Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01029/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01029-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

,',., :, . -~- ·,) .,., ' . ~. . ,,. ·- ~ . ' --

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ,. ' ,I 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

I ' I I 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR~UNITY 

COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

' 

'. ·,-)_._,_,,., .~ .. , . 

FILED 

United St.able Court of Appeals 

'I1enth Circuit 

OCT 2 81988 

· ROBERT, L. HC1ECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 86-1029 

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

,, 

• I 'J 

I ,1 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 84-C-1436) 

Warren Bo Duplinsky, Attorney (Johnny J. Butler, Acting General 

Counsel; Gwendolyn Young Reams, Acting Associate General Counsel; 

and Vella M. Fink, Assistant General Counsel, with him on the 

briefs), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, 

D.C.r,for Fl,intiff~Appellant. 

William H. Brown, III of Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Steve D. Shadowen of Schnader, 

Harrison~ Segal & Le~is, Philad~lphia, Pennsylvania, and John R. 

Webb of Holme, Roberts & Owen, Denver,' Colorado, with him on the 

brief), .for Defendant-Appellee. -

Before McKAY, BARRETT and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

' I 

McKAY, Cireuit Judge. 

,1 If"' 

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 1 
•• , ...... ·~' ., •• .I. ,._.J __ '., ; .... -· • 

~r. _Jetome Patterson, a package delivery driver for the 

United Parcel Service, filed a charge .with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity· Commission challenging UPS' "no-beard" policy. UPS 

had, and still maintains, 'an express policy that employees, in public contact positions' cannot wear beards. Mr. Patterson suffers 

from psuedofolliculitis barba~e ( "PFB"}, a skin cond_i tion, both 

painful and disfiguring, which affects approximately twenty-five 

percent of the black male population. The sole treatment for his 

condition i.s to refrain'from shaving., Mr. Patterson supplied documentation of his condition to his superiors from both UPS medical 

pers©nnel and 'outside physicians. The medical evidence stated 

that growing a beard·was necessary in ,order to alleviate his condition. Nevertheless, pursuant to UPS' express "no beard policy," 

Mr. Patterson's supervisors told him that he would be transferred 

to a non-public contact position at a lower salary if he did not 

shave.· The EEOC investigated the claim filed by Mr. Patterson, 

and brought suit under Section 706(f)(l) of Title VII of the .Civir 

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 u.s.c. ·s 2000e et seq. (Title 

VII). This• suit was;brought on_bahalf of Mr: Patterson and other 

similarly sitaated black males. Mr. Patterson settled with UPS 

and is no longer involved in ,the case. 

At a hearing in the district court, the EEOC submitted an 

affidavit by Theodis Hall. Mr. Hall a1leged''that he was denied 

employment.at UPS because he refused to shave· (due to PFB): The 

affidavit ~lso alleged, after being subsequentl¥ hired by UPS in 

1981, that he was not given~ public contact position because of 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 2 
( 

... (.· . .... ,,.:.-.,· ,_ 

his beard. 'The district court rejected the affidavit because it 

was not submitted more than seventy-two hours before the hearing '', 

as requirad' by 'Local Rule 908(d) (Colo. R. Pro.). The court also 

held that tlrle affidavit did not 'show that Mr. Hall was "a presently aggrieved persoh" under Title VII because the 1977 allegation was too remote in• time and the 1981 allegation didn't clearly 

state that Mr~ Hall was adversely affected by the "no, beard" 

policy. 

•Aft~r rejecting Mr. Hall ·as an aggrieved party, the court. 

concluded thae ehe EEOC 'lacked standing because it could not 

present an·actual injured party to the court. As'a result, 'the 

district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS. Because 

the district court erroneously concluded that the EEOC must proceed on behalf of an actual injured party when challenging a discriminatory employment policy under Title VII, we reverse. 

Under the'broadiremedial powers granfed by Congress under· 

Title vt1, the EEOC has standing oy itself to challenge a policy ' I I ' 'I 

. that represents ongoing discrimination. Therefo~e, the fact that 

the original plainttff, Jerome ~atterson~ settled.his claim with 

UPS did not moot the-EEOC's claim. Likewise, the EEOC's failure 

to produce an additional party within the seventy-two-hour time 

"' limit ,i:s irrelevant. Under Title VII., ,the E:l!:OC need not produce 

an injured·party when seeking to challenge an allegedly discriminatory policy that. may affect unidentifiable members· of a known 

class. ,This.iclass presumably includes members.of the population 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 3 
:•:,· •• :, ·,.,__,. ..'· •• ,,. ·••'•• -1 .. ·· .,_, • •'·-.. ..,t.· ...... :,;, .. , 

afflicted within PFB who are potential UPS applicants seeking public contact positions and who may 9e discouraged from applying 

because of the '"no beard" rule. 

I ' l I 

At the behest of'Jerome P~ttetson, an identified plaintiff, 

the EEOC properly brought this suit upder section 706. The fact 

that a particular plaintiff settles his or her claim does not 

require the EEOC, in a. case of ongoing discrimination, to abandon 

suit under §ection 706 and reinitiate ·the same suit under section 

707'as a.commissioner's charge. 1 The district· court mistakenly 

assumed 1that '

1having elected to proceed under!Section 706, rather 

than bhrough a Commissioner's charge under Section 707, this 

action cannot now be maintained." EEOC v. UPS, No. 84-C-1436 (D. 

Colo. 1985). Once the EEOC has properly sued pursuant to a. specific individual's complaint, it may proceed under section 706, 

although the original plaintiff is.no longer a party. 

The 1972 ~mendments to Title VII wer~ designed to increase 

the EEOC's arsenal o~cavailable weapons to cnallenge discrimina-

~· I 

tory practices: The EEOC's mandate is to protect the.public generally from ongoing discriminatpry practices. In.General 

1 While section 707 is available to start EEOC action without a 

specific complainant, once a section 706 action commenced, it is 

unnecessary to abandon that proceeding to se~k a new action under 

section 707. Section 706(f)(l) provides in relevant part; 

If within thirty days after a charge is filed with th~ 

Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any 

period of reference under subsection (c) o~ (d)~ the 

Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent 

a conciliation agreement acceptable to' the Commission, 

the Commission may bring a civil action against any 

-4-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 4 
Telephone Cb. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323 (1980j, _the Supreme Court 

held that "Ro.le 23 is not applicabJ.e to an enforcement action 

brought bJ the 'EEOC in its· own name and pursuant.to its authority 

under § 706, to prevent unlawful ·~mployment practices." Id,. Additionally~ the Supreme· Court held that "the EEOC is not merely a 

proxy for tbe victims of disci;imination," id. at 326, and that the 

EEOC may proc~ed with a suit·in its own name without seeking class 

certification on behalf of a class of individuals in order to protect the puJ:>lic interest in ending oiscriminatory employment practices. ~Tit1e ,VII protects all employees of and applicants for 

empl©yment .wi t!h• 1 a covered,.-employer II Jd. at 323. 

I '-\ . , 

In the case before us, the district court mischaracterized 

the nature of this 1 dispute. The district court found that there 

was no Art. III case and controversy; therefore, it mistakenly 

held.that the EEOC lacked standing to sue without an actual 

injur.ed par-ty before the court. The idea that the EEOC might not 

have standing to do what it is legally· required to do was put to 

rest in"General Telephone. .The~,,Slipreme Court did "no more than 

follow a, straight-forward reading of the statute~ which seems to 

. authorize the . EEOC ___ to sue , _______ in its o~n name _ to enforce federal 

law by obtaining appropriate relief for those persons injured by 

discriminatory practices forbidden ,by the Act." Id. at 324-25 

( emphasis added•). "Those persons injuiied" m~y well be persons who 

respondent not a gqyernment, governmental agency, or 

politic~l ~ubdivision named in the charge~ 

-5-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 5 
have never applied for the job because they were.discouraged by a 

discriminatory practice.· 

, .. ,. ' 

In General Telephone'the Supreme Court relied on the legislative history of the 1972 amendm~nt~ •to Title VII. It is clear 

from the amendments that "Congress sought to implement the public 

interest as w~11· as to bring-about more effective enforcement of 

private rights." Id. at 326. While, there is no, doubt that the 

EEOC operat~s on behalf'of and for the benefit of specific 

aggrieved individuals, the Supreme Court cleariy outlined the. 

Commiss::i:on '.s prime function. "Although the EEOC can secure spe:-

cific·1relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive ·seniority, or damages for back pay or benefits denied, on behalf of 

discrimination victims, the agency is guided by 'the overriding 

public interest in equal employment opportunity • . . · asserted 

through direct Federal enforcement.'" Id. at 326 (citing 118 

Codg~.Rec. 4941 (1912}) (emphasis added). 

' . 

Th~'Court's· dec~sion in Genetal Telephone was clearly • I 

intended, to reinforce the EEOC's broad powers under Title VII to 

police ongoing discrimination. "Given the clear purpose of Title 

VII, the EEOC's jurisdiction over enforcement, and the remedies 

available, the EEOC need look no further than.§ 706 for its 

authority to bring suit in its own name for the purpose, among 

others, of,securing relief for a group of aggrieved-individuals.'' 

Id. at 324,(emphas,is added). The'language of the Supreme Court I• 

indicates that while securing relief for a group of aggrieved 

-6-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 6 
individuals· is a paramount purpose of section 706J. it is not the 

· sole purpose .... -but rather• one goal :•amo~g others." 

'·· ,. ' .I 

The 1972 amendments were adμed to Title VII to destroy the 

apparent. limits placed on the Cqmm'ission's ability to proceed with 

suit prior t;:o 1972. "Under tl)e procedural structure created by 

the 1972 amendments, the EEOC does not function simply as a 

vehicle for conducting. litigation on behalf of. private parties; it 

is a Federa} administrative agency charged with the responsibility 

of investigating claims of employment discrimination .. " . Id. 

at 326-27, n.8 fciting Occidental Life Ins. c~. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 

355, 368 (1977)J. 

, Title VII, by way of its 1972 amendments~ gives the EEOC 

standing to sue to protect the public interest in freedom from 

employment discrimination. In its discussion of the 1972 amendments, the ,General Telephone Court explained that "'the EEOC .... 

has the authority to,institute, exactly the same actions that the 

Department of, Justic~cdoes qnde_E pattern or practice.'" 18 Cong. I 

Rec. 4080 ( 19~2). The Court further noted that ''.the Department of 

Justice [brings] its suits in tpe name of the United States and 

without obta±ning certification••under Rule 23--it does not sue as 

a representative of the p~rsons aggrieved--and we must assume 

Congress' familiarity with the procedute. Ii 1 is clear that with 

the 1972 amendments Congress intended the EEOC to.proceed in the 

same manner." Id. at 329. The section.706(f)(u.) action in this 

I 

case, wl;lich was. instituted at the request of Mr. Patterson, is no 

less - -7-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 7 
valid. now that he settled with UPS than if he were still part of 

the suit. The Supreme Court plain}y stated, "[w]e are reluctant, 

absent~cleat cdngressional guidance, to subject§ 706(f)(l) 

actions to requirements that migpt disable the enforcement, agency 

from advancing the public interest' in the manner and to the extent 

contemplated by the statute."; Id. at 331. 

In this case the defendants' briefs focus on the "specific 

individuals." language· ih the Genera:).. Telephone opinion, ~' 

''[w]hen the EEOC acts, albeit~at the~behest of· and for the benefit 

of specific irtdividuals, it acts also to vindicate the public 

interest in pre~enting employment discrimination." Id. at 326 

(footnote omitted). We believe the language is descriptive rather 

than exclusionary. The EEOC may, but is not required to, act 

through an individual in order to vindicate the public interest. 

This suit was clearly brought at the ''behest of" a specific individual, Jero~e Patterson. The sole. issue is whether 

Mr. Patterson's settlement·with UPS m9ots:the EEOC's claim. We 

conclude' that. the EEPC•, intends Jo· proceed in order to vindicate I 

the public interest in preventing employment discrimination. 

Moreover, the action benefits "specific individuals", unnamed and 

unidentified;'who nevertheless have an interest in securing a public contact position at UPS but who would otherwise be denied that 

"' opportunity due, to a medical condition. '• 1 

This court has addressed a similar issue in EEOC v. St. 

Louis-San Francisco Rail~~Y Co., 743 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1984). 

-8-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 8 
St. Louis involved a challenge to the railroad's_minimum height 

requirement for certain positions as discriminatory against women. 

The court~noted that actual applications received by the defendant 

may not reflect the potential a~plicant pool because ''(m]any 

otherwise qualified pbtential ~~plicants might not apply because 

of a self-r~cognized inability, to meet .the discriminatory requirements." Id. at 742 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433, U.S. 321, 

329-30 ( 1977)). In St .. Louis Railway we found that "Congress · 

•. ·• gave 5he EEOC broad enforceme~t•powers by authorizing it to 

bring civil·actions in federal district court against private 

empl~yeFs reasonably su~pected of violating Title VII.'' Id. at 

.743. ~! 

The issue of whether or not an individual claimant's settlement moots the EEOC's right of action was squarely addressed by 

the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 

1539.(9th Ci~. 1987).: In Goodyear,.an employee filed a charge 

with the EEOC alleging. that her• employer failed ·to promote her 

because·•of her race.: ,; The compl~inant entered into a settlement I 

agreement with the employer without consent of the EEOC. The 

Ninth Circuit held that the complainant's "settlement does not 

moot the EEOC's right of action•seeking injunctive relief to protect employees as a class. and to deter ·the employer from discrimination." Id. at 1543. "[The defendant's] argument erroneously 

assumes that the EEOC's section 706 action is· merely.a representative suit, and not one to vindicate public interests." Id. at 

1542. ,I t f• . 

--9-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 9 
Even though the employee in Goodyear settled_ her claim, the 

court held that the EEOC·'s right ot action survived. "The EEOC's 

right of actiorl is independent of the employee's private action 

rights." Id. at 1542 (citing General Telephone). In fact,, two 

circuits, have held that res judlcata principles do not bar the 

EEOC from bringing an action against an employer even after its 

employees hav~ s~ttled their•private claim. New Orleans S.C. 

Ass'n v. EEOC, 680 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1982); EEOC v.·McLean· 

Trucking Co., 525 F.2d·l007, 1010 (~th Cir. 1975). The Ninth 

Circuit also , declared that " [ s] ect ioh 7 06·( g) authorizes the EEOC 

to seek iclass 1action-ty~e~relief wiihout complying with Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23, even when it ·only al!eges,individuaJ acts of discrimination." Id. at 1543. 

The First Circuit, in a similar case, United States v. 

Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1985), held 

that.mootnes~ of the complainant~s claim in a Title IX action did 

not moot the Attorney General's right, to continue the suit against 

the Marftime Academy: for sex diEctimination in student recruitment 

and admissions~ Although the original complainant abandoned 

interest in entering the academy and allegedly lacked qualifications, this did not vitiate the•Attorney General's authority to 

sue under Title IX. The defendants argued, much like the defendants in this case, that after the complainant~s claim was moot 

"there remained no controversy between [the complainant] arid [the 

defendant],and that the Attorney General could only sue on her J. 

behalf[;] the Academy insist~ that 'the United.States had no 

-10-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 10 
great~r fight to continue the suit after [the co~plainant's] individual c+aim· had become moot than she.would have had."' Id. at , . 

151 (footnote omitted) .. The Court disagreed. and. held that "a 

required purpose in all such ca~es is to 'materially furth~r the 

orderly pchievement of desegregation in public education,.' with 

the Attorney General empowere4 to seek.!such r~lief as ~ay be 

appropriate. '.11 Id. at 15l, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-,6(a). 

The First Circuit,found neither rnootness nor standing to be 

problematic~, The Court believed that "the domdnant statutory purpose,,is,to_address and ~ure discriminatory pr~ctices uncovered as 

a res~lt of the, individual complaint, .not si~pl;y to provide ·pri- · 

vate relief for a particular complainant." Id. at 151-52. 

In the present case the Court below held that since the complainant se~tled, the EEOC lacked standing to continue in its role 

of 1 poiicing ~iscrirnination. The court in Massachusetts Maritime 

also held that· I ' 

the 1 Atto1ney Gen~ral mijde a certification which was sufficient, when su'it was brought. That was all the statute 

calls fo•~ [The complainant's] subsequent abandonment 

of interest in entering the Academy, and questions about 

her qualifications, did ,not remove the ·Attoroey 

General's right to proceed. This right continues until 

discrimination and the effects of past discrimination 

are erased. 

Id. at 152 (emphasis added). 

' I 

,, I 

I. 

,I I j• ' 

-11-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 11 
?regisely the same reasoning appiies to the_tacts in this 

case. Tbe EEOC's right to proceed_en4ures until the alleged 

discrimination'is eradicated. 

REV~RSED. 

!· ,, 

,, I ,, 

I ~ 

•\ I 

; C ·, 

• I 

'' 

' I '• I 

,I 

-12-

Appellate Case: 86-1029 Document: 010110042900 Date Filed: 10/28/1988 Page: 12