Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00592/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00592-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1330 Breach of Contract

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

ASD SPECIALTY HEALTHCARE, )

INC., etc., )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:05cv592-MHT

) (WO) 

ROBERT G. HICKES, M.D., )

P.C., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the court on a motion for

summary judgment filed by plaintiff ASD Specialty

Healthcare (“ASD”) against defendant Robert G. Hickes,

M.D., P.C. (“P.C.”). Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is

appropriate when “there is no genuine issue of material

fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.”

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1. ASD asked that Hickes “[a]dmit that, beginning in

2004, Hickes ordered and received from Plaintiff medical,

pharmaceutical and other products on an ongoing basis.”

Doc. No. 36, ex. 2, Request for Admissions, para. I.

Hickes responded: 

“Denied. However, admitted that Hickes’

professional corporation ordered and

received such products.” 

Doc. No. 36, ex. 3, Response to Request for Admissions,

para. I.

2

Robert G. Hickes, a physician, does not dispute that

he ordered and failed to pay for $ 177,253.77 worth of

medical products from ASD, a supplier of medical and

pharmaceutical products. However, in his first response

to ASD’s request for admissions, Hickes, who was named

only as an individual in ASD’s original complaint, denied

that he individually ordered and received these products.

Instead, he asserted that the P.C., the professional

corporation owned entirely by him (that is, his medical

practice), bore responsibility.1

 Subsequently, in an

apparent change of strategy, Hickes amended his responses

Case 1:05-cv-00592-MHT-VPM Document 46 Filed 08/07/06 Page 2 of 8
2. Doc. No. 36, ex. 4, Amended Response to Request

for Admissions, para. I.

3. Docs. No. 31 and 32.

4. ASD styles its second count against the P.C. as

“claim for open book account.” This locution does not

appear to exist in Alabama law, although it is a

statutory claim in other jurisdictions. Waldman v.

Englishtown Sportswear, Ltd., 92 A.D.2d 833, 836 (N.Y.

App. Div. 1983)(finding that an action on a book account

is purely statutory, and that no New York statute

authorizes such an action). It is clear from ASD’s

representations to the court and the law cited in its

motion for summary judgment that it intends to assert a

claim for an account stated. Because ASD alleged both a

claim for an open book account and a claim for account

stated in its original complaint against Hickes as an

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to admit personal liability for the debt, omitting all

mention of the P.C.2

As a result of these admissions, ASD filed a motion

for summary judgment against Hickes as an individual.

Hickes did not dispute this motion, and the court granted

summary judgment in favor of ASD in an opinion and order

dated February 23, 2006.3

 ASD also amended its complaint

to assert state-law claims of “unjust enrichment” and

“account stated” against the P.C.4

 Currently pending

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individual, it is unclear why it asserted only the

nonexistent claim against the P.C. Nonetheless, the

court will construe the claim as one for account stated.

5. Affidavit of Robert G. Hickes, M.D. (Doc. No.

40).

4

before the court is ASD’s second motion for summary

judgment on the two counts asserted against the P.C.

To summarize the minimal factual record in this case:

(1) neither the existence of the debt nor Hickes’s

individual responsibility to pay it have been disputed;

(2) Hickes first admitted that the P.C. bore

responsibility, and then amended this response to admit

only individual responsibility; and (3) Hickes has filed

an affidavit asserting that all products purchased from

ASD were invoiced to him as an individual, not to the

P.C.5

 

 ASD does not assert a breach-of-contract claim

against the P.C., yet the claim of account stated depends

upon the existence of a contract between the parties:

Case 1:05-cv-00592-MHT-VPM Document 46 Filed 08/07/06 Page 4 of 8
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“The term ‘account’ covers any item of indebtedness by

contract, express or implied.” Wilhite v. Beasley, 497

So. 2d 103, 105 (Ala. 1986) (quoting Martin v.

Stoltenborg, 142 So. 2d 257, 259 (Ala. 1962)). To

establish a prima facie case for a claim of account

stated, ASD must prove: “(1) a statement of the account

between the parties is balanced and rendered to the

debtor; (2) there is a meeting of the minds as to the

correctness of the statement; and (3) the debtor admits

liability.” Ayers v. Cavalry SVP I, LLC, 876 So. 2d 474,

477 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (quoting University of South

Alabama v. Bracy, 466 So. 2d 148, 150 (Ala. Civ. App.

1985)). These elements presume the existence of an

underlying contract, whether express or implied. Indeed,

“an account stated is not founded on the original

liability, but on the defendant's admission that a

definite sum is due in the nature of a new promise,

express or implied.” Stoltenborg, 142 So. 2d at 259.

Case 1:05-cv-00592-MHT-VPM Document 46 Filed 08/07/06 Page 5 of 8
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By contrast, it is black letter law that the

predicate for a claim of unjust enrichment is the absence

of a contract: “the existence of a contract precludes the

existence of a contract implied by law, or quasi

contract,” 66 Am Jur 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts

§ 24, and “when an adequate remedy at law exists, a claim

of unjust enrichment will not be entertained.” Id.,

§ 30. 

In other words, although not pleaded in the

alternative, ASD’s two counts against the P.C. are, in

fact, mutually exclusive. If there was a contract

between the parties, then ASD cannot prevail on a claim

of unjust enrichment, although it may present evidence

sufficient to sustain its claim for account stated.

Conversely, if there was no contract between the parties,

then the claim for account stated will fail, while the

claim for unjust enrichment may be asserted.

It is precisely the existence--or lack--of a contract

between ASD and the P.C. that the parties dispute,

Case 1:05-cv-00592-MHT-VPM Document 46 Filed 08/07/06 Page 6 of 8
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although, presumably because breach of contract was not

asserted, no conclusive evidence is before the court that

would allow this preliminary determination to be made.

The record reflects only the conflicting admissions of

Hickes as to which entity, the individual or the P.C.,

ordered the products. No actual contract has been

produced, nor have the parties produced evidence (or even

argued) that Hickes and his P.C. are legally

indistinguishable, such that the court could conclude,

based on the evidence, that Hickes signed ASD’s invoices

as an agent of the P.C., or not. 

Resolution of the underlying question of the

existence of a contract is necessary for the court to

analyze the evidence as it pertains to the specific

elements of each asserted claim. Because the limited

evidence before the court does not establish

conclusively, one way or another, whether ASD contracted

with the P.C., nor whether the P.C. is legally

distinguishable from Hickes, there is a genuine issue of

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material fact and summary judgment is denied on both

pending counts.

It is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff ASD Specialty

Healthcare, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

36) is denied.

DONE, this the 7th day of August, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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