Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01005/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0227 FCC-Unsolicited Telephone Sales

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTON EWING,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 19-cv-1005-BAS-LL

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 7]

v.

SENIOR LIFE PLANNING, LLC,

Defendant.

Anton Ewing filed a Complaint against Senior Life Planning, LLC, for 

violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) under both 47 

U.S.C. §227(b) (using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to deliver a 

message without the consent of the owner) and § 227(c) (contacting a cellular 

telephone listed in the Do Not Call database). (“Complaint,” ECF No. 1.) Senior 

Life Planning, LLC has failed to respond.

Mr. Ewing now seeks default judgment in the amount of $64,000 for eight 

telephone calls placed in violation of the TCPA. (ECF No. 7.) He seeks $1,500 per 

telephone call per violation for a total of $24,000, and he also seeks damages under 

the California Penal Code for unauthorized recording of a cellular telephone call. 

(Id.)

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The Court, in its discretion, declines to award treble damages per telephone 

call, but will award $500 per telephone call for each violation for a total of $8,000. 

Furthermore, the Court finds Mr. Ewing has failed to allege a cause of action or facts 

supporting a cause of action for violation of California Penal Code §637.2, and, 

therefore, declines to award damages under this section.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs applications to 

the court for default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Default judgment is 

available as long as the plaintiff establishes: (1) defendant has been served with the 

summons and complaint and default was entered for its failure to appear; (2) 

defendant is neither a minor nor an incompetent person; (3) defendant is not in the 

military service or not otherwise subject to the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act of 

1940; and (4) if defendant has appeared in the action, that defendant was provided 

with notice of the application for default judgment at least seven days prior to the 

hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., v. Streeter, 438 

F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (D. Ariz. 2006). The Court must also satisfy that it has 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant and that plaintiff has standing to bring the 

lawsuit. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding when considering 

whether to enter default judgment, court may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack 

of personal jurisdiction because a judgment entered without subject matter or 

personal jurisdiction over the parties is void).

Entry of default judgment is within the trial court’s discretion. Aldabe v. 

Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this determination, the court 

considers the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) 

the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 

the material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the 

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strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on 

the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Upon entry of default, the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, except 

those relating to damages, are deemed admitted. TeleVideo Sys., Inc., v. Heidenthal, 

826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). Where the amount of damages claimed is a 

liquidated sum or capable of mathematical calculation, the court may enter a default 

judgment without a hearing. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In determining damages, a court may rely on declarations submitted by the plaintiff 

in lieu of a full evidentiary hearing. See Philip Morris USA v. Castworld Prods.,

Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Requirements

Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements for default judgment 

pursuant to Rules 55 and 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to 

Rule 55(a), the Clerk of Court properly entered default against Defendant Senior Life 

Planning, LLC. (ECF No. 5.) The Registered Agent of Senior Life Planning, LLC 

was personally served with the summons and complaint, and Senior Life Planning 

LLC failed to plead or otherwise defend this action. (ECF No. 3.) Defendant is not 

a minor, an incompetent person, nor is it subject to the Soldiers and Sailors Civil 

Relief Act of 1940. Furthermore, Defendant was also served with a copy of the 

present Motion at least seven days prior to the hearing. (ECF No. 7.) 

Thus, the Court, in its discretion, may order default judgment against 

Defendant. But, before entering default judgment, the Court reviews personal and 

subject matter jurisdiction, as well as the factors enumerated in Eitel.

B. Jurisdiction and Standing

1. Personal Jurisdiction

Plaintiff alleges specific personal jurisdiction over Senior Life Planning, LLC. 

(Complaint ¶ 30.) The Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test to determine whether 

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the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to subject it to specific 

jurisdiction. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). Under the threepart inquiry, specific jurisdiction exists only if: (1) the out-of-state defendant 

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the forum’s laws; (2) the cause of 

action arose out of the defendant’s forum-related activities and (3) the exercise of 

jurisdiction is reasonable. Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of this 

specific jurisdiction test. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 

802 (9th Cir. 2004). “If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two 

prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the 

exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id.

Plaintiff has successfully shown that Senior Life Planning LLC purposely 

availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum when it placed 

telephone calls to Plaintiff whose telephone and residence were in the Southern 

District of California. Furthermore, since the cause of actions under the TCPA arose 

out of these forum-related activities, Plaintiff has sufficiently satisfied the first two 

prongs of the specific jurisdiction test. Because Senior Life Planning LLC has failed 

to respond to the Complaint, it has not met its burden to show that exercise of 

jurisdiction in this forum would not be reasonable. 

2. Standing

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he has standing to bring the 

claims at issue. To demonstrate standing, plaintiff must show that he has suffered an 

injury in fact, fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and that 

this injury in fact is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo v. 

Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560–61 (1992)). To establish injury in fact, plaintiff must show that he “suffered 

‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and 

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‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. A plaintiff does not 

automatically satisfy the injury in fact requirement whenever a statute grants a 

statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Id. 

at 1549. Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a 

statutory violation. Id.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he was called on his cellular telephone at 

least five times by Defendant. (Complaint ¶ 41.) Plaintiff says he “expressly 

informed Defendant to cease and desist from all future telemarketing on the first 

call.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that his “personal privacy and peace . . . was invaded 

by Defendant’s persistent phone calls using an ATDS and a pre-recorded message.” 

(Id.) Finally, Plaintiff claims he has registered his telephone on the Do Not Call list 

specifically because he does not wish to receive these telephone calls. (Id. ¶ 34.) 

This is sufficient injury in fact, fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 

defendant, to satisfy standing under Spokeo. See Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., 

LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls 

or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their 

recipients.”). Furthermore, this injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision. Therefore, Plaintiff has standing to bring the claims.

C. Eitel Factors

1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first Eitel factor considers whether a plaintiff will suffer prejudice if a 

default judgment is not entered. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Security Cans, 238 F. Supp. 

2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Plaintiff attempted to prevent telemarketing calls 

by putting his name on the Do Not Call list and by instructing Defendant not to call 

his number again, to no avail. If default judgment is not entered, Mr. Ewing will be 

without recourse to recover for the injury suffered by this violation.

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2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint

Two of the Eitel factors are (1) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim, 

and (2) the sufficiency of the complaint. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. The Ninth 

Circuit has suggested that these two factors require that a plaintiff “state a claim on 

which the [plaintiff] may recover.” Kleopping v. Fireman’s Fund, No. C 94-2684 

TEH, 1996 WL 75314, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1996) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 

572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

In Counts One and Two, Plaintiff alleges violations of the TCPA, section 

227(b)(1)(A) (first count—call to a cellular line)) and (b)(1)(B) (second count—call 

to a residential telephone) even though he is alleging all telephone calls were made 

to his personal telephone number (619)719-9640. He fails to allege that this is a 

residential line, therefore, the Court analyzes the cause of action under (b)(1)(A). 

In the Ninth Circuit, to prove a violation of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A), a plaintiff 

must show that “(1) the defendant called a cellular telephone number; (2) using an 

automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient’s prior express 

consent.” Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 

2012). The plaintiff must be the “called party,” which includes “a telephone service 

subscriber.” Drew v. Lexington Consumer Advocacy, No. 16-cv-00200-LB, 2016 

WL 9185292, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016).

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of the TCPA. He claims that 

Catherine Gillespie, an employee of Senior Life Planning, LLC, called his cellular 

telephone multiple times using an automatic telephone dialing system. (Complaint 

¶¶ 1, 4, 27, 31, 41.) He supports his claims that an ATDS was used by alleging 

additional claims that: (1) Gillespie admitted using an ATDS on her computer to dial 

his telephone (id. ¶ 4); (2) he heard a pause or click before the call, commonly 

associated with an ATDS (id. ¶ 38); (3) there was a long delay when the calls were 

connected (id. ¶ 38); (4) an audio recording via robotic voice message initiated the 

call (id. ¶ 46); (5) the calls were impersonal advertisements, not addressing Plaintiff 

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personally (id. ¶ 46); (6) Plaintiff has never heard of Senior Life Planning, has never 

visited any location operated by it, has never provided his cellular telephone number 

to it, has never had a prior business relationship with it and has never purchased a 

product or service from it (id. ¶ 46); and (7) he has no reason to be contacted by 

Defendant (id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff alleges he did not give permission or consent for these 

calls. (Id. ¶ 28.) The calls were placed from a number owned, used and controlled 

by Senior Life Planning, LLC. (Id. ¶ 31.) Thus, Plaintiff has stated a claim under 

which he may recover. 

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that he received telemarketing calls from 

Senior Life Planning, LLC, despite the fact that he had registered his telephone 

number with the Do Not Call database, in violation of 47 U.S.C. §227(c). Section 

227(c) directs the Federal Communications Commission to formulate regulations to 

protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights and to establish a national database of 

telephone subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations (the “Do Not 

Call Registry”). See Kazemi v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. C 09-5142 MHP, 2010 

WL 963225, at *2 (N.D. Cal, Mar. 16, 2010); 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(3). The regulations 

promulgated under §227(c) prohibit telephone solicitation to any telephone number 

on the Do Not Call Registry. Id.; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c). Section 227(c)(5) 

establishes a private right of action for a person who has received a telephone call in 

violation of these regulations. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant called him multiple times on his Do Not Call 

registered cell phone. (Complaint ¶¶ 19, 34.) “Defendant’s employee asked if 

Plaintiff was interested in merchant cash advances or business loans.” (Id. ¶ 31.) 

Thus, Plaintiff alleges a cause of action under § 227(c).

Finally, although Plaintiff states no cause of action for a violation of 

California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), or California Penal Code §637.2, the 

Prayer for Relief alleges damages under this section. To prove a violation of CIPA, 

a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that [defendant] recorded a telephone call with [plaintiff], 

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(2) that one of the parties to the recorded call was using a cell phone, and (3) that 

plaintiff did not consent to the recording.” NEI Contracting and Eng’g, Inc. v. 

Hanson Aggregates Pac. Sw. Inc., No. 12-cv-1685 BAS (JLB), 2016 WL 4886933, 

at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2016).

Although Plaintiff alleges he received multiple telephone calls on his cellular 

telephone, his allegations regarding the recording of any of those telephone calls is 

sparse. The only reference to recording is in paragraph 4 when he alleges, “The 

initial lady on the phone said her name was Lisa . . . Lisa then transferred the call to 

her funding manager, Gillespie [the Senior Life Planning employee who allegedly

placed the calls using an ATDS]. Lisa admitted that she was recording the call at the 

end and not the beginning.” (Complaint ¶ 4.) To the extent Plaintiff is alleging 

violations of CIPA, the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient. There is no 

allegation that any telephone call with a Senior Life Planning employee was 

recorded. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging Lisa recorded a telephone call, it is not 

clear what telephone call was recorded or what part of a call was recorded, nor is 

Lisa’s role with Senior Life Planning clear. The Complaint suggests Lisa’s only role 

was to transfer the call to the Senior Life Planning executive. Hence, to the extent 

Plaintiff is requesting default judgment on this cause of action, the substantive merits 

and sufficiency of the Complaint weigh against granting default judgment. 

3. Sum of Money at Stake

The fourth Eitel factor balances “the amount of money at stake in relation to 

the seriousness of the [d]efendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175; see 

also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Default judgment is disfavored where the sum of 

money at stake is too large or unreasonable in relation to defendant’s conduct. 

Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. C 06-03594 JSW, 2007 WL 

1545173, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).

Plaintiff is requesting $64,000 in damages for eight telephone calls. However, 

$40,000 of that request is made for a violation of CIPA, which, as discussed above, 

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the Court finds is insufficiently alleged. Plaintiff is requesting $24,000 for the TCPA 

violations. In light of the fact that this is no more than is allowed under the statute, 

the Court finds this factor supports granting default judgment.

4. Possibility of Dispute

The next Eitel factor considers the possibility that material facts are disputed. 

PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1471–72. Generally, there is little possibility of dispute 

concerning material facts because (1) based on the entry of default, the Court accepts 

allegations in the complaint as true and (2) Defendant has not made any effort to 

challenge the complaint or otherwise appear in this case. See Pepsico, Inc., 238 F.

Supp. 2d at 1177. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.

5. Possibility of Excusable Neglect

The sixth Eitel factor considers whether a defendant’s default may have 

resulted from excusable neglect. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Eitel, 

782 F.2d at 1471–72. Defendant was properly served with the Complaint. (ECF No. 

3.) Defendant was also served with both the Request for Entry of Default and the 

Motion for Default Judgment. (ECF Nos. 4, 7.) Defendant has not responded. Thus, 

the possibility that Defendant’s default resulted from excusable neglect is remote. 

See Shanghai Automation Instrument Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005 

(N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding no excusable neglect because defendants “were properly 

served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in 

support of the instant motion”). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the entry 

of default judgment.

6. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits

“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” 

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. The mere enactment of Rule 55(b) indicates, however, that 

“this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 

1177 (quoting Kloepping, 1996 WL 75314, at *3 (“Defendant’s failure to answer 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.”). 

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Since Defendant failed to plead or otherwise defend, the seventh Eitel factor does not 

preclude the entry of default judgment.

7. Conclusion

Aside from the policy of deciding cases on the merits, all of the Eitel factors 

weigh in favor of the entry of default judgment on the TCPA claims. Consequently, 

the Court finds it appropriate to grant Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against 

Defendant on Counts One and Three. Because Plaintiff fails to adequately allege 

sufficient facts in the Complaint to support the second cause of action and any claim 

under CIPA, the Court denies default judgment on these claims.

D. Damages

Under Rule 8(a)(3), a plaintiff’s demand for relief must be specific, and 

plaintiff “must ‘prove up’ the amount of damages.” Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Banh, 

No. CV 03-4043 GAF (PJWx), 2005 WL 5758392, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2005); 

Elektra Entmn’t Grp., Inc. v. Bryant, No. CV 03-6381 GAF (JTLX), 2004 WL 

783123, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2004) (“Plaintiffs must ‘prove up’ the amount of 

damages that they are claiming.”). Rule 54(c) limits the relief that can be sought in 

a motion for entry of default judgment to that identified in the complaint. Fed. R. 

Civ. Proc. 54(c) (“A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in 

amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.”); see also PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 

1174 (default judgment “shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that 

prayed for in the [complaint]’”). Also, a defaulting defendant is not deemed to have 

admitted facts concerning damages alleged in the complaint. See id. at 1177 (“Upon 

entry of default, all well pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except those 

relating to damages” (citing TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917–18)).

In his Motion for Default Judgment, Mr. Ewing requests $64,000 in damages 

plus an injunction ordering Senior Life Planning, LLC to stop calling his cellular 

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telephone.1 Mr. Ewing attaches a Declaration to his Motion detailing eight telephone 

calls he received on his personal cellular telephone number (619-719-9640), a 

number he has registered with the Do Not Call Database since 2012. (ECF No. 7, 

Declaration of Anton Ewing, at ¶¶ 4, 5, 12.) Mr. Ewing requests $1,500 in statutory 

damages for each telephone call (or $12,000) for the cause of action under §227(b), 

that is, making a telephone call with the use of an ATDS. He also requests an 

additional $1,500 in statutory damages for each telephone call (an additional 

$12,000) for the cause of action under §227(c), that it, making a telephone call to a 

telephone number registered with the Do Not Call list. Finally, although there is no 

cause of action in the Complaint for a violation of California’s Invasion of Privacy 

Act (“CIPA”), Ewing requests an additional $5,000 per telephone call (or $40,000) 

for the unlawful recording of his eight telephone calls.

As discussed above, the Court declines to grant the Motion for Default 

Judgment to the extent Mr. Ewing is requesting damages under CIPA. Hence the 

Court analyzes only the $24,000 requested under the TCPA.

Both §227(b) and §227(c) provide that, in lieu of actual damages, a plaintiff 

may request statutory damages of up to $500 per violation. Courts considering the 

issue have allowed separate recoveries for an ATDS violation and one for a violation 

of the Do Not Call list even if the violations occurred in the same telephone call. See,

e.g., Heidarpour v. Empire Capital Funding Grp., Inc., No. 18-cv-250-YGR (KAW), 

2018 WL 6809186, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2018); Lexington Consumer Advocacy,

2016 WL 9185292, at *10; Roylance v. ALG Real Estate Servs., Inc., No. 5: 14-cv2445-PSG, 2015 WL 1522244, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015) (“‘[T]he fact that 

the statute includes separate provisions for statutory damages in subsections (b) and 

 1 To the extent Mr. Ewing requests that default judgment be entered on liability only and that Mr. 

Ewing be allowed to conduct discovery on the issue of damages, the Court declines that request. 

Mr. Ewing fails to show what such discovery would uncover. And, given the fact that Defendant 

has not responded in any way to the Complaint, Mr. Ewing fails to explain how he expects to get 

Defendant to respond to discovery requests.

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(c) suggests that a plaintiff could recover under both.’” (quoting Carvat v. NMP, 

LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 448 (6th Cir. 2011))). This Court agrees that separate recoveries 

should be allowed for each violation.

If the Court finds that Defendant willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA, 

the Court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to $1,500 per 

telephone call. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(B)(3)(c); Sapan v. Authority Tax Servs., LLC, No. 

13-cv-2782 JAH (JLB), 2014 WL 12493282, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2014). In J2 

Global Communications, Inc. v. Blue Jay, Inc., No. c 08-4254 PJH, 2009 WL 

4572726, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2009), the district court awarded treble damages 

because other lawsuits had been brought against the defendant for violations of the 

TCPA, and defendant had had a prior judgment issued against it for these violations, 

yet persisted in violating the statute. Id. The court may also award treble damages 

if it finds that statutory damages will be considered trivial and thus will not deter the 

defendant from future misconduct. Lexington Consumer Advocacy, 2016 WL 

9185292, at *11. 

The Court declines to award treble damages in this case. Mr. Ewing details 

eight calls made all in the month of May 2019. Although he claims in his Motion for 

Default Judgment that Defendant has “2 civil lawsuits pending” and that “Senior Life 

Planning has continued to get sued over and over, year after year[,]” (ECF No. 7, at 

18), the only specifics about a lawsuit against Senior Life Planning is one filed in 

2019. (Id. at 7.) It is not clear that the lawsuit listed was filed before the telephone 

calls were made to Mr. Ewing in this case. Nor does Mr. Ewing provide any support 

for his allegation that Defendant has been repeatedly sued for a violation of the 

TCPA. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, finds that treble damages are not 

warranted in this case.

Hence the Court awards statutory damages of $500 per telephone call, or 

$4,000 for the telephone calls made with an ATDS in violation of §227(b), and the 

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Court awards additional statutory damages of $500 per telephone call, or $4,000 for 

the telephone calls made to a Do No Call registered phone, in violation of §227(c).

Plaintiff also requests injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is also available under 

the TCPA. Lexington Consumer Advocacy, 2016 WL 9185292, at *11. The Court 

finds it appropriate to issue an injunction enjoining Senior Life Planning from 

contacting telephone number (619)-719-9640 in any fashion.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is 

GRANTED IN PART. (ECF No. 7.) The Court ORDERS the Clerk of the Court 

to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on Counts One and 

Three in the amount of $8,000. Furthermore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request 

for injunctive relief: Defendant is enjoined from contacting cellular telephone 

number (619)-719-9640. 

Finally, the Court finds Plaintiff is unable to sufficiently plead a violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (TCPA call to a residential telephone)—his second cause 

of action. Plaintiff admits multiple times that the phone number that Defendant 

called is his cell phone. (See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 4, 19.) Therefore, the Court sua 

sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s second cause of action.

This concludes the litigation in this matter. The Clerk is instructed to close 

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 19, 2019

Case 3:19-cv-01005-BAS-LL Document 8 Filed 09/18/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 13