Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00275/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00275-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SAMMY WILLIAMS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-0275 PHX EHC (MEA)

)

DEPUTY WARDEN PERKINS, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TERRY GODDARD, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL:

On January 23, 2006, Petitioner, who is in the custody

of the State of Arizona, filed a pro se petition seeking a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting four

claims for relief. Respondents filed an Answer to the Petition

(“Answer”) on June 30, 2006. Docket No. 13. Respondents assert

Petitioner did not properly exhaust two of his habeas claims and

that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of the

other two habeas claims. Therefore, Respondents argue, the

petition must be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

I Procedural History

Petitioner was charged by the State of Arizona with

first-degree felony murder in 2001, regarding events occurring

on October 23, 2000. At his trial in 2003, one of Petitioner’s

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1

 Mr. Harris was not, at the time of Petitioner’s trial, charged

with a crime regarding the events he testified to at Petitioner’s trial.

Answer, Exh. I at 47. However, because Mr. Harris was implicated in the

criminal events of that evening by his own sworn testimony, for the sake of

ease and clarity, the Court will refer to Mr. Harris as a co-participant.

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co-participants, James Harris,1 testified against Petitioner and

received use immunity from prosecution for his testimony.

Answer, Exh. F at 63 & passim; Exh. I at 47; Exh. N at 2 n.1.

Petitioner’s other co-participant, Carissa Morones, pled guilty

to second-degree murder, reduced from a charge of first-degree

felony murder, in exchange for her testimony at Petitioner’s

trial. Id., Exh. F at 133-35; Exh. N at 2 n.1. 

Petitioner is presumably Hispanic. See id., Exh. N at

7 n.3. Petitioner’s male co-participant, Mr. Harris, is

Caucasian and was, at the relevant time, apparently a much

larger person than Petitioner. Cf. id., Exh. F at 34 & 112 (Mr.

Harris and Ms. Morones’ testimony Mr. Harris was known by the

nickname “Tiny.”). 

Ms. Morones testified that she, Petitioner, and Mr.

Harris traveled to Phoenix from Show Low in October of 2003 in

Ms. Morones’ vehicle. Id., Exh. F at 110-14. She testified her

intent in going to Phoenix was to earn money dancing at an adult

nightclub. See id., Exh. F at 112-14. 

The co-participants’ testimony on some of the events of

October 23, 2000, and their testimony about the intent

underlying some of their actions did not agree. Ms. Morones

testified that, while in Phoenix, the male co-participants

discussed committing a robbery. Id., Exh. F at 115-16. Ms.

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2

 Ms. Morones testified she called “to let them know I

wouldn’t be at the club, to pick me up somewhere else because I

couldn’t return back to the club.... I was going to go do what I

would call a hustle, make some money, a few hundred dollars quick,

that I wanted him to be at that address within an hour, hour and a

half, to not leave me there because I can’t return back to the club.”

Answer, Exh. F at 118-19. 

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Morones testified that, on October 23, 2003, she had intended to

“hustle” a gentleman whom she met at a nightclub. Id., Exh. F

at 118, 139. Mr. Harris testified that, on October 23, 2000,

he, Petitioner, and Ms. Morones planned a robbery involving a

victim Ms. Morones would contact at a nightclub. Id., Exh. F at

40-41. 

Mr. Harris and Ms. Morones both testified Petitioner

was in possession of a .40 caliber gun on October 23, 2000.

Id., Exh. F at 38, 46, 55. Mr. Harris and Ms. Morones both

testified Ms. Morones possessed a .38 caliber gun on the night

in question. Id., Exh. F at 38 & 128.

Ms. Morones and Mr. Harris testified Ms. Morones made

contact with Mr. David Hull at a Phoenix nightclub. Id., Exh.

F at 117. They testified Ms. Morones then called the other two

co-participants, who were at a Scottsdale hotel, to let them

know she was leaving the nightclub with Mr. Hull. Id., Exh. F

at 117.2 Mr. Harris and Petitioner traveled from the hotel to

the nightclub in Ms. Morones’ car, where they made their

presence known to Ms. Morones. Id., Exh. F at 118-19. 

Ms. Morones and Mr. Hull left the nightclub in Mr.

Hull’s car, and were followed by Mr. Harris and Mr. Williams in

Ms. Morones’ vehicle. See id., Exh. F at 45-46; 120-21. Mr.

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Hull realized he was being followed, slowed his vehicle to allow

the other vehicle to pull alongside his car, and then pulled

ahead, executed a U-turn, and stopped his car. Id., Exh. F at

120-23.

Mr. Harris testified Mr. Hull’s car stopped and Ms.

Morones exited Mr. Hull’s car and pointed her gun at Mr. Hull.

Id., Exh. F at 47-48. Mr. Harris testified Petitioner exited

the other vehicle and approached the driver’s side window of Mr.

Hull’s vehicle and pointed a gun at Mr. Hull. Id., Exh. F at

47-49. Mr. Harris testified he heard a shot and the victim’s

car accelerated. Id., Exh. F at 47-49. Mr. Harris testified he

believed Petitioner fired a shot that hit Mr. Hull. Id., Exh.

F at 50.

Ms. Morones testified that, when Mr. Hull initially

stopped his car she tried to immediately exit the vehicle but

could not get out of the car. Id., Exh. F at 123. She

testified Petitioner approached the driver’s side of the vehicle

with a gun. Id., Exh. F at 123. Ms. Morones averred she got

“halfway out” of the car, and then Petitioner told Mr. Hull to

“freeze.” Id., Exh. F at 123. She testified “[t]he gun [held

by Petitioner] went off.” Id., Exh. F at 123. She testified

she was “halfway out of the car” when Mr. Hull was shot. Id. at

124.

Both Ms. Morones and Mr. Harris testified that when Mr.

Hull was shot or immediately afterwards his car accelerated and

crashed after hitting an obstacle. Id., Exh. F at 51 & 124.

Mr. Harris testified Petitioner subsequently stated “‘I shot

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him. I shot him.’” Id., Exh. F at 52. Ms. Morones testified

Petitioner subsequently stated: “Yeah, that’s how you do it. No

witnesses.” Id., Exh. F at 125. 

Mr. Harris testified Ms. Morones instructed Petitioner

to go to Mr. Hull’s vehicle and take his wallet. Id., Exh. F at

52 (“Carissa was yelling, ‘Grab the wallet. Get it.’”). Both

co-participants testified Petitioner then approached the crashed

vehicle and removed Mr. Hull’s wallet from his person through

the window of the crashed vehicle. Id., Exh. F. at 52-53 & 125-

26. The three participants then fled in Ms. Morones’ car.

Mr. Harris testified Ms. Morones removed $300 from the

victim’s wallet and stuffed the money in her bra. Id., Exh. F

at 52-53. Ms. Morones testified there was money in the wallet,

that she did not know how much money was in the wallet, and that

Petitioner removed from the money from the wallet and kept the

money. Id., Exh. F at 126-27. 

Mr. Hull died from his injuries approximately one month

later, on November 28, 2000. Id., Exh. N at 6. At Petitioner’s

trial, the police officer who initially responded to the crash

testified Mr. Hull told the officer, at the scene of the crash,

that he’d been shot by a black or Hispanic male. Id., Exh. F at

29. A police detective testified he had interviewed Mr. Hull,

who was then intubated and unable to speak, at a hospital on

October 27, 2000. Id., Exh. G at 34-35. The detective

testified Mr. Hull conveyed to him, through written notes in

response to questions by the detective, that the victim left a

Phoenix nightclub with a female on the night in question. Id.,

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Exh. G at 35-38. Mr. Hull indicated the driver of the car that

followed his vehicle from the nightclub was “a huge individual.”

Id., Exh. G at 38. 

The detective testified Mr. Hull “scribbled a note here

that the individual that actually did the shooting was a

Hispanic or a light-complected black male.” Id., Exh. G at 38.

He indicated to the detective he had approximately $400 in his

wallet at the time of the shooting. Id., Exh. G at 42.

A forensic witness testified at Petitioner’s trial that

Mr. Hull was shot with a .40 caliber gun. Id., Exh. G at 85-86.

The forensic witness testified a gun identified as being in

Petitioner’s possession on October 23, 2000, could not be

excluded or positively identified as the .40 caliber gun which

was used to shoot Mr. Hull. Id., Exh. G at 85. 

Another witness testified that, on the night in

question, he heard a car crash and then observed a Hispanic male

about five feet seven or five feet eight inches tall lean into

the victim’s car. Id., Exh. H at 11-16. The witness testified

he saw the Hispanic male then get into another vehicle, later

identified as Ms. Morones’ vehicle, and drive away. Id., Exh.

H at 11-16. 

Both Ms. Morones and Mr. Harris were vigorously crossexamined by Petitioner’s counsel, who noted their interest in

implicating Petitioner as having planned to commit a robbery and

as the shooter, and the inconsistencies in their prior

statements and their trial testimony. See id., Exh. F (passim).

Counsel elicited an admission from Mr. Harris that, prior to

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Petitioner’s trial, he had never stated to the police or

testified that Petitioner and Mr. Harris and Ms. Morones had

planned to commit a robbery. Id., Exh. F at 65, 75, 106. After

Mr. Harris’ testimony, Petitioner’s counsel moved for a mistrial

based on inconsistencies in Mr. Harris’ previous sworn statement

at a preliminary hearing and his trial testimony, which motion

was denied. Id., Exh. G at 3-8.

On January 14, 2003, after deliberating less than one

day, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree felony

murder, predicated on the commission of a robbery. Id., Exh. I

at 72. 

The trial court heard testimony on aggravating and

mitigating factors regarding Petitioner’s sentence. Id., Exh.

J. The government alleged as aggravating factors Petitioner’s

commission of the crime for pecuniary gain and the crime’s

commission in a cruel, heinous and depraved manner. Id., Exh.

J at 9. 

Petitioner’s cousin spoke on his behalf at the

aggravation and mitigation hearing. Id., Exh. J at 5-6.

Petitioner’s counsel argued mitigation in the form of strong

family support and the disparity between Petitioner’s sentence

and the disposition of the co-participants. Id., Exh. J at 10.

Petitioner spoke on his own behalf, asserting he had not

committed the crime charged. Id., Exh. J at 11-12.

The trial court then found “there [were] very

substantial aggravating factors involved, and they are for

pecuniary gain; accomplice; the emotional injury caused to the

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family; the senselessness of the act; and the prior felony

convictions.” Id., Exh. J at 12. 

Petitioner’s counsel objected to this statement:

I would, just for the record, object to the

Court’s consideration of any aggravating

factors not enumerated under 13-703, under

State v. Viramontes, 390 Arizona Advanced

Reports 3, 2003. Specifically, I believe the

Court articulated the presence of an

accomplice, the emotional impact on the

victim’s family, and Mr. Williams’ prior

felony convictions, which do not qualify

under 13-703, and as to those factors I

object to the consideration of them.

Id., Exh. J at 14.

The government agreed with defense counsel’s statement

regarding permissible aggravating factors. Id., Exh. J at 15.

The trial court confessed error in considering the forbidden

aggravating factors, stated it was eliminating those factors

from consideration, and concluded “a sentence of natural life is

appropriate for the reasons” stated by the government. Id.,

Exh. J at 15.

On May 2, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for this

crime. Id., Exh. J. 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence. Petitioner asserted on appeal that: (1) the trial

court erred by allowing the prosecution to strike three Hispanic

veniremen for “wholly subjective” reasons without further

inquiry; (2) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay

evidence, i.e., the statements of the victim through the

testimony of the police detective; (3) his sentence was improper

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because the court improperly found he had committed the crime in

a cruel, heinous, or depraved manner; the court erred in

concluding Petitioner would be eligible for sentence

commutation; and Petitioner did not receive proper credit for

his presentence incarceration. Id., Exh. K.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence in an opinion issued April 22, 2004.

Id., Exh. N. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did

not err in determining the prosecution had presented raceneutral reasons for excluding three of the four Hispanic venire

members. Id., Exh. N at 7-11. The Court of Appeals examined

Petitioner’s claim pursuant to the analysis stated in Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and concluded the prosecution had

stated race-neutral reasons for challenging the specific

potential jurors, citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-768

(1995) (concluding a race-neutral reason for striking a juror

need not be “persuasive, or even plausible” to withstand

scrutiny). The Court of Appeals noted a venire member’s age and

employment history, the given reasons for the suspect strikes,

were objective factors and that the trial judge had agreed a

third juror should be removed because she “wasn’t really getting

it.” Id., Exh. N at 11. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that admitting

the hearsay evidence of the victim’s statements did violate

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness.

However, the Court of Appeals concluded this error was harmless.

The Court of Appeals determined the hearsay evidence did not

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affect the jury’s verdict, inter alia, because other evidence

was offered to establish Petitioner was the shooter, rather than

Mr. Harris or Ms. Morones. Id., Exh. N at 15-17. The Court of

Appeals noted evidence supporting the fact that on the night in

question Petitioner possessed a .40 caliber gun, the type of gun

used to shoot the victim. Id., Exh. N at 17. The Court of

Appeals noted a witness testified they saw a Hispanic male about

five foot seven inches tall reach into the victim’s car after it

crashed, providing dis-interested supporting evidence that

Petitioner, rather than his co-participants, committed the

robbery underlying the felony murder charge. Id., Exh. N at 16-

17. 

Regarding Petitioner’s claim his sentence was

improperly aggravated based on a non-statutory aggravating

factor, the appellate court concluded that, even if the trial

court erred by sentencing Petitioner based on an improper

aggravating factor, the record “amply support[ed]” the

conclusion the crime was committed for monetary gain, a proper

aggravating factor which would support the sentence imposed and

which any re-sentencing judge would likely use as a basis for

imposing the same sentence. Id., Exh. N at 20-21. The court

noted the trial court’s comments regarding commutation were

directed at the victim’s family, and that, because Petitioner

had been sentenced to “natural life,” his claim to credit for

presentence incarceration was a legal misnomer. Id., Exh. N at

21-22 & n.14.

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The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of this

decision on September 22, 2004. Id., Exh. Q.

Petitioner filed an action for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure on

August 26, 2004. Id., Exh. P. Petitioner, through counsel,

asserted he was entitled to relief from his sentence based on

the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Id., Exh. R.

The petition was denied by the trial court on June 27, 2005.

Id., Exh. U. The trial court’s opinion states in its entirety:

The court has reviewed the entire PostConviction Relief package.

IT IS ORDERED summarily dismissing the

Petition.

The court agrees with the State that the law

as it presently provides compels dismissal.

State v. Fell, 209 Ariz. 77, 97 P.3d 902,

(App. 2004), review granted, March 22, 2005,

and State v. Martinez, 209 Ariz. 280, 100 P.

3d 30 (App. 2004), review granted, February

8, 2005.

Id., Exh. U. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of this

decision on April 27, 2006. Id., Exh. X. 

Petitioner filed a second action for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court on April 19, 2006,

asserting a claim his co-defendant had given perjured testimony

and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

Id., Exh. W. This action was dismissed because the court

concluded the claims were precluded, on May 10, 2006. Id., Exh.

Y.

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Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because: (1) his co-defendant was allowed to give

perjured testimony, in violation of his right to due process of

law; (2) he was denied a jury of his peers because the

prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude Hispanic

individuals from the jury; (3) his sentence was improper, i.e.,

premised on facts found by the judge and not a jury and because

he was not given credit for time served prior to conviction; (4)

his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him was

violated when the trial court allowed hearsay testimony.

Respondents contend Petitioner did not properly exhaust

his first and third habeas claims by fairly presenting them to

Arizona’s highest court, i.e., the Arizona Supreme Court, in a

procedurally correct manner. Respondents argue the other two

claims may be denied on the merits.

II Analysis

Exhaustion

A state prisoner must “exhaust” a claim in the state

courts before the District Court may grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of the claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989). To

properly exhaust a claim in the state courts, the petitioner

must afford the state the opportunity to rule upon the merits of

the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s

“highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. Castille, 489

U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d

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1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). A federal habeas petitioner has not

exhausted a particular claim if he has the right to raise the

claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2006). Therefore, if it is clear

the habeas petitioner’s claim is now procedurally barred under

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in Arizona, in the context of a petitioner who has not been

sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied

if the petitioner has presented the claim to the Arizona Court

of Appeals, either on direct appeal or in a petition for

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d

993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005). 

Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment without

the possibility of parole, therefore, his federal habeas claims

would be properly exhausted if he presented them to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009; Beyart v.

Schriro, 2006 WL 1305275, at *3 n.2 (D. Ariz.) (“Arizona law no

longer requires that a life sentence case be appealed to the

Arizona Supreme Court.”).

Respondents contend, inter alia, that Petitioner did

not completely exhaust his third claim for federal habeas

relief, i.e., his Blakely claim, because he did not seek review

of this claim by the Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents argue

the opinion in Swoopes was effectively overruled by Baldwin v.

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3

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now allows: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2006). 

4

 The Court notes Respondents raise this argument to

preserve it for appeal and that the District of Arizona has previously

rejected the argument. See Reese v. Savage, 2006 WL 1516020, at *3

(D. Ariz.); Crook v. Arizona, 2005 WL 3455110, *3 n.2 (D. Ariz.).

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Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004) (“To

provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner

must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court

(including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary

review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of

the claim.”(emphasis added)) .

Because the Arizona Court of Appeals considered and

rejected Petitioner’s Blakely claim on the merits, and the

Blakely claim may be denied on the merits regardless of any

alleged failure to fully exhaust the claim,3 the Court will not

analyze Respondents’ argument regarding the continued vitality

of Swoopes subsequent to the decision in Baldwin.4

Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because Mr. Harris offered perjured testimony at

Petitioner’s trial.

Petitioner contends his right to due process was

violated because Mr. Harris “gave several conflicting statements

... [and] lied repeatedly on the stand and the judge allowed it

even after said witness admitted to perjury.” Petition at 5. 

Petitioner contends: “This witness should have been precluded or

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impeached on the witness stand. The witness was coerced into

confessing to the crime and testifying against the

Petitioner...” Id. Petitioner contends he raised this issue in

his direct appeal. 

Petitioner did not present this claim to the Arizona

state courts in his direct appeal or in his first Rule 32

action. Petitioner raised this claim in his second Rule 32

action and the Arizona Superior Court found the claim

procedurally precluded by Petitioner’s failure to raise the

issue in his direct appeal or in his first Rule 32 action. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner raises a

claim in the state court, but the court finds the claim to be

defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31,

111 S. Ct. at 2555-56. The state’s procedural bar satisfies the

federal habeas exhaustion requirement, however it also provides

an independent and adequate state-law basis for upholding a

petitioner’s conviction and sentence. See Franklin v. Johnson,

290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 2002) (“... the procedural

default rule barring consideration of a federal claim applies

only when a state court has been presented with the federal

claim, but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons”);

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1417 (9th Cir. 1998). See

also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860-61, 122 S. Ct. 2578,

2581-82 (2002) (concluding that a state court’s finding that a

post-conviction claim was barred as waived, pursuant to Rule

32.2(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, was a decision

independent of federal law and adequate to bar federal review of

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state prisoner’s federal habeas claim on the merits). 

Federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim

is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a miscarriage of

justice, or cause and actual prejudice to excuse his default of

the claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51, 111 S. Ct. at

2555-56. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from

the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate cause, a

petitioner must show the existence of some external factor which

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules.

See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.

1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll, 137

F.3d 1415-16. Petitioner must prove that, “but for” the alleged

constitutional violations, there is a reasonable probability he

would not have been convicted of the same crime. See Manning v.

Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173

F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). 

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review

of the merits of his claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327,

115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

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485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, Petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable juror could have found him guilty of

the offense of first-degree felony murder. See Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 867; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832,

842-43 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Additionally, even if Petitioner asserted a claim of

actual innocence as excusing his procedural default of his due

process claim, federal habeas relief may not be granted on this

assertion absent a finding of an independent constitutional

violation occurring in the state criminal proceedings. Dretke

v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004);

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860-61

(1993).

Petitioner has not shown cause for, or prejudice

arising from his procedural default of this claim. Neither has

Petitioner shown a fundamental miscarriage of justice and,

therefore, the claim must be dismissed. 

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2. Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to a

jury of his peers because Hispanic veniremen were peremptorily

stricken from the jury.

Petitioner alleges “all” Hispanic venire members were

stricken from the jury “on frivolous grounds,” in violation of

his right to a jury of his peers. Petition at 6. Petitioner

properly exhausted this claim by fairly presenting it to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal, which court

denied the claim on the merits.

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 &

Supp. 2006). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” our

clearly established law if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth

in our cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent. 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

When reviewing a habeas claim, the federal courts must

afford great deference to the state court’s rulings with regard

to issues raised in the petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

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Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357, 359-60

(2002). “An unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id.,

537 U.S. at 25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations omitted).

“In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state

court has misapplied a ‘governing legal principle’ to ‘a set of

facts different from those of the case in which the principle

was announced.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct.

2527, 2535 (2003) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123

S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). See also Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct.

1432, 1439-40 (2005) (“Even on the assumption that [the state

court’s] conclusion was incorrect, it was not unreasonable, and

is therefore just the type of decision that AEDPA shields on

habeas review.”).

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded Petitioner’s

right to a fair jury was not violated by the prosecution’s use

of peremptory strikes to remove Hispanic individuals from the

jury panel. The Court of Appeals identified the appropriate

governing legal principle, i.e., the United States Supreme

Court’s decisions in Batson and Purkett. The Court of Appeals

properly concluded the prosecution had stated race-neutral

grounds for striking the jurors and, therefore, the state

court’s denial of relief on this basis was not clearly contrary

to established federal law. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.

127, 142 n.14, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 n.14 (1994) (finding that

peremptory challenges made on the basis of a characteristic

other than race or gender (such as occupation) do not implicate

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the Equal Protection clause); Jordan v. LeFevre, 206 F.3d 196,

200 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding the juror’s “type of employment”

is an acceptable race-neutral basis for a peremptory challenge).

Because the state decision was not clearly contrary to federal

law, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim. 

3. Petitioner contends his sentence is predicated

on an aggravating factor found by a judge and not a jury, in

violation of the holding of Blakely.

Petitioner contends his sentence violates his

constitutional rights, asserting:

The sentencing was unlawful as the judge

without benefit of a jury or Petitioner

admitting to aggravating factors, used

aggravating factors to sentence Defendant to

natural life. Also the court believed that

the Petitioner would be eligible for

commutation and did not give Petitioner any

pre-sentence incarceration credit. 

Petition at 7.

The Arizona Superior Court considered the merits of

this claim in Petitioner’s first action for post-conviction

relief and denied the claim. The Superior Court relied on

Arizona v. Fell and Arizona v. Martinez in concluding

Petitioner’s constitutional rights, as explained in Blakely, had

not been violated.

In Fell, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded:

[W]e hold that Blakely does not apply to a

trial court’s decision whether to sentence a

defendant convicted of first-degree murder to

a term of natural life imprisonment or life

with the possibility of parole. ... both

options are indeterminate sentencing

alternatives in § 13-703(A), variations, as

it were, on a life term of imprisonment.

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Either alternative may be imposed based

solely on the jury’s guilty verdict, without

additional findings.

Neither the statute nor case law requires a

sentencing judge to enter factual findings on

the aggravating or mitigating factors in this

context. Compare § 13-703 (containing no

language requiring findings of fact on

circumstances judge considers in imposing

prison term of natural life or life with the

possibility of parole) with § 13-702(B)

(requiring factual findings on aggravating or

mitigating factors); [] And, we find both

unsupported and unpersuasive [the

defendant’s] suggestion that a life term of

imprisonment with the possibility of parole

is the “presumptive” prison term in this

context or the “statutory maximum” for

purposes of Blakely and that a natural life

term is tantamount to an aggravated, upward

adjustment from that presumptive term.

209 Ariz. 77, 86, 97 P.3d 902, 910-11, aff’d, 210 Ariz. 554

(2005). 

Similarly, in Martinez, the Arizona Court of Appeals

concluded:

In Blakely, the Court specifically

distinguished the situation where judicial

sentencing factors merely impact the minimum

punishment available from that where they

increase the maximum punishment above that

authorized by the verdict. [] It is only in

the latter case that a defendant’s due

process right to trial by jury is implicated.

See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,

567, 122 S. Ct. 2406 [] (2002)[]. Because a

guilty verdict for first-degree murder

authorizes the court to impose a life

sentence either with or without the

possibility of release, the court may

properly consider the statutory sentencing

factors, without the need for jury findings

regarding those factors, in deciding whether

to allow the possibility of release. See ... State v. Fell, 209 Ariz. 77, 86, ¶ 29, 97

P.3d 902, 911 (App. 2004) (“Blakely does not

apply to a trial court’s decision whether to

sentence a defendant convicted of

first-degree murder to a term of natural life

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imprisonment or life with the possibility of

parole.”).

The trial court properly decided whether

defendant would be eligible for release after

twenty-five years in conformance with State

v. Viramontes, 204 Ariz. 360, 64 P.3d 188

(2003). There was no error in the court’s

imposition of the natural life sentence, much

less fundamental error.

Arizona v. Martinez, 209 Ariz. 280, 283-84, 100 P.3d 30, 33-34

(Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 762 (2005) (emphasis

added).

The Court concludes the Arizona Superior Court did not

err in denying Petitioner’s Blakely claim, and the Court of

Appeals properly denied review of this decision. Additionally,

had the Arizona courts erred in their interpretation of Blakely,

the United States Supreme Court could have accepted certiorari

in Martinez to consider the issue. The state courts’ conclusion

that Petitioner’s sentence did not violate his constitutional

rights was not clearly contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of federal law, particularly Blakely. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim.

Additionally, the claim may be denied on the merits.

The United States constitution allows that sentencing factors

may be found by a judge, rather than a jury, when the sentence

imposed is not greater than what state law authorizes “on the

basis of the verdict alone.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305, 124 S.

Ct. at 2538. Therefore, if the jury verdict alone provided

Petitioner could be sentenced to a term of natural life,

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated.

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5

 See Arizona v. Viramontes, 211 Ariz. 115, 115, 118 P.3d

630, 630 (Ct. App. ) (“regardless of whether the state seeks the death

penalty, a trial court in a first-degree murder case should sentence

the defendant pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703 rather than A.R.S. §

13-702”).

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At the time Petitioner was sentenced, the Arizona

statutes provided “[a] defendant convicted of first-degree

murder faces three possible sentences: death, a life sentence

with release eligibility after 25 years, or a sentence of

‘natural life’ with no possibility of release.” Arizona v.

Guytan, 192 Ariz. 514, 523-24, 968 P.2d 587, 596-97 (Ct. App.

1998) (internal citation omitted). The Arizona courts have

interpreted the law applicable at the time of Petitioner’s

sentencing as allowing an individual convicted of first-degree

murder to be sentenced to natural life “based solely on the

jury’s guilty verdict, without additional findings.” See Fell

97 P.3d at 910.5 This interpretation of state law is binding on

this Court. The Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that a state

court’s interpretation of state law ... binds a federal court

sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 126 S. Ct. 602,

604 (2005). Because, as a matter of law, the jury’s verdict of

guilty of first-degree felony murder, without further findings,

provided a sufficient factual basis for the sentence imposed on

Petitioner, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

merits of his Blakely claim.

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4. Petitioner contends he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because the trial court improperly admitted hearsay

testimony.

Petitioner asserts his Sixth Amendment rights were

violated by the admission of hearsay testimony at his trial.

Petition at 8.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ determined Petitioner’s

Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the admission of the

challenged testimony, but that the error was harmless. This

conclusion was not contrary to clearly established federal law

because the trial court correctly identified the governing rule,

i.e., the harmless error rule, and its application of the rule

to the facts of the case was not unreasonable. See Inthavong v.

Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126

S. Ct. 1660 (2006) (“Under AEDPA we must defer to the state

court’s harmless error ruling unless it is ‘contrary to, or

involve[s] an unreasonable application of’ Supreme Court

precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The state court’s harmless

error holding is ‘contrary’ to precedent if it ‘fails to apply

the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the

controlling authority to a case involving facts materially

indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result.’”). 

To be entitled to habeas relief on a claim or erroneous

admission of evidence, the petitioner must demonstrate the error

had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s

verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, 113 S.

Ct. 1710, 1721-22 (1993); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,

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679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986); Cummings v. Adams, 172 Fed.

App. 188, 190 (9th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-

10923 (May 5, 2006); Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 468 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

Under this standard, an error is harmless

unless the record review leaves the

conscientious judge in grave doubt about the

likely effect of an error on the jury’s

verdict ... i.e., that, in the judge’s mind,

the matter is so evenly balanced that he

feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the

harmlessness of the error.

Padilla v. Terhune, 309 F.3d 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2002)

(regarding erroneous admission of non-testifying co-defendant’s

out-of-court statement) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

The record before the Court indicates overwhelming

evidence that Petitioner was guilty of the crime of felony

murder, i.e., committing a robbery which resulted in the death

of another. Although the co-participants’ testimony diverged on

some points, both testified Petitioner shot the victim and

removed the wallet from the victim after the car crash. The

fact that Petitioner committed the robbery was corroborated by

the dis-interested bystander witness who testified he saw

someone of Petitioner’s height and race, which description did

not fit Mr. Harris, reach into the victim’s car after it

crashed. In addition to the co-participants’ arguably selfserving testimony, the allegation that Petitioner was the actual

shooter is supported by evidence the victim was shot with a .40

caliber gun and that, on the night in question, Petitioner

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possessed a .40 caliber gun, while one co-participant possessed

a .38 caliber gun and the other co-participant was not armed.

The Court concludes the Court of Appeals’ decision was not

contrary to clearly established federal law because the

allegedly improper evidence did not clearly have a substantial

and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict, given the weight of

other evidence of guilt.

III Conclusion

Petitioner failed to exhaust his due process claim and

he has not shown cause for or prejudice arising from his

procedural default of this claim and, therefore, the claim must

be dismissed. Petitioner’s other three claims for federal

habeas relief may be denied because the Arizona state courts’

decisions denying these claims were not an unreasonable

application of federal law. Additionally, Petitioner’s Blakely

claim may be denied on the merits, regardless of Petitioner’s

alleged failure to properly exhaust this claim.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Williams’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

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service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 15th day of August, 2006.

 

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