Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_24-cv-00423/USCOURTS-alnd-2_24-cv-00423-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHISN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MONIQUE HUMPHREY,

Plaintiff,

v.

EQUIFAX INFORMATION 

SERVICES, LLC, et al.

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:24-cv-423-ACA

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Monique Humphrey alleges that Defendants Equifax Information 

Services, LLC; Experian Information Solutions, Inc.; Trans Union, LLC; and 

Fair Collections and Outsourcing, Inc. violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i, 1681s-2(b). (Doc. 1). The court dismissed 

Ms. Humphrey’s claims against Trans Union and Equifax under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). (Doc. 53). Ms. Humphrey’s claims against Experian and 

Fair Collections remain. 

Experian moves to compel arbitration on the grounds that Ms. Humphrey 

agreed to terms of use on an affiliate’s website that included an arbitration 

agreement, binding Ms. Humphrey to arbitrate claims against not only that affiliate 

but also Experian. (Doc. 45). Because the court finds no genuine dispute of material 

FILED

 2024 Dec-30 PM 12:28

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:24-cv-00423-ACA Document 56 Filed 12/30/24 Page 1 of 10
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fact exists as to Ms. Humphrey’s assent to the arbitration agreement, the court 

GRANTS Experian’s motion to compel arbitration.

I. BACKGROUND

The court evaluates a motion to compel arbitration using “a summaryjudgment-like standard.” Bazemore v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 

1333 (11th Cir. 2016). The court examines the evidence presented to determine 

whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning the formation of an 

arbitration agreement. Id. Therefore, the court’s description of the facts will 

incorporate evidence submitted to the court outside of the pleadings. Because the 

court has dismissed Equifax and Trans Union as defendants (doc. 53), the facts 

below will focus on the remaining defendants, Experian and Fair Collections.

Experian is a consumer reporting agency. (Doc. 1 ¶ 19). At some point, 

Ms. Humphrey signed up for credit monitoring services. (See doc. 50-2 ¶¶ 6–7). 

Experian.com is one website affiliated with “Experian Consumer Services,” which 

also does business as ConsumerInfo.com, Inc. (See doc. 45-1 at 2 ¶ 1, 14). 

ConsumerInfo.com’s director of product operations, Dan Smith, attests that 

Ms. Humphrey’s membership was to a service called “CreditWorks.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 3). 

He does not have a copy of her specific enrollment forms but attests that when 

Ms. Humphrey enrolled in CreditWorks online, she had to complete a form that links 

to the terms of use agreement. (Id. at 3 ¶¶ 3–4). The terms of use agreement in use 

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when Ms. Humphrey signed up for CreditWorks provided that the enrollee agreed

to arbitrate “all disputes and claims between [the enrollee, Experian Consumer 

Services, and its affiliates, including Experian] that arise out of, or relate to, her 

CreditWorks agreement, including claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.” 

(Doc. 45 at 5–6) (quotation marks omitted). Ms. Humphrey attests that she has never 

heard of CreditWorks and never saw an arbitration agreement when she signed up 

for credit monitoring. (Doc. 50-2 ¶¶ 9–10). She does not deny, however, that the 

credit monitoring service she signed up for was CreditWorks. (See generally doc. 

50-2).

Sometime after November 2020, Fair Collections, “a national rental housing 

debt collections agency,” reported to Experian a debt that Ms. Humphrey maintains 

she never owed. (Doc. 1 ¶ 22, 50–62, 70). Experian then reported this false debt to 

Ms. Humphrey’s credit file. (Id. ¶ 71). The false collection account “made it 

practically impossible for [Ms. Humphrey] to continue to obtain credit,” and resulted 

in denials of various housing applications, and near denials of a car purchase and 

loans. (Id. ¶¶ 65, 127–36). Ms. Humphrey repeatedly requested that Experian 

reinvestigate the disputed information with Fair Collections and correct her credit 

report.” (Id. ¶¶ 75, 81, 113). But Experian failed to conduct a reasonable 

reinvestigation. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 81–85, 116–20). Ms. Humphrey filed suit asserting that 

Experian and Fair Collections failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure 

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maximum possible accuracy and failed to conduct reasonable reinvestigations, 

among other claims under FCRA. (Id. at 22–26). 

II. DISCUSSION

Experian moves to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act 

(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 4, on the ground that the arbitration agreement in 

CreditWorks’s terms of use, to which Ms. Humphrey was required to agree in order 

to enroll in CreditWorks, binds her to arbitrate her claims against Experian. (Doc. 

45 at 5–6). 

The FAA applies to all “contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving 

interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. A written agreement to arbitrate is “valid, 

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 

the revocation of any contract.” Id. In determining whether parties agreed to arbitrate 

a particular dispute, the court considers whether “(a) the plaintiff entered into a 

written arbitration agreement that is enforceable under ordinary state-law contract 

principles and (b) the claims before the court fall within the scope of that agreement.” 

Lambert v. Austin Ind., 544 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2008). 

The parties dispute only whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists. 

(See doc. 45 at 11–19; doc. 10–24). “The threshold question of whether an arbitration 

agreement exists at all is simply a matter of contract.” Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1329

(quotation marks omitted). And the Eleventh Circuit “has [repeatedly] emphasized 

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that state law generally governs whether an enforceable contract or agreement to 

arbitrate exists.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The court will therefore look to 

Alabama law to determine whether the evidence provided supports the existence of 

a valid arbitration agreement. “After a motion to compel arbitration has been made 

and supported, the burden is on the non-movant to present evidence that the 

supposed arbitration agreement is not valid or does not apply to the dispute in 

question.” Moore-Dennis v. Franklin, 201 So. 3d 1131, 1137 (Ala. 2016) (quotation 

marks omitted; alteration accepted).

Experian seeks to compel arbitration. (Doc. 45). Ms. Humphrey challenges 

the motion on the grounds that (1) Mr. Smith’s affidavit is not admissible because 

he lacks personal knowledge of the facts therein, and (2) his affidavit fails to 

demonstrate that she assented to the arbitration agreement. (Doc. 50). The court will 

consider each argument in turn.

1. Mr. Smith’s Affidavit Is Admissible

First, Ms. Humphrey argues that Mr. Smith’s affidavit is inadmissible on the 

grounds that he lacks personal knowledge that Ms. Humphrey accepted the terms 

and conditions, including the arbitration agreement, when she signed up for credit 

monitoring. (Doc. 50 at 10–19). She contends that Mr. Smith’s affidavit amounts to 

mere speculation about what she must have done. (Id. at 12–13). And she criticizes 

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Experian’s refusal to provide the documents Mr. Smith relied on in attesting that 

Ms. Humphrey must have agreed to the arbitration agreement. (Id. at 15–16).

Because motions to compel arbitration are analyzed like motions for summary 

judgment, Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1333, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies. 

Rule 56(c)(4) states that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a 

motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible 

in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the 

matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); see also Fed. R. Evid. 602.

The court is not persuaded that Mr. Smith lacks personal knowledge to attest 

to the facts in his affidavit. Mr. Smith, as Director of Product Operations for 

ConsumerInfo.com, explains that his duties require him to be familiar with “how 

consumers enroll, the forms they must complete to enroll,” the terms of use, and 

“Experian’s electronic databases that store consumer enrollment information, 

including the webpages a consumer would have encountered to complete their 

enrollment into CreditWorks.” (Doc. 45-1 at 2 ¶ 1). 

Moreover, Mr. Smith has access to Ms. Humphrey’s membership data and 

verified that Ms. Humphrey enrolled on February 23, 2018. (Id. at 4). He states that 

through his personal experience as Director of Product Operations (see id. at 3), he 

knows that Ms. Humphrey “would not have been able to successfully enroll in 

CreditWorks unless she clicked th[e] button” accepting and agreeing to the terms of 

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use (id. at 5). Mr. Smith thus adequately lays a foundation for his personal 

knowledge of these facts, even if he did not physically witness Ms. Humphrey accept 

the terms of use. 

Upon reviewing the briefs, it appears that Ms. Humphrey does not object to 

Mr. Smith’s personal knowledge of these facts, but to the inference that Experian 

asks the court to draw from them: that Ms. Humphrey agreed to the arbitration clause

by accepting the terms of use when she enrolled in credit monitoring services. Under 

a summary judgment-like standard, the court may review the evidence and “draw all 

reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Berry v. Crestwood 

Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2023). But as the court will discuss 

below, the only inference to be drawn is that Ms. Humphrey did accept the terms of 

use because the undisputed evidence establishes that she enrolled in CreditWorks 

and would have had to accept the terms of use to complete her enrollment. 

2. No Genuine Dispute of Material Fact Exists as to Whether 

Ms. Humphrey Assented to the Arbitration Agreement

Second, Ms. Humphrey contends that the arbitration agreement is invalid and 

unenforceable as it lacked mutual assent. (Doc. 50 at 20–24). She argues that 

ConsumerInfo.com’s “clickwrap” terms of use agreement intended to “lure” her into 

binding arbitration terms by not requiring her “to first click on the box containing 

the arbitration agreement” or “scroll down to view the complete contents.” (Id. at 

21–22). And she states in her affidavit that “she did not see an arbitration agreement, 

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or any mention of an arbitration agreement, when [she] signed up for credit 

monitoring.” (Doc. 50-2 at 3).

Under Alabama law, the elements of a valid contract include offer, 

acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent. Ex parte Riverfront, LLC, 129 So. 3d 

1008, 1013 (Ala. 2013). A party may demonstrate mutual assent by presenting a 

signature on a contract, or “other external and objective manifestations of mutual 

assent.” I.C.E. Contractors, Inc. v. Martin & Cobey Const. Co., 58 So. 3d 723, 726

(Ala. 2010). Although mutual assent is a necessary element of any contract, the 

Alabama Supreme Court has held that mutual assent is not destroyed if parties to the 

contract do not choose to read the contract terms. See First Fam. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 

Rogers, 736 So. 2d 553, 558 (Ala. 1999). In First Family, the Court held that the 

plaintiffs were bound to an arbitration agreement, despite not reading and/or 

understanding the arbitration agreement within the contract they signed, because 

they were “competent adult[s], having the ability to read and understand the 

instrument” and did not present “evidence that [they] were denied the opportunity to 

read the document or that they were otherwise tricked into signing it.” Id.

Although Ms. Humphrey argues that Experian tricked her by embedding the 

arbitration agreement within a hyperlink along with other terms of use (see doc. 50 

at 22–23), Ms. Humphrey does not assert that Experian or its affiliates affirmatively 

misrepresented the arbitration clause or prevented her from reading the arbitration 

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clause (see generally id.). The court does not consider Experian’s unwillingness to 

call Ms. Humphrey’s attention to the arbitration agreement, (doc. 50 at 20–24), the 

same kind of trickery that the Alabama Supreme Court shows concern for in First 

Family. Like the plaintiffs there, no evidence demonstrates that Ms. Humphrey 

“could not have understood what [she] was signing if [she] had taken the time to 

read the document.” First Family, 736 So. 2d at 558. 

Finally, Ms. Humphrey only states in her affidavit that she did not see the 

arbitration agreement, not that she did not agree to it. (See doc. 50-2 at 3) (emphasis 

added). This declaration is in stark contrast to her following statement: that she “did 

not click on anything that notified [her] that” she would waive her right to a jury. 

(Id.). Whereas Ms. Humphrey denies that she agreed to waive her right to a jury, she 

does not deny clicking on an agreement to arbitrate her claims. The only reasonable 

inference to draw from her statements is that she does not dispute that she clicked 

on, or agreed to, the arbitration agreement she now contests. 

Therefore, Ms. Humphrey’s evidence does not raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether she assented to the arbitration agreement. Her evidence

only raises a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she read it. And absent 

evidence that she was incapable of reading the agreement, she has not disputed that 

she agreed to the arbitration clause.

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III. CONCLUSION

Based on the affidavits from Ms. Humphrey and Mr. Smith, the court finds 

that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Humphrey assented 

to the arbitration agreement contained in CreditWorks’s terms of use. Accordingly, 

the court GRANTS Experian’s motion to compel arbitration without considering its 

additional arguments. The court STAYS Ms. Humphrey’s claims against Experian 

pending arbitration. Ms. Humphrey’s claims against Fair Collections shall proceed.

DONE and ORDERED this December 30, 2024.

 _________________________________

 ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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