Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02570/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02570-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Although the County of San Joaquin and the San Joaquin

County Sheriff’s Department are named separately in Plaintiff’s

Complaint, the Sheriff’s Department is a department of the County

of San Joaquin. 

2 “The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment

are well known, see, e.g., Rodgers v. County of Yolo, 889 F. Supp.

1284 (E.D. Cal. 1995), and need not be repeated here.” Reitter v.

City of Sacramento, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2000).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROL THERESA SMITH, ) CIV-S-03-2570 GEB KJM

)

Plaintiff, ) ORDER

)

v. )

)

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

 )

Defendants County of San Joaquin and San Joaquin County

Sheriff’s Department (hereinafter referenced together as “the

County”)1; Sheriff Baxter Dunn; Sergeant William Dorcey; and Deputy

Van Grouw move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against them

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and unreasonable searches

and seizures. Plaintiff opposes the motion.2

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DISCUSSION

I. The County

The County contends Plaintiff cannot prevail on her § 1983

claim against it because she cannot “establish that she experienced a

depravation of her constitutional rights and that particular conduct

was intended to implement or execute a policy, statement, ordinance,

regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the

County.” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 3-4.) The County may only be

liable under § 1983 when “execution of a government’s policy or custom

. . . inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of

City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Liability for improper

custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it

must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and

consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of

carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

1996). To succeed on her Monell claims, Plaintiff must show that

either (1) “the [County] acted with ‘the state of mind required to

prove the underlying violation,’” or (2) “the [County]’s deliberate

indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the

employee to commit the constitutional violation.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff makes a conclusory allegation that the County has

a “custom and practice” of excessive force, unlawful arrests, and

unreasonable searches and seizures. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

¶ 26.) However, Plaintiff has failed to present specific facts

supporting this conclusory allegation. Therefore, summary judgment is

granted in favor of the County.

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II. Sheriff Dunn

Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC state in a conclusory

manner that Sheriff Dunn is liable in his supervisory capacity for all

of Plaintiff’s claims. (FAC ¶ 25.) Sheriff Dunn counters that

“[P]laintiff has developed no evidence of any kind whatsoever that

Dunn has any individual supervisory liability.” (Defs.’ Reply to

Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) “Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not

liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious

liability.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“A supervisor may be liable [in his individual capacity] if there

exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the

constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.” Id. at 646. A supervisor may be liable if he “set in

motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a

series of acts by others, which he knew or reasonably should have

known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” 

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991).

“Rule 56(c) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]

mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[W]here

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, Rule 56

permits the moving party to point to an absence of evidence to support

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Bay v. Times

Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1991). Since

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3 Plaintiff claims that Sergeant Dorcey is liable in his

individual capacity based on both direct liability and supervisory

liability. (FAC ¶¶ 24, 25.) However, since there is a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Sergeant Dorcey is directly liable

for Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and excessive force, the issue of

Sergeant Dorcey’s supervisory liability need not be reached in this

Order.

4

Defendants have pointed to an absence of evidence showing that Sheriff

Dunn was personally involved in Plaintiff’s arrest or had knowledge of

the acts leading to Plaintiff’s alleged injury, Sheriff Dunn’s motion

for summary judgment is granted.

III. Sergeant Dorcey3 and Deputy Van Grouw (“The Officers”)

The officers argue “[t]here was probable cause to arrest

[Plaintiff] for violating California Penal Code Sections 148 and

647(f) and that she was not subjected to an excessive use of force.” 

(Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.) Alternatively, the officers argue

their conduct “was reasonable in light of the current state of the law

and therefore [they are] entitled to qualified immunity.” (Id.) 

A. Arrest Without Probable Cause

“[P]robable cause exists when, under the totality of the

circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would

have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the suspect]

had committed a crime.” Peng v. Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir.

2003). Plaintiff was arrested under California Penal Code section 148

(“§ 148”) and California Penal Code section 647(f) (“§ 647(f)”). 

(Defs.’ Sep. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUF”) at ¶ 13;

Pl.’s Response to Defs.’ SUF at ¶ 13.) Deputy Van Grouw was one of

the arresting officers who handcuffed Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Separate

Statement of Disputed Facts (“SDF”) ¶ 15.) Under summary judgment

jurisprudence, Sergeant Dorcey is also treated as an arresting officer

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since Plaintiff declares he directed the deputies at the scene to

arrest her and informed her of her arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 23, 24.) 

An officer may face personal liability for an unlawful arrest even

though he did not physically arrest the individual if the officer gave

“authoritative commands constituting the arrest.” Nesmith v. Alford,

318 F.2d 110, 119 (5th Cir. 1963); accord Grandstaff v. City of

Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985). 

The officers assert they had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff for a violation of § 148, which prohibits willfully

resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer engaged in the

performance of his or her duties, because Plaintiff’s presence at the

scene impeded the investigation of the officers. (SUF ¶ 12.) The

officers aver that Plaintiff was asked numerous times to leave the

scene of the criminal investigation they were conducting but Plaintiff

refused to do so and became rude and verbally abusive with the

officers. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) The officers also aver that Plaintiff was

asked numerous times to produce identification but only produced a

California Department of Corrections identification card and refused

to produce identification that included her date of birth. (Id. ¶¶ 8,

9.) However, Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she did not

interfere with peace officers and “was not abusive, belligerent,

obstreperous, or uncooperative.” (SDF ¶ 18.)

The officers also assert they had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff for a violation of § 647(f), which prescribes that it is a

misdemeanor for a person to be “found in any public place under the

influence of intoxicating liquor [or] any drug . . . in a condition

that he or she is unable to exercise care for his or her own safety or

the safety of others, or . . . interferes with or obstructs or

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prevents the free use of any street, sidewalk, or other public way.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 647(f). The officers assert that Plaintiff became

rude, vulgar, and verbally abusive with the deputies on the scene and

appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or some other

intoxicating substance. (SUF ¶¶ 10, 11.) However, Plaintiff avers

she was not drunk, stating that she consumed only two glasses of

champagne several hours before her arrest. (SDF ¶ 1.) Furthermore,

Deputy Ford, another arresting officer on the scene, avers that he

does not know whether he would have arrested Plaintiff for a violation

of § 647(f) if he was not directed to do so by Sergeant Dorcey. (Id.

¶ 33.)

A court must “construe all reasonable inferences in favor of

the non-moving party.” KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504

U.S. 451, 456 (1992)). Drawing reasonable inferences from Plaintiff’s

averments reveals the existence of genuine issues of fact as to

whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for 

violating §§ 148 and 647(f).

Alternatively, the officers assert they are qualifiedly

immune from Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claims. (Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. at 4.) The determination of whether qualified immunity

applies is a two-part inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). First, “Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right?” Id. If a violation of a

constitutional right has been adequately alleged, then the question is

whether the right was clearly established. Id. at 201-02. A right is

“clearly established” if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer

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that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at

201-02. “Whether a right is ‘clearly established’ for purposes of

qualified immunity is an inquiry that ‘must be undertaken in light of

the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’

. . . In other words, ‘[t]he contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right.’” Graves v. City of Coeur

D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 846 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 201).

Since genuine issues of material fact exists as to whether

the officers violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from unlawful

arrest, the inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right

proscribing the unlawful arrest she declares she suffered was clearly

established so that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer

that the officers’ conduct was unlawful in the situation they

confronted. It is recognized that officers who “correctly perceive

all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to

whether [the arrest based on those relevant facts] is legal in those

circumstance[s] [are] entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. (citing

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205). However, since a conflict exists between

the parties’ respective versions of what happened that led to

Plaintiff’s arrest, summary judgment jurisprudence requires

Plaintiff’s version to be credited as accurate. Therefore, a genuine

issue of material fact exists as to whether the officers are

qualifiedly immune from liability on Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest

claim. Accordingly, the officers’ motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim is denied.

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B. Excessive Force

The officers argue that “the force used to arrest

[Plaintiff] was reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting the arresting officers.” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at

11.) Whether a particular use of force was reasonable is judged from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene based upon “a

careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396

(1989). In Graham, the Supreme Court enumerated factors for assessing

“the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,”

which include: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and whether the suspect actively resist[ed] arrest or

attempt[ed] to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396-97.

Plaintiff avers that “Deputy Van Grouw grabbed [her] arms,

handcuffed [her] behind her back and lifted her off the ground by the

handcuffs,” thereby causing a complete tear of her rotator cuff. (SDF

¶¶ 15, 20.) Plaintiff further avers she did not fight the police or

otherwise resist arrest and that Deputy Van Grouw was “real aggressive

[and] forceful[ly]” twisted her arm while “dragg[ing] her off the

ground” toward the police vehicle with her hands behind her. (Id. ¶¶

17, 24-25, 28-30.) Plaintiff also avers she complained about the

excessiveness of the force by twice stating, “You’re hurting me.” 

(Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Because of these averments, a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether the amount of force used by Deputy

Van Grouw was necessary under the circumstances. 

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Further, Plaintiff’s averments also create a genuine issue

of material fact on Sergeant Dorcey’s liability for excessive force

since Plaintiff avers that Sergeant Dorcey directed Deputy Van Grouw

to arrest Plaintiff. Under Plaintiff’s version of what happened, the

reasonable inferences can be drawn that Sergeant Dorcey observed

Deputy Van Grouw’s use of force and may have had an opportunity to

stop it. Plaintiff avers that Sergeant Dorcey hollered at Deputy Van

Grouw to hurry up, and “[a]s soon as he said that, [Deputy Van Grouw]

grabbed . . . both my arms, handcuffed me, and lifted me off the

ground by my handcuffs with my arms behind my back.” (Smith Dep. at

90.) 

Although Plaintiff’s version of what occurred is

contradicted by the officers, all reasonable inferences that can be

drawn from the summary judgment record are required to be drawn in

favor of Plaintiff. Therefore, the officers are denied summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. 

The officers also assert they are entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.

J. at 4.) However, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether a reasonable officer under the circumstances at the scene of

the seizure would have believed it was lawful to employ the amount of

force used, which has to be decided at trial. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the summary judgment motion of the County of 

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San Joaquin, the Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Dunn is granted.

The officers’ motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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