Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00122/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00122-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR W. PHILLIPS, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

)

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:07-CV-00122 LJO NEW (DLB) HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #10]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, following his conviction by

plea of nolo contendere on August 21, 1997, of, inter alia, commission of lewd and lascivious acts

on a child under the age of fourteen in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288(a). See Petition at 2. 

Petitioner was sentenced to serve sixteen years in state prison. Id. 

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Although the petition was filed in the Kings County Superior Court on December 27, 2005, the petition was dated 1

December 21, 2005. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed on

the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess the timeliness of

federal habeas filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9 Cir. 2001), citing th

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the

petition filed on December 21, 2005, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for mailing.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

On December 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kings 1

County Superior Court challenging the California Department of Corrections’ computation of

sentence reduction credits. Petitioner pursued his remedies in the state courts until his petition was

denied by the California Supreme Court on December 20, 2006. See Attachments to Petition.

On January 22, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in

this Court. On May 4, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for violating the oneyear limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and for failure to present a cognizable

federal claim. Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss on May 17, 2007. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period and for failure to present a cognizable federal claim. Because

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on January 22, 2007, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, however, Petitioner does not challenge the underlying conviction.

Rather, he challenges the computation of sentence reduction credits by the California Department of

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

Corrections (“CDC”). Petitioner contends his sentence should be reduced pursuant to Cal. Penal

Code §§ 2931 and 2933.1 to a total of 1,946 days. Based on this computation, Petitioner alleges he

should have been released on December 21, 2002.

Respondent contends the statute of limitations expired on December 22, 2003, because

Petitioner should have discovered his claim by at least December 22, 2002, the day he began serving

beyond the time he allegedly should have been released. Respondent’s argument is persuasive. As set

forth above, title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) states that the limitation period shall run from “the date

on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.” The objective standard in determining when time begins to run under

Section 2241(d)(1)(D) is “when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the

important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150 (9 Cir.2001), quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7 Cir.2000). th th

In this case, Petitioner knew the important facts or should have discovered them through due

diligence on or before December 22, 2002. Petitioner claims he should have been released on

December 21, 2002. Therefore, when he was still in prison on December 22, 2002, he either knew or

should have known the basis for his claims at that time. For this reason, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D)

Petitioner had one year until December 22, 2003, to file his federal petition. He did not do so until

January 22, 2007. Therefore, the instant petition is untimely. 

In addition, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for his post-conviction collateral challenges

because the first was not filed until December 21, 2005, after the limitations period had already

expired. Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral challenges could have no

tolling consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled th

to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256

(11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). 

C. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). Here, the Court finds no reason to equitably toll the limitations period.

D. Failure to Present a Cognizable Federal Claim

Respondent also argues the petition should be dismissed because Petitioner has failed to

present a cognizable federal claim. Respondent’s arguments are correct. 

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of

Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). See also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a

person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484

(1973).

Furthermore, in order to succeed in a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must

demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state court

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2). 

In the petition before the Court, Petitioner does not allege a violation of the Constitution or

federal law, nor does he argue that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

Petitioner does not allege that the adjudication of his claims in state court “resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, . . . or

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts . . . .” 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner’s claim is one of a state agency’s application of state law, and generally,

issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, (1991)

("We have stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.' "),

quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993)

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”); see also Oxborrow v. Eikenberry,

877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989) (Federal courts are bound by state

court rulings on questions of state law.). 

In his opposition, Petitioner attempts to convert his claims into federal ones by claiming

violations of his constitutional rights. However, his broad assertion does not transform his claims.

Merely placing a “due process” label on an alleged violation does not entitle Petitioner to federal

relief. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1386, 1388-89 (1996). Broad, conclusory allegations of

unconstitutionality are insufficient to state a cognizable claim. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9

th

Cir.1995); Greyson v. Kellam, 937 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir.1991) (bald assertions of ineffective

assistance of counsel did not entitle the petitioner to an evidentiary hearing); see also Hiivala v.

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999), citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) th

(“general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the

right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion). As Respondent correctly notes, a federal

court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of its own statutes governing conduct credits unless

“the court's interpretation is untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a

constitutional violation.” Brodheim v. Rowland, 993 F.2d 716, 717 (9 Cir.1993), quoting Taylor v. th

Kincheloe, 920 F.2d 599, 609 (9th Cir.1990). There is no subterfuge apparent here, and Petitioner

has not shown the state’s interpretation of its own statutes to be untenable.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period and for failure to present a cognizable

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federal claim.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation,

any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” 

Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if

served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation will then be

submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. th

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 12, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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