Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00579/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00579-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA N. HARRELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA FORENSIC MEDICAL 

GROUP, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0579 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing 

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will 

direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 

and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly 

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payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 

facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 

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(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

In the instant case, plaintiff filed the following documents with the court:

1. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed April 6, 2015. (ECF No. 9.)

2. Supplemental exhibit to the FAC, filed April 27, 2015. (ECF No. 10.)

3. “Supplemental information,” regarding the allegations in the FAC, filed May 26, 

2015. (ECF No. 11.)

4. “Supplemental [prayer for] relief,” filed June 24, 2015. (ECF No. 14.)

5. “Supplemental information,” concerning the allegations in the FAC, filed June 24, 

2015. (ECF No. 15.)

6. “Supplemental information,” regarding a 602 medical appeal,1filed July 7, 2015. 

(ECF No. 16.)

7. “Supplemental information,” regarding a 602 medical appeal, filed July 15, 2015. 

(ECF No. 17.)

Plaintiff is hereby informed that the court cannot refer to documents # 2-7 listed above in 

order to make the FAC complete for purposes of screening and service. Local Rule 220 requires 

that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any other pleading. 

Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave to file a second amended complaint – which consists

only of a single document plus any necessary exhibits – and is admonished not to make 

additional, subsequent filings to supplement that complaint. While the court appreciates 

plaintiff’s solicitousness in promising to “keep this court informed with updated information” 

 

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The court is uncertain whether plaintiff intends to bring claims herein based on the subject 

matter of the 602 medical appeal. Plaintiff is cautioned that “a district court must dismiss an 

action involving prison conditions when the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies 

prior to filing suit but is in the process of doing so when a motion to dismiss is filed.” McKinney 

v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).

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(ECF No. 17 at 1), each additional filing that he makes will only delay the handling of his case. 

This is particularly true given that “[j]udges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest 

caseloads in the nation, and this Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources to 

individual cases and matters.” Cortez v. City of Porterville, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1162 (E.D. Cal. 

2014).

The court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement 

as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading 

policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and 

succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Because plaintiff 

has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the FAC must be dismissed. 

The court will, however, grant leave to file a second amended complaint

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each 

named defendant is involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is 

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Id.; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As it appears that plaintiff is attempting to bring claims under the Eighth Amendment for 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, plaintiff is advised as follows regarding the 

standards that govern such a claim. 

To state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care, 

plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To prevail, plaintiff must 

show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendant possessed a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2012), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); 

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Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1991). 

To meet the objective element, plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a serious 

medical need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Such need exists if the failure to treat the injury or 

condition “could result in further significant injury” or cause “the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotes and 

citations omitted). Serious medical needs include “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable 

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a 

medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; [and] the existence of

chronic and substantial pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), 

overruled in part on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997).

Under the subjective element, a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if the 

official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. 

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotes and citation omitted). To prevail on 

a claim for deliberate indifference, a prisoner must demonstrate that the prison official “kn[ew] of 

and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of 

the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate 

indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” 

Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). The court “need not defer to the 

judgment of prison doctors or administrators” when deciding the deliberate indifference element. 

Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (where prison officials were aware loss 

of his dentures was causing him severe pain and permanent physical damage, three month delay 

in providing pain relief and soft food diet constituted Eighth Amendment violation). 

Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 104-05. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in providing care, a 

plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th 

Cir. 2002); Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. 

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In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would 

provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 

1060.

In applying the deliberate indifference standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it 

can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical 

needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not 

support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 

1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.) A complaint that a physician has been negligent in 

diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment 

under the Eighth Amendment. Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 

1990). A difference of opinion between medical professionals concerning the appropriate course 

of treatment generally does not amount to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 

Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Also, “a 

difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding 

treatment does not give rise to a [§]1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th 

Cir. 1981). To establish that such a difference of opinion amounted to deliberate indifference, the 

prisoner “must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable 

under the circumstances” and “that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive 

risk to [the prisoner’s] health.” See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); see 

also Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123 (awareness of need for treatment followed by unnecessary delay 

in implementing the prescribed treatment sufficient to plead deliberate indifference); see also

Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (decision of non-treating, non-specialist physicians to repeatedly deny 

recommended surgical treatment may be medically unacceptable under all the circumstances.)

Thus, plaintiff is advised that, in setting forth the allegations of his second amended 

complaint, he should set forth specific instances where each defendant allegedly violated 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights in addressing plaintiff’s medical needs, and set forth facts 

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demonstrating how each defendant’s act or failure to act constitutes deliberate indifference to 

plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior versions of the complaint. See

Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, 

prior versions of the complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an 

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the second amended complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The second amended 

complaint must also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second 

Amended Complaint.” Failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order 

may result in the dismissal of this action.

////

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5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the forms necessary to file a 

prisoner civil rights complaint.

Dated: September 30, 2015

/harr0579.14.new

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA N. HARRELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA FORENSIC MEDICAL 

GROUP, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0579 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

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