Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00690/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00690-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

FREDDY ARIAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE

ARMY, 

Defendant. /

NO. CIV. 2:09-690 WBS GGH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Freddy Arias brought this action against John

McHugh in his official capacity as Secretary of the Army1

 for

damages and cost recovery pursuant to the Americans With

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-83, and Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17

(2006). Defendant John McHugh, Secretary of the Army, now moves

1 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) complains

against Pete Geren, who was Secretary of the Army when plaintiff

originally filed his complaint. On September 21, 2009, John

McHugh was confirmed as Secretary of the Army. Pursuant to Rule

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, John McHugh is

substituted for Pete Geren as the defendant in this suit.

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for summary judgment on plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 56 on the basis

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is was at all relevant times a lawfully

admitted permanent U.S. resident, and was hired by the U.S.

Department of the Army on October 7, 2002, through the Student

Temporary Employment Program (“STEP”)2 as an office clerk at Pine

Flat Lake. (See Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed

Facts (Docket Nos. 67-68) ¶¶ 11, 14; Amended Taylor Decl. (Docket

No. 65) Ex. 1.) In January of 2003, plaintiff changed positions

to become a student park ranger at Pine Flat Lake (Pl.’s Response

to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 15; Amended Taylor

Decl. Ex. 2.) Plaintiff eventually worked through the Student

Career Experience Program (“SCEP”). (Amended Taylor Decl. Ex.

7.)3 Students in either STEP or SCEP programs can be noncitizens, provided they are a lawfully admitted permanent

resident or otherwise authorized to be employed. 5 C.F.R. §

2 The STEP program for students provides for temporary

hires in the excepted service of one year or less and does not

confer eligibility to be promoted or noncompetitively converted

to term, career-conditional, or career positions. (Pl.’s Ex. in

Supp. of Opp’n to MSJ Ex. 1-2.); see 5 C.F.R. § 213.3202(a)(10). 

Students may be noncompetitively converted to the SCEP program

whenever they meet that program’s requirements and a suitable

position is available. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3202(a)(15). 

3 Students in the SCEP program who have met all of its

requirements may be noncompetitively converted to a career or

career conditional appointment at any time within 120 days of

satisfactory completion of their degree program. Id. § 

213.3202(b)(10). Students in the SCEP program, however, must

obtain U.S. citizenship before they can be converted. Id. § 

213.3202(b)(6)(ii), (b)(11)(i). 

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213.3202(a)(6), (b)(6). SCEP students must obtain U.S.

citizenship, however, before they are eligible to be

noncompetitively converted to a term, career, or career

conditional appointment. Id. § 213.3202(b)(6)(ii). 

In 2006 Ken Manning, the security officer for the

Sacramento District of the Army Corps of Engineers, discovered

three non-citizen contractors in the Sacramento District with

access to Department of Defense occupied buildings and computer

systems in violation of their contracts. (Amended Taylor Decl.

Ex. 53 (Manning Depo.) 16-17.) In response, Manning set out to

determine if there were any other non-U.S. citizens working in

the Sacramento District who were not complying with security

protocol. (Id. at 15-17.) Manning sent an e-mail request to

front-line supervisors in the District requesting them to

identify anyone who was not a United States citizen working in

their area. (Id. at 16.) Manning received e-mails in response

that revealed four additional non-citizens, all of whom were

employed under student-excepted appointments and were not

complying with governing security regulations for non-citizens. 

(Id. at 17.) 

Two of these employees, plaintiff and Hector Galvan,

worked in the student program at Pine Flat Lake. Both plaintiff

and Galvan were Mexican citizens. Manning believed that the

Department of Army regulations required all non-citizen employees

to be identified as such in all Department of Defense

communications, and that such employees would have to have their

access cards modified to display a red stripe. (Id. at 18, 31-

32.) Manning advised managers on August 22, 2006, that security

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regulations must be enforced; specifically, that any non-U.S.

citizen employees must change their Outlook e-mail identifier and

access card to reflect their non-citizenship status. (See

Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 36 (Pl’s Resp. to Req. for Admissions

Set One) ¶¶ 51, 58.) Access cards of non-citizens were to be

changed to have a red stripe when before they had a white stripe,

and the Outlook identifier was changed to include “Non-US

Citizen”. (Pl.’s Index of Exhibits Ex. 9.) On August 24, 2006,

plaintiff’s supervisor, Michael LaFrentz, forwarded Manning’s email to plaintiff and Galvan and instructed them to comply. 

(Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 8-10.) Non-citizen employees in the

Sacramento District also had their citation-issuing authority

revoked. (See Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 54 (Friedman Depo.) 17-

19; id. Ex. 48 (LaFrentz Depo.) 27-28.) On September 25, 2006,

plaintiff’s citation authority was revoked and he had to

relinquish his badge and citation book. (Amended Taylor Decl.

Ex. 36 (Pl’s Resp. to Req. for Admissions Set One) ¶ 65.) 

On September 27, 2006, plaintiff made contact with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and filed his first

discrimination complaint on November 2, 2006. (See Amended

Taylor Decl. Ex. 14.). Plaintiff alleged race, national origin,

and disability discrimination and retaliation for the (1) change

in his Outlook identifier; (2) change in his access card; (3)

revocation of his citation authority; (4) transfer from the SCEP

program down to the STEP program on September 25, 2006; (5)

stress caused by the situation and subsequent need to request

several days sick leave(6); discriminatory jokes he experienced

at work related to his ethnic background; (7) assignment to work

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Christmas due to discrimination or possible retaliation for

filing his EEOC complaint; (8) denial of a training opportunity

in December 2006; and (9) charging him as AWOL on October 6,

2006. (Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 14, 21.) Claims 1, 2, and 3

were accepted by the Army’s EEO office for investigation, and

claims 4-9 were dismissed because they had not previously been

brought to the attention of an EEO counselor as required by the

regulations. (Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 21.) 

Plaintiff’s EEO claim was denied on June 26, 2008.

(Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 33.) The EEOC opinion stated that it

was denying plaintiff’s claims because classification on

citizenship is not actionable, none of the alleged actions were

“ultimate employment decisions” subject to Title VII protection,

decisions were not based on his race or national origin, no

retaliation occurred since the issues raised in the complaint

occurred prior to his EEO protected activity, and plaintiff’s

disability claim arose after the events that gave rise to the

action. (Id. Ex. 33.) 

On October 9, 2006, plaintiff was scheduled to work at

the Fresno Columbus Day Fair and showed-up for work late and left

early, for a total of 1.5 hours, without requesting permission in

advance and in violation of attendance policies. (Amended Taylor

Decl. Ex. 12-13.) LaFrentz talked to plaintiff on October 12,

2006 about complying with his time schedule and his work

performance and attitude. (Id. Ex. 13.) Plaintiff submitted a

retroactive request for leave for the October 9, 2006 incident,

which was denied on October 13, 2006. (Id. Ex. 12.) Plaintiff’s

reason for seeking leave for the time missed was “due to school

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ending at 1400” and “to catch-up on school work.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was therefore charged with being Absent Without Leave

(“AWOL”). (Id. Ex. 13.) On October 13, 2006, plaintiff was

issued a “Need for Improvement” memorandum which cautioned that

the citizenship issue should not interfere with plaintiff

fulfilling his job responsibilities. (Id. Ex. 13.) 

Plaintiff’s next annual review by LaFrentz, covering

the period from May 1, 2006 through April 31, 2007, was positive,

but not as positive as plaintiff’s earlier reviews. (See

(Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 29.) Plaintiff took leave on May 6,

2007 as a result of stress, and again took leave on July 20, 2007

after a meeting with LaFrentz regarding plaintiff’s work duties. 

(See Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 20.) In July 2007 plaintiff was

agin counseled about leave policies. (Amended Taylor Decl. Ex.

20, 22.) 

On August 6, 2007, plaintiff called LaFrentz five

minutes after he was scheduled to appear for work and told

LaFrentz he overslept and would be an hour late to work. (Amended

Taylor Decl. Ex. 23, 29.) LaFrentz then called his supervisor,

Calvin Foster, to inform him he was inclined to charge plaintiff

as AWOL. (Id. Ex. 23-24.) Foster then called his supervisor,

Jim Sander, and informed him of his phone call with LaFrentz. 

(Id. Ex. 24.) When plaintiff showed-up for work, LaFrentz

engaged plaintiff in a conversation which became heated. (Id.

Ex. 23, 29.) Plaintiff walked out of LaFrentz’s office during

the conversation and prepared a request for sick leave to present

to LaFrentz. (Id. Ex. 23, 29.) LaFrentz called Foster again

informing him of the conversation. While LaFrentz was on the

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phone, plaintiff re-entered LaFrentz’s office and presented a

leave slip for sick leave for his remaining shift. (Id.) 

LaFrentz told plaintiff to wait until he was finished with his

phone conversation, to which plaintiff responded that he was

leaving and that LaFrentz had better “hurry up.” (Id. Ex. 23,

29.) Foster requested LaFrentz to put plaintiff on the telephone

so Foster could speak with plaintiff, which plaintiff refused.

(Id. Ex. 23-24, 29.) Plaintiff left LaFrentz’s office and called

him a “jerk” in front of other employees. (Id. Ex. 23, 29.) 

Plaintiff then left work without having his leave request

approved. LaFrentz conveyed these events fo Foster, who

subsequently conveyed them to Sander. (Id. Ex. 24.) 

Foster and Sander decided to place plaintiff on paid

administrative leave pending an investigation into the August 6,

2007 incident. (Id. Ex. 24-26.) LaFrentz subsequently signed a

removal letter on August 20, 2007 terminating plaintiff, which

was effective August 27, 2007. (Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 27-28.)

 The letter cited attendance-related offenses and “discourtesy in

the workplace” as the reasons for plaintiff’s termination. (Id.

Ex. 27.) 

Plaintiff filed his second EEOC complaint of

discrimination on October 6, 2007, again pleading discrimination

on the basis of race, national origin, and retaliation. (Id. Ex.

29.) Plaintiff alleged race and national origin discrimination

and retaliation for (a) the August 6, 2006 AWOL charge; (b) the

May 17, 2007 level 3 performance rating; (c) being placed on

administrative leave on August 6, 2007; (d) receiving a July 20,

2007 call from LaFrentz regarding plaintiff’s July 21 and 22

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requests for leave; (e) being asked to sign a leave slip signed

by LaFrentz and harassment by him on July 23, 2007; and (f) the

August 27, 2007 termination of employment. (Id. Ex. 29, 32.) On

October 24, 2007, the EEOC accepted claims a, c, and f and

dismissed claims b, d, and e for failure to bring those claims to

the EEOC within forty-five days of their occurrence as required

by the regulations. (Id. Ex. 32.) Plaintiff’s complaint was

denied on March 19, 2009, because plaintiff filed the instant

lawsuit on September 19, 2008. (Id. Ex. 34]; see 29 C.F.R. §

1614.107(a)(3) (dismissing EEO complaints that are the basis of a

civil action in federal court involving the complainant, provided

180 days have passed since complainant filed the EEO complaint). 

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on September 19,

2008 in the Northern District of California, which merged the two

EEO complaints in one federal action. (Docket No. 1.) The

action was transferred to this district on March 13, 2009. 

(Docket No. 14.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April

21, 2009. (Docket No. 22.) Before the court is defendant’s

motion for summary judgment.4

 

Plaintiff alleges in three causes of action for race

and national origin discrimination, disability discrimination,

and retaliation that the discriminatory conduct he experienced

consisted of: (1) being erroneously classified as a foreign

national instead of as a lawful U.S. permanent resident on August

4 Defendant also filed an amended request for judicial

notice asking the court to take judicial notice of pleadings and

other documents present in the case file. (Docket No. 66.) 

Because such documents are matters of public record not

reasonably subject to dispute, the court will take judicial

notice of the documents.

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22, 2006; (2) being identified as a non-U.S. citizen by his

access card that displayed a red stripe instead of a white stripe

on October 10, 2006; (3) having his Outlook e-mail identifier

changed to include the information that he is a non-citizen on

August 23, 2006; (4) having his citation authority removed; (5)

being threatened to be removed from the SCEP program; (6) having

his performance rating downgraded on May 17, 2007; (7) being

charged as AWOL for coming in to work late on August 6, 2007; (8)

being placed on administrative leave of August 6, 2007; (9) being

terminated on August 27, 2007; (10) defendant’s failure to

provide reasonable accommodations for his disability; and (11)

defendant’s failure to put an end to the harassment plaintiff

experienced at work. (See FAC.)

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A material fact is one that could affect

the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could

permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the nonmoving

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 256. On

issues for which the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial lies

with the nonmoving party, the moving party bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

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negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case or by

demonstrating that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to

support an essential element of its claim or defense. Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099,

1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

Once the moving party carries its initial burden, the

nonmoving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in

its own pleading,” but must go beyond the pleadings and, “by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56,] set out

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

(1986); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir.

1989). On those issues for which it will bear the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial, the nonmoving party “must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d

at 1103.

In its inquiry, the court must view any inferences

drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court also may not

engage in credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, for

these are jury functions. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Claims of race and national-origin discrimination under

Title VII are evaluated pursuant to the burden-shifting framework

provided in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “the burden of

production first falls on the plaintiff to make out a prima facie

case of discrimination.” Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413

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F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005). He may do so by showing that

(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he performed his job

satisfactorily prior to the disparate treatment; (3) he was

subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly

situated employees outside the protected class received more

favorable treatment. Id.; see Raad Fairbanks N. Star Borough

Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). If plaintiff

fails to carry his initial burden to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination, summary judgment is appropriate. If plaintiff

successfully establishes his prima facie case, the “burden of

production, but not persuasion, [] shifts to the employer to

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

challenged action.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d

1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.

at 802). 

Assuming the employer articulates a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, plaintiff, in order to

survive summary judgment, bears the burden of supplying evidence

to the court that gives rise to an inference of intentional

discrimination. See Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1094 (citing St. Mary’s

Honot Ctr. at 507-08.). At this stage of the analysis, “[t]he

mere existence of a prima facie case, based on the minimum

evidence necessary to raise a McDonnell Douglas presumption, does

not preclude summary judgment” in favor the employer. See Wallis

v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather,

“[i]n response to the defendant’s offer of nondiscriminatory

reasons, the plaintiff must produce specific, substantial

evidence of pretext.” Id. “In other words, the plaintiff must

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tender a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext in order to

avoid summary judgment.” Id.

A. Evidentiary Objections

“A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in

ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT

& SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181

(9th Cir. 1988)). After receiving defendant’s Reply and

plaintiff’s Opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss, the

court determined that there were many evidentiary objections to

the evidence supplied by both parties and granted the parties an

extension of time to resubmit their briefs an evidence to take

into account the evidentiary objections.

Despite the court’s April 23, 2010 Order (Docket No.

62) admonishing the parties that statements of undisputed fact

are not evidence subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence,

plaintiff filed an amended list of objections to several of

defendant’s stated undisputed facts rather than to the evidence

in support of those statements. (Docket No. 71.) To the extent

that plaintiff’s objections are to the stated undisputed facts

themselves as conclusions drawn from the exhibits proffered by

defendant, they are inappropriate and are overruled. Plaintiff’s

amended list of objections also include several blanket

objections to multiple sources of evidence listed in support of a

statement of undisputed fact. This also contravenes the court’s

April 23, 2010 Order, which required the parties to separately

list each evidentiary objection, “specifically identifying the

statement objected to in the evidence and its location, citing

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the applicable Federal Rule of Evidence, and articulating the

objection made therein.” (Docket No. 62.) It is impossible for

the court to understand, let alone rule upon, broad blanket

objections. To the extent that plaintiff broadly objects to the

various evidence cited in support of the statements of undisputed

fact objected to, those objections are also overruled as

inappropriate. 

The remainder of plaintiff’s unorganized and confusing

objections are on the basis of relevance, hearsay, lack of

foundation, lack of personal knowledge, prejudice, improper

character evidence, and assuming facts not in evidence. The

court has reminded the parties that on summary judgment, the

evidence need not be in a form that is admissible at trial. See

Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119

(E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

324 (1986)). Furthermore, many of these objections are

unnecessary when made to evidence presented in support of a

motion for summary judgement, as the court is not in danger of

prejudice and the summary judgment standard dictates that summary

judgment can be granted “only when there is no genuine dispute of

material fact. See Burch, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 1119-20. 

Plaintiff’s objections are therefore overruled. 

B. Arias’s Declaration

“The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a party

cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his

prior deposition testimony.” Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,

952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991). This is because “if a party

who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an

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issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his

own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of

summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of

fact.” Id. at 266 (quoting Foster v. Arcata Assocs., Inc., 772

F.2d 1453, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

The “sham affidavit rule” may be invoked only if a

district court makes “a factual determination that the

contradiction was actually a sham” and “the inconsistency between

a party’s deposition testimony and subsequent affidavit . . .

[is] clear and unambiguous.” Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577

F.3d 989, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks,

citations omitted). Accordingly, “the non-moving party is not

precluded from elaborating upon, explaining or clarifying prior

testimony elicited by opposing counsel on deposition [and] minor

inconsistencies that result from an honest discrepancy, a

mistake, or newly discovered evidence afford no basis for

excluding an opposition affidavit.” Messick v. Horizon Indus.,

62 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff submitted a

declaration in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (Docket No. 70) that defendant contends portions of

which ought to be striken as a sham declaration. 

Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff’s

representations that he was a “Park Ranger” contradict his prior

statements that he was a “student park ranger,” and his

representations that he was a “permanent citizen” and

“mischaracterized as a non-US citizen” contradict his earlier

admissions that he was not–-and still is not--a United States

citizen while he was employed by the Army. The evidence is

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uncontraverted and plaintiff has repeatedly stated that he was

always a student employee at Pine Flat Lake. Any representations

that plaintiff was a permanent “Park Ranger” will therefore be

ignored by the court in deciding defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

Likewise, the evidence is uncontraverted and plaintiff has

repeatedly stated that he was not and is not a United States

citizen. The court will therefore ignore any reference to the

fact that plaintiff was a United States citizen in evaluating

defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

Defendant also objects to statements in plaintiff’s

declaration that he “never demonstrated a poor work attitude” and

that he remained positive about his job. The court finds these

statements to be merely plaintiff’s opinion as to his prior work

performance and a minor discrepancy with the prior testimony to

which the government compares it. Plaintiff has repeatedly

called attention to his positive reviews and lack of

confrontations with LaFrentz or other employees before the

incidents that form the basis of this lawsuit. These statements,

therefore, will be considered as evidence in deciding defendant’s

motion to dismiss.

C. Claims Properly Before the Court

In order to maintain a suit alleging employment

discrimination against an agency of the United States, a claimant

must exhaust his administrative remedies in accordance with

published procedures. See Leorna v. United States Dep’t of

State, 105 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Brown v. General

Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. 

Federal regulations require that a federal employee raise a

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discrimination claim with an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)

counselor within forty-five days of an adverse employment action. 

See Leorna, 105 F.3d at 550 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)). 

This forty-five day limit acts as a “statute of limitations for

filing suit.” Johnson v. U.S. Treas. Dep’t., 27 F.3d 415, 416

(9th Cir. 1994). The EEO may dismiss a complaint or portions

thereof for, inter alia, failure to comply with the forty-five

day limit, and failure to state a claim. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107. 

A partial dismissal of a complaint is reviewable by an EEOC

administrative judge on request for a hearing on the entire

complaint before the agency issues a final decision, or appealed

to the EEOC Office of Federal Operations (“OFO”) within thirty

days of a final decision on the remaining claims in the

complaint. (See, e.g., Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 33.) Any

decisions not challenged are waived. (Id.) 

Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over

employment discrimination claims that have not been presented and

exhausted in the administrative process. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. 

Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing they have exhausted their

administrative remedies and that the federal courts have

jurisdiction over their claims. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors

Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178 (1936). 

Plaintiff’s suit is founded on eleven alleged acts of

discrimination, all of which were raised in either plaintiff’s

first or second complaint to the Army EEO office. Eight of the

acts of discrimination at issue in this case were accepted for

review by the Army EEO office and three were rejected. The fact

that the Army EEO office rejected three of the alleged acts of

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discrimination that plaintiff raises in this suit is not enough

to preclude this court’s jurisdiction over claims that stem from

those acts. All of the claimed incidents of discrimination in

plaintiff’s Complaint are therefore properly before the court. 

D. First Cause of Action for Race and National Origin

Discrimination

1. Actions Alleged in First EEO Complaint

It is not disputed that plaintiff belongs to a

protected class and that prior to the implementation of the new

security measures that plaintiff performed his job

satisfactorily. Defendant does not argue that the security

measures do not constitute an adverse employment action. 

Primarily at issue is whether similarly situated employees

outside of plaintiff’s protected class received more favorable

treatment than plaintiff. The evidence in the record indicates

that Manning e-mailed all front-line managers in the Sacramento

District asking them about non-citizen employees once he became

aware of non-citizen contractors of various nationalities in the

Sacramento District that had access to sensitive information. 

LaFrentz apparently responded to Manning’s e-mail indicating that

there were two non-U.S. citizen student employees at Pine Flat

Lake, and Manning made the two student employees at Pine Flat

Lake as well as two other non-U.S. citizen employees brought to

his attention comply with updated security measures. 

The evidence plaintiff points to in support of the

contention that the changes were the result of unlawful

discrimination is that Manning’s e-mails that LaFrentz forwarded

to plaintiff indicated that plaintiff and Galvan’s e-mail

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notifiers and access cards would have to indicate their “Mexican

citizenship” and referred to them as “Mexican citizens.”5

(Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 8-10.) Plaintiff and Galvan were both

Mexican citizens at the time and were the only non-citizen

employees at Pine Flat Lake affected by Manning’s security

policies. While there is evidence that the security policies

were applied to other non-U.S. citizen employees in the

Sacramento district, (See (Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 33, at 4),

there remains a material dispute as to whether other non-U.S.

citizen employees were directed to have their country of

citizenship revealed in the same way that Manning directed that

plaintiff’s Mexican citizenship be revealed. Plaintiff has

therefore met his prima facie burden.

Defendant has, in turn, articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for implementing the challenged security

measures. Namely, the heightened security concerns that arise

when non-citizen employees of the Department of Defense have

access to sensitive information and computer systems and the

related need to identify non-citizen employees. Plaintiff has,

however, provided evidence of pretext sufficient to meet his

burden under McDonnell Douglas. Plaintiff’s supervisors knew

that he was not a U.S. citizen when he was hired and originally

issued his access card, Outlook identifier, and citation

authority. Yet it was not until long after plaintiff began

working at Pine Flat Lake that he was required to comply with the

regulations. That Manning stated in his e-mails that plaintiff

5 In his brief, plaintiff argues that Manning’s e-mails

refer to plaintiff’s “Mexican status.” The court has been unable

to locate any such reference. 

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had to reveal his “Mexican” citizenship rather than simply his

status as a non-U.S. citizen is also evidence sufficient to

withstand summary judgment that Manning’s justification for the

security measures could be pretext. 

2. Actions Alleged in Second EEO Complaint

With respect to plaintiff’s alleged race and national

origin discrimination claims that stem from his second EEO

complaint for being listed as AWOL on August 6, 2006, being

placed on administrative leave on August 6, 2007, and being

terminated from his position on August 27, 2007, plaintiff has

also met his prima facie burden. Again, it is not disputed that

plaintiff is a member of a protected class and that the

challenged actions are adverse employment actions. Plaintiff has

also provided evidence in the form of performance reviews and

awards that he performed his job in an overall satisfactory

manner prior to and after the events at issue occurred sufficient

to withstand summary judgment. At issue is whether others

outside of plaintiff’s protected class were treated more

favorably than plaintiff. 

Individuals are similarly situated when they have

similar jobs and display similar conduct. See, e.g., Vasquez v.

City of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Wall v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 718 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir.

1983) (employees not similarly situated where other employees do

not have disciplinary record). The employees need not be

identical; they must simply be similar “in all material

respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006).

The evidence in the record suggests that the operational

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distinction between a student park ranger and permanent park

ranger was minimal. (Compare Amended Taylor Decl. Ex. 3 with id.

Ex. 5). For purposes of establishing his prima facie burden, the

court will consider permanent park rangers to be similarly

situated in all material respects to student park rangers. 

Plaintiff generally compares himself to Park Rangers Anderson,

Hershey, Thompson, Ehrke, and Coons. (Amended Taylor Decl. Ex.

38 (Pl’s Resp. to Interrogatories Set One) ¶¶ 1-2.) 

With respect to plaintiff’s being marked AWOL on August

6, 2006, the evidence indicates that other employees were not

present at their booths or positions but were not punished in a

manner similar to plaintiff. This is sufficient to satisfy

plaintiff’s prima facie burden. Defendant satisfies its burden

by arguing that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to mark

plaintiff AWOL was that plaintiff failed to work the entirety of

his shift as required by attendance policies. However, evidence

that other employees were not marked AWOL as plaintiff was that

day raises a material dispute of fact with respect to whether the

stated reason for marking plaintiff as AWOL was mere pretext for

a discriminatory motive. 

With respect to plaintiff being put on administrative

leave and eventually being terminated from his position as a

student park ranger, plaintiff compares himself specifically to

Park Rangers Coons and Thompson. Park Ranger Coons was

terminated by LaFrentz for, inter alia, disobeying orders, lack

of professionalism, and bad judgment. (Amended Taylor Decl. Ex.

18.) Plaintiff argues that he should not have been placed on

administrative leave or terminated because Coons was not

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terminated until after multiple incidents of bad behavior whereas

plaintiff alleges he was terminated only after one incident. 

Plaintiff also compares himself to Park Ranger Thompson, who in

2005 was late to park ranger training in Jackson, California

because he overslept from being intoxicated the night before. 

(Thompson Dep. (Docket No. 58) 24-25.) La Frentz was Thompson’s

team leader at the time, and LaFrentz told Thompson he would have

to report Thompson’s absence to plaintiff’s supervisor when they

returned from the retreat. (Id. at 25.) Thompson’s supervisor

decided not to formally punish Thompson for being late to the

training. (Id.) Plaintiff, however, was counseled and punished

for arriving to work late on August 6, 2007, the end result of

which was his termination. These comparisons are sufficient to

satisfy plaintiff’s prima facie burden that he was treated

differently than other park rangers at Pine Flat Lake. 

Defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for marking plaintiff AWOL, placing him on

administrative leave, and eventually terminating him. 

Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff violated workplace

attendance policies and was insubordinate to management. The

evidence is undisputed that plaintiff had been counseled about

attendance policies before the August 6, 2007 incident and that

he had previously been marked AWOL. On August 6, 2007, plaintiff

arrived to work one hour late. Furthermore, plaintiff admits

that he called LaFrentz a “jerk,” that he told him to “hurry up”

off the telephone, that he refused to talk on the phone to Foster

when asked, and that he left work without having his leave slip

signed. Plaintiff’s comparison to Park Rangers Coons and

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Thompson, however, raises a material fact as to whether plaintiff

was disciplined and eventually terminated because of a

discriminatory motive and is sufficient to withstand a motion for

summary judgement. 

E. Second Cause of Action for Retaliation

Under Title VII, an employer may not take any adverse

employment action against an employee who has opposed any

practice made unlawful by Title VII or made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation,

proceeding or hearing under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to

retaliation claims under FEHA and Title VII. Stegall v. Citadel

Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2003); Flait

v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 475-76 (1992). The

employee must establish a prima facie case by showing that the

employee engaged in a protected activity, his employer subjected

him to adverse employment action, and there is a causal link

between the protected activity and the employer’s action. 

Stegall, 350 F.3d at 1065-66; Akers v. County of San Diego, 95

Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1453 (2002). Then the employer has the

burden to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the

action taken. The employee then bears the ultimate burden of

demonstrating that any such reason was merely a pretext for a

discriminatory motive, and that the retaliation was intentional. 

Stegall, 350 F.3d at 1066; Akers, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 1453. 

The first two prongs necessary to establish a prima

facie burden of retaliation do not appear to be in dispute. 

Plaintiff was charged AWOL, put on administrative leave, and

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ultimately terminated. Plaintiff made contact with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission on September 27, 2006, and

filed his first discrimination complaint on November 2, 2006. 

LaFrentz was interviewed by an EEO counselor on November 27,

2006, and plaintiff’s EEO claim was denied on June 26, 2008.

Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave on August 6, 2007

and was terminated from his position on August 27, 2007. Other

than the fact that defendant was aware of plaintiff’s protected

activity, plaintiff does not provide any direct evidence in

support of his allegations that the administrative actions taken

against him were done to retaliate for filing an EEO complaint. 

The timing of alleged retaliatory conduct, however, can

provide circumstantial evidence of retaliation that is sufficient

to create a prima facie case of retaliation. See Passantino v.

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th

Cir. 2000) (noting that causation can be inferred from timing

alone); see also Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 505

(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that a prima facie case of causation was

established when discharges occurred forty-two and fifty-nine

days after EEOC hearings); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371,

1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that sufficient evidence existed

where adverse actions occurred less than three months after

complaint filed, two weeks after charge first investigated, and

less than two months after investigation ended). But see

McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124-25 (9th Cir.

2004) (holding temporal link alone did not establish prima facie

case of retaliation where the “events were separated by a year

and a half”). 

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Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave more than

eight months after plaintiff filed his EEO complaint and LaFrentz

was interviewed by an EEO counselor. However, the evidence in

the record shows that the Army EEO investigation was still

pending at the time of plaintiff’s termination–-indeed, the

investigation was not completed until ten months after plaintiff

had been terminated from his position at Pine Flat Lake. While

in some circumstances the gap in time between the filing of an

EEO complaint and the adverse employment action can be too great

to support an inference of causation based on timing alone, see,

e.g., Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1035

(9th Cir. 2006) (nine month gap between complaint of

discrimination and adverse employment action too great to support

inference of causation), in this case plaintiff has met his prima

facie burden. Unlike in Cornwell, the evidence in this case is

undisputed that plaintiff’s supervisor in fact was aware of

plaintiff’s EEO complaint and participated in the ongoing

investigation of plaintiff’s claims of discrimination. 

The court has already explained that defendant has

articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for placing

plaintiff on administrative leave and subsequently terminating

him. Plaintiff’s comparison to Park Rangers Thompson and Coons

nevertheless raises a material dispute as to whether the

disciplinary actions taken against him were the result of

plaintiff’s protected EEO activity, and the court will therefore

deny defendant’s motion for summary judgement. 

F. Third Cause of Action for Disability Discrimination

Under the Americans With Disabilities Act

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The federal government may not be sued under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-83,

because it is specifically excluded from the ADA's definition of

“employer.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211(2), 12111(5)(B); Zimmerman v.

Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Rather, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.,

provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims based on a

federal employee’s disability. See, e.g. McGuinness v. United

States Postal Serv., 744 F.2d 1318, 1322-1323 (7th Cir. 1984);

Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 413-414 (9th Cir. 1985). 

While plaintiff’s third cause of action for disability

discrimination is brought under the ADA, the court will interpret

it as one brought under the Rehabilitation Act.

“To establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) he is disabled within

the meaning of the statute; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the

position; (3) he was adversely treated because of his disability;

and (4) he worked for the federal government.” Wilborn v.

Ashcroft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1207 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (citing

Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a

plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination, “the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment

decision. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to

produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that defendant's articulated reason is pretextual.” Id.

“In other words, [ ] plaintiff ‘must tender a genuine issue of

material fact as to pretext in order to avoid summary judgment.’” 

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Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1983)

(quoting Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.

1983)). 

The Americans with Disabilities Act, whose standards of

substantive liability are incorporated in the Rehabilitation Act,

defines “disability” as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of

such individual, (B) a record of such an impairment, or (C) being

regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that he is disabled due

to severe mental anxiety and emotional stress. (FAC ¶ 45.) The

regulations define a physical or mental impairment as: 

(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic

disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more

of the following body systems: neurological,

musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory

(including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,

digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and

endocrine; or

(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental

retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental

illness, and specific learning disabilities.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). The regulations further provide that the

term “substantially limits” means: 

(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the

average person in the general population can perform; or

(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner

or duration under which an individual can perform a

particular major life activity as compared to the

condition, manner, or duration under which the average

person in the general population can perform that same

major life activity.

Id. § 1630.2(j)(1). The ADA defines “major life activities” as

including: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,

hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,

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speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,

communicating, and working,” as well as including major bodily

functions. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(B). The regulations further

inform that:

(3) With respect to the major life activity of working–

(i) The term substantially limits means

significantly restricted in the ability to

perform either a class of jobs or a broad

range of jobs in various classes as compared

to the average person having comparable

training, skills and abilities. The inability

to perform a single, particular job does not

constitute a substantial limitation in the

major life activity of working.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). Finally, the regulations provide

guidance for determining whether all three elements of

“disability”–-physical or mental impairment, substantially

limiting, major life activity--are met: 

(2) The following factors should be considered in

determining whether an individual is substantially

limited in a major life activity:

(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;

(ii) The duration or expected duration of the

impairment; and

(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the

expected permanent or long term impact of or

resulting from the impairment.

Id. § 1630.2(j)(2). 

The evidence in the record indicates that plaintiff

sometimes experienced stress at work that caused him to lose the

ability to concentrate, request sick leave, and leave his

scheduled shifts early. This is sufficient to survive summary

judgment as to whether plaintiff is “disabled” under the statute. 

Likewise, there is sufficient evidence that plaintiff was

otherwise qualified for his position, as he performed his job for

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years in an exemplary manner and continued to perform

satisfactorily even after he began experiencing stress on the

job. Similarly, plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to

meet his prima facie burden that he was adversely treated because

of his workplace stress. On August 6, 2007, plaintiff left work

after a heated exchange with LaFrentz during which he presented a

leave slip seeking time off for stress. There is evidence that

plaintiff sought to remove himself from LaFrentz’s presence, and

that as a result of his stress he called LaFrentz a “jerk” and

would not talk to Foster on the phone when asked. The

disciplinary actions taken against plaintiff are also evidence

that defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations for

plaintiff’s stress disability.

The same evidence explained earlier satisfies

defendant’s burden to provide a non-discriminatory reason for the

disciplinary actions taken against plaintiff. Specifically, that

plaintiff was late to work due to sleeping in, that he called

LaFrentz a “jerk” and left work without having his leave slip

approved. Yet a material issue of fact remains as to whether

these actions were taken because of plaintiff’s disability. The

court will therefore deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment

with respect to plaintiff’s third cause of action.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: June 17, 2010

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