Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00306/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00306-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOY D. CURRINGTON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 14-0306-C

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her

claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The parties 

have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Docs. 18 & 20 (“In accordance with

provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to 

have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, . . . 

order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”).) 

Upon consideration of the administrative record, plaintiff’s brief, the Commissioner’s 

brief, and the arguments of counsel at the February 4, 2015 hearing before the Court, it 

is determined that the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits should be affirmed.

1

 1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall 

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Docs. 18 & 20 (“An appeal from a 

judgment entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of 

Appeals for this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of 

this district court.”))

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 1 of 16
2

Plaintiff alleges disability due to degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, 

peripheral edema, peripheral neuropathy, hypertension, morbid obesity, and borderline 

intellectual functioning. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the following 

relevant findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through September 30, 2012.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

June 12, 2009, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 

et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative 

disc disease of the lumbar spine, peripheral edema, peripheral 

neuropathy, hypertension, morbid obesity, and borderline intellectual 

functioning. (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

. . .

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the 

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 

404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

. . .

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

less than the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). She can frequently lift and carry up to 10 

pounds. She can sit for one hour at one time before needing a change of 

position of at least five minutes before returning to the sitting position, 

she can stand or walk for approximately 30 minutes at one time before 

needing to sit for at least five minutes before returning to either 

standing or walking, and work could continue through the position 

change. During regularly scheduled breaks and lunch, she needs to 

elevate her legs to at least as high as chair height or straight out using a 

chair or box, but not specialized medical equipment, to prop up the legs. 

She can occasionally push and pull leg controls and frequently push 

and pull arm controls. She can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, 

balance, and climb ramps and stairs. She cannot climb ropes, ladders, or 

scaffolding; work at unprotected heights; work around dangerous 

machinery; or operate automotive equipment. She can perform simple, 

routine, repetitive tasks. She can occasionally interact with the public, 

co-workers, and supervisors. She can occasionally adapt to changes in 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 2 of 16
3

the work setting. She can maintain attention and concentration for up to 

two hours at a time.

. . .

As for the claimant’s physical impairments, she was treated in October 

2008, October 2009, and November 2010 at Providence Family 

Physician[s], where she was diagnosed with hypertension and obesity and 

prescribed clonidine. The minimal treatment notes indicate that the 

clonidine helped to control her blood pressure, and her other examination 

findings were essentially normal. In November 2011, she underwent a 

consultative examination performed by Dr. Sherman. She complained of 

lower back pain, swelling in her legs and feet, and shortness of breath 

with lots of activity. Examination findings indicated the presence of 

hypertension and obesity. The examination revealed she had a full range 

of motion in all her extremities and her back, despite her complaints of 

pain in her back on full extension and full flexion. Though her back had 

lost some of its lordotic curve due to her obesity, it was devoid of spasm 

or deformity. The other examination findings were all essentially normal, 

including gait, station, ability to squat without difficulty, ability to heel-totoe walk, motor skills, negative atrophy, seated leg raise results, and intact 

gross and fine manipulation. Dr. Sherman diagnosed the claimant with 

morbid obesity, low back pain caused by her obesity, hypertension, 

peripheral edema caused by her hypertension, constipation, and a limited 

education/slow learner.

From December 2011 to February 2013, the claimant was treated at Victory 

Health Center for various complaints and follow-ups. In December 2011, 

she presented with complaints of high blood pressure, and treatment 

notes indicated she was not regularly checking her blood pressure, had no 

regular exercise program, and had no diet. An examination revealed 

hypertension and obesity, but otherwise normal results, and the claimant 

was diagnosed with hypertension, pedal edema, and morbid obesity. In 

January 2012, the claimant presented for follow-up treatment and the 

examination revealed obesity and high normal blood pressure but 

otherwise produced essentially normal findings. The claimant was 

diagnosed with morbid obesity, multiple joint pains, and hypertension. In 

February 2012, she presented with complaints of swelling, shortness of

breath, and hypertension. An examination produced findings of obesity 

and hypertension, but was otherwise normal. She was diagnosed with 

hypertension, constipation, and morbid obesity. A March 2012 follow-up 

examination was accompanied by complaints of some numbness and 

pain; an examination again produced findings of obesity and 

hypertension, but was normal otherwise, and the claimant was diagnosed 

with hypertension. In July 2012, the claimant complained of tingling in her 

hands, and an examination produced findings of obesity and 

hypertension, but was relatively normal otherwise. The claimant was 

diagnosed with morbid obesity, hypertension, and carpal tunnel 

syndrome. A December 2012 treatment found the claimant complaining 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 3 of 16
4

that her right arm was stiff and her knee was “locking up.” An 

examination revealed obesity, hypertension, degenerative changes in her 

left knee, and bilateral crepitus in her knees, but it was essentially normal 

for other systems. She was diagnosed with degenerative joint disease of 

her “knees,” neuropathy, hypertension, and morbid obesity. The notes 

indicate that Lyrica was not ordered for her neuropathy. In February 2013, 

the claimant complained of chronic low back pain. An examination 

revealed obesity, hypertension, degenerative changes in the claimant’s 

lumbar spine due to her obesity, and only mild degenerative changes in 

the claimant[‘s] cervical spine. Other systems were normal. The claimant 

was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease of her lumbar spine, 

hypertension, morbid obesity, and neuropathy.

The objective findings and the claimant’s admitted abilities and activities 

do not support the allegations she is disabled by her degenerative disc 

disease of the lumbar spine, peripheral edema, peripheral neuropathy, 

hypertension, or morbid obesity, of a combination thereof. Despite 

complaints, diagnoses, and treatment, the claimant’s myriad of 

examination findings throughout the record were essentially normal. The 

“non-normal” examination findings revolved primarily around the 

claimant’s hypertension and obesity, of which the hypertension was 

admittedly “helped” by medication, and her obesity, which involved the 

claimant’s refusal to follow doctors’ recommendations to lose weight. The 

recent diagnoses of degenerative joint disease of her knees and 

degenerative disc disease of her lumbar spine are undermined by her 

admitted and indicated activities such as dusting, cleaning, washing 

dishes, cooking, ironing, and doing laundry.

Nevertheless, the undersigned acknowledges that the claimant’s physical 

symptomology can reasonably be expected to cause some functional 

limitations and, accordingly, has limited the claimant to less than the full 

range of sedentary work. The limitations to only frequently lifting and 

carrying up to 10 pounds; being able to change positions between sitting 

and standing throughout the workday; being able to elevate her feet 

during breaks and lunch; only occasionally pushing and pulling leg 

controls; only frequently pushing and pulling arm controls; only 

occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, balancing, and 

climbing ramps and stairs; never climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolding; 

and never working at unprotected heights, around dangerous machinery, 

or operating automotive equipment, all accommodate her degenerative 

disc disease of the lumbar spine, hypertension, and morbid obesity, as 

well as any potential medication side effects. The claimant’s peripheral 

edema and peripheral neuropathy are accommodated by the limitation to 

sedentary work, the ability to change positions, and the ability for the 

claimant to elevate her legs during breaks and at lunch.

As for opinion evidence regarding the claimant’s physical impairments, as 

part of his consultative examination, Dr. Sherman opined that the 

claimant’s obesity was the cause of her lower back pain and made her 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 4 of 16
5

intolerant to activity, and her hypertension and obesity were the cause of 

the edema. Dr. Sherman noted that her six years of employment with 

Wendy’s as a cashier proved she can count money and handle at least fast 

food duties. His ultimate opinion was that the claimant can do some forms 

of fast food jobs or some restrictive-activity jobs. Dr. Sherman’s opinion is 

consistent with the medical evidence of record, which showed essentially 

normal examination findings throughout the period of adjudication; 

consistent with his own examination findings, which were essentially 

normal except for morbid obesity and hypertension; and consistent with 

the claimant’s admitted activities and abilities, which include performing 

household chores and the ability to lift 15 pounds. Accordingly, the 

undersigned gives Dr. Sherman’s opinion great weight.

In March 2013, Chris Corsentino, D.C., a chiropractor, completed a clinical 

assessment of pain form (CAP), and a physical capacities evaluation form

(PCE). In the CAP, Chiropractor Corsentino noted that pain was present 

in the claimant to such an extent as to be distracting to adequate 

performance of daily activities or work; physical activity increases pain to 

the extent that medication and/or bed reset is necessary; and prescribed 

medication will severely limit the patient’s effectiveness due to 

distraction, inattention and drowsiness. In the PCE, Chiropractor 

Corsentino opined that the claimant can walk for zero hours total at one 

time and for a total of zero hours in an eight-hour workday; can stand for 

one hour at a time and for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday; 

can sit for one hour at a time and for a total of three hours in an eight-hour 

workday; can occasionally lift and carry up to 10 pounds; can use her 

bilateral hands for simple grasping and fine manipulation but not for the 

pushing and pulling of arm controls; cannot use her feet for the pushing 

and pulling of leg controls; can occasionally reach but cannot bend, squat, 

crawl, or climb; is mildly restricted in activities involving being around 

moving machinery and exposure to marked changes in temperature and 

humidity; and is mildly restricted in activities involving exposure to dust, 

fumes, and gases. Chiropractor Corsentino noted that the patient has an 

antalgic gait, has difficulty with lumbar movement, and is very limited 

due to pain. He concluded that the claimant is currently unable to work 

and that her limitations would continue for more than 12 months. 

Although Chiropractor Corsentino is not considered to be an acceptable 

medical source for medical opinion purposes, the undersigned has 

considered his opinion under 20 CFR 404.1527(d), 20 CFR 416.913(d), and 

SSR 06-03p. The undersigned gives little weight to his opinion. His 

opinion is not supported by the objective testing performed by Dr. 

Sherman in Exhibit 3F and set forth above. Chiropractor Corsentino’s 

opinion is also not supported by the treatment records from Victory 

Health, in which the claimant demonstrated essentially normal 

examination findings with regard to her systems, except for repeated 

diagnoses of obesity and hypertension. Finally, Chiropractor Corsentino’s 

opinion does not accord with the claimant’s admitted abilities and 

activities, which include performing housework such as laundry, dishes, 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 5 of 16
6

and dusting; cooking simple meals; caring for her son; and shopping for 

two to four hours at one time twice per month.

. . .

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 

CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

. . .

7. The claimant was born on April 19, 1974 and was 35 years old, 

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the alleged 

disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate 

in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because 

the claimant’s past relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 404.1568 and 

416.968).

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 

404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

. . .

If the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform the full 

range of sedentary work, a finding of not disabled would be directed by 

Medical-Vocational Rule 201.24. However, the claimant’s ability to 

perform all or substantially all of the requirements of this level of work 

has been impeded by additional limitations. To determine the extent to 

which these limitations erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base, 

the Administrative Law Judge asked the vocational expert whether jobs 

exist in the national economy for an individual with the claimant’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. The 

vocational expert testified that given all of these factors the individual 

would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations 

such as break lining coder ((DOT) Code 574.685-010), a sedentary and 

unskilled job with approximately 78,000 positions in the national economy 

and 2,000 in Alabama; a final assembler (DOT Code 713.687-018), a 

sedentary and unskilled job with approximately 230,000 positions in the 

national economy and 3,000 in Alabama; and a stuffer (DOT Code 731.685-

014), a sedentary and unskilled job with approximately 342,000 positions 

in the national economy and 5,000 in Alabama.

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the undersigned has determined that the 

vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with the information contained 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 6 of 16
7

in the DOT, except for the position change detailed in the residual 

functional capacity. The vocational expert testified that the claimant’s 

need to change positions would only minimally erode (10 percent) the 

occupational based indicated by the DOT and its companion publications. 

The vocational expert explained that she based her testimony on her 24 

years of experience in vocational rehabilitation performing both formal 

and informal job analyses. The undersigned finds [] the vocational 

expert’s explanation to be satisfactory.

Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the undersigned

concludes that, considering the claimant’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity, the claimant is capable of 

making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy. A finding of not disabled is therefore 

appropriate under the framework of the above-cited rule.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from June 12, 2009, through the date of this decision

(20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

 

(Tr. 12, 13, 16-17, 18-20, 23, & 23-24 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; 

most emphasis in original but some added).) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s 

decision (Tr. 1-3) and thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security.

DISCUSSION

In all Social Security cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving that she is 

unable to perform her previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1986). In 

evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the examiner must consider the 

following four factors: (1) objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of 

examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, education and 

work history. Id. at 1005. An ALJ, in turn,

uses a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether the claimant is 

disabled, which considers: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in 

substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe 

impairment; (3) if so, whether the severe impairment meets or equals an 

impairment in the Listing of Impairments in the regulations; (4) if not, 

whether the claimant has the RFC to perform h[is] past relevant work; and 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 7 of 16
8

(5) if not, whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work 

experience, there are other jobs the claimant can perform.

Watkins v. Commissioner of Social Security, 457 Fed.Appx. 868, 870 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012)2

(per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (c)-(f), 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(f); Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)) (footnote omitted).

If a plaintiff proves that she cannot perform her past relevant work, as here, it 

then becomes the Commissioner’s burden—at the fifth step—to prove that the plaintiff 

is capable—given her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of 

substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Id.; Jones v. Apfel, 

190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1089, 120 S.Ct. 1723, 146 

L.Ed.2d 644 (2000); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, but 

importantly, although “a claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to 

return to h[er] past relevant work, the [Commissioner of Social Security] has an 

obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th 

Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the Commissioner’s

decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that she can perform those sedentary, 

unskilled jobs identified by the vocational expert at the administrative hearing, is 

supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a 

scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 

L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must view 

the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to 

 2 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they 

may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.R. 36-2.

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 8 of 16
9

the Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).3

Courts are precluded, however, from “deciding the facts anew or re-weighing the 

evidence.” Davison v. Astrue, 370 Fed. Appx. 995, 996 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (per 

curiam) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)). And, “’[e]ven if 

the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a court] must affirm 

if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting Crawford v. 

Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-1159 (11th Cir. 2004)).

On appeal to this Court, Currington asserts one reason why the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny her benefits is in error (i.e., not supported by substantial evidence): (1) 

the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion of a non-accepted medical source 

regarding the limitations resulting from her diagnosed severe impairments of 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, peripheral edema, peripheral 

neuropathy, hypertension, and morbid obesity. There can be no question but that Chris 

Corsentino, a chiropractor, completed a physical residual functional capacity evaluation 

form, as well as a clinical assessment of pain form, on March 5, 2013. On the pain form, 

Corsentino indicated that plaintiff’s pain was present to such an extent as to be 

distracting to adequate performance of daily activities or work, that physical activity 

increases pain to the extent medication and/or bed rest is necessary, and that the 

medication plaintiff takes severely limits her effectiveness due to distraction, inattention 

and drowsiness. (Tr. 250.) The PCE reflects Corsentino’s findings that Currington can 

sit for one hour at a time and for three hours total in an 8-hour workday; she can stand 

for one hour at a time and for a total of two hours in an 8-hour workday; she cannot 

walk for any period of time; she can occasionally lift and carry up to 10 pounds; she 

 3 This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal principles, 

however, is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 9 of 16
10

cannot push and pull arm controls; she cannot use her feet for any repetitive 

movements; she can occasionally reach but cannot bend, squat, crawl or climb; and she 

has only mild restrictions in terms of being around moving machinery, exposure to 

temperature and humidity changes, and exposure to dust, fumes and gases. (Tr. 251.) 

Corsentino remarked on the PCE that Currington had an antalgic gait and difficulty 

with lumbar movement due to pain. (Id.) Interestingly, however, Corsentino’s 

assessments are unaccompanied by a narrative report (see Tr. 250-251) and, indeed,

there is absolutely no other evidence in the record generated by Corsentino (see 

Administrative Transcript). 

Chiropractors are excluded from the list of “acceptable medical sources” whose 

opinions are to be considered in determining the existence of an impairment. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1513(a) (2013). However, medical sources who are not “acceptable medical 

sources” are considered “other sources” and their opinions and evidence may be used 

“to show the severity” of an impairment and “how it affects [the] ability to work[.]” See 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d) (chiropractors included in subsection (1)). “Even though a 

chiropractor’s opinions may be considered, ‘an ALJ has no duty to give significant or 

controlling weight to a chiropractor’s views.’” Lucas v. Colvin, 2014 WL 358724, *8 (N.D. 

Ala. Jan. 31, 2014), quoting Miles v. Social Security Administration, 469 Fed.Appx. 743, 745 

(11th Cir. Mar. 15, 2012). 

Social Security Ruling 06-03p clearly provides that the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d) can be applied to opinion evidence from medical sources 

who are not “acceptable medical sources,” including the following factors: (1) how long 

the source has known the claimant and how frequently the source has seen the 

claimant; (2) how consistent the source’s opinion is with other evidence; (3) the degree 

to which the source presents relevant evidence to support the opinion; (4) how well the 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 10 of 16
11

source explains the opinion; (5) whether the source has a specialty or area of expertise 

related to the individual’s impairments; and (6) any other factors that tend to support or 

refute the source’s opinion. Id. The ruling goes on to explain that not every factor listed 

will apply in every case. Id. And, finally, the ruling explains that the “adjudicator 

generally should explain the weight given to opinions from [] ‘other sources,’ or 

otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the . . . decision allows a . . . 

subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning . . . .” Id.

With these principles in mind, the undersigned considers plaintiff’s sole 

argument that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion of a non-accepted 

medical source, Chris Corsentino, D.C. “regarding the limitations resulting from the 

Plaintiff’s diagnosed severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 

spine, peripheral edema, peripheral neuropathy, hypertension, and morbid obesity.”

(Doc. 11, at 1-2; see also id. at 2 (arguing the ALJ “erred in assigning little weight to the 

opinion of Chris Corsentino, D.C., who indicated limitations on a clinical assessment of 

pain form and a physical capacities evaluation that would result in a conclusion that the 

Plaintiff could not perform any work in the national economy.”).) The plaintiff is correct 

in noting that given the diagnoses by acceptable medical sources of degenerative disc 

disease of the lumbar spine, peripheral edema, peripheral neuropathy, and morbid 

obesity, that Corsentino “could opine regarding the severity of [] [her] impairments and 

[their] effects on her ability to work[]” (Doc. 11, at 4); however, her suggestion that the 

ALJ did not give Corsentino’s opinions “weight” (id. at 5) is simply incorrect inasmuch 

as the ALJ set forth the entirety of Corsentino’s pain assessment and physical capacities 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 11 of 16
12

evaluation, afforded those opinions “little weight[,]” and set forth several reasons for 

giving Corsentino’s opinions little weight (Tr. 20).

4

His opinion is not supported by the objective testing performed by Dr. 

Sherman in Exhibit 3F and set forth above. Chiropractor Corsentino’s 

opinion is also not supported by the treatment records from Victory 

Health, in which the claimant demonstrated essentially normal 

examination findings with regard to her systems, except for repeated 

diagnoses of obesity and hypertension. Finally, Chiropractor Corsentino’s 

opinion does not accord with the claimant’s admitted abilities and 

activities, which include performing housework such as laundry, dishes, 

and dusting; cooking simple meals; caring for her son; and shopping for 

two to four hours at one time twice per month.

(Id. (internal citations omitted).) And while the ALJ did not elaborate upon her first 

reason for rejecting Corsentino’s opinions, she committed no error inasmuch as in 

discussing the evidence in other portions of her decision she ensured that this Court 

could follow her reasoning in this regard. See SSR 06-03p (“[T]he adjudicator generally 

should explain the weight given to opinions from [] ‘other sources,’ or otherwise ensure 

that the discussion of the evidence in the . . . decision allows a . . . subsequent reviewer 

to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning . . . .”). Indeed, the ALJ correctly summarized Dr. 

Sherman’s consultative examination findings (Tr. 18 (“In November 2011, she 

underwent a consultative examination performed by Dr. Sherman. She complained of 

lower back pain, swelling in her legs and feet, and shortness of breath with lots of 

activity. Examination findings indicated the presence of hypertension and obesity. The 

examination revealed she had a full range of motion in all her extremities and her back, 

despite her complaints of pain in her back on full extension and full flexion. Though her 

 4 In addition, her suggestion that Corsentino “linked” his limitations to all 

of the severe impairments found by the ALJ is simply inaccurate. Indeed, the PCE form 

completed by Corsentino makes clear that the source of all limitations noted consisted 

of plaintiff’s “antalgic gait” and “difficulty with lumbar movement[]” (Tr. 251), that is, 

difficulties solely related to plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine.

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 12 of 16
13

back had lost some of its lordotic curve due to her obesity, it was devoid of spasm or 

deformity. The other examination findings were all essentially normal, including gait, 

station, ability to squat without difficulty, ability to heel-to-toe walk, motor skills, 

negative atrophy, seated leg raise results, and intact gross and fine manipulation.” 

(internal citations omitted)); compare id. with Tr. 219 (“EXT: There was no cyanosis, 

clubbing, or edema currently. There were no obvious varicosities in her legs or feet. She 

had full ROM in all of her extremities. BACK: There was no spasm or deformity. She 

does have some loss of the lordotic curve. This is also probably due to her weight. She 

had full ROM in her back, but complained with full extension and full flexion. 

LOCOMOTOR: She has a widened but normal gait. Normal station. She was able to 

squat without difficulty. Heel toe walk was normal. NEUROLOGICAL: She has good 

motor strength, 5/5. Sensory was normal. Reflexes were 3/4, grips were 5/5. Romberg 

was negative. Seated leg raise was negative. Atrophy was negative. Manipulation fine 

and gross was intact.”)), as well as the treatment records from Victory Health Center 

(Tr. 18-19 (“In December 2011, she presented [to Victory Health Center] with complaints 

of high blood pressure, and treatment notes indicated she was not regularly checking 

her blood pressure, had no regular exercise program, and had no diet. An examination 

revealed hypertension and obesity, but otherwise normal results, and the claimant was 

diagnosed with hypertension, pedal edema, and morbid obesity. In January 2012, the 

claimant presented for follow-up treatment and the examination revealed obesity and 

high normal blood pressure but otherwise produced essentially normal findings. The 

claimant was diagnosed with morbid obesity, multiple joint pains, and hypertension. In 

February 2012, she presented with complaints of swelling, shortness of breath, and 

hypertension. An examination produced findings of obesity and hypertension, but was 

otherwise normal. She was diagnosed with hypertension, constipation, and morbid 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 13 of 16
14

obesity. A March 2012 follow-up examination was accompanied by complaints of some 

numbness and pain; an examination again produced findings of obesity and 

hypertension, but was normal otherwise, and the claimant was diagnosed with 

hypertension. In July 2012, the claimant complained of tingling in her hands, and an 

examination produced findings of obesity and hypertension, but was relatively normal 

otherwise. The claimant was diagnosed with morbid obesity, hypertension, and carpal 

tunnel syndrome. A December 2012 treatment found the claimant complaining that her 

right arm was stiff and her knee was ‘locking up.’ An examination revealed obesity, 

hypertension, degenerative changes in her left knee, and bilateral crepitus in her knees, 

but it was essentially normal for other systems. She was diagnosed with degenerative 

joint disease of her ‘knees,’ neuropathy, hypertension, and morbid obesity. The notes 

indicate that Lyrica was not ordered for her neuropathy. In February 2013, the claimant 

complained of chronic low back pain. An examination revealed obesity, hypertension, 

degenerative changes in the claimant’s lumbar spine due to her obesity, and only mild 

degenerative changes in the claimant[‘s] cervical spine. Other systems were normal. The 

claimant was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease of her lumbar spine, 

hypertension, morbid obesity, and neuropathy.”); compare id. with Tr. 230-246 & 252-255 

(Dr. Lightfoot’s treatment notes from Victory Health Center reflect not only the items 

noted by the ALJ but, as well, consistently reflect that plaintiff consistently was alert 

and in no acute distress on physical examination and that the family practitioner 

consistently counseled Currington to diet, exercise, lose weight, and comply with all 

medications)). The foregoing evidence produced by two examining physicians, along 

with plaintiff’s testimony regarding her daily activities (Tr. 35-36 (plaintiff’s testimony 

that she cares for her son, fixes him hotdogs or other simple meals, washes dishes, puts 

the clothes in the “laundry,” and does a “little” dusting)), stands in stark contrast—as 

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 14 of 16
15

the ALJ notes (Tr. 20)—to the severe limitations found by a chiropractor on two forms

completed on March 5, 2013 (see Tr. 250-251), forms that “stand alone” without any 

treatment records from the chiropractor supporting the limitations set forth on those 

forms (see Administrative Transcript).5 In light of this infirmity, “the court is unable to 

assess whether the chiropractor’s [findings/limitations] are reliably supported by his 

own treatment records.” Tankersley v. Colvin, 2014 WL 5092219, *5 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 

2014); compare id. with, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (in considering opinion evidence 

from an “other” source, one key factor is “the degree to which the source presents 

relevant evidence to support the opinion”). Moreover, given the clear indication that the 

CAP and PCE were based solely upon plaintiff’s lower back difficulties (see Tr. 251) and 

Corsentino’s failure to set forth any specific range of motion limitations (see id.), it is as 

impossible for this Court—as it was the ALJ—to find that plaintiff’s degenerative disc 

disease of the lumbar spine would produce the severe limitations set forth by the 

chiropractor.

6 Thus, the ALJ did not err in affording Corsentino’s RFC opinion and 

clinical assessment of pain “little” weight. 

Because substantial evidence of record supports the Commissioner’s 

determination that Currington can perform the physical and mental requirements of a 

reduced range of sedentary work as identified by the ALJ (see Tr. 16-17; compare id. with 

Tr. 35-36, 186-192, 209-210, 212-216, 218-220, 230-243 & 252-257), and plaintiff makes no 

 5 Dr. Sherman’s examination findings are simply not consistent with, nor do they 

support, the limitations set forth by Corsentino (compare Tr. 218-220 with Tr. 250-251), plaintiff’s 

arguments to the contrary notwithstanding (see Doc. 11, at 4).

6 Another factor detracting from Corsentino’s opinions is the fact that the record 

evidence fails to reveal when the chiropractor began treating plaintiff and how often Corsentino 

saw Currington. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) & 416.927(d)(1) (factor relevant to opinion 

evidence from an “other” source is “how long the source has known the claimant and how 

frequently the source has seen the claimant”).

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 15 of 16
16

argument that this residual functional capacity would preclude her performance of the 

sedentary jobs identified by the VE during the administrative hearing (compare Doc. 11 

with Tr. 50-52), the Commissioner’s fifth-step determination is due to be affirmed. See, 

e.g., Owens v. Commissioner of Social Security, 508 Fed.Appx. 881, 883 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 

2013) (“The final step asks whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national 

economy that the claimant can perform, given h[er] RFC, age, education, and work 

experience. The Commissioner bears the burden at step five to show the existence of 

such jobs . . . [and one] avenue[] by which the ALJ may determine [that] a claimant has 

the ability to adjust to other work in the national economy . . . [is] by the use of a 

VE[.]”(internal citations omitted)); Land v. Commissioner of Social Security, 494 Fed.Appx. 

47, 50 (11th Cir. Oct. 26, 2012) (“At step five . . . ‘the burden shifts to the Commissioner 

to show the existence of other jobs in the national economy which, given the claimant’s 

impairments, the claimant can perform.’ The ALJ may rely solely on the testimony of a 

VE to meet this burden.” (internal citations omitted)).

CONCLUSION

It is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying 

plaintiff benefits be affirmed.

DONE and ORDERED this the 10th day of February, 2015.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00306-C Document 21 Filed 02/10/15 Page 16 of 16