Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02745/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02745-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kuy Volland, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Mobile Mini, Inc., 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-02745-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 55)

and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Declaration of Katherine Callaway (Doc. 63). For the

reasons stated below, both motions are denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an Asian-American woman, alleges that Defendant, a national publiclytraded company headquartered in Tempe, Arizona that leases and sells portable storage

containers and related devices, subjected her to a hostile work environment and retaliated

against her when she complained that her supervisor made racially and sexually demeaning

remarks. (Doc. 1).

On October 8, 2007, Plaintiff began working for Defendant as its National Accounts

Manager. (Doc. 56 ¶ 17). She reported to Paul Widner, who was Defendant’s Vice President

of Sales and Development. (Id. ¶ 20). In December of 2007, Nicholas Scirghio replaced

Widner as the Vice President of Sales and Development, and Plaintiff then reported to

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Scirghio. (Id. at 21). On December 23, 2005, in response to earlier complaints, Scirghio had

been issued a written warning that stated “[a]ny repeated complaints of the above issues will

lead to further discipline up to and including suspension, demotion, or termination.” (Doc.

61-3, Ex. H).

In anticipation of acquiring a competitor, Defendant undertook several broad

reorganization efforts in early 2008, overseen by Mark Graham, Defendant’s Director of

Professional Development. (Doc. 56 ¶ 35). As part of the reorganization, Defendant created

a National Account Support Center. (Id. at 37). In addition, the position of National Accounts

Manager, held by Plaintiff, was eliminated, and a new position, National Accounts Support

Center Manager, was created. (Id. at 38). Graham informed Plaintiff of the changes

personally on April 3, 2008, and while Plaintiff took the news calmly, she stated that she did

not understand why she was not automatically selected to be the National Accounts Support

Center Manager. (Id. at 41). On April 8, 2008, Scirghio sent an email to the Branch Managers

and the Branch Office Managers, copying Graham, announcing a number of new positions,

including the National Account Support Center Manager. (Doc. 56-3, Ex. 7(B)). The email

stated that Defendant’s preference is to “promote from within,” and stated that anyone

interested in a position should email Graham or Scirghio. (Id.).

Plaintiff applied for the position of National Account Support Center Manager; she

also approached Katherine Callaway, Defendant’s Vice President of Human Resources and

Risk Management. (Doc. 56-2, Ex. 2 at 98). According to Callaway, the two met “a couple

of times.” (Id. at 101). During the meetings, Plaintiff expressed her belief that “it was

discrimination that [Scirghio] did not have to re-apply for his job but she had to re-apply for

her job.” (Id.). During that meeting or another meeting with Callaway, Plaintiff reported that

Steve Bunger, the President and CEO of Defendant, had spoken with Scirghio about Asian

reflexology massage, and that Bunger had made a joke about receiving a “happy ending” at

the end of the massage. (Id. at 107). When meeting with Plaintiff before Plaintiff was

interviewed for the position, Callaway “advise[d] her to wait until after her interview to see

what happened,” rather than make a formal complaint. (Id. at 100). Callaway believed that

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Plaintiff would be hired for the position, and told Plaintiff so. (Id. at 102). She acknowledged

in her deposition that one reason she did not investigate the allegation that Scirghio had

participated in the telling of a racially and sexually offensive joke was that if she did, “[i]t

may have affected [Plaintiff]’s employment in some way or another,” and that Callaway

“really wanted [Plaintiff] to have an unbiased shot at that position.” (Id. at 146).

Plaintiff was interviewed for the position by Scirghio and Graham. (Doc. 55 ¶ 113).

Another internal applicant, Mary Gaskin, was interviewed only by Graham. (Id. ¶ 114).

Gaskin was offered the position of National Account Support Center Manager on April 11,

2008. (Id. ¶ 130). Plaintiff again met with Callaway, and stated that she believed she had not

received the job because Scirghio had retaliated against her, and that Scirghio had engaged

in “inappropriate behavior.” (Doc. 56-2, Ex. 2 at 109–10). On April 14, Scirghio emailed

Plaintiff, asking her to “list for me all the duties you perform in your roll [sic],” and

requesting that she describe the duties of newly-created positions that would be reporting to

Gaskin. (Doc. 61-4, Ex. O). Volland responded, but when asked to train someone hired for

the newly-created position, she again approached Callaway. Callaway emailed Scirghio,

stating that asking Plaintiff to train Gaskin and those who would report to Gaskin was

“belittling” because “on one hand she isn’t good enough for the job, but on the other hand

you want her to do the job.” (Doc. 6-14, Ex. P). Scirghio responded that “it is obvious to me

that we made the right choice with Mary just base [sic] on [Plaintiff]’s actions over the past

few days.” (Doc. 61-4, Ex. N). Gaskin herself describes the position that Plaintiff originally

held as “the position I pretty much think I took.” (Doc. 61-3, Ex. F at 69).

Plaintiff was offered a severance agreement on April 16, 2008, which offered her two

weeks pay in exchange for a waiver of any claim of discrimination or retaliation. (Doc. 56-3,

Ex. 7(E)). Plaintiff declined to sign the agreement and received no severance. (Doc. 56 ¶

147–48). Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) which found on August 31, 2010 that she had been retaliated against by being

asked to sign a severance agreement containing unlawful provisions. (Doc. 61-4, Ex M). The

EEOC made no finding on any other charge. (Id.).

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

In July of 2008, Gaskin complained to Graham that Scirghio regularly engaged in

sexual innuendo at work, favored attractive female employees over others, and engaged in

otherwise inappropriate behavior at work. (Doc. 61-3, Ex. F at 41). In November of 2008,

after Scirghio attended a dinner with a number of employees as part of a team-building

exercise, multiple employees complained that he had engaged in inappropriate behavior at

the dinner. (Doc. 61-3, Ex. J). Defendant conducted an extensive investigation and a

“Memorandum/ Employee Warning Report” was prepared and dated December 18, 2008.

(Doc. 61-3, Ex. K). There is no evidence in the record of Scirghio receiving any other

discipline based on the December 2008 investigation. (Doc. 61-2, Ex. A at 91).

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 20, 2010. When Callaway was deposed, she

stated that she did not know whether Defendant had a “zero-tolerance policy” with regard

to sexual harassment, that she does not “work by consulting policy” but instead evaluates

“the working relationship as a whole and the people within the relationship” and would use

her “instinct and my intuition” rather than any written policy to determine whether someone

needed to be disciplined. (Doc. 63-1, Ex. C at 26, 48). Subsequently she submitted a

declaration that quotes extensively from Defendant’s written sexual harassment policy.

(Doc.63-1, Ex. A).

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s suit, and

Plaintiff has moved to strike Callaway’s declaration. (Docs. 55, 63).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Strike

When a party repudiates a previous deposition in a subsequent affidavit, the affidavit

testimony cannot be relied upon to “‘create’ an issue of fact and avoid summary judgment.”

Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless,

“[a]ggressive invocation of the rule also threatens to ensnare parties who may simply have

been confused during their deposition” and therefore the rule should be applied cautiously.

Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009).

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary

judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record]

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“Issues of credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.” Harris

v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). See also Consol. Elec. Co.

v. United States, 355 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1966) (reversing summary judgment and stating

that “[w]hen an issue requires determination of state of mind, it is unusual that disposition

may be made by summary judgment”). Because credibility determinations and motive are

particularly important considerations in employment discrimination cases, the Ninth Circuit

has held that “in the context of employment discrimination, we have emphasized the

importance of zealously guarding an employee’s right to full trial.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co.,

520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008).

II. Analysis

A. Motion to Strike

It is not proper to invoke the sham affidavit rule to strike Callaway’s affidavit. The

affidavit is not in fact in conflict with Callaway’s deposition testimony. The portions of the

affidavit to which Plaintiff objects detail Defendant’s written anti-discrimination policy. The

fact that such a policy exists does not contradict Callaway’s statement that she does not work

by consulting policy but instead evaluates whether or not one employee has sexually harassed

another based on her intuition and instinct. (Doc. 63-1, Ex. C at 26, 48). In her statement of

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

facts in opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff acknowledges as much, writing that she

“admits that [Defendant] has accurately quoted its antidiscrimination policy, but DENIES

that [Defendant] actually enforces the policy.” (Doc. 61 ¶ 6) (emphasis in original). In

evaluating Defendant’s summary judgment motion, the Court will rely on all evidence

submitted, including Callaway’s affidavit and her deposition.

B. Summary Judgment

Plaintiff alleges both that she was retaliated against for complaining about Scirghio’s

behavior and that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. These claims will be

addressed in turn.

1. Retaliation

Title VII “prohibits retaliation against an employee ‘because [she] has opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice’” by Title VII. Nelson v. Pima Cmty.

College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)).

Retaliation claims are evaluated under the familiar three-part test for Title VII claims

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima

facie case of retaliation, an employee must show that “(1) he engaged in a protected activity;

(2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists

between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234,

1240 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit “has explained that . . . ‘the requisite degree of proof

necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII on summary judgment is minimal and

does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.’” Villiarimo v.

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2002).

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer has the burden to put

forward “legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for any adverse actions taken.” Steiner v.

Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464–65 (9th Cir. 1994). If the employer meets this

burden, the employee then “has the ultimate burden of showing that [the employer’s]

proffered reasons are pretextual.” Id. The plaintiff may do so by presenting either direct

evidence or specific and substantial circumstantial evidence that the defendant’s reason was

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

a pretext to retaliate against her. See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062; Godwin v. Hunt Wesson,

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998).

a. Prima Facie Case

Plaintiff claims that she reported to Callaway in late 2007 and early 2008 that Scirghio

had made sexually and racially offensive comments in the workplace, such as repeatedly

referring to her as “China Doll,” stating that “Asian women are supposed to be submissive,”

and suggesting that she should use her looks to advance her career. (Doc. 61 ¶ 175).

According to Plaintiff, she made a total of three complaints; first Callaway told her to “brush

off” Scirghio’s behavior, but ultimately warned her that Plaintiff could lose her job if she

continued to complain, and told her that others who had complained about Scirghio had

subsequently lost their jobs. (Doc. 61 ¶¶ 178–87). Additionally, she states that she asked

Scirghio to stop making such comments on multiple occasions, but that his response was to

grin, laugh, or joke. (Doc. 61 ¶ 183). Defendant points to evidence which it claims suggests

that Plaintiff did not make these early complaints, but acknowledges that for the purposes of

summary judgment, it “accepts as true [Plaintiff’s] allegations that she complained” prior to

April 2008. (Doc. 55 at 6). Moreover, Callaway denies telling Plaintiff that she could lose

her job over complaining, although subsequent discovery has revealed that two earlier

women had in fact complained about Scirghio and he had received no punishment other than

a written warning. (Doc. 33 at 120:4; 80:9–24).

Plaintiff was employed until April of 2008, at which point she was let go and offered

severance on the condition that she not file a Title VII complaint. (Doc. 56-3, Ex. 7(E)).

Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s position was eliminated and replaced with a substantively

different position, but the internal candidate who took that position described it as Plaintiff’s

previous position. (Doc. 61-3 at 69:17–20). Defendant claims that Scirghio played no role

in selecting another candidate over Plaintiff for the position, and that the person who did

select the other candidate had no way of knowing about Plaintiff’s complaint history. (Doc.

55 at 13–14). It is not contested that Scirghio sent out the notice for the position and asked

potential applicants to email him, that Scirghio interviewed candidates for the position,

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

including Plaintiff, and that after another candidate was selected for the position, Scirghio

wrote an email about Plaintiff stating that “it is obvious to me that we made the right choice”

in hiring someone else. (Doc. 61-4, Ex. N). A reasonable jury could conclude that Scirghio

played some role in deciding whom to hire for the position. Since Scirghio was the subject

of the complaints and because a jury could believe Plaintiff when she stated that she

complained to him directly, Plaintiff has established a causal connection between her

complaints and the loss of her job and has therefore made out her prima facie case.

b. Legitimate, Non-retaliatory Reasons

Defendant notes that the person hired for the position, Mary Gaskin, had substantially

more experience managing people than Plaintiff, and that the new job would require more

management experience. (Doc. 56 ¶ 44). To meet its burden in the second step of the

McDonnell Douglas test, an employer need only “articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action,” and Defendant here has met that burden.

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc. 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).

c. Pretext

At the third step, the Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the employer’s

proffered reason is pretextual, “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Chuang v. University of California Davis,

225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000). If the evidence of pretext is circumstantial, it must be

“specific and substantial in order to create a triable issue.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150

F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has found “substantial evidence” of

pretext when the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, shows that those

people involved with the adverse employment decision were “the very people whose actions

had prompted [a plaintiff’s] complaints.” Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 505

(9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she complained to Scirghio directly in addition

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Plaintiff claims additionally that her EEOC determination constitutes evidence of

retaliation. (Doc. 64 at 26). An EEOC determination is “highly probative” of the merits of

a complaint. Plummer v. Western Intern. Hotels Co., Inc., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff’s EEOC determination, however, did not involve an allegation that she was

retaliated against when Defendant did not hire her for the managerial position, but only

addressed whether requiring her to waive the right to sue in exchange for severance was itself

retaliatory.

- 9 -

to complaining to Callaway about Scirghio.1

 (Doc. 61 ¶¶ 177–183). Callaway acknowledged

in her deposition that if Scirghio knew that Plaintiff had complained about her, Scirghio

“might say something to her that might increase her stress,” or “[i]t might have affected her

employment in some way or other.” (Doc. 61-2, Ex. A at 145:23-146:21). Although

Defendant contests the fact that Plaintiff ever complained to Callaway prior to April of 2008

and asserts that Scirghio played no role in deciding whom to hire, when material issues of

fact are found in Plaintiff’s favor, Scirghio participated in the decision to hire or terminate

Plaintiff while aware that she had filed complaints against him for his inappropriate

comments. Such facts would constitute substantial evidence of pretext, and summary

judgment on the retaliation claim will be denied.

2. Hostile Work Environment

Title VII provides that an employer may not “discriminate against an individual with

respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of

such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

(2006). A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving the discrimination

“created a hostile or abusive work environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.

57, 66 (1986).

An employee was subject to a hostile work environment when he or she can show “(1)

that he or she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial or sexual nature, (2) that

this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875–76 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit has

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

cautioned that “where two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to

distinct components,” so Plaintiff’s allegations regarding racial and sexual comments must

be considered together. Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994). If

an employee experiences a hostile work environment, an employer has an affirmative defense

to liability if the employer has “provided a proven, effective mechanism for reporting and

resolving complaints of sexual harassment, available to the employee without undue risk or

expense,” and the employee “failed to avail herself of the employer’s preventive or remedial

apparatus.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998).

Plaintiff alleges that working for Scirghio required enduring a constant barrage of

sexually and racially demeaning comments. She claims that the first time she met him,

Scirghio stated, “I didn’t think [Plaintiff’s husband] had a hot little Asian as a wife.” (Doc.

61 ¶ 175). He advised her to “use her body to market,” and asked “so you never flaunt your

goods to get in the door?” (Id.). He told her that she did not need to exercise because “you

look hot already,” and asked her to come into his office and fix his phone because “your

people are good at computers and phones and things like that.” (Id.). He referred to her as

“China Doll,” according to Plaintiff, too many times for her to remember, and stared at her

breasts so frequently that she had to tell him to look at her face instead. (Id.). He stated that

he could “make or break” her career and asked “what she was going to do for him” while

leering at her. (Id.). Defendant denies that many of these statements were made, and provides

evidence to impeach Plaintiff’s credibility. (Doc. 55 at 6). At summary judgment, however,

“[i]ssues of credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.” Harris, 183

F.3d at 1051.

Scirghio’s alleged comments were racial and sexual in nature, and Plaintiff credibly

claims that they were unwelcome. The alleged behavior would create “an environment that

a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,

21 (1993). An objectively reasonable person would find that the comments were not merely

“genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with

members of the same sex and the opposite sex.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc.,

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The record contains an “Employee Warning Report” regarding the November 2008

incident. (Doc. 61-3, Ex. K). This “warning” does not mention the previous “warning” which

promised that Scirghio would be disciplined for repeating his behavior, and does not state

that Scirghio is receiving discipline. The copy is not signed by Scirghio or anyone else; and

there is no evidence in the record that the “warning” was actually provided to him.

- 11 -

523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). Resolving disputed issues in her favor, Plaintiff has shown that she

was subjected to a hostile work environment.

Nor can Defendant avail itself of the affirmative defense outlined in Faragher.

Plaintiff does not deny that Defendant had a sexual harassment policy in place, but a

reasonable jury could conclude, based on Callaway’s deposition testimony and Defendant’s

response to multiple complaints against Scirghio, that it did not enforce this policy, or in any

event did not enforce it with regard to Scirghio. The Court has not considered whether the

underlying allegations in the previous complaints are admissible at summary judgment in

support of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Scirghio’s actions; it has considered these

incidents only with regards to how they bear on Defendant’s Faragher defense. Scirghio was

the subject of multiple complaints of sexually inappropriate behavior after Plaintiff was fired,

and the record contains no evidence that Defendant took any action beyond issuing warning

letters, only to issue further warning letters when the warnings were not heeded.2

A reasonable jury, moreover, could conclude, based upon Callaway’s deposition, that

Defendant did not enforce its written sexual harassment policy. Callaway stated that she does

not consult written policy but instead works by intuition. (Doc. 61-2, Ex. A at 48). She stated

that she believes a hostile work environment is “one in which a person is so distraught

that—and distracted by whatever is making the environment hostile that they can’t perform

their job functions.” (Id. at 151). The Supreme Court has specifically rejected this argument,

noting that “the test is not whether work has been impaired, but whether working conditions

have been discriminatorily altered.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring). Callaway

also stated that she was not aware of whether Defendant had a zero-tolerance policy towards

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Defendant argues that “zero-tolerance policy” is a “vague and undefined term.”

(Doc. 67 at 3). Plaintiff’s attorney greatly reduced any confusion by asking Callaway if she

understood the term to mean that “[w]e will not tolerate any sexual harassment, even a little

bit is what I mean, zero tolerance, we will absolutely not tolerate discriminatory harassment

at work.” (Doc. 63-1, Ex. C at 25–26). Callaway stated that she understood that definition

and did not know whether Defendant had such a policy. Id.

- 12 -

sexual harassment. (Id. at 25–26).3

 A reasonable jury could conclude, based on Defendant’s

handling of the multiple complaints against Scirghio and Callaway’s deposition, that

Defendant did not offer “a proven, effective mechanism for reporting and resolving

complaints of sexual harassment, available to the employee without undue risk or expense.”

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. Given the fact that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Defendant fulfilled the first prong of the Faragher defense, consideration of the

second prong is not necessary. Defendant is denied summary judgment with regards to the

hostile work environment claim.

CONCLUSION

Callaway’s declaration does not contradict her deposition. Plaintiff’s motion to strike

her declaration is denied and the Court considered both the declaration and the deposition in

ruling on Defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of retaliation, and Defendant has put forth a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Because a

reasonable jury could credit Plaintiff’s claims that she complained directly to Scirghio about

his behavior, and because a jury could believe that Scirghio was involved in the decision not

to hire Plaintiff, genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the decision not to hire

her was pretextual. Moreover, a reasonable person crediting Plaintiff’s account of Scirghio’s

behavior would find that Scirghio’s comments created a hostile work environment. Based on

Defendant’s failure to discipline Scirghio for similar incidents, and Callaway’s statements

in her deposition that she does not work according to written policy, Defendant cannot avail

itself of the Faragher defense.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 55) is denied.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Declaration of Katherine Callaway (doc. 63)

is denied.

DATED this 16th day of July, 2012.

Case 2:10-cv-02745-GMS Document 72 Filed 07/16/12 Page 13 of 13