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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 1 61989 

A. J . YOUNG, Guardian Ad Litem for; 

NORMAL. YOUNG, 

> ROBERT L. HOECKER 

> Clerk 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 85-2836 

) (D.C. No. 84-C-342-B) 

BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) ( N . D. Ok la • ) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and SETH, Circuit Judges, and SEAY, Chief Judge.** 

**Honorable Frank H. Seay, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Norma and A. J. Young brought this action against Burlington 

Northern Railroad Company alleging its negligence caused a 

train-automobile accident· which left Mrs. Young permanently 

disabled. In turn, defendant claimed Mrs. Young's own negligence 

was the cause of the accident. After a five-day trial, the jury 

returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The Youngs filed a 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 85-2836 Document: 010110024649 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 1 
motion for new trial alleging, among other things, that the trial 

court erred in admonishing the jury to disregard certain testimony 

of their expert witness. The district court denied the motion for 

new trial and the Youngs appealed. 

The accident giving rise to this action occurred at a 

railroad crossing located just south of Claremore, Oklahoma, on 

January 27, 1984. Just before the accident, Mrs. Young had waited 

for a red pickup truck, driven by Doug Pitts, to pass before 

turning onto Bryant Rbad. Following the pickup, she proceeded to 

a railroad crossing (the Bryant crossing), located about seventy 

feet from where she had turned onto Bryant. The pickup proceeded 

across the tracks without incident. Mrs. Young, however, was 

struck by a train as she tried to cross the tracks. The parties 

in both vehicles stated they did not hear a train whistle prior to 

crossing the railroad trac~s. 

During trial, the Youngs presented the testimony of Robert 

Crommelin, who was accepted by the trial court as a qualified 

expert witness in the area of traffic engineering. Mr. Crommelin 

testified that, based on his inspection and evaluation, the 

Bryant crossing, where the accident occurred, was an ultra 

hazardous crossing. The crossing was controlled by cross bucks, 

without flashing lights or gates. Mr. Crommelin stated that the 

"passive protection" of a cross buck was insufficient and an 

inadequate traffic control at this particular crossing. 

The Youngs requested Mr. Crommelin also be permitted to 

testify as to whether a normal driver would have seen the train 

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Appellate Case: 85-2836 Document: 010110024649 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 2 
coming or whether a normal driver would have been distracted by 

the pickup truck and fail to notice the train. The trial court 

refused to permit this testimony because it invaded the province 

of the jury. Upon cross-examination and redirect, however, Mr. 

Crommelin did testify as to what a normal driver would have done 

under the circumstances of this case. 

Prior to closing arguments, the trial court informed counsel 

of its intention to admonish the jury to disregard Mr. Crommelin's 

testimony concerning what a normal driver would have done. The 

court stated that the essence of such testimony, that a normal 

driver would not have seen the train because she would have been 

distracted, essentially was a conclusion that a driver does not 

have to obey the laws of Oklahoma which impose a duty on motor 

vehicle drivers to keep a lookout for and yield to trains when 

approaching a crossing. See Jester v. St. Louis-San Francisco 

~, 413 P.2d 539, 542 (Okla. 1965). The court further reasoned 

that the testimony touched upon the question of whether the 

parties exercised ordinary care under the facts and circumstances 

of the case. The court held that determination of this question 

was the so~e province of the jury. The Youngs objected on the 

grounds that defendant's lay witnesses were permitted to state 

their opinion on whether Mrs. Young "should have seen" the train 

and that prohibiting the Youngs' witness from testifying to this 

effect would prejudice their case. 

The trial court's admonition to the jury, delivered over the 

plaintiffs' objections, recognized that Mr. Crommelin testified on 

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Appellate Case: 85-2836 Document: 010110024649 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 3 
J 

two distinct subjects: the hazardous or ultrahazaidous condition 

of the railroad crossing, and how a "normal" driver would respond 

upon approaching the crossing. As to the testimony on the 

condition of the crossing, the trial court instructed the jury 

that Mr. Crommelin's expert testimony was entitled to the weight 

and credit the jury believed it deserved. As to the normal driver 

testimony, the court stated, "I do not think he was an expert to 

express an opinion on that," and instructed the jury to disregard 

that testimony. 

Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial contending that the 

court erred in excluding the testimony of Mr. Crommelin. They 

again argued that it was prejudicial error for the district court 

to admonish the jury to disregard portions of plaintiffs' expert 

testimony while permitting defendant's lay witnesses to testify to 

the same . issue. The district court denied the motion, holding 

that the issue of what a normal driver, in the exercise of 

ordinary care, would have done in the situation was not "a proper 

subject for expert opinion and invaded the province of the jury." 

Doc. 48 at 1. 

In ruling on an evidentiary issue, "the trial judge has broad 

discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert 

evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless manifestly 

erroneous." Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 

(1962); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1061 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987); see Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 

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Appellate Case: 85-2836 Document: 010110024649 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 4 
• l 

1485 (10th Cir. 1987). 1 The trial court, in excluding the normal 

driver testimony, apparently was concerned that Mr. Crommelin's 

discussion of "normal" conduct was really testimony as to what a 

reasonable person would do under the circumstances. In 

admonishing the jury, the court attempted to discourage any 

inference the jury might make that what a "normal" driver would do 

was also what a person exercising ordinary care would do. The 

essence of the district court's admonition is that Mr. Crommelin 

was not qualified to testify about what a reasonable person would 

do under the circumstances of the case. 

A similar situation arose in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff had tripped on a 

section of curb that was defective. The sidewalk immediately next 

to the broken curb was spalled and damaged. The court permitted 

the plaintiff to have a "human factors" expert testify that the 

spalling of a concrete sidewalk was an effective distraction to 

the plaintiff who failed to notice the defective curb. Under 

Virginia law, a pedestrian has an affirmative duty to be aware of 

irregularities in grade, unevenness in surface, and sharp 

depressions in public walkways. Because the law created a duty to 

be cautious, the court held that it was prejudicial error not to 

admonish the jury to disregard the expert's testimony as to the 

distracting quality of the spalling concrete. Id. at 1055-56. 

1 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence instructs a district 

court to determine first whether the witness is qualified to 

testify in a particular field and second whether the witness' 

testimony would assist the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence. Coleman v. Parkline Corp., 844 F.2d 863, 865 (b.c. Cir. 

1988). 

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Appellate Case: 85-2836 Document: 010110024649 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 5 
, 

• 

In the present case, the trial court recognized the proble-s 

created by an expert's testimony that a distraction was sufficient 

to permit a driver to disobey her duty to look for and yield to an 

approaching train. The court perhaps was worried that "the 

evaluation of the commonplace by an expert witness might supplant 

a jury's independent exercise of common sense." Scott, 789 F.2d 

at 1055. We conclude the district court was well within its 

discretion in admonishing the jury to disregard this particular 

portion of the expert's testimony. 

Finally, the Youngs contend that the trial court's admonition 

to the jury was prejudicial error because several defense 

witnesses were permitted to testify as to what Mrs. Young "should 

have done." Plaintiffs mischaracterize the lay witness testimony. 

Each of the defense witnesses testified only to the issue of 

whether Mrs. Young could have seen the train, had she looked, not 

whether she should have seen the train or should have looked under 

the circumstances. The lay testimony addressed only the physical 

description of the crossing. Mr. Crommelin was also permitted to 

testify as to his observations of the intersection's physical 

characteristics and whether Mrs. Young could have seen the train, 

had she looked. Lay witnesses are permitted to testify to 

"concrete facts within their own observation and recollection--

that is facts perceived from their own senses, as distinguished 

from their opinion or conclusions drawn from such facts." 

Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 847-48 (10th Cir~ 

1979). Each witness had observed the crossing and had personal 

knowledge about whether a person could see a train approaching or 

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Appellate Case: 85-2836 Document: 010110024649 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 6 
whether any physical object would obstruct the view. Such 

evidence clearly was admissible. We do not believe that the 

proper admission of testimony supporting one party's case entitles 

the other party to introduce countervailing testimony even though 

the trial court does not find the countervailing testimony to be 

helpful to the jury. 

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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