Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03564/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03564-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHEARWOOD FLEMING,

Petitioner,

 v

ANTHONY KANE, 

Respondent. 

BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS,

Real party in interest.

 /

No C 05-3564 VRW

ORDER

Respondent Anthony Kane has moved to dismiss petitioner

Shearwood Fleming’s habeas corpus petition, claiming it is barred

by the one-year statute of limitations under 28 USC section

2244(d)(1). Doc # 12. Petitioner amended his petition rather than

enter a formal opposition to respondent’s motion and argues that he

is within the one-year limit. Docs # 15, # 16. 

The court has reviewed respondent’s memorandum and

petitioner’s amended petition and finds oral argument unnecessary

to adjudicate this matter. For the reasons stated herein,

respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Case 3:05-cv-03564-VRW Document 20 Filed 02/16/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The BPT was abolished on July 1, 2005 and replaced with the

Board of Parole Hearings (BPH). See Cal Gov Code section 12838.4

(2007). The court will continue to use BPT to denote the past actions

of the “board,” even though the BPH is now the real party in interest.

 

2

“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 USC section

2244(d)(1). Neither party disputes 2244(d)(1)’s applicability. 

The dispute arises over when to begin counting the days. The

following table sets forth the relevant dates and events. 

Date Event Days Elapsed

from

Previous

Event

September 18, 2002 The Board of Prison Terms (BPT)1

conducted petitioner’s parole

hearing at issue. Doc # 1 at 15. 

-

October 18, 2002 The BPT’s decision to deny

petitioner parole becomes effective. 

Doc # 16 at 4; Appx A-I, Ex C at

326. 

0

March 18, 2003 Petitioner files an administrative

appeal of the BPT’s denial of his

parole. Doc # 16 at 4; Appx A-I, Ex

D at 328. 

151

July 8, 2003 The BPT denies petitioner’s appeal. 

Doc # 12, Ex 1. 

-

October 18, 2003 Petitioner admits to service of

denial of appeal on his counsel. 

Doc # 1 at 23. 

0

August 17, 2004 Petitioner files his habeas petition

in Los Angeles Superior Court. Doc

# 1 at 23; Appx A-II, Ex J at 701.

304

July 20, 2005 California Supreme Court denies

review of petition. Doc # 1 at 23;

Appx A-II, Ex L. 

0

September 2, 2005 Petitioner files his habeas petition

in this court. Doc # 1. 

44

 

Case 3:05-cv-03564-VRW Document 20 Filed 02/16/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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I

Respondent asserts that the 151 days that elapsed between

October 18, 2002 when the BPT’s decision became effective and March

18, 2003 when petitioner filed his administrative appeal should

count toward the one-year period “because no court or

administrative decisions were pending.” Doc # 12 at 3, Doc # 19 at

2. The court disagrees. Subsection (D) of section 2244(d)(1)

applies to habeas petitions challenging parole board decisions. 

See Shelby v Bartlett, 391 F 3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir 2004); Redd

v McGrath, 343 F 3d 1077, 1081-85 (9th Cir 2003). Subsection (D)

mandates that the statute of limitations begins to run from “the

date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” 28 USC section 2244(d)(1)(D). The “factual predicate”

used by courts in habeas cases challenging parole board actions is

the day the administrative appeal becomes final, subject to the

petitioner receiving proper notice. Shelby, 391 F 3d at 1066;

Redd, 343 F 3d at 1084. 

Respondent’s claim that no case was pending between the

BPT’s denial of parole and the filing of the appeal 151 days later

is unavailing in light of Shelby and Redd. 

Respondent next argues that the 151 days should count

against petitioner’s time because of petitioner’s “unreasonable

delay.” Doc # 12 at 3, Doc # 19 at 2-3. This argument is equally

unavailing. Each case respondent cites in support of his

“unreasonable delay” argument concerns an unreasonable delay by a

habeas petitioner in filing a state habeas petition; none concerns

an administrative appeal in the parole context. Id. Further, even

Case 3:05-cv-03564-VRW Document 20 Filed 02/16/07 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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if the “unreasonable delay” argument were applicable in the

administrative appeals context, there is no indication that

petitioner unreasonably delayed in filing his administrative

appeal. The applicable law in effect when petitioner filed his

appeal required prisoners to file their appeals within ninety (90)

days of receipt of written confirmation of the BPT’s decision. See

15 CCR section 2052(c). October 18, 2002, the day respondent urges

the court to count from, is the wrong day to begin counting the

ninety (90) days to appeal unless this is the same day petitioner

received written confirmation of the BPT’s decision. The fact that

the BPT processed petitioner’s appeal amounts to an acknowledgment

that it was timely filed. And the BPT’s processing of the appeal

shows that petitioner did not unreasonably delay in his filing. 

II 

The court must determine when petitioner “could have

discovered through the exercise of due diligence” the fact that the

BPT denied his administrative appeal before it can accurately

calculate the days elapsed from 2244(d)(1)’s statute of

limitations. Courts have held that notice is necessary to apprise

prisoners of the action taken against them. In Shelby, where the

issue was when the statute of limitations began running for a

habeas petitioner challenging a state prison disciplinary decision,

the court cited Burger v Scott, 317 F 3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir 2003)

for the principle that “the limitations period beg[an] on * * * the

undisputed date Burger learned of the change in his parole

reconsideration date” (internal quotations omitted). 391 F 3d at

1062. The court in Shelby noted that since “Shelby does not

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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dispute that he received timely notice of the denial of his

administrative appeal * * * and he offers no evidence to the

contrary,” the limitation period started the day following the

denial of the administrative appeal. Id. See also Redd, 343 F 3d

at 1082 (“Redd does not dispute that he received notice of the

Board’s decision on December 7. The limitations period therefore

began to run the following day.”); Cook v New York State Division

of Parole, 321 F 3d 274, 280 (2d Cir 2003)(The statute of

limitations began to run when the petitioner “was notified that the

administrative decision to revoke his parole had become final.”). 

 Respondent submits with his motion a copy of the BPT’s

July 08, 2003 denial of petitioner’s administrative appeal. Doc #

12, Ex 1. Petitioner contends in his amended petition that neither

he nor his attorneys received notice of the BPT’s July 8, 2003

denial and, therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to

run until after the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s

habeas petition on July 20, 2005. Doc # 16 at 4-5. But in

petitioner’s original petition he admitted that on October 18, 2003

the BPT “first served the denial of the administrative appeal on

Petitioner’s counsel.” Doc # 1 at 23. Respondent has not produced

any evidence showing that petitioner received notice of the denial

or a proof of service showing when petitioner’s attorneys received

notice of the denial. Nor has respondent offered any evidence that

petitioner could have learned of the decision through the exercise

of due diligence. Petitioner, on the other hand, submitted the

declaration of Naomi Chairez. Doc # 18-3. Ms Chairez declares

that she personally spoke to Mike Terry, who works at the BPT Desk,

and he related to her that the records indicated that petitioner

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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was not served. Id at 2. Ms Chairez also declares that she

reviewed the files of petitioner’s attorney and that they too were

never served with the denial of petitioner’s administrative appeal. 

Id. As noted above, respondent does not offer any evidence to

refute either point. Nevertheless, because the petitioner offers

no explanation for the inconsistency and because the statements in

the original petition are unequivocal, the court treats October 18,

2003 as the date from which 28 USC section 2244(d)(1)’s one-year

time limit began to run. 

Three-hundred and four (304) days elapsed between October

18, 2003, when the clock began ticking, and August 17, 2004, when

petitioner filed his habeas petition in Los Angeles superior court. 

These 304 days count against petitioner’s time. The statute of

limitations is tolled, however, upon the filing of a collateral

challenge in state court until there is final resolution in the

state system. See 28 USC section 2244(d)(2); Evans v Chavis, 546

US 189, __ (2006); Carey v Saffold, 536 US 214, 219-20 (2002);

Brown v Poole, 337 F 3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir 2003). The California

Supreme Court denied review on July 20, 2005 and petitioner filed

his habeas petition in this court on September 2, 2005, forty-four

(44) days later. Forty-four (44) days, added to the 304 days

referred to above, equal 348 days. Petitioner’s filing falls

within the one-year requirement prescribed by section 2244(d)(1).

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Case 3:05-cv-03564-VRW Document 20 Filed 02/16/07 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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For the forgoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss

is DENIED. Respondent shall now respond on the merits to the order

to show cause dated July 5, 2006. Doc # 11. Respondent’s response

is due thirty (30) days from the date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:05-cv-03564-VRW Document 20 Filed 02/16/07 Page 7 of 7