Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00206/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00206-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DEBORAH TUMLINSON (1), 

Defendant.

 Case Nos.: 14CR2978-JLS 

 18CV0206-JLS 

 

ORDER: (1) DENYING IN PART AND 

DISMISSING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION UNDER 20 U.S.C. § 2255 TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT 

SENTENCE; AND (2) DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

 Presently before the Court is Defendant Deborah Tumlinson’s First Amended 

Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (ECF No. 

203). Plaintiff United States of America filed a response in opposition, Defendant filed a 

reply, and Plaintiff filed a surreply. The Court has reviewed the record, the submissions 

of the parties, and the supporting exhibits and, for the reasons set forth below, will deny 

in part and dismiss in part Defendant’s motion. 

Background

 Defendant Tumlinson and her husband were charged in a multiple count indictment 

alleging conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, and bankruptcy 

fraud. ECF No. 1. Defendant was initially represented by retained counsel, Randy 

Wagner. ECF No. 19. Mr. Wagner was subsequently permitted to withdraw as counsel 

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of record and new counsel, Manuel Luis Ramirez, was appointed. ECF Nos. 58, 62. 

Approximately eight months later, on February 11, 2016, the Court granted the substitution 

of Michael S. Berg, who was retained to represent Defendant. ECF No. 127. 

 On May 13, 2016, Defendant pled guilty to Count 4 of the indictment, alleging wire 

fraud, pursuant to a plea agreement. ECF No. 135. The plea agreement contained a waiver 

of appeal and collateral attack which waived “any right to appeal or to collaterally attack 

the conviction and any lawful restitution order, except a post-conviction collateral attack 

based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 14. The plea agreement also 

contained a waiver of appeal or collateral attack of the sentence, “except a post-conviction 

collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless the Court 

imposes a custodial sentence above the high end of the guideline range recommended by 

the Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing.” Id. 

 More than eight months after pleading guilty, on January 27, 2017, Defendant was 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months and one day, well below the 

Government’s recommendation of 27 months. ECF Nos. 151, 144. Defendant was allowed 

to self-surrender on March 3, 2017, a deadline which was ultimately extended until January 

19, 2018. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on February 21, 2017 which was withdrawn 

two days later, on February 23, 2017. ECF Nos. 159, 162. On December 20, 2017, this 

court granted Defendant’s request for appointment of counsel to represent her with respect 

to any claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 191. 

Analysis

 In the instant motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Defendant raises three claims: 1) 

her attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment by 

not investigating exculpatory evidence; 2) the Government violated her Brady rights, 

resulting in her pleading guilty; and 3) her guilty plea was coerced and invalid due to her 

medical conditions, empty stomach and medications, and false evidence. Defendant 

argues that the Court should set aside the guilty plea and conviction, or alternatively, 

covert Defendant’s prison sentence to home confinement given her medical condition. 

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The Government responds that Defendant’s motion is procedurally barred by her plea 

agreement waiver of collateral attack and by default for failing to raise her claims on 

direct appeal. The Government further argues that substantively Defendant’s claims fail 

because she was not deprived of exculpatory evidence. 

 As part of her plea agreement, Petitioner waived the right to appeal and to 

collaterally attack the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, with the exception of a 

collateral attack based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also 

waived her right to appeal and to collaterally attack the sentence unless the Court 

imposed a sentence in excess of the high end of the guideline range recommended by the 

Government pursuant to the plea agreement. A knowing and voluntary waiver of a 

statutory right is enforceable. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th 

Cir. 1990). The right to collaterally attack a sentence under § 2255 is statutory in nature, 

and a defendant may therefore waive the right to file a § 2255 petition. United States v. 

Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 

(9th Cir. 1993). 

 The scope of a § 2255 waiver, however, may be subject to potential limitations. 

For example, a defendant’s waiver will not bar an appeal if the trial court did not satisfy 

certain requirements under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to ensure 

that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. 

Such a waiver might also be ineffective where the sentence imposed is not in accordance 

with the negotiated agreement, or if the sentence imposed violates the law. Id.; United 

States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). Finally, a waiver may not

“categorically foreclose” defendants from bringing § 2255 proceedings involving 

ineffective assistance of counsel or involuntariness of waiver. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433; 

Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014. Unless Petitioner can demonstrate that one of these 

limitations to the validity of the waiver are applicable, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider her collateral challenge to her conviction, with the exception of the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims preserved in the plea agreement. See Washington v. 

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Lampert, 422 F.3d. 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that if sentencing agreement’s 

waiver of the right to file a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was valid, 

district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case). 

 Defendant contends that her plea agreement waiver is invalid because she was 

cognitively impaired the day she pleaded guilty and because she pled guilty on the basis 

of false evidence against her. As to the cognitive impairment claim, Defendant alleges 

that she not eaten the day of her guilty plea, she was severely dehydrated, and had taken 

various medications.1

 In addition, Defendant asserts that she suffers from 

neurocardiogenic syncope syndrome (NSS) and that she experienced an episode of NSS 

on the day of her guilty plea. Defendant contends that her guilty plea hearing was “like 

sleep walking for her, an unconscious event even though the outward signs made it 

appear that she was conscious of what was transpiring.” ECF 203 at 11. As a result, 

Defendant claims that her guilty plea was not intelligent or voluntary. 

The court determines voluntariness by looking at the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the signing and entry of the plea agreement. United States v. Kaczynski, 239 

F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001). In assessing the voluntariness of the plea, the court must 

accord great weight to statements made by the defendant contemporaneously with his 

plea. Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986). The representations of the 

defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor, as well as the judge’s findings in accepting the 

plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). “Solemn declarations in open court 

carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory 

allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions 

                                               

1

 Defendant asserts that before her guilty plea she had taken: 1) 50 mg. of Tramadol (a pain 

medication); 2) 4 Formula 303 pills (a homeopathic relaxant); 3) 5 mg. of Pindolol; and 4) 70 mg. of 

Cannabidiol (CBD oil). ECF 203 at 10. 

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that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Id. at 74; see also Kaczynski, 239 

F.3d at 1115. 

The Court’s recollection of the change of plea proceedings is that Defendant was 

engaged, aware, and fully cognizant of the proceedings. Defendant answered the Court’s 

inquiries appropriately and did not hesitate to stop the Court and confer with counsel if 

she had a question before proceeding. The transcript of the proceedings reflects the 

Court’s recollection. ECF 170. Defendant informed the Court that she had taken 

prescribed medications for a variety of conditions, but that she felt all right to proceed 

with her change of plea. Id. at 6. At another point, after defense counsel asked whether 

Defendant might be seated, the Court inquired whether she was okay to proceed, and she 

answered “No – absolutely, 100 percent.” Id. at 8. Later in the proceeding, after the 

Court advised Defendant of the maximum penalties, the following exchange took place: 

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, hold on. 

(DISCUSSION HELD OFF THE RECORD) 

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Are you okay to proceed? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

Id. at 11. 

The transcript also reflects Defendant’s awareness and consciousness of the 

proceedings. For example, during a discussion about restitution, defense counsel 

indicated to the Court that Defendant had already prepaid $130,000 and Defendant 

immediately corrected him on the record, indicating that she had paid $131,000. Id. at 5. 

When defense counsel indicated to the Court that Defendant had read the factual basis set 

forth in the plea agreement and agrees and adopts each of the allegations, Defendant 

immediately indicated, “Yes, your Honor, I do” without any prompting from the Court. 

Id. at 11. 

 Thus, the contemporaneous evidence regarding Defendant’s guilty plea, her 

declarations in open court, the transcript of the change of plea proceeding, and the 

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statements within the Plea Agreement adopted by Defendant, all indicate that 

Defendant’s plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. In addition, more than 18 

months passed between the time Defendant entered her guilty plea and her final selfsurrender date and Defendant never moved to withdraw her guilty plea or otherwise bring 

her cognitive impairment to the attention of the Court, even though numerous court 

hearings were held in this time frame. Thus, despite Defendant’s current assertions, the 

Court is persuaded that the files and records in this case conclusively demonstrate that 

Defendant’s mental condition was sufficient to support her guilty plea. 

 Defendant also contends that her plea was involuntary because it was induced by 

false evidence. This claim is based on information provided by Carter Johnston to the 

Government beginning in January, 2017. Mr. Johnston claimed to have uncovered 

evidence that a letter he wrote to a real estate broker indicating that Defendant and her 

husband had reached a settlement in a lawsuit was based upon an error on his part, not a 

misrepresentation made at the request of Defendant, as he had previously maintained.2

 

ECF 203-2. Mr. Johnston also indicated that in a subsequent letter to the real estate 

broker he may have mistakenly implied that the lawsuit was settled, but any implication 

was his error and not intentional. Id. Defendant claims that because she was never 

advised of Mr. Johnston’s exculpatory evidence, her plea was involuntary and 

unintelligent. 

 The Court is not persuaded that Mr. Johnston’s “new” evidence is exculpatory. In 

an email of May 20, 2010, which Mr. Johnston claims to have misconstrued, Defendant’s 

instruction to Mr. Johnston was to “take out the following highlighted in red.” ECF No. 

207-2. “It is my understanding” is highlighted in red. Id. Mr. Johnston took out those 

                                               

2

 On July 30, 2014, Mr. Johnston signed a stipulation of facts in connection with disbarment proceedings 

held against him which attested that Mrs. Tumlinson provided him with information that had to be 

included in the letter, including the representation that a settlement had been reached. ECF 207-6. In 

December, 2015, Mr. Johnston told FBI Special Agent Duczakowski that the information included in 

both letters to the real estate broker was provided by Mrs. Tumlinson. ECF 207-7.

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terms, and emailed the changes back to Defendant. Id. The next email by Defendant 

indicates “almost perfect...see changes below. Just make sure you put it on letterhead.” 

ECF No. 207-3. The draft of the proposed letter below, approved by Defendant with 

changes made by Defendant, read: 

Dear Ms. Castberg: 

I am an attorney of record for Douglas and Deborah Tumlinson. Mr. and 

Mrs Tumlinson have reached a settlement in their action against SDG&E 

resulting from the fire damage to their property. While the details of that 

settlement are confidential, the Tumlinsons plan to devote $600,000 of their 

funds to the purchase and improvement of the property at 13398 Jacaranda 

Blossom in Valley Center. Accordingly, there will be no financing needed 

on the purchase of the property. 

... 

ECF 207-3. 

Thus, despite Mr. Johnston’s dubious revelation in January, 2017 that the explicit 

instruction provided in the first email by Mrs. Tumlinson (to take out the terms 

highlighted in red) also included a second instruction to change the wording to indicate 

that the Tumlinson’s “had agreed to settle their lawsuit,” the evidence demonstrates that 

Defendant had knowledge of and approved the version of the letter indicating that a 

settlement had been reached. This is consistent with the factual basis admitted by 

Defendant in the plea agreement.3

 

 Thus, even if one were to credit Mr. Johnston’s late-founded belief that the initial 

misrepresentation stemmed from an error on his part, subsequent evidence–the letter 

finally approved by Defendant—demonstrates that Defendant was aware of the 

                                               

3

 The portion of the factual basis regarding the letter provides: “the defendant caused Attorney C.J. to 

send a letter to real estate broker E. Castberg on May 20, 2010, in which he unwittingly misrepresented 

that the TUMLINSONS had reached a settlement in their SDG&E lawsuit.” ECF No. 135 at 4-5. 

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misrepresentation and directed it to be sent. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that Mr. 

Johnston’s January 2017 evidence is exculpatory. 

 Moreover, even if the evidence had been exculpatory, it has no effect on the 

numerous other admissions made by Defendant which demonstrate that Defendant 

intended to misrepresent that a settlement of the SDG&E lawsuit had been reached. 

Defendant admitted that she directed Mr. Johnston to send a letter on October 2, 2010, to 

a representative of U.S. Claims, indicating that the Tumlinsons had settled the SDG&E 

lawsuit for $2,490,000.00. ECF No. 135 at 5. Defendant admitted that, on October 5, 

2010, she represented to U.S. Claims that a court-appointed mediator in the lawsuit had 

already awarded $2.4 million to the Tumlinsons and that, on October 6, 2010, she signed 

a Purchase Agreement in support of an application for a loan from U.S. Claims which 

falsely represented that Mr. Johnston represented the Tumlinsons in connection with their 

“Settled Claim” in the SDG&E lawsuit. Id. Thus, given the evidence and admissions 

before the Court, the Court is not persuaded that Defendant’s guilty plea was based on 

false evidence or improperly influenced by any failure to disclose the information Mr. 

Johnston provided to the Government beginning in January, 2017.

 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant entered her plea agreement knowingly 

and intelligently and, thus, her limited waiver of the right to bring this collateral attack is 

valid. Defendant’s waiver preserved her right to bring a challenge to the effectiveness of 

her counsel, but the other claims raised in Defendant’s Petition must be dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

 Turning to Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant 

contends that her attorneys, Mr. Wagner and Mr. Ramirez4

, were ineffective for failing to 

investigate exculpatory evidence. Defendant indicates that her attorneys apparently did 

not have the benefit of the exculpatory documents that Mr. Johnston produced between 

                                               

4

 Defendant also asserts that she suffered from ineffective assistance from Mr. Johnston, but he did not 

represent her in this case. 

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January and November, 2017. Defendant claims that there is a reasonable probability she 

would have gone to trial rather than pleading guilty had she known of Mr. Johnston’s 

exculpatory evidence. 

 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show 

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced 

the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish 

prejudice, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome.” Id. 

For the reasons previously set forth, the Court is not at all persuaded that the 

information provided by Mr. Johnston was exculpatory. Furthermore, Defendant makes 

no showing that any of her counsel failed to properly investigate her involvement in the 

charged offenses or that counsel’s conduct was otherwise deficient. Defendant has also 

failed to establish that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Even if one were to entirely disregard the evidence allegedly 

nullified by Mr. Johnston’s “exculpatory” evidence, the factual basis set forth in the plea 

agreement still contains ample support for Defendant’s wire fraud conviction. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be denied. 

Evidentiary Hearing

 A court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing when ruling on § 2255 

motions. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1989). Section 2255 

allows courts to forego such a hearing when “the motion and the files and records of the 

case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). 

The Court finds an evidentiary is not required in this matter because the records 

conclusively demonstrate Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

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Conclusion 

Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, the record, and applicable law, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED: 

 1. Defendant’s claims challenging the validity of her guilty plea and waiver of 

collateral attack are DENIED. 

 2. Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is DENIED. 

 3. Defendant’s remaining claims challenging her conviction and sentence are 

DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

 4. The Court DENIES Defendant a certificate of appealability, as Defendant has 

not made a substantial showing that she has been denied a constitutional right. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c) (providing that a certificate shall issue “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.”). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 13, 2018 

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