Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05280/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 17, 2000 Decided July 14, 2000

No. 99-5280

Steven D.C. Bigelow,

Appellant

v.

Department of Defense,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv00535)

Eugene R. Fidell argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was David P. Sheldon.

W. Mark Nebeker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

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Before: Ginsburg, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: Steven D.C. Bigelow, while a

major in the United States Air Force, worked in the Information Warfare and Special Technical Operations Center, a part

of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

The chief of that section and Major Bigelow's immediate

supervisor, United States Army Colonel Nathan W. Noyes,

learned of allegations of misconduct concerning Bigelow, perhaps the most serious of which was that he sometimes

disappeared in foreign countries near sensitive international

borders. Major Bigelow's position demanded that he hold

the highest security classification, above "Top Secret" (the

name of the classification is itself classified). Colonel Noyes's

position, so it is claimed, demanded that he continually assess

the trustworthiness of those under his command. To this

end, and because he thought Bigelow might be lying about his

past, Noyes went to the Joint Staff Security Office and

requested Bigelow's personnel security file. Convinced that

his suspicions had been confirmed, Colonel Noyes referred

the matter to the Air Force for disciplinary action, as a result

of which Major Bigelow was relieved of his duties at the

Pentagon (he is now a Lieutenant Colonel at Bolling Air

Force Base).

Bigelow brought this action under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 552a, seeking damages and other relief against the Department of Defense on the ground that Colonel Noyes unlawfully

reviewed his personnel security file in violation of the Act.

The district court, Judge Thomas P. Jackson, granted the

government's motion for summary judgment and declared

moot Bigelow's motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeal comes down to the question whether Colonel

Noyes, as an officer of the agency maintaining the file, had "a

need for the [Bigelow's] record in the performance of [his]

duties." 5 U.S.C. s 552a(b)(1). Among other things the

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Privacy Act generally prohibits government agencies from

disclosing personnel files. To this general prohibition there

are several exceptions, one of which is the "need-to-know"

provision of s 552a(b)(1). The Defense Department assures

us, through a brief filed on its behalf by the United States

Attorney, and through a sworn declaration of Colonel Noyes,

that Noyes's duties entailed examining Bigelow's personnel

security file because Bigelow was under his supervision. We

believe the Department's regulations support this position.

At the Pentagon, "personnel security investigative reports"

may be revealed only to "those designated DoD officials who

require access in connection with specifically assigned personnel duties, or other activities specifically identified under the

provisions of s 154.65." 32 C.F.R. s 154.67. The activities

mentioned in s 154.65 include "determining eligibility of DoD

military and civilian personnel ... [for] assignment or retention in sensitive duties." 32 C.F.R. s 154.65. Major Bigelow

had "access to the Nation's most sensitive secrets." Amended Complaint p 45. Did Colonel Noyes have a continuing

duty to determine whether Major Bigelow should be retained

in his sensitive duties on the Joint Chiefs of Staff? According

to s 154.60(a) of the regulations, the answer is yes. An

"individual's trustworthiness is a matter of continuing assessment," and the "responsibility for such assessment must be

shared by the organizational commander or manager, [and]

the individual's supervisor...." 32 C.F.R. s 154.60(a).

Bigelow and our dissenting colleague read s 154.60(a) differently than does the Defense Department. Judge Tatel

asserts that despite the unconditional wording of s 154.60(a),

military supervisors do not have an official need to examine

personnel files in assessing the trustworthiness of any individual under their command. Why not? Because only commanders and security officers have access to personnel security files, which of course begs the question. Bigelow, at least,

is willing to concede that a supervisor is responsible for

assuring the trustworthiness of those under him. The question is how the supervisor may go about this. Bigelow says

that the various ways of fulfilling the supervisor's duty are

spelled out in s 154.60(c). Searching personnel files for

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derogatory information is not listed. We think his line of

reasoning misses the point of the need-to-know exemption in

the Privacy Act. Section 552a(b)(1) does not require an

agency to list those of its officers eligible to look at protected

records, nor does it demand that an agency official be specifically assigned to examining records. What must be determined--and what Judge Tatel does not confront--is whether

the official examined the record in connection with the performance of duties assigned to him and whether he had to do so

in order to perform those duties properly. See Pippinger v.

Rubin, 129 F.3d 519, 529-30 (10th Cir. 1997); Hernandez v.

Alexander, 671 F.2d 402, 410 (10th Cir. 1982). Colonel Noyes

reviewed Major Bigelow's file in connection with his continuing duty to make sure that the major was worthy of trust;

and he had a need to examine the file in view of the doubts

that had been raised in his mind about Bigelow and Bigelow's

access to the country's top secrets. See Britt v. Naval

Investigative Service, 886 F.2d 544, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989)

(dictum). Given these circumstances it is an overstatement to

suppose, as our dissenting colleague does, that our decision

"has dramatically expanded the number of people" within the

military who may examine personnel files. Dissenting op. at

6. There may be many people in the military who have

access to the nation's most important secrets, but we doubt

that their supervisors regularly receive information casting

doubt on their trustworthiness.

Bigelow points to s 154.55, which gives commanders, upon

the receipt of certain kinds of "derogatory information" about

an individual, the power to take actions including temporarily

suspending the individual's access to classified materials in

the interest of national security. 32 C.F.R. s 154.55(c). Although Colonel Noyes was the "Chief" of his unit, all agree

that he was not a commander within the regulation's intent.

Still, we cannot see how this regulation helps Bigelow's case.

From all that appears, s 154.55, together with its procedural

counterpart (32 C.F.R. s 154.56), simply spells out in detail

the formal administrative adjudicatory scheme for revoking

or suspending security clearances. The regulation nowhere

mentions who shall have access to personnel security records;

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that is the subject of s 154.65 and s 154.67, which we have

already cited. It does not relieve supervisors of their duty,

spelled out in s 154.60(a), to assess continually the reliability

and loyalty of those working under them. While s 154.55(b)

does require the reporting of "derogatory information" to the

commander forthwith, it contemplates that such information

will first be "developed" or will become "available." 32

C.F.R. s 154.55(b). Here Colonel Noyes developed such

information and when he reported it to the Air Force, as he

attests in his affidavit, he presumably acted in accordance

with s 154.55(b).

If we were somewhat less sure of our reading of the

Defense Department's regulations, the interpretation advanced in the Department's brief would still carry the day.

Although the Supreme Court held in Christensen v. Harris

County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2000), that agency interpretations of statutes must derive from some formal agency

action before judicial deference is due, the Court treated

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997), as still good law

despite the fact that the agency's interpretation--there of a

regulation--appeared only in a legal brief. Auer does not

require an agency to demonstrate affirmatively that its interpretation represents its fair and considered judgment. See id.

Nor must an agency's litigating position represent some

"longstanding agency practice." Dissenting op. at 5, 6 (quoting Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v. FMSHRC, 212 F.3d 1301, ----,

2000 WL 639933, at *3 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 2000)). Auer held

that so long as there is no basis to suspect that the agency's

position represents anything less than its considered opinion,

deference is appropriate. Auer put the matter in these

terms: the Court had "no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment." 519 U.S. at 462. Like the Auer Court, we have no

reason to suppose that the interpretation of the regulations

set forth by government counsel represents anything other

than his client's position. And we have been pointed to no

past practices or pronouncements that are inconsistent with

the Defense Department's current interpretation. Compare

Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 212 F.3d at ----, 2000 WL 639933, at

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*3 (finding deference unwarranted given "the flip-flops [in]

the Secretary's position.... [and] litigation counsel's simultaneous advocacy of several different positions"). The Department's interpretation of the regulations is therefore entitled

to weight.

Because we are unpersuaded that discovery would have

reaped anything pertinent to resolving these issues, we will

not upset the district court's discretionary decision to refuse

to grant Major Bigelow's Rule 56(f) motion before acting on

the motion for summary judgment. See White v. Fraternal

Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Affirmed.

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Tatel, Circuit Judge, dissenting: To maintain national

security, Department of Defense employees whose official

duties require access to classified information undergo extensive, very personal background investigations. The regulatory scheme at issue in this case protects the sensitive information collected during those investigations and maintained in

personnel security files--information about political associations, criminal or dishonest conduct, mental illness, family

relationships, financial circumstances, drug and alcohol use,

sexual behavior, etc. See 32 C.F.R. s 154.7 & Pt. 154, App.

H. Relying on the government's appellate brief in this case,

which in turn relies solely on a declaration of the non-policymaking employee whose behavior is the target of this suit,

this court interprets the regulations to give access to personnel files not just to officials specified in the regulation, but to

any supervisor anywhere in the Department who doubts an

employee's loyalty. Because there is more than ample "reason to suspect" that this counterintuitive interpretation of the

regulation represents a convenient litigating position rather

than the "fair and considered judgment" of the Secretary of

Defense or any other official with policy-making responsibility, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997), Supreme Court

and circuit precedent preclude us from deferring to it. See,

e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 213

(1988); Akzo Nobel Salt v. FMSHRC, 212 F.3d 1301, No.

99-1370, 2000 WL 639933 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The Privacy Act prevents non-consensual release of personnel records except "to those officers and employees of the

agency which maintains the record who have a need for the

record in the performance of their duties." 5 U.S.C.

s 552a(b)(1). Reinforcing this protection, Defense Department regulations provide:

In recognition of the sensitivity of personnel security

reports and records, particularly with regard to individual privacy, it is Department of Defense policy that such

personal information be handled with the highest degree

of discretion. Access to such information shall be afforded only for the purposes cited herein and only to persons

whose official duties require such information.

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32 C.F.R. s 154.65. To protect the privacy of personnel

security files, the regulation requires them to be stored only

in approved locked cabinets, vaults, or safes; transmitted

only in sealed double envelopes bearing a special restricted

access notation; and reproduced only to the minimum extent

necessary. See id. s 154.68. Information contained in these

files may not be made available without the consent of the

subject except to those personnel who have an official need

for the information, and then only for specified limited purposes: "determining eligibility ... for access to classified

information, assignment or retention in sensitive duties, ...

or for law enforcement and counterintelligence investigations." Id. s 154.65. Commanders and security officers who

have "specifically assigned personnel security duties" may

access the files. Id. s 154.67(b). But "[r]ank, position, or

title alone do not authorize access to personal information

about others. An official need for the information must exist

before disclosure." Id. s 310.41(a)(2).

Despite these regulatory safeguards, Colonel Noyes obtained Major Bigelow's file solely on the basis of his status as

Bigelow's supervisor. The government does not contend that

Noyes has any law enforcement, counterintelligence, or other

"specifically assigned personnel security duties." Id.

s 154.67(b). Nor does it claim that Noyes is one of the

specifically enumerated persons empowered to make decisions about Bigelow's security clearance or duty assignment.

See id. Pt. 154, App. E; s 154.47(b); s 154.55(c). Indeed,

the regulations make it quite clear that if Noyes was "aware

of ... significant adverse information" about Bigelow, his

obligation was to forward that information to the Defense

Investigative Service for further investigation. Id.

s 154.60(c)(3). That agency, not Noyes, was responsible for

reviewing the information and determining whether Bigelow's

conduct required further investigation. Id. s 154.9 ("No

other DoD component [other than the Defense Investigative

Service] shall conduct personnel security investigations unless

specifically authorized by the Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy.")

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Citing section 154.60 of the regulations, my colleagues

conclude that Noyes had an "official need" for access to

Bigelow's file because "[a]n 'individual's trustworthiness is a

matter of continuing assessment,' and the 'responsibility for

such assessment must be shared by the organizational commander or manager, [and] the individual's supervisor' "--in

this case, Noyes. Maj. Op. at 3 (quoting 32 C.F.R.

s 154.60(a)). Although I agree with my colleagues that the

regulations impose on supervisors a "shared" duty to assess

the trustworthiness of those they supervise, I do not agree

that this duty gives supervisors a per se "official need"--

indeed duty--to go through security files. The regulations

protect the privacy of personnel security files by providing

access only to certain specified officials (commanders and

security officers) and by requiring that supervisors like

Noyes report their concerns to the Defense Investigative

Service for further investigation. 32 C.F.R. s 154.60(c)(3).

Of course, had the Secretary of Defense, exercising his authority to interpret Department regulations, interpreted

"shared" responsibility to mean that supervisors are "designated DoD officials who require access in connection with

specifically assigned personnel duties" within the meaning of

section 154.67, I would defer to that interpretation. See

Buffalo Crushed Stone v. Surface Transp. Bd., 194 F.3d 125,

128 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Where the meaning of regulatory

language is not free from doubt, we will defer to the agency's

interpretation so long as it sensibly conforms to the purpose

and wording of the regulations.") (internal quotation marks

and alteration omitted). But neither the Secretary nor any

other policy-making official has so interpreted the regulation.

The Supreme Court made clear in Auer that under certain

circumstances we may defer to regulatory interpretations

that appear "only in the context of" litigation. 519 U.S. at

462. But Auer deference has limits. In Bowen, the Supreme

Court held that "[d]eference to what appears to be nothing

more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be

entirely inappropriate." 488 U.S. at 213. The difference

between the two cases is this--the Court deferred to the

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Secretary's interpretation in Auer because, unlike in Bowen,

it was "in no sense a post hoc rationalization advanced by an

agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack,"

but instead "reflect[ed] the agency's fair and considered

judgment on the question." Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Martin v.

OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 156 (1991) ("Our decisions indicate that

agency litigating positions are not entitled to deference when

they are merely appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations

for agency action, advanced for the first time in the reviewing

court.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Akzo Nobel Salt,

212 F.3d at ----, 2000 WL 639933 at *3 ("[C]ourts ... defer

to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations first put

forward in the course of litigation, but only where they

'reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the

matter in question.' ") (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). This

insistence that an agency exercise its "fair and considered

judgment" stems from two concerns: "First, appellate counsel's interpretation may not reflect the views of the agency

itself. Second, it is likely that 'a position established only in

litigation may have been developed hastily, or under special

pressure,' and is not the result of the agency's deliberative

processes." National Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d

1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting FLRA v. United States

Dept. of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

Thus, we may defer to an agency's litigating position if, for

instance, it merely "articulate[s] an explanation of longstanding agency practice," Akzo Nobel Salt, 212 F.3d at ----, 2000

WL 639933 at *3 (citing Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1998)), or if

the Secretary explicitly adopts the position expressed in the

brief, see FLRA, 884 F.2d at 1455, but not where the record

"strongly suggests to us that the Secretary has in fact never

grappled with--and thus never exercised her judgment

over--the conundrum posed by the regulation's clear ambiguity." Akzo Nobel Salt, 212 F.3d at ----, 2000 WL 639933 at

*3.

Bowen, not Auer, controls this case. The record indicates

that the Secretary of Defense has never "grappled with" or

"exercised [his] judgment over ... the conundrum posed by

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[this] regulation's clear ambiguity": whether all supervisors

have a per se duty to review the personnel security files of

employees they supervise. Id. The government's brief cites

only one source in support of its interpretation of the regulation: a declaration prepared for this litigation by Noyes.

Nothing in the record, however, demonstrates that Noyes has

authority to make policy for the Department. See Paralyzed

Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587

(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("A speech of a mid-level official of an agency

... is not the sort of 'fair and considered judgment' that can

be thought of as an authoritative departmental position.")

(quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). Indeed, the statement in

Noyes's declaration cited in the brief--"I had an official need

to know the information in the personnel security file of any

employee under my supervision in order to protect the interests of national security"--does not purport to set agency

policy. It represents only Noyes's view about why he

thought he had authority to search Bigelow's file. Noyes,

moreover, is the alleged wrongdoer in this case, the person

with the greatest incentive to defend his past "action[s]

against attack." Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.

Of course, we could rely on the government's appellate

brief alone if its interpretation of the regulation reflected the

agency's "fair and considered judgment." Auer, 519 U.S. at

462 (deferring to the Secretary of Labor's explicit interpretation of his regulation appearing for the first time in her

amicus brief). But it does not. The brief merely asserts that

"Appellee" has interpreted its regulation to require supervisors to review personnel files, citing only the Noyes declaration. Moreover, the record contains none of the indicators

that would allow us to conclude that a government position

set forth for the first time in an appellate brief reflects an

agency's "fair and considered judgment." The brief does not

say that the Defense Department has a "longstanding agency

practice" of allowing supervisors access to personnel files,

Akzo Nobel Salt, 212 F.3d at ----, 2000 WL 639933 at *3, nor

is there any indication that the Department "in practice ...

has, at least implicitly, followed the same interpretation that

it advances on appeal." National Wildlife Fed'n, 127 F.3d at

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1129. Defense Department lawyers, moreover, neither

signed the brief nor appear of counsel, as agency lawyers

often do in our cases. See FLRA, 884 F.2d at 1455 (deferring

to agency interpretation in brief because "Ms. Horner, the

agency head, has explicitly adopted the view of the amicus

brief. There is no risk that counsel may have acted as

mavericks disembodied from the agency that they represent.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

It misses the point to say that "we have been pointed to no

past practices or pronouncements that are inconsistent with

the Defense Department's current interpretation." Maj. Op.

at 5. The point is that we have good "reason to suspect that

this interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and

considered judgment" (Auer's words) and is nothing more

than the position of the U.S. Attorney and the two AUSAs

who signed the brief. As the Supreme Court observed in a

similar situation where counsel "rationalized the basis of [a

regulation] with great professional competence.... this is

hardly tantamount to an administrative interpretation of [the

relevant statutory provisions].... Congress has delegated to

the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the

responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands." Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628

(1971). And as we said in City of Kansas City, Missouri v.

HUD, 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991), "[i]n whatever

context we defer to agencies, we do so with the understanding

that the object of our deference is the result of agency

decisionmaking, and not some post hoc rationale developed as

part of a litigation strategy."

For these reasons, I believe that the U.S. Attorney's brief

represents a classic example of " 'post hoc rationalization[ ]'

advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action

against attack." Auer, 519 U.S. at 462. By deferring to the

brief, the court has not only dramatically expanded the

number of people with a duty to examine highly sensitive

personnel security files, but attributed to the Secretary an

interpretation of section 154.60 that he cannot change without

notice and comment rulemaking. See Paralyzed Veterans of

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tion an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation

as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the

process of notice and comment rulemaking."). I respectfully

dissent.

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