Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01010/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01010-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL PENNIEWELL,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

1:06-CV-01010 OWW GSA HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant

to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, following his

conviction by plea of guilty on April 12, 1982, to second degree murder in violation of Cal. Penal

Code § 187. See Respondent’s Answer to Petition (hereinafter “Answer”), Exhibit 1. Petitioner

was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of fifteen years to life in state prison with the

possibility of parole. Id. 

On March 16, 2005, Petitioner attended a subsequent parole suitability hearing before the

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28 The information is derived from the probation officer’s report. See Answer, Exhibit 2. 1

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California Board of Prison Terms (now the Board of Parole Hearings - “BPH”). See Answer,

Exhibit 3. Petitioner participated in the hearing and was represented by counsel. Id. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the BPH concluded Petitioner was suitable for parole. Id. at 44.

On August 12, 2005, after considering the parole decision of the BPH, the Governor

reversed the Board’s decision. See Answer, Exhibit 4. 

Petitioner sought relief in the state courts. He filed a habeas petition in the Los Angeles

County Superior Court on September 20, 2005, which was denied in a reasoned decision on

September 29, 2005. See Answer, Exhibit 5. He then filed a habeas petition in the California

Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District on November 8, 2005. See Answer, Exhibit 6. That

petition was denied on February 15, 2006. Id. Finally, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court on March 13, 2006. See Answer, Exhibit 7. On March 17, 2006, the

petition was summarily denied. Id.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 19, 2006, in the

United States District Court, Central District of California. The petition was transferred to this

Court on July 3, 2006. The petition challenges the Governor’s 2005 decision reversing the

Board’s grant of parole.

On January 25, 2007, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Respondent concedes

Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies and the petition is timely. Petitioner filed a traverse

on April 26, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

On the evening of April 24, 1981, Petitioner and two others assaulted a 40-year old man

who was walking along some railroad tracks in Los Angeles. The three individuals knocked the

victim to the ground and took his wallet. One of the three then shot the victim in the back with a

sawed-off .22 caliber rifle. The victim managed to go to a liquor store where he sought help.

However, the victim eventually died from the gunshot wound.

Five days later on the afternoon of April 29, 1981, a man driving his vehicle was stopped

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at an intersection to allow a woman to cross the street. For an unknown reason, the woman

accused the man of attempting to hit her with the car. A heated argument ensued. Petitioner, who

had been standing on the porch of a nearby residence, joined in the argument which culminated

with Petitioner saying, “Motherfucker, I’m gonna shoot your ass.” Petitioner ran inside the

residence and returned with a .22 caliber rifle and fired approximately 8 to 10 shots at the victim

through the windshield. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state

court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction,

28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the

threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass v. California

Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. Lambert, 370 th

F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a th

state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petition is not

challenging [her] underlying state court conviction.’”).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this

Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other

words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

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or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th

Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

II. Review of Petition

A parole release determination is not subject to all the due process protections of an

adversary proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9 Cir. 1987); see th

also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (explaining that due process is flexible and calls for procedural

protections that particular situations demand). "[S]ince the setting of a minimum term is not part

of a criminal prosecution, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not

constitutionally mandated, even when a protected liberty interest exists." Pedro, 825 F.2d at

1399; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). In the state parole

context, the only process to which an inmate is entitled is: 1) the inmate must receive advance

written notice of a hearing, Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; 2) the inmate must be afforded an

"opportunity to be heard," Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; 3) if the inmate is denied parole, the

inmate must be told why "he falls short of qualifying for parole,” Id.; and 4) the decision must be

supported by "some evidence" having an indicia of reliability. Superintendent, Mass. Correc.

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1987).

“In Superintendent v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that ‘revocation of good time does not

comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings of the

prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.’ 472 U.S. 445, 454

(1985), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. In

determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met, this Court need not examine the entire

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record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. Rather,

this Court must determine whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the Governor. Id., citing Superintendent v. Hill, at 455-56. Although Hill

involved the accumulation of good time credits, the same standard applies to parole, as both

situations “directly affect the duration of the prison term.” Id., citing Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

In making a determination whether an inmate is suitable for parole, the parole board is

guided by the following regulations:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for a denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall

include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is

reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may

safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.

15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2402(a) and (b).

In this case with regard to the procedural protections outlined in Greenholtz, Petitioner

was provided all that is required. Petitioner was given with advance notice of the hearing, he was

represented by counsel at the hearing, he was granted an opportunity to submit materials for the

Board’s consideration and an opportunity to be heard during the hearing, and he was provided a

written decision explaining the Board’s reasons. See Answer, Exhibit 3. All of this information

was submitted to the Governor and considered in his decision.

Petitioner, however, contends the Governor’s decision had no evidentiary support. After

reviewing the record, the Court finds that the state court decisions rejecting Petitioner’s claims

were not unreasonable, because the Governor’s decision is supported by at least “some

evidence.” 

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Title 15, of the California Code of Regulations, Section 2402(c) sets forth certain

negative factors which the Board would consider in determining whether Petitioner is suitable for

parole. 

Section 2402(c) provides:

Circumstances Tending to Show Unsuitability. The following circumstances each 

tend to indicate unsuitability for release. These circumstances are set forth as general

guidelines; the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances

in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances tending to indicate

unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very

trivial in relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or tumultuous

relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental

problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in

prison or jail.

15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c). 

In reversing the Board’s decision, the Governor considered and found several factors

indicating unsuitability per § 2402(c). First, the Governor relied on Petitioner’s previous record

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of violence pursuant to § 2402(c)(2). The Governor noted Petitioner was a gangmember and had

an extensive criminal history going back to an early age. At only nine years old, Petitioner was

detained and counseled for burglary. At fifteen, he was adjudicated and placed on probation for

fighting and carrying a knife while on school grounds. Between the ages of fourteen and

seventeen, he was arrested numerous times for burglary, marijuana, carrying a loaded and

concealed weapon, and robbery. While he was not convicted of these crimes, Petitioner did admit

on previous occasions to committing three prior robberies and carrying a loaded weapon when

“dealing dope.” Thus, there was ample evidence to support the Governor’s finding on this factor.

The Governor further found Petitioner had engaged in misconduct while incarcerated.

The Governor noted that Petitioner had been disciplined seven times for misconduct, most

recently in 2000, and he had been counseled eleven times for minor misconduct. Petitioner had

also admitted on a previous occasion to purchasing drugs in 1989. While these facts arguably do

not qualify as “serious misconduct” pursuant to § 2402(c)(6), they are relevant to the

determination under § 2402(b). As set forth above, § 2402(b) provides that “all relevant, reliable

information available . . . shall be considered” including such information as the prisoner’s “past

criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably

documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and

after the crime; . . . and any other information which bears on the prisoner’s suitability for

release.” Furthermore, “[c]ircumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability

for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.” Given

Petitioner’s institutional behavior record, the Governor properly considered this information in

determining Petitioner was not suitable for release.

The Governor also relied on the facts of the commitment offense. Pursuant to

§ 2402(c)(1)(B), the Governor found the second degree murder was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner. This finding is supported by “some evidence.” Petitioner and his crime

partners planned the robbery and assaulted an individual knocking him to the ground. While he

was on the ground, one of the crime partners fired a shot into the victim’s back. They then left

him for dead while making off with his wallet. These facts certainly support the Governor’s

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finding of a calculated and dispassionate murder per § 2402(c)(1)(B). 

The Governor also found several positive factors in Petitioner’s background. The

Governor noted that Petitioner had acquired training in printing, bakery, office services, shoe

repair, and computers. It was further noted that Petitioner had completed several self-help and

therapy programs. Nevertheless, the Governor noted Petitioner had not upgraded himself

educationally. More importantly, the Governor found Petitioner had no parole plans for

employment and no real job prospects upon release, and Petitioner had not inquired into

receiving assistance upon release. Given Petitioner’s history of committing robberies, this was

indeed relevant and significant since being able to support oneself financially is critical to

success upon parole. Thus, the Governor reasonably determined that Petitioner remained an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released. 

It is apparent the Governor considered all relevant evidence in this case and carefully

balanced and assessed the various factors. Those findings were supported by at least “some

evidence.”

Petitioner also contends the Governor is relying on the immutable circumstances of the

underlying offense and his juvenile criminal history. The Ninth Circuit has held that serious

questions involving a prisoner’s liberty interest in parole would be raised if the Board or

Governor continued to rely solely on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole, despite a prisoner’s continuing demonstration of

exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916. As discussed above,

however, the circumstances of the offense and Petitioner’s past criminal history, while

significant, were not the only reasons for the Governor’s decision. The Governor also relied on

Petitioner’s institutional misconduct and lack of realistic parole plans in denying parole. 

Petitioner also alleges his sentence violates his equal protection rights because

indeterminately sentenced prisoners are treated differently than other prisoners. Because the

preferential treatment alleged in this claim is neither based on a suspect classification nor

impinges on constitutionally protected rights, it must merely withstand rational basis review. City

of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). As discussed above, the

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Governor’s decision is founded on a rational basis. See also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263,

270 (1973) (Supreme Court stated that legislative classifications and groupings created to enable

the determination of an optimal time for parole eligibility require only some rational basis to

sustain them.). Therefore, this claim is also without merit.

Petitioner next complains his sentence has become disproportionate as compared to his

offense. A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime for which a defendant is

convicted may violate the Eighth Amendment. However, no inference of gross disproportionality

can be drawn in this case. Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. His sentence of 15

years to life is not grossly disproportionate to his crime. In addition, the Governor’s act of

reversing the parole board’s recommendation does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See

United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589, 599 (10th Cir.1985) (“A sentence of imprisonment for

a very long term of years, the effect of which is to deny a prisoner eligibility for parole until a

time beyond his life expectancy, does not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of

imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.”). 

Finally, Petitioner claims the Governor’s decision has rendered his plea agreement

invalid. Petitioner states he was induced to plead guilty to second degree murder and forego a

trial to avoid exposing himself to a first degree murder conviction and sentence. However, the

Governor’s decision has converted his sentence to one which he would have received had he

been tried and found guilty of first degree murder. Petitioner’s claim is without merit. Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life. As correctly argued by Respondent, Petitioner has

submitted no evidence that he was informed he would serve a set term or that the Governor

would not reverse a recommendation of parole by the Board. Therefore, the claim must be

rejected.

In light of the above, it cannot be said that the state court resolution of Petitioner’s claims

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. Judgment be entered in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 9, 2007 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij UNI 8 TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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