Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01040/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01040-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RICHARD MALOTT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PLACER COUNTY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-CV-1040 KJM EFB 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on the motions by defendants Placer County, Ken 

Addison and Matt Hardcastle, and defendants Detective Michelle Hendricks and Deputy Darin 

Epperson to dismiss plaintiff’s third amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). See ECF Nos. 64, 66. Plaintiff opposes the motions. See ECF Nos. 70, 71. Defendants 

have replied. See ECF Nos. 72, 73. The court found the matter appropriate for resolution without 

a hearing. 

As explained below, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendants’ 

motions. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

The court has reviewed the facts of this case in detail in its prior orders. See, e.g., 

ECF Nos. 38, 60. It recounts only facts relevant here in light of the pending motions. 

This case arises from plaintiff’s arrest for illegally carrying a concealed handgun 

after he was pulled over for rolling through a stop sign on April 25, 2013 in Sacramento County. 

Third Am. Compl. (the TAC), ECF No. 63 ¶ 1. Specifically, on the evening of April 25, 2013, 

defendants Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputies Javier Bustamante (Bustamante) and Darin 

Epperson (Epperson) stopped plaintiff for rolling through a stop sign. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. Plaintiff 

exited his vehicle as requested by Epperson. Id. ¶ 23. Epperson conducted a pat-down search of 

plaintiff and, during the search, located a handgun. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. At the time of the search, 

plaintiff did not have a valid California Concealed Weapons permit. Id. ¶ 26. After finding the 

handgun, Bustamante and Epperson placed plaintiff under arrest for carrying a concealed firearm 

without a permit, id. ¶ 27, handcuffed plaintiff, and placed him in the back of their police patrol 

car, id. ¶ 28. 

Bustamante then searched plaintiff’s car, id. ¶ 30, and located a book titled “Daily 

Reminder Standard Diary” (the diary), id. ¶ 31. The diary contained entries regarding plaintiff’s 

charitable aid missions, church donations, foreign travels, plans for travel, past, present and 

potential future girlfriends, recollections of dreams, ideas for self-improvements, trials and 

tribulations of daily life, metaphysical musings, and thoughts and speculations on the meaning 

and nature of life. Id. ¶ 56. The diary was closed and on the passenger’s seat. Id. ¶ 32. 

Bustamante and Epperson removed the diary from the car and read a portion of it. Id. ¶ 33. 

Bustamante then later booked the diary into evidence along with other items taken from the car. 

Id. ¶ 34. 

Plaintiff was taken to Mercy San Juan Hospital after experiencing physical distress 

in the back of the patrol car. Id. ¶¶ 35, 47. Plaintiff alleges Bustamante and Epperson ignored his 

request for medical care for a substantial amount of time. Id. ¶ 38. In addition, plaintiff alleged 

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Bustamante closed the patrol car door on his head and later used a small hard object known as a 

Kubaton to push twice on plaintiff’s sternum on two separate occasions before requesting 

emergency medical care. Id. ¶¶ 39, 42–43, 46. 

On June 4, 2013, Epperson gave the diary to defendant Michelle Hendricks, a 

Detective with the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. Id. ¶ 54. Hendricks read the diary. 

Id. Hendricks discussed with and forwarded the diary to defendant Matt Hardcastle, a Detective 

with the Placer County Sheriff’s Department, who also read the diary. Id. ¶¶ 10, 54. 

Hendricks, acting in conjunction with Epperson and Hardcastle, photocopied and 

published the diary to at least three people, including plaintiff’s former girlfriend Clorese Carter 

(Carter) and plaintiff’s long-time friend Julie Ferneyhough (Ferneyhough) who worked and lived 

with her family in one of the houses on the Malott Ranch at the time. Id. ¶ 58. The Malott Ranch 

consists of five contiguous parcels of land owned by plaintiff’s immediate family and the family 

trust. Id. ¶ 19. There are five single family residences, including plaintiff’s residence, and two 

guest houses on the Malott Ranch. Id. The plaintiff’s residence sits on a private road protected 

by multiple electronically coded gates and signs indicating the ranch is private property. Id. 

Hardcastle, Epperson and Hendricks coordinated communications with Carter and 

Ferneyhough over a period of months. Id. ¶ 60. At least one interview was attended and 

conducted by both Hendricks and Epperson jointly. Id. Another meeting was attended and 

conducted by Hendricks and Hardcastle, also jointly.2

 Id. One meeting occurred on June 21, 

2013, when Epperson and Hendricks met with Carter in Epperson’s squad car in a parking lot. Id. 

¶ 61. On another occasion, Hendricks interviewed both Carter and Ferneyhough at Carter’s 

home; Hendricks stated, during the interview, it was unusual for her to be acting outside of her 

county and it was the first time she had done so. Id. ¶ 62. During this interview, Hendricks 

showed Carter and Ferneyhough portions of plaintiff’s diary that contained entries about them. 

 2

 It is unclear from the Third Amended Complaint whether the meeting on June 21, 2013 

was the one attended and conducted by both Hendricks and Epperson, or if they jointly conducted 

the interview where both Carter and Ferneyhough were present at Carter’s home. 

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Id. On separate occasions, Hendricks and Hardcastle explicitly told Ferneyhough they were 

working together. Id. ¶ 65. 

Between August 13, 2013 and August 21, 2013, defendant Ken Addison, a 

Sheriff’s Deputy with the Placer County Sheriff’s Department, id. ¶ 13, and at least three other 

Placer County Sheriff’s Department Deputies went to the Malott Ranch on multiple occasions 

without warrants or exigent circumstances to conduct “welfare checks,” id. ¶¶ 73, 77, 83, wearing 

black swat-type technical gear that bore little or no indicia of law enforcement, id. ¶ 75. Addison 

was allegedly selected for the visits to the Malott Ranch because of his physically intimidating 

appearance. Id. ¶ 74. Addison and other unnamed defendants3 did not believe a warrant, 

probable cause, consent, or exigent circumstance was needed to authorize their entry. Id. ¶ 78. 

The Nevada County Sheriff’s Department allegedly communicated with Placer 

County officials before the Placer County Deputies’ visits to the Malott Ranch between August 

13 and 21, 2013, and allegedly agreed to not interfere. Id. ¶ 79. The Nevada County Sheriff’s 

Department also actively participated by providing Placer County officials with the code to open 

the locked security gate surrounding plaintiff’s property.4

 Id. On one visit, Addison left his 

business card and a request for plaintiff to call him. Id. ¶ 80. On or about August 13, 2013, 

Addison informed plaintiff during a phone conversation the Nevada County Sheriff’s Department 

knew Addison and others had visited the Malott Ranch. Id. 

 3

 The Ninth Circuit provides that “‘[plaintiffs] should be given an opportunity through 

discovery to identify [] unknown defendants’” “in circumstances . . . ‘where the identity of the 

alleged defendant[] [is] not [] known prior to the filing of a complaint.’” Wakefield v. Thompson, 

177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 

1980)) (modifications in the original). Plaintiff is warned, however, that such defendants will be 

dismissed where “‘it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint 

would be dismissed on other grounds.’” Id. (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). Plaintiff is 

further warned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), which states that the court must dismiss 

defendants who have not been served within 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless 

plaintiff shows good cause, is applicable to doe defendants. See Glass v. Fields, No. 1:09-cv00098-OWW-SMS PC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97604 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); Hard Drive 

Prods. v. Does, No. C 11-01567 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109837, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 

2011). 

4

 The third amended complaint does not specify how officials from the Nevada County 

Sheriff’s Department obtained the code to the security gate. 

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On the final occasion Addison and the unnamed defendants visited the Malott 

Ranch, they allegedly entered the property by climbing over the locked gate, because they were 

unable to go through the electronic gates as on prior occasions. Id. ¶ 88. Sometime in 

mid-August 2013,5 after the last visit, Hardcastle advised Ferneyhough and her family they 

needed to move off the ranch because their lives were in danger in light of Placer County’s plans 

to raid the ranch. Hardcastle implied there would be a gunfight and told Ferneyhough if her 

children were killed in the process, it would be “on her.” Id. ¶ 89. During a recorded interview at 

the Placer County Sheriff’s Department, Hardcastle told Ferneyhough that Placer County and 

Sacramento County were sharing information about plaintiff. Id. ¶ 90. At one point, Addison 

told plaintiff’s brother on the phone that he was tired of chasing plaintiff and threatened to have a 

Placer County warrant issued for plaintiff’s arrest should plaintiff refuse to meet with him. Id. ¶ 

93. 

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint alleges twelve claims. In their motions, the 

Sacramento County and Placer County defendants do not seek to dismiss all of the claims. Both 

sets of defendants do seek dismissal of claim number ten, conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment rights in the search of his diary, against defendants Epperson, Hendricks, and 

Hardcastle. The Placer County defendants also seek dismissal for the first time of the following 

claims: claim number four, unreasonable search of the contents of the diary in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, against defendant Hardcastle; claim number six, unreasonable search of the 

Malott Ranch in violation of California Civil Code section 52.1, against defendants Addison and 

Placer County; and, claim number nine, threat of issuing an arrest warrant in violation of 

California Civil Code section 52.1, against defendants Addison and Placer County. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS 

A party may move to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the 

 5

 The third amended complaint actually states the last visit by the Placer County deputies 

occurred in mid-August 2014; however, as the other events in the complaint occurred in 2013, 

this court presumes the date is misstated. 

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complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a 

cognizable legal theory. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 

(9th Cir. 2013). The court assumes the complaint’s factual allegations are true and draws all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule does not apply 

to “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986), quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, to “allegations that contradict matters properly 

subject to judicial notice,” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the 

complaint, Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than 

unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of a claim’s elements do 

not alone suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Evaluation under Rule 12(b)(6) is a 

context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Tenth Claim: Conspiracy to Search Diary against Epperson, Hendricks, and 

Hardcastle 

This is defendants’ second attempt to dismiss this claim. The claims against the 

individual defendants are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The elements of a conspiracy claim under section 1983 are (1) the existence of an 

agreement, either express or implied, to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights and (2) a 

deprivation of rights resulting from the agreement. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 

2010). Although the conspiratorial agreement need not be overt, a complaint must include some 

factual basis to support the inference that defendants’ acts were propelled by the agreement. 

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999); Harris v. 

Clearlake Police Dep’t, No. 12-0864, 2012 WL 3042942, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012). The 

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plaintiff must state “specific facts to support the existence of a [claimed] conspiracy.” Buckey v. 

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Burns v. Cnty. of Kings, 883 F.2d 819, 

821 (9th Cir. 1989). Allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 

action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts . . . .” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. 

Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Vague claims that 

defendants were involved in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his rights will not suffice. See 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 

896, 937 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting conclusory conspiracy allegations are insufficient to provide 

notice to defendants); Cabrera v. Maddock, No. 10-00611, 2015 WL 3466398, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 

June 1, 2015) (noting “a bare allegation that defendants conspired to violate plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under section 1983”). “To 

be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each 

participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” United Steelworkers of 

Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). 

The Sacramento County defendants argue the third amended complaint does not 

allege any facts that would allow the court to infer either Epperson or Hendricks entered into an 

agreement to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 64-1 at 5. The Sacramento 

County defendants also argue plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of constitutional rights 

resulting from any agreement alleged. ECF No. 64-1 at 6–7. Specifically, these defendants 

contend plaintiff instead seems to be basing the section 1983 conspiracy claim on the “alleged 

violation of random state torts, such as defamation and false light.” ECF No. 64-1 at 5. 

The Placer County defendant, Hardcastle, argues plaintiff does not allege any 

direct communication between Hardcastle and Epperson, or discussions of plaintiff between 

Hardcastle and Epperson or Hendricks. ECF No. 66-1 at 11. Hardcastle also argues reproduction 

and distribution of the diary by Epperson, Hendricks and Hardcastle is not sufficient to show 

conspiracy. Id. 

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Plaintiff responds that defendants’ joint actions in disseminating the content of the 

diary would have been unlikely without an agreement of the defendants. ECF No. 70 at 5. 

Epperson forwarded the diary to Hendricks who forwarded it to Hardcastle, and Hendricks and 

Hardcastle subsequently discussed and acted jointly to target plaintiff. Id. at 4. Plaintiff further 

alleges Hardcastle, Epperson and Hendricks acted in concert when they coordinated 

communication with plaintiff’s friends over the course of months. Id. For example, Epperson 

and Hendricks conducted at least one interview jointly, even though the defendants worked for 

different sheriff’s departments. Id. Additionally, plaintiff alleges Hendricks told her interviewees 

that it was unusual for her to be operating outside of her county, and Hendricks and Hardcastle 

both stated on at least one occasion they and their counties were working together. ECF No. 70 

at 5. 

First, the court finds defendants’ argument that plaintiff has not stated a 

constitutional violation unpersuasive. Plaintiff has stated a violation of the Fourth Amendment, 

alleging defendants “violated [his] right to be free from unreasonable seizure of personal 

property,” in this case, the diary. TAC ¶ 149. 

Nevertheless, this claim is not adequately pled because plaintiff has not stated 

“specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. 

Plaintiff alleges Epperson, Hendricks and Hardcastle entered into a conspiracy to violate 

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. TAC ¶ 148. Plaintiff also alleges Epperson forwarded the 

diary to Hendricks, and they discussed the contents of the diary together. Id. ¶¶ 54, 55. However, 

plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the existence of an agreement between Epperson and 

Hendricks with respect to the initial constitutional violation, e.g., the unlawful search and seizure 

of the diary. 

In Lacey, supra, the Ninth Circuit noted the conspiracy allegations there, regarding 

one of the defendants, were conclusory because the complaint failed to provide the scope of the 

conspiracy: the role of one of the alleged conspirators, and when or how the conspiracy operated. 

693 F.3d at 937. Here, similarly, plaintiff has only provided allegations of “defendants 

gratuitously show[ing] copies of the diary to friends, acquaintances and persons,” “defendants 

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us[ing] their possession of diary to disseminate false, erroneous or fictional and injuries 

information,” and “Hardcastle, Epperson and Hendricks [meeting] together with Carter.” TAC 

¶ 148. Plaintiffs argue that the fact Hardcastle, Epperson and Hendricks coordinated 

communications and met together with plaintiff’s friends demonstrates a conspiracy. ECF No. 70 

at 5. Though in a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of a complaint are accepted as true, 

they still must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555. Here, plaintiff has not met this sufficiency hurdle. While “[d]irect evidence of 

improper motive or an agreement to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional right will only rarely be 

available,” plaintiff still needs to articulate specific facts that would allow the court to draw 

inferences that defendants shared a common goal of depriving plaintiff of his constitutional 

rights. The mere fact the defendants here communicated together is not enough. 

Accordingly, the Sacramento County and Placer County defendants’ motions to 

dismiss plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy are both GRANTED, but with leave to amend. 

B. Fourth Claim: Invasion of Privacy With Respect to Diary Against Hardcastle 

Law enforcement officers are shielded from suit unless their conduct violates 

“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The qualified immunity test comprises 

two inquiries: (1) whether the facts plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional 

right; and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of defendant’s 

alleged conduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The court has discretion in 

determining the order of deciding the two prongs. Id. at 240. Because qualified immunity is an 

affirmative defense, the burden of proof initially lies with the official asserting the defense. 

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812. Here, the court looks at the second prong, considering whether the right 

at issue was “clearly established” at the time of defendant’s alleged conduct, because defendant 

Hardcastle does not contest the first prong. 

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Under the second prong, the court must determine whether the constitutional right 

was “clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other grds. in 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223. A right is clearly established when “it would be clear to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. The 

reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct is judged “against the backdrop of the law at the time of 

the conduct.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). This prong, in essence, is “an 

inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the necessity of his actions.” 

Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) (original emphasis).6 In resolving 

this inquiry, the court determines whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff, show that defendants were reasonable in their belief that their conduct did not violate 

the Constitution. Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier, 

533 U.S. at 201). In other words, even if defendants’ actions did violate the Fourth Amendment, 

a “reasonable but mistaken belief that [their] conduct was lawful would result in the grant of 

qualified immunity.” Id.; see also Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 

2011) (an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for unlawful arrest if he had probable cause or 

if “it is reasonably arguable that there was probable cause for the arrest”) (emphasis in original). 

Qualified immunity thus “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

Hardcastle, one of the Placer County Detective defendants, argues he is entitled to 

qualified immunity for any claim relating to invasion of privacy caused by reading and 

distributing plaintiff’s diary, because plaintiff’s allegations do not show that Hardcastle knew or 

had any reason to believe that the methods used to obtain plaintiff’s diary were inadequate or 

incompetent. ECF No. 66-1 at 5–6. Specifically, Hardcastle argues plaintiff did not allege any 

facts to show Hardcastle had any communications with Sacramento County Deputies Epperson or 

Bustamante, who first located and seized the diary. Id. at 6. 

 6

 “While the constitutional violation prong concerns the reasonableness of the officer’s 

mistake of fact, the clearly established prong concerns the reasonableness of the officer’s mistake 

of law.” Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (italics in original). 

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Plaintiff counters he has had no opportunity to conduct discovery on what 

information Placer County Detective Hendricks, who first received the diary from Epperson, may 

have conveyed to Hardcastle along with the diary. ECF No. 71 at 4–5. Plaintiff argues the third 

amended complaint cannot be read to say Hardcastle made “appropriate inquiries” about the 

diary, and points to the court’s previous orders rejecting Hendricks’ analogous claim for qualified 

immunity. Id. at 5 (referencing ECF No. 38 at 13). 

The court agrees that the third amended complaint does not say anything akin to 

conceding Hardcastle made “appropriate inquiries” about the diary. Officers do “have an 

ongoing duty to make appropriate inquiries regarding the facts received.” Motley v. Parks, 432 

F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds by United States v. King, 687 

F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The lack of “appropriate inquiries,” therefore, must be taken 

in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223. As the court found with 

respect to Hendricks in the prior order, ECF No. 38 at 13, because the third amended complaint 

does not recount what information Hardcastle received from Hendricks or imply that Hardcastle 

made any “appropriate inquiries” about the diary, Hardcastle is not entitled to claim qualified 

immunity under the second prong at this stage of the proceedings. 

At this early stage, in considering the motion to dismiss, the court accepts 

plaintiffs’ allegations as true, and is not uncommon, finds granting qualified immunity would be 

premature. The issue may be raised again on a motion for summary judgment. See Akey v. 

Placer Cnty, No. 14-2402, 2015 WL 1291436, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015). 

Accordingly, defendant Hardcastle’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth claim on 

the grounds of qualified immunity is DENIED. 

C. Sixth Claim: Illegal and Unreasonable Search of Malott Ranch in Violation of 

California Civil Code Section 52.1 against Addison and Placer County 

1. Addison 

The California Bane Act prohibits any person from interfering by “threats, 

intimidation or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual . . . of rights 

secured by the Constitution . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). Although the Bane Act was initially 

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interpreted as applicable only to hate crimes, the California Supreme Court subsequently has 

broadened its application to include any unconstitutional acts “so long as those acts were 

accompanied by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Venegas v. Cnty. of L.A., 32 Cal. 

4th 820, 843 (2004). In Venegas, the court allowed a Bane Act claim to proceed with a federal 

section 1983 claim for an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 827. While in certain respects the 

functional equivalent of a section 1983 claim to succeed, a Bane Act claim requires more than 

evidence of a violation of rights. Davis v. City of San Jose, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1007 (N. D. Cal. 

2014). Additionally, if the improper means requirement is satisfied, then, unlike section 1983, the 

Bane Act can apply to statutory violations in addition to constitutional rights violations. Id.

In Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, a California Court of Appeal considered 

whether the Bane Act is satisfied “where coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation 

alleged, as it is in an unreasonably prolonged detention, or does the statute require a showing of 

coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself?” 203 Cal. App. 

4th at 958. In Shoyoye, a clerical error resulted in the unlawful detention of a prisoner who had 

been ordered released, and the California Court of Appeal rejected the prisoner’s Bane Act claim 

because: 

[W]here coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged, 

i.e., an over-detention in County jail, the statutory requirement of 

“threats, intimidation, or coercion” is not met. The statute requires 

a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in 

the wrongful detention itself. 

Id. at 959. 

After Shoyoye was decided, the same California Court of Appeal decided 

Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 968 (2013), in which an unresisting 

handcuffed plaintiff was beaten and pepper-sprayed during a wrongful arrest. There, the 

defendants argued: “the Bane Act [did] not apply because coercion is inherent in an unlawful 

arrest.” Id. at 978. The Bender court concluded the defendants’ contention had no merit, 

distinguishing Shoyoye factually. It found the Bane Act applied “because there was a Fourth 

Amendment violation—an arrest without probable case—accompanied by the beating and pepper 

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spraying of an unresisting plaintiff, i.e. coercion that is in no way inherent in an arrest, either 

lawful or unlawful.” Id. It went on: 

[A] wrongful detention that is “accompanied by the requisite 

threats, intimidation, or coercion”—“coercion independent from the 

coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself” that is 

“deliberate or spiteful”—is a violation of the Bane Act. To the 

extent any language in the federal cases suggests otherwise, that 

language does not reflect California law. 

217 Cal. App. 4th at 981 (internal citations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit recently has clarified whether a plaintiff bringing a Bane Act 

claim must introduce independent evidence showing threats, intimidation, or coercion. In Lyall 

v. City of Los Angeles, the Circuit found the district court had correctly determined a plaintiff in a 

search-and-seizure case had to have established threats or coercion beyond the coercion inherent 

in a detention or search in order to recover under the Bane Act. See 807 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th 

Cir. 2015). In reaching its decision, the Circuit referenced Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. 

App. 4th 41, 68–69, as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 6, 2015), in which the California Court 

of Appeal found that a wrongful arrest or detention alone does not state a cause of action under 

the Bane Act, which requires a plaintiff to show both an (1) intentional interference or attempted 

interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) that the interference or 

attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion. The court in Allen expressly 

stated that both are distinct elements under the Bane Act. Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 68 (citing 

Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 535 N.E. 2d 588, 590–93 (1989), which analyzed the 

Massachusetts Civil Rights Act of 1979 upon which the Bane Act was modeled). A plaintiff 

cannot attempt to satisfy two distinct elements by establishing only one, e.g., an unlawful or 

unconstitutional act. In Lyall, the Circuit found Allen representative of the clear rule emerging 

from California cases, and in applying its reasoning found the district court in the underlying trial 

court proceeding did not err in requiring plaintiffs to show threats, intimidation or coercion 

independent from acts inherent in their detention and search. 807 F.3d at 1196. 

Here, plaintiff alleges defendant Addison entered plaintiff’s property without a 

warrant, consent or exigent circumstances. TAC ¶ 125. However, merely interfering with a right, 

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even if unlawfully, is not sufficient to constitute a threat, intimidation or coercion under the Bane 

Act. Lyall, 807 F.3d at 1196. Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate that a constitutional violation 

“occurred and that the violation was accompanied by threats, intimidation or coercion within the 

meaning of the statute.” Chavez v. Cnty. of Kern, No. 12-1004, 2014 WL 412562, at *8 (E.D. Ca. 

Feb. 3, 2014). In evaluating the threatening or coercive conduct, the court must consider 

“whether a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the plaintiff, would have been intimidated 

by the actions of the defendants and have perceived a threat of violence.” Richardson v. City of 

Antioch, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Winarto v. Toshiba America 

Electronics Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2001) (officer’s act of kicking in 

a door, using a taser and screaming at plaintiff was sufficiently coercive). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any such action with respect to defendant Addison. 

Plaintiff alleges on August 20, 2013, Addison made a threat of obtaining an arrest warrant for 

plaintiff in a phone conversation with plaintiff’s brother. On the face of the third amended 

complaint, it does not appear this threat accompanied a violation of the alleged constitutional 

violation at issue here, that is, the unreasonable search of Malott Ranch; furthermore, plaintiff 

alleges the threat in support of a separate Bane Act violation, which the court addresses below. 

And though the third amended complaint alleges that Hardcastle in August 2013 told 

Ferneyhough to leave the ranch with her family because there would likely be a raid resulting in a 

gunfight, the complaint makes no allegation that Addison knew Hardcastle made such a 

statement. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Addison was selected for the visits to Malott Ranch 

because of his large size, and that Addison, along with other unnamed co-defendants, wore black 

swat-type technical gear with little or no indicia of law enforcement on these visits. TAC ¶¶ 74–

75. While these facts border on intimidation and coercion, in the context alleged here they are 

inherent aspects of the alleged unreasonable search. Specifically, plaintiff has not alleged 

defendant Addison used any force beyond that necessary to affect the search. Compare Ruiz v. 

Flores, No. 14-179, 2015 WL 966148, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (allegations failed to show 

defendants used force beyond that necessary to effect unlawful search where plaintiff’s 

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compliance was obtained by defendants physically restraining him and by intimidation and 

implicit threats of use of additional physical force), with Heinke v. Cnty. of Tehama Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, No. 12-2433, 2013 WL 3992407, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013) (allegations that 

defendant intimidated by withholding nutrition and medical care from isolated injured plaintiff to 

keep him quiet about the mistreatment sufficient to demonstrate a threat, intimidation or coercion)

and Bender, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 981 (court found “a showing of coercion separate and apart 

from the coercion inherent in an unlawful arrest” where officer also “deliberately and 

unnecessarily beat and pepper-sprayed the unresisting, already handcuffed plaintiff.”). 

The Bane Act was “intended to address only egregious interference with 

constitutional rights, not just any tort.” Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 959. In broadening the 

Bane Act’s application to any unconstitutional acts, the California Supreme Court did so “so long 

as those acts were accompanied by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Venegas, 32 

Cal. 4th at 843. Here, plaintiff merely repeats the same allegations that support his section 1983 

claim for unreasonable search. See TAC ¶¶ 119–23. He has not pled a Bane Act claim. 

Plaintiff has not stated a Bane Act claim for illegal and unreasonable search. 

2. Placer County 

As for Placer County, in California, a county can be held liable for the negligence 

of an employee under California Government Code section 815.2. See Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 

278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff made sufficient claims against individual police 

officers and county under California law for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, 

negligence and gross negligence). Section 815.2 provides that “[a] public entity is liable for 

injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the 

scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a 

cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 

815.2(a). California law in this way is different from federal law: “California . . . has rejected the 

Monell7 rule and imposes liability on counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts 

 7 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 

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of county employees; it grants immunity to counties only where the public employee would also 

be immune.” Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1016.

Given plaintiff has not stated a cause of action against Addison, the county cannot 

be held vicariously liable. 

The motion to dismiss by defendants Addison and Placer County as to plaintiff’s 

claim for illegal and unreasonable search in violation of California Civil Code section 52.1 is 

GRANTED with leave to amend. 

D. Ninth Claim: Threat to Obtain Arrest Warrant in Violation of California Civil 

Code Section 52.1 against Addison and Placer County 

1. Addison 

The Bane Act also is the basis of plaintiff’s ninth claim. “The essence of a Bane 

Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or 

coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do 

under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under 

the law.” Fenters v. Yosemite Chevron, 761 F. Supp. 2d 957, No. 05–1630, 2010 WL 5475945, at 

*34 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2010) (quoting Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal. App. 

4th 860, 883 (2007)); accord Bailey v. County of San Joaquin, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1179 (E.D. 

Cal. 2009). The statute expressly addresses when “speech alone” may provide a basis for a Bane 

Act claim: 

(j) Speech alone is not sufficient to support an action brought 

pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b)8

, except upon a showing that the 

speech itself threatens violence against a specific person or group of 

persons; and the person or group of persons against whom the threat 

is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence 

will be committed against them or their property and that the person 

threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the threat. 

 8

 Subdivision (a) is set forth above. See page 15 supra. Subdivision (b) reads as follows: 

“Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered 

with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision (a), may institute and 

prosecute in his or her own name . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code 52.1(b). 

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Cal. Civ. Code 52.1(j); see also Martin v. County of San Diego, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108 (S.D. 

Cal. 2009) (“although the language of § 52.1(a) does not mention ‘violence,’ § 52.1(j) explicitly 

provides that violence is a required element where the ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ is based 

purely upon a defendant’s statements.”). 

In the recent case Allen, a California Court of Appeal found there was no section 

52.1 violation where the complaint alleged only a threat of arrest and confiscation of property by 

the police officer. 234 Cal. App. 4th at 66). In Allen, the plaintiffs specifically did not allege the 

use of excessive or unreasonable force by the police or a threat of violence. Id. The plaintiffs 

alleged only they “had a reasonable belief violence would result should they disobey the orders of 

the police officers . . . .” Id. 

Here, plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendant Addison . . . threaten[ed] to have an arrest 

warrant issued from Placer County for [plaintiff]’s arrest should [plaintiff] refuse to meet with 

[d]efendant Addison to [d]efendant Addison’s satisfaction.” TAC ¶ 142. As in Allen, plaintiff 

has not alleged Addison used excessive force or threatened him with violence. The complaint 

thus lacks the factual allegations to support the elements required of a section 52.1 claim. 

2. Placer County 

Here as well, given that plaintiff has not stated a claim against Addison, the county 

cannot be held vicariously liable for Addison’s negligence under California Government Code 

section 815.2. 

The motions of defendants Addison and Placer County to dismiss plaintiff’s claim 

for threat to obtain arrest warrant in violation of California Civil Code section 52.1 are 

GRANTED, with leave to amend. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

defendants’ motions to dismiss as follows: 

(1) The Sacramento County and Placer County defendants’ motions to dismiss 

plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy are both GRANTED, with leave to amend. 

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 (2) Defendant Hardcastle’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on the grounds of 

qualified immunity is DENIED. 

(3) The motions of defendants Addison and Placer County to dismiss plaintiff’s 

claim for illegal and unreasonable search in violation of California Civil Code section 52.1 are 

GRANTED, with leave to amend. 

(4) The motions of defendants Addison and Placer County to dismiss plaintiff’s 

claim for threat of arrest warrant in violation of California Civil Code section 52.1 are 

GRANTED, with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint is due within 21 days from the date of this 

order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 11, 2016. 

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