Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02512/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYIERRE C. PERRY,

Petitioner,

v.

G.J. JANDA, et al.

Respondents.

 

 

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Case No. 12-CV-2512-LAB (JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. Introduction

Petitioner Tyierre C. Perry (“Petitioner” or “Perry”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On February 4, 2010, Petitioner was convicted by

jury in San Diego Superior Court case number SCD202276 of first degree

felony murder of Spencer Watts (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)) with use of a

firearm (count 1); attempted robbery of Spencer Watts (id. §§ 664 & 211)

with use of a firearm (count 2); and robbery of Keenan Wheeler (id. § 211)

with use of a firearm (count 3). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”)

at 103-06.) Petitioner contends the trial court committed prejudicial Doyle1

1

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).

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error by admitting two statements he made after he was read his Miranda2

rights following his arrest. (See Pet. at 6-6(a).) 

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, and all the

supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the

documents and evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set

forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

The following statement of facts is taken from the California Court of

Appeal opinion, People v. Tyierre Christian Perry, No. D057006, slip op.

(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012). (Lodgment No. 5.) This Court gives

deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. 

Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner may

rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The facts as found by the

state appellate court are as follows:

1. The homicide

On April 22, 2006, Keenan Wheeler and his friend Spencer

Watts picked up Ecstasy pills they planned to sell that night. 

That evening, when Watts and Wheeler were at Duana Lewis’s

home, Watts received a telephone call and told the caller to

“have Homey call me.” Watts then received a direct-connect or

walkie-talkie type call on his cell phone, and Lewis heard a

male on the other end say, “you go meet me, cuz.” Watts and

Wheeler left Lewis’s home at around 8:30 p.m. that evening.

Watts, who went by the nickname “Black,” had received a

direct-connect call on his cell phone to meet the person who

wanted to buy the Ecstasy pills at the Walmart in the College

Grove Shopping Center. Watts drove his car into the Walmart

parking lot with Wheeler sitting in the front passenger seat.

Each had a bag of Ecstasy pills. 

According to Wheeler, two males got into the back seat of

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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Watts's car. One–who the prosecutor argued in his closing was

Perry–was the darker-skinned shooter who sat behind Watts. 

Wheeler testified the shooter was “probably” 5 feet 10 inches

tall, was in his early- or mid-20's, “maybe” had a faint

moustache, wore on his head a doo-rag and a baseball cap

turned to the side, had a “thin” but muscular build, and weighed

“maybe” 150 pounds. The second male, who had a lighter

complexion and sat behind Wheeler, was not wearing a doo-rag

or hat.

Watts asked the two males where they were from, and they

both said, “Oceanside.” According to Wheeler, the four men

shook hands and the darker male sitting behind Watts (Perry)

said, “Oceanside Crip” or “West Coast Crip.” Robert Minton, a

San Diego police officer who interviewed Wheeler at the scene

after the shooting, testified that Wheeler told him the person

who sat behind the driver’s seat said they were Oceanside

Crips. 

According to Wheeler, Perry said he wanted to see the product

and Watts handed him one of the bags of Ecstasy pills. Watts

told him how much the bag cost and asked him for the money. 

Perry pulled out a gun and told the other male, “Go through his

pockets.” Perry also told Watts and Wheeler to give him

everything in their pockets. Perry’s companion took $20 from

Wheeler's left pocket. 

Perry tried to go through Watts's pockets, but Watts resisted

and struggled with him. Perry said something like, “You think

this is a game? You think I'm playing around?” Watts told

Perry, “You are not going through my fucking pockets,” and,

“Fuck that. If you are going to shoot, shoot me. You might as

well shoot me now.” Watts then put the car in reverse.

Perry reached forward, tried to put the gearshift back in park,

but put it in neutral, and the car started to roll backward. The

male sitting behind Wheeler hopped out of the car and told

Perry, “Shoot him.” Perry immediately fired one shot and got

out of the car. He and his companion ran away, taking one of

Watts's three phones that had been by the gearshift. 

Watts grabbed at his chest and started to tense up. Wheeler

saw blood rush from Watts’s nose and mouth, and then Watts

became unresponsive. Wheeler grabbed one of Watts’s cell

phones, called 911 at about 8:55 p.m., and told the police

dispatcher that a Black male tried to rob them and shot his

friend. Watts died from the gunshot wound. The autopsy

showed the bullet entered Watts’s back and traveled through

his right lung and heart. 

2. The investigation

The police found two plastic baggies containing Ecstasy pills

and a pair of rubber latex gloves near Watts’s car.

Perry’s fingerprints were found on the driver’s side rear

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passenger door in two places. Both prints, which were from

Perry’s left middle finger, were pointed downward toward the

back of the car. 

A Motorola Boost push-to-talk cell phone (also known as a

“Lady Thug” Motorola phone), which belonged to Latishia

Rivera, was found on the ground about 10 feet from the car. 

Rivera’s phone had been used for several communications with

a cell phone found in the driver-side door of Watts’s car. On

April 20, 2006, there were 19 calls between these two phones;

on April 22 (the day Watts was killed), there were 12 such calls;

and the first communication on April 20 took place at 1:08 p.m. 

The last push-to-talk or direct-connect call between these two

phones was made at 8:50 p.m. on April 22.

Rivera’s cell phone had two contact entries under the name

“Bklacc,” and the speed dial numbers for these address book

contact entries were 56 and 58 out of 60 entries, indicating the

numbers were recently stored.

Rivera was Perry’s girlfriend in April 2006, and the two were

staying together in a house in El Cajon at that time. Rivera

acknowledged that her push-to-talk phone was found at the

scene of the crime. Perry did not have his phone during the

weekend of April 22, 2006, either because he ran out of

minutes or lost it. Rivera did not use her phone or lend it to

anyone that weekend, and she did not know whether Perry took

it. When the police interviewed her in 2006, she initially lied

and said she lost her phone. 

Rivera stated she did not recognize the phonebook entries for

“Bklacc”–which is slang that she pronounced as “black”–in her

phone. She had seen Perry use “CC” instead of “CK,” but she

did not think Perry would write “black” as “Bklacc.” She

acknowledged there were a lot of direct -connect calls between

her phone and “Bklacc,” but she did not make any of them, and,

although it was possible Perry made those calls, she did not

know whether he did.

Rivera said that on the night of April 22 she and Perry watched

television together. She went to bed alone early that night, and

Perry remained on the couch. Rivera did not know when she

went to bed, but stated it was dark outside. Perry was in bed

with her when she woke up the next morning.

. . . . 

San Diego Police Detective Bruce Pendleton testified about his

interview with Rosalyn Stanley regarding the Watts homicide

and whether she had information about who may have been

involved in the killing. Detective Pendleton asked her about a

conversation she had with Antonio “Tony” (or “Shorty-Six”)

Winfield. Stanley indicated she was at a party when Winfield

told her he knew who killed Watts. (. . . . Stanley claimed at

trial she had been in a “drug blur” at the party and did not

remember talking to Winfield there and also did not remember

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what she said to Detective Pendleton during the interview.) 

Winfield said Perry told him that he only intended to rob Watts,

not kill him.

San Diego County District Attorney Investigator Matthew

O’Deane testified about his interview with Winfield. Winfield

told him he was a close friend of both Watts and Perry. In

August 2006, when Winfield saw Perry at a party and asked

him about the shooting of Watts, Perry told Winfield that he met

with Watts to buy Ecstasy pills, but he did not shoot Watts, and

he dropped his phone when he was buying the drugs. (At trial,

Winfield denied saying this, and claimed Perry told him he had

nothing to do with the shooting. Winfield also denied telling

Stanley that Perry told him it was his (Perry’s) intention to rob

Watts but not to shoot him.)

San Diego Police Detective Johnny Keene retrieved security

videotapes from the Walmart at the shopping center on College

Grove Avenue. One of the videos appeared to show Watts's

BMW. It showed a car driving down one of the aisles in the

parking lot, parking in a stall for two or three minutes, and then

rolling backward. 

. . . .

3. Gang evidence

The parties stipulated that Perry was a member of South

Oceanside Gangster Crips on April 22, 2006 (the date Watts

was killed). South Oceanside Gangster Crips is one of five

documented Crips criminal street gang sets in Oceanside.

Oceanside Police Detective Gordon Govier testified about

certain ways that Crip members speak and write. Crips will not

use a “C” and “K” together because to do so is a sign of

disrespect towards Crips gang members. Instead, a Crip

member will use “CC” or “KK.” The telephone contact “Bklacc”

(in Rivera’s cell phone) was consistent with how a Crips gang

member would write. Detective Govier found writings on

Perry’s MySpace page that were consistent with how a Crips

gang member would write. 

Detective Govier testified that Crips gang members will use the

term “cuz” as a greeting when communicating with each other

or to let others know who they are. This term is a sign of

disrespect when used towards a rival gang member or

someone who is not part of the gang culture. He opined that if

someone called Watts “cuz” while talking to him, it would have

been a sign of disrespect, and it also could have been used to

let Watts know with whom he was dealing and to instill fear in

him. 

4. Perry’s arrest and incriminating statements; other evidence

On December 17, 2007, after searching for more than a year

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and a half, Perry was located and arrested in Escondido. 

Escondido police officers transported Perry to the San Diego

Police Department. Detective Pendleton testified that while

Perry was waiting to be transported to the county jail, Perry said

he did not want to “screw himself.” Perry’s statement was not a

response to any question or statement made by Detective

Pendleton. Perry also stated, “This was accidental.” 

At trial, Wheeler stated he and Watts had gone to the mall in

Oceanside about three weeks before Watts was killed. They

talked to an African-American male with a doo-rag. Wheeler

testified it was the same male he saw in a lineup about a month

before trial, and he did not tell the police that it looked like the

same person because it just came to him as he was testifying. 

Wheeler also testified he picked Perry out of a live lineup, but

that he could not tell the jury Perry was the shooter because he

was not “110 percent sure” it was him; he picked out Perry in

the lineup because he recognized Perry from seeing him in

court. Wheeler also stated that when he was at a mall in

Oceanside, he saw a person who looked like Perry talking to

Watts.

. . . .

(Lodgment No. 5 at 3-10.)

The California Court of Appeal provided the following background

regarding Petitioner’s Doyle error claim:

1. Defense exclusion motion and related Evidence Code section

402 hearing

Before trial, Petitioner moved for exclusion of evidence of the

statements he made after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right

to remain silent. The court conducted a pretrial hearing under

[California] Evidence Code section 402 to determine whether

Perry’s post- invocation statements were admissible.

The sole witness, Detective Pendleton, testified that Escondido

Police Department officers arrested Perry and transported him

to the San Diego Police Department headquarters. Detective

Pendleton and his partner, Detective Beard, attempted to

interview Perry there. He first read to Perry his Miranda rights. Detective Pendleton stated that when he asked Perry whether

he was willing to talk to him, Perry asked for an attorney; and,

after discussing Perry’s request, Detective Pendleton stopped

the interview. 

Detective Pendleton stated that after Perry went through the

booking process, which lasted about 15 to 20 minutes, he was

placed in a holding cell for another 15 to 20 minutes while

Detective Pendleton completed the booking paperwork. While

Perry was in the holding cell, he asked Detective Pendleton

how he could give the detective information about what

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happened. Detective Pendleton gave Perry his business card

and told him he could have his attorney call him (Detective

Pendleton). Detective Pendleton stated that, during this time,

he did not ask Perry any questions about the shooting.

After the booking process and paperwork were complete,

Detective Pendleton walked with Perry to the sally port–a

secure garage-like area where police cars drive through to drop

off and pick up prisoners–and put him in a patrol car to be

transported to the county jail. However, Perry had left with his

personal property a phone number he wanted, so he asked

Detective Pendleton to find it for him. Detective Pendleton took

Perry out of the patrol car and had him sit at a table so they

could look through his personal property for the phone number.

After Perry sat down at the table, he said he did not want to

screw himself. Perry’s statement was not prompted by any

questions from Detective Pendleton. 

Detective Pendleton then asked Perry whether he now wanted

to talk to him, and told Perry that if he did want to talk, he

(Detective Pendleton) would have to take Perry upstairs again

to re-admonish him. Perry said, “No, this was an accident.”

Detective Pendleton testified he replied that he did not “see it

as accidental,” and the word “it” referred to the shooting. Perry

responded, “There was a witness,” and Detective Pendleton

replied, “We [have] spoke[n] to a lot of witnesses.” In turn,

Perry said, “You guys are trying to put me [in] jail.”

After Detective Pendleton was excused, and before hearing

oral argument, the court indicated that Perry’s statement, “[T]his

was an accident,” appeared to be an admissible spontaneous

statement. 

The prosecutor argued that Perry’s first statement about not

wanting to screw himself was made without any questions from

Detective Pendleton, and both this statement and Perry’s

subsequent statement that “this was an accident” were

admissible because they were voluntary, spontaneous

statements. The prosecutor also argued there was no danger

of error under Doyle [v. Ohio], 426 U.S. 610, because Perry volunteered his statements. Defense counsel essentially

submitted on his motion papers and Detective Pendleton’s

testimony.

a. Court’s ruling

The court denied Perry’s motion to exclude evidence of his

post-invocation statements, finding there were no “Miranda [or] due process violations” and stating it was prepared to allow the

prosecution to introduce the statement “this was an accident” in

the People's case-in-chief.

//

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2. Opening statements

During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that

when Perry was about to be transported to jail, he told

Detective Pendleton that he did not want to screw himself. The

prosecutor later added, “[Y]ou will hear about [Perry’s]

admissions to the detective that this was an accident.” 

In his opening statement, defense counsel replied: 

“Now you will hear about Mr. Perry’s arrest. And

they will say, well, he made this statement, ‘This is

accidental.’ Mr. Perry supposedly was in the sally

port waiting to be transported to jail and he

supposedly made this statement that was not

recorded. I’m not even sure it’s accurate. And who

knows even what it means. [¶] If you think he’s

talking about the crime charged, assuming he was

even advised of the crime charged, assuming he

was talking about that, it might indicate he knew

something about this, and Mr. Perry–we’re not

denying he touched the car. We’re not denying that

maybe he even knew some of the players involved,

but what we are denying and what we are saying,

they can’t prove that he entered the car and shot

Mr. Watts.” 

3. The court’s rulings and Detective Pendleton’s testimony during

the prosecution’s case-in-chief

During the People’s case-in-chief, outside the presence of the

jury and over defense counsel’s objection under Doyle v. Ohio,

supra, 426 U.S. 610, the court ruled that Perry’s two statements were admissible as spontaneous admissions.

. . . .

Following [a] chambers conference and in front of the jury, the

following exchange took place between the prosecutor and

Detective Pendleton:

“[The prosecutor]: Detective Pendleton, you testified that the

defendant told you that he didn’t want to screw himself, right?

“[Detective Pendleton]: Correct.

“[The prosecutor]: And that wasn’t in response to any question

that you asked him, right?

“[Detective Pendleton]: No.

“[The prosecutor]: Or any statement that you made to him,

right?

“[Detective Pendleton]: Right.

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“[The prosecutor]: And after hi[s] telling you that he didn’t want

to screw himself, and I would like you to answer yes or no if you

can, after hi[s] telling you that, did he say to you this was

accidental?

“[Detective Pendleton]: Yes.”

4. Prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal arguments

During his closing argument, the prosecutor referred three

times to Perry’s two post-invocation self-incriminating

statements. First, he told the jury, “Didn’t the defendant tell the

police he didn’t want to screw himself and that this was an

accident almost a year and a half after this statement would ever have been made when he was arrested?” (Italics added.)

Second, the prosecutor stated that Perry was “taken to the police,

[Detective Pendleton] gets his booking . . . information. And when

they are to part ways, [Perry], while he was told why he is being

arrested, once in Escondido, arrested for the murder of Spencer

Watts–and, again, in San Diego, that he was arrested for that College

Grove shooting, [Perry] says he didn’t want to screw himself and this

was accidental.” (Italics added.)

Last, the prosecutor told the jury, “[I]t’s running through

[Perry’s] mind should I talk to the detective, should I not talk to

him, I don’t want to screw myself. And he tells the detective

that and then he tells him that’s accidental and that’s the

evidence you have. Another statement made by the defendant. 

No reason why the detective would make it up. That connects

him to the case. Another incriminating statement.” (Italics

added.)

During his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor again referred to

Perry’s two post-invocation self-incriminating statements. 

Specifically, the prosecutor argued that, in order to agree with

the defense theory that Perry did not shoot Watts, the jury

“would have to conclude that [Perry’s] statement[s] to [Detective

Pendleton] that it was an accident and he didn’t want to screw

himself had nothing to do with the homicide.” (Italics added.)

(Lodgment No. 5 at 10-17.)

III. Procedural Background

On March 19, 2009, the District Attorney for the County of San Diego

filed an Amended Information charging Petitioner with one count of murder

and two counts of robbery. (CT at 5-8.) On February 4, 2010, a jury found

Petitioner guilty of first degree felony murder of Spencer Watts with use of

a firearm (count 1); attempted robbery of Spencer Watts with use of a

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firearm (count 2); and robbery of Keenan Wheeler with use of a firearm

(count 3). (Id. at 103-06.) Petitioner was sentenced on March 16, 2010 to

an indeterminate term of 50 years to life plus 23 years. (Id. at 221-23.) 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One (“California Court of Appeal”). (Lodgment

No. 3.) On January 31, 2012, in an unpublished opinion, the California

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Lodgment No. 5.)3

 Petitioner then

filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which was

denied without comment on April 25, 2012. (Lodgment Nos. 6, 7.) 

On October 15, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Respondent filed an Answer on December 17, 2012. (Doc. No. 7.)

Petitioner did not file a Traverse. 

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Habeas corpus is a "'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction

through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786

(2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)). A

federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only

on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas courts

may not "reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." 

3

The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to amend the sentencing minute order to reflect that the 23-year determinate

term it imposed as to count 3 was to be served concurrently to the term it

imposed as to count 1. (Lodgment No. 5 at 33.)

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Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S.

74, 76 (2005) ("[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal

court sitting in habeas corpus.") 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")

governs review of Petitioner's claims because he filed his federal habeas

petition after that statute's 1996 effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 322-23 (1997). AEDPA imposes a "'highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings,'” requiring "that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7). "AEDPA prevents

defendants–and federal courts–from using federal habeas corpus review

as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." 

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). "As a condition for obtaining

habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the

state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. 

"By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on

the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1)

and (d)(2)." Id. at 784. Federal habeas relief is available under the first

exception if the state court result "was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (distinguishing the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

"contrary to" test from its "unreasonable application" test). To be found an

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"unreasonable application" of the precedent, the state court decision must

have been "more than incorrect or erroneous"; it "must have been

'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003)

(citations omitted); Renico, 559 U.S. at 779. A lack of holdings from the

Supreme Court on the issue presented precludes relief under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006); see also Moses v.

Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[W]hen a Supreme Court

decision does not 'squarely address[] the issue in th[e] case’ . . . it cannot

be said, under AEDPA, there is 'clearly established' Supreme Court

precedent addressing the issue . . .," and a federal habeas court "must

defer to the state court's decision.") (citations omitted). Section "2254(d)

mandates that only Supreme Court precedential holdings clearly establish

a right, [but] our circuit precedent may provide persuasive authority for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent." Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d

757, 767 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Under the second AEDPA exception, habeas relief is available only if

the state court based its result "on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)

("Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear

and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision

adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding, § 2254(d)(2)"). The question "is not whether a federal court

believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that

determination was unreasonable–a substantially higher threshold." Schriro

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v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

Federal courts apply AEDPA standards to the "last reasoned

decision" by a state court. Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.

2005); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) ("Where

there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim

[are presumed to] rest upon the same ground."). Federal habeas courts

reviewing prisoners' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 "must assess the

prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under

the 'substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in" Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121

(2007); see also Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000)

(stating that the Ninth Circuit applies the Brecht harmless error standard

"uniformly in all federal habeas corpus cases under § 2254"). Thus, even if

constitutional error occurred, the petitioner must still demonstrate actual

prejudice, that is, that the error "had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38.

B. Doyle Error Claim 

Petitioner raised his Doyle error claim in his petition for review filed in

the California Supreme Court on direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 6.) That

court denied the claim without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 7.) 

Accordingly, this Court must “look through” the state supreme court’s denial

to the state appellate court’s opinion as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501

U.S. at 801-06. In denying Petitioner’s Doyle error claim, the California

Court of Appeal stated: 

Here, relying on Bushyhead4

 and what Perry calls the “explanatory refusal doctrine,” under which he asserts “the

entire manner of a defendant’s invocation is constitutionally

4

United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001).

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protected and cannot be introduced at trial,” Perry contends his

statements to Detective Pendleton in the sally port–“I don’t want

to screw myself” and “it was an accident”–were inadmissible

“explanatory invocations” protected by the Fifth Amendment.

We conclude Bushyhead is not persuasive and decline to follow it. There, the defendant (Bushyhead) claimed on appeal from

his first degree murder conviction that the trial court violated the

Fifth Amendment and committed reversible Doyle error when it

(1) permitted an FBI agent to testify that, after Bushyhead was

arrested but before he received Miranda warnings, he told the agent, “I have nothing to say, I’m going to get the death penalty

anyway” (Bushyhead, supra, 270 F.3d at pp. 907, 908, italics added); and (2) allowed the prosecutor to comment on this

statement in both his opening statement and closing argument. 

(Id. at pp. 911-912.) Citing Wainwright,

5 supra, . . ., for the proposition that “a person’s statement invoking his right to

silence is part of the ‘silence’ that must be protected”

(Bushyhead, at p. 913), and concluding that Bushyhead’s statement “was not an unsolicited confession but the invocation

of silence itself” (id. at p. 912), the Ninth Circuit held in Bushyhead that the trial court “impermissibly infringed on Bushyhead’s right to silence (ibid.) by “admitting the testimony of [the agent] about Bushyhead’s statement and . . . allowing

the prosecutor to comment on this statement..” [Footnote and

citation omitted.]

In support of its holding, the Bushyhead court commented that, “[j]ust as a prosecutor at trial cannot use the fact of defendant’s

post-Miranda silence, he also cannot use a statement such as ‘I’m not going to say anything’ or ‘I’m not saying anything until

my lawyer gets here.’” (Bushyhead, supra, 270 F.3d at p. 913.) We agree with both this portion of the Bushyhead court’s

analysis and its holding that the trial court committed Doyle error by admitting evidence of, and allowing the prosecutor to

comment upon, Bushyhead’s first statement, “I have nothing to

say,” as this was an unequivocal statement of a desire to

remain silent protected by the Fifth Amendment. [Citations

omitted.]

However, we do not agree with the Bushyhead court’s

conclusion that the trial court in that case also committed Doyle error by admitting evidence of, and allowing the prosecutor to

comment upon, what Perry refers to as the “explanatory

portion” of Bushyhead’s statements: “I’m going to get the death

penalty anyway.” (See Bushyhead, supra, 270 F.3d at p. 913.) In support of this portion of its holding, the Ninth Circuit cited

Wainwright, supra, 474 U.S. 284, United States v. Whitehead

(9th Cir. 2000) 200 F.3d 634 (Whitehead), and United States v.

Velarde-Gomez (9th Cir. 2001) 269 F.3d 1023 (Velarde) for the proposition that “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination

prevents the government’s use at trial of evidence of a

defendant’s silence–not merely the silence itself, but the

5

Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986).

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circumstances of that silence as well. The entirety of

Bushyhead’s statement was an invocation of his right to silence

and is therefore protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination.” (Bushyhead, supra, 270 F.3d at p. 913, italics added.) In our view, the Bushyhead defendant’s

second “explanatory” statement–“I’m going to get the death

penalty anyway”–did not constitute an invocation of his

constitutional right to silence as it was neither a “statement of a

desire to remain silent [nor a statement] of a desire to remain

silent until an attorney has been consulted” (Wainwright, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 295, fn. 13), even though it immediately followed

his first statement–“I have nothing to say”–which was an

unequivocal invocation of his right to silence. Thus, this second

statement was not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination. Accordingly, we disagree with the

Bushyhead court’s conclusion that “[t]he entirety of Bushyhead’s statement,” including the statement that “I’m going

to get the death penalty anyway,” was a protected invocation of

the right to silence. (See Bushyhead, at p. 913.) 

For these same reasons, we are also not persuaded by the

Ninth Circuit’s additional conclusion that the Bushyhead defendant’s second statement, “I’m going to get the death

penalty anyway,” was a constitutionally protected

“circumstance” of his “silence.” (See Bushyhead, supra, 270 F.2d at p. 913.) 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 20-22.) The Court of Appeal then went on to

distinguish Wainwright, Whitehead, and Velarde, cited above. (Id. at 22-

23.) The state appellate court then continued:

We also conclude Perry’s reliance on Doyle is misplaced. Here, the court did not allow the prosecutor to use at trial

Perry’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to silence. As

discussed, the court found, and we agree, that Perry’s

statements were spontaneous statements, the admission into

evidence of which did not constitute Doyle error. Detective

Pendleton’s testimony during the Evidence Code section 402

hearing shows that about 30 to 40 minutes after he gave the

Miranda warnings to Perry and stopped the interview when Perry asked for an attorney, Perry spontaneously stated in the

sally port area that he did not want to screw himself. Detective

Pendleton stated he had not asked Perry any questions before

Perry made this statement. Detective Pendleton testified he

then asked Perry whether he now wanted to talk to him and told

Perry that if he did want to talk, he (Detective Pendleton) would

have to take Perry upstairs again to re-admonish him. Perry

replied, “No, this was an accident.” Perry’s statement, “No,” in

response to Detective Pendleton[‘s] question whether he

(Perry) wanted to talk to him was an unequivocal invocation of

Perry’s constitutional right to remain silent. However, his

statement that “it [(the shooting)] was an accident,” like his

statement that he did not want to screw himself, was not an

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invocation of Perry’s constitutional right to remain silent. The

record shows both statements were spontaneous, voluntary,

and thus admissible statements. For all of the foregoing

reasons, we conclude the court did not commit Doyle error. 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 23-24.) Finally, the Court of Appeal concluded: 

Even if we were to conclude the court committed constitutional

Doyle error, and we do not, we would also conclude any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the

applicable harmless-error standard. [Citations omitted.] The

prosecution presented overwhelming evidence . . ., apart from

the evidence of his two self-incriminating statements to

Detective Pendleton, from which any reasonable jury could find

Perry was the shooter who murdered Watts. Wheeler’s

description of the shooter, the discovery of Perry’s fingerprints

on the rear driver’s side of Watts’s car, the evidence of Perry’s

confession . . . to Winfield at a party that Stanley attended,

Perry’s stipulated South Oceanside Gangster Crips gang

membership at the time of the shooting, and Wheeler’s

testimony showing the shooter (who sat behind Watts)

identified himself as a “Crip,” amply support Perry’s convictions

in this matter.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 24-25.) 

Under Doyle, clearly established federal law provides that the use at

trial of a defendant’s post-arrest silence, after receiving Miranda warnings,

violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doyle,

426 U.S. at 619. Because a defendant in custody must be advised of his

right to remain silent under Miranda, the Doyle court concluded that a

defendant’s silence in the face of these warnings “may be nothing more

than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights.” Id. at 617. The

Supreme Court further clarified in Wainwright v. Greenfield that “[w]ith

respect to post-Miranda warnings ‘silence,’ . . . silence does not mean only

muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as

of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.” 

Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 295 n.13. In United States v. Bushyhead, the

Ninth Circuit relied on the aforementioned Wainwright excerpt in stating

that “a person’s statement invoking his right to silence is part of the

‘silence’ that must be protected.” Bushyhead, 270 F.3d at 913. 

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In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner primarily relied upon

Bushyhead to argue that his statements were “explanatory invocations,”

that is, that they were part of the circumstances of his invocation of his right

to remain silent, and as such, were protected by the Fifth Amendment. 

(See Lodgment No. 3 at 19-35 & Lodgment No. 5 at 20.) The California

Court of Appeal declined to follow Bushyhead, finding it unpersuasive and

finding Petitioner’s reliance on Bushyhead misplaced. (Lodgment No. 5 at

20, 23.) The state court’s rejection and distinguishing of Bushyhead was

not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority, as its

determination that only the portion of a post-Miranda statement that

unequivocally invokes the right to remain silent, i.e., Petitioner’s “No”

response when Detective Pendleton asked him whether he now wanted to

talk and that if he did, he would need to be re-admonished, is protected by

the Fifth Amendment was not an unreasonable application of Doyle, which

is primarily concerned with protecting a defendant’s ability to invoke his

Miranda rights without fear that exercising those rights will be used against

him. The state appellate court reasonably found that the trial court’s

exclusion of “No,” but admission into evidence of the remainder of the

subject statements, adequately protected Petitioner’s right to invoke his

Fifth Amendment right to silence. Because federal courts can grant

habeas relief only when a state court’s decision conflicts with clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, Doyle cannot provide Petitioner with

a basis for federal habeas relief. 

The state court’s determination that no Doyle error was committed

because both of Petitioner’s statements were made voluntarily and

spontaneously was also not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Detective Pendleton’s testimony showed that he

gave Petitioner the Miranda warnings and stopped his interview when

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Petitioner requested an attorney. It was 30 to 40 minutes after stopping the

interview when Petitioner spontaneously stated in the sally port that he did

not want to “screw himself.” No questioning prompted Petitioner to make

the statement. (Lodgment No. 5 at 23.) Detective Pendleton responded to

Petitioner’s statement by asking Petitioner whether he now wanted to talk

to him and if stating that if so, they would need to go upstairs so Petitioner

could be re-admonished. Petitioner responded “No,” invoking his right to

remain silent, and immediately voluntarily and spontaneously continued,

“this was an accident.” As the record shows both of Petitioner’s statements

were spontaneous and voluntary, their admission at trial did not violate

Doyle. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (providing that when a suspect fails

to remain silent after being given Miranda warnings, whatever he says can

be used against him at trial); Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 (same). 

2. Even if a Doyle Error Occurred, It Was Harmless

“In federal habeas proceedings, harmless error analysis requires

federal courts to determine’ whether the error had substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Cudjo v. Ayers, 698

F.3d 752, 768 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Brecht, 407 U.S. at 637). “The

overwhelming majority of trial errors . . . do not trigger habeas relief” unless

such “substantial or injurious effect or influence” is shown, “or unless the

judge ‘is in grave doubt’ about the harmlessness of the error.” Medina v.

Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing O’Neal v. McAninch,

513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)). 

Here, as the state appellate court found, the admission of Petitioner’s

two post-invocation statements did not have a substantial or injurious effect

on the jury’s verdict because of the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt apart from

the statements in question, including Wheeler’s description of the shooter,

the discovery of Petitioner’s fingerprints on the rear driver’s side of Watts’s

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car, the evidence of Petitioner’s confession to Winfield at a party attended

by Stanley, Petitioner’s stipulated South Oceanside Gangster Crips gang

membership at the time of the shooting, and the evidence that the shooter

identified himself as a Crip. (See Lodgment No. 5 at 24-25.) Given this

evidence, no grave doubts exist as to the harmlessness of any error to

admit the two statements in question, and habeas relief is not warranted. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the California Court of

Appeal’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law, nor was its decision based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented,

and Petitioner’s habeas claim should be denied.

V. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to

federal habeas relief under the applicable legal standards. Therefore, the

undersigned magistrate judge hereby recommends that the Petition be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Larry A. Burns, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later

than October 24, 2013, any party may file written objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later than

November 7, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

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Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 3, 2013

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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