Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04384/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04384-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:185 Employee Pension Plan

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE MORENO, et al.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SHAMROCK CONCRETE

CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-05-4384 MMC

AMENDED* ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; DENYING DEFENDANT

JOSEPH PATRICK MOLLOY’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is the motion, filed August 4, 2006 by plaintiffs Jose Moreno, Larry

Totten, Laborers Vacation-Holiday Trust Fund for Northern California, Laborers Pension

Trust Fund for Northern California, and Laborers Training and Retraining Trust Fund for

Northern California, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Defendants Joseph Patrick Molloy (“Molloy”) and Shamrock Concrete

Construction, Inc. (“Shamrock, Inc.”) have filed separate oppositions, to which plaintiffs

have jointly replied. Also before the Court is Molloy’s cross-motion for summary judgment,

filed October 6, 2006, pursuant to Rule 56; plaintiffs have filed opposition thereto, to which

Molloy has replied. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to

 

* The amendment is solely to correct a typographical error at page 1, line 22.

Case 3:05-cv-04384-MMC Document 47 Filed 12/08/06 Page 1 of 8
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1

By order filed October 24, 2006, the Court vacated the hearing scheduled for

October 27, 2006.

2

The following facts are undisputed.

3

Molloy is President, Chief Executive Officer, and Responsible Managing Officer for

Shamrock, Inc. (See Molloy Decl. ¶ 4.)

2

 the motions, the Court rules as follows.1

BACKGROUND2

Molloy, pursuant to a Memorandum Agreement signed March 28, 2002, agreed to

be bound by the “Laborers’ Master Agreement for Northern California June 28, 1999

through June 30, 2002” as well as by “any future modifications, changes, amendments,

supplements, extensions or renewals of or to said Master Agreement,” (see Hagan Decl.

Ex. A; Molloy Decl. ¶ 3); the Master Agreement was subsequently renewed through June

30, 2006, (see Hagan Decl. ¶ 8; Compl. Ex. A). The Master Agreement requires employers

to “pay hourly contributions [to certain trust funds] for each hour paid for and/or worked,

including overtime pay, shift pay, show-up time pay and similar payments” in accordance

with a schedule specified in the Master Agreement. (See Hagan Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. B § 28A.)

When Molloy signed the Memorandum Agreement in 2002, he was a sole proprietor,

doing business as Shamrock Concrete Construction. (See Molloy Decl. ¶ 3.) On January

14, 2003, Molloy incorporated under the name Shamrock Concrete Construction, Inc.

(“Shamrock, Inc.”). (See Bevington Decl. Ex. B; Molloy Decl. ¶ 4.) “By January 1, 2004,

[Molloy] had stopped doing business as [a] sole proprietor,” and, “[a]fter January 2004, “did

not employ any workers.” (See Molloy Decl. ¶ 5.) “Commencing January 1, 2004,”

Shamrock, Inc. employed construction workers and made trust fund contribution payments

to plaintiffs. (See id.)3

In their complaint filed October 27, 2005, plaintiffs allege defendants made certain

contributions on an untimely basis and failed to make other required contributions.

//

Case 3:05-cv-04384-MMC Document 47 Filed 12/08/06 Page 2 of 8
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3

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment as

to “all or any part” of a claim “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), (c). Material facts are those that

may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. The Court may not

weigh the evidence. See id. at 255. Rather, the nonmoving party’s evidence must be

believed and “all justifiable inferences must be drawn in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” See

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989)

(en banc) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

interrogatory answers, admissions and affidavits, if any, that it contends demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving

party’s burden is discharged when it shows the court there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325.

 A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [that] party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

also Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. The opposing party need not show the issue will be

resolved conclusively in its favor. See id. at 248-49. All that is necessary is submission of

sufficient evidence to create a material factual dispute, thereby requiring a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions at trial. See id.

//

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4

Both defendants argue that, as to unpaid contributions due as a result of plaintiffs’

audits, plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment because plaintiffs’ moving papers refer in one

passage to “the period July 1, 2004 through March 31, 2006,” (see Pls.’ Mot. at 2:15-16),

and in another passage to “the period July 1, 2002 through March 31, 2006,” (see id. at

7:4-5). Neither defendant articulates, however, much less demonstrates, any prejudice as

a result of the above-referenced discrepancy. Neither defendant disputes that the audited

period was July 2002 through March 2006, nor that evidence offered by plaintiffs

unambiguously refers to such period as the period covered by the audit. (See Hagan Decl.

Ex. J at 1.)

4

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid contributions, as well as corresponding interest and

liquidated damages, and also interest and liquidated damages corresponding to

contributions alleged to have been made on an untimely basis. Plaintiffs seek to hold both

Molloy and Shamrock, Inc. jointly liable for the entire amount assertedly owed.

A. Molloy

1. December 2002 Contributions

Molloy does not dispute that under the terms of the Master Agreement, he was

responsible for making contributions to plaintiffs corresponding to covered work performed

by employees hired by Molloy in his capacity as a sole proprietor, nor that he employed

workers as a sole proprietor in 2002.

Plaintiffs offer evidence that plaintiffs conducted audits of defendants’ books in 2004

and in 2006 and that such audits disclosed that Molloy failed to pay $3495.80 in

contributions due in December 2002, (see Hagan Decl. ¶ 17; Hagan Supp. Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A

at 1), that the interest owing on such unpaid contributions is $2254.79, (see Hagan Supp.

Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B), and that the amount of liquidated damages owing on such unpaid

contributions is $2254.79, (see Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D). Molloy offers no evidence to

the contrary, nor has he challenged the mathematical calculations made by plaintiffs.4

Accordingly, it is undisputed that Molloy is liable to plaintiffs in the amount of

$8005.38.

//

//

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5

2. 2004 - 2006 Contributions

Plaintiffs offer evidence, discussed infra, that contributions, interest, and liquidated

damages are owed to plaintiffs corresponding to work performed in 2004, 2005, and 2006

by employees of Shamrock, Inc. In arguing Molloy is liable for such sums, plaintiffs rely on

¶ 30 of the Master Agreement, which provides that such “Agreement is binding upon each

Individual Employer regardless of whether he/she or it changes the name or style or

address of his/her or their business.” (See Hagan Decl. Ex. C ¶ 30).

Plaintiffs argue that the “obvious purpose” of ¶ 30 is to “prevent the individual

employer from playing a shell game using different business names or styles to evade the

obligations of the agreement.” (See Pl.’s Opp. to Molloy’s Cross-Mot. at 4:20-22.) 

Consistent therewith, plaintiffs read ¶ 30 to provide that when an individual employer, such

as Molloy, agrees to be bound by the Master Agreement, he remains bound by that

Agreement irrespective of whether he later changes the name or form of his business. 

Such interpretation, plaintiffs argue, is further supported by the Memorandum Agreement,

which provides that even where the newly-named or newly-formed employer signs a new

agreement with plaintiffs, the individual employer “continues to be bound” by the agreement

he previously signed. (See Hagan Decl. Ex. A.)

Molloy, although agreeing with plaintiffs that the “obvious purpose” of ¶ 30 is to

prevent an individual employer from playing “a shell game,” (see Reply in Support of

Molloy’s Cross-Mot. at 3:27 - 4:3), argues ¶ 30 should be interpreted as providing that

where an individual employer incorporates, the new corporation, but not the individual

employer, is liable under the Master Agreement. This proposed interpretation is not

persuasive. First, such interpretation runs counter to the language of both the

Memorandum Agreement and Master Agreement, each of which provides for continuing

liability of the “Individual Employer,” i.e., the signatory thereto. Second, were the Court to

adopt Molloy’s interpretation, a party signing the contract could avoid liability thereunder

simply by engaging in the type of “shell game” both parties agree the contract sought to

preclude.

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5

In light of this finding, the Court has not addressed plaintiffs’ argument that Molloy’s

cross-motion is procedurally improper.

6

Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiffs have demonstrated, as a matter of law, that

Molloy is liable for the contributions owed by reason of covered work performed by

employees of Shamrock, Inc., and that Molloy is not entitled to summary judgment.5

Plaintiffs offer evidence that the following contributions, interest, and liquidated

damages are owed for the period 2004 through 2006:

(1) Of “reported contributions” identified by Shamrock, Inc. on “Employer Reports”

submitted to plaintiffs, defendants failed to pay the total amount of $27,873.54. (See

Hagan Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. I.) The interest owing on such unpaid contributions is $4590.89,

(see Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D), and the amount of liquidated damages owing thereon is

$4590.89, (see id.).

(2) Plaintiffs’ audit results uncovered that defendants did not report $88,291.14 in

contributions due. (See Hagan Decl. ¶ 17; Hagan Supp. Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A). The interest

owing on such unpaid contributions is $14,700.70, (see Hagan Supp. Decl. Ex. B), and the

amount of liquidated damages owing thereon is $14,700.70, (see Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex.

D; Hagan Supp. Decl. Ex. B).

(3) The interest owing on contributions paid on an untimely basis is $1379.72, (see

Hagan ¶ 13, Ex. G; Bevington Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D at 2), and the amount of liquidated damages

owing on untimely paid contributions is $2400, (see id.).

Molloy has offered no evidence to the contrary, nor has he challenged the

mathematical calculations made by plaintiffs.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated, as a matter of law, that Molloy is liable to

plaintiffs in the further amount of $158,527.58.

//

//

//

//

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7

B. Shamrock, Inc.

1. December 2002 Contributions

Plaintiffs argue that Shamrock, Inc. is jointly liable with Molloy for the $8005.38 due

as a result of unpaid contributions, interest, and liquidated damages corresponding to

obligations owed in December 2002, on the ground Shamrock, Inc. is the “successor” to

Molloy’s sole proprietorship. (See Pls.’ Reply at 2:15-17.) Setting aside the fact that

plaintiffs articulate their successorship theory for the first time in plaintiffs’ reply to

Shamrock, Inc.’s opposition, thereby precluding Shamrock, Inc. from responding thereto,

plaintiffs offer no evidence in support of a successorship theory.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to show Shamrock, Inc. is, as a matter of law,

jointly liable with Molloy for the above-referenced $8005.38.

2. 2004 - 2006 Contributions

Plaintiffs argue that Shamrock, Inc. is jointly liable with Molloy for the $158,527.58

due as a result of unpaid contributions, interest, and liquidated damages corresponding to

obligations owed for the period 2004 through 2006. Shamrock, Inc. concedes it is

“responsible for all contributions” owed to plaintiffs as of January 1, 2004, (see Shamrock,

Inc.’s Opp. at 2:28 - 3:3), and has offered no evidence to dispute plaintiffs’ evidence or

calculations as to the amounts owed corresponding to that period.

Accordingly, it is undisputed that Shamrock, Inc. is jointly liable with Molloy for the

above-referenced $158,527.58.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part, as follows:

a. To the extent plaintiffs claim plaintiffs are entitled to the total amount of

$166,532.96, of which amount $158,527.58 is jointly and severally owed by Molloy and

Shamrock, Inc., and $8005.38 is severally owed by Molloy, the motion is hereby

GRANTED.

Case 3:05-cv-04384-MMC Document 47 Filed 12/08/06 Page 7 of 8
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b. To the extent plaintiffs claim Shamrock, Inc. is jointly liable with Molloy for

the sum of $8005.38, the motion is hereby DENIED.

2. Molloy’s cross-motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 8, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-04384-MMC Document 47 Filed 12/08/06 Page 8 of 8