Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01817/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01817-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL KENNETH PORTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

NURSE HOWARD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 10-cv-1817-BAS-(PCL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I. INTRODUCTION

Samuel Kenneth Porter (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner incarcerated at

Calipatria State Prison, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed a

Third Amended Complaint on August 15, 2013, alleging civil rights violations

pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 135.) Now before the

Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 150.)

The Honorable Cynthia Bashant referred the matter to the undersigned

Judge for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(d). After a thorough review of the pleadings and

supporting documents, this Court recommends the Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED. 

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his original complaint, pursuant to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on

August 30, 2010. In the original complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants,

acting in their official capacity and under color of law, orchestrated a rape of the

Plaintiff in violation of: the Eighth Amendment’s bar of cruel and unusual

punishment; due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; and equal protection

and due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff requested:

injunctive relief; damages in the sum of $2.5 million; punitive damages in the sum

of $2.5 million; and future and exemplary damages in the sum of $500,000. (Id.)

On November 13, 2010, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

against the same Defendants, with the same causes of action, and same requested

relief. (Doc. 13.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and strike the FAC on

January 10, 2011. (Doc. 27.) After a response (Doc. 30), reply (Doc. 31), and

supplemental response in opposition (Doc. 39), the Court submitted a Report and

Recommendation on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 57.) The Report and

Recommendation of this Court was adopted by the District Court on July 29,

2011; the Defendants’ motion to strike was denied, but the motion to dismiss was

granted. (Doc. 64.) The FAC was dismissed without prejudice. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on August 30, 2014.

(Doc. 73.) The SAC named the same Defendants and same causes of action, but

requested only $900,000 in total damages. (Doc. 73.) Defendants moved to

dismiss the SAC on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. (Doc. 76.) Plaintiff’s opposition argued that the Prison Rape Elimination

Act (“PREA”) superseded the exhaustion requirement. (Doc. 104.) On February

27, 2012, this Court recommended the motion to dismiss be granted on exhaustion

grounds. (Doc. 106.) After Plaintiff filed an objection, the district court adopted

the Court’s Report and Recommendation, agreeing that, “there is no set of facts

that Porter could allege to overcome the lack of exhaustion.” (Doc. 122, at 7.)

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Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 23, 2012.

(Doc. 124.) The Ninth Circuit agreed that “the district court properly dismissed

Porter’s [SAC] because Porter did not properly exhaust the prison grievance

process with respect to his claims and failed to provide sufficient evidence to show

that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable.” (Doc 133, at 3.) The

Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court

for entry of an order dismissing Plaintiff’s unexhausted claims without prejudice.

(Id.) On remand, the district court entered and Order Dismissing the Action

Without Prejudice, on July 31, 2013. (Doc. 134.) 

Not to be deterred, on August 15, 2013 Plaintiff filed a Third Amended

Complaint (“TAC”) alleging the same causes of action and same Defendants, 

requesting injunctive relief and $5.4 million in total damages. (Doc. 135, at 7.)

However, Plaintiff now alleges he has previously sought and exhausted all forms

of informal or formal relief from the proper administrative officials. (Id. at 6.)

Now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs TAC,

filed on November 21, 2013. (Doc. 150.) Defendants argue that this Court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction, or alternatively, that Plaintiff has failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. 150-3.) Plaintiff filed a response in

opposition on January 10, 2014. (Doc. 164.)

III. DISCUSSION

 Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum of decision (Doc.

133) upholding the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint and remanding for entry of dismissal without prejudice deprives this

Court of jurisdiction. (Doc. 150-3, at 13-15.) For the following reasons, the Court

agrees and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Under the “law of the case doctrine,” a court is generally precluded from

reconsidering an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court in

the identical case. United States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2007). “The

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law of the case doctrine states that the decision of an appellate court on a legal

issue must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case.”

Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 12 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir.1993) (internal

quotations omitted). Because the purpose of the doctrine is to promote judicial

finality, it necessarily follows that the law of the case acts as a bar only when the

issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court. See

Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 834-35 (9th Cir.1982)

(explaining that law of the case principles are analogous to res judicata). Although

the doctrine applies to a court’s “explicit decisions as well as those issues decided

by necessary implication,” Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149, 157 (9th

Cir.1989) (internal quotations omitted), it “clearly does not extend to issues an

appellate court did not address,” Luckey v. Miller, 929 F.2d 618, 621 (11th

Cir.1991).

Here, the relevant legal issue decided by the Ninth Circuit in its

memorandum was whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

(Doc. 133, at 3.) The Ninth Circuit held: 

The district court properly dismissed [Plaintiff’s] action because

[Plaintiff] did not properly exhaust the prison grievance process with

respect to his claims and failed to provide sufficient evidence to show

that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. (Id.) The issue now presented to the Court by Defendants in their motion to

dismiss is also whether Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

(Doc. 150-3, at 15-21.) 

Further, it would be necessary to review exhaustion before considering the

TAC on its merits. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (A state prisoner must exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing an action under this section); see also Porter

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) (holding that Prison Litigation Reform Act

requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies); Woodford v. Ngo, 548

U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006) (explaining that “proper exhaustion” requires adherence to

administrative procedural rules). Section 1997e(a) mandates that “[n]o action shall

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be brought ... until [the prisoner’s] administrative remedies ... are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This language clearly contemplates exhaustion prior to the

commencement of the action. Exhaustion subsequent to the filing of suit will not

suffice. Cf. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 532 U.S. at 738 (2001) (“The

‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint under § 1983 may

be entertained.”); see also Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir.2001)

(“[A]llowing prisoner suits to proceed, so long as the inmate eventually fulfills the

exhaustion requirement, undermines Congress’ directive to pursue administrative

remedies prior to filing a complaint in federal court.”); Freeman v. Francis, 196

F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir.1999) (“The prisoner, therefore, may not exhaust

administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit.”)

Plaintiff now alleges he has satisfied the exhaustion requirements. (Doc.

135, at 6.) However, the Ninth Circuit has already ruled that dismissal is proper in

this case because there has not been exhaustion. (Doc. 133, at 3.) Further, the

Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the SAC, which stated: “there

is no set of facts Porter could allege to overcome the lack of exhaustion...” (Doc.

122, at 7.) Because Plaintiff cannot exhaust administrative remedies during the

pendency of the suit, i.e., between the filing of the SAC and TAC, the

circumstances since the Circuit Court’s ruling have not changed. Freeman, 196

F.3d at 645. Thus, it is inconsequential that Plaintiff now alleges exhaustion has

been met. By merely changing the exhaustion allegation and not the parties or

causes of action, Plaintiff has effectively re-submitted his SAC. 

If the Court considered the TAC on the merits, the first inquiry will be,

necessarily, the very issue already decided by the Circuit Court: exhaustion of

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That issue has already been ruled

upon. (Doc. 133, at 3.) The Court cannot rule on it again. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977.

It is not possible for Plaintiff to assert facts to overcome the exhaustion

requirements in his TAC. (Doc. 122, at 7.) Plaintiff could not have exhausted his

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remedies during the interim between the SAC and TAC. Freeman, 196 F.3d at

645. Thus, the first issue addressed by the Court in considering the TAC would be

identical to the one addressed by the Ninth Circuit, breaching the law of the case

doctrine. Herrington, 12 F.3d 901. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States

District Judge Cynthia Bashant under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil

Rule 72.1(c)(1)(d) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered GRANTING the

Motion to Dismiss.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 30, 2014, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 13, 2014. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 25, 2014

Peter C. Lewis

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Cynthia Bashant All Parties and Counsel of Record

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