Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05316/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05316-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CHING LEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAMALA D. HARRIS,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-05316-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[Re: ECF 23]

Before the Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss the amended petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mot., ECF 23. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss and DISMISSES with prejudice Petitioner’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 16, 2012, Petitioner was found guilty in Contra Costa County Superior 

Court of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse. Am. Pet. 6, ECF 22. Petitioner was sentenced to 

three years of probation, and required to serve one day in jail, attend a fifty-two week domestic 

violence class, and perform twenty hours of community service. Clerk’s Tr. On Appeal 66, ECF 

22-2.

The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s direct appeal on September 

19, 2014. Am. Pet. 7. On May 26, 2015, Petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

Appellate Division of Contra Costa County Superior Court, which was denied on July 17, 2015. 

Ex. E to Am. Pet., ECF 22-6; Mot. 2. On November 18, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition of writ of 

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Ex. 1 to Mot. Petitioner’s probation ended two 

days later on November 20, 2015. Resp. to Mot. (“Resp.”) 5, ECF 24. The California Supreme 

Court denied the petition on March 23, 2016, citing to People v. Villa, 45 Cal. 4th 1063 (2009) and 

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In re Wessley W., 124 Cal. App. 3d 243, 246 (1981). Ex. F to Am. Pet.

On November 19, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition in this Court before his state claim was 

exhausted, but given the California Supreme Court’s later decision denying his petition, his claim

has become wholly exhausted. ECF 20. On May 4, 2016, Petitioner filed an amended petition, to 

which Respondent now moves to dismiss. Am. Pet.; Mot.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. 

Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally 

in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to 

exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by 

presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each 

and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); McNeeley v. Arave, 

842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1988). The state’s highest court must be given an opportunity to 

rule on the claims even if review is discretionary. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 

845 (1999) (petitioner must invoke “one complete round of the State’s established appellate 

review process.”). 

However, a federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state 

court if the decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question 

and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). 

In the context of direct review of a state court judgment by a federal court, the “adequate and 

independent state ground” doctrine goes to jurisdiction; in federal habeas cases, it is also 

grounded in comity and federalism. Id. The procedural default rule is a specific instance of 

the more general “adequate and independent state grounds” doctrine. Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court 

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pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the 

claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice 

as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the 

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Where 

petitioner’s claims were not fairly presented to the state courts, but an independent and 

adequate state procedural rule exists which bars their review, claims are procedurally barred in 

federal habeas review. Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011). A petitioner must 

establish factual innocence in order to show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would 

result from application of procedural default. See Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1085

(9th Cir. 2002); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that the amended petition should be dismissed as procedurally 

defaulted. Mot. 3. According to Respondent, Petitioner raised the same two claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in state habeas review to the California Supreme Court as those in his 

federal petition here. Ex. 1 to Mot.; Mot. 4. The California Supreme Court denied the petition 

citing to People v. Villa, 45 Cal. 4th 1063 (2009) and In re Wessley W., 124 Cal. App. 3d 243, 246 

(1981). The California courts in these two cited cases held that California Penal Code section 

1473(a) only makes habeas relief available to petitioners in constructive custody, and not those out 

of custody. Mot. 4. Given that Petitioner’s probation ended just two days after he petitioned the 

California Supreme Court, Respondent argues that the California Supreme Court rightly barred his 

claims under Villa. Id. Respondent further claims that the imposition of the Villa bar was

“adequate,” because it is “firmly established” and “regularly followed.” Id. at 4-5.

Petitioner disputes that the California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition rested on “an 

adequate and independent state law basis.” Resp. 3. Specifically, Petitioner argues that references 

to federal law were interwoven throughout Villa. Id. at 4. Petitioner also argues that the instant 

case differs from Villa, in that he filed his state habeas petition when he was still on probation. Id. 

Separately, Petitioner contends that jurisdiction has already attached to this Court because an 

expired sentence does not render the federal petition moot as long as the petitioner was in custody 

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“at the time his petition was filed.” Id. at 5-6 (citing Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 

(1989)). Lastly, Petitioner claims that even if there were an independent and adequate state 

procedural ground, he can demonstrate cause and prejudice. Id. at 6.

A. Whether the California Supreme Court’s Denial Rests on an Independent State 

Ground

The California Supreme Court issued a denial of the state habeas claim, stating only that 

“[t]he petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 1063 

and In re Wessley W. (1981) 124 Cal. App. 3d 243, 246.)” Harris v. Superior Court of State of 

Cal., Los Angeles Cty., 500 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting the practice of the California 

Supreme Court in entering a “very brief order” denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus). 

Here, Petitioner does not dispute that the California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition rests on 

Villa or that the Villa bar is “firmly established” or “regularly followed.” Walker v. Martin, 562 

U.S. 307, 316 (2011); Reply 2. Rather, the main thrust of Petitioner’s argument is that Villa is 

interwoven with federal law, and thus is not an independent state ground to qualify as a procedural 

default. Id. at 3-4. The Court now reviews Villa in detail below to evaluate whether the Villa bar

is an independent state ground.

 Avelino Villa, the petitioner in Villa, pled guilty to possession of cocaine for sale in 1989

and was sentenced to three years of probation. 45 Cal. 4th at 1066. One year after his conviction, 

he obtained lawful permanent resident status in United States. Id. at 1066-67. In 2005, when 

Villa applied to renew his permanent resident status, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

(“INS”) arrested him for deportation based on his 1989 conviction. Id. at 1067. Villa then 

petitioned for writ of habeas corpus to overturn his 1989 conviction, alleging ineffective trial 

counsel among other claims. Id. The California Supreme Court first noted that availability of the 

writ of habeas corpus in California is implemented by Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (a), 

which provides: “Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained . . . may prosecute a writ of 

habeas corpus.” Id. at 1068 (emphasis in original) (citing Cal. Penal Code § 1473(a)). The court 

then concluded that “a necessary prerequisite for issuance of the writ is the custody or restraint of 

the petitioner,” where custody can include constructive custody, such as parole or probation. Id. at 

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1068-69. The court then found that Villa was no longer in the custody of the state of California, 

the sovereign responsible for the 1989 conviction, but in the custody of INS. Id. at 1072. As 

such, his detainment for removal “did not constitute ‘custody’ . . . for the purposes of satisfying 

the habeas corpus jurisdictional requirements of California law.” Id. In other words, the court 

found that INS’s custody and potential deportation are “collateral consequences” for Villa, and did 

not constitute “custody for state habeas corpus purposes.” Id. at 1070-72, 1074.

Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, this Court finds that the Villa bar is based on a state 

ground independent from federal law, made apparent by Villa’s detailed reasoning and its 

numerous citations to California statutes and cases. Villa’s conclusion that state habeas relief is 

only available to those in custody stemmed from its interpretation of California Penal Code 

section 1473. Such an interpretation of a state statute constitutes an independent state ground, 

unrelated to federal law. Although Villa cites to a federal case, Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 

(1989), the discussion there was to provide examples of collateral consequences of a criminal 

conviction, similar to Villa’s deportation, which do not constitute “custody” for the purpose of 

California state habeas. 45 Cal. 4th at 1070-71 (holding that collateral consequences, such as the 

loss of the license to practice medicine, sex offender registration, inability to vote, or inability to 

serve on a jury, do not constitute constructive custody). Although Villa also cites Maleng for the

proposition that “the collateral consequences [] are not themselves sufficient to render an 

individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it,” this citation was not 

interwoven into Villa’s analysis, nor did it form the underpinnings for the Villa bar. Id. at 1071

(citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492). Rather, the holding in Villa was rooted in the court’s 

interpretation of California Penal Code section 1473 and based on other California cases 

interpreting the statute. E.g., 45 Cal. 4th at 1070-71 (citing to In re Wessley W., 124 Cal. App. 3d 

243, 247 (1981) (finding no constructive custody and thus habeas relief unavailable)). That the 

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for state habeas relief on independent state 

procedural grounds is reinforced by the additional citation to In re Wessley W., a case that 

discussed no federal cases and also concluded that collateral consequences, such as being on law

enforcement’s “rap sheet,” do not constitute constructive custody under section 1473. 124 Cal. 

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App. 3d at 246-47.

Petitioner also advances the argument that even if the state rule were independent of 

federal law, a case-by-case inquiry is still required. Resp. 4 (citing to Cooper, 641 F.3d at 332). 

However, the case-by-case inquiry mentioned in Cooper pertains to a situation where the state 

court procedural determination relies on a federal constitutional claim. In Cooper, the Nevada 

Supreme Court analyzed whether the alleged violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963) qualified for cause and prejudice, to reach its determination on procedural default. 641 

F.3d at 332. The Ninth Circuit determined that the state court’s decision with respect to those 

claims in Cooper did not rest on an independent state ground. Here, the California Supreme Court 

did not analyze Petitioner’s federal claims to deny his petition but rather relied on an independent 

state ground so Cooper is inapposite.

B. Jurisdiction Attached to This Court

Petitioner also argues that jurisdiction has attached to this Court when he filed the federal 

petition before he completed his probation. Resp. 5. However, this is inapposite to the doctrine of 

state procedural default. Although federal law does not moot habeas relief as long as the 

“petitioner had been in physical custody under the challenged conviction at the time the petition 

was filed,” the cases proffered by Petitioner say nothing on the issue of state procedural default. 

E.g., Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492. Contrary to Petitioner’s implication that the alleged attached 

jurisdiction takes precedence over procedural default, the Ninth Circuit has expressly found that 

procedural default can still bar federal review where a federal habeas corpus petition is not moot

on its own. Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Cause and Prejudice and Miscarriage of Justice

Where, as here, the Court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground 

supporting the state court denial of a habeas petition, federal habeas review is barred unless the 

prisoner can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

The “cause standard” requires the petitioner to show that ‘“some objective factor external 

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to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to raise the claim.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 

(1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). “Without attempting an exhaustive 

catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule,” the Supreme Court 

has noted that “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to 

counsel, or that some interference by officials made compliance impracticable, would constitute 

cause under this standard.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488 (internal quotation and citations omitted). 

Next, with respect to the “prejudice” prong, petitioner bears the burden of showing, “not merely 

that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original). “To ascertain the level to which 

such errors taint the constitutional sufficiency of the trial, they must ‘be evaluated in the total 

context of the events at trial.’” See Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 393 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting 

Frady, 456 U.S. at 169).

Lastly, the “miscarriage of justice” exception is limited to habeas petitioners who can 

show, based on “new reliable evidence,” that “‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 

the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-27 (1995)

(quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496); see, e.g., Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir.

2001) (holding petitioner must establish “factual innocence” in order to show fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would result from application of procedural default).

Here, Petitioner summarily argues that the state court did not timely provide him with a 

full transcript of the trial proceedings, thus establishing cause and prejudice to excuse the 

procedural default. Resp. 6.1 The Court is not persuaded that the delay in obtaining the transcripts

was an “interference” that “made compliance impractical.” Of the transcripts submitted by 

Petitioner in his state habeas petition, the Clerk’s Transcript was filed on May 1, 2013, and the 

Reporter’s Transcript was filed in the superior court on April 10, 2013. Reply 5-6 (citing Ex. 1 to 

 

1

Petitioner incomprehensibly argues that “these circumstances have been outlined in previous 

pleadings in the instant proceeding” Resp. 6, without providing the Court with so much as a clue 

as to where in the docket such evidence might reside. The Court declines the invitation to sift 

through the court file and to guess which portions might pertain to this argument.

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Mot.). However, Petitioner did not make a state filing for a writ of habeas corpus until more than 

two years later on May 26, 2015. Ex. E to Am. Pet.; Reply 6. Even if Petitioner was waiting for 

the decision on his direct appeal, the direct appeal was denied on September 19, 2014 and 

Petitioner has offered no explanation as to why he waited until May 26, 2015 to file his state 

petition. Am. Pet. 7; Ex. E to Am. Pet. Nor is there anything in the record that suggests he could 

make the requisite showing of “cause.” Given that both “cause and prejudice” are required to 

excuse the procedural default, Petitioner cannot succeed in overcoming the default when failing to 

demonstrate “cause.” Nevertheless, Petitioner also conclusorily states in support of the 

“prejudice” prong, that “exclusion of the evidence that is the subject of this petition would 

materially alter the outcome of his cases due to the damning nature of the hearsay statements.” 

Resp. 6. Given that Petitioner has made no attempt to expound on why the alleged errors 

“[infected] his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions,” Petitioner similarly fails to 

address the “prejudice” prong. Resp. 6. Finally, Petitioner does not argue that there would be a 

“miscarriage of justice,” the other exception to procedural default. Accordingly, the Court finds 

that the procedural default is not excused and the procedural default thus bars federal review of his 

petition.

D. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability (“COA”). See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. A judge shall 

grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the certificate must indicate which 

issues satisfy this standard, id. § 2253(c) (3). Specifically, a “petitioner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his 

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).

“Determining whether a COA should issue where the petition was dismissed on procedural 

grounds has two components, one directed at the underlying constitutional claims and one directed 

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at the district court’s procedural holding.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). 

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the 

prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, 

that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial 

of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court 

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. at 484. As each of these components is a “threshold 

inquiry,” the federal court “may find that it can dispose of the application in a fair and prompt 

manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue whose answer is more apparent from the record and 

arguments.” Id. at 485. Supreme Court jurisprudence “allows and encourages” federal courts to 

first resolve the procedural issue, as was done here. See id.

Here, Petitioner has not made a showing that the procedural default could be excused, and

accordingly, a COA will be denied. This Court’s conclusion with respect to procedural default is 

not subject to reasonable debate. On that basis, this request is denied. Petitioner may not appeal 

the denial of a COA in this Court but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 

22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons,

(1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

(2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED; and

(3) The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

Dated: December 22, 2016

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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