Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02303/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02303-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332nr Diversity-Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW METTLER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 18-cv-2303-BAS-MSB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 34]

v.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

In 2018, Plaintiff Matthew Mettler sued Defendant Government Employees 

Insurance Company (“GEICO”) for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing. (ECF No. 1-2.) GEICO now moves for summary 

judgment on some of Plaintiff’s claims. (“Mot.,” ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to the Motion, (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 36), to which GEICO replied, 

(“Reply,” ECF No. 38).

1 The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on 

1 Along with its reply brief, GEICO submitted various objections to Plaintiff’s evidence. (ECF No. 

38-3.) The first piece of contested evidence is John DiMugno’s report, which Plaintiff attached to 

his opposition. (ECF No. 36-3.) DiMugno opines on the issue of whether GEICO was obligated 

to provide Matthew with independent counsel. “[A]n expert witness cannot give an opinion as to 

her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law.” Hangarter v. Provident Life &

Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004). DiMugno provides an evaluation of the law

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the papers and without oral argument. Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated 

below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART GEICO’s Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Prior to August 1, 2015, GEICO issued an auto insurance policy to Kellie and 

Stephen Mettler with body injury liability limits of $100,000 per person. (Joint 

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, “JSUMF,” ECF No. 38-4, at ¶ 1.) On 

August 1, 2015, Kellie’s teenaged son Matthew was driving her car and following 

another car being driven by his friend Elias. (Id. ¶ 3.) Matthew’s phone was ringing

because Kellie was calling him, so he looked down at his phone, negligently failed 

to stop in time, and rear-ended Elias’ car. (Id. ¶ 3; Mot. at 7.) Elizabeth Cooke was 

a rear-seat passenger in the car being driven by Elias. (Id. ¶ 2.)

On August 19, 2015, Cooke went to a chiropractor. (GEICO’s Exhibit 4, at 

25.)2 On February 22, 2016, Kellie informed GEICO that she had been served with 

a lawsuit by Cooke. (JSUMF ¶ 6.) The lawsuit named both Matthew and Kellie. 

(Id.) The next day, GEICO appointed Beverly Mills to serve as defense counsel. (Id.

¶ 7.) Mills answered Cooke’s complaint and served discovery. On May 16, 2016, 

GEICO received from Mills a copy of Cooke’s unverified interrogatory answers and 

document responses, including medical records. (Id. ¶ 8.) On June 23, 2016, 

Cooke’s attorneys wrote to GEICO making a policy limits settlement demand of 

surrounding the issue and a legal conclusion, and his report is therefore not proper. The Court 

sustains GEICO’s objection to the report. 

GEICO also objects to various portions of the declaration of counsel Ryan Bright. GEICO 

makes best evidence rule objections to the portions of Bright’s declaration where he summarizes 

certain pieces of evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1002 (“An original writing, recording, or photograph 

is required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.”). 

The Court sustains these objections; the documents speak for themselves. Further, GEICO’s 

objection to Bright’s description of what occurred at mediation is moot because the Court did not 

consider Bright’s statements in analyzing GEICO’s motion.

2 Both parties attach their extensive exhibits to their briefs as one large attachment. Any page 

reference herein to exhibits, including depositions, refers to the CM/ECF pincite page number 

located at the top of the page. Any reference to Plaintiff’s Exhibits refers to the attachments at 

ECF No. 36-4 and any reference to GEICO’s Exhibits refers to the attachments at ECF No. 34-4.

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$100,000 in exchange for the release of Kellie and Matthew and the dismissal of the 

lawsuit. (GEICO’s Exhibit 9, at 92.) On July 7, 2016, GEICO rejected the settlement 

demand and provided a counteroffer of $12,900. (JSUMF ¶ 10.)

On August 4, 2016, Cooke made a second policy limits demand in the form of 

a California Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, but it was only as to Matthew. 

(Id. ¶ 11.) GEICO rejected the offer and made a counteroffer of $16,000. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

On January 19, 2017, Cooke made another settlement demand for $350,000. (Id.

¶ 13.) This demand included a copy of the results of Cooke’s MRI, which had been 

taken on December 22, 2016, and a report by Dr. Keshavarzi following an evaluation 

of Cooke on January 10, 2017. (GEICO’s Exhibit 11, at 107–111.) Dr. Keshavarzi’s 

report detailed Cooke’s description of “migraines, left arm weakness, numbness and 

tingling in her left arm, and a throbbing pain in her left scapula.” (Id. at 110.) Dr. 

Keshavarzi informed Cooke of a surgical option as an “aggressive treatment for the 

pain.” (Id.) In February 2017, GEICO rejected the offer and made a counteroffer 

for $20,000. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 25, at 221–22.)

On March 6, 2017, Cooke was evaluated in an independent medical 

examination (“IME”) by Steven Schopler, a doctor chosen by GEICO. (JSUMF

¶ 14.) Dr. Schopler concluded that Cooke has “multilevel cervical spondylosis” and 

“would be a candidate for cervical spine reconstructive surgery.” (GEICO’s Exhibit 

13, at 121.) He opined that “physical therapy, epidural injections, facet injections, 

trigger point injections, and acupuncture are unlikely to prove to be beneficial to 

her.” (Id.) GEICO learned of Schopler’s opinions on March 14, 2017. (JSUMF 

¶ 15.) GEICO then offered a settlement of $100,000, which Cooke rejected. (Id.

¶¶ 16, 17.) GEICO transferred the defense of the Mettlers to the law firm of Tyson 

& Mendes. (Id. ¶ 18.)

Cooke underwent a three-level anterior cervical discectomy and fusion surgery 

in June 2017. (Id. ¶ 19.) In April 2018, Cooke agreed to a settlement as to Kellie 

only for $15,000 to be paid by GEICO and the case went to trial against Matthew.

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(Id. ¶ 20.) Trial resulted in a jury verdict of $701,493; the judge then granted a 

motion to award prejudgment interest and costs based on the rejected Section 998 

offer, leading to a total judgment of approximately $850,000. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.) 

Matthew’s attorney demanded GEICO pay the entire judgment. (Id. ¶ 23.) GEICO, 

Cooke, and Matthew participated in a private mediation, where GEICO reached a 

settlement with Cooke for a total of $500,000. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25.) This settled any 

liability Matthew had to Cooke. GEICO and Matthew did not reach a settlement, so 

Matthew filed the present suit. (Id. ¶ 26; “Compl.,” ECF No. 1-2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party 

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to 

judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, 

it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence 

that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by 

demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to 

establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts 

will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. 

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

If the moving party fails to discharge this initial burden, summary judgment 

must be denied, and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1970). If the moving party 

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meets this initial burden, however, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary 

judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986); Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s 

position is not sufficient.” (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242, 252)). Rather, the 

nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and by “the depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e)).

When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn 

from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the 

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, 

not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. ANALYSIS

The Court first evaluates GEICO’s rejection of Cooke’s offers to settle for

policy limits.

A. Cooke’s June 23 $100,000 Settlement Offer

Plaintiff alleges GEICO acted in bad faith in rejecting Cooke’s June 23 

settlement offer of $100,000. GEICO argues its decision was reasonable as a matter 

of law and moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s allegation of bad faith.

“In each policy of liability insurance, California law implies a covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing. This implied covenant obligates the insurance company, 

among other things, to make reasonable efforts to settle a third party’s lawsuit against 

the insured.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 310, 312 (1999). 

An insured may bring a claim against its insurer for wrongfully refusing to settle, 

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provided that the insured proves the existence of a reasonable offer to settle the 

claims against the insured for an amount within the policy limits of the insured’s 

policy. Graciano v. Mercury Gen. Corp., 231 Cal. App. 4th 414, 425 (2014) (citing 

Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 877 (1973)). The insurer must settle 

a claim against the insured within policy limits if there is a “substantial likelihood of 

recovery in excess of those limits.” Johansen v. Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. 

Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 16 (1975). “In determining whether an insurer has given 

consideration to the interests of the insured, the test is whether a prudent insurer 

without policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer.” Crisci v. Sec. Ins. 

Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429 (1967); see also Judicial Council of 

California Civil Jury Instruction 2334 (“A settlement demand for an amount within 

policy limits is reasonable if [name of defendant] knew or should have known at the 

time the demand was rejected that the potential judgment was likely to exceed the 

amount of the demand based on [name of plaintiff in underlying case]’s injuries or 

loss and [name of plaintiff]’s probable liability.”).

The determination of whether an insurer’s conduct rises to the level of bad 

faith must be determined on a case by case basis when considering all of the relevant 

circumstances. Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Ass’n v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 

90 Cal. App. 4th 335, 346 (2001). The circumstances to consider when evaluating 

the reasonableness of the insurer’s settlement decision are “wide-ranging” and 

include “motive, knowledge, experience, and the ability to prophesy.” Camelot by 

the Bay Condominium Owners’ Ass’n v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27 Cal. App. 4th 33, 48 

(1994). “[O]rdinarily whether the insurer has acted unreasonably, and hence in bad 

faith, in rejecting a settlement offer is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.” 

Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 792 (1975). However, 

where there are no competing inferences allowing for reasonable minds to differ, the 

question of whether an insurer acted reasonably and in good faith becomes one of 

law. Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1445, 1454–55; 

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see also Chateau Chamberay, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 346 (holding reasonableness is a 

question of law if “only one reasonable inference can be drawn” from undisputed 

evidence).

In Cooke’s June 23 letter, she laid out her damages, noting she had incurred 

$11,079.40 in past medical bills and had past loss of earnings in the amount of

$4,275.00. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13, at 173.) She also stated she had claims for

“general damages related to past pain and suffering,” future medical bills, and future 

general damages for pain; she provided no monetary amount for these damages. (Id.

at 175.) Cooke did not detail how her damages could exceed $100,000. On July 7, 

GEICO rejected the offer and provided a counteroffer of $12,900. (JSUMF ¶¶ 9, 

10.) GEICO argues it did so because Cooke did not have a substantial likelihood of 

a recovery greater than $100,000. (Mot. at 13.) GEICO makes a point to note that 

only after it rejected the demand, Cooke got a second MRI, a doctor offered spinal 

fusion as a treatment, and GEICO’s IME doctor opined that surgery was warranted. 

GEICO argues it was not until these events took place that the case became worth 

more than $100,000. (Id.) 

The Court begins its analysis by assuming that on July 7, based on the 

information known to GEICO, the rejection of the $100,000 settlement was 

reasonable. Plaintiff does not directly dispute this, but instead focuses his argument 

on whether GEICO conducted an appropriate investigation before rejecting the offer. 

(Opp’n at 7–8.) Plaintiff argues that GEICO could have learned relevant facts earlier, 

and that GEICO did not conduct a reasonable investigation during the claims process 

to identify the necessary facts for it to determine whether Cooke’s claims would 

likely exceed the policy limit. 

An insurer “cannot rely on its breach of the duty to conduct a reasonable 

investigation to shield itself from liability for breach of the related duty to accept a 

reasonable settlement demand.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Parks, 170 Cal. App. 4th 

992, 1009 (2009). To the extent that GEICO’s failure to have sufficient information 

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to reject the offer was GEICO’s own doing as a result of an unreasonable 

investigation, then the decision not to accept Cooke’s offer may ultimately still 

constitute bad faith. See Spradlin v. GEICO Indemnity Co., No. 2:18-cv-10299-

SVW-KES, 2019 WL 5481304, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019).

An insurer’s investigation is unreasonable if the insurer “fails to consider, or 

seek to discover, evidence relevant to the issues of liability and damages.” Shade 

Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales & Mktg., Inc., 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 880

(2000). Consequently, if the insurer did not undertake an adequate investigation, 

“the insurer is charged with constructive notice of facts that it might have learned if 

it had pursued the requisite investigation.” KPFF, Inc. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 56 

Cal. App. 4th 963, 973 (1997) (citations omitted). The determination of whether an 

insurer’s investigation was reasonable must be made on a case-by-case basis and 

depends on the totality of the circumstances, but a determination of reasonableness 

may be made as a matter of law based on undisputed evidence supporting only one 

reasonable inference. See Chateau Chamberay, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 346.

The Court begins by evaluating the reports and opinions of Beverly Mills, who 

represented GEICO in the beginning of the case. Mills was fully involved in the case 

early on and prepared thorough reports regarding her impressions and opinions. In 

a report dated March 2, 2016, Mills referenced the reports of a chiropractor, Dr. 

Singh. Singh’s “extremely minimal records” showed Cooke was complaining of 

headaches and pain, and an MRI showed bulges. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10, at 160.) 

Mills noted she did not have any other medical records at the time. (Id.) In her report 

dated April 13, 2016, Mills noted she had received more medical records, and she

detailed reports by a chiropractor, radiologists (who performed x-rays and an MRI), 

physical therapists, and others. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11, at 164.) Mills opined that 

“the good news is that [Cooke’s neurosurgeon] Dr. Rahimifar did not think that 

[Cooke] is a surgical candidate.” (Id. at 166.) Mills also opined, “I think that a 

biomechanical engineer could look at the photographs of the [car] . . . and help us 

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ascertain the forces exerted on [Cooke] in this accident, if this matter were to proceed 

to trial.” (Id.) Mills concluded that they could “discuss whether to have [Cooke] 

examined and/or her medical records reviewed” after Mills deposed Cooke. (Id.) On 

June 9, 2016, Mills deposed Cooke’s two daughters, who were in the car at the time 

of the accident, and Elias, the driver of the car. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12, at 169.) Mills 

concluded that “between what we might see on subrosa, an accident 

reconstruction/biomechanical investigation, and [Cooke’s] own private medical 

providers’ records, we might be able to establish that this woman was not injured, or 

at least to the extent claimed.” (Id. at 170.) Later that month, Cooke made the 

$100,000 settlement offer.

On July 7, 2016, Cooke was deposed. In Mills’ summary of Cooke’s 

deposition, she opined that Cooke “greatly exaggerated” her complaints and Mills 

“[did] not believe that [Cooke] was hurt in this incident.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 16, at 

184.) Mills concluded, “I want to have her records reviewed, and her examined 

(probably by a neurosurgeon). I strongly urge as well that we consider retaining a 

biomechanical engineer, I just don’t see that the forces necessary to injure a woman 

in prime physical condition . . . were present in this accident.” (Id. at 186.) Mills 

noted that she believed Cooke had only minimal complaints, “but considering that 

she is still treating extensively, and getting injections and occipital blocks, I am 

concerned about our clients’ policy limits.” (Id.) 

Also on July 7, 2016, GEICO rejected Cooke’s $100,000 settlement demand. 

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15, at 182.) The decision was made by David Fetchina, the 

regional liability administrator in GEICO’s claims department. (“Fetchina Decl.,” 

ECF No. 34-3, at ¶ 1.) Fetchina directed GEICO adjuster Adria Shaw to reject the 

offer. Shaw did so and made a $12,900 counteroffer. (Id. ¶ 57.) It appears that Shaw 

did not read Cooke’s deposition before making the counteroffer. (“Shaw Depo.,”

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, at 68.) It is unclear whether Fetchina reviewed Cooke’s 

deposition or the summary before he authorized the rejection. 

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Fetchina declares that he “felt confident about GEICO’s ability to settle” for 

approximately $35,000. (Fetchina Decl. at ¶ 24, 25.) He based this decision on the 

medical records he had at the time. A “key component” of this determination was 

neurological surgeon Dr. Imad Abumeri’s medical opinion. (Id. ¶ 46.) On November 

9, 2015, Dr. Abumeri determined that Cooke is “not a surgical candidate . . . and her 

injuries most likely are soft tissue injury/muscular injury.” (GEICO’s Exhibit 37, at 

213.) Prior to seeing Dr. Abumeri, Cooke had participated in physical therapy and 

chiropractic treatments. Her chiropractor noted her progress over time, recording 

that her movement had improved at each visit. (GEICO’s Exhibits 25–29, at 174–

182.) The physical therapy reports also noted Cooke’s progress. On November 3, 

2015, Cooke was reported as having a “40% improvement in neck, upper back pain 

[and a] >90% improvement in headaches with Physical Therapy intervention.” 

(GEICO’s Exhibit 35, at 200.)

But the medical records show that Cooke continued treatments and therapy

following her appointment with Abumeri and with physical therapists. Cooke 

received an MRI in September 2015. (GEICO’s Exhibit 31, at 186.) A pain 

management specialist opined that Cooke was still complaining of neck pain and 

headaches in December 2015. (GEICO’s Exhibit 38, at 216.) He scheduled Cooke 

for trigger point injections in the trapezius muscles. (Id.) Later that month, Cooke 

received two injections of methylprednisolone and Marcaine. (GEICO’s Exhibit 39, 

at 218.) In a follow-up visit, Cooke reported that the injections gave her four to five

days of relief “but then she overworked herself and now her pain is back” with 

increased headaches. (GEICO’s Exhibit 40, at 220.) In January 2016, Cooke was 

put under anesthesia and was given an occipital nerve block. (GEICO’s Exhibit 41, 

at 222.)

On July 7, 2016, GEICO informed Cooke’s counsel that it only had records up 

to January 2016, so Cooke’s counsel sent GEICO additional medical records, 

including: physical therapist’s opinions that Cooke was still feeling weakness, 

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occasional tingling, pain, and limitations; doctor’s notes indicating a positive Spuring 

test; and evidence that Cooke had received a cervical epidural injection under 

anesthesia in June 2016. (“Bright Decl.,” ECF No. 36-2, at ¶ 27–34.) Also on July 

7, 2016, Fetchina authorized Shaw to reject the June 23 policy demands limit. 

(Fetchina Decl. ¶ 55.)

Turning first to the opinions of GEICO’s counsel Mills, the Court notes that a

common thread throughout the correspondence between Mills and GEICO was 

Mills’ opinion that Cooke was not as injured as she claimed to be, but that Mills 

believed that the issue could be resolved by more investigation. Specifically, Mills 

mentioned a biomechanical investigation more than once and noted she wanted to 

see more records. A biomechanical investigation was not done by the time GEICO 

rejected the settlement offer. Mills has at least “thirty years of litigation experience, 

including many years with a successful track record of defending GEICO insureds 

in auto crash cases with skill, care, and expertise.” (Fetchina Decl. ¶ 15.) Mills had 

personally met Cooke and evaluated her behavior and credibility, and she had clearly 

delineated her opinions—that Cooke was exaggerating her injuries but that an IME 

or biomechanical review could confirm this. (See, e.g., GEICO’s Exhibit 43, at 229 

(on July 7, 2016, Mills opined “I want to have [Cooke’s] records reviewed, and her 

examined (probably by a neurosurgeon.) I strongly urge as well that we consider 

retaining a biomechanical engineer . . .”).) Yet without following Mills’ 

recommendations, Shaw and Fetchina formed the opinion that the medical evidence 

did not establish a case of more than $100,000.

And while it is apparent that Fetchina reviewed Cooke’s medical records,3

3 In his declaration, Fetchina summarizes “all of the medical records in GEICO’s claim file as of 

July 7, 2016, when [he] authorized” Shaw to reject the June 23 demand. (Fetchina Decl. ¶ 55.) 

The latest record in this summary is dated January 2016. (Id. at ¶ 53.) But, Cooke’s counsel 

declares that on July 7, 2016, he sent additional medical records to GEICO which detailed Cooke’s 

medical appointments from April 2016 to June 2016. (Bright Decl. ¶¶ 26–33.) The timeline of 

this is unclear, and the parties do not specify whether Fetchina reviewed Bright’s July 7 production 

before authorizing the rejection of Cooke’s settlement demand. If Fetchina did not review the new 

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prepared calculations, and used his experience of evaluating “thousands” of bodily 

injury cases before rejecting the offer, the issue is, were enough steps taken before 

the conclusion was reached? (See Fetchina Decl. ¶ 56.) It was undisputed that 

Matthew was liable for the accident and that Cooke had not played a part in the cause 

of the collision. (JSUMP ¶4.) Fetchina and Shaw had evidence that Cooke had seen 

quite a few doctors and had sought relief through many different forms of treatment. 

(Shaw Depo. at 61; see also Bright Decl. ¶ 24 (“At the time of the June 23, 2016 

demand, Elizabeth Cooke attended approximately 75 medical visits as a result of this 

crash, including chiropractic care, radiology, physical therapy, primary care 

physician, pain management, and orthopedic specialists.”).) GEICO knew that 

Cooke was complaining of stiffness, headaches, and pain; she had not experienced 

these symptoms prior to the incident. (See Shaw Depo. at 64.) It is apparent from 

Cooke’s medical records that she was not healed or even on the path to recovery by 

July 2016; despite trying many different methods and treatments, she was still in 

pain, stiff, and had limited movement.

Despite this information, at the time GEICO rejected the settlement offer, it 

had not asked for a biomechanical review of the forces. Nor had GEICO submitted 

Cooke to an IME. To be sure, it was Cooke’s own doctor who had opined that she 

was not a candidate for surgery, so GEICO may have thought an IME was 

unnecessary. But still, Cooke’s medical records consistently showed her injury 

persisted. An IME was conducted later, after July 2016, but Fetchina testified he 

does not know the cause of the delay. (“Fetchina Depo.,” Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4, at 

77.) He “would have liked it to have happened earlier” but “it slipped through the 

cracks, vacations, holidays, schedule of the doctor. There’s a lot of factors that help 

extend these things unnecessarily.” (Id. at 80.) He testified that GEICO could have 

records, the Court finds this creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was reasonable 

for him to reject the offer without reviewing all medical records. Therefore, for purposes of the 

below analysis, the Court assumes Fetchina reviewed all records.

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asked for an extension of time to have an IME conducted before responding to the 

settlement demand, and that there would have been no harm in doing so, but no 

extension was requested. (Id. at 77.) He testified that an IME would have “made a 

difference” and “that’s why it was being considered.” (Id. at 79.)

GEICO eventually submitted Cooke to an IME by Dr. Schopler in March 

2017. (JSUMF ¶ 14.) This was done “[t]o confirm that [Cooke’s] doctor opinion 

was correct.” (Shaw Depo. at 69.) Shaw testified that getting an IME is “usually the 

process that happens in litigation. [It’s] standard with every other litigated case.” 

(Id.) Following the IME, Dr. Schopler opined that Cooke was a candidate for 

surgery. (GEICO’s Exhibit 13, at 121.) Shaw testified that had the IME been 

conducted before GEICO rejected Cooke’s policy limits offer, it would have “likely” 

changed the offer GEICO made. (Id.) Of course, this change of GEICO’s opinion 

of the case is evident; after receiving the IME results, GEICO offered to settle with

Cooke for $100,000. GEICO also eventually consulted with a biomechanical/ 

accident reconstructionist, Isaac Ikram. Although the date of the consultation is 

unclear, in September 2017, GEICO’s counsel summarized Ikram’s report as “not 

favorable” because Ikram concluded that “based on 1) [Cooke’s] left sided neck 

complaints, and 2) her head [was] turned to the right [when the impact occurred], 

there are good biomechanical explanations for plaintiff’s asymmetric neck 

complaints and the presence of radicular symptoms that required corrective surgery.” 

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 24, at 213–14.) 

The Court finds that whether or not it was reasonable for GEICO to reject the 

policy limits offer without performing a biomechanical review or an IME is a

disputed issue of fact. GEICO’s decision-makers believed Cooke’s medical records 

did not show a high-dollar case, but they made this determination before these 

potentially crucial steps were taken. The Court is not holding that simply because 

Plaintiff has pointed to a step that GEICO did not take before rejecting the settlement 

offer, this may make GEICO’s conduct unreasonable. See Maynard v. State Farm 

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Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1163 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (noting it is not 

the case that a plaintiff can “defeat summary judgment simply by pointing to any 

number of additional expert reports that the insurer could have—but failed to—

obtain that would have somehow better informed its evaluation of Plaintiff's claim”). 

Instead, what raises a disputed issue of fact is whether GEICO should have hired a 

biomechanical expert or submitted Cooke to IME following Mills’ suggestions and 

expressed “concern” about GEICO’s policy limits, as well as the medical records 

showing Cooke’s lack of progress in recovery. Without undisputed evidence of a 

reasonable investigation, it cannot be said that GEICO’s rejection of the policy limits

offer was reasonable as a matter of law. The Court DENIES GEICO’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment as to this issue.

B. Cooke’s CCP Section 998 Offer (August 4, 2016)

Cooke’s other settlement demand within policy limits was made in August 

2016 in the form of a California Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer. (JSUMF 

¶ 11.) GEICO rejected the settlement demand and provided a counteroffer of 

$16,000. (Id. ¶ 12.) GEICO argues that its refusal of this offer cannot form the basis 

of Plaintiff’s bad faith claim.

Plaintiff argues GEICO’s refusal of the offer was unreasonable. But the first 

question is whether the offer itself was reasonable. An offer is reasonable if 

(1) its terms are clear enough to have created an enforceable contract 

resolving all claims had it been accepted by the insurer, (2) all of the 

third party claimants have joined in the demand, (3) it provides for a 

complete release of all insureds, and (4) the time provided for 

acceptance did not deprive the insurer of an adequate opportunity to 

investigate and evaluate its insured’s exposure.

Graciano, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 425 (citations omitted).

The CCP Section 998 offer was a policy limits demand, but it was made only 

as to Matthew. (JSUMF ¶ 11.) “[A]n insurer may, within the boundaries of good 

faith, reject a settlement offer that does not include a complete release of all of its 

insureds.” Strauss v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 26 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1021 (1994). 

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Therefore, GEICO is correct that the CCP Section 998 offer was not a reasonable 

offer. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that GEICO acted in bad faith in rejecting the 

Section 998 offer, (see Compl. ¶ 11), the Court GRANTS GEICO’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment on this issue.

C. GEICO’s Communication of a Settlement Offer

Plaintiff’s complaint vaguely alleges that GEICO acted in bad faith by 

“unreasonably and/or intentionally refusing to communicate a settlement offer to 

Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 23.k.) Plaintiff does not provide details as to this unspecified 

settlement offer. GEICO moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that 

GEICO acted in bad faith by failing to communicate a $250,000 settlement demand. 

(Mot. at 26.) The settlement demand at issue occurred in an April 2, 2018 text 

between Poncho Baker (Cooke’s trial counsel) and Kevin Place (one of GEICO’s 

attorneys). Place was running late to an expert deposition and emailed Baker to tell 

him so. Baker emailed back, saying, “Pay 250K and call it a day!!” and Place 

responded, “Lol. If I could, I would.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 29, at 244.)4

“An insurer’s duty to communicate a settlement offer arises even if the offer 

is made in excess of policy limits.” Saelee v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., No. CIV. 

S05-2648WBSKJM, 2007 WL 120000, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2007) (citing 

Heredia v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 228 Cal. App. 3d 1345, 1360 (1991). Under 

California law, an insurer acts in “bad faith” when it fails “to inform the insured of a 

compromise offer.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 

689 (1957). “[The] duty to communicate may be triggered by something less than a 

formal offer.” Id.

4 Plaintiff points out that in March 2018, prior to the relevant text conversation, Baker emailed 

Campbell, another one of GEICO’s attorneys, and asked if GEICO “has any interest in resolving 

this case above the policy limits” and if not, he would request a continuance in another one of his 

trials. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 28, at 242.) Campbell responded that there was no change in GEICO’s 

position. (Id.) Plaintiff does not appear to be arguing that the March 2018 email was an “offer” 

that should be communicated to the clients, but instead that it shows Baker was serious about 

settling the case if possible.

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Place testified he is “sure” that the text conversation with Baker is something 

he “would have likely” relayed to Matthew and Kellie, but he did not have “a specific 

recollection of that conversation.” (“Place Depo.,” Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7, at 147:8–

18.) Kellie Mettler testified that she was not informed of any offer to settle the case 

for $250,000. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 40, at 282.) Further, Matthew’s father testified 

that he had never heard that the “case could go away for $250,000” and if he had 

known of that opportunity, he would have paid the extra $150,000 so the case did not 

go to trial. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, at 155–56.) This shows that the Mettlers were 

harmed by the failure to communicate the offer, as they would have taken advantage 

of it had they known of it.

Without any evidence that the Mettlers knew of the offer and without any 

concrete answer by Place regarding the communication, there is at least a question 

of material fact as to whether the offer was communicated by GEICO’s counsel. But, 

GEICO argues that even if the offer was not communicated, GEICO (as opposed to 

its counsel) did not learn of the offer until it had expired. Campbell informed 

GEICO’s adjuster Russell Gardner on Saturday, April 7, 2018 that, “Baker stated in 

passing that trial could be avoided for $250,000.” (GEICO’s Exhibit 20, at 146.) 

Gardner testified he did not see this email until Monday, April 9, 2018, which was 

the first day of trial. (“Gardner Depo.,” GEICO’s Exhibit 49, at 261.) GEICO argues

that by that time, the offer had expired, and it should not be held liable for its 

counsel’s failure to communicate the $250,000 offer prior to trial.

The Court disagrees that it is undisputed that the offer expired on the first day 

of trial. From GEICO’s perspective, the only information it had was Campbell’s 

email, which stated “Baker stated in passing that trial could be avoided for 

$250,000.” There is no information that Baker stated or implied that the offer must 

be accepted before April 9, and, in any event, Gardner testified that he received the 

email “the morning of the trial” so it is possible trial had not yet begun when he 

learned of the offer. (See Gardner Depo. at 261.) Therefore, at the very least, 

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GEICO’s adjuster learned of the settlement offer on April 9, 2018, and there is no 

evidence that anyone at GEICO communicated the offer to the Mettlers. Gardner 

believed that Place had informed the Mettlers of the offer, (id. at 262), but Place 

testified that he does not know whether he told Gardner that he had done so. (Place 

Depo. at 139.) And as noted above, Place cannot definitively say that he told the 

Mettlers of the offer. There is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether GEICO

informed the Mettlers of a settlement offer, as GEICO had a duty to do. For these 

reasons, the Court DENIES GEICO’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim 

of bad faith for its failure to communicate the $250,000 settlement offer.

D. Punitive Damages

Finally, GEICO seeks summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s punitive damages 

claim.

“In order to establish that an insurer’s conduct has gone sufficiently beyond 

mere bad faith to warrant a punitive award, it must be shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that the insurer has acted maliciously, oppressively or fraudulently.” Mock 

v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 328 (1992). “This higher 

clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies at every stage of the litigation 

process, including summary adjudication.” Adams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187 F. Supp. 

2d 1219, 1231 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 87 Cal. App. 4th 

1112, 1121 (2001)).

Plaintiff bases his punitive damages claim on the conduct of Fetchina and 

Shaw. Under California law, an employer may be liable for punitive damages based 

upon acts of an employee if the employer “authorized or ratified the wrongful 

conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, 

fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. Further, “[w]ith respect to a corporate 

employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, 

ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, 

director, or managing agent of the corporation.” Id. Plaintiff argues that Fetchina 

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and Shaw were “managing agents” and GEICO does not seem to dispute this. See 

Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 823 (1979) (holding that punitive 

damages could be awarded against an insurance company based on the tortious acts 

of its claims representatives).

Plaintiff lays out all actions that he believes form the basis for a punitive 

damage claim: Fetchina authorizing Shaw to reject the first two policy limits 

demands (without an IME and without reading Cooke’s deposition transcript),

Fetchina authorizing Shaw to reject Cooke’s $350,000 demand despite a doctor’s

surgical recommendation, and Fetchina and Shaw’s mishandling of the case once a

conflict of interest formed between GEICO and Matthew. (Opp’n at 26–27.)

The Court addresses the conflict of interest issue first. As background and as 

noted above, GEICO rejected Cooke’s two policy limit demands, and Cooke made a 

third demand of $350,000 in January 2017. In the demand letter, Cooke’s counsel 

stated that GEICO’s rejection of the two earlier demands created a conflict of interest 

between GEICO and the Mettlers because if GEICO “had agreed to pay the previous

policy demand, [the Mettlers] would not be required to contribute $250,000 to 

resolve this case.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 33, at 253.) Cooke’s counsel recommended 

that GEICO provide the Mettlers with independent counsel. (Id.) GEICO then 

communicated the $350,000 settlement offer to Matthew and reminded him, “our 

office is representing you only to defend this lawsuit, and you also may hire another 

lawyer, at your own expense, to monitor the defense being provided and/or to discuss 

your rights.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 34, at 255.) 

Although the evidence supporting the claims is unclear to the Court, Plaintiff 

alleges that GEICO then created a “Chinese Wall” or a “split file” between the 

Mettlers’ original file and a new file to avoid a conflict of interest. (Opp’n at 21.) 

Plaintiff alleges GEICO violated the split file by allowing GEICO employees on both 

sides of the wall to communicate. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff also alleges GEICO should 

have paid for independent counsel for Matthew due to a conflict of interest. The right 

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to independent counsel paid for by an insurer is generally referred to as “Cumis 

counsel” due to the California Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego Navy Federal 

Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Society Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358 (1984). “The Cumis

opinion was codified in 1987 by the enactment of Civil Code section 2860, which 

‘clarifies and limits’ the rights and responsibilities of insurer and insured as set forth 

in Cumis.” James 3 Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 91 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1100 (2001) 

(citations omitted).

The Court first addresses the propriety of this argument. Plaintiff has not 

previously alleged that GEICO acted improperly by failing to appoint counsel or that 

it violated the “Chinese wall” after splitting the Mettler file. The only reference to 

this argument is one sentence in Plaintiff’s complaint where he alleges that GEICO 

breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by “unreasonably and/or intentionally 

compelling Plaintiff to retain counsel during and after the pendency of the underlying 

lawsuit to protect and promote their [sic] legal interests against GEICO.” (Compl. ¶ 

23.h.) Allowing Plaintiff to use this brief reference now as the basis for his punitive 

damages claim would be unduly prejudicial. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 

F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) (in evaluating a motion for leave to amend, holding 

that “adding a new theory of liability at the summary judgment stage would prejudice 

the defendant”). 

And in any event, the California code section regarding conflicts of interest 

specifically provides that “[n]o conflict of interest shall be deemed to exist as to 

allegations of punitive damages or be deemed to exist solely because an insured is 

sued for an amount in excess of the insurance policy limits.” Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 2860(b). Plaintiff tries to distinguish this by arguing that the code section does not 

excuse an insurer from providing Cumis counsel “once a claimant makes a demand 

within policy limits and there is a ‘likelihood’ of liability in excess of policy limits.” 

(Opp’n at 23.) Plaintiff cites no authority supporting this proposition, nor can the 

Court locate any. Thus, for these reasons, the Cumis counsel claim cannot be used 

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to support Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim.

The Court turns to the other allegations which Plaintiff argues form the basis 

of his punitive damages claim. Plaintiff argues that Shaw and Fetchina willfully and 

consciously disregarded the Mettlers’ rights, conducted an inadequate investigation, 

made “undifferentiated low ball offers[,]” relied on facts supporting GEICO’s 

position and disregarded those that did not, fired defense counsel for protecting 

Matthew’s interests instead of GEICO’s, and did not comply with the “Chinese 

wall.” (Opp’n at 28.) For the most part, these are the same allegations that form 

Plaintiff’s bad faith claim. 

“[T]he evidence required to support an award of punitive damages for breach 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is ‘of a different dimension’

from that needed to support a finding of bad faith.” Shade Foods, Inc., 78 Cal. App. 

4th at 909 (2000); see also Mock, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 328 (“Evidence that an insurer 

has violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing does not thereby establish that it 

has acted with the requisite malice, oppression or fraud to justify an award of punitive 

damages.”). Because of this difference, California courts have held punitive 

damages are generally only available against insurance companies when there are 

“established policies or practices in claims handling which are harmful to insureds.” 

Mock, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 329; see also Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1013–14 (noting 

punitive damages are available against insurance companies where there is sufficient 

evidence of a “conscious course of conduct, firmly grounded in established company 

policy” (quoting Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 923 (1978))); Amadeo 

v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1152, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002) (same)

Plaintiff points to actions that he believes GEICO performed improperly, but 

he has not provided any evidence that these actions were done with malice, 

oppression or fraud. See Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 25 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 

1288 (1994) (holding conduct showing an insurer’s “negligence or slipshod 

investigation” is not enough to support punitive damages). And there is no evidence 

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before the Court showing a policy or pattern of GEICO disregarding the rights of its 

insureds. See Mock, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 329. Without this, Plaintiff has no claim of 

punitive damages. The Court GRANTS GEICO’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

as to Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 

PART GEICO’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as detailed herein. Subject to the 

Order of the Chief Judge No. 18, In re Suspension of Jury Trials and Other 

Proceedings During the Covid-19 Public Emergency (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020), the 

Court orders the parties to contact the Magistrate Judge’s chambers to reset their 

mandatory settlement conference. Upon conclusion of this conference, the parties 

shall coordinate with the Magistrate Judge to set new dates for a pretrial conference 

and trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 15, 2020

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