Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08353/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08353-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Lee Peasley,

Petitioner,

v.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-08353-PCT-JJT (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner James Lee Peasley (“Petitioner”) was convicted in Mohave County 

Superior Court, case #CR-2005-1604, and is serving two consecutive twelve year 

imprisonment sentences, for a total of twenty four years imprisonment (Doc. 1 at 2). 

Petitioner is confined in the Arizona State Prison in Tucson, Arizona. On December 24, 

2019,

1 he filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a 

Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (“Petition”) (Doc. 1).2 After Order of the 

1 The Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on December 30, 2019 (Doc. 1). The 

Petition contains a certificate of service indicating that Petitioner placed the Petition in the 

prison mailing system on December 24, 2019 (Doc. 1 at 10). Pursuant to the prison

mailbox rule, the undersigned has used December 24, 2019, as the filing date. Porter v. 

Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A petition is considered to be filed on the date 

a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.”).

2 Citation to the record indicates documents as displayed in the official Court electronic 

document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No. CV-19-

08353-PHX-JJT (DMF).

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Court and service (Docs. 4, 5), Respondents filed a Limited Answer on March 23, 2020

(Doc. 7). Petitioner moved for an extension to file his reply, which was granted (Docs. 8, 

9). Petitioner’s reply was due on May 22, 2020 (Doc. 9), but Petitioner did not file a reply. 

This matter is ripe for decision.

This matter is on referral pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure for further proceedings and a report and recommendation (Doc. 4 at 4). For the 

reasons set forth below, the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge recommends that 

this Court dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) with prejudice and deny a certificate of 

appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Convictions and Sentences in Trial Court

In December 2005, a Mohave County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner with three 

counts of theft and one count of burglary in case #CR-2005-1604 (Doc. 7-1 at 4).

3 After 

Petitioner was arraigned and released, the trial court severed one of the theft counts on 

request of Petitioner’s counsel (Id.). Petitioner did not appear for trial (Id.). Defense 

counsel asserted that Petitioner may not have known about the trial date, but the prosecutor 

assured that Petitioner’s sister had recently stated that Petitioner was aware of the trial date 

(Id.). The court proceeded to hold the jury trial without Petitioner (Id.). The jury convicted 

Petitioner of two counts of theft (Counts I and II) and one count of burglary (Count III)

(Id.). Petitioner appeared for sentencing, but did not attempt to explain his absence from 

trial (Id.). The court found that Petitioner had four historical prior felony convictions and 

sentenced him to: 12 years’ imprisonment on Count I; 4 years’ imprisonment on Count II, 

concurrent with Count I; and 12 years’ imprisonment on Count III, consecutive to Counts 

I and II (Id.).

3 The appellate court’s stated facts are entitled to the presumption of correctness. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) (“In habeas 

proceedings in federal court, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be 

correct.”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763, n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument 

that the statement of facts in an Arizona Supreme Court opinion should not be afforded the 

presumption of correctness).

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A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were set 

forth by the Arizona Court of Appeals in its December 16, 2008, opinion on Petitioner’s

direct appeal:

¶ 2 In May 2005, C.F. discovered numerous items missing from residential 

property he was developing on North Ladera Drive in Dolan Springs.

Mohave County Deputy Sheriff K.A. investigated the burglary. On August 

9, 2005, Deputy K.A. stopped and arrested [Petitioner], C.F.’s neighbor, on 

an unrelated matter. K.A. inventoried and photographed various items that 

were in the bed of the pick-up truck [Petitioner] was driving at the time of 

the arrest.

¶ 3 Approximately one month later, K.A. began investigating burglaries 

committed at J.S.’s and M.C.’s residences, both also in Dolan Springs. J.S. 

discovered the burglary in September 2005 when he returned from out of 

town to his property located on Kingman Drive. During the course of his 

investigation, K.A. presented J.S. with photographs of the items K.A. 

discovered in [Petitioner]’s truck. J.S. identified items in those photographs 

as items he was missing. The total value of the items stolen from J.S.’s 

residence, including furniture, utensils, drapes, and fencing, was estimated to 

be $2,845.

¶ 4 On September 26, 2005, M.C. learned of the burglary at her home when 

a neighbor who was checking on the property called M.C. at her summer 

home in Montana. All of the tools in M.C.’s deceased husband’s shop were 

missing as were an automobile, a “water hauler,” a television, a VCR/DVD 

player, stereo equipment, a sewing machine, prospecting equipment, and 

fifty containers of gold M.C. and her husband had discovered in their 

prospecting pursuits. Not including the vehicle, M.C. estimated the value of 

the stolen items to be “just under $20,000.”

¶ 5 Sometime in November 2005, K.A. began investigating a burglary at 

T.M.’s Dolan Springs residence. In October 2005, T.M. was living at his 

part-time residence in California when he learned that his home in Dolan 

Springs had been “broken into.” The following day, T.M. discovered 

approximately thirty items missing including an “Indian” rug and blanket, 

television, CD player, and two VCRs. T.M. estimated the value of the stolen 

items to be $2,700.

¶ 6 On November 24, 2005, while attempting to contact [Petitioner] at his 

residence located on Ladera Drive (“Ladera Residence” or “Ladera 

Property”), K.A. noticed through an open window a couch and love seat that 

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resembled furniture J.S. reported stolen. On December 5, 2005, K.A. noticed 

[Petitioner]’s window was covered with an Indian blanket similar to one 

reported stolen by T.M. Four days later, K.A. executed a search warrant at 

[Petitioner]’s residence and seized numerous items from all four burglaries.

Specifically, he discovered, among other items, M.C.s green “puffer” [a type 

of prospecting equipment] inscribed with her late husband’s name and valued 

at $400 and T.M.’s blanket, television, and CD player with a total value of 

$240. K.A. also discovered at [Petitioner]’s residence furniture and 

appliances that belonged to J.S. and had a total value of over $1,330. Of the 

$167,000 worth of items C.F. reported stolen, only three tripods and six to 

eight computer modems with a total value of $711 to $1130 were discovered 

at [Petitioner]’s residence.

(Id. at 3-4) (footnotes omitted).

4

B. Direct Appeal

Through appointed counsel, Petitioner timely appealed his convictions and 

sentences (Doc. 7-1 at 3-4). Petitioner raised three grounds: that the trial court erred in 

finding his trial absence was voluntary, that there was insufficient evidence underlying his 

convictions, and that the conviction on Count II should be vacated on double jeopardy

grounds (Id. at 3-9). On December 16, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected 

Petitioner’s arguments regarding trial absence and insufficiency of evidence, affirmed 

Petitioner’s convictions on Counts I and III, and vacated Petitioner’s conviction on Count 

II on double jeopardy grounds, concluding that Count II was a lesser-included offense of 

Count I (Id.). Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration in the court of appeals, 

and he did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court (Id. at 11-12). The 

Arizona Court of Appeals issued the mandate on March 3, 2009 (Id.).

C. First Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) Proceedings

On March 12, 2009, Petitioner signed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR

notice”) that was filed with the trial court on March 16, 2009 (Doc. 7-1 at 14-17). Counsel 

for Petitioner subsequently filed a notice stating that he had reviewed the record and could 

4

In rejecting Petitioner’s insufficiency of the evidence claim on direct appeal, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals set forth and discussed some additional facts (Id. at 6).

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not find any colorable claims to raise (Id. at 19-21). On September 29, 2009, the trial court 

issued an order giving Petitioner forty five days to file a supplemental pro se PCR petition 

(Id. at 23).5 On December 31, 2009, the court denied “any Petition for Post Conviction 

Relief in its entirety” because Petitioner had failed to file a supplemental pro se PCR 

petition (Id. at 25). Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals (Doc. 7 at 7, footnote 2).

D. Second PCR Proceedings

Almost six years later, Petitioner filed a second PCR notice (Doc. 7-1 at 27-33). In 

the November 2015 filing, the box on the PCR notice form was checked which states that 

“[n]ewly discovered material facts exist which probably would have changed the verdict 

or sentence,” and handwritten in the notice was an assertion that “evidence was used from 

another case” to unlawfully convict Petitioner (Id. at 28-29). Also checked on the PCR 

notice form was the box which states that “[f]acts exist which establish by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant is actually innocent” but Petitioner did not assert 

or present such facts in or with the PCR notice (Id. at 29, 27-33). The box was checked 

raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the notice asserted that Petitioner 

had a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of trial counsel (Id. at 28, 32). The 

box was checked indicating that Petitioner did not have a lawyer, the box was checked that 

Petitioner did not want the court to appoint a lawyer, and the affidavit of indigency for 

appointment of a lawyer was left blank (Id. at 28-29). The second PCR notice was signed 

by Petitioner declaring “under penalty of perjury that the information contained in [the] 

form and in any attachments is true to the best of my knowledge or belief” and that 

Petitioner understands “that failure to raise any known ground for relief in [the] petition 

will prohibit” raising such ground at a future date (Id. at 29).

On December 7, 2015, the superior court summarily dismissed the second PCR 

notice for failure to comply with requirements of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

5 The entry date on the docket, rather than the date of the minute entry, is the operative date 

of the trial court’s order. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(c).

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for a successive PCR notice and petition (Id. at 35-36).

On December 21, 2015, Petitioner filed a “Motion to File Under Rule 31.19” in the 

Arizona Supreme Court, which challenged the trial court’s dismissal of his second PCR 

proceeding (Id. at 38-47). Also filed with the Arizona Supreme Court on the same day was

an Application to Proceed in forma pauperis by a Prisoner in a Civil (Non-Habeas) case, 

using the form for such from the United States District Court, District of Arizona with the 

Arizona Supreme Court (Id. at 49-50). Petitioner signed the form, which contained the 

number “CV-1508290-JJT” (Id.). It appears that the Application to Proceed in forma 

pauperis was improperly mailed to the Arizona Supreme Court instead of this Court, as the 

case number was a valid open case number with this Court in which Petitioner was 

obligated to fill out the Application to Proceed in forma pauperis or to pay the filing fee. 

See section I(E), infra.

On April 7, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s “Motion to File 

Under Rule 31.19”, noting that Petitioner was required to file a petition for review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals if he wanted to challenge the trial court’s ruling (Id. at 52).

E. Petitioner’s December 2015 Filing in this Court

On December 1, 2015, Petitioner filed a civil proceeding in the United States 

District Court, District of Arizona (Doc. 1 in CV 15-8290-PCT-JJT-DMF). The prisoner 

civil rights complaint attached an Arizona Department of Corrections “Duty/Special Needs 

Order” signed by a nurse and dated November 23, 2015, prescribing that a “COIII or 

COIV” is “to assist” Petitioner “with writing medical/legal documents” (Doc. 1 at 7 in CV 

15-8290-PCT-JJT-DMF). Yet, the complaint was blank in the sections for disclosing 

persons who assisted in preparing the complaint (Doc. 1 at 8 in CV 15-8290-PCT-JJTDMF). The handwriting on the envelope addressed to the Clerk of Court appears to be in 

the same handwriting as the complaint (compare Docs. 1 & 1-1 in CV 15-8290-PCT-JJTDMF). Handwritten in the complaint was that “Defendant is handicapped and can’t write 

in his defense,” although the complaint references to “Defendant” apparently refer to 

Petitioner, who the complaint states is in need of treatment for Parkinson’s Disease (Doc. 

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1 at 4-5 in CV 15-8290-PCT-JJT-DMF).

The civil rights complaint asserted three claims (Doc. 1 in CV 15-8290-PCT-JJTDMF). The first claim named the Mohave County Attorney’s Office and alleged:

Defendant was wrongfully convicted. Mohave County used evidence from 

another case, 2005, in 2005. The Defendant is not in any way involved in 

this crime.

(Id. at 4). The second claim named Mohave County Sheriff’s Department and alleged that 

the officer filing the case against Petitioner used false evidence and Petitioner’s rights were 

violated when he was tried in abstentia (Id. at 5, 9). The third claim named Petitioner’s 

trial counsel and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (Id. at 6). Petitioner also appears 

to argue that his sentence is excessive (Id. at 9). Petitioner requested that the conviction 

be “overturned,” punitive damages be awarded to Petitioner, and that Petitioner be released 

as well as exonerated (Id. at 8).

In December 2015, Petitioner also wrote an inmate letter that requested inmate 

banking at Arizona Department of Corrections to:

please, prepare 6 month’s statement of trust account for US District Court 

Judge, CV-15-08290-JJT. Forma Pauperis – waiver has to be signed by C03-counselor case manager as to account status-6-month from June 15 – thru 

Dec-15-2015, Thank you.

(Doc. 7-1 at 47). Petitioner also filled out and signed the Application to Proceed in forma 

pauperis, but instead of it being signed by a counselor/case manager and sent to the United 

States District Court, it was mailed to the Arizona Supreme Court (Id. at 49-50).

An Application to Proceed in forma pauperis was not received by the United States 

District Court in the prisoner civil rights case Petitioner had filed. On January 6, 2015, the 

Court noted that “Plaintiff did not pay the $350.00 civil action filing fee and $50.00

administrative fee or file an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis” and ordered that:

(1) Within 30 days of the date this Order is filed, Plaintiff must either pay the

$350.00 filing fee and $50.00 administrative fee or file a complete 

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Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and a certified six-month trust 

account statement.

(2) If Plaintiff fails to either pay the $350.00 filing fee and $50.00

administrative fee or file a complete Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of 

dismissal of this action without prejudice and without further notice to 

Plaintiff.

(3) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing 

an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Non-Habeas).

(Doc. 3 at 3 in CV 15-8290-PCT-JJT-DMF).

With no Application to Proceed in forma pauperis being received, on February 19, 

2016, the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court, District of Arizona, entered 

the following “Judgment of Dismissal in a Civil Case”:

Decision by Court: This action came for consideration before the Court. 

The issues have been considered and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that pursuant to the Court’s Order filed

January 6, 2016, judgment of dismissal is entered. Plaintiff to take nothing 

and the complaint and action are dismissed without prejudice for failure to 

comply with the Court’s Order.

(Doc. 4 in CV 15-8290-PCT-JJT-DMF). The Court’s internal docket notes state that a 

copy of the Judgment of Dismissal in a Civil Case was mailed to Petitioner on the date of 

entry; that internal docket entry is the last entry in the closed matter.

F. Subsequent State Court Filings

In December 2017, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Hearing on Restitution 

Exoneration” in the superior court (Id. at 54-57). The motion asserted that the “Sheriff in 

Dolan Springs has arrested and convicted 3 persons for the same crime who were in 

possession of the stolen property that defendant was falsely accused and convicted of 

stealing” and named such persons as “Lee Jordan” and “Royce” (Id. at 55). Petitioner 

further asserted that he “does not know any of these criminals but only through his family, 

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acquaintances and friends living in Dolan Springs does he know the events of their arrest 

and conviction for possession of the property defendant is pay[ing] [r]estitution for” (Id.).

Later in December 2017, Petitioner filed a third PCR notice (Id. at 59-62). In 

response to the question in the PCR notice form asking if court appointed counsel is 

requested, the box indicating “No” is marked (Id. at 60). Petitioner also filed a Request for 

a Private Investigator to accompany the PCR notice (Id. at 64-66) which stated as follows:

Since being incarcerated Police Detectives have located the stolen properties 

and true perpetrators of these crimes. Those perpetrators have been 

sentenced to prison, some have been released already. The most important 

issue is that the Police Detectives never informed the defendant or this court 

of the arrest of the perpetrators. Furthermore, the arresting detectives are 

now or have served incarceration for trafficking in stolen property.

(Id. at 65). Attached to the third PCR notice was a medical ADA and special needs form 

signed by a nurse dated December 13, 2017, prescribing that “COIII or COIV to assist with 

writing medical/legal documents” (Id. at 61). The motion accompanying the PCR notice 

also stated that it was written by another person on Petitioner’s behalf because “Petitioner 

asked that [he] write this motion to explain his circumstances and to request and 

appointment of investigator to assist him in his evidence for proving he did not commit 

these crimes” (Id.).

On January 31, 2018, the superior court noted that Petitioner had suggested in his 

third PCR notice that there may be newly discovered evidence that “others have been 

convicted of the same or similar offenses” and gave Petitioner until March 15, 2018, to 

supplement his PCR notice with specifics (Id. at 68). In the same order, the court denied 

Petitioner’s request for an investigator and his “Motion for Hearing on Restitution 

Exoneration” (Id. at 69).

In February 2018, Petitioner filed an “Addendum to Motion Ref. Rule 32” (Id. at 

74-75). In that filing, Petitioner asserted that he “was not able to be present at his trial as 

he was detained in another state because of business responsibility and his means of 

transportation was not functional” (Id. at 74). Petitioner also asserted that “[h]e was told 

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that a continuance would be obtained so that he could be present at trial” and cited multiple 

rules (Id.). Petitioner made no reference to other persons being responsible for the crimes 

for which he was convicted.

In February 2018, Petitioner also filed a separate “Request for Retrial,” wherein he 

claimed that he was hampered in providing specific information to support his actual 

innocence claim (Id. at 71-72). This document plainly stated that it was written by another 

person on behalf of Petitioner, and it was a different person than the person who wrote the 

December 2017 motion (Id.). In the document, Petitioner asserted that he “has been 

somewhat hampered in providing as stated a colorable claim because such claim is to be 

found in court records of which the defendant has no access because his is incarcerated in 

prison” (Id.). Petitioner wrote that “if provided court transcripts of a subsequent 

prosecution regarding the same property and the names of individuals convicted 

subsequent to [his] trial, it will be determined that they are the perpetrators having no link” 

to Petitioner (Id.). Petitioner further asserted that “none of the stolen property was found 

in [his] possession” (Id.).

In March 2018, before the deadline to supplement his third PCR notice, Petitioner

filed another “Request for Retrial” which referenced Arizona’s PCR rule and reiterated 

verbatim the language in the February 2018 Request for Retrial quoted above (Id.).

The prosecution filed a “Response to Request for Retrial”, stating that Petitioner’s 

motion for retrial “untimely by a matter of years” and that to the extent that Petitioner’s 

filings may be considered a PCR petition, they fail to state a colorable claim for relief (Id.

at 83-84). The prosecution’s one paragraph response appears to be a consolidated response 

to Petitioner’s filings and cites no rule or other legal authority (Id.).

In June 2018, Petitioner filed a “Special Action” in the superior court, which stated 

that “Movant is required to file the petition as mandamus because the presiding court has 

abrogated due process pursuant to Rule 32 despite repeated requests for evidentiary hearing 

and retrial” (Id. at 86-87). The filing was followed by an order issued a few weeks later

noting that the prosecution had filed a response to Petitioner’s “Post-Conviction Request 

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for Retrial” and “denying [Petitioner’s] Request for Retrial” without any discussion, 

analysis, or legal citation (Id. at 89). In the order, the court also stated that it “notes the 

[Petitioner] has now filed with this [c]ourt a Special Action. The [c]ourt takes no further 

action on the Special Action unless requested to do so. If [s]uperior [c]ourt jurisdiction is 

established through proper service of any pleading [sic].” (Id.)

In July 2018, less than thirty days after the superior courts’ order, Petitioner filed a 

“Special Action” in the Arizona Supreme Court challenging the superior court’s order 

denying Rule 32 post-conviction relief (Id. at 91-98). The supreme court dismissed the 

special action on November 1, 2018, because “the petition fails to state a sufficient reason 

for seeking special action relief initially in [the Arizona Supreme Court] instead of the 

[Arizona] Court of Appeals” and because “Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P., provides that if the 

superior court denies post-conviction relief, a petitioner may file a timely petition for 

review by the [Arizona] Court of Appeals” (Id. at 100).

G. These Habeas Proceedings

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in his December 24, 2019, Petition (Doc. 

1). In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel

for failure to properly investigate or present evidence of Petitioner’s actual innocence. In 

Ground Two, Petitioner alleges violation of his due process rights under Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose the actual 

perpetrators of the theft and burglary, whom Petitioner names but no evidence is submitted 

in support of these allegations. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the “extraction of restitution payments 

from” Petitioner for property that Petitioner asserts he did not steal.

Attached to the Petition is the November 1, 2018, Arizona Supreme Court denial of 

Petitioner’s special action challenging the superior court’s order denying Rule 32 postconviction relief (Doc. 1 at 14). Also attached to the Petition is an Arizona Department of 

Corrections “Duty/Special Needs Order” signed by a nurse and dated November 23, 2015, 

prescribing that a “COIII or COIV” is “to assist” Petitioner “with writing medical/legal 

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documents” (Doc. 1 at 12).

Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice because the 

Petition was untimely filed and because the Petition grounds are unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted without excuse (Doc. 7). Respondents also assert that Ground 

Three is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding (Id. at 16-17).

Petitioner moved for an extension to file his reply, which was granted (Docs. 8, 9). 

Petitioner’s reply was due on May 22, 2020 (Doc. 9), but Petitioner did not file a reply. 

Before the time for reply expired, Petitioner filed a motion to appoint counsel, which has 

been the last filing by Petitioner in this matter (Doc. 10).

The motion to appoint counsel averred that Petitioner has Parkinson’s disease and 

cannot write himself because his hands and body shake (Id. at 1). The motion asserted that 

Arizona Department of Correction officers’ assistance with writing is not adequate because 

the officers who would be assisting are not legally trained (Id. at 1-2). The motion, written 

by another inmate, further asserted that Petitioner is elderly and is having “problems 

focusing, concentrating, and remembering facts” (Id. at 2-3). The inmate writer offers the 

lay observation that Petitioner is “in the beginning of the Altzheimer stages” (Id. at 2). No 

medical or other documentation was submitted with the motion (Id.).

The undersigned denied Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel without prejudice, 

ordering that “[i]f, at a later date, the Court determines that a hearing in front of the District 

Judge is required, counsel will be appointed in accordance with Rule 8(c) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings” (Doc. 11).

II. AEDPA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Start Date of AEDPA’s One Year Limitations Period and Statutory 

Tolling

A threshold issue for the Court is whether the habeas petition is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

921-22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

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(“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s habeas petition because he filed it after April 24, 1996, 

the effective date of AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). For AEDPA statute of limitations 

purposes, the Court uses December 24, 2019, the date Petitioner placed the original Petition

in prison mail, as the applicable filing date for the Second Amended Petition. See Mayle 

v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005).

Under AEDPA, there are four possible starting dates for the beginning of its one 

year statute of limitations period:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable 

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The latest of the applicable possible starting dates is the operative 

start date. Id.

AEDPA expressly provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly 

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral review 

petition is “properly filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with state 

rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). This includes compliance 

with filing deadlines. A state post-conviction relief petition not filed within the state’s 

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required time limit is not “properly filed,” and the petitioner is not entitled to statutory 

tolling during those proceedings. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When 

a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for 

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (finding that inmate’s 

untimely state post-conviction petition was not “properly filed” under AEDPA’s tolling 

provision, and reiterating its holding in Pace, 544 U.S. at 414). Once the statute of 

limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do not “restart” the clock.

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 

823 (9th Cir. 2003).

1. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) & 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

The Petition arises from a final judgment and sentence. The start date for AEDPA’s 

one year statute of limitations period determined by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) is the date 

that the judgment and sentence became “final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Here, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its opinion on direct review on December 16, 2008 (Doc. 

7-1 at 3-8). Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court or a 

motion for reconsideration in the Arizona Court of Appeals (Id. at 11-12). Thus, his 

convictions and sentences became final on January 20, 2009, i.e., when the time to file a 

petition for review expired. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (2008) (providing that a petition 

for review must be filed within 30 days, unless a motion for reconsideration is filed); Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 1.3(a) (2008) (providing that “[w]henever a party has the right or is required to 

take some action within a prescribed period after service of a notice or other paper and such 

service is allowed and made by mail, 5 days shall be added to the prescribed period.”)

6

 

Thus, unless an alternate starting date is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), 

6 Because Arizona courts have broadly applied the rule expanding time limits by five days 

after service by mail and application of the rule does not affect the outcome, undersigned 

has applied the rule. See, e.g., State v. Savage, 573 P.2d 1388 (Ariz. 1978) (applying Rule 

1.3(a) to Rule 32.9(c) deadline for petition for review from denial of motion for rehearing 

in PCR proceeding).

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(C), or (D), AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations period began to run on January 21, 

2009. 

The one year limitations period ran for 50 days from January 21, 2009, through 

March 11, 2009, and then stopped running during Petitioner’s timely first PCR proceedings 

beginning on March 12, 2009 (Doc. 7-1 at 14-17), which the superior court denied “in its 

entirety” on December 31, 2009, because Petitioner had failed to file a supplemental pro 

se PCR petition (Id. at 25). Petitioner did not timely file a petition for review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals of the denial his first PCR proceedings (Doc. 7 at 7, footnote 2). Thus, 

the one year statute of limitations ran for 50 days from January 21, 2009, to March 11, 

2009; was tolled beginning on March 12, 2009, and ending on December 31, 2009; and 

began running again on January 1, 2010, for the remaining 315 days, expiring on Thursday, 

November 11, 2010. Petitioner’s second and third PCR notices were filed well after the 

limitations period expired and, thus, could not and did not restart the limitations period.

2. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) & 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

When applicable, AEDPA provides that its one-year limitations period shall run 

from “the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by state action in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such state action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). For this provision 

to apply, a petitioner “must satisfy a far higher bar than that for equitable tolling.” Ramirez 

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009). On its face, § 2244(d)(1)(B) applies only to 

impediments created by state action that violates the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. Id.; Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1088 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2005). Prosecutorial 

misconduct claims are not encompassed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). See Wood v. 

Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the “direct interference” language 

of the statute seems to exclude Brady claims, but concluding that it “need not resolve this 

vexing question”). Further, a petitioner may be entitled to the commencement of a new 

limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(B) only if the impediment “altogether prevented him 

from presenting his claims in any form, to any court.” Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 1001. In 

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addition, § 2244(d)(1)(B) does not restart the limitations period after it has already expired 

under § 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). See Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 

394, 405, (2001) (in dicta). “To obtain relief under § 2244(d)(1)(B), the petitioner must 

show a causal connection between the unlawful impediment and his failure to file a timely 

habeas petition.” Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th

Cir. 2006)).

Applying the legal standards set forth above, none of Petitioner’s assertions in his 

habeas filings qualify as unlawful state action to trigger a later start date under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(B) and, as further discussed in the equitable tolling section, infra, Petitioner 

has not demonstrated the required causal connection between any impediments alleged and 

his failure to file a timely habeas petition. Thus, a later start date for AEDPA’s limitations 

period is not appropriate under subsection (B) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and statutory 

tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) need 

not be considered.

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) & 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Petitioner does not allege that he is entitled to habeas relief based on a constitutional 

right newly recognized by the United States Supreme Court and made retroactive. Thus,

subsection (C) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) is inapplicable and statutory tolling under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) need not be considered.

4. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) & 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Subsection (D) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), by its terms, only applies when two 

predicates are met: (1) there is a delayed discovery of the facts giving rise to a claim; and 

(2) the delay is excusable because the petitioner has exercised diligence. The term “factual 

predicate” in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) refers to the facts underlying the claim, not the

legal significance of those facts. Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(petitioner need not “understand the legal significance” of the facts, rather than “simply the 

facts themselves,” before the “due diligence (and hence the limitations) clock start[s] 

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ticking”).

In Petitioner’s second PCR notice filed in November 2015, Petitioner checked the 

box on the PCR notice form stating that “[n]ewly discovered material facts exist which 

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence” and wrote that “evidence was used 

from another case” to unlawfully convict Petitioner” (Doc. 7-1 at 28-29). Petitioner also 

checked the box on the November 2015 PCR notice form stating that “[f]acts exist which 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is actually innocent” (Id. at 

29, 27-33). It appears by November 2015, Petitioner was of the belief that there was 

evidence that would exonerate him,7although the specifics of such evidence, how 

Petitioner discovered such, and when Petitioner discovered such is not revealed in the 

November 2015, filing, or even the record in this matter. All three of Petitioner’s habeas 

claims arise from the core alleged facts that Petitioner is actually innocent and that others 

known to the prosecution perpetrated the crimes for which Petitioner was convicted. Yet, 

nowhere in the record is there a showing of Petitioner’s exercise of diligence in discovering 

the facts that he believes exonerate him despite that, according to Petitioner, the 

prosecution had the names of the persons whom Petitioner asserts are the perpetrators at 

the time of Petitioner’s trial (Doc. 1 at 7).

Nevertheless, as Respondents suggest (Doc. 7 at 8) even if one were to consider 

November 2015 the earliest discovery date of the factual predicate of Petitioner’s claims 

with the exercise of due diligence, the December 24, 2019, filing of the Petition was 

untimely. As Respondents further suggest (Id.), even if one to consider AEDPA’s 

limitations period to have begun in November 2015 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) 

and tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), until April 7, 2016, when the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s motion challenging the trial court’s denial of his second 

PCR petition (Doc. 7-1 at 52), AEDPA’s limitations period would have expired on April 

7, 2017, rendering the filing of the Petition untimely by over two and a half years.

7 Petitioner’s December 2015 filing in federal court underscores such (see Doc. 1 in CV 

15-8290-PCT-JJT-DMF).

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5. The Petition Was Filed Beyond AEDPA’s One Year Limitation Period

Applying subsection (A) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) on 

the record before the Court, AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired on November 10, 

2010. Given the record before the Court, subsection (A) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) is properly applied and the statute of limitations expired on November 

10, 2010. Even if Petitioner could or had established a later start date under subsection (D) 

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) based on his November 2015 filing, 

the limitations period would have ended on April 7, 2017, rendering the Petition’s 

December 24, 2019, filing untimely by over two and a half years. Therefore, unless 

equitable tolling applies to render the December 24, 2019, filing of the Petition timely, or 

Petitioner has met his burden for the “actual innocence gateway,” these proceedings should 

be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Equitable Tolling

The U.S. Supreme Court has held “that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). AEDPA’s limitations 

period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. 

Id. at 645-46. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted. Pace, 

544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent 

permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions, but the 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.”).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 

limitations period “only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting 

with reasonable diligence from making a timely filing.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 600 

(9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (upholding the district court’s finding that no equitable tolling 

existed where the petitioner was not diligent in his use of the remaining ten months of the 

limitations period after he received his case file from his attorney and that the delay in 

receiving his record was not the cause of his untimely filing). Put another way, for 

equitable tolling to apply, Petitioner must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

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diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way” to prevent him 

from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace, 544 

U.S. at 418). To meet the first prong, a petitioner “must show that he has been reasonably 

diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an impediment to filing caused by an 

extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after as well, up to the time of filing his 

claim in federal court.” Smith, 953 F.3d at 598-99. The second prong is met “only when 

an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from 

making a timely filing.” Id. at 600.

“The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not 

maximum feasible diligence.” Id. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In 

determining whether reasonable diligence was exercised or not, courts should “consider 

the petitioner’s overall level of care and caution in light of his or her particular 

circumstances.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011). Whether to apply the 

doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see also 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that equitable tolling is 

“unavailable in most cases,” and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under 

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations and internal 

emphasis omitted).

A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, 

or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154 (“[A] pro 

se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling.”); see also Ballesteros v. Schriro, CIV 06-675-PHX-EHC 

(MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, 

ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and 

temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). A prisoner’s 

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“proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of 

those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000).

In the Ninth Circuit, there is a two-part test to determine when a habeas petitioner 

is eligible for equitable tolling based upon a mental impairment:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control, by demonstrating the 

impairment was so severe that either

(a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally 

understand the need to timely file, or

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to 

prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims 

to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made 

it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the 

circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original, internal 

citations and footnote omitted). This standard “reiterates the stringency of the overall 

equitable tolling test” and “the mental impairment must be so debilitating that it is the butfor cause of the delay, and even in cases of debilitating impairment the petitioner must still 

demonstrate diligence” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014)

(petitioner not entitled to equitable tolling based on a mental impairment where he showed 

that his condition was not so debilitating that he could not rationally or factually understand 

the need to timely file—he repeatedly sought administrative and judicial remedies, showed 

an awareness of basic legal concepts, and requested assistance in pursuing his state 

remedies).

A fair inference from the entire background and record is that Petitioner may suffer 

from Parkinson’s disease. According to the National Institute of Neurological Disorders 

and Stroke:

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Parkinson’s disease (PD) belongs to a group of conditions called motor 

system disorders, which cause unintended or uncontrollable movements of 

the body. The precise cause of PD is unknown, but some cases are hereditary 

while others are thought to occur from a combination of genetics and 

environmental factors that trigger the disease. In PD, brain cells become 

damaged or die in the part of the brain that produces dopamine--a chemical 

needed to produce smooth, purposeful movement. The four primary 

symptoms of PD are:

tremor--shaking that has a characteristic rhythmic back and forth motion

rigidity--muscle stiffness or a resistance to movement, where muscles remain 

constantly tense and contracted

bradykinesia--slowing of spontaneous and automatic movement that can 

make it difficult to perform simple tasks or rapidly perform routine 

movements

postural instability--impaired balance and changes in posture that can 

increase the risk of falls.

Other symptoms may include difficulty swallowing, chewing, or speaking; 

emotional changes; urinary problems or constipation; dementia or other 

cognitive problems; fatigue; and problems sleeping.

https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/All-Disorders/Parkinsons-Disease-Information.

As discussed supra, the Petition was filed on December 24, 2019, over nine years 

after the statute of limitations ran on November 10, 2010, and even if a later start date under 

subsection (D) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) was applied, the Petition was filed over two and 

a half years after the limitations period expired. Noteworthy is that there were no filings 

by Petitioner between the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling which ended Petitioner’s second 

PCR proceedings in April 2016, and Petitioner’s motions and third PCR proceedings filed 

in superior court in December 2017, and Petitioner does not present any evidence that his 

condition prevented the filing of a habeas petition during this timeframe. Indeed, the record 

reflects that the day Petitioner filed his second PCR proceedings in 2015, he had a medical 

needs order that a COIII or COIV would write his medical and legal documents, that 

Petitioner was able to accomplish state court filings despite his medical condition, and that 

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Petitioner even filed the prisoner civil rights case with this Court in 2015, CV 15-8290-

PCT-JJT-DMF.

Had Petitioner sent a second Application to Proceed in forma pauperis to the United 

States District Court, the Court would have screened Petitioner’s 2015 civil rights 

complaint and dismissed the claim for unlawful confinement with instructions for 

Petitioner to file a federal habeas petition regarding such.8 While it may not have been 

Petitioner’s fault that his first Application to Proceed in forma pauperis was mailed to the 

Arizona Supreme Court rather than the United States District Court for his filing in this 

Court in CV 15-8290-PCT-JJT-DMF, reasonable diligence required that Petitioner follow 

up with the prison officials so that Petitioner could prepare and send a second Application 

to Proceed in forma pauperis to the United States District Court after he received the United 

States District Court’s Order of January 6, 2016; the same applies to the February 6, 2016, 

Order. Petitioner did not do so, has not shown that his condition was so severe that either 

he was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file a

habeas petition, and has not shown that his condition rendered him unable personally to 

prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing with the assistance of the COIII or COIV 

writing for him as had been prescribed by the nurse at the Arizona Department of 

Corrections. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100. Nor has Petitioner asserted, let alone 

demonstrated, that he was unable to procure the assistance of the COIII or COIV or some 

other person writing for him as had been prescribed by the nurse at the Arizona Department 

of Corrections. See Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 2013 

WL 656132 (U.S. 2013) (petitioner failed to demonstrate diligence in pursuing claim and 

8 Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is granted 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims 

which: (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996); Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (when the court dismisses the complaint of 

a pro se litigant with leave to amend, the “court must provide the litigant with notice of the 

deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to 

amend effectively”).

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that his mental disorder made it impossible to meet federal deadline where petitioner had 

continual assistance of his jail house lawyer in filing both his federal and state habeas 

corpus petitions).

Neither the vague and conclusory statements regarding Petitioner being elderly and

disabled, nor the statements that Petitioner is now having “problems focusing, 

concentrating, and remembering facts” (Doc. 1 at 2, 10; Doc. 10 at 2) are sufficient to 

justify equitably tolling AEDPA’s limitations period. See Boulb v. United States, 818 F.3d 

334, 340 (7th Cir. 2016) (conclusory assertions regarding mental condition insufficient to 

warrant evidentiary hearing). Despite Parkinson’s disease or some similar impairment, 

Petitioner was able to accomplish court filings in 2015, 2017, and 2018, and the Arizona 

Department of Corrections nurse addressed Petitioner’s need for someone to write for him

as early as 2015. Petitioner’s general averments about the loss of his legal materials (Doc. 

1 at 2, 6) are likewise insufficient to meet his burden for equitable tolling. Petitioner was 

able to accomplish court filings related to his convictions and sentences in 2015, 2017, and 

2018 despite his general statements that his legal papers were lost some time ago. See 

Smith, 953 F.3d at 582 (if an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner from timely 

filing a habeas corpus petition, then the petitioner must be reasonably diligent in filing the 

petition before the extraordinary circumstance arises and once the extraordinary 

circumstance dissipates).

Evaluating the record before the Court, the Court cannot find at any point during the 

limitations period that Petitioner had an impairment that was so severe that he “was unable 

rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file” or that his “mental 

state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.” 

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100. Here, while other persons may have written for Petitioner, the 

record does not support a conclusion that Petitioner was unable to direct what should be 

written. Petitioner has not alleged or provided any documentation that supports an 

inference that Petitioner was unable to rationally or factually understand the need to timely 

file his habeas petition or to personally prepare one and effectuate its filing. Nor has 

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Petitioner provided documentation or even averred that a mental condition made it 

impossible for him to meet AEDPA’s deadline. Further, Petitioner makes no argument 

that his mental condition was worse in kind or degree during the limitations period 

compared to when he filed the instant federal habeas petition.

In addition, Petitioner has not provided details of any specific action he took in 

pursuing his habeas claims before the late filing of the Petition. Despite Petitioner’s 

medical condition, he accomplished filings in state court in December 2017 through mid2018, but initiated no habeas or other filing with this Court in that timeframe. Also 

noteworthy is that Petitioner did not file these habeas proceedings within a year of the 

Arizona Supreme Court’s November 1, 2018, denial of Petitioner’s Special Action 

regarding the superior court’s denial of Petitioner’s third PCR proceedings. The Ninth 

Circuit recently stated that “for a litigant to demonstrate” that “he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently” sufficient to satisfy “the first element required for equitable tolling, he 

must show that he has been reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an 

impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after 

as well, up to the time of filing his claim in federal court.” Smith, 953 F.3d at 598-99. On 

the record before the Court, Petitioner has not established the diligence required for 

equitable tolling.

Because Petitioner has not met his burden of showing extraordinary circumstances 

which prevented his filing of a timely habeas petition with this Court and he has not shown 

reasonable diligence towards filing a timely habeas petition with this Court, equitable 

tolling is unavailable. Therefore, the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice as 

untimely unless Petitioner is entitled to relief under the “actual innocence gateway.”

C. Actual Innocence

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391-396 (2013), the Supreme Court held 

that the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that applies to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) , and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 

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(petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the 

district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have 

voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

To pass through the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish 

his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. 

U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 399 

(2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner 

to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 

2011); McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399 (2013) (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). Because of “the rarity of such 

evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily 

rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calderon v. 

Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

Here, Petitioner makes assertions of actual innocence but has not supported his 

assertions of actual innocence with any evidence, let alone reliable evidence. Accordingly, 

the actual innocence gateway provides no relief to Petitioner for the untimely filing of the 

Petition. 

D. These Proceedings Are Untimely Under AEDPA

Under applicable law, the Petition’s December 24, 2019, filing was untimely. 

Equitable tolling does not render the Petition’s filing timely, nor does the actual innocence 

gateway. Thus, these untimely proceedings should be dismissed with prejudice.

III. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS ARE PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED 

WITHOUT EXCUSE

A. Applicable Law

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1. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before this Court 

may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the specific 

federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. Netherland, 

518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The 

mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish 

exhaustion.”). To properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his 

claims to the state’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-46 (1999).

In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through 

appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Fair presentment of claims to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals requires a description of “both the operative facts and the 

federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts [could] have a ‘fair 

opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his 

constitutional claim.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003)).

A corollary to the exhaustion requirement is the “procedural default doctrine.” The 

procedural default doctrine limits a petitioner from proceeding in federal court where his 

claim is procedurally barred in state court and “has its roots in the general principle that 

federal courts will not disturb state court judgments based on adequate and independent 

state law procedural grounds.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004). There are two 

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types of procedural bars, “express and implied.” Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 

(9th Cir. 2010). An express procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a 

claim based on a procedural bar ‘“that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal 

claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 

(1989); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) 

determinations are independent of federal law because they do not depend upon a federal 

constitutional ruling on the merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) 

(“adequate” grounds exist when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule).

In Arizona, claims not previously and properly presented to the state courts are 

generally barred from federal review because an attempt to return to state court to present 

them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of claims for which a successive 

petition is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) & (b), (successive postconviction petitions are limited to claims of being held in custody beyond sentence 

expiration, newly discovered material facts, requests for delayed appeal, significant change 

in the law retroactively applicable that would probably overturn conviction or sentence, 

and actual innocence); 32.4(a) (time bar); 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within 

thirty days of trial court’s decision). Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s 

procedural rules to bar further review of claims that were not properly raised on direct 

appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 

(determinations made under Arizona’s procedural default rule are “independent” of federal 

law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We have held that 

Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly followed [or “adequate”] in several cases.”) 

(citations omitted), reversed on other grounds, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002); State 

v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52, 185 Ariz. 319, 334-36 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in post-conviction proceedings). A petitioner who fails to 

follow a state’s procedural requirements for presenting a valid claim deprives the state 

court of an opportunity to address the claim in much the same manner as a petitioner who 

fails to exhaust his state remedies.

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If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner attempted to 

raise the claim in state court and that state procedural bar is both “independent” and 

“adequate,” then review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law default prevents the state 

court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed 

in federal court.”) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977) and Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)). Moreover, if a state court applies a procedural 

bar, but goes on to alternatively address the merits of the federal claim, the claim is still 

barred from federal review. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989) (“[A] state 

court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its 

very definition, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal 

court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court’s judgment, even 

when the state court also relies on federal law.... In this way, a state court may reach a 

federal question without sacrificing its interests in finality, federalism, and comity.”)

(citations omitted); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s 

application of a procedural rule is not undermined where, as here, the state court 

simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.”) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n. 10).

2. Excuse for Procedural Default

This Court may review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or 

(2) a miscarriage of justice/actual innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 321; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

“Cause” is something that “cannot be fairly attributable” to a petitioner, and a 

petitioner must show that this “objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts 

to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice a “habeas petitioner must show 

‘not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked 

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

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constitutional dimensions.’” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 

U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original)). “Such a showing of pervasive actual 

prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other than a showing that the 

prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.” Id. While both “cause” and 

“prejudice” must be shown to excuse a procedural default, a court need not examine the 

existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 

107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1991).

The miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default “is limited to those 

extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his [actual] innocence and establishes that 

the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.” Johnson v. Knowles, 

541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). The legal standard and 

requirements for the miscarriage of justice exception regarding procedural default are the 

same as the “actual innocence” gateway regarding AEDPA’s statute of limitations period. 

See Section II(C), supra.

B. Petitioner’s Claims Are Unexhausted and Procedurally Defaulted 

Without Excuse

None of Petitioner’s habeas claims were raised at the Arizona of Appeals on direct 

appeal, through Petitioner’s first PCR proceedings, or even through Petitioner’s second and 

third PCR proceedings. It is too late to return to the Arizona Court of Appeals and try to 

raise such claims. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4. Therefore, all Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and subject to an express 

procedural bar; all Petitioner’s habeas claims are procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner has not shown cause for his procedural default because there was no 

external force that prevented Petitioner from timely and appropriate exhaustion by bringing 

his claims through state appropriate process to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Further, for 

the same reasons that the “actual innocence” gateway regarding AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations period is not applicable, the miscarriage of justice exception is not applicable 

here. See Section II(C), supra.

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Accordingly, all grounds in the Petition are procedurally defaulted without excuse, 

and on that basis alone, the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. GROUND THREE IS NOT COGNIZABLE IN A FEDERAL HABEAS 

PROCEEDING

Petitioner’s Ground Three regards the restitution order against him and payments 

thereon, but does not attack the legality or duration of Petitioner’s confinement. Therefore, 

Ground Three is not cognizable in this habeas corpus action. See Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 

976, 984 (9th Cir. 2010) (Section 2254 “does not confer jurisdiction over a habeas corpus 

petition raising an in-custody challenge to a restitution order.”) Thus, dismissal with 

prejudice of Ground Three is appropriate on this basis in addition to untimeliness and 

procedural default.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the undersigned finds the filing of the Petition (Doc. 

1) was untimely and that the claims are procedurally defaulted without excuse. Further, 

Petitioner’s Ground Three challenging the restitution order and payments is not cognizable 

in this habeas proceeding.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Petition (Doc. 1) be dismissed 

with prejudice. Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s 

judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the reasoning 

set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the District Judge 

was correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to the extent the District Judge adopts 

this Report and Recommendation regarding the Petition, a certificate of appealability 

should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Doc. 1) is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

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procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 17th day of June, 2020.

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