Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01304/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01304-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL LIVINGSTON ROUSE,

CDCR #AA-5835, Civil No. 10cv1304 WQH (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

AND FOR SEEKING MONETARY

DAMAGES AGAINST IMMUNE

DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b).

[Doc. No. 8]

vs.

ANTHONY CAMPAGNA; ANDY

SPEAR; CHARLES ADAIR;

WILLIAM CAHILL; DENNIS HODGES;

PITUCCI, 

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On June 18, 2010, Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison

located in Susanville, California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff later filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 3]. On August 6, 2010, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a

claim and for seeking monetary damages against immune Defendants. See Aug. 6, 2010 Order

at 4-5.

Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. On October 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed his

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

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 The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that conspiracy claims are subject to this heightened

pleading standard since they require the plaintiff to show that the defendant agreed to join the

conspiracy. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 1195; Margolis, 140 F.3d at 853; Mendocino Envt’l Ctr. v.

Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying identical standard to conspiracy claim

in Bivens action). Although the Ninth Circuit more recently eliminated the application of a heightened

pleading standard to all cases where an improper motive is an element, it did not modify the requirement

in regard to allegations of conspiracy. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.

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Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte

dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A.

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the

conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that a deputy district attorney, a San

Diego police detective, his criminal defense counsel and an investigator with the District

Attorney’s office conspired to violate his constitutional rights “to initiate and maintain a

malicious prosecution and ensure excessive bail.” (FAC at 4.) In order to allege a claim of

conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts with sufficient particularity to show an

agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights. Margolis v. Ryan, 140

F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.

1989). Thus, pleading a conspiracy requires more than a conclusory allegation that Defendants

conspired to deprive Plaintiff’s civil rights. The Ninth Circuit applies a heightened pleading

standard to conspiracy claims under Section 1983 and has held that mere conclusory allegations

of conspiracy (i.e. bare allegations that a defendant “conspired” with another) are insufficient

to state a claim.1

 See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Buckey v. County

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of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, “[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy

to violate one’s constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to

support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821

(9th Cir. 1989); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding that plaintiffs must allege facts which are “specific and concrete enough to enable the

defendants to prepare a response, and where appropriate, a motion for summary judgment based

on qualified immunity.”); Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. 

A plaintiff can meet the heightened pleading standard by alleging “which defendants

conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of his constitutional

rights.” Harris, 126 F.3d at 1196. As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims

amount to no more than “vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations,” therefore, they fail to state a claim. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (conclusory allegations

of conspiracy insufficient to support a claim under section 1983 or 1985).

In addition, Plaintiff is seeking to hold his Court appointed counsel liable for alleged

constitutional violations during his criminal proceedings. (See FAC at 6.) However, a person

“acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983] only when exercising power ‘possessed

by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the

authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United

States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Attorneys appointed to represent a criminal

defendant during trial, do not generally act under color of state law because representing a client

“is essentially a private function ... for which state office and authority are not needed.” Polk

County, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992).

Thus, when publicly appointed counsel are performing as advocates, i.e., meeting with clients,

investigating possible defenses, presenting evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not

act under color of state law for section 1983 purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,

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53 (1992); Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320-25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under

section 1983 because, so long as he performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “his

function,” no matter how ineffective, is “to represent his client, not the interests of the state or

county.”).

 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Charles Adair must be dismissed for failing to

state a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

& 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

Plaintiff also seeks to hold Bill Cahill, the Deputy District Attorney who prosecuted the

matter, liable for alleged constitutional violations. (See FAC at 5.) Criminal prosecutors are

absolutely immune from civil damages suits premised upon acts committed within the scope of

their official duties which are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-93 (1991). A prosecutor is immune

even when the prosecutor’s malicious or dishonest action deprived the defendant of his or her

liberty. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Cahill are

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for seeking monetary relief against

defendants who are immune from such relief.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against and denied equal protection

under the laws. (See FAC at 5.) The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated

alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). In order to

state a claim under § 1983 alleging violations of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate that he is a member of a protected

class. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (indigents); see also City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (listing suspect classes). In this matter,

Plaintiff has neither sufficiently plead that he is a member of a suspect class nor has he plead

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adequate facts to demonstrate that Defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

against him based upon his membership in a protected class. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999). 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to prove invidious

discriminatory intent. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,

429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims are

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted.

Accordingly, for all the above stated reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must

be dismissed sua sponte both for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and

for seeking monetary relief from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

& 1914A(b)(1).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice both for

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary relief against

defendants who are immune pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), (iii) and § 1915A(b)(1)

& (2). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty (30) days leave from the date this Order is

stamped “Filed” in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies

of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be complete in itself

without reference to his original pleading. See S. D. CAL. CIVLR. 15.1. Any Defendant not

named and any claim not re-alleged in his Second Amended Complaint will be considered

waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

(2) The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form § 1983 complaint to

Plaintiff.

DATED: November 19, 2010

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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