Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00459/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00459-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRANCE JAMES BURKE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0459 FCD DAD P

vs.

RICHARD SUBIA, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered by

the Placer County Superior Court on October 13, 1998. Respondents have filed a renewed

motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations

set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). For the reasons set

forth below, the undersigned will recommend that respondents’ motion be granted.

BACKGROUND AND STATE COURT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 18, 1998, a Placer County jury found petitioner guilty of two counts of

lewd and lascivious acts against a child under the age of 14, in violation of California Penal Code

§ 288(a). The jury also found true the allegations that petitioner had suffered two prior

convictions for violent or serious felonies within the meaning of California Penal Code §

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1170.12. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in state prison pursuant to

California Penal Code § 667.61 plus two consecutive terms of five years each for the two prior

felonies, for a total of 35 years to life in state prison. (Pet. at 2; Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3

& Lodged Doc. 1 at 1-2.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the California Court of Appeal

for the Third Appellate District. Seven issues were raised in the appeal. On December 28, 2000,

the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction in an unpublished opinion. Petitioner

then sought review of four of the seven issues in the California Supreme Court. The California

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on March 28, 2001. Petitioner did not file a

petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. (Pet. at 2, 3a-3c & Attachs.

#1 & #2; Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 3 & Lodged Doc. 1 at 1.)

On June 4, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Placer

County Superior Court. On June 24, 2002, the Superior Court denied the petition “for the

reasons that the Petitioner has failed to adequately explain why these issues were not raised on

appeal. In addition, stated grounds for relief are frivolous.” (Pet. at 3a, 3d, 4a & Attachs. 3 & 4;

Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2 & Lodged Docs. 2 & 3.)

On April 29, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. The California Court of Appeal

summarily denied the petition on May 15, 2003. (Pet. at 4a & Attachs. #5 & #6; Resp’ts’ Mot. to

Dismiss at 3 & Lodged Docs. 4 & 5.)

On December 8, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition on February 26,

2006, with citations to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998) and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d

756 (1953). (Pet. at (4)(a), (4)(b) & Attachs. 7 & 8; Mot. to Dismiss at 3& Lodged Docs 6 & 7.)

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 Thorson had been decided on the same day the district judge adopted the findings and 1

recommendations in this case. 

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FEDERAL COURT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 6, 2006, petitioner filed his federal habeas petition. On March 15,

2006, the undersigned ordered respondents to file a responsive pleading. On April 12, 2006,

respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition was filed outside of the

AEDPA one-year statute of limitations. On December 11, 2006, the undersigned recommended

that respondents’ motion to dismiss be denied. Respondents filed objections, and petitioner filed

a reply.

On February 15, 2007, the assigned district judge found that the undersigned’s

findings and recommendations were supported by the record and by the proper analysis. The

court declined to exercise its discretion to consider respondents’ new arguments and

supplemental evidence presented for the first time in their objections and adopted the findings

and recommendations in their entirety. The assigned district judge also ordered respondents to

file a response to the federal petition.

On February 21, 2007, respondents filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the

judgment in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645 (9th

Cir. 2007) (holding that a denial of a state habeas petition by the California Supreme Court

citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998) was a clear ruling that the petition was

untimely) On March 15, 2007, the undersigned denied the motion because no judgment had been

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issued in the case within the meaning of Rule 59(e). In so doing, the court indicated that

respondents could file a renewed motion to dismiss in reliance on the new decision referred to in

the motion. Respondents then filed the pending renewed motion to dismiss. Petitioner has filed

a timely opposition.

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 In presenting this argument respondents’ counsel reviews the history of petitioner’s

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state habeas proceedings and concludes at one point: “The limitations period then ran for eleven

days until Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 6, 2006, for a

total of 354 days.” (Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5.) Were this the case, of course, the federal

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RESPONDENTS’ RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondents again move to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner’s habeas

petition is time-barred. (Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) In this regard, respondents argue that

petitioner’s conviction became final on June 26, 2001. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner therefore had until

June 26, 2002 to file his federal habeas petition. (Id.) Petitioner did not file the instant petition

until March 6, 2006. (Id.) Absent tolling, respondents contend that the petition is untimely

under the AEDPA. (Id.)

Respondents acknowledge that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted” toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

(Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5.) Respondents also acknowledge that a properly filed

application is “pending” and tolls the one-year limitations period while under consideration by

the court. (Id. at 5.) Finally, respondents note that AEDPA’s tolling provision allows for the

possibility of continuous statutory tolling for the time in which a prisoner is properly pursing one

complete round of the state’s collateral review process. (Id.) 

Respondents emphasize, however, that “[a]n application is ‘properly filed’ when

its deliver and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing

filings.” (Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5) (quoting Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)). 

Therefore, if a state court has rejected an application as untimely, the application is not properly

filed and has no tolling effect. (Id. at 5.) Here, respondents argue, the habeas petition filed by

petitioner with the California Supreme Court was clearly denied as untimely under state law and

therefore did not serve to toll the one-year federal statute of limitations. Though oddly phrased,

respondents’ argument is persuasive.2

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petition would be timely filed within the one-year statute of limitations. Though awkwardly

presented, respondents’ actual argument is that far more than one year’s time ran before the filing

of the federal petition since the petition filed with the California Supreme Court could not serve

to toll the statute of limitations.

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Respondents argue that petitioner did not properly file his California Supreme

Court petition. (Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) Relying on the decision in Thorson, respondents

contend that when the California Supreme Court summarily denies a state habeas petition by

citing the page in the Robbins decision cited by that court here, it is a “clear ruling” that the

petition was rejected as untimely. (Id. at 7.) Such a petition is not properly filed, so the

limitations period begins to run upon the lower court’s denial and is not tolled while the petition

is under consideration by the California Supreme Court. (Id. at 7-8.) Respondents contend that,

the limitations period for petitioner’s filing of a federal habeas petition began to run again on

May 16, 2003, the day after the California Court of Appeal denied habeas relief, and expired on

or about June 6, 2003, long before petitioner filed the instant federal petition. (Id. at 8.) 

Respondents acknowledge that petitioner has offered explanations for his delay in

filing his habeas petition with the California Supreme Court in his previous opposition to

respondents’ first motion to dismiss. (Id.) These reasons included petitioner’s legal research,

rewriting the petition to abandon one claim and make the remainder of the petition more concise,

his prison work hours, restricted access to the library, and dealing with allegations of

inappropriate conduct with a minor in his church congregation. (Id.) However, respondents

contend that these justifications were all presented to the California Supreme Court and that court

nonetheless denied the petition as untimely. (Id.) Respondents argue that the California

Supreme Court’s ruling of untimeliness is “the end of the matter.” (Id. at 8) (citing Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) and Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)). 

Respondents conclude that because petitioner’s federal petition is untimely, it

must be dismissed with prejudice. (Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10.) 

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PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION

Petitioner has submitted numerous arguments in opposition to respondents’

motion to dismiss. First, petitioner contends that respondents waived the issue they raise in their

brief because they failed to raise it at the earliest opportunity. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Mot. to

Dismiss at 12.) Petitioner notes that he pointed out respondents’ error in his previous opposition,

and respondents failed to address it in a reply. (Id.) Petitioner contends that respondents have

never offered an explanation as to why they failed to raise the affirmative defense. (Id. at 13-14.) 

Second, petitioner contends that the California Supreme Court’s denial of his

habeas petition was unreasonable. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 14.) In this

regard, petitioner notes that the California Supreme Court, the California Court of Appeal, and

the Placer County Superior Court never ordered an evidentiary hearing regarding the facts

presented in petitioner’s state petition. (Id.) Petitioner contends that under the AEDPA no

deference is due to the state courts where, as here, the state has made an unreasonable

determination of the facts. (Id.) 

Third, petitioner contends that the California Supreme Court may have rushed its

decision. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 17.) After waiting more than 14 months,

petitioner contends that he wrote the California Supreme Court inquiring about his petition. 

Petitioner notes that the court returned the correspondence to him, stamped “Received”, along

with a copy of the docket showing that the court denied the petition on the same day it received

petitioner’s inquiry. (Id.)

Fourth, petitioner argues that he filed his petitions under the rule of law existing at

that time. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 18.) In this regard, petitioner contends

that he filed his petition with the California Supreme Court based on the understanding that, so

long as his petition was properly filed and ruled on, it would toll the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations, regardless of whether it was denied on the merits or on procedural grounds. (Id.) 

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Fifth, petitioner argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thorson is in need of

further review for a variety of reasons. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 18-19.) 

Finally, petitioner contends that Thorson is inconsistent with other Ninth Circuit and U.S.

Supreme Court decisions and is confusing. (Id. at 21-23.) 

Sixth, petitioner contends that the California courts have not applied the decision

in In re Robbins consistently with respect to the issue of timeliness. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’ts’

Mot. to Dismiss at 24.) He argues that even in denying his own state habeas petitions, the state

courts have employed the decision in In re Robbins arbitrarily, citing it sometimes and not others. 

Petitioner contends that the state has not been able to prove that the procedural rules regarding

timeliness have been consistently or regularly applied by California courts. (Id. at 24.)

Finally, petitioner argues that his federal petition contains a number of grounds

demonstrating that his constitutional rights have been violated and his trial and its verdict are

infirm. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss at 24.) He contends that to not have a federal

court review his claims would constitute a miscarriage of justice. (Id. at 25.) 

ANALYSIS

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a

one-year period of limitation applies to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in federal court

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The

period of limitation applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after the statute was enacted. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). Because this action was filed in 2006, the

AEDPA period of limitation is applicable.

The one-year period of limitation began to run when petitioner’s judgment of

conviction became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In this case, judgment was entered against

petitioner on October 13, 1998. On appeal, the California Supreme Court denied review on

March 28, 2001. Accordingly, petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final on June 26,

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2001, upon expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The AEDPA

statute of limitations began to run the following day, on June 27, 2001, and expired one year

later, on June 26, 2002, unless petitioner is entitled to the benefit of tolling provisions. Patterson

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted” toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute of

limitations is not tolled during the interval between the date on which a judgment becomes final

and the date on which the petitioner files his first state collateral challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once state collateral proceedings are commenced, a state

habeas petition is “pending” during a full round of review in the state courts, including the time

between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition in a higher court, as long as the

intervals between petitions are “reasonable.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002).

However, a petitioner is only entitled to tolling for those time periods during

which his “properly filed” state habeas petitions were pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (habeas petition rejected by state court as untimely

was not “properly filed” for purposes of statutory tolling); Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645

(9th Cir. 2007). When a state postconviction petition is determined to be untimely by a state

court, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145,

1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 [, 414], 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812

(2005)). See also Carey, 536 U.S. at 226. In Thorson v. Palmer the Ninth Circuit held that a

state habeas corpus petition denied with citation to “ the very page of Robbins that sets forth ‘the

basic analytical framework’ governing California’s timeliness determinations in habeas corpus

proceedings” was a clear ruling that the state petition was untimely and therefor not properly

filed. 479 F.3d at 645. Id.

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In this case, it is undisputed that the statute of limitations had run for 343 days

before petitioner filed his first state habeas petition with the Placer County Superior Court on

June 4, 2002. On June 24, 2002, the Superior Court denied petitioner’s first state habeas petition

“for the reasons that the Petitioner has failed to adequately explain why these issues were not

raised on appeal. In addition, stated grounds for relief are frivolous.” (Lodged Docs 3.) 

Approximately ten months later, on April 29, 2003, petitioner filed his habeas petition with the

California Court of Appeal. On May 15, 2003, the California Court of Appeal summarily denied

that petition. (Lodged Docs 5.) Over eighteen months later, on December 8, 2004, petitioner

filed his habeas petition with the California Supreme Court. On February 26, 2006, the

California Supreme Court denied that petition stating only “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 756.)” 

(Lodged Docs 7.) 

As in Thorson, here the California Supreme Court denied the petition before it as

untimely, citing the same page of the In re Robbins decision cited in Thorson’s case. The

holding in Thorson binds this court and requires a finding that petitioner’s Supreme Court

petition was denied as untimely and did not, therefore, operate to toll the federal statute of

limitations. While it is not clear because of the summary nature of the order which filing delay

the California Supreme Court was referring to, the most likely period the court considered

excessive was the 572-day period between the California Court of Appeal’s habeas denial and

petitioner’s filing of his petition with the California Supreme Court. In that case, the one-year

limitations period ran for 343 days from June 26, 2001, the date petitioner’s conviction became

final until June 4, 2002, the date petitioner filed his first habeas petition with the Superior Court. 

The AEDPA clock started running again on May 15, 2003, the date the Court of Appeal denied

his petition and did not stop until March 6, 2006, the date he filed his federal petition with this

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 In the alternative, if the California Supreme Court’s order refers to the 307-day period 3

between the Superior Court’s denial of the petition before it and petitioner’s filing of his petition

with the California Court of Appeal, petitioner’s Court of Appeal petition was not “properly

filed,” and the period between the Superior Court’s denial and petitioner’s filing of his California

Supreme Court petition is not tolled. Under that scenario, the one-year limitations period ran for

343 days from June 26, 2001, the date petitioner’s conviction became final until June 4, 2002, the

date petitioner filed his habeas petition with the Superior Court. The AEDPA clock started

running again on June 24, 2002, the date the Superior Court denied his petition and did not stop

until December 8, 2004, the date he filed his petition with the California Supreme Court. Based

on this calculation, petitioner’s untolled time ran for more than three years, still far exceeding

AEDPA’s one-year limitation period. See Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645-46 (9th Cir.

2007) (addressing the various periods of delay the California Supreme Court could have been

referring to in their summary denial and their effect on the timeliness of the federal petition.)

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court. Based on this calculation, petitioner’s untolled time ran for almost four years before his

federal petition was filed, far exceeding AEDPA’s one-year limitation period.3

As in Thorson, any ambiguity in the California Supreme Court’s order does not

affect the decision in this case. Well over one-year of untolled time ran long before the federal

petition was filed. Accordingly, respondents’ motion to dismiss should be granted.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondents’ April 3, 2007

motion to dismiss the petition as barred by the statute of limitations be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. A document containing objections

should be titled “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply

to objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain 

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circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 17, 2007.

DAD:9

burk0459.mtd(2)

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