Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00789/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00789-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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 The Court concludes that oral argument on these motions is not necessary. The

parties submitted memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and facts supporting their

positions. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.

1999); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alanco Technologies, Inc., an Arizona

corporation; Technology Systems

International, Inc., f/k/a TSI Acquisition

Corporation, an Arizona corporation;

Robert R. Kauffman and Elizabeth

Kauffman, husband and wife; Greg E.

Oester and Linda Oester, husband and

wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Carolina Casualty Insurance Company,

a Florida corporation, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-04-789-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant’s mot ion for reconsideration and motion

to stay the discovery schedule. Docs. ##59, 72. The motion for reconsideration will be

denied and t he Court will grant a 30-day extension of fact discovery. Terms used in this

Order correspond with terms used in the Court’s Order of May 19, 2005. Doc. #58.1

Case 2:04-cv-00789-DGC Document 76 Filed 10/31/05 Page 1 of 4
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I. Motion for Reconsideration.

Defendant argues vigorously that the Court based its Order of May 19, 2005

(Doc. #58) on an argument never made by Plaintiffs. Doc. #59 at 2-4. T he Court does not

agree. Construction of the insurance contract was an issue addressed at length by the

parties. Moreover, the Nint h Circuit has held that a district court “‘may grant summary

judgment on any legal ground the record supports.’” Jack son, Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192,

1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.14[1] (1994)). 

Defendant asserts t hat Plaintiffs agreed the IVI exclusion must be analyzed as of the

date the claim was first made, but in making this argument Defendant cites to page 4 of

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment where Plaintiffs discuss Defendant’s argument.

Doc. #59 at 2-5; see Doc. #51 at 4 (“In its previously filed Motion to Dismiss, Carolina

stated that with a claims-made policy, the Court must analyze the [IVI] exclusion when the

claim was first made[.]”) (emphasis added). T he Court has reviewed the briefing on the

motions for summary judgment and cannot conclude that Plaint iffs agreed the IVI exclusion

was to be analyzed solely with respect to the first complaint filed in the State Court Suit.

To the contrary, Plaintiffs argued that the IVI exclusion was to be analyzed with respect to

t he amended complaint and that the amended complaint was a new claim asserted by a

non-insured claimant. Doc. #51 at 3, 7-9. 

The motion for reconsideration relies on language from the IVI exclusion to suggest

that the exclusion itself required the Court to consider only the first complaint in the State

Court Suit. In so arguing, Defendant seems to contend that Section VII.C need not be

consulted because the IVI exclusion itself expressly ap p lies to the original complaint – the

complaint by which the claim was “instigated” – in the State Court Suit. Defendant did not

make this argument in its motion for summary judgment or its response to Plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment, but relied instead on Section VII.C. See Docs. ##50, 54. Motions

for reconsideration are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their

original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26

(9th Cir. 1998). 

Case 2:04-cv-00789-DGC Document 76 Filed 10/31/05 Page 2 of 4
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Defendant argues that t he Court’s decision is incorrect in light of Pintlar Corp. v.

Fidelity & Casualty Co., 205 B.R. 945, 947 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997). The Court addressed

Pintlar in its previous decision. See Doc. #58 at 6-7. M ot ions for reconsideration should

not ask the Court to rethink what it has already analyzed. See United States v . Rezzonico,

32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998). 

Defendant argues t hat the Court’s decision is contrary to Arizona law which

requires that an insurance policy be construed as a whole. In reaching its previous

decision, however, the Court relied on the Arizona authority it considered most relevant.

See Doc. #58 at 5. Again, t he proper purpose of a motion for reconsideration is not to ask

the Court to rethink its prior analysis. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.

Defendant claims that the Court’s decision will have implications beyond this case.

It was not so intended. The Court did not p urp ort to announce broad principles of

insurance policy interpretation t hat would have application in cases other than this one,

and it would be incorrect for Plaintiffs, Defendant , or any other party to cite the Court’s

prior order for some broader purpose.

II. Motion to Stay Discovery.

The Court ent ered a Case Management Order on February 18, 2005. Doc. #49. That

order established a deadline for fact discovery of August 12, 2005. Id. ¶ 5. Approximately

five and one-half months into the discovery schedule, and only eleven working days

before t he deadline, Defendant filed a motion arguing that discovery should be stayed until

the underlying litigation has been resolved. Doc. #72 at 3. Defendant alternatively argued

that discovery should be stayed until 30 days after the Court ruled on Defendant’s motion

for reconsideration. Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides that a scheduling order “shall not be

modified except upon a showing of good cause[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Good cause exists

when a deadline “cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the

extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 Advisory Comm.’s Notes (1983 Am.). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good

cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the part y seeking the amendment.”

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Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992).

Defendant argues that a stay might enable the parties to avoid “spending

thousands of dollars seeking to compel discovery, reviewing documents, and deposing

witnesses.” Doc. #75 at 2. But the eleven working days that remained in the discovery

period when Defendant’s motion was filed left little time for such activities. To the extent

Defendant seeks additional time to engage in such discovery, the Court finds that it has

not demonstrated the diligence required for good cause under Rule 16. Nor is the Court

willing t o st ay this litigation pending the outcome of the underlying case. This is an

independent action in need of independent resolution. 

Because Defendant ’s motion for reconsideration has been pending for some time,

the Court will grant an extension of the fact discovery deadline to 30 days after the date

this order is filed. All other terms of the Court’s Case Management Order shall remain in

effect. See Doc. #49.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for reconsideration (Doc. #59) is denied.

2. Defendant motion to stay the discovery schedule (Doc. #72) is granted in

part, as set forth above.

 DATED this 31st day of October, 2005.

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