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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 5, 1999 Decided February 4, 2000

No. 99-7027

Barwood, Inc., et al.,

Appellees

v.

District of Columbia, et al.,

Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv01901)

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Office

of the Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellants.

With her on the briefs were Robert R. Rigsby, Interim

Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel.

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Stephen W. Grafman argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief was A. Thomas Morris. John Marshall

entered an appearance.

Before: Williams, Ginsburg and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

Williams, Circuit Judge: On June 12, 1998 the District of

Columbia Taxicab Commission promulgated 31 D.C.M.R.

s 828, restricting the circumstances under which suburban

taxicabs may pick up passengers in the District and subjecting violators to criminal sanctions. Plaintiffs, various suburban taxicab companies and some of their drivers, sought a

temporary restraining order ("TRO") against the Commission

and various individual defendants, to prevent them from

enforcing s 828. They argued that the Commission lacked

the authority to alter the existing reciprocity arrangements,

and that reciprocity infractions are subject only to civil sanctions. On July 31, 1998 the district court entered a TRO,

which was later expanded in response to allegations that it

had been violated. On February 16, 1999 the district court

entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Commission

from enforcing s 828, from imposing any criminal sanctions

for reciprocity violations, or from otherwise altering the preexisting reciprocity arrangements. Barwood, Inc. v. District

of Columbia, No. 98-1901 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 1999). The District appealed.

Plaintiffs pursued this injunction--and so far as appears

the entire lawsuit--almost exclusively on the basis of violations of District of Columbia law. The original complaint

asserted diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. s 1332(a). Later that same day, presumably upon realizing that the District of Columbia, like a state, is not a citizen of a state (or of

itself) for diversity purposes, see Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1987), plaintiffs filed an

amended complaint attempting to establish federal question

jurisdiction. To this end they added claims that defendants'

conduct had violated "the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C.

s 1983."

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Because there are no allegations of federal constitutional

violations independent of the purported violations of District

of Columbia law (or at any rate no such allegations for which

plaintiffs have standing), there is no subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate the preliminary injunction and

remand for the district court to dismiss the complaint.

* * *

The District law claims around which this suit has revolved

are somewhat complex but can be generalized as assertions

that various agencies and individuals of the District's executive branch acted ultra vires. In the District of Columbia

Taxicab Commission Establishment Act of 1985 (the "Taxicab

Act" or the "Act"), D.C. Code s 40-1701 et seq., the District

created the District of Columbia Taxicab Commission

("D.C.T.C." or the "Commission"), and gave it "exclusive

authority for intrastate regulation of the taxicab industry."

Id. s 40-1704. The Act did not address the issue of taxicab

reciprocity (i.e., the arrangements under which suburban

taxicabs may operate within the District, and vice versa), but

provided the Commission with the authority to "[a]dvise the

Mayor regarding the entering, modifying, and terminating of

reciprocal agreements respecting taxicabs with governmental

bodies in the Washington metropolitan area." Id.

s 40-1707(b)(1)(L). On August 13, 1987 the Commission's

chairman issued "Administrative Order No. 4," which purported to govern the provision of taxicab service in the

District by cabs licensed only in other jurisdictions.

On June 12, 1998 the District of Columbia Taxicab Commission promulgated a new provision to the District of Columbia

Municipal Regulations, 31 D.C.M.R. s 828, limiting the scope

of taxicab reciprocity with neighboring jurisdictions. The

regulation provided penalties in the form of fines of up to

$300 and imprisonment of up to 90 days.

Plaintiffs, suburban taxicab drivers and their companies,

filed a complaint in the district court. They named as

defendants the District, the District Chief of Police, and the

Taxicab Commissioners. The complaint--and all successive

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amended complaints--specified that the various individual

defendants were sued "in their official capacities." The complaint alleged that only the Mayor, not the Commission,

possessed the exclusive authority "to change, modify or alter

applicable reciprocity arrangements in the District of Columbia," Joint Appendix 186, and that the provision of civil

penalties by the Taxicab Act, D.C. Code s 40-1719(a), was

exclusive, negating the purported penalties under s 828.

In response to a TRO issued by the district court, the

chairman of the D.C.T.C. issued an order rescinding Administrative Order No. 4--the 1987 internal agency memorandum

setting forth the District's policy of reciprocity. Further, the

Mayor delegated to the Commission his authority to alter

reciprocity agreements. Soon thereafter the Commission

rescinded existing s 828 and, under the Mayor's delegation,

approved an identical rule as an "emergency" s 828.

Plaintiffs filed a contempt motion, arguing that the Commission's action violated the TRO. They also alleged that

Harry Silverman, a Commissioner of the D.C.T.C., should be

found in criminal contempt for deliberately running his car

into a taxicab owned by one of the plaintiffs in an attempt to

arrest the driver pursuant to s 828. Plaintiffs filed a Second

Amended Complaint, expanding their claims to encompass

the alleged infractions by the Commission and by Silverman.

The district court followed up with TROs broader than the

initial one, and on February 16, 1999 issued the preliminary

injunction now on appeal. It enjoined the defendants from:

"(1) enforcing 31 D.C.M.R. s 828, or any portion thereof; and

(2) taking any action to effectuate any arrests or other

criminal penal actions against taxicab drivers in connection

with alleged reciprocity violations." In addition, the D.C.T.C.

was enjoined from: "(1) taking any action ... in reliance

upon any purported mayoral delegation regarding reciprocity;

and (2) seeking to enact, modify, or repeal any regulations,

administrative orders, or other administrative actions that

have the effect of limiting, modifying, repealing, or otherwise

altering reciprocity."

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* * *

We may dispense rapidly with jurisdictional theories advanced in or before oral argument. Plaintiffs say that if their

District law theory is correct, the District lacks the authority

to arrest taxicab drivers for reciprocity violations; thus any

arrest is illegal and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The argument has an initial plausibility: if an arrest without

probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment, then surely

one for which no cause could possibly exist must do so. If

correct, of course, the argument would transform a wide class

of state law claims into federal ones. Every arrest claimed to

violate state law would entail an ancillary federal claim, even

though the state law attack rested (as here) on state law

theories having no connection whatever with the policies

underlying the Fourth Amendment.

Cases such as Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965),

and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), both cited by

plaintiffs, allow anticipatory relief against threatened state

law enforcement; but these cases turned on that enforcement's deterrent threat to plaintiffs' constitutional, in particular First Amendment, rights. (In Dombrowski, moreover,

enforcement was alleged to be in bad faith, "only to discourage appellants' civil rights activities." 380 U.S. at 490.)

Here plaintiffs make no parallel allegation that the District's

arguably ultra vires taxicab regulations burden or chill any

independent federal constitutional rights. Mere inconsistency

with state, or even federal, law will not suffice to create a

Fourth Amendment cause of action (unless, of course, the

inconsistency is with the Fourth Amendment itself).

Plaintiffs also argue that any arrest under the disputed

provisions will be a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, apparently asserting a due process theory.

Again this is a state law claim in federal garb. But "the fact

of a state law violation does not resolve whether a plaintiff

has been deprived of due process." Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 944 (D.C.

Cir. 1988); see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211,

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1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("A state ought to follow its

law, but to treat a violation of state law as a violation of the

Constitution is to make the federal government the enforcer

of state law. State rather than federal courts are the appropriate institutions to enforce state rules."). A due process

claim rests on "the manner in which the violation occurs as

well as its consequences." Committee of U.S. Citizens, 859

F.2d at 944; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558

(1974) ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the

individual against arbitrary action of government."); United

States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 446 n.28 (7th

Cir. 1982) ("In order for the violation of state law to rise to

the level of a federal constitutional violation, it must be

alleged that the violation was the result of arbitrary state

action."). But plaintiffs point to nothing in the record that

would support a claim that the Commission acted arbitrarily

or in a manner otherwise violative of due process, except to

argue that the regulation violates state law. That is not

enough.

Similarly, it is not enough that in their amended complaints

plaintiffs ask that the Commission should be held in civil

contempt for violating the district court's TRO. To secure

jurisdiction by this means would be a remarkable feat of

bootstrapping. But just as a court without jurisdiction over

an underlying case has no jurisdiction to issue a subpoena

(unless issued in aid of determining jurisdiction), or to enforce

it by civil contempt, United States Catholic Conference v.

Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988); cf.

Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(finding that there is no such thing as a cause of action for

civil contempt, a device used simply to secure compliance with

a court order), so too a court without jurisdiction over an

underlying case cannot issue a TRO, or enforce it by civil

contempt.

The possibility that the U.S. Attorney may pursue a criminal contempt claim against Silverman or other defendants,

see United States Catholic Conference, 487 U.S. at 78-79, of

course, neither provides plaintiffs with a cause of action nor

supplies jurisdiction for their civil suit.

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In a supplemental brief filed after oral argument, the

plaintiffs have sought to turn their allegations against Commissioner Silverman into an independent federal claim, and

then, in a marvelous twist, to suggest that jurisdiction over

the other claims might survive as supplementary claims under 28 U.S.C. s 1367. This will not work.

Plaintiffs say that Silverman's conduct independently created a federal cause of action. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that he "intentionally collided his vehicle into a

taxicab" of one of the plaintiff companies, that the intentional

collision represented a battery, that Silverman acted under

color of state law, and thereby violated the court's TRO, and

that therefore he should be held in criminal contempt. Second Amended Complaint, pp 31-35. The complaint goes on to

say that Silverman's conduct placed the plaintiff cab company

"in jeopardy of unreasonable government action, ... in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments ...

and 42 U.S.C. s 1983." Id. p 47.

We will assume for these purposes that Silverman was

acting under color of state law,1 and that absent unusual

circumstances the deliberate use of a car to ram another, to

enforce a cab regulation, violates the federal constitution as

an unreasonable use of force. But recall that the plaintiffs'

suit is only against the District, the individuals being named

only in their official capacity. Indeed, when the plaintiffs

sought contempt proceedings against Silverman, the district

court noted "that Defendants do not represent Mr. Silverman,

and that Mr. Silverman has never appeared in any of these

proceedings." Memorandum Opinion, Oct. 30, 1998, at 6 n.3.

Insofar as plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against further

use of cars as battering rams by the District, they have failed

even remotely to allege facts essential for standing; there is

no assertion of any fact giving reason to believe that Silverman or any other District officer or employee will again use

this innovative law enforcement technique against any of the

__________

1 The District, however, cites D.C. Code Ann. s 40-1722 (1998)

for the proposition that the D.C. Council has transferred all taxicab

enforcement responsibilities to the Metropolitan Police Department.

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plaintiffs' cabs. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,

110 (1983) (finding that plaintiff who did not "face[ ] a real

and immediate threat of again being illegally choked" pursuant to the city's policy with respect to the use of chokeholds

did not have standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief

against the city).

Although plaintiffs also seek damages, they have never

alleged that the District has adopted a "policy or custom" of

enforcing its taxi regulations by means of crashing autos into

each other, as would be required for municipal liability under

s 1983. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). While of course an omission in substantive allegations is not inherently a jurisdictional defect, here

the question is whether plaintiffs' references to the alleged

Silverman episode ever purported to invoke federal question

jurisdiction. In fact those references are most naturally

understood exclusively as the bases for plaintiffs' requests for

criminal contempt remedies, see Second Amended Complaint

at WW 31-35, and for their jurisdictionally defective request for

injunctive relief (id. p 47). Under the most reasonable reading, the allegation against Commissioner Silverman does not

form a basis for plaintiffs' claim for damages, and accordingly

the successive complaints altogether fail to allege a federal

claim.

Of course the alleged ramming may in fact afford the

specific cab company and driver a good s 1983 claim against

Silverman. They are at liberty to try such a suit. If,

however, they should seek to combine that claim with ones

dependent on the District law issues which have hitherto

consumed the time of the district court, invoking as they have

here at the last minute the "supplemental jurisdiction" provision of 28 U.S.C. s 1367, allowance of such supplemental

jurisdiction would either be improper for want of a "common

nucleus of operative fact," United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383

U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also Doe by Fein v. District of

Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996), or be an abuse of

discretion given that the District law issues so clearly "substantially predominate[ ] over the claim or claims over which

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the district court has original jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C.

s 1367(c)(2).

The preliminary injunction is vacated and the case remanded for the district court to dismiss the complaint.

So ordered.

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