Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01015/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01015-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BAY M., for Anthony M. (deceased), 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW M. SAUL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant. 

 Case No.: 18-cv-01015-W (JLB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

JOINT MOTION FOR JUDICIAL 

REVIEW OF FINAL DECISION OF 

THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY 

(ECF Nos. 16, 17) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Thomas J. Whelan, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On May 21, 2018, plaintiff Bay M. (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of Anthony M. 

(“Claimant”), her deceased husband, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

                                               

1

 Andrew M. Saul, the new Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is hereby 

substituted as the defendant in this case per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). 

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seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying his 

application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision is the parties’ Joint Motion for 

Judicial Review of Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. (ECF Nos. 16, 

17.)2

 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that that Judgment be 

entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with 

prejudice. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about February 21, 2014, Claimant filed an application for a period of 

disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging 

disability since September 30, 2011. (Certified Administrative Record [“AR”] 254-60.) 

After his application was denied initially and upon reconsideration (AR 154-58, 160-65), 

Claimant requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 

(AR 166-67). 

On July 13, 2016, Claimant passed away. (AR 293.) Thereafter, Plaintiff requested 

to be substituted in for her deceased husband and to proceed with the administrative 

hearing. (AR 202-04, 212.) An administrative hearing was held on August 29, 2016 and 

a supplemental administrative hearing was held on December 21, 2016. (AR 38-77, 78-

125.) Plaintiff appeared at the initial hearing with counsel, and testimony was taken from 

her and a vocational expert (“VE”). (AR 38-77.) Plaintiff also appeared at the 

                                               

2

 The Court notes that the parties’ final deadline to submit the Joint Motion for 

Judicial Review was February 8, 2019. (ECF No. 15.) However, despite being granted 

over three months of additional time, the parties did not file the Joint Motion for Judicial 

Review until March 15, 2019, over a month late. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) Even then, the parties 

did not manage to file a “joint” motion. Each party filed their own version of the Joint 

Motion for Judicial Review, each of which is substantially similar, but not identical, and 

each is signed by only the filing party. (See id.) The Court has considered both versions 

of the Joint Motion, but in this Order the Court will refer to the version filed at ECF No. 

16, unless otherwise necessary. 

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supplemental hearing with the same counsel and testimony was taken from her, a different 

VE, and a medical expert. (AR 78-125.) 

As reflected in his April 5, 2017 hearing decision, the ALJ found that Claimant had 

not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from his alleged onset 

date through July 13, 2016, the date of his death. (AR 12-34.) The ALJ’s decision became 

the final decision of the Commissioner on March 20, 2018, when the Appeals Council 

denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) This timely civil action followed. 

II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At Step One, the ALJ found that Claimant 

did not engage in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date of September 30, 

2011 through the date of his death. (AR 17.) 

At Step Two, the ALJ found that Claimant had the following severe impairments: 

diabetes mellitus, diabetic retinopathy, bilateral retinal detachment and related visual 

impairments. (AR 17.) The ALJ further identified the following nonsevere medically 

determinable impairments: hypertension, diabetic nephropathy, and affective disorder. 

(AR 17-21.) 

At Step Three, the ALJ found that Claimant did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments from the alleged onset date through the date 

of death. (AR 21.) 

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Next, the ALJ determined that Claimant had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c), with the 

following additional limitations: 

frequent climbing of ramps and stairs; frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling, 

crouching, and crawling; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; must 

avoid all exposure to hazards (such as moving machinery, unprotected 

heights); no driving; cannot read normal size print; limited to no depth 

perception and occasional near acuity (where near acuity is defined as close 

up work requiring the ability to distinguish shape, size, and nature of small 

objects such as nuts, bolts, and screws by viewing them); and occasional far 

acuity. 

(AR 22.) 

At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Claimant was unable to perform any past 

relevant work. (AR 26.) 

At Step Five, based on the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with 

Claimant’s vocational profile and RFC could perform the requirements of representative 

occupations such as a dining room attendant, hotel housekeeper, and cafeteria attendant 

that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, the ALJ found that Claimant 

was not disabled. (AR 27-28.) 

III. DISPUTED ISSUES 

As reflected in the parties’ Joint Motion for Judicial Review of Final Decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security, the disputed issues that Plaintiff is raising as the grounds 

for reversal and remand are:3

1. Whether the ALJ erred in disregarding the opinions of Claimant’s 

treating physicians concerning Claimant’s physical impairments,

                                               

3

 Plaintiff’s arguments in the Joint Motion do not follow the identified disputed 

issues in a coherent manner. Accordingly, the Court will address each of the disputed 

issues raised in the Joint Motion in the order considered by the ALJ according to the 

Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process. 

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including diabetic retinopathy, peripheral neuropathy, vision loss, and 

diabetes.4

2. Whether the ALJ erroneously gave controlling weight to the Seagate 

consultative examiner. 

3. Whether the ALJ erred in finding Claimant’s mental impairment 

nonsevere and in disregarding the opinions of Claimant’s treating 

physicians concerning his mental impairments. 

4. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the lay witness statements of 

Claimant and his wife and whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

(ECF Nos. 16-1 at 11-12; 17 at 11-12.) 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

                                               

4

 Plaintiff does not identify in the Joint Motion which treating physician’s 

opinion concerning Claimant’s diabetes the ALJ erred in disregarding. However, to the 

extent Plaintiff is referring to the opinions of Dr. Lin, Dr. Gelber, Dr. Lessner, or Dr. 

Henderson as they relate to Claimant’s diabetic retinopathy and related vision loss, see 

ECF No. 17 at 8, 12-14, 61-62, the Court addresses the ALJ’s treatment of these opinions 

herein. Plaintiff also does not identify in the Joint Motion which treating physician’s 

opinion concerning Claimant’s peripheral neuropathy the ALJ erred in disregarding. In 

fact, although the ALJ did make a finding that “the objective findings in clinical 

examinations do not support peripheral neuropathy as a medically determinable 

impairment” (AR 18), the Joint Motion does not address Claimant’s peripheral neuropathy 

at all. Therefore, the Court does not treat this as a raised claim and does not address it in 

this Report and Recommendation. 

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“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

V. DISCUSSION 

A The ALJ’s Step Two Determination 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred at Step Two in finding Claimant’s mental 

impairment nonsevere. (ECF No. 16-1 at 32-34, 39-45, 54-59.) In making this finding, 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in giving controlling weight to a Seagate medical 

report regarding Claimant’s mental impairments and limitations to the exclusion of reports 

of Claimant’s treating and examining physicians, Dr. Henderson and Dr. Lessner. (Id.) 

 1. Legal Standard 

At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987)). An impairment or 

combination of impairments may be found “not severe only if the evidence establishes a 

slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to 

work.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-87 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d 

at 1290); see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988). The Commissioner 

has stated that “[i]f an adjudicator is unable to determine clearly the effect of an impairment 

or combination of impairments on the individual’s ability to do basic work activities, the 

sequential evaluation should not end with the not severe evaluation step.” Webb, 433 F.3d 

at 687 (quoting Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) No. 85-28). 

Step Two, then, is “a de minimis screening device [used] to dispose of groundless 

claims,” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290, and an ALJ may find that a claimant lacks a medically 

severe impairment or combination of impairments only when his conclusion is “clearly 

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established by medical evidence.” SSR 85-28; see also Yuckert, 841 F.2d at 306 (“Despite 

the deference usually accorded to the Secretary’s application of regulations, numerous 

appellate courts have imposed a narrow construction upon the severity regulation applied 

here.”). On review, a court must determine whether the ALJ had substantial evidence to 

find that the medical evidence clearly established that the claimant did not have a medically 

severe impairment or combination of impairments. See Webb, 433 F.3d at 687. 

 2. Background 

In this case, the ALJ determined that Claimant’s affective disorder was a medically 

determinable mental impairment, but concluded that this disorder “did not cause more than 

minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities and was 

therefore nonsevere.” (AR 19.) In making this determination, the ALJ evaluated the 

medical opinions and evaluations set forth below. 

 On May 23, 2014, Dr. Ana Maria Andia with Seagate Medical Group performed a 

Comprehensive Psychiatric Evaluation of Claimant. (AR 473-79.) Dr. Andia diagnosed 

Claimant with adjustment disorder with depressed mood, noting psychosocial stressors 

during the past year, including physical health issues and loss of employment, and assessed 

him as having a GAF score of 62. (AR 478.) Based on her examination, Dr. Andia gave 

Claimant the following functional assessment: (1) he is able to understand, remember, and 

carry out simple one- or two-step job instructions; (2) he is mildly limited in his ability to 

do detailed and complex instructions due to his depressive symptoms; (3) he is able to 

relate and interact with coworkers and the public; (4) he is mildly limited in his ability to 

maintain concentration and attention, persistence, and pace due to depressive symptoms; 

(5) he is able to accept instructions from supervisors; (6) he is able to maintain regular 

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attendance in the work place and perform work activities on a consistent basis; and (7) he 

is able to perform work activities without special or additional supervision. (AR 478-79.)5

 At Step Two, in evaluating whether Claimant’s affective disorder was a severe 

impairment, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Andia. (AR 18-19.) The ALJ 

summarized Dr. Andia’s opinion as follows: 

In a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation performed by Ana Maria Andia, 

M.D., in May 2014, the claimant reported daily moderate symptoms of feeling 

sad, decreased appetite, low energy, problems with memory and 

concentration, and insomnia, noting his response to treatment had been fair 

([AR 474]). However, the claimant told Dr. Andia that his ability to work had 

not been affected by these symptoms, but rather by his physical problems; he 

noted that he had made attempts to return to work, but he could not find 

employment. He also stated his symptoms did not limit his daily activities. 

Id. The claimant told Dr. Andia that he likes to go out to the gym and exercise, 

and his hobbies are working out ([AR 475]). 

Dr. Andia diagnosed adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and alcohol 

abuse allegedly in full, sustained remission. She opined that the claimant was 

able to: understand, remember and carry out simple one or two-step job 

instructions; relate and interact with coworkers and the public; accept 

instructions from supervisors; maintain regular attendance in the workplace 

and perform work activities on a consistent basis; and perform work activities 

without special or additional supervision. She also opined he was mildly 

limited in his ability to carry out detailed and complex instructions, and 

                                               

5

 Plaintiff asks the Court to reject Dr. Andia’s opinion as structurally biased, 

contending that the Commissioner’s reliance on Seagate is “controversial” and Seagate’s 

reports are “dubious.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 32-34.) Plaintiff purports to attach an affidavit 

from Mary Mitchell to the Joint Motion, but no such affidavit is attached to either Joint 

Motion filed in this case. (See ECF Nos. 16, 17.) However, as the purported statements 

of Ms. Mitchell claiming the Seagate reports are biased apparently do not relate specifically 

to Dr. Andia or to this particular case, the Court finds that the affidavit is irrelevant. See 

Alzayadie v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-1886-JLS JMA, 2010 WL 3169592, at *16 (S.D. Cal. July 

26, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 3169591 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2010); see also ECF No. 18-

2, Ta v. Colvin, 14-cv-02487-MMA (BGS) (S.D. Cal.) (Mitchell Affidavit). Moreover, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that Dr. Andia’s opinion in this case was 

biased. Accordingly, the Court will treat it as any other opinion by an examining physician. 

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maintain concentration and attention, persistence and pace due to depressive 

symptoms ([AR 478-79]). 

(AR 18-19.) The ALJ did not thereafter assign any particular weight to Dr. Andia’s 

opinion. However, the ALJ relied heavily on Dr. Andia’s opinions, as discussed below, in 

determining that Claimant’s mental impairment was nonsevere. 

 In determining that Claimant’s mental impairment was nonsevere, the ALJ explicitly 

rejected the opinions of Dr. Harry C. Henderson, Claimant’s treating psychiatrist. (AR 

18.) In an opinion dated March 25, 2014, Dr. Henderson diagnosed Claimant with “major 

depression, recurrent.” (AR 768.) Dr. Henderson opined that Claimant had “marked 

restriction of activities of daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning 

and often deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to complete 

tasks in a timely manner in work settings or elsewhere.” (AR 768.) Dr. Henderson noted 

that Claimant was taking strong and potent narcotic medications to control his pain and 

depression and was experiencing chronic fatigue and sedation due to residual effects of 

narcotics medications. (AR 768.) Dr. Henderson opined that Claimant’s chronic fatigue 

and sedation, as well as his pain and inability to remember and concentrate contributed to 

his overall impairment. (AR 768.) Dr. Henderson further opined that Claimant’s ability 

to adapt to stresses in the working environment was severely limited and not sustainable in 

the workplace. (AR 768.) Dr. Henderson added that Claimant would not be able to 

compete in the workplace and was in need of continued therapy. (AR 768.) 

The ALJ found that Dr. Henderson’s opinions were not supported by the record as a 

whole, including Claimant’s reported activities of daily living. (AR 18.) He further found 

that (1) the record does not contain consistent and substantially abnormal mental status 

examination findings, (2) formal psychiatric treatment appears to have been quite 

intermittent in the record as a whole, and (3) the record contains no evidence of psychiatric 

emergency room visits or inpatient admissions. (AR 18.) 

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In his discussion at Step Two, the ALJ also addressed a psychological evaluation 

performed by Milton Lessner, Ph.D.,6

 in August 2014. (AR 19 (citing AR 480-90).) The 

ALJ noted that Dr. Lessner diagnosed Claimant with major depression with psychotic 

features, and passive-aggressive personality disorder, and assessed him with a Global 

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 40, suggesting significant difficulty 

functioning. (AR 19, 489.) The ALJ did not accord any specific weight to the evaluation 

of Dr. Lessner because he “did not assess any specific limitations in his mental residual 

functional capacity.” (AR 19.) The ALJ specifically did not accord substantial weight to 

the assessed GAF score of 40 because the “GAF scale is no longer used to assess global 

functioning.” (AR 19 n.1.) 

 3. Analysis 

To support a finding that an impairment is not severe, the ALJ must (1) carefully 

evaluate the medical findings that describe the impairment, which include “the objective 

medical evidence and any impairment-related symptoms”; and (2) make an informed 

judgment about the limitations and restrictions the impairment and related symptoms 

impose on the individual’s physical and mental ability to do basic work activities. SSR 96-

3P. 

In evaluating the severity of mental impairments, an ALJ is required to follow a 

special psychiatric review technique at each level of the administrative review process. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a); see also Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 725 

(9th Cir. 2011). Once an ALJ determines that the claimant has a medically determinable 

mental impairment, he must rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the 

impairment in four broad functional areas: Understand, remember, or apply information; 

interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage oneself. 

                                               

6

 The ALJ refers to Dr. Lessner as Dr. Milton. (See AR 19.) As Dr. Lessner’s 

opinion indicates that his name is Milton Lessner, the Court will refer to him Dr. Lessner 

in this Order. (See AR 480-90.) 

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20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b), (c). In rating the degree of limitation, the ALJ uses the 

following five-point scale: none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520a(c)(4). If the ALJ rates the degrees of the claimant’s limitation as “none” or 

“mild,” the impairment is generally considered not severe, unless the evidence otherwise 

indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to do basic 

work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d). 

Here, the ALJ assessed the four areas of mental functioning, known as the 

“paragraph B” criteria, finding that Claimant had only “mild” limitation in each area, and 

therefore his medically determinable mental impairment was not severe. (AR 19-20.) In 

assessing each area, the ALJ relied exclusively on Dr. Andia’s medical opinions and 

Claimant’s own statements. (AR 19-20.) The ALJ did not consider Dr. Henderson’s 

opinions, or the objective findings of Dr. Lessner. Accordingly, the Court turns to address 

whether the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Henderson’s opinions and failing to consider Dr. 

Lessner’s evaluation. 

 a. Legal Standard 

Medical opinions are among the evidence that the ALJ considers when assessing a 

claimant’s ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). Case law distinguishes among 

the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who directly treated the claimant 

(treating physicians), (2) those who examined but did not treat the claimant (examining 

physicians), and (3) those who did neither (nonexamining physicians). Lester v. Chater, 

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). The medical opinion of a 

claimant’s treating physician is given “controlling weight” so long as it “is well-supported 

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not 

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” Trevizo 

v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). 

“When a treating physician’s opinion is not controlling, it is weighted according to factors 

such as the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature 

and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, and 

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specialization of the physician.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6)). Greater 

weight is also given to the “opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her 

area of specialty.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(5)). 

 If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s 

opinion, as is the case here, “an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 

F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 

1998) (“[The] reasons for rejecting a treating doctor’s credible opinion on disability are 

comparable to those required for rejecting a treating doctor’s medical opinion.”). “The 

ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 

F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

“The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a 

treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831 (emphasis in original). However, “[o]pinions 

of a nonexamining, testifying medical advisor may serve as substantial evidence when they 

are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with it.” Morgan v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 

53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 b. Dr. Henderson 

In his opinion dated March 25, 2014, Dr. Henderson represented that he had been 

treating Claimant on a bi-monthly basis since October 2012 for depression and psychosis 

due to sudden blindness and diabetic retinopathy. (AR 766.) Therefore, although the 

record contains only three treatment records of Dr. Henderson, there is evidence he treated 

Claimant bimonthly for over a year and was continuing to treat Claimant through at least 

November 2014. (See AR 18, 339, 359, 386-87, 766-71.) Dr. Henderson opined that 

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Claimant “exhibited all the typical effects of depression and hopelessness.” (AR 766.) 

Dr. Henderson further opined that Claimant was “having frequent panic attacks, and bouts 

of hallucinations” and there was “evidence of psychosis and schizophrenia as he was 

haunted by instances of abuse.” (AR 767.) Dr. Henderson noted that “[p]ain, depression 

and recurrent obsessive thoughts interfere with concentration and attention,” highlighting 

the fact that Claimant could not “recall three nouns after three minutes” and could not 

“perform serial 3s,” while his ability to concentrate upon even simple new tasks was poor. 

(AR 767.) Dr. Henderson’s treatment notes also indicate that Claimant was being treated 

with medication. (See AR 769-70.) As set forth above, Dr. Henderson concluded that 

Claimant had “marked restriction of activities of daily living, marked difficulties in 

maintaining social functioning and often deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace 

resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner in work settings or elsewhere.” 

(AR 768.) 

The first reason cited by the ALJ for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Henderson was 

that his statements were not supported by the “claimant’s reported activities of daily 

living.” (AR 18.) Inconsistency between a physician’s opinion and a claimant’s daily 

activities suffices as a specific and legitimate reason for discounting a treating physician’s 

opinion if supported by substantial evidence from the record as a whole. See Ghanim v. 

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014); Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600-02. 

In his decision, the ALJ noted Dr. Henderson’s statement that Claimant had “become 

withdrawn and had difficulty connecting with others; he stayed home by himself all day 

and did not go out or have any social function.” (AR 18 (citing AR 766).) However, as 

the ALJ noted, Claimant told Dr. Andia that his ability to work had not been affected by 

his “symptoms of feeling sad, decreased appetite, low energy, problems with memory and 

concentration, and insomnia,” but rather by his physical problems. (AR 18 (citing AR 

474).) The ALJ further noted that Claimant informed Dr. Andia that “his symptoms did 

not limit his daily activities” and that “he like[d] to go out to the gym and exercise, and his 

hobbies [were] working out.” (AR 18 (citing AR 475).) In assessing Claimant’s ability to 

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interact with others, the ALJ noted that Claimant lived with his wife and parents and 

reported to Dr. Andia “getting along well with people at work, and having good 

relationships with family.” (AR 20 (citing AR 475).) The ALJ further noted Claimant’s 

own Function Report in which he stated that he “was able to relate and interact with 

coworkers and the public, and accept instructions from supervisors.” (AR 20 (citing AR 

307-15).) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ reasonably determined that 

Claimant was less affected by his memory and concentration problems and was more able 

to engage in daily activities and interact with others than suggested by Dr. Henderson. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that this was a specific and legitimate reason supported by 

substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Henderson’s opinions regarding Claimant’s 

restriction of activities of daily living, difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and 

deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. 

The next reason cited by the ALJ for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Henderson was 

that the record “does not contain consistent and substantially abnormal mental status 

examination findings.” (AR 18.) In his decision, the ALJ noted Dr. Henderson’s 

representation that he had been treating Claimant on a bi-monthly basis since October 2012 

for depression and psychosis due to sudden blindness and diabetic retinopathy. (AR 18 

(citing AR 766).) However, despite Dr. Henderson’s statement that he treated Claimant on 

a bi-monthly basis, the record only includes a single page of treatment notes from each of 

three separate appointments with Dr. Henderson. (See AR 386-87, 769-71.) The treatment 

notes are mostly illegible, but do not appear to include any mental status examinations. 

(See AR 386-87, 769-71.) The notes provide a space for the physician’s “Mental Status 

Examination” of the patient’s appearance, attitude, behavior, speech, affect, suicidality, 

homicidality, thought content, hallucinations, delusions, thought process, orientation, 

insight, and judgment. (See AR 386-87, 769-71.) Dr. Henderson did not document any 

findings in this space, but rather made a few notes under “Clinical Impression” which 

appear to be documentation of the claimant’s subjective complaints. (See AR 386-87, 769-

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71.) In addition to his own treating notes, Dr. Henderson stated in conclusory fashion that 

his opinions were also based on reports from Claimant and his review of Claimant’s 

medical records consisting of Scripps treating notes, ophthalmologist Dr. Lin’s treating 

notes, and Dr. Lessner’s psychological evaluation. (See AR 766-67.) 

“[A]n ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and 

unsupported by the record as a whole, . . . or by objective medical findings.” Batson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Tonapetyan v. 

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)). Here, although Dr. Henderson stated that he 

had been treating Claimant on a bi-monthly basis, the record only includes a single page 

of treatment notes from each of three separate appointments and those notes do not reflect 

any mental status examinations performed by Dr. Henderson. Dr. Henderson also stated 

that he relied on Claimant’s treatment notes from Scripps, including those from Dr. Lin. 

However, these notes almost exclusively concern Plaintiff’s physical ailments, e.g., his 

diabetes, hypertension, and vision loss. Dr. Henderson further stated that he relied on Dr. 

Lessner’s psychological evaluation. However, Dr. Henderson did not state which of Dr. 

Lessner’s findings he relied on in reaching his opinions. As Dr. Henderson’s opinions 

were conclusory, brief and unsupported by the record as a whole or objective medical 

findings, the Court finds that this was a specific and legitimate reason supported by 

substantial evidence for the ALJ to reject Dr. Henderson’s opinions. 

The final reasons cited by the ALJ for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Henderson were 

that “[f]ormal psychiatric treatment . . . appears to have been quite intermittent in the record 

as a whole” and there is “no evidence of psychiatric emergency room visits or inpatient 

admissions.” (AR 18.) As noted above, in his opinion dated March 25, 2014, Dr. 

Henderson represented that he had been treating Claimant on a bi-monthly basis since 

October 2012 for depression and psychosis due to sudden blindness and diabetic 

retinopathy, and the record indicates that he continued to see Claimant through at least 

November 2014. (See AR 18, 339, 359, 386-87, 766-71.) Therefore, although the record 

contains only three treatment records of Dr. Henderson and no documentation of any 

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emergency room visits or hospital stays, the Court does not find that this was a specific and 

legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Henderson’s opinions. 

Based on the foregoing, as the ALJ provided two specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in 

rejecting the opinions of Dr. Henderson in determining whether Claimant’s mental 

impairment was severe at Step Two. 

c. Dr. Lessner

Dr. Henderson referred Claimant to Dr. Lessner for a consultation. (AR 480.) On 

August 4, 2014, Dr. Lessner performed several tests on Claimant, including the Mooney 

Problem Check List, Rotter Incomplete Sentence Blank, Beck Depression Inventory, 

Bender Gestalt Test, and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”). 

(AR 485.) Dr. Lessner noted that Claimant “appeared to be confused and disoriented” and 

his “responses to the Infrequency [S]cale (Validity-MMPI-2) would show that he is deeply 

disturbed and in considerable turmoil.” (AR 485.) Dr. Lessner noted that Claimant’s 

“highest clinical scale score (8)(MMPI-2) would manifest that [Claimant] is in acute 

psychological despair.” (AR 486.) Dr. Lessner also noted that Claimant’s “2 coded clinical 

configuration (i/8) (MMPI-2) would show that [he] harbors feelings of hostility and 

aggression but is not able to express them in a modulated manner.” (AR 487.) Claimant’s 

“2 code configuration (8)(1) (MMPI-2)” also indicated that Claimant “harbors bizarre 

somatic complaints of a vague, weird dimension.” (AR 487.) In this regard, Dr. Lessner 

noted that Claimant had attacks in which he could not control his movements or speech but 

knew what was going on around him, as well as blank spells in which his activities were 

interrupted, and he did not know what was going on around him. (AR 488.) 

Dr. Lessner stated that the results of the Bender Gestalt Test suggested depression 

and indicated suspiciousness, paranoia, and obsessive-compulsive rigidity, as well as a 

tendency toward social alienation, repression, lack of sensitivity towards others, and low 

frustration tolerance. (AR 488-89.) Dr. Lessner also stated that there was evidence of 

psychotic conditions as reflected by Claimant’s erratic beliefs and hallucinatory behavior. 

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(AR 488.) In addition, Dr. Lessner noted that a feature that seemed to repeat itself 

throughout Claimant’s protocol was his “use of denial.” (AR 489.) Dr. Lessner stated that 

this was “emphatically reflected by his responses to the Beck Depression Inventory.” (AR 

489.) Dr. Lessner stated that “[j]udging by his choices of symptoms it would appear that 

[Claimant] is subtly covering up his dysthymic annoyances and disparities.” (AR 489.) 

As an example, Dr. Lessner stated that Claimant’s “remark that he has not lost interest in 

people did not match with his high scores in the social alienation scales (MMPI-2).” (AR 

489.) Dr. Lessner, as noted above, thereafter diagnosed Claimant with major depression 

with psychotic features and passive-aggressive personality disorder, and assessed him with 

a GAF score of 40. (AR 489.) 

Here, as noted above, the ALJ discussed Dr. Lessner’s opinion in brief detail but did 

not assign a specific weight to the opinion because Dr. Lessner “did not assess any specific 

limitations in [Claimant’s] mental residual functional capacity.” (AR 19.) The Court 

agrees with this assessment. While Dr. Lessner diagnosed Claimant with major depression 

with psychotic features and passive-aggressive personality disorder, he did not assess or 

opine as to what Claimant could and could not do as a result of his mental health condition. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). The ALJ therefore did not actually reject any of Dr. 

Lessner’s opinions. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err. See, e.g., Turner 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2010) (where a physician’s report 

did not assign any specific limitations or opinions regarding the claimant’s ability to work, 

“the ALJ did not need to provide ‘clear and convincing reasons’ for rejecting [the] report 

because the ALJ did not reject any of [the report’s] conclusions”); Montez v. Astrue, 320 

F. App’x 532, 534 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding the ALJ did not err by not assigning a specific 

weight to a treating physician’s opinion where the ALJ commented that it placed no 

restrictions on the claimant’s ability to work). 

The Court acknowledges that several of Dr. Lessner’s findings, including the 

statement that Claimant was in “acute psychological despair” would tend to indicate that 

Claimant’s mental impairment was severe. However, the Court further notes that during 

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the initial hearing Plaintiff did not mention Claimant’s depression or any mental 

impairments as a reason for his inability to work.7

 (See AR 38-77.) Moreover, several of 

the medical records provided by Plaintiff, including a few that post-date Dr. Lessner’s 

opinion, state that there was no evidence of depression. (See, e.g., AR 392 (3/16/10), 415 

(6/7/13), 412 (11/15/13), 493 (8/19/14), 631 (5/27/15), 667 (3/31/16).) Accordingly, 

substantial evidence in the longitudinal record, including Claimant’s own statements, as 

discussed below, supports the ALJ’s determination that Claimant’s depression was 

nonsevere. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err at Step Two in finding that 

Claimant’s medically determinable mental impairment of affective disorder was 

nonsevere. (AR 19-20.) 

 B. The ALJ’s Step Three Determination 

Although not expressly identified as a disputed issue, Plaintiff contends in her 

summary of the medical evidence that the ALJ erred at Step Three in finding that 

Claimant’s visual impairment did not meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments from the alleged onset date through the date 

of death. (ECF No. 16-1 at 6-8.) As the Commissioner discussed this argument in the 

Joint Motion, the Court will address it below. 

 “If a claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals 

a condition outlined in the ‘Listing of Impairments,’ then the claimant is presumed disabled 

at step three, and the ALJ need not make any specific finding as to his or her ability to 

perform past relevant work or any other jobs.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)). For an impairment or combination of impairments 

to meet a Listing, all of the criteria of that Listing must be satisfied for the requisite 

                                               

7

 When asked by the ALJ at the initial hearing what was going on with her 

husband in the last couple of years before he passed away “besides the visual problems,” 

Plaintiff only responded, “He had diabetes and . . . high blood pressure.” (AR 52.) She 

testified that he was “tired” and would “always complain about blurred vision.” (AR 52.) 

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durational period. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (the impairment “must 

meet all of the specified medical criteria” in the Listing); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 404.1509. “An ALJ must evaluate the relevant evidence before 

concluding that a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment.” Lewis, 

236 F.3d at 512. “A boilerplate finding is insufficient to support a conclusion that a 

claimant’s impairment does not do so.” Id. (citing Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 

(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that ALJ erred by failing to consider evidence of equivalence)). 

Plaintiff specifically contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Listing 2.02 did not 

apply. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 6; AR 21.) A claimant has statutory blindness if his visual 

disorder meets the criteria of Listing 2.02. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 

2.00(A)(2)(c). Listing 2.02 is met if the claimant’s “[r]emaining vision in the better eye 

after best correction is 20/200 or less.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 2.02. In 

determining that Claimant did not meet Listing 2.02, the ALJ stated: 

In this case, the medical records reveal the claimant’s remaining vision in the 

better eye was 20/40 after best correction (Exhibit 8F). His vision was 

reported as 20/60 or 20/70 in other visits, but there is no evidence that the 

vision in his better eye was ever anywhere close to 20/200. . . . Therefore, 

based on the evidence, the undersigned concludes that the severity of the 

claimant’s visual impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet 

or equal the criteria of section[] 2.02. . . . 

(AR 21.) 

The ALJ described Claimant’s visual history as follows: 

The claimant was diagnosed with diabetic retinopathy for which he underwent 

right eye retinal detachment repair in November 2013, and left eye pars plana 

vitrectomy and endolaser treatment in December 2013 ([AR 424, 428]). In 

August 2014, the claimant underwent right eye pars plana vitrectomy, scleral 

buckle, and retinectomy due to proliferative diabetic retinopathy and retinal 

detachment (Exhibit 8F/12.) 

. . . 

In April 2015, [the claimant’s] distance visual acuity in the left eye was 20/40, 

but he had a cataract in the right eye ([AR 649]). The claimant underwent 

surgery for a white cataract in the right eye on August 17, 2015 ([AR 657]). 

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He reported some improvement in a follow-up examination on August 27, 

2015 ([AR 672]). 

. . . 

The claimant’s past eye history included a vitrectomy surgery in the right eye 

on November 25, 2013, and in the left [e]ye on December 9, 2013; he also had 

additional laser treatments in the left eye on November 12, 2013 and January 

10, 2014. His last eye examination on January 10, 2014 revealed the right eye 

was only able to see fingers held a few feet in front of him (he could not see 

any letters on an eye chart), and the left eye had visual acuity of 20/60. Dr. 

Lin noted this level of vision made it very difficult to drive or work; he also 

noted it was possible the claimant’s vision may improve slightly over time, 

but this was not certain ([AR 385, 554-71, 774-75]). 

Philip Gelber, M.D., an impartial medical expert Board certified in 

ophthalmology, testified at the December 21, 2016 hearing by telephone ([AR 

772-73]). Having reviewed the evidence of record through [AR 772-73], Dr. 

Gelber testified that on January 10, 2014, the claimant’s right eye was limited 

to finger counting,[8] and his left eye was at 20/60, so that the claimant was 

essentially functioning with only one eye. Dr. Gelber noted that, per [AR 492-

508], vision in the right eye was again very poor, limited to hand motion, but 

the left eye was pretty stable at 20/40-2, i.e., the claimant missed 2 letters on 

the 20/40 line. Then, as reflected in [AR 509-26], the claimant’s left eye was 

again at 20/60, and it was corrected slightly to 20/40, with the right eye again 

at the finger counting level. 

(AR 23 (footnote added).) 

Plaintiff and the ALJ agree that Claimant’s left eye was his better eye. (See ECF 

No. 16-1 at 2-5; AR 23-24.) Plaintiff argues that Claimant’s “left eye vision was at times 

20/200 or even worse, especially in 2013.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 6.) The underlying record 

                                               

8

 See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 2.00(A)(5)(a)(ii) (“A visual acuity 

recorded as CF (counts fingers), HM (hand motion only), LP or LPO (light perception or 

light perception only), or NLP (no light perception) indicates that no optical correction will 

improve your visual acuity. If your central visual acuity in an eye is recorded as CF, HM, 

LP or LPO, or NLP, we will determine that your best-corrected central visual acuity is 

20/200 or less in that eye.”). 

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demonstrates that Claimant’s left eye vision as of November 12, 2013 was 20/60-2. (AR 

422.) Thereafter, Claimant’s left eye vision appears to have been 20/200 or worse on 

November 29, 2013 and December 13, 2013, shortly before and after surgery on his left 

eye. (See AR 405 (20/LP in left eye), 407 (20/200 “SC” in left eye), 424-26 (operative 

report dated 12/9/13)).9

 However, beginning in late December 2013, through September 

2015, there is no indication in the record that Plaintiff’s left eye vision was ever 20/200 or 

worse. (See AR 585, 597, 595, 603, 500, 519, 611, 649, 672, 670.) A claimant is only 

considered disabled at Step Three if the impairment meets the duration requirement, which 

provides that the impairment “must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous 

period of at least 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1525(c)(3), (4), 404.1509, 404.1581. Therefore, although the ALJ inaccurately stated 

that “there is no evidence that the vision in his better eye was ever anywhere close to 

20/200,” Plaintiff does not meet the duration requirement. Accordingly, any error 

committed by the ALJ at Step Three is harmless. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting the Ninth Circuit has deemed legal errors harmless where it was 

clear they did not alter the ALJ’s decision). 

 C. Treating Physicians 

Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Gelber 

and Dr. Lin, who were Claimant’s treating physicians, in assessing Claimant’s RFC. 

 1. Dr. Lin 

 Dr. Richard Lin provided a letter “To Whom It May Concern” dated 

January 21, 2014. (AR 385.) Dr. Lin treated Claimant at Scripps Clinic Division of 

Ophthalmology. (AR 385.) The letter described Claimant’s status and treatment. (AR 

385.) The letter concluded as follows: 

                                               

9

 The designation “OS” refers to the left eye, and the designation “SC” means 

without correction. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 17.) 

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At [the Claimant’s] last eye examination on January 10, 2014, his right eye 

was only able to see fingers held a few feet in front of him (he cannot see any 

letters on an eye chart). The left eye had visual acuity of 20/60. This level of 

vision makes it very difficult for him to drive or work. In addition, he may 

also require further laser treatments or eye surgeries in the future. Although 

it is possible his vision may improve slightly over time, this is not for certain. 

Please extend to him any disability benefits for which he may qualify due to 

his impaired vision. 

(AR 385.) Dr. Lin provided no further opinions. 

 In his decision, the ALJ described Dr. Lin’s letter. (AR 23.) However, he did not 

treat Dr. Lin’s letter as an opinion and therefore did not evaluate what weight he believed 

it deserved. “Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect 

judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, 

diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or 

mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). 

The only concrete restriction contained in the letter was the reference to Claimant’s 

difficulty driving. This statement does not contradict the other medical opinions in the 

record. Dr. Gelber, the testifying medical expert, as well as the State Agency physical 

medical consultants, opined that limitations were appropriate due to Claimant’s visual 

impairment. (See AR 84-98, 133-35, 147-49.) Claimant’s RFC also included a limitation 

to no driving. Accordingly, to the extent Dr. Lin’s medical opinion was not addressed, it 

was harmless error. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. 

Dr. Lin also opined that Claimant’s limitations would make it “very difficult” for 

him to work and asked that he be extended any appropriate social security benefits. Dr. 

Lin did not opine that Claimant qualified for benefits, but merely urged the recipient of the 

letter to extend Claimant any benefits “for which he may qualify.” (AR 385.) Even if Dr. 

Lin had offered the opinion that Claimant qualified for disability benefits, the ultimate issue 

of disability is reserved to the Commissioner, and any opinion by Dr. Lin on this ultimate 

issue, which would not be considered a “medical opinion,” would not be binding on the 

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ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (3); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 

1986). 

 2. Dr. Gelber 

 a. Opinions

Dr. Philip Joseph Gelber, an impartial medical expert, Board-certified in 

ophthalmology, testified at the supplemental administrative hearing on 

December 21, 2016. (AR 23, 84-98, 772-73.) Dr. Gelber reviewed the medical record and 

found the record sufficient for him to offer medical opinion testimony on Claimant’s visual 

and ophthalmological issues. (AR 85.) Dr. Gelber opined that on January 10, 2014, 

Claimant’s “right eye was finger counting and that would meet the listing and he would be 

a one-eyed patient.” (AR 88-89.) Because he was a one-eyed patient, Dr. Gelber opined 

that Claimant would have some restrictions. (AR 90.) 

Dr. Gelber stated, “With one eye they don’t have good depth perception, so 

[Claimant] couldn’t have gotten any jobs that required any kind of depth perception.” (AR 

90.) Dr. Gelber then explained the implication of the restriction, stating, “Well, there 

would be certain types of jobs where he might have to put certain parts of something that 

he was working on into different bins or something and he would have a lot – he would 

have to take a lot more time than, you know, somebody with both eyes.” (AR 91.) Dr. 

Gelber added that “it would take [Claimant] a little longer with the one eye,” stating that 

“he would have a harder time [seeing] something that was small or had to be placed in a 

certain area.” (AR 93.) Dr. Gelber added, “He could do it,” but “it would take him longer” 

and “he would be moderately slower than somebody . . . who had both eyes and good depth 

perception.” (AR 93-94.) Dr. Gelber concluded that any jobs that require “some . . . degree 

of depth perception” would be “out of the picture.” (AR 95.) 

During his testimony, the ALJ asked Dr. Gelber whether Claimant would have a 

limited ability to do close-up work requiring the ability to distinguish shapes, sizes, and the 

nature of small objects by viewing them. (AR 94-95.) Dr. Gelber responded by asking 

Plaintiff whether her husband was able to read a newspaper. (AR 94.) She responded, 

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“No.” (AR 94.) Dr. Gelber therefore responded to the ALJ’s question by stating: “Well I 

think, you know, if they can’t read a newspaper it would be hard to find work, you know, 

when you can’t read instructions.” (AR 95.) Dr. Gelber then opined that Plaintiff “was 

definitely handicapped.” (AR 95.) However, Dr. Gelber ultimately agreed with the ALJ’s 

statement that Claimant’s “ability to distinguish small objects, such as nuts, bolts and 

screws . . . would not have been eliminated but . . . would have been substantially 

compromised.” (AR 95-96.) 

Dr. Gelber further opined that even though Claimant had a driver’s license at the 

time he passed away, he did not think a person with Claimant’s vision could drive. (AR 

90-91.) However, he later added that he “could drive slowly,” but was not going to be “on 

the freeway passing people and doing stuff.” (AR 96.) Dr. Gelber noted that Claimant 

“would have limitations in . . . trying to judge how far a car is away from him.” (AR 96.) 

Dr. Gelber also opined that he did not think Claimant would have any problem with color. 

(AR 92.) 

Upon questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney, Dr. Gelber further opined that Claimant’s 

far vision was also compromised. (AR 97.) He stated: “20/40 is not normal, you know, 

real acute vision. It’s going to be fuzzy.” (AR 97.) 

 b. ALJ’s Decision

 The ALJ summarized Dr. Gelber’s testimony in his decision. (AR 23-24.) The ALJ 

further summarized the work restrictions identified by Dr. Gelber arising from Claimant’s 

poor visual acuity in the right eye as follows: 

 The claimant would be precluded from jobs that require depth 

perception; 

 The claimant would be substantially compromised (meaning it would 

take him substantially longer) in his ability to perform jobs requiring 

him to distinguish, identify or sort small objects, such as nuts, bolts, 

and screws; 

/// 

/// 

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 The claimant could drive slowly, but should not drive at higher rates of 

speed, such as on the freeway. 

(AR 24 (emphasis in original).) The ALJ then gave “significant weight” to Dr. Gelber’s 

opinions regarding Claimant’s limitations and stated that the RFC “is an attempt to 

articulate Dr. Gelber’s testimony, viewed in its entirety and in light of the record, including 

the medical record, as a whole, in an accurate, precise, vocationally-meaningful way.” (AR 

24.) The ALJ explained his translation of Dr. Gelber’s testimony into Claimant’s RFC as 

follows: 

For example, Dr. Gelber stated the claimant’s ability to engage in tasks 

involving the distinguishing of small objects was compromised to some 

extent, so that he could engage in such tasks, but it would take him longer than 

it would take an individual with two good eyes; the RFC takes this testimony 

into account by limiting the claimant to occasional near acuity. As another 

example, Dr. Gelber testified concerning difficulties the claimant would have 

had determining the distance between certain objects (when driving, for 

example), so that the claimant was able to drive, but slowly; the RFC takes 

this testimony into account by limiting the claimant to occasional far acuity. 

The claimant’s monocular vision and depth perception difficulties were also 

the basis for the preclusion in the RFC of all exposure to hazards, such as 

moving machinery and unprotected heights. 

In some respects, in fact, and in order to give the claimant the benefit of the 

doubt, the residual functional capacity is more restrictive than the testimony 

of Dr. Gelber would indicate. For example, though Dr. Gelber stated the 

claimant could drive (with the limitations noted above), the RFC in contrast 

precludes driving completely. 

(AR 24 (emphasis in original).) 

 The ALJ further noted that he gave little weight to Dr. Gelber’s statements on the 

issue of whether Claimant met or medically equaled a listing, because his testimony on this 

point was “unclear and imprecise, and possibly inconsistent with the regulations.” (AR 

23.) The ALJ added that “[v]iewing his testimony as a whole, it appears that his comment 

that the claimant met the listing in the right eye meant only that the claimant was in fact 

essentially blind in that eye. If, as does not appear to be the case, Dr. Gelber was of the 

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opinion that the claimant actually met Listing 2.02, this opinion would be directly contrary 

to the medical record since, as noted earlier . . . , the claimant’s corrected vision in the 

better eye was not 20/200 or worse.” (AR 24.) 

 c. Analysis

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “erroneously made up a contorted analysis of Dr. 

Gelber’s testimony by eliminating unfavorable parts of the testimony and only considering 

the parts supporting a denial of benefits.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 13.) However, based on the 

Court’s review of the record, as laid out above, the Court finds that the ALJ accurately 

summarized Dr. Gelber’s testimony regarding Claimant’s limitations and incorporated the 

only functional limitations identified by Dr. Gelber into the RFC. 

 Although Dr. Gelber made statements during his testimony such as “I don’t know 

who’s going to hire him” and “if they can’t read a newspaper it would be hard to find 

work,” Dr. Gelber did not identify any concrete functional limitations that the ALJ failed 

to incorporate into his RFC. In fact, the ALJ gave Claimant the benefit of the doubt by 

including the limitations that he could not drive and was limited to no depth perception, 

when Dr. Gelber variously opined during his testimony that Claimant could “drive slowly” 

and would only have “some problem” with depth perception. (AR 93, 96.) The ALJ also 

repeatedly asked Dr. Gelber during the hearing if Claimant would have any additional 

limitations as far as “near acuity” and “far acuity,” but Dr. Gelber did not identify any 

additional limitations which are not incorporated into the RFC. (See, e.g., AR 92-93, 96.) 

Plaintiff claims that Dr. Gelber testified that Claimant had severely restricted or no 

far acuity, and the ALJ therefore erred in determining that Claimant had occasional far 

acuity. (ECF No. 16-1 at 23-26.) “Far acuity” is defined as “clarity of vision at 20 feet or 

more.” (Id. at 23.) However, the Court notes that Plaintiff testified at the initial hearing 

that when her husband was sitting on the passenger side in the car, when they got “close to 

the exit sign or the street sign, he could see them, but if I hand him a paper where the font 

is maybe size ten or so, he wouldn’t be able to see.” (AR 52.) Therefore, although Dr. 

Gelber testified that Claimant’s far vision would be “fuzzy,” (AR 97), there was also 

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evidence in the record suggesting that Claimant could read street signs at twenty feet. (AR 

52.) 

 Furthermore, the Court agrees with the ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Gelber’s 

testimony regarding Claimant’s right eye being at “finger counting and that would meet 

the listing and he would be a one-eyed patient.” (See AR 23-24 n.4, 88.) As Claimant’s 

right eye was his worse eye, the most natural and logical interpretation of this testimony is 

that Dr. Gelber was acknowledging that under the standard of Listing 2.02, Claimant was 

blind in his right eye and thus “he would be a one-eyed patient.” Dr. Gelber was not, in 

that part of his testimony, addressing Claimant’s vision in his better eye. It would be 

irrational to interpret Dr. Gelber’s testimony on this point to be that Dr. Gelber was opining 

Claimant’s vision in his left eye met the standard of Listing 2.02. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not improperly characterize or reject 

the opinions of Dr. Gelber. 

 D. Adverse Credibility Determination 

1. Legal Standard 

 a. Claimant’s Testimony

It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that if the claimant has produced objective 

medical evidence of impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce some 

degree of pain and/or other symptoms and the record is devoid of any affirmative evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the 

claimant’s pain and/or other symptoms only if the ALJ makes specific findings stating clear 

and convincing reasons for doing so. See Smolen, 80 F. 3d at 1281-92; Dodrill v. Shalala, 

12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F. 2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407. 

It is incumbent on the ALJ to specify which of the claimant’s statements concerning 

his symptoms and functional limitations were not credible and in what respect the 

statements lacked credibility. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; see also Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 

(“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not 

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credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”). The ALJ is guided 

by “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation,” and may consider inconsistencies with 

the medical record or in the claimant’s testimony, unexplained failures to seek treatment, 

and whether the claimant engages in activities of daily living that are inconsistent with the 

alleged symptoms. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations omitted). 

An ALJ’s assessment of claimant credibility is entitled to “great weight.” Weetman 

v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Nyman, 779 F.2d at 531. “When 

evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision, [courts] 

may not substitute [their] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196. 

 b. Lay Testimony

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness 

testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to work. See Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; see also 

Revels, 874 F.3d at 655; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3). Indeed, “lay testimony as to a 

claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects ability to work is competent evidence 

. . . and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.” Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 

1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Consequently, “[i]f the ALJ wishes to 

discount the testimony of lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each 

witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; see also Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511 (“Lay testimony as to a 

claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence that an ALJ must take into account, unless he 

or she expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane to each 

witness for doing so.”) (citations omitted). Lay witness observations may not be 

discounted on account of the applicant’s lack of credibility. Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918. 

 2. Background 

 a. Testimony of Claimant and Plaintiff 

In a Disability Report, dated March 5, 2014, Claimant listed the following physical 

or mental conditions that limited his ability to work: (1) retina detachment; (2) Type 2 

diabetes; (3) hypertension; (4) arthritis; (5) cholesterol; (6) memory loss; (7) chronic 

headaches; (8) insomnia; and (9) depression. (AR 295.) Claimant reported taking 

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Atorvastatin and Metformin for his diabetes, Naprosyn for his arthritis, Cymbalta and 

Vibyed for his depression, Fanayst for his insomnia, and Lisinopril for his heart disease. 

(AR 298.) 

In a Function Report, dated March 21, 2014, Claimant stated that his illnesses, 

injuries, or conditions limited his ability to work in the following ways: “I get weak and 

tired fast. Sometime[s] I forget stuff. My conditions limit my ability to see, drive, work, 

and move around in unfamiliar place[s] and environment[s].” (AR 307.) Claimant 

reported having a hard time falling asleep and stated that he could not drive or work. (AR 

308.) Claimant noted that his typical daily routine included breakfast, walking around the 

block, doing housework, eating lunch, watching a little television, eating dinner, 

showering, and going to bed. (AR 308.) Claimant’s hobbies included watching television, 

surfing the internet, and going to the gym. (AR 311.) He reported being able to do these 

things very well and going to the gym twice a week. (AR 311.) When he went to the gym, 

Claimant needed someone to accompany him. (AR 311.) 

Claimant also reported preparing his own meals on a daily basis as well as cleaning 

the house and doing laundry for one to two hours once a week. (AR 309.) Claimant 

reported going outside two to three times a week and stated that he traveled by riding in a 

car or by riding a bicycle. (AR 310.) Claimant was able to go grocery shopping once a 

week for about an hour, but had a hard time paying the bills and handling money because 

he had a hard time reading. (AR 310-11.) Claimant reported spending time with others, 

including talking to them, walking around, and eating together. (AR 311.) Claimant 

further reported no problems getting along with family, but he did not go out to see friends 

often after his conditions began. (AR 312.) 

Claimant reported that his illnesses, injuries, or conditions affected his ability to 

walk and see. (AR 312.) Claimant noted that he needed to rest for five minutes after 

walking for twenty feet. (AR 312.) Claimant’s conditions also affected his memory and 

concentration. (AR 312.) Claimant reported finding it hard to focus for a long time and 

could only pay attention for ten minutes. (AR 312.) He also had memory issues where he 

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would sometimes forget stuff. (AR 312.) Claimant stated that he was “ok” at following 

written instructions, getting along with authority figures, and handling changes in routine, 

but he did not follow spoken instructions or handle stress too well. (AR 312.) Claimant 

added that two of his medications made him dizzy and gave him headaches. (AR 314.) 

 In a separate Function Report filled out by Plaintiff on the same date, she stated that 

her husband’s illnesses, injuries, or conditions limited his ability to work in the following 

ways: “He is blind. His right eye[] needs multiple[] surgeries due to diabet[ic] retina 

detachment. Anthony is unable to see, drive, and perform work duties.” (AR 320.) 

Although her husband stated that he did not need help or reminders with daily activities, 

his wife stated that he did need help or reminders to brush his teeth, shower daily, and take 

his medicine. (AR 309, 322.) Plaintiff also stated that she prepared her husband’s meals 

because her husband was unable to see. (AR 322.) Plaintiff further stated that her husband 

traveled by walking or by riding in a car. (AR 323.) She added that it was dangerous for 

him to be left outside alone because his vision was not clear. (AR 323.) 

In addition, Plaintiff stated that her husband’s illnesses, injuries, or conditions 

affected his ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, kneel, hear, climb stairs, see, and 

use his hands. (AR 325.) Plaintiff further stated that her husband had difficulty with his 

memory and concentration, and difficulty with understanding, following instructions, and 

getting along with others. (AR 325.) Plaintiff elaborated that Claimant could only lift up 

to fifteen pounds, could not walk more than fifty feet unless assisted by others, and could 

not complete tasks because he tended to forget and could not remember the routine. (AR 

325.) Plaintiff noted that Claimant did not finish what he started. (AR 325.) Plaintiff 

added that Claimant could only walk twenty to fifty feet before needing to rest for five 

minutes. (AR 325.) Plaintiff stated that Claimant’s ability to follow written instructions 

was “average,” but his ability to listen was poor and he did not comprehend spoken 

instructions. (AR 325.) In all other respects, Plaintiff’s report was consistent with 

Claimant’s report. (See AR 307-28.) 

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 On his Appeal form, dated July 27, 2014, Claimant represented that he had poor 

memory and needed to be reminded to take his medications. (AR 342.) He stated that he 

could not function by himself, but rather depended on his family to take care of him and 

prepare food for him. (AR 342.) He added that he stayed home all the time and could not 

go anywhere or do anything due to his poor vision. (AR 342.) He further noted that he 

was depressed and anxious about his condition. (AR 342.) 

 In a subsequent Disability Report, submitted December 11, 2014, Claimant 

represented that his vision was “getting worse and worse” and he was “more depressed” 

and had “worsening memory loss.” (AR 357.) He added that he was “anguished.” (AR 

358.) He stated that he needed help bathing and preparing food. (AR 364.) He stated that 

he could not see well to cook or tie his shoes. (AR 364.) He stated that he was “more 

dependent on his wife to cook for [him] and to remind [him] to take medicines.” (AR 364.) 

He stated that he was “helpless and hopeless.” (AR 364.) 

 Claimant passed away on July 13, 2016. (AR 293.) Therefore, only Plaintiff 

testified at the administrative hearings. She testified as follows: 

Claimant was fired from his last job in 2011 because he was having a hard time 

seeing at work. (AR 48.) Claimant tried to find another job but could not find work. (AR 

48.) The last time Claimant drove was 2013. (AR 49.) The vision in Claimant’s left eye 

was stable after surgery, but the surgery did not improve his vision. (AR 50-51.) The 

vision in Claimant’s right eye, however, just kept getting worse. (AR 49-50.) Claimant 

did not do a lot of reading because he could not see most of the time. (AR 51.) He would 

go outside and walk back and forth down the street. (AR 51.) Claimant was not aware of 

what her husband did during the eight hours she was at work, but when she would call and 

check in, he would be sitting or walking outside or watching television. (AR 51.) Claimant 

would just listen to the television. (AR 51.) Claimant could read street signs when they 

drove close to them, but could not see small font, such as the font in a newspaper. (AR 

52.) In addition to his vision problems, Claimant had diabetes and high blood pressure. 

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(AR 52.) As a result, Claimant would be tired and occasionally nap and always complained 

about blurred vision. (AR 52-53, 56.) 

Claimant did not have a problem using his hands, but did have a problem with lifting 

things because the doctor informed him that it would put a stress on his vision. (AR 53.) 

Claimant was not supposed to lift anything over twenty pounds. (AR 54.) Claimant was 

not allowed to cook at home because he burned himself once. (AR 57.) His retired father 

stayed with him at home and looked out for him. (AR 57.) After Claimant stopped 

working, there was always someone with him. (AR 57-58.) On the weekends, Claimant 

stayed home, walked the dog, watched television, listened to the radio, and rested 

approximately a third of the day. (AR 58-59.) Plaintiff or Claimant’s father would drive 

him to the doctor’s office. (AR 59.) His father would also drop him off at the gym. (AR 

59.) At home, Claimant would help out by washing plates. (AR 59.) 

During the supplemental hearing, Plaintiff testified that her husband had a driver’s 

license before he passed away, but he was not able to drive. (AR 87.) She further stated 

that her husband was unable to read a newspaper. (AR 94.) 

 b. ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ found that Claimant’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to have caused the alleged symptoms; however, the ALJ found that 

Claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of those 

symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 

record. (AR 22.) The ALJ first considered the testimony and written statements of 

Plaintiff. (AR 25.) He described her statements as follows: 

[Plaintiff] described the claimant’s activities as eating breakfast and napping, 

noting that she worked and did not see him during the day ([AR 320-28]). She 

reported the claimant had no problem with personal care; he prepared his own 

meals, cleaned the furniture, and did light loads of laundry; he went out 2-3 

times a week, shopped in stores, and went to the gym twice a week. He did 

not play sports because of his vision problems, and he had multiple surgeries 

due to retinal detachment. Id. 

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At the August 2016 hearing, [Plaintiff] testified that the claimant was unable 

to work because of his eyesight; he had difficulty driving, and he last drove in 

2013. His right eye kept getting worse, and he had multiple surgeries on the 

right eye. He had one surgery on the left eye, and the vision improved in his 

left eye. The claimant had diabetes mellitus and hypertension, but he had no 

problem using his hands (Testimony). 

(AR 25.) 

The ALJ gave “significant weight” to these statements made by Plaintiff because 

they were generally consistent with the evidence of record. (AR 25.) However, the ALJ 

gave less weight to Plaintiff’s assertions that Claimant had problems with lifting, squatting, 

bending, standing, reaching, walking, kneeling, hearing, stair climbing, memory, 

completing tasks, concentrating, understanding, following instructions, using hands, and 

getting along with others. (AR 25 (citing AR 325).) The ALJ stated that these statements 

were entitled to less weight “to the extent they might suggest a more restrictive level of 

functioning than found [in the ALJ’s decision], because to that extent they would be 

inconsistent with the evidence of record as a whole, including the claimant’s reported 

activities and the medical record.” (AR 25.) 

 For example, the ALJ noted that Claimant only reported in his March 21, 2014 

Function Report problems with walking, seeing, memory, and concentration. (AR 25 

(citing AR 312).) Claimant also reported that he had no problems getting along with 

family, friends, neighbors, and others; he finished what he started; and he was able to 

follow written instructions. (AR 25 (citing AR 312).) Claimant further reported that he 

went to the gym and worked out on a regular basis, and he spent time with others talking, 

walking around, and eating. (AR 25 (citing AR 324).) The ALJ thus concluded that 

Plaintiff’s statements were “not fully consistent with those of the claimant at that point in 

time.” (AR 25.) He added that this was “certainly not to suggest intentional exaggeration 

or misstatement, but only to note that, as often is the case, two persons with two different 

perspectives do not see or assess matters in exactly the same way.” (AR 25.) 

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 Next, the ALJ addressed Claimant’s statements regarding the extent and severity of 

his impairments and the limitations they cause. (AR 25.) The ALJ found that with respect 

to Claimant, “the evidence submitted does not support that functional limitations existed 

at a disabling level.” (AR 25-26.) The ALJ explained as follows: 

The claimant stated he became weak and tired quickly, that he could walk for 

only short distances, and that his conditions limited his ability to see, drive, 

work, and move around in unfamiliar environments. He stated he had 

difficulty concentrating for long periods of time and had memory problems. 

On the other hand, as noted above, the claimant reported that he worked out 

on a regular basis, he liked to go to the gym and exercise, and he spent time 

with others talking, walking around, and eating ([AR 307-15, 475]). He also 

indicated that he had made attempts to return to work, but he could not find 

employment, and he stated his symptoms did not limit his daily activities ([AR 

475]). Some of these matters provide additional support for the residual 

functional capacity found above. 

(AR 26.) The ALJ concluded that “[t]o the extent that the claimant’s statements might be 

inconsistent with that residual functional capacity, they are not supported by or consistent 

with the record as a whole, including objective signs and findings, as discussed elsewhere 

in this decision.” (AR 26.) 

 3. Analysis 

 a. Claimant’s Testimony 

Because the Commissioner has not argued affirmative evidence of malingering, the 

Court will apply the “clear and convincing” standard to the ALJ’s adverse credibility 

determination. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying “clear 

and convincing” standard where the government did not argue that a lesser standard should 

apply based on evidence of malingering); see also Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163 n.9 (same). 

The Court finds that the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons supported by 

specific findings for discounting Claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his mental 

and physical limitations to the extent not contained within the RFC. First, the ALJ 

explained that Claimant’s activities of daily living were inconsistent with his allegations of 

total disability. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (finding inconsistencies between a 

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claimant’s testimony and daily activities which were supported by substantial evidence in 

the record constituted a clear and convincing reason for rejecting the claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of the symptoms). Next, the ALJ observed that Claimant’s testimony 

was internally inconsistent. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. For example, the ALJ noted that 

Claimant reported that he became weak and tired quickly and could walk for only short 

distances, but he also reported that he went to the gym twice a week, and his daily routine 

included walking. 

The ALJ further recognized that Claimant reported having difficulty concentrating 

for long periods of time and memory problems. (AR 25-26.) As laid out above, Claimant 

reported in his Function Report that he found it hard to focus for a long period of time and 

could only pay attention for ten minutes. (AR 312.) He also reported memory issues and 

problems following spoken instructions. (AR 312.) However, the ALJ noted in his 

decision that while Claimant reported to Dr. Andia problems with memory and 

concentration, he also stated that his ability to work had not been affected by these 

symptoms. (AR 18 (citing AR 474).) 

The ALJ further rejected Claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his 

symptoms because it was “not supported by or consistent with the record as a whole, 

including objective signs and findings, as discussed elsewhere in [his] decision.” (AR 26.) 

In May 2014, Dr. Andia tested Claimant’s memory and concentration. (AR 477.) 

Claimant’s digit span was five forward and three backward. (AR 477.) Claimant was able 

to recall 3/3 items immediately and 3/3 items after five minutes. (AR 477.) Claimant could 

not recall how President Kennedy died, but he did know the name of the current President 

of the United States and the name of the current Governor of California. (AR 477.) 

Claimant also knew that Washington, D.C. is the capital of the United States and that 

Sacramento is the capital of California. (AR 477.) In addition, although Claimant was 

unable to perform serial sevens, he was able to perform serial threes. (AR 477.) Claimant 

was also able to do simple calculations and follow the conversation well. (AR 477.) Based 

on her examination, Dr. Andia concluded that Claimant was able to understand, remember 

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and carry out simple one or two-step job instructions and only mildly limited in his ability 

to maintain concentration and attention, persistence and pace due to depressive symptoms. 

(AR 478-79.) 

The Court acknowledges that in March 2014, Dr. Henderson noted that Claimant 

complained of memory loss and anxiety about his life. (AR 767.) He added that Claimant’s 

“[p]ain, depression and recurrent obsessive thoughts interfere with concentration and 

attention.” (AR 767.) Based on his examination, Dr. Henderson stated that Claimant could 

not recall three nouns after three minutes and could not perform serial 3s. (AR 767.) He 

further noted that his ability to concentrate upon even simple new tasks was poor. (AR 

767.) Dr. Henderson opined that Claimant often had “deficiencies of concentration, 

persistence or pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner in work setting 

or elsewhere.” (AR 768.) However, as set forth above, the ALJ properly rejected the 

opinions of Dr. Henderson. Therefore, although there is some evidence in the record 

supporting Claimant’s testimony regarding his poor memory and inability to concentrate, 

for the reasons discussed above, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Henderson’s opinions 

regarding Plaintiff’s limitations. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s determination that the Claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of his symptoms was not supported by or consistent with the record 

as a whole, including objective signs and findings, was also a clear and convincing reason 

supported by specific findings for discounting Claimant’s testimony regarding the severity 

of his mental and physical limitations to the extent not contained within the RFC. 

 b. Plaintiff’s Testimony

 The ALJ gave “less weight” to Plaintiff’s statements that Claimant had “problems 

with lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, hearing, stair climbing, 

memory, completing tasks, concentrating, understanding, following instructions, using 

hands, and getting along with others.” (AR 25 (citing AR 325).) The ALJ gave less weight 

to these statements “to the extent they might suggest a more restrictive level of functioning 

than found herein, because to that extent they would be inconsistent with the evidence of 

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record as a whole, including the claimant’s reported activities and the medical record.” 

(AR 25.) 

In his decision, the ALJ described the inconsistencies between the Third Party 

Function Report completed by Plaintiff the same day as the Function Report filled out by 

Claimant. (AR 25.) The ALJ noted that Claimant identified greater restrictions than her 

husband at the same point in time. (AR 25.) The Court finds that this inconsistency is a 

germane reason to disregard her testimony to the extent it reflected greater restrictions than 

those identified in the RFC. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 

1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the ALJ provided a germane reason to reject a lay 

witness’s testimony where the testimony was inconsistent with the record). 

Moreover, in light of the Court’s conclusion that the ALJ provided clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting Claimant’s own subjective complaints, and because 

Plaintiff’s testimony in other respects was similar to such complaints, including Claimant’s 

difficulty with memory and concentration, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane 

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, to the extent the testimony was similar. See 

Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In light of our 

conclusion that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting [the 

claimant’s] own subjective complaints, and because [his wife’s lay] testimony was similar 

to such complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting her 

testimony.”). 

E. The ALJ’s Step Five Determination 

At Step Five of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether 

the claimant is able to do any other work considering his RFC, age, education, and work 

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). At this step, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ 

improperly disregarded the testimony of the first VE. (ECF No. 16-1 at 27-28.) However, 

Plaintiff mischaracterizes the first VE’s testimony. The first VE identified three jobs that 

all required frequent near acuity. (AR 66-67, 72-73.) Therefore, the VE testified that if 

Claimant was limited to occasional near acuity “he could not do the jobs because it calls 

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for frequent.” (AR 73.) The second VE, on whom the ALJ relied, identified different jobs, 

each of which require only occasional or no near acuity to perform. (AR 28, 111.) 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err at Step Five. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that that Judgment be 

entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with 

prejudice. 

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served 

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The 

objections should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may 

respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with 

a copy of the objections. See id. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 5, 2019 

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