Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00371/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00371-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOYLE WAYNE DAVIS,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-0371 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition on April 4, 2006. Petitioner contends that his previous

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was dismissed on untimeliness grounds. Petitioner

contends that the recent Ninth Circuit opinion of Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030 (9 Cir. th

2005), renders the prior petition timely. A review of this Court’s docket indicates that Petitioner

did, in fact, file a prior petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254, in Doyle Wayne

Davis v. E. Roe, CV-F-01-5961 LJO HC, which was dismissed as untimely on June 18, 2002,

and judgment was entered on June 24, 2002. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on June 28, 2002,

and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a certificate of appealability on May 27, 2003. 

DISCUSSION

Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current

petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). A federal court must dismiss a second or

successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The

court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner

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can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis

of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).

However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets

these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or successive petition. 

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by

this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of

appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words,

Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive

petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must

dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave

to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or

successive petition. Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v.

Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v.

United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

A second or successive petition for habeas corpus is not considered “successive” if the

initial habeas petition was dismissed for a technical or procedural reason versus on the merits. 

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-87 (2000) (holding that a second habeas petition is not

successive if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust); Stewart v.

Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1998) (a second habeas petition is not successive if the

claim raised in the first petition was dismissed by the district court as premature.) 

The prior petition in CV-F-01-5961 LJO HC, was dismissed as time-barred by the statute

of limitations. Although a dismissal based on the statute of limitations does not include an

examination of the merits of the petition, it nonetheless operates and is equivalent to a final

judgment on the merits. See e.g. Ellingson v. Burlington Northern Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.3

(9 Cir. 1981) (“[a] judgment based on the statute of limitations is ‘on the merits’, citing Mathis

th

v. Laird, 457 F.2d 926, 927 5 Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871 (1972)); In re Marino, 181 th

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F.3d 1142, 1144 (9 Cir. 1999) (explaining that “for res judicata purposes a dismissal on statute

th

of limitations grounds can be treated as a dismissal on the merits.”) A dismissal based on

untimeliness under the statute of limitations bars further review of the action. Therefore, because

the prior petition was adjudicated “on the merits”, and the instant petition is a “second or

successive petition” under § 2244(b). 

Petitioner makes no showing that he has obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to

file his successive petition attacking the conviction. That being so, this Court has no jurisdiction

to consider Petitioner's renewed application for relief from that conviction under Section 2254

and must dismiss the petition. See Greenawalt, 105 F.3d at 1277; Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991. If

Petitioner desires to proceed in bringing this petition for writ of habeas corpus, he must file for

leave to do so with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3).

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DISMISSED, without prejudice, as a successive petition.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 25, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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