Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07249/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 1995 Decided June 20, 1995

No. 93-7249

UDC CHAIRS CHAPTER, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cv0141)

Douglas B. Huron argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.

David A. Splitt argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Robin C. Alexander.

Before WALD, SILBERMAN, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Facing a serious financial crisis, the University of the District of

Columbia, an independent agency of the D.C. government, implemented a number of cost-saving

measures, including a plan to scale back its 1992 summer school program by not extending summer

contractsto its department chairpersons. Protesting this sharp departure from a decade-long practice

of issuing such contracts, thirty-three of the department chairs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1988). They claimed that the University had deprived them of a constitutionally-protected property

right without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment and had breached their

contractual rights as employees of the government of the District of Columbia. The district court

granted summaryjudgment to theUniversitywith respect to the chairpersons'FifthAmendment claim

and dismissed their common law contract claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We

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affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. Even if the chairpersons had a

constitutionally-protected property interest in summer employmentan issue that we do not

addresswe hold that the University's grievance procedures, which the chairpersons did not pursue,

would have accorded them all the process that they were due. We also affirm the district court's

dismissal of the chairpersons' common law claim and decline to addresstheir constitutionalContract

Clause claim because they did not raise it in the district court.

I.

The University'sfifty departments are headed bychairpersons chosen fromamong the regular

faculty by the deans of the relevant colleges. Chairpersons perform administrative and supervisory

duties, in addition to teaching. Like regular faculty members, chairpersons are employed by the

University pursuant to nine-month "academic year" contracts. Until the summer of 1992, the

University also offered chairpersons additional contracts covering the eight-week summer term with

compensation set at twenty-two percent of their academic year faculty salaries.

In the autumn of 1991, the University began to address budget shortfalls that it anticipated

would result from reduced government funding and depletion of its cash reserves. Dr. Tilden

LeMelle, President ofthe University, proposed a wide range ofinitiatives designed to lower operating

costs, such as hiring freezes, pay cuts and program restructuring. One of his recommendations led

to a decision not to issue contracts to department chairpersons for the 1992 summer term.

On April 28, 1992, Acting Provost and Vice-President for Academic Affairs Marcellina

Brooksformally announced the summer contract decision to the deans and instructed them to inform

their respective chairpersons. Two weeks later, on May 14, she sent a written memorandum directly

to the chairpersons, advising them that: "In the interest of expanding the course offerings during this

time of fiscal limitations, the University will not employ department chairpersons this summer. You

will resume your duties as chairperson effective August 16, 1992." Memorandum from Marcellina

Brooks, Acting Provost and Vice-President for Academic Affairs, to Department Chairpersons(May

14, 1992), in Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 216. This decision became effective at the beginning of the

summer term, a few days after the academic year ended on May 15.

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Surprised by this change in the University's practice of issuing summer contracts, the

chairpersons complained to their respective deans. The deans uniformly disclaimed any ability to alter

the administration's decision. On behalf of a group of chairpersons, one chairperson wrote to

President LeMelle requesting that he "direct[ ] immediate issuance of chairpersons' summer

employment contracts" or "notifyme ... ofthe appropriate proceduresfor bringing a formal grievance

against the University on behalf of the departmental chairpersons." Letter from Dr. Wilmer L.

Johnson to Dr. Tilden J. LeMelle 2 (June 9, 1992), in J.A. at 66. Although the President's response

said that he had forwarded the letter to the University's General Counsel, Letter from Dr. Tilden J.

LeMelle to Dr. Wilmer L. Johnson (July 7, 1992), in J.A. at 68, the chairpersons did not receive a

formal response from the General Counsel's office. Nor did the chairpersons initiate a formal

grievance.

In January of the following year, thirty-three ofthe department chairpersons brought thissuit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Board of Trustees of the University, President LeMelle and

Acting Provost Brooks, alleging that theyhad been deprived ofsummer employment in 1992 without

due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)

(applying Fifth, rather than Fourteenth, Amendment to District of Columbia). Apart from a general

claim for notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, the chairpersons did not specify the process they

sought. They moved for partial summary judgment on liability, reserving the issue of damages for

a jury. The University cross-motioned for a complete disposition of the case through summary

judgment.

The district court rejected the chairpersons' claimthat a propertyright to summer employment

arose from the D.C. Municipal Regulations, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 8 (1988), or from the University's

practice of issuing summer contracts to department chairs. In the absence of a "mutually explicit

understanding," Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972), or "a legitimate claim of

entitlement," Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), the district court held that the

chairpersons had no constitutionally-protected property interest and granted summary judgment in

favor of the University on the chairs' Fifth Amendment due process claim. The chairpersons also

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raised a common law contract claim that the district court dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. The chairpersons appeal both decisions of the district court, adding a third

claim that the University violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution.

II.

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Propert v. District

of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1991). We must decide whether a "genuine issue as

to anymaterialfact" exists and, if not, whether "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We give the party against whom summary judgment was granted "the

benefit of allreasonable evidentiary inferencesthat can be drawn in hisfavor." Abourezk v. NewYork

Airlines, Inc., 895 F.2d 1456, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internalquotationmarks and citations omitted).

And of significance for this case, we may determine whether summary judgment should be granted

on different grounds than those upon which the district court relied. See Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d

1316, 1322 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 337 (1993).

In order to assess whether the government has violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process

Clause, we engage in a "familiar two-part inquiry": we must determine whether the plaintiffs were

deprived of a protected interest, and, ifso, whether they received the processthey were due. Logan

v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); see also Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc. v.

United States, 982 F.2d 594, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The district court granted summary judgment

for the University after deciding that the chairs had no constitutionally-protected property interest to

compensation for the 1992 summer term. We find it unnecessary to decide that issue because, even

assuming that a property interest existed, we conclude that the chairpersons would have received

adequate due process under the University grievance procedures had they used them.

In response to the question "what process is due," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481

(1972), the Supreme Court has established a "general rule that individuals must receive notice and

an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property." United States v.

James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 499 (1993); see also Cleveland Board of

Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("essential principle" of Due Process Clause is

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prior notice and hearing). Due process, while "flexible" and determined by the particular

circumstances of each situation, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 481, requires, at a minimum, an

"opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The chairs claim that the notice they received was insufficient, but they do not support this

assertion, nor could they: the department chairpersons received written notice of the administration's

decision from Acting Provost Brooks on May 14. Brooks' memorandum clearly satisfies the due

process requirement that notice be "reasonably calculated to reach interested parties." Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950); see also Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546

(due process entitlestenured public employee to "oral or written notice of the charges against him");

Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting "usual requirement

of written notice"). Assured that the University gave adequate notice of its decision, we focus on

whether it provided the chairs with an opportunity to be heard that would satisfy the minimal

requirements of due process. We thus turn to an analysis of the University's grievance procedures.

The University's grievance procedures, adopted in compliance with D.C. Code Ann. § 1-

617.2(a) (1992) and set forth in D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 8, ch. 16 (1988), offer employees an

opportunity to challenge a decision or policy of the University. A "grievance" encompasses

complaints alleging a "violation ... of University rules or applicable law" or "[a] failure to act pursuant

to the policies and practices of the University...." Id. at § 1600.3. Upon lodging a formal written

grievance, a grievant has the opportunity to engage in "informal discussions" with an immediate

supervisor, id. at § 1603.2, who in turn grantsthe reliefsought or refersthe matter, within five days,

to the next level supervisor, id. at § 1603.3. If, as would have been the case here, the second level

supervisor is a vice-president, the grievant can request review by an impartial panel. Id. at § 1605.2.

The regulationsrequire the impartial panel to conduct an independent inquiry, id. at § 1606.1,

which may include gathering documentary evidence, conducting personal interviews, calling a group

meeting, holding an informal hearing or any combination thereof, id. at § 1606.2. If the panel holds

a hearing, it must seek "to bring out pertinent facts regarding the grievance raised," id. at § 1607.2,

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and the grievant has a right to present witnesses, id. at § 1608.1. After the panel has conducted its

inquiry, it must afford the grievant an opportunity to review the investigative file and to respond. Id.

at § 1606.3. The panel then reports its findings and recommendations to the appropriate

vice-president and the grievant. Id. While the regulations provide no time limit for the panel's

proceedings, they do require the vice-president to make a decision within fifteen days of receipt of

the panel's recommendations. Id. at § 1609.1. In most cases, including this one, the grievant has a

right to appeal to the D.C. Office of Employee Appeals, id. at § 1609.5; see also D.C. Code Ann.

§ 1-617.3(b) (1992), and any subsequent decision by the Office of Employee Appeals may be

appealed to the Superior Court ofthe District ofColumbia,see D.C. Code Ann. § 1-606.3(d) (1992).

We are satisfied that these procedures incorporate the basic element of due process: the

opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker. See Propert, 948 F.2d at 1333; see also Logan

v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 433 ("Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the

opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly adjudged."). A grievant may "present his

side of the story," Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, at several stages of the process, including before an

impartial panel, and may appeal the University's decision to the D.C. Office ofEmployee Appeals and

then to the Superior Court. The issue before us in this case is whether the grievance procedures offer

this opportunity to be heard at a "meaningful time." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

The chairpersons argue that the procedures could not have provided them with a hearing

before the deprivation occurred, contending that a "pre-deprivation" hearing is required by the Due

Process Clause. We, of course, cannot know for certain whether the University's procedures could

have afforded review by an impartial panel before the summer term began since the chairpersons

never took advantage of them. As we understand the record, however, a hearing prior to the

beginning of the summer term was at least possible. Had the chairpersons filed a formal written

grievance immediately after their deans informed them of the administration's decision, they could

have requested review by an impartial panel within five days. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 8, § 1603.3.

Although the regulations do not establish any binding deadlines for an investigative panel, it is

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possible that a panel would have moved quickly in light of the impending opening of the summer

term.

The outcome of this case, however, does not turn on whether the University's procedures

could have provided a hearing prior to the beginning ofthe summer term, for we conclude that, under

these circumstances, due process does not require one. Nothing in Propert v. District of Columbia,

948 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991), upon which the chairs principally rely to support their contention

that a pre-deprivation hearing is required, is to the contrary. There we held that the District of

Columbia's procedures for destroying a registered vehicle identified as "junk" failed to satisfy the

minimum requirements of due process, not because a pre- deprivation hearing was not held, but

because the District provided no hearing procedure at all. Id. at 1333.

While a pre-deprivation hearing is certainly the preferred manner of satisfying due process,

the Supreme Court has made clear that a post-deprivation opportunity to be heard is sufficient in

"extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing

the hearing until after the event." James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 436 (noting that

post-deprivation process may be sufficient when state must necessarily act quickly or it isimpractical

to provide pre-deprivation process). Determining whether a post-deprivation hearing would satisfy

the minimalrequirements of due processinvolves "an examination ofthe competing interests atstake,

along with the promptness and adequacy of later proceedings." James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at

501. As directed by the Supreme Court in James Daniel Good, we balance the three factorsset forth

in Mathews v. Eldridge: the private interest affected; the risk of erroneous deprivation of that

interest and the likely value of additional safeguards; and the Government's interest. See id. (citing

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335); see also Board of Governors v. DLG Financial Corp., 29

F.3d 993, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 1085 (1995).

We begin with "the private interest that will be affected" by the University's decision.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. This case is not like Cleveland Board of Education v.

Loudermill, where the employer fired the plaintiff under what later employers might consider

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"questionable circumstances." 470 U.S. at 543. Here, the chairpersons kept both their faculty jobs

and chair positions, losing onlythe benefits of an eight-week summer contract. The University plainly

expected the chairsto resume their dutiesin August, thusremoving any suggestion that it considered

the chairpersons individually incompetent or inadequate. The chairs suffered no stigma, diminished

reputations or barriers to future employment as a result of the University's decision not to employ

themfor the summer. Their interest boils down to one thing: receiving compensation for the summer

term. While we do not underestimate their interest in summer paychecks, the loss is a purely financial

one that is completely compensable by a post-deprivation decision favorable to the chairpersons. Cf.

Royster v. Board of Trustees of Anderson City School, 774 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding

that no deprivation of property interest occurred when school superintendent was terminated with

full pay and benefits through end of contract), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986).

We next consider "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the

procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,"

the second of the three Mathews factors. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. In this context,

where the question before usisthe adequacy of a post-termination hearing, we understand thisfactor

to require us to ask whether "the risk of an erroneous deprivation" would be reduced if the entire

grievance procedures, including the opportunity for review by an impartial panel, were completed

prior to the beginning of the summer term. Unlike cases involving the termination of welfare

payments, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Social Security disability benefits, Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319, utility services, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S.

1 (1978), or dismissalfor cause, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 532, where the Supreme Court has held that

the presence of individual characteristics makes pre-deprivation hearings particularly important, the

individual characteristics, qualifications or reputations ofthe chairpersons are not at issue in this case.

The decision not to offer summer contracts was precipitated by the president's determination, made

only after months of analysisregarding budget shortfalls and potential cost-saving measures, that the

University faced a serious financial crisis. Where, as here, the deprivation turns on a policy decision

and not on an individual's characteristics, a pre-deprivation hearing would do little to reduce the risk

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of erroneous deprivation of the chairpersons' interests. See, e.g., Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360,

366 (7th Cir. 1983); see id. at 368 (Flaum, J., concurring) ("risk of government error and the value

of pre-deprivation hearing in reducing that risk" is "insubstantial" when decision not to grant

compensatory time off is based on staffing shortages and individualized determinations of fact or law

are not necessary).

With respect to the final Mathews factorthe government's interest, "including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335the University describes its

interest in the starkest of terms: it sought to address "a severe financial crisis" and to avoid

"insolvency." Appellees' Brief at 8-9. The decision not to hire the chairpersons for the summer term

represented one of many cost-saving measures that the University implemented to preserve its fiscal

stability. The Supreme Court has long recognized the government's interest in remaining solvent, a

concern that usually arises in the context of revenue collection, see, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner,

283 U.S. 589, 595-97 (1931) (no prior judicial hearing required before payment of deficiency

assessment for income taxes as government has need "promptly to secure its revenues"), but that is

equally applicable here. Requiring the University to postpone, in effect to forego, the savings from

elimination of summer contracts could add significantly to its financial crisis.

Weighing the Mathews factors, we find that, under the circumstances of this case, the

grievance procedures would have satisfied due process even if they could not have been completed

until after the beginning of the summer program. The chairpersons' private interest was strictly

monetary, of limited duration, without personal stigma and fully compensable through a

post-deprivation financial award in their favor; pre-deprivation hearings were not likely to reduce the

risk of an erroneous decision; and finally the government's interest in continuing to provide

educationalservicesto the community while remaining solvent wassubstantial. See Memphis Light,

436 U.S. at 19 ("[W]here the potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indicate a

likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures underlying the decision to act are sufficiently

reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination, government may act without providing

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additional advance proceduralsafeguards." (internalquotationmarks and citation omitted)); see also

Reeve Aleutian Airways, 982 F.2d at 602 (holding that post-deprivationhearing, combined with other

procedural protections, fulfilled minimal due process requirements owed to air carrier who was

temporarily suspended from transporting military personnel). We affirm the district court's grant of

summary judgment for the University.

III.

The district court dismissed the chairpersons' breach of contract claimbecause they had failed

to exhaust their administrative remedies under the District of Columbia Comprehensive Merit

Personnel Act, D.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-601.1 to 1-637.2 (1992), and the University's grievance

procedures, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 8, ch. 16. The chairpersons do not appeal the district court's

determination that their contract claim fell within the statutory definition of "grievance," nor do they

appeal the court's determination that they did not avail themselves of the grievance procedures.

Instead, they argue that pursuing their administrative remedies would have been futile because "the

relevant officials[had] already committed themselvesto a course of action." Appellants' Brief at 29.

Even construing the allegations of the complaint most favorably to the pleader, as we are required

to do when reviewing a dismissalfor lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974), we find nothing in the chairpersons' pleadings to support their claim of futility.

In this circuit, the exhaustion requirement "may be waived only in the most exceptional

circumstances." Communications Workers of America v. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although futility can amount to just such an

exceptional circumstance where "an agency has articulated a very clear position on the issue which

it has demonstrated it would be unwilling to reconsider," we require the "certainty of an adverse

decision" or indications that pursuit of administrative remedies would be "clearly useless."

Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of America v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Communications Workers, 40 F.3d at 432;

Committee of Blind Vendors v. District of Columbia, 28 F.3d 130, 133 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The

mere "probability of administrative denial of the relief requested does not excuse failure to pursue"

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administrative remedies, Randolph-Sheppard, 795 F.2d at 106; rather "[plaintiffs] must show that

it is certain that their claim will be denied." Smith v. Blue Cross &Blue Shield United, 959 F.2d 655,

659 (7th Cir. 1992).

To demonstrate the futility of pursuing a grievance, the chairpersons cull several allegations

from their complaint, including: "The deans said that they were not a party to the decision and could

not do anything about it," Complaint, UDC Chairs Chapter, Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, No.

93cv0141, at ¶ 9 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 1993), in J.A. at 6; a representative of the chairpersons wrote to

President LeMelle requesting that summer contracts be issued to the chairpersons or that the

President notify the chairpersons "of the appropriate procedures for bringing a formal grievance

against the University on behalf of the department chairpersons," but the President's only response

was to forward the letter to the University's General Counsel, id.; and finally the General Counsel

"acknowledged" to two of the plaintiffs that chairs would have to "file suit" if they wanted

compensation for the summer of 1992, id. at ¶ 10, in J.A. at 7. These allegations, which add up to

the proposition that the deans would not, or could not, reconsider the summer contract decision and

that an appeal to the Provost, the person who announced the decision, would be futile, fall short of

demonstrating to us that the University's grievance procedures would have been "clearly useless."

Randolph-Sheppard, 795 F.2d at 105. A mere presumption that the University would not reconsider

its position does not rise to the level of certainty required to invoke the futility exception. See, e.g.,

Communications Workers, 40 F.3d at 433 ("Even if one were to concede that an unfavorable decision

... was highly likely, that does notsatisfyourstrict futility standard requiring a certainty of an adverse

decision."). This is particularly true where, as here, the chairpersons could appeal the Provost's

decision to an impartial entity, the D.C. Office of Employee Appeals. See D.C. Mun. Regs., tit. 8,

§ 1609.5; see also D.C. Code Ann. § 1-617.3(b). Finding no basis for concluding that resort to the

grievance procedures would have been futile, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the chairs'

common law contract claim.

Finally, we decline to consider the chairpersons' claim of a Contract Clause violation. U.S.

Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. They raised it for the first time on appeal, and this court has consistently

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declined to decide claims not raised in the district court. See, e.g., Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d

156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

So ordered.

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