Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00964/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00964-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIXIE HAISLIP,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1 Commissioner 

of Social Security

Defendant.

1:12-cv-00964 GSA

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 

EAJA IN PART

(Doc. 18)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the denial of her disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income payments on June 14, 2012. (Doc. 1). On September 30, 2013, this 

Court issued an order reversing the ALJ‟s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled, and remanded 

the case for further proceedings. (Doc. 15). The Court entered judgment in Plaintiff‟s favor on 

September 30, 2013. (Doc. 16). 

Plaintiff now seeks attorney‟s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (28 U.S.C. 

 

1 Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the 

defendant in this action.

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§ 2412(d)) (“EAJA”) in the amount of $5,971.97, and $350.00 in costs. Defendant opposes the 

motion on the basis that its position was substantially justified and that the requested fees are 

unreasonable. Upon a review of the pleadings, the Court grants Plaintiff‟s motion in part. 

Plaintiff shall be awarded fees in the amount of $4,999.71, and $350.00 in costs.

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Justification

1. Legal Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), claimants who successfully challenge an agency 

decision in a civil action are entitled to reasonable fees and expenses. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) 

provides as follows:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to 

a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in 

addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that 

party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including 

proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the 

United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the 

court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified 

or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

Thus, when a claimant wins a remand based on an incorrect decision by the 

Commissioner, attorneys‟ fees are to be awarded unless the Commissioner shows that she was 

“substantially justified” in her position, or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 

Meier v. Colvin, 727 F. 3d 867, 869-870 (9th Cir. 2013); see also, Lewis v. Barnhardt, 281 F. 3d 

1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). “It is the government‟s burden to show that its position was 

substantially justified.” Meier, 727 F. 3d at 870 (citing Guitierrez v. Barnhardt, 274 F. 3d 1255, 

1258 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial justification means „justified in substance or in the main - that 

is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.‟” Id. (quoting Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). “Put differently, the position of the United States must

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have a „reasonable basis in both law and fact.‟” Id. citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 565.

The position of the United States includes both the government‟s litigation position and the 

underlying agency action giving rise to the civil action. Id. citing Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F. 3d 

1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2001). If the government‟s underlying agency action was not substantially 

justified, it is not necessary to address whether the government‟s litigation position was justified. 

Id. at 872.

2. The Commissioner’s Position was Not Substantially Justified.

There were two issues presented in this case: 1) whether the ALJ‟s formulation of the 

Plaintiff‟s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and hypotheticals were proper (which included an 

analysis of whether the ALJ‟s treatment of the medical record was appropriate), and 2) whether 

the ALJ erred in her credibility finding. This Court found that the ALJ credited the opinions of 

four doctors, but failed to address all of the limitations identified by each doctor in the RFC or in 

the hypotheticals. (Doc. 15, pg. 16 and 18). It was also determined that the ALJ failed to 

reconcile inconsistencies between the doctors‟ opinions that would likely affect the extent the

limitations should be included in the RFC. Finally, this Court noted the ALJ‟s hypotheticals were 

improper. In particular, the hypotheticals posed by the ALJ to the VE listed limitations separately 

rather than listing all of the limitations combined in one hypothetical. (Doc. 15, pg. 19, n. 16). 

Based on these deficiencies, the Court found the ALJ‟s decision was not supported by substantial 

evidence and remanded the case. It did not reach the merits on Plaintiff‟s arguments regarding 

the ALJ‟s credibility findings.

Defendant argues that the government‟s position was substantially justified because it

reasonably defended the ALJ‟s evaluation of the medical opinions, as well as the ALJ‟s formation 

of the RFC and related hypotheticals. The court disagrees. First, under Meier v. Colvin, this 

Court must examine the underlying agency action (in this case the ALJ‟s decision), before 

evaluating the government‟s litigation position. Meier, 727 F. at 872. It is well established that a

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claimant's RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1545(a); 20 C.F .R. § 416.945(1). The assessment of a RFC must be “based on all the 

relevant evidence in [the claimant's] case record.” Id. Furthermore, if the RFC assessment 

conflicts with a medical source opinion, the ALJ must explain why the opinion was not adopted. 

SSR 96-8. Thus, if the ALJ does not find the limitations to be supported by substantial evidence, 

she must explain why. The ALJ failed to do so in this case.

Additionally, this Court found that the ALJ also failed to include these limitations in the 

hypothetical question posed to the VE. (Doc. 15, pg. 18). It is well established that "[h]ypothetical 

questions posed to the vocational expert must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the 

particular claimant . . ." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F. 3d 503, 517 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gamer v. Secretary 

of Health and Human Services, 815 F. 2d 1275, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1987); Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 

418, 422 (9th Cir.1988). Here, because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence 

and fully incorporate all of the combined limitations into the hypotheticals posed, the ALJ‟s 

decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Similarly, the ALJ decision was not 

substantially justified since the ALJ did not follow clearly established legal principals. 

Although the Defendant correctly notes that the government‟s position can be 

substantially justified for purposes of EAJA even if a Court found the ALJ‟s decision was not

based on substantial evidence, this principal is not applicable here. Given the facts of this case

and the ALJ‟s analysis, the agency‟s underlying decision does not have a “reasonable basis in 

both law and fact.” Meier, 727 F. 3d at 870. Accordingly, the ALJ‟s decision was not 

substantially justified. Because the government‟s underlying agency action was not substantially 

justified, this court need not address whether the government‟s litigation position was justified. 

Meier, 727 F. 3d at 872.

///

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B. Reasonableness

Under the EAJA, attorney‟s fees must be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Perez–

Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir.2002). The amount of the fee must be determined 

based on the particular facts of the case. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). In 

making this determination, courts should apply the “lodestar” method to determine what 

constitutes reasonable attorney's fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. To calculate the lodestar amount, 

the court multiplies “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation ... by a reasonable 

hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The Court further explained that counsel for the 

prevailing party should exercise “billing judgment” to “exclude from a fee request hours that are 

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” as a lawyer in private practice would do. 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2008) (“The number of hours to be compensated is calculated by considering whether, in light of 

the circumstances, the time could reasonably have been billed to a private client.”).

The court must provide a concise and clear explanation of the reasons for its attorney 

award calculation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437; Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th 

Cir. 2001). A court has wide latitude in determining the number of hours reasonably expended 

and may reduce the hours if the time claimed is excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. 

Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 

1035 (1990). “ „Hours that are not properly billed to one's client are not properly billed to one's 

adversary pursuant to statutory authority.‟ ” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (quoting Copeland v. 

Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc)). The applicant bears the burden of 

demonstrating the reasonableness of the fee request. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).

Hourly Rates

Here, Plaintiff requests $184.32 per hour for work performed by counsel in 2012 and 

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2013. However, since the time of the filing of Plaintiff‟s motion, the Ninth Circuit has issued the 

attorney fee rates for 2013 at $187.02. These rates are the applicable statutory maximum hourly 

rates under EAJA for attorney work performed in those years, adjusted for increases in the cost of 

living. Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2005), and Ninth Circuit Rule 

39–1.6. The Commissioner does not contest the hourly rate, therefore, the amount requested by 

Plaintiff‟s counsel has been modified to reflect the amended rates for the appropriate years. The 

issue in this case is whether the number of attorney hours expended were reasonable.

The Parties’ Positions

Plaintiff argues that the request for payment of $5,971.97 for 32.4 hours of attorney work 

is reasonable. The Defendant argues that Plaintiff should only be compensated for 25.4 hours of 

work. Specifically, Defendant contends: 1) the amount of time billed for legal research of the 

opening brief and reply briefs was excessive, 2) that work done on the case prior to filing the 

complaint is not compensable, and 3) that the fee award provisions of EAJA are not available 

with respect to issues not actually adjudicated. As such, Plaintiff should not be awarded fees with 

regard to the credibility determination since this Court did not rule on this issue.

Having considered all of Defendant‟s arguments, Plaintiff‟s counsel will be awarded fees 

for 26.8 hours of attorney work. As a preliminary matter, the Court has considered Defendant‟s 

arguments regarding the length of time Plaintiff‟s counsel spent on preparing the confidential 

letter brief, the opening brief, and the reply. A review of the time sheets reveals that the number 

of hours was reasonable. The medical record in this case was over four hundred pages long, the 

case presented several complex issues, and the briefing resulted in a twenty page order issued by 

this Court. As such, there will be no reduction in attorney hours on this basis. 

However, the Defendant cites Hardisty v. Atrue in support of its argument that Plaintiff‟s 

counsel should not be reimbursed for hours spent researching and writing arguments regarding 

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Plaintiff‟s credibility because the Court did not adjudicate that issue. Hardisty v. Atrue, 592 F. 3d 

at 1077. This contention is well taken in light of the facts of this case, and the fact that Plaintiff 

has not filed a reply brief in response to this issue. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s award will be 

reduced by 5.6 hours on this basis (1.0 hours for research regarding the credibility issue, 2.6 hours 

for drafting the argument in the opening brief regarding the ALJ‟s credibility finding, and 2.0 

hours preparing the reply regarding this issue). 

Conversely, the Court is not persuaded that counsel should not be paid for the preliminary 

assessment of this case and the drafting of the complaint. Defendant cites Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 

501 U.S. 89, 97 (1991), and Mendenhall v. NTSB, 213 F.3d 464, 469 (9th Cir.2000) for the 

proposition that that Plaintiff should not be compensated for work performed prior to filing the 

complaint in this case. However, neither of the cases Defendant cites stands for this proposition. 

Mendenhall dealt with whether the EAJA permits compensation for work performed in 

administrative proceedings prior to the filing of a civil action, not for work performed in 

preparation for the filing of a civil action. See Mendenhall, 213 F.3d at 468–69. The same is true 

of the Supreme Court's decision in Melkonyan. In Melkonyan, the Court noted that work 

performed in administrative proceedings is generally not compensable under EAJA, with a 

limited exception for those administrative proceedings conducted while a civil complaint remains 

pending “and depends for its resolution upon the outcome of the administrative proceedings.” 

Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 97 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Neither of these cases 

holds that work performed in preparation for a civil action after the administrative proceedings 

have concluded is noncompensable under EAJA. Accordingly, this Court will reimburse 

Plaintiff‟s counsel for the initial assessment of the case, as well as for the drafting of the 

complaint. See Tate v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5773047 at * 4 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 24, 2013); McClintock 

v. Astrue 2011 WL 1043718, at *1 -2 (S.D. Cal., Mar. 22, 2011) (“work performed in 

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preparation for the filing of a civil action is proper and reasonable”). 

As a result of the above, Plaintiff‟s counsel will be awarded the following attorney‟s fees:

Total Hours Rate Applied Total Amount

4.6 2012 ($184.32) $847.87 (4.6 x $184.32)

22.2 2013($187.02) $4,151.84 (22.2 x $187.02)

26.8 ----------------- $4,999.71

Plaintiff is also entitled to $350.00, the cost of filing the complaint.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that Plaintiff‟s Motion for Attorneys‟ Fees be 

GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff‟s counsel is entitled to an attorney fee award in the amount of 

$4,999.71 for 26.8 hours of work, and $350.00 in costs.

This amount should be payable to Plaintiff pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 

(2010).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2014 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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