Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00428/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00428-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 423
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Withdrawal 28 USC 157
Cause of Action: 28:0157 Motion for Withdrawal of Reference

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CARRAMERICA REALTY

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

NVIDIA CORPORATION, et al., 

Defendants.

 /

NO. C 05-00428 JW

Related Cases:

 5:05-cv-00427-JW

5:05-cv-00429-JW

5:06-cv-03856-JW

5:06-cv-03238-JW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

CARRAMERICA’S THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

CarrAmerica Realty Corporation ("CARR") brought this action against nVidia Corporation

("NVIDIA"), individual nVidia executives (collectively, "NVIDIA Defendants"), and the former

directors and officers of 3DFX Interactive, Inc. ("3DFX Defendants") (collectively, "Defendants"),

alleging twelve causes of action related to the now dissolved 3DFX Interactive, Inc.’s ("3DFX")

breach of its lease with CARR. The Defendants move to dismiss the claims set forth in CARR’s

Third Amended Complaint. (hereafter, "TAC," Docket Item No. 83). The Court deemed it

appropriate to take the motions under submission without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

Based on the papers submitted to date, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions. 

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II. BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2005, the Court dismissed CARR’s Second Amended Complaint ("SAC,",

Docket Item No. 27) for lack of standing, and entered an Order granting CARR leave to file a Third

Amended Complaint. (Order Dismissing Second Amended Complaint With Leave to Amend;

Setting Further Case Management Conference, hereafter, "November 10, 2005 Order," Docket Item

No. 82.) 

In its Third Amended Complaint, CARR alleges the following:

3DFX was a public company in the business of developing and selling graphic

chips, graphics boards, and related technology. (TAC ¶ 11.) 

CARR leased approximately 26,000 square feet of commercial space in

Austin, Texas to 3DFX on or about July 23, 1998. (TAC ¶ 8.) The lease ran through

August 31, 2003. (TAC ¶ 9.)

On or about December 15, 2000, 3DFX and its competitor, NVIDIA, entered

into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") under the terms of which at

closing NVIDIA would pay to 3DFX $70 million in cash and approximately $40

million in NVIDIA stock in exchange for the transfer to NVIDIA of specified assets

of 3DFX including its portfolio of patents, trademarks, and applications. The

Agreement also provided that 3DFX would dissolve after closing the asset sale to

NVIDIA. (TAC ¶ ¶ 13, 46.) 

At the time of the Agreement, CARR had no knowledge of the agreement. 

(TAC ¶ 13.) 

NVIDIA sought to conceal the true nature of its agreement with 3DFX by

labeling the agreement an "asset purchase" because NVIDIA wanted to acquire all of

3DFX’s assets without becoming liable to 3DFX’s creditors which included CARR. 

(TAC ¶ 14.)

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On or about December 15, 2000, immediately after execution of the

Agreement, 3DFX ceased operations; its employees were terminated and were hired

by NVIDIA. (TAC ¶ 18.) 

At some unspecified date, but before the December 15 events described in ¶

18, 3DFX and NVIDIA entered into a "secret agreement," to the effect that NVIDIA

directed 3DFX "to continue making lease payments as if it, and not NVIDIA were

occupying the premises and that NVIDIA would reimburse 3DFX for these payments

at a future date. (TAC ¶ 21.) 

The payments made pursuant to the "secret agreement" created the false

impression that 3DFX remained a viable tenant. If CARR had known the "true state

of affairs," it would have insisted that either NVIDIA assume the lease or that 3DFX

vacate so that CARR could lease the premises to a new tenant. (TAC ¶ 21.)

 Eventually, 3DFX stopped paying rent allegedly pursuant to the "secret

agreement." (TAC ¶ 23) 

On the basis of these allegations, CARR asserts claims for: 1) interference with contractual

relations against the NVIDIA Defendants; 2) intentional interference with prospective economic

advantage against the NVIDIA Defendants; 3) negligent interference with prospective economic

advantage against the NVIDIA Defendants; 4) successor liability against NVIDIA; 5) fraudulent

transfer against all Defendants under Civil Sections 3439.04(a); 6) 3439.04(b)(1); 7) and

3439.04(b)(2); 8) declaratory relief against all Defendants; 9) breach of fiduciary duty against the

3DFX Defendants; 10) fraud against all Defendants; 11) conspiracy against all Defendants; and 12)

tort of another against all Defendants. 

Defendants move to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint on the ground that it fails to

allege facts which would entitle CARR to relief.

III. STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. Navarrov. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint may be

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dismissed as a matter of law for one of two reasons: "(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2)

insufficient facts stated under a cognizable theory." Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749

F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The court "must

presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the non-moving party." Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citing Western Reserve Oil & Gas Co. v. New, 765 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1985) cert. denied,

474 U.S. 1056 (1986)). However, the court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2

(9th Cir. 1986) (citing Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981)). 

A motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the claim is

properly made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Michael Schmier v. United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, et al., 279 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2002). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. A creditor lacks standing to pursue a claim against a defendant for injury inflicted

upon a bankrupt company because the right to pursue the claim vests in the Trustee,

unless the creditor is alleging an injury particularized to that creditor only.

As explained in the November 10, 2005 Order, and despite CARR’s insistence to the

contrary, under California law as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, standing to pursue a general

creditor’s cause of action is delegated exclusively to the bankruptcy trustee, unless a creditor can

show particularized injury. In re Folks, 211 B.R. 378 (9th Cir. BAP 1997); (November 10, 2005

Order at 3.) 

"If a claim is a general one, with no particularized injury arising from it, and if that claim

could be brought by any creditor of the debtor, the trustee is the proper person to assert the claim,

and the creditors are bound by the outcome of the trustee’s actions." Id. (quoting Kalb, Voohis Co

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v. American Fin. Corp., 8 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted.). A cause of action is general

"if the liability is to all creditors of the corporation without regard to the personal dealings between

[the corporation’s] officers and such creditors." Id. (quoting Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent.

Exchange, Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1349 (7th Cir. 1987). If, on the other hand, "the claimant himself is

harmed and no other claimant or creditor has an interest in the cause," the cause of action is personal

to the creditor. Id. (quoting Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1348-49.) Injury to the creditor is thus a

determining factor. "To determine whether an action accrues individually to a claimant or generally

to the corporation, a court must look to the injury for which relief is sought and consider whether it

is peculiar and personal to the claimant or general and common to the corporation and creditors." 

Koch, 831 F.2d at 1348-9. 

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has expanded the holding of In re Folks to grant standing to a

trustee of a bankrupt firm where the trustee alleges that a defendant’s dissipation of corporate assets

limited the firm’s ability to pay its creditors. In re Smith, 421 F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Despite "the economic reality that any injury to an insolvent firm is necessarily felt by its creditors,"

the Defendants’ acts in dissipating corporate assets via the Agreement gives rise to only a general

claim for which the bankruptcy trustee has exclusive standing to pursue. Id. 

B. CARR’s First Claim for Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 

does not allege a claim for particularized injury.

CARR alleges that the NVIDIA Defendants intentionally interfered with the contractual

relationship between CARR and 3DFX by entering into the Agreement and by entering into the

"secret agreement." This claim is essentially the same claim that was asserted in the Second

Amended Complaint except for the alleged "secret agreement." The Court has previously

determined that CARR lacks standing to pursue claims resulting from the Agreement. Therefore,

the issue becomes whether, if CARR alleges breach of the lease and related claims pursuant to both

the Agreement and the alleged "secret agreement," it states a claim for a particularized injury. 

CARR contends that its Third Amended Complaint alleges a particularized injury because

the alleged "secret agreement" only affected 3DFX’s rental obligation to CARR. CARR contends

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that if, as it alleges, 3DFX ceased making rent payments and abandoned the premises "pursuant to"

the alleged "secret agreement", this transforms its claim to one for a particularized injury. 

Even accepting as true the allegation that 3DFX sold its assets and shut down its operations

under both the Asset Purchase Agreement and this newly alleged separate "secret agreement," the

cause of any harm suffered by CARR remains the transfer of assets and cessation of operations

under the Agreement. Allegations that the harm suffered was caused by the alleged "secret

agreement" to have 3DFX continue to pay rent is no more than artful pleading to avoid the

overriding effect of the Agreement. If there was any interference with contractual obligations of

3DFX due to lack of notice of its impending demise, that interference came from lack of notice of

the Agreement itself, which affected all creditors. 

The Court is not called upon to comment whether the bankruptcy trustee has a claim against

NVIDIA for contractual interference resulting from the alleged "secret agreement". 

The Court DISMISSES CARR's First Claim for Intentional Interference with Contractual

Relations without leave to amend on the ground that the alleged facts state a claim of harm to the

corporation which affected all creditors. 

C. CARR’s Second and Third Claims for Intentional and Negligent Interference with

Prospective Economic Advantage Claims have been withdrawn.

Given CARR’s stated intention to withdraw the Second and Third Causes of Action in its

submitted opposition papers, the Court DISMISSES CARR's Second and Third claims. (CARR’s

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the NVIDIA Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Third Amended Complaint, at 5, Docket No. 112.) 

The dismissal is without prejudice; however, there is no reason to believe that the Court

would not apply the same legal analysis to these claims as all other claims against NVIDIA. 

D. CARR’s Fourth Claim for Successor Liability is derived from its infirm First

Claim and is thereby, dismissed.

CARR relies word-for-word on the allegations in its Second Amended Complaint to support

its successor liability claim in its Third Amended Complaint. (Compare SAC ¶ ¶ 40-45 with TAC ¶

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¶ 39-44.) While CARR’s allegations of a "secret agreement" between NVIDIA and 3DFX,

described supra, are incorporated by reference into this claim, CARR has made no attempt to draw a

causal connection between the alleged "secret agreement" and its successor liability claim. Since the

Court has previously determined that this claim as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint is a

general claim for which CARR lacks standing to pursue, and CARR has not remedied its lack of

standing, the Court DISMISSES CARR’s Fourth Claim for Successor Liability without leave to

amend.

E. CARR’s Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Claims for Fraudulent Transfer are general claims

and are thereby, dismissed.

CARR’s allegations in support of its fraudulent transfer claims are substantially the same as

those in its Second Amended Complaint. (Compare SAC ¶ ¶ 50-75 with TAC ¶ ¶ 45-73.) By way

of explanation, CARR states that its prosecution of the claims were ordered stayed pending

resolution of the underlying proceeding pending in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern

District of California, and that to the extent the stay is still binding, it will defer prosecution of the

claims pending resolution of the adversary proceeding. (TAC ¶ ¶ 57, 65, 73.) However, the Court

has previously determined CARR’s fraudulent transfer claims to be general claims (see November

10, 2005 Order at 4), and CARR’s statements concerning deferment of prosecution does not remedy

its lack of standing. 

The Court DISMISSES CARR’s Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Claims for Fraudulent Transfer

without leave to amend. 

F. CARR’s Eighth Claim for Declaratory Relief is derivative of infirm claims and is

thereby, dismissed.

CARR has asked the Court to issue a "judicial determination of the rights and duties of

CARR and [D]efendants" with respect to NVIDIA’s alleged successor liability and obligations under

the Lease. (See TAC ¶ ¶ 75-77.) "‘[A] request for declaratory relief will not create a cause of action

that otherwise does not exist.’ Rather, ‘an actual present controversy must be pleaded specifically’

and ‘the facts of the respective claims concerning the [underlying] subject must be given.’" City of

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 As the In re Jacks Bankruptcy Court noted: "[t]o a substantial extent, the right to recover

from directors or officers of California corporations for the violation of their fiduciary duties has

been codified in California statute." In re Jacks, 266 B.R. at 391. On appeal, the In re Jacks

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel commented that although "California's Corporation Code provides a

remedy for an insolvent corporation's director's violations of fiduciary duties to creditors . . . ‘the

common law is not repealed by implication or otherwise, if there is no repugnancy between it and

the statute, and it does not appear that the legislature intended to cover the whole subject.’

California's corporate statutes, while modifying remedies, do not eliminate the trust comprised of

corporate assets that arises upon a corporation's insolvency." In re Jacks, 266 B.R. at 737 (internal

citation omitted). Since CARR does not raise this claim in a statutory context, the Court does not

consider its application, but rather, considers the common law application of CARR’s claim to

determine if there was a breach of a fiduciary duty for the purposes of this Order. 

8

Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 80 (2002) (citations omitted). Accordingly, CARR’s claim for

declaratory relief is wholly derivative of its foregoing claims. 

The Court DISMISSES CARR’s Eighth Claim for Declaratory Relief without leave to

amend.

G. CARR’s Ninth Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty fails to state a claim. 

CARR alleges that the 3DFX Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to CARR as a

creditor by entering into the "secret agreement" with NVIDIA which concealed the fact that 3DFX

would be going out of business and would eventually breach the Lease. (TAC ¶ ¶ 79-81.) 

A corporation’s directors and officers owe no fiduciary duty to creditors under California law

until the corporation becomes insolvent. In re Jacks, 243 B.R. 385, 390 (Bankr. Ct. C.D. Cal. 1999),

aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 266 B.R. 728 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2001).1

 "Because a director’s fiduciary

duties to creditors do not arise until the corporation is insolvent, the timing of the insolvency is

critical." In re Jacks, 266 B.R. at 738. The time of insolvency as determined under California law is

the point at which the corporation is unlikely to be able "to meet its liabilities . . . as they mature." 

Id. (quoting Cal. Corp. Code § 501). 

Once a corporation becomes insolvent, the scope of a director’s or officer’s fiduciary duty to

creditors is to not "divert, dissipate or unduly risk assets necessary to satisfy their claims." In re Ben

Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. 646, 655 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ill.1998), amended and superseded

by, 2000 WL 28266 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2000). California courts have applied the "trust fund

doctrine" where "all of the assets of a corporation, immediately on its becoming insolvent, become a

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trust fund for the benefit of all of its creditors." In re Jacks, 266 B.R. at 736 (quoting Saracco Tank

& Welding Co., Ltd. v. Platz, 65 Cal. App. 2d 306, 315 (1944) (internal citation omitted)). Under

the trust fund doctrine, the directors and officers of the insolvent corporation become fiduciaries

whose obligations to the creditors is to protect the assets of the insolvent corporation to satisfy their

claims. See, e.g. Saracco, 65 Cal. App. 2d at 315. 

Recovery for breaching this fiduciary duty generally pertains to cases where the directors or

officers of an insolvent corporation have diverted assets of the corporation "for the benefit of

insiders or preferred creditors." In re Ben Franklin, 225 B.R. at 655 (quoting from Laura Lin, Shift

of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty of Creditors, 46

Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1512 (1993)); see also Bank of America v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792

(E.D. Va. 2002); see also Helm Financial Corp. v. MNVA R.R., 212 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir.

2000).

Although the Court is unaware of any California cases that expressly limit the fiduciary duty

under the trust fund doctrine to the prohibition of self-dealing or the preferential treatment of

creditors, the scope of the trust fund doctrine in California is reasonably limited to cases where

directors or officers have diverted, dissipated, or unduly risked the insolvent corporation’s assets. 

See In re Jacks, 266 B.R. at 736 (trust fund doctrine applied to a director’s use of an insolvent

corporation’s assets to guarantee a personal debt); c.f. Commons v. Schine, 35 Cal. App. 3d 141, 145

(1973) (trust fund doctrine applied to a controlling partner’s preference in paying insolvent

partnership’s debt to his own creditor corporation); see also Saracco, 65 Cal. App. 2d 306 (1944)

(trust fund doctrine applied to a director’s preferential distribution of assets); see also Wright Motor,

299 F. 106 (1924) (trust fund doctrine applied to a director’s fraudulent transfer of corporate assets

to himself); c.f. Title Ins. etc. Co. v. California Dev. Corp., 171 Cal. 173 (1915) (trust fund doctrine

applied to a company controlling an insolvent development corporation’s preferential payment of the

insolvent development corporation’s debts); see also Bonney v. Tilley, 109 Cal. 346 (1895) (trust

fund doctrine applied to directors of an insolvent corporation, who were also creditors of the

corporation, secured a preference to their claims over other creditors’ claims). Given the application

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of the trust fund doctrine in California, the scope of the fiduciary duty to creditors can be broadly

defined as not diverting, dissipating or unduly risking the corporate assets needed to satisfy

creditors’ claims. 

As the court observed in In re Ben Franklin in defining the scope of a director’s fiduciary

duty to creditors under Delaware law, "the ‘insolvency exception’ to the general rule that directors

owe no duty to creditors is, after all, an exception. Its scope should be no greater than the problem it

was intended to solve." In re Ben Franklin, 225 B.R. at 655-56. A similar approach is taken by the

Court in determining whether the 3DFX Defendants could have breached a fiduciary duty owed to

CARR as a creditor by entering into the "secret agreement". 

 The Third Amended Complaint alleges that a fiduciary relationship existed between CARR

and the 3dfx Defendants because "when the [Agreement] was being negotiated and then executed,

3DFX was insolvent and/or in the zone of insolvency and the officers and directors thereby owed a

fiduciary duty to CARR." (TAC ¶ 79.) CARR contends given that the Third Amended Complaint

alleges that the "secret agreement" was created during the same month as the Agreement, which

caused 3DFX’s insolvency, a reasonable inference for the purposes of these motions can be made

that the "secret agreement" occurred when 3DFX was insolvent and the 3DFX Defendants had a

fiduciary duty to CARR. 

Given that the 3DFX Defendants owed a fiduciary duty to CARR to protect the assets of

3DFX, the Third Amended Complaint must show that this duty was breached. The Third Amended

Complaint alleges that this fiduciary duty was breached when the 3DFX Defendants entered into the

"secret agreement" to hide the fact "that 3DFX would cease doing business on or about December

15, 2000, and would thereafter be in breach of the CARR Lease." (TAC ¶ 81.) However, this

alleged breach of fiduciary duty is not related to protecting the assets of 3DFX in order to satisfy

creditors’ claims. Rather, the "secret agreement" is alleged to have breached a duty to disclose the

source of 3DFX’s rent payments and the fact that 3DFX was insolvent. Since the Third Amended

Complaint does not allege that the "secret agreement" diverted, dissipated or unduly risked the assets

necessary to satisfy creditors’ claims for which the 3DFX Defendants owed a fiduciary duty to

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protect, the Third Amended Complaint has not alleged that the 3DFX Defendants breached their

fiduciary duty. 

Furthermore, the nature of the "secret agreement" as alleged in the Third Amended

Complaint reasonably suggests that the "secret agreement" may have actually helped protect the

assets of 3DFX. The "secret agreement" is alleged to have provided a means by which 3DFX could

continue paying its rent obligations to CARR at a time when 3DFX was allegedly unable to meet its

liabilities as they became due. (TAC ¶ 81.) Even though the "secret agreement" is alleged to have

also included the cessation of rent payments, the execution of the "secret agreement" as alleged in

the Third Amended Complaint does not suggest that the rent payments that would otherwise go to

CARR were diverted to a preferred creditor or used by the 3DFX Defendants in promoting their own

self-interest.

The Court DISMISSES CARR's Ninth Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty with leave to

amend. 

H. CARR’s Tenth Claim for Fraud is indistinguishable from the First Claim and is

thereby dismissed on the same ground.

CARR’s Tenth Claim for Fraud is a new claim asserted in the Third Amended Complaint. 

The fraud claim is primarily based upon a failure to disclose the "secret agreement." As discussed

above, the injury from the alleged "secret agreement" is indistinguishable from those allegedly

inflicted upon the corporation through the implementation of the Asset Purchase Agreement and are

consequently unparticularized as the CARR. 

Without reaching the merits of the claim, the Court DISMISSES CARR's Tenth Claim for

Fraud for lack of standing; the dismissal is with prejudice.

I. CARR’s Eleventh Claim for Conspiracy is dismissed for lack of standing.

CARR alleges in its Third Amended Complaint that the Defendants conspired in creating the

Agreement and the "secret agreement." (TAC ¶ 95.) 

Under California law, "[n]o cause of action exists for conspiracy itself; the pleaded facts

must show something which, without the conspiracy, would give rise to a cause of action." 

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Zumbrun v. Univ. of Southern California, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12 (1972). "Conspiracy is not a cause

of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually

committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its

perpetration." Applied Equip. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 510-11 (1994) (citing

Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal.3d 773, 784 (1979)). Given that CARR has no standing to

pursue the contractual interference claim against the NVIDIA Defendants, it has no standing to

pursue the conspiracy claim. 

The Court DISMISSES CARR's Eleventh Claim for Conspiracy without leave to amend.

J. CARR’s Twelfth Claim for relief under a "Tort of Another"theory is dismissed.

Under the American rule, each party must generally pay his or her own attorney fees. Gray

v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 498, 504 (1984). This rule is subject to several

exceptions, one of which is the "tort of another," or "third party tort" exception, which allows

recovery of attorney fees where the plaintiff is required to employ counsel to prosecute or defend an

action against a third party because of the tort of the defendant. Id. at 505. CARR’s alleged

entitlement to recoupment of any attorney fees as damages arising from NVIDIA’s allegedly tortious

behavior toward 3DFX derives from its having standing to sue NVIDIA for the alleged tort. 

Lacking standing, CARR may not maintain this claim. 

The Court DISMISSES CARR's Twelfth Claim for relief under a "Tort of Another" theory

without leave to amend.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss CARR’s Third Amended Complaint.

With respect to the NVIDIA Defendants, the Court finds that there are no circumstances

which would entitle CARR to proceed against NVIDIA for the alleged harm it inflicted on 3DFX

and derivatively upon CARR. Therefore, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth,

Eleventh, and Twelfth claims against NVIDIA are dismissed with prejudice.

//

Case 5:05-cv-00428-JW Document 121 Filed 09/29/06 Page 12 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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With respect to the 3DFX Defendants, all claims are dismissed with prejudice except the

Ninth Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Should CARR wish to file an amended complaint, it

shall file within 30 days from the date of this Order.

Dated: September 29, 2006 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-00428-JW Document 121 Filed 09/29/06 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Douglas A. Applegate daa@sezalaw.com

Dwight Craig Donovan Dwight@mbvlaw.com

George M. Lee gml@sezalaw.com

Henry H. Oh henry.oh@dlapiper.com

James N. Kramer jkramer@orrick.com

John L. Fitzgerald jfitzgerald@pinnaclelawgroup.com

Jonathan B. Gaskin jgaskin@orrick.com

Jonathan S. O&#039;Donnell jon@mbvlaw.com

Justin Myer Lichterman jlichterman@orrick.com

Karen Johnson-McKewan kjohnson-mckewan@orrick.com

Kim Y. Arnone karnone@buchalter.com

Leah Anne Nutting lnutting@orrick.com

Morgan William Tovey mtovey@reedsmith.com

Richard C. Darwin rdarwin@buchalter.com

Robert P. Varian rvarian@orrick.com

Ruth Young Kwon rkwon@orrick.com

William R. Overend woverend@reedsmith.com

Office of the U.S. Trustee/SJ

U.S. Federal Bld.

280 S 1st St. #268

San Jose, CA 95113-3004 

USBC Manager-San Jose

US Bankruptcy Court

280 South First Street

Room 3035

San Jose, CA 95113 

Dated: September 29, 2006 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk 

By: /s/ JW Chambers 

Elizabeth Garcia

Courtroom Deputy

 

Case 5:05-cv-00428-JW Document 121 Filed 09/29/06 Page 14 of 14