Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02630/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02630-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:206 Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SAMUEL J. FAULKNER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-02630 PHX MEA

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ) MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. )

______________________________ )

The parties have consented to have all proceedings in

this case conducted before a United States Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff, Mr. Samuel Faulkner, who is represented by

counsel, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

seeking judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant

Michael Astrue (the “Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s claim

for Social Security disability insurance benefits pursuant to

Title II of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§

401-433.

I Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance

benefits on January 26, 1999. See Administrative Record on

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Appeal (“R.”) (Docket No. 15) at 158-66. Plaintiff asserted he

became unable to work on or about September 15, 1997. Id. at

158. Plaintiff had not worked since 1994. Id. Plaintiff

previously filed two applications for Social Security benefits,

in 1995 and in 1996, which were both denied. Id. at 172. The

date Plaintiff was last insured for disability insurance

benefits was December 31, 1999. Id. at 28.

Plaintiff’s 1999 application was denied initially and

upon reconsideration. Id. at 27, 97-100, 102-05. Hearings were

held on July 10, 2001, and on August 7, 2002, with regard to

Plaintiff’s eligibility for disability insurance benefits. Id.

at 1049-93 & 1095-1115. In a decision issued September 17,

2002, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded Plaintiff

was not disabled as that term is defined by federal statutes

and, accordingly, that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits.

Id. 1007-18. Plaintiff appealed this decision and the Social

Security Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded

the case for the resolution of specific issues. Id. at 27-28,

1022-25. 

Pursuant to the Appeals Council’s decision, a

supplemental hearing was conducted on September 13, 2005. Id.

at 1116-48. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the

hearing, and Plaintiff testified at the hearing. Id. In a

decision issued September 23, 2005, an ALJ concluded Plaintiff

was not disabled as that term is defined by the Social Security

regulations. Id. at 27-36. 

Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, finding

him not disabled and not eligible for disability benefits, by

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the Social Security Appeals Council. Id. at 22. The Appeals

Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, see id. at 11-14,

rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of Defendant,

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, for

purposes of judicial review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (2007).

Plaintiff filed a complaint for judicial review of the

decision denying benefits on November 2, 2006. Plaintiff

alleges the ALJ erred in his findings of fact and application of

the law when concluding Plaintiff was not disabled as that term

is defined by the Social Security statutes.

II Standard of review

The Court has jurisdiction to review the final decision

of Defendant denying Plaintiff’s application for Social Security

disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Each

party seeks judgment as a matter of law in their favor.

Judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner is

based upon the pleadings and the record of the contested

decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2003 & Supp. 2007). The

scope of the Court’s review is limited to determining whether

the Commissioner, i.e., the ALJ, applied the correct legal

standards to Plaintiff’s claim and whether the record as a whole

contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of

fact. See id. § 423; Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th

Cir. 2005); Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir.

2001). However, if an ALJ’s legal error was harmless, i.e.,

there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s

conclusion on the challenged issue absent the legal error, the

case need not be remanded for further proceedings. See Batson

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v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th

Cir. 2004); Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.

1990); Booz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d

1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated an error

is harmless if it does not “materially impact” the ultimate

disability determination or if the error is not prejudicial to

the claimant, including when the error is made at a step of the

sequential process the ALJ was not required to take. See, e.g.,

Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006)

(stating: “we have only found harmless error when it was clear

from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the

ultimate nondisability determination,’” and holding an “ALJ’s

silent disregard of lay testimony about how an impairment limits

a claimant’s ability to work” was not harmless error); Stout v.

Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th

Cir. 2006); Selassie v. Barnhart, 203 Fed. App. 174, 176 (9th

Cir. 2006) (finding an ALJ’s legal error in failing to document

his application of the “special technique” for evaluating

severity of mental impairments, as required by 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520a, was not harmless error because the claimant had

presented a “colorable claim of a mental impairment.”). 

Satisfying the substantial evidence standard requires

more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of

evidence. See, e.g., Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953. Substantial

evidence has been defined as the amount of relevant evidence a

reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. See, e.g., Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066

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(9th Cir. 2006); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.

1999). Evidence is insubstantial if it is overwhelmingly

contradicted by other evidence in the administrative record.

See Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003);

Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983); Cullen v.

Astru, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1262 (D. Kan. 2007) (“The

determination of whether substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner’s decision, however, is not simply a quantitative

exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed

by other evidence or if it constitutes mere conclusion”);

Robison v. Barnhart, 316 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D. Del. 2004);

Rodriguez v. Barnhart, 252 F. Supp. 2d 329, 332 (N.D. Tex.

2003); Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501 (M.D. Pa.

2000). If the evidence with regard to an issue is in equipoise,

the Court must affirm the decision of the ALJ. See, e.g.,

Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953; Gwathney v. Chater, 104 F. 3d 1043,

1045 (8th Cir. 1997); Books v. Chater, 91 F. 3d 972, 977-78 (7th

Cir. 1996). But see Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th

Cir. 1997). Additionally, “[w]hile inferences from the record

can constitute substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably

drawn from the record’ will suffice.” Widmark, 454 F.3d at

1066, quoting Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193.

Because the ALJ is responsible for weighing the

evidence, resolving conflicts, and making independent findings

of fact, the Court may not decide the facts anew, re-weigh the

evidence, and decide whether a claimant is or is not disabled.

See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001); Powers v.

Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434-35 (7th Cir. 2000). As stated supra,

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if the evidence can support either outcome, the reviewing court

may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but must

affirm the ALJ’s decision. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,

679 (9th Cir. 2005); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201

(9th Cir. 2001); Casey v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,

987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).

III Statement of the Law

Title II of the Social Security Act provides for the

payment of benefits to individuals who suffer from a

“disability.” See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D) (2003 & Supp. 2007).

To establish eligibility for disability benefits under

the Social Security Act, the claimant must show that: (1) he

suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than twelve months, see id. § 423(d)(1)(A); and (2) the

impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing the work

that the claimant previously performed and incapable of

performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists

in the national economy. See id. § 423(d)(2)(A). If a claimant

meets both of these requirements, he is by definition

“disabled.” See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.

1999). 

The Social Security Administration regulations

prescribe a five-step sequential process for determining whether

a claimant is “disabled.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2007). The

burden of proof is on the claimant throughout steps one through

four. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. If a claimant is found

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to be “disabled” or “not disabled” at any step in the sequential

process, there is no need to proceed to the subsequent step(s).

See id.

First, the claimant must establish he is not gainfully

employed at the time of his application. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(i) (2007). Next, the claimant must be suffering

from a “medically severe” impairment or “combination of

impairments.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (“If you do not have a

severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that

meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509, or a combination

of impairments that is severe and meets the duration

requirement, we will find that you are not disabled.”). The

third step is to determine whether the claimant’s impairment

meets or equals one of the “listed” impairments included in

Appendix 1 to this section of the Code of Federal Regulations.

See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments

meet or equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, the

claimant is conclusively “disabled.” See id. 

The fourth step of the process requires the ALJ to

determine whether the claimant, despite his impairment, can

perform work similar to work he has performed in the past. A

claimant whose “residual functional capacity” allows him to

perform “past relevant work” despite his impairments, will be

denied benefits. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant

cannot perform his past relevant work, at step five the burden

shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the claimant can

perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the

national economy, given his residual functional capacity. See

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id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098.

When assessing a claimant’s residual functional

capacity, the Commissioner must consider the record opinions of

physicians. Social Security Administration regulations

distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians

regarding a claimant’s residual functional capacity: (1) those

who treat the claimant (the “treating” physicians); (2) those

who examine but do not treat the claimant (the “examining”

physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the

claimant, but who review the claimant’s file (the “nonexamining”

or “reviewing” physicians). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2007);

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).

Additionally, the Social Security Administration

regulations instruct adjudicators to give greater weight to

medical opinions that are explained than to those that are not

explained, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (2007), and to the

opinions of specialists concerning matters relating to their

specialty over those of nonspecialists. See id. §

404.1527(d)(5). See also Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1201-02; Saelee

v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996).

IV Statement of Facts

Plaintiff was born in 1963. Plaintiff graduated from

high school, and completed two years of college in 1995 through

1997. R. at 169. Plaintiff also attended DeVry Institute of

Technology in 1999 and 2000. Id. at 205-08, 212-27. Plaintiff

previously worked as a United States Army aircraft electrician,

and as a concrete worker, and as assistant manager in a

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1

 Plaintiff’s earnings record shows minimal earnings from 1982 through

1989. R. at 161. Plaintiff earned slightly more income from 1991 through

1993. The earnings record shows no earnings after 1994, when Plaintiff was

discharged from the Army. Id.

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restaurant. Id. at 164.1 

The date Plaintiff was “last insured” for Social

Security disability insurance benefits was December 31, 1999.

Accordingly, to receive disability insurance benefits Plaintiff

had to establish he was “disabled,” i.e., not capable of

performing work available in the national economy despite his

severe physical and mental impairments, on or before December

31, 1999. In the application for disability insurance benefits

at issue in this case, Plaintiff asserts he became unable to

work as of September 15, 1997. Accordingly, the issue before

the ALJ and the Court is whether or not the record supports a

conclusion Plaintiff was “disabled” during the time period

September 15, 1997, through December 31, 1999.

Plaintiff was honorably discharged from service in the

United States Army, due to physical conditions, in 1994.

Plaintiff receives monthly veterans’ disability payments. Id.

at XX. Plaintiff began schooling to become an accountant in

1995, however, he took a medical leave from school in 1997 to

address his alcohol addiction which had resulted in an arrest

for domestic violence. Id. 503-04. Plaintiff completed a “fast

track” alcohol-cessation program in October of 1997. Id. at

264. The record indicates Plaintiff remained abstinent from

alcohol from 1997 through at least December 31, 1999.

In the record is a report by a Mr. William Haase dated

September 25, 1997, based on his “full ASI interview” with

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Plaintiff. Id. at 276. The transcript is not legible regarding

Mr. Haase’ identity or the purpose of the interview. Plaintiff

reported he suffered chronic back spasms, chronic arthritics,

and pains in his shoulders and knees. Id. at 276. Plaintiff

told Mr. Haase he took Tylenol for pain. Id. Plaintiff

reported he had “significant periods in which he experienced

serious problems getting along with his sexual partner/spouse,

his close friends and his neighbors.” Id. at 278. Plaintiff

reported serious depression and serious anxiety and tension.

Id. Plaintiff also stated he had trouble understanding,

concentrating and remembering, and that he had trouble

controlling violent behavior. Id. at 278. 

Plaintiff was seen at the Long Beach, California,

Veterans Administration (“VA”) hospital on November 4, 1997.

Id. at 430. Plaintiff reported he was sleeping better, six to

seven hours per night, that his appetite was good and his energy

level was improving. Id. Plaintiff stated his concentration

was “ok”, and that he was “still depressed but improving...”

Id.

Plaintiff was again seen at the Long Beach VA hospital

on March 5, 1998. Id. at 377. The physician’s notes indicate

Plaintiff had slipped and hurt his lower back, although he did

not fall. Id. At that time, the physician signed a one-day

work release for Plaintiff, diagnosing back pain. Id. at 379.

Plaintiff was seen at the Long Beach VA hospital on

March 10, 1998. Id. at 261. Plaintiff stated he had not taken

his Wellbutrin or Elavil for about one month and he said he

could feel himself becoming more depressed without the

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medication. Id. Plaintiff stated “he feels well maintained

when on his current med.” Id. See also id. at 497. Another

evaluation in the record by a registered nurse dated March 10,

1998, indicates Plaintiff was depressed, with blunted affect,

but that Plaintiff’s thought processes were logical, and that

his memory and cognition were intact. Id. at 330.

The record is largely devoid of legible evidence

regarding Plaintiff’s medical condition from April of 1998,

through January of 1999. In his statement of facts in support

of his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff does not discuss

facts regarding his medical condition from March 10, 1998,

through January 27, 1999. See Docket No. 18 at 8. Plaintiff’s

primary complaints to his physicians at this time appear to be

gastrointestinal and related to his back and knee pain. 

Plaintiff was seen at the VA hospital on August 11,

1998, and indicated his antidepressant medication made it

difficult for him to concentrate. R. at 355. A physician’s

note dated September 8, 1998, indicated Plaintiff had cancelled

his last two appointments. Id. at 354. A physician’s noted

dated September 30, 1998, stated Plaintiff’s lower back pain was

making it difficult to sit for prolonged periods, and he

requested a medical release from his classes. Id. at 352.

In October of 1998, Plaintiff was referred to a chronic

pain management program. Id. at 348. In October of 1998

Plaintiff reported to VA hospital staff that he was having a

“hard time” accepting his disability, i.e., his pain, but that

he was “coping somewhat better.” Id. at 347. A physician’s

note dated November 23, 1998, indicated Plaintiff wanted a

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refill of his vicodin, and that he was going to “try and get

this medication from his psychiatrist. Says he is leaving town

for the holiday tonight.” Id. at 496. A physician’s report

dated January 6, 1999, indicates Plaintiff’s mental condition

was “stable,” although Plaintiff reported experiencing panic

attacks. Id. at 347. On December 31, 1998, Plaintiff’s

primary care physician at the VA hospital, Nurse Practitioner

Mandala, received a letter from Plaintiff asking him to provide

a statement for the Social Security Administration indicating he

was 100% disabled and “unable to work. Also increasing his

vicodin use.” Id. at 495. The record indicates that, at that

time, Ms. Mandala stated she was “unable to certify disability

& unwilling to continue prescribing vicodin.” Id.

Plaintiff filed his application for disability benefits

on January 26, 1999, alleging he had been disabled since

September of 1997. R. at 158-66. 

Plaintiff was seen at the Long Beach VA hospital on

January 27, 1999, for a mental health interview regarding his

referral to a chronic pain management program. Id. at 249.

Plaintiff reported he experienced lower back pain, which was

caused by an accident and a fall down a flight of stairs in

1991. Id. Plaintiff also reported degenerative bone disease,

concentrated primarily in his knees. Id. Plaintiff declared

his knee pain “[wa]s exacerbated only during certain physical

activities” and that he “use[d] a cane during times when pain

[made] it difficult for him to ambulate.” Id. at 249. 

The VA hospital physician noted Plaintiff’s pain

“severely limits his ability to work, engage in sexual

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2 The GAF is one of the five axes of the diagnostic system

described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

(4th edition), the “DSM-IV”, and considers psychological, social, and

occupational functioning. A GAF score is a subjective determination

which represents “the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall

level of functioning.” DSM-IV at 30. A GAF score of 21-40, on a 100

point scale, indicates multiple symptoms affecting all levels of

functioning and a GAF score of 41-70 indicates severe symptoms or

serious impairments in social or occupational functioning. 

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activities, and perform household chores. His pain moderately

limits his ability to sleep, take part in recreational

activities, and perform personal hygiene tasks.” Id. The

physician further recorded: “Patient has a history of depression

and is taking Wellbutrin and Elavil to treat symptoms, including

mild passive SI.” Id. at 250. Plaintiff stated he had been

unemployed since 1994, that he received veteran’s disability

payments, and that it was “not a priority for him to regain

employment.” Id.

Tests conducted that day indicated Plaintiff was not

experiencing a high-moderate to severe depressive episode. Id.

The physician diagnosed pain disorder with both psychological

factors and as a result of a general medical condition. Id.

The physician also diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from a

recurrent major depressive disorder and an anxiety disorder, not

otherwise specified. Id. The physician also opined Plaintiff

experienced severe limitations in social and occupational

functioning, which arose from stressors related to chronic pain.

Id. at 250-51. The doctor assessed Plaintiff as having a Global

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 45.2

In February of 1999 Plaintiff reported to his physician

that he felt his depression was “getting better”. Id. at 248.

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Plaintiff was taking Elavil for his depression at that time.

Id. at 248.

In February of 1999, Plaintiff sought and received a

medical withdrawal from California State University, Long Beach.

Id. at 343. Plaintiff indicated his disability began December

1, 1998. Id. at 342. Plaintiff averred withdrawal was

requested due to his lower back pain. Id.

Plaintiff was scheduled for fourteen physical therapy

appointments for his chronic low back pain on or about February

24, 1999. Id. at 337. Plaintiff attended only three of the

scheduled appointments. Id.

In a disability report filed February 23, 1999,

Plaintiff asserted he was no longer able to work due to chronic

low back pain, gastrointestinal problems, knee problems,

problems with his left shoulder, and major depression. Id. at

163. Plaintiff stated his medical disabilities prohibited him

from working because he was “unable to move freely,” and because

he had “periods of incapacitation, depression, severe bouts of

back pain and subsequent numbness, [and] abdominal pain.” Id.

Plaintiff averred his illnesses first bothered him in early

1994, and that he became unable to work on or about March 31,

1994. Plaintiff also stated he had worked after his

disabilities first bothered him. Id. Plaintiff noted he had

previously served in the United States military and that he

received a medical disability discharge from the military. Id.

at 163. Plaintiff asserted he had been hospitalized for

depression in September of 1997. Id. At the time of his

application, Plaintiff was taking Flexaril, Wellbutrin, Elavil,

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and Prevacid. Id. at 168. 

Plaintiff completed a pain questionnaire on or about

March 5, 1999. Id. at 176-78. Plaintiff stated his pain began

to occur in 1991. Id. at 176. Plaintiff reported his pain was

located in his mid to low back, left shoulder, and in his knees.

Id. Plaintiff stated the pain radiated down his legs and

resulted in numbness in his feet. Id. Plaintiff averred the

pain occurred every day, and was caused by bending, twisting,

stooping, mild exertion, tension, stress, and long periods of

walking, sitting, or standing. Id. 

Plaintiff further stated he took Flexaril and Vicodin

as needed, five to seven days per week, and that the medication

relieved his pain for about 30 minutes to an hour. Id.

Plaintiff alleged the medication caused constipation and

fatigue. Id. Plaintiff also utilized other pain mediation

techniques to relieve his pain, including stretching,

whirlpools, and application of ice and heat. Id. at 177.

Plaintiff stated that, despite his pain, he could do light

household chores, work on the computer, read, and watch

television. Id. Plaintiff alleged he could no longer

concentrate. Id. at 176. Plaintiff declared he could no longer

engage in strenuous activity, employment, sports, or sex, due to

his pain. Id. Plaintiff further stated he could walk for onequarter mile, stand for 20 minutes at a time, and sit for 20 to

60 minutes at a time. Id.

In a Daily Activities Questionnaire completed on or

about March 5, 1999, Plaintiff described his daily activities as

stretching and light housework, and reading and studying. Id.

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at 179. Plaintiff related he rested in the afternoon and that

he had difficulty sleeping at night because of muscle spasms and

acid reflux. Id. at 179. Plaintiff reported he took Elavil to

sleep each night. Id. Plaintiff also alleged he had difficulty

putting on his shoes and taking care of his feet. Id. at 179.

Plaintiff stated he cooked a simple meal about once a week, and

that he did very limited grocery shopping because he had

difficulty loading and unloading groceries. Id. at 180.

Plaintiff stated he could do limited cleaning, including dusting

and sweeping or vacuuming. Id.

Plaintiff also asserted in the questionnaire that he

“noticed that my concentration and memory are compromised by

episodes of pain. I often watch a taped [television] show more

than once because I cannot remember what happened!!” Id. at

181. Plaintiff disclosed he read from one to three hours per

day, including “fiction books, computer magazines & sports

magazines. I frequently have to re-read to understand.” Id.

Plaintiff stated that he left his house during the week to go to

the VA hospital, to visit his parents, and to run errands, but

that “going out often creates anxiety.” Id. 

With regard to his ability to get along with others,

Plaintiff alleged “personal relationships are taxed by my

[irritability] or my perceived thoughts about their failure to

understand my situation.” Id. at 182. Plaintiff further

averred he was 

very social prior to the onset of depression

dramatically changed my social outlook. I

feel I have very little to offer and I feel

like a failure consequently, I fear

interaction with others because they may ask

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3 A grade report dated June 22, 2001, issued by the DeVry Institute of

Technology, indicates Plaintiff received a “B” in financial accounting,

business policy, and business policy lab, a “C” in financial accounting lab

and a “D” in career development,” with an overall GPA of 2.9. R. at 213.

The grad report states that Plaintiff was a student in good standing. Id.

Other school records, which are not legible and not easily interpreted, are

also included in the Record on Appeal. Id. at 214-27.

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about personal things like work etc. Range

of motion and pain prevent many or most

social outings.

Id.

With regard to his mental abilities, Plaintiff declared

he had “tried higher education but I have repeatedly failed

courses because I cannot concentrate during lectures with

reading I have to highlight things and go over them several

times.” Id. at 183.3 Plaintiff stated he was frustrated by

verbal instructions. Id. Plaintiff also reported he took

Elavil and Wellbutrin for depression, analgesics and Flexaril

for pain, and Prevacid and cisapride (Propulsid) for his

stomach. Id. at 183.

In response to the question regarding how his condition

kept him from working, Plaintiff stated:

Limited range of motion, back pain & spasms,

depression severely limit my capabilities

poor physical health coupled with depression,

loss of concentration and anxiety about my

future preclude employment.

Id. at 183.

A Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment was

completed by a state agency physician on April 21, 1999. Id. at

236-39. The physician opined Plaintiff did not have severe or

disabling mental symptoms, and concluded “Claimant is capable of

following simple instructions.” Id. at 238. On April 21, 1999,

a Psychiatric Review Technique summarily concluded Plaintiff

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suffered major depression, resulting in slight limitations in

Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and social functioning.

Id. at 306. The reviewer concluded the psychiatric disability

only seldom limited Plaintiff’s ability to concentrate or

complete tasks in a work setting. Id.

Plaintiff’s January 1999 application for disability

insurance benefits was initially denied on April 28, 1999. Id.

at 95.

In April of 1999, Plaintiff was receiving outpatient

treatment at the Long Beach, California, VA hospital for both

“physical and emotional” problems. Id. at 240. On June 30,

1999, progress notes indicate Plaintiff was prescribed

methocarbamol (a muscle relaxer), amitriptyline (an

antidepressant), bupropion (Wellbutrin), hydrocodone (Vicodin),

lansoprazole (used to treat gastrointestinal ailments) and

cisapride. Id. at 241. Plaintiff reported he had completed a

pain management program which was helpful, but that he still

needed six hydrocodone per day to manage his pain. Id.

Plaintiff declared he had quit taking cisapride due to

headaches. Id. Plaintiff was assessed as experiencing

depression, which was being followed by the hospital’s

psychiatric services department, and variable gastrointestinal

distress, which was generally controlled with medication, and

“Poss CTS”. Id. at 242.

Plaintiff submitted to a complete psychiatric

evaluation requested by the California Department of Social

Services, on or about March 28, 1999. Id. at 228. The

examiner, Dr. Ogbeche, a psychiatrist, noted Plaintiff was

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receiving disability benefits from the Veteran’s Administration,

stating “He is 70% service connected.” Id. Plaintiff told the

doctor he had tried going back to school after his discharge

from the Army in 1994, but that “he could not continue due to

pain. He has been trying to study computers, but has not been

able to do so because of the spasms that he gets. He misses

classes, and had to withdraw medically because of his severe

pain...” Id. at 228. 

Plaintiff stated his memory was “okay,” but that his

concentration was “terrible.” Id. Plaintiff stated he had

“problem[s] remembering things due to his muscle spasms. The

patient also describes himself as being depressed, irritable,

feeling hopeless and worthless with poor self-esteem.” Id. at

229. Plaintiff reported he lived with his family, but that he

did not visit with friends. Id. at 230. Plaintiff stated he

could shop for himself, bathe himself, and feed himself. Id.

Plaintiff further communicated that, on a daily basis, he did

stretching, reading, drawing, and computer work. Id. Dr.

Ogbeche concluded Plaintiff suffered from low back pain, pain

disorder with psychological factors, and with moderate

psychosocial stressors. Id. at 231. The doctor opined

Plaintiff had a GAF (Global Assessment of Functioning) of 70.

Id.

Dr. Ogbeche concluded in a “Functional Assessment”

that:

The history, presentation and mental status

examination revealed no evidence of cognitive

deficits, perceptual disturbances or

delusional disorders at this time.

The patient has no restrictions in his daily

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activities, and has no difficulty in

maintaining social functioning. The patient

has no difficulties with concentration, and

had no episodes of emotional deterioration

during the examination. The patient is

capable of understanding, remembering and

carrying out simple instructions. He is

capable of responding appropriately to coworkers and superiors in the workplace. He

is capable of performing work activities on

a consistent basis, without any special or

additional supervision.

Id. at 231.

In August of 1999, the Social Security Administration

sought a file review by a Dr. Mallare, to assess the severity of

Plaintiff’s mental impairments. Id. at 309-23. In an

evaluation made after reviewing the record, signed August 31,

1999, Dr. Mallare concluded Plaintiff had “adequate memory,

understanding [and] concentration to perform simple repetitive

tasks in situations with minimal social contact.” Id. at 312.

On September 1, 1999, Plaintiff’s January 1999

application for disability benefits was denied upon

reconsideration. Id. at 96.

In September of 1999, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr.

Dorsey, a psychiatrist and neurologist. Id. at 401-09. Dr.

Dorsey recorded Plaintiff’s psychiatric complaints as

depression, with only a few days per month when he felt well.

Id. at 401. Plaintiff believed his pain was the source of his

depression. Id. at 402. Plaintiff also complained of insomnia,

anxiety, irritability, impaired memory and concentration “most

of the time,” inertia, feelings of worthlessness and failure,

and decreased sociability. Id. Plaintiff told Dr. Dorsey that

he had been evaluated for depression at a VA outpatient clinic

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in 1995. Id. at 403. Plaintiff reported he attended school

part-time and that he shared the housework, shopping, cooking,

and child supervision with his live-in girlfriend, and that he

could occasionally drive a car. Id. at 405. 

Dr. Dorsey concluded Plaintiff suffered from “major

depression, moderate, chronic,” and assessed a GAF of 60, with

moderate mental symptoms and impairment. Id. at 407-08. Dr.

Dorsey opined the “best” GAF Plaintiff had experienced in the

past year was 60. Id. Dr. Dorsey stated: “He would have

moderate disability from a psychiatric viewpoint alone with

respect to his ability to engage in gainful employment in an

open labor market... It is much more likely than not that the

veteran’s current major depression is a consequence of the

physical injuries he sustained ...” Id. at 408.

In November of 1999, the Los Angeles Regional Office of

the Department of Veterans Affairs issued a “Rating Decision.”

Id. at 526. The purpose of the evaluation was Plaintiff’s knee

problems, “currently evaluated as 10 percent disabling,” and a

possible “[s]ervice connection for depression as secondary to

the service-connected disability of mechanical back pain s/p

fracture T12.” Id. The VA evaluator concluded “service

connection for depression has been established as related to the

service-connected disability of mechanical back pain s/p

fracture T12. This condition is evaluated as 10 percent

disabling from October 27, 1997.” Id. at 527. 

The evaluator continued:

An evaluation of 10 percent is granted

whenever there is occupational and social

impairment due to mild or transient symptoms

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4

 Plaintiff’s medical records through 2005 are in the Administrative

Record at Docket No. 15. However, because the ALJ’s decision involved

evaluating Plaintiff’s condition on or before December 31, 1999, the Court

will not discuss the later medical records except to the extent the Appeals

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which decrease work efficiency and ability to

perform occupational tasks only during

periods of significant stress; or symptoms

controlled by continuous medication. ...

[Plaintiff] was described [by the VAMC Long

Beach] as generally dysthymic but otherwise

attentive when present.

Id. The VA evaluator further noted: “The evidence shows that he

is in full time study pursuing a business accounting degree...”

Id. The evaluator then opined Plaintiff would have “moderate

difficulty engaging in gainful employment.” Id.

Physician’s notes entered August 15, 2000, by

Plaintiff’s treating physician state “‘Pt routinely misses appts

and then comes for non scheduled appts requesting his narcotic.’

Will not renew any more unless pt keeps his appointments next

time.” Id. at 470. 

In November of 2000, Plaintiff’s doctor noted Plaintiff

was experiencing “variable flare ups of back pain. Has just

started a new term at school this week. Plans to graduate from

program in June.... States he feels pretty good today. Still

has occ bouts with Depression. Missed last appt with psych....”

Id. at 469. 

In June of 2001, Dr. Sokolski, a psychiatrist, began

treating Plaintiff at the Long Beach VA hospital. Id. at 682.

Dr. Sokolski noted in the record that, in his opinion, Plaintiff

had been unable to work since 1996. Id. at 682, 946. Dr.

Sokolski opined Plaintiff had moderate to marked limitations in

his daily mental activities. Id. at 941-42.4

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28 Council, the ALJ, or the parties deemed specific opinions relevant to the

issues before the Court.

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A hearing regarding Plaintiff’s 1999 application for

disability benefits was conducted on July 10, 2001. Id. at

1051-93. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing.

Id. at 1051. At the hearing Plaintiff testified his depression

was caused by the inability to do things, and that he felt

unmotivated and without purpose. Id. at 1087. Plaintiff

testified he was “confused all the time,” and that he was

forgetful. Id. Plaintiff testified he was not sure if the

medication he took for his depression was helping or not. Id.

Plaintiff was able to return to work by January of

2002. Id. at 544. In March of 2002 Plaintiff’s physician

noted his “medication is helping with depression. He has been

working teaching computer classes. He has been taking Zoloft

[], Wellbutrin, [] quetiapine [an anti-psychotic medication] [],

and gabapentin [a pain medication] []... He states that he feels

a little tired but otherwise has no side effects.” Id. at 512.

Doctor’s notes from June 5, 2002, indicate Plaintiff had a “new

baby at home, a month old.... Went back to work today. He cont

to teach computers at vocation school... Depressive sx come and

go....” Id. at 539. 

 A second hearing regarding Plaintiff’s 1999 application

for disability benefits was conducted on August 7, 2002, at

which the ALJ heard additional testimony from a medical expert

and a vocational expert. The ALJ issued his decision denying

benefits on September 17, 2002.

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The record indicated Plaintiff was hospitalized for

three weeks in 2003 after a suicide attempt. Id. at 924. In

November of 2004 Plaintiff “stated that [he was now] receiving

100% SC from the V.A. helped with his stress.” Id. at 965. In

April of 2005 Plaintiff had moved to Arizona, although he was

seen at that time by Dr. Sokolski at the Long Beach VA hospital.

Id. at 973. Plaintiff reported his medications for his mental

state were helpful and that he was experiencing “no side effects

from the medications. He states that his condition has been

stable. He has less financial stress compared to before.” Id.

Upon remand from the Appeals Council, a third hearing

regarding Plaintiff’s 1999 application for disability benefits

was conducted before the ALJ on September 13, 2005. Id. at

1116-48. At that time Plaintiff testified he could not work

because he had a hard time remembering things on “almost” a

daily basis and because he was forgetful. Id. at 1122.

Plaintiff averred he could not work because he felt suicidal on

a daily basis. Id. at 1122. Plaintiff testified that, despite

his mental problems, he had been in a relationship for

approximately ten years, and that both he and his girlfriend

were supported by his veteran’s disability benefits. Id. at

1124. Plaintiff further testified that, despite his suicidal

ideology, he was planning a wedding for September of 2005. Id.

at 1126. Plaintiff testified he had been fired from his

teaching employment in 2002. Id. at 1125.

Plaintiff stated the symptoms of depression he

experienced were feeling “down and not very energetic. It’s

hard to find a reason to want to stay alive some days, most

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days.” Id. at 1126. Plaintiff also testified that he suffered

from anxiety and that he heard voices. Id. at 1128-29.

The ALJ concluded that, during the relevant time

period, between September 15, 1997, the alleged date of onset of

disability, and December 31, 1999, when Plaintiff was last

insured for benefits, Plaintiff could have performed a full

range of light work, with alternate sitting and standing and

minimal limitations in his mental functioning, on a regular and

continuing basis. Because Plaintiff was able to do work during

that time period despite his ailments, the ALJ concluded,

Plaintiff was not disabled as that term is defined by the Social

Security regulations. Id. at 28. The ALJ also stated that,

because Plaintiff was “found not disabled, it is unnecessary to

consider the issue of whether or not drug addiction and/or

alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the

determination of disability.” Id.

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff had severe impairments,

i.e., mild degenerative changes in his lumbar spine area and

gastroesophageal reflux disease with peristalsis. Id. at 29.

The ALJ further stated: “His pain disorder with psychological

factors, major depressive disorder, and alcohol dependence in

complete long-term remission were non-severe during the time

period under consideration...” Id. at 29.

The ALJ further stated “If the claimant’s report of

symptoms is credible, he would have little or no capacity to

function on a regular and continuing basis. If not credible, he

would have minimal limitations.” Id. at 30. The ALJ noted

that, after Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, he had engaged in

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substantial gainful activity in 2002, based on his earnings

record. Id. at 35.

The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff was not

“totally” credible with regard to Plaintiff’s allegations

regarding his functional limitations during the period in

question. Id. The ALJ found Plaintiff had “minimal limitations

in his ability to function mentally on a regular and continuing

basis.” Id. at 36. 

The ALJ determined that:

considering the claimant’s age, educational

background, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, he is capable of making

a successful adjustment to work that exists

in significant numbers in the national

economy. A finding is therefore reached

within the framework of Medical-Vocational

Rule 202.21 that he was not under a

disability which began at any time during the

period September 15, 1997, his alleged onset

date, through December 31, 1999, his date

last insured.

Id. at 36. 

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by finding he did not

have “Severe Pain Syndrome” or a severe mental disorder prior to

his date last insured.

The issue before the Court is not whether Plaintiff’s

condition became disabling after December 31, 1999, but whether

the record supported the ALJ’s conclusion that, on or before his

date last insured, Plaintiff was not disabled because he was

capable of substantial gainful activity despite his mental or

physical limitations. Although Plaintiff was assessed with a

GAF score of 45 in January of 1999, which would indicate an

inability to function in a work-related setting at that time,

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one month later Plaintiff reported to his physician that he felt

his depression was improving. A Mental Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment completed by a state agency physician on

April 21, 1999, concluded Plaintiff did not have severe or

disabling mental symptoms, and concluded Plaintiff was able to

follow simple instructions. R. at 238. On April 21, 1999, a

Psychiatric Review Technique summarily concluded Plaintiff’s

ability to concentrate or complete tasks in a work setting was

only seldom limited. Id. at 306. Dr. Dorsey concluded in

September of 1999 that Plaintiff suffered from moderate major

depression and assessed a GAF of 60, indicating an ability to

function in a work-related setting Id. at 407-08. Dr. Dorsey

opined the “best” GAF Plaintiff had experienced in the past year

was 60. Id. In November of 1999 the VA evaluator noted

Plaintiff was attending school full-time and opined Plaintiff

would have “moderate difficulty engaging in gainful employment.”

Id. at 517.

The bulk of the record indicates that Plaintiff’s

mental condition after December 31, 1999, after his date last

insured, alternately improved and deteriorated, including an

eventual apparent relapse in Plaintiff’s alcohol and drug use.

The record indicated Plaintiff was hospitalized for three weeks

in 2003 after a suicide attempt. Id. at 924. However, the

record also indicates that, after his date last insured

Plaintiff’s condition was not so disabling that it prevented him

from completing a course of schooling in 2001 and subsequently

working as a teacher for approximately six months. The record

also indicates that, after Plaintiff’s severe bout with

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depression in 2003, after treatment, in 2005 Plaintiff was

planning a wedding and a future with his long-term girlfriend

and that Plaintiff participated in parenting his toddler child.

The ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of

performing work available in the national economy despite his

limitations arising from his chronic pain and depression is

supported by substantial evidence in the record. All of the

evidence in the record before the ALJ with regard to Plaintiff’s

mental residual functional capacity prior to his date last

insured indicated Plaintiff suffered from affective disorder,

i.e., depression, at least partially as a result of his chronic

physical pain. However, no treating physician, examining

physician, or reviewing physician opined between 1997 and

December 31, 1999, that Plaintiff suffered “severe pain

syndrome” or a more-than-moderately severe depressive disorder,

which resulted in a complete inability to work. 

 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by relying “solely” on

the residual functional mental capacity assessment of Dr.

Ogbeche. 

There was substantial evidence in the record to support

Dr. Ogbeche’s assessment of the degree to which Plaintiff’s

depression affected his ability to work. Although a functional

assessment by a then-treating physician based on clinical

findings would be entitled to greater weight than Dr. Ogbeche’s

opinion, there is no opinion in the record from a psychiatrist

who treated Plaintiff from September of 1997 through December

31, 1999, which contravenes the opinion of Dr. Ogbeche with

regard to the severity of Plaintiff’s mental capacity. 

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Dr. Ogbeche was not a reviewing psychiatrist, but an

examining psychiatrist. Although a single consultative

examination alone cannot constitute substantial evidence to

support the ALJ’s conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s residual

mental capacity, Dr. Ogbeche’s assessment is supported by that

of Dr. Dorsey, another examining psychiatrist, the 1999 VA

evaluator, and the opinion of the reviewing psychiatrist, Dr.

Mallare. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err as a matter of law in

adopting the residual mental functional capacity of Dr. Ogbeche.

The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons, which are

supported by substantial evidence in the record, i.e., the

opinions of Dr. Ogbeche, Dr. Dorsey, the VA examiner, and Dr.

Mallare, for rejecting the Plaintiff’s assertion, and Dr.

Sokolski’s later conclusion, that Plaintiff was completely

disabled because of his pain and the resulting allegedly

disabling depression. See Melloni v. Massanari, 98 Fed. App.

659, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the ALJ’s well-considered analysis

of the record evidence in this case is sufficient to overcome

the presumption in favor of a treating physician.”); Morgan, 169

F.3d at 600 (concluding the opinion of non-examining physician,

alone, is sufficient to support an ALJ’s decision finding a

claimant not disabled, if the non-examining physician’s opinion

is in accordance with independent substantial evidence in the

record); Saelee, 94 F.3d at 522-23(holding that the “ALJ’s

primary reliance on the findings of ... a medical consultant was

not an abuse of discretion” because other evidence in the record

supported the non-treating, non-examining physicians’ findings);

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(stating an ALJ need not accept the opinion of a doctor if the

opinion is conclusory and inadequately supported by clinical

findings); Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579, 580 (9th Cir.

1984) (holding that if the evidence supports more than one

rational interpretation, this Court must uphold the decision of

the ALJ and must not second-guess the ALJ’s choice among

conflicting medical opinions). Accordingly, Plaintiff is not

entitled to reversal of the ALJ’s opinion based on this claim.

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred by accepting the

opinion of Dr. Ogbeche regarding Plaintiff’s residual mental

functional capacity, and rejecting the opinions of Dr. Sokolski

and Dr. Messinides. 

Dr. Messinides and Dr. Sokolski, who examined and

treated Plaintiff, opined that Plaintiff was “totally disabled.”

However, these doctors offered their opinion of Plaintiff’s

condition in July of 2004. See R. at 927 & 937. Plaintiff was

not insured for disability insurance benefits after December 31,

1999, and, accordingly, the opinion of Dr. Ogbeche, who examined

Plaintiff in 1999, was more probative of the decision before the

ALJ than opinions rendered after that date. Although Dr.

Sokolski opined Plaintiff had been disabled since 1996, his

opinion in this respect was based solely on his review of

Plaintiff’s VA hospital records and not on his personal

observation or treatment of Plaintiff prior to his date last

insured. Although the ALJ could not reject the 2004 opinions

solely because they were retrospective, see Petersen v.

Barnhart, 213 Fed. App. 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006), the ALJ did

not err by “rejecting” the opinions of Dr. Messinides and Dr.

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5 Plaintiff states: 

The ALJ also failed to even mention that Mr. Faulkner received

100% service-connected VA disability benefits. Treatment records

reflect that Plaintiff was receiving 70% service-connected

benefits for his physical conditions (Tr. 288), and later 100%

service-connected benefits for his mental conditions (Tr. 965).

Despite this, the ALJ never requested a copy of the VA rating

decision or even mentioned this important fact in his decision.

Docket No. 17 at 6. The Court notes the Record at 965 is a doctor’s note

regarding the VA’s 2004 decision, not a copy of the VA evaluation as

contained in the record regarding the 1999 VA decision. 

-31- 

Sokolski as to Plaintiff’s condition on or before December 31,

1999, because the opinions regarding his condition at that time

were not supported by other evidence in the record and,

accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on this claim.

See Bodnarchuk v. Barnhart, 70 Fed. App. 411, 413 (9th Cir.

2003).

Plaintiff further asserts the ALJ erred by failing to

examine or discuss the Veteran’s Administration 2004 decision

concluding Plaintiff was “100%” disabled. 

The Court concludes the ALJ did not err by not

discussing the 2004 VA decision referenced by Plaintiff because

the ALJ impliedly adopted the explained VA decision issued

during the relevant time period, i.e., 1999.5 In 1999 the VA

evaluator determined that Plaintiff was not “disabled,” as that

term is defined by the Social Security regulations. Instead,

the VA determined in 1999 that Plaintiff’s physical disabilities

had also resulted in a “10%” mental disability, i.e.,

depression, which was associated with his physical conditions.

The 1999 VA decision supports the ALJ’s opinion that Plaintiff

had, at that time, only slightly or moderately limited with

regard to his mental abilities to perform work-related tasks.

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The fact that the VA evidently determined in 2004 that, at that

time, Plaintiff was entitled to 100% service-connected benefits

based on his medical condition could not be dispositive with

regard to Plaintiff’s medical condition between 1997 and 1999.

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by finding his mental

impairments and “severe pain syndrome” were not severe

conditions prior to December 31, 1999, at step 2 of the

sequential evaluation. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by not proceeding past

step 2 of the sequential analysis because the evidence supported

a finding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments and his “pain

syndrome” were “severe” impairments as that term is defined by

the Social Security regulations. Plaintiff argues:

The record clearly demonstrates that prior to

December 31, 1999 Mr. Faulkner had severe

mental limitations and a severe pain

syndrome. The substantial medical record

documents clinical findings and

symptomatology of pain in the lower back....

and, depressive and anxiety symptoms of

difficulty with concentration and remembering

[R. at 278], anger and irritability [R. at

278, 501]... low energy [250], and suicidal

ideation [R. at 250]. 

Docket No. 17 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends these findings “could

reasonable result in the symptoms claimed, and have resulted in

more than a slight abnormality in Mr. Faulkner’s ability to

perform basic work duties.” Docket No. 17 at 3. 

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff had severe impairments,

i.e., mild degenerative changes in his lumbar spine area and

gastroesophageal reflux disease with peristalsis. R. at 29.

The ALJ further stated: “His pain disorder with psychological

factors, major depressive disorder, and alcohol dependence in

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complete long-term remission were non-severe during the time

period under consideration...” Id. at 29.

At step 2 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ assesses

whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments which significantly limit his ability

to do basic work activities.

The Social Security Regulations regarding step 2

provide: 

(a) Non-severe impairment(s). An impairment

or combination of impairments is not severe

if it does not significantly limit your

physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities.

(b) Basic work activities. When we talk about

basic work activities, we mean the abilities

and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.

Examples of these include--

(1) Physical functions such as walking,

standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling,

reaching, carrying, or handling;

(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and

speaking;

(3) Understanding, carrying out, and

remembering simple instructions;

(4) Use of judgment;

(5) Responding appropriately to supervision,

co-workers and usual work situations; and

(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work

setting.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (2007). 

A medically severe ailment may be a mental ailment.

See, e.g., Giese v. Barnhart, 55 Fed. App. 799, 801 (9th Cir.

2002). An impairment or combination of impairments is per se

not severe if the record evidence establishes the claimant

suffers from only a slight abnormality that has “no more than a

minimal effect on [the claimant’s] ability to work.” Webb v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations

omitted). If the ALJ finds that the claimant lacks a medically

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severe impairment, the ALJ must find the claimant to be not

disabled; however, if the ALJ concludes the claimant does have

a medically severe impairment, the ALJ proceeds to the next

steps in the sequence. See id. An ALJ may find that a claimant

lacks a medically severe impairment or combination of

impairments only when this conclusion is “clearly established by

medical evidence.” Id., 433 F.3d at 686-87.

There is substantial evidence (more than a scintilla of

evidence and enough evidence that a reasonable mind would accept

it as adequate) to support the ALJ’s finding that the medical

evidence established Plaintiff’s “pain syndrome” and depression

were not “severe” impairments within the time Plaintiff was

insured for disability benefits. See Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420

F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2005); Bowser v. Commissioner of Soc.

Sec., 121 Fed. App. 231, 237-38 (9th Cir. 2005). Compare Webb,

433 F.3d at 687-88. Although Plaintiff’s depression improved

and deteriorated after his date last insured, there is no

evidence in the record his pain or depression were completely

disabling for a period of twelve months prior to December 31,

1999. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on this

claim. 

Additionally, the Court notes that, in this matter, the

ALJ evidently proceeded beyond step 2 of the evaluation and

considered the limitations imposed by Plaintiff’s physical

conditions and pain and his depression when assessing whether he

had the residual functional capacity to perform work available

in the national economy. Therefore, an error in the ALJ’s

labeling of the severity of Plaintiff’s pain and depression was

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not prejudicial and, therefore, not a basis for remanding this

matter. See Stout v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d

1050, 1054-56 (9th Cir. 2006); Maziarz v. Secretary of Health &

Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987). Even when part

of an ALJ’s five-step analysis is not linguistically completely

clear or exhaustively complete, or precisely factually accurate,

some errors are legally harmless, such as errors which do not

affect the ultimate result of the analysis. See Parra v.

Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2007); Curry, 925 F.2d at

1131; Booz, 734 F.2d at 1380. Compare Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885

(stating: “we have only found harmless error when it was clear

from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the

ultimate nondisability determination,’” and holding an “ALJ’s

silent disregard of lay testimony about how an impairment limits

a claimant’s ability to work” was not harmless error); Selassie,

203 Fed. App. at 176 (finding an ALJ’s legal error in failing to

document his application of the “special technique” for

evaluating severity of mental impairments, as required by 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520a, was not harmless error because the claimant

had presented a “colorable claim of a mental impairment.”).

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by not making a

“proper” credibility determination.

An ALJ must provide “specific, cogent reasons,”

supported by substantial evidence in the record, for his

disbelief of a claimant’s statements regarding the claimant’s

disability. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345.

See also Jernigan v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir.

1991). Unless there is affirmative evidence indicating that the

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claimant is actually malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for

rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.

See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683,

687 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ must specifically identify what

portion of the testimony in the record is credible and what

testimony undermines the claimant’s complaints. See Lester, 81

F.3d at 834; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.

1993). 

“To find the claimant not credible the ALJ must rely

either on reasons unrelated to the subjective testimony (e.g.,

reputation for dishonesty), on conflicts between his testimony

and his own conduct, or on internal contradictions in that

testimony.” Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th

Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). “Where ...

the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to

disbelieve an allegation ... and those findings are supported by

substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to

second-guess that decision.” Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. 

An ALJ is not required to accept every symptom of which

a claimant complains as rising to the level of a functional

limitation. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th

Cir. 1989) (stating an ALJ is free to accept or reject a

claimant’s proposed restrictions as long as the decision is

supported by substantial evidence). “[D]isability requires more

than mere inability to work without pain. To be disabling, pain

must be so severe ... as to preclude any substantial gainful

employment.” Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 807 (10th Cir.

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6 A claimant is not disabled during a particular time period if

she is able to engage in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(3) (2006); Flaten v. Secretary of Health &

Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1459-60 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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1988)).

The ALJ made specific findings, supported by the

record, regarding Plaintiff’s credibility. The Court concludes

the ALJ’s determination Plaintiff was not completely credible

regarding his pain and disability is supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Plaintiff’s stated that he could assist

with light housekeeping, maintain relationships to the point of

parenting and marriage, use a computer, attend school, etc.,

despite his alleged incapacitating depression and physical pain.

Plaintiff alleged he was so distracted by his pain that he could

not work at even minimally functional employment and yet

Plaintiff was able to successfully attend school during the

relevant time period and Plaintiff was able to engage in

substantial gainful activity6 two years after the relevant time

period. Plaintiff declared he had “tried higher education but

I have repeatedly failed courses because I cannot concentrate

during lectures with reading I have to highlight things and go

over them several times.” R. at 183. However, Plaintiff’s

grade reports and eventual employment as an instructor indicate

he did not repeatedly fail courses. Id. at 213. The grade

report states that Plaintiff was a student in good standing.

Id. Plaintiff was apparently able to attend classes in 1997,

prior to the date he allegedly became disabled, until he left

school to attend to an alcohol problem which had resulted in an

arrest. Plaintiff returned to school and attended classes in

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1999 and 2000, through and beyond his date last insured.

Even if the record permits a different assessment of

Plaintiff’s credibility, the Court may not reverse the ALJ’s

decision in this regard unless there is a lack of substantial

evidence to support the ALJ’s decision, and the Court concludes

there is sufficient evidence in the record to reach this

standard. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. “Where ... the ALJ has

made specific findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an

allegation ... and those findings are supported by substantial

evidence in the record, our role is not to second-guess that

decision.” Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. Plaintiff’s case is

similar to the reported cases in which the reviewing court held

the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial

evidence. See Parra, 481 F.3d at 750-51; Morgan, 169 F.3d at

600; Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995);

Curry, 925 F.2d at 1130 (finding that the claimant’s testimony

that “she was able to take care of her personal needs, prepare

easy meals, do light housework, and shop for some groceries” was

inconsistent with her claimed inability to perform all work

activity). Compare Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883-84 & n.2

(concluding the ALJ committed non-harmless error by giving only

“fleeting” mention as to why the claimant’s credibility was at

question without providing any “narrative,” supported to

citation to the record, as to why the claimant’s claim of pain

was not credible).

VI Conclusion

The Court concludes there is sufficient relevant

evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that

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Plaintiff was not disabled on or prior to his date last insured.

Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on any of his claims of

error.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11) is DENIED, and Defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 20) is GRANTED.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant and against

Plaintiff with regard to the charges stated in the complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a result of the Court’s

determination that judgment in favor of Defendant is

appropriate, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 1st day of October, 2007.

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