Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_04-cv-01071/USCOURTS-arwd-1_04-cv-01071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

PATTY D. BROWN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-1071

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background:

The plaintiff in this case has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner"), denying her claim for a period of

disability and disability insurance benefits (hereinafter “DIB”), pursuant to §§ 216(i) and 223 of

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423. Both

parties have filed appeal briefs (Doc. #5 & 6). In this judicial review, the court must determine

whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The history of the administrative proceedings is contained in the respective appeal briefs

and will not be recounted here except as necessary. 

The plaintiff asserts disability due to: status post right wrist fracture; burns of the lower

extremities; and, left eye blindness. The issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner's

decision is supported by substantial record evidence. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the

ALJ: did not consider her impairments in combination; failed to order an independent medical

examination; improperly evaluated her credibility; and, improperly found that she was capable

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of returning to her past relevant work. (Doc. #5, p. 5-6). 

 The Commissioner has established, by regulation, a five-step sequential evaluation for

determining whether an individual is disabled.

The first step involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the claimant is, benefits are denied; if not, the

evaluation goes to the next step.

Step 2 involves a determination, based solely on the medical evidence, of whether the

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id., § 404.1520(c); see 20

C.F.R. § 404.1526. If not, benefits are denied; if so, the evaluation proceeds to the next step.

Step 3 involves a determination, again based solely on the medical evidence, of whether

the severe impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment which is presumed to be

disabling. Id., § 404.1520(d). If so, benefits are awarded; if not, the evaluation continues.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has sufficient residual

functional capacity, despite the impairment(s), to perform past work. Id., § 404.1520(e). If so,

benefits are denied; if not, the evaluation continues.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able to perform other

substantial and gainful work within the economy, given claimant's age, education and work

experience. Id., § 404.1520(f). If so, benefits are denied; if not, benefits are awarded. 

The plaintiff’s current application was filed on August 20, 2001, and alleged an onset

date for disability of April 20, 2001 (T. 50-53, 65, 89). An administrative hearing was held on

April 21, 2003 (T. 736-765), after which the ALJ issued his written decision, dated September

18, 2003, containing the following relevant findings: 

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1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the

Act on April 20, 2001, the alleged onset date of disability, and

continued to meet them through only July 30, 2002.

3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has a history

of diagnoses of and/or treatment for a blind right eye, a fracture

of the right wrist and burn injuries to both lower extremities

(Exhibits B-1F through B-4F), which are “severe” impairments

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. However, she

does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

listed in or medically equal in severity to an impairment

contained in the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart

P of Regulations No. 4. 

4. The claimant’s testimony and subjective allegations as to the

extent of her symptoms, limitations and restrictions are found to

be credible only in so far as they are supported by the evidence of

record and only to the extent that she is limited to the

performance of no more than sedentary and or light work activity.

5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

broad range of light work activity. (If an individual can perform

light activity, it is also determined that she can perform sedentary

work activity). The claimant has the residual functional capacity

to occasionally lift up to 20 pounds and to frequently lift or carry

objects weighing up to 10 pounds. She can also sit for at least 1⁄2

hour to 2 hours without interruption and for a total of about 6

hours in an 8-hour workday. She also has postural limitations in

the areas of being able to only occasionally perform activities like

balancing, stooping, and crouching; has manipulative limitations

in the areas of being unable to perform activities like constant

reaching and grasping; and has environmental limitations in the

areas of having to avoid being exposed to temperature extremes

and/or safety hazards such as unprotected heights and/or moving

machinery. She experiences no more than mild to moderate pain

that does not required (sic) medication and does not significantly

affect her ability to concentrate, and she has no mental

restrictions. 

 6. Vocation expert testimony has established that the claimant’s past

work as an office manager and government eligibility worker was

skilled work performed at the sedentary exertional level.

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7. Vocation expert testimony has also established that the

limitations and/or restrictions caused by the claimant’s

impairment do not precluded (sic) the performance of her

vocationally relevant past work. The claimant therefore has the

residual functional capacity to perform her vocationally relevant

past work and is capable of returning to that past work (20 CFR

§§ 404.1565). 

8 The claimant has not been under a “disability” as defined in the

Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the decision

(20 CFR §§ 404.1520(e). 

(T. 19-20).

Applicable Law:

This court's review is limited to whether the decision of the Commissioner to deny

disability benefits to the plaintiff is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 

Lorenzen v. Chater, 71 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir.1995). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance, but enough so that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a

conclusion. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir.1996). The undersigned must

consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's

decision, but the denial of benefits shall not be overturned even if there is enough evidence in

the record to support a contrary decision. Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th

Cir.1996) (citing Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir.1993). The decision should not

be reversed "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite

conclusion." Harris v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, the court's review is not simply "a rubber stamp for the [Commissioner's]

decision and involves more than a search for evidence supporting the [Commissioner's]

findings." Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir.1984). Indeed, "[t]o determine

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whether existing evidence is substantial, '[the court] must consider evidence that detracts from

the [Commissioner's] decision as well as evidence that supports it.' " Warburton v. Apfel, 188

F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir.1993)).

In addition, the court's review of the decision must include a determination as to whether the

proper legal standards were applied. See Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 835-36 (8th

Cir.1983). Thus, this court’s review is both limited and deferential to the agency. See

Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir.1996). 

The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is unable to engage in substantial

gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which is

expected to last for at least 12 months or result in death. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). See also,

Ingram v. Chater, 107 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir.1997); Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 836

(8th Cir.1983). Further, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that she is not able to perform

her past relevant work. Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir.1994). Thus, the

plaintiff has a responsibility to present the strongest case possible. See Thompson v. Sullivan,

928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir.1991).

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) states:

(1) The term “disability” means-

(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months····

Section 404.1505(a) states:

The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

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can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. To meet this definition, you

must have a severe impairment, which makes you unable to do your previous

work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national

economy. To determine whether you are able to do any other work, we consider

your residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience.

We will use this definition of disability if you are applying for a period of

disability, or disability insurance benefits as a disabled worker, or child's

insurance benefits based on disability before age 22····

Section 404.1509 states:

Unless your impairment is expected to result in death, it must have lasted or

must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. We call

this the duration requirement. 

The term "durational impairment" has been interpreted in several circuit courts of

appeals. See Alexander v. Richardson, 451 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir.1971); Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d

590, 594 (8th Cir.1993). In Alexander v. Richardson, the claimant argued that if his

impairment extended for a period of one year or more, he was entitled to benefits even if his

inability to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only for a lesser period. Alexander v.

Richardson, 451 F.2d at 1186. The Tenth Circuit held that the purpose of the statute and its

legislative history support the Commissioner's interpretation that it is the disability which must

be continuous for 12 months, rather than the impairment. Id. 

In Titus v. Sullivan, the court reasoned that: 

Disability is established by showing a medically determinable mental or physical

impairment which prevents engaging in any gainful activity. Inability to engage

in any gainful activity and the impairment which causes it cannot be separated.

The two components of disability must exist at the same time. The statute, which

defines disability, not impairment, speaks only of an impairment which can be

expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve

months and one which will disable a person seeking disability benefits for a like

period. 

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Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d at 594. 

The court further "observed that although a person who has lost one hand has an

impairment for life, he is not entitled to disability benefits if he is able to return to gainful

activity within one year of his injury." Id.

The undersigned agrees that in order for a plaintiff to meet the Act's durational

requirement, she must demonstrate that she was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity

due to her impairment for twelve consecutive months. 

Further, when making determinations regarding the credibility of a plaintiff's subjective

allegations of pain, Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1984), requires the

administrative factfinder to examine such matters as: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the

duration, frequency and intensity of the pain; (3) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of

medication; (4) precipitating and aggravating factors; and, (5) functional restrictions. Polaski,

739 F.2d at 1322. When rejecting a plaintiff's complaints of pain, however, the ALJ must make

an express credibility determination detailing his reasons for discrediting the testimony. Ricketts

v. Secretary of H.H.S., 902 F.2d 661, 664 (8th Cir.1990).

Discussion:

At the outset, the undersigned notes that the plaintiff’s onset date is April 20, 2001, yet

she has not sought any medical treatment for any of her alleged impairments since January 17,

2002, or 15 months prior to the administrative hearing. While plaintiff alleged for the first time

in her appeal brief that her disability is due, in part, to cirrhosis of the liver, the record contains

only one medical record that mentions this alleged impairment. On July 10, 2001, Dr. C.H.

Fohn observed:

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The patient is an ex-alcoholic. Had bad cirrhosis of the liver initially. Recently

her liver enzymes had been back to normal, as well as bilirubin has dropped

back to normal.

(T. 108). At hearing, the plaintiff testified she had been sober “since the Saturday before Easter

Sunday two years ago.” (T. 747). Thus, there is no evidence to support a new allegation of

severe cirrhosis. 

Plaintiff was hospitalized for alcohol dependency from April 29, 2001 through May 5,

2001 (T. 665-700). During her stay, it was discovered that plaintiff had fallen on some steps

the day before her admission, injuring her right wrist (T. 668, 697). On May 5, 2001, x-rays of

the right forearm revealed “a fracture of the distal radius, comminuted with an ulnar styloid

avulsion with good position and alignment.” (T. 665, 697). At hearing, the plaintiff testified

that her arm was set incorrectly, and that in order to correct it “they’re going to have to go back

and rebreak my bones and my bones were too brittle. They’re too thin to do that again.” (T.

749). However, there is no substantiation for this claim in the record. To the contrary, plaintiff

also testified that she has not had any orthopedic care for her right arm, since she left the

hospital. She further stated that Dr. Fohn had prescribed physical therapy for her legs, but not

for her arm (T. 750-751). Plaintiff testified that she could write, albeit slowly (T. 750). Indeed,

plaintiff completed her own agency disability reports (T. 65-68, 75-79, 89-97). At her last visit

to Dr. Fohn on August 23, 2001, plaintiff reported a little soreness in the right arm. There is no

evidence of further treatment for the right wrist fracture. The only additional complaints about

the wrist came in plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing in April, 2003. 

The main focus of plaintiff’s testimony concerning disability concerned her legs. On

May 5, 2001, while in the hospital for alcohol dependency, plaintiff accidentally caught her

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 As the defendant has pointed out, in his decision, the ALJ stated that the plaintiff 1

asserts she is blind in her right eye (T. 13), yet at hearing he correctly noted plaintiff contends

she is blind in her left eye, and not her right eye (T. 761). The undersigned agrees that this

mistake is harmless error and has no practical impact on the outcome of the case, nor does it

alter the finding of no disability. See McGinnis v. Chater, 74 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir.1996). 

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clothes on fire with a lighted cigarette. This incident caused burns to both legs and required

transfer from the chemical dependency unit to the hospital’s emergency room (T. 332, 665,

668). The burns have been categorized as both first and second degree, and second and third

degree, and the total burn area was estimated approximately 16-20% of her body (T. 98, 150,

193, 233-234, 238, 248, 334-336, 339, 398, 665-666). Plaintiff remained in the hospital until

June 26, 2001, during which time she underwent several debridement treatments, bilateral skin

grafts in several places and physical therapy treatments (T. 98, 151-155, 248, 476-480, 652-

659). Again, at her last visit to Dr. Fohn on August 23, 2001, plaintiff reported that the donor

sites and some of the other areas were a little sensitive to touch. Dr. Fohn noted that “Patty has

really done well as far as the burns go.” (T. 98). After discharge from the hospital, plaintiff

underwent physical therapy on three to four occasions from November 29, 2001 through

January 17, 2002 (T. 725-729). On January 17, 2002, the doctor reported her wounds to be

healed, although plaintiff complained of itching and parathesis type pain (T. 725). The doctor

also determined her range of motion was unlimited, and no further surgical correction was

needed (T. 725). 

Plaintiff also asserts disability due to left eye blindness, testifying that she became blind 1

in her left eye when stung by a wasp on July 23, 1998, some three years prior to her alleged

onset date, and during which time she engaged in substantial gainful activity (T. 748). 

However, the record contains no evidence of treatment for the eye, during the relevant time

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period. Plaintiff testified that she required reading/magnifying glasses for her right eye, to help

her read (T. 740-741, 753). Although she reportedly possessed a prescription for glasses,

plaintiff testified that her doctor stated there was no need for plaintiff to purchase them (T.

753). 

Accordingly, we note that the plaintiff has presented evidence of treatment for only an

eight (8) month period. She testified that she had last seen a doctor six (6) months prior to the

administrative hearing, but the administrative record, which is 765 pages, contains no record of

such visit. There simply is no evidence of treatment after her last physical therapy visit to

Arkansas Children’s Hospital Burn Clinic on January 17, 2002 (T. 725). This, despite the fact

that the ALJ, at the close of the hearing and without request, left the record open for thirty days

and advised counsel to let him know if additional time was needed, and assured counsel that

such a request would be granted (T. 765). No evidence was submitted after the administrative

hearing, either to the ALJ or to the Appeals Council. Thus, it is clear that plaintiff has not met

the durational requirement of the statute.

Additionally, we have considered the record in its entirety, and find that the ALJ has

done a thorough job of evaluating the plaintiff’s credibility. He discussed the objective medical

evidence extensively (T. 13-15). In addition, he found that the medical evidence indicates that

plaintiff made a good recovery from her wrist injury and burns, and has neither required nor

received additional medical treatment or physical therapy for any of her symptoms since

January 17, 2002. This is inconsistent with plaintiff’s claims of disability. Singh v. Apfel, 222

F.3d 448, 453 (8th Cir.2000). Plaintiff also testified at hearing that she had not taken

prescription pain medication for over a year (T. 746-747). See Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d

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563, 566 (8th Cir.2003). The ALJ also considered the plaintiff’s daily activities, and found that

they were more self-limited after January 17, 2002, rather than as a result of any actual

functional restrictions. The record contains no evidence of physician-imposed restrictions after

January 17, 2002. Plaintiff reported on August 20, 2001, just three to four months after the

burn accident and fractured wrist, the ability to: dress; care for her hair; do laundry, dishes, and

change sheets; prepare sandwiches and frozen dinners; pay bills, use a checkbook and count

change; drive short distances, walk for limited periods for exercise and use public

transportation; and, attend church, watch television and listen to the radio (T. 75-76). In a

document completed on May 24, 2001, just weeks after her accident, plaintiff reported an

ability to walk, read, write, garden, talk, listen to music and play cards. She also enjoyed

watching television, primarily game shows and “soaps.” (T. 652). The ALJ concluded such

activities are not consistent with plaintiff claims of disability.

The ALJ next evaluated the duration, frequency and intensity of plaintiff’s alleged pain

and other symptoms, finding a lack of objective evidence to support the continued claims, a

lack of medical treatment, medication and physician-placed restrictions for same (T. 16). 

Considering the dosage, effectiveness and side effects of plaintiff’s medications, the ALJ

concluded:

If the claimant was experiencing severe debilitating pain on a daily or even

weekly basis, it is reasonable to assume she would have more regularly and more

recently sought medical treatment and would take medication to relieve that pain

(Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878 (8th Cir.1987). Failure to take strong

medication is a factor that can be used to discredit subjective allegations of pain

(Wingert v. Bowen 894 F.2d 296 (8th Cir.1990).

(T. 16).

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Finally, the ALJ summarized:

The undersigned [ALJ] has considered the medical evidence, the testimony and

the above-numerated factors. The appearance and demeanor of the claimant

have also been considered. While it is recognized and accepted that the

claimant’s severe impairments could be expected to cause some slight

limitations, nothing in the record documents that the claimant is restricted to the

point that she is incapable of performing all basic work-related activities. 

Therefore, the ALJ finds the claimant credible only in so far as her allegations

are supported by the medical evidence of record and only to the extent that she

would be limited to the performance of less strenuous sedentary and/or light

work activity. The undersigned cannot find the claimant’s allegations that she is

incapable of all work activity to be fully credible.

(T. 16-17). The Court agrees. The ALJ has considered the plaintiff’s subjective allegations

and nonexertional limitations pursuant to the criteria set forth in Polaski, and found that they

lack credibility. Substantial evidence supports this determination, as well as the ALJ’s residual

functional capacity determination. 

Because the ALJ determined that the plaintiff was unable to return to her past relevant

work, the burden of persuasion shifted to the Commissioner to show that plaintiff was able to

engage in work in the national economy. Sanders v. Sullivan, 983 F.2d 822, 823 (8th

Cir.1992). In the present case, the ALJ utilized the testimony of a vocational expert (hereinafter

“VE”), to reach his decision that plaintiff was not disabled. When, as here, the ALJ finds the

plaintiff's nonexertional impairments significantly diminish his or her residual functional

capacity to perform the full range of activities listed in the Guidelines, the Commissioner must

produce expert vocational testimony or other similar evidence to establish that there are jobs

available in the national economy for a person with the plaintiff's characteristics. Thompson,

850 F.2d at 349; see also Harris v. Shalala 45 F.3d 1190, 1194 -1194 (8th Cir.1995).

Nonexertional limitations are limitations other than on strength but which nonetheless

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reduce an individual's ability to work. Examples are mental, sensory or skin impairments, as

well as impairments which result in postural and manipulative limitations or environmental

restrictions. See 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(e) (1986). Pain is a nonexertional

impairment. See Beckley v. Apfel 152 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.1998); Cline, 939 F.2d 560,

565 (8th Cir.1991).

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in that the “in-house Vocational Analyst stated

that the Plaintiff cannot return to past relevant work (TR 64)” (Doc. #5, p. 24) (emphasis in

original). Arguing further, the plaintiff alleges the ALJ “did not resolve the conflict between

the Opinion and that of the Vocational Analyst for the State” (Doc. #5, p. 24). However, the

ALJ acknowledged and considered the opinions of state agency medical consultants, in

accordance with Social Security Ruling 96-6p (T. 17). It should also be noted that the

vocational analyst is just that, and not a medical doctor. Finally, the ALJ did not “summarily

dismiss” the analysts’ findings, but rather, declined to entirely adopt them with regard to

residual functional capacity, noting that nevertheless, the conclusions were supportive of the

ALJ’s ultimate findings that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform work

activity, and that she is not disabled (T. 17). 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits to

the plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence of record and should be affirmed. The Court

also finds that the plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 

ENTERED this 23 day of August, 2005. rd

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/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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