Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_15-cv-00210/USCOURTS-alsd-2_15-cv-00210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

BELINDA HOLBROOK, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 15-0210-C

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her

claims for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, widow’s disability 

insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. The parties have consented to 

the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for 

all proceedings in this Court. (Docs. 25 & 26 (“In accordance with provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a United 

States magistrate judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, . . . order the entry 

of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”).) Upon consideration 

of the administrative record, plaintiff’s brief, the Commissioner’s brief, and the 

arguments of counsel at the March 30, 2016 hearing before the Court, it is determined 

Case 2:15-cv-00210-C Document 28 Filed 05/11/16 Page 1 of 17
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that the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits should be reversed and remanded 

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.

1

 

Plaintiff alleges disability due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, spinal 

stenosis of the cervical spine with associated shoulder pain and upper extremity 

numbness, and a mood disorder. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the 

following relevant findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2012.

2. It was previously found that the claimant is the unmarried 

widow of the deceased insured worker and has attained the age of 50. 

The claimant met the non-disability requirements for disabled widow’s 

benefits set forth in section 202(e) of the Social Security Act.

3. The prescribed period ends on July 31, 2018.

4. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

March 26, 2012, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

5. The claimant has the following severe impairments: chronic 

obstructive pulmonary disease, [and] back[] and shoulder pain (20 CFR

404.1520(c)).

. . .

6. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the 

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 

404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).

. . .

 1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall 

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Docs. 25 & 26 (“An appeal from a 

judgment entered by a magistrate judge shall be taken directly to the United States court of 

appeals for this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this 

district court.”))

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7. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant must 

alternate between the sit and stand positions at will. She can 

occasionally bend, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can 

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently reach 

overhead, bilaterally. She can perform frequent handling, fingering, 

and feeling. She must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, 

heat, wetness, and humidity. She must avoid all exposure to fumes, 

odors, dust, gas, unprotected heights, dangerous machinery, and uneven 

surfaces. She can perform no more than simple, short instructions and 

simple work related decisions with few work place changes at unskilled 

work. She can make only simple, work-related decisions in a low stress 

work environment. She is unable to frequently work in close proximity 

to others due to concentration issues, that is, she can only work in the 

public.

In making this finding, the undersigned has considered all symptoms and 

the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as 

consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based 

on the requirements of 20 CFR 404.1529 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p. The 

undersigned has also considered opinion evidence in accordance with the 

requirements of 20 CFR 404.1527 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p, 96-6p and 06-3p.

In considering the claimant’s symptoms, the undersigned must follow a 

two-step process in which it must first be determined whether there is an 

underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s)—

i.e., an impairment(s) that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical 

and laboratory diagnostic techniques—that could reasonably be expected 

to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms.

Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could 

reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms 

has been shown, the undersigned must evaluate the intensity, persistence, 

and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to 

which they limit the claimant’s functioning. For this purpose, whenever 

statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects 

of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical 

evidence, the undersigned must make a finding on the credibility of the 

statements based on a consideration of the entire case record.

In her initial claim, she alleged chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 

and back and shoulder pain. On appeal, she indicated the pain in her neck 

and shoulder was radiating to the other side; her arms and hands were 

numb; and she could not turn her head to the left without pain. She 

reported it was getting harder to reach for items without sharp pains in 

her neck and shoulders. Her current medication list included medications 

for depression/mood swings, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 

allergies, and neck and shoulder pain.

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In a function report, the claimant indicated the following: She and her 

father awake and eat breakfast from prior prepared meals with the help 

from her sister. This eliminates the need to wash dishes. They microwave 

in paper plates. She reminds her father to take his medication. She needs 

no help with her persona care. She prepares her own meals from the 

already prepared meals and sandwiches. With her sister’s help, she does 

light cleaning. She does no yard work because of neck pain, arm 

numbness, and shortness of breath. When she travels, she drives or rides 

in a car. She shops for groceries and necessities, weekly. She is able to 

manage money. She spends time with others daily, talking on the phone 

and at church. She goes to church, the grocery store, and doctor 

appointments on a regular basis. She needs no reminders to go to these 

places. She needs no one to accompany her. She gets along with family, 

friends, and neighbors. She is unable to lift over five pounds. Kneeling, 

squatting, and bending are difficult. Bending causes shoulder and neck 

pain and dizziness. She can follow written and spoken instructions. She 

has no problem getting along with authority figures. She has not been 

fired from a job because of problems getting along with others. She adjusts 

to handle stress and changes in routine.

At the hearing, she testified to the following: She cannot work because of 

neck and shoulder pain. Her neck pain causes arm numbness; and activity 

causes shortness of breath requiring her to lie down during the day. She 

uses an inhaler for flare-ups. Her pain without medication is an 8/10 and 

with medication, a 6/10. Her medication causes grogginess. She sees a 

doctor regularly.

She has had really bad mood swings. Her mother took her to mental 

health where she started treatment. She does not have problems with her 

anxiety/mood swings as long as she takes her medication; and she has not 

been hospitalized overnight since March of 2012.

She helps care for her father who has dementia. She reminds him about 

his medication. She has begun dating again. She reads a lot—about three 

to four books per month. She goes grocery shopping, visiting her grown 

children[,] and she goes to church every Sunday. She has a driver’s 

license[] and she drove herself to the hearing. She dresses and bathes, 

independently. She cooks, makes the beds, and washes dishes and 

vacuums. She can read and write. She uses no recreational drugs or 

alcohol. She stopped smoking cigarettes in January.

In terms of the claimant’s impairments, by way of history, in June of 2011, 

she was seen and treated at Cahaba Mental Health Center for dysthymic 

disorder, late onset type. She reported doing well on her medication until 

she ran out. She voiced concerns about getting rid of a used car business. 

In December of 2011, status post[] her husband dying in a trucking 

accident and her mother being diagnosed with a brain tumor, she 

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presented again and was treated for dysthymic disorder, late onset type 

and bereavement.

The claimant was seen and treated in the emergency room in March of 

2012 because of flu-like symptoms. He head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat 

exam was normal. Her respiratory [examination] revealed no distress, 

clear breath sounds, no wheezes, rhonchi, or crackles; and she had 

bilaterally[] equal breath sounds. Her respiratory effort was easy. Her 

cardiovascular [examination] was normal. She had no range of motion 

limitations. She had a normal chest X-ray. She was treated with 

medication. She was admitted for influenza-like illness. Her discharge 

diagnosis included acute bronchitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary 

disease, urinary tract infection, and depression. During her stay, her 

cough [] improved[] and she was discharged home in stable condition. 

She was also seen and treated in the emergency room in May of 2012 

because of neck and shoulder pain. Her lungs were clear during this visit. 

Her shoulder and neck X-ray revealed no fracture and minimal AC [] 

degenerative joint disease. 

On April 17, 2012, the claimant was seen for follow-up to a previous 

hospital visit for burning sensation while urinating. She did not use drugs 

or alcohol. Her systems review was negative, including pulmonary. Her 

physical exam revealed clear lungs to auscultation. Her cardiovascular 

and musculoskeletal exams were also normal. She was assessed with 

recurrent chronic cough, chronic obstructive pulmonary 

disease/bronchitis, urinary tract infection, dyslipidemia, fatigue, and 

depression with anxiety. She was treated with medication. At her twoweek follow-up in May, her dysuria had resolved. Her lungs and 

musculoskeletal exams were normal. Her mammogram was negative.

Her cervical spine X-ray from May 30, 2012 revealed normal operative 

fusion levels at C5-C6 and C6-C7; there was very severe bilateral 

foraminal stenosis at C3-C4 and facet hypertrophy was creating at least 

moderate foraminal stenosis on the left and right side at all the other 

foramen; and there was no severe canal stenosis demonstrated.

The claimant was seen and treated by Donald Overstreet, M.D., between 

September of 2012 and August of 2013 for sinus problems, back pain, 

allergic rhinitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, otitis media, and 

cough and treated with medication. In July of 2013, Dr. Overstreet opined 

that because of the claimant’s spinal stenosis and chronic obstructive 

pulmonary disease, she was not adequately able to perform activities in a 

working environment. Partial, rather than great[,] weight is assigned to 

this opinion because Dr. Overstreet treated the claimant; however, the 

undersigned disagrees that the claimant is not able to perform work 

activity.

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

Case 2:15-cv-00210-C Document 28 Filed 05/11/16 Page 5 of 17
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expected to cause the alleges symptoms; however, the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this 

decision. The claimant is not credible. She says she cannot work because 

of neck and shoulder pain. However, the objective medical evidence is not 

consistent with disability. During a medical visit while she was being 

treated for flu-like symptoms, upon physical examination, her head, eyes, 

ears, nose, and throat exam were normal. Her respiratory [examination] 

revealed no distress, clear breath sounds, no wheezes, rhonchi, or crackles; 

and she had bilaterally[] equal breath sounds. Her respiratory effort was 

easy. Her cardiovascular [examination] was normal. She had no range of 

motion limitations; and she had a normal chest X-ray. During her stay, her 

cough [] improved[] and she was discharged home in stable condition. At 

a later visit in May of 2012, when she complained of neck and shoulder 

pain, her lungs were clear; and her shoulder and neck X-ray revealed no 

fracture and minimal AC [] degenerative joint disease. 

She also testified about a mood disorder already discussed above and 

found nonsevere. Plus, she testified that she does not have problems with 

her anxiety/mood swings as long as she takes her medication; and she has 

not been hospitalized overnight since March of 2012; and, as noted above, 

during a mental health visit, she reported she was “fine”. 

What is more inconsistent with disability is her routine of activities of 

daily living. She testified to the following: She helps care for her father 

who has dementia. She reminds him about his medication. She has begun 

dating again. She reads a lot—about three to four books per month. She 

does grocery shopping, visit[s] her grown children[,] and she goes to 

church every Sunday. She has a driver’s license[,] and she drove herself to 

the hearing. She dresses and bathes[] independently. She cooks, makes the 

beds, [] washes the wishes and vacuums[,] and she can read and write. In 

conclusion, the undersigned finds this behavior and activity indicative 

that the claimant’s impairments are not as disabling as alleged.

In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by 

the fact that the signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings are insufficient 

and inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations.

8. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 

CFR 404.1565).

. . .

9. The claimant was born on February 25, 1962 and was 50 years old, 

which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age, on 

the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563).

10. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564).

Case 2:15-cv-00210-C Document 28 Filed 05/11/16 Page 6 of 17
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11. The claimant has acquired work skills from past relevant work 

(20 CFR 404.1568).

. . .

12. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, the claimant has acquired work skills from 

past relevant work that are transferable to other occupations with jobs 

existing in significant numbers in the national economy (20 CFR 

404.1569, 404.1569(a) and 404.1568(d)).

. . .

The vocational expert was asked if any occupations exist which could be 

performed by an individual with the same age, education, past relevant 

work experience, and residual functional capacity as the claimant, and 

which require skills acquired in the claimant’s past relevant work but no 

additional skills. The vocational expert responded and testified that 

representative occupations such an individual could perform include: 

storage facility rental clerk (light and unskilled), DOT# 295.367-026, 6,900 

local jobs available and 332,000 national jobs available and self-service 

store attendant (light and unskilled), DOT# 299.677-010, 45,000 local jobs 

available and 3,300,000 national jobs available. 

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the undersigned has determined that the 

vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with the information contained 

in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles except for the sit and/or stand 

option which is based upon the vocational expert’s education, training, 

and experience. 

Accordingly, although the claimant’s additional limitations do not allow 

the claimant to perform the full range of light work, considering the 

claimant’s age, education and transferable work skills, a finding of “not 

disabled” is appropriate under the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule

202.15.

13. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from March 26, 2012, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).

(Tr. 19-20, 21, 21-24, 25 & 25-26 (internal citations & footnote omitted; emphasis in 

original).) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 1-3) and, thus, the 

hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

DISCUSSION

Case 2:15-cv-00210-C Document 28 Filed 05/11/16 Page 7 of 17
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In all Social Security cases, an ALJ utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation 

to determine whether the claimant is disabled, which considers: (1) 

whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, 

whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the 

severe impairment meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of 

Impairments in the regulations; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the 

RFC to perform her past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether, in light of 

the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experience, there are other 

jobs the claimant can perform.

Watkins v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 457 Fed. Appx. 868, 870 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012)2

(per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (c)-(f), 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(f); Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)) (footnote omitted). The claimant bears the 

burden, at the fourth step, of proving that she is unable to perform her previous work. 

Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has 

met this burden, the examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective 

medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence 

of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, education and work history. Id. at 1005. Although “a 

claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to her past relevant 

work, the [Commissioner of Social Security] has an obligation to develop a full and fair 

record.” Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). If a 

plaintiff proves that she cannot do her past relevant work, as here, it then becomes the 

Commissioner’s burden—at the fifth step—to prove that the plaintiff is capable—given 

her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial 

gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Phillips, supra, 357 F.3d at 1237; 

Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1089, 120 S.Ct. 

1723, 146 L.Ed.2d 644 (2000); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). 

 2 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be 

cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.R. 36-2.

Case 2:15-cv-00210-C Document 28 Filed 05/11/16 Page 8 of 17
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The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the Commissioner’s

decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that she can perform those light jobs 

identified by the vocational expert, is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial 

evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). “In determining whether substantial 

evidence exists, we must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence 

favorable as well as unfavorable to the Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 

F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).3 Courts are precluded, however, from “deciding the facts 

anew or re-weighing the evidence.” Davison v. Astrue, 370 Fed. Appx. 995, 996 (11th Cir. 

Apr. 1, 2010) (per curiam) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)). 

And, “’[e]ven if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a 

court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’” Id.

(quoting Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-1159 (11th Cir. 

2004)).

On appeal to this Court, Holbrook asserts four reasons why the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny her benefits is in error (i.e., not supported by substantial evidence): (1) 

the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not rooted in the medical evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in 

failing to give adequate weight to the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Donald 

Overstreet; (3) the ALJ erred in failing to acknowledge her severe mental impairment; 

and (4) the ALJ’s credibility finding is flawed. The undersigned considers these claims 

together within the context of the ALJ’s RFC assessment.

 3 This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal principles, 

however, is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

Case 2:15-cv-00210-C Document 28 Filed 05/11/16 Page 9 of 17
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Initially, the Court notes that the responsibility for making the residual 

functional capacity determination rests with the ALJ. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)

(“If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level . . ., the administrative law 

judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity.”) with, e.g., 

Packer v. Commissioner, Social Security Admin., 542 Fed. Appx. 890, 891-892 (11th Cir. Oct. 

29, 2013) (per curiam) (“An RFC determination is an assessment, based on all relevant 

evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability to do work despite her impairments. There is 

no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence, so long as 

the ALJ’s decision is not a broad rejection, i.e., where the ALJ does not provide enough 

reasoning for a reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s 

medical condition as a whole.” (internal citation omitted)). A plaintiff’s RFC—which 

“includes physical abilities, such as sitting, standing or walking, and mental abilities, 

such as the ability to understand, remember and carry out instructions or to respond 

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work pressure[]”—“is a[n] [] assessment 

of what the claimant can do in a work setting despite any mental, physical or 

environmental limitations caused by the claimant’s impairments and related 

symptoms.” Watkins, supra, 457 Fed. Appx. at 870 n.5 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)-(c), 

416.945(a)-(c)). Here, the ALJ’s RFC assessment consisted of the following: “After 

careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) except the claimant must alternate between the sit and stand positions at 

will. She can occasionally bend, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can 

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently reach overhead, 

bilaterally. She can perform frequent handling, fingering, and feeling. She must 

avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat, wetness, and humidity. She must 

Case 2:15-cv-00210-C Document 28 Filed 05/11/16 Page 10 of 17
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avoid all exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gas, unprotected heights, dangerous 

machinery, and uneven surfaces. She can perform no more than simple, short 

instructions and simple work related decisions with few work place changes at 

unskilled work. She can make only simple, work-related decisions in a low stress 

work environment. She is unable to frequently work in close proximity to others due 

to concentration issues, that is, she can only work in the public.” (Tr. 21 (emphasis in 

original).)

To find that an ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence, it 

must be shown that the ALJ has “’provide[d] a sufficient rationale to link’” substantial 

record evidence “’to the legal conclusions reached.’” Ricks v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1020428, 

*9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2012) (quoting Russ v. Barnhart, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (M.D. 

Fla. 2005)); compare id. with Packer v. Astrue, 2013 WL 593497, *4 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013) 

(“’[T]he ALJ must link the RFC assessment to specific evidence in the record bearing 

upon the claimant’s ability to perform the physical, mental, sensory, and other 

requirements of work.’”), aff’d, 542 Fed. Appx. 890 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013); see also 

Hanna v. Astrue, 395 Fed. Appx. 634, 636 (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) (per curiam) (“The ALJ 

must state the grounds for his decision with clarity to enable us to conduct meaningful 

review. . . . Absent such explanation, it is unclear whether substantial evidence 

supported the ALJ’s findings; and the decision does not provide a meaningful basis 

upon which we can review [a plaintiff’s] case.” (internal citation omitted)).4 However, 

 4 It is the ALJ’s (or, in some cases, the Appeals Council’s) responsibility, not the 

responsibility of the Commissioner’s counsel on appeal to this Court, to “state with clarity” the 

grounds for an RFC determination. Stated differently, “linkage” may not be manufactured 

speculatively by the Commissioner—using “the record as a whole”—on appeal, but rather, 

must be clearly set forth in the Commissioner’s decision. See, e.g., Durham v. Astrue, 2010 WL 

3825617, *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2010) (rejecting the Commissioner’s request to affirm an ALJ’s 

decision because, according to the Commissioner, overall, the decision was “adequately 

(Continued)

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in order to find the ALJ’s RFC assessment supported by substantial evidence, it is not 

necessary for the ALJ’s assessment to be supported by the assessment of an examining 

or treating physician. See, e.g., Packer, supra, 2013 WL 593497, at *3 (“[N]umerous court 

have upheld ALJs’ RFC determinations notwithstanding the absence of an assessment 

performed by an examining or treating physician.”); McMillian v. Astrue, 2012 WL 

1565624, *4 n.5 (S.D. Ala. May 1, 2012) (noting that decisions of this Court “in which a 

matter is remanded to the Commissioner because the ALJ’s RFC determination was not 

supported by substantial and tangible evidence still accurately reflect the view of this 

Court, but not to the extent that such decisions are interpreted to require that 

substantial and tangible evidence must—in all cases—include an RFC or PCE from a 

physician” (internal punctuation altered and citation omitted)); but cf. Coleman v. 

Barnhart, 264 F.Supp.2d 1007 (S.D. Ala. 2003).

In this case, even if this Court was to find that the ALJ properly analyzed Dr. 

Overstreet’s opinion, which is simply not the case, the ALJ’s RFC assessment cannot be 

found to be supported by substantial evidence inasmuch as the ALJ does not explain, 

when summarizing the evidence of record, how the medical evidence supports each 

component of his RFC assessment. Significantly, the ALJ does not point to evidence in 

 

explained and supported by substantial evidence in the record”; holding that affirming that 

decision would require that the court “ignor[e] what the law requires of the ALJ[; t]he court 

‘must reverse [the ALJ’s decision] when the ALJ has failed to provide the reviewing court with 

sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted’” 

(quoting Hanna, 395 Fed. Appx. at 636 (internal quotation marks omitted))); see also id. at *3 n.4 

(“In his brief, the Commissioner sets forth the evidence on which the ALJ could have relied . . . . 

There may very well be ample reason, supported by the record, for [the ALJ’s ultimate 

conclusion]. However, because the ALJ did not state his reasons, the court cannot evaluate 

them for substantial evidentiary support. Here, the court does not hold that the ALJ’s ultimate 

conclusion is unsupportable on the present record; the court holds only that the ALJ did not 

conduct the analysis that the law requires him to conduct.” (emphasis in original)); Patterson v. 

Bowen, 839 F.2d 221, 225 n.1 (4th Cir. 1988) (“We must . . . affirm the ALJ’s decision only upon 

the reasons he gave.”).

Case 2:15-cv-00210-C Document 28 Filed 05/11/16 Page 12 of 17
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the record which establishes that Holbrook can “frequently” reach overhead, bilaterally, 

and perform “frequent” handling, fingering, and feeling (Tr. 21 (some emphasis 

supplied)),5 and this Court cannot find such evidence, particularly in light of the 

uncontroverted x-ray evidence of record which establishes very severe bilateral 

foraminal stenosis6 at C3-C4 and facet hypertrophy creating at least moderate foraminal 

stenosis on the left and right side at all the other foramen (Tr. 316). In other words, it is 

not apparent to the undersigned how the ALJ applied and analyzed the foregoing x-ray 

evidence (and any other pertinent evidence of record, including plaintiff’s testimony) 

vis-à-vis his RFC findings that plaintiff is capable of performing frequent overhead 

reaching and handling.

7 Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment fails to provide an articulated linkage to the medical evidence of record,

8

and, therefore, this cause need be remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for 

further consideration not inconsistent with this decision. Stated somewhat differently, 

 5 “’Frequent’ means occurring from one-third to two-thirds of the time.” See 

generally SSR 83-10.

6 Stenosis is a “narrowing or stricture of a duct or canal.” SLOANE-DORLAND 

ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY, 487 (Supp. 1992).

7 Of course, the light jobs identified by the VE and relied upon by the ALJ, that is, 

work as storage-facility rental clerk and self-service store attendant, require frequent reaching 

and handling. Compare DOT 295.367-026 with DOT 299.677-010.

8 The linkage requirement is simply another way to say that, in order for this 

Court to find that an RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence, ALJs must “show 

their work” or, said somewhat differently, show how they applied and analyzed the evidence to 

determine a plaintiff’s RFC. See, e.g., Hanna, 395 Fed. Appx. at 636 (an ALJ’s “decision [must] 

provide a meaningful basis upon which we can review [a plaintiff’s] case”); Ricks, 2012 WL 

1020428, at *9 (an ALJ must “explain the basis for his decision”); Packer, 542 Fed.Appx. at 891-

892 (an ALJ must “provide enough reasoning for a reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ 

considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole[]” (emphasis added)). Thus, by failing 

to “show his work,” the ALJ has not provided the required “linkage” between the record 

evidence and his RFC determination necessary to facilitate this Court’s meaningful review of 

his decision.

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the ALJ has failed to provide this Court with sufficient reasoning for determining that 

the proper legal analysis has been conducted.9

In addition to the foregoing, the Court also finds that the ALJ committed error in 

analyzing the opinions proffered by Dr. Overstreet. On July 12, 2013, Dr. Overstreet

completed a Clinical Assessment of Pain form (“CAP”) and thereon indicated that due 

to plaintiff’s spinal stenosis and COPD “she is not adequately able to perform daily 

activities in a working environment.” (Tr. 368.)10 In addition, Overstreet opined the 

following on the CAP: (1) pain is present to such an extent as to be distracting to 

adequate performance of daily activities or work; (2) physical activity—such as 

walking, standing, bending, moving of extremities, etc.—would increase pain to such 

an extent that bed rest and/or medication is necessary; and (3) the side effects of 

prescribed medication totally restrict plaintiff and cause her to be unable to function at 

a productive level of work. (Tr. 368.) 

The law in this Circuit is clear that an ALJ “’must specify what weight is given to 

a treating physician’s opinion and any reason for giving it no weight, and failure to do 

so is reversible error.’” Nyberg v. Commissioner of Social Security, 179 Fed.Appx. 589, 590-

591 (11th Cir. May 2, 2006) (unpublished), quoting MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 

 9 The undersigned would note, however, that the ALJ did not err in failing to 

acknowledge or analyze the RFC assessment completed by A. Perry, a Single Decisionmaker, as 

argued by plaintiff. (See Doc. 16, at 7.) Perry is not an acceptable medical source, see Siverio v. 

Commissioner of Social Security, 461 Fed.Appx. 869, 871-872 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2012) (per curiam) 

and, therefore, her opinion is entitled to no weight, compare id. at 871 (“’SDM-completed forms 

are not opinion evidence at the appeals level.’”) with Brown v. Astrue, 2012 WL 920973 (M.D. Fla. 

Mar. 19, 2012) (finding that an RFC assessment completed by an SDM with no apparent medical 

credentials is not an opinion of an acceptable medical source and is not entitled to any weight)

and Hall v. Astrue, 2012 WL 2499177, *2-3 (N.D. Ala. Jun. 22, 2012) (finding ALJ erred in 

“affording any weight, even minimal weight,” to the assessment of the SDM).

10 Overstreet also indicated on a Disability Questionnaire that Holbrook is 

incapable of performing a full-time job. (Tr. 369.)

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1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (other citations omitted). In other words, “the ALJ must give the 

opinion of the treating physician ‘substantial or considerable weight unless “good 

cause” is shown to the contrary.’” Williams v. Astrue, 2014 WL 185258, *6 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 

15, 2014), quoting Phillips, supra, 357 F.3d at 1240 (other citation omitted); see Nyberg, 

supra, 179 Fed.Appx. at 591 (citing to same language from Crawford v. Commissioner of 

Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004)). 

Good cause is shown when the: “(1) treating physician’s opinion was not 

bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or 

(3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the

doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 

(11th Cir. 2004). Where the ALJ articulate[s] specific reasons for failing to 

give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight, and those 

reasons are supported by substantial evidence, there is no reversible error. 

Moore [v. Barnhart], 405 F.3d [1208,] 1212 [(11th Cir. 2005)].

Gilabert v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 396 Fed.Appx. 652, 655 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2010) 

(per curiam). 

In this case, the entirety of the ALJ’s analysis relative to Dr. Overstreet’s 

“opinions” is the following: “In July of 2013, Dr. Overstreet opined that because of the 

claimant’s spinal stenosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, she was not 

adequately able to perform activities in a working environment. Partial, rather than 

great[,] weight is assigned to this opinion because Dr. Overstreet treated the claimant; 

however, the undersigned disagrees that the claimant is not able to perform work 

activity.” (Tr. 23-24.) Had this been the extent of Dr. Overstreet’s opinion, the 

undersigned would have to necessarily agree with the ALJ’s analysis since the ability to 

perform activities in a working environment is a dispositive issue reserved to the 

Commissioner, compare Kelly v. Commissioner of Social Security, 401 Fed.Appx. 403, 407 

(11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2010) (“A doctor’s opinion on a dispositive issue reserved for the 

Commissioner, such as whether the claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work,’ is not 

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considered a medical opinion and is not given any special significance, even if offered 

by a treating source[.]”) with Lanier v. Commissioner of Social Security, 252 Fed.Appx. 311, 

314 (11th Cir. Oct. 26, 2007) (“The ALJ correctly noted that the opinion that Lanier was 

unable to work was reserved to the Commissioner.”). However, this was not the “end” 

of Dr. Overstreet’s opinion; instead, as aforesaid, Dr. Overstreet offered numerous 

opinions directed to the pain experienced by plaintiff, how physical activity impacts 

plaintiff’s pain, and the limitations attendant to plaintiff’s medication side effects. (Tr. 

368.) The ALJ did not even acknowledge these opinions of Dr. Overstreet,11 much less 

offer specific reasons for rejecting them. (Compare id. with Tr. 23-24.) Accordingly, this 

Court finds the ALJ’s error in this regard reversible. Compare Nyberg, supra with Winschel 

v. Commissioner of Social Security, 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen the ALJ 

fails to ‘state with at least some measure of clarity the grounds for his decision,’ we will 

decline to affirm ‘simply because some rationale might have supported the ALJ’s 

conclusion. . . . In such a situation, ‘to say that [the ALJ’s] decision is supported by 

substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to scrutinize the 

record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational.’ . . . The 

ALJ did not mention the treating physician’s medical opinion, let alone give it 

‘considerable weight.’ Likewise, the ALJ did not discuss pertinent elements of the 

examining physician’s medical opinion, and the ALJ’s conclusions suggest that those 

elements were not considered. It is possible that the ALJ considered and rejected these 

two medical opinions, but without clearly articulated grounds for such a rejection, we 

cannot determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were rational and supported by 

 11 The Court also finds troubling the ALJ’s failure to make mention of at least the 

highlights of Dr. Overstreet’s treatment of plaintiff (see, e.g., Tr. 342-369 & 383-437), including 

that he injected plaintiff’s right shoulder on at least one occasion (see id. at 401). 

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substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Secretary’s decision is reversed. On remand, the 

ALJ must explicitly consider and explain the weight accorded to the medical opinion 

evidence.”).12

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security denying plaintiff benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to 

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 

115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. The 

remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) makes the plaintiff a prevailing party for 

purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 

292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over 

this matter.

DONE and ORDERED this the 11th day of May, 2016.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 12 Given these articulated bases warranting a remand of this action, it is not 

necessary for this Court to address plaintiff’s other assignments of error. See Pendley v. Heckler, 

767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Because the ‘misuse of the expert’s testimony alone 

warrants reversal, we do not consider the appellant’s other claims.”). However, the 

undersigned is curious about another matter which the ALJ can address on remand and that is 

why the administrative decision contains no recognition that plaintiff’s application was also for 

supplemental security income (see Tr. 17-26 (no citations to Title XVI SSI regulations); compare id. 

with Tr. 195-200 (application for SSI)). 

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