Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00440/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00440-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 15cv440 JM(PCL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS: GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND

v.

CITY OF IMPERIAL; IMPERIAL

POLICE DEPARTMENT; MIGUEL

COLON; and MARLENE BEST,

Defendants.

Defendant City of Imperial (“City”) moves to dismiss the civil rights cause of

action based upon the complaint’s failure to adequately allege municipal liability. 

Plaintiff Robert Martinez partially opposes the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 1

7.1(d)(1), the court finds the matter presented appropriate for resolution without oral

argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants City’s motion to dismiss

the civil rights claim, grants the motion to dismiss the Imperial Police Department as

an improper defendant, and grants Plaintiff 15 days leave to amend from the date of

entry of this order.

BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2015, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants City,

Imperial Police Department, Police Chief Miguel Colon, and City Manager Marlene

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Imperial Police Department is an improper

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defendant.

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Best by alleging two causes of action for (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 against all

Defendants and (2) violation of Gov’t Code §§3300 et seq., 3502, 3506 and Labor

Code §1102.5 against the City. 

Until his termination in August 2014, Plaintiff was a police officer with the

Imperial Police Department. Defendant Colon is the Police Chief and Marlene Best

the City Manager. The Complaint alleges that “Police Chief Colon is a tyrant, who

repeatedly rules thorough fear, intimidation and retaliation.” (Compl. ¶8). In April

2014, Colon allegedly ordered officers to attend a church service in uniform. Plaintiff

voiced concern about supporting a religious organization while on duty and in uniform. 

Plaintiff was allowed to not attend the service. (Compl. ¶9). Colon also allegedly

criticized Plaintiff for attending the criminal trial of a friend while not on duty and not

dressed in uniform. In May 2014, Plaintiff allegedly voiced his concern thatColon was

“allowing officers to work in the field, by themselves, with absolutely no immediate

back up of any kind available,” thus creating a risk to officer safety. (Compl. ¶10). 

The next month, Plaintiff complained to the City that Colon was allegedly “defrauding

the military by charging the military for police personnel who were supposed to be

guarding a (military) crash site,” but were not guarding the site. (Compl. ¶11).

Allegedly, without conducting an “investigation of any kind,” on July 8, 2014,

Colon provided notice to Plaintiff that he was being terminated because he “failed to

turn in reports timely.” (Compl. ¶14). Plaintiff alleges that Colon “completely

deprived [him] of due process of law.” Id. On July 29, 2014, Plaintiff allegedly

appeared at an administrative hearing. The next day, Colon issued a final notice of

discipline, reducing the termination to a suspension. Plaintiff then appealed the

suspension. Upon learning of the appeal, “Colon became enraged and told [Plaintiff]

and his attorney that because [Plaintiff] exercised his appeal rights of the suspension

he had decided to revert back to his termination.” (Compl. ¶19).

With respect toCity,Plaintiff alleges that “City delegated its final policy-making

authority (with respect to all Police Department employment relations) to Defendants

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Colon and Best.” The City also allegedly “adopted and ratified each of [the decisions

of Colon and Best] as its own policies, customs, practices or decisions, as if the same

had been promulgated directly by City.” (Compl. ¶4).

City moves to dismiss the §1983 claim on grounds the Monell allegations fail

to state a claim for municipal liability. Plaintiff opposes the motion and requests leave

to amend.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly

suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

(under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer the

mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The defect must appear

on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material

in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th

Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of

the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Further, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

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plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed,

116 S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept astrue all material allegations

in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

Pleading Civil Rights Claims

Prior to Iqbal and Twombly, “a claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more

than a bare allegation that the individual officer’s conduct conformed to official policy,

custom, or practice.” Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir.2007). In

addressing the impact of Iqbal and Twombly on the pleading standards for civil rights

cases, the Ninth Circuit recently stated:

we can at least state the following two principles common to all of them.

First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint

or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action,

but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.

Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly

suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued

litigation.

AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631,637 (9 Cir. 2012) (quoting th

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir.2011)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s reliance upon

Whitaker for the proposition that conclusory pleading is sufficient to state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 is misplaced.

The Motion

City claims that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for municipal liability. Under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person” who acts under color ofstate law may be sued. The

term “person” has been interpreted broadly, even to include cities, counties, and other

local government entities. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658 (1978). Municipalities, their agencies and their supervisory personnel

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cannot be held liable under section 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability. They can, however, be held liable for deprivations of constitutional

rights resulting from their formal policies or customs. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-

693; Watts v. County of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001); Shaw v.

California Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 1986).

Locating a “policy” ensures that a municipality “is held liable only for those

deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of

those officials whose acts may be fairly said to be those of the municipality.” Board

of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04

(1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a

“custom” which has not been “formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may

fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so

widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691); see

also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (holding that municipal

liability under § 1983 may be shown if Plaintiff provesthat an employee committed an

alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a “longstanding practice or custom which

constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local government entity.”) 

In Board of the County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397 (1997) the Supreme Court made the causal prerequisite clear: “it is not

enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the

municipality . . . [t]he plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is,

a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of

culpability and must demonstrate a causal link between the municipal action and the

deprivation of federal rights.” Id. at 404 (italics in original).

“To bring a § 1983 claimagainst a local government entity, a plaintiff must plead

that a ‘municipality’s policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff's

constitutional rights.” Ass’n for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

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648 F.3d 986, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff must show (1) he possessed a

constitutional right of which he was deprived, (2) the municipality had a policy, (3) the

policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right, and (4)

the policy is the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Anderson v.

Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). “For a policy to be the moving force

behind the deprivation of a constitutional right, the identified deficiency in the policy

must be closely related to the ultimate injury,” and the plaintiff must establish “that the

injury would have been avoided had proper policies been implemented.” Long v. Cnty.

of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, the complaint’s allegations are too generalized and conclusory to state a

claim. Plaintiff does nothing more than parrot the requirementsfor municipal liability. 

Plaintiff alleges that the “City delegated its final policy-making authority to Defendants

Best and Colon” and that “City adopted and ratified each of their decisions as alleged

herein as its own policies, customs, practices or decisions, as if the same had been

promulgated directly by the City.” (Compl. ¶4). Both individual Defendants allegedly

acted “within the course and scope of [their] employment, as official policy-maker[s]

for the City and/or the Department.” (Compl. ¶5). However, such allegations fail to

establish a claim beyond the speculative level. “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state

a claim. Iqbal, 56 U.S. at 662. 

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss and grants Plaintiff 15 days leave

to amend from the date of entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 26, 2015

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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