Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00779/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00779-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD E. GRANT,

Petitioner, No. Civ. S-90-0779 DFL JFM

v.

 Opinion and Order

 DEATH PENALTY CASE 

 

JILL BROWN, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. 

_____________________________/

Petitioner Richard E. Grant was convicted of the first

degree murder of Edward Halbert and sentenced to death. The

conviction and sentence were affirmed by the California Supreme

Court. See People v. Grant, 45 Cal.3d 829 (1988). Grant seeks

to set aside the conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for

Findings and Recommendations. See L.R. 72-302(17). The

magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on certain of

petitioner’s claims. On November 15, 2004, the magistrate judge

filed exhaustive Findings and Recommendations. Both sides filed

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 Claim 4N1 alleges that defense counsel was ineffective 1

for failing to further investigate and present evidence of

Grant’s history of mental illness and his social and medical

background, including his abusive upbringing, repeated suicide

attempts, brain damage, and drug and alcohol abuse. Claim 4P

alleges that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to

mitigate the prosecution’s evidence of other crimes with evidence

of Grant’s mental illness. Without such evidence, defense

counsel was left with no defense and repeatedly commented that

there was “no excuse” for petitioner’s bad conduct. 

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objections, and responses to objections, in May and June 2005. 

The court has conducted a de novo review of all issues as to

which objection is made. 

The Findings and Recommendations are 205 pages long and

comprehensively address every issue and aspect of this case. 

There is no point in repeating what already is so well stated in

the Findings and Recommendations. The magistrate judge rejected

all claims except claims 4N1 and 4P, addressing ineffective

assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. The magistrate judge 1

recommends that the death sentence be set aside because of

defense counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence of

Grant’s mental illness and social history, including an abusive

upbringing. 

Despite the daunting length of the Findings and

Recommendations, and the associated record, the colorable claims

in this case are not particularly complex. Defense counsel’s

handling of the penalty phase was off the charts. He called two

witnesses in mitigation, each of whom gave the briefest possible

testimony which in toto was as harmful as helpful. Therefore, it

is fair to say that defense counsel offered nothing in

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 See Findings and Recommendations at 42 n.25, 48. 2

 Defense counsel tried unsuccessfully and belatedly to 3

offer evidence of Grant’s mental illness at the penalty phase. 

He was unable to reach the psychiatrist whom he had hired for the

guilt phase, and had not made sufficient provision for his use at

the penalty phase. He failed to ask the trial court for the

appointment of another psychiatrist. Thus, counsel’s “tactical”

decision was not even tactical; it was simply the product of poor

planning. See Findings and Recommendations at 26. 

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mitigation. Yet counsel had in his possession, or could easily

have obtained, evidence of Grant’s abusive childhood, serious

mental illness, and substance abuse. His decision not to offer

any of this evidence, when he had nothing else to offer, was

ineffective and prejudicial. 

According to defense counsel, he did not offer evidence of

Grant’s abusive childhood because it might have permitted the

prosecutor to offer evidence that, as an 18 or 19 year old, Grant

allegedly had sodomized his younger brothers. But counsel never

made a motion to exclude this evidence, and it appears from the

record that such a motion could well have succeeded. Indeed, 2

counsel never took steps to determine whether there was any truth

to the accusation by contacting the brothers or interviewing

Grant’s mother. Given that counsel had no other mitigating

evidence to offer, it was incumbent upon him to do more. A

tactical decision of such consequence, made with such

fecklessness, is not entitled to deference. 

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Respondents also make much of Grant’s belligerence during

his mental examination by the respondents’ experts. The court

concurs with the magistrate judge’s finding that the experts

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could have done more to successfully examine Grant. However,

surely the overall finding of ineffective representation does not

depend on whether or not respondents’ experts could have offered

a more effective rebuttal of petitioner’s evidence of mental

illness had Grant been more cooperative. Even assuming this to

be the case, defense counsel’s decision not to offer any evidence

whatsoever of Grant’s mental illness – given the extensive record

of it – or any evidence of his social history – particularly his

dysfunctional upbringing by abusive, irresponsible parents – in a

circumstance in which there was no other mitigating evidence, was

not justifiable. The extensive record of serious mental illness,

coupled with the abusive upbringing and the failure to offer any

mitigating evidence, is sufficiently compelling to satisfy the

prejudice requirement under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), even assuming that respondents’ experts would have

raised questions about the extent of Grant’s mental illness and

that some of the evidence may have cast Grant in an unfavorable

light.

Accordingly, upon de novo review, the court adopts the

Findings and Recommendations as to claims 4N1 and 4P.

The court also adopts the Findings and Recommendations as to

the following claims, except as specifically noted:

1A/B/C: Incompetence of psychiatric expert;

2A/B/C and 4B: Court erred in failing to find that

petitioner was incompetent; counsel was ineffective in

failing to request a competency hearing. However, the court

declines to adopt the finding and recommendation at page

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134, lines 2-21, in which the magistrate judge finds that

defense counsel was unreasonable in failing to seek a

competency examination during the penalty phase. The

evidence is not sufficient to overcome the deference due to

counsel’s judgment, based on his own interactions with

petitioner, that petitioner understood the proceedings and

was able to assist counsel;

3: Decision to testify was involuntary;

4A: Counsel’s failure to obtain adequate psychiatric opinion

at guilt phase;

4C: Counsel’s failure to seek second counsel;

4D: Counsel’s failure to move for severance of the two

murder charges;

4E: Counsel’s failure to conduct adequate voir dire;

4F: Counsel’s failure to request separate guilt and penalty

juries;

4G2: Counsel’s failure to impeach Wilson;

4H: Counsel’s failure to present self-defense evidence

concerning the Halbert killing;

4I: Counsel’s failure to investigate Halbert’s van;

4J: Counsel’s failure to request autopsy report;

4K: Counsel’s failure to request diminished capacity

instructions; 

4L/S: Counsel’s ineffective assistance results in cumulative

prejudice;

 

4M: Counsel’s failure to challenge San Bernardino murder

conviction; 

 4N2a/2b: Counsel’s failure to investigate/impeach as to

Durant, Walker, and Kingrey incidents;

4N2c: Counsel’s failure to impeach Sines;

4N3: Counsel’s failure to present evidence of Halbert’s

threats and violent tendencies;

4N4: Counsel’s failure to present evidence of moral

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justification for killing Halbert;

4O: Counsel’s failure to obtain discovery concerning Bosenko

incident;

4Q: Counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on

elements of unadjudicated crimes;

4R: Counsel’s failure to object to biblical references;

5: Counsel’s financial conflict of interest;

6: Counsel’s conflict of interest re Durant;

7: Counsel’s conflict of interest as a former prosecutor;

8A/B: Prosecutor failed to disclose benefits given to

Kingrey and Durant; 

8C: Prosecutor failed to correct Durant’s testimony; 

8D: Prosecution destroyed records that had been subpoenaed;

8E: Prosecutor failed to disclose evidence re Bosenko

matter;

8F/G: Prosecution failed to preserve evidence;

9A: Court erred in denying motion to change venue;

9B: Counsel’s failure to conduct adequate voir dire re

pretrial publicity;

10: Court erred in denying continuance;

11A/B: Court erred in permitting evidence of Grant’s

admission to Detective Malmberg and Sergeant McDannold;

12A/B: Insufficient evidence of first degree murder;

13: Court erred in failing to give diminished capacity

instructions;

14: Court erred in giving an incomplete malice instruction;

15: Instructional error as to reasonable doubt instruction; 

16: Invalid waiver of right to be present;

17/18: Prosecutor failed to disclose juror misconduct;

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19A/B: Court erred in failing to empanel separate guilt and

penalty phase juries;

20: Court erred in admitting testimony that Grant wanted the

death sentence;

21: Prosecutor failed to provide notice and evidence of an

aggravating circumstance; 

22: Court erred in admitting George’s testimony;

23: Court erred in permitting evidence of jail-made knife

possessed by petitioner and his threat on Bosenko;

 

24: Court erred in permitting evidence of petitioner’s 

unadjudicated criminal activity;

25: Court erred in permitting evidence of subsequent

convictions as aggravating factor;

26: Court erred in not holding a preliminary hearing re

admissibility of unadjudicated criminal conduct;

27: Cumulative prejudice from errors in admitting evidence

of other crimes;

28: Prosecutor improperly referred to the Bible;

29: Court erred in forbidding defense counsel from reading

newspaper article; 

30: Petitioner is mentally retarded and cannot be executed

under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002);

31A: Instructional error alleged as to CALJIC No. 8.84.2;

31B: Instructional error alleged as to sentencing factor

(k); 

31C: Instructional error alleged as to inclusion of

irrelevant aggravating and mitigating factors;

31D: Instructional error alleged as to failure to instruct

that some factors are only mitigating;

31E: Instructional error alleged as to failure to tell jury

that guilt phase instruction on pity was not applicable to

penalty phase;

31F: Court erred in not requiring written findings from

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 The issue affects the order on remand and cannot be 4

avoided; if it was unconstitutional to execute petitioner because

of the passage of time, then the court would not remand the case

for further sentencing proceedings that could lead to the reimposition of the death penalty. 

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jury, in failing to give unanimity and burden of proof

instruction;

31G: Instructional error alleged as to failure to instruct

on elements of unadjudicated offenses;

31H: Instructional error alleged as to failure to instruct

jury not to count the Floyd murder aggravating factor more

than one time;

31I: Instructional error alleged as to failure to give two

requested instructions;

32: Jury misconduct in considering possibility of

petitioner’s release if he received a life sentence;

33: Inaccurate death verdict;

34: California Supreme Court failed to conduct

proportionality review;

35: California Supreme Court did not afford petitioner due

process in its handling of his appeal and habeas claims;

36: Prolonged confinement under sentence of death violates

the Eighth Amendment and international law. The court

adopts the Findings and Recommendations as to claim 36 with

one exception. The magistrate judge recommends that the

court decline to decide whether, because of delay, the

application of the death penalty to defendant would serve no

penological purpose and therefore violate the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. However, rather than declining to

decide this issue, the court finds that this aspect of the 4

claim is also foreclosed by the reasoning in McKenzie v.

Day, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1995). 

37: Deprivation of right to select method of execution; 

38B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B9: Ineffective assistance

by trial counsel who represented petitioner during San

Bernardino trial and conviction; 

38C: Prosecutorial misconduct at San Bernardino trial;

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38D: Court erred in denying motion for new counsel (San

Bernardino trial);

38E: Court erred in disclosing defense investigative request

(San Bernardino trial);

38F: Court erred in admitting hearsay (San Bernardino

trial);

38G: Error by court and counsel in handling of juror note

(San Bernardino trial); 

38H: Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument (San

Bernardino trial);

38I: Erroneous jury instructions (San Bernardino trial);

38J: Insufficient evidence (San Bernardino conviction);

38K: San Bernardino County killing should not have been

counted as a special circumstance because it occurred after

the Shasta County murders.

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 For the reasons stated above and in the Findings and 

Recommendations, as adopted, the court makes the following order:

Petitioner's second amended petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is granted as to the penalty phase on the basis of claims

4N1 and 4P. The petition is denied in all other respects. 

Petitioner's sentence of death shall be vacated and a lesser

sentence imposed that is consistent with state law, unless the

state commences a new penalty trial within ninety days of the

filed date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 10, 2006.

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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