Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00100/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00100-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

JOSHUA ALLEN STRICKLIN PLAINTIFF 

ADC #138119 

V. No. 5:18CV00100-JM-JTR 

STARK, Captain, 

Cummins Unit, ADC, et al. DEFENDANTS 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 The following Recommended Disposition has been sent to United States 

District Judge James M. Moody Jr. You may file written objections to all or part of 

this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain 

the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of 

this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do 

not file objections, Judge Moody can adopt this Recommendation without 

independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may 

waive the right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. Introduction 

 Plaintiff Joshua Allen Stricklin (“Stricklin”) is a prisoner at the Cummins Unit 

of the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”). He has filed a pro se § 1983 

Complaint and an Amended Complaint alleging that Defendants violated ADC 

policy and his constitutional rights by refusing to provide him with any 

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administrative grievance forms. Docs. 2 & 5. Before Stricklin may proceed with this 

case, the Court must screen his claims.1

 

II. Discussion 

 Stricklin alleges that, from March 23 to April 26, 2018, Defendants Sergeant 

Agnew (“Agnew”), Lieutenant Griffin (“Griffin”), Lieutenant Wade (“Wade”), 

Lieutenant Avery (“Avery”), Lieutenant Bass (“Bass”), Sergeant Nailer (“Nailer”), 

Sergeant Bobby Jones (“Jones”), Sergeant James (“James”), Sergeant G. Smit 

(“Smit”) and Sergeant Boatner (“Boatner”) refused to provide him any 

administrative grievance forms. According to Stricklin, he requested forms from 

each of these Defendants, and each told him there were “no available” forms in his 

barracks. Stricklin alleges that Defendants’ actions were “a conscious effort to 

sabotage and prevent him from filing grievances” regarding prison officials’ refusal 

to issue him a mattress for ten days (March 23 to April 2, 2018).2 Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 

5 at 4. 

 1

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints 

seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or a portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are 

legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). When 

making this determination, a court must accept the truth of the factual allegations contained in the 

complaint, and it may consider documents attached to the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011). 

2

Stricklin filed a separate § 1983 lawsuit alleging that the ten-day mattress denial amounted 

to inhumane conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Stricklin v. Griffin, 

E.D. Ark. No. 5:18cv00093-BSM-JTR (Stricklin I). On October 29, 2018, the Court dismissed that 

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 Stricklin alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated ADC policy, which 

requires that grievance forms be “readily available” in each housing area. He also 

alleges that their conduct violated his constitutional right to access the courts because 

it prevented him from exhausting his administrative remedies about the mattress 

denial, which he was required to do before presenting claims on the issue to the 

federal court and to the Arkansas State Claims Commission (“Commission”). Doc. 

2 at 4-6; Doc. 5 at 4, 6-8. 

 Stricklin sues Defendants in their official and individual capacities, and he 

seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Doc. 2 at 2 & 5; Doc. 5 at 2 & 5. 

A. Defendant Stark 

 In his initial Complaint, Stricklin named Captain Stark (“Stark”) as a 

Defendant, but he did not make any factual or legal allegations against him. Doc. 2 

at 1. The Court ordered Stricklin to amend his Complaint to explain how Stark 

personally participated in denying his constitutional rights. Doc. 4 at 2. Stricklin’s 

Amended Complaint does not identify Stark as a Defendant, nor does it contain any 

factual or legal allegations about him. Doc. 5 at 1-2 & 4. 

 Accordingly, the Court recommends that Stark be dismissed from this § 1983 

action, without prejudice. 

 

case for failure to state a claim. Id., docs. 13 & 16. Stricklin does not challenge the mattress denial 

in this action. 

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B. Violation of ADC Policy

 Stricklin alleges that Defendants violated the ADC grievance policy, which 

requires that grievance forms be “readily available to any inmate in any housing area 

at any time.” Doc. 2 at 4-6. 

 As a matter of law, the violation of prison policy, standing alone, does not rise 

to the level of a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983. Moore v. Rowley, 

126 Fed. Appx. 759, 760 (8th Cir. 2005); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 

(8th Cir. 1997). In addition, it is well settled that prisoners do not have a due process 

right to enforce compliance with internal prison rules or regulations. Phillips v. 

Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003). 

 Finally, the Eighth Circuit has made it clear that prisoners do not have a 

constitutional right to a grievance procedure. Walker v. Bertsch, 745 Fed. Appx. 664, 

664 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that prisoner did not state a due process claim regarding 

the prison’s grievance system, “as the grievance system does not give rise to a liberty 

interest requiring due process protection”); Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 

(8th Cir. 2002); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (grievance 

system is a “procedural right only” and does not “confer any substantive right upon 

the inmates”). Thus, there is no § 1983 liability simply because a prison official fails 

to process a grievance, or even when the official prevents a prisoner from filing a 

grievance. Williams v. Robinson, 623 Fed. Appx. 832, 833 (8th Cir. 2015) (allegation 

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that prisoner was “not allowed to file a grievance” regarding outgoing mail did not 

state a viable claim); Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

 Accordingly, Stricklin’s claim, that Defendants Agnew, Griffin, Wade, 

Avery, Bass, Nailer, Jones, James, Smit and Boatner violated ADC policy requiring 

that grievance forms be “readily available,” fails to state a viable claim for relief 

under § 1983. 

C. Constitutional Right to Access the Courts 

 Stricklin alleges that the refusal of Defendants Agnew, Griffin, Wade, Avery, 

Bass, Nailer, Jones, James, Smit, and Boatner to provide him with grievance forms 

violated his constitutional right to access the courts because: (1) it “constructively 

and literally” prevented him from satisfying the exhaustion requirement for filing a 

§ 1983 claim with the federal courts about the mattress-denial issue; and (2) it 

“direct[ly] result[ed]” in the dismissal of a case he had filed with the Claims 

Commission about the issue. Doc. 2 at 4-5; Doc. 5 at 4. 

 Prisoners have a constitutional right to access the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 

U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (this right is “established beyond doubt”).

3

 To have standing 

 3

The constitutional source for the right of access to the court is “unsettled.” Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002) (noting that courts have grounded the right in the 

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Fifth 

Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due 

Process Clauses); see Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1989) (“The prisoner’s right of 

access has been described as a consequence of the right to due process of law and as an aspect of 

equal protection.”) (internal citations omitted); Earl v. Fabian, 556 F.3d 717, 726 (8th Cir. 2009) 

(“Access to the courts is a constitutional right whose basis is unsettled.”). 

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to proceed with a court access claim, a prisoner must show that he was “actually 

injured” in regard to a “nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal 

claim.” White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Harbury, 536 

U.S. at 413). In this respect, “actual injury” means “actual prejudice with respect to 

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or 

to present a claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996). Furthermore, actual 

injury occurs, for constitutional purposes, only when a prisoner’s impeded claim was 

an attack on his sentence or an action for “vindication of fundamental civil rights” 

regarding his conditions of confinement. Id. at 354-55; White, 494 F.3d at 680. 

“Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and 

perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 355 (emphasis in original). 

 Finally, in a “backward-looking” court access claim, such as this one, the 

prisoner must also show that he has been denied access to a remedy that is 

unavailable in a current or future lawsuit. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-15 (a “backwardlooking” claim is one in which the “official acts claimed to have denied access may 

allegedly have caused the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, the 

loss of an opportunity to sue, or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular 

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order of relief”) (internal citations omitted).4

 “There is, after all, no point in spending 

time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access when a plaintiff 

would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler case without the denial-ofaccess element.” Id. at 415. 

 Thus, to establish an “actual injury” sufficient to proceed with his court access 

claim, Stricklin must identify: (1) an arguably meritorious underlying claim 

regarding his conditions of confinement;5

 (2) actions by Defendants that impeded 

litigation of that claim; and (3) a remedy that may be awarded that would not 

otherwise be available. See Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415. 

 1. Stricklin’s Claim That He Was Denied Access to the Federal Courts 

 Stricklin argues that Defendants’ refusal to provide any grievance forms 

“constructively and literally prevent[ed] [him] from exhausting [his] legal claims in 

[federal] court concerning being deprived of a mattress for ... 10 days.” Doc. 2 at 4. 

This claim clearly fails for lack of an “actual injury.” 

 Before filing this lawsuit, Stricklin filed a separate § 1983 action in this Court 

alleging that he had been denied a mattress for ten days (March 23 to April 2, 2018), 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Stricklin I, supra note 2. On October 29, 

 4

In contrast, a “forward-looking” court access claim is one in which “systemic official 

action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing suits at the present time,” such 

as in cases involving denial of access to a prison law library. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413. 

5

Stricklin’s mattress-denial claim obviously was not an attack on his sentence. 

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2018, the Court dismissed Stricklin I for failure to state a viable claim, concluding 

that Stricklin’s allegation “did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Id., 

docs. 13 & 16. In that action, Stricklin specifically alleged that prison officials had 

“sabotaged” his efforts to file an administrative grievance about the mattress issue 

by refusing to provide any grievance forms. However, as the Court explained, the 

alleged lack of access to the ADC grievance process “did not prevent [Stricklin] 

from initiating this § 1983 lawsuit, nor has it prevented the Court from adjudicating 

his claims and determining them to be non-meritorious.” Id., doc. 13 at 8. Thus, 

regardless of whether Stricklin had exhausted his ADC administrative remedies 

about the mattress issue, the Court reviewed his underlying claim and found it to be 

without merit. 

Because Stricklin was in no way prevented or impeded from filing a § 1983 

lawsuit in federal court about the mattress denial, this aspect of his constitutional 

court access claim must be dismissed. 

 2. Stricklin’s Claim That He Was Denied Access to Claims Commission 

 Stricklin also argues that the Claims Commission’s dismissal of his mattressdenial claim was a “direct result” of Defendants’ refusal to provide grievance forms. 

Doc. 5 at 4-5. This claim also fails. 

 According to documents attached to his Amended Complaint, on April 26, 

2018, Stricklin filed a claim with the Claims Commission seeking $10,000 in 

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damages because he was deprived of a mattress. The ADC moved to dismiss his 

claim arguing, inter alia, that Stricklin failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

because he did not file a grievance with the ADC about the issue. Stricklin did not

respond to the motion to dismiss. Id. at 6. 

 On August 7, 2018, the Claims Commission granted the ADC’s motion to 

dismiss. Its Order stated: 

 Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a

claimant must utilize and exhaust the administrative remedies before 

seeking relief from the Claims Commission. See Ark. Dept. of Health 

and Human Servs. v. Smith, 370 Ark. 490, 492-93 (2007). The purpose 

of this doctrine is to provide the agency with an opportunity to address 

the issue. See id. Where a claimant fails to exhaust his or her 

administrative remedies, the Claims Commission lacks jurisdiction to 

hear the claim. 

 ... Based upon the lack of documents attached to Claimant’s 

claim and Claimant’s failure to respond to the [motion to dismiss], the 

Claims Commission finds that Claimant failed to grieve the mattress 

issue. As such, the Claims Commission finds that Claimant failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies and that dismissal is proper. 

Doc. 5 at 7. 

 Stricklin did not submit to this Court a copy of the claim he filed with the 

Claims Commission, nor does he explain the basis for that claim other than that he 

was “denied a mattress from 3-23-18 to 4-2-18.” Id. at 4. To adequately plead an 

access-to-the-courts claim, a prisoner is required to describe in his § 1983 complaint

the underlying cause of action that was allegedly impeded so that the Court can 

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determine whether it is “nonfrivolous” and “arguably meritorious.” Harbury, 536 

U.S. at 415-16. 

 If Stricklin’s Claims Commission action was for anything other than 

“vindication of fundamental civil rights,” it fails under Lewis, as explained above. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-55; see Nation v. Dickerson, No. 2:16cv00134-BSM, 2017 

WL 1393700 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 14, 2017) (dismissal of prisoner’s Claims Commission 

action was not “actual injury” under the Constitution because his “underlying legal 

claims were based on violations of prison policy, not an attack on his conviction or 

an action to vindicate his civil rights”). 

 The result is the same if the Court assumes that Stricklin raised the same 

inhumane conditions of confinement claim before the Claims Commission that he 

raised in Stricklin I. Because his mattress denial claim in Stricklin I was found to be 

non-meritorious, it follows that his underlying legal claim before the Claims 

Commission was also non-meritorious, regardless of whether he had 

administratively exhausted that claim. 

 In addition, Stricklin has not shown that Defendants’ alleged refusal to 

provide grievance forms actually impeded him from litigating his action before the 

Claims Commission. Stricklin’s Claims Commission action was dismissed for lack 

of administrative exhaustion. However, he did not respond to the ADC’s motion to 

dismiss on this basis; he did not file a motion to reconsider; and he did not appeal 

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the Claims Commission’s dismissal. See Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10-211(a)(1) 

(Westlaw 2019) (allowing 40 days from the Claims Commission’s final order to file 

a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal to the General Assembly). Thus, 

Stricklin was not prevented from making his arguments about the lack of grievance 

forms; he simply chose not to do so. In short, he fails to explain why he could not 

have avoided dismissal by arguing to the Claims Commission that prison officials 

obstructed his efforts to exhaust when they refused to provide any grievance forms. 

 Finally, Stricklin has not shown, as required by Harbury, that he had no 

remedy other than his allegedly thwarted claim before the Claims Commission. At 

the time the Claims Commission dismissed his claim, his § 1983 action in Stricklin 

I – raising the same claim that he was denied a mattress for ten days – was still 

pending. In Stricklin I, the Court ultimately addressed the merits of his mattress 

claim, finding it to be without merit. Thus, he did not “lose” the ability to present 

the mattress claim, nor was he prevented from fully litigating it to resolution. 

 Because Stricklin did not suffer an actual injury related to his Claims 

Commission claim, the Court recommends that this aspect of his constitutional court 

access claim also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. 

III. Conclusion 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

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 1. Stricklin’s Complaint and Amended Complaint (Docs. 2 & 5) be 

DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

 2. The dismissal of this case be counted as a “STRIKE,” pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

 3. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in 

forma pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommendation would not be 

taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 14th day of November, 2019. 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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