Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01802/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01802-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brandon Andrew Martinez,

Movant,

v. 

United States of America,

Respondent.

No. CV-19-01802-PHX-JJT (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Movant Brandon Andrew Martinez by and through counsel has filed a motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1.) The government 

does not contest the Motion.

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Movant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Movant seeks to vacate his conviction, reasoning

that the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2019) 

and United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 913 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019) preclude his prior 

state convictions from being considered “felonies” for purposes of section 922(g)(1).

Previously, the maximum term of potential imprisonment for the predicate offense 

determined whether Movant was a felon. Now, Movant is a felon under this statute only if 

his prior offense exposed him to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year. Movant

was placed on probation for three class 6 felonies, which each had a presumptive term of 

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one year of imprisonment. Movant could only be exposed to more than one year of 

imprisonment if the court found an aggravating factor, which the court did not do when 

sentencing Movant to probation. Movant was not exposed to more than one year of 

imprisonment for each of his offenses, so he is not a felon under this statute.

While Movant’s claim is procedurally defaulted for failure to raise the issue on 

direct appeal, under the “actual innocence” exception outlined by Bousley v. United States, 

523 U.S. 614 (1998), Movant is entitled to relief. Because the sentencing court did not 

make findings as required by Arizona law necessary for Movant to have been exposed to a 

sentence of more than one year in prison, Movant was not a felon at the time he was 

sentenced by this Court, and therefore actually innocent of violating section 922(g)(1). The

Petition should be granted, and Movant’s conviction vacated.

On August 16, 2019, the government filed a Response (doc. 11) in opposition to the 

Petition, but on March 6, 2020, the government filed a notice stating that it “withdraws its 

opposition to Movant’s Motion” (doc. 20). 

II. Background.

On April 18, 2018, Movant pleaded guilty to three class 6 felonies in Maricopa 

County Superior Court: two violations for possession of burglary tools and one violation 

for possession of drug paraphernalia. (Doc. 11 at 2.) Movant also pleaded guilty to one 

count of possession of marijuana, a class 1 misdemeanor. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. A, at 2.) As part 

of the plea agreement, Movant was placed on probation for three years. (Doc. 1 at 4.) On 

June 12, 2018, Movant was ordered to make restitution in the amount of $1,913.28. 

(Doc. 11-3, Ex. C, at 2-3.)

On July 24, 2018, Movant was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of 

unlawful possession of ammunition. (Doc. 1 at 4.) On September 10, 2018, Movant pleaded

guilty to the charged offense, and admitted to the state law convictions as recounted above. 

(Id.) On November 26, 2018, Movant was sentenced to thirteen months in prison followed 

by three years of supervised release. (United States v. Martinez, CR-18-01030-001-PHXCase 2:19-cv-01802-JJT Document 21 Filed 03/12/20 Page 2 of 8
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JJT, at Doc. 25 (D. Ariz. Nov. 26, 2018).)

1 Movant did not file an appeal. (Id at 3.) On 

March 18, 2019, Movant filed a timely Motion to Vacate Sentence (doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255. On August 16, 2019, the government filed its formal response. (Doc. 11.) On 

September 16, 2019, Movant filed a Reply. (Doc. 13.)

On February 25, 2020, the Court held oral argument on the Motion. On March 6, 

2010, the government withdrew “its opposition to Movant’s Motion.” (Doc. 20.)

III. Motion to Correct Sentence.

Movant argues that his conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) should be 

vacated. (Doc. 1 at 7.) He asserts that, while he did not file a direct appeal of his sentence 

within the proscribed time, his conviction is nonetheless subject to collateral attack under 

the “actual innocence” exception to the procedural default rule. (Id. at 5.) Movant explains 

that, at the time of sentencing, Ninth Circuit case law stated that, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), an offense “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” 

referred to any felony for which the potential maximum sentence exceeded one year. (Id. 

at 4, citing United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2005).) However, the Ninth 

Circuit overruled Murillo in Valencia-Mendoza, concluding that two intervening Supreme 

Court decisions, Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) and Moncrieffe v. 

Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), rendered Murillo “clearly irreconcilable” with Supreme 

Court precedent. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d at 1219. Movant explains that, under 

Arizona’s sentencing guidelines, the presumptive sentence for a class 6 felony in Arizona 

is exactly one year unless the trial judge makes specific findings in aggravation. (Doc. 1 at 

3 (citing A.R.S. § 13-702(D)).) He concludes by arguing that, since the state trial court 

found no aggravating factors at sentencing, it would be legally impossible to be exposed to 

a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, which means Movant cannot be a “felon” 

under the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 1 at 5.)

1 This Court retains jurisdiction over the Motion even though Petitioner has been 

released from confinement. See Matus–Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir.

2002) (a person on supervised release remains in “custody” and “may seek relief pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255”).

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IV. Standard of Review.

A federal prisoner may seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 if: (1) his sentence was 

imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the sentencing 

court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence on the prisoner; (3) the sentence 

imposed exceeded the maximum sentence authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is 

“otherwise subject to collateral attack,” which means the sentence contains “a fundamental 

defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Davis v. United 

States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (internal citation omitted). A petition under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 is meant as an “extraordinary remedy” not to be granted lightly. Bousley v. United 

States, 523 U.S. at 621.

a. Procedural Default.

In federal habeas cases, a defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal is 

generally barred from raising it for the first time on collateral review. Sanchez-Llamas v. 

Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350-51 (2006). Failure to raise a claim on direct appeal means the 

claim is “procedurally defaulted” for purposes of collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

unless the movant can show (1) cause for failing to raise the issue on appeal and “actual 

prejudice” from that failure, or that the Movant is “actually innocent.” Bousley, 523 U.S. 

at 522. The Court finds that Movant cannot show cause to excuse failing to raise the issue 

on appeal. As the Supreme Court indicated in Bousley, “futility cannot constitute cause if 

it means simply that a claim was unacceptable to that particular court at that particular 

time.” Id. at 623. Accordingly, Movant cannot point to the validity of Murillo at the time 

of sentencing to defend against the lack of direct appeal. Therefore, unless Movant can 

demonstrate that he is “actually innocent” of the crime of conviction, his Petition should 

be rejected. 

b. Actual Innocence.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] movant is actually innocent when he was 

convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 

1047 (9th Cir. 2011). Actual innocence is possible when a movant shows “in light of 

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subsequent case law, that he cannot, as a legal matter, have committed the alleged crime.” 

Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014). As Movant does not contest that 

he was in possession of ammunition subject to the jurisdictional limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g), the only way he cannot have committed the alleged crime was if he was not a 

member of one of the classes of persons barred from possessing ammunition.

V. Discussion.

a. Law.

Prior to 2019, the Ninth Circuit held that the statutory maximum for an offense 

determined whether the offense was a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

[W]e hold the maximum sentence that makes a prior conviction under state 

law a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remains, after Blakely, 

the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal 

statute, not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against 

the particular defendant for his commission of that crime according to the 

state's sentencing guidelines. 

Murillo, 422 F.3d at 1155.

In 2019, the Ninth Circuit explicitly overruled Murillo in Valencia-Mendoza. 

But in Carachuri-Rosendo and Moncrieffe, the Supreme Court held that, 

when considering whether a crime is “punishable” by more than one year, 

the court must examine both the elements and the sentencing factors that 

correspond to the crime of conviction. Accordingly, we hold that our earlier 

precedents are irreconcilable with Carachuri-Rosendo and Moncrieffe and 

must be overruled.

Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d at 1222.

The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied Valencia-Mendoza to 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1). 

Accordingly, we consider McAdory’s prior convictions to have been 

“punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” such that they 

would serve as predicates under § 922(g)(1), only if McAdory’s convictions 

actually exposed him to sentences of that length. None of McAdory’s prior 

convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any 

accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would 

justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory

under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the 

meaning of the statute.

McAdory, 935 F.3d at 844.

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b. Movant is actually innocent.

The Court concludes that Movant’s prior state law convictions were not “punishable 

by more than one year in prison” within the meaning of Valencia-Mendoza. Three of 

Movant’s four prior convictions2are designated as class 6 felonies under Arizona law, 

which according to the state’s sentencing guidelines, carry a “presumptive” sentence of 

one year. A.R.S. § 13-702(D). Therefore, under Arizona law, a sentence for committing a 

class 6 felony can only exceed one year if an aggravating factor were “found to be true by 

the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt or are admitted by the defendant.” A.R.S. § 13-

702(C). The trial court did not make findings when Movant was sentenced to probation, so 

there are no findings of aggravating factors that would have exposed Movant to more than 

one year of imprisonment. 

Arizona’s sentencing guidelines state that an aggravated term of imprisonment may 

be imposed only if the evidence is introduced or submitted to the court or the trier of fact 

before sentencing, and “factual findings and reasons in support of these findings are set 

forth on the record at the time of sentencing.” A.R.S. § 13-702(C). The Arizona Supreme 

Court in State v. Harrison, 985 P.2d 486 (Ariz. 1999) stated a sentence may only be 

aggravated by the trial court after it had “articulated at sentencing the factors the judge 

considered to be aggravating or mitigating and explained how these factors led to the 

sentenced [sic] imposed.” Id. at 489. The Harrison Court went on to say that, even if it did 

not require a “specific litany” or “formal findings or conclusions” for compliance with 

section 13-702(C), the sentencing court itself must provide a reasoned explanation for 

deviating from the presumptive sentence, even if a reviewing court could determine the 

basis from the record. As the Supreme Court of Arizona explained, 

[t]he victim, the defendant, and the public have the right to know why a 

particular sentence was imposed and that it was not arbitrary. These interests 

are not satisfied simply because an appellate court is able to infer what the 

judge might have thought. Nor are the purposes of the statute satisfied merely 

because appellate review reveals that the record supports the result. 

2 The remaining conviction is a class 1 misdemeanor, for which the maximum 

possible sentence is six months in prison. A.R.S. § 13-707(A)(1). Accordingly, it cannot 

be a predicate offense for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

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Harrison, 985 P.2d at 490. 

Here, Movant was not exposed to more than one year of imprisonment for any of 

his prior offenses. Similar to McAdory, Movant was convicted “under § 922(g)(1) even 

though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.” McAdory, 935 F.3d 

at 844. The Court in McAdory ordered that his conviction be vacated and the indictment 

dismissed. Id. Because Movant is innocent of his § 922(g)(1) conviction, he has satisfied 

the requirements of Bousley and is entitled to relief. See also, United States v. Masters, 

CR-19-752-TUC-JGZ at doc. 57 (dismissing a § 922(g)(1) superseding indictment because 

defendant’s prior class 6 felony offense did not serve as a predicate offense); United States 

v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that Adams has, indeed, shown 

‘factual innocence’ as contemplated by Bousley because he has shown that it is impossible 

for the government to prove one of the required elements of a § 922(g)(1) charge—that the 

defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the offense. This is so because Adams was 

‘in fact’ not a felon.”).

V. Conclusion.

The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds Movant procedurally 

defaulted as to whether he had prior predicate felony convictions by failing to raise the 

issue on direct appeal, but that he is nonetheless entitled to relief as “actually innocent” of 

being a felon in possession of ammunition. The Court will therefore recommend that the 

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (doc. 1) be granted, and Movant’s 

conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) be vacated and the Indictment 

dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 

Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (doc. 1) be GRANTED, and Movant’s 

conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) be VACATED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

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Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 12th day of March, 2020.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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