Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02043/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02043-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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28 This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO PEREZ, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:09-cv-02043-GEB-KJM

)

v. ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

) MOTION TO EXPUNGE NOTICE OF

GMAC MORTGAGE; KAY-CO INVESTMENTS ) PENDING OF ACTION AND

dba PRO30 FUNDING; ETS SERVICES, ) DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL

LLC; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC ) JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; ADAM ) REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS*

LANCASTER; JAMES RAY WALL, JR.; )

and RANDALL GILBERT HEYDEN, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Three motions are pending: (1) Defendants GMAC Mortgage and 

ETS Services, LLC’s (“Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) Defendants’

motion to strike certain portions of Plaintiff’s complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f); and (3) Defendants’ motion to

expunge Plaintiff’s notice of pendency of action. Plaintiff has not

filed an opposition to the motions or a non-opposition statement as

required by Local Rule 230(c). This failure to comply with Local Rule

230(c) is tantamount to filing a non-opposition statement. See Oliver

v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-1381-FCD-GGH, 2009 WL

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3122573, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) (stating plaintiff’s

response is “tantamount to no response at all, and the court could

properly construe plaintiff’s response as a non-opposition to

defendant’s motion”). Further, after the motions were filed Plaintiff

filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Defendants filed an

objection to Plaintiff’s FAC, arguing Plaintiff’s FAC was filed

“without consent of the parties or leave of the Court.” (Defs.’ Obj.

to Plt.’s FAC 1:19-22.) Defendants are correct since Plaintiff’s FAC

was filed thirty five days after Defendants filed their motion to

dismiss and motion to strike. The right to amend a complaint as a

matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, as amended

December 1, 2009, terminates twenty one days after service of a motion

under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Therefore, Plaintiff’s FAC was not

timely filed. 

Defendants further argue in their objection that

Plaintiff’s: 

recent filing of the First Amended Complaint

appears to simply be a further and inappropriate

stalling tactic in an effort to further delay

Plaintiff’s eviction from the [property at issue in

this case,] and to allow Plaintiff to continue

living in the Subject Property rent-free.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s inappropriate filing of the

First Amended Complaint appears to be an attempt by

Plaintiff to avoid a hearing on . . . Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike and Motion to

Expunge.

Defendants also argue in their objection that “Plaintiff should not be

permitted to waste the Court’s resources and time merely as a vehicle

to stall his eviction from the Subject Property.” 

Defendants seek to expunge the Notice of Pendency of Action

recorded on July 28, 2009 as document no. 2009-9 037254 in the

official records of Merced County, California, a true and correct copy

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of which is 10 attached as Exhibit “C” to Defendants’ request for

judicial notice filed on February 10, 2010.

The court “may take judicial notice of matters of public

record.” United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, Defendants’

request for judicial notice of such documents filed on February 10,

2010 is granted. 

“A lis pendens is recorded by someone asserting a real

property claim, to give notice that a lawsuit has been filed which

may, if that person prevails, affect title to or possession of the

real property described in the notice.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.

Charlton, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1066, 1069 (1993) (citing Cal. Code Civ.

Pro. §§ 405.2, 405.4, 405.20). “Once a lis pendens is filed, it

clouds the title and effectively prevents the property's transfer

until the litigation is resolved or the lis pendens is expunged.” BGJ

Associates, LLC v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 75 Cal. App. 4th

952, 966-67 (1999).

“A motion for expungement may be brought at any time after

notice of pendency has been recorded. The party who recorded the

notice of lis pendens bears the burden of proof in opposing

expungement.” Balagapo v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 2:09-cv-00405-JAM-GGH,

2010 WL 144108, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2010) (citing Cal. Code Civ.

Pro. § 405.30). The lis pendens must be expunged “if the claimant has

not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable

validity of the real property claim.” Orange County v. Hongkong and

Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd., 52 F.3d 821, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 405.32). “To constitute a ‘real

property claim’ the cause of action, if meritorious, must affect the

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right of possession of specific real property or affect the title to

the specific real property.” Logan v. Resmae Mortgage Corp.,

2:09-cv-01632-MCE-GGH, 2009 Wl 5206716, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24,

2009) (quoting Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 405.4). To establish the

“probable validity” of a “real property claim,” the party who recorded

the lis pendens must demonstrate “that it is more likely than not that

[he] . . . will obtain a judgment against the defendant . . . .” 

Orange County, 52 F.3d at 824 (quoting Cal Code Civ. Pro. § 405.32).

Since Defendants’ dismissal motion, motion to strike, and motion to

expunge the recorded lis pendens show that an expungement order should

issue, Defendants’ motion to expunge is granted.

Defendants also argue if they prevail on their expungement

motion they are entitled to recover $1,813.50 in attorneys’ fees under

California Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38. This section

provides:

[t]he court shall direct that the party prevailing

on any motion [for expungement] . . . be awarded

the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of making

or opposing the motion unless the court finds that

the other party acted with substantial

justification or that other circumstances make the

imposition of attorney's fees and costs unjust. 

The award of attorneys’ fees “is mandatory, unless the Court finds

that the opposing party acted with substantial justification, or that

other circumstances make the imposition of attorneys' fees unjust.” 

Olivier v. NDEX West, LLC, No. 1:09-CV-00099 OWW GSA, 2009 WL 2486314,

at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009); see also Castro v. Superior Court,

116 Cal. App. 4th 1010, 1118 (2004) (stating that “a prevailing party

on a motion to expunge a lis pendens is entitled to recover attorney

fees.” (emphasis in original)). Since Defendants have prevailed on

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their expungement motion, their request for $1,813.50 in attorney’s

fees is granted.

Defendants’ dismissal motion and motion to strike, and the

status of Plaintiff’s FAC are now addressed. Plaintiff’s FAC

eliminates all claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction,

which has the effect of eliminating federal question jurisdiction. 

“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the

state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs,383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). This is because

“[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter

of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for

them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Id. Therefore,

Plaintiff is granted leave to file the FAC nunc pro tunc as of the

date it was filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (“The court should

freely give leave when justice so requires.”). Since the FAC is now

the operative pleading Defendants’ pending dismissal motion and motion

to strike, which do not address the operative pleading, are denied as

moot. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc., v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating an amended complaint

supercedes the prior complaint). 

Further, since Plaintiff’s FAC neither contains a federal

claim nor provides a basis for the Court to exercise diversity

jurisdiction, the Court may sua sponte decide whether to continue to

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court

“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state]

claim” if “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” have

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been dismissed. “While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one

of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the Gibbs values of

economy, convenience, fairness and comity.” Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001

(Quotations omitted). “Since state courts have the primary

responsibility to develop and apply state law, . . . the Gibbs values

do not favor continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over

[Plaintiff’s] state claims . . . .” Anderson v. Countrywide

Financial, No. 2:08-cv-01220-GEB-GGH, 2009 WL 3368444, at *5 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 19, 2009); see also Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 (stating that “in

the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before

trial, the balance of factors will point towards declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims” (quotations and

citation omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and this

case shall be closed.

Dated: March 24, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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