Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-00832/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-00832-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

**E-filed 07/23/2010** 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

JOHN E. DANNENBERG 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

WARDEN ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., et al., 

 Defendants 

____________________________________/

No. C 09-0832 RS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

After serving approximately 19 years in prison for manslaughter, plaintiff John E. 

Dannenberg was granted parole by the Board of Parole Hearings (“the Board”). Governor Arnold 

Schwarzenegger then exercised his review power under the California Penal Code and reversed the 

Board’s decision. In December of 2007, California’s Sixth District Court of Appeal issued a final 

decision granting Dannenberg’s petition for habeas corpus and reinstating the determination made 

by the Board. Dannenberg, however, was not released on parole for another 14 months, while 

further review of his habeas petition was pending, first in the California Supreme Court and then 

again in the Sixth District after the matter was re-transferred to that court for further consideration in 

light of intervening decisions in similar cases. 

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In this action, Dannenberg presents a compelling argument that under a better interpretation 

of California law, he was entitled to immediate release upon the Sixth District’s initial decision, the 

Attorney General not having obtained a stay from either the Sixth District itself, or from the 

California Supreme Court. As explained in this Court’s order granting defendants’ initial motion to 

dismiss, however, when the California Supreme Court denied the Attorney General’s stay 

application as “unnecessary,” it effectively ruled that the Sixth District’s initial decision did not give 

rise to an immediate right to release, and under Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 that determination is not 

reviewable here. 

As a result, this Court previously dismissed Dannenberg’s claims based on alleged unlawful 

imprisonment, without leave to amend. Because defendants conceded that the California Supreme 

Court’s ruling did not categorically preclude Dannenberg’s claim based on denial of equal 

protection, the Court granted Dannenberg leave to amend with respect to that claim, advising him 

that he needed to allege (1) sufficient non-conclusory facts to support his equal protection claim, and 

(2) sufficient facts to show how each named defendant “personally participated in the decision to 

treat him differently than other similarly situated persons, or . . . had both the personal authority and 

responsibility under state law to ensure his equal treatment, but failed to act.” 

Dannenberg’s Second Amended Complaint includes additional factual averments explaining 

both how he believes he received unequal treatment under the law, and why he contends each of the 

named defendants is responsible. Nevertheless, the facts alleged, together with matters subject to 

judicial notice, reveal that Dannenberg’s supposed differential treatment arose from the decision of 

the California Supreme Court that left his case in a different procedural posture than those of the 

other prisoners who he contends were “similarly situated,” and not from the actions or inactions of 

defendants. 

If Dannenberg is correct that the California Supreme Court misinterpreted California law, 

then his incarceration for an additional fourteen months beyond the time he should have been 

 

1

 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 

460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). 

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released was an injustice. It is not, however, a matter subject to a remedy in this Court. The 

complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The general background of this action has been set forth in prior orders and will not be 

repeated here. The factual averments of the Second Amended Complaint differs from its 

predecessor in the following respects: (1) as to each individual defendant, Dannenberg has 

described, with citations to statutes in some instances, the defendant’s legal responsibilities in the 

parole process, and that each defendant was put on written notice by Dannenberg’s counsel of his 

contention that he was being held unlawfully, (2) Dannenberg has now identified four other 

prisoners who he contends were similarly situated to him in that appellate courts granted their 

habeas petitions after the Governor had overturned the Board’s grant of parole—Sarah Lawrence, 

Peter Cooper, Bradford Titone, and Edward Gozy. Dannenberg asserts, and court records subject to 

judicial notice reveal, that each of those prisoners were released on parole after the appellate courts 

had ruled, and while further challenges to the appellate decisions were still pending in the California 

Supreme Court. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Dannenberg did not receive unequal treatment from defendants and/or there was a rational basis 

to treat him differently

 The Equal Protection Clause, “guarantees equal laws, not equal results.” McQueary v. 

Blodgett, 942 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 

(1979). Here, the facts alleged and those subject to judicial notice show that: 

 1. Dannenberg and the four other prisoners were all serving indeterminate life sentences. 

 2. In all five instances, the Board granted parole. 

 3. In all five instances, the Governor overruled the Board’s decisions. 

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 4. In all five instances, the appellate courts granted habeas relief (or upheld trial court 

 habeas grants). 

 5. In all five instances, the state officials sought to have the appellate decisions stayed, 

 pending further review. 

6. In the cases of Lawrence, Cooper, and Titone, both the appellate courts and the California 

 Supreme Court promptly denied the various stay requests. See Defendants’ Request 

for Judicial Notice Exhibits 5-9; Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 27, 29.2 In the case 

of Gozy, the appellate court promptly denied a request to stay the effect of the trial 

court’s grant of habeas; the matter apparently did not reach the California Supreme 

Court. See Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit 4; Second Amended 

Complaint ¶¶ 32. 

7. In Dannenberg’s case, unlike the others, the California Supreme Court did not act 

expeditiously either to grant or to deny the stay request. Instead, some six weeks 

after the request was filed, the court denied it as “unnecessary,” stating that the matter 

would not become final until the remittitur issued. 

 Under these circumstances, Dannenberg has failed to plead facts showing he was subjected 

to improper unequal treatment by defendants. Rather, it is manifestly apparent that his continued 

incarceration during further review of his habeas petition resulted from the California Supreme 

Court’s decision to treat his case differently than it did those of Lawrence, Cooper, and Titone. As 

set out in the prior order, even assuming that the California Supreme Court committed legal error, it 

is beyond the purview of this Court to revisit that issue in this proceeding.3

 

2

 The complaint does not expressly allege that Cooper’s request for a stay was denied by the 

Supreme Court, but Dannenberg does not dispute that fact. 

3

 Dannenberg makes much of the fact that the Attorney General “invited” the supposed legal error 

by submitting a brief stating that the stay could be denied as unnecessary. Dannenberg offers no 

authority, however, and the Court is aware of none, that would support imposing personal liability 

on state officials on the grounds that their counsel offered erroneous legal argument that a court 

accepted. 

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 To the extent it is possible to characterize defendants, as opposed to the California Supreme 

Court, as having elected to treat Dannenberg differently, his equal protection claim still fails because 

the judicial decision provided defendants a rational basis for the determination to keep him 

incarcerated. Accordingly, Dannenberg’s complaint must be dismissed, without leave to amend. 

B. Other defense arguments

 Defendants offer several other grounds for dismissal, none of which are persuasive. 

 

1. Immunity of Governor and Parole Board Members

 Defendants argue that Governor Schwarzenegger and the Board members named as 

defendants enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their decisions to grant or to deny parole. 

While that may be so, Dannenberg is not seeking to hold defendants liable for denying him parole, 

but instead for failing to release him when the Sixth District Court of Appeal reinstated the Board 

decision to grant him parole. Were his claim otherwise viable, quasi-judicial immunity would not 

be a bar. 

 2. The Wardens’ Authority 

Defendants contend that Warden Ayers, and his successor Warden Wong, cannot be 

responsible for failing to release Dannenberg because wardens “lack independent authority to make 

prison release decisions, as that is the parole board’s responsibility.” Motion at 7:8-9 (quoting 

Brown v. California Department of Corrections, 554 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 2009). This argument 

ignores the fact that the Board had already ordered Dannenberg’s release, and the Sixth District had 

reinstated that order. Accordingly, this argument would not, standing alone, foreclose 

Dannenberg’s claims against Wardens Ayers and Wong. 

 3. Class of one

 Defendants contend that a “class of one” equal protection claim does not lie where the 

challenged action involves “subjective and individualized” decisions to be made in the exercise of 

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official discretion. Again, defendants may be correct as a matter of general principle, but they 

continue to misconstrue the claim Dannenberg is making. Because Dannenberg’s claim arises from 

defendants’ failure to carry out a parole decision made in his favor and reinstated by the Sixth 

District, defendants’ arguments regarding discretion in granting parole are misplaced. 

 4. Qualified Immunity 

 Defendants make a qualified immunity argument that is largely built on their prior argument 

that no “class of one” equal protection claim lies in the context of discretionary decisions. In light 

of the conclusion that there is no viable claim of a constitutional violation committed by defendants, 

the qualified immunity argument is moot. 

C. Individual liability

 As noted above, the prior order required Dannenberg to allege facts showing how each 

named defendant “personally participated in the decision to treat him differently than other similarly 

situated persons, or . . . had both the personal authority and responsibility under state law to ensure 

his equal treatment, but failed to act.” February 10, 2010, Order at 11:3-6. A reasonable inference 

was, and remains, that all of the state officials involved in this matter were at all times acting on the 

advice of counsel; that is to say, the decisions regarding whether or not to release Dannenberg were 

almost certainly made as a matter of legal analysis in conjunction with the attorney general’s office. 

Even to the extent any other state officials had input into the decisions, they almost certainly were 

consulting closely with the attorney general’s office. 

That said, Dannenberg has now adequately shown, for pleading purposes at least, that 

Warden Ayers and Wong had the power and authority to carry out the Board’s order upon its 

reinstatement by the Sixth District, and therefore could be potentially held liable for failing to do so, 

had the California Supreme Court not effectively ruled that no immediate obligation to release arose 

when the Sixth District ruled. Dannenberg has also shown that pursuant to California Penal Code § 

5075(c), the Executive Officer of the Board is charged with exercising “all duties and functions 

necessary to insure that the responsibilities of the board are successfully discharged.” As such, at 

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least at the pleading stage, there would also appear to be a basis to impose liability against 

defendants Hoshino and Monday, who were each the Board’s Executive Officer during relevant 

time periods, were Dannenberg’s claim otherwise viable. 

As to Governor Schwarzenegger and Board Chairman James Davis, however, Dannenberg 

has shown nothing more than that they had some involvement in the process and that they did not 

respond to his counsel’s written demands that he be released. While it is true that a failure to act can 

be wrongful where there is a duty to act, Dannenberg’s counsel could not unilaterally create such a 

duty simply by sending letters. Accordingly, the claims against the Governor and Davis are subject 

to dismissal on this additional ground. 

Finally, Dannenberg suggests that this motion does not address his claims against “Doe” 

defendants—unknown subordinate state employees who may have been involved in the decisions as 

to when and whether Dannenberg would be released. Dannenberg contends the case must proceed 

to discovery so that he can ascertain the identities of such persons and the roles they played. Given 

the conclusion above that Dannenberg has no viable claim against any state official, the discovery 

he seeks to determine whether individual liability might otherwise lie against specific individuals is 

moot. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is granted, without leave to amend. 

The Clerk shall close the file. 

Dated: 07/23/2010 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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