Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01293/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01293-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The facts surrounding petitioner’ commitment offense are not relevant to the claim at 1

bar and, therefore, will not be repeated herein. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS ROY PETERSON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1293 MCE JFM P 

vs.

JOE MCGRATH, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2000 conviction on

possession of cocaine for sale and other drug-related offenses. Petitioner claims that he suffered

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because he did not raise a claim that petitioner’s trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to challenge the trial court’s use of jury

instructions CALJIC 2.11.5 and 17.41.1. (Second Amended Petition, filed January 23, 2004, at

5.)1

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

a. Legal Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-88. After a petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally,

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’”

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There

is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). However, that deference “is predicated on counsel’s performance

of sufficient investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound

judgments.” Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith

v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed

counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of

professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751

(1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the

ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation

would be “seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1998) (counsel not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and is

not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) There is, of course, no obligation to raise

meritless arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a

showing of deficient performance as well as prejudice). Thus, counsel is not deficient for failing

to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to demonstrate prejudice in this

context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have

prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434, n.9.

b. CALJIC 2.11.5

Petitioner claims he sustained ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because

appellate counsel, in the Petition for Review filed in the California Supreme Court, did not raise

a claim that petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when trial counsel failed to

challenge the trial court’s use of jury instruction CALJIC 2.11.5. Petitioner raised the substance

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As read to the jury, the instruction provided: “There has been evidence in this case 2

indicating that a person other than the [petitioner] was or may have been involved in the crimes

for which the [petitioner] is on trial. There may be other reasons why that person is not here on

trial. Therefore, do not discuss or give any consideration as to why the other person is not being

prosecuted in this trial or whether he or she has been or will be prosecuted. Your duty is to

decide whether the [P]eople have proved the guilt of the [petitioner] on trial.” (CALJIC No.

2.11.5.) 

5

of this claim on direct appeal. Petitioner was granted leave to pursue the ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim in the state supreme court and, on July 9, 2003, the California Supreme

Court rejected this claim without comment. (Ex. F, Answer, filed March 4, 2004.) 

The last reasoned state court rejection of the merits of the jury instruction claim is

the decision of the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. The state court of

appeal wrote:

[Petitioner] claims the trial court erred in giving two jury

instructions and that reversal is warranted notwithstanding his

failure to object to the instructions.

This court may review “any instruction given . . . even though no

objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial

rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (Pen. Code,

§ 1259.) “Substantial rights are affected if the error ‘result[s] in a

miscarriage of justice, [i.e.,] making it reasonably probable

defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the

absence of error.’” (People v. Elsey (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 948,

953-954, fn. 2 [brackets in original], quoting People v. Andersen

(1994 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249; but see People v. Arredondo

(1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 973, 978 [The cases equate ‘substantial

rights’ with reversible error, i.e., did the error result in a

miscarriage of justice?”].)

Accordingly, our review is limited to determining whether the two

instructions challenged by [petitioner] constituted a miscarriage of

justice such that it is reasonably probable [petitioner] would have

obtained a more favorable result if not for the error. As discussed

below, we find no prejudicial error.

First, [petitioner] claims the trial court erred in instructing the jury,

pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.11.5, not to consider why other

individuals involved in the crimes were not being prosecuted at the

trial. [Petitioner] claims use of the instruction prevented jurors

2

from properly considering Karen Ristau’s bias, interest, and

motives in testifying against [petitioner].

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

The trial court should not have given the instruction because each

person involved in the criminal conduct at issue testified. 

“‘CALJIC No. 2.11.5 . . . should not be given when a

nonprosecuted participant testifies because the jury is entitled to

consider the lack of prosecution in assessing the witness’s

credibility.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th

153, 226; see also Use Note to CALJIC No. 2.11.5.)

Nevertheless, the error was not prejudicial. Given other jury

instructions and closing argument, there is little danger the jury

failed to consider relevant issues of witness credibility. (Cf. People

v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th and p. 227; People v. Carrera

(1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313.) The jury received the standard

instruction asking them to consider the instructions as a whole. 

(CALJIC No. 1.01.) Another instruction indicated the jury should

consider “anything” relevant to witness credibility, including “the

existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest or other motive” on the

part of the witness and “whether the witness is testifying under a

grant of immunity.” (CALJIC No. 2.20.) The jury was also told

that accomplice testimony incriminating [petitioner] “should be

viewed with caution.” (CALJIC No. 3.18 (1999 rev.).) In closing

argument, both the prosecutor and the defense counsel discussed

factors relevant to Ristau’s credibility, including the agreement she

had received from the prosecution.

(Ex. B to Answer, People v. Peterson, No. C036573, slip op. at 4-6 (July 9, 2001)). Thus, the

state court found it was error to use CALJIC 2.11.5, but found the error was not prejudicial.

At trial, Karen Ristau testified that she had pled to felony possession and being

under the influence stemming from her arrest on February 9, 2000, that she was awaiting

sentencing on those charges, and that the case in sentencing had nothing to do with her testimony

in the instant case. (RT 168-69.) She further testified that the under the influence charge related

to her involvement in the incidents at issue herein, which occurred on March 2, 2000, had been

dismissed. (RT 170.) Defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine Ms. Ristau about the

plea agreement reached with the prosecution (RT 182-84), and admitted the District Attorney’s

April 19, 2000 memo concerning the agreement into evidence as Exhibit 41. (RT 183.) 

In addition to the disputed instruction, the trial court instructed the jury on how to

evaluate witness testimony (CALJIC No. 2.20) as follows:

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

Every person who testifies under oath [or affirmation] is a witness.

You are ths sole judges of the believability of a witness and the

weight to be given the testimony of each witness. In determining

the believability of a witness you may consider anything that has a

tendency to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of

the witness, including but not limited to . . . [t]he existence or

nonexistence of a bias, interest or other motive. . . . 

(CT 154.) The jury was also instructed on how to resolve discrepancies in testimony (CT 144),

how to weigh conflicting testimony (CT 157), and how to address a witness who willfully

testifies falsely (CT 156). The jury was also instructed on the definition of accomplice (CT 174)

and, if the witness was found to be an accomplice, that the testimony of that witness should be

viewed with caution (CT 175). 

Petitioner maintains that the erroneous use of CALJIC 2.11.5 rose to the level of a

constitutional violation because it interfered with petitioner’s right to present his defense and “to

meaningfully confront his accusers by placing them before the jury in their proper perspective.” 

(Pet.’s January 23, 2004 Mem. Ps & As at 21.) Petitioner argues that because this error was of

constitutional magnitude, the court should employ the harmless error standard of Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). (Pet.’s January 23, 2004 Mem. Ps & As at 22.) However,

petitioner contends this error cannot be deemed harmless under any standard because this case

was close, as the jury deliberated over three days, at one point sending a note to the trial judge

that it had deadlocked. (Pet.’s January 23, 2004 Mem. Ps & As at 22.)

A challenged instruction violates the federal constitution if there is a "reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the

consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380,

(1990). "When considering an allegedly erroneous jury instruction in a habeas proceeding, an

appellate court first considers whether the error in the challenged instruction, if any, amounted to

'constitutional error.'" Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Calderon

v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 147 (1998)). To determine constitutional error, 

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

an appellate court asks whether there is a reasonable likelihood that

the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that

prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. 

That inquiry also can be described as having two parts: (1)

whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood an

assertedly ambiguous instruction to mean what the defendant

suggests it means; and (2) if so, whether the instruction, so

understood, was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where CALJIC 2.11.5 is given in error, the

court must review the totality of the trial court's instructions to the jury to determine whether

there was constitutional error. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005).

If the court finds constitutional error, then it applies the test for harmless error

from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Under Brecht, the appellate court considers

whether the error had a " 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict.' " Id. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). "If we are

in grave doubt as to whether the error had such an effect, the petitioner is entitled to the writ."

Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir.2000).

Petitioner concedes he was permitted to cross-examine Ms. Ristau about the

immunity deal she reached with the prosecution. (Pet.’s January 23, 2004 Mem. Ps & As at 21.) 

Even though the trial court was mistaken to give CALJIC 2.11.5, any mistake was cured by the

instructions read as a whole. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 997 (9th Cir. 2005)(Given the

totality of the trial court's instructions to the jury, the trial court's instruction not to consider the

prosecution status of others involved in Allen's aggravation crimes was not constitutional error.)

Here, the jury was specifically instructed regarding witness bias, interest, or other

motive. A rational juror would understand that "anything that has a tendency to prove" the

existence of a witness's "bias, interest or other motive," would include any evidence that Ristau

received immunity or other favorable treatment from the prosecution. When read in conjunction

with the other instructions regarding witness bias, CALJIC No. 2.11.5 can reasonably be

understood to preclude speculation as to prosecution or non-prosecution of other participants, not

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As read to the jury, CALJIC 17.41.1 provided: “The integrity of a trial requires that 3

jurors at all times during their deliberations conduct themselves as required by these instructions. 

Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to

disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment or any other improper

basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the court of that situation.” 

(People v. Peterson, slip op. at 6, n.3.)

9

to preclude consideration of evidence going to the question of witness bias. Given the trial

court's clear instruction that the jury could consider the bias of any witness by reference to

"anything" that "has a tendency" to show bias, there is no reasonable likelihood that CALJIC No.

2.11.5 would have precluded the jury from considering whether Ristau was biased by favorable

treatment from the prosecution. The jury was also instructed on accomplice liability, such that if

the jury found Ms. Ristau to be an accomplice, the jury was instructed to view her testimony with

caution. 

Thus, the court’s use of CALJIC No. 2.11.5 did not render the trial fundamentally

unfair so as to violate due process. In light of the trial court's instructions read as a whole, there

is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood CALJIC No. 2.11.5 to bar consideration of

Ms. Ristau’s motives for testifying. In order to demonstrate Strickland prejudice in this context,

petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have prevailed on

appeal. Because this court finds there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood its

charge based on the instructions as a whole, counsel would not have prevailed on appeal;

therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue in the Petition for

Review before the California Supreme Court. This claim should be denied.

c. CALJIC 17.41.1

Petitioner claims he sustained ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because

appellate counsel did not raise a claim that petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance when he failed to challenge the trial court’s use of jury instruction CALJIC 17.41.1,3

which was later disapproved by the California Supreme Court. People v. Engelman, 28 Cal.4th

436 (2002). This claim was raised by petitioner on direct appeal. Appellate counsel failed to

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

include this claim in his petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. 

Petitioner was granted leave to pursue this claim in the state supreme court and,

on July 9, 2003, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim without comment. (Ex. F,

Answer, filed March 4, 2004.) 

The last reasoned state court rejection of the merits of this jury instruction claim is

the decision of the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. In relevant part,

the state court of appeal wrote:

We need not decide whether this instruction was error since any

error was not prejudicial. (See generally People v. Molina (2000)

82 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1335-1336.) The instruction is “not likely to

come into play in most cases” (id. at p. 1335), and there is little

reason to believe it played any part in the jury’s deliberations here. 

While [petitioner] emphasizes the length and nature of the jury

deliberations and argues the jury might have been inclined toward

nullification based on the facts, there is no indication the jury was

inclined to disregard its oath and engage in nullification. None of

the jurors came forward to complain of any misconduct, and we are

confident that each juror diligently performed his or her duties.

(Ex. B to Answer, People v. Peterson, No. C036573, slip op. at 6-7 (July 9, 2001)). 

In Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2004), the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that no clearly established United States Supreme Court

precedent supports a contention that CALJIC 17.41.1 violates a constitutional right. In order to

demonstrate Strickland prejudice in this context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for

counsel’s errors, he probably would have prevailed on appeal. Because petitioner’s challenge to

the use of this instruction is foreclosed by the decision in Brewer, appellate counsel cannot be

found ineffective for his failure to include this claim in the petition for review filed in the

California Supreme Court. This claim should therefore be denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 25, 2005.

001; pete1293.157

Case 2:02-cv-01293-MCE-JFM Document 29 Filed 08/26/05 Page 11 of 11