Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00343/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00343-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRIME, JUSTICE & AMERICA, INC., )

a California Corporation; and )

RAY HRDLICKA, an individual, ) 2:08-cv-343-GEB-EFB

)

Plaintiffs, ) ORDER*

)

v. )

)

PERRY L. RENIFF, in his official )

capacity of Sheriff of the County )

of Butte, California, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ sole

claim alleged under the First Amendment; specifically, Plaintiffs

claim Defendant’s denial of their request to distribute unsolicited

copies of Plaintiffs’ Crime, Justice & America (“CJA”) publication to

inmates at the Butte County Jail violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment

right to communicate with inmates. Defendant argues Plaintiffs do not

have a First Amendment right to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA

to inmates, and contend even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs have

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

that right, Defendant’s refusal to distribute unsolicited copies of

CJA to inmates should be upheld because “it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests,” citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

78, 89 (1987). 

“[A] fundamental rule of judicial restraint” is that

“questions of a constitutional nature [are avoided] unless absolutely

necessary to a decision of the case.” U.S. v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188,

1197 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854

(1985); Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)). In

Turner, the Supreme Court held “a prison regulation [that] impinges on

. . . [First Amendment] rights . . . is valid if it is reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

To guide courts in evaluating whether a challenged

regulation is reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests, Turner established the

following four-part test:

(1) whether the regulation is rationally related

to a legitimate and neutral governmental

objective; (2) whether there are alternative

avenues that remain open to the inmates to

exercise the right; (3) the impact that

accommodating the asserted right will have on

other guards and prisoners, and on the allocation

of prison resources; and (4) whether the existence

of easy and obvious alternatives indicates that

the regulation is an exaggerated response by

prison officials.

Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 901 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation and

citation omitted).

Defendant argues the first Turner factor weighs in his favor

since his refusal to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA is

rationally related to his legitimate and neutral interest in

maintaining a secure and orderly jail. Captain Jerry Jones and

Lieutenant Byran Flicker of the Butte County Jail each declare the

Butte County Jail has a mail distribution policy that prohibits

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

distribution of unsolicited commercial mail to inmates. They declare

this mail policy limits the amount of paper to which inmates may have

access, which thereby restricts inmates’ ability to use paper to

secret contraband and allows staff to conduct cell searches more

efficiently; limits the amount of material inmates’ may use to plug

their toilets and flood their cells; and restricts inmates’ ability to

place paper over their windows and light fixtures, which prevents

staff from conducting required welfare checks efficiently. They

further declare this mail policy “ensures that staff have the ability

to adequately search every piece of [incoming] mail . . . [to]

minimizes the amount of contraband that enters the facility.” (Jones

Decl. ¶ 30; Flicker Decl. ¶ 11.)

Plaintiffs counter Defendant’s refusal to distribute CJA is

an arbitrary means of maintaining a secure and orderly jail, relying

on Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005). In

Lehman, the Ninth Circuit found “a ban on non-subscription [i.e.,

free] bulk mail and catalogs” violated the First Amendment. Id. at

699. The Ninth Circuit stated a ban “based on the postage rate at

which the mail was sent” or the fact that “the inmates . . . did not

pay for the mail that was sent to them” was an arbitrary means of

“reduc[ing] the volume of mail that may contain contraband [because]

it is far more likely that contraband would be contained in first

class mail than in bulk mail.” Id. at 700. The Ninth Circuit also

stated this ban was an arbitrary means of “increas[ing] the efficiency

of cell searches” since the prison “already regulate[d] the quantity

of possessions that prisoners may have in their cells.” Id.

Defendant rejoins Lehman is distinguishable since “every

piece of mail sent by [the publisher in Lehman was] sent as a result

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

of a request by the recipient” Id. at 700. The Ninth Circuit stated

in Lehman “the fact that a request was made by the recipient . . . is

important” in determining whether the sender’s First Amendment right

to communicate with the recipient has been violated because “[t]he

sender’s interest in communicating the ideas in the publication

corresponds to the recipient’s interest in reading what the sender has

to say.” Id. at 700-01 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Therefore, Lehman is distinguishable since Plaintiffs seek to send CJA

to inmates “regardless of whether [inmates] requested the

publication.” Id. at 700.

Further Captain Jones and Lieutenant Flicker aver the

prohibition of unsolicited commercial mail is not arbitrary because

inmates would especially use unsolicited copies of CJA for improper

purposes such as secreting contraband, plugging their toilets, and

covering windows and light fixtures, because “unlike personal mail, or

attorney-client mail, inmates do not have a connection to unsolicited

commercial mail, and they are less concerned that the unsolicited

publications would be damaged, lost, or seized.” (Flicker Decl. ¶¶

22, 24; Jones Decl. ¶ 36.) They further aver that although there are

regulations restricting the quantity of each inmate’s possessions,

these regulations are insufficient because inmates still “routinely

attempt [to use their possessions] to secret contraband, start fires,

plug their toilets, and cover their light and windows.” (Jones Decl.

¶ 36; see also Flicker Decl. ¶ 22.) Accordingly, there is a rational

relationship between the prohibition of unsolicited commercial mail

and Defendant’s interest in maintaining jail security; and the first

Turner factor weighs in Defendant’s favor.

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Defendant also submits evidence on the second Turner factor

demonstrating Plaintiffs have an alternative avenue to distribute CJA

to inmates; specifically, Captain Jones avers “inmates can . . .

request and receive publications . . . .” (Jones Decl. ¶ 9.) 

Plaintiffs counter this alternative could be satisfied, relying on

Plaintiff Ray Hrdlicka’s averment that Plaintiffs may “make public

records requests for copies of [the Butte County Jail’s] full inmate

roster” and use this information to make “direct mailings” of CJA to

each inmate. (Hrdlicka Decl. ¶¶ 21, 23.) Plaintiffs argue if they

follow this procedure, Defendant would have “no apparent way to

distinguish” solicited copies of CJA from unsolicited copies of CJA. 

(Opp’n at 31:12-17.) Plaintiffs appear correct, but their argument

does not negate Defendant’s position that Plaintiffs have an

alternative. Accordingly, the second Turner factor also weighs in

Defendant’s favor.

Defendant also submits evidence on the third Turner factor. 

Captain Jones and Lieutenant Flicker each declare that distribution of

unsolicited commercial mail would create an additional burden on the

inadequate resources already existing at the Butte County Jail. 

Captain Jones declares for the past ten years, Defendant has

experienced ongoing difficulties in maintaining adequate staffing, and

that as a result of inadequate staffing, several programs, such as the

inmate road crew, the inmate hog farm, and several vocational

programs, had to be discontinued. Lieutenant Flicker declares jail

staff currently needs to devote “approximately 6 hours a day to sort,

search, transport and distribute the mail.” (Flicker Decl. ¶ 10.) 

Captain Jones further declares there have already been complaints at

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the Butte County Jail about “the timely distribution of incoming legal

and personal mail.” (Jones Decl. ¶ 23.)

Captain Jones also declares Defendant’s “prohibition against

unsolicited commercial mail is designed to limit the amount of mail

that enters the facility, which in turn limits the amount of time and

resources that must be expended to search and distribute incoming

mail. . . . In addition, limiting the amount of staff time that is

spent processing unsolicited commercial mail allows [Jones] and

management staff more flexibility in assigning staff to perform other

duties on an immediate and ongoing basis.” (Jones Decl. ¶ 30.) He

also declares “requiring [Defendant] to dedicate staff time to

processing unsolicited publications would greatly interfere with

staff’s ability to process other mail, and, depending on the staffing

levels and inmate population at any given time, would likely interfere

with the provision of other services as well. . . .” (Jones Decl. ¶

31; see also Flicker Decl. ¶¶ 11, 12.)

Plaintiffs counter distribution of CJA would not burden jail

resources, relying on Hrdlicka’s averment that Plaintiffs intend to

make weekly distributions of CJA to only ten percent of the inmates in

the Butte County Jail. (Hrdlicka Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19, 20, 23, 31.) Based

on the list of inmates in the Butte County Jail provided by a Deputy

County Counsel in August 2004, which showed approximately 570 inmates,

Plaintiffs would only send approximately 57 copies of CJA to the Butte

County Jail each week.

Captain Jones rejoins, declaring he is “concerned that if

[the Butte County Jail] agree[s] to distribute unsolicited copies of

[CJA] [then the Butte County Jail] would then have to permit other

unsolicited newsletters, advertisements, and publications to be

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

distributed . . . as well.” (Jones Decl. ¶ 33.) In light of

Defendant’s evidence concerning the impact distribution of unsolicited

commercial mail could have on jail resources, the third Turner factor

also weighs in Defendant’s favor.

Defendant also argues the fourth Turner factor weighs in his

favor since he has no “easy and obvious alternatives” and his mail

policy is not an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns. 

Plaintiffs counter alternative ways to address Defendant’s concerns

already exist, pointing to Captain Jones and Lieutenant Flicker’s

averments that there are regulations restricting the quantity of each

inmate’s possessions. However, Captain Jones and Lieutenant Flicker

aver these regulations are insufficient since inmates still “routinely

attempt [to use their possessions] to secret contraband, start fires,

plug their toilets, and cover their light and windows.” (Jones Decl.

¶ 36; see also Flicker Decl. ¶ 22.) Therefore, the fourth Turner

factor also weighs in Defendant’s favor.

Since all four Turner factors weigh in favor of Defendant,

Defendant’s refusal to grant Plaintiffs’ request to distribute

unsolicited copies of CJA is “reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Accordingly,

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

However, on March 17, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a motion for

leave to amend the Complaint to add a new claim under the Clayton Act. 

This motion is untimely since the last motion hearing date prescribed

in a pretrial scheduling order issued on May 2, 2008 was December 15,

2008. Plaintiffs fail to explain why they filed their motion to amend

after the prescribed law and motion deadline and why they failed to

schedule it for hearing on or before the last motion hearing date. 

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

While it is recognized that Defendant’s summary judgment motion sub

judice was originally set for hearing on December 1, 2008, and that

the hearing date for this motion was changed to January 12, 2009, in

response to Plaintiffs’ late request for a continuance of the motion

filed November 26, 2008, that continuance Order did not otherwise

extend the last hearing deadline for a motion. 

Plaintiffs only address the “no further amendment” provision

in the May 2 pretrial scheduling order, arguing that good cause exists

for amending this portion of the scheduling order since they did not

have a copy of a contract on which their Clayton Act claim depends

until Defendant filed his summary judgment motion on October 30, 2008,

and the basis for their Clayton Act claim did not arise until some

unspecified time in November 2008. Plaintiffs have the burden,

however, of demonstrating that they could not have filed their

amendment motion as required by the May 2 pretrial scheduling order,

and their failure to state when in November 2008 their Clayton Act

claim ripened does not satisfy their burden.

As Plaintiffs must know, the new claim they seek to add

would affect several deadlines prescribed in the May 2 pretrial

scheduling order, including the discovery completion date which

expired October 15, 2008, and trial date which is set for May 19,

2009, and Defendant should have been provided opportunity to litigate 

Plaintiffs motion to add a new claim “at [this] late stage of

litigation” as prescribed in the May 2 pretrial scheduling order. 

Eagle v. Am. Tel & Tel. Co., 769 F.2d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 1985); see

also Garcia v. Dillon Co., Inc., No. 05-cv-02339, 2008 WL 4509821, at

*5 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2008) (denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend

where the plaintiff was “seeking to make this a brand new lawsuit, but

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

with a trial date that is only four months away); Chaara v. Intel

Corp., No. CIV 05-278, 2006 WL 4079030, at *1 (D. New Mex. May 31,

2006) (denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend “because the case is

ripe for dismissal rather than transformation into a lawsuit . . .”).

Here that opportunity has been denied not only because of

Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the last motion hearing date

prescribed in the May 2 pretrial scheduling order, but also because of

Plaintiffs’ filing of a defective motion under Local Rule 5-137(c). 

This Rule provides “[i]f filing a document requires leave of Court,

such as an amended complaint when an answer is on file, counsel shall

attach the document proposed to be filed as an exhibit to the motion

and lodge a proposed order as required be these Rules.” See also

Stringham v. Lee, No. CIV S-04-1530, 2007 WL 1302497, at *1 (E.D. Cal.

Apr. 30, 2007) (denying motion to amend because it “was not

accompanied by a proposed amended complaint and is defective on that

basis alone”); Meyer v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-06-2584, 2008 WL

2223253, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2008) (“Since plaintiff did not

submit a proposed second amended complaint, the court is unable to

evaluate it and defendants are unable to determine whether they might

stipulate to its filing. Plaintiff’s defective motion for leave to

amend must therefore be denied.”). This Rule provides notice of the

exact amendment proposed, which Plaintiffs has not given because of

their failure to attach their proposed amended complaint. Although

Plaintiffs state in the motion “[a]ttached hereto as Exhibit A is a

true and correct copy of Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint,” the

referenced proposed Amended Complaint is not attached.

Since Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the Rule 16 good

cause standard by not providing justification for filing a late

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

motion, violated Local Rule 5-137(c) by failing to attach their

proposed Amended Complaint to their motion, and seek to add a new

claim under the Clayton Act which is tantamount to filing a new

lawsuit, reason has not been provided justifying delaying summary 

judgment Defendant seeks.

For the stated reasons, the Clerk of the Court shall enter

judgment in favor of Defendant since his summary judgment motion is

granted, and Plaintiff’s defective motion filed March 17, 2009, is

stricken.

Dated: March 18, 2009

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:08-cv-00343-TLN-EFB Document 45 Filed 03/18/09 Page 10 of 10