Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01857/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01857-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNDELL HENDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

W. L. MUNIZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01857-JST 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; 

SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Re: Dkt. No. 42

Plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), has filed a pro se

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that SVSP prison officials have violated his First 

Amendment right to free exercise of religion, his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, 

and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and 

punitive damages. 

The Court granted Defendants’ request to file multiple dispositive motions, allowing 

Defendants to first file a summary judgment motion raising exhaustion and other procedurallybased defenses. Docket No. 41. Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ summary 

judgment motion alleging failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Eleventh Amendment 

immunity, and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Docket No. 42. Plaintiff has filed an 

opposition, Docket No. 63, and Defendants have filed a reply, Docket No. 69. For the reasons set 

forth below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART. 

//

//

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BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

A. Religious Accommodations at Salinas Valley State Prison

Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim. Ellis Decl., Ex. R (“Henderson Dep.”) 25:20-21. When 

Plaintiff arrived at SVSP’s Facility B on August 11, 2010, Chaplain Landou served as the Muslim 

chaplain. Hernandez Decl. ¶¶ 4, 11 and Ex. A; Henderson Dep. 69:1-70:7. During normal 

programming, Facility B receives Jumu’ah services — Islamic Friday prayer service — in the 

chapel on the first, third, and fifth Friday of each month. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 8. From August 2010 

to July 2011, a prison-wide staff shortage required Chaplain Landou to conduct Facility B’s 

Jumu’ah services on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 9. In July 2011, Facility B’s 

Jumu’ah services were moved back to Fridays. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 10. 

In April 2012, Chaplain Landou transferred to another institution. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 11. 

After Chaplain Landou’s transfer, there was no Muslim chaplain or certified volunteer to supervise 

Facility B inmates while they congregated in the chapel. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 11. Because inmates 

cannot congregate in the chapel without a chaplain or volunteer to supervise their conduct, Muslim 

inmates were not allowed to congregate in the chapel for prayer. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 12. From 

August 28, 2012 through January 2, 2013, black inmates in Facility B were placed on a modified 

program,

1 which resulted in the cancellation of all out-of-cell religious programming for black 

inmates. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 14. 

On November 26, 2012, Hernandez joined SVSP as its community resources manager 

(“CRM”). Hernandez Decl. ¶ 2. On January 3, 2013, CRM Hernandez arranged for Herrera, the 

Native American spiritual leader at the time, and Chaplain T. Aquil, the Muslim chaplain at 

Correctional Training Facility, to supervise Jumu’ah services on an ad-hoc basis. Hernandez Decl. 

¶ 15.

 

1 A modified program is a significant interruption to normal prison programming based on the 

discovery of serious threats to institutional security, or serious threats to inmate and staff safety, or 

following inmate violence. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 6. A modified program generally involves the 

suspension of various programs or services for a specific group of inmates and/or in a specific part 

of the facility. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 6. 

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On April 15, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an unsigned memorandum to Spiritual Leader 

Herrera that was addressed to “all concerned staff.” Hernandez Decl. ¶ 19 and Ex. C. The 

memorandum requested accommodations for Ramadan 2013,2including preferred meeting times, 

preferred prayer periods, preferred menus, and a preferred vendor to provide the halal meals. 

Hernandez Decl., Ex. C. The memorandum also requested that specific Facility B Muslim 

inmates handle preparation and distribution of Ramadan food for Facility B Muslim inmates. 

Hernandez Decl., Ex. C. This memorandum was forwarded to CRM Hernandez, who passed it on 

to SVSP’s Religious Review Committee (“RRC”). Hernandez Decl. ¶ 19. The RRC is the SVSP 

body to which inmates must submit their religious accommodations requests. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 

18. The RRC is composed of designated institutional chaplains, a correctional captain or his 

designee, two correctional complex administrators, and the CRM. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 18.

On May 22, 2013, CRM Hernandez attended a meeting with several members of the RRC, 

Plaintiff, and Chaplin Aquil. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 20. At this meeting, Plaintiff was informed that, 

due to security needs and lack of available resources, SVSP could not accommodate the request 

made in his April 2013 memorandum for five hours of nightly congregational prayer during 

Ramadan 2013. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 20. Chaplain Aquil also stated that Islam does not require 

congregational breaking of the fast during Ramadan, or congregational sundown prayers during 

Ramadan. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 20.

On May 29, 2013, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations (“CDCR”)

issued a memorandum to all community resources managers and food services managers regarding 

food services during Ramadan 2013. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 21 and Ex. D. The May 2013 CDCR 

memorandum authorized CDCR institutions to serve Ramadan participants their food on paper 

trays at the regular feeding time for the general inmate population even if that time was before 

sundown. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 21 and Ex. D. 

On June 7, 2013, then-warden R.T.C. Grounds approved the “Salinas Valley State Prison 

Ramadan Protocol,” which was prepared by members of the RRC, in consultation with SVSP

 

2

In 2013, Ramadan began July 8 and ended on August 8. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 21.

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Custody and Food Service staff. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 22 and Ex. E. The SVSP 2013 Ramadan 

Protocol set forth the dates of Ramadan observance, the Ramadan 2013 menu, and meal delivery 

times. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 22 and Ex. E. The 2013 Ramadan Protocol provided that Ramadan 

meals would be prepared according to approved halal practices, as requested in Plaintiff’s April 

2013 memorandum. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 22 and Ex. E. The 2013 Ramadan Protocol did not 

provide the menu items and preferred prayer periods requested by Plaintiff in his April 2013 

memorandum. Hernandez Decl., Ex. E. 

On June 18, 2013, M. Lawal accepted the SVSP Muslim chaplain position, but delayed his 

start date until after Ramadan. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 23. 

On July 2, 2013, shortly before Ramadan began, Facility B inmates rioted. Hernandez 

Decl. ¶ 24. Facility B was placed on a modified program resulting in the cancellation of all group 

worship, including congregational Ramadan services for black inmates. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 24. 

The modified program was later limited to members of the Bloods and Crips Security Threat 

Groups. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 24. Plaintiff has been identified as a Crip and therefore remained on 

the modified program until July 25, 2013. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 24. Although Facility B returned to 

normal programming between July 26 and August 6, 2013, Facility B did not allow inmates to 

participate in congregational Ramadan services because there still was no chaplain or volunteer to 

supervise chapel worship. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 25. From August 7 to August 27, 2013, Facility B 

was again put on a modified program due to inmate rioting, and all congregational worship was 

cancelled during this time. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 26. Due to the repeated modified programs and the 

unavailability of a chaplain or certified volunteer to supervise chapel worship during Ramadan, 

Facility B Muslim inmates were unable to congregate for the Rituals of Iftar (daily breaking of 

Ramadan fast) or the feast of Eid al-Fitr (the ceremonial end to Ramadan). Hernandez Decl. ¶ 27. 

Instead, inmates ate their Ramadan meals in their cells. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 27.

On December 12, 2013, Plaintiff sent the RRC a request to add “Midamar” and “Halalco 

Books and Meats” as religious package vendors. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 28. On April 1, 2014, 

Plaintiff submitted a proposal to the RRC to establish a Muslim-oriented group, called “Milatti 

Islami Anonymous,” that would provide a twelve-step recovery program for “any type of criminal 

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activities, gang involvement, and any other destructive substance abuse addictions,” and that 

would also raise funds for Muslim-inmate religious activities. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 29 and Ex. H. 

On April 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant action. Docket No. 1. 

On August 11, 2014, SVSP administrators requested that Plaintiff resubmit his proposal

for “Milatti Islami Anonymous” with a proposed course curriculum and informed Plaintiff that 

fundraising for inmate programs was prohibited. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 30. On October 1, 2014, 

Plaintiff submitted a revised request to establish “Milatti Islami Anonymous” but did not include a 

proposed curriculum. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 31. No action was taken on Plaintiff’s revised request 

before Plaintiff’s amended complaint was filed on October 9, 2014. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 31. 

B. Plaintiff’s Grievances

Grievance No. SVSP-10-03454. On November 18, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a grievance 

alleging that Muslim inmates had been “systemically denied the right to assemble and worship on 

Fridays . . .” Docket No. 45-6 at 5. The grievance requested, inter alia, that a policy be 

implemented allowing Muslim inmates to congregate on Fridays at noon for Jumu’ah prayers, 

including during lockdown periods and modified programs. Docket No. 45-6 at 5 and 7. The 

grievance was denied at the first level by Sergeant E. Parsons and Facility B Captain S. Hatton on 

the grounds that the staff redirection plan3only allowed for Jumu’ah prayers to be held on 

Wednesdays and Thursdays.4 Docket No. 45-6 at 20–21. At the second level of review, the 

grievance was assigned to Counselor Medina. Docket No. 45-6 at 9. The grievance was partially 

granted at the second level by then SVSP Chief Deputy Warden Solis on the same grounds. Chief 

Deputy Warden Solis stated that the lack of Friday Muslim services was not intended to 

discriminate against particular inmates, but was necessary to ensure prison safety. Docket No. 45-

6 at 10–12. On May 3, 2011, the grievance was denied at the third level by Appeals Examiner K. 

 

3

In response to budgetary concerns, the CDCR reduced staff by three percent. Docket No. 46-5 at 

10. In order to ensure prison safety and security, CDCR also implemented a staff redirection plan 

which redirected staff a certain amount of hours to obtain a three percent salary reduction. Id. 

The staff redirection plan impacted inmate programs generally, but specifically impacted the 

availability of Facility B program services on Fridays. Id. 

4 At the time of the grievance, mandatory staff training conducted on the third Fridays of each 

month conflicted with Muslim services. Docket No. 46-5 at 10.

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Kostecky and Inmate Appeals Branch Chief D. Foston on the grounds that institutional safety 

required holding Jumu’ah services on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Docket No. 46-65 at 2–4.

Grievance No. SVSP-13-01818. On April 8, 2013, Plaintiff submitted a grievance 

alleging that the CDCR was defrauding the federal government by accepting $230 million in 

federal funding but failing to run appropriate religious programming. Docket No. 45-7 at 6–8. 

Plaintiff specifically alleged that the CDCR, SVSP “Warden(s), Captain(s), Lieutenant(s), 

Sergeant(s) and staff” were preventing Muslim inmates from practicing their religion by (1) 

preventing Muslim inmates from assembling for mandatory Friday Jumu’ah prayers; (2) failing to 

hire a full-time Muslim chaplain who followed the tenets of Islam; (3) failing to purchase holy 

qurans, prayer rugs, religious books, hadiths about Islam, and prayer oil, and preventing inmates 

from seeking donations of such items from Muslim groups; (4) preventing Muslim inmates from 

making the required five daily congregational prayers; (5) preventing Muslim inmates from 

observing the breaking of the fast during Ramadan with congregational prayer and eating together 

(Eid); and (6) prohibiting Muslim inmates from ordering halal items in their religious packages. 

Docket No. 45-7 at 8. Plaintiff requested the following actions: (1) that the prison hire a Muslim 

chaplain who could read and recite the Quran in Arabic and who knew a minimum of twenty

chapters of the Quran; (2) that the prison allow Muslim inmates to report to the chapel for a 

minimum of 15 minutes for the five-daily congregational prayers; (3) that the prison hold Friday

Jumu’ah prayers regardless of whether a chaplain is present; (4) that the prison assign custody 

staff to supervise every religious service; (5) that the prison allow Muslim inmates to go to the 

chapel at 12 noon or from 12:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.; (6) that the prison pay each Muslim inmate 

$100 for each congregational prayer that had been denied in the past ten years; (7) that the prison 

house all Muslim inmates in the same building; (8) that the prison allow Muslim inmates quarterly 

religious packages; and (9) that the prison order holy qurans, Islamic books, and prayer rugs. 

Docket No. 45-7 at 8. 

On May 24, 2013, at the first level of review, CRM Hernandez and Native American 

Spiritual Leader Herrera partially granted the grievance on the grounds that SVSP was in the 

process of hiring a Muslim chaplain and that Muslim inmates were already allowed to make 

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quarterly purchases of halal foods from authorized vendors. Docket No. 45-11 at 3–4. The 

grievance was denied as to all other issues. Docket No. 45-11 at 3–4. Plaintiff appealed the 

denial, and the second-level review was assigned to Counselor Medina. Docket No. 45-15 at 8.

On June 17, 2013, Warden Muniz partially granted the grievance at the second level of review on 

the grounds that a Muslim chaplain had recently been hired and that when there was no full-time 

Muslim chaplain at SVSP, alternative chaplains had supervised Jumu’ah prayers whenever 

possible. Docket No. 45-9 at 4–10. Warden Muniz denied the grievance as to all other issues. 

Docket No. 45-9 at 4–10. The second-level review stated that Plaintiff had raised new issues in 

his response to the first-level decision, but did not specify what these issues were. Docket No. 45-

9 at 9. Plaintiff’s appeal to the third level of review was denied in its entirety on September 26, 

2013. Docket No. 45-7 at 2–5. The third-level review stated that Plaintiff had raised new issues 

in his response to the second-level decision, but did not specify what these issues were. Docket 

No. 46-7 at 4.

Grievance No. SVSP-13-03281. On June 30, 2013, Plaintiff submitted a grievance 

alleging that the 2013 Ramadan Protocol would deny Muslim inmates their right to observe 

Ramadan. Specifically, Plaintiff grieved that the 2013 Ramadan Protocol would require Muslim 

inmates to eat cold, non-certified halal meals that were prepared and served by non-Muslims; 

require Muslim inmates to eat from paper trays; and prevent Muslim inmates from breaking their 

fast together and making the mandatory congregational prayer. Docket No. 46-9 at 5–7. Plaintiff 

requested the following relief: (1) an audit to find out why Muslim inmates are forced to eat 

altered and/or genetically altered or created soy products during Ramadan; (2) an audit of the 

ecclesiastical funds to determine why certified halal meals were not being provided for Ramadan; 

(3) a written explanation as to why the CDCR and/or CRM Hernandez were prohibiting Muslim 

inmates from preparing and serving food for Ramadan; (4) a written explanation as to why 

Muslim inmates were being prohibited from meeting in the chapel for five hours each evening of 

Ramadan to eat and pray tarawih (Ramadan congregational prayer) together; and (5) that SVSP 

adopt the proposals set forth in Plaintiff’s April 15, 2013 memorandum. Docket No. 46-9 at 5–7. 

During Plaintiff’s first-level interview with CRM Hernandez, Plaintiff clarified that in 

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addition to soy products, he believed that the turkey and chicken being served for Ramadan were 

not halal. Docket No. 46-16 at 6–8. On July 29, 2013, in the first-level response, CRM 

Hernandez partially granted the grievance by removing an allegedly non-halal “BBQ soyspread” 

from the Ramadan menu. Docket Nos. 46-12 at 3 and 46-16 at 6. CRM Hernandez denied the 

remaining claims, stating that due to reduced staff, limited overtime, and security concerns, 

Muslim inmates could not be served hot meals after sundown during Ramadan; that, according to

Muslim Chaplain Aquil, it was not forbidden for non-Muslim staff to serve Ramadan meals; that, 

according to Food Manager R. Conway, inmates need to be certified food handlers/servers to cook 

and serve food; that, according to Chaplain Aquil, it was not mandatory that Muslim inmates 

congregate for the daily evening Ramadan prayer; and that, due to security needs and available 

resources, Plaintiff’s request that Muslim inmates congregate for the daily evening Ramadan 

prayer could not be accommodated. Docket No. 46-12 at 3–4. CRM Hernandez also reported that 

the food served during 2013 Ramadan is certified halal, and that ecclesiastical funds are not used 

for food purchases. Docket No. 46-12 at 4. 

The grievance was accepted at the second level of review and assigned to Counselor 

Medina on September 3, 2013. Docket No. 46-16 at 2. On September 12, 2013, in the secondlevel review, Warden Muniz partially granted the grievance on the same grounds as the first-level 

decision, and denied the rest of the grievance. Docket No. 46-15 at 7–11. On December 10, 2013, 

the third-level review denied the grievance in its entirety. Docket No. 46-19 at 6–8. 

C. Federal Civil Rights Action

On April 23, 2014, Plaintiff commenced the instant action, naming Warden Muniz, 

Correctional Counselor Medina, and CRM Hernandez as defendants. Docket No. 1. On January 

26, 2015, the Court found that the following allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint —

Defendants denied Plaintiff Friday Jumu’ah prayers and five daily congregational prayers; 

prevented him from observing the Rituals of Iftar5 which require breaking the daily fast with other 

Muslims and praying the Magrib and Tarawih prayers with other Muslims; denied him a qualified 

 

5

Iftar is the evening meal when Muslims end their daily Ramadan fast at sunset.

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Muslim chaplain and necessary religious artifacts; prohibited him from making purchases from 

Muslim vendors; and prevented him from starting a Muslim resource group — stated cognizable 

claims for violations of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, 

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, and rights under RLUIPA. Docket No. 15 at 3; 

see also Docket No. 13 (“FAC”). The Court also found that the following allegations in Plaintiff’s 

amended complaint — Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with hot Ramadan meals prepared 

and served by Muslims and denied him the ceremonial halal foods normally eaten at the religious 

ceremonies of Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr — stated cognizable claims for violations of Plaintiff’s 

First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and rights under RLUIPA. Docket No. 15 

at 3; see also FAC. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2014). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the 

case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 

fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party. See id.

A court shall grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial [,] . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial 

burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Id. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings 

and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See id. at 324 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

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For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 

1999). The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 

Elec. Serv., Inc., v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Exhaustion

In their summary judgment motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust 

any of his claims, because he either failed to file a grievance regarding the claim, or his grievance 

was procedurally improper. Docket No. 42 at 14–15. Plaintiff argues that he satisfied the 

exhaustion requirement because Defendants addressed the merits of his grievances. Docket No. 63 

at 6–7.6

1. Standard

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or 

any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until 

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion 

in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 

All available remedies must be exhausted; those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor 

must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Id. Section 1997e(a) requires “proper exhaustion” of 

available administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). Proper exhaustion 

requires using all steps of an administrative process and complying with “deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules.” Id. at 90. The level of detail in an administrative grievance necessary to 

 

6

Plaintiff also argues that he “has standing before this court to seek redress from the alleged 

violations which are ripe for a decision from this court,” Docket No. 63 at 5, and that his 

grievances fulfilled the notice pleading standard, id. at 7. Plaintiff misunderstands the exhaustion 

requirement. The exhaustion requirement is distinct from standing, ripeness, or notice pleading. 

Defendants are not challenging Plaintiff’s standing to bring his claims, the ripeness of his claims, 

or whether he has sufficiently pled his claims. Rather, Defendants allege that he has not satisfied 

the exhaustion requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Docket No. 42 at 14–17. 

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properly exhaust a claim is determined by the prison’s applicable grievance procedures. Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“To provide adequate notice, the prisoner need only provide the level of detail required by the 

prison’s regulations.”).

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides its 

inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any policy, decision, action, condition, 

or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a 

material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner 

must submit his complaint on CDCR Form 602 and proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) 

first formal-level appeal filed with one of the institution’s appeal coordinators, (2) second formallevel appeal filed with the institution head or designee, and (3) third formal-level appeal filed with 

the CDCR director or designee. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. This satisfies the 

administrative remedies exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. §§ 3084.1(b); 3084.7(c)(3); 

Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237–38 (S.D. Cal. 1997). If an inmate’s grievance does not 

comply with a procedural rule but prison officials decide it on the merits anyway at all available 

levels of administrative review, it is exhausted. Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 656, 658 (9th Cir. 

2016) (agreeing with all “sister” circuits). 

2. Analysis

a. Claims regarding congregational prayers, qualified Muslim chaplain, 

necessary congregational artifacts, and observing Iftar

Plaintiff failed to adequately identify Defendants in grievance number SVSP-13-01818, as 

required by the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3084.2(a)(3)-(4). However, in 

their reply, Defendants acknowledge that, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Reyes 

v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2016), this procedural defect was waived by Defendants when 

Defendants addressed SVSP-13-01818 on the merits. Defendants concede that the claims raised 

in SVSP-13-01818 have been exhausted. Docket No. 69 at 4–5. 

Defendants argue that grievance number SVSP-13-01818 only raised and exhausted the 

following claims: Plaintiff was denied congregational Friday Jumu’ah prayer and the five-time 

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daily prayers; denied a qualified Muslim chaplain; and denied necessary congregational artifacts.

Docket No. 42 at 15 and Docket No. 69 at 4. The Court finds that grievance number SVSP-13-

01818 also grieved — and exhausted — the claim that Defendants prevented Plaintiff from 

observing the rituals of Iftar which require Plaintiff to break his fast with other Muslims and 

praying the Magrib and Tarawih prayers with other Muslims.7 See Docket No. 46-7 at 2 (“Thus 

preventing Muslims to Observe the breaking of the Fast together during the Month of Ramadan, 

make Congregation Salat (i.e. Prayer) once the Fast is broken, and eating together as previously 

done at the Salinas Valley State Prison for years as well as other prisons.”). Accordingly, 

Defendants’ summary judgment motion is DENIED to the extent that it requests dismissal for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies for Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants denied him 

congregational Friday Jumu’ah prayer and the five-time daily prayers; a qualified Muslim 

chaplain; necessary congregational artifacts; and the ability to observe Iftar.

b. Claims regarding Muslim vendors, Muslim resource group, and 

ceremonial halal foods for Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his claims that Defendants prohibited 

him from purchasing from Muslim vendors; prohibited him from starting a Muslim resource 

group; and denied him the ceremonial halal foods normally eaten at the religious ceremonies of 

Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr. Plaintiff makes the general statement that “[e]ach and every claim 

which is before this court was presented to defendants within [his] appeal, they were investigated 

and addressed on there (sic) merits.” Docket No. 63 at 7. However, Plaintiff does not identify 

which grievance exhausted these particular claims, and none of Plaintiff’s grievances that are in 

the record (e.g. grievance numbers SVSP-13-01818, SVSP-10-03454, and SVSP-13-03281)8raise 

these claims. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part Defendants’ summary judgment motion 

and dismisses without prejudice, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Plaintiff’s claims 

 

7 Grievance number SVSP-13-01818 also grieved the prohibition on ordering halal items in 

religious packages, but Plaintiff has not raised this as a claim in this action. 

8 Both parties agree that grievance number SVSP-10-03078, which has also been filed in the 

record, grieved whether Plaintiff was allowed to wear a kufi cap which is not at issue in this 

action. Docket Nos. 42 at 5 and 63 at 4.

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that Defendants prohibited him from making purchases from Muslim vendors; that Defendants 

prohibited him from starting a Muslim resource group; and that Defendants denied him the 

ceremonial halal foods normally eaten at the religious ceremonies of Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr.

c. Claim regarding hot Ramadan meals prepared and served by Muslims

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s remaining claim that Defendants failed to provide him 

with hot Ramadan meals prepared and served by Muslims. Defendants acknowledge that this

claim was grieved in grievance number SVSP-13-03281:

The Community Resource Manager, “C. Hernandez” is not allowing thge (sic) Muslims to 

choose Muslim inmate to cook and pass out our food for Ramadan, which is 

“FORBIDDEN” (sic) in our Religion (sic). . . . The June 7, 2013 Memo Guarantees (sic) 

that your EVENING RAMADAN MEALS WILL BE SERVED ON PAPER PLATES, 

AND COLD (sic), as it has been systematically done for the last three years under this 

lockdown memorandum. . . .

Docket No. 45-12 at 7. Defendants also acknowledge that grievance number SVSP-13-03281

grieved the Defendants’ refusal to allow Plaintiff five hours of congregational prayer during each 

day of Ramadan and refusal to allow Plaintiff to break his fast with other inmates at sundown 

during each day of Ramadan. Docket No. 69 at 5.

Defendants argue that grievance number SVSP-13-03281 did not exhaust Plaintiff’s claim

regarding Ramadan meals because it did not comply with the prison’s procedural rule that 

prohibited inmates from grieving prison officials’ anticipated actions, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.6(b)(1) (2013), because it grieved the 2013 Ramadan Protocol, which had not yet taken 

effect at the time the grievance was filed.9

 

9 Defendants also argue that grievance number SVSP-13-03281 did not exhaust Plaintiff’s 

claims regarding Ramadan because the 2013 Ramadan Protocol was not implemented. Docket 

No. 69 at 5. Whether or not the 2013 Ramadan Protocol was implemented, Plaintiff still suffered 

the alleged constitutional violation of being denied hot Ramadan meals prepared and served by 

Muslims. A grievance exhausts administrative remedies when, liberally construed, it has the same 

subject and same request for relief as the federal claim. See, e.g., Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 

1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002))

(“‘grievance suffices [to exhaust a claim] if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which 

redress is sought.’”); cf. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (even with liberal construction, grievance requesting a lower bunk due to poor balance 

resulting from a previous brain injury was not equivalent to, and therefore did not exhaust 

administrative remedies for, claims of denial of mental health treatment in violation of the ADA 

and Rehabilitation Act). Grievance number SVSP-13-03281 has the same subject and same 

request for relief as the federal claim, thereby exhausting Plaintiff’s claim regarding Ramadan 

meals. To argue that grievance number SVSP-13-03281 failed to exhaust Plaintiff’s claim 

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The Court disagrees and finds that SVSP-13-03281 addressed all the issues grieved, 

including Plaintiff’s claim regarding Ramadan meals, on the merits at all available levels of 

administrative review, thereby exhausting Plaintiff’s claim regarding Ramadan meals. Reyes, 810 

F.3d at 656, 658 (procedurally defective grievance is exhausted if decided on the merits by prison 

officials at all available levels of administrative review). At the first-level review, CRM 

Hernandez partially granted the grievance by removing an allegedly non-halal “BBQ soyspread” 

from the Ramadan menu, but denied the remainder of Plaintiff’s grievance. In relevant part, CRM 

Hernandez denied Plaintiff’s request for hot Ramadan meals prepared and served by Muslim 

inmates stating that reduced staff, limited overtime, and security concerns prohibited the prison 

from providing Muslim inmates with hot meals after sundown; and inmates could not serve food 

unless they were certified food handlers/servers. Docket No. 46-12 at 3. In the second-level 

review – which took place after Ramadan had passed and therefore no longer grieved anticipated 

actions – Warden Muniz partially granted the grievance on the same grounds as the first-level 

decision, and denied the rest of the grievance on the same grounds. Docket No. 46-15 at 7–11. 

The third-level review denied the grievance in its entirety on the same grounds as set forth in the 

first-level review. Docket No. 46-19 at 6–8. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ summary 

judgment motion to the extent that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants failed to 

provide him with hot Ramadan meals prepared and served by Muslims. 

C. Eleventh Amendment

Defendants argue, and Plaintiff concedes, that Defendants are entitled to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for monetary relief. 

Docket No. 42 at 17–18 and Docket No. 63 at 8. Defendants are employees of a state agency, the 

CDCR. Official capacity suits against Defendants are therefore suits against the state, see

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169–70 (1985) (suit against a state official in his official 

capacity is not a suit against the official but rather a suit against the official’s office, i.e., the state) 

 

because the injury complained of was caused by other prison protocols and not by the 2013 

Ramadan Protocol is an overly technical application of the exhaustion requirement and an overly 

narrow construction of grievance number SVSP-13-03281.

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and barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237–38 

(1985) (Eleventh Amendment bars from the federal courts suits against a state by its own citizens). 

Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment also prohibits litigants from bringing suits for money 

damages against state officials acting in their official capacity. Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 

860–61 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 169–70 (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 

609, 620 (1963)) (suit will be barred under the Eleventh Amendment if the judgment sought 

would expend itself on the public treasury or domain); see also Confederated Tribes & Bands v. 

Locke, 176 F.3d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1999) (damages claim against governor in his official capacity 

barred by Eleventh Amendment). The Ninth Circuit has specifically applied this bar to an 

inmate’s suit for official-capacity damages under RLUIPA. See Holley v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr., 

599 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010) (Eleventh Amendment bars inmate’s suit for official-capacity 

damages under RLUIPA). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for monetary relief.

D. RLUIPA

Defendants correctly argue that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to 

Plaintiff’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims. RLUIPA does not authorize suits against state 

actors (including prison officials) acting in their individual capacity. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 

899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with other circuits addressing this issue). In response, Plaintiff 

argues that he is suing Defendants in their individual capacities for violating his First Amendment 

right to free exercise of religion; that Defendants did not plead qualified immunity; and that 

Plaintiff’s rights were clearly established. Docket No. 63 at 8. These issues are unrelated to 

whether RLUIPA contemplates individual liability. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims.

E. Defendants Counselor Medina and Warden Muniz 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Counselor Medina and 

Warden Muniz because a prison official’s denial of an inmate appeal cannot serve as the sole basis 

for liability under § 1983. Defendants argue, and Plaintiff concedes, that Plaintiff’s claims against 

Counselor Medina and Warden Muniz are based on their denials of his inmate appeals. Docket 

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No. 42 at 18–19 and Docket No. 63 at 9. Plaintiff argues that Counselor Medina and Warden 

Muniz are liable because their failure to act resulted in the constitutional violations. 

The cases cited by Defendants — Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2003), and

Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1988) — establish that inmates lack a constitutional 

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860; Mann, 855 F.2d at 

640. In applying this principle, courts have held that there is no due process liability for failing to 

process or decide an inmate appeal properly. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. However, where a 

grievance puts a prison official on notice of an ongoing violation, the prison official’s knowing 

failure to respond to an inmate’s request for help may establish § 1983 liability. Cf. Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006) (supervisor may be liable for deliberate indifference to a 

serious medical need, for instance, if he or she fails to respond to a prisoner’s request for help). If 

a defendant only denied an inmate appeal about a religious problem that already had occurred and 

was complete (e.g., an exclusion of the inmate from a religious ceremony on a past date), there 

would be no liability for a constitutional violation; however, where the problem is an ongoing 

religious need and the request is made in an inmate appeal to remedy the ongoing problem, 

liability can be based on the denial of an inmate appeal, just as it could be based on the denial of a 

verbal request from the inmate. 

Grievance number SVSP-13-01818, filed June 30, 2013 grieved, in relevant part, the 

denial of congregational Jumu’ah prayer and the five-time daily prayers; the denial of a qualified 

Muslim chaplain; the denial of necessary congregational artifacts; and the denial of the ability to 

observe Iftar. Docket No. 45-7 at 8. Grievance number SVSP-13-01818 was assigned to 

Counselor Medina at the second level of review on June 7, 2013, Docket No. 45-7 at 7, and denied 

by Warden Muniz at the second level of review on July 15, 2013, Docket No. 45-9 at 4–10. This 

grievance put both Warden Muniz and Counselor Medina on notice of the aforementioned 

potential ongoing constitutional violations. Liability for these alleged constitutional violations can 

therefore be based on Counselor Medina’s investigation of these grievances and Warden Muniz’s 

denial of these grievances. Cf. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1098. 

Grievance number SVSP-13-03281 grieved, in relevant part, Defendants’ failure to provide 

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hot Ramadan meals prepared and served by Muslim inmates. Docket No. 45-12 at 5–7. 

Grievance number SVSP-13-03281 was assigned to Counselor Medina at the second level of 

review on September 3, 2013, Docket No. 45-16 at 2, after Ramadan had ended. This grievance 

was denied by Warden Muniz at the second level of review on September 12, 2013, Docket No. 

45-15 at 7–11, also after Ramadan had ended. In this instance, Counselor Medina and Warden 

Muniz denied an inmate appeal about a religious problem that already had occurred and was 

complete, and are therefore not liable for the alleged constitutional violation. See Taylor v. List, 

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (supervisory official liable under §1983 if he or she knew of a 

violation and failed to act to prevent it). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ summary judgment motion is DENIED with respect to the 

liability of Warden Muniz and Counselor Medina for claims arising out of the denial of Friday 

Jumu’ah prayers, five-time daily prayers, a qualified Muslim chaplain, necessary congregational 

artifacts, and the ability to observe Iftar, but GRANTED with respect to the liability of Warden 

Muniz and Counselor Medina for claims arising out of the failure to provide hot Ramadan meals 

prepared and served by Muslim inmates. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ summary judgment motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. 

2. The Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims; 

Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for monetary damages; and any claims against Warden Muniz 

and Counselor Medina arising out of the failure to provide hot meals Ramadan prepared and 

served by Muslim inmates.

3. The Court dismisses without prejudice, for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants prohibited him from making purchases from Muslim 

vendors; prohibited him from starting a Muslim resource group; and denied him the ceremonial 

halal foods normally eaten at the religious ceremonies of Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr. Plaintiff 

may refile such claims after he has complied in full with the exhaustion requirements.

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4. The case will proceed on the following claims. 

a. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants, in their official and individual 

capacities, denied him Friday Jumu’ah prayers, five-time daily prayers, a qualified Muslim 

chaplain, necessary congregational artifacts, and the ability to celebrate Iftar in violation of 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment equal protection rights. These same allegations state cognizable claims against 

Defendants in their official capacities for violation of Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA. 

b. Plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Hernandez, in her individual and 

official capacities, failed to provide him with hot Ramadan meals prepared and served by Muslim 

inmates, in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. This same 

allegation also states a claim against defendant Hernandez in her official capacity for violation of 

Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA. 

5. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, Defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary 

judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely and 

adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 

F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th 

Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). 

If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

Defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. 

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

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6. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants' declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

(The Rand notice above does not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again 

concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

7. The stay on discovery is lifted. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

8. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants’

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. 

9. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

10. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

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11. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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