Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07088/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2013 Decided June 25, 2013

No. 11-7088

SHIRLEY SHERROD,

APPELLEE

v.

ANDREW BREITBART AND LARRY O’CONNOR,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00477)

Bruce D. Brown argued the cause for appellant Larry

O'Connor. With him on the briefs were Bruce W. Sanford and

Mark I. Bailen. Eric Kuwana entered an appearance. 

Laura R. Handman, Micah J. Ratner, Jonathan R.

Donnellan, Kristina E. Findikyan, David E. McCraw, Kurt

Wimmer, Gregg P. Leslie, and Eric N. Lieberman were on the

brief for amici curiae Media Organizations, et al. in support of

appellants. 

Ariel B. Levinson-Waldman, Senior Counsel to the Attorney

General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of

Columbia, argued the cause for amicus curiae District of

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Columbia. With him on the brief were Irvin B. Nathan,

Attorney General, and Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General.

Thomas D. Yannucci argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief were Michael D. Jones and Thomas A. Clare. 

Peter A. Farrell and Beth A. Williams entered appearances. 

Julie A. Murray, Paul Alan Levy, and Arthur B. Spitzer were

on the brief for amici curiae Public Citizen, Inc., et al. in support

of neither party. 

Before: BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from

an order of the district court denying defendants’ motion to

dismiss under the District of Columbia’s Anti-SLAPP Act of

2010. D.C. Code § 16-5501 et seq. The district court’s

jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

The court gave three reasons for its order: the D.C. statute is

inapplicable in federal court under the Erie doctrine, see Erie

R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); the D.C. statute was not

effective at the time the complaint was filed and was not

retroactive; and defendants’ motion under the statute was

untimely. Sherrod v. Breitbart, 843 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C.

2012).

SLAPP stands for “strategic lawsuits against public

participation” and refers to suits “aimed to punish or prevent the

expression of opposing points of view.” COMM. ON PUB.

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SAFETY & THE JUDICIARY, REP. ON B. 18-893, at 1 (D.C. 2010). 

The D.C. anti-SLAPP Act, which became effective March 31,

2011, was intended to “allow a defendant to more expeditiously,

and more equitably, dispense” with such a suit. Id. It provides

that a moving party is entitled to dismissal of the complaint

upon a prima facie showing that the claim arises from conduct

protected by the statute, unless the responding party

demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits. D.C. Code

§§ 16-5501, 16-5502.

The first question is whether we have appellate jurisdiction. 

The question presented itself because the district court’s order

was not a final judgment ending the action. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. Defendant O’Connor invokes the collateral order

doctrine.1

 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.

541 (1949). This confers appellate jurisdiction over “district

court decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important

questions completely separate from the merits, and that would

render such important questions effectively unreviewable on

appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.” Digital

Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994).

Other courts of appeals have considered whether the

collateral order doctrine permits review of interlocutory appeals

from denials of motions to dismiss under state anti-SLAPP

statutes. In Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003), the

Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause California law recognizes the

protection of the anti-SLAPP statute as a substantive immunity

from suit, this Court, sitting in diversity, will do so as well.” Id.

at 1025–26. It then concluded that it had jurisdiction over the

appeal because “[a] district court’s denial of a claim of

1

 Andrew Breitbart and Larry O’Connor were defendants in the

district court. Breitbart died on March 1, 2012. His estate did not

enter an appearance in this appeal. 

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immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an

appealable final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Id. at

1026; see also DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706 F.3d

1009, 1013–16 (9th Cir. 2013); Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599

F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2010).

But the Ninth Circuit also held that district court orders

denying motions to dismiss under Nevada’s and Oregon’s antiSLAPP statutes were not final orders and were not appealable

under the collateral order doctrine. See Metabolic Research,

Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795, 800–02 (9th Cir. 2012); Englert v.

MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1105–07 (9th Cir. 2009). The

Englert court concluded that Oregon’s statute “was not intended

to provide a right not to be tried, as distinguished from a right to

have the legal sufficiency of the evidence underlying the

complaint reviewed by a nisi prius judge before a defendant is

required to undergo the burden and expense of a trial.” Englert,

551 F.3d at 1105. The court’s conclusion was “based on the

failure of the Oregon anti-SLAPP statute to provide for an

appeal from an order denying a special motion to strike.”2

 Id.

The Ninth Circuit used the same reasoning in Metabolic

Research, holding that “Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is more

like Oregon’s at the time we decided Englert” because “unlike

California’s, it does not furnish its citizens with immunity from

trial,” 693 F.3d at 801, and “[a] legislatively approved immunity

from trial, as opposed to a mere claim of a right not to be tried,

is imbued with a significant public interest,” id. at 800.

The First Circuit determined it had jurisdiction under the

collateral order doctrine over “an order that a state anti-SLAPP

statute does not apply at all to federal court proceedings due to

2

 Oregon later amended its anti-SLAPP statute. See Or. Rev. Stat.

§§ 31.150(1), 31.152(4) (amended 2010).

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[a direct conflict with] Federal Rules 12 and 56.” Godin v.

Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2010). The court found that

“[i]t is relevant, but not conclusive” that Maine’s anti-SLAPP

statute, as interpreted by the state supreme court, permits

interlocutory appeals of orders denying special motions to

dismiss, because it demonstrates that Maine’s legislature

“‘wanted to protect speakers from the trial itself rather than

merely from liability.’” Id. at 85 (quoting Batzel, 333 F.3d at

1025). The court used this determination to reach its ultimate

conclusion that “the order at issue here involves ‘an asserted

right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed

if it were not vindicated before trial.’” Id. (quoting Lauro Lines

s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989)).

The Fifth Circuit also decided that an order denying a

motion to dismiss under Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute is

immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, in

part because the statute “provides a right not to stand trial, as

avoiding the costs of trial is the very purpose of the statute.” 

Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 178

(5th Cir. 2009). The court recognized that “[l]ike Oregon’s antiSLAPP statute, Article 971 does not include a provision

expressly authorizing immediate appeal.” Id. at n.*. It

attempted to harmonize this apparent departure from the Ninth

Circuit’s reasoning by noting that Louisiana’s courts “allow

immediate appeals through writs of supervision.” Id.

With respect to the D.C. anti-SLAPP Act, the statute’s text

contains no provision for interlocutory appeals. The D.C.

Council’s Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary

explained in its legislative report that it had removed such a

provision, included in the original bill, because of a decision of

the D.C. Court of Appeals that the Council could not expand the

appellate jurisdiction of the District’s courts over appeals of

non-final orders. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY & THE JUDICIARY,

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REP. ON B. 18-893, at 7 (citing Stuart v. Walker, 6 A.3d 1215,

1218–19 (D.C. 2010)). The committee expressed its strong

support for the excised provision, which “would have provided

an immediate appeal over a non-final order (a special motion to

dismiss),” and for the view of the dissenting opinion in Stuart

that the Council had the authority denied by the majority. Id.

Stuart held that “[w]hen read in conjunction with the

definition of our jurisdiction in D.C. Code § 11-721(a)(1) as

being over ‘final orders,’ a plain reading of § 602(a)(4) of the

Home Rule Act is that the D.C. Council cannot enact any

legislation affecting the finality of orders for purposes of

appealability to this court, or attempt to modify this court’s

jurisdiction in any other way.” Stuart, 6 A.3d at 1217 n.3. The

D.C. Court of Appeals vacated the decision and granted a

petition for rehearing en banc. Stuart v. Walker, 30 A.3d 783

(D.C. 2011). The en banc court issued an unpublished judgment

stating that “as the en banc court is equally divided regarding

the issue of jurisdiction . . . the trial court’s order directing the

parties to proceed with arbitration remains in full force and

effect.” Stuart v. Walker, No. 09-CV-900 (D.C. Feb. 16, 2012)

(unpublished judgment).

The D.C. Court of Appeals issued an order in another case

dismissing an interlocutory appeal under the anti-SLAPP Act

because “[t]he subject order is not appealable under the

collateral order doctrine, see Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.,

3[3]7 U.S. 541, 546 (1947), and the District’s anti-SLAPP

statute does not provide for interlocutory review. See, e.g.,

Englert v. MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2009).” 

Newmyer v. Sidwell Friends Sch., No. 12-CV-847 (D.C. Dec. 5,

2012) (unpublished order). The significance of this terse,

unpublished order is unclear. 

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Rather than resolving the issues relating to application of

the collateral order doctrine, we shall assume that we have

appellate jurisdiction. We may do so without running afoul of

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,

94–102 (1998). In holding that “a merits question cannot be

given priority over an Article III question,” 523 U.S. at 97 n. 2,3

the Court in Steel Co. left standing its decision in Norton v.

Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 530, 532 (1976), in which the Court

avoided “difficult and perhaps close jurisdictional arguments”

by assuming appellate jurisdiction when precedent had rendered

the “merits . . . plainly insubstantial.” See also Secretary of the

Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 677–78 (1974) (per curiam). In

distinguishing Norton, the Steel Co. Court pointed out that

another one of its decisions had conclusively resolved the merits

issue in Norton, and so the Norton Court “did not use the

pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for

reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone

unaddressed.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98. In other words, a court

does not exercise its “power to declare the law,” id. at 94, and

thus need not resolve difficult questions of its jurisdiction, when

a prior judgment of the court forecloses the merits issue. Other

courts of appeals have since invoked Norton to assume

jurisdiction when the merits decision was “foreordained” by

precedent. See Starkey v. Boulder Cnty. Soc. Servs., 569 F.3d

1244, 1260 (10th Cir. 2009); Restoration Pres. Masonry, Inc. v.

Grove Europe Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2003); Seale v.

INS, 323 F.3d 150, 151, 155 (1st Cir. 2003); Ctr. for Reprod.

Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2002). 

Our court too has followed such reasoning in assuming

3

 Here there is a live case or controversy; the parties have

standing; and the controversy between O’Connor and Sherrod is—in

the words of Article III § 2—one “between Citizens of different

States.” The only jurisdictional issue relates to the collateral order

doctrine.

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jurisdiction and reaching the merits. See Emory v. United Air

Lines, Inc., No. 11-7142, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (slip op. at 9) (D.C.

Cir. June 21, 2013); cf. Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of

Jordan, 543 F.3d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Kramer v. Gates,

481 F.3d 788, 790–91 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As we next discuss,

precedent in this circuit renders the merits of this appeal a

foregone conclusion.

The district court concluded that defendants’ motion to

dismiss was untimely because it was not filed within the 45-day

period set in the D.C. anti-SLAPP Act. Sherrod, 843 F. Supp.

2d at 86. O’Connor conceded at oral argument that the statute’s

45-day period began running when Sherrod served her

complaint on February 12, 2011. O’Connor also expressly

disclaimed any argument that the period did not begin to run

until the statute’s effective date, which came after service of the

complaint. Given these concessions,4

 the limitations period in

the D.C. statute was to expire on March 29, 2011. O’Connor

and his co-defendant did not file their motion to dismiss under

the D.C. statute until April 18, 2011. Sherrod opposed the

motion on several grounds, one of which was that the motion

was untimely.

O’Connor claims that his motion to dismiss was timely

because the district court had granted an extension of time. The

sequence is as follows. On March 10, 2011, O’Connor and his

co-defendant filed a “Consent Motion to Extend Time to

Answer, Move or Otherwise Plead in Response to the

Complaint.” It was a “Consent Motion” because plaintiff

4

 The defense presented no argument that the district court could

simply—on Erie grounds—disregard the D.C. statute’s 45-day

limitations period for filing a motion under the anti-SLAPP law. Both

sides—and the district court—assumed that the 45-day period

governed. We make the same assumption. 

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Sherrod had agreed to allowing a thirty-day extension of time. 

The motion recited that defendants “hereby move the Court

pursuant to Rule 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . ..” As

grounds for the thirty-day extension, the motion stated that

O’Connor had only recently retained counsel. The motion did

not mention the D.C. anti-SLAPP Act. The district court

granted the motion on March 15, 2011.

We reject O’Connor’s argument that this extension of time

enlarged the period for filing under the D.C. statute. Motions

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) cannot extend

statutory time limits.5

 “Every court to have considered this

question has held that Rule 6(b) may be used only to extend time

limits imposed by the court itself or by other Federal Rules, but

not by statute.” Argentine Republic v. Nat’l Grid Plc, 637 F.3d

365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ( per curiam) (collecting cases), cert.

denied, 132 S. Ct. 761 (2011); see also 4B CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L.

MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1165 (3d ed.

2002). The reason is apparent. Rule 6(b) gives district courts

wide discretion to modify the time limits set forth in the rules. 

Statutory time limits are different. Whether a statute of

limitations may be tolled requires the court to engage in

statutory interpretation. This is not a matter of the court’s

discretion. The intent of the legislature is controlling. See 3M

Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1460–63 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As in

Argentine Republic, “the district court could not, as a matter of

law, have granted the motion because Rule 6(b) may not be used

to extend periods of time dictated by statute.” 637 F.3d at 368.

It follows that the district court’s granting of the “Consent

Motion” to extend time pursuant to Rule 6(b) could not have

5

 Defendants’ later filed a second motion to extend time, but by

then the statutory deadline had passed. 

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extended the D.C. statute’s 45-day limit. The district court

therefore properly denied as untimely defendants’ motion to

dismiss under the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP Act. 

Affirmed.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, concurring: In disposing of this 

appeal, we take the extraordinary step of deciding the merits 

of a controversy before ascertaining our jurisdiction. I write 

separately to emphasize the limits of our power on this

occasion.

“Every federal appellate court has a special obligation to 

satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction” before proceeding to 

the merits of a case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

When we act without jurisdiction, “more than legal niceties 

are at stake . . . . The statutory and (especially) constitutional 

elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of 

separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts 

from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from 

acting permanently regarding certain subjects.” Id. at 101. 

Article III, § 1 delegates to Congress the power to decide 

when and on what subjects courts of appeals may act. U.S.

CONST. art. III, § 1. Pursuant to that power, Congress has 

restrained us from acting prior to the entry of a final judgment 

in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. No such final 

judgment has issued below, so unless we are operating within 

one of the narrow exceptions to the rule of finality (such as 

the collateral order doctrine), we have no authority to 

“pronounce upon the meaning . . . of a state or federal law.” 

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.

We dispose of this appeal without resolving whether we 

possess jurisdiction only because the appeal does not require 

us to “pronounce upon the meaning . . . of a state or federal 

law.” The Supreme Court has held that we need not resolve 

complex jurisdictional questions on the rare occasion that the 

outcome of the case is “foreordained” by precedent – in other 

words, where it stands on all fours with a prior decision. See 

supra at 7 (citing Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976)). 

The majority explains that its Rule 6(b) analysis is dictated by 

our holding in Argentine Republic v. National Grid Plc., 637 

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F.3d 365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). I join that 

conclusion but not because it is clear to me that the rule in 

Argentine Republic would apply in every instance where a 

district court invokes Rule 6(b) to alter a statutory deadline or 

that the rule would apply particularly to the time limit in the 

D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act. Indeed, those issues were not 

considered by the district court or argued to us. I join the 

court’s conclusion only because O’Connor failed to make any 

argument for why his case is legally distinguishable from 

Argentine Republic. We said enough about the meaning of 

Rule 6(b) in Argentine Republic that we may settle this case 

without “pronounc[ing] upon the meaning” further.

But the crucial point to keep in mind is that we may not 

use Norton to “reach[] a question of law that otherwise would 

have gone unaddressed.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98. In a very 

real sense, that means that when we bypass a thorny 

jurisdictional problem to dispose of an appeal under Norton,

we cannot make any new law at all. Argentine Republic is the 

law of this circuit on Rule 6(b), and this case should be seen 

only as an application of its holding in a case where no one 

argued that it did not apply. Indeed, nobody should cite our

discussion of Rule 6(b) as binding precedent. Litigants 

wishing to learn whether Rule 6(b) may be used to extend the

statutory time limit found in the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act are 

advised to consult Argentine Republic, which provides the 

latest word on the subject.

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