Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00992/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00992-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

2

 Defendants refer to Hurley Industries, Inc. and Advanced Marketing Int’l., Inc.

collectively as “AMI,” and Plaintiffs state that “[u]pon information and belief, HII is a corporate

affiliate of AMI.”

3

 On April 29, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply brief addressing

case authority cited by Defendants in their reply brief. The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ surreply brief, which does not affect the outcome of this motion. For the purpose of making the

record clear, this Order clarifies that Plaintiffs’ motion to file a sur-reply brief is GRANTED.

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 5/24/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARIA WHITWORTH, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

HURLEY INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 06-00992 JF

ORDER1 DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

[re: docket no. 19]

Defendants Hurley Industries, Inc. and Advanced Marketing Int’l., Inc. (collectively

“AMI”)2 move to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and

12(b)(6). Plaintiffs Maria Whitworth (“Whitworth”) and Hy Cite Corporation (“Hy Cite”)

oppose the motion.3 The Court heard oral argument on May 4, 2006. For the reasons set forth

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Plaintiffs state in their opposition that AMI is an Illinois corporation, citing ¶ 7 of the

complaint. However, ¶ 7 doesn’t address this issue, and ¶ ¶ 3 and 4 allege that AMI and HII are

Florida corporations.

2

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

below, the motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

AMI is alleged to be a Florida corporation4 with its principal place of business in Mt.

Dora, Florida, which is in the business of selling and marketing stainless steel cookware and

kitchen equipment through independent distributors. Compl., ¶¶ 3, 4; Hurley Decl., Ex. 13. 

Since 2001, Whitworth has been a resident of California. Whitworth Decl., ¶ 2. In 2003,

Whitworth became a distributor for AMI, and entered into a distributor agreement for the

purpose of selling cookware. Id., ¶ 3. While working for AMI, Whitworth lived in California

and attended only two trade shows per year outside of California. Id., ¶ 5.

In 2005, Whitworth was required to sign a new distributor agreement (the “distributor

agreement”), which includes the following relevant provisions:

Covenant Not to Compete. DISTRIBUTOR agrees that for a period of two (2)

years after termination of his or her contract/business relationship with HII,

DISTRIBUTOR will not in any manner, whether with or without cause, within the

continental United States of America, directly or indirectly engage in the sale or

marketing of any cookware through public presentations, cooking shows, or any

related activity or in any business competitive with HII. This will include but is

not limited to, engaging in such business as owner, partner, DISTRIBUTOR,

agent, or as employee of any person, firm, or corporation engaged in such

business, or in being interested directly or indirectly in any such business

conducted by any person, firm, or corporation. 

This restriction on distribution specifically includes, but is not limited to, the sale

or marketing of any stainless steel or waterless cookware through public

presentations, live cooking shows, or related performances, at home shows, fairs,

mall shows, or similar places. DISTRIBUTOR is further restricted from using

any designs or display ideas used by HII.

Liquidated Damages. DISTRIBUTOR agrees that, in the event of his/her

violation of this agreement, the DISTRIBUTOR will pay as liquidated damages to

HII the sum of $1,000.00 per day, for each day or part thereof that

DISTRIBUTOR continues to breach this agreement. Further, as liquidated

damages, if DISTRIBUTOR, without written consent of HII, fails to comply with

any provision of this agreement, DISTRIBUTOR’S right to any commissions or

bonuses which DISTRIBUTOR would otherwise be entitled shall terminate and

HII’s obligation to make any such payment shall cease. It is recognized and

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

agreed that damages in such event are difficult in ascertaining, though great and

irreparable, and that this agreement with respect to liquidated damages shall in no

event prevent HII from obtaining injunctive relief.

Choice of Law and Venue. The validity, interpretation and performance of this

agreement shall be controlled by and construed under the laws of the State of

Florida. Both parties agree that any objections to venue be waived and that venue

shall be in the Circuit Court for Lake County, Florida.

Hurley Decl., Ex. 13, §§ 17, 21, 23.

Hy Cite is alleged to be a Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in

Madison, Wisconsin, which sells cookware and related products through distributors and is a

direct competitor or AMI. Compl., ¶¶ 2, 14. On January 15, 2006, Whitworth and Hy Cite

reached an agreement whereby Whitworth would distribute Hy Cite’s products, and Whitworth

stopped working for AMI. Whitworth Decl., ¶ 7. In her position as a Hy Cite distributor,

Whitworth has worked exclusively in California. Id., ¶ 8.

On February 14, 2006, Whitworth and Hy Cite filed the complaint in the instant action

against Defendants HII and AMI, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Distributor Agreement

is void and unenforceable pursuant to California Business and Professional Code § 16600 and

that Hy Cite has not tortiously interfered with the agreement between Whitworth and AMI/HII. 

Defendants move to dismiss for improper venue, for failure to establish federal jurisdiction, or on

the basis that Plaintiffs are seeking an anticipatory declaratory judgment..

Hy Cite and other individual plaintiffs have filed similar actions in other federal district

courts. On August 31, 2005, Hy Cite and six individual plaintiffs filed a complaint against AMI

in the Central District of California Ferguson, et al. v. Advanced Marketing International, Inc.

Furbush Decl., Ex. 1. On December 20, 2005, that court issued an order granted AMI’s motion

to dismiss for improper venue with respect to Hy Cite and the four individual plaintiffs whose

sales activities took place in states other than California. Id., pp. 14, 17. However, that court

denied AMI’s motion to dismiss for improper venue with respect to the two individual plaintiffs

who were alleged to be citizens of California performing their marketing and selling in

California, reasoning that:

when an employee (or independent contractor or distributor) is a citizen of

California, lives and works in California, visits trade shows in California, and

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

markets and sells goods to consumers located in California, then the fact that the

new employer is incorporated or does business in another state besides California

does not render California’s antipathy to noncompetition agreements less potent. 

Id., p. 14. On December 9, 2005, Hy Cite filed a complaint against AMI in the Western District

of Wisconsin, alleging facts similar to those alleged in the Central District of California action. 

Id., Ex. 2. AMI has filed a motion to dismiss the Wisconsin action, which is pending. Id., Ex. 3.

AMI has filed three actions against Hy Cite and other former AMI distributors in state

court in Lake County, Florida, on September 30, 2005, October 6, 2005, and December 27,

2005. Id., Exs. 4-6. Hy Cite has removed these actions to the District Court for the Middle

District of Florida, and AMI has moved to remand them to state court based on the forum

selection clause of the Distribution Agreement. Id., Exs. 7-9.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for improper venue may be brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(3). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(3), the court need not accept the pleadings as true

and may consider facts outside of the pleadings. See, e.g., Agueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87

F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir.1996); American Home Assurance Co. v. TGL Container Lines, Ltd., 347

F.Supp.2d 749, 755 (N.D. Cal. 2004). When a 12(b)(3) motion is based upon a forum selection

clause, as the instant motion is, the court “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-moving party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party.” Murphy v.

Schneider National, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004).

For purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, and the Court must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Leave to

amend must be granted unless it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by

amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). When

amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp,

90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Forum selection clause

The parties dispute whether the forum selection clause in the Distribution Agreement

requires dismissal of the instant action for improper venue. Defendants argue that the clause

establishes mandatory venue in Florida, while Plaintiffs contend that Whitworth is entitled to the

benefit of California’s public policy disfavoring noncompetition agreements and that Hy Cite is

not a party to the Distribution Agreement.

There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of forum selection clauses, which

are “prima facie valid and should not be set aside unless the party challenging enforcement of

such a provision can show it is ‘‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.’” Argueta v. Banco

Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407

U.S. 1, 10 (1972)). A forum selection clause is unreasonable only if: 

(1) its incorporation into the contract was the result of fraud, undue influence, or

overweening bargaining power,

(2) the selected forum is so “gravely difficult and inconvenient” that the complaining

party will “for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court;” or 

(3) enforcement of the clause would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in

which the suit is brought.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that enforcement of the forum selection clause

would contravene California public policy. Although “choice of law provisions are usually

respected by California courts,” a forum selection clause “designating [a foreign] law will not be

given effect if it would violate a strong California public policy . . . [or] ‘result in an evasion of . .

. a statute of the forum protecting its citizens.’” Hall v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.App.3d 411,

416-17 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 

As Defendants argue, forum selection clauses themselves do not always violate California

public policy. For example, in Swenson v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 415 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1104 (S.D.

Cal. 2006), the court held that the forum selection clause designating Washington as the litigation

forum was valid, even though Washington law arguably might have led “to a result conflicting

with the provisions of [California Business and Professions Code] § 16600.” However, that

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 “Except as provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to

this state and also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this state

or of such other state or nation will govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement, this

code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.” Fla. Stat. § 671.105(1).

6

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

court’s conclusion relied on the fact that California and Washington both follow Section 187 of

the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine the enforceability of a choice of law

provision:

Enforcement of the forum selection clause here does not contravene a California

policy as to forum. Both California and Washington use the same rule to enforce

these clauses. [citations] The forum selection clause requiring the case to be

litigated in Washington is therefore valid.

Id. at 1105. Similarly, in Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 415 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1025 (N.D. Cal.

2005), the court’s determination that “nothing prevents Google and Lee from making the same

arguments in the Washington state proceeding that they make here” relied on the fact that

California and Washington both follow Section 187 of the Restatement:

Google and Lee contend that “the Washington state court forum . . . is inadequate

to protect [Google and Lee’s] separate and independent rights under California

law.” The flaw in this argument is that Google and Lee fail to explain why they

cannot ask the Washington state court to apply California law. Both states apply

the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (“section 187”) to determine

whether choice-of-law provisions are valid. 

Id. at 1022.

In the instant case, however, Florida and California do not apply the same rules in

determining whether choice of law provisions are valid. Choice of law provisions are

authorized by Florida Statute § 671.105(1),

5

 and, “[g]enerally, Florida enforces choice-of-law

provisions unless the law of the chosen forum contravenes strong public policy.” Mazzoni

Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co. 761 So. 2d 306, 311 (Fla. 2000). In contrast,

California follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2), see Nedlloyd Lines

B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.4th 459, 464-65 (1992), which provides as follows:

(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights

and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties

could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

that issue, unless either

(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction

and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, or

(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental

policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in

the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188,

would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of

law by the parties.

In other words, a California court first must determine whether (1) the chosen state has a

substantial relationship to the parties or their transaction or (2) there is any other reasonable

basis for the parties’ choice of law. Nedlloyd, 3 Cal.4th at 466. If neither of these tests is met,

that is the end of the inquiry, and the court need not enforce the parties’ choice of law. Id. If

either test is met, however, the Court must determine whether the chosen state’s law is contrary

to a fundamental policy of California. Id. If there is no such conflict, the Court shall enforce

the parties’ choice of law. If there is a fundamental conflict with California law, the Court must

determine whether California has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the

determination of the particular issue. Id. If California does have a materially greater interest

than the chosen state, the choice of law will not be enforced, because in such circumstance the

Court will decline to enforce a law contrary to California’s fundamental policy. Id. 

Because of the differences between Florida’s and California’s choice of law rules, this

Court will not presume that enforcement of the forum selection clause would not contravene 

California public policy. Instead, following Hall, a “determination as to the validity of the

choice of law provision is prerequisite to a determination of whether the forum selection clause

should be enforced.” Hall, 150 Cal.App.3d at 416. In the instant case, Florida, which is AMI’s

principal place of business, has a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction. 

Nedlloyd, 3 Cal.4th at 467 (“substantial relationship present when ‘one of the parties is

domiciled’ in the chosen state”). However, there is a fundamental conflict between Florida and

California laws governing whether non-competition agreements are enforceable. Under

California law, there is a strong public policy against non-competition agreements. Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 16600 (“Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent

void.”). In contrast, Florida law permits non-competition agreements “so long as such contracts

are reasonable in time, area, and line of business.” Fla. Stat. § 542.335. Accordingly, this Court

must determine whether California has a materially greater interest than Florida in the

determination of the instant case.

 Section 16600 was intended to protect the employment interests of individuals such as

Whitworth, who was a resident of California when she became a distributor for AMI and lived

and worked in California while employed by AMI. Whitworth Decl., ¶¶ 2-5. The policy

underlying § 16600 is that “‘[t]he interests of the employee in his own mobility and betterment

are deemed paramount to the competitive business interests of the employers, where neither the

employee nor his new employer has committed any illegal act accompanying the employment

change.’” Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal.App.4th 881, 900-901 (1998)

(quoting Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal.App.2d 244, 255 (1968)). 

Defendants cite cases in which California’s policy against non-compete provisions does

not compel courts to follow California law. These cases, however, are distinguishable. While

the First Circuit determined in Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968

F.2d 1463, 1468 (1st Cir. 1992), that “California does not trump New Hampshire,” this

conclusion was based on facts substantially different than those in the instant case. In

Ferrofluidics, there was “an employment contract performed in New Hampshire by a New

Hampshire employer and a New Hampshire employee throughout the employment period.” Id. 

In Lowry Computer Products, Inc. v. Head, the Eastern District of Michigan noted that § 16600

“‘invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a

competitor after completion of his employment . . . unless they are necessary to protect the

employer’s trade secrets.’” Lowry, 984 F.Supp. 1111, 1114-15 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (quoting

Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal.2d 239, 242 (1965)). Because trade secrets were

“precisely what [was] at issue” in that case, the Lowry court held that California did not have a

fundamental public policy interest in preventing the enforcement of the non-compete provision. 

Id. at 1115. In contrast, Defendants have neither alleged nor argued that trade secrets are at

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

issue. 

This Court concludes that California has a materially greater interest than Florida in the

determination of the instant case, and that enforcement of the forum selection clause would

contravene a strong California public policy. Accordingly, it is not necessary for the Court to

reach the issue of whether Hy Cite is bound by the forum selection clause.

B. Jurisdiction over Hy Cite’s claim against AMI for declaratory judgment

Defendants argue correctly that California Business and Professional Code § 16600 is an

insufficient basis for federal jurisdiction over Hy Cite’s claim against AMI for declaratory

judgment. Plaintiffs assert, however, that this Court may assert diversity or supplemental

jurisdiction over Hy Cite’s claim. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), this Court may assert

supplemental jurisdiction over related claims and parties: 

in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part

of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or

intervention of additional parties.

28 U.S.C.. § 1367(a). Accordingly, because the claim asserted by Hy Cite is so related to the

claim asserted by Whitworth that it forms part of the same case or controversy, this Court asserts

supplemental jurisdiction over Hy Cite’s claim.

C. Improper Anticipatory Declaratory Judgment

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court still must exercise its discretion to determine

whether to assert jurisdiction over the instant action: “In a case of actual controversy within its

jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may

declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,

whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201(a); see also Wilton v.

Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) (“Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act 

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding

whether to declare the rights of litigants.”).

Defendants argue that by asserting jurisdiction over the instant case, this Court would

reward Plaintiffs for filing suit first in order to preempt a suit by Defendants in Florida.

A suit is ‘anticipatory’ for the purposes of being an exception to the first-to-file

rule if the plaintiff in the first-filed action filed suit on receipt of specific, concrete

indications that a suit by the defendant was imminent. Such anticipatory suits are

disfavored because they are examples of forum shopping. As such, by

recognizing this exception to the first-to-file rule, courts seek to eliminate the race

to the courthouse door in an attempt to preempt a later suit in another forum.

Guthy-Renker Fitness, L.L.C. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 264, 271 (C.D. Cal.

1998) (internal citations omitted). However, “[t]he underlying purpose of the first-to-file rule is

to promote efficiency and should not be disregarded lightly.” Id. at 269. Plaintiffs assert that

there is no evidence that Defendants gave them specific and concrete indications that a suit

brought by Defendants was imminent. Although Plaintiffs allege that the owner of HII and AMI

“has threatened to sue Hy Cite and former AMI distributors for allegedly breaching their

Distributer Agreements or, in the case of Hy Cite, for tortiously interfering with the Distributor

Agreements, and Plaintiffs collectively have a reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit based upon

those threats,” these allegations are not “specific, concrete indications that a suit by the defendant

was imminent.” Id. at 271. Not all indications of a dispute or contract breach are necessarily

evidence that suit is imminent:

Oxxford argues that because Bryant filed this action in an obvious

response to its letter of June 14, 2000, he “raced to the courthouse” in a brazen

display of forum shopping. There is some merit to that contention, although

Oxxford’s letter indicated only that it would “declare a breach” and that it would

“seek indemnification” if Bryant did not honor the license agreement. Such

language no doubt put Bryant “on notice that [Oxxford] was at least considering

filing suit against [him]. [Oxxford’s] letter, however, gave no indication that a

lawsuit was imminent, or that [Oxxford] was doing anything more than blowing

smoke about a potential lawsuit.”

It is basic contract law that declaring a breach, which is what Oxxford

threatened to do here, does not necessarily indicate a lawsuit will follow, but can

be merely the first step in excusing one’s self from future performance under the

contract. 

Bryant v. Oxxford Exp., Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 2000). As in Bryant, the

Court concludes that the instant action is not improperly anticipatory.

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is DENIED. 

DATED: May 24, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Case No. C 06-00992 JF

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Xochitl D. Arteaga xochitl.arteaga@lw.com, jennifer.leung@lw.com

J. Donald Best jdbest@mbf-law.com, sakrause@michaelbest.com

J. Donald Best jdbest@michaelbest.com, sakrause@michaelbest.com

Amy O. Bruchs aobruchs@michaelbest.com, sktrotter@michaelbest.com

Michael Joseph Furbush mfurbush@groneklatham.com, jhopkins@groneklatham.com

Daniel Patrick Osterndorf dosterndorf@groneklatham.com, jhopkins@groneklatham.com

John C. Scheller jcscheller@michaelbest.com, lmmansfield@michaelbest.com 

Case 5:06-cv-00992-JF Document 38 Filed 05/24/06 Page 12 of 12