Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01722/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01722-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE NINO,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. MUNOZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-01722-JLT (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO 

FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 

OR NOTIFY THE COURT OF HIS 

DESIRE TO PROCEED ONLY ON 

CLAIMS FOUND COGNIZABLE

(Doc. 1)

21-DAY DEADLINE

Joe Nino alleges the defendants subjected him to retaliation and cruel and unusual 

punishment. (Doc. 1.) The Court finds that Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Defendants 

Munoz, Carillo, Harris, Masferrer, and an unnamed sergeant, but not against the remaining 

defendants. Therefore, the Court directs Plaintiff to file a first amended complaint curing the 

deficiencies in his pleading or a notice that he wishes to proceed only on the claims found 

cognizable.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 

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it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as 

true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 

any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 

theories. Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 

of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 

pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 

inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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B. Linkage and Causation

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 

rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 

section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS1

Plaintiff’s claims stem from incidents that occurred while he was incarcerated at 

California Correctional Institution. (Doc. 1 at 1.) On December 31, 2018, Correctional Officers 

Harris and Masferrer approached Plaintiff’s cell, at which point Plaintiff “ran to the toilet . . . and 

flushed some contraband.” (Id. at 21.) The officers yelled at Plaintiff, then placed him in 

handcuffs and pushed him to the ground. (Id.) The officers continued yelling at Plaintiff, asking 

him what he had flushed, and searched his body and clothing. (Id. at 21-22.) The officers then 

pulled Plaintiff’s pants and boxers down and sprayed him with pepper spray, “laughing and 

coughing at the same time.” (Id. at 22.) One of the officers “spread [Plaintiff’s] buttocks . . . and 

. . . penetrated his rectum” with his fingers. (Id.) As the officers were escorting Plaintiff out of the 

building, they pushed him against a wall and repeatedly punched him with closed fists in his back 

and rib area, while an unnamed sergeant (“Sergeant John Doe”) laughed with the officers. (Id.) 

The sergeant then told the officers, “that’s it, take him to the front.” (Id.) Officer Harris then 

kicked Plaintiff in the genitals. (Id.) After the incident, Plaintiff filed grievances for excessive 

force and sexual assault. (See id. at 7.)

On July 29, 2019, Correctional Officers Carillo and Munoz approached Plaintiff in the 

exercise yard and ordered him to turn around and place his hands behind his back. (Id. at 5.) 

1 For screening purposes, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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Plaintiff complied, and Munoz placed him in handcuffs while Carillo put leg irons around his 

ankles. (Id.) As the officers were escorting Plaintiff away, Munoz tripped Plaintiff, and the 

officers slammed him to the floor. (Id. at 5-6.) The officers then punched Plaintiff in his head and 

face, as Plaintiff yelled for them to stop. (Id. at 6.) Officer Munoz then “placed his hand around 

[Plaintiff’s] neck and stated, ‘you know what this is for motherfucker, you want to write me and 

my partners up, the ball is in your court.’” (Id.) When the officers stopped punching, Munoz 

stood up and kicked Plaintiff, stating, “snitch.” (Id.) As “nurses and ISU” approached, Munoz 

said to Carillo, “we will say that he kicked you and tried to spit, okay?” to which Carillo

responded, “cool.” (Id.) Plaintiff was then escorted to the facility’s medical clinic, and he was 

later transferred to an outside hospital. (Id.)

When Plaintiff returned to the prison, Munoz approached his holding cell, stating, “we 

sent you back your complaint for excessive force and P.R.E.A. allegations against Harris, if you 

know what[’s] better for you, then you better drop it.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff replied that he would 

not drop his complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff was then transferred to Kern Valley State Prison. (Id.)

As a result of the July 29, 2019 incident, Plaintiff suffered a laceration above his eyebrow, 

which required stitches; a concussion; bruises; headaches; and a “subclinical iritis.” (Id. at 6-7.) 

Plaintiff experienced pain and blurriness in his eye, and he now requires prescription glasses. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners “constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 

(1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As courts have observed, “[p]ersons are 

sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment.” Gordon v. Faber, 800 F. Supp. 797, 800 (N.D. 

Iowa) (citations omitted). “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty 

that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A correctional officer engages in excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause if he (1) uses excessive and unnecessary force under all the circumstances 

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and (2) “harms an inmate for the very purpose of causing harm,” and not “as part of a good-faith 

effort to maintain security.” Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 788 (9th Cir. 2018). In other 

words, “whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force . . . , the core 

judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7

(1992). In making this determination, courts may consider “the need for application of force, the 

relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by 

the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. 

at 7. Courts may also consider the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Id. However, the 

absence of serious injury is not determinative. Id.

Plaintiff states cognizable claims of excessive force against Defendants Harris, Masferrer, 

Carillo, and Munoz. On December 31, 2018, Plaintiff alleges Officers Harris and Masferrer 

pulled off his pants and underwear and sprayed his back area with pepper spray, after they had 

placed him in handcuffs and taken him to the ground. (Doc. 1 at 21-22.) Plaintiff states that the 

officers then punched him repeatedly in the back and rib area, and that Harris kicked him in the 

genitals. (Id. at 22.) On July 29, 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Officers Carillo and Munoz slammed 

him on the ground and punched him in the head and face, after they had restrained him in

handcuffs and leg irons. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff states that Munoz also kicked him. In both of these 

cases, Plaintiff’s allegations show that the officers applied force that was excessive and 

unnecessary and for the purpose of causing harm, not to maintain or restore security, and that he 

suffered significant injuries as a result.

Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim against Correctional Sergeant Escarcega or the 

unnamed warden of CCI (“Warden John Doe”). With respect to Escarcega, Plaintiff does not 

mention the sergeant in his factual allegations, despite naming him as a defendant. Plaintiff thus 

fails to link this defendant to his claims. See Section II.B, supra. With respect to Warden John 

Doe, Plaintiff alleges the warden “fail[ed] to adequately train custody staff in the appropriate use 

of force and . . . fail[ed] to investigate the incident or discipline the other defendants.” (Doc. 1 at 

11, 19.) This statement, however, is conclusory and lacks factual support. Plaintiff does not 

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provide any facts showing that the warden failed to adequately train or discipline his staff or 

investigate the incident, or that his actions or inactions were otherwise a cause of the Eighth 

Amendment violations of which he complains. As explained in section II.A, supra, “[t]hreadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

To the extent that Plaintiff names Sergeant Escarcega and Warden John Doe simply 

because they hold supervisory positions, the Court notes that section 1983 does not impose 

liability on a supervisor merely because her subordinate has violated Plaintiff’s rights. See id. at 

676-77. To impose individual liability, a plaintiff must allege specific misdeeds that each 

defendant committed, rather than the misdeeds of those she supervised. See id. If Plaintiff is 

unable to make this showing with respect to any defendant(s), then he should not include the 

defendant(s) in an amended complaint.

B. Failure to Intercede

“[O]fficers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional 

rights of a suspect or other citizen.” United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9th Cir. 

1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (citations omitted). In cases involving 

a failure to intercede, “the constitutional right violated by the passive defendant is analytically the 

same as the right violated by the person who strikes the blows.” Id. Thus, where a plaintiff alleges 

that a “prison officer . . . failed to intervene while his fellow prison officers used excessive force,” 

“[t]he core judicial inquiry is whether the prison officer maliciously and sadistically failed to 

intervene to cause harm.” Stevenson v. Holland, No. 1:16-cv-01831-AWI-JLT, 2020 WL 264422, 

at *17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2020). “Importantly, . . . officers can be held liable for failing to 

intercede only if they had an opportunity to intercede.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 

1289 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant John Doe watched and laughed as Officers Harris and 

Masferrer pushed him against a wall and punched him in the back and rib area. (Doc. 1 at 22.) 

This allegation is sufficient to show that the sergeant failed to intervene for the purpose of 

causing harm. Plaintiff thus states a cognizable failure-to-intercede claim against this defendant.

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C. Sexual Assault

“Sexual . . . abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer is a violation of the [Cruel and 

Unusual Punishments Clause of the] Eighth Amendment.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 

1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “In the simplest and most absolute of terms, . . .

prisoners [have a clearly established Eighth Amendment right] to be free from sexual abuse. . .” 

Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (as quoted in Wood, 692 F.3d at 1046).

As explained above, cruel and unusual punishment claims have objective and subjective 

components. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (citation omitted). In cases of coercive 

sexual conduct by a prison guard against a prisoner, the Ninth Circuit has held that the conduct 

itself satisfies the objective prong, since it is “deeply offensive to human dignity and is 

completely void of penological justification.” Wood, 692 F.3d at 1051 (quoting Schwenk, 204 

F.3d at 1196) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, “the conduct itself constitutes 

sufficient evidence that force was used maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 

causing harm,” and thus the conduct standing alone satisfies the subjective prong. Id. at 1050 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff states a cognizable claim of sexual assault against Correctional Officers Harris 

and Masferrer. Plaintiff alleges that one of the officers “penetrated [Plaintiff’s] rectum” with his 

fingers, after both officers had taken Plaintiff to the ground in handcuffs and pepper sprayed him.

(Doc. 1 at 22.) This allegation satisfies both prongs of an Eighth Amendment claim.

D. Retaliation

A claim of First Amendment retaliation has five elements. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). First, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected activity. Id.

For example, filing an inmate grievance is protected, Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th 

Cir. 2005), as is the right to access the courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see 

also Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985). Second, the plaintiff must show that 

the defendant took adverse action against him. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 (citation omitted). 

“Third, the plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected 

conduct.” Id. In other words, the plaintiff must claim the defendant subjected him to an adverse 

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action because of his engagement in protected activity. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. “Fourth, the 

plaintiff must allege that the official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness 

from future [protected] activities.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “Fifth, the plaintiff must allege ‘that the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did 

not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution.’” Id. (quoting Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532).

Plaintiff states cognizable retaliation claims against Correctional Officers Munoz and 

Carillo. Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in protected activity, i.e., filing staff complaints 

regarding the December 31, 2018 incident of alleged excessive force and sexual assault, and that 

Munoz and Carillo subjected him to adverse action because of his engagement in the protected

activity, i.e., subjecting him to excessive force on July 29, 2019. (Doc. 1 at 13-17.) Plaintiff does 

not allege that the officers’ actions would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness; however,

he alleges that he was harmed, and “harm that is more than minimal will almost always have a 

chilling effect.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 n.11.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims against 

Defendants Munoz, Carillo, Harris, Masferrer, and Sergeant John Doe, but not against the 

remaining defendants. Because he may be able to cure the deficiencies in his pleading, the Court 

grants Plaintiff leave to amend. Within 21 days of the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified herein or, in the alternative, 

notify the Court that he wishes to proceed only on the claims found cognizable. If Plaintiff no 

longer wishes to pursue this action, he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal. If Plaintiff needs 

an extension of time to comply with this order, he shall file a motion seeking an extension no 

later than 21 days from the date of service of this order.

Plaintiff is informed that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey 

v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, a first amended complaint must 

be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. The 

Court provides Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies

identified in this order. However, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding 

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unrelated claims in an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a first amended complaint;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and,

3. Within 21 days of the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file one of the 

following three items:

a. a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order, or

b. a notice that he does not wish to file a first amended complaint and instead 

wishes to (1) proceed only on his claims of excessive force or failure to 

intercede against Defendants Munoz, Carillo, Harris, Masferrer, and Sergeant 

John Doe; retaliation against Defendants Munoz and Carillo; and sexual 

assault against Defendants Harris and Masferrer, and (2) dismiss the remaining 

claims and defendants, or

c. a notice of voluntary dismissal of this entire case.

If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this action 

proceed only on the claims found cognizable herein and that all other claims and defendants 

be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2021 _ /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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