Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02453/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02453-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LENNELL SMART,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden, and BOARD

OF PRISON TERMS, STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Respondents. /

No. C 05-2453 WHA (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The

petition is directed to denial of parole.

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it,

and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For the

reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in 1981. He received a sentence of 

fifteen years to life in prison. In 2004 he was denied parole for the seventh time; it is that

parole decision he challenges here. He alleges that he has exhausted these claims by way of

state habeas petitions. 

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United States District Court

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DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of

law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong

applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies

the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support

granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state

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trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and

convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory

assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres

v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated by the board’s repeated

denials of parole based on the unchanging facts of his offense, and by its ignoring evidence of

rehabilitation. 

Among other things, respondent contends that California prisoners have no liberty

interest in parole and that if they do, the only due process protections available are a right to be

heard and a right to be informed of the basis for the denial – that is, respondent contends there

is no due process right to have the result supported by sufficient evidence. Because these

contentions go to whether petitioner has any due process rights at all in connection with parole,

and if he does, what those rights are, they will addressed first.

1. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. 

a. LIBERTY INTEREST

Respondent contends that California prisoners have no liberty interest in parole. 

Respondent is incorrect that Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), applies to parole decisions,

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see Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (Sandin “does not affect the creation of

liberty interests in parole under Greenholtz and Allen.”), and, applying the correct analysis, the

California parole statute does create a liberty interest protected by due process, see McQuillion

v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”). Respondent’s claim to the contrary is without

merit. 

b. DUE-PROCESS PROTECTIONS 

Respondent contends that even if California prisoners do have a liberty interest in

parole, the due process protections to which they are entitled by clearly-established Supreme

Court authority are limited to notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a statement of reasons for

denial. That is, he contends there is no due process right to have the decision supported by

“some evidence.” This position, however, has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which has

held that the Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by "some evidence in the

record", or is "otherwise arbitrary." Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying

"some evidence" standard used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (same). The evidence underlying the

Board’s decision must also have "some indicia of reliability." McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904;

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The some evidence standard identified in Hill is clearly established

federal law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. 

2. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

In a line of relatively recent cases the Ninth Circuit has discussed the constitutionality of

denying parole when the only basis for denial is the circumstances of the offense. See Hayward

v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, (9th cir. 2008); Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 852-54 (9th Cir.

2007); Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-17 (9th Cir. 2003).

In Biggs the court said that it might violate due process if the Board were to continue to

deny parole to a prisoner because of the facts of his or her offense and in the face of evidence of

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1 The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the

record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1129 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined

in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985).

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rehabilitation. 334 F.3d at 916-17. No legal rationale for this statement was provided, and it

was unclear whether the court was suggesting that the continued denial of parole would be a

new sort of due process violation or whether it was simply expressing the thought that with the

passage of time the nature of the offense could cease to be “some evidence” that the prisoner

would be a danger if paroled.1

 This ambiguity was helpfully cleared up in Irons, where the

court clearly treated a “some evidence” claim as different from a “Biggs claim.” Irons, 505

F.3d at 853-54. It appears, putting together the brief discussions in Biggs and Irons, that the

court meant that at some point denial of parole based on long-ago and unchangeable factors,

when overwhelmed with positive evidence of rehabilitation, would be fundamentally unfair and

violate due process. As the dissenters from denial of rehearing en banc in Irons point out, in the

Ninth Circuit what otherwise might be dictum is controlling authority if the issue was presented

and decided, even if not strictly “necessary” to the decision. Irons v. Carey, 506 F.3d 951, —

(9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2007) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing and discussing

Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 751 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

Depending on whether the discussion of dictum in the dissent from denial of rehearing

en banc in Irons is correct, it thus may be that the Ninth Circuit has recognized at due process

right which for convenience will be referred to in this opinion as a “Biggs claim.” Here

petitioner contends that it was a violation of his due process rights for the Board to deny parole 

based on the circumstances of his offense and without regard to his rehabilitation. This will be

treated as two claims, one a Biggs claim, the second a more conventional contention that there

was not “some evidence” to support the decision.

a. “BIGGS CLAIM”

Petitioner has failed to establish the predicate for his Biggs claim. Petitioner’s parole

was not denied solely because of the circumstances of his offense, but also because of his

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involvement in 1996 in a prison-based fraudulent income tax scheme (Exh. C at 50-53, 75), and

because his rehabilitation gains were relatively recent (id. at 76). Although the 1996 criminal

activity was relatively old, it did indicate that he was still criminally-inclined at a date long after

his incarceration. In addition, the due process right putatively recognized in Biggs is not

clearly-established United States Supreme Court authority, so cannot be the basis for habeas

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (habeas relief cannot be granted unless state court decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority). 

The Biggs claim fails.

b. SOME EVIDENCE

Ascertaining whether the some evidence standard is met "does not require examination

of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; Sass,

461 F.3d at 1128. The some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that "the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457).

Petitioner committed the murder for which he is incarcerated in 1980 (Exh. C. at 16). 

He was in an argument with the victim and left the scene (id. at 14). The victim followed him,

and others on petitioner’s block attached the victim, beating him (id. at 17-24). Evidently the

appellate decision indicates that petitioner participated in this beating, but petitioner denies it

(id. at 12-14). The point is minor, however, because petitioner concedes that he left the scene,

got a shotgun, returned to the scene and shot and killed the victim (id. at 24). 

These events occurred twenty-four years before the parole hearing at issue here, greatly

reducing their value as evidence of petitioner’s present danger to society. On the other hand,

petitioner’s conduct was exceptionally callous and indicates that at that time he was a very

dangerous person. When petitioner’s participation in criminal activity in prison in 1996 and the

relatively recent nature of his rehabilitation gains is added to the evidentiary value of this longago conduct, the Court concludes that there was marginally “some evidence” to support the

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denial of parole. There was no due process violation. 

CONCLUSION

Because petitioner’s rights were not violated, the rejection of these claims by the state

courts was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established United States

Supreme Court authority. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1 , 2008. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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