Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02390/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02390-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Adam Paul Blomdahl,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Ryan Thornell, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-23-02390-PHX-MTL

ORDER 

Petitioner Adam Paul Blomdahl (“Petitioner”) was convicted in Maricopa County 

Superior Court of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon. (Doc. 10 at 1-2.) He is currently serving a sentence of life 

imprisonment for the murder conviction and two consecutive twelve-year terms for the 

aggravated assault convictions. (Id.) 

On November 14, 2023, Petitioner submitted his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(the “Petition”) with this Court. (Doc. 1.) Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine issued a 

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending the Petition be dismissed without 

prejudice and that a certificate of appealability be granted. (Doc. 34.) Petitioner filed his 

Objections to the R&R. (Doc. 35.) The Court now rules. 

I. BACKGROUND

The R&R recounts the factual and procedural history of this case, including the

underlying state court proceedings. (Doc. 34 at 3-9.) Neither party has objected to this 

portion of the R&R, and the Court hereby accepts and adopts it. United States v. Ramos, 

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65 F.4th 427, 433 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 

 Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in his Petition. (Doc. 1.) The R&R 

summarized the Petition as claiming: 

(1) his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to “effective 

assistance and due process [were] violated, preventing [him] 

from presenting all of his causation evidence in [his] defense”; 

(2) his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to “effective 

assistance and due process [were] violated[,] preventing [him] 

from rec[ei]ving a fair trial” and “excessive bond [was] imposed, while the State used this as a tactical advantage”; 

(3) his First and Fourth Amendment rights “to court access and 

to be secure in his person, papers & effects [were] violated by 

an implicated Phoenix P.D., false reporting and illegal 

warrants”; and 

(4) his Second and Fifth Amendment rights of “freedom to bear 

arms and to be secure in his property and without it [being] 

taken unless w[ith] just compensation” were violated because “[t]he State gave a jury instruction about (possession) when 

[Petitioner] was not a prohibited possessor & should have 

given a Willits instruction.” 

(Doc. 34 at 2 (citing Doc. 10 at 2).) 

The R&R ultimately determined that Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted because 

Petitioner has ongoing post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceedings in state court and 

recommends that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 34 at 19.) The R&R 

summarized the “unusual PCR procedural history and posture” as follows:

Petitioner’s first PCR proceedings were timely filed, but his appointed counsel misunderstood the procedural posture or 

applicable law and moved for dismissal without prejudice of 

the PCR proceedings pending Petitioner’s restitution appeal after his direct appeal was completed. Based on such, the 

superior court dismissed the PCR proceedings without 

prejudice with leave to refile within thirty days after the 

conclusion of the pending appeal. Petitioner then refiled within

thirty days after the conclusion of the pending appeal, but his 

then still-appointed PCR counsel did not act. Two different judges of the superior court issued separate and different 

rulings based on Petitioner’s post-appeal filings, one dismissing the PCR proceedings, and the other appointing 

different counsel and setting a PCR proceedings briefing schedule. The latter PCR proceedings are still pending and the 

scope of such are unclear. 

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(Id. at 17-18.) Petitioner’s appointed counsel for the pending PCR proceedings 

acknowledged that “Petitioner should be entitled to assert his claims as to the mandate in 

the restitution appeal and as to claims brought under Rule 32.1(a), 32.1(d), 321.1(e) [sic], 

32.1(g) and 32.1(h).” (Id. at 9 (quoting Doc. 25-1 at 9).) And Petitioner expressed an 

intention to raise all claims relating to his convictions and restitution appeal in his pro se 

PCR petition. (Id. (citing Doc. 28).) The deadline for filing his pro se PCR petition, 

however, was pending when Magistrate Judge Fine issued the R&R. (Id.) 

Given this unusual procedural posture, the R&R found “Petitioner did not or has not 

yet properly exhausted his habeas claims in the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally 

appropriate manner,” which is either by “direct appeal or in petitioning for review of 

denial/dismissal of PCR proceedings.” (Id. at 16.) The R&R recommends that the Petition 

be dismissed without prejudice rather than stayed because Petitioner “has not established 

good cause for his failure to exhaust” to warrant a stay. (Id. at 18.) 

Petitioner raises one principal objection to the R&R: that he has “a freestanding 

claim for actual innocence,” and the claim is supported by “new reliable evidence.” 

(Doc. 35 at 1.) Petitioner also filed a Motion for Telephonic Hearing regarding his actual 

innocence claim. (Doc. 36.) No response has been received. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing an R&R, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, 

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” Ramos, 65 F.4th at 433 (citing Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d at 1121) (emphasis in original); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) 

(finding that district courts need not conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not 

the subject of an objection”). 

B. Exhaustion 

 Petitioner’s habeas claims are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

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Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which requires petitioners to exhaust the remedies 

available in state court before pursuing relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 

“[T]he exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to 

resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal 

courts.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). 

A petitioner has not exhausted a claim “if he has the right under the law of the State 

to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented” in state court. Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)); see also Kipp v. 

Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 947 n.4 (9th Cir. 2020). “A petitioner satisfie[s] the exhaustion 

requirement if: (1) he has fairly presented his federal claim to the highest state court with 

jurisdiction to consider it, or (2) he demonstrates that no state remedy remains available.” 

Johnson, 88 F.3d at 829 (cleaned up). “Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, 

detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. 

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005). 

For non-capital cases in Arizona, a habeas petitioner presents his claim to the 

highest court by presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a direct appeal or through 

post-conviction relief. See Kyzar v. Ryan, 780 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). To properly present 

claims before the Arizona Court of Appeals, the petitioner must include a description of 

“the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state 

courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon 

his constitutional claim.” Walden v. Shinn, 990 F.3d 1183, 1196 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 A. Actual Innocence

The only objection Petitioner raises to the R&R is that he has “a freestanding claim 

for actual innocence,” supported by “new reliable evidence.” (Doc. 35 at 1.) Petitioner 

appears to argue that he was not the cause of the victim’s death and opines that “during his 

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trial, the [medical examiner] lied and said the cause of death of [the victim] was due to 

injuries, when there was not a brain death diagnoses, but new evidence proves the omitted 

organ donation was the actual cause.” (Id. at 3.) According to Petitioner, medical staff 

misled the victim’s 75-year-old mother, “telling her that ‘her daughter was braindead,’”

but if the jury knew “the medical condition info that was used to get [the victim’s] mom to 

donate her daughter[‘]s organs, whereby removing life support and causing death, than

[sic] there would be no way a reasonable juror would find [Petitioner] guilty of murder.” 

(Id. at 3, 5.) Petitioner requests a certificate of innocence. (Id. at 2.) He also asks the Court 

to order an evidentiary hearing or alternatively, to stay this case pending the outcome of 

his PCR proceedings in state court. (Id.) 

 Petitioner’s singular objection is merely a reiteration of his causation arguments in 

Ground I of his Petition. (See Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner does not refute the R&R’s finding 

that Petitioner has not exhausted the remedies available in state court, as required under 

AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Nor has Petitioner argued that no state remedy is 

available. Johnson, 88 F.3d at 829. The record of Petitioner’s ongoing PCR proceedings is 

not before this Court, and as a result, it remains unclear what claims the state court has or 

will allow the Petitioner to raise in his pro se petition, including Petitioner’s freestanding 

actual innocence claim. Because Petitioner raises no other objection to the R&R, the Court 

will adopt the R&R’s finding that Petitioner’s claims are not exhausted, and therefore, will 

dismiss the Petition without prejudice. Martineau v. Elliot, No. CV-08-1214-PHX-SMM 

(JRI), 2008 WL 3582811, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2008) (dismissing habeas petition as 

premature when the petitioner presently had a Rule-32 petition pending in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court). 

B. Certificate of Appealability 

The R&R recommends issuing a certificate of appealability because “[r]easonable 

jurists may find it debatable as to whether the matter should be dismissed, particularly 

without prejudice and rather than stayed.” (Doc. 34 at 19.) 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant makes a substantial 

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showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The petitioner must 

show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether: (1) the petition states a valid 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and (2) the district court was correct in any 

procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights have been 

denied, nor has Petitioner argued that reasonable jurists would debate whether a dismissal 

without prejudice versus a stay is procedurally proper. The R&R found that “Petitioner is 

not entitled to a Rhines stay because Petitioner has not established good cause for his failure 

to exhaust.” (Doc. 34 at 18.) Petitioner raises no good cause arguments in his Objections. 

Therefore, reasonable jurists could not debate whether the Petition should have been 

resolved by a stay and abeyance as opposed to a dismissal without prejudice. Given the 

unclear scope of the pending PCR proceedings in state court, the Petition is premature for 

failure to exhaust. A dismissal without prejudice is appropriate as Petitioner can refile his 

Petition once his remedies available in state court have been exhausted. Slack, 529 U.S. at

487 (2000) (holding that a petition filed after a petition has been dismissed for failure to 

exhaust before the district court adjudicated any claims is not a second or successive 

petition). Therefore, the Court will modify the R&R in part and deny the issuance of a 

certificate of appealability. 

IV. MOTION FOR HEARING

Petitioner also asks this Court for a telephonic hearing regarding his actual 

innocence claim. (Doc. 36.) The Court does not find good cause to order a telephonic or 

other hearing at this time. Petitioner’s arguments are clear from his briefs, and a hearing 

would not aid the Court in resolution of the R&R. The Court will deny Petitioner’s Motion.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); LRCiv 7.2(f). 

V. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Hearing (Doc. 36) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the R&R (Doc. 34) is accepted in part and 

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modified in part as provided in this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition (Doc. 1) is dismissed without 

prejudice. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED denying the issuance of a certificate of appealability

and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because Petitioner has not demonstrated 

that reasonable jurists could find the ruling debatable or conclude that the issues presented 

are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 

F.4th 1038, 1046-47 n.1 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003)); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 

 Dated this 18th day of December, 2024. 

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