Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02246/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02246-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GONZALO ARAMBULA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ANDREW WONG and 

M.S. EVANS, Warden,

Defendants. ____________________________

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No. C 05-2246 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND ADDRESSING ALL PENDING

MOTIONS

(Docket nos. 34, 36, 37, 39, 42,

48, 54, 55, 63, 64, 65, 66)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Gonzalo Arambula, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP), brought this pro

se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

constitutional rights violations while he was incarcerated at

Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP). Upon its initial review, the

Court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, finding that

some of his claims appeared to be unexhausted. Plaintiff then

filed an amended complaint in which he reiterated that he had

exhausted his administrative remedies as to all claims in his

original complaint. 

In an Order dated July 5, 2006, the Court found that Plaintiff

stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Dr.

Andrew Wong and Warden M.S. Evans for deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs (docket no. 19). The Court noted that

Plaintiff was suing Defendant Evans in his supervisorial capacity

because of his failure to ensure constitutionally adequate medical

care for Plaintiff. The Court served Defendants with a copy of the

original and amended complaints. Each Defendant separately moves

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 Defendants do not raise a qualified immunity defense in their

motions for summary judgment.

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for summary judgment (docket nos. 39, 42).1 Plaintiff also moves

for summary judgment (docket nos. 36, 64) and opposes Defendants'

motions for summary judgment (docket nos. 50, 53).

For reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants'

motions for summary judgment, DENIES Plaintiff's motions for

summary judgment and addresses all other pending motions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Wong and Evans arose

from their alleged failure to treat Plaintiff's four health-related

concerns. 

Plaintiff's first concern deals with arthritic deterioration

in his left knee. (Stage Decl. ¶ 4.) On June 26, 2003 at

California State Prison - Corcoran (Corcoran), where Plaintiff was

then incarcerated, Dr. David Smith performed arthroscopic surgery

on Plaintiff's left knee. (Vervoort Decl., Ex. 3 at 9.) On July

11, 2003, Dr. Smith ordered a hinged neoprene knee brace for

Plaintiff and prescribed Ibuprofen, at a dose of 800 mg. daily for

ninety days. (Id., Ex. 3 at 10.)

According to Plaintiff's medical record, Corcoran medical

staff issued an elastic knee brace to Plaintiff on July 18, 2003. 

(Stage Decl. ¶ 4.) On July 31, 2003, Plaintiff requested a hinged

knee brace. (Id.) He was told that a hinged knee brace was

unavailable at Corcoran, and he was instructed to renew his request

after transferring to SVSP. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wong failed to provide him

with the prescribed hinged knee brace when he was transferred to

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SVSP. (Compl. at 3.) However, Defendants contend there is nothing

in the record showing that Plaintiff renewed his request for a

hinged knee brace by submitting a Health Care Services Request upon

his arrival at SVSP. (Stage Decl. ¶ 4.) On July 13, 2004, Dr.

Haffner, a physician at SVSP, prescribed a neoprene knee brace for

Plaintiff. (Id.) A formal inventory search of SVSP warehouse's

computerized database confirmed Plaintiff's receipt of a knee brace

on July 30, 2004. (Gonzales Decl. ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Wong failed to renew his

prescription for Ibuprofen. (Compl. at 3.) The record shows that

numerous SVSP physicians, including Defendant Wong, prescribed

Ibuprofen, Motrin, Tylenol, Aspirin, and other pain relievers at

various times to treat Plaintiff's pain associated with arthritic

deterioration of his left knee. (Stage Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff's

prescription for Ibuprofen expired on April 1, 2004; however,

Defendants claim that it was not renewed due to Plaintiff's failure

to appear for scheduled chronic care appointments on May 13, 2004

and June 7, 2004. (Id. ¶ 8.) On July 13, 2004, Plaintiff resumed

his chronic care appointments and Dr. Haffner, the attending

physician, renewed Plaintiff's prescription for Ibuprofen. (Id.)

Plaintiff's second health-related concern involves a sprain to

his right wrist from an accidental fall at SVSP on October 20,

2003. (Id. ¶ 5.) On November 25, 2003, SVSP physician Dr. David

Zarek ordered Plaintiff a wrist support for use during physical

activity for a three-month period. (Compl., Ex. 7.) Plaintiff

claims he never received the prescribed wrist support. (Compl. at

3.) However, on October 1, 2004, Plaintiff refused delivery of a

wrist support that was specially ordered for him. (Gonzales Decl.

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¶ 5.) 

Dr. Zarek also prescribed a muscle relaxer called

Chlorzoxazone at a dose of 500 mg. daily for sixty days. (Stage

Decl. ¶ 6.) Dr. Zarek and Defendant Wong renewed Plaintiff's

prescription for Chlorzoxazone on more than one occasion until the

last prescription expired on March 23, 2004, and it was never

renewed after that date. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant

Wong deprived him of his prescription for Chlorzoxazone by failing

to renew it after it expired. (Compl., Ex. 8.) 

Plaintiff's third and fourth health-related concerns relate to

his diabetes and high blood pressure. Plaintiff claims that

Defendant Wong failed to provide him with his diabetes and high

blood pressure medication. (Compl. at 3.) Defendants claim that

between February and July of 2004, Plaintiff's medication for high

blood pressure was discontinued because his blood pressure readings

were within normal range. (Id.)

In sum, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wong was deliberately

indifferent for his failure to supply the following prescriptions: 

Ibuprofen; Chlorzoxazone; knee brace; wrist support; and diabetes

and high blood pressure medications. Furthermore, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Evans is liable in his supervisorial

capacity for his failure to ensure constitutionally adequate

medical care for Plaintiff.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). A verified complaint may be used as an

opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is based on

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th

Cir. 1995).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

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(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion

Defendants concede that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative

remedies as to his deliberate indifference claim relating to

Defendant Wong's refusal to renew Plaintiff's prescriptions for

Ibuprofen and Chlorzoxazone as well as his failure to supply

Plaintiff with the prescribed knee brace and wrist support. 

However, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's deliberate

indifference claim is unexhausted as to allegations of Defendant

Wong's failure to provide medication for Plaintiff's diabetes and

high blood pressure.

A. Background

A search of SVSP's computerized database of all administrative

appeals filed by inmates revealed that Plaintiff has filed thirtytwo separate 602 appeals. (Medina Decl., Ex. A.) 

As of November 17, 2006, only one of the inmate appeals that

reached the Director's level of review, appeal no. SVSP-A-04-02949,

includes the same claims against Defendant Wong that Plaintiff has

alleged in the present action. (Vervoort Decl., Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4,

5.) Plaintiff filed appeal no. SVSP-A-04-2949 on April 25, 2004,

alleging Defendant Wong's failure to comply with other physicians'

orders to treat Plaintiff's arthritis, diabetes and hypertension. 

(Compl. at 3, Ex. 1, 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that

Defendant Wong was deliberately indifferent by failing to renew

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Plaintiff's prescriptions for Ibuprofen and Chlorzoxazone and by

failing to supply him with his prescribed knee brace and wrist

support. (Id.) He also included a demand for a permanent

prescription for Ibuprofen and Chlorzoxazone. (Id.)

The only other appeal relating to the claims in this action is

appeal no. SVSP-A-05-02675. This appeal, which concerns

Plaintiff's failure to receive insulin, blood pressure medications,

Prilosec and Ibuprofen in 2005, was not pursued through the

Director's level of review. (Vervoort Decl., Ex. 5.) 

B. Standard of Review

The Prison Litigation Reform Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to

provide, "No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The purposes of the exhaustion

requirement set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) include allowing the

prison to take responsive action, filtering out frivolous cases,

and creating administrative records. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 525 (2002). In order to satisfy the requirement, the

exhaustion of all "available" remedies is mandatory; those remedies

need not meet federal standards, nor must they be "plain, speedy

and effective." Id.; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5

(2001).

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the

right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision,

action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having

an adverse effect upon their welfare." See Cal. Code Regs. tit.

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15, § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative

remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through

several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution; (2) formal

written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form; (3) second level

appeal to the institution head or designee; and (4) third level

appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.

Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). This satisfies the

administrative remedies exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). 

See id. at 1237-38.

When no other administrative remedy is available, the

exhaustion requirement is deemed fulfilled. See Booth, 532 U.S. at

736 n.4. The obligation to exhaust persists as long as some remedy

is available; when that is no longer the case, the prisoner need

not further pursue the grievance. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926,

934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). For example, a prisoner need not exhaust

further levels of review once he has either received all the

remedies that are available, or been reliably informed by an

administrator that no more remedies are available. Id. at 935. By

contrast, an inmate was deemed not to have exhausted all available

remedies where he was informed at the second formal level that his

administrative appeal would be treated as a staff complaint, that

any non-staff claims should be separately appealed, that further

review was available if he was dissatisfied, and that his appeal

was denied. Id. at 940-43.

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. 

Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants have the burden of

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raising and proving the absence of exhaustion, and inmates are not

required specifically to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their

complaints. Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 921-22. Because there can be no

absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, a

movant claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent

relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels or through

awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a result of

that process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir.

2005). 

C. Analysis

Based on the evidence in the record, the Court finds that

Defendants have met their burden of raising and proving the absence

of exhaustion of Plaintiff's claim of inadequate medical care

relating to his diabetes and high blood pressure.

Search results from SVSP's computerized database of

administrative appeals and authenticated copies of appeals

documentation clearly support Defendants' contention that Plaintiff

did not seek all available administrative remedies to address his

claim of inadequate medical care relating to his diabetes and high

blood pressure. The evidence is undisputed that any inadequate

medical care for Plaintiff's diabetes and high blood pressure,

which was alleged in appeal no. SVSP-A-05-02675, is an issue that

has not been addressed or reviewed at the Director's level. 

(Medina Decl. Ex. A at 2.) 

Because the Court finds that Defendants have met their initial

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion as to

Plaintiff's claim inadequate medical care relating to his diabetes

and high blood pressure, Plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and

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"set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Plaintiff has attached seventy-six

exhibits to his original and amended complaints; however, even

drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court does not

find any evidence to rebut Defendants' claim of nonexhaustion. 

Having reviewed the parties' pleadings and submitted evidence

in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment,

the Court concludes that Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative

remedies with respect to his medical claim of inadequate medical

care relating to diabetes and high blood pressure. Accordingly,

this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust

available administrative remedies.

II. Deliberate Indifference Claim

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d

769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). The analysis of a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs involves an examination of

two elements: (1) a prisoner's serious medical needs and (2) a

deliberately indifferent response by the defendants to those needs. 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

A. Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or

the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

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Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

Here, Defendants do not dispute that arthritic deterioration

in Plaintiff's left knee and a sprain in his right wrist were

"important and worthy of comment or treatment" from medical staff. 

Id. Plaintiff claims he is a "critical care patient" with a

history of arthritis, diabetes and high blood pressure. (Compl. at

3.) Plaintiff contends that his lack of prescribed knee brace,

wrist support, Ibuprofen and Chlorzoxazone contributed to his

chronic pain and discomfort. (Id.) The record shows that several

doctors, including Defendant Wong, Dr. Smith, Dr. Zarek, Dr.

Taylor, Dr. Haffner and Dr. Bowman, were involved in addressing

Plaintiff's various medical needs between June, 2003 and December,

2004. (Compl., Ex. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 26.) Plaintiff's

condition was such that a "reasonable doctor or patient would find

important and worthy of comment or treatment" sufficient to meet

the serious medical needs prong of a deliberate indifference claim. 

See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. However, to establish an Eighth

Amendment violation Plaintiff must also provide evidence that

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs.

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B. Deliberate Indifference

1. Defendant Wong

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wong was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs by intentionally causing

delays and lapses in the provision of his prescribed knee brace and

wrist support, as well as failing to renew his prescriptions for

Ibuprofen and Chlorzoxazone. 

A claim of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient

to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Franklin v.

State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1130 (9th Cir. 2004);

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (mere negligence in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a

prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights); O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d

614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (repeatedly failing to satisfy requests

for aspirins and antacids to alleviate headaches, nausea and pain

is not constitutional violation; isolated occurrences of neglect

may constitute grounds for medical malpractice but do not rise to

level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain). 

The Court finds an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's

assertion that Defendant Wong violated the Eighth Amendment by

being deliberate indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. 

The undisputed evidence in the record does not show any

responsibility Defendant Wong had in the procurement or delivery of

Plaintiff's requested orthopedic items. The record shows Plaintiff

received an elastic knee brace at Corcoran on July 18, 2003. 

(Stage Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff presents no evidence to suggest

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Defendant Wong intentionally and deliberately interfered with or

delayed SVSP's compliance with these orders. Nothing in the record

suggests that Defendant Wong was aware of, was involved in, or had

any control over, SVSP's ordering and delivery process for a hinged

or elastic knee brace. What the record does show is that Plaintiff

sought relief from SVSP's administrative appeals process after

making the claim that Defendant Wong refused to provide him with a

hinged knee brace. However, Plaintiff's conclusory statements,

without more, are not sufficient to carry his burden of proof at

the summary judgment stage. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens,

425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (in equal protection case,

conclusory statement of bias not sufficient to carry nonmoving

party's burden in a motion for summary judgment).

There is also no evidence in the record to suggest Defendant

Wong's involvement in the procurement or delivery of Plaintiff's

wrist support. After Plaintiff sprained his right wrist in

November, 2003, Dr. Zarek prescribed a wrist support for Plaintiff

for use during physical activity for a three-month period. 

Although it is undisputed that an attempted delivery of a wrist

support to Plaintiff did not occur until October, 2004, Plaintiff

presented no evidence that Defendant Wong interfered with or

delayed Dr. Zarek's order. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to produce any

evidence that indicates Defendant Wong's involvement in or control

over the procurement and delivery of Plaintiff's knee brace and

wrist support. See Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th

Cir. 2002) (doctor entitled to summary judgment where plaintiff

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claimed not to have received antibiotics the doctor prescribed for

him but failed to produce any evidence showing that the failure was

in any way within that doctor's control). Accordingly, the Court

finds no grounds to support Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant

Wong was aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's

health or safety as a result of delays in the deliveries of

Plaintiff's knee brace and wrist support. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at

1058.

Plaintiff also failed to raise a triable issue of fact on his

claim that Defendant Wong's failure to renew his prescriptions for

Ibuprofen and Chlorzoxazone constituted deliberate indifference to

his medical needs. Plaintiff claims he is entitled to permanent

prescriptions for Ibuprofen and Chlorzoxazone to alleviate pain and

discomfort associated with arthritic deterioration in his left

knee. (Compl., Ex. 4.) However, the record shows that Dr. Wong

did not approve Plaintiff's request for permanent prescriptions. A

difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical

authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to an Eighth

Amendment Violation. See Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344. Rather,

Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the course of treatment

Defendant Wong chose was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances and that he chose this course in conscious disregard

of an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d

at 1058 (in order to prevail on a claim involving choices between

alternative courses of treatment, a plaintiff must show that the

course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable

under the circumstances and that they chose this course in

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conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff's health). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met this burden because he

did not produce any evidence to support his assertion that

Defendant Wong's decision not to approve a permanent prescription

was a failure to exercise honest medical judgment. See Jackson v.

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

Additionally, evidence in the record supports a finding that

Defendant Wong was not deliberately indifferent to providing

medical care to Plaintiff. The record shows that Defendant Wong

renewed Plaintiff's prescription for Chlorzoxazone beyond the

initially prescribed period of sixty days on more than one

occasion. (Stage Decl. ¶ 6.) The record also shows that Defendant

Wong continued Plaintiff's medications for diabetes and high blood

pressure despite Plaintiff's failure to keep his chronic care

appointments in May and June of 2004. (Id. ¶ 8.) In a signed

declaration dated February 2, 2007, Dr. Jack W. Stage, M.D., an

expert hired by Defendants to review Plaintiff's medical records

and SVSP's pharmacy dispensing records, states that "it is my

professional opinion that Dr. Wong provided reasonable and

appropriate medical care to [Plaintiff] at all times." (Stage

Decl. ¶ 3.) Dr. Stage further opined that "the standard of care

given by Dr. Wong was at least equal to that of the other

physicians who care for [Plaintiff]." (Id.) According to Dr.

Stage, Defendant Wong's decision not to renew Plaintiff's Ibuprofen

prescription when Plaintiff failed to attend scheduled appointments

is consistent with good medical practice because, without seeing

and examining Plaintiff, Defendant Wong could not exercise medical

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judgment to determine the necessity of the prescription. (Stage

Decl. ¶ 8.) At most, the quality of medical treatment Plaintiff

received from Defendant Wong could have amounted to negligence or

medical malpractice. A showing of medical malpractice or

negligence, however, is insufficient to establish a constitutional

deprivation under the Eighth Amendment. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at

1060-61. Construing the facts in light most favorable to the

Plaintiff, the Court does not find that Defendant Wong's failure to

satisfy Plaintiff's requests to renew his prescriptions for

Chlorzoxazone and Ibuprofen constitutes evidence of a

constitutional violation which could rise to the level of

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See O'Loughlin, 920

F.2d at 617. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Wong was not

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. 

Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence regarding an

essential element of his claim and, therefore, Defendant Wong is

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323.

2. Defendant Evans

Plaintiff sues Defendant Evans in his supervisorial capacity. 

Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant Evans had knowledge that

Plaintiff was treated with deliberate indifference by Defendant

Wong because appeals decisions at the Director's level of review

were forwarded to Defendant Evans. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

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disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison

official must not only "be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists," but

he "must also draw the inference." Id. In order to establish

deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show a purposeful act or

failure to act on the part of the defendant and a resulting harm. 

See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State

Prison Commissioners, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Such

indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay, or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown

in the way in which prison officials provided medical care. See

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. If a prison official should have been

aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated

the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v.

County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing

of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or

(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)

(citation omitted). A supervisor therefore generally "is only

liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). An administrator may be

liable for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, for

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instance, if he or she fails to respond to a prisoner's request for

help. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). "It

has long been clearly established that '[s]upervisory liability is

imposed against a supervisory official in his individual capacity

for his own culpable action or inaction in the training,

supervision, or control of his subordinates, for his acquiescence

in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made,

or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to

the rights of others.'" Preschooler II v. Clark County School Bd.

of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations

omitted).

Plaintiff's administrative appeals alleging Defendant Wong's

deliberate indifference to his medical needs were pursued between

April and November of 2004 (Medina Decl., Ex. A at 2.) The record

shows that the Warden's Office at SVSP receives as many as fifty

appeals decisions per day. Defendant Evans was transferred from

Tehachapi, California to SVSP as Acting Warden on December 1, 2004,

which is after Plaintiff received a partial grant on the second

level for appeal no. SVSP-A04-02049. (Evans Decl. ¶ 1.)

Here, Defendant Evans does not dispute that he has received

appeals decisions at the Director's level addressing Plaintiff's

concerns. Therefore, taking the facts in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the record supports Plaintiff's

assertion that Defendant Evans could be held liable in his

supervisorial capacity because he had knowledge of the alleged

violations. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. However, the Court has

found that his subordinate, Defendant Wong, was not deliberately

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indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Plaintiff has

failed to produce sufficient evidence regarding an essential

element of his claim and, therefore, Defendant Evans is entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

III. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff has filed motions for summary judgment which consist

of brief statements reiterating his claim that he is the victim of

cruel and unusual punishment. Because the parties have filed

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court has considered all of

the evidence submitted by Defendants in support of their motions,

as well as the admissible evidence submitted by Plaintiff to

evaluate whether summary judgment should be granted to Plaintiff. 

See Fair Housing Council of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside

Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). 

For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff has not established that Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to his medical needs. When the Court, as it must,

regards as true Defendants' evidence and draws all reasonable

inferences in favor of Defendants, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, no

genuine issues of material fact exist which entitle Plaintiff to

judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motions for

summary judgment (docket nos. 36, 64) are DENIED. 

IV. Plaintiff's Additional Pending Motions

Plaintiff has filed three motions for immediate injunctive

relief because KVSP Correctional Officers allegedly obstructed his

access to KVSP's law library (docket nos. 34, 48). He also

requests immediate monetary relief and provisions of multiple

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2

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) is to be applied

liberally in favor of amendments and, in general, leave shall be

freely given when justice so requires. Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994). While mere delay in seeking to

amend is not grounds to deny amendment, leave need not be granted,

where the amendment of the complaint would cause the opposing party

undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in

futility, or creates undue delay. Id.; see also Roberts v. Arizona

Bd. of Regents, 661 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court's

finding of prejudice to defendants sufficient to deny amendment,

because motion to amend came at eleventh hour, when summary judgment

pending and discovery period had closed, affirmed as proper exercise

of district court's discretion).

20

items, including a knee brace and a brand new wheelchair at KVSP

(docket no. 54). Any claims regarding the conditions of his

confinement at KVSP must be filed in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of California, because that is the

district in which KVSP is located. Accordingly, Plaintiff's

requests for injunctive relief (docket nos. 34, 48, 54) are DENIED

without prejudice to Plaintiff seeking such relief in the Eastern

District.

Plaintiff filed an untimely motion for leave to amend his

complaint after Defendants moved for summary judgment. Under Rule

15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff may amend as

of right at any time prior to the filing of a responsive pleading

and thereafter only with leave of court. Leave must be freely

granted "when justice so requires." Plaintiff could have moved to

amend at any time prior to the filing of the motion for summary

judgment but did not. Defendants would be substantially prejudiced

by such an amendment coming at the eleventh hour, when both parties

have moved for summary judgment and substantial delay would result

if the amendment was granted.2 Furthermore, Plaintiff has not

demonstrated any reason for his late amendment. Accordingly, leave

to amend his complaint (docket no. 63) is DENIED.

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.05\Arambula2246.MSJ+pendMOTS.frm 21

Plaintiff's motion for a subpoena duces tecum and motion for

enforcement of the subpoena duces tecum (docket nos. 65, 66),

specifically requesting prison operational procedures and medical

records, are DENIED as moot.

Plaintiff's other pending motions which are unintelligible and

do not specify relief are DENIED as moot, including his motions

entitled "Motion for Request a [sic] Entry of Judgment By

Declaratory Motion Statement" and "Motion to Compel and Discovery"

(docket nos. 37, 55).

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff's medical claim of inadequate medical care

relating to diabetes and high blood pressure is DISMISSED without

prejudice for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. 

Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED as to the

remaining claims (docket nos. 39, 42).

2. Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment (docket nos. 36,

64) are DENIED. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending

motions as indicated above, enter judgment in favor of Defendants,

and close the file.

4. This Order terminates Docket nos. 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 48,

54, 55, 63, 64, 65 and 66.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 9/20/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARAMBULA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WONG et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-02246 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 20, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Amy Wing Man Lo

California Attorney General's Office

1515 Clay Street

Suite 2000

Oakland, CA 94612

Gonzalo Arambula T-61604

Kern Valley State Prison; Delano II

FAC C-8-111 Low

P.O. Box 5103

Delano, CA 93216-5103

Dated: September 20, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-02246-CW Document 68 Filed 09/20/07 Page 22 of 22