Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00433/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00433-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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1 Although the case caption references several “Does,”

plaintiff has not amended his complaint to add the names of any

person other than the Regents. Also notable is that plaintiff

addresses only his claims against the Regents in his opposition

to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the

court analyzes plaintiff’s claims as applying only to the Regents

as the lone defendant in this case. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

STEVAN VALADEZ, 

NO. CIV. S-03-0433 WBS GGH

Plaintiff, 

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA, DOES 1 through

20, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff brings this action against defendant Regents

of the University of California (“the Regents”)1 alleging: (1)

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. §

1983; (2) discrimination and harassment against a veteran in

violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment

Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. (“the USERRA”); and (3)

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2 These claims include: (1) race discrimination and

harassment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940; (2) disability discrimination

and harassment under the FEHA; (3) retaliation under the FEHA;

(4) violation of the California Family Rights Act, Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12945.2; and (5) whistle-blower retaliation in violation

of the California Labor Code § 1102.5.

3 All of these facts are undisputed. (See Def.’s

Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. of Mot.

for Summ. J. ¶¶ 1-5). 

2

other state-law claims.2 Plaintiff also argues that his

complaint raises a federal claim under the Family Medical Leave

Act (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“the FMLA”)), though defendant

denies this. The court has jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. §

1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental

jurisdiction). The Regents now move for summary judgment on all

plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56.

I. Factual and Procedural Background3

Plaintiff initially filed a complaint in this court

against defendant on or about June 17, 2002. On September 26,

2002, both parties stipulated to dismiss that action without

prejudice. An order approving the stipulation was signed by

Judge Levi on October 17, 2002. Thereafter, plaintiff re-filed

the instant action in the Superior Court of California in and for

the County of Sacramento on November 15, 2002. Defendant filed

an answer to plaintiff’s state-court complaint on February 24,

2003. On March 5, 2003, defendant removed this case to this

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 

///

///

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II. Discussion

The court must grant summary judgment to a moving party

“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party adverse to a motion for summary

judgment may not simply deny generally the pleadings of the

movant; the adverse party must designate “specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Does Not State a Federal Claim

Under the FMLA

In plaintiff’s response to defendant’s separate

statement of undisputed material facts in support of defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, (“Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUF”),

plaintiff asserts that there is a dispute as to whether his

complaint raises a federal claim against defendant under the

FMLA. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUF ¶ 6). However, defendant

correctly points out that there is no legitimate dispute on that

question. 

Plaintiff’s complaint does mention “the Family Medical

Leave Act” in the caption of her fifth claim for relief. (Acero

Decl., Ex. GG (Pl.’s Compl.) at 8). However, allegation 43 of

plaintiff’s complaint, which allegedly supports this claim for

relief, states only that “Plaintiff was and is at all times

herein an employee covered by [what plaintiff refers to as] the

State Family Medical Leave Act” (Id. ¶ 43)(emphasis added), which

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defendant evidently interpreted to mean the California Family

Rights Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2. Plaintiff makes no

allegation anywhere in his complaint that he was covered by the

federal Family Medical Leave Act and never cites the federal

statute. (See Acero Decl., Ex. GG (Pl.’s Compl.). 

Furthermore, plaintiff’s counsel signed the parties’

joint status report, which report specifically states that

“[p]laintiff will seek court approval to amend his complaint to

allege under federal law . . . [a] [v]iolation of the Family

Medical Leave Act/Retaliation (29 U.S.C. § 2601).” (See Joint

Status Report signed and dated May 22, 2003 at 3). Plaintiff 

would have no need to seek leave to amend his complaint to assert

a claim that was already included in his complaint. Therefore,

this unchallenged statement in the joint status report is

tantamount to an admission that plaintiff’s complaint does not

state a federal claim under the FMLA. 

This interpretation of plaintiff’s complaint is further

bolstered by other statements in the joint status report

regarding the nature of plaintiff’s claims and the grounds for

federal jurisdiction over this case. In the section of the

report detailing a summary of plaintiff’s claims, there is

mention of an allegation that “[d]efendant refused to provide

[plaintiff] with appropriate family or medical leave as required

by California statutes . . . ,” but no mention of a refusal to

provide plaintiff with any leave required by the FMLA. (Id. at

2)(emphasis added). The joint status report also specifically

states that federal jurisdiction for this case arises under the

Federal Civil Rights Act of 1876 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and the

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USERRA (38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq.). (See id. at 4). Nowhere in

the joint status report is there any reference to federal

jurisdiction based on the FMLA. 

 Plaintiff’s response to defendant’s telling citation to

the joint status report is simply that “defendant prepared it.” 

(Telfer Decl. ¶ 21). Plaintiff does not dispute that his counsel

signed the joint status report. Nor does he explain why he never

took issue with the reading of his complaint memorialized in that

report until now. Furthermore, plaintiff had ample time to seek

leave to amend his complaint to include a federal claim under the

FMLA, but failed to do so. His eleventh-hour request to have the

court read an amendment into his complaint now, at the summary

judgment stage, asks too much. See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonal &

Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)(“A plaintiff may not

amend [his] complaint through argument in a brief opposing

summary judgment.”); Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 817 (7th

Cir. 2002)(same). Granting plaintiff’s request would also unduly

prejudice defendant and likely compel the court to readjust its

scheduling order. See DCD Programs Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d

183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)(leave to amend may be denied if it would

cause opposing party undue prejudice or is sought in bad faith or

after undue delay). Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff’s

complaint does not state a federal claim under the FMLA. 

B. First Amendment Claim Under § 1983

Plaintiff states in his opposition that he does not

oppose the denial of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Pl.’s

Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1). Because defendant’s

motion for summary judgment as to this claim is unopposed, the

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court will grant summary judgment as to the claim. See Henry v.

Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993)(unopposed

motion for summary judgment may be granted where moving party’s

papers are sufficient to support motion on their face). 

C. USERRA Claim

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s USERRA claim is not

properly before this court for two reasons: (1) the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; and (2) the claim is

barred by the Eleventh Amendment (See Embury v. Kings, 361 F.3d

562 (9th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff argues that the court has

subject matter jurisdiction over the claim under USERRA and that

defendant waived any Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removed

this case to federal court. However, the court notes that the

Eleventh Amendment question will be moot if the court determines

that it lacks jurisdiction over the claim in the first instance. 

See Velazquez v. Frapwell, 165 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir.

1999)(vacating prior decision based on Eleventh Amendment

immunity and dismissing USERRA claim against state employer where

amendment to USERRA statute established lack of jurisdiction over

claim). Therefore, the court will address defendant’s argument

regarding subject matter jurisdiction first. 

Defendant removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a). Under § 1441(a), “any civil action brought in a State

court of which the district courts of the United States have

original jurisdiction, may [generally] be removed by the

defendant . . . to the [proper] district court of the United

States. . . .” However, “[t]he remand statute, 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c), requires a district court to remand a removed ‘case’ to

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state court ‘if at any time before final judgment it appears that

the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.’” Lee v.

Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff is a person, and there is no dispute that 

defendant is a state employer. See Velazquez, 165 F.3d at

593(treating Trustees of Indiana University as state employer

under USERRA where court found Trustees to be arm of state); BV

Eng’g v. University of Cal., 858 F.2d 1394, 1395 (9th Cir. 1988)

(both University of California and its Board of Regents are arms

of state). Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction over

USERRA claims brought by persons against state employers. This

is because Congress amended a section of the USERRA in 1998 in a

way that “unmistakably” evidences “Congress’ intention to limit

USERRA suits [brought by persons] against states to state courts.

. . .” Velasquez, 165 F.3d at 594(interpreting 38 U.S.C. §

4323(b)(2) in context of claim brought by person against state

employer); see also Dew v. United States, 192 F.3d 366 (2d Cir.

1999)(38 U.S.C. § 4323(b) grants state courts jurisdiction over

USERRA claims brought by persons against state employers);

Larkins v. Dep’t. of Mental Health, State of Ala., 1999 U.S. Dist

LEXIS 9137 *3-5 (D. Ala. Feb 3, 1999)(state court is now proper

forum for USERRA claims brought by persons against state

employers).

None of the authorities cited above addressing the

proper forum for a USERRA claim brought by a person against a

state employer are binding on this court, and the Ninth Circuit

has yet to reach the issue. However, an examination of the text

of 38 U.S.C. § 4323 and the changes Congress made to that text in

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4 In the case of an action against a State (as an

employer) or a private employer commenced by the United States,

the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction

over the action.

38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(1)(emphasis added).

In the case of an action against a private employer by

a person, the district courts of the United States shall have

jurisdiction of the action.

38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(3)(emphasis added). 

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1998 persuades this court that the authorities cited reach the

correct conclusion. As noted in Larkins, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

at *3, prior to the 1998 amendment to § 4323, federal district

courts had jurisdiction over all USERRA claims against state

employers regardless of the plaintiff’s status. See also 38

U.S.C. § 4323, legislative notes(38 U.S.C. § 4323(b) used to

allow “an action against a State as an employer” to be brought in

“any district in which the State exercise[d] any authority or

carrie[d] out any function.”). This changed with the 1998

amendment.

In that amendment, Congress clearly made the proper

forum for USERRA claims dependent on who sued whom. The amended

statute specifically grants federal district courts jurisdiction

over USERRA claims brought by the United States against both

state and private employers and claims brought by persons against

private employers.4 However, “[i]n the case of an action against

a State (as an employer) by a person, . . .” the postamendment

statute states only that “. . . the action may be brought in a

State court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the laws

of the State.” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2)(emphasis added). 

One might argue that the permissive language used in §

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5 Venue.–(1) In the case of an action by the United

States against a State (as an employer), the action may proceed

in the United States district court for any district in which the

State exercises any authority or carries out any function.

(2) In the case of an action against a private

employer, the action may proceed in the United States district

court for any district in which the private employer of the

person maintains a place of business. 

38 U.S.C. § 4323(c)(emphasis added). 

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4323(b)(2) was not meant to exclude a person from bringing a

USERRA claim against a state employer in federal court. However,

this argument is effectively defeated by the fact that, in the

course of amending the statute, Congress removed the language

from the preamendment statute allowing all actions against state

employers to be brought in qualifying district courts. See 38

U.S.C. § 4323, legislative notes(listing previous text of 38

U.S.C. § 4323(b)). The argument is further undermined by the

fact that the postamendment statute delimits venue only for

USERRA claims brought either by the United States against a state

employer or by anyone against a private party. See 38 U.S.C. §

4323(c).5 Venue for USSERA claims brought by persons against

state employers is conspicuously absent from the statute. Id.

This omission makes sense when one considers that questions of

venue are irrelevant to courts that lack subject matter

jurisdiction over a given case. Therefore, the court interprets

§ 4323(b)(2) in accordance with the other courts that have

reached the issue and concludes that federal district courts lack

original jurisdiction over USERRA claims brought by persons

against a state employer.

Nevertheless, in this case, it is clear that the court

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had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s § 1983 claim which arose under

federal law. See 38 U.S.C. § 1331(granting federal courts

original jurisdiction over all claims arising under laws of 

United States). In cases like this one, where a court has

federal jurisdiction over one of several claims comprising a

single case, a jurisdictional bar against another claim does not

deprive the court of jurisdiction over the case. See Lee, 260

F.3d at 1002-1003(“[T]he presence of at least some claims over

which the district court has original jurisdiction is sufficient

to allow removal of an entire case, even if others of the claims

alleged are beyond the district court’s power to decide.”). 

However, where a given claim is barred by federal law, the court

may remand that claim to state court. See Kruse v. Hawaii, 68

F.3d 331, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1995)(adopting Sixth Circuit’s

reasoning in Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332 (6th Cir.

1990), justifying postremoval remand of claims barred by Eleventh

Amendment and retention of other nonbarred federal claims). 

The court is aware of a district court decision in this

Circuit which held that, where there is an independent basis for

federal jurisdiction, a district court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a federally-created claim over which state

courts were given sole jurisdiction, even after dismissal of all

other nonbarred federal claims. Kinder v. Citibank, 2000 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 13853 *9 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2000). However, the

court can find no Ninth Circuit or other authority requiring the

court to exercise such jurisdiction.

Because Congress has explicitly given state courts sole

jurisdiction over USERRA claims brought by persons against state

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6 Because the court has disposed of all plaintiff’s

claims on jurisdictional grounds, it need not reach the substance

of plaintiff’s evidentiary objections, which only go to the

merits of her claims. 

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employers, the court determines that it would be unseemly to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s USERRA claim. 

Therefore, the court will exercise its discretion to remand

plaintiff’s USERRA claim to state court. Having thus resolved

the jurisdictional issue, the court need not address the parties’

arguments regarding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

D. State-Law Claims

Following the final disposition of all federal claims

in an action that includes pendent state claims, “[i]t is

generally within a district court’s discretion either to retain

jurisdiction to adjudicate the pendent state claims or to remand

them to state court.” Harrel v. 20th Century Ins., 934 F.2d 203,

205 (9th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted). Both plaintiff’s federal

claims have been disposed of in this action. Because California

courts are a better forum for resolving plaintiff’s state-law

claims, the court will remand those claims to state court.6 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; and

(2) plaintiff’s USERRA claim and remaining state-law

claims be, and the same hereby are, REMANDED to state court. 

DATED: June 29, 2005

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