Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00455/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00455-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Carino, married but filing as an

individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Peter Gorski, as Special Administrator for

the Estate of Tate A Lynch; Paul Sansone;

Jacob Robinson; and City of Casa Grande,

Arizona, a municipal corporation, 

Defendants. 

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No. 07-455-PHX-NVW

ORDER

This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Daniel

Carino (“Carino”) against the City of Casa Grande (“the City”) and three of its police

officers, Lynch, Sansone, and Robinson (collectively “the officers”). Carino alleges that

the officers subjected him to excessive force, wrongful arrest, and malicious prosecution

in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and Arizona law. Defendants now move for summary judgment. (Doc. # 84.) 

I. Background

The parties dispute the events leading to Carino’s arrest. “[W]e view the evidence

in the light most favorable to [Carino,] the nonmoving party, and accept the version of all

disputed facts most favorable to him.” Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052,

1054 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003).

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In the early morning of January 23, 2005, Carino was standing on the sidewalk

next to his vehicle with his wife Becky and two friends. Sergeant Tate A. Lynch

approached the group because their vehicle had been seen leaving the scene of a potential

fight at a party in the neighborhood. (Doc. # 82, Ex. A at 15–16.) Sergeant Lynch

questioned the group, grew angry with Becky, cursed at her, and ordered her to shut up. 

(Doc. # 91, Ex. P at 129–30, 137–38.) He then ordered them to leave the area on foot. 

They complied and walked up the street to a parking lot. Sergeant Lynch and another

officer, Paul Sansone, followed the group, parked their vehicles, and approached the

Carinos, who were hugging each other to keep warm. (Id., Ex. H. at 71; Ex. M at 63). 

Sergeant Lynch asked Becky for identification. Carino responded that he had his wife’s

identification, but before he could retrieve it Sergeant Lynch grabbed Becky by her left

arm. Carino reached his arm out and told Sergeant Lynch to stop, but did not make

contact with the officer. Sergeant Lynch let Becky go, grabbed Carino’s outstretched

arm, and began pulling him away from Becky and towards the ground. (Id., Ex. A at

35–38.) Becky’s sister later observed bruises on her left arm. (Id., Ex. N at 166–67.)

At that point, Officer Jacob Robinson arrived and began to assist Sergeant Lynch

by grabbing Carino’s other arm. (Id., Ex. A at 15; doc. # 82, Ex. C at 14.) Officer

Sansone, who had been monitoring Carino’s friends, then ran up, placed his Taser in

Carino’s back, and pulled the trigger. (Id., Ex. D at 76.) Carino and officers Lynch and

Robinson fell to the ground together. The officers hit Carino in the ribs, the sides of his

head, and his face, and used their Tasers on him. They continued such treatment even

after Carino was handcuffed. (Doc. # 91, Ex. A at 38–40.) The following day, Carino’s

doctor observed that he had lacerations above his eyes and injuries to his back, chest, and

elbows. (Id., Ex. O at 49–50.) A City of Casa Grande paramedic who examined Carino

at the scene within twenty minutes of the incident testified that he did not detect any signs

of alcohol impairment. (Id., Ex. I at 174.) One of Carino’s friends, Veronica Brown,

witnessed the incident and testified that Carino and his wife never argued or yelled at

each other that evening, that Carino had only one drink over the entire course of the

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 The officers object that Veronica Brown is not qualified to provide her opinion

about whether Carino was intoxicated. Fed. R. Evid. 701 permits lay opinion testimony if

it is rationally based upon the perception of the witness, helpful to the fact finder, and does

not involve scientific, technical or specialized information. Lay witness testimony about

whether someone is intoxicated is generally admissible under these requirements. See, e.g.,

United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465, 470 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[A] lay witness may state his

opinion that a person appeared nervous or intoxicated.”); United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp.

2d 530, 560 (D. Md. 2002) (collecting authorities). The officers’ objection is therefore

overruled. However, even were her opinion excluded, it is reasonable to infer the same

conclusion from her sworn statement that Carino had only one drink over the entire evening,

and the paramedic’s testimony that Carino displayed no signs of intoxication. The court must

draw this inference in favor of Carino on the officers’ motion for summary judgment. 

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evening and never appeared intoxicated,1

 that Carino never resisted the officers in any

way, and that once Carino was taken to the ground he was never on his feet again. (Id.,

Ex. B ¶ 5, 10, 11.) 

The officers told a different story in their reports. They reported that Carino and

his wife appeared intoxicated and that they approached the couple in the parking lot

because they heard Becky yelling and cursing at her husband. Sergeant Lynch wrote that

he asked the couple to separate from one another because he feared one of them would

get hurt, and when they refused, he attempted to separate them by force. Carino resisted

so Sergeant Lynch and Officer Robinson began to struggle with him, whereupon Officer

Sansone deployed his Taser causing the group to fall. The officers’ reports then describe

a long struggle, which included Carino getting back to his feet, charging Sergeant Lynch,

punching him in the face, and slamming his head against the pavement. (Id., Ex. A

1–17.) 

After he was arrested, Carino appeared before a magistrate judge for a preliminary

hearing. The magistrate judge relied on a statement by Sergeant Lynch, which was

consistent with his report, to find that they had probable cause to arrest him. (Doc. # 82,

Ex. G.) Later, a grand jury indicted Carino for two felony counts of assault and one

felony count of resisting arrest. The sole witness to testify before the grand jury had no

first-hand knowledge of the incident and relied exclusively on the officers’ reports to

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 Defendants originally argued that the officers were not personally served with notice

of the state-law claims, but have since conceded that service was proper. (Doc. # 95 at 9.)

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prepare his testimony. (Doc. # 91, Ex. C at 13–15.) Following the indictment, the Deputy

County Attorney reviewed the officers’ reports, attended depositions, determined that the

arrest was supported by probable cause, and proceeded to prosecute Carino. (Doc. # 82,

Ex. J at 26–27.) Carino was tried and acquitted by a jury on January 12, 2007. He filed

his original complaint in this suit seven days later, asserting only federal causes of action. 

(Doc. # 1, Ex. A.) On February 7, 2007, Carino served a notice of claim on the City and

the police officers, followed by an amended notice of claim on May 31, 2007.2

 (Id., Exs.

L, M.) He amended his complaint to include a state law claim of malicious prosecution

on September 14, 2007. (Doc. # 32.) 

II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper when “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” A “genuine issue” of material

fact will be absent if, “viewing the evidence and inferences which may be drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to the adverse party, the movant is clearly entitled to

prevail as a matter of law.” Jones v. Halekulani Hotel, Inc., 557 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th

Cir. 1977); see also Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Cases alleging use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution “nearly always require[] a jury to sift through disputed factual

contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom,” and therefore “summary judgment or

judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Lolli

v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415–16 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Santos v. Gates, 287

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 Citing California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics,

Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987), Defendants contend that Carino’s version of the

incident is so highly improbable that he should have to “present more persuasive evidence

than would otherwise be necessary” to survive summary judgment. Franciscan Ceramics

is not an excessive force case. Excessive force cases nearly always involve two dramatically

different versions of a single event. See, e.g., Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463

(9th Cir. 2007). At base, Defendants find Carino’s version of the incident exceedingly

improbable because he has not “explain[ed] why these officers, who had never before been

the subject of a complaint involving the use of excessive force, would engage in such strange

behavior.” (Doc. # 95 at 3.) But the officers’ subjective motivations have no place in an

excessive force inquiry under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397–99 (1989). There is no reason to hold Carino to a

higher-than-normal standard of proof on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

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F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)).3

III. Municipal Liability

To maintain an action against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

that his constitutional rights were violated by a policy, practice, or custom of the

municipality. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). Carino 

does not contend that the City had any formal policy of allowing its officers to violate the

Fourth Amendment, nor does he contend that any policy-making official ratified the

officers’ conduct. Rather, his argument is that the City had a practice or custom of failing

to discipline its officers, which caused the officers to believe they could violate the law

with impunity, including by using excessive force to arrest Carino without probable

cause. For such a practice or custom to be actionable, it must have been “so ‘persistent

and widespread’ that it constitute[d] a ‘permanent and well settled city policy.’” Trevino

v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). “Liability

for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be

founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct

has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Id. (citing Bennett v. City of

Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984)).

Carino’s primary evidence of lack of discipline in the City of Casa Grande Police

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Department is the testimony of his expert, who reviewed the department’s disciplinary

record. However, when asked whether his review revealed that the City had a practice of

failing to discipline its officers, the expert replied, “I don’t know at this point.” (Doc. #

82, Ex. N at 170.) Carino has not provided any evidence beyond what his expert

reviewed. His response to the motion for summary judgment relies upon the same

evidence reviewed by his expert, none of which shows a persistent and widespread failure

to discipline officers for using excessive force, conducting unwarranted arrests, or

otherwise violating the legal rights of citizens. Carino has failed to provide evidence

from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the City had a practice or custom of

laxly disciplining its offers. The City’s motion for summary judgment will therefore be

granted. 

IV. Qualified Immunity

Police officers receive qualified immunity for their official actions. Qualified

immunity shields government officials from liability “insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The first step in a

qualified immunity analysis is to determine “based upon the facts taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, did the officer’s conduct violate a

constitutional right?” Johnson v. County of L.A., 340 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 2003). “If

there was a constitutional violation, ‘the second inquiry is whether the officer could

nevertheless have reasonably but mistakenly believed that his or her conduct did not

violate a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. at 791–92. The officers assert a

qualified immunity defense against Carino’s Fourth Amendment claims of excessive

force and wrongful arrest.

A. Excessive Force

“The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making an arrest to use only an

amount of force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them.” 

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Tennessee v.

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Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985)). 

To determine whether a specific use of force was reasonable, we must balance

“the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests against the countervailing government interests at stake.” Relevant

factors to this inquiry include, but are not limited to, “the severity of the crime

at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to

evade arrest by flight.” When appropriate, our reasonableness determination

must also make “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to

make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular

situation.” 

Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)) (citations omitted).

The officers have done little more than present their own version of the facts and

ask the court to rule in their favor. They have utterly failed to show that the force they

applied was objectively reasonable under Carino’s version of the facts, which the court

must accept as true for purposes of this motion. Accepting Carino’s version of the

incident, a reasonable jury could find that the force employed by the officers was

unreasonable. The quantum of force used against Carino was severe. Before handcuffing

him, the officers used their Tasers on him and hit him in the ribs, face, and head. They

continued to do so even after he was in handcuffs. Carino was not committing any crime

at the time the officers approached him. He was sober, and he threatened neither the

officers nor his wife. Even under the officers’ version of events, it was Becky Carino

who appeared hostile, not her husband. When Sergeant Lynch grabbed Becky’s arm,

Carino reached out his arm and told him to stop, but did not make contact with the officer. 

Carino’s reaching out his arm does not justify the force subsequently used by the

officers. “A person has the ‘limited right to offer reasonable resistance to an arrest that is

the product of an officer’s personal frolic. That right is . . . [triggered] by the officer’s

bad faith or provocative conduct.’” Id. at 479 (quoting United States v. Span, 970 F.2d

573, 580 (9th Cir. 1992)). Sergeant Lynch’s unjustified, swift, and violent treatment of

Becky could reasonably be considered “provocative,” triggering Carino’s right to offer

reasonable resistence. Id. (concluding that police officers’ conduct could reasonably be

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considered provocative where they gang-tackled a man violently and without warning). 

Carino’s gesture for Sergeant Lynch to stop was a reasonable, indeed natural, reaction to

the unexpected assault on his wife. In any event, Sergeant Lynch and Officer Robinson

thereafter used a disproportionate amount of force against Carino given his lack of

resistance, even granting the officers leeway for the split-second judgments necessitated

by police work.

Carino’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force was undoubtedly

established as of 2005. Even so, the officers are entitled to immunity if they reasonably

but mistakenly believed that the force they employed was lawful given the circumstances

they confronted. See Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Saucier allowed for the possibility that an officer might misunderstand the amount of

force permissible under particular factual circumstances . . . .” (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 205 (2001))). No reasonable officer would believe that beating and using a

Taser on a compliant person who has committed no crime is permitted by the law,

especially once the person has been handcuffed and subdued. See id. at 161 (holding that

officers’ use of force against a prone and compliant suspect was excessive); Davis v. City

of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Any reasonable officer . . . would

have known . . . that swinging a handcuffed man into a wall head-first multiple times and

then punching him in the face while he lay face-down on the ground . . . was unnecessary

and excessive.”). The officers are therefore not immune from Carino’s excessive force

claim. 

B. Wrongful Arrest

“The Fourth Amendment requires that a law enforcement officer have ‘probable

cause’ to arrest an individual without a warrant.” United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698,

704 (9th Cir. 2005). “The test for whether probable cause exists is whether ‘at the

moment of arrest the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting

officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to

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warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing

an offense.’” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 471 (quoting Jensen, 425 F.3d at 704). 

Carino was not committing a crime when they approached him in the parking lot. 

Rather, Carino was arrested for assaulting the officers after they physically separated him

from his wife. He was also charged with resisting the officers’ effort to arrest him after

the alleged assault. Carino’s testimony, corroborated by an eye witness to the incident,

was that he never resisted, much less attacked, the officers that morning. A reasonable

jury could accept his version of the incident and conclude that the officers arrested Carino

without probable cause. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on arrests lacking

probable cause has long been firmly established, and the officers do not contend, nor

could they contend, that they were reasonably mistaken about the extent of its protection

for Carino. The officers therefore are not immune from Carino’s claim of wrongful

arrest. 

IV. Malicious Prosecution

Carino asserts malicious prosecution claims against the officers under § 1983 and

Arizona law. “[T]o prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must

show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and

that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific

constitutional right.’” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). Under

Arizona law, the “essential elements of malicious prosecution are (1) a criminal

prosecution, (2) that terminates in favor of plaintiff, (3) with defendants as prosecutors, 

(4) actuated by malice, (5) without probable cause, and (6) causing damages. Slade v.

Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298, 300, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (1975) (citing Overson v. Lynch, 83 Ariz.

158, 317 P.2d 948 (1957)). “Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against

prosecutors but may be brought, as here, against other persons who have wrongfully

caused the charges to be filed.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066 (citing Galbraith v. County of

Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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The officers present only two defenses to Carino’s malicious prosecution claims. 

First, they argue that several government officials’ independent probable cause

determinations bar his claim against the officers. Second, they attack the sufficiency of

his notice of claim under A.R.S. § 12-821.01. 

A. Carino Has Rebutted the Presumption of Probable Cause

After Carino was arrested, a magistrate judge, a grand jury, and a deputy county

attorney all determined that the officers had probable cause to arrest Carino for felony

assault and resisting arrest. It is presumed that such officials “exercised independent

judgment in determining that probable cause for an accused’s arrest exists at that time,”

and therefore that police officers cannot be sued for damages suffered after such an

independent probable cause determination. Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th

Cir. 1981); cf. Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that when an

individual has a full and fair opportunity to challenge a probable cause determination

during the course of the prior proceedings, he may be barred from relitigating the issue in

a subsequent § 1983 claim). However, the presumption can be rebutted through proof

that a police officer “improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided

misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in

wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of

legal proceedings.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067, see also id. at 1068 (“[C]ollateral

estoppel does not apply when the decision to hold a defendant to answer was made on the

basis of fabricated evidence presented at the preliminary hearing or as the result of other

wrongful conduct by state or local officials.”). To rebut the presumption, a plaintiff must

point to something more “than the fact that the officers’ reports were inconsistent with

[his] own account of the incidents leading to his arrest.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 483

(quoting Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original). 

The magistrate judge, the sole witness before the grand jury, and the deputy county

attorney all relied on the officers’ reports to determine that there was probable cause to

arrest Carino. Carino has supplied more than his own account of the incident to prove

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that the officers knowingly inserted false information into the police reports. He offers

the affidavit of Veronica Brown, who witnessed the incident and whose version of the

facts is dramatically different than the officers’ version. He also supplies testimony from

a City of Casa Grande paramedic, who stated that Carino showed no signs of alcohol

impairment twenty minutes after he was arrested. Carino has therefore rebutted the

presumption of independent judgment. See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 483 (“Blankenhorn

submitted more than mere conclusory allegations of falsehood by submitting the

declaration of a witness, Garcia, that directly contradicted the police reports.”). Neither

the magistrate judge’s, nor the grand jury’s, nor the deputy county attorney’s probable

cause determination disposes of Carino’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. 

B. Carino’s Notice of Claim Provided Some Facts Supporting His Damages

Under Arizona law, before initiating an action for damages against a public entity

or public officer, a claimant must provide a notice of claim in compliance A.R.S. § 12-

821.01. A notice of claim shall contain, inter alia, “a specific amount for which the claim

can be settled[,] and the facts supporting that amount.” § 12-821.01(A). The law does

not require the claimant to include “sufficient” facts to support the settlement amount,

Backus v. State, ___ P.3d ___, 2008 Ariz. App. LEXIS 111 at *16, 2008 WL 2764601 at

*5 (Ct. App. July 17, 2008), nor does it require the inclusion of “a specific calculation for

each possible basis for or element of damage—only a total amount,” Jones v. Cochise

County, 187 P.3d 97, 102 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). A notice of claim is sufficient if it

contains “any facts to support the proposed settlement amounts, regardless of how

meager.” Backus, 2008 Ariz. App. LEXIS 111 at *23, 2008 WL 2764601 at *7. 

Carino’s notice of claim contains some facts supporting his settlement demand. 

He states that he was forced to incur legal fees to defend himself at significant cost to

himself and his family; that three character witnesses testified to his outstanding

reputation, and that the prosecution damaged his reputation despite his acquittal; that his

freedom to travel was restricted by the conditions of his release; and that he lived in fear

of a prison sentence for two years. All of these facts relate to damages arising from his

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state law malicious prosecution claim. 

The officers complain that Carino did not provide a sufficient factual basis for the

general damages he included in his settlement demand. In Backus, the court assessed the

factual basis for general damages included in a settlement demand in a wrongful death

suit. The court noted the difficultly of fashioning a standard for evaluating the factual

basis for “[g]eneral damages . . . such as pain, suffering (physical and emotional), the

diminution or loss of the ability to engage in recreational and family activities, and, in

general, how the injury adversely affects the claimant’s ability to participate in and enjoy

the daily activities of life.” Id. at *18, 2008 WL 2764601 at *6. It concluded that “it was

enough for the State to understand that Backus was a surviving adult child and was

seeking compensation for the death of her father.” Id. at *24, 2008 WL 2764601 at *7–8. 

The plaintiff could “simply indicate that any life has value, particularly to a surviving

family member, and . . . arbitrarily place a dollar figure on this admittedly purely

subjective assessment.” Id.

Carino noted that he suffered from restrictions on his freedom while he was

prosecuted. He also noted the fear and anxiety that naturally arises in one facing an

undeserved prison sentence. According to Backus, those facts are enough to support the

general damages that he claims were caused by the malicious prosecution. The officers

rely heavily on Franklin v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-06-02316-PHX-NVW, 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 36409, 2007 WL 1463753 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2007), but in that case the

plaintiff failed to provide “any facts supporting the claimed amounts for emotional

distress and for damages to . . . reputation.” Id. at *11, 2007 WL 1463753 at *3 (quoting

Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 297 n.3, 152 P.3d 490,

494 n.3 (2007)). Carino, in contrast, has supplied some facts supporting both the damage

to his reputation and his emotional distress. See Castaneda v. City of Williams, No.

CV07-00129-PCT-NVW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42980 at *11–12, 2007 WL 1713328 at

*4 (D. Ariz. June 12, 2007) (“Plaintiffs provided the City with information, however

sparse, about the nature and the extent of Ray Castaneda’s ‘physical and emotional’

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injuries. This factual foundation satisfies the literal requirements of the statute . . . .”).

If the officers wanted more or different information than he supplied, the proper

thing to do was to ask for it, not wait until after completing costly discovery to assert a

defense that was available from the outset. See Backus, 2008 Ariz. App. LEXIS 111 at

*19–20, 2008 WL 2764601 at *6 (“To the extent the governmental entity seeks additional

information to evaluate the demand, it certainly can ask for it . . . .”); cf. Jones, 187 P.3d

at 102 (“[W]aiver may be found when a governmental entity has taken substantial action

to litigate the merits of the claim that would not have been necessary had the entity

promptly raised the [notice of claim] defense.”). Additionally, Carino properly waited

until the statutorily prescribed period had run to amend his complaint to include the statelaw malicious prosecution claim. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(E). Carino’s notice of claim

therefore was not deficient. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City of Casa Grande’s motion for

summary judgment (doc. # 84) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Officers Lynch, Sansone, and Robsinson’s

motion for summary judgment (doc. # 84) is denied. 

DATED this 30th day of September, 2008.

 

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