Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01463/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

O’Shay Johnson,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 01-1463 MCE PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

J. Mayhew,

Defendant.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel prosecuting a

civil rights action against a prison official.

The complaint alleges that while incarcerated at California

State Prison - Sacramento (CSP-SAC) plaintiff filed a grievance

against defendant August 27, 2000. Defendant interviewed

plaintiff about the grievance and predicted correctional officers

would deny it. Defendant visited plaintiff at his work place,

asked if he had withdrawn the grievance and said that a wise man

heeds warnings and threats. In retaliation for the grievance

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defendant allegedly denied plaintiff visits with his family,

while saying the denial was because the visits were during

plaintiff’s work time though plaintiff had been suspended from

work and prison regulations allegedly permit visitation in these

circumstances. Plaintiff claims defendant violated his rights

under the First Amendment, Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause. He seeks damages.

Defendant seeks summary judgment and plaintiff opposes.

January 16, 2002, the court advised plaintiff of the

requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035

(1999), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

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case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

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matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id. at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no

motion to strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United

States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979)

(incompetent medical evidence).

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. It

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is well-settled that inmates have no constitutional right to

visitation. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490

U.S. 454 (1989); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984);

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986); Cooper v.

Garcia, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (S.D. Cal. 1999). An allegation that

a defendant subjected a prisoner to “[v]erbal harassment or abuse

. . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation

under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d

136, 138 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

retaliation claim as well. “Within the prison context, a viable

claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five elements: (1)

An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct,

and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408

F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

The following facts are undisputed. During the relevant

period, July through November 2000, defendant was the

Institutional Visiting Sergeant at CSP-SAC. His duties included

processing and overseeing the visitors who came to see inmates

housed at CSP-SAC in order to ensure that the visit was in

compliance with institutional policies and procedures. Prison

regulations provide that inmates “assigned” to work accumulate

excused time off (ETO) which can be used under specified

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circumstances for “regular visiting” during work hours. Common

practice was to permit inmates visitors during work hours if they

finished their work early and their work supervisor approved it,

even when technical requirements for excused time off had not

been met. Plaintiff was assigned to work on the days his

visitors were turned away but he was not working because he had

been suspended from his job for misconduct.

Plaintiff filed a grievance against defendant August 20,

2000. The grievance was assigned to defendant August 28, 2000. 

Defendant interviewed plaintiff September 11 and denied the

grievance at the first level September 15, 2000. September 10,

2000, defendant refused to allow plaintiff’s mother to visit him. 

During the period plaintiff was not working defendant turned away

visitors on four occasions but permitted 13 visitors. 

Defendant denied plaintiff visits pursuant to Title 15, Cal.

Admin. Code § 3045.2. The regulation provides that inmates

“assigned to work” accumulate excused time off (ETO) that may be

used, at the discretion of their work supervisors, for

visitations under extraordinary circumstances, such as to see 

visitors who have traveled a long distance or in the event of a

death or family illness.

Though he refused to work, plaintiff had been assigned to

work and has not shown that he had accumulated ETO or his

supervisor’s permission to use ETO for visitation. Although it

was not a neat fit, the regulation literally required defendant

to deny visitation and any other reading would have sabotaged the

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underlying legitimate correctional goals by rewarding the slacker

with unfettered visitation privileges and punishing the

industrious prisoner with only limited visitation. 

Even if one disagrees with defendant’s application of the

regulation, he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

A governmental official who seeks qualified immunity from a

civil rights action is entitled to a ruling on that issue early

enough to avoid the costs and expenses of trial. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). The question involves a two-part

analysis. First, taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right? If no constitutional

right would have been violated were the allegations established,

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity.” Saucier v. Katz at 201. Second, the court must

address whether the right at issue was clearly established, i.e.,

“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202

(citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (“the right

allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of

specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly

established”)). Under Saucier, immunity is established where an

officer in defendant’s position reasonably could have been

mistaken as to whether his conduct violated clearly established

law. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Certainly that was the case here. 

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Accordingly, the court hereby recommends defendant’s

September 15, 2004, motion for summary judgment be granted. 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: July 21, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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