Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00323/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00323-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LEWIS A. HENDERSON

Plaintiff, 

vs.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,

DMAFB, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV06-0323-TUC-FRZ (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint

in Part, filed on August 28, 2006, along with Exhibits A and B. On October 30, 2006,

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with Exhibits A through

V attached. On December 7, 2006, Defendants filed a reply. For reasons which follow,

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court GRANT Defendants' Motion

to Dismiss in Part. 

Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a civil service employee of the United States Air Force and DavisMonthan Air Force Base. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) 

On June 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United States District Court

invoking the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to “the Privacy Act 1974 552a(g)(1)(D).

(Complaint, ¶ 1) 

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants failed to keep confidential and properly

safeguard information as it relates to the IAW Air force Civilian Drug Testing

Agreement. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) 

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Plaintiff also alleges that he was not properly informed that his position was

subject to drug testing, that he was required to test twice in one month, and that

Defendants attempted to deal with him directly without a union representative, all in

violation of the bargaining agreement. (Complaint, ¶ ¶ 8, 9, 11.) Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of 2 million dollars. (Complaint,

¶ 18, p. 4.)

Discussion

Defendants' Position

Defendants move to have the Court dismiss the Plaintiff's collective bargaining

agreement claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants assert that federal

courts have no power to review federal personnel decisions and procedures unless such

review is expressly authorized by Congress. 

Plaintiff's Position

Plaintiff argues that he pursued administrative remedies through the grievance

procedure, and, through no fault of his own, was denied the ability to seek arbitration,

and thus, the claim is now ripe for judicial review.

Analysis

Motion to Dismiss in Part

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal is

appropriate when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1). When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the

district court may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve

factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States,

850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052, 109 S.Ct. 1312, 103

L.Ed.2d 581 (1989); See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4, 67 S.Ct. 1009,

1011 n.4 (1947) (“when a question of the District Court's jurisdiction is raised ... the

court may inquire by affidavits or otherwise, into the facts as they exist.”). 

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“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only that power

that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress

pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106

S.Ct. 1326, 1331 (1986) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 173-180,

2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct.

1673, 1675 (1994) (citations omitted). 

The claims in this case are in essence against the federal government, and are

thus barred by sovereign immunity unless the government has consented to suit, United

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965 (1983); and there is a substantive

basis for relief, Leath v. Stetson, 686 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Contract claims against the United States are controlled by the Tucker Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1491. The district courts and the Court of Claims have concurrent jurisdiction

over Tucker Act claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Where a claim is for an amount in

excess of $10,000, however, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction. See id.; 28

U.S.C. § 1491. 

Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction under the Privacy Act. (Complaint, p.1) The

Privacy Act, however, does not provide a jurisdictional basis for Plaintiff's contractual

claims, neither does it act to waive sovereign immunity over Plaintiff's contractual

claims. Plaintiff responds to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by alleging jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Federal Tort Claims Act). (Plaintiff's Opposition, p.9.)

The substance of the Complaint, and not Plaintiff's characterization, defines this Court's

jurisdictional review; see Mendenhall v. Kusicko, 857 F.2d 1378, 1378-79 (9th Cir.

1988) cf. Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1982); and Plaintiff's

claims based on violations of the collective bargaining agreement sound in contract. 

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Neither this Court, however, nor the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to

grant declaratory or injunctive relief when exercising jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.

North Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1985). This limitation

goes so far as to preclude § 702 (Administrative Procedure Act) waivers of sovereign

immunity for claims that are not for money damages, in which an adequate remedy is

not available elsewhere, and in which claims do not seek relief expressly or impliedly

forbidden by another statute. Tucson Airport Auth. v. General Dynamics Corp., 136

F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Plaintiff has alleged no monetary damages arising from a breach of the CBA.

Thus, Plaintiff has failed demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity as to these

claims, and this Court is without jurisdiction to review them. In light of the foregoing,

this Court recommends that the District Judge, after its independent review, GRANT

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint in Part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

for the reasons stated above. (Doc. No. 14).

Alternatively, this Court addresses Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's CBA

claims are precluded under the CSRA, and finds that, should the District Court find a

waiver of sovereign immunity, Plaintiff's CBA claims are precluded. 

The district court is prohibited from exercising subject matter jurisdiction when

it is determined that Congress intended to preclude review. Thunder Basin Coal, Co.

v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994). 

The Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), enacted in 1978, created an elaborate

framework for evaluating adverse personnel decisions, established standards for review

of such actions by the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), and provided for

judicial review of MSPB decisions in the Court of Claims or in the regional courts of

appeals.” Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 774 (1985). It is “an integrated scheme of

administrative and judicial review, designed to balance the legitimate interests of the

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1 It does appear that Plaintiff did elect to raise his Privacy Act

claims in the grievance procedure as set forth under the CSRA.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Orsay v. United

States Department of Justice, 289 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2202),

raises the issue of whether or not the CSRA would thus preclude

judicial review of his Privacy Act claims. Although the issue

was not raised in Defendants' Motion, it was raised in the Reply,

and, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), this Court has the power to

bring a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

of its own accord at anytime where jurisdiction is not available

to the litigants. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the

District Court, after it issues its decision on this Report and

Recommendation, refer this case back to the Magistrate Judge

for further briefing on this issue. 

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various categories of federal employees with the needs of sound and efficient

administration.” See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444, 108 S.Ct. 668 (1988)

In deciding questions of jurisdiction and preclusion, the Supreme Court has

determined that this Court must first ascertain where Plaintiff's claims fit within the

statutory scheme, as the CSRA provides different treatment for grievances depending

on the nature of the claim. Whitman v. Dep't. of Transp., ___ U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2014,

2015 (2006).

Defendants, at this point, do not argue that jurisdiction is precluded over

Plaintiff's Privacy Act claims.1

 Defendants are challenging this Court's subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims arising out of the alleged violations of the collective

bargaining agreement (“CBA”). The claims that this Court has determined arise

directly out of the CBA are (1) Plaintiff's allegations that he was not properly informed

that his position was subject to drug testing, (2) that he was required to test twice in one

month, and (3) that Defendant attempted to deal with him directly without a union

representative. (Complaint, ¶ ¶ 8, 9, 11.)

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Unlike the claims in Whitman, the claims at issue in this motion arise solely from

allegations of violations of the CBA, and thus, fall squarely under the Congressional

preclusion established by the CSRA:

Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any collective

bargaining agreement shall provide procedures for the settlement of

grievances, including questions of arbitrability. Except as provided in

subsections (d), (e), and (g) of this section, the procedures shall be the

exclusive administrative procedures for resolving grievances which fall

within its coverage.

5 U.S.C.A. § 7121(a). 

Subsection 2 allows the CBA to exclude any matter from the application of the

grievance procedure which is provided for in the agreement. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7121(a).

Subsections (d), (e), and (g), pertain to the election of remedies when the grievance

involves “prohibited personnel practices” as set forth under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b), 5

U.S.C. § 4303, and 5 U.S.C. § 7512. Plaintiff's CBA claims do not invoke these

“prohibited personnel practices,” and, thus, Plaintiff proceeds under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)

and the terms and scope of the CBA. 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff is subject to the Labor Management Relations

Agreement Between Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona and Local 2924 American

Federation of Government Employees (“LMA”, Doc. No. 14, Ex. A). (Doc. No. 14,

p.6.) Article 30 of the LMA details the grievance procedure of the CBA. Section 2, of

Article 30 describes the scope of the CBA, and includes grievances concerning: “(1)

Any matter relating to the employment of an employee, ...” and (2) any “claimed

violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of this Agreement, or any supplement to

this Agreement, or any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment.”

The claims made by Plaintiff under the CBA do not fall into the exceptions of the LMA,

found at Article 30, Section 2, paragraph b, and thus are subject to the grievance

procedures of the LMA. 

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Step 1 of the grievance requires that “any grievance shall first be taken up orally

or in writing by the concerned employee ... with the immediate supervisor ... with

authority to render a decision.” (LMA, Art.30 § 7, Step 1.) If the grievance is not

resolved satisfactorily at Step 1, the employee, or representative, may, at Step 2, submit

the matter in writing to the next level of supervision. (LMA, Art.30 § 7, Step 2.) If not

settled at Step 2, the employee and/or representative may submit the grievance to the

Support Group Commander for further consideration at Step 3. (LMA, Art.30 § 7, Step

3.) “If the grievance is not satisfactorily settled to the aggrieved party's satisfaction at

Step 3, the Union or the Employer may refer the matter to Arbitration.” (LMA, Art.30

§ 7, Step 4.)

Plaintiff raised his concerns in a letter to “Whom it May Concern” dated October

7, 2005. Regarding the three claims he raises as they relate to the CBA, only one of

those claims, that he was tested twice in one month, was alluded to in that letter, but not

directly raised as a violation. (Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,

Ex. M., Recommended Resolution, paragraphs (a) and (f.).) 

Victor Cruz, Branch Chief, MANR responded to Plaintiff's complaint,

identifying three items, paragraphs (b.), (e.), and (f.) for review and disposition. (Id.,

Ex. P.) Branch Chief Cruz informed Plaintiff, in writing, that there was no record for

a second test for him in December, 2004; that, from time to time, an employee will be

randomly selected and in some cases receive letters more than once but will not be

required to test more than once, but that the drug test process is random, and that

individuals are not singled out absent a work related incident and Plaintiff's situation

was standard operating procedure. (Id.) 

After meeting with Plaintiff and his representative, on March 16, 2006, Colonel

Cesar A. Rodriguez denied Plaintiff's grievance at Step 3, and memorialized the

outcome in a memorandum dated April 10, 2006. The memo states that Plaintiff had

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raised the issue that he had not received written notification that he was occupying a

Testing Designated Position. (Id., Ex. U.) 

Plaintiff attempted thereafter to pursue the case through arbitration, however, his

Union would not pursue the case beyond the Step 3 Grievance. (Id., Ex. T and

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 8) The minutes from the

meeting indicate that the problems with pursing the case further were the “evidence for

the amount of damage that Mr. Lewis received as result of the incident and the partial

remedy already received at the Step 3 Grievance.” (Id.) These issues were identified

as reasons why it would be difficult to win in arbitration. (Id.) 

Because Plaintiff is a member of the bargaining unit and since the resolution of

his claims are subject to the exclusive grievance procedures enunciated in the CBA, this

Court holds that it is without jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff's claims that his employer

violated the CBA. 

That Plaintiff failed to exhaust his CBA claims, by failing to raise them in the

grievance procedure at all, or by failing to raise them throughout the final step of

arbitration, whether his fault, or whether it was caused by the lack of fair representation

in the grievance process, is irrelevant. Had Plaintiff fully exhausted his claims, he

would not have been entitled to judicial review under the CSRA. See 5 U.S.C. §

7121(a)(1).

Recommendation

This Court recommends that the District Judge, after its independent review,

GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint in Part. (Doc. No. 14).

This Court further recommends that the District Court refer this case back to the

Magistrate Judge in order to establish a briefing schedule and submit a Report and

Recommendation as to this Courts subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining

Privacy Act claims. 

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Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CIV 06-323-

TUC-FRZ. 

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007.

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