Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-4_24-cv-00013/USCOURTS-akd-4_24-cv-00013-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 751
Nature of Suit: Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 

SAMUEL ISAACSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WALMART, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 4:24-cv-00013-SLG 

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 

Before the Court at Docket 12 is Defendant Walmart, Inc.’s (“Walmart”) Rule 

12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Plaintiff 

Samuel Isaacson responded in opposition at Docket 17, and Walmart replied at 

Docket 18. Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to the Court’s 

decision. 

BACKGROUND 

This is an employment discrimination case arising out of Mr. Isaacson’s 

termination from his position as a manager at Walmart in Fairbanks, Alaska. Mr. 

Isaacson alleges that he was a full-time manager at a Walmart location in Florida 

for over seven years before he transferred to a Fairbanks Walmart in October 

2022.1 Mr. Isaacson further alleges that, in 2023, he requested a medical leave of 

1 Docket 5 at ¶ 4. 

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absence under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) due to a flare up of 

epilepsy, which Walmart approved.2 On May 26, 2023, Mr. Isaacson requested 

an extension of this leave from Walmart, through its agent Sedgwick, a claims 

processing company.3 In an email dated June 5, 2023, Sedgwick stated that Mr. 

Isaacson’s extension was approved through July 15, 2023, but that Mr. Isaacson 

was to submit additional evidence to support his extended leave request by June 

25, 2023.4 

However, on June 5, 2023, the same day Sedgwick appeared to approve 

the extended leave, Mr. Isaacson’s supervisor sent him a text message notifying 

him that he had been terminated from his employment at Walmart for “job 

abandonment.”5 The following day, June 6, 2023, Sedgwick emailed Mr. Isaacson 

to notify him that his leave request had been closed because he was no longer 

employed with Walmart.6

Based on these allegations, Mr. Isaacson filed a charge of discrimination 

with the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (“ASCHR”) in August 2023.7 

On January 19, 2024, Mr. Isaacson “received a Dismissal and Notice of Rights 

2 Docket 5 at ¶¶ 5, 9. 

3 Docket 5 at ¶¶ 10, 12. 

4 Docket 5 at ¶ 10. 

5 Docket 5 at ¶ 11. 

6 Docket 5 at ¶ 12. 

7 Docket 5 at ¶ 7. 

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from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . .”8 Mr. Isaacson 

then initiated this lawsuit and asserted claims for violations of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2611 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C § 12111 et 

seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

9 In Count III 

of his Amended Complaint, Mr. Isaacson alleges that “Defendant Walmart’s 

agent’s termination of Plaintiff Isaacson’s employment on June 5, 2023, was 

motivated by his status as a Jewish person, in violation of Title VII’s prohibition 

against national origin and religious discrimination.”10

 LEGAL STANDARD 

A party may seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

for a complaint’s “failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.” “To 

survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’”11 Nonetheless, “the trial court does not have to accept as true 

conclusory allegations in a complaint or legal claims asserted in the form of factual 

8 Docket 5 at ¶ 7. 

9 Docket 5 at ¶¶ 16–37. 

10 Docket 5 at ¶ 33. 

11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). 

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allegations.”12 Upon dismissal, leave to amend should be given freely, unless 

amendment would be futile.13

DISCUSSION 

Walmart moves to dismiss Count III of Mr. Isaacson’s Complaint—his Title 

VII claim—on two bases. First, Walmart asserts that Mr. Isaacson did not 

administratively exhaust a claim of discrimination based on his Jewish faith 

because he did not mention his religion in his charge to the ASCHR.14 Second, 

Walmart contends that Mr. Isaacson’s Amended Complaint lacks factual 

allegations that suggest anyone at Walmart knew of his religious beliefs.15 

Mr. Isaacson acknowledges that his “religion and national origin 

discrimination claims were not included in his ASCHR/EEOC charge” but 

maintains that these claims are reasonably related to those he alleged in the 

discrimination charge.16 He asserts that “in the present case, allowing Plaintiff 

Isaccson [sic] to include Jewish national origin and Jewish religious discrimination, 

as additional bases for his discriminatory termination does not significantly change 

the scope of the factual allegations underlying his complaint.”17 Further, Mr. 

12 In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016). 

13 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

14 Docket 12 at 4–5. 

15 Docket 12 at 5–6. 

16 Docket 17 at 3. 

17 Docket 17 at 4–5. 

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Isaacson maintains that he “has pled factual content that allows the court to draw 

reasonable inferences that the defendant Walmart is liable for the misconduct 

(wrongful termination) alleged . . . .”18

I. Mr. Isaacson Likely Did Not Administratively Exhaust a Claim 

Reasonably Related to Discrimination on His Faith. 

Title VII declares unlawful employment practices that discriminate against 

an individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.”19 And it provides a private right of action to individuals who suffer such 

discrimination.20 Before a claimant may sue, however, he must exhaust his 

administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission or an equivalent state agency and either receive a rightto-sue letter or allow a specified time to elapse.21

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional in Title VII 

cases.22 Nonetheless, “[i]ncidents of discrimination not included in an [agency] 

charge may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like or 

reasonably related to the allegations contained in the [agency] charge.”23 The 

18 Docket 17 at 6. 

19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 

20 Id. § 2000e-5(f). 

21 Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1). 

22 Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 550 (2019) (“Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is not 

of jurisdictional cast.”). 

23 Green v. L.A. Cnty. Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal 

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exhaustion requirement is met with respect to “all allegations of discrimination that 

either fell within the scope of the [agency’s] actual investigation or an [agency] 

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of 

discrimination.”24 Additionally, courts construe E.E.O.C. charges with “utmost 

liberality.”25 “Whether a plaintiff in a Title VII action has timely exhausted her 

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, so the defendant bears the 

burden of pleading and proving it.”26

The charge of discrimination Mr. Isaacson filed with the ASHRC focuses 

exclusively on his physical disability and does not mention his Jewish faith.27 

Therefore, discrimination based on Mr. Isaacson’s Jewish faith is not likely 

“reasonably related” to the allegations of disability discrimination in the charge 

because the factual allegations therein would not have put an investigating agency 

on notice of Mr. Isaacson’s religion and would not have resulted in an investigation 

that encompassed religious discrimination. Although an investigation would have 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

24 B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Feb. 20, 2002) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

25 E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see

Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997). 

26 Kraus v. Presidio Tr. Facilities Div./Residential Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d 1039, 1046 n.7 (9th Cir. 

2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

27 Docket 26-1 (“I believe I was discriminated against based on my physical disability.”); see also 

United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 993 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A district court may 

consider documents referenced by the Complaint without converting a 12(b)(6) motion to one for 

summary judgment.”); Docket 5 at ¶ 7 (referencing Mr. Isaacson’s charge of discrimination).

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broadly sought information about the circumstances of Mr. Isaacson’s termination, 

it would not likely have sought information related to a previously unmentioned 

basis for the termination. 

Defendants filed documents that support a finding that the agency 

investigation of Mr. Isaacson’s discrimination charge did not touch upon his Jewish 

faith, despite the investigator’s open-ended inquiries. However, in ruling on a 

motion to dismiss, the Court must only consider the Complaint and charge filed 

with the ASHCR referenced therein. It may be that other evidence produced at 

summary judgment indicates that the agency investigation swept more broadly or 

included information reasonably related to Mr. Isaacson’s claims of discrimination 

on the basis of his Jewish faith. Therefore, Walmart’s motion to dismiss is denied 

with respect to exhaustion without prejudice to Walmart renewing this affirmative 

defense at summary judgment.28

II. Mr. Isaacson Fails to State a Claim of Discrimination on the Basis 

of his Jewish Faith. 

 In addition to exhausting his Title VII claim, Mr. Isaacson must adequately 

plead it. The Complaint fails to adequately state a claim that Walmart 

discriminated against Mr. Isaacson on the basis of his Jewish faith, which he 

asserts as both a claim of discrimination based on national origin and a claim 

28 See Docket 18 at 4 n.3 (“To the extent the Court believes consideration of the agency file 

requires converting this motion to one for summary judgment, Walmart requests the opportunity 

to move for summary judgment again after further discovery in this matter should the Court not 

dismiss Count III at this juncture.”). 

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based on religion.29 Title VII declares it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any 

individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.”30 To establish a prima 

facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) [he] had a 

bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; 

(2) [he] informed [his] employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer 

threatened [him] or subjected [him] to discriminatory treatment, including 

discharge, because of [his] inability to fulfill the job requirements.”31 Additionally, 

to establish prima facie case of discrimination based on national origin, a plaintiff 

must allege (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was qualified for his job, (3) 

he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals 

outside the protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances 

surrounding the adverse employment action lead to an inference of 

discrimination.32 

While a plaintiff need not plead facts constituting all elements of a 

prima facie employment discrimination case in order to survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts nevertheless look to those elements 

to analyze a motion to dismiss, so as to decide, in light of judicial 

experience and common sense, whether the challenged complaint 

contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for 

29 Docket 5 at ¶ 33. 

30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 

31 Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998). 

32 Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the 

general requirements of a prima facie case that supports a Title VII employment discrimination 

claim). 

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relief that is plausible on its face.33 

For a claim to be plausible, it cannot be premised on conclusory statements, 

unwarranted inferences, or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action.”34 Rather, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.”35 

Here, Mr. Isaacson’s sole allegation related to his religion is that “Defendant 

Walmart’s agent’s termination of Plaintiff Isaacson’s employment on June 5, 2023, 

was motivated by his status as a Jewish person . . . .”36 This is a conclusory 

statement, not a factual allegation, and therefore does not allow the Court, in light 

of judicial experience and common sense, to conclude that Mr. Isaacson has 

stated a plausible claim pursuant to Title VII. However, Mr. Isaacson’s Title VII 

claim may not be futile because further allegations with respect to discrimination 

on the basis of his Jewish faith could cure his deficient pleading. Accordingly, Mr. 

Isaacson may file an Amended Complaint seeking to rectify this deficient claim 

within 14 days of the date of this order or notice that he intends to proceed 

solely on Claims I and II. 

33 Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 796–97 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Sheppard v. 

David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012)). 

34 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

35 Id.

36 Docket 5 at ¶ 33. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Walmart’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Count 

III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Count III of the Amended 

Complaint—Mr. Isaacson’s claim of discrimination pursuant to Title VII—is 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Mr. Isaacson may file an amended 

complaint within 14 days of the date of this order. 

DATED this 31st day of December, 2024, at Anchorage, Alaska. 

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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