Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02791/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02791-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING

ASSOCIATION, a California mutual

benefit corporation,

 NO. CIV. S-06-2791 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR STAY OF

TOM CACKETTE, in his official THE INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

capacity as Executive Officer

of the California Air Resources

Board, 

Defendant,

and

NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, INC.; COALITION FOR 

CLEAN AIR, INC.; SOUTH COAST

AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT

DISTRICT; CITY OF LONG BEACH,

Defendant-Intervenors.

----oo0oo----

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1 Plaintiff originally filed this action against

Catherine E. Witherspoon, who has since resigned. Cackette, the

Chief Deputy Executive Officer and Acting Executive Officer of

the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), is automatically

substituted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). 

2 The NRDC and CCA intervened and filed their papers

jointly, and will therefore be referred to jointly as NRDC/CCA.

3 The court heard this motion on an expedited basis. 

2

Plaintiff Pacific Merchant Shipping Association

(“PMSA”) brought this action against defendant Tom Cackette1 to

enjoin the adoption and enforcement of 13 C.C.R. § 2299.1 and 17

C.C.R. § 93118 (“the regulations”) and obtain a declaration that

the regulations are preempted by federal law and/or

unconstitutional. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

(“NRDC”), Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. (“CCA”)2, South Coast Air

Quality Management District (“SCAQMD”), and the City of Long

Beach (“Long Beach”) intervened as defendants, pursuant to this

court’s order of April 3, 2007. (April 3, 2007 Order.) 

On August 30, 2007, this court granted plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined defendants

from enforcing the regulations. (August 30, 2007 Order 28.) On

September 13, 2007, the clerk entered judgment in favor of

plaintiff pursuant to this court’s August 30, 2007 order. 

(Docket No. 98.) Defendants filed their notice of appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on September

13, 2007. (Docket No. 99.) Defendants now move for a stay of

the injunction pending appeal or, alternatively, a stay of the

injunction pending a similar motion to the Ninth Circuit.3

Once a notice of appeal is filed, the district court is

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4 The “status quo” means the status quo as of the filing

of the appeal. Id.; Tribal Village of Akutan, 859 F.2d 662, 663

(9th Cir. 1988). Here, therefore, the status quo at the time

defendants filed the appeal is that defendants were enjoined from

enforcing the regulations. Accordingly, the court does not need

to grant defendant’s motion to preserve the status quo. 

5 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

8(a)(2), a motion for injunction pending appeal may be made to

the court of appeals or to one of its judges. Such a motion must

“state that, a motion having been made, the district court denied

the motion or failed to afford the relief requested.” Fed. R.

App. P. 8(a)(2)(A). 

3

divested of jurisdiction over the matters being appealed. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sw. Marine Inc., 242 F.3d

1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the principle of exclusive

appellate jurisdiction is not absolute. Id. Rather, the trial

court retains the inherent power during the pendency of an appeal

to act to preserve the status quo to ensure the effectiveness of

the eventual judgment.4 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), which allows a

district court to “in its discretion . . . suspend, modify,

restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal

upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper

for the security of the rights of the adverse party,” codifies

the exception to the general rule of exclusive appellate

jurisdiction. Rule 62(c) “does not restore jurisdiction to the

district court to adjudicate anew the merits of the case.” 

McClatchy Newspapers v. Cent. Valley Typographical Union No. 46,

686 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1982). In addition, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1), to obtain an

injunction pending appeal from the Ninth Circuit, “[a] party must

ordinarily move first in the district.”5

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In deciding whether to grant an injunction pending

appeal, courts apply the standard employed when considering a

motion for a preliminary injunction. Akutan, 859 F.2d at 663;

Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). In the

Ninth Circuit, to meet the criteria for a preliminary injunction,

the moving party must demonstrate “either (1) a combination of

probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable

injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance

of hardships tips sharply in its favor.” Akutan, 859 F.2d at 663

(internal quotation marks omitted). These two “interrelated

legal tests” are not separate, but represent the “outer reaches

of a single continuum.” Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435 (quoting Los

Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d

1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980)). The required degree of irreparable

harm increases as the probability of success decreases. See Se.

Alaskas Conservation Council v. United States Army Corps of

Eng’rs, 472 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006); Ranchers Cattlemen

Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1092 (9th Cir. 2005); Clear Channel

Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir.

2003). The public interest standard is a separate consideration

in determining whether to grant equitable relief. Amoco Prod.

Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987); Hilton v.

Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).

A. Success on Merits/Serious Legal Question

Several courts have observed that the “success on the

merits factor cannot be rigidly applied,” because if it were, an

injunction would seldom, if ever, be granted “because the

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district court would have to conclude that it was probably

incorrect in its determination on the merits.” Oregon Natural

Res. Council v. Marsh, Civ. No. 85-6433-E, 1986 WL 13440, *1 (D.

Or. 1986) (citing Hinnebaugh v. Smith, 476 F. Supp. 502, 510

(C.D. Cal. 1978)). Rather, district courts properly “stay their

own orders when they have ruled on an admittedly difficult legal

question and when the equities of the case suggest that the

status quo should be maintained.” Id. (citing Washington Metro.

Area v. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). An

injunction is “frequently issued where the trial court is

charting a new and unexplored ground and the court determines

that a novel interpretation of the law may succumb to appellate

review.” Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D. Haw.

1972). 

Defendants raise the arguments they made in opposition

to the question presented by plaintiff’s summary judgment motion:

whether the regulations are permissible in-use regulations or

emission standards preempted by § 209(e)(2) of the Clean Air Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (“CAA”), Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat.

322. The court has acknowledged that this is a difficult

question. (August 30, 2007 Order 19:11.) Although the burden to

establish likely success on the merits is more substantial after

a decision on the merits than at the preliminary injunction

stage, Mich. Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v.

Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991), the court does

not agree with plaintiff that this factor is dispositive in this

case. While this court will not venture any opinion as to how

the Court of Appeals will eventually rule, the court finds that

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questions of law are sufficiently difficult so that the court

must undertake an analysis of the other factors.

B. Irreparable Harm/Balance of Hardships

Defendants’ appeal presents difficult questions of law. 

Accordingly, defendants must establish that they will suffer

irreparable harm absent the stay and that the balance of the

hardships “tips sharply in their favor.” Se Alaska Conservation,

472 F.3d at 1100. For the following reasons, defendants have not

met their burden.

The irreparable harm claimed by defendants is nebulous

at best. Defendants contend that on an annual basis, the

regulations prevent 31 deaths, 830 asthma attacks, 7,258 days of

work loss, and 38,526 minor restricted activity days. Any

deaths, asthma attacks or other health problems caused or

contributed to by air pollution are by definition the result of a

combination of sources over a period of time. This court cannot

conclude, from what has been presented, that any number of

deaths, asthma attacks or lost work days will be proximately

caused by the additional air pollution created by ocean going

vessels operating in full compliance with the CAA and all

regulations promulgated by the EPA.

The court does not find it necessary to wade through

the voluminous, contested factual issues over how much pollution

will be reduced due to the regulations. The crux of the issue--

something mentioned only in passing by plaintiff and not even

addressed by defendants in their briefing--is the Eleventh

Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from

awarding money damages against the state treasury

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6 For example, the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit a

federal court from awarding prospective or ancillary relief. 

See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Milliken v.

Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Edelman, 415 U.S. 651. 

Accordingly, the cost of complying with an injunction is

something that can be compensated. However, the situation here

appears to be the reverse in which the costs to plaintiff results

from the state not being forced to comply with an injunction. 

Defendants fail to address the issue of whether ancillary or

prospective relief could be awarded in the scenario that this

court stays the injunction and the Ninth Circuit affirms the

court’s summary judgment order. 

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retrospectively. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651

(1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459

(1945). Defendants fail to argue that any exception to this

well-established maxim of constitutional law would encompass this

situation.6 If the court granted the stay and the Ninth Circuit

affirms this court’s judgment, plaintiff’s would suffer damages

at the annual rate of $37.88 million. (Garrett Opp’n Decl.

(Docket No. 104) ¶ 3.) Rule 62(c) contemplates that a court

grants a stay “upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it

considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse

party.” Because the State of California has not agreed to waive

its sovereign immunity, and none of the other defendants will

agree to post bond, the court cannot fathom what possible

circumstances it could in good conscience grant defendants a stay

without eviscerating plaintiff’s hard-fought victory.

Although defendants may claim some irreparable harm in

the sense that more pollution may be emitted than if the court

granted a stay, the extent of irreparable harm is speculative. 

In contrast, plaintiff’s irreparable harm--the cost of complying

with the regulations--is more ascertainable. Considering the

harm to plaintiff is concrete and the harm to defendants is

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theoretical, the court cannot conclude that the balance of the

harms tips sharply in favor of the defendants.

 C. The Public Interest

As defendants argue, preventing pollution and the

consequential fatalities and negative effects on health is in the

public interest. However, defendants’ view of the public

interest in this case is too narrow. 

Plaintiff raises the public interest inherent in the

proper functioning of the federal system by providing national

governance in the laws controlling air pollution. The CAA makes

“the States and the Federal Government partners in the struggle

against air pollution.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. U.S., 496 U.S. 530,

532 (1990). However, unlike regulation of pollution from

stationary sources, regulation of motor vehicles has been

primarily a federal project. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, ex

rel. Certain of its Members v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1078-82 (D.C.

Cir. 1996); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. New York State Dep’t of

Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 524-27 (2d Cir. 1994) (“MVMA”);

Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1101-03,

1108-11, (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“MEMA”), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952

(1980). 

Indeed, regulation of ocean going vessels implicates

not just national, but international uniformity. Specifically,

the EPA’s regulation of ocean going vessels coincided with

similar action of the International Marine Organization (IMO). 

Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In

1997, the IMO formally adopted Annex VI to the International

Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as

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Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto (MARPOL), which

prescribes a nitrogen oxide emissions limit for certain diesel

engines. Id. Annex VI has recently been ratified by the

requisite number of IMO member countries and has taken affect. 

Id. The EPA set its regulations at same level as Annex VI. Id.

(citing Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from New CI Marine

Engines at or Above 37 Kilowatts, 63 Fed. Reg 28,309, 28,313

(advance notice of proposed rulemaking) (May 22, 1998)). 

Additionally, the regulations affect the field of

international maritime commerce, which has historically been

within the purview of the federal rather than the state

government. United States V. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). In

Locke, the Supreme Court observed that maritime commerce is “an

area where the federal interest has been manifest since the

beginning of our Republic and is now well established.” 529 U.S.

at 99. Indeed, during the debates on the ratification of the

Constitution, the Federalist Papers touted the authority of

Congress to regulate interstate navigation without intervention

from separate states that would result in difficulties conducting

foreign affairs as a primary reason for adopting the

Constitution. See Federalist Nos. 4, 6, and 22. The public

interest is implicated by continuing to follow two hundred years

of precedent.

Another reason the public interest counsels against

defendants is the inherent value in the court’s judgment having

meaning. As discussed above, the Eleventh Amendment makes it

extremely difficult for plaintiff’s victory to be compensated in

the event the Ninth Circuit affirms the injunction. 

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Consequentially, defendants’ position would render this court’s

opinion nugatory. In addition to failing to reward plaintiff for

its victory, a stay obliterates the consequences that must flow

from a decision by this court--particularly one resulting from a

careful review of nearly three hundred pages of briefing, over a

hundred applicable precedents, and thousands of pages of

documents. A judgment of this court must have repercussions

beyond advising the Ninth Circuit. The court finds that the

public interest balances against granting a stay.

The appeal on merits does implicate difficult questions

of law. However, defendants have not shown a high degree of

likely success on the merits of their appeal nor have they shown

that the balance of the harms tips decidedly in their favor. 

Moreover, defendants have not convinced this court that a stay is

in the public interest. Accordingly, the court must deny

defendants’ motion. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for a

stay of the injunction pending appeal be, and the same hereby is,

DENIED.

DATED: October 4, 2007

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