Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01667/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01667-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE L. DAVIS,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

KINGS COUNTY BOARD OF 

SUPERVISORS, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG (PC)

 

FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING THAT THIS 

ACTION BE DISMISSED FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 24)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS 

Terrence L. Davis (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner1proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with this civil rights action. Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on December 7, 2018. 

(ECF No. 1). The Court screened that complaint on January 10, 2020, finding that the 

complaint failed to state any cognizable claim and giving leave to amend. (ECF No. 21). 

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on February 14, 2020, which is now before this Court 

for screening. (ECF No. 21). 

The Court finds that the complaint fails to state any cognizable claim. Therefore, the

Court recommends dismissing this action for failure to state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff has 

twenty-one days to file objections to these findings and recommendations.

\\\

1 Plaintiff has alleged that he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incidents alleged in the complaint.

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 1 of 11
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by inmates seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the inmate has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may also screen the 

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, 

that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that 

the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 

“are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s 

legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 

pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint generally alleges that the law library at Kings 

County Jail was deficient and deprived him of his rights. 

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 2 of 11
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff claims that Kings County Jail law library was not viable or accessible to him. 

It only furnished a computer with no written manual in sight regarding how to use the 

computer, and no legal assistance. The Kings County Sherriff is required to keep jail prisoners 

and detainees safe and is answerable to those individuals for their safe keeping. 

On or about November 5, 2014, Plaintiff, who was a detainee at the time, unknowingly 

filed this matter with the California Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board. 

Plaintiff then correctly filed the matter with the Board of Supervisors of Kings County 

Government Center. Plaintiff recites when it was amended.

Plaintiff went to the facility’s established law library. Plaintiff observed that it was only 

a 5x10 cell type area. When he entered the room, he saw only a single black box affixed to the 

wall and a black book which turned out to be a vehicle code book. Plaintiff tried to figure out 

how to operate the computer. Plaintiff has a learning disability, which he has had since 

childhood. Plaintiff was given an allotted time of two and a half hours. However, he could not 

gain any access to any legal information at the time. When Plaintiff spoke to various deputy 

personnel and officers, he was told they do not have anyone to give him any assistance and he 

was pretty much on his own. Others told him that, due to jail policy, they could not provide 

him with any legal assistance. Plaintiff had to blunder on aimlessly. He sat in the room for two 

and a half hours, trying to access a computer without any training. 

This situation played out in the months that followed. Kings County Jail personnel 

continued to refuse to provide any legal or computer assistance. Plaintiff filed a grievance, but 

nothing was done. 

Plaintiff alleges that he “had filed various ‘Legal/Confidential/Privileged, and Regular 

Mail... But however, due to Kings County Jail-Mail Rm. Waxed (Non-existent) policy’s [sic], 

practices, sloppy negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se,’ deliberate indifferences, 

dereliction of duty;’ Acts and Violation inconjunction [sic] with ‘the Board of Supervisors,’

and Kings County Sheriff’s egregious and punitive Mail Rm. Co. Jail policy’s [sic], practices, 

procedures, mandates ... confidential correspondence were not received by there [sic] 

respective agencies....” (ECF No. 24, at p. 12) (first alteration in original).

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 3 of 11
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As a case in point, in the case of Terrence W. Davis v. High Desert State Prison, et al., 

Case No. 2:14-cv-00404-EFB, was wrongfully dismissed on November 7, 2014, due to Kings 

County’s grossly negligent mail room policies. 

Due to these ongoing acts, Plaintiff became very apprehensive about his mail. Agencies 

and people were claiming that they failed to receive his mail. Plaintiff made inquiries into the 

policies and learned that there were no incoming/outgoing legal policies and procedures 

established to avoid the issues with lost, destroyed, or misplaced legal mail.

Plaintiff contends that he was not receiving all of his mail from about December 16, 

2014, until January 9, 2015.

Plaintiff alleges that various defendants, including the Kings County Jail and Kings 

County Board of Supervisors, violated his rights, including his rights under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. He alleges that he is an individual with a disability 

and was denied a program or activity due to his disabilities.

Plaintiff claims that he suffered great distress because he was unable to adequately 

litigate his civil and criminal cases. 

III. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL CLAIMS

A. Section 1983

The Civil Rights Act provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 

provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 

also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los 

Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 4 of 11
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 

“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 

meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal 

connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which 

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” 

Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 

causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 

Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 

of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have 

been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 

691, 695 (1978).

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 

858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To state a 

claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must 

allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants either: personally 

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 5 of 11
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed 

to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 

‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional 

violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations 

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). For instance, a supervisor may 

be liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is 

made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of 

others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations, 

quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

“Local governing bodies ... can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, 

declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 

implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted 

and promulgated by that body's officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (footnote omitted). 

“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove that 

action pursuant to official municipal policy caused their injury. Official municipal policy 

includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and 

practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law. These are 

action[s] for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 

51, 60–61 (2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (alteration in original).

B. Requirement to Allege Personal Participation

As discussed above, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there 

must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation 

alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 695.

However, as to the individual defendants, Plaintiff has not provided any allegations 

regarding how their actions or inactions caused the alleged constitutional deprivations

described in the complaint. In order to allow a claim to go forward against an individual, 

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 6 of 11
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff must allege what his or her involvement was in the constitutional violation.

Plaintiff does list a number of individuals as defendants in the introduction to the 

complaint, but Plaintiff again failed to tie any specific defendant to any action in the 

complaint.2 

C. Claims Regarding Access to Courts

a. Legal Standards

As the alleged actions apparently took place while Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, his 

conditions of confinement claim is brought under the Fourteenth as opposed to the Eighth 

Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (pretrial detainees may raise conditions 

of confinement claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than 

the protections against cruel and unusual punishment afforded by the Eighth Amendment as to 

post-conviction inmates).

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The right is limited to the 

filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims 

for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating 

opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit that 

cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 

(2002); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other 

grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015) (differentiating “between two types of 

access to court claims: those involving prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance and those 

involving prisoners’ rights to litigate without active interference.”).

However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any 

access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual injury” 

is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to 

2 Plaintiff does allege that there were unconstitutional law library policies that interfered with his access 

to the courts, and that the Sheriff was responsible for these policies. However, as described in these findings and 

recommendations, Plaintiff has failed to state an access to the courts claim.

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 7 of 11
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also Jones v. Blanas, 

393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the “inability to file a complaint or 

defend against a charge”). 

In addition, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” underlying 

claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the underlying claim must 

be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, 

Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not 

otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” Id. at 415.

b. Application to Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that his ability to access the library was so limited that 

it was unreasonable. 

However, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled an actual injury. Plaintiff states that the

case of Terence W. Davis v. High Desert State Prison, et al., E.D. CA, Case No. 2:14-cv00404-EFB (E.D. Cal) “was wrongfully dismissed.” However, Plaintiff has not explained how 

the lack of a law library or the policies and procedures regarding the processing of mail

prejudiced this case. The Court takes judicial notice3of the entries in the case and observes 

that the Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim. Plaintiff was given leave 

to amend, but Plaintiff failed to amend his complaint. The Court then dismissed Plaintiff’s case 

“for failure to prosecute and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 

Davis v. High Desert State Prison, Case No. 2:14-cv-00404, ECF No. 16 at p. 2. Neither 

Plaintiff’s allegations nor the entries in this case sufficiently show that Plaintiff was harmed by 

the lack of a reasonable law library or the policies and procedures regarding the processing of 

mail.

D. Claim Regarding Processing of Mail

It is not clear that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a separate claim based on the Jail’s 

policies and procedures regarding the processing of his mail. To the extent that he is, he failed 

3 Fed. R. Evid. 201.

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 8 of 11
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to state a claim because there are no allegations that any defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s 

right to send or receive mail. 

Inmates enjoy “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 

F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), and Plaintiff does allege that some of the mail he 

sent was not received, and that he “believes” that he was not receiving all of mail sent to him

from about December 16, 2014, until January 9, 2015. However, Plaintiff does not provide any 

specific examples, and does not allege how many pieces of mail were not properly processed. 

Additionally, Plaintiff failed to connect the actions or inactions of any defendant to the 

allegedly improperly processed mail.

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a separate claim based on the processing 

of his mail, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.

E. Claims Regarding Disability Discrimination

To state a claim for violation of Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 

Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was 

excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public 

entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of 

his disability; and (4) (for the Rehabilitation Act claim) the public entity receives federal 

financial assistance. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Neither the ADA nor Rehabilitation Act provides a basis to sue government officials in 

their individual capacities. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (a 

plaintiff cannot sue state officials in their individual capacities to vindicate rights created by 

Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Burgess v. Carmichael, 37 F. 

App'x 288, 292 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Plaintiffs may sue only a ‘public entity’ for [ADA] violations, 

not government officials in their individual capacities); Rines v. Riverside Cty. Jails Sheriffs, 

2019 WL 6916005, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2019) (“a plaintiff cannot sue an official in his or 

her individual capacity under the ADA or the [Rehabilitation Act]”).

In Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit stated 

that “[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a 

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 9 of 11
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall, 260 F.3d 

at 1138 (footnote omitted)). The Court held that deliberate indifference is the appropriate 

standard to use in determining whether intentional discrimination occurred. Id. “Deliberate 

indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially 

likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 1139. “[I]n order to meet the second 

element of the deliberate indifference test, a failure to act must be the result of conduct that is 

more than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.” Id. at 1139.

Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that he was excluded from library programs on account of 

his disability. However, he does not sufficiently describe the disability (Plaintiff simply states 

that he has a “learning disability”). He also does not describe how he was excluded from 

participation in a program on the basis of his learning disability. 

F. Additional Claims

Under “Claim 1” in his complaint, Plaintiff lists numerous causes of action, including:

“Violation(s) of The Bill of Rights, 1st. 4th. 8th. 14

th

. Amndts, Due Process and Equal 

Protection Stand Violations, (ADA.), 504. Rehab. Violations, Deliberate Indifference, Color of 

Law, Color of Office, Et seq., Access to the Courts.” 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice 

of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 

512 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff must set forth 

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

Plaintiff’s list of numerous potential causes of action does not satisfy Rule 8. Plaintiff 

does not explain how the facts relate to each of these listed claims. Although the Court gave 

leave to amend in order to allow Plaintiff to include a short and plain statement of the factual 

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 10 of 11
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

allegations that support each claim, Plaintiff’s complaint is difficult to understand and does not 

clearly state what actions relate to which claims.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Court finds that the first amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim upon 

which relief may be granted. The Court does not recommend granting further leave to amend 

because the Court provided Plaintiff with applicable legal standards and an opportunity to 

amend his complaint, yet Plaintiff’s first amended complaint largely suffers from the same 

defects as his original complaint. 

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 

1. This action be DISMISSED, with prejudice, based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to the 

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one (21) days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court. Such a document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2020 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:18-cv-01667-DAD-EPG Document 25 Filed 03/31/20 Page 11 of 11