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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH . 

PI LB 0 

lkited Stjtf§ Ci>urt ,;,f Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS M.l\Y 2 19BO 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

In re: NATHAN DAVIDOVICH and AMY JILL ) 

DAVIDOVICH, ) 

) 

Debtors, ) 

) 

) 

) 

NATHAN DAVIDOVICH and CHRISTINE JOBIN, ) 

Trustee, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CHARLES WELTON, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

No. 89-1035 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-Z-1216) 

Nathan. Davidovich of Nathan Davidovich & Associates, P.C., Denver, 

Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Robert R. Marshall, Jr., (Jeffrey L. Dykes with him on the brief), 

of Elrod, Katz, Preeo & Look, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON,* District Judge. 

*Honorable Alan B. Johnson, District Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 89-1035 Document: 010110296459 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 1
In this action, brought by the debtor and bankruptcy trustee 

against the debtor's former law partner, plaintiffs seek 

confirmation of an arbitration award resolving disputes arising 

out of dissolution of the law partnership and a judgment awarding 

plaintiffs the proceeds from this award. The bankruptcy court 

dismissed their petition upon finding that any amount due 

plaintiffs under the arbitration proceeding was entirely offset by 

mutual debts determined in this same proceeding and by costs 

incurred by the defendant in connection with a real estate 

partnership between the former law partners and others. 

Plaintiffs appeal this ruling and other aspects of the bankruptcy 

court judgment. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

Background 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted: 

On January 1~ 1980, debtor-appellant Nathan Davidovich and 

defendant-appellee Charles Welton formed a partnership to engage 

in the general practice of law. Just less than three years later, 

the two joined with four others to form the OSM Partnership. This 

Partnership owned and managed a small commercial building which 

housed the Davidovich & Welton law firm and several other tenants. 

Under the OSM Partnership Agreement, Davidovich and Welton each 

owned a 30% share of this partnership and were its managing 

partners. Both parties, as well as the other OSM partners, were 

also jointly and severally liable on an OSM Partnership note 

totaling approximately $460,000. 

Dissolution of the law partnership. On September 1, 1984, 

Davidovich and Welton dissolved their law partnership. In April 

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of the following year, they agreed to binding arbitration of all 

disputes attendant to the dissolution of the partnership before 

the Denver Bar Association Intraprofessional Committee 

(Committee). Although Welton requested that the Committee also 

address issues relating to the OSM Partnership in this proceeding, 

the Committee declined on the grounds that resolution of these 

issues would be binding on non-parties to the arbitration, namely 

the other OSM partners and the OSM Partnership itself. 

In its October 29, 1986 decision, as supplemented on 

February 27, 1987 (collectively the "Arbitration Award"), the 

Committee, among other things, found that the parties had agreed 

that the attorneys' fees 9enerated by cases pending at the time of 

the law firm dissolution should be distributed between them 

according to the following formula: The attorney retaining the 

case received 50% of any fee generated after the partnership's 

dissolution; .the attorney responsible for bringing the case into 

the partnership would receive 25% of any fees and Davidovich and 

Welton would split the remaining 25% of any fees generated. The 

Committee further found that the parties' agreement applied to all 

pending personal injury cases which were listed in the parties' 

respective position papers. Upon noting that the parties 

disagreed on application of the distribution formula to one case, 

the Trujillo matter, the Committee resolved the dispute by finding 

that the case was referred to the partnership jointly, thus 

requiring Davidovich and Welton to split the 25% ''fee generating" 

share. The Committee did not find that the parties disputed 

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application of the fee formula to any other cases identified in 

their position papers. 

In its initial 1986 decision, the Committee calculated that 

Welton owed Davidovich $38,583.29 for cases resolved since the 

firm's dissolution and for other partnership expenses and that 

Davidovich owed Welton $25,515.02 on the same basis. The net 

result of these calculations, therefore, was a debt of $13,068.27 

owed by Welton to Davidovich. This net result was subject to 

readjustment, however, for fees collected in former partnership 

cases resolved after the Committee's initial decision and certain 

other matters addressed in the Arbitration Award. According to a 

July 1988 accounting prepared by Welton, these adjustments 

resulted in a net debt of $15,256.84 owed by Welton to Davidovich. 

Defendant's Ex. 1. This total was subject to further adjustment 

upon resolution of four remaining partnership cases, one retained 

by Davidovich and three by Welton. Id. At the time of this 

appeal, one of these cases, the Mccafferty case retained by 

Welton, was awaiting appeal of an $800,000 jury verdict awarded to 

Welton's client. According to Welton's submittal to the 

Committee, which was not disputed by Davidovich in the arbitration 

proceeding, Davidovich is entitled to receive 12.5% of any fee 

ultimately collected in this case. 

Bankruptcy of Davidovich. On August 14, 1985, while the 

Committee arbitration was still underway, Davidovich filed a 

voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Soon 

thereafter, plaintiff-appellant Christine Jobin was appointed 

trustee of the bankruptcy estate. On January 29, 1986, the court 

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granted Davidovich a discharge of all debts arising before that 

date. Welton did not file a proof of claim against Davidovich's 

estate in this proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court approved a 

stipulation for relief from stay to allow the arbitration 

proceeding to continue. 

OSM Partnership events. Shortly before Davidovich declared 

bankruptcy, the OSM Partnership fell behind in payments on its 

bank loans and consequently issued a partnership call for a total 

of $10,000. Defendant's Ex. 85. Davidovich did not pay his 30% 

share of this call, which came due two weeks after he filed for 

bankruptcy. In case of such a partner default, the OSM 

Partnership Agreement permitted the nondefaulting partners to 

(1) ignore Davidovich's default _or (2) to pay his share themselves 

and then either require him to execute a promissory note payable 

to the parties who advanced his share or to essentially cede his 

partnership share to those parties. Defendant's Ex. 2, ,1 3.05. 

Some or all of the nondefaulting OSM partners, including Welton, 

apparently opted to pay Davidovich's share and then distribute his 

partnership share among themselves. 

Sometime after the partnership call and Davidovich's 

bankruptcy filing, the bank foreclosed on the deed of trust 

securing the OSM Partnership note. As a result of the 

negotiations and litigation that followed, Welton claims to have 

contributed an additional $52,000 to the OSM Partnership to help 

redeem the commercial building owned by the Partnership and settle 

the deficiency remaining on Partnership's original note. Doc. 7 

at 4. 

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This proceeding. On November 18, 1987, Davidovich and the 

trustee for the bankruptcy estate filed this adversary proceeding 

against Welton, seeking confirmation of the Arbitration Award, an 

accounting under the Award, discharge of the amount Davidovich was 

required to pay Welton under the Award and a judgment on the 

Award. Doc. 1. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 

proceeds from the Arbitration Award were necessary to satisfy the 

remaining debts of the bankruptcy estate, with any remainder to be 

paid to Davidovich. Sometime after initiating this action, 

plaintiffs also requested that the court determine that Davidovich 

was entitled to 25% of any fees generated by the Mccafferty case, 

rather than the 12.5% stated in papers submitted to the Committee 

in the arbitration proceeding. 

Welton argued before 

Arbitration Award was binding 

the bankruptcy court that the 

on the parties and (1) limited 

Davidovich to recovery of 12.5% of whatever fees were collected in 

the Mccafferty case and (2) mandated an offset for the more than 

$25,000 Davidovich owed Welton under that Award. Welton also 

argued that any net debt owed to Davidovich pursuant to the Award 

was more than offset by the $52,000 Welton had contributed to the 

OSM Partnership after Davidovich's bankruptcy to redeem the OSM 

property and prevent a deficiency judgment from being entered 

against himself and the other parties, including oavidovich, on 

the OSM Partnership note. In support of both requested offsets, 

Welton cited both the setoff provisions of 11 u.s.c. § 553 (1982 & 

Supp. III 1985) and the equitable doctrine of recoupment. 

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The Bankruptcy Court accepted each of Welton's arguments and 

dismissed this action pursuant to Welton's motion at the close of 

plaintiffs' case. On appeal to the U.S. District Court for the 

District of Colorado, the bankruptcy court's judgment was affirmed 

in its entirety. This appeal timely followed. 

Discussion 

We review the decision of the bankruptcy court under the same 

standards of review that govern appellate review in other cases. 

See Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540, 1543 

(10th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we review the bankruptcy court's 

legal determinations de~, Heins v. Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc. (In 

re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc.), 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988), 

and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if 

it is without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing 

all of the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made. 

States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1987). 

LeMaire v. United 

Plaintiffs raise three primary issues on appeal: (1) whether 

the bankruptcy court erred in holding that Welton's debt to 

Davidovich under the Arbitration Award was entirely offset by· 

obligations arising out of the Arbitration Award and the OSM 

Partnership; (2) whether the bankruptcy court erred in holding 

that the Arbitration Award limited Davidovich's share of the fee 

in the Mccafferty case to 12.5% and (3) whether the bankruptcy 

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court erred in dismissing this action without confirming the 

Arbitration Award. We address each issue in turn. 

A. Setoff and Recoupment 

The bankruptcy court denied plaintiffs any recovery under the 

Arbitration Award on the ground that Davidovich's debts to Welton 

under both that Award and the OSM Partnership completely offset 

whatever amount Davidovich might otherwise be due under the Award. 

The legal bases for this holding were the related but distinct 

doctrines of setoff and recoupment. 

1. General principles 

The common law doctrine of setoff, 

section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code, grants a 

as recognized in 

creditor the right 

"to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor" so 

long as both debts arose before commencement of the bankruptcy 

action and are indeed mutual. 11 u.s.c. S 553(a); see Tradex, 

Inc. v. United States (In re IML Freight, Inc.), 65 Bankr. 788, 

791 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986). This mutuality requirement mandates 

that the debts involved be between the same parties standing in 

the same capacity, see England v. Industrial Comm'n (In re 

Visiting Home Servs., Inc.), 643 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 

1981)(interpreting a predecessor to S 553); In re O.P.M. Leasing 

Servs., Inc., 68 Bankr. 979, 986 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 

1987)(interpreting S 553), and that each debt be valid and 

enforceable. See Berkman v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. (In re 

Berkman), 17 Bankr. 710, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982)(quoting 

4 Collier on Bankruptcy S 553.04[2](L. King 15th ed. 1979)). The 

mutual debt need not, however, have arisen out of the same 

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transaction in order for setoff to be available under the statute. 

See id.; IML Freight, Inc., 65 Bankr. at 793. 

The common law doctrine of recoupment, while frequently 

merged with the doctrine of setoff in other contexts, is a 

distinct doctrine in bankruptcy cases. See Ashland Petroleum Co. 

v. Appel (In re B & L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 155, 157 (10th Cir. 

1986). This distinction arises from recoupment's origin as an 

equitable rule of joinder that permitted adjudication in one suit 

of two claims, both arising out of the same transaction, that 

otherwise had to be brought separately under the common law forms 

of actions. Id. In the modern bankruptcy setting, this rule has 

evolved to permit a creditor to offset a claim that "'arises from 

the same transaction as the debtor's claim,'" without reliance on 

the setoff provisions and limitations of section 553, because the 

creditor's claim in this circumstance is '"essentially a defense 

to the debtor's claim against the creditor rather than a mutual 

obligation, and application of the limitations on setoff in 

bankruptcy would be inequitable.'" Id. (quoting Lee v. Schweiker, 

739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984)). Thus, so long as the 

creditor's claim arises out of the "same transaction'' as defined 

under the recoupment doctrine, the creditor's claim may be offset 

against the debt owed without regard for the timing and other 

requirements stated in section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code. 

2. Application to this case 

In this case, the bankruptcy court did 

between setoff and recoupment in allowing Welton 

not distinguish 

to offset his 

Arbitration Award and OSM Partnership claims against Davidovich. 

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Accordingly, we must test each claimed offset against both 

doctrines to determine their validity. 

Arbitration Award offset. It is clear from the discussion 

above that Welton's claim against Davidovich pursuant to the 

Arbitration Award may be offset against his debt to Davidovich 

under that same Award under either the setoff provisions of 

section 553 or the doctrine of recoupment. Setoff under 

section 553 is permitted because both claims arose before 

Davidovich filed for bankruptcy, are between the same parties 

acting in the same capacity and are otherwise valid and 

enforceable. 1 See 11 u.s.c. § 553(a); see generally 4 Collier on 

Bankruptcy at§ 553.04[2](L. King 15th ed. 1990). An offset is 

similarly available under the doctrine of recoupment because both 

debts arise out of a single integrated. transaction, the binding 

arbitration proceeding before the Committee, such that it would be 

inequitable for Davidovich to enjoy the benefits of that 

transaction without meeting its obligations. See In re B & L Oil 

Co., 782 F.2d at 157. Accordingly, we affirm the bankruptcy 

court's holding that Welton is entitled to offset Davidovich's 

debt under the Arbitration Award against Welton's obligations to 

plaintiffs under that same Award. 

OSM Partnership offset. We have considerably more difficulty 

with the bankruptcy court's approval of an offset for costs 

1 See discussion below regarding Davidovich's claim that the 

bankruptcy court's discharge of his debts, coupled with Welton's 

failure to file a proof of claim against the bankruptcy estate, 

barred any offset from being asserted by Welton. 

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incurred by Welton in connection with the OSM Partnership. At the 

outset, we note that Welton does not actually claim a debt against 

Davidovich in this regard, but rather reimbursement for 

contributions to the Partnership that may have prevented a 

deficiency judgment from being entered against Davidovich and the 

estate. There is no evidence in the record, however, that any 

part of these contributions were made on behalf of Davidovich or 

that Davidovich otherwise owes Welton and the other OSM partners 

some amount in connection with settlement of the deficiency 

action. In fact, it appears that, pursuant to the OSM Partnership 

Agreement, Welton and the remaining OSM partners essentially took 

over Davidovich's OSM Partnership share after he failed to respond 

to the August 1985 partnership call, leaving Davidovich with no 

participation in or potential future benefit from the 

Partnership's subsequently successful efforts to redeem the OSM 

property from foreclosure and to settle the deficiency action. 

Assuming that a claim could be made against Davidovich in these 

circumstances, it would also appear that the Partnership itself, 

rather than Welton individually, owns that claim. Finally, if any 

claim does exist against Davidovich in connection with the OSM 

Partnership, it arose after Davidovich filed for Chapter 7 

bankruptcy. 

This last fadtor alone precludes any right to setoff a claim 

based on these events against the prepetition claim that 

ultimately resulted in the Arbitration Award. See 

11 U.S.C. S 553(a). Given the relationship between Welton's debt 

under the Arbitration Award and his additional contributions to 

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the OSM Partnership, we must also hold that Welton cannot offset 

these contributions under the doctrine of recoupment. "The fact 

that the same two parties are involved [in the claims to be 

offset], and that a similar subject matter gave rise to both 

claims does not mean that the two arose from the 'same 

transaction'" for purposes of the doctrine of recoupment. Lee v. 

Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984). In fact, courts have 

generally only found this "same transaction'' requirement to be 

satisfied when the debts to be offset arise out of a single, 

integrated contract or similar transaction. See In re B & L Oil 

Co., 782 F.2d at 157-58; Quittner v. Los Angeles Steel Casting 

Co., 202 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1953). In this case, Welton's. 

obligations under the Arbitration Award and his additional 

contributions to the OSM Partnership not only did not arise out of 

a single contract, they are not limited to the same parties 

(because of the involvement of the OSM Partnership and other 

partners in the latter transaction) and only arose out of the same 

subject matter to the extent that the concept of the OSM 

Partnership arose out of Davidovich and Welton's association in 

their former law firm. 2 This single connection is simply not 

enough to establish that any claim Welton may have against 

Davidovich in connection with the OSM Partnership arises out of 

the "same transaction" as Welton's obligations under the 

Arbitration Award such that it may be asserted as a de facto 

2 Plaintiffs admitted 

Arbitration Award and OSM 

their trial brief to the 

arising out of the OSM 

arbitration." Doc. 7 at 5. 

the tenuous connection between the 

Partnership matters when they stated in 

bankruptcy court that their claims 

Partnership were "unrelated to the 

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defense to those obligations under the doctrine of recoupment. 

Accordingly, we reverse both the bankruptcy court's determination 

that the two claims were part of the "same transaction" for 

purposes of recoupment and its holding that Welton's OSM 

Partnership contributions could be offset against his obligations 

, under the Arbitration Award. 

3. Discharge and/or lack of proof of claim as bar 

to any offset 

Davidovich also challenges the award of any offset 

case on the grounds that Welton's failure to file a proof 

against the bankrupt estate, coupled with the bankruptcy 

entry of an order discharging Davidovich from his debts, 

Welton from asserting any right to setoff or recoupment 

in this 

of claim 

court's 

preclude 

in this 

proceeding. Davidovich's cited basis for this argument is our 

decision in Turner v. United States (In re G.S. Omni Corp.), 

835 F.2d 1317 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In In re G.S. Omni, we held that timely filing of a proof of 

claim is not a prerequisite to asserting a right of setoff under 

11 u.s.c. S 553. Id. at 1317. In so doing, we reasoned that a 

creditor's right to setoff was a universally recognized right 

grounded in principles of fairness that was not, with a few 

limited exceptions, affected by the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1318. 

As further support for our holding, we noted that a debt remains 

viable at least until discharged and hence stated that "until 

discharge is ordered, a creditor need not file a proof of claim as 

a prerequisite to asserting a right of setoff pursuant to S 553." 

Id. at 1319. 

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Davidovich has seized on this latter statement to argue that 

filing of a proof of claim is a prerequisite to asserting a right 

of setoff pursuant to section 553 in any post-discharge action 

brought to recover money owed the estate or debtor. This result 

is not required by Omni, however, and contradicts express 

provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. As we recognized in Omni, the 

Bankruptcy Code "does not affect any right of a creditor to offset 

a mutual, [prepetition] debt owing such creditor" other than in a 

limited number of circumstances not present here. Id. at 1318; 

11 u.s.c. S 553(a). Thus, the right to assert a setoff against a 

mutual, prepetition debt owed the bankrupt estate survives even 

the Bankruptcy Court's discharge of the bankrupt's debts. In re 

Morgan, 77 Bankr. 81, 85 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987); Ford v. 

Darracott (In re Ford), 35 Bankr. 277, 279-80 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 

1983); Slaw Constr. Corp. v. Hughes Foulkrod Constr. Co. (In re 

Slaw Constr. Corp.), 17 Bankr. 744, 748 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); 3 

see Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 

Bankr. 20, 26 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). Here, no less than in Omni, 

it would also "be unfair to deny a creditor the right to recover 

an established obligation while requiring the creditor to fully 

satisfy a debt to a debtor." Omni, 835 F.2d at 1318. 

Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Omni that filing of a 

3 Each of these cases upheld a creditor's right to setoff a 

discharged debt under section 553 notwithstanding the provision in 

section 524(a)(2) of the Code that "[a] discharge ••• operates 

as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an 

action, the employment of process or an act, to collect, recover 

or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor." 

See Morgan, 77 Bankr. at 85; Ford, 35 Bankr. at 279; Slaw Constr., 

17 Bankr. at 748. 

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proof of claim is not a prerequisLte to assertion of a right to 

setoff under 11 u.s.c. S 553 and hold further that a discharged 

debt may be setoff upon compliance with the terms and conditions 

stated in section 553 of the Code. Given this result and our 

previous holding that Davidovich's obligations to Welton under the 

Arbitration Award are subject to setoff under section 553, we need 

not decide whether the doctrine of recoupment may also be asserted 

in a post-discharge proceeding to offset a trustee's claim. 4 

B. The Mccafferty Case 

Davidovich also argues on appeal that he is entitled to a 25% 

share of any fee ultimately collected in the Mccafferty case, 

rather than the 12.5% share argued by Welton, because the case was 

originally referred to the Davidovich & Welton partnership rather 

than to Welton individually. In his testimony before the 

bankruptcy court, however, Davidovich admitted that he was aware 

that Welton had presented the Committee with information 

indicating that Davidovich was entitled to only a 12.5% share of 

this case and that he. did not dispute that figure before the 

Committee. Tr. 47-48. Having also stipulated that the 

Arbitration Award was binding, id. at 3, and further asserted that 

no additional factual determinations were required with respect to 

4 We also note but do not decide that a different result may 

obtain under either or both doctrines when a creditor asserts a 

right to setoff or recoupment in a personal action brought by the 

debtor alone, rather an action brought by the bankruptcy trustee 

to recover assets for the bankruptcy estate. See Johnson v. 

Rutherford Hosp. (In re Johnson), 13 Bankr. 185-;-T88-89 (Bankr. 

M.D. Tenn. 198l)(holding that 11 u.s.c. S 524(a)(2) precludes 

setoff of a discharged debt against a post-petition judgment in 

favor of the debtor, as opposed to the bankruptcy estate, under 

the Truth in Lending Act). 

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enforcement of the Award, Doc. l at 11 14, Davidovich cannot now 

seek to reopen this issue in this proceeding. Accordingly, we 

affirm the bankruptcy court's holding that Davidovich is entitled 

by the Arbitration Award to 12.5% of any fees ultimately collected 

in the Mccafferty case. 

C. Confirmation of Arbitration Award 

It is undisputed that the Arbitration Award was conducted in 

compliance with the Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act, 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-201 to 223 (1987 Replacement Vol.), and 

is binding between the parties. Accordingly, we reverse the 

bankruptcy court's dismissal of this action and order that the 

Award be confirmed, 5 subject to the-offset and Mccaffery holdings 

herein, so that plaintiffs may recover whatever amount, if any, is 

ultimately due them under that Award. 

The judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED with respect to its allowance. of 

an offset for Davidovich's debt to Welton under the Arbitration 

Award and determination that Davidovich is entitled to 12.5% of 

any attorneys' fees ultimately collected in the Mccafferty case. 

The judgment of the bankruptcy court is REVERSED with respect to 

its allowance of an offset for claims arising out of the OSM 

Partnership and its dismissal of this action. We REMAND this 

5 The district court has jurisdiction to confirm the 

Arbitration Award because confirmation of the Award is a civil 

proceeding "related to" Davidovich's bankruptcy case. See 

28 u.s.c. § 1334(b); Fietz v. Great w. Sav. (In re Fietz), 

852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988)(a civil proceeding is related to 

the bankruptcy case if its outcome could conceivably have any 

effect on the estate or could alter the debtor's rights, 

liabilities or freedom of action). 

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proceeding to the district court for further proceedings in 

accordance with this decision. 

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