Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01198/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01198-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Pamela Kaweske, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Thomas DeRosa, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-01198-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants 

Thomas and Beatrice DeRosa (Doc. 19) and the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment by 

Plaintiffs Pamela and John Kaweske (Doc. 21). For the following reasons, the Court 

grants Defendants’ motion and denies Plaintiffs’ motion. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Pamela Kaweske and Defendant Beatrice DeRosa were conversing in a 

fenced-in dog park at Canyon Vistas RV Resort while their dogs played in the dog park 

without wearing leashes. DeRosa’s golden retriever, Jack, bumped into Kaweske from 

behind, causing her to lose her balance. Although Kaweske managed to grab DeRosa’s 

shoulders and prevent herself from falling, Kaweske alleges that she sustained serious 

injuries. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standard 

 The Court grants summary judgment when the movant “shows that there is no 

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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the Court views the 

evidence “in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Warren v. City of 

Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995). Where the parties have filed cross-motions 

for summary judgment, the Court “evaluate[s] each motion independently, ‘giving the 

nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.’” Lenz v. 

Universal Music Corp., 2015 WL 5315388, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015) (quoting 

ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir.2003)). “[A] party seeking 

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court 

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

 The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or 

denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 

53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). Substantive law determines which facts are material, 

and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. 

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 248). Thus, the nonmoving party must show that the genuine factual issues “can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of 

either party.” Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 

F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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II. Analysis 

 Kaweske sues under theories of common law negligence and statutory strict 

liability. Both of these claims fail. 

A. Common Law Negligence 

 Under Arizona common law, liability for injury by animals “is imposed only if the 

owner knew or had reason to know the dangerous propensities of the animal.” James v. 

Cox, 130 Ariz. 152, 153 n.1, 634 P.2d 964, 965 n.1 (App. 1981). Thus, the “common law 

theory” is “one of negligence.” Id. 

 Here, Plaintiffs have failed to make any showing that Defendants knew or had 

reason to know that Jack, their golden retriever, had any dangerous propensities. 

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants knew that Jack “would occasionally run, jump around 

and bump into people without their consent at [the dog park].” (Doc. 21 at 4.) Plaintiffs 

point to Thomas DeRosa’s deposition testimony: 

Q: Does [Jack] behave around other people without any problems? 

A: Yes, he does. 

Q: Have there been any situations where he’s caused injury to another individual during the time that you’ve owned him? 

A: No, never. 

Q: How about [have] there been any situations where he’s caused injury to another animal? 

A: No, never. 

Q: Do you know if he’s ever jumped on a person or ran into them without their consent? 

 [ . . . ] 

A: When he’s at the dog park running around with other dogs, it is quite frequent that he and other dogs tend to run around your legs. Even though they may have an acre to run in, they all seem to want to gather around your legs and will occasionally bump into you. 

(Doc. 21-7 at PDF 6, Tr. 17.) 

 Jack’s propensity to join the other dogs at the dog park in gathering around 

people’s legs and occasionally bumping into them does not rise to the level of a 

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“dangerous” propensity under Arizona law. Jack had never bitten anyone or otherwise 

injured anyone. See James, 130 Ariz. at 154, 634 P.2d at 966 (no dangerous propensities 

where the dog had never bitten anyone); Hartsock v. Bandhauer, 158 Ariz. 591, 594, 764 

P.2d 352, 355 (App. 1988) (testimony that “the dogs occasionally fought with each other 

and would snarl, growl and bite each other” and that the dogs’ owner warned children 

“not to come in the yard because the dogs might bite them” was insufficient evidence of 

the dogs’ “dangerous propensities abnormal to their class”); Brady v. Skinner, 132 Ariz. 

425, 426, 646 P.2d 310, 311 (App. 1982) (“no showing of any dangerous propensities” 

on the part of two mules, one “ornery” and the other “playful and friendly,” neither of 

which “had ever kicked, bitten, or tried to injure anyone”). In short, all evidence 

indicates that Jack has always behaved like a normal golden retriever. Cf. Brady, 132 

Ariz. at 426, 646 P.2d at 311 (“[The mules] were no more dangerous than any other 

mules.”). 

 Because Defendants had no reason to know that Jack had any dangerous 

propensities, Plaintiffs’ common law negligence claim fails. James, 130 Ariz. at 153 n.1, 

634 P.2d at 965 n.1. 

B. Strict Liability

 The parties agree that Jack did not bite Pamela Kaweske, and therefore Plaintiffs 

concede that Defendants are not liable under A.R.S. § 11-1025(A), which applies only to 

dog bites. (Doc. 21 at 1.) 

 Plaintiffs maintain, however, that Defendants are strictly liable under A.R.S. § 11-

1020, which provides that “[i]njury to any person or damage to any property by a dog 

while at large shall be the full responsibility of the dog owner or person or persons 

responsible for the dog when such damages were inflicted.” The parties do not dispute 

any material facts. The sole issue is the legal question of whether a dog without a leash 

in a fenced-in dog park is “at large” under the statute. 

 The Arizona legislature defined “at large” to mean “neither confined by an 

enclosure nor physically restrained by a leash.” A.R.S. § 11-1001. Plaintiffs assert that 

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dogs are not “confined by an enclosure” when they are in the fenced-in dog park. (Doc. 

21 at 5.) 

 In construing the statute, the Court “give[s] effect to each word or phrase and 

appl[ies] the usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly 

intended a different meaning.” Spirlong v. Browne, 236 Ariz. 146, 149, 336 P.3d 779, 

782 (App. 2014) (quotations omitted). A fenced-in area is an “enclosure” in the ordinary 

sense of the word. See Black’s Law Dictionary (defining “enclose” as “to fence or hem 

in on all sides” and “enclosure” as “land surrounded by some visible obstruction”); see 

also State v. Cabrera, 114 Ariz. 233, 235, 560 P.2d 417, 419 (1977) (“the wrecking yard 

was surrounded by fence so as to constitute an ‘enclosure’”); Hight v. Indus. Comm’n, 44 

Ariz. 129, 131, 34 P.2d 404, 405 (1934) (“a fence enclosing six hundred acres” 

constitutes an “enclosure”); Overson v. Cowley, 136 Ariz. 60, 67, 664 P.2d 210, 217 

(App. 1982) (a fenced area constitutes an “enclosure” even when the fencing “was not 

always in repair”). 

 Here, the dog park is entirely fenced-in such that the dogs are restrained from 

leaving the dog park on their own accord, and therefore the dogs that play in the dog park 

are “confined by an enclosure.” A.R.S. § 11-1001. As such, dogs are not “at large” 

when they are in the dog park, regardless of whether they are leashed. Id.

 Plaintiffs assert that the legislature provided a second, narrower definition of “at 

large” which also applies here. Plaintiffs cite A.R.S. § 11-1012, titled “Dogs not 

permitted at large; wearing licenses,” subsection D of which provides: “No person in 

charge of any dog shall permit such dog in a public park or upon any public school 

property unless the dog is physically restrained by a leash, enclosed in a car, cage or 

similar enclosure or being exhibited or trained at a recognized kennel club event, public 

school or park sponsored event.” 

 This language does not modify the statutory definition of “at large” as it applies to 

this case. The legislature did not indicate that a dog is necessarily “at large” unless it is 

“enclosed in a car, cage or similar enclosure”; rather, the legislature specified that in 

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certain locations, dogs must be more narrowly restricted. No Arizona statute 

establishing strict liability for injuries caused by dogs applies here, and therefore 

Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim fails. 

CONCLUSION 

 Plaintiffs failed to establish that Defendants’ dog, Jack, has dangerous 

propensities, and thus Defendants cannot be liable for common law negligence for 

injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained after Jack bumped her. Moreover, because Jack did 

not bite Plaintiff and was not “at large” when he bumped her, statutory strict liability does 

not apply. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment by 

Defendants Thomas and Beatrice DeRosa (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment by 

Plaintiffs Pamela and John Kaweske (Doc. 21) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 24th day of June, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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