of May, 2006.

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