Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01216/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1/

 As used herein, “CT” and “RT” refer to the Clerk’s Transcript and the

Reporter’s Transcript, from the California Superior Court trial, Respondent’s

Lodgment Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. 

11cv1216 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERGIO RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

B.M. CASH, Warden,

Respondent.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 11-1216-IEG(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

I. INTRODUCTION

Sergio Rodriguez (hereafter “Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his

San Diego County Superior Court convictions of first degree murder

and gun use and discharge. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1, CT 239-42,

246-47.)1/

 He was sentenced to two consecutive indeterminate terms

of twenty five years to life imprisonment. (CT 199-200, 249-50.)

Petitioner alleges his conviction and imprisonment violates the

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 1 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 2

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in Griffin v.

California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 

Respondent B.M. Cash (hereafter “Respondent”) asserts that

habeas corpus relief is not available because the judgment did not

result in a violation of Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights,

and that the absences of a violation of the U.S. Constitution

compels the denial of relief. 

Based upon a review of the pleadings, documents, and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the

Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

This Statement of Facts is taken substantially from the

California Court of Appeal unpublished opinion, People v. Rodriguez,

case No. D054633 (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6, at 2-4). The Court

relies on these facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Park v.

Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical

fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are

entitled to statutory presumption of correctness).

In July 2007, Petitioner, wearing a San Diego Padres jersey,

and friend Fernando Gomez separately drove to Wild Woolly’s bar in

Chula Vista, California. As the two consumed beers at the bar,

Petitioner commented that another person (Andrew Hicks), sitting at

a nearby table, was looking at him. Petitioner then aggressively

approached Hicks, yelling and cursing at him. Two bar security

guards who witnessed the confrontation reported Hicks was not

aggressive in response to Petitioner. One of the guards pulled

Petitioner away and admonished him to calm down. Petitioner then

offered to shake Hicks’ hand, but Hicks refused. The same guard

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 2 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 3

asked Petitioner to stay away from Hicks. Petitioner complied by

moving to another end of the bar where he socialized for a time

before leaving with Gomez through the rear door.

After leaving the bar, Petitioner and Gomez drove in Gomez’s

car to purchase beer, then parked near the bar and stood outside

drinking. Empty beer cans of the same size and brand purchased by

Petitioner at the store were found at the scene. One of the cans

had Petitioner’s fingerprints on it and two other cans had Gomez’s

fingerprints on them. While Petitioner was drinking outside the

bar, he used an expletive to refer to Hicks. Soon thereafter,

Petitioner aggressively approached two men who walked out of the bar

and began to fight with one of them. The two men then ran away from

Petitioner.

Petitioner then walked to his car, retrieved a shotgun and

returned with the shotgun tucked into his pants. At that time Hicks

walked out of the bar, Petitioner pulled out the shotgun, and began

striking Hicks with it. Hicks asked, “What did I do?” and grabbed

the shotgun, but Petitioner freed it from Hick’s hand, stepped back,

aimed, and fired. Hicks fell to the ground and died from the

gunshot wound, which hit him in the back on his upper right

shoulder. Stippling around the wound was consistent with the

shotgun being fired from a distance no greater than five to eight

feet. The trajectory of the gunshot was consistent with Hicks

ducking and turning away when he was struck.

A witness heard the gunshot and saw Petitioner hurriedly

cross the street while trying to hide something in his pants.

Petitioner tried to enter his own car but then ran to Gomez’s car,

saying he had lost his car keys. Petitioner told Gomez to drive him

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 3 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 4

home. Petitioner telephoned his mother on the way to his house and

said, “Mom, I f—ed up.” Before Gomez left Petitioner’s house,

Petitioner admonished him to keep his mouth shut. That night,

Petitioner’s sister wrote in her diary that her brother had killed

someone.

Petitioner subsequently told two other witnesses that he had

been in a fight. One witness saw Petitioner’s mother trying to

retrieve his car from the area of the murder. The day after the

incident Petitioner told his girlfriend that he had shot someone. 

Several weeks after the incident, the police arrested

Petitioner and searched his house. During the search, they found a

Padres jersey similar to the one Petitioner wore the night of the

incident. The jersey was in the garage, inside a box under some

newspaper. There were small white flakes consistent with shotgun

shell buffer on the jersey, and similar to buffer material located

at the murder scene. Although police did not find a shotgun, they

did find a shotgun choke tool and shotgun cleaning materials in

Petitioner’s room. 

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 20, 2007, Petitioner was charge with premeditated

and deliberate murder (Cal. Penal Code, §§ 187, 189; count 1), and

robbery (Cal. Penal Code, § 211; count 2). It was alleged that in

the commission of the murder, Petitioner intentionally and personally used and discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily

injury and death [Cal. Penal Code §§ 12022.53 (d), (c), (b),

12022.5(a)]. Petitioner pled not guilty. (CT 215.)

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 4 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 5

On November 12, 2008, following a jury trial, Petitioner was

found guilty of first degree murder and the firearm use and

discharge allegations were found to be true. (CT 239-42, 246-47.)

On February 10, 2009, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to

twenty five years to life imprisonment on the murder conviction and

a consecutive term of twenty five years on the firearm discharge

that caused great bodily injury and death. (CT 199-200, 249-50.)

On February 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.

(CT 201.) On December 8, 2009, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment. (Respondent’s Lodgment 6.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the California

Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment 7.) On February 18, 2010,

the California Supreme Court denied review. (Respondent’s Lodgment

8.)

On May 18, 2011, Petitioner filed the Petition currently

before the Court. Respondent filed an Answer. Petitioner filed a

Traverse. 

IV. PETITIONER’S CLAIM

Petitioner raises one claim in his Petition. He contends his

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the

prosecution committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument

by commenting on Petitioner’s failure to testify, in violation of

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The prosecutor’s

statements were as follows:

Search of his residence. A hidden jersey. Why is

that a hidden jersey? Why didn’t he tell us why

Sergio Rodriguez hid that jersey? Why didn’t we hear

about that? Why is that jersey hidden in the garage in

a box underneath newspaper?

[Griffin objection overruled.]

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 5 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 6

Ladies and gentlemen, I’m talking about, why didn’t

counsel explain to us - he explained to us that that

jersey was in the garage, something about it not

having blood on it, and he didn’t tell us why it was

in the garage. 

(3 RT 683.)

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge,

or a district court shall entertain an application for

a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2006). 

“[The Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act]

establishes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court

rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the

benefit of the doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 6 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 7

§ 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court arrives

at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this

Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the

“unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Id. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). A state

court, however, need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving

a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court

decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law.

Id.

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 7 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 8

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). The Court observed

that the standard is difficult to meet “because it was meant to be.”

Id. at 786.

V. DISCUSSION

A. CLAIM ONE: Griffin Error

Petitioner raised this claim in the California Court of

Appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecutor’s comments,

“viewed in context... can only be seen as a fair comment on the state

of the evidence, comment[s] falling outside the purview of Griffin,”

and “the trial court overruled defense counsel’s Griffin error

objection because the prosecutor’s question did not refer directly

or indirectly to Rodriguez’s failure to testify.” (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 6, at 7, 10.) The Court of Appeal addressed Petitioner’s arguments by examining the context in which the prosecutor’s

comments were made, and found that the prosecutor did not ask the

jury to draw an adverse inference from Petitioner’s silence, in

violation of Griffin. (Id. at 7.) The trial court’s judgment was

affirmed. (Id. at 10.)

Petitioner then raised this claim in a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. The Petition was

denied without a citation to authority or statement of reasoning.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8.) As there was no reasoned opinion

furnished by the California Supreme Court, this Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst, 501 U.S. at

801-06.

 1. Discussion

The Fifth Amendment prohibits the prosecution from commenting

on a defendant's failure to testify by forbidding “either comment by

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 8 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2/

The trial court did not offer a curative instruction here but none was

necessary given the prosecutor’s comments and the context in which they were made.

11cv1216 9

the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court

that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615,

fn omitted. However, "courts will not reverse when the prosecutorial

comment is a single, isolated incident, does not stress an inference

of guilt from silence as a basis of conviction, and is followed by

curative instructions." Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir.

1987).2/

A prosecutor may comment on the defendant's failure to

present exculpatory evidence as long as the comments do not call

attention to the defendant's failure to testify. United States v.

Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Chan

Yu-Chong, 920 F.2d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1990). Comments on the failure

of the defense, as opposed to the defendant, to counter or explain

the testimony presented are also permissible. Mares, 940 F.2d at

461; Chan Yu-Chong, 920 F.2d at 599; see also United States v.

Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1506 (9th Cir. 1987)(comments only

indirectly referred to defendant's failure to testify). A prosecutor’s indirect comment violates Griffin only 

if it is manifestly intended to call attention

to the defendant's failure to testify, or is of

such a character that the jury would naturally

and necessarily take it to be a comment on the

failure to testify.

Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 809. 

Petitioner’s claim does not succeed because the prosecutor

did not commit a Griffin error by directly or indirectly commenting

on Petitioner’s failure to testify. 

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 9 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 10

During opening argument, the prosecutor discussed the

evidence and specifically addressed Petitioner’s Padres jersey and

the location where it was found, arguing that it evidenced a

consciousness of guilt:

And finally, the shirt worn on the night of the

killing, that Padres shirt that we talked about.

Well, he wears it in his DMV photo, apparently wears

it when he goes out to a party, goes to a friend’s

house to drink. Why is it in the garage? Why is it in

a box underneath a newspaper? Why is it hidden? It is

because that’s the one he wore on the night he

murdered Andrew Hicks? Absolutely. Why isn’t it

hanging in his closet? Why isn’t it laying on his bed

with the rest of his clothes? It’s in the closet– in

the garage hidden under boxes, underneath this

newspaper, hoping that nobody will find it.

(3 RT 616).

Petitioner’s counsel, in his argument, scoffed at the

assertion that the jersey was hidden or that its location suggested

a consciousness of guilt. (3 RT 660-661).

During the prosecutor’s opening argument, no mention was

made, either directly or indirectly, of Petitioner’s election to

remain silent and not testify. The prosecutor legitimately drew the

trier-of-fact’s attention to the Padres jersey and its location when

it was found. Petitioner’s counsel, as expected, attempted to diffuse

the damaging evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from

that evidence. Petitioner’s counsel’s closing argument invited the

prosecutor’s rebuttal comments which were an appropriate response

thereto.

The prosecutor did not directly address Petitioner’s failure

to testify in his rebuttal comments. Preceding the comments to which

Petitioner objects, the prosecutor stated: “So let’s go over some of

the things that (defense) counsel talked about.” These words placed

the prosecutor’s subsequent comments in the proper context and must

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 10 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 11

be considered with them. Petitioner looks only to the “offending”

argument in isolation without looking to what the prosecutor said

before as well as afterward. In the question “why didn’t he tell us,”

the “he” refers to defense counsel, as evidenced by the words “why

Sergio Rodriguez hid that jersey?” immediately following. (3 RT

683.) The prosecutor’s questioning of why defense counsel did not

present exculpatory evidence or testimony to explain why the jersey

was hidden is permissible under Mares. After the Griffin objection

was overruled, the prosecutor again did not refer to Petitioner’s

refusal to testify, but asserted “I’m talking about, why didn’t

counsel explain to us...” (3 RT 683)(emphasis added). The use of

the word “counsel” shows that the prosecutor was directing his

comments to Petitioner’s counsel’s failure to rebut the evidence

presented. 

Furthermore, the prosecutor’s indirect comments did not

manifestly intend “to call attention to the defendant's failure to

testify.” Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 809. The question “[w]hy didn’t he

tell us why Sergio Rodriguez hid that jersey?” was used as a

rhetorical device to call attention to the possibility that Petitioner hid the jersey, thereby showing Petitioner’s consciousness of

guilt. The prosecutor clearly used “he” to refer to defense

counsel’s failure to address the issue. (3 RT 683.) After the trial

court overruled Petitioner’s defense counsel’s Griffin objection, the

prosecutor stated “why didn’t counsel explain to us... he didn’t tell

us why it [the jersey] was in the garage.” (Id.) The prosecutor’s

comments reflect defense counsel’s deficiency in addressing the

issue, not an indirect attack on Petitioner’s election not to

testify. Also, the comments were not of “such a character that the

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 11 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 12

jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the

failure to testify” because of the prosecutor’s use of the word

“counsel.” Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 809. The prosecutor’s remarks were

not used impermissibly as they did not convey a direct or indirect

referral to Petitioner’s failure to testify.

Based on an independent review of the record, the Court finds

that the California Court of Appeal’s and the California Supreme

Court’s denial of claim one was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Greene,

288 F.3d at 1089. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief

be DENIED as to claim one.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation denying all

claims in the Petition to United States District Judge Irma E.

Gonzalez under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

district court issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report

and Recommendation and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying

the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 11, 2012, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 27, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 12 of 13
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11cv1216 13

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 12, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:11-cv-01216-IEG-WVG Document 19 Filed 12/12/11 Page 13 of 13