Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00852/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00852-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The proceedings were assigned to this Court, but have been referred to Magistrate Judge

Ruben B. Brooks by Local Rule 72.3(e), “Assignment of § 1983 Prisoner Civil Cases to United States

Magistrate Judges,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY L. ARMSTRONG,

CDC #K-43710, Civil No. 06-0852 L (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$250 BALANCE FROM PRISONER’S

TRUST ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 3]; AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)

vs.

L.E. SCRIBNER, Warden

Defendant.

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison in Calipatria,

California and proceeding pro se, has filed a “Request for an Order of Prohibitory Injunciton”

which the Court has liberally construed as a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.1

 Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but has

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instead submitted a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) [Doc. No. 3].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 3]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only

if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however,

remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is

ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must

collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or

appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and

no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case

based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is

ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 3] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, the PLRA also requires

courts to review complaints filed by prisoners, and all persons proceeding IFP, and dismiss any

action or complaint which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 496 (9th Cir. 1996); Williams v.

Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1997) (“plain language of the PLRA holds that . . . fees

be assessed at the moment [of filing], regardless of whether appeal [or complaint] is later

dismissed”); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The dismissal of

a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A does not negate a prisoner’s obligation to pay the

filing fee in accordance with § 1915(b)(1)-(2).”).

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method

for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

(1989) (internal citations omitted); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). As

such, § 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting

under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

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A. Access to Courts Claim

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that the prison’s policy of permitting law library access

only when a prisoner is facing a legal deadline violates his access to the courts. However, the

Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations fall short of the pleading standards necessary to

state an access to courts claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Prisoners do “have a constitutional

right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right

of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord

Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme

Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison

authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing

prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons who are trained in the

law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish a violation of the right to access

to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous

legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has been frustrated or

impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-

55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or

existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at

348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d

1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, however, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to show that he has been

precluded from pursuing a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal

conviction or sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355

(right to access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his]

sentence[], directly or collaterally, and . . . to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”);

see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the

“underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in

the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the

litigation.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he has been

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actually injured by any specific Defendant’s actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that

he was “so stymied” by Defendants’ actions or grievance processing that “he was unable to even

file a complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351;

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] . . . the predicate

claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the

‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, these claims must be

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

III. Conclusion and Order

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 3]

is GRANTED.

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing

fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount equal

to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James Tilton,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883,

Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1).

However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped

“Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the

superseded pleading. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79

(9th Cir. 1996).

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 30, 2006

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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