Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-02198/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-02198-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK TICER,

Plaintiff,

v.

GREGORY YOUNG, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02198-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 11

Plaintiff Mark Ticer brings this suit against Defendants Gregory Young and the Board of 

Trustees of the California State University ("CSU"), alleging violations of Title II of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as 

well as intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 

negligence. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Pending before the Court is Defendant CSU's motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. (Def's. Mot., Dkt. No. 11.) Upon consideration of the moving and 

responding papers, as well as the arguments presented at the August 18, 2016 motion hearing, and 

for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant 

CSU's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

In 2000, Plaintiff was accepted as a student in San Jose State University's ("SJSU") 

Biomedical, Chemical, and Materials Engineering ("BCME") Department. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff 

suffers from chronic schizophrenia, which results in a fear of people that can cause him serious 

emotional problems. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9.) Plaintiff registered with the SJSU Disability Resource 

Center ("DRC") in March 2001. (Compl. ¶ 8.) The DRC determined that Plaintiff was eligible to 

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participate in the Chemical Engineering Program as a disabled student, and that Plaintiff was 

eligible for extended time on exams as an accommodation. (Id.) The DRC also issued Plaintiff a 

DRC identification card. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he experiences medication problems and other disability-related issues 

that can lead to delays with his homework assignments. (Compl. ¶ 9.) While he was usually able 

to complete the assignment by the due date, he occasionally had difficulty delivering them on time 

due to his fear of people. (Id.) Almost every professor accepted Plaintiff's homework assignments 

after Plaintiff showed them his DRC card and explained the delay. (Id.) However, in Fall 2003, 

Plaintiff took ChE190 with Professor Gregory Young, who was the BCME Department Associate 

Chair (and later the full Department Chair) and Plaintiff's academic advisor. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 13.) 

Professor Young required that homework assignments be submitted during the first five minutes 

of class. (Compl. ¶ 13.) When Plaintiff met with Professor Young to explain that his homework 

was late due to his disability, Professor Young still refused to accept the assignment. (Id.) Later 

that semester, Plaintiff proposed e-mail delivery of his homework several times, but Professor 

Young would become angry and "scold[] Plaintiff while complaining about the inconvenience that 

the email solution would cause him." (Compl. ¶ 14.) Professor Young's syllabus stated that an 

exam could be excused if he was presented with a written request. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff 

provided a written request, explaining that he had a fear of people that caused emotional 

difficulties on the day of the exam. (Id.) Professor Young became angry and said he did not have 

time to constantly allow Plaintiff to make up his exams, said Plaintiff could not pass the class with 

these problems, and told Plaintiff that he should change his major. (Id.)

On December 16, 2003, Plaintiff met with the BCME Department Chair, Dr. Allen, to ask 

if she would support an incomplete ("I") grade in Professor Young's class, which would extend the 

time for Plaintiff to complete the class. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff explained his disability, but Dr. 

Allen allegedly responded by telling Plaintiff that the engineering program would be too difficult 

for Plaintiff with these problems, and suggesting he change his major. (Id.) That day, Dr. Allen 

sent Plaintiff a letter stating that his work in Professor Young's class did not warrant an incomplete 

grade, but an unauthorized withdrawal ("U"). (Compl. ¶ 17, Exh. H.) She identified four classes 

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that Plaintiff had outstanding "I" or "W" grades in, and suggested that Plaintiff seek assistance 

from the DRC's academic advisor and the SJCSU Counseling Center. (Id.) She did not advise 

Plaintiff to seek counseling within the BCME Engineering Department, which Plaintiff contends is 

evidence that she was pressuring him to seek a new major. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff later 

completed the four classes he had outstanding "I" or "W" grades in, receiving grades of A, B, B, 

and A-. (Compl., Exh. Q.)

Because Professor Young was the only professor who taught ChE190, Plaintiff re-enrolled 

in Professor Young's class in Fall 2004. (Compl. ¶ 21.) When Plaintiff asked Professor Young to 

accept his homework late, Professor Young became angry and refused. (Id.) Professor Young 

also refused to accept the homework by e-mail, and told Plaintiff that he could not work as an 

engineer if he could not turn his homework in on time. (Id.) Plaintiff became frightened by this 

conduct. Because he believed he could not ask Dr. Allen for help without her pressuring him into 

picking a new major or dismissing him from the program, he withdrew from the ChE190 class. 

(Id.)

In 2006, Professor Young told Plaintiff that his previously completed engineering classes 

were going to expire and that he would need to retake the classes. (Compl. ¶ 22.) Professor 

Young also told Plaintiff that he would not be able to graduate and that it would be a waste of both 

Plaintiff's and Professor Young's time to continue his engineering studies. (Id.) Plaintiff learned 

in 2015 that he could have asked for an alternative to retaking the classes, but Professor Young did 

not offer him any alternatives. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Professor Young again pressured Plaintiff into 

changing his major. (Compl. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff refused, and repeated his expiring classes. (Id.)

Plaintiff again registered for Professor Young's ChE190 class in Fall 2006. (Compl. ¶ 24.) 

Professor Young refused to accept Plaintiff's late homework assignments and did not allow 

Plaintiff to make up exams, preventing Plaintiff from passing the class. (Id.) Plaintiff contends 

that when he did deliver his homework assignments in time, he received high scores. (Id., Exh. I.)

In January 2007, Professor Young and Dr. Allen were in a BCME faculty meeting to 

discuss Plaintiff's grade point average dropping below 2.0 in the Junior Core Chemical 

Engineering Classes. (Compl. ¶ 25, Exh. J.) The drop was due to Plaintiff receiving a D in 

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Professor Young's ChE190 class. Despite this, the faculty advised Plaintiff to enroll in ChE160A, 

a higher-level course that was only taught by Professor Young. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 26.)

Plaintiff enrolled in Professor Young's ChE160A class in Spring 2007. (Compl. ¶ 27.) 

Plaintiff contends that enrolling in the class caused him fear, anxiety, and apprehension, as he 

worried that Professor Young would prevent him from passing the class which in turn could 

disqualify him from the program. (Id.) During the semester, Plaintiff had a medication problem 

that prevented him from delivering a homework assignment in time. (Compl. ¶ 28.) When he 

asked Professor Young to accept the late homework, Professor Young got angry, denied the 

request, and told Plaintiff that he would fail the class if he had another late assignment. (Id.) 

Professor Young also told Plaintiff he would have to repeat the ChE190 class if he did not change 

his major. (Id.) Plaintiff dropped out of the class. (Id.)

Plaintiff re-enrolled in Professor Young's ChE190 class in Fall 2007, per Professor 

Young's requirement. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Professor Young again refused to allow Plaintiff to turn in 

his homework late. Professor Young later told Plaintiff that he had to complete the ChE190 class 

because he would not sign a class withdrawal request. Plaintiff became frightened and stopped 

attending the class. (Id.)

From 2008 to 2009, Professor Young left SJSU on sabbatical. Plaintiff was able to 

complete additional courses during his sabbatical. (Compl. ¶ 31.) When Professor Young 

returned, Plaintiff re-enrolled in Professor Young's ChE190 class in Fall 2009. (Compl. ¶ 32.) 

Plaintiff stopped attending due to emotional problems caused by the presence of Professor Young, 

and took a break from the semester. (Id.) In Spring 2010, Plaintiff took two courses that he had 

completed at community college but that Professor Young told him to repeat. (Compl. ¶ 33.) 

However, due to "his years of negative experience" with Professor Young, his disability worsened 

and he was unable to complete the classes. (Id.) Plaintiff did not return to SJSU in Fall 2010, and 

was authorized a medical leave of absence in January 2011 by Dr. Gleixner, the Associate Chair of 

the BCME Department. (Compl. ¶¶ 34, 35.)

In September 2011, Plaintiff tried to extend his medical leave, which required Professor 

Young's signature. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Professor Young refused to sign "because he was not a 

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psychiatrist," told Plaintiff that he should have been dismissed from SJSU long ago, and that 

Plaintiff had been wasting everyone's time. (Id.) Professor Young also criticized Dr. Gleixner for 

approving the first medical leave of absence. (Id.) Plaintiff became frightened and reported 

Professor Young's behavior to Dr. Allen. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Dr. Allen expressed no concerns about 

Professor Young's behavior, but approved the medical leave extension. (Id.)

Plaintiff did not return to SJSU after the medical leave expired, due to his prior encounter 

with Professor Young. (Compl. ¶ 38.) When Plaintiff attempted to get a medical leave extension 

during the Spring 2013 semester, the SJSU Office of the Registrar denied the request. (Id.)

During the medical leaves, Plaintiff became concerned that he would lose his tuition 

payments from the Department of Rehabilitation ("DOR"). (Compl. ¶ 39.) To explain his 

problem with Professor Young, Plaintiff wanted to chart his homework scores and present his 

findings to the DOR. (Id.) To show the scores were authentic, Plaintiff met with Professor Young 

in December 2013, requesting official copies of his homework records. (Compl. ¶¶ 39, 40.) 

Professor Young said he would contact Plaintiff if he found the records. (Compl. ¶ 40.) However, 

when Plaintiff contacted DOR to schedule an appointment, he learned that DOR had closed his 

file in December 2011. (Compl. ¶ 41.) He contacted Professor Young to let him know the 

information was no longer needed, but Professor Young e-mailed him the homework data from 

Fall 2006 regardless. (Id.)

In 2014, Plaintiff decided he wanted to return to SJSU, which would require reopening his 

file with DOR. (Compl. ¶ 42.) He again wanted to chart his homework scores, as he was 

concerned that DOR would deny him financial support due to his difficulty passing Professor 

Young's classes. (Id.) On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff met with Professor Young to ask for the 

homework records. (Compl. ¶ 43.) Upon seeing Plaintiff, Professor Young became angry. (Id.) 

When Plaintiff explained he wanted his remaining homework records for his DOR reinstatement, 

Professor Young gave him his homework record from the ChE160A class. (Compl. ¶¶ 43, 44.) 

The record also included Plaintiff's record in his exams and lab work, even though Plaintiff had 

not requested this information. (Compl. ¶ 44, Exh. N.) 

On April 23, 2014, Plaintiff returned to Professor Young's office. (Compl. ¶ 45.) 

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Professor Young was angry to see him. (Id.) Plaintiff again asked for the homework records, 

requesting that they be presented in the same format as the record sent by Professor Young in 

December 2013. (Id.) Professor Young agreed, but told Plaintiff the records would not help his 

reinstatement with DOR. (Id.) Plaintiff also explained he would need academic counseling to 

return to the Chemical Engineering Program, and Professor Young replied that he was not eligible 

to return. (Compl. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff asked Professor Young to authenticate the December 2013 

record, but Professor Young refused. (Id.) As Professor Young was preparing the new records, 

Plaintiff explained that only homework data was needed. Professor Young replied that he was 

preparing what the DOR needed to see, and began scolding Plaintiff, telling Plaintiff that this was 

a waste of his and the DOR's time. (Id.) Professor Young told Plaintiff not to return to his office, 

then ordered Plaintiff to follow him outside of his office and into an area where there were other 

students and staff members. Professor Young continued to insult and accuse Plaintiff in front of 

others, telling him that he did not know what he was doing, that he was causing trouble, and that 

he was wasting Professor Young's time. (Id.) Professor Young handed him the homework record 

(which again contained information about the incomplete exams and labs) and continued to scold 

him as Plaintiff left. (Id., Exh. O.) During this incident, Plaintiff's distress was so severe that he 

could not breathe. (Compl. ¶ 47.) He has been suffering from severe Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder since. (Compl. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff also believes that by providing him with a homework 

record with information about the incomplete exams and labs, Professor Young was trying to 

"encourage a negative response by the DOR to Plaintiff's reinstatement efforts." (Compl. ¶ 49.)

In August 2014, Plaintiff reported the April 23, 2014 incident to SJSU's Ombudsperson 

Office. (Compl. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff spoke to the Human Resources Department, but no one ever 

contacted him to investigate or report any action taken. (Id.) On October 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed 

a claim with CSU's Office of the Chancellor, Risk Management and Public Safety Department. 

(Compl. ¶ 51.) CSU stated it would investigate the April 23, 2014 incident, but that the other 

events were untimely. (Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exh. 2 (Dkt. No. 11).)

B. Procedural background

Plaintiff filed this action on April 22, 2016. On May 16, 2016, the summons as to 

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Defendant Young were returned unexecuted, and Defendant Young has not been served or 

appeared in this case. (Dkt. No. 10.) On June 3, 2016, CSU filed the instant motion to dismiss, 

along with a Request for Judicial Notice. (Def.'s Mot., Dkt. No. 11.) On June 30, 2016, Plaintiff 

filed a "Motion to Dismiss All State Claims Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)," 

requesting that the Court dismiss all of the state claims. (Dkt. No. 19.) On July 6, 2016, the Court 

issued an order construing Plaintiff's filing as a voluntary dismissal of the state law claims for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 

negligence, and dismissed the state claims. (Dkt. No. 20.) On August 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed his 

opposition to CSU's motion to dismiss. (Pl.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No. 26.) Plaintiff did not file an 

opposition to the Request for Judicial Notice. On August 23, 2016, CSU filed its reply. (Def.'s 

Reply, Dkt. No. 27.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Request for judicial notice

A district court may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are 

"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 

333 (9th Cir. 1993). A court may, therefore, take judicial notice of matters of public record. 

United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

B. Motion to dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based 

on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

In considering such a motion, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted), and may dismiss the case or a claim "only where there is no cognizable legal theory" or 

there is an absence of "sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief." 

Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate 

"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" and "conclusory statements" are 

inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 1996) ("[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat 

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully . . . When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal citations omitted).

Generally, if the court grants a motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend is made "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by 

the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for judicial notice

Defendants ask that this Court take judicial notice of: (1) the "CSU Claim Form" submitted 

by Plaintiff on October 23, 2014, and (2) CSU's November 14, 2014 response, stating that CSU 

would investigate the April 23, 2014 event. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants' 

request for judicial notice, and so Plaintiff is not deemed to dispute the authenticity of any of the 

exhibits. The Court may take judicial notice of the filing date and content of the CSU Claim 

Form, and of the filing date and content of CSU's response as these documents are a matter of 

public record which set forth facts "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 

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sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." Clarke v. Upton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 

1037, 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (taking judicial notice of tort claims and their rejection by the 

county).

B. Statute of limitations

CSU argues that Plaintiffs' claims concerning events other than the April 23, 2014 

interaction between Plaintiff and Professor Young are time-barred.1

Title II of the ADA states: "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 

U.S.C. § 12132. Because "Title II does not contain an express statute of limitations," the Court 

"borrow[s] the statute of limitations applicable to the most analogous state-law claim, so long as it 

is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Sharkey v. O'Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 770 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that "California Government 

Code § 11135 provides the most analogous state-law claim to a Title II claim" as § 11135 

"provides an almost identical state-law counterpart to Title II," and that a three-year statute of 

limitation applies. Id. at 771, 773.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a 

disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from 

the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 

or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 794. Like Title II, the 

Rehabilitation Act does not contain its own statute of limitations, so the Court must look at the 

most analogous state-law claim. Kramer v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 81 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973 

(N.D. Cal. 1999). Post-Sharkey, the district court in Hartline v. National University held that a 

claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act "is most closely analogous to a personal injury 

claim or to an Unruh Act claim," and thus applied a two-year statute of limitations. No. 2:14-cv635 KJM AC (PS), 2015 WL 4716491, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015). The Ninth Circuit, 

 

1 At the hearing, CSU clarified that it was not arguing that the California Torts Claim Act applied 

to the federal claims.

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however, has explained that "Title II of the ADA was expressly modeled after § 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act," and that the same analysis applies to both. Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 

1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). Given that Title II and § 504 create the same rights and obligations, 

see Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1055 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004), it would seem that 

§ 11135 would also provide the most analogous state-law claim to a § 504 claim, thus creating a 

three-year statute of limitations. See Sharkey, 778 F.3d at 771.

Even assuming a three-year statute of limitations for both the Title II and § 504 claims, the 

vast majority of Plaintiff's allegations take place more than three years prior to the filing of his 

complaint on April 22, 2016. The only wrongful event that occurred after April 22, 2013 is 

Plaintiff's April 23, 2014 meeting with Professor Young.2 Otherwise, the last interaction Plaintiff 

had with Professor Young was in September 2011, when Professor Young denied a medical leave 

extension that was then approved by Dr. Allen. (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37.) SJSU's Office of the 

Registrar denied another medical leave extension during the Spring 2013 semester, but Plaintiff 

does not specify an exact date for this denial nor does he appear to base his Title II or 

Rehabilitation Act claims on this denial. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 63, 75.) Thus, the majority of Plaintiff's 

allegations are time-barred.

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that allegations that fall outside the statutory period are 

not time-barred because: (1) the continuing violations doctrine applies, and (2) Plaintiff is bringing 

a "hostile learning environment" claim. (Pl's. Opp'n at 5.)

1. Continuing violations doctrine

"The continuing violations doctrine extends the accrual of a claim if a continuing system of 

discrimination violates an individual's rights up to a point in time that falls within the applicable 

limitations period." Douglas v. Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

Ninth Circuit originally recognized two methods to establish a continuing violation. "First, the 

plaintiff may show a serial violation by pointing to a series of related acts against one individual, 

 

2

Plaintiff also met with Professor Young on December 2, 2013, but states that Professor Young 

was "approachable" on that day and does not allege any wrongful action during that meeting. 

(Compl. ¶ 40.)

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of which at least one falls within the relevant period of limitations." Id. "Second, a plaintiff may 

show a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations 

period-a systemic violation." Id. (internal quotation omitted). The Supreme Court subsequently 

rejected the "serial violation" method, explaining that "discrete discriminatory acts are not 

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each 

discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act." Nat'l R.R. 

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Thus, to succeed on a continuing 

violations theory, Plaintiff must challenge a "systematic policy or practice of discrimination."

Plaintiff does not allege a systemic policy or practice. The Ninth Circuit has explained that 

a pattern-or-practice claim "cannot be based on 'sporadic discriminatory acts' but rather must be 

based on discriminatory conduct that is widespread throughout a company or that is a routine and 

regular part of the workplace." Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1247 (2003). In 

Cherosky, the four plaintiffs requested permission to use a respirator at work, which the employer 

denied pursuant to its policy of prohibiting respirators except where air contaminants exceeded 

regulatory limits. Id. at 1245. The Ninth Circuit found that this did not constitute a pattern or 

practice because the plaintiffs did not attempt to show that the employer "widely discriminates 

against employees with disabilities or that it even routinely discriminates with respect to respirator 

requests." Id. at 1247. Moreover, the plaintiffs did not assert that the general rule prohibiting 

respirators was discriminatory. Instead, the plaintiffs were challenging the "individualized 

decision" to deny the accommodation request, and "[t]hese individualized decisions are best 

characterized as discrete acts, rather than as a pattern or practice of discrimination." Id.; contrast 

with Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., Case No. C06-5125 SBA, 

2009 WL 2982840, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) (applying continuing violations doctrine 

where the plaintiffs expressly challenged the defendants' reliance on inadequate guidelines and 

procedures that failed to ensure necessary access).

Here, although Plaintiff alleges that Professor Young "engaged Plaintiff with a pattern of 

discrimination involving deliberate indifference," Plaintiff is not challenging a systemic policy or 

widespread practice of discrimination that is a regular part of the school environment. Instead, 

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Plaintiff is ultimately challenging Professor Young's individual decision not to accept late 

homework. As to the other allegations that Professor Young required Plaintiff to retake certain 

courses or that BCME advised Plaintiff to take a class that they did not expect him to pass, there is 

no allegation that these decisions were made according to system-wide policy or practice. In fact, 

with respect to SJSU itself, Plaintiff alleges that "virtually all SJSU professors" accepted his late 

homework assignments or allowed Plaintiff to make up his exams, further emphasizing that 

Professor Young's refusal to accept late homework from Plaintiff was not according to any 

systemic policy or practice by SJSU. (See Compl. ¶ 10.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has not 

adequately alleged a continuing violation against the university.

2. Hostile learning environment

In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that there was a "hostile learning environment." (Pl's. 

Opp'n at 5-6.) In Morgan, the Supreme Court explained that "[a] hostile work environment claim 

is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one 'unlawful employment 

practice.'" 536 U.S. at 117. If an act contributing to the hostile work environment claim falls 

within the statutory period, the entire duration of the hostile environment claim can be considered 

because all of the acts are part of the single claim. Id. at 117-18.

As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the Ninth Circuit recognizes a hostile 

learning environment claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. In Garedakis v. Brentwood 

Union School District, the district court declined to recognize a hostile learning environment 

claim, noting that "this court was unable to locate any decision by the Ninth Circuit or by any 

district court within the Ninth Circuit recognizing a claim of hostile educational environment 

under the ADA or § 504, against a school board." -- F. Supp. 3d --, Case No. 14-cv-4799-PJH, 

2016 WL 1718270, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2016). Outside of this circuit, the district court in 

Guckenberger v. Boston University found that a hostile learning environment claim did exist under 

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. 957 F. Supp. 306, 313 (D. Mass. 1997). Based on the statutory 

language, it explained that "[b]oth statutes apply to discrimination by educational facilities in 

receipt of federal funds, and neither limits its prohibitions to discrimination in the employment 

context." Id. Further, the statutory language "is substantially similar to Title IX of the Education 

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Amendments of 1972, which courts have held is the statutory basis for hostile learning 

environment claims based on sexual harassment." Id. The district court thus concluded that "there 

is a cause of action under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for a hostile learning environment 

when harassment based on a student's disability has the purpose of unreasonably interfering with 

the individual's performance or of creating an intimidating , hostile, or offensive environment." 

Id. at 314 (internal quotation and modifications omitted). This conclusion was "consistent with 

the express congressional purpose in enacting the ADA to 'address the major areas of 

discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)).

Although the Court finds the Guckenberger court's holding persuasive, it is not clear 

Plaintiff's hostile learning environment claim would be timely based on the April 23, 2014 

meeting between Plaintiff and Professor Young. As CSU pointed out at the hearing, Plaintiff was 

no longer a student, but was seeking to return to the program. Because Plaintiff was no longer a 

student, the April 23, 2014 meeting was not a part of the hostile learning environment that

Plaintiff alleges took place when he was still a student. At best, it provides additional evidence of 

Professor Young's hostility towards him, but the single incident itself is not sufficient to establish 

a hostile learning environment claim. Plaintiff does not allege that an incident within the statute of 

limitations occurred while he was still enrolled.

3. Tolling

The Court concludes, however, that Plaintiff may be able to allege facts to support a tolling 

argument. At the hearing, Plaintiff indicated that the reason he did not bring his claims sooner 

was because he was not aware that he had a claim, as he believed that his problems were due to his 

disability or medication. "Equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is prevented from asserting a 

claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances 

beyond the plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim on time." Stoll v. Runyon, 165 

F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit has held that "mental incompetence 

constitutes a ground for equitable tolling . . . when mental incompetence precludes a person from 

asserting his rights during the proper time period . . . ." Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 

263 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds by United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1996); 

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see also Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 465 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Brockamp for the 

proposition that equitable tolling may be appropriate "if a medical condition prevented a plaintiff 

from filing suit"). Here, Plaintiff explained that it was not until he was diagnosed with PostTraumatic Stress Disorder resulting from his interactions with Professor Young that he realized he 

had a claim; in short, Plaintiff was impaired and could not recognize his claims. Moreover, 

Plaintiff explained that Defendants created an "illusion" that everything was proceeding properly 

and that no accommodations were available to him. For example, Professor Young and Dr. Allen 

both refused to give him accommodations, instead telling him to change his major, and the faculty 

told him to take Professor Young's class without affording him any accommodations despite 

knowing of his prior problems passing Professor Young's class without accommodations. Plaintiff 

further stated during the hearing that it was not until 2014 that he understood that the lack of 

accommodations was a problem that supported a claim.

The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff's claims based on events outside the statutory 

period with leave to amend, so that Plaintiff can plead additional facts to support an equitable 

tolling argument. In addition to the facts stated during the hearing, Plaintiff should explain when 

he was incapacitated and for what period, as well as when and why he realized he had a claim. 

Plaintiff should also provide additional facts as to what accommodations he was entitled to, 

including what, if any, accommodations the DRC and SJSU were to provide him.3

C. Disability discrimination claim

CSU next argues that Plaintiff cannot establish his Title II or Rehabilitation Act claim. 

(Def.'s Mot. at 7.) To make a prima facie case under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff 

must allege: (1) that he is disabled under the Act; (2) he is "otherwise qualified" to participate in or 

receive the benefit of the public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) he was either 

 

3 Under the relevant statutes, an individual is not entitled to any accommodation that he requests. 

Rather, "an educational institution is not required to make fundamental or substantial 

modifications to its programs or standards; it need only make reasonable ones." Zukie v. Regents 

of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999). "[T]he issue of reasonableness depends on 

individual circumstances of each case," including a showing that the institution satisfied its "duty 

to gather sufficient information from the disabled individual and qualified experts as needed to 

determine what accommodations are necessary to enable the individual to meet the standards in 

question." Wong, 192 F.3d at 818 (internal quotations and modifications omitted).

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excluded from participating in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or 

activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) the exclusion, denial 

of benefits, or discrimination was because of his disability. E.R.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Haw. Dep't of 

Educ., 728 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted); see also Duvall, 260 F.3d at 

1135. Because the Court has dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff's claims as to events occurring 

before April 22, 2013 as time-barred, the Court focuses its analysis on the April 23, 2014 meeting 

between Plaintiff and Professor Young.

1. Standing

CSU contends that Plaintiff lacks standing as to the April 23, 2014 event because he was 

not a student at the time. (Def's. Mot. at 8.) Plaintiff concedes that he was acting more akin to an 

applicant at this time. (Pl's. Opp'n at 6.) Neither party provides any case law on whether an 

applicant has standing to invoke the ADA. The Court has not found case law on this issue in this 

Circuit, although the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a job applicant can bring an ADA claim. 

E.g., Cooper v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 125 F.3d 786, 790 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Discrimination under 

the ADA is defined as limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant in a way that adversely 

affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such 

employee") (internal quotation and modification omitted); Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps. Ass'n, 

239 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Under the ADA, the term 'discriminate' is defined as 

including not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of 

an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee . . . .") (internal 

quotation omitted). Outside of this Circuit, at least one court has permitted a prospective student

to bring an ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim against a school. E.g., Wolff v. Beauty Basics, Inc., 

887 F. Supp. 2d 74, 75 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying motion to dismiss ADA and Rehabilitation Act 

claim of a deaf prospective student where the school would not provide interpreter services for 

classes).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has standing to bring his claims based on the April 23, 2014 

meeting, even if he was not enrolled as a student. Plaintiff was seeking to return to the program, 

and thus is comparable to a job applicant or a prospective student. To adopt CSU's position that 

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Plaintiff lacked standing simply because he was not a student would allow a school to discriminate 

against an applicant solely on the basis of disability without any consequence. This would be 

contrary to the statutes, which seek to prevent qualified individuals with a disability from being 

excluded from participation in the activities of a public entity based on their disability alone. 

Absent any case law in support of CSU's position, the Court declines to limit the ADA's protection 

to enrolled students only.

2. Merits of the disability claim

CSU also argues that Plaintiff does not have a disability as defined by the ADA. An 

individual is disabled where the individual has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially 

limits one or more major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Congress has 

since passed the ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, the purpose of which "was to reject that the 

terms substantially and major in the definition of disability under the ADA need to be interpreted 

strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled . . . ." Doe v. Samuel Merritt 

Univ., 921 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). "According to the 

regulations, the term substantially limits 'is not meant to impose a demanding standard' and 

determining 'whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity should not demand 

extensive analysis.'" Id. (quoting 29 CF.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (iii)).

The Court wholly rejects CSU's argument that Plaintiff lacks an impairment because "the 

only activity allegedly limited by plaintiff's disability is that of getting to one class on time." 

(Def.'s Mot. at 9.) By narrowly focusing on one effect of Plaintiff's disability, CSU completely 

ignores that Plaintiff has alleged that he suffers from chronic schizophrenia, and that this has 

resulted in a fear of people that causes serious emotional problems, such as when he is suddenly 

exposed to the population of students. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9.) It was this fear of people that allegedly 

prevented Plaintiff from getting to class on-time. In short, Plaintiff has alleged that he has 

problems interacting with other people, which the Ninth Circuit has specifically recognized as a 

major life activity "because interacting with others is an essential, regular function, like walking 

and breathing." McAlindin v. Cty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court 

finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a disability.

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As for CSU's remaining arguments regarding the merits of Plaintiff's claim—whether 

Plaintiff was excluded from CSU's services, whether Plaintiff was a victim of discrimination, and 

whether the discrimination was because of Plaintiff's disability—CSU's arguments focus 

exclusively on Plaintiff's pre-April 23, 2014 allegations, and do not address the April 23, 2014 

meeting. (See Def.'s Mot. at 9-11.) Because the Court rejects CSU's arguments that Plaintiff lacks 

standing or a disability, the Court DENIES CSU's motion to dismiss the disability discrimination 

claims based on the April 23, 2014 meeting and any subsequent events.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS CSU's motion to dismiss the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims 

based on events prior to April 22, 2013. The dismissal is without prejudice, and Plaintiff has leave 

to allege facts, if possible, to demonstrate that tolling of the statute of limitations should apply in 

this case. The Court DENIES CSU's motion to dismiss the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims 

based on the April 23, 2014 meeting with Professor Young and subsequent events. Plaintiff has

forty-five (45) days from the date of this order to file a First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is on 

notice that the First Amended Complaint will supersede the original complaint, such that it will be 

treated as nonexistent. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 878 n.40 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated 

on other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). For this reason, Plaintiff shall 

properly identify the legal and factual bases for all of his claims, free of any reference to any prior 

complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2016

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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