Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-01247/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-01247-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

NATHAN D. McFERRIN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAPITAL ONE BANK (U.S.A.), N.A.,

Defendant.

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CASE NO. 7:14-CV-1247-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 12.)1 Plaintiff Nathan D. McFerrin has sued defendant Capital

One Bank alleging claims based in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and state-law

claims of fraud, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Upon

consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, and the relevant law, the court is

of the opinion that defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, (doc. 12), is due to

be granted.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 9 at 1-2.) The purpose of such a motion,

authorized by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to test the facial

sufficiency of the plaintiff’s statement of a claim for relief. Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue

1Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each

document as it is filed in the court’s record.

FILED

 2015 Mar-27 AM 11:41

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:14-cv-01247-SLB Document 27 Filed 03/27/15 Page 1 of 13
Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read

together with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “requires that a

pleading contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010)

(internal citations and quotation omitted). 

When addressing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in the

Complaint as true and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 

Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359

(11th Cir. 2011)(quoting Am. Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1288). To survive a Motion to

Dismiss, “the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Am. Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)))(internal quotations omitted). A claim

is “plausible” if the facts are sufficient “to allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation,” and the court does not assume that plaintiff can prove facts she has not

alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 563 n.8. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

“[W]hile notice pleading may not require that the pleader allege a ‘specific fact’ to cover

every element or allege ‘with precision’ each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a

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Case 7:14-cv-01247-SLB Document 27 Filed 03/27/15 Page 2 of 13
complaint ‘contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements

necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.’” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr.

for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)(quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig.,

655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981)).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains the following “Statement of Facts,” which the court

assumes are true for purposes of deciding defendant Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint:

On December 03, 2008 a civil action, without proof of debt being

[owed] by Plaintiff, was filed against Plaintiff in the District Court of

Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. Plaintiff denied this debt for approximately six

(6) and one half [(1/2)] years before Defendant (Plaintiff at that time) decided

that the filed complaint against current Plaintiff, Nathan D. McFerrin, should

be vacated because of fraud on a third party. Plaintiff was subjected to threats

of incarceration, humiliation, denial of credit opportunities, increased interest

payments for credit received, a complete destruction of the harmony of a

household and destruction of credit, because of Defendant’s [sic] Capital One

Bank’s actions against and toward Plaintiff.

(Doc. 1 at 2.) After defendant filed its first Motion to Dismiss,2(doc. 6), plaintiff filed an

Amendment to Original Complaint, which contained the following allegations:

2. Defendant, Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., hereinafter, Capital One,

has engaged in only one business practice with the Plaintiff and that is a

relentless pursuit of a phantom debt allegedly owed by the Plaintiff.

2By separate Order, the court has denied as moot defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss. 

The Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, (doc. 12), includes all grounds raised in the

first Motion to Dismiss. (Compare doc. 6 with doc. 12.)

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3. Defendant, Capital One, qualifies as a debt collector because it has

used the “instrumentalities of the interstate commerce, through usage of the

phone and the mails in an attempt to collect from the Plaintiff.

4. Defendant, Capital One has engaged in regular telephone calls at

Plaintiff’s residence and workplace alleging that Plaintiff owes a debt and that

they are collecting such a debt.

5. Defendant Capital One has not attempted to set itself apart as

separate entity engaging in such collection practices on behalf of the

Defendant, Capital One.

6. Defendant, Capital One, has attempted to collect on a credit card,

allegedly contracted with and issued to the Plaintiff, in which the Plaintiff

would have used for personal use. . . .

. . .

8. Plaintiff re-alleges that Defendant, Capital One has engaged in debt

collection practices that were/are intentional and reckless and that Plaintiff has

suffered tremendous emotional distress bybeing called repeatedlyat home and

at work.

9. Plaintiff alleges that for Defendant, Capital One, to knowingly and

intentionally accept a payment for a contract of a credit card, that 1) they

cannot produce and 2) if produced, the Plaintiff would not have signed, is to

be enriched unjustly. Emphasis added.

10. Plaintiff specifically states that Defendant, Capital One, has found

a name and an address, and by method of “default to pay” forces consumers

just like Plaintiff, to become overwhelmed with phone calls and letters and

ultimately give [in] and pay a debt that is not owed. This is a fraudulent

scheme that will not be deterred, even when an innocent consumer states

emphatically that the debt is not owed and demands strict proof thereof.

Plaintiff has become overwhelmed with phone calls and received a small

claims complaint that was later dismissed citing third party fraud. Plaintiff has

been threatened with criminal charges and jail time if he does not pay a debt

that is not his. Plaintiff has repeatedly stated the debt was not his. Plaintiff

engaged in continued dialogue with the Defendant, Capital One, for

considerable time before the debt lawsuit was dismissed.

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Case 7:14-cv-01247-SLB Document 27 Filed 03/27/15 Page 4 of 13
(Doc. 11 at 1-2.) In response to plaintiff’s Amendment, defendant filed the instant Motion

to Dismiss Amended Complaint.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant asks the court to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on the ground that his Complaint

and Amended Complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the

reasons set forth below, the court agrees.

A. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s claimunder the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

[“FDCPA”] is due to be dismissed because plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show

that defendant is a debt collector as the term is defined by the FDCPA. The FDCPA defines

“debt collector” as – 

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails

in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,

or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts

owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. . . . [T]he term includes

any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name

other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or

attempting to collect such debts. . . . The term does not include – 

(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor,

collecting debts for such creditor . . . .

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A). “The term ‘creditor’ means any person who offers or extends

credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person

to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the

purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.” Id. (4).

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Plaintiff has not specified the FDCPA provision he contends defendant violated.

Nevertheless, viewing the allegations of his Complaint and Amended Complaint, the court

finds that he is alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, which states in pertinent part:

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation

or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the

general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of

this section:

. . .

(2) The false representation of – 

(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt;3

 . . .

. . .

(4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result

in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment,

attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action

is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action.4

. . .

15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e. As set forth above, “debt collector” does not include a creditor trying

to collect its own debt.

Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint allege that defendant’s collection

actions were taken with the purpose of collecting a credit card debt owed to Capital One.

This factual assertion, that defendant was a creditor, bars plaintiff’s claim for relief under the

FDCPA.

3

(See doc. 1 at 1-2; doc. 11 ¶¶ 2, 10.)

4

(See doc. 1 at 2; doc. 11 ¶ 10.)

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint will be granted and plaintiff’s

FDCPA will be dismissed with prejudice without leave to amend.5

B. FRAUD

Count Two of plaintiff’s Complaint alleges, “Defendant pursued the collection of the

debt allegedly owed byPlaintiff, continuously for approximate [61⁄2] years, without complete

validation of such debt . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 3.) In his Amendment to Original Complaint,

plaintiff alleges that defendant has a “fraudulent scheme” to force an “innocent consumer”

to “pay a debt that is not owed.” (Doc. 11 ¶ 10.) Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s

fraud claim based on plaintiff’s failure to plead the claim with specificity. (See doc. 12 at

12-15.) In response to defendant’s Motion,6plaintiff argues that he “has gone to great

lengths to notify [defendant] that it had ‘the wrong guy’ and this was ignored repeatedly.” 

(Doc. 17 at 2.)

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“The Supreme Court has noted that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, leave

should be freely given ‘[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff

may be a proper subject of relief.’ Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L.

Ed. 2d 222 (1962). Pursuant to Foman, a district court may deny leave to amend a complaint

under Rule 15(a) if that amendment would be futile. 371 U.S. at 182; see also Burger King

Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)(holding that ‘denial of leave to

amend is justified by futility when the complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal’).” 

McKinley v. Petsmart, Inc., No. 2:05-CV562F(WO), 2005 WL 2108107, *3 n.4 (M.D. Ala.

Aug. 24, 2005). Because defendant is a creditor and not a debt collector, any leave to amend

would be futile.

6Plaintiff’s Response states, “Plaintiff’s Claim for Fraud is Sufficient Under the

FDCPA,” and he cites the court to case law regarding criminal mail fraud. (Doc. 17 at 1-2.) 

However, plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a state-law fraud claim. (Doc. 1 at 3.) 

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Case 7:14-cv-01247-SLB Document 27 Filed 03/27/15 Page 7 of 13
In Alabama, “To establish the elements offraudulent misrepresentation [plaintiff] has

to show: (1) that the [defendant’s] representation was false, (2) that it concerned a material

fact, (3) that [plaintiff] relied on the false representation, and (4) that actual injury resulted

from that reliance.” Ex parte Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 991 So. 2d 1263, 1275 (Ala.

2008)(internal quotations and alterations omitted; citation omitted). With regard to reliance

necessary to support a cause of action for fraud, the Alabama Supreme Court has held:

[A] party cannot claim that [he] was deceived by a representation if [he] was

sufficiently skeptical of it or knew the representation to be false.

To claim reliance upon a misrepresentation, the allegedly deceived

party must have believed it to be true. If it appears that he was in fact

so skeptical as to its truth that he placed no confidence in it, it cannot

be viewed as a substantial cause of his conduct. If the plaintiff knew

that the representations were false, he can not [sic] complain that he has

been misled to his damage by the defendant’s attempted deception. The

idea of a person knowing a representation to be false and at the same

time relying thereon is a contradiction in terms.

Sandoz, Inc. v. State, 100 So. 3d 514, 527 (Ala. 2012)(quoting AstraZeneca, 41 So. 3d at

28)(internal quotations and citations omitted).

In his Complaint and Amendment to Original Complaint, plaintiff alleges that

defendant repeatedly tried to collect a debt that plaintiff steadfastly insisted he did not owe. 

Plaintiff, however, makes no allegation, nor could he given his conviction that he did not owe

the amount claimed, that he relied on defendant’s false representation to his detriment. He

has alleged no facts that would support a claim that he was ever deceived by defendant’s

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statements that plaintiff owed it money. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff has not, and

cannot, state a claim for fraud based on defendant’s assertion that plaintiff owed it a debt.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint will be granted and plaintiff’s

fraud claim will be dismissed with prejudice. Any leave to amend would be futile in light

of plaintiff’s admission that he was never deceived by defendant’s assertion.

C. UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s Motion to Dismiss this count. Therefore,

defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint will be granted and plaintiff’s unjust

enrichment claim will be dismissed.7

D. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Alabama recognizes a tort claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress:

[The Alabama Supreme] Court first recognized the tort of outrage [or

intentional infliction of emotional distress] in 1980, in American Road Service

7Even if plaintiff had not abandoned this claim, the court would dismiss plainitff’s

unjust enrichment claim. In his Amendment, plaintiff “alleges that for Defendant, Capital

One, to knowingly and intentionally accept a payment for a contract of a credit card, that 1)

they cannot produce and 2) if produced, the Plaintiff would not have signed, is to be enriched

unjustly.” (Doc. 11 ¶ 9.) However, plaintiff never alleged that he made any payment to

defendant. Therefore, he has failed to allege a claim for unjust enrichment for which relief

may be granted. See Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988, 1011-12 (Ala. 2006)(holding that

for a plaintiff to recover on a claim for unjust enrichment he must show either “that the

defendant holds moneywhich, in equity and good conscience, belongs to the plaintiff” or that

defendant “holds money which [plaintiff] improperly paid to defendant because of mistake

or fraud”). Nothing in the Complaint, Amendment to Original Complaint, or Response

supports a plausible claim that defendant holds money that belongs to plaintiff or that

plaintiff ever paid defendant any money because of mistake or fraud.

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Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1980). In Inmon this Court recognized the

tort proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1948), holding:

‘‘[O]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or

recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to

liability for such emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from

the distress. The emotional distress thereunder must be so severe that

no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Any recovery

must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, liability

ensuing only when the conduct is extreme. Comment, Restatement

[(Second) of Torts § 46], at 78 [ (1948) ]. By extreme we refer to

conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious

and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Comment (d),

Restatement, supra at 72.’’

394 So. 2d at 365. The Court noted in Inmon that the tort of outrage 

‘‘does not recognize recovery for ‘mere insults, indignities, threats,

annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.’ Comment,

Restatement, supra, at 73. The principle applies only to unprivileged,

intentional or reckless conduct of an extreme and outrageous nature,

and only that which causes severe emotional distress.’’

394 So. 2d at 364-65. As this Court has since held:

‘‘The tort of outrage is an extremely limited cause of action. It is so

limited that this Court has recognized it in regard to only three kinds of

conduct: (1) wrongful conduct in the family-burial context, Whitt v.

Hulsey, 519 So. 2d 901 (Ala.1987); (2) barbaric methods employed to

coerce an insurance settlement, National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v.

Bowen, 447 So. 2d 133 (Ala.1983); and (3) egregious sexual

harassment, Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1989). 

See also Michael L. Roberts and Gregory S. Cusimano, Alabama Tort

Law, § 23.0 (2d ed.1996). In order to recover, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct ‘(1) was intentional or

reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional

distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure

it.’ Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So. 2d 38, 44 (Ala.

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Case 7:14-cv-01247-SLB Document 27 Filed 03/27/15 Page 10 of 13
1990)(citing American Road Service Co. v. Inmon[, 394 So. 2d 361

(Ala. 1980)]).’’

Potts v. Hayes, 771 So. 2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000). That is not to say, however,

that the tort of outrage is viable in only the three circumstances noted in Potts. 

Recently, this Court affirmed a judgment on a tort-of-outrage claim asserted

against a family physician who, when asked by a teenage boy’s mother to

counsel the boy concerning his stress over his parents’ divorce, instead began

exchanging addictive prescription drugs for homosexual sex for a number of

years, resulting in the boy’s drug addiction. See O’Rear v. B.H., 69 So. 3d 106

(Ala. 2011). It is clear, however, that the tort of outrage is viable only when

the conduct is ‘‘‘so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and

utterly intolerable in a civilized society.’’’ Horne v. TGM Assocs., L.P., 56 So.

3d 615, 631 (Ala. 2010)(quoting Inmon, 394 So. 2d at 365).

Little v. Robinson, 72 So. 3d 1168, 1172-73 (Ala. 2011). This court has no “commission to

redefine the present boundaries of state law claims.” Jackson v. Countrywide Home Loans,

No. 2:11-cv-327-MEF, 2012 WL 777180, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2012). With these

standards in mind, the court finds that plaintiff has not stated an intentional-infliction-ofemotional-distress claim upon which relief may be granted.

In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant filed suit against himto collect a debt

he did not owe. (Doc. 1 at 2.) He alleges that he “has suffered tremendous emotional

distress by being called repeatedly at home and at work,” (doc. 11 ¶ 8), including “threats of

incarceration, humiliation, denial of credit opportunities, increased interest payments for

credit received, a complete destruction of the harmony of a household, and destruction of

credit,” (doc. 1 at 2). He argues that defendant’s conduct was outrageous based on “repeated

harassment through the phone system and mails . . . for a debt not owed.” (Doc. 17 at 2.) 

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Case 7:14-cv-01247-SLB Document 27 Filed 03/27/15 Page 11 of 13
However, beyond these conclusorystatement, plaintiff has not described defendant’s conduct

or otherwise alleged any facts to support his claim that defendant’s calls and letters were “so

outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” See

Little, 72 So. 3d at 1173 (internal citations omitted). Indeed, the Alabama Supreme court has

held that “oppressive collection practices” – including “threatening, abusive, and insulting

language,” a “wrongful threat of repossession,” and the “filing of an adverse report with a

credit bureau” – are not so extreme as to support an outrage claim. See Standridge, 565 So.

2d at 45.

The court finds that plaintiff has not alleged a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress and, therefore, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss this claim will be granted. 

Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress will be dismissed with

prejudice without leave to amend because such amendment would be futile.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that plaintiff has failed to state

any claim for which relief can be granted. An Order granting defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Amended Complaint, (doc. 12), will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum

Opinion.

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Case 7:14-cv-01247-SLB Document 27 Filed 03/27/15 Page 12 of 13
DONE this 27th day of March, 2015.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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