Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01546/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01546-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL C. HAMILTON,

CDC #K-01232, Civil No. 05-1546 DMS (BLM)

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

[Doc. No. 17]

vs.

F. HOLMES; J. NAPOLITANO; 

M. BROWN; A. FAVILA; 

T. LOFTIN,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”) in Imperial,

California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. No. 16]. Plaintiff claims CEN Sgt. F. Holmes subjected him to unlawful retaliation

and cruel and unusual punishment by transferring him from one yard to another on July 6, 2004. (See

SAC at 2-3, 5.) Plaintiff further claims Inmate Appeals Examiner Tony Loftin denied him due process

on January 19, 2005, when he found Plaintiff’s grievances regarding the transfer unsubstantiated. (Id.

at 2, 4, 5.) Holmes and Loftin have filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc.

No. 17]. 

For the reasons discussed below, Defendant Holmes and Loftin’s Motion is GRANTED.

/ / /

/ / /

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1

 Because Plaintiff’s SAC supersedes his prior pleadings, and it fails to identify any other

previously named Defendant (Napolitano, Brown, Favila or Calderon) and does not re-allege any

constitutional violations on the part of those persons, he has waived all claims against them. See King

v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

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I. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this case by filing a “Civil Action for Protection of Rights, Damages and

Injunctive Relief” pursuant to CAL.CIVIL CODE § 52.1(a), (b) and (c) in Imperial County Superior Court

on June 13, 2005. After the named defendants were served, they filed a Notice of Removal invoking

this Court’s federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) on August 3, 2005 [Doc. No.

1]. Plaintiff objected to the removal, arguing that his case involved no federal questions, but on

February 23, 2006, this Court overruled those objections, denied Plaintiff’s request to remand, sua

sponte dismissed his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and denied his “urgent” request

enjoining his transfer from CEN to either San Quentin, Folsom or Soledad State Prisons. (See Feb. 23,

2006 Order [Doc. No. 10] at 11.) The Court further granted Plaintiff leave to file an Amended

Complaint, which addressed the deficiencies of pleading identified in its Order within 45 days. (Id.) 

On March 10, 2006, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “First Amended Complaint” (“FAC”)

[Doc. No. 11]. However, on May 30, 2006, the Court found Plaintiff’s FAC failed to address any

previously identified pleading deficiencies, and was instead merely a request for reconsideration of the

Court’s February 23, 2006 Order. Therefore, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration

and dismissed his FAC pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 8, but granted Plaintiff an additional opportunity to

amend. (See May 30, 2006 Order [Doc. No. 15] at 7.) On June 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”), now alleging Eighth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violations by Sgt.

Holmes and Appeals Examiner Loftin (“Defendants”) only [Doc. No. 16].1

 On July 6, 2006, Defendants

filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC for failing to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

[Doc. No. 17]. In opposition, Plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,”

(hereafter “Opposition”) [Doc. No. 19], to which Defendants have filed a Reply [Doc. No. 22]. 

/ / /

/ / /

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II.

DISCUSSION

A. Factual Background

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged three separate causes of action, all “involving a First

Amendment right to the United States Constitution, the right of an inmate ‘trained in law,’ to

communicate with inmates he was in the process of assisting with [] legal claims in state and federal

courts.” (See Compl. at ¶¶ 5-6, 8-10, 12, 14-15.) In its February 23, 2006 Order, this Court clearly

outlined how and why Plaintiff’s allegations fell short of stating a First Amendment claim, and granted

him leave to amend. (See Feb. 23, 2006 Order at 6-9 (citing Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001);

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); and Christopher v. Harbury,

536 U.S. 403 (2002).) 

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege, as he did before, that Defendants

violated the First Amendment by transferring him away from fellow inmates to whom he had a “right”

to provide legal assistance. Instead, Plaintiff claims that on July 6, 2004, Sgt. Holmes “sought to place

[his] life in danger,” by transferring him to another yard after Plaintiff refused to name, confirm or

otherwise identify who the Mexican, white and black “shot callers” on the yard were. (SAC at 2-3.)

Plaintiff claims Holmes “punished” him for refusing “to be a snitch” by removing Plaintiff from the

facility where he was “housed ... for over five years,” where he “had numerous friends” and where he

“enjoyed assisting others with their legal problems.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims Holmes’ decision to

transfer him was “without just cause,” and was precipitated by Plaintiff’s refusal “to place his [own] life

in danger,” because “inmates who are just ‘said’ to supply such information ... are eventually stabbed,

or sometimes killed.” (Id.) Plaintiff concludes that Holmes “attempt[ed] to place [him] in a dangerous

... life threatening situation” in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments

clause. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Loftin, in his individual and official capacity as a Third

Level Appeals Examiner, denied him due process when he reviewed Plaintiff’s inmate appeal regarding

Holmes’ action, as well as corroborating declarations of other three other inmates, and nevertheless

denied the grievance, finding Plaintiff’s claim “completely unsubstantiated.” (Id. at 4, 5.)

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Plaintiff requests $100,000 in general and punitive damages from each Defendant, as well as

“specific relief in order to make examples of [them], and to ensure that such behavior and acts alleged

... will not occur again.” (Id. at 7.)

III.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Arguments

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Sgt.

Holmes because a mere transfer between yards does not involve an “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” (Defs.’ Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. at 3-4.) Defendants further contend Plaintiff fails

to state a claim against Appeals Examiner Loftin because there is no free-standing constitutional right

to an inmate grievance procedure, and that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims to the extent

he seeks monetary damages for acts alleged to have been taken by them in their official capacities. (Id.

at 4-6.) 

In his Opposition, Plaintiff first accuses Defendants of “downplaying [his] claim to the level of

a ‘transfer,’ where in all reality the transfer was the fruit of unheeded threats and coercion to place [his]

life in danger.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) Plaintiff further argues that his SAC alleges sufficient facts to show

that Sgt. Holmes acted with “deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety” by “threat[ening] and

coerci[ng]” him to “place [his own] life in danger.” (Id. at 6-7.) Second, Plaintiff claims Defendants

have also mis-characterized his due process claim by repeatedly asserting that he has no “constitutional

right to a[] grievance system.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff specifically denies raising such a claim, and instead

asserts Defendant Loftin “depriv[ed him]] of a fair hearing.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff claims his SAC

sufficiently alleges facts which show a violation of his due process right to a “fair proceeding” because

Loftin found his grievances against Sgt. Holmes “unsubstantiated” even though Plaintiff provided

“mountains of evidence” including “declarations by outside sources” in corroboration. (Id. at 7-8.) 

In their Reply, Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff premises his Eighth Amendment

claim against Sgt. Holmes on grounds that he placed Plaintiff’s life in danger, he still fails to state a

claim because “theoretical danger” without physical injury “does not rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment constitutional violation.” (See Defs.’ Reply at 2.) Defendant Loftin further claims

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Plaintiff’s SAC fails to allege Loftin was “personally involved” in the denial of Plaintiff’s grievance.

(Id. at 3.) Finally, Defendants claim that Plaintiff “received all the process he was due,” and that he is

not entitled to due process protection “unless there was a loss of liberty,” therefore, his due process

claim must fail. (Id. at 4.)

B. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). A claim may be dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). In deciding

such a motion, all material factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all

reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill, 80 F.3d at 338. Dismissal is proper only where

there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal

theory. Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988)). However, the court need not accept all conclusory allegations as true; rather, it must “examine

whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); Benson v. Arizona State Bd. of

Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 275-76 (9th Cir. 1982) (court need not accept conclusory legal

assertions); Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Conclusory allegations,

unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.”);

accord Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984) (“All well-pleaded facts, as distinguished

from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true.”). “The plaintiff must allege with at least some

degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones

v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal ... is the complaint.” Schneider v. California Dep’t

of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, when resolving a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, the court may not generally consider materials outside the pleadings. Id. This

precludes consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion

to dismiss brought pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

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2

 In Claim One, Plaintiff’s does not allege Sgt. Holmes transferred him in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could he, as a non-consensual transfer is not per se violative of either

substantive due process or equal protection rights. Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir.

1991); Stinson v. Nelson, 525 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1975). As a matter of due process, a prisoner’s

liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his conviction that the state may generally confine or

transfer him to any of its institutions, to prisons in another state, privately run-facilities or to federal

prisons, without offending the Constitution. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985)

(intrastate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process Clause); White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002,

1012 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that interstate transfer from state prison in Washington to privately-run

prison in Colorado did not violate substantive due process principles because “state prison facilities have

never ‘been exclusively public.’”) (quoting Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 405 (1997)

(discussing history of private penal institutions); see also Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866-69

(10th Cir. 2000) (finding no due process violation in transferring prisoner to out-of-state private

prison)). 

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236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 Moore’s FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 12.34[2] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (“The court

may not ... take into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss,

because such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a).”)). However, the court may

consider documents or exhibits “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard

Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 (9th Cir. 1990); Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W. Inc., 101 F.3d

1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996).

1. Claim One

As noted above, Plaintiff’s SAC first claims that Sgt. Holmes’s decision to transfer him violated

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in two ways. First, Plaintiff

claims Sgt. Holmes transferred him in “retaliation” for refusing to snitch on his fellow inmates. (See

SAC at 5.) Second, Plaintiff alleges Sgt. Holmes “punish[ed] him without just cause” in violation of

the Eighth Amendment by “attempting to place [him] in a ‘dangerous’ and ‘life threatening situation.’”

(Id.)

a. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

Defendants are correct insofar as they argue Plaintiff has no constitutional right, under either the

Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendments,2

 to be housed in the prison facility or yard of his choosing. Olim

v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983) (“Even when ... the [prison] transfer involves long

distances and an ocean crossing [from Hawaii to California], the confinement remains within

constitutional limits.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). “It is perfectly obvious that every

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decision to remove a particular inmate from the general prison population for an indeterminate period

could not be characterized as cruel and unusual. If new conditions of confinement are not materially

different from those affecting other prisoners, a transfer for the duration of a prisoner’s sentence might

be completely unobjectionable and well within the authority of the prison administrator.” Hutto v.

Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978).

This is because, “[a]fter incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ...

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eight Amendment.” Whitely v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 319 (1986). To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of

confinement, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to fulfill two requirements: one objective and one

subjective. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the objective requirement, the

prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that the prison official’s acts or omissions deprived him

of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981);

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This objective component is satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes

sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.”

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; Wright v. Rushen, 642

F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Under the subjective requirement, the prisoner must allege facts that show that the defendant

acted with “deliberate indifference.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). “Deliberate

indifference” exists when a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

and safety; the official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged absolutely no facts related to his transfer which satisfy either the

objective or subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. First, Plaintiff does not claim to

have been deprived of any of life’s “necessities” simply by being transferred to another yard. Rhodes,

452 U.S. at 357. Specifically, he does not allege to have been denied “food, clothing, shelter, [proper]

sanitation, [or adequate] medical care” as a result of his transfer from B-yard, nor does he claim to have

had his personal health or safety in any way compromised as a result. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246. 

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/ / /

Second, Plaintiff alleges no facts to show that Sgt. Holmes transferred him to another yard with

“deliberate indifference” to a known or obvious excessive risk to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. In fact, Plaintiff’s first Exhibit, attached in support of his SAC is his CDC 602 Inmate/Parolee

Appeal, Log No. 04-1106, and signed by him on July 7, 2004, states: “On June 6, 2004, I reported to

Sgt. Holmes ... that Inmate Dove P-32294, my assigned cellmate of ‘two weeks,’ had made a threat upon

my life.” (See SAC, Pl.’s Appendix/Attachment at 1; Branch, 14 F.3d at 454 (court ruling pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), may consider documents or exhibits “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and

whose authenticity no party questions.”) Thus, even though Plaintiff and his new cellmate Dove

apparently resolved their differences after Holmes “remove[d] [Plaintiff] ... not only out of the cell (B5

121), but completely off ‘B’ yard,” (see Pl.’s Appendix/Attachment at 1), Holmes’ decision to transfer

Plaintiff away from a now known risk to his safety, does not show any conscious disregard to Plaintiff’s

safety; rather, it undermines Plaintiff’s claim entirely, for “[p]rison officials have a duty [under the

Eighth Amendment] ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 833 (emphasis added). The mere fact that both Plaintiff and Dove “sign[ed] chronos[] stating

[they] [we]re not enemies,” and that they believed they “c[ould] remain on the same yard without

incident,” (see Pl.’s Appendix/Attachment at 1, 6 “CDC 128-B” dated 7/5/04) does not, without more,

show Holmes was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety in deciding to transfer him anyway. See

Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although there are some minimal legal limitations,

[...] the assignment of inmates within the California prisons is essentially a matter of administrative

discretion.”); id. at 1290 (“[C]ourts must remember that the duty to protect inmates’ constitutional rights

does not confer the power to manage prisons or the capacity to second-guess prison administrators, for

which [they] are ill-equipped.”). 

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claims for failing to state a claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

b. First Amendment Retaliation

Although prisoners do not have a constitutional right to particular custody levels or facility

placements, the Ninth Circuit has long held that transfers and demotions may violate a prisoner’s First

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Amendment rights if they are motivated by a desire to curtail protected speech activities. Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the Court finds that a liberal construction of the facts

underlying Plaintiff’s claim against Sgt. Holmes requires consideration of not only whether his transfer

violated the Eighth Amendment, but also whether it was retaliatory. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004); Pratt 65 F.3d at 806.

A plaintiff suing prison officials pursuant to § 1983 for retaliation must allege sufficient facts

to show: (1) he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights, (2) the alleged retaliatory

action “does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and

discipline,” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), and (3) the

defendants’ actions harmed him. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Hines v.

Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

 Courts must “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation

of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807

(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). Thus, the burden is on the prisoner to allege

facts which demonstrate “that there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he

complains of.” Id. at 808; Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289.

i. Protected Conduct– Exercise of Constitutional Right

Here, Plaintiff claims Sgt. Homes transferred him because he refused to either identify or

confirm the identity of inmate ‘shot-callers’ on the yard at Sgt. Holmes’s request. (SAC at 2.) Plaintiff

argues his claim is similar to the one raised in Austin, where the Ninth Circuit found a prisoner’s

allegations of having been “punished for filing a grievance” sufficient to state a claim for retaliation

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 8. (Id., citing Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171.) Defendants claim Plaintiff’s reliance

on Austin, is “inapposite” because he “was not punished for filing a grievance, his grievance was merely

denied,” and they “do not claim Plaintiff’s SAC fail[s] to meet the plain pleading standards of Rule

8(a).” (Defs.’ Reply at 3.) 

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance

is sufficient to support a claim under section 1983. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288. Defendants are correct

that Plaintiff does not allege his transfer (the “adverse action”) was precipitated or “caused” by his use

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of the prison grievance system, which is “protected conduct.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807. In fact, Plaintiff’s

Exhibits show that his CDC 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal regarding the transfer was filed on July 7, 2004,

one day after Sgt. Holmes had him transferred. (SAC, Pl.’s “Appendix / Attachment” at 1.) Nor does

Plaintiff claim Holmes transferred him because he exercised his right to access to the court, see e.g.,

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996), or the First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to

other inmates, as he did in his original pleading. See Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 (2001)

(declining to “cloak the provision of legal assistance [to other inmates] with any First Amendment

protection above and beyond the protection normally accorded [to] prisoners’ speech.”).

Instead, Plaintiff now claims only that Sgt. Holmes transferred him because he refused to snitch

on his fellow inmates. (SAC at 2-3.) In Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989),

the Ninth Circuit found an inmate’s allegation that prison officials conspired to label prisoner a “snitch”

in retaliation for petitioning for redress of grievances stated a cognizable claim for violation of right of

access to the courts. Id. at 1138. Here, however, Plaintiff does not claim Holmes labeled, or even

threatened to label him a “snitch” in the presence of other inmates–instead, he claims he merely feared

such a fate and therefore, refused to participate in Holmes’ investigation. The question then becomes

whether Plaintiff has a constitutional right not to “snitch,” i.e., whether his refusal to speak is “protected

conduct” which may form the basis of a retaliation claim. See Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815; Pratt, 65 F.3d

at 807.

The Ninth Circuit has never considered this specific question, although two district courts in

other Circuits have. In David v. Hill, 401 F.Supp.2d 749 (S.D. Texas 2005), a case strikingly similar

to the one before this Court, Michael David, a Texas State prisoner, claimed prison officials filed false

disciplinary charges against him, rifled through his mail, confiscated his property, and held him in

solitary confinement “because he failed to work as a snitch” and refused to “give up” corrupt prison unit

employees in an ongoing internal investigation of illicit drug and tobacco trafficking activities within

the prison. Id. at 756. David filed a civil rights complaint alleging harassment and retaliation, as well

as deliberate indifference to his health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 753. The

Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, arguing David “failed to state a claim of

retaliation because he failed to identify what constitutional right he was exercising that motivated

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defendants to retaliate against him.” Id. at 755-56. Specifically, the defendant prison official argued that

“an inmate has no constitutional right to avoid being asked questions and pressured to participate in a

prison investigation.” Id. at 756. The Southern District of Texas, however, disagreed. Id.

The court canvassed published decisions in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh

Circuits which have “long recognized that being labeled a ‘snitch’ in the prison environment can indeed

pose a threat to an inmate’s health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment,” id. at 756, and

concluded that David’s retaliation claim, based on his refusal to snitch, “was a logical extension of

[Eighth Amendment] failure to protect case law; that he not be forced to participate in activities that

place his life in danger.” Id. at 757 (citing United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 900, 905 (5th Cir.

1978); Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984); Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1139; Miller

v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1088 n.* (4th Cir. 1990); Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1567-68

(10th Cir. 1996); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 699 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001).) Thus, even though

David, like Plaintiff in this case, did not allege to have been retaliated against for filing inmate

grievances, and did not claim that Defendants actually did label him a snitch in the presence of other

inmates, but rather, claimed his refusal to snitch was the motivating factor behind prison officials’

retaliatory actions, the Court “assume[d] without deciding that [David] ha[d] a constitutional right not

to participate in a prison investigation” that could place his life in danger, and therefore, had alleged

facts sufficient to satisfy the first prong of a retaliation claim, i.e., that he was punished because he

engaged in “protected conduct.” David, 401 F.Supp.2d at 757; see also Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. 

The only other court to have considered this question in the context of a retaliation cause of

action has similarly analogized to the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (holding

“prison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners” under

the Eighth Amendment) (citations omitted), and has assumed the same. See Jackson v. Johnson, 15

F.Supp.2d 341, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The Court assumes, without deciding, that Jackson satisfies the

first prong of the [retaliation] test--that he has [a] constitutional right[] not to snitch....”) (comparing

Watson v. McGinnis, 964 F.Supp. 127, 131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding prison guard’s labeling of

inmate as a snitch sufficient to state Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim)).

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Here, Plaintiff’s claims are almost identical to those raised in David–he alleges Sgt. Holmes

“effected [his] removal” from B-yard where Plaintiff “was housed for over five years” and where he

“enjoyed assisting other[ inmates] with their legal problems,” because he refused “to place his life in

danger” by either “tell[ing] [Holmes] who the Mexican, white[] and black shot callers [we]re,” or

refusing to confirm Holmes’ suspicions as to the shot callers’ identities. (SAC at 2-3.) Thus, this Court

will assume, like the Court in David, that Plaintiff’s refusal is “protected conduct” sufficient to support

a retaliation claim. David, 401 F.Supp.2d at 757; Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815; Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807.

ii. Advancement of Legitimate Penological Goal

The Court must next consider, however, whether Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to satisfy

the second prong of a retaliation claim. i.e., “that there were no legitimate correctional purposes

motivating the actions he complains of.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808; Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289. In the context

of this case, then, Plaintiff must plead facts to show that Sgt. Holmes’ transferred him because he

refused to snitch, and for no other “legitimate correctional purpose[].” Id. 

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff admitted that prior to transfer, he had “reported a threat on

his life” by his new cellmate, Dove, who had recently been assigned to Plaintiff’s cell on B-yard. See

Compl. ¶ 7. As discussed above in the context of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, it is obvious that

Sgt. Holmes had a “legitimate correctional purpose,” and in fact, a constitutional duty, to protect

Plaintiff, and any inmate within his care, from a known or obvious and serious threat to his safety.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (“Prison officials have a duty [under the Eighth Amendment] ... to protect

prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”) (quotations and citations deleted). And while

an amended pleading supersedes the original and the text of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

includes no mention of Plaintiff’s conversation with Sgt. Holmes about Dove’s threat, the “Appendi[ces]

/ Attachment[s]” to his Second Amended Complaint do. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”);

see also Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (“When a

plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining

whether dismissal [is] proper” under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).) 

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For example, Plaintiff’s CDC Inmate/Parolee Form 602, Log No. 04-1106, filed on July 7, 2004,

and attached as an Exhibit to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, defeats any retaliation claim he

may wish to assert against Sgt. Holmes, because it shows that Holmes had a neutral and legitimate

reason to transfer him, regardless of whether Plaintiff agreed to snitch. See Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808; Bruce,

351 F.3d at 1289. Specifically, Plaintiff’s CDC 602 states, “On June 6, 2004, I reported to Sargent [sic]

Holmes ... that inmate Dove P-32294, my assigned cellmate of ‘two weeks,’ had made a threat upon my

life. Sargent [sic] Holmes subsequently made the decision to remove me the following day, not only

out of cell (B5 121), but completely off ‘B’ yard.” See SAC Append. / Attach. at 1.

In addition, another of Plaintiff’s attachments, his California Board of Control Government

Claim, submitted to the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board on February 1, 2005,

alleges both that Holmes asked Plaintiff to “snitch” on the yard’s shot-callers, and that Plaintiff had

reported Dove’s threats to Sgt. Holmes : 

Threats were made upon my life. I reported these threats to Sargent [sic]

Holmes and Leuitenant [sic] Napolatano. The decision was made to

move me off the yard in which I was assisting inmates with legal issues

for a period of over 5 years. This decision was supported by Leuitenant

[sic] Napolatano, Captain Favilia and CCI M. Brown, who stood there

and allowed this violation of constitutional law. The threats were made

by inmate Dove P-32294, who had just come to the Facility less than one

month of the incident, where my moval [sic] from “B” Facility [e]ffected

approximately 9 inmates who[] I was presently assisting with legal

issues. I was also interrogated by Sargent [sic] Holmes to snitch out who

the Mexican and White shot callers are, for which if I was stupid enough

to tell him, he sure would have told them that I told him, just like he told

me that Zimmerman, Jones and Howard, inmates on B Yard, are his

agents. 

See SAC, Append. / Attach. at 24; Parks School of Business, 51 F.3d at 1484; see also MGIC Indem.

Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), court may take judicial

notice of public records); Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994) (court may take judicial

notice under Rule 12(b)(6) of “records and reports of administrative bodies”).

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Sgt. Holmes’

decision to transfer him off B-Yard was retaliatory because he has failed to show the transfer lacked or

failed to advance “legitimate penological goals such as preserving institutional order and discipline.”

Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815-16; Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808; Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289. The Court agrees with

Defendants that had Holmes failed to transfer Plaintiff after knowing inmate Dove had made a “threat

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upon [his] life,” and if Plaintiff was harmed as a result, Holmes would have been deliberately indifferent

to a serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See e.g., Estate of Ford v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding, in an Eighth Amendment failure to

protect case, if correctional officers knew one inmate “was acting out dangerously with cellmates” or

that “he was a threat to [plaintiff] but housed [plaintiff] with him anyway, this would violate the Eighth

Amendment.... [T]here is no question that this conduct would touch all the bases established in

Farmer.”). 

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Sgt.

Holmes is GRANTED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

2. Claim Two

Defendants’ further seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim against Defendant Loftin,

an inmate appeals examiner, for failing to “fairly” process his inmate appeals. See Defs.’ Mot. at 4-5;

SAC at 4, 5.

The procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause apply only when

a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,

672 (1977); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997). While Plaintiff claims that Loftin

deprived him of his due process when he found Plaintiff’s claims against Sgt. Holmes “unsubstantiated,”

the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest in an inmate grievance

procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due process claim

of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance

procedure”).

The Court further finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Defendant

Loftin deprived him of a protected liberty interest by failing to favorably respond to his grievances. See

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting prisoner’s claimed loss of liberty

interest in the unsatisfactory processing of his inmate appeals “because inmates lack a separate

constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”) Liberty interests can arise from

state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). However, a prisoner may only challenge a state

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action which does not restrain a [constitutionally] protected liberty interest if that state action

“nonetheless imposes some ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.’”

/ / /

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)); see also Neal, 131

F.3d at 827-28; Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

Here, Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest how Loftin’s allegedly inadequate review and

consideration of his inmate CDC 602 appeal amounted to a restraint on his freedom not contemplated

by his original sentence or resulted in an “atypical” and “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-

484. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s grievance procedure

due process claims against Defendant Loftin pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Defendants’ Holmes and Loftin’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 17] is GRANTED; and

(2) No further leave to amend will be granted. See Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d

336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (where amendment of litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to

amend is appropriate).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 6, 2006

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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