Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_23-cv-00202/USCOURTS-akd-3_23-cv-00202-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

NIAL SHERWOOD WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANCHORAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:23-cv-00202-SLG

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On September 1, 2023, Nial Sherwood Williams, a self-represented litigant

(“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(“Complaint”), a civil cover sheet, and an application to waive filing fee.

1

 The Court 

screened the Complaint, found it deficient, but granted Plaintiff leave to file either 

an amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal by July 30, 2024.

2

 To 

date, Plaintiff has not responded. 

DISCUSSION

Rule 41(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal due to a

plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with a court order. In deciding whether to 

dismiss on this basis, a district court considers five factors: “(1) the public’s interest 

in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) 

1 Dockets 1-3.

2 Docket 5.

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the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”3

Here, the first two factors — the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 

litigation and the Court's need to manage its docket — weigh in favor of dismissal. 

Plaintiff’s failure to file either a First Amended Complaint or Notice of Voluntary 

Dismissal within the specified timeline suggests Plaintiff does not intend to litigate 

this action diligently.

4 Further, a presumption of prejudice to a defendant arises 

when the plaintiff unreasonably delays prosecution of an action.5 Because Plaintiff 

has not offered any justifiable reason for failing to meet the Court’s deadline, the 

third factor also favors dismissal.6

The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy 

favors disposition on the merits.7 However, “this factor lends little support to a 

party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but 

whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,”8 which is the case here. The 

3 Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 

1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986).

4 Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991) (a plaintiff has the burden 

“to move toward... disposition at a reasonable pace, and to refrain from dilatory and evasive 

tactics”).

5 Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976).

6 See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 401 (9th Cir.1998) (reiterating that the 

burden of production shifts to the defendant to show at least some actual prejudice only after 

the plaintiff has given a non-frivolous excuse for delay).

7 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002).

8

In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 

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fifth factor is comprised of three subparts, which include “whether the court has 

considered lesser sanctions, whether it tried them, and whether it warned the 

[uncooperative] party about the possibility of case-dispositive sanctions.”9 The 

Court’s Order at Docket 6 warned Plaintiff of the potential dismissal of this action 

in the event of noncompliance. Based on the foregoing, this case must be 

dismissed. Dismissal without prejudice “minimizes prejudice to a defendant and 

preserves a plaintiff’s ability to seek relief.”

10

 The Court finds no other lesser 

sanction to be satisfactory or effective in this case.

11 Therefore, this case is 

dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to prosecute this action.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 

1. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.

3. The Clerk of Court shall issue a final judgment.

DATED this 2nd day of August 2024, at Anchorage, Alaska.

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason 

SHARON L. GLEASON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2006) (citing In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996)).

9 Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 482 F.3d at 1096 (internal citation omitted).

10 Alli v. City and County of San Francisco, 2022 WL 3099222 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (internal citations 

omitted).

11 See, e.g., Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424 (a district court need not exhaust every sanction 

short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case but must explore possible and meaningful 

alternatives) (internal citation omitted).

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