Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01185/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 09CV1185 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFERSON SISON,

Petitioner,

v.

LARRY SMALL, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 09-1185-BEN(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

On May 29, 2009, Petitioner Jefferson Sison (hereafter

“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereafter

“Petition”). Respondent Larry Small (hereafter “Respondent”) filed

an Answer to the Petition. Petitioner filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer. The Court, having reviewed the Petition, the Answer,

the Traverse and the documents lodged therewith, find that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 15, 2005 in the San Diego Superior Court, Petitioner

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28 1/ All references to code sections are to the California Penal Code,

unless otherwise noted.

2 09CV1185 

was convicted of one count of carjacking [Cal. Penal Code §215(a)]1/,

one count of attempted carjacking [§§215(a), 664] and one count of

first degree murder [§187(a)]. The jury also found that Petitioner

personally used a firearm during the commission of the carjacking

[§12022.5(a), 12022.53(c)], that he personally used and personally

discharged a firearm during the commission of the attempted

carjacking [§12022.5(a), 12022.53(c)], that a principal was armed

with a firearm during the commission of the murder [§12022(a)(1)]

and the murder was in the commission or attempted commission of a

robbery. [§190.2(a)(17)] (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 141-145).

On October 6, 2005, the court sentenced Petitioner to a

determinate term of 28 years and six months imprisonment, and a term

of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 474-475, Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at

1725, 1728).

Petitioner appealed the judgment. On November 13, 2007, the

California Court of Appeal reversed the carjacking conviction and

otherwise affirmed the judgment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3).

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Court of

Appeal’s decision in the California Supreme Court. On February 27,

2008, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review

without comment or citation to authority. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

5).

On May 29, 2009, Petitioner filed the Petition that is now

before the Court. On September 16, 2009, Respondent filed an Answer

to the Petition. On November 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a Traverse

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to Respondent’s Answer.

B. STATEMENT OF FACTS

 This Statement of Facts is taken substantially from the

California Court of Appeal unpublished opinion, People v. Martin, et

al., No. D047341 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. Div. 1, Nov. 13,

2007)(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3). This Court relies on these

facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Park v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,

35-36 (1992). (holding findings of historical fact, including

inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness).

1. Arnquist Carjacking

On December 28, 2003, at 10:45 PM, Steven Arnquist (hereafter

“Arnquist”) was driving a black Honda Civic, equipped with a premium

stereo system, 17-inch chrome wheel rims and low profile tires, when

he stopped at an automatic teller machine in a parking lot of a

shopping center in Spring Valley, California. Arnquist’s fiancee,

Taneisha Taylor (hereafter “Taylor”) was a passenger in the vehicle.

When Arnquist realized that he had not signed the check he planned

to deposit in the automatic teller machine, he returned to his car

and sat in the driver’s seat to sign the check. The driver’s side

door was open. Taylor stood outside the car next to him.

Suddenly, two men ran up to Arnquist and Taylor. Taylor began

to scream. One man held a gun to Arnquist’s face and told him to

hand over his wallet. Arnquist complied. The man ordered Arnquist

to get up, but when Arnquist began to stand up, the man hit him with

the gun and pushed him. The other man opened the passenger side

door and ordered Arnquist to pop open the trunk with the trunk

release lever, give the car keys to the first man and get out of the

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car. Arnquist complied. The second man then grabbed Taylor’s hair,

held a gun to her head, pulled her to the back of the car and

ordered her to get in the trunk.

Virgilio Villegas (hereafter “Villegas”), who had just left

a grocery store in the shopping center, noticed a commotion in the

parking lot and drove toward it. When he saw a woman on the ground,

he started honking his horn at, and flashing his headlights on, the

people near Arnquist’s vehicle. When the man holding Taylor heard

Villegas’ car’s horn, he released her and said “Let’s get out of

here,” and entered Arnquist’s vehicle and drove away. Villegas

called 911 and drove Arnquist and Taylor to a Sheriff’s substation

nearby.

Arnquist described the first man who approached him as more

husky than the second man who approached him. Arnquist further

described the men as Asian, approximately five feet, eight inches to

five feet, ten inches tall, and weighing between 200 and 225 pounds.

Taylor thought the men were Filipino or Mexican. Both men wore

hooded sweatshirts and masks. One of the men wore camouflage-type

pants.

The following day, Petitioner’s co-defendant Robbie Martin

(hereafter “Martin”), who worked as a security guard at the Sycuan

casino, told two of his co-workers, Curtis Kellas (hereafter

“Kellas”) and Joseph DeBenedetti (hereafter “DeBenedetti”), about a

recent Spring Valley carjacking in which he and his partner held two

people at gunpoint and took their vehicle. According to

DeBenedetti, Martin described how he enjoyed the carjacking “from

start to finish.” Martin drew a street map of the shopping center.

Petitioner, who was present during the conversation with

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DeBenedetti, glanced at the map and nodded his head. Martin said

”Oh, hey, I was talking about what we did the other night...You know

what I mean? Petitioner responded “Oh, yep, yep.” According to

DeBenedetti, Petitioner did not seem surprised and displayed a “ha

ha ha, hee, hee, yep, that kind of attitude.”

On December 30, 2003, Sheriff’s Deputies recovered Arnquist’s

vehicle from a residential area in Spring Valley. The vehicle no

longer had the premium stereo system, wheels or rims. The axle was

bent and the car could not be driven properly.

In May 2004, Arnquist and Taylor were shown photographic

line-ups. At first, Arnquist did not recognize any of the persons

depicted in the photographs he was shown. However, after Arnquist

looked at the photographs a second time, he pointed to the picture

of Martin. Arnquist said that the photograph of Martin looked

familiar and could have been one of the men involved in the

carjacking. Taylor was unable to identify Petitioner or Martin from

the photographs that she was shown. At trial, Arnquist could not

identify either Petitioner or Martin.

2. King Attempted Carjacking and Attempted Murder

On March 4, 2004, Martin arranged a meeting with Benjamin

King (hereafter “King”), from whom he was purchasing anabolic

steroids. At about 9:15 PM that evening, King was sitting in his

vehicle with his motor running at the appointed location for the

meeting, when he saw two people approaching from the rear. One man,

whom King later identified as Martin, walked up to the passenger

side of the vehicle and knocked on the window. King motioned for

the man to get into the vehicle. The man stepped back, pulled a

bandana over his face, opened the passenger side door, stuck a gun

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in King’s face, and ordered to King to get out of the vehicle. At

the same time, the other man, who King later identified as Petitioner, opened the driver’s side door and hit King with a gun. King

released the emergency brake and floored the gas pedal. When the

vehicle began to move, Martin, who was partially in the vehicle,

fired a shot at King. The bullet hit the post behind King’s head,

but shrapnel struck King in the shoulder. Petitioner fired a shot

at King, but missed. King quickly drove away.

King had never met Martin before. All of their discussions

leading to Martin’s purchasing of steroids had been on the telephone. Martin was referred to King by DeBenedetti. After the

attempted carjacking, King left DeBenedetti a voice mail message. In

the voice mail message, King told DeBenedetti not to tell Martin

anything about him. That night, King did not contact law enforcement authorities because he believed that the authorities would not

do anything and because he did not want to get in trouble for

selling steroids. The following day, King changed his mind and

contacted the authorities.

In late March 2004, Sheriff Detective Douglas Akers (hereafter “Akers”) received information from Sycuan casino about a

carjacking that occurred on December 28, 2003. Sycuan put Akers in

touch with Kellas and DeBenedetti. Kellas gave Akers a pocket-sized

digital recorder with a recording of portions of the conversation

between him, DeBenedetti and Martin. During Akers’ interviews with

Kellas and DeBenedetti, Akers learned about the attempted carjacking

of King.

On March 24, 2004, Akers interviewed King, examined the

vehicle King had been driving on March 4, 2004 and showed King two

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photographic line-ups. King identified Petitioner in one of the

photographic line-ups that he was shown. In the other photographic

line-up, King initially said that the photograph of Martin looked

like the other man who attempted to carjack his car, but was

thinner. Ultimately, King selected the photograph of another man in

the line-up as the second assailant. At the preliminary hearing and

at trial, King identified Petitioner and Martin as the assailants.

On April 20, 2004, Sheriff’s Deputies arrested Petitioner and

Martin. Akers told Martin that he was a suspect in the Arnquist

carjacking. At first, Martin denied participation in the

carjacking. Martin also denied knowing King. After Akers showed

Martin cellular phone records indicating that he and King had

numerous telephone calls with each other, Martin said that he was

trying to buy steroids from King. After Akers played the recording

of the conversation Martin had with Kellas and DeBenedetti, Martin

admitted that he had carjacked Arnquist’s vehicle.

Akers also questioned Petitioner. Petitioner denied knowing

King. After Akers confronted Petitioner with a piece of paper found

in Petitioner’s car that had King’s name and cellular phone number

on it, Petitioner admitted that he knew King. When Akers played the

recording of Martin telling Kellas and DeBenedetti about the

Arnquist carjacking, Petitioner denied participation in the crime.

Petitioner said that in the recording, Martin was not referring to

him.

3. Luna Murder

On April 8, 2004, Francisco Luna (hereafter “Luna”) owned and

was driving a black Lexus with 20-inch Diablo wheel rims, which was

equipped with a flip-up dashboard television, a passenger side visor

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television, and a driver’s side visor television. On that day, Luna

had told his girlfriend and his cousin that he was going to look at

a gun he wanted to buy.

On April 9, 2004, a bicyclist on International Road in south

San Diego saw shell casings, blood and drag marks on the road. It

was later determined from the casings that the gun that was used was

.380 caliber. The bicyclist followed the drag marks to a brush area

and discovered a dead body underneath a piece of carpet. The body

appeared to have been dragged to where the bicyclist found it. San

Diego Police later identified the victim as Luna. An autopsy on the

body revealed that the cause of death was gunshots to head and body.

Jason McDaniel (hereafter “McDaniel”) was a friend of Luna

and Martin. McDaniel contacted the police and told them that a few

days before Luna was killed, Martin had asked him about Luna.

Martin wanted to know if Luna carried a gun and who might back up

Luna if he got into trouble or was confronted by gang members.

McDaniel said that he had not thought much about Martin’s questions

at the time, but after Luna was killed, he immediately connected the

conversation with Martin to Luna’s killing. McDaniel also said that

a few days after Luna’s killing, Martin visited him and asked him if

he wanted to buy wheel rims. The wheel rims were the same as those

on Luna’s Lexus.

After McDaniel was interviewed, Detective Jonathan Smith

conducted a background check on Martin and discovered that Martin

had been employed at Sycuan casino and was in custody for a

carjacking and shooting in Spring Valley.

On May 7, 2004, another detective interviewed Thomas

DiFrancesco (hereafter “DiFrancesco”), a slot machine attendant at

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the Sycuan casino. At first, DiFrancesco denied knowing anything

about Luna’s Lexus and Luna’s killing. The detective persuaded

DiFrancesco to tell him what he knew about the Luna killing.

DiFrancesco told the detective that he had a conversation with

Martin and had taken Martin to where Luna’s Lexus was found.

DiFrancesco showed the detective where the Lexus was found.

DiFrancesco agreed to be interviewed at police headquarters.

At police headquarters, he said that there was another person with

Martin, who he thought was named “Jeff.” Jeff arrived in the black

Lexus with shiny wheel rims. Jeff went to a liquor store to obtain

a crate to put under the Lexus after the tires were removed. He

said that Martin became frustrated with Jeff because Jeff did not

know how to “jack up” a car, so Martin pushed Jeff out of the way to

do it himself. The wheel rims were removed and placed in the back

of Martin’s car.

On June 9, 2004, another detective interviewed DiFrancesco.

At first, DiFrancesco denied going to Martin’s residence on the

night Luna was killed. However, after the detective persuaded him to

tell him what he knew about the Luna killing, DiFrancesco started

crying and asked “What if I witnessed something?” Then DiFrancesco

admitted that he was there when Luna was killed, but did not know

the killing was going to happen. He told the detective that he heard

Martin describe the gun as a .380 caliber gun. Thereafter, he

showed detectives where Luna was killed, where his truck and Luna’s

Lexus had been parked, how he and the others walked into the field,

where each person was standing and where the gun fire began.

In October 2004, DiFrancesco was informed that he would not

be prosecuted for stripping Luna’s Lexus or disposing of the stolen

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property from the Lexus.

At trial, DiFrancesco was the prosecution’s chief witness. He

testified as follows:

On April 8, 2004, he called Martin to inquire about stereo equipment that Martin

was selling. During the conversation,

Martin asked him if he knew anyone who

wanted to buy a gun. Throughout the day, he

and Martin talked several more times.

Martin invited him to come to his house at

11:00 PM. Martin also instructed him to

say, “I forgot it,” when he arrived.

He drove to Martin’s residence, where Martin, Petitioner and Luna were standing

outside. Martin asked him “Did you bring

it?” He had forgotten Martin’s instruction

and said “Bring what?”

Martin introduced him to Luna and they

discussed Luna purchasing a gun from Martin. When Luna went to his car to get

something, Petitioner pulled a gun from his

waistband and handed it to Martin, who

tucked the gun in his waistband. Petitioner said, “Here, you do it.” When Luna

came back to the group, he wanted to make

sure that the gun worked properly, so the

group decided to go somewhere to test fire

the gun. The group left Martin’s residence.

Petitioner rode with DiFrancesco in

DiFrancesco’s truck and Martin and Luna

left in Luna’s Lexus with Martin driving.

The group drove to a secluded area near the

international border, parked and began to

walk on an unpaved road along a river bed.

Martin left the group and walked up an

embankment. Petitioner walked into some

bushes. Martin suddenly turned around and

fired a gun at Luna. As Luna tried to run,

Martin shot him in the back. Martin chased

Luna while he continued to shoot at him.

Petitioner came out of the bushes and

started to chase Luna. After the shooting

stopped, it appeared that Martin and Petitioner were tugging at Luna’s leg. Martin

came back to where DiFrancesco was standing

and Petitioner followed, but was limping.

Martin, Petitioner and DiFrancesco returned

to the vehicles. Martin drove with

DiFrancesco and told Petitioner to drive 

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Luna’s Lexus. The Lexus was driven to “The

Spot,” a street in a residential area of

Spring Valley where cars are frequently

stripped. They decided not to strip the

car at that time. Martin told DiFrancesco

to go home.

On April 9, 2004, between 1:30 and 2:00 AM,

Martin called Saroun Morn, a co-worker at

the Sycuan casino and asked if Morn had a

garage where he could store a Lexus. Morn

thought he heard a voice in the background

which he thought was Petitioner’s voice.

Morn told Martin that he did not know of

any place to store a Lexus.

Later that morning, DiFrancesco met with

Martin and Petitioner. They went to an

apartment complex in El Cajon, California,

where Petitioner parked Luna’s Lexus in an

alley. DiFrancesco watched as Martin and

Petitioner, both of whom were wearing

gloves, stripped down the Lexus. Martin

and Petitioner removed the wheel rims and

put them in the back of DiFrancesco’s

truck. Other items from the Lexus were put

in Martin’s vehicle. The stripped Lexus

was left in the alley.

Sometime in April 2004, Martin tried to

sell 20-inch Diablo chrome wheel rims to

some co-workers in the employee parking lot

of the Sycuan casino. Martin said that the

wheel rims were from a Lexus.

The prosecution also presented Martin’s cellular phone

records, which indicated that he drove from Spring Valley to south

San Diego on two separate occasions between the late night hours of

April 8, 2004 and the early morning hours of April 9, 2004. The

records showed a large number of calls between Martin and Petitioner

and Martin and DiFrancesco during those hours.

4. Martin’s Defense

Martin admitted that he carjacked Arnquist’s vehicle on

December 28, 2003.

Martin also admitted that he made plans to buy steroids from

King on March 4, 2004. However, he sent Petitioner and DiFrancesco

to meet King and make the purchase because his girlfriend was

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expecting him that night. Martin testified that he spent that night

with his girlfriend and did not see Petitioner or DiFrancesco until

the next day. The next day, Martin asked Petitioner, who he had

given $200 for the steroid purchase, if he had the steroids. Martin

stated that Petitioner told him that he and DiFrancesco had tried to

“jack” the car, but they “fucked up.” Martin’s girlfriend testified

that he spent the evening with her and that she was sure because of

an entry she placed in her journal.

Martin denied having anything to do with Luna’s killing. He

stated that Luna wanted to buy a gun and that he knew that

DiFrancesco had a gun for sale. Martin arranged to be the “middle

man” in the gun sale. Luna, Petitioner and DiFrancesco were present

at the gun sale site. After Luna said that he wanted to go

somewhere to test fire the gun, Martin left to sell some stolen

radios that Petitioner had brought to Martin. Martin said that he

was informed by telephone that Luna and DiFrancesco could not find

a location to test fire the gun and suggested that DiFrancesco

“hook-up” with Petitioner. Petitioner later called Martin and

suggested that Petitioner meet Martin at a field near the international border. Martin said that he could not find the location, so

he went home and called DiFrancesco at 12:44 AM to find out whether

DiFrancesco had sold the gun to Luna. DiFrancesco told Martin that

Luna did not buy the gun, but asked for Martin’s help in finding a

garage to house a car that he had just carjacked.

Martin met DiFrancesco and Petitioner in a Spring Valley

shopping center. The three of them exited the parking lot and left

Luna’s Lexus at “The Spot” (an area in Spring Valley where many

stolen cars are brought to be stripped) for the rest of the night.

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The next day, Martin, Petitioner and DiFrancesco stripped the

Lexus in an alley near DiFrancesco’s residence. Martin did not know

the Lexus was Luna’s car until a few days later, when McDaniel told

him that Luna had been killed.

5. Petitioner’s Defense

Petitioner denied participating in the Arnquist carjacking on

December 28, 2003. He testified that on that evening, long-time

friends had visited him and brought a gift for his daughter.

Petitioner said that Martin lied when he testified he talked to

Petitioner about stripping Arnquist’s car the day after the

carjacking. Petitioner said that Martin bragged about carjackings

all the time. Petitioner said that if he heard Martin say anything

about Petitioner’s involvement in the crimes, he would have denied

any participation, and would have called Martin a liar.

Petitioner denied that he had anything to do with the

attempted carjacking of King. Petitioner said that Martin had given

him King’s telephone number because he was interested in working out

and Martin suggested he use steroids. Petitioner said that he was

with his girlfriend in their apartment on the night of the King

attempted carjacking.

Petitioner denied anything to do with Luna or Luna’s car. He

testified that on the night of Luna’s killing, he spent the night

with his girlfriend in their apartment watching wrestling on

television. When the wrestling program ended, Petitioner went

outside to smoke a cigarette with his neighbor Sandra Washington.

Washington testified that she saw Petitioner on his porch smoking a

cigarette between 10:00 PM and 10:30 PM on the night of Luna’s

murder.

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C. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. Each ground is

based on an alleged violation of his right to due process guaranteed

by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.

In Ground One, Petitioner contends that the joinder of the

Arnquist and King carjacking counts with the Luna murder count

resulted in an unfair trial.

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that the joinder of Martin

as a co-defendant at his trial resulted in an unfair trial.

In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was an aider and abettor in the

murder of Luna.

In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that the aggregate effect

of the joinder of the charges and the joint trial with Martin, along

with other trial errors, cumulatively prejudiced him.

D. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction over a

petition for writ of habeas corpus to lie, the petition must allege

that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. The

current petition was filed on May 29, 2009 and is therefore governed

by the AEDPA. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must

satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets

§ 2254(d)(1)and (2) as follows:

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Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court’s decision may be found to be “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme court precedent: (1) “if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from the [the

court’s] precedent.” Id. at 405-406; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 72-75 (2003). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case,” or, “if the state court either unreasonably

extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where

it should not apply or unreasonably extends a legal principle from

our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where

it should apply.” Williams, 539 U.S. at 407; Andrade, 538 U.S. at

76. 

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

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16 09CV1185 

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled in part by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74-77). 

E. GROUND ONE: JOINDER OF COUNTS

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his 5th and

14th Amendment rights to due process when it denied his motion to

sever the carjacking charges from the murder charge. (Pet. at 6,

Memo of Points & Authorities at 13-17). Respondent asserts that

joinder of the charges did not result in an unfair trial.

1. Background

The prosecution charged Petitioner and Martin with the

Arnquist carjacking, and the King attempted carjacking and attempted

murder. (Respondent Lodgment No. 1 at 14-19). In a separate case,

the prosecution charged Petitioner and Martin with the murder of

Luna. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 403-408). Thereafter, the

prosecution filed a Motion to Consolidate the two cases. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 35-43). Petitioner filed an Opposition to

the Motion. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 64-69). Martin also

filed an Opposition to the Motion. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at

46-60). The court granted the Motion to Consolidate the charges.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 6-14).

\\

\\

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2. Consolidation of the Carjacking and Murder Charges Did Not 

 Violate Petitioner’s Constitutional Rights

The California Court of Appeal’s opinion in Petitioner’s

direct appeal is the last reasoned state court determination of the

merits of Petitioner’s claim. Notwithstanding the fact that

Petitioner conceded that the charges were eligible for joinder, the

California Court of Appeal found consolidation of the charges was

appropriate because, notwithstanding the fact that Petitioner

conceded that the charges were eligible for joinder: (1) carjacking,

attempted murder and murder were in the same class of crimes, as

each is an assaultive crime against a person; (2) all of the charges

arose out of Petitioner’s and Martin’s desire to steal cars by using

deadly force, that the carjackings; and (3) attempted murder and

murder showed Petitioner’s and Martin’s common scheme or plan to

accomplish their goals, which is relevant to their intent, and that

they acted in accordance with their common scheme or plan. Further,

the court noted that the crimes were sufficiently similar in that

they were all violent, serious and equally repugnant. In the

Arnquist carjacking, Petitioner tried to put Taylor in the trunk of

the car when he was interrupted by Villegas. Had Villegas not

interrupted the carjacking, Taylor’s fate could have been as bad as

Luna’s fate. In the attempted carjacking of King, Petitioner and

Martin fired gunshots at King at close range. Had it not been for

King’s quick reaction in leaving the scene, he too could have been

murdered. Consequently, Luna’s murder was not likely to inflame the

jury any more than any of the other charges. Moreover, the Court of

Appeal found that all of the charges against Petitioner and Martin

were strong, so there was not a “spill-over” effect of joining a

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18 09CV1185 

weak charge with a strong charge, which could have ultimately

altered the outcome of some or all of the charges. Moreover, the

jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the charge of attempted

murder of King demonstrates the jury’s capacity to compartmentalize

and consider each count independently. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3

at 27-32).

Improper joinder does not, in itself, violate the U.S.

Constitution. Rather, misjoinder would rise to the level of a

constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as

to deny a defendant his Firth Amendment right to a fair trial. U.S.

v. Lane 414 U.S. 438, 446, n. 8 (1986). This prejudice is shown if

the impermissible joinder had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Sandoval v. Calderon

241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000). Courts have recognized that the

risk of prejudice is great whenever joinder of charges allows

evidence of other crimes to be introduced in a trial where the

evidence would otherwise be inadmissible. See U.S. v. Lewis 787 F.2d

1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1986). Prejudice may also arise from the

joinder of a strong evidentiary case with a weaker one. There is

danger in both situations because it is difficult for a jury to

compartmentalize the damaging information. See Bean v. Calderon 163

F.3d 1073, 1084-1085 (9th Cir. 1998).

“The propriety of a consolidation rests with the sound

discretion of the state trial judge. The simultaneous trial of more

than one offense must actually render (a) petitioner’s state trial

fundamentally unfair and hence violative of due process before

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 would be appropriate.”

Featherstone v. Estelle 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1989), citing

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Tribbitt v. Wainwright 540 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.

denied 430 U.S. 910 (1977). “In considering whether a violation of

due process has occurred, the emphasis must be on the word ‘actually;’ for, viewed clearly, it is only the consequences of joinder,

over which the trial judge has much control, and not the joinder

itself, which may render the trial ‘fundamentally unfair.’” Herrring

v. Meachum 11 F.3d 374, 377 (2nd Cir. 1993). Therefore, if a

petitioner claims a due process violation based on joinder of

offenses, he must prove that actual prejudice resulted from the

joinder. Tribbitt 540 F.2d at 841., see Opper v. U.S. 348 U.S. 84,

94-95 (1954).

Here, the Court does not find any prejudice, much less actual

prejudice in the joinder of the carjacking, attempted murder and

murder charges. Moreover, the Court does not find that the joinder

of the charges had a substantial or injurious effect or influence on

the jury’s verdict. The crimes with which Petitioner and Martin

were charged were all violent crimes against a person while using

guns. The evidence of the carjackings, attempted murder and murder

were all indicative of Petitioner’s and Martin’s scheme or plan to

steal cars from their drivers, with the use of guns to accomplish

the thefts. In furtherance of Petitioner’s and Martin’s scheme or

plan, Petitioner provided Martin with the gun which was used to

murder Luna, at which time Petitioner acknowledged, by saying to

Martin, “Here, you do it,” meaning that Martin would shoot Luna.

Petitioner, together with Martin, chased Luna after Martin began

shooting at Luna; Petitioner helped Martin drag Luna’s body to where

it was found and put carpet over Luna’s body in an effort to conceal

it; and Petitioner drove Luna’s vehicle away from the murder scene

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20 09CV1185 

to one location, and on the next day, drove Luna’s vehicle to

another location where he helped Martin strip it.

Further, the Court is not convinced that Petitioner’s

conviction for the murder of Luna was affected by a “spill-over” of

the evidence presented for the carjacking and attempted carjacking

convictions. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Significant

evidence would have been cross-admissible if the carjacking charges

were separated from the murder charge. Evidence of the attempted

carjacking and attempted murder of King would have been admissible

to show that Petitioner and Martin committed carjackings and that

Luna’s murder was part of their common scheme or plan to steal cars

from their drivers by using deadly force. Moreover, the evidence

was relevant to show Petitioner’s and Martin’s intent and that

Petitioner and Martin acted in accordance with their common scheme

or plan. Therefore, Petitioner’s attempt to separate the carjackings

charges from the murder charge, is unsupported.

The record in this case reflects that both the carjackings

and the murder arose out of Petitioner’s and Martin’s common scheme

or plan to steal vehicles by using gun violence to intimidate or

kill the drivers of the vehicles. One such act in furtherance of

that common scheme or plan resulted in the murder of one of the

drivers of a vehicle that they targeted for theft. Another act in

furtherance of their common scheme or plan resulted in a failed

attempt to kill the driver of a vehicle targeted for theft. In

order to give the jury the complete picture of what transpired at

each of the carjackings and the murder, significant evidence of each

offense was relevant and cross-admissible had the cases been tried

separately. As a result, the is no indication that the consolidaCase 3:09-cv-01185-BEN-WVG Document 15 Filed 12/30/09 Page 20 of 32
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21 09CV1185 

tion of the carjacking and murder charges resulted in any prejudice

to Petitioner, or that joinder of the charges had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Therefore,

the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner’s trial was fundamentally

unfair. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim

in this regard be DENIED.

F. GROUND TWO: JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS

Petitioner claims that his rights to due process under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the trial court

denied his motion to sever his trial from the trial of his codefendant Martin. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the joint

trial was fundamentally unfair because Martin presented a defense

that was entirely antagonistic to his defense in that Martin accused

and blamed Petitioner for the alleged crimes. (Petition at 7, Points

and Authorities at 18-20). Respondent argues that the denial of the

motion to sever Petitioner’s trial from Martin’s trial did not

result in an unfair trial.

1. Background

Prior to trial, Petitioner moved to sever his trial from the

trial of his co-defendant Martin. A hearing was held, and the

motion was denied. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9 at 20-26)

2. Denial of Petitioner’s Motion To Sever His Trial From His

Co-Defendant’s Trial Did Not Violate Petitioner’s

Constitutional Rights

The California Court of Appeal’s opinion in Petitioner’s

direct appeal is the last reasoned state court determination of the

merits of Petitioner’s claim. The Court of Appeal found that denial

of Petitioner’s motion for severance was appropriate. The Court of

Appeal considered the holdings in People v. Aranda 63 Cal. 2d 518

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2/ In People v. Aranda, The California Supreme Court held that the

admission at trial of a non-testifying co-defendant’s out-of-court

confession, which inculpates the defendant, is not rendered harmless

by a jury instruction that the evidence should not be considered

against the defendant. Further, if the defendants are tried

together, the statement must be redacted to remove direct and

indirect identification of the defendant, or it must be excluded

altogether.

In Bruton v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court held that introduction at

trial of an incriminating extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying co-defendant violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right to cross-examination, even though the jury is instructed to

disregard the statement in determining the defendant’s guilt or

innocence. 

22 09CV1185 

(1965), Bruton v. U.S. 391 U.S. 123 (1968) and Zafiro v. U.S. 506

U.S. 534 (1992)2/ in finding the denial of the motion to sever to be

sound. Further, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor agreed

not to present at trial Martin’s statements that were violative of

the holdings of Aranda and Bruton. Rather, the prosecutor said he

would present, and did present, only some of Martin’s post-arrest

admissions that specifically implicated Martin, and no one else.

Further, the prosecutor said he would not present, and did not

present, Martin’s pre-arrest evasive statements, arguably adoptive

admissions, that implicated Petitioner. Petitioner acknowledged that

severance was unnecessary in light of the prosecutor’s representation to abide by the holdings of Aranda and Bruton. The Court of

Appeal concluded that under the circumstances presented, the trial

court properly denied Petitioner’s motion for severance.

In Zafiro v. U.S. 506 U.S. 534 (1992), and Lane, supra, the

U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of misjoinder in the

context of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Fed. R. Crim. P.”),

Rule 8. In Zafiro and Lane, the Court applied federal constitutional principles in its discussion of misjoinder and severance

under Rule 8. In Lane, the Supreme Court noted that “the specific

joinder standards of Rule 8 are not themselves of constitutional

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3/ Fed R. Crim P. 14(a) states in pertinent part:

If the joinder of... defendants in an indictment, an information, or

a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant... the

court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’

trials or provide other relief that justice requires.

23 09CV1185 

magnitude.” Lane, 414 U.S. at 446, n. 8. However, the Court also

stated that “misjoinder would give rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny

a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Id. Further,

in Zafiro, the Court explained the relationship between the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure and general fair trial principles:

(I)t is well settled that defendants are not entitled

to severance merely because they may have a better

chance of acquittal in separate trials. Rules 8(b)and

14 are designed ‘to promote economy and efficiency and

to avoid a multiplicity of trials, (so long as) these

objectives can be achieved without substantial prejudice to the right of the defendants to a fair trial.’

Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, citing Bruton, supra. (other citations

omitted.)

Fed. R. Crim P. 8(b) states in pertinent part:

The indictment or information may charge 2 or more

defendants if they are alleged to have participated in

the same act... or in the same series of acts...,

constituting an offense or offenses...

There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials

of defendants who are indicted together. Joint trials promote

efficiency and serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts. Zafiro 506 U.S. at 537.

However, in interpreting Fed. R. Crim P. 143/, federal courts

have recognized that “mutually antagonistic” or “irreconcilable”

defenses may be so prejudicial in some circumstances to mandate

severance. Nevertheless, courts have reversed relatively few

convictions for failure to grant severance on grounds of mutually

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4/ The Court of Appeal does not address what impact, if any, the jury’s

decision to convict on this count, where the evidence was constitutionally

insufficient, spilled over and poisoned the jury’s ability to objectively and

independently consider the evidence regarding the other counts. However, as

noted earlier, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder (of

King) charge which reflects its diligent effort to compartmentalize the evidence.

As the Court of Appeal noted, the evidence was overwhelming against Petitioner

on the remaining counts. Accordingly, this Court concludes that Petitioner was

not prejudiced by the joinder of the Arnquist carjacking.

24 09CV1185 

antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses. Id. at 538.

The Zafiro court held that “when defendants are properly

joined under Rule 8(b) district court should grant a severance under

Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would

compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or

prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or

innocence.” Id. at 539.

Here the California Court of Appeal identified and correctly

applied the applicable United States Supreme Court law. In so

doing, it reversed Petitioner’s conviction for the Arnquist

carjacking because the only evidence linking Petitioner to that

carjacking was Martin’s statement to Kellas and DeBenedetti that

Petitioner assisted him in committing the carjacking, and that

Petitioner concurred in Martin’s statement. On the other hand, the

evidence against Martin was overwhelming. Martin confessed to the

Arnquist carjacking after he heard Kellas’ tape recording of him

boasting about it. Additionally, the eye witness identification

evidence of Petitioner was very weak in that Arnquist and Taylor

could not identify Petitioner as one of the men involved in the

carjacking. As a result, the Court of Appeal concluded that had

Martin’s statement not been introduced at trial, there was little,

if any, evidence with which the jury could have found Petitioner

guilty of the carjacking.4/

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Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal, applying the same United

States Supreme Court precedent, found Petitioner’s convictions for

the attempted carjacking of King and the murder of Luna to be

justified and correct under constitutional standards.

In the King attempted carjacking, the independent evidence

against Petitioner was strong. King positively identified Petitioner in a photographic line-up, at the preliminary hearing and at

trial, as the man who tried to carjack his car. King testified that

he did not know Petitioner. Further, a piece of paper with King’s

name and phone number on it was found in Petitioner’s car and

Petitioner gave incredible explanations for having that piece of

paper in his car. Moreover, Petitioner’s conviction was not reliant

upon anything that Martin allegedly said.

In the Luna murder, the evidence supporting Petitioner’s

conviction as an aider and abettor in the murder was very strong.

DiFrancesco testified that Petitioner gave Martin the murder weapon

and told Martin,”Here, you do it.” DiFrancesco testified that after

Martin began shooting at and chasing Luna, Petitioner joined in the

chase. DiFrancesco further testified that after Luna was killed,

Petitioner helped Martin drag Luna’s body to where it was concealed.

Additionally, Petitioner drove Luna’s Lexus away from the murder

scene. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC

No. 17.00, which directs the jury to separately consider each

defendant. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 243)

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. The Court of

Appeal correctly identified and applied the controlling United

States Supreme Court precedent in overturning one of Petitioner’s

convictions for carjacking, but affirming the other convictions for

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attempted carjacking and murder. 

In the King attempted carjacking and the Luna murder, there

was strong independent evidence that Petitioner committed both

crimes. Any statements made by Martin were not used as the

evidence with which the jury found Petitioner guilty. Instead,

Petitioner’s own words and actions supplied the evidence with which

to convict him of the King attempted carjacking and the Luna murder.

Therefore, the Court concludes that even if Petitioner and Martin

had mutually antagonistic defenses, Petitioner was not prejudiced by

being tried with Martin in a joint trial. Moreover, any prejudice

that Petitioner may have suffered as a result of the Arnquist

carjacking conviction was remedied by the California Court of

Appeal. As a result, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim. The Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this regard

be DENIED. 

G. GROUND THREE: SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction for the murder of Luna on an aider and

abettor theory. Respondent argues that there was sufficient

evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for the murder of Luna.

The clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of

the evidence claims is set forth by the United States Supreme Court

in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See Mitchell v.

Prunty, 107 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other

grounds by Santamaria v. Horsley, 133 F.3d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc). In Jackson, the Court held that the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, and an applicant is

entitled to habeas corpus relief, “if it is found that upon the

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record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could

have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443

U.S. at 324. In making this determination, habeas courts “must

respect the province of the jury to determine the credibility of

witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable

inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all

conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict.” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 319. Once a state court fact finder has found a defendant

guilty, federal habeas courts must consider the evidence “in the

light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. Federal habeas

courts must also analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to

the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state

law.” Id. at 324 n.16 (emphasis added).

Two Ninth Circuit cases have addressed in dicta the postAEDPA standard of review for sufficiency-of-the evidence claims. In

Mitchell v. Prunty, supra, the Ninth Circuit stated that in

reviewing the state court’s determination that sufficient evidence

supports the guilty verdict, federal habeas courts should ask: “Was

the state court’s application of Jackson to the facts of this case

reasonable?” Mitchell 107 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3. The Mitchell court

also indicated that state court which reviewed the sufficiency of

the evidence claim must have taken “more than a perfunctory look at

the relationship between the evidence presented and the verdict.”

Id. Moreover, in Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d at 1002, 1013 (9th Cir.

1997), the Ninth Circuit stated:

[T]he district court’s duty to ascertain

the sufficiency of the evidence by engaging

in a thorough review of the complete state

court record is unaffected by the AEDPA.

Without such a review of the record, it is

impossible to determine whether the state

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5/ The Court of Appeal identified and applied People v. Young, 34 Cal.

4th 1149 (2005) and People v. Johnson,26 Cal. 3d 557 (1980). 

In Young, the California Supreme Court stated, “In reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence... the question we ask is ‘whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Young

34 Cal. 4th at 1175. (emphasis in the original)

In Johnson, the California Supreme Court stated, “(We) ‘must view

the evidence in a light most favorable to (the prosecution) and

presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that

the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’” Johnson 26

Cal. 3d at 576.

The Court notes that Young and Johnson state substantially the same

standard as that enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia.

28 09CV1185 

court adjudication rested on an “unreasonable application” of clearly established

federal law or an “unreasonable determination” of fact. 

Thus, this Court has engaged in a thorough review of the

complete state court record to determine whether the state court

unreasonably applied Jackson and whether the state court made

unreasonable determinations of fact. Id.

Here, the California Court of Appeal applied the correct rule

of law regarding sufficiency of the evidence.5/

Under California law, there are two types of aider and

abettor liability. An aider and abettor is liable for the intended

offense, but also “for any other offense that was a ‘natural and

probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted. People v.

Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248, 260 (1996). Whether a crime is the

natural and probable consequence of the intended crime is a factual

issue to be determined by the jury under an objective standard. The

jury must be satisfied that the second crime was reasonably

forseeable under the circumstances of the case. People v. Nguyen, 21

Cal. App. 4th 518, 531 (1993).

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The Court of Appeal, in applying these principles, found

Petitioner’s conviction for the murder of Luna, as an aider and

abettor, to be amply supported by the evidence presented at trial.

Specifically, the Court of Appeal found that Petitioner aided and

abetted Martin in the commission of a planned armed robbery of

Luna’s Lexus. This armed robbery could have, and did, naturally and

probably lead to the shooting and killing of Luna. In anticipation

of the armed robbery, Petitioner supplied Martin with a gun and told

Martin, “Here, you do it.” Martin used the gun to shoot and kill

Luna so that he and Petitioner could steal Luna’s Lexus. In

furtherance of Petitioner’s and Martin’s plan to commit an armed

robbery of Luna’s Lexus, Petitioner chased Luna after Martin began

shooting. Luna was killed. Further, after Luna was killed,

Petitioner assisted Martin in dragging and concealing Luna’s body.

The jury could have reasonably inferred that Petitioner gave Martin

the gun with the intent of facilitating the armed robbery of Luna’s

Lexus, and if Luna was killed during the armed robbery, Petitioner

would assist Martin in concealing or disposing of Luna’s body.

Additionally, the Court of Appeal found that a reasonable

person in Petitioner’s position should have known that murder was a

reasonably forseeable consequence of his and Martin’s plan to commit

an armed robbery in order to steal Luna’s Lexus.

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. The evidence

presented at trial, as detailed by the Court of Appeal, would allow

a rational trier of fact to find Petitioner’s guilt as an aider and

abettor beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence clearly shows that

Petitioner and Martin intended to commit an armed robbery of Luna in

order to steal Luna’s Lexus. A natural and probable consequence of

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committing an armed robbery is that the victim would be shot and

killed. The killing of Luna, in furtherance of the armed robbery,

was reasonably forseeable, under the circumstances. Further, the

jury was correctly instructed on the California law of aider and

abettor liability. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3 at 47).

Therefore, this Court finds that pursuant to Jackson v.

Virginia, a rational trier of fact could have found, and did find,

that the evidence presented at trial supplied proof beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty of Luna’s murder as an

aider and abettor.

As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in

this regard be DENIED.

H. GROUND FOUR: CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE

Petitioner claims that the aggregate effect of joining the

charges, joining the defendants, along with other trial errors,6/

cumulatively prejudiced him. Respondent argues that there is no

controlling United States Supreme Court precedent concerning this

area of the law, and where there is no controlling precedent, there

is no basis for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254.

With regard to this claim, the California Court of Appeal

found that there were no errors at trial to cumulate. Therefore,

Petitioner’s claim failed. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3 at 48-49).

“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined

effect of multiple trial court errors violates due process where it

renders the resulting trial fundamentally unfair.” Parle v.

Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Chambers v.

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Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973). Where no single trial error

in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant habeas relief,

“the cumulative effect of multiple errors may still prejudice a

defendant.” United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th

Cir. 1996). Where “there are a number of errors at trial, ‘a

balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error review’ is far less

effective than analyzing the overall effect of all the errors in the

context of the evidence introduced at trial against the defendant.”

Id., quoting United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir.

1988). “Where the government’s case is weak, a defendant is more

likely to be prejudiced by the effect of cumulative errors.”

Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1381.

Here, there is no basis for finding a due process violation

arising from the cumulative effect of any trial errors. As set

forth above, Petitioner’s three alleged errors are without merit,

and with respect to any of Petitioner’s other claims, he has not

identified any errors to cumulate. Since Petitioner has not

established errors which could cumulate to violate due process, the

California Court of Appeal’s adjudication of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

state court proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim fails. As

a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this

regard be DENIED. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

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Corpus be DENIED with prejudice.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 29, 2010, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

February 12, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 30, 2009

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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