Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01978/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01978-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Manuel Stevens, III, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV11-01978-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff filed a motion requesting attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d). Doc. 18. Defendant has filed a response and 

Plaintiff has filed a reply. Docs. 21, 22. Neither party has requested oral argument. For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion and award fees to Plaintiff in 

the amount of $9,807.75. 

I. Background.

 On March 22, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for judicial review, challenging the 

Social Security Administration’s denial of his request for Disability and Social Security 

Income benefits. Doc. 13. The Court issued an order on June 5, 2012, remanding for an 

award of benefits because it found that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting in part the testimony of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician, Dr. Alicia Guice, M.D. Doc. 16. 

II. Discussion.

 “The EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to prevailing parties.” 

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Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff is a prevailing party 

because this matter was remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 

42 U.S.C. ' 405(g). See Doc. 16; Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 

2001) (“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for purposes of 

the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether 

disability benefits ultimately are awarded.”); Flores v. Shahala, 49 F.3d at 567 (“If the 

district court enters judgment reversing and remanding under sentence four, then the 

claimant must apply for fees within 30 days of the date the judgment becomes final.”). 

The Court should award reasonable attorney fees and costs under the EAJA unless 

Defendant shows that its position in this case was “substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d)(1)(A); see Gutierrez, 

274 F.3d at 1258. 

 A. Was Defendant=s Position Substantially Justified?

 Defendant contends that an award of fees is not appropriate because its position 

was substantially justified. Doc. 21. Under the EAJA, “substantial justification” means 

that “‘the government’s position must have a reasonable basis in law and fact.’” Shafer 

v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 

1052 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Where, as here, the ALJ=s decision was reversed on the basis of 

procedural errors, the question is not whether [Defendant’s] position as to the merits of 

[Plaintiff’s] disability claim was substantially justified. Rather, the relevant question is 

whether [Defendant’s] decision to defend on appeal the procedural errors committed by 

the ALJ was substantially justified.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

 The Court concludes that Defendant’s decision to defend the ALJ’s treatment of 

Dr. Guice’s testimony was not substantially justified. The Court found that when 

formulating Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ appeared to 

incorporate parts of Dr. Guice’s testimony but “did not include [her] opinion that 

Plaintiff’s pain was sufficiently severe to interfere frequently with his attention and 

concentration, nor her assessment that Plaintiff could stand or walk less than 2 hours and 

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sit less than 6 hours in an 8 hour workday.” Doc. 16 at 4-5; Tr. 21. Defendant argued 

that the ALJ sufficiently explained his reasons for rejecting this testimony, but the Court 

found no such explanation. Doc. 16 at 5-6. The ALJ was required to make findings 

setting forth “‘specific, legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the 

record” for rejecting the testimony of a treating physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). His 

failure to do so was clear legal error. 

 Defendant argues that the Court failed to acknowledge its more basic contention 

on appeal that the limitations Dr. Guice testified to were, in fact, consistent with the 

ability to do light work. Doc. 21 at 4-5. But Defendant refers only to the parts of Dr. 

Guice’s opinion that the Court also found to be consistent with the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment, and does not address the parts of Dr. Guice’s opinion that the ALJ appeared 

to discredit. The Court specifically noted that the vocational expert’s response to the 

ALJ’s queries related to Dr. Guice’s pain assessment indicated that Plaintiff was 

incapable of doing his past or other full time work. Doc. 16 at 5, 11. As the Court 

explained in its previous order, the ALJ was required either to accept this conclusion or to 

articulate clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion upon 

which it was based. Id. at 5-7, 10. The ALJ did neither. Thus, the Commissioner’s 

defense was not substantially justified. 

B. Is the Amount of the Requested Fee Award Reasonable? 

 Plaintiff=s counsel, Mark Cardwell, has filed an affidavit and an itemized statement 

of fees showing that he worked 56.9 hours on this case and that the fees and costs total 

$10,438.17. Doc. 20-1 at 1. Defendant contends that courts have found between 20 and 

40 hours to be the typical number spent on social security appeals and that, because this 

case entailed only an average-sized (approximately 600 page) record, and did not present 

any unusual issues, the Court should reduce the number of hours to 40, thereby reducing 

the total award to $7,339.72, a net reduction of 29.7 per cent. Doc. 21 at 8. 

 Plaintiff argues that the time spent on this case was reasonable and that his request 

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for fees comports with the amount of fees awarded in other social security cases. Doc. 22 

at 3; see Doc. 19 at 8, 8 n. 5 (citing cases). Plaintiff cites Costa v. Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 690 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2012), in which the Ninth 

Circuit faulted a magistrate judge for seemingly applying what he perceived to be a 

district-wide rule setting the upper limit for hours billed on social security cases at 40 and 

reducing a fee award with an “eye toward getting the number of hours down to forty 

rather than based on the number of hours that was reasonable for the legal services 

provided.” The Court of Appeals cited to its decision in Morena v. City of Sacremento, 

534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008), in which it opined that “[b]y and large, the court 

should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was 

required to spend on the case.” Moreno went on to acknowledge that due to its 

familiarity with the case, the district court can exercise its discretion to impose slight 

reductions of no more than 10 per cent without specific explanation, but that for larger 

cuts the court must provide a clear explanation. 534 F.3d at 1112. 

 Defendant does not make a detailed objection to any particular expenditures of 

time in this case. Nonetheless, the Court agrees that the total amount of time billed 

exceeds the high end of what the Court would expect for a case such as this that did not 

contain an excessively lengthy record and did not present particularly complex or novel 

issues. Plaintiff, who bears the burden of showing that the amount of fees requested is 

justified (Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)), has presented no facts about 

this case that made it exceptionally difficult. The Court will therefore exercise its 

discretion and reduce the amount of fees awarded by 10 per cent to $9,807.75. This 

amount factors in the additional 2.5 hours claimed for preparing the reply. Doc. 22 at 5. 

 IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiff=s motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 18) is granted. 

 

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 2. Plaintiff is awarded $9,807.75 in attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the 

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. ' 2412. 

 Dated this 20th day of November, 2012. 

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