Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03220/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MELVA A. SCHALK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES GALLEMORE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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JUN 2 0 1Q~O 

~OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-3220 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 88-1355) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

James S. Phillips, Jr. of Phillips & Phillips, Wichita, Kansas, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Steven c. Day of Woodard, Blaylock, Hernandez, Pilgreen & Roth, 

Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, JONES,* and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

* The Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, United States 

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-3220 Document: 01019867893 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Melva Schalk appeals the district court's 

order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee 

James Gallemore on her First Amendment claims asserted under 42 

u.s.c. S 1983. In this appeal, Schalk alleges Gallemore violated 

her First Amendment rights when, as chief administrator of a 

publicly owned hospital, he fired her for writing a letter to, and 

later speaking with, hospital board of trustees members about 

management practices. Gallemore denies there was any First 

Amendment violation and argues, in the alternative, that he is 

immune from liability for civil damages. 1 

I 

Schalk was employed at St. Luke's Hospital in Wellington, 

Kansas, for approximately eighteen years prior to her termination 

in August 1986. St. Luke's is a municipally owned hospital 

governed by a publicly elected board of trustees. At the time she 

was terminated, Schalk was a part-time patient accounts clerk. 

Before his appointment as chief administrator, Gallemore was 

Schalk's immediate supervisor. 

At some time subsequent to Gallemore's appointment, Schalk 

became concerned about what she perceived to be "waste," 

"inefficiency," and "favoritism" at the hospital. Appellant's 

Addendum at A-1, Schalk Affidavit at 2. In November 1985, Schalk 

hand-delivered a four-page letter to the hospital board members 

and the city council expressing concern over various hospital 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3220 Document: 01019867893 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 2 
matters, including specific concerns regarding certain hospital 

employees. In the letter, she requested that the trustees 

schedule time for her to speak at the next board meeting to 

discuss her concerns. Schalk stated that Gallemore had refused to 

let her address the board as a group, but invited her to speak to 

them individually. 

The first two pages of the letter raise questions regarding 

specific instances of problems with employees. It states, in 

part, as follows: 

"Do kitchen employees pay for their food as was 

requested in Department Head meeting a few months ago? 

Why does an employee in the kitchen get to leave the 

building every day to take her children to school on our 

time? Why do some salaried people have to work 6 hours 

a day and others 8? There are some salaried people who 

do not even work 6. Why did they pay $1,000.00 for [one 

employee] to take Lamaze instructions when [another 

·employee] already knew how and would have _taught?" 

Appellant's Addendum at A-16. 

The second two pages are designated "personal complaints" and 

consist mainly of Schalk's personal observations and concerns 

about hospital administration and a dispute she had with a nurse 

supervisor in 1983. The second section also includes a complaint 

related to Schalk's failure to get a pay raise. In the letter's 

last paragraph Schalk requests that the board intervene to improve 

hospital management and, consequently, raise employee morale. 

On December 4, 1985, the board of trustees sent Schalk a 

written response. The board outlined each question or issue and 

answered it. In this response, Gallemore's position was 

clarified. The board stated: 

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"The Administrator's reply to your request [to be 

placed on the agenda] was as follows: That he would not 

place you on the agenda. He suggested that you discuss 

these matters with any or all of the members of the 

board of trustees, and after you have had these 

discussions, if any Board Member feels this topic is 

suitable for discussion at the Board Meeting, they can 

request it be placed on the agenda and he would 

certainly do that. 

The Administrator further advised you that matters 

of this nature were normally discussed in Executive 

Sessions and that you might or might not be present 

during the executive Session. Your reply was, that;s 

fair.' [sic] You further replied, 'and after that I 

will be fired.' The administrator's reply was, 'no. 111 

Appellant's Addendum at A~4o. 

The board did not specifically respond to the last paragraph 

of the letter. The board did, however, take action based on at 

least one of the concerns raised. 

In a subsequent counseling session with Gallemore and her 

immediate supervisor, Jerry Zoglmann, Schalk was formally 

reprimanded for writing the letter. 

describes the violation as follows: 

Her written reprimand 

"With reference to a four page list of questions and 

allegations concerning management practices 1n the 

Hospital.' • This list was prepared, signed and 

submitted to members of the Board of Trustees and 

members of the city council by Melva Schalk .... None 

of the questions ask [sic] or allegations made in the 

four page list, referred to above, relate to any area of 

responsibility associated with your job or position in 

the Hospital. In the future, if you wish to continue as 

an employee of the Hospital, complaints of this nature 

that do not directly relate to your job or its 

performance will not be tolerated and will be considered 

as unacceptable conduct on your part. I refer 

specifically to the Personnel Policies page 10, items 

12, 14, 15, and 19 that cover Disciplinary Action. 

Any further conduct of this nature, in violation of 

policies covering employee conduct, will result in 

immediate discharge." 

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Appellate Case: 89-3220 Document: 01019867893 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 4 
Appellee's Addendum at App. c. As a result of this session, it 

was Schalk's understanding that she could not approach the board 

as she had done in the past. However, she did not believe she was 

prohibited from speaking casually with board members if she saw 

them. 

On August 16, 1986, Schalk encountered board member Richard 

Strait in a local grocery store. She told him she wanted to meet 

with the board to discuss problems and concerns she had regarding 

waste and inefficiency at the hospital, specifically including her 

concern over nurses sleeping on the job. The following week, 

Gallemore was made aware of this conversation, and Schalk was 

terminated. 

Gallemore testified in his deposition that he fired Schalk 

because she spoke with board member Strait. He also took into 

account the letter she wrote -to the board and city council 

members. Gallemore readily admitted Schalk's 1986 employee review 

identified her as an "above average'' employee. He agreed that her 

performance on the job had nothing to do with the termination. 

Schalk ran for and was elected to the hospital board of 

trustees in April 1987. A number of Wellington newspaper articles 

from 1987-88 indicate that the hospital was having severe 

financial difficulty which dated back several years. See 

Appellant's Addendum at A-11. It is worth noting that Schalk 

raised the issue of fiscal problems in her 1985 letter some two 

years earlier. Defendant Gallemore resigned as administrator 

effective January 1, 1988. 

) 

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Schalk brought suit against Gallemore in June 1988, asserting 

that he violated her First Amendment rights to freedom of 

association and to petition the government for redress of 

grievances. She also asserted that the rule prohibiting her from 

speaking to board members constituted a prior restraint on her 

speech. 2 Gallemore filed a motion for summary judgment arguing 

that there was no First Amendment violation. In the alternative, 

he argued he was immune from suit. The district court granted 

summary judgment on all claims and did not reach the immunity 

issue. Schalk v. Gallemore, 718 F. Supp. 862, 868 (D. Kan. 1989). 

II 

A. Standard of Review 

On appeal, we review the granting of a motion for summary 

judgment de novo, and apply the same standard as the district 

court. Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 792 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine 

issues of fact, and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 

(1986). Here, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the appellant, as the nonmoving party. Conaway, 853 

F.2d at 792 n.4. 

In First Amendment cases in particular, "an appellate court 

has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of the whole 

2 In his response brief, Gallemore asserts the prior restraint 

issue was not raised below. However, in Schalk's response to the 

motion for summary judgment she argued that Gallemore's actions in 

limiting her ability to air grievances was "tantamount to a prior 

restraint on First Amendment activity." See Plaintiff's 

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 18. 

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record' in order to make 

constitute a forbidden 

sure that 

intrusion 

'the judgment 

on the field 

does not 

of free 

expression.'" Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 

Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting New York Times Co. v. 

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)). The threshold issue of 

whether Melva Schalk's speech is protected is one of law. Connick 

v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983); Koch v. City of 

Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. 

denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 (1988). 

B. Freedom of Speech 

It is now axiomatic that a governmental entity cannot 

condition employment "on a basis that infringes the employee's 

constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression." 

Connick, ~61 U.S. at 142. In analyzing whether a public 

employer's actions impermissibly infringe on free speech rights, 

the Supreme Court has adopted a multi-tier test. Melton v. City 

of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 713 (10th Cir.), reh'g granted on 

other grounds, 888 F.2d 724 (1989). 

First, the court must decide whether the speech at issue 

touches on a matter of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; 

Melton, 879 F.2d at 713. If it does, the court must balance the 

interest of the employee in making the statement against the 

employer's interest "in promoting the efficiency of the public 

services it performs through its employees." Pickering v. Board 

of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Third, if the preceding 

prerequisites are met, the speech is protected, and plaintiff must 

show her expression was a motivating factor in the detrimental 

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employment decision. Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 

429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Finally, if the plaintiff sustains this 

burden, the employer can still prevail if it shows by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same 

decision regardless of the protected speech. Id. 

1. Public Concern Analysis 

To determine whether employee speech touches on a matter of 

public concern, we look at whether it can "be fairly considered as 

relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to 

the community." Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. This examination 

requires analysis of the "content, form, and context of a given 

statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147-48. When 

the content of the speech focuses on disclosing public officials' 

malfeasance or wrongdoing, it is likely to be considered a matter 

of public concern. Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 857 

(10th Cir. 1989) (and cases cited therein). Conversely, speech is 

generally not protected if the aim is simply to air grievances of 

a purely personal nature. Id. The pertinent inquiry is whether 

the actor is speaking as a citizen or an employee. Connick, 461 

U.S. at 147. 

In this regard, it is not enough that the topic of the speech 

be of general interest to the public; in addition, what is 

actually said must meet the public concern threshold. Wilson v. 

City of Littleton, 732 F.2d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 1984) (emphasis 

added). In drawing the thin line between a public employee's 

speech which touches on matters of public concern, and speech from 

the same employee which only deals with personal employment 

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matters, we have looked to the subjective intent of the speaker. 

McEvoy v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 466; (10th Cir. 1989); see also 

Conaway, 853 F.2d at 796 (focus on motive of the speaker to 

determine whether speech was calculated to disclose misconduct). 

After examining the record here, we hold Schalk's letter and her 

comments to board member Strait in the grocery store do constitute 

speech touching on matters of public concern. 

Schalk wrote and delivered the letter on her own time. While 

Schalk expressed concern over a wide range of internal employee 

situations, the overall tone and underlying message is directed to 

waste, inefficiency, and favoritism at the hospital. The first 

two pages of the letter are certainly more "public" in outlook 

than are the second two pages. The last paragraph of the letter, 

~owever, connects all of the stated concerns to perceived problems 

with hospital administration. In fact, the board's response 

characterizes Schalk's communication as a request to speak with 

the members about "management practices.'' In other contexts, 

similar issues have been held to be matters of public concern. 

Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1983) 

(allegations of waste, inefficiency, and possibly fraudulent 

county practices are issues of public concern); Rookard v. Health 

& Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (''[a]n allegation 

of corrupt and wasteful practices at a large municipal hospital, 

made to the city official empowered to investigate such charges, 

obviously involves a matter of public concern"); see also Coats v. 

Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1989) (allegations of 

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favoritism in grading at university constitute matter of public 

concern). 

Further, we note the statements were not made in the context 

of an ongoing personal employment grievance. See Connick, 461 

U.S. at 148 (speech was merely extension of an internal employee 

dispute). Gallemore admits Schalk's job performance was not a 

factor in the termination. Additionally, she was not addressing 

her supervisor or a co-worker, but public officials specifically 

elected to oversee the efficiency and financial stability of the 

hospital. See Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 104 (fact that plaintiff 

raised the issues before legislative body empowered to investigate 

is significant in public concern analysis). The concerns are not 

exempt from public concern status merely because Schalk became 

aware of them through her employment. Id. 

The record indicates hospital board meetings are open to the 

public. Therefore, as a public citizen, Schalk could approach the 

board with these concerns and would be welcomed in doing so. Only 

her status as an employee prevented her from doing that here. 

This fact is especially pertinent, as Schalk was later elected to 

the hospital board. While the lower court did not find this fact 

dispositive, it clearly supports her statement that she was 

motivated out of her concern as a citizen and a taxpayer. It also 

creates a strong inference that her motives were not retaliatory 

or in any way related to displeasure with her position. 

Although the issues Schalk raised do resemble a "laundry 

list" instead of a commentary on public issues, she should not be 

penalized for her lack of eloquence. When reviewed in context, 

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her letter implicates the fiscal policies of the defendant and 

attempts to disclose waste and wrongdoing. Further, although 

Gallemore asserts that the statements are not truthful, there is 

no evidence that Schalk knowingly or recklessly made false 

statements, which could void any protected status. Pickering, 391 

U.S. at 574-75; Wulf, 883 F.2d at 859. 

The news articles printed in the Wellington paper in 1987-88 

also support our assessment that Schalk's concerns in 1985 were a 

matter of public concern. Obviously the local newspaper thought 

the financial stability of St. Luke's was newsworthy. 3 In many 

instances, the news articles address efficiency at the hospital. 

Although these issues might not be newsworthy in a larger 

community, the record here reflects that the financial stability 

of St. Luke's was a topic of public concern in Wellington, Kansas. 

We see no meaningful distinction between allegations of waste in a 

large municipal hospital as compared to those in a small 

community. See Rookard, 710 F.2d at 46. Consequently, we find 

the first two pages of the Schalk letter constitute matters of 

public concern. Therefore, we move on to the second level of the 

four-part test. 

3 This case is distinguishable from our discussion of media 

publicity in Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d at 1448 ("Media 

publicity of the dispute is not determinative of the question of 

whether Koch's speech was on a matter of public concern .•.• "). 

There, it was the employee's dispute itself which was reported. 

Here, the financial stability of the hospital was reported as a 

distinct news item, thereby supporting the argument that it was a 

matter of public concern in the community. 

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2. The Pickering Balancing Test 

The task under Pickering is to "balance the interests of the 

[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 

concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 

promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 

through its employees." 391 U.S. at 568. Pertinent 

considerations include: "[w]hether the statement impairs 

discipline by superiors or har~ony among co-workers, has a 

detrimental impact on close working relationships for which 

personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the 

performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular 

operation of the enterprise." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 

388 (1987). The Rankin Court also considered the manner, time, 

and place of the employee's expression, as well as the context in 

which the dispute arose. Id. The focus is necessarily centered 

on intradepartmental relationships and performance. Melton, 879 

F.2d at 715. 

' 

This court has held that an employee's First Amendment rights 

must be protected "unless the employer shows that some restriction 

is necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to 

insure effective performance by the employee." Wren v. Spurlock, 

798 F.2d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1986)(quoting Childers v. 

Independent School Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir. 

1982)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987). The government must 

produce evidence of an actual disruption of services which results 

from the employee's speech. Melton, 879 F.2d at 715-16. 

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Here, Gallemore argues the speech was disruptive to the 

efficient operation of the hospital because he could no longer 

"realistically have fulfilled his obligations as administrator 

in the face of Melva Schalk's activities." Brief of 

Appellee at 31. Specifically, he asserts Schalk's uncomplimentary 

remarks created hostility which made it impossible for him to 

handle hospital matters. While these arguments have superficial 

appeal, Gallemore submitted no actual evidence of any disruptive 

confrontations. The existence of some animosity between Schalk 

and those she identified in her letter is not dispositive. See 

Conaway, 853 F.2d at 798 ("It would be anomalous to hold that 

because the employee's whistle blowing might jeopardize the 

harmony of the office or tarnish the integrity of the department, 

the law will not allow him to speak out on his perception of 

potential improprieties or department corruption."). There is no 

testimony nor even an allegation that Schalk's work was affected 

by the reprimand she received following her submission of the 

letter. To the contrary, there is evidence in the record that 

Schalk's performance was rated above average after the reprimand. 

Moreover, unlike other positions, the job of patient accounts 

clerk does not involve working relationships necessitating an 

especially high degree of personal loyalty or confidence. 4 In 

4 This case differs, therefore, from Connick, in which a close, 

loyal relationship between superiors and assistants was deemed 

vital to the accomplishment of the work. There is no evidence in 

the instant case suggesting that disagreements between Schalk and 

Gallemore would affect her ability to serve the hospital or the 

public. 

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fact, Schalk describes her position as involving a great deal of 

paperwork. 

There is no suggestion that the letter impugned Gallemore's 

ability to discipline Schalk or others, nor is there evidence that 

she encouraged other employees to take action against Gallemore or 

the hospital. In fact, the record demonstrates Schalk and 

Gallemore had no problems between December 1985 and the time of 

her dismissal some_eight months later. Although Gallemore states 

there was "extreme hostility'' at the hospital, there is absolutely 

no deposition testimony supporting this conclusion. Because 

Gallemore has not alleged any disruption as a result of Schalk's 

actions, and we fail to see any, we hold the Pickering balance 

tips in favor of Schalk. 5 

3. Motivating Factor Test 

Because we have concluded the speech was protected, we turn 

to Schalk's allegations that it was a motivating factor in her 

termination. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. If Schalk 

successfully proves that her speech activities were such a 

5 Gallemore also asserts Schalk should have used internal 

grievance procedures to air her concerns. See Johnsen v. 

Independent School Dist. No. 3, 891 F.2d 1485, 1494 (10th Cir. 

1989) (decision to contact outside agencies prior to using 

internal procedures was unnecessarily disruptive). The grievance 

procedure of the hospital, however, states "a grievance is defined 

as any significant dissatisfaction arising from the job except 

complaints arising from termination for cause." (emphasis in 

original.) There is apparently no internal mechanism provided for 

bringing to light non-job-related hospital concerns. Further, 

both Schalk's letter and the board's response indicate Gallemore 

gave her permission to talk to board members. There is nothing in 

the record to suggest she disregarded any requests to use internal 

procedures. Finally, given the nature of her allegations, it was 

reasonable for her to forego any procedure requiring her to 

confront Gallemore directly. See id. at 1490 n.4. 

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motivating factor, Gallemore then has the burden of showing the 

employment decision would have been the same regardless of the 

protected speech. Id. Generally these are factual determinations 

which, in the event of disagreement, would preclude summary 

judgment. Melton, 879 F.2d at 713. However, there appears to be 

no disagreement over the role of Schalk's speech activity in her 

termination. Gallemore admitted in his deposition that he 

terminated Schalk for speaking with board member Strait and, to a 

lesser extent, for writing the letter; he also admitted that her 

job performance was not a factor in the termination decision. See 

Appellant's Addendum at A-50, A-5la, A-52. Therefore, we must 

conclude baseq on the law and the undisputed facts before us that 

Schalk was terminated because of her protected speech activity. 

C. Freedom of Association 

Schalk argues that in restricting her access to the board of 

trustees, Gallemore violated her right to freedom of association. 

The Supreme Court has recognized two types of association 

protected by the First Amendment. 

"In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that 

choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate 

human relationships must be secured against undue 

intrusion by the State because of the role of such 

relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom 

that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this 

respect, freedom of association receives protection as a 

fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set 

of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to 

associate for the purpose of engaging in those 

activities protected by the First Amendment speech, 

assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and 

the exercise of religion." 

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). 

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Schalk's circumstances fit into neither of these two 

categories. There are no allegations that her right of "intimate 

association" was impaired by the restriction on speaking to board 

members. And, in this case, her right of "political association" 

is indistinguishable from her right to free speech. The 

"association" that she seeks is nothing more nor less than an 

audience for her speech. It therefore must collapse into the 

for~going discussion regarding her right to free speech. 6 

D. Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances 

Plaintiff's claim that her First Amendment right to petition 

was infringed is susceptible to the same disposition as her 

association claim. In the instant case, Schalk's right to 

petition is inseparable from her right to speak. As such, we see 

no reason to subject this claim to a different sort of analysis. 

See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (characterizing 

right to petition as "an assurance of a particular freedom of 

expression"); Day v. South Park Indep. School Dist., 768 F.2d 696 

(5th Cir. 1985) (right to petition is governed by "public concern" 

analysis of Pickering), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986). 

6 We do not hold that the "public concern" analysis is a 

necessary step in all public employee/freedom of association 

claims. See Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564 n.7 (10th 

Cir. 1989) (expressing doubt regarding applicability of "public 

concern" analysis to freedom of association claims). In some 

constitutionally protected associations, "public concern" may be 

an inapt tool of analysis. For example, a public school teacher 

fired for being married would have a colorable freedom of 

association claim against her employer, but would likely not 

satisfy the public concern test. We see no reason to treat speech 

and association differently in cases like the one at bar, however, 

where, in context, the two interests are clearly identical. 

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III 

Gallemore has asserted that even if the speech is protected, 

he has qualified immunity which shields him from liability. 

Because we may affirm the trial court's decision on any grounds 

supported in the record, we proceed to consider the qualified 

immunity defense. Scivally v. Time Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 101, 103 

(10th Cir. 1983}. 

A. Gallemore's Official Capacity Immunity 

In her complaint, Schalk specifically states causes of action 

against Gallemore in both his individual and official capacities. 

The Supreme Court has noted that an "official capacity'' suit is, 

in essence, a suit against the governmental entity. Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). However, 

"[a governmental entity] may not be sued under§ 1983 

for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or 

agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's 

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by 

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 

government as an entity is responsible under§ 1983.'' 

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 

In order to be sued in this capacity, the municipality must 

receive notice and have an opportunity to respond. Graham, 473 

U.S. at 166; Melton, 879 F.2d at 726 n.30. It is unclear from the 

record whether the hospital was given notice or an opportunity to 

respond to this suit. In addition, factual issues exist relative 

to whether Gallemore's actions constituted hospital board policy. 

Therefore, we must remand for further proceedings on this issue. 7 

7 At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the 

district court inquired about the status of the official capacity 

Continued to next page 

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B. Qualified Immunity of Gallemore 

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme 

Court outlined the standard for determining whether public 

officials will be found immune from liability in civil suits. It 

states that "government officials performing discretionary 

functions, generally are shielded from liability from civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818. This 

determination is a question of law. Id.; Melton, 879 F.2d at 726. 

For purposes of this inquiry, a constitutional right is "clearly 

established'' if "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently 

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 

doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 

640 (1987) (emphasis added). 

Reconciling these principles in First Amendment cases, 

however, proves a difficult task. While the particularized 

factual inquiry necessary in these cases decreases the likelihood 

that a defendant should have known his conduct was 

unconstitutional, an overly-broad application of qualified 

immunity would "effectively eviscerate whistle blower protection 

for public employees." Melton, 879 F.2d at 728 (quoting Roth v. 

Veterans Admin., 856 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1988)). As we said 

in Melton: 

Continued from previous page 

suit. Counsel for Schalk stated he did not know whether the 

hospital had received notice of the lawsuit. Counsel for 

Gallemore stated the hospital did not. II R. 21-22. 

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"A simple black letter rule is not possible. What is 

clear is that Harlow places the presumption in favor of 

immunity for public officials acting in their individual 

capacities. Harlow is intended as a shield against 

liability but cannot become an insuperable barrier; 

therefore, public officials lose immunity in the face of 

clearly established law. However, because a rule of law 

determined by a balancing of interests is inevitably 

difficult to clearly anticipate, it follows that where 

Pickering balancing is required, the law is less likely 

to be well established than in other cases. We believe 

that except for case-by-case analysis and application, 

the rule cannot be better stated than in Harlow itself 

with careful consideration of its underlying 

principles." 

Id. at 728-29 (footnote omitted}. 

As set out in Part II B. supra, at the time the relevant 

events took place in this case, the law was clear that a public 

employee had a constitutionally protected right to bring waste, 

mismanagement, or other matters of public concern to the attention 

of the responsible administrative entity. Nevertheless, 

"[q]ualified immunity analysis requires that the court consider 

the operation of the rule in the context of '"the circumstances 

with which the [the official] was confronted."'" Id. at 729 

(quoting Giacolane v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1988)). 

Consequently, we must ascertain whether "the protected nature of 

[Schalk's] speech was sufficiently clear that [Gallemore] should 

have been on notice that [his asserted interest in preventing 

disruption] would not survive a balancing inquiry." Id. 

Specifically, we must determine whether it would have been clear 

to a reasonable official that Schalk's letter was addressed to 

matters of public concern, rather than an unprotected statement of 

personal grievances. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-48. 

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Although we conclude in Part II B.l. that the letter is 

properly viewed as directed to matters that are of public concern, 

we acknowledge that the issue is not clear-cut. Although the 

question is a close one, we cannot say that a reasonable official 

should have known that Schalk's allegations raised matters of 

public concern as a matter of clearly established law. We 

therefore conclude that Gallemore is entitled to qualified 

immunity in a claim for damages against him individually. 

IV 

In conclusion, we hold that Melva Schalk's speech was 

protected under the First Amendment. However, James Gallemore is 

immune from liability. We remand for further proceedings with 

regard to the issue of Gallemore's immunity in his official 

capacity. The decision of the United States District Court for 

the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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