Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00145/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00145-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-1- 09cv0145

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER LUEVANO, Civil No. 09cv0145-WQH (RBB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [Doc. No. 1]

vs.

M. MARTEL, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Christopher Leuvano (hereinafter “Luevano” or “Petitioner”),

is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [doc. no. 1]. Leuvano

challenges his San Diego County Superior Court convictions for

aggravated mayhem, assault with a deadly weapon, and petty theft

with a prior. (Pet. 6-8; Pet. App. A, 1-9; see also Lodgment No.

1, Clerk’s Tr. 00007-11, Oct. 19, 2006 (amended information); id.

at 00161-65, Nov. 22, 2006 (verdicts).) Petitioner contends that

his federal constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 1 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-2- 09cv0145

Amendments were violated because the trial court denied a motion to

reopen the defense case in order to cross-examine the main

prosecution witness with recently obtained documents, and he

received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in

connection with that issue. (See Pet. 6-8; Pet. App. A, 1-9.)

Respondent Warden Martel (hereinafter “Respondent”) counters

that habeas relief is not available because the resolution of

Petitioner’s claims by the state courts was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. (See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 3-10.) 

Based upon a review of the pleadings, documents, and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the

Court recommends the Petition be DENIED. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2006, an amended information was filed in the

San Diego County Superior Court charging Luevano with one count of

mayhem in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) section

203 (count one), one count of assault with a deadly weapon by means

of force likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of Penal

Code section 245(a)(1) (count two), and one count of petty theft

with a prior in violation of Penal Code section 484 (count three). 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. 00007-11.) The charging document

alleged that Luevano had three prior convictions for which he had

served time in prison and had not remained free of custody for five

years following his release, within the meaning of Penal Code

sections 667.5(b) and 668, and he had two prior “strike”

convictions within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667(b)-(i),

1170.12, and 668, California’s three-strikes law. (Id.) 

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 2 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-3- 09cv0145

Following a jury trial, Luevano was convicted on all counts. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. 00161-65 (verdicts).) The jury also

found that he personally used a deadly weapon and inflicted great

bodily injury on the victim during the commission of the offenses. 

(Id.) Luevano admitted the prior conviction allegations were true,

and he was sentenced to a state prison term of twenty-five years to

life plus ten years. (Id. at 00167 (mins.); Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 4, 508-18, Nov. 22, 2006.)

Petitioner filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeal

for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, in which he

raised, as his sole ground for relief, claim two presented here. 

(Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v. Luevano, No.

D050281 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2008).) The state appellate court

affirmed the convictions in all respects in an unpublished opinion. 

(Lodgment No. 4, People v. Luevano, No. D50281, slip op. (Cal. Ct.

App. Feb. 15, 2008).) 

Next, he filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court in which he presented, as his sole ground for relief, claim

two raised here. (Lodgment No. 5, Pet. for Review, People v.

Luevano, No. SD2007800791 (Cal. filed Feb. 26, 2008).) The court

denied the petition without a citation of authority or a statement

of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Luevano, No. S161233,

order (Cal. Apr. 28, 2008).)

Luevano thereafter filed a habeas corpus petition directly in

the California Supreme Court, without filing habeas petitions in

the lower state courts, in which he asserted all three claims

presented here. (Lodgment No. 7, Luevano v. Martel, No. S165083

(Cal. filed July 14, 2008) (petition).) The court denied the

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 3 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4- 09cv0145

petition without a citation of authority or a statement of

reasoning. (Lodgment No. 8, In re Luevano, No. S165083, order

(Cal. Dec. 17, 2008).)

Luevano filed a habeas corpus Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 in this Court on January 23, 2009 [doc. no. 1]. Respondent

filed an Answer and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of the Answer to the Petition on June 1, 2009 [doc. no.

10], and Petitioner filed a Traverse on July 6, 2009 [doc. no. 16].

III. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

In June of 2006, Cynthia Moreno was employed as a customer

service manager at the College Grove Wal-Mart store in San Diego. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 41, Nov. 20, 2006.) Adrian

Salas was employed as a loss prevention officer at the same store. 

(Id. at 99.) On the evening of June 5, 2006, Moreno was assisting

the cashier at the self-checkout registers near the store’s exit. 

(Id. at 49.) From that location, she could see the price and

description of each item scanned. (Id.) About the same time, in a

different part of the store, Salas observed Luevano place a

Universal Product Code (“UPC”) bar code label on a box containing a

computer monitor and proceed toward the self-checkout line. (Id.

at 107-14.) Salas described Luevano to Moreno and instructed her

to “verify what he’s scanning.” (Id. at 50-51.) The shirts

Luevano scanned rang up as shoes, and the computer monitor, priced

at $298, scanned as a mouse pad costing $2.97. (Id. at 54-55, 60.) 

The merchandise Petitioner scanned had a total retail selling price

of $320.21, but he was only charged $21.64. (Id. at 74.)

/// 

///

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 4 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-5- 09cv0145

While Luevano was still in the process of checking out, Moreno

told Salas what she had observed. (Id. at 61.) Moreno then

watched Luevano proceed toward the exit followed by Salas. (Id. at

62-65.) She knew that when confronting shoplifters, it was Salas’s

practice to “grab” them, inform them that he is security for the

store, and ask them to come back inside and answer a few questions. 

(Id. at 65.) That process is usually quick; Moreno became

concerned when Salas had not returned with Petitioner after two

minutes. (Id. at 65-66.) She approached the exit and saw Salas

pulling on Luevano’s arm. (Id. at 66.) Petitioner freed himself

from Salas’s grip and ran toward a half-door where shopping carts

are brought into the store. (Id. at 67.) Moreno testified that

Salas attempted to push Luevano into a soft drink vending machine,

but Luevano was able to duck underneath the cart door and run

outside. (Id. at 68.) Moreno went outside and saw Salas and

Petitioner wrestling on the ground; Salas was attempting to

handcuff Luevano, but Luevano was fighting and resisting being

handcuffed. (Id. at 69.) Moreno went back inside the store and

called the manager. (Id. at 70.) 

Salas testified that he had been trained, consistent with WalMart policies, to use reasonable force when handcuffing suspected

shoplifters, which included taking them to the ground and using

“pressure points,” but not directly striking the suspect. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 130-31, Nov. 21, 2006.) He

said he was never given any training, either by Wal-Mart or a

third-party provider, regarding how he should chase a fleeing

suspect, and the training he received was based on the assumption

that the suspect is not trying to flee. (Id. at 180-82.) Salas

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 5 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-6- 09cv0145

stated that it is his normal procedure in an encounter with a

suspected shoplifter to first identify himself, and then ask the

suspect to come back inside the store and discuss the stolen

merchandise. (Id. at 136-40; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2,

103.) If the individual runs back inside the store, the policy

provides that Salas can handcuff him but not take him to the

ground. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 131.) 

Salas testified that after he observed Luevano place a UPC bar

code on a computer monitor, he described Luevano to Moreno and

asked Moreno to let him know the price it scanned. (Lodgment No.

2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 108, 114; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3,

132-33.) Salas watched Luevano as he scanned the items, and Moreno

told Salas that the computer monitor scanned as a $3.00 mouse pad. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 136-40.) Petitioner was

speaking to another man while scanning the merchandise, and the two

men proceeded together toward the exit. (Id. at 140-41.) The man

walking with Luevano exited first and set off the alarm. (Id.) 

While that person was being checked by the “door leader,” Luevano

exited, also setting off the alarm. (Id.) 

Salas maneuvered in front of Luevano in order to confront him,

because store policy provided that suspects were not to be

approached from behind. (Id. at 142-44.) Salas made eye contact

with Luevano and said, “Sir, I’m from Wal-Mart security,” and

Petitioner nodded in understanding. (Id. at 145-46.) Salas was in

the middle of saying, “You need to come,” when Luevano started to

run. (Id. at 145.)

Salas grabbed Luevano’s shirt, and they moved together toward

the cart door. (Id. at 147-48.) Salas pushed Luevano in an

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 6 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-7- 09cv0145

attempt to get him up against the wall to handcuff him, as he had

been trained to do. (Id. at 149-50.) Luevano pushed back, and his

hand hit Salas in the head, as they both crashed into a soda

machine. (Id. at 150-51.) Salas lost his hold on Luevano at that

point, and Luevano went out the cart door. (Id. at 152.) Salas

followed him through the cart door and succeeded in taking him down

to the ground about four feet in front of the cart door. (Id. at

152.) 

Luevano managed to get away again, but Salas caught him where

the sidewalk meets the blacktop of the parking lot, “not that far

from the cart door.” (Id. at 153-54, 227.) Salas pulled Luevano

to the ground, took control of his wrist, took out his handcuffs,

and attempted to handcuff him. (Id. at 154-55.) Luevano, who was

face down with one hand under his body, resisted Salas’s efforts to

handcuff him by pulling away, but Salas managed to get the

handcuffs on one wrist. (Id. at 155-56.) Salas told Petitioner to

stop resisting and to put his hands behind his back to be

handcuffed. (Id. at 155.) 

Luis Rodriguez, a Wal-Mart cashier, appeared and helped Salas

get Petitioner’s other arm around his back; Rodriguez held

Luevano’s legs as Salas finished handcuffing him. (Id. at 156,

211.) A uniformed security guard appeared just before Petitioner

was handcuffed but did not help; Salas explained that the guard

reports incidents that happen in the parking lot. (Id. at 161-62.)

Although Salas never felt or saw a weapon, he felt blood

gushing from the top of his head as he was trying to handcuff

Petitioner. (Id. at 157-58.) Rodriguez testified that he saw

something in Luevano’s free hand that looked like a ball-point pen. 

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 7 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-8- 09cv0145

(Id. at 210-11.) Rodriguez felt blood splatter “all over the

place” and “figured [Luevano] managed to use the object in his

hand.” (Id. at 213.) Soon thereafter, Rodriguez saw an X-Acto

utility knife lying on the ground just out of Petitioner’s reach. 

(Id. at 215-17.) 

Moreno testified that after calling the store manager, she

went back outside and saw Rodriguez helping Salas subdue

Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 70-71.) She saw a

uniformed security guard arrive and just stand by without

intervening; the guard worked for the shopping mall, not Wal-Mart. 

(Id. at 82, 87.) Moreno went back inside the Wal-Mart store and

called an assistant manager. (Id. at 71.) When she came back

outside a third time, Petitioner was in handcuffs standing beside

Salas and still struggling to get away. (Id. at 72, 83.) Moreno

observed Salas bleeding, and “his whole cheek was hanging” from his

face, so she called the police. (Id. at 71-73, 83.) She did not

see Salas or Luevano hit each other during their struggle. (Id. at

71.) Luevano struggled even after being handcuffed, attempted to

run again, and told Salas “he was doing 25 to life.” (Id. at 72;

Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 164-67.) 

Salas was taken to the hospital immediately after the

encounter; fifteen staples were used to close cuts to his head;

eight staples went into his stomach; and a plastic surgeon sutured

cuts to his face, nose, neck, and lip. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 3, 172-75.) At the time of trial, Salas had visible scars on

his neck, mouth, nose, head, and stomach as a result of the

altercation with Petitioner. (Id. at 175-77.) The police officer

who took a statement from Salas at the hospital testified that

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 8 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-9- 09cv0145

blood was pouring from a very deep cut on his head, and Salas’s

injuries were “some of the worst” the officer had seen in his

career. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, at 93.) The police

officer who arrested Petitioner testified that Luevano’s injuries

were minor and included a small cut above the eyebrow, a small

laceration on his biceps, and tiny abrasions on his hand, injuries

which merely required Band-Aids. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

3, 234-35, 239.) The People rested their case-in-chief. (Id. at

243.)

The only witness called by the defense was Petitioner. He

testified that he entered Wal-Mart with the intention of stealing

merchandise by switching UPC bar codes, and he had an X-Acto knife

and glue stick with him for that purpose. (Id. at 244-45.) 

Petitioner admitted that he had been convicted of residential

burglaries in 1996 and 1997, and petty theft with a prior in 2000. 

(Id. at 244.) 

 Luevano said he switched UPC bar codes on several items and

checked out through the self-checkout lane. (Id. at 244-46.) As

he was leaving the store, an employee asked to see his receipt,

checked it, and handed it back. (Id. at 248.) Luevano continued

toward the exit, when Salas approached him and identified himself

as store security. (Id. at 249, 289-90.) Petitioner admitted he

nodded to Salas in recognition that he had been caught, and then he

“made a break for it and tried to run.” (Id.) Luevano explained

that he did not want to be caught because he had previously been

convicted of petty theft with a prior, and if caught again, “more

than likely,” he “would be doing 25 to life.” (Id.)

/// 

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 9 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-10- 09cv0145

Petitioner testified that as he tried to run, Salas grabbed

him and pushed him into a soda machine. (Id. at 250.) Luevano hit

the vending machine and pushed off toward a small door used for

shopping carts. (Id.) Salas was holding Luevano’s shirt, and he

was “half dragging” Salas as they both went through the small door

onto the sidewalk. (Id. at 251.)

When they were outside on the sidewalk, Salas had Luevano “by

the scruff of the neck,” and Luevano felt as if Salas had hit him

in the back of the head. (Id. at 251-54.) Petitioner ran again,

but Salas soon had him on the ground in the parking lot. (Id. at

254-55.) Luevano was face down with Salas on top of him, and

Salas’s knee was in his back. (Id. at 255-56.) Luevano testified

that he attempted to twist out from underneath Salas’s knee, and

Salas began hitting the back of his head and pushing his head into

the ground. (Id. at 256-58.) Luevano saw a security vehicle pull

up and thought the incident was over, but Salas kept pushing him

down by the neck so Luevano began resisting more. (Id. at 258.) 

Petitioner thought the security guard would handcuff him, but

the guard just stood there. (Id. at 259.) Luevano thought Salas

“was having a bad day or something because he was going really far

for being loss prevention and trying to keep his merchandise from

leaving the store.” (Id.) Luevano felt pressure on the back of

his legs, believed that he was about to be “jumped,” and decided it

was time to begin defending himself. (Id. at 260-61.) He pulled

the X-Acto knife out of his pocket and started cutting Salas. (Id.

at 262-63.) He was afraid that he was going to be hurt, and he did

not expect to be hurt by a store’s loss prevention officer. (Id.

at 263, 303.) 

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 10 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-11- 09cv0145

The statement Petitioner made to Salas regarding “25 to life”

was a reference to his belief that he would likely face a sentence

of twenty-five years to life in prison if he were convicted of

another petty theft offense. (Id. at 289-90.) Luevano testified

that after he had been handcuffed, he still attempted to run

because he did not want to be arrested. (Id. at 268-69.) The

defense rested. (Id. at 308.) 

Frederick James, a parole agent with the department of

corrections, was called as a rebuttal witness. (Id. at 319-21.) 

The agent was on duty at the county jail two days after Luevano’s

arrest and testified that Luevano asked, “What am I looking at?” 

(Id. at 321.) He explained that this was a common question from

persons arrested while on parole, and the agent asked Luevano about

his current offense. (Id. at 321-22.) Petitioner said, “I went to

the Wal-Mart and tried to switch the price on a computer monitor

and got caught by the security guard. He tried to detain me, so I

cut him with a box cutter I had in my pocket.” (Id. at 324-25.) 

The parole agent asked Luevano, “Why did you do that?” (Id. at

324.) He replied, “I did not think the security guard had the

right to put his hands on me.” (Id.) Petitioner denied making

those statements during his trial testimony; Luevano said he had

refused to speak to the parole agent about the incident “because he

wasn’t my parole officer.” (Id. at 272.) Both parties rested, and

the jury was excused until the next day. (Id. at 328-30.)

The next morning, at the time closing arguments were scheduled

to begin, defense counsel informed the court that when he returned

to his office the previous afternoon, correspondence from Wal-Mart

had arrived in response to a subpoena duces tecum. (Lodgment No.

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 11 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The juror referred to sent a note to the trial judge on the first day

of trial, which is included in the record. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

00155 (note)). It reads: “Is it legal for a non-peace officer to use force

when detaining a shoplifter? Is it (Wal-Mart) policy to use force to detain

a shoplifter? If so, what is California law? Is force necessary? When is

it necessary?” (Id.) The trial judge responded that the question would be

addressed by counsel during their examination of the witnesses or in the

jury instructions or both. (Id. at 00152 (mins.); Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 2, 117-18.) The jury instructions addressed state law regarding

a merchant’s right to use force to detain a suspect, as well as the ability

of a private person to effect an arrest for a public offense committed in

his or her presence. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 4, 434-35.) 

-12- 09cv0145

2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 4, 369.) The documents were Wal-Mart policy

guidelines describing what employees are allowed to do when

detaining shoplifters. (Id.) Defense counsel moved to reopen in

order to cross-examine Salas with the documents, arguing that WalMart policies provided that their agents are not permitted to

pursue a suspected shoplifter who is fleeing more that ten feet,

and they must stop pursuing any fleeing shoplifter if it looks like

somebody could be hurt. (Id. at 369-70.) Counsel argued that

Luevano’s state and federal constitutional rights to confront and

cross-examine Salas were implicated because Salas’s credibility was

at issue. (Id. at 370-71.) He argued that Salas might have

knowingly violated Wal-Mart policies, and Luevano’s claim of selfdefense was implicated because Luevano was defending himself in the

face of a violent and overzealous pursuit by Salas. (Id.) 

Furthermore, one of the seated jurors had inquired about Wal-Mart’s

policies regarding detaining shoplifters.1 (Id.)

The trial judge reviewed the Wal-Mart documents, described

them on the record, and discussed the issue outside the presence of

the jury. (Id. at 378-84, 396, 410, 417.) The court denied the

motion to reopen. (Id. at 412.) It found that the evidence had

minimal relevance and was vastly outweighed by prejudice. The

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 12 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-13- 09cv0145

trial evidence showed that there was not a substantial break in

contact between Salas and Luevano, and litigating whether the

policy was violated would be time-consuming and confusing to the

jurors; reopening the case would lengthen the trial and might

result in the loss of jurors who had been told at the beginning of

trial of its expected length, which had already been exceeded; and

the policies related to civil liability of Wal-Mart, not criminal

liability of Petitioner. (Id. at 409-12.)

The jury was instructed, heard closing arguments, and began

their deliberations. (Id. at 418-502.) Petitioner admitted the

truth of the prior conviction allegations. (Id. at 508-18.) After

deliberating for about an hour, the jury found Luevano guilty on

all charges and found the allegations that he had personally used a

deadly weapon and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the

victim were true. (Id. at 519-21; Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

00161-65 (verdicts); id. at 00160 (mins.).)

IV. Petitioner’s Claims

Luevano raises three claims in his Petition. In claim one, he

argues that his trial counsel’s failure to obtain the Wal-Mart

policies in time to use them at trial amounted to ineffective

assistance in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (See Pet.

6; Pet. App. A, 1-6.) He contends that at the start of trial,

counsel was aware that the documents subpoenaed from Wal-Mart had

not arrived, yet he did not request a continuance of the trial. 

(Id.) Petitioner attaches a copy of the Wal-Mart polices as

Exhibit 1 to the Petition and argues they are relevant to his

defense. Luevano characterizes his defense as a credibility

contest between Salas and him, because they show that Salas’s

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 13 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-14- 09cv0145

actions were overly aggressive by Wal-Mart standards. (Pet. App.

A, 5-6.) 

In claim two, Luevano alleges that his rights to confront and

cross-examine Salas, and to present evidence, as protected by the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, were violated by the trial court’s

denial of the motion to reopen the defense case. (Pet. at 7; Pet.

App. A, 7-9.) Petitioner argues that the evidence would have shown

that Salas was not simply doing his job, and his willingness to

violate Wal-Mart policies demonstrates that he had a propensity for

excessive force and violence. (Pet. App. A, 7-9.) 

Petitioner alleges in claim three that his federal

constitutional right to the effective assistance of appellate

counsel was violated when his counsel failed to present a claim on

direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed

to present evidence of the Wal-Mart policies. (Pet. at 8.)

V. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), as amended by the

Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, sets forth the following scope

of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 14 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-15- 09cv0145

a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly

established Supreme Court precedent (1) “if the state court applies

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases[]” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of

[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000). A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular

state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. An unreasonable application

may also be found “if the state court either unreasonably extends a

legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 15 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-16- 09cv0145

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application

must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed

to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions

. . . .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Habeas relief is also available if the state court’s

adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2)

(West 2006). In order to satisfy this provision, a federal habeas

petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which

the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest are objectively

unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

B. Analysis

The resolution of Petitioner’s second claim for relief is

dispositive of his other claims. Accordingly, the Court will begin

the analysis with claim two, the only one of the three claims

denied by the state courts in a reasoned opinion. (See Lodgment

No. 4, People v. Luevano, No. D50281, slip op. at 1-7.)

1. Claim Two: Denial of Right to Confront and CrossExamine Salas

In claim two, Luevano alleges that his rights to present

evidence and to confront and cross-examine Salas were violated by

the trial court’s denial of the motion to reopen the defense case. 

(Pet. at 7; Pet. App. A, 7-9.) Respondent replies that the state

courts’ resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

///

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 16 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-17- 09cv0145

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

(See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 6-9.)

Luevano raised this claim in the petition for review he filed

in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 5, Pet. for Review,

People v. Luevano, No. SD2007800791.) That court denied the

petition without a citation of authority or a statement of

reasoning. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Luevano, No. S161233,

order.) Luevano had presented this claim to the state appellate

court on direct appeal, and the court denied it on the merits in an

unpublished opinion. (See Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening

Brief, People v. Luevano, No. D050281; Lodgment No. 4, People v.

Luevano, No. D50281, slip op. at 4-6.) 

In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), the Supreme

Court adopted a presumption which gives no effect to unexplained

state court orders but “looks through” them to the last reasoned

state court decision. This Court will look through the silent

denial by the state supreme court to the appellate court opinion. 

After finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion to reopen, the appellate court analyzed

Petitioner’s federal claim:

To the extent Luevano has couched his contention in

constitutional terms, it is also clear that the Sixth

Amendment does not require trial courts to admit any

evidence offered by a defendant, nor must it permit every

avenue of cross-examination such defendant might wish to

pursue. Trial courts have discretion to exclude

evidence, even in the face of a Sixth Amendment argument,

where such evidence is repetitive, cumulative, or only

marginally relevant. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475

U.S. 673, 679; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334,

372; People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298,

350.)

Applying the appropriate standard of review, it is

clear the trial court acted well within its discretion to

deny the request to reopen. As the trial court noted,

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 17 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-18- 09cv0145

the material at issue dealt entirely with Wal-Mart’s

internal policies regarding store security. The policies

recognized the company policies might be more restrictive

than state law. They are plainly designed to regulate

the activities of company employees to prevent injury or

potential civil liability. They do not purport to

address the criminal law of any state or federal

jurisdiction. Rather, such policies rationally seek to

limit losses that companies might incur due to civil suit

or injury to employees. A retailer might conclude the

loss of a few hundred dollars in merchandise is not worth

the risk of serious injury to an employee or customer. 

Such a rational business decision does not affect the

question under California law of whether Salas was the

aggressor, for purposes of Luevano’s claim of

self-defense or whether Salas used excessive force, which

might have justified Luevano using deadly force to

protect himself.

Salas was thoroughly cross-examined and Luevano was

able to fully set forth his defense. Further examination

of Salas about internal Wal-Mart policies, which he

apparently had never seen, would not add any relevant

evidence for the jury's consideration. The trial court's

decision to deny the request to reopen the case was

proper and did not deny Luevano his Sixth Amendment right

to confrontation.

(Lodgment No. 4, People v. Luevano, No. D50281, slip op. at 5-6.)

“The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that,

‘(i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ We have

held that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal

and state prosecutions.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42

(2004) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)). 

“Restrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse

witnesses and to present evidence ‘may not be arbitrary or

disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’” 

Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1987) (quoting Rock v.

Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). 

The Confrontation Clause “does not require the court to reopen

cross-examination so that defense counsel can pursue a line of

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 18 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-19- 09cv0145

questioning that was available when the witness testified

initially.” Stephens v. Hall, 294 F.3d 210, 227 (1st Cir. 2002).

Rather, it only guarantees “an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever

way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v.

Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis in original). 

In determining whether a state trial court’s limitation on

cross-examination of a prosecution witness rises to the level of a

Confrontation Clause violation, the Supreme Court has observed:

We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of

the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was

prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate crossexamination designed to show a prototypical form of bias

on the part of the witness, and thereby “to expose to the

jury the facts from which jurors . . . could

appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability

of the witness.”

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v.

Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)); see also Pennsylvania v.

Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1987)(“[T]he right to cross-examine

includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or that

the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable.”) 

Luevano contends that his inability to cross-examine Salas

with the Wal-Mart polices prevented him from introducing evidence

that Salas had a propensity for excessive force and violence. 

(Pet. App. A, at 8.) He attaches copies of the policies to the

Petition and contends they (1) prohibit pursuing a suspected

shoplifter more that ten feet, but the trial court found that Salas

pursued him thirty feet; (2) provide that a security officer must

stop pursuing a suspect immediately if it appears that any person

may be harmed, but both he and Salas were injured; (3) provide that

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 19 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-20- 09cv0145

employees may not physically reapprehend a suspect who evades

physical restraints, but Luevano broke free several times during

the struggle; and (4) prohibit a security officer from striking a

suspect, but Luevano contends Salas slammed him into a vending

machine, ripped his clothes, struck him in the back of the head

several times, smashed his face into the parking lot asphalt, and

repeatedly kneed him in the back. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that the state appellate court identified

the applicable clearly established federal law and correctly found

that reasonable limitations on cross-examination are permitted. 

(Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 7-8.) Respondent contends that whether

Salas was the aggressor or used excessive force under California

law is “wholly distinct” from whether Salas violated Wal-Mart’s

internal policies and procedures. (Id. at 8.) Accordingly, the

policies were not relevant, and their admission would have confused

or misled the jury. (Id.) In any case, Respondent contends that

the appellate court correctly noted that the record strongly

suggests Salas was unaware of the policies and that evidence that

Salas violated the polices would have been of marginal relevance. 

(Id.) 

Petitioner replies that it is misleading for Respondent to

characterize the appellate court’s “dicta,” that Salas apparently

had never seen the Wal-Mart policies, as a finding that the record

“strongly suggests” Salas was unaware of the polices. (Traverse

2.) Petitioner questions how the appellate court could make that

finding when Salas was not actually cross-examined with the

policies. (Id.) Rather, he contends that cross-examination of

Salas with the policies “would go a long way to determining

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 20 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-21- 09cv0145

‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort . . . or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” (Id. at 3 (quoting

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)) (citing Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)).)

Salas was asked on direct examination about his training,

which included his knowledge of Wal-Mart’s policies, and answered

questions regarding the procedures he actually follows. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 100-03; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

3, 130-31.) He said he received three weeks of on-the-job

training, that he “read a notebook,” and that “company policy” was

explained to him. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 100-02.) He

also indicated that Wal-Mart policy forbids directly striking a

suspect. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 130.) 

Defense counsel began cross-examination with questions about

Salas’s training and experience, including Wal-Mart policies. (Id.

at 179-82.) Salas testified that he was never given any training,

either by Wal-Mart or a third-party provider, regarding how he

should chase a fleeing suspect. (Id. at 180-82.) Rather, the

training he received was based on the assumption that the suspected

shoplifter is not trying to flee. (Id. at 180.) Salas was not

asked any questions on cross-examination about the “notebook” he

had been given or whether he was independently aware, from reading

the notebook or having the policies explained to him, of any WalMart policies regarding fleeing suspects. Defense counsel was not

in possession of the written Wal-Mart policies at that time and was

presumably unaware that Wal-Mart policies addressed procedures

regarding fleeing suspects. 

///

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 21 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-22- 09cv0145

Nevertheless, Salas was cross-examined about Wal-Mart policies

which prohibited him from hitting suspects. The only evidence he

violated that policy was Petitioner’s testimony that Salas hit him

in the back of the head. Thus, the jury was already called upon to

assess whether Salas violated that particular policy. The Court

must address whether additional cross-examination with the policies

regarding fleeing suspects might have affected Salas’s credibility. 

Salas, however, testified that he had not been trained as to

Wal-Mart policies regarding fleeing suspects. Thus, regardless of

whether Salas knew of and violated policies regarding fleeing

suspects, the appellate court was correct in finding they had very

little relevance to “whether Salas acted within California law in

using force to restrain Luevano or . . . whether Luevano was

entitled to use deadly force in self-defense.” (Lodgment No. 4,

People v. Luevano, No. D05281, slip op. at 4.) The jury was

instructed that they could find that Luevano’s actions were “lawful

self-defense if: [He] reasonably believed that he was in imminent

danger of suffering bodily injury; (2) [He] reasonably believed

that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against

that danger; [and] (3) The defendant used no more force than was

reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.” (Lodgment No.

2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 4, 435.)

Petitioner testified that he did not believe he was in danger

of being hurt until he saw the security guard standing next to him

without intervening, felt pressure from Rodriguez on the back of

his legs, and concluded that Salas “was getting more violent” and

would do “whatever it took to make sure that [he] didn’t get away.” 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 260-63.) Luevano’s admissions

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 22 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-23- 09cv0145

belied a need to defend himself. He continued his attempts to

escape even after he had been handcuffed and the struggle had

ended, and Luevano admitted that he was motivated to avoid arrest

because he believed he would likely face a life sentence if

arrested. (Id. at 268-69, 290.) Based on his past arrest for

shoplifting, he thought Salas “was really going far . . . trying to

keep his merchandise from leaving the store.” (Id. at 259-60.) 

Petitioner “didn’t expect to be manhandled” and thought Salas would

probably follow him to his car and record the vehicle’s license

plate number. (Id. at 295.) Luevano told the parole agent that he

cut Salas because he did not have “the right to put his hands on

me,” not because he was afraid of being hurt as he testified to at

trial. (Id. at 324.) Salas testified that Luevano apologized

after he had been handcuffed and taken back inside the store. (Id.

at 168.)

Petitioner has not established that Salas’s credibility could

have been diminished in any meaningful way by cross-examination

with the Wal-Mart policies regarding fleeing suspects. As the

appellate court pointed out, the record was unclear as to whether

Salas was aware of the nature and extent to those policies, which

were geared toward avoidance of civil liability. The jury was

instructed on the law regarding how far Salas was allowed to go in

apprehending Luevano (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 4, 434-35),

and internal Wal-Mart policies were of no relevance to the

determination of whether Salas acted within California law. Even

if Salas was aware of the policies and violated them, the

justification for the amount of force used focuses on the

difference between Petitioner’s and Salas’s versions of the events. 

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 23 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Petitioner’s reliance on Hudson and Whitley is misplaced. Whitley

articulates factors to use in deciding “whether force was applied in a good

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” so as to determine

whether a state actor inflicted punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause upon a prisoner who was

shot during the quelling of a prison riot. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; see

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (considering same Whitley factors under Eighth

Amendment excessive force analysis for prisoner beaten by guards). Because

Petitioner has not presented (and is unable to state) an Eighth Amendment

claim, those cases do not apply. Thus, the adjudication of his claims by

the state courts was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable

application of, those cases. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

-24- 09cv0145

The testimony of other eyewitnesses and the minor nature of

Petitioner’s injuries outweigh any impact a violation of the

policies might have had on Salas’s credibility. Luevano’s

credibility is undermined by his fear of a life sentence, his three

felony convictions, and his admission that he was going to the

store to steal. 

In sum, Salas was cross-examined about policies forbidding him

from hitting suspects and the difference in his and Luevano’s

testimony. Other witnesses testified as to the nature and extent

of the struggle. Even if Salas had been confronted with Wal-Mart

policies regarding fleeing suspects, it is unlikely that Salas’s

credibility could have been significantly diminished with further

cross-examination. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679-80. The state

appellate court’s similar conclusion, which cited to and relied on

the principles articulated in Van Arsdall, was neither contrary to,

nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts.2 Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-

13; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679-80. 

Moreover, assuming Petitioner could demonstrate a violation of

the Confrontation Clause arising from the trial court’s denial of

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 24 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-25- 09cv0145

defense counsel’s motion to reopen, or demonstrate that the state

courts’ contrary conclusion was objectively unreasonable within the

meaning of AEDPA, the Court must determine whether the error was

harmless. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680-84 (holding that

Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error

analysis); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007)

(holding that harmless error analysis is still required after

establishing an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law because 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “sets forth a precondition

to the grant of habeas relief[,] . . . not an entitlement to

it[]”).

Habeas relief is not available “unless the error resulted in

‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict[,]’ or unless the judge ‘is in grave doubt’ about

the harmlessness of the error.” Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872,

877 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the

damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully

realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case

depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to

reviewing courts. These factors include the importance

of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case,

whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or

absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the

testimony of the witness on material points, the extent

of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course,

the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.

All the factors identified in Van Arsdall support a finding

that any error was harmless. First, although Salas’s testimony was

important to the prosecution’s case, it was well corroborated by

all the other witnesses, including Petitioner. Luevano’s testimony

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 25 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-26- 09cv0145

was substantially the same as all the witnesses who testified,

except as to whether Salas hit Petitioner and smashed his face into

the asphalt. His claim of the need to defend himself was belied by

the minor nature of Luevano’s injuries and his desperation to avoid

being arrested. Moreno testified that she never saw Salas hit

Petitioner, although she was not present at all times during the

struggle. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 71.) 

Petitioner’s defense that he had a reasonable belief that use

of a deadly weapon was necessary to prevent injury to himself is

further undermined by evidence that he did not use his knife until

he was completely surrounded, without other options for escaping

what he knew would likely be a life sentence. Most importantly,

the evidence established that Petitioner suffered only minor

injuries, consistent with the type of struggle described by the

witnesses, whereas Salas incurred serious injuries which have

scarred him for life. Moreover, Salas was cross-examined regarding

whether Wal-Mart policies prohibited striking suspected

shoplifters. Thus, the cross-examination of Salas with the WalMart policies regarding pursuing fleeing suspects would have had

little corroborating or contradicting effect. 

The remaining Van Arsdall factors weigh against a finding of

harmfulness. Salas was subject to cross-examination on Wal-Mart

policies, which revealed that he knew he was permitted to use

“pressure points” but not directly strike suspects. In addition,

the prosecution’s case was extremely strong, supported not only by

eyewitnesses, including Petitioner’s testimony, but by physical

evidence regarding the injuries Petitioner inflicted and received. 

The Court is convinced that any questioning of Salas’s credibility,

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 26 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-27- 09cv0145

arising from his violation of the policies regarding fleeing

suspects, would not have had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the jury’s verdicts. See Medina, 386 F.3d at 877. 

For these reasons, the state appellate court’s determination

that the trial court’s denial of the defense motion to reopen the

case to confront and cross-examine Salas with the internal Wal-Mart

policies did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights and was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceedings. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679-80. Furthermore,

any error arising from that decision was clearly harmless. Medina,

386 F.3d at 877. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief

be DENIED as to claim two.

2. Claim One: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In claim one, Luevano alleges that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to procure the Wal-Mart policies

in time to use them at trial. (See Pet. 6; Pet. App. A, 1-6.) He

complains that counsel knew that the documents subpoenaed from WalMart had not arrived by the start of trial, yet he did not request

a continuance. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that Petitioner has not carried his burden

of establishing that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure

to obtain the policy documents before trial, because he has failed

to demonstrate any error arising from the exclusion of the

policies. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 9-10.) Respondent contends

that the silent denial of this claim by the state supreme court is

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 27 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-28- 09cv0145

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law governing ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. (Id.)

Petitioner replies that his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim raises a constitutional violation distinct from the trial

court’s failure to reopen the defense case. (Traverse 1-2.) He

contends that although the appellate court found that the Wal-Mart

policies were not relevant to any disputed issue, the policy

documents would have been admissible if defense counsel had

obtained them in time. (Id. at 2.) Luevano disagrees with the

appellate court’s relevancy determination and argues that the

materials could have been used to demonstrate that Salas acted in

excess of his training and intended to inflict harm, thus

bolstering Luevano’s claim of self-defense. (Id.) 

Luevano raised this claim in a habeas corpus petition filed in

the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 7, Luevano v. Martel,

No. S165083 (petition).) The petition was denied without a

citation of authority or a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No.

8, In re Luevano, No. S165083, order.) Because there is no lower

state court opinion addressing this claim, the Court is required to

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether

the California Supreme Court clearly erred in its application of

controlling federal law when it denied the claim. Richter v.

Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (“(W)hile we are not

required to defer to a state court’s decision when that court gives

us nothing to defer to, we must still focus primarily on Supreme

Court cases in deciding whether the state court’s resolution of the

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 28 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-29- 09cv0145

case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law.”) 

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law

governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that

Strickland “has long been clearly established federal law

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”). For

ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for habeas

relief, Petitioner must demonstrate two things. First, he must

show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. “This requires showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, he

must show counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

Id. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious

they deprived Petitioner “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Id. 

To satisfy the prejudice prong, Petitioner need only

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different absent the error. Williams,

529 U.S. at 406; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a

proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding

itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a

preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”) 

The prejudice inquiry is to be considered in light of the strength

of the prosecution’s case. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 966 (9th

Cir.), amended, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002).

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 29 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-30- 09cv0145

Because Petitioner is unable to demonstrate prejudice arising

from defense counsel’s performance, there is no need to determine

whether counsel was deficient in failing to obtain the Wal-Mart

policy documents prior to trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690,

694 (holding that both deficient performance and prejudice must be

shown to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim). In order to

demonstrate prejudice, Luevano must show a reasonable probability

that confidence in the outcome of his trial is undermined by

defense counsel’s failure to confront and cross-examine Salas with

the Wal-Mart policy documents. See e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539

U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (“In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the

evidence in aggravation against the totality of available

mitigating evidence [which counsel failed to discover and present

at sentencing].”) Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced because

the evidence would have shown that Salas was not simply doing his

job; he exceeded Wal-Mart policies and had a propensity for

excessive force and violence. (Pet. App. A, 7-9.)

As discussed above, Luevano’s contention that it was

reasonable to use deadly force to repel Salas’s effort to handcuff

him is belied by the disparity in their injuries, as well as

Petitioner’s admission that he tried to avoid arrest because he was

likely facing life in prison. His self-defense case was further

weakened by his statement to the parole agent that he cut Salas

because he did not believe Salas had a right to put his hands on

him. In addition, he testified that his past shoplifting

experience had taught him that loss prevention officers do not

ordinarily pursue a fleeing suspect, giving rise to an inference

that Luevano believed he could eventually escape if he refused to

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 30 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-31- 09cv0145

submit and used force to resist arrest. Petitioner’s assertion

that he resorted to deadly force due to a reasonable belief that it

was necessary to prevent further injury to himself was contradicted

by the evidence. He resorted to brute force only after he was

completely surrounded and about to be handcuffed. At that point,

it was clear that Luevano was not going to escape without using

deadly force, and he was desperate to avoid spending the rest of

his life in prison. Thus, evidence that his use of the knife was a

reasonable response to a reasonably-held belief in the need to

defend himself was extremely weak, whereas the evidence supporting

a finding of guilt was extremely strong. 

In light of the strength of the prosecution’s case,

confronting Salas with the Wal-Mart policies regarding fleeing

suspects would not have strengthened Petitioner’s defense. The

claim of self-defense was weak; the jury rejected it after only an

hour of deliberations. In any case, Salas was cross-examined

regarding the policy against hitting suspects. The jury evaluated

Luevano’s and Salas’s credibility. Petitioner’s attempt to

demonstrate prejudice arising from defense counsel’s error is

untenable.

Based on an independent review of the record, the Court finds

that the state supreme court’s silent denial of claim one was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13;

Greene, 288 F.3d at 1089. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

habeas relief be DENIED as to claim one.

///

///

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 31 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-32- 09cv0145

3. Claim Three: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate

Counsel

Petitioner alleges in claim three that his federal

constitutional right to the effective assistance of appellate

counsel was violated because counsel failed to argue on appeal that

Luevano received ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on

the failure to confront and cross-examine Salas with the written

Wal-Mart policies. (Pet. at 8.) Respondent replies that

Petitioner is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by

appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal because

Luevano was unable to show prejudice from trial counsel’s failure

to timely obtain the policy documents. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer

9-10.) As a result, the resolution of this claim by the state

supreme court was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Id.) 

Luevano raised this claim in his habeas corpus petition filed

with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 7, Luevano v.

Martel, No. S165083 (petition).) Because the petition was denied

without a citation of authority or a statement of reasoning,

(Lodgment No. 8, In re Luevano, No. S165083, order), and there is

no lower state court opinion addressing this claim, the Court again

conducts an independent review of the record to determine whether

the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling

federal law when it denied Luevano’s petition. Richter, 578 F.3d

at 952; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; Greene, 288 F.3d at 1089.

Strickland also sets forth the clearly established United

States Supreme Court law governing ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claims. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 32 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-33- 09cv0145

(2000). As discussed above, Petitioner’s constitutional rights

were not violated by defense counsel’s failure to confront and

cross-examine Salas with the Wal-Mart policies. Because Luevano is

unable to demonstrate prejudice arising from trial counsel’s

performance, he failed to establish ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

as to claim three. The failure to raise meritless or untenable

claims on appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507

(9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]rial counsel’s performance, although not

error-free, did not fall below the Strickland standard. Thus,

petitioner was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s decision not

to raise issues that had no merit.”); Gustave v. United States, 627

F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is no requirement that an

attorney appeal issues that are clearly untenable.”); Baumann v.

United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that

attorney’s failure to raise meritless legal argument does not

constitute ineffective assistance). 

Based on an independent review of the record, the Court finds

that the state supreme court’s silent denial of claim three was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13;

Richter, 578 F.3d at 952. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

habeas relief be DENIED as to claim three.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation denying all

three claims in the Petition to United States District Judge

William Q. Hayes under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 33 of 34
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-34- 09cv0145

HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District

of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the district court issue an Order (1) approving 

and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 18, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

July 2, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 14, 2010

 _____________________________

 Hon. Ruben B. Brooks

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-00145-WQH-RBB Document 17 Filed 05/14/10 Page 34 of 34