Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_07-cv-00135/USCOURTS-ared-3_07-cv-00135-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JONESBORO DIVISION

RAZORBACK CONCRETE

COMPANY

Plaintiff

VS. 

DEMENT CONSTRUCTION, LLC

Defendant

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NO: 3:07CV00135 SWW

ORDER

Plaintiff Razorback Concrete Company (“Razorback”) commenced this contract dispute

against Dement Construction, LLC (“Dement”) pursuant to the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, and

Dement counterclaimed. The case is before the Court on Dement’s motion for summary

judgment (docket entries #72, #73, #74), Razorback’s response in opposition (docket entries #81,

#82, #86), and Dement’s reply (docket entry #87). After careful consideration, and for reasons

that follow, Dement’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. 

I. Background

This case arises from a highway bridge construction project, which included modifying an

existing bridge in Crittenden County, Arkansas near the Tennessee/Arkansas border to make the

bridge more resistant to seismic activity. The Tennessee Department of Transportation

(“TDOT”) served as the managing agent for the project, and Dement served as the prime

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contractor. On April 27 2006, Razorback faxed a quote and a revised quote to Dement for

supplying ready mix concrete for the bridge project, and on May 17, 2006, Razorback faxed an

amended quote to Dement. 

Dement mailed Razorback a purchase order, dated June 6, 2006, which specifies three

types of concrete, described in terms of TDOT classes and PSI (strength) ratings, at specified

prices per cubic yard. Under the heading “APPRX. QUANTITY,” the purchase order reads: 

“AS REQUIRED.” The purchase order also contains the following specifications:

CLASS D CONCRETE SHALL HAVE LIMESTONE AGGREGATE

SUPPLIER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THE REQUIRED

CONCRETE MIX DESIGNS.

SUPPLIER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL TESTING AT THE PLANT AS

REQUIRED BY SECTION 604 OF THE SPECIFICATIONS CONTRACT

GOVERNING THIS PROJECT.

MATERIALS ARE TO MEET THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF THIS

PROJECT.

PRICES ARE FIRM THRU 12/31/06.

TERMS: NET 20 DAYS AFTER DELIVERY.

THE ABOVE PRICES ARE PLUS APPLICABLE SALES TAX.

OFCCP Rules and Regulations 41 C.F.R. 60-1.4(a); 41 C.F.R. 60-250.4(e); 41 C.F.R. 60-

741.4(a) and 41 C.F.R. 61-250.10 are incorporated in this agreement by reference.

Forms PR-1273; Form 7-2(a); Special Provisions Regarding Certification of NonSegregation of Facilities; Special Provision Regarding Material Purchase; Special

Provision Regarding Health and Safety become a party of the Purchase Order and have

already been submitted to the Material Supplier. 

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Parties’ exhibits cited in this order match CMECF attachment numbers, which do not

necessarily match the parties’ exhibit numbers. 

3

Docket entry #74, Attach. #1.1 Under the heading “ACCEPTANCE,” the purchase order is

signed by Razorback’s general manager, H. Keith Wetsell (“Wetsell”), and Dement’s managing

member, William D. Dement (“Mr. Dement”). 

Dement alleges that beginning in September 2006, tests indicated that a portion of the

concrete supplied by Razorback did not meet specified strength standards. Dement further

alleges that after Razorback changed its mix design in December 2006, the instances of failed

strength tests ceased temporarily, but started again in March 2007. 

According to Razorback, the concrete it supplied was ultimately accepted and the initial

test results, which indicated that the concrete did not meet strength specifications, were

unreliable due to poor handling of test cylinders. See Wetsell Aff. (docket entry #74, Attach.

#8), ¶ 6. Additionally, Razorback contends that Dement alone shouldered the responsibility to

make, store, cure, and transport test cylinders. Id. 

By letter dated April 4, 2007, Dement’s vice president Charles Tyson Capps (“Capps”)

complained to Wetsell that job progress was being delayed due to “low concrete breaks,” i.e., the

failure of concrete to meet strength specifications. See docket entry #81, Attach. #10. Capps’

letter states in part: “We understand your position that all of the low breaks eventually gained

enough strength to be acceptable enough to leave in place with little or no penalty, but allowing

time to gain those strengths has delayed this project.” Id. Capps’ letter states that instead of

removing the concrete in place, which would have cost Razorback “well beyond 

$ 1,000,000,” Dement chose to wait the additional time required for the concrete to gain 

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strength. Capps proposed in his letter that Razorback share a portion of the costs associated with

project delays. Id. 

By letter to Capps dated April 11, 2007, Razorback’s president W. Kent Ingram, Jr.

(“Ingram”), restated Razorback’s position that “the concrete did not fail but rather the tests did.”

Docket entry #81, Attach. #12. Ingram offered to cooperate in efforts to reach an amicable

agreement regarding delay costs but requested specific information regarding the alleged delays. 

Ingram concluded the letter by asking whether it was Dement’s intention to set off payments to

Razorback for future concrete deliveries and stating that he would assume that Dement would

pay for material as delivered unless informed otherwise. 

By letter to Capps dated May 8, 2007, Ingram advised Capps, who had not replied to his

April 11 letter, as follows: “Razorback . . . treats your failure to respond . . . as your

representation . . . that the current dispute set out in your April 4, 2007 letter . . . is separate and

apart from the continued business relationship the two companies have, and Razorback . . . will

rely upon your failure to respond . . . as your representation . . that no monies due Razorback . . .

for deliveries of concrete to the job sit will be withheld as an offset . . . If I am incorrect, then you

must notify me in a writing received by me prior to the close of business Friday, May 11, 2007.

Should you later try to offset moneys due Razorback . . . , not only will Razorback . . . have a

breach of contract claim against your company, but a claim for fraud, deceit and

misrepresentation. Docket entry #81, Attach. #13. 

Mr. Dement responded to Ingram by letter dated May 9, 2007, stating that he did not

intend to unilaterally deduct payments due Razorback, and he would seek a mutual agreement

before any final decision was made. The letter concludes as follows: “We are confident in the

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expectation that Razorback . . . will continue to honor and fulfill its existing purchase order to

supply ready mix concrete for this project. We will continue to pay all invoices for such ready

mix in a timely manner based on this purchase order as we have done in the past.” Docket entry

#81, Attach. #14. 

Subsequent letters between Capps and Wetsell indicate that representatives from

Razorback and Dement met on June 14, 2007 and discussed issues and procedures regarding

cylinder handling and curing. See docket entry #81, Attachs. #15, #16. Apparently, the parties

continued to work together during this time period in an effort to reduce instances of failed

cylinder tests.

By affidavit, Wetsell testifies that in reliance of Mr. Dement’s representation that Dement

would pay all invoices for concrete, Razorback continued to deliver concrete to the job site. See

Wetsell Aff. (docket entry #74, Ex. #9), ¶ 7. According to Wetsell, contrary to Mr. Dement’s

representation, Dement withheld “substantial sums” due Razorback beginning in June 2007. Id. 

Dement contends, however, that it paid Razorback as late as August 6, 2007 and did not

begin withholding money until after it learned of additional low break problems. See Defs.’ St.

Facts, docket entry #86, ¶ 7. By letter to Wetsell dated September 14, 2007, Capps stated that

the estimated cost of removing and replacing defective concrete was $420,000 and that, in an

effort to resolve the situation without withholding payment to Razorback, Dement would accept

security by way of an irrevocable letter of credit from Razorback for the estimated cost. See

Wetsell Aff. (docket entry #74, Attach. #8) Attach. #4. The letter concludes: “We will be well

along with Phase II before the results of any 28 day cylinders can be known. Removal and

replacement of multiple bonds could run into the millions of dollars. If your concrete is good, as

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you say it is, then you should have not problem standing behind your product.” Id. 

By letter dated September 24, 2007, Wetsell notified Capps that Razorback would

continue to provide concrete for two weeks, provided that Dement pay all money owed

Razorback by September 26, 2007 and provide, in writing, that any concrete delivered would be

the purchase price of the concrete and that Dement would make no claim for damages by way of

lost profits, consequential damages, penalties, and the like. See Wetsell Aff. (docket entry #74,

Attach. #8) Attach. #5. Dement did not respond to Wetsell’s proposal, and Razorback stopped

delivering concrete to the job site.

On September 26, 2007, Razorback commenced this lawsuit, seeking “monies owed”

and punitive damages, alleging that Dement committed fraud by representing that it would pay

for concrete supplied by Razorback. Alternatively, Razorback seeks “the monies it is owed”

including lost profits under a breach of contract theory. 

Dement alleges that after Razorback filed this lawsuit, TDOT determined that the

concrete supplied by Razorback, which initially failed to meet strength specifications, gained

enough strength to meet specifications. In its answer, Dement alleges that after it learned that the

TDOT would accept the concrete, it paid Razorback the entire amount owed for materials

supplied less “deductions for items not under the contract between the parties” and “deductions

for . . . the failure of Razorback’s materials to meet the specifications of the Project.” Docket

entry #20, ¶ 13. Dement alleges that it deducted Razorback’s charges for ice and certain labor

charges that were not included in the purchase order. 

Along with its answer, Dement filed a counter-complaint, charging that Razorback

breached the parties’ contract by unilaterally and prematurely terminating its relationship, which

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will add approximately $100,000 to $ 125,000 to Dement’s project costs. Additionally, Dement

claims that Razorback breached the parties’ contract by supplying sub-standard concrete. 

II. Choice of Law

The Court is obliged make an independent determination as to which state’s law governs

the substantive issues in this case. When federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship,

a federal court looks to the choice-of-law principles of the forum state–in this case Arkansas--and

applies those principles as the forum state would. Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 28 F.3d 763,

764 (8th Cir. 1994). In contract actions, when, as in this case, an agreement does not specify the

law to be applied, Arkansas Courts have applied the “significant contacts” test, which requires

an inquiry into the nature and quantity of each state’s contacts with the transaction at issue. 

Fuller v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 281 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2002); Southern Farm Bureau

Casualty Ins. Co. V. Craven, 79 Ark. App. 423, 89 S.W.3d 369 (2002). 

“In cases not involving an effective choice of law by the parties, the following factors are

relevant to the determination of which state has the most significant relationship to a particular

case: 1) the place of contracting; 2) the place of negotiation of the contract; 3) the place of

performance; 4) the location of the subject matter of the contract; 5) the domicile, residence,

nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.” Crisler v. Unum

Insurance Co. of America, 366 Ark. 130, 133, 233 S.W.3d 658, 660 (2006)(citing Restatement

(Second) Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971)). 

In this case, Razorback is an Arkansas corporation, with a principal place of business in

West Memphis, Arkansas; and Dement is a Tennessee limited liability company, with a principal

place of business in Jackson, Tennessee. Although Dement alleges, without providing any

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Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a moving party must

demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v.

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supporting evidence, that it did not solicit a bid from Razorback, Wetsell testifies by affidavit 

that Razorback sent Dement a quote for concrete at Dement’s request. See Wetsell Aff. (docket

entry #74, Attach. #8) ¶ 4. It is undisputed that Razorback faxed the quote to Dement’s

Tennessee office, and that Dement faxed its purchase order to Razorback’s office in Arkansas. 

In sum, the record shows that the contract at issue was made and negotiated in Arkansas and

Tennessee. 

Regarding the place of performance, the parties’ agreement required Razorback to supply

concrete to a job site in Arkansas–the purchase order includes the terms “F.O.B. - JOB SITE -

TRUCKS.” Additionally, the location of the subject matter of the contract, the bridge and the

concrete, were located in Arkansas. 

Dement urges the Court to apply Tennessee law because the TDOT served as managing

agent for the project, Tennessee allocated more funds than Arkansas for the project, and the

concrete supplied by Razorback was tested in Tennessee. However, based on the pertinent

factors to be considered, particularly the place of performance and location of the subject matter

of the contract, the Court finds that Arkansas has the most significant relationship to the

transaction in the present case. Accordingly, the Court finds that Arkansas law governs this

dispute.

III. Summary Judgment

Dement moves for summary judgment,2

 asserting that it is not liable for fraud, breach of

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for

summary judgment, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

The non-moving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading but

must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at

587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “[A] genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a

dispute of fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute is

genuine, that is, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.” RSBI Aerospace, Inc.

v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995).

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contract, lost profits, punitive damages, or attorneys’ fees. 

Fraud

Under Arkansas law, the elements of an action for fraud are “(1) a false representation of

a material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation is false or that there is insufficient evidence

upon which to make the representation; (3) intent to induce action or inaction in reliance upon

the representation; (4) justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) damage suffered as a

result of the reliance.” Goforth v. Smith, 338 Ark. 65, 991 S.W.2d 579, 586 (1999). 

Razorback claims that by letter dated May 9, 2007, Dement promised to pay all invoices

for concrete supplied under the parties’ purchase order, knowing that the promise was false and

with no intention of keeping the promise. Dement notes that under Arkansas law, an action for

fraud may not be predicated on representations related solely to future events and that Dement’s

letter did not relate to a past event or present circumstance, but merely defined its expectations

for the future: that both parties would perform under the contract. 

The Arkansas Supreme Court has explained:

In the context of negotiating a contract, a misrepresentation sufficient to form the

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basis of a deceit action may be made by one prospective party to another and must

be related to a past event, or a present circumstance, but not a future event. “An

assertion limited to a future event may be a promise that imposes liability for breach

of contract or a mere prediction that does not, but it is not a misrepresentation as to

that event.

South County, Inc. v. First Western Loan Co., 315 Ark. 722, 727-28, 871 S.W.2d 325, 327

(1994) (emphasis added) (quoting P.A.M. Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield,

315 Ark. 234, 240, 868 S.W.2d 33, 36 (1993)). Under Arkansas law, an action for fraud can be

predicated on a representation regarding future conduct only where the representation is made “in

bad faith and without honest intention of performing the promise.” Starling v. Valmac Indus.,

Inc., 589 F.2d 382, 387 (8th Cir.1979); see also Goforth v. Smith, 338 Ark. 65, 77, 991 S.W.2d

579, 586 (1999). 

Razorback argues: “[Dement] expressed an intent to withhold money, promised not to

withhold money only to induce Razorback to supply more concrete, then withheld money within 

a month despite the fact that there were no legitimate problems with the concrete after

[Dement’s] promise. This evidence raises an issue of fact regarding defendant’s intent, and

intend is a question of fact to be determined by a jury.” Docket entry #82, at 5. 

By letter to Wetsell dated April 4, 2007, Capps proposed that Razorback share a portion

of the cost associated with project delays. See docket entry #81, Ex. #10. The Court finds no

evidence that Dement expressed an intent to withhold money. Additionally, the record is void of

evidence that Dement could not perform its promise when made, or that Dement made no effort

to fulfill its promise. It is undisputed that Dement met with Razorback on June 14, 2007 and

continued to pay Razorback’s invoices after Mr. Dement’s May 9, 2007 letter, see Wetsell Aff.

(docket entry #74, Ex. #8) ¶ 7. And although Razorback contends that the concrete it supplied

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after Dement’s promise had “no legitimate problems,” it is undisputed that initial tests performed

on concrete supplied after Dement’s promise to pay showed that the concrete lacked sufficient

strength. Rather than support a claim of fraudulent intent, the record indicates that when Mr.

Dement stated his expectation that both Razorback and Dement would continue to fulfill their

obligations under the purchase order, he intended the same. 

“‘While fraud may be established by circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be

so strong and well connected as to clearly show fraud.’” Fowler v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical

Laboratories, Inc., 225 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2000)(quoting Allred v. Demuth, 319 Ark. 62,

890 S.W.2d 578, 580 (1994)). Under this standard, Razorback’s showing is insufficient to show

fraud, and Dement is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

Breach of Contract

After Razorback commenced this lawsuit, Dement released the funds it owed Razorback

for concrete provided, less amounts for charges for ice. Razorback seeks payment for these ice

charges under a breach of contract theory, and Dement claims that it has no obligation to pay

because ice charges “were not part of any contract between the parties, and there was no mutual

assent on these terms.” Docket entry #74, at 8. 

The purchase order signed by the parties specifies that materials are to meet the plans and

specifications governing this project, and TDOT specifications governing the project provide: 

When concrete is being placed during hot weather, appropriate measures shall be

taken to reduce the hazards of increased rate of cement hydration and high concrete

temperatures. The temperature of concrete at point of discharge shall not exceed

90EF (32EC).

The Contractor shall take any or all, but not limited to, the following precautions to

reduce the temperature of the concrete: . . . Use crushed or chipped ice as a portion

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of the mixing water, or use water cooled by refrigeration or other means. . . . 

Docket entry #74, Ex. #4. 

It is undisputed that Dement paid Razorback’s invoices that included charges for cold

water, necessary to meet the foregoing temperature requirements. Razorback’s price quotes,

faxed to Dement before the parties signed Dement’s purchase order, provide prices for hot and

cold water, but contain no prices for ice. See docket entry #74, Attachs. #11, #12, #13. In

deposition, Capps acknowledged that Dement was responsible to pay for cold water necessary to

meet TDOT temperature specifications because Razorback “quoted it and [he] could quantify it

when [he] put [his] bid in.” Capps Dep. (docket entry #81, Attach. #1) at 40. Apparently, Capps

takes the position that Dement is not obligated to pay the cost of items, including ice, that

Dement did not include in the project bid it submitted to the TDOT. 

The record contains evidence that Razorback delivered ready mix to the job site that was 

too hot according to TDOT specifications, and a Dement employee directed Razorback

employees to add ice. Wetsell testifies: “It was, like, no one knew we were going to need ice

until one day out there they shut down unless they added ice, and Ace [Dement’s employee]

began to add the ice and they said, no, you’ve got to do it another way, you’ve got to do it at the

plant, so we did it at his request and then ultimately sent a bill for it, which it just never did get

added into a–an agreement or anything. It was just there.” Wetsell Dep. (docket entry #81,

Attach. #11) at 153. 

The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which governs contracts for the sale of goods

in Arkansas and the contract at issue in this case, provides that a written contract may be

explained or supplemented by evidence of the parties’ course of performance. See Ark. Code

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Ann. § 4-2-202(a); Bank of Am. v. CD. Smith Motor Co., 353 Ark. 228, 106 S.W.3d 425 (2003). 

A “course of performance” is a sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular

transaction that exists if: (1) the agreement . . . with respect to the transaction involves repeated

occasions for performance by a party; and (2) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the

performance and an opportunity for objection to it, accepts the performance or acquiesces in it

without objection. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-1-303.

 Here, Razorback has presented evidence that in the course of performing the contract, 

Razorback supplied ice in order to meet TDOT temperature requirements, initially at Dement’s

request, which was accepted without objection. Additionally, given that Dement agrees that it

was obligated to pay for cold and hot water, items that are not specified in the purchase order, it

is reasonable that it would also pay for ice used to regulate concrete temperature. In sum, the

Court finds genuine issues for trial with respect to whether the parties’ agreement requires

Dement to pay for ice charges. 

Lost Profits 

Razorback claims damages for lost profits in the amount of $318,767 that it “would have

earned on the second phase of the project if defendant had not breached the contract.” Docket

entry #88, at 88. Dement claims that Razorback is not entitled to lost profits as a matter of law

and seeks summary judgment on this issue. 

Dement initially argues that consequential damages, including lost profits, are not

available to sellers under the UCC. To the contrary, the UCC clearly provides that a seller may

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Other UCC seller’s remedies include resale remedies, see Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-706, and

the contract-market formula for seller’s damages (the difference between the market price at the

time and place of tender and the unpaid contract price together with incidental damages, but less

expenses saved), see Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-708(1). 

4

Dement further argues that lost profits are not available because the contract at issue was

terminable at will and the parties did not contemplate lost profits as damages recoverable in the

event of a breach. However, Razorback counters with testimony by Wetsell showing otherwise.

Wetsell testifies: “It is well established in the concrete and construction industry that the custom

and usage in the industry is that a contract to supply concrete for a job continues until the job is

complete.” Wetsell Aff. (docket entry #81, Attach. #20). 

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recover lost profits when other seller’s remedies3

 provided under the Code are inadequate to put

the seller in as good a position as if the buyer had performed. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-708(2). 

Dement also argues that Razorback’s claim for lost profits is speculative and cannot be

proved.4 The official comments to UCC § 2-708(2) state that the lost profit remedy is applicable

in “cases of uncompleted goods, jobbers or middlemen, and other lost-volume sellers.” U.C.C. 

2-708, Official Comment 5. To qualify as a “lost volume” seller, the seller must show that it

could have supplied both the breaching purchaser and the resale purchaser with the goods. “If the

seller could not or would not have profitably made another sale in absence of breach, there is no

lost volume and the seller would normally be made whole by a recovery of the incidental costs

associated with the substitute transaction.” Id. 

Dement points to Wetsell’s deposition testimony stating that Razorback probably turned

away or didn’t bid on work during the time it was supplying concrete for the bridge project

because “we knew we were kind of at a maximum peak there with their job . . . .” Wetsell Dep.

(docket entry #74, Attach. #26) at 166-67. Wetsell also testified that Razorback would have

taken on other jobs “if it was a size that we could handle” but Razorback did not, in fact, turn

away work because of the bridge project. Wetsell Dep. (docket entry #74, Ex. 27) at 168. 

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Arkansas Code § 16-22-308 permits an award of attorneys’ fees to “the prevailing party.”

It is yet to be determined whether Razorback is a prevailing party. Furthermore, a claim for

attorneys’ fees must be made by motion filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). 

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Wetsell’s testimony clearly shows that Razorback does not qualify as a “lost volume”

seller. Furthermore, Razorback provides no evidence showing that other seller’s remedies

provided under the UCC are inadequate, and it is therefore entitled to lost profits. Accordingly,

the Court finds that Dement is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Razorback’s claim

for lost profits. 

Punitive Damages

Razorback seeks punitive damages in connection with its fraud claim, and Dement asserts

that Razorback is unable to prove the type of egregious conduct necessary to support a claim for

punitive damages. Because the Court finds no genuine issues for trial with respect to

Razorback’s fraud claim, the issue of punitive damages is moot. 

Attorneys’ Fees

Dement asserts that no evidence supports an award of attorneys’ fees in this case. The

Court finds this argument premature5

 and denies, without prejudice, Dement’s motion to

summarily dismiss Razorback’s claim for attorneys’ fees. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Dement Construction Company, LLC’s

motion for summary judgment (docket entry #72) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART. Plaintiff Razorback Concrete Company’s fraud claim and claims for punitive damages

and lost profits are dismissed. Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract remains. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to exclude expert opinions

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regarding lost profits (docket entry #70), motion to bifurcate trial with respect to compensatory

and punitive damages (docket entry #91), and motion for a ruling on choice of law (docket entry

#92) are DENIED AS MOOT. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion in limine (docket entry #93)

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and may be resubmitted at a time closer to trial. 

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 22nd DAY OF JANUARY, 2010. 

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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