Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00290/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Injunctive/Declaratory Relief

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David Deichmiller, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 

Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Northwest 

Trustee Services Incorporated, 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-00290-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 12) and Request 

for Summary Disposition of Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 20). For the following 

reasons, the Request for Summary Disposition is denied and the Motion to Remand is 

granted.1

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff David Deichmiller filed this action in Arizona state court on January 30, 

2014. (Doc. 1-1.) The complaint asserts various causes of action against the Defendants 

in relation to Deichmiller’s home and mortgage. (Id.) On February 6, Deichmiller filed 

affidavits of service, stating that he had served all three defendants on January 31. (Id.) 

 On February 13, 2013, Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 

 

1

 The requests for oral argument are denied because the parties have thoroughly 

discussed the law and the evidence, and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. 

See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Grp., Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

Case 2:14-cv-00290-GMS Document 27 Filed 07/23/14 Page 1 of 4
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(“Deutsche Bank”) and Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC (“Ocwen”) filed for removal in this 

Court asserting jurisdiction based on Federal Question and Diversity Jurisdiction. (Doc. 

1.) Defendant Northwest Trustee Services Incorporated (“Northwest Trustee”) did not 

join in that filing and the filing makes no avowal or reference to Northwest Trustee’s 

position in relation to the motion. (See id.) On February 27, counsel for Northwest 

Trustee entered an appearance in this case. (Doc. 10.) 

 On March 17, Deichmiller filed motions seeking remand based on several reasons. 

(Docs. 12–13.) Procedurally, Deichmiller argues that all of the Defendants did not 

consent to the removal in a timely manner and the filing of the Notice of Removal failed 

to comply with Local Rule 3.6. (Id.) Substantively, Deichmiller argues that there is no 

federal question jurisdiction because state law predominates and there is no diversity 

jurisdiction because the amount in controversy requirement is not met. (Id.) On April 7, 

Northwest Trustee filed a motion consenting to and joining the Notice of Removal filed 

by the other defendants. (Doc. 16.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. Summary Disposition 

 Deichmiller moves for summary disposition based on Defendants’ untimely 

response to the Motion to Remand. Under the Local Rules of this Court, responsive 

memorandum should be served within fourteen days. LRCiv 7.2(c). Failure to do so “may

be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of 

the motion summarily.” LRCiv 7.2(i) (emphasis added). Deichmiller asks that the rule be 

applied in this case because Defendant’s Response was four days late. 

 Here, the Defendants did request an extension from Deichmiller even if that 

request came one day after the deadline. Although Defendants failed to file their 

responsive motion within the deadline, half of the four days that they were late were 

weekend days. The Court accepts the delayed response and will not dispose of the matter 

summarily or treat the delay as a consent in this case.

Case 2:14-cv-00290-GMS Document 27 Filed 07/23/14 Page 2 of 4
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. Timely Consent to Removal 

 In the Ninth Circuit, the removal statute is strictly construed and a court must 

reject federal jurisdiction “if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 

instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) When seeking removal, 

“all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the 

removal of the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). However, nominal parties need not 

join in the removal petition. Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 

1986). A defendant must file the notice of removal within “30 days after receipt by or 

service on that defendant of the initial pleading or summons.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B). 

 Here, only two of the three defendants joined in the Notice of Removal. The 

Notice did not indicate whether Northwest Trustee had consented to removal. Northwest 

Trustee was served on January 31 and did not file a motion indicating that it wished to 

join in the removal until April 7, over two months after service. Accordingly, all 

“properly joined and served” defendants did not file a notice of removal within 30 days. 

There is no argument that Northwest Trustee is a nominal party that did not need to 

consent. 

 Defendants argue against remand, but the cases they cite all support the conclusion 

that this case should be remanded back to state court. Defendants note that one district 

court found that it was only a technical defect where the notice of removal only averred 

the consent of a non-moving defendants. City of Univ. City, Missouri v. AT & T Wireless 

Servs., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 927, 930 (E.D. Mo. 2002). Here, there was no such 

averment, and the court in that case held that “[i]f there was no averment by counsel that 

all parties consented to the removal, then remand would be appropriate.” Id. Another 

court cited by Defendants held that “the defendant seeking removal must explain the 

absence of the co-defendants in the notice of removal, and the failure to set out such an 

explanation renders the notice facially defective.” Yount v. Shashek, 472 F. Supp. 2d 

1055, 1060 (S.D. Ill. 2006). Here, there was no explanation and the notice is facially 

defective under the reasoning in Yount. 

Case 2:14-cv-00290-GMS Document 27 Filed 07/23/14 Page 3 of 4
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The final case cited by defendants also supports remand. It held that 

[w]hile courts generally do not require all defendants to sign 

the removal petition itself, most courts have required some 

form of unambiguous written evidence of consent to the court 

in timely fashion. See, e.g., Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 

301 (7th Cir. 1994) (“To ‘join’ a motion means to support it 

in writing”) (citations omitted); Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of 

N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262, n.11 (5th Cir. 1988) (“This does 

not mean that each defendant must sign the original petition 

for removal, but there must be some timely filed written 

indication from each served defendant . . . that it actually 

consented to such action”). 

Michaels v. State of N.J., 955 F. Supp. 315, 321 (D.N.J. 1996) (citation expanded). The 

only written filing by Northwest Trustee within the thirty days was a notice of 

appearance. That filing does not indicate or imply support of the notice of removal. 

Northwest Trustee did not provide unambiguous written evidence of consent in a filed 

writing until April 6, and that notice was untimely. 

 The removal statute is strictly construed and Defendants failed to meet its 

requirements or provide support for their position that their failure should be ignored. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Remand (Doc. 12) is 

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to remand this matter to Maricopa County 

Superior Court and terminate this action. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Request for Summary Disposition of 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 20) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 23th day of July, 2014. 

Case 2:14-cv-00290-GMS Document 27 Filed 07/23/14 Page 4 of 4