Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05875/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05875-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cynthia Rendon,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Circle K Stores Incorporated and 

Christopher Bradley Larson-Jarvis,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-05875-PHX-SMB

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Circle K Stores Inc.’s Partial Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.1(Docs. 17, “Mot.”) Plaintiff Cynthia Rendon responded,2

and Circle K replied. (Doc. 19, “Resp.”; Doc. 20, “Reply.”) Neither party requested oral 

argument and the Court finds a hearing unnecessary to resolve this motion. LRCiv 7.2(f). 

After considering the complaint,3 pleadings, and relevant law, Circle K’s motion will be 

granted, and the complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Rendon began working part-time at a convenience store in Arizona back in 

2018. (Doc. 1, “Compl.” ¶ 9.) Shortly after beginning work there, Circle K bought the store 

1 The other defendant, Christopher Bradley Larson-Jarvis, is not a party to this motion. 

2 Ms. Rendon supplemented her response with a document titled “Citation of Supplemental 

Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Circle K’s Partial Motion to 

Dismiss.” (Doc. 22.) That document and the two supplemental authorities cited within have

been considered by the Court. (See Doc. 22.)

3 Ms. Rendon’s complaint incorporates her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

Charge of Discrimination and Right to Sue Letter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

10(c). (Doc. 1, “Compl.” ¶ 8.) Although inadvertently omitted as exhibits to the complaint, 

they were filed later. (See Doc. 6-1 at 2, 4.)

Case 2:19-cv-05875-SMB Document 23 Filed 07/10/20 Page 1 of 8
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and hired her on as a customer service representative. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 4, 8-9.) While working 

for Circle K, she was supervised by store manager and customer service representative

Christopher Bradley Larson-Jarvis, whom she had become acquainted with as a customer 

before she was hired. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 8-9.) Ms. Rendon’s complaint arises out of Mr. LarsonJarvis’ conduct at Circle K in his office on October 29, 2018.4

(Id. ¶¶ 8-13.) 

On that day, Ms. Rendon stopped at the Circle K where she worked to grab a coffee 

on the way to her other job. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.) When she arrived, one of her co-workers who 

was working at the time told her to ask Mr. Larson-Jarvis, who was in the back office of 

the store, to cover for him while he went to the bathroom. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.) Ms. Rendon went 

into the back office, but could not find him. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11-12.) Then, unsuspectingly, Mr. 

Larson-Jarvis, who was “hiding where the ‘soda bibs’ are kept,” “jumped out and closed 

and locked the office door behind [Ms.] Rendon and proceeded to forcibly sexually assault 

her in a portion of the office where there was no surveillance coverage.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 12.) Ms. 

Rendon was “shocked, embarrassed, and humiliated” and immediately left the store, but 

did not report the incident. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 13.) Just a little while afterwards, Mr. Larson-Jarvis 

texted Ms. Rendon, asking her if she was okay and then later called her, asking if she could 

just “text [him] back and tell [him] [he] made [her] feel good.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Ms. Rendon felt 

“compelled to text back.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 14.) In the months that followed, Mr. Larson-Jarvis 

reduced Ms. Rendon’s hours at Circle K. (Id.) 

Five months after the incident, Mr. Larson-Jarvis transferred to work at another 

Circle K and was replaced by a different store manager. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 15.) Ms. Rendon told her 

new manager about the October 29, 2018 incident, which eventually led to Circle K 

suspending Mr. Larson-Jarvis for five days, but not firing him. (Id.) Because of the alleged

incident, “[Ms.] Rendon has suffered psychological trauma, physical harm, 

embarrassment, humiliation, and continuing severe emotional distress, and anxiety.” (Id. ¶ 

16.) Her complaint alleges claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of 

4 Ms. Rendon also alleges that before this date, “[Mr. Larson-Jarvis] had flirted with [her], 

asked her why she did not have a boyfriend, and had deliberately brushed up against her in 

an offensive matter.” (Id. ¶ 10.) She also alleges that he had texted her saying “I wonder 

what sex would be like with you.” (Id.)

Case 2:19-cv-05875-SMB Document 23 Filed 07/10/20 Page 2 of 8
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., common law battery, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 6-8.5) The Title VII claims are brought 

solely against Circle K, while the common law battery and IIED claims are brought against 

Circle K and Mr. Larson-Jarvis. (Id.) Circle K now moves to dismiss the latter two claims 

against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet 

the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the 

defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 

41, 47 (1957)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable 

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that 

sets forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient 

factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

Facial plausibility exists if the pleader sets forth “factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but requires “more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Circle K does not argue that the complaint fails to allege Mr. 

5 Ms. Rendon does not number the allegations concerning her four claims.

Case 2:19-cv-05875-SMB Document 23 Filed 07/10/20 Page 3 of 8
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Larson-Jarvis’ liability for common law battery and IIED.6It instead argues that nothing 

plausibly alleges Circle K is vicariously or directly liable for either claim. (Mot. at 3-6.) 

Without claiming that Circle K is directly liable for either claim,7 Ms. Rendon argues in 

response that Circle K is “alleged to be liable for the intentional torts of i[t]s store manager 

under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the law of agency.” (Resp. at 3.) Since Ms. 

Rendon does not dispute that Circle K is not directly liable for these claims, the only 

question is whether the complaint alleges Mr. Larson-Jarvis acted within the course and 

scope of his employment with Circle K when he allegedly assaulted her.

8 The Court finds 

no such thing alleged in the complaint.

A. Nothing Alleges Circle K is Vicarious Liability for Mr. Larson-Jarvis’ 

Tortious Conduct.

“An employer is vicariously liable for the negligent or tortious acts of its employee 

acting within the scope and course of employment.” Higginbotham v. AN Motors of 

Scottsdale, 228 Ariz. 550, 552, ¶ 5, 269 P.3d 726, 728 (App. 2012) (quoting Baker ex rel. 

Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, Inc., 197 Ariz. 535, 540, ¶ 17, 

5 P.3d 249, 254 (App. 2000)); Pruitt v. Pavelin, 141 Ariz. 195, 205, 685 P.2d 1347, 1357 

(App. 1984) (“[A]n employer is vicariously liable only for the behavior of an employee 

who was acting within the course and scope of his employment.” (citing Leigh v. Swartz, 

74 Ariz. 108, 245 P.2d 262 (1952); Conchin v. El Paso & S.W.R. Co., 13 Ariz. 259, 108 P. 

260 (1910)). Whether an employee’s conduct falls within the course and scope of his 

employment depends on several factors, including:

(1) whether the conduct is the kind the employee is employed 

to perform or that the employer had the right to control at the 

time of the conduct; (2) whether the conduct occurs within the 

authorized time and space limits; and (3) whether the conduct 

furthers the employer’s business, even if the employer has 

expressly forbidden it.

6 The Court assumes without deciding that these claims are adequately alleged against him.

7 The Court notes that Ms. Rendon’s complaint alleges that Circle K and Mr. Larson-Jarvis 

are jointly and severally liable for common law battery and IIED.

8 Ms. Rendon does not dispute that Circle K is only vicariously liable for Mr. LarsonJarvis’ conduct if he was acting within the course and scope of his employment.

Case 2:19-cv-05875-SMB Document 23 Filed 07/10/20 Page 4 of 8
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Higginbotham, 228 Ariz. at 552 ¶ 5, 269 P.3d at 728 (citations omitted); see GuzmanMartinez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV-11-02390-PHX-NVW, 2012 WL 2873835, at *14 

(D. Ariz. July 13, 2012) (noting additional factors under Arizona law to consider); Ray 

Korte Chevrolet v. Simmons, 117 Ariz. 202, 207, 571 P.2d 699, 704 (App. 1977) (“Under 

Arizona law, an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while he is doing 

any reasonable thing which his employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him to do or 

which may reasonably be said to have been contemplated by that employment as 

necessarily or probably incidental to the employment.” (citations omitted)).

Circle K argues that “[Ms. Rendon] has not alleged any facts, that, accepted as true, 

support her vague allegation that Mr. Larson-Jarvis was acting within the course and scope 

of his employment when he allegedly assaulted her.” (Mot. at 4.) Ms. Rendon appears to 

claim in response that several allegations in her complaint show such a thing.9(Resp. at 4-

5 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 1-3, 9-14, 16)). After simply listing these allegations without argument, 

she claims that “under Arizona law, when a supervisor rapes a subordinate employee using 

his authority as a supervisor at the workplace during working hours, liability may be 

imputed to the employer under respondeat superior or the law of agency.” (Id. at 6.) Circle 

K, in its reply, highlights how Ms. Rendon is not alleged to have been assaulted during 

working hours, and that her characterization of having been assaulted “during working 

hours” is disingenuous. (See Reply at 2 n.2 (noting how Ms. Rendon was allegedly 

assaulted after she “stopped at the Circle K store to buy coffee on her way to her other job” 

(citing Compl. ¶ 11 (emphasis in original)))). Even if Ms. Rendon was alleged to have been 

assaulted at Circle K by Mr. Larson-Jarvis while he was on duty, Circle K argues that this 

does not necessarily mean the alleged assault occurred within the course and scope of his 

employment. (Id. at 3.) In other words, it argues that “not every act committed by a 

supervisor at work during his working hours falls within the course and scope of 

9 The Court describes Ms. Rendon’s argument as one that “appears to claim” because she 

merely lists paragraphs in her complaint without any corresponding argument. (Resp. at 4 

(“Second, the specific numbered fact allegations in the Complaint include, inter alia, the 

following: [listing paragraphs].”).

Case 2:19-cv-05875-SMB Document 23 Filed 07/10/20 Page 5 of 8
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

employment.” (Id.) The Court finds Circle K’s arguments persuasive.

Indeed, nothing in Ms. Rendon’s complaint alleges that Mr. Larson-Jarvis’ assault 

was within the course and scope of his employment with Circle K. Cf. Guzman-Martinez, 

2012 WL 2873835, at *16. At most, it alleges that Circle K employed Ms. Rendon, she 

was allegedly assaulted at Circle K by an employee who was on duty, and “[Mr.] LarsonJarvis . . . was at all times material to this Complaint . . . [a]cting on behalf of his employer, 

Circle K, as the store manager of its convenience store at [location], and as the supervisor 

of Circle K employee [Ms.] Rendon.” (Compl. ¶¶ 1-3, 9, 16.) Beyond these things, which 

do not meaningfully identify any relationship between Mr. Larson-Jarvis’ conduct and his 

employment with Circle K, the complaint merely alleges Mr. Larson-Jarvis’ tortious 

conduct towards Ms. Rendon at Circle K. (See id. ¶¶ 10-14.) The absence of any allegations 

concerning how Mr. Larson-Jarvis’ assault of an off-duty employee was within the course 

and scope of his employment at Circle K is detrimental to Ms. Rendon’s assertion that 

Circle K is vicariously liable for the alleged tortious conduct. See Pruitt, 141 Ariz. at 205, 

685 P.2d at 1357.

To be clear, the Court renders no judgment concerning whether an employer may 

be liable “when a supervisor rapes a subordinate employee using his authority as a 

supervisor at the workplace during working hours,” as Ms. Rendon erroneously argues is 

the situation alleged here.10 Not only is this not alleged in the complaint, but it ignores 

whether any factual allegations support a finding that Mr. Larson-Jarvis was acting within 

the course and scope of his employment with Circle K at the time of the alleged assault. 

The issue is not whether vicarious liability attaches in any given situation, but rather 

whether Mr. Larson-Jarvis’ tortious conduct is alleged to have occurred within the course 

10 Ms. Rendon cites State Dep’t of Admin. v. Schallock, 189 Ariz. 250, 941 P.2d 1275 

(1997) for this proposition, even though it is not the situation alleged here. (Resp. at 6-8.) 

In Schallock, the Arizona Supreme Court found that a supervisor’s sexual harassment of 

his subordinates may be within the scope of employment under very different 

circumstances than those alleged here, such as the supervisor’s long history of harassment 

known to his employer. See 189 Ariz. at 257-58, 941 P.2d at 1281-82. Unlike in Schallock, 

Ms. Rendon has not alleged any facts showing Circle K knew for years about Mr. LarsonJarvis’ harassment of her, let alone anything showing a connection between his conduct 

and Circle K employment beyond conclusory allegations.

Case 2:19-cv-05875-SMB Document 23 Filed 07/10/20 Page 6 of 8
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and scope of his employment in Ms. Rendon’s complaint. Higginbotham, 228 Ariz. at 552, 

¶ 5, 269 P.3d at 728; Pruitt, 141 Ariz. at 205, 685 P.2d at 1357; Ray Korte Chevrolet, 117 

Ariz. at 207, 571 P.2d at 704. Beyond baldly alleging “Mr. Larson-Jarvis was acting on 

Circle K’s behalf” and that it occurred at Circle K, (see Compl. ¶¶ 11-12), the factual basis 

supporting Ms. Rendon’s conclusion, even when accepting the well-pled allegations as 

true, is not plausibly alleged. Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

B. Leave to Amend Will Be Granted.

Ms. Rendon requests leave to amend in the event the Court finds that dismissing her 

common law battery and IIED claims against Circle K is appropriate. (Resp. at 9.) Circle 

K objects on the basis that it previously identified the complaint’s deficiencies to Ms. 

Rendon before filing this motion. (Reply at 4.) Notwithstanding whether Circle K 

previously informed Ms. Rendon of the complaint’s deficiencies, and in accordance with 

the well-settled law in this Circuit, because “it is not ‘absolutely clear’ that [she] could not 

cure [her complaint’s] deficiencies by amendment,” the Court will give her the opportunity 

to do so. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“leave to amend should be “freely” given “when justice so requires[]”).

Ms. Rendon’s amended complaint must address the deficiencies identified above

concerning whether Mr. Larson-Jarvis’ allegedly tortious conduct occurred within the 

course and scope of his employment with Circle K. Ms. Rendon’s amended complaint 

should follow the form detailed in Local Rule 7.1.

Within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order, Ms. Rendon may submit

an amended complaint. She must clearly designate on the face of her amended complaint 

that it is the “First Amended Complaint.” If she decides to file an amended complaint, she

is reminded that it supersedes the original complaint, see Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 

896 (9th Cir. 2012), and it must be complete in itself and “must not incorporate by reference 

any part of the preceding pleading, including exhibits,” LRCiv 15.1.

IV. CONCLUSION

Ms. Rendon’s complaint inadequately alleges that Mr. Larson-Jarvis’ tortious 

Case 2:19-cv-05875-SMB Document 23 Filed 07/10/20 Page 7 of 8
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conduct occurred within the course and scope of his employment with Circle K. Without 

alleging such a thing, Circle K cannot be vicarious liability for his alleged common law 

battery or IIED. Notwithstanding Ms. Rendon’s deficient pleading, the Court will grant her 

leave to amend her complaint to address the deficiencies outlined above.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Circle K Stores Inc’s Partial Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 17.) Ms. Rendon’s complaint is dismissed WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND. If Ms. Rendon chooses not to amend her complaint within thirty (30) days, 

the case will proceed with all claims, but the common law battery and IIED claims will 

only proceed as to Mr. Larson-Jarvis.

Dated this 10th day of July, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-05875-SMB Document 23 Filed 07/10/20 Page 8 of 8