Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02198/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02198-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANNE KNOX; WILLIAM L.

BLAYLOCK; ROBERT A. CONOVER;

EDWARD L. DOBROWOLSKI, JR.;

KARYN GIL; THOMAS JACOB HASS;

PATRICK JOHNSON; and JON

JUMPER, On Behalf of

Themselves and the Class They

Seek to Represent,

NO. 2:05-CV-2198-MCE-KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

STEVE WESTLY, Controller,

State of California; and

CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000,

SERVICE EMPLOYEES

INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIOCLC,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiffs, state employees,

have sued Defendants Steve Westly and California State Employees

Association, Local 1000, Service Employees International Union,

AFL-CIO, CLC (“CSEA” or “the Union”).

Case 2:05-cv-02198-MCE-CKD Document 81 Filed 11/01/06 Page 1 of 9
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Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their First,

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by,

inter alia, using Plaintiffs’ monies to support political causes

without satisfying the procedural safeguards compelled by Chicago

Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

Certification. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ Motion

is granted. 

BACKGROUND

The Court has already set forth a detailed factual

background for this action in its Order dated August 15, 2006,

which is incorporated by reference and need not be reproduced

herein. Mem. & Order 2-4, August 15, 2006. In that Order, the

Court granted the Union’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as

to Plaintiff Conover’s claims as a Union member. Id. As a

result of that August 15, 2006, Order, Plaintiffs have withdrawn

that portion of their Motion seeking to certify Union members as

part of the class. The Court agrees that, given the dismissal of

Plaintiff Conover’s claims as a Union member, certification as to

a class consisting of Union members cannot be sustained. 

Plaintiff Conover, however, was not himself dismissed in that

Order and remains a Plaintiff in this litigation as a non-union

Plaintiff.

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STANDARD

A court may certify a class if a plaintiff demonstrates that

all of the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)

have been met, and that at least one of the requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) have been met. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23; see also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d

1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996). Before certifying a class, the trial

court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether the

party seeking certification has met the prerequisites of Rule 23.

Id. at 1233. While the trial court has broad discretion to

certify a class, its discretion must be exercised within the

framework of Rule 23. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc.,

253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).

Rule 23(a) provides four prerequisites that must be

satisfied for class certification: (1) the class must be so

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)

questions of law or fact exist that are common to the class, (3)

the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical

of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition,

a plaintiff must establish one of the following: (1) that there

is a risk of substantial prejudice from separate actions; (2)

that declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the class as a

whole would be appropriate; or (3) that common questions of law

or fact predominate and the class action is superior to other

available methods of adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

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ANALYSIS

1. Numerosity

As noted above, a class must be “so numerous that joinder of

all members is impracticable” before the action is class

certified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). A class numbering several

thousand satisfies the numerosity requirement with ease. Baird

v. Ca. Faculty Ass’n, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13594, *8 (D. Cal.

2000) (citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiffs allege the

class in this case is in the thousands and may be in the tens of

thousands. Compl. ¶ 12. Such an allegation is sufficient to

meet the numerosity requirement of Rule 23. 

2. Commonality

A class has sufficient commonality if there are “questions

of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 

The commonality preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less rigorous

than the companion requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Hanlon v.

Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). Indeed,

Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively. Id. All

questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule.

The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual

predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts

coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class. Id.

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Here, the core legal theory advanced by Plaintiffs is that

each was deprived of his or her constitutional right to an

adequate explanation of the use of the fee increase; notice of

the right to object to and not pay for that portion of the

increase being used on the ballot propositions, politics and

other non-bargaining activities; a prompt opportunity to

challenge the amount of the increase, if any, that the Union

claims was spent on collective bargaining; and an escrow of the

amount in dispute. See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307-10.

The foregoing allegations are plainly common questions of

law as to all proposed class members. Plaintiffs allege an

identical right not to have their fair share fee seized without

the protections afforded by Hudson. Accordingly, the Court finds

the requirement of commonality is met.

3. Typicality

The typicality prerequisite of Rule 23(a) is fulfilled if

“the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical

of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(a)(3). Under the rule’s permissive standards, representative

claims are “typical” if they are reasonably co-extensive with

those of absent class members; they need not be substantially

identical. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

CSEA vigorously contends that a class consisting of both

objecting and non-objecting non-union members is insufficiently

typical for class certification.

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More precisely, CSEA contends that typicality does not exist

because there are defenses to liability that exist against the

class that do not exist against the named Plaintiffs. CSEA

argues that both the objector and non-objector subclasses

received a Hudson notice in June 2005. That notice, they allege,

specifically alerted all non-members that their fair share fee is

“subject to change without further notice to fee payers.” Compl.

¶ 31. Given the foregoing language being included in the June

Hudson notice, CSEA contends it will assert consent as a defense

to the non-objecting class members. A defense that cannot, by

definition, exist against the objecting named Plaintiffs.

As an initial matter, the suggestion that actual objectors

cannot represent a class of potential objectors has already been

rejected in this District. See Friedman v. Cal. State Employees

Ass’n, 163 LRRM (BNA) 2924, 2327 (E.D. Cal. 2000). In addition,

the theory of Plaintiffs’ case is that the June notice itself was

inadequate. Under that theory, whether a party objected or did

not object is irrelevant because a requirement to object does not

arise until adequate notice has been given. Consequently, the

Court finds sufficient typicality to certify the class. 

 

4. Adequacy of Representation

The final hurdle interposed by Rule 23(a) is that “the

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).

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To satisfy constitutional due process concerns, absent class

members must be afforded adequate representation before entry of

a judgment which binds them. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,

42-43 (1940). Resolution of two questions determines legal

adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any

conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the

named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action

vigorously on behalf of the class? See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020

(citing Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507,

512 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Defendants here contend that the proposed class cannot be

certified because of a conflict of interest. This conflict

arises, they argue, because Plaintiffs are seeking punitive

damages. During the oral argument before this Court, Plaintiffs

clarified they were not seeking punitive damages and stipulated

to amend their Complaint to remove any reference or claim for

punitive damages. In light of this action by plaintiffs, CSEA’s

conflict of interest argument fails.

Further, the Ninth Circuit recently clarified that even had

Plaintiffs not agreed to forego a pursuit of punitive damages,

CSEA’s argument would nonetheless have failed. This circuit does

not favor denial of class certification on the basis of

speculative conflicts. See Cummings v. Connell, 316 F.3d 886,

896 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,

909 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that class members might have

differing interests at later stages of litigation, but that

“potential conflicts” do not present a valid reason for refusing

to certify a class). Accordingly, the Court finds the

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requirement of adequacy of representation satisfied.

5. Rule 23(b)(1)(A)

A class action may be certified under this subsection if

individual litigation would create the possibility of

inconsistent adjudications that “would establish incompatible

standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). Plaintiffs argue that all the proposed

class members of potential objectors are owed the same duties

under Hudson and that each, therefore, could bring an action to

enforce his or her rights in either a state or federal forum. 

This scenario, Plaintiffs allege, would subject Defendants to a

risk of incompatible standards of conduct as to their duties to

members of the proposed class. The Court agrees. To the extent

each state worker was entitled to a Hudson notice regarding the

special assessment but did not receive that notice, each would

have an independent cause of action for this alleged violation. 

Such a wide group of potential litigants could certainly give

rise to incompatible standards of conduct. Accordingly, the

Court finds this action proper for class certification under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)(A).

6. Appointment of Class Counsel

Plaintiffs request that W. James Young, a staff attorney

employed by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation,

Inc., be appointed as class counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23.

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Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs’ request or controvert in

any way Mr. Young’s ability to fairly and adequately represent

the class. In addition, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient

evidence that Mr. Young is competent to pursue this action on

behalf of the class. In light of foregoing and the Court’s

determination that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification

should be granted, the Court hereby appoints Mr. Young as class

counsel. 

CONCLUSION

The Court hereby grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

Certification. The Court finds that the named Plaintiffs are

adequate representatives of the class of individuals who pay

compulsory fees to CSEA who are not members and who have, at one

time or another, specifically objected to the use of their agency

fees for politics or other non-bargaining activities. The Court

further finds that Plaintiff Conover is an adequate

representative of the class of individuals who pay compulsory

fees to CSEA who are not members and who have not at any time

objected to the use of their agency fees for politics or other

non-bargaining activities.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 31, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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