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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 24, 2009 Decided December 1, 2009 

No. 08-5228 

JOHN F. WINSLOW, 

APPELLANT

v. 

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:84-cv-1316-JMF) 

Richard L. Swick argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs was David H. Shapiro. 

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellees. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, 

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GRIFFITH and 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: After losing his job as an 

attorney at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, John 

Winslow sued and prevailed on an age discrimination claim. 

The District Court awarded back pay; the court’s order did not 

include prejudgment interest. Several years later, Winslow 

moved for prejudgment interest, which he claimed was 

mandatory under the Back Pay Act. The District Court 

treated Winslow’s claim as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or 

amend the judgment. The problem for Winslow was that 

Rule 59(e) motions must be filed no later than 10 days after 

the entry of judgment. Therefore, the District Court denied 

Winslow’s motion as time-barred. Winslow now appeals, 

arguing that the motion is better categorized as a motion 

under Rule 60(a) to correct a clerical mistake or a motion 

under Rule 69 or 70 to enforce the judgment. Because those 

motions are not subject to time constraints, he asks us to reach 

the merits of his prejudgment interest argument. The 

Supreme Court has flatly stated, however, that motions for 

mandatory prejudgment interest are governed by Rule 59(e) 

and, therefore, by its 10-day filing requirement. See

Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 176-77 n.3 

(1989). We therefore affirm the judgment of the District 

Court. 

I 

 After a bench trial, the District Court found that FERC 

had unlawfully fired John Winslow on the basis of age. As 

relief, the District Court ordered reinstatement as well as back 

pay and other benefits. 

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The parties entered into a stipulated agreement with 

respect to the components of the award. The stipulation 

included a precise calculation of the back pay due Winslow: 

“payment of backpay in the gross amount of $179,126.34.” 

Winslow v. FERC, No. 84-1316, at 2 (D.D.C.) (stipulation to 

relief granted) (J.A. 62). It also included other relief such as 

the “correction of all agency records, including plaintiff’s 

official personnel folder” and “payment of an additional 

$931.36 for health expenses.” Id. at 2-3 (J.A. 62-63). 

The District Court accepted the parties’ stipulation and 

issued an order directing FERC to make the listed payments 

to Winslow. Winslow v. FERC, No. 84-1316 (J.A. 60-65). 

FERC paid Winslow $179,126.34 – full back pay without 

interest. 

Two and a half years later, Winslow moved to obtain 

prejudgment interest under the Back Pay Act. That Act 

provides that certain awards of back pay “shall be payable 

with interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(2)(A). 

 In accord with the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 176-77 n.3 

(1989), the District Court classified Winslow’s motion as a 

Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because 

Rule 59(e) motions must be filed no later than 10 days after 

the entry of judgment and because Winslow’s motion was 

filed two and a half years after the entry of the judgment, the 

District Court ruled that Winslow’s motion was untimely. 

This appeal followed. We exercise de novo review of this 

legal question regarding interpretation of Rule 59(e). 

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II 

 Winslow contends that he is entitled under the Back Pay 

Act to receive prejudgment interest on his back pay award. 

The Back Pay Act provides that back pay awards “shall be 

payable with interest,” 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(2)(A), and the Act 

applies to employment discrimination suits such as 

Winslow’s. See Brown v. Secretary of the Army, 918 F.2d 

214, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

In light of what he views as a clear legal entitlement to 

prejudgment interest on his back pay award, Winslow 

principally argues that the District Court’s failure to award 

prejudgment interest was simply a clerical error. Motions to 

correct clerical errors fall under Rule 60(a); under that rule, a 

clerical error may be corrected “whenever one is found in a 

judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a). Winslow alternatively 

suggests that his motion may be characterized as a motion 

under Rule 69 or 70 to enforce the original judgment. 

Whether under Rule 60, Rule 69, or Rule 70, Winslow asserts 

that his motion – which was filed two and a half years after 

the District Court’s entry of judgment – was timely. 

 

 Winslow’s argument faces an insurmountable hurdle, 

however – namely the Supreme Court’s decision in Osterneck 

v. Ernst & Whinney. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 

“a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment 

interest constitutes a motion to alter or amend the judgment 

under Rule 59(e)” and is subject to the strict 10-day time limit 

for Rule 59(e) motions. 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989) (emphasis 

added). More to the point for present purposes, the Osterneck

Court also addressed the related issue of mandatory

prejudgment interest: “We do not believe the result should be 

different where prejudgment interest is available as a matter 

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of right.” Id. at 176 n.3. The Court explained that courts and 

litigants are best served by a “bright-line rule” and that even a 

motion for mandatory prejudgment interest “implicates the 

merits of the district court’s judgment” and thus is governed 

by Rule 59(e). Id. at 177 n.3. 

Winslow contends that Osterneck’s statement regarding 

mandatory prejudgment interest is dicta. He urges us to “take 

a different course” than the Osterneck Court and to allow 

motions for mandatory prejudgment interest under Rule 60(a). 

Winslow Br. at 29-30. He says that his position better 

“comports with the Congressional and judicial policies 

favoring the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws via full 

compensation to prevailing plaintiffs.” Id. at 30. 

We decline Winslow’s invitation to flout the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Osterneck. Vertical stare decisis – both in 

letter and in spirit – is a critical aspect of our hierarchical 

Judiciary headed by “one supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art.

III, § 1. And as we have said before, “carefully considered 

language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, 

generally must be treated as authoritative.” United States v. 

Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2006). We note, 

moreover, that we are not alone in choosing to adhere to 

Osterneck on this question of mandatory prejudgment 

interest: The five other courts of appeals to consider the 

question have reached the same result. See Crowe v. Bolduc, 

365 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2004); Kosnoski v. Howley, 33 F.3d 

376, 378 (4th Cir. 1994); Pogor v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 135 

F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1998); McCalla v. Royal MacCabees 

Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004); McNickle 

v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 888 F.2d 678, 682 (10th Cir. 

1989). 

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We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered. 

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