Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00845/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00845-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0227 FCC-Unsolicited Telephone Sales

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTON EWING, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ALIERA HEALTHCARE, 

Defendant. 

 Case No.: 19cv845-CAB-LL 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S EX 

PARTE APPLICATION FOR 

ORDER RE: COMMUNICATIONS 

BETWEEN COUNSEL 

[ECF No. 18] 

 On July 25, 2019, Defendant filed an “Ex Parte Application for Order Re 

Communications Between Counsel” (hereinafter “Motion” or “Mot.”) and a Declaration in 

support thereof. ECF No. 18. On July 29, 2019, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a 

“Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Emergency Motion for Email” (hereinafter 

“Opposition” or “Oppo.”). ECF No. 21. Defendant’s Motion requests that the Court enter 

an order: (1) barring Plaintiff from recording phone conversations with counsel for 

Defendant; (2) directing Plaintiff to stop blocking counsel for Defendant’s emails; (3) 

relieving the parties’ meet and confer obligation pursuant to Judge Lopez’s Chambers 

Rules with respect to the instant Motion; and (4) instructing Plaintiff to comply with Local 

Rule 83.4 (Professionalism). Mot. at 1. 

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Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s Motion on the grounds that it “is not properly before 

the Court because it seeks relief that is well beyond the meet and confer that was conducted 

at the ENE.” Oppo. at 1. Regarding the issue of Plaintiff recording phone conversations 

with counsel for Defendant, Plaintiff argues that for cell phone conversations “[t]he law 

requires one party to the conversation to simply disclose the fact of recording to the other 

side” and “if [defense counsel] continues with the call . . . then he is consenting to being 

recorded.” Id. at 4. In other words, Plaintiff argues, “[i]f Mr. Rackers objects to recording, 

he can, politely say goodbye and terminate the call.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal 

citations omitted). Plaintiff argues that “[w]hen a land line is called, California requires 

confidential information to be exchanged in order to trigger the requirement to notify the 

person that they are being recorded.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff contends that “nothing that counsel 

and Plaintiff discussed thus far in this matter has risen to the level of confidential 

information,” so “no notice or consent is even required.” Id. 

The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ briefing in this case and will address 

each issue below. 

1. Meet and Confer Obligation 

 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s request that “[t]he emergency motion should be sua 

sponte stricken or stricken under Rule 12(f)” is overruled. Oppo. at 3. Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure Rule 12(f) provides that “[t]he Court may strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

FRCP Rule 12(f). Plaintiff argues that because Defendant did not serve the exhibits in 

support of the Declaration on Plaintiff, the entire Motion should be stricken. Oppo. at 3. It 

is not clear to the Court whether the exhibits in support of Defendant’s Declaration were 

served on Plaintiff. Notwithstanding this, all of the exhibits at issue are internal 

communications between Plaintiff and defense counsel, and Plaintiff should have them. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to strike the instant Motion. 

The Court finds that Defendant has met its meet and confer requirements in this case. 

Defendant raised the issues in the instant motion during the Case Management Conference 

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held on July 19, 2019 with Judge Lopez. ECF No. 13. Judge Lopez discussed these issues 

jointly with defense counsel and Plaintiff during the CMC in an effort to come to a mutually 

agreeable resolution. The parties were unable to reach a resolution on these issues during 

the CMC, and Judge Lopez informed defense counsel that he could file a written discovery 

motion on these issues if necessary.1

 Accordingly, Defendant’s request to relieve the 

parties’ meet and confer obligation pursuant to Judge Lopez’s Chambers Rules with respect 

to the instant Motion is GRANTED. 

2. Civil Local Rule 83.4 (Professionalism) 

 With respect to Defendant’s request to instruct Plaintiff to comply with Local Rule 

83.4 of Professionalism, this district's rules state that “[a]ny person appearing propria 

persona [i.e. pro se] is bound by these rules of court and by the Fed.R.Civ.P.” Civ. L.R. 

83.11. So even though Mr. Ewing is pro se, this district's Local Rules require him to follow 

the rules of professionalism outlined in Civil Local Rule 83.4, which require him to, among 

other things, “be courteous and civil in all communications” and “attempt to informally 

resolve disputes with opposing counsel.” Civ. L.R. 83.4(a)(1). Accordingly, counsel for 

Defendant and Plaintiff are reminded that the Court expects them to conduct themselves 

civilly and professionally and in compliance with Civil Local Rule 83.4 on 

Professionalism. 

3. California Penal Code § 632 

 In support of Defendant’s request for an order barring Plaintiff from recording phone 

conversations with counsel for Defendant, Defendant states: 

Plaintiff has demanded that counsel for Aliera either send letters to him via 

U.S. Mail or contact him by telephone. However, when counsel for Aliera 

contacts Plaintiff by telephone, Plaintiff insists on recording each 

conversation, despite counsel for Aliera explicitly informing Plaintiff that he 

has not agreed to be recorded, and despite the fact that recording telephone 

                                               

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 Plaintiff’s allegation that Judge Lopez told defense counsel “what motion to file and how to file it” is a 

misrepresentation of the facts. Oppo. at 1. Accordingly, the Court declines to analyze further Plaintiff’s 

attempt to engage in personal attacks on the Judge. 

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conversations without consent of both parties violates California Penal Code 

§ 632. 

Mot. at 5. Plaintiff does not dispute that he records all calls with defense counsel. Oppo. 

at 4 (“Every letter and every email and every call expressly informs Mr. Rackers that all 

calls are recorded.”). In fact, Plaintiff contends that “Mr Rackers has made abundantly 

clear here [] that he needs to be recorded in order to preserve the truth.” Id. at 5. 

CIPA is California's anti-wiretapping and anti-eavesdropping statute and is designed 

“to protect the right of privacy.” Cal. Penal Code § 630. The Act provides for a civil action 

for damages based on violations of section 632 which prohibits recording a “confidential 

communication” “intentionally and without the consent of all of the parties.” Id.; Cal. Penal 

Code § 637.2(a) (“Any person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may 

bring an action against the person who committed the violation.”). To state a claim for 

violation of section 632, the three elements that a plaintiff must plead are “(1) an electronic 

recording of (or eavesdropping on); (2) a ‘confidential’ communication; [where] (3) all 

parties did not consent.” Weiner v. ARS Nat'l Servs., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 

(S.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th 766, 774–76 (2002)); see also 

Stoba v. Saveology.com, LLC, No. 13CV2925, 2014 WL 3573404, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 

18, 2014). Section 632(c) defines a “confidential communication” as including “any 

communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to 

the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto.” Cal. Penal Code § 

632(c). Excluded from protection are communications in “circumstance[s] in which the 

parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be 

overheard or recorded.” Roberts v. Wyndham Int'l, Inc., No. 12CV5083, 2012 WL 

6001459, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012); Cal. Penal Code § 632(c). 

Here, although Defendant does not seek damages pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 632, 

Defendant relies on this code section in support of Defendant’s request for a court order 

barring Plaintiff from recording telephone conversations without defense counsel’s 

consent. In this case, the conversations between Plaintiff and defense counsel involve 

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litigation-related matters such as discovery disputes, scheduling issues, and courtmandated meet and confers. The Court finds that counsel for Defendant has an objectively 

reasonable expectation that these conversations would not be divulged to anyone else and 

that these conversations are confidential communications within the meaning of Section 

632. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1089, *11 

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2002). In Nissan Motor Co., the Court held: 

It is wrong to use the coercive and privacy-violating technique of tape 

recording (or threatening to tape record) what the Court finds to be 

confidential communications. Threatening to record conversations between 

counsel (or actual recordation of such conversations) is a troubling tactic. If 

counsel believes that conversations are being mischaracterized, there are 

traditional and non-invasive ways to address this situation. The parties may 

promptly confirm important communications in writing or via email. In more 

extreme situations, the parties may require the presence of third-parties. As 

the parties are well aware, however, it is often essentially impossible to avoid 

oral communication given the pace of litigation, conflicting schedules, and the 

rules that may require person-to-person conferences. 

The Court finds that the recordation of conversations between counsel in the 

normal course of litigation, without consent, is a violation of California Penal 

Code § 632. In addition to being illegal, the Court finds that it is inherently 

unethical for an attorney to record a conversation with another attorney 

regarding the routine progression of litigation without the other party’s 

knowledge or consent. 

Id. at *22 (internal citations omitted). 

For the reasons set forth herein, the law does not allow for recordation of 

conversations between Plaintiff and defense counsel without defense counsel’s consent. 

Plaintiff’s argument that “[i]f Mr. Rackers objects to recording, he can, politely say 

goodbye and terminate the call” is without merit. Oppo. at 4 (emphasis in original) (internal 

citations omitted). Pursuant to Local Rule 83.4 on Professionalism, the parties are required 

to “be courteous and civil in all communications” and to “attempt to informally resolve 

disputes with opposing counsel.” Civ. L.R. 83.4(a)(1). If Plaintiff insists on recording calls 

in violation of the law, and simultaneously expects defense counsel to politely terminate 

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the call if he does not consent to the recording, then the parties will not be able to work 

together to informally resolve disputes. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for an order 

barring Plaintiff from recording phone conversations with counsel for Defendant is 

GRANTED. Plaintiff is ORDERED to cease any recording of conversations between 

Plaintiff and defense counsel moving forward in this litigation. 

4. Email Communication 

Defendant also seeks an order directing Plaintiff to stop blocking counsel for 

Defendant’s emails. Mot. at 1. In support, Defendant states: 

There is no reason the parties cannot communicate via email. Plaintiff has 

admitted to having an email account but has simply blocked counsel from 

emailing him. If Plaintiff does not want to email, that is his choice, but counsel 

for Aliera cannot be blocked from emailing Plaintiff when U.S. Mail is 

inefficient and phone conversations are not productive. 

Mot. at 2.2

 Plaintiff opposes on the following grounds: 

The Court does not even allow or require email with Plaintiff. Plaintiff does 

not have ECF efiling privileges. The Court corresponds via U.S. mail. So to 

can opposing counsel. If US Mail and telephone are good enough for the 

Court, that should be good enough for opposing counsel as well. 

Oppo. at 8. Notably, Plaintiff cites no case or other law to support his argument that he 

should be allowed to block Defendant from emailing Plaintiff. As set forth above, Plaintiff 

and Defendant are required to “be courteous and civil in all communications” and “attempt 

to informally resolve disputes with opposing counsel.” Civ. L.R. 83.4(a)(1). Additionally, 

the Federal Rules require the parties to confer, communicate, and cooperate. See, e.g., Fed. 

                                               

2

 Plaintiff sent counsel a letter on June 1, 2019, stating that:

You are hereby prohibited from emailing me ever again. Do not send me any more emails. 

I am blocking your domain and I will not respond to you. All calls to my phone are and 

will be recorded. You are on express notice of this. If you have to meet and confer with 

me, via telephone, it will be recorded. 

Rackers Decl., ¶ 6; Exh. D. 

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R. Civ. P. 5, 26, 37. Email provides immediate and convenient notice and its use has 

become commonplace for a primary means of communication between parties in litigation. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s request for an order directing Plaintiff to stop blocking 

Aliera’s counsel’s emails is GRANTED. On or before August 16, 2019, Plaintiff is 

ORDERED to unblock Defendant’s emails to Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 12, 2019 

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