Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00023/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00023-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stephen Oliver Swartz, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 12-0023-TUC-FRZ (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On January 9, 2012, Petitioner, Stephen Oliver Swartz, filed a pro se “Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254” (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.)1

Respondents filed an answer to the Amended Petition (“Answer”) with exhibits A 

through Z attached. (Doc. 13). Petitioner filed a reply (“Reply”). (Doc. 15.) Pursuant to 

this Court’s order granting an additional thirty (30) days to file a supplement addressing 

the constitutional claims discussed in the order, (Doc. 18) Respondents filed a 

Supplemental Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Supplemental Answer”). 

(Doc. 19). Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondent’s Supplemental Answer to Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Supplemental Reply”) on February 22, 2013. (Doc. 20.) 

The case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Velasco for all pretrial matters 

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2, Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the 

District of Arizona. (Doc. 6.) The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after 

its independent review of the record, enter an order denying the petition. 

1

 “Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 1 of 22
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Proceedings in the Trial Court 

 On July 2, 2009, in Pima County Cause Number CR-20083507 (“cause number 

‘3507”) Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to possession of a deadly weapon by a 

prohibited possessor, a class four felony. (Exs. A, B, and C.)2

 On October 8, 2009, in 

Pima County Cause Number CR-20093102, (“cause number ‘3102”), Petitioner entered a 

plea of guilty to second-degree burglary, a class three felony. (Exs. D, E and F.) On 

November 5, 2009, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a 4.5-year term of imprisonment 

for the prohibited possessor conviction in cause number ‘3507 to be served consecutive 

to a 6.5-year term of imprisonment for the burglary conviction in cause number ‘3102. 

(Exs. G and H.) 

B. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

 On November 23, 2009, Petitioner filed a notice and a form petition of postconviction relief (“PCR”) in cause number ‘3507. (Exs. I and J.) On November 30, 2009, 

Petitioner filed a notice of PCR in cause number ‘3102. (Ex. K.) The court, informally 

consolidating the two cause numbers, appointed counsel to represent Petitioner and set a 

deadline for filing the PCR. (Ex. L) The trial court granted two extensions of the PCR 

filing deadline, and on June 10, 2010, before the time for filing the PCR expired, 

Petitioner filed a pro se PCR in cause number ‘3507 alleging six grounds for relief: (1) 

ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) double jeopardy violations; (3) the grand jury 

proceedings violated Petitioner’s right to due process; (4) insufficiency of the indictment; 

(5) unconstitutionality of the prohibited possessor statute; and (6) the prohibited 

possessor statute violates due process. (Ex. O.) On June 21, 2010, counsel filed a notice 

informing the trial court that she was unable to find a meritorious issue in either cause 

number ‘3507 or ‘3102, and requested additional time for Petitioner to amend his PCR 

and moved to withdraw as counsel. (Ex. P.) The trial court granted the additional time, 

 

2

 Unless otherwise noted, exhibits attached to the State’s Answer and 

Supplemental Answer, are referenced throughout as “Ex. ___.” 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 2 of 22
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and granted counsel’s request to withdraw. (Ex. Q.) Petitioner did not file an amended 

petition, and the trial court summarily dismissed the Rule 32 proceedings on October 4, 

2010, stating that Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition failed “to present a material issue of fact or 

law which would entitle [him] to relief.” (Ex. R.) 

 Petitioner filed a “Request for Statement of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 

Law,” prompting the trial court to affirm the summary disposition of the PCR and make 

findings that “the petitioner was provided with effective assistance of counsel and that all 

of the petitioner’s remaining claims have been waived by virtue of the defendant’s 

decision to enter into the Plea Agreement resulting in his imprisonment. The petitioner 

received presumptive sentences within the range of sentencing provided for in his plea 

agreement.” (Ex. S and T.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review from the denial of his PCR with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Ex. U.) Petitioner stated that he “was denied effective assistance of 

counsel, Arizona Revised Statue 13-3102(A)(4) constitutes double jeopardy, the initial 

finding of probable cause was invalid, illegal and contrary to state law and established 

procedure, the indictment was insufficient as a matter of law, the statutes under which 

defendant was arrested and convicted are unconstitutional, defendant was not a prohibited 

possessor as defined by statute and the Superior Court lacked valid jurisdiction.” (Id. at 

5.) Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in summarily disposing of his claims 

because “if the judicial process and statute under which a defendant was convicted is 

constitutionally infirm then any judgment or sentence resulting from such a statute and 

process must therefore not only be invalid but also illegal and thus void.” (Id.) The court 

of appeals granted review but denied relief in a memorandum decision on June 10, 2010. 

(Ex. V.) The appellate court ruled that because he pled guilty Petitioner waived his 

nonjurisdictional claims, “including his double-jeopardy claim, his due process claims, 

his claim that the indictment was insufficient, his claim that he had not properly been 

deprived of his right to bear arms so as to be a prohibited possessor, and his claims 

relating to the constitutionality of the prohibited-possessor statutes, except insofar as they 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 3 of 22
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

relate to the trial court’s jurisdiction.” (Id. at 4.) The appellate court further rejected 

Petitioner’s IAC claim, finding Petitioner’s claims “highly speculative, particularly in 

light of the police report stating that two officers had seen Swartz with a gun in his 

possession and the fact that Swartz would have faced two more felony charges had he 

proceeded to trial.” (Id. at 7-8.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court on May 12, 

2011. (Ex. W.) The Arizona Supreme denied review on September 6, 2011. (Ex. S.) 

C. Federal Habeas 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on January 4, 2012. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner 

presents four grounds in the Amended Petition in support of his request for habeas relief: 

(1) “Denial of right to representation by a competent 

attorney/ineffective assistance of counsel[;]” 

(2) “Conviction and punishment under Arizona Revised Statute []§ 13-

3102(A)(4) the ‘Prohibited Possessor Statute[’] constitutes a 

violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States 

Constitution[;]” 

(3) “Petitioner was denied due process and proper and valid jurisdiction 

was denied to the Arizona Superior Court[;]” and 

(4) “Arizona Revised Statute []§ 13-3102(A)(4) is unconstitutional.” 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

Because Mitchell filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

(“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997) (holding that AEDPA 

governs federal habeas petitions filed after the date of its enactment, April 24, 1996). 

The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold” for habeas relief with 

the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal 

criminal sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 475 (2007) (citations 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 4 of 22
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

omitted). The AEDPA's “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... 

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7). 

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim 

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision 

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 

(9th Cir. 2005). The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims on the merits in a 

reasoned opinion, and the state supreme court denied them without comment. (Exs. V, 

X.) Under the “look through” doctrine, Petitioner’s claims are deemed to have been 

rejected for the same reasons given in the last reasoned decision on the merits. In this 

case the Court looks to the court of appeal’s memorandum decision granting review of 

the trial court’s order denying his PCR and denying relief. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802-06. 

 “The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a 

rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became 

final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under 

subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if 

any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” 

federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's 

state-court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 

549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled 

on other grounds Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Habeas relief cannot be 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 5 of 22
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional 

principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 

896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, 

circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly 

established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 

1069. 

 The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 

2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state-court decision is “contrary to” the 

Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set 

of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 

8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary 

to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the 

correct legal rule to the facts of a prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within § 

2254(d)(1)'s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas 

court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from 

[the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... 

case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to 

a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to 

find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner 

must show that the state-court decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but 

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 6 of 22
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

25. 

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the 

state-court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller–El 

v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller–El II ). A state-court decision “based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller–El,

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ( Miller–El I ); see Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999. In considering a 

challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state-court factual determinations are presumed to be 

correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473–74; Miller–El 

II, 545 U.S. at 240. 

B. Timeliness 

 A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review[.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “The time during which a properly filed application for state 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner had until one year after his conviction and sentence became final to file 

his federal petition. Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the Petition. Upon 

review of the state-court record, the Court finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition 

is timely. 

 C. Ground One 

Petitioner alleges in Ground One of his Petition that counsel, appointed to 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 7 of 22
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

represent Petitioner until other counsel was appointed on May 19, 20093, was ineffective 

in his representation of Petitioner because he failed to communicate with Petitioner, 

failed to adequately or timely pursue an investigation of his case, and failed to appear for 

scheduled court hearings. (Petition, at 6.) Respondents concede that this claim was 

exhausted in state court, (Answer, at 7-9) but assert the claim lacks merit. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) is the clearly established law for 

IAC claims. See Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780 (2011). When, as 

here, a defendant alleges IAC during a plea process, the two-part test in Strickland

applies. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 128 (2008); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 

57-58 (1985). To prevail on a claim of IAC, “a defendant must show both deficient 

performance by counsel and prejudice.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 

(2009) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 390; 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 

The Court need not address both components of the test if petitioner makes an 

insufficient showing on one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Thus, a court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining whether 

prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 

n.14. (2000) (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack 

of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be 

followed.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). For reasons explained below, the 

Magistrate Judge finds that it is only necessary to address the prejudice prong to resolve 

Petitioner’s IAC claim. 

To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is “a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “That requires a ‘substantial,’ not 

just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 131 

 

3 See Minute Entry date 5/19/09 (Ex. Z.) 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 8 of 22
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 791). 

In the context of guilty pleas, the prejudice requirement “focuses on whether 

counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea 

process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. A defendant may satisfy the prejudice prong by showing 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 52, 58. 

This Court's review of the Arizona Court's rejection of Petitioner's claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel is “doubly deferential.” See Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 

123 (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2004)(per curiam)). In reviewing a 

state court’s resolution of an IAC claim, the Court considers whether the state court 

applied Strickland unreasonably: 

For [a petitioner] to succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim], 

... he must do more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test 

if his claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 

2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its 

independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland

incorrectly. Rather, he must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to 

the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (citations omitted). The petitioner bears the 

burden of proving his case, and must convince the district court by a preponderance of 

evidence of the facts underlying the alleged constitutional error. See Lambert, 393 F.3d 

at 370 n.16 (citing McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1418-19 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

Given the uncertainty involved in plea negotiations, deference to the appellate court’s 

determination is significant. See Premo v. Moore, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 733, 744 (2011) 

(“The stakes for defendants are high, and many elect to limit risk by forgoing the right to 

assert their innocence.”) 

Petitioner makes no allegations in this Petition that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

failure to communicate with him, or to file motions and appear in court. Similarly, 

Petitioner failed to support his IAC claim in his PCR with allegations or evidence that he 

was prejudiced by counsel’s allegedly deficient performance in this regard. (Exs. O and 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 9 of 22
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

U.) Because Petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice, this 

portion of his IAC claim is without merit. See Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 122. Petitioner has 

not suggested any additional information he may have provided to counsel during their 

meetings, or what meritorious motions counsel should have filed. Petitioner offers no 

basis for the District Court to conclude that the state court’s finding of no ineffective 

representation was an unreasonable determination of the facts, or an unreasonable 

application of, or contrary to, federal law. Thus, Petitioner’s claim of IAC as it relates to 

a failure to communicate, file motions or appear in court is without merit. 

Petitioner alleged, in his PCR, that his attorney’s failure to pursue investigative 

leads resulted in the loss of exculpatory evidence, which “was a pivotal reason [he] 

decided to accept the offered plea bargain.” (Eh. O, at 2.) Whether a petitioner can 

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate a potential 

defense depends in large part on whether the potential defense “likely would have 

succeeded at trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Lambert, 393 F.3d at 982 (“Where the 

alleged error is counsel’s failure to investigate a potential defense, the salient inquiry is 

whether discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation 

as to the plea. In turn, the result of this inquiry may depend on whether the defense would 

have likely succeeded at trial.”)(internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted). 

 Petitioner provided his own statement that the attorney’s failure to pursue 

investigative leads had resulted in the loss of exculpatory evidence because “witnesses 

moved or changed jobs and were no longer available to testify. Also, two (2) videotapes 

that would have provided exculpatory evidence were lost” because of the attorney’s 

failure to timely secure them. (Ex. AA, at 2.) Petitioner did not state what witnesses were 

no longer available to testify, what their testimony would have been, or what was on the 

videotapes. Petitioner did attach to his PCR a copy of a letter that he sent to the State Bar 

of Arizona in which he asserts that his counsel, despite stating he was prepared to go to 

trial, had not interviewed two store clerks and two security guards that could have 

verified that he was not in possession of a gun. (Ex. CC, at 2.) 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 10 of 22
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner has not shown that the Arizona court's decision, finding his allegations 

of prejudice merely speculative, involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. The state appellate court considered the evidence submitted in 

support of Petitioner’s allegation that counsel’s failure to adequately investigate “was one 

of the main reasons [he] decided to accept the state’s plea offer rather than go to trial” 

and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court elaborated on the trial court’s 

finding that Petitioner “was provided with effective assistance of counsel” by considering 

the evidence of petitioner’s guilt and the benefit he would gain from entering the plea 

agreement and found that Petitioner’s assertion was “highly speculative” in light of the 

police report stating that two officers had seen Petitioner with a gun in his possession and 

the fact that Petitioner would have faced two more felony charges had he proceeded to 

trial. (Ex. V, at ¶¶ 12–13.) This application of Strickland was not unreasonable. 

Petitioner pled guilty in cause number ‘3507 to possession of a deadly weapon by 

a prohibited possessor. (Ex. A.) According to the police report attached to Petitioner’s 

PCR, at least one, and most likely two, police officers saw Petitioner in possession of a 

gun. (Ex. DD.) Given this strong evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, even assuming that 

Petitioner’s counsel failed to adequately pursue the investigative leads, there was little 

likelihood that the evidence would have changed the outcome had Petitioner gone to trial. 

Thus, there is no likelihood that this evidence would have caused Petitioner’s counsel to 

change his recommendation that Petitioner accept a plea agreement, particularly in light 

of the dismissal of the two additional felony charges. Accordingly, Petitioner was not 

prejudiced by counsel’s performance. The state court’s determination of this issue was 

not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends denying the Petition with respect to 

Ground One. 

 D. Ground Two 

Petitioner alleges in Ground Two of the Petition that conviction and punishment 

under A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), the “prohibited possessor statute” constitutes a violation 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 11 of 22
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. (Petition, at 7.) 

Respondents concede that this claim is cognizable on habeas review, but assert that it is 

without merit. (Supplemental Answer, at 3.) 

 The state court found this claim waived by virtue of Petitioner’s valid guilty plea. 

(Ex. V, at ¶ 7.) Generally “ ‘a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused 

person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.’ ” 

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989) (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 

504, 508 (1984) ( overruled in part on other grounds by Puckett v. United States, 556 

U.S. 129 (2009)). This rule is predicated on the idea that a valid guilty plea “removes the 

issue of factual guilt from the case.” Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975). 

 Nevertheless, “even though the guilty plea may establish factual guilt, it will not 

bar all constitutional claims.” Journigan v. Duffy, 552 F.2d 283, 288 (9th Cir. 1977) A 

defendant's plea of guilty does not foreclose a subsequent challenge when the defendant’s 

right was the “right not to be haled into court at all.” Broce, 488 U.S. at 574–75 (citing 

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974)). “Where the State is precluded by the 

United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law 

requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered 

pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.” Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 (citing Blackledge, 417 

U.S. at 30). A plea of guilty does not waive a claim that “judged on its face the charge is 

one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute”, including a claim of a double 

jeopardy violation. Id. at 62, n.2. Because the state court found this claim waived by entry 

of Petitioner’s guilty plea, “there is no state court decision on [the] issue to which to 

accord deference,” and the claim is reviewed de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 

1167 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Brazzel v. Washington, 491 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge addresses the merits of Petitioner’s double jeopardy 

claim. 

The specific terms of a plea agreement may waive a double jeopardy claim. See 

Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 8 (1987) (agreeing that the specific terms of plea 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 12 of 22
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

agreement entered into by defendant removed the double jeopardy bar to second 

prosecution). 

In this case, Petitioner’s plea agreement in cause number ‘3507 provided: 

Defendant hereby waives any right to raise and/or appeal any and all 

motions, defenses, probable cause determinations, restitution orders, and 

objections which defendant has asserted or could assert to this prosecution 

and to the court’s entry of judgment against defendant and imposition of 

sentence upon defendant. 

(Ex. A at § I.) 

In Lemke v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a clause in a plea 

agreement, similar to that entered into by Petitioner in this case, which waived “all 

motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or could assert 

hereafter, to the court’s entry of judgment against him” waived a federal habeas 

petitioner’s right to raise a double-jeopardy claim. 719 F.3d 1093, at 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). 

The Ninth Circuit suggested, without deciding, that while such a defense can be waived, 

such a conclusion was not compelled by the specific terms of Lemke’s plea agreement 

and proceeded to consider the merits of the claim. Id. at 1098 (distinguishing the terms of 

Lemke’s plea agreement with the specific terms of the plea agreement at issue Adamson). 

Because Lemke calls into question the validity of Petitioner’s waiver as it relates to his 

double-jeopardy claim, the Magistrate Judge will address the merits of Petitioner’s claim. 

 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall “be subject for the 

same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. The 

Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant against both successive punishments and 

prosecutions for the same criminal offense. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 

(1993) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) overruled on other grounds 

by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)). However, only where “the two offenses for 

which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the ‘same-elements' test,” does 

the double jeopardy bar apply. Id. The “same-elements” test was enunciated by the 

Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States: “[W]here the same act or transaction 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 13 of 22
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 

determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires 

proof of a fact which the other does not.” 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 

 In cause number ‘3507 Petitioner pled guilty to, and was convicted of, misconduct 

involving weapons, in violation of A.R.S. § 13–3102(A)(4), which requires proof that 1) 

he knowingly possessed a deadly weapon and 2) that he was a prohibited possessor; that 

is, he had been convicted of a felony and had not had his rights to carry a firearm 

restored. See A.R.S. §13-3102(7) (defining the term “prohibited possessor”). Pursuant to 

the terms of Petitioner’s plea agreement, Petitioner admitted a prior historical conviction 

in Pima County Superior Court for burglary in the third degree, in violation of A.R.S. § 

13–1506(A). (See Ex. A, §1; Ex. EE) The elements supporting a conviction for third 

degree burglary are that a defendant: 1) enter or remain unlawfully in or on a 

nonresidential structure or in a fenced commercial or residential yard; 2) with the intent 

to commit any theft or any felony therein. State v. Hamblin, 217 Ariz. 481, 483 (App. 

Div. 2, 2008). Petitioner does not allege that the offenses contain the same elements. 

Neither does Petitioner dispute that these offenses contain different elements. Petitioner 

asserts that “because possession of a firearm is not a crime,” it cannot be an element of an 

offense and he was being punished “solely upon the prior felony for which Petitioner was 

already punished.” (Petition, at 7.) As Respondents correctly note: 

Petitioner’s argument conflates the concepts of elements of a crime with the 

crime itself. Possession of a deadly weapon is an element of the offense of 

weapons misconduct; it does not matter whether “in and of itself” it is 

criminal. Because Petitioner’s prior felony conviction for third-degree 

burglary and his conviction for weapons misconduct do not contain the 

same elements, his conviction for weapons misconduct does not violate his 

double jeopardy rights. 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends denying the Petition with respect 

to Ground Two. 

 E. Ground Three 

 Ground Three of the Petition, alleges a due process violation based on the trial 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 14 of 22
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

court’s lack of jurisdiction over Petitioner’s case because (a) the weapons misconduct 

statute is unconstitutional; (b) the initial finding of probable cause and the grand jury 

proceedings were improper because of the use of perjured testimony and incompetent 

witnesses; (c) the grand jury indictment was deficient as a matter of law; and (d) he was 

not a prohibited possessor and has never had a suspension of rights or “civil death” 

imposed upon him by a valid court of law. (Petition, at 8.) 

 Respondents contend that Ground Three (a) is cognizable on federal habeas 

review, but is without merit. (Supplemental Answer, at 3 and 5.) Respondents argue that 

Petitioner has waived Grounds Three (b) and (c), and, additionally, these claims fail to 

raise a federal question, and are thus not amenable to federal habeas review. 

(Supplemental Answer, at 4.) Respondents argue that Ground Three (d) is essentially a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and as such, was waived by the entry of a 

guilty plea. (Supplemental Answer, at 5.) 

 Grounds Three (b) and (c) are non-cognizable on habeas review because they are 

waived by entry of a guilty plea, and they do not relate to the power of the State to bring 

Petitioner into court. See Menna, 423 U.S. at 62. Additionally, despite Petitioner’s 

allegation of a due process violation, Petitioner’s claims raise only allegations of 

violations of state law. Petitioner asserts, as he did in his PCR, that the finding of 

probable cause and the grand jury proceedings were in violation of Arizona law, the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Arizona Rules of Evidence. (Petition, at 8; 

Ex. O, at 8–17.) Petitioner also asserts, as he did below, that the grand jury indictment 

was deficient as a matter of law because the grand jury did not comply with Arizona law 

in indicting him. (Petition, at 8; Ex. O, at 17–18.) To the extent that petitioner is 

contending that the trial court erred as a matter of state law, his claim is not cognizable on 

federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 

(1991) (reiterating that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) 

(“A federally issued writ of habeas corpus, of course, reaches only convictions obtained 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 15 of 22
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

in violation of some provision of the United States Constitution.”); Park v. California, 

202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). Merely asserting that errors in state law resulted in a 

violation of due process does not suffice to raise a question of federal law for purposes of 

federal habeas review; Petitioner cannot “transform a state-law issue into a federal one 

merely by asserting a violation of due process.” See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 

1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing Grounds Three (b) and 

(c) because they are non-cognizable claims for purposes of federal habeas review. 

Petitioner claims, in Ground Three (d), that he “was not a ‘prohibited possessor’ 

and has never had a suspension of rights or ‘civil death’ imposed upon him by a valid 

court of law.” (Petition, at 8) Petitioner asserts he raised this claim in his PCR, and refers 

the court to his PCR in support of his argument. In his PCR Petitioner argued that under 

state law he was not a prohibited possessor because his right to possess a gun was not 

taken away by judicial action but, rather, automatically by statute upon conviction of a 

felony. See A.R.S. § 13–904(A)(5) (providing that conviction for a felony suspends a 

person’s right to possess a firearm); § 13–3101(7)(b) (defining prohibited possessor as, 

e.g., a convicted felon whose right to possess a firearm has not been restored). (Petition, 

at 8, Ex. O, at 29–31.) Petitioner asserted in his PCR that A.R.S. § 13-904(A)(5) is an 

unconstitutional statute, in violation of his right to due process under state and federal 

law, because the statute “amounts to nothing more than a Bill of Attainder and violates 

Article III Distribution of Powers section of the Constitution of the State of Arizona.” 

(Ex. O, at 31.) To the extent that petitioner is contending that the trial court erred as a 

matter of state law, his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68 (reiterating that “it is not the province of a federal 

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions”); Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221 (“A federally issued writ of habeas corpus, of course, reaches 

only convictions obtained in violation of some provision of the United States 

Constitution.”); Park, 202 F.3d at 1149. 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 16 of 22
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

To the extent Petitioner asserts he is not a “prohibited possessor” under state law, 

and as such, his conviction violates due process, (See Ex. O, at 30), as Respondents 

correctly explain: 

This is not a claim that the State lacked the power to bring him into court 

on the charge of weapons misconduct. Rather, it is a claim that he did not 

meet the requirements of the statute to be a prohibited possessor, which is 

essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. As such, it is 

waived by the entry of a guilty plea. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner waived this claim by entering a plea of guilty in state 

court. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 573-574 (A defendant need not consciously waive “each 

potential defense relinquished by a plea of guilty”; rather, “[r]elinquishment derives . . . 

from the admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.”) 

 Finally, though only apparent from a reading of Petitioner’s PCR attached to his 

federal habeas Petition and his Supplemental Reply (Doc. 20, at 5), Petitioner argues that 

A.R.S. §13-904, which suspends the rights of a convicted felon to possess a gun or 

firearm, is an unconstitutional bill of attainder, in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the 

Constitution of the United States.4

 “[A] state court's decision is not contrary to or an 

 

4

 Pursuant to Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a petitioner is obligated to specify in a federal habeas petition all grounds for relief, as well as the facts 

supporting each of these grounds. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 661 (2005) 

(observing that Rule 2(c) requires pleading “separate congeries of facts” in support of each ground for relief); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n. 7 (1977) (observing that “notice” pleading in habeas is insufficient and that petition “is expected to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error’ ”) (quoting Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases). Martinez’s Petition is defective because 

it does not provide enough specific facts in support of Ground One (A), to enable a court 

to tell from the face of the Petition whether further habeas review is warranted. See 

Shepherd v. Nelson, 432 F.2d 1045, 1046 (allegation that petitioner was deprived of his rights and cross-examination was properly dismissed as a bare conclusion, unsupported by allegations of underlying fact); Adams v. Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 

1990) (holding that “in order to substantially comply with the Section 2254 Rule 2(c), a 

petitioner must state specific, particularized facts which entitle him or her to habeas 

corpus relief for each ground specified. These facts must consist of sufficient detail to 

enable the court to determine, from the face of the petition alone, whether the petition merits further habeas corpus review.”); see also Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases In The United States District Courts 2(c), 4 (1996). Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief. Boehme v. 

Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970). Accordingly, dismissal of this claim is 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 17 of 22
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent unless that 

precedent is closely on point.” John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 

2011)(citing Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 125 (holding that the state court's decision was not 

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent where no Supreme Court 

decision “squarely addresses the issue” in the case or gives a “clear answer to the 

question presented”); Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77). 

 Bills of attainder are prohibited by the United States Constitution: “No State shall . 

. . pass any bill of attainder.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.1. A bill of attainder is a 

legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 

Wall. (71 U.S.) 277, 323 (1866); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen'l Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 

468 (1977). “A given statute must satisfy three requirements to meet this definition: 

‘specification of the affected persons, punishment, and lack of judicial trial.’ Selective 

Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Int. Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 

3352, 182 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984).” Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co,. Inc., 10 F.3d 1485, 

1495-96 (9th Cir. 1993). Absence of the first requirement alone is dispositive, and the 

Court need not address the remaining requirements. See United States v. Munsterman, 

177 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999). The undersigned is unaware, and Petitioner cites no 

controlling precedent, which recognizes or extends these Supreme Court principles to 

find unconstitutional state legislation prohibiting and criminalizing the possession of 

firearms by a convicted felon. 

 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's silence on the specific issue at hand, this 

Court must consider whether the state court's ruling constitutes an unreasonable 

application of the general principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 

Court has held that even a general standard “may be applied in an unreasonable manner”; 

a state court does so when no “reasonable interpretation of the controlling [Supreme 

Court] standard” can “support [the state court's] legal ruling.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 

U.S. 930, 953 (2007)(citations omitted). “The more general the rule, the more leeway 

 warranted on this basis alone. 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 18 of 22
- 19 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Harrington, --- U.S. --

-, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 The Ninth Circuit, considering a federal statute making it unlawful for any person 

who has been indicted for or convicted of a felony to transport in interstate commerce 

any firearm or ammunition found that because there is no absence of trial, since both the 

prior conviction and the relevant elements of the federal statute must be judicially 

established, the statute was not a bill of attainder.5 Williams v. United States, 426 F.2d 

253, 255 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Munsterman, 177 F.3d at 1142 (statute making it 

unlawful to sell a firearm to person under indictment for a felony, or for such a person to 

receive a firearm shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, is not a bill of attainder 

because it is reasonably calculated to achieve a non-punitive public purpose, i.e., to keep 

firearms out of the hands of person with a somewhat greater likelihood than other citizens 

to misuse firearms). 

 Furthermore, this conclusion that the prohibition against bills of attainder does not 

apply to the prohibition of firearm possession by felons or those under indictment is 

consistent with the decisions of other courts outside this circuit that have addressed this 

or a similar issue. See United States v. Donofrio, 450 F.2d 1054, 1056 (5th Cir. 

1972)(criminal legislation prohibiting possession of weapon by convicted felon is not a 

prohibited bill of attainder because it is designed to accomplish a legitimate governmental 

purpose and is a constitutional exercise of legislative power); United States v. Hemmings, 

258 F.3d 587, 594-595 (7th Cir. 2001) (Statute prohibiting being felon in possession of 

firearm was not “bills of attainder”; statute did not determine guilt based on prior felony 

convictions, nor did it remove protections of trial); United States v. Stanko, 641 F.Supp. 

 

5

 The Constitution also forbids passage of bills of attainder by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. There is no distinction in analysis between the Bill of Attainder 

Clauses in section 10, which applies to the states, and in section 9, which applies to Congress. SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 672 n.6 

(9th Cir. 2002)(citing Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 

728 (9th Cir, 1992)). 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 19 of 22
- 20 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

866, 871 (D. Neb. 2009)(Because Congress has the power and authority to target citizens 

convicted of dangerous and violate crimes and to impose the punishment of losing their 

right to bear arms conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the result 

of a bill of attainder); United States v. Guidry, 2008 WL 1886088 (W.D. La March 18, 

2008)(recommending that statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon did not constitute a prohibited bill of attainder given that it did not determine guilt 

or remove the protections of a trial); See also State v. Swartz, 601 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 

1999)(state statute banning possession of a firearm by a felon did not constitute unlawful 

state bill of attainder since the individual was given a jury trial on the charge prior to the 

imposition of punishment); State v. Whitaker, 364 N.C. 404 (2010)(same). 

 Thus, it is evident that “fairminded jurists” could conclude that criminal legislation 

which punishes the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, such as A.R.S. § 13-

904(A)(5) is not an unlawful bill of attainder. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that the state court’s conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court precedent. 

 Finally, Petitioner argues in Ground Three (a) that A.R.S. 13-3102(A)(4) is an 

unconstitutional statute. Respondents concede that this claim was not waived by 

Petitioner’s entry of a guilty plea. Accordingly, this claim will be addressed on the 

merits. Because this claim is related to Ground Four of the Petition, it is addressed 

together with this claim in the following section. 

 F. Ground Three (a) and Ground Four 

 In Grounds Three (a) and Four of the Petition, Petitioner argues that A.R.S. § 13-

3102(A)(4) is unconstitutional because (1) it is overbroad and vague, and cannot stand 

alone; (2) does not give adequate notice; (3) constitutes a status crime involving selective 

prosecution; (4) requires a mandatory presumption of mens rea; and (5) constitutes 

automatic punishment by the state legislature and state law rather than punishment 

imposed by a valid court of law. (Petition, at 8-9) 

 The court of appeals resolved these claims by reference to several Arizona cases 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 20 of 22
- 21 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

rejecting Petitioner’s claims. (Ex. V, at 5–6.) Petitioner has not met his burden of 

demonstrating that the state court’s resolution of this issue was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United 

States Supreme Court. 

 Petitioner relies on the attachment to the Petition of his pleadings in state court to 

fully argue these claims. As noted above in footnote 3 regarding Ground Three (d), the 

attached documents do not suffice to raise and argue Petitioner’s federal claims. While 

the Court is mindful of the leniency granted to the interpretation of pro se pleadings, “this 

should not place on the reviewing court the entire onus of creating a federal claim for the 

petitioner.” Burkey v. Deeds, 824 F.Supp. 190, 193 (D.Nev. 1993). A Federal Court is 

“authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on 

its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). 

 The only federal claim made clear in the Petition is that the weapons misconduct 

statute is unconstitutional because it infringes on his right to bear arms. (Petition, at 9.) 

As noted by Respondents, there is no clearly established federal law by the Supreme 

Court that a convicted felon has a Second Amendment right to possess firearms; in fact, 

the Court has indicated the opposite. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 

626 (2008) (explaining that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 

unlimited. . . .[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”); see also United States v. Vongxay, 

594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010)(rejecting argument that the Court’s identification of 

felons as categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to 

bear arms in Heller is dicta because it is an integral limitation on the holding in Heller.) 

 Petitioner also asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because prosecution under 

it constitutes “selective prosecution.” To the extent this can be understood as an equal 

protection claim despite his failure to cite any constitutional provision, as Respondents 

assert, his claim also fails because the Supreme Court has held that statutes that prohibit 

felons from possessing weapons do not violate equal protection. Lewis v. United States, 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 21 of 22
- 22 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

445 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1980). Thus, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that 

Arizona’s weapons misconduct statute is unconstitutional, and his related claim that the 

state courts therefore lacked jurisdiction to convict him, were not unreasonable 

applications of federal law. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends denying the 

Petition with respect to Grounds Three (a) and Four. 

 G. Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Petition, at 11.) As Respondents 

correctly note, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this Court. The 

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pinholster makes clear that review of § 2254(d) 

claims “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim 

on the merits.” 131 S. Ct. at 1398. All Petitioner’s claims, even those summarily denied 

by the state courts, were adjudicated on the merits. Id. at 1402. 

 III. CONCLUSION 

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id.

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 12-0023-

TUC-FRZ. 

 If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 15th day of April, 2014. 

Case 4:12-cv-00023-FRZ Document 23 Filed 04/15/14 Page 22 of 22