Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07566/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07566-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAWRENCE EUGENE PATTERSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ELAINE TOOTELL, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 18-cv-07566-PJH 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

DISCUSSION 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 

is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

(citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 

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factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 

to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 

Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

LEGAL CLAIMS 

Plaintiff states that he received inadequate eye care and lost sight in his left eye. 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two 

elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the 

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059. 

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. 

The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly 

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affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are 

examples of indications that a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment. Id. at 

1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable 

steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must 

not only “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official 

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the 

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 

F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and 

prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” 

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is 

that of the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In California, the general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the 

two-year period set forth at California Civil Procedure Code section 335.1 and is the 

applicable statute in § 1983 actions. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th 

Cir. 2004); see also Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (limitations period 

for filing § 1983 action in California governed by residual limitations period for personal 

injury actions in California, which was then one year and codified in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 340(3)); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (enacted in 2002) (current codification of residual 

limitations period, which is now two years). 

California Civil Procedure Code section 352.1 recognizes imprisonment as a 

disability that tolls the statute of limitations for up to two years when a person is 

“imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court 

for a term less than for life.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). 

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On October 9, 2013, plaintiff complained to medical officials about blurry vision in 

his left eye. He was examined by medical staff and provided eye drops. On October 10, 

2013, plaintiff was seen by a doctor, after plaintiff suffered a sudden loss of vision in his 

left eye. Plaintiff was seen on October 16, 2013, by an eye doctor who diagnosed a 

retinal detachment and recommended plaintiff be seen by an outside retina specialist. 

The next day, October 17, 2013, plaintiff was seen by an outside retina specialist and 

surgery was performed on October 18, 2013, to reattach the retina. At a follow up 

appointment with the retina specialist on April 4, 2014, it was noted that plaintiff’s retina 

was reattached, but he had developed a cataract and a macular pucker. Another surgery 

was conducted on August 25, 2014, to correct these new problems. An additional 

surgery occurred on December 9, 2014. On June 1, 2016, the outside specialist 

concluded that the vision would not improve further. Beginning in October 2016, plaintiff 

was seen several times by ophthalmology and retina specialists at the University of 

California San Francisco. Plaintiff states that the delay of surgery led to the permanent 

loss of sight in his left eye and seeks money damages. 

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. It appears that many events 

described in the complaint occurred beyond the statute of limitations and would be 

untimely. Plaintiff should specifically identify which specific surgery was delayed that led 

to the loss of sight. Moreover, plaintiff’s underlying allegations do not set forth a 

constitutional claim. Plaintiff was promptly seen by medical staff and outside specialists 

and underwent surgery very quickly. He has not described deliberate indifference. While 

there could have been some small delays in receiving medical care, mere delay of 

medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 

indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985). 

CONCLUSION 

1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the 

standards set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed no later than March 29, 

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2019, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the 

words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint 

completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he 

wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may 

not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to file amended 

complaint may result in dismissal of this action. 

2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed 

“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 28, 2019 

 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

Case 4:18-cv-07566-PJH Document 8 Filed 02/28/19 Page 5 of 6
Service_Certificate _CRD 

rev. August 2018 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAWRENCE EUGENE PATTERSON, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ELAINE TOOTELL, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 18-cv-07566-PJH 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that: 

(1) I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of 

California; and 

(2) On 2/28/2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an 

interoffice delivery receptacle located in the Clerk’s office. 

 

Lawrence Eugene Patterson ID: D-82670

San Quentin State Prison 1 North Block 3 low

San Quentin, CA 94974 

Dated: 2/28/2019 

Susan Y. Soong 

Clerk, United States District Court 

By:________________________ 

Kelly Collins, Deputy Clerk to 

the Honorable Phyllis J. Hamilton 

Case 4:18-cv-07566-PJH Document 8 Filed 02/28/19 Page 6 of 6