Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00528/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00528-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROBERT F. LINDLEY, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-0528 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On February 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254, challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state

court. Respondents filed an Answer to [the] Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 11) on June 7, 2006.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, the petition must be denied and dismissed

with prejudice. Additionally, Respondents assert the Court may

not consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims for habeas relief

because he failed to properly exhaust his claims in the Arizona

state courts. 

On July 18, 2006, Petitioner filed a traverse to the

answer to his petition for relief. See Docket No. 13?

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1

 The relevant statute was amended effective January 1,

1994. 

[F]ormer [Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated] 

§ 13-604(H), [] expressly permitted convictions

for crimes not committed on the same occasion but

consolidated for trial to be used as prior

convictions--colloquially known as “Hannah

priors”--for sentence enhancement purposes.

Arizona v. Ofstedahl, 208 Ariz. 406, 407 (Ct. App. 2004). See Arizona

v. Hannah, 126 Ariz. 575, 576-77 (1980) (holding that, under the prior

version of the relevant statute, the sequence of convictions, rather

than offenses, determined a defendant’s eligibility for sentence

enhancement); Arizona ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz.

280, 282 (1984) (relying on Hannah for the proposition that “it [was]

not necessary that the ‘prior conviction’ be also a prior offense”).

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Petitioner contends Respondents have misstated the record in his

state criminal proceedings. Petitioner asserts his petition was

timely filed and that he did exhaust his habeas claims in state

court.

I Procedural History

In 1987 Petitioner was indicted on seven counts of

child molestation and eight counts of sexual conduct with a

minor; all charges were class 2 felonies and all charges were

classified as dangerous crimes against a child. Answer, Exh. B.

On October 11, 1989, the state filed an allegation of a Hannah1

prior or repetitive convictions with regard to the charges in

the 1987 indictment. Id., Exh. C.

A jury trial was conducted in May of 1990 with regard

to the 1987 charges against Petitioner. Id., Exh. D. Prior to

the trial, on a motion by the state, the trial court dismissed

four of the charges against Petitioner. Id., Exh. D at 66.

Petitioner moved for a judgment of acquittal on the remaining

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charges at the close of the prosecution’s case. Id., Exh. D.

The trial court granted the motion with regard to one of the

charges and denied the motion with regard to the other ten

remaining charges. Id., Exh. D at 71. Petitioner testified at

his trial. Id., Exh. F at 2. After deliberating for

approximately one week, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the

remaining ten counts charged in the indictment. Id., Exh. D. at

77 & 102.

The trial court concluded there were no aggravating or

mitigating circumstances in Petitioner’s case for the purpose of

imposing sentence. Id., Ehx. E & Exh. S at 12. On August 10,

1990, after hearing the testimony of Petitioner’s mother, the

trial court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive terms of

imprisonment on each count of conviction, ranging from 17 years

to life imprisonment, including five terms of life imprisonment.

Id., Ehx. E & Exh. S at 12.

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his convictions and

sentences on August 21, 1990. Id., Exh. F. On December 5,

1991, prior to a decision regarding his appeal, Petitioner filed

an action seeking post-conviction relief in the Arizona trial

court. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner asserted his counsel was

ineffective because counsel did not raise an insanity defense.

Id., Exh. H. The petition for post-conviction relief was

dismissed by the trial court on April 6, 1992. Id., Exh. I.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which consolidated review of the decision with

Petitioner’s direct appeal. Id., Exh. J.

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On December 2, 1992, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. Id., Exh. K. However, the

Arizona Court of Appeals determined Petitioner was improperly

sentenced with regard to two of the consecutive life sentences;

the Court of Appeals ordered the sentences for these two

convictions be served concurrently. Id., Exh. K. The Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed all of the other imposed sentences and

also concluded the trial court properly denied Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., Exh. K at 158.

Petitioner did not seek review of the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision in his direct appeal or his consolidated

action for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Supreme Court.

On June 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a second action for

post-conviction relief in the Arizona trial court. Id., Exh. L.

The trial court found the issues raised were precluded by the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and dismissed the petition

on June 27, 1997. Id., Exh. M. 

Petitioner filed a third notice of post-conviction

relief on July 31, 1997, which action was initially dismissed by

the trial court. Id., Exh. O. On October 28, 1997, the third

action for post-conviction relief was re-instated by the trial

court for consideration of Petitioner’s claims regarding the

effective assistance of his appellate and post-conviction

counsel. Id., Exh. P & Exh. Q. In a thorough and extensive

opinion the Arizona Superior Court considered each of

Petitioner’s claims and concluded Petitioner had presented one

viable claim. Id., Exh. T. The trial court ordered an

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2 The Court appreciates Respondents’ thorough and competent

detailing of the additional pleadings and proceedings regarding this

state-court action. The Court will not repeat those details here

because they are not relevant to the ultimate determination made by

the Court regarding the timeliness of the federal habeas petition.

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evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s claim that his

appellate counsel was ineffective. Id., Exh. T at 28. 

The evidentiary hearing was conducted July 24, 2000.

Id., Exh. U. In an opinion issued August 25, 2000, the Arizona

Superior Court ordered Petitioner be allowed to file a direct

appeal of his convictions and sentences arguing the trial court

erred by not striking particular jurors for cause. Id., Exh. V.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed the permissive

appeal on September 5, 2000. Id., Exh. W.2 On August 6, 2002,

the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision

affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The Court of

Appeals concluded the trial court had not abused its discretion

in declining to remove three jurors for cause. Id., Exh. FF.

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of this decision on

March 18, 2003. Id., Exh. GG. 

Petitioner filed a fourth action for post-conviction

relief on April 9, 2003, signed March 31, 2003, which was

dismissed because the claims were precluded, and a motion for

reconsideration of this decision was denied by the trial court

on September 22, 2003. Id., Exhs. HH & KK. 

Petitioner filed a fifth action for post-conviction

relief on October 14, 2003, which was dismissed, and review of

the dismissal was denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals on

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3 As noted supra, the Arizona Court of Appeals determined

Petitioner had been improperly sentenced with regard to two counts of

conviction for which he was sentenced to consecutive terms of life

imprisonment, ordering the sentences for these convictions be served

concurrently. 

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April 19, 2005. Id. at 5. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on

February 21, 2006. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal

habeas relief because: (1) he was denied his constitutional

right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury; (2) he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel because they failed to raise particular issues

at his trial and in his direct appeal; (3) he was denied his

right to the effective assistance of counsel; (4) there was

insufficient evidence to support the verdicts against him, in

violation of his right to due process of law, i.e., his trial

was fundamentally unfair. 

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

On December 2, 1992, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on all charges, although it

altered the consecutive nature of two of the imposed sentences.

See Answer, Exh. K.3 Therefore, Petitioner is a state prisoner

whose conviction became final in March of 1993, when the time

for petitioning the United States Supreme Court for review of

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the Arizona state courts’ decisions in his direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Petitioner’s state

conviction became final before April 24, 1996, the effective

date of the AEDPA. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). Additionally, the AEDPA required state prisoners whose

convictions became final before April 24, 1996, to file any

petition for federal habeas corpus relief from those convictions

prior to April 23, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the AEDPA also entitled a

petitioner to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 &

Supp. 2006); Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361,

363-64 (2000). 

Because Petitioner’s state conviction became final

prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the one-year statute

of limitations on Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief

began to run on April 24, 1996, and expired on April 23, 1997,

unless it was statutorily tolled by any pending action for state

post-conviction relief. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246. 

 Petitioner did not have any properly-filed action for

state post-conviction relief pending from April 24, 1996, until

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4 Because the decision arose in the context of a direct

appeal arising from relief granted in an action for post-conviction

relief, Petitioner arguably had the right to seek certiorari from this

decision and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until

June 15, 2003, pursuant to the holding in Bowen cited supra.

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April 23, 1997. Petitioner did file a second state action for

post-conviction relief on June 12, 1997, which was dismissed

because the issues raised were precluded. However, the filing

of this action could not revive the already-expired statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See Ferguson

v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S.

Ct. 328 (2003); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th

Cir. 2000).

Alternatively, calculating the statute of limitations

from the date Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became

final upon the conclusion of his third action for postconviction relief, in which relief in the form of a permissive

appeal was granted but in which substantive relief was denied,

does not allow that the federal habeas petition is timely filed.

Petitioner filed the permissive appeal on September 5,

2000. On August 6, 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences and the Arizona Supreme

Court denied review of this decision on March 18, 2003. Answer,

Exh. GG. Calculating the statute of limitations from the latest

date that Petitioner could have sought certiorari from this

decision, June 15, 2003,4 the statute of limitations on

Petitioner’s federal habeas claims began to run on June 16,

2003, and expired on June 15, 2004, unless tolled by a properly

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5

 In Welch v. Newland the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

held a federal habeas petitioner was entitled to tolling of the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations from the time the petitioner filed

their action for state post-conviction relief until the time the

state’s highest court entered a final order denying and dismissing the

action for post-conviction relief. See 267 F. 3d 1013 (9th Cir.

2001), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1078 (2004).

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filed state action for post-conviction relief. 

Petitioner filed a fourth action for post-conviction

relief on April 9, 2003, signed March 31, 2003, which was

dismissed because the claims were precluded. Additionally,

Petitioner filed a fifth action for post-conviction relief on

October 14, 2003, which was dismissed on April 19, 2005.

However, neither of these actions for post-conviction relief

tolled the statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas

claims because neither of them was a “properly filed” action for

state post-conviction relief as that term is defined by the

federal courts’ interpretation of the AEDPA. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412-13, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-14

(2005); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005),

petition for cert. filed (June 5, 2006, No. 05-11438). See also

Richardson v. Newland, 171 Fed. App. 156, 157 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner contends his petition is timely, arguing his

state action for post-conviction relief filed April 9, 2003,

tolled the applicable statute of limitations from March 31,

2003, when he signed this petition, until March 15, 2005. See

Docket No. 13. Petitioner also maintains he is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to Welch v.

Newland.5 Petitioner asserts the statute of limitations

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regarding his federal habeas claims was tolled “with the filing

of his timely 1991 PCR petition and remained tolled until his

PCR challenges concluded with the denial of his last PCR

petition by the state Supreme Court on 3-16-05 ...” Id.

The Court is not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments

regarding the statutory tolling of the applicable statute of

limitations. Analyzing the applicable statute of limitations

running from the date his initial direct appeal became final,

Petitioner’s federal habeas action is not timely filed because

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action prior to April

27, 1997. Additionally, analyzing the one-year statute of

limitations as running from the date Petitioner’s permissive

appeal of his convictions and sentences became final, the

statute of limitations regarding the federal habeas petition

also expired and was not sufficiently statutorily tolled prior

to February 21, 2006, when the federal habeas petition was filed

because Petitioner did not have a “properly filed” state action

for state post-conviction relief pending at any time from June

16, 2003, until June 15, 2004. Petitioner’s federal habeas

action, filed February 6, 2006, was filed more than a year after

the relevant statute of limitations expired, absent any

statutory tolling.

 Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, absent any

statutory tolling, the merits of his petition for habeas relief

may only considered if the AEDPA’s time limitation may be

“equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d

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6 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not squarely

addressed whether the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace

“lowered” the standard for equitable tolling set in Spitsyn. See

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 (9th Cir.

2005). See also Astorga v. Terhune, 130 Fed. App. 181, 183 (9th Cir.

2005); Boudette v. Schriro, 2006 WL 664364, at *3 (D. Ariz.).

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798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has determined equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a

federal habeas petition is available only if extraordinary

circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time. See Lott, 304 F.3d at 922

(concluding the petitioner was entitled to tolling for time

period the petitioner was denied access to his legal files while

being transferred); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir.

2002). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas petitioner

“must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the

but-for and proximate causes of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).6 It is Petitioner’s

burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his

case. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005).

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing there

were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made

it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition,

or that any state action was the “but for” cause for his failure

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to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace, 544 U.S. at

418-19, 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding that the petitioner was

not entitled to equitable tolling because he was misled or

confused about timing of exhausting his state remedies and

filing his federal habeas petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410

F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Each of the cases in which

equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful

conduct, either by state officials or, occasionally, by the

petitioner’s counsel.”); Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068 (concluding

that counsel’s errors in miscalculating the statute of

limitations and mis-advising the petitioner did not warrant

equitable tolling). Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App.

989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006);

Faught v. Butler, 135 Fed. App. 92, 93 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the statute of

limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the filing of

his federal habeas petition. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action

within the one-year period specified by the AEDPA and Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas action.

See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir. 2000)

(concluding that the petitioner’s delays in seeking collateral

review of his conviction did not show reasonable diligence, and

that the AEDPA’s tolling provision already accommodated the

exhaustion requirements that prisoners faced, and that

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petitioner’s pro se status during most of limitations period did

not merit equitable tolling); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978

(10th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Lindley’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

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to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 20th day of July, 2006.

 

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