Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04016/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has

been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this

suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

SHARON ARMSTRONG PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-4016

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Sharon Armstrong brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)

denying her claim for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits

under the provisions of Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the

Act). Both parties have filed appeal briefs and the matter is now

ripe for review. The Court, being well and sufficiently advised,

finds and orders as follows with respect thereto: 

BACKGROUND

1. Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI

benefits on November 13, 2003, alleging that she became disabled

in September 2003, due to pain in her back and legs. (Tr. 48-49,

50, 54.)

2. The ALJ, in a written decision dated October 28, 2005,

found that plaintiff was not disabled, as she retained the 

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residual functional capacity to perform the full range of

sedentary work. (Tr. 13-19.)

3. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals

Council and submitted additional medical records. (Tr. 223-247.)

Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision by the

Appeals Council was denied on February 14, 2006. (Tr. 5-7.) When

the Appeals Council declined review, the ALJ’s decision became the

final action of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial

review of that decision.

APPLICABLE LAW

4. Our review of the Commissioner's determination is

limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court's role is to

determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Siemers v.

Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence

means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, it means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); Oberst v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1993). If,

after reviewing the record, the Court finds that it is possible to

draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those

positions represents the Commissioner’s findings, the Court must

affirm the Commissioner’s decision. See Pearsall v. Massanari,

274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8 Cir. 2001). Even if the Court would have th

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weighed the evidence differently, the Court must affirm the denial

of benefits if there is enough evidence to support the other side.

Id.

5. To be eligible for SSI benefits, a claimant has the

burden of establishing the existence of a disability under the

Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). To meet this burden, the claimant

must show:

* that she has a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for at

least one year;

* that she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful

activity; and

* that this inability results from the impairment.

See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

6. The Commissioner follows a familiar five-step process to

determine whether a claimant is disabled:

(1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing her claim; 

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to

perform basic work activities; 

(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a presumptively

disabling impairment listed in the regulations; 

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(4) whether the claimant has the residual functional

capacity – that is, what she can do despite her limitations -- to

perform her past relevant work; and

(5) if the claimant cannot perform her past work, the burden

then shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs

in the national economy that the claimant can perform given her

age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920; see also Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217. 

PLAINTIFF’S SUBJECTIVE COMPLAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

7. At the administrative hearing conducted by the ALJ on

March 30, 2005, plaintiff testified as follows:

* that she was 41 years of age and had a tenth-grade

education (Tr. 266);

* that on September 3, 2003, her brother pushed her during

an altercation, causing her to fall down and injure her back (Tr.

268);

* that she has constant, severe pain in her lower back and

left leg and cannot stand for long periods of time “or ... just

[has] to sit down, or move around” (Tr. 269); and

* that a specialist recommended surgery, but she decided

not to have it because it could result in nerve damage or a

worsening of her condition (Tr. 269).

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8. In a supplemental interview outline plaintiff completed

when she applied for benefits, plaintiff described her activities

as follows:

* she is able to bathe and dress herself, but is not able

to take care of her hair because when she “put[s] [her] hands up

for a long time they start hurting” (Tr. 71); 

* she is able to do dishes, but is not able to do other

household chores because her “back and legs start to bother” her

(Tr. 71);

* she is not able to shop or run errands because she

cannot “pick up things or walk a lot” (Tr. 71);

* she is not able to prepare meals (Tr. 72);

* she drives - but, according to her testimony at the

hearing, she is only able to drive short distances because her

back starts hurting (Tr. 72, 274); and

* she spends her time watching television and reading (Tr.

72).

MEDICAL EVIDENCE

9. An MRI taken of plaintiff’s back in October 2003

revealed:

At L4-5 the disc maintains normal height. However,

there is diffuse desiccation with moderate diffuse

bulging and a small focal tear in the annulus fibrosis.

The bulge is coupled with some mild facet arthropathy

and allows for mild bilateral lateral recess stenosis.

However, no evidence of disc herniation or spinal

stenosis.... (Tr. 91.)

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10. Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Paul Pappas, ordered

physical therapy and epidural steroid injections, but plaintiff

reported that these treatments did not alleviate her pain, and she

was referred to a neurosurgeon, Dr. J. Brett Dietze. 

11. In January 2004, Dr. Dietze recommended a L4-5

microdiscectomy on the right side. (Tr. 140-41.) However, as

noted above, plaintiff declined to have the surgery due to the

risks involved. 

12. In March 2004, Dr. Robert Redd, a non-examining stageagency consultant, reviewed plaintiff’s medical records and

completed a residual functional capacity assessment indicating

that he believed plaintiff was capable of performing the

exertional demands of light work with only occasional stooping and

crouching. (Tr. 131-38.)

13. In May 2004, plaintiff was evaluated at Dickson

Orthopedic Centers. Dr. Dickson opined that plaintiff’s symptoms

were not related to an acute herniated disk. (Tr. 190.)

14. In follow-up visits with Dr. Pappas, plaintiff declined

any referral for surgery or “elsewhere,” stating that she was

awaiting a disability hearing and would like to “follow up” after

it. (Tr. 196, 199.)

15. Dr. Pappas, at the request of Plaintiff’s attorney,

completed a form assessing plaintiff’s ability to perform workrelated activities as follows: she could lift/carry less than ten

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pounds occasionally, she could stand/walk less than two hours in

an eight-hour workday, and she could sit less than two hours in an

eight-hour workday. (Tr. 143-45.)

At the hearing before the ALJ, Dr. Pappas explained that his

assessment was based largely on plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

When the ALJ asked whether he was qualified to complete a workrelated activities report, Dr. Pappas responded: “I’ll do it on a

temporary basis. But as far as any long-term, no I don’t do

disability evaluations... [G]enerally we’ll do [it] on a month-tomonth basis.” (Tr. 261-62.) 

16. In May 2005, Dr. Roshan Sharma reviewed plaintiff’s

medical records and performed a consultative examination. Dr.

Sharma found:

Extremities - She has full range of motion in both upper

and lower extremities....

Examination of the Lower Back - Patient’s range of

motion could not be actually ascertained as she would

not flex reporting that she has too much pain and flexed

no more than 30 degrees. Extension was 0.... She is

able to tiptoe and heel walk and do a hop squat. No leg

length discrepancy and no muscle atrophy noted.

Straight leg raise is 65 degrees in both lower

extremities. Patient reports significant pain in the

lower back when performed on either lower extremity.

Faber’s test and Popliteal compression test is negative.

Sitting straight leg raise is full[,] however, she

starts complaining of pain at 60 degrees of sitting

straight leg raise in either extremity.

(Tr. 204-05.) 

17. Dr. Sharma concluded that plaintiff had low back pain

secondary to a disc protrusion at the L5 level. In Dr. Sharma’s

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assessment, plaintiff’s pain behaviors and inability to flex and

extend did not correspond well to her medical condition. (Tr.

205.) Dr. Sharma opined that plaintiff was capable of the full

range of sedentary work and a limited range of light work, as she

could lift/carry up to ten pounds frequently; she could stand/walk

up to six hours in an eight-hour workday; she had no limitations

with regard to sitting; and she had only occasional postural and

environmental limitations, none of which affected her ability to

perform sedentary work. (Tr. 207-08.)

DISCUSSION

18. The Court first addresses the ALJ's assessment of

plaintiff's subjective complaints. The Court believes the ALJ

adequately evaluated the factors set forth in Polaski v. Heckler,

739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), and concludes there is

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination that

plaintiff's complaints were not fully credible. 

(a) First of all, plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not

supported by the medical evidence. 

* While an MRI revealed degenerative disc disease of

plaintiff’s lumbar spine, with a small annular tear and bulging at

the L4-5 level, there was no evidence of an acute herniated disc.

* Dr. Redd, a non-examining state agency consultant,

believed that plaintiff was capable of performing light work with

only occasional stooping and crouching. 

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* Dr. Sharma, who performed a consultative examination of

plaintiff, opined that plaintiff’s pain behaviors did not

correspond well to her medical condition. Dr. Sharma concluded

that plaintiff was capable of performing the full range of

sedentary work and a limited range of light work.

* At the request of plaintiff’s attorney, Dr. Pappas,

plaintiff’s treating physician, completed a work-related

activities form indicating that plaintiff was not capable of even

sedentary work. 

A treating physician’s opinion is due “controlling weight” if

that opinion is “‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical

and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with

the other substantial evidence in the record.’” Prosch v. Apfel,

201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8 Cir. 2000) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §

th

404.1527(d)(2)). Although a treating physician’s opinion is

entitled to great weight, it does not automatically control or

obviate the need to evaluate the record as a whole. Id. at 1013.

The ALJ may discount or disregard such an opinion if other medical

assessments are supported by superior medical evidence, or if the

treating physician has offered inconsistent opinions. Id.

The Court finds that the ALJ was justified in crediting Dr.

Sharma’s assessment over Dr. Pappas’ assessment. First of all,

the weight of the medical evidence supports Dr. Sharma’s

assessment. Further, Dr. Pappas’ treatment notes never mentioned

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any restrictions on plaintiff’s activities. See Hogan v. Apfel,

239 F.3d 958, 961 (8 Cir. 2001) (ALJ did not err in discounting th

treating physician’s medical source statement where limitations

detailed in statement were never mentioned in physician’s

treatment records). Additionally, at the hearing before the ALJ,

Dr. Pappas explained that his assessment was based largely on

plaintiff’s subjective complaints and that he generally assesses

only temporary limitations and does not perform long-term

disability evaluations. 

(b) The credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is

also diminished by the fact that plaintiff declined a referral for

surgery or “elsewhere,” stating that she did not wish to “follow

up” until after her disability hearing. See Guilliams v.

Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802 (8 Cir. 2005) (claimant’s failure to th

take advantage of treating physician’s offer to refer him to a

specialist weighed against his credibility).

(c) Finally, the ALJ found that plaintiff had no past

relevant work experience and properly determined that plaintiff’s

poor work record undermined her credibility. See Pearsall, 274

F.3d at 1218 (a lack of work history may indicate a lack of

motivation to work rather than a lack of ability).

(d) Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ

adequately evaluated and discounted plaintiff’s subjective

complaints.

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19. The Court next addresses the ALJ’s assessment of

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. The ALJ found that

plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform the

full range of sedentary work. The Court believes the evidence

discussed above supports this determination. If an ALJ finds, and

the record supports the finding, that a claimant can perform the

full range of activities in a work category, the ALJ may refer to

the Medical-Vocational Guidelines found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 2 (Grid) in making the ultimate conclusion of

disability or non-disability. See Harris v. Shalala, 45 F.3d

1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1995). Given the Court’s finding that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that

plaintiff is capable of the full range of sedentary work, the

Court believes the ALJ properly relied on the Grid, eliminating

the need for expert vocational testimony, in concluding that given

plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and capacity for

sedentary work, plaintiff was not disabled.

CONCLUSION

20. Based on the foregoing, a separate judgment will issue

forthwith affirming the ALJ's decision denying plaintiff benefits

and dismissing plaintiff's case with prejudice. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED this 22 day of March 2007. nd

/S/JIMM LARRY HENDREN 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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