Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01094/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01094-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FIKRI BAYRAMOGLU, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MATTHEW CATE, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 13-cv-01094-YGR (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; AND DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Plaintiff Fikri Bayramoglu, a frequent litigant in federal court, brings the instant pro se

civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from alleged constitutional violations 

that occurred in 2008 while he was incarcerated at the California Training Facility (“CTF”). 

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Upon reviewing the complaint, the Court found Plaintiff had 

stated cognizable claim against: (1) CTF Lieutenants C. C. Hancock and J. Vera as well as CTF 

Appeals Coordinator A. P. Santiago for retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights; and (2) CTF Correctional Officer D. Branch for the use of excessive force in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. Dkt. 8 at 3-5. All other remaining claims were dismissed. See id. 

 The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment.1 Dkt. 54. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s aforementioned claims are barred as a 

result of prior state court and federal court judgments entered in actions arising from the same 

incident in this federal action. In the alternative, Defendants move for summary judgment on the 

ground that the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to Defendants’ motion and also a cross-motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 59. 

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 In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants have filed an unopposed 

request for judicial notice (“RJN”). Dkt. 55. Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of 

“the existence and content of the court records outlined below from Plaintiff Fikri Bayramoglu’s 

previous state-court proceedings in the Superior, Appellate, and Supreme Courts of California, 

Case Nos. HC6521, E047969, and S172001” as well as “Plaintiff’s previous federal-court 

proceedings in the District and Appellate Courts, Case Nos. CV 09-4357-PSG (PJW) and 07-

80059.” Id. at 1. Good cause appearing, Defendants’ RJN is GRANTED. The Court may take 

judicial notice of the aforementioned documents because “a court may take judicial notice of its 

own records in other cases, as well as the records of an inferior court in other cases.” United 

States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s cross-motion. Dkt. 67. Plaintiff thereafter filed a 

reply to Defendants’ opposition. Dkt. 68. 

 Having read and considered the papers submitted in connection with this matter, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s cross-motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Summary 

As mentioned above, Plaintiff was previously incarcerated at CTF in 2008. In the instant 

complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on May 21, 2008, he submitted a “staff complaint” against CTF 

Sergeant E. Banales, who is not a named defendant in this action. Dkt 1 at 3. Plaintiff claims that 

Defendant Hancock retaliated against Plaintiff by issuing a “bogus” disciplinary charge for 

“threatening” Sgt. Banales after Plaintiff filed the aforementioned staff complaint. Id. Plaintiff 

claims that on June 20, 2008, Defendant Vera found him guilty of “Threatening Staff,” and 

Plaintiff was assessed a sixty-day loss of good time credits as well as five months in the Secure 

Housing Unit (“SHU”). Id. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Santiago conspired with them by 

denying his 602 inmate appeal of the guilty finding. Id. at 2-3. As mentioned above, the Court 

found that Plaintiff’s allegations stated a cognizable claim of retaliation. 

Plaintiff further alleges in his complaint that after he was found guilty of the 

aforementioned disciplinary charge, Defendant Branch—who was one of the “segregation 

officers” at the SHU—read him his “CDC 114 lock-up order,” “slammed [him] up against the 

wall,” said “All you do is file a 602 . . . cuff up,” and applied handcuffs on him unnecessarily 

tightly as well as high on his arms. Id. at 4. Again, as mentioned above, the Court found that 

when liberally construed, this claim was cognizable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment 

against Defendant Branch for the use of excessive force. 

The Court notes that Plaintiff was thereafter transferred to Avenal State Prison, and his 

eventual release from ASU became effective upon his arrival there on September 30, 2008. Dkt. 

55-4 at 17. Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at a prison in the United States of America because, 

on April 9, 2015, he was transferred back to Turkey pursuant to the “U.S.-Turkey Prisoner 

Transfer Treaty.” Dkt. 48 at 2.

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B. State Court Actions 

1. In re Fikri Bayramoglu, Monterey County Superior Court 

On January 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Monterey 

County Superior Court, which the state superior court denied on March 16, 2009 in a reasoned 

opinion. See In re Fikri Bayramoglu (C-54604), HC 6521; RJN Ex. A, Dkt. 55-1; Dkt. 65-1 at 1-

12. According to the state superior court’s denial, Plaintiff had raised the following claims: 

(1) being “illegally placed into administrative segregation for five months,” and during which time 

frame, “his personal property was stolen, lost or destroyed;” and (2) that his central file was 

“grossly contaminated” with the imposition of illegal SHU terms on August 27, 1997 and June 9, 

2008.” Dkt. 55-1 at 2; see also Dkt. 65-1 at 4-10.2

 This Court notes that Plaintiff also raised his 

excessive force claim against Defendant Branch in his state superior court petition. Dkt. 65-1 at 8. 

In its March 16, 2009 Order denying the petition, the state superior court noted the 

following background facts: 

 On June 20, 2008, Petitioner was found guilty of a violation 

of CCR § 3005(c), for the specific act of threatening staff. He was 

assessed 60 days forfeiture of credits, consistent with a Division “E” 

offense, and referred to UCC for program review/transfer. (See 

Rules Violation Report (RVR) Log No. I-06-08-08 dated 6/9/08.) 

 He submitted an appeal Log No. CTF-08-02879 regarding 

the RVR and the finding of guilt, and on December 18, 2008, his 

appeal was denied at the Director’s level. 

Id. at 1. The state appellate court further noted that the record showed that the evidence used to 

render the guilty finding included: 

1) The information provided in the RVR Log No. I-06-08-08 dated 

6/9/08, in which Reporting Employee (R.E.) C. Hancock documents 

in part: Inmate Bayramoglu wrote “I’d of not only Fuck Sgt. 

Banales’ Mother, I’d fuck his world up because I really believe that 

the disrespectful motherfuckers must be put in check” in the form of 

an Inmate Appeals CDC-602 dated 5/21/08 (Log. No. 08-02077); 

2) Information provided by Inmate Bayramoglu where he stated 

during the hearing that he is Turkish and gets very passionate and 

loud just like Italians, which he is aware of; 

3) Reporting Employee, Lieutenant Hancock, documents that Inmate 

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 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by the parties. 

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Bayramoglu stated, “I wrote the 602 and what you are doing is 

illegal,” leading the [Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”)] to believe 

that the intent of a threat towards Sergeant Banales is actual and 

real; and 

4) Inmate Bayramoglu became loud, boisterous, and unruly during 

the hearing and several times th[e] SHO had to order him to calm 

down so that [the SHO] could resume with the CDC-115 process. 

Based on this evidence the SHO found that: 

 “Inmate Bayramoglu insists that he did not threaten anyone. 

However, after reviewing all of the evidence which consists of the 

RVR, written CDC-602, in addition to his own testimony at the 

RVR hearing, th[e] SHO is convinced that Inmate Bayramoglu 

would somehow carry out his threat on Sergeant Banales given the 

chance. He claimed to be a hot tempered Turk coupled with the fact 

that during his testimony he became irritable, loud and at times out 

of control this SHO had an Officer standing by during the RVR 

hearing just to keep Inmate Bayramoglu under control. 

 It is reasonable to believe in this circumstance the perception 

of a threat existed.” 

Id. at 3-4. The state superior court determined that the SHO’s finding that Plaintiff was guilty of 

the specific act of threatening staff was “supported by some evidence in the record.” Id. at 4. 

 The state superior court also gave the following facts relating to Plaintiff’s placement in 

administrative segregation: 

 On June 9, 2008, Petitioner was placed in administrative 

segregation, based on RVR Log No. I-06-08-08 dated 6/9/08. 

According to the ASU Placement Notice, which set forth the reasons 

for his placement in ASU, due to the threats against Sgt. Banales, 

Petitioner’s presence in the general population presented an 

immediate threat to the safety of self and others. On June 19, 2008, 

Petitioner appeared before the Administrative Segregation Unit 

(ASU) Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) for his initial 

ASU review. Based upon a review of the ASU Placement Notice, 

his central file, case factors, and a discussion with Petitioner, the 

committee elected to confirm ASU retention for 60 days to complete 

the RVR process. 

 On July 17, 2008, the ICC assessed a mitigated SHU 

confinement time of 4 months, commencing June 9, 2008, with a 

minimum early release date of September 9, 2008 and a maximum 

release date of October 9, 2008. The SHU Term Assessment 

Worksheet reflects that the total confinement time of 4 months 

represented the “expected” (i.e. mid-range) of 5 months minus 1 

month subtracted for mitigation. 

 The ASU Placement “Reissue/Retain” Notice dated July 20, 

2008, states that Petitioner has been found guilty of the charge of 

threatening staff (RVR Log No. I-06-08-08), and that a four-month 

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mitigated term has been assessed. Such Notice reflects the reason 

for placement is that Petitioner “endangers institutional security.” 

Further, it asserts that a pre-MERD review was conducted in ICC 

and that Petitioner’s ASU placement has changed to “Pending 

Transfer to an alternate Level II institution.[”] The Petitioner does 

not contain documentation regarding the pre-MERD review 

conducted by ICC. 

 Petitioner submitted an inmate appeal Log No. CTF-08-

03409 regarding the assessed SHU term, and on February 5, 2009, 

his appeal was denied at the Director’s Level. 

Id. at 4-5. In denying Plaintiff’s claim relating to his alleged illegal ASU placement and SHU 

term imposition on June 9, 2008, the state superior court found that his “placement and retention 

in ASU and the assessment of the mitigated conferment time of 4 months is supported by some 

evidence in the record.” Id. at 5. 

 The state superior court also denied Plaintiff’s remaining claims relating to the loss of his 

personal property and the alleged illegal SHU term imposition on August 27, 19973

, upon finding 

that he “ha[d] failed to state with particularity the facts upon which relief should be granted and 

ha[d] failed to provide reasonably available documentary evidence supporting his claims.” Id. at 

5-6. In addition, the state superior court noted that Plaintiff had failed to allege facts showing he 

exhausted his administrative remedies as to those claims. Id. 

 Therefore, the state superior court denied all claims in Plaintiff’s state habeas petition. Id.

at 6. 

2. In re Fikri Bayramoglu, California Court of Appeal 

After the denial of his state superior court habeas petition, Plaintiff filed Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus in the Fourth Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal on March 25, 

2009. See In re Fikri Bayramoglu (C-54604), E047969; RJN Ex. B, Dkt. 55-2. 

In this state appellate court habeas petition, Plaintiff initially only claimed that his petition 

concerned “‘illegal’ [ASU] placement and destruction of personal property.” Dkt. 55-2 at 3. 

However, Plaintiff added additional claims in this petition, including the following claims: (1) he 

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 The state superior court also found that Plaintiff’s claim relating to the August 27, 1997 

SHU term imposition was untimely and that he failed to show “that his delay was justified by the 

recent discovery of new legal or factual bases in support of his claim, or that his claim falls within 

an exception to the timeliness bar. Dkt. 55-1 at 6. 

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suffered retaliation because he “filed a ‘Citizen-Complaint’ Log #CTF-S-08-02077, on Sgt. E. 

Banales, who [cussed] at my dear dead mom . . . .”; (2) his “Central File [was] ‘Tempered’ [sic] 

[with] and grossly contaminated, and that [Defendant] Santiago is an unscrupulous crook that . . . 

cannot be trusted”; and (3) that Defendant Branch injured Plaintiff when Plaintiff was placed in 

ASU on the “bogus threatening staff charge.” Id. at 5-6. 

On April 7, 2009, the Court of Appeal issued a summary denial of Plaintiff’s petition. RJN 

Ex. C, Dkt. 55-3. 

3. In re Bayramoglu (Fikri) on H.C., California Supreme Court 

On April 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on 

April 13, 2009. See In re Bayramoglu (Fikri) on H.C., S172001; RJN Ex. D; Dkt. 55-4. On June 

10, 2009, the California Supreme Court issued a summary denial of the petition for review. RJN 

Ex. E; Dkt. 55-5. 

C. In re Fikri Bayramoglu, Case No. CV-09-4357 (Central District of California) 

On June 17, 2009, Plaintiff initiated his first federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. See In re Fikri 

Bayramoglu, Case No. CV-09-4357; RJN Ex. F; Dkt. 55-6. He raised the following four claims, 

including that: (1) he was “illegally charged” with “Specific Acts Threatening Staff” in his Citizen 

Complaint filed against Sgt. E. Banales” and found guilty on June 20, 2009; (2) his file was 

“grossly contaminated” with “illegal SHU terms”; (3) Defendant Santiago erroneously found 

Plaintiff guilty of the “bogus charge of Threatening Staff”; and (4) he was illegally placed in 

administrative segregation for four months. Id. at 6-7. 

On July 23, 2009, Respondent in Case No. CV-09-4357 filed a motion to dismiss on the 

grounds that Plaintiff’s federal petition failed to state a federal question, was unexhausted, and was 

barred in part by the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996. See RJN Ex. G; Dkt. 55-7. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. See 

RJN Ex. H; Dkt. 55-8. 

On October 28, 2009, Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh issued a report and 

recommendation to deny Plaintiff’s petition and to dismiss the action with prejudice upon finding 

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that the claims were “not cognizable because they involve[d] only questions of state law.” See 

RJN Ex. I; Dkt. 55-9 at 8. Magistrate Judge Walsh added that, even liberally construing Plaintiff’s 

petition as raising a federal claim, it “would still clearly fail on the merits” upon determining 

whether the prison disciplinary decision was supported by “some evidence.” Id. (citing 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (holding that due process only requires that a 

prison disciplinary decision be supported by “some evidence”).) Upon reviewing the record, 

Magistrate Judge Walsh stated as follows: 

 

 Petitioner was charged with threatening Banales in violation 

of California Code of Regulations § 3005.5 (6/28/2008 CDC Rules 

Violation Report, p. 4.) On June 28, 2008, a hearing was held and a 

copy of Petitioner’s signed staff complaint against Sgt. Banales was 

submitted as evidence. (6/28/2008 CDC Rules Violation Report, p. 

2.) Petitioner acknowledged writing in the complaint, “I’d of not 

only fuck Sergeant Banales’ mother, I’d fuck his world up because I 

really believe that the disrespectful mother[f]ucker must be put in 

check,” but argued that it was not a threat to Sgt. Banales. 

(6/28/2008 CDC Rules Violation Report, p. 3.) The hearing officer 

rejected Petitioner’s argument, finding that Petitioner intended to 

convey an “actual and real” threat to Sgt. Banales. (6/28/2008 CDC 

Rules Violation Report, p. 4.) 

 The Monterey County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s 

habeas petition, finding that there was “some evidence in the record” 

that Petitioner threatened Banales. (Lodged Exh. 2, Order of the 

Superior Court of California, County of Monterey.) This Court 

agrees. On its face, the complaint form that Petitioner admittedly 

filled out and submitted to prison staff threatened violence against 

Sgt. Banales. At a minimum, the complaint amounted to some 

evidence having an indicia of reliability that Petitioner committed 

the offense of threatening a prison staff member. See Yonai [v. 

Evans], [No. C 06-5217 PJH (PR)], 2009 WL 666966, at *5 [(N.D. 

Cal. 2009)] (finding statements by prisoner that he was going to 

“tak[e] care of” and “get” corrections officers, whom he called 

“motherfuckers,” constituted some evidence of threatening prison 

officials). Thus, there is no merit to Petitioner’s claims. 

Id. at 9. 

On November 18, 2009, the Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez adopted the Magistrate Judge 

Walsh’s October 29, 2009 finding and reasoning, and issued a judgment dismissing the petition 

with prejudice. See RJN Exs. J & K; Dkt. 55-10, 55-11. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s 

decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which assigned the appeal case number 07-80095. 

See RJN Ex. L; Dkt. 55-12. 

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On January 21, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order 

denying Plaintiff’s habeas petition, holding that the appeal was “so insubstantial as to not warrant 

further review.” See RJN Ex. M; Dkt. 55-13. 

D. The Instant Action 

As mentioned above, on March 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging 

constitutional violations that occurred while he was housed at CTF in 2008. Dkt. 1. 

On July 29, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, and thereafter issued an Order of Partial Dismissal and Service on October 30, 2013. 

Dkt. 8. As mentioned, upon its initial review of the complaint, the Court found Plaintiff had stated 

a cognizable retaliation claim against Defendants Hancock, Vera, and Santiago, and a cognizable 

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Branch for the use of excessive force. The Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the other Defendants named in his complaint. 

In an Order dated July 23, 2014, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status was revoked pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dkt. 27. The case was dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing a 

motion to reopen no later than twenty-eight days from the date of that Order, accompanied by the 

full filing fee of $350.00. Id. at 10. 

After being granted multiple extensions of time to do so, Plaintiff, who is no longer 

incarcerated, as mentioned above, finally paid the full $350.00 filing fee. See Receipt Number 

44611012363. 

In an Order dated December 18, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to reopen this 

action, and his request to use the Court’s electronic case filing system. Dkt. 48. 

Consistent with the Court’s scheduling order, Defendants have filed the instant motion for 

summary judgment, which asserts that the Plaintiff’s claims in the instant action are barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion for summary 

judgment.

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 

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on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in 

the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 

(1986). 

When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court must consider 

all of the evidence submitted in support of both motions to evaluate whether a genuine issue of 

material fact exists precluding summary judgment for either party. The Fair Housing Council of 

Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Claim preclusion may be raised in a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Holcombe v. 

Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that claim preclusion may be presented in a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). In the preclusion context, a federal court may take judicial 

notice of the record in the earlier proceeding. Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 

420 F.3d 1022, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 n.3 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“Judicial notice is properly taken of public records, such as transcripts, orders, and 

decisions made by other courts or administrative agencies.”), overruled in part on other grounds, 

Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[m]aterials from a proceeding in 

another tribunal are appropriate for judicial notice”). Here, as explained above, the Court takes 

judicial notice of the state and federal court records relating to Plaintiff’s prior state and federal 

habeas proceedings. 

B. Analysis of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of 

an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been 

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raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). “Under collateral estoppel [also 

referred to as issue preclusion], once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its 

judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of 

action involving a party to the first case.” Id. These doctrines bar not only every claim that has 

been raised and decided, but also the assertion of any legal theory or ground for recovery that 

might have been raised in the first action. McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 

1986). 

When the effect of a state court judgment is at issue, federal courts must apply the law of 

the forum state to determine the preclusive effect of the judgment. Migra v. Warren City Sch. 

Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 84 (1984). California law provides that a final judgment in state 

court “precludes further proceedings if they are based on the same cause of action.” Brodheim v. 

Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). For claim 

preclusion to apply, “three requirements have to be met: (1) the second lawsuit must involve the 

same ‘cause of action’ as the first one, (2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits in 

the first lawsuit and (3) the party to be precluded must itself have been a party, or in privity with a 

party, to that first lawsuit.” San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Employees’ 

Retirement Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009). A “cause of action” is determined by 

analyzing the “primary right” at stake. Id. The same primary right is at issue where the two 

actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant. Id. 

1. Plaintiff’s Prior State Court Habeas Actions 

Applying the foregoing test in relation to Plaintiff’s prior state court actions, the Court 

finds that the three requirements for claim preclusion are satisfied in this case. As an initial 

matter, the instant federal action and Plaintiff’s prior state court actions involve the same harm and 

wrong by Defendants—that prison officials, including Defendants Hancock, Vera, and Santiago, 

played a role in imposing an allegedly false and wrongful RVR against Plaintiff as punishment for 

filing a “staff complaint” against Sgt. Banales on May 21, 2008. Compare RJN Exs. A-E with 

Dkt. 1 at 3-4. In addition, these actions involve the same harm and wrong caused by Defendant 

Branch when he injured Plaintiff while placing Plaintiff in ASU on the “bogus threatening staff 

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charge.” Compare Dkts. 65-1 at 8 and 55-2 at 5-6 with Dkt. 1 at 4. Although the legal theories 

presented and remedies sought in the state court proceedings differ from those presented in this 

action, the fact remains that his present and prior proceedings arise from the same conduct and 

involve the same injury to Plaintiff and the same wrong by Defendants. See Eichman v. Fotomat 

Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174 (1983) (“[I]f two actions involve the same injury to the 

plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the 

second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or 

adds new facts supporting recovery.”); see also San Diego Police Officer’s Ass’n, 568 F.3d at 734 

(“What is critical to the analysis ‘is the harm suffered . . .’”). 

The remaining requirements for claim preclusion are also satisfied. Plaintiff does not 

dispute that there was a final judgment on the merits rendered in the prior state court habeas 

proceedings. As noted, the state superior court denied Plaintiff’s habeas petition in an order 

explaining that court’s findings and reasoning. See RJN Ex. A. Specifically, the state superior 

court found that Plaintiff’s placement and retention in administrative segregation following his 

guilty finding for threatening staff was supported by evidence in the record. Id. The state 

appellate and supreme courts’ summary denials of Plaintiff’s subsequent petitions also constitute a 

judgment on the merits. Silverton v. Dept. of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Finally, the privity requirement is satisfied, as Plaintiff brought each of the prior state court 

actions. See San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n, 568 F.3d at 734. Plaintiff was the same party in 

the state actions, and Defendants are in privity with Respondents in those actions. Privity exists 

when a person is so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. See 

Trujillo v. Santa Clara County, 775 F.2d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir. 1985). For example, privity exists 

between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a 

representative of the government is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party 

and another officer of the government. See Church of New Song v. Establishment of Religion on 

Taxpayers’ Money, 620 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981) (citation 

omitted) (prison employees at federal prison in Texas in privity with prison employees at federal 

prison in Illinois as both suits against employees of Federal Bureau of Prisons). Such is the case 

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here, where Defendants in the instant action are in privity with Respondents in Plaintiff’s state 

habeas actions because all the suits are against employees of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

Therefore, the three requirements for claim preclusion based on Plaintiff’s prior state court 

habeas proceedings are satisfied in this action. Thus, upon considering such state proceedings, the 

Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of claim preclusion. 

2. Plaintiff’s Prior Federal Court Habeas Action 

 A prior federal habeas decision may have preclusive effect in a separate section 1983 

action. Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1993). In Plaintiff’s prior federal habeas 

proceedings, he raised the same issues the instant action, i.e., he challenged the allegedly improper 

RVR after he filed a citizen’s complaint against Sgt. Banales, and argued that the resulting fourmonth ASU term was illegal. However, the final judgment entered in Plaintiff’s prior federal 

habeas action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California and in the 

Ninth Circuit precludes relitigation of the issues asserted in that proceeding. See In re Fikri 

Bayramoglu, Case No. CV-09-4357; RJN Exs. J & K; Dkt. 55-10, 55-11. As mentioned above, in 

Plaintiff’s prior federal habeas action, Magistrate Judge Walsh issued detailed findings and a 

recommendation to deny Plaintiff’s petition, and the district court ultimately adopted the report 

and recommendation in full. See RJN Exs. I & J. Magistrate Judge Walsh had found that 

Plaintiff’s claims were not cognizable because none of the asserted allegations stated a violation of 

the Constitution. See RJN Ex. I. Importantly, Magistrate Judge Walsh found that there was no 

merit to Plaintiff’s claim that the RVR initiated by Defendants was improper. See id. 

Specifically, Magistrate Judge Walsh cited the Monterey County Superior Court’s order denying 

Plaintiff’s state habeas petition and finding that there was “some evidence in the record” that 

Plaintiff had threatened Sgt. Banales. Dkt. 55-9 at 9. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Walsh noted 

that “on its face, the complaint form that Petitioner admittedly filled out and submitted to prison 

staff threatened violence against Sgt. Banales.” Id. Therefore, the issue of whether the RVR was 

brought against Plaintiff in retaliation cannot be relitigated in the instant action because a prior 

federal court has already determined that the RVR was instituted against Plaintiff for a legitimate 

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penological purpose, i.e., that Plaintiff had committed the offense of threatening a prison staff 

member. Id. Therefore, claim preclusion applies to bar Plaintiff from relitigating the issue as to 

whether the RVR was proper because such an issue was already decided in a prior habeas decision 

in Plaintiff’s prior federal action in the Central District, In re Fikri Bayramoglu, Case No. CV-09-

4357. Therefore, the final judgment in Plaintiff’s prior federal habeas proceeding may have a 

preclusive effect to bar the instant action, which it does. 

 Accordingly, based on the above discussion, the issues raised in the instant complaint 

regarding Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation and excessive force are barred under res judicata and, 

therefore, must be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment as to the retaliation and excessive force claims on the ground that 

they are barred by res judicata. Dkt. 54. Because the Court grants summary judgment on claim 

preclusion grounds, it need not rule on Defendants’ alternative argument that the action is barred 

by the applicable statute of limitations. 

C. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 

Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, which consists of a variety of 

unrelated allegations regarding previous prison staff’s treatment of him, including three other 

allegedly “illegal[]” placements in the SHU, as well as allegations regarding Defendant Branch’s 

actions of “switching Plaintiff’s full stinky matteress [sic] with a[] half matterss [sic] with a[] sick 

sinister intent in subjecting Plaintiff to pain and suffering . . . .” Dkt. 59 at 2-3, 5. These 

allegations may form the basis for a separate case, but they are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s stated 

claims in the instant action of retaliation and excessive force. Therefore, his cross-motion for 

summary judgment is DENIED on this ground. 

In the event that Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to as a matter of law, his motion is must 

also be denied. On Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed 

in favor of Defendants, as the non-moving parties. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 

(9th Cir. 1999); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Because Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on all the issues at trial, on his motion for summary 

judgment he must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than 

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for him. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Because Defendants’ motion for summary judgment has 

been granted above, Plaintiff’s cross-motion must necessarily be denied. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Dkt. 59. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

1. Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Dkt. 39. 

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the retaliation and 

excessive force claims on the ground that they are barred by res judicata. Dkt. 54. The complaint 

is thereby DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. 

3. Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Dkt. 59. 

4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, close the file, and terminate all 

pending matters. 

5. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 54 and 59. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 

______________________________________ 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 

United States District Judge 

September 12, 2016

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