Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01382/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01382-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN SCOTT MARLETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

KELLY HARRINGTON, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01382-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

(ECF No. 1)

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE 

WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Her complaint is before the Court for 

screening. (ECF No. 1.)

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is an inmate1at California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility 

(“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names as Defendants: Kelly Harrington, 

Director of Corrections at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”); Vincent Cullen, Assistant Deputy Director of CDCR; Jeffery Bears, Secretary 

of CDCR; Martin Hoshino, Undersecretary of CDCR; Stu Sherman, Warden of CSATF; 

 

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The Court assumes, for the purposes of this screening order, that Plaintiff is a transgender inmate, and 

so it will refer to Plaintiff in the feminine gender. Plaintiff does not, however, specifically identify herself as 

such in the complaint. If she decides to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff is advised that she must set 

forth all elements of her claims, including her identification as a transgender inmate. 

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and Janelle Reynoso, Associate Warden of CSATF. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and 

injunctive relief only. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

CDCR has instituted policies designating certain California prisons, including 

CSATF, for the housing and treatment of transgender inmates. Plaintiff contends that 

CSATF staff members arbitrarily place transgender inmates in housing assignments 

without regard for their safety and welfare. 

Transgender inmates are routinely housed with non-transgender prisoners, 

exposing the transgender inmates to a greater risk of harm without furthering a 

penological goal. Many of these non-transgender inmates, for example, attempt to 

sexually coerce the transgender inmates or physically assault them. This practice of 

routinely housing transgender inmates with non-transgender inmates violates the 

national standards set forth in the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. 

If a transgender inmates refuses the housing assignment – either due to a 

credible concern for her personal safety or incongruity with the potential housing inmate 

– disciplinary action is taken and the transgender prison is placed in a more restrictive 

housing unit, such as Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”) or the Security Housing Unit 

(“SHU”), pending review by a Facility Captain who must authorize the release from AdSeg or SHU. Correctional staff will generally leave transgender inmates in Ad-Seg or 

SHU for long periods of time without regularly and meaningfully considering other, less 

restrictive housing options. 

Since non-transgender inmates are able to select and choose their housing 

assignments without detriment, CSATF’s treatment of transgender inmates violates 

these inmates’ equal protection rights. Additionally, CSATF are denying transgender 

inmates humane conditions of confinement with deliberate indifference to their safety.

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Standing

Standing is “the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power 

of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To have 

Article III standing, a plaintiff must plead and prove that he or she has suffered sufficient 

injury to satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the United States 

Constitution. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (“‘One element 

of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that they have 

standing to sue.’” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997))). To establish 

Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish: (1) injury-in-fact that is concrete and 

particularized, as well as actual or imminent; (2) that this injury is fairly traceable to the 

challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that this injury is redressable by a favorable 

ruling from the court. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 

(2010); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-

81 (2000).

Plaintiff does not allege any facts from which one can determine whether she has 

standing to assert her claims. Plaintiff challenges the CSATF practice of routinely placing 

transgender inmates, without regard to their safety, in cells with non-transgender 

inmates, and of placing transgender inmates in Ad-Seg or SHU if they complain of the 

placement. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that she was housed with a nontransgender inmate upon transfer to CSATF, that she objected to the placement, that

she was injured by a non-transgender inmate, or that she was placed in Ad-Seg or SHU 

for a long period of time following objection to the housing placement. Without such 

allegations, it is impossible for the Court to determine if Plaintiff has alleged any injury as 

a result of the challenged practices. 

B. Personal Liability

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional 

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or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 

580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). To state a 

claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th 

Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the 

actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 677; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235; Jones, 297 

F.3d at 934. “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is ‘a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 

F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). Supervisors may be held liable where 

they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Corales v. 

Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff does not specify whether she is proceeding against the Defendants in 

their individual or official capacities, or both. To the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims 

against these Defendants in their personal capacities, she has failed to set forth any 

allegations that any of the named Defendants were personally involved in the alleged 

violation or that there was a causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation. 

C. Official Capacity Claims

Under Section 1983, plaintiff may also seek prospective injunctive relief against 

defendant in his official capacity. See Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

2013) (citing cases). “Official-capacity suits ... generally represent only another way of 

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pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the 

government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit 

is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citing, inter alia, Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of 

N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).

In an official-capacity action, a governmental entity may be liable under Section 

1983 if it was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of constitutional rights, 

based on the entity's “policy or custom.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in 

Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013):

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not 

required to allege a named official's personal involvement in 

the acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional 

violation. See id.; Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Rather, a plaintiff 

need only identify the law or policy challenged as a 

constitutional violation and name the official within the entity 

who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief. See L.A. 

Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010); Hafer [v. Melo], 502 

U.S. [21] at 25 [1991].

Assuming Plaintiff is able to establish standing, the Court finds that she has 

alleged the existence of a policy or custom that caused the violation of rights, as 

discussed infra. However, a defendant in a suit to enjoin an allegedly unconstitutional 

practice must be able to appropriately respond to court-ordered injunctive relief if the 

plaintiff prevails. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157-61 (1908). Plaintiff’s complaint fails 

to assert that any of the six named Defendants has the ability to appropriately respond to 

court-ordered injunctive relief. 

D. The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003

Plaintiff invokes the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15601, as a 

basis for relief. It is clear, however, that the Prison Rape Elimination Act does not create 

a private right of action. Bell v. County of Los Angeles, 2008 WL 4375768 (C.D. Cal.

2008); Inscoe v. Yates. 2009 WL 3617810 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Rather, the Prison Rape 

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Elimination Act was enacted to study the problem of prison rape. Pirtle v. Hickman, 2005 

WL 3359731 (D. Idaho 2005). Nothing in the Act suggests that it created a private right 

of action, enforceable under section 1983. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 

340-41 (1997) (statutory provision gives rise to federal right enforceable under § 1983 

where the statute “unambiguously imposed a binding obligation on the States” by using 

“mandatory, rather than precatory, terms”). The Act in itself contains no private right of 

action, nor does it create a right enforceable under Section 1983. Plaintiff thus fails to 

state a federal section 1983 claim based on a violation of the Prison Rape Elimination 

Act.

E. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439

(1985); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim 

may be established by showing that Defendants intentionally discriminated against 

Plaintiff based on his membership in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. 

Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. 

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated 

differently, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008); Village 

of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 

F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 

(9th Cir. 2008). Discrimination on the basis of transgender status is subject to 

intermediate scrutiny. Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 

See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(holding that United States v. Windsor, ––– U.S. –––, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) “requires 

that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving sexual 

orientation”).

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Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges the existence of a practice that treats 

transgender inmates differently from the rest of the prison population. However, before 

the Court will require the Defendants to respond to the complaint, and before the merits 

of the claims can be reached, Plaintiff must allege facts showing her standing, as 

discussed above. Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to file an amended complaint to 

cure this defect.

F. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from 

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). While conditions of 

confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the 

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citations omitted). 

Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to 

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the 

Eighth Amendment. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

730, 737 (2002). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, the 

plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of and 

disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

847; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff here alleges the existence of a practice of routinely placing transgender 

inmates in cells with non-transgender inmates, thereby exposing the former group to a 

risk of harm (although the nature and extent of that risk and the resulting harm, and the 

basis for alleging its likelihood of occurring, are not specified). But again, before the 

Court will require the Defendants to respond, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating 

that she has standing and address the other issues identified in this Order. 

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V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, she must 

demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of her constitutional rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a 

claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each named Defendant personally participated in a 

deprivation of her rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff should note that although she has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George, 507 F.3d at 607. Plaintiff should 

carefully read this Screening Order and focus her efforts on curing the deficiencies set 

forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the service of this order, Plaintiff shall a first

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order;

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2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (a) a blank civil rights complaint form and 

(b) a copy of her complaint, filed September 10, 2015;

3. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint, the Court will dismiss this 

action, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a court order and failure to 

prosecute, subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g). Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1761 (2015).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 15, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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