Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04656/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04656-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IDENTITY ARTS, a California Limited

Liability Company,

Plaintiff, No. C 05-4656 PJH

v. ORDER DENYING

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

BEST BUY ENTERPRISE SERVICES, INJUNCTION

INC., a Minnesota Corporation, BEST

BUY CO., INC., a Minnesota Corporation,

and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction came on for hearing before this court on

January 18, 2006. Plaintiff, Identity Arts LLC (“Identity Arts”) appeared through its counsel,

Drexel A. Bradshaw. Defendants, Best Buy Enterprise Services, Inc. and Best Buy Co.,

Inc. (“Best Buy”) appeared through their counsel, Joel D. Covelman and Robert F. Hinton. 

Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby DENIES the motion as follows,

for the reasons stated at the hearing.

BACKGROUND

This is an action for copyright infringement. In May 2000, while at a movie

presentation of “Gladiator,” David Janssen (who co-founded plaintiff company) witnessed a

fellow movie-goer being harassed and heckled for receiving a cell phone call mid-movie. 

As a result of that incident, Janssen was struck with an idea – to create faux movie trailers

to be shown prior to the commencement of movies, in which cell phone users would be

encouraged to shut off their phones. To implement his idea, Janssen enlisted the help of

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David Bobrow, and the two began working on plans to film and market a short version of a

faux movie trailer known as the “Submarine Spot.” 

In March 2002, Janssen registered a script for the Submarine Spot with the U.S.

Copyright Office, and that same month, Janssen and Bobrow filmed several scenes of the

copyrighted script and edited them into a rough cut of the Submarine Spot. Armed with the

rough cut Submarine Spot, Janssen and Bobrow co-founded plaintiff Identity Arts, LLC,

(“Identity Arts”) in order to produce, promote, and sell the rough cut spot to cell phone

manufacturers, cell phone service providers, and movie theater chains. 

In June 2003, Identity Arts sent the rough cut Submarine Spot to defendants Best

Buy et al. (“Best Buy”). Thereafter, and throughout 2003, the parties negotiated an

agreement allowing Best Buy to use a final edit of the Submarine Spot and to market it to

potential advertisers and movie theaters. The final agreement, which called for Best Buy to

pay Identity Arts the sum of $390,000 in exchange for the spot, was executed on October

7, 2003. 

After the final Submarine Spot was successfully promoted by Best Buy in AMC

movie theaters throughout the country, Best Buy proceeded to introduce other faux movie

trailers, including those entitled “The Buffalo” (in which Native Americans are interrupted by

cell phone ringing during a buffalo hunt), “Pump up the Movie” (a parody of the “Bring It On”

cheerleading movie), and “Return of the Kwan” (a martial-arts themed spot reminiscent of

“Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon”). None of the spots was done with the permission or

authorization of Identity Arts. 

On November 14, 2005, Identity Arts filed the instant action against Best Buy et al.,

asserting five causes of action: (1) direct copyright infringement; (2) vicarious copyright

infringement; (3) contributory copyright infringement; (4) unfair competition under California

Business & Professions Code §17200; and (5) unjust enrichment. The crux of Identity Arts’

complaint alleges that each of the above spots introduced by Best Buy is a derivative work

of the Submarine Spot, nearly identical in use of story structure, design, and relevant

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elements.

Identity Arts now seeks an order granting a preliminary injunction enjoining

defendant Best Buy from showing any derivative works of any sort – including the above

spots – pending resolution of the merits of the action. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff must show (1) a strong

likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if

preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4)

advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). See Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988,

994 (9th Cir. 2004). Alternatively, injunctive relief can be granted if the plaintiff merely

“demonstrate[s] ... a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of

irreparable injury...”. See id. 

In a copyright case such as this one, a showing of reasonable likelihood of success

on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Apple Computer Inc. v.

Formula Int’l Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, the fundamental inquiry is

whether plaintiff can demonstrate reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. 

B. Legal Analysis

Best Buy raises two issues that it argues constitute a bar to the grant of Identity Arts’

request for preliminary injunction. First, it argues that Identity Arts lacks standing to bring

this motion as to the Submarine Spot script, the rough cut Submarine Spot, or the final

Submarine Spot. Second, Best Buy argues that even if standing exists, Identity Arts cannot

prove any likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright infringement claims. The

court addresses each issue in turn.

1. Standing

If Best Buy is correct that Identity Arts lacks standing, then Identity Arts’ motion fails

at the outset. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (standing

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an “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III”). 

Best Buy asserts that Identity Arts lacks standing because (1) with respect to the

Submarine Spot script, Identity Arts is not the exclusive owner of the copyrights therein;

and (2) with respect to the rough cut Submarine Spot and the final Submarine Spot, both

are derivative works that Identity Arts failed to properly register for copyright protection. To

support standing, Identity Arts points out that, since the filing of its complaint and this

motion, an assignment of rights has taken place granting Identity Arts the exclusive rights

to all works at issue, and an application is also now on file to register both the rough cut

Submarine Spot and the final Submarine Spot with the US Copyright Office. As discussed

below, however, Best Buy is correct, and no standing exists. 

 a. Identity Arts as Exclusive Licensee 

Title 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) provides that only “the legal or beneficial owner of an

exclusive right under a copyright” is entitled to bring an action for copyright infringement. 

As Best Buy correctly points out, this provision requires that a plaintiff have an exclusive

right prior to bringing an action. Here, however, the evidence demonstrates that Identity

Arts is not the owner of an exclusive right in either the Submarine Spot script, the rough cut

Submarine Spot, or the final Submarine Spot. 

With respect to the Submarine Spot script, this is the only one of the three works at

issue that Identity Arts demonstrates is subject to copyright protection by virtue of a valid

registration certificate. See Ex. A to the Declaration of David Janssen in Support of

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Janssen Decl.”). Initially, this raises a

presumption of validity with respect to the copyright of the Submarine Spot script. See,

e.g., Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative, 122 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th

Cir. 1997); North Coast Indus. v. Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d (9th Cir. 1992). However, Best

Buy can, and does, rebut this presumption. See id. It does so by demonstrating that the

Submarine Spot script does not owe its origin to Mr. Janssen as the sole author – as the

copyright registration states – but rather to Mr. Janssen and at least one other co-writer,

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possibly two. Specifically, Best Buy points to (1) a prior version of the Submarine Spot

script that identifies Mr. Janssen and a Ben Nichols as co-authors, and (2) Identity Arts’

own (and other) website pages identifying both Ben Nichols and a David Bobrow as coauthors. See Exs. 3-7 to the Declaration of Joel D. Covelman in Support of Defendants’

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Preliminary Injunction Motion (“Covelman Decl.”). Identity Arts

does not – or else cannot – dispute this evidence. 

Since there is proof of more than one author for the Submarine Spot script, the only

right that Identity Arts can have in the script (through co-founder David Janssen) is a nonexclusive one. This is because, absent a joint agreement or an exclusive transfer of rights

by all authors of a copyrighted work, the only right that may be transferred by an individual

joint author is a non-exclusive right to the work. See, e.g., Meredith v. Smith, 145 F.2d 620

(9th Cir. 1944). Accordingly, and as stated at the outset above, this precludes Identity Arts

from proceeding for infringement under the copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).

Identity Arts attempts to fix this flaw by introducing evidence of belated assignments

of rights from Janssen, Bobrow and Nichols to Identity Arts. See Exs. A-C to the

Declaration of Drexel A. Bradshaw in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(“Bradshaw Decl.”). This is to no avail. While those assignments purport to exclusively

transfer “all intellectual property rights and moral rights” in “certain proprietary products,”

the assignments themselves are wholly deficient. See id. As Best Buy points out, the

purportedly exclusive assignments nowhere state the nature of what is being assigned, nor

do they contain any description of any of the three works at issue here, nor do they even

contain an actual assignment provision. See id. In short, they are of dubious legal

significance. Accordingly, it simply cannot be concluded that Identity Arts has sufficiently

demonstrated that it is the owner of an exclusive right in the Submarine Spot script, such

that it may maintain and institute an action against Best Buy for infringement of the script.

With respect to the rough cut Submarine Spot and the final Submarine Spot, Identity

Arts has great difficulty demonstrating how those two works could even form the basis for a

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preliminary injunction against Best Buy in the first place. First, they are not specifically

alleged as a basis for copyright infringement in Identity Arts’ complaint. See, e.g.,

Yamaguchi v. United States Dept. of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997)

(allegations must “establish a basis for judgment against the defendant”); Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). Second, the works are not registered with the U.S. Copyright

Office (see argument below). Even assuming, however, that Identity Arts could succeed in

proving that it is entitled to allege a copyright infringement claim based on the two works,

Identity Arts’ motion would still hinge on proving that it is the holder of exclusive rights in the

two works. And for the reasons stated above, Identity Arts cannot do so on the basis of the

so-called exclusive assignments it has submitted into evidence on this motion. 

Accordingly, Identity Arts has similarly failed to demonstrate that it is the owner of an

exclusive right in the rough cut Submarine Spot or the final Submarine Spot, such that it

may maintain and institute an action against Best Buy for infringement of these works.

b. Unregistered Derivative Works 

As indicated above, Identity Arts has additional problems in proving standing with

respect to the rough cut Submarine Spot and the final Submarine Spot. In order to assert

standing as to both works, Identity Arts must demonstrate registration of the two works with

the U.S. Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (registration as prerequisite for

infringement action); see also Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th

Cir. 1998) (“[c]opyright registration is not a prerequisite to a valid copyright, but it is a

prerequisite to a suit based on a copyright.”). 

Only after Best Buy pointed out in its opposition to plaintiff’s motion that plaintiff

could not allege copyright infringement for unregistered derivative works did Identity Arts

register both the rough cut Submarine Spot and the final Submarine Spot. Or rather,

Identity Arts filed an application to register the two works. See Bradshaw Decl., ¶ 5. The

question now before the court is whether that belated application is sufficient to allow the

court to presume registration of the two works for standing purposes. 

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Identity Arts asserts that Ninth Circuit precedent allows the court to deem the two

works at issue registered as of the date of application, and to relate that registration back to

the date on which Identity Arts filed the instant action (Nov. 16, 2005). For support, Identity

Arts relies on Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). 

Reliance on this case, however, is misguided. Roth Greeting Cards held that

plaintiff could institute his action as of the day that he filed his application for registration,

and that subsequently revised copyright applications as to the same underlying work would

relate back to the date of filing of the initial application (where the revisions addressed a

prior error). It did not hold in favor of what Identity Arts argues here – that plaintiff could

first initiate an action, and subsequent to that, file an application for registration of the

works upon which the original action was based. Nor has any other case so held, a fact

that counsel for Identity Arts conceded at the hearing on its motion. 

Indeed, Nimmer on Copyright – the seminal copyright treatise – makes clear that,

while the court would be within its authority to allow an action to be initiated prior to actual

issuance of a registration certificate but after the filing of an application for registration,

there is a jurisdictional defect under the copyright statutes for actions that are initiated prior

to the sending of an application for registration. See Nimmer on Copyright, § 7.16[B][1][a]. 

So here. Identity Arts filed the instant action in November 2005, and by its own

admission, did not seek to register the rough cut Submarine Spot, or the Submarine Spot,

until January 4, 2006. Accordingly, Identity Arts cannot maintain its copyright infringement

action with respect to the rough cut Submarine Spot or the final Submarine Spot, and it

lacks standing as to both on the instant motion before the court. 

In sum, the above deficiencies – on both the exclusive rights issue and the

unregistered works issue – operate to deprive Identity Arts of standing. This is enough to

deny Identity Arts’ motion. Even if the court could overlook the deficiencies, however, for

the reasons below, Identity Arts would still be incapable of proving a reasonable likelihood

of success on the merits of its copyright infringement action against Best Buy. 

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2. Reasonable Likelihood of Success

To succeed on its infringement action against Best Buy, Identity Arts must prove (1)

ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) defendant’s copying of constituent elements of the

original work. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361

(1991). 

a. Ownership

Proof of ownership breaks down into several constituent parts: originality in the

author; copyrightability of the subject matter; compliance with applicable statutory

formalities; and a transfer of rights between the author and plaintiff so as to make plaintiff

the valid copyright claimant. See generally Nimmer on Copyright, §13.01[A]. Generally

speaking, a registration certificate constitutes prima facie evidence of most of these

elements – i.e., originality, copyrightability, satisfaction of statutory formalities. See id. In

applicable circumstances, the only element for which proof is still necessary is that of

proving a valid transfer of rights between author and plaintiff. Id. 

As discussed above, the only work properly at issue before the court here is the

rough cut Submarine Spot script, for which Identity Arts has provided a copy of the

registration certificate. See Janssen Decl., Ex. A. As to this, Identity Arts has tendered

evidence of all three co-authors’ assignment of exclusive rights to Identity Arts. See

Bradshaw Decl., Exs. A-C. Again, however, these assignments are deficient on their face

as legally valid assignments. As such, they fail to provide sufficient proof of ownership on

the part of Identity Arts. 

b. Defendant’s Copying of Original Work 

The gist of Identity Arts’ motion with respect to this second element comes down to

whether or not Best Buy copied the work at issue – i.e., whether it had access to Identity

Arts’ work, and whether Best Buy’s works are substantially similar to the original work at

issue. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003). 

With regard to the access question, Identity Arts claims that it provided Best Buy

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with copies of the rough cut Submarine Spot and the final Submarine Spot. Best Buy does

not dispute this, but asserts through declarations that it never had access to the Submarine

Spot script. See, e.g., Declaration of Joseph Michaelson in Support of Defendants’

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Preliminary Injunction Motion; Declaration of William Nordin in

Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Preliminary Injunction Motion. 

Again, only the script is properly before the court, since the script is the only one of

the three works that was properly registered and properly the subject of the copyright

infringement claim. And as to that script, Identity Arts provides no affirmative proof

controverting Best Buy’s declarations, all of which establish that Identity Arts never

provided Best Buy with a copy of the Submarine Spot script, and that declarants have

never even seen the script. See id. Accordingly, without any such evidence, Identity Arts

cannot prove that Best Buy had the requisite access. 

Similarly, Identity Arts would have an equally hard time demonstrating substantial

similarity. This inquiry is highly fact specific. The Ninth Circuit, in illuminating the

cornerstones of the inquiry, has used what it calls a “total concept and feel” approach. 

See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). In sum,

the “total concept and feel” approach refers to a two-part test – the “extrinsic test,” used to

determine similarity in general ideas, and an “intrinsic test,” used to compare the particular

expression used. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Speilberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). Expert

testimony is particularly relevant to the former, while the latter focuses on a reasonable

person’s sense of whether the expression used in competing works is similar. Inherent in

all the foregoing, however, is the fundamental premise that copyright law does not protect

ideas; it can only protect particular expressions of ideas. See, e.g., Olson v. Nat’l

Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, Identity Arts introduces on reply the expert testimony of Professor Robert

Vianello, who testifies via declaration as to the substantial similarity of the original

Submarine Spot work, and Best Buy’s subsequent works. This evidence, however, is

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insufficient to prove satisfaction of the extrinsic test as an initial matter. 

Generally speaking, Mr. Vianello’s testimony is devoted to drawing parallels between

the works in question, and he asserts that the thirteen original elements claimed by Identity

Arts are also found in Best Buy’s subsequent works. As Best Buy pointed out in its surreply

and at the hearing, however, in many instances Mr. Vianello’s testimony improperly claims

general cinematic techniques and ideas as protectable expression. For example, Mr.

Vianello asserts that the presence of on-screen characters who address the movie

audience directly is a protectable expression that is substantially similar in both the

Submarine Spots and in Best Buy’s allegedly infringing works. See Declaration of Robert

Vianello in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ¶¶ 8-9. In reality,

however, this is a cinematic technique familiar to many, including the court, which is several

decades old. 

To be sure, Identity Arts would be correct in stating that at least some cases in the

past have found certain plot ideas, as expressed in dramatic and other works, to be

protectable. See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1527, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding

that West Side Story authors intentionally borrowed from Romeo and Juliet). It is also true

that the Ninth Circuit itself has required a comparison of “plot, theme, dialogue, mood,

setting, pace, and sequence” as valid considerations under the extrinsic test analysis. See

Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356. 

Nonetheless, it is still difficult for Identity Arts to claim that its 13 elements are truly

elements of expression that are simulated identically by Best Buy in its subsequent spots. 

This is because, as numerous cases have recognized, mere similarity of format, theme,

style, or setting is insufficient to give rise to substantial similarity. Moreover, it has also

commonly been held that even if the plots of two works are substantially similar, there is no

liability if the trier of fact reasonably concludes that defendant copied only the basic idea,

and independently created a similar plot. See, e.g., Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862

F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (similar ideas in two video games). This is the scenario that

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rings most true here, upon review of the works at issue. 

As such, the court need not consider the intrinsic test in order to conclude, as has

been evident from the beginning, that Identity Arts cannot make out a case for likelihood of

success on the merits of its claim regarding copyright infringement. 

C. Conclusion 

For the above reasons, Identity Arts’ arguments fail as to (1) standing; and (2)

likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright infringement claim. Accordingly, Identity

Arts’ motion is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2006 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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