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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 19, 2010 Decided March 18, 2011

No. 09-7109

ASID MOHAMAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR THE ESTATE OF 

AZZAM RAHIM, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

JIBRIL RAJOUB, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 09-7158

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01800)

Robert J. Tolchin argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants.

Laura G. Ferguson argued the cause for appellees. With 

her on the brief was Kevin G. Mosley. Richard A. Hibey and 

Mark J. Rochon entered appearances.

Before: GINSBURG, TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The sons and widow of Azzam 

Rahim sued the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine 

Liberation Organization for damages on behalf of Rahim’s 

estate. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants tortured and 

killed Rahim in violation of both the Torture Victim 

Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note § 2(a), and 

federal common law. The district court granted the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding only a natural 

person is amenable to suit under the TVPA and the Rahims 

had no cause of action under federal common law. We affirm 

the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

Because the district court dismissed this case on the basis 

of the complaint alone, we assume for the purpose of this 

appeal that the allegations therein are in all respects true. 

Meijer, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 533 F.3d 857, 865–66 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). According to the complaint, Azzam Rahim, a 

Palestinian born and raised in the West Bank, became a 

citizen of the United States after moving here in the 1970s. 

The events in suit took place when Rahim visited the West 

Bank in 1995. While he was sitting in a coffee shop, some 

two to four men, who identified themselves as security police, 

forced him into an unmarked car. They took Rahim to a 

prison in Jericho, where he was tortured and eventually killed. 

In 1996 the U.S. Department of State issued a report on 

human rights practices in the West Bank since Israel had 

transferred certain responsibilities over the area to the 

Palestinian Authority. The report stated that Rahim had “died 

in the custody of PA intelligence officers in Jericho.”

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The Rahims initially filed suit in the U.S. District Court 

for the Southern District of New York. In 2007 that court 

entered a default against the defendants, neither of which had 

answered the complaint.* After the defendants moved to 

vacate the entry of default and to dismiss the Rahims’ 

complaint for, among other reasons, lack of personal 

jurisdiction in that district, the court granted the Rahims’

motion to transfer the case to the District Court for the 

District of Columbia, where the defendants renewed their 

motions to vacate the entry of default and to dismiss the 

Rahims’ complaint.

Granting the defendants’ motions, the district court set 

aside the entry of default and dismissed the case pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding the 

plaintiffs have no cause of action under either the TVPA or 

federal common law. Mohamad v. Rajoub, 664 F. Supp. 2d 

20, 22–24 (D.D.C. 2009). The Rahims now appeal.

II. Analysis

The plaintiffs present three issues on appeal: (1) whether 

the district court abused its discretion in vacating the entry of 

default, see Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 

1980), and, if not, whether the Rahims have a cause of action 

under (2) the TVPA or (3) federal common law. We review 

the latter two issues de novo. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 

F.3d 1211, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

A. Setting Aside the Default

First, we hold the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in setting aside the default entered against the 

 * No judgment was ever entered upon the default.

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defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), 

which rule permits a district court to “set aside an entry of 

default for good cause.” See also Jackson, 636 F.2d at 836 

(“strong policies favor resolution of disputes on their merits”). 

In exercising its discretion, the district court is supposed to 

consider “whether (1) the default was willful, (2) a set-aside 

would prejudice plaintiff, and (3) the alleged defense was 

meritorious.” Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 

627 F.2d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In this case, the district 

court did not say why it granted the defendants’ motion to 

vacate but, as it happens, we need not remand the case 

because the Rahims’ only argument against setting aside the 

default is that the defendants presented no “meritorious 

defense” to this action.

As the defendants note, “allegations are meritorious if 

they contain even a hint of a suggestion which, proven at trial, 

would constitute a complete defense.” Id. at 374 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). The defendants far 

surpassed this standard, as will be seen in what follows.

B. The Torture Victim Protection Act

The TVPA was enacted in 1992 in order to create “a civil 

action for recovery of damages from an individual who 

engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.” Pub. L. No. 102-

256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note). 

The relevant provision of the TVPA states:

(a) Liability.--An individual who, under actual or 

apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign 

nation--

(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil 

action, be liable for damages to that individual; or 

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(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing 

shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the 

individual's legal representative, or to any person 

who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful 

death.

28 U.S.C. § 1350, note § 2(a). The defendants argue the 

district court properly dismissed the Rahims’ claim under the 

TVPA because this provision does not create a cause of action 

against an organization, as opposed to a natural person.

We begin our inquiry, as always, with the text of the 

statute. Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 

2009). The Rahims claim the Palestinian Authority and the 

PLO are amenable to suit under the TVPA because the word 

“individual,” in referring to the perpetrator of torture or of 

extrajudicial killing, includes organizations. The Rahims’ 

authority for this proposition is limited to the observation that 

the term “individual” is “consistently viewed in the law as 

including corporations.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 

F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding corporation 

may be sued under TVPA), aff’d in relevant part, 578 F.3d 

1252, 1264 n.13 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Romero v. 

Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (TVPA 

“allows suits against corporate defendants”); United States v. 

Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (statute 

making it a crime to access certain computers and thereby 

cause damage to “one or more individuals” applies to injured 

corporations). The defendants, for their part, argue 

“individual” should be understood in its ordinary sense, 

meaning only a natural person. See, e.g., In re North (Gadd 

Fee Application), 12 F.3d 252, 254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 

(“individual” as used in the fee provision of the Ethics in 

Government Act describes only natural persons).

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We agree with the defendants. Because the Congress did 

not define the term “individual” in the TVPA, we give the 

word its ordinary meaning, Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 

513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995), which typically encompasses only 

natural persons and not corporations or other organizations, 

North, 12 F.3d at 254 (“In common usage, ‘individual’ 

describes a natural person”) (citation omitted); cf. Clinton v. 

City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 n.13 (1998) (“‘person’ 

often has a broader meaning in the law” than does 

“individual”). Notably, the Dictionary Act, which provides 

guidance in “determining the meaning of any Act of 

Congress,” strongly implies the word individual does not 

comprise organizations because it defines “person” to include 

“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, 

societies,... as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1; see also 

Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 

2010) (through the Dictionary Act, the “Congress has directed 

courts to presume the word ‘individual’ in a statute refers to 

natural persons and not corporations”).

The Rahims nonetheless argue the term “individual” is at 

least ambiguous, wherefore the court should look to the 

purpose of the TVPA, which supports liability for 

organizations. Quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 

(2d Cir. 1995), they reason that because the Congress enacted 

the TVPA in order “to codify the cause of action” recognized 

by the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and to “extend 

that cause of action to plaintiffs who are U.S. citizens,” and 

because the ATS permits a plaintiff to sue an organization, the 

TVPA must do also. See Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1263 

(“corporate defendants are subject to liability under the 

ATS”). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 

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F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (ATS does not confer 

jurisdiction over claims against corporations).*

We reject the Rahims’ argument because the structure of 

the TVPA confirms what the plain text of the statute shows: 

The Congress used the word “individual” to denote only 

natural persons. The liability provision of the statute uses the 

word “individual” five times in the same sentence — four 

times to refer to the victim of torture or extrajudicial killing, 

which could be only a natural person, and once to the 

perpetrator of the torture or killing. § 1350, note § 2(a). The 

Rahims advance no cogent reason, and we see none, to think 

the term “individual” has a different meaning when referring 

to the victim as opposed to the perpetrator. See Bowoto, 621 

F.3d at 1127 (“There is no indication Congress intended 

‘individual’ to have a variety of meanings throughout the 

TVPA”); Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996) (“the 

normal rule of statutory construction” is “that identical words 

used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the 

same meaning”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). We note also the liability provision uses the word 

“person” in reference to those “who may be a claimant in an 

action for wrongful death,” § 1350, note § 2(a)(2); because a 

claimant could be a non-natural person, such as the decedent’s 

estate, this further supports the significance of the Congress 

having used “individual” rather than “person” to identify who 

may be sued under the TVPA.

To be sure, there are, as the Rahims note, situations in 

which the same word in a single statute has a different scope, 

depending upon its precise context. They point to Weaver v. 

 * The issue whether corporations may be held liable in a suit 

brought under the ATS is pending before this court in Doe v. Exxon 

Mobil Corp., No. 09-7125 (D.C. Cir. argued Jan. 25, 2011).

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U.S. Information Agency, 87 F.3d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 

where this court said, “Identical words may have different 

meanings where the subject-matter to which the words refer is 

not the same ..., or the conditions are different, or the scope of 

the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that 

exercised in another,” id. at 1437 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Because none of those conditions 

obtains here, the more applicable statement in Weaver is the 

topic sentence of the same paragraph: “Normally, the same 

word appearing in different portions of a single provision or 

act is taken to have the same meaning in each appearance.” 

Id. 

In their reply brief, the Rahims for the first time argue in 

the alternative the defendants are secondarily liable for 

Rahim’s death either pursuant to the principle of respondeat 

superior or for aiding and abetting his killer(s). See 

Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1258 n.5 (“the TVPA permits aiding 

and abetting liability”); but see Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1128 

(rejecting argument plaintiffs could sue corporation “under 

the TVPA upon a theory of ‘aiding and abetting’”). This 

argument comes too late. Sitka Sound Seafoods, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 206 F.3d 1175, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“In order to 

prevent ... sandbagging of appellees and respondents, we have 

generally held that issues not raised until the reply brief are 

waived”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In 

any event, we doubt the Rahims could prevail upon such a 

theory of liability. As the Ninth Circuit observed, even if we 

assume some form of vicarious liability is possible, the text of 

the TVPA still “limits such liability to individuals,” Bowoto, 

621 F.3d at 1128, and we have already seen that in this statute 

“individual” comprises only natural persons.

In sum, we hold the TVPA does not permit a suit against 

either the Palestinian Authority or the PLO. Accordingly, we 

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affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the 

Rahims’ claim under the TVPA.

C. Federal Common Law 

The Rahims also advance a claim against the Palestinian 

Authority and the PLO under “customary international law, as 

a part of federal common law,” over which this court has 

federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In 

response, the defendants maintain the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), 

precludes such a claim. They also rely upon a recent Ninth 

Circuit decision, Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191 (2010), in 

which the court rejected the idea that any federal statute other 

than the ATS “recognizes a general cause of action under the 

law of nations.” Id. at 1197, 1197–98 n.7 (“If any plaintiff 

could bring any claim alleging a violation of the law of 

nations under federal-question jurisdiction, there would be no

need for statutes such as the ATS and the [TVPA], which 

recognize or create limited causes of action for particular 

classes of plaintiffs (aliens) or particular violations (torture)”).

As the defendants note, the Supreme Court in Sosa

cautioned against reading § 1331 to imply a federal common 

law claim for a violation of the law of nations. One issue in 

that case was whether the plaintiff had a remedy under the 

ATS against a foreign national whom the Drug Enforcement 

Administration had hired to abduct the plaintiff from Mexico. 

542 U.S. at 697–98. The Court explained that although the 

ATS is a “jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of 

action,” the “historical materials” indicate it “was intended to 

have practical effect the moment it became law” in 1789. Id.

at 724. Accordingly, the Court concluded, “The jurisdictional 

grant” in the ATS “is best read as having been enacted on the 

understanding that the common law would provide a cause of 

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action for” a “modest number of international law violations,” 

including at least “Blackstone’s three primary offenses: 

violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 

ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. Because nothing between the 

enactment of the ATS and our modern case law “has 

categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a 

claim under the law of nations as an element of common 

law,” the Court added that federal courts today may consider 

“new cause[s] of action” under the ATS, but only with “great 

caution.” Id. at 724–28.

The Supreme Court also went on, however, to caution

that its decision should not be read as “imply[ing] that every 

grant of jurisdiction to a federal court carries with it an 

opportunity to develop common law.” Id. at 731 n.19. 

Indeed, the Court expressly distinguished the ATS — under 

which a cause of action for a violation of the law of nations 

could be recognized — from § 1331, stating: “Section 1350 

[i.e., the ATS] was enacted on the congressional 

understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by 

entertaining some common law claims derived from the law 

of nations,” whereas federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 

§ 1331 was not “extended subject to any comparable 

congressional assumption”; indeed a “more expansive 

common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331” may not be 

“consistent with the division of responsibilities between 

federal and state courts after Erie.” Id.

Accordingly, following the Supreme Court’s guidance in 

Sosa, we hold the Rahims do not have a cause of action 

cognizable under § 1331 for an alleged violation of federal 

common law. The district court correctly so held in 

dismissing this aspect of their complaint.

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is

Affirmed.

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