Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-01402/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-01402-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELY WILKINS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C 01-1402 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR BIFURCATION OF TRIAL;

VACATING HEARING

Before the Court is defendants’ motion, filed December 29, 2005, for bifurcation of

claims at trial, pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs

have filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having considered the papers

filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems the motion suitable for

decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for February 10, 2006, and rules

as follows.

Defendants seek to bifurcate the trial of plaintiffs’ claims in such manner that

plaintiffs’ claims against the two individual officers would be tried first and, if appropriate,

plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the City of Oakland, see Monell v. New York City Dep’t of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), would be tried thereafter. “The Court, in furtherance

of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition

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Plaintiffs argue that their Seventh Amendment rights would be violated if their

claims were tried before separate juries. The Court need not address this argument,

however, as defendants do not seek to have plaintiffs’ claims heard before separate juries

but, rather, a bifurcated trial before the same jury. (See Defs.’ Reply, filed January 27,

2006, at 2:12-16.)

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Relying on Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F. 2d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 1992), plaintiffs argue

that even if an individual officer is found not to have committed a Fourth Amendment

violation, a municipality nevertheless can be held liable on an improper training and/or

supervision theory. The language in Hopkins on which plaintiffs rely is dicta, however, as

the individual officer therein was not exonerated. Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Heller as well as the Ninth Circuit cases, cited infra, expressly holding to the

contrary, Hopkins should not be read as standing for the proposition that a municipality may

be held liable in the absence of a constitutional violation by the individual defendant.

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and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim . . . or issues, always preserving

inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment . . . .” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 42(b).1

For the reasons stated in defendants’ motion and reply, the Court finds bifurcation, in

the manner proposed by defendants, is appropriate. In particular, as defendants have

shown, the evidence relevant to the claims against the individual officers does not overlap

in any meaningful way with the evidence relevant to the municipal liability claim. Contrary

to plaintiffs’ argument, evidence of a municipality’s failure to provide training to or to

sufficiently supervise an officer is not relevant with respect to the issue of whether such

officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner in his/her use of force. See, e.g.,

Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F. 3d 372, 387 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in

an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions

are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.”).

Further, as defendants point out, if the trier of fact finds the individual officers did not

deprive the decedent of his Fourth Amendment rights, such finding is dispositive of

plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799

(1986) (“[N]either Monell [ ] nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages

against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the

jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”);2

 see also Fairley v.

Luman, 281 F. 3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Exoneration of [the individual officer] of the

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charge of excessive force precludes municipal liability for the alleged unconstitutional use

of such force.”); Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F. 3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding

where trier of fact found individual officers did not deprive plaintiff of Fourth Amendment

rights, trial court “correctly entered judgment” for municipality on municipal liability claim;

distinguishing case where officer’s exoneration based on qualified immunity), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1122 (1997); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F. 3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding, where

individual officers were entitled to judgment on ground they did not use excessive force,

municipality was entitled to judgment on claim municipality failed to adequately train

officers).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, defendants’ motion for bifurcation is hereby GRANTED, and

plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers shall be tried first. If the trier of fact finds that

one or more such individual defendants committed a Fourth Amendment violation, the trial

will proceed before the same jury with respect to the municipal liability claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:01-cv-01402-MMC Document 139 Filed 02/08/06 Page 3 of 3