Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01533/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01533-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 7 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nicholas Lew Blackwater, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CIV 14-1533-PHX-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Nicholas Lew Blackwater, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 7), and Petitioner filed a traverse (Doc. 10).

BACKGROUND1

On July 1, 2005, the Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner as follows:

Counts 1, 7 and 11, kidnapping, class 2 dangerous felonies; Counts 2 and 8, aggravated

assault, class 2 dangerous felonies and dangerous crimes against children; Count 3, sexual

abuse, a class 5 dangerous felony; Counts 4, 9 and 14, sexual assault, class 2 dangerous

felonies; Count 5, kidnapping, a class 2 felony; Count 6, sexual assault, a class 2 felony; and

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Counts 10, 12 and 13, aggravated assault, class 3 dangerous felonies. (Exh. A.) The facts

underlying the charges are set forth in the presentence report.

Counts I, II, III and IV:

The following information is summarized from Phoenix Police Departmental

Report #70985951:

The defendant approached thirty-seven year old Lynette Davis as she walked

down the street on June 16, 1997. He demanded to see her identification and

instructed her to get in his vehicle. Because the victim initially assumed he was

an undercover police officer, she complied. The defendant subsequently

solicited her assistance to cash a check to no avail and drove her to a location

behind [some] semi-trucks. After he held a knife to her throat, the victim

became frightened. The defendant subsequently threatened to kill her and

ripped her shirt and bra away from her body. He instructed the victim to

pretend to enjoy the assault and again threatened to kill her if she looked in his

direction or spoke to him. The defendant inserted his penis into the victim’s

vagina and engaged in sexual intercourse against her will for approximately

five minutes. He subsequently sucked on her nipples and threatened to assault

her through anal intercourse, but he did not do so. The victim believed the

defendant planned to kill her because he continued to wave the knife toward

her throat. After an hour or longer elapsed, the defendant drove away from the

scene in possession of the victim’s wallet.

Phoenix Police officers ensured the victim received medical attention prior to

transporting her for a rape examination. One of the police officers, who was

standing in the vicinity of the treatment room, overheard the victim screaming

in pain during the examination.

When the defendant was interviewed in the Arizona Department of

Corrections on October 28, 2004, he initially denied that he even picked up

hitchhikers or used the services of prostitutes. Once he was confronted with

DNA evidence and the victims’ statements, however, the defendant asserted

that he had engaged in consensual vaginal intercourse with prostitutes, who

reportedly might have filed claims of assault or rape because he never paid

them for their services.

Counts V and VI:

The following information is summarized from Phoenix Police Departmental

Report #71422849:

Thirty-one year old Kathleen Marcyoniak was hitchhiking on August 29, 1997

when the defendant offered her transportation, and the victim observed a child

in the car seat in the back of the vehicle after she accepted his offer. The

defendant subsequently drove the victim to isolated location where he

demanded her property and took off her pants. The defendant slapped the

victim in the face and threatened to kill her. He forcibly engaged in vaginal

intercourse with the victim as his child cried in the back seat, and once he was

finished, the defendant left the scene in possession of the victim’s money, a

false tooth and other property.

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Counts VII, VIII, IX, X:

The following information is summarized from Phoenix Police Departmental

Report #91020663:

On June 22, 1999, thirty-three year old Stephanie Jones was working as a

prostitute when she encountered the defendant and stepped into his vehicle. He

subsequently drove her into an alley, produced a knife resembling a box cutter,

and demanded that the victim engage in anal sexual relations with him.

Because he held the knife to her throat, the victim felt compelled to remove her

dress and assumed a position on her hands and knees in the passenger seat of

his vehicle. The victim was uncertain if the defendant ejaculated, but once he

appeared to be finished, she asked him to drive her away from this area. When

the defendant refused, the victim, who was angered by the assault, kicked him

in the head, whereupon the defendant responded by cutting her breast with

[the] knife. He subsequently left the area, and the victim managed to locate

transportation to a hotel room she shared with her boyfriend, who transported

her to the hospital. After police officers arrived at the hospital, they observed

a four-inch long gaping wound that required stitches on the victim’s right

breast.

During the investigation of this offense, detectives spoke with the defendant’s

wife, who admitted that her children discovered blood in the back of their van

in 1999. Because she was uncertain what action to take, Mrs. Blackwater

cleaned the van and did not inform authorities.

Counts XI, XII, XIII, XIV:

The following information is summarized from Phoenix Police Departmental

Report #2001-12007255:

On October 26, 2001, the defendant threatened thirty-three year old Jodie

Dicken with a knife as she walked down the street and ordered her to get into

his vehicle. He voiced his plan to rape and kill her and reported that he had

killed his first rape victim. The defendant held the knife against the victim’s

ribs and drove her to an area near the railroad tracks. Once the defendant

stopped his vehicle, he jumped on top of the victim and stabbed her right arm.

The victim fought back and initially retrieved the knife from the defendant, but

he managed to gain control of it and threatened to kill her if she attempted to

take it again. The defendant reported that he planned to have anal sex with the

victim, but he apparently changed his mind and forced her to endure

non-consensual vaginal intercourse for five to ten minutes. The defendant

subsequently threw the victim into his vehicle as she attempted to dress

herself, but he maintained possession of her purse containing credit cards,

checks and cellular phone. Once the victim finished pulling her pants back on,

she attempted to solicit assistance by screaming at individuals in passing cars,

and a security guard ultimately heard her and contacted law enforcement

authorities.

The victim was transported to the Family Advocacy Center for a rape

examination after police officers photographed her injury, which was not

described in any other detail in the police report.

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Related Offenses:

***

According to Phoenix Police Departmental Report #2000-01160779, thirty-six

year old Dawn Toftee requested transportation from the defendant on July 30,

2000. He immediately drove erratically to a location different to where she

requested, grabbed her hair and pulled out a long knife with a four-inch blade.

Using extremely profane and descriptive language, the defendant informed the

victim that he planned to engage in anal sexual intercourse with her, and

threatened to kill her if she inadvertently defecated on his penis. The victim

felt the defendant’s penis in her anus for approximately five minutes before he

ejaculated on top of her. The defendant subsequently cut a piece of the

victim’s sleeve with his knife to clean himself and pushed her from his vehicle.

Officers observed the victim had what appeared to be spots of blood on her

shirt and purse, and she was transported for a rape examination after medical

personnel treated her.

The victim did not provide officers a means to contact her and numerous

subsequent attempts to do so were unsuccessful.

(Exh. D at 1-3.)

On February 22, 2006, Petitioner entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead

guilty to: Counts 4, 9 and 14 as charged, sexual assault, class 2 felonies; Count 5 as charged,

kidnapping, a class 2 felony; Count 3 as charged, sexual abuse, a class 5 felony; and Count

6 as amended, attempted sexual assault, a class 3 felony. (Exh. B at 1.) In exchange, the State

agreed to dismiss Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, and 10-13, the allegations of dangerousness, and not to

file charges arising out of PPD DR 2000-01160779. (Id. at 2.)

The plea agreement stipulated that Petitioner would be sentenced as follows: within

the aggravated range of 7-14 years of prison on each of Counts 4, 9, and 14 (7 years being

the presumptive term); and within the aggravated range of 7 to 12.5 years of prison on Count

5 (5 years being the presumptive term) – the sentences imposed in all those counts to be

served consecutively. (Exh. B at 2.) Additionally, Petitioner agreed to be sentenced to

lifetime probation on Counts 3 and 6, but should probation be rejected that the resulting

prison sentences would be served consecutively to each other and to the sentences imposed

in Counts 4, 5, 9 and 14. (Id.) Petitioner specifically agreed to the two following relevant

provisions:

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The parties hereto fully and completely understand and agree that by entering

into a plea agreement, the defendant consents to judicial factfinding by

preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of sentence.

In making the sentencing determination, the court is not bound by the rules of

evidence.

I have read and understand the provisions of this agreement and the addendum

to this plea agreement. I have discussed the case and my constitutional rights

with my lawyer. I understand that by pleading GUILTY I will also be waiving

and giving up my right to a trial by jury to determine guilt and to determine

any fact used to impose a sentence within the range set forth in Paragraph 1 of

this agreement.

(Exh. B at 4.) The trial court went over all the special conditions with Petitioner in open

court, and advised him “of all pertinent constitutional rights and rights of review.” (Exh. C

at 1.)

On March 23, 2006, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 14

years of imprisonment on Count 4; to an aggravated term of 12.5 years of imprisonment on

Count 5, to be served consecutively to Count 4; to an aggravated term of 14 years of

imprisonment on Count 9, to be served consecutively to Count 5; and to an aggravated term

of 14 years of imprisonment on Count 14, to be served consecutively to Count 9. (Exh. E at

2-3.) The trial court also placed Petitioner on concurrent terms of lifetime probation for

Counts 3 and 6, to commence upon absolute discharge from prison for each separate offense

in Counts 4, 5, 9 and 14. (Id. at 3-4.) At sentencing, Petitioner received and signed a “Notice

of Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure.” (Exh. F.)

On April 6, 2007, Petitioner filed an untimely PCR notice. (Exh. G.) On April 27,

2007, the trial court dismissed it, finding:

Defendant filed an untimely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on April 6,

2007. Defendant was sentenced on March 23, 2006.

Defendant claims he should be allowed to file this untimely notice because his

attorney failed to file the notice after being instructed to do so. Defendant was

advised at the time of sentencing, and in the Notice of Rights of Review After

Conviction and Procedure that he signed on March 23, 2006, that it was his

responsibility to file the notice with the 90-day time period. He has failed to

provide the court with meritorious reasons why the failure to timely file the

notice was without fault on his part, as required by Rule 32.1(f), Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure.

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED dismissing Defendant’s Notice of Post-Conviction Relief.

(Exh. H.) On August 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a “Request for Status of Defendant’s

Post-Conviction Relief,” and another similar filing on February 20, 2009. (Exhs. I and J.) On

May 1, 2009, the trial court issued a minute entry explaining that it had dismissed Petitioner’s

PCR on April 24, 2007, and ordered another copy of that minute entry sent to Petitioner.

(Exh. K.)

On November 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a second untimely PCR notice. (Exh. L.) On

December 1, 2010, the trial court dismissed this second petition, concluding:

The Court has reviewed defendant’s Notice of Post-Conviction Relief filed on

November 16, 2010, and defendant’s Request for Preparation of

Post-Conviction Record filed on November 16, 2010. Defendant pled guilty

on February 22, 2006, and was sentenced by this Court on March 29, 2006.

This is defendant’s second Rule 32 proceeding and it has been filed in an

untimely manner.

Defendant claims there are newly discovered material facts which probably

would have changed the verdict or sentence in his case. To be entitled to

post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must

show that the evidence was discovered after trial although existed before trial;

the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at trial or appeal

through reasonable diligence; the evidence is neither solely cumulative nor

impeaching; the evidence is material; and the evidence probably would have

changed the verdict or sentence. State v. Saenz, 197 Ariz. 487, 489, ¶ 7, 4 P.3d

1030, 1032 (App. 2000), see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e).

Specifically, defendant claims that the Court made an error in sentencing him

to a consecutive sentence on count five of his indictment, kidnapping in

violation of A.R.S. § 13-1304. Defendant pled guilty to count five pursuant to

a plea agreement and was sentenced by this Court to 12.5 years to be served

consecutively to defendant’s other sentences. Defendant claims that he was

sentenced improperly because he believes the Court misread the presentence

report in this matter and thought that the kidnapping victim was under the age

of fifteen. He bases this assumption on his belief that the Court sentenced the

defendant pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1304(B) which states that if the victim of

the kidnapping is under the age of fifteen, the sentence for kidnapping shall

run consecutively to any other sentence imposed on the defendant.

Defendant fails to support this claim. Pursuant to Rule 32.5, “Facts within the

defendant’s personal knowledge shall be noted separately from other

allegations of fact and shall be under oath. Affidavits, records, or other

evidence currently available to the defendant supporting the allegations of the

petition shall be attached to it. Legal and record citations and memoranda of

points and authorities are required.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5. Defendant fails to

provide any facts, affidavits, records, or other evidence to support this claim.

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In addition, the defendant is in error concerning the law. Even if the facts that

defendant alleged were true, A.R.S. § 13-711 allows the Court to sentence the

defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment without relying on A.R.S. §

13-1304(B).

A defendant must comply strictly with Rule 32 by asserting substantive

grounds which bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order for the

Court to grant relief. State v. Manning, 143 Ariz. 139, 141, 692 P.2d 318, 320

(1984). Defendant fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an

untimely Rule 32 proceeding.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED dismissing defendant’s Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief and denying defendant’s Request for Preparation of

Post-Conviction Relief Record.

(Exh. M at 1-2.) On December 8, 2010, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Object to Court Order.”

(Exh. N.)

On March 6, 2012, Petitioner filed a third untimely PCR notice. (Exh. O.) On March

19, 2012, the trial court dismissed the petition, concluding in relevant part:

This is the defendant’s third Rule 32 proceedings. The defendant’s previous

Rule 32 proceedings were dismissed by the Court on April 24, 2007, and

November 26, 2010, respectively.

The defendant raises a single claim for post-conviction relief in his petition.

The defendant believes that the Court improperly sentenced him to aggravated

terms of imprisonment. The defendant argues that he was entitled to have the

aggravating factors submitted to a jury for a determination of truth beyond a

reasonable doubt.

As this is the defendant’s third Rule 32 proceeding, it is considered to be

successive and his options for relief are limited. In order to avoid exclusion

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a), the defendant argues that there has been

a significant change in the law that would apply to his case. See Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.1(g). Specifically, the defendant claims that the United States Supreme

Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), would require

that he be resentenced. The defendant’s claim that Blakely constitutes a change

in the law is simply wrong. The defendant was sentenced two years after the

Blakely decision was handed down by the Supreme Court. Therefore, there

was no change in the law.

The defendant’s claim is properly analyzed pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.1(a); that the defendant’s convictions and sentences were obtained in

violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, the defendant is arguing that

he was denied due process by the Court when the Court found aggravating

factors to enhance the defendant’s sentence instead of allowing a jury to

perform that function. The Court does not need to address the merits of the

defendant’s claim because he cannot raise a claim of this nature in an untimely

or successive Rule 32 proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

A defendant must comply strictly with Rule 32 by asserting substantive

grounds which bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order to grant

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relief. State v. Manning, 143 Ariz. 139, 141, 692 P.2d 318, 320 (1984).

Defendant fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely

or successive Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 32.4(a).

IT IS ORDERED denying the defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief

and dismissing the defendant’s Rule 32. Proceeding.

(Exh. P at 2.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review on April 11, 2012, in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Exh. Q.) The court of appeals granted review, but denied relief, in a memorandum

decision dated July 17, 2013. (Exh. R.) In pertinent part, the court concluded:

On review, Blackwater repeats his Blakely claim and again suggests the claim

is not precluded because his illegal sentence “is an issue of subject matter

jurisdiction which can be raised at any time.[FN] But Blackwater is incorrect

that sentencing error involves subject matter jurisdiction. He relies on State v.

Vargas-Burgos, in which this court stated “that a sentence that is outside the

parameters of the applicable statutes . . . raises a question of subject matter

jurisdiction” that therefore “can be raised at any time.” 162 Ariz. 325, 327, 783

P.2d 264, 266 (App. 1989). But we concluded in State v. Bryant, that “we

[had] used the word ‘jurisdiction’ imprecisely” in Vargas-Burgos and thus, a

final judgment “remains binding and enforceable” even if erroneous. 219 Ariz.

514, ¶¶ 15-17, 200 P.3d 1011, 1015 (App. 2008); see also State v. Maldanado, 223 Ariz. 309, ¶ 15, 223 P.3d 653, 655 (2010) (“[C]oncluding that a court

cannot enter a valid judgment because of a procedural error does not mean that

the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”). In any event, Vargas-Burgos did

not address whether Rule 32.2, Ariz. R. Crim. P. can preclude a defendant

from challenging a sentence on the grounds of illegality and fundamental error

in a successive petition for post-conviction relief. In Vargas-Burgos, we

simply refused to find waived, for purposes of the defendant’s direct appeal,

a claim of sentencing error that we characterized as fundamental on the ground

that the defendant had failed to object in the trial court. See 162 Ariz. at 327,

783 P.2d at 266. Preclusion under Rule 32.2 clearly was not implicated in that

case.

[FN] Blackwater does not repeat his claim that Blakely constitutes a significant

change in the law pursuant to Rule 32.1(g).

Moreover, although sentencing error is subject to fundamental error review in

some circumstances, it nonetheless is subject to preclusion. See State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, ¶¶ 6-7, 23, 203 P.3d 1175, 1177, 1180 (2009) (holding illegal

sentence claim precluded); Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 42, 166 P.3d at 958

(fundamental error not excepted from preclusion). Accordingly, even assuming

that Blackwater is correct that his sentences were imposed in violation of

Blakely, that claim is precluded because he had the opportunity to raise it in his

prior post-conviction proceedings and did not do so. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(a)(3).

Although review is granted, relief is denied.

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(Exh. R at 3-4.) Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the court of appeals denied that

as well, issuing its mandate on October 14, 2013. (Exhs. S and T.)

Meanwhile, on August 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a fourth untimely PCR notice. (Exh.

U.) Within days, the trial court denied this PCR as well, explaining:

Defendant pled guilty to one count of Sexual Abuse, a Class 5 Felony; one

count of Kidnapping, a Class 2 Felony; one count of Attempted Sexual

Assault, a Class 3 Felony; and three counts of Sexual Assault, a Class 2 felony.

The Court sentenced the defendant on March 23, 2006, to a term of

imprisonment to be followed by lifetime probation. This is the Defendant’s

fourth Rule 32 proceeding; it is both successive and untimely.

The defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g), that there has

been a significant change in the law that if applied retroactively to the

defendant’s case, it would probably affect the outcome of the defendant’s

convictions or sentences. Specifically, the defendant refers to the Ethical Rule

3.8. The defendant provides no factual or legal basis to support a finding that

the rule change is applicable retroactively. Further, even if the change [were]

applicable to the prosecutor at the time of the trial there is no basis to find the

outcome of the conviction or sentence would have been affected. Accordingly,

defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(g).

A defendant must comply strictly with Rule 32 by asserting substantive

grounds which bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order for the

Court to grant relief. State v. Manning, 143 Ariz. 139, 141, 692 P.2d 318, 320

(1984). Defendant fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an

untimely Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 32.4(a).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying the defendant’s Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief.

(Exh. V at 1-2.)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration on September 9, 2013, and on September 26,

2014, the trial court also denied that. (Exhs. W and X.)

On July 8, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises

one ground for relief in which he alleges his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the

trial court “sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated prison term based on facts that were neither

admitted by defendant, nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”

DISCUSSION

In his Answer, Respondents contends that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely and,

as such, must be denied and dismissed.

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The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

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In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See id.

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for

equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented

him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely.

Petitioner was sentenced under the plea agreement on March 23, 2006. (Exhs. E.) By

pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal, and had 90 days to file an

“of-right” petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Because Petitioner failed to file such a petition within the prescribed time, the

judgment became final for statute of limitations purposes when the 90-day period expired,

on June 21, 2006, and the limitations period began to run on that date. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A); Summers, 481 F.3d at 711. The statute of limitations expired one year later

on June 21, 2007. Petitioner did not file his habeas petition until July 8, 2014. Thus, absent

any tolling, his petition is more than seven years too late.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Petitioner filed his untimely notice of

post-conviction relief on April 6, 2007 – which was well after the 90-day period expired to

file an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32. (Exhs. G, H.)

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Consequently, the untimely notice failed to constitute a “properly filed” petition to the state

court and did not toll the limitations period. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 414-17 (holding that

“[b]ecause the state court rejected petitioner’s PCR petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly

filed,’ and he was not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)”). Additionally,

Petitioner’s subsequent state court pleadings did not toll the limitations period. These

pleadings were filed after the statute of limitations ended and could not restart the expired

1-year limitations period. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823.

In sum, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition more than seven years after the

1-year limitations period expired. The Petition is therefore untimely.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Petitioner argues in his that he is entitled to equitable tolling, citing due diligence and

extraordinary circumstances. However, Petitioner does not meet the stringent requirements

for this extraordinary relief. Other than reciting the standard for equitable relief, Petitioner

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asserts no valid reason for the untimeliness of his habeas petition, and therefore demonstrates

no entitlement to equitable tolling. And, Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal

resources, ignorance of the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry

v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”).

Furthermore, the Court notes that the trial court reviewed with Petitioner his rights of review

in open court, and Petitioner reviewed and signed a notice of rights of review. (Exhs. C, F.)

Despite this, Petitioner failed to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and his habeas petition is

untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

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days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2015.

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