Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01877/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01877-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY FLETCHER,

CDCR #C-41111,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PRAMO, Warden; 

A.W. HERNANDEZ, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01877-AJB-BGS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 3]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1)

GREGORY FLETCHER (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley 

State Prison (“SVSP”) in Soledad, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil 

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff’s claims the Warden and Associate Warden of Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego covered up “assaults, murders, corruptions, 

rape, and shooting[s]” at RJD during “all of 2011” and until October 7, 2015, as part of 

the “Green Wall Mafia Union” and as the result of a racial conspiracy against black 

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inmates. (ECF No. 1 at 1-4.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of “protection” 

against harm at SVSP, as well as $25 million in general and punitive damages for “all the 

deaths, murders, assaults, [and] rape[s] that [Defendants] got away with.” (Id. at 7).

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 3), followed by several supplemental 

declarations in support of his IFP (ECF Nos. 5, 7).

I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 

F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted certified copies of his CDCR 

Inmate Statement Report, as well as several prison certificates, verified by a SVSP trust 

account officer, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. See ECF

Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These documents show that Plaintiff had no 

deposits to his account, carried no balance over the 6-month period preceding the filing 

of his Complaint, and had an available balance of zero at the time of filing. As a result, 

the Court declines to assess any initial partial filing at this time. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a 

“failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 3) and

directs the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”), or his designee, to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the 

installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

///

///

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II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

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(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff claims RJD’s Warden and Associate Warden have, over the course of four 

years, “intentionally and knowingly” “covered up shootings, murders, assaults, rape and 

more” and have been “letting blacks get hurt.” (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.) Plaintiff claims this is 

due to a racist conspiracy “by CDC officers Green Wall Mafia Union” and because there 

are no cameras on the A, B, C, or D Facility at RJD; therefore “they[’ve] never been 

caught.” (Id. at 4.) 

First, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for conspiracy 

under section 1983, because it offers only “naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, to show the existence of an agreement or a 

meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights, or any actual deprivation of 

those constitutional rights. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. 

Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Jones v. Jimenez, No. 1:14-cv02045 LJO

SAB PC, 2015 WL 8538922, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015) (finding prisoner’s vague 

references to “green wall” conspiracy tactics insufficient to state a cognizable conspiracy 

claim, and therefore, subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

and § 1915A).

Second, it appears Plaintiff seeks to hold both RJD’s Warden and Associate 

Warden liable for unspecified constitutional violations based solely on their supervisory 

duties with regard to other unnamed RJD officials. But his Complaint contains no further 

“factual content” describing either Defendant’s direct involvement in any constitutional 

injury actually suffered by Plaintiff sufficient to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the [Wardens] [are] liable” for any constitutional violation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. “All § 1983 claims must be premised on a constitutional violation.” Nurre v. 

Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). To state a claim, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his 

constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 673; Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 

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(9th Cir. 2014). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the acts or 

omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 672-673. “In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under 

section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights 

deprivation.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002); Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either 

(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient 

causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). This causal connection “can be established by setting 

in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts 

by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause 

others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207-08 (internal quotation marks, citation, 

and alterations omitted).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims only that both Defendants “kn[e]w[] exactly 

what [wa]s going on,” and that Associate Warden Hernandez is “very racist and 

prejudice.” (ECF No. 2, 4.) But these conclusory accusations fail to plausibly suggest that 

either Defendant personally participated in, or directed their subordinates to do anything 

which caused an actual violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 

934; Starr, 625 F.3d at 1205-06; Redman v. City of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (finding supervisory personnel liable only when an adequate causal connection 

is alleged between the Defendant’s breach of duty and the plaintiff’s constitutional 

injury). In fact, Plaintiff fails to allege he was ever actually injured by the racial 

conspiracy he seeks to expose. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (prisoners 

lack standing to assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners and may only challenge 

violations of their own rights that result in an actual injury).

///

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“Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title 

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

Thus, as currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint amounts to no more than 

“an unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation,” that “stops short of 

the line between possibility and plausibility” that he is entitled to relief. Id. at 678. 

Therefore, it “fails to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Id.; Taylor, 880 

F.2d at 1045, and his claims against the Warden and Associate Warden must be 

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

C. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint 

fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, and doubts he will be able to 

cure his pleading defects, it will provide him a chance to do so—if he can. See Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).2

 

2

 The Court takes judicial notice of two other civil rights actions recently filed by Plaintiff 

in the Southern District of California. Both also allege constitutional violations occurring 

at RJD, but both involve separate claims against different sets of Defendants. See e.g., 

Fletcher v. Marquez, et al., 3:16-cv-00564-JLS-MDD (S.D. Cal. filed March 4, 2016); 

Fletcher v. Quin, et al., 3:15-cv-02156-GPC-NLS (S.D. Cal. Filed Sept. 24, 2015); Bias v. 

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (court “‘may take notice of proceedings in 

other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have 

a direct relation to matters at issue.’”) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 

803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff is cautioned that should he elect to amend his Complaint 

in this case, he may not include any claim which is duplicative of one he has already alleged 

in another case pending before another judge. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 

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III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 3).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in his account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and 

GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original 

pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint 

will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

///

 

1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that a prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915 if it “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.”).

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If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

and 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2016

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