Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00005/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONG LIU; YUHONG HUANG,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

v. DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary of U.S.

Department of Homeland Security; ROBERT

S. MUELLER; Director of Federal Bureau of

Investigation; EMILIO GONZALES,

Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services; and CHRISTINA POULOS, Acting

Director, California Service Center, U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services,

Defendants.

On January 9, 2007, pro se plaintiffs Dong Liu and Yuhong Huang (“Plaintiffs”) filed a 

complaint seeking to have defendants Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”), Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”),

Emilio Gonzalez, Director of United States Citizen and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and

Christina Poulos, Acting Director, California Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services (“CSC”) (collectively “Defendants”) properly adjudicate Plaintiffs’ I-485 applications to

register permanent residence or adjust status. (Doc. No. 1.) Presently before the Court is

defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 5.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants’ motion.

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Plaintiff Dong Liu also filed a Form I-140 (immigration petition for alien worker), which

was approved on March 31, 2005. 

- 2 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are natives and citizens of China. (Compl.¶ 2.) On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs each

filed I-485 applications to register permanent residence or adjust status with USCIS.1 Id. After

filing their adjustment applications, Plaintiffs made multiple inquires of Defendants seeking

information regarding the status of their respective applications. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs also sought

assistance from their United States Senator and local Congressional representative. (Id. ¶ 12.) In

the course of Plaintiffs’ correspondence with USCIS, Plaintiffs learned that their FBI name check

results (one of the necessary investigative steps in processing Plaintiffs’ applications) were still

pending. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs allege that the required FBI checks have been pending for over two

years and that Defendants have failed to process the applications towards final adjudication. Id. 

Plaintiffs request this Court: 1) order the FBI to expedite the background investigations; and 2)

order the CSC to adjudicate their applications. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

B. Procedural Background

On January 9, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to have Defendants properly

adjudicate their I-485 applications to register permanent residence or adjust status. (Doc. No. 1.)

On March 20, 2007, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 5.) On April 10, 2007,

Plaintiffs filed their opposition. (Doc. No. 8.) On April 17, 2007, Defendants filed a reply. (Doc.

No. 9.) The matter is now fully briefed, and the Court finds it appropriate for disposition without

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ entire suit against them under Rule 12(b)(1)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and under Rule

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction of the court over the

subject matter of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction and possess ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Sandpiper

Village Condominium Ass’n., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 428 F.3d 831, 841 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Limits upon federal jurisdiction must not be disregarded or evaded. See Owen Equipment &

Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). “A federal court is presumed to lack

jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” A-Z Intern. v. Phillips,

323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted). It is the burden of

plaintiffs to persuade the Court that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Hexom v. Oregon Dept.

of Transp., 177 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999).

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be “facial” or “factual.”

See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) cert. denied 544 U.S.

1018 (2005). A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in the

complaint. See Id. In contrast, a factual attack challenges the substance of a complaint’s

jurisdictional allegations. See St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir.1989). If the

defendant brings a facial attack, a district court must assume that the factual allegations in the

complaint are true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Love v.

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir.1990). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted if, on

its face, the complaint fails to allege grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction as required by

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc. 328

F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.2003).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims

asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th

Cir. 2001). Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a claim when the claim lacks a cognizable legal

theory or there are insufficient facts alleged to support plaintiff's theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). In considering the sufficiency of a complaint

under Rule 12(b)(6), courts cannot grant a motion to dismiss “unless it appears beyond doubt that

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id.

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all

well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether plaintiff can prove any set of

facts to support a claim that would merit relief. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir.1996). If a complaint is found to fail to state a claim, the court should grant leave

to amend unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of

other facts. See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.1995). 

The Court recognizes the mandate to construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally in

determining whether a claim has been stated. See Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon,

88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff asserts three statutory bases for subject matter jurisdiction: 1) mandamus

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361; 2) the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et

seq. (“APA”); and 3) the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (“DJA”). (Compl. 

¶ 7.) Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that none of these statutes vest the court with subject

matter jurisdiction in this case.

1. Mandamus Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that § 1361 does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over USCIS’s

adjudication of Plaintiffs’ I-485 applications because USCIS’s duty is discretionary. Title 28

U.S.C. § 1361 states that the District courts have original jurisdiction over “any action in the

nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof

to perform a duty owed to a plaintiff.” A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is

available where: (1) the individual's claim is clear and certain; (2) the official’s duty is

nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and (3) no other

adequate remedy is available. See Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir.2003); see also

Wilmot v. Doyle, 403 F.2d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 1968) (“Mandamus will lie only to compel

ministerial duty plainly defined by law and not to compel an exercise of discretion.”). Nor may

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

mandamus be used to instruct an official how to exercise his or her discretion. See Wilmot v.

Doyle, 403 F.2d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 1968). Furthermore, the district court has discretion to not

issue a writ of mandamus even where the prerequisites have been satisfied. See San Jose Mercury

News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F. 3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiffs’ filed their I-485 applications pursuant to § 245 of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The statute states in relevant part:

The status of an alien . . . may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion

and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully

admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such

adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to

the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is

immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). The Court, however, is limited in its review of discretionary decisions or

actions of USCIS regarding I-485 applications pursuant to section 242 of the INA. The statute

states in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including. .

. section[ ] 1361 . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to review--

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title,

or

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be

in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,

other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). These statutes taken together illustrate Congress’ intent to preclude

the courts from reviewing discretionary decisions or actions of the USCIS to include I-485

applications. 

Defendants argue that their discretion also extends to the pace of adjudicating Plaintiffs’

applications. In furtherance of their position, Defendants note the absence of any statutes or

regulations which limit the time the Department of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, or

the FBI must act in adjudicating an I-485 application. See 8 C.F.R. § 245 et seq.; Compare 8

U.S.C. § 1447(b) (requiring USCIS to make a determination on a naturalization application within

120 days after it conducts a naturalization examination). Plaintiffs maintain, however, that

Defendants’ discretion extends only to the final determination of their applications. Plaintiffs

argue that Defendants duty to “process the application[s] within a reasonable time” is nonCase 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

discretionary. (Pls. Opp’n at 5.) 

Defendants have provided the declaration of Wendy S. Clark, the Acting Assistant Center

Director with the USCIS’ CSC. (Decl. Wendy S. Clark, ISO Defs. Mot. Dismiss. Ex. A, hereafter,

“Clark Decl.”) Ms. Clark attests that she has reviewed the records regarding Plaintiff Dong Liu’s

I-485 application, and that to date, required security checks have yet to be completed, preventing

USCIS from adjudicating Plaintiffs’ applications. (Clark Decl. ¶ 14.) While the security checks

have been completed for Plaintiff Yuhong Huang, she is an accompanying spouse and not

otherwise entitled to an immigrant status or immigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d); therefore,

her application cannot be adjudicated independently. Id. Both applications will be adjudicated

once the required security checks are completed for Plaintiff Dong Liu. Id. 

Before a decision is rendered on an alien’s application to adjust status, USCIS (in

conjunction with the FBI) conducts several forms of security and background checks to ensure that

the alien is eligible for the benefit sought and that he or she does not pose a risk to national

security or public safety. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) These checks enhance national security and ensure the

integrity of the immigration process by screening out aliens who may seek to harm the United

States and its citizens. Id. These checks include: 1) an FBI name check that is run against FBI

investigative databases, which is compiled by law enforcement agencies and includes

administrative, applicant, criminal, personnel, and other files; 2) an FBI fingerprint check that

provides information regarding an applicant’s criminal background within the United States; and

3) a check against the Interagency Border Inspection System, which contains records and

information from over 20 federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies that is used inter alia

to compile information regarding national security risks, public safety concerns, and other law

enforcement concerns. (Id. ¶ 4; USCIS Fact Sheet, ISO Defs. Mot. Dismiss. Ex. 1 at 2, hereafter,

“USCIS Fact Sheet.”) 

The CSC receives approximately 5000 I-485 applications monthly and currently has 30,000

I-485 applications awaiting adjudication. (Clark Decl. ¶ 6.) Ms. Clark explains that sometimes a

lengthy delay is unavoidable because the security check may reveal derogatory information on the

subject alien. (Id. ¶ 10.) That derogatory information is sometimes possessed by another

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

government agency and the substance of that information is not always revealed. Id. Even after

all of the known information from government agencies is collected, further investigation may still

be required. Id.

Ms. Clark also explains that aliens who have applied for adjustment of status may apply for

and obtain employment authorizations for the entire time their application is pending. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

Applicants for adjustment of status can also apply for and obtain advance parole to enable them to

travel abroad during the pendency of their applications. Id.

 The federal courts have recently become inundated with naturalization actions seeking

declaratory relief as is the case here. Some district courts have determined that the pace at which

USCIS adjudicates I-485 applications is discretionary. Accordingly, district courts should not

consider whether USCIS is adjudicating I-485 applications at a reasonable pace under § 1361.

See, e.g., Grinberg v. Swacina, __ F.Supp.2d __ 2007 WL 840109, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (holding

that sections 242 and 245 of the INA preclude judicial review of any discretionary “decision or

action” of the Attorney General in immigration matters including the pace at which immigration

decisions are made.); Safadi v. Howard, 466 F.Supp.2d 696, 698-700 (E.D. Va.2006) (finding no

jurisdiction under § 1361 because § 1255(a) grants USCIS discretion over the entire process of

adjustment application adjudication and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of any

“action,” meaning any act or series of acts, to include the pace at which that action proceeds); 

Mustafa v. Pasquerell, 2006 WL 488399 at *4 (concluding that the proper focus is whether

Plaintiffs have a clear right to an immediate or expedited adjudication of their petition and

application; if the timing of the relief sought is a matter within the discretion of the agency, there is

no clear right to relief.); Li v. Chertoff , __F.Supp.2d ___ *5 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (concluding that as

long as USCIS is making reasonable efforts to complete the adjudication, the pace required to

complete that process is committed to their discretion.). 

Other district courts’ decisions have fallen on the other end of the spectrum with opposite

conclusions. These courts allege that USCIS failed to adjudicate immigration applications within

a reasonable period of time and have found jurisdiction to hear a mandamus suit because to hold

otherwise would allow USCIS to potentially delay adjudicating immigration applications

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 The Court makes no determination whether a district court could ever have mandamus

jurisdiction under § 1361 to hear a petition to compel USCIS to adjudicate an I-485 application.

- 8 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

indefinitely. See, e.g., Gelfer v. Chertoff, WL 902382 *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007) (“Allowing

the respondents a limitless amount of time to adjudicate petitioner's [I-485] application would be

contrary to the ‘reasonable time’ frame mandated under 5 U.S.C. 555(b) and, ultimately, could

negate the USCIS’s duty under 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a) (5)”); See Singh v. Still, 470 F.Supp.2d 1064,

1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“petitioners whose applications for adjustment in status are properly before

the INS ... have a right, enforceable through a writ of mandamus, to have the applications

processed within a reasonable time.”).

Without any Ninth Circuit law addressing the immigration issue presented here, this Court

elects to follow the majority of courts that have dismissed similar actions for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. As long as USCIS continues to make reasonable efforts to complete Plaintiffs’ I-485

applications, the pace required to complete that process is committed to their discretion.2

 See Li,

__F.Supp.2d ___ at *5 . Even accepting all of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, Defendants

have provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the delay results from the increased national

security issues and not agency inaction. Given the myriad of concerns facing law enforcement and

national security in this post 9/11 world, Defendants’ delay appears to be reasonable. “What

constitutes an unreasonable delay in the context of immigration applications depends to a great

extent on the facts of the particular case.” Gelfer v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 902382 * 3 (N.D. Cal.

2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Accordingly, this Court concludes that it does not

presently have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs’ mandamus petition under § 1361

regarding USCIS’s discretionary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ I-485 applications. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for writ of mandamus based on the

Court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is therefore granted without prejudice.

2. Jurisdiction Under the Administrative Procedure Act

To invoke jurisdiction under the APA, a petitioner must show that (1) an agency had a

nondiscretionary duty to act and (2) the agency unreasonably delayed in acting on that duty. See 

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-65 (2004). “[A] person suffering

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within

the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 702. This

includes judicial review to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 

28 U.S.C. § 706(1). Plaintiffs argue that these statutes, in combination with the federal question

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provide jurisdiction for the Court to hear their complaint.

“Failures to act are sometimes remediable under the APA, but not always.” Norton v.

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004). “[A] claim under § 706(1) can

proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it

is required to take.” Id. at 64 (emphasis in original). The essential allegation, that the action is

“unreasonably delayed” is not a ground for jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court noted, “a delay

cannot be unreasonable with respect to action that is not required.” Norton, 524 U.S. at 63, n. 1.

Therefore, a court only has jurisdiction to compel an agency to act within a certain time period

under the APA when the agency is compelled by law to act within a certain time period. See id.

Plaintiffs contend that the Court should implement a “reasonable time period” standard and

compel Defendants to process their naturalization applications. However, no statute or regulation

dictates a time period within which USCIS must act. The only governing time limit is the APA’s

directive that agencies resolve matters within a reasonable time. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (providing

that each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it with due regard for the

convenience and necessity of the parties and within a reasonable time). This regulation clearly

affords wide discretion to USCIS in matters relating to the pace of the adjudication of I-485

applications. Plaintiffs have failed to identify any statute or regulation requiring the FBI and/or

USCIS to complete their name checks in any period of time, reasonable or not. Therefore, the

Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to judicially impose new heightened requirements on the

administrative agency charged with adjudication of naturalization applications. 

The Court further concludes that 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes district courts

from reviewing any discretionary act of USCIS, precludes this Court from reviewing whether

Defendants have adjudicated Plaintiff's I-485 application within a reasonable period of time under

the APA. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

review under the APA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

3. Jurisdiction Under Declaratory Judgment Act

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (the DJA) states that “any court of the United States, upon the filing

of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party

seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” Although the DJA

enlarged the range of remedies available in federal courts, it did not extend federal courts’

jurisdiction. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). The DJA

does not establish a new basis for jurisdiction in the federal courts, but merely establishes a new

remedy, available in cases in which jurisdiction otherwise exists. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330

F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1964). Since the Court has previously concluded that it does not presently

have either mandamus jurisdiction or jurisdiction under the APA, the DJA does not confer

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for

review under the DJA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Conclusion

The Court concludes that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ suit

under a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the APA, or the DJA. Accordingly, the

Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ entire suit. 

Because the Court concludes it lacks mandamus jurisdiction based on the declaration of

Wendy S. Clark stating that Plaintiffs’ I-485 applications are delayed pending the completion of

required security checks for Plaintiff Dong Liu, the motion is granted without prejudice.

C. Failure to State a Claim

Since the Court has concluded that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’

case, it declines to address whether Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 07CV0005 BEN (WMC)

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants’

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 30, 2007

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00005-BEN-WMC Document 11 Filed 04/30/07 Page 11 of 11