Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01534/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01534-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The following facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal in

People v. Davis, H022399 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 210456), unpublished.

Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SCOTT DAVIS,

 Defendant,

 v.

THOMAS L. CAREY, Warden of California State

Prison, Solano,

 Plaintiff.

Case Number C 04-1534 JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. BACKGROUND1

On December 28, 1998, Petitioner Scott Davis (“Davis”) was involved in an automobile

accident that resulted in the deaths of four teenagers. Davis was traveling in his black Acura on

Highways 87, 85, and 101, driving recklessly and at high speeds. On the southbound side of

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

Highway 101 near the Cochrane exit, Davis collided with another vehicle, a Chevy pickup truck,

driven by Nader Afshar. Upon impact, the truck went through the center median, crossed over

into the northbound lanes, and crashed head-on into a Toyota. A Honda then crashed into the

Chevy truck, and a minivan hit the Honda. The four teenage passengers in the Toyota were

killed, and Ashfar and two others were hospitalized. Davis left the scene.

The following morning, Davis called a friend, Pamela Bradt, and explained to her that he

had been in an accident and needed to be picked up. He told Bradt that he fled the scene and had

been hiding in the bushes because he was “under the influence,” did not have a driver’s license,

and had outstanding warrants. Davis also informed Bradt that he wanted to locate his car

because he had methamphetamine hidden in the engine compartment and wanted to retrieve it. 

Bradt contacted the Highway Patrol to report Davis’s call. Later that day police officers arrested

Davis at a home after he had tried to escape and then struggled with the officers. Davis tested

positively for methamphetamine. 

Prior to trial, the state trial court held in limine proceedings to determine the admissibility

of five prior acts of driving misconduct by Davis: a 1991 conviction for driving under the

influence of methamphetamine and cocaine when Davis was stopped for speeding, drove away

from an officer, and crashed into a tree; a 1996 incident in which Davis drove through a

crosswalk and hit a high school student; a 1998 conviction for being under the influence of a

stimulant when Davis fishtailed out of a parking lot at night without lights on; a 1998 incident in

which Davis had used methamphetamine and hit a deer in the road after passengers had

expressed concern about his driving; and a 1998 incident in which Davis was driving in a

residential area, tried to pass a car on the right, and crashed into the car and a tree. Respondent

argued that the evidence was relevant to (1) Davis’s mental state for purposes of the implied

malice element of murder (knowledge and appreciation of the risk of dangerous driving), and (2)

the objective standard for lesser-included vehicular manslaughter charges. 

Davis challenged the admission of the prior acts, arguing that they were not sufficiently

similar to the acts alleged in the charged offenses to prove whether he had acted with implied

malice. The trial court overruled Davis’s objections and allowed the evidence to be presented at

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

trial.

Davis also sought an order to bar testimony from Pamela Bradt with respect to Davis’s

stay in prison during the 1980's. The trial court issued an order barring such testimony. At trial,

however, during Bradt’s direct testimony, the prosecutor asked, “[d]id you see [Davis] more or

less on a regular basis the entire time you knew him or was it sporadic?” Bradt replied, “[n]o, I

seen him quite often when he was in prison, and out when he got out of prison back in the ‘80s,

and then I didn’t see him for about seven or eight years when I was in recovery.” After a sidebar

conference, the trial court ordered the statement stricken from the record and instructed the jury

to disregard Bradt’s testimony concerning prison. Davis later moved for a mistrial, and the court

denied the motion.

On August 23, 2000 a Santa Clara Superior Court jury found Davis guilty of four counts

of second degree murder in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 187(b); three counts of reckless

driving causing injury with a specified prior in violation of Cal. Vehicle Code § 23104(b); three

counts of methamphetamine-related offenses (transportation, possession, and being under the

influence) in violation of Health and Safety Code §§ 11379(a), 11377(a) and 11550(a),

respectively; resisting an officer in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 69; battery in violation of Cal.

Penal Code §§ 242, 243(b); and driving with a suspended license in violation of Cal. Vehicle

Code § 14601.1. Davis also was found to have suffered a prior “strike” conviction for first

degree burglary within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 667(a),(b)-(i). The trial court

sentenced Davis to consecutive terms of thirty years to life for the four counts of second-degree

murder, which were consecutive to a determinate term of sixteen years, and four months on the

remaining counts of conviction. 

Direct Appeal: 

Davis filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District,

raising the following arguments: 

(1) the court erred in admitting evidence of prior incidents; (2) the court erred in

admitting Ms. Bradt’s testimony that Mr. Davis admitted being under the

influence because there was no corpus delicti; and (3) the prosecutor’s failure to

warn Bradt to avoid stating appellant had been in prison was a misconduct and the

court’s denial of a mistrial when the comment was made was error. 

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The matter was taken under submission without oral argument upon completion of the

briefing pursuant to Civ. L. R. 2254-8.

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

(Appellant Br.). The Court of Appeal affirmed Davis’s convictions in an unpublished opinion

filed on November 7, 2002. The California Supreme Court denied Davis’s petition for review on

January 22, 2003. 

Habeas Petition: 

Davis filed the instant habeas petition in this Court on April 20, 2004, asserting that the

trial court violated his rights to due process and a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments by (1) admitting evidence of his prior acts of driving misconduct and (2) denying

his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard testimony regarding his prior imprisonment. The

matter having been fully briefed and all of the parties’ arguments having been considered, the

Court concludes that the petition is without merit and should be denied.2

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if

the state court reaches a decision different from that reached by the Supreme Court on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A state court’s

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 This Court looks to the decision of the highest court to address the merits in

determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the defendant’s case. Id. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

A state court’s decision is based upon “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented” when the state court fails to consider and weigh highly probative,

relevant evidence, central to the defendant’s claim, that was properly presented and made part of

the state-court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) This Court must

presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the defendant

rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Evidence of Other Crimes. 

Davis first claims that the state trial court deprived him of due process by admitting

evidence of five prior acts of his driving misconduct. Davis contends that the prior acts were not

sufficiently similar to the charged offense to justify the admission of any evidence with respect

to them at trial under Cal. Evid. Code § 1101 and that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting the evidence under Cal. Evid. Code § 352. He further argues that allowing the jury to

consider his prior acts was improper because the evidence gave rise to an impermissible

inference that he “had a character trait of having a propensity to drive badly.”

The last reasoned state court decision on this issue is the decision of the California Court

of Appeal dated November 7, 2002.3

 The Court of Appeal observed that, “on appeal, the trial

court’s determination of whether to admit prior conduct evidence under Evidence Code section

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

1101, ‘being essentially a determination of relevance, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

[Citations] [¶] . . . [¶] A court abuses its discretion when its ruling ‘falls outside the bounds of

reason.’ [Citation]’” (citing People v. Kipp, 18 Cal.4th 349, 369, 371 (1998)). The court further

explained that absent a clear showing that the trial court’s determination was irrational or

arbitrary, its decision should not be set aside on review. (Citing People v. Preyer, 164

Cal.App.3d 568, 573-74 (1985)). The court found that the prior acts were purposely offered to

show Davis’s knowledge that certain conduct is life threatening in order prove the required

element of implied malice in connection with a charge of second degree murder. The appellate

court concluded that the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence was a rational exercise of its

discretion, and that the prejudicial impact of the evidence did not outweigh its probative value. 

The balancing of prejudice and probative value primarily is a task for the trial court in its

discretion, and absent a clear showing of abuse, its determination will be upheld. See People v.

Sassounian, 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 402 (1986). 

Davis asserts that the appropriate standard for reviewing the admission of evidence in

this case is not abuse of discretion but rather whether the prosecution can establish beyond a

reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967). This assertion is incorrect. In Chapman, the trial court relied on a then-existing

provision in the California Constitution that allowed the prosecution to comment on defendants’

failure to testify and to instruct the jury to draw inferences of defendants’ guilt from the lack of

testimony. Id. at 19. After the trial, but prior to appeal, the United States Supreme Court held

that the provision in question resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of the rights afforded

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 615

(1965). In light of this holding, the defendants challenged their convictions on the grounds that

allowing comment on their failure to testify was not harmless error because they suffered a

violation of their constitutional rights. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20. The Supreme Court held that

“before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a

belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 24.

By its terms, Chapman presupposes a federal constitutional error, and sets forth the

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

standard to apply in order to determine whether that error warrants a reversal. In this case,

however, the issue addressed by the state appellate court was not whether an error of

constitutional dimension was harmless, but whether there was error at all. The court properly

noted that unless the application of a state evidentiary rule offends a fundamental principle of

justice or is so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair, there can be no due process

violation. 

Davis also argues that the state appellate court’s determination was unreasonable. 

However, that court’s determination that because the prior incidents involved Davis “causing or

being involved in an accident, reckless incident, or injury to a pedestrian while driving,” it was

not irrational to find that each act was “highly relevant to show that defendant knew that reckless

driving endangered life,” Id. was entirely reasonable. Nor was it unreasonable for the court to

conclude that the prior acts evidence had significant probative value, or that it was well within

the trial court’s discretion to decide whether that probative value outweighed any prejudicial

effect. See Sassounian, 182 Cal.App.3d at 402. 

The Court of Appeal focused particularly on the prejudicial effect of the incident

involving the high school student. Davis argues that this incident was not sufficiently similar to

the charged offense to be probative, and was so prejudicial that its exclusion was warranted. The

appellate court looked to People v. Olguin, 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1369 (1994), which stated that

“[e]vidence code section 352 is designed for situations in which evidence of little evidentiary

impact evokes an emotional bias.” The court concluded that any emotional bias in this case was

insignificant because “the high school incident was considerably less inflammatory than the

evidence of the charged offenses.” 

Relying upon Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948), Davis argues that

evidence of his bad character should have been excluded, not because it was irrelevant, but

because it would prejudice the jury. He asserts that the evidence of the uncharged high school

incident caused the jury to prejudge him, thus denying him a fair trial. However, on habeas

review this Court does not apply the same standard as the state appellate court. "[A] federal

court cannot disturb on due process grounds a state court's decision to admit prior bad acts

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

evidence unless the admission of the evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the

trial fundamentally unfair." Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). There is no

indication here that the state appellate court’s decision to defer to the trial court’s discretion was

so “arbitrary or prejudicial” that it amounted to a violation of Davis’ due process rights. 

B. Denial of Motion for a Mistrial Based on Prosecutorial Misconduct.

Davis’s second claim is that the trial court violated his due process rights by denying his

motion for a mistrial after Ms. Bradt, in violation of the trial court’s in limine ruling, made

reference to the fact that Davis had been in prison. Davis argues that the prosecution’s failure to

warn Bradt against mentioning the fact that he had been in prison amounted to prosecutorial

misconduct. Davis also contends that such misconduct violated his right to due process because

the admission of the evidence prejudiced the jury. The state appellate court concluded that Davis

failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct and that any prejudice that might have been caused

by the testimony was cured by the trial court's admonition to the jury. 

Pursuant to controlling Supreme Court authority, the sole inquiry in determining whether

alleged prosecutorial misconduct violated a defendant's federal constitutional rights is whether 

the prosecutors' comments "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (citing

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)). The appropriate standard of review is the "the

narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power." Darden, 477 U.S.

at 181 citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642. In finding that the trial court did not unreasonably deny

Davis’ motion for a mistrial, the state appellate court looked to the trial court’s observations and

reactions to assess the impact of Bradt’s testimony on the jury. The trial court was not convinced

that the jury was surprised by the prison testimony and further held that its instruction to the jury

to disregard the testimony was sufficient to prevent undue prejudice. The Court of Appeal

pointed out that the jury already knew from other evidence that Davis had a serious criminal

background, and Davis himself stated in a recorded police interview played at trial that he had

been arrested and locked up many times. Based on these factors, the court held that the trial court

reasonably could have determined that any prejudice resulting from Bradt’s testimony could be

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

cured adequately by the admonition.

This Court finds no support in the record for Davis’s contention that Bradt’s testimony

was so prejudicial as to warrant a finding that the testimony “so infected the trial with unfairness

as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (citing

Donnelly, 416 U.S. 637). Davis fails to show that the denial of his motion for a mistrial “resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

III. ORDER 

 Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court finds and concludes that Petitioner has failed

to show any violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly,

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the

file. 

DATED: _________________________________

______________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C-04-1534-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(JFEX2)

Copies of Order have been served upon the following persons:

Counsel for Petitioner:

Dennis P. Riordan 

dennis@Riordan-Horgan.com 

Counsel for Respondent:

Peggy S. Ruffra 

peggy.ruffra@doj.ca.gov, DocketingSFAWT@doj.ca.gov 

Case 5:04-cv-01534-JF Document 40 Filed 04/20/07 Page 10 of 10