Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07101/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACQLYN KNIGHT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CONCENTRIX CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 4:18-cv-07101-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL 

CERTIFICATION

Re: Dkt. No. 46

On May 20, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion for conditional certification pursuant to the Fair 

Labor Standards Act.

On August 1, 2019, the Court held a hearing, and, after careful consideration of the parties’ 

arguments and the applicable legal authority, for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 

IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion for conditional certification. 

I. BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2018, Plaintiffs Jacqlyn Knight, Aquanetta Wright, and LaPrincess June 

filed the instant collective action complaint against Defendant Concentrix Services US, Inc. 

(Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) On November 28, 2018, Plaintiff Christopher Mcadory joined the action. 

(Dkt. No. 9.) Defendant operates physical call center locations throughout the United States, 

including in New York, Michigan, South Carolina, California, Arizona, Indiana, Wisconsin, 

Maryland, and Virginia. (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 46 at 4; Decl. of Sarah Ording, “Ording Decl.,” Dkt. 

No. 53-1 at 6, ¶ 3.) The Plaintiffs worked at Defendant’s call centers located in Rochester, New 

York, Southfield, Michigan, and Warren, Michigan. Id. at 4-5. Alternatively, Defendant’s call 

center employees may also operate from client facilities, utilizing the respective client’s systems, 

software, and tools. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 53 at 2; Ording Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendant claims that each 

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“project” or location has multiple Team Leaders, who supervise different hourly Customer Service 

Representatives (“CSRs”). (Def.’s Opp’n at 3.) 

Plaintiffs worked as CSRs or Technical Support Representatives, but allege to have 

performed the same or similar job duties as all Call Center Agent employees (“CCAs”). (Pls.’ 

Mot. at 4-5.) Collectively, Plaintiffs claim that they worked in excess of 40 hours a week, were 

paid between $11 to $13 an hour, and worked for Concentrix between June 2017 and June 2018. 

(See id.; see also Decl. of Jacqlyn Knight, “Knight Decl.,” Dkt. No. 46-2 ¶ 3 (employed from 

October 2017 to February 2018); see also Decl. of Aquanetta Wright, “Wright Decl.,” Dkt. No. 

46-3 ¶ 3 (employed from October 2017 to April 2018); see also Decl. of Christopher Mcadory, 

“Mcadory Decl.,” Dkt. No. 46-4 ¶ 3 (employed at two different call centers from June 2017 to 

June 2018).). Plaintiffs contend that they were not paid for certain pre-shift activities including 

turning on their computer, logging into their computer, logging into several necessary programs, 

and plugging in their headsets. (Pls.’ Mot. at 5.) 

On May 21, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their motion. (Pls.’ Mot, Dkt. No. 46.) On June 28, 

2019, Defendant filed its opposition. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 53.) On July 12, 2019, Plaintiffs 

filed their reply. (Pls.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 54.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), an employee may bring a collective action 

on behalf of other “similarly situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “[W]orkers may litigate 

jointly if they (1) claim a violation of the FLSA, (2) are ‘similarly situated,’ and (3) affirmatively 

opt in to the joint litigation, in writing.” Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1100

(9th Cir. 2018). “Similarly situated” means “plaintiffs must be alike with regard to

some material aspect of their litigation.” Id. at 1114. “[W]hat matters is not just any similarity 

between party plaintiffs, but a legal or factual similarity material to the resolution of the party 

plaintiffs' claims, in the sense of having the potential to advance these claims, collectively, to 

some resolution.” Id. at 1115. In other words, “[p]arty plaintiffs are similarly situated, and may 

proceed in a collective, to the extent they share a similar issue of law or fact material to the 

disposition of their FLSA claims.” Id. at 1117. Unlike class actions under Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 23, employees who do not affirmatively opt in are not bound by the judgment and may 

bring their own action. Centurioni v. City & Cty. of S.F., 2008 WL 295096, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 

1, 2008).

Determining whether a collective action is appropriate is within the discretion of the 

district court. Saleh v. Valbin Corp., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Leuthold 

v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 466 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). While the FLSA does not 

explicitly define “similarly situated,” a majority of courts in this circuit follow a two-step 

approach to determine whether employees in a proposed collective are “similarly 

situated.” Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 466–67 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2004); 

Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 835, 837 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Daniels v. 

Aeropostale West, Inc., 2013 WL 1758891, *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2013). 

In the first step, frequently referred to as the notice stage, plaintiff moves for 

preliminary certification and show that the members of the defined collective are “similarly 

situated” for purposes of providing notice of the action. At this early stage, the standard is 

“lenient” and district courts simply evaluate whether there is “some factual basis beyond the mere 

averments in their complaint for the class allegations.” Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 

F.R.D. 530, 536 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007); see also Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109; see also Harris, 

716 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (handful of declarations sufficient to make factual showing at notice stage).

Also, in contrast to class actions under Rule 23, the court does not play a gatekeeping role 

in collective actions. Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1101. Rather, the sole consequence of preliminary or 

conditional certification is sending out a court-approved written notice to putative members for the 

purpose of opting-in to the litigation. Id. Thus, at the notice stage, courts have also rejected 

attempts by defendants to introduce evidence going to the merits of plaintiffs’ allegations. See, 

e.g., Labrie v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc., No. C-08-3182-PJH, 2009 WL 723599 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (rejecting defendant’s evidence in evaluating conditional certification, and 

finding that it is more appropriately considered on a motion to decertify).

The second step occurs when discovery has closed, and the case is ready to be tried. Karl v. 

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., No. C 18-04176 WHA, 2019 WL 2775567, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 

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2, 2019). At that juncture, the party opposing collective certification may move for 

decertification. Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. 466–67.

III. DISCUSSION

At the notice stage, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that they and the putative 

collective action members were subject to an illegal policy, plan, or decision, and are “similarly 

situated.” Saleh, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1028; Daniels, 2013 WL 1758891, *6. Here, Plaintiffs seek to 

conditionally certify the collective and authorize notice to 

All current and former Call Center Agent employees, or other job 

titles performing the same or similar job duties, who worked more 

than forty hours per week for Concentrix at any time in the last three 

years and were not paid overtime for every hour worked. “At Home” 

Call Center Agents are excluded from the Class.

(Pl.’s Mot. at 1.) 

A. Whether Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden for conditional certification.

Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim is based on Concentrix’s alleged failure to pay Plaintiffs and other 

CCAs overtime compensation for off-the-clock hours that they were forced to work prior to their 

shifts, in order to be ready to take calls as soon as their shifts started. 

i. Illegal policy, plan or decision requirement is satisfied

Plaintiffs allege that they and the putative members were subject to the same illegal 

conduct, namely the requirement that they arrive at their workstations and perform pre-shift work 

before they clocked in to their scheduled shift. (Pls.’ Mot. at 6-7 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 34, 37-40.) 

Indeed, Ms. Knight states that she worked at least 15 minutes off-the-clock before her shift. 

(Knight Decl. ¶ 5.) The pre-shift work was necessary, because Ms. Knight was required to log in 

to all of her applications and be ready to take her first call at her shift start time. Id. Similarly, Ms. 

Wright reported working up to 30 minutes off-the-clock before her shifts. (Wright Decl. ¶ 5.) Mr. 

Mcadory also claims that he regularly spent 15 to 30 minutes working off-the-clock prior to the 

start of his shift so that his phone was “ready” to take calls. (Mcadory Decl. ¶ 5.)

In opposition, Defendant contends that the company’s policy is that CSRs “accurately 

record all time worked and are paid for all time worked.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 8.) And, to the extent 

that Plaintiffs’ allegations are true, that this pre-shift work is the result of “a few rogue Team 

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Leaders instruct[ing] three of the four Plaintiffs not to record all of their time worked— not a 

company-wide policy.” Id. at 9. These three plaintiffs, however, worked in three locations in two 

different states, which suggests that there may be some deviation from the official company policy 

of paying employees for all hours worked. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 7.)

Defendant has submitted 17 declarations to support the claim that all CSRs were 

effectively trained to record all of their time worked, including pre- and post-shift time. (Def.’s 

Opp’n at 9.) Generally, the fact that Defendant has submitted competing declarations does not 

preclude conditional certification. Harris, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 838. That Concentrix submitted 

declarations from putative class members that conflict factually with the declarations from the 

named plaintiffs is irrelevant at this juncture, because the Court does not resolve factual disputes at 

the notice stage. Saleh, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (quoting Colson v. Avnet, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 

914, 926 (D. Ariz. 2010)). 

Furthermore, Defendant’s assertion that “Plaintiffs must come forward with concrete 

evidence, based on personal knowledge, that CSRs, en masse, were instructed on the same illegal 

policy,” is not the law in this district, and the undersigned is not bound by the decisions of 

neighboring districts. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 12) (emphasis in original). To require otherwise would 

permit a defendant employer to defeat certification before the plaintiffs were afforded an 

opportunity to engage in meaningful discovery to obtain the “concrete evidence” necessary to 

support their claims.

Instead, the only question at the conditional certification stage is whether Plaintiffs have 

made “substantial allegations” that the proposed collective members were subject to an illegal 

policy, plan, or decision, by showing there is some factual basis beyond the “mere averments” in 

the complaint. Godhigh v. Savers, LLC, 2016 WL 7406659, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016)

(citing Daniels, 2013 WL 1758891, at *6.). Plaintiffs three declarations are sufficient to meet 

their burden at the notice stage. See Harris, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 

ii. Plaintiffs are similarly situated for the purposes of conditional certification.

Plaintiffs must also show that they are similarly situated with the members of the defined 

collective. Plaintiffs allege that, regardless of which call center location they worked at, which of 

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Defendant’s clients they serviced, or what their technical job titles were, Plaintiffs all performed 

similar jobs. (Pls.’ Mot. at 12.) Specifically, they performed customer service for Defendant’s 

clients via Defendant’s phone and computer systems. Id.; see Compl. ¶¶ 20-21. Defendant does 

not dispute that the named plaintiffs performed the same job functions.

Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are not similarly situated with respect to their 

timekeeping process, which varied by location. (Def.’s Opp’n at 9-10.) For example, some 

putative class members used telephones to login, while others used computers, and even the 

computer applications differed by location. Id. at 10. Defendant argues that most putative class 

members used different computer applications, and, unlike the named plaintiffs, “did not have to 

be ‘ready’ on their telephones to log-in their time.” Id. Also, many putative class members worked 

at client locations, such that all of their equipment and applications differed. Id. Some putative 

class members had their time automatically recorded the moment they logged-in to their 

computers or telephones. Id. Furthermore, Defendant contends that “many sites prohibited Team 

Leaders from editing putative class members time records at all without approval from senior 

management or Human Resources.” Id. Additionally, citing three declarations, Defendant claims 

that, “[c]ontrary to Plaintiffs’ experiences, some sites prohibited pre-shift work of more than five 

or ten minutes.” Id. at 11.1

Defendant’s argument that the various timekeeping processes precludes Plaintiffs from 

being similarly situated is unavailing. First, Defendant decided to utilize different types of 

timekeeping processes at different locations. Plaintiffs were merely using the process implemented 

at their respective locations. Furthermore, the use of different timekeeping programs at different 

locations has no bearing on whether there was a policy or practice from the supervisors and Team 

Leads instructing the plaintiffs and putative class members to not record their time worked before 

the start of their shift. 

Regardless, an evaluation of the evidence is more appropriate at the second stage on a 

 

1 By allowing five or ten minutes of pre-shift work, Defendant appears to concede that some preshift work was uncompensated, which suggests that the national policy to “accurately record all 

time worked and [compensate employees] for all time worked” was not followed. (See Def.’s 

Opp’n at 8.)

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motion to decertify or once the case reaches the merits phase of the litigation. Saleh, 297 F. Supp. 

3d at 1035 (citing Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., No. 13-CV-00581-WHO, 2014 WL 2126877, 

at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2014)). It is at the second stage of the certification that the court may 

consider “whether the ‘disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs’

means that this case cannot proceed collectively, or would need to be prosecuted with subclasses 

for each of the job titles or geographic locations....” Wellens, 2014 WL 2126877 at *5.

a. Whether Anderson collective action members are precluded from 

participation.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff Mcadory is not similarly situated, because his claims, as 

well as those of other putative class members, may have been released by settlement of another 

FLSA lawsuit, Anderson v. The Minacs Group (USA) Inc., No. 2:16-cv-13942-NGE-SDD (E.D. 

Mich). (Def.’s Opp’n at 15.) 

In their reply, Plaintiffs argue that, even if the prior lawsuit were relevant and Mcadory and 

others released their claims against Defendant, any release would only serve to limit their 

respective damages, which should be considered at stage two. (Pls.’ Reply at 6-7.) Indeed, 

Mcadory remained in Defendant’s employ after the end date of March 31, 2017, so, at worst, he 

could be still compensated for the period of April 1, 2017 to June 2018. See Unopposed Mot. for 

Approval of FLSA Collective Settlement, Decl. of Molly E. Nephew, “Nephew Decl.,” Dkt. No. 

46-1, Ex. 2 at 3. 

Accordingly, the Court declines to find that Plaintiff Mcadory not similarly situated.

b. Collective Action Waivers

On December 28, 2018, Concentrix contends that it began entering into class and 

collective action waivers with its Representatives, as well as other positions. (Def.’s Opp’n at 15; 

Ording Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. D.) As a result, the Court would be required to make individual 

determinations of whether each putative class member waived their right to proceed in this action, 

and those determinations would predominate over the litigation. Id. Defendant is again putting the 

proverbial cart before the horse, as this is an issue that may be addressed at stage two.

//

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c. Plaintiff LaPrincess June

Defendant argues that Plaintiff June is not similarly situated, because she was a work-athome employee, and Plaintiffs have conceded that such employees are excluded from the putative 

class. (Def.’s Opp’n at 16.) Plaintiffs did not address Plaintiff June in their reply, but the 

complaint provides that Plaintiff June worked at the Greenville, SC call center from August 2017 

to July 2018. (Compl. ¶ 14.) At the hearing, Plaintiffs acknowledged that Plaintiff June was an athome employee, but was waiting for Defendant to confirm that she never worked at a call center. 

Plaintiffs conceded that if she exclusively worked at-home, that she would not be an appropriate 

representative of the proposed collective.

Accordingly, in the interim Plaintiff June may remain a named plaintiff, but the parties are 

ordered to determine whether she worked at a call center during relevant time period prior to the 

next case management conference.

iii. Plaintiffs’ proposed collective is too broad.

Plaintiffs seek to certify the collective action as: 

All current and former Call Center Agent employees, or other job 

titles performing the same or similar job duties, who worked more 

than forty hours per week for Concentrix at any time in the last three 

years and were not paid overtime for every hour worked. “At Home” 

Call Center Agents are excluded from the Class.

(Pl.’s Mot. at 1.)

This proposed collective, however, is overbroad, as Plaintiffs have only provided evidence 

that CCAs, CSR, and others who performed similar job duties, worked off-the-clock before their 

scheduled shifts in preparation for that work shift. Accordingly, the Court conditionally certifies 

the more narrow collective2as:

All current and former Call Center Agent employees, Customer 

Service Representative employees, or other job titles performing the 

same or similar job duties, who worked off-the-clock before their shift 

for Concentrix, in preparation for their shift, resulting in working 

more than forty hours per week at any time in the last three years, and 

were not paid overtime for the pre-shift time worked. “At Home” Call 

Center Agents are excluded from the Class.

 

2 The Court notes that pre-shift work should be compensated regardless of whether that additional 

time is subject to an overtime premium.

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Thus, at this juncture, Plaintiffs’ showing is sufficient at the notice stage to support 

conditional certification of the narrowed collective. Certification may be revisited at the second 

stage as to the proper scope of the FLSA class, and whether subclasses are appropriate.

B. Proposed Notice

Concentrix raises several objections to the Plaintiffs’ proposed notice. (Def.’s Opp’n at 

16.) 

i. Contact Information Requested

Plaintiffs request that Defendant produce a list of all putative class members from each of 

its brick-and-mortar facilities. (Pl.’s Mot. at 15.) Specifically, Plaintiffs request each call center 

employee’s full name, last known mailing address, and last known email address (work email 

address if a current employee of Concentrix, personal email address if a former employee of 

Concentrix). Id. 

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ request for e-mail addresses is overbroad, 

duplicative, and unnecessarily intrusive to the privacy rights of Defendant’s employees. (Def.’s

Opp’n at 16.) Plaintiffs, however, argue that this type of contact information is commonly 

furnished in FLSA cases. (Pls.’ Mot. at 16.) Plaintiffs reason that, in today’s modern 

environment, email is a ubiquitous and typical means of communication, and the production of 

them have, in turn, become commonplace in FLSA cases throughout the country. Id.

“Courts routinely approve the production of email addresses and telephone numbers with 

other contact information to ensure that notice is effectuated....” Benedict v. Hewlett-Packard 

Co., No. 13-CV-00119-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18594, at *61 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014). 

Nevertheless, Defendant contends that names and addresses alone should suffice to meet the needs 

for notice and that emails should only be required where necessary to ensure delivery. (Def.’s 

Opp’n at 23.) (citing Shaia v. Harvest Mgmt. Sub LLC, 306 F.R.D. 268, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2015)). 

The Court disagrees. Now, email are regularly utilized by the masses, and may, in fact, be more 

reliable than mailing addresses, particularly for former employees who may have moved 

residences. Indeed, Plaintiffs raise the potential challenge in reaching potential class members 

given the classes’ transient nature, as reason to require email addresses to ensure delivery. (Pls.’ 

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Mot. at 19. Thus, Plaintiffs’ request to receive employees’ last known email address is granted. 

Lastly, Plaintiffs request that Concentrix be ordered to produce the contact information 

within 14 days. (Pls.’ Mot. at 15.) Defendant requests that the deadline be extended to thirty days 

after the Court’s order approving the notice to the putative class members. (Def.’s Opp’n at 21.)

There is no reason why the production of the contact information should be predicated on the 

approval of the notice. Rather, it makes more sense for Plaintiffs to have the contact information 

prior to the approval, so that the notice may be disseminated immediately after it is approved.

Accordingly, within 21 days of this order, Defendant shall produce each putative class 

member’s full name, last known mailing address, and last known email address (work email 

address if a current employee of Concentrix, personal email address if a former employee of 

Concentrix). Additionally, the notice may be disseminated using both U.S. Mail and e-mail. (See 

Pls.’ Mot. at 15)

ii. Electronic Signature Service is Acceptable

Plaintiffs request that putative class members be allowed to opt-in using electronic 

signatures. (Pls.’ Mot. at 17.) Defendant opposes this request on the grounds that consent forms 

filed using electronic signatures may not be reliable or authentic. (Def.’s Opp’n at 19.) The Court 

disagrees. “Technology has advanced since the Harris action wherein the Court concluded that 

electronic signatures could raise authenticity issues.” Woods v. Vector Mktg. Corp., No. C-14-

0264 EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32370, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015). Moreover, 

Plaintiffs’ proposed safeguards to verify that the identity of individuals signing his or her Consent 

to Sue form is the same without regard to whether the form is submitted by U.S. Mail or 

electronically. (Pls.’ Reply at 14.) Plaintiffs’ argue that counsel is not in a better position to 

authenticate a consent form received via U.S. Mail than one submitted via encrypted signature 

software sent only to the opt-in plaintiff. Id. Moreover, the Court notes that many important 

documents are routinely sent and signed electronically, such as financial documents, contracts, and 

even taxes. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request that putative class members be permitted to file their consent 

forms using electronic signature is granted.

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iii. A follow-up notice is permitted

Plaintiffs request that a follow-up notice be sent half-way through the 90-day opt-in period. 

(Pls.’ Mot. at 19.) Plaintiffs argue that allowing for a reminder is not novel in this district, and 

serves the remedial purpose of the FLSA, because it will ensure that interested class members who 

may have misplaced, forgotten about, or never received the original notice would be afforded an 

opportunity to opt-in. Id.

Defendant opposes the follow-up notice, because it contends that multiple solicitations to

putative class members, who otherwise show no interest in joining the suit, is inappropriate and 

unduly suggestive that the court believes that Plaintiffs’ claims have merit. (Def.’s Opp’n at 21.) 

The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, the request is for a second notice to be sent around day 

45. Even if it is disseminated via U.S. Mail and e-mail, that accounts for a maximum of four 

notices total, all of which are easily discarded.3 Second, any concern that a follow-up would 

unduly suggest that the Court find the case has merit is “ uncompelling, given that the second 

notice will be disseminated by Plaintiff[s’] counsel, not the Court.” See Sanchez v. Sephora USA, 

Inc., No. 11-03396 SBA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99924, at *18 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2012). 

Furthermore, the disclaimer on the first page of the proposed notice makes it clear that the Court 

takes no position on the merits of the case. (Proposed Notice, Nephew Decl., Ex. 6.) Third, the 

fact that individuals need to opt-in to FLSA actions to be included renders a reminder notice 

appropriate. See id.; see also Harris, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding reminders 

appropriate because of the opt-in requirement).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request to send follow-up notices halfway through the 90-day 

notice period is granted.

iv. Content of the Proposed Notice

The Court is responsible for monitoring the preparation and distribution of the notice, to 

“ensure that it is timely, accurate, and informative.” Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 

 

3 The ability to send a reminder notice is even more important when using e-mail, since notices 

may be erroneously identified by e-mail clients as “junk” or “spam” and routed to folders unseen 

by putative class members. A reminder at least provides one more opportunity of being seen by 

the intended recipient.

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165, 172, 110 S. Ct. 482, 487 (1989). Defendant contends that the proposed notice is improper,

because the prospective class members are not properly apprised of their responsibilities in joining 

the lawsuit, the requested statement of legal effect is duplicative and unnecessary, and Defendant 

should be allowed to specifically deny Plaintiffs’ claims in the notice. (Def.’s Opp’n at 16.) 

a. Responsibilities of Opt-in Plaintiffs

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs fail to include all of the class members’ potential risks 

and responsibilities that arise from opting-in to an FLSA collective action. (Def.’s Opp’n at 18.) 

Specifically, Defendant requests that the following language be included, “if you do not prevail on 

your claim, Concentrix’s court costs and expenses may be assessed against you. You may also be 

obligated to testify at trial, testify at depositions, respond to discovery requests, and may be 

required to travel for the trial.” Id. Plaintiffs, however, argue that the purpose for this language is 

to cause a chilling effect on the participation in the action. (Pls.’ Reply at 12.)

Indeed, Plaintiffs’ proposed notice contains most of the obligations proposed by 

Defendant, including that they may be required to respond under oath to written questions, to have 

their deposition taken, to produce documents, and/or testify in court at a trial or hearing in the 

United States Federal Courthouse in Oakland, California. (Proposed Notice at 2.) For that reason, 

the Court finds that any further inclusion of potential liability, such as speculative costs, would 

cause a chilling effect to potential class members, and is, therefore, unnecessary. See McKeenChaplin v. Provident Sav. Bank, No. 2:12-cv-03035-GEB-JFM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113654, at 

*21-22 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (there, the court held that warning prospective plaintiffs that they 

may be responsible for Defendant’s cost is not required by the FLSA). As a result, Defendant’s 

proposed change is denied.

b. Requested Statement of Legal Effect

Defendant contends that part of Plaintiffs’ requested statement of legal effect is duplicative 

and unnecessary. (Def.’s Opp’n at 19.) The section reads as follows:

If you do not wish to be part of this lawsuit, you do not need to do 

anything. If you do not join the lawsuit, you will not be part of the 

case in any way and you will not be bound by or affected by the result 

(whether favorable or unfavorable). In other words, if you do not file 

a Consent to Sue form, you will not receive any unpaid minimum 

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and/or overtime wages or other relief granted under this lawsuit if 

Plaintiffs prevail on their FLSA claims.

(Proposed Notice at 3.) Here, Defendant seeks to strike the second sentence that states “[i]n other 

words, if you do not file a Consent to Sue form, you will not receive any unpaid minimum and/or 

overtime wages or other relief granted under this lawsuit if Plaintiffs prevail on their FLSA 

claims.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 19 (citing Proposed Notice at 3.)) While perhaps redundant, to an 

individual not familiar with FLSA cases or the law generally, it may aid in understanding the 

consequences of not opting-in to the collective action. Thus, the Court finds that the second 

sentence assists potential class members in making an informed decision by clarifying the 

preceding sentence. Accordingly, the request to strike the second sentence is denied.

c. Whether Defendant is permitted to specifically deny allegations

Plaintiffs’ notice states that “Defendant denies Plaintiffs’ allegations.” (Proposed Notice at 

2.) Defendant, however, requests that a more specific denial of the claims be added that states: 

“Concentrix contends that it requires all hourly call-center agents to accurately record all time 

worked and pays its call centers agents for all time worked.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 19.) Defendant’s 

proposed denial, however, mirrors its purported nationwide policy, and is meant to rebut the claim 

that putative class members performed off-the-clock work. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 7-8.)

Consequently, Defendant’s request for a more specific denial is denied.

d. Meet and confer to finalize proposed notice

In light of the foregoing, the parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding the form of 

the notice, which shall be consistent with this order. The parties are advised to carefully review the 

proposed notice to ensure that the narrowed putative class is properly identified, and that no 

typographical errors are in the final submission.4 If they cannot stipulate to the form of notice, 

they may submit a joint letter of not more than five pages explaining their respective positions,

and shall attach the redlined versions of their proposals, so that the undersigned can easily discern 

where their positions differ. The stipulation or joint letter shall be filed within 21 days of this 

order.

 

4 The Court observed that the sentence on page 3, line 17 ends with “unless you,” which appears 

to be in error.

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C. The Court declines to appoint Johnson Becker as interim collective action 

counsel

Finally, Plaintiffs request that the law firm of Johnson Becker be appointed interim class 

counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g)(1). (Pls.’ Mot. at 20.) Johnson Becker is national plaintiffs’ law 

firm, which has been appointed interim class counsel in dozens of FLSA actions. (See Johnson Becker, 

P.L.L.C Law Firm Resume, Nephew Decl., Ex. 7.) While Defendant does not object to this 

appointment, there are no other firms besides Johnson Becker seeking to be appointed as interim 

collective action counsel, and the consent to sue form explicitly provides that the individual opting-in 

to the litigation agrees to be represented by Johnson Becker. (See Consent to Sue, Nephew Decl., Ex. 6 

at 6.) Accordingly, the Court finds it unnecessary to make a formal interim appointment and declines 

to do so.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to conditionally certify the collective action is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant shall produce a contact list for the 

narrowed, putative collective within 21 days of this order. 

Additionally, the parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding the proposed notice, 

which shall be consistent with this order. Within 21 days of this order, the parties shall either 

submit a stipulated, proposed notice or a joint letter consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2019

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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