Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-00242/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-00242-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK ANTHONY JAEGEL SR.; MARK ANTHONY

JAEGEL JR., Individually and on

Behalf of All Others Similarly

Situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-00242 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs Mark Anthony Jaegel Sr. and Mark Anthony Jaegel

Jr., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, move

to certify classes of individuals who have been subject to strip

searches as part of booking procedures while being processed into

the Alameda County Jail. Plaintiffs claim that these searches

violate California Penal Code § 4030 and the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the Constitution. Plaintiffs move to certify (1) an

injunctive relief class to prohibit these alleged illegal searches

and (2) a statutory damages class to recover compensation provided

to victims of illegal strip searches under § 4030(p). Defendants

oppose the motion. The matter was heard on December 10, 2009. 

Having considered oral argument and all of the papers filed by the

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parties, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion in part and denies it

in part.

BACKGROUND

On January 13, 2008, Deputies from the Alameda County

Sheriff’s Department arrested Plaintiffs Mark Anthony Jaegel Sr.

and his son Mark Anthony Jaegel Jr. for their roles in a bird

fight. Plaintiffs were transported to the Alameda County Santa

Rita Jail Facility where they were allegedly strip searched along

with other detainees in violation of California Penal Code

§ 4030(f) and their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiffs were grouped with other detainees who were being

processed into the jail. Deputies ordered Plaintiffs to stand

shoulder to shoulder in a hallway and remove their clothing down to

their underwear. Some detainees, including Plaintiff Mark Jaegel

Sr., did not wear underwear and were left completely naked. 

Deputies ordered the detainees to open their mouths, run their

fingers through their hair and raise each foot off the ground while

spreading their toes. Deputies visually inspected the detainees

during these exercises. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint states that they bring this class action

on behalf of all pretrial detainees and inmates whom Defendants

have allegedly strip searched at their county jail facilities since

January, 2006. Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs allege that, since January,

2006, Defendants “have and continue to engage in a custom, practice

and/or official policy of strip searching all inmates who enter

their jail facilities without regard to bonafide security risks.” 

Id. at 4. In the same complaint, separate from the class action

allegations, Plaintiffs sue Defendants for false imprisonment. Id.

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at ¶ 2. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A plaintiff seeking to represent a class must satisfy the

threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as the requirements

for certification under one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Rule

23(a) provides that a case is appropriate for certification as a

class action if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are

typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(b) further provides that a case may

be certified as a class action only if one of the following is

true:

(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual

class members would create a risk of:

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to

individual class members that would establish

incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing

the class; or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual class

members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive

of the interests of the other members not parties to the

individual adjudications or would substantially impair or

impede their ability to protect their interests;

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act

on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final

injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is

appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common

to class members predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members, and that a class action is superior to

other available methods for fairly and efficiently

adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these

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findings include:

(A) the class members’ interests in individually

controlling the prosecution or defense of separate

actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning

the controversy already begun by or against class

members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating

the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 

A plaintiff seeking class certification bears the burden of

demonstrating that each element of Rule 23 is satisfied, and a

district court may certify a class only if it determines that the

plaintiff has borne its burden. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.

147, 158-61 (1982); Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d

1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977). In making this determination, the

court may not consider the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.

Burkhalter Travel Agency v. MacFarms Int’l, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 144,

152 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Rather, the court must take the substantive

allegations of the complaint as true. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d

891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the court need not accept

conclusory or generic allegations regarding the suitability of the

litigation for resolution through class action. Burkhalter, 141

F.R.D. at 152. In addition, the court may consider supplemental

evidentiary submissions of the parties. In re Methionine Antitrust

Litig., 204 F.R.D. 161, 163 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also Moore v.

Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983)(noting

that “some inquiry into the substance of a case may be necessary to

ascertain satisfaction of the commonality and typicality

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requirements of Rule 23(a);” however, “it is improper to advance a

decision on the merits at the class certification stage”). 

Ultimately, it is in the district court’s discretion whether a

class should be certified. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 946

(9th Cir. 2003); Burkhalter, 141 F.R.D. at 152.

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs’

assertion that this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality

and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a)(1), (2) and (4), and the

Court finds that it does. See 1 Alba Cone & Herbert B. Newberg,

Newberg on Class Actions § 3.3 (4th ed. 2002) (where “the exact

size of the class is unknown, but general knowledge and common

sense indicate that it is large, the numerosity requirement is

satisfied”); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th

Cir. 1998) (“All questions of fact and law need not be common to

satisfy [Rule 23(a)(2)]. The existence of shared legal issues with

divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of

salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the

class.”). 

Defendants’ main arguments in opposing Plaintiffs’ motion for

class certification are that Plaintiffs fail to meet the 

requirements of typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) and that common

issues do not predominate under Rule 23(b)(3). 

I. Class Certification: Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement provides that a “class

representative must be part of the class and possess the same

interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.” Falcon,

457 U.S. at 156 (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.

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Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The requirement is meant “to assure that the

interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of

the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th

Cir. 1992). Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied where the named plaintiffs 

have the same or similar injury as the unnamed class members, the

action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named

plaintiffs, and other class members have been injured by the same

course of conduct. Id. Class certification is inappropriate,

however, “where a putative class representative is subject to

unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the

litigation.” Id. (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir.

1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991)).

Defendants argue that it is impossible to ascertain whether

the named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those in the proposed

class in general because Plaintiffs’ class certification motion

refers to class members as “pre-arraignment detainees,” but their

proposed definition in the appendix to the class certification

motion refers to class members as “detainees” without the “prearraignment” qualifier. Despite this inconsistency, it is clear

from the numerous instances throughout Plaintiffs’ moving papers

where they refer to proposed class members as “pre-arraignment

detainees” that the proposed class members consist only of prearraignment detainees and not all individuals detained in Alameda

County jails. Therefore, the Court can and does address

typicality.

Defendants next argue that the named Plaintiffs’ claims are

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1California Penal Code § 4030(f) provides:

No person arrested and held in custody on a misdemeanor or

infraction offense, except those involving weapons,

controlled substances or violence . . . shall be subjected

to a strip search or visual body cavity search prior to

placement in the general jail population, unless a peace

officer has determined there is reasonable suspicion based

on specific and articulable facts to believe such person is

concealing a weapon or contraband, and a strip search will

result in the discovery of the weapon or contraband. No

strip search or visual body cavity search or both may be

conducted without the prior written authorization of the

supervising officer on duty. The authorization shall

include the specific and articulable facts and circumstances

upon which the reasonable suspicion determination was made

by the supervisor.

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not typical of those of the proposed class members with respect to

both of the causes of action to be resolved on a class basis. The

first cause of action is labeled “Illegal Strip Search in Violation

of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California Penal Code

Section 4030” and the second is labeled “Violation of Penal Code

Section 4030.” Despite the different labels, both causes of action

contain virtually identical allegations and both charge Defendants

with improperly strip searching Plaintiffs in violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California Penal Code

§ 4030(f). 

Plaintiffs assert that their strip searches were conducted in

violation of Penal Code § 4030(f). This subsection concerns

searches which take place “prior to placement in the general jail

population.” It prohibits strip searches or visual body cavity

searches of persons “arrested and held in custody on a misdemeanor

or infraction offense, except those involving weapons, controlled

substances or violence . . . .”1 Plaintiffs claim that they were

arrested only for violating California Penal Code § 597(c), a

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2California Penal Code § 597(c) provides: 

Every person who maliciously and intentionally maims,

mutilates, or tortures any mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian,

or fish as described in subdivision (d), is guilty of an

offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or

by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars

($20,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment, or,

alternatively, by imprisonment in the county jail for not

more than one year, by a fine of not more than twenty

thousand dollars ($20,000), or by both the fine and

imprisonment.

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misdemeanor charge of being a spectator at a bird fight.2 

In contrast to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the Alameda County

Sheriff’s Department arrest records show that Plaintiffs were

arrested for three crimes: Penal Code §§ 597(c), 597(b) and 597b. 

Sections 597(c) and 597b were charged as misdemeanors, but 597(b)

was charged as a felony. Rockwell Decl., Exh. B, C; Luna Decl.

¶ 2. Because § 4030(f) does not apply to detainees arrested for

felony offenses, Plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of those in the

proposed classes. Therefore, the motion for class certification

fails with respect to any claim of violation of California Penal

Code § 4030(f). 

In Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, they assert that the

“Alameda County Sheriff’s Department maintains a blanket policy

that requires all persons who enter the Alameda County Jail to

undergo a strip search, without regard to any individual factor

bearing reasonable suspicion that the person poses a risk of

possessing a weapon or contraband.” Reply at 6-7. However,

Plaintiffs allege that, as part of the search, they were ordered to

disrobe down to their undershorts. Motion at 5. Only individuals

who were not wearing undershorts on the day that they were detained

were searched while naked. Named Plaintiff Mr. Jaegel Sr. was one

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such individual, but his son, the other named Plaintiff, Mr. Jaegel

Jr., was not. Because Mr. Jaegel Jr. was clothed at the time of

his search, his claim is not typical of those of the class. As to

Mr. Jaegel Sr., irrespective of the fact that he was permitted to

wear his undershorts, because he was not wearing undershorts, he

was naked at the time of the search, and, as such, was de facto

subject to a strip search. Therefore, Mr. Jaegel Sr. presents

claims typical of those of the class. 

II. Class Certification: Predominance

“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed

classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by

representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623

(1997). “When common questions present a significant aspect of the

case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a

single adjudication, there is clear justification for handling the

dispute on a representative rather than an individual basis.” 

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that common issues do not predominate

because, even if their alleged policy to strip search all prearraigned detainees upon entering the jail is unconstitutional, the

unnamed Plaintiffs’ rights were not violated if their searches were

conducted based on reasonable suspicion. Defendants assert that

whether there was reasonable suspicion for each search will depend

on the individual circumstances involved. 

Defendants’ argument does not defeat class certification. The

real issue in this case is the constitutionality of the policies

and practices of the Sheriff’s Department, which were applied to

all class members. The legal question presented by the named

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Plaintiffs, whether the Sheriff’s strip search policy is

unconstitutional, is the same with respect to the unnamed class

members. Thus, given the alleged uniform and indiscriminate nature

of the strip search policy and practice at issue, it appears that

liability can be determined on a class-wide rather than an

individual basis. 

The class includes only those subjected to a strip search

without any individualized reasonable suspicion that they were

concealing contraband. Thus, those who were subjected to searches

based on individualized reasonable suspicion are not included in

the class. Although such post hoc determinations of reasonable

suspicion weigh against certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3),

they do not compel the Court to find that this case must be tried

on an individual basis. Post hoc determinations do not detract

from the legal question of whether individuals were searched

pursuant to an unconstitutional blanket strip search policy. See

Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, C 03-1840, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 9120, *11 (N.D. Cal.). Moreover, even if some categories of

individuals within the class could be permissibly strip searched,

some of these determinations too could be resolved on a class-wide

basis. See id. at 10.

As to superiority, at this stage, it is apparent that the

resolution of the liability and damages issues in a class action is

likely to be a far more efficient method of adjudication than the

individual assertion of lawsuits grounded in similar facts. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that all of the requirements of

Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) have been met and certification of a class is

warranted. 

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II. Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2)

Plaintiffs also move for certification of an injunctive relief

class under Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) permits certification

where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on

grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive

relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate

respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). “Class

certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate only where the

primary relief sought is declaratory or injunctive.” Zinser v.

Accufix Research Institute, Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Although common issues must predominate for class

certification under Rule 23(b)(3), no such requirement exists under

23(b)(2). “It is sufficient if class members complain of a pattern

or practice that is generally applicable to the class as a whole.

Even if some class members have not been injured by the challenged

practice, a class may nevertheless be appropriate.” Walters v.

Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998); see 7A Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 1775 (2d ed. 1986) (“All the class members need not be

aggrieved by or desire to challenge the defendant's conduct in

order for some of them to seek relief under Rule 23(b)(2).”); see

also Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988)

(emphasizing that, although “the claims of individual class members

may differ factually,” certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is a

proper vehicle for challenging “a common policy”).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants maintain uniform customs,

practices and procedures to strip-search all incoming detainees who

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The Court deleted the language in Plaintiffs’ proposed class

definition that referred to a supervising officer’s prior written

authorization for a strip search because that requirement applies

only to California Penal Code § 4030. Section 1983 does not

redress violations of state law. 

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are processed into the Alameda County jails. Class certification

for injunctive relief is appropriate in this case because

Defendants are alleged to have acted “on grounds that apply

generally to the class.” Accordingly, the Court also certifies a

class under Rule 23(b)(2). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion

for class certification in part and denies it in part. Docket No.

19. The Court notes that, although it grants certification in this

case, “[d]eterminations to certify a class depend on initial

predication and are always subject to revision.” Tardiff v. Knox

County, 365 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004). The Court can always

decertify the class should that become necessary. 

With that caveat, the following class is hereby certified

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2) for injunctive and

declaratory relief and (b)(3) for damages: 

All pre-arraignment detainees who are or will be held in

Defendants’ custody and who, because of such detention, will

be strip searched pursuant to Alameda County Sheriff's

Department custom, policy or procedure without a reasonable

suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the

detainee possessed a weapon or contraband that would be

found as a result of the strip search.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 01/22/10 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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