Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01005/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01005-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES E. HALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

REGAL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, 

 Defendant.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01005-EPG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY 

DEFENDANT REGAL ENTERTAINMENT 

GROUP

(ECF No. 37)

On July 2, 2015, Plaintiff James E. Hall filed a complaint against Defendant Regal 

Entertainment Group, claiming that, as a result of Defendant’s negligence, he fell and injured 

himself in Defendant’s movie theatre. (ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he fell on 

the stairs while entering the Regal Turlock Stadium 14 movie theatre on July 7, 2013. Plaintiff 

alleges that the stairs were not adequately maintained because there was a greasy substance on the 

carpet, which caused Plaintiff to slip and fall. (First Amended Complaint ¶ 10, ECF No. 23.) 

The litigation is currently proceeding on Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which alleges a 

single cause of action for negligence.

On September 2, 2016, Defendant moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether 

Defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the defective condition. (ECF No. 37.) 

Plaintiff opposed the motion (ECF No. 38), and Defendant filed a reply in support of the motion, 

Case 1:15-cv-01005-EPG Document 43 Filed 10/19/16 Page 1 of 6
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(ECF No. 40). The Court heard oral argument on October 7, 2016, with Betty Fracisco 

telephonically appearing for Plaintiff and Nicholas Schieffelin appearing for Defendant. (ECF 

No. 42.) The Court took the matter under submission and issues its order as follows.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment may be granted to a moving party who demonstrates “that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of 

any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The 

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify specific facts showing there is a genuine 

issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there 

must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. For 

purposes of summary judgment, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails 

to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... 

consider the fact undisputed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

B. Negligence 

Under California law, which applies in this action,1the elements of a negligence cause of 

action are “the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting 

in injury.” Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp, 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998 (2013). A property owner has a

duty to “exercise ordinary care in the management of his or her premises in order to avoid 

exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Scott v. Chevron U.S.A., 5 Cal.App.4th 510, 

515 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

“A store owner exercises ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the portions 

of the premises open to customers, and the care required is commensurate with the risks 

 

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“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” 

Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

The elements of a state cause of action are governed by state substantive law. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 

F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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involved.” Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 (2001). “In the context of a business 

owner's liability to a customer or invitee, speculation and conjecture with respect to how long a 

dangerous condition has existed are insufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's burden.” Id. at 1206. 

Although the owner's lack of knowledge is not a defense, “[t]o impose liability for injuries 

suffered by an invitee due to [a] defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier ‘must 

have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the 

exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as 

involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises . . .” Id.

The Supreme Court of California explained the burden involved in negligence based on a 

dangerous condition on a landowner’s premises:

[W]here the plaintiff relies on the failure to correct a dangerous condition to prove 

the owner’s negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had 

notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it. The courts’ reasoning is that if 

the burden of proving lack of notice were placed on the owner in a slip-and-fall 

case, where the source of the dangerous condition or the length of time it existed 

cannot be shown, failure to meet the burden would require a finding of liability, 

effectively rendering the owner an insurer of the safety of those who enter the 

premises. Several courts believe that shifting the burden to the defendant would, 

contrary to existing negligence law, permit an inference of negligence to be drawn 

against the owner based solely on the fact that the fall or accident occurred.

The plaintiff need not show actual knowledge where evidence suggests that the 

dangerous condition was present for a sufficient period of time to charge the owner

with constructive knowledge of its existence. Knowledge may be shown by 

circumstantial evidence which is nothing more than one or more inferences which 

may be said to arise reasonably from a series of proven facts. Whether a 

dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to 

have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury, and the cases do not impose 

exact time limitations. Each accident must be viewed in light of its own unique 

circumstances. The owner must inspect the premises or take other proper action to 

ascertain their condition, and if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the owner 

would have discovered the condition, he is liable for failing to correct it. 

Id. at 1206–07.

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Evidence Submitted by the Parties

Defendant puts forth evidence of the following material facts on the issues of: (1) its 

actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition (a greasy substance on the carpeting 

of the movie theatre); and (2) its exercise of reasonable care:

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 Prior to opening each day, the opening manager, usually an assistant manager, 

inspects each auditorium in the Theatre and completes a Manager’s Daily 

Inspection Report. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 37, ECF No. 

37-1 (“DSUF”).)

 As part of the daily inspection, the assistant manager checks the condition of the 

carpet and floors in each auditorium. (DSUF No. 38.)

 The purpose of the inspection is to assess and confirm that every auditorium is 

clean and safe. (DSUF No. 39.)

 On July 7, 2013, an assistant manager inspected auditorium No. 3 and confirmed 

that the carpet and floors were in good condition. (DSUF No. 40.)

 In addition to the daily morning inspections, after every movie showing, Regal 

employees, usually ushers, walk through and inspect each auditorium. (DSUF No. 

41.)

 As part of every inspection, they confirm that the carpeted stairs are clean and free 

of debris and spills. (DSUF No. 42.)

 As a general matter, all Regal employees are trained to look for and clean up, pick 

up or report for correction any debris or moisture on the floor. (DSUF No. 42.)

In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff largely concedes the above facts by noting them as 

“undisputed.” However, Plaintiff adds the following clarifications and additional facts, and 

argues that together Plaintiff has met its burden on summary judgment as to the breach of Regal’s 

duty of due care:

 The time of the morning inspection is 8:45 a.m., about 6.5 hours before the 

incident. No standards are given for what “good condition means.” (Plaintiff’s 

Response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 37, ECF No. 38-2 

(“PRDSUF”).) 

 Ushers are equipped with only a brush, trash can, and paper towels. They have no 

carpet cleaner, cleaning solutions, or scrapers. They are not equipped to pick up or 

eliminate the greasy, sticky substance described by the Plaintiff, and therefore do 

not pick it up. (PRDSUF No. 42.)

 After reporting the incident, Plaintiff sat in the auditorium for about 30 minutes, 

and no one came to clean up the cause of his fall. (PRDSUF No. 46.)

 The Theater was inspected by Plaintiff’s counsel and expert on August 22, 2016. 

Slippery and sticky spots were observed even though the janitors had cleaned and 

the Theater knew of the inspection in advance. (PRDSUF No. 47.)

B. Application of Evidence

The Court has carefully considered the evidence submitted in light of the negligence 

standards cited above. The evidence is largely undisputed, although the conclusion based on the 

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evidence is not. Defendant has put forth undisputed evidence of conducting inspections in the 

morning and before each showing, including the Plaintiff’s movie showing, which did not reveal 

the greasy substance. In response, Plaintiff does not put forth any evidence that Defendant knew 

of the greasy substance. Plaintiff does not, for example, put forth any testimony from an usher, 

other patron, or even the Plaintiff himself, seeing a greasy substance in that location before

Plaintiff’s fall. Plaintiff does not put forth any evidence disputing that inspections were done in 

the regular course of business or that this theater was inspected prior to the movie showing at 

issue. Thus, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to present disputed facts regarding whether 

Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the greasy substance.

Plaintiff did put forth evidence disputing that Defendant conducts inspections with 

reasonable care. Plaintiff alleges that the usher-inspectors are not equipped with the proper 

equipment to clean up spills because they lack carpet cleaner, cleaning solutions, or scrapers. The 

relevant factual evidence regarding this dispute comes from the deposition of Jessica Rivera, an 

usher for Defendant, who testified that if there is a spill, “we immediately pick it up or soak it up” 

with paper towels. She also confirmed that picking up trash and soaking up spills encompassed 

the entire universe of her responsibilities with respect to keeping the theater clean. (Deposition of 

Jessica Rivera (“Rivera Decl.”) 43:7-24, ECF No. 38-1, p.8.) This testimony supports 

Defendant’s contention that ushers ordinarily clean up spills with paper towels. There is no 

evidence that spills are ignored or that the paper towels are insufficient for this purpose. 

Plaintiff’s purported evidence that slippery and sticky spots were observed during an 

inspection during the litigation is insufficient to raise a disputed question of material fact because 

the observation was made three years after the incident in question. It is insufficient to establish 

notice of the greasy substance at the time of the fall. That said, the Court was troubled by Mr. 

Schuller’s declaration and its implications for Defendant’s current safety procedures.

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant failed to clean up Plaintiff’s actual spill for at least 

30 minutes after Defendant was notified. (Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s 

Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 46, ECF No. 40-1.) The failure to clean up the spill upon 

notification does not display reasonable care by Defendant. It suggests that Defendant did not 

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take spills seriously at the time of Plaintiff’s fall. Defendant’s only answer is that this evidence 

concerns the time immediately after the spill and does not establish actual or constructive notice 

before the spill.

Ultimately, the Court agrees with Defendant that this fact is insufficient to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact as to actual or constructive notice before Plaintiff’s fall. Defendant’s 

response to the spill, or lack of any response, occurred after the fall. It does not provide evidence 

of Defendant’s failure to inspect the theater before Plaintiff’s fall, nor does it raise an inference of 

actual or constructive notice of any greasy substance before the fall. It may show a negligent 

response to the fall or a risk to other customers after Plaintiff’s fall, but neither of those issues is 

presented in the current litigation. The Court finds that this fact alone does not satisfy Plaintiff’s 

burden on summary judgment as to the element of notice.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment 

as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to an element of Plaintiff’s 

negligence cause of action. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37) is 

GRANTED in full. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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