Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02985/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02985-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ALFREDO MENDOZA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-2985 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

DORA B. SCHRIRO, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Mr. Alfredo Mendoza (“Petitioner”), who is

incarcerated by Respondents in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro

se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 on December 11, 2006. Respondents filed an Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 8)

on February 22, 2007.

I Background

On April 8, 2003, Petitioner was charged by grand jury

indictment with one count of kidnapping. Answer, Exh. A. The

indictment was later amended to allege three prior felony

convictions. Id., Exh. A. The facts alleged at Petitioner’s

trial indicated that, in September of 2002, Petitioner and four

accomplices broke into the victim’s home and abducted the

victim at gunpoint. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. The defendants also

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -2-

beat the victim and demanded the victim’s wife provide them

with $5000 in cash or they would murder her and the victim.

Id., Exh. D. The victim’s wife contacted the police. Id.,

Exh. D & Exh. E. 

The victim was ultimately located at Petitioner’s

residence by the police, who had tapped the victim’s telephone;

the kidnappers had repeatedly called the tapped phone. Id.,

Exh. D & Exh. E. The victim testified at Petitioner’s trial

that Petitioner had repeatedly beat and kicked him and

threatened him with a gun and a knife during his detention by

the kidnappers. Id., Exh. D at 41-49, 70-71. Petitioner was

at the residence when the police SWAT team rescued the victim,

after the police arrested some of the codefendants as they were

attempting to acquire the ransom. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E.

Petitioner was in handcuffs and kneeling outside the residence

as the victim was removed from the home; the victim

spontaneously identified Petitioner as someone who had beat him

during his ordeal. Id., Exh. D. As the victim was being moved

to an interviewing room at the police station he was walked

past a room where suspects in the kidnapping were held; the

victim identified some of the individuals involved in the

kidnapping, including Petitioner, to the police detective who

was conducting the interview with the victim. Id., Exh. E at

104-09, 110-12, 115-16 (“When I walked [the victim] through []

the booking area, [the victim] told me it was [Petitioner].”).

The jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. Id.,

Exh. A, Exh. B, Exh. F. The government dismissed its

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The practice of showing a suspect singly to a witness for the

purpose of identification shortly after a crime--commonly

known as a “show-up”--is not inherently unconstitutional.

However, as the Supreme Court noted in Stovall v. Denno, the

“show-up,” or “[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to

persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part

of a lineup, has been widely condemned.” 388 U.S. 293, 302,

87 S.Ct. 1967 [] (1967). A show-up, as opposed to a line-up

or photo array, has been described as “inherently suggestive”

because the defendant is presented singly to the witness by

the police. []

Jones v. West, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2007 WL 495498, at *21

(W.D.N.Y.).

-3-

allegation of prior felony convictions. Id., Exh. G. On

December 5, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive

term of 10.5 years imprisonment for his kidnapping conviction,

a class 2 dangerous felony. Id., Exh. G. 

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner asserted the

trial court erroneously determined the victim’s crime scene and

police station identifications of Petitioner were not unduly

suggestive “show-ups.”1 Id., Exh. H. Petitioner also alleged

the trial court abused its discretion and violated Petitioner’s

right to due process by not analyzing the reliability of the

victim’s identification of Petitioner as a perpetrator of the

crime and by failing to give the jury an “identification”

instruction. Id., Exh. H. Additionally, Petitioner asserted

the victim’s in-court identification of him was not reliable

because the victim had previously seen him at the crime scene

and inside the police station. Id., Exh. H. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -4-

conviction in a memorandum decision issued December 14, 2004.

Id., Exh. K. The Court of Appeals concluded the pretrial

identifications were not unduly suggestive because “there was

no attempt made by the police to obtain an identification from

the victim.” Id., Exh. K at 9-11. The Arizona Court of

Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give the

jury an “identification” instruction because the trial court

was only required to give the instruction when it found a

suggestive out-of-court identification of the defendant by the

victim. Id., Exh. K at 12. 

Petitioner sought review of his conviction and

sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh. L. The

petition for review was summarily denied in a decision issued

April 4, 2005, and filed on May 5, 2005. Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari regarding his

conviction or sentence from the United States Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed a state action seeking postconviction relief on June 2, 2005. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner

was appointed counsel to represent him in this action. Id.,

Exh. O. The petition for post-conviction relief asserted

Petitioner was deprived of his right to the effective

assistance of counsel. Id., Exh. P. Petitioner alleged his

counsel failed to call an alibi witness, i.e., his brother, and

failed to request a jury instruction regarding an alibi

defense. Id., Exh. P. The Arizona trial court ordered an

evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s claims for relief,

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -5-

which was held December 12, 2005. Id., Exh. S. Petitioner and

his brother testified at the hearing. Id., Exh. T.

Petitioner’s trial counsel also testified at the hearing. Id.,

Exh. T. 

In a minute entry issued December 15, 2005, the

Arizona Superior Court concluded Petitioner had not been denied

his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id., Exh.

U. The Superior Court agreed with the state that “the evidence

that Defendant’s counsel failed to call an alibi witness is not

credible.” Id., Exh. U.

Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals within the time specified by Rule

32.9(c), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. On April 21,

2006, approximately three months after the deadline for seeking

review expired, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. V. The Arizona Court of

Appeals dismissed the petition for review in an order issued

April 25, 2006. Id., Exh. W. In the order dismissing the

petition without prejudice, the Court of Appeals informed

Petitioner he could seek leave to file an untimely petition in

the Arizona Superior Court. Id., Exh. W. Petitioner did not

seek such leave. See id., Exh. Y. 

Approximately ten months later, Petitioner filed his

federal habeas action on December 11, 2006, asserting he is

entitled to relief because: (1) the victim’s pretrial

identifications of Petitioner violated his right to due process

because they raised the likelihood the victim would identify

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -6-

him at trial; (2) his right to due process was violated by the

trial court’s refusal to give an “identification” jury

instruction; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective, i.e.,

counsel failed to call his brother to testify as to an alibi

and failed to request a jury instruction regarding an alibi.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion

Respondents contend Petitioner’s second and third

claims for relief must be dismissed because Petitioner did not

fully exhaust these claims in the state courts by presenting

them as federal constitutional claims in a procedurally correct

manner to the Arizona Court of Appeals or to the Arizona

Supreme Court.

A state prisoner must “exhaust” a claim in the state

courts before the District Court may grant federal habeas

relief on the merits of the claim. See Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille

v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989).

To properly exhaust a claim, the petitioner must afford the

state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by

“fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court

in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille, 489

U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss a

habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2006). 

-7-

1108, 1110 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2971 (2005).2

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005). 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a

federal habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the

claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2006). Because the exhaustion

requirement refers only to remedies still available to the

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal

habeas relief, it is satisfied if the petitioner is

procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state

courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2006); Castille,

489 U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas

petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state

law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -8-

presented a claim in state court and is now barred from doing

so by the state’s procedural rules, including rules regarding

waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S.

at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d

1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural default also occurs

when a petitioner did present a claim to the state courts, but

the state courts did not address the merits of the claim

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural

rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111

S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-28, 111

S. Ct. at 2553-57; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665

(9th Cir. 2005); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

2002) (“A state is entitled to treat as forfeited a proposition

that was not presented in the right court, in the right way,

and at the right time--as state rules define those courts,

ways, and times. Failure to comply with the state’s procedural

rules furnishes an independent and adequate state ground of

decision that blocks federal collateral review.”). “If a

prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a state

procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent

grounds to bar direct review ... he may not raise the claim in

federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or

actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th

Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in the state courts by presenting

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -9-

this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally

correct manner in his action for state post-conviction relief.

Petitioner is procedurally barred from returning to the state

courts to exhaust this unexhausted federal habeas claim by the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governing preclusion and

timeliness. Because Petitioner does not have any procedurally

correct means of raising his claim in the state courts, the

claim is technically exhausted. However, because Petitioner

did not present the claim to the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner, the claim is technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975,

987 (9th Cir. 2002).

B. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally

defaulted claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate

a miscarriage of justice, or cause and actual prejudice to

excuse his default of the claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at

750-51, 111 S. Ct. at 2555-56. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse

for the petitioner’s procedural default and “prejudice” is

actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional

violation. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.

1991). To demonstrate cause, a petitioner must show the

existence of some external factor which impeded his efforts to

comply with the state’s procedural rules. See MartinezVillareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To

establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged

error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

infecting his entire [criminal proceedings] with error of

constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll v.

Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998). Establishing

prejudice requires Petitioner to prove that, “but for” the

alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable

probability he would not have been convicted of the same crime.

See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy

v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both

cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural

default, the Court need not examine the existence of prejudice

if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43

(1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. 

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in the Arizona state courts.

Because Petitioner does not argue cause for nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of this claim, the Court

may not grant relief based on the merits of the claim.

C. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

“Habeas corpus is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ available

only to those ‘persons whom society has grievously wronged and

for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation.’”

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 1145 (2006), quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 633-34, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993). However,

the Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -11-

prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court

proceedings unless the state court reached a decision contrary

to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

or unless the state court decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994

& Supp. 2006). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to”

our clearly established law if it applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in our cases or if it confronts a set

of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of this

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result

different from our precedent. 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

When reviewing a habeas claim, the federal courts must

afford great deference to the state court’s rulings with regard

to issues raised in the petitioner’s federal habeas action.

See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357,

359-60 (2002). When more than one state court has adjudicated

a claim, the Court must analyze the last reasoned decision by

a state court to determine if the state’s denial of relief on

the claim was clearly contrary to federal law. See Barker v.

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). Additionally, United States

Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state court’s last

reasoned decision are the source of “clearly established

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -12-

federal law” for the purpose of federal habeas review of state

court decisions regarding federal constitutional claims.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523

(2000); Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093.

D. Petitioner’s exhausted claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts the victim’s pretrial

identifications of Petitioner violated his right to due process

of law because they raised the likelihood the victim would

identify him at trial.

A criminal defendant has a federal constitutional

right to due process of law, which may, in certain

circumstances, be violated by an improper pretrial

identification procedure or subsequent in-court identification.

See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104-07, 97 S. Ct. 2243,

2249-50 (1977). The standard to be applied on habeas review

of this type of claim is that of “fairness” in a criminal

proceeding, required by the constitutional right to due process

of law. Id. If a reviewing court may properly conclude the

identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the

alleged act was not “unduly suggestive” given the “totality of

the circumstances,” then the criminal proceeding was not

rendered unfair by the identification and the defendant’s right

to due process was not violated. Id. 

The United States Supreme Court has stated that

pretrial identification procedures violate the defendant’s

right to due process if the identification procedure is

impermissibly suggestive and the reliability of the

identification, based on the totality of circumstances, does

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -13-

not outweigh the corrupting effect of the suggestive

procedures. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S. Ct.

375, 382 (1972); Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S. Ct. at 2253

(“reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility

of identification testimony.”). A conviction based on

identification testimony following the witness’ pretrial

identification violates the defendant’s constitutional right

to due process whenever the pretrial identification procedure

is so “impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971

(1968); Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986).

“It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a

defendant’s right to due process.” Neil, 409 U.S. at 198, 93

S. Ct. at 381-82. If an identification is reliable, it will

be admissible even if the confrontation was suggestive. See

Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 605 (6th Cir. 2000). 

On direct review of Petitioner’s conviction, the

Arizona Court of Appeals concluded the victim’s pretrial

identifications of Petitioner were not unduly suggestive

because “there was no attempt made by the police to obtain an

identification from the victim.” Answer, Exh. K at 9-11. The

state court’s findings with regard to whether the

identifications were unduly suggestive and violated

Petitioner’s rights is entitled to deference by this Court.

See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1087 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998);

Abrams v. Barnett, 121 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 1997). 

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -14-

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that the

identifications of Petitioner were not unduly suggestive in

violation of his right to due process was not clearly contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law. See

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 104-07 & n.8; Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384,

88 S. Ct. at 971; Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th

Cir. 1995). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on his claim that his right to due process was

violated by the pretrial and in-court identification of

Petitioner as a perpetrator of the alleged crime.

2. Petitioner asserts his right to due process was

violated by the trial court’s refusal to give an

“identification” jury instruction.

“Undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned

[jury] instructions may survive due process scrutiny,”

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 1736

(1977), unless “the ailing instruction by itself so infected

the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 772, 112 S. Ct.

475, 482 (1991); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-147, 94

S. Ct. 396, 400 (1973). See also Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d

1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). The burden is elevated where the

habeas petitioner alleges that the trial court’s failure to

give an instruction, rather than the rendering of an erroneous

one, deprived them of due process. See Neely v. Newton, 149

F.3d 1074, 1085 (10th Cir. 1998).

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s refusal to give the jury an “identification”

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -15-

instruction, noting the trial court was only required to give

the instruction when it found a suggestive out-of-court

identification of the defendant by the victim. Answer, Exh.

K at 12. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the jury

instruction was not required because the identification was not

unduly suggestive was not clearly contrary to federal law. See

Jones v. West, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2007 WL 495498, at *22

(W.D.N.Y.). Considering the totality of the circumstances and

the totality of the evidence introduced at trial, the trial

court’s failure to give an “identification” instruction did not

so infect Petitioner’s entire trial as to deprive him of his

right to due process and the Arizona Court of Appeals did not

err in so concluding. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel was not properly exhausted in

the state courts. Because Petitioner offers no cause for, nor

prejudice arising from, his procedural default of this claim,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

Additionally, the Arizona state courts’ decision that

Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process with

regard to either the identification of Petitioner as the

perpetrator of the alleged crimes or with regard to the

instructions given the jury was not clearly contrary to federal

law and, accordingly, relief must be denied on these claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Mendoza’s

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -16-

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date

of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s

right to appellate review of the findings of fact and

conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to

the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 4th day of April, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-02985-PGR Document 9 Filed 04/10/07 Page 16 of 16