Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01386/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01386-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:402 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASHLEY ANN YAMADA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of 

Social Security,1

Defendant.

Case No. 1:20-cv-001386-JLT-BAM

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 23)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ashley Ann Yamada (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental 

Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties’ briefing on the motion was 

submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe for findings and 

recommendations. (Docs. 23, 27.) Having considered the parties’ briefs, along with the entire record 

in this case, the Court finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was not 

1 Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023.

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin O’Malley is substituted

for Kilolo Kijakazi as Defendant in this suit.

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supported by substantial evidence in the record and was not based upon proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, this Court will recommend reversing the agency’s determination to deny benefits and 

remanding the matter for further proceedings consistent with this order.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff applied for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on July 14, 2017, alleging that 

she became disabled on January 1, 2001. AR 179-181.2 The alleged onset date was later amended to 

July 14, 2017. See AR 34. That claim was denied initially on October 18, 2017, and on 

reconsideration on January 5, 2018. AR 65-79; 80-93; 105-110. Plaintiff requested a hearing before 

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and ALJ Shiva Bozarth held a hearing on September 19, 2019. 

AR 31-64. ALJ Bozarth issued an order denying benefits on the basis that Plaintiff was not disabled 

on January 2, 2020. AR 12-30. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals 

Council denied. AR 1-6. This appeal followed.

September 19, 2019 Hearing Testimony

ALJ Shiva Bozarth held a hearing on September 19, 2019. AR 31-64. Stephen Schmidt, an 

impartial vocational expert, also appeared and testified. AR 58-63. Plaintiff’s attorney Jonathan Pena 

was also present. The ALJ began by asking Plaintiff’s attorney whether he had any objections to 

anything contained in the record, and he responded that he did not object. AR 34. The ALJ then 

admitted exhibits into evidence. Id.

Plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Pena, opened by noting that Plaintiff was a younger individual 

applying for Title XVI benefits, with an amended alleged onset date of July 14, 2017. Id. Mr. Pena 

stated that Plaintiff had a combination of physical impairments that at Steps Four and Five would 

cause absenteeism and limit her to a less than sedentary residual functional capacity, rendering her 

incapable of performing past relevant work or other work. AR 34-35. Mr. Pena additionally noted 

that mental capacity was also at issue, as Plaintiff had instances where Plaintiff would become angry 

or difficult to deal with, limiting Plaintiff to no contact with the public or coworkers and only simple 

2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate 

page number.

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and routine tasks. AR 35. In response to a question from the ALJ, Mr. Pena stated that there was a 

mention of narcotics use in the record, but abuse of narcotics were not generally impacting her 

psychiatric impairment. AR 35-36. The ALJ noted that there was an instance in which Plaintiff was 

insistent upon receiving prescribed medication and, when denied it, ran down the street throwing 

things out of her purse. AR 37. The ALJ inquired whether Plaintiff was not taking her medications or 

was taking more than prescribed. Id. Mr. Pena responded that Plaintiff’s screening and her contract 

with “Lags” had not been breached and Plaintiff was compliant with her medications. AR 37-38. Mr. 

Pena further noted that though Plaintiff took medication, she was only able to tolerate the pain to the 

point where she did not have to take it at that time. AR 38. 

Under examination by the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that the last time she worked was in 2009 or 

2010. AR 41. During that time, she was an in-home support worker, where she worked one day 

before being fired. AR 42. In that position, she said that she could lay down and let one of the people 

she was there to support watch the television. Id. Plaintiff stated that she also worked for Long’s 

Drug Stores, for more than five months but less than a year. AR 43. Plaintiff also said that she 

worked for Clovis Lakes Associates in an office for approximately three to five months during a 

summer. Id. Plaintiff testified that she finished high school and completed “a little bit of college.” Id. 

She said that she was right-handed. Id. The ALJ told the VE that they would consider Plaintiff to 

have had no prior relevant work. Id. 

Plaintiff testified that she lived in Reedley in a house with her grandparents and her 16-yearold son. AR 44. She said that her grandmother would take her son to school every day, she did not 

make her own meals, did not do any grocery shopping. AR 44-45. She said that she drove her 

grandmother’s car “every now and then” but had only recently gotten her license back after it was 

suspended due to tickets. Id. Plaintiff said that her grandmother brought her to the hearing. AR 45. 

Plaintiff said that she had friends or others that she socialized with who would come over to her house 

or would go out to the movies with her once or twice a year. Id. She said that she did not know why 

she did not go out more often. AR 46. Plaintiff testified that she would watch television at home,

would watch whatever caught her attention, and could sometimes watch an entire television program. 

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Id. Plaintiff said that she would read things online, use Facebook on her phone, text friends, and play 

free casino games on her phone. Id.

Upon examination by her attorney, Plaintiff testified that sometimes she would not be able to 

watch an entire television program because her mind would wander. AR 46-47. Plaintiff said that she 

had not had any improvement with her back issues following her social security benefits application in 

2017. AR 47. She stated that she received treatment at LAGS Medical Center and was told she 

needed to be put back on physical therapy but was not in physical therapy at the time of the hearing. 

Id. Plaintiff testified that the physical therapy did not help when she had tried it before, and that she 

previously received injections every month. AR 47-48. Plaintiff said that she was previously given 

medication to help control the pain but was off the medication for approximately 30 months because 

her provider kept telling her that her spine was not curved enough. AR 48. She then said that her 

latest doctor told her that she needed to have paperwork saying that she could have pain medication 

with her anxiety medication. Id. Plaintiff said that she was off the pain medication since June and 

was last prescribed pain medication in May. AR 48-49. In responding to her attorney’s question 

regarding medication compliance, Plaintiff testified that some days she was in excruciating pain and

took more pain medication. AR 49. She said that she would consequently run out of pain medication 

earlier than scheduled. Id. Plaintiff testified that she had better days and bad days during a month, 

and was taking her medication as prescribed on the better days. Id. Plaintiff said that she was told by 

her doctor not to double up on her medication, but that those instructions were difficult for her to 

follow. AR 49-50. Plaintiff said that, as she had been off her medication for some time, she would 

manage the pain by staying in bed or crying due to the pain. AR 50. Plaintiff said that while she was 

on her medication, the pain was there “All the time.” Id. She said that when she was using her 

medication, she rated her pain as being at an eight or nine out of ten. AR 50-51. She said that when 

she received injections, that would bring her pain to approximately a seven out of ten. AR 51. 

Plaintiff testified that she had pain in her lower back and in her neck, and that activities such as 

brushing her teeth, leaning over, and standing and doing dishes for five minutes would cause her pain. 

AR 51-52. She said that while on medications, she could stand for approximately a half hour before 

needing to sit down and take a break, and that she would need approximately an hour break before she 

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could return to standing for a half hour. AR 52. She said that she could sit for about an hour before 

needing to stand up or lay down. Id. Plaintiff said that she would need to stand, walk around, or lay 

down for approximately an hour before she could return to doing activity seated in a chair. AR 52-53. 

She stated that she could walk about 25 yards before needing to take a break. AR 53. Plaintiff said 

that she did not go grocery shopping, could lift a gallon of milk and hand it to someone, but was not 

sure how much weight she could tolerate lifting. Id. She stated that days on which she did tasks her 

pain became noticeably worse. AR 54. Plaintiff testified that when she complied with the medication 

dosage, approximately three-quarters of a month still consisted of bad days. Id. She said that during 

an average day when she was taking medication as prescribed, she would need to lie down to rest 

during daytime hours for approximately five or six hours. AR 54-55. 

Plaintiff said that for her daily routine, she would get up and make sure her son got up but

would not assist him in getting ready for school. AR 55. She said that she would clean “a couple of 

things” around her room, spending approximately ten to fifteen minutes cleaning. Id. She stated that 

she would sometimes help with the dishes and could barely sweep the small one-person bathroom that 

they used. AR 56. Plaintiff also said that she would sometimes have trouble falling asleep. Id. 

Plaintiff noted that she had been switched from Xanax to Klonopin, though sometimes she would not 

take it because it would make her very groggy the following day. AR 56-57. She said that she told 

her psychiatrist about the grogginess and noncompliance as she had not seen the doctor since starting 

the medication. AR 57. Plaintiff stated that she still experienced a panic attack or anxiety attack once 

or twice a week, and would see a psychiatrist once a month beginning in 2019. AR 58. She said that 

she had not noticed seeing the psychiatrist helping, and that back surgery had previously been 

discussed but she had not received further information regarding any potential back surgery. Id. 

Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ elicited testimony from vocational expert (“VE”) 

Stephen Schmidt. AR 58-63. The VE testified that he could be an impartial witness, Plaintiff’s 

attorney had no objections to the VE’s qualifications, and the VE stated that he would inform the ALJ 

if his testimony deviated from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. AR 59. The ALJ asked the VE 

hypothetical questions and asked the VE to assume an individual with the same age, education, and 

work experience as Plaintiff. Id. For the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to consider a 

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hypothetical individual who: could lift or carry 50 pounds occasionally, could lift or carry 25 pounds 

frequently; could stand or walk at least six out of eight hours; could sit for at least six out of eight 

hours; would need to change positions once per hour while remaining at the workstation; could 

frequently reach overhead; could frequently operate foot controls; could frequently climb ramps or 

stairs; could never climb ladders or scaffolds; could frequently stoop and crouch; could never work in 

unprotected heights or around fast-moving machinery; would be limited to simple and routine tasks; 

and would have jobs of a reasoning level of one or two. AR 59-60. The VE testified that there were 

jobs in the national economy, including: Mail Clerk (DOT No. 209.687-026, light, SVP 2, with 58,000

jobs); Office Helper (DOT No. 239.567-010, light, SVP 2, with 265,000 jobs); and Parking Attendant 

(DOT No. 915.473-010, light, SVP 2, with 77,000 jobs). AR 60.

For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume an individual who: could lift or 

carry 20 pounds occasionally; could lift or carry ten pounds frequently; could stand or walk at least six 

out of eight hours; could sit for at least six out of eight hours; could occasionally climb ramps or stairs; 

could never climb ladders or scaffolds; could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; 

could never work at unprotected heights or around fast-moving machinery; and would be limited to 

simple and routine tasks. AR 60. The VE testified that the response to the first hypothetical would 

remain appropriate for the second hypothetical. AR 61. 

For the third hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume an individual who needed two 

additional 15-minute breaks per day due to pain symptoms. Id. The VE testified that there would be 

no work in the national economy for such an individual. Id. For the fourth hypothetical, the ALJ 

asked the VE to assume an individual who would need to be absent two days per month unscheduled 

due to pain symptoms. Id. The VE testified that there would be no work in the national economy for 

such an individual. Id. 

Upon examination by Plaintiff’s attorney, the VE testified that if the individual from the first 

hypothetical needed a sit/stand option and would need to alternate between sitting, standing, and 

walking, the frequency of the rotation would impact the world of light work or sedentary work. AR 

61-62. The VE testified that the alternation would limit the jobs significantly but the jobs the VE 

found in response to the first hypothetical would remain. AR 62. Plaintiff’s attorney then asked 

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whether there would still be work available if a hypothetical individual with the same limitations 

would have off-task behavior for 15% of the workday. Id. The VE testified that there would be no 

work. Id. 

The VE testified that his testimony as it related to a sit/stand option, time off-task, and 

additional breaks was based upon his training and experience. AR 62-63. The VE further testified 

that the job numbers identified were based upon a source generally and reasonably relied upon by 

other experts in his field. AR 63. The VE also testified that his testimony was based upon his years of 

training, education, experience, and access to professional resources, and was within a reasonable 

degree of professional certainty. Id. Plaintiff’s attorney closed by contending that the combination of 

Plaintiff’s impairments would prevent her from performing at Step Four and Step Five. Id.

Medical Record

The relevant medical record was reviewed by the Court and will be referenced below as 

necessary to this Court’s decision.

The ALJ’s Decision

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 12-30. Specifically, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 14, 2017, the 

application date. AR 17. The ALJ identified the following severe impairments: obesity and 

degenerative disc disease. Id. The ALJ also determined that other impairments, including a right 

ankle fracture, bipolar disorder, and depression did not cause more than a minimal limitation in her 

ability to perform basic work activities and were therefore nonsevere. AR 17-18. The ALJ further 

determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 

medically equaled any of the listed impairments. AR 20.

Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to 

perform a full range of work at the light exertional level with the nonexertional limitations that 

Plaintiff was: able to lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; able to stand and 

walk at least six hours total and sit for at least six hours total in an eight-hour workday but needed to 

be able to change positions once per hour while remaining at the workstation; could frequently reach 

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overhead; could frequently operate foot controls; could frequently climb ramps or stairs; could 

frequently stoop and crouch; was unable to climb ladders or scaffolds due to medication side effects; 

should never work at unprotected heights or around fast moving machinery due to medication side 

effects; and was limited to performing only simply and routine tasks due to medication side effects. 

AR 20; 20-24. The ALJ considered “all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence,” as well 

as “medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s).” Id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, was defined as a younger individual on 

the date the application was filed and had at least a high school education. AR 24. Given Plaintiff’s 

age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that there were jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. AR 24-25. The ALJ noted 

that examples of jobs consistent with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC included:

(1) Mail Clerk (DOT No. 209.687-026, light exertional level, unskilled, SVP 2, with 58,000 jobs 

nationally); (2) Office Helper (DOT No. 239.567-010, light exertional level, unskilled, SVP 2, with 

265,000 jobs nationally); and (3) Parking Attendant (DOT No. 915.473-010; light exertional level, 

unskilled, SVP 2, with 77,000 jobs nationally). Id. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not 

been disabled from the application date of July 14, 2017. AR 25.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 

Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 

1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be 

considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the 

evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., 

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Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s 

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, 

and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 

Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 

severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or 

her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The 

burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 

1990).

DISCUSSION3

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. (Doc. 23 at 11-15.) Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred in 

discounting treating source opinions despite finding them persuasive. (Id. at 15-19.)

A. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed harmful error by failing to provide clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony as inconsistent with the evidence. (Doc. 23 at 

11-15.) In deciding whether to admit a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must engage in a 

two-step analysis. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014); Batson v. Comm’r, 359 

F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). First, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of her 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptom or pain alleged.

3 The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including 

arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific 

argument or brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.

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Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. If the claimant satisfies the first step and there is no evidence of 

malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only 

by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. at 1015. 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms. AR 23. However, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms, noting that the 

statements were not consistent with medical evidence and other evidence in the record. Id. The ALJ 

was therefore required to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints.

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations were not fully consistent with the medical and 

other evidence. Id. Although lack of supporting medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for 

discounting testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 

681 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ contrasted Plaintiff’s allegations with the objective findings as follows:

she alleged her condition worsened beginning in 2017 (see

Exhibit 7E, p. 2), but that is inconsistent with the generally 

unremarkable March 2019 findings and opinion of Dr. Wagner (see 

Exhibits 10F; 20F). The claimant further alleged her ability to bend is 

"affected" (see Exhibit 4E, p. 6), but Dr. Wagner’s March 2019 report 

that she was easily able to bend over at the waist to take off her shoes 

and socks and put them back on (see Exhibits 10F; 20F) does not 

support this. The claimant also alleged her ability to remember and 

concentrate are "affected" (see Exhibit 4E, p. 6), but that is inconsistent 

with Dr. McDonald’s examination findings, which showed an 

unimpaired recent and long-term memory with excellent attention and 

concentration (see Exhibit 9F, p. 4).

AR 23-24. The ALJ also earlier discussed the history of Plaintiff’s allegations of low back pain and 

neck pain, contrasting those allegations with medical findings. AR 21.

In support of the contention that Plaintiff’s allegations of a worsening condition and inability to 

bend were inconsistent with the medical evidence, the ALJ cites relatively normal findings from a 

March 2019 report which noted that Plaintiff was “easily able to get up out of the chair in the waiting 

room and walk at a normal speed back to the exam room without assistance,” “sat comfortably,” and 

“easily got on and off the exam table, easily able to bend over at the waist, take off shoes and socks 

and put them back on demonstrating good dexterity and good flexibility.” AR 681 (also noting under 

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Neck/Nodes findings: “Supple without adenopathy, thyromegaly, or masses. There are no palpable 

cervical, supraclavicular, epitrochlear, or axillary lymph nodes.”); 682 (noting normal

Coordination/Station/Gait findings with negative Romberg test, and relatively normal range of motion 

findings). The ALJ also earlier discussed Plaintiff’s low back pain and neck pain but found that there 

were relatively normal findings. AR 21; see, e.g. AR 521 (May 2016 extremities findings noting “No 

clubbing, cyanosis, pallor, or edema. Decreased sensation in the lower extremities.”); 606 (August 

2017 report noting normal range of motion and strength for musculoskeletal system); 912 (July 2018 

neurosurgery progress note stating “Patient walks with no neurological deficit in lower extremity.”); 

926 (March 2019 Impression noting “Normal bilateral lower needle EMG and nerve conduction study; 

there is no electrodiagnostic evidence of large fiber peripheral polyneuropathy, lumbar radiculopathy, 

or any other nerve entrapment neuropathies on this study.”); 944 (March 2019 report noting “Motor 

Strength/Muscle Bulk and Tone: Strength is 5/5 in the bilateral upper and lower extremities, including 

grip. Normal bulk and tone; no atrophy noted.”). The ALJ therefore appropriately discussed the 

medical evidence as one factor in discounting Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony.

Second, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “alleges suffering from significant limitations, which 

prohibit her from working... but that is inconsistent with her report that she cooks, cleans, drives, 

shops, walks for some exercise, and performs her own activities of daily living without assistance.” 

AR 24. An ALJ may properly discount a claimant’s subjective complaints when the daily activities 

demonstrate an inconsistency between what the claimant can do and the degree that disability is 

alleged. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2012) (an ALJ may consider “whether 

the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms”), superseded by 

regulation on other grounds. Even where a plaintiff’s activities suggest some difficulty functioning, 

they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims 

of a totally debilitating impairment. Id. at 1113.

However, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly warned that ALJs must be especially cautious in 

concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments that 

would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will often be 

consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016. The 

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Ninth Circuit has also held that ALJs err when they fail to “elaborate on which daily activities 

conflicted with which part of Claimant's testimony.” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2014). Courts in this district have found that the ALJ erred when the ALJ failed to precisely identify 

how the daily activities conflicted with symptoms testimony. See Sanders v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

1:21-cv-00204-DAD-BAM, 2024 WL 1641035, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2024) (““The ALJ's lack 

of explanation is particularly troubling here because it appears unlikely that, for example, the evidence 

regarding plaintiff's daily activities significantly undercut his subjective testimony. The ALJ noted that 

plaintiff testified he ‘was able to carry groceries from his truck to his house,’ ‘does laundry, shops, 

cooks, and does dishes,’ and ‘is able to [do] yard work off and on, with difficulty’... In any event, the 

ALJ did not explain the relevance of any of plaintiff's testimony regarding his daily activities, so the 

court is unable to evaluate the ALJ's reasoning.”); Ridens v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-cv-01769-JDP (SS), 

2023 WL 5613826, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2023) (“Although the ALJ identified two activities that 

purportedly conflicted with plaintiff's testimony, he failed to specify what component of plaintiff's 

testimony was undermined by his performance of these activities... More fundamentally, there is no 

apparent conflict between plaintiff's testimony and the two activities identified by the ALJ. Plaintiff 

primarily alleged difficulty with walking and standing for extended periods of time, which is not 

inconsistent with doing ‘some laundry.’”).

Here, the ALJ simply noted that Plaintiff “alleges suffering from significant limitations, which 

prohibit her from working,” which the ALJ contended is inconsistent with a report in which Plaintiff 

noted that she “does cook and clean,” “does drive and did drive here today,” “does shop and perform 

her own activities of daily living without assistance and walks some for exercise.” AR 24; 680. 

However, the ALJ’s discussion of these limited activities does not explain how they contradict 

Plaintiff’s allegations of neck pain, back pain, bending ability, or other limitations. The ALJ therefore 

has not adequately explained how Plaintiff’s daily activities provided a sufficient basis for discounting 

Plaintiff’s testimony. Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1138. Thus, the ALJ only properly used medical evidence 

in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. AR 21-24. Because lack of supporting medical evidence cannot 

form the sole basis for discounting testimony, the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s symptoms 

testimony. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. 

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B. Remedy

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or order an immediate award of 

benefits is within the Court's discretion. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Unless “the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no 

useful purpose,” remand for further proceedings is warranted. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. As it is 

not clear that “further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose,” remand for further 

proceedings is appropriate. Id.; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A 

district court may reverse the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without 

remanding the cause for a rehearing, but the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand 

to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”) (internal quotes and citations omitted). On 

remand, the ALJ should address whether Plaintiff's symptoms testimony is adequately supported or 

whether there are specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's symptoms testimony.

Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address Plaintiff's remaining 

arguments concerning whether the ALJ erred in considering PA-C Hector Aguilar’s medical opinion. 

See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for 

the reasons stated, we decline to reach [plaintiff's] alternative ground for remand.”); see also Augustine 

ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[The] Court need not 

address the other claims plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff with any further relief 

than granted, and all of which can be addressed on remand.”); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 

n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Because we remand for reconsideration of step three, we do not reach the other 

arguments raised.”); Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“Because 

the ‘misuse of the expert's testimony alone warrants reversal,’ we do not consider the appellant's other 

claims.”).

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and was not based on proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 23) be GRANTED; 

2. Plaintiff's appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security be GRANTED and the agency's determination to deny benefits be

REVERSED; and

3. The Clerk of this Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Ashley Ann 

Yamada and against Defendant Martin O’Malley, Commissioner of Social Security.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being 

served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections with the 

Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time 

may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 

1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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