Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00002/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00002-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EFRAIN ORNELAS CRUZ,

Petitioner,

v.

R. STEWART,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 0002 AWI WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. 14]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to

dismiss. Petitioner has not opposed or otherwise responded to the motion.

On December 12, 2002, Petitioner was convicted in the Fresno County Superior Court of

felony false imprisonment (Cal. Penal Code, § 236)2/, felony criminal threats (§ 422) with personal

use of a deadly weapon (§12022(b)(1)), misdemeanor exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417(a)(1)), and

misdemeanor child endangerment (§ 273a(b)). The court found true special allegations (§§

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667(b)(1), 1170.12(a)-(d), 667(a), 667.5(b)) and sentenced Petitioner to state prison

for thirty-six years to life. On September 2, 2004, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment. On November 10, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for

Review. Petitioner did not file a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal or in the

California Supreme Court.

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that

Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state judicial remedies. Petitioner has not opposed the motion.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For th

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a

federal claim to a state court. See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982)

(Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an

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argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074

(1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

In his original petition filed January 3, 2006, Petitioner raises three claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel and one claim of prosecutorial misconduct. None of these claims have been

presented to the California Supreme Court and therefore, they are unexhausted. The court must

dismiss a petition that contains unexhausted claims, even if it also contains exhausted claims. Rose,

455 U.S. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d

756, 760 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997); Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d th

371, 372 (9 Cir.1988). th

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Pub.L. No

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by Respondent. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(C). The court can also excuse exhaustion if “(I) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a process ineffective to protect the

rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this case, Respondent has not waived

exhaustion. In addition, California provides avenues for Petitioner to pursue state claims. For

example, these claims could have been presented in a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See, Cal.

Penal Code §§ 1473 - 1475. Finally, there are not sufficient circumstances in this case for the court

to ignore the United States Supreme Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and

find that California’s corrective processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights.

Petitioner’s original petition for writ of habeas corpus currently before this court contains

only unexhausted claims, and therefore must be dismissed. See, Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct.

at 1205; Gordon, 107 F.3d at 760; Guizar 843 F.2d at 372.

Petitioner’s amended petition filed May 9, 2006, contains three “claims” in which he simply

denies having committed criminal threats, exhibiting a deadly weapon, or simple battery. Relief by

way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 fn.7

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(2000). The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner makes no

claim that the earlier adjudication of these three claims, if any, meets the above standard, and

nothing supporting such a claim is apparent. Thus, the court finds that the amended petition does

not state a claim for relief pursuant to Section 2254.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s motion to

dismiss be GRANTED and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case and to enter

judgment for Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

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District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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