Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05849/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05849-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

T. J. WHEELER, )

)

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

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D. RUNNELS, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

 )

CV F 03 5849 WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 

ORDER RE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a jury trial in Tulare County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of first

degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and discharge of a firearm at an inhabited

dwelling. Penal Code Sections 664/192(a), 246. The jury found that Petitioner had personally

used a firearm in commission of all of the offenses, Penal Code Sections 12022.5(a), 12023.5(c),

(d), and found that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury in the manslaughter attempt,

Penal Code Section 12022.7(a). Petitioner was committed to state prison for consecutive life

terms.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

(“Court of Appeal”). The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified as to the sentence

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only in case number F038303. Petitioner filed a petition for review, which the California

Supreme Court denied on April 23, 2003.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The court finds the Court of Appeal correctly summarized the facts in its February 5,

2003 opinion. Thus, the court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the Court of Appeal.

DISCUSSION

 JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his

rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged

arises out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9

th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed on Jun 16, 2003, after the enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is governed by its

provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

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respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003)

(disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.

2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue

the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at

1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id.

(citations omitted). 

When the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this court "looks

through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal,

the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look

through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms

latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000)

(holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state

court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal

law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

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findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

Admission of Hearsay

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in admitting a hearsay statement by his wife,

Gracie Wheeler, that two weeks before the homicide in this case she told Petitioner she recently

had a “one-night stand” with the homicide victim. The court found the statement relevant as

evidence of a motive to harm the victim, and admitted the statement under Evidence Code

section 1230, the exception to hearsay for any “admission against social interest.” 

The Court of Appeal’s opinion is the last reasoned state court opinion on this issue. In

rejecting the claim, the Court of Appeal reviewed the background of the social interest exception

to the hearsay rule, relevant California case law, and the standard of review to be applied. The

court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in concluding that the statement at

issue fell within the stated exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Evidence Code Section 1200.

A federal court has no basis for disputing a state’s interpretation of its own law. Clemons v.

Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 739-40 (1990).

The Court of Appeal also addressed Petitioner’s contention that admission of Gracie’s

statement violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The

Court of Appeal found Gracie’s statement sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the confrontation

clause, whether the matter was reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard or under de novo

review. In so doing, the court reviewed the common law roots of the exception to the hearsay

rule for declarations against interest, and found that under the particular facts of the case, Gracie

had no apparent reason to lie. See People v. Cudjo, 6 Cal.4th 585, 607 (1993) (in analyzing

whether a statement passes the threshold of trustworthiness, a trial court may take into

considering the circumstances under which the statement was uttered, including the possible

motive of the declarant and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant).

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Although Petitioner argues that California’s exception to hearsay for any “admission

against social interest” does not adequately reflect contemporary values and that Gracie’s

statement was not trustworthy enough to be admitted, Petitioner’s arguments are mainly policy

arguments. Such policy arguments are not properly the subject of a federal habeas corpus

petition. Rather, as set forth above, the burden is on Petitioner to show that the adjudication of

the claim in the Court of Appeal “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court finds that Petitioner has not met that burden. Accordingly, the

court must conclude that this contention does not provide a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Jury Misconduct

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in not conducting a more thorough inquiry

into alleged jury misconduct, which resulted in the violation of Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury and due process. The Court of Appeal was

the last court to issue a reasoned opinion on this issue, and explained in part as follows:

During deliberations, Wheeler’s father approached a juror and asked, “‘Excuse

me, do you know how long you’re going to take?’” The juror “ignored him completely”

and returned immediately to the jury room, where she told three other jurors who were

already there “just that the gentleman got up and asked [her] a question.” The court

asked, “You mentioned that somebody had approached you?” “Right, that’s all,” she

replied. “Nothing,” she added. The court asked, “Do you have any idea who the

gentleman is?” “I don’t know,” she replied. The court inquired, “Do you think there’s

anything about what’s happened that would affect your ability to be a fair juror?” “No,”

she replied.

Out of the juror’s presence, the court stated to counsel, “We can do a whole big

thing here. I don’t want to. Doesn’t sound like it was a big thing to the other jurors.” 

The court suggested in an instruction that the juror simply not talk about the gentleman 

who approached her and just concentrate on her job as a juror. The court asked if counsel

had any input. Wheeler’s counsel answered, “No, other than we may want to have the

hallway cleared.” The prosecutor was silent. The court ordered the bailiff to monitor the

hallways.

The court brought the juror back and instructed her “to go back in and just begin

deliberating as though nothing had happened” and not to “mention anything more to

anybody about what happened or even speculate about it.” The juror answered, “That

sounds fine.” After she returned to the jury room, the court ordered Wheeler’s father out

of the courthouse for the duration of the trial. The court asked if counsel wanted to put

anything on the record. Both counsel answered, “No.”

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Opinion in Case no. F038303, 9 - 10.

The Court of Appeal found that under California law, Petitioner had forfeited his right to

raise his contention regarding juror misconduct by not requesting additional inquiry at trial. In

doing so, it rejected Petitioner’s argument that any objection he made at trial would have been

futile. On habeas corpus review, a federal court must respect a state court’s application of its

own law and must not engage in de novo review Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). 

The Court of Appeal stated that although Petitioner’s failure to raise a contemporaneous

objection eliminated the possibility of appellate review, it would analyze the merits of Wheeler’s

argument to preclude an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel is based on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,

which exists “in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 684, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). A claim for ineffective assistance

must meet the two-part test advanced by the Strickland court. First, petitioner must show that

counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, [petitioner] must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687.

In the present case, the Court of Appeal first found that by completely ignoring

Wheeler’s father, the juror complied with both the letter and spirit of the jury instruction telling

jurors not to discuss anything about the case with anyone during recesses. Second, the Court of

Appeal found that nothing in the record indicated any violation of the instruction that the jurors

were to “determine the facts from the evidence received at trial and not from any other source”

or the instruction not to “converse among yourselves or with anyone else on any subject

connected with the trial” except when all 12 jurors were present in the jury room. The Court of

Appeal concluded that the juror’s comment neither adversely affected the jury’s impartiality nor

lightened the prosecutor’s burden of proof nor contradicted any asserted defense. Thus, the

Court of Appeal further concluded that the court’s failure to conduct additional inquiry into

possible juror misconduct did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights to a fair trial, an

impartial jury, or due process.

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Petitioner acknowledges the Court of Appeal’s finding that he had forfeited this issue for

purposes of appeal, but argues that by stating that it did not want to conduct further inquiry after

questioning Juror no. 11, the trial court foreclosed any request by counsel to question the three

other jurors to whom Juror no. 11 spoke. He argues that he therefore did not waive the right to

challenge the court’s action. This court finds that argument to be meritless, as the trial court

expressly asked counsel for “input” regarding how the matter should be handled. Thus, the trial

court did not foreclose the possibility of questioning the other three jurors.

Although Petitioner argues that what occurred in his case amounts to jury misconduct

which raises the presumption of prejudice, the Court of Appeal found the juror’s comment

“neither adversely affected the jury’s impartiality nor lightened the prosecutor’s burden of proof

nor contradicted any asserted defense.” Nothing in Petitioner’s arguments demonstrate that this

finding was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Similarly, although Petitioner argues that

violation of federal constitutional rights mandates reversal absent a finding of harmless error,

Petitioner has not established a violation of federal constitutional rights in this case. 

Accordingly, the court finds that this contention presents no basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Presentence Custody Credits

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeal erroneously concluded that presentence

custody credits are statutorily precluded for non-homicide crimes when the defendant is

ultimately convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal reached this conclusion based on its

analysis of Penal Code Section 2933.2. A federal court has no basis for disputing a state’s

interpretation of its own law. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 739-40 (1990). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that the Court of Appeal misinterpreted a California statute

presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this petition for writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to

close this case.IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: March 28, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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