Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00460/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00460-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

M.G., G.M., L.A., J.M., L.G., F.B., M.N.,

R.G., L.S., and E.R.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 12cv0460 JM(MDD)

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO

vs. DISMISS 

METROPOLITAN INTERPRETERS AND

TRANSLATORS, INC., J.C., L.L., R.P.,

M.L., B.A., UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, EILEEN ZEIDLER, SONDRA

HESTER, DAREK KITLINSKI, and

WILLIAM R. SHERMAN,

Defendants.

This matter comes before the court in response to the court’s March 20, 2013

request for further briefing on whether Plaintiffs may bring a private cause of action

against the United States pursuant to the Employee Polygraph Protection Act

(“EPPA”), 29 U.S.C. §2001 et seq. (Ct. Dkt. 60). That order also denied the sovereign

immunity motion brought by Defendants United States of America, Eileen Zeidler,

Sondra Hester, Darek Kitlinski, and William R. Sherman (collectively the “Federal

Defendants”). Plaintiffs M.G., G.M., L.A., J.M., L.G., F.B., M.N., R.G., L.S., and E.R.

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the

court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the reasons

set forth below, the court denies the motion to dismiss the EPPA claims and grants the

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motion to dismiss the individual Federal Defendants from this action. 

BACKGROUND

On October 10, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”) alleging nine causes of action: (1) violation of EPPA, 29 U.S.C. §2002(1); (2)

violation of EPPA, 29 U.S.C. §2002(2); (3) violation of EPPA, 29 U.S.C. §2002(3); (4)

civil conspiracy; (5) fraud; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) intentional infliction

of emotional distress; (8) negligence; and (9) permanent injunction and other equitable

relief. Plaintiffs allege jurisdiction based upon federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§1331 and 29 U.S.C. §2001 et seq., and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). (SAC ¶¶1, 2). Defendants Eileen Zeidler,

Sondra Hester, Darek Kitlinski, and William R. Sherman are employees of the Drug

Enforcement Agency (“DEA”).

Plaintiffs’ claims relate to their employment as linguists with Metropolitan

Interpreters and Translators, Inc. (“Metropolitan”). Defendants J.C., L.L., R.P., M.L.,

and B.A. are employees of Metropolitan. (SAC ¶¶7-11). Metropolitan provides

translation, transcription and interpretation servicesto the lawenforcement community,

government agencies, and private corporations. (SAC ¶18). Plaintiffs provide the

following summary of their case:

In 2011, Metropolitan and DEA requested, required and demanded that

all linguists working in their San Diego and Imperial County offices take

polygraph exams. DefendantB.A., the Metropolitan site supervisorin San

Diego, made all arrangements for Plaintiffs take the DEA administered

polygraph exams as a condition of employment. If the employees “failed”

or refused the test, or had inconclusive results, they would lose their

“clearance” to be in the DEA offices, meaning that they would be

terminated from their jobs.

Metropolitan was not conducting an investigation involving

economic loss to Metropolitan. Nor did Metropolitan have any

individualized suspicion that any of the Plaintiffs had committed a crime

or engaged in wrongdoing. Rather, Defendants imposed the blanket

requirement that every linguist in San Diego and Imperial County take

polygraphs. Defendants provided no written material to Plaintiffs which

explained the purpose of these mandatory tests nor the basis for any

investigation or suspicion; nor did Defendants give written notice of the

employees’ rights under federal and state law.

One of the polygraphists, Defendant Eileen Zeidler, asked grossly

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inappropriate and personal questions to some of the Plaintiffs. These

questions were demeaning and humiliating. DEA agents pressured

Plaintiffs into “telling the truth” or accused Plaintiffs of lying. Agents

escorted Plaintiffs out of the building in a humiliating fashion after they

“failed” the polygraph.

The polygraph testing in this case was prohibited by the Employee

Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001, et seq. (“EPPA”)

Defendants effectively terminated Plaintiffsfromtheir employment either

for “failing” the polygraph test, having an inconclusive test result, or

refusing to submit to the examination.

(SAC at pp. 2:8-3:2). 

According to Plaintiffs, in 2011, they were informed by Metropolitan that they

would be discharged if they failed the polygraph exam, refused the exam, or provided

inconclusive test results. (SAC ¶38). The DEA not only allegedly requested and

demanded the polygraph tests, but planned, designed, administered and executed them

as well. (SAC ¶40). Metropolitan scheduled and coordinated the exams of its

employees. (SAC ¶38). The Metropolitan Defendants allegedly instructed its

“employees that they were not to discuss the polygraph with any DEA employee” and

to direct any questions regarding the polygraph only to Metropolitan. (SAC ¶48). 

With respect to each Plaintiff, the SAC alleges as follows:

• Plaintiff M.G. On July, 6, 2011, Defendant B.A. instructed M.G. that

he was required to take a polygraph examination. No one provided M.G.

any written materials regarding the examination. M.G.'s polygraph exam

lasted four hours. After the examination, Metropolitan terminated his

employment. (SAC ¶ 63).

• Plaintiff F.M. On July 8, 2011, Defendant B.A. told F.M. he needed to

come to work the next day to take a polygraph examination. The next

day, July 9, 2011, F.M. was subjected to an approximately four hour

polygraph exam. The polygrapher asked personal questions regarding

F.M.'s past relationships and financial situation. The polygrapher told

F.M. that he had neither passed nor failed the exam. F.M. was later

escorted out of the building and his badge was taken away. Metropolitan

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discharged F.M. from employment. (SAC ¶ 64).

• Plaintiff L.A. Defendant B.A. told L.A. that she was to take a

polygraph test on August 29, 2011. On August 10, 2011, however, B.A.

told L.A. that she would have to take the exam the next day, August 11,

2011. No one provided L.A. anywritten material regarding the polygraph

examination. During the pre-test phase of the examination, the

polygrapher asked L.A. if she had engaged in sexual activity with

animals. L.A.'s examination lasted approximately five hours and she was

told that she did not pass the exam. L.A. was terminated from her

employment with Metropolitan. (SAC ¶ 66).

• Plaintiff J.M. On August 1, 2011, J.M.'s shift supervisor gave him a

letter instructing him to submit to a polygraph test on August 22, 2011.

No one provided J.M. with any other written documentation about the

examination. The examination lasted approximately four hours and

included a question regarding his sexual conduct and whether he cheated

on his partner. The polygrapher told J.M. he failed one question and

asked J.M. to submit to a retest. J.M. agreed. No one set up a retest and

Metropolitan thereafter terminated J.M. (SAC ¶ 67).

• Plaintiff L.G. Defendant B.A. told L.G. that she was required to take

a polygraph test on September 13, 2011. On Tuesday August 30, 2011,

DefendantB.A. arbitrarily changed the date to September 2, 2011, via text

message. On September 2, 2011, L.G. submitted to a three hour

polygraph examination. L.G. wasinformed she "failed" the test. She took

the test again the next day for another three hours and again was told that

she had "failed." Plaintiff L.G. worked at the ICE office which did not

request or require a polygraph examination. In December of 2011,

Metropolitan advised ICE of L.G.'s polygraph results. Metropolitan

effectively discharged L.G. in December of 2011. (SAC ¶ 68).

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•Plaintiff F.B. On August 2, 2011, a Metropolitan shift supervisor gave

F.B. a facsimile notifying him that he was scheduled for a polygraph on

September 30, 2011. No one provided any other documents related to the

polygraph. On August 30, 2011, Defendant B.A. sent F.B. a text message

informing him that his polygraph was rescheduled. On September 9,

2011, Defendant B.A. sent F.B. a text message informing F.B. his new

examination date was on September 14, 2011. F.B. submitted to a

polygraph test on that date. The test lasted approximately four hours. He

was asked personal questions, including whether he ever received

treatment froma mental health practitioner. The polygrapher told F.B. he

"failed" the exam, and thereafter Metropolitan discharged him. (SAC ¶

69).

• Plaintiff M.N. Defendant B.A. told M.N. via text message that she was

to take a polygraph test on September 15, 2011. M.N. provided a written

statement to the DEA agent declining to take the polygraph test because

the test violated the Employment Polygraph Protection Act (“EPPA”).

Metropolitan fired her because she declined to take the test. (SAC ¶ 72).

• Plaintiff R.G. In the summer of 2011, Defendant B.A. told R.G. verbally

that he would have to submit to a polygraph examination on a later date.

R.G. grew concerned because he found out that employees who had been

subjected to testing were called liars during the examinations. On or

about November 6, 2011, R.G. informed Defendant B.A. that he was not

going to take the examination. R.G. worked at the ICE office at that time,

which did not request or require Metropolitan employees to take a

polygraph examination. On December 21, 2011, while working at the

ICE office, R.G. was informed that he was required to leave the site after

he finished his shift. Defendant L.L. notified R.G. that he was to return

his identification card. R.G. contacted Defendant B.A. regarding L.L.'s

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instructions and B.A. expressed regret that R.G. would no longer be

working at Metropolitan. (SAC ¶ 73). 

• Plaintiff L.S. On September 9, 2011, Defendant B.A. informed L.S. via

text message that his polygraph was scheduled on September 15, 2011.

Defendant B.A. also gave additional instructions about what to eat and

wear on the examination day. On September 12, 2011, a supervisor told

L.S. that his exam would be rescheduled. On November 4, 2011, B.A.

informed L.S. via text that his polygraph wasscheduled for the upcoming

Wednesday. B.A. also instructed him to eat before the exam. On

November 8, 2011, B.A. sent L.S. a text message canceling the test. Later

that day, B.A. called L.S. and told himto take the polygraph on November

22, 2011. On November 16, 2011, B.A. cancelled the polygraph via email.

B.A. stated he would contact L.S. as soon as the polygrapher gave B.A.

available dates. The next day, November 17, 2011, B.A. told L.S. thatshe

would be taking the polygraph on November 22, 2011, after all. On

November 22, 2011, B.A. sent a text to L.S. rescheduling the polygraph

test for the next day. L.S. submitted to the polygraph examination the next

day, November 23, 2011. An hour after finishing the exam, B.A. called

L.S. and told her to give her badge to her supervisor and leave the

building. (SAC ¶ 74).

• Plaintiff E.R. On March 12, 2012, Defendant B.A. told E.R. his

polygraph had been scheduled on March 18, 2012, B.A. requested that

E.R. go to the DEA office to submit to testing. E.R. had worked

exclusively for ICE. (SAC ¶ 76).

On July 18, 2012, Judge Dana M. Sabraw granted in part and denied in part the

motion to dismissthe First Amended Complaintfiled by Defendants Metropolitan,J.C.,

L.L., R.P., M.L., and B.A. (Ct. Dkt. 20). Upon amendment, the Federal Defendants

were joined as parties in the SAC. Shortly after this case was transferred to this court,

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on January 28, 2013, the court ordered the substitution of the United States for the

individual Federal Defendants pursuant to the Federal Employees LiabilityReformand

Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (“FTCA”), Section 6, 28 U.S.C. §2678(d)(1). (Ct.

1

Dkt. 47).

On March 20, 2013, the court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss the

SAC based upon severalsovereign immunity arguments and requested further briefing

on whether EPPA affords Plaintiffs a private right of action against the Government. 

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly

suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937

(2009) (under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer

the mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The

defect must appear on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider

extraneous material in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950

F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly

On February 25, 2013, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against Defendant L.L. 

1

(Ct. Dkt. 55).

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submitted as part of the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

The EPPA Claims

The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs, all employees of Metropolitan, may

maintain a private right of action against the United States. EPPA provides certain

employees with a limited private right of action against their employers. In pertinent

part, EPPA provides:

(c) Private civil actions. (1) Liability. An employer who violates this

chapter shall be liable to the employee or prospective employee affected

by such violation. Such employer shall be liable for such legal or

equitable relief as may be appropriate, including, but not limited to,

employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment oflost wages and

benefits. 

(2) Court. An action to recover the liability prescribed in paragraph (1)

may be maintained against the employer in any Federal or State court of

competent jurisdiction by an employee or prospective employee for or on

behalf of such employee, prospective employee, and other employees or

prospective employees similarly situated. No such action may be

commenced more than 3 years after the date of the alleged violation. 

(3) Costs. The court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party

(other than the United States) reasonable costs, including attorney's fees. 

29 U.S.C. §2005(c).

The term “‘employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the

interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee.” 29 U.S.C.

§2001(2). Plaintiffs allege that the United States is liable under this provision because

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the Federal Defendants “participated in the violation by terminating security clearances

of Plaintiffs; authorizing and requesting the polygraph testing; and coordinating the

discharge of Plaintiffs from employment.” (SAC ¶106).

Plaintiffs urge the court to apply the so-called “economic reality test” adopted

by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. Reasoning that the employer definition in EPPA is

similar to that found in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Family and

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the FifthCircuit applied the so-called “economic reality

test.” 

When examining the degree of control necessary to treat a polygraph

examiner as an employer for purposes of the EPPA, district courts have

considered whether the examiner (1) decided that a polygraph

examination should be administered; (2) decided which employee would

be examined; (3) provided expertise or advice to the employer regarding

compliance with the EPPA's requirements, or the employer relied on the

examiner to ensure compliance; or (4) decided whether the examined

employee would be subjected to disciplinary action, or merely reported

the results of the polygraph examination to the employer.

Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2002). These

circuits reasoned that the meaning of “employer” under the “FLSA includesthose who,

as a matter of economic reality, exercise some degree of control over an employee’s

term and conditions of employment.” Id. at 727.

2

The court concludes that the economic realities test as applied to private parties

in such cases as Calbillo, 288 F.3d 721, and Fernandez v. Mora-San Miguel Elec. Coop., Inc., 462 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2006), does not readily translate to circumstances

where the Government may be acting in the public interest. In Calbillo, the employer,

Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., hired Allied Polygraph Services, Inc. (“Allied”) to

investigate the workplace theft of products from its parts department. An employee of

Allied interviewed several employees and wasinvolved in the decision to interview the

plaintiff. However, there wasinsufficient evidence to show that Allied’s employee was

Even if the economics reality test were to apply under the circumstances, the court concludes

2

that development of a factual record is a prerequisite to determining the applicability of the economics

reality test. 

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involved in the decision to require the suspected wrongdoer employee to undergo a

polygraph examination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of

Allied, and against the plaintiff-employee, on the EPPA claims. In Calbillo there was

no governmental involvement. 

In Fernandez, the employer suspected employee theft of an air compressor from

its storage yard. The employer then contacted Lucero Professional Services (“LPS”)

and requested that it perform polygraph tests on some of its employees. LPS informed

the employer that it would not test the employees but would do so if requested in

conjunction with a criminal investigation. Shortly thereafter the New Mexico Fourth

Judicial District Attorney’s Office (“DAO”) requested that LPS conduct the polygraph

examinations. The employer set the schedule for the employee examinations and LSP

conducted the polygraphs. However, LPS would not disclose the results to the

employer, only the DAO. The DAO released the results to the employer and two

employees were terminated. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the EPPA

claims against LPS and the DAO. In both these cases, the polygraph experts were 3

retained to advance the private interests of the employer. In both Fernandez and

Calbillo, the underlying question was whether the polygrapher qualified to be treated

as an “employer” within the meaning of EPPA, a question not before this court. 

4

The FLSA authorities are also instructive on the application of the economic

reality test. FLSA casestypically involve resolution of the degree of control exercised

The claims against DAO were dismissed based upon state law sovereign immunityprinciples. 3

The Government highlights that EPPA’s definition of “employer” is different than that in the 4

FLSA and the FMLA because the definition in these statutes specifically includes the Government

whereas EPPA does not. For example, the FLSA provides:

(d) “Employer” includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an

employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee and includes a public

agency (meaning the United States).

29 U.S.C. §203(d). The Government argues that the FLSA was amended to specifically include the

definition of employer “includes a public agency.” Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 263 (D.C. Cir.

1982). This amendment, the Government argues, demonstrates that public agencies should not be

included as employer for purposes of EPPA.

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by a purported employer over the employee. “To determine whether an individual or

entity is an employer, the court considers whether the alleged employer: ‘(1) possessed

the power to hire and fire employees; (2) supervised or controlled employee work

schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate or method of payment;

and (4) maintained employee records.’” Gray v. Powets, 673 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir.

2012) (quoting Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir.2010)). “The

dominant theme in the case law is that those who have operating control over

employees within companies may be individually liable for FLSA violations committed

by the companies.” Id. at 357. Under this view, whether the DEA exercised

operational control over Plaintiffs’ conditions of employment presents a question of

fact.

5

The statutory definition of “employer” extends to those “acting directly or

indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective

employee.” 29 U.S.C. §2001(2). Plaintiffs have properly pled sufficient facts giving

rise to the plausible inference that the DEA was acting in the interests of Metropolitan

by requiring the polygraphs in questions. Plaintiffs have also pled that the DEA was

acting in concert with Metropolitan and involved with the policies and procedures for

the administration of the polygraphs. At this early stage in the litigation process, the

court denies the motion to dismiss, noting that the issues raised are better addressed in

the context of an evidentiary motion or at trial. 

Parenthetically, the court notes that the EPPA statutory scheme provides

exemptions from EPPA for certain governmental agencies “in the performance of any

counterintelligence function[s]” and for purposes of criminal investigation. 29 U.S.C.

§§2006(b) - (c). To that end, the statute specifically permits the following agencies to

require a contractor’s employees, consultants, or experts to submit to polygraph

examination: the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the National

The court notes that 48 C.F.R. §37.104(c) may limit the Government’s ability to exercise 5

continuous supervision and control over a contracted employee.

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SecurityAgency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping

Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any

other department or agency whose duties involve access to top secret information

classified at the level of top secret or designated as being with a special access program

under Executive Order 12356, or successor orders. 29 U.S.C. §2006(b). While the

DEA may engage in certain intelligence and counterintelligence activities with respect

to international drug trafficking organizations, as well as criminal investigations, it is

not specifically listed as an exempt public agency nor does the Government argue that

the DEA’s “duties involve access to information that has been classified at the level of

top secret.” 29 U.S.C. §2006(b)(2)(B). 

In sum, the court deniesthe motion to dismiss the EPPA claims against the DEA. 

The Claims Against the Individual Federal Defendants

The Government also moves for dismissal of the individual Federal Defendants

pursuant to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28

U.S.C. §2671 etseq. (FTCA”). Under the FTCA, “a federal employee isimmune from

suit upon certification of the Attorney General that the employee was acting within the

scope of his employment.” Pauly v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 348 F.3d 1143, 1150-51

(9th Cir. 2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). There are two exceptions: where the

allegations involve violations of the United States Constitution or violations of a

federal statute that itself authorizes an action against the individual. Hamad v. Gates,

2011 WL 6130413, *8 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2). Upon

certification by the Attorney General, the United States shall be substituted as the

defendant and the government employee dismissed from the suit. Kashin v. Kent, 457

F.3d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2006). “Any other civil action or proceeding for money

damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or

the employee’s estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission

occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).

Here, the court grants the motion to dismiss the individual Federal Defendants

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because the Government certifies that the individual federal defendants “were acting

within the scope of their federal employment at the time of the incidents giving rise to

this suit.” (Ct. Dkt. 47 at p.1:25-28). 

In sum, the court denies the motion to dismiss the EPPA claims and grants the

motion to dismiss all claims against the Federal Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 8, 2013

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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