Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-99003/USCOURTS-ca9-08-99003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH RUDOLPH WOOD, III, 

Petitioner-Appellant, No. 08-99003

v. D.C. No.  4:98-CV-00053- CHARLES L. RYAN, interim

JMR Director, Arizona Department of

Corrections, OPINION

Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 18, 2011—San Francisco, California

Filed September 10, 2012

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Ronald M. Gould, and

Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Thomas

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COUNSEL

Julie S. Hall (argued), Law Offices of Julie S. Hall, Oracle,

Arizona; and Kevin C. Lerch, Law Office of Kevin C. Lerch,

Tucson, Arizona, for petitioner-appellant Joseph Rudolph

Wood, III.

Terry Goddard, Attorney General; Kent Cattani (argued),

Chief Counsel, Capital Litigation Section; and Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Arizona, for

respondents-appellees Charles L. Ryan et al.

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

Joseph R. Wood III, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals the

district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his state convictions for murder and aggravated assault

and the imposition of the death penalty. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

I

Petitioner Joseph Wood shot and killed his estranged girlfriend, Debra Dietz, and her father, Eugene Dietz, on August

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7, 1989 at a Tucson automotive paint and body shop owned

and operated by the Dietz family. The Arizona Supreme Court

described the facts as follows:

Since 1984, Defendant and Debra had maintained

a tumultuous relationship increasingly marred by

Defendant’s abusive and violent behavior. Eugene

generally disapproved of this relationship but did not

actively interfere. In fact, the Dietz family often

included Defendant in dinners and other activities.

Several times, however, Eugene refused to let

Defendant visit Debra during business hours while

she was working at the shop. Defendant disliked

Eugene and told him he would “get him back” and

that Eugene would “be sorry.”

Debra had rented an apartment that she shared

with Defendant. Because Defendant was seldom

employed, Debra supported him financially. Defendant nevertheless assaulted Debra periodically.

[FN1]. She finally tried to end the relationship after

a fight during the 1989 July 4th weekend. She left

her apartment and moved in with her parents, saying

“I don’t want any more of this.” After Debra left,

Defendant ransacked and vandalized the apartment.

She obtained an order of protection against Defendant on July 8, 1989. In the following weeks, however, Defendant repeatedly tried to contact Debra at

the shop, her parents’ home, and her apartment.

[FN2].

FN1. Debra was often bruised and sometimes wore sunglasses to hide blackened

eyes. A neighbor who heard “thuds and

banging” within Debra’s apartment called police on June 30, 1989, after finding

Debra outside and “hysterical.” The

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responding officer saw cuts and bruises

on Debra.

FN2. Defendant left ten messages on

Debra’s apartment answering machine on

the night of Friday, August 4, 1989.

Some contained threats of harm, such as:

“Debbie, I’m sorry I have to do this. I

hope someday somebody will understand

when we’re not around no more. I do

love you babe. I’m going to take you

with me.”

Debra and Eugene drove together to work at the

shop early on Monday morning, August 7, 1989.

Defendant phoned the shop three times that morning.

Debra hung up on him once, and Eugene hung up on

him twice. Defendant called again and asked another

employee if Debra and Eugene were at the shop. The

employee said that they had temporarily left but

would return soon. Debra and Eugene came back at

8:30 a.m. and began working in different areas of the

shop. Six other employees were also present that

morning.

At 8:50 a.m., a Tucson Police officer saw Defendant driving in a suspicious manner near the shop.

The officer slowed her patrol car and made eye contact with Defendant as he left his truck and entered

the shop. Eugene was on the telephone in an area

where three other employees were working. Defendant waited for Eugene to hang up, drew a revolver,

and approached to within four feet of him. The other

employees shouted for Defendant to put the gun

away. Without saying a word, Defendant fatally shot

Eugene once in the chest and then smiled. When the

police officer saw this from her patrol car she immediately called for more officers. Defendant left the

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shop, but quickly returned and again pointed his

revolver at the now supine Eugene. Donald Dietz, an

employee and Eugene’s seventy-year-old brother,

struggled with Defendant, who then ran to the area

where Debra had been working.

Debra had apparently heard an employee shout

that her father had been shot and was trying to telephone for help when Defendant grabbed her around

the neck from behind and placed his revolver

directly against her chest. Debra struggled and

screamed, “No, Joe, don’t!” Another employee heard

Defendant say, “I told you I was going to do it, I

have to kill you.” Defendant then called Debra a

“bitch” and shot her twice in the chest. 

Several police officers were already on the scene

when Defendant left the shop after shooting Debra.

Two officers ordered him to put his hands up. Defendant complied and dropped his weapon, but then

grabbed it and began raising it toward the officers.

After again ordering Defendant to raise his hands,

the officers shot Defendant several times.

State v. Wood, 881 P.2d 1158, 1165-66 (Ariz. 1994). Wood

was arrested and indicted on two counts of first degree murder

and two counts of aggravated assault against the police officers who subdued him. Id. at 1166.

At trial, Wood conceded his role in the killings, but argued

that they were impulsive acts that were not premeditated. Id.

After a five-day trial, the jury found Wood guilty on all

counts. Id. at 1169. Following an aggravation and mitigation

hearing, the trial court sentenced Wood to imprisonment for

the assaults and to death for each murder. Id. at 1165.

In 1994, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Wood’s convictions and sentences. Id. The court also independently

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reviewed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determined that the trial court correctly concluded

that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating

circumstances, thereby supporting the imposition of the death

penalty. Id. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Wood v. Arizona, 515 U.S. 1147 (1995), and Wood’s

petition for rehearing, Wood v. Arizona, 515 U.S. 1180

(1995). 

In 1996, Wood filed a state petition for post-conviction

review (PCR). The state post-conviction court and the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief. In 2002, Wood filed a second PCR petition. The state post-conviction court and

Arizona Supreme Court again denied relief. 

In 1998, Wood filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in federal district court, followed by the filing of an Amended

Petition later that year. In 2006, the district court issued an

order on the procedural status of Wood’s claims, finding certain claims properly exhausted and ordering merits briefing on

those claims and dismissing others as procedurally barred.

Order Re: Procedural Status of Claims, Wood v. Schriro, No.

CV-98-053-TUC-JMR (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2006), ECF No. 63.

In 2007, the district court denied Wood’s remaining habeas

claims on the merits. Wood v. Schriro, No. CV-98-053-TUCJMR, 2007 WL 3124451, at *46 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007).

We review the district court’s denial of Wood’s habeas

petition de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Stanley

v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010). We review the

denial of Wood’s request for an evidentiary hearing for an

abuse of discretion. Id. Wood filed his habeas petition after

April 24, 1996, thus the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) applies. Woodford v. Garceau, 538

U.S. 202, 204-07 (2003). To obtain relief under AEDPA,

Wood must show that the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to” clearly established federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court, (2) “involved an unreasonable application of”

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such law, or (3) “was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts” in light of the record before the state court. Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

II

The district court correctly determined that Wood was not

entitled to habeas relief on his claims that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in violation of his rights to due

process and a fair trial. The district court denied five claims

on the merits and concluded that four claims were procedurally barred.

A

The district court was correct in its denial of Wood’s prosecutorial misconduct claims on the merits. Wood argues that

the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by: (1)

cross-examining a psychologist about whether another doctor

had considered hypnotizing or administering amobarbital to

Wood; (2) eliciting testimony about a prior arrest, his employment history, and his personal relationships with previous

girlfriends and with Ms. Dietz; (3) cross-examining a psychologist about Wood’s mental state; (4) cross-examining a

lay witness about Wood’s mental state; and (5) committing

cumulative error. 

A prosecutor’s actions constitute misconduct if they “so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477

U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,

416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). The “appropriate standard of

review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is ‘the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.’ ” Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642). On

habeas review, constitutional errors of the “trial type,” including prosecutorial misconduct, warrant relief only if they “had

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substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1

[1] The district court properly denied Wood’s claim that

the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking Dr. Allender,

a psychologist called as an expert witness by the defense,

whether he had considered hypnotizing or administering amobarbital to Wood. Wood, 2007 WL 3124451, at *6-8. On

direct examination, Wood’s counsel asked Dr. Allender questions about Wood’s alleged inability to remember the shootings. On cross-examination, the prosecutor probed Dr.

Allender’s understanding of Wood’s alleged memory loss.

Wood alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking

the following line of questions:

Q: Didn’t Dr. Morris [another psychologist who

examined Wood] suggest that hypnosis or amobarbital might be ideal to discover whether [Wood] was

malingering?

A: He suggested that those might be techniques.

Q: With hypnosis, you place them under hypnosis in

order to find out what the truth of the matter was?

A: What the theory would be is if it is an unconscious process, that you can probably do hypnosis or

use the sodium amobarbital to get past the conscious

defense or unconscious defense mechanisms.

Q: So you didn’t, did you attempt, did you request

a hypnosis evaluation?

A: I didn’t because I didn’t, I’m not as convinced

about those techniques as Dr. Morris is.

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Q: Amobarbital, is that a truth serum?

A: That is what they call it, that is what people have

called it along the way.

[2] The Arizona Supreme Court denied this claim on direct

review. Wood, 881 P.2d at 1172-73. In doing so, the Arizona

Supreme Court reasonably applied clearly established law.

Although Wood argues that the evidence obtained by hypnosis or sodium amobarbital would have been scientifically

unreliable, the Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that

“courts generally exclude testimony induced or ‘refreshed’ by

drugs or hypnosis” but determined that the prosecutor’s questions about amobarbital and hypnosis in Wood’s case were

“within the wide latitude permitted on cross-examination”

because they were “not intended to impugn [Wood] but to test

the basis and credibility of Dr. Allender’s opinions concerning whether [Wood] was faking his asserted memory loss at

the time of the murders.” Id. at 1172-73. 

Wood also contends that Dr. Allender appeared unqualified

because he did not consider this potential evidence, but the

record belies this assertion. Dr. Allender testified that he did

not perform hypnosis or administer amobarbital because he

was not convinced about the reliability of these tests. By

questioning the reliability of the tests, Dr. Allender demonstrated his credibility as an expert by showing that a competent psychologist questions the use of methods and practices

that do not provide credible results. The prosecutor’s questions did not “so infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make

the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477

U.S. at 181.

2

[3] The district court also correctly denied Wood’s claims

that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting testimony about Wood’s prior arrest, employment history, per10826 WOOD v. RYAN

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sonal relationships with previous girlfriends, and self-centered

relationship with Ms. Dietz. Wood, 2007 WL 3124451, at *8-

11. The Arizona Supreme Court addressed the prior arrest and

employment history claims. Wood, 881 P.2d at 1170-72.

However, it did not address the claims about Wood’s prior

relationships with other girlfriends or his allegedly selfcentered relationship with Ms. Dietz, so we must review these

two claims de novo. See Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860

(9th Cir. 2011). 

The Arizona Supreme Court reasonably determined that the

prosecutor’s passing reference to Wood’s prior arrest on

cross-examination did not violate Wood’s right to due process. On direct examination, Dr. Allender testified that he

reviewed police reports from the Tucson and Las Vegas

police departments. The prosecutor then followed up on

cross-examination by asking questions about these reports:

Q: Directing your attention, you said you had some

Las Vegas reports?

A: Yes.

Q: You had police reports from 1979?

A: I believe I did. I would have to flip through and

look for it if you want me to.

[The Court]: Maybe if you ask — 

Q: Do you recall in 1979 an incident when [Wood]

was arrested for some criminal activity?

A: I think I found a report from ‘79 from Las Vegas.

[4] The Arizona Supreme Court determined that this line

of questioning did not deprive Wood of a fair trial because

“the prosecutor simply asked Dr. Allender to elaborate on the

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reports he first mentioned on direct examination. The jury

never learned the details of the conduct underlying Defendant’s Las Vegas arrest.” Wood, 881 P.2d at 1172. The court

concluded that “[b]ecause Dr. Allender relied on the reports

in forming his opinion of Defendant, the prosecutor’s crossexamination was proper.” Id. This brief mention of Wood’s

prior misdemeanor did not deprive him of a fair trial. The

prosecutor referred to the misdemeanor only in passing during

the examination and he did not mention it in his closing argument. 

The trial court had granted a motion in limine excluding the

introduction of this prior misdemeanor into evidence, and the

Arizona Supreme Court determined that Wood would have

been entitled to a limiting instruction that references to the

police reports were admissible only to show the basis of Dr.

Allender’s opinions had he objected. Id. at 1172. But to the

extent Wood argues this merits reversal, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

[5] The prosecutor’s references to Wood’s employment

history, prior relationships, and self-centered relationship with

Ms. Dietz also do not rise to the level of a due process violation. The Arizona Supreme Court properly concluded that the

challenged testimony regarding Wood’s employment history

was merely “perfunctory and undetailed” such that “its admission d[id] not rise to the level of fundamental error.” Wood,

881 P.2d at 1170. Similarly, the prosecutor’s questions that

elicited Wood’s former girlfriend’s testimony that Wood was

unfaithful and Margaret Dietz’s testimony that Wood was

selfish in his relationship with Debra Dietz were also perfunctory and undetailed and they did not violate Wood’s due process rights. 

3

[6] The prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct

by cross-examining Dr. Allender about Wood’s mental state.

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Wood alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

improperly raising the issue of Wood’s mental state at the

time of the incident in the following line of questions:

Q. Let me ask you, sir, I don’t know, you are talking

about impulsivity here today. Of the defendant. You

said the defendant has a trait of acting impulsively?

A. [Dr. Allender] That’s my belief, yes.

Q. Under the facts of this case as you understand

them, sir, how would a person who was not impulsive have committed this offense?

A. Had it been thought through and premeditated,

then I would say it was not impulsive. I see impulsivity as acting without forethought.

Q. Well, how would a non-impulsive person have

committed this offense?

A. I think they would have planned it out.

Q. So what you are saying is that this wasn’t planned

out, from what you know about the facts of this case

it wasn’t planned?

A. It is hard for me to say whether it is planned.

Well, I think Mr. Wood behaved in a general

sequence but given his lack of recall for the specific

offense, it is hard for me to know whether this was

planned out or not.

[7] The district court correctly concluded that this line of

cross-examination did not warrant the grant of habeas relief.

Even if the prosecutor’s questions arguably touched on

Wood’s state of mind at the time of the crimes, Dr. Allender’s

answers did not. He merely testified that he was not certain

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if Wood had planned the shootings. This testimony did not

conflict with Wood’s impulsivity theory and did not deprive

Wood of a fair trial.

4

[8] The prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct

by cross-examining Mona Donovan, a mutual friend of Wood

and Ms. Dietz, about Wood’s mental state. On direct examination, Donovan testified that Wood sometimes acted impulsively. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Donovan

about her pre-trial statement that Wood’s anger increased as

a situation worsened. Wood argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking the following questions about an

incident at Ms. Dietz’s apartment:

Q: When [Wood] trashed the apartment, he trashed

the apartment to get some of his possessions and

avenge his anger? I was reading the question

[defense counsel] asked you on page 11, do you

know why he broke in? Answer, to get some of his

possessions, to avenge some of his anger by breaking possessions of [Ms. Dietz’s]. Do you recall that?

A: Yes.

Q: In fact I think there was a telephonic interview

that you gave to a legal assistant in my office on the

9th of October, do you recall when you were asked

why he did that, indicating that he probably, he was

probably very angry and did it out of spite?

A: I don’t recall the telephone conversation.

Q: Does that sound like something you would say?

A: I really don’t know, I don’t remember.

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Q: Would you agree with that statement?

A: That he would do it out of spite?

The Court: Let’s quit asking this witness, the witness

why this defendant did or didn’t know why he did

something, there’s no way she could know it.

Q: You indicated did you not that he avenged some

of his anger by breaking and destroying some possessions of [Ms. Dietz’s]?

A: Yes.

The Court: Did you hear what I just said, quit asking

her about his mental state. Quit asking her about his

mental state.

Q: Well, when you say the word avenge, what do

you mean by the word avenge? Do you mean to get

revenge?

A: Yeah, I guess so.

Wood contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by

asking Ms. Donovan to speculate about Wood’s mental state

after the trial judge ruled that the question was improper.

Because the Arizona Supreme Court did not address this

claim on the merits, we review it de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d

at 860.

[9] The district court correctly concluded that the questioning did not violate Wood’s right to a fair trial. Although the

prosecutor should have dropped this line of questioning after

the trial judge admonished him once, the improper follow-up

question about Wood’s mental state during an event unrelated

to the killings was not so prejudicial that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair. The fact that Wood had vandalized Ms.

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Dietz’s apartment had already been established. Additionally,

the information elicited by the prosecutor was consistent with

the defense theory that Wood was impulsive and had angercontrol problems. Donovan’s testimony regarding Wood’s

motives in vandalizing the apartment was only tangentially

related to the issue of Wood’s state of mind at the time of the

shootings.

5

[10] Finally, the cumulative impact of each of the incidents

of alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not violate Wood’s

right to a fair trial. Even when separately alleged incidents of

prosecutorial misconduct do not independently rise to the

level of reversible error, “[t]he cumulative effect of multiple

errors can violate due process.” United States v. Nobari, 574

F.3d 1065, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). However, Wood’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct do not rise to the level of a due process violation even

when considered in the aggregate.

B

Wood raises additional prosecutorial misconduct claims

that the district court dismissed as procedurally defaulted.

Wood claims that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by: (1) eliciting evidence that Wood was incarcerated

while awaiting trial; (2) eliciting false testimony regarding the

position of the bullets in the gun’s cylinder; (3) impugning

defense counsel’s motives; and (4) eliciting inflammatory victim impact evidence. We affirm the district court’s dismissal

of these claims because they were not fairly presented to the

state courts. 

To fairly present a claim in state court, a petitioner must

describe the operative facts supporting that claim. Davis v.

Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

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270, 275-78 (1971). Wood concedes that the specific facts

underlying these claims were not presented on direct appeal,

but he argues that they merely constitute additional particular

instances of prosecutorial misconduct that do not fundamentally alter the claim raised on direct appeal. However, a general allegation that a prosecutor engaged in pervasive

misconduct is not sufficient to alert a state court to separate

specific instances of purported misconduct. See Picard, 404

U.S. at 275-78.

In the alternative, Wood argues that the first and last of

these claims — that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

eliciting evidence that Wood was incarcerated while awaiting

trial and eliciting inflammatory victim impact evidence —

were not defaulted because they were incorporated by reference to his state PCR petition in his petition for review. 

The district court properly determined that these claims

were not fairly presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. As

the Supreme Court has explained:

[O]rdinarily, a state prisoner does not “fairly present” a claim to a state court if that court must read

beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document)

that does not alert it to the presence of a federal

claim in order to find material, such as the lower

court opinion in the case, that does so.

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

Additionally, “a habeas petitioner who has failed to meet

the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal

claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to

address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). 

[11] Arizona law requires that a petitioner present the

issues and material facts supporting a claim in a petition for

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review and prohibits raising an issue through incorporation of

any document by reference, except for appendices. Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(iv). Wood failed to comply with these

requirements and thereby failed to fairly present these claims

to the Arizona Supreme Court.

Finally, Wood argues that even if his false testimony claim

is procedurally defaulted, the district court erred by not reaching the merits of this claim because failure to do so would

cause a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To establish a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice,” Wood must show that

“a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). He

must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the

new evidence.” Id. As a result, the Supreme Court has noted

that this exception “would remain ‘rare’ and would only be

applied in the ‘extraordinary case.’ ” Id. at 321. 

[12] Wood does not meet this burden because considerable

evidence of his premeditation was introduced at trial. The

morning of the crime, Wood called the shop to determine

whether Debra and Eugene Dietz were there and, although he

regularly carried a gun with him, he brought more ammunition to the shop than was his habit. Wood, 881 P.2d at 1169.

He waited to shoot Eugene until after Eugene had hung up the

telephone, actively searched for Ms. Dietz, and held her

before shooting her, stating, “I told you I was going to do it,

I have to kill you.” Id. Evidence was also introduced detailing

Wood’s history of violence against Ms. Dietz, as were taped

messages in which Wood threatened her life. Id. at 1165 nn.1-

2. Given this evidence against Wood, it is not more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty

of premeditated murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

III

The district court correctly determined that Wood was not

entitled to habeas relief on his claims that he was denied

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effective assistance of counsel at trial, sentencing, and on

appeal. 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that

he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Deficient performance is

established when “counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In determining deficiency, “a court must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”

Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish

prejudice, Wood must show “a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Under AEDPA review, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland

standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking

whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claims are

also assessed according to the Strickland standard. 466 U.S.

at 695. The test for prejudice at sentencing in a capital case

is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the

errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. AEDPA’s “objectively unreasonable”

standard also applies to ineffective assistance of counsel at

sentencing claims that are considered and denied by a state

PCR court. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002).

A

The district court correctly dismissed Wood’s claims that

his trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffecWOOD v. RYAN 10835

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tive. He contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently

by inadequately investigating and preparing his mental health

defense and failing to object to alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

1

[13] Wood’s counsel’s investigation and preparation of

Wood’s mental health defense was not constitutionally ineffective. At trial, Wood conceded his role in the killings but

argued that they were not premeditated because he had acted

impulsively. Wood, 881 P.2d at 1166. Wood alleges that his

counsel rendered ineffective assistance in asserting an impulsivity defense by failing to provide Dr. Allender with sufficient background material to testify effectively about his

mental health at trial. The record indicates that counsel adequately prepared Dr. Allender for his testimony. At counsel’s

request, Dr. Allender thoroughly examined Wood over the

course of two days. During these examinations, Dr. Allender

administered several psychological tests and discussed

Wood’s drug and alcohol abuse, hospitalization history —

including his history of head injuries — and the incident

itself. Dr. Allender also reviewed psychological evaluations

by Dr. Boyer, Dr. Morris, and Dr. Morenz, the three other

mental health experts who also examined Wood. Each of

these evaluations discussed Wood’s personal history of alcohol abuse, his suicide attempts, and his head injuries. Given

this background preparation, Dr. Allender was prepared to

testify about Wood’s mental state. 

Furthermore, Wood has not demonstrated prejudice. Counsel presented an impulsivity defense and Wood has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that a different or more

comprehensive presentation of that defense would have

resulted in a different verdict, especially in the face of the

overwhelming evidence of premeditation. See Williams v.

Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the PCR

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court did not unreasonably apply Strickland when it rejected

this claim.

2

[14] The district court properly rejected Wood’s claims

that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the alleged incidents of prosecutorial misconduct. The PCR court did not unreasonably apply Strickland in

determining that Wood failed to demonstrate prejudice. Many

of counsel’s decisions not to object at trial were consistent

with his presentation of an impulsivity defense. For example,

evidence elicited by the prosecutor concerning instances of

Wood’s erratic behavior was consistent with the strategy of

offering Wood’s impulsive personality as a defense to the element of premeditation. See Wood, 881 P.2d at 1170. Additionally, the jury’s finding of premeditation was supported by

strong evidence at trial. See Wood, 881 P.2d at 1169. In light

of this evidence, Wood has not demonstrated a reasonable

probability that the result of the trial would have been different had defense counsel objected to the alleged instances of

prosecutorial misconduct.

B

[15] The district court also properly dismissed as procedurally defaulted Wood’s claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to impeach three witnesses.

Wood claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach Anita Sueme, Eric Thompson, and

Donald Dietz for allegedly giving prior statements inconsistent with their trial testimony. We affirm the district court’s

dismissal of this claim because it was not fairly presented to

the state courts. 

To fairly present a claim in state court, a petitioner must

describe the operative facts supporting that claim. Davis, 511

F.3d at 1009; see also Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6; Picard, 404

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U.S. at 275-78. Wood concedes that he did not raise these particular claims on direct appeal, but as with some of his claims

of prosecutorial misconduct, see supra Section II.B, he argues

that they merely constitute additional particular instances of

ineffective assistance of counsel that do not fundamentally

alter the claim raised on direct appeal. However, as with the

claims of prosecutorial conduct discussed previously, a general allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is not sufficient to alert a state court to separate specific instances of

ineffective assistance. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-78.

C

The district court did not err in denying Wood’s claim that

his counsel failed to effectively assist him at sentencing. Specifically, Wood contends that his counsel failed to prepare and

present evidence of his diminished capacity, failed to prepare

him for his pre-sentence interview, and failed to assert his

military service as a mitigating factor. 

1

Wood argues that his counsel failed to properly marshal

evidence of Wood’s personality changes following head injuries and his social background, including his alcoholism and

mental illness. However, information regarding each of these

issues was put before the trial court. Evidence of Wood’s

reported head injuries was presented through Dr. Allender’s

testimony during the guilt stage of the trial. Dr. Allender testified that Wood’s head injuries did not cause a significant

behavioral change. Wood’s head injuries were also discussed

in the other mental health experts’ Rule 11 reports. 

[16] Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present

additional evidence and argument at sentencing about Wood’s

head injuries because it had already been presented at trial.

See Bell, 535 U.S. at 699-700. Additional evidence of Wood’s

social background, including his history of substance abuse,

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was also presented at sentencing by Dr. Breslow, a psychiatric

chemical dependency expert. Dr. Breslow reviewed Wood’s

medical and military records, statements from trial witnesses,

and the mental-health evaluations prepared by Dr. Morris, Dr.

Morenz, and Dr. Allender. He testified that Wood suffers

from alcohol, stimulant, amphetamine, and cocaine dependencies. He explained that Wood’s substance abuse had a profound effect on Wood’s personality by impairing his

judgment, making him more impulsive, and likely impacting

his behavior at the time of the killings. Thus, counsel developed and presented this mitigating evidence in detail and the

PCR court reasonably rejected Wood’s claim. 

[17] Wood also argues that his counsel never requested or

acquired an in depth neurological evaluation. However, the

PCR court found that Wood’s counsel requested a brain mapping test, on Dr. Breslow’s recommendation, although that

request was denied by the trial court. Counsel attempted to

acquire the recommended evaluation and his failure to obtain

it does not render his performance constitutionally ineffective.

2

[18] The district court properly concluded that the PCR

court reasonably denied Wood’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim that his counsel failed to prepare him for his

pre-sentence interview. Wood argues that he was not adequately prepared because he did not express remorse for his

actions in his interview with the probation officer. But Wood

included expressions of remorse in a letter delivered by counsel to the sentencing judge. The record also indicates that the

court did not consider Wood’s lack of remorse in the presentence report as a factor in his sentence. Therefore, Wood does

not demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s performance

because he “has failed to show that the information relative to

remorse contained in the pre-sentence report had any effect on

the sentencing court’s decision to impose the death penalty.”

Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1991).

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3

[19] The district court properly concluded that the PCR

court reasonably denied Wood’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim on the ground that his counsel did not explicitly

present his military service as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Counsel presented Wood’s military records for consideration by the trial court and the sentencing judge is presumed

to have known and applied the law correctly, which meant

giving consideration to this mitigating evidence.

4

The district court did not err in concluding that the PCR

court reasonably denied Wood’s claim that the cumulative

effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies entitles him to a new trial

and sentencing proceeding. “Separate errors by counsel at

trial and at sentencing should be analyzed together to see

whether their cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his

right to effective assistance.” Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991,

1001 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Wood’s assertion of

cumulative error fails because his individual claims of his

counsel’s errors at trial and sentencing are not supportable,

and they do not entitle him to relief even when aggregated.

D

The district court correctly denied Wood’s claim that he

was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his

appellate attorneys had an alleged conflict of interest, but did

not withdraw from representation. Wood did not raise this

particular ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal or in

his PCR proceedings, so the district court dismissed it as

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. 

IV

[20] The district court properly denied Wood’s claim that

the state trial court erred by denying Wood’s request for fund10840 WOOD v. RYAN

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ing to obtain a neurometric brain mapping test. The district

court dismissed this claim as procedurally defaulted because

Wood did not fairly present it to the state courts. Wood contends that he properly exhausted this claim by presenting it to

the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal and by presenting it in post-conviction proceedings. He also contends that

the Arizona Supreme Court necessarily considered this claim

during its independent sentencing review. 

Wood did not exhaust his claim on direct review. Wood

discussed the denial of the funding request only in his description of the trial court’s proceedings; he did not argue that the

denial of the funding request violated his constitutional rights.

This passing reference was not sufficient to fairly alert the

Arizona Supreme Court to this claim. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 2004).

Wood also did not properly exhaust this claim in postconviction proceedings. Although Wood raised this claim in

the PCR petition, he did not include it in his petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court. Wood argues that he

incorporated his PCR petition by reference into his petition

for review before the Arizona Supreme Court. Again, as discussed in Part II.B of this opinion, this incorporation by reference was not a sufficient method of fairly presenting this

claim to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Baldwin, 541 U.S.

at 32. 

The Arizona Supreme Court’s independent sentencing

review did not serve to exhaust this claim. In capital cases, the

Arizona Supreme Court independently reviews the facts that

established the aggravating and mitigating factors in order to

justify the sentence imposed. Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938,

951 (9th Cir. 2008). However, this independent review does

not necessarily exhaust all claims of constitutional error. See

Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1057-58 (9th Cir.

2005). We agree with the district court that the Arizona

Supreme Court would not necessarily consider whether the

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trial court’s denial of a funding request limited Wood’s ability

to present mitigating evidence.

V

[21] Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion

by denying Wood’s request for an evidentiary hearing, evidentiary development, and expansion of the record. During

PCR proceedings, Wood requested, but did not receive, an

evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims. The district court concluded that Wood may have diligently attempted to develop the factual basis for his claims,

but the district court still denied these requests under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) after determining that Wood had not

alleged the existence of disputed facts which, if true, would

entitle him to relief. 

Wood contends that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient handling of mental health evidence at the guilt and sentencing stages of trial. However, the record details counsel’s

performance, including his effort to investigate, prepare, and

present a guilt-stage defense based on Wood’s character trait

of impulsivity. Therefore, Wood is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims can be “resolved by reference to the state court

record.” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.

1998) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Wood is not entitled

to an evidentiary hearing or additional discovery in federal

court because this ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as it was adjudicated on

the merits in the PCR proceedings. Review of such claims “is

limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, ___

U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). 

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VI

[22] For these reasons, we therefore affirm the district

court’s denial of Wood’s habeas petition and request for an

evidentiary hearing.

AFFIRMED.

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