Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00013/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00013-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 1:08cv0013

 

 

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESNO DIVISION

PAUL EDWIN GAUL, Civil No. 1:08-0013 BTM

Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

JAMES HARTELY, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Paul Edwin Gaul, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of California challenging a 2006 decision of the Board of Parole Hearings. Based on a review

of the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of the Answer, the Lodgments submitted by Respondent, Petitioner’s Traverse and other

supporting documents, the Court ORDERS the Petition be DENIED. 

II. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS RAISED IN FEDERAL PETITION

Paul Edwin Gaul (“Gaul”) is a state prisoner who was sentenced in 1994 to

15-years-to-life for second degree murder. On September 15, 2005, the California Board of

Parole Hearings (“Board”) granted him parole. On January 30, 2006, the Governor reversed the

/ / /

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Board’s decision. (Resp’t Ex. 1, Att. 1.) On April 28, 2006, the Board notified Gaul that

another parole suitability hearing would be held on September 6, 2006. (Id., Att. 3.) 

On June 16, 2006, Gaul filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Superior Court for Los

Angeles County. In the petition, Gaul claimed that the Board’s 2005 suitability determination

became final 120 days after the decision and, because the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s

decision came after the 120 day time limit, the Board was not permitted to conduct subsequent

suitability hearings. Under such circumstances, Gaul argued, the Board must hold a “Progress

Hearing.” (Resp’t Ex. 1 at 5-9.) He claimed that if the Board were to hold another “suitability”

hearing, it would be a violation state law and his federal due process rights. (See id. at 6, 8-9.)

Gaul asked the state court to prohibit the Board from holding another parole consideration

hearing and find that they may only hold subsequent “progress hearings.” (See id. at 10.) The

superior court denied the petition on May 16, 2007. (Resp’t Ex. 2.) 

Gaul then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal on July 16,

2007, raising the same claims contained in his petition to the superior court. (Ex. 3.) The

appellate court denied the petition on July 19, 2007. (Resp’t Ex. 4.) On July 30, 2007, Gaul

filed a petition with the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Ex. 5.) The petition was denied on

September 12, 2007. (Resp’t Ex. 6.)

Gaul filed the instant federal petition for habeas corpus on January 2, 2008. Gaul raises

the same claims in his federal petition as those presented in his state court petitions. He again

argues it is a due process violation of a state-created liberty interest for the Board to schedule

a subsequent parole consideration hearing when there is no state regulatory or statutory authority

authorizing such a hearing. (See Pet. at 5-7.) 

III. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current petition is governed by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Gaul must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds

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1

 Section 2269(a) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations states: “At [the Progress

Hearing] the hearing panel shall determine whether a previously set parole date should be advanced

because of the prisoner’s conduct in prison or any change in circumstance under the criteria in Section

2290.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2269(a).

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by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus

claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result

of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision

will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

As discussed above, Gaul claims the procedure by which the Board seeks to review his

parole suitability amounts to a due process violation of a state protected liberty interest. Gaul

alleges specifically that, under state law, the Board’s 2005 suitability determination became

“final” 120 days after the hearing, on January 13, 2006. Thus, the Board’s decision to grant

Gaul parole had already become “final” when the Governor reversed the decision on January 30,

2006. Gaul claims that as a result, the Board is not permitted to conduct subsequent suitability

hearings. Rather, under such circumstances, Gaul argues, the Board must hold a “Progress

Hearing” pursuant to 15 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2269(a).1

 (See Pet. at 5-7.) He claims failure

to do so is a violation of state law and amounts to a violation of his federal due process rights.

(See id.)

Because there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court on these claims, the

Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision which addressed the claims, the

Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In denying the claim, the superior court stated:

The Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) found petitioner suitable for

parole at a parole consideration hearing held on September 15, 2005, pending

approval from the Governor. The Governor is authorized to reverse the Board’s

grant of parole. (Pen. Code §3041.2.) In this case, the Governor exercised his

authority to reverse the Board’s grant. The Board’s decision did not become final

because it was not approved by the Governor. Because petitioner has not been

found suitable for parole, the Board may hold subsequent hearings to determine

petitioner’s suitability for parole. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

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 California Constitution, article V, section 8 (b) provides, in pertinent part, “No decision of the

parole authority of this state with respect to the granting, denial, revocation, or suspension of parole of

a person sentenced to an indeterminate term upon conviction of murder shall become effective for a

period of 30 days, during which the Governor may review the decision subject to procedures provided

by statute.”

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(Resp’t Ex. 2 at 1.)

To the extent Gaul argues that the holding of subsequent parole hearings would be

erroneous as a matter of California law, he fails to state a cognizable claim. “[F]ederal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). 

Moreover, to the extent Gaul’s claims that his federal due process rights were violated,

he is not entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under California law, inmates are

granted parole consideration hearings before panels. While panel decisions may indicate that

they “grant” parole, these decisions are, in fact “proposed decisions [which] shall be reviewed

prior to their effective date.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2041(a). A decision of a panel finding

an inmate suitable for parole becomes effective 120 days after the hearing date. Cal. Pen. Code,

§ 3041(b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2041(h). In California, however, the Governor possesses

ultimate authority to affirm, modify, or reverse the decisions. Cal. Const., art. V, § 8.2

 “In order

to allow the Governor time to act, no decision [by the Board] granting, denying, revoking, or

suspending parole for such a prisoner is final for a period of 30 days.” In re Tokhmanian, 168

Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1273 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Pen.Code, § 3041.2. The Governor’s 30-day

period commences on the effective date of the panel’s decision. In re Arafiles, 6 Cal. App. 4th

1467, 1474 (Ct. App. 1992). “As the panel’s decision granting parole is not effective for 120

days to allow the board time to act, the Governor’s 30-day period does not begin until after that

time.” Tokhmanian, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 1273. When reviewing constitutional claim on habeas

corpus, a federal court must defer to a state’s interpretations of its own statutes and regulations.

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; see also Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2003)

(stating that “it is axiomatic that we defer to [the state courts] regarding predicate questions

related to the interpretation of the parole regulations.”) 

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Because the state acted in accordance with a proper interpretation of its own statutes, no

due process violation has occurred. As the state court found, the Board’s parole grant became

effective on January 13, 2006, after which the Governor had until February 12, 2006 to act on

the Board’s decision. See id. The Governor reversed the Board’s decision on January 30, 2006.

(Resp’t Ex. 1, Att. 1.) Therefore, the Board’s decision granting Gaul parole never became final.

Accordingly, the Board must hold subsequent suitability hearings to determine Gaul’s parole

suitability. Gaul was not “granted” parole effective January 13, 2006, and thus he is not entitled

to a progress hearing under California law. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2269. 

Finally, the state’s court’s denial of Gaul’s claim is also neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Courts have held that

“California prisoners whose sentences provide for the possibility of parole have a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole release date, a liberty interest

[that is] protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause.” Irons v. Carey, 505

F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1128 (9th Cir. 2007). There is, however, no clearly established law requiring the Board to hold

a “progress hearing” upon the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s suitability determination. 

Accordingly, Gaul is not entitled to habeas relief. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77

(2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for writ of habeas corpus is therefore DENIED.

Further, because Petitioner has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right,” the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Clerk

shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 25, 2010

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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