Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01390/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01390-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Leo Davis,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Paul Penzone, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 19-01390 PHX SMB (CDB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN M. BRNOVICH: 

I. Background

In an order entered July 9, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed 

in this matter in forma pauperis and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 6). In an 

order entered November 19, 2019, the Court dismissed Counts Two through Eight of 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at ECF No. 8, and also dismissed Defendants

Penzone, Payne, Kirk, A8992, Karas, Smith, A7936, Marty, Spurgin, Dawson, and Lee. 

(ECF No. 9). The Court ordered Defendant Culda, in his individual capacity, to answer 

Count One of the First Amended Complaint, asserting Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights 

were violated when Defendant Culda retaliated against Plaintiff for filing a grievance by 

filing a disciplinary charge against him. (ECF No. 9 at 3-4, 8). Defendant Culda waived 

service on December 4, 2019, (ECF No. 11, docketed December 26, 2019), and his answer 

is due February 3, 2020. 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his First Amended 

Complaint. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff has lodged a proposed Second Amended Complaint, 

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asserting five claims for relief. (ECF No. 10 at 5-20). Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended 

Complaint names the defendants previously dismissed from this matter and reasserts

Counts Two through Five of the First Amended Complaint. (Id.).

II. Governing law

A. Standard for granting or denying a motion to amend

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff should 

be given leave to amend his complaint when justice so requires. Granting or denying leave 

to amend is a matter committed to the Court’s discretion. Hartmann v. California Dep’t of 

Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), requires the screening 

of prisoner complaints and the dismissal of allegations that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted prior to ordering service of an amended complaint on the defendants. 

See, e.g., O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Futility of amendment is 

sufficient to justify denial of a motion for leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 

627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). A proposed amended complaint is futile if, accepting 

all of the facts alleged as true, it would be immediately “subject to dismissal” for failure to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 

1998); Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Medical Mutual of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 

2010). The Court is obliged to liberally construe an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s 

complaint. See, e.g., Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does not demand 

detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A 

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do.’” Id., quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although pro se pleadings must be liberally 

construed, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim 

is plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 679. Therefore, although a plaintiff’s specific factual allegations 

may be consistent with a constitutional claim, the reviewing court must assess whether 

there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

B. Elements of a § 1983 claim

To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) an act by the named 

defendant; (2) taken under color of state law; (3) which deprived the plaintiff of a federal 

right; and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 

(9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a 

result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he must allege an affirmative link 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-

72, 377 (1976); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 1989).

III. Analysis of Plaintiff’s proposed amendments

A. Count One

In dismissing the other defendants named in Count One of the First Amended 

Complaint, the Court determined:

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a First Amendment retaliation 

claim against Defendant Culda, and this Defendant will be required to answer 

Count One of the First Amended Complaint. The remaining allegations in 

Count One are insufficient to state a claim. There is nothing in the First 

Amended Complaint to suggest that Defendant Culda continued to engage in 

retaliatory conduct after Plaintiff filed his grievance or that any other 

Defendant knew Culda filed the disciplinary charge in retaliation for 

Plaintiff’s grievance. Accordingly, Culda’s retaliatory behavior cannot be 

attributed to any failure by Defendants Payne, Karas, A8992, Kirk, Marty, 

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Smith, Lee, and Penzone to take remedial action. The claims against these 

Defendants will therefore be dismissed. 

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to suggest that 

Defendant Penzone was personally involved in the denial of Plaintiff’s 

grievance or grievance appeals.

(ECF No. 9 at 8 & n.3). The Court also found: “Although Plaintiff has named Defendants 

in both their individual and official capacities, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to plausibly show 

that an MCSO policy, practice, or custom resulted in the constitutional injuries alleged in 

Counts One and Two. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the official capacity claims in 

these counts.” (ECF No. 9 at 7).

In his proposed Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff adds the following 

allegations: “A number of decisions have held that an inmate[’s] grievance complaints 

could be sufficient to give notice of constitutional violations,” and that prison officials or 

employees who know or should know that an inmate’s constitutional rights are being 

violated “may be held liable if they fail to do anything about it.” (ECF No. 10 at 12). 

Plaintiff alleges that his filing of a grievance regarding Defendant Culda placed “MCSO 

staff,” i.e., “Sgt. Payne (B2195),” on notice that Defendant Culda had violated his federal 

constitutional rights. (ECF No. 10 at 12-13). He further asserts that Payne, Karas, Sgt 

A8992, Kirk, Marty, Smith, Lee, and Penzone, as Defendant Culda’s “direct supervisors,” 

were placed on notice “of the false charges brought forth by” Defendant Culda in retaliation 

for Plaintiff’s filing of a grievance, i.e., Plaintiff contends his filing of a grievance placed 

these supervisors “on notice” that his constitutional rights were violated. (Id.). Plaintiff 

argues that because the “supervisory officials failed to remedy the violation by dismissing 

the false charges” and “failed to investigate or reprimand or admit that Ofc Culda’s actions 

were wrong, [] it can be inferred that there was a policy or custom that was the moving 

force on the continuance of discipline that stemmed from the trumped-up charges filed by 

Ofc Culda.” (Id.). In support of this allegation of law Plaintiff cites Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006), Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1998), and 

Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff contends “[w]hen 

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officials or employees who know, or reasonable [sic] should know, that an inmate is being 

treated unconstitutionally, they may be held liable if they fail to do anything about it,” 

citing Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 839-40 (11th Cir. 1990), Gomez v. Vernon, 255 

F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001). (Id.). The cases cited by Plaintiff are not on point: Jett, 

involved an Eighth Amendment violation and direct notice to supervisors via a letter from 

the plaintiff; Reed involved a prisoner from whom food and medication were withheld and 

the plaintiff sent letters “directly” to the supervisory officials and provided proof the letters 

were received; and Alexander, a Bivens case, involved the rejection of a qualified immunity 

defense when the official performed an affirmative act, participated in an affirmative act, 

and/or failed to perform an act they were legally required to perform, i.e., the recalculation 

of the plaintiff’s sentence. Greason notes that there is no supervisory liability in a § 1983 

case and that a supervisor can be held liable only when their own conduct was causally 

related to the constitutional violation committed by their subordinate. See 891 F.2d at 836-

37. 

To properly state a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal 

participation by the defendant. . . . A supervisor is only liable for 

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in 

or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 

prevent them.

Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

In Gomez, an “access to the courts” matter, the Ninth Circuit considered the relief 

awarded after a trial judge found the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated because 

the Idaho Department of Corrections, two of its penal institutions, and several officials 

retaliated against inmates who filed lawsuits or availed themselves of grievance 

procedures, pursuant to a “turn a-blind-eye” policy. See 255 F.3d at 1126-27. The standard 

noted in that matter was to find a supervisory official liable for a subordinate’s 

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constitutional violation when it was shown that “’it was almost impossible’” for the 

subordinate “’to suffer discipline as a result of a complaint’” lodged by the individual 

whose rights were clearly violated. Id. at 1127. See also Dillberg v. County of Kitsap, 76 

F. App’x 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the “policy or custom” standard requires the 

plaintiff show “the constitutional violation occurred pursuant to a ‘longstanding practice 

or custom’” or “multiple instances of known constitutional violations that went 

unredressed”). Plaintiff has not, therefore, stated sufficient non-conclusory allegations to 

support any supervisory liability with regard to Count One of his proposed Second 

Amended Complaint. Indeed, in a prior suit the Court dismissed a similar allegation that 

prison administrators and supervisors were liable for an alleged violation of Plaintiff’s 

federal constitutional rights because they failed to “grant Plaintiff’s grievances or grievance 

appeals.” Davis v. Penzone, 2017 WL 8792541, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2017) (No. CV 17-

01912-PHX-DLR (BSB)). 

B. Count Two

Count Two of the lodged Second Amended Complaint states a claim for violation 

of Plaintiff’s right to due process of law in disciplinary proceedings. In dismissing this 

claim as stated in the First Amended Complaint, the Court concluded:

Procedural due process in disciplinary proceedings requires that the 

inmate receive: (1) written notice of the charges, no less than twenty-four 

hours prior to the hearing; (2) a written statement by the factfinders as to the 

evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action and (3) a limited 

right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when it would not 

be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals to allow the 

defendant to do so. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1974). If these 

procedural protections are followed, the only function of a federal court is to 

review the statement of evidence upon which the committee relied in making 

its findings to determine if the decision is supported by “some facts.” 

Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). 

Due process requires simply “that there be some evidence to support the 

findings made in the disciplinary hearing.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 

445, 457 (1985).

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant Kirk’s hearing are too 

vague and conclusory to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Plaintiff claims that Kirk “refused to allow Plaintiff to tell his side of the 

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incident,” but he does not allege what took place at the hearing, indicate 

whether he was permitted to present other evidence in his behalf, or describe 

Kirk’s alleged refusal to hear Plaintiff’s version of events. In the absence of 

such information, it is not clear that Kirk’s conduct violated Plaintiff’s 

procedural due process rights or that Plaintiff’s disciplinary convictions were 

devoid of support. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in Count 

Two, and this count will be dismissed.

(ECF No. 9 at 9). 

In his proposed Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff seeks to cure the cited 

deficiencies by asserting:

The mere fact that Ofc Culda retaliated against plaintiff by filing false 

charges — giving false testimony, after Plaintiff had filed a grievance on Ofc 

Culda — would support a due process violation. As a result of the false 

charges Plaintiff was seen at his cell by Sgt Kirk (B0326), who stated “I’m 

here because you received a DAR.” When Plaintiff attempted to tell his side 

of the incident, Sgt. Kirk rudely interrupted Plaintiff stating, “I don’t care 

what you have to say - you’re guilty as the DAR is written!” Plaintiff was 

not allowed to present any evidence or to give his testimony to support his 

version of events. Essentially, the disciplinary hearing consist[ed] of Sgt Kirk 

writing “guilty as DAR is written” on the DAR and sanctioning Plaintiff to 

30 days disciplinary restrictive housing and 30 days full restriction, which is 

the maximum sanctions.

(ECF No. 10 at 14). 

Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies noted in the Order at ECF No. 9. As the 

Order noted Plaintiff filed a grievance, the grievance was investigated, and at some point 

he was allowed the opportunity to contradict Defendant Culda’s assertion in the 

disciplinary action report (“DAR”), i.e., Plaintiff averred that “at no point did [he] make or 

offer any bribes or interfer[e] or harass the officers.” (ECF No. 9 at 3). Plaintiff apparently 

was also given notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the DAR, as his First 

Amended Complaint contained an excerpt of the denial of his external grievance appeal: 

“You claim that the retaliation was in the form of a Disciplinary Action Report you 

received that you state contained ‘ridiculous disciplinary charges.’ The Hearing Sergeant 

disagreed with you and you were found guilty.” (ECF No. 9 at 4, quoting the First Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 8) at 14-15).

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C. Count Three

Count Three of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and proposed Second 

Amended Complaint asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to bodily 

privacy. Plaintiff contends inmates at the Maricopa Integrated Health System holding cells 

are recorded and monitored in a “humiliating and degrading” manner. In his First Amended 

Complaint Plaintiff asserted the system’s buildings 

. . . have security cameras that are pointed at the cells’ toilets and are 

monitored by both male and female officers. (Doc. 1 at 10.) These cameras 

have “captured Plaintiff’s genitalia and buttock[s] between the hours of 

0430-0700 on 33 specific dates between September 24, 2015, and December 

5, 2018. (Id.) Inmates are strip-searched before they are taken to the holding 

cells, and, according to Plaintiff, there is no legitimate reason for the cameras 

to record inmates using the toilet. (Id. at 11.)

(ECF No. 9 at 5). In dismissing this claim, the Court concluded:

Pretrial detainees, like convicted prisoners, do not possess “the full 

range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 546. “A 

right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally 

incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their 

cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.” Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984). Furthermore, any restriction on Plaintiff’s 

privacy interests is justified to the extent that it is “reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 

(1987). While a policy permitting daily cross-gender observation of prisoners 

showering and using the bathroom may rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation, “infrequent and casual observation, or observation at a distance, 

are not so degrading as to warrant court interference.” Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. 

Sheriff’s Dep’t, [“Byrd I”] 629 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 

(citing Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988); see also 

Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2017)

[“Byrd II”].

Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a claim 

under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments for a violation of his right to 

bodily privacy. Plaintiff has identified thirty-three separate dates on which 

he was allegedly recorded by MIHS cameras, but the duration and extent of 

Plaintiff’s exposure on those dates is unclear. It is not sufficient to identify a 

window of time during which some type of cross-gender viewing may have 

occurred; rather, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show the scope and 

manner of intrusion that occurred on a specific date. In the absence of such 

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information, his allegations are simply too speculative to demonstrate that he 

was injured as the result of a constitutional privacy violation. See Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), amended on other 

grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (court need not accept as true 

unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences). Accordingly, the 

Court will dismiss the bodily privacy claims in Counts Three and Four.

(ECF No. 9 at 9-10). 

Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint adds the specific times and dates 

that he asserts the “cameras have captured Plaintiff’s genitalia and/or buttock[s],” listing 

the same 33 dates from September 24, 2015 through December 5, 2018 he asserted in his 

First Amended Complaint when the cameras “captured” images of his genitalia and 

buttocks, and adding the fact that on these dates the lengths of time the images were 

“captured” ranged from one minute to two minutes. (ECF No. 10 at 15). 

Although it is clear that cross-gender strip-searches violate the right to bodily 

privacy, the standard for establishing a claim that brief and infrequent glimpses of an 

inmate’s nudity requires frequent cross-gender visualization of more than a “limited” view, 

which viewing occurs in close proximity to the inmate. Plaintiff fails to allege that any

female guard actually watched him “frequently and up close,” or that any female guard was 

provided more than an “indistinct, limited view” of his body. Compare Michenfelder v. 

Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495 (9th 

Cir. 1985); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff’s allegation that over a period of approximately 38 months a female guard 

might have had the opportunity to view him using the toilet, via a remote surveillance 

camera, on 33 occasions, i.e., an average of once every five weeks, for two minutes at most, 

does not rise to the level of a violation of his right to bodily privacy. See Michenfelder, 860 

F.2d at 333-34 (holding the fact that a female officer might be able to observe strip searches 

did not equate to the violation of a constitutional right where the officers were not 

“routinely present”). In Byrd II, cited in the screening order, the bodily privacy claim 

survived a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff alleged female guards “observed daily, 

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from four to five feet away, male pretrial detainees showering and using the bathroom,” 

implying that when the observation was “obscured” and “distant” the claim might be 

dismissed. 845 F.3d at 924 (emphasis added). The holding regarding bodily privacy in 

Byrd I, also cited in the screening order, involved the cross-gender strip-search of the 

plaintiff wherein the female officer “touched Byrd’s inner and outer thighs, buttocks, and 

genital area with her latex-gloved hand through very thin boxer shorts. She moved his penis 

and scrotum in the process of conducting the search.” 629 F.3d at 1142. Plaintiff does not 

allege he was touched; or that any female officer even remotely, much less “up close,” 

actually viewed his genitalia or buttocks; or that any such viewing occurred for more than 

two minutes; or the degree to which any “view” of his buttocks or genitalia was more than 

indistinct or limited. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state an adequate claim that his right 

to bodily privacy was violated.

D. Counts Four and Five 

Counts Four and Five of Plaintiff’s lodged Second Amended Complaint are 

verbatim Counts Four and Five of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which the Court 

previously concluded failed to state a claim for relief. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion at ECF No. 10, seeking leave to 

docket and proceed on his proposed Second Amended Complaint, be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

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Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 30th day of January, 2020.

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