Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01395/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01395-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Conrad E. Salcido, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-1395-PHX-SLG (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SHARON L. GLEASON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Conrad Salcido filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on June 28, 2012. In 1991,

he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to two counts of Attempted Molestation of

a Child and one count of Attempted Sexual Conduct With a Minor, involving two of his

grandchildren and his goddaughter, and he was placed on lifetime probation. In 2006, the

State filed a petition to revoke his probation, and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial

court revoked his probation, and sentenced him to a mitigated nine-year prison term. In his

federal petition, he maintains that he is entitled to early release because he has served fifty

percent of his sentence. Respondents contend that his petition is untimely and that he is not

entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. In the alternative, Respondents argue that Salcido’s

claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. The Court agrees that the petition is

untimely filed, and that Salcido is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. The Court

recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:12-cv-01395-SLG Document 17 Filed 10/10/13 Page 1 of 4
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BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2006, Salcido filed a Notice of Appeal (Doc. 12, Exh M). Following

the completion of briefing, on May 9, 2007, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s

revocation of Salcido’s probation (Id., Exh P). Salcido did not seek review in the Arizona

Supreme Court. Almost two years later, on March 3, 2009, Salcido filed a Petition for PostConviction Relief, seeking a reduction in his prison term based upon a significant change in

the law, citing State v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, 162 P.3d 650 (App. 2007) (Id., Exh Q). On

June 29, 2009, the trial court denied Salcido’s request for post-conviction relief, finding that

State v. Gonzalez did not provide grounds for relief, and that in any event, his claim was

waived by not raising it on appeal (Id., Exh R).

On July 1, 2009, Salcido filed a second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, arguing

that he was sentenced illegally in 1992, citing State v. Peek, 219 Ariz. 182, 195 Ariz. 641

(2008). On November 12, 2009, the trial court again denied Salcido’s petition, finding the

issue waived or precluded, and that State v. Peek did not provide grounds for relief (Id., Exh

S, T).

On September 23, 2011, Salcido filed a third Notice of Post-Conviction Relief,

arguing that he should be released because he had served 50 percent of his sentence (Id., Exh

U). On June 11, 2012, the trial court denied Salcido’s request for post-conviction relief,

acknowledging that Salcido was correct in stating that he was eligible for release, that

eligibility for release is separate from being granted release, that such a decision was one for

the Arizona Department of Corrections to determine, not the trial court, and that if it was in

the trial court’s discretion, it would oppose such release (Id., Exh V). Salcido filed his

federal petition on June 28, 2012 (Doc. 1).

DISCUSSION

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is required

to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). For a state prisoner who does not seek review in a state’s highest court, the

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judgment becomes final on the date that the time for seeking such review expires. Gonzalez

v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during

the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State courts. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See

Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, filing a new petition for

post-conviction relief does not revive a limitations period that expired before the new petition

was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

Salcido’s conviction became final on June 9, 2007, thirty days after the date of the

court of appeals decision, when the time for seeking review in the Arizona Supreme Court

expired. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 712-17 (9th Cir. 2007). Salcido was required

to file his federal petition on or before June 10, 2008. Absent any statutory or equitable

tolling, his federal petition, filed four years after the expiration of the one-year period of

limitations, is untimely filed.

The Court has determined that he is not entitled to any statutory tolling for the time

period between June, 2007, when his conviction became final, and March, 2009, when

Salcido filed his Rule 32 petition, because no application was “pending” during those twentyone months. Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048. Post-conviction review is not “pending” until a notice

of post-conviction relief is filed. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054,

1056 (9th Cir. 2004). Although Salcido’s 2009 Rule 32 petition was not ruled untimely by

the trial court, it was still filed more than three years after the expiration of the one-year

period of limitations, and therefore, could not revive it. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d at

823. For the same reason, the two subsequent petitions also did not revive the limitations

period. Id.

Salcido is entitled to equitable tolling only if he establishes that he has been pursuing

his rights diligently and some extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely

petition. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010). Salcido filed nothing in state

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court for almost two years, and has not indicated why he chose to wait that length of time to

file his Rule 32 petition. He is not entitled to equitable tolling.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Conrad Salcido’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 10th day of October, 2013.

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