Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01086/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01086-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM E. BROWN, JR.,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-1086 FCD KJM P

vs.

T. FELKER, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus challenging his Placer County convictions for robbery and burglary. Respondent

filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition is not timely. On January 9, 2008, the court

recommended that the petition be dismissed. Petitioner’s objections to this recommendation

included a claim, raised for the first time, that his legal materials were seized, which delayed the

timely filing of his petition. Accordingly, on February 15, 2008, the court vacated the findings

and recommendations and directed the parties to brief the question.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted in Placer County on June 18, 2002, and pursued a direct

appeal to the Court of Appeals and then to the California Supreme Court, which denied review

on October 15, 2003. Lodged Documents (Lodg. Docs.) 1-4. 

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 Based on the prison mailbox rule of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988), a 1

document is filed when it is given to prison authorities for mailing. See also Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 There are two certificates of service attached to this petition; one is dated November 9 2

and the other is dated November 21, 2004. 

2

Petitioner mailed a petition to the Placer County Superior Court on October 14,

2004. Lodg. Doc. 5. This was denied on October 29, 2004. Lodg. Doc. 6. 1

Petitioner continued his challenge by mailing a new writ petition to the Court of

Appeal on November 21, 2004 ; this was denied in an order filed December 16, 2004. Lodg. 2

Docs. 7-8. On December 4, 2004, while the initial petition was pending, petitioner filed a second

petition in the Court of Appeal, which was denied on December 16 as well. Lodg. Docs. 9-10.

Petitioner’s next step was to file a petition in the California Supreme Court on

January 4, 2005; this was denied on December 21, 2005. Lodg. Docs. 11-12.

On January 12 and March 16, 2007, petitioner returned to the California Supreme

Court. Lodg. Docs. 13-14. These two petitions were still pending when respondent filed the

motion to dismiss; both were subsequently denied on June 27, 2007.

The instant petition was filed May 18, 2006.

II. The Statute of Limitations

The AEDPA contains a statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for

a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post- conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

A conviction is final for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations at the

expiration of the ninety day period for seeking certiorari, which in this case was March 17, 2004.

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the AEDPA year began

running on January 14, 2004, and would have expired on January 15, 2005, absent any tolling. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (excluding the day from which the period begins to run from the calculation

of the time). 

The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any “properly filed”

state collateral attack on the judgment. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999). 

An untimely state court application for collateral relief will not provide a basis for tolling under

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) because such applications are not “properly filed.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 414-15 (2005).

In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 218-21 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the

AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled not only between the dates of actual filing and decision on

a writ, but also during those periods between filings as a petitioner works his or her way “up the

ladder” through higher courts to complete “one full round” of state court review of claims. Id. at

217, 219-20. 

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 The court agrees with respondent that petitioner is not entitled to any additional tolling 3

for the petition filed December 4, 2004 in the Court of Appeal, because the time that petition was

pending was subsumed in the time tolled by the earlier petition, filed in that court on November

29, 2004. 

4

Once a respondent places a petitioner on notice that a federal petition is subject to

dismissal as untimely, petitioner has the burden of proving that he is entitled to tolling. Smith v.

Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2002).

Respondent agrees that petitioner is entitled to tolling from October 14, 2004

through December 21, 2005 – from the mailing of the petition to Placer County Superior Court

through the denial by the California Supreme Court, a total of 433 days. Motion To Dismiss

(MTD) at 4. Accordingly, the AEDPA year did not run out until March 24, 2006. Nevertheless, 3

the instant petition, filed May 18, 2006, is not timely. Nor was the statute of limitations

reviewed by the last two petitions filed in the California Supreme Court, on January 12 and

March 16, 2007. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Vroman v. Brigano, 346

F.3d 598, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2003).

III. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner claims he is entitled to equitable tolling for several, somewhat

contradictory reasons. Specifically, he alleges that on November 8, 2005, Correctional Officer

Pribble threw away the “legal documents” that he and an inmate writ-writer were reviewing in

order to federalize his claims. Supp. Brief at 6. These documents included petitioner’s only 

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copy of his state writ with its exhibits and copies of portions of reporters’ transcripts. Id. 

However, petitioner also alleges:

[T]he inmate assisting the Petitioner by doing his writ was illegally

placed in administrative segregation in and about April 2006 with

all of the Petitioner trial transcripts, writs, and other Legal

documents. Untill Petitioners assistant and jail house lawer

release. Petitioner could not file untill he received it, - - - - - At

which time the new amending claims IAC under anti-terrorist act

was at least 90 days late, to submit petitioners federal writ.

Supp. Brief at 2-3 (reproduced as in original). Later, he explains that 

As a laymen of Law. prior I was to serve 10-months of a year in

administrative segregation . . . here in High Desert State Prison 2-

unit: 

Upon such time since I’ve had a inmate jail house lawer whom had

all of my Legal Original Transcripts, . State writs Exhibits etc.

which are relevant to my federal writs. . . Upon return to (H.D.S.P)

general population from administrative segregation for good

conduct and program. I was issued my personal property Legal

documents etc. and noticed I had parts of various Legal documents

I could possibly use to file this. thats when C/O Pribble destroyed

or lost petitioners Legal documents he’d taken. I wrote to my jail

house lawer inmate whom was assisting me prior to my . . .

segregation term. His wife did not reply in a timely fashion when

my assistance sent stated Legal documents, transcripts etc. he had

her to send me due to C.D.C. rules which do not allow inmate’s to

communicate between yards or prisons etc. nor segregation units. 

My inmate assistance Jail house lawer had his family member

contact me and inform me that as soon as his wife receive his

documents and “she has the funds” she would forward them to

petitioner. Petitioner received stated Legal documents from her 90

days late from his due date.

Supp. Brief at 7-8 (reproduced as in original). Petitioner has supported this account with a copy

of a grievance filed November 8, 2005, protesting Pribble’s seizure and ultimate destruction of

his “merits & exhibits.” Supp. Brief, Ex. A. 

Petitioner also has attached the declaration of Raymond Henderson, a writ writer

who was assisting petitioner from April 2004 until August 2005, when petitioner was placed in

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administrative segregation. Supp. Brief, Declaration of Raymond Henderson (Henderson Decl). 4

Henderson avers:

I had Petitioners . . . Legal transcripts, writ of habeas corpus, and

various Legal documents for his criminal conviction as well as

those for case’s no’s WHC-581-66226259. I attempted to

continuously get said stated Legal transcripts and documents back

to Mr. W. Brown Jr. C.D.C. No. T-58106. Yet due to C.D.C.

Rules etc. inmate’s are not allowed to communicate between yards

or with administrative inmates. So I sent petitioners Documents to

my sister Ms. Tricia, Penny whom attempted to forward them to

inmate W. Brown. Said documents and Legal transcripts were

months later returned. She then attempted to send them back to me

again they were denied. Untill in 3/20/2006 I was finally allowed

to receive them. When Mr. Brown returned to D-facility I returned

said Legal Documents.

Henderson Decl. (reproduced as in original). 

In addition, petitioner also alleges he had difficulties getting to the law library

because of lockdowns. Supp. Brief, Exs. C & D. 

The Ninth Circuit has held:

We will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period

only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. When external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

may be appropriate. 

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations, citations omitted). It

is petitioner’s burden to show he is entitled to equitable tolling. Espinoza-Matthews v. People of

the State of California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). To meet his burden, he must

demonstrate "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way." Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

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A. Pribble’s Seizure of Legal Materials

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that equitable tolling may be justified when,

through no fault of his own, a habeas petitioner was separated from his legal files and transcripts. 

Thus, in Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002), the court recognized that if petitioner was

able to bear his burden of showing he was deprived of his legal material for a period of eightytwo days when he was away from the prison, he might be entitled to equitable tolling. 

In Espinoza-Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1024, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a

petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling for the entire time he was in administrative segregation

and deprived of his legal property. In that case, the petitioner asked for access to his legal

property, which was being stored while he was in segregation, but was told he could not have

access until he was released. The court found petitioner entitled to tolling for the entire period he

was deprived of his legal materials, even though he still had a month after the papers were

returned to him before the statute of limitations expired. Id. at 1028. As the court observed, “it

is 'unrealistic to expect [a habeas petitioner] to prepare and file a meaningful petition on his own

within the limitations period' without access to his legal file." Id. at 1027 (quoting Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003)).

It is difficult to fashion a coherent narrative from petitioner’s pleadings. It

appears, however, that Pribble did not take the only copy of petitioner’s legal materials in

November 2005, but rather only some duplicates of the materials in the possession of petitioner’s

inmate assistant or writ writer. Supp. Brief at 7-8. Petitioner has not demonstrated the requisite

causal link between Pribble’s actions and his inability to file his federal petition in a timely

fashion.

B. Separation From The Writ Writer

With respect to the time petitioner did not have access to the writ writer, the dates

are difficult to square: Henderson claims he helped petitioner until petitioner’s placement in

segregation in August 2005; petitioner says he was released from segregation by November 2005

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and was able to retrieve the materials Pribble later confiscated; Henderson says he gave petitioner

his legal materials sometime after March 20, 2006. Nevertheless, it appears that petitioner and

his writ writer were in fact separated for some period of time as a result of petitioner’s ad-seg

placement.

Several courts have rejected claims of equitable tolling based on difficulties with

writ writers. In United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the movant had

relied on a writ writer whose placement in segregation “separated [petitioner] and his papers for

some time before the expiration of the one year grace period until after the filing deadline had

passed.” The court found this an insufficient basis for equitable tolling, because movant

“entrusted [the writ writer] with his legal documents at his peril.” Id. at 205; Marsh v. Soares,

223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (fact that writ writer took 170 days to prepare petition not

sufficient ground for equitable tolling); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F.Supp.2d 650, 655 (N.D. Tex.

1998) (reliance on writ writer who misled petitioner did not make it impossible for petitioner to

file); see also Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1372, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s reliance on

jailhouse lawyer did not excuse his procedural default). The court finds these decisions

persuasive, however non-controlling. In this case, the lack of access to a writ writer cannot

support equitable tolling.

C. Access To The Law Library

Petitioner’s pleadings do not provide a clear chronology of his purported

difficulties in getting access to the law library, but Exhibit C, a first level response to a grievance,

suggests that those difficulties did not arise until June 15, 2006, after the original petition was

filed in this case. Supp. Brief, Exs. C & J (though Ex. J appears to be a pass to the law library,

rather than proof of any difficulties). 

Several courts have rejected the impact of a lock-down or of restrictions on law

library access as bases for equitable tolling unless the petitioner can show actual harm. Akins v.

United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th Cir. 2000) (no connection shown between lockdown

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and inability to file); Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (limited

access to library); Lindo v. Lefever, 193 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same). Here,

plaintiff has not shown how his difficulties in June prevented him from filing his petition in

March 2006.

IV. Actual Innocence

In his reply, petitioner claims he is actually innocent of the underlying bank

robbery and so any untimeliness should not prevent this court from considering the merits of his

habeas petition. Reply at 10-11. 

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a

habeas petitioner who makes “a colorable showing of actual innocence” that would implicate a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” may be entitled to have “otherwise barred constitutional

claim[s]” considered on the merits. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that a sufficient Schlup

showing might overcome the bar of the statute of limitations. Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775

(9th Cir. 2002). Ultimately, it is petitioner’s burden to demonstrate actual innocence. Jaramillo

v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that this exception to the statute of limitations

is concerned with actual, as opposed to legal, innocence and must be based on reliable evidence

not presented at trial. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559

(1998). A mere “repackaging of the record as presented at trial” does not constitute proof of

actual innocence. Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub

nom. Hubbard v. Moore, 543 U.S. 1070 (2005). 

Petitioner argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and

that his attorney was ineffective, and alleges that his prior bank robbery conviction was used

improperly to enhance his sentence. This repackaging of the trial record cannot support his

claim of actual innocence.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to

dismiss (docket no. 24) be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 14, 2008. 

2

brow1086.157(2)

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