Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00203/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00203-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN FREITAG,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 12cv203 DMS (BGS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND, AND

DENYING REQUEST FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

vs.

DOWNTOWN PARTNERSHIP CLEAN +

SAFE, et al.,

Defendants.

In this civil rights action, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint, Motion and

Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury in Support of Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP” and

“IFP Motion,” respectively), and Request for Appointment of Counsel Under the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (“Request for Appointment of Counsel”). For the reasons which follow, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

is GRANTED, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and the Request for

Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.

Every party instituting a civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States,

except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,

1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets is sufficient to show he is unable to pay the fees

Case 3:12-cv-00203-DMS-BGS Document 6 Filed 02/22/12 Page 1 of 3
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or post securities required to maintain this action. See Civil Local Rule 3.2(d). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to

a mandatory sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Upon review of allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the

Court finds they are insufficient for purposes of sua sponte screening under section 1915(e)(2)(B).

To the extent Plaintiff claims his constitutional rights were violated, he must sufficiently allege

that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of state law, and that

the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Tatum v. City and County of

San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is not apparent that either

of the named Defendants, Downtown Partnership Clean + Safe or J. Wiggins, were acting under the

color of state law. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges a representative of Downtown Partnership Clean +

Safe harassed and embarrassed him by shining a flashlight at him in front of other people while he was

trying to sleep in a doorway, and that police officers subsequently declined to investigate this incident.

As alleged, neither of these claims rises to the level of violating Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights.

To the extent Plaintiff is proceeding under 18 U.S.C. Section 241, this is a criminal statute.

An individual may not bring criminal charges by filing a complaint in this court. See Aldabe v.

Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The conduct of criminal prosecution is an executive

function within the exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General. See United States v. Batchelder,

442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for criminal violations. 

Based on the foregoing, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). In light of the dismissal, Plaintiff’s Request for

Appointment of Counsel is DENIED as moot. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint as provided

herein, he may file another request for appointment of counsel.

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Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff's IFP Motion is GRANTED.

2. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. No later than March 15,

2012, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint, if any, which addresses each deficiency of pleading

noted above. If the pleading deficiencies set forth above are not addressed in the amended complaint,

the amended complaint may be dismissed with prejudice and without further leave to amend.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading.

See S.D. Cal. Civ. Loc. Rule 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the amended

complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

Should Plaintiff elect not to file an amended complaint by March 15, 2012, this case shall remain

dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) without

further Order of the Court.

3. Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 22, 2012

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:12-cv-00203-DMS-BGS Document 6 Filed 02/22/12 Page 3 of 3