Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02343/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02343-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY RIDEAU,

CDCR #K-32522,

Civil No. 11cv2343 JAH (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b)

vs.

J. VELASCO; GERALD J. JANDA; SILVIA

S. ROACHO; P. KUZIL-RUAN;

IRMA MARENO; SHERMAN RUTLEDGE

III; GABRIELA NUNEZ; J. CRIMAN;

G. TRUJILLO,

Defendant.

I. Procedural History

On October 11, 2011, Gregory S. Rideau (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se,

submitted a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff filed a

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2],

along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel [ECF No. 3].

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On December 13, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, denied his

Motion for Appointment of Counsel and dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b).

See Dec. 13, 2011 Order at 7-8. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in

order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. On January 6, 2012,

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires courts to review complaints filed by prisoners against officers

or employees of governmental entities and dismiss those or any portion of those found frivolous,

malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief

from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213

F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Prior to the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only

frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing a prisoner’s suit make and rule

on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The district court should grant leave to

amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.

1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

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“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while liberal

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court may nevertheless not “supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). 

As currently pleaded, the Court finds that, once again, Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two

essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right,

privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985)

(en banc).

A. Access to Courts

Plaintiff claims that Defendants conspired to prevent him from attending Court hearings

that resulted in dismissal of his cases. (See FAC at 5.) Prisoners do “have a constitutional right

to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of

access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley

v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held

that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to

assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners

with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons who are trained in the law.”

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish a violation of the right to access to the

courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal

attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded,

and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996).

An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see

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also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171

(9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have precluded

his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or

sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to

access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly

or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”); see also Christopher

v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of

action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just

as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.”). Plaintiff was

previously informed that he must describe the nature of the cases which appear to have occurred

in Superior Court in the County of Imperial. (See FAC at 5.) In order for there to be an access

to courts claim, Plaintiff must be able to show that these cases were related to his conditions of

confinement or related to his criminal conviction. He fails to describe the underlying nature of

these cases despite the Court’s previous Order informing him that he must do so. Plaintiff will

only be given one final opportunity to amend these claims to meet the requirements of both

Lewis and Christopher as set forth above.

B. Conspiracy claims

Once again, Plaintiff also alleges that several correctional officers acted in a conspiracy

to violate his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “To state a cause of action

under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a class

of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws,

(3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury,

property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.”

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403

U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). 

“[T]he language requiring intent to deprive equal protection . . . means that there must be some

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racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege membership in a protected class and fails to allege that any

Defendant acted with class-based animus, both of which are essential elements of a cause of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02; Schultz v. Sundberg, 759

F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that conspiracy plaintiff must show membership in a

judicially-designated suspect or quasi-suspect class); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995

F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993).

C. Sixth Amendment claims

Plaintiff claims that his Sixth Amendment rights have been violated but he fails to provide

sufficient facts from which this Court could determine whether he has stated a claim. The Sixth

Amendment, by its express language, “does not attach until a prosecution is commenced.”

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). Here, as stated above, Plaintiff fails to describe

the nature of the cases involving the alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for all the

reasons set forth above but will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his Complaint

to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court.

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A. However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days

leave from the date this Order is filed in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures

all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete

in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants

not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived.

See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without

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further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved § 1983 form complaint to

Plaintiff.

DATED: February 13, 2012 _______________________________________

 HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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