Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00013/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00013-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MILTON OTIS LEWIS,

NO. CIV. S-02-0013 FCD GGH DP

Petitioner,

v. DEATH PENALTY CASE

JEANNE WOODFORD, Warden, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on petitioner Milton Otis

Lewis’ objections to the findings and recommendations of the

magistrate judge, filed January 23, 2007 (“F&R”), addressing

alleged instructional error during the guilt phase of

petitioner’s trial and ineffective assistance of counsel claims

based upon petitioner’s counsel’s failure to request particular

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1 This matter was referred to a United States magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B) and Eastern

District Local Rule 72-302.

2

jury instructions.1 For the reasons set forth below, the court

adopts the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and

holds that respondent’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The court adopts the factual and procedural background set

forth by the magistrate judge in his findings and

recommendations. (See F&R, filed January 23, 2007, at 15-20.)

STANDARD

When timely objections to findings by a magistrate judge are

filed, the district court must conduct a de novo determination of

the findings and recommendations as to issues of law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). The district court may adopt, reject, or modify in

part or in full the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C).

ANALYSIS

1. Instructional Error: Involuntary Manslaughter

The court adopts the analysis set forth by the magistrate

judge in granting respondent’s motion for summary judgment on

petitioner’s claim of a violation of his constitutional rights

based upon the court’s failure to give an instruction on

voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. The magistrate judge

correctly found that it was error for the state trial court to

refuse petitioner’s request to give a jury instruction for

manslaughter based upon the petitioner’s testimony and that of

others regarding intoxication. (F&R at 48-52). The magistrate

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judge also correctly found that petitioner could not establish

that the error was structural error, or “reversible per se,”

because there is no Supreme Court authority for such a

proposition; as such, petitioner bears the burden of

demonstrating that the error was not harmless. See Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

An error is not harmless if it “had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Id.; see also Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1059-60 (9th

Cir. 2005) (holding that the Brecht standard survived the AEDPA,

even though the inquiries may overlap in many cases). If the

court harbors “grave doubt” as to whether the error has such a

substantial or injurious effect, the petitioner is entitled to

the writ. Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir.

2000). 

Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s harmless error

analysis. Specifically, petitioner alleges that the trial

court’s failure to instruct on petitioner’s theory of the case,

voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, is reversible per se,

citing Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995). However,

as noted by the magistrate judge, petitioner’s reliance on

Duckett is misplaced. (F&R at 52). The statement in Duckett

cited by petitioner refers to cases decided by the Ninth Circuit

on direct appeal. 67 F.3d at 744. The Duckett court emphasized

that in reviewing cases on direct appeal, . . . [it] may require

the district courts to ‘follow procedures deemed desirable from

the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in no wise

commanded . . . by the Constitution.’” Id. (quoting Cupp v.

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Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). The Ninth Circuit further

clarified that “[t]he fact that a jury instruction is inadequate

by Ninth Circuit direct appeal standard does not mean a

petitioner who relies on such an inadequacy will be entitled to

habeas relief from a state court conviction.” Id. (citing

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-71 (1991)). Moreover, the

Duckett court held that the failure to give an alibi instruction,

which would have been reversible per se on direct appeal, was not

error of a constitutional magnitude for purposes of habeas

relief. As such, the Ninth Circuit did not grant habeas relief

based upon the state court’s failure to give the requested alibi

instruction.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Ninth Circuit has

clearly stated that in the context of collateral review in a

habeas petition, even where a jury instruction is required but

not given, the petitioner must still “demonstrate that the

violation had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s

deliberation and verdict.” Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560,

577 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121,

1134 (9th Cir. 2002); Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826, 833 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“If the court finds constitutional error, then it

applies the test for harmless error.”). In Beardslee, the Ninth

Circuit addressed petitioner’s claims in a habeas petition that

the jury should have been instructed on the lesser-included noncapital offense of manslaughter, which petitioner asserted was

supported by the defense theory of imperfect duress. Id. at 576. 

The court held that petitioner failed to proffer any authority to

demonstrate that his imperfect duress theory was viable based

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2 The magistrate judge incorrectly stated that Beardslee

was an AEDPA case. However, this misstatement does not affect

the applicability of the Brecht harmless error analysis to this

case.

3 The Ray decision was overruled in 2000 by People v.

Blakely, 23 Cal. 4th 82, 89 (2000). However, Ray was the law at

the time of petitioner’s trial in 1990. 

5

upon the evidence at trial, and thus, the manslaughter

instruction was not required. Id. However, the court noted that

even if such an instruction was required, habeas relief based

upon constitutional error could not be awarded unless petitioner

prevailed upon the Brecht harmless error analysis. Id. at 577. 

Indeed, when analyzing the trial court’s failure to give a jury

instruction regarding a mistake of fact theory, the Beardslee

court undertook the Brecht harmless error analysis and held that

the petitioner could not meet the substantial effect standard

based upon the evidence at trial. Id. at 577-78.2 Therefore,

even where the court finds constitutional error, the court must

still conduct a harmless error analysis in order to grant habeas

relief.

The court agrees with the magistrate judge’s finding that

the failure to instruct the jury on voluntary or involuntary

manslaughter did not have a substantial and injurious effect on

the jury’s deliberation and verdict. (See F&R at 53-55). At the

time of petitioner’s trial, under California law, evidence of

voluntary intoxication in a homicide case could be admitted to

show that defendant did not form the intent to kill, even where

the petitioner’s mental state was short of unconsciousness. 

People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 30-31 (1975).3 Moreover, the trial

court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary

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manslaughter where there is substantial evidence that the

defendant was unable to entertain an intent to kill. Id.; People

v. Webber, 228 Cal. App. 1146, 1162 (1991). Substantial evidence

of lack of intent requires evidence of a “cause and effect

relationship between intoxication and lack of intent to kill.” 

Webber, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 1162. This may be supported by lay

testimony regarding the petitioner’s behavior or ingestion of

narcotics, expert testimony relating to the amount of narcotics

in the petitioner’s bloodstream, and/or expert testimony with

respect to the effect of those narcotics on the petitioner’s

ability to form sound judgments. Id. (citing Ray, 14 Cal. 3d at

25). “Lack of an intent to kill may [also] be indicated by

evidence that a defendant was acting like an automaton, robotlike or in a trance or dazed, i.e., that the body was moving

without the mind.” Id. at 1163.

While there may have been sufficient evidence to require a

jury instruction on manslaughter in petitioner’s trial, the

evidence regarding petitioner’s inability to form intent due to

intoxication was so weak that substantial and injurious harm

caused by the failure to instruct on manslaughter cannot be

found. Petitioner testified that he had taken two quarter gram

doses of methamphetamine within about five minutes of each other

(RT 3401-02). He also testified that he had been drinking

Southern Comfort with Amy Hadix. (RT 3406). However, there was

no expert testimony regarding the amount of alcohol or narcotics

in his bloodstream. Nor was there any expert testimony with

respect to the effect that the amount of alcohol or narcotics had

on petitioner’s state of mind. Further, neither Baker nor Hadix,

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4 Hadix testified that she said “Hi, Jim, how are you?”

before petitioner entered the apartment. (RT 3179).

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who were with petitioner immediately before and during the

murder, testified that petitioner was acting like he was in a

trance or dazed. The most favorable evidence to petitioner was

the testimony of June Rice, who testified that when petitioner

entered her apartment after killing James Rumsey he had a glare

in his eyes and looked like he was in a daze. (RT 3254). 

However, she did not testify that petitioner was acting as if on

“auto-pilot”; rather, she testified that he looked like he was

under the influence of methamphetamine. (Id.)

Moreover, petitioner’s own testimony undermined his

contention that he was unable to form the requisite intent due to

his intoxication. Petitioner testified that he “began to ball up

inside” when he was preparing to go down to Rice’s apartment to

get more drugs by telling Rice and Beard that the prior drugs

they sold him were bad. (RT 3407). Petitioner stated that if

someone approached him like he was about to approach Beard, he

would be very defensive. (Id.) Therefore, he brought a kitchen

knife with him. (RT 3408). He admitted that this wasn’t an

automatic action, but that he did some thinking before he decided

that he needed to bring the knife with him. (RT 3448). 

Petitioner told Hadix to stop at the Rumsey apartment.4 (RT

3409-10). He testified that he believed it was Rice’s apartment

and that he stabbed James Rumsey because he made a sudden

movement to get out of his chair that frightened petitioner. (RT

3473). However, after he stabbed both James and Helen Ramsey,

petitioner testified that he realized what was happening. (RT

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3412). He then checked the wallet in James Rumsey’s pocket and

threatened to kill Helen Rumsey if she didn’t give him money. 

(RT 3413). Petitioner also testified that immediately after the

murder, he went directly down to Rice’s apartment without having

any confusion or trouble finding it. (RT 3482). Finally,

petitioner testified that when he arrived at Rice’s apartment, he

was able to reform the “same intent” to get drugs. (RT 3483). 

In sum, petitioner testified that although he was able to

form the intent to get drugs and think about the possible danger

of his conduct such that he armed himself with a kitchen knife

immediately prior to the murder, and although he was able to form

the intent to rob the Rumseys after he stabbed both James and

Helen Rumsey, and although he was able to reform that same intent

to get drugs when he arrived at Rice’s apartment immediately

after the murder, he was so intoxicated that he was unable to

form the intent to rob or kill James Rumsey before he stabbed him

in the neck. However, petitioner’s intentional and thoughtful

actions both immediately prior to and immediately after the

murder of James Rumsey is inconsistent with someone who was so

intoxicated that he was unable to form the intent to rob or kill.

In light of the lack of any expert testimony, the lack of

lay witness observations that petitioner was behaving as if

without thinking, and petitioner’s own inconsistent testimony,

petitioner cannot meet the substantial and injurious effect

standard. Nor does the court harbor “grave doubt” as to the

effect of the trial court’s failure to give a manslaughter jury

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5 Petitioner also objects to the magistrate judge’s

findings with respect to Claim 57 based upon the sufficiency of

the evidence to support a felony murder conviction. In his

moving papers, petitioner specifically challenged the evidence of

requisite intent to commit robbery or burglary. However,

petitioner fails to address the basis or merits of his objection

in his briefing. 

Moreover, a de novo review of the record of the whole

supports the magistrate judge’s finding that the California

Supreme Court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence

was not unreasonable under the AEDPA. Petitioner admitted during

his testimony that after he was arrested he told officers that he

was trying to make money. (RT 3438). Petitioner also testified

that he had money on his mind the day before and the day the

murder was committed. (RT 3439). Hadix and Baker both testified

that petitioner was present when the Rumseys brought money to

Baker’s apartment earlier that day and when Baker’s daughter

commented that James Rumsey had “gobs” of money. Petitioner

testified that he knew there was money in the Rumsey’s apartment. 

(RT 3409). Based upon this evidence and the other evidence

presented at trial, a rational jury could have made inferences to

support a conviction of felony murder. 

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instruction. Therefore, the court adopts the magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendations with respect to this claim.5

Petitioner also objects to the magistrate judge’s failure to

analyze its claim based upon the trial court’s failure to provide

the jury with an option beyond either acquittal or conviction for

felony murder. Petitioner relies on the rule set forth by the

Supreme Court in Beck v. Alabama, that trial courts must provide

jury instructions on lesser included offenses. 447 U.S. 625, 637

(1980). The Court reasoned that “when the evidence

unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a

serious, violent offense – but leaves some doubt with respect to

an element that would justify conviction of a capital offense – 

the failure to give the jury the ‘third option’ of convicting on

a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the

risk of an unwarranted conviction.” Id. Therefore, the Court

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held that it violated due process to preclude the consideration

of lesser included offenses where the only options available to

the jury were conviction or acquittal of a capital offense. Id.

at 638. 

Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the magistrate judge

addressed this issue in his findings and recommendations in light

of the California Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue. (F&R

at 57). The jury was instructed as to the lesser included

offense of theft as well as robbery and burglary. (Id.) If the

jury did not find that petitioner had the requisite state of mind

to commit robbery or burglary, it could have found him guilty of

the lesser included offense of theft, which crime had no

requirement of an intent to steal at the time of entry. As such,

a felony murder conviction would have been precluded. However,

the jury did not find petitioner guilty of theft, but of robbery

and burglary. Further, with respect to the homicide charges, the

jury was instructed as to capital murder and second degree

murder. (RT 3740-41). Therefore, the jury was not presented

with an “all or nothing” situation, but was given a range of

options, “which eliminated the enhanced risk of an unwarranted

conviction.” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 955 (9th Cir.

2001) (holding that the trial court’s failure to give a sua

sponte imperfect self defense instruction did not violate Beck v.

Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), where the jury was instructed on

the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and

manslaughter). As such, the magistrate judge properly found that

the ruling of the California Supreme Court was not an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority and that the

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failure to give a manslaughter instruction did not violate due

process. 

2. Other Instructional Error and Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel Claims

Petitioner generally objects to the magistrate judges

findings and recommendations with respect to Claims 60-68, 82,

and 84 because he contends that the magistrate judge did not

provide coherent findings and conclusions and that the magistrate

judge improperly conflated the merits review of these claims with

that of Claim 59. However, the extensive analysis of each claim

set forth by the magistrate judge belies this contention. (See

F&R at 58-69) (addressing Claims 60-68, 82, and 84). Moreover,

the court finds no basis for petitioner’s objection based upon

the magistrate judge’s failure to repeat verbatim analysis from

Claim 59 that was equally applicable to other claims. Rather,

the court’s de novo review of the record demonstrates that the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations regarding Claims

60-68, 82, and 84 are proper and supported by law.

Petitioner also objects to the magistrate judge’s findings

regarding some of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims

(Claims 66-68, 89-90, and 94). Petitioner summarily argues that

trial counsel’s actions fell far below any reasonable standard of

performance with respect to the submission of necessary jury

instructions. For the reasons set forth in the F&Rs (F&R at 58-

69), the magistrate judge correctly found that applying the AEDPA

standard, trial counsel did not act unreasonably in his

representation of petitioner and that any error by counsel did

not affect the judgment.

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6 The court noted this effect of petitioner’s specific

IAC claims on his claim of cumulative prejudice in its Memorandum

and Order, filed Oct. 14, 2005. 

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Finally, petitioner argues that the Strickland analysis of

the prejudice cause by each of trial counsel’s failures must be

reserved until all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

are ripe for review. Petitioner’s claims based upon the

individual effect of specific alleged deficiencies by trial

counsel are ripe for review. For the reasons set forth above,

the court adopts the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations with respect to these claims. However,

petitioner still maintains a claim based upon the cumulative

effect of counsel’s alleged errors, Claim 28. The magistrate

judge’s findings and recommendations do not address this claim. 

Therefore, to the extent the court finds counsel’s performance

deficient, the cumulative effect of these deficiencies may be

reviewed when adjudicating Claim 28.6

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court adopts the magistrate

judge’s findings and recommendations filed January 23, 2007 and

thereby GRANTS respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the

claims raised and addressed in the findings and recommendations.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 11, 2008

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