Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05911/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05911-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAURICE A. JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

WOODFORD, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 5911 AWI SMS P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1) 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM 

 Maurice A. Jackson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 29, 2004, alleging a violation of his constitutional

rights for inadequate medical care. Plaintiff names Jeanne Woodford, Director of the California

Department of Corrections, Warden A.K. Scribner, Chief Medical Officer John D. Klarich,

Thanit Hasadsri, Chief Physician/Surgeon and Andrew D. Lucine as Defendants. Plaintiff is

seeking monetary damages. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that while he was housed at California State Prison, Corcoran, he

suffered from a debilitating medical condition which resulted from Defendants not providing him

adequate medical care and treatment. Plaintiff states that after several requests for medical

attention, he filed an Inmate appeal on August 26, 2002, complaining that medical staff at Salinas

Valley State Prison and Corcoran failed to provide him adequate care or treatment and that they

were negligent in diagnosing his medical condition. Specifically, Plaintiff states that he

complained that he was losing weight, had muscle spasms, double vision and nausea that had

been occurring for over two years. IN February of 2000, Plaintiff saw an Optometrist that

indicated Plaintiff might be having a thyroid problem and should get a second opinion. In

August of 2000, Plaintiff submitted blood samples for testing. The samples showed high levels

of “glucose serum,” “SGPT serum,” “ALK Phosphatase,” and “GGT Serum.” In addition,

Plaintiff’s blood showed high levels of Monocytes. Plaintiff continued to seek medical attention

and continued to lose weight. 

On or about October 2001, Plaintiff became very ill. Plaintiff was seen by staff and sent

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back to his cell with Motrin, Capazre and a three day lay-in. In 2002 Plaintiff had the same

symptoms and was seen by Dr. Dang. Dr. Dang identified a large goiter in Plaintiff’s neck in

addition to wide-eyed appearance and profuse shaking. Dr. Dang ordered more blood work and a

urinalysis which showed the same results as the previous tests. Plaintiff was then diagnosed

with Graves disease from his hyper thyroid gland. Plaintiff took the prescribed medication and

began to feel nervous, fearful, indecisive, fatigue and mood swings. Plaintiff was then

prescribed with another medication which made him feel worse. Plaintiff began to have hair

loss, erratic behavior, bug eyes, and angry outbursts and mood swings. Plaintiff was scheduled

for an appointment with an endocrinologist in April of 2002, however, he did not make the

appointment because transportation officers said they never received the paper work. Plaintiff

was later scheduled to see another doctor at 12:30 on an unidentified date, however, the

transportation officers breaks made Plaintiff late to the appointment. Transportation officers then

returned Plaintiff to the prison before Plaintiff had a consult with the doctor. 

Plaintiff states as a result of his condition, he had two violent incident with other

prisoners. Plaintiff states that even after 5 months of initiating his 602 he did not receive

adequate medical care for his condition and that to date, his care has been deficient. 

Plaintiff states his appeal was partially granted on October 16, 2002 but was told he

would not receive monetary funds for lack of authorization. 

Plaintiff states that his informal appeal filed on August 26, 2002, had not received a log

number so he inquired into that. He was informed that his appeal was bypassed to the second

level wherein Defendant Scribner signed the second level response and either Defendant Klarich

or Hasadsri signed on March 20 or March 24 of 2003, and partially granted the appeal at the

second level. Plaintiff states that they failed to enclose a statement in the response, however. 

On May 1, 2003, he submitted his appeal to the Director’s level indicating that he was

dissatisfied. At this time, N. Grannis signed on behalf of Jeanne Woodford and P. Enriquez,

Facility Captain and denied his appeal. Plaintiff next filed a board of Control claim. 

Plaintiff contends that each of the named Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs and allowed him to suffer. 

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C. ANALYSIS 

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

2. Eighth Amendment - Medical Care 

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

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and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). 

In this case, although Plaintiff alleges that the named Defendants were deliberately

indifferent, he provides no facts demonstrating that the named Defendants knew of and

disregarded a serious risk to his health. Plaintiff alleges numerous times in his recitation of the

facts that he received inadequate care, however, he provides no specific facts as to what care was

not provide or how the care was inadequate. Plaintiff’s allegations are purely conclusory and do

not state a claim for relief. In addition, Plaintiff fails to link any of the above named Defendants

to an act or omission giving rise to a constitutional violation. From the facts provided, it appears

that the Defendants were merely individuals who signed their names to Plaintiff’s medical

appeals. However, the mere fact that the Defendants reviewed his inmate appeal is insufficient to

state a claim for relief. Plaintiff indicates in his Complaint that the appeals were denied because

the records showed that he had received the medical care he asked for. 

To the extent Plaintiff is merely dissatisfied with the care given, “[a] difference of

opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not

give rise to a s 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal

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citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose

was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose this course in

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330,

332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that any of the named defendants “[knew] of and

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at

837. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. 

3. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some

facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v.

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be

alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit,

507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that defendants personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v.

Black at 646. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim on this ground as well. 

4. Capacity

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The Court notes that Plaintiff is suing the named individuals in their official and

individual capacities. The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in

their official capacity. See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.

1997); Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1996); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469,

472 (9th Cir. 1992). For this reason, plaintiff may not pursue damages claims against the

defendants in their official capacities. 

5. Negligence - State Law Claim

Plaintiff is informed that violation of state law, such as negligence and medical

malpractice, is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. To state a claim under §

1983, there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis,

424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims, plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367. As there is no cognizable claim for relief under Section 1983 as alleged in the

Complaint, the Court will not examine or consider Plaintiff’s negligence claim. 

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

time to file a first Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he wish to

do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Amended Complaint how the conditions complained of

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 

1980). The Amended Complaint must specifically state how each defendant is involved. 

Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423,

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

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Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference the

appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within THIRTY

(30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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