Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-55878/USCOURTS-ca9-15-55878-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PORFIRIA YOCUPICIO, and on behalf

of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PAE GROUP, LLC; ARCH

RESOURCES GROUP LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-55878

D.C. No.

2:14-cv-08958-

GW-JEM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 6, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed July 30, 2015

Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez and Richard R. Clifton,

Circuit Judges, and Kimberly J. Mueller,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Fernandez

* The Honorable Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.

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2 YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC.

SUMMARY**

Class Action / Jurisdiction

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a

plaintiff’s motion to remand the action to state court after the

case had been removed to federal court pursuant to the

provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, and

remanded with instructions to remand the matter to the state

court.

The panel held that where a plaintiff files an action

containing class claims as well as non-class claims, and the

class claims do not meet the CAFA amount-in-controversy

requirement while the non-class claims, standing alone, do

not meet diversity of citizenship jurisdiction requirements,

the amount involved in the non-class claims cannot be used

to satisfy the CAFA jurisdictional amount, and the CAFA

diversity provisions cannot be invoked to give the district

court jurisdiction over the non-class claims.

COUNSEL

Thomas Stephen Campbell and Justin F. Marquez (argued),

Rastegar Law Group, APC, Torrance, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael E. Chase (argued) and Bruce Michael Timm, Boutin

JonesInc.,Sacramento, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC. 3

OPINION

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:

Porfiria Yocupicio appeals the district court’s denial of

her motion to remand this matter to the Superior Court of the

State of California, County of Los Angeles (“Superior

Court”) after PAE Group, LLC, and Arch Resources Group,

LLC (collectively, “Arch”) removed1

it pursuant to the

provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L.

No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of

28 U.S.C.) (“CAFA”). The district court determined that it

had diversity jurisdiction over the action because it was a

class action that came within the CAFA provisions. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).2 We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Yocupicio filed this action against Arch in the Superior

Court based upon allegations of numerous violations by Arch

of the California Labor Code. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code

§§ 201 (timely pay), 226.7 (meal and rest periods), 512 (meal

periods), 1194 (minimum wages). The complaint alleged ten

causes of action, the first nine of which were brought as class

claims on behalf of Yocupicio and “certain current and

former employees” of Arch. The tenth cause of action,

however, was not brought as a class claim; it was brought as

a representative claim under the California Labor Code

Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Cal. Lab.

 

1

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1453(b).

2 Unless otherwise stated, all references hereafter to section numbers are

to sections of Title 28 of the United States Code.

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4 YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC.

Code §§ 2698–2699.5. Based on the record, and on the

presentations by the parties, we will assume for purposes of

this opinion that, not including attorney’s fees, the amount

sought pursuant to the class claims was $1,654,874 and the

amount sought pursuant to the PAGA claim was $3,247,950. 

We note that those amounts add up to $4,902,824, but, while

the parties dispute the district court’s estimate of the

reasonable amount of attorney’s fees sought, we will assume,

without deciding, that addition of reasonable attorney’s fees

would cause the total recovery for the class claims and the

PAGA claim to reach $5,000,001 at least.3 We will proceed

on that basis.4

After the district court denied Yocupicio’s motion, she

petitioned for permission to appeal pursuant to § 1453(c)(1);

we granted permission.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to § 1453(c)(1). The

district court’s jurisdiction was premised on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d). Whether it properly assumed jurisdiction is the

subject of this appeal.

“‘We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion

to remand to state court for lack of federal subject matter

3

See Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199, 202, 54 S. Ct. 133,

134, 78 L. Ed. 267 (1933); Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150,

1155–56 (9th Cir. 1998).

4 As it is, if the amounts of the class claims and the PAGA claim are not

aggregated, the amount of the attorney’s fees, if any, need not be

considered.

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YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC. 5

jurisdiction.’” Haw. ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A.,

761 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “We

also review CAFA construction and applicability de novo.” 

United Steel, Paper &Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied

Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d

1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010). We review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error. Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc.,

742 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

DISCUSSION

In any removal case, the first and overarching condition

has been outlined by the Supreme Court, that is:

As a general matter, defendants may remove

to the appropriate federal district court “any

civil action brought in a State court of which

the district courts of the United States have

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

The propriety of removal thus depends on

whether the case originally could have been

filed in federal court.

City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163,

118 S. Ct. 523, 529, 139 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1997). As relevant

here, that condition focuses on “CAFA [, which] gives federal

courts jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in

§ 1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 members, the

parties are minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy

exceeds $5 million.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co.,

LLC v. Owens, __ U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 547, 552, 190 L. Ed.

2d 495 (2014); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, __

U.S. __, __, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348, 185 L. Ed. 2d 439 (2013).

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6 YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC.

There is no dispute that causes of action one through nine

are class claims, and that they would satisfy CAFA’s

numerosity and minimal diversity requirements. See

§ 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C), (d)(5)(B); see also United Steel

Workers, 602 F.3d at 1090–91.

5 But those claims, taken

singly or aggregated, do not meet the over $5,000,000

requirement. See § 1332(d)(2). The tenth cause of action, the

PAGA claim, was not brought as a class claim; it was brought

as a representative claim6

and cannot be deemed to be a class

claim.7

The district court, however, considered both the amounts

asked for in the class claims and the amount asked for in the

PAGA claim when it decided that the CAFA $5,000,000

threshold was exceeded. In so doing, it determined that the

plain language of CAFA so required, even though CAFA’s

focus is on class action questions. We disagree.

5 The parties concede as much, and we agree. See Serrano v. 180

Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007).

6 No doubt all class claims are representative in nature. However, not

all representative claims are class claims; to say that they are would be a

logical fallacy. See Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842,

848 (9th Cir. 2011).

7

See Louie, 761 F.3d at 1040–41; Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp.,

747 F.3d 1117, 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct.

870, 190 L. Ed. 2d 702 (2014); Arias v. Super. Ct., 46 Cal. 4th 969, 981,

985, 209 P.3d 923, 930, 933, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596, 599–600 (2009). 

Indeed, the fact that Yocupicio expressly did not seek class status for that

claim is “fatal to CAFA jurisdiction” over it. Louie, 761 F.3d at 1040. 

Moreover, the parties do not assert that there would be diversity of

citizenship jurisdiction over the PAGA claim. See § 1332(a), (c); Urbino

v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2013).

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YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC. 7

We do, of course, agree that:

As always, our starting point is the plain

language of the statute. “[W]e examine not

only the specific provision at issue, but also

the structure of the statute as a whole,

including its object and policy.” If the plain

meaning of the statute is unambiguous, that

meaning is controlling and we need not

examine legislative history as an aid to

interpretation unless “the legislative history

clearly indicates that Congress meant

something other than what it said.”

Chimei, 659 F.3d at 847–48 (internal citations omitted). But

when we apply that standard, we reach a conclusion quite the

opposite of that reached by the district court.

The language of the statute shows that in enacting CAFA,

Congress was focused on class actions rather than on all

representative actions or on cases where a class claim was

only a part, perhaps a small part, of a civil action. As the

Supreme Court has pointed out, “Congress enacted [CAFA]

to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal

court.” Dart, __ U.S. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 554. And “CAFA’s

primary objective . . . [is to ensure] ‘Federal court

consideration of interstate cases of national importance.’” 

Standard Fire Ins., __ U.S. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 1350 (citation

omitted). That does not suggest that every case with a class

claim can be brought in federal court. The language of the

statute indicates as much. It states that “district courts shall

have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

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8 YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC.

$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class

action.” § 1332(d)(2).

Moreover, it states that a “‘class action’” is “any civil

action filed under” class action rules “as a class action.” 

§ 1332(d)(1)(B). Notably, it does not state or suggest that the

mere presence of even a relatively minor class claim in an

action will suffice for federal diversity jurisdiction purposes. 

The same is true of the concept of aggregation, where “the

claims of the individual class members” are to be aggregated

in determining the amount in controversy,

8

but class members

are those “who fall within the definition of the proposed or

certified class in a class action.”9 Again, the focus is on class

actions and on claims of individuals as members of the

class.10 The provisions do not speak to claims that are not

part of the class action itself; there appears to be no reason to

include those large or small claims in the threshold

calculations. Congress showed no intent to have actions with

insufficiently large class components heard in the federal

courts, and filing them in or removing them to the federal

courts would not comport with the language or purpose of

CAFA.

For example, suppose a California plaintiff brought a

class claim against a California defendant that had

 

8

 § 1332(d)(6).

 

9

 § 1332(d)(1)(D).

10 The provisions did solve aggregation problems regarding jurisdiction

over class claims, themselves, but did not purport to do more. See Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 550–52, 572, 125 S.

Ct. 2611, 2616, 2628, 162 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2005) (referring to the state of

the law before CAFA and to CAFA’s limited reach).

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YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC. 9

misrepresented its product to have a somewhat higher quality

rating than it had, and a separate individual claim because the

product had allegedly failed in a situation affecting the

plaintiff and caused him to incur very substantial damages. 

Suppose, also, that the amount of the false representation

claim11came to a total value of $100,000 for all class

members, but the alleged damage to the individual plaintiff

due to the product failure12came to $5,000,000. Is it

plausible to believe that in enacting CAFA, Congress

intended to vest jurisdiction over that controversy in the

federal courts? We are satisfied that the answer is no, but that

is what Arch’s reading of the statute would require.

We recognize that a district court need not always eschew

taking supplemental jurisdiction of claims over which it

would not otherwise have jurisdiction. See, e.g., § 1367;

Brown v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 738 F.3d 926,

930, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2013). In Allapattah Servs., Inc.,

545 U.S. at 558, 125 S. Ct. at 2620, the Court was faced with

the question of whether a district court had jurisdiction over

a case where some plaintiffs’ claims satisfied the amount in

controversy requirement, but others did not. The Court held:

When the well-pleaded complaint contains at

least one claim that satisfies the amount-incontroversy requirement, and there are no

other relevant jurisdictional defects, the

district court, beyond all question, has original

jurisdiction over that claim. The presence of

other claims in the complaint, over which the

 

11 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500.

 

12 A typical product liability tort claim.

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10 YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC.

district court may lack original jurisdiction, is

of no moment. If the court has original

jurisdiction over a single claim in the

complaint, it has original jurisdiction over a

“civil action” within the meaning of

§ 1367(a), even if the civil action over which

it has jurisdiction comprises fewer claims than

were included in the complaint. Once the

court determines it has original jurisdiction

over the civil action, it can turn to the

question whether it has a constitutional and

statutory basis for exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over the other claims in the

action.

Id. at 559, 125 S. Ct. at 2620–21. The lynchpin in that

holding was that the court did have jurisdiction over one of

the claims. Here, however, the district court would not have

had jurisdiction over any of the claims. It would not have had

jurisdiction over the class claims because taken together they

did not exceed the $5,000,000 threshold; it would not have

had jurisdiction over the PAGA claim because of a lack of

complete diversity. But Arch would have us find jurisdiction

over the class claims by using the amounts sought in the

PAGA claim, and, we suppose, have us find jurisdiction over

the PAGA claim because the court would have jurisdiction

over the class claims. While that argument is Daedalian, we

find no basis in statutory or case law to support it.13

13 Yocupicio raises other issues challenging the mathematics of

jurisdiction: calculation of the amount of the PAGA claim and the amount

of attorney’s fees that should be added. However, in light of our decision

on this issue, we need not and do not consider the other issues.

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YOCUPICIO V. PAE GROUP, INC. 11

CONCLUSION

Where a plaintiff files an action containing class claims

as well as non-class claims, and the class claims do not meet

the CAFA amount-in-controversyrequirement while the nonclass claims, standing alone, do not meet diversity of

citizenship jurisdiction requirements, the amount involved in

the non-class claims cannot be used to satisfy the CAFA

jurisdictional amount, and the CAFA diversity provisions

cannot be invoked to give the district court jurisdiction over

the non-class claims. The district court should have granted

Yocupicio’s motion to remand. Thus, we reverse and remand

to the district court with directions to remand this matter to

the Superior Court.

REVERSED and REMANDED. Costs on appeal are

awarded to Yocupicio.

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