Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_12-cv-01088/USCOURTS-alnd-1_12-cv-01088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

ASHLEY L. MANER,

Plaintiff,

v.

LINKAN, LLC, d/b/a FUGI

JAPANESE CUISINE,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 4:12-CV-1088-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The defendant (“Linkan”) has filed two post-judgment motions. The first is a

motion to vacate, alter, or amend this court’s final judgment under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e) (“Rule 59 Motion”). Doc. 34. The second motion asks this

court to do two things: (1) allow Linkan to add a post-verdict res judicata/collateral

estoppel defense to its Answer, and (2) dismiss this action as a result (“Dismissal

Motion”). Doc. 38. The court has considered the arguments made in the following

documents:

• Linkan’s attached memorandum to its Rule 59 Motion (Doc. 34-1)

• A Response to the Rule 59 Motion (Doc. 40) filed by the plaintiff (“Ms.

Maner”)

• Linkan’s Amendment to its Dismissal Motion (Doc. 39)

FILED

 2013 Nov-21 AM 11:16

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 1 of 10
• Ms. Maner’s Response to the Dismissal Motion (Doc. 41)

For the following reasons, the court will DENY Linkan’s Motions.

I. Linkan’s Rule 59 Motion fails because it neither produces newlydiscovered evidence nor identifies any manifest legal or factual trial

errors.

On August 1, 2013, a jury returned a verdict in Ms. Maner’s favor on both her 

pregnancy discrimination and retaliation claims. Doc. 29. The jury awarded her a

combined $50,000 for emotional distress damages and $250,000 for punitive

damages. Id. In its final judgment, this court reduced these amounts to a net total of

$50,000 because of the applicable damage caps found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A).

Doc. 33 at 2-3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows litigants to file a motion

to alter or amend a judgment no later than 28 days after the court entersthe judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Under this provision, Linkan timely asks the court to either (1)

delete or strike the punitive and/or emotional distress damages awards, or (2),

alternatively, lower the award for emotional damages. Doc. 34 at 1. Linkan generally

argues that “there was insufficient evidence to justify the award of either emotional

damages or punitive damages.” Id.

“The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered

evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th

2

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 2 of 10
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old

matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the

entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757,

763 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “[T]he decision to alter or amend judgment

is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge and will not be overturned

on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 507

(11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763

F.2d 1237, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 1985)).

A. Emotional Distress Damages

Linkan has not met this standard in regard to Ms. Maner’s emotional distress

damages award. Relying primarily on Fifth Circuit precedent, Linkan argues that Ms.

Maner “has not met her burden of proving that she has suffered emotional damages

. . .” Doc. 34-1 at 4. Linkan further contendsthat Ms. Maner did not prove a “specific

discernible injury to [her] emotional state.” Id. (quoting Patterson v. PHP Healthcare

Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 940 (5thCir. 1996)). In support, Linkan generally assertsthat Ms.

Maner gave “scant evidence of any emotional damages she may have suffered.” Id.

at 1. It does not, however, cite the specific parts of her testimony that it found

3

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 3 of 10
deficient.

1

These arguments are insufficient under Rule 59(e). Linkan does not offer any

newly-discovered evidence concerning Ms. Maner’s emotional damages. Nor does

it identify any “manifest” legal or factual errors made during the trial on this issue.

Instead, Linkan generally maintains that Ms. Maner offered inadequate evidence on

the emotional harm she suffered. Even were this claim not unjustifiably vague, such

an argument “could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet,

408 F.3d at 763. Linkan further does not specifically cite any controlling precedent

in this Circuit revealing a manifest legal error. Because of these facts, the court will

neither strike nor reduce Ms. Maner’s emotional distress damages award.

B. Punitive Damages

Linkan also does not satisfy Rule 59 standards on the punitive damages issue.

Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a Title VII plaintiff may recover punitive

damages if they can show that the defendant intentionally “engaged in a

discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless

indifference to the [plaintiff’s] federally protected rights . . .” 42 U.S.C. §

Linkan claims in its Motion that it has ordered her testimony transcript “so that her exact 1

testimony can be quoted correctly and can be reviewed.” Doc. 34-1 at 1 n.1. However, Linkan

never supplemented its Motion with any such pinpoint citations to her testimonial transcript.

4

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 4 of 10
1981a(b)(1). Linkan argues that there is no evidence that Linkan “through its agent

acted with malice orrecklessindifference” to Ms. Maner’s federally-protected rights.

Doc. 34-1 at 7. It justifies this claim in the following manner:

In the case now before the court it has not been shown by the Plaintiff that the

manager of Fugi restaurant even knew it was against the law to fire someone

because of pregnancy. The Plaintiff’s complaint was made to Jennifer Lin who

testified that the real manager of the restaurant was not her, but Crosby Price.

It was Lin to whom the Plaintiff says she complained that it was against the

law to fire somebody because they are pregnant.

. . .

Since the Plaintiff failed to show any evidence that the manager, Crosby Price,

knew of the purported violation of her claim of being fired because she was

pregnant or that he otherwise acted with reckless indifference, the Plaintiff

cannot successfully assert liability against his principal, Linkan, LLC, asthere

is no evidence that Linkan, LLC, acted with malice or with reckless

indifference through its manager, Crosby Price.

Doc. 34-1 at 5-6. Linkan particularly complains that no “fact-intensive inquiry” was

made during the trial to determine whether Mr. Price and Ms. Lin’s actions could be

justly imputed to Linkan under traditional agency principles. Id. at 6 (citing Kolstad

v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 543 (1999)). 

In order to be liable for punitive damages, Linkan must have acted with malice

or reckless indifference to Ms. Maner’s civil rights. That is, it must have “at least

discriminate[d] in the face of a perceived risk” that its actions violated federal law.

Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536. More specifically, “[m]alice means ‘an intent to harm’ and

5

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 5 of 10
recklessness means ‘serious disregard for the consequences of [one's] actions.’”

Ferrill v. The Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 476 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc., 97 F.3d 488, 491 (11th Cir. 1996)) (alteration in original).

“A jury may find reckless indifference where the employer does not admit that it

knew that its actions were wrong.” EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 611 (11th Cir.

2000) (citing Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Indiana, Inc., 103 F.3d 576,

582 (7th Cir.1996)). “However, mere negligence as to the civil rights of employees

is not enough to justify punitive damages.” Id. (citing EEOC v. Wal–Mart StoresInc.,

156 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.1998)).

Here, Linkan denies that the jury could have justly found it vicariously liable

for its employees’ discriminatory actions. “[I]n express terms, Congress has directed

federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles.” Kolstad, 527 U.S.

at 541 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998)). Under

such principles, a court may award punitive damages against a principal for the

actions of its agent if: 

• the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act;

• the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him;

• the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the

scope of employment; or

6

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 6 of 10
• the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved

the act.

See id. at 542-43 ((quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 C (1957)). In

determining whether an agent was employed in a managerial capacity, the court

“should review the type of authority that the employer has given to the employee, the

amount of discretion that the employee has in what is done and how it is

accomplished.” Id. (quotation omitted). Under this analysis, “an employee must be

‘important,’ but perhaps need not be the employer's ‘top management, officers, or

directors,’ to be acting “in a managerial capacity.” Id. (quotation omitted). However,

“an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment

decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer's

‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.’” Id. at 545 (quotation omitted).

With these principles in mind, the court disagrees with Linkan that it has

identified any manifest trial error. Instead, it appears to be re-litigating matters it

either raised – or could have raised – during trial. Linkan disputes that Jennifer Lin

acted in a managerial capacity at Fugi Restaurant. See Doc. 34-1 at 5-6. Both parties

exhaustively litigated this point at trial. In fact, Ms. Maner testified that she did not

consider Ms. Lin her “day-in-and-day-out” manager; that was Crosby Price. Doc. 36

at 13-14, 78. Rather, Ms. Maner considered Ms. Lin part of ownership. Id. at 13-14.

7

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 7 of 10
Ms. Lin was married to Sebastian Lin (for at least part of the relevant time) and

prepared the weekly schedules for the restaurant employees. Id. at 14, 78-79. Ms.

Maner explicitly agreed with her attorney’s statement that Ms. Lin was “in a position

where she could give people instructions and orders and tell them what to do and

when to do it.” Id. at 14. Linkan thus had the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Maner

on this point, and the jury was able to evaluate the competing evidence. There was,

therefore, sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that Ms. Lin was

Linkan’s agent who was “employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the

scope of employment” when she discriminated against Ms. Maner despite Ms.

Maner’s repeated protests that such conduct was illegal. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 C (1957)). Accordingly, the court

will not vacate Ms. Maner’s punitive damages award.

II. Linkan’s Dismissal Motion fails because it does not comply with Rule 15.

As noted above, the jury in this action returned its verdict on August 1, 2013.

Doc. 29. On that same day, the Circuit Court for Calhoun County, Alabama, entered

an Order in a pending unemployment compensation suit that Ms. Maner had filed in

that venue. Doc. 42-2. That Order reversed an Alabama Department of Industrial

Relations decision finding that Ms. Maner had voluntarily left her position at Fuji

8

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 8 of 10
“without good cause connected to work.” Id. at 1. The state court thus awarded her

unemployment compensation benefits. Id. On August 7, 2013, this court entered final

judgment in the instant action. Doc. 33. On September 12, 2013, Linkan filed its

Motion asking this court to permit it to amend its Answer to “interpose the defenses

of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel” because “[t]he issues in this civil action

(including whether Plaintiff voluntarily resigned her employment orwasinvoluntarily

terminated) are substantially similar to the issues presented, and could have been

presented by Plaintiff, in [her] Unemployment Compensation Case.” Doc. 38 ¶ 5, 7.

Linkan also asks the court to dismiss the action with prejudice on this basis. Id. ¶ 8.

The court will not do either action because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15

does not permit it. Rule 15(a) governs pleadings amendments before trial and does

not apply once the court has entered final judgment. See Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Czeremcha v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO, 724 F.2d

1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984). Rule 15(b), on the other hand, permits amendments after

trial to reflect issues tried by consent. The relevant provision reads:

When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties' express or

implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.

A party may move--at any time, even after judgment--to amend the pleadings

to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue. But failure

to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2). This is the only scenario in which Rule 15 permits post9

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 9 of 10
judgment amendment. It obviously does not apply in this action.2

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, the court will DENY Linkan’s Rule 59 Motion and its

Dismissal Motion. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 21st day of November, 2013.

 

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

The Eleventh Circuit has stated that a party may amend its pleadings post-judgment after 2

it has been granted relief under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc.,

626 F.3d 1327, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). This situation also does not apply

here.

10

Case 1:12-cv-01088-VEH Document 44 Filed 11/21/13 Page 10 of 10