Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01439/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01439-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY J. BIGGS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1439 FCD GGH P

vs.

GRAY DAVIS, et al., 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1985 conviction for first

degree murder. After carefully considering the record, the court recommends that this claim be

denied.

II. Issues and Summary

The petition raised two claims: 1) breach (or recision) of the plea agreement; 2)

Equal Protection violation. On March 31, 2004, the court denied petitioner’s Equal Protection

claim. On December 6, 2004, an evidentiary hearing was held regarding petitioner’s claim

alleging breach of the plea agreement. 

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 Respondent briefs ineffective assistance as if it were an issue in the case. The court has 1

scrutinized the petition and does not recognize it as an issue, much less an exhausted issue.

2

It is important to the adjudication here to emphasize the remaining issue at bar. 

The issue is not drawn as one involving the voluntariness or intelligence of a plea, nor is it one

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea stage. The issue concerns only breach of a 1

plea agreement. See Petition at Ground 2. The alleged breach of the plea agreement claim

requires discussion of two theories – (1) petitioner is entitled to specific performance of the plea

agreement, and (2) if entered into by “mistake,” i.e., plaintiff was misinformed about a fact

essential to the plea agreement, the plea agreement should be rescinded. The first theory depends

upon a plea agreement, certain as to its terms, the breach of which would require enforcement in

plaintiff’s favor. Although a unilateral mistake of fact basic to formation of a contact may be

grounds for recision of the contract, Donovan v. RFL Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 261, 278, 109 Cal. Rptr.

2d 807, 821-822 (2001), petitioner’s own misreadings of that agreement or mispredictions

concerning the ultimate application of that agreement under the law do not transform an

otherwise clear plea agreement into a breached agreement. In other words, a unilateral mistake

of contract interpretation does not void a plea agreement (contract). See Hedging Concepts, Inc

v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1420-1422 (1996) [unilateral, subjective

misinterpretation of contract is not a “mistake” constituting grounds for rescission]; Lawrence v.

Shutt, 269 Cal. App. 2nd 749, 764-765, 75 Cal. Rptr. 533, 542 (1969).

III. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The

AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication 

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of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

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contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

No state court held a hearing and found facts with respect to petitioner’s claim

that his plea agreement was breached. This federal court held an evidentiary hearing. Therefore,

the ordinary rule that state factual findings are presumed correct and can only be overcome by

clear and convincing evidence, see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004), does

not apply here. Rather the court engages in de novo fact finding. Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d

1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2002).

IV. Discussion

Petitioner argues that he plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement providing that

he would be released from prison after serving 12 1⁄2 years. Because petitioner was not released

after this time, he argues that his plea bargain was breached. 

A. Background

On July 17, 1984, the San Mateo County Municipal Court filed a complaint

charging petitioner with murder and alleging two special circumstances: the murder was

intentional and carried out for financial gain within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code §§

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190.2(a)(1) and 190.2(b); and that the victim was a witness to a crime who was killed for the

purpose of preventing his testimony in a criminal proceeding within the meaning of Cal. Penal

Code § 190.2(a)(10). Petitioner’s Dec. 3, 2004, lodged exhibits, tab 2, pp. 4-5. 

On December 21, 1984, the Superior Court filed an information making the same

allegations against the petitioner, but for the witness special circumstance allegation. Id., pp. 6-7. 

On December 26, 2004, attorney John Balliet was appointed to represent petitioner. Id., p. 8.

On February 21, 1985, the parties reached a settlement. Id., p. 62. There was no

written plea agreement. However, the minutes from the February 21, 1985, hearing summarized

the terms of the agreement:

Both counsel agree the matter will be submitted to the Court on the Preliminary

transcript.

Conditions of the submission are as follows:

1. The special circumstance allegation under V2190.2(a)(1) PC will be stricken

by the District Attorney.

2. The defendant will cooperate in the continuing investigation of the Diaz matter

and related matters.

3. The defendant will be placed in maximum security today in the San Mateo

County Jail.

4. Deputy District Attorney Tom Stevens will use his best good faith efforts to

find a suitable out of state prison, which will include conjugal visits. Any prison

chosen will be with the approval of the defendant.

Id., p. 62. 

The transcript from the February 21, 1985, hearing also contains a recitation of

these terms. Petitioner’s December 3, 2004, lodged exhibits, tab 1, pp. 114-115. At this hearing,

Judge Knight also accepted petitioner’s plea:

Court: Mr. Biggs, you have a right to a jury trial in this matter. A jury would be

twelve people who would be selected at random to hear your case and decide

unanimously whether you are guilty or innocent. Do you understand?

Petitioner: Yes.

Court: What has been suggested is that your case be submitted to me based upon

the transcript from the preliminary hearing in this case. I will inform you, sir, that

if the case is submitted to me, having reviewed the transcript, that I will find you

guilty of the charge. Do you understand that?

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Petitioner: Yes, sir.

Court: That, basically, that if you submit the matter to the court on the transcript,

you are giving up your right to trial by jury, and by giving up you are basically

entering a plea of guilty. Do you understand that?

Petitioner: Yes, sir.

Court: Do you understand the punishment in this case is 25 years to life with the

possibility of parole, without the special allegation? Do you understand?

Petitioner: Yes, sir.

Court: Have any threats or promises been made to you to induce you to submit

this matter to the Court based upon the preliminary hearing?

Petitioner: Other than–

Court: Other than what has been said.

Petitioner: Other than that, no.

Court: Do you understand that the time you serve in state prison would be

followed by four years on parole?

Petitioner: Yes, sir.

Court: You have discussed this matter thoroughly with your attorney?

Petitioner: Yes, sir.

Court: Any other can think of that I should cover with this defendant in regard to

this submission?

Prosecutor: As far as the parole period, your Honor, I believe it is at least five

years.

Court: Five years parole on this, and as far as the factual basis you will make that

determination yourself. I will determine the facts from the preliminary hearing.

Id., pp. 16-18

On April 26, 1985, Judge Knight heard petitioner’s motion to reduce his

conviction from first to second degree murder. Respondent’s Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit 1. 

During the hearing, Balliet made two references to petitioner’s plea as having been to 25 years to

life. Balliet argued that petitioner had less culpability than the other three men who were

convicted in connection with the murder. Balliet stated, 

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In the Diaz case, which was before this court, Mr. Diaz at the end of March

entered a plea to first degree murder with a special circumstance being stricken

and faces a penalty of 25 years to life, the same Jeffrey Biggs.

Id., pp. 2-3. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, Balliet argued, 

When you add what’s happened to Diaz or probably what will happen to Diaz or

Lowery, the fact that Kizer got immunity, I think it’s grossly disproportionate for

what Jeffrey Biggs did to send him to prison for twenty-five years to life.

Id., p. 25. 

In denying petitioner’s motion Judge Knight stated, 

I think you have done a good job for your client in getting him what he got. He is

probably going to be out of prison in twelve to sixteen years. The victim is never

going to be around again. His mother’s life is ruined. The motion to reduce to

second degree is denied. 

Id., p. 28. 

Judge Knight then went on to sentence petitioner to twenty-five years to life. Id.,

p. 29. 

On May 15, 1985, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner’s December 3,

2004, notice of lodging, tab 2, p. 76. On January 20, 1987, the California Court of Appeals

found that the plea colloquy failed to get a direct waiver from petitioner of his decision to waive

his right against self-incrimination. Id., tab 3, pp. 19. The state appellate court gave petitioner

the option of either to be retried or not. Id., p. 22.

Petitioner was to appear in Superior Court in June and July of 1987. Id., pp. 9-11. 

Balliet, again representing petitioner, filed a motion to dismiss because of an alleged violation of

petitioner’s speedy trial rights. Id., pp. 5-8. This motion was either denied or abandoned (the

record does not indicate) because on November 6, 1987, petitioner appeared before Judge Kemp

and plead no contest to the murder charge. Respondent’s Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit B. 

Judge Kemp began by discussing the terms of petitioner’s plea agreement:

Court: This is an add on to the calendar? Gentlemen, I frankly don’t understand

what it says in the promises here. I’ve got the first three words, and that’s:

“special circumstances dismissed,” but then it says something about “same

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conditions regarding...”

Balliet: Placement.

Court: “As original submission on transcript and to be delivered forthwith to

C.D.C.” I have no idea what that’s about.

Prosecutor: The first and third are self-explanatory; that there would not be a

referral to the probation department; that is, forthwith delivery to C.D.C. The

middle one is there was an agreement at the time this matter was submitted on a

transcript over two years ago as to housing with the Department of Corrections. I

have agreed with Mr. Biggs that that would be renewed on behalf of the People. 

That pretty much in terms of the agreement as to where he will be housed in the

Department of Corrections, that that will be renewed as a condition of his plea.

Court: What is that agreement?

Prosecutor: That he will continue to receive the preferred housing arrangement

from the Department of Corrections. The reason this came about in the first place,

without going into detail, was because of an agreement reached with Mr. Biggs as

to his participation in this case with other people, and I am ensuring that simply

because he withdrew a plea for a period of two months–two to three months that

he doesn’t lose that benefit. I don’t want him to lose that benefit simply because

he chose to exercise that which the Court of Appeal allowed him to do. So, I

think the court merely has to advise him that he has been promised that identical

housing arrangement that was made with the Department of Corrections at the

time of the plea, the original submission on the transcript will be renewed, and I

think that would suffice for the record, and I am being very cautious about this

one. It came back once because of inadequate advice, and I think this complies

with the law.

Id., pp. 2-4. 

Judge Kemp then took petitioner’s plea. She began by asking petitioner if he had

the read form entitled “waiver of rights.” Id., p. 4. Petitioner’s main concern at the hearing was

that he be returned to Deuel Vocational Institute in Tracy to serve his sentence.

Court: Have any promises been made to you, Mr. Biggs?

Petitioner: Not at all.

Court: Do you understand that I cannot guarantee sitting here today, that they’re

going to take you directly to Tracy. I want to be sure that you understand that;

that you may in fact be at Vacaville for some brief period of time. Ultimately you

are going to go to Tracy, but I can’t absolutely assure that you’re not going to go

to Vacaville for some brief time. I don’t want this to come back to haunt all of us. 

Ultimately–and the commitment is going to read that you are going to be housed

at Tracy, but apparently the Department of Corrections may take you, however,

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briefly to Vacaville. Do you understand that?

Petitioner: Yes, I do.

Court: And having that in mind, do you want to go ahead and enter this plea?

Petitioner: Yes, I do.

Court: Any other promises been made to you to enter this plea of no contest?

Petitioner: No, there hasn’t.

Court: To a violation of section 187 of the Penal Code, murder in the first degree

on or about September 6, 1981, what is your plea?

Petitioner: Guilty.

Court: It’s no contest.

Petitioner: No contest, yes.

Court: Is this your signature on this form?

Petitioner: Yes, it is.

*****

Court: Time is waived and there is no legal cause, Mr. Balliet?

Balliet: That is correct.

Court: The court is going to sentence the defendant to 25 years to life in the

Department of Corrections. 

Id., pp. 6-8.

B. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner’s mother testified that after petitioner plead guilty, Balliet called and

told her that petitioner had got 25 to life but that he would serve only about 12 1⁄2 years of that

according to the plea bargain. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, p. 6. 

Petitioner testified that had he gone to trial and been found guilty of first degree

murder with special circumstances, he faced a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. 

Id., p. 18. Petitioner testified that his understanding of the plea agreement was that he would

plead guilty to first degree murder without the special circumstances pursuant to a slow plea. Id.,

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p. 19. He believed that he would be sentenced to 25 years, but get out in 12 1⁄2 years if he

behaved himself in prison and worked. Id., p. 19. Petitioner testified that Balliet told him that he

would serve 12 1⁄2 years of his 25 to life sentence. Id., p. 31. Petitioner testified that Balliet did

not tell him that his release was in the hands of the Parole Board. Id., p. 32. 

When Judge Knight stated that petitioner would serve 12 to 16 years, petitioner

believed that he would serve the high end of 16 only if he messed up. Id., p. 34. Petitioner

understood the “life” portion of his sentence to mean the maximum he would spend in prison if

he committed a lot of prison violence. Id., p. 58. 

Petitioner testified that when Judge Knight took his plea and asked him if any

promises had been made to him, the transcript from that hearing left out part of his statement. 

Id., p. 60. The transcript, as set forth above, states that petitioner responded, “Other than –“

At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner testified that he thought he would have said, “Other than

the 12 1⁄2 years.” Id., p. 73. Petitioner suggested that the transcript inadvertently omitted this

statement. Id.

In support of the evidentiary hearing, on September 3, 2004, the parties filed the

declaration of the prosecutor in petitioner’s case, Lawrence Stevens. Mr. Stevens is now a Judge

in the California Court of Appeals, First Appellate District. Judge Stevens states that he does not

recall whether he had any discussions with Balliet or petitioner regarding the meaning of the 25

year to life sentence. Stevens decl., ¶ 5. While Judge Stevens does not know what Judge Knight

meant when he said that petitioner would probably get out of prison in 12 to 15 years, Judge

Stevens states that this sentence was in the range of sentences he actually knew life inmates

served. Id., ¶ 5. His memory is that a typical sentence for someone in petitioner’s situation was

more like 15 to 16 years rather than 12. Id.

The parties stipulated as to what Balliet would have testified to. See Stipulation

filed December 3, 2004. Balliet would have testified as follows:

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vi. That the final offer from the prosecutor’s office was that Mr. Biggs would

plead guilty in exchange for:

(a) The special circumstance allegation would be stricken upon motion by the

prosecutor;

(b) Mr Biggs would continue to cooperate in the investigation of other enumerated

matters;

(c) Mr. Biggs would be placed immediately in maximum security confinement in

the county jail;

(d) The prosecutor would use his best good faith effort to find a suitable out-ofstate prison which allowed conjugal visits; and

(e) Any prison chosen would be with the approval of Mr. Biggs.

vii. That no other promises were made to Mr. Biggs in return for his plea of

guilty.

viii. That it was Balliet’s custom and practice at that time to describe the

collateral consequences of the plea to a client in Mr. Biggs’s situation. Balliet’s

understanding of California sentencing law was that defendants sentenced to life

terms would serve two-third of the twenty-five to life sentence before being

eligible for parole and eligibility for parole did not guarantee release. Mr. Balliet

has no personal recollection of these discussions with Mr. Biggs.

ix. That Balliet has no personal recollection of this discussion with Mr. Biggs, but

based on his memory of his practice, Balliet would have informed Mr. Biggs that

his release from prison was in the hands of the parole board. 

x. That when Judge Clarence Knight stated to [sic] during the April 26, 1985,

plea hearing that Mr. Biggs would probably be out in twelve to sixteen years,

Judge Knight was not reciting any part of the plea agreement, nor what Balliet

believes he had explained to Biggs would be the consequence of Biggs’s plea.

xi. That Balliet believes Judge Knight was only stating his understanding of the

sentencing law, not promising or informing Mr. Biggs that he would actually be

out of prison in twelve to sixteen years.

xii. That the prosecutor’s office, did not convey any promise or indication to Mr.

Biggs, or me, that Mr. Biggs would be released from prison at any specific time. 

xiii. That the prosecutor’s office did not convey any promise or indication to Mr.

Biggs, through Balliet, that Mr. Biggs would receive a specific percentage of good

or work time credits toward his sentence.

The parties also stipulated to the testimony of attorney James Courshon. See

December 3, 2004, stipulation. Courshon has practiced criminal defense in San Mateo County

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since 1966 and was familiar with the plea and sentencing practices of the San Mateo County

Superior Courts during the years 1985-1987 as well as other times.

Courshon would have testified that in 1984 through 1987, an inmate in San Mateo

County sentenced to 25 years to life could serve as short a time as 12 1⁄2 years of their sentence. 

Courshon would have testified that a defense attorney in San Mateo County in 1984-1987 would

have acted reasonably in informing a defendant pleading guilty to murder and agreeing to a 25 to

life sentence that his term in prison could be as little as 12 1⁄2 years if the defendant complied

with the terms of the prison system. 

C. Background Law

At the time petitioner entered his plea, he was entitled to earn day for day custody

credits. In 1988, the California Court of Appeals held in In re Monigold, 205 Cal. App. 1224,

253 Cl. Rptr. 120 (1988) that inmates serving life sentences were eligible to earn only one-third

custody credits.

For prisoners serving indeterminate terms, such as petitioner, conduct credits

apply only to the setting of the minimum eligible parole term (MEPD), at which time the prisoner

is entitled to a parole suitability hearing. In re Dayan, 231 Cal. App. 3d 184, 282 Cal. Rptr. 269

(1991). A life prisoner is usually scheduled for a parole suitability hearing within the year

preceding the minimum eligible date. Cal. Penal Code § 3041. Conduct credits are not applied

by the Board of Prison Terms after it sets an actual release date, after initially finding a prisoner

suitable for parole. 213 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 272.

D. Analysis

After reviewing the record, the court finds that petitioner’s plea agreement was

that he would be sentenced to 25 years to life, and not 12 1⁄2 years. While the plea agreement was

apparently not written down prior to petitioner’s entry of plea on February 21, 1985, and

November 6, 1987, it is clear from the record that this sentence was understood by petitioner, the

court, Balliet and the prosecutor. 

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At the February 21, 1985, hearing Judge Knight told petitioner that his

punishment was 25 years to life. The court is not persuaded by petitioner’s testimony at the

evidentiary hearing that the transcript from the February 21, 1985, hearing inadvertently omitted

his statement to Judge Knight that he had been promised a 12 1⁄2 year sentence. Rather, the

transcript indicates that petitioner understood that he was being sentenced to 25 years to life. “In

assessing the voluntariness of the plea, statements made by a criminal defendant

contemporaneously with his plea should be accorded great weight.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431

U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977). 

The court’s finding regarding petitioner’s understanding of his sentence is

supported by the fact that at the April 6, 1985, hearing to reduce his conviction, Balliet twice

stated that petitioner had been sentenced to 25 years to life. These statements reflect the

understanding by the parties of the agreed upon sentence. Judge Knight’s comment that

petitioner would probably get out of prison in 12 to 16 years was clearly his prediction regarding

when petitioner would be paroled rather than a statement regarding petitioner’s sentence. 

Moreover, this statement was made after petitioner entered his plea where he indicated his

understanding that his sentence was 25 years to life. At the November 6, 1987, hearing,

petitioner also told Judge Kemp that no promises had been made to him. After Judge Kemp

sentenced him to 25 years to life, petitioner did not speak up. 

Petitioner’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing also indicates that he understood

that he was being sentenced to 25 years to life. Petitioner’s testimony that he believed he would

be released in 12 1⁄2 years on the condition that he behave well in prison does not support a

finding that he believed that he was being sentenced to a determinate term of 12 1⁄2 years. Rather,

this testimony suggests that petitioner believed that he would be paroled in 12 1⁄2 years if he

behaved himself. Petitioner’s errant prediction regarding when he might be paroled does not

undermine the finding that he understood that he agreed to and was being sentenced to 25 years

to life.

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 A different situation favoring recision might be presented in the case where a certain 2

term of years was made a part of the agreement, or stated as a basic assumption in forming the

agreement, and that assumption later proved wrong. Here, in entering the plea agreement, no

such assumption was ever made known to the prosecution or the court. 

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Thus, while petitioner is correct that plea agreements are measured by contractual

principles, Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003), contractual principles,

including the doctrine of unilateral mistake, and when such is sufficient to rescind a contract, and

when it is not, govern here. Petitioner does not really suggest that he did not understand the

precise sentence to which he agreed – he does assert that he misapprehended the manner in which

the contract would be interpreted and applied according to California law. The prosecutor never

made a 12 1⁄2 year release part of the plea bargain. The prosecutor never promised that petitioner

would be released after a specified time. The court never enunciated any terms which would

permit the finding that a 12 1⁄2 year term was promised. Thus, there is no agreement which could

be specifically enforced. In order for specific enforcement, the court would have to insert this

new 12 1⁄2 year provision into a record devoid of this fact, and then pretend that the prosecution

had agreed to it. No provision of contract law would permit such.

Moreover, the doctrine of unilateral mistake, which would only permit recision of

the agreement, does not assist petitioner. The fact that after the plea was entered petitioner

believed, and the judge for that matter announced during sentencing in which he denied a motion

to reduce the first degree murder conviction, predictions about the future decisions of the BPT, or

calculation of time credits, does not render the initial plea agreement subject to recision. 

Hedging Concepts, supra. The fact that the law regarding credits applicable to indeterminate

sentences was later clarified adverse to petitioner does not void the contract.2

Petitioner’s position, that his subjective interpretation of how his plea agreement

would ultimately play out must be honored, would make plea agreements in indeterminate

sentencing cases impossible. Every prisoner would assert that his or her own unspoken beliefs

about when the plea agreement called for the granting of parole are part and parcel of the plea

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 The undersigned rejects petitioner’s testimony that he believes that the 12 1⁄2 year “term”

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of the agreement was something he testified to and which was left out of the transcript.

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agreement. The prosecution would never know precisely what it had bargained for. Petitioner’s

position is all the more unmeritorious when one reviews the transcript and petitioner

affirmatively testified that no promises had been made other than what was said on the record.3

Finally, even if petitioner’s mistaken beliefs about the application of his contract

could be viewed as a type of unilateral mistake subject to the Donovan analysis, the fact of the

matter is that the enforcement of the contract as written is not unconscionable – a requirement for

application of the unilateral mistake doctrine in cases where the party seeking enforcement of the

contract did not mislead the party seeking recision, or otherwise cause the alleged mistake. 

Donovan, 26 Cal. 4th at 281, 291, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825, 826, 831. Petitioner cannot prevail

on this point. The trial judge, who found petitioner guilty on the basis of the preliminary

transcript (as agreed to in the plea agreement) focused on the same argument, and rejected it. 

If there is any disproportionality, it’s the fact that [the codefendants] were perhaps getting too little [death penalty or more

time in prison was warranted], not that your client was getting too

much... so I have no hesitancy in denying the motion to [reduce the

first degree murder conviction to second degree].

RT (April 26, 1985) at 25. 

The doctrine of unilateral mistake is inapplicable.

Because it is clear that petitioner’s sentence pursuant to his plea bargain was 25

years to life, and that petitioner understood this, the court finds no breach of the plea agreement. 

Accordingly, the court need not reach the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. 

After conducting a de novo review of the record, the court finds that petitioner’s

claim alleging breach of his plea agreement is without merit.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s remaining

claim alleging breach of the plea agreement be denied and judgment be entered in favor of

respondent. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 9/25/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj - big1439.157

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