Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00324/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00324-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODERICK O. FONSECA,

CDCR #G-62092,

Civil No. 12cv0324 JLS (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL

PARTIAL FILING FEE, GARNISHING

$350.00 BALANCE FROM

PRISONER’S TRUST ACCOUNT; AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

AND 1915A(b)

vs.

P. COLIO; C.G. BUTLER;

H. LOPEZ; E. DELGADO;

L.S. McEWEN;

Defendants.

Roderick O. Fonseca (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, initially submitted a civil action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of California. United States District Judge

Jeffrey White determined that the actions alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint arose in Calipatria and

thus, transferred the matter to the Southern District of California on February 3, 2012. 

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C.

Case 3:12-cv-00324-JLS-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/12 Page 1 of 8
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§ 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the

plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook,

169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP remain

obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their action is ultimately

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the

average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the

prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having

custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s

income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to

the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d

at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him

when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

[ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the

entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the

Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

//

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INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must subject

each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the

sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court

to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as amended,

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP

provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the U.S.

Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at 845; Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating

that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of process is made on the

opposing parties”).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Andrews, 398

F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving

liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

//

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Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004);

Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

Plaintiff’s Complaint is not entirely clear but it appears that he is claiming that on two

occasions Defendant Colio denied Plaintiff a portion of his meals. (See Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff

appears to bring this claim both as an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim and

as a denial of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”). 

To state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment, however, Plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show that the conditions of his confinement subjected him to “unquestioned and serious

deprivations of basic human needs.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991). The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable

prisons,” and conditions imposed may be “restrictive and even harsh.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347,

349. Adequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. Hoptowit v. Ray,

682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). However, prison food need not be “tasty or aesthetically

pleasing,” and it need only be “adequate to maintain health.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456

(9th Cir. 1993); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Although the Ninth Circuit has never decided what exact quantity of prisoner food is

necessary to pass constitutional muster, other courts have established guidelines. See, e.g., Green v.

Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding two meals a day sufficient if nutritionally and

calorically adequate); see also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 186, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1971)

(finding diets of 2,800 to 3,300 calories per day constitutionally adequate); Cunningham v. Jones,

667 F.2d 565, 566 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding one meal a day for 15 days, where the meal contained

2,000-2,500 calories and was sufficient to maintain health, constitutionally adequate). It is clear,

however, that even the complete denial of single meals on a few occasions is insufficient to support

a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See e.g., Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir.

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1999) (“[T]hat Palmer may have missed one meal ... does not rise to the level of a cognizable

constitutional injury”); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Missing a mere one

out of every nine meals is hardly more than that missed by many working citizens over the same

period.”); Wilkins v. Roper, 843 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (denial of one meal does not

give rise to constitutional violation). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a cruel and unusual punishment claim because he has failed

to allege facts which show that he was denied sufficient food or nutrition necessary to maintain his

health. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (when

considering Eight Amendment challenges to the conditions of confinement, court should consider

amount of time the prisoner was subject to the allegedly unconstitutional condition). 

While Plaintiff also appears to attempt to allege a claim under RLUIPA, the factual

allegations in the Complaint are so disjointed that it is simply not clear to the Court the nature of

Plaintiff’s religious claims. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et. seq., provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule

of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the

burden on that person – [¶] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

and [¶] (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (emphasis added); see also San Jose Christian College v. Morgan Hill, 360

F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2004) (“RLUIPA ‘replaces the void provisions of RFRA’ . . . and prohibits

the government from imposing ‘substantial burdens’ on ‘religious exercise’ unless there exists a

compelling governmental interest and the burden is the least restrictive means of satisfying the

governmental interest.”). 

RLUIPA defines religious exercise to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); San Jose

Christian College, 360 F.3d at 1034. The party alleging a RLUIPA violation carries the initial burden

of demonstrating that a governmental practice constitutes a substantial burden on his religious exercise.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a); 2000cc-2(b) (“[T]he plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on

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whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim

substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.”).). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims

lack sufficient factual allegations to state a claim under RLUIPA.

Finally, Plaintiff also appears to allege that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights have

been violated by the alleged inadequate review of his administrative grievances. (See Compl. at 4.) 

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that: “[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S.CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The requirements of procedural

due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s

protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes

and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke due process

protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). To state a procedural due process claim,

Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation

of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th

Cir. 2000). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest

in an inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific

prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a

[prison] grievance procedure”)); accord Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (1995); Buckley

v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that prison official deprived him

of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison grievances in a satisfactory

manner. While a liberty interest can arise from state law or prison regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at

223-27, due process protections are implicated only if Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants:

(1) restrained his freedom in a manner not expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and

significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff pleads nothing

to suggest how the allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate grievances amounted

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to a restraint on his freedom not contemplated by his original sentence or how it resulted in an “atypical”

and “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.

Thus, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the procedural adequacy of inmate grievance procedures,

his Complaint fails to state a due process claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim upon

which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)

& 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the

defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint fails to address the

deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in

this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%)

of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount

in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the

date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies

of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference

to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not reCase 3:12-cv-00324-JLS-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/12 Page 7 of 8
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alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form § 1983 complaint to

Plaintiff.

DATED: February 28, 2012

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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