Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-02328/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-02328-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1961 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURLEE C. DENNIS,

Plaintiff, No. C 10-2328 PJH

v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction came on for hearing on July 14, 2010

before this court. Plaintiff, Curlee C. Dennis (“plaintiff”), appeared in pro per. Defendant

Wachovia (“defendant” or “Wachovia”) appeared by telephone through its counsel,

Christopher Carr. Having read all the papers submitted and carefully considered the

relevant legal authority, the court hereby DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction, as

stated at the hearing, as follows.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges five causes of action against defendant Wachovia and

others: (1) declaratory relief; (2) breach of contract; (3) misrepresentation/fraud; (4) quiet

title; and (5) violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

("RICO"). As the court highlighted to plaintiff at the previous hearing on plaintiff’s motion for

temporary restraining order, for a plaintiff to successfully seek a preliminary injunction, the

law requires that the plaintiff establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest (where the public

interest is at issue). See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct.

365, 374 (2008); see also Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218-19 (2008). Noting that

Case 4:10-cv-02328-PJH Document 20 Filed 07/15/10 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the plaintiff could likely satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, the court furthermore

instructed plaintiff to focus on the likelihood of success factor in connection with any one

cause of action, in bringing any preliminary injunction motion. 

Plaintiff’s motion fails to satisfy this standard. Indeed, the vast majority of plaintiff’s

motion targets arguments unrelated to any of the claims asserted in plaintiff’s complaint. 

Plaintiff’s motion, for example, addresses violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act;

defendant World Savings Bank’s securitization of instruments, resulting in conversion and

unjust enrichment ; defendant World Savings Bank’s predatory lending; an invalid

substitution of trustee performed by defendants Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation

and Wells Fargo; and a World Savings Bank and its agents’ wrongful breach of a purported

agent-trustee relationship. See generally Mot. Prelim. Inj. None of these arguments

relates to the merits of any claim asserted in plaintiff’s underlying complaint – or even, in

fact, any claim asserted therein against Wachovia specifically. 

Reading plaintiff’s arguments as charitably as possible, only one of her arguments –

that regarding the existence an unconscionable and unenforceable contract – may be

construed as an argument in connection with the merits of her underlying breach of

contract claim. However, plaintiff’s argument fails to identify the precise contract at issue,

the parties purportedly bound by the contract, or the means by which any provision of such

contract is unconscionable or unenforceable. This alone dooms plaintiff’s argument. See,

e.g., First Commercial Mortgage Co. v. Reece, 89 Cal. App. 4th 731, 745 (2001)(elements

of a breach of contract claim are the existence of a contract, performance by the plaintiff or

excuse for nonperformance, breach by the defendant, and damages). Moreover, to the

extent plaintiff argues instead that she was “induced into signing” an “illegal cognovit note”

that prevented her from “intentionally, deliberately, or intelligently and knowingly” waiving

her due process rights, such an argument is both nonsensical and lacking in merit. A

“cognovit” is “an acknowledgment of debt or liability in the form of a confessed judgment,”

and is traditionally an instrument signed by a defendant. Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Ed.). It is not immediately apparent, and plaintiff does not explain, how such an instrument

is either relevant to the current action, or even in existence. All of which collectively

demonstrates to the court that, even construed liberally, plaintiff’s arguments regarding her

breach of contract claim fall short of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits of

her claim. 

In short, because plaintiff has failed to come forward with any argument that

adequately establishes her likelihood of success on the merits of any underlying claim, the

court DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2010 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:10-cv-02328-PJH Document 20 Filed 07/15/10 Page 3 of 3