Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01092/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01092-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NINA WATERS,

Plaintiff,

 v

JO ANNE B BARNHART, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No C 05-1092 VRW

 ORDER

Plaintiff Nina Waters brings this action under 42 USC

section 405(g), challenging the final decision of the Social

Security Administration (“SSA”) to deny her applications for

supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits and disability

insurance benefits (“DIB”). Pl Mot (Doc #20). The parties have

filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that

follow, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

and GRANTS defendant Jo Anne B Barnhart’s motion for summary

judgment.

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I

A

Plaintiff was born on July 11, 1955. Administrative

Record, Doc #9 (“AR”) 158. Plaintiff was 46 years old at the time

of her application and she has a ninth grade education. AR 177. 

She has past relevant work experience as a cashier, a warehouse

worker, a retail worker/manager and a bartender. AR 195. 

Plaintiff stopped working in 1998 (or, according to the record of

one psychological evaluation, 1995 (AR 453)) for reasons unrelated

to her health and has not worked since. AR 21, 171.

Plaintiff testified that from January 2001 to April 2001,

she experienced dizziness, blackouts and bad headaches. AR 36-37. 

Her symptoms increasingly worsened and after she passed out five

times from trying to get to a telephone, plaintiff admitted herself

into San Joaquin General Hospital. AR 36. On April 17, 2001, she

was diagnosed with adult-onset communicating hydrocephalus. AR

309, 310. Communicating hydrocephalus is caused by “obstruction to

the cerebrospinal fluid flow from outside the ventricular system.” 

AR 245.

On April 24, 2001, plaintiff underwent surgery for

placement of a ventriculoperitoneal shunt. AR 321-323. Plaintiff

testified that after the surgery, she still experienced migraines,

dizziness and blackouts. AR 38. She testified that she felt the

shunt physically and that it impaired her ability to perform her

daily activities. AR 39. She experienced trouble brushing her

hair on the right side, trouble twisting and turning, diarrhea and

daily headaches. AR 39-40. Plaintiff testified that she used

Excedrin for her headaches. AR 40. In her request for

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reconsideration, plaintiff reported she felt “constant pain from

the shunt” and an “unexplained numbness in my foot.” AR 213.

On August 23, 2001, Plaintiff was re-admitted to San

Joaquin General Hospital for a possible shunt infection. AR 292. 

A shunt tap was performed and plaintiff was given pain medication. 

Id. The results of the shunt tap revealed “zero white cells and no

bacteria seen on Gram stain.” Id. Plaintiff’s test results

indicated she did not have a shunt infection. AR 295.

Plaintiff’s daughter, Rebecca Waters, prepared two Third

Party Information Questionnaires regarding her mother’s daily

activities. AR 183-88, 201-06. She reported plaintiff generally

spent a typical day “sleeping and watching tv.” AR 183. She

reported that she prepared and cooked meals for plaintiff, helped

plaintiff shower and also helped with laundry and other household

chores. AR 184. She also reported plaintiff was unable to stand

for a long period of time without getting sick or dizzy and could

not drive. AR 185. 

In December 2001, plaintiff’s friend, Shari Spear, also

prepared a Third Party Questionnaire. AR 226. Ms Spear reported

plaintiff “can’t bath [sic] as often unless someone is there to

help her * * *.” AR 227. She also reported plaintiff needed help

to complete her household chores and had no recreational activities

or hobbies. Id. On the personal information section, Ms Spear

reported plaintiff has a “hard time remembering something five

minutes before” and plaintiff’s “whole personality has changed.” 

AR 230-31.

 Plaintiff did not have medical coverage during the

relevant period, so she primarily received medical attention from

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the emergency department and surgical unit at San Joaquin General

Hospital. AR 240. Therefore, she did not have a primary care

physician or a treating neurologist. Id. 

The record contains reports from consulting examinations

ordered by the SSA in connection with plaintiff’s claim for

benefits. On September 20, 2001, a consultative psychological

examination was performed by psychologist Richard Richwerger, EdD. 

AR 258. Dr Richwerger noted plaintiff’s performance on the

psychological tests appeared to be “effected [sic] by her

significant use of Demerol” and “not valid due to performance

inconsistencies and due to the fact that the claimant appeared to

be significantly intoxicated by medication.” AR 261-64.

On September 21, 2001, a consultative neurological

examination was performed by S McIntire, MD. AR 265. The

neurologist reported there were no abnormal findings to suggest

functional limitations. AR 268. The report indicated that

plaintiff’s symptoms were consistent with communicating

hydrocephalus but that objectively, plaintiff did not have any

cognitive, motor or sensory deficits. Id. 

On March 29, 2002, plaintiff injured her upper and lower

back during an automobile accident. AR 414. X-rays of plaintiff’s

lower back revealed mild degenerative disk disease and facet joint

arthritis. AR 422. For pain, plaintiff took Vicodin, Skelaxin,

and Neurontin. AR 414. Plaintiff was referred to physical

therapy, which she attended from May 20, 2002 to August 16, 2002. 

AR 391. At her initial evaluation on May 20, plaintiff rated her

pain as an 8 out of a 10 point scale and described it as

“constant.” AR 414. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that the

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pain from her neck created a burning sensation and it made her

“sick to [her] stomach.” AR 45. Plaintiff was discharged from

physical therapy in August 2002 and reported feeling fifty to sixty

percent better. AR 383, 391. 

After plaintiff told the ALJ that the testing done by Dr

Richwerger was unreliable, AR 52-61 and infra, the ALJ suggested an

additional consultative psychological examination, to which

plaintiff agreed. AR 104. After the hearing, therefore, plaintiff

underwent an additional consultative psychological examination with

Michael Moseley, PhD. AR 453. During the examination, plaintiff

told Dr Moseley that she had headaches every day and that her range

of involvement was limited by pain or discomfort. Id. Dr Moseley

reported that plaintiff had a history of methamphetamine abuse

“[o]ff and on for the last ten years” and that her “limitations

reported for functional daily activities appeared to be

questionable.” Id. Dr Moseley reported that plaintiff

demonstrated behaviors consistent with amphetamine abusers in the

population and that her MMPI-II score was invalid. AR 456, 457. 

On the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form he

completed, Dr Moseley indicated that plaintiff had no abnormalities

or limitations. AR 450-53. 

 

B

On July 20, 2001, plaintiff filed applications for DIB

and SSI benefits with the SSA, listing her disability onset date as

January 16, 2001. AR 158-60; 459-60. She based her claim on

alleged “water on the brain” and short-term memory problems due to

hydrocephalus. AR 109. On November 21, 2001, the SSA denied the

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application, stating “[t]hough you may have pain, swelling and

tenderness of your brain, the records show that your condition is

responding or has responded to treatment * * *.” AR 462. 

Plaintiff filed for reconsideration. AR 467. The request was

denied. AR 113; 467. 

Plaintiff filed a request for an administrative hearing. 

AR 119. A hearing was held on September 9, 2002. AR 25. 

Plaintiff appeared without counsel and the Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) informed plaintiff of her right to representation. AR 27. 

The hearing was continued to allow plaintiff to obtain

representation. AR 28. 

On December 2, 2002, the ALJ opened a second hearing at

which plaintiff appeared with counsel. AR 30-106. Plaintiff and

Robert Raschke, the vocational expert (VE), were the only two

witnesses to testify. AR 31. The VE testified that a hypothetical

individual under age fifty with plaintiff’s past relevant work

experience, level of education, and a residual functional capacity

(RFC) for exertionally light, unskilled work would be able to work

nationally at 617,175 jobs and regionally at 7,300 jobs. AR 84,

88, 90. The VE testified that taking into consideration

plaintiff’s cervical spine limitation, there would be a forty

percent erosion overall of these numbers. Id. The ALJ stated that

he would disregard the regional numbers because after the erosion,

the numbers would be insignificant. AR 97, 102-103. The ALJ noted

that this fact was irrelevant because the law only requires that

there be jobs available in the national economy, not the region in

which the claimant resides. AR 98. Under the Medical-Vocational

guidelines, there are approximately 1,600 separate sedentary and

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light occupations that exist in the national economy, each

representing numerous jobs. 20 CFR Part 404, Subpt p, App 2. 

At the administrative hearing, plaintiff raised concerns

about the existing medical evidence from the psychological

consultation by Dr Richwerger, EdD. AR 52-61. The ALJ proposed

“follow-up” testing and plaintiff agreed. AR 104. 

The VE was asked to retain his notes in the event

plaintiff’s attorney had additional questions for him after the

new psychological exam. Id. The ALJ and plaintiff’s attorney

agreed that if there was a supplemental hearing, it would be a

telephone hearing with the VE. Id. After the hearing, as

described in part IA supra, Dr Moseley re-evaluated plaintiff. AR

453-57. Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ improperly failed to

proffer this post-hearing evaluation to plaintiff.

On July 14, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision denying

plaintiff benefits. AR 15-24. The ALJ applied the five-step

sequential evaluation process set forth in the SSA regulations for

determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520,

416.920. The five-step evaluation process is as follows: (1)

determine whether the claimant is currently employed in substantial

gainful activity (ie, work that involves significant physical or

mental activities, and is performed for pay or profit); (2) if the

claimant is not currently employed in such activity, then determine

whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of

impairments that significantly limits his or her physical or mental

ability to do basic work; (3) if the claimant does have such an

impairment or combination of impairments, then determine whether

the claimant has an impairment(s) which meets or equals the

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impairments in the Listing of Impairments, 20 CFR pt 404, subpt p,

app 1; (4) if the claimant does have such an impairment(s), then

the claimant will be considered disabled, but if the claimant does

not have such an impairment(s), then determine whether the claimant

has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past

work; and (5) if the claimant is unable to perform his or her past

work, then determine whether the claimant has the residual

functional capacity to perform any other work which exists in

substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 CFR § 404.1520,

CFR § 416.920. The determination that a claimant can perform other

work may be established: (1) by the testimony of a vocational

expert, or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at

20 CFR pt 404, subpt p, app 2. Id. If a claimant is unable to

perform any other work, then the claimant will be considered

disabled. Id.

Applying the five-step sequential evaluation to the case

at hand, the ALJ found: (1) plaintiff met the Act’s insured status

requirements through December 2002; (2) plaintiff has not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset

date; (3) plaintiff has the “severe” impairments of hydrocephalus

status post shunt placement/revision, seizures with headaches,

cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, and an anxiety

disorder or amphetamine abuse in uncertain remission; (4)

plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or equaled any

listed impairment; (5) plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not

entirely credible; (6) plaintiff had the RFC for both sedentary

and light work; (7) plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant

work; (8) plaintiff was a “younger individual” so that her limited

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education and transferability of skills were not relevant to

plaintiff’s vocational profile due to her young age; and (9) there

were other jobs existing in significant numbers that plaintiff was

able to perform and therefore, plaintiff was not disabled as

defined by the Act. AR 23.

The ALJ’s determination of plaintiff’s RFC was based on

the physical therapist’s report, the consultative examiner’s

report and the plaintiff’s own testimony as to her limitations. 

AR 21. The ALJ did not give great weight to the initial

consultative examiner’s report because of plaintiff’s complaint at

the hearing that the examiner did not conduct a thorough

evaluation. AR 22. Further, the ALJ did not find plaintiff’s

testimony credible as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of her impairments. AR 21. He explained that her

testimony regarding her pain and physical limitations conflicted

with other evidence in the record and the ALJ noted:

The claimant has not received any 

significant or ongoing treatment for back

pain. She has been prescribed narcotic 

pain medications * * *. However, she is 

able to engage in * * * recreational 

activities such as gambling at a casino, 

boating on a lake, and camping. Further,

a consultative examiner raised the 

possibility of prescription drug abuse, 

in which case the claimant’s use of pain 

medications may not be reflective of her 

pain level. The possibility of illicit 

drug use was raised by another 

consultative examiner * * *. 

AR 21.

Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that there

were a significant number of jobs that plaintiff could perform

within a limited range of the sedentary and light work categories. 

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 The Court has been unable to reconcile with the procedural

history of this case with plaintiff’s representative’s statement that

plaintiff was subsequently awarded Title XVI benefits “due to the

ALJ’s determination dated July 14, 2003" with an onset date of July

1, 2003. Doc #20 at 3, AR 8. There is no record of this alleged

award anywhere else in the record. It has, however, no bearing on the

outcome of the instant appeal. 

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AR 22-23. The ALJ concluded plaintiff was not disabled within the

framework of Rules 201.09 and 202.18 of the Medical-Vocational

guidelines. AR 23; 20 CFR pt 404, subpt p, app 2. 

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the SSA’s

Appeals Council,1

 which denied review, making the ALJ’s decision

final. AR 5. On March 15, 2005, plaintiff timely filed the

instant action for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Doc 1.

II

The court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining

whether the SSA’s final decision to deny benefits is supported by

substantial evidence in the administrative record. 42 USC §

405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less

than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thomas v

Barnhart, 278 F3d 947, 954 (9th Cir 2002). A district court may

overturn a decision to deny benefits only if the decision is not

supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on

legal error. See Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir

1995); Magallanes v Bowen, 881 F2d 747, 750 (9th Cir 1989). 

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical

testimony and all other ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. 

Morgan v Commissioner of Social Sec Admin, 169 F3d 595, 599 (9th

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Cir 1999). The decision of the ALJ will be upheld if the evidence

is “susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” 

Andrews, 53 F3d at 1040.

III

A

Disability is the “inability to do any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months.” 20 CFR § 404.1505(a), 20 CFR

§ 416.905(a). An individual is considered “disabled” if his

impairments are such “that he is not only unable to do his

previous work but cannot * * * engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy * *

*.” Id.

A claimant may be found “not disabled” at any step in

the five-step evaluation process; a claimant may be found

“disabled” only at step three or five. 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4),

20 CFR § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at

steps one through four. Bustamante v Massanari, 262 F3d 949, 953-

54 (9th Cir 2001) (citing Tackett v Apfel, 180 F3d 1094, 1098 (9th

Cir 1999)). At step five, the burden of proof shifts to the SSA. 

Id; see also Brown v Apfel, 192 F3d 493 (5th Cir 1999) (“This

shifting of the burden of proof [] is neither statutory nor

regulatory, but instead, originates from judicial practices.”). 

If a plaintiff reaches step five, the Secretary has the burden of

proving that there are jobs in the national economy that the

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plaintiff can perform. Oyen v Shalala, 865 F Supp 497, 504 (D Ill

1994).

At step two of the evaluation process, if the claimant

suffers from a combination of impairments, the combined effect of

all impairments will be considered “without regard to whether any

such impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient

severity.” 20 CFR § 404.1523, 20 CFR § 416.922(b). Further, if

the claimant has “a medically severe combination of impairments,

the combined effect of the impairments will be considered

throughout the evaluation process.” Id.

According to SSR 96-7p, the adjudicator is required to

make “a finding about the credibility of the individual’s statements

about the symptom(s) and its functional effects.” SSR 96-7p. The

adjudicator must “carefully consider the individual’s statements

about the symptoms with the rest of the relevant evidence in the

case record * * *.” Id. The adjudicator must consider the entire

case record, including objective medical evidence and statements

from “other persons about the symptoms and how they affect the

individual, and any other relevant evidence. Id.

20 CFR § 404.1513 reads, in pertinent part,

In addition to evidence from the 

acceptable medical sources listed in paragraph

(a) of this section, we may also use evidence 

from other sources to show the severity of 

your impairment(s) and how it affects your 

ability to work. Other sources include, but 

are not limited to:

(1) Medical sources not listed in 

paragraph (a) of this section (for example, 

nurse-practitioners, physicians’ assistants, 

naturopaths, chiropractors, audiologists, and 

therapists);

\\

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(4) Other non-medical sources (for 

example, spouses, parents and other 

caregivers, siblings, other relatives, 

friends, neighbors, and clergy).

Under 20 CFR § 404.953 (a), the administrative law judge’s

decision must be based on evidence offered at the hearing or

otherwise included in the record (emphasis added).

B

Plaintiff makes three major contentions in support of

her motion. First, she contends the ALJ erred by not proffering

post-hearing medical evidence for comment and possible request for

a supplemental hearing, thereby violating plaintiff’s due process

rights. Second, plaintiff contends the ALJ erred as a matter of

law by ignoring the evidence from lay persons regarding

plaintiff’s pain and physical limitations. And third, plaintiff

contends that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial

evidence; specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorporated

into his decision unsupported allegations of drug use. The court

disagrees with these contentions.

1

Plaintiff contends her due process rights were violated

because the ALJ failed to proffer psychologist Dr Moseley’s

opinion. The court finds plaintiff’s due process rights were not

violated. Furthermore, even if the ALJ erred by not proffering

the post-hearing evidence, the error is harmless.

Plaintiff cites the SSA’s Hearings, Appeals, and

Litigation Manuel (HALLEX) I-2-7-30 in support of the proposition

that proffer of post-hearing evidence is mandatory. Plaintiff

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also argues that cases such as Tom v Heckler, 779 F2d 1250 (7th

Cir 1985), Townley v Heckler, 748 F2d 109, 114 (2d Cir 1984), and

Yount v Barnhart, 416 F3d 1233 (10th Cir 2005), stand for the

proposition that proffer of post-hearing evidence to a claimant

and her representative is mandatory. Doc #20 at 8. 

The Ninth Circuit has ruled that HALLEX does not

prescribe substantive rules and does not carry the force and

effect of law. Moore v Apfel, 216 F3d 864, 868 (9th Cir 2000);

see also Bunnell v Barnhart, 336 F3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir 2003). 

In Moore, the plaintiff appealed the decision of the district

court and argued that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous because the

ALJ violated a provision of HALLEX. Moore, 216 F3d at 866. The

Ninth Circuit rejected that argument and found HALLEX is “not

binding on the Commissioner and we will not review allegations of

noncompliance with the manual.” Id at 869. Because HALLEX is an

internal manual that does not have the force and effect of law,

this court will not entertain claims of alleged violations of the

manual. 

Plaintiff also contends that prevailing case law

indicates that post-hearing evidence must always be proffered to a

claimant. Plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In

Tom, the plaintiff did not contend that the ALJ’s reliance on the

post-hearing vocational report denied him due process. Tom, 779

F2d at 1252. Therefore, the court did not address the merits of

whether a due process violation occurred. Id. Tom is irrelevant

to this case.

In Townley, the ALJ used a post-hearing vocational

report as the primary evidence in his decision to deny benefits. 

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Townley, 748 F2d at 114. In Yount, the court determined that

plaintiff’s due process rights were violated when his request to

cross-examine a post-hearing medical report was denied. Yount,

416 F3d at 1235. 

These two cases are distinguishable from the instant

case for two reasons: (1) the ALJ did not use the medical report

as his primary evidence to deny benefits and (2) in this case,

plaintiff was aware that a post-hearing medical evaluation was

underway — indeed, she participated in it — but did not

specifically request cross-examination.

A plaintiff in a disability hearing is not entitled to

unlimited cross-examination, but rather “such cross examination as

may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.” 5

USC § 556(d). The ALJ has discretion to decide when crossexamination is warranted. Solis v Schweiker, 719 F2d 301, 301

(9th Cir 1983). Social security adjudications are non-adversarial

and therefore, the need to cross-examine every reporting physician

is not crucial to the fairness and accuracy of the ALJ’s decision. 

Flatford v Chater, 93 F3d 1296, 1306 (6th Cir 1996). “[D]ue

process does not require the Commissioner to allow a social

security claimant upon request to cross-examine every physician

providing post hearing evidence * * * .” Id at 1305.

Under the circumstances of this case, moreover, it

appears that the ALJ effectively proffered Dr Moseley’s posthearing report to plaintiff. Proffer of post-hearing evidence can

be inferred from the circumstances. Oyen v Shalala, 865 F Supp at

509 n16. In Oyen, the ALJ did not “technically” proffer posthearing evidence, but the court viewed the circumstances under

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which it was provided as the “practical equivalent of an ALJ

proffer.” Id. Here, the record indicates plaintiff was aware

that a post-hearing psychological re-evaluation would occur. 

Plaintiff was represented by counsel and, in fact, the evaluation

at issue was ordered specifically because plaintiff’s counsel

voiced concerns about the first evaluation. The ALJ informed

plaintiff at the hearing that a re-evaluation would be set up. 

Plaintiff requested permission to re-examine the VE with regards

to the new medical testimony but she did not request a

supplemental hearing for cross-examination of the post-hearing

psychological consultation – although she could have. Because

plaintiff had knowledge of and means of access to the post-hearing

report, the proffer requirement was satisfied. 

An error is harmless if correction of that error would

not alter the result of the case. Curry v Sullivan, 925 F2d 1127,

1131 (9th Cir. 1990). The post-hearing psychological evaluation

was requested in order to clarify plaintiff’s mental functioning

absent the effects of pain medications and/or illicit substances. 

AR 20. Dr Moseley reported that plaintiff did not have any

significant mental or emotional limitations and his opinion

excluded any possible drug use. AR 450-52. His findings were

consistent with the other consultative physician who examined

plaintiff prior to the hearing. Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision

made clear that the VE’s testimony and plaintiff’s lack of

credibility were the major factors in his decision to deny

benefits. While the ALJ mentioned Dr Moseley’s report, it does

not appear to have been a significant factor in the ALJ’s

decision. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff was

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denied due process in connection with Dr Moseley’s report, remand

would be futile because it would not alter the result. Any error

surrounding the ALJ’s use of the Moseley report was harmless.

2

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to consider

the entire record in his decision because he did not mention the

third party questionnaires that plaintiff provided. The court

finds no legal error and that the ALJ did in fact consider the

entire record in his decision.

In interpreting the evidence and developing the record,

the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence. 

Howard v Barnhart, 341 F3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir 2003); Black v

Apfel, 143 F3d 383, 386 (8th Cir 1998). An ALJ’s failure to cite

specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not

considered. Black, 143 F3d at 386. The ALJ is empowered to

reject cumulative testimony. Id at 387 (ALJ who properly

discredited plaintiff’s complaints of pain is equally empowered to

reject the cumulative testimony of her parents).

Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not consider the Third

Party Questionnaires because he did not mention them in his

decision. Plaintiff argues that pursuant to SSR 88-13 and Smolen

v Chater, 80 F3d 1273 (9th Cir 1996), the ALJ was required to give

full consideration to testimony from family and friends. In

Smolen, plaintiff’s medical records were sparse and the ALJ

rejected the testimony of her family and friends because he found

the testimony to be “biased.” Id at 1289. SSR 88-13 states “In

evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, the

adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the available

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evidence * * *.” The court in Smolen ruled that under SSR 88-13,

the ALJ erred by failing to consider the testimony of Smolen’s

family members regarding her symptoms. Smolen, 80 F3d at 1288.

This case is distinguishable from Smolen. In this case,

plaintiff’s medical records were not sparse and the ALJ did not

state that he rejected the evidence from the Third Party

Questionnaires. Here, the ALJ reached his decision without citing

to the specific evidence. Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions,

the ALJ’s decision not to cite specific evidence presented at the

hearing does not give rise to an inference that the ALJ did not

consider that piece of evidence.

In Vincent v Heckler, 739 F2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir 1984),

the court ruled that all evidence presented does not need to be

discussed; rather, the ALJ must explain why “significant probative

evidence has been rejected.” Here, the Third Party Questionnaires

were not significant probative evidence. The questionnaires were

filled out by plaintiff’s daughter and a friend. The

questionnaires all attested to plaintiff’s daily activities and

these questionnaires were cumulative of plaintiff’s testimony

regarding her physical limitations. The ALJ explained in his

decision that he did not find plaintiff’s testimony credible

regarding the intensity of her pain (discussed below in section

III B 3). The ALJ fully considered the record in its entirety and

his decision is affirmed.

3

Plaintiff’s final contention is that the ALJ’s decision

is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, plaintiff

argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record because drug

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testing was not performed on plaintiff and the “insinuations” of

drug abuse are not supported by the record. Furthermore,

plaintiff alleges that the ALJ took certain statements plaintiff

made out of context. After reviewing the record in its entirety,

the court finds there is substantial evidence in the record to

support the ALJ’s denial of plaintiff’s DIB and SSI applications

and the administrative record was properly developed.

The ALJ must fully and fairly develop the record to

assure that plaintiff’s interests are considered. See Tonapetyan

v Halter, 242 F3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir 2001). If plaintiff is

unrepresented, “the ALJ must be especially diligent in exploring

for all the relevant facts,” id, including disabling factors not

raised but implicit in the record. Celaya v Halter, 332 F3d 1177,

1182-83 (9th Cir 2003) (holding that the claimant’s illiteracy and

pro se status should have alerted the ALJ to develop the record

better).

SSA regulations state that “when the evidence [the SSA]

receives from [the claimant’s] treating physician or psychologist

or other medical source is inadequate for us to determine whether

you are disabled,” the SSA will seek additional information from

plaintiff’s treating physicians or through SSA-ordered

consultative examinations. 20 CFR §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(d). 

SSA regulations only require an ALJ to seek additional evidence

when the medical reports from plaintiff’s treating physicians are

conflicting, ambiguous or do not contain the information necessary

to making a determination regarding a claimant’s disability. See

Mayes v Massanari, 276 F3d 453, 459-50 (9th Cir 2001).

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Here, the ALJ fulfilled his duty fully and fairly to

develop the record to ensure that plaintiff’s interests were 

considered. During the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel objected to

the first consultative evaluation because the examiner raised the

possibility of prescription drug abuse. Because of this

objection, the ALJ proposed to have new testing done and

plaintiff’s counsel agreed to this remedy. Plaintiff claimed that

she was not given an opportunity to question the basis of the

psychologist’s “insinuation,” but plaintiff was fully aware of the

findings in the initial evaluation. Plaintiff’s counsel had the

opportunity to — but did not — subpoena the first examiner or

request a drug test to cure the record of this “insinuation.” The

ALJ’s duty to develop the record was not further extended merely

because the second consultative examiner also raised the

possibility of illicit drug use. 

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts

in medical testimony, and all other ambiguities are to be resolved

by the ALJ. Andrews, 53 F3d at 1040. The ALJ’s findings must be

supported by specific, cogent reasons. Rashad v Sullivan, 903 F2d

1229, 1231 (9th Cir 1990). The ALJ must identify what testimony

is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s

complaints. Lester v Chater, 81 F3d 821, 834 (9th Cir 1996). The

adjudicator makes the credibility finding regarding the

individual’s statements about symptoms and their functional

effects. SSR 96-7p.

The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s testimony regarding

the intensity and limiting effects of her impairments was not

credible. The ALJ’s determinations about plaintiff’s lack of

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credibility did not rest solely on the consultative evaluations;

rather there were several other factors that the ALJ considered. 

The ALJ specifically identified the discrepancies in plaintiff’s

testimony. For instance, although plaintiff repeatedly alleged

that she can not stand for more than five minutes and that her

daily activities involved sleeping and watching television, the

exertion required for plaintiff’s recreational activities far

surpassed her alleged physical limitations. 

Evidence existed in the record that showed plaintiff

participated in a variety of vigorous recreational activities,

despite her “constant pain.” On June 18, 2002, plaintiff was very

sore during a physical therapy session because she had “stayed up

all night at the casino.” AR 403. About nine days later, on June

27th, plaintiff confessed at another physical therapy session that

she was very sore again because she had been camping. AR 399. 

About two weeks later, plaintiff’s “soreness” further increased

because she went swimming in the lake and paddled a boat. AR 395. 

The ALJ did not take these statements out of context nor did he

misquote the record. These were statements that plaintiff herself

made to her physical therapist and confirmed at the hearing. The

fact that these activities “worsened” her pain symptoms does not

minimize the inconsistencies between her testimony regarding her

physical limitations and her testimony regarding her recreational

activities. These statements suggest a much greater functional

capacity than plaintiff claims to possess. Based on the conflict

between plaintiff’s testimony and the evidence in the record,

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that her

testimony was not credible.

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IV

For the reasons stated herein, the court affirms the

ALJ’decision to deny benefits. Accordingly, the court DENIES

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTS defendant Jo

Anne B Barnhart’s motion for summary judgment. The clerk is

directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant and to close the

file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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