Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01011/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01011-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES MICHAEL HASSINGER,

Petitioner,

 v.

DERREL ADAMS, Warden,

Substance Abuse and Treatment Center,

Corcoran, California,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-01011 WHA

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY AND (2)

DENYING REQUEST TO

APPOINT COUNSEL

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Charles Michael Hassinger requests that this Court issue a certificate of

appealability so that he may challenge the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He

also asks for appointment of counsel. Some of the issues in the petition are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further, at least after all doubts are resolved in petitioner’s favor. 

The request for a certificate is therefore GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The

interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel. The request for appointment

therefore is DENIED. 

STATEMENT

Petitioner was convicted by a Santa Clara County Superior Court jury of six violations

of California Penal Code Section 288(a), which prohibits lewd and lascivious acts on a person

less than fourteen years old. On February 7, 2006, the Court denied petitioner’s request for a

Case 3:05-cv-01011-WHA Document 37 Filed 03/09/06 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 To protect their privacy, the victims are identified in this order only by their initials. 

2

 Petitioner’s counsel misleadingly implies that Crawford did not abrogate Roberts. Crawford did just

that by holding that testimonial hearsay was inadmissible unless the declarant was available for crossexamination by the defendant. 541 U.S. at 68–69. Under Roberts, such statements would be admissible even if

the declarant were not available for cross-examination, provided they bore “indicia of reliability.” 448 U.S. at

2

writ of habeas corpus and issued a judgment against him. Petitioner now requests appointment

of counsel and a certificate of appealability. 

ANALYSIS

1. Certificate of Appealability

A district court may grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). The

certificate is granted if the petitioner demonstrates “that the issues are debatable among jurists

of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Any doubt is resolved in the

petitioner’s favor. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted). 

In his petition, Mr. Hassinger claimed that his confrontation-clause rights were violated

when the trial court allowed testimony by L. C., a twenty-three-year-old woman who claimed

that petitioner had molested her in 1986.1

On this issue, the certificate of appealability is denied. Petitioner’s counsel persists in

misconstruing the most obvious part of the Confrontation Clause: there can be no violation of

the Clause when the accused is allowed to examine fully, in open court, the witnesses against

him or her. Petitioner continues to argue frivolously that the Confrontation Clause was violated

because L. C.’s testimony contained inadmissible hearsay. The Confrontation Clause has

nothing to do with hearsay except when the out-of-court declarant is unavailable for crossexamination. Obviously, that was not the case here. Petitioner’s counsel also suggests that this

Court relied on the “theor[y]” that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2002) overruled Ohio

v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The Court made no such reliance. In fact, the Court explicitly

cited both Roberts and Crawford in support of this particular Confrontation Clause holding.2

Case 3:05-cv-01011-WHA Document 37 Filed 03/09/06 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 66. In fact, Crawford pulled no punches in its demolition of Roberts, stating that “[t]he unpardonable vice of

the Roberts test . . . is . . . its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation

Clause plainly meant to exclude.” 541 U.S. at 63. 

3

Plaintiff’s counsel also labors under the misunderstanding that non-testimonial statements are at

issue. All of L. C.’s challenged statements were testimonial. Counsel’s arguments on this point

are therefore off the mark. 

Petitioner’s counsel also fundamentally misstates the standard for granting a certificate

of appealability. He is correct that a certificate must be granted if the issue is debatable among

jurists of reason. He misunderstands, however, the “issue” to which this rule applies. It is not

enough that jurists of reason could disagree with the court decision that set forth the underlying

constitutional rule. The relevant issues instead are whether or not jurists of reason could

disagree about which decision supplies the governing rule and about how to apply that rule to

the particular case before the court. It is therefore irrelevant that, as petitioner’s counsel points

out, one judge dissented in Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005), which held that

Crawford was applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. 

In his petition, Mr. Hassinger argued that his due-process rights were violated because

there was insufficient evidence that he molested one of the victims, Y. S., on three separate

occasions, as charged, or that he did so on the dates alleged in the charging instrument. 

On this issue, the certificate of appealability is denied. Petitioner argues that a

certificate on this issue should issue because the Court’s finding supposedly was based “in large

part” upon out-of-court statements made by Y. S. in Korean to her father and to the father’s

employer, which were then immediately translated to a police officer. Petitioner alleges that

these statements were improperly considered by the jury because they were too unreliable. He

claims that they were unreliable because the father did not speak much English, the father’s

employer did not speak much Korean and the police officer did not speak any Korean. 

These reasons are insufficient to grant a certificate of appealability because they rest on

the misguided notions about the Confrontation Clause that are described above. Y. S. testified

at the trial and was subject to full cross-examination, so admission of her prior statements could

not have violated the Confrontation Clause. 

Case 3:05-cv-01011-WHA Document 37 Filed 03/09/06 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Petitioner also argues that a certificate should issue on the issue of whether there was a

variance between the pleading and the proof that effectively amended the charging instrument

and thereby denied him his right to due process of law. This argument relies upon rejection of

the testimony discussed immediately above. No reasonable jurist could conclude that the

aforementioned testimony could be excluded on confrontation-clause grounds. Petitioner

advances no alternative grounds for excluding it. The constructive-amendment argument

therefore necessarily fails also. No certificate is granted on this issue. 

The Court held that petitioner failed to carry his burden on the allegation that there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of molesting Y., another one of his victims. Petitioner asks

for a certificate of appealability on the grounds that a reasonable jurist could disagree with this

Court’s decision that there was sufficient evidence notwithstanding the fact that Y. identified

defense counsel as the man who molested her. 

On this issue, the certificate of appealability is denied. Petitioner’s counsel mistakenly

states that this Court discounted Y.’s identification of defense counsel as nothing more than the

confused statement of a young child communicating through an interpreter. The Court did no

such thing. It merely stated that the jury reasonably could have disbelieved this identification as

a “confused statement of a young child communicating through an interpreter.” Petitioner next

claims that the foregoing statement by the Court is “speculation . . . unsupported by the record.” 

The record, however, shows that Y. was a young child communicating through an interpreter

and that her statement may have been confused, in that it arguably was contradicted by other

evidence. Petitioner’s arguments therefore fail on this aspect of the issue. 

Petitioner also seeks a certificate on the grounds that a reasonable jurist could disagree

with the Court’s decision to rely upon testimony by Y.’s mother to “cancel out Y.’s exculpatory

identification testimony.” The mother was relating things that her five-year-old daughter told

her. Petitioner bases this argument on the same flawed Confrontation Clause interpretation,

suggesting that the mother’s testimony should not have come in because the five-year-old’s

statement was unreliable and because the girl purportedly did not know the difference then

between a lie and the truth. In fact, both the mother and Y. testified and were available for

Case 3:05-cv-01011-WHA Document 37 Filed 03/09/06 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

cross-examination. There was no Confrontation Clause violation. No reasonable jurist would

find otherwise. On this issue, the certificate of appealability is denied. 

Petitioner also argues that a certificate should be issued on the issue of whether there

was insufficient evidence that he committed the crimes against Y. during the period charged. 

The situation presented, however, was not one of insufficient evidence. That doctrine only

covers failures to produce enough evidence of the essential elements of the crime. The specific

dates on which petitioner molested Y. was not an essential element of the crime. No reasonable

jurist would disagree with this finding. The certificate is therefore denied on this issue. 

Petitioner also seeks a certificate on whether expert testimony about “child sexual

predators” was improperly admitted because it impermissibly allowed the jury to infer guilt

from a medical or psychological characteristic or behavior. The only support petitioner offers

for this rule in both the request for a certificate and the original petition is a citation to People v.

Housley, 6 Cal. App. 4th 949, 957 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). That decision does not claim to be

based upon the Constitution. Petitioner has therefore failed to mount any allegation that his

federal rights were violated on this basis. Mere state-law violations are not cognizable on

federal habeas review. The request for a certificate on this issue therefore is denied. 

Petitioner also asks for a certificate of appealability as to the Court’s denial of his

requests for oral argument and an evidentiary hearing. Those requests were held to be moot

because petitioner made them after his petition had been denied. Petitioner claims that his

requests were proper and timely under Habeas L.R. 2254-7 and 2254-8, and therefore the denial

of them as moot arguably violated his Fifth Amendment due-process right and his “statutory

right” to present a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

A certificate of appealability can only issue upon “a substantial showing of the denial of

a constitutional right,” not a statutory right. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). Petitioner’s argument about

violation of a statutory right under 28 U.S.C. 2254 therefore fails. As to his Fifth Amendment

argument, petitioner fails to state why the decision not to consider those requests violated due

process of law. He also does not cite any authority for his position. He thereby fails to make a

“substantial showing” that he was denied the right. Furthermore, the Court did not violate the

Case 3:05-cv-01011-WHA Document 37 Filed 03/09/06 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Local Rules. Habeas Local Rule 2254-1 states that “[t]he application of these rules to a

particular petition may be modified by the Judge to whom the petition is assigned.” That

provision authorized the Court to shorten the normal fifteen-day period in which parties can

request oral argument and evidentiary hearings. In addition, Rules 2254-7 and 2254-8 did not

divest the Court of its power to decide the petition in less than fifteen days. Finally, before the

requests were received, this Court had already examined the record to determine if an

evidentiary hearing was warranted, an examination required by Rule 8(a) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The Court had found that

no hearing was necessary. Petitioner thus effectively got all the rights he deserved under Rule

2254-7. Petitioner is denied a certificate on this issue. 

The Court, however, agrees with petitioner that the following issues “are adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further,” at least after all doubts are resolved in the

petitioner’s favor. See Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025. 

A. Whether or not admission of the testimony by L. C. violated

petitioner’s due-process rights because it was propensity and badcharacter evidence. 

B. Whether jury instructions on the testimony by L. C. allowed

conviction even if all elements of the crime were not proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

C. Whether petitioner’s due-process and Sixth Amendment rights

were violated by a material variance between pleading and proof

as to the dates on which he molested Y. 

D. Whether petitioner’s due-process rights to discovery, including the

right to exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83 (1963), were violated when evidence was disclosed to petitioner

mid-trial. 

E. Whether the testimony given about petitioner’s computer and

about child sexual predators amounted to bad-character or unfair

Case 3:05-cv-01011-WHA Document 37 Filed 03/09/06 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

evidence that was barred by the Due Process Clause, including the

interpretation of that clause at Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).

F. Whether petitioner’s sentence violated the Sixth Amendment by

allowing the minimum sentence to be increased based upon facts

not found by the jury. 

G. Whether petitioner’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment ban

on cruel and unusual punishment. 

2. Appointment of Counsel.

In all habeas proceedings brought under 28 U.S.C. 2254, such as this one, the court may

appoint counsel for an applicant who is or becomes financially unable to afford counsel. All

appointments of such attorneys are governed by 18 U.S.C. 3006A. 28 U.S.C. 2254(h). A court

may appoint counsel for financially eligible Section 2254 petitioners whenever it “determines

that the interests of justice so require . . . .” Section 3006A(2)(B); Gen. Order No. 2 at 3

(implementing Section 3006A). Whether or not to appoint counsel in Section 2254 cases is a

matter left to the judge’s discretion. The only way a judge abuses his or her discretion by

failing to appoint counsel for a habeas petitioner is when an evidentiary hearing was held or

should have been held. Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 729–30 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Although petitioner is indigent, appointment is not required by the interests of justice. 

Although this Court has granted in part petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability, his

chances of success on appeal are slim. It therefore would be an unwise use of government

resources to pay an attorney for him. Furthermore, petitioner already has an attorney. That

attorney has not indicated any intention to cease representing petitioner if he is not appointed by

the court. Petitioner therefore apparently is in no risk of having to go it alone. Finally,

petitioner’s counsel did a weak job of briefing the issues. If this court were to appoint counsel,

it would be a different attorney. That would make it more difficult for petitioner to move

quickly on his appeal. For these reasons, the interests of justice and therefore 18 U.S.C.

3006A(2)(B) do not require appointment of counsel. 

Case 3:05-cv-01011-WHA Document 37 Filed 03/09/06 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the request for a certificate of appealability is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART. The interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel. 

That request is therefore DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2006 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-01011-WHA Document 37 Filed 03/09/06 Page 8 of 8