Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00275/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00275-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Erin Lee Perry,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-19-0275-PHX-JJT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 on March 14, 2019 (Doc. 8). The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for 

consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of 

fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 

72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals provided 

the following factual background:1

¶2 On May 16, 2012 the superior court in case number CR2012-

3907 placed Perry on two years probation for possession of burglary 

tools, a class 6 felony, and two years probation for resisting arrest, 

also a class 6 felony ("2012 felony case"). That same day, the court 

 

1 The state court acknowledged the summary was favorable to the prosecution. “We view 

the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict and resolve all 

reasonable inferences against Perry.” (Exh. E, Mem. Dec. 11/4/14 at n. 1) Accordingly, 

this summary is not a finding by the undersigned of the related facts, and is offered only 

to provide context. 

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in case number CR2012-103224, also placed him on two years 

probation for the possession or use of marijuana, a class 1 

misdemeanor ("marijuana case"). 

¶3 One year later, in May 2013, a Mesa police officer arrested 

Perry after a Mesa Community College security guard observed him 

reach into a light pole in a fenced construction yard at 3:30 a.m. and 

attempt to pull out the pole's copper wiring.

(Exh. E, Mem. Dec. 11/4/14 at ¶ 2-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Docs. 19-25, are referenced 

herein as “Exh. ___.”)2

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted for burglary, and the state petitioned to revoke Petitioner’s 

probation on the 2012 felony case and the marijuana case. 

A Plea Offer had been extended to allow him to plead guilty to a 

lesser charge with a sentencing range less than the 10 years sentence 

ultimately imposed. While the matter was pending, a Settlement 

Conference was held. At the Settlement Conference, the Defendant 

was advised that because he had two prior felony convictions, he 

faced a higher sentencing range than a person without a similar 

criminal history. The Plea Offer expired.

(Exh. P, M.E. 9/19/16 at 1.) 

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial, and was convicted on the burglary charge, and 

allegation of commission while on probation. (Exh. E, Mem. Dec. 11/4/14 at ¶ 3; Exh. A, 

M.E. 10/10/13.) “Before sentencing, the superior court held a ‘priors trial’ and found the 

State had proven by clear and convincing evidence Perry had two prior felony 

convictions.” (Exh. E, Mem. Dec. 11/4/14 at ¶ 3.) On December 13, 2013, Petitioner was 

sentenced to 10 years in prison. (Exh. B, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal. Counsel was unable to find an issue for review, and 

 

2 Respondents have filed two copies of each of their Exhibits A through T. One copy is 

attached to the main docket items, Docs. 20 to 25 (e.g. Doc. 20 includes Exhibits A to I), 

and another copy has been filed as attachments to those main docket items (e.g. Docs. 20-

1 to 20-9 appear to contain duplicates of Exhibits A to I). Respondents have filed a Notice 

(Doc. 29) confirming that the copies are indeed duplicates. The undersigned has reviewed 

only the first filed copy of each lettered exhibit, which are included in each main docket 

entry.

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filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and related state cases. 

(Exh. D, Opening Brief.) Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per supplemental brief, 

but did not do so. (Exh. E, Mem. Dec. 11/4/14 at ¶ 1.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals searched the record for “fundamental error,” and 

found none. The court did find that the sentencing minute entry incorrectly calculated the 

pre-sentence incarceration as 277 days, rather than 279 days, and improperly referenced 

“A.R.S. 13-702”, a provision that related to first time offenders. (Id. at ¶ 7.) The court 

corrected the minute entry to provide for the 279 days and to delete the reference to § 13-

702. Otherwise, the conviction and sentence (as well as revocations of probation) were 

affirmed. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-10.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review on appeal. (Exh. F, Mandate.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner then filed a PCR Notice (Exh. G), eschewing appointment of counsel. 

(See Exh. H, M.E. 10/7/14.) Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition (Exh. J) raising claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel based on: (1) failure to obtain a competency hearing; 

(2) failure to adequately explain the charges and exposure if convicted; and (3) 

cancellation of the second part of a Settlement Conference without his consent.

Eventually counsel appeared for Petitioner, and the PCR court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing on the petition, at which trial counsel and other witnesses testified. 

The PCR court denied the petition on the merits. (Exh. P, M.E. 9/19/16.) 

Petitioner then filed through counsel a Petition for Review (Exh. R), arguing 

ineffective assistance of counsel based failure to: “(1) request a Rule 11 examination, 

instead conducting her own screening; and (2) determine whether the anti-psychotic 

medications prescribed to Mr. Perry effected his ability to understand the proceedings.” 

(Id. at 13.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief, summarily finding 

no abuse of discretion by the PCR court. (Exh. S, Mem. Dec. at 2.) 

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Petitioner did not seek further review in his PCR proceeding. (Exh. T, Mandate.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his original Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 15, 2019 (Doc. 1). The 

Court dismissed that petition with leave to amend on the basis that Petitioner failed to 

allege facts to support his claims, and instead simply referred to various state court filings. 

(Order 2/21/19, Doc. 7 at 2.)

Petitioner then filed his Amended Petition (Doc. 8) on March 14, 2019. Liberally 

construing Petitioner’s Petition in light of the record, the undersigned finds that it asserts 

the following four grounds for relief:

1. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to address Petitioner’s inability to 

understand the charge or the settlement conference proceedings because of mental 

health issues.

2. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to have Petitioner’s competency evaluated.

3. He was denied due process as a result of the failure of the court to sua sponte 

conduct a competency evaluation. See e.g. United States v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 

1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (failing to sua sponte hold a competency hearing erroneous if 

evidence of incompetence was such that a reasonable judge would be expected to 

experience a genuine doubt respecting the defendant's competence). 

4. Petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Petitioner seeks as relief the imposition of a time served or mitigated sentence 

(citing a list of mitigating factors including family to support, ailing mother, mental health 

issues, and intervening death of a son). (Doc. 8 at 9, 11.)

On March 29, 2019, Petitioner filed Exhibits (Doc. 13) to his Amended Petition. 

The Court accepted those exhibits as supplements to the record. (Order 4/2/19, Doc. 14.) 

Response - On June 28, 2019, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 19) and 

Exhibits (Docs. 20-25). Respondents argue Ground 3 is procedurally defaulted, and the 

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remaining grounds are without merit. Respondents address the argument of prejudice in 

Ground 4 as part of the merits analysis of Grounds 1 and 2. 

Reply - On July 17, 2019, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 27). Petitioner argues the 

merits of Ground 3, but does so primarily by arguing the ineffectiveness of trial counsel 

in failing to pursue a competency evaluation. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND 3 - EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

1. Not Properly Exhausted

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to fairly present to the state courts, and has 

now procedurally defaulted his state remedies on, his claim in Ground 3 that the trial court 

should have conducted a competency evaluation and determination. 

The Petition did not address whether this claim was raised to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, denied raising it to the Arizona Supreme Court, and indicated it was presented in 

his First, Second, and Third petitions. (Petition, Doc. 8 at 9.) 

Respondents argue it was never presented to the state courts and is now untimely 

and barred from a successive PCR petition. (Answer, Doc. 19 at 8-9.) 

The Court’s Order filed July 1, 2019 (Doc. 26) noted the procedural default defense 

raised in the answer, and directed: 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any assertions in the reply 

that Petitioner’s claims were fairly presented to the state appellate 

courts shall be supported by specific references to the location of the 

presentation of the claim, i.e. by exhibit number/letter in the record 

of this proceeding, document name, date of filing with the state court, 

page(s)/ line number(s) (e.g. “Exh. A, Petition for Review, filed 

1/1/15, at 1/17 – 2/23”).

(Order 7/1/19, Doc. 26.) 

In reply, Petitioner fails to address the non-exhaustion and procedural default 

defense. 

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) 

(per curiam). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the 

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death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal 

habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999)). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to show that he has 

properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Petitioner has not met that burden.

No claims were presented on Petitioner’s direct appeal, where neither appellate 

counsel nor Petitioner raised any claims. It is true that a petitioner’s state remedies are 

exhausted where the state courts have reached and passed on the merits of a federal claim, 

regardless whether the petitioner had fairly presented the claim to the state court. “It is 

reasonable to infer an exception [to the fair presentation requirement] where the State has 

actually passed upon the claim.” Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). See 

Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (“exhaustion does not require 

repeated assertions if a federal claim is actually considered at least once on the merits by 

the highest state court”); Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir.1984) 

("[t]here is no better evidence of exhaustion than a state court's actual consideration of the 

relevant constitutional issue"); and Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (8th 

Cir.1990) (state court's sua sponte consideration of an issue satisfies exhaustion). Here, 

however, the issues addressed sua sponte by the appellate court in conducting an Anders 

review did not include claims of error based on the lack of a competency evaluation. 

It is true that Petitioner argued to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his PCR petition 

for review that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency evaluation 

or address his ability to understand the proceedings. (Exh. R, Pet. Rev. at 13, et seq.) But 

that is not the same claim of failures by the trial court as asserted in Ground 3. “While 

[the ineffective assistance and underlying constitutional claim are] admittedly related, they 

are distinct claims with separate elements of proof, and each claim should have been 

separately and specifically presented to the state courts.” Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). Indeed, the ineffectiveness claims raised in the PCR 

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proceeding arise from the information available to counsel and counsel’s response. The 

due process claim in Ground 3 arises from the information known to the trial judge and 

his response to it. See Garza, 751 F.3d at 1134.

Accordingly, Petitioner never fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals the 

due process claim asserted in Ground 3. 

2. Procedurally Defaulted

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly 

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no 

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of 

a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of justice” 

which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to 

the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s waiver bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. 

Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 19 at 7-

8.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply shows 

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"that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral 

proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 1069 

(2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in prior 

PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel). For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that 

the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights 

“that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 

399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, 

(2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury 

under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal 

waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. 

Here, Petitioner’s claim in Ground 3 is not the sort requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by waiver, Petitioner would now be barred from 

raising his claims by Arizona’s time bar. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for 

post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days 

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the 

order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 

Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting 

that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the 

rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar claims if they fall within the 

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claim in Ground 3. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply. 

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Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a claim 

is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state 

courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims 

of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts in this 

proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars would 

prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claim in Ground 3 is 

now procedurally defaulted.

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal 

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse 

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13). The 

Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily turn on some 

objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

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Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner proffers no cause to excuse his failure to raise the claim in Ground 3.

Petitioner having failed to show cause, this Court need not examine the merits of 

Petitioner's claim in Ground 3 or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and 

prejudice. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). 

4. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure 

to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional 

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). 

Petitioner offers nothing to show his actual innocence. Accordingly, Ground 3 

must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. GROUNDS 1, 2 AND 4 – INEFFECTIVENESS RE COMPETENCY

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 1, Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to address 

Petitioner’s inability to understand the charge or the settlement conference proceedings 

because of mental health issues. (Petition, Doc. 8 at 6.) In Ground 2, Petitioner argues

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to have Petitioner’s competency evaluated by an 

expert or the court, relying instead on her own evaluation. (Id. at 7.) In Ground 4, 

Petitioner argues he was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness. (Id. at 9.) 

Respondents concede these claims were raised to the Arizona Court of Appeals in 

Petitioner’s PCR petition and his subsequent petition for review. Respondents argue that 

the last reasoned decision on these claims, that of the PCR Court, did not make an 

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unreasonable determination of the facts, nor make legal decisions that were contrary to or 

an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court case law. (Answer, Doc. 19 at 11-

16.) 

In his Reply (Doc. 27), Petitioner argues that in light of his history of mental health 

issues, use of anti-psychotic medication, and lack of urgency in the court proceedings, 

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mental health evaluation. He argues as a 

result his rejection of the plea offer was not knowing, and he was unable to assist in his 

defense because he did not understand the charge. He argues that had he been competent, 

he would have taken the plea offer and received a shorter sentence. 

2. Applicable Standards of Review

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every error justifies relief. Rather, statutes limiting habeas 

review “reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in 

the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through 

appeal.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011). 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 

Errors of Fact and Evidentiary Hearings - Federal courts are further authorized 

to grant habeas relief in cases where the state-court decision “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not 

second-guess a state court's fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court 

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record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). “Moreover, implicit findings of fact 

are entitled to deference under § 2254(d) to the same extent as explicit findings of fact.” 

Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008). See also Watkins v. Rubenstein, 

802 F.3d 637, 649 (4th Cir. 2015).

3. Relevant State Court Decision

In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas court looks through summary 

opinions to the last reasoned decision on the claim(s). Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 

1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, that was the decision of the PCR court, which found:

In presenting his case for Post-Conviction Relief, Defendant 

asserts that he told his Attorney Abbi Romshek that he had mental 

health issues. In an effort to determine whether she felt Defendant 

needed a Rule 11 Evaluation, Attorney Romshek asked Defendant

some questions about the legal proceedings. She was aware of his 

mental health diagnosis but was also aware that Defendant was being 

treated for the mental illness. Her case notes from July 17, 2013 

indicate that Defendant reported that while in jail, he is receiving 

medication that makes him feel "good" and more focused. After 

questioning him about the legal proceedings, she felt he understood 

and did not require a Rule 11 Evaluation. Defendant argues that an 

Attorney with no medical training does not have the expertise needed 

to make a determination of competence. It does not appear from the 

notes in Exhibit 4 that the Attorney was making a determination of 

competence but rather a determination of whether he appeared to be 

in need of an evaluation to determine competence. Making a 

determination of whether one is in need of a Rule 11 Evaluation is 

quite different from making a competency evaluation. In nearly all 

criminal proceedings, Defense attorneys make determinations 

whether their client is in need of a Rule 11 Evaluation so it is not 

unusual that Ms. Romshek did so in this proceeding. 

Defendant maintains that his Attorney did not adequately 

explain the charges and sentencing possibilities to him. Contrary to 

this assertion, Ms. Romshek's notes clearly indicate that she had 

multiple conversations with him explaining why he was not charged 

with Trespassing, that the trial would essentially be Defendant's word 

against that of the Security Guard, that it would not look good to a 

jury that Defendant's version of events changed three times. She 

explained that his prior felonies would be used to aggravate his 

sentence. To all of this, Defendant responded with questions, 

requested that Ms. Romshek request reduced charges, he explained 

that before the Security Guard arrived, he had been sitting on a tractor 

but did not reveal this because he did not want to be charged with 

Theft of Means of Transportation. All the acts and statements of the 

Defendant indicate he understood the charges and the possible 

sentence. His point at the time was that he did not want to plead guilty 

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to "something he did not do". Rather, he thought he would be able to 

"tear the witness up on the stand" and be acquitted. (Exhibit 4 ). 

Defendant claims his Attorney cancelled the second day of the 

Settlement Conference without his permission. In her notes that 

appear in Exhibit 4, Attorney Romshek documents that on September 

19, 2013, Defendant told her he did not want to accept the current 

plea offer because he can't plead to something he didn't do. The notes 

indicate that his Attorney then explained that the County Attorney 

would not offer him a plea that required him to do less than 4.5 years 

in the Department of Corrections. Once Defendant told her he would 

not accept the current offer, she told Defendant she would cancel the 

change of plea hearing.

(Exh. P, M.E. 9/19/16 at 2.) 

4. No Unreasonable Determination of Facts

Plaintiff proffers no argument why the PCR Court’s factual findings were 

unreasonable. The undersigned perceives no basis to find them unreasonable. 

5. No Remediable Legal Error

The PCR court was not explicit about the law being applied, or the legal conclusions 

reached. When faced with such a summary decision, the habeas court conducts a limited 

from of de novo review. The habeas court must first determine what arguments or theories 

could have supported the state court’s decision; and then ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of the Supreme Court. Livaditis v. Davis, 933 F.3d 1036, 1044 

(9th Cir. 2019). 

For review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the law clearly established 

by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

Livaditis, 933 F.3d at 1045. Under Strickland, the petitioner must satisfy a two-part test:

First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must 

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 

requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 

the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

466 U.S. at 687. An objective standard applies to proving such ineffectiveness, and 

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requires a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th 

Cir. 1991)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s 

actions is judged from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all 

the circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689. 

Here, the PCR court concluded that, under the facts known to counsel, counsel was 

not acting unreasonably in relying upon her own evaluation of Petitioner’s mental capacity 

to understand the proceedings, the charges, and the plea offer. The PCR court rejected the 

contention that knowledge of a mental health history and medications rendered this 

unreasonable. 

Indeed, the evaluation involved in a competency determination is not rigorous. 

“Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure 

that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.” Godinez v. 

Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993). The test for competence to stand trial is whether the 

defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as a factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 

(1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Not all people who have a mental 

problem are rendered by it legally incompetent." Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 593 

(5th Cir. 1990). The same standard applies to the ability to decide on a plea and enter a 

plea. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 399. 

At most, Petitioner had presented evidence to the PCR court from mental health 

experts that Petitioner suffered from mental health issues and might have been incompetent

to consider the plea or to assist at trial. (See e.g. Exh. R, Pet. Rev. at 10-13 (summarizing 

evidentiary hearing testimony of Dr. Walker and Dr. Seward).) But none of those 

witnesses could opine that Petitioner’s presentation to trial counsel during the pretrial and 

trial proceedings would have made it unreasonable for her to conclude that Petitioner had 

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the required reasonable degree of understanding, and rational and factual understanding of 

the proceedings. 

To the extent that there may have remained a question in PCR court’s mind, the 

court was required to strongly presume counsel rendered adequate assistance and made 

her decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. The burden was on 

Petitioner to overcome that presumption, by affirmatively showing that counsel failed to 

act reasonably considering all the circumstances. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 

(2011). Thus, the PCR court could have concluded that Petitioner had simply failed to 

establish deficient performance. The undersigned finds such a decision would have been 

correct.

The PCR court did not address the prejudice prong of Strickland, as argued by 

Petitioner in Ground 4. Although a defendant must prove both deficient performance and 

prejudice, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was 

reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Therefore, even if this Court could conclude that such conclusions were 

inconsistent with Strickland or another decision of the Supreme Court, fairminded jurists 

could disagree. Thus, this Court must uphold the decision of the state court. Livaditis, 

933 F.3d at 1044. 

Accordingly, Grounds 1, 2 and 4 must be denied. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that 

in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention 

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pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in 

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a 

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 

or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as 

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

(A) Ground 3 of Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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(B) The remainder of Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8) 

be DENIED.

(C) To the extent the foregoing findings and recommendations are adopted in the District 

Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: January 23, 2020

19-0275r RR 20 01 15 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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