Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01915/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01915-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIUS COLLINS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1915 FCD DAD P

vs.

D.L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction

entered against him on July 19, 2002 in the Solano County Superior Court on charges of first

degree murder with personal use of a firearm and vehicle theft. He seeks relief on the grounds

that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction on a theory of felony

murder; (2) the trial court erred in the felony murder instructions given to the jury; and (3) there

was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction on a theory that the murder was

premeditated and deliberate. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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 The following summary is drawn from the May 12, 2003 opinion by the California 1

Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-4, filed in this

court on August 4, 2005, as Exhibit 1 to respondent’s Answer.

 For clarity, we refer to Mattie and Clyde Hoston by their first names and, in so doing, 2

mean no disrespect.

2

 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

 

There were no witnesses to Clyde Hoston’s murder on November 

3, 2000. His body was found in the closet of the house in 

Vacaville he shared with his wife, Mattie, and his stepson, the

defendant.

Both Clyde and Mattie Hoston took vanpools to work in the Bay 2

Area. When Mattie arrived home on November 3, at about 6:45 

p.m., Clyde’s car, a Lexus, was not in the garage. No one appeared 

to be home. Assuming that her husband had taken her son on an 

errand and to pick up some food, she fixed herself a drink and 

watched television. After a while, she went upstairs to use the 

bathroom in the master bedroom she shared with Clyde. She 

noticed a light on Clyde’s closet and opened the door. She saw

clothing piled on the floor of the closet. When she noticed blood in 

the corner of the closet, she ran out to a neighbor’s house for help. 

Her neighbor, Jeffrey Lostak, accompanied her back to the house. 

He looked in the closet and saw a pile of clothing on the floor and

blood on the carpet. Lostak called the police.

The police saw no signs of forced entry or of any disturbance in the 

house, other than in the closet. Underneath the pile of clothes, in a 

fetal position, with his knees tucked into his chest and his arms 

tucked under his body, the police discovered Clyde’s body. His 

pockets were turned out and, in his hand, was the lid to a 

jewelry box. The bottom of the box, containing his wife’s pearl ring 

and wedding ring, was found on the closet floor.

An autopsy showed Clyde had been shot six times. The fatal bullet 

wound was fired from a gun that was within 17 or 18 inches of 

Clyde’s head. There were also two bullet wounds to his buttocks, 

one to the back of his shoulder, and two to his hip. Each of these 

shots struck him on the left side of his body. One of the wound 

patterns revealed that Clyde had been in a flexed, squatting position, 

with his thighs close to his torso when the shot was fired. There 

were no defensive wounds on his body.

Clyde owned a .357 caliber Colt Python gun. He kept it unloaded in 

its original box in the nightstand next to his bed in the master

bedroom. The gun was not in the nightstand when the police

searched the house after the murder. The police did find an empty 

Colt Python firearm box in Clyde’s nightstand. The drawer also 

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contained a red plastic ammunition tray. A firearms expert testified 

that the bullets recovered from Clyde’s body were similar in design,

weight, and size to those that would be fired by a .357 caliber 

revolver and that the gun Clyde owned could have fired those

bullets.

Mattie’s son, Clyde’s stepson, defendant Julius Collins, had been 

living in the house since October 2000. Defendant was unemployed 

and did not own a car or have a driver’s license. Defendant had also 

stayed with his mother and Clyde earlier in the year. Mattie’s car 

was stolen around this time and Clyde suspected that defendant had 

stolen the car. A neighbor also testified that Clyde was concerned 

about defendant’s presence in his house.

Defendant’s fingerprint was found on the empty red plastic box of

ammunition in Clyde’s nightstand. In defendant’s bedroom, the 

police found, on defendant’s bed, Clyde’s key-ring, which held the 

key to the house and to Clyde’s Lexus. The house key was bent. 

Mattie testified that she had never seen it in that condition. An 

empty box of Winchester .357 magnum bullets was found in a 

dresser in defendant’s room.

Clyde was last seen by fellow vanpool riders on November 3 

between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. as he drove off in his Lexus from 

the Vacaville drop-off point. According to Mattie, he generally 

arrived home from work at about 4:00 p.m.

On the afternoon of November 3, defendant was seen by several 

people in the Hostons’ neighborhood. One neighbor testified that 

she saw defendant at about 3:45 p.m. in front of the Hoston home. 

He looked “spacey.” Both the son of this neighbor and the son’s 

girlfriend testified that, sometime between 5:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m., 

they saw the Hostons’ garage door open. A Lexus pulled quickly 

out of the garage. Defendant was driving the Lexus. He drove away 

fast, swerving abruptly out of the garage. Another neighbor testified 

that, at about 5:30 p.m. she heard male voices inside the Hoston 

home yelling, “Go,” or “No.” The voices she heard sounded like 

men watching a football game. None of the neighbors testified that 

they heard any gunshots.

Defendant was arrested in Oakland three days after his stepfather’s

murder. He had a key to Clyde’s Lexus in his shoe. The Lexus was 

parked a block away from where defendant was arrested. In the 

trunk of the Lexus was a key-ring which held six keys, including a

key to the Hostons’ BMW. Mattie had not given defendant 

permission to drive the Lexus or take this key-ring.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 

50 years to life in prison. 

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Following his conviction, petitioner filed a timely appeal of his judgment of

conviction in the California Court of Appeals for the First Appellate District. In that appeal he

raised the same claims that he raises in the instant petition. (Answer, Ex. 1.) With the exception

of petitioner’s two-year concurrent sentence for the vehicle theft, which was stayed by the

appellate court since it was part of the same course of conduct that resulted in the murder, the

conviction was affirmed on appeal in a reasoned decision dated May 12, 2003. (Id.) Petitioner

subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was summarily

denied by order dated July 16, 2003. (Answer, Ex. 2.)

On September 12, 2003, petitioner filed his initial petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in this court, which was dismissed with leave to file an amended petition within thirty

days. On January 29, 2004, petitioner filed his first amended petition for a writ habeas corpus. 

In response to petitioner’s first amended petition, respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure

to exhaust state remedies. Pursuant to respondent’s motion, petitioner’s first amended petition

was dismissed and petitioner was given thirty days to file a second amended petition presenting

only his exhausted claims. On November 8, 2004, petitioner filed his second amended petition

for a writ of habeas corpus. This petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to file the

petition on the form employed by this court. On December 3, 2004, petitioner filed his third

amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, upon which this action is proceeding.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

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corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

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II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence - Felony Murder

Petitioner claims that the evidence introduced at his trial failed to support his

conviction on the charge of first degree felony murder because there was insufficient evidence

that the victim was killed during the commission of a robbery. (Am. Pet. at 5.) Petitioner argues

that the evidence as to felony murder was insufficient because there was no evidence establishing

the specific circumstances of the shooting. In this regard, petitioner points to the testimony of

Detective John Carli that, in his opinion, this was not a robbery-based murder. (Id.; Reporter’s

Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 609.) Petitioner also argues that although witness Sandra Mallonee

testified that she heard yelling, which she associated with a fight or people watching a football

game, coming from the victim’s home (id. at 484-486), there was no evidence establishing the

circumstances surrounding the shooting. (Am. Pet. at 13.) He contends that despite the evidence

suggesting that someone went through the victim’s pockets, there was no evidence establishing

that it was the shooter who did so before the victim was shot. (Id. at 13-14.) Nor, according to

petitioner, was there any evidence presented that the shooting was committed in order to take the

victim’s car keys. (Id.) Petitioner also argues that the victim was found by police still in

possession of his wallet, watch and credit cards. (Id. at 14.) Petitioner asserts that all of the

evidence actually suggests that the victim was likely killed in the course of an argument but not

in an attempt to rob him. (Id. at 14.) Therefore, petitioner claims, there was insufficient

evidence introduced at trial to support his first degree murder conviction on a felony murder

theory.

1. State Court Opinion

Petitioner’s argument in this regard was rejected on the merits by the California

Court of Appeal. The appellate court explained its reasoning as follows:

The trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict defendant

of felony murder, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit robbery

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 CALJIC No. 9.40 provides that robbery consists of five elements: “1. A person had 3

possession of property of some value however slight; [¶] 2. The property was taken from that

person or from his immediate presence; [¶] 3. The property was taken against the will of that

person; [¶] 4. The taking was accomplished either by force or fear; and [¶] 5. The property was

taken with the specific intent permanently to deprive that person of the property.”

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and that the murder had occurred during the commission or

attempted commission of the robbery. (CALJIC No. 8.21.) The

jury was also instructed on the elements needed to prove robbery. 

(CALJIC No. 9.40.) Defendant contends the trial court erred in 3

giving the jury these instructions because there was insufficient

evidence Clyde was killed during the commission of a robbery. 

We disagree. 

If there is “insufficient evidence to support one of the prosecution’s

theories, it is error for the trial court to instruct on it . . . .” (People

v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 408.) “‘The test for 

determining whether instructions on a particular theory of guilt are 

appropriate is whether there is substantial evidence which would 

support conviction on that theory. [Citation.] To determine whether

there is substantial evidence to support a conviction we must view 

the record in a light most favorable to the conviction, resolving all 

conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

support of conviction. We may conclude that there is no 

substantial evidence in support of conviction only if it can be said 

that on the evidence presented no reasonable fact finder could find 

the defendant guilty on the theory presented. [Citation.]’ 

[Citations.]” (Ibid.)

Defendant, citing People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 (Green), 

argues the evidence establishes nothing more than he and Clyde 

had an argument. The evidence to which defendant refers is the 

testimony of a neighbor, Sandra Mallonee. Mallonee testified that 

at about 5:30 p.m. she heard male voices inside the Hoston home 

yelling, “Go,” or “No.” She did not testify she heard an argument. 

Rather she thought the men whose voices she heard were watching 

a football game. Defendant, relying on this testimony, contends it

is far more likely that any intent to take Clyde’s keys and car was 

an afterthought formed after Clyde’s death and, thus, the evidence

did not support the felony-murder robbery instruction. 

In Green, supra, after the victim was murdered, the defendant took 

her jewelry, clothing and purse. The defendant was convicted of 

robbery. The court reversed, holding that “a conviction of robbery

cannot be sustained in the absence of evidence that the accused 

conceived his intent to steal either before committing the act of 

force against the victim (and the intent remained operative

until the time of the taking) or during the commission of the act; if 

the intent arose only after he used force against the victim– i.e., for

a nonlarcenous purpose– the taking will at most constitute a theft.”

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(Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 51-53.) Defendant notes that the 

Green court supported its holding by analogy to the “settled rule

that when the force used against the victim results in his death, the

defendant’s intent to rob will not support a conviction of felony 

murder (§ 189) if it arose after the infliction of the fatal wound. . . .

‘[T]he evidence must establish that the defendant harbored the 

felonious intent either prior to or during the commission of the 

acts which resulted in the victim’s death; evidence which 

establishes that the defendant formed the intent only after 

engaging in the fatal acts cannot support a verdict of first degree

murder based on section 189.’” (Id. at p. 54, fn. 44.) Defendant 

argues that, as in Green, there is no evidence that his intent to steal

arose until after the use of force against the victim took place.

We do not agree. Although the defendant contends the evidence 

suggests that Clyde’s murder was “committed for a personal, 

non-larcenous purpose,” the evidence even more strongly suggests

that Clyde was murdered while he was being robbed. The record 

contains sufficient evidence to support the giving of the felonymurder robbery instructions. When Clyde’s body was discovered,

the top of a jewelry box was in his hand. The bottom of the box

containing his wife’s pearl ring and wedding ring was found near

his body. This fact is convincing evidence that, before he died, 

Clyde was attempting to prevent the theft of these valuable

items. Several items of value were actually taken from the Hoston

home, further evidence that Clyde was killed during the course of 

a robbery. The gun Clyde kept in his nightstand, which might well 

have been used to kill him, was missing. His keys were found on 

defendant’s bed, possibly discarded there because the house key 

was bent and unusable. Two other sets of car keys were taken 

from the home, as was Clyde’s car. Defendant was seen driving 

this car away from the house on the evening of the murder. One

of the missing car keys was found in defendant’s possession and 

Clyde’s car was recovered about a block away from where defendant 

was arrested. These facts constitute substantial evidence that 

Clyde was killed during the commission of a robbery. 

The possibility that defendant might have taken Clyde’s keys and 

the car after he was murdered, does not necessarily mean that 

defendant formed the intent to rob Clyde after he killed him. It is

well established that “when one kills another and takes substantial 

property from the victim, it is ordinarily reasonable to presume the 

killing was for the purposes of robbery.” (People v. Turner (1990) 50 

Cal.3d 668, 688; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 357; 

People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 35 [“If a person 

commits a murder, and after doing so takes the victim’s wallet, the 

jury may reasonably infer that the murder was committed for the

purpose of obtaining the wallet, because murders are commonly 

committed to obtain money.”].) An inference that defendant 

formed the intent to rob Clyde before his death was a reasonable 

one.

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Defendant also argues that, because other valuables in the house 

were undisturbed, there was not substantial evidence that he 

intended to rob Clyde. In People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 

1128-1129, a case cited by the Attorney General, our Supreme 

Court rejected a similar argument that, when a defendant failed to 

take other property of value from a victim, robbery could not be 

inferred. The Kipp court pointed out that the defendant in that case 

might well have overlooked other items of value because he was in 

a hurry, possibly because he feared being detected. In light of Kipp,

we reject defendant’s argument. 

We also disagree with defendant’s suggestion that the testimony of 

the investigating officers establishes that no robbery took place. 

Detective Steve Carey testified that he assumed Clyde’s pockets 

had been turned out after his death, and Detective John Carli 

opined that the crime did not appear to be robbery-based murder. 

These interpretations of the crime scene, however, are not the only 

way to look at the evidence in this case. In a case such as this one 

where the evidence is circumstantial, “we must decide whether the 

circumstances reasonably justify [the jury’s] findings, 

‘but our opinion that the circumstances also might reasonably be 

reconciled with a contrary finding’ does not render the evidence 

insubstantial. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 528-529.)” 

(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887-888.) As we have 

explained, the inferences that Clyde was murdered during the 

commission of a robbery is reasonable in light of the evidence. 

Therefore, despite contrary inferences that might be drawn from the 

record, substantial evidence supports the giving of the robbery 

felony-murder instruction in this matter. 

 

(Opinion at 4-7.)

2. Applicable Law

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There

is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “[T]he dispositive question

under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson,

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443 U.S. at 318). A petitioner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding “faces a heavy burden when

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due

process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to grant the

writ, the habeas court must find that the decision of the state court reflected an objectively

unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Juan H. v. Allen, 408

F.3d at 1275. 

The court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is

challenged in habeas proceedings. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985),

vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is

the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. If the trier of

fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in its review will assign the

inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). “The

relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether

the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict.” United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196

(9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991)). “The

question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether

rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d

303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court determines the sufficiency of the evidence in

reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson,

443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983.

3. Analysis 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the undersigned

concludes that there was sufficient evidence presented at petitioner’s trial from which a

reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of first

degree murder under a theory of felony murder based on the commission of a robbery. As the

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California Court of Appeal explained, evidence introduced at petitioner’s trial demonstrated that

at the time of his arrest he was found in possession of a key to the victim’s car and the car was

found parked only a block away from where petitioner was arrested. In addition, a neighbor had

identified petitioner as driving the victim’s car, swerving out of the victim’s garage and speeding

away from the house the evening of the murder. (RT at 212-19). Moreover, Detective Carey

testified at petitioner’s trial that at the crime scene he saw the lid of a jewelry box in the victim’s

hand and that this lid fit a jewelry box containing a pearl ring and a diamond ring found close to

the victim’s body. (Id. at 273.) There was also testimony that the victim’s gun was missing. (Id.

at 274-76, 343-44.) 

Petitioner is correct in stating that Detective Carli, an officer who assisted in the

investigation and drafted the search warrant affidavit for the victim’s house, testified at trial that

he had concluded that this was not a robbery-based murder. (Id. at 605-06, 609.) However,

Detective Carli also testified that the victim’s pants pockets were turned inside-out indicating

that the killer had removed something from them, the victim’s car was taken, the murder weapon

was missing and that the killing appeared to involve both the taking of the victim’s car and a

theft from the victim’s person. (Id. at 609-10.) Finally, Detective Carli testified that such facts

would establish that a robbery had occurred. (Id. at 610.) Although Detective Carli’s testimony

regarding whether the victim’s killing appeared to be a robbery-based murder was internally

inconsistent, there was nonetheless sufficient evidence presented from which a jury could

reasonably conclude that petitioner killed the victim during his attempt to steal the car, gun, and

jewelry. 

For the reasons described above, the state court’s conclusion that sufficient

evidence supported petitioner’s conviction of first degree murder based on a felony murder

theory is not “objectively unreasonable.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). See

also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

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B. Felony Murder Jury Instruction

In a related claim, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury

on felony murder because there was insufficient evidence that he had killed the victim during the

commission of a robbery. (Am. Pet. at 11, 17.) Relying on the decision in Griffin v. United

States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991), petitioner contends that “if even one juror” voted to convict him

based upon the unsupported felony murder theory, he was denied “a unanimous jury and the

judgment of conviction must be reversed.” (Am. Pet. at 17.) 

In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to

warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely ‘undesirable,

erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process right

guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.

1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail on such a claim

petitioner must demonstrate “that an erroneous instruction ‘so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 317 (quoting Darnell v.

Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1987)). In making its determination, this court must

evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a

component of the entire trial process.’” Id. (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th

Cir. 1984)). Thus, in order to prevail on this claim, petitioner must demonstrate that the felony

murder jury instructions were given in error and so infected the entire trial that petitioner’s right

to due process was violated. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991).

As explained by the state appellate court, under California law, the test for

determining whether jury instructions on a particular theory of guilt are appropriate is whether

there is substantial evidence which would support conviction on that theory. (Opinion at 4-5)

(quoting People v. Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th 518, 528 (1993). To determine whether there is

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substantial evidence to support a conviction, a reviewing court must view the record “in a light

most favorable to conviction resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable

inferences in support of conviction.” (Opinion at 5) (quoting Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 528-

29). A reviewing court may conclude that there is no substantial evidence in support of

conviction “only if it can be said that on the evidence presented no reasonable factfinder could

find the defendant guilty on the theory presented.” Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 528-29 (citing

People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 578 (1980)). 

For the reasons explained above in addressing petitioner’s insufficiency of the

evidence claim, there was substantial evidence presented at trial from which a reasonable juror

could have found that petitioner murdered the victim during the commission of a robbery. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in giving a felony murder jury instructions. Because it

was supported by sufficient evidence, felony murder was not a legally flawed theory of

conviction under the circumstances of this case and the challenged jury instruction was properly

given. For these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence - Premeditation and Deliberation 

Petitioner alleges that the evidence of his premeditation and deliberation presented

at trial was insufficient to support his conviction on the first degree murder charge. (Am. Pet. at

5.) He contends that the evidence admitted at his trial did not support the jury’s finding of

motive or of planning the act and manner of killing as required for premeditation and

deliberation. (Id. at 27-29.) As an indication that there was no premeditation and deliberation on

the part of the shooter, petitioner points out that the victim’s body was only covered by a pile of

clothes and was not moved to a different location. (Id. at 28.) Petitioner also points to the lack

of any evidence of a serious disagreement between himself and the victim. (Id.) Petitioner

contends that the prosecution failed to introduce at trial evidence sufficient to support a

conviction of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder. 

/////

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The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument on appeal. The

state appellate court explained its reasoning as follows:

Defendant argues the record does not contain sufficient evidence of

premeditation and deliberation but, instead, shows, “at most, rash

and unconsidered conduct.” We do not agree. The evidence in this

case, and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the

evidence, constitute substantial evidence of premeditation and

deliberation. 

First, the evidence strongly suggested that Clyde was killed by the 

gun he kept, unloaded, in his nightstand. In order to use the gun, 

defendant first would have been required to obtain bullets for the 

gun and then load it. An empty box of bullets that fit Clyde’s gun 

was discovered in defendant’s bedroom and, thus, the jury not 

unreasonably could have inferred defendant purchased these 

bullets in advance in order to use Clyde’s gun against him. In 

addition, defendant’s fingerprint was found on an ammunition tray 

in Clyde’s nightstand, again suggesting that defendant planned in 

advance to shoot Clyde with this gun. In sum, a jury could well 

have drawn the reasonable inference that Clyde’s killing was 

premeditated in light of evidence that defendant was required to 

obtain bullets and load the gun prior to shooting Clyde. Although 

use of a deadly weapon is not always evidence of a plan to kill, 

obtaining a weapon in advance of a killing has been held to support

an inference of planning. (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 

593, fn. 5.) 

Second, there was evidence from which the jury could infer that 

defendant had a motive to kill Clyde. Defendant did not own a car

and was without a job or other source of income. Moreover, 

defendant may have previously stolen one of the Hostons’ cars. 

There was testimony that Clyde did not like defendant and was 

unhappy about his presence in his house. The jury could have

drawn the reasonable inference that defendant premeditated the 

killing in order to provide himself with the car he lacked. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the manner in which the

murder took place is convincing evidence on which to base a

finding of premeditation and deliberation. Clyde was shot at close

range to the head in front of his ear. There were no defensive

wounds on his body. In People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333,

348, evidence of shots to a victim’s head and the absence of

defensive wounds was found to “describe[ ] actions that were cold

and calculated” sufficient to justify a finding of premeditation. 

Similarly, in People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 957, the

court found evidence of an execution-style murder sufficient to

sustain a first degree murder verdict. Here too the evidence showed

a close range shot to the head and no sign of a struggle. 

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In sum, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that the 

shooting was premeditated and deliberate. 

(Opinion at 8-9.) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of premeditation and deliberation to support a

verdict of first degree murder. In California, premeditation and deliberation can be established

through three basic categories of evidence: evidence of planning activity, evidence of defendant’s

motive, or evidence about the manner of killing. People v. Boyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333, 347-48 (1987);

People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 26-27 (1968); People v. Gunder, 151 Cal. App. 4th 412, 420

(2007) (noting that the factors recognized in Anderson are but a guide for appellate courts and

not an exhaustive list that excludes all other types and combinations of evidence that could

support a finding of premeditation). In the instant case, as the state appellate court pointed out,

there was sufficient evidence presented at petitioner’s trial from which it was reasonable for the

jury to infer that this murder was premeditated and deliberate. First, the evidence established that 

the victim was shot with his own gun which he kept unloaded. That evidence was sufficient to

support the inference that petitioner had to obtain bullets and load the gun before shooting the

victim, thus demonstrating premeditation. Second, the evidence that petitioner had no job or

other source of income and previously tried to steal one of the Hostons’ cars suggested that he

had a motive to commit the murder in order to steal the victim’s car. Third, the evidence at trial

established that the victim was shot at close range just in front of his ear, without any defensive

wounds or any sign of struggle. This evidence of the manner of the killing was sufficient to

allow a reasonable jury to infer premeditation and deliberation on the part of petitioner. 

For these reasons, the decision of the state appellate court rejecting petitioner’s

argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to deliberation and premeditation

is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 19, 2007.

DAD:jp

collins1915.hc

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