Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02594/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02594-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Isaac Javier Henderson,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02594-PHX-ESW

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Isaac Javier Henderson’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal 

of the Social Security Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of his claim for 

disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits 

and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 

Plaintiff alleges disability beginning on December 21, 2011. 

This Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 

405(g), 1383(c). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon 

the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing 

the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case 

for a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction. (Doc. 13). After reviewing the Administrative Record (“A.R.”), Plaintiff’s 

Opening Brief (Doc. 16), Defendant’s Response Brief (Doc. 20), and Plaintiff’s Reply 

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(Doc. 21), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and is free of harmful legal error. The decision is 

therefore affirmed. 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Disability Analysis: Five-Step Evaluation

The Social Security Act (the “Act”) provides for disability insurance benefits to 

those who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a 

physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act also provides for 

Supplemental Security Income to certain individuals who are aged 65 or older, blind, or 

disabled and have limited income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382. To be eligible for benefits based 

on an alleged disability, the claimant must show that he or she suffers from a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment that prohibits him or her from engaging in 

any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(A)(3)(A). 

The claimant must also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.

To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an 

analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four 

steps:1

Step One: Is the claimant engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity”? If so, the analysis ends and disability benefits are 

denied. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step two.

Step Two: Does the claimant have a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments? A severe 

impairment is one which significantly limits the claimant’s 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not 

have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 

1 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,746 (9th Cir. 2007).

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disability benefits are denied at this step. Otherwise, the ALJ 

proceeds to step three.

Step Three: Is the impairment equivalent to one of a number 

of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges 

are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity? 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets 

or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is 

conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is 

not one that is presumed to be disabling, the ALJ proceeds to 

the fourth step of the analysis.

Step Four: Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 

performing work which the claimant performed in the past? 

If not, the claimant is “not disabled” and disability benefits 

are denied without continuing the analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the 

last step. 

If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner:2

Step Five: Can the claimant perform other work in the 

national economy in light of his or her age, education, and 

work experience? The claimant is entitled to disability 

benefits only if he or she is unable to perform other work. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). Social Security is 

responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that 

other work exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work 

experience. Id.

B. Standard of Review Applicable to ALJ’s Determination

The Court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence 

and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although “substantial 

2 Parra, 481 F.3d at 746.

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evidence” is less than a preponderance, it is more than a “mere scintilla.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient 

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it 

is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 

(9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving 

conflicts, ambiguity, and determining credibility. Id.; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Court also considers the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an ALJ’s 

decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ’s decision need not be remanded or 

reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there 

remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error “does not 

negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion”) (citations omitted).

II. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff was born in 1972, has an eleventh grade education, and has been 

employed as a street sweeper, pest control worker, pumper/driver of porta-potties, and 

retail manager. (A.R. 34, 50-52). 

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In November 2011, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability insurance 

benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income benefits. (A.R. 

223-29). Plaintiff alleges that on December 21, 2011,3 he became unable to work due to 

torn ligaments in his shoulders and loss of strength in his hands and arms. (A.R. 65). 

Social Security denied both applications in April 2012. (A.R. 147-54). On October 23, 

2012, upon Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, Social Security affirmed the denial of 

Plaintiff’s application. (A.R. 159-65). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. 

(A.R. 166-67). After holding an April 2013 hearing, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not 

disabled. (A.R. 9-29, 30-60). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, 

making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 

1-6). Plaintiff thereafter filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

requesting judicial review and reversal of the ALJ’s decision.

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Disability Analysis

The ALJ completed all five steps of the disability analysis before finding that 

Plaintiff is not disabled and entitled to disability benefits. 

1. Step One: Engagement in “Substantial Gainful Activity”

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the amended alleged disability onset date. (A.R. 14). Neither party disputes this 

determination.

2. Step Two: Presence of Medically Severe Impairment/Combination 

of Impairments 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: (i) lumbar 

degenerative disc disease; (ii) osteoarthritis of the knees, bilaterally; (iii) “[s]tatus post 

left shoulder injury with multiple years and tendinosis”; (iv) morbid obesity, dysthymic 

3 Plaintiff initially alleged disability beginning on September 15, 2010. (A.R. 33, 65). Plaintiff amended the alleged disability onset date to December 21, 2011. (A.R. 33, 

342).

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disorder; and (v) anxiety disorder. (A.R. 14-15). Neither party disputes the ALJ’s 

determination at this step.

3. Step Three: Presence of Listed Impairment(s) 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 15). Neither party 

disputes the ALJ’s determination at this step.

4. Step Four: Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has retained the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b), except that Plaintiff is able to frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and 

climb ramps and stairs. (A.R. 18). The ALJ assessed additional restrictions as follows:

[Plaintiff] should never be required to climb ladders, ropes, 

and scaffolds. [Plaintiff] is also able to frequently lift 

overhead with his left upper extremity, as well as frequently 

perform fine and gross manipulation, but should avoid 

concentrated exposure to hazards such as dangerous 

machinery and unprotected heights. [Plaintiff] would also 

require the option to sit and stand at-will. [Plaintiff] is also 

able to complete simple, unskilled and repetitive tasks in 

work environments that require no more than occasional and 

superficial contact with co-workers, supervisors, and the 

general public, and should not be expected to resolve 

conflicts or persuade others. 

(A.R. 18).

After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) and Plaintiff’s 

RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work. (A.R. 

22-23). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step four in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC by (i) 

misinterpreting the evidence when assigning significant weight to the opinions of 

examining physician Dr. Brian Briggs and reviewing physician Dr. Nadine Keer and (ii) 

improperly rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating pain management doctor, Dr. O. 

Uhrik. (Doc. 16 at 4-6).

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5. Step Five: Capacity to Perform Other Work 

At the final step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform the requirements 

of work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as “CashierParking Lot” and “Office Helper.” (A.R. 23-24).

The issue at this step pertains to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred at step 

four in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. If the ALJ committed harmful legal error at step four, 

then the ALJ’s determination at step five is also erroneous. 

D. Plaintiff’s Challenge at Step Four

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, there are three 

categories of physicians: (i) treating physicians, who actually treat the claimant; (ii) 

examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (iii) nonexamining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 

F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons that 

are supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining doctor. Id. at 830-31; Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 

(9th Cir. 2005). An ALJ cannot reject a treating or examining physician’s opinion in 

favor of another physician’s opinion without first providing specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence, such as finding that the physician’s 

opinion is inconsistent with and not supported by the record as a whole. Bayliss, 427 

F.3d at 1216; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (an ALJ must consider whether an opinion is 

consistent with the record as a whole); see also Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 

2002); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (finding it not improper for an ALJ to reject a 

treating physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with the record).

1. Dr. Brian Briggs

On February 27, 2012, consulting physician Dr. Brian Briggs examined Plaintiff. 

(A.R. 465-69). In his report, Dr. Briggs recounted that Plaintiff stated that his pain is 

aggravated by standing or sitting for more than thirty minutes, but “is relieved by 

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medications.” (A.R. 465). Dr. Briggs assessed that Plaintiff can (i) occasionally lift 

twenty pounds; (ii) frequently lift ten pounds; (iii) stand or walk for six to eight hours in 

an eight-hour day; and (iv) frequently climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, 

reach, handle, finger, and feel. (A.R. 468-69). Dr. Briggs further assessed that Plaintiff 

has no limitations with respect to sitting, seeing, hearing, and speaking. (A.R. 469). 

Finally, Dr. Briggs opined that Plaintiff can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds and

is restricted from working around heights and moving machinery. (Id.). The ALJ gave 

Dr. Briggs’ opinion significant weight, stating that it is “fully consistent with the 

probative findings of the physical examination conducted by Dr. Briggs, [the ALJ’s] 

review of the record and the report of activity testified to by [Plaintiff] and his report that 

his pain ‘is relieved by medication.’” (A.R. 21). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misinterpreted the evidence by relying on Dr. Briggs’ 

statement that Plaintiff’s pain is relieved by medication. (Doc. 16 at 4). Plaintiff asserts 

that “every chart note” from Plaintiff’s treating pain management physician, Dr. O. 

Uhrik, “indicates pain and only partial relief from medications . . . .” (Id.). Dr. Uhrik’s 

progress notes, however, state that Plaintiff’s pain is reduced by forty to sixty-five 

percent with pain medication. (e.g., A.R. 472-80, 507-09, 588-89, 591-96). Dr. Uhrik’s 

most recent progress notes state “Pain control obtained.” (A.R. 588-89, 591-96). 

Further, a number of recent progress notes state “Quality of life with current medications: 

Improved.” (e.g., A.R. 589, 592, 593, 595). Because Plaintiff’s reported reduction in 

pain is by definition “relief,”4 Plaintiff has failed to show how the ALJ’s statement that 

Plaintiff’s pain is “relieved by medication” misinterprets the evidence in the record. 

In addition, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously assigned significant weight 

to Dr. Briggs’ opinion because Dr. Briggs acknowledged that the medical records he 

reviewed were not up to date. (A.R. 467). Plaintiff cites to no authority that requires an

4 Plaintiff’s argument conflates the definitions of “relieve” and “eliminate.” “Relieve” is defined as “to reduce or remove (something, such as pain or an unpleasant feeling).” Meriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relief (emphasis added). “Eliminate” is defined as “to put an end to or get rid of.” Meriam- Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eliminate.

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consultative examining physician to review all of a claimant’s medical records, and the 

Court finds none. See 20 §§ C.F.R 404.1517, 416.917. Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument 

misses two points. First, Dr. Briggs’ opinions are based on an independent physical 

examination. Dr. Briggs diagnosed Plaintiff with gross obesity, decreased range of 

motion of the left elbow, and degenerative joint disease of the knees. (A.R. 468). In his 

medical source statement, Dr. Briggs explained that his conclusions are based on these 

diagnoses. (A.R. 468-69). 

Second, the ALJ reviewed Dr. Briggs’ opinion in the context of the record and 

found that the two comported. (A.R. 21). Plaintiff does not challenge this finding. 

Where “the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing a decision, we 

may not substitute our judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 

995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039). The Court finds that the 

ALJ’s assignment of significant weight to Dr. Briggs’ opinion is supported by substantial 

evidence and is based on correct legal standards.5

 

For the above reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ 

misinterpreted the evidence and improperly weighed Dr. Briggs’ opinion.

2. Dr. Nadine Keer 

On April 17, 2012, state agency physician Dr. Keer reviewed Plaintiff’s medical 

records and opined that Plaintiff could (i) occasionally lift and/or carry twenty pounds; 

(ii) frequently lift and/or carry ten pounds; (iii) stand and/or walk for about six hours in 

an eight-hour workday; and (iv) sit for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour 

workday. (A.R. 91-93). Dr. Keer also assessed that Plaintiff could frequently climb 

5 In his Opening Brief, Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ violated 20 C.F.R. § 

1527, which explains that Social Security generally gives more weight to an examining physician’s opinion than a non-examining physician’s opinion. (Doc. 16 at 6). The basis 

for this argument is the ALJ’s statement that “Therefore to [the] extent it is consistent 

with the DDS opinion of [non-examining physician] Dr. Keer, significant weight was afforded to Dr. Briggs’ consultative opinion.” (A.R. 21). The Court finds this statement 

inconsequential to the ultimate disability determination. The ALJ did not give Dr. Keer’s 

opinion more weight—she assigned significant weight to both Dr. Keer and Briggs’ opinions, which are nearly identical. Further, the ALJ articulated legitimate reasons for giving Dr. Briggs’ opinion significant weight (e.g. it is consistent with the record). 

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ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl and has no restrictions with respect to 

pushing/pulling, balancing, and feeling (i.e. skin receptors). (A.R. 91-92). Like Dr. 

Briggs’ opinion, Dr. Keer found that Plaintiff should never climb ladders, ropes, and 

scaffolds and should avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as machinery and 

heights. (A.R. 92-93). However, unlike Dr. Briggs, Dr. Keer found that Plaintiff is 

limited in his ability to reach, handle (i.e. gross manipulation), and finger (i.e. fine 

manipulation) due to left arm pain and decreased range of motion in his left forearm. 

(A.R. 92).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assigning significant weight to Dr. Keer’s 

opinion because Dr. Keer’s report predates Plaintiff’s submission of an additional 102 

medical documents. (Doc. 16 at 5). Plaintiff, however, does not discuss the content of 

these additional medical documents or explain how the additional documents would have 

changed the outcome of the administrative proceedings. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to address an issue that 

the claimant failed to argue with specificity in his briefing). Without the requisite 

specificity and analysis supported by the record, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show 

error, let alone that harmful error. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir.

2011) (“Where harmfulness of the error is not apparent from the circumstances, the party 

seeking reversal must explain how the error caused harm.”); Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 

1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The burden is on the party claiming error to demonstrate not 

only the error, but also that it affected his ‘substantial rights,’ which is to say, not merely 

his procedural rights.”) (citing Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407–09 (2009)).

Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the additional documents and considered the 

merits of Plaintiff’s contention. Although Dr. Keer did not have access to all of Dr. 

Uhrik’s records, Dr. Keer explicitly referenced Dr. Uhrik’s March 20, 2012 progress 

note, which states that:

HPI: Presents with pain in both arms, elbows, and both 

shoulders. The pain is moderate in severity and the pain is 

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reduced by 40% with meds and is constant. And, as a result 

of the pain the patient is not able to work or do his ADL’s. 

. . . .

Medication: does not share ow[n] pain meds with others, 

“pain meds enable me to do my ADL’s,” and he states 

medication does not affect his driving.

(A.R. 472). Dr. Uhrik’s March 20, 2012 progress note is representative of Dr. Uhrik’s 

most restrictive progress notes that were submitted after Dr. Keer conducted her review. 

Many of Dr. Uhrik’s progress notes that Dr. Keer did not review indicate that Plaintiff’s 

pain is reduced by fifty percent with medications. (A.R. 473-75, 477, 513-14, 589, 593).6

 

Several progress notes state that Plaintiff’s pain is reduced by sixty percent and two

others state a pain reduction of sixty-five percent. (A.R. 507-09; 479-80).7 Further, 

almost all of Dr. Uhrik’s progress notes dated after Plaintiff’s amended alleged disability 

onset date (December 21, 2011) state that Plaintiff’s pain medications enable him to do 

his daily activities without impacting his ability to drive.8

 Indeed, the record reflects that 

Plaintiff drives his daughter to school and drove alone to the consultative examinations. 

(A.R. 48, 484-85, 550). 

Regarding the records from other providers that Plaintiff submitted after Dr. 

Keer’s review, a March 17, 2012 exam revealed only mild degenerative changes in 

Plaintiff’s left knee. (A.R. 530). An October 11, 2012 emergency room report states that 

Plaintiff’s chronic pain is resolved and that Plaintiff had normal range of motion. (A.R. 

523). Finally, at a February 2013 intake appointment at TERROS, Inc., Plaintiff stated 

that he is able to complete his daily activities and denied having any medical issues. 

(A.R. 570). Plaintiff stated that “I have depression and anxiety and I don’t have any 

6 A few of these records predate Plaintiff’s December 21, 2011 alleged disability onset date. The Court notes that “[m]edical opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited relevance.” Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1165.

7 The records at A.R. 479-80 predate Plaintiff’s December 21, 2011 alleged disability onset date by several months. The records at A.R. 507-09 are from 2012.

8 The progress notes that do not contain these statements are entirely silent on the issue.

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motivation to do anything[].” (Id.). This is in contrast to Plaintiff’s statements at the 

April 2013 hearing and throughout the administrative proceedings that chronic pain 

prevents him from completing activities. (A.R. 40, 302).

After reviewing the additional documents submitted after Dr. Keer’s April 2012 

report, the Court finds that there is no reason to believe a remand would lead to a 

different result. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197 (applying harmless error standard); see 

also Ward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that a 

remand is unnecessary if “it will amount to no more than an empty exercise.”); see 

also Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989) (“No principle of 

administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect 

opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different 

result.”). Moreover, even if Dr. Keer’s opinion is discounted, Dr. Briggs’ opinion 

remains, which the ALJ did not improperly weigh. As Dr. Briggs’ opinion is based on 

his own examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Briggs’ opinion alone constitutes substantial 

evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC determination. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 

1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining physician’s medical report based on independent 

examination of claimant constitutes substantial evidence to support ALJ’s disability 

determination). 

For the above reasons, the Court finds that any error by the ALJ in assigning 

significant weight to Dr. Keer’s opinion is harmless.

3. Dr. O. Uhrik

Plaintiff’s treating pain management physician, Dr. O. Uhrik, provided medical 

assessments dated May 15, 2012 and March 20, 2013, which opine that Plaintiff can sit 

for less than one hour in an eight-hour workday and stand/walk for less than one hour in 

an eight-hour workday. (A.R. 496-98, 585-87). Dr. Uhrik’s May 2012 assessment states 

that Plaintiff can occasionally lift up to twenty pounds, while Dr. Uhrik’s May 2013 

assessment states that Plaintiff can occasionally lift up to ten pounds. (A.R. 496, 585). 

The ALJ gave Dr. Uhrik’s opinions partial weight. (A.R. 22). Because Dr. Uhrik’s 

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opinions are contradicted by another acceptable medical source, the Court must 

determine whether the ALJ offered specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. 

Uhrik’s medical opinion.

The ALJ gave two primary reasons for giving Dr. Uhrik’s opinion partial weight. 

The ALJ first explained that “the sitting/standing/walking and postural limitations are not 

supported by even Dr. Uhrik’s own treatment records where he has provided that 

medications have been effective of eliminating 40-65% of [Plaintiff’s] pain with ‘no side 

effects’ and ‘stable for three years on [prior medication] regimen.’” (A.R. 22). Finding 

inconsistencies between a treating physician’s opinion and his or her treatment notes is a 

specific and legitimate reason for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. Valentine v. 

Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2009); Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ permissibly rejected treating 

physician's opinion when opinion was contradicted by or inconsistent with treatment 

reports); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (a conflict between 

treatment notes and a treating provider’s opinions may constitute an adequate reason to 

discredit the opinions of a treating physician); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 

(9th Cir. 2003) (treating doctor’s opinion properly rejected when treatment notes 

“provide no basis for the functional restrictions he opined should be imposed on 

[claimant]”). Moreover, the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.9

 For example, Dr. Uhrik’s March 20, 2013 assessment opines that Plaintiff has 

“moderately severe” and “severe” limitations due to pain and fatigue, but a 

contemporaneous progress note states “adequate pain relief with current meds” and 

“Impression: . . . Pain control obtained.” (A.R. 587-88). As mentioned, “[p]ain control 

9 To the extent Plaintiff argues that the record medical evidence actually supports Dr. Uhrik’s opinions, the Court will not second guess the ALJ’s reasonable determination 

to the contrary. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599.

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obtained” is found in a number of other recent progress notes along with the statement 

“Quality of life with current medications: Improved.” (e.g., A.R. 589, 591-96). 

The ALJ also discounted Dr. Uhrik’s opinion because it was “based largely on 

[Plaintiff’s] subjective (and improved) pain complaints . . . .” (A.R. 22). “An ALJ may 

reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s selfreports that have been properly discounted as incredible.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041. 

Here, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his symptoms. Because 

Plaintiff’s Opening Brief does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility analysis, the issue is 

waived.10 

Finally, the ALJ discounted Dr. Uhrik’s opinion because “it appears to be 

sympathetic” to Plaintiff. (A.R. 22). Yet the ALJ did not cite to specific evidence 

suggesting that Dr. Uhrik’s alleged sympathy for Plaintiff adversely impacted his 

professional judgment. The Court thus finds that the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Uhrik was 

sympathetic to Plaintiff is an invalid reason for discounting Dr. Uhrik’s opinion. See

Haulot v. Astrue, 290 F. App’x 53, 54 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding an ALJ’s statement that 

treating doctor was “sympathetic” to the claimant did not constitute substantial evidence 

for rejecting his considered diagnosis). This error, however, is harmless in light of the 

ALJ’s two other valid reasons discussed above. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (where 

some reasons supporting an ALJ’s credibility analysis are found invalid, the error is 

harmless if the remaining valid reasons provide substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s 

10 Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115(9th Cir. 1999) (at least when claimants 

are represented by counsel, they must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative 

hearings in order to preserve them on appeal); Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security 

Admin, 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (deeming argument not made in 

disability claimant’s Opening Brief waived). The Court does not find that manifest 

injustice would occur in deeming the argument waived. Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1115 

(failure to comply with waiver rule is only excused when necessary to avoid manifest 

injustice). 

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credibility determination and “the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ's ultimate 

conclusion.”). 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and is free from reversible error. Accordingly, the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 3rd day of December, 2015. 

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