Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02607/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02607-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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1

 On February 12, 2007, Michael J. Astrue was sworn in as Commissioner of Social

Security, replacing Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the original defendant herein. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1), Michael J. Astrue is substituted as the defendant in this

action. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT B. BLUM,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2607 EFB

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ORDER

Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant. 

 /

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)

under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”) for a closed period of time. For the reasons that

follow, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the

Commissioner.

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2

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability,

in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) and

1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under

both programs. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 and 416.971-76; Bowen v.

Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step

2

I. BACKGROUND

This case is before the undersigned after a previous remand by the district court on

September 27, 2005. At issue is whether plaintiff had the ability to perform work other than his

past relevant work during a closed period – from the alleged onset of disability, July 15, 1997, to

June 1, 1999, when he returned to work. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 109, 112, 444. 

Plaintiff, born October 22, 1950, filed his initial application for benefits on September 1,

1998, alleging disability due to severe bilateral shoulder injuries. AT 422, 90. His claim was

denied by the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on July 12, 1999. AT 42-46. On September 19,

2001, the Appeals Council remanded the case back to the ALJ to evaluate the treating and

examining source opinions, discuss plaintiff’s alleged difficulty in reaching and lifting above the

shoulder, and evaluate plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. AT 73-75. A hearing was held on

July 9, 2002, at which the newly assigned ALJ heard plaintiff’s testimony and that of a

vocational expert. AT 417-39. In a decision dated December 24, 2002, the ALJ determined that

plaintiff was not disabled.2

 AT 24-31.

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five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

3

 On September 27, 2005, the district court remanded the case to the ALJ with an order to

reevaluate plaintiff’s testimony from 1999 concerning his alleged impairments during the

relevant period. The court found that the ALJ erred in assessing plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity (“RFC”), and held that the opinions of two state agency physicians were “to be accepted

as establishing plaintiff was limited to sedentary work with the nonexertional impairments found

by [those] physicians.” AT 477. The court further directed the ALJ to take the testimony of a

vocational expert in light of plaintiff’s limitation in reaching overhead on a repetitive, sustained

basis. AT 480-81. 

On remand, the ALJ again found that plaintiff was not disabled based on his ability to

perform other jobs. Specifically, the ALJ relied on the vocational expert’s testimony that

considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and RFC, plaintiff could perform the job

of charge account clerk, which existed in significant numbers in the national economy. AT 449. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff presents two primary arguments challenging the ALJ’s decision. First, plaintiff

alleges that the ALJ erred at step five of the sequential analysis by failing to pose a complete

hypothetical to the vocational expert which accurately reflected all of plaintiff’s nonexertional

limitations. Further, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to resolve conflicts between the expert’s

testimony and the description of the charge account clerk job listed in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles. Second, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly assessed plaintiff’s

subjective complaints of pain. 

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4

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000);

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel,

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir.1999).

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,

are conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol.

Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Step Five Findings

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that plaintiff could perform sedentary work

as a charge account clerk, where the vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical did not

include all of plaintiff’s limitations as established by the state agency medical consultants. 

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5

Per the district court’s remand order, the ALJ adopted the state agency physicians’

assessments of plaintiff’s limitations in determining his RFC. AT 150-56, 291-96. Specifically,

the ALJ found that plaintiff had the

residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertional and

nonexertional requirements of work, except: he could lift and

carry up to ten pounds occasionally; he could frequently lift and

carry less than ten pounds; he could stand/walk at least two hours

in an eight-hour workday; he could sit about six hours in an eighthour workday; he could climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and

crawl occasionally; he could not perform overhead reaching on a

repetitive/sustained basis bilaterally; he had to avoid all hazards

such as heights and machinery; he had to avoid concentrated

exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, wetness, humidity, noise

and vibration; he had to avoid concentrated exposure to fumes,

odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation. 

AT 448. 

Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, this finding is a precise reflection of the assessments by

state agency physicians, and was properly reflected in the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational

expert. AT 152, 294, 509. Plaintiff argues that both physicians checked a box on their

assessment forms indicating that plaintiff had limitations “reaching in all directions (including

overhead).” AT 152, 294. What plaintiff fails to appreciate is that this “checked box” is

qualified by the physicians’ comments that plaintiff’s limitation was in “reaching over shoulder

level on a repetitive sustained basis.” Id. At the 2006 hearing, plaintiff’s own attorney

confirmed that this was the appropriate interpretation of these notes. AT 512. 

The record supports this interpretation. During the relevant period, plaintiff reported

difficulty in reaching overhead or reaching while bearing weights, but did not report limitations

in reaching in general. See, e.g., AT 116, 302, 305, 306, 412-14. Further, he reported that his

daily living activities were unaffected by his impairment, and that he was only precluded from

heavy lifting and certain sporting activities. See, e.g., AT 116, 301, 408. There is no evidence

that plaintiff had any other limitations in his ability to reach. 

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6

Furthermore, because the record establishes that plaintiff’s only “reaching” limitation

was in reaching overhead on a “repetitive/sustained basis,” plaintiff’s assertion that he could not

perform the charge account clerk job is unavailing. More precisely, plaintiff fails to establish

that there was a “conflict” between the vocational expert’s testimony concerning that job and its

description in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). 

The vocational expert testified that based on plaintiff’s age, education, work experience

and RFC, plaintiff could perform the job of charge account clerk, which existed in significant

numbers in the national economy. AT 449. Plaintiff argues that this testimony conflicts with the

DOT’s description of the job, which states that it requires frequent reaching. See United States

Dept. of Labor, Employment and Training Admin., Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th ed.

1991), (“DOT”), 205.367-014 (charge account clerk).

The DOT definition is fully consistent with the expert’s testimony at the hearing. If there

is any issue at all, it is one of ambiguity, and not of conflict, with regard to the DOT’s

description of “frequent reaching.” Any such ambiguity was resolved at the hearing when

plaintiff’s attorney asked the expert whether plaintiff could perform this job if he was restricted

from reaching in all directions, and the expert answered “no.” AT 511. A colloquy then

followed, in which the ALJ and the attorney discussed the record evidence, and it was conceded

that plaintiff was not limited to reaching in all directions but only to overhead reaching. AT 511-

12. When asked whether plaintiff could perform the job with that restriction, the expert replied

that he could. AT 511-12. 

Even though plaintiff argues that, pursuant to Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152

(9th Cir. 2007) and Social Security Ruling 00-4p, the ALJ was required to ask the vocational

expert whether his testimony conflicted with the DOT, the failure to do so in this case was

harmless. Here, due to the colloquy between the ALJ, plaintiff’s counsel and the expert, it was

made clear that plaintiff’s limitation was in reaching overhead, not reaching in all directions, and

that even with the overhead limitation, plaintiff could perform the job of charge account clerk. 

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7

AT 511-12. After that colloquy, there was no doubt that the job of charge account clerk could be

performed by a person with plaintiff’s limitation in reaching overhead on a sustained basis. 

Accordingly, there was no conflict between the testimony and the DOT, and any ambiguity was

resolved during the hearing. See Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154, n.19 (noting that failure to ask

about a conflict is harmless where there is no conflict, or where the vocational expert provided

sufficient support for his conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts).

Finally, plaintiff argues that the vocational expert’s testimony failed to account for

plaintiff’s restriction from concentrated exposure to noise. 

First, this court notes that the ALJ adopted this “noise” limitation believing she was

required to pursuant to the district court’s remand order. That order provided that the state

agency physicians’ assessments established plaintiff’s limitations during the closed period. AT

477. The ALJ noted this provision, but also noted that the physicians never explained why

plaintiff’s shoulder impairment necessitated avoidance of concentrated exposure to dust, fumes,

noise, and the like. AT 448. Indeed, there is absolutely no evidence in the record supporting

these limitations. Based on this fact, and upon a global reading of the district court’s prior order,

it is clear that the court was concerned only with plaintiff’s limited ability to reach overhead and

not his purported limitations from concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, noise, etc. The

previously assigned magistrate judge found the state agency opinions persuasive insofar as they

expressed limitations based on plaintiff’s severe shoulder impairment, and directed the ALJ to

explore those restrictions on remand through vocational expert testimony. AT 480-81. 

Furthermore, while plaintiff points to the DOT’s indication that the charge account clerk

job involves exposure to moderate (level 3) noise, the court notes that in plaintiff’s previous and

current job as a truck driver, he is exposed to loud (level 4) noise. Compare DOT, 905.663.014 

(truck driver, heavy) (exposure to noise in truck driving is “level 4 – loud”) with DOT, 205.367-

014 (exposure to “level 3 – moderate” noise in charge account clerk job).

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8

Based on the foregoing, the court finds there was no error in the ALJ’s failure to probe

the issue of whether the job of charge account clerk impermissibly exposed plaintiff to too much

noise. Further, there was no conflict between the expert’s testimony and the DOT’s description

of the charge account clerk job, and any failure to inquire about a possible conflict was harmless.

B. Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate plaintiff’s subjective

complaints of pain with respect to his ability to work during the closed period. In particular,

plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to first make the threshold finding that plaintiff suffered from

a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce pain, and

then failed to discuss all the factors set forth in SSR 96-7p for determining whether plaintiff’s

allegations of pain were credible. Plaintiff points to no particular evidence that plaintiff’s pain

affected his ability to do sedentary work with the limitations prescribed by the state agency

physicians and adopted by the ALJ. Rather, plaintiff merely makes general assertions of error

with regard to the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341,

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ

then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors,

medication, treatment and functional restrictions. Id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1)

the applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d

625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996).

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the

ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g.,

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). “Without affirmative evidence showing that

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3

 The district court found that the ALJ had previously, improperly based her credibility

determination on plaintiff’s testimony from 2002, which only concerned his limitations at that

time. AT 478, 426-34. 

9

the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony

must be clear and convincing.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th

Cir. 1999).

Here, there was objective medical evidence of plaintiff’s shoulder impairments, which

were likely to produce pain. Indeed, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ determined

plaintiff did not have bilateral shoulder injuries, she ultimately found that “the medical evidence

establishes that claimant has severe bilateral shoulder injuries.” AT 450. 

 As ordered by the district court, the ALJ considered plaintiff’s testimony from the 1999

hearing regarding the relevant period of alleged disability. AT 478-79.3

 After considering that

testimony, the ALJ made an adverse credibility determination, which she supported by

articulating clear and convincing reasons that were supported by the record. AT 448. 

In particular, the ALJ noted plaintiff’s failure to follow a prescribed course of treatment. 

For example, the ALJ noted that plaintiff had not been fully compliant with medication and

physical therapy during the closed period. AT 447, 217-18. The ALJ also pointed to plaintiff’s

daily activities which did not evidence a complete inability to perform work-related activities. 

Specifically, the ALJ noted that plaintiff had undertaken a road trip of several hundred miles,

and was able to perform household chores. AT 447. Indeed, in a report dated August 23, 1998,

plaintiff reported that his daily activities were unrestricted except that he could not do any heavy

lifting or sporting activity. AT 116. Similarly, he testified on April 14, 1999, that his daily

living activities were unaffected and that he had no problems sitting, standing, walking, carrying,

squatting, crawling, pushing, or climbing stairs. AT 408-15. 

In assessing plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ also cited plaintiff’s attitude of entitlement to

benefits, noting his preference for his current job and disinclination to try any other kind of

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work. The ALJ commented that an “individual is not ‘entitled’ to Social Security disability

payments because he does not want retraining to a less strenuous job that might be less

lucrative.” AT 447. 

To the extent plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to consider plaintiff’s alleged

inability to stand “in one spot, maybe five or ten minutes” before he “start[ed] getting sore,” that

argument is unavailing. AT 507-08. First, plaintiff’s alleged limitation in that regard was

brought up for the first time during the 2006 hearing, and appears nowhere else in the record. In

fact, the record is replete with plaintiff’s statements that he had no problem standing during the

relevant time period. See, e.g., AT 310, 316, 413. Indeed, the state agency physicians, whose

opinions plaintiff does not contest in any way, found that plaintiff could stand for at least two

hours in a workday. AT 150, 294. Thus, the ALJ did not err by declining to credit plaintiff’s

purported standing limitations. 

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not considering statements by the state

agency physicians that plaintiff was credible. AT 154, 296. To the contrary, the ALJ adopted

those very opinions in determining plaintiff’s RFC. Significantly, those physicians who found

plaintiff credible also found him capable of performing sedentary work with certain restrictions. 

AT 150-56, 291-96. 

The ALJ considered plaintiff’s testimony from 1999, as ordered, and made an adverse

credibility finding which was based on proper standards and supported by the evidence. More

importantly, plaintiff has pointed to no evidence demonstrating that any of plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, even if credited, would preclude him from doing the job of charge account clerk

during the relevant period. Accordingly, reversal on this basis is inappropriate and the ALJ’s

credibility determination should not be disturbed.

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V. CONCLUSION

The court finds the ALJ’s assessment is supported by substantial evidence in the record

and based on the proper legal standards. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

is DENIED, the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and the

Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the Commissioner.

DATED: March 3, 2008.

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