Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02270/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02270-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HEATHER MARIE EWING and MARK

LEE EWING,

NO. CIV. S-05-2270 WBS GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA BY AND

THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES

IN THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S

OFFICE OF THE COUNTY OF SAN

JOAQUIN; SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY;

DISTRICT ATTORNEY JOHN D.

PHILLIPS; DEPUTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY LESTER F. FLEMING;

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT; CITY OF STOCKTON;

STOCKTON POLICE DEPARTMENT;

OFFICER STEVEN MICHAEL

PEPPARD, individually and in

his capacity as a City of

Stockton Police Officer;

OFFICER WILLIAM JEROME HUTTO,

individually and in his

capacity as a City of Stockton

Police Officer; OFFICER JOHN

J. REYES, individually and in

his capacity as a City of

Stockton Police Officer;

OFFICER STEVEN W. CAPPS,

individually and in his

capacity as a City of Stockton 

Police Officer; OFFICER TODD

KAMIGAKI, individually and

in his capacity as a City of

Stockton Police Officer;

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OFFICER McCARTHY, individually

and in his capacity as a City

of Stockton Police Officer;

OFFICER JOSE MARTINEZ,

individually and in his

capacity as a City Of Stockton

Police Officer; OFFICER JULIE

BARKETT, individually and in

her capacity as a City of

Stockton Police Officer;

OFFICER GARY LEE PAUL NASELLO,

individually and in his

capacity as a City of Stockton

Police Officer; INVESTIGATOR

BERTOCCHINI, individually and

in his capacity as an

investigator of the District

Attorney of San Joaquin

County; OFFICER STEVEN ALDRED

FLORES, individually and in

his capacity as a City

of Stockton Police Officer,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Heather Marie Ewing and Mark Lee Ewing

allege four causes of action against defendants: (1) direct

violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, actionable under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights through a custom or policy, also actionable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, (3) negligence, and (4) negligent supervision. 

(Compl.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

defendants San Joaquin County, San Joaquin County Sheriff’s

Department, District Attorney John D. Phillips, Deputy District

Attorney Lester F. Fleming, and Investigator Vito Bertocchini now

move for dismissal of the federal and state claims against them.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On November 6, 2004, Mark Donahue died from a stab

wound sustained in an altercation that took place outside a bar

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called Shakers in Stockton, California. (Compl. ¶ 11.) In

connection with this death, the authorities initially sought two

male members of the Jus Brothers motorcycle club in their 30’s to

late 40’s and a female companion. (Id.) Following a brief

investigation conducted along with the San Joaquin County

Sheriff’s Department and District Attorney’s Office, officers of

the Stockton Police Department arrested plaintiffs for Donahue’s

murder on November 8, 2004. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 15.)

Plaintiffs claim that throughout their detention,

defendants were presented with, and failed to investigate,

“significant, credible, and verifiable exculpatory evidence.” 

(Id. ¶¶ 15, 17.) Specifically, plaintiffs point out that two

men, Robert Memory and Frank Prater, admitted to being involved

in the November 6th altercation with Donahue and voluntarily

surrendered themselves to the police on November 12, 2004. (Id.

¶ 17.) They also allege that “Prater had previously, on November

10, 2004, attempted to surrender to the Police Department with

counsel, but the Police Department refused to arrest him stating

that they did not have an arrest warrant for him yet.” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs, however, remained in custody with charges pending

against them until November 15, 2004. (Id. ¶ 18.)

On January 31, 2006, defendants San Joaquin County, San

Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department, Phillips, Fleming, and

Bertocchini moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint as to them for

failure to state a cognizable claim. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp.

of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 4.) The parties subsequently agreed to

dismiss without prejudice plaintiffs’ claims against the San

Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department. (Mar. 6, 2006 Dismissal by

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Stipulation.) Remaining before the court is defendants Phillips,

Fleming, and Bertocchini’s (“the DA Defendants”) motion, in which

they argue that plaintiffs fail to allege that the DA Defendants

did anything besides initiate and present the State’s case, which

are protected activities for prosecutors. (Mem. of P. & A. in

Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 10.) Also still before the court

is defendant San Joaquin County’s motion to dismiss.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). The court

may not consider material beyond the complaint, however, reliance

on matters of public record is allowed. Mack v. S. Bay Beer

Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on

other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501

U.S. 104 (1991) (explaining that reliance on matters of public

record “does not convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for

summary judgment”). Dismissal is appropriate only when “it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van

Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis

added); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

B. Inspector Bertocchini

In support of their motion to dismiss, the DA

Defendants argue that they are entitled to either absolute or

qualified immunity for their actions and those taken by

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The search warrant and supporting affidavit submitted 1

by plaintiffs in opposition to this motion are public records

which the court can consider on a motion to dismiss. People v.

Jackson, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1009, 1022 (2005) (observing that

California law “provides that the documents and records in an

executed search warrant ‘shall be open to the public as a

judicial record’” (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1534(a))).

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Bertocchini, who allegedly assisted with efforts to gather facts

in support of the search warrant issued for plaintiffs’ residence

and plaintiff Heather Ewing’s person. Prosecutors and their

investigators are only absolutely immune from suit for conduct

‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.’” KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004);

Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). They are afforded

mere qualified immunity when performing investigatory or

administrative functions separate from their role as judicial

advocates. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). Significantly, the Supreme Court has

observed that “[a] prosecutor neither is, nor should consider

himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have

anyone arrested.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.

The allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint and the

evidence plaintiffs submitted in support of their opposition to

defendants’ motion suggest that Bertocchini contributed in some

manner to plaintiffs’ arrest. (Compl. ¶ 12; Pls.’ Req. for

Judicial Notice Ex. A, 10 (search warrant and supporting

affidavit).) In providing supplementary and collaborative 1

information to police investigators, prior to any probable cause

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The court notes that plaintiffs’ complaint simply 2

alleges that “employees of the District Attorney’s Office [were]

responsible in some manner and fashion for the Plaintiffs’

arrests and/or prolonged arrest and detention . . . .” (Compl. ¶

12.) Seeded throughout the complaint, however, are allegations

which, when read as a whole, further explain the basis for

plaintiffs’ claims. Significantly, plaintiffs allege that their

arrests were based on insufficient evidence. (Id. ¶ 14.) These

allegations sufficiently provide defendants with “fair notice of

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determination, Bertocchini was not acting as an advocate for the

state in a judicial proceeding. The judicial phase of the

criminal process was not even underway. Consequently,

Bertocchini cannot claim absolute prosecutorial immunity for his

contributions to the Stockton Police Department’s initial

investigation. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 776 (5th

Cir. 1999) (suggesting that prosecutors do not act as advocates

when they “manufacture[] evidence for the police to place in an

affidavit for probable cause”).

This leaves the possibility of qualified immunity. 

“Qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.’” Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d

931, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986)). In applying it, the court asks “(1) whether,

‘taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right’; and, if a violation of a constitutional

right [can] indeed be found, (2) ‘whether the right was clearly

established.’” Sissoko v. Rocha, 412 F.3d 1021, 1038 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 

Plaintiffs allege that Bertocchini, by providing

misleading evidence to police investigators, interfered with 2

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what the plaintiff[s’] claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). Moreover,

plaintiffs further explain in their opposition brief that they

believe that defendant Bertocchini maliciously provided police

investigators with misleading evidence that was later used to

support the search warrant. (Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss 4.)

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their constitutional right to a reliable determination of

probable cause before being arrested. (Compl. ¶ 14, 18.) 

Indeed, plaintiffs certainly have such a right. Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1979) (“By virtue of its

‘incorporation’ into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth

Amendment requires the States to provide a fair and reliable

determination of probable cause as a condition for any

significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” (citing Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975))). Additionally, taking the facts

alleged in the complaint as true, the court cannot find beyond

doubt that plaintiffs can prove no facts to establish that

Bertocchini violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by

tainting the probable cause determination for the search warrant,

the execution of which led to plaintiffs’ arrests. Consequently,

the court cannot at this time hold that Bertocchini’s conduct did

not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Likewise, the court cannot at this stage determine

whether it would have been “clear to a reasonable officer that

[Bertocchini’s] conduct was unlawful in the situation

confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004). The

full extent of Bertocchini’s conduct has not yet been described

to the court and at the pleading stage, plaintiffs are not

required to provide a detailed account. Morgan v. United States,

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323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that courts do not

apply a heightened pleading standard simply because the

government asserts the defense of qualified immunity); see also

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (observing that,

even in cases where qualified immunity is at issue, “summary

judgment serves as the ultimate screen to weed out truly

insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial”); McKenna v. Wright, 386

F.3d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] qualified immunity defense can

be presented in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but . . . the defense

faces a formidable hurdle when advanced on such a motion . . .

.”). Bertocchini’s contributions to the initial investigation,

in which he undisputedly played some part, could violate clearly

established federal law under some circumstances. Consequently,

the court cannot say that it is beyond doubt that plaintiffs can

prove no set of facts in support of their claims which would

entitle them to relief and Bertocchini is not entitled to

dismissal based on qualified immunity at this time.

C. District Attorneys Phillips and Fleming

Plaintiffs appear to have two theories for the District

Attorneys’ § 1983 liability. First, plaintiffs posit that when

he went forward with plaintiffs’ arraignment, Fleming knowingly,

or at least recklessly, relied on the allegedly false and

misleading evidence supplied by Bertocchini. (Pls.’ Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 4.) For such acts, which are “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,”

Fleming is absolutely immune. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430; Burns v.

Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991) (holding that prosecutors are

endowed with absolute immunity for pretrial court appearances “in

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The court notes that supervisory liability is the only 3

theory under which plaintiffs here can state a claim against the

District Attorneys for Bertocchini’s actions. Plaintiffs cannot

bring a Monell claim based on allegations that Bertocchini

deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights pursuant to a

policy or custom of the District Attorney’s Office. See Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 

Such claims are available only against local government entities

and, as explained in part II.D, the California District Attorneys

represent the state, not their local county, when performing

investigative and prosecutorial functions. See id. at 690 n.54

(“Our holding today is, of course, limited to local government

units . . . .”); Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1030-

31 (9th Cir. 2000); Walker v. County of Santa Clara, No.

04-02211, 2005 WL 2437037, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) (“[A]

district attorney also represents the state when training and

developing policies related to prosecuting violations of state

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support of taking criminal action against a suspect”, even if the

prosecutor’s presentation to the court was false and/or

misleading); see also Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 760 (9th

Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that a prosecutor is absolutely

immune for “fail[ure] to dismiss the charges after learning new

information”).

Second, plaintiffs argue that the prosecutors can be

held accountable for Bertocchini’s actions, as he was merely

acting pursuant to orders from Fleming and Phillips. (Pls.’

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 4, 7.) A supervisor cannot be

held liable under § 1983 on a simple respondeat superior basis,

absent a statute stating otherwise, and the parties have not

addressed whether a relevant statute exists. Redman v. County of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). However,

supervisory liability can attach “if supervisory officials

implement a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of

the constitutional violation.’” Because the court has rejected 3

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law.”). 

The DA Defendants did not brief whether plaintiffs have 4

alleged cognizable state law claims for negligence and/or

negligent supervision against them. These claims would not be

covered by qualified immunity, because qualified immunity applies

only to the federal claims. Foster v. McGrail, 844 F. Supp. 16,

29 (D. Mass. 1994). In the absence of arguments on this matter,

the court declines to consider whether plaintiffs have stated

viable claims against the DA defendants.

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Bertocchini’s request for immunity, it follows that Fleming and

Phillips likewise cannot be absolved of liability as his

supervisors at this early stage. Jackson v. City of Bremerton,

268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a supervisor can

only escape liability if plaintiff did not actually suffer a

constitutional injury at the hands of his subordinate).4

D. San Joaquin County

In the March 6, 2006 stipulation, plaintiffs stressed

that their voluntary dismissal applied only to defendant San

Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department. The County, evidently,

still remains a defendant in this case and a party to this

motion.

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the County appears to

be based on the fact that the “employees of the Sheriff’s

Department and the District Attorney were employees of the County

of San Joaquin . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 13.) These “employees”

allegedly deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights

pursuant to a policy or custom of the County. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) 

As plaintiffs have dismissed the Sheriff’s Department and do not

name any individual employees of the Department, the court

assumes that plaintiffs intend to maintain their claims against

the County based on its relationship with the District Attorney’s

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Office. 

However, plaintiffs’ complaint misstates the

relationship between the San Joaquin District Attorney and San

Joaquin County. The Ninth Circuit has held, based on a detailed

analysis of state law, that California District Attorneys,

despite being named for particular counties, are state officers

when investigating and prosecuting individuals in the name of the

people of the state. Weiner, 210 F.3d at 1030-31 (observing that

California Government Code § 25303 “precludes a county from

obstructing ‘the investigative and prosecutorial function of the

district attorney of a county’”); see also Pitts v. County of

Kern, 17 Cal. 4th 340, 364 (1998) (holding that “the functions

for which a prosecutor may obtain absolute, as opposed to

qualified, immunity [do not] parallel those for which a district

attorney represents the state, as opposed to the county”). 

Because the County did not have authority over the DA Defendants’

activities, as described in plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiffs

have failed to state a cognizable claim against the County. See

Grech v. Clayton County, Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir.

2003) (holding that, to state a § 1983 claim against a local

governmental entity for an unconstitutional policy or custom, “a

plaintiff . . . must show that the local governmental entity,

here the county, has authority and responsibility over the

governmental function in issue”).

III. Conclusion

While this motion was pending, plaintiffs voluntarily

dismissed defendant San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department and

opposed only defendants Phillips, Fleming, and Bertocchini’s

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arguments in support of their motion to dismiss. As explained

above, the court lacks sufficient facts to determine whether

Bertocchini is immune from suit at this stage in the litigation. 

Phillips and Fleming, as Bertocchini’s supervisors, likewise

cannot be dismissed at this time. However, because the remaining

defendants are not subject to the control of the County, the

County cannot be held liable under § 1983 for promulgating a

policy or custom that violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 

(1) defendants Phillips, Fleming, and Bertocchini’s

motion to dismiss this action as to them be, and the same hereby

is, DENIED. 

(2) defendant San Joaquin County’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims as to it be, and the same hereby is,

GRANTED.

(3) pursuant to the parties’ March 6, 2006 stipulation,

this action is hereby dismissed as against defendant San Joaquin

County Sheriff’s Department without prejudice, each party to bear

its own costs.

DATED: March 24, 2006

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