Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00799/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00799-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY WAYNE KNOX; DORIS RAY 

KNOX; JEREMY EDWARD MOORE, 

individually and as successor-in-interest to

VERONICA LYNN CARTER, deceased,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, a municipal 

corporation; EDWARD CHRISTOPHER 

LOUCHREN, individually and in his 

capacity as a police officer for the CITY 

OF FRESNO; DOUGLAS EDWARD 

COX, individually and in his capacity as a 

police officer for the CITY OF FRESNO,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00799-GSA

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 30)

On April 17, 2015, Defendants City of Fresno, Edward Louchren, and Douglas Cox

(“Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”). (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiffs Jerry Knox, 

Doris Knox, and Jeremy Moore (“Plaintiffs”) filed a timely opposition to the Motion. The Court 

has reviewed the papers and determined that this matter is suitable for decision without oral 

argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). After a review of the pleadings and the for the reasons 

set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

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I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of Veronica Lynn Canter, the daughter and stepdaughter 

of Doris Knox and Jerry Knox, respectively, and the mother of Jeremy Moore. Plaintiffs allege 

that two Fresno police officers shot and killed Canter when responding to a 911 call on March 7, 

2014. Pursuant to California Government Code §§ 910 et seq., Plaintiffs filed a claim for 

damages arising out of the shooting with the City of Fresno on March 27, 2014. The claim was 

filed by Jerry and Doris Knox “on her own behalf and on behalf of Ms. Canter’s estate.” The 

claim was rejected on May 2, 2014. Twenty days later, on May 27, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a 

Complaint against the Defendants. The Complaint included a single cause of action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged a violation of Ms. Canter’s Fourth Amendment right “to be free from 

the use of excessive force” and the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest of Plaintiffs Jerry and 

Doris Knox “in the familial companionship and society of their daughter.” The Complaint did not 

include Jeremy Moore as a plaintiff.

On January 30, 2015, Plaintiffs Doris and Jerry Knox moved to amend the Complaint to, 

among other things, add Jeremy Moore as a plaintiff (both in his individual capacity and as a 

successor-in-interest to Veronica Canter) and to add three additional state claims for wrongful 

death, negligence, and battery. The motion to amend the complaint was granted over Defendants’ 

opposition and Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”). (ECF No. 24.) The FAC 

alleges five causes of action:

1) First Cause of Action (Violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);

2) Second Cause of Action (Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);

3) Third Cause of Action (Wrongful Death);

4) Fourth Cause of Action (Negligence); and,

5) Fifth Cause of Action (Battery).

All five causes of action are alleged by Doris Knox (as an individual), Jerry Knox (as an 

individual), and Jeremy Moore (as an individual and as successor-in-interest to Veronica Canter). 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is targeted at the Third, Fourth, and Fifth causes of action 

with respect to all Plaintiffs. Defendants argue that the state causes of action are time-barred 

because under the California Tort Claims Act (the “Act”), Plaintiffs were required to file a 

complaint concerning their state claims no more than six months after their initial government 

claim was rejected by the City of Fresno. Defendants further argue that state and federal relation 

back principles should not operate to link the new state claims to the filing date of the original 

complaint. Defendants do not move to dismiss the First or Second Causes of Action as alleged by 

any of the Plaintiffs.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR A RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks for more than a sheer possibility 

that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must 

“accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 

895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2007). Legally conclusory statements, when unsupported by actual factual 

allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678-79. A motion to dismiss based on the 

running of a statute of limitations cannot be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Supermail 

Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1995). 

III. DISCUSSION

As explained in the Court’s previous order granting Plaintiffs leave to amend the 

Complaint, the Act provides that plaintiffs must file a claim for damages before suing a public 

entity:

Under the Act, a potential plaintiff must submit a claim describing the 

“indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be 

known at the time of presentation of the claim” to the public entity that is the 

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target of the claim. Cal. Gov’t Code § 910. Once the public entity provides 

written notice that the claim has been acted on (e.g., rejected, approved, etc.), the 

potential plaintiff has six months to file suit based on any claims subject to the 

Act.1 Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6. The intent of the statute is to give the public entity 

notice of the claim so that it can be given “a timely opportunity to investigate the 

claim and determine the facts; and to avoid unnecessary lawsuits by giving the 

[entity] the opportunity to settle meritorious claims without going through an 

avoidable trial.” Lacy v. City of Monrovia, 44 Cal.App.3d 152, 155 (1974).

(ECF No. 23.)

While Plaintiffs acknowledge that the state law claims were not filed within the required

window after the City of Fresno claim was denied, they argue that the state law claims should 

“relate back” to the date the Complaint was originally filed. Because the Complaint was filed 

within the six month window, Plaintiffs argue that the state law claims should be allowed to 

proceed. The Court previously summarized the relation back doctrine:

“Relation back” refers to a doctrine that allows an amendment of a pleading to 

“relate back” to the date of the original pleading, thus evading any statute of 

limitations that might affect the amendment. Baldwin Cty. Welcome Center v. 

Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 n. 3 (1984). An amendment to a complaint “relates 

back” to the date the complaint was originally filed if the “law that provides the 

applicable statute of limitations allows relation back” or “the amendment asserts a 

claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—

or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.”2Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). 

California courts have construed the Act to allow relation back when amending a 

complaint against a public entity if the newly asserted claims address the “same 

conduct” as the original claims.3See, e.g., Carlino v. L.A. Cty. Flood Control 

Dist., 10 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1536 (1992) (allowing amendment substituting a 

party where plaintiff had “substantially complied with the claims presentation 

requirements” against public entity); Bendix Corp. v. City of L.A., 150 Cal.App.3d 

921, 926 (1984) (allowing additional claims against a public entity where the new 

claims “addressed the same conduct” as the original pleading). A new claim arises 

out of the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading” 

if it “will likely be proved by the ‘same kind of evidence’ offered in support of the 

original pleading.” ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pacific R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 

(9th Cir. 2014).

(ECF No. 23.) 4

In the current Motion, Defendants argue that: (1) the Court should apply state law rather 

 

1 The statute of limitations does not apply to federal claims. Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (“state 

notice of claim statutes have no applicability to § 1983 actions”).

2 Regardless whether state or federal law is applied, the “more forgiving principle of relation back . . . should be 

available to save the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1) 1991 amendment advisory committee’s note.

3 Defendants argue that the statute of limitations that the Act makes “applicable to state causes of action is mandatory 

and cannot be circumvented by Rule 15(b) [sic].” Opposition Brief 4:9-10. Neither of the cases cited establish such a 

rule, however, nor do they hold that the Act precludes the application of the “relation back” doctrine to a state claim 

against a public entity. 

4 Defendants disagree with the Court’s previous characterization of Carlino and Bendix.

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than federal law to construe the statute of limitations for the state claims; and (2) the statute of 

limitations provided by the Act is mandatory and overwhelms equitable tolling principles (state 

and federal). Defendants also argue that Plaintiff Jeremy Moore was never a party to the City of 

Fresno claim and that his state causes of action should thus be barred.

Plaintiffs respond that: (1) a number of district courts have applied federal relation back 

principles in cases involving the Act; and (2) Plaintiff Jeremy Moore’s state causes of action were 

actually timely because Plaintiffs “substantially complied” with the terms of the Act by filing the 

City of Fresno claim on behalf of Canter’s estate. 

A. Jerry and Doris Knox’s State Claims

1. The Act does not preclude the application of the relation back doctrine.

There is no question that Jerry and Doris Knox filed a claim with the City of Fresno and 

proceeded to file the Complaint within the prescribed time period. Defendants contend however, 

that the state causes of action in the FAC should not “relate back” to the filing of the Complaint 

because California state law has conclusively determined that the statute of limitations established 

by the Act is mandatory in all instances. Defendants rely principally on Uribe v. McKesson, No. 

08CV01285 DMS (NLS), 2011 WL 9640 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011), which found that “[f]ederal 

equitable estoppel principles may not be applied to a pendant state claim foreclosed by a state’s 

mandatory limitations period.”5The Uribe court, relying in part on Chase v. California, 67 

Cal.App.3d 808, 812 (1977), also found that the statute of limitations imposed by the Act 

precluded the application of several state equitable tolling doctrines.6

Later California decisions interpreting Chase, however, have softened this restriction. 

Addison v. State of Cal., 21 Cal.3d 313, 316 (1978) (finding that the Chase court’s interpretation 

 

5

It is not clear whether the court in Uribe intended to state that equitable tolling principles may not be applied, rather 

than equitable estoppel principles. Equitable estoppel, in the statute of limitations context, can mean that the 

opposing party acted in a fraudulent way to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit in time. Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 

F.3d 745, 751 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling, on the other hand, stands more broadly for the concept that a “statute 

of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite diligent efforts, did not discovery the injury until after the 

limitations period had expired.” Black’s Law Dictionary 579 (8th ed. 2004). A literal reading of the language in 

Uribe would thus limit its application (and likely preclude its relevance in the current case). In more practical sense, 

equitable estoppel may require a focus on the actions taken by opposing party, rather than on the plaintiff’s actions.

6

For example, the general state equitable tolling provision for minors in medical malpractice actions would be 

superseded by the Act under the court’s reading of California law. See Martell v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 67 

Cal.App.4th 978, 983 (1998).

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of the Act “does not preclude application of the equitable tolling doctrine, the purpose of which is 

to soften the harsh impact of technical rules which might otherwise prevent a good faith litigant 

from having a day in court”). Similarly, at least one California court examining similar statute of 

limitation requirements has allowed relation back, arguing that “[t]he policy behind statutes of 

limitations is to put defendants on notice of the need to defend against a claim in time to prepare a 

fair defense on the merits.7This policy is satisfied when recovery under an amended complaint is

sought on the same basic set of facts as the original pleading.” Garrison v. Bd. of Directors, 36 

Cal.App.4th 1670, 1678 (1995). 

District courts construing California law have also concluded that relation back principles 

can apply, even in cases involving the Act. In Saunders v. Garay, Case No. 11-cv-06322-WHO, 

2014 WL 4386727 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014), for instance, a plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted 

by a San Francisco Sheriffs’ Deputy and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff had timely 

filed a claim with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. Over two 

years later, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint that also alleged state law claims for battery, 

negligence, and a violation of the California Bane Civil Rights Act. Defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss. In denying the motion, the Court found that the “state law causes of action in the 

amended complaint are based on the same general set of facts, same defendants, and the same 

accident and injuries as the original complaint.” Id. at *3, citing Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc., 

216 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1094 (1989). Thus, the court reasoned, the purposes of the Act were met. 

Id. at *2, quoting Crow v. State of Cal., 222 Cal.App.3d 192, 202 (1990) (“The purpose of the 

‘notice-of-claim’ requirement is ‘to give the public entity the opportunity to evaluate the merit 

and extent of its liability and determine whether to grant the claim without the expenses of 

litigation’). Many other courts have held similarly. See, e.g., Montes v. Rafalowski, No. C-09-

00976 RMW, 2012 WL 1595683, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (“Thus, in light of ‘the policy of 

the law of this state which favors avoiding forfeitures and allowing good faith litigants their day 

 

7 Defendants contend that DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 55 Cal.4th 983 (2012), which held that the Act 

is intended to “confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances,” demands a finding that 

no equitable tolling principles should be applied to the Act. But DiCampli dealt with facts involving the proper 

recipient of a claim under the Act, not the broader application of equitable tolling under the Act.

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in court,’ this court concludes that relation back is not categorically barred from applying in Tort 

Claims Act cases”); Wride v. Fresno Cnty., No. 1:05-cv-00486-AWI-SKO PC, 2011 WL 

4954159, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2011); Jaffe v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. C 03-00137 WHA, 

2008 WL 2050813, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (“Defendants first incorrectly argue that 

‘presentation of a claim under the California Tort Claims Act is a mandatory prerequisite to 

maintaining a cause of action against a public entity’ and Jaffe’s failure to file a notice of claim 

acts as an automatic bar to any amendments-disregarding the applicability of equitable tolling. 

This is not an accurate reflection of California law”); Roe v. Cnty. of Lake, 107 F.Supp.2d 1146 

(N.D. Cal. 2000). 

Defendants urge the Court to adopt the holding of Walker v. California Department of 

Corrections, No. 2:09-cv-0569 WBS KJN P, 2014 WL 268525 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014), which 

Defendants argue held that “federal courts do not have the authority to circumvent the mandatory 

statute of limitations under California’s Tort Claims Act.” But it is not entirely clear that that was 

the Walker court’s holding. Although Walker dismissed a plaintiff’s state law claims, it is unclear 

whether it did so because the initial state claims were filed in an untimely manner or because the 

lawsuit was initiated in an untimely manner after the initial state claims were rejected (or both). In 

Walker, the plaintiff accrued a state cause of action on October 28, 2005. Id. at *32. He did not 

file a claim with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board until July 3, 

2006, more than two months after the applicable deadline. Id. His claim was denied on February 

22, 2007. The Walker opinion appears to indicate that the claim was denied because it was 

untimely, rather than based on its merits. Id. at *32 (after the rejection of his claim, “[p]laintiff 

was expressly informed that his only recourse was to petition a court for relief from the claim 

presentation requirement”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff proceeded to file suit based on the 

rejected claim in an untimely fashion. 

In dismissing plaintiff’s claims, the Walker court found that “[w]hile the six-month period 

for filing a court action on a state tort claim, after the Board has acted on the claim, may be tolled

during a prisoner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies, such tolling does not apply to the 

initial filing of the claim.” Id. at *35 (emphasis added). The Walker court’s holding thus appears 

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to be that: (1) the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an adequate reason to equitably 

toll the initial filing of a claim under the Act; and (2) the exhaustion of administrative remedies 

may be an adequate reason to equitably toll the filing of a lawsuit after an administrative agency 

(such as the Victim Compensation Board) has acted on a claim under the Act. Neither of these 

holdings compels the result that Defendants suggest, i.e., the complete preclusion of any equitable 

tolling mechanism after a claim has been rejected under the Act.8The Court thus finds Saunders

and its companion cases more persuasive in this instance than Uribe and Walker and finds that the 

Act does not preclude the application of the relation back doctrine.

2. Applying the relation back doctrine.

The Court previously found that the new state claims in the FAC related back to filing of 

the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15:

As in Roe, the conduct described in the original Complaint and the proposed 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) are the same: they both describe a sequence 

of events on March 7, 2014 in which two Fresno police officers respond to a 911 

call identifying Canter as a trespasser. The two officers respond to the call, break 

down the door of an apartment, and shoot Canter. Compare Complaint at ¶ 12 (“. 

. . one of the officers pointed his gun at Ms. Canter, and without cause or 

justification, shot and fired several bullets into Ms. Canter’s body”) with FAC at 

¶ 13 (“. . . Defendant Officer Louchren pointed his gun at Ms. Canter, and 

without cause or justification, shot and fired several bullets into Ms. Canter’s 

body”). Canter dies shortly thereafter. 

Both the Complaint and the FAC also allege that the City of Fresno acted with 

“deliberate indifference” in training and supervising its officers, resulting in the 

alleged injuries. Compare Complaint at ¶ 15 (“The actions of the officer who 

killed Ms. Canter were taken pursuant to the policies and practices of the Fresno 

Police Department, including, but not limited to, deliberate indifference to the 

use of excessive and often deadly force in encounters with civilians. . . “) with 

FAC at ¶ 16 (“The actions of the officers who killed Ms. Canter were taken 

pursuant to the policies and practices of the Fresno Police Department, including, 

but not limited to, deliberate indifference to the use of excessive and often deadly 

force in encounters with civilians. . . “). The Complaint even contains express 

references to state claims.9See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 21 (“. . . defendants were 

acting . . . within the scope of their employment with the City of Fresno”); 22 (“. 

 

8 Walker also occurred in the context of acts by the Victims Compensation Board which allegedly confused plaintiff 

as to his filing deadline(s). For this reason, the Walker court considered his arguments in the equitable estoppel 

context, rather than the more general equitable tolling context.

9 Among others, the Complaint alleges facts that could constitute a vicarious liability theory for recovery. This theory 

is made explicit in the FAC, but the inclusion of such facts suggests that the addition of the state claims in the 

amendment is merely a re-labeling of existing legal theories from the Complaint. Roe, 107 F.Supp.2d at 1154 

(amendment relates back where “the original complaint alleges violations of plaintiff’s federal and state civil and 

constitutional rights, and lists state tort theories of liability, including a claim for respondeat superior against the 

County which is only available under state law”).

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. . defendants . . . intentionally violated state and federal law”). Virtually none of 

the substantive factual allegations between the Complaint and the FAC are 

different.

(ECF No. 23.)

Defendants contend that the Court should apply California law to the statute of limitations 

question, rather than Rule 15. Under California law, a new complaint relates back to the filing of 

an original complaint “provided recovery is sought in both pleadings on the same general set of 

facts . . . it is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts 

that is determinative.” Lamont v. Wolfe, 142 Cal.App.3d 375, 378 (1983) (“The court cited with 

approval the federal rules formula: ‘Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 

pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading, 

the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading’”), quoting Austin v. Mass. 

Bonding & Ins. Co., 56 Cal.2d 596, 601-602 fn. 2 (1961). Later decisions have expanded the 

inquiry to include the nature of the alleged injury and instrumentality causing the injury. Norgart 

v. Upjohn, 21 Cal.4th 383, 409 (1999). 

This rule applies even where new causes of action or theories of recovery are used in the 

amended pleading. Id. at 381 (“While it is true the defending the wrongful death claim may 

require the defendants to gather additional evidence, this burden exists in every relation back 

case. The test is whether two complaints relate to the same general set of facts. If they do, the 

relation back doctrine applies”), citing Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 18 Cal.3d 932, 940 

(1977) (emphasis in original). A plaintiff is thus free to reformulate his or her theory (or theories) 

of recovery in an amended pleading. Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410, 419 (1974) (“The relationback rule does not function only when the amended complaint contains no new theories of 

liability which might necessitate the adduction of evidence irrelevant to the issues raised by the 

original complaint. In the context of amending complaints, therefore, it has been felt that a 

defendant is not prejudiced when a plaintiff changes the theory of his action after the running of 

the limitations period in a manner requiring the defendant to gather additional evidence”).

Grudt v. Los Angeles, 2 Cal.3d 575 (1970) illustrates the application of the relation back 

doctrine under California law. In Grudt, a man was shot and killed by two police officers. His 

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wife, the plaintiff, filed a lawsuit against the officers and the city of Los Angeles, alleging a cause 

of action for wrongful death. She later amended her complaint to add a claim for negligence, 

which the trial court struck on the grounds that the amendment had occurred after the statute of 

limitations had run. The California Supreme Court, criticizing the trial court’s decision as 

assuming “an unduly rigid approach,” overturned the decision, saying that even if “plaintiff’s 

second cause of action added a significant new dimension to the lawsuit,” California’s relation 

back rule “requires only that the original and amended pleadings seek recovery ‘on the same 

general set of facts.’” Id. at 583-584, quoting Austin, 2 Cal.3d at 600. 

The Court has little difficulty concluding that the new state causes of action in the FAC 

meet the California test for relating back to the filing date of the original Complaint. As explained 

above, the FAC contains, almost verbatim, the same set of facts as alleged in the Complaint. That 

Plaintiffs have reformulated their theories of recovery based on those facts does not change that, 

nor does it mean that Canter’s parents should be precluded from a decision on their claims on the 

merits. Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1982) (“It is also the prevailing 

view that an amendment which changes the legal theory on which an action initially was brought 

is of no consequence to the question of relation back if the factual situation out of which the 

action arises remains the same and has been brought to the defendant's attention by the original 

pleading”). Nor does the addition of these causes of action alter the nature of their injuries (i.e., 

the loss of Veronica Canter) or the instrumentality causing those injuries (i.e., Defendants’ 

actions) Plaintiffs Doris and Jerry Knox are alleging the same facts, the same injuries, and the 

same causal chain that links those facts to their injuries. Their claims thus survive the Motion to 

Dismiss.

B. Jeremy Moore’s State Claims 

Although the Court has concluded that the Act does not bar the application of the relation 

back doctrine to the claims asserted by Doris and Jerry Knox, Defendants make two additional 

arguments to the application of the relation back doctrine to Plaintiff Jeremy Moore’s state 

claims. In particular, Defendants argue that Moore never actually filed a claim with the City of 

Fresno under the Act and cannot be substituted in as the successor-in-interest for Canter’s estate. 

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In other words, Defendants suggest that Moore’s claims cannot be saved by the relation back 

doctrine for two reasons. First, because Moore never filed a claim under the Act and was not a 

party to the initial Complaint, there is nothing for his new state claims to “relate back” to. 

Second, even if the City of Fresno claim was filed on behalf of Canter’s estate (and the 

Complaint included a survivor claim on behalf of her estate), Moore cannot be substituted in as a 

plaintiff to pursue those claims.10

1. Jeremy Moore’s claims as a successor in interest to Veronica Canter.

As a threshold matter, there is a distinction between the claims Jeremy Moore asserts as a 

successor in interest to Veronica Canter and the claims Jeremy Moore asserts as an individual on 

his own behalf. In California, “a cause of action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the 

person’s death.” Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 377.20(a). Such a cause of action “passes to the 

decedent’s successor in interest, subject to . . . the Probate Code, and an action may be 

commenced by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in 

interest.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.30. A “successor in interest” is “the beneficiary of the 

decedent’s estate.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.11. Under California Probate Code § 6402, if an 

individual dies intestate without a surviving spouse or domestic partner, the decedent’s estate 

passes to “the issue of the decedent,” or, “[i]f there is no surviving issue, to the decedent’s parent 

or parents equally.” As the issue of Veronica Canter, any surviving causes of action are thus 

properly be brought by Moore, assuming Canter’s intestacy. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.3d 

159, 174 (1985) (“decedent’s claim is in the nature of a tort . . . such a claim survives his death 

and may be brought by the administrator of his estate”). Indeed, once it was determined that 

Canter had surviving issue, only Moore would have standing to pursue the estate claims. Canter’s 

parents, who previously pursued the claims in the City of Fresno claim and in the original 

Complaint, would only be proper successors in interest absent Moore’s existence.

At the same time, these successor in interest claims are more properly characterized as 

claims that accrued to Veronica Canter and survived her death, rather than claims for injuries that 

 

10 The original Complaint alleged a survivor claim by Canter for the violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. 

(Complaint ¶ 25, ECF No. 1 (“the shooting of Ms. Canter by Fresno police officers violated her Fourth Amendment 

right to be free from the use of excessive force”).)

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Moore himself has suffered. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1264-65 (2006) 

(“Unlike a cause for wrongful death, a survivor cause of action is not a new cause of action that 

vests in the heirs on the death of the decedent. It is instead a separate and distinct cause of action 

which belonged to the decedent before death but, by statute, survives that event”). Although they 

are claims pursued by Moore as a plaintiff in this case, then, they are actually the estate’s 

claims—Moore is merely the successor in interest pursuing them on behalf of the estate. Thus, the 

addition of Moore as a successor in interest to Canter is more aptly characterized as the 

substitution of a successor in interest rather than the addition of a new party. San Diego Gas & 

Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 146 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1553 (2007) (in evaluating the addition of a 

new plaintiff as the successor in interest for a survivor claim, “[t]he question is not whether 

relation-back doctrine applies, but whether Nicole is the proper plaintiff on this claim”).

No rule prevents the substitution of Jeremy Moore to represent the estate of Veronica 

Canter as her successor-in-interest. Indeed, California cases have routinely allowed the 

substitution of one plaintiff for a more proper plaintiff as a real party in interest. Branick v. 

Downey Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 39 Cal.4th 235, 243 (2006), citing Klopstock v. Superior Court, 17 

Cal.2d 13, 19-21 (1941) (administrator of deceased shareholder’s estate substituted as plaintiff in 

corporate derivative action); Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc., 72 Cal.App.4th 497, 506-509 

(1999) (trustee in bankruptcy substituted for bankrupt debtors); Cal. Air Resources Bd. v. Hart, 

21 Cal.App.4th 289, 300-301 (1993) (Attorney General substituted for state administrative 

agency); Jensen v. Royal Pools, 48 Cal.App.3d 717, 720-723 (1975) (condominium owners 

substituted for owners’ association); Powers v. Ashton, 45 Cal.App.3d 783, 790 (1975) (trustees 

substituted for nontrustee administrator). 

There are limitations to such substitutions, however: a “plaintiff proposed to be 

substituted may not ‘state facts which give rise to a wholly distinct and different legal obligation 

against the defendant.’” Branick, 39 Cal.4th at 243. To explain this standard, Branick suggests a 

parallel with the relation back standard, saying that the new claim must: “(1) rest on the same 

general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality, as the 

original one.” Id. at 244, quoting Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 408 (1999) (emphasis in 

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original). The Court has little difficulty determining that the substitution of Moore as a successorin-interest for the survivor claims involves the same general facts as in the initial Complaint—

with few exceptions, none of the facts alleged have changed. 

The new state claims also allege the same injuries and instrumentality for those injuries.

The estate was previously represented by Jerry and Doris Knox, both in the City of Fresno claim 

and in the initial Complaint. In the FAC, Moore has been substituted in to pursue the estate’s 

claims—Canter’s claims that survived her death. The claims arise out of the same essential facts 

as they did when Canter’s parents represented her estate. They involve the same injury (e.g., the 

excessive force that Canter was subjected to) and occurred via the same instrumentality (e.g., the 

acts of Officers Louchren and Cox). Nor has the substitution of Moore created a wholly distinct 

legal obligation against Defendants. Instead, Moore merely represents a new representative for 

Canter’s estate. Estate of Manzo v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 06cv60 BTM (WMC), 2009 WL 

559832, at *5 (S.D. Cal. March 3, 2009) (“Claims filed with the County of San Diego on behalf 

of the Estate by Maria Manzo, rather than Anahi Manzo, still disclosed sufficient information to 

enable the County to adequately investigate the merits of the Estate’s claims”). Because the Court 

has previously found that: (1) the initial claim to the City of Fresno was asserted, in part, on 

behalf of Canter’s estate; and (2) the relation back doctrine can be applied to claims governed by 

the Act, there is no reason that Moore cannot step into the case as the successor in interest to 

Canter’s claims. 

2. Jeremy Moore’s individual claims.

Moore’s individual claims, however, are another question. In the FAC, Moore is asserting 

claims both on behalf of Canter’s estate and in his own capacity as an individual. As explained 

above, Moore’s survivor claims as Canter’s successor in interest are merely claims that Canter 

would have had, were it not for her untimely death. Moore’s individual claims, on the other hand, 

are claims that are asserted on his own behalf and are for injuries that Moore, rather than Canter, 

suffered because of Defendants. 

Under California law, these two sets of claims, even if brought by the same plaintiff, are 

distinct and different. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1278 (2006) (“This 

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survivor claim, which plaintiff pursued as the decedent's successor in interest, pleaded injury to 

the decedent, Gilbert Quiroz. In contrast, the earlier-filed wrongful death claim pleaded only 

injury to plaintiff, acting for herself, as the decedent's heir. As a matter of law, these distinct 

claims are technically asserted by different plaintiffs and they seek compensation for different 

injuries”), citing Bartalo v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 (1975). California courts 

have used this distinction to both save and to strike down claims that have been filed after the 

applicable statute of limitations has passed. Id. at 1279 (“A claim that is first asserted by 

amendment after the limitations period has passed will not be barred so long as the amendment is 

based on the same general set of facts and involves the same injury. This holds true even where 

the amendment names or substitutes a new party plaintiff, as long as the new plaintiff is not 

seeking to enforce an independent right or to impose a greater liability on the defendant”), citing 

Klopstock v. Superior Court 17 Cal.2d 13, 20–22 (1941); Pasadena Hospital Assn. Ltd. v. 

Superior Court 204 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1034–1037 (1988); Garrison v. Board of Directors (1995) 

36 Cal.App.4th 1670. 

Defendants are thus correct that, while the City of Fresno claim “put Defendants on notice 

that an estate existed for decedent,” it did not put them on notice that Canter had an adult son who 

would be pursuing claims for injuries that are distinct and different from: (1) Canter’s estate; or 

(2) Canter’s parents. (Defendants’ Reply Brief 5:11-12, ECF No. 34.) Nor was there substantial 

(or indeed, any) compliance with the Act by Moore.11 His name does not appear on the City of 

Fresno claims, nor are his injuries alleged in the initial Complaint. Even if his injuries are based 

on the same general set of facts as the injuries to Canter and the Knoxs, they are distinguishable 

because they are personal to him as an individual. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 

146 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1550 (2007), citing Bartalo v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 

 

11 The Court does not agree with Plaintiffs’ contention that there was substantial compliance with the terms of the 

Act for Moore’s individual claims. While a persuasive argument can be made that there was substantial compliance 

with the Act’s requirements with respect to the Moore’s survivor claims (because the City of Fresno claim was 

brought on behalf of Canter’s estate—Plaintiffs merely erred in naming Doris Knox the successor in interest of that 

estate), no such argument can be made with respect to Moore’s individual claims. Nothing on the face of the City of 

Fresno claim indicates or even hints at the existence of Moore’s own claims against the Defendants. Nelson v. Cnty. 

of Los Angeles, 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 796 (2003) (“Where two or more persons suffer separate and distinct injuries 

from the same act or omission, each person must submit a claim, and one cannot rely on a claim presented by 

another”).

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(1975). Put another way, Moore’s individual causes of action seek damages for an injury—e.g., 

the loss of companionship, comfort, and affection of his mother—that is personal to him and thus 

different and distinct from the injuries suffered by Jerry and Doris Knox, even if the theory of 

recovery is the same. Id. at 1551 (“in a wrongful death action, the ‘injury’ is not the general loss 

of the decedent, but the particular loss of the decedent to each individual claimant”) (emphasis 

added).12

Because the injuries asserted in Moore’s individual state claims are different and distinct 

than those asserted by Jerry and Doris Knox or Moore’s survivor state claims, the addition of 

those claims creates a “new cause of action that seeks to enforce an independent right; as such, 

the relation-back doctrine will not apply.” Id. at 1553. Moore’s individual state claims must thus 

be dismissed.

IV. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30). Accordingly, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third (Wrongful Death), Fourth (Negligence), 

and Fifth (Battery) Causes of Action alleged by Plaintiff Doris Knox is DENIED;

2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third (Wrongful Death), Fourth (Negligence), 

and Fifth (Battery) Causes of Action alleged by Plaintiff Jerry Knox is DENIED;

3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third (Wrongful Death), Fourth (Negligence), 

and Fifth (Battery) Causes of Action alleged by Plaintiff Jeremy Moore as the 

successor in interest to Veronica Canter is DENIED; and,

4) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third (Wrongful Death), Fourth (Negligence), 

and Fifth (Battery) Causes of Action alleged by Plaintiff Jeremy Moore on his own 

behalf is GRANTED. The First (Fourth Amendment) and Second (Fourteenth 

 

12 By way of contrast, Jerry and Doris Knox have suffered the exact same injuries across every iteration of their 

claim—in the City of Fresno claim, the initial Complaint, and the FAC. So too, Canter’s injuries (the claims for 

whom accrue to the estate) are consistent across the City of Fresno claim, the initial Complaint, and the FAC. 

Moore’s personal injuries, however, are not—they do not appear in the City of Fresno claim or the initial Complaint. 

Rather, they first spring into existence in the FAC.

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Amendment) Causes of Action alleged by Plaintiff Jeremy Moore on his own 

behalf remain unaffected by this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 8, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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