Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00814/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00814-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERONICA AVELAR,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-0814 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

YOUTH AND FAMILY ENRICHMENT 

SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment came on for hearing before this court on

May 7, 2008. Plaintiff Veronica Avelar (“plaintiff”) appeared through her counsel, Robert S.

Aaron. Defendant Youth & Family Enrichment Services dba First Chance North (“First

Chance”) appeared through its counsel, Dirk D. Larsen. Having read the parties’ papers

and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause

appearing, the court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion as follows, and for the reasons

stated at the hearing.

BACKGROUND

This case involves allegations of a sexual assault that purportedly occurred while

plaintiff was involuntarily confined at a sobering station, after having been arrested for

driving under the influence. 

A. Background Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that on February 12, 2005, at approximately 3:01 a.m., she was

arrested by the Colma Police Department for driving under the influence. See Complaint, ¶

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

9. Following the arrest, the Colma police transported plaintiff to defendant First Chance,

where she was involuntarily confined. Defendant is an entity that provides and maintains a

24-hour program that serves as an alternative to jail for persons arrested for driving under

the influence. See id. at ¶¶ 4, 10.

When plaintiff was dropped off at defendant’s facility, she was left alone with

defendant Floyd Burrell (“Burrell”), an employee of defendant’s who was the only one in

charge of the facility on the evening of February 12. See id. at ¶ 5. Defendant Burrell did

an initial screening of plaintiff. During the screening, Burrell asked plaintiff multiple

questions about her private and medical history, including whether she had a boyfriend. 

Burrell then admitted plaintiff, and took her to a room that was used to house female

arrestees. Plaintiff was the only individual in the room. Id. at. ¶ 12.

According to plaintiff’s allegations, after plaintiff had been in the room for a period of

time, defendant Burrell entered the room and began conversing with her. Burrell asked

plaintiff whether she had ever cheated on her boyfriend. He also asked whether she had

ever had sex with a black man. Plaintiff alleges that she responded by continually asking to

be released. Defendant Burrell then asked plaintiff if she would give him a “blow job,” and

exposed himself to plaintiff. Subsequent to that, plaintiff alleges that defendant Burrell

moved behind her, pushed her against the wall, and attempted to rape and/or sodomize

her. Hoping to avoid being raped or sodomized, plaintiff alleges that she “encouraged

Burrell to orally copulate her which he did.” See generally id. at ¶ 13. 

Plaintiff alleges that she was released early the following morning and that after her

release, defendant Burrell made repeated telephone calls to her, which plaintiff refused to

answer or return. See Complaint, ¶ 15.

B. The Instant Action

As a result of the above, plaintiff instituted the present action against defendants

Burrell and First Chance, alleging: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of the

Ralph Act under Cal. Civil Code § 51.7; (3) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act; (4)

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 2 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 First Chance has also filed objections to evidence with respect to (1) plaintiff’s

references to defendant’s subsequent remedial measures regarding supervision policies at

First Chance; and (2) plaintiff’s references to defendant’s insurance liability against sexual

assaults of its employees. The court hereby SUSTAINS both objections, based on Federal

Rules of Evidence 407 and 411.

3

sexual battery; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) negligent infliction of

emotional distress; and (7) negligence. See generally Complaint. The first cause of action

is a federal claim; the others are state common law and statutory claims. Plaintiff asserts

the first claim against defendant Burrell only; all other claims are asserted against both

defendants. 

Defendant First Chance now moves for summary judgment on two grounds. First, it

moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s second through sixth causes of action, on

grounds that First Chance cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged sexual assault of

plaintiff by its employee. Second, it moves for summary judgment on grounds that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s seventh cause of action, for negligent

hiring, retention and supervision of defendant Burrell.1

 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

Summary judgment shall be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of

the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to

a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The court must view the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be

drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986).

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 3 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

B. Vicarious Liability

The issue of defendant’s vicarious liability is at the heart of this motion. Under

California’s doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held vicariously liable for

torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment. See Perez v. Van

Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal.3d 962, 967 (1986). The doctrine of respondeat superior

only applies, however, if the plaintiff is able to prove that the employee's tortious conduct

was committed within the scope of employment. The general rule is that where an

employee commits acts of sexual misconduct during the course of his work, such acts are

outside the scope of his employment, and no vicarious liability attaches. See, e.g., Maria

D. v. Westec Residential Sec., Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 125, 146-47 (2000); Lisa M. v. Henry

Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 12 Cal. 4th 291, 301 (1995); Farmers Ins. Group v. County of

Santa Clara, 11 Cal.4th 992, 1006-07 (1995). To that end, First Chance seeks summary

judgment on grounds that defendant Burrell’s alleged sexual assault cannot, as a matter of

law, be considered an action within the scope of Burrell’s employment, such that vicarious

liability extends to First Chance.

Plaintiff, by contrast, relies on an exception to the general rule against employer

liability for an employee’s sexual misconduct. Specifically, plaintiff relies on the California

Supreme Court’s ruling in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, in which the state supreme court

decided that vicarious liability can extend to employers of on-duty police officers who

commit sexual assaults. See 54 Cal. 3d 202 (1991). 

Preliminarily, an overview of Mary M. is essential, as the parties agree that the

court’s holding there – and subsequent interpretations of that holding – provides the

roadmap for the court’s ruling here. In Mary M., the state supreme court considered

whether the City of Los Angeles could be held vicariously liable for the actions of a police

officer who raped a woman whom he pulled over while on duty. See 54 Cal. 3d 202. In

deciding whether the police officer was acting within the scope of his employment – and

therefore, whether vicarious liability applied – the supreme court stated that the “test” for

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 4 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

determining whether an employee is acting outside the scope of employment is whether “in

the context of the particular enterprise, an employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling

that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the

employer's business.” See id. at 214. 

In making this determination, the Mary M. court referenced three underlying policy

interests which must be satisfied in order to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. It

found that vicarious liability is appropriate in order to (1) prevent recurrence of the tortious

conduct; (2) give greater assurance of compensation for the victim; and (3) ensure that the

victim's losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave

rise to the injury. See Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 209. The court found that these three policy

considerations justified imposition of vicarious liability in the case before it, because (1) the

imposition of liability on public entities whose law enforcement officers commit sexual

assaults while on duty would encourage employers to take preventive measures, without

significantly interfering with the ability of police departments to enforce the law and protect

society; (2) vicarious liability is appropriate in compensating the victims of police

misconduct, as evidenced by the state legislature’s passage of laws prohibiting police

officers from committing police brutality; and (3) the cost of the victim’s loss should properly

be borne by the City and the public, since the community derives substantial benefits from

the lawful exercise of police power. See id. at 214-17. 

The Mary M. court then went on to conclude that the police officer at issue was, in

fact, acting within the scope of his employment. The court noted first that the proper inquiry

was whether the risk of the employee’s misconduct “was one that may fairly be regarded as

typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise undertaken by the employer.” See id. at

217. And it further observed: “in view of the considerable power and authority that police

officers possess, it is neither startling nor unexpected that on occasion an officer will

misuse that authority by engaging in assaultive conduct.... Sexual assaults by police

officers are fortunately uncommon; nevertheless, the risk of such tortious conduct is

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 5 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

broadly incidental to the enterprise of law enforcement, and thus liability for such acts may

appropriately be imposed on the employing public entity.” Id. at 217-18. Then, rejecting

the City’s argument that the police officer was pursuing his own interests rather than acting

in the course of his employment, the court noted that the employee police officer had

committed a wrongful act “in the course of a series of acts... which were authorized by the

principal.” Id. at 219 (In “[v]iewing the transaction as a whole, it cannot be said that, as a

matter of law, [the employee officer] was acting outside the scope of his employment when

he raped plaintiff”). In sum, vicarious liability applied to the City defendant, concluded the

court. 

The parties agree that the fundamental question before the court here is whether the

Mary M. exception to the rule of non-employer liability for sexual assaults applies to the

facts here, such that First Chance can be held liable for defendant Burrell’s actions. 

Plaintiff asserts that Mary M. compels the imposition of vicarious liability here, since the

underlying policy reasons that justified imposition of vicarious liability in the police officer

context also apply here. Defendant objects, however, arguing that Mary M. limited its

holding to the on-duty police officer context only, as subsequent decisions have

recognized. Ultimately, while this issue is a difficult one, the court is persuaded that

defendants have the better argument, and there is no basis for extending the Mary M.

holding to the case at bar. 

First, there is nothing in Mary M. that suggests that the California Supreme Court

would find that vicarious liability should be applied outside the police officer context, to a

third party non-profit “sobering station,” based on a counselor’s sexual assault. Indeed,

Mary M. expressly distinguishes between situations involving police officers, and situations

involving other contexts in which the employees are cloaked with authority similar to police

officers. For example, the Mary M. court noted that cases that involve sexual assaults by

private security guards are “distinguishable.” See 54 Cal. 3d at 219. According to the

court, because “such persons do not act as official representatives of the state,”“any

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 6 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

authority they have is different from, and far less than, that conferred upon an officer of the

law.” Id. In other words, the court took into account the actual authority that police officers

possess, reasoning that it was this authority that justified in part the imposition of vicarious

liability where the factual circumstances make it appropriate. Where such actual authority

does not exist, it stands to reason that no vicarious liability results. 

This is precisely the case here. While plaintiff may have believed that defendant

Burrell was a police officer, that First Chance’s premises were equivalent to a jail, and that

she was in custody, this has no impact on the actual authority vested in Burrell – which

consisted of no official authority at all. Specifically, Burrell was a counselor, not a police

officer, did not wear a uniform or badge, and did not possess a gun. Nor was Burrell

authorized by law or by his employer to use force of any kind against “inmates.” Moreover,

the facility was not a locked facility like a jail, and plaintiff was free to leave at anytime, even

though she did not know that. Accordingly, under Mary M., the situation at bar is

distinguishable. 

Second, not only is Mary M. distinguishable, but defendant is furthermore correct

that Mary M. expressly limited its reasoning to those situations dealing with actual on-duty

police officers, based on the unique position of authority duly vested in police officers by the

state. See Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 218 fn.11 (“We stress that our conclusion in this case

flows from the unique authority vested in police officers. Employees who do not have this

authority and who commit sexual assaults may be acting outside the scope of their

employment as a matter of law.”)(emphasis added); id. at 221 (“we hold that when, as in

this case, a police officer on duty misuses his official authority by raping a woman whom he

has detained, the public entity that employs him can be held vicariously liable”). As

defendant’s counsel emphasized at the hearing, the authority to use force is fundamental to

police officers’ duties. And it is precisely because police officers are authorized to

physically detain and touch others without consent that makes their sexual misconduct

foreseeable, justifying at least in part, employer liability. 

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 7 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The court also finds other subsequent cases to be instructive in holding that

vicarious liability does not extend to employers for the actions of employees who possess no

actual authority equal to that of police officers’ – despite the fact they are vested with other

types of apparent authority. See, e.g., Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th 291 (no vicarious liability for ultra

sound technician’s sexual assault of patient); Farmers Ins. Group, 11 Cal. 4th 992 (no

vicarious liability for deputy sheriff’s sexual harassment of a trainee as supervisory authority

over the trainee was not comparable to extraordinary authority of law enforcement officers over

the public); John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438 (1989)(no vicarious liability

for teacher’s molestation of a student as authority of police with uniforms, badges and guns

far surpasses the authority of teachers over students).

8

Finally, the court finds defendant’s reliance on later cases including Maria D. v.

Westec Residential Security, instructive.2 In Maria D., the California appellate court

affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant, where plaintiff alleged

that defendant was vicariously liable for the sexual assault of its on-duty security guard. 

See 85 Cal. App. 4th 125, 148 (2000). The plaintiff in Maria D. made similar arguments to

those made by plaintiff here, including that the Mary M. reasoning should be extended to

cover defendant’s security guards, based on the fact that those security guards “project the

authority of police officers; patrol communities in marked vehicles, wearing uniforms and

carrying firearms; and are authorized by their employer to make a private persons arrest

and to use deadly force in certain circumstances...”. See id. at 148. The Maria D. court,

however, held that notwithstanding these marks of ostensible authority, “a significant

difference between the police officer in Mary M. and the security guard here remains.” The

difference: “[t]he security guard’s actual authority is not comparable to that of a police

officer.” Id. 

Again, so here. While plaintiff has done her best to urge the court to analogize

defendant Burrell to a police officer vested with actual authority, and to analogize defendant

First Chance to a municipal employer housing an actual jail, the analogy does not pass

muster, for the reasons stated above. No analogy can supplant the actual authority

required to justify treatment as a police officer. Moreover, if neither Mary M. nor Maria D.

were willing to extend the Mary M. exception to security guards – whose marks of

ostensible authority (e.g., uniforms, firearms, ability to make arrests) are arguably much

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 8 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The operative complaint alleges only a claim for negligent hiring, training, and

supervision. See Complaint, ¶ 45. This is contrary to plaintiff’s opposition brief, which states

for the first time that defendant First Chance had a “duty to enact an effective mechanism for

the protection of its highly vulnerable female detainees,” “had a duty to effectively

communicate key incidents between outgoing and incoming management;” and “had a duty

to provide onsite supervision of its staff working alone on graveyard shift” – all of which plaintiff

asserts First Chance violated. Nonetheless, plaintiff is bound by the allegations and claims of

her complaint, and may not allege additional duties or negligence grounds for the first time on

summary judgment. 

9

greater than defendant Burrell’s – then the court will not contravene this precedent. 

In sum, the court is not persuaded that the Mary M. exception applies to the facts

here such that vicarious liability should extend to First Chance. Accordingly, the court

GRANTS summary judgment in defendant’s favor as to plaintiff’s second through sixth

causes of action.

C. Negligence

Defendant also seeks summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s seventh cause of

action – i.e., plaintiff’s claim that defendant First Chance was “negligent in its hiring,

screening, training monitoring, supervising, disciplining, and or otherwise managing

Burrell.” See FAC, ¶ 45.3 In order to succeed on a negligent hiring and supervision claim,

a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant’s “acts or omissions [allegedly committed by

defendant itself], in the context of hiring, training or retaining [] an employee, breached a

duty of care which it owed directly to plaintiff.” See, e.g., Flores v. Autozone West, Inc., 74

Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 187 (2008). Liability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon

the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics that might pose a

danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the

wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees. Thus, a critical element in stating a

claim for negligent hiring and supervision is the defendant’s knowledge of characteristics

that might pose a danger to employees, customers, or the public. See, e.g., Federico v.

Superior Court (Jenry G.), 59 Cal. App. 4th 1207, 1216 (1997). 

Construing plaintiff’s arguments as liberally as possible, plaintiff contends that First

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 9 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Chance negligently hired and trained defendant Burrell, and that it negligently supervised

Burrell by failing to provide supervision on his graveyard shift, and by leaving him alone on

a graveyard shift. To begin with, however, plaintiff has come forward with no evidence

establishing that First Chance knew that defendant Burrell was incompetent or unfit to

perform his role as counselor for women detainees, or more specifically, that Burrell had a

propensity to commit sexual assaults. While plaintiff has introduced evidence that another

counselor was allegedly involved in a sexual assault against a female client in 2001, and

the fact that Burrell was aware that detainees would occasionally come-on sexually to First

Chance staff, this falls far short of suggesting, let alone proving, that defendant Burrell had

a propensity to assault women. See Aaron Decl., Ex. B at 82-84; Ex. C at 17-20. Since the

relevant inquiry here is whether First Chance knew that Burrell was a person who could not

be trusted, within the context at issue – i.e., whether First Chance knew or should have

known that Burrell’s sexual misconduct was foreseeable – plaintiff’s failure to introduce any

evidence suggesting Burrell’s propensity to commit sexual assaults, is fatal to plaintiff’s

negligent hiring and supervision claim. See Federico, 59 Cal. App. 4th at 1216 (“an

employer's liability must be determined in the context of the specific duties the work

entails”). 

Furthermore, defendant has introduced evidence that defendant Burrell received

regular training, was aware of First Chance’s prohibition of indecent conduct and sexual

harassment, and furthermore signed and acknowledged receipt of First Chance’s code of

conduct, which expressly forbids sexual harassment and indecent conduct. See, e.g.,

Doherty Decl., ¶ 6; Larsen Decl., Ex. 2 at 46-47; 102. 

In sum, therefore, there are no material facts that have been introduced which

suggest that defendant First Chance’s acts or omissions in the training, hiring, or

supervision, etc. of defendant Burrell, breached any duty of care to plaintiff. Summary

judgment is therefore GRANTED in defendant’s favor on the seventh cause of action.

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 10 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2008 

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-00814-PJH Document 61 Filed 06/23/08 Page 11 of 11