Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05161/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 9, 1998 Decided April 10, 1998

No. 97-5161

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,

Appellee

v.

Federal Election Commission,

Appellant

No. 97-5160

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,

Appellee

v.

Federal Election Commission,

Appellant

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(96cv02184 & 95cv00349)

Richard B. Bader, Associate General Counsel, Federal

Election Commission, argued the causes for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Lawrence M. Noble, General Counsel,

and Vivien Clair and David Kolker, Attorneys.

Marc E. Elias argued the causes for appellee. With him

on the briefs was Robert F. Bauer.

Bobby R. Burchfield argued the cause in No. 97-5161 for

amicus curiae the National Republican Senatorial Committee. With him on the briefs was Thomas O. Barnett.

Before: Randolph, Rogers, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee ("DSCC") is a political committee comprised of sitting

Democratic members of the United States Senate. Its primary function is to aid the election of Democratic candidates

to the Senate. In May 1993 DSCC lodged a complaint with

the Federal Election Commission. The complaint alleged

that the National Republican Senatorial Committee

("NRSC") donated some $187,000 to non-party organizations

as part of a last-minute effort to funnel "soft money" into the

1992 United States Senate elections, in violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, 2 U.S.C.

ss 431-455.

By February 1995 the Commission had neither dismissed

the complaint nor assigned it to an enforcement team. DSCC

sued the Commission in district court on the ground that the

Commission's "failure to act" was "contrary to law" under 2

U.S.C. s 437g(a)(8). The district court agreed and issued a

declaratory judgment to that effect. The court also granted

DSCC's later application for attorney's fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.

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s 2412. Thereafter, according to DSCC, the Commission

continued to drag its feet. And so in September 1996, DSCC

sued again, and again the district court found in its favor. In

a May 1997 decision, the court declared that the Commission's "failure to take meaningful action" on the complaint

within "a reasonable time" was "contrary to law," in violation

of s 437g(a)(8). As a remedy, the court ordered the Commission to conform its conduct to the court's declaratory judgment within 30 days. See 2 U.S.C. s 437g(a)(8)(C). The

Commission has appealed both the May 1997 order and the

earlier award of attorney's fees and costs.

Both cases must be remanded to the district court for

findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding DSCC's

standing to sue the Commission under s 437g(a)(8). When

the cases were in the district court no one contested DSCC's

standing and the district court said nothing on the subject.

The issue reared up only on appeal, mainly through the

efforts of the amicus curiae. Shortly before we heard oral

argument, the Supreme Court handed down Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).

Steel Co. seems to hold that before deciding the merits,

federal courts must always decide Article III standing whenever it is in doubt. We say "seems" because two of the

Justices comprising the five-Justice majority on this point

interpreted the Court's opinion as not setting down an absolute, rigid, unbending rule. See id. at 1020 (O'Connor, J.,

joined by Kennedy, J., concurring). In any event, we can

think of no rational qualification or exception to remove these

cases from the Steel Co. rule. Now that the question has

been raised, we cannot go any further without first determining that DSCC had standing. But the factual record compiled in the district court is inadequate to the task. Because

DSCC's standing was not disputed below, there is little

evidence regarding the three standing requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. See id. at 1016- 17;

28 U.S.C. s 2412(a)(1), (b); Friends of Boundary Waters

Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 1995); Lane

v. United States, 727 F.2d 18, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1984). Yet

evidence there must be. The district court decided both

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cases on summary judgment, a stage at which standing turns

not on allegations in the complaint but on "specific facts"

established by evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

National Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. Kantor, 91

F.3d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Humane Soc'y of the United

States v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, the cases are remanded to allow DSCC to

present evidence so that the district court may determine

whether DSCC has satisfied the injury-in-fact, causation, and

redressability requirements of standing. As to the last of

these, we note that the particular showing required of DSCC

might well depend on the Supreme Court's decision in Akins

v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted,

117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997). The Court heard oral argument in

Akins on January 14, 1998. A report of the argument

suggests that the Court's decision may deal with the redressability element of standing under s 437g(a)(8). See Oral

Argument Tr., FEC v. Akins, No. 96-1590, 1998 WL 12082

(U.S. argued Jan. 14, 1998).

If the district court concludes on remand that DSCC did

not have standing, DSCC obviously would not be entitled to

fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to Justice

Act. See 28 U.S.C. s 2412(a)(1), (b); Boundary Waters, 53

F.3d at 886; Lane, 727 F.2d at 20-21. Should the court find

that DSCC did have standing, the court should--in order to

facilitate review of the fee award on appeal--explain the

reasons why it resolved the "prevailing party" and "substantial justification" prongs in DSCC's favor. See Farrar v.

Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992); Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

So ordered.

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