Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05488/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05488-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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 Defendant Gardner, the third defendant against whom this suit was proceeding, was dismissed on

September 29, 2005, based on plaintiff’s failure to furnish information sufficient to serve defendant with process. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). (Docs. 32, 35.)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN CARLOS DUARTE,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. D. ANDREWS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-CV-5488-AWI-LJO-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST

AND FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

BE DENIED, AND RECOMMENDING

SCHEDULING ORDER BE MODIFIED TO

ALLOW FURTHER DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

(Doc. 31)

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff John Carlos Duarte (“plaintiff”) is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of civil rights by federal

actors. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed January 8, 2004, against

defendants Puentes and Duffle (“defendants”) on plaintiff’s equal protection claim.1 (Doc. 16.) On

August 1, 2005, pursuant to the unenumerated portion of Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c), defendants filed

Case 1:03-cv-05488-SMS Document 37 Filed 11/16/05 Page 1 of 9
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 Pursuant to the court’s order of August 2, 2005, defendants’ motion for summary judgment in the

alternative to dismissal is not being considered by the court, as it is procedurally deficient. (Doc. 33.)

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a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust and for judgment on the pleadings.2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.

(Doc. 31.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 20, 2005. (Doc. 36.)

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust

1. Standard

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement

applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought by the

prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative process can

provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

“All ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards,

nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing to Booth, 532 U.S.

at 739 n.5). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-

1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to exhaust nonjudicial

administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion,

rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curium)). In

deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the court may look

beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. If the court

concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is

dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

Case 1:03-cv-05488-SMS Document 37 Filed 11/16/05 Page 2 of 9
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 This document was submitted with plaintiff’s original complaint, amended complaint, and opposition. The

most legible copy of the document is that attached to the original complaint.

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2. Discussion

In their motion, defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of this action because

plaintiff did not complete the administrative remedy process. (Doc. 31.) Defendants contend that

after plaintiff’s appeal was rejected as untimely at the Regional Director’s level, plaintiff failed to

pursue the appeal to the third and final level of review, known as the General Counsel’s level. (Id.,

5:24-6:7.)

Plaintiff contends that the exhaustion requirement should be excused because of futility.

(Doc. 36, 13:19-26.) In addition, plaintiff contends that his failure to pursue his appeal was caused

by deficiencies in the process. (Id., 13:9-19.) Plaintiff contends that defendants caused him to fail

to follow the rules by giving him incorrect advice and incorrect forms. (Id.)

TheBureauofPrisons (BOP) provides a three-step Administrative Remedy Program to allow

inmates to seek review of any issue relating to any aspect of their confinement. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10,

542.13, 542.15 (2005). The program is available to BOP inmates and inmates housed at Community

Corrections Centers, but not to inmates confined in other non-federal facilities. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10

(2005). The first step is informal resolution and is not required for inmates housed at Community

Corrections Centers. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13 (2005). The second step requires the submission of an

appeal to the Regional Director within twenty calendar days of the date the Warden signed the

informal level response. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a) (2005). The third step requires the submission of

an appeal to the General Counsel within thirty calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed

the response. Id.

Plaintiff submitted a “TCI Inmate Request to Staff” dated December 22, 2002, to Associate

Warden Gardner. (Doc. 36, Exhibit 7.) In the request, plaintiff complains about his SHU placement

and states that he is being racially harassed.3 (Id.) In the section entitled “Disposition,” a staff

member wrote, “You are currently pending investigation.” (Id.) An appeal by plaintiff was

subsequently received at the Regional Director’s level on February 21, 2003, and was rejected on

///

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February 25, 2003, as untimely because it was not received within twenty days of the Warden’s

response. (Id., Exhibit 8.)

Pursuant to section 542.17(c), if a request or appeal is rejected and the inmate is not given

the opportunity to correct the defect and resubmit the appeal, the inmate may appeal the rejection to

the next level of appeal. In this instance, that would be the General Counsel’s level. Thus, if

plaintiff was required to utilize the Administrative Remedy Program set forth in 28 C.F.R. 542 et

seq., his failure to appeal the Regional Director’s rejection of his appeal as untimely to the General

Counsel’s level would render his appeal unexhausted.

However, defendants fails to set forth any evidence that Taft Correctional Institution (TCI),

where plaintiff is housed, is a Community Corrections Center, making its inmates eligible for the

Administrative Remedy Program. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 (2005). Further, plaintiff submits

evidence that indicates Taft inmates were precluded from pursuing appeals to the BOP levels unless

their appeal issues were considered to be BOP issues. (Doc. 36, Exhibit 5.) Pursuant to GEO’s TCI

Administrative Remedy Procedure, there are two procedures for appealing the Warden’s response

to an inmate’s issue. (Id., p. 4.) If the issue concerns a BOP related matter, the inmate may appeal

to the BOP. (Id., p. 5.) BOP related matters are specifically defined as (1) classification, (2)

designation, (3) sentence computation, (4) reduction in sentence, (5) removal or disallowance of

good conduct time, (6) decision taking inmate property, and (7) issues directly involving BOP staff.

(Id.) GEO matters are defined as all other matters not defined as BOP matters. (Id.) For GEO

matters, the Warden’s response is the final response and constitutes exhaustion. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s issue that he was racially discriminated against in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause does not appear on its face to be a BOP related matter. If plaintiff’s issue was in fact a GEO

matter, it appears that the Warden’s response to plaintiff’s issue constituted exhaustion of plaintiff’s

claim in this action. That plaintiff subsequently submitted his appeal to the BOP for review does not

work to undue exhaustion, if exhaustion already occurred. Given that plaintiff’s appeal was rejected

on procedural grounds as time barred, the court cannot infer from Regional Director’s response that

plaintiff should have pursued his appeal with the BOP or that the BOP would even have considered

the appeal on its merits.

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Defendants bear the burden of pleadings and proving the absence of exhaustion. Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-370 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants are required to demonstrate that

pertinent relief remained available. Id. In light of defendants failure to submit evidence

demonstrating that plaintiff, as a TCI inmate, was subject to the Administrative Remedy Program

and plaintiff’s submission of a GEO policy indicating that he was not subject to the Administrative

Remedy Program set forth in section 542, the court finds that defendants are not entitled to dismissal

of this action based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies. However,

neither can the court conclude that plaintiff did exhaust. The GEO policy submitted by plaintiff was

issued on May 21, 2004, and superceded the prior policy issued on June 12, 2003. The incident at

issue in this action occurred in 2002 and plaintiff’s appeal/request to the Warden was submitted in

2002. There is no evidence in the record regarding the GEO/TCI Administrative Remedy Procedure

that was in place during the relevant time. Therefore, the court shall recommend that defendants’

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust be denied, without prejudice to refiling. 

C. Judgment on the Pleadings

1. Standard

Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter the pleadings are

closed but within such time as not to delay trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”

Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all material facts in the pleading under attack

are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard

Feiner & Co., 883 F.2d 1429, 1436 (9th Cir. 1989). The court must assume the truthfulness of the

material facts alleged in the complaint. All inferences reasonably drawn from these facts must be

construed in favor of the responding party. General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists

v. Seventh Day Adventist Congregation Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). If matters

outside the pleadings are considered, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment. Fed.

R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). However, documents submitted with the complaint may be considered as part

of the complaint for purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Hal Roach Studios, 896

F.2d at 1555. The court may consider the full text of documents referred to in the complaint without

converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment, provided that the document is central to

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plaintiff’s claim and no party questions the authenticity of the document. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d

449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In this instance, defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment.

As set forth in the court’s order of August 2, 2005, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was

procedurally deficient and will not be considered by the court. With respect to the motion for

judgment on the pleadings, the court shall not convert it to a motion for summary judgment and will

not therefore consider the declarations submitted as evidence.

2. Discussion

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was charged in an incident report with

violating an institutional rule by giving or receiving money from another inmate. (Doc. 15.)

Plaintiff alleges that both he and the other inmate involved admitted their guilt. (Id.) Plaintiff was

assessed ten days in the Security Housing Unit, and lost visitation and commissary privileges for

three months. (Id.) The other inmate was not punished. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was treated

differently than the other inmate by defendants because he is Hispanic and the other inmate is white.

(Id.)

Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal because plaintiff has not alleged any facts

showing discriminatory purpose or racial animus. (Doc. 31, 6:14-8:5.) Defendants further ague that

one isolated incident is insufficient in the prison context without allegations showing improper

motive or discriminatory intent. (Id.) 

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). “‘Prisoners are protected . . . from invidious

discrimination based on race.’” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

The federal system is one of notice pleading. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d

1119, 1126 (2002). “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any

set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Discovery and summary

judgment motions - not motions to dismiss - “define disputed facts” and “dispose of unmeritorious

claims.” Id. at 512. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the

pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353

F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him

to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was the only one punished by defendants

following an incident with another inmate because he is Mexican and the other inmate is white. The

court can no longer apply a heightened pleading standard to plaintiff’s claim by requiring that he

allege specific facts as to defendants’ motive. See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1083. The Ninth Circuit has

warned district courts on more than one occasion that notice pleading requires only notice to the

other party of the claim and allegations showing that the plaintiff may be entitled to some relief.

Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171; Jackson, 353 F.3d at 757. Further, pro se complaints such as this are held

to even less stringent standards. Jackson at 757. In this instance, although plaintiff does not set forth

any specific allegations supporting his claim that defendants’ treatment of him was racially

motivated, the amended complaint “at least minimally informed the parties and the court of”

plaintiff’s equal protection claim. Austin at 1171. Under the very minimal notice pleading

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 The forty-five days would run from the date of the issuance of Judge Ishii’s order considering this

Findings and Recommendations, not from the date of the issuance of this F&R.

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standards, plaintiff was required to do no more. The court therefore recommends that defendants’

motion for judgment on the pleadings be denied, with prejudice. 

D. Conclusion

As set forth in the preceding sections, the court cannot find based on the record before it that

plaintiff failed to exhaust or that plaintiff did exhaust, and the court therefore recommends that

defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust be denied without prejudice. Further, the court

finds that plaintiff’s allegations, while minimal, are sufficient underfederal notice pleading standards

to withstand a motion to dismiss, and recommends that defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings be denied with prejudice. 

The deadline for filing pre-trial dispositive motions was August 1, 2005, and the instant

motion was filed by defendants on that date. In light of the fact the court did not consider

defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on their failure to comply with Local Rule 56-260

and in light of the recommendation to deny defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

without prejudice, the court recommends that the scheduling order be modified to allow the parties

forty-five additional days within which to file dispositive motions.

4

 If neither plaintiff nor

defendants choose to file a dispositive motion within forty-five days, this matter is ready to be set

for trial. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the available

administrative remedies, filed August 1, 2005, be DENIED, without prejudice;

2. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed August 1, 2005, be

DENIED, with prejudice; and

3. The scheduling order be modified to allow the parties forty-five days from the date

of service of the District Judge’s order within which to file further dispositive

motions.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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