Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02352/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02352-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

WESTLEY VANCE HASKINS,

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA SCHRIRO, Director, Arizona

Department of Corrections,

Respondent. 

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CV 05-2352-PHX MHM (JM)

ORDER

Currently before the Court are Petitioner’s Motion to Stay (Dkt. #53), Petitioner’s

Motion to Amend Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. #61), and Magistrate Judge Jacqueline

Marshall’s accompanying Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #67). 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must review the legal analysis in a Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In addition, a district court must

review the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo for those facts to

which objections are filed. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court shall make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.”). “Failure to object to a magistrate judge's

recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact.” Jones v. Wood, 207

F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Westley Haskins filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 on August 4, 2005. (Dkt. #1). The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge

Jacqueline Marshall for Report and Recommendation on June 21, 2006. (Dkt. #3). On May

5, 2008, following Respondent’s Answer (Dkt. #18) and Petitioner’s Motion to Conduct

Limited Discovery (Dkt. #26), Magistrate Judge Marshall filed her Report and

Recommendation that the Court deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. #35). 

Petitioner then filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation, raising new

allegations of a Brady violation for failure to disclose felony convictions of state witnesses

and factual innocence with respect to his state conviction on one count of child abuse. (Dkt.

#37). In addition, Petitioner filed a Motion for a Procedural Order to authorize Petitioner to

use his personal typewriter to prepare documents with respect to this litigation due to his

diagnosis of osteoarthritis and degenerative joint disease (Dkt. #36). Petitioner also filed

a Motion to Stay Habeas Corpus Proceedings Pending Appeal (Dkt. #41). 

On September 16, 2008, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Marshall’s Report and

Recommendation in part, denying both Petitioner’s Motion to Conduct Limited Discovery

and Petitioner’s due process claim with respect to the Arizona Court of Appeal’s refusal to

remand, and granting Petitioner’s unopposed Motion for a Procedural Order. (Dkt. #44).

The Court withheld ruling on the remainder of Judge Marshall’s Report and

Recommendation and directed Respondents to address Petitioner’s newly-raised allegations,

including whether those allegations are sufficient to warrant granting Petitioner’s Motion to

Stay. Id. The Court requested a supplemental Report and Recommendation from Judge

Marshall on the merits of Petitioner’s Motion to Stay. Id.

On September 19, 2008, Respondents requested that the Court stay the Order granting

Petitioner’s Motion for Procedural Order to use his personal typewriter pending an Objection

by the Arizona Department of Corrections. (Dkt. #45). The Court granted that Motion on

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While this Court has referred to the document filed at Dkt. # 48 as an “Objection,” it is in

fact captioned as a “Response.”

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September 26, 2008. (Dkt. #47). The Department of Corrections filed their Objection on

October 27, 20081

. (Dkt. #48)

Respondents filed their response to Petitioner’s newly-raised allegations of factual

innocence and a Brady violation on October 31, 2008. (Dkt. #49). On December 5, 2008,

Petitioner filed a Reply to that Response, a second Motion to Stay pending adjudication of

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims in state court, and a Reply to the Department of Correction’s

Objection to Petitioner’s Motion for Procedural Order. (Dkt. #s 52-54).

After reviewing Respondents’ Response to Petitioner’s newly-raised allegations, the

Court ordered Respondents to file a supplement brief addressing whether the Court should

allow Petitioner to amend his Petition to state his alleged Brady violation as a free-standing

claim and/or state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate the

presence of drugs in Petitioner’s daughter’s system. (Dkt. #55). The Court also directed

Respondents to address whether Petitioner would be entitled to a stay to present his claims

to the state courts per Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). Respondents filed their

supplemental response on January 12, 2009 (Dkt. #59), and Petitioner filed a Reply on

January 23, 2009 (Dkt. #62).

On December 12, 2008, Magistrate Judge Marshall issued a Report and

Recommendation that the Court deny Petitioner’s original Motion to Stay Habeas Corpus

Proceedings Pending Appeal. (Dkt. #41). Petitioner filed an Objection on January 21, 2009.

(Dkt. #60). Then, on January 23, 2009, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (Dkt. #61). 

On February 11, 2009, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Marshall’s Report and

Recommendation denying Petitioner’s first Motion To Stay. (Dkt. # 64). The Court further

ordered U.S. Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Marshall to issue a Report and Recommendation

concerning the motions that remained pending in this action: (1) the Arizona Department of

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Corrections’s Objection to the Court’s granting Petitioner’s Motion for a Procedural Order

(Dkt. # 48), (2) Petitioner’s Motion to Stay (Dkt. # 53), and (3) Petitioner’s Motion to Amend

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. #61). The Court also requested that Judge Marshall report on

whether the Court’s decision to withhold ruling in part on her initial Report and

Recommendation (Dkt. #44) should be deemed moot as a result of Petitioner’s Motion to

Amend.

On August 8, 2009, Magistrate Judge Marshall issued a Report and Recommendation

denying Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and his Motion to Amend Writ of Habeas Corpus, and

denying as moot Arizona Department of Corrections’ Objection to the Court’s granting

Petitioner’s Motion for a Procedural Order (Dkt. #67). On September 10, 2009, this Court,

concerned that Petitioner, due to a change of address, had not received the Report &

Recommendation, directed the Clerk of the Court to resend the Report and Recommendation

to the Petitioner, and ordered that Petitioner and Respondent file any objections to the Report

and Recommendation within ten days. (Dkt. #69) Petitioner filed an objection to the Report

and Recommendation on September 21, 2009. (Dkt. #70)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Amend

In his Motion to Amend Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner prays this Court allow him

to amend his original habeas petition to include a claim predicated on Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963), alleging that the State failed to disclose the criminal backgrounds of two

witnesses that testified against him at trial. (Dkt. #67, p.1). Petitioner also wishes to amend

his petition to include an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his counsel’s

failure to raise this Brady claim on appeal. Id. Finally, in his objections to a previously filed

Report and Recommendation, as well as the instant one, Petitioner suggests that counsel

performed ineffectively by failing to independently test and investigate the state’s assertions

concerning the presence of methamphetamine in his daughter’s system. Id. at 2.

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The civil rules governing amendments are applicable to habeas cases. Mayle v. Felix,

545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005). Under these rules, “[b]efore a responsive pleading is served,

pleadings may be amended once as a "matter of course," i.e., without seeking court leave.”

 Id. After the responsive pleading has been served, amendments may be made at any time

during a proceeding with leave of the court. Id. However, in Mayle the Supreme Court

constrained district courts’ discretion concerning the amendment of habeas petitions. It held

that after the one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition imposed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) has run, proposed amendments

must relate back to the claims plead in the original habeas petition. Id; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

1. Statutory Tolling

 The State has responded to Petitioner’s habeas petition. (Dkt. #18). Accordingly,

Petitioner may no longer amend his petition without leave of this Court. As a preliminary

issue, then, this Court must determine whether its discretion is constrained by the

requirements of AEDPA. Under AEDPA, the one-year tolling period runs from the latest of:

(1) the date on which the judgement became final; (2) the date on which a state-created

impediment from filing has been removed; (3) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court; and (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D)

 Petitioner’s appeal for statutory tolling appears to be predicated on his discovery of

new evidence; evidence that is the factual predicate of his claims. The evidence proffered

by Petitioner is: (1) the criminal backgrounds of two witnesses at his trial; and (2) a report

concerning the urine and blood testing of Petitioner’s daughter, which calls into question the

conclusions of the state lab concerning the amount of methamphetamine in her system. (Dkt.

61, p.2–3). Magistrate Judge Marshall concluded that in discovering this evidence

Petitioner did not exhibit the requisite diligence. (Dkt. #67, p.5) Petitioner objects to this

determination, arguing that at trial his attorney repeatedly requested the state produce

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criminal background reports on the witnesses in question, (Dkt. #70, p.5), and that he

repeatedly asked both trial and appellate counsel to order an independent laboratory test of

his daughters blood and urine. Id. at 5.

With respect to the criminal-background evidence, the Court agrees with the

conclusions reached by the magistrate. Petitioner is correct, the record does not contain

direct evidence that the State turned witness Francis Smith’s known arrest history over to

Petitioner. The trial transcript shows, however, that trial counsel raised and established Mr.

Smith’s felony record during cross-examination. (Dkt. #59, ex. U, p.117–119). Thus, even

if the state did not turn over a prior conviction history, Petitioner was clearly on notice that

such evidence existed or may have existed. Given these facts, the Court believes that

Petitioner could have secured this evidence sometime during the four years that passed

between his conviction and the filing of his habeas petition. Accordingly, this Court agrees

with the Magistrate that “even if the facts underlying the proposed new claim[] w[as]

discovered after trial, Petitioner was not dilligent in securing them.” (Dkt. #70, p.8).

In support of his other new claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner has

provided the Court with a report by Ed French, who appears to be a faculty member in the

Department of Pharmacology at the University of Arizona, that questions the conclusions and

questions the methodology of Southwest Laboratories, the laboratory hired by the State to

conduct the analysis of Petitioner’s daughter’s blood and urine. (Dkt. #26, ex.1). Petitioner

argues he acted diligently in securing this evidence, as “new scientific methods have been

brought forth and were not discovered until the National Academy of Sciences issued its

research regarding Forensic Analysis well after the filing of this action.” (Dkt. #70, p.8).

The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s claim that his lawyers rebuffed efforts to secure such

testing earlier, by telling him he did “‘not know the law’ and was not a ‘trained

professional.’” Id. The fact, however, that Plaintiff ultimately procured such testing on his

own suggests that he may have been able to secure the testing earlier, and therefore did not

exercise sufficient diligence. 

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In his Objections to the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner appears to read the

Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, however, as suggesting that he failed to file his federal

habeas within the one year statute of limitations period. (Dkt. #70, p.2–3). This is incorrect. It is

undisputed that petitioner timely filed his federal habeas petition on August 4, 2005 (Dkt. #1).

Instead, the Magistrate Judge’s discussion of timeliness and AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations

served only to demonstrate that Petitioner is no longer free to amend his habeas petition without

showing that the newly proposed claims “relate back” to the claims raised in his original timely

petition. (Dkt. #67, p.3)

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Ultimately, however, the Court need not reach a definitive conclusion concerning

Petitioner’s diligence in discovering this evidence. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff’s

evidence constitutes a new factual predicate for the purposes of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(D), Plaintiff did not file his Motion to Amend within the one year statute of

limitation provided therein. Plaintiff first brought the evidence in question to the Court’s

attention in a filing made on December 28, 2007. See (Dkt. #26, ex.1(Ed French’s Report));

Id. at ex. 5–8 (the criminal histories of Francis Smith and Leslie Donald Ray). Assuming

further that the date on which this evidence could have been discovered through due

diligence was the same as the date on which it was filed, Petitioner would have needed to file

his Motion to Amend by December 28, 2008. Petitioner filed the instant Motion to Stay on

December 5, 2009, but, importantly, did not file his pending Motion to Amend until January

23, 2009; one year and twenty-six days after the latest possible time this Court could find the

statute began to run again. 

Therefore, for purposes of this action, the statute of limitations began to run from the

date on which Petitioner’s judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking review. Id.; (Dkt. #67, p.3). In this case, however,

Petitioner did not avail himself of state-post conviction procedures. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

conviction became final on March April 5, 2005, 90 days after the Arizona Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the trial court’s dismissal of his direct appeal on

January 5, 20052

. Id.; see Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (statute of

limitations does not begin to run until close of ninety-day period within which petitioner

could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court).

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Accordingly, this Court has no choice but to find that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory

tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling

Having found that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling , the Court must now

consider whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. Equitable tolling is available only

when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir.1998).

“When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles

v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999). Under AEDPA, “the threshold necessary to

trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, cases in which the Ninth Circuit

has found extraordinary circumstances are rare and generally limited to those in which a

serious mistake by a government official, counsel, or court prejudices the plaintiff. See e.g.,

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054–57 (9th Cir. 2008) (petitioner entitled to equitable

tolling because he relied on the Ninth Circuit's legally erroneous holding in determining

when to file a federal habeas petition); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877–79 (9th Cir.

2002) (equitable tolling warranted where district court mishandles a petition causing it to be

untimely).

The Magistrate recommended that equitable tolling not be applied in this case. (Dkt.

#67, p.5–6). Petitioner objects, arguing that he pursued his rights diligently throughout, but

his attorneys thwarted these efforts by failing to raise the issues and conduct the

investigations he requested. (Dkt. #70, p.8). Petitioner argues that this diligence, combined

with “the extraordinary circumstance of both obtaining scientific information and attempting

to retain a competent counsel to take on these issues” justifies equitable tolling. Id. Mindful

of the difficulties faced by Plaintiff, this Court does not believe that the circumstances

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presented by Petitioner rise to the level of the extraordinary. Therefore, equitable tolling is

not justified in this case. 

3. Relation Back

Because the statute of limitations has run, this Court must ask whether Petitioner’s

proposed amendments relate back to the claims in his original petition. Mayle v. Felix, 545

U.S. 644, 659 (2005). “An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original

pleading when ... the claim ... asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,

transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.”

FED.R.CIV.PRO. 15(c)(2). An amended habeas petition, “does not relate back (and thereby

escape AEDPA's one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by

facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Mayle, 545

U.S. at 649. Additionally, in Mayle the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the trial itself

constitutes the same transaction or occurrence for the purposes of the relates-back test: “If

claims asserted after the one-year period could be revived simply because they relate to the

same trial, conviction, or sentence as a timely filed claim, AEDPA's limitation period would

have slim significance.” Id. at 662. 

In his original habeas filing, Petitioner plead four grounds for relief: (1) a due process

violation stemming from exclusion of defense witnesses; (2) Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel (IAC) from counsel’s failure to timely disclose defense witnesses; (3) Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel from counsel’s failure to interview defense witnesses; and (4) a Due

process violation stemming from the Arizona Court of Appeals’ failure to remand his case

to trial court in light of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). (Dkt. #1). Petitioner objects

to the Magistrate’s finding that his new claims do not relate back to any of the four contained

in his original petition. (Dkt. #70, p.3–4). This Court, like the Magistrate Judge, does not

believe that Plaintiff’s newly proposed Brady and IAC claims relate back to his original

claims. 

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 The Brady claim is clearly a new ground for relief. It is supported by different facts,

both in time and type, then those supporting Petitioner’s other claims, as it implicates

prosecutorial conduct, whereas the original claims focus on the actions of trial counsel and

the trial-court judge. As to his new IAC claims, Petitioner argues they relate back because

his habeas petition contained two other IAC claims.. (Dkt. #70, at 4). The Court must reject

this argument. Petitioner’s new allegations of IAC are unrelated to either of his other IAC

allegations. The only relationship between these claims is their accusation of ineffectiveness.

Though they may share a common legal theory, they implicate a different set of operative

facts, arising out of different instances of conduct. See Mandacina v. U.S., 328 F.3d 995,

1002 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that petitioner’s new claim of IAC was different in time and

type from the ten counts of IAC alleged in his original petition). Accordingly, this Court

must find that Plaintiff’s new claims do not relate back to those found in his original petition.

B. Motion For a Stay

In the Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Marshal analyzed Petitioner’s Motion

for a Stay under the rubric of Rhines v. Weber. 544 U.S. 269 (2205) Under Rhines, in

limited circumstances, a federal district court has the discretion to stay a mixed habeas

petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims to allow the petitioner to present his

unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance, and then return to federal court for

review of his perfected petition. 544 U.S. 269. Because this Court has already decided that

Petitioner may not amend his habeas petition, his petition is not mixed, and the Rhines

analysis is inapplicable. 

Instead, should this court decide to grant a stay, it must do so pursuant to Kelly v.

Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the Kelly three-step procedure (1) a petitioner

amends his petition to delete any unexhausted claims; (2) the court stays and holds in

abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing the petitioner the opportunity to

proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his

petition and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to the original petition. King v. Ryan,

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564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070–71).” The Rhines and

Kelly approaches are distinct because “Rhines applies to stays of mixed petitions, whereas

the three-step [Kelly] procedure applies to stays of fully exhausted petitions.” Jackson v.

Roe, 425 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2005); see also King, 564 F.3d at 1140 (“[T]he three-step

procedure outlined in Kelly allows the stay of fully exhausted petitions).” Additionally,

unlike a stay predicated on Rhines, a Kelly stay “does nothing to protect a petitioner’s

unexhausted claims from untimeliness in the interim.” King, 564 F.3d at 1141.

This Court acknowledges that Petitioner did not start on the same procedural ground

as the normal Kelly petitioner; with a mixed petition. Petitioner is, however, in the same

procedural posture as any Kelly-petitioner that has taken step-one; he possesses a fully

exhausted habeas claim and prays that the Court grant a stay. Accordingly, the Court

believes the rules governing Kelly apply in the instant case. And, when faced with a fully

exhausted petition at Kelly step-two, a district court still retains discretion concerning

whether or not to grant a stay. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070. A stay is clearly appropriate when

declining to do so would cause otherwise valid claims to be forfeited. Id. Conversely, the

Ninth Circuit also recognizes that a Court may properly deny staying an exhausted habeas

petition when Mayle’s relation-back requirement would prevent the petitioner from ever

successfully amending his claim. King, 564 F.3d. at 1141–2. In King, the Ninth Circuit

upheld a district court’s decision not to grant a Kelly-stay where that court did not believe

“that any of petitioner's unexhausted claims would relate back to the date of petitioner's

original filing,” as required by Mayle. Id. at 1142.

This Court has already concluded in this Order that Petitioner’s unexhausted claims

do not relate back to the claims made in his original petition. Therefore, granting Petitioner’s

Motion for a Stay could never lead to him eventually being permitted to amend his habeas

petition to include these new claims. Accordingly, this Court, following the logic set forth

in King, declines to exercise its discretion to grant a stay, as doing so would only result in

unnecessary delay in adjudicating the claims properly before this court.

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C. The Previous Report and Recommendation

In a previous Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Marshall concluded that

Petitioner’s habeas petition should be dismissed. (Dkt. #37). In an a subsequent Order, this

Court, conducting a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation, reached the same

conclusion concerning Petitioner’s habeas petition. (Dkt. #44). In order to give full

consideration to Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay, however, this Court abstained from fully

adopting Magistrate Marshall’s previous Report and Recommendation. Id. Now that the

Court has fully addressed Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay and Motion to Amend, and

dismissed them, the Court no longer has reason for withholding final action on Petitioner’s

habeas petition.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting the Magistrate Judge Marshall’s Report and

Recommendation (Dkt. #67) to the extent it is consistent with this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Motion to Stay (Dkt. #53)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Dkt. #61)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Arizona Department of Corrections’

Objection to the Court’s granting Petitioner’s Motion for a Procedural Order (Dkt.# 48).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED adopting in full Magistrate Judge’s Marshall’s

previous Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #37) to the extent it is consistent with the

Court’s Order conducting a de novo review (Dkt. #44).

/ / / 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioners’s habeas petition (Dkt. #1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to close this case.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2009

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