Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00580/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00580-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The instant petition was filed on April 13, 2012, challenging the 

computation of credits on Petitioner’s sentence by the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). 

(Doc. 1). 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Instant Petition.

On June 6, 2012, Respondent requested a stay of proceedings because the issue of Petitioner’s 

credits was already pending before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. (Doc. 

12). To avoid duplication of judicial resources, Respondent requested that the proceedings be held in 

abeyance pending the New York federal court’s resolution of this issue. Id. On November 8, 2012, the 

Court granted the stay and required Respondent to file regular status reports. (Doc. 13).

On October 20, 2014, Respondent notified the Court that the New York district court had 

CHRISTOPHER BRADLEY,

 Petitioner,

v.

H. A. RIOS, JR.,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-00580-LJO-JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION (Doc. 28)

ORDER DIRECTING THAT OBJECTIONS BE 

FILED WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS

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adjudicated the issues raised in this petition and requested the stay be lifted. (Doc. 27). On November 

19, 2014, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss, contending that, pursuant to the ruling of the 

New York court, Petitioner has been accorded all of the relief to which he is entitled concerning 

credits and that the petition should be dismissed. (Doc. 28). Petitioner has not filed an opposition to 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

B. Prior Procedural History.

Petitioner is in custody of the BOP serving a 276-month sentence. This sentence was imposed 

after his 2007 conviction in the United States District Court for Eastern District of New York for 

killing an individual while distributing cocaine, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). (Doc. 28, Ex. 

2, Attach 7). 

According to the documents filed with the motion to dismiss, including a declaration by Marcus 

Boudreaux, a BOP Management Analyst who audited the records relating to Petitioner’s sentence. 

(Doc. 28, Ex. 2), following is the case chronology: Petitioner was arrested on March 15, 2004 in 

Brooklyn, New York, by non-federal authorities on the charges of attempted first degree robbery, 

criminal possession of a weapon, menacing, and possession of an ammunition clip. (Id., p. 3). On May 

10, 2004, Petitioner pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in state court and was sentenced to time 

served. (Id.). During that time, he was in the continuous custody of the New York City Department of 

Corrections (“NYC-DOC”). (Id.). 

When Petitioner was arrested on these charges, he was on parole after a conviction of sale of a 

controlled substance in another state court and had been originally sentenced on that case to a two-year 

minimum, six-year maximum prison term. (Doc. 28, Ex. 2 at p. 3) As a result of the March 15, 2004 

arrest and plea, the state, on March 24, 2004, commenced proceedings to revoke Petitioner’s parole on 

the earlier charge. (Id.). After the state determined that Petitioner had four years, two months, 

nineteen days remaining on his original sentence, the court revoked Petitioner’s parole and returned 

him to custody for an additional five-month term. (Id.). Petitioner remained in the custody of the 

NYC-DOC until June 2, 2004, when he was released into the custody of the New York State 

Department of Correctional Services (NY-DOC), to continue service of his original sentence for sale 

of a controlled substance. (Id.). 

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On July 27, 2004, the state parole board determined that the earliest possible release date for 

Petitioner was August 18, 2004. (Id., p. 4). On August 12, 2004, Petitioner was temporarily 

transferred to federal custody pursuant to a writ. (Doc. 28, Ex. 2, Attach. 17). Petitioner was 

prosecuted on the federal charges and on July 18, 2007, was sentenced by the U.S. District Court for 

the Eastern District of New York, to a 276-month term for killing an individual while distributing 

cocaine. (Doc. 28, Ex. 2, p. 4). The sentencing order does not indicate that the 276-month term was to 

be served concurrent with any other prison term. (Doc. 28, Ex. 2, Attach 6). 

On July 26, 2007, Petitioner was returned to the custody of the NY-DOC to continue serving

his state sentence. (Doc. 28, Ex. 2, p. 4). A federal detainer was lodged with the NY-DOC regarding 

Petitioner’s federal sentence, holding him when he completed the state prison term. (Id.). According 

to Management Analyst Boudreaux, during the period Petitioner was subject to the federal writ, i.e., 

from August 12, 2004 until July 26, 2007, Petitioner remained in the primary custody of the state 

authorities, several state parole hearings were held, and the parole decision in all of those proceedings 

were designated “Postponed” because Petitioner was being held subject to the federal writ. (Id., p. 5). 

On October 10, 2007, Petitioner, at his own request, was released via parole in order to “start his 

Federal sentence earlier.” (Id.). 

JURISDICTION

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United 

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While a federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or 

constitutionality of his conviction must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255, a petitioner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's execution must 

bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 

F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); 

United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir. 1991); Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 

(9th Cir. 1990). To receive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 a petitioner in federal custody must show that 

his sentence is being executed in an illegal, but not necessarily unconstitutional, manner. See, e.g., 

Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1995) (contending time spent in state custody should be 

credited toward federal custody); Jalili, 925 F.2d at 893-94 (asserting petitioner should be housed at a 

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community treatment center); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 479 (3rd Cir. 1990) (arguing Bureau 

of Prisons erred in determining whether petitioner could receive credit for time spent in state custody); 

Brown, 610 F.2d at 677 (challenging content of inaccurate pre-sentence report used to deny parole). A 

petitioner filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the 

judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown, 610 F.2d at 677. 

In this case, Petitioner alleges he is being unlawfully denied credit for the time in “federal 

custody” while awaiting trial on his federal charges. (Doc. 1 at 3) Petitioner claims that this period of 

time, nearly three years, was not credited to any other sentence. Id. Thus, Petitioner is challenging the 

execution of his sentence rather than its imposition; therefore, the claim is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 

2241. In addition, because Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of filing of the petition at the United 

States Penitentiary, Atwater, California (“USP Atwater”), which lies within the Eastern District of 

California, Fresno Division, this Court has jurisdiction to proceed.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that Petitioner’s 

contentions regarding the Bureau of Prison’s award of credits are without merit. Along with the 

motion, Respondent has submitted additional evidence in the form of declarations, reports, and 

documents, all in support of Respondent’s contention that Petitioner’s claims lack merit.1 Rule 4 of 

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly

appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to 

relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if the 

motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the state’s 

procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to 

 

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The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases may be applied to petitions for writ of habeas corpus other than those brought 

under § 2254 at the Court’s discretion. See, Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Civil Rule 81(a)(2) 

provides that the rules are “applicable to proceedings for . . . habeas corpus . . . to the extent that the practice in such 

proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice of civil actions.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P 81(a)(2). 

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evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 

602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state 

procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the Court orders a response, and the Court should use Rule 

4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

As discussed above, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases do not expressly provide for 

motion practice; rather, such motion practice must be inferred from the structure of the rules 

themselves. Hillery, 533 F.Supp. at 1195. For example, Rule 11 provides as follows: “The Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions of 

these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.” Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases. Because of the peculiar and unique nature of habeas proceedings, as a general rule, neither 

Rule 12(b)(6) nor summary judgment motions under Rule 56 are particularly appropriate. Given the 

nature of a habeas corpus petition, Anderson v. Butler, 886 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1989) (modern 

habeas corpus procedure has the same function as an ordinary appeal); O’Neal v. McAnnich, 513 U.S. 

440, 442 (1995) (federal court’s function in habeas corpus proceedings is to “review errors in state 

criminal trials”(emphasis omitted)), motions for summary judgment are unnecessary because petitions 

may be decided immediately by the Court following submission of the pleadings provided no material 

issues of fact exist. See, 1 J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 17.3 (1988) 

(The habeas corpus statute authorizes -- indeed, it seems to require -- the court treat the petition itself as

the equivalent of a petitioner-initiated summary judgment motion).

Similarly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacking the sufficiency of the pleading in the petition does 

not comfortably fit within the habeas landscape either. As mentioned, the district court is already 

tasked with the responsibility to initially screen the petition for sufficiency pursuant to Rule 4 of the 

Rules Governing Section 2254 cases. Here, the Court’s order of September 25, 2009, requiring 

Respondent to file a response, was issued only after the Court had undertaken its Rule 4 obligation. 

Thus, at that point, the Court had, by implication, already found the petition’s pleadings sufficient to 

proceed. Premising a motion to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6), as Respondent has done, is therefore 

redundant in that, essentially, such a motion requests that the Court conduct a pleading examination that 

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it has already completed. 

Although procedurally appropriate to do so, denying Respondent’s motion to dismiss solely on 

narrow procedural grounds and then requiring Respondent to file an answer that would, in all 

likelihood, raise the same issues again based on the same documentary evidence, would be an 

inefficient use of the Court’s limited judicial resources. Instead, the Court has the inherent power under 

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to construe Respondent’s motion as an Answer on the merits. 

If Petitioner has been given a reasonable time within which to file a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer, 

the Court is then in a position to rule on the merits of the petition without the need for further factual 

development of the record or additional briefing.

Accordingly, the Court will construe Respondent’s motion to dismiss as an Answer on the 

merits. Despite the passage of sixty days since the motion to dismiss was filed, Petitioner has not filed 

any responsive pleading. Therefore, the Court will review these issues on their merits. 

B. Exhaustion.

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging any 

circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Martinez v. Roberts, 804 

F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984); 

Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983). The requirement that federal prisoners exhaust 

administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition was judicially created; it is not a 

statutory requirement. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, “because exhaustion 

is not required by statute, it is not jurisdictional.” Id. If Petitioner has not properly exhausted his 

claims, the district court, in its discretion, may either “excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits 

or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court.” Here, 

Respondent concedes that Petitioner’s claims are exhausted. (Doc. 28, p. 4). 

C. Calculation of Credits.

The petition contends that the BOP erred in failing to credit him with time served between 

August 12, 2004 and July 25, 2007, the period during which the federal proceedings were pending prior 

to sentencing. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Respondent, on the other hand, contends that Petitioner has received all 

the credits he is due under federal law. The Court agrees with Respondent.

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The authority to compute a federal prisoner’s sentence is delegated to the Attorney General, 

who exercises it through the BOP. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 

1354-55 (1992); Allen v. Crabtree, 153 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1091 

(1999). “Computing a federal sentence requires two separate determinations: first, when the sentence 

commences; and, second, to what extent the defendant in question may receive credit for any time 

already spent in custody.” United States v. Smith, 812 F.Supp 368, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Jimenez v. 

Warden, FDIC, Fort Devens, Mass., 147 F.Supp.2d 24, 27 (D.Mass.2001); Chambers v. Holland, 920 

F.Supp. 618, 621 (M.D.Pa. 1996), affirmed by, 100 F.3d 946 (3rd Cir. 1996). A federal sentence 

commences “on the date the defendant is received in custody... to commence service of sentence at the

official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); Thomas v. 

Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, there is no dispute that Petitioner is entitled to credit against his federal sentence starting 

on October 10, 2007, and, likewise, no contention has been raised that he has not received this credit. 

This is precisely the conclusion reached by the Eastern District of New York as well. (Doc. 28, Ex. 4, 

p. 8). The only remaining issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to federal credits for any period of time 

prior to that date--specifically for the period between August 12, 2004 and July 26, 2007 when 

Petitioner was in the temporary custody of federal officers during the pendency of his federal criminal 

proceeding. 

Thomas v. Brewer determines the date Petitioner’s federal sentence commenced. In that case, 

petitioner was arrested on state charges on May 10, 1964. While in state custody, he was charged in 

federal court with armed bank robbery. On three occasions--June 15, 1964, June 23, 1964, and August 

4, 1964--petitioner was brought to federal court on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to answer 

the federal charges. On the latter date, August 4, 1964, petitioner was sentenced to the “maximum 

period prescribed by law.” Thomas, at 1363. 

After his sentencing in federal court, petitioner was returned to state authorities in Los Angeles, 

where, on August 28, 1964, he appeared in state court and was sentenced to two concurrent terms. 

Thomas, at 1363. On February 11, 1965, petitioner was sentenced in state court to a term of life on yet 

another charge. Id. at 1364. Thomas began serving his state term in California State Institution, Chino, 

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on February 23, 1965. Id. On November 23, 1966, pursuant to a recommendation of the state court, 

petitioner was turned over to U.S. marshals to enable concurrent service of petitioner’s federal and state 

terms. At an unknown date in December 1966, petitioner was delivered to the Federal Correctional 

Institute, Lompoc, California. Id.

Thomas contended in a federal habeas petition that he should be given credit for time in custody 

between August 4, 1964 and November 23, 1966. Thomas, at 1364. The federal district court 

disagreed and denied Thomas’ petition. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Thomas’ contention 

that he was in federal custody at the time of his initial federal sentencing on August 4, 1964, and that 

his federal sentence should therefore run from that date. Id. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 

district court’s determination that Thomas’ sentence commenced to run on November 23, 1964, the 

date he was originally released from state prison and turned over to the custody of U.S. marshals for 

concurrent service. Id. at 1369 (“Thomas’s sentence could not have begun to run until he was received 

at an institution either to serve his sentence, or to be transported to another institution where his 

sentence was to be served.”). 

Applying Thomas to this case, Petitioner was not “received into [federal] custody...to 

commence service of sentence at the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served”

during the period from August 12, 2004 until July 26, 2007. During that time period, despite being

temporarily placed with federal authorities, Petitioner was still serving his state sentence for his parole 

revocation and thus, he was still in the primary custody of the State of New York. By contrast, 

Petitioner was unquestionably “received into [federal] custody” on October 10, 2007, shortly after he 

completed his state prison term and subject to the detainer lodged by the federal government for his 

conviction July 18, 2007 conviction. Thomas, 923 F.2d at 1369; see United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 

1293, 1301 (9th Cir. 1977)(“a federal term cannot begin until a prisoner has been received by federal 

authorities”); United States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1976)(“Unless time is served in 

federal custody, it does not count as credit for time served under a federal sentence”); Gunton v. Squier, 

185 F.2d 470, 471 (9th Cir. 1950)(“his Federal sentence could not start to run until he was delivered to 

and received by the United States Marshal at the place of detention to await transportation to the 

Federal penitentiary”). At that point, and only at that point, was Petitioner in the primary custody of 

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federal authorities for purposes of awarding credits on his federal conviction. Accordingly, October 10, 

2007 was the date when Petitioner’s federal detention “commenced.” This conclusion is entirely 

consistent with that reached by the Eastern District of New York in rejecting the same argument 

Petitioner raises in this case. (Doc. 28, Ex. 4, p. 8). 

Petitioner asserts, however, that he should be awarded pre-trial credits for the period from 

August 12, 2004 until July 26, 2007, against his federal sentence. As mentioned, 18 U.S.C. § 3585, 

provides, inter alia, that “[a] defendant be given credit for any time spent in official detention prior to 

the date a sentence commences . . . that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3585(b) (emphasis added). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, two reasons exist for why Petitioner 

is not entitled to these additional “pre-trial” credits against his federal sentence. First, that time period

was not a term served “as a result of the offense for which the [federal] sentence was imposed,” § 

3585(b)(1). Second, Petitioner’s claims to the contrary, he had already received credit for that time on 

his state sentence, which precludes him from receiving the same credits on his federal sentence. § 

3585(b)(2). (Doc. 28-2 at 7) To give Petitioner credit for his “pre-trial” detention on the federal charges 

for both his state sentence and his federal sentence would violate the plain language of § 3585(b), and 

is barred by United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337, 112 S.Ct. 1351 (1992) (“Congress made clear 

[in Section 3585(b) ] that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.”). 

Thus, the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to custody credit pursuant to § 3585(b). Put 

another way, all of the time Petitioner now seeks to have credited against his federal sentence has 

already been credited toward his state sentence. (Doc. 28-2 at 7) Since Petitioner has received full 

credit against his state sentence for the all of the time spent in federal custody pursuant to the writ of 

habeas corpus, he is not entitled to any additional credit, which would, in effect, be double credits

against his federal sentence for the same period of time. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); see also United States v. 

Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (“Congress made clear [in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)] that a defendant could not 

receive a double credit for his detention time.”); Boniface v. Carlson, 856 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 

1988)(per curium)(applying the precursor to 18 U.S.C. § 3585, and concluding that “[s]ince the State of 

Florida gave [petitioner] credit on his state sentence for the period of time he was denied release [from 

state custody], he is not entitled to credit against his federal sentence for the same period of time”); 

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Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 274-275 (3d Cir. 2000)(“[T]he general rule prohibiting double credit 

articulated in section 3585(b) applies equally to situations where, as here, the prisoner was in federal 

control pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum during the time period for which a presentence credit is sought.”); United States v. LaBeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1998)(“[A] 

defendant has no right to credit on his federal sentence for time that has been credited against his prior 

state sentence.”). 

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted and 

that the petition be denied on its merits.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 28), be 

GRANTED and that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED with prejudice.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 21 days 

after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be 

served and filed within ten days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. The 

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties 

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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