Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-275/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION 

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MDL No. 1917 

Case No. C-07-5944-SC 

ORDER DENYING SHARP'S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

This Order Relates To: 

Sharp Electronics Corp., et al. v. 

Hitachi, Ltd., et al., 13-cv-1173-

SC 

ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Now before the Court is an emergency motion filed by Sharp 

Electronics Corporation and Sharp Electronics Manufacturing Company 

of America, Inc. ("Sharp"), seeking leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9. ECF No. 2750 

("Recons. Mot."). The motion seeks the Court's reconsideration of 

its earlier ruling that Sharp failed to demonstrate excusable 

neglect in missing the June 12, 2014 deadline to opt out of two 

settlements between the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs ("DPPs") and 

/// 

/// 

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the SDI and Hitachi Defendants1 ("Proposed Settlements"). In re 

Cathode Ray Tube Antitrust Litigation, Case No. C 07-5944-SC, 2014 

WL 4181732 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014), ECF No. 2746 ("Order"). The 

motion is opposed. ECF No. 2754 ("SDI Opp'n"); 2755 ("Hitachi 

Opp'n"); 2756 ("Toshiba Joinder"). The Court held argument on the 

motion on August 22, 2014, and counsel for Sharp, Hitachi, and the 

DPPs were heard. ECF No. 2759 ("Hr'g Tr."). After considering the 

parties' arguments and submissions, the Court DENIES Sharp's motion 

for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The parties are familiar with the factual and procedural 

background of the case, so an exhaustive review is unnecessary. 

The facts relevant to the motion are set forth below and are based 

on the parties' submissions and the Court's findings following the 

hearing on the motion. Defendants are allegedly manufacturers of 

cathode ray tubes ("CRTs") and, in some cases, of finished products 

as well. In March 2013, Sharp filed a direct action suit against a 

host of defendants including the Settling Defendants. ECF No. 

1604-2 ("Sharp Compl."). 

On April 14, 2014 the Court granted provisional certification 

to a class in the Proposed Settlements. ECF No. 2534 ("Prelim. 

 

1 The SDI Defendants include Samsung SDI Co. Ltd. (f/k/a Samsung 

Display Devices Co., Ltd.), Samsung SDI America, Inc., Samsung SDI 

Brasil, Ltd., Tianjin Samsung SDI Co., Ltd., Samsung Shenzhen SDI 

Co., Ltd., SDI Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., and SDI Mexico S.A. de C.V. 

(collectively "SDI"). The DPP's proposed settlement with Hitachi 

includes Hitachi, Ltd., Hitachi Displays, Ltd. (n/k/a Japan Display 

Inc.), Hitachi America, Ltd., Hitachi Asia, Ltd., and Hitachi 

Electronic Devices (USA) Inc. (collectively, "Hitachi"). SDI and 

Hitachi are collectively referred to as the "Settling Defendants." 

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Approval Order"). Subsequently, the Settlement Administrator set 

the deadline to opt out of the Proposed Settlements for June 12, 

2014. The Settlement Administrator mailed notice to the class 

members including eight addresses for various Sharp entities.2

 ECF 

No. 2713-1 ("Murray Sharp Decl.") ¶¶ 3-4. None of the Sharp 

notices were returned. Id. ¶ 4. The Settlement Administrator also 

published notice in the Wall Street Journal, established a website 

with copies of the relevant notices and a Frequently Asked 

Questions page with the June 12 deadline, and activated a toll-free 

telephone line with customer service representatives available to 

answer questions related to the class settlement. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. 

Before, during, and after the June 12 deadline, Sharp was 

actively litigating against the Settling Defendants. See ECF No. 

2698 ("Opt-Out Mot.") at 1-2 (discussing Sharp's litigation against 

the Settling Defendants). Nonetheless, Sharp did not submit an 

opt-out notice to the Settlement Administrator by the June 12 

deadline. Instead, on June 26, 2014, after DPPs' counsel contacted 

counsel for Sharp and pointed out that an opt-out request had not 

been received from Sharp, Sharp immediately submitted its opt-out. 

ECF No. 2715-1 ("Saveri Decl.") ¶¶ 3, 6. As a result, Sharp was 

included on the list of opt-outs filed by the DPPs on the courtordered deadline of June 26, the earliest date on which the 

 

2

 At the hearing, counsel for Sharp was unaware of the number of 

notices received. Hr'g Tr. at 13:13-15:7. Apparently the notices 

may have been directed to other Sharp entities around the world, 

while only Sharp Electronics Corporation and Sharp Electronics 

Manufacturing Company of America, Inc. are actively litigating 

claims in this case. It is unclear from the factual record whether 

Sharp has a system in place for forwarding these notices to a 

central location for processing. In any event, what is clear is 

that Sharp received, but failed to process, at least one notice of 

the Proposed Settlements with the opt-out deadline. 

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Settling Defendants were notified of the list of opt-outs. Id. ¶ 

6. Twelve days later, counsel for Sharp contacted SDI and 

Hitachi's counsel seeking to stipulate to an extension of the optout deadline, but Hitachi refused. ECF No. 2698-1 ("Benson Decl.") 

¶ 6. 

On July 23, 2014, Sharp filed a motion seeking to confirm the 

validity of its opt-out request or, alternatively, to enlarge the 

time to opt out of the Proposed Settlements. The Court denied the 

motion, finding that the weight of the factors identified by the 

Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick 

Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), militated against 

a finding of "excusable neglect." Order at *3. Specifically, the 

Court concluded that, under the factors identified in Pioneer, 

Sharp failed to demonstrate excusable neglect because it (1) failed 

to provide anything more than a mere "generalized assertion" that 

the absent class members would be prejudiced if Sharp were not 

permitted to opt out, (2) offered no "explanation as to why it 

missed the applicable opt-out deadline aside from mentioning that 

notice was 'inadvertently not . . . sent to outside counsel for the 

Sharp Plaintiffs,'" id. (quoting Benson Decl. ¶ 5), and (3) ignored 

the fact that, in addition to the initial two week delay in 

submitting opt-out notice, Sharp also waited twelve more days 

before contacting the Settling Defendants seeking their position on 

the issue. Id. 

At the same time, the Court granted a parallel motion by Dell 

Inc. and Dell Products L.P. ("Dell"), finding various 

distinguishing facts rendered Dell's neglect excusable. Id. at *3-

4. The Court also concluded, citing a long line of cases, that 

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Sharp's litigation conduct was insufficient to opt it out of the 

Proposed Settlements. Id. at *4-5 (citing Bowman v. UBS Fin. 

Servs., Inc., No. C-04-3525, 2007 WL 1456037, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 

17, 2007) (collecting cases)). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Civil Local Rule 7-9 requires a party seeking to file a motion 

for reconsideration to obtain leave of the court. Civ. L.R. 7-

9(a); Dennis v. Chappell, 5:98-cv-21027-JF, 2014 WL 710102, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2014). The moving party must "specifically 

show reasonable diligence in bringing the motion," as well as one 

of the following: 

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material 

difference in fact or law exists from that which was 

presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory 

order for which reconsideration is sought. The party 

also must show that in the exercise of reasonable 

diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not 

know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory 

order; or 

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of 

law occurring after the time of such order; or 

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material 

facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented 

to the Court before such interlocutory order. 

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(1)-(3). Furthermore, "[n]o motion for leave to 

file a motion for reconsideration may repeat any oral or written 

argument made by the applying party in support of or in opposition 

to the interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have 

reconsidered." Id. at (c). "Whether or not to grant 

reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court." 

Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian 

Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

The instant motion seeks leave from the Court to file a motion 

for reconsideration. Specifically, Sharp seeks reconsideration 

under Local Rule 7-9(b)(3), which provides for reconsideration when 

there is "[a] manifest failure by the Court to consider material 

facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the 

Court before such interlocutory order." Sharp argues 

"reconsideration is appropriate here because material facts were 

not considered in the Court's Order." Recons. Mot. at 3. 

The material facts allegedly not considered in the Court's 

prior order are relevant to three findings made in support of the 

Court's conclusion that Sharp failed to show excusable neglect. 

First, the Court found that "neither Sharp nor the DPPs provide any 

detail above generalized assertions of prejudice." Order at *3 

(citing ECF Nos. 2715 ("DPPs Br.") at 3-4; Saveri Decl. ¶ 9). 

Accordingly, "the Court [did] not ascribe significant weight" to 

the prejudice factor in Pioneer. Id. Second, as to the length of 

delay, the Court found that even if it were to credit Sharp's 

conclusion that missing the opt-out deadline by two weeks was "de 

minimis," Sharp "fail[ed] to note that after filing its request for 

exclusion, counsel waited an additional twelve days before 

contacting opposing counsel . . . ." Id. Finally, the Court found 

that "Sharp has offered no explanation as to why it missed the 

applicable opt-out deadline aside from mentioning that notice was 

'inadvertently not . . . sent to outside counsel for the Sharp 

Plaintiffs.'" Id. (quoting Benson Decl. ¶ 5). Accordingly, the 

Court concluded that the facts offered by Sharp were "simply 

insufficient to justify a finding of excusable neglect." Id. 

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 In the instant motion, Sharp suggests that "[i]n coming to 

this conclusion, the Court relied on three factual ambiguities that 

could have been corrected . . . ," and "submit[s] that these 

factual ambiguities relied upon by the Court can and should be 

clarified in the interests of justice . . . ." Recons. Mot. at 3. 

First, as to the question of prejudice, Sharp now offers a detailed 

description of its expert's estimates of Sharp's overcharges at the 

hands of the Settling Parties. Specifically Sharp's expert 

estimates, based on Sharp's $334.8 million in purchases from the 

Settling Defendants, that Sharp was overcharged $14.1 million by 

Hitachi and $22.5 million by SDI. After trebling, this amounts to 

$109.8 million in damages. In contrast, if Sharp remains in the 

class, Sharp estimates its pro rata share of the Proposed 

Settlements will be approximately $1.3 million. As a result, Sharp 

contends that both it and the DPP settlement class will be severely 

prejudiced should Sharp be forced to share in the Proposed 

Settlements. Second, Sharp specifically addresses the previously 

unexplained twelve-day delay between submitting its untimely optout request and contacting opposing counsel. Sharp contends that 

during those twelve days, "counsel for Sharp diligently conferred 

with both its clients and counsel for Dell, and conducted relevant 

legal research." Recons. Mot. at 5. Accordingly, Sharp argues the 

length of delay factor should not weigh against them. Finally, 

Sharp expands on its earlier explanation for missing the opt-out 

deadline. Now Sharp explains its procedures for handling opt-out 

notices and contends that those "procedures appear to have been 

unsuccessful in this single instance for a simple reason: the 

individual at [Sharp] responsible for reviewing these notices 

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failed to forward the relevant notice to legal counsel." Recons. 

Mot. at 6. 

Defendants argue that the Court should not consider these 

clarifying facts because Sharp has not met the standard under Local 

Rule 7-9(b)(3). Simply put, Defendants argue the Court should not 

consider this newly offered evidence because these facts were known 

to Sharp at the time of its earlier motion and were nonetheless not 

raised in its submissions. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 

1239 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e do not consider evidence or 

arguments presented for the first time in a motion for 

reconsideration."); Love v. Permanente Med. Grp., No. C-12-05679 

WHO(DMR), 2014 WL 720744, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2014) (denying 

a motion for reconsideration based on facts "which should have been 

put before the court in the first instance"); cf. Exxon Shipping 

Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (noting that under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a motion to alter or amend 

judgment "may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise 

arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to 

entry of judgment"). Furthermore, Defendants point out that 

Sharp's proffered ground for reconsideration -- the failure of the 

Court to consider material facts which Sharp presented in its 

earlier motion -- ignores the fact that "the Court's identification 

of material facts missing from Sharp's motion demonstrates a 

thorough consideration of the facts that were actually presented to 

the Court." Hitachi Opp'n at 2 (citing Order at 7) (emphasis in 

original); see also SDI Opp'n at 3 ("Sharp does not attempt to 

point the Court to any facts or arguments that were made in its 

prior submissions which the Court failed to consider.") (emphasis 

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in original). Finally, Defendants contend that even if the Court 

were to consider the new facts offered by Sharp, they do nothing to 

alter the Court's prior conclusion that the Pioneer factors weigh 

against a finding of excusable neglect. 

Defendants are right. Undoubtedly, the facts discussed in 

Sharp's motion would have been relevant to the Court's weighing of 

the factors under Pioneer had they been presented in Sharp's 

earlier motion. See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395 (noting that the 

excusable neglect inquiry is "at bottom an equitable one, taking 

account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's 

omission"). However, the Court is only able to weigh the facts 

which the parties put before it. See Traveler's Prop. Cas. Co. of 

Am. v. Centex Homes, No. 11-3638-SC, 2012 WL 2135315, at *1 (N.D. 

Cal. June 12, 2012) (Conti, J.) (denying a motion for leave to file 

a motion for reconsideration because the "theory was never 

mentioned before, [therefore] the Court could not have wrongfully 

failed to consider it"). Civil Local Rule 7-9 seeks to avoid 

precisely this situation, by requiring that motions for leave to 

file motions for reconsideration raise either (1) a material change 

in facts or law which could not have been known with reasonable 

diligence at the time of the earlier motion, (2) the emergence of 

new facts "occurring after the time of such order," or (3) the 

failure of the Court to consider the factual and legal arguments 

presented on the earlier motion. See Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(1)-(3) 

(emphasis added). Sharp fails to satisfy this standard. 

In its motion for reconsideration, Sharp does not point to any 

facts "which were presented to the Court," that the Court failed to 

consider in its prior order. Id. at (3) (emphasis added). For 

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example, in its original briefing, Sharp offered only the following 

conclusory statement regarding prejudice to the absent class 

members: 

The settlement class may suffer, however, if Sharp is 

prohibited from pursuing its individual opt-out cases 

against Samsung SDI and Hitachi. Unexpectedly including 

Sharp, a sizeable purchaser of CRTs, in the class would 

dramatically reduce the proportional recovery for other 

class members. It would be unfair to punish the settling 

class members because of Sharp's inadvertent two-week 

delay in providing formal opt-out notice. 

Opt-Out Mot. at 4-5. The Court considered these allegations of 

prejudice, and concluded that, while the prejudice factor weighed 

in Sharp's favor, without more detail the Court could not "ascribe 

significant weight to this factor."3 Order at *3. Specifically, 

Sharp offered no information regarding (1) the amount of its 

purchases from the Settling Defendants during the class period, (2) 

 

3

 At the hearing on this motion, Sharp's counsel repeatedly 

contended that the Court "might have inferred . . . that Sharp had 

at least around three or four hundred million dollars in purchases, 

from what was before the Court." Hr'g Tr. at 8:2-5; 9:16-17. 

Apparently, counsel believes that the Court could infer the amount 

of purchases by combining Sharp's characterization of itself as a 

"sizeable purchaser of CRTs," Opt-Out Mot. at 4, with the DPPs' 

counsel's declaration stating that "Sharp and Dell's CRT and CRT 

Product purchases during the class period are in billions of 

dollars[,] [f]or example Dell's counsel informed me today that its 

purchases from Samsung SDI exceeded $1.6 billion." Saveri Decl. ¶ 

9. While the Court might have inferred that -- after all, such an 

inference is consistent with Sharp's later-offered evidence that 

Sharp had purchases from the Settling Defendants totaling $334.8 

million -- such an inference is by no means the only one 

mathematically available. ECF No. 2750-1 ("Gallo Recons. Decl.") ¶ 

6. Because the only concrete number quoted was Dell's purchases 

against just one of the Settling Defendants, the Court could just 

as easily have concluded that Sharp's purchases were significantly 

smaller. Moreover, even if the Court were able to make such an 

inference from the record before it, the Court still lacked any 

basis for determining what percentage of Sharp's purchases from the 

Settling Defendants constituted overcharges, and thus recoverable 

damages in either the Proposed Settlements or in a separate opt-out 

case, and what effect, if any, the amount of Sharp's recovery would 

have on the class's recovery. 

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what amount of those purchases Sharp considered to be overcharges, 

and hence recoverable damages, (3) how much Sharp would be entitled 

to under the settlement, or (4) what concrete impact Sharp's 

inclusion would have on the recovery of absent class members. 

Similarly, in its original briefing, Sharp's only proffered 

explanation as to why it failed to opt out of the class in a timely 

manner was "Sharp's outside litigation counsel had never received a 

copy of the notice indicating the June 12, 2014 deadline for opting 

out as it had inadvertently not been forwarded to litigation 

counsel by Sharp Electronics Corporation." Opt-Out Mot. at 2; see 

also Benson Decl. ¶ 5. The Court analyzed this explanation and 

found it lacking given the multiple forms of notice received by or 

available to Sharp, and based on In re Static Random Access Memory 

(SRAM) Antitrust Litigation, No. C 07-01819 CW, 2009 WL 2447802, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009), in which Judge Wilken rejected a 

similarly vague explanation based on "an 'honest mistake' due to 

human error." Finally, the Court found the length of delay factor 

weighed against Sharp, concluding that even if Sharp's initial 

fourteen day delay was, as it argued, "de minimis," Sharp failed to 

mention or explain its further twelve day delay before contacting 

defendants.4 As a result, the Court weighed the applicable factors 

 

4

 At the hearing, Sharp's counsel made two points relevant to this 

twelve-day delay. First, he contended that Sharp "had explained 

previously that we were consulting with our client, we were 

consulting with Dell, who was in the same boat, and we were doing 

legal research and trying to figure out what to do about the 

situation." Hr'g Tr. at 11:21-25. This is incorrect. In fact, 

Sharp's briefing and accompanying declarations on the earlier 

motion gloss over the existence of this period and fail to explain 

what happened during those twelve days and why the delay occurred. 

See, e.g., Opt-Out Mot. at 2 (stating that "[a]fter confirming that 

it appeared on the opt-out list filed with the Court, counsel for 

Sharp contacted lead counsel for Hitachi and Samsung SDI to learn 

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in light of the facts offered by Sharp. Because Sharp cannot show 

the existence of newly discovered facts, intervening changes in the 

law, or factual or legal arguments the Court failed to consider, 

Sharp's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is 

DENIED. 

 Nevertheless, even if the Court were to grant Sharp's motion, 

many of the additional facts offered by Sharp would not 

meaningfully alter the Court's analysis. For instance, even 

 

whether they would take the position that Sharp's opt-out was 

ineffective as untimely" but failing to mention Sharp's counsel 

only did so twelve days after the opt-out list was filed) (citing 

Benson Decl. ¶ 6); Benson Decl. ¶¶ 2-6 (describing Sharp's actions 

immediately after discovering that it missed the opt-out deadline, 

but skipping directly from that point to July 8, when its counsel 

first spoke to opposing counsel). Second, also at the hearing, 

Sharp's counsel stated that in SRAM there was a "six-week delay on 

the plaintiff's side of the case." Hr'g Tr. at 12:23-24. As a 

result, Sharp argues the Court misweighed the length of delay 

factor because "[c]lass counsel and [Sharp] discussed this fact the 

very first day when we got Sharp's name on the list" of opt-outs. 

Id. at 12:20-22. However the facts of SRAM are somewhat more 

nuanced. In SRAM, Intel realized it had failed to opt out twentythree days after the applicable deadline, a period similar to the 

fourteen days at issue here. Intel immediately contacted the 

"outside counsel and several Defendants to inform them of its 

intent to opt out and to find the most efficient remedy," similar 

to Sharp's immediate contact with the DPPs' counsel here. 2009 WL 

2447802, at *1. Nonetheless, as counsel stated, six weeks after 

discovering the error and notifying outside counsel and the 

defendants of the issue, Intel contacted Plaintiffs' lead counsel 

for the first time and discussed the best course of action. Three 

days later, Intel filed a motion seeking an enlargement of time. 

While it is true that the six week period before contacting all 

relevant counsel is significantly longer than the one at issue 

here, that fact does not alter the Court's treatment of the SRAM 

case. First, the Court did not discuss the SRAM case's relevance 

to the length of delay factor, instead relying on it in addressing 

Sharp's explanation for the delay. Order at 7. Second, and most 

importantly, the Court agrees with the SRAM court's assessment of 

the failure to promptly contact opposing counsel. After 

discovering its failure to meet the opt-out deadline, Sharp had two 

options: file a motion for an extension of time or obtain the 

consent of the opposing parties and file a stipulation. SDI and 

Hitachi would have needed to agree to such a stipulation. As a 

result, Sharp's "delay belies its argument that it acted reasonably 

and diligently." SRAM, at *3. 

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considering the additional facts offered by Sharp, it is by no 

means clear that the class will suffer significant prejudice if 

Sharp is included in the Proposed Settlements. As Defendants point 

out, under the Proposed Settlements, Sharp will be entitled to a 

pro rata share of the settlement proceeds. According to Sharp's 

estimates, its pro rata share is likely to amount to approximately 

$1.3 million. As a result, Sharp's recovery from the Proposed 

Settlements would only reduce the class's recovery by 2.8 percent. 

Other courts have found even larger reductions in absent class 

members' recoveries only slightly prejudicial. See Cassese v. 

Wash. Mut., Inc., No. 05-cv-2724 (ADS)(ARL), 2013 WL 5502831, at *2 

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2013) (concluding that a difference of less than 

five percent in the class' recovery would only have "a relatively 

slight prejudicial effect" in an excusable neglect analysis). As a 

result, the Court still would not "ascribe significant weight" to 

the prejudice to absent class members. Order at *3. 

Similarly, even considering Sharp's newly offered facts, the 

length of delay factor weighs against a finding of excusable 

neglect. First, neither Sharp's initial two-week delay in 

submitting its opt-out notice, nor the twelve-day delay prior to 

contacting defense counsel is particularly long or short. 

Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has reversed a finding of excusable 

neglect where a party missed the applicable deadline by just two 

days. See Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931-32 (9th Cir. 

1994) (relying on the party seeking the extension's failure to 

present "a persuasive justification" for missing the applicable 

deadline), questioned by Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 766 n.3 

(9th Cir. 2009); see also Russell v. United States, No. C 09-03239 

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WHA, 2010 WL 1691634, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2010) (finding that 

while an opt-out request "was only one day late, it was 

nevertheless late," and concluding the moving party could not 

demonstrate excusable neglect). Furthermore, as to the previously 

unexplained twelve-day delay before contacting opposing counsel, 

Sharp's counsel offers no reason why its actions during that period 

-- conferring with Dell, the DPPs, and Sharp; and conducting legal 

research -- precluded it from contacting opposing counsel. 

Accordingly, even if Sharp's counsel is right that nothing material 

changed in this litigation during those twelve days, Hr'g Tr. 12:6-

9, the failure to promptly contact opposing counsel after 

discovering the missed opt-out deadline still "belies [Sharp's] 

argument that it acted reasonably and diligently." SRAM, at *3. 

Finally, while Sharp offers additional detail about its 

explanation for the delay, its explanation remains unsatisfying. 

Just as the Ninth Circuit concluded that "failure to read an 

applicable rule is one of the least compelling excuses that can be 

offered," Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2004), 

so too is pointing to "oversight" in failing to adequately 

"review[] such notices [and] fail[ing] to forward the relevant 

notice to legal counsel."5

 Recons. Mot. at 6. Sharp is 

 

5

 The Court does wish to clarify one point in its earlier order. 

As the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held, per se rules are 

inappropriate in weighing whether a party can establish excusable 

neglect. See Pincay, 389 F.3d at 859-60 ("[U]nder Pioneer, the 

correct approach is to avoid any per se rule."); see also Ahanchian 

v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(reversing a district court's conclusion that "a calendaring 

mistake is the type of 'inadvertent mistake' that is not entitled 

to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1)" as impermissibly adopting a 

per se rule contrary to Pioneer). While the Court concluded that 

"[i]nadvertence and miscommunication are insufficient excuses," the 

Court did not intend to suggest that it believes that cases of 

inadvertence or miscommunication can never satisfy the excusable 

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represented in this litigation by some of the most experienced and 

able class action litigators in the country. It received actual 

notice of the Proposed Settlements and applicable opt-out deadline. 

The Court's preliminary approval order, even if it did not specify 

the opt-out deadline, should have put experienced class action 

counsel on notice that Sharp had two choices: remain in the class 

and be bound by the settlement, or opt out and continue pursuing 

individual claims against the Settling Defendants. See Silvercreek 

Mgmt., Inc. v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 534 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 

2008) (finding no excusable neglect in failing to timely opt out in 

part because, even where the party did not receive actual notice 

from the settlement administrator, experienced counsel received the 

district court's preliminary approval order and could have surmised 

or otherwise inquired about the deadline). Sophisticated parties 

and experienced counsel know or should know that it is folly to 

rely solely on receiving mailed notice of a pending class 

settlement. After all, while individual notice is required for all 

identifiable class members, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 

U.S. 156, 176 (1974), even identifiable class members need not 

 

neglect standard. Instead, as the Court perhaps should have made 

more clear, under the flexible standards elucidated by the Supreme 

Court and the Ninth Circuit, Sharp's vague explanation for the 

delay -- that notice was inadvertently not sent to outside counsel 

-- was, like "a lawyer's mistake of law in reading a rule of 

procedure[,] . . . not a compelling excuse." Pincay, 389 F.3d at 

860; see also Steinfeld v. Discover Fin. Servs., No. C 12-01118 

JSW, 2014 WL 1309352, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (rejecting a 

late opt-out request where the only explanation cited for the delay 

was "that his late submission was inadvertent"). Accordingly, as 

the Court found in its first order, when weighing the applicable 

factors, Sharp's undisputed good faith and weak, "generalized 

assertions of prejudice," were insufficient to outweigh Sharp's 

vague and unimpressive explanation for the delay and unexplained 

twelve-day delay prior to contacting opposing counsel. This 

conclusion falls well within the Court's discretion under Pioneer 

and subsequent Ninth Circuit law. 

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actually receive such notice to be bound. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 

1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power 

Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding notice was 

adequate even where it was received by some class members after the 

opt out date). As the Court previously found, the notice in this 

case was constitutionally sufficient. Order at *3. In short, as 

Judge Kozinski wrote, examining explanations for missed deadlines 

accepted by the Ninth Circuit: 

Was this a class action that bristled with client 

"consultation difficulties"? Was the client distracted 

by a divorce and job change, and he had lost his lawyer 

to boot? Was the rule confusing or the notice of the 

deadline unusual? No, no and no. The action was not 

complicated; the lawyer worked at a large, sophisticated 

law firm; and the rule is . . . clear . . . . 

Pincay, 389 F.3d at 862 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Pioneer, 

507 U.S. at 398; Laurino v. Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 

(9th Cir. 2002); Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (9th 

Cir. 1996)). As a result the Court remains unpersuaded by Sharp's 

explanation for its delay. 

All that said, at least one of Sharp's points, the prejudice 

it would experience as a result of being bound by the Proposed 

Settlements, would merit serious consideration were the Court to 

grant reconsideration. While Pioneer focused on the potential for 

prejudice to the non-moving parties, the Ninth Circuit has stated 

that consideration of the prejudice to the movant should also be 

considered in analyzing excusable neglect. See Feinstein v. Serv. 

Solutions Grp. LLC, 464 F. App'x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 

Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009) for 

the proposition that "prejudice to the moving party should also be 

considered in any analysis of the first Pioneer . . . factor"). As 

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Sharp points out, should it remain in the Proposed Settlements, it 

will receive $1.3 million in exchange for releasing individual 

claims it believes are worth $109.8 million. This is a substantial 

prejudice, even if the Court grants some credence to Defendants' 

contrary suggestions that Sharp's claims (1) ignore litigation 

risk, (2) are irrelevant because "[a]ll settlements require 

plaintiffs to accept less than the alleged full value of their 

claim," and (3) overlook the possibility of joint and several 

liability.6 Hitachi Opp'n at 3. While the Court previously 

weighed the prejudice factor lightly in Sharp's favor, this 

evidence would (even more than the detail provided by Dell and the 

DPPs in support of Dell's parallel motion, Order at *3) tip the 

scales on prejudice substantially in Sharp's favor. Nonetheless, 

the Court does not reach the issue because Sharp only made passing 

and conclusory reference to the prejudice it might suffer by being 

included in the Proposed Settlements in its earlier motion to 

enlarge the opt-out period. In fact, Sharp's only previous 

reference to this issue is limited to portions of a single 

paragraph in the Benson Declaration. See Benson Decl. ¶ 14 

 

6

 Settling Defendants also suggest that "Sharp's 0.39 [percent] 

recovery of total CRT purchases from the Hitachi and SDI Defendants 

'compares favorably to settlements finally approved in other price 

fixing cases.'" Hitachi Opp'n at 4 (quoting ECF No. 2728 ("DPPs' 

Class Cert. Br.")) (citing Fisher Bros. v. Mueller Brass Co., 630 

F. Supp. 493, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). However, the Settling 

Defendants, both of which cite this passage as support for their 

argument that Sharp's recovery compares favorably to other 

settlements, seem to have misread DPPs' argument and the case they 

cite. Fisher Brothers v. Mueller Brass Co., addressed recoveries 

between 0.1 and 2.4 percent of defendants' total sales. On the 

present motion the parties are not discussing whether the class's 

recovery constitutes a sufficient percentage of the Settling 

Defendants' sales, but rather whether Sharp's pro rata portion of 

the Proposed Settlements constitutes such a small percentage of 

Sharp's alleged damages as to be substantially prejudicial to 

Sharp. As a result, Fisher is inapposite. 

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(stating that "[s]ubstantial harm or prejudice to Sharp . . . would 

occur if either form of relief requested through Sharp's Motion 

were not granted," and that "Sharp was a sizeable purchaser of CRTs 

during the relevant period"). Because these facts were not 

presented to the Court at the time of its earlier order, the Court 

could not have "manifest[ly] fail[ed] . . . to consider" any 

material facts that were actually presented. See Civ. L.R. 7-

9(b)(3). 

V. CONCLUSION

In closing, the Court notes that it is not without sympathy 

for Sharp and its counsel. The Court has repeatedly been impressed 

by the quality and diligence of counsel for all parties in this 

case. Furthermore, Sharp's counsel's genuine and candid apology 

for this regrettable incident is appreciated. Yet sympathy is not 

a part of the excusable neglect analysis under Pioneer. Instead, 

the Court must engage in a fact-bound inquiry, taking account of 

the relevant circumstances before determining whether a party's 

neglect is excusable. In doing so, the Court is, as all courts 

are, dependent on the parties to submit and develop the factual 

record necessary to resolve the issue. While the Court cannot say 

whether it would reach the same conclusion now, having had the 

benefit of the additional facts offered in support of the instant 

motion, Sharp took that risk when it chose not to present these 

facts to the Court on its earlier motion. Sharp now seeks the 

proverbial second bite at the apple in an effort to remedy this 

error, but that is not the purpose of the reconsideration process. 

After neglecting to meet the applicable opt-out deadline by 

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fourteen days, neglecting to notify opposing counsel for twelve 

more days, and neglecting to offer admittedly material facts that 

it could have offered in support of its earlier motion, Sharp's 

motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: September 8, 2014 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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