Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05319/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05319-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2002 Decided December 6, 2002

No. 01-5319

& No. 01-5405

Robert Vinson Brannum,

Appellant

v.

William Lake, Brig. Gen., U.S.A.F., et al.,

Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01461 & No. 00cv02333)

Richard B. Katskee, appointed by the court as amicus

curiae, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the

briefs were Evan M. Tager and Arnon D. Siegel.

Robert V. Brannum filed pro se briefs.

USCA Case #01-5319 Document #718167 Filed: 12/06/2002 Page 1 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Laurie Weinstein, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Henderson, Circuit Judge,

and Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Williams.

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge: Robert Brannum is an

Individual Mobilization Augmentee ("IMA") in the United

States Air Force Reserves. He was recalled to active duty

pursuant to Article 2(d) of the Uniform Code of Military

Justice (the "Uniform Code"), 10 U.S.C. s 802(d), which

authorizes such recalls for a "member of a reserve component." After the recall he was subjected to punishment

under the code. He sued in district court, claiming (among

other things) that as an IMA he was not a member of a

reserve "component" and therefore was not subject to recall

under Article 2(d) or, consequently, to the defendants' later

exercise of military jurisdiction. He sought damages and

injunctive relief vacating the punishment. The district court

dismissed all his claims, including the jurisdictional ones,

invoking the doctrine of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135

(1950), which precludes actions against the government under

the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries "incident to service"

and has since been extended to some other damage actions.

See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); United

States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987). We reverse, but solely

as to Brannum's jurisdictional claim for equitable relief.

* * *

According to the Air Force, IMAs such as Brannum "are

assigned to active-duty units in specific wartime positions and

train on an individual basis. Their mission is to augment

active-duty manning by filling wartime surge requirements."

Air Force Reserve Command, USAF Fact Sheet, availaUSCA Case #01-5319 Document #718167 Filed: 12/06/2002 Page 2 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ble at http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/Air_Force_Reserve_

Command.html.

Brannum began an active duty tour at Holloman Air Force

Base in New Mexico on March 21, 2000. On March 26 the

Air Force began investigating complaints against him for

sexual harassment. Brannum learned of the investigation

and on June 8 departed Holloman, leaving a note saying that

he was "voluntarily terminating" his active-duty tour. Because the Air Force regarded Brannum's tour of duty as

requiring him to serve an additional ten days, it responded

with an order on June 18, 2000, purportedly under 10 U.S.C.

s 12301(d), recalling Brannum to active duty.

Brannum then filed suit in the United States district court

for the District of Columbia, alleging that various Air Force

officers and civilian employees had violated his due process

rights, had engaged in race discrimination and reprisals for

Brannum's having filed a complaint with the Inspector General, and had committed defamation, malicious prosecution, and

various violations of Air Force regulations. He sought and

obtained a temporary restraining order barring enforcement

of the Air Force's recall order on the ground that s 12301(d)

did not authorize the involuntary recall of reservists to active

duty. The Air Force then rescinded the recall order, and the

court dissolved the TRO.

About a month later, the Air Force issued new orders--this

time under Article 2(d) of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C.

s 802(d)--directing Brannum to report for active duty at

Holloman so that he could be subjected to disciplinary punishment involving both the sexual harassment allegations and his

allegedly premature departure. Brannum again sought a

TRO in the district court to enjoin enforcement of the recall

order. This time he argued principally that, although

s 802(d) authorizes involuntary recall of "member[s] of a

reserve component" for proceedings under the Uniform Code,

an IMA such as Brannum is not a member of any reserve

component and therefore is not subject to such a recall. The

district court denied the TRO, and Brannum reported again

to Holloman.

USCA Case #01-5319 Document #718167 Filed: 12/06/2002 Page 3 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The Air Force offered and Brannum chose the option of

proceeding by way of non-judicial punishment in lieu of trial

by court martial. The adjudicating officer dismissed the

sexual harassment charges but found Brannum guilty of

being absent without leave and ordered him demoted one

rank from Master Sergeant to Technical Sergeant. Brannum

appealed unsuccessfully to the appropriate higher officer.

When Brannum's active duty ended on September 28, 2000

he filed a second complaint in the district court, this time

naming a larger set of Air Force officers and civilian employees. In the second complaint he restated the claims from his

pending suit and added new claims under the Constitution

and various federal statutes and regulations. Most important

for our purposes, he renewed his contention that the defendants had violated his constitutional and statutory rights by

subjecting him to punishment in excess of their jurisdiction

under the Uniform Code at a time when he was in fact in

civilian status and not subject to recall under Article 2(d).

He also alleged that they had violated his rights by, inter alia,

such procedural violations as pre-judging his case, failing to

disclose the identity of his accusers, and failing to produce

copies of the evidence against him. The second complaint

sought compensatory and punitive damages and an injunction

setting aside his non-judicial punishment.

The district court dismissed all of Brannum's claims for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Feres doctrine.

Noting that this court had not yet addressed whether the

doctrine extended to equitable claims, the district court held

that the Feres doctrine applied to "non-facial constitutional

challenges of military decisions." (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly it dismissed not only his claims for money damages

but also his claims to equitable relief. Brannum appealed.

In January, we issued an order granting defendants' motion for summary affirmance of the district court opinion with

regard to all but Brannum's equitable claims, but instructed

the clerk "to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until

resolution of the remainder of the appeal." See Order of

January 30, 2002. In addition, we ordered briefing and

USCA Case #01-5319 Document #718167 Filed: 12/06/2002 Page 4 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

argument on the issue of Brannum's equitable claims. We

now reverse the district court's decision that it did not have

jurisdiction to consider Brannum's equitable claim that the

military unlawfully recalled him for punishment. While nonmilitary courts are not generally permitted to intervene in the

operation of military justice, Brannum's complaint regarding

his allegedly illegal recall goes to whether the military had

jurisdiction over him under 10 U.S.C. s 802(d) in the first

place. The Feres doctrine poses no bar to such a claim.

* * *

First, as the district court correctly noted, the Feres doctrine forecloses damages actions by service members against

the government for injuries occurring "incident to service" in

the military. "The special nature of military life--the need

for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and

equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel--would be

undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers

to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to

command." Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).

The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that Feres

does not bar all suits by service personnel:

"[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic

rights simply because they have doffed their civilian

clothes." This Court has never held, nor do we now

hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress

in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the

course of military service.

Id. at 304 (1983) (quoting Earl Warren, "The Bill of Rights

and the Military," 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1962)); see also

United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987) (noting that

Chappell "referred to redress designed to halt or prevent the

constitutional violation rather than the award of money damages.").

In finding Brannum's suit barred, the district court drew a

line between facial challenges (permitted) and as-applied challenges (not permitted). This cannot be correct. First, as

USCA Case #01-5319 Document #718167 Filed: 12/06/2002 Page 5 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Brannum points out, the Supreme Court and this court have

heard numerous as-applied challenges to military policies.

See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (asapplied Free Exercise challenge to Air Force's prohibition

against wearing yarmulke while in uniform); Steffan v. Perry,

41 F.3d 677, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (facial and asapplied Equal Protection challenges to regulations prohibiting

homosexuals from attending the Naval Academy or serving in

the Navy). Thus some as-applied challenges are plainly

permitted. Furthermore, the district court's proposed distinction would create the anomalous result that suits seeking

facial or wholesale invalidation of military policies would be

permitted, while those seeking more targeted as-applied relief

would be barred. In light of Feres's concern about excessive

judicial interference with military decision-making, and the

general constitutional preference for as-applied challenges

over facial ones, see, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.

739 (1987), such a result would be bizarre. To the extent that

Speigner v. Alexander, 248 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001), invoked such a distinction in denying jurisdiction over a separated National Guard officer's suit for reinstatement, we

respectfully disagree.

While we think it clear that at least some equitable claims

relating to military service are not barred by the Feres

doctrine, this case does not require us to ascertain Feres's

exact bounds. Here Brannum asserted that his due process

and other rights were violated by the military taking actions

against him in excess of its jurisdiction under the Uniform

Code. This jurisdictional claim falls squarely within the

Supreme Court's decision in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420

U.S. 738 (1975). There the Court held that the Article III

courts had jurisdiction to entertain an Army captain's suit

seeking an injunction against pending court martial proceedings based on conduct that he claimed was not "service

related" and thus not within the court martial jurisdiction.

Id. at 740, 744-53. See also McKinney v. White, 291 F.3d

851, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (summarizing Schlesinger). In light

of Schlesinger, the Feres doctrine cannot preclude equitable

suits challenging military jurisdiction under the Uniform

USCA Case #01-5319 Document #718167 Filed: 12/06/2002 Page 6 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Code. (For these purposes we see no distinction between

courts martial and non-judicial punishments under the Uniform Code; "correctional custody" of up to seven days is

permissible under the latter. See Article 15(b)(2)(B), 10

U.S.C. s 815(b)(2)(B).)1 Because Feres does not apply, the

defendants' argument that our summary affirmance in January created "law of the case" that Brannum's alleged injuries

arose "incident to service" under Feres is irrelevant; even if

Brannum's alleged injuries were "incident to service," Schlesinger permits an equitable suit claiming that the military has

exercised Uniform Code authority without jurisdiction.

Here, Brannum's contention that his position as an IMA

excludes him from the reach of Article 2(d) and thus from

recall and Uniform Code proceedings is just such a jurisdictional claim. Indeed, during argument counsel for the Air

Force conceded that a civilian court could review an allegation that the military had made a "fundamental mistake in

jurisdiction." Thus while Brannum may yet face other obstacles to the equitable relief he seeks, neither Feres nor the

facial vs. as-applied distinction relied upon by the district

court would be among them.

While we see Feres as no bar to Brannum's jurisdictional

claim, we affirm the district court's dismissal of his other

claims. As the Court said in Schlesinger,

"[T]he acts of a court martial, within the scope of its

jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled or reviewed in

the civil courts, by writ of prohibition or otherwise."

420 U.S. at 746 (quoting Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 177

(1886)). Indeed, that rule long antedates Feres and, although

reflecting similar sensitivity to the special requirements of

__________

1 Although the district court in its recitation of the facts noted

that "plaintiff, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. s 802(d) was properly recalled

to active duty," we do not consider the language to constitute a

finding as to the recall's propriety, especially in light of the court's

dismissal of the entire case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

USCA Case #01-5319 Document #718167 Filed: 12/06/2002 Page 7 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the military, does not depend on Feres. See also McKinney,

291 F.3d at 853; Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1381 n.16

(D.C. Cir. 1991). This prohibition surely includes challenges

to non-judicial punishment offered in lieu of a court martial.

* * *

We affirm the district court's dismissal with respect to

Brannum's non-jurisdictional claims, reverse as to the claim

for equitable relief against the defendants' alleged excess of

jurisdiction, and remand to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #01-5319 Document #718167 Filed: 12/06/2002 Page 8 of 8