Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05462/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05462-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES DWAYNE AIRY,

Petitioner,

 v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Acting Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-5462 CRB (PR)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at California State Prison, Sacramento in

Represa, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his

sentence violates the constitutional proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base in the Superior Court of the

State of California in and for the County of Santa Clara. He also admitted having suffered

three prior strike felony convictions and having served three prior prison terms. On January

6, 2005, he was sentenced to 25 years to life plus three consecutive one-year enhancements

in state prison pursuant to California’s Three Strikes law.

Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence to the California Court

of Appeal and the Supreme Court of California, which on February 8, 2006 denied review. 

He then filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Per order filed February 26, 2007, the court found that the petition, when liberally construed,

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stated a cognizable claim under § 2254 and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of

habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show

cause and Petitioner has filed a traverse.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §

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2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th

Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining

whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application fo Supreme Court precedent,

only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need be “reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Claim and Analysis

Petitioner claims that his 28-years-to-life sentence under California’s Three Strikes

law constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment. 

“The Eight Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and

sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the

crime.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (citations omitted). For purposes of

federal habeas review, the gross disproportionality principle is “the only relevant clearly

established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ framework”

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003). A sentence will

be found grossly disproportionate only in “exceedingly rare” and “extreme” cases. Id.

In judging the appropriateness of a sentence under a recidivist statute, a court may

take into account the government’s interest not only in punishing the offense of conviction,

but also its interest in dealing in a harsher manner with those who are repeat criminals. 

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980). The Eighth Amendment does not preclude a

state from making a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating

criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime, as may

occur in a sentencing scheme that imposes longer terms on recidivists. See Ewing, 538 U.S.

at 29-30 (upholding 25-years-to-life sentence for recidivist convicted of grand theft).

In determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate under California’s

Three Strikes law, the court looks to whether such an “extreme sentence is justified by the

gravity of [an individual’s] most recent offense and criminal history.” Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering the relevance of the criminal history, a

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court must consider the “factual specifics” of an individual’s priors to determine whether the

conduct involved violence or was particularly serious. Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 970

(9th Cir. 2005). Not every case warrants a life sentence for a three strikes offender. 

Compare id. (holding sentence of 25 years to life on petty theft with prior conviction was

grossly disproportionate to crime where previous two strikes were the result of one

negotiated plea resulting in a single county jail sentence) with Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082,

1086 (9th Cir. 2004) (sentence of 25 years to life not grossly disproportionate for conviction

of petty theft with a prior when defendant struggled with guard to prevent apprehension and

prior convictions of robbery involved threat of violence “because his cohort used a knife”).

Here, Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to California’s Three Strikes law, which is

triggered when a defendant is convicted of a felony, and has suffered one or more prior

“serious” or “violent” felony convictions. See Cal. Penal Code § 667(e)(2)(A). Under the

three strikes sentencing scheme, any felony conviction can constitute the third strike and

subject a defendant to a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. See id.

Petitioner’s triggering offense was possession of cocaine base, properly charged as a

felony under California law. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11350(a); see also Cal. Health

& Safety Code § 11055(b)(6) (listing cocaine as a Schedule II drug). His criminal history is

quite lengthy and involves multiple crimes of violence. Petitioner’s probation report showed

that his three prior strike offenses included: (1) a 1989 conviction for robbery where he and

a co-defendant held up an auto parts store; (2) a 1980 conviction for robbery where he took

money from the victim by force or fear; and (3) a 1973 conviction for residential burglary

where he entered a house at 3:00 a.m., repeatedly raped and forcibly orally copulated a 19-

year-old victim, pulled out a chunk of her hair, and took money from her purse. CT 276. In

addition to these strikes, Petitioner has an extensive criminal history, spanning more than

three decades including, possession of controlled substance, possession of controlled

substance for sale, petty theft with priors, indecent exposure, robbery, burglary, failure to

register as a sex offender, driving under the influence, and felony probation violations. See

id.; see also People v. Airy, No. H028336, slip op. at 15 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2005) (Pet.

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Ex. A, App. A) (“[D]efendant’s criminal history began in 1969 and continued into the 1990s

with convictions for theft, robbery, burglary, drug offenses, and failure to register as a sex

offender.”). Moreover, Petitioner was on parole when he committed the current triggering

offense. Id.

Based on Petitioner’s history of criminal recidivism, which includes multiple crimes

of violence, his life sentence cannot be said to be grossly disproportionate in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. See Rios, 390 F.3d at 1086. The Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in 

Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2006), makes this conclusion clear. In Taylor, the

court upheld a three strikes life sentence for possession of .036 grams of cocaine because

Taylor’s priors, like Petitioner’s priors in this case, involved crimes of violence. See 460

F.3d at 1101-02. 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim

was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2252(d). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on his Eight Amendment claim. 

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the court is satisfied that the

petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2008 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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