Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08115/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08115-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 385
Nature of Suit: Property Damage - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tri-State Generation and Transmission 

Association Incorporated, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Mitsubishi International Corporation, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-08115-PCT-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by plaintiffs Tri-State 

Generation and Transmission Association Incorporated, et al. (“Tri-State”). (Doc. 151.) 

Tri-State alleges numerous grounds on which the Court previously erred in denying their 

motion to compel production of a document withheld by defendants Mitsubishi 

International Corporation, et al. (“Mitsubishi”) pursuant to the parties’ jointly stipulated 

clawback agreement. (Docs. 150, 94.) Each of these alleged errors is considered in turn. 

For the reasons discussed below, Tri-State’s motion is denied. 

 

1. Impeachment 

Tri-State first disputes the Court’s finding that Tri-State presented “no authority 

that impeachment, in any of its manifestations, suffices under Rule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) to 

pierce work product.” (Doc. 151 at 4.) Tri-State argues that in its original briefing it 

cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 

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(1947), and points specifically to the Hickman Court’s invocation of the word 

“impeachment” to support its disagreement with the Court’s finding. 

The Hickman Court, however, mentioned “impeachment” in the context of 

articulating when written materials prepared by counsel “may properly” be discoverable. 

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added). In the portion of the opinion Tri-State 

highlights, the Hickman Court notes that such written materials “might be useful for 

purposes of impeachment or corroboration.” Id. Precatory dicta such as this do not 

establish that impeachment “suffices” to justify piercing work-product protection. This 

Court was correct to conclude that neither Hickman nor any other authority cited by TriState establishes that “impeachment, in any of its manifestations, suffices under Rule 

26(b)(3)(A)(ii) to pierce work product.” 

2. Waiver 

Tri-State next disputes the Court’s finding that Mitsubishi did not waive work 

product protection because its actions were “reasonable and timely under the Clawback 

Order . . . which contemplates that inadvertent disclosures may be likely.” (Doc. 151 at 

4.) According to Tri-State, the Court erred because it “did not controvert – or even 

address – plaintiffs’ authorities in the Clawback Reply which establish that the failure to 

object to the introduction of an exhibit waives any privilege, regardless of the presence of 

a claw-back provision governing inadvertent disclosure – the precise scenario at issue 

here.” In its reply brief, Tri-State argued that “[i]t is well-settled that ‘[c]law-back 

provisions . . . govern only waivers by inadvertent disclosure.’ . . . ‘Accordingly, failure 

to timely object to the introduction of an exhibit waives any privilege, regardless of the 

presence of a claw-back provision governing inadvertent disclosure.’” (Doc. 138 at 13 

(emphasis and citations omitted).) 

However, the authority Tri-State cites for this “well-settled” proposition consists 

of three unpublished district court opinions from other districts, one of them not even in 

this circuit. This Court is not bound by those authorities. Tri-State has cited no case law 

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from any controlling jurisdiction that undermines this Court’s previous conclusion. 

3. Reasonableness 

Tri-State next contests this Court’s finding that Mitsubishi “acted reasonably in 

completing the deposition” despite becoming aware of the possible inadvertent disclosure 

at the deposition itself. Tri-State disputes that Mitsubishi acted reasonably in 

“abstain[ing] from asserting any objections whatsoever during two hours of examination 

about [the] document [at issue],” and flags United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 

(9th Cir. 1973), as “controlling law on the subject of waiver.” (Doc. 151 at 5.) Tri-State 

points to Gurtner for the proposition that “[o]nce the subject matter is disclosed by a 

knowing failure to object there is nothing left to protect from disclosure” (Doc. 151 at 5), 

but offers no explanation of what the Court is supposed to take away from this principle. 

Whatever the intended takeaway, these objections do not controvert the Court’s 

finding that Mitsubishi acted reasonably. Tri-State omits from its argument this Court’s 

finding that the deposition, conducted in Japanese, was “scheduled under the demanding 

requirements of Japanese law.” (Doc. 150 at 2.) To suspend the deposition under the 

circumstances in order to evaluate clawback options would have jeopardized a 

proceeding not readily conducive to rescheduling or continuation at a later date. The 

Court reiterates that it was reasonable under the circumstances to have waited until the 

next morning to contest the document. 

Furthermore, Gurtner is both legally and factually distinct from this case. Legally, 

Gurtner dealt with the attorney-client privilege, not the work-product doctrine, a related 

but distinct notion not necessarily subject to the same guiding principles. And factually, 

Gurtner was a case where the defendant made an untimely objection while a witness was 

on the stand before the jury at trial, not amid pre-trial discovery. Gurtner, 474 F.2d at 

299. The proposition cited by Tri-State (“Once the subject matter is disclosed by a 

knowing failure to object there is nothing left to protect from disclosure”) pertains to jury 

trials, not pre-trial discovery. In any case Mitsubishi’s actions at the deposition did not 

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amount to a “knowing failure to object.” 

Tri-State’s arguments therefore fail to undermine the Court’s conclusion that 

Mitsubishi acted reasonably in objecting the following morning instead of during the 

deposition itself. 

4. Discoverable By Other Means 

Next, Tri-State opposes the Court’s determination that “[a]ll the subjects of the 

factual recitations in the disputed documents are discoverable by other means.” They 

contend that such a ruling is “manifestly unjust and/or reflects a misapprehension of the 

facts” because the fact discovery deadline had passed more than a month before the 

Court’s order. (Doc. 151 at 5.) 

This ignores the ample time Tri-State had to conduct discovery. Tri-State never 

claims they were unaware of the discovery deadline, or that they did not have the 

opportunity to conduct discovery prior to (and including) the deposition at issue. The 

information Tri-State seeks has all along been discoverable by other means regardless of 

whether they capitalized on all opportunities to acquire it. 

5. Characterization of Plaintiff’s “Real Intended Use” of the Documents 

Tri-State next contends that the Court was incorrect to conclude that “[p]laintiffs’ 

real intended use of the documents is to show that the Defendants thought the valve was 

supposed to be a stopper . . . .” Tri-State points to arguments in its briefing that 

addressed “the critical admissions against interest about the potential for over-rotation of 

the valve and the defendants’ failure to warn plaintiffs that over-rotation could crash the 

turbine.” (Doc. 151 at 6.) 

Whether or not the Court comprehensively characterized Tri-State’s intentions 

does not bear on the outcome of this motion. Rule 59 does not counsel reconsideration 

because one party disagrees with an immaterial characterization of its motives. 

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6. Ordinary vs. Opinion Work Product 

Tri-State next argues that the Court “apparently determined sua sponte” that 

portions of the disputed statements “are ‘opinion’ work product to which no discovery 

exception applies,” this despite the fact that, in Tri-State’s view, the parties do not dispute 

that the document at issue “amount[s] to ‘ordinary’ work product, which is entitled to 

only the most minimal protection.” (Doc. 151 at 6.) 

The Court is not aware of anywhere in the record—and indeed Tri-State points to 

nothing—in which Mitsubishi concedes that the disputed document is “ordinary” work 

product. Regardless, Tri-State’s attribution lacks what they themselves characterize as 

the hallmark of “ordinary” work product: “raw factual information” (Doc. 132 at 17). 

Tri-State instead points to various conclusions throughout the document—Mitsubishi’s 

reference to the tab as a stopper and other internal observations about the nature of the 

device (Doc. 151 at 6-7; Doc. 132 at 18-19)—and simply labels these as facts. This 

sleight-of-hand gets Tri-State nowhere. Mitsubishi’s opinions and conclusions are 

opinions and conclusions, not facts. The Court made no error in this regard. 

7. Characterization of Plaintiffs’ Position 

Tri-State next contends that the Court incorrectly “assumed plaintiffs’ position to 

be that ‘the valve was supposed to be a stopper.’” (Doc. 151 at 7 (quoting Doc. 150 at 

2).) Based on this, Tri-State contends that the Court “misapprehended the facts,” and that 

correctly understanding the nature of the device in question “is critical to the evaluation 

of plaintiffs’ arguments.” (Doc. 151 at 7.) 

This argument amounts to a failed exercise in cherry-picking. Unfortunately for 

Tri-State, the full sentence from which the quote was taken reads as follows: 

Plaintiffs’ real intended use of the disputed documents is to show that the

Defendants thought the valve was supposed to be a stopper because they 

themselves used the word “stopper” (the interpreter’s word in translating 

from Japanese). 

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(Doc. 150 at 2 (emphasis added).) The Court’s order took no position on what Tri-State 

believes the stopper to be. The order did take a position on what Tri-State wanted from 

the document: to show that Mitsubishi believed the valve was supposed to be a stopper. 

Even if that incorrectly states why Tri-State wants to the disputed document, it still 

attributes no position to Tri-State on whether the stopper is a valve. The Court made no 

misapprehension of the facts. 

8. Undue Hardship 

Finally, Tri-State takes issue with the Court’s purported conclusion “that ‘undue 

hardship’ only exists ‘when one party has investigated facts that are no longer viable for 

the other party to investigate, such as because of loss or destruction of tangible things.’” 

(Doc. 151 at 7.) Tri-State contends this definition is “unduly restrictive, manifestly 

unjust and contrary to established law.” 

The Court’s order did not say that undue hardship “only” exists where facts 

investigated by one party are no longer viable for investigation by the other. The order 

simply called this “the paradigm of ‘undue hardship’” (emphasis added), which it is. 

Any confusion over the meaning of “paradigm” could have been dispelled by consulting 

a dictionary. See, e.g., Paradigm Definition, Merriam-Webster Online 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paradigm (last visited Dec. 20, 2016) 

(defining “paradigm” as “example, pattern; especially: an outstandingly clear or typical 

example or archetype”). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 

151) is denied. 

 Dated this 20th day of December, 2016. 

Neil V. Wake

Senior United States District Judge 

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