Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-01992/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-01992-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK ANTHONY CANDLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANTA RITA COUNTY JAIL WATCH 

COMMANDER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 11-cv-01992-CW 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

(Dkt. Nos. 65, 70)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner incarcerated at Pelican Bay 

State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining about his conditions of confinement 

during the period of his incarceration as a pretrial detainee at 

the Santa Rita County Jail (SRCJ). On April 11, 2012, the Court 

issued an Order finding that, in his First Amended Complaint 

(1AC), Plaintiff had alleged “a cognizable claim that his 

conditions of confinement at the SRCJ amounted to punishment, in 

violation of due process,” against Defendants Captain David

Sanchas, Sergeant David L. Snider and Sergeant Barry Quin. See

Dkt. no. 4 at 2. 

On October 5, 2012, Defendants filed a motion for summary 

judgment. On May 13, 2013, the Court denied this motion without 

prejudice to Defendants filing a renewed motion after the parties 

conducted discovery. See Dkt. no. 36 at 5. Thereafter, on 

August 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed two discovery-related motions, 

see Dkt. nos. 44 and 45, which Defendants opposed. On August 30, 

2013, Defendants again filed their motion for summary judgment.

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See Dkt. no. 47. On September 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to this motion. See Dkt. no. 56. Meanwhile, in June 

2013, Plaintiff had filed a motion for leave to amend his 

complaint, see Dkt. no. 40, and a motion to supplement his 

complaint, see Dkt. no. 41. On September 30, 2013, the Court 

issued an order denying the motion to supplement the complaint, 

denying without prejudice the motions to amend the complaint and

for summary judgment and referring the discovery disputes to a 

magistrate judge. See Dkt. no. 54 at 2. Plaintiff was granted 

leave to file a renewed motion to amend to name additional

defendants within twenty-one days after the resolution of the 

discovery disputes. See id. at 5, 6.

On May 21, 2014, the magistrate judge entered an order that 

appeared to resolve all the discovery disputes. See Dkt. no. 63. 

When Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within twentyone days, the Court issued an order that Plaintiff’s 1AC was the 

operative complaint in the action and set a briefing schedule for 

Defendants’ summary judgment motion. See Dkt. no. 64. On August 

25, 2014, Defendants filed their summary judgment motion. See

Dkt. no. 65. On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a “reply” to 

the Court’s order, arguing that the order was premature because

one discovery dispute remained unresolved. See Dkt. no. 67. On 

September 4, 2014, the magistrate judge issued an order resolving 

this discovery dispute. See Dkt. no. 68. On September 22, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed his opposition to the summary judgment motion. 

See Dkt. no. 69. On September 25, 2014, he filed another motion 

for leave to file an amended complaint. See Dkt. no. 70. 

Defendants have opposed this motion. On October 17, 2014, 

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Plaintiff filed a “supplemental letter” requesting leave to add 

new evidence to his opposition, which Defendants have opposed. 

See Dkt. no. 73.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, grants Plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (2AC) and 

denies the request to add new evidence.

ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE

A district court may consider only admissible evidence in

ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under 

Rule 56, as long as it is based on personal knowledge and sets 

forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Schroeder v. 

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff 

fails to submit a declaration with either opposition, and the 

September 22, 2014 opposition is not written under penalty of 

perjury. However, Plaintiff’s September 30, 2013 opposition to 

Defendants’ previous motion for summary judgment is sworn under 

penalty of perjury. See Dkt no. 56 at 20. Plaintiff’s 1AC is

also under oath. Therefore, the facts contained in Plaintiff’s 

September 30, 2013 opposition and his 1AC that are based on his 

personal knowledge are admissible. 

The evidence Plaintiff submits in his “supplemental letter,”

which consists of information about the classification of other 

inmates, is duplicative of other evidence he submitted with his 

September 30, 2013 opposition. Therefore, the request to add new 

evidence is denied.

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BACKGROUND

In his 1AC, Plaintiff states the following: From June 17, 

2008 through December 13, 2010, when Plaintiff was a pretrial 

detainee at the SRCJ, Defendants placed him in disciplinary lockup without filing disciplinary charges against him or providing a 

hearing. During the entire time Plaintiff was in lock-up, 

Defendants failed to provide him with cleaning implements for his 

cell, allowed him only one hour of exercise every six to eight 

weeks and, from March 2009 to December 2010, allowed him to 

shower only once every three days. 

Defendants present the following evidence: Lieutenant 

Michael Molloy has been employed by the Alameda County Sheriff’s 

Office (ACSO) for over eighteen years. Declaration of Lt. 

Michael Molloy (Molloy Dec.) ¶ 2. Since January 13, 2013, Lt. 

Molloy has been the Classifications Unit Lieutenant at SRCJ and, 

from May 31, 2009 through September 17, 2011, he worked as the 

Classifications Sergeant. Id. Lt. Molloy is personally familiar 

with the policies and procedures and customs and practices 

regarding the operation of the Classifications Unit, particularly 

as they relate to the placement of inmates in administrative 

segregation (administrative segregation). Id. ¶ 4. The ACSO 

Classifications Unit is responsible for the management of jail 

inmates, keeping inmates and staff safe by properly housing 

inmates and updating and maintaining the integrity of the 

Classifications Unit’s files on inmates. Id. ¶ 3. 

With the exception of short term disciplinary isolation, 

administrative segregation is used as a non-punitive placement to 

isolate an inmate as a protective measure to maintain the 

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security of SRCJ and to ensure the safety of the inmate, staff 

and other inmates. Id. ¶ 5. Some of the factors the 

Classifications Unit examines to determine if an inmate is a 

safety risk are: (1) whether the inmate has previously served 

time in county jail or state prison; (2) the seriousness of the 

present crimes charged against the inmate; (3) whether the inmate 

has a history of assault charges or is currently being charged 

with a violent offense; and (4) whether the inmate is a validated 

prison gang member or otherwise affiliated with a gang. Id. ¶ 7.

Lt. Molloy has reviewed the Classifications Unit’s file 

pertaining to Plaintiff and, based on this review, he states the 

following: On June 17, 2008, Plaintiff was booked into custody 

at SRCJ. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. During Plaintiff’s intake interview with 

the Classifications Unit, he admitted he was affiliated with the 

Acorn gang, which is a violent West Oakland street gang. Id. 

¶ 9, Ex. 1 (Plaintiff’s Classification Intake Form). The 

Classifications Unit placed Plaintiff in administrative 

segregation based upon his previous periods of incarceration, his 

pending charges of seven felonies, including attempted murder and 

discharging a firearm at an inhabited building, which carried a 

possible life sentence, and his affiliation with the Acorn gang. 

Id. ¶ 10. In addition, the ACSO received a memorandum from the 

Alameda County District Attorney’s Office requesting that 

Plaintiff and several other inmates related to the same criminal 

case be housed in administrative segregation and that Plaintiff 

be kept separate from certain other inmates. Id. ¶ 11. The 

memorandum cited a concern for the safety of certain members of 

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the public who would be better protected if the request were 

granted. Id.

Plaintiff’s case was reviewed by the Classifications Unit 

within seven days of Plaintiff’s arrival at SRCJ, then every 

seven days for the first sixty days he was held in custody and 

then every thirty days for the remainder of his time in custody 

at SRCJ. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13. 

Sergeants Snider and Quin and Captain Sanchas state that, as 

officers in the Grievance Unit, they had no responsibilities or 

duties related to the classification of inmates and had no 

authority to override a decision by the Classifications Unit 

regarding an inmate’s housing location. Declaration of Sgt. 

David L. Snider, (Snider Dec.) ¶ 5, Declaration of Sgt. Barry 

Quin (Quin Dec.) ¶ 8, Declaration of Capt. David Sanchas (Sanchas 

Dec.) ¶ 6. Lt. Molloy states that Santa Rita Grievance Unit 

personnel do not have authority to decide whether an inmate will 

be transferred to administrative segregation; that decision is 

made by the Classifications Unit. Molloy Dec. ¶ 12. Lt. Molloy 

also states that Grievance Unit personnel do not have authority 

to determine what hearing rights, if any, an inmate will be 

afforded when he is transferred into administrative segregation. 

Id.

In his sworn opposition, Plaintiff indicates that he was 

never interviewed by the Classifications Unit or informed of the 

reasons for his placement into administrative segregation, he 

never admitted he was a member of the Acorn gang, and the copy of 

the Classification Intake form submitted by Defendants does not 

pertain to him because his signature is forged, he would never 

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indicate he was a member of a gang, and some of the identifying 

characteristics on the form do not describe him. He also states 

that, although previously he was incarcerated ten times, he was 

never considered to be a security risk and provides evidence that 

other pre-trial detainees associated with gangs and with serious 

charges against them were not placed in administrative 

segregation.

While Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, he filed three 

administrative grievances. On August 5, 2008, Plaintiff filed 

grievance number 08G-S1268, in which he stated that he should not 

have been classified in administrative segregation. Quin Dec.

¶¶ 4-5, Ex. 1. The review of the grievance was supervised by 

Sgt. Quin who, at that time, was Litigation-Grievance Sergeant at 

SRCJ. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. Sgt. Quin reviewed Plaintiff’s 

Classifications Detail and consulted with the Classifications 

Unit. Id. at ¶ 6. His investigation confirmed that Plaintiff 

was to be placed in administrative segregation. Id. Sgt. Quin, 

as investigating supervisor, signed the written response to 

Plaintiff’s grievance, which informed Plaintiff that the 

Classifications Unit, not the Grievance Unit, is responsible for

the classification of inmates and suggested that Plaintiff

contact the Classifications Unit about his classification

concerns. Id., Ex. 1 at 4. 

On April 27, 2009, Plaintiff filed grievance number 09GS0716, in which he stated that he had followed the instructions 

given in the response to his last grievance and had tried to 

contact the Classifications Unit, but no one responded. Snider 

Dec. ¶¶ 4,5, Ex. 1. Plaintiff also asserted that he was deprived 

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of adequate cleaning supplies because he had not been given a mop 

or broom. Id. ¶ 5, Ex. 1. The review of this grievance was 

supervised by Sgt. Snider who, at that time, was LitigationGrievance Sergeant at SRCJ. Id. ¶ 2. Sgt. Snider, as 

investigating supervisor, signed the grievance response, which

again informed Plaintiff that the Classifications Unit handles 

the classification of inmates and suggested that Plaintiff send 

that unit a message about his classification concerns. Id. ¶ 6,

Ex. 1 at 3. The grievance response also stated, “The housing 

unit deputy verified inmates are offered cell-cleaning supplies

during their podtime. It is your responsibility to clean your 

living area, including the showers, when cell cleaning supplies 

are offered. The grievance process is not the first step to 

resolve a problem in the housing unit. In the future, if you 

have a problem in the housing unit, notify the housing unit 

deputy.” Id. ¶ 7, Ex. 1 at 3. 

In his sworn opposition, Plaintiff indicates that he asked 

the housing unit deputy several times for a mop or broom, but was 

only given a spray bottle containing cleaning liquid and a toilet 

brush. See Dkt. 56 at 13. 

On August 16, 2009, Plaintiff filed grievance number 09GS1223, in which he stated that he had sent several messages to 

the Classifications Unit, still had not heard from anyone, and 

did not know why he was placed in administrative segregation. 

Id., Ex. 2 at 1. He also stated that he was taken out of his 

cell only two hours per week, that it took him four days to get a 

shower and that he had “developed rashes and sores on my

backside, most likely from infested feces and dirt from lack of 

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showering.” Id. Sgt. Snider investigated this grievance and 

signed the grievance response as the investigating supervisor. 

Id., Ex. 2 at 4. The response informed Plaintiff, “The Grievance

Unit again checked with the Classifications Unit and they have 

reviewed your status. The Classifications Unit has verified, for 

the safety of staff and the facility you are to remain in Ad-Seg 

until further notice.” Id. 

Regarding Plaintiff’s claim of insufficient exercise time, 

Sgt. Snider’s review substantiated that Plaintiff received 

insufficient exercise time and, as a corrective action, Sgt. 

Snider sent a copy of the grievance response to the appropriate 

supervisors for review. Id. 

Regarding Plaintiff’s claim about insufficient showers and a 

resulting rash, Sgt. Snider wrote, “The grievance process is not 

the first step to resolve a medical issue. If you require 

medical attention for a rash, obtain and submit an Inmate Medical 

Request form. You will be placed on a list to have your medical 

needs addressed by the housing unit nurse.” Id.

Captain David P. Sanchas has been employed with the ACSO for 

approximately fourteen years and, at the time at issue, he was a 

lieutenant supervising the SRCJ Litigation-Grievance Unit. His 

duties included reviewing inmate grievances and the Grievance 

Unit’s responses. Sanchas Dec. ¶¶ 1-3. If Capt. Sanchas agreed 

with the thoroughness of an investigation and its outcome, he 

would sign off on the Inmate Grievance Response Form as the 

Commanding Officer. Id. Capt. Sanchas reviewed Plaintiff’s 

grievance number 09G-S1223 in which Plaintiff asserted he was 

inappropriately placed in administrative segregation, he did not 

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receive adequate exercise time and he was provided inadequate 

time to shower. Id. ¶ 4. Capt. Sanchas signed the grievance 

response as the commanding officer, thus approving Sgt. Snider’s

investigation and conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s claims. Id.

¶¶ 3, 5-7.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is only proper where the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits show that there is “no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material 

facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party. Id. 

The court will grant summary judgment “against a party who 

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the 

initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The 

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the 

pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ designate 

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.’” Id. at 324. 

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In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make 

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with 

respect to a disputed material fact. T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific 

Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Due Process Claim Based on Placement in Administrative 

Segregation

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his due process 

rights by placing him in administrative segregation without 

charging him with any violations, without a hearing and without 

an opportunity to present his views. Defendants do not dispute 

that Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation for over 

two and one-half years while he was a pretrial detainee at SRCJ 

without charging him with a violation. However, they argue this 

was constitutional because Plaintiff was placed in administrative 

segregation not as punishment, but for security reasons and a 

hearing is not constitutionally required when a pretrial detainee 

is placed in administrative segregation for nonpunitive reasons.

1. Legal Standard

A pretrial detainee is not protected by the Eighth 

Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment 

because he has not been convicted of a crime. Bell v. Wolfish, 

441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979). Pretrial detainees are 

protected from punishment without due process, however, under the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. 

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987); Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-36; 

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Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause against jail 

conditions that amount to punishment).

Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process 

Clause may arise from two sources——the Due Process Clause itself 

and laws of the states. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 

(1976). A court presented with a procedural due process claim by 

a pretrial detainee should first ask if the alleged deprivation 

amounts to punishment and therefore implicates the Due Process 

Clause itself; if so, the court then must determine what process 

is due. Bell 441 U.S. at 537-38. 

Some of the tests applied to determine whether an action is 

punitive are whether the action: (1) involves an affirmative 

disability or restraint; (2) comes into play only on a finding of 

scienter; (3) will promote the aims of punishment——retribution 

and deterrence; (4) is applied to behavior that is a crime; 

(5) has an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 

connected; and (6) appears excessive in relation to the 

alternative purpose assigned. Id. at 537-38. 

Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the 

part of the detention officials, the determination of whether an 

action is punitive will usually turn on “whether an alternative 

purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is 

assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive. . .” Id. at 

538. “Thus, if a particular restriction of pretrial detention is 

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it 

does not, without more, amount to punishment.” Id. at 539. 

“Maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order 

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and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or 

retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both 

prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Id. at 546-47. 

Due process for placement in disciplinary segregation as 

punishment upon a finding that the prisoner was guilty of 

misconduct cannot be imposed without the procedural requirements 

of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Mitchell v. Dupnik, 

75 F.3d 517, 523-26 (9th Cir. 1996). Wolff established the 

following procedural requirements for disciplinary hearings: 

(1) written notice of the charges; (2) a period of no less than 

twenty-four hours to prepare for the hearing; (3) a written 

statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and 

reasons for the disciplinary action; (4) a limited right to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence at the hearing; and 

(5) the limited right to receive assistance from a fellow inmate 

or correctional staff. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-70.

However, the value of the Wolff procedures is minimal in the 

context of a decision to segregate a prisoner for security 

reasons because the inquiry does not involve the factual 

determination of guilt, but relies on largely subjective factors. 

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986), 

overruled in part on other grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 

472 (1995). Due process for placement in administrative 

segregation for security purposes requires only an informal 

nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner 

is segregated, notification to the prisoner of the reasons for 

the segregation and allowing the prisoner an opportunity to 

present his views; it does not require detailed written notice of 

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charges, representation by counsel or counsel-substitute, an 

opportunity to present witnesses or a written decision describing 

the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative 

segregation. Id. at 1100-01. 

2. Analysis—Proper Defendants1

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s 

actions both actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a 

federally protected right. Lemire v. California Dept. 

Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 

2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris 

v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A 

person deprives another of a constitutional right within the 

meaning of § 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in 

another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the 

plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 

It is undisputed that Defendants’ only connection to 

Plaintiff’s due process claim was their review and denial of his

administrative grievances about his placement in administrative 

segregation. Plaintiff presents no evidence to dispute 

Defendants’ testimony that, as Grievance Unit personnel, they 

were not involved in decisions to place inmates in administrative 

 

1Because the Court finds that the named Defendants are not the 

proper defendants for this claim, it does not rule on whether 

Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation constituted a 

due process violation. As discussed below, the Court grants 

Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint to name the 

proper defendants and it is anticipated that the merits of his 

due process claim will be addressed as it applies to the newly 

named defendants. 

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segregation, they were not involved in the Classifications Unit’s 

decision to place Plaintiff in administrative segregation and 

they lacked authority to overrule the Classifications Unit’s 

decisions to place inmates in administrative segregation. 

Defendants’ testimony is corroborated by Lt. Molloy, who confirms 

that Grievance Unit personnel lack authority to decide whether an 

inmate is transferred into administrative segregation and to 

determine what hearing rights, if any, will be given to inmates 

transferred into administrative segregation.

Citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 

1978), Plaintiff argues that, even if Defendants had no authority 

to challenge the Classifications Unit’s original decision, their 

denial of his grievances caused him to continue to be held in 

administrative segregation without due process. In Johnson, the 

sheriff failed to fulfill his statutory duty to appoint members 

of a classification committee to determine whether the plaintiff 

should be transferred from the honor camp to jail. Id. at 742-

43. The plaintiff was transferred without review or due process. 

Id. at 742. Because the transfer required forfeiture of the 

plaintiff’s honor camp earnings, he claimed he was deprived of

due process. Id. The court explained that “personal 

participation is not the only predicate for § 1983 liability,” 

and that the requisite causal connection can be set “in motion by 

a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably 

should know would cause others to inflict constitutional injury.” 

Id. at 743-44. The court held that the sheriff could be liable 

because his failure to fulfill his statutory duty to appoint a 

classification committee resulted in the due process violation. 

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Johnson is distinguishable. In Johnson, the defendant had a 

duty to act and failed to do so. Here, Defendants fulfilled 

their duty to investigate Plaintiff’s grievances by contacting 

the Classifications Unit which informed them that Plaintiff was 

in administrative segregation because he was a security risk. 

The fact that Defendants did not remedy the grievances does not 

mean their failure to act is analogous to the failure to act by

the sheriff in Johnson. 

Plaintiff also argues the fact that Sgt. Snider affirmed

Plaintiff’s separate grievance about insufficient time to 

exercise and took “corrective action” by sending his affirmance 

to the appropriate supervisor shows that Defendants could have 

affirmed his grievance about placement in administrative 

segregation and taken corrective action by sending it to the 

“appropriate supervisor.” Plaintiff’s argument fails to 

distinguish between actions taken by the Classifications Unit in 

placing him in administrative segregation and actions taken by 

jail personnel that might cause unsafe conditions. As stated by 

Defendants and confirmed by Lt. Molloy, the Grievance Unit did 

not have authority to overrule decisions made by the 

Classifications Unit. Plaintiff submits no evidence to dispute 

this.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to submit evidence to raise a 

dispute of material fact that Defendants violated his due process 

rights by denying his administrative grievances regarding his 

classification. Summary adjudication is granted to Defendants on 

this claim.

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C. Retaliation Claim2

Plaintiff claims that the Alameda County District Attorney’s 

office requested that he be placed in administrative segregation

“in retaliation” or as a courtroom strategy. To state a claim 

based on retaliation, Plaintiff must show that he was retaliated 

against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the 

retaliatory action did not advance a legitimate penological goal, 

such as preserving institutional order and discipline. Barnett 

v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In his sworn opposition, Plaintiff briefly states that he 

was a witness to a violent crime, he refused to identify the 

shooter and he threatened to sue the District Attorney’s office. 

Dkt. no. 56 at 7. However, this brief statement does not include 

evidence that Defendants took any action in retaliation for 

Plaintiff’s alleged threat to sue the District Attorney’s office. 

Therefore, summary adjudication is granted to Defendants on this 

claim.

D. Due Process Claim based on Conditions of Confinement

In his sworn 1AC and opposition, Plaintiff states that, from 

June 17, 2008 through December 13, 2010, he received one hour of 

exercise every six to eight weeks, that although he asked for a

broom or mop to clean his cell, he never received them and that, 

from March 2009 to December 2010, he was able to shower once 

every three days. However, the grievances upon which his claims 

 

2

Although Plaintiff did not allege a retaliation claim in his 1AC 

nor did the Court include a retaliation claim in its Order to 

Show Cause, Defendants address it because Plaintiff insists his 

allegation that he was placed in administrative segregation by 

the District Attorney “in retaliation” asserts such a claim.

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are based are dated April 27, 2009 (administrative segregation

and cleaning supplies) and August 16, 2009 (administrative 

segregation, exercise and showers). Thus, there is no evidence 

that Defendants were aware, at the relevant times, of any of 

Plaintiff’s complaints other than those claimed in his 

grievances.

Defendants argue that none of the conditions described in 

Plaintiff’s grievances constitutes a substantial deprivation,

that they were not responsible for imposing these conditions and

that, even if they were, they were not deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s needs.

Pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 

are comparable to inmates’ rights under the Eighth Amendment; 

therefore, the same standard applies. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 

1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16). 

Under the Due Process Clause, detainees are protected against 

jail conditions that amount to punishment. Pierce, 526 F.3d at

1205. 

A prison official violates a pretrial detainee’s 

constitutional rights when two requirements are met. First, the 

deprivation must be, objectively, sufficiently serious that the 

omission results in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure 

of life’s necessities.” Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128 (citing Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). In determining whether a 

deprivation of a basic necessity is sufficiently serious to 

satisfy the objective component of a constitutional claim, a 

court must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of 

the deprivation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 

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2000). The more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be 

withheld. Id. 

Second, the responsible prison official must have acted 

subjectively with “deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s health 

or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference is 

shown when the prison official knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Id. at 837. 

The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference. Id. A claimant need not 

show, however, that a prison official acted or failed to act 

believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough 

that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of 

a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 842; see also Robins 

v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1995).

1. Farmer’s Objective Prong

a. Outdoor Exercise

Exercise is one of the basic human necessities protected by 

the Eighth Amendment. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th 

Cir. 1993). Prisoners "confined to continuous and long-term 

segregation" may not be deprived of outdoor exercise. Keenan v. 

Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 

1318 (9th Cir. 1998). The "long-term" deprivation of outdoor 

exercise to such prisoners is unconstitutional. LeMaire, 12 F.3d 

at 1458; see, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (denial of outdoor exercise for six and onehalf weeks meets the objective prong of Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claim); Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1089-90 

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(denial of outdoor exercise for six months while inmate was in 

segregation sufficient to proceed to trial); Pierce, 526 F.3d at

1213 (holding that ninety minutes of exercise per week for 

detainees in administrative segregation constituted punishment 

under § 1983 but approving requirement that detainees have at 

least two hours of exercise per week). California regulations 

require county jails to provide pretrial detainees with at least 

three hours of exercise per week. Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, 

§ 1065. 

Although in his opposition, Plaintiff indicates he received 

one hour of exercise every six to eight weeks, his grievance 

stated that he was allowed two hours of exercise per week. As 

discussed previously, Defendants were only aware that Plaintiff 

received two hours of exercise per week; there is no evidence 

that they were aware of worse conditions that Plaintiff describes 

in his 1AC and opposition. Under Pierce, two hours of exercise 

per week is constitutional. Therefore, Plaintiff’s evidence

fails to satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim

as it relates to lack of exercise. 

b. Cleaning Supplies

According to Plaintiff’s grievance, he did not receive a 

broom or mop to clean his cell. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s claim fails because, at SRCJ, “cleaning supplies” are 

distributed to inmates upon request so that they can clean and 

sanitize their immediate housing area. Snider Dec. at ¶ 7. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are 

provided with adequate sanitation. Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. 

“The more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be 

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withheld.” Id. Sanitation is a basic need. Anderson v. County 

of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.) (severe or prolonged lack 

of sanitation can constitute an infliction of pain within the 

meaning of the Eighth Amendment), amended, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir.

1995). Plaintiff admits that he was provided with a toilet brush 

and spray bottle with cleaner to clean his cell. No authority 

requires that inmates receive cleaning supplies of their choice. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s evidence fails to establish the objective 

prong of an Eighth Amendment violation. Summary adjudication is 

granted to Defendants on this claim.

c. Showers

According to Plaintiff’s grievance, he was allowed to shower 

every four days. Defendants dispute this with evidence that 

Plaintiff was able to take showers during his pod time and, 

according to them, he received adequate pod time each week. 

Inmates’ showers may be limited to as few as one per week 

without violating the Eighth Amendment. See Fleming v. Brown, 

2011 WL 3206854, at *4 (N.D. Cal.)(citing Davenport v. 

DeRobertis, 844 F.3d 1310, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1988)); Purvis v. 

Arpaio, 2012 WL 4466566, at *3 (D. Ariz.) (denial of daily 

showers not sufficiently serious to rise to level of 

constitutional violation).

Therefore, even taking Plaintiff’s evidence as true, he has 

failed to establish that being allowed to shower every four days

was sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective prong of an 

Eighth Amendment claim. Summary adjudication is granted to 

Defendants on this claim.

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2. Farmer’s Subjective Prong

Even if the objective requirement of Plaintiff’s conditions 

of confinement claims had been met, he has not provided evidence 

of the subjective prong of these claims. As mentioned above, the 

only evidence linking any Defendant to these claims is

Plaintiff’s three grievances.

a. Exercise Time 

On August 16, 2009, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating 

that he was allowed only two hours of exercise per week. Sgt. 

Snider investigated by interviewing Plaintiff’s housing unit 

deputies and found that Plaintiff received three hours of 

exercise per week. Snider Dec. ¶ 11. Sgt. Snider knew that ACSO 

policies and procedures provided that inmates were to receive 

five hours of exercise per week, but that state regulations set a 

minimum of three hours per week. Id. Based on his finding that 

Plaintiff received three hours of exercise per week, Sgt. Snider 

could have reasonably believed that there was no constitutional 

violation because three hours per week met the state requirement

and two hours per week was constitutional under Pierce, 526 F.3d 

at 1213. However, Sgt. Snider affirmed Plaintiff’s grievance 

because Plaintiff was not provided the five hours prescribed by 

ACSO. Sgt. Snider then sent his findings to the appropriate 

supervisor, most likely the supervisor of Plaintiff’s housing 

unit, who he reasonably believed would provide Plaintiff with 

more time to exercise. 

At that time, Plaintiff had not made the allegation that he 

now makes in his complaint that he was receiving one hour of 

exercise every six to eight weeks. Based on Plaintiff’s 

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grievance, there was no constitutional violation. Even so, Sgt. 

Snider took Plaintiff’s claim seriously, investigated it, 

affirmed it and then sent the report to the supervisor he thought 

would remedy Plaintiff’s exercise deficiency. These actions do 

not show that Sgt. Snider disregarded an excessive risk to 

Plaintiff’s health. Because Sgt. Snider was not deliberately 

indifferent, Capt. Sanchas’ approval of Sgt. Snider’s actions 

also did not constitute deliberate indifference. 

b. Cleaning Supplies

On April 27, 2009, Plaintiff submitted a grievance briefly 

stating that he had been at SRCJ for over ten months and had not 

received a mop or broom. Sgt. Snider, the investigating 

supervisor, found that the housing unit deputy verified that 

inmates are offered “cleaning supplies” during their pod time and 

that it was Plaintiff’s responsibility to clean his cell with the 

supplies that were offered. Sgt. Snider informed Plaintiff of 

his findings on the grievance response form. 

Sgt. Snider’s response does not show deliberate 

indifference; he investigated Plaintiff’s complaint, was told by 

the housing unit deputy that Plaintiff would be provided cleaning 

supplies when he asked for them and informed Plaintiff how he 

could obtain them. 

c. Showers

Plaintiff’s grievance stated that he could take a shower 

only every four days and that he was developing a rash. Sgt. 

Snider responded to Plaintiff’s statement about his rash by 

informing Plaintiff that he could obtain medical treatment by 

submitting a medical request form. Because being allowed to 

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shower every four days did not establish the objective prong of a 

constitutional violation, it was not unreasonable for Sgt. Snider

not to provide more showers. Therefore, Plaintiff’s evidence 

does not show that Sgt. Snider was deliberately indifferent to 

Plaintiff’s serious need.

II. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that, even if a constitutional violation 

occurred, they are entitled to qualified immunity on each of 

Plaintiff’s claims. The defense of qualified immunity protects 

“government officials . . . from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982). A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must 

determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an 

actual constitutional right and whether the right was clearly 

established, such that it would be obvious to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 244 (2009).

As discussed above, the evidence shows that Defendants did 

not violate Plaintiff’s due process rights by denying his 

grievances about his placement in administrative segregation. 

However, assuming the existence of a constitutional violation, 

the evidence, viewed in Plaintiff’s favor, shows that it would 

not have been clear to reasonable officers in Defendants’ 

position that it was unlawful to deny Plaintiff’s grievances 

after investigating with the Classifications Unit and 

communicating the Classifications Unit’s response to Plaintiff, 

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especially in light of the fact that they had no authority to 

overrule any Classifications Unit decision. 

The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff’s 

constitutional right to adequate exercise was not violated by 

Sgt. Snider and Capt. Sanchas. However, assuming the existence 

of a constitutional violation, the evidence, viewed in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiff, shows that it would not have been 

clear to reasonable officers in the position of Sgt. Snider and 

Capt. Sanchas that it was unlawful to affirm the grievance and 

send it to the relevant supervisor for correction after

investigating and finding that, although Plaintiff was allowed a 

constitutionally acceptable two hours of exercise per week, he 

was not allowed the hours prescribed by ACSO. 

The undisputed evidence shows that Sgt. Snider did not 

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by denying his 

grievances about receiving one shower every three or four days 

and not being provided with a mop or broom to clean his cell. 

However, assuming the existence of a constitutional violation, 

the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 

shows that it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer 

in Sgt. Snider’s position it was unlawful to deny the grievances,

after investigating them and finding that Plaintiff could receive 

cleaning supplies and that he was provided with constitutionally 

sufficient opportunities to shower.

Accordingly, Defendants are granted summary adjudication

based on qualified immunity on all claims. 

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III. Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff moves for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint 

(2AC) to add ten individuals as defendants who, he alleges, are 

responsible for placing him in administrative segregation. The 

Court’s September 30, 2013 order, referring discovery matters to 

a magistrate judge, granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended 

complaint within twenty-one days after resolution of the 

discovery disputes. Defendants argue the motion to amend should 

be denied because Plaintiff filed it more than twenty-one days 

after the magistrate judge’s April 21, 2014 order, which, they 

claim, resolved all discovery disputes. However, Plaintiff’s 

explanation that the April 21, 2014 order did not resolve one 

outstanding discovery dispute is well-taken, especially in light 

of the fact that the magistrate judge entered another discovery 

order on September 4, 2014. Because Plaintiff’s motion for leave 

to amend was filed on September 25, 2014, within twenty-one days 

of the last discovery order, the Court finds that it is timely. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that leave 

to amend a complaint should be “freely given when justice so 

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Four factors are commonly 

used to determine the propriety of a motion for leave to amend. 

These are: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing 

party, and futility of amendment.” Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 

1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The decision to grant or deny a request for 

leave to amend rests in the discretion of the trial court. 

California v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 

2004).

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The fact that Plaintiff filed this motion twenty-one days 

after the resolution of the last discovery dispute is evidence 

that he did not file it in bad faith or with undue delay. 

Amending the due process claim to name the proper defendants is 

not futile because summary adjudication was granted to the 

current Defendants on the ground that they were not the proper 

defendants. Furthermore, allowing Plaintiff to amend his 

petition to add the proper defendants will not prejudice the 

current Defendants because their motion for summary adjudication 

has been granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

file a 2AC is granted.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a 2AC is granted. 

The Clerk is directed to file Plaintiff’s 2AC. After the 2AC is 

filed, the Court shall issue a separate order of service.

2. The motion for summary adjudication in favor of the 

current Defendants is granted.

3. This Order terminates docket numbers 65 and 70.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26, 2015

__________________________________

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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