Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02367/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02367-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Unit.ed St.ates Court of Appeals 'fenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EDGAR LEE DURRE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JOHN DEMPSEY, Acting Director Colorado ) 

Dept. of Corrections; BILL WILSON, ) 

Superintendent; CARLOS BACA, ) 

Superintendent; CAPT. C.A. LINAM, ) 

Security Officer; SGT. D.L. ORNDORFF, ) 

Property Officer; CAPT. REX WORLEY, ) 

Housing Capt.; MAJOR COX; LT. J.J. ) 

LEONARD, Housing Officer; LT. JAMES ) 

AKINS, Case Manager; MARK MCGOFF, ) 

Superintendent; MAJOR CHARLIE WATSON; ) 

CAPT. JUANITA MCINTYRE; LT. FRED ) 

NELSON; THOMAS I. COOPER; R.W. HENSON; ) 

MAJOR SPURLOCK; CAPT. IRVING G. JAQUEZ; ) 

CAPT. D.J. ERPS; OFFICER BECCACCIA; ) 

LT. JOS ARAGON, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees ) 

) 

FEB 2 81989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-2367 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 86-F-2319) 

Submitted on the record without oral argument. 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 1 
Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Colorado 

Department of Corrections, .commenced this action pursuant to 42 

u.s.c. § 1983 against employees of the Department of Corrections. 

Plaintiff alleged defendants, through a series of incidents 

occurring during p~aintiff 's confinement in three different 

Colorado correctional facilities, conspired to violate plaintiff's 

constitutional rights guaranteed by the sixth, eighth, and 

fourteenth amendments. 

Plaintiff appeals. 1 

The district court dismissed the action. 

The district court dismissed several of plaintiff's claims 

without prejudice, holding these claims were included in the 

subject matter of a class action to which plaintiff is a party, 

_M_a_r_i_o_n_e_a_u_x~~v~·~~C_o_l_o_r_a_d_o~~S_t_a~t_e~~P_e_n_i_t_e_n_t_i_a_r~y, No. 78-K-1065 

(D. Colo). Plaintiff asserted claims alleging defendants violated 

plaintiff's right to due process by improperly conducting a 

disciplinary hearing in April, 1986, placing plaintiff in 

administrative segregation without a hearing, and failing to 

conduct a regression hearing before reclassifying plaintiff and 

transferring him to another facility. These claims are part of 

the subject matter of the Marioneaux class action, to which 

plaintiff is a party as an inmate in the custody of the Colorado 

1 After examining the appellate record, this panel has 

determined· unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause--is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 2 
Department of Corrections as of March 18, 1985. Stipulation, 

Marioneaux, No. 78-K-1065 (D. Colo. April 2, 1985). The district 

court properly dismissed these claims without prejudice, allowing 

plaintiff to seek redress through the class action. 

Plaintiff also alleged defendants, in October, 1986, 

violated plaintiff's due process rights by improperly conducting a 

disciplinary hearing which resulted in a determination that 

plaintiff had violated prison regulations. Ordinarily, this claim 

would also be included within the subject matter of Marioneaux. 

Plaintiff, however, further asserted prison officials reversed the 

hearing officer's determination on administrative appeal. The 

district court, therefore, properly dismissed this claim as moot. 

The district court dismissed plaintiff's remaining claims 

with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This court will 

review de novo a district court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6). Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 

1986). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle plaintiff to relief. Id. In reviewing the district 

court's dismissal, we accept as true plaintiff's allegations, 

which will be construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Because plaintiff was proceeding pro se, this court will liberally 

construe his pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972). 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 3 
In order to state a valid cause of action pursuant to § 1983, 

plaintiff must allege defendants deprived plaintiff of a .right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States while 

defendants were acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H •. 

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Meade, 841 F.2d at 1526. 

Plaintiff's § 1983 claims satisfied the "under color of state law" 

requ~rement. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1981), 

overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 

330-31 (1986). 

Plaintiff alleged defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff 

of his constitutional rights. Because plaintiff failed to allege 

specific facts showing agreement and concerted action among 

defendants, the district court properly dismissed the conspiracy 

claim with prejudice. See Sooner Prods. Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 

510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983). Conclusory allegations of conspiracy 

are insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim. Id. 

Plaintiff alleged defendant Orndorff, a Department of 

Corrections property officer, wrongfully confiscated plaintiff's 

belongings and deliberately destroyed several items of plaintiff's 

property in violation of plaintiff's right to due process. The 

district court ruled, because adequate state post-deprivation 

remedies existed through which plaintiff could assert a claim for 

the loss of his property, this claim failed to state a cause of 

action for the denial of due process. 

The complaint in this case is sixteen pages long. The 

allegations of deprivation of property read as follows: 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 4 
In the process of prowling through plaintiffs [sic] 

property for five days, [Defendant Sgt. Orndorff] , wantonly, willfully and with malace [sic] destroyed 

$60.00 worth of legal binders bought by plaintiff to 

preserve his legal case files. Thus rendering them 

completely useless • • • • And upon completion of 

defendants [sic] harrassment [sic] tactics, the 

plaintiff was missing twenty nine soda pop tokens 

• • • • That is a theft of $10.15. All of this as a 

harrassment [sic] is in violation of plaintiffs [sic] 

due process and equal protection rights. 

There was no allegation in the complaint concerning indigency, 

lack of counsel, or refusal by the state to allow plaintiff to 

present his claims in state court. 

A United States magistrate reviewed plaintiff's lengthy 

complaint and entered his conclusions and recommendations in an 

eleven-page report. Concerning the above allegations, 'the 

magistrate said: 

In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), the 

Supreme Court decided that intentional deprivations of 

property as well do not constitute Fourteenth Amendment 

violations if adequate state post-deprivation remedies 

are available. Id. at 533. Colorado law provides such 

a remedy at Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-10-106 (1982 Repl. 

Vol.), when property is wrongfully taken or negligently 

misplaced by a state official. Therefore, the complaint 

fails to state a claim under 42 u.s.c. §1983 against 

defendant ORNDORFF and must be dismissed in accordance 

with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). If he feels so inclined, 

plaintiff can pursue . his Colorado statutory claim 

procedures. 

The plaintiff then filed nine pages of objections to the 

magistrate's recommendations. Concerning the alleged deprivation 

of property, plaintiff stated: 

The Magistrate at pages 10 and 11 finds that the 

intentional deprivation of property by the defendants, 

not withstanding [sic] that the deprivation is a part of 

the ongoing acts by the defendants against the plaintiff 

is governed by application of an adequate post 

deprivation remedy as purportedly contained in C.R.S. 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 5 
24-10-106 (1982 Repl. V.); (PAGE 11). Stated quite 

simply does C.R.S •. 24-10-106 provide such a remedy on 

the facts of this case, that PARRATT v. ~AYLOR, 451 U.S. 

517 [sic] forecloses determination of this issue in this 

Court as suggested by the Magistrate. (page 11) 

Relying on COLEMAN v. FAULKNER, 697 F.2d .1347 (10th 

Cir.) Plaintiff claims that the state remedy av·ailable 

in Colorado is inadequate because plaintiff is indigent; 

cannot retain counsel; the State will not provide 

counsel in civil cases for such a proceedings [sic], and 

Colorado State Prison Authorities will not allow the 

plaintiff to appear in civil actions in their own 

behalf. Further attempts to avail themselves of such 

remedies in Colorado Courts by pro-se [sic] litigants is 

continually rebuffed by the Colorado Courts. The 

posture of this matter thus is simply not developed in a 

manner that permits a summary denial of the property 

claims herein, until sufficient facts are developed to 

show that the remedy is inadequate. The vitality of 

COLEMAN appears untouched evenly, DANIELS v. WILLIAMS, 

106 s.ct. 662, and in any event COLEMAN remains the law 

of the Tenth Circuit and on the basis of stare decisis 

this Court should follow its lead. 

The district court, in its five-page, well written and 

reasoned opinion, adopted the magistrate's report and stated 

concerning this issue: 

Intentional deprivations of property do not 

constitute Fourteenth Amendment violation if adequate 

state post-deprivation remedies are available. Hudson 

v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 24-10-106 provides a remedy when property is 

wrongfully taken by a state official. Thus, the 

Magistrate found that the claim against defendant 

Orndorff must be dismissed. Plaintiff asserts that the 

state remedies available for the deprivation of his 

property are "inadequate because plaintiff is indigent; 

cannot retain counsel; the State will not provide 

counsel in civil cases for such a proceedings, and 

Colorado State Prison Authorities will not allow the 

plaintiff to appear in civil actions." The availability 

of free counsel in Colorado State Court does not affect 

the existence of his state statutory remedy. Further, 

plaintiff is entitled to file suit in Colorado State 

Court regardless of whether he is being held in custody. 

Accordingly, the claims against ~efendant Orndorff were 

properly dismissed. 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 6 
When we review dismissal of a complaint for failure to state 

a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we must accept the 

plaintiff's allegations as true. Meade, 841 F.2d at 1526. We 

also consider plaintiff's allegation of indigency, lack of 

counsel, and confinement contained in his response to the 

magistrate's recommendations because pro se complaints are held to 

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers~ 

Haines, ~04 U.S. at 520. 

The intentional deprivation of property is not a fourteenth 

amendment violation if adequate state post-deprivation remedies 

are available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The 

magistrate and district court found Colo. Rev. Stat. 

S 24-10-106(l)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1988) provided an adequate 

post-deprivation remedy. Relying on this court's decision in 

Coleman v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 1347, 1349 (10th Cir. 1982), 

plaintiff asserted the state post-deprivation remedy is inadequate 

because of his indigency, lack of counsel and confinement. 

In Coleman, this court held the district court must consider 

the allegation of indigency, lack of counsel and confinement in 

determining ·whether the state post-deprivation remedy is 

constitutionally sufficient. We did not hold that this allegation 

alone established a § 1983 claim as a matter of law. In Coleman, 

the district court's dismissal was reversed and remanded to allow 

the court to consider Coleman's allegation that the state remedy 

was constitutionally insufficient for an indigent prisoner. In 

the case before this court, the district court considered 

plaintiff's allegation of indigency, lack of counsel, and 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 7 
confinement, and 

constitutionally 

district court's 

found Colorado's post-deprivation remedy 

sufficient . for an indigent prisoner. The 

decision followed the mandate of Coleman. 

Therefore, unless indigency, lack of ~ounsel, and confinement make 

the state post-deprivation remedy inadequate, the district court's 

dismissal of the § 1983 claim must be affirmed. 

Colorado law waives the defense of sovereign immunity for 

damages for . injuries resulting from the operation of any 

6orrectional facility. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(l)(b) (Repl. 

Vol. 1988). Colorado requires a notice of a claim to be filed 

containing specified information. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-109 

(Repl. Vol. 1988). The purpose of the notice is to allow for the 

immediate abatement of dangerous conditions, "to foster prompt 

settlement of meritorious claims," and to facilitate budget 

requirements. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 

532 P.2d 346, 349 (Colo. 1975)(emphasis added). The complaint 

pleaded no facts showing that plaintiff is unable, because of 

indigency, lack of counsel, or confinement, to follow the Colorado 

claim procedure. 

If plaintiff's claim progressed to filing a suit in court, 

neither his indigency, lack of counsel, or confinement would 

prevent commencement of the suit. A Colorado statute allows an 

indigent person to petition the court to waive court costs and 

expenses. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-16-103 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 

Pleadings may be prepared and signed by a pro se party, Colo. R. 

Civ. P. 11, and mailed to the court. Plaintiff's conclusory 

allegation that he "cannot retain counsel'' failed to indicate any 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 8 
attempt to secure counsel through a contingency-fee arrangement, 

legal aid, or E!.2 bono representation, or through law student 

assistance, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-5-116 through 12-5-116.5 (Repl. 

Vol. 1985). There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel 

in a civil case. Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505 (10th Cir. 

1969). Plaintiff's confinement also does not prevent pursuit of· 

the state remedy. He may file pleadings and copduct discovery 

through the mail. He can present his testimony to the court by 

deposition. Colo. R. Civ. P. 30 and 31. Plaintiff's conclusory 

allegation that his status as an indigent prisoner makes the 

state post-deprivation remedy inadequate failed to state a claim 

for relief under § 1983. See, ·~ .. ! .. 9 .. =..1 Williams v. St. Louis County, 

812 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1987)(dismissal of § 1983 

complaint improper where petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion indicated 

the state court refused to allow him to proceed in forma 

pauperis). There existed no showing in the complaint that 

indigency and confinement have in fact resulted in an inadequate 

state remedy. Plaintiff did not satisfy the causation requirement 

for a civil rights claim by alleging mere indigency and 

confinement. He must make some allegation showing they have in 

fact denied him an adequate state remedy. In order to state a 

claim under § 1983, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to 

show deprivation, in this case the lack of an adequate state 

remedy. Indigency and confinement standing alone are not 

sufficient. 

The district court dismissed plaintiff's remaining claims 

with prejudice. With one exception, we affirm. 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 9 
Plaintiff alleged defendant Aragon, a Department of 

Corrections' housing officer, instigated and directed the beating 

of plaintiff by several other inmates in the presence of defendant 

Aragon. This allegation, accepted as true, stated a valid claim 

pursuant to § 1983. Bethea, 417 F.2d at 508-09; see also Collins 

v. Hladky, 603 F.2d 824, 825 (10th Cir. 1979). 

Plaintiff failed to allege the personal participation of any 

.of the other defendants in the incident underlying his claim 

against defendant Aragon. In order to be liable pursuant to 

§ 1983, a defendant must have personally participated in the 

alleged deprivation. Meade, 841 F.2d at 1527-58. The district 

court properly dismissed this claim to the extent it was asserted 

against any of the other defendants. 

The district court order dismissing plaintiff's claim against 

defendant Aragon for directing inmates to beat plaintiff is 

REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the district 

court's order is AFFIRMED. 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 10 
No. 87-2367, Durre v. Dempsey, et al. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge, concurring. 

I join in the majority opinion but would advance a somewhat 

different reason to affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's claim 

under 42 u.s.c. S 1983 for wrongful deprivation of his belongings. 

I would affirm because plaintiff's allegation that he is unable to 

pursue state remedies is conclusory and does not allege facts 

sufficient to state a cause of action. The majority's careful 

recitation of the procedures available for pro se litigants under 

Colorado law serves to highlight the inadequacy of plaintiff's 

conclusory allegations. 

11 

Appellate Case: 87-2367 Document: 01019740030 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 11