Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06669/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06669-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANETTA LYNN LEIVA,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-6669 AWI WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 17, 1995, a jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder pursuant to Penal

Code Section 187. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve a term of imprisonment of 25 years

to life.

Petitioner appealed her conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

(“Court of Appeal”). The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion issued

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March 6, 2006. Petitioner filed a petition for review, which the California Supreme Court denied on

April 16, 1997.

On October 19, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Kern County

Superior Court. The court denied the petition on October 27, 1999.

Petitioner filed the present petition on December 8, 2004. Respondent contends that

Petitioner’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner contends that she is entitled to

equitable tolling based on mental health issues. On September 5, 2006, Respondent requested this

court to decide Petitioner’s claims on the merits, without addressing the issue of equitable tolling. 

Respondent noted that the issue of mental competency is a relatively complex issue which would

require lengthy litigation, and thus asked the court to proceed on the merits. Respondent expressly

does not waive the issue of equitable tolling and preserves the right to litigate this defense at a later

date if necessary. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court of Appeal’s opinion contained the following factual findings:

While the defendant’s case was still at the preliminary hearing stage, defense counsel

requested a competency evaluation of defendant . . . . Dr. Estner evaluated defendant in

November 1994 and reported to the superior court that defendant was competent to stand

trial and cooperate with counsel . . .

[U]pon arraignment in the superior court, defendant entered her pleas of not guilty and not

guilty by reason of insanity. The superior court then appointed two mental health experts to

examine defendant . . . . the two experts reached opposite conclusions about the defendant’s

sanity at the time she committed the murder. As a consequence, the prosecutor requested

that the court appoint another expert to examine defendant to determine her mental status.

In particular, the [prosecutor] asked the court to appoint Dr. Estner, reasoning it would take

less time and thus cost less for him to complete . . . . examination because he was already

familiar with the case. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court granted the prosecution’s

request and appointed Dr. Estner.

On her attorney’s advice, defendant refused to cooperate with Dr. Estner. The psychiatrist

nevertheless reached an opinion that defendant was sane at the time she committed the

offense. He relied upon his review of police reports, reports of the other mental health

experts, audio cassette tapes of interviews of defendant and others, and his November 1994

interview of defendant.

Defense counsel made an in limine motion to exclude from the sanity phase any testimony by

Dr. Estner concerning Defendant’s statements to him during the competency examination, as

well as the fruits of such statements . . . the trial court denied the motion.

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In his testimony during the sanity phase of defendant’s trial, Dr. Estner identified three

statements defendant made to him, namely:

“She said she was carrying the baby and she slipped and fell and the baby struck the ground.”

I asked her specifically if she was hearing voices telling her to do this? No.” and

She was also hearing some voices at the time, I asked her very specifically if the voices told

her to hurt the child. She said that she had told the other examiners the voices liked the child

and were protective of the child. She also told me that she couldn’t do anything without the

devil’s permission, and so unless he gave permission, she wouldn’t hurt the children.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County

Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed on December 8, 2004, after

the enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

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The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

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U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For th

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a

federal claim to a state court. See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982)

(Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an

argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074

(1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

When, as in this case, the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this

court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of

Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look

through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms

latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) th

(holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's

rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under §

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2254(d)(1)). 

DISCUSSION

Admission of Testimony of Dr. Estner

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Estner

during the sanity phase of trial. Petitioner claims that the admission of this testimony, which relied

on her statements made during the competency examination, violated her Fifth Amendment right

against self incrimination. She argues that she was never advised that her statements during the

competency examination could be used against her if she pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity

In addressing this issue, the Court of Appeal discussed the rule that neither a defendant’s

statements to a psychiatrist appointed under section 1369 for a competency examination nor the

fruits of such statements may be used “in trial of the issue of [an individual’s] guilt. See People v.

Arcega, 32 Cal.3d 504, 522 (1982); see Tarantino v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 470 (1975). 

Unpublished Court of Appeal Opinion in Case No. F023618, 6. The Court of Appeal held:

In our estimation, the use immunity rule established in Tarantino and approved in

Arcega does not apply in this case. Arcega and Tarantino at most prohibit the introduction

of section 1368 evidence during the guilt and penalty phases of trial. (Arcega, supra, 32

Cal.3d at p. 522; Tarantino, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 470.) However, the statements

defendant made to Dr. Estner during his competency examination were not introduced during

the guilt phase or any penalty phase of defendant’s trial. Instead, the prosecution offered Dr.

Estner’s testimony during the sanity phase of defendant’s trial, after defendant had been

found guilty of murder by the jury. Thus, unlike the defendants in Tarantino and Arcega, the

evidence which the jurors relied upon to convict defendant did not include defendant’s

statements to Dr. Estner.

Id. at 7. 

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim that this distinction is immaterial and that her

statements to Dr. Estner were inadmissible in all phases of her trial. The Court of Appeal held:

As we said in Stanfill, because the rational for excluding such statements is the protection of

the defendant’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination the law governing the

privilege should be applicable. (Stanfill, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 581.) The law

governing the privilege is well-settled that if there is no objection at trial to the admission of

statements purportedly obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the objection cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Peters (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 522, 530; see also

People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 524, fn. 8.) Here, if defendant had any such Fifth

Amendment privilege, she waived it because she never objected in the trial court to Dr.

Estner’s testimony on the ground it violated the Fifth Amendment, the Miranda rule, or any

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other related principle.

Id. at 9.

Finally, the Court of Appeal held that any error that did occur was harmless:

In any event, even if defendant could establish error of constitutional proportions, we

would not find prejudice. Defendant cannot point to any statement made to Dr. Estner

relevant to his opinion of her sanity which she did not make to at least one or more of the

other mental health experts who examined her to evaluate her sanity at the time of the murder. 

As Dr. Estner noted, defendant told a “variety of examiners” that she slipped and fell and that

the death of her child was the result of an accident. Those examiners included at least two of

the mental health experts who testified at trial. These two experts also testified that in their

interviews with defendant she said the voices she heard had not told her to hurt the baby and

that the voices liked the baby. Consequently, any possible error in admitting Dr. Estner’s

testimony about defendant’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman

v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)

Id. at 10. 

Petitioner now argues that the Court of Appeal’s analysis “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” entitling her to habeas corpus relief. 

Petitioner relies heavily on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), in which the Supreme Court found

that the Fifth Amendment privilege applied where a competency examination was performed and the

prosecution used the substance of the defendant’s disclosures against him in the penalty phase of a

death penalty case. The Supreme Court held that because the defendant had not knowingly and

voluntarily consented to the competency examination, i.e., Miranda admonitions had not been given,

the prosecution was prohibited from relying on the defendant’s statements to make their case. 

Petitioner

 now argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege is applicable to the statements she made in the

 competency examination, and that Constitutional error occurred because she was not advised that

 her statements could be used against her. This court finds that in so arguing, Petitioner ignores the

Court of Appeal’s finding that if she had a Fifth Amendment privilege, she waived it because she

“never objected in the trial court to Dr. Estner’s testimony on the ground it violated the Fifth

Amendment, the Miranda rule, or any other related principle.” 

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Further, although Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeal erred in finding harmless error in

this case, she does not address the court’s finding that she could not identify any statement made to

Dr. Estner that she did not make to at least one or more of the other mental health experts who

examined her. In particular, the Court of Appeal notes that two mental health experts testified as to

some of the same statements by Petitioner. Under these circumstances, this court cannot find that the

Court of Appeal erred in finding that the admission of Dr. Estner’s testimony did not substantially

influence the jury’s decision.

In light of the above, this court must conclude that Petitioner has failed to carry her burden of 

showing that the Court of Appeal’s decision, adopted by the California Supreme Court, resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, there is no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Finally, the court notes that Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability. The controlling

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2253, provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge,

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in

which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention

pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not

be taken to the court of appeals from--

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises

out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

In the present case, the court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of making a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability

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will be denied.

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case;

3) A certificate of appealability is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 6, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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