Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00433/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00433-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark Fischer,

Petitioner,

v. 

B. Von Blankensee,

Respondent.

No. CV-19-00433-TUC-RCC

ORDER 

On January 15, 2020, Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommended the Court deny Petitioner Mark 

Fischer’s pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a 

Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”) (Doc. 9). (Doc. 17.) Judge Ferraro notified the 

parties they had fourteen days from the date of the R&R to file objections and an 

additional fourteen days to file a response. Id. Plaintiff filed his objection to the R&R

(Doc. 20); Defendant did not file a response. For the reasons stated below, the Court 

adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and denies the Petition.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW: MAGISTRATE’S R&R

The standard of review of a magistrate judge’s R&R is dependent upon whether or 

not a party objects: where there is no objection to a magistrate’s factual or legal 

determinations, the district court need not review the decision “under a de novo or any 

other standard.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). However, when a party 

objects, the district court must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s 

Case 4:19-cv-00433-RCC Document 21 Filed 03/05/20 Page 1 of 5
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or 

modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the 

magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). Moreover, “while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de 

novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, 

sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.” Thomas, 

474 U.S. at 154. 

II. FACTUAL HISTORY

Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate’s statement of facts. As such, the Court 

adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recitation of facts, and merely summarizes as necessary to 

address Petitioner’s objections. 

Petitioner has been denied parole three times; the third denial forms the basis for 

the instant Petition. Petitioner alleges that the United States Parole Commission 

(“Commission”) erred when it denied him parole because the Commission (1) incorrectly 

calculated his risk of recidivism under the Static-99 score and (1) inappropriately 

evaluated Petitioner’s minimalization of his offense. (Doc. 9 at 4.) The Commission gave 

Petitioner a Static-99 score of 3 when he should have received a Static-99R score of -1. 

Id.

Respondent admits that Petitioner was given an incorrect Static-99R score. (Doc. 

15 at 2.) Respondent further concedes that Petitioner is entitled to a new parole hearing 

but disagrees with Petitioner’s assertion that the error entitles him to immediate release. 

Id. Regardless, Respondent claims, since Petitioner was granted a new parole hearing the 

Petition is now moot. Id. at 4-6.

Petitioner counterargues that he is not raising a due process claim, but instead he is 

challenging the Commission’s lack of evidence supporting its denial of parole. Because 

of this, he claims, the Court should evaluate whether the Commission had “good cause” 

to depart from the parole guidelines. (Doc. 16 at 7.) To grant him relief, Petitioner 

believes the Court must determine that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and 

Case 4:19-cv-00433-RCC Document 21 Filed 03/05/20 Page 2 of 5
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

order the Commission to immediately grant parole. (Doc. 9 at 9.)

III. MAGISTRATE’S R&R

The Magistrate Judge found that because he had already been granted a rehearing, 

there was no further relief that the Court could provide and therefore Petitioner’s claim 

was moot. (Doc. 17 at 3-6.) The Magistrate Judge indicated, “The appropriate remedy for 

the Commission’s admitted error in considering the wrong Static-99R

1

score is a new 

parole eligibility hearing. See, e.g., Benites v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 595 F.2d 518, 520, 521 

(9th Cir. 1979) (upholding district court’s grant of partial habeas relief in the form of a 

new parole eligibility hearing where parole commission applied incorrect criteria in 

denying parole).” Id. at 4.

In addition, the judge disagreed with Petitioner’s assertion that (1) he was not 

raising a due process claim and (2) because it was not a due process claim, a new parole 

hearing was not the appropriate relief, but rather immediate parole. Id. at 5. The judge 

found the case law cited by Respondent persuasive wherein an error in a parole hearing 

permitted a new hearing for relief. Id.

IV. PETITIONER’S OBJECTION

Petitioner’s Objection again argues that he was not raising a due process claim, 

therefore, the Court should evaluate whether there was good cause to vary from the 

parole guidelines. (Doc. 20 at 3-5.) Because he asserts there was no good cause, the 

decision was arbitrary, and he is entitled to an order vacating the Commissioner’s 

decision, mandating a rehearing, and granting immediate parole. Id. at 3.

V. DUE PROCESS

“A federal court’s jurisdiction to review the Parole Commission’s decisions ‘is 

limited. [The district court] determine[s] whether the Commission exceeded its statutory 

authority or acted so arbitrarily as to violate due process.’” Williams v. Ives, No. CV 15-

5116-GW (AGR), 2017 WL 1030114, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Benny v. U.S.

1 Petitioner argues that the Magistrate said the Commission gave him a Static 99R score 

instead of a Static 99 score. This is inconsequential to the Court’s determination that 

Petitioner’s claims are moot. Moreover, Petitioner has not explained how the error would 

change the Court’s analysis. 

Case 4:19-cv-00433-RCC Document 21 Filed 03/05/20 Page 3 of 5
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Parole Comm’n, 295 F.3d 977, 981-81) (9th Cir. 2002)).

Despite his contention that he asserts a “good cause” claim, not a due process 

violation, the court is not convinced. He claims that the Commission’s denial of parole

was contrary to parole guidelines, was arbitrary and capricious, and was beyond the 

Commission’s statutory authority provided for by the laws of the United States. This is a 

due process claim. 

VI. REMEDY AND MOOTNESS

“A federal court does not have jurisdiction to give opinions upon moot questions 

or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the 

matter in issue in the case before it.” Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 

1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted). An issue is moot and 

must be dismissed when “an event occurs that prevents the court from granting effective 

relief.” Id. 

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the appropriate remedy for 

Petitioner’s alleged due process violation is to grant a new hearing. See Williams v. Ives, 

No. CV 15-5116-GW (AGR), 2017 WL 1030114, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (finding 

that a new hearing, not immediate release, is the appropriate remedy for due process 

violation caused by a parole decision). Petitioner has already been granted a new hearing 

at the next available hearing date. Therefore, the action the Court would take–to order a 

new parole hearing–has already been effectuated and any order by the Court would be 

meaningless. This renders the issue moot.

Petitioner’s objection also asks the Court to hold its decision in abeyance pending 

the rehearing. This is inappropriate because regardless of the outcome, the rehearing will 

have no effect on the Court’s analysis of the instant parole denial. The Court declines to 

stay this matter.

VII. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

“The plain language of [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c)(1) does not require a petitioner to

obtain a [certificate of appealability] in order to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition.”

Case 4:19-cv-00433-RCC Document 21 Filed 03/05/20 Page 4 of 5
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2008). “Nor is there any other statutory

basis for imposing a [certificate of appealability] requirement on legitimate § 2241 

petitions. Although state prisoners proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a [certificate of

appealability], see § 2253(c)(1)(A), there is no parallel requirement for federal prisoners.”

Id.; see also Close v. Thomas, 653 F.3d 970, 974 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, because 

Petitioner is a federal prisoner bringing a legitimate § 2241 petition, a certificate of 

appealability is not required. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Ferraro’s Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED. 

(Doc. 17.)

2. Petitioner’s pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”) DENIED. (Doc. 9.) 

3. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case file 

in this matter.

Dated this 4th day of March, 2020.

Case 4:19-cv-00433-RCC Document 21 Filed 03/05/20 Page 5 of 5