Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00008/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00008-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC RICHARD ELESON,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE A. LIZARRAGA, et. al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00008-LJO-SAB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On December 29, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition.1 (Pet., ECF No. 1). On April 

28, 1995, Petitioner was convicted of Lewd or Lascivious Acts, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 

288(a), in the Tuolumne County Superior Court. (Pet. at 2).2 Petitioner was sentenced to 85 

years to life. (Pet. at 2). The Court issued an order for Petitioner to show cause why the petition 

should not be dismissed for violating the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (ECF No. 

12). Petitioner submitted a response to the order to show cause and an errata sheet for his 

response to the order to show cause. (ECF Nos. 13, 14). 

 

1

Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court deems the petitions filed on the date they were signed and presumably 

handed to prison authorities for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 

1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001).

2

Page numbers refer to the ECF pagination.

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Petitioner alleges the following grounds for relief in his federal petition: (1) Cal. Penal 

Code § 288 was not validly enacted, so the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence 

him; (2) Cal. Penal Code § 667 is illegal because California did not seek authorization from the 

Appropriations Committee of the California Legislature for the greater amount of taxes 

necessary to pay for increased periods of incarceration, and it was not validly enacted; (3) 

Government officials’ failure to respond to Petitioner’s documents means that his allegations are 

true and he should be released; (4) The prosecutors and judges did not have the authority to act in 

his case, because the California Bar is not valid; (5) California has no jurisdiction over him; (6) 

The two sentence enhancements should be served after the indeterminate sentences are complete; 

and (7) His out-of-state conviction should not have been used to enhance the punishment of his

California conviction involved in this petition. 

I.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to 

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir. 2001). In Herbst, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a 

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner 

adequate notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 

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S.Ct. 586 (1997). As the instant petition was filed on October 13, 2014, it is subject to the 

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a 

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, 

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme 

Court on January 15, 1997. Thus, direct review concluded on April 15, 1997, when the ninety 

(90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. See Barefoot v. 

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Brown v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner claims that there is no statute of limitations when fraud is present. However, as 

Petitioner is a state prisoner pursuant to a state court judgment, there is a 1-year period of 

limitation. Petitioner also claims that there is an ongoing impediment to filing his petition. 

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However, Petitioner does not provide any specific reasons why he was unable to file his habeas 

petition or explain what impediments prevented him from filing his habeas petition for over 

fifteen years after the expiration of the statute of limitations. In addition, Petitioner does not 

explain how he was able to file the instant federal petition if there are still ongoing impediments 

that affect his ability to file documents with the Court. Therefore, based upon the information 

before the Court, the Court does not find that an impediment by State action prevented Petitioner 

from filing his federal petition.

Petitioner asserts that he was unable to discover the facts supporting his claim about the 

State Bar of California’s true status until 2013. (ECF No. 13 at 6). Petitioner asserts that he was 

not provided with a copy of Article XII of the California Constitution as was in effect in 1927 

until September 2014. (ECF No. 13 at 6). However, Petitioner submits an article about the 

California State Bar, which he signed and dated September 6, 2012. (ECF No. 1-1 at 89-113). 

Therefore, on September 6, 2012, Petitioner was aware of the facts concerning his claim about 

the California State Bar. However, the limitations period does not run from the date that a 

petitioner discovers or finds out about the factual predicate. The limitations period runs from the 

date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added). It appears 

that Petitioner could have discovered the factual predicate of his claims through the exercise of 

due diligence at the time his direct review concluded. Therefore, the period of limitations will 

run from the conclusion of direct review. 

Petitioner had one year from the conclusion of direct review, absent applicable tolling, in 

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the statute of limitations 

expired on April 15, 1998, absent applicable tolling. However, Petitioner delayed filing the 

instant petition until December 29, 2014, over sixteen years beyond the expiration of the statute 

of limitations. Therefore, Petitioner’s federal petition is untimely absent any applicable tolling.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

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judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 

The statute of limitations expired on April 15, 1998. Petitioner claims that he has filed 

two habeas petitions in the California state courts. (Pet. at 3-4). Although Petitioner filed two 

post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim in state 

court, the petitions did not operate to toll the statute of limitations. Petitioner’s first state habeas 

petition was filed in the Tuolumne County Superior Court on September 11, 2013, over fifteen 

years after the limitations period expired. (Pet. at 3). Subsequently, on February 3, 2014, 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Pet. at 4). 

As the limitations period had already expired at the time the collateral challenge was filed, the 

collateral challenges had no tolling consequences. See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th

Cir.2000). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for his two state habeas 

petitions. Thus, it appears that Petitioner’s federal petition is untimely, absent equitable tolling. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) 

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department 

of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 

(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997)). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give 

rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002); Hinton v. 

Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Petitioner argues that his claims are timely because his claims involve fraud by lawyers 

and the courts involving his trial and appeals. However, Petitioner’s fraud argument goes to the 

merits of his claims, and does not address why he should be entitled to equitable tolling. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that he has been pursuing his rights diligently or that an 

extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing his habeas petition. Therefore, the Court 

finds that Petitioner’s arguments are not sufficient to entitle him to equitable tolling. Thus, 

Petitioner’s petition is untimely.

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II.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s petition be 

DISMISSED for violating the limitation period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

thirty (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, Petitioner may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” The assigned District Judge

will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Petitioner 

is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 

the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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