Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01506/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01506-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12181 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lisa Freemyer, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Kyrene Village II, LLC, a Delaware

limited liability company, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-1506-PHX-GMS

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION, FINDINGS OF FACT,

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) by the assigned District Judge, the Hon. G. Murray Snow, on August 30,

2010 to conduct a Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., post-default damages hearing. (Doc. 9) This

Magistrate Judge will recommend that default judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff Lisa

Freemyer (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant Kyrene Village II, LLC, a Delaware limited

liability company, for the reasons set forth in this Report and Recommendation.

I. Background

This is a disability discrimination case brought by a disabled plaintiff,

suffering from multiple sclerosis and using a wheelchair for mobility, who encountered

discriminatory barriers when she shopped at a Chandler, Arizona shopping center. Plaintiff

brings this action pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42

U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., and the Arizonans with Disabilities Act (“AzDA”), Arizona Revised

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 41-1492 to 41-1492.12. The District Court has subject-matter

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jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claim pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

A. Allegations

The Complaint, filed on July 16, 2010, alleges that Defendant Kyrene Village

II, LLC (“Kyrene Village”) owns, operates, leases or leases to others a shopping center,

known as Kyrene Village, located at the southwest corner of Chandler Boulevard and Kyrene

Road in Chandler, Arizona. (Doc. 1, ¶ 4 at 2) Plaintiff contends that Kyrene Village

shopping center is a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of the ADA and

AzDA. (Id., ¶ 5) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “suffers from multiple sclerosis and

requires the use of a wheelchair for mobility” and “is a customer at Defendant’s [shopping

center] and has visited [it] regularly . . . to enjoy the goods and services at the shopping

center, as Defendant offers them to non-disabled members of the public.” (Id., ¶¶ 7-8)

Plaintiff contends she “has suffered an injury under the ADA and AzDA because of her

awareness of discriminatory conditions on the property and [is] deterred from visiting or

patronizing the [shopping center] . . . as a direct result of Defendant’s failure to remove

discriminatory architectural features on the property.” (Id., ¶¶ 10, 12 at 3) The Complaint

seeks, inter alia, injunctive relief that Defendant remove existing barriers to access and that

Defendant’s shopping center be made accessible to, and usable by, individuals with

disabilities as required by the ADA and AzDA; an award of attorney’s fees, costs and

litigation expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 12205; and non-liquidated, compensatory damages

under the AzDA. (Id. at 6)

B. Procedural requirements 

Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements for a default judgment

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). First, Defendant Kyrene Village’s Arizona statutory agent

was properly served with process on July 26, 2010. (Doc. 5) Second, on August 25, 2010,

the Clerk of Court properly entered default against Kyrene Village due to its failure to timely

answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 8) Third, Defendant Kyrene

Village is not an infant, an incompetent person, in military service or otherwise exempted

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under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940. See, Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2); 50

U.S.C.App. § 501, et seq. Fourth, Kyrene Village’s statutory agent, Bruce I. Shapiro,

Arizona Partners Retail Investment Group, LLC, located in Scottsdale, Arizona, was properly

served with Plaintiff’s application for default judgment, entitled Request for Post-Default

Hearing, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). (Doc. 7)

After notice, a default damages hearing was conducted in open court on

December 17, 2010. (Doc. 20) The only witness testifying was Paul Farber, CAI/PE, of

Farber Consulting, LLC, a Phoenix-based real estate compliance consulting firm. Mr. Farber

represents himself as an accessibility inspector and plans examiner, certified by the

International Code Council, and an independent ADA consultant since 2005. (Doc. 18-1,

Exhibit (“Exh”) A at 3) He claims to have “consulted and analyzed hundreds of properties

in the Phoenix area for issues involving architectural accessibility for people with disabilities,

and the methods and cost of barrier removal [and has] been recognized by the United States

District Court, District of Arizona as an expert in the areas of ADA barrier identification,

measurement, and the costs and methods of architectural barrier removal.” (Id.) 

The Court concludes that Mr. Farber qualifies as an expert witness by his

knowledge, experience, and education to offer opinion testimony regarding the standards of

accessibility set forth in the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG ”) which is the

product of reliable principles and methods properly applied to the facts and issues in this

case. Rule 702, Fed.R. of Evid. Moreover, the Court concludes that his technical knowledge

in this specialized area will assist the Court to understand the evidence and determine the

facts and legal issues in this action. Id. On January 5, 2011, the Court visited Kyrene

Village to view the ten (10) architectural features that are the basis of the Complaint and

independently corroborate Mr. Farber’s opinion testimony.

II. Legal Standard

Following entry of default, Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., permits a district court

to enter final judgment in a case. Entry of default judgment, however, is not a matter of right.

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. Caridi, 346 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2004). No party

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in default is entitled to notice under Rule 55 unless he has “appeared” in the action.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). If a party in default has “appeared,” the party must be served with

written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing. Id.

“Normally, an appearance in an action involves some presentation or submission to the court.

But because judgments by default are disfavored, a court usually will try to find that there

has been an appearance by defendant.” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized

Tech., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988). It is unclear whether the September 24, 2010

non-lawyer Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (sic), doc. 11, filed by “Trigild Inc.,

Receiver, William J. Hoffman, In Pro Per as Agent for Receiver” constitutes a valid

appearance for Kyrene Village. Nevertheless, notice of Plaintiff’s application for default

judgment, entitled Request for Post-Default Hearing, was provided to Kyrene Village’s

statutory agent, Bruce I. Shapiro, Arizona Partners Retail Investment Group, LLC. (Doc. 7

at 2) Notice of the Court’s November 18, 2010 order, setting the December 17, 2010 default

damages hearing, was also mailed on the same day by the Clerk of Court to Trigild Inc.,

Receiver. See, Clerk’s November 18, 2010 docket entry.

Entry of default judgment is entirely within the district court’s sound discretion

and may be refused if no justifiable claim has been alleged or a default judgment is

inappropriate for other reasons. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986);

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Well-pled factual allegations in a

complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. Philip Morris

USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing TeleVideo

Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987)); Geddes v. United Financial

Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977).

In determining damages or other requested relief, a district court may rely on

the declarations submitted by the plaintiff or conduct a full evidentiary hearing. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 55(b)(2). “A plaintiff’s burden in ‘proving up’ damages is relatively lenient.” Philip

Morris USA, 219 F.R.D. at 498. “[F]undamental fairness, required by due process of law,

limits the scope of relief[,]” id., which is, undoubtedly, why Rule 54(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.,

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proscribes that a “default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what

is demanded in the pleadings.” Rule 54(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. “In applying this discretionary

standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Philip Morris USA, 219

F.R.D. at 498 (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D.Cal.

1999)).

The Ninth Circuit has enumerated seven factors for a district court to consider

in determining whether to grant a default judgment: (1) the merits of the plaintiff’s

substantive claim; (2) the sufficiency of the complaint; (3) the sum of money at stake in the

action; (4) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (5) the possibility of a dispute

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the

strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring a decision on the

merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986); Truong Giany Corp. v. Twinstar Tea

Corp., 2007 WL 1545173 (N.D. Cal. 2007). After considering and balancing all these factors,

the Court finds that they weigh strongly in favor of entering the default judgment

recommended herein.

III. Standing

“Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, and a party invoking federal

jurisdiction has the burden of establishing it.” Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Center, LLC,

472 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1214 (S.D.Cal. 2007) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 561 (1992)). “A suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III standing is not a ‘case or

controversy,’ and an Article III federal court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

the suit.” Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)). To establish standing,

a plaintiff bears the burden of showing: (1) injury-in-fact, or the invasion of a legally

protected interest, that is both (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent; (2)

a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood

that a favorable decision will regress the wrong. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

“In order to establish standing under the ADA for injunctive relief, ‘[a

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plaintiff] must demonstrate that [she has] suffered or [is] threatened with a concrete and

particularized legal harm, coupled with a sufficient likelihood that [she] will again be

wronged in a similar way.’” Mantic Ashanti’s Cause v. Darwish Plaza, 2006 WL 1360969,

* 3 (S.D.Cal. 2006) (quoting Bird v. Lewis & Clark College, 303 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.

2002) (quotations and citations omitted). A plaintiff can establish injury-in-fact by showing

that she encountered barriers at a place of public accommodation and that she intends to

return to the public accommodation if it is made accessible. Id. (citing Pickern v. Holiday

Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002); Molski v. Price, 224 F.R.D. 479

482-83 (C.D.Cal. 2004) (plaintiff established standing to seek injunctive relief under the

ADA against gas station which he visited and whose restroom he found not accessible to

wheelchair users, based on plaintiff’s testimony that he intended to return to service station

to check out its accessibility and to use the restroom facilities) (citing Pickern v. Holiday

Quality Foods Incorporated, 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) and Steger v. Franco, Inc.,

228 F.3d 889, 892-94 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1030 (2002)). 

IV. Americans with Disabilities Act

A. Liability

“Congress enacted the ADA ‘to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable

standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities . . . .’” Arizona ex

rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)). Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public

accommodations, prescribing generally that

[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the

full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any

person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public

accommodation.

Id. Disability discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in

existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).

Under the ADA, the terms “readily achievable” mean “easily accomplishable and able to be

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carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). The ADA also sets

forth a number of factors for courts to consider when making a “readily achievable”

determination:

(A) the nature and cost of the action needed under this chapter;

(B) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the

action; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses

and resources, or the impact otherwise of such action upon the operation of the

facility;

(C) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the

business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the

number, type, and location of its facilities; and

(D) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the

composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the

geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or

facilities in question to the covered entity.

Id. “Whether a specific change is readily achievable ‘is a fact intensive inquiry.’” Hubbard

v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1168 (S.D.Cal. 2006) (citation omitted).

Title III gives the Department of Justice authority to develop regulations

implementing the requirements of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). The ADA Accessibility

Guidelines are codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, Appendix A. Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433

F.Supp.2d 1150, 1159 (S.D.Cal. 2006). Barrier removal must comply with the applicable

requirements for alterations. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d). After January 26, 1992, any alteration

to a place of public accommodation “shall be made so as to ensure that, to the maximum

extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by

individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.” Parr v. L & L

Drive-Inn Restaurant, 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1088 n. 27 (D.Haw. 2000) (quoting 28 C.F.R. §

36.402(a)(1)). “To the ‘maximum extent feasible’ only applies to ‘the occasional case where

the nature of an existing facility makes it virtually impossible to comply’ with accessibility

standards. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(c)). “In these circumstances, the alteration shall

provide the ‘maximum physical accessibility feasible.’” Id.

“To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show that (1)

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[s]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that

owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied

public accommodations by the defendant because of [her] disability.” Harkins Amusement,

603 F.3d at 670 (citing Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007)). “[T]o

succeed on a ADA claim of discrimination on account of one’s disability due to an

architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) the existing facility at the

defendant’s place of business presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA, and

(2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96

F.Supp.2d 1065, 1085 (D.Haw. 2000) (citations omitted).

As Plaintiff points out, Title III of the ADA does not specify which party bears

the burden of proving that removal of an architectural barrier is readily achievable. (Doc. 19

at 2) Although “[t]he Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on whether the plaintiff or defendant bears

the burden of proof in showing that removal of an architectural barrier is readily achievable,”

the Ninth Circuit and several district courts within the Ninth Circuit have applied the

burden-shifting framework set forth in Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson

Family, Ltd., 264 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2001). Vesecky v. Garick, Inc., 2008 WL 4446714, at

* 2-3 (D.Ariz. 2008) (citing, among others, Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 506 F.3d 1191, 1202

(9th Cir. 2007). In Colorado Cross, the Tenth Circuit stated that the “[p]laintiff bears the

initial burden of production to present evidence that a suggested method of barrier removal

is readily achievable” and that if plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the

defendant, who “bears the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding its affirmative defense

that a suggested method of barrier removal is not readily achievable.” Colorado Cross, 264

F.3d at 1006. In 2008, however, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the burden shifting

approach allocated in Colorado Cross where a defendant sought a historical designation on

a place of a public accommodation. In Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard and Winery, LLC,

531 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008), the court held that a defendant “is in a better position

to introduce, as part of an affirmative defense, detailed evidence and expert testimony

concerning whether the historic significance of a structure would be threatened or destroyed

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1

 On December 22, 2010, the U.S. Senate confirmed Judge Murgia’s appointment to

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

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by the proposed barrier removal plan.” 531 F.3d at 1048. 

Because there is no suggestion in the record that the Kyrene Village shopping

center is a historical building, this Magistrate Judge will follow the lead of former District

Judge Mary H. Murguia1

 that 

[u]ntil the Ninth Circuit provides additional and specific instruction to the

lower courts[,] this Court will follow the overwhelming majority of federal

courts that apply the burden-shifting framework of Colo. Cross, specifically

in cases where a historic building is not at issue. The Court, therefore, finds

that [plaintiff] has the initial burden to produce evidence that removal of the

barriers on [defendant’s] property are readily achievable, or “easily

accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.”

42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). If [plaintiff] carries this burden, it will shift to

[defendant] who will bear the ultimate burden of persuasion as an affirmative

defense.

Vesecky, 2008 WL 4446714 at * 3.

B. Authorized Relief

Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(B), money damages are not available in an

ADA case to private litigants; remedies are limited to injunctive relief, attorney’s fees and

costs. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (providing that remedies under Title III are the same as those

outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(A), which do not permit recovery of monetary damages);

Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002). “In addition to attorneys’ fees, the ADA

authorizes ‘litigation expenses and costs.’” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 2007 WL

2462084, * 5 (E.D.Cal. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12205). “Expert witness fees are to be

included in the term litigation expenses in ADA cases.” Id. (citation omitted); also see, Lovell

v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[B]ecause the term ‘litigation

expenses’ normally encompasses expert witness fees, we hold that the statutory provision

provides direct authority for the award of expert witness fees. Second, because Congress

gave the Attorney General the authority to promulgate regulations under the ADA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12134(a), those regulations “must be given legislative and hence controlling weight unless

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they are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to the statute.’”). 

V. Arizonans with Disabilities Act

A. Liability

The Arizonans with Disabilities Act (“AzDA”), A.R.S. §§ 41- 1492 to 41-

1492.12 “is intended to be consistent with the ADA.” Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 2010 WL

3244900, * 6 (D.Ariz. 2010). The AzDA prohibits discrimination by public accommodation

and commercial facilities as follows: 

No individual may be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full

and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages

or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who

owns, leases, leases to others or operates a place of public accommodation.

A.R.S. § 41-1492.02(A). For the purposes of subsection A of this section, “discriminated

against” means: “[a] failure to remove architectural barriers . . . that are structural in nature

in existing facilities . . . if the removal is readily achievable.” A.R.S. § 41-1492.02(G)(4).

Under Arizona law, the owner of the “entity” has the burden of proving “that the removal of

a barrier under paragraph 4 of this subsection is not readily achievable . . . .” A.R.S. §

41-1492.02(G)(5).

Under Arizona law and consistent with the ADA, a public accommodation is

defined to include, among other things, a shopping center. A.R.S. § 41-1492(11)(e); Nolan

v. Starlight Pines Homeowners Ass’n, 216 Ariz. 482, 167 P.3d 1277, 1280 (Az.Ct.App. 2007)

A disability within the meaning of the statute is a “physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” A.R.S. §

41-1492(5).

B. Authorized Relief

The AzDA provides that if any person believes a covered person or entity has

engaged in prohibited conduct under the AzDA, a plaintiff “may institute a civil action for

preventive or mandatory relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary

injunction, restraining order or other order.” A.R.S. § 41-1492.08(A); Bailey-Null v.

ValueOptions, 221 Ariz. 63, 209 P.3d 1059 (Az.Ct.App. 2009). Arizona Revised Statute §

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41-1492.09 provides that “[i]n any civil action under this article the court:

1. May grant any equitable relief that the court considers to be appropriate,

including, to the extent required by this title:

(a) Granting temporary, preliminary or permanent relief.

(b) Providing an auxiliary aid or service, a modification of a policy,

practice or procedure or an alternative method.

(c) Making facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals

with disabilities.

2. May award such other relief as the court considers appropriate, including

monetary damages to aggrieved persons. In this paragraph “monetary

damages” and “such other relief” do not include punitive damages.

A.R.S. 41-1492.09 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not provided, nor has this Court’s

independent research discovered, any Arizona case that explains the meaning of “monetary

damages to aggrieved persons.” Plaintiff does not contend that the AzDA creates an express

or implied private cause of action for compensatory damages, like the Consumer Fraud Act.

Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 576, 521 P.2d 1119, 1122

(Ariz. 1974) (“Although the [Consumer Fraud] Act does not specifically provide for a right

of action against persons violating the provisions of the article, we believe inferentially such

right of action is granted by s 44-1533.”). The issue, however, is irrelevant in this case

because Plaintiff did not testify or present any evidence at the default damages hearing to

warrant an award of monetary or compensatory damages. 

VI. Findings of Fact

After review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, doc. 1; the Default Hearing

Memorandum, doc. 18; the Post-Hearing Memorandum, doc. 19; the Proposed Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, doc. 17; conducting an evidentiary hearing on December 17,

2010; and viewing in person the shopping center’s areas of alleged non-compliance with the

ADA on January 5, 2011, the Court hereby enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law

pursuant to Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. 

The Court makes the following findings of fact:

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 “The ADA imposes different requirements on existing facilities than it does on new

construction. ‘For existing facilities, the [ADA] requires the removal of architectural barriers

. . . where such removal is readily achievable, and permits the use of alternative methods

where removal of architectural barriers is not readily achievable. By contrast, in new

construction - any facility designed and constructed for first occupancy after January 26,

1993 - the Act censures the failure to design and construct facilities . . . that are readily

accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” Parr, 96 F.Supp.2d at 1085 n. 21

(quoting Small v. Dellis, 1997 WL 853515, at * 3 (D.Md. 1997) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Defendant Kyrene Village is covered under the ADA requirements for

an “existing” facility.

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1. Defendant Kyrene Village II LLC is a company that owns, operates, leases

or leases to others a shopping center, located at the southwest corner of Chandler Boulevard

and Kyrene Road, in Chandler, Maricopa County, Arizona.

2. The shopping center is a “public accommodation,” as defined by both the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. and the Arizonans with

Disabilities Act (“AzDA”), A.R.S. § 41- 1492, et seq.

3. Kyrene Village was constructed in the 1980’s.2

4. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff Lisa Freemyer (“Plaintiff”) has

lived in the Phoenix metropolitan area. She has visited the shopping center regularly and

continues to visit the shopping center to date.

5. Plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis and requires a wheelchair for

mobility purposes.

6. Plaintiff has encountered various accessibility barriers upon visiting the

shopping center that have remained similar on each visit. She visited the shopping center in

May, 2010, and she encountered discrimination in the form of numerous architectural

barriers, preventing her from enjoying the services.

7. As a result of these barriers at Kyrene Village, Plaintiff was denied access

to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or

accommodations which are available at Defendant’s shopping center.

8. Plaintiff’s expert, Paul Farber, CAI/PE, of Farber Consulting, LLC, testified

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that he has visited the shopping center and performed a site inspection on the property. Mr.

Farber is a certified accessibility expert and plans examiner. He identified, and testified to,

ten (10) architectural barriers at the Kyrene Village shopping center that violate the ADAAG

guidelines.

9. In front of Regal Beagle (facing north), the access aisle serving the

“accessible” parking spaces contains a curb ramp with a running slope of 7.9%, in excess of

the 2.0% maximum for accessible parking spaces and access aisles. The cost to remove these

barriers is $1,904.00.

10. In front of Dollar Tree, the access aisle serving the “accessible” parking

spaces contains a curb ramp with a running slope of 7.1%, in excess of the 2.0% maximum

for accessible parking spaces and access aisles. The cost to remove these barriers is

$2,272.00.

11. In front of the former Basha’s space, there are two “built-up” style curb

ramps that extend into the vehicular traffic lane. The cost to remove these barriers

is $1,140.00.

12. In front of Audio Express, the sidewalk curb ramp has a running slope of

14.0%, in excess of the 8.33% maximum. In addition, the asphalt immediately adjacent to

the base of the ramp has a running slope of 7.7%, in excess of the 5.0% maximum. The cost

to remove these barriers is $1,865.00.

13. In front of Kyrene Lanes, all three sidewalk curb ramps are too steep: the

south curb ramp has a running slope of 11.3%, in excess of the 8.33% maximum,

and a side flare slope of 26.3%, in excess of the 10% maximum. The center ramp

(immediately in front of the entrance) has a running slope of 9.1%. The north curb ramp has

a running slope of 10.1%. The cost to remove these barriers is $1,008.00.

14. The “accessible” parking spaces serving the north curb ramp in front of

Kyrene Lanes have running slopes in excess of the 2.0% maximum: the south space has a

running slope of 7.9% and the north space has a running slope of 3.6%. The cost to remove

this barrier is $4,812.50.

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3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(A) and (B) provides:

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15. The sidewalk curb ramp serving Corvette Cafe and Lounge has a running

slope of 11.4%, in excess of the 8.33% maximum. The cost to remove this barrier is

$1,188.00.

16. The “accessible” parking space serving Corvette Cafe and Lounge has a

running slope of 6.0%, in excess of the 2.0% maximum. The cost to remove this barrier is

$2,750.00.

17. The sidewalk curb ramp serving Queens Bowl restaurant has a running

slope of 11.0%, in excess of the 8.33% maximum. The cost to remove this barrier is $646.00.

18. The sidewalk curb ramp in front of India Gate (serving as part of the

“accessible” route from Chandler Boulevard) has a running slope of 10.4%, in excess of the

8.33% maximum. The curb ramp also has a side flare slope of 15.5%, in excess of the 10.0%

maximum. The cost to remove this barrier is $630.00.

19. Mr. Farber further testified that the removal of each barrier identified above

is readily achievable.

20. The estimated total cost to remove the 10 barriers identified by Mr. Farber

is $18,215.50.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction (federal question) over this

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

2. Defendant Kyrene Village II, LLC was properly served with the Summons

and Complaint by service upon its Arizona statutory agent, Bruce I. Shapiro, Arizona

Partners Retail Investment Group, LLC, located in Scottsdale, Arizona, on July 26, 2010 at

1:20 p.m. pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(B).3

 (Doc. 5) 

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(h) Serving a Corporation, Partnership, or Association. Unless federal law

provides otherwise or the defendant’s waiver has been filed, a domestic or

foreign corporation, or a partnership or other unincorporated association that

is subject to suit under a common name, must be served:

(1) in a judicial district of the United States: 

(A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) [following state law for

service of process] for serving an individual; or 

(B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an

officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized

by appointment or by law to receive service of process and--if the

agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires--by also

mailing a copy of each to the defendant;

Rule 4(h)(1)(A) and (B), FED.R.CIV.P., (emphasis added); see also, Direct Mail Specialists,

Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Technologies, Inc., 840 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1988). 

4 Defendant Kyrene Village “owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public

accommodation” in Arizona. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. 

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3. Personal jurisdiction exists over Defendant Kyrene Village II, LLC, a

Delaware limited liability company, because it was served with process in accordance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(B) and it has, at least, the “minimum contacts”4

 with

Arizona such that the exercise of jurisdiction in Arizona “does not offend traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945). Therefore, the Court may properly enter default judgment against Defendant Kyrene

Village. King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1992).

4. This Magistrate Judge has authority to recommend a non-final and

independent determination of fact and law that default judgment be entered against

Defendant Kyrene Village II, LLC, without its consent. Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d. 992,

999 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that magistrate judge was well within her authority to issue a

report and recommendation on Wang’s habeas petition without Wang’s consent for de novo

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5

 A public accommodation is any one of a number of entities enumerated in the act

provided that the entity’s operation “affects commerce.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Shopping

centers are public accommodations under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E).

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review by district judge); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); LRCiv. 72.2(a)(1).

5. Plaintiff has Article III standing for her ADA and AzDA claims. Plaintiff’s

allegations in her Complaint that she “visited a public accommodation on a prior occasion

and is currently deterred from visiting that accommodation by accessibility barriers establish

that [her] injury is actual or imminent.” Doran, 524 F.3d at 1041(citations omitted);

Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1041 (N.D.Cal. 2009). Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that 

1) “[s]he is a customer at Defendant’s property and has visited regularly,

including in May, 2010, to enjoy the goods and services at the shopping center,

as Defendant offers them to non-disabled members of the public[,]” doc. 1, ¶

8 at 2;

b) she “plans to return to the Defendant’s shopping center to enjoy the goods,

services, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered to

nondisabled members of the public, but is deterred from returning because of

discriminatory conditions on the property[,]” id. ¶ 9 at 2-3; and

c) she “has suffered an injury under the ADA and AzDA because of her

awareness of discriminatory conditions on the property and her being deterred

from visiting or patronizing the public accommodations.” id. ¶ 10 at 3.

6. The shopping center, “Kyrene Village,” located at the southwest corner of

Chandler Boulevard and Kyrene Road, Chandler, Maricopa County, Arizona is a “public

accommodation” within the meaning of the ADA.5

7. Defendant Kyrene Village II LLC owns, operates, leases or leases to others

a public accommodation commonly known as Kyrene Village shopping center.

8. The Kyrene Village shopping center constitutes existing construction and,

in places where no alterations have been made, must therefore comply with the accessibility

standards set forth in the ADA’s ADAAG Guidelines to the extent that barrier removal is

readily achievable.

9. The Kyrene Village shopping center contains ten (10) architectural features

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constituting barriers to accessibility.

10. ADAAG 4.6.3 requires that the maximum slope for accessible parking

spaces and adjacent access aisles be 2.0% in all directions. Here, in front of Regal Beagle

(facing north), the access aisle has a running slope of 7.9%.

11. ADAAG 4.6.3 requires that the maximum slope for accessible parking

spaces and adjacent access aisles be 2.0% in all directions. Here, in front of Dollar Tree, the

access aisle has a running slope of 7.1%.

12. ADAAG 4.7.6 prohibits “built-up” style curb ramps from projecting into

the vehicular traffic lanes. Here, in front of the former Basha’s space, two “built-up” curb

ramps project into the vehicular traffic lane, creating a safety hazard for manual wheelchair

users.

13. ADAAG 4.8.2 requires that the maximum running slope for all ramps be

8.33%. 4.7.2 requires that the maximum slope for a route immediately adjacent to a curb

ramp be 5.0%. Here, in front of Audio Express, the curb ramp has a running slope of 14.0%

and the asphalt immediately adjacent to the base of the ramp has a running slope of 7.7%.

14. ADAAG 4.8.2 requires that the maximum running slope for all ramps be

8.33%. ADAAG 4.7.5 requires that the maximum slope for curb ramp side flare be 10.0%.

Here, in front of Kyrene Lanes, the south curb ramp has a running slope of 11.3%, and a side

flare slope of 26.3%. The center ramp (immediately in front of the entrance) has a running

slope of 9.1%. The north curb ramp has a running slope of 10.1%.

15. ADAAG 4.6.3 requires that the maximum slope for accessible parking

spaces be 2.0% in all directions. Here, the south “accessible” parking space serving the north

curb ramp in front of Kyrene Lanes has a running slope of 7.9% and the north space has a

running slope of 3.6%.

16. ADAAG 4.8.2 requires that the maximum running slope for all ramps be

8.33%. Here, in front of Corvette Cafe, the curb ramp has a running slope of 11.4%.

17. ADAAG 4.6.3 requires that the maximum slope for accessible parking

spaces be 2.0% in all directions. Here, the “accessible” parking space serving Corvette Cafe

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6 Per 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), post-judgment interest is calculated “from the date of the

entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity

Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for

the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (footnote

omitted).

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has a running slope of 6.0%.

18. ADAAG 4.8.2 requires that the maximum running slope for all ramps be

8.33%. Here, in front of Queens Bowl, the curb ramp has a running slope of 11.0%.

19. ADAAG 4.8.2 requires that the maximum running slope for all ramps be

8.33%. ADAAG 4.7.5 requires that the maximum slope for curb ramp side flares be 10.0%.

Here, in front of India Gate, the curb ramp has a running slope of 10.4%, and a side flare

slope of 15.5%.

20. The removal of each of these barriers is readily achievable.

21. Plaintiff is thus entitled to injunctive relief under the ADA and AzDA.

22. As to post- judgment interest, Plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest

at the federal rate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, to be calculated by the Clerk of the Court

from the date of the entry of judgment.6

23. The ADA provides that, “[i]n any action or administrative proceeding

commenced pursuant to this Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation

expenses, and costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (emphasis added). In order to award fees and

costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, the district court must first determine whether “the party

seeking fees and costs is the prevailing party.” Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restaurant, 2005

WL 3719631 (C.D.Cal. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 12205. A prevailing plaintiff under a statute so

worded “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would

render such an award unjust.” Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134

(9th Cir. 2002)

24. Plaintiff requests an award for her reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to

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7

 Note: this fee amount does not include the approximate one hour incurred on the date

of the default damages hearing, the time incurred in researching and drafting the post-hearing

memorandum, and attending the Court’s January 5, 2011 viewing of Kyrene Villiage

shopping center. Plaintiff’s counsel may wish to file a supplemental fee application for his

time not included in the Report and Recommendation.

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42 U.S.C. § 12205 as the prevailing party in the amount of $6,733.33.007 based upon

counsel’s reasonable billing rate ($300.00 per hour) and in the exercise of, what the Local

Rules refer to as, counsel’s “billing judgment.” (Doc. 18-2, Exh B at 1-5). 

25. Plaintiff requests an award for her costs, expert witness fees, and litigation

expenses of $5,901.94. (Id.)

26. Federal law governs the award of taxable costs. Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

68 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff may recover her taxable costs by strict

compliance with Rule 54(d)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., and LRCiv 54.1(a).

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. that Plaintiff Lisa Freemyer’s request for a default judgment against

Defendant Kyrene Village II, LLC, be GRANTED;

2. that Plaintiff’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees, costs and litigation

expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 12205, docs. 1 at 6; 18, Exh B at 2-5, be GRANTED; 

3. that default judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Lisa Freemyer against

Defendant Kyrene Village II, LLC, in the amount of $12,634.94 with interest thereon at the

annual federal rate from the date of entry of the Judgment until paid in full.

4. that a permanent injunction is entered that Defendant Kyrene Village II LLC,

its successors, and/or assigns, shall modify the Kyrene Village shopping center, located at

the southwest corner of Chandler Boulevard and Kyrene Road, Chandler, Arizona. The

modifications shall occur by no later than six (6) months after entry of judgment, and shall

involve the removal of the following barriers to accessibility:

1. In front of Regal Beagle (facing north), the access aisle serving the

“accessible” parking spaces contains a curb ramp with a running slope of

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7.9%, in excess of the 2.0% maximum for accessible parking spaces and

access aisles. Defendant shall demolish and remove curb ramp from access

aisle, resurface and repaint asphalt underneath; renovate adjacent concrete

sidewalk to provide new, “L-shaped” sidewalk ramp (proceeding east with one

leg of the “L” and south with the other leg of the “L”) with level landing at

sidewalk adjacent to top of current west parking space, which parking space

would become the new, repainted access aisle.

2. In front of Dollar Tree, the access aisle serving the “accessible” parking

spaces contains a curb ramp with a running slope of 7.1%, in excess of the

2.0% maximum for accessible parking spaces and access aisles. Defendant

shall demolish and remove curb ramp from access aisle, resurface and repaint

asphalt underneath; renovate adjacent concrete sidewalk to provide new alley

curb ramp.

3. In front of the former Basha’s space, there are two “built-up” style curb

ramps that extend into the vehicular traffic lane. Defendant shall saw cut at the

face of the curbs the portion of the concrete ramps that extend into traffic, and

resurface asphalt underneath.

4. In front of Audio Express, the sidewalk curb ramp has a running slope of

14.0%, in excess of the 8.33% maximum. In addition, the asphalt immediately

adjacent to the base of the ramp has a running slope of 7.7%, in excess of the

5.0% maximum. Defendant shall demolish and remove existing steep curb

ramp and replace with a new compliant alley ramp with running slope of less

than 8.33%; remove existing asphalt adjacent to base of ramp and resurface

with slopes less than 2.0% in all directions.

5. In front of Kyrene Lanes, all three sidewalk curb ramps are too steep: the

south curb ramp has a running slope of 11.3%, in excess of the 8.33%

maximum, and a side flare slope of 26.3%, in excess of the 10% maximum.

The center ramp (immediately in front of the entrance) has a running slope of

9.1%. The north curb ramp has a running slope of 10.1%. Defendant shall

demolish and remove existing center ramp to provide at least one accessible

entrance, and replace with a compliant alley curb ramp with a running slope

of less than 8.33%.

6. The “accessible” parking spaces serving the north curb ramp in front of

Kyrene Lanes have running slopes in excess of the 2.0% maximum: the south

space has a running slope of 7.9% and the north space has a running slope of

3.6%. Defendant shall excavate, remove, repave and re-stripe parking spaces

so slopes are less than 2% in all directions.

7. The sidewalk curb ramp serving Corvette Cafe and Lounge has a running

slope of 11.4%, in excess of the 8.33% maximum. Defendant demolish and

remove existing steep curb ramp and replace with a new compliant alley ramp

with running slope of less than 8.33%.

8. The “accessible” parking space serving Corvette Cafe and Lounge has a

running slope of 6.0%, in excess of the 2.0% maximum. Defendant shall

excavate, remove, repave and re-stripe parking space so slopes are less than

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2% in all directions.

9. The sidewalk curb ramp serving Queens Bowl restaurant has a running slope

of 11.0%, in excess of the 8.33% maximum Defendant shall demolish and

remove existing steep curb ramp and replace with a new compliant alley ramp

with running slope of less than 8.33%.

10. The sidewalk curb ramp in front of India Gate (serving as part of the

“accessible” route from Chandler Boulevard) has a running slope of 10.4%, in

excess of the 8.33% maximum. The curb ramp also has a side flare slope of

15.5%, in excess of the 10.0% maximum. Defendant shall demolish and

remove existing steep curb ramp and replace with an “L-shaped” ramp with

compliant slopes. The bottom level landing of the “L” should run north/south,

to be accessed from the south (from the location of the current adjacent

parking space, which have to be designated as an access aisle), and then

proceed uphill and west for the length of the “L.” Five feet of curbing to be

added in the location of the current ramp’s east edge.

IT IS ORDERED that if this Report and Recommendation is approved by

District Judge Snow or if he otherwise directs, the Clerk is kindly directed to enter Judgment

consistent with this Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 58(a),(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to

mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Kyrene Village II, LLC’s statutory agent

Bruce I. Shapiro, Arizona Partners Retail Investment Group, LLC, 6621 N. Scottsdale Rd.,

Scottsdale, Arizona, 85250-4421.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1), as amended

on December 1, 2010; Rules 72(b) and 6, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended on

December 1, 2010. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to this Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the District Judge without further review. United States v. Reyna- Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of this

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the

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findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to this Magistrate Judge=s

recommendations. Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this 6th day of January, 2011.

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