Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01838/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01838-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAJ SIDHU, CASE NO. CV F 06-1838 AWI LJO

Plaintiff, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S REMAND

MOTION

vs. (Doc. 14.)

SIERRA ENTERTAINMENT,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Raj Sidhu (“Mr. Sidhu”) seeksto remand to StanislausCounty Superior Court this state

law civil rights and negligence action on grounds that his claims are not preempted by the Federal

Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101, et seq. (“FRSA”). This Court considered Mr. Sidhu’s remand

motion on the record and VACATES the February 2, 2007 hearing, pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule

78-230(h). Forthe reasons discussed below, this Court REMANDS this action to the Stanislaus County

Superior Court.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Sidhu’s Civil Rights Claims

Mr. Sidhu is physically disabled and uses a wheelchair. Defendant Sierra Entertainment

(“Sierra”) operates a railroad dinner train out of Oakdale, California. On July 24, 2006, Mr. Sidhu filed

in Stanislaus County Superior Court his complaint to allege a cause of action for violation of the Unruh

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2 “At the core of the federal judicial system is the principle that the federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction.” Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9 Cir. 1979). th

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Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 51, et seq. (“Unruh Act”), for physical disability discrimination

based on“failure to remove structural barriers” and “inadequate wheelchair clearance at the entrance of

the railroad dinner train,” a public accommodation. The Unruh Act cause of action further alleges that

Sierra denied Mr. Sidhu “access to the services and facilities on offer” to discriminate against Mr. Sidhu

and has refused “to take any steps to rectify the situation and to provide full and equal access for [Mr.

Sidhu] and other persons with physical disabilities.” Mr. Sidhu’s complaint also alleges a negligence

cause of action that Sierra failed to exercise ordinary care and to ensure its dinner train complied with

accessibility guidelines and that facilities were configured to ensure equal access by persons with

wheelchairs.

Removal To This Court

On September 6, 2006, Sierra removed Mr. Sidhu’s action to this Court’s Sacramento division

on grounds that this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in that Mr. Sidhu’s

claims are preempted by the FRSA. On December 19, 2006, the action was transferred to this Court’s

Fresno division.

DISCUSSION

Removal Principles

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove from state court any action “of which the

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” Federal courts “shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 1331. Because of the “Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts

on removal,” the removal statute is strictly construed against removal. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. 1

Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109, 61 S.Ct. 868, 872 (1941); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9

th

Cir. 1996). Federal jurisdiction “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the

first instance.” Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485; Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9 Cir. 1992). A th

defendant “has the burden of establishing that removal was proper.” Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485; Harris

v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 930, 932 (9 Cir. 1994). th

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FRSA Preemption

Mr. Sidhu claims that the FRSA does not preempt his Unruh Act claim. There is a presumption

against finding federal preemption of state law. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113,

S.Ct. 1732, 1739 (1993). “Pre-emption will not lie unless it is ‘the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress.’” CSX Transp., 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. at 1737 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,

331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947)). 

The FRSA is a comprehensive system of railway safety regulations and was enacted to “promote

safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.” 49

U.S.C. § 20101; Thiele v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 68 F.3d 179, 182 (7 Cir. 1995). The Secretary th

of Transportation is empowered to “prescribe regulations establishingminimum standards for the safety

of cars used by railroad carriers to transport passengers.” 49 U.S.C. § 20133(a). The FRSA addresses

national uniformity of regulation and in turn preemption:

Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety and laws, regulations, and

orders related to railroad security shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.

A state may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad

safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety

matters), or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security matters)

prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State

requirement. A state may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law,

regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, or

order – 

(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard or

security hazard;

(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States

Government; and

(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.

49 U.S.C. § 20106 (“section 20106").

Despite section 20106, FRSA preemption is disfavored. Williams v. Nat’l Railroad Passenger

Corp., 392 F.Supp.2d 790, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2005). “FRSA preemption is even more disfavored than

preemption generally.” United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 860 (5 Cir. 2000) (citing th

Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 515 (5 Cir. 1999)). To apply FRSA preemption, a th

court “eschews” broad categories, such as “railroad safety,” and focuses on the federal regulation’s

subject matter. Williams, 392 F.Supp.2d at 792. Courts should interpret relevant federal regulations

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narrowly to ensure that the careful balance which Congress struck between state and federal regulatory

authority is not improperly disputed. Williams, 393 F.Supp.2d at 792. The FRSA preempts state laws

which impair or are inconsistent with Federal Railroad Administration regulations and which aim at the

same safety concerns addressed by the Federal Railroad Administration. Burlington Northern Railroad

Co. v. State of Montana, 880 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9 Cir. 1989). th

Mr. Sidhu’s primary argument appears to be that FRSA preemption does not apply in that “the

regulations at stake in this case are not about railroad safety.” Mr. Sidhu notes that the Unruh Act: (1)

incorporates a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”),

Cal. Civ. Code, § 51(f) ; (2) provides an independent state law basis for injunctive relief not exceeding

that required by other law, Cal. Civ. Code, § 52(g); and (3) provides statutory damages for intentional

violation, Cal. Civ. Code, § 52(a). Mr. Sidhu argues that the Unruh Act imposes no additional or

different regulation on Sierra than that required by the ADA but “provides an additional damages

provision and independent state law basis for an injunction, attorney’s fees and costs.” 

Sierra responds that the FRSA and its regulations comprehensively “occupy the area of safety

on railroads, to include safety and specifications for passenger cars. Sierra notes that the Secretary of

Transportation sets minimum standards regarding “crashworthiness,” “interior features” affecting

passenger safety, maintenance and inspection, emergency response procedures and equipment, and

operating rules and conditions that directly affect safety. 49 U.S.C. § 20133(a)(1) – (5). Sierra points

out the Secretary of Transportation’s authority covers “tourist, historic, scenic [and] excursion railroad

carriers,” such as Sierra’s dinner train. Sierra references Department of Transportation and Federal

Railroad Administration regulations on passenger carsafety, including those governing seating, internal

fittings and surfaces (49 C.F.R. § 228.233); rollover strength (49 C.F.R. § 238.215); load bearing

structures (49 C.F.R. § 238.213); and safety appliances (49 C.F.R. § 238.229). Sierra argues that the

Department of Transportation and Federal Railway Administration regulations “encompass much more

than ADA compliance” in that “they go to the very safety of the cars themselves.” Sierra concludes that

FRSA preemption exists because the FRSA and its and regulatory scheme cover the “accessibility issue”

raised by Mr. Sidhu. 

The FRSA and its regulations cover specifications and capacities for railway passenger cars and

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in turn passenger car safety. Sierra points to no statute or regulation specifically covering passenger car

access for the disabled. Although accessibility would seem a logical topic of federal regulation, Sierra

relies on broad references to passenger car “safety,” not accessibility. Given the disfavor of FRSA

preemption, this Court is to “eschew” broad categories, such as “railroad safety,” and to focus on the

federal regulation’s subject matter. Williams, 392 F.Supp.2d at 792. Again, Sierra points to no specific

regulation addressing the crux of Mr. Sidhu’s claims. As such, Sierra has failed to meet its burden to

establish FRSA preemption, and doubts against FRSA preemption favor Mr. Sidhu. 

As a backup, Mr. Sidhu appearsto argue that the Unruh Actsatisfiessection 20106's three prongs

to avoid FRSA preemption. This Court next turns to section 20106's three prongs to address whether

Mr. Sidhu’s claims are subject to preemption. 

Local Safety Hazard

As a reminder, to avoid preemption under section 20106, an additional or more stringent state

law related to railroad safety must be necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard.

Mr. Sidhu notes that barrier removal and accessible design required by the ADA and Unruh Act are

“safety regulations” to ensure: (1) use of public facilities by disabled people, including those who use

wheelchairs; and (2) safety of persons with impaired mobility. Mr. Sidhu points out that many

California and federal regulations address access to facilities “as their primary purpose” and “have

obvious safety implications for ordinary users as well as people [who] use wheelchairs.” Thus, Mr.

Sidhu appears to assert, as an alternative argument, that the Unruh Act and its regulations “are about

safety.”

Mr. Sidhu next contends that California laws prohibiting disability discrimination “protect a

broader class than comparable Federal laws” and provide protections “independent from the ADA.” Mr.

Sidhu points out that California Civil Code section 52(a) sets a minimum $4,000 statutory penalty to

provide a greater protection than the ADA against arbitrary and intentional disability discrimination in

California. Turning to locality, Mr. Sidhu offers that “the regulation being applied is the same as the

national one, but the behavior in question is located entirely inside California, hence a local safety

issue.” Mr. Sidhu further offers that California provides “protection to classes of persons who might

not be covered by federal rules” and “believes that federal protections for people with disabilities are

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insufficient.” Mr. Sidhu concludes that section 20106's first prong is satisfied in that the Unruh Act

addresses “safety of persons with disabilities” and “is an essential local safety concern that applies to

a recreational dinner train operating entirely within the state.” 

Although 49 U.S.C. § 20106 allows “additional or more stringent laws and regulations related

to railroad safety,” it does so only “when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety

hazard.” Williams, 392 F.Supp.2d 790, 794. “The locality exception does not apply to state-wide

hazards.” Williams, 392 F.Supp.2d at 794 (citing United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 861

(5 Cir. 2000)). A passenger car design defect “must – by its very nature – run everywhere the trains th

do; the hazard travels with the train and is therefore not local.” Williams, 392 F.Supp.2d 794.

Sierra correctly notes that the local safety hazard “is limited to a localized or geographically

discrete area with characteristics that are neither common nor statewide.” Although a moot point given

the absence of FRSA preemption, Mr. Sidhu fails to demonstrate that the Unruh Act addresses a local

railroad safety issue.

Incompatibility With Federal Law

Turning to section 20106's second prong, to avoid preemption, an additional or more stringent

state law related to railroad safety must not be incompatible with federal law. Mr. Sidhu appears to

contend that Sierra’s dinner train is not subject to Secretary of Transportation regulations addressing

transportation services for disabled individuals. Mr. Sidhu points to 49 C.F.R. § 37.37(c):

Conveyances used by members of the public primarily for recreational purposes

rather than for transportation (e.g., amusement park rides, ski lifts, or historic rail cars

or trolleys operated in museum settings) are not subject to requirements of this part.

Such conveyances are subject to Department ofJustice regulations implementing title II

or title III of the ADA (28 CFR part 35 or 36), as applicable.

Mr. Sidhu claims that the Department of Justice regulations referenced in 49 C.F.R. § 37.37(c) are not

about railroad safety to raise a preemption issue. Mr. Sidhu argues that the “Secretary of Transportation

has not regulated the specific issue of disability discrimination by recreational railroads” and the Unruh

Act is not incompatible in the absence of comparable federal law. Moreover, Mr. Sidhu contends that

the Unruh Act is in “harmony” with the ADA to provide “additional protection within California against

arbitrary and intentional discrimination.”

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Sierra does not specifically address the incompatibility with federal law issue. Nonetheless, the

issue is moot, and Mr. Sidhu’s points further emphasize the absence of FRSA preemption as to his

claims.

Burden On Interstate Commerce

To avoid section 20106 preemption, an additional or more stringent state law related to railroad

safety must not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Mr. Sidhu argues that application of the

Unruh Act to Sierra’s dinner train does not affect interstate commerce in that the dinner train “is entirely

contained within the boundaries of California and thus is subject to state law.” Mr. Sidhu continues:

“State law forbidding discrimination can in no way burden interstate commerce in this case, because

defendant’s train is not part of interstate commerce.”

Given the absence of FRSA preemption here, the interstate commerce issue is moot, and Sierra

does not challenge Mr. Sidhu’s points.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

On the basis of good cause, this Court:

1. REMANDS this action to Stanislaus County Superior Court; and

2. DIRECTS this Court’s clerk to take necessary action to remand this action to the

Stanislaus County Superior Court and to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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