Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00535/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00535-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

 Plaintiff Kristoffer Shaun Cornelius seeks judicial review and reversal of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his 

application for Social Security disability benefits.1

I. Background 

 On March 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and Title XVI of the 

Social Security Act. (AR2

 30, 208-15.) Plaintiff alleges that he became unable to work 

on March 1, 2010, due to his disabling conditions of attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder (“ADHD”), depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder (“OCD”), 

bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and sleep deprivation. (AR 

 1

 The request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

2

 Administrative Record 

Kristoffer Shaun Cornelius, 

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-13-00535-PHX-SPL

ORDER 

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132, 136.) On August 12, 2010, the SSA denied Plaintiff’s application (AR 132-39), and 

on December 17, 2010, the SSA denied Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration (AR 141-

47). Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request (AR 148-49), a hearing was held on November 29, 

2011, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Joan G. Knight (AR 46-82). 

 Applying the five-step sequential framework,3

 on January 4, 2012, the ALJ issued 

a decision ruling that Plaintiff is not disabled and is not entitled to disability benefits. 

(AR 30-41.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since March 1, 2010, his alleged disability onset date. (AR 32.) At step 

two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “bipolar disorder, 

NOS,4

 generalized anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, alcohol 

dependence, in reported remission since July 15, 2011, and amphetamine dependence, in 

reported remission since July 15, 2011.” (AR 32.) 

 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal one 

of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 33-

34.) In making this determination, the ALJ considered the degree to which claimant’s 

 3

 In deciding whether a claimant is disabled and eligible for Social Security disability benefits, an ALJ employs a five-step sequential analysis, determining: 

(1) whether the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted for more than 12 months; (3) whether the 

impairment meets or equals’ one of the listings in the 

regulations; (4) whether, given the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity, the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant can make an 

adjustment to other work. 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 CFR §§ 404.1520, 416.920). See also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or 

‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). The 

claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four of the sequential process. Id.; 

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

4

 NOS stands for “Not Otherwise Specified.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 381 (4th ed. TR 2000). 

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mental impairments interferes which the four broad functional areas (referred to as 

“paragraph B” listing criteria). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c), 416.920a(c). In areas of 

activities of daily living, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild restrictions; in the area of 

social functioning, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild difficulties; in the area of 

concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ found Plaintiff had moderate difficulties; and 

in the area of episodes of decompensation, the ALJ found Plaintiff had two episodes of 

decompensation. (AR 33-34.) 

 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity5

(“RFC”) “to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following 

nonexertional limitations: the claimant is capable of simple, unskilled work.” (AR 34.) 

The ALJ stated that the RFC assessment reflected “the degree of limitation the [ALJ 

found] in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis.” (AR 34.) Based on his residual 

functional capacity finding, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could no longer perform his past 

work. (AR 39.) At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform other jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 40.) The ALJ therefore 

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. (AR 41.) 

 On February 7, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, 

and the ALJ’s decision therefore became the final decision of the Commissioner of the 

SSA. (AR 2-4.) Having exhausted the administrative review process, on March 13, 

2013, Plaintiff sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision by filing a Complaint in this 

Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1.) 

II. Standard of Review 

The district court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of 

record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, 

with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district 

court reviews the ALJ’s decision under the substantial evidence standard and must affirm 

 5

 A claimant’s residual functional capacity is defined as the most he or she can do 

despite his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 

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the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and it is free from legal error. Orn 

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th 

Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance; “it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 

2007); see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. Even if the ALJ erred, however, “[a] decision 

of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the district court considers the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720; Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 

1993); Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. Where “the evidence can reasonably support either 

affirming or reversing a decision, [the district court] may not substitute its judgment for 

that of [the ALJ].” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). See also

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). It reviews “only the reasons 

provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a 

ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 

III. Discussion 

Arguing that this case should be remanded for an award of benefits, Plaintiff 

claims that the ALJ erred: (1) by failing to incorporate adopted medical opinion evidence; 

(2) by improperly rejecting medical opinion evidence; and (3) by improperly rejecting 

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his impairments. (Docs. 26, 28.) In response, Defendant 

agrees that the ALJ erred in resolving her findings on medical opinion evidence, but 

disputes whether the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled. (Doc. 27.) 

Therefore, Defendant argues that this case should be remanded for further proceedings. 

(Id.) 

A. Residual Functional Capacity Assessment 

 First, the ALJ erred by failing to discern the limitations that where accounted for 

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in determining Plaintiff had a RFC to perform “simple, unskilled work.” (AR 34.) See 20 

CFR § 404.1520a(e). In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider the nature 

and extent of a claimant’s mental limitations and restrictions to determine his ability to 

work on a regular and continuing basis. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(c); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a)(2). “A limited ability to carry out certain mental activities, such as 

limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in 

responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting, 

may reduce [a claimant’s] ability to do past work and other work.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.945(c). 

 In her decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was moderately limited in 

concentration, persistence, or pace.6

 (AR 33.) In making this finding, the ALJ relied on 

opinions of Sheri Tomak, Psy.D., and Sharon Steingard, D.O., which she accorded 

significant weight. (AR 33, 37-38, 101-128, 421-427.) Dr. Steingard found Plaintiff’s 

score on the “Mini-Mental State Examination” suggested cognitive impairment, his 

“[p]ersistence will be poor” as he does not have any history of sustaining work or 

“maintaining appropriate adult responsibilities,” and has “limitations in understanding 

social cues and disregards some social norms.” (AR 426-427.) Dr. Tomak opined that 

Plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out 

detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, perform 

activities within a schedule, complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace 

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, and respond appropriately to 

changes in the work setting. (AR 109-11.) 

 The ALJ did not address however, whether Plaintiff could perform “simple, 

unskilled work” despite his functional limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. 

 6

 “Concentration, persistence, or pace” refers to the “ability to sustain focused 

attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the timely and appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in work settings.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Sub. P, App. 1 § 12.00(c)(3). 

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“The basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work include the 

abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple 

instructions; to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work 

situations; and to deal with changes in a routine work setting.” SSR 85-15 (emphasis 

added). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568 (“Unskilled work is work which needs little or no 

judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of time.”). 

The ability to meet the mental demands to perform unskilled “simple tasks” may be 

limited by “concentration, persistence, or pace” if an individual cannot complete simple 

tasks “at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, or 

without undue interruptions or distractions.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 

12.00(c)(3). Although the ALJ discussed the medical evidence of record, she did not set 

forth her findings regarding Plaintiff’s specific limitations in concentration, persistence, 

or pace, nor did she provide a reasoned bridge between his limitations and his ability to 

perform simple, unskilled work. Therefore, the ALJ erred in her assessment of Plaintiff’s 

RFC. 

 B. Vocational Expert Testimony 

 The ALJ further erred in failing to take into account all of Plaintiff’s limitations in 

propounding hypotheticals to the vocational expert. An ALJ must include all restrictions 

in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert, including moderate 

limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989); Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (a hypothetical that fails to take into 

account a claimant’s limitations is defective). 

 The ALJ first posed a hypothetical describing a person who, in performing 

unskilled work, is “restricted to performing simple work tasks.” (AR 77.) This 

hypothetical was inadequate. The medical opinions adopted by the ALJ suggest that 

Plaintiff’s deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace limit his ability to carry out 

work tasks on a continued basis regardless of the nature or complexity of the work to be 

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performed. See O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The 

ability to stick with a given task over a sustained period is not the same as the ability to 

learn how to do tasks of a given complexity.”); Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 

2009); Newton v. Chater, 92 F.3d 688, 695 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding “simple jobs” was 

insufficient to cover concentration, persistence, or pace deficiencies). For this reason, the 

ALJ’s second more restrictive hypothetical of an individual limited “to performing 

simple, repetitive tasks” also did not adequately incorporate Plaintiff’s limitations. (AR 

77.) O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 620 (generally, “employing terms like ‘simple, 

repetitive tasks’ on their own will not necessarily exclude from the VE’s consideration 

those positions that present significant problems of concentration, persistence and pace”). 

 Because the ALJ failed to direct the vocational expert to the totality of Plaintiff’s 

limitations, the expert’s testimony had “no evidentiary value to support a finding that 

[Plaintiff] can perform jobs in the national economy.” DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 

841, 850 (9th Cir. 1991). Having relied on the vocational expert’s opinion, the ALJ’s 

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled was not based on substantial evidence. 

 C. Remand for Further Proceedings 

 Finding there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination 

of disability can be made, the Court concludes that remanding this case for further 

proceedings, rather than for an award of benefits, is appropriate. An ALJ’s decision shall 

be reversed and remanded for the calculation and award of benefits only where: “(1) the 

record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no 

useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the 

claimant disabled on remand.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014); 

see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 

F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 Plaintiff first argues that Dr. Steingard’s opinion, if credited, is a basis for 

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remanding this case for a determination of benefits. If such evidence were credited, 

however, it is not clear that Plaintiff would be found disabled on remand. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel posed two hypotheticals to the vocational 

expert incorporating the opinion of Dr. Steingard as follows: 

[U]nder understanding and memory, “The score on the MiniMental Status Exam does suggest cognitive impairment. The score is 22 out of 20. Psychological testing would be helpful to further assess concentration IQ and the possibility of learning disability.” 

The next section is the sustained concentration and 

persistence: “Persistence will be poor. He does not have any history of sustaining work. He does not have a history of maintaining appropriate adult responsibilities. He put little effort into some of the tasks on the Mini-Mental Status 

Examination. He was distracted by the phone ringing in the interview. Social interaction: interaction is limited but not 

impaired. He seems to have some limitations in understanding social queues and disregards some social norms such as not 

eating in the waiting room and not eating in a doctor’s office. Interaction is not precluded. He was otherwise respectful. He did not display emotional ability adaptation. Cognitively, he can perform simple and repetitive tasks. He can be a 

passenger in a private vehicle. He is capable of using public transportation. He should not be managing benefits if deemed eligible to receive them.” 

Would you agree that a person with those limitations would 

be precluded from all work on a sustained basis? 

A Am I to understand there’s no emotional ability? 

Q There was no emotional ability. He did not display 

emotion ability during the evaluation. 

A During the evaluation. 

Q And I guess I – in answering this question, I would 

like you to focus on the sustained concentrating and persistence, where it’s persistence will be poor. 

A Right. I’m also thing [sic] about the little effort. 

Q And I would just ask you to take that at face value 

because he does – the doctor, she doesn’t say why there was 

little effort, whether it was related to illness or attitude or 

anything. So just take it at face value that during the – I’ll read it again: “He puts little effort into some of the tasks on 

the Mini-Mental Status Examination.”\ 

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A Mm-hmm. 

Q “He was distracted by the phone ringing in the 

interview.” 

A I’m having trouble answering that in that there seems 

to be a variance in information. Because we don’t know what 

little effort – when she’s saying he displayed ‘little effort’ on some tasks, we don’t know what that’s due to. 

Q Well, let me ask a different question then. 

A Okay. 

Q Let’s just take the statement “persistence will be poor.” 

Based on your experience as a vocational expert, would you 

agree that someone with poor persistence would have trouble 

maintaining employment? 

A Yes, I would. 

(AR 79-81.) Here, in response to counsel’s hypotheticals, the vocational expert found Dr. 

Steingard’s opinion unclear. The vocational expert was unable to answer whether “a 

person with those limitations would be precluded from all work on a sustained basis.” 

While counsel narrowed his hypothetical to “someone with poor persistence,” contrary to 

Plaintiff’s portrayal, the vocational expert did not find that this limitation would preclude 

a person from all work on a sustained basis. Rather, the vocational expert only responded 

affirmatively that a person with such limitation would have “trouble maintaining 

employment.” Without more, it cannot be said that Dr. Steingard’s opinion, if credited, 

would mandate a finding of disability on remand. 

 Second, Plaintiff argues that the opinion of treating psychiatrist Amnon Kahane, 

M.D, if credited, is a basis for remanding this case for an award of benefits. Finding the 

record has not been fully developed, the Court does not reach whether the ALJ erred in 

her treatment of Dr. Kahane’s opinion evidence. In offering various reasons for rejecting 

Dr. Kahane’s check-box medical assessment form, the ALJ appears to rely on an 

evaluation of his treatment notes. (AR 38, 419-420.) However, beyond the check-box 

form, the record contains only a one-page “Prescriber Progress Note” completed by Dr. 

Kahane in which he finds Plaintiff was stable and his condition was controlled by 

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medication. (AR 380.) Further, while the ALJ refers to treatment notes in rejecting the 

check-box medical assessment form completed by treating physician Jeffery Edelman, 

M.D., the record contains no treatment records from Dr. Edelman. (AR 39, 538-39.) 

Without clarification and explanation regarding these discrepancies, the Court cannot 

adequately evaluate the strength of the discredited evidence and determine if it is clear 

that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled on remand. See Garrison, 759 

F.3d at 1021. 

 Lastly, no hypothetical was posed to the vocational expert that incorporated the 

limitations outlined in Plaintiff’s testimony. Therefore, even if the discredited testimony 

were credited as true, the record does not show whether the ALJ would be required to 

find Plaintiff disabled on remand based on this evidence. 

IV. Conclusion

 In sum, the Court has considered the record as a whole, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. The Court 

concludes there are significant outstanding issues and will remand this case to the ALJ 

for further proceedings and a new decision. On remand, in addition to reevaluating the 

evidence and taking new testimony, the ALJ should accept any additional medical 

evidence into record that exists for the period at issue. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is VACATED and REMANDED to the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

 Dated this 19th day of September, 2014. 

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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