Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00030/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00030-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARMANDO SOLIS,

Petitioner,

v.

C. M. HARRISON,

Respondent.

 /

1: 07 CV 00030 AWI WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RE MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 11]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted in Kings County Superior Court of lewd and lascivious acts with a

child under fourteen years old, forcible sexual penetration, and unlawful corporal punishment of a

child. Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 

which affirmed his appeal. The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on

April 21, 2004. 

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On April 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court in case

number CV-F-05-0498 OWW LJO HC. This petition was dismissed without prejudice on

November 29, 2005.

On April 5, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. The court denied the petition on December 13, 2006.

On January 8, 2007, Petitioner filed the present petition in this court.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kings

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

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grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

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respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is untimely and barred by the

statute of limitations. Petitioner opposes the motion.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

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 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth

Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is

filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. 1

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v.

Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The

Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition

to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and

will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end

before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period

does not, however, toll for the time during which a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is pending in

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federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001). 

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on April 21,

2004. The state appeal process became “final” within the meaning of Section 2244(d)(1)(A) when

the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expired ninety days later, on July 20, 2004. 

Supreme Court Rule 13, Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9 Cir. 1999). The one-year statute of th

limitations began running the following day - - July 21, 2004. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9 Cir. 2001)(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)). Thus, absent tolling, the last day to file a federal

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petition was July 20, 2005.

As Respondent argues, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Section 2244(d)(2). Although Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court, he did so on April 5, 2006, after the statute of limitations expired. Therefore, this

collateral challenge had no tolling consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th

Cir.2000) (petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also,

Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001)(" § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitations period

during the pendency of a federal habeas petition").

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); Calderon v. th

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds th

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that th

"[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at th

1288-1289.

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling in the present case, based on alleged

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negligence by his appellate attorney, and on Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the law. However, an

attorney’s miscalculation of the limitations period, and general negligence in failing to timely file a

petition do not constitute extraordinary circumstances so as to warrant equitable tolling. See

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144

(9 Cir. 2001). Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that claims of ignorance of the law and illiteracy th

are insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800

F.2d 905, 909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but th

insufficient to establish cause); Kibler v. Walters, 220 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9 Cir. 2000) (lack of th

knowledge of state law not cause). 

In light of the above, the court must conclude that this petition for writ of habeas corpus is

untimely and is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss this petition is GRANTED;

2) This petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED with prejudice as barred by the statute

of limitations; and

3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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