Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01914/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01914-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Benjamin Fisk,

Plaintiff,

v. 

County of Maricopa, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-21-01914-PHX-MTL

ORDER 

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Counts 1 

and 2) (Doc. 78) and Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80). The 

Motions are fully briefed. (Docs. 78, 80, 82, 83, 92, 93, 98.) The Court held oral argument 

on February 7, 2024. The Court rules as follows. 

I. FACTS

Plaintiff Benjamin Fisk is a detention sergeant employed by the Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”). (Doc. 78-1 at 7.) In 2019, he founded the Maricopa County 

Law Enforcement Association (“MCLEA”). (Id. at 7, 12-13.) At the time of the events at 

issue, he served as its president. (Id. at 7, 12-13, 32, 69, 235-36, 238, 250.)

Plaintiff describes MCLEA as “a nonprofit employee association established . . . . to 

promote a positive role of the police, deputy, detention, and probation profession through 

education, communication, and support of members.” (Id. at 7.) It “is a membership 

organization, which advances its members’ interest[s] by securing rights and benefits 

through diligent representation.” (Doc. 78 at 2; see also Doc. 78-1 at 7.) 

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On May 26, 2020, Plaintiff petitioned MCSO for permission to speak to his 

coworkers about MCLEA. (Doc. 78-1 at 3-4.) His request stated:

I would like to request that permission be granted to speak to 

the recruit classes and other staff members about the benefits 

of being a member of MCLEA. Maricopa County Policy and 

Sheriff’s Office Policy allow for this to take place. The intent 

is to approach the recruit classes during their lunch period for 

about 15 minutes. Other employees would be contacted before 

briefings in non-work areas. 

(Id. at 3 (cleaned up).) Ultimately, on August 6, 2020, the request was denied pursuant to 

newly enacted Office Policy CP-2.32. (Id. at 333.)

Around the same time, Plaintiff made two statements to the media about COVID-19 

within MCSO. (Doc. 83-1 at 148; Doc. 83-2 at 3.) On July 7, 2020, Plaintiff said that two 

recently deceased MCSO employees had been ailing from COVID-19. (Doc. 83-1 at 148.) 

On July 20, 2020, Plaintiff told a reporter that several MCSO employees had contracted 

COVID-19, that tensions were high at MCSO, and that “[t]here are things that can be done 

that the sheriff’s office can do better and they’re just not being done.” (Doc. 83-2 at 3.) 

Many of Plaintiff’s superiors were aware of, and surprised by, Plaintiff’s statements. 

(Doc. 83-1 at 117.)

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff became the subject of a disciplinary investigation. (See 

Doc. 80-5 at 12.) In July and August 2020, MCSO received five complaints alleging that 

Plaintiff had violated office policy. (Doc. 80-4 at 27-28, 30, 32, 34, 36.) MCSO initiated 

an investigation and Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave. (Doc. 80-5 at 12.) 

In August 2020, the investigation was assigned to an outside investigator for review and 

follow up. (Id.) The investigator determined that Plaintiff was not a candidate for major 

discipline, and he was returned to active duty. (Doc. 29 ¶ 36; Doc. 80 at 5.) The 

investigation is still ongoing. (Doc. 80 at 5.)

In December 2020, Plaintiff received a negative employee performance appraisal 

(“EPA”) from Lt. Deana Wierschem. (Doc. 80-5 at 14-26.) Lt. Wierschem was not 

Plaintiff’s direct supervisor but conducted his EPA because Plaintiff had filed a complaint 

against his direct supervisor. (Doc. 80-1 at 24.) Lt. Wierschem concluded that Plaintiff had 

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not met minimum performance standards because he failed to complete his daily 

paperwork and meet assigned deadlines. (Doc. 80-5 at 14, 18.) Because of the unfavorable

EPA, Plaintiff was not eligible for a merit-based pay increase. (Doc. 29 ¶ 85; Doc. 80-5 at 

14, 17, 19-20.) On administrative review, however, MCSO agreed to amend the EPA to 

reflect that Plaintiff had met minimum performance standards. (Doc. 80-1 at 24-26; Doc. 

80-5 at 28-32.) Plaintiff received the associated raise, retroactive to the original date of 

eligibility. (Doc. 29 ¶¶ 49-50; Doc. 80 at 5.)

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in November 2021. (Doc. 1.) In his Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiff asserts three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violation of his First Amendment 

right to freedom of speech; (2) violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of 

association; and (3) retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment right to freedom of 

speech. (Doc. 29 ¶¶ 51-90.) Now, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the first two 

claims. (Doc. 78.) Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. (Doc. 80.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 

genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and material facts are those “that might affect 

the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant 

is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Id. at 255; 

see also Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The 

court must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matters asserted but only 

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”).

“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 

[the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A party opposing summary judgment 

must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record” establishing a genuine dispute or 

“show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Court does not have a duty “to scour the record in search of a 

genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Freedom of Speech Violation

“[C]itizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by accepting public 

employment.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231 (2014). “[T]he First Amendment protects 

a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters 

of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). But the Supreme Court 

has also recognized that this right has limits. Indeed, “a governmental employer may 

impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees, restraints that would be 

unconstitutional if applied to the general public.” City of San Diego, California v. Roe, 543 

U.S. 77, 80 (2004). 

“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the 

[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of 

the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 

through its employees.” Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Tp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Il., 

391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). This inquiry is known as the Pickering balancing test, and it 

“provides the framework for analyzing whether the employee’s interest or the 

government’s interest should prevail in cases where the government seeks to curtail the 

speech of its employees.” Lane, 573 U.S. at 236.

In the First Amendment retaliation context, the Ninth Circuit has distilled Pickering 

and its progeny into a five-step analysis: 

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; 

(2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public 

employee; (3) whether the plaintiff’s protected speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 

action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for 

treating the employee differently from other members of the 

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general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the 

adverse employment action even absent the protected speech.

Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). When the inquiry is limited to whether 

a First Amendment violation occurred, as is the case with Plaintiff’s first claim, only steps 

one, two, and four are relevant. See e.g., Hernandez v. City of Phoenix, 43 F.4th 966, 

976-79 (9th Cir. 2022); Berry v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 649-52 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Tucker v. State of Cal. Dept. of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210-14 (9th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. 

Multnomah County, Oregon, 48 F.3d 420, 422-27 (9th Cir. 1995). Because this test 

provides the exclusive means for determining whether an employee’s freedom of speech 

rights have been violated by their government employer, the Court does not rely on the 

portion of the parties’ briefing that applies a traditional forum analysis. See Johnson v. 

Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 960-64 (9th Cir. 2011). 

At step one, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that his or her speech 

addressed an issue of public concern. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070; see also Connick v. Myers, 

461 U.S. 138 (1983). Speech involves a matter of public concern if it “can fairly be 

considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community

or is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value 

and concern to the public.” Lane, 573 U.S. at 241 (cleaned up); see also Johnson, 48 F.3d 

at 422. In contrast, “speech that deals with individual personnel disputes and grievances 

and that would be of no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of 

governmental agencies is generally not of public concern.” Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 

F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). 

Here, Plaintiff’s request to speak about “the benefits of being a member of 

[MCLEA]” did not involve a matter of public concern. (Doc. 78-1 at 3.) Plaintiff did not 

request to speak about a newsworthy event, engage in political or social debate, expose 

government inefficiency or corruption, or discuss anything else that at least some members 

of the general public would have been interested in. See e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 

U.S. 378 (1987); Pickering, 391 U.S. 563; Lane, 573 U.S. 228. Instead, he merely sought 

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to expand membership in his private business. MCLEA’s expansion is not of concern to 

the public, and it is “of no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of” 

MCSO’s duties. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973. 

Plaintiff argues that his speech involved a matter of public concern because 

“[s]olicitation for membership in a group, including requests to pay, contribute, or support 

a group, is constitutionally protected speech” and “[i]ndustrial relations are also a matter 

of public concern.” (Doc. 78 at 13.) Plaintiff relies on cases that do not apply. First, Village 

of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), is inapposite. 

That case did not involve Pickering or restrictions on employee speech by a government 

employer. Village of Schaumberg, 444 U.S. 620. Second, while Thornhill v. State of 

Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-04 (1940), and Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 

Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979), arguably recognize Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

right to disseminate facts surrounding labor disputes and advocate on behalf of his fellow 

MCLEA members, those cases do not suggest that Plaintiff’s attempts to expand 

membership in MCLEA are a matter of public concern.

Because Plaintiff’s request to speak to his fellow employees about the benefits of 

joining MCLEA did not involve a matter of public concern, the Court grants summary 

judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s first claim. Johnson, 658 F.3d at 961-62 

(“Because [Eng prescribes] sequential steps, a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy a single one 

necessarily concludes [the] inquiry.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

B. Freedom of Association Violation

The First Amendment also protects Plaintiff’s right to associate with others “for the 

purpose of engaging in protected activity.” Santopietro v. Howell, 73 F.4th 1016, 1025 (9th 

Cir. 2023). But here, the record lacks any evidence that Defendants prohibited Plaintiff 

from associating with MCLEA or its members. Plaintiff makes no argument to the contrary. 

(See generally Docs. 78, 83, 93.) To the extent Plaintiff argues that MCSO’s denial of his 

request to speak also violated his right to freedom of association, that argument fails for 

the reasons already discussed. Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 695-98 (9th Cir. 2005) 

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(applying the same Pickering-based analysis to plaintiff’s freedom of speech and freedom 

of association claims in a case where those claims were intertwined). Accordingly, the 

Court grants summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s second claim. 

C. Freedom of Speech Retaliation

Plaintiff contends that he was retaliated against because of statements he made to 

the media during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 83 at 8-10, 14.) While the parties analyze 

this claim using the traditional test for freedom of speech retaliation, the Ninth Circuit has 

made clear that, where the government is both sovereign and employer, the test set forth in 

Eng applies. See e.g., Hernandez, 43 F.4th at 976; Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 

1032, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2017); Rodriguez-Malfavon v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 706 Fed. 

Appx. 348, 348 (9th Cir. 2017).

First, Plaintiff’s statements to the media, as reported on July 7 and 20, 2020, entirely 

addressed a matter of public concern—the impact of COVID-19 on MCSO and its 

employees. “Subjects that receive media coverage ‘almost by definition involve matters of 

public concern.’” Hernandez, 43 F.4th at 978 (quoting Roe v. City and County of San 

Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997)) (cleaned up). Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s statements merely reported facts and expressed general dissatisfaction, but the 

relative “value” of Plaintiff’s speech does not factor into the Court’s determination of 

whether, and to what extent, that speech addressed a matter of public concern. 

Second, Plaintiff has demonstrated that he spoke as a private citizen rather than as 

a public employee. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. “Statements are made in the speaker’s capacity 

as citizen if the speaker had no official duty to make the questioned statements, or if the 

speech was not the product of performing the tasks the employee was paid to perform.”

Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff had no official duty to speak to the media about the impact of 

COVID-19 on MCSO and its employees. Nor was his speech the product of performing 

his official job duties. Thus, he spoke as a private citizen. Defendants do not argue 

otherwise. (See generally Docs. 80, 92.)

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Third, a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s protected speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor for his negative EPA and ongoing disciplinary 

investigation. Plaintiff bears the burden at this step, and the question is “purely [one] of 

fact.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. To demonstrate that retaliation was a substantial or motivating 

factor behind an employer’s adverse employment actions, 

[A]n employee may introduce evidence that: (1) the speech and 

adverse action were proximate in time, such that a jury could 

infer that the action took place in retaliation for the speech; (2) 

the employer expressed opposition to the speech, either to the 

speaker or to others; or (3) the preferred explanations for the 

adverse action were false and pretextual.

Candelaria v. City of Telleson, Arizona, 721 Fed. Appx. 588, 590-91 (9th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff has presented evidence that the adverse employment actions occurred just 

a few months after his statements to the media (See Doc. 80-5 at 12, 14-26) and that his 

supervisors were aware of his speech prior to taking the adverse employment actions (Doc. 

83-1 at 117). A reasonable jury may infer from these circumstances that Plaintiff’s 

statements were a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment actions that 

came shortly thereafter. See e.g., Anthoine v. North Central Cntys. Consortium, 605 F.3d

740, 751 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We have held that proximity in time may support an inference 

of retaliation sufficient to survive summary judgment.”).

Fourth, Defendants lacked an adequate justification for treating Plaintiff differently 

than members of the general public. On this step, the burden shifts back to Defendants to 

demonstrate that MCSO’s “legitimate administrative interests outweigh[ed Plaintiff’s]

First Amendment rights.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. Where the speech substantially (or, as 

here, entirely) involves a matter of public concern, a stronger showing of government 

interests is necessary. Lane, 573 U.S. at 242.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s statements to the media were vague, unhelpful, and 

carried a limited First Amendment interest compared to MCSO’s powerful interest “in the 

peaceful and efficient operation of its detention facilities.” (Doc. 80 at 11.) But again, 

because Plaintiff’s speech entirely addressed a matter of public interest—the impact of a 

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global pandemic on sensitive local government operations—it carried a strong First 

Amendment interest. Lane, 573 U.S. at 242. And while MCSO’s articulated interests are 

likewise strong, Plaintiff’s tame and uninflammatory statements presented a very minimal

threat to those interests. 

Fifth, and finally, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants would not have 

taken the adverse employment actions absent the protected speech. Defendants bear the 

burden on this “pure[] question of fact.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072. As for the negative EPA, 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff would have received the same review absent his comments 

to the media because Lt. Wierschem had a justified and independent basis for it—that 

Plaintiff was not timely completing his paperwork. (Doc. 80 at 13.) But a reasonable jury 

may reject this explanation and find instead, based on the evidence in the record (including 

the negative EPA’s temporal proximity to Plaintiff’s protected speech), that it is pretextual. 

Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s disciplinary investigation would 

have occurred regardless of his statements to the media because, once MCSO received 

complaints against Plaintiff, it was required by policy to open an investigation. (Id. at 

14-15.) But like the plaintiff in Eng, Plaintiff here suggests that the “apparently baseless 

charges were themselves motivated by his exercise of his First Amendment rights.” 552 

F.3d at 1074 (emphasis in original). For example, the first (and longest) complaint against 

Plaintiff was received just one day following Plaintiff’s second statement to the media. 

(Doc. 80-4 at 27.) The other complaints were received shortly afterward. (Id. at 30, 32, 34, 

36.) Moreover, a reasonable jury could find that the investigation, once begun, was handled 

unfavorably or unjustifiably extended because of Plaintiff’s protected speech.

Because a reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on his freedom of speech 

retaliation claim, the Court denies summary judgment on that claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

A reasonable jury could not find that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment right to freedom of speech by denying his request to speak to his coworkers 

about the benefits of joining MCLEA. Nor could one find that Defendants violated 

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Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of association. A reasonable jury could, 

however, find that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for his protected remarks to the 

media about COVID-19’s impact on MCSO and its employees. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Counts 1 

and 2) (Doc. 78) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Amended Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 80) is granted in part and denied in part as follows:

1. The Court enters summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s 

claims for violations of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of 

association.

2. Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment right 

to freedom of speech shall remain pending. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, consistent with this Order, Defendants Brian 

C. Lee, Tiffany Shaw, Andrew Mesquita, and Barry Roska are dismissed. The Clerk of 

Court shall not enter judgment at this time. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Court will set a trial setting conference by 

separate order. 

Dated this 23rd day of February, 2024.

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