Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05964/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05964-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH FAULKNER,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

COUNTY OF KERN, et al., 

 Defendants.

1:04-CV-05964 OWW TAG

ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCS. 42,

60 & 65), MOTION TO

REINSTATE (DOC. 38), AND

MOTION TO BIFURCATE (DOCS.

55 & 58)

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. In 2000, Plaintiff was convicted in Kern County Superior

Court of attempted kidnaping and false arrest. He was sentenced

to two life terms. After serving three and one-half years of his

sentence, his conviction was vacated on habeas corpus on the

ground that several pivotal child witnesses recanted their trial

testimony. He now seeks civil damages from the County of Kern

and various individual County and State officials involved with

his arrest, prosecution, appeal, and habeas petition. 

Before the court for decision are cross-motions for summary

judgment concerning all claims. (Docs. 42, 60 & 65.) Also

currently pending is a motion to reinstate dismissed defendant

Deputy Public Defender Leslie Greer (Doc. 38), as well as a

motion to bifurcate the trial (Docs. 55 & 58). 

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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Incident and Initial Investigation.

On November 25, 1999, Carol Cooper called the Kern County

911 dispatcher to report that Plaintiff grabbed a child named

Samantha and placed her on the handlebars of his bicycle. 

(County’s Ex. I, 911 call transcript; Fennel Decl. at ¶ 4; Dixon

Decl. at ¶4-6.) Kern County Sheriff’s Deputies Fennel and Dixon

were dispatched to investigate the complaint. When they arrived

on the scene, the parents and several other adults restated the

complaint made to the 911 operator. Each of the adults confirmed

that Plaintiff grabbed Samantha and placed her on his bicycle. 

The parents also told the Deputies that Plaintiff grabbed Brandon

and pulled him. 

Deputy Fennel’s essentially undisputed description of his

involvement details the information gathered during the

investigation:

On November 25, 1999, I was on patrol in metropolitan

Bakersfield. I was dispatched to a call in which it was

reported that a suspicious man was annoying children in

an apartment complex at 811 Beardsley Avenue, apartment

#14. When I arrived, I spoke to Carole Perry who told

me that she was the mother of eight-year-old Breanna

Blankenship. Perry reported also that eight-year-old

Samantha Spoon was Breanna's half-sibling and that she

was visiting Perry's home. 

Perry told me that Breanna and Samantha reported to her

that a man on a bicycle offered the girls money to go

with him and grabbed Samantha in an attempt to force

her to go with him. Perry said that a little boy,

Brandon McElroy, had also been grabbed by the man.

Perry said that both girls appeared to [be] frightened

and that they thought that man was still in the

apartment complex.

//

//

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Perry said that she and her father, Richard Bond, went

out to the parking lot and saw a man [on] a bicycle

traveling north on Beardsley Avenue. Perry and Bond

followed the man to a residence at Plymouth Avenue.

Perry said that she approached the man and asked him

what he was doing at the apartment complex. The man

replied that he was there to pick up a girl but

couldn't locate her. 

After Perry explained to me what Samantha and Breanna

had told her, I spoke to Samantha, Breanna and Tiffany

Grady. When I spoke to the girls, I did not suggest to

them that anything happened. Instead, I asked each

child to tell me if something happened. I did not use

leading or suggestive questioning and I did not coerce

or pressure the girls to tell a particular version of

the events. Instead, each girl told me her account of

what happened. I recorded what the girls told me in the

incident report I prepared. The girls' demeanor

appeared frightened. Breanna had difficulty talking

about the incident. However, I did not force her to

speak but allowed her to take her time in telling what

happened. I did not find this to be unusual but,

instead, consistent with the fear that her demeanor

indicated to me she felt. The girls' statements were

each substantially similar to the others. Also, Deputy

Dixon interviewed another child, Brandon McElroy, who

also described the incident markedly similarly to the

girls. I did not speak with Brandon McElroy. 

(Fennel Decl. at ¶¶4-5.)

Deputy Dixon spoke with Brandon McElroy and his mother Edie

Kincaid. Dixon’s account of his involvement in the investigation

is undisputed as well:

Upon my arrival, I contacted BRANDON DEAN MC ELROY. MC

ELROY told me he was playing in the driveway area of

his apartment with a lot of other children. MC ELROY

saw the suspect, who was later identified as Kenneth

Faulkner, riding a bicycle through the apartment

complex toward Beardsley Avenue. Faulkner stopped next

to MC ELROY leaning over on his bicycle and grabbed MC

ELROY by the left hand and wrist area. Faulkner told

MC ELROY“Come with me.” MC ELROY attempted to pull his

hand away from Faulkner and then began screamning. 

Faulkner let go of MC ELROY when he started screaming

and then rode away on his bicycle. 

I asked MC ELROY if Faulkner attempted to place him on

his bicycle, pick him up, or pull him away. MC ELROY

told me Faulkner just pulled on his arm. I asked MC

ELROY to demonstrate for me how Faulkner pulled him. 

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MC ELROY placed both of his hands on my left hand and

pulled me a distance of approximately one-and-a-halfto-two feet. I asked MC ELROY if he was sure this was

how far Faulkner pulled him. MC ELROY said he was. 

MC ELROY described Faulkner as a white male wearing a

blue hat, blue shirt, glasses, having brown hair with a

long ponytail, and blue eyes. MC ELROY also said

Faulkner was riding an older blue bicycle with hand

brakes on top of the handlebars. This concluded my

interview with MC ELROY. 

(County’s Ex. H, Incident Report prepared by Dixon at 3-4.) 

Dixon denied using coercion or pressure when interviewing

Brandon: 

When I spoke to [Brandon], I did not suggest to him

that anything happened or what had happened. I asked

him to tell me if something happened. I did not use

leading or suggestive questioning and I did not coerce

or pressure the boy to tell a particular version of the

events. Despite his age (five-years-old) Brandon told

me what happened. I recorded what he told me in an

“additional narrative” report I prepared. 

(Dixon Decl., at ¶7.) 

Deputies Fennel and Dixon then placed Plaintiff under

arrest. Fennel explained to Plaintiff that he was being arrested

on three counts of kidnaping a child for the purpose of sexual

assault. But, before Plaintiff was told of the factual

allegations against him, he asked the deputy whether the children

said he grabbed them and then denied guilt by explaining that it

couldn’t be a sex crime because he “had no sexual gratisfaction

[sic].” (County’s Ex. E, Incident Report; Fennel Decl. at ¶6.)

After the arrest, Deputy Dixon had no further involvement in

Faulkner’s case. (Dixon Decl. at ¶9.) 

Plaintiff had two prior California convictions involving

forcing females to go with him against their will for the purpose

of sexual assault. In one of those incidents, he forced a minor

female to walk to an alley while he was on his bicycle. 

(Brownlee Decl. at ¶9.)

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B. The Criminal Proceedings.

The initial criminal complaint against Faulkner was filed

and the arraignment handled by a Deputy District Attorney who is

not named in the complaint. (See Brownlee Decl. at ¶9; County’s

Ex. A-C.) In December 1999, after the filing of the complaint

and the arraignment, and one week before the scheduled

preliminary hearing, Deputy District Attorney John Brownlee was

assigned to the case. (Brownlee Decl. at ¶ 3.) Brownlee had no

contact with either Deputy Fennell or Deputy Dixon, nor with any

of the child witnesses until the morning of the preliminary

hearing. (See Id. at ¶4.) Just before the initial December 14,

1999 preliminary hearing date, Brownlee spoke to Samantha Spoon

in the presence of Deputy Fennel. (Id. at ¶4.) Brownlee

declares that he conducted this interview because he thought she

might have to testify at the hearing and Brownlee wanted to know

the substance of her testimony. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) After this

meeting with Samantha, Deputy Fennel had no further contact with

any of the witnesses in the case. (Fennel Decl. at ¶8.) 

The preliminary hearing did not go forward on December 14,

1999 and was continued until January 2000. Brownlee had no

further involvement with the case until the day of the continued

preliminary hearing. On that day, Brownlee asked Brandon to be

present at the courthouse because Brownlee thought he would

require Brandon’s testimony. Brownlee greeted Brandon in the

hallway, but did not speak to him about the substance of the

case. Neither Brandon nor any other child witness was required

to testify at the preliminary hearing. (Brownlee Decl. at ¶6.) 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that there was

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probable cause to bind Fulkner over for trial. (See id.)

Faulkner’s trial was scheduled for May 2000. (Id. at ¶7.) 

A few days before the trial, Brownlee met with each of the child

witnesses to prepare his presentation of the evidence. (Brownlee

Depo. at 39 (discussing having meetings with the child witnesses

before the trial and then dismissing certain charges based on

those interviews “just before trial”).) 

When Brownlee met with Tiffany, Tiffany confirmed most

aspects of her initial story, but did not confirm that Faulkner

grabbed her. At the conclusion of this interview, Brownlee

immediately called Faulkner’s defense counsel, Leslie Greer,

informed her of the content of Tiffany’s interview, and dropped

the charges against Faulkner pertaining to Tiffany. (See

Brownlee Depo. at 40.)

C. Mary Blankenship’s Interactions with the District

Attorney’s Office.

Mary Blankenship, who is the grandmother of both Samantha

and Brianna, testified that she accompanied the girls to meetings

with Brownlee in Brownlee’s office on two or three occasions. 

Ms. Blankenship asserted during an evidentiary hearing in the

habeas corpus proceeding that Samantha had a history of lying

regarding family matters. At some point in the late 1990s,

Samantha was removed from the custody of her parents because

Samantha had reported to the Department of Children’s services

that she was being abused at home. Samantha was ultimately

returned to her parents. Ms. Blankenship asserted at the habeas

hearing that Samantha was returned to her parents in part because

her accusation of abuse turned out to be a lie. (Pltf’s Ex. A,

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habeas evidentiary hearing Tr., at 20.)

At some point, Ms. Blankenship formed the opinion that

Samantha was also lying about her interactions with Plaintiff. 

(See id. at 27.) Although the record is not perfectly clear on

the timing of Ms. Blankenship’s communication of this belief to

Defendant Brownlee, she did assert generally that she informed

Brownlee of her “doubts” before trial. (Id. at 43.) 

Q: Ms. Blankenship, Mr. Marshall just asked you if

you delayed a year before you told anyone of your

doubts. Isn’t it correct that you told Mr.

Brownlee even before trial? 

A: Yes, I did. I’m Sorry. 

(Id. at 43.) 

In addition, Ms. Blankenship testified that, after the

trial, she thought the girls were probably lying and then called

Brownlee to tell him as much.

The Court: ...The question is, after the trial, what

did you do because you thought the girls were

probably lying, and the first thing you did is you

called Brownlee?

The Witness: Correct.

***

Q: When did you do that? When did you call Mr.

Brownlee in relation to the trial?

A: I talked to Mr. Brownlee after the trial about it

also.

Q: How long after the trial is what I am getting at. 

Do you know?

A: When I had called Mr. Brownlee’s office to find

out about the sentencing, and that’s when I had

told him what took place. 

(Id. at 33.) But, nothing in the record clarifies when after the

trial this communication took place. 

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Ms. Blankenship also testified that she expressed similar

doubts to a “lady from the District Attorney’s Office,” in

September 2000, and ultimately to James Faulkner “in September,

shortly after trial.” (Id. at 44.)

Q: And isn’t it also correct that you testified on

direct that you ultimately told attorney Jim

Faulkner, James Faulkner, in September 2000,

shortly after trial. 

A: Yes.

Q: And you also testified -- well, did you in fact

talk, yourself, with the D.A. investigator in

September of 2000?

A: I talked with her -- with a lady from the District

Attorney’s Office. 

Q: Did you express that same doubt to her?

A: I did. 

(Id.) 

Brownlee maintains that he could hardly recall meeting Mary

Blankenship and denied ever receiving any warnings from her

regarding the veracity of any of the child witnesses. (See

Brownlee Depo. at 49-51, 57-61; see also Brownlee Decl. at ¶7.) 

When asked, hypothetically, what Brownlee would have done if he

had received information prior to trial indicating that Samantha

was not credible, Brownlee responded that he would have informed

Plaintiff’s defense counsel, Leslie Greer, because he thought

“she would be entitled to that.” (Id. at 59.) 

Ms. Blankenship further asserts that, when Brownlee

interviewed Samantha, he suggested some answers to her. The

record does not reflect, however, the substance (i.e., the

materiality) of any answers she might have given. The pertinent

portion of Me. Blankenship’s testimony is: 

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Q: Do you recall Mr. Brownlee ever suggesting to

Samantha answers?

A: Yes, I do. 

Q: Did you ever hear him suggest to Samantha that

something actually happened in a different way

from what she had said? 

A: Yes, I did. 

Q: And then did Samantha then agree with Mr.

Brownlee’s version

Mr. Marshall: I am going to object to both Mr. 

Brownlee’s suggestion and Samantha’s responses 

as being hearsay. 

The Court: The objection is sustained.

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit A, Doc. 69, at 27).

Brownlee denies having suggested any answers to the

witnesses or fabricating evidence in any way. (Brownlee Decl.,

at ¶7.) 

D. Conviction and Sentencing. 

On May 9, 2000, a jury convicted Faulkner of false

imprisonment and attempted kidnaping of Brandon, but acquitted

him of the remaining charges. 

On June 6, 2000, Faulkner was sentenced. (Kern’s Statement

of Undisputed Fact (“KSUF”) #47; Brownlee Decl., at ¶7.)

Faulkner’s public defender, Leslie Greer, filed a notice of

appeal on June 13, 2000. (Docket from People v. Faulkner, Fifth

Appellate District, Case No. F035831.) Louis Wijsan was

appointed as appellate counsel for Faulkner on August 7, 2000. 

(Id.) 

//

//

//

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E. Brownlee Learns Witnesses May be Recanting. 

In September 2000, Brownlee learned that one or more of the

girls might be recanting her trial testimony. (KSUF 48; Brownlee

Decl. at ¶14.) At that point, Brownlee did not know the extent

of the girls’ intent to recant. Brownlee directed Patricia

Poeschel, an investigator with the District Attorney’s office, to

interview the children. (KSUF 49; Brownlee Decl. at ¶14.) The

interviews began in September but were not concluded until 

November 2000. (Ex. L to Poechel Depo. at 2-4). 

F. Wijsen Files Opening Appellate Brief.

Around the same time Poeschel began interviewing the child

witnesses, in September 2000, Wijsen filed his opening appellate

brief, making no mention of any potential recantations. (State’s

Ex. A.) 

G. Appellate Counsel Becomes Independently Aware of the

Recantations. 

Meanwhile, in September 2000, at essentially the same time

Brownlee begame aware of the potential recantations, Faulkner’s

uncle, James Faulkner, who is a lawyer, learned independently

that the girls were recanting their trial testimony. (James

Faulkner Depo. at 56.) James Faulkner passed this information on

to Wijsen. Although the record is not entirely clear on the

timing of this communication, Wijsen probably became aware of the

recantations in September 2000 as well, as is evidenced by

representations made by Wijsen in a subsequent court filing. (See

State’s Ex. B, at 3 (“In September of 2000, appellate counsel for

petitioner received information alleging that Mary

Blankenship...had contacted the kern County District Attorney’s

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staff and advised it that her [grand]children had lied about what

had occurred between them and petitioner.”).)

Wijsen and James Faulkner would eventually dispatch a

private investigator to take the witnesses’ statements, but this

process would not be completed until February 2001. 

H. Marshall is Assigned to Handle the Appeal for the

State. 

Assistant Attorney General R. Todd Marshall first became

involved in the case on September 26, 2000, shortly after Wijsen

filed his initial appellate brief. (Marshall Decl. at ¶4.) 

Marshall filed a response to on behalf of the People on October

26, 2000. At that time, Marshall had no knowledge of the

potential recantations. (Marshall Decl. at ¶5.) 

I. Brownlee Receives the Poeschel Reports.

Poeschel concluded her interviews of the child witnesses in

November 2000. Of the four child witnesses who testified at the

criminal trial, Brianna and Samantha reported that they lied

about Faulkner grabbing Samantha. Poeschel prepared reports on

the interviews and provided these reports to Brownlee on or

around November 21, 2001. (These reports are referenced

hereinafter as the “Poeschel reports.”)

While reviewing the case file and the Poeschel reports,

Brownlee noticed that, at about the same time the children began

to recant, Faulkner had been sending letters to the families of

some of the children, offering them money to get them to “tell

the truth.” (See Pltf’s Exh. E & F, Letters from Brownlee to

Greer and Marshall.) 

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J. Brownlee Produces the Poeschel Reports to Greer.

On November 21, 2001, within one day of receiving the

reports from Poechel, Brownlee provided copies to Leslie Greer. 

(KSUF 52; Brownlee Decl. 14; Pltf’s Ex. E.) At the time,

Brownlee did not know the status of Faulkner’s appeal and

believed Greer would act on the information. (Brownlee Depo. at

74.) Brownlee attached the reports to a letter which states in

its entirety:

November 21, 2000

RE: People v. Faulkner

Dear Leslie, 

Enclosed please find a number of reports from our

investigations unit, as well as multiple letters from

Faulkner to the parents of the victims. 

It appears that the girls are recanting their

story. However, it also appears that Brandon is

sticking to his story. You might recall that the jury

convicted on Brandon, acquitted on the girls. 

While reading through the information, I noted

that about the time Faulkner starts offering money to

the family of the victim’s [sic] is about the time the

girls recanted their story. Interesting. 

Let me know if you would like to do anything about

this. 

John R. Brownlee

Deputy District Attorney

Special Prosecutions Unit

K. Greer’s Assertion that She Provided the Poeschel

Reports to Wijsen.

Greer claims that she promptly passed the reports on to

Wijsen, Faulkner’s appellate counsel, after speaking with Wijsen

on the telephone about the matter. (Greer Decl. at ¶6.) 

Plaintiff asserts that the Reports were never passed along to

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Wijsen passed away at some point in 2004 or 2005 (the 1

record is unclear as to the exact date). No deposition of Wijsen

was taken nor are any declarations from Wijsen regarding this

case on record. 

13

Wijsen.1

L. Production of the Smith Reports. 

An investigator hired by James Faulkner obtained the

children’s statements in February 2001. (James Faulkner Depo. at

58-59.) The investigator, Carl Smith, summarized his interviews

in a report. (Ex. E to James Faulkner Depo.) According to

Smith’s summaries, the girls stated that they decided among

themselves that they should lie and at no time claimed that

anyone coerced them into lying. (See id.) Smith also noted in

his summary report that an investigator from the District

Attorney’s office had also been conducting post-trial interviews

of the children and that Samantha and Breanna told the

investigator they had lied. (Id.; see also James Faulkner Depo.

at 70.)

Smith’s interviews of the child witnesses were recorded and

eventually transcribed, although not until June 2001. (See

State’s Ex. B.) James Faulkner gave Wijsen the transcripts in

June 2001, but could not recall whether he gave Wijsen a copy of

Smith’s summary report prepared in February 2001. 

M. Wijsen Files the First Habeas Petition.

On June 21 2001, while the appeal was pending, Wijsen filed

a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Fifth Appellate

District. (State’s Ex. B.) The petition makes no reference to

the Poeschel reports, but did rely upon Smith Reports to argue

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Plaintiff asserts that Wijsen’s failure to mention the 2

Poeschel reports in this initial habeas petition is evidence that

he never received them. 

14

that the child witnesses had recanted. In this habeas petition,

Wijsen acknowledged being aware of the recantations as of

September 2000 and specifically that he was aware that Mary

Blankenship “had contacted the Kern County District Attorney’s

staff and advised it that her children had lied at trial....”

(Id. at 3.) 

2

N. The Order to Show Cause.

On October 10, 2001, the Fifth District Court of Appeals

issued an order to show cause to the Kern County Superior Court

why Faulkner’s initial habeas petition should not be granted. 

The Superior Court set an evidentiary hearing for June 17 and

18th, 2002. 

O. Marshall Receives the Poeschel Reports and Attaches

them to a Court Filing.

On December 4, 2001, Marshall received a copy of the

Poeschel Reports from Brownlee. Marshall assumed that Faulkner’s

counsel also had a copy, in light of the allegations of

recantation contained within the initial habeas petition. 

(Marshall Decl., at ¶9.) Nothing in the record explains why

Marshall did not received a copy of the Poeschel reports until

December 2001, more than a year after they were produced. 

On December 14, 2001, Wijsen filed a motion for bail pending

appeal on behalf of Faulkner. Marshall filed an opposition to

release on bail, in which he directed the state court’s attention

to the Poeschel Reports, but argued that the recantations should

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In the first footnote to Plaintiff’s motion for summary 3

judgment Plaintiff points out that the Poeschel reports appear to

have been hastily attached to the bail opposition. This,

Plaintiff suggests, “raises the question of whether Investigator

Poeschel’s reports were perhaps inadvertently disclosed to

petitioner.” This assertion is baseless. Marshall referenced

the reports in the body of his motion several times. (See

State’s Ex. D at 2.)

15

be viewed with caution because they coincided with letters sent

by Plaintiff to the parents of at least one of the child

witnesses. (See State’s Ex. E, Opp’n to Bail Mot., at 2.) 

Marshall attached to his opposition copies of the Poeschel

reports a letter sent by Plaintiff to Brandon’s mother. Again,

Marshall assumed at the time that Wijsen was already in

possession of the Poeshel reports. (Marshall Decl. at ¶5.) 3

P. Marhsall Defends the Conviction at the Habeas

Evidentiary Hearing.

Marshall represented the State at the June 17 and 18, 2002

hearing on Plaintiff’s initial habeas petition. According to the

Fifth Appellate District’s description of this hearing “Brandon

was the only witness who testified consistently at both the trial

and the evidentiary hearings.” (State’s Ex. E at 5.) The

Superior Court denied the writ, finding that Faulkner did not

meet his burden of proof; that Brandon’s testimony was

consistent; and that, while Breanna and Samantha both admitted

lying at trial, they both consistently stated that Faulkner

offered them $20 to accompany him. Finally, the Superior Court

found that Faulkner’s post arrest statement that he had “no

sexual gratification” was compelling evidence of guilt. 

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Q. The Second Habeas Petition.

On September 25, 2003, the Fifth Appellate District granted

Wijsen permission to file a second habeas petition. (See Pltf’s

Ex. M at 7.) In the second petition, filed October 18, 2002,

Wijsen alleged, among other things, misconduct with respect to

disclosure of the Poeschel reports. Specifically, Wijsen alleged

that he first became aware of the Poeschel reports when they were

attached by Marshall to the State’s opposition to Plaintiff’s

bail motion. (Id. at 28.)

Unaware that the District Attorney’s investigator

had already uncovered the fact that the principal

witnesses against petitioner committed perjury at

trial, Private Investigator Carl Smith interviewed the

witnesses and found that they had falsely accused

petitioner and perjured themselves at trial. 

If petitioner had known that the commission of

perjury was already known to the People, he would have

so advised the Court in this Petition [] or the related

motions. As it was, he could rely only on his own

discovery of what to the Court and petitioner himself

was newly discovered evidence, which unequivocally

established that the prosecution’s key witnesses had

committed perjury. 

While the Attorney General persisted in intensive

efforts at persuading this Court that it must not issue

an Order to Show Cause and that the Petition for Writ

must be denied because petitioner’s claims would be

untrustworthy, neither the Attorney General nor the

District Attorney disclosed to the Court or

petitioner’s counsel that exculpatory evidence in the

People’s possession showed the trustworthiness of the

claims. Even after this Court issued the Order to Show

Cause, respondent kept this Court and the Superior

Court and petitioner in the dark about the fact that

the key witnesses had recanted to the People long

before what respondent called their “purported

recantations” to Investigator Smith. 

Not until respondent filed an Opposition to

petitioner’s motion for Release on Bail with the

Superior Court on or about December 21, 2001, to which

it attached the reports by Investigator Poeshel

(Appendix ), did petitioner learn from this perhaps

inadvertent inclusion of the existence of the

exculpatory evidence, which supported his claims on

appeal and on habeas corpus. 

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(Id. at 28-30.) Wijsen argued that these circumstances

constituted a Brady violation representing an “additional

independent ground to mandate reversal of petitioner’s

convictions.” (Id. at 31.) 

This second petition was successful. The Fifth Appellate

District essentially reasoned that Brandon’s testimony, although

credible, contained no proof of the intent element. Because the

only proof of intent came from the girls’ recanted testimony, the

conviction could not stand. (See State’s Ex. E.)

R. Recent Procedural History. 

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 14, 2004, seeking civil

damages from the County of Kern, the State of California, and

various individual defendants. (Doc. 1.) A hearing on the

pending motions for summary judgment, for reinstatement of

dismissed Defendant Greer, and to bifurcate was held on March 13,

2006. (Doc. 96.) At the hearing, Plaintiff was invited to

submit a supplemental filing containing references to the record. 

Plaintiff filed his supplemental brief on March 21, 2006 (Doc.

97), to which the County replied (Doc. 98, filed March 22, 2006). 

Thereafter, the matter was submitted for decision. 

III. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT

The operative First Amended Complaint contains a laundry

list of constitutional deprivations allegedly suffered by

Plaintiff at the hands of Defendants. For example, Plaintiff’s

first claim, which is directed at the Kern County Sheriff’s

Department, the District Attorney’s office, the Public Defender’s

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The named employees of the Public Defender’s Office, 4

Leslie Greer and Mark Arnold, were voluntarily dismissed on April

20, 2005. Plaintiff has now moved to reinstate Ms. Greer as a

defendant. 

18

office, and a number of individual employees of those offices,

alleges: 

4

...acting in their official capacities and with

deliberate indifference, gross negligence and/or

reckless disregard to the safety security and

constitutional and statutory rights of plaintiff,

maintained, enforced, tolerated, permitted, acquiesced

in, and/or applied inter alia policies and practices

including detaining and arresting without reasonable

suspicion or probable cause; encouraging and partaking

in perjury and falsification of statements and

testimony causing false imprisonment and malicious

prosecution; selecting, retaining, training and

assigning employees with demonstrable propensities for

misconduct including false arrest and subornation of

perjury; failing to adequately train, supervise and

control employees in the proper arrest, investigation

of, and prosecution of suspects; failing to adequately

discipline employees involved in the misconduct

described [] including condoning and encouraging

employees in the belief that they can violate the

rights of persons such as the plaintiff in this action

with impunity, and that such conduct will not adversely

affect their opportunities for promotion and other

employment benefits; failing to adequately investigate

incidents such as the events complained of herein and

conducting investigations in such a manner as to

conceal the misconduct of employees, condoning and

encouraging the fabrication of evidence following

incidents involving the improper arrests and

investigations. 

(Doc. 12, filed Nov. 10, 2004, at ¶18.) Plaintiff alleges that

the above-described conduct violated Plaintiff’s “Fourth, Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” 

Plaintiff’s own description of the case in his motion for

summary judgment hardly clarifies his allegations: 

//

//

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Plaintiff alleges his arrest, wrongful conviction, and

subsequent malicious prosecution were obtained through

the intentional efforts of all named defendants to

prosecute plaintiff’s wrongful conviction through the

use of false statements and perjured testimony of minor

children witness/victims who were being manipulated and

directed and encouraged by defendants. Plaintiff

further alleges that his conviction was upheld as a

result of the defendants wrongful acts in violation of

plaintiff’s constitutional rights in suppressing the

perjured testimony from the Court, the jury and from

plaintiff and his counsel. 

Plaintiff further alleges that the District Attorney’s

office and the Public Defender’s office were advised of

the perjury before and during the trial and none of the

prosecutors, investigators, counsel or police involved

took any action to correct the miscarriage of justice. 

The perjurious testimony, the prejudicial investigation

and the prosecution’s participation in the miscarriage

of justice combined to deprive plaintiff of due process

and a fundamentally fair trial. 

(Doc. 65, Pltf’s Mot. for Sum. J., at 8.) 

However, the factual submissions provided by the parties in

the context of the instant cross-motions suggest that the claims

have narrowed to essentially three factual allegations: 

(1) that investigators and prosecutors fabricated

evidence by either coercing the child witnesses

into making false statements or by using improper

investigative techniques; 

(2) that the prosecution was warned both before and

during the criminal trial that several of the

child witnesses might not be telling the truth,

but did nothing with this knowledge; and 

(3) that both County and State prosecutors failed to

timely disclose exculpatory evidence. 

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background.

1. Section 1983.

Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

provides a cause of action against “[e]very person who, under

color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws...” To establish liability

under 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that he has been deprived

of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal

law and (2) that the deprivation was effected “under color of

state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).

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2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity.

 The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any such suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by the Citizens

or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against

a state for damages or injunctive relief, unless the state has

consented to or waived immunity, or Congress has validly

abrogated the same. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.

44, 54-55 (1996); In re Harleston, 331 F.3d 699, 701 (9th Cir.

2003). The Eleventh Amendment’s “reference to actions 'against

one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a

State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain

actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.” 

Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997);

see also Ulaleo v. Paty, 902 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990). 

3. Suits Against Government Officials. 

The Complaint states that a number of officials are being

sued “officially” and “individually.” The distinction between

these types of allegations is critical.

a. Official Capacity Suits.

Suits against an official in her or his official capacity

are treated as suits against the entity on whose behalf that

official acts. In such suits, the real party in interest becomes

the entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21, 25 (1991). A federal action for monetary damages against an

individual State official acting in his official capacity is

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barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the same way that an action

against the State is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l

Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Although a municipal (e.g., county) official acting in her

or his official capacity is not absolutely protected by the

Eleventh Amendment, liability only attaches to the municipality

under certain circumstances. 

Municipalities cannot be held liable under a

traditional respondeat superior theory. Rather, they

may be held liable only when "action pursuant to

official municipal policy of some nature caused a

constitutional tort.... [T]o establish municipal

liability, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an

unconstitutional municipal policy. 

Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372, 393 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658

(1978)). There are various ways a plaintiff may prove the

existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy under the socalled Monell doctrine. These are discussed in context below. 

b. Personal Capacity Suits.

In contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985))(internal quotations omitted). To establish personal

liability in a § 1983 or § 1985 action, it is enough to show that

the official, “acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal

quotations omitted). Public officials sued in their personal

capacity may assert personal liability defenses, such as

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qualified immunity. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. 

4. Prosecutorial Immunity.

Prosecutorial immunity protects eligible government

officials who perform functions “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 430 (1976). “Such immunity applies even if it leaves

the genuinely wronged [plaintiff] without civil redress against a

prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of

liberty." Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)

(internal quotations omitted). A prosecutor is protected by

absolute immunity for any actions that are “quasi-judicial” in

nature and are performed “within the scope of [the prosecutor’s]

authority.” Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723

F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir. 1984). 

5. Qualified Immunity.

In this case, Defendants assert the defense of qualified

immunity on behalf of all the individual Defendants. Deciding

qualified immunity entails a two-step analysis. First, a court

must ask whether a constitutional violation occurred at all. If

the answer to this question is yes, the court must then inquire

whether the right violated was “clearly established” by asking

whether a reasonable officer could believe that the defendant’s

actions were lawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). 

//

//

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B. Summary of the Cross-Motions.

The State Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims

against Defendants Bill Lockyer, the Attorney General of

California, and Assistant Attorney General R. Todd Marshall. 

State defendants argue that (1) Lockyer and Marshall both enjoy

absolute prosecutorial immunity; (2) Defendant Marshall is also

entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) there is no evidence that

either Lockyer or Marshall violated Plaintiff’s civil rights.

The County Defendants move for summary judgment on all

claims against all remaining Defendants (Brownlee, Jagels,

Sparks, Fennell, and Dixon). First, the County maintains that

Brownlee and Jagels are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. The

County also argues that it cannot be held liable as a

municipality on a number of grounds: (a) the District Attorney

and/or his Deputies act on behalf of the State when prosecuting

crime; (b) similarly, the Sheriff of Kern County and/or his

Deputies act on behalf of the State when performing law

enforcement functions; and (c) Plaintiff has failed to establish

municipal liability under Monell. As to all Defendants, the

County maintains that there is no evidence supporting the

existence of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, any

individual defendants not otherwise immune are entitled to

qualified immunity. Finally, the County asserts that the

doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Plaintiff from arguing that

the named defendants coerced the child witnesses into lying,

because Plaintiff took the position in his habeas corpus

proceedings that the child witnesses fabricated the lies

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For example, Plaintiff’s motion is entitled a “motion 5

for summary judgment,” but, in the conclusion section, rather

than requesting judgment, plaintiff prays that the court will

“deny defendants[’] motion for summary judgment.” (Doc. 65 at

20.)

26

themselves.

Plaintiff’s cross-motion squarely presents one legal issue

for decision: Whether the California Appellate Court decision

granting Faulkner’s habeas corpus petition, in which the court

reasoned that the child witness recantations were material to the

underlying conviction, operates to bar relitigation of the issue

of “materiality” for the purposes of establishing a Brady

violation. Plaintiff also appears to request judgment as to

liability for at least some of the defendants, but, his motion

lacks the essential factual support necessary to entitle him to

judgment on any of his claims. The arguments raised therein, 5

however, are treated as additional arguments in opposition to the

defendants’ motions.

C. Official Capacity v. Individual Capacity; Supervisor

Liability As Applied to Defendants Lockyer, Marshall,

Sparks, and Jagels.

1. Plaintiff Has Not Established A Personal Capacity

Claim Against Defendant Lockyer. 

Neither Defendant Lockyer nor Defendant Marshall can be sued

in this court for acts taken in their official capacity, as this

would effectively constitute a suit against the State of

California. The Office of the Attorney General of the State of

California is an arm of the State entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. See Long v. Van de Kamp, 961 F.2d 151, 152 (9th Cir.

1992). Accordingly, no official capacity lawsuit may lie against

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Whether Marshall is protected from personal liability 6

by any personal immunities is discussed below.

For example, in his motion for summary judgment, 7

Plaintiff alleges that the Attorney General’s office improperly

withheld copies of the Poeschel reports under the heading

“Defendants Implemented Policy So Deficient that It Repudiated

Plaintiff’s Rights Protected by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments.” (Doc. 65 at 10-11.)

27

the Attorney General’s office or any of its employees.

The inquiry turns to whether Plaintiff has adduced any

evidence to support personal liability claims against Lockyer

and/or Marshall. A plaintiff suing a state official in his

personal capacity must establish a “connection between the state

official and the allegedly unconstitutional action” Rounds v.

Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1999). 

It is not disputed that Plaintiff has established a connection

between Marshall’s acts and the alleged constitutional

deprivation. However, the State defendants suggest that 6

Plaintiff has failed to establish claims against Lockyer in his

personal capacity. 

 Personal participation is required for personal liability

under 1983. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir.

1989). Plaintiff impliedly alleges here that Lockyer

participated in the deprivation of his rights by failing to

adequately supervise and/or discipline his Defendant Marshall.7

But, this cannot form the basis of a personal liability suit

against a state official. 

//

//

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A supervisor is only liable for constitutional

violations of his subordinates if the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There

is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Id. at 1046. 

Plaintiff cites Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.

1989), for the proposition that supervisory liability may exist

even without overt personal participation “if supervisory

officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself

is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force

of the constitutional violation.” Plaintiff quotes Hansen out of

context and advances an inapposite application of supervisoral

liability. The Hansen court reasoned:

Hansen alleges that the chief of police is guilty of

malfeasance because he didn't properly train or

supervise the officers. Under Section 1983, supervisory

officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on

any theory of vicarious liability. See Pembaur v. City

of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). A supervisor

may be liable if there exists either (1) his or her

personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,

or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th

Cir.1987).

Supervisory liability exists even without overt

personal participation in the offensive act if

supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient

that the policy “itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights” and is “the moving force of the

constitutional violation.” Id. at 304 (internal

citations omitted).

Id. at 645-46 (emphasis added)(parallel citations omitted). In

support of the language cited by Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit

cites Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Thompkins in turn cites Monell for the proposition that

supervisory liability may exist even without overt personal

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participation. Both the Ninth Circuit in Hansen and the Fifth

Circuit in Thompkins were actually referencing the form of

official capacity supervisor liability which may be imposed upon

municipalities under Monell. This does not establish an

additional basis for personal liability applicable to State

officials. 

Plaintiff has elicited absolutely no evidence of Lockyer’s

personal involvement in the acts that allegedly deprived

Plaintiff of his civil rights. Lockyer asserts that he was not

even aware of the case until after this lawsuit was filed. 

Plaintiff offers no factual rebuttal. There is no evidence that

Lockyer promulgated or knew of any policy to withhold evidence in

State habeas cases or that such a policy existed or operated in

this case.

Lockyer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all

claims brought against him in either his official or personal

capacity. The State Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as

to all claims against Defendant Lockyer is GRANTED. The State

Attorney General is entitled to judgment.

2. Plaintiff Has Not Established Personal Liability

Claims Against Either Sheriff Sparks or District

Attorney Jagels.

Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence of personal

involvement by either Sheriff Sparks or District Attorney Jagels. 

Sparks apparently played no role in investigating the

reports made by the children. (KSUF #42, 43.) In fact, there is

no evidence that he had any knowledge of the investigation at

all. Plaintiff has not established any basis for maintaining a

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personal liability claim against Defendant Sparks. There is no

evidence that Sparks promulgated or had knowledge of a policy to

falsify or withhold evidence.

The same applies to Defendant Jagels. Plaintiff has failed

to adduce any evidence of Jagels’ participation in the

investigation and/or prosecution, other than the fact that the

legal pleadings associated with the criminal prosecution filed by

Brownlee bear Jagels’ signature as a matter of protocol, signed

by a deputy district attorney. 

Defenants’ Sparks and Jagels’ motions for summary judgment

as to any individual-capacity claims against them are GRANTED. 

D. Liability of the County of Kern.

1. In Federal Court, Venegas Does Not Control; The

County May be Liable for the Conduct of County

Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs. 

The County argues that it cannot be liable for the allegedly

unlawful official acts of those Defendants who are County

Sheriffs, because, according to the County, County Sheriffs in

California act on behalf of the State, not the County when

investigating crime. The County’s defense is based on a recent

California Supreme Court case, Venegas v. County of Los Angeles,

32 Cal. 4th 820 (2004), which examined whether a county sheriff

acted as an agent of the state when conducting a criminal

investigation. The Venegas court examined applicable provisions

of the California Constitution, several relevant California

statutes, and prior California cases to reach the conclusion that

“sheriffs act on behalf of the state when performing law

enforcement duties.” 

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Application of this seemingly straightforward holding is

complicated by the fact that Ninth Circuit decisions do not

follow and squarely contradict Venegas. The case most on point

is Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2001), which

holds that county sheriffs in California act on behalf of their

county, not the state, during the course of investigating crime. 

Brewster predates Venegas and the Ninth Circuit has yet to

address Venegas directly. 

At first glance, the United States Supreme Court’s holding

in MacMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), suggests that

the more recent pronouncement in Venegas should control. 

MacMillan held that whether an official acts as a policymaker for

a state is a question of state law. See also City of St. Louis

v. Proprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1988)(“We begin by

reiterating that the identification of policymaking is a question

of state law...not a question of federal law.”) The United

States Supreme Court has held elsewhere that “[t]he California

Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of California state

law.” See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997).

However, there is Ninth Circuit authority that suggests

application of the MacMillan rule would be inappropriate. For

example, in Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (2001),

the Ninth Circuit held that the Los Angles Sheriff’s department

acted on behalf of the County, not the State, when administering

local prison policy. In Streit, Los Angeles County urged the

Ninth Circuit to simply adopt the holding of a parallel

California case, County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

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(Peters), 68 Cal App. 4th 1166 (1998), which held that the Los

Angeles Sheriff acted on behalf of the State in setting the

policies governing the release of prisoners from the Los Angeles

County. The Ninth Circuit rejected Los Angeles County’s

argument, primarily on the ground that Peters was

distinguishable. In addition, the Ninth Circuit noted that “even

if the case were on all fours we would not be bound by Peters's

conclusion regarding section 1983 liability because such

questions implicate federal, not state, law.” 236 F.3d at 563.

The Ninth Circuit performed its own independent analysis of

California law. 

The Ninth Circuit spoke even more directly in Weiner v. San

Diego County, 210 F3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001), which examined

whether a California district attorney is a state officer when

deciding whether to prosecute an individual. In Weiner, the

court acknowledged that McMillan calls for an analysis of

California law to determine whether an official acts on behalf of

the state or a county. Id. 

This does not mean, however, that we must blindly

accept its balancing of the different provisions of

state law in determining liability under § 1983. In

McMillian, the Court stated that “our inquiry is

dependent on an analysis of state law,” which does not

mean “that state law can answer the question for us by,

for example, simply labeling as a state official an

official who clearly makes county policy. But our

understanding of the actual function of a governmental

official, in a particular area, will necessarily be

dependent on the definition of the official's function

under relevant state law.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785.

We must, therefore, examine California's constitution,

statutes, and case law.

Id. (emphasis added, parallel citations omitted). 

Weiner cautions against the blind acceptance of the Venegas

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At least one other district court that has addressed 8

this issue, albeit in an unpublished opinion, is in accord. See

Thomas v. Baca, 2005 WL 1030247 *3 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2005)

33

holding, given the existence of a contrary Ninth Circuit rule in

Brewster, which is binding upon this court. See Barapind v.

Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 at 750-51. 

In a concurring and dissenting opinion in Venegas,

California Supreme Court Justice Kennard acknowledges that the

holding in Venegas is not binding upon federal courts within the

Ninth Circuit:

Because the Ninth Circuit considers California sheriffs

performing law enforcement functions to be county

officers, the majority's contrary conclusion here

creates a split that results in immunizing sheriffs

from section 1983 liability in actions brought in state

court while exposing them to liability in identical

actions filed in federal court. This effectively drives

California civil rights plaintiffs with actions against

a county sheriff out of our court system and into

federal court. To ensure uniformity in the enforcement

of federal civil rights law in both state and federal

courts in California, the United States Supreme Court

should decide which view is correct.

32 Cal. 4th at 854.

For purposes of this section 1983 case, a federal claim

brought in a federal court within the Ninth Circuit, the County

of Kern may be liable for the law enforcement-related acts of

Sheriff Sparks. It remains to be determined, however, whether

any official capacity claim against him (i.e., against the

County) survives summary judgment.8

2. The County Cannot be Liable for the Official Acts

of a County District Attorney in Preparation for a

Prosecution or to Train Others To Prosecute.

The County argues that it cannot be liable for the official

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acts of a District Attorney or Deputy District Attorney. In

support of this proposition, the County points to both California

cases and binding Ninth Circuit authority. 

The operative California case is Pitts v. County of Kern, 17

Cal. 4th 340 (1998), which concerned claims against District

Attorney Jagels that are remarkably similar to those brought by

Plaintiff in this case. Specifically, the complaint in Pitts

alleged that 

the County and Jagels, in his official capacity,

established a pattern, custom, and practice of

procuring false statements and testimony by threat,

promise, intimidation, force, bribery, and coercion of

witnesses, and thereby established an official policy

governing the conduct of Jagels's employees. [The

complaint also alleged] the County and Jagels failed to

provide adequate training, procedures, guidelines,

rules, and regulations to prevent such conduct by

district attorney employees, and hence were

deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs' constitutional

rights. The official policy and the failure to act were

actual causes of the deprivation of plaintiffs' rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. In particular, [the Pitts] plaintiffs

assert their constitutional right to a fair and

impartial trial free of knowingly procured false

testimony was violated.

Id. at 352. The California Supreme Court concluded in Pitts that

the County of Kern could not be liable for Jagels’ official acts

because a California district attorney acts on behalf of the

state in preparing to prosecute and prosecuting crimes. Pitts

hald that the district attorney was a state actor when “he

establishes policy or trains employees in these areas.” 

Just as we have concluded that in California a district

attorney represents the state when preparing to

prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of

state law, we further conclude it logically follows

that he or she also represents the state, and not the

county, when training and developing policy in these

areas. No meaningful analytical distinction can be made

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between these two functions. Indeed, a contrary rule

would require impossibly precise distinctions. The

district attorney would represent the state when he or

she personally prepared to prosecute and prosecuted

criminal violations of state law, but the county when

training others to do so, or when developing related

policies. Moreover, anytime the district attorney

relied on a formal policy to handle a particular aspect

of a case, that decision would be attributable to the

county, even though the prosecution itself would be a

state function. Such a result would be nonsensical, and

would impose local government liability under the most

arbitrary of circumstances.

Id. at 362. Under Pitts, Kern County cannot be liable for any

acts taken by Defendant Brownlee to prepare to prosecute a crime

or for Defendant’s Jagels training and development of policy in

these areas. This means that, regardless of any proof that would

otherwise satisfy Monell, the County cannot be held liable for

allegedly unconstitutional district attorney prosecutorial

policies. Neither, of course, can the State, as it is immune

under the Eleventh Amendment. 

On this issue the Ninth Circuit is in accord. In Weiner,

210 F3d at 1031, after performing its own independent analysis

under MacMillan, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a district

attorney is a state actor when deciding whether to prosecute an

individual. 

Plaintiff argues that this rule simply does not apply to the

allegations in this case because Brownlee and Jagels were acting

as investigators and were not “preparing to prosecute” or

“prosecuting criminal violations of state law.” This argument,

based primarily on a recent Ninth Circuit case concerning

prosecutorial immunity, Genzler v. Loganbach, 410 F.3d 630 (9th

Cir. 2005), is discussed in greater detail below. To the extent

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that certain of Defendant Brownlee’s acts were investigatory in

nature under Genzler, the County could be liable for those acts,

but only if Plaintiff had otherwise satisfied Monell. As is

discussed below, Plaintiff concedes that he has not established

Monell liability. 

3. Failure of Proof under Monell.

Even if Plaintiff could establish that any individual

defendant not otherwise immune had violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, the County can only liable be when "action

pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a

constitutional tort....” Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372, 393

(9th Cir. 2003). “[T]o establish municipal liability, a

plaintiff must prove the existence of an unconstitutional

municipal policy.” Id. 

Here, there is no direct evidence of the existence of a

policy, nor is there any evidence of a pattern of municipal

activity. Nevertheless, a municipality may be liable under

Monell for a single incident where: (1) the person causing the

violation has “final policymaking authority;” (2) the “final

policymaker” “ratified” a subordinate’s actions; or (3) the

“final policymaker” acted with deliberate indifference to a

subordinate’s constitutional violations. Christie v. Iopa, 176

F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1999). However, “Proof of a single incident

of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose

liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes

proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional

municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal

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policymaker.” City of Okl. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824

(1985).

Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy,

and its origin, must be separately proved. But where

the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional,

considerably more proof than the single incident will

be necessary in every case to establish both the

requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and

the causal connection between the "policy" and the

constitutional deprivation. Under the charge upheld by

the Court of Appeals the jury could properly have

imposed liability on the city based solely upon proof

that it employed a non-policymaking officer who

violated the Constitution.

Id. Even if one of the Christie exceptions applies, a court

should hesitate to impose liability based on a single decision. 

Where a claim of municipal liability rests on a single

decision, not itself representing a violation of

federal law and not directing such a violation, the

danger that a municipality will be held liable without

fault is high. Because the decision necessarily governs

a single case, there can be no notice to the municipal

decisionmaker, based on previous violations of

federally protected rights, that his approach is

inadequate. Nor will it be readily apparent that the

municipality's action caused the injury in question,

because the plaintiff can point to no other incident

tending to make it more likely that the plaintiff's own

injury flows from the municipality's action, rather

than from some other intervening cause.

Christie, 176 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Board of County Com’rs of

Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 408-09 (9th Cir.

1997).

Here, there is no evidence of any action on the part of any

supervisor at any of the named agencies, let alone any evidence

of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff offers no factual rebuttal

to the County’s motion for summary judgment on the Monell claim

and conceded this during oral argument.

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The County of Kern’s motion for summary judgment as to all

claims against it is GRANTED. Because Plaintiff has failed to

state claims against Defendants Jagels and Sparks in their

individual capacities, leaving only the official capacity claims

against them, their motion for summary judgment as to all claims

against them is also GRANTED. 

E. Prosecutorial Immunity As Applied to Defendants

Marshall, Lockyer, Brownlee, and Jagels.

Immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest

possible stage of litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224

(1991)(per curiam); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,

526 (1985)(where a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial,

the immunity would have been effectively squandered). 

1. Applicable Legal Framework.

Absolute immunity is most clearly applied to acts taken by a

prosecutor to prepare for the initiation of judicial proceedings

or for trial and which occur within the role of an advocate. See

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). However,

absolute immunity also applies to investigative activities

undertaken in order to prepare a case, Ybarra, 723 F.2d at 679,

and to actions taken by prosecutors for the purpose of

determining whether to bring charges in the first place, Demery

v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984). As a general

rule, absolute immunity applies to acts “having more or less

connection with the general matters committed to [the

prosecutor’s] control or supervision.” Ybarra, 723 F.2d at 678. 

The Ninth Circuit has extended the protection of absolute

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immunity to a prosecutor’s acts before, during, and after trial:

 Because by hypothesis resentful defendants initiate

suits irrationally or for purposes of harassment, they

are just as likely to ascribe unconstitutional purposes

to the prosecutor's post-trial acts as to his acts

before and during trial....

Demery, 735 F.2d at 1144-45 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

Like allegations of misconduct during the trial

preparation stage, allegations of misconduct in a

prosecutor's post-trial handling of a case can

generally be corrected without resort to a civil trial

for damages. This claim...is the type that the Supreme

Court, in its wisdom, wanted to prevent and recognized

would be better handled by various post-trial

remedies....

Id. 

However, the line between covered and non-covered conduct is

not always clear. A recent Ninth Circuit case, Genzler v.

Loganbach, 410 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2005), provides the rule of

decision here. Genzler considered the “difference between the

advocate's role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses

as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the detective's

role in searching for clues and corroboration that might give him

probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the

other hand.” Id. at 639 (citing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). The

Ninth Circuit reasoned that absolute immunity should not apply

“[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions

normally performed by a police officer.” However, when a

prosecutor “is organizing, evaluating, and marshaling that

evidence in preparation for a pending trial, in contrast to the

police-like activity of acquiring evidence which might be used in

a prosecution,” it is more appropriate to apply absolute

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immunity. Id. The Ninth Circuit suggested that “the timing of

evidence gathering is a relevant fact in determining how closely

connected that conduct is to the official's core advocacy

function in the judicial process....” Id. For example, “when a

witness is being coached at or during a break in trial, the

prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity even if he or she is

instructing the witness to lie.” Id. (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at

430, 431 n.33). But, timing is not dispositive and must be

considered alongside evidence concerning the function that was

being performed during the particular interview. Id. at 640.

The Genzler court applied this approach to two factual

scenarios. In the first scenario, prosecutors met with a witness

more than one month prior to the preliminary hearing,

approximately one week prior to the filing of the complaint, and

at least several days prior to the completion of the police

investigation and written synthesis. In identifying the function

being performed, the Ninth Circuit found that, at the same time

the interview was performed, the prosecutor “was engaged in other

work that can only be characterized as police-type

investigation.” Id. In examining the function of the

interviews, the Genzler court focused on the nature of the

information obtained by the prosecutor from various witnesses. 

For example, [the prosecutor] and [his supervisor]

interviewed Scott Davis [a witness to the homicide] on

April 25, 1996. The notes from the conversation reflect

only a narrative from Davis’ point of view about the

events of the stabbing. [The prosecutor] joined police

Detective Warrick in a meeting on June 3, 1996 with

Shery Logel, Genzler’s ex-girlfriend, discussing her

story about giving Genzler's knife to [another

witness], and Genzler's character in general. This

conversation, too, was police-type investigative work,

as indicated by the nature of the information obtained

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and by the presence of Detective Warrick. On June 5,

1996, [the prosecutor] interviewed Paul Ernst, another

witness to the homicide, about what he had seen.

Similarly, on June 28, 1996, [the prosecutor] met again

with John Belsan, who came forward with evidence about

a past fight with Genzler. Again, [the prosecutor’s]

notes from this conversation reflect only Belsan's

narrative about what happened in that confrontation.

That [the prosecutor] was engaged in police-type

investigative work during the time he met with Flanders

supports an inference that he was also engaged in such

work when he met with her.

Id. at 640-41. In all of these examples, the prosecutor was

still at the stage of gathering information about the incident

from various points of view. Interview noes did not reflect

opinions about credibility, appraisal as a witness, or other type

of information or evaluation normally characterized as attorney

work product. This information-gathering function in conjunction

with the timing of the interviews caused the Genzler court to

conclude that absolute immunity was not available under the

circumstances. Id. at 641.

In the second scenario reviewed by the Genzler court,

prosecutors met with a witness a a few days after the filing of

the criminal complaint (and only a week or so after the

interviews analyzed above). The Genzler court did not “view the

filing of the complaint as an event after which, by definition,

all actions by the prosecutor and his staff are protected by

absolute immunity,” noting that the preliminary hearing was still

more than three weeks away. The functional analysis revealed

that “officials were continuing the process of investigation into

the facts that would inform whether there was such probable

cause, and the precise charges on which Genzler would stand trial

had yet to be determined.” Id. at 642. To reach this

conclusion, Genzler examined the prosecutor’s notes from the

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From a practical perspective, if the functional aspect 9

was dispositive, absolute immunity would be essentially

eviscerated. 

42

second meeting 

They are captioned, "Witness Interview.” These

interview notes, like notes taken of other interviews

by [the prosecutor], record only a narrative of what

Flanders reportedly said at the meeting about the

events of April 17 and April 18. The notes state that

“FLANDERS had told me during a conversation that took

place at her residence several days earlier that she

had a clearer picture in her mind of the events

surrounding HARLESS' death. She felt that she could

relate them in a more organized fashion than she may

have done earlier in the investigation.” Specifically,

the notes state that Flanders was “distracted” by the

arrival of Scott Davis, which is inconsistent with the

initial statement Flanders made to police. The notes

thus reflect that [the prosecutors] were in the process

of gathering information from Flanders during the

meeting and possibly encouraged her to lie as part of

their process.

Id. (emphasis added). 

This provides some guidance about how a court should draw a

line between “organizing, evaluating, and marshaling [] evidence

in preparation for a pending trial,” an activity protected by

absolute immunity, and “the police-like activity of acquiring

evidence which might be used in a prosecution,” for which a law

enforcement office or prosecutor only receives qualified

immunity. Id. The prosecutor was not protected by absolute

immunity while interviewing a witness after the filing of the

complaint but before the probable cause determination, and where

the interview could be characterized as part of the “process of

gathering information.” It is unclear how much weight should be

given to the timing of the interviews in relation to the function

performed. 

9

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Genzler is entirely consistent with Broam v. Bogan, 320 10

F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit’s most recent

case directly addressing a prosecutor’s immunity from civil

liability for violating Brady. Broam affirmed the general

proposition that “a prosecutor’s decision not to preserve or turn

over exculpatory material before trial, during trial, or after

conviction is a violation of due process under Brady.” Id. 

However, because a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from

43

Genzler cites with approval a Fifth Circuit case, Cousin v.

Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633 (5th Cir. 2003), that provides an

example of an interview that is covered by prosecutorial

immunity:

In Cousin, the Fifth Circuit held that a declaration by

a witness who was allegedly coerced and intimidated

into lying eliminated any ambiguity about whether the

prosecutor was engaged in an investigatory or

quasi-judicial function when he interviewed that

witness. 325 F.3d at 633. The declaration clearly

showed that when the prosecutor met with the witness,

“he did so to tell [the witness] how he should

testify." 

Genzler, 410 F.3d at 642. Genzler distinguished Cousin on the

ground that:

Here, by contrast, the interview notes show a process

of police-type investigation--or, viewed in the light

most favorable to Genzler, a process of manufacturing

evidence while performing police-type investigative

work--not [the prosecutors] acting as advocates by

actively preparing Flanders for her testimony in court.

Id. 

One clear rule ascertainable from Genzler and Cousin is that

a prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity when the

prosecutor is accused of “telling the witness how to testify”

because, at that stage, the prosecutor is acting as an advocate[]

by actively preparing the witness for testimony in court. Id. 

If Defendants’ conduct falls within this description, they are

entitled to absolute immunity.10

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liability “when they are performing a quasi-judicial function,” a

prosecutor is nonetheless immune from civil liability for a Brady

violation that takes place within his or her quasi-judicial

function. Id. (emphasis added). Genzler expands upon Broam’s

holding to provide guidance as to when a prosecutor’s acts should

be deemed “quasi-judicial” in nature. 

It is possible to interpret Plaintiffs allegations as 11

alleging that Marshall’s conduct during the interviews of

Samantha and Breanna violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,

but this would make little sense, given that Marshall concluded

at the end of these meetings that the two girls had lied and

there is no suggestion Marshall had any role in shaping the

girls’ statements. 

44

2. Absolute Immunity As Applied to Defendant

Marshall.

Here, Plaintiff alleges, essentially, that Defendant

Marshall was involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights in

several ways at several stages in the proceedings. First,

Plaintiff alleges that Marshall failed to timely turn over the

Poeschel Reports to the appropriate authorities in violation of

Brady. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Marshall improperly

conducted interviews of the child witnesses prior to an

evidentiary hearing in the habeas proceedings. Finally,

Plaintiff suggests that Marshall acted in bad faith when, despite

having concluded during the interviews that Samantha and Breanna

had lied, he “fail[ed] to acknowledge plaintiff’s claims of

illegal search, seizure, and wrongful prosecution following [the]

opinion of the California 5th Appellate District Court...” and

failed to withdraw the State’s opposition to Plaintiff’s posttrial motions.11

//

//

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a. Marshall’s alleged failure to turn over the

Poeschel Reports.

Marshall first became involved in the case after the initial

appellate brief was filed on September 26, 2000. Marshall filed

the State’s response on behalf of the People on November 14,

2000. At that time Marshall had no knowledge of the potential

recantations. On December 4, 2001, Marshal received a copy of

the Poeschel Reports. Marshall assumed that Faulkner’s counsel

also had a copy. (Marshall Decl., at ¶9.) On December 15, 2001,

Wijsen filed a motion for bail pending appeal on behalf of

Faulkner. Marshall filed an opposition to the bail motions and

attached the Poeschel Reports to it as exhibits. To the extent

that this evidence supports the factual assertion that Marshall

failed to hand over the Poeschel reports, any such failure

occurred in the context of Marshall’s work as an attorney and

advocate in the appellate/habeas proceedings. Marshall is

entitled to absolute immunity for this activity. 

b. Marshall’s interviews of the child witnesses

prior to the habeas evidentiary hearing.

On June 21, 2001, Wijsen filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus with the Fifth Appellate District Court on

Faulkner’s behalf. The petition alleged that several of the

trial witnesses had recanted their trial testimony. On October

10, 2001, the Appellate Court issued an order to show cause to

the Kern County Superior Court why Faulkner’s petition should not

be granted. The Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on

June 17 and 18, 2002. 

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Prior to the evidentiary hearing, in early February 2002,

Marshall interviewed all of the child witnesses in the company of

California Department of Justice Special Agent Morales. (See

Pltf’s Ex. R, Attch. E-R.) Marshall asserts that he conducted

the interviews “for the sole and exclusive purpose of preparing

for the hearing, including assessing the credibility of potential

witnesses.” (Marshall Decl. at ¶ 10.) During those interviews,

Marshall concluded that “[i]t was clear they had either lied at

trial or were subsequently lying about having fabricated their

trial testimony...Nevertheless, because the jury had acquitted

Faulkner of all counts relating to those two anyway, and because

the counts of which he was convicted solely and independently

related to the third alleged victim, Brandon, who remained

steadfastly consistent in his own accounts, it was my good faith

belief that the boy’s testimony independently supported those

convictions.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff disputes Marshall’s asserted “purpose” for the

meetings, pointing to the content of the interviews conducted by

Marshall. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that Marshall acted

in “bad faith” when he “tried to get Brandon to change his

testimony by oppressive questioning.” Marshall asked Brandon

whether Faulkner touched any of the children. When Brandon

answered “No,” Marshall attempted to rephrase the question as

“Were you paying attention to what he...” when Brandon cut him

off and said “No he didn’t.” Marshall then asked “You didn’t see

him do it or you weren’t paying attention?” Brandon answered “He

didn’t.” Marshall then asked “You didn’t see him do it?” 

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Brandon answered “I saw him but he didn’t do it.” Plaintiff

asserts that “Marshall was attempting to get this boy to say what

the girls had been denying for over two years.” (Doc. 93, Pltf’s

Reply to State’s Opp’n to Pltf’s Mot. for Sum. J., at 4.) 

However, even accepting Plaintiff’s theory about Marshall’s

intent, Marshall’s questioning was a reasonable and necessary

part of the process of preparing witnesses and the People’s case

for the evidentiary hearing. The interview was designed to probe

the depth of Brandon’s knowledge and observations. This falls

squarely within the pattern of questioning in Cousin, the Fifth

Circuit case cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit in Genzler. 

In Cousin, a prosecutor met with the witness “to tell [the

witness] how he should testify.” Even though this interview was

arguably coercive, it was covered by absolute immunity because

the interview was designed to prepare the witness to testify.

Cousin, 325 F.3d at 633. Marshall’s conduct during his

interview of Brandon is protected by absolute immunity because he

was actively preparing the witness for testimony in court. 

Genzler, 410 at 643. 

//

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Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Marshall is liable 12

because he acted in “bad faith.” Plaintiff appears to make these

arguments in the context of the qualified immunity standard, but

to the extent that he asserts a “bad faith” exception to absolute

immunity, no such exception exists. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (“To

be sure, [prosecutorial] immunity does leave the genuinely

wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor

whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. 

But the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would

disserve the broader public interest. It would prevent the

vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that

is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice

system.”)(emphasis added). 

48

c. Bad faith allegations.

Finally, Plaintiff suggests that Marshall acted in “bad

faith” when, despite having concluded during the interviews 12

that Samantha and Breanna had lied, he “fail[ed] to acknowledge

plaintiff’s claims of illegal search, siezure, and wrongful

prosecution following [the] opinion of the California 5th

Appellate District Court...” and failed to withdraw the State’s

opposition to Plaintiff’s post-trial motions. These are

decisions on legal strategy Marshall made in the course of his

role as a prosecutor and are therefore covered by absolute

immunity, even if made in bad faith or with an improper motive.

Defendant Marshall’s motion for summary judgment as to all

claims against him is GRANTED.

3. Absolute Immunity As Applied to Defendant Lockyer.

The claims against Lockyer have been dismissed because

Plaintiff has not established any basis for personal liability

against Lockyer. Even if this were not the case, Lockyer is

entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Lockyer’s only direct

participation in the case is the fact that his name appears above

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the signature line of pleadings as attorney, filed and signed by

Marshall as Lockyer’s deputy. Where a prosecutor’s involvement

is “limited to the use of his title in the formal pleadings of

the state criminal case,” absolute immunity applies. Freeman on

Behalf of the Sanctuary v. Hittle, 708 F.2d 442, 443 (9th Cir.

1993). Plaintiff has offered no other evidence or legal grounds

upon which to find otherwise. Defendant Lockyer’s motion for

summary judgment as to all claims against him is GRANTED. 

4. Absolute Immunity As Applied to Defendant

Brownlee.

Defendant Brownlee asserts that he is entitled to absolute

immunity for his allegedly unlawful conduct. Plaintiff objects,

asserting that Brownlee was acting in an investigatory capacity,

rather than in his role as an advocate, when he allegedly

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The operative

allegations against Brownlee are: (1) that he failed to disclose

to Faulkner and/or act upon the potentially exculpatory evidence

provided by Ms. Blankenship; (2) that he used coercive or

suggestive tactics while interviewing the child witnesses prior

to the criminal trial; and (3) that he ordered an investigator to

conduct new interviews of the child witnesses after the

conclusion of the criminal trial and then failed to disclose the

content of those interviews to the appropriate authorities. The

threshold inquiry is whether the activities in which Brownlee

engaged are the type covered by absolute immunity under Genzler.

//

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a. Mary Blankenship’s warnings to Brownlee of

Potentially Perjurious Testimony.

The parties dispute whether and when Mary Blankenship

informed Brownlee of her belief that one or more of the child

witnesses might be lying. There is evidence that Ms. Blankenship

warned Brownlee of her “doubts” both before and after the trial,

although the exact timing of Ms. Blankenship’s warning(s) is not

clear from the record. (Pltf’s Ex. A at 33, 43.) Brownlee

denies ever having received such warnings. For the purposes of

this motion, where disputed facts must be viewed in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party, it must be assumed that Ms.

Blankenship communicated these warnings to Brownlee, both before

and after the trial. 

Genzler controls whether absolute immunity applies in this

case. The inquiry demands an examination of both the timing and

the nature of Brownlee’s interactions with Ms. Blankenship. In

Genzler, the prosecutor was not protected by absolute immunity

for acts that can be characterized as part of the “process of

gathering information.” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 642. In contrast,

a prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity if he or she “is

acting as an advocate by actively preparing the witness for

testimony in court.” Id. at 643.

(1) The pre-trial warnings.

The exact timing of Ms. Blankenship’s purported pre-trial

warning(s) to Brownlee is not clear. The only relevant evidence

is the following excerpt from Ms. Blankenship’s testimony:

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Q: Ms. Blankenship, Mr. Marshall just asked you if

you delayed a year before you told anyone of your

doubts. Isn’t it correct that you told Mr.

Brownlee even before trial? 

A: Yes, I did. I’m Sorry. 

(Id. at 43.) Ms. Blankenship testified that she accompanied the

girls to meetings with Brownlee in Brownlee’s office on two or

three occasions. (Pltf’s Ex. A at 43.) It can be inferred from

this evidence that she spoke with Brownlee at these meetings. No

other pre-trial interactions between Ms. Blankenship and Brownlee

are referenced in the record. 

Under Genzler, these pre-trial witness interviews must be

examined in the overall context of Brownlee’s involvement in the

prosecution. Brownlee was first assigned to handle Faulkner’s

prosecution one week before the preliminary hearing scheduled on

December 14, 1999. Brownlee had no contact with either Deputy

Fennel or Dixon or with any witness until the morning of the

preliminary hearing. Just before that hearing, Brownlee spoke

with Samantha Spoon about the incident. Brownlee asserts that he

conducted this interview because he thought that she might need

to testify at the hearing and he wanted to know what she would

say. 

With respect to timing, as in Genzler, where the prosecutor

was not entitled to absolute immunity for interviews conducted

prior to the probable cause hearing, the probable cause

determination had not yet been made when Brownlee met with

Samantha prior to the preliminary hearing. However, unlike

Genzler, where the interviews took place several weeks prior to

the preliminary hearing, Brownlee met with Samantha the same day,

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immediately prior to a judicial hearing, to prepare himself to

present the People’s case at that hearing. (Brownlee Decl. at

¶4.) In so doing, Brownlee was “acting as an advocate by

actively preparing the witness for testimony in court,” a

function that is protected by absolute immunity. See Genzler,

410 at 643. Although it is a close call, Brownlee’s conduct in

this circumstance is best described as “organizing, evaluating,

and marshaling []evidence in preparation for a pending trial [or

adversarial hearing], in contrast to the police-like activity of

acquiring evidence which might be used in a prosecution...” Id.

at 639. Brownlee is entitled to absolute immunity for his 

interview of Samantha immediately prior to the preliminary

hearing. Even if Ms. Blankenship warned him in the context of

this interview of her belief that Samantha might not be telling

the truth, absolute immunity shields Brownlee from civil

liability for failure to disclose this potentially exculpatory

evidence. See Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030. 

Faulkner’s trial was set for early May 2000. At some point

“within days” of the trial (the exact date of the interviews

appears nowhere in the record), Brownlee interviewed all of the

child witnesses. The probable cause determination had already

been made by an independent judge and the preliminary hearing

concluded. Again, the circumstances suggest a close connection

with the upcoming criminal trial. No contrary evidence has been

submitted. 

Even assuming that Ms. Blankenship did warn Brownlee during

any of these pre-trial witness interviews that either or both of

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Ms. Blankenship also testified that she expressed 13

similar doubts to a “lady from the District Attorney’s Office,”

in September 2000. (Id. at 44.)

Q: And you also testified -- well, did you in fact

talk, yourself, with the D.A. investigator in

September of 2000?

A: I talked with her -- with a lady from the District

Attorney’s Office. 

Q: Did you express that same doubt to her?

A: I did. 

53

the girls might be lying, Brownlee is shielded by absolute

prosecutorial immunity.

(2) The post-trial warnings.

The record is also unclear as to the timing of the purported

post-trial warning(s). Ms. Blankenship testified that, after the

trial, she thought the girls had probably lied and then called

Brownlee to tell him as much.

The Court: ...The question is, after the trial, what

did you do because you thought the girls were

probably lying, and the first thing you did is you

called Brownlee?

The Witness: Correct.

***

Q: When did you do that? When did you call Mr.

Brownlee in relation to the trial?

A: I talked to Mr. Brownlee after the trial about it

also.

Q: How long after the trial is what am getting at. 

Do you know?

A: When I had called Mr. Brownlee’s office to find

out about the sentencing, and that’s when I had

told him what took place. 

(Id. at 33.)13

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But, Plaintiff does not name this “lady” as a defendant nor

connect her to Defendant Brownlee in any way. 

54

No precise time frame for this conversation is provided in

the record. Ms. Blankenship’s mention of the word “sentencing”

suggests that this communication took place in close proximity to

Plaintiff’s sentencing hearing. Sentencing is a phase that is

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process,” and is therefore protected by absolute immunity from

civil liability. See Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028-29; see also

Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1996)(Gould, J.,

concurring)(prosecutors were absolutely immune for participation

in re-sentencing and parole revocation proceedings). 

b. Brownlee’s alleged use of improperly

suggestive interview techniques.

Faulkner also alleges that Brownlee used improperly

suggestive interview techniques with Samantha. Specifically,

Faulkner points to the following except from Ms. Blankenship’s

testimony: 

Q: Do you recall Mr. Brownlee ever suggesting to

Samantha answers?

A: Yes, I do. 

Q: Did you ever hear him suggest to Samantha that

something actually happened in a different way

from what she had said? 

A: Yes, I did. 

Q: And then did Samantha then agree with Mr.

Brownlee’s version

Mr. Marshall: I am going to object to both Mr. 

Brownlee’s suggestion and Samantha’s responses 

as being hearsay. 

But, it is undisputed that Brownlee’s only direct interactions

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with Samantha occurred either immediately prior to the

preliminary hearing or just prior to the trial itself. All of

these meetings were in preparation for her potential testimony as

a witness in judicial proceedings, were not investigatory in

nature, and afford Brownlee absolute immunity. This immunity

protects Brownlee even if he did tell Samantha “what she should

say.” 

c. Brownlee’s involvement in the preparation and

disclosure of the Poeschel reports.

Faulkner was convicted in early May 2000, and was sentenced

to prison in June 2000. In September 2000, Brownlee received

information that one or more of the girls might be changing their

trial testimony. Brownlee was not aware at that stage of the

extent of the witnesses’ intent to recant. Brownlee directed

District Attorney Investigator Patricia Poeschel to interview the

children. These interviews occurred in September, October, and

November 2000. On November 21, 2000, Brownlee received reports

from Poeschel (the Poeschel Reports) summarizing the interviews,

which indicated that two of the girls said they lied about

Faulkner grabbing Samantha. Brownlee claims that he immediately

made a copy of the reports and sent them to the Public Defender’s

office that same day. The Public Defender, Leslie Greer, admits

having received the reports from Brownlee and asserts that she

forwarded them on to Wijsen. Faulkner asserts, however, that the

reports were never given to Wijsen and has presented some proof

to support this assertion, including the circumstantial evidence 

that Wijsen did not reference the reports in his appellate brief

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or the initial habeas petition. For the purposes of this motion,

Faulkner’s version of events must be credited. No explanation is

provided for any failure of Wijsen to receive the Poeschel

Reports Greer sent to him.

The threshold inquiry is whether, under the Genzler

functional analysis, Brownlee’s relevant conduct is shielded by

absolute immunity. The Ninth Circuit has extended the protection

of absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s acts before, during, and

after trial:

 Because by hypothesis resentful defendants initiate

suits irrationally or for purposes of harassment, they

are just as likely to ascribe unconstitutional purposes

to the prosecutor's post-trial acts as to his acts

before and during trial....

Demery, 735 F.2d at 1144-45 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

Like allegations of misconduct during the trial

preparation stage, allegations of misconduct in a

prosecutor's post-trial handling of a case can

generally be corrected without resort to a civil trial

for damages. This claim...is the type that the Supreme

Court, in its wisdom, wanted to prevent and recognized

would be better handled by various post-trial

remedies....

Id. 

However, absolute immunity only attaches to a prosecutor’s

post-trial activities that are related to his or her role as an

advocate. In Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992),

the Seventh Circuit declined to extend absolute immunity under

facts strikingly similar to this case. In that case, two

individuals, Houston and Brown, were convicted of murder. While

their appeals were pending, a cooperating witness told law

enforcement officers that neither Houston nor Brown had committed

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the murders. The witness specifically stated that other

individuals were responsible for the murder. Those two other

witnesses subsequently confessed to law enforcement officers. 

None of this information was disclosed to Houston or Brown until,

after they learned of the confessions on their own, and their

defense attorneys then confronted the prosecutors. 

The Houston court held that the prosecutors were not

absolutely immune from liability under the circumstances, in part

because the appeal was being handled by different government

attorneys at the time the prosecutors learned of the other

witnesses’ confessions. In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh

Circuit engaged in a lengthy examination of the historical bases

for and purposes of prosecutorial immunity before determining

that absolute immunity was not appropriate under those

circumstances. See also Spurlock v. Thompson 330 F.3d 791, 799

(6th Cir. 2003)(prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity for

allegedly unlawful conduct more than a year after completion of

criminal trial). In contrast, where a prosecutor is still

handling post conviction motions and/or the direct appeal,

absolute immunity applies. Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263

(4th Cir. 1994). 

Here, by the time Brownlee learned of the recantations in

September 2000, Faulkner had already filed his notice of appeal

(in June 2000), and appellate counsel had been appointed (in

August 2000). By the end of September 2000, Marshall had been

assigned to the case. Accordingly, when Brownlee received the

Poeshel reports in November and disclosed them to Leslie Greer,

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he was no longer prosecuting the case and absolute immunity would

not apply to this particular conduct. 

Defendant Brownlee’s motion for summary judgment on absolute

immunity grounds is GRANTED as to all the factual allegations

against him, except that the motion is DENIED with respect to his 

involvement in the preparation and disclosure of the Poeschel

reports. Whether this remaining allegation against Brownlee is

sufficient to overcome qualified immunity is discussed below. 

5. Absolute Immunity of Defendant Jagels.

As discussed, Plaintiff has failed to elicit any proof in

support of a Monell claim against the County and summary judgment

has been granted to Defendant Jagels on any official capacity

claims against him. Nor has Plaintiff established that Defendant

Jagels personally participated in or ratified with knowledge any

alleged constitutional violations, entitling Jagels to summary

judgment on any individual capacity claims against him. Even if

Plaintiff could establish an individual capacity claim against

Jagels, he would be entitled to absolute immunity, as his deputy

did no more than sign under the authority of the District

Attorney’s title. Freeman, 708 F.2d at 443. There is no

evidence to show Jagels knew of, directed, participated in, or

established and implemented a policy that made him responsible

for Brownlee’s conduct. 

//

//

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F. Qualified Immunity Applied to the Remaining Claims.

The County and the State move for summary judgment on behalf

of all the remaining individual defendants on the grounds that

all are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff cross-moves

for summary judgment on the ground that defendants’ actions

wrongfully deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights. 

1. Qualified Immunity Legal Framework.

The standard for qualified immunity implicates the legal

bases for the alleged constitutional violations. Deciding

qualified immunity entails a two-step analysis. First, a court

must ask whether a constitutional violation occurred at all. If

the answer to this question is yes, the court must then inquire

whether the right violated was “clearly established” by asking

whether a reasonable officer could believe that the officer’s

actions were lawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). 

 The traditional summary judgment approach should be used in

applying the first step of the Saucier analysis: 

A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity

issue must consider, then, this threshold question:

Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

[official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right?

Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility are manifestly the

province of a jury.

Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110-1111 (9th Cir.

2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the second

step, the court asks whether it would be clear to a reasonable

official that the official’s conduct was unlawful in the

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situation confronted. Although this inquiry is primarily a legal

one, where the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that his

conduct was lawful “depends on the resolution of disputed issues

of fact...summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins v. City

of Oakland, 364 F.3d 949, 1110-11 (9th. Cir. 2003) (citing

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg J., concurring)). 

Under Saucier, the first question is whether “taken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the

facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Here, Plaintiff alleges: 

(1) that investigators and prosecutors fabricated evidence

by either coercing the child witnesses into making

false statements or by using improper investigative

techniques; 

(2) that the prosecution was warned both before and during

the criminal trial that several of the child witnesses

might not be telling the truth, but did nothing with

this knowledge; and 

(3) that both County and State prosecutors failed to timely

disclose exculpatory evidence. 

Some of these claims pertain only to Defendants who are

protected by absolute immunity. Defendants Marshall, Lockyer,

Jagels, and Sparks are entitled to summary judgment on absolute

immunity grounds. Defendant Brownlee is protected by absolute

immunity for almost all of his actions. The sole exception is

that he is protected only by qualified immunity for his conduct

regarding the disclosure of the Poeschel reports. Defendants

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Fennell and Dixon are likewise protected only by qualified

immunity. Accordingly, the remaining claims are:

(1) that Defendants Fennel and Dixon fabricated evidence by

either coercing the child witnesses into making false

statements or by using improper investigative

techniques; 

(2) that Defendant Brownlee learned after the trial that

several of the child witnesses intended to recant their

trial testimony, but did not timely or adequately

disclose the information to Plaintiff’s counsel. 

2. Deliberate Fabrication/Knowingly Pursuing

Prosecution of an Innocent Defendant.

The first allegation is whether Defendants Fennel and Dixon

used improper investigative techniques, falsified evidence,

and/or pursued Plaintiff’s prosecution, despite awareness of his

innocence. 

These claims are controlled by a line of cases beginning

with Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001), in which

the Ninth Circuit has closely circumscribed the range of faultyinvestigation law enforcement claims which may form the basis for

Section 1983 liability in the conduct of child abuse

investigations and interrogations. In Devereaux, a foster parent

who had been accused of sexual misconduct with his foster

children brought a Section 1983 action against various government

entities and law enforcement officials, alleging that defendants

manipulated and coerced the children into giving false evidence

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against him, and withheld and ignored exculpatory evidence. Id. 

Defendants asserted qualified immunity, and the district court

granted summary judgment. Id. Applying the Saucier two-step

qualified immunity approach, the Ninth Circuit ruled that 

there is no constitutional due process right to have

child witnesses in a child sexual abuse investigation

interviewed in a particular manner, or to have the

investigation carried out in a particular way. 

Id. Instead, the Ninth Circuit requires that a plaintiff: 

must, at a minimum, point to evidence that supports at

least one of the following two propositions: (1)

[d]efendants continued their investigation of

[plaintiff] despite the fact that they knew or should

have known that he was innocent; or (2) [d]efendants

used investigative techniques that were so coercive and

abusive that they knew or should have known that those

techniques would yield false information. 

Id. Deliberate falsification of evidence is required; mere

faulty investigative techniques will not suffice to state a

Section 1983 due process claim. Id.

In Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.

2003), the Ninth Circuit ruled that “[a] police officer’s failure

to preserve or collect potential exculpatory evidence does not

violate the Due Process Clause unless the officer acted in bad

faith.” Cunningham, 345 F.3d at 812. Plaintiff argued that the

officer acted in bad faith because he failed to document his

interrogations and did not keep a record of the two children’s

statements denying sexual abuse. The Ninth Circuit rejected this

argument, on the grounds that the officer “likely believed his

tactics were lawful.” Id. Accord Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d

813, 318 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Under the first step of the Saucier analysis, the court must

analyze whether the undisputed facts, together with the disputed

facts viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, show the

Defendants’ conduct establish a constitutional violation under

Devereaux. 

The theory of Plaintiff’s case against Fennel or Dixon is

that their “failure to investigate the outlandish stories of the

minor witnesses deprived plaintiff of his right to be free from

unlawful seizure and of due process.” (Doc. 70, at 15 (emphasis

added).) 

Defendants’ fail[ed] to conduct an investigation at the

scene of plaintiff’s arrest, when all physically

obvious evidence pointed to the impossibility of a

factual scenario as alleged by minor witnesses Samantha

Spoon and Breanna Blanketship. The two eight year old

witnesses informed Defendant Sheriff Deputies Fennel

and Dixon that Faulkner “picked up one of the girls and

placed her on the handlebars of his bicycle while it

sat on its kick-stand.” [Exhibit E, to County MSJ, p.

13 of 19] Fennell then reported that Samantha “jumped

off the bicycle and ran. Faulkner attempted to put

Brandon on the bicycle (illegible), but he was able to

pull away and run.” [Exhibit E, to County MSJ, p. 13 of

19]. Any person familiar with the weight and balance

of a bicycle on its kickstand, and especially a

Sheriff’s Deputy familiar with chasing suspects on

bicycles and making arrests in various factual

situations knows that this factual scenario is

impossible. 

Defendants’ assertion that the witness lied, and

therefore Defendant Sheriff Deputies Fennel and Dixon

should be absolved of liability for their conduct at

the scene of the arrest, is a non sequitur. Defendants

Fennell and Dixon were trained law officers sent to the

scene to ascertain if a crime had been committed. Mere

allegations, illogical in nature, do not provide

probable cause to arrest anyone without a proper

investigation. [Exhibit E, to County MSJ, incident

report; Plaintiff’s Exhibit “O,” Wijsen letter;

Plaintiff’s Exhibit “C”, Poeschel Reports]

(Id. at 13-14.)

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The County makes the obvious counterpoint: “Doubtless, 14

thousands of children [who ride on bike handlebars] would dispute

this claim.” (County’s Reply at 10 n.6)

64

These allegations are controlled by the Devereaux line of

cases. To overcome qualified immunity in a faulty investigation

case, Plaintiff must “point to evidence that supports at least

one of the following two propositions: (1) [d]efendants continued

their investigation of [plaintiff] despite the fact that they

knew or should have known that he was innocent; or (2)

[d]efendants used investigative techniques that were so coercive

and abusive that they knew or should have known that those

techniques would yield false information.” 

Interviewers of child witnesses of suspected sexual

abuse must be given some latitude in determining when

to credit witnesses' denials and when to discount them,

and we are not aware of any federal

law--constitutional, decisional, or statutory--that

indicates precisely where the line must be drawn.

263 F.3d 1070. 

Here, Plaintiff’s only argument relevant to Deputies Fennel

and Dixon is that it is impossible for a child to sit on the

handlebars of a bike while that bike leaned on its kickstand,14

and no reasonable law enforcement investigator could accept the

assertion as true. Even assuming the truth of this assertion,

this does not provide a sufficient factual basis to defeat

qualified immunity. It is far from “clearly established” that

such a scenario is impossible and a reasonable officer could

believe that Defendants Fennel and Dixon’s actions were lawful. 

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). To the extent

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that the complaint also impliedly asserts a Devereaux violation

against Defendant Brownlee, it is difficult to imagine how the

only conduct for which Brownlee is not protected by absolute

immunity –- his alleged failure to timely and properly disclose

the Poeschel reports –- fits into the Devereaux framework. 

Arguendo, the State’s continued insistence upon Plaintiff’s guilt

throughout the appeal could be interpreted as “continu[ing] [an]

investigation of [plaintiff] despite the fact that they knew or

should have known that he was innocent...,” which is prohibited

by Devereaux. But, it was Marshall, not Brownlee, who made the

decision to defend the conviction on appeal and habeas corpus. 

As discussed, Marshall is absolutely immune for his conduct in

post-trial proceedings. The more plausible basis for Brownlee’s

liability is the failure to disclose/ Brady claim, discussed

below. 

3. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence. 

The only remaining claim is the allegation that Defendant

Brownlee failed to adequately disclose the existence of the

Poeschel reports after trial. Under Saucier, the inquiry is

whether the undisputed facts, together with the disputed facts

viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, indicate that

Brownlee violated a clearly established constitutional right. 

The first question is whether the facts show the existence of a

constitutional violation. In this case, this first inquiry is

complex. 

//

//

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a. Is there any constitutional duty to disclose

evidence obtained after conviction and

sentencing?

A threshold question is whether Brownlee was under any

constitutional duty to disclose the evidence in question to

anyone at all, given that the evidence was discovered after

Plaintiff’s trial and conviction. 

Plaintiff maintains that Brownlee was under a “continuing

duty pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) to

disclose any “newly acquired” exculpatory evidence to Faulkner’s

counsel and to the Court.” (Doc. 70, Pltf’s Opp’n to Kern’s

Mot., at 9.) In support of this proposition, Plaintiff cites

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), Imbler v. Pachman,

424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976), Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746,

749-50 (9th Cir. 1992). Neither Ritchie nor Imbler support

Plaintiff’s contention. Ritchie concerned evidence known to the

prosecution prior to trial. 480 U.S. at 43-47. The cited

passage from Imbler, footnote 25, suggests that any continuing

duty to disclose exculpatory evidence discovered post trial is an

ethical responsibility, not a constitutional one:

The possibility of personal liability also could dampen

the prosecutor's exercise of his duty to bring to the

attention of the court or of proper officials all

significant evidence suggestive of innocence or

mitigation. At trial this duty is enforced by the

requirements of due process, but after a conviction the

prosecutor also is bound by the ethics of his office to

inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or

other information that casts doubt upon the correctness

of the conviction. Cf. ABA Code of Professional

Responsibility s EC 7-13 (1969); ABA Standards, supra,

s 3.11. Indeed, the record in this case suggests that

respondent's recognition of this duty led to the

post-conviction hearing which in turn resulted

ultimately in the District Court's granting of the writ

of habeas corpus.

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The County points to a district court case, Hankison v. 15

Board of Prison Terms, 768 F. Supp. 720, 722 (N.D. Cal. 1991),

decided one year prior to Thomas, in support of its assertion

that “[w]hen the prosecution does not learn of the exculpatory

evidence until after the trial, there is no Brady error for

failing to provide it to the defense.” In Hankison, a habeas

case, the petitioner challenged his conviction on the ground that

prosecutors failed to disclose a pre-verdict witness recantation

to his defense counsel. The district court, after an evidentiary

hearing, found that the prosecution was unaware of the

67

424 U.S. at 427 n.25.

Thomas directly support Plaintiff’s assertion. Thomas

concerned a state prisoner pursuing federal habeas relief from a

sexual assault conviction. Thomas asserted several grounds for

habeas relief, including that the state suppressed a semen sample

which would have exonerated him of the sexual assault charge. 

All of his claims were procedurally defaulted in state court and

he was unable to demonstrate cause for his procedural defaults. 

Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the habeas claims

would only be cognizable in federal court if Thomas could

establish a “colorable showing of factual innocence.” Noting

that the “semen sample, or tests thereof, might enable him to

make such a showing,” the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 

[T]he state is under an obligation to come forward with

any exculpatory semen evidence in its possession. See

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). We do not

refer to the state's past duty to turn over exculpatory

evidence at trial, but to its present duty to turn over

exculpatory evidence relevant to the instant habeas

corpus proceeding. Thomas has alleged that the state

possesses evidence which would demonstrate his

innocence and revive an otherwise defaulted ground for

issuing a writ. Under the circumstances, fairness

requires that on remand the state come forward with any

exculpatory evidence it possesses. If no such evidence

exists, the state need only advise the district court

of that fact.

979 F.2d 749-50 (emphasis added)(parallel citations omitted).15

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recantation until after the verdict was announced. Id. at 722. 

The district court reasoned that habeas relief was not warranted

on Brady grounds because, although “[t]he suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request

violates due process...[a] Brady error cannot occur where the

prosecution and law enforcement do not possess and are unaware of

the favorable evidence.” Id. In light of the clear

pronouncement in Thomas, Hankison is not particularly persuasive. 

Hankison’s central focus was whether the trial comported with due

process. Here, in contrast, the issue is whether Brownlee was

under any obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence discovered

after trial. Thomas answers this question in the affirmative.

68

Although Thomas establishes a duty to disclose information

discovered after trial, the existence of this duty does not end

the inquiry into the nature of the constitutional right as it

must be applied in a civil lawsuit brought pursuant to section

1983.

b. What is the legal standard for a Brady claim

brought under Section 1983?

In the context of the criminal process, “[t]here are three 

components of a true Brady violation: [t[he evidence at issue

must be favorable to the accused, either because it is

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have

been suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently;

and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.

263, 281-82 (1999). Also in the criminal context, Brady imposes

a “no fault” obligation upon prosecutors to turn over exculpatory

evidence. A prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory, material

evidence is grounds for a new trial, whether the withholding was

innocent, negligent, or intentional. See Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 

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However, a series of cases have called into question whether

a similar “no fault” standard applies in civil cases where

liability is based upon a Brady violation. In Cunningham v. City

of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2003), where the

plaintiff alleged that police officers failed to preserve and

gather evidence that might have exonerated him, the Ninth Circuit

imposed a bad faith requirement. The Ninth Circuit has never

explicitly discussed whether a similar bad faith requirement

applies to a true Brady violation (i.e., a case dealing with the

purposeful (bad faith) suppression of exculpatory evidence

already in the possession of the government). 

The Fourth Circuit, in Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656 (4th

Cir. 2000), extended the bad faith requirement to a civil Brady

claim where an officer negligently failed to turn over

exculpatory evidence in his possession. Jean’s reasoning is

instructive. The Brady disclosure obligation is derived from the

due process protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Fourth Circuit reasoned that some form of intentional conduct

is required to impose liability for a due process violation under

§ 1983. 

[I]t would be impermissible to hold the police liable

for due process violations under § 1983 where they have

acted in good faith. In Daniels v. Williams, the

Supreme Court stated “that the Due Process Clause is

simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official

causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty,

or property.” 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). The Fourteenth

Amendment mandates, “nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Daniels

holds that, as a matter of plain constitutional text,

no “deprivation” occurs on account of official

negligence. 474 U.S. at 330-33. Indeed, negligent

conduct cannot by definition establish the “affirmative

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abuse of power” necessary to constitute a due process

deprivation. See id. at 330-32. Under Daniels, then,

police officer negligence or inadvertence in failing to

turn over evidence cannot be actionable under § 1983.

The Jean court analogized the circumstances before it to Arizona

v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), which concerned police

officers who allegedly failed to preserve potentially exculpatory

semen evidence. 

The Youngblood Court held, however, that “unless a

criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of

the police, failure to preserve potentially useful

evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of

law.” Id. at 58.

While Youngblood dealt with the failure to preserve

evidence, its principles are certainly applicable to

the present situation. Here, as in Youngblood, the

prosecutor and ultimately the defense allegedly failed

to receive exculpatory evidence from the police. Here,

as in Youngblood, the police officers' actions were

alleged to constitute a due process violation. The

Youngblood Court stressed its “unwillingness” to read

the Due Process Clause to impose “on the police an

undifferentiated and absolute duty” in that context.

Id.

We similarly decline to impose a sweeping duty on

police in the instant situation and note the obvious

drawbacks of doing so. For instance, such a duty would

widen the legal gulf between prosecutors and police to

such an extent as to make scapegoats of police for

every item of evidence discovered post-trial.

Prosecutors plainly enjoy absolute immunity in the

exercise of their prosecutorial duties, of which the

disclosure of Brady material to the defense is clearly

one. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123-29

(1997); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Imbler

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 413-16, 430-31 (1976). To

confer on prosecutors absolute immunity while denying

to police the right to argue even bona fides would

multiply exponentially litigation against even

conscientious officers.

Id. at 661 (parallel citations omitted).

Arguably, this case is distinguishable from Jean because

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 The Ninth Circuit in Devereaux also cautions against 16

the danger of allowing any Brady claim valid in the criminal

context to translate into a civil liability claim: “a Brady

violation cannot in itself support a deliberate-fabrication-ofevidence claim –- if it did any prisoner with a successful Brady

claim would be able to bring a § 1983 action against the

prosecutor for deliberate falsification of evidence.” 263 F.3d

at 1079.

71

Brownlee is in fact a prosecutor, not a police officer. There is

a common characteristic of all the section 1983 Brady cases: the

Defendants in such cases are always either investigators, see

Ramirez v. County of Los Angeles, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1226-27

(C.D. Cal. 2005)(claim failed on other grounds), or prosecutors

who were acting in their investigatory capacity, see Houston, 978

F.2d at 368 (claim survived absolute immunity challenge and was

remanded for further proceedings). This is because prosecutors

acting in their quasi-judicial capacity are absolutely immune

from civil liability. See Imbler, 424 U.S. 409. The remaining

Brady allegation in this case concerns acts taken by Brownlee

outside the scope of his role as a prosecutor. Stripped of the

protections afforded prosecutors, it is reasonable to apply to

Brownlee the standard of law applicable to investigators.16

Plaintiff must establish more than mere negligence on Brownlee’s

part. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (“[T]he Due Process Clause is

simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing

unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.”).

Here, it is undisputed that Brownlee turned the Poeschel

Reports over to Leslie Greer, Plaintiff’s trial counsel. (Greer

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The only relevant factual issue that remains in dispute 17

is whether Wijsen actually received the Poeschel Reports from

Greer. This appears to implicate potential negligence on Greer’s

part, if she failed to timely provide the report to Wijsen.

72

Decl. at ¶6.) (It is also undisputed that he later turned the 17

reports over to Defendant Marshall, the Assistant Attorney

General assigned to handle the State’s opposition Plaintiff’s

appeal and habeas petition. But this disclosure did not occur

until December 21, 2001.) The inquiry turns to whether

Brownlee’s disclosure of the Poeschel reports to Greer satisfied

his duty to disclose, or whether this act constituted an

intentional (i.e., more than negligent) delay to deprive

Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. 

 Plaintiff argues that Brownlee was under a further duty to

disclose the existence of the recantations directly to the court. 

Plaintiff, however, cites absolutely no authority for this

proposition, nor has any been located. To the contrary, some

authority suggests a prosecutor’s Brady obligation may be met in

a variety of ways that fall far short of providing direct notice

of the evidence to a court. For example, a prosecutor may rely

on an “open file policy” to comply with Brady, whereby defense

counsel are permitted access to the prosecution’s entire file. 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 

The undisputed circumstances surrounding the recantations

suggest why it may have been more provident for Brownlee to leave

the decision as to whether to disclose the reports up to defense

counsel. Around the same time that the witnesses began to

recant, Plaintiff was sending letters to the families of at least

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That letter states: 18

Enclosed please find a number of reports from our

investigations unit, as well as multiple letters from

Faulkner to the parents of the victims. 

It appears that the girls are recanting their story. 

However, it also appears that Brandon is sticking to his

story. You might recall that the jury convicted on Brandon,

acquitted on the girls. 

While reading through the information, I noted that

about the time Faulkner starts offering money to the family

of the victim’s [sic] is about the time the girls recanted

their story. Interesting. 

Let me know if you would like to do anything about

this. 

This belief is supported by a long line of cases 19

holding that recantations should be viewed with suspicion. See

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997).

73

some of the witnesses, offering them financial gain in exchange

for recantations. Brownlee’s November 21, 2000 letter to Greer18

discusses his belief that these letters cast doubt upon the

import of the recantations. (See Pltf’s Ex. E.) Nevertheless, 19

Brownlee provided the reports to Greer and left it up to her to

let him “know if [she] would like to do anything about this.” 

(Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that Brownlee also had an obligation to

disclose the reports directly to Wijsen, Plaintiff’s appellate

counsel. By the time Brownlee disclosed the Poeschel reports to

Greer on November 21, 2000, Wijsen was already actively involved

in the appeal, having filed his opening appellate brief on

September 25, 2000. Although there is moral authority in

Plaintiff’s argument, he has cited no legal authority that

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Even if, arguendo, the record did establish a 20

constitutional violation, the existence of a duty to disclose to

someone other than Ms. Greer is far from the type of “clearly

established” rule required to overcome qualified immunity. Here,

to the contrary, a reasonable official could believe that

Brownlee’s disclosure to Greer was adequate under the

circumstances. 

74

imposes a clear duty upon Brownlee to direct the information to

appellate counsel nor has any been located. 

There is no evidence in the record suggesting that

Brownlee’s disclosure of the Poechel reports to Greer was an

unreasonable or intentionally deficient method of disclosure. 

The qualified immunity analysis need not proceed past the first

step, as the facts to not establish a constitutional violation.20

Brownlee is entitled to qualified immunity for his conduct in

connection with causing the preparation of and disclosure to

Faulkner’s defense lawyer of the Poeschel reports. Brownlee’s

motion for summary judgment on this remaining claim is GRANTED. 

G. Motion to Reinstate Defendant Greer. 

The current lawsuit, filed in July 2004, initially named

Kern County Deputy Public Defender Lesley Greer as a defendant. 

In March 2005, Deputy County Counsel Andrew Thompson and

Plaintiff’s counsel, Ellen Ellison, discussed the possible

voluntary dismissal of Lesley Greer and others. Mr. Thompson

represented that he knew of nothing that Ms. Greer had done that

would impose liability upon her. Shortly thereafter, the parties

stipulated to the dismissal of Greer with prejudice. 

Faulkner now asserts that the dismissal was based upon Mr.

Thompson’s misrepresentations as to Greer’s involvement and/or

complicity in a Brady violation. Specifically, Faulkner asserts

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that there is evidence that Ms. Greer failed to pass the Poeschel

Reports on to Mr. Faulkner’s appellate attorney. Faulkner bases

his motion to reinstate on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),

which provides: 

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court

may relieve a party or a party's legal representative

from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,

or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence

which by due diligence could not have been discovered

in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)

fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of

an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the

judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,

or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been

reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer

equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief

from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be

made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1),

(2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment,

order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion

under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality

of a judgment or suspend its operation...

Plaintiff specifically invokes Rule 60(b)(3) and (b)(6), which

allow for a judgment to be set aside because of “fraud,

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” and

for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment,” respectively. 

Reinstating Greer as a defendant also implicates Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which provides

A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter

of course at any time before a responsive pleading is

served or, if the pleading is one to which no

responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not

been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so

amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.

Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only

by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse

party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so

requires....

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Leave to amend should be “freely given,” “[i]n the absence of any

apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to

cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 182 (1962). Here, substantial time has passed, discovery is

closed, and the case has been pursued without Greer’s

participation. Even if Plaintiff satisfied the requirements for

setting aside the dismissal with prejudice under Rule 60,

amendment to add Greer as a defendant would be legally futile.

It is undisputed that Brownlee forwarded the Poeschel

reports to Greer on November 21, 2000 and that Greer received

them. Greer admits as much and Plaintiff does not dispute this. 

(Greer Decl. at ¶6.) Upon receipt of the reports, Greer asserts

that she telephoned Wijsen immediately and informed him of the

contents of the reports. (Id.) Greer maintains that she then

forwarded copies of the reports to Wijsen. Faulkner contends

that Ms. Greer never forwarded the reports to Wijsen, a

contention that is supported by some circumstantial evidence. 

For example, although the habeas petition filed by Wijsen on

behalf of Mr. Faulkner on June 19, 2001 does indicate that Wijsen

received information in September 2000 that several of the child

witnesses intended to recant their testimony, Wijsen makes no

reference to the Poeschel reports therein:

//

//

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Plaintiff speculates that Greer may have conspired with 21

Brownlee and/or others to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights. In

theory, such a claim could render a non-state actor, such as Ms.

Greer, liable under section 1983. Here, however, Plaintiff

offers nothing but conclusory allegations of conspiracy,

asserting generally that Greer “joined in an effort to revise the

facts regarding who was told of the Poeschel reports...” and that

she “is apparently strongly motivat[ed] to aid Mr. Brownlee in an

attempt to have met his duty under Brady... through her.” (See

Doc. 91, Reply to Mot. to Reinstate, at 4-5.) Apart from these

conclusory allegations, however, Plaintiff offers absolutely no

evidence of the existence of any such conspiracy.

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In September 2000, appellate counsel for petitioner

received information alleging that Mary Blankenship,

the mother of two key prosecutorial witnesses in the

case agaoist petitioner, Samantha Spoon and Breanna

Blankenship, had contacted the Kern County District

Attorney’s staff and advised it that her children had

lied at trial about what had occurred between them and

petitioner. Next[,] appellate counsel had it confirmed

by Bakersfield Attorney James L. Faulkner [] that the

two children had admitted to Mary Blankenship that

their accusations against petitioner were a total

fabrication and that the alleged attempted abduction

and false imprisonment of Brandon McElroy was in fact

nothing more than petitioner stopping Brandon and

others from throwing rocks at him. 

(Doc. 49, County’s Opp’n to Mot. to Reinstate, Ex. 1 at 6.) 

Instead, the petition relies exclusively upon Smith’s interviews

of Brianna Blankenship and Samantha Spoon, in which both girls

recant their trial testimony. For purposes of this motion,

therefore, it is be assumed that Greer indeed did fail to turn

the Poeschel reports over to Wijsen. 

There is not an iota of evidence that Greer’s failure was

more than negligence. Such a failure does not expose Greer to

civil liability under section 1983. At best, Plaintiff could 21

maintain a professional malpractice suit against Greer, provided

all of the prerequisites to such a suit were satisfied. But,

given that all of the federal claims in this lawsuit have been

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resolved on summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, the

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over this remaining claim

would likely be inappropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)(“The

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a claim...if...the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction....”). 

H. Plaintiff’s Argument that the California 5th Appellate

District Opinion Precludes Further Litigation on the

Issue of Materiality under Brady. 

As discussed, Plaintiff’s second state petition for a writ

of habeas corpus was successful. In reaching the conclusion that

the writ should be granted, the Fifth Appellate District used the

term “material” in reference to the recanted evidence. Plaintiff

now requests recognition of this ruling as collateral estoppel,

and argues that the Defendants should be barred from relitigating

the question of materiality for purposes of the Brady standard. 

Because no Brady claim survives summary judgment, this argument

is moot. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED as

to all defendants on all claims;

(2) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

(3) Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate dismissed defendant

Greer is DENIED.

(4) Defendants’ motions to bifurcate are DENIED AS MOOT. 

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SO ORDERED

Dated: June 28, 2006

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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