Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_96-cv-01401/USCOURTS-caed-2_96-cv-01401-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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 By separate order, the court has approved a supplemental Phase III budget for 1

petitioner’s counsel. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM A. PROCTOR, No. CIV S-96-1401-RRB-CMK

Petitioner, DEATH PENALTY CASE

vs. ORDER

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., et al.,

Respondents.

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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel, seeks a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A case management conference was held before the

undersigned on January 8, 2008, where the court and parties discussed a litigation plan for the

remainder of Phase III (initial merits briefing; fact development; motion for evidentiary hearing).

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Claims A through T are petitioner’s guilt phase claims. Claims U through NN 2

(except Claims AA1, AA2, and AA3, in which petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel

at the guilt phase trial) are petitioner’s penalty phase claims and have not been briefed. Claims

B, E, I, T, V, X, Z, BB, DD, FF, KK, LL, and MM have been dismissed. The court has

recommended that Claims A, C, D, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O, Q, R, and S be denied on the

merits. As to Claim P, the court recommended that the claim be addressed at a later stage in

these proceedings. 

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I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the murder of a Burney, California, woman in 1982. 

Petitioner filed his original petition on July 31, 1996. See People v. Proctor, 4 Cal.4th 499

(1992); Proctor v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994). On August 5, 1996, the Federal Public

Defender was directed to enter an appearance on behalf of petitioner and identify whether outside

counsel would need to be appointed. James S. Thomson and Jolie Lipsig were appointed on

September 18, 1996. This case proceeds on the amended petition, lodged on December 17, 1997. 

Following exhaustion in state court, respondent filed an answer on October 14, 2004. 

II. PHASE III CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN

A. Initial Merits Briefing

Pursuant to a prior case management order, the parties have briefed most of the

guilt phase claims raised in the amended petition and the undersigned issued findings and

recommendations on May 15, 2007. With respect to these findings and recommendations, the 2

court vacated due dates for the parties to file objections pending approval of a supplemental

Phase III budget. The court will now set due dates regarding objections. Specifically, each side

will be given an opportunity to file objections of their own and to respond to objections filed by

the other side. No further briefing on the findings and recommendations is contemplated and

upon filing of objections and responses thereto, the matter will be submitted to the district judge

for final decision. 

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At the January 8, 2008, hearing, the court discussed with the parties the potential

for resolution on the merits of five selected penalty phase claims. 

1. Claims W, Y, CC, and NN

In Claims W, Y, CC, and NN, petitioner raises the following arguments:

Claim W Trial court improperly denied petitioner’s motion under Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 

Claim Y Prosecutorial misconduct by misstating the law during closing. 

The portion of this claim based on the prosecutor’s comment that

circumstantial evidence is “the best evidence in the world” has

been dismissed. 

Claim CC Trial court error by failing to instruct the jury that the special

circumstances should be considered as one factor.

Claim NN Petitioner’s death sentence violates international law (this claim

has been dismissed except “to extent that the claim does not rely

upon alleged violations of . . . United States treaties.”).

As to each of these five claims, respondents’ counsel indicated in his belief that

they can be resolved on the merits on the existing record without the need for discovery. 

Petitioner’s counsel disagreed. Initially, petitioner’s counsel expressed their belief that the

phased litigation approach to capital cases in this circuit does not contemplate “piecemeal”

merits briefing of claims. Rather, they suggested that all merits briefing should be conducted

only after an evidentiary hearing is held. The court disagrees with counsel’s interpretation of the

phased litigation approach. Specifically, Phase III contemplates “initial merits briefing,” which

clearly indicates that some merits resolution may be appropriate before an evidentiary hearing is

held, which occurs, if at all, in Phase IV. This is consistent with the reality that, often times,

some claims raised in a habeas corpus petition can be resolved on the record as it existed in the

state court and do not require fact development. 

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Petitioner’s counsel also argued that the specific claims identified by the court

cannot be resolved without discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing. In particular, as to Claims

W, Y, CC, and NN, counsel stated that each of these claims has an ineffective assistance of

counsel component and that, for this reason, the claims cannot be resolved without an evidentiary

hearing. A review of the amended petition reflects otherwise. In Claim W, petitioner asserts trial

court error, not trial counsel error, and that his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise this issue on direct appeal is set forth in Claim JJ. In Claim Y, petitioner alleges

prosecutorial misconduct, not trial counsel error, and specifically states that trial counsel's failure

to object is the subject of Claim AA12. In Claim CC, petitioner alleges trial court error, and that

trial counsel’s failure to object is raised separately in Claim AA14. Finally, Claim NN alleges

violation of international law, and that the counsel’s failure to raise the issue are the subjects of

Claims JJ and KK. Therefore, the court concludes that the ineffective assistance of counsel

components of Claims W, Y, CC, and NN are all preserved elsewhere in the amended petition. 

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the court finds that it would be

appropriate to consider further Phase III initial merits briefing on Claims W, Y, CC, and NN. 

2. Claim EE

 The district judge previously assigned to this case (Judge Levi) described Claim 

EE in his March 30, 2005, order granting respondent’s motion to dismiss. Judge Levi observed

that Claim EE “challenges the California death penalty scheme on several grounds: (1) that the

California scheme does not adequately narrow the class of death-eligible offenders because the

special circumstances embrace almost anyone convicted of first-degree murder; (2) that

California’s death penalty scheme does not require juries to make any record of the grounds upon

which it imposed the death penalty or prosecutors to disclose the basis upon which they decide to

seek the death penalty; and (3) that a district attorney, rather than the California attorney general,

determines whether to seek the death penalty in any given case.” Judge Levi initially dismissed

this claim in its entirety. However, on July 28, 2005, he issued an order granting, in part,

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petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Specifically, Judge Levi reinstated “. . . the portion of

Claim EE which raises an equal protection challenge to the California death penalty scheme

based on an alleged failure to provide uniformity in charging decisions from county to county.” 

This is all that remains of Claim EE. 

Consistent with Judge Levi’s description of the remaining portion of Claim EE,

petitioner’s counsel offer the following description in their motion for leave to conduct formal

discovery regarding this claim:

In refined Claim EE, petitioner asserts that his death sentence

violates the Fourteenth Amendment because the law under which he was

sentenced denies equal protection of the laws. Petitioner alleges that the

arbitrary implementation of the death penalty violates the Equal Protection

Clause because it fails to provide assurances that the rudimentary

requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied. . . . 

[T]he Supreme Court has reconfirmed that fundamental rights cannot be

denied based upon arbitrary and disparate statewide “standards.” Bush v.

Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 

* * *

California is comprised of 58 counties. Each county has its own

District Attorney who is responsible for decisions respecting the

prosecution of defendants within that county, including the decisions when

to file capital murder charges against persons accused of first-degree

murder, and when to seek the death penalty against those charges with

special circumstances first-degree murder. Cal. Gov’t Code § 26501;

Keenan v. Superior Court, 126 Cal.App.3d 576, 581-85 (1981). In the

absence of any statewide standards to determine which of those defendants

who meet the capital murder criteria will actually be deemed death-eligible

and charged with death by the prosecutor, the crucial determination of

whether the defendant’s life will be at stake at a penalty trial turns more on

the county in which the killing occurred than it does on the facts and

circumstances of the killing or the individual characteristics of the

defendant. Because the decision whether to seek the death penalty against

a potentially death-eligible defendant is left to the discretion of the

prosecutor in the county where the crime was committed and each county

may and does, in fact impose its own standards (or none at all), for

deciding who will face death, the implementation of the death penalty in

California violated the Equal Protection Clause. 

Further, discriminatory impact is apparent in this case where the

Shasta County District Attorney chose to seek the death penalty against

petitioner. Similarly situated defendants in other counties would not have

been charged with the death penalty, despite the fact that under state law,

they were charged with a capital offense and thus death could have been

sought by the local district attorney. 

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Judge Karlton, who is the district judge assigned in Frye and Riel, concluded that 3

the narrowing claim is not foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Mayfield v. Woodford,

270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001), and Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002). Judge Levi

read Mayfield and Karis differently and concluded that the narrowing claim is foreclosed.

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Because petitioner is Caucasian, he does not argue that application of the death penalty in

California results in discrimination based on race. Rather, he alleges discrimination based on

location and demographics. 

Respondents’ counsel indicated at the January 8, 2008, hearing that he believed

the remaining portion of Claim EE could be resolved on the existing record. Petitioner’s

counsel, however, argued that this claim requires extensive discovery. First, counsel observed

that a similar claim is being litigated in other cases pending in this district: Frye v. Calderon,

CV-S-99-0628-LKK-KJM, and Riel v. Woodford, CV-S-01-0507-LKK-KJM. In Frye, the

orders discuss Claim 37, which is described in a December 3, 2002, order, as follows:

. . . In claim 37 petitioner alleges that California’s death penalty

scheme fails to adequately narrow the class of persons eligible for the

death penalty as required by the Eighth Amendment.

The claim was similarly described in an October 6, 2003, order (Doc. 123 in Frye) as follows:

. . . In claim 37, petitioner alleges that the California death penalty scheme

fails to narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty . . .

because California’s special circumstances are so broad. Claim 37 is

supported by a study (the “Shatz study”) of 404 first degree murder cases.

Thus, Claim 37 as raised in Frye is the “narrowing claim” which has been dismissed in this case. 

Similarly, in Riel, the orders discuss Claim 36, which is described in a July 15, 2003, order as the

“Narrowing Claim.” Based on the foregoing, and contrary to counsel’s assertions in this case,

the claims raised in Frye and Riel are not the same as what remains of Claim EE raised in this

case. Specifically, the “narrowing claim” component was dismissed in this case by Judge Levi.3

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The court pointed this out to petitioner’s counsel, who next argued that Claim EE

nonetheless requires discovery similar to discovery ongoing in Frye and Riel. As outlined in

their motion for leave to conduct discovery, counsel contend the following discovery is needed: 

1. A list of each conviction in a California adult homicide case where the

crime occurred on or after November 8, 1978, to present, identifying the

name of each defendant, the county in which the case originated, and its

Superior Court case number;

2. The Probation Officer’s report in each and every adult first degree murder

conviction case in California during the years beginning on January 1,

1981, and ending on December 31, 1991;

3. A list of each adult homicide case filed in the counties of Shasta, Lassen,

Modoc, Plumas, Siskiyou, Tehama, and Trinity, where the crime occurred

on or after November 8, 1978, to the present, identifying the name of each

defendant, the county in which the case originated, and its Superior Court

case number, and whether or not the death penalty was sought by the

prosecutor in each case;

4. The Probation Officer’s report in each and every first or second-degree

murder case filed in the counties of Shasta, Lassen, Modoc, Plumas,

Siskiyou, Tehama, and Trinity, where the crime occurred on or after

November 1, 1978, to the present;

5. Respondents identify persons best able to testify regarding information

collected according to “BCS/LEIC” standard homicide codes, including

the dates on which such information began being colleted, the sources of

information collected , and the existence of any database containing or

able to access information;

6. Depositions of the persons identified in response to no. 5;

7. Records-only depositions of the District Attorneys of Shasta, Lassen,

Modoc, Plumas, Siskiyou, Tehama, and Trinity Counties, or the person

designated by the District Attorney, to produce any and all documents

setting forth or establishing policies, procedures, and/or criteria used in

deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty in a capital murder case

from November 8, 1978, to the present; and

8. Records-only deposition of the Attorney General of the State of California,

or the person designated by the Attorney General, to produce any and all

documents setting forth or establishing policies, procedures, and/or criteria

to be used by county prosecutors to decide whether or not to seek the death

penalty in a capital murder case from November 8, 1978, to the present,

and any and all communications from the Attorney General or his deputies

regarding whether capital charges should be brought or the death penalty

should be sought in a case or class of cases. 

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Without expressing an opinion as to whether this discovery would be appropriate,

the court does find that discovery is not necessarily required to resolve the claim. In other words,

it is possible the claim could be resolved on the current record. In Campbell v. Kincheloe, a

1987 death penalty case out of Washington, the Ninth Circuit addressed a very similar equal

protection claim and stated:

Campbell argues that Washington's capital punishment statute is

unconstitutional because it vests unbridled discretion in the prosecutor to

decide when to seek the death penalty. That argument has been explicitly

rejected by the Supreme Court.. . . 

829 F.2d 1453, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 199, 255 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1960); and

Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976)); c.f. United States v. Mitchell,

502 F.3d 931, 982 (9th Cir. 2007).

In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice White stated in his concurring opinion that it cannot be assumed

prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decisions by factors other than the strength of

their case and the likelihood a jury would impose the death penalty. See 428 U.S. at 199, 255. In

other words, the strength of the prosecutor’s case is sufficient to justify the decision to seek the

death penalty. Based on the facts as determined by the state court, it may be possible for this

court to determine whether the prosecutor was justified in seeking the death penalty in

petitioner’s case.

Petitioner’s counsel state that Judge Levi, in his order granting reconsideration as

to Claim EE, specifically determined that fact development was necessary to resolve the claim. 

The court does not agree with this reading of Judge Levi’s order. In his motion for

reconsideration, petitioner argued: (1) the court misconstrued petitioner's claim; and (2) the cases

cited by the court do not preclude the claim. Petitioner also argued that further fact development

was necessary, but only as to the “narrowing claim” component. Specifically, petitioner argued: 

Petitioner's narrowing claim is thus much different than the related

claims as presented to the Ninth Circuit in Karis and Mayfield. This

critical distinction is evidenced by the on-going proceedings in several

cases in the Eastern and Northern Districts of California, which have

allowed discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the "as-applied" aspect of

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The Clerk of the Court will be directed to terminate petitioner’s motion as a 4

pending motion. This does not mean that the motion will be deleted from the docket or that

petitioner will have to re-file the motion. This action is taken purely for administrative reporting

purposes. 

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the narrowing claim. (emphasis added). 

Thus, according to petitioner, Karis and Mayfield discussed the legal aspect of the narrowing

claim, and the Frye and Riel cases deal with the as-applied aspect of the narrowing claim. The

remaining portion of Claim EE in this case does not involve the “narrowing claim.” Judge Levi

granted reconsideration as to the as-applied equal protection component of Claim EE, but did not

state that further fact development was necessarily required to resolve the claim. This was

petitioner’s argument as to other aspects of Claim EE, not a holding of this court. 

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the court finds that it would be

appropriate to consider further Phase III initial merits briefing on the remainder of Claim EE. 

B. Motion for Leave to Conduct Formal Discovery

As indicated above, petitioner has filed a motion for leave to conduct formal

discovery with respect to Claim EE. In light of the court’s intention to consider whether Claim

EE is amenable to a decision on the merits on the existing record, it is not necessary to consider

petitioner’s discovery motion at this time.4

C. Motion for Evidentiary Hearing

At the January 8, 2008, hearing, the court elicited from counsel estimates as to

when a motion for an evidentiary hearing could be filed. However, for reasons discussed in the

court’s supplemental Phase III budget order, the court finds that it is premature to set a briefing

schedule at this point in time. The court will conduct a further Phase III case management

conference hearing following completion of briefing on the five claims addressed in this order. 

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III. CONCLUSION

The court hereby establishes the following schedule for the parties to submit

objections, and responses thereto, to the court’s May 15, 2007, findings and recommendations:

Objections due: April 30, 2008

Responses to objections due: June 30, 2008

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds it appropriate to consider further

Phase III initial merits briefing on Claims W, Y, CC, EE, and NN. The following briefing

schedule is established for further initial merits briefing on Claims W, Y, CC, EE, and NN:

Respondents’ opening brief due: September 17, 2008

Petitioner’s answering brief due: November 17, 2008

Respondents’ reply brief due: December 17, 2008

By calling for further initial merits briefing, this is not to say that the court

concludes that no discovery could ever be appropriate for these claims (particularly Claim EE). 

Rather, the court desires to explore whether these claims can be resolved without the need for

discovery. If the claims cannot be resolved on the existing record, petitioner will be free to

pursue discovery. The court thus makes clear that nothing in this order necessarily forecloses the

possibility of discovery on any of these claims. If necessary, the court will take up petitioner’s

motion for leave to conduct formal discovery on Claim EE at a later date. The court will also

discuss with the parties at a later date a briefing schedule for a motion for evidentiary hearing. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The parties may file objections to the court’s May 15, 2007, findings and

recommendations, and responses thereto pursuant to the schedule set forth above;

2. The parties shall brief the merits of Claims W, Y, CC, EE, and NN

pursuant to the schedule set forth above; and

3. Further briefing on petitioner’s motion for leave to conduct formal

discovery concerning Claim EE is suspended and the Clerk of the Court is directed to

administratively terminate the matter as a pending motion.

DATED: January 28, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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