Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01252/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01252-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LaCEDRIC W. JOHNSON,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

ISAAC GONZALEZ, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:14-cv-01252-LJO-EPG-PC

 

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO EITHER:

 (1) FILE A SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT,

 (2) NOTIFY COURT THAT HE IS 

WILLING TO PROCEED WITH THE 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, ONLY 

ON THE CLAIMS FOR EXCESSIVE 

FORCE AND DENIAL OF ACCESS TO 

COURTS FOUND COGNIZABLE BY THE 

COURT, OR

 (3) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE 

STANDS ON THE FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT AS FILED

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

I. BACKGROUND

LaCedric W. Johnson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 28, 2014, Plaintiff 

filed the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On November 19, 2014, Plaintiff

filed the First Amended Complaint as a matter of course under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). (ECF No. 

10.) The First Amended Complaint recites allegations of events occurring from September 18, 

2012 through July 10, 2014 at Pleasant Valley State Prison, during which Plaintiff was 

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deprived of his personal property, including legal documents and religious items, harassed for 

filing a complaint in state court, prevented from appearing at scheduled telephonic court 

hearings, and subjected to beatings and pepper spray for not immediately removing his boxer 

shorts when ordered. For the reasons described in this order, the Court finds that Plaintiff states 

cognizable claims for denial of access to courts and excessive force. Plaintiff shall be given a 

choice to either proceed with these claims, file a Second Amended Complaint, or stand on the 

current complaint for review by the District Court. 

Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint is now before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken 

as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id.

///

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III. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred at Pleasant 

Valley State Prison (PVSP) in Corcoran, California, where Plaintiff is presently incarcerated in 

the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff 

names as defendants Correctional Officer (C/O) Isaac Gonzalez, C/O A. Martinez, and 

Sergeant J. Benavides (collectively, “Defendants”), who were all employed by the CDCR at 

PVSP at the time of the events at issue. Plaintiff‟s factual allegations follow. 

On September 17, 2012, Plaintiff‟s personal property was packed into eight boxes in 

preparation for a move to Delta 4 segregation unit. The next day, defendant Martinez escorted 

Plaintiff to a holding cage. Defendants Gonzalez and Martinez informed Plaintiff that “we are 

going to break-down your property to six cubic feet.” (First Amended Complaint at 3 ¶3.) 

Under California regulations, PVSP limits inmate property to six cubic feet when inmates are 

rehoused to Delta 4 Unit. Gonzalez and Martinez began discarding Plaintiff‟s personal, 

religious, and legal files. Plaintiff informed Martinez and Gonzalez that he had five active 

legal cases and they were infringing on his access to courts and property rights. Martinez 

became belligerent and stated, “If you can‟t show me a deadline, I‟m throwing it away.” (Id. at 

4 ¶5.) Plaintiff explained that he was waiting on responses and has been litigating some of the 

cases for years. Gonzalez asked, “What can he keep?” and Martinez stated, “If it don‟t have a 

heading and a current date, throw it away.” (Id. at 4 ¶6.) The two defendants threw away 

Plaintiff‟s personal documents, Social Security documents, religious materials, family 

obituaries, and legal documents. The Islamic religious materials that were discarded included a 

Holy Quran, and afterward Plaintiff was unable to perform daily readings of the Holy Quran for 

the duration of his Delta 4 unit stay, in excess of six months. Plaintiff asked whether his excess 

property could “be stored or sent home instead of being thrown away,” but his request was 

denied. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that California regulations forbid obstruction of access to courts 

and retaliation for bringing and maintaining legal claims, and require Defendants to give 

Plaintiff his legal files and retain his personal property while housed in segregation. 

///

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Plaintiff notified the courts and opposing counsels in his cases and requested extensions 

of time. However, Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to settle his federal case 2:08-cv-01609-

KJM-KJN because defendants discarded irreplaceable declarations of Nick Daley, now 

deceased, and Abraham Calderon, both eye-ear witnesses whose testimony would have 

strengthened his claims and could have provided leverage for a higher settlement or success at 

trial. Plaintiff also alleges that he was unable to pursue two appeals of habeas corpus cases, 11-

16994 and 12-16655, at the Ninth Circuit, in which he challenged prison disciplinary due 

process violations, because Defendants discarded documentary evidence, reference materials 

and a brief. In those cases, Plaintiff had suffered loss of 360 days good time credits and loss of 

visitation privileges. 

Plaintiff also alleges that he suffered denial of his habeas corpus petition no. 12-0720-

JST at the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California challenging his current 

sentence, because he had no documents available to proceed on appeal. The loss of documents 

hindered Plaintiff from assisting his counsel in presenting claims of unauthorized illegal 

excessive sentencing. Plaintiff alleges that he cannot bring a further challenge to his sentence 

via habeas corpus because it would be denied as a “successive” petition. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff is 

now serving the remainder of his sentence, which is in excess of a decade. Plaintiff filed 

grievances against Martinez and Gonzalez for discarding his property and retaliation.1

On April 4, 2013, Plaintiff was released from Delta 4 unit and defendant Gonzalez was 

assigned security and escort duty. Plaintiff‟s property was already packed when Gonzalez 

arrived at Plaintiff‟s cell, but it was heavy. Gonzalez told Plaintiff, “I‟m going to put you in the 

 

1 While Plaintiff alleges he was subject to retaliation, he does not indicate in the First Amended 

Complaint that he seeks to bring a retaliation claim. Plaintiff specifically brings only three claims, which do not 

include a retaliation claim. (ECF No. 10 at 13-15.) Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiff‟s allegations insufficient to 

state a retaliation claim because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing a link between his protected litigation 

activities and the adverse actions against him. Plaintiff shall be granted leave to amend if he wishes to bring a 

retaliation claim. “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment rights, 

and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 

F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

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shower, lower B section, I‟ll take care of your property.” (Id. at 7 ¶18.) On the way to Facility 

B, Gonzales stated, “You had a lot of stuff so I placed it in two bags.” (Id.) When Plaintiff 

arrived at Facility B and inventoried his property, he found that he was missing six months 

worth of legal mail and a Georgetown Law Journal. On April 12, 2013, the property officer 

[not a defendant] brought Plaintiff the remainder of his property that had been retained, 

consisting of three boxes out of the original eight. Plaintiff filed a Staff Complaint against 

defendant Gonzales for retaliation, based on the confiscation of Plaintiff‟s legal mail.

On August 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed a state court action against Gonzalez and Martinez for 

conversion of property. Facility B staff began harassing Plaintiff for filing the case, by 

conducting cell searches, making comments, and refusing to process legal mail. On December 

23, 2013, Plaintiff was scheduled to appear telephonically for a case management conference as 

ordered by state court Judge Kapetan. Defendant Facility B Sergeant J. Benavides denied 

Plaintiff telephone access and did not make any provisions for Plaintiff to join the conference. 

Plaintiff was able to schedule another telephonic conference without penalty, for January 6, 

2014. Plaintiff proceeded to the facility office and informed Sergeant Benavides of his 

scheduled conference. Benavides said, “What are you here for? We don‟t have anything here 

for you,” denying Plaintiff access to court. 

On January 29, 2014, during a controlled yard release with random pat downs

conducted by Sergeant Benavides, Plaintiff realized he had forgotten to bring his identification 

card, which was required to leave the building. Plaintiff asked the Building I tower officer for 

a cell unlock to retrieve it. The tower officer ignored Plaintiff, and Officer Santos ordered 

Plaintiff to strip for an unclothed body search. Plaintiff complied except for his boxer shorts 

while the officers searched his clothing and legal folder. Santos ordered Plaintiff to remove his 

boxer shorts. A female staff member entered the building looking in Plaintiff‟s direction, and 

Plaintiff said, “One moment out of respect for the female, I‟m Muslim.” (Id. at 9 ¶27.) Santos 

immediately sprayed Plaintiff in the face with pepper spray. Plaintiff stumbled blindly to the 

shower to rinse his eyes, and Santos began beating Plaintiff with his baton with rapid blows to 

his arms and legs. Officer Leon sprayed Plaintiff in the face with mace. Plaintiff placed his 

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head under the running water, and Santos again began beating Plaintiff across his wrist, arms, 

and shins. The emergency alarm was sounded and Sergeant Benavides and ten guards 

responded to the scene, yelling “Get down.” (Id. at 10 ¶26.) Because of Plaintiff‟s injuries, he 

had difficulties complying with the order. The guards formed a skirmish line in front of the 

shower, and officers emptied six more canisters of pepper spray on Plaintiff, causing him to 

choke, gag and hyperventilate. Santos began beating Plaintiff across the arms and legs as he 

was trying to comply with the order, grabbed Plaintiff‟s ankles, and dragged him out of the 

shower. Sergeant Benavides jumped on Plaintiff‟s back and began beating him in the head and 

face and kicking him in the genitalia while yelling, “Stop resisting!” (Id.) Brutally beaten, 

Plaintiff was placed in too-tight cuffs, stripped naked, placed in a medical Stokes litter, and 

carried across the yard. He was slammed to the ground in a medical holding cage, and a spit 

mask was placed over his head, leaving him to suffocate, choking and gagging on his own 

fluids. Plaintiff was denied medical attention and taken to Delta 4 unit administrative 

segregation. He was found in the cell unresponsive and taken to medical, then referred to an 

outside hospital for testing and overnight observation. Plaintiff was charged with battery on an 

officer, to cover up the excessive force. Sergeant Benavides was in charge of documenting the 

incident. Plaintiff alleges that PVSP staff has a practice of using pat-down and unclothed body 

searches to engage targeted inmates in uncompromising situations, attack inmates, and make 

false charges of battery on an officer for harassment and reprisals. Plaintiff alleges that he was 

targeted because he was litigating civil lawsuits against PVSP guards Gonzalez and Martinez. 

Plaintiff also alleges that prison staff made calculated efforts to punish inmates for exercising 

their rights to seek redress from the government, by placing them in administrative segregation 

where their property is destroyed and they have restricted access to the law library.

On February 5, 2014, Sergeant Benavides and Officer Santos forced Plaintiff to comply 

with the six cubic foot property limitation in Delta 4 segregation. Plaintiff suffered from severe 

trauma to his head and depression. 

State court Judge Kapetan scheduled an order to show cause hearing for Plaintiff‟s 

failure to appear at the January 6, 2014 telephonic conference which Sergeant Benavides had 

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prevented Plaintiff from attending. On February 20, 2014, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his 

case, without prejudice. 

Plaintiff requests monetary damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, costs of suit, 

and attorney‟s fees.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983 

“[Section] 1983 „is not itself a source of substantive rights,‟ but merely provides „a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.‟” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman 

v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 

F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 

“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 

meaning of § 1983, „if he does an affirmative act, participates in another‟s affirmative act, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.‟” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite 

causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a „series of acts by others

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which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict‟ constitutional 

harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 

causation “closely resembles the standard „foreseeability‟ formulation of proximate cause.” 

Arnold v. Int‟l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 

of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff brings three distinct causes of action against Defendants in the First Amended 

Complaint, for (1) denial of access to courts, (2) infringement on exercise of religion, and (3) 

violations of due process. (ECF No. 10 at 13-15.) The Court also finds that Plaintiff states a 

claim for excessive force.

A. Denial of Access to Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts and prison 

officials may not actively interfere with Plaintiff's right to litigate. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 346 (1996); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts have traditionally 

differentiated between two types of access claims, those involving the right to affirmative 

assistance, and those involving inmate's right to litigate without active interference. Silva v. Di 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) (abrogated on other grounds) (emphasis added). 

Prisoners have the right to pursue claims that have a reasonable basis in law or fact

without active interference. Id. at 1103-04 (finding that repeatedly transferring the plaintiff to 

different prisons and seizing and withholding all of his legal files constituted active 

interference) (abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, -- U.S. --, 135 S.Ct. 1759 

(2015)). The complaint should state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a), just as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement 

should describe any remedy available under the access claim and presently unique to it. 

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403. Mere inconvenience to Plaintiff resulting from lost, 

misplaced, or confiscated legal documents will not suffice to support a constitutional claim.

Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103–04. 

Defendants‟ actions must have been the proximate cause of actual prejudice to Plaintiff. 

Id. To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must show that he suffered an actual injury, 

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which requires “actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation” by being shut out of 

court. Nevada Dep't of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 348, 351); Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415; Phillips, 588 F.3d at 655. 

Construing Plaintiff‟s allegations generously, Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205

(9th Cir. 2007), the Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for denial of access to 

courts against defendants Martinez and Gonzalez, for knowingly confiscating and destroying 

Plaintiffs‟ legal files, resulting in the dismissal of Plaintiff habeas corpus case, and against 

defendant Benevides for preventing Plaintiff from making his court calls. The Court finds no 

other cognizable access to court claim against any other defendants.

B. Infringement on Free Exercise of Religion

The protection of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is triggered when 

prison officials infringe upon the practice of an inmate‟s religion by preventing him from 

engaging in conduct that he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith; to be upheld, the 

impinging rule or regulation must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 

Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008). Pursuant to RLUIPA, prison officials 

may not substantially burden an inmate's religious exercise unless the burden furthers a 

compelling governmental interest and does so by the least restrictive means. Alvarez v. Hill,

518 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that included within his confiscated property were religious materials, 

including his Holy Quran. Plaintiff alleges that the confiscation and destruction of those items 

burdened the exercise of his religion, in violation of the First Amendment. Assuming the 

confiscation of Plaintiff's excess property led to the incidental destruction of religious items, as 

Plaintiff alleges, there is no support for a claim that Defendants acted to prevent Plaintiff from 

engaging in the practice of his religion. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation 

of his right to free exercise of religion.

C. Violation of Due Process – Confiscation of Property

Prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 

728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is 

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actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13, 4 

(1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 

754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), “[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by 

a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the 

loss is available,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 

California Law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property 

deprivations. See Cal. Gov't Code '' 810-895; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th 

Cir. 1994). California‟s Government Claims Act2requires that a tort claim against a public 

entity or its employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government 

Claims Board, formerly known as the State Board of Control, no more than six months after the 

cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov=t Code '' 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2 (West 2006). 

Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent 

to suit. State v. Superior Court of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245, 90 P.3d 116, 

124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 543 (2004); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm=n, 67 F.3d 1470, 

1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege 

compliance with the Government Claims Act. Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1245, 90 P.3d at 124, 13 

Cal.Rptr.3d at 543; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 

F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Martinez and Gonzalez improperly confiscated 

Plaintiff‟s personal property, which indicates that the deprivation of property was intentional 

and unauthorized. Thus, Plaintiff=s remedy would be found under California law. Plaintiff fails 

 

2 This Act was formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton v. Superior 

Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 741-42 (Cal. 2007) (adopting the practice of using Government Claims Act rather than 

California Tort Claims Act).

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to show compliance with California‟s Government Claims Act, and therefore his property 

claim is not cognizable under federal or state law.3

D. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth 

Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to 

cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not 

significant injury is evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 

2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de 

minimis injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a 

federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment=s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical 

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort >repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” 

Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in 

violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and 

unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship 

between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the 

responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant 

to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id.

 

3

Plaintiff is required to allege in his complaint that he has complied with, or is excused from, the 

claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 

1234, 1239 (2004); Mangold v. California Public Utilities Com‟n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995).

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The Court finds that Plaintiff states an excessive force claim against Sergeant 

Benavides, Correctional Officer W. Leon, and Officer M. Santos. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court has screened Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint and finds that it states

cognizable claims against defendants Martinez, Gonzalez, and Benevides for denial of access to 

courts, and against defendants Benavides, Leon, and Santos for use of excessive force. Plaintiff 

fails to state any other claims against any defendant. 

Plaintiff may either proceed with the First Amended Complaint on the claims found 

cognizable by the Court, file a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

by this order, or stand on the First Amended Complaint as filed.

4

 If Plaintiff chooses to file a

Second Amended Complaint, that complaint will supersede the First Amended Complaint and 

the Court will screen the Second Amended Complaint in full. 

Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, the amended complaint should be brief, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of 

Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. Williams, 297 

F.3d 930, 934 9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter . . . to „state a 

claim that is plausible on its face.‟” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). There is 

no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her own 

misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). Plaintiff 

is advised that a short, concise statement of the allegations in chronological order will assist the 

Court in identifying his claims. Plaintiff should name each defendant and explain what 

happened, describing personal acts by the individual defendant that resulted in the violation of 

Plaintiff‟s rights. Plaintiff should also describe any harm he suffered as a result of the 

 

4

If Plaintiff chooses to stand on the First Amended Complaint as filed, the Magistrate Judge will 

recommend dismissal, by the District Judge, of the claims found noncognizable in this order.

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violation. Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is 

not for the purpose of adding new defendants for unrelated issues. 

If Plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended 

complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F. 3d 896, 907 

n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superceded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the original 

complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in 

an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “Second Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of 

perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

either:

(1) File a Second Amended Complaint attempting to cure the deficiencies 

identified in this order,

(2) Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is instead willing to proceed only on the access to courts 

claim against defendants Martinez, Gonzalez, and Benevides, and the 

excessive force claim against defendants Benavides, Santos, and Leon, 

or

(3) Notify the Court in writing that he stands on the First Amended 

Complaint as filed, in which case the Court will issue findings and 

recommendations to the District Judge consistent with this opinion;

3. Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint “Second Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 

1:14-cv-01252-LJO-EPG-PC; and

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4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to comply with a Court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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