Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01212/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01212-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH McGOWEN, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

NESTLE FOOD COMPANY, )

)

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:06cv01212 AWI DLB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REMAND 

(Document 12)

On October 6, 2006, Plaintiff Kenneth McGowen (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant motion to

remand this action to the Stanislaus County Superior Court. The motion was heard before the

Honorable Dennis L. Beck, United States Magistrate Judge, on January 12, 2007. Sylvia

Courtney appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Adam Levine appeared on behalf of Defendant Nestle!

USA, Inc. (erroneously sued as Nestle! Food Co., hereinafter “Defendant”). 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his discrimination complaint in the Stanislaus County Superior Court on

August 7, 2006, alleging four causes of action against Defendant, his employer: (1) disability

discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2)

failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to engage in the

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 Plaintiff’s public policy claim is based on the same allegedly discriminatory actions of Defendant that give 1

rise to his FEHA claims. He alleges that such actions are contrary to the public policy of the state of California. 

2

interactive process in violation of FEHA; and (4) wrongful termination in violation of public

policy. 

1

Defendant was served with the summons and complaint on August 8, 2006, and filed a

notice of removal on September 6, 2006. Defendant’s notice of removal is based on Section

301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), which confers federal jurisdiction for

suits alleging violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.

Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand on October 6, 2006, arguing that there is no

need to interpret the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and thus no

preemption. Defendant filed its opposition on December 21, 2006. Plaintiff filed his reply on

January 5, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the complaint, Plaintiff commenced his employment with

Defendant in 1975 and all relevant times, was employed as a first (day) shift Depalletizer

Operator at Defendant’s Modesto Plant. During Plaintiff’s employment, he was a member of

General Teamsters Local #386 (“Union”) and the terms and conditions of his employment were

subject to a CBA. Plaintiff suffers from a physical disability known as Post-Polio syndrome,

which causes limitations in his upper and lower extremities.

On or about February 28, 2005, Defendant informed Plaintiff that his position was being

eliminated. According to Defendant, his position was eliminated so that the first shift, like the

other two shifts, had only one Depalletizer Operator. Plaintiff was reassigned to the position of

Depalletizer Operator on the third (night) shift. Plaintiff alleges that his managers knew that he

was physically unable to perform the position without an accommodation. Plaintiff alleges that

he was forced into early retirement and suffered a significant loss of earnings and diminution in

retirement benefits. 

On February 28, 2005, Plaintiff’s Union filed a grievance alleging that Defendant had not

actually “eliminated” Plaintiff’s job on the first shift within the meaning of the CBA, but had

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

reassigned his duties to less senior employees in violation of the Seniority Provision (Section 17)

and Bid Provisions (Section 18) of the CBA. On May 16, 2005, while the grievance was still

pending, Plaintiff informed Defendant that he could no longer perform the third shift Depalletizer

Operator position because of his disability. He explained that working the third shift interfered

with his sleep patterns, which in turn aggravated his Post-Polio syndrome. Plaintiff requested

that he be returned to his original position on the first shift. Within a few months, the employee

who occupied the first shift Depalletizer Operator position retired and Plaintiff was awarded this

position. Plaintiff, however, did not return to work.

DISCUSSION

A. Preemption Under Section 301

By statute “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the

United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to

the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such

action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Section 301(a) of the LMRA establishes federal jurisdiction for “[s]uits for violation of

contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Federal law

governs suits for breach of a CBA under the LMRA, which therefore completely preempts any

state cause of action for breach thereof. Franchise Tax Bd. Of State of Cal. v. Construction

Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911

F.2d 233, 237 (9th Cir.1990). “Even suits based on torts, rather than on breach of collective

bargaining agreements, are governed by federal law if their evaluation is ‘inextricably

intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.’” Miller v. AT & T Network

Systems, 850 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.

202, 213 (1985)). 

The LMRA does not, however, preempt the application of a state law remedy when the

“factual inquiry [under the state law] does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a

collective bargaining agreement.” Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The issue in Lingle was “whether an employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that provides her with a

2

contractual remedy for discharge without just cause may enforce her state law remedy for retaliatory discharge.” Lingle, 486

U.S. at 401. Reversing the court of appeals’ finding of preemption, the Court noted that the elements constituting retaliatory

discharge under Illinois law pertained to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer. To

defend against a retaliatory discharge claim, an employer must show that it had a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge; this

purely factual inquiry does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at 407.

4

407 (1988). Thus, claims that only “tangentially involv[e]” a provision of a 2

collective-bargaining agreement are not preempted by section 301 . . . Nor are causes of action

which assert “‘nonnegotiable state-law rights . . . independent of any right established by

contract.’” Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., supra, 850 F.2d at 546.

In Miller, 850 F.2d at 548, the court articulated the following analysis for determining

whether claims based on “nonnegotiable” and “independent” state law rights are subject to

preemption:

The court must consider (1) whether the CBA contains provisions that govern the actions

giving rise to a state claim, and if so, (2) whether the state has articulated a standard

sufficiently clear that the state claim can be evaluated without considering the

overlapping provisions of the CBA, and (3) whether the state has shown an intent not to

allow its prohibition to be altered or removed by private contract. A state law will be

preempted only if the answer to the first question is ‘yes,’ and the answer to either the

second or third is ‘no.’

Following this body of authority, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly recognized that a claim

is not preempted by Section 301 if it merely requires reference to, as opposed to interpretation of,

the provisions of a CBA. See, e.g., Beals v. Kiewit Pacific Co., Inc., 114 F.3d 892, 895 (9th

Cir.1997); Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Local 302 Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers, 109 F.3d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir.1997); Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d

743, 749 (9th Cir.1993) (“Fox errs in equating ‘reference’ with ‘interpret’”). 

The Ninth Circuit has also held on several occasions that the LMRA does not preempt

discrimination claims under FEHA because the rights created thereunder are nonnegotiable and

independent of rights under a CBA. See Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., supra, (finding

no preemption of a FEHA national origin discrimination claim); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers,

911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir.1990) (finding no preemption of a FEHA religious discrimination

claim); Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 644 (9th Cir.1989) (finding no

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

preemption of a FEHA racial discrimination claim); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873

F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1989) (finding no preemption of a FEHA age discrimination claim);

Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no preemption

of disability discrimination claim under FEHA, despite a broad provision in the CBA prohibiting

discriminatory discharge, where resolution of state law claim did not require reference to terms

of the CBA). 

Recognizing the lack of a black and white rule, the Ninth Circuit has commented,

The demarcation between preempted claims and those that survive § 301's reach is not,

however, a line that lends itself to analytical precision. As the Supreme Court

acknowledged in Livadas, “[T]he Courts of Appeals have not been entirely uniform in

their understanding and application of the principles set down in Lingle and

[Allis-Chalmers ].” Id. at 124 n. 18, 114 S.Ct. 2068. And little wonder. “Substantial

dependence” on a CBA is an inexact concept, turning on the specific facts of each case,

and the distinction between “looking to” a CBA and “interpreting” it is not always clear

or amenable to a bright-line test. See Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208

F.3d 1102, 1108-09 (9th Cir.2000); Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743,

748 (9th Cir.1993). Nevertheless, the interpretive principles the Supreme Court has

articulated help guide us through the analytical thicket.

Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 690 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Relevant CBA Sections

Section 17 SENIORITY

17.4 In the event of a reduction in force the following procedures shall be applied,

provided the employees in the department having seniority are capable of

performing the remaining job.

17.5 When one of several jobs in the same classification on the same shift is required

to be eliminated, the employee in the classification on that shift who has the least

location seniority shall be the employee whose job is to be eliminated provided

the employee remaining on the job is qualified on the job and has completed a

minimum of six (6) months in this position after being qualified. If the employee

remaining on the job does not meet the above criteria, that employee will be

displaced and Section 17.6(a) and (b) shall be applied.

17.6 The employee whose job is to be eliminated shall have the following seniority

rights which shall be exercised in the order listed: (a) He/She shall have the right

to displace the employee with the least departmental seniority in his/her wage

bracket in his/her department whose job he/she is capable of performing. . . (b) If

he/she can displace no employee pursuant to paragraph 17.6(a), he/she shall have

the right to displace the employee with the least location seniority in his/her wage

bracket at the plant or location whose job he/she is capable of performing. The

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 As Plaintiff argued at the hearing, the affect of the CBA on the reasonable accommodation claim and 3

interactive process claim is somewhat minimal, meaning that the provisions of the CBA have little impact on these

duties under FEHA. However, Plaintiff’s complaint contains more than just these two claims and the preemption

analysis must take into consideration all claims in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

6

Company in its sole discretion, based upon all facts, shall make a determination of

the employee’s capabilities of performing said job. . .

Section 18 JOB BIDDING

18.2 If an employee becomes physically disabled, the Union and the Company may

agree upon a job which is suitable employment for the employee, and when a

vacancy occurs in that job, it may be filled by assignment of the disabled

employee without regard to the provisions of this Section.

C. Analysis

The outcome of this motion turns on whether the CBA requires interpretation in

resolving Plaintiff’s causes of action. Indeed, the parties agree that this is the ultimate question

and agree to the applicable law, as set forth above.

The parties do not agree, however, on the extent to which the CBA will require

interpretation, if at all, during the course of this litigation. While Plaintiff contends that the

meaning of the relevant provisions in the CBA is clear and requires no interpretation, Defendant

argues that the very actions of which Plaintiff complains - job elimination and reassignment - are

governed by Sections 17 and 18 of the CBA, and thus determining whether Defendant acted in

accordance with the CBA will inevitably require interpretation of these provisions. 

The logical starting point for this analysis is a breakdown of the elements and burdens of

Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim, the crux of Plaintiff’s complaint and the claim most

likely to require interpretation of the CBA. Under FEHA, Plaintiff bears the initial burden of 3

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by proving that: (1) he suffers from a disability;

(2) he is a qualified individual; and (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action

because of the disability. Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 236. Assuming Plaintiff

satisfies his burden, Defendant must then offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the

adverse employment decision. Id. Finally, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that Defendant’s

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

proffered reason was pretextual. Id. (citing Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist., 41

Cal.App.4th 189, 196-197 (1995).

Pursuant to the above framework and assuming Plaintiff proves his prima facie case of

disability discrimination, the burden will shift to Defendant to put forward a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating Plaintiff’s position and assigning the functions of the

position to other employees. Defendant’s rebuttal will undoubtedly revolve around the actions it

took under the CBA. Defendant will likely argue that it was required, pursuant to the terms of

the CBA, to eliminate Plaintiff’s position and reassign the functions in the manner that it did,

thereby offering a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. 

The next step is key to the resolution of this motion. Once Defendant argues that it has a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions because it was required to follow the terms

of the CBA, the burden will shift back to Plaintiff to demonstrate pretext. As Plaintiff admitted

at the hearing, Plaintiff will likely argue that Defendant’s reason(s) is pretextual because

Defendant violated the CBA in eliminating Plaintiff’s position and scattering the functions of the

position among several employees. Analyzing whether Defendant’s actions were legitimate or

pretextual, and determining whether any inference can be drawn from Defendant’s actions, will

involve a fairly detailed analysis of the CBA. This, of course, leads to Section 301 preemption.

Citing Humble v. Boeing, 305 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002), Plaintiff contends that mere

reference to the CBA or the possibility of interpretation is insufficient to preempt Plaintiff’s

action. There, plaintiff alleged causes of action for disability discrimination under Washington

law (failure to provide reasonable accommodation), as well as other claims. The Ninth Circuit

found that the claim was not preempted, rejecting Boeing’s argument that the seniority provisions

of the CBA would need to be interpreted to determine which jobs plaintiff was eligible, for two

reasons. 

First, the court cited Jimeno v. Mobile Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1995), in

reiterating its prior holdings that “a CBA provision does not trigger preemption when it is only

potentially relevant to the state law claims, without any guarantee that interpretation or direct

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 In part, Jimeno determined that issues of the employer’s defense to a reasonable accommodation claim 4

(i.e., in determining undue hardship, it would be necessary to consider factors such as facility size, number of

employees, composition of the workforce, and facility budgets) which might involve consultation of the CBA

rendered the CBA only “peripherally relevant” to the claim and so did not mandate preemption. Jimeno, at 1527.

8

reliance on the CBA terms will occur.” Humble, at 1110. Because plaintiff did not argue that

she could only be accommodated by a transfer, and because Washington law provides for

reasonable accommodations to be made in other ways, i.e., job modification, the seniority

provisions might not be implicated at all.

Second, again citing Jimeno , the court explained that “the mere need to refer to a CBA to

4

determine the jobs for which a disabled employee might be eligible may not be sufficient to

trigger § 301 preemption, even if such consultation is certain to occur.” Id. The court then

explained the affect of the seniority provisions:

Jimeno is closely on point with respect to the preemption-triggering effect of CBA

seniority provisions in the present case, and is consistent with both Supreme Court

precedent and our own explaining that the mere need to consult the terms of the CBA in

the course of resolving a state law claim does not necessarily result in preemption . . . We

do not discount the possibility that in the course of resolving the reasonable

accommodation claim, an interpretive dispute might arise under [the seniority provisions]

over the jobs for which Humble was eligible. However, any interpretation of the CBA’s

provisions in the present case is only potential and limited; the CBA terms do not inhere

in the nature of Humble’s reasonable accommodation claim, nor does the claim, based on

non-negotiable duties under Washington law, “substantially depend” upon application

and interpretation of seniority requirements.

Humble, at 1011. 

While the Court recognizes that, at first glance, Humble might appear to be very similar

to the instant case, the two cases are distinguishable. First and most importantly, the resolution

of Plaintiff’s case will require more than mere reference to the CBA. This fact is neither

speculative nor is the CBA “potentially” relevant; as explained above, the analysis of Plaintiff’s

pretextual explanation will require analysis of the CBA. Second, this analysis will involve more

than just the seniority provisions, as was the case in Humble, because part of the analysis will

require deciding whether Defendant violated the CBA by distributing the functions of Plaintiff’s

prior position among several employees. 

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Audette v.

Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehouse Union, 195 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), more instructive

under the facts of this case. In Audette, longshore worker plaintiffs alleged that defendants

breached a prior settlement agreement by denying them registration as Class B workers under

their CBA in retaliation for a prior lawsuit and because of the gender of some of the plaintiffs,

violating both the settlement agreement and Washington state antidiscrimination law. The Ninth

Circuit upheld the denial of remand, and as to the state gender discrimination claim, explained

that it was preempted because:

The instant [claim] does not involve a free-standing claim of discrimination. Rather, the

claim turns on whether defendants' alleged failure to perform the settlement agreement

was motivated by retaliation or discrimination. Under Washington discrimination law, an

employer or union can refute a prima facie case of discrimination by offering a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for their employment decision. Here, resolution of the

discrimination and retaliation claim turns on defendants' offer of a “legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason” requiring interpretation of the collective bargaining

agreementAAAA Accordingly, this claim is preempted.

Id. at 1113. 

Accordingly, because the resolution of Plaintiff’s claim will require interpretation of the

CBA, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted. “In enacting § 301 Congress

intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.”

Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962). The Court finds no reason to deviate

from this principle. Plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 19, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-01212-AWI-DLB Document 24 Filed 01/19/07 Page 9 of 9