Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01309/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01309-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANARD KITCHENS, 

 Plaintiff, 

v.

JOHN W. TYLER, et al.,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1: 15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM 

 (ECF No. 1)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 5.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail “to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted,” or that “seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

Case 1:15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS Document 8 Filed 10/08/15 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff identifies California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officer John W. Tyler, CHP 

special counsel Jonathan Rothman, and CHP Lieutenant Commander D.W. Knoff as 

Defendants. 

Plaintiff’s allegations can be summarized essentially as follows:

On May 9, 2010, Plaintiff attempted to commit “suicide by cop” during a traffic 

stop by Defendant Tyler in Hanford, California. Plaintiff was charged with attempted 

murder of a peace officer and wrongfully convicted. Plaintiff is currently serving his time 

at Pleasant Valley State Prison. 

Defendant Tyler lied to detectives of the King County Sheriff’s Office regarding the 

incident. In March 2012, at Plaintiff’s trial, Defendant Tyler committed perjury by 

testifying that Plaintiff stated “Don’t shoot. Don’t shoot. Please don’t kill me.” (ECF No.1 

at 4.) This testimony was the only evidence presented at trial as to Plaintiff’s intent.

During Plaintiff’s appeal of his conviction, he discovered there was an audio 

recording of the incident on May 9, 2010, which Defendant Tyler altered in order to 

conceal exculpatory evidence. In September 2013, Plaintiff requested on numerous 

occasions the complete original recording from Defendant Tyler. Defendant Tyler did not 

respond, which “Plaintiff concluded . . . was a deliberate act to conceal evidence so as to 

prevent Plaintiff from bringing a claim on direct appeal.” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) 

In December 2013, Plaintiff sent a request to CHP headquarters. Defendant 

Rothman responded that the requested documents were exempt from disclosure. 

Plaintiff contacted Internal Affairs who ordered that the records be produced. Defendant 

Rothman has yet to produce the documents because he wants to conceal exculpatory 

evidence and prevent Plaintiff from bringing a claim on appeal.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Tyler for altering and withholding 

Case 1:15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS Document 8 Filed 10/08/15 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

evidence and making false statements. Defendant Knoff failed to conduct a meaningful 

investigation of Plaintiff’s complaint by responding “I have determined that you had your 

day in court. . .” (ECF No. 1 at 13.) Defendant Knoff knew of Defendant Tyler’s 

misconduct and conspired with Defendant Rothman to prevent Plaintiff from appealing 

his conviction on this basis. 

As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff was not able to raise a claim 

regarding Defendant Tyler’s misconduct in his appeal. Defendants’ conduct has delayed 

Plaintiff’s pursuit of post-conviction relief. Because Plaintiff attempted to appeal his 

conviction, Defendants Tyler and Rothman retaliated against Plaintiff by concealing 

evidence and Defendant Knoff retaliated against Plaintiff by denying him access to the 

Internal Affairs grievance process.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, damages, and costs for Defendants’ violation of his 

First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Ketchum v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

Case 1:15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS Document 8 Filed 10/08/15 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility 

that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. 

B. Access to Courts

Plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the courts. See, e.g., Silva v. Di 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2011). The right is limited to bringing 

complaints to federal court in direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights 

actions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). It is not a right to discover such 

claims or to litigate them effectively once filed with a court. Id. at 354-55. A plaintiff must 

show that he suffered an “actual injury,” i.e. prejudice with respect to contemplated or 

existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous 

claim. Id. at 348-49. An “actual injury” is one that hinders the plaintiff’s ability to pursue 

a legal claim. Id. at 351. 

Where a prisoner asserts a backward-looking denial of access claim – one 

seeking a remedy for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim – he must show: 1) the 

loss of a “nonfrivolous” or “arguable” underlying claim, 2) “the official acts frustrating the 

litigation,” and 3) “a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but [that is] not 

otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

U.S. 403, 415, 417 (2002) (noting that a backward-looking denial of access complaint 

“should state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a), just as if it were being independently pursued.”). 

Case 1:15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS Document 8 Filed 10/08/15 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

It is not clear from Plaintiff’s allegations whether he complains of an injury with 

respect to contemplated litigation or a lost opportunity in his previously filed appeal. 

Plaintiff alleges at one point that his “direct appeal came to an end,” and then, at another 

point, that he has been delayed in bringing a claim, that he was prevented from doing so 

while represented by appointed counsel, and that he is now unable to afford a private 

attorney to assist him. (ECF No. 1 at 14-15.) To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to assert 

a backward-looking denial of access claim for his lost opportunity to present a claim in 

his appeal, he has not alleged what the “nonfrivolous” underlying claim would be, as 

required by Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a) or the remedy that can be awarded that is not 

otherwise available to him in a suit yet to be brought. Plaintiff should also clarify whether 

his criminal appeal is pending and the outcome of the appeal. See Morales v. City of 

Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) ("denial-of-access-to-the-courts claims 

arising from alleged police misconduct . . . are not ripe until the trial court proceedings 

are concluded adversely to the plaintiffs.")). Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

C. Retaliation

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff alleges that he was engaged in protected conduct (pursuing a legal 

action), and that Defendants took adverse action against him (concealed evidence and 

denied his Internal Affairs grievance). However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts as to 

whether these actions chilled his First Amendment rights or they would chill that of a 

person of ordinary firmness and whether or not the alleged adverse acts advanced 

legitimate correctional goals. Additionally, Plaintiff’s speculation that Defendants’ 

Case 1:15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS Document 8 Filed 10/08/15 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

conduct was motivated by his filing his appeal is insufficient. Plaintiff must allege facts to 

support a retaliatory mindset. See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(finding that a prisoner established a triable issue of fact regarding prison officials’ 

retaliatory motives by raising issues of suspect timing in addition to other evidence, 

including statements). Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

D. Heck Bar

Often referred to as the Heck bar, the favorable termination rule bars any civil 

rights claim which, if successful, would demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its 

duration. Such claims may be asserted only in a habeas corpus petition. Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (until and unless favorable termination of the 

conviction or sentence occurs, no cause of action under § 1983 exists); see also

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (the application of Heck “turns 

solely on whether a successful § 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a 

conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that affected the length of the prisoner’s 

confinement”); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997) (holding that a 

claim for monetary and declaratory relief challenging the validity of procedures used to 

deprive a prisoner of good-time credits is not cognizable under § 1983).

It appears from Plaintiff’s Complaint that a finding in his favor on his access to 

courts claim will necessarily render his conviction invalid. To the extent that Plaintiff 

claims Defendants withheld exculpatory evidence which would prove his innocence and 

negate an essential element of his crime (his intent) and he was denied the ability to 

raise such a claim on appeal, he must pursue the claim in a habeas corpus petition. If 

Plaintiff is merely seeking potentially exculpatory evidence (the audiotape recording of 

Defendant Tyler), he should so state and clarify how the relief he seeks will not

demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement or its duration.

Case 1:15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS Document 8 Filed 10/08/15 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

E. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks an order re-opening the CHP internal affairs investigation against 

Defendant Tyler. Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an “extraordinary 

remedy, never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 

(2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 

Plaintiff has failed to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits or that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor since he has failed to state a cognizable claim. He 

also fails to allege how he would suffer irreparable harm if the relief he seeks is not 

granted or that an injunction is in the public’s interest.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to 

amend, it is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his 

efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general 

rule, an “amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. Here, the amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under 

Case 1:15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS Document 8 Filed 10/08/15 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1.) is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his signed Complaint filed August 26, 

2015; 

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from service 

of this Order; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, 

failure to comply with a court order, and failure to prosecute, subject to the 

“three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 8, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01309-LJO-MJS Document 8 Filed 10/08/15 Page 8 of 8