Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01525/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01525-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1332tl Diversity-Torts to Land

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREENFIELD MHP ASSOCIATES, 

L.P., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AMETEK, INC., et al.,,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-01525-GPC-AGS

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISQUALIFY

[ECF No. 130]

Before the Court is a motion to disqualify opposing counsel filed by Defendant 

Ametek, Inc.1 (ECF No. 130.) Ametek seeks an order disqualifying Baron & Budd P.C. 

and Gomez Trial Attorneys (collectively, “Plaintiffs’ Counsel”) as counsel to the 

plaintiffs in this action and three other related federal lawsuits before this Court: Trujillo, 

et al. v. Ametek, et al. (Case No. 15-cv-1394), Cox, et al. v. Ametek, Inc. et al. (Case No. 

17-cv-597), and Cox, et al. v. Ametek, Inc. et al. (Case No. 17-cv-1211). The motion is 

fully briefed. For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES the motion to 

disqualify. The Court also DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions.

 

1 According to the motion, it is also filed by Thomas Deeney, an Ametek officer who is a codefendant in 

the related cases. Deeney is not a party in this case, but is a defendant in related cases.

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I. Background

In this action, Plaintiffs—owners of three mobile home parks located in El Cajon, 

California—have brought suit claiming damage to their property as a result of ground 

contamination. Defendants are Ametek, Inc., a former owner and operator of an aircraft

parts manufacturing facility near Plaintiffs’ properties (“The Facility”), and Senior

Operations, LLC, the current owner of the facility. In short, Plaintiffs allege that 

Ametek, while operating The Facility, constructed an underground waste sump, which 

eventually leaked and produced a chemical plume contaminating nearby soil and 

groundwater. This contamination is the origin of five lawsuits, four of which are before 

this Court, and one of which is in state court.

On May 29, 2015, students and staff from Magnolia Elementary School 

(“MES”)—which abuts The Facility—filed a putative class action in state court against 

Ametek, Thomas Deeney (an Ametek officer), and Senior. Trujillo, et al. v. Ametek, Inc., 

et al., No. 15-cv-01395 (S.D. Cal.). The plaintiffs in Trujillo allege injury as a result of 

inhaling toxic vapors while on MES property. The defendants removed the case to 

federal court. The plaintiffs in Trujillo are represented by Baron & Budd, P.C. The case 

is currently in discovery.

Plaintiffs in this case, owners of three nearby mobile home parks—Greenfield, 

Villa Cajon, and Starlight—filed suit against Ametek and Senior on July 10, 2015. (ECF 

No. 1.) This is not a class action. Plaintiffs in this case are represented by Baron & Budd 

and Gomez Trial Attorneys. Defendants in this case have recently filed a motion for 

summary judgment. (See ECF No. 135.)

On January 25, 2017, three residents of the Greenfield park filed suit in state court 

against Greenfield’s owners. Rossiter, et al. v. Greenfield MHP, et al., No. 37-2017-

3143-CU-PO-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct.). According to the electronic state court docket—of 

which this Court may take judicial notice, see, e.g., Williams v. Los Angeles Cty. Super. 

Ct., No. CV 08-4823-TJH (MAN), 2009 WL 73732, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2009)—it 

appears that the plaintiffs in Rossiter are represented by the Gilleon Law Firm, and the 

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Greenfield owners are represented by Cooksey Toolen Gage Duffy & Woog. The 

defendants in Rossiter have filed a third-party complaint against Ametek and Senior. No 

one in this case suggests that Baron & Budd or Gomez Trial Attorneys are involved in the 

Rossiter lawsuit. According to Ametek, the plaintiffs in Rossiter claim that the 

Greenfield owners failed to warn its residents about the plume contaminating the park 

property.

On March 24, 2017, residents of the three mobile home parks filed a putative class 

action in this Court against Ametek, Deeney, and Senior. Cox, et al. v. Ametek, Inc., et 

al., No. 17-cv-597 (S.D. Cal) (Cox I). In Cox I, the plaintiffs allege that they have been 

injured as a result of inhaling toxic vapors stemming from the contamination of the soil 

and groundwater at the mobile home parks. The plaintiffs are represented by Baron & 

Budd. On June 20, 2017, the defendants in Cox I filed third-party complaints against the 

mobile home park owners, seeking indemnity as a result of the park owners’ alleged 

failure to warn their residents about the contamination of the park properties. In October 

2017, this Court denied several motions to dismiss the third-party complaints. (See No. 

17-cv-597, ECF No. 59.)

Finally, on June 14, 2017, three sons of a deceased resident of the Villa Cajon park 

filed suit in this Court against Ametek and Deeney.2 Cox, et al. v. Ametek, Inc., et al., 

No. 17-cv-1211 (S.D. Cal.) (Cox II). Cox II is not a class action. There, the plaintiffs 

claim wrongful death against the defendants, alleging that the contamination in the 

mobile home parks caused their mother’s death. The Cox II plaintiffs are represented by 

Baron & Budd.

II. Legal Standard

“The disqualification of counsel because of an ethical violation is a discretionary 

exercise of the trial court’s inherent powers.” Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. 

 

2 The plaintiffs in Cox II later amended their complaint to add Senior as a defendant.

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Supp. 2d 1015, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2004). When considering the merits of the claim of a 

violation of ethical rules, this Court considers California law. See In re Cty. of Los 

Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court is well aware, however, that a 

motion for “disqualification is a drastic measure that is disfavored . . . [b]ecause [it is]

often tactically motivated.” Crenshaw, 318 F. Supp.2d at 1020. “Because of this 

potential for abuse, disqualification motions should be subjected to particularly strict 

judicial scrutiny.” Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int’l Corp. v. Style Cos., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 

(9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

Ametek contends that Plaintiffs’ Counsel must be disqualified from representing

any of the plaintiffs in the four federal lawsuits because there is a concurrent conflict of 

interest. The mobile home park residents and owners have adverse interests, according to 

Ametek, because—as suggested by the Rossiter state court suit and the defendants’ 

indemnity claims in Greenfield—the mobile home park residents have viable claims 

against the park owners for the owners’ alleged failure to warn the residents about the 

plume’s contamination of the park properties.

As explained below, both parties erroneously assume that Ametek must 

demonstrate Article III standing for the Court to consider the disqualification motion. In 

light of the totality of the circumstances of this case, however, the Court finds that 

disqualification is inappropriate.

A. Standing

The parties appear to agree that this standing issue is governed by Article III of the 

United States Constitution. In other words, the parties assume that, to seek 

disqualification of another party’s counsel on the basis of a violation of an applicable 

ethical rule, a moving party must satisfy the elements of Article III standing with respect 

to the disqualification sought. The parties disagree as to whether Ametek can 

demonstrate Article III standing with respect to the alleged conflict of interest at issue 

here. Ametek argues it has standing to move for disqualification in theses cases because 

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so long as Plaintiffs’ Counsel represent the park residents and park owners, there is an 

ever present threat that whatever final judgment or settlement is reached will be 

invalidated by an appeal on the ground of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s conflict of interest. 

Plaintiffs respond by arguing that this risk is neither an “actual or imminent” injury, 

which a party must establish to assert Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The Court, however, need not address this issue because the 

Court finds that it possesses the power to consider and decide the motion for 

disqualification by virtue of its inherent power to preserve the integrity of the adversary 

process.

“Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States to the 

resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ and Article III standing . . . enforces the 

Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Hein v. Freedom From Religion 

Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597–98 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This 

limitation is one of subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court’s power to adjudicate a legal 

dispute and provide appropriate relief. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[L]ack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” (emphasis omitted)); 

see also Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 560 (2017) (“A court of 

competent jurisdiction is a court with the power to adjudicate the case before it. And a 

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction defines its power to hear cases.” (citation omitted)). 

Article III standing limits federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction to cases in which the 

party invoking the court’s jurisdiction can demonstrate a “personal injury fairly traceable 

to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested 

relief.” Hein, 551 U.S. at 598 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 

While the doctrine of Article III standing requires a court to consider the relationship 

between the parties, the doctrine is ultimately a limitation on the court’s power. See 

Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (“The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have ‘standing’ to 

invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of [the Article III] 

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doctrines.” (emphasis added)). 

Considering this nature of the Article III standing doctrine, it makes little sense to 

apply its requirements to a party seeking disqualification of another party’s counsel. This 

Court possesses an inherent power to disqualify attorneys appearing before it. See, e.g., 

United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227, 241 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The 

authority of federal courts to disqualify attorneys derives from their inherent power to 

preserve the integrity of the adversary process.”); Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 

F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“The disqualification of counsel because of an 

ethical violation is a discretionary exercise of the trial court’s inherent powers.”); Visa 

U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“The right 

to disqualify counsel is within the discretion of the trial court as an exercise of its 

inherent powers.”); Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10-cv-2618-H-CAB, 2011 

WL 163928, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011) (same). Notably, that power is one the Court 

can invoke sua sponte. See, e.g., State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Drobot, 192 F. Supp. 

3d 1080, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (noting that even if the movant lacked standing to move 

for disqualification, “[t]he Court would [honor its obligation to manage the conduct of 

attorneys] by raising the disqualification issue on its own when it found out about the 

conflict”). The fact that the Court possesses an inherent power to disqualify Plaintiffs’ 

Counsel sua sponte requires the conclusion that Article III has conferred that power

regardless of how the ethical violation comes to the Court’s attention. See Erickson v. 

NewMar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Whenever an allegation is made that 

an attorney has violated his moral and ethical responsibility . . . [i]t is the duty of the 

district court to examine the charge, since it is that court which is authorized to supervise 

the conduct of the members of its bar.” (quoting Gas-A-Tron of Ariz. v. Union Oil Co., 

534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1976)).

Put differently, if Article III’s standing limitations applied to a disqualification 

motion, the result would be illogical: a court could disqualify an attorney sua sponte, but 

might not be able to grant a motion to disqualify depending the identity of the movant. 

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Consider a variation of the situation in this case. Assume Plaintiffs’ Counsel is engaging 

in a blatant ethical violation by, say, selling Plaintiffs’ confidential communications to 

unrelated parties. Further assume that this ethical violation does not affect Ametek’s 

interests. If the Court found out about Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s misdeeds, it would be the 

Court’s duty to examine the conduct for disqualification of counsel and, as stated above,

could do so sua sponte pursuant to its inherent authority. But what if Ametek files a

motion to disqualify Plaintiffs’ Counsel? If Article III standing principles apply, 

Plaintiffs’ Counsel would argue the Court lacks the power to disqualify Plaintiffs’ 

Counsel in response to Ametek’s motion. This makes no sense given the Court’s 

inherent power to disqualify Plaintiffs’ Counsel.

The Ninth Circuit has only briefly addressed this issue in dicta. In Kasza v. 

Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 1998), the court affirmed the denial of the 

plaintiff’s motion to disqualify defense counsel. While the defendants had not raised the

issue of the plaintiff’s standing to move for disqualification, the court noted: “We have 

difficulty seeing how [the plaintiff] has standing to complaint about a possible conflict of 

interest arising out of common representation of defendants in different civil actions, 

having nothing to do with her own representation. ‘As a general rule, courts do not 

disqualify an attorney on the ground of conflict of interest unless the former client moves 

for disqualification.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025, 1031 (2d Cir. 

1993)). But the court did not rely on this issue in reaching its decision; it instead held 

that, assuming that plaintiff had standing to move for disqualification, the denial of the 

motion was not an abuse of discretion. As a result, the discussion in Kasza quoted above 

is non-precedential dicta. Cetacean Comm. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(“A statement is dictum when it is made during the course of delivering a judicial 

opinion, but . . . is unnecessary to the decision in the case and [is] therefore not 

precedential.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court acknowledges that its conclusion that Article III standing doctrine does

not limit disqualification motions directly conflicts with the decision in Colyer v. Smith, 

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50 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 1999), and the courts in this circuit that have relied on 

Colyer’s reasoning.

3

 There, after a comprehensive review of case law concerning a nonclient party’s standing to seek disqualification of another party’s counsel, the court 

determined that the movant must “establish a personal stake in the motion to disqualify 

sufficient to satisfy the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of Article III.” Id. at 971. 

But the Colyer court also acknowledged its own “inherent obligation to manage the 

conduct of attorneys who appear before it and to ensure the fair administration of 

justice.” Id. at 972. As explained above, if a court has the power to disqualify attorneys 

before it as the result of an ethical violation, it is irrelevant—for purposes of subjectmatter jurisdiction—who brings the ethical violation to the Court’s attention.

The Court also acknowledges that the Eighth Circuit has adopted an Article IIIoriented view with respect to motions to disqualify, though it appears to be the only 

federal circuit to do so.

4

 In O’Connor v. Jones, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument

that “because he has undisputed standing to bring [the underlying lawsuit], he also has 

standing to raise by motion any issue that may occur to him in the course of the 

litigation.” 946 F.2d 1395, 1399–1400 (8th Cir. 1991). The court explained that Article 

III standing applies to both disputes and “particular issues” presented to a federal court. 

Id. at 1400 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Impliedly holding that a 

motion for disqualification was a “particular issue” to which Article III standing doctrine 

governed, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring that motion. Id. 

 

3

See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Pima Cty., No. CV 11-534 TUC DCB, 2012 WL 12873766, at *2 (D. Ariz. 

Sept. 19, 2012); So v. Land Base, LLC, No. CV 08-03336 DDP (AGRx), 2010 WL 3075641, at *2 (C.D. 

Cal. 2010); Simonca v. Mukasey, No. CIV S-08-1453 FDC GGH, 2008 WL 5113757, at *3–4 (Nov. 25, 

2008); Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Stanley, No. CV-07-00954-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 2177323, at *2–4 

(D. Ariz. July 27, 2007); Decaview Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Decaview Asia Corp., No. C 99-02555 MJJ 

(ME), 2000 WL 1175583, at *8–10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2000).

4 The Seventh Circuit has relied on O’Connor to hold that a plaintiff “does not have standing to 

disqualify the [defense] attorneys because he cannot show that their representation of the county harmed 

him in any way.” Dupree v. Hardy, 859 F.3d 458, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Schneider v. Cty. of 

Will, 123 F. App’x 715, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2005). But those cases do not address the issue of whether this 

standing limitation derives from Article III.

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As an initial matter, this Court agrees with the O’Connor court that the plaintiff’s 

argument went too far. The fact that a complaint satisfies the requirements of subjectmatter jurisdiction does not mean that the court possesses jurisdiction to grant every 

motion filed in that case. For example, if the plaintiff in O’Connor sought only damages 

in his complaint, but then filed a motion for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff would 

have to establish independent standing to request the injunctive relief. See, e.g., 

Davidson v. Kimberly-Clerk Corp., 873 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017). But rejecting 

the plaintiff’s argument in O’Connor does not answer the question of whether Article III 

governs a motion to disqualify, or in the words used by Warth, whether such a motion is 

a “particular issue” pertinent to the limits of Article III standing. Because the Eighth 

Circuit did not address that issue, the opinion is not of much help. If anything, its 

discussion supports this Court’s conclusion. At the beginning of its discussion, the court 

states: “[i]n cases where counsel is in violation of professional ethics, the court may act 

on motion of an aggrieved party or may act sua sponte to disqualify.” O’Connor, 946 

F.2d at 1399. That acknowledgement tees up this Court’s reasoning above: if the Court 

can disqualify Plaintiffs’ Counsel sua sponte, it must also have the power to grant a 

motion to disqualify, regardless of which party files the motion.

In sum, in the absence of controlling Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit case law 

stating the contrary, this Court concludes that Article III does not prevent the Court from 

entertaining and deciding a motion to disqualify counsel. That conclusion, of course, 

does not require that such a motion be granted.

B. Whether Disqualification is Appropriate

Having concluded that Article III does not pose a barrier to deciding the instant 

motion, the Court must consider whether disqualification under these circumstances is 

appropriate. It is not.

“Disqualification proceedings are equitable in nature. For this reason, courts may 

properly consider the totality of the circumstances, including whether the motion is being 

brought in bad faith or otherwise for tactical reasons.” Sherman v. CLP Res., Inc., No. 

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CV 12-8080-GW (PLAx), 2015 WL 13542762, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (citations 

omitted). Because of the potential for abuse, and in light of the drastic nature of an order 

of disqualification, courts disfavor motions to disqualify. See, e.g., Reading Int’l, Inc. v. 

Malulani Grp., Ltd., 814 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We are mindful of the drastic 

nature of disqualification.”); Cty. of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d at 995 (“A motion to 

disqualify a law firm can be a powerful litigation tactic to deny an opposing party’s 

counsel of choice.”); Optyl Eyewear Fashion, 760 F.2d at 1050 (“Because of this 

potential for abuse, disqualification motions should be subject to particularly strict 

scrutiny.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); White v. Experian Info. Sols., 993 F. Supp. 

2d 1154, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“[B]ecause motions to disqualify are often tactically 

motivated, such motions are strongly disfavored and subject to particularly strict judicial 

scrutiny.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. 

Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985) (“[W]e share the Court of Appeals’ concern about 

tactical use of disqualification motions to harass opposing counsel.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). “Because a motion to disqualify a party’s counsel may implicate 

several important interests, it is important that judges examine such motions carefully, 

bearing in mind such considerations as a client’s right to chosen counsel, an attorney’s 

interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client to replace disqualified 

counsel, and the possibility that tactical abuse underlies the disqualification motion.” 

Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. CV 10-00927 MMM (AJWx), 2010 WL 4352723, at 

*3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Ametek asserts that Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s representation presents an impermissible 

concurrent conflict of interest. Under the California ethics rules, “[a] concurrent conflict 

exists where an attorney represents two or more clients with materially adverse or 

potentially materially adverse interests at the same time.” Sherman, 2015 WL 13542762 

at *5 (citing Cal. R. Prof’l Conduct 3-310(C))). Based on the pleadings in the four 

federal cases, there is at least a potential conflict of interest in Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s 

simultaneous representation of the mobile home park residents in Cox I and the owners in 

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this case. As alleged in Ametek’s third-party complaint in this case, as well as 

(presumably) in the Rossiter action in state court, the residents’ interests are adverse to 

the mobile home park owners to the extent that the residents can claim injury resulting 

from the owners’ failure to warn residents about the contamination on the park properties. 

See Walker v. Apple, Inc., 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 319, 1110–11 (Ct. App. 2016) (“An 

‘adverse’ interest is one that is ‘hostile, opposed, antagonistic . . . , detrimental, [or] 

unfavorable’ to another’s interest.” (quoting Ames v. State Bar, 506 P.2d 625, 630 (Cal. 

1973)).

Nonetheless, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case and the 

potential for litigation gamesmanship involved, equity in this case counsels against 

disqualification of Plaintiffs’ Counsel. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs are correct that any 

conflict of interest between the mobile home park residents and the park owners does not 

impact Trujillo and Cox II. The plaintiffs in Trujillo are suing on the basis of their 

exposure to toxins while on MES property, which was caused by Ametek. There has 

been no suggestion that the mobile home park owners also own the MES property. Even 

assuming the park owners failed to warn the park residents of the toxins on the mobile 

home park properties, that fact has no relevance to the Trujillo plaintiffs’ exposure to 

toxins while on MES property. Ametek responds to this argument by asserting that some 

of the students at MES live, or lived, in the mobile home parks. Even if that is true, the 

compensable damages in Trujillo are based on exposure at MES only, not the mobile 

home parks. Similarly, the sole claim in Cox II—a wrongful death claim asserted by the 

sons of a former Villa Cajon mobile home park resident—is irrelevant to the asserted 

conflict of interest because the decedent in that case passed away before any of the 

Greenfield plaintiffs came into ownership of the Villa Cajon mobile home park. (ECF 

No. 145-1 at ¶ 15.)

With respect to the conflict arising in Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s representation of the 

plaintiffs in Greenfield and Cox I, the Court finds the most crucial circumstance here to 

be the fact that all of the plaintiffs in those cases have signed sworn declarations

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indicating that they know of the potential conflict, have consulted independent counsel 

regarding the conflict issue, and still wish to be represented by Plaintiffs’ Counsel. (ECF 

Nos. 145-3, 145-4, 145-5, 145-6, 145-7.) Ametek argues that the declarations are 

insufficient to protect all of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s clients from a conflict because the Court 

must also consider the interests of the unnamed class members in Cox I, who have not 

consented to representation by Plaintiffs’ Counsel. Cox I, however, has not reached the 

class certification stage. Until the class is certified, the unnamed putative class members 

are not clients of Plaintiffs’ Counsel. See Sherman, 2015 WL 13542762 at *5 (“In short: 

unless class counsel forms an independent attorney-client relationship with a putative 

class member, putative class members are not clients before class certification.”); Kullar 

v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353, 356 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[S]ince no class 

has yet been certified in Echeverria II (and no class was ever certified in Echeverria I), 

no attorney-client relationship has yet arisen between [the firm representing the named 

plaintiffs in those suits] and the members of the putative class.”); Atari, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 

212 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (Ct. App. 1985) (“We cannot accept the suggestion that a 

potential (but as yet unapproached) class member should be deemed a party represented 

by counsel even before the class is certified . . .” (internal quotation marks and omissions 

omitted)). The Court will, of course, consider this potential conflict when addressing a 

motion to appoint Plaintiffs’ Counsel as class counsel in Cox I. See Yumul, 2010 WL 

4352723 at *4 & n.9 (noting that it will consider “unethical conduct by plaintiff’s 

counsel” when the case reaches the classification phase). But for purposes of the instant 

motion to disqualify, there is no conflict of interest with respect to unnamed members of 

the putative class in Cox I.

While Plaintiffs overstate the evidence of gamesmanship involved in the instant 

motion to disqualify, the Court cannot ignore the motion’s timing. The conflict identified 

by Ametek has existed since March 2017, when Plaintiffs’ Counsel filed the Cox I 

complaint, yet it was not until late November of 2017 that Ametek filed the motion to 

disqualify. The disqualification motion was also filed six days after the Court denied 

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Ametek’s request to be included in a motion to suspend the case management dates in the 

this case. (ECF No. 129.) It was also filed eight days prior to the pre-trial motion 

deadline. After Ametek filed the disqualification motion, it moved for a stay of 

proceedings. (ECF No. 132.) While these circumstances do not prove that this motion 

was brought as a delay tactic, the risk clearly exists. Finally, also relevant to this 

analysis—but not necessarily suggesting gamesmanship by Ametek—is the fact that this 

case was filed two and a half years ago. Disqualifying Plaintiffs’ Counsel at this juncture 

would cause significant delay in an already aging case.5

In light of the clear indication by the clients impacted by the potential conflict of 

interest that they wish to be represented by Plaintiffs’ Counsel, the age of this case, and 

the risk that this motion was brought as a matter of tactical gamesmanship, the Court 

finds that the totality of the circumstance weigh against disqualification.

IV. Motion for Sanctions

In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs assert that the Court should enter 

sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 against Ametek because the motion 

to disqualify has “no legal or factual support,” and was brought “to harass or to cause 

unnecessary delay.” (ECF No. 145 at 25.) The Court finds sanctions under these 

circumstances unwarranted. The motion to disqualify filed by Ametek was far from 

frivolous: it raised a viable claim that Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s concurrent representation of 

the mobile home park residents and owners violates California’s rules of professional 

conduct. While there is evidence suggesting that Ametek’s filing of this motion was 

motivated at least in part by tactical gamesmanship, the Court does not find that Rule 11 

sanctions are appropriate under the circumstances.

//

 

5 Because the Court denies the motion to disqualify on its merits, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ 

argument that Ametek’s counsel failed to satisfy any meet-and-confer requirements before filing the 

motion. (See ECF No. 145 at 7–12.)

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V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Ametek’s motion to disqualify Baron & Budd and 

Gomez Trial Attorneys as counsel for the plaintiffs in this case, as well as Trujillo, Cox I, 

and Cox II, is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions is also DENIED.

The hearing scheduled for January 26, 2018, is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2018

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