Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01374/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01374-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 06cv1374

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY K. ROLINSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-1374-H

(RBB)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

On July 6, 2006, Danny K. Rolinson (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant

to section 405(g) of the Social Security Act (“Act”) requesting judicial review of the

final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner” or “Defendant”), denying Plaintiff a period of disability, Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits

under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Act. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 28,

2008, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 14.) On April 7,

2008, Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a response in

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 17, 18.) Plaintiff

filed a reply to Defendant’s opposition on May 13, 2008. (Doc. No. 19.) On June

3, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion to supplement the administrative record to

supply the Court with the complete text of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision,

Case 3:06-cv-01374-H-RBB Document 22 Filed 06/18/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 06cv1374

one page of which was missing from the Administrative Record. (Doc. No. 20.) The

Court granted that joint motion. (Doc. No. 21.)

For the following reasons the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment and grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Background

Plaintiff is a 51 year old male with a high school education. (Administrative

Record (“AR”) 19.) His past work experience includes employment as a janitor and

operating room aide. (AR 19.) Plaintiff alleges that he became disabled in July,

2002 because of asthma, high blood pressure, cardiomegaly, leg pain, cysts and

depression. (AR 19, 30.) Plaintiff initially filed applications for DIB and SSI

payments on May 21, 2004. (AR 18.) Defendant denied his claim initially and upon

reconsideration on July 9, 2004 and again on December 17, 2004. (AR 30-40.) On

February 16, 2005, Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 41.) 

The hearing before the ALJ took place on October 24, 2005. (AR 25.) The

ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process for determining disability:

(1) evaluate recent gainful work activity; (2) determine medical severity of

impairment(s); (3) determine whether impairment(s) meet or equal the duration and

listing requirements of the Act; (4) assess residual functional capacity and determine

whether claimant can perform previous work; (5) if claimant is disabled at steps 1-4,

the burden shifts to Commissioner to determine whether claimant can adjust to other

work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s degenerative joint disease in

the right hip and knee, hypertension, and status post right cortical intraparenchymal

hemorrhage were severe. (AR 19-20.) However, the impairments did not meet or

medically equal the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No.

4 and 16 at step three. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); (AR 24-25.) At step four, Plaintiff’s residual

Case 3:06-cv-01374-H-RBB Document 22 Filed 06/18/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 06cv1374

functional capacity allowed him to perform more than sedentary work, but less than

the full range of light work. (AR 25.) However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s

allegations of disabling pain, medical side effects, and asthma limitations were not

credible and that at step five Plaintiff was not disabled within the framework of the

Medical-Vocational Rules 201.21 and 202.20 (“Grids”). (AR 25.) Based on these

findings, Plaintiff was denied a period of disability and DIB and SSI benefits under

Sections 216(I), 223, 1602, and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. (Id.) Plaintiff’s request

for review of the ALJ’s decision was denied on May 2, 2006, and the ALJ’s decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 3.)

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful claimants to seek judicial

review of a final agency decision. 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g). Upon review, the

Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed if it was supported by substantial

evidence and based on proper legal standards. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002,

1004 (9th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” but less

than a preponderance, and is such “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971); Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). A finding of

substantial evidence is determined from the record as a whole. Desrosiers v. Sec’y

of Health and Human Serv., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The claimant bears the burden of proving disability through the first four steps

of the sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); Clem v. Sullivan,

894 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990). If the claimant meets this burden the

Commissioner assumes the burden of proof at step five to show that there are jobs

existing in the national economy that the claimant could perform given his residual

functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482

U.S. 37, 146 n. 5 (1987).

Case 3:06-cv-01374-H-RBB Document 22 Filed 06/18/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 06cv1374

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial

evidence because the ALJ failed to consider medical and lay testimony relating to

Plaintiff’s asthma and neck tumor when assessing the severity of Plaintiff’s

impairments at step two and residual functional capacity at step four. Plaintiff also

contends that the ALJ misused the Grids to determine that Plaintiff could perform

other work at step five because the ALJ failed to review or reject the opinions of two

State agency medical consultants. For the following reasons, the Court concludes

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessments and that the ALJ used the

Grids appropriately.

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Assessment

1. The ALJ’s Assessment of the Severity of Plaintiff’s Impairments

An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly or even minimally

effect a claimant’s physical or mental capacity to perform basic work activities. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 85-28. Here, the

Court concludes that medical records from Comprehensive Healthcare and Scripps

Hospital constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s

asthma and pain from a neck cyst did not qualify as severe impairments.

First, between 2003 and 2005 three treating physicians at Scripps Mercy

Hospital and one consulting physician stated that Plaintiff’s asthma required no

treatment beyond an inhaler, that Plaintiff was able to perform without difficulty all

activities of daily living, that there was no evidence of frequent severe asthma

attacks, and that Plaintiff’s lungs were clear with no wheezing. (AR 208, 211-12,

239.) Although Disability Determination Services consulting doctors, Dr. Mauro and

Dr. Swan, indicated that a severe medical impairment was established by Plaintiff’s

hypertension and asthma, medical records indicate that outpatient medication “clears

all symptoms.” (AR 254) (emphasis in original). The ALJ determined that since

Plaintiff’s asthma did not create more than a minimal limitation on his ability to

perform basic work activities, his asthma was not a severe impairment. Warre v.

Case 3:06-cv-01374-H-RBB Document 22 Filed 06/18/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 06cv1374

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that

impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for

the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI benefits); see also Allen v. Heckler,

749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984) (determining credibility and resolving conflicts in

medical testimony are the ALJ’s responsibility). 

Second, because pain is subjective and not susceptible to measurement by

reliable clinical techniques, a Plaintiff must establish an underlying medical cause

of pain, then substantiate the pain in other ways. SSR 88-13; see, Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991). While the neck cyst constitutes an

underlying medical cause of pain, Plaintiff terminated his employment for the

purpose of excising the cyst, then waited two years before having it excised. (AR

139, 290-91.) He also failed to attend a scheduled treatment six months after

terminating his employment. (AR 168.) When a Plaintiff fails to seek or follow

prescribed treatment for pain, the ALJ may use such failure as a basis for finding the

complaint unjustified or exaggerated. See, e.g., Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603

(9th Cir. 1989). Further, Plaintiff’s cyst was not malignant and showed no atypical

cells. One week after excision Plaintiff was healing and complained of little pain.

(AR 139.) Based on the record as a whole, the Court concludes that substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s impairments were not

severe. 

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Assessment

A residual functional capacity assessment can be made only after identifying

the “individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess[ing] his or her

work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” SSR 96-8p; see also, 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545. Medical testimony, related symptoms, and other evidence inform

the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The Court concludes that the ALJ

relied on substantial medical and lay testimony in assessing Plaintiff’s residual

Case 3:06-cv-01374-H-RBB Document 22 Filed 06/18/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

“AR 22a” refers to page six of the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion, which was missing

from the Administrative Record and supplemented by joint motion. (See Doc. No. 21.)

- 6 - 06cv1374

functional capacity as less than light but more than sedentary. (AR 22a.1)

First, the ALJ considered all symptoms and medical evidence when identifying

the Plaintiff’s physical, mental and other abilities to determine functional limitations.

(AR 22-22a.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff did his own laundry at times, shopped for

groceries, that he could frequently lift items weighing up to 10 pounds, and that

Plaintiff occasionally could lift up to 20 pounds. (AR 22.) Plaintiff admitted to

being able to stand for up to four hours and that he had no problems sitting. (AR 22,

286.) Although Plaintiff was hospitalized for one week, the ALJ noted that his

doctor discharged him in good condition and able to perform activities of daily

living. (AR 212.) 

Plaintiff testified that his medication side effects caused him to sleep 16 to 17

hours a day and that he took his medication as prescribed. (AR 284.) A statement

from Plaintiff’s cousin indicated that Plaintiff slept too long during the day and had

difficulty concentrating and getting along with others. (AR 120-28.) However, the

ALJ considered this testimony not credible since the record reflected inconsistent

claims by the Plaintiff. Most notably, Plaintiff consistently failed to take the

hypertension medication that he claimed made him tired, and his medical records did

not substantiate his complaints about disabling pain, difficulty remembering, sitting,

standing, walking, using his hands or writing. (AR 23, 76, 168, 198, 209, 254-56.)

Resolving such conflicts in medical testimony and determining credibility are the

sole responsibility of the ALJ. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d

595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

Second, although Plaintiff argues that the assessments of Dr. Mauro and Dr.

Swan were disregarded, they both assessed Plaintiff with the ability to perform

exertionally medium work, which is a greater work ability that the sedentary to light

ability assessed by the ALJ. (AR 184-91, 204.) Further, Dr. Mauro noted that

Case 3:06-cv-01374-H-RBB Document 22 Filed 06/18/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 06cv1374

although Plaintiff complained of disabling asthma and hypertension, “allegations are

deemed less than credible, in that . . . disabling severity of any alleged condition is

not . . . supported by MER.” (AR 189.) The Court concludes that the ALJ

appropriately resolved questions of credibility and conflicts in medical testimony and

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity.

C. The ALJ applied the correct legal standards. 

Use of the Medical-Vocational Rules (“Grids”) is appropriate even when they

do not “completely and accurately represent a claimant’s [non-exertional]

limitations,” provided that the ALJ first determines whether a claimant’s

nonexertional limitations significantly affect the range of work permitted by his

exertional limitations.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d at 1101-02. Here, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff’s asthma did not significantly limit Plaintiff’s range of work

and that Plaintiff’s allegations of side effects from his medication were not

completely credible. Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ used the Grids

appropriately under the law. 

First, the effects of Plaintiff’s asthma were already factored into Dr. Mauro’s

determination of medium work capacity and did not significantly erode Plaintiff’s

ability to perform the demands of basic work. (AR 185.) Further, Plaintiff’s asthma

was controlled by medication. Olde v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983)

(reliance on Grids is proper where nonexertional impairments are controlled by

medication).

Second, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s complaints of medication side

effects were not supported by the medical record. The parties disagree about

whether the Comprehensive Health Center’s notation that Plaintiff suffered “no side

effects” referred to effects of his blood pressure medication or to effects of his high

blood pressure. (AR 194.) However, either interpretation supports a denial of

benefits. On the one hand, if Plaintiff suffered no side effects from his medication,

Case 3:06-cv-01374-H-RBB Document 22 Filed 06/18/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 06cv1374

as Defendant argues, Plaintiff’s complaints of drowsiness as a result of his

medication are unfounded. On the other hand, if Plaintiff suffered no side effects

from his high blood pressure, as Plaintiff argues, Plaintiff’s high blood pressure

indicates he was not taking his medication and could not suffer side effects from it.

Further, medical evidence contradicted the third party report that Plaintiff was unable

to concentrate. (AR 120-28.) Scripps Mercy treatment records noted he was “alert

and oriented . . . His attention span and concentration [were] normal. His remote

memory [was] intact.” (AR 243.) Dr. Santana also noted, “no significant problems

from a mental standpoint.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d at 579 (determining

credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony are the ALJ’s responsibility);

(AR 207.) The Court concludes that because these nonexertional limits did not

significantly affect Plaintiff’s range of work, the ALJ’s exclusive use of the Grids

was appropriate. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d at 1101-02.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner’s decision, and that the Commissioner based that

decision on proper legal standards. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d at 1004.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 18, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

Case 3:06-cv-01374-H-RBB Document 22 Filed 06/18/08 Page 8 of 8