Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00087/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN W. WILLIAMS,

CDCR #V-34099,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KATHLEEN ALLISON; P.S. LOGAN; 

PATRICK COVELLO; K. COTRELL; 

COLEY; PLASCENCIA; COWART,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00087-BAS-BGS

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

[ECF No. 2]

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff John Wesley Williams, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 together with a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF Nos. 1, 2.) 

Plaintiff claims a Director of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), as well as RJD’s Warden, Associate Warden, and several 

correctional officials, violated his constitutional rights between May 2018 and January 

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2019 by “stealing” and/or “misappropriating” his personal and legal property and 

retaliating against him when he refused to withdraw inmate appeals he filed regarding that

property. (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1, at 5–9.) He seeks declaratory relief and unspecified 

amounts of compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 9–10.)

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty.

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face 

an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 

filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 

F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended 

section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule”). The objective 

of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation 

in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 

1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both before and after 

the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.

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“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 

styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 

prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008); 

see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that when 

court “review[s] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 

dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 

the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim’”

(quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013))). Once a prisoner has 

accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP 

civil action or appeal in federal court unless he alleges he is facing “imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051–52.

B. Discussion

As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, and finds

it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of 

serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, as noted above, Plaintiff seeks to sue a CDCR administrator 

and various RJD officials for allegedly failing to properly return several CDs he purchased 

but was not authorized to possess, “misappropriat[ing] a box of [his] legal property,” and 

later subjecting him to harassment and retaliation when he refused to withdraw inmate 

appeals regarding the lost property. (See Compl. 5–9.) These claims fail to plausibly meet 

§ 1915(g)’s exception for imminent danger. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055-56 (plaintiff 

must allege to face a real, proximate and/or ongoing danger at the time of filing); Prophet 

v. Clark, No. CV 1-08-00982-FJM, 2009 WL 1765197, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2009) 

(finding prisoner’s access to the courts, interference with legal mail, and retaliation claims 

insufficient to satisfy § 1915(g) exception for cases of “imminent danger of serious 

physical injury”). While Plaintiff also alleges he is a participant in RJD’s EOP (enhanced 

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outpatient program) due to a history of “cutting” to relieve stress, (see Compl., 4), he does 

not contend he faced imminent physical injury, was actually threatened, or feared any sort 

of danger at the time he filed his Complaint as a result of the Defendants’ alleged acts or 

omissions. See Bontemps v. Hicks, No. 1:16-CV-01854-DAD-EPG, 2018 WL 1905648, 

at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2018) (“[T]he complaint of a three-strikes litigant must reveal a 

nexus between the imminent danger it alleges and the claims it asserts, in order for the 

litigant to qualify for the ‘imminent danger’ exception of § 1915(g).” (quoting Stine v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:13-CV-1883 AWI MJS, 2015 WL 5255377, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 

9, 2015)).

And while Defendants typically carry the burden to show that a prisoner is not 

entitled to proceed IFP, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to 

show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore 

counts as a strike.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119–20. That is the case here. The Court finds, 

based on a review of its own dockets and other court proceedings available on PACER,

that Plaintiff John W. Williams, identified as CDCR #V-34099, has had more than three

prior prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, 

malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.1

They are: 

1) Williams v. Narramore, et al., Civil Case No. 2:03-cv-01972-UA-AJW 

(C.D. Cal., West. Div., July 25, 2003): Order denying IFP and dismissing case

for “failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted” pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e) [ECF No. 6] (strike one);

2) Williams v. Gonzer, Civil Case No. 2:04-cv-08941-UA-AJW (C.D. 

 

1 A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv-00452–MMA-WMc, 

2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Sers., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 

(9th Cir. 1986)), and “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2002)). 

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Cal., West. Div., Nov. 22, 2004): Order denying IFP and dismissing case for

“failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1) [ECF No. 2] (strike two); 

3) Williams v. Young, Civil Case No. 2:08-cv-01737-WBS-CMK (E.D. 

Cal., June 4, 2010): Findings and Recommendations [“F&R”] to dismiss 

Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2) [ECF No. 55]; (E.D. Cal. 

June 29, 2010: Order adopting F&R and dismissing case [ECF No. 57] 

(strike three);

4) Williams v. Hubbard, et al, Civil Case No. 2:10-cv-01717-UA-FFM 

(C.D. Cal., West. Div., July 6, 2010): Order denying IFP and dismissing case 

as “frivolous, malicious, or [for] fail[ing] to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted” [ECF No. 3] (strike four);

5) Williams v. Hubbard, et al., Ninth Circuit Appeal No. 10-56230 (Nov. 

4, 2010): Order denying appellant’s motion to proceed IFP “because we find 

that the appeal is frivolous” [DktEntry 6]); Dec. 8, 2010 Order dismissing 

appeal for failure to prosecute [DktEntry 7])2(strike five); 

6) Williams v. Harrington, et al., No. 1:09-cv-01823-GSA (E.D. Cal. May 

25, 2012): Order dismissing civil action with prejudice for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) [ECF No. 29] (strike six); and

7) Williams v. Soto, et al., Ninth Circuit Appeal No. 14-15524 (May 14, 

2014): Order denying appellant’s motion to proceed IFP “because we find that 

the appeal is frivolous” [DktEntry 7]); June 6, 2014 Order dismissing appeal 

for failure to prosecute [Dkt Entry 9]) (strike seven).3

 

2

See Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that appellate court’s denial of 

prisoner’s request for IFP status on appeal on grounds of frivolousness constituted a “strike” under 

§ 1915(g) “even though [it] did not dismiss the appeal until later when the [appellant] did not pay the 

filing fee”).

3 The Court notes Plaintiff has previously been denied leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g) in this Court, and had his IFP status revoked in the Northern and Central Districts of 

California as well. See Williams v. Neotti, et al., No. 3:10-cv-02672-H-BGS (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) 

(ECF No. 3); Williams v. Soto, et al., No. 4:12-cv-03583-YGR (PR) (N.D. Cal. March 7, 2014) (ECF No. 

36); Williams v. Moore, et al., No. 2:13-cv-09522-PSG-FFM (C.D. Cal., West. Div., March 10, 2015) 

(R&R to deny IFP as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [ECF No. 58]); (C.D. Cal. West. Div. May 4, 2015) 

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Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three

“strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not 

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this civil action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055; see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt 

permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

II. Conclusion and Orders

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, (ECF No. 2), as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

2) DISMISSES this civil action WITHOUT PREJUDICE based on Plaintiff’s 

failure to pay the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a). Plaintiff may re-open his case by paying the full $400 fee on or before 

April 7, 2019;

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in good 

faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 7, 2019

 

(Order adopting R&R [ECF No. 60]); and Williams v. Soto, No. 2:15-cv-01294-PSG-FFM (C.D. Cal., 

West. Div., Feb. 27, 2015 Order denying IFP as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) [ECF No. 5].

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