Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00228/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00228-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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151" ~ I I Pti 2- 52 

, I 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TERRY McKINLEY, Civil No. 15cv0228 WQH (REB) CDCR #C-9411 7, 

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF Doc. No.2] vs. 

AND 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

AMY MILLER; J.G. JANDA; COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO 

R. PREMDAS; B. HUGIE, 	 STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

AND 28 U.S.C § 1915A(bJ(1) 

Defendants. 

Terry McKinley ("Plaintiff'), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California 

Men's Colony West located in San Luis Obispo, California, and proceeding pro se, has 

filed a civil rights complaint ("Compl.") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his constitutional rights when he was housed 

at Centinela State Prison ("CEN") in 2014. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 filing fee 

mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

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Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No.2). 

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).! An action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a 

prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in 

installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844,847 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

("PLRA"), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a "certified copy ofthe 

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the 

average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average 

monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the 

prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forward 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b )(2). 

Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. ClvLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The 

Court has reviewed Plaintiffs trust account statement, as well as the attached prison 

1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 

2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of$50. See 28 U.S.c. § 1914(a), (b); Judicial 

Conference Schedule ofFees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May 1,2013). However, 

the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. 

Id. 

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certificate verifying his available balances, and has determined that Plaintiff has no 

available funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

(providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action 

or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no 

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee."); Taylor, 281 F .3d at 

8S0 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal 

of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds 

available to him when payment is ordered."). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No.2) 

and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)( 1). However, the entire 

$3S0 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk 

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 (b )(1 ). 

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND § 1915A(b) 

A. Standard of Review 

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the PLRA 

also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP, and 

by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused 

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms 

or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon 

as practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915( e)(2)(B), § 1915A(a), (b). Under 

these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from 

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002,1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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All complaints must contain "a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief." FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements ofa cause ofaction, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "Detennining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. 

The "mere possibility of misconduct" falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. Us. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then detennine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

("[W]hen detennining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff."); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). 

However, while the court "ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt," Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

201 0) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

"supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University ofAlaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and 

conclusory allegations ofofficial participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient 

to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id. 

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

"Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights." Devereaux 

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 "is not itself a source of 

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substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). "To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws ofthe United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Tsao 

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 

C. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claims 

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,832 (1994). In 

particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of 

other prisoners. See id. at 833; Hoptowit v. Ray 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982) 

("Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical 

abuse."). However, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two 

requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, obj ecti vely, sufficiently serious; and 

(2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate safety. Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 834; Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457,459 (9th Cir. 1986). "Deliberate 

indifference" requires that the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 

inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The official must both be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. 

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient 

to support a plausible claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment against Defendants 

because he has failed to include "further factual enhancement" from which the Court 

may reasonably infer that any ofthe named Defendants acted, or failed to reasonably act, 

under circumstances which presented a "substantial" or obvious risk" of "imminent" 

harm to Plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (to 

be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must fail to reasonably act under 

circumstances which are '''sure or very likely to cause serious ... and needless 

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suffering'" and which "give rise to 'sufficiently imminent dangers. '" (quoting Helling 

v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993)). 

In Plaintiffs Complaint he generally refers to "prison officials" "intentionally 

creating and spreading false rumors" in which Plaintiff was allegedly labeled an 

informant. (Compl. at 14.) Plaintiff does allege that he was injured by other inmates but 

he fails to identify with any specificity how the named Defendants were personally 

involved in the allegation that he was labeled an informant. 

Thus, as currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment failure 

to protect claims against Defendants are merely "consistent with" their possible liability, 

but, without more are insufficient to "nudge [Plaintiff s] his claim" of cruel and unusual 

punishment "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,680 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557,570). 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims must be 

dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), but without prejudice so 

that Plaintiff may attempt to properly amend them in light of the standard of pleading 

outlined above. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446; Lucas v. 

Dept. ofCorr., 66 F .3d 145, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("Unless it is absolutely 

clear that no amendment can cure [a pleading] defect ..., a pro se litigant is entitled to 

notice ofthe complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of 

the action."). 

D. Due Process Claims 

Plaintiff further alleges to have been deprived ofthirty (30) days ofbehavior credit 

as a result of his disciplinary conviction for possessing a controlled substance. (See 

Compl. at 8.) The Court finds this claim must also be dismissed for failing to state a 

claim upon which section 1983 can be granted because a finding in Plaintiff s favor 

would "necessarily imply the invalidity" of his disciplinary conviction. See Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,486-87 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-44 

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(1997). 

Heck and Balisok make clear that constitutional claims involving a prison's 

disciplinary decision to revoke behavioral credits fail to state a claim under section 1983 

since habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy whenever a claim for damages 

depends on a determination that a disciplinary judgment is invalid or the sentence 

currently being served is unconstitutionally long. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643-44; Heck, 512 

U.S. at486-87; see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (holding that 

a person in state custody may not use § 1983 to challenge "the very fact or duration of 

... confinement" by seeking "a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or 

a speedier release from that imprisonment."); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875 (9th 

Cir. 2002) ("It has been clear for over thirty years that a state prisoner seeking injunctive 

relief against the denial or revocation of good-time credits must proceed in habeas 

corpus, and not under § 1983."). 

Here, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim for money damages necessarily implies the 

invalidity ofhis disciplinary conviction and renders his claim incognizable under Heck. 

B a lis ok, 520 U.S. at 648; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) 

(noting that "a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no 

matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the 

prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings )-if 

success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity ofconfinement or its 

duration.") (emphasis in original). 

Thus, in addition to amending his pleading to state an Eighth Amendment claim, 

Plaintiff must also amend to allege facts sufficient to show that Defendants' decision to 

revoke thirty days of his behavioral credit has already been "reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make 

such a determination, or called into question by a writ ofhabeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. 

at 486-87. Until and unless he can do so, no cause of action will accrue under § 1983. 

Id. 

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IV. 	 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff's Motion to proceed IFP pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(Doc. No. 

2) is GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff's prison trust account the 

$350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an 

amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income and forward 

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY 

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO TillS ACTION. 

3. 	 The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey 

A. Beard, Secretary, California Department ofCorrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

4. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(l). 

5. Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this 

Order in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of 

pleading noted above. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without 

reference to his original pleading. See S.D. CAL. ClvLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. 

v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original."); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(citation omitted) ("All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not 

alleged in an amended complaint are waived."). 

IfPlaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, this civil 

action shall remain dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

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§ 1915A(b)(1). 

6. The Clerk of Court shall mail Plaintiff a court approved civil rights 

complaint form. 

DATED: 

HON. WILLIAM . HAYES 

United States Dist lct Judge 

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