Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01039/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRUCE DIXON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

M. KROENLEIN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-1039 AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has 

consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 305(a). ECF No. 4. 

I. Plaintiff’s Current Address 

 As an initial matter, the docket reflects that plaintiff is housed at the California State 

Prison-Sacramento. However, the Inmate Locator website operated by the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) indicates that plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the 

California Medical Facility.1 It appears that plaintiff has not complied with Local Rule 183(b) 

 

1

 See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate 

determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); see also City of 

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We may take judicial notice of a 

record of a state agency not subject to reasonable dispute.”). 

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which requires that a party appearing in propria persona inform the court of any address change. 

The Clerk of the Court will be directed to serve a copy of this order on plaintiff at both his 

address of record and at the California Medical Facility and plaintiff will be required to file a 

notice advising the court of his current address. Plaintiff is advised that failure to notify the court 

of his current address, or to notify the court if his address changes in the future, may result in 

dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute. 

II. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). ECF No. 3. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2). 

III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

This standard also applies to complaints brought by non-prisoners that are proceeding pro se. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

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Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona, 

885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute 

on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490 

U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, 

has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id. 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations 

omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that 

merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) 

(quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure ' 1216 (3d 

ed. 2004)). 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint 

under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

IV. Complaint 

 Plaintiff alleges that he was placed on suicide watch on March 22, 2014, after attempting 

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to hang himself. ECF No. 1 at 4-5, ¶ 11. On March 24, 2014, while still on suicide watch, 

plaintiff became depressed and began cutting himself. Id. A nursing assistant reported plaintiff’s 

behavior to defendant Lynch and defendant Lynch allegedly told the assistant to stop reporting 

plaintiff’s attempts at self-harm and to tell plaintiff to cut himself deeper. Id. The next day, 

defendant Kroenlein removed plaintiff from suicide watch without conducting a psych evaluation 

and later that day plaintiff attempted to hang himself again. Id. After plaintiff’s suicide attempt, 

he got to talk to defendant Kroenlein and explained about his issues. Id. A correctional officer 

also told her that plaintiff had been trying to hurt himself and that it would be best if he was on 

suicide watch. Id. Defendant Kroenlein instead put plaintiff in a strip cell. Id. 

Between March 25, 2014, and March 26, 2014, while plaintiff was in the strip cell, he 

attempted to strangle himself three times, cut himself, and banged his head against the cell door. 

Id. at 5, ¶ 12. Plaintiff’s self-harm attempts were witnessed by various medical staff but, under 

orders from defendant Kroenlein, failed to take any preventative measures or place him on suicide 

watch. Id., ¶¶ 12, 15. On March 26, 2014, plaintiff also swallowed a sharpened screw in front of 

defendant Chris, who did nothing to document or report plaintiff’s behavior. Id. 

Plaintiff was transferred to a crisis bed on March 27, 2014, and was there until April 3, 

2014. Id., ¶ 13. While there, plaintiff was under the care of defendant Silar. Id. Plaintiff alleges 

that defendant Silar knew he had swallowed a screw, and that he could use that screw to harm 

himself once it passed through his system, but did nothing. Id. He also alleges that he cut 

himself numerous times while under defendant Silar’s care and that defendant Silar ordered the 

nurses to not give plaintiff any preventative help and to not place him on suicide watch. Id., ¶ 15. 

Defendants Montoya and Diciro were allegedly mental health supervisors. Id. 

V. Eighth Amendment – Deliberate Indifference 

 A. Legal Standard 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006), (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires 

plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s 

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condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (quoting 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotations 

marks omitted), overruled on other grounds WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc)). 

Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “‘knows of 

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1187 (9th Cir. 2002)). Deliberate indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful 

act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). A difference of opinion between an 

inmate and prison medical personnel—or between medical professionals—regarding appropriate 

medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. 

 B. Failure to State a Claim 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 

362, 371, 376 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). “Vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 

Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Additionally, “[t]here is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Taylor v 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under 

§ 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, 

or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. 

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A supervisor may be liable for the constitutional 

violations of his subordinates if he “knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Finally, supervisory liability may also exist without any personal 

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participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 

repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations 

marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). 

Plaintiff’s only allegation against defendants Montoya and Diciro is that they were head 

supervising mental health providers. ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 15. This is insufficient to state a claim of 

relief against either defendant. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would show that either 

defendant participated in the deprivation of his rights or knew about the violations and failed to 

take action to stop them. The claims against these defendants will therefore be dismissed with 

leave to amend. 

 C. Claims for Which a Response Will Be Required 

 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Lynch ordered an assistant to stop reporting plaintiff’s acts 

of self-harm and to encourage plaintiff to cut himself deeper. ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 11. He further 

alleges that defendants Kroenlein and Silar were aware of his suicide attempts and acts of selfharm but refused to provide appropriate care, place him on suicide watch, or take other 

preventative action and ordered other mental health staff to not take any action. Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 11-

15. Finally, he alleges that defendant Chris watched him swallow a sharpened screw, but failed to 

report or document the incident, even though the screw could be used by plaintiff for self-harm 

once it passed through his system and could potentially cause harm while inside of plaintiff. Id. 

at 5, ¶¶ 12-13. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation of plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment rights and these defendants will be required to respond to the complaint. 

VI. Leave to Amend 

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the complaint does not state 

cognizable claims against defendants Montoya and Diciro. However, it appears that plaintiff may 

be able to allege facts to remedy this and he will be given the opportunity to amend the complaint 

if he desires. 

 Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendants Kroenlein, Lynch, Chris, and Silar on 

his claims that they failed to provide appropriate mental health care or he may delay serving any 

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defendant and amend the complaint to attempt to state cognizable claims against defendants 

Montoya and Diciro. 

Plaintiff will be required to complete and return the attached notice advising the court how 

he wishes to proceed. If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, he will be given thirty days to 

file an amended complaint. If plaintiff elects to proceed on his claims against defendants 

Kroenlein, Lynch, Chris, and Silar without amending the complaint, the court will send him the 

necessary forms for service of the complaint and the claims against defendants Montoya and 

Diciro will remain dismissed without prejudice. 

If plaintiff chooses to file a first amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the 

conditions about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo, 

423 U.S. at 370-71. Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant 

is involved. Arnold v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268 (citations 

omitted). 

 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 

his first amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 929 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims 

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend do not have to be re-pled in subsequent 

amended complaint to preserve appeal). Once plaintiff files a first amended complaint, the 

original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. 

//// 

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VII. Summary 

Plaintiff must notify the court of his current address. If plaintiff does not notify the court 

of his current address and keep the court updated when his address changes, this case may be 

dismissed for failure to prosecute. 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 

 Some of the allegations in the complaint state claims against the defendants and some do 

not. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants Kroenlein, Lynch, Chris, and Silar violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights by not providing proper mental health treatment state a claim. The defendants 

will be required to respond to these allegations. 

 Plaintiff’s claim that defendants Montoya and Diciro were mental health supervisors does 

not state a claim because plaintiff has not shown that these defendants were involved in the 

violation of his rights or knew that the people they were supervising were violating plaintiff’s 

rights and failed to stop them. The fact that they were supervisors is not enough to make them 

liable for the alleged violation of plaintiff’s rights. These claims will be dismissed with leave to 

amend. 

 If plaintiff wants, he can either (1) proceed immediately on his claims against defendants 

Kroenlein, Lynch, Chris, and Silar or (2) try to amend the complaint to state claims against 

defendants Montoya and Diciro. If plaintiff wants to go forward without amending the 

complaint, his claims against defendants Montoya and Diciro will remain dismissed without 

prejudice. If plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, the first amended complaint must include 

all of the claims plaintiff wants to make, including the ones that have already been found to state 

a claim, because the court will not look at the claims or information in the original complaint. In 

other words, any claims not in the first amended complaint will not be considered. Plaintiff must 

complete the attached notification showing what he wants to do and return it to the court. Once 

the court receives the notice, it will issue an order telling plaintiff what he needs to do next (i.e. 

file an amended complaint or complete and return service paperwork). 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve this order on plaintiff at his address of 

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record and at the California Medical Facility, P.O. Box 2000, Vacaville, CA 95696-2000. 

2. Within twenty-one days of service of this order, plaintiff must notify the court of his 

current address. 

3. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 

 4. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith. 

 5. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Montoya and Diciro are dismissed with leave to 

amend. 

 6. Plaintiff has the option to proceed immediately on his Eighth Amendment claims 

against defendants Kroenlein, Lynch, Chris, and Silar as set forth in Section V.C. above, or to 

amend the complaint. 

 7. Within twenty-one days of service of this order, plaintiff shall complete and return the 

attached form notifying the court whether he wants to proceed on the screened complaint or 

whether he wants to file a first amended complaint. 

DATED: April 27, 2016 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRUCE DIXON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

M. KROENLEIN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-1039 AC P 

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE ON HOW TO 

PROCEED 

 Check one: 

_____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his Eighth Amendment claims against 

defendants Kroenlein, Lynch, Chris, and Silar without amending the complaint. Plaintiff 

understands that going forward without amending the complaint means that his claims 

against defendants Montoya and Silar will remain dismissed without prejudice. 

_____ Plaintiff wants to amend the complaint. 

DATED:_______________________ 

 

 BRUCE DIXON 

 Plaintiff pro se 

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