Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00595/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00595-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER JAMES LYNOTT, No. CIV S-06-0595-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. AMENDED FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

TOM CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with counsel, brings this petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus (Docs. 1 & 3), filed on March 21, 2006, respondent’s answer (Doc.

10), filed on July 5, 2006, and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 11), filed on July 11, 2006.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 1

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

The Prosecution Case

Defendant and his neighbor, William Hartig, had a cordial

relationship until a dispute arose between them over Hartig’s plans to

build a house on his property in Blue Canyon. Defendant, who worked

part time for a structural and civil engineering firm, claimed that Hartig

did not have the permits needed to start construction.

Hartig hired Champion Contractors and Richard Hawkins to pour

the cement footings for the new house. Hartig was at the construction site

between 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. on July 28, 2001. Harlan Hamby, an

employee of Interstate Concrete Pumping, arrived to deliver concrete

between 6:00 a.m. and 6:15 a.m., while it was still dark. Defendant

approached Hamby in a state of agitation and said, “You are not pouring

today.” Defendant claimed he had “red flagged” the project and pulled the

building permit. Hamby explained that he was not the “big cheese,” and

defendant began to calm down. However, when other crew members

arrived, defendant yelled and screamed, accusing them of “bootlegging

concrete.” Hartig attempted to talk with defendant.

Cement contractor Hawkins, who was a large man, entered the

discussion and said, “[T]his is bull crap. We’re going to pour concrete.”

He tried to stand his ground because there was a lot of money involved in

the work scheduled that day. Hawkins suggested that defendant and

Hartig work out their differences later through the permit process. 

Defendant responded, “[Y]ou are not that big. I’ve took [sic] guys bigger

than you before.” Defendant said he could have five guys there in 30

minutes to take care of all of them. He warned, “[Y]ou don’t know who

you are messing with. You don’t know who I’m associated with.”

According to Christopher Mulock, one of Hawkins’s workers,

defendant said that he was going to get people to “come over and take care

of us” and threatened to “shoot [our] asses if [he had] to.” Hartig

recounted similar threats. At least twice, defendant said, “[D]o you have

any idea what organization I belong to? Do you have a clue what

organization I belong to? You are so fucked. You are from the Bay Area. 

Do you know what [the] number four means in the Bay Area?” Defendant

took his four fingers, pointed them down to the ground, cursed Hartig

again, and walked away.

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The rest of Hawkins’s crew arrived and poured 150 yards of

concrete that morning. Around 9:00 a.m., Hawkins saw two men drive up

to defendant’s house in a white truck. The men had a 12-pack of beer and

carried open beers in their hands.

Most of the crew, including Hawkins, took a break up the hill from

the work site around 10:00 a.m., approximately four hours after the verbal

confrontation with defendant. Hartig, Hamby, Mulock, and Dean Earing

remained in the foundation hole. During the break, all of the men heard

between four and 20 shots fired. Hawkins saw tree boughs fall on the

crew. The weapon was not in the crew’s line of sight, but the bullets

struck the trees 15 to 20 feet above them. Hawkins testified the shooter

“did a really good job” of scaring them. 

The four men then came out of the foundation hole, walked up the

road past the entrance to defendant’s driveway, and joined the rest of the

crew. Hamby, Earing, and Mulock saw defendant standing with one or

two other men, and testified he was holding a rifle. Mulock saw defendant

fire the gun in the air. 

Hawkins called the sheriff’s department, and Deputy Sheriff Jack

Houser responded. Houser had known defendant for some time, was

familiar with the property, and was aware that defendant had a felony

record. Deputy Sheriff Ryan Owens and California Highway Patrol

Officer Chris Worster already were at the scene when Houser arrived.

Deputy Houser asked dispatch to telephone defendant’s house. 

Defendant then came outside accompanied by Christopher Klitgaard. 

Defendant told Houser that he confronted the foreman and questioned the

permits when the machinery awakened him earlier in the day. He denied

shooting a gun and suggested that local kids had done it. Klitgaard

volunteered that he had fired the gun and concealed it in the house. 

Houser warned Klitgaard that he might be subject to criminal prosecution. 

Defendant’s wife, Pamela, came out of the house and told Deputy

Houser that she heard shots from the laundry room but did not see anyone

fire a gun. At Houser’s request, she went back inside and retrieved a .44-

magnum lever-action carbine from under the living room couch. John

Feurstenberger came out of the house with her. 

Once Deputy Houser learned from witnesses that defendant had

been in possession of the rifle, he placed him under arrest. Houser

searched unsuccessfully for spent cartridges. There were no usable

fingerprints on the rifle. 

The Defense Case

Both defendant and his wife, Pamela, testified at trial.

Pamela said that she was awakened at 4:47 a.m. on July 28, 2001,

by the headlights of what she assumed was a logging truck. She found

defendant on the couch where he had gone to sleep watching television. 

Defendant and Pamela went outside and saw Hartig emerging from

the entrance to the construction pit. When defendant asked what he was

doing, Hartig replied he was going to pour a foundation. Defendant

challenged Hartig’s right to proceed, citing a correction notice dated 10

days earlier that had not been corrected.

/ / /

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4

According to Pamela, Hawkins told them he had no permits, he did

not need one, and he planned to pour the concrete whether they liked it or

not. Hawkins stepped forward as if to bully defendant, and defendant

became agitated for the first time. He told Hawkins, “[Y]ou don’t know

who I am or who I work with. I know practically everybody in the

county.” He made to reference to the number four.

Defendant and his wife then returned to the house. Pamela wanted

to call the sheriff’s department, but she and defendant decided it best to

deal with the situation the following Monday. Defendant knew the sheriff

would not get involved in a dispute over a building permit. Pamela started

doing laundry and defendant went back to sleep. The couple planned to go

to the Boomtown buffet or the swap meet at Denio’s with Klitgaard and

Feurstenberger later in the day. 

Klitgaard and Feurstenberger arrived at defendant’s home between

9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. They spoke with defendant and Pamela for about

20 minutes. At that point, they went outside to smoke while Pamela

continued with household chores and defendant took a shower. Klitgaard

often went to garage sales, flea markets, and swap meets. He brought with

him a rifle that he had recently purchased. Defendant and Pamela were

still busy, so Klitgaard retrieved the rifle from his car and loaded it for

target practice. Klitgaard put seven rounds in the magazine and one in the

chamber. He fired over an abandoned house at some trees. Hawkins’s

crew was approximately 90 degrees to the right of where he fired.

Feurstenberger was standing next to Klitgaard when he fired the

rifle. The cartridge door jammed after the first round. Klitgaard fixed the

jam with a screwdriver supplied by defendant, and fired off the rest of the

rounds. Not wanting to damage the firearm more, Klitgaard left it on the

porch ant went inside. When the sheriff’s deputies arrived and asked

defendant to come outside, Klitgaard brought the rifle into the house and

put it under the couch.

Defendant and Pamela heard the shots from inside the house. 

Defendant went outside when his friends called him, and he showed them

where he kept his tools. Defendant denied handling the gun. He testified

that in order to protect his friends, he told Deputy Houser that kids must

have done the shooting. 

Roger Dunscombe, a neighbor of defendant’s, testified he was at

home when the heavy equipment arrived. Later in the morning, he heard

shooting and looked outside. He saw two men, one holding a gun pointed

at the trees. Neither of the men was defendant. 

Prosecution Rebuttal

Deputy Houser testified regarding statements made to him by

Feurstenberger and Klitgaard. Feurstenberger said that he was not the

person who shot the rifle, that he heard the shots, but that he did not see

who possessed the gun or fired it. Klitgaard said that he hid the gun under

the couch because “he didn’t want [defendant] to get in trouble.”

An investigator from the Placer County District Attorney’s Office

testified that he interviewed Klitgaard, who admitted firing the gun while

defendant and Feurstenberger were watching. Klitgaard also said that

defendant got the screwdriver to fix the gun. 

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5

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of: three counts of threatening to

commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury on Christopher Mulock, William Hartig,

and Richard Hawkins; one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm; and one count of

discharging a firearm with gross negligence. The jury also found true the allegation that

petitioner had used a firearm in the commission of the offenses. Petitioner was sentenced to 14

years and 4 months in state prison. 

On direct appeal, petitioner argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to show

that he had used a firearm in the commission of the criminal threats; (2) the prosecutor

committed misconduct by informing the jury that petitioner had previously been convicted of

assault; (3) the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the caliber of bullets recovered by

defense investigators; (4) consecutive sentencing violated California law; and (5) the

enhancement must be stricken. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in a decision issued

on February 9, 2005. The California Supreme Court denied review without citation or comment

on May 18, 2005. On March 9, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel. That petition was

denied without comment or citation on February 22, 2006. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

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habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state court

decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the governing

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law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate that

Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the wrong

legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases

to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See id. at 406. 

If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to determine first

whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 (9th

Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which case federal

habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question is whether

the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refused to extent that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct.

1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be

found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly

erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to

give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

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283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

In his petition, which was filed with the assistance of counsel, petitioner raises the

following claims:

I. The firearm use enhancements must be reversed because the record

contains insufficient evidence of a connection between the verbal threats

and the possession or discharge of the rifle, and therefore insufficient

evidence that a firearm was used in the commission of threats of violence;

II. The prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by eliciting

petitioner’s admission to a prior assault conviction on cross-examination;

III. The state trial court improperly excluded evidence of the caliber of

bullets recovered by defense investigators; and

IV. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel for failure of

defense counsel to obtain expert ballistics analysis of the slugs taken from

trees near petitioner’s property, which would have demonstrated that the

slugs were fired from Klitgaard’s gun, corroborating petitioner’s testimony

and undermining the testimony of prosecution witnesses.

Respondent concedes these claims are exhausted. The court will address first petitioner’s claims

(III and IV) relating to the underlying offense of making criminal threats. The court will then

address petitioner’s claim (I and II) concerning enhancements. 

/ / /

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A. Exclusion of Evidence

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at

1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786

F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. 

See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). Because federal habeas

relief does not lie for state law errors, a state court’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal

habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due

process. See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000); Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d

971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see

also Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1994). In order to raise such a claim in

a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage

of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396 F.2d 293, 294-

95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the caliber of

bullets recovered by defense investigators. As to this claim, the state court stated:

We turn now to defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in

excluding defense evidence regarding the caliber of a bullet recovered

from trees near defendant’s house. 

In November 2002, 16 months after the incident, defense

investigator Lowell Carlton retrieved a rifle slug from a tree near

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defendant’s house at a location consistent with defense testimony. When

defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony on the caliber of the slug, the

prosecutor objected for lack of foundation, based on the failure to show

Carlton “ha[d] the ability to look at a bullet and tell you what caliber it is

based on that.” According to the prosecutor, “it only becomes relevant if

he can say this came out of the gun here, and I have seen no foundation for

the ballistics of that, either.”

The court sustained the objection because the defense had not

disclosed Carlton as an expert before trial. Thereafter, the court admitted

the bullet into evidence for the limited purpose of showing that Carlton

dug it out of the tree.

Defense investigator Gary Holden testified that in May 2002 he

watched defendant take bullets out of the tree “that [had been] shot at.” 

The court refused to allow those bullets to be introduced into evidence

because “there [was] not a sufficient foundation in the record to provide a

nexus that those slugs [were] from the gun in question or shot on the day

in question.”

Defendant argues the trial court improperly excluded Carlton’s

testimony about the caliber of the bullet he found. Asserting that

exclusion of this testimony was not an appropriate sanction for violation of 

reciprocal discovery in the circumstances of this case, defendant contends

that the ruling violated his right to due process. 

In concluding that the trial court did not err, the state court stated:

“We review the correctness of the challenged ruling, not . . . the

analysis used to reach it” . . . and conclude the court did not err in

excluding Carlton’s testimony. 

* * *

Defendant is correct that violation of the reciprocal discovery

statute does not ordinarily warrant exclusion of testimony at trial. 

(citations omitted). However, Carlton’s testimony was properly excluded

on the ground articulated by the prosecutor, lack of foundation. Carlton

acknowledged he could only estimate the caliber of the bullet. He

indicated his knowledge came from 30 years of investigative experience

with the sheriff’s department. The defense’s failure to link the bullet that

Carlton found with the rifle used in the shooting 16 months earlier

justified exclusion of the testimony. Lacking that foundation, his

testimony on the caliber of the bullet was not admissible. 

As to the correct standard of review, it is not clear that the state court addressed the due process

aspect of this claim. While it could be argued that, because the state court concluded that

exclusion of the evidence was proper under state law, exclusion necessarily could not have

amounted to a fundamental miscarriage of justice, nowhere in the state court’s decision does the

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Petitioner is incorrect when he states that the state court “pointed out that the 2

bullet was not positively linked to Klitgaard’s gun.” 

11

court conclude that petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. Therefore, this court will

review de novo to determine whether constitutional error has occurred.

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated because exclusion of

Carlton’s caliber testimony “was a prejudicial violation of petitioner’s right to present evidence

in his own behalf.” Specifically, petitioner asserts that his ability to present a defense was

prejudiced by the ruling because:

The testimony . . . that the caliber of the recovered slugs matched

the caliber of Klitgaards’s gun would have greatly bolstered the defense

claim that these were the bullets fired on July 28, 2001. This information

would have altered the balance of credibility between defense and

prosecution witnesses. It would have helped demonstrate that the gun was

fired in a direction away from the construction crew. This would have

corroborated the defense witnesses, and contradicted the prosecution

witnesses, and thus would have helped demonstrate that petitioner had no

direct hand in the firing of the gun. 

The court disagrees. As the state court observed, there was absolutely no link between the bullet

found by Carlton with the rifle used in the shooting. Absent such a link, Carlton’s testimony 2

would not have helped petitioner’s case in the way he claims. Petitioner’s version of events is

that Klitgaard fired the shots from the rifle. At best, however, Carlton’s testimony would only

establish that there was at least one .44 caliber bullet in the tree where Carlton found the bullet. 

Even if it were stipulated that the bullet Carlton found came from the gun fired on the date of the

incident, it would not establish who fired the shots, the critical issue. Therefore, the testimony

would not have bolstered petitioner’s position that he did not fire the gun. 

As to petitioner’s contention that Carlton’s testimony would have helped establish

that the shots were fired away from the construction crew, the court does not agree. Again, at

best, the testimony could have established that, indeed, a shot was fired in the direction of the

tree where Carlton found the bullet. However, that does not establish that shots were not also

fired in the direction indicated by prosecution witnesses. 

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Moreover, as to petitioner’s contention that Klitgaard was the shooter, during the

prosecution rebuttal case, Feurstenberger said that he was not the shooter, that he only heard the

shots but did not see who fired them. In addition, during the defense case-in-chief, petitioner

testified that he was not present when the gun was fired but only heard the shots from inside the

house. However, Klitgaard testified that he was standing with petitioner and Feurstenberger on

the porch when the shots were fired. This directly contradicts Feurstenberger’s and petitioner’s

testimony that they did not see who fired the shots. Carlton’s testimony to the effect that a bullet

was found in a tree in a direction away from the construction crew would not have rehabilitated

the inconsistent testimony. 

Finally, the record is clear that, even though Carlton’s testimony was not allowed,

petitioner was nonetheless able to present his defense that he was not the shooter. Both Klitgaard

and Feurstenberger testified. In addition, petitioner and his wife testified. Through all this

testimony, petitioner had ample opportunity to present his defense. 

For all of these reasons, the court finds that petitioner was not denied the ability to

present his defense by exclusion of Carlton’s testimony. Therefore, petitioner’s due process

rights were not violated in this regard.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that, considering

all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

See id. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to

have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. See id. at 690. The federal court must

then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were

outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. See id. In making this

determination, however, there is a strong presumption “that counsel’s conduct was within the

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wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all

significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be

followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697).

As to the proper standard of review under AEDPA, this claim was raised in

petitioner’s state habeas petition. The state court, however, did not issue a reasoned opinion when

it denied this claim. Rather, it denied without comment or citation. Therefore, the court will

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

based on an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853;

Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to obtain

expert ballistics analysis. In response to this claim, respondent’s argument, in its entirety, is:

As to the related claim of ineffectiveness for not testing the bullets

to meet the foundational objection, this must be judged under the familiar

Strickland standard. Under this test, petitioner must show both that

counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and

that petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Petitioner cannot meet the heavy

burden imposed by Strickland. The independent evidence of petitioner’s

guilt of the charged offenses was strong. He had motive to shoot at the

victims to stop their work and had threatened to shoot them before the shots

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were fired. The victims also testified to seeing petitioner with the weapon

in question. Petitioner’s main defense was that he did not possess or shoot

the weapon at all, the direction of the bullets was not crucial to the case. 

The court agrees with respondent that there is no prejudice. Petitioner argues that ballistics

analysis would have established a link between the slugs recovered from the scene and Klitgaard’s

gun. Even so, ballistics analysis would not have established who fired the gun, which is the

critical question. Petitioner also contends that ballistics analysis would have showed that the gun

was fired in a different direction than described by prosecution witnesses. However, as discussed

above, while such an analysis might have established that the gun was fired in a different

direction, it would not have established that the gun was not also fired in the direction of the

construction crew. Given the inconsistencies in the testimony of defense witnesses (as discussed

above), the victims’ testimony that they saw petitioner holding the rifle, and the lack of probative

value to ballistics analysis, the court finds that petitioner was not prejudiced and, therefore, did

not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. 

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Success on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct requires a showing that the

conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). The conduct must be examined to

determine “whether, considered in the context of the entire trial, that conduct appears likely to

have affected the jury's discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v.

Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990). Even if an error of constitutional magnitude is

determined, such error is considered harmless if the court, after reviewing the entire trial record,

concludes that the alleged error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Error is

deemed harmless unless it “is of such a character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's

substantial rights.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760-761 (1946). Depending on the

case, a prompt and effective admonishment of counsel or curative instruction from the trial judge

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may effectively “neutralize the damage” from the prosecutor’s error. United States v.

Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Simtob, 901 F.2d at 806).

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by attempting to get

him to admit to a prior assault conviction on cross-examination. As to this claim, the state court

stated:

We begin with defendant’s contention that the prosecutor

committed prejudicial misconduct during cross-examination of defendant

by trying to elicit evidence concerning the nature of his prior felony

conviction.

Among other things, defendant was charged with having a prior

conviction for a serious or violent felony, namely, a violation of [California

Penal Code] section 245(a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon or instrument

other than a firearm or by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He

also was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. 

(citation omitted). 

Before trial, the parties stipulated that “defendant will admit the

strike prior alleged against him in the Information” and “admit that he . . .

therefore may not possess a firearm under California law.” Defendant

agreed to the stipulation on the condition that, if convicted, he “retain[ed]

the right” to ask the court to strike the prior conviction finding for purposes

of sentencing. Out of the jury’s presence, defendant waived his rights with

respect to the felony conviction allegation and admitted that “on or about

October 14, 1987, [he was] convicted of a 245(a)(1) violation of the Penal

Code as a strike[.]” 

During cross-examination before the jury, defendant admitted he was

a convicted felon. The prosecutor then asked defendant if the “charge [he

was] convicted of in 1987 was assault with a deadly weapon.” Defense

counsel objected before defendant answered. The court sustained the

objection. When the prosecutor stated, “I do not believe that piece of

evidence was excluded for purposes of impeachment,” the court responded,

“Sustained. Stricken.” Later, the jurors were instructed as follows:

“Statements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence. . . . [¶]

If an objection was sustained to a question don’t guess what the answer

might have been. . . . [¶] Don’t assume to be true any insinuation suggested

by a question asked a witness. [¶] . . . [¶] Don’t consider for any purpose . . .

any evidence that was stricken by the Court. Treat [it] as though you had

never hear of it.”

The court began its analysis by concluding that it agreed with petitioner’s interpretation of the

stipulation. Specifically, the state court stated that “the only reasonable interpretation of the

stipulation is that the nature of the conviction [for felony assault with a deadly weapon] would not

be revealed to the jury for any reason.” The court, however, concluded that reversal was not

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required:

To prevail on his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must

show that it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to him would

have occurred absent the prosecutor’s question. (citations omitted). His

argument in this respect is unconvincing.

According to defendant, the question conveyed to the jurors was

that he had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in 1987, which

was almost 14 years before the events at issue in this case. But defendant

never answered the question, and the trial court not only struck the question

but later (1) instructed the jurors that questions are not evidence, (2)

admonished them not to guess what an answer might have been if an

objection was sustained, (3) told them not to assume to be true any

insinuation suggested by a question, and (4) directed them not to consider

for any purpose any evidence that was stricken by the court. We presume

the jurors followed these instructions. (citation omitted). 

Defendant argues the evidence in this case was so “closely

balanced, particularly on the crucial question of who discharged the rifle,”

that the unanswered question could have tipped the scales against him

despite the trial court’s action in striking the question and instructing the

jury not to speculate about the answer or to consider it for any reason. 

Contrary to defendant’s claim, the evidence of his guilt was strong. It was

defendant who had the motive to shot at the victims to stop their work. It

was defendant who shortly before had threatened to “shoot [the workers’]

asses if [he had] to”; it was defendant whom the victims saw holding the

rifle soon after the shots were fired, and it was defendant whom victim

Mulock saw punctuate the earlier shooting by firing the rifle into the air. 

The state court concluded that, for these reasons, there was no reasonable probability that the jury

would have rendered a different verdict if the misconduct had not occurred. Because the state

court applied the Brecht harmless error test, this court concludes that it applied the correct federal

legal rules and will, therefore, review under the “unreasonable application of” standard.

The court finds that the state court’s adjudication was not an unreasonable

application of federal law. First, the state court gave prompt curative instructions. See

Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1291. This effectively neutralized any damage done by the asked, but

unanswered question. Second, as discussed at length above, the evidence regarding who fired the

shots was not as “closely balanced” as petitioner contends. 

/ / /

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/ / /

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D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus

relief is available if it is found that, upon the record of evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Under Jackson,

the court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on

habeas. See id. It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. “The question

is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether rational

jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306

(9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in the context of

the substantive elements of the criminal offense, as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at

324 n.16.

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence of a necessary element of the

firearm enhancement – a connection between verbal threats and possession or discharge of the

rifle. As to this claim, the state court stated:

The jury found that defendant used a firearm in threatening to

commit crimes that would result in death or great bodily injury. 

([California Penal Code] § 422).

Section 422 states in pertinent part: “Any person who willfully

threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury

to another person, with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be

taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which,

on its fact and under the circumstances in which it is made is so

unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the

person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of

execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in

sustained fear for his or her safety . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in

the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state

prison.” 

Defendant points out that the evidence shows the shooting was

separated from the verbal threats by a period of at least four hours after the

confrontation. Thus, he argues, there was insufficient evidence to establish

a “facilitative nexus” between the firearm use ([California Penal Code] 

§ 12022.5(a)) and the underlying felonies.

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Section 12022.5(a) states: “Except as provided in subdivision (b),

any person who personally uses a firearm in the commission of a felony or

attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of

imprisonment in the state prison for 3, 4, or 10 years, unless use of a

firearm is an element of that offense.” Whether a defendant used a firearm

within the meaning of section 12022.5 is a question of fact for the jury. 

(citation omitted).

The state court continued by defining the elements of the underlying crimes in this case –

violation of California Penal Code § 422:

The underlying crimes in this case, violation of section 422, require

proof that “(1) the defendant willfully threatens to kill or seriously injure

another person; (2) the defendant has the specific intent that the listener

understands the statement to be a threat; (3) the threat and the

circumstances under which it was made lead the listener to believe the

defendant would immediately carry through on the threat; and (4) the threat

causes the listener to suffer sustained fear based upon a reasonable belief

the threat would be carried out. (citation omitted).

The court then focused on California law regarding the sustained fear element and stated:

“Sustained fear” means fear which continues for “‘a period of time

that extends beyond what is momentary, fleeting, or transitory.’” (citation

omitted). Thus, in determining whether a threat caused a victim to suffer

sustained fear, a jury properly can consider an action that the defendant

took after the threat. (citation omitted). This is so because a victim might

not take a serious threat seriously until presented with further conduct by

the defendant. Accordingly “the threatening statement does not have to be

the sole cause of the victim’s fear and that a statement the victim does not

initially consider a threat can later be seen that way based upon a

subsequent action taken by a defendant . . . .” (citation omitted). 

The state court then discussed California cases which hold that the “surrounding circumstances”

can include the history of the parties’ relationship and subsequent actions taken by the defendant. 

Specifically, activities after the threat can give meaning to the words. The court then concluded:

Here, two of the victims, Hawkins and Mulock, testified they did

not take defendant’s criminal threat seriously until defendant fired the

shots. Thus . . . it not only was defendant’s threat but subsequent action of

firing the rifle that caused the threat to make the victims experience

sustained fear. Accordingly, defendant used the firearm in the commission

of the criminal threats because he “‘utilized the gun at least as an aid in

completing an essential element of the [underlying] crime . . . .’” (citation

omitted). 

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Because there is substantial evidence to support a finding that

defendant used the gun as an aid in completing an essential element of the

crime of making a criminal threat, his claim of error fails. (citation

omitted). 

In analyzing petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim in light of the substantive elements of

the crime, the court finds that the state court applied the applicable rules from Jackson v. Virginia. 

Therefore, this court reviews the state court’s determination under the more deferential

“unreasonable application of” standard. 

The question is whether the state court unreasonably applied federal legal rules in

concluding that there was sufficient evidence for the firearm enhancement. As revealed by the

state court’s analysis, California law does not require the kind of nexus petitioner argues is

required. In short, the passage of time between the initial verbal confrontation and the firing of

the shots is immaterial under California law. Because the state court reached this conclusion by

looking to the substantive elements of the state crime, as required by Jackson, this court finds that

it correctly applied Jackson. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment

and close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

/ / /

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/ / /

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and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 1, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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