Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06494/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06494-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID GONZALES REYMUNDO,

Petitioner,

vs.

CAL TERHUNE,

Respondent.

Case No. CV F-00-6494 JKS

O R D E R

David Gonzales Reymundo seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Docket Nos. 1 (Pet.); 18 (Answer); 21 (Traverse). Reymundo was convicted of burglary and in

bifurcated proceedings waived his right to a jury trial on allegations that he had two prior

convictions for felonies and four separate prison terms. The court found five of the prior conviction

allegations true and one not true. Pursuant to the California Three Strikes law, Reymundo was

sentenced to 13 years imprisonment to be served prior to an indeterminate 25-year-to-life term. The

petition raises essentially three grounds upon which, Reymundo argues, habeas relief should be

granted. The grounds are: (1) There was insufficient evidence to support the use of several prior

convictions for three strikes purposes; (2) prosecutorial misconduct deprived Reymundo of due

process; and (3) Reymundo suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. These arguments are

addressed in order.

DISCUSSION

Reymundo’s petition post-dates the April 24, 1996, enactment of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which governs federal court procedure for habeas corpus

petitions. AEDPA permits a federal court to grant relief in habeas petitions only if the state court’s

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ORDER 

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decision: (1) was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). “The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual

determinations.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A state

court’s determination is “‘contrary to’ federal law if the state court (1) ‘applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law’ set forth in Supreme Court case authority or (2) applies controlling

law to a set of facts that are ‘materially indistinguishable’ from a Supreme Court decision but

nevertheless reaches a different result.” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir.

2003) (citing and quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). A state court’s decision is

an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it is “objectively unreasonable,” which “requires the

state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Reymundo argues that there was insufficient evidence regarding three of his prior

convictions used to qualify him for California’s Three Strikes Law. Under the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), Reymundo would be

“entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. In

performing this inquiry, the Court must review the record in the light most favorable to the

prosecution. Id.

1. Prior Conviction For Assault With a Deadly Weapon

Reymundo contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he was convicted of assault

with a deadly weapon on a peace officer, rather than assault by means likely to produce great bodily

injury, and that the trial court erred in finding that the offense was a “serious felony” for purposes of

the Three Strikes Law. At the time of Reymundo’s conviction for assaulting an officer, such an

assault could be committed either (1) with a deadly weapon or instrument, other than a firearm; or

(2) by means likely to produce great bodily injury. See Docket No. 18, Ex. 5 at 4. Under the Three

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1

 In California, so long as the evidence shows the requisite intent, “[a] car can be operated in

such a manner as to constitute a deadly weapon.” People v. Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. 398, 406 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1981). 

ORDER 

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Strikes definition of “serious felony” only assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon or

instrument—not assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury—qualifies for sentence

enhancement. See Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c). 

In support of using Reymundo’s conviction as a “strike,” the prosecutor submitted a copy of

the information and Reymundo’s signed “declaration regarding guilty plea.” Clerk’s Transcript

(CT) at 92–98. The information charged Reymundo with violating:

Section 245(b) of the Penal Code of the State of California, in that the said defendant(s) did

willfully and unlawfully commit an assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, an automobile, and

by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, on the person of Steve Detjen, a

peace officer then and there engaged in the performance of his duties.

CT at 92.1 Reymundo pleaded guilty to the offense. In his declaration regarding the plea, he

handwrote the factual basis for the plea of guilty: “I rammed a police car twice with Detective

Detjen inside while attempting to escape arrest.” CT at 96. He initialed the box directly adjacent to

this statement and signed the declaration. Id.; CT at 98. Additionally, he signed the following

statement: “I have read, discussed and have had explained to me by my attorney each of the above

items, and understand the same. I have initialed each item as proof thereof.” CT at 98. 

Furthermore, when Reymundo entered his plea the prosecutor stated the factual basis as follows:

“the Defendant assaulted with a deadly weapon, specifically an automobile, Officer Steve Detgen of

the Madera Police Department, a peace officer.” CT at 105. The court asked Reymundo’s attorney

if he had any comments about the factual basis for the charge recited by the prosecutor, to which he

replied “No, Your Honor.” Id. The court then asked Reymundo, “you understand the charges

against you so that it’s not necessary for me to read them?” Reymundo answered “yes.” Id.

The evidence submitted to show that Reymundo assaulted an officer with a deadly weapon

rather than merely with force likely to produce great bodily injury was more than sufficient to

support its use for Three Strikes purposes. The California Court of Appeal’s finding to this effect

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

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ORDER 

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2. Separate Prior Prison Terms 

Reymundo argues that there is insufficient evidence that his 1969 robbery term and 1976

vehicle theft term were separate prison terms, and that his 1976 vehicle theft term and 1977

receiving stolen property term were separate prison terms. 

 Under the Three Strikes Law, a prior separate prison term means: 

a continuous completed period of prison incarceration imposed for the particular offense

alone or in combination with concurrent or consecutive sentences for other crimes, including

any reimprisonment on revocation of parole which is not accompanied by a new

commitment to prison, and including any reimprisonment after an escape from incarceration.

Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(g). In California, “a prisoner who is incarcerated on both a parole

revocation and a new commitment is subject to an enhancement for the offense for which he was on

parole.” In re Kelly, 655 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Cal. 1983) overruled on other grounds by People v.

Langston, 95 P.3d 865 (Cal. 2004). Thus, 

a prior separate prison term is defined as that time period a defendant has spent actually

incarcerated for his offense prior to release on parole. In addition, if the defendant has

violated his parole and has been sent back to prison, but has not received a new

commitment, that time block is deemed to be continuing. If defendant has been returned

with the addition of a new commitment, however, the time block is not continued, and only

that portion of prison time spent prior to release on parole constitutes the prior separate

prison term.

Id. at 1284. Furthermore, a “completed period of prison incarceration” for purposes of the Three

Strikes Law means a “base prison period, prior to parole, and possibly upon revocation of parole

(but only if not accompanied by a new commitment), has been served.” Id. at 1287. 

A. Robbery and Vehicle Theft Imprisonment Terms

The record reflects that Reymundo was convicted of armed robbery on October 9, 1969, and

was received into prison on October 24, 1969. CT at 58, 65. He was released on parole on May 12,

1975, but his parole was suspended and he was returned to prison on November 4, 1975. He was

again released on parole on March 1, 1976. During this period of parole, he stole a vehicle, for

which he was convicted on June 14, 1976, and committed to prison on June 28, 1976. CT at 63. 

The evidence sufficiently demonstrates that Reymundo was returned to prison not only because of a

parole violation, but also for a new offense, thereby qualifying the prison term as separate. The

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ORDER 

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Court of Appeal’s decision on this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law.

B. Vehicle Theft and Receiving Stolen Property Imprisonment Terms

Reymundo next argues that there is insufficient evidence to prove that he served separate

sentences for his vehicle theft conviction and receiving stolen property conviction. The evidence

shows that Reymundo was paroled on September 3, 1977, for his June 14, 1976 conviction for

vehicle theft. Docket No. 18, Ex. 15 at 398. Thereafter he was held in custody on October 12,

1977, for receiving stolen property. He was convicted of the offense on October 26, 1977, and

received in prison November 28, 1977. Id.; CT at 62. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeal’s

conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to show that Reymundo served separate prison terms for

vehicle theft and receiving stolen property. As such, the California Court of Appeal’s decision was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Reymundo next argues that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony and that doing

so had a substantial injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. The contention is based on discrepancies

between the testimony of two officers who responded to the scene. One officer testified that when

he arrived at the scene he moved Reymundo away from the garage where he had been trapped,

handcuffed him, and put him in the back of his patrol car to await the arrival of another officer. 

Docket No. 16, Ex. 18 at 132–33. The second officer on the scene testified that when he arrived he

saw the first officer removing Reymundo from the garage and that he did not remember which of

them handcuffed him. Id., Ex. 17 at 176–77. 

As a preliminary matter, the State argues that Reymundo has not exhausted his prosecutorial

misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel arguments. The state bases this contention on

citations from the California Supreme Court in response to Reymundo’s petition which, it argues,

indicate that the claims were not alleged with sufficient particularity and that the petition did not

clear the initial burden of pleading adequate grounds for relief. See Docket No. 18, Ex. 13 (citing In

re Swain, 209 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1949); People v. Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252 (Cal. 1995)). The Court

concludes, however, that the interests of judicial efficiency and comity are best served by reaching

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ORDER 

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the merits of Reymundo’s claims. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987); Boyd v.

Thompson, 147 F.2d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The United States Supreme Court has “recognized that prosecutorial misconduct may ‘so

infec[t] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Greer

v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). 

[I]f the prosecution knowingly uses perjured testimony, or if the prosecution knowingly fails to

disclose that testimony used to convict a defendant was false, the conviction must be set aside if

there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury verdict.” 

United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Reymundo’s claim is without merit. Any discrepancy in the officers’ testimony was minor. 

Furthermore, a prosecutor who presents witnesses with contradictory testimony does not necessarily

knowingly present perjured testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1346

(9th Cir. 1989). There is no reasonable likelihood that the discrepancy in the officers’ testimony

could have affected the jury verdict. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, Reymundo argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts that

his trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to investigate out-of-court conversations during which

perjurious testimony was developed.” Docket No. 2 (Mem.) at 27. In support of this contention,

Reymundo cites the testimony of a police officer. Docket No. 18, Ex. 17 at 169. Reymundo’s

attorney asked the officer if he had spoken to the victims of the burglary “in the hall . . . outside the

courtroom.” Id. The officer answered “yes,” and defense counsel did not pursue the matter further.

The Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and defines the basic elements of a fair trial in the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984). A fair trial, in essence, “is

one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for

resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.” Id. at 685. Because the right to counsel

plays such a crucial role in the adversarial system, it is not enough that a lawyer merely be present at

courtroom proceedings; a lawyer must, at the very least, demonstrate a basic level of competency. 

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2Section 2253 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

ORDER 

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Id. This conclusion follows directly from the purpose of the Sixth Amendment, which “is to ensure

that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.” 

Id. at 691–92. To make a successful Sixth Amendment ineffective counsel challenge to a state court

judgment, a petitioner must demonstrate that (1) his trial counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for these deficiencies, a reasonable probability

exists that the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to him. Id. at 687–88, 691–92. 

Reymundo cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland test. He merely states that “[t]rial

counsel was made aware of conversations held among prosecution witnesses regarding their

testimony, yet counsel failed to investigate.” Docket No. 1 at 27. The citation to the record

provided by Reymundo shows that counsel asked questions on cross-examination regarding the out

of court contact between prosecution witnesses. This is insufficient to show that trial counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Additionally, there is no

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to look into these conversations further the

outcome would have been more favorable to Reymundo. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

Reymundo’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. 

The Court is of the view that a certificate of appealability should be addressed now, rather than after

Reymundo’s petition and the issues it presents fade from memory. Appeal may not be taken

without a certificate of appealability from either this Court or from the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2253.2 The standard for granting a certificate of appealability has been stated

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(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

ORDER 

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as follows: “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits . . . [t]he

petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 888–89 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Reymundo has made no such

showing. The Court will therefore DENY a certificate of appealability. Reymundo may seek a

certificate of appealability directly from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ motions panel.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 18 day of August 2005.

/s/ James K. Singleton

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

United States District Judge 

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