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Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

CHARLES A. SAWYER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SWIFT & COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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JAN 07 19BS 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 85-2801 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE STATE OF KANSAS 

{ No . 8 3- 2 4 0 3 ) 

William H. Berger, United States Department of Labor, Atlanta, 

Georgia (Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney; Robert 

S. Streepy, Assistant United States Attorney; George R. Salem, 

Deputy Solicitor of Labor; John F. Depenbrock, Associate Solicitor 

of Labor, Washington, D.C.; Tedrick A. Housh, Jr., Regional 

Solicitor, United States Department of Labor, Kansas City, 

Missouri, with him on the brief), Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Daniel B. Denk of McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, Kansas City, 

Kansas, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and ANDERSON,* District 

Judge. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 85-2801 Document: 01019290248 Date Filed: 01/07/1988 Page: 1 
Swift & Company (Swift) appeals the Judgment and Order of the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas, finding 

that Swift violated 38 u.s.c. §§ 202l(b)(3} and 2024(d), the 

Veterans Reemployment Rights Act (Act), in its treatment of 

Charles A. Sawyer (Sawyer). Sawyer was an employee of Swift from 

December 8, 1980, until January 10, 1983, and a member of the Navy 

Reserves beginning for purposes of this case in October, 1982. 

The District Court decided the case on the parties' joint 

motion for declaratory judgment based on stipulations of fact and 

deposition testimony. The court's Memorandum and Order appears at 

610 F. Supp. 38 (D. Kan. 1985}. The stipulations considered by 

the trial court are as follows: 

1. Defendant is a corporation maintaining a place 

of business at 4612 Speaker Road, Kansas City, Kansas. 

2. Plaintiff was employed by defendant on 

December 8, 1980, in an other than temporary position as 

a mechanic and was discharged on January 10, 1983. 

3. Plaintiff joined the Navy Reserve in October, 

1982, a component of the Armed Forces of the United 

States, and was assigned to a Naval Reserve Unit in 

Memphis, Tennessee. The plaintiff would meet a military 

transport plane at Richards-Gebaur Airport at 6:00 p.m. 

on the Fridays preceding his drills for transportation 

to Memphis. 

4. Plaintiff was scheduled to perform inactive 

duty training with his Naval Reserve Unit in Memphis, 

Tennessee on December 11 and 12, 1982. 

5. Plaintiff attended a second step grievance 

hearing at Swift & Company on December 9, 1982. Also 

present at the hearing were Stan Hall, Lucille White, 

Henry Duron, Ron Lupardus, Steve Dickey, and Pat 

Holland. Plaintiff contends that at this hearing he 

gave defendant verbal notice of his make-up drill the 

first nonholiday weekend in January, 1983. Defendant 

alleges there was no such notice given. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2801 Document: 01019290248 Date Filed: 01/07/1988 Page: 2 
6. The plaintiff did not work at Swift & Company 

on Saturday, December 11, 1982. 

7. The plaintiff's supervisor at Swift & Company 

was Jerry Kaprol. Steve Dickey was employed in 

December, 1982, as Chief Engineer. 

8. 

National 

Workers. 

Plaintiff was a union steward for Local 122, 

Brotnerhood of Meat Packers and Industrial 

9. Plaintiff rescheduled his make-up inactive 

duty training originally scheduled at Memphis for 

December 11 and 12, 1982, with the Naval Reserve Unit at 

Olathe, Kansas, for January 8 and 9, 1983. 

10. The plaintiff's shift at Swift & Company was 

from approximately 2:00 p.m. to approximately 10:30 p.m. 

weekdays. 

11. Defendant's objection to plaintiff's attending 

inactive duty training in Memphis was based on the fact 

that the plaintiff had to leave work early on Fridays 

preceding reserve drills. 

12. On January 6, 1983, defendant posted a list of 

employees scheduled to work on Saturday, January 8, 

1983. Plaintiff's name appeared on this list. 

13. 

training 

January 8 

scheduled 

1983. 

Plaintiff attended his make-up inactive duty 

at the Naval Reserve Unit, Olathe, Kansas, on 

and 9, 1983, and did not report to his 

overtime work at Swift & Company on January 8, 

14. Plaintiff attended inactive duty training at 

the Naval Reserve Unit in Memphis, Tennessee, in October 

and November, 1982. 

15. There were eight mechanics on plaintiff's shift. 

16. Every employee assigned to work on January 8, 

1983, was a mechanic. 

17. The plaintiff had been disciplined on 

occasions prior to January 10, 1983, for his work 

attendance record at Swift & Company and was accordingly 

in the progressive disciplinary mode. 

18. The plaintiff was scheduled to work on January 

8, 1983, and he did not ~eport for work on such date. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2801 Document: 01019290248 Date Filed: 01/07/1988 Page: 3 
were: 

19. The plaintiff returned to work on January 10, 

1983, and he was indefinitely suspended, and 

subsequently discharged by defendant. 

The issues thus presented for the trial court's determination 

(1) the responsibility of Swift to allow Sawyer a monthly 

absence from work ori Friday evenings in order to travel from 

Kansas City to Memphis, Tennessee, for his weekend training 

drills; ( 2) whether Sawyer gave Swift adequate notice that he 

would attend a makeup drill in Olathe, Kansas, on January 8-9, 

1983, in lieu of assigned overtime that weekend; and ( 3) whether 

Sawyer was terminated as a result of his attending military 

reserve training on January 8-9, 1983. 

The trial court found with respect to the first issue that 

because 38 u.s.c. § 2024(d) provides that a leave of absence from 

work "shall upon request be granted ••. for the period required 

to perform • inactive duty training," Swift was obligated to 

allow Sawyer to leave early on Fridays to attend training drills. 

Swift apparently does not dispute this finding. With respect to 

the other two issues, the trial court found that Sawyer gave 

adequate notice during the December 9, 1982, second-step grievance 

hearing that he would be absent the "first nonholiday weekend in 

January, 1983" for a make-up drill in Olathe, Kansas and that 

Sawyer was terminated in violation of 38 u.s.c. § 2021 (b)(3) 1 as 

1 38 U.S.C. § 202l(b)(3) provides: 

Any person who [is in the employ of a private employer] 

shall not be denied retention in employment or any 

promotion or other incident or advantage of employment 

because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve 

component of the Armed Forces. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2801 Document: 01019290248 Date Filed: 01/07/1988 Page: 4 
a direct result of attending that drill. The court ordered 

reinstatement and back pay and ruled that the back pay could not 

be reduced by the unemployment compensation Sawyer collected after 

he was fired. Swift has appealed these three determinations. 

DISCUSSION 

Our standard of review is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a): 

"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 

and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 

court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." This 

standard may be problematic when the trial court bases its 

findings of fact upon deposition testimony and stipulations by the 

parties. Nevertheless, the clearly erroneous standard applies to 

all cases where the trial court makes findings of fact. Anderson 

v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). Anderson 

summarizes certain general principles that may be gleaned from the 

cases. The foremost of these is that "(a] finding is clearly 

erroneous 'when although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Id. at 

573. On the other hand, the reviewing court may not reverse the 

trier of fact merely because it might have decided the case 

differently, nor can it decide factual issues de novo. Id. 

Finally, where there are two permissible views of the evidence, 

the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. 

Id. at 574. Bearing these standards in mind, we will discuss each 

issue raised by Swift. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2801 Document: 01019290248 Date Filed: 01/07/1988 Page: 5 
I. 

The trial court's determination that Sawyer gave adequate 

notice of his intention to make up his December training drill 

during the weekend of January 8-9, 1983, is a conclusion of law 

based on a factual ·finding that Sawyer did bring the matter up at 

a second step grievance hearing on December 9, 1982. We do not 

question the trial court's factual finding, since the evidence was 

in conflict on this point and the trial court must choose the more 

credible version. Still, on the basis of the entire record, we do 

question the court's conclusion. 

First, we observe that legal authority on the subject of what 

constitutes proper notice to an employer under 38 U.S.C. § 

2024(d) 2 is sparse. In Blackmon v. Observer Trans. Co., 102 

C.C.H. Labor Cases ~11, 450 at 23, 913 (W.D.N.C. 1982), the court 

was asked to decide whether mention of a reserve obligation by a 

driver at a drivers' meeting convened for general purposes 

constituted proper notice under the Act. The court sidestepped 

the issue by finding that because no one could corroborate the 

employee's contention, the employee had not in fact made the 

2 28 U.S.C. §2024(d) provides: 

Any employee [in private employment] shall 

upon request be granted a leave of absence by 

such person's employer for the period required 

to perform active duty for training or 

inactive duty training in the Armed Forces of 

the United States. 

The phrase "upon request" has been interpreted to mean 

"after proper notice." Rodgers v. Missouri Pacific R. 

Co., 82 C.C.H. Labor Cases ~10, 222 at 16, 859 (E.D. 

Ill. 1977); Blackmon v. Observer Trans Co., 102 C.C.H. 

Labor Cases ~11, 450 at 23, 913 (W.D.N.C. 1982). 

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request. We can find no other cases that squarely address such an 

issue. 

In the instant case, we accept the trial court's finding that 

during a grievance hearing in December, Sawyer brought up the fact 

that he needed to make up his reserve obligation on "the first 

nonholiday weekend in January." We also note that the primary 

purpose of the grievance proceeding was to consider two grievances 

filed by Sawyer: the first because he was not scheduled to work 

overtime on a Friday holiday in November, and the second because 

he was disciplined for not wearing a beard net. We also note that 

no witness remembered Sawyer giving a specific date. Further, the 

record shows that later in December, Sawyer gave Patrick Holland, 

the personnel manager, a copy of his orders for a January 22 

drill. The orders contained nothing pertaining to the January 8 

drill, nor did Sawyer mention it (R., Vol. VII, pp. 28-30). 

Finally, when the overtime list was posted on January 6, the 

evidence is undisputed that Sawyer failed to inform anyone that 

his name should not have been on the list and that he would not be 

working on January 8. The trial court excused this, saying it was 

not unreasonable for Sawyer to fail to remind Swift that he needed 

the weekend off, in light of the fact that Swift had denied Sawyer 

time off in December to fly to Memphis. This misses the mark, 

since the makeup drill was in Olathe and did not necessitate 

travel time on Friday night. Moreover, several Swift witnesses 

testified without contradiction that they told Sawyer that Reserve 

drills on Saturdays and Sundays were no problem. Looking at the 

record as a whole, it is clear to us that although Sawyer did 

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Appellate Case: 85-2801 Document: 01019290248 Date Filed: 01/07/1988 Page: 7 
mention a makeup drill to take place the first nonholiday weekend 

in January, later events proved this statement ineffective as 

notice to Swift. Sawyer's reserve status did not eclipse his 

ordinary obligations to his employer, including his obligation to 

notify or remind Swift, at any time from January 6 up to one hour 

before his shift was to begin on January 8, that he had a prior 

commitment. On this record, notice was clearly inadequate: it 

was not understood and acted upon, and Sawyer knew or should have 

known it. Had Sawyer not been in the Reserves and had the same 

situation occurred, Swift would have been justified in terminating 

Sawyer. His record was replete with unexcused absences and 

tardiness, and it is undisputed that he was one infraction away 

from termination. 

We hold that under the circumstances of this case, the trial 

court's conclusion that notice was adequate was clearly erroneous. 

II. 

The trial court's finding that Sawyer was terminated in 

violation of 38 U.S.C. § 202l(b)(3) is premised on its conclusion 

that he gave adequate notice of his January 8 drill obligation. 

Because he was fired after attending this drill, the court found 

the conclusion inescapable that Sawyer was terminated because of 

his reserve status. The trial court did not discuss the role of 

Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 u.s. 549 (1981), except to dismiss 

it as inapplicable to the issue, not under appeal here, of whether 

Swift was required to give Sawyer travel time on Friday evenings. 

In our view, Monroe cannot be ignored, despite its factual 

dissimilarity to the instant case. The issue in Monroe was 

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whether an employer was required to make scheduling accommodations 

for employee-reservists. The Court held an employer did not have 

to make such accommodations because§ 202l{b)(3) was intended and 

enacted for the limited purpose of protecting reservists from 

discrimination based solely on their reserve status. If 

scheduling accommodations would not be made for employees without 

military obligations, they would not be made for employeereservists. Monroe's importance to the instant case is two-fold. 

First, it requires an analysis in terms of an employer's 

treatment of non-reserve employees. If a non-reserve employee in 

Sawyer's position would be terminated for the same conduct, 

Sawyer's reserve status cannot insulate him. If, on the other 

hand, a non-reserve employee would not be terminated for the same 

conduct, it becomes obvious that the reasons given for termination 

were pretextual. The evidence showed that other employees had 

been disciplined or terminated for missing scheduled overtime on 

Saturdays. (R., Vol. VII, pp. 40-42). Sawyer was in the 

''progressive mode" of the disciplinary progression, which meant 

that one more infraction on his part would result in termination. 

( R. I Vol. VII, pp. 55-57). Moreover, there were a number of other 

reservists at Swift who were given time off with no problems. 

( R. , Vol. VIII, p. 27) . On this basis, it would be difficult to 

conclude that Sawyer was discriminated against because of his 

reserve status. 

The second way Monroe is significant is that it suggests a 

much more stringent standard for cases brought under§ 202l(b)(3) 

than for those brought under other federal labor statutes, which 

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apparently require a "but-for" test. At 452 U.S. 559, the Court 

states: 

The legislative history thus indicates that§ 202l{b)(3) 

was enacted with a significant but limited purpose of 

protecting the employee-reservist against 

discriminations like discharge and demotion, motivated 

solely by reserve status {emphasis supplied). 

Again at 559-60: 

Congress wished to provide protection to reservists 

comparable to that already protecting the regular 

veteran from 'discharge without cause' - to insure that 

employers would not penalize or rid themselves of 

returning reservists after a mere pro forma compliance 

with§ 2024{d) (emphasis supplied). 

And yet again at 565: 

The frequent absences from work of an employee-reservist 

may affect productivity and cause considerable 

inconvenience to an employer who must find alternative 

means to get necessary work done. Yet Congress has 

provided in § 202l(b}(3) that employers may not rid 

themselves of such inconveniences and productivity 

losses by discharging or otherwise disadvantaging 

employee-reservists solely because of their military 

obligations (emphasis supplied). 

In Clayton v. Blachowske Truck Lines, 640 F. Supp. 172 (D. 

Minn. 1986), the court applied the standard set forth in Monroe to 

a situation similar to the case at bar. Plaintiff was the safety 

director for a trucking firm whose duties included working on 

Saturdays. He informed his employers before accepting the 

position that he had Minnesota National Guard drills one weekend a 

month and was assured there would be no problem. After 

approximately four months, plaintiff was terminated for poor job 

performance. Among the specific reasons were plaintiff's frequent 

absences on Saturdays. Plaintiff asserted that this reason 

implicated his National Guard status, thereby violating § 2021, 

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and that it was a material issue of fact whether the other reasons 

were pretextual and thus precluded summary judgment. Citing 

Monroe, the court held: 

Even when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff 

the record before the court shows that plaintiff was not 

terminated solely because of his reserve status. It is 

undisputed that defendants knew when they hired 

plaintiff that he was in the National Guard and that 

they assured plaintiff that these obligations would be 

no problem. It is also undisputed that plaintiff was 

given several reasons for his termination. Three of the 

four reasons . . . were unrelated to his guard duties 

and are supported by the evidence. Moreover, defendants 

have pointed to additional reasons for termination which 

are well supported by the sworn statements of a number 

of witnesses • . . For these reasons, the court 

concludes as a matter of law that plaintiff was not 

terminated solely because of his National Guard 

obligations. 640 F. Supp. at 174. 

On appeal, the the trial court was affirmed in Clayton v. 

Blachowske Truck Lines, 815 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987). We can 

find no other circuit court cases construing 38 u.s.c. § 

202l(b)(3) and the language in Monroe within a similar factual 

context. In our view, the language in Monroe is plain and must be 

construed as in Clayton. 

In the instant case, as in Clayton v. Blachowske Truck Lines, 

id., it is clear that even if Sawyer's reserve status played some 

role in his termination, there were sufficient other, nonpretextual, reasons irrelevant to his military status. Sawyer's 

disciplinary problems antedated his joining the Reserves by nearly 

two years. In fact, his pattern of absenteeism started very 

shortly after his employment at Swift began. And the witnesses 

were unanimous in saying that Swift would not have terminated 

Sawyer if management had known in advance that Sawyer would not be 

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working on January 8. We cannot conclude as a matter of law that 

Sawyer was terminated solely because of attending Naval Reserve 

training on January 8, 1983. Rather, we conclude that Sawyer was 

terminated for valid reasons of absenteeism and tardiness, having 

little, if anything; to do with his Reserve obligations. 

Having reached this conclusion, we need not consider the 

issue of whether Sawyer's back pay award should be reduced by the 

amount of his employment compensation. 

For the above reasons, we hold the trial court's conclusions 

as to the issues discussed herein are clearly erroneous and we 

must REVERSE. 

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