Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00567/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00567-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333in Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY ROBERTS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANJALI STOKES LEVINE; 

LOUISE MOYA STOKES; and 

ANIL KUMAR STOKES,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-567-WQH-BLM

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are 1) the Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and Quash Service of Process filed by Defendant Anjali 

Levine (ECF No. 19); 2) the Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint filed 

by Defendants Anjali Levine, Louise Stokes, and Anil Stokes (ECF No. 22); 3) the Motions 

to Dismiss First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can 

Be Granted Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed by Anjali Levine (ECF No. 23), 

Louise Stokes (ECF No. 24), and Anil Stokes (ECF No. 25); and 4) the Motion Regarding 

Choice of Law filed by Plaintiff Jeffrey Roberts (ECF No. 32).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On March 28, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (ECF No. 

1). Plaintiff filed Proofs of Service as to Louise Stokes and Anil Stokes on April 6, 2019 

(ECF Nos. 3-4), and as to Anjali Levine on April 15, 2019 (ECF No. 5). Louise Stokes and 

Anil Stokes filed Motions to Dismiss the Complaint on April 29, 2019 (ECF Nos. 6-7), but 

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Anjali Levine never filed a responsive pleading. On May 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Request 

for Entry of Default as to Anjali Levine. (ECF No. 9). The Clerk entered default on May 

2, 2019. (ECF No. 2).

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 21, 2019. (ECF No. 13). Plaintiff 

brings claims against Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes for 1) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”); 2) assault and battery; 3) violation of the Bane Act, section 

52.1 of the California Civil Code; 4) invasion of privacy; 5) civil harassment; 6) stalking; 

7) fraud; 8) deceit; 9) scheme to defraud and communications fraud in violation of section 

817.034 of the Florida Statutes; 10) violation of the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt 

Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.; 11) malicious civil conspiracy; 

and 12) stalking and harassment. Plaintiff brings claims against Anil Stokes for 1) 

malicious civil conspiracy; and 2) aiding and abetting. Plaintiff seeks damages, including 

punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 32. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction 

against Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes “against further possession or control of Plaintiff’s 

private information.” Id. at 33. 

On May 23, 2019, Anjali Levine filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and 

Quash Service of Process. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff did not file a response.

On June 6, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Amended 

Complaint. (ECF No. 22). Defendants each filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended 

Complaint. (ECF Nos. 23-25).

On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 

Strike and Motions to Dismiss. (ECF No. 26). On July 24, 2019, Defendants filed a Reply 

in support of their Motion to Strike (ECF No. 28) and Replies in support of their Motions 

to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 29-31).

On July 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion Regarding Choice of Law. (ECF No. 32). 

On August 19, 2019, Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Choice of 

Law Motion. (ECF No. 34). Plaintiff did not file a reply.

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B. Factual Allegations in the FAC

Plaintiff is a divorced, Orthodox Jewish rabbi with two children, living in Palm 

Beach County, Florida. Plaintiff alleges that in September 2011, he met Anjali Levine on 

frumster.com, a dating website for Orthodox Jews. On Plaintiff’s frumster.com profile, he 

“represented himself . . . [as] a religious teacher and counselor . . . .” ECF No. 13 at 3. 

Plaintiff alleges that, around this same time, Anjali Levine’s mother, Louise Stokes, 

reached out to Plaintiff via Facebook Messenger. Plaintiff alleges that Louise Stokessought 

Plaintiff’s counseling and guidance regarding Louise Stokes’ marriage to Anil Stokes, her 

plans to divorce Anil Stokes, her desire to convert to Judaism, her financial difficulties, 

and her sick mother.

Plaintiff alleges that, after “numerous phone calls over several months, Anjali

Levine requested to meet Plaintiff in person.” Plaintiff alleges that Anjali Levine planned 

to fly from California, where she lived, to visit Plaintiff in Florida in January 2012. Plaintiff 

alleges that Anjali Levine forwarded Plaintiff “an authentic-appearing paid-for e-ticket 

flight itinerary.” Shortly before the flight, Anjali Levine cancelled the visit. Plaintiff alleges 

that this cancelled trip was the first of many. Plaintiff alleges that between 2011 and 2017, 

Anjali Levine and/or Louise Stokes would send Plaintiff “authentic-appearing e-tickets.” 

These tickets were intended to “dupe” Plaintiff into believing that Anjali Levine and/or 

Louise Stokes were in Florida attempting to meet him. Plaintiff alleges that Anjali Levine 

and Louise Stokes intended to harass Plaintiff, and Anjali Levine had no intention of ever 

meeting him. Id. at 4.

Plaintiff alleges that there were approximately fifteen trips between 2011 and 2017 

where Anjali Levine “misrepresented” to Plaintiff that she attempted to visit Florida but 

could not board the plane. There were also six trips where Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes 

allegedly told Plaintiff that Anjali Levine was in Florida but was too scared to meet Plaintiff 

in person. Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that he saw photos on Facebook of Anjali Levine in 

New York or California when she claimed to be in Florida.

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Anjali Levine’s second failed trip occurred in March 2012. Plaintiff alleges that he 

received a booking confirmation from a Palm Beach hotel showing that Anjali Levine paid 

$368, non-refundable, for a room. Anjali Levine did not show up at the hotel. When 

Plaintiff pressed Anjali Levine about her failure to come to Florida, Anjali Levine told 

Plaintiff that she was “afraid to meet him in person” because she was a victim of childhood 

sexual assault. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was genuinely concerned and cared for 

Anjali Levine. Plaintiff counseled Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes on how to deal with 

Anjali Levine’s trauma. Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes confided to Plaintiff that Anjali

Levine had suffered from an eating disorder, insomnia, and nervous breakdowns and that 

Anil Stokes was suffering from Parkinson’s disease. Plaintiff alleges that Anjali Levine 

visited a therapist who was “utterly convinced Anjali was telling the truth.” Id. ¶ 36.

Plaintiff alleges that Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes’ representations were false. Anjali

Levine, Louise Stokes, and Anil Stokes’ ailments were “invented” in order to “appeal[] to 

Plaintiff’s sympathy as a religious teacher and counselor to . . . manipulate, control, 

psychologically abuse, and defraud Plaintiff.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that he became 

emotionally involved in Anjali Levine’s welfare, pouring “years of counseling, care, 

money, and effort” into Anjali Levine’s psychological well-being at the expense of his own 

health. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges he suffered from 1) chest pain caused by the stress of Anjali 

Levine allegedly planning to visit him; 2) pneumonia; 3) fever and skin lesions requiring 

surgery; 4) blackouts from abnormal blood pressure; and 5) severe emotional distress. Id. 

at 15-16.

Plaintiff alleges that Anjali Levine expressed to Plaintiff that she had “romantic and 

even sexual fantasies about him.” Anjali Levine sent Plaintiff and his children gifts, 

including a $488 leather briefcase. Plaintiff alleges that Anil Stokes “was aware of and 

financially enabled Anjali’s and Louise’s interactions with Plaintiff.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff 

alleges that Anjali Levine’s claims of romance were insincere, and the gifts were intended 

to trick Plaintiff into believing her lies.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants invited him to visit Anjali Levine on eight occasions

in New York, Irvine, or Washington, D.C. Plaintiff alleges that when Plaintiff traveled to 

meet Anjali Levine, she was either not in the city she had claimed to be in or she “actively 

avoided” Plaintiff during his visit. Plaintiff alleges Anjali Levine “admitted to Plaintiff that 

she had stalked Plaintiff,” and she appeared in photos on Facebook less than a mile from 

Plaintiff’s house on dates when she told Plaintiff she was in California or New York. Id. at 

10. Plaintiff alleges that Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes would “frantically call[], text[], 

and arrange[] meetings . . . day after day where they kept him waiting as long as possible, 

playing on his sympathy and begging for his counsel and support.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff 

alleges that on “June 27, 2017, Plaintiff suspected fraudulent intentions on Anjali’s and 

Louise’s behalf.” Plaintiff “told Anjali he did not want to live knowing she had deceived 

him in order to test Anjali’s reactions.” Anjali Levine “urged [Plaintiff] to kill himself 

immediately.” Id. at 14.

Plaintiff alleges that between 2011 and 2017, he sent Anjali Levine approximately 

$8,000 in gifts and cash, based on false representations from Anjali Levine and Louise 

Stokes that they needed money to pay for Anjali Levine’s therapy, travel expenses, and 

school. Anjali Levine “regularly expressed her desire to receive gold jewelry.” Id. at 21. 

Plaintiff alleges that Anjali Levine “bragged” to Plaintiff that she conducted schemes to 

obtain gifts and money from other Orthodox Jewish men, whom she contacted via 

Facebook or frumster.com. Id. at 22.

II. MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND QUASH SERVICE

Anjali Levine contends that the Court should set aside entry of default and quash 

service of process because service of process was defective.1(ECF No. 19-1 at 8). Anjali 

 

1 Anjali also requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Motions to Dismiss the Complaint filed by 

Louise and Anil. (Vokshori Decl., ECF No. 19-5 ¶ 3). Judicial notice of the requested documents is 

unnecessary for this Order. Anjali’s request for judicial notice is denied. See Asvesta v. Petroustas, 580 

F.3d 1000, 1010 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying request for judicial notice where judicial notice would be 

“unnecessary”).

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Levine contends that no one served her personally on April 9, 2019, or any other day. 

Instead, an envelope with Anjali Levine’s name was left at the front desk of her office on 

April 16, 2019. Id. at 14.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), a court may set aside an entry of 

default for good cause. “Failure to properly serve a defendant with process pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4 constitutes good cause to set aside an entry of default.” Koninklijke Philips 

Elecs. N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 470, 472 (D. Nev. 2007). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) governs service of process on individuals 

within a judicial district of the United States. Rule 4(e) provides that a plaintiff may serve 

an individual by:

(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in the 

courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located 

or where service is made; or

(2) doing any of the following:

(a) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 

individual personally;

(b) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place 

of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides 

there; or

(c) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment 

or by law to accept service.

California state law allows for service upon an individual by 1) delivering a copy of the 

summons and complaint by “personal delivery . . . to the person to be served;” 2) substitute 

service combined with mailing after a good faith effort at personal service has been 

attempted; or 3) service by publication. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 415.10, 415.20, 415.30, 

415.50. Manners of substitute service include “leaving a copy of the summons and 

complaint during usual office hours in his or her office” or “leaving a copy of the summons 

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and complaint at the person’s . . . usual place of business . . . in the presence of . . . a person 

apparently in charge of his or her office.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(a)-(b). 

Here, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that service of process was proper,

because default judgment has not been entered. Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 801. Plaintiff fails 

to meet his burden. See SEC v. Internet Solutions for Bus., Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“[A] signed return of service constitutes prima facie evidence of valid service 

. . . .”). Anjali Levine has submitted Declarations and Exhibits that call the Proof of Service 

into question, and Plaintiff has not submitted additional evidence of proper service. 

Plaintiff’s failure to show Anjali Levine was properly served constitutes good cause to set 

aside the entry of default, even though the Complaint is no longer the operative complaint 

in this matter. Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen a 

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the amended complaint supersedes the original, the 

latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”) (quotation omitted). Anjali Levine’s 

Motion to Set Aside Default and Quash Service of Process (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED.

III. CHOICE OF LAW MOTION

Plaintiff contends that the Court should apply Florida substantive law to Counts Nine 

and Ten of the Amended Complaint, which Plaintiff has brought for violations of the 

Florida Communications Fraud Act (“FCFA”), section 817.034 of the Florida Statutes. 

Plaintiff contends that there is “no California equivalent” to the FCFA. (ECF No. 32 at 1). 

Plaintiff contends that the FCFA is different from both California common law fraud and 

California’s codified tort of deceit, because “each of the California [laws] only address 

liability for specific actions, whereas the very purpose of Florida Statutes § 817.034 is to 

address ‘a systematic, ongoing course of conduct . . . .’” Id. at 2 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 

817.034(3)(d)). Plaintiff contends that Florida and California’s fraud and deceit laws exist 

to protect persons in their states. Plaintiff’s location during the underlying events should, 

therefore, determine which law governs. Plaintiff contends that the Court should also apply 

Florida substantive law to Count Twelve for malicious civil conspiracy, because Florida 

and California civil conspiracy laws are designed to protect the citizens of their respective 

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states. “Defendants should be held accountable under Florida law for actions directed at a 

Plaintiff in Florida.” (ECF No. 32 at 2).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to show the Court should 

apply Florida law. (ECF No. 34 at 5). Defendants contend that the FCFA “is not applicable 

to the facts alleged in the matter and thus there is no conflicting law to choose from.” Id.

at 10. Defendants contend that the FCFA does not apply because Defendants did not 

conceal their names or attempt to sell Plaintiff any service or product. Id. at 11. Defendants 

contend that, if the FCFA does apply, there is no conflict with California law, because the 

FCFA is a restatement of the federal wire and mail fraud laws. California courts “employ 

those same federal wire and mail fraud statutes.” Id. at 13-14. Defendants contend that 

California state law addresses schemes to defraud, not only specific, discrete acts. Id. at 15. 

Finally, Defendants contend that California has the greater interest in applying its law, 

because California was where the alleged wrongs were committed. Id. at 16. Defendants 

contend that Florida and California conspiracy law is virtually identical, so there is no 

conflict between the two laws. Id. at 18. 

Federal courts sitting in diversity “must apply the forum state’s choice of law rules 

to determine the controlling substantive law.” Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 F.3d 943, 

950 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). The foreign law proponent has the burden to show 

that foreign law, rather than California law, should apply to the plaintiff’s claims. In re 

Hyundai v. Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 539, 561 (9th Cir. 2019). To meet their burden, 

the foreign law proponent must satisfy California’s three-step “governmental interest” test. 

Id.

Under the first step of the governmental interest approach, the foreign law

proponent must identify the applicable rule of law in each potentially 

concerned state and must show it materially differs from the law of California 

. . . . If . . . the trial court finds the laws are materially different, it must proceed 

to the second step and determine what interest, if any, each state has in having 

its own law applied to the case . . . . Only if the trial court determines that the 

laws are materially different and that each state has an interest in having its 

own law applied, thus reflecting an actual conflict, must the court take the

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final step and select the law of the state whose interests would be ‘more 

impaired’ if its law were not applied.

Wash. Mut. Bank v. Sup. Ct., 15 P.3d 1071, 1080 (Cal. 2001) (citations omitted). The 

preference is to apply California law, rather than choose the foreign law. Strassberg v. New 

England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1978).

Regarding Plaintiff’s Ninth and Tenth Counts, Plaintiff fails to make any argument 

regarding step three of the governmental interest test. Even if Plaintiff meets his burden at

steps one and two of the governmental interest test, Plaintiff fails to show Florida’s interest 

would be more impaired if the Court applies California law than California’s interest would 

be if the Court applies Florida law. See Coufal Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 936 

(9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]ith respect to regulating or affecting conduct within its borders, the 

place of the wrong has the predominant interest.”). Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to 

demonstrate that the Court should apply Florida law, rather than California law, to 

Plaintiff’s Ninth and Tenth Counts. 

Regarding Plaintiff’s Twelfth Count, Plaintiff makes no effort to “identify the 

applicable rule of law in each potentially concerned state and [] show it materially differs 

from the law of California.” Wash. Mut. Bank, 15 P.3d at 1080. Plaintiff has not met his 

burden to show the Court should apply Florida law. The Court applies California law to 

Counts Nine, Ten, and Twelve. Plaintiff’s Motion Regarding Choice of Law (ECF No. 32) 

is DENIED.

IV. MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on the grounds it fails 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 23-1 at 2). 

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.” In order to state a claim for relief, a pleading 

“must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

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entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “is proper only 

where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support 

a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ 

of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell 

v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Count One – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Anjali Levine contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for IIED, because

“Plaintiff’s distress flowing from frustrated communications and a failed relationship, with 

alleged false statements along the way about Defendant Levine’s childhood, finances and 

whereabouts . . . do not rise to the level needed” to show extreme and outrageous conduct. 

(ECF No. 23-1 at 6-7). Louise Stokes contends that her statements to Plaintiff regarding 

Anjali Levine’s well-being and childhood traumas “fail to constitute actionable conduct.” 

Louise Stokes contends that the email from Plaintiff to Louise Stokes, which Plaintiff 

attaches to his Amended Complaint, shows Plaintiff “liked” Louise Stokes, not that she

caused Plaintiff emotional distress. (ECF No. 24-1 at 6). Louise Stokes contends Plaintiff 

has not alleged that Louise Stokes intended to cause Plaintiff emotional distress. Id. at 5. 

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes also contend that Plaintiff’s IIED claim is barred by the 

applicable two-year statute of limitations. (ECF No. 23-1 at 7). 

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Plaintiff contends that he “does not claim ‘mere rudeness and insensitivity,’ . . . [h]e 

claims specific physical harm on specific dates, well documented by medical records . . . 

.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 12). Plaintiff also contends a three-year statute of limitations applies 

to every Count in the Amended Complaint, because “[t]he essence of this lawsuit is 

fraudulent misrepresentation.” Id. at 10-11.

To establish a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must show:

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of 

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; 

(2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) 

actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s 

outrageous conduct.

Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009) (quotation omitted). A defendant’s conduct 

is “outrageous” when it is “so extreme as to exceed all abounds of that usually tolerated in 

a civilized community.” Id.

Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that he “has suffered severe emotional 

distress since discovering the reality of Defendants’ interactions with him.” (ECF No. 13 

at 16). Plaintiff alleges that Anjali Levine told Plaintiff that he should kill himself. Plaintiff 

alleges, however, that he told Anjali Levine he did not want to live “in order to test Anjali’s 

reactions.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Plaintiff alleges that Anjali told Plaintiff to kill 

himself after Plaintiff suspected Defendants’ “fraudulent intentions.” Id. at 14-15. Plaintiff 

fails to state facts sufficient to show Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes’ conduct constitutes 

“extreme and outrageous conduct.” See Nagy v. Nagy, 258 Cal. Rptr. 787, 791 (Ct. App. 

1989) (“Although we do not condone respondent’s misrepresentations, they are similar to 

a ‘betrayal,’ for which the law wisely should not provide a remedy.”). Anjali Levine and 

Louise Stokes’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Count are GRANTED.

C. Count Two – Assault and Battery

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is 

defective because Plaintiff pleads assault and battery as a single cause of action. (ECF No. 

23-1 at 8-9). Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim

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for battery or assault, because “no allegations suggest in any way that [Anjali Levine or 

Louise Stokes] ever had physical contact with Plaintiff to make a ‘battery’ even possible.” 

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that “[t]here are no facts alleged to show that 

[Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes] acted with the intent to make physical contact with 

Plaintiff, nor that [they] ever threatened to physically touch him.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff 

requests “leave to Amend the current Complaint in order to state assault and battery 

allegations as separate claims.”

The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) defendant 

touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or 

offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was 

harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in 

plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching.

So v. Shin, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 269 (Ct. App. 2013); California Civil Jury Instructions 

(2017) (“CACI”) No. 1300.

The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted 

with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch 

plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed 

she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably 

appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) 

plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and 

(5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.

So, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 269; CACI No. 1301.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “Anjali and Louise intended to and 

did repeatedly inflict bodily harm on Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 13 at 17). Plaintiff states no facts 

to support this conclusory allegation. Plaintiff does not allege that Anjali Levine or Louise 

Stokes touched Plaintiff or caused Plaintiff to be touched. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

battery against Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes.

Plaintiff alleges that “Anjali assaulted Plaintiff by repeatedly seeking to convince 

him to kill himself.” Id. Anjali Levine’s alleged statements telling Plaintiff to commit 

suicide do not amount to an assault. See Plotnik v. Meihaus, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 598 

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(Ct. App. 2012) (“Mere words, however threatening, will not amount to an assault.”). 

Plaintiff does not allege Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes intended or threatened to touch 

Plaintiff or cause him to be touched. Plaintiff does not allege he reasonably believed he 

was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner. Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

for assault against Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes. Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes’

Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Count are GRANTED.

D. Count Three - Violation of the Bane Act

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

violation of the Bane Act, because Plaintiff does not allege that Anjali Levine or Louise 

stokes “threatened, intimidated, or committed violence against him.” Anjali Levine asserts

that she and Plaintiff never met, so no battery was possible. Anjali Levine contends that 

her alleged “stalking” cannot support a Bane Act claim, because “Plaintiff was unaware of 

the conduct and thus felt no threat or intimidation.” Anjali Levine contends that Plaintiff’s 

allegation that Anjali Levine encouraged Plaintiff to kill himself was not a credible threat 

of violence. (ECF No. 23-1 at 12). Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff 

fails to allege that he was prevented from doing something he was entitled to do by law. 

Id. at 13. Plaintiff contends that Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes’ coercion and threats of 

violence were covert; Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes “worked together through fraud 

and deceit to harm Plaintiff and then Anjali Levine sought to coerce Plaintiff into

committing suicide.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 13).

The Bane Act permits an individual to pursue a civil action for damages where 

another person “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by 

threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or 

individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the 

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). “The 

essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., 

‘threat[], intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing 

something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do 

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something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Austin B. v. Escondido 

Union Sch. Dist., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 472 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Jones v. Kmart Corp., 

949 P.2d 941, 946 (Cal. 1998)).

Speech alone is not sufficient to support an action brought pursuant to 

subdivision (a) or (b), except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens 

violence against a specific person or group of persons; and the person or group 

of persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because 

of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property and 

that the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the 

threat.

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(k). 

Plaintiff fails to identify any “rights” that Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes sought to 

interfere with. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). Plaintiff does not allege that Anjali Levine or 

Louise Stokes threatened violence, that Plaintiff reasonably feared violence would be 

committed against him or his property, and that Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes had the 

ability to carry out any threatened violence. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(k). Plaintiff fails to state 

facts sufficient to show Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes violated the Bane Act. Anjali 

Levine and Louise Stokes’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Count are GRANTED.

E. Count Four – Invasion of Privacy

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

invasion of privacy, because “Plaintiff does not claim that Defendants gained unconsented 

access to his home or to any personal or private information.” (ECF No. 23-1 at 14). Anjali 

Levine and Louise Stokes also contend that Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy is 

barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 15. Plaintiff contends that he 

“was duped into performing certain actions based on the defendants’ misrepresentations.” 

Therefore, any personal disclosure was not voluntary. (ECF No. 26-1 at 13). Plaintiff 

contends that each cause of action is subject to the three-year statute of limitations for fraud 

or mistake. Id. at 11.

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The tort of intrusion into private affairs, or intrusion upon seclusion, requires: (1) 

the defendant’s intentional intrusion into a private place, conversation, matter, affairs, or 

concerns; (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 

1185, 1212 (Cal. 2007).

To prove actionable intrusion, the plaintiff must show the defendant 

penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained 

unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the 

plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in 

the place, conversation or data source.

Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).

Plaintiff does not allege facts from which the Court can infer that Anjali Levine or 

Louise Stokes “penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or 

obtained unwanted access to data.” Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that Anjali 

Levine was stalking him. (ECF No. 13 at 10). Plaintiff fails to allege facts to show Anjali 

Levine intruded into any “secluded” area where Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of 

privacy. See Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999) (“The first element 

is not met when the Plaintiff has merely been observed, or even photographed or recorded, 

in a public place.”). Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes’ Motionsto Dismiss the Fourth Count 

are GRANTED.

F. Count Five – Civil Harassment

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff’s claim for harassment under 

section 527.6(b)(3) of the California Code of Civil Procedure2is an “expedited process, [] 

not properly included as a cause of action in a complaint.” (ECF No. 23-1 at 16). Anjali

Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff does not state a claim for harassment 

because Plaintiff does not state facts that show Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes threatened 

violence or engaged in “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at Plaintiff.” 

 

2 The Parties mistakenly reference section 527.6 of the “California Civil Code” in the Amended 

Complaint, Motions, and Response.

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Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by either a two- or 

three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 17. Plaintiff contends that his Amended Complaint 

is “explicit,” and he “most certainly claims and outlines” conduct that falls under section 

527.6(b)(3). (ECF No. 26-1 at 14).

California Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides: “A person who has 

suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order 

and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Cal. Code 

Civ. Proc. § 527.6(a)(1). “Harassment” is:

Unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful 

course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, 

or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of 

conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer 

substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional 

distress to the petitioner.

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 527.6(b)(3). Section 527.6 “was enacted to provide an expedited 

procedure for preventing ‘harassment’ as defined.” Byers v. Cathcart, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 398, 

402 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). Section 527.6 “provides for temporary restraining 

orders to handle immediate problems, followed quickly by a court hearing on a limitedscope antiharassment injunction—normally within 15 days, but in no case more than 22 

days even if time is extended for good cause.” Id. at 402-03 (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

527.6(c)-(d)). Section 527.6 “does not allow for final resolution of disputed rights.” Byers, 

67 Cal. Rptr. at 403.

Here, Plaintiff seeks final resolution of disputed rights; he does not seek a temporary 

injunction. Plaintiff does not assert any reason that a cause of action for a violation of 

section 527.6 is properly included in the Amended Complaint. Anjali Levine and Louise

Stokes’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Count are GRANTED.

G. Count Six – Stalking

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

stalking, because he does not allege Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes engaged in a pattern 

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of conduct intended to harass, alarm, or place Plaintiff under surveillance. (ECF No. 23-1 

at 18). Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend they did not make a threat that would 

cause Plaintiff to fear for his safety. Id. at 18-19. Plaintiff contends that he “feared for his 

personal wellbeing and that he demanded that Anjali’s ‘visits’ stop for over three years, 

but that she continued.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 14-15).

Under section 1708.7 of the California Civil Code, an individual is liable for the tort 

of stalking when a plaintiff shows:

(1) The defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to 

follow, alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff. In order to 

establish this element, the plaintiff shall be required to support his or her 

allegations with independent corroborating evidence.

(2)As a result of that pattern of conduct, either of the following occurred:

(A) The plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety . . . .

(B) The plaintiff suffered substantial emotional distress, and the 

pattern of conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer 

substantial emotional distress.

(3) One of the following:

(A) The defendant, as a part of the pattern of conduct specified in 

paragraph (1), made a credible threat with either (i) the intent to place 

the plaintiff in reasonable fear for his or her safety, . . . or (ii) reckless 

disregard for the safety of the plaintiff . . . . In addition, the plaintiff 

must have, on at least one occasion, clearly and definitively demanded 

that the defendant cease and abate his or her pattern of conduct and the 

defendant persisted in his or her pattern of conduct unless exigent 

circumstances make the plaintiff’s communication of the demand 

impractical or unsafe.

(B) The defendant violated a restraining order . . . .

Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a). 

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Assuming that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes engaged 

in a prohibited pattern of conduct, Plaintiff fails to “support his . . . allegations with 

independent corroborating evidence” as required by subdivision (a)(1). The Exhibits 

Plaintiff attaches to his Amended Complaint show that Plaintiff actively reached out to 

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes, wanted to meet Anjali Levine in person, and enjoyed his

conversations with Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes. See, e.g., ECF No. 16-2 at 1 (April 3, 

2012, Facebook Messenger chain, Louise Stokes: “I would love to talk;” Plaintiff: “sounds 

great!”); ECF No. 15-5 at 2 (November 18, 2013, email from Plaintiff to Louise Stokes

stating, “I’ve tried to reach out to you as much as I know how since I first met Anjali;” and 

“I was only too happy to spend hours on the phone”); ECF No. 17-3 at 1 (December 25, 

2013, email from Plaintiff to Louise Stokes stating, “Anjali . . . can NOT run again . . . . 

Please call me”); ECF No. 17-5 at 1 (January 30, 2014, email from Plaintiff to Louise

Stokes stating, “Are [you and Anjali Levine] planning on meeting me at some point, or just 

leaving?”). Anjali Levine’s July 16, 2017, email to Plaintiff, stating that she “will pay 

restitution for the emotional harm I caused you” (ECF No. 18-4 at 1), is insufficient to 

show Anjali Levine stalked Plaintiff. Plaintiff also does not allege that Anjali Levine or 

Louise Stokes made a “credible threat” as required by subdivision (a)(3). Anjali Levine 

and Louise Stokes’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Count are GRANTED.

H. Counts Seven Through Ten – Fraud and Deceit

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff fails to plead fraud with 

particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). (ECF No. 23-1 at 19). 

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff requires Anjali Levine and Louise

Stokes to “guess at [their] hazard which statements and which acts, flowing back to 2011, 

and which of the 25 Exhibits, are supposedly being relied on by Plaintiff.” Anjali Levine 

and Louise Stokes contend that their conversations with Plaintiff are non-actionable 

personal opinions and expressions of statement of mind. Id. at 20. Louise Stokes contends 

that Plaintiff fails to allege that Louise Stokes’ statements induced Plaintiff to pay for 

anything. Louise Stokes also contends Plaintiff’s Seventh and Eighth Counts are barred by 

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the three-year statute of limitations. (ECF No. 24-1 at 19). Plaintiff contends his assertion 

that Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes targeted Orthodox Jewish men is fundamental to 

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes’ “malicious intentions.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 15).

Claims sounding in fraud or mistake must comply with the heightened pleading 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that a complaint 

“must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Rule 9(b) 

“requires . . . an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations 

as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 

476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 

USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (averments of fraud must be accompanied by 

“the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged”) (quotation omitted). 

“To comply with Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants 

notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that 

they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 

Bly-Magee v. Cal., 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).

In a suit involving multiple defendants, “there is no absolute requirement that . . . 

the complaint must identify false statements made by each and every defendant.” Swartz, 

476 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in original). “On the other hand, Rule 9(b) does not allow a 

complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together but requires plaintiffs to 

differentiate their allegations when suing more than one defendant and inform each 

defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged participation in the fraud.” 

Id. at 764-65 (quotation and alterations omitted). “[A] plaintiff must, at a minimum, 

identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraudulent scheme.” Id. at 765 (quotation 

and alterations omitted).

“The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) 

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of 

falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; 

and (e) resulting damage.” Lazar v. Sup. Ct., 909 P.2d 981, 984 (Cal. 1996) (quoting 5 

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Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 676, p. 778). California’s tort of 

deceit has been codified at section 1709 of the California Civil Code, which provides that 

“[o]ne who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his 

injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” A “deceit” under section 

1709 is any one of the following: 1) “[t]he suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, 

by one who does not believe it to be true;” 2) “[t]he assertion, as a fact, of that which is not 

true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true;” 3) “[t]he suppression 

of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which 

are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact;” or 4) “[a] promise, made 

without any intention of performing it.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1710.

Plaintiff alleges that Louise Stokes “regularly presented [herself] as needing 

money,” but he fails to state facts that show Louise Stokes intended to induce Plaintiff to 

give her money. ECF No. 13 at 21; see Ashburn v. Miller, 326 P.2d 229, 238 (Ct. App. 

1958) (“Intent to defraud is not the essence of a suit for deceit; it is the intent to induce 

action by the other party that counts.”). Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants outright requested 

money from Plaintiff,” but he fails to connect this request to any misrepresentation. 

Plaintiff fails to allege “the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.”

Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106. Plaintiff also fails to connect his claimed damages—“$8,000 in 

gifts and cash 2011-2017 based on Defendants’ misrepresentations”—to any alleged 

misrepresentations. (ECF No. 13 at 21). Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the heightened 

pleading standard required to state a claim for fraud or deceit under Rule 9(b). Anjali 

Levine and Louise Stokes’ Motions to Dismiss the Seventh through Tenth Counts are 

GRANTED.

I. Count Eleven – RICO Violation for Mail and Wire Fraud

Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes contend that Plaintiff “only states in the most 

conclusory terms a scheme or plan on the part of Anjali and Louise to engage in mail 

fraud.” (ECF No. 23-1 at 21). Anjali Levine contends that Plaintiff fails to plead the 

contents of any writing allegedly authored by Anjali Levine. Anjali Levine and Louise

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Stokes contend that Plaintiff’s gifts of money and property are not a cognizable form of 

damages under RICO. Id. at 22. Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes also contend that 

Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Id. at 23. 

Plaintiff contends that the gifts he sent Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes were not voluntary 

“in the context of allegations of fraud.” Plaintiff contends that he states damages in the 

amount of “$8,000 in gifts and cash.” Plaintiff also contends that the statute of limitations 

has not expired because he did not discover Defendants’ misrepresentations until June 27, 

2017. (ECF No. 26-1 at 16). 

To state a RICO violation, a plaintiff must show “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) 

through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury 

to plaintiff’s business or property.” Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 

431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Predicate acts can include mail or 

wire fraud, which share the same elements:

(1) the defendants formed a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) the defendants 

used the United States mails [or wires] or caused a use of the United States 

mails [or wires] in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) the defendants did so 

with the specific intent to deceive or defraud.

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 

1986); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.

Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegations that Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes 

devised “a scheme to defraud” and that Anjali Levine told Plaintiff she had “conducted an 

analogous scheme” in the past. (ECF No. 13 at 22, 26). Plaintiff does not state facts to 

support these allegations. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden under Rule 9(b). Anjali Levine 

and Louise Stokes’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eleventh Count are GRANTED.

J. Count Twelve – Civil Conspiracy

Anjali Levine, Louise Stokes, and Anil Stokes contend that “a civil conspiracy is not 

an independent tort.” (ECF No. 23-1 at 23). Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails, because 

Plaintiff’s claims for the underlying torts fail. Id. at 24. Louise Stokes contends that 

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Plaintiff fails to plead facts to demonstrate that she entered into a common plan with Anjali

Levine to commit a tort. (ECF No. 24-1 at 25). Anil Stokes contends that he is “not 

mentioned once in the claim for conspiracy” and that Plaintiff fails to allege Anil Stokes

entered into an agreement with the other Defendants. (ECF No. 25-1 at 6). Plaintiff 

contends that Defendants have not challenged civil conspiracy under Florida law, so they 

have not challenged Plaintiff’s Twelfth Count. (ECF No. 26-1 at 16).3

Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability 

on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share 

with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. 

By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts as his 

or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy.

In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the immediate 

tortfeasors.

Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 869 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal. 1994).

The elements of a civil conspiracy are 1) the formation of a group of two or more persons 

who agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act; 2) a wrongful act 

committed pursuant to the agreement; and 3) resulting damages. Id.

“Standing alone, a conspiracy does no harm and engenders no tort liability.” Id.

Without an underlying tort, a claim for conspiracy cannot stand. See Okun v. Sup. Ct., 629 

P.2d 1369, 1376 (Cal. 1981) (“A complaint for civil conspiracy states a cause of action 

only when it alleges the commission of a civil wrong that causes damage. Though 

conspiracy may render additional parties liable for the wrong, the conspiracy itself is not 

actionable without a wrong.”). A motion to dismiss the conspiracy cause of action should 

be granted if no actionable conduct is alleged. Id.

Here, Plaintiff does not state facts to show any Defendants conspired with another 

to commit a tort. Plaintiff fails to state facts showing Defendants agreed to commit each of 

the wrongful acts alleged in the Complaint, instead generally alleging that Louise Stokes

 

3 The Court has ordered California conspiracy law applies to Plaintiff’s claim. 

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“reinforced” Anjali Levine’s “false narrative.” Id. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are 

insufficient. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Twelfth Count are GRANTED.

K. Count Fourteen4 – Aiding and Abetting

Anil Stokes contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting, 

because he has failed to plead “knowledge” or “intent.” (ECF No. 25-1 at 8). Plaintiff does 

not respond to Anil Stokes’ contention.

Aiding and abetting requires the commission of an underlying tort. See CACI 3610. 

Liability may . . . be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of 

an intentional tort if the person (a) knows the other’s conduct constitutes a 

breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other 

to so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a 

tortious result and the person’s own conduct, separately considered, 

constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.

Am. Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd., 225 Cal. App. 4th 1451, 1475 (Ct. App. 

2014). To plead aiding and abetting, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant “had actual 

knowledge of the specific primary wrong” being committed. Casey v. Bank Nat. Assn., 26 

Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 406 (Ct. App. 2005). 

Plaintiff alleges Anil Stokes lived with Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes, was 

“aware” of Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes’ interactions with Plaintiff, and paid for Anjali

Levine’s therapy, flights to see Plaintiff, and gifts for Plaintiff and his children. (ECF No. 

13 at 32). Plaintiff fails to allege facts from which the Court can infer that Anil Stokes had 

knowledge of any specific, primary wrong. Anil Stokes’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Fourteenth Count is GRANTED.

///

///

///

 

4 Plaintiff and Defendants refer to the “aiding and abetting” count as “Count Thirteen.” However, the 

Amended Complaint states that Count Thirteen is for “Stalking & Harassment.” (ECF No. 13 at 30). 

“Aiding and Abetting” is Count Fourteen. Id. at 31.

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V. MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants move to strike certain allegations in the Amended Complaint on the 

grounds that they are redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(f) (ECF No. 22-1).

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading 

an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

“Redundant” matter is needlessly repetitive. See Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. 

Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002). “Immaterial” matter “has no 

essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” 

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 5 Charles A. Wright 

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706-07 (1990)), rev’d on 

other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). “‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do 

not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Id. at 711. Scandalous matter 

“cast a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person.” In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. 

Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Motions to strike should only be granted 

when it is “clear that it can have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation,” 

Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Nordic PCL Const., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (D. Haw. 

2012), and should not be used “to dismiss a claim for damages on the basis it is precluded 

as a matter of law,” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 

2010).

B. Immaterial, Impertinent, and Redundant Language

Defendants move to strike certain allegations in the Amended Complaint on the 

grounds that they are “historical matter” that are immaterial, impertinent, and redundant. 

Specifically, Defendants move the Court to strike paragraphs 10-21, 25, 27, 31-33, 35, 36, 

38, and 39, and paragraph “31” on page 13 of the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 22-1 at 

10). Plaintiff contends that the allegations in the Amended Complaint are not “genuinely 

and obviously irrelevant to the stated causes of action.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 7).

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The allegations in the paragraphs Defendants move to strike have potential bearing 

on the subject matter of this litigation. Defendants’ communications with Plaintiff, the 

failed attempts to meet, and alleged false statements (paragraphs 10-21) have a direct 

bearing on each of Plaintiff’s claims. The gifts Anjali Levine allegedly sent Plaintiff 

(paragraphs 25, 25) are material to Plaintiff’s claims and damages. The actions described 

in paragraphs 31-33, 35, 36, 38, and 39, and paragraph “31” on page 13, are material to

Plaintiff’s claims. The Court cannot conclude these allegations have no possible bearing 

on any of Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants’ Motion to Strike paragraphs 10-21, 25, 27, 31-

33, 35, 36, 38, and 39, and paragraph “31” on page 13, is DENIED.

C. Scandalous Matter

Defendants move to strike certain Exhibits and allegations in the Amended 

Complaint on the grounds that they “are scandalous and ha[ve] no legal relationship to any 

of Plaintiff’s 14 Counts.” (ECF No. 22-1 at 11). Specifically, Defendants move to strike 

paragraphs 4, 6, 10, 13, 27, 29, 74, 75, 91, 92, and 93, and all the incorporated Exhibits. 

Id. at 12. Plaintiff contends that “[i]t is not scandalous, as here, to allege that a defendant 

being sued for fraud is a fraudster.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 6).

None of the paragraphs or Exhibits challenged by Defendants allege scandalous 

matter. All of the allegations are material to jurisdiction, venue, or Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendants. Defendants do not show how the allegations “cast a cruelly derogatory light.” 

In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 965. Defendants’ Motion to Strike 

paragraphs 4, 6, 10, 13, 27, 29, 74, 75, 91, 92, and 93, and all the incorporated Exhibits, is 

DENIED.

D. Redundant Claims

Defendants contend the Court should strike certain Counts and allegations in the 

Amended Complaint, because they are based on Florida Law and are therefore repetitive 

of Plaintiff’s California law claims for the same conduct. Defendants contend that the Court 

should strike Plaintiff’s Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Twelfth Counts, paragraph 50 of the 

Fourth Count, and paragraphs 104, 105, and 110 of the Thirteenth Count, because Plaintiff 

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improperly alleges violations of Florida law in a California law complaint. Defendants 

contend that Plaintiff’s Thirteenth count for stalking and harassment is redundant of 

Plaintiff’s two other claims for stalking and harassment. (ECF No. 22-1 at 14). Plaintiff 

contends that choice of law issues are not properly raised in a motion to strike. (ECF No. 

26-1 at 7).

The Court has dismissed many of the Counts Defendants seek to strike: Four, Eight, 

Nine, Ten, and Twelve. Defendants’ Motion to Strike these counts is moot. Regarding the 

Thirteenth Count, a motion to strike is not a proper filing in which to raise substantive 

choice of law issues. See Tattersalls Ltd. v. Wiener, No. 3:17-cv-1125-BTM-JLB, 2019 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26238, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2019) (“The Court declines to rule on 

choice-of-law issues in a motion to strike.”). Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Eighth, 

Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Counts, paragraph 50 of the Fourth Count, and 

paragraphs 104, 105, and 110 of the Thirteenth Count, is DENIED.

E. Impertinent Request for Relief

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees

and costs is impertinent, because “[n]ot all of Plaintiff’s claims . . . support the recovery of 

punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs.” (ECF No. 22-1 at 18).

Defendants’ request is precluded by the holding in Whittlestone. The court in 

Whittlestone held that “Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not 

authorize a district court to dismiss a claim for damages on the basis it is precluded as a 

matter of law.” 618 F.3d at 975; see id. at 974 (“[T]he claim for damages is not impertinent, 

because whether these damages are recoverable pertains directly to the harm being 

alleged.”). Here, Plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs are 

directly related to the harms Plaintiff alleges. See Powell v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 

14-cv-04248-MEJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97607, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 23, 2017) (finding 

that the defendant could not raise issues of punitive damages or attorneys’ fees in a motion 

to strike because Whittlestone has rejected these claims as a proper basis for a Rule 12(f) 

motion). Defendants’ Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s prayer for relief is DENIED.

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VI. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Anjali Levine’s Motion to Set Aside Entry of 

Default Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and Quash Service of Process (ECF No. 19) is 

GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 

22) is DENIED. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss First Amended Complaint for Failure to 

State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

(ECF Nos. 23, 24, 25) are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion Regarding Choice of Law (ECF 

No. 32) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file any motion for leave to amend 

the Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order.

Dated: October 30, 2019

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