Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03477/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03477-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alexander Paul Celaya,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-03477-PHX-ROS

ORDER 

In 2014, Petitioner Alexander Paul Celaya (“Celaya”) was convicted in state court 

of five counts of molestation of a child. After pursuing a direct appeal, as well as a postconviction relief proceeding in state court, Celaya filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in this court. Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett issued a Report and Recommendation 

concluding that Celaya was not entitled to relief and that Grounds 1, 2(d)–(h), and 4 should 

be dismissed as procedurally defaulted, while Grounds 2(a), (b), (c), (i), (j), and 3 of the 

petition should be denied on the merits. (Doc. 20.) Celaya filed objections, and 

Respondents replied. (Docs. 21, 22.) Having reviewed each ground for relief, Celaya is not 

entitled to relief and the recommendations will be adopted.

BACKGROUND

Celaya does not object to the factual background set forth in the Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”). Therefore, that background will be adopted in full, with the 

clarification that in 2014 a jury found Celaya guilty on one count of child molestation of

his daughter, K.C., and four counts of child molestation of his niece, J.H. (Doc. 10 at 14–

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25.) The facts underlying the conviction are as follows. On one occasion, Celaya took K.C. 

“to his room and touched his hand and penis to her vaginal area,” and on more than one 

occasion Celaya took J.H. “upstairs into another room, removed their pants, and made her 

touch her vaginal area and his penis.” (Doc. 11 at 69.) The superior court sentenced Celaya 

to serve 17 years on each count (three consecutive sentences and two concurrent 

sentences), for a total sentence of 51 years. (Doc. 10 at 29.)

On direct appeal, represented by a new attorney, Celaya focused primarily on the 

denial of his motion to sever the counts relating to K.C. from the counts related to J.H. and 

the denial of his motions for judgments of acquittal. (Doc. 11 at 25–33.) The Arizona Court 

of Appeals affirmed Celaya’s convictions. (Doc. 11 at 68–72.)

In 2016, Celaya filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”), and Celaya’s 

PCR counsel filed a PCR petition raising four issues, including prosecutorial misconduct, 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and violation of Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment rights. (Doc. 12 at 4.) After briefing, the superior court denied relief, and 

denied a subsequent motion for rehearing. (Doc. 14 at 3–8, 42.) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed the superior court’s ruling. (Doc. 15 at 69.)

In May 2019, Celaya timely initiated this federal habeas proceeding, alleging four 

grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents identified and separately addressed a number of 

sub-claims contained in Ground Two, and the R&R addresses some of the sub-claims 

separately. The grounds of Celaya’s petition are as follows.

Ground One: Prosecutorial misconduct.

Ground Two: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel, specifically:

2a) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to marshal evidence 

impeaching victims/support of alibi.

2b) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to conduct other discovery.

2c) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to renew the motion for 

severance.

2d) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the opening 

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statement.

2e) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the rebuttal 

testimony of Haughn.

2f) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the rebuttal 

testimony of Andrew Celaya.

2g) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the testimony of 

Wendy Dutton.

2h) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the prosecutor’s 

closing arguments.

2i) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to specifically object to the 

introduction of recorded recollection.

2j) Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present known impeachment 

evidence.

Ground Three: Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to present 

claims related to prosecutorial misconduct and the admission of J.H.’s recorded 

recollection on appeal.

Ground Four: Violation of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because Celaya “was 

confined in jail during the trial and the sheriff’s transportation practices interfered 

with his ability to participate in his trial and confer with his counsel.”

(Doc. 4 at 1–2, Doc. 8 at 4–5.)

The R&R concludes that Grounds One, 2(d)–(h), and Four were procedurally 

defaulted, and that Grounds 2(a)–(c), (i), (j), and Three should be denied on the merits.

ANALYSIS

I. Procedural Default: Grounds One and Four, and Grounds 2(d)–(h)

The R&R concludes that Grounds One and Four are procedurally defaulted because 

the state courts denied relief on those claims by invoking an independent and adequate state 

rule, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3). This rule precludes post-conviction 

relief on claims that could have been raised and adjudicated on direct appeal. Celaya 

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concedes that these issues could have been raised on direct appeal but were not. (Doc. 21 

at 2.) Celaya claims the failure to present these issues on appeal “is a perfect example of 

the ineffective [assistance of appellate] counsel claim.” (Doc. 21 at 2.) Ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel can, in some circumstances, excuse the procedural default 

of claims. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000) (“[A] claim of ineffective 

assistance . . . generally must be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before 

it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default.”). But as explored later, Celaya 

has not established he suffered ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Nor has Celaya 

established any other basis on which to excuse the procedural default of these claims. 

Therefore, Celaya is not entitled to relief on Ground One or Ground Four.

Grounds 2(d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) relate to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

in failing to object to the opening and closing statements and the testimony of three 

witnesses. The R&R finds that these grounds have not been exhausted because they were 

not fairly presented in the Petition for Review filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals 

regarding the superior court’s denial of PCR relief. (Doc. 20 at 9.) Because Celaya is 

precluded from returning to state court to exhaust these grounds under an independent and 

adequate state rule, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3), the R&R concludes

that Grounds 2(d)–(h) are procedurally defaulted. Celaya has not objected to this finding, 

and he is not entitled to relief on Grounds 2(d)–(h).

II. Merits Review: Grounds 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(i), 2(j), and Ground Three

Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j) relate to ineffective assistance of counsel based on 

evidentiary issues; specifically, ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to use thirdparty discovery to obtain alibi evidence, failing to conduct “other discovery” regarding 

J.H., and failing to present certain impeachment evidence. (Doc. 1 at 8.) The superior court 

noted that Celaya failed to comply with the Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure requiring 

him to submit affidavits or other evidence supporting his allegations and held that the first 

prong of Strickland v. Washington, requiring deficient performance, was not met. (Doc. 14 

at 6.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s ruling that the claims in 

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Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j) lack merit, and the R&R concludes that Celaya has failed to show 

that the state courts’ rulings were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, 

or that the rulings were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Doc. 20 at 

16.) Celaya objects that the failure to submit affidavits was “due to the failure of the state 

court to allow discovery during the PCR.” (Doc. 21 at 2.) But Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j) 

challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel, not what happened during the post-conviction 

relief process. That is, the fact that Celaya was not permitted to pursue discovery during 

his post-conviction relief proceedings does not establish the superior court erred in 

rejecting his claims. And without any objections explaining why the superior court’s 

conclusion, based on the evidence before it, was an unreasonable application of Strickland, 

Celaya is not entitled to relief on Grounds 2(a), (b), and (j).

Ground 2(c) relates to trial counsel’s failure to renew a motion to sever the counts 

pertaining to K.C. from the counts pertaining to J.H. The superior court concluded that this 

decision was strategic, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed this reasoning. (Doc. 20 

at 17.) Celaya objects that the decision “was not strategic” and “was never discussed” with 

him. But trial counsel’s lack of a discussion with Celaya does not mean the decision was 

not strategic, and Celaya’s “disagreement with trial counsel’s strategy does not constitute 

deficient performance on the part of trial counsel.” Murray v. Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 817 

(9th Cir. 2018). Celaya is not entitled to relief on Ground 2(c).

Ground 2(i) relates to trial counsel’s general, but not specific, objection to the 

introduction of J.H.’s police interview. Celaya’s objections accuse J.H. of lying but do not 

object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that this Ground be denied. Absent any 

objection, there is no need to review the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning and Celaya is not 

entitled to relief on Ground 2(i).

Ground Three relates to appellate counsel’s failure to present claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct on direct appeal. The superior court reasoned the underlying prosecutorial 

misconduct arguments lacked merit and appellate counsel had to “select[] some issues and 

reject[] others” when presenting his appellate arguments. (Doc. 14 at 7.) In the superior 

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court’s view, trial “counsel’s performance was not deficient.” (Doc. 14 at 7.) While 

Celaya’s objections establish he disagrees with these conclusions, his objections do not 

establish those conclusions were an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. 

Celaya is not entitled to relief on Ground Three.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 20) is ADOPTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is 

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis on appeal are DENIED because dismissal of portions of the petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling 

debatable and because the portions of the petition not procedurally barred do not make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Dated this 5th day of May, 2020.

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver

Senior United States District Judge

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