Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02408/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02408-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rena Cook, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration, 

 Defendant. 

CV 14-02408-TUC-DCB (JR) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Plaintiff Rena Cook brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security 

denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social 

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Plaintiff presents two issues on appeal: 

whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed to accord the appropriate weight 

to examining physician testimony; whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

findings on her ability to concentrate and remember; whether substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s evaluation of lay-witness statements; and whether the ALJ 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 1 of 17
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

properly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility. Pending before the court is an Opening 

Brief filed by Plaintiff (Doc. 18), the Commissioner’s Brief (Doc. 22), and Plaintiff’s 

Reply Brief (Doc. 23). Based on the pleadings and the administrative record 

submitted to the Court, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, 

after its independent review, remand this case for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 A. First Application 

 Plaintiff filed an application for DIB in February 2005, alleging disability 

since January 14, 2005. R. at 270. The Social Security Administration denied 

Plaintiff’s application for DIB initially and upon reconsideration. R. at 270. Plaintiff 

requested a hearing before an ALJ and, in a decision issued on April 13, 2007, the 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the SSA. R. at 

277. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s 

decision. R. at 209. Plaintiff then sought review by the District Court and, on March 

1, 2010, United States Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro affirmed the 

Commissioner’s final decision. See Cook v. Astrue, No. CV-08-636-TUC-DTF (D. 

Ariz.) 

B. Second Application 

 In March 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for both DIB and SSI benefits, 

alleging disability since April 14, 2007. R. at 414, 421. After her applications were 

denied initially and on reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an ALJ. R. at 

278, 282, 289, 292, 296. On November 21, 2011, Plaintiff appeared with counsel 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 2 of 17
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

and testified before ALJ George W. Reyes. R. at 95-131. By order dated February 3, 

2012, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled at step four. R. at 216-229. 

On August 29, 2013, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff’s request for review and 

remanded her claims to an ALJ for readjudication. R. at 235-37. 

 After remand, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified again before ALJ 

Reyes. R. at 67-95. In addition, Ruth Van Vleet testified as a vocational expert 

(“VE”). R. at 83-93. On March 28, 2014, the ALJ rendered a partially favorable 

decision. R. at 23-38. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of status 

post cervical fusion, obesity, fibromyalgia, affective disorder, and an anxiety 

disorder. R. at 26. However, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled 

from April 14, 2007 through October 1, 2012 because she could perform her past 

relevant work as a substance abuse counselor as that job is generally performed. R. 

at 36-37. However, for the period from October 1, 2012 through March 28, 2014, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work and was disabled 

pursuant to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. R. at 37-38. The ALJ thus found 

Plaintiff was not entitled to DIB (because she was not disabled on or before the date 

she was last insured, September 30, 2009), but that she was disabled for SSI purposes 

as of October 2, 2012. R. at 38. 

 On September 5, 2014, the ALJ’s March 28, 2014 decision became the 

Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review. R. at 1. This appeal followed. 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 3 of 17
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 For purposes of Social Security benefits determinations, a disability is defined 

as: 

The inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. 

 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation 

process. It is claimant’s burden to show (1) he has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, (2) he has a severe physical or mental impairment, and (3) the 

impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) precludes him from doing his past work. If at any step the Commissioner 

determines that a claimant is or is not disabled, the inquiry ends. If the claimant 

satisfies his burden though step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show 

at step five that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work that exists in 

substantial numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

 In this case, Plaintiff was denied at step four of the evaluation process. At 

step four of the evaluation, a claimant has the burden of showing that she can no 

longer perform her past relevant work. Lewis, 281 F.3d at 1083 (citing Pinto v. 

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Residual 

functional capacity is defined as that which an individual can still do despite her 

limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. If the ALJ concludes the claimant has the RFC to 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 4 of 17
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

perform past work, the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). An RFC finding is 

based on the record as a whole, including all physical and mental limitations, whether 

severe or not, and all symptoms. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96–8p. 

 The ALJ’s decision to deny disability benefits will be vacated “only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere 

scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 

F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). In evaluating whether the decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both 

the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from it. 

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

(“findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”). If there is sufficient evidence to support 

the Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. 

See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir.1990). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 A. Dr. Hassman’s opinion 

 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erroneously evaluated the opinion of examining 

physician, Jeri Hassman, M.D. After examining Plaintiff on December 22, 2010, Dr. 

Hassman completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related 

Activities (Physical). R. at 714-717. In the Statement, Dr. Hassman indicated that 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 5 of 17
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Plaintiff’s conditions would impose limitations “for 12 continuous months.” R. at 

714. The doctor opined that in an eight hour day, Plaintiff could occasionally lift 10 

pounds and frequently lift less than 10 pounds. Addressing limitations in standing, 

walking and sitting, the Dr. Hassman indicated that Plaintiff had the ability to do so 

for “6-8 hours in an 9 hour day,” but she would need to “change position at least 

every forty-five minutes for at least five minutes.” R. at 715. The doctor also 

indicated that Plaintiff had a limited ability to see, but an unlimited ability to hear and 

speak, and that she could occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl, but 

should never use a ladder or crawl. R. at 716. Finally, Dr. Hassman indicated that 

Plaintiff should not work around heights, moving machinery, extremes in 

temperature, chemicals, dust/fumes or gases. R. at 716. 

 In the Decision, the ALJ stated that “Dr. Hassman opined that the claimant 

was capable of a range of sedentary work.” R. at 35. Plaintiff contends that this 

conclusion ignores Dr. Hassman’s statement that Plaintiff “need[ed] to be able to 

change position at least every hour for at least five minutes.” Opening Brief, pp. 8-9. 

By ignoring that part of the opinion, Plaintiff contends, the ALJ failed to fully 

examine Dr. Hassman’s opinion about sustained work, did not provide the required 

specific evidence to reject that part of the opinion, and failed to recognize that Dr. 

Hassman’s opinion was supported by her own clinical findings. Id., pp. 9-11. 

 As the Commissioner recognizes, the only portion of Dr. Hassman’s opinion 

that was not incorporated into the ALJ’s RFC assessment was the need to be able to 

change position “at least every hour for at least five minutes.” That portion of Dr. 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 6 of 17
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Hassman’s opinion, the Commissioner contends, was properly rejected because 

“[t]he ALJ articulated that Dr. Hassman’s opinion was contradicted by later record 

evidence and undermined by the doctor’s lack of access to Plaintiff’s medical 

records.” Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the general 

statements cited by the Commissioner are not enough to support the ALJ’s decision. 

 First, the opinions of examining physicians, like those of treating physicians, 

are given more weight than the opinions of a non-examining physicians, Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), and the ALJ must provide clear and 

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting a treating or an 

examining physician’s uncontradicted opinion. Id.; Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 

725 (9th Cir. 1998). Even where the examining physician’s opinion is controverted, 

the ALJ cannot reject the controverted opinion without providing specific and 

legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. The ALJ 

did not satisfy that burden here. 

 The ALJ never mentions in the Decision that Dr. Hassman believed that 

Plaintiff would have to change position at least every hour for at least five minutes. 

By not doing so, the Court cannot with any level of confidence conclude that the 

limitation was rejected at all, or if it was, on what basis. In fact, by not mentioning 

the limitation, the Court is left to ponder whether the ALJ found it not credible or 

merely omitted it due to oversight. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 

2002) (ALJ can reject examining physician’s opinion “by setting out a detailed and 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 7 of 17
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.”). Thus, as it stands, the Decision does 

not contain the specific and legitimate reasons that would support the rejection of Dr. 

Hassman’s opinion on this point. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d at 1216; Reddick, 

157 F.3d at 725. 

 Of course the omission would be of no import if, even if considered, it would 

not impact Plaintiff’s RFC and employability. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 

409 (2009) (“[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon 

the party attacking the agency’s determination.”). However, at the hearing before the 

ALJ, Plaintiff’s counsel included the limitation in the hypothetical she offered to the 

VE, who responded: 

 I believe based on my understanding of your hypothetical, yes. 

With the change of every 45 minutes and having to take a few minutes 

break, I think you said up to 5 minutes out of an hour, it’s going to start 

to decrease her ability to work on a full-time basis. 

R. at 93. With this testimony in the record, it is apparent that the limitation, if not 

rejected by the ALJ, would have some impact on the ALJ’s decision. Thus, because 

the limitation was not expressly disregarded in the Decision and was not included in 

the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE, the Court cannot fully and confidently examine the 

ALJ’s RFC determination. 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 8 of 17
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

B. Limitations in concentration, focus and memory 

 1. The ALJ’s finding 

 In the Decision, the ALJ found that, “due to her psychological impairments, 

[Plaintiff] also has moderate difficulty with concentrating, focusing, and memory that 

are, or can be, controlled with medication without significant side effects.” R. at 31-

32. Plaintiff objects to the finding, asserting that it is susceptible to two different 

interpretations. Opening Brief, p. 16. The two interpretations offered by Plaintiff 

are: 

 First, the ALJ may have meant that [Plaintiff] actually had 

moderate difficulty with concentrating, focusing, and remembering, 

i.e., that [Plaintiff] actually had a limited ability to concentrate, focus, 

and remember. [Plaintiff ] calls this the First Interpretation. 

 Second, the ALJ may have meant that [Plaintiff] did not have 

any deficit with respect to concentration, focus or memory because 

whatever deficit she had was controlled or could be controlled by 

medications without significant side effects. [Plaintiff] refers to this as 

the Second Interpretation. 

Id. Plaintiff then proceeds to argue that, under either interpretation, the ALJ erred. 

Specifically, she contends that, under the First Interpretation, she was precluded from 

performing her past relevant work, and under the Second Interpretation, the ALJ’s 

Decision was not supported by substantial evidence. On this point, however, the 

Court finds that the ALJ’s statement was clear and that neither the First Interpretation 

nor the Second Interpretation accurately reflects the ALJ’s finding. 

 As does the Commissioner, the Court finds the ALJ’s statement unambiguous: 

the Plaintiff has “moderate difficulty with concentrating, focusing, and memory that 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 9 of 17
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

are, or can be, controlled with medication without significant side effects.” The 

statement is clear in the Decision and it was clearly presented to the VE. R. at 86. 

 2. The ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Peck’s opinions 

 Plaintiff next urges the Court to find that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the 

opinion of Denny Peck, Ph.D. Dr. Peck diagnosed chronic PTSD in partial 

remission, ADHD, depressive disorder, cognitive disorder, histrionic personality 

traits, and a GAF of 55. R. at 917. Based on his evaluation of Plaintiff, Dr. Peck 

concluded that “[t]he combination of impairments rise to the level of severe 

impairment and meet the guidelines from the Social Security Administration. 

[Plaintiff] is unable to work in any position that [sic] she has experience or training.” 

R. at 919. Dr. Peck then indicated that, although she had prior episodes of 

decompensation, Plaintiff became disabled in January 2005. R. at 919. 

 In the Decision, the ALJ gave “limited weight” to Dr. Peck’s opinions, finding 

them “too restrictive in light of the overall evidence . . . .” R. at 29. Plaintiff argues 

that the evidence cited by the ALJ does not undermine Dr. Peck’s opinions. In 

making her argument, however, Plaintiff parses the support cited by the ALJ and 

contends that several specific entries do not support the ALJ’s conclusion. However, 

in doing so, she merely offers her interpretation of the record, which does not 

undermine the specific and legitimate reasons offered by the ALJ in support of his 

Decision. 

 In the Decision, the ALJ states that Dr. Peck’s assessment did not “address or 

account for the fact that the claimant traveled ‘often’ between Tucson and New 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 10 of 17
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Mexico to visit her fiancé,” that she often took care of her sick fiancé, and that her 

GAF scores reported through COPE indicated no more than mild symptoms.” 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not explain how any of those statements undercut 

Dr. Peck’s opinions. Dr. Peck opined that Plaintiff’s “psychiatric impairments with 

her physical diagnoses make it impossible to work at any employment.” R. 919. In 

light of that opinion, it was legitimate for the ALJ to note that Dr. Peck did not 

mention Plaintiff’s physical activities and to note her GAF scores did not appear to 

support the degree of limitation described by Dr. Peck. Similarly, Dr. Peck reported 

that Plaintiff was hostile. It was therefore legitimate for the ALJ to note that she had 

been reported as having a “good sense of humor and was smart and confident.” R. at 

29. 

 Plaintiff contends it was error for the ALJ to rely on the April 19, 2005 

opinion of Thomas McCabe, Ph.D (R. at 959-962) because it predates her alleged 

onset date. However, as the Commissioner points out, Dr. Peck stated that Plaintiff 

became disabled in January 2005. R. at 919. Thus, because it was prepared during 

the period for which Dr. Peck found Plaintiff disabled, Dr. McCabe’s evaluation was 

relevant to evaluating Dr. Peck’s overall opinion. 

 Plaintiff argues that the evaluation performed in November 2010 by Judith 

Kroese, Ph.D., could not properly be used to devalue Dr. Peck’s opinions because 

“Dr. Kroese did not appreciate that [Plaintiff] had PTSD, ADHD, psychological 

factors affecting physical condition, and histrionic traits.” Opening Brief, p. 22. 

Plaintiff’s contention ignores that, despite not diagnosing each of Plaintiff’s alleged 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 11 of 17
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

psychiatric conditions, Dr. Kroese was aware of Plaintiff’s prior medical and 

psychiatric history and in fact expressly referenced allegations of PTSD (R. at 704) 

and ADHD (R. at 705). That Dr. Kroese did not diagnose those maladies is not 

evidence that her opinion could not be used to evaluate Dr. Peck’s opinions. To the 

contrary, it was perfectly legitimate for the ALJ to point out the discrepancies 

between the two doctors’ opinions. 

 Thus, the ALJ’s findings provide a specific and legitimate basis to discount 

Dr. Peck’s opinion in favor of other opinions which the ALJ found were better 

supported by the evidence and more consistent with the record as a whole. 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2001). Because the ALJ’s 

partial rejection of Dr. Peck’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence, the Court 

finds that the ALJ did not improperly discount it. 

C. Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Testimony

 The ALJ must support his credibility determination “with specific, clear and 

convincing reasons.” Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234 

(9th Cir.2011). “The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s 

credibility, including (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the 

claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the 

symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. If the ALJ’s 

finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in secondCase 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 12 of 17
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

guessing.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 In relation to the ALJ’s credibility assessment, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ 

was wrong to use her activities “without explaining how one of those activities 

contradicted any specific allegation she made,” and because he “did not identify any 

activity in which [Plaintiff] engaged that had any relevance to her highly skilled past 

relevant work as a substance abuse counselor.” Opening Brief, p, 24. These 

arguments do not support a finding of error. 

 First, there is nothing in the Decision that indicates that the ALJ was 

evaluating Plaintiff’s psychiatric, rather than physical, limitations when discussing 

her activities of daily living. In the Decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

impairments included status post cervical fusion, obesity, and fibromyalgia. R. at 26. 

Her activities, which included travel, volunteer work, and taking care of her fiancé, 

are certainly relevant to her physical impairments. Thus, the ALJ’s purported failure 

to link her activities to her ability to work as a substance abuse counselor was not 

necessary. 

 Second, Plaintiff’s argument entirely ignores a number of other reasons the 

ALJ cited in his credibility analysis. The ALJ reiterated and adopted the credibility 

analysis from her previous application, which was found by the District Court to be 

supported by substantial evidence, and augmented it with his own, updated analysis. 

The reasons cited include not only the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony 

and her activities of daily living, but also inconsistency with the medical record and 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 13 of 17
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

sparse treatment. Plaintiff makes no argument related to those findings. These 

constitute substantial evidence and support the ALJ’s decision and without any 

argument to the contrary, render harmless any improper reliance on Plaintiff’s 

activities of daily living. Batson v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 

1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 D. Lay witness testimony 

 The ALJ rejected the opinion of Larry Whitmer, Plaintiff’s fiancé. In support 

of his evaluation, the ALJ first noted that the statement “basically supports the 

allegations of the claimant that she has disabling limitations,” and then found the 

statement was “not substantiated by the overall medical evidence and activities of 

daily living,” and did not “provide persuasive evidence that the [Plaintiff] was able to 

function to a lesser extent than that determined in the residual functional capacity.” 

R. at 35. 

 Lay testimony such as that offered by Mr. Whitmer must be taken into account 

unless the ALJ “expressly determined to disregard such testimony and gives reasons 

germane to each witness for doing so.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 

2011). If the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the 

ALJ need only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different 

witness. Valentine v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th

Cir. 2009. 

 In the Decision, the ALJ rejects the testimony of Mr. Whitmer as inconsistent 

with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and because it was not substantiated by the 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 14 of 17
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

medical evidence. An ALJ may not reject lay testimony solely because it is not 

supported by objective medical evidence. Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th

Cir. 2009). However, where, as here, “lay witness testimony does not describe any 

limitations not already described by the claimant, and the ALJ's well-supported 

reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony apply equally well to the lay witness 

testimony, it would be inconsistent with our prior harmless error precedent to deem 

the ALJ's failure to discuss the lay witness testimony to be prejudicial per se.” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ’s clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, as discussed above, 

apply with equal force to the testimony of her fiancé. Thus, the ALJ did not err in 

evaluating his testimony. 

 E. Remedy 

 The decision whether to remand a matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) or to order an immediate award of benefits is within the discretion of 

the district court. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, 

when a court reverses an administrative agency determination, the proper course is to 

remand to the agency for additional proceedings. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 

886 (9th Cir. 2004). Generally, an award of benefits is appropriate only when: 

 (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be 

resolved before the determination of disability can be made, and (3) it 

is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the 

claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 15 of 17
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). An award of benefits is 

appropriate where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative 

proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed. Varney v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 Here, an outstanding issue remains to be resolved. On remand, the ALJ must 

reevaluate Dr. Hassman’s opinion and provide his interpretation thereof. In light of 

that evaluation, the ALJ may also find it necessary to reevaluate Plaintiff’s RFC and 

work abilities. As such, the Court recommends that this matter be remanded. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, enter an order grating Plaintiff’s request 

to reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and remand to the ALJ to conduct 

further proceedings. 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. No reply briefs shall be filed unless 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 16 of 17
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

leave to do so is granted by the district court. If any objections are filed, this action 

should be designated case number: CV 14-2408-TUC-DCB. Failure to timely file 

objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 28th day of August, 2015. 

Case 4:14-cv-02408-DCB Document 24 Filed 08/28/15 Page 17 of 17