Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01280/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HIRAM LEBRON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1280 GEB JFM P

vs.

S. GARCIA, Warden, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1998 conviction on

charges of involuntary manslaughter in violation of California Penal Code § 192 and assault on a

child under the age of eight resulting in death in violation of California Penal Code § 273ab, and

the sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison imposed thereon in February 1999. Petitioner

claims in his amended petition, filed December 13, 2002, that his prison sentence violates the

Eighth Amendment, and that California Penal Code § 273ab violates due process.

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01280-GEB -JFM Document 12 Filed 10/24/05 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Valdez, et al., No. C031612 (Jan. 30, 2001), a copy of which is

attached as Exhibit A to Respondents’ Answer, filed March 24, 2003.

2

FACTS1

 The convictions in this case arose from the death of 11-monthold Thalia Escoto (Thalia), the daughter of [petitioner] Hiram

Lebron’s (Lebron) live-in fiancée, defendant Eva Valdez (Valdez).

. . . . 

 On May 17, 1997, Lebron, who was watching 11-month-old

Thalia while Valdez was at work, brought Thalia, unconscious,

into the pediatric emergency room at U.C. Davis Medical Center. 

Appearing panicked and concerned, Lebron pointed to the right

side of Thalia’s head that told a nurse that she had fallen. Medical

intervention failed to save Thalia’s life. 

 An autopsy disclosed that Thalia had suffered a depressed-type

skull fracture, which is typically caused by a blow. Thalia also had

a linear skull fracture; various forces, such as blows or falls, can

cause linear fractures. According to Dr. Donald Henrikson, the

pathologist who performed the autopsy, a “significant amount of

force” would be necessary to produce such injuries, such as the

force from a car accident, or from a fall of more than 10 feet, or

from a deliberate assault.

 Henrikson observed injuries to Thalia’s brain and hemorrhages

to her eyes, symptoms typical of the violent shaking associated

with shaken infant syndrome. He also observed numerous

contusions scattered about Thalia’s body.

 Henrikson concluded that Thalia died as a result of blunt force

impact and shaking – a homicide. Evidence of both fresh and older

injuries suggested a pattern of continuing abuse. Dr. Claudia

Greco, a neuropathologist, basically concurred with Henriksen’s

findings.

 Evidence was presented of Lebron’s involvement, or possible

involvement, in various injuries suffered by Thalia, including a

scalding burn, a broken arm, a black eye, and bumps and bruises to

Thalia’s head and body. These injuries took place over a threemonth span, which roughly coincided with the period during which

Lebron and Valdez lived together. Innocent explanations were

offered for most of these injuries. 

(People v. Valdez, et al.,, slip op. at 2, 3-4.)

Case 2:02-cv-01280-GEB -JFM Document 12 Filed 10/24/05 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Case 2:02-cv-01280-GEB -JFM Document 12 Filed 10/24/05 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Constitutionality of California Penal Code § 273ab

Petitioner’s first claim is that California Penal Code § 273ab violates due process

by authorizing imposition of punishment equivalent to that imposed on a first degree murder

conviction without requiring proof of the mental state required for a first degree murder

conviction. Pointing to the fact that he was acquitted of second degree murder and convicted

only of involuntary manslaughter and relying on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), Mullaney v.

Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), petitioner argues

that § 273ab violates his right to due process because it allowed imposition of the punishment for

first degree murder without proof of the mens rea required to support a murder conviction.

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision of the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. Relying on another state

court of appeal decision, People v. Albritton, 67 Cal.App.4th 647 (1998), the state court rejected

this claim on the ground that:

Section 273ab is a very serious felony. It requires that a

particularly vulnerable victim – a cared-for child under eight years

of age – die at the hands of his or her caretaker; the caretaker must

intentionally assault the child using force that a reasonable person

would believe was likely to result in great bodily injury, and such

force must result in the child’s death. [Footnote omitted.] Under

this accepted view of section 273ab is much higher than negligence

and can be rationally compared with child abuse homicide or

murder in terms of punishment. [Footnote omitted.]

(People v. LeBron, slip op. at 39.)

The state legislatures have broad authority to define crimes and impose

punishments thereon. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)). The Due Process Clause prevents only imposition of

punishments based on “arbitrary” distinctions. See Chapman v. U.S., 500 U.S. 453, 464-65

(1991). 

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01280-GEB -JFM Document 12 Filed 10/24/05 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

When a State's power to define criminal conduct is challenged

under the Due Process Clause, we inquire only whether the law

“offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and

conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”

Patterson, 432 U.S., at 202, 97 S.Ct., at 2322 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 58 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 

The California statute that imposes on a caretaker who intentionally assaults a

child with force likely to cause great bodily injury thereby causing the child’s death the same

punishment imposed on those convicted of first degree murder is not based on the type of

arbitrary distinction that would run afoul of the Due Process clause, nor does it offend

fundamental principles of justice. The state court’s rejection of petitioner’s first claim for relief

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling principles of United

States Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner’s first claim for relief should be denied.

B. Eighth Amendment

Petitioner’s second claim is that his sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison

violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Petitioner contends

that his conduct was not more than criminally negligent and that his sentence is therefore

disproportionate to the offense. 

As noted above, the federal habeas corpus statute provides in relevant part that

habeas corpus relief is unavailable for any claim denied on the merits in State court “unless the

adjudication of the claim-- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In Lockyer v. Andrade, supra, the United States

Supreme Court made clear that, in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to a prison

sentence, the “only relevant clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or

‘unreasonable application of’ framework is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise

contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.”

Case 2:02-cv-01280-GEB -JFM Document 12 Filed 10/24/05 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991); Solem v.

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). The

Andrade Court concluded that two consecutive 25-years-to- life sentences with the possibility of

parole, imposed under California's three-strikes law following two petty theft convictions with

priors, did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 77; see also Ewing v. California,

538 U.S. 11 (2003) (holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft

under California's three-strikes law did not violate the Eighth Amendment). “Outside the context

of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have

been exceedingly rare.” Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.

The Supreme Court has cautioned federal courts to be “‘reluctan[t] to review

legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment.’” Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982)

(quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274). “Generally, as long as the sentence imposed upon the

defendant does not exceed statutory limits, [a federal court] will not overturn it on eighth

amendment grounds.” United States v. Zavala-Serra, 853 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1988). See

also Belgarde, 123 F.3d at 1215; United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir.

1990). “[A] sentence within the limits set by a valid statute may not be overturned on appeal as

cruel and unusual punishment unless the sentence is so ‘grossly out of proportion to the severity

of the crime’ as to shock our sense of justice.” United States v. Cupa-Guillen, 34 F.3d 860, 864 

(9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1979)) (citing

United States v. Washington, 578 F.2d 256, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

Petitioner’s sentence is not one of those “exceedingly rare” sentences fitting

within the contours of the “gross disproportionality” principle, and thus does not constitute cruel

and unusual punishment. The state’s court rejection of this claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment precedent. Petitioner’s

second claim for relief should be denied.

///// 

Case 2:02-cv-01280-GEB -JFM Document 12 Filed 10/24/05 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

For the foregoing reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 21, 2005. 

12

lebr1280.157

Case 2:02-cv-01280-GEB -JFM Document 12 Filed 10/24/05 Page 7 of 7