Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-01574/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-01574-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KORY T. O’BRIEN,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

GIBSON, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:21-cv-01574-ADA-GSA-PC

 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE 

PROCEED WITH PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL 

COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANTS 

GIBSON, MARONEY, REHMAN, RICHEY, 

AND CDCR ON THE CLAIMS FOUND 

COGNIZABLE BY THE COURT, AND 

THAT ALL OTHER CLAIMS AND 

DEFENDANTS BE DISMISSED FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

[ECF No. 1.]

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE ON OR 

BEFORE OCTOBER 13, 2023

I. BACKGROUND

Kory T. O’Brien (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and 

Case 1:21-cv-01574-KES-GSA Document 28 Filed 09/25/23 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Institutionalized Persons Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing 

this action on October 25, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) 

On August 11, 2023, the Court screened the original Complaint and issued an order 

finding that Plaintiff states the following cognizable claims: 

#1. Against Defendant Connie Gibson under the First Amendment Free Exercise 

Clause in her individual capacity for monetary damages, and under RLUIPA in 

her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief; 

#2. Against Defendant C. Maroney under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause

in Maroney’s individual capacity for monetary damages;

#3. Against Defendant Z. Rehman under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause 

in Rehman’s individual capacity for money damages;

#4. Against Defendant Charles Richey under the First Amendment Free Exercise 

Clause in his individual capacity for money damages, and under RLUIPA in his

official capacity for prospective injunctive relief; and

#5. Against Defendant CDCR under RLUIPI in CDCR’s official capacity for 

prospective injunctive relief.

(ECF No. 25.)

Pursuant to the screening order, Plaintiff was required to either: (1) File an Amended 

Complaint, curing the deficiencies found in the original Complaint by the Court, or (2) Notify 

the Court in writing that he wishes to proceed with the original Complaint with only the 

cognizable claims enumerated above as #1-#5, on or before September 15, 2023. (Id.) On 

August 14, 2023, the Court issued a subsequent order informing Plaintiff that he had a third

choice in responding to the screening order. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff was informed that he may 

choose to stand on the original Complaint, despite its deficiencies, and if Plaintiff made this 

choice the Court would recommend to the District Judge that Plaintiff’s case proceed with the 

original Complaint, but only with the cognizable claims enumerated above as #1-#5, and that all 

other claims and defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Id.)

On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response to the screening order. (ECF No. 27.)

Case 1:21-cv-01574-KES-GSA Document 28 Filed 09/25/23 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO THE SCREENING ORDER

In his response, Plaintiff informed the Court that he wishes to stand on the original 

Complaint as written, with (1) the First Amended Free Exercise claims against Defendants 

Gibson, Maroney, Richey, and Rehman, and (2) the RLUIPA claim against Defendants CDCR, 

Gibson, and Richey. Plaintiff also informed the Court that he agrees with the Court’s 

recommendation to dismiss the equal protection claim. However, Plaintiff disagrees with the 

Court’s recommendation that his state claims be dismissed based on the Court’s finding that he 

had not demonstrated compliance with the requirements of California’s Government Claims Act. 

Plaintiff argues that he is not required to show evidence that he exhausted those remedies because 

the Court is required to accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe the allegations in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that he has already met his burden to allege 

exhaustion and it is now up to Defendants to address the issue of exhaustion of the Government 

Claims Program’s requirements. Thus, Plaintiff argues that the Court should take supplemental 

jurisdiction of his state law claims.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff is mistaken that he is not required to demonstrate his compliance with the 

requirements of the Government Claims Act before the Court can take supplemental jurisdiction 

of his state law claims. As discussed in the screening order, “[t]imely claim presentation is not 

merely a procedural requirement, but is . . . a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an 

action against defendant and thus an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Lopez v. Cate, 

No. 1:10- cv-01773-AWI, 2015 WL 1293450, at *13 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code 

§§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2) (emphasis added). Independent of Plaintiff’s obligation 

to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Plaintiff has an 

obligation to comply with the Government Claims Act, and timely claim presentation is not 

merely a procedural requirement, but is a condition precedent to Plaintiff’s maintaining state law 

claims against Defendants and thus an element of Plaintiff’s cause of action. Id.; McCoy v. 

Torres, No. 119CV01023NONEJLTPC, 2020 WL 5257842, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020), 

Case 1:21-cv-01574-KES-GSA Document 28 Filed 09/25/23 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

report and recommendation adopted, No. 119CV01023NONEJLTPC, 2021 WL 111748 (E.D. 

Cal. Jan. 12, 2021) (citing McPherson v. Alamo, No. 3:15-cv-03145-EMC, 2016 WL 7157634, 

at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Parthemore v. Col, 221 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1376 (2013)) (emphasis 

added).

Plaintiff states in the Complaint that he “has exhausted the California Government Claims 

Program.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) However, this statement is a mere legal conclusion and is 

insufficient to show compliance. See Cardenas v. Cty. of Tehama, No. 218CV03021TLNDMC, 

2020 WL 4475188, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2020). Plaintiff has not provided the claim as an 

attachment to the Complaint, nor has he indicated when he filed the claim or what specific facts 

and causes of action were referred to in the claim. See id. Without such information Plaintiff has 

not sufficiently pleaded facts demonstrating he complied with the California Government Claims 

Act in bringing his state law claims. Id. Therefore, the Court shall recommend that Plaintiff’s 

state law claims be dismissed for his failure to show compliance with the Government Claims 

Act.

Accordingly, the Court shall recommend that this case proceed only with the claims found 

cognizable by the Court in the August 11, 2023 screening order, enumerated above as #1-#5, and 

that all other claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff states cognizable claims in 

the original Complaint against the following, but no other claims against any of the Defendants:

#1. Against Defendant Connie Gibson under the First Amendment Free Exercise 

Clause in her individual capacity for monetary damages, and under RLUIPA in 

her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief; 

#2. Against Defendant C. Maroney under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause

in Maroney’s individual capacity for monetary damages;

#3. Against Defendant Z. Rehman under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause 

in Rehman’s individual capacity for money damages;

Case 1:21-cv-01574-KES-GSA Document 28 Filed 09/25/23 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

#4. Against Defendant Charles Richey under the First Amendment Free Exercise 

Clause in his individual capacity for money damages, and under RLUIPA in his

official capacity for prospective injunctive relief; and

#5. Against Defendant CDCR under RLUIPI in CDCR’s official capacity for 

prospective injunctive relief.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This case proceed with the original Complaint, with only the claims found 

cognizable by the Court, enumerated above as #1-#5;

2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state 

a claim; 

3. Plaintiff’s state law claims and his claims for violation of equal protection be 

dismissed from this case; and

4. This case be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings, 

including initiation of service of process.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). On or before 

October 13, 2023, Plaintiff may file written objections with the court. Such a document should 

be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 

on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 

923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 24, 2023 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:21-cv-01574-KES-GSA Document 28 Filed 09/25/23 Page 5 of 5