Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02030/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID PAUL RUFF,

CDCR #E-74808,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-2030-WQH-KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 8] 

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

AND

3) DENYING MOTION FOR 

RESTRAINING ORDER

[ECF No. 6]

David Paul Ruff (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has 

filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). In addition, 

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Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Restraining Order (ECF No. 6), along with a certified copy 

of his inmate trust account statement which the Court liberally construes to be a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 8).

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182,

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows Plaintiff has had no monthly deposits to his 

account, has carried no balance over the six month period preceding the filing of his 

Complaint, and that his current available balance is zero. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or 

appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets 

and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; 

Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” 

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to 

the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 8), 

declines to “exact” any initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he “has 

no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary for the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to instead collect the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted.)

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that he was diagnosed with liver cancer in November 2016. (ECF 

No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff was told that he would undergo surgery to remove the tumor in his 

liver but he was later informed that the operation was “too complicated.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims this is causing him “undue stress” and he is concerned that he will be assigned a 

cellmate who “wants to fight.” (Id.) Due to Plaintiff’s medical condition he has to “arise 

at all times of the night to use toilet and sink.” (Id.) Plaintiff believes that a cellmate would 

rather harm Plaintiff and receive a cell transfer than “suffer the environment of living with 

[an] inmate suffering from bodily illnesses that wake you up through the night.” (Id. at 5.) 

In addition to compensatory and punitive damages, Plaintiff is seeking an Order from this 

Court directing prison officials to place Plaintiff on permanent “single cell status.” (Id. at 

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9.) 

D. Individual Liability 

Plaintiff names Warden Paramo as the only named Defendant in this action. (Compl. 

at 1.) However, under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that each 

named Defendant individually participated in causing a constitutional violation. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010).

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat 

superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21, and as an RJD

administrator, Defendant Paramo may only be held liable if he personally “participated in 

or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 

1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). Some culpable action or inaction must be attributable to the 

Defendant individually, and while the creation or enforcement of, or acquiescence in, an 

unconstitutional policy may support a claim, Plaintiff must further allege that the policy 

was the moving force behind the violation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205; Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 

F.3d 895, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Paramo are DISMISSED for failing to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

E. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action claiming that his Eighth Amendment rights are 

being violated by Defendants failing to address his concerns that he may suffer injury if he 

is housed with another inmate. (ECF No. 1 at 3-5.)

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety and well-being of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–

33 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). To state an Eighth 

Amendment failure to protect claim, however, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 

plausibly show that (1) he faced conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” to 

his health or safety, and (2) the individual prison official he seeks to hold liable was

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“deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). To demonstrate deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must 

allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that Defendant both knew of and disregarded a 

substantial risk of serious harm to his health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, 

Plaintiff must allege “the official [was] both be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and [that] he . . . also 

dr[e]w that inference.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plausibly suggest that Defendant Paramo would know 

that Plaintiff faces a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. Plaintiff alleges no additional 

facts from which the Court might reasonably infer that Defendant Paramo was aware or 

became aware that Plaintiff faced any risk, let alone a substantial one from any other 

inmate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923. 925 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(“mere threat” of possible harm does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Berg v. 

Kincheloe, 749 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (deliberate indifference requires showing of 

“more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.”); Hernandez v. Schriro, No. CV 

05-2853-PHX-DGC, 2011 WL 2910710, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2011) (“While theoretical 

risk is always possible, Farmer requires more—‘conditions posing a substantial risk of 

serious harm.’”).

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims must be 

DISMISSED for failing to state a claim.

In addition, the Court finds that because Plaintiff plainly concedes, on the face of his 

Complaint, that the administrative exhaustion of his claims is currently pending at the time 

of filing (ECF No. 1 at 8), this entire action must be dismissed. See Albino v. Baca, 747 

F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting that where “a prisoner’s failure to exhaust 

is clear from the face of the complaint,” his complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to 

state a claim), cert. denied sub nom, Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014); Wyatt v. 

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion 

is a valid ground for dismissal[.]”), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 747 F.3d at 

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1166. The “exhaustion requirement does not allow a prisoner to file a complaint addressing 

non-exhausted claims.” Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004 (citing McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 

1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Thus, for all the reasons discussed, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint must be 

dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 

§ 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

E. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, and he has now been provided with 

“notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” the Court will also grant him an opportunity 

to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).2

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Finally, Plaintiff also requests an Order “for temporary single-cell status during the 

Court proceedings.” (Pl.’s Mot, ECF No. 6, at 1.)

Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it 

has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. 

See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting 

that one “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only 

upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within 

which the party served must appear to defend.”). The court may not attempt to determine 

the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 

U.S. 229, 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). Pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), an injunction binds only “the parties to the 

action,” their “officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,” and “other persons 

 

2

 Plaintiff is cautioned that all claims re-alleged in his Amended Complaint must be 

exhausted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) prior to its filing. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 

F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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who are in active concert or participation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(A)-(C).

Substantively, “‘[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he 

is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 

of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 

in the public interest.” Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736-37 (2015) 

(quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “Under 

Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order 

to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 

1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).

First, because Plaintiff’s Complaint has not survived the initial sua sponte screening 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, the United States Marshal has not yet 

been directed to effect service on his behalf, and the named Defendants have no actual 

notice of either of Plaintiff’s Complaint or his Motion for injunctive relief. Therefore, the 

Court cannot grant Plaintiff injunctive relief because it has no personal jurisdiction over 

any Defendant at this time. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1), (d)(2); Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 

U.S. at 350; Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727-28. A district court has no authority to grant relief in 

the form of a temporary restraining order or permanent injunction where it has no 

jurisdiction over the parties. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) 

(“Personal jurisdiction, too, is an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district ... court, 

without which the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”) (citation and internal 

quotation omitted).

Second, in conducting its initial sua sponte screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the 

Court has found it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and has dismissed 

it without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Therefore, 

Plaintiff has necessarily failed to show, for purposes of justifying preliminary injunctive 

relief, any likelihood of success on the merits of his claims at this time. Id.; see also Asberry 

v. Beard, Civil Case No. 3:13-cv-2573-WQH JLB, 2014 WL 3943459, at *9 (S.D. Cal. 

Aug. 12, 2014) (denying prisoner’s motion for preliminary injunction because his 

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complaint was subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, and 

therefore he had not shown he was “likely to succeed on the merits” of any claim, that “the 

balance of equities tip[ped] in his favor,” or the issuance of an injunction would serve the 

public interest (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20)).

Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged, and cannot yet demonstrate that he is or will be 

subject to immediate and irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue. To meet FED. R.

CIV. P. 65’s “irreparable injury” requirement, Plaintiff must do more than simply allege 

imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 

844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This requires he allege “specific facts in an affidavits 

or a verified complaint [which] clearly show” a credible threat of “immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss or damage.” FED R. CIV. P. 65(b)(A). “Speculative injury does not 

constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 

674-75.

Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to serve the required notice upon the adverse 

parties, has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and has offered only 

speculative allegations of harm which are neither immediate nor irreparable, the Court 

DENIES his Motion for Restraining Order and finds he is not entitled to the extraordinary 

injunctive relief he seeks. See Dymo Indus. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th 

Cir. 1964) (“The grant of a preliminary injunction is the exercise of a very far reaching 

power never to be indulged in except in a case clearly warranting it.”).

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

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IV. Conclusion and Orders

Based on the foregoing the Court:

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 8);

2) DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION;

3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Restraining Order (ECF No. 6); and

5) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS

him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 

original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 

dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

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amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

6) The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved civil rights 

complaint form for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2017

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