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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Ap~ 

Tf!nth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN O 61989 

JAMES MILAM; ALLAN MILLER; 

CHARLEY BELL; PAUL CULLY; 

JOHNSON WARLEDO; MARIE JONES, 

Plaintiffs-~ppellants, 

v. 

WILLIAM HODEL, Secretary, Department 

of Interior; BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS; 

JOHN FRITZ; ABE ZUNI; GEORGE GOODNER; 

ALENE MILLER; PAULINE STEWARD; 

ROBERT KERNELL, JR., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-2755 

(D.C. No. 86-61-C) 

( E. D. Ok la. ) 

Before LOGAN, LEAVY,* and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

*The Honorable Edward Leavy, Circuit Judge, United States Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

This is an appeal from an order of the district court 

granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, officials of 

the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Secretary of the 

Department of the Interior, and the members of the Seminole tribal 

election board. The appellants, former elected officials and 

other members of the Seminole nation, contend on appeal that the 

district court erred as a matter of law in determining that the 

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appellees did not improperly interfere in certain internal matters 

of the tribe. We affirm. 

The issues in this case grow out of a long-standing dispute 

between certain members of the Seminole nation and the BIA. The 

dispute began in 1982, when for reasons not germane to this 

appeal, the General Council of the Seminole nation acted to remove 

appellants Milam and Miller, then Principal Chief and Assistant 

Chief, respectively, of the Seminole nation, from office. The BIA 

recognized the removal of these officers, and Milam and Miller 

brought an action in federal district court, seeking a declaratory 

judgment that their removal was invalid. The court granted this 

relief, finding that the General Council had not complied with 

certain constitutional notice requirements in removing the 

appellants from office. It further directed the BIA to recognize 

Milam and Miller as Chief and Assistant Chief. See Milam v. 

United States Dep't of the Interior, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian 

Law Training Program) 3013, No. 82-3099 (D.D.C. 

1982}(Milam I). 

Dec. 23, 

After the district court's ruling in Milam I, dissension 

within the Seminole tribal government continued. Several bands 

wi thin the tribe attempted to remove and replace their elected 

representatives to the General Council. 1 As a result of these 

1 The General Council of the Seminole nation is comprised of 

three representatives selected by each of the fourteen bands in 

the nation. To be recognized as a band, the band must consist of 

at least ten tribe members. Bands with fewer than ten members 

have no representation in the General Council. Seminole Nation 

Const. art. IV, S 1. 

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I 

attempts, competing factions of the tribe contested the legitimate 

composition of the General Council. The BIA was unable to 

determine which band representatives comprised the General 

Council, and it refused to release federal funds to the tribe 

until the issue was resolved. By letter to appellant Milam~ dated 

January 10, 1984, the BIA took the position that a band's attempt 

to remove its representative from office was not effective until 

the General Council had affirmatively acted to remove the 

representative. Since the council had not acted to vacate the 

office of certain representatives rejected by their bands, the BIA 

concluded that the members of the General Council acting in June, 

1982 (the June 1982 Council) were the de jure council for the 

nation, despite the appellants' claim that several of these 

members had been legitimately removed from office. 

The dispute over recognition of the General Council continued 

through the summer of 1984, and members of the June 1982 Council 

requested that the BIA intervene in an upcoming council meeting. 

The BIA declined to do so, and noted that the only way that the 

current impasse could be resolved would be through a new election 

of tribal officers, and it recommended that a special election be 

called for this purpose. A special election proved unnecessary, 

however, as a regular tribal election was to be held the following 

year. 

On March 30, 1985, the General Council, comprised of the June 

1982 Council and certain members recognized by the appellants, met 

and enacted certain measures governing the conduct of the upcoming 

election. Ordinance 85-1 set forth comprehensive rules and 

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regulations for the qualification and registration of electors and 

candidates, notice requirements, 

addition, the ordinance provided 

and 

for 

voting procedures. 

the establishment of 

In 

an 

Election Board to carry out the provisions of the ordinance, and a 

Review Board to hear election protests, review petitions against 

election procedure, and serve as final arbiter of Election Board 

appeals. In Resolution 85-2, the General Council ratified the 

action taken at an earlier council meeting in which the Election 

Board was appointed and requested the local office of the BIA to 

provide technical and financial assistance for the registration of 

voters. At the close of this meeting, a representative of the BIA 

indicated that the actions taken by the council at this meeting 

would be recognized by the BIA. 

In response to the tribe's request for election assistance, 

the BIA determined that it would be unable to provide a direct 

grant of funds to the tribe because the BIA had not resolved 

problems with the tribe over payment of previous grants under the 

Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. S 450(h)(l982 & Supp. IV 

1986). Instead, the BIA decided to pay the salaries of the 

tribally appointed Election Board and provided the board with 

equipment and facilities out of which to operate. The BIA took no 

other action with respect to payments to or supervision of the 

Election Board. 

The election was scheduled for July 6, 1985. In June, 1985, 

appellant Milam, then Principal Chief of the tribe, received 

reports from several tribal members of constitutional violations 

in the election process. When one member brought these violations 

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to the attention of the Election Board, the board declined to act, 

on the grounds that it had no authority to do so. On June 27, 

1985, pursuant to Ordinance 85-1, Milam appointed a Review Board 

to investigate the alleged violations in the electoral process. 

Upon learning of the appointment of the Review Board, the BIA sent 

a letter to Milam, informing him that it was the BIA's position 

that before the Review Board could legally act, the appointees to 

the board must be approved by the majority of the General Council. 

On July 5, 1985, the Review Board reported its findings to 

the Chief, recommending that, because of 

constitutional violations, the upcoming election 

declared invalid. Chief Milam accepted 

a number of 

should be 

the board's 

recommendation, and that day declared the election null and void. 

The election was conducted over Milam's protest and despite his 

declaration that the election was invalid, and it resulted in a 

runoff between several candidates. On August 2, 1985, the 

appellants filed the instant action in federal district court for 

the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive 

relief and requesting a temporary restraining order to prevent the 

runoff election from taking place. Their request for a 

restraining order was denied, and the runoff election was held as 

scheduled. This case was subsequently transferred to the District 

Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The BIA thereafter 

recognized the results of both the election and the runoff. 

Upon transfer of the case to this jurisdiction, the 

appellants moved for summary judgment. The parties filed a joint 

statement of issues and facts which was to govern the district 

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court's consideration of the motion. The stipulation identified 

two issues for the district court's resolution: whether the BIA 

was improperly involved in the tribe's internal affairs when it 

recognized the June 1982 Council, and whether the BIA's funding of 

the Election Board was an improper intrusion into internal tribal 

affairs. The court granted summary judgment for the appellees on 

both issues. First, it found that the BIA had the authority to 

interpret the Seminole Constitution in order to determine which 

representatives constituted the General Council for the limited 

purpose of carrying out federal relations with the tribe. Second, 

it saw no impropriety in the BIA's decision to fund the 1985 

election by providing assistance in the form of wages and 

facilities to the Election Board and concluded that the BIA had 

not improperly interfered in internal tribal matters. The 

appellants now appeal to this court, arguing that the district 

court's ruling on these issues was in error. 

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court applies 

the same standard as that applied by the district court. Osgood 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 

1988). Under this standard, summary judgment is proper only if 

there is no genuine material issue of fact and if the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Willner v. Budig, 848 

F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (10th Cir. 1988). In this case, since the 

parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts upon which summary 

judgment was to be based, the role of this court is to determine 

whether the appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. 

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This court has long recognized that internal Indian tribal 

disputes are matters for resolution by the tribe under the 

principle of tribal self-determination and are not within the 

jurisdiction of the federal courts or of the federal government 

agencies. See Wheeler v. Swimmer, 835 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 

1987); Wheeler v. United States Dep't of Interior, Bureau of 

Indian Affairs, 811 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1987); Mccurdy v. Steele, 

506 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1974); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 

674, 679 (10th Cir. 1971); Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1, 2 

(10th Cir. 1968); Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians 

v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 

831 (1966); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of S. Ute Reservation, 

249 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 

(1958). Other jurisdictions have similarly recognized this 

principle. Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir. 

1983); Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 677 F.2d 645, 650 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 

1110, 1117 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom., Harjo v. Andrus, 581 

F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Pawnee Business 

Council of the Pawnee Indian Tribe of Okla., 382 F. Supp. 54, 58 

(N.D. Okla. 1974). 

Tribal resolution of internal political disputes, and 

particularly those involving tribal elections, is central to the 

tribe's ability to govern itself. Mccurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d at 

656. Federal interference in such elections is warranted only in 

very limited circumstances, such as when the election is a 

referendum on a new form of tribal government. See,~, Morris 

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v. Watt, 640 F.2d 404 (O.C. Cir. 1981); Harjo v. Kleppe,. 420 

F. Supp. 1110. When this court is asked to review agency action 

with respect to internal tribal matters where intervention is 

required, we review the agency's action under the arbitrary and 

capricious standard. Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d at 338. We 

resolve any question with respect to that involvement with an eye 

toward protecting the tribal right of self-determination. Wheeler 

v. Department of Interior, 811 F . 2d at 552. 

As to the first issue on appeal, we agree with the district 

court that the BIA had the authority to determine which tribal 

government it would recognize and that it did not act arbitrarily 

or capriciously by determining that it would interact with the 

June 1982 Council. One of the few circumstances in which an 

agency is empowered to intervene in an internal tribal matter 

results from an agency's need to determine which tribal government 

to recognize in order to carry out government relations with the 

tribe. Id.; see also Milam I, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law 

Training Program) at 3015-16. In this case, to perform its 

statutorily defined duties, the BIA was required to interact with 

the General Council of the Seminole tribe in order to provide 

much-needed federal funds for tribal programs. Without a clear 

indication as to which tribal faction to recognize, the BIA was 

legitimately concerned that it deal with the proper 

representatives of the Seminole nation. By looking to the tribal 

Constitution to make this determination, it was simply taking 

action "necessary to carry out its statutory and regulatory 

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obligations." Wheeler v. Department of Interior, 811 F.2d at 552; 

Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d at 339. 

Given that the BIA had the duty to act in this situation, we 

agree with the district court that the BIA's interpretation of the 

Seminole constitution was not arbitrary and capricious. The 

constitution provides that "by an affirmative vote," council 

members may remove a band representative who fails to carry out 

his duties • . Seminole Nation Const. art. IX, S 1. It similarly 

provides that the council shall automatically "declare vacant" the 

seat of a member who fails to attend two council meetings in 

succession. Id. S 2. Further, bands have the responsibility "to 

fill, pursuant to tribal customs, any vacancy which may occur." 

Id. § 3. Thus, in each case, some sort of council action is 

required to remove a band representative from office. Once that 

vacancy is so created, bands may fill that vacancy according to 

tribal custom. The appellants' contention that bands may 

unilaterally terminate their representatives from office, creating 

a vacancy on their own initiative, is clearly inconsistent with 

the above language. Consequently, we affirm the district court's 

ruling that the BIA had the authority to interpret the Seminole 

constitution for the purpose of carrying out federal relations 

with the tribe and that its interpretation was not arbitrary and 

capricious. 

As to the appellants' second argument on appeal, we concur 

with the district court that the manner in which the BIA provided 

funding to the tribe for the 1985 election does not require 

invalidation of that election. The primary thrust of the 

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' appellants' argument on appeal is that, because the BIA paid the 

wages of the Election Board, and the board subsequently conducted 

the election in an unconstitutional manner, the BIA is responsible 

for the Board's actions and that this constitutes unlawful 

interference by the BIA in the tribe ' s internal affairs. We 

disagree. 

First, there is no dispute that the members of the Election 

Board were temporary federal employees while performing the 

functions assigned to the Board. But this fact, in and of itself, 

does not establish improper federal intrusion into the election 

process. The appellants have demonstrated -no causal connection 

between the fact that the BIA chose to fund the tribe in this 

particular manner and the irregularities which occurred in the 

election notification, registration, and petition process. On the 

contrary, the undisputed facts indicate that the Election Board 

was appointed by appellant Milam and approved by the General 

Council. Any inappropriate actions appear to have been the result 

of the individual proclivities of the board members, and not 

because such members were receiving federal paychecks. There is 

no additional evidence that the BIA took any action to influence 

the outcome of the election or the manner in which the Election 

Board registered electors or conducted the petition process for 

candidates for office. Moreover, the General Council specifically 

requested the assistance of the BIA in the election process. 2 

2 In Resolution 85-1, 

negotiate a grant or 

enrollment/registration 

reaffirmed this action 

and financial assistance 

the council directed Chief Milam to 

contract with the BIA for a "tribal 

office," and in Resolution 85-2, it 

and requested the BIA provide "technical 

necessary to register Seminole tribal 

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\ 

When a case is submitted to the court on a stipulation of facts, 

the burden is on the party seeking to recover to demonstrate his 

right from the facts agreed upon. 83 C.J.S. Stipulations, § 25 

(1955). Appellants have not met this burden; consequently, we 

affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 

the BIA on the issue of the BIA's finding of the Election Board. 

The appellants raise a third issue in this appeal, contending 

that the BIA's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Review 

Board was also an unwarranted intrusion into the tribe's internal 

affairs. We need not reach this issue, because it is not properly 

before us on appeal. It was not raised in the parties' 

stipulation of issues, and the district court did not address its 

merits. Issues not ruled on by the district court are generally 

not properly before this court on appeal. 3 Burnette v. Dresser 

Indus. Inc., 849 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1988). Moreover, since the 

filing of the complaint in this case, appellant Milam has taken up 

this matter directly with the BIA and the Department of Interior. 

Before the district court and this court on appeal have 

jurisdiction to hear the merits of this issue, appellant Milam 

must first exhaust his administrative remedies through these 

agencies. See Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 351-52 

(8th Cir. 1985). 

members" for the upcoming election. 

3 For this reason, _and because we have concluded that the BIA's 

funding of the Election Board was not an improper intrusion into 

tribal matters, we likewise do not reach the issue of whether the 

BIA's conduct amounted to fraud or mismanagement of federal funds. 

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f 

' The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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