Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01760/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01760-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGEL PROVENCIO,

Petitioner,

v.

CHRIS CHRONES, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 06-1760-L(LSP)

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO HOLD FEDERAL HABEAS

PETITION IN ABEYANCE (14-1)

On August 25, 2006, Petitioner Angel Provencio (“Petitioner”), a

state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. On December 12, 2006, Respondent filed an Answer to the

Petition. On January 29, 2007, counsel for Petitioner made an

appearance in this case. On January 30, 2007, the Court granted

Petitioner’s Motion to Amend his Petition. On April 2, 2007,

Petitioner, now proceeding with counsel, filed a First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Also, on April 2, 2007,

Petitioner, proceeding with counsel, filed a Motion to Hold Federal

Habeas Petition in Abeyance (“Motion to Stay & Abey”) that is now

pending before the Court. On April 25, 2007, Respondent Chris Chrones

(“Respondent”) filed an Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion. 

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In Petitioner’s Motion, Petitioner seeks an order staying the

proceedings so he can exhaust his state court remedies as to Claim 2 

in the First Amended Petition. Respondent opposes the Motion, arguing

a stay should not be granted because Petitioner has not shown good

cause for failing to exhaust his state court remedies before he filed

his First Amended Petition in federal court. For the reasons outlined

below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion to Stay & Abey.

 I.

 Exhaustion

The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a

federal court’s consideration of claims presented in a habeas corpus

proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b) Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522

(1982). In Rose v. Lundy, the Supreme Court held “a district court

must dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and

exhausted claims.” Id. Such a dismissal leaves “the prisoner with

the choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of

amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted

claims to the district court.” Id. at 510.

Petitioner admits that his Petition includes both exhausted and

unexhausted claims. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of First Amended Petition at 30, Motion to Stay & Abey at 1) In Claim

2, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on

counsel’s alleged failure to present mitigating evidence at his

sentencing hearing. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of First Amended Petition at 30) 

 II

 Stay and Abeyance

When Rose v. Lundy was decided, there was no statute of

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limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition; after

exhausting claims in state court, a petitioner could return to federal

court “with relative ease.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S.Ct

1528, 1533 (2005). However, AEDPA changed many aspects of federal

habeas corpus proceedings, including the application of the one-year

statute of limitations for bringing a habeas corpus petition in

federal court, which is set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). In Rhines,

the Supreme Court recognized petitioners can effectively be denied the

opportunity for collateral review in federal court “[a]s a result of

the interplay between AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations and [Rose

v.] Lundy’s dismissal requirement.” Rhines, 125 S.Ct. at 1533-1534. 

Therefore, the Rhines court held that federal courts have discretion

to stay mixed petitions and to hold habeas proceedings in abeyance

while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust all claims. 

Id. at 1534-1535.

The Rhines court also held that stay and abeyance “should be

available only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 1535. If employed

too often, the procedure could undermine the purposes of AEDPA,

namely, to reduce delay and streamline federal habeas corpus

proceedings. Id. at 1535. In this regard, the Supreme Court stated

“it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to

deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had good

cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are

potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the

petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id.

Good Cause

Petitioner argues that he had good cause for his failure to

exhaust his unexhausted claim because he was confused as to whether

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his state petition was timely filed, he was ignorant of the law, and

he did not realize he could still pursue the claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing in state court once the California

Supreme Court had denied his original habeas petition. Respondent

argues that Petitioner has failed to show that good cause exists for

his failure to exhaust his unexhausted claim.

Claim is Potentially Meritorious

Petitioner argues that his unexhausted claim is potentially

meritorious. Specifically, Petitioner argues that he has stated a

prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent

argues that Petitioner’s claim is not potentially meritorious.

Intentionally Dilatory Litigation Tactics

Petitioner argues that raising his unexhausted claim at this time

is not the result of dilatory litigation tactics. Specifically,

Petitioner argues that he is serving a life sentence and wants to have

his claims resolved as soon as possible. Therefore, the raising of

his unexhausted claim at this time can not be the result of dilatory

litigation tactics. Respondent does not address the issue. 

The Supreme Court in Rhines did not define “good cause,” but did

acknowledge AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations “‘serves the wellrecognized interest in the finality of state court judgments’” because

it “‘reduces the potential for delay on the road to finality by

restricting the time that a prospective federal habeas petitioner has

in which to seek federal habeas review.’” Rhines 125 S.Ct. at 1534,

quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001). The Supreme Court

also suggested a broad definition of “good cause” would be contrary to

AEDPA because it would not “be compatible with AEDPA’s purposes.” Id.

at 1534.

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In a decision issued shortly after Rhines, the Supreme Court in

dicta addressed one circumstance which would qualify as “good cause”

for failing to exhaust state court remedies before a federal petition

is filed. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1810-1811 (2005),

the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits as to the

application of section 2244(d)(2), which tolls AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations while a “properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending. 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(2) In Pace, the court held that an application for state postconviction relief is not “properly filed” for purposes of

section 2244(d)(2) if it is considered untimely under state law. Id.

at 1810. In reaching its decision, the Pace court addressed a

fairness argument by the petitioner who claimed a “petitioner trying

in good faith to exhaust state remedies may litigate in state court

for years only to find out at the end that he was never ‘properly

filed,’and thus that his federal habeas petition is time barred.” Id.

at 1813 Citing its prior decision in Rhines, the Supreme Court

responded to the petitioner’s argument as follows: “A prisoner seeking

state post-conviction relief might avoid this predicament, however, by

filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and asking the federal

court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state

remedies are exhausted. A petitioner’s reasonable confusion about

whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute

‘good cause’ for him to file in federal court” before his state court

remedies are completely exhausted. Id. 

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Rhines, the Ninth Circuit

held the “good cause” standard prescribed by Rhines is less stringent

than the “extraordinary circumstances” standard, which the Ninth Circuit

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applies in the context of equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute

of limitations. Jackson v. Roe 425 F.3d 654, 661-662 (9th Cir. 2005).

“[E]quitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation is

available . . . only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.’”

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005),

quoting Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). “That

determination is ‘highly fact-dependent’” and the petitioner “‘bears the

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Id. quoting

Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) and Whalem/Hunt v.

Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc per curiam). For

example, “extraordinary circumstances” exist where a habeas petitioner

is denied access to legal materials for a significant period of time.

Espinoza-Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1027-1028; Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

921-925 (9th Cir. 2002).

District courts interpreting the Rhines “good cause” standard have

taken markedly different approaches. Despite the Ninth Circuit’s

endorsement of a lenient standard in Jackson, some district courts in

the Ninth Circuit have applied a more stringent standard, finding “it

appropriate to look to procedural default case law for guidance in

determining whether petitioner has demonstrated the requisite ‘good

cause’ for failing to exhaust . . . unexhausted claims prior to filing

[a federal] habeas action.” Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F.Supp.2d 1205,

1207 (C.D. Cal. 2005). For example, in Johnson v. Sullivan 2006 WL

37037 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2006), petitioner argued that he had “good

cause” for his failure to exhaust because his appellate counsel was

ineffective on direct appeal and because he did not know the claim was

unexhausted when he filed his federal petition. Id. at *2. The

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district court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Jackson that

“good cause” is less stringent than the “extraordinary circumstances”

standard applied to determine whether a petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at *3 n.4.

Instead, the district court concluded “the good cause standard for

failure to exhaust may be analogized to the ‘cause’ required to overcome

a procedural bar.” Id. at *3. In the procedural default context,

“‘cause’ usually means some objective factor external to the petitioner

which gave rise to the default.” Id. at *3. Under this more stringent

standard, the district court concluded the petitioner had not

established good cause for failing to exhaust his state court remedies.

The district court reasoned that an error by appellate counsel on a

discretionary appeal was not enough to establish good cause because

“counsel’s conduct did not prevent petitioner from seeking state habeas

relief on the unexhausted claim.” Id. at *3. The district court also

concluded the petitioner’s lack of knowledge was “not an objective

factor external to petitioner which prevented compliance with the

exhaustion requirement.” Id. at *3. To justify its reliance on a more

stringent standard than the one set forth by the Ninth Circuit in

Jackson v. Roe, the district court reasoned it would defeat the purpose

of exhaustion if a petitioner’s “lack of knowledge” could establish

“good cause” because “any petitioner could claim lack of knowledge to

continually amend their petition.” Id. at *3.

Another court has opined that “good cause” should be determined by

alluding to “excusable neglect,” noted in Pioneer Inv. Services v.

Brunswick Assoc. 507 U.S. 394 (1993). Corjasso v. Ayers 2006 WL 618380

(E.D. Cal. March 9, 2006) The Corjasso court indicated that it would

look to factors such as prejudice to the non-moving party, length of the

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delay and its effect on efficient court administration, whether the

delay was caused by factors beyond the control of the movant, and good

faith. Id. at *1

In other contexts, the Ninth Circuit has held “good cause” requires

a showing of diligence. Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302

F.3d 1080, 1087-1088 (9th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232

F.3d 1271, 1294-1295 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Te Selle, 34 F.3d

909, 910 -911 (9th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975

F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992); Fimbres v. United States, 833 F.2d 138, 139

(9th Cir. 1987); Townsel v. Contra Costa County, 820 F.2d 319, 320-321

(9th Cir.1987); Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir.1985).

“[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers

no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609, citing

Engleson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th

Cir.1992). Ignorance of the law and inadvertent failure to calendar a

deadline have also been found incompatible with diligence and good

cause. Townsel, 820 F.2d at 320-321; Wei, 763 F.2d at 372.

In this case, Petitioner requests that the Court hold his exhausted

First Amended Petition in abeyance while he returns to state court in

order to exhaust his state remedies for a new claim. However, the Ninth

Circuit has not decided whether the good cause standard stated in Rhines

or the standard established in Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Taylor)

134 F.3d 981, 988, n.11 (9th Cir. 1988) cert. denied 525 U.S. 920 (1998)

applies to a case where a petitioner seeks to litigate a new unexhausted

claim in state court, while his exhausted petition is pending in federal

court.

The Ninth Circuit has noted that Rhines and Taylor apply to

different types of petitions: “Rhines applies to stays of mixed

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petitions, whereas (Taylor) applies to stays of fully exhausted

petitions and requires additional steps - the amendment of the

original...petition and an...amendment to add the newly exhausted

claims.” Jackson 425 F.3d at 661.

In this case, Petitioner’s First Amended Petition is a mixed

petition in that it contains one exhausted claim and one unexhausted

claim. Therefore, Rhines applies in this case.

Rhines indicates that it applies to the question of whether a

district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow the

petitioner to present his unexhausted claims to the state court, and

then return to federal court for review of the completely exhausted

petition. Rhines 125 S.Ct. at 1531.

In Riner v. Crawford, 415 F.Supp 2d 1207 (D. Nev. 2006), the court

held that the Rhines good cause standard applicable in consideration of

a petitioner’s request for stay and abeyance of his federal habeas

petition 

requires the petitioner to show that he was prevented from 

raising the claim, either by his own ignorance or confusion

about the law or the status of his case, by circumstances

over which he had no control, such as actions by counsel,

either in contravention of the petitioner’s clearly

expressed desire to raise the claim, or when petitioner 

had no knowledge of the claim’s existence.

Riner 415 F. Supp. at 1211 (emphasis added)

See also Haithcock v. Veal 2007 WL 935471 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2007);

Leonardos v. Buddress 2007 WL 1174282 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2007); Hagins

v. Gay 2007 WL 148951 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2007); Calvert v. Daniels 2006

WL 2527639 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2006); Medina v. Woodford 2006 WL

2844578 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2006)

Petitioner has shown a legitimate reason that warrants the delay of

the proceedings in this Court while he exhausts his new claim in state

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court. Petitioner indicates that he had reasonable confusion as to

whether his state court petition would be timely. Further, he indicates

that he was ignorant of the law in that he did not know he could still

pursue his new claim in state court after the California Supreme Court

denied his other claims because appellate counsel advised him that his

next step after a denial by the California Supreme Court was to file a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court. The Court

concludes that Petitioner’s proffered reasons for requesting a stay are

not unreasonable.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a federal court may deny an

unexhausted claim on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the

petitioner does not raise even a colorable federal claim. Cassett v.

Stewart 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) Therefore, if a petitioner

states a colorable claim, the claim is not plainly meritless. Here,

since Petitioner’s new claim appears to be at least “colorable,” it is

not plainly meritless under Rhines’ second prong. Lugo v. Kirkland 2006

WL 449130 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006) at *4

Additionally, Respondent has not provided to the Court any evidence

or explanation that Petitioner seeks stay and abeyance of his Petition

for purposes of delaying the proceedings before the Court. Actually, the

opposite appears to be true. Petitioner is serving a life sentence. He

has every reason to resolve his claims at the earliest possible date.

Petitioner’s actions support this conclusion. Petitioner filed his

original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 73 days after the statute of

limitations on his Petition began to run. He still had 292 days left

before the statute of limitations would run.

Consequently, the Court concludes that Petitioner has shown good

cause for his failure to exhaust his newly discovered claim. As a

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result, there is no reason not to stay this action while Petitioner

exhausts his new claim. Lugo at *4, Briscoe at *1-2

Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey his Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is stayed until 

November 1, 2007. 

Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Petitioner shall file a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the appropriate state court. The

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus shall include the new unexhausted

claim. Petitioner shall provide to this Court proof that the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in the state court. If Petitioner

does not file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the appropriate

state court within 30 days of the date of this Order, Petitioner shall

file with the Court a declaration explaining why such Petition was not

filed. 

Within 30 days after the state court has ruled on the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus and the new unexhausted claim is exhausted,

Petitioner shall file an Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in this Court containing his new claim. Petitioner shall provide

to the Court proof of when the California Supreme Court rules on his new

claim.

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 CONCLUSION

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey,

Respondent’s Opposition to the Motion, and the pertinent authorities

pertaining to the Motion, and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, hereby GRANTS

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey.

DATED: April 30, 2007

Hon. Leo S. Papas

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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