Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08141/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08141-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony L. Rodrigues, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-08141-PCT-DGC (ESW)

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Anthony L. Rodrigues is a pro se prisoner currently confined in the 

Arizona State Prison Complex-Corrections Corporation of America’s (“CCA”) Red Rock 

Correctional Center (“RRCC”) in Eloy, Arizona. On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a 

Second Amended Complaint alleging a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint involves his incarceration at 

Arizona State Prison Complex-Kingman. The Court ordered Defendants to answer Count 

Two and dismissed all other claims. (Doc. 16 at 7). All Defendants have timely 

answered or responded and all issues are joined. (Docs. 27, 29, 66). 

 Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Emergency Temporary 

Restraining Order (Docs. 21, 22) to which Defendants filed their Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Request for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 26). 

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Plaintiff’s Request for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order involves 

his incarceration at RRCC. 

 Several motions are deemed ripe for consideration and are discussed below. 

DISCUSSION 

 I. “Defendants Ryan and Diaz’s Motion to Permit Supplemental Briefing on 

Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Request for Preliminary Injunction and 

Temporary Restraining Order [Docs. 21, 22, 26].” (Doc. 31) 

 Defendants Ryan and Diaz request the opportunity to supplement their responsive 

briefing to specifically address the conditions of confinement at RRCC, the facility in 

which Plaintiff is currently housed. In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 

Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (Docs. 21 and 22), Plaintiff alleges that his 

conditions of confinement at RRCC violate his Eighth Amendment protection against 

cruel and unusual punishment due to Plaintiff’s exposure to second-hand smoke. 

Plaintiff also alleges a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, stating that RRCC 

is denying Plaintiff access to legal materials and the Courts. Information concerning the 

conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement at RRCC is clearly relevant to a full consideration 

of the injunctive relief requested. Rule 26(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Parties may obtain 

discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 

defense.”); see also Amor v. Arizona, No. CV-06-499-TUC-CKJ, 2010 WL 960379 at 

*15 (D. Ariz. March 15, 2010) (“Defendants have the right to defend against allegations 

in a court of law.”). However, Plaintiff objects to the request to supplement because (i) 

he did not receive a copy of Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 31) and (ii) the Motion is “overly 

broad and generalized.” (Doc. 34 at 2). 

 The Court finds that Defendants mailed Plaintiff a copy of the Defendants’ request 

to supplement at Plaintiff’s address of record. See Defendants’ Notice of Mailing (Doc. 

36). More than sufficient time has passed to allow Plaintiff to review the document. In 

addition, supplemental briefing will assist the Court in deciding the issues raised by 

Plaintiff. 

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 Therefore, for good cause shown, the Court will grant Defendants Ryan and 

Diaz’s Motion to Permit Supplemental Briefing (Doc. 31). 

 II. “Plaintiffs’ [sic] Motion to Strike Defendant(s) Opposition to Request for 

Preliminary Injunction and TRO” (Doc. 41) 

 Plaintiff asks the Court to strike Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Request for 

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 26) because Plaintiff did 

not receive the document until October 28, 2015. Defendants’ Opposition (Doc. 26) was 

filed on October 5, 2015. Plaintiff argues that he received Defendants’ Opposition (Doc. 

26) after response time pursuant to Rule 6, Fed. R. Civ. P., had run, precluding Plaintiff 

from filing a response. 

 As Defendants’ Notice of Mailing (Doc. 36) reflects, Defendants mailed Plaintiff a 

copy of Defendants’ Opposition to Request for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary 

Restraining Order (Doc. 26). Plaintiff, in fact, received Defendants’ Opposition. 

Delayed receipt of Defendants’ Opposition is not a basis to strike Defendants’ 

Opposition. Pursuant to Rule 65, Fed. R. Civ. P., Plaintiff has filed a Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Docs. 21, 22). Defendants 

have responded. Rule 6, Fed. R. Civ. P., does not provide Plaintiff with the opportunity 

to respond to a response. If Plaintiff wanted to file a reply, he certainly could have done 

so after service of Defendants’ Opposition as reflected in Defendants’ Notice of Mailing 

(Doc. 36). See LRCiv 7.2(d) (“The moving party . . . shall have seven (7) days after 

service of the responsive memorandum to file a reply memorandum if that party so 

desires.”) Instead, Plaintiff chose to file a Motion to Strike. “[A] motion to strike may be 

filed only if it is authorized by statute or rule, such as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

12(f), 26(g)(2), or 37(b)(2)(A)(iii), or if it seeks to strike any part of a filing or 

submission on the ground that it is prohibited (or not authorized) by a statute, rule, or 

court order.” LRCiv 7.2(m). Plaintiff cites the Court to no rule or statute which 

authorizes his Motion to Strike. Nor does the Court find such relief appropriate in this 

case. 

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 No prejudice has inured to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has filed “Supplemental Exhibits in 

Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order” (Doc. 

32). He has had the opportunity to brief his position (Docs. 21, 22, 32). In addition, the 

Court will grant Defendants the opportunity to supplement their Opposition. When 

Defendants file the supplement to their Opposition, Plaintiff may file a reply pursuant to 

LRCiv 7.2(d). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 41) will be denied. 

 III. “Plaintiff’s Notice of Default Service By Mail of Defendant Ryan and 

Diaz Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 39) 

 Plaintiff alerts the Court in his “Notice of Default Service by Mail” that Plaintiff 

had not been served with Defendants Ryan and Diaz’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) at the 

time Plaintiff received the Court’s Order (Doc. 33) setting a date by which Plaintiff must 

file his response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiff’s document is not a 

proper motion. Plaintiff cannot request relief from the Court through the filing of a 

“Notice.” See Rule 7(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. (“A request for a court order must be made 

by motion.”). Nor can Plaintiff supplement a pleading or motion through the filing of a 

“Notice.” 

 In addition, the information Plaintiff seeks to convey is now moot. Plaintiff 

received Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) and filed a response (Doc. 43). 

 The Court will take no action regarding Plaintiff’s “Notice of Default Service by 

Mail of Defendant Ryan and Diaz Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 39). 

 IV. “Plaintiff’s Notice of Siezure [sic] of Trial Preparation Material” (Doc. 

38) 

 Plaintiff informs the Court in his “Notice of Siezure [sic] of Trial Preparation 

Material” that RRCC on October 17, 2015 “seized as contraband a package of documents 

containing trial preparation and discovery material.” (Doc. 38 at 1-2). Plaintiff 

references his Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Emergency Temporary Restraining 

Order (Docs. 21, 22) filed on September 21, 2015. If Plaintiff intends to supplement his 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Emergency Temporary Order or to raise additional 

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grounds for relief, he must do so by a proper motion. See Rule 7(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 

Plaintiff has not requested any relief from the Court. If Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, 

he cannot do so by filing a “Notice.” See Rule 65, Fed. R. Civ. P. The Court takes no 

action on Plaintiff’s “Notice of Siezure [sic] of Trial Preparation Material.” (Doc. 38). 

 V. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Docs. 47 and 48) 

 Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel because (i) the issues in his case are 

factually and legally complex and involve constitutional law and the Americans with 

Disability Act in a correctional setting; (ii) Plaintiff’s access to case law, local rules of 

procedure, and legal manuals is limited by his incarceration; and (iii) the discovery 

process is complicated and contentious involving the credibility of witnesses who include 

senior staff and corrections officials. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests the appointment 

of a private investigator to assist Plaintiff with discovery. Plaintiff asserts that his claims 

are meritorious as they survived screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(a).1

 There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. See 

Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991); Ivey v. Bd of 

Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). “However, a court 

may under ‘exceptional circumstances’ appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Agyeman v. Coors. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

“When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider ‘the 

likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his 

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Palmer, 560 F.3d 

at 970 (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “Neither of these considerations is 

dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Palmer, 560 F3.d at 970 (citing 

Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 

1 The Court ordered Defendants to file a responsive pleading to Count Two of Plaintiff’s 

Second Amended Complaint only as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and ADA claim. (Doc. 16 

at 67).

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 Having considered both elements, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that 

exceptional circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counsel in 

this case. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, nor has he 

shown that he is experiencing difficulty in litigating this case because of the complexity 

of the issues involved. The issues presented to the Court are not legally complex. See 

Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 (“If all that was required to establish successfully the 

complexity of the relevant issues was a demonstration of the need for development of 

further facts, practically all cases would involve complex legal issues.”) In addition, 

Plaintiff’s filings with the Court, as well as his briefed Motion for Appointment of 

Counsel, demonstrate the Plaintiff is quite capable of navigating his proceedings, 

articulating his position, and presenting organized arguments to the Court. Plaintiff 

remains in a position no different than many pro se prisoner litigants. Having failed to 

show that any exceptional circumstances are present, Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment 

of Counsel will be denied. 

 Regarding Plaintiff’s alternative request that the Court “appoint a private 

investigator to aid and assist the Plaintiff in pre-trial discovery to issue subpoenas, inspect 

premises to locate and conduct interviews of potential witnesses” (Doc. 47 at 2), the 

Court will deny the request. Congress has not authorized the expenditure of public funds 

for the Court appointment of an investigator for a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 

United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976)). There is no legal basis to 

support Plaintiff’s request. Nor are there public funds budgeted to subsidize it. 

 VI. Plaintiff’s Motion for Court Appointed Expert (Docs, 49, 50) 

 Plaintiff requests that the Court appoint an “occupational health and safety or 

equivalent heating, ventalation [sic] and cooling enviromental [sic] engineer to give 

expert testimony pertaining to the enviromental [sic] conditions that exist in Plaintiff’s 

former and current prison housing areas.” (Doc. 49 at 1). Plaintiff also requests that the 

Court appoint “a medical expert qualified to give testimony pertaining to the adverse 

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health risk associated with exposure to secondhand enviromental [sic] tobacco smoke 

(ETS).” (Id.) Plaintiff cites the Court to Fed. R. Evid. 706 as well as case law in support 

of his Motion. 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his case is of such 

complexity that the judicial appointment of experts is necessary at this stage of the 

litigation. See McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir.) vacated on other grounds 

sub nom. Helling v. McKinney, 502 U.S. 903 (1991) (district court may exercise its 

discretion to appoint an expert under Rule 706). Rule 706, Fed. R. Evid., does not 

authorize the Court to finance for the Plaintiff the expenditure of expert witness fees. 

Federal Courts are not authorized or required to subsidize a civil action for a plaintiff 

proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211 

(9th Cir. 1989); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976). Extraordinary 

circumstances have not been shown to require Defendants to bear such an expense or to 

authorize the use of non-appropriated funds at this time. See Geraldes v. Prebula, No. 

CIV-S-01-211LKK/EFB, 2012 WL 1355739 (E.D. CA April 18, 2012). Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Court Appointed Expert (Docs. 49 and 50) will be denied. 

 VII. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Service of 

Subpoenas (Doc. 62) 

 On September 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for U.S. Marshal to Effect Service 

of Subpoenas (Doc. 23). The Court by Order of November 25, 2015 deemed the Motion 

moot as the U.S. Marshals Service executed service as to all Defendants. (Doc. 54). 

Plaintiff requests reconsideration of the Court’s Order so that Plaintiff may serve 

subpoenas on prison personnel. Plaintiff does indicate to whom his subpoenas are 

directed or what information he seeks. No specific factual support is presented. All 

Defendants have been served. 

 Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in rare circumstances. See 

Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). “Reconsideration is appropriate if 

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the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear 

error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change 

in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). See also LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) (“The Court will ordinarily deny a 

motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing 

of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier 

with reasonable diligence”). 

 Plaintiff has not presented any basis which warrants reconsideration of the Court’s 

prior Order. Plaintiff has not presented newly discovered evidence, a change in the law, 

clear error, or manifest injustice. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof. 

Therefore, his Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 62) will be denied. 

CONCLUSION 

 For all the reasons stated above, 

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants Ryan and Diaz’s Motion to Permit 

Supplemental Briefing on Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Request for Preliminary 

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 31). Defendants Ryan and Diaz shall 

file their supplemental briefing no later than January 25, 2016. Plaintiff may file a reply 

in accordance with LRCiv 7.2(d). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying “Plaintiffs’ [sic] Motion to Strike 

Defendant(s) Opposition to Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO” (Doc. 41). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED taking no action on “Plaintiff’s Notice of Default 

Service by Mail of Defendant Ryan and Diaz Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 39) and 

“Plaintiff’s Notice of Siezure [sic] of Trial Preparation Material” (Doc. 38). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of 

Counsel (Docs. 47, 48). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Court Appointed 

Expert (Docs. 49, 50). 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration 

(Doc. 62). 

 Dated this 13th day of January, 2016. 

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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