Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00740/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00740-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiffs Carlos Carrasquilla and Alba Lyda Carrasquilla (“Plaintiffs”) filed this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants County of Tulare (“Tulare County”) and 

Stacey Zeller Johnson (“Defendant Zeller”) (sued as DOE 1 (Zeller) and DOE 6 (Johnson)) on May 

13, 2015.1 (Doc. 1). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

(Docs. 12, 13, 53). 

Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment brought by Defendant Zeller. 

(Doc. 38). Plaintiffs’ operative claims against Defendant Zeller include a claim for failure to protect 

Mr. Carrasquilla from injury at the hands of other inmates in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution, Mr. Carrasquilla’s state law claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, and Mrs. Carrasquilla’s claim for interference with her marital relationship with 

Mr. Carrasquilla in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs opposed the motion for 

 

1

Defendants Anderson, Garcia, Vargas and Salgado, the remaining defendants, were dismissed from this action 

with prejudice on November 22, 2016. (Doc. 45). 

CARLOS CARRASQUILLA, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

vs.

COUNTY OF TULARE, et al., 

Defendants.

_________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-00740-BAM

ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT STACEY 

ZELLER JOHNSON’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(Doc. 38)

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summary judgment on November 23, 2016, and Defendant Zeller replied on December 2, 2016. 

(Docs. 47, 50). The Court heard oral argument on December 15, 2016. Counsel Brian Bush appeared 

by telephone on behalf of Plaintiffs Carlos Carrasquilla and Alba Lyda Carrasquilla. Counsel Judith 

Chapman appeared by telephone on behalf of Defendant Tulare County. Counsel William Bruce and 

Ravi Patel appeared by telephone on behalf of Defendant Zeller. 

Having considered the moving, opposition and reply papers, and the parties’ arguments, 

Defendant Zeller’s motion for summary judgment shall be DENIED. 

I. Motion for Summary Judgment - Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any 

affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that may affect 

the outcome of the case under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

323 (1986). The exact nature of this responsibility, however, varies depending on whether the issue 

on which summary judgment is sought is one in which the movant or the nonmoving party carries the 

ultimate burden of proof. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If 

the movant will have the burden of proof at trial, it must “affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable 

trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In 

contrast, if the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, “the movant can prevail merely 

by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in 

its pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which 

a jury could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis 

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omitted). “[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice in this regard. Id. at 929; 

see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When 

the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56[], its opponent must do more than simply show 

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (citation omitted). “Where the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities 

Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the court does not make credibility determinations 

or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the 

[nonmoving party] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party 

must produce a factual predicate from which the inference may reasonably be drawn. See Richards v. 

Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 

1987).

In arriving at the findings and rulings in this opinion, the Court carefully reviewed and 

considered all arguments, points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts 

and responses thereto, if any, objections, and other papers filed by the parties. Omission of reference 

to an argument, document, paper, or objection is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did 

not consider the argument, document, paper, or objection. This Court thoroughly reviewed and 

considered the evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate. 

II. Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”)2

In July 2014, Plaintiff Carlos Carrasquilla was arrested pursuant to a warrant on charges under 

California Penal Code section 288. UMF 1. Mr. Carrasquilla was housed in a unit within the jail with 

approximately 16 other inmates. UMF 2. In the unit in which Mr. Carrasquilla was housed, inmates 

communicate with guards and administrators through written notes placed on the cell bars known as 

 

2

The facts detailed here are taken from the parties’ joint statement of undisputed facts (Doc. 38-2), and construed 

in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). Material 

disputed and undisputed facts are discussed in detail where relevant to the Court’s analysis of a specific cause of action. 

Unless otherwise noted, any objections to evidence are overruled. 

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“kites.” UMF 3. 

On or about July 20, 2014, one or more inmates in Mr. Carrasquilla’s unit wrote a kite 

identifying himself or themselves—by name and inmate identification number—as Mr. Carrasquilla. 

UMF 4. The kite was not written by Mr. Carrasquilla. UMF 5. The kite, purporting to be from Mr. 

Carrasquilla, requested the identification of the charges against Mr. Carrasquilla. UMF 6. Defendant 

Deputy Stacey Zeller Johnson collected the kite. UMF 7. Defendant Zeller provided a written 

response to the kite that indicated that Mr. Carrasquilla was being held on a charge related to child 

molestation. UMF 8. Defendant Zeller’s written response to the kite was collected by an inmate other 

than Mr. Carrasquilla. UMF 9. Soon after Defendant Zeller’s written response to the kite, Mr. 

Carrasquilla was attacked by one or more fellow inmates, apparently because the attacker(s) had 

discovered that Mr. Carrasquilla was accused of child molestation. UMF 10. 

III. Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement (“PSF”)3

It is common knowledge that inmates charged with child molestation, like Mr. Carrasquilla, are 

more likely to be subjected to physical abuse than other inmates. PSF 11. Because of this known risk 

of injury to such “vulnerable” inmates (including those charge with sex crimes against children), 

Tulare County established policies as to which employees like Defendant Zeller were trained, that 

included the rights of said inmates to be safe from abuse and punishments, the right of said inmates to 

be “protected” from abuse. It was the policy of Tulare County that “every reasonable effort to protect” 

said inmates was to be undertaken. PSF 12. Deputies are trained not to disclose inmate charges to 

other inmates. Defendant Zeller knew and understood this as part of her duties and training. PSF 13.

There is a known hierarchy among jailers, like Tulare County, that sex offenders, in particular 

sex offers against minors, are more likely to be subject to beatings and abuse, i.e., jailhouse justice. 

Accused child molesters become a target for such inmates. Defendant Zeller was aware of this 

hierarchy. PSF 14. Defendant Zeller was aware of this hierarchy that at the very bottom and most 

subject to abuse and beatings would be the sexual predators. She had been thoroughly trained to know 

and understand this hierarchy and the placement of the child molester at the vulnerable position at the 

 

3

The facts detailed here are taken from Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Material Disputed Facts (Doc. 47-4), and 

Defendant Zeller’s reply (Doc. 50-1). 

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bottom of that hierarchy. PSF 15. 

General population included murderers, people charged with murder, other violent crimes, 

crimes against law enforcement, gang members who often have order to place a hit on inmates 

accused of child molestation. PSF 16. The 16-man tank into which Mr. Carrasquilla was placed 

included the very type of inmate which comprised the general population, i.e., murderers, gang 

members and a variety of other violent crimes. Defendant Zeller was aware of this. PSF 17. The 

information known to the Tulare County Jail was that Mr. Carrasquilla’s charges included lewd acts 

upon a child. He was on a “county hold” meaning he was to be held until transferred to L.A. County. 

Defendant Zeller, from training and experience, knew that Mr. Carrasquilla’s charges included lewd 

acts upon a child. PSF 18. Mr. Carrasquilla’s jacket, which included those charges, was to be kept in 

the intake office. Defendant Zeller knew this. PSF 19. With knowledge as to the risks posed by the 

inmates in Mr. Carrasquilla’s cell should they discover or be made aware of his charges, Defendant 

Zeller, known to the inmates as a deputy who regularly responded to kites, left the kite on the cell bars 

where there was nothing stopping other inmates from taking and reading kites that were left. PSF 20. 

Because only the intake deputies would have the inmate’s jacket with the specific charges, Defendant 

Zeller had to have deliberately sought out the requested information to provide the inmates. PSF 21. 

After the assault on Mr. Carrasquilla, Defendant Zeller conducted an investigation, and took 

statements from each inmate/witness. PSF 22. The kite disclosing Mr. Carrasquilla’s status as an 

accused child molester was not mentioned in Defendant Zeller’s report. PSF 23. It would be one of 

the most serious breaches of jailhouse security for inmates to obtain a document listing another 

inmate’s charges and bail amount. PSF 24. Defendant Zeller’s report did not discuss the kite. Her 

supervising Sergeant did not investigate the kite. Defendant Zeller was not punished for the kite. PSF 

25.

Plaintiff suffered severe injuries, including a comminuted right maxillary sinus acute fracture, 

comminuted right zygomatic arch fracture, right and left nasal bone fracture with nasal septal 

deviation to the right, right lateral orbital wall fracture and inferior frontal sinus depressed fracture. 

PSF 26. 

///

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IV. Discussion

A. Fourteenth Amendment – Failure to Protect

Defendant Zeller initially argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. 

Carrasquilla’s failure-to-protect claim based on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 

standard. (Doc. 38, pp. 10-13). However, a pretrial detainees’ failure-to-protect claim arises under the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 

Unusual Punishment Clause. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, --- U.S. ---, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2475, 192 L.Ed.2d 

416 (2015); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 

“Jailers have a duty to protect pretrial detainees from violence at the hands of other inmates.” 

Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070. To establish a violation of this duty, a plaintiff must “show that the prison 

officials acted with deliberate indifference.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068. The elements of a pretrial 

detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against an individual officer are as follows:

(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under 

which the plaintiff was confined;

(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm;

(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even 

though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high 

degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct 

obvious; and

(4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. “With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be 

objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each 

particular case.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also Weishaar v. County of Napa, No. 14-

cv-01352-LB, 2016 WL 7242122, *7, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) (citing Castro, 833 F.3d at 1069-70) 

(“The ‘deliberate indifference’ test under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is . . . 

‘purely objective.’”). Under this test, “a pretrial detainee who asserts a due process claim for failure to 

protect” must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless 

disregard.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071.

In her moving papers, Defendant Zeller argues that the evidence demonstrates that she was 

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deceived into revealing Mr. Carrasquilla’s status and had no knowledge of any risk of harm to him. In 

particular, Defendant Zeller contends that there is an absence of any evidence that she knew Mr. 

Carrasquilla’s status was being improperly disclosed. Rather, Defendant Zeller contends that the 

evidence, based on testimony from Inmate Dale Watson, demonstrates that the inmates sought to trick 

her into believing that the kite came from Mr. Carrasquilla. (Doc. 38, pp. 11-12.) Defendant Zeller 

further argues that there is no evidence that she was aware of facts that could have led her to believe 

that her response to the note would put Mr. Carrasquilla in danger “because she had no knowledge that 

one or more of the inmates had impersonated Carrasquilla in writing the kite.” (Id.) Defendant Zeller 

essentially asserts that she was used by an inmate with violent intentions to execute a plan of abuse on 

a fellow inmate. (Id. at 12-13). Defendant Zeller claims she did not draw any inference that her 

response to the kite could harm Mr. Carrasquilla.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Zeller has misstated the law and improperly 

applied an Eighth Amendment standard to Mr. Carrasquilla’s failure-to-protect claim. Applying the 

appropriate Fourteenth Amendment standard, as outlined above, Plaintiffs contend that there are 

genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Defendant Zeller acted with deliberate indifference 

when she provided Mr. Carrasquilla’s charging information. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the 

undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendant Zeller performed an intentional act by collecting the kite 

and writing a response that was collected by an inmate other than Mr. Carrasquilla. UMF 7-9. 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Zeller’s actions were unreasonable in light of her awareness of the 

significant risk of injury facing persons charged with child molestation in the jail and her training that 

“every reasonable effort to protect” said inmates was to be undertaken. PSF 12, 13. She also was 

aware that inmates charged with child molestation are the most likely to be subjected to beatings at the 

hands of other inmates. PSF 14, 15. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Zeller knew that 

Mr. Carrasquilla was charged with lewd acts upon a child, and thus, was at the highest risk of 

suffering a beating by other inmates should they become aware of his charges. PSF 15, 18. She also 

knew and was trained not to dispense an inmate or detainee’s charging information to other inmates. 

PSF 13. Plaintiffs argue that despite her knowledge and training, Defendant Zeller disclosed sensitive 

information by leaving the kite on the cell bars where there was nothing stopping other inmates from 

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taking and reading it. PSF 20. Plaintiffs conclude that these facts raise triable issues as to whether 

Defendant Zeller acted with deliberate indifference when she disclosed Mr. Carrasquilla’s charging 

information.

In her reply, Defendant Zeller responds that the only condition that created a risk for Mr. 

Carrasquilla was the disclosure of his status as an accused child molester. Defendant Zeller argues 

that she made no intentional decision with respect to the disclosure, having no idea that she was 

making a disclosure to anyone other than Mr. Carrasquilla. Further, Defendant Zeller argues that she 

showed no intent to create the condition that ultimately caused harm to Mr. Carrasquilla, and another 

officer in her circumstances would not have recognized a risk of harm. (Doc. 50, p. 6).

The Court finds questions of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of Defendant Zeller 

on Mr. Carrasquilla’s failure-to-protect claim. There is a question of fact whether Defendant Zeller 

took reasonable precautions to abate the risk of disclosure of the sensitive information. Plaintiffs have 

presented evidence demonstrating that Defendant Zeller provided Mr. Carrasquilla’s charging 

information in a kite left on the cell bars. Defendant Zeller did so knowing not only that the kite could 

have been collected by any inmate, but also that persons charged with child molestation or a sex crime 

against a minor are at risk of being beaten by other inmates if the charges are discovered. She did not 

call Mr. Carrasquilla over to collect the kite or otherwise ensure that sensitive information was given 

only to the appropriate person. The evidence also demonstrates that Defendant Zeller failed to 

disclose her role in providing the kite prior to the assault on Mr. Carrasquilla. Although Defendant 

Zeller argues that she did not expect any harm to result from placing the kite on the bars, she has not 

provided a declaration in support of her motion for summary judgment. Further, the standard at issue 

is an objective one. On the present facts, a jury could find that “a reasonable officer in [these]

circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved” by leaving the kite with Mr. 

Carrasquilla’s charges on the cell bars and the “failure to take reasonable measures” to ensure that the 

kite was not collected by an inmate other than Mr. Carrasquilla “caused [Mr. Carrasquilla’s] injuries.” 

Castro, 833 F.3d at 1072. In other words, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Zeller’s 

actions, in the circumstances, were “objectively unreasonable.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. 

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B. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Zeller next argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because her conduct did 

not violate a clearly established constitutional right. 

Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability for damages if “their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 

(1982). In resolving a government official’s qualified immunity claim, a court must evaluate two 

questions: (1) whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right 

was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

Defendant Zeller argues that the constitutional right at issue must be defined narrowly, and that 

the right at stake here is the right to keep sensitive charging information confidential from fellow 

inmates. Defendant Zeller contends that there is no law that clearly establishes this right as 

constitutionally protected. (Doc. 38 at pp. 13-14). 

Plaintiffs counter that this is an “absurd construction” of Mr. Carrasquilla’s well-established 

right as a pretrial detainee to be free from violence at the hands of other inmates while incarcerated. 

(Doc. 47, p. 19). Plaintiffs further counter that the Ninth Circuit rejected a similarly narrowed 

description in Castro, 833 F.3d at 1067, which involved a pretrial detainee, Jonathan Castro, suing Los 

Angeles County Sheriff’s officials under section 1983 for violating his due process right as a pretrial 

detainee to be protected from harm at the hands of other inmates. In that action, Mr. Castro had been 

arrested and subsequently detained in a sobering cell at the police station in 2009. The sobering cell 

was not equipped with audio monitoring and was checked only sporadically. Several hours later, 

officials placed Jonathan Gonzalez, a combative inmate who had been arrested on a felony charge, in 

the same cell. After Inmate Gonzalez was placed in the cell, Mr. Castro attempted to attract an 

officer’s attention, but no one responded. Within hours of their co-confinement, Mr. Castro was 

severely beaten and injured at the hands of Inmate Gonzalez. Id. at 1064.

Although jail officials in Castro acknowledged the right of a pretrial detainee to be free from 

violence from other inmates, they argued that “such a broad description” was “too general to guide 

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[the court’s] analysis.” Id. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the right at issue was the “right to 

be free from violence at the hands of other inmates.” Id. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit reasoned as 

follows:

[A] right is clearly established when the “contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that 

a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Serrano 

v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The “contours” of Castro's right 

were his right to be free from violence at the hands of other inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

833, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court need not catalogue every way in which one 

inmate can harm another for us to conclude that a reasonable official would understand 

that his actions violated Castro’s right. Nor do the official’s actions, in this context, 

require some affirmative act. As we held months before Castro’s arrest, “direct causation 

by affirmative action is not necessary: ‘a prison official may be held liable under the 

Eighth Amendment if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and 

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’ ” Clem v. Lomeli, 

566 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009) (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 

114 S.Ct. 1970). The contours of the right required only that the individual defendants 

take reasonable measures to mitigate the substantial risk to Castro. Accordingly, we reject 

the individual defendants’ argument that the law on which Castro bases his claim was not 

clearly established at the time of the incident. Therefore, qualified immunity does not bar 

the claim against them.

Id. 

The Court finds the analysis of Castro instructive, and that the “contours” of Mr. Carrasquilla’s 

right involved the right to be free violence at the hands of other inmates. Id. As found in Castro, a 

pretrial detainee’s right to be free from violence from other inmates was clearly established well 

before Mr. Carrasquilla’s arrest in July 2014. Indeed, more than twenty years before Mr. 

Carrasquilla’s arrest and detention, the Supreme Court expressly held that under the Eighth 

Amendment “prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other 

prisoners” because they have “stripped [the inmates] of virtually every means of self-protection and 

foreclosed their access to outside aid.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 

L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The Supreme Court also clearly held, well before Mr. Carrasquilla’s arrest and 

detention, that the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are “at least as great as the Eighth 

Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 

U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983).

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violence at the hands of fellow inmates was clearly established before Mr. Carrasquilla’s arrest and 

detention in the Tulare County Jail. (Doc. 38, p. 15). Instead, Defendant Zeller attempts to argue that 

her conduct in responding to the kite did not violate Mr. Carrasquilla’s constitutional right. (Doc. 38,

p. 16). Because there are triable issues of fact as to whether Defendant Zeller’s conduct violated Mr. 

Carrasquilla’s constitutional right, the Court finds that Defendant Zeller is not entitled to qualified 

immunity on Mr. Carrasquilla’s failure-to-protect claim. 

C. Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Marital Relations

Plaintiff Alba Lyda Carrasquilla claims that Defendant Zeller interfered in her familial relationship 

with Mr. Carrasquilla in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

Defendant Zeller argues that this claim is subject to summary judgment because Plaintiffs cannot 

establish the underlying constitutional violation, i.e., Mr. Carrasquilla’s failure-to-protect claim. (Doc. 

38, pp. 17-18). Because triable issues of fact preclude summary judgment on Mr. Carrasquilla’s 

failure-to-protect claim, Defendant Zeller’s motion for summary judgment on Mrs. Carrasquilla’s 

related claim shall be denied. 

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant Zeller argues that Mr. Carrasquilla’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress fails because she demonstrated no intent to inflict injury. 

To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law, a 

plaintiff must show: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of 

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s 

suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the 

emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Christensen v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal.3d 868, 

903 (1991). Conduct is considered outrageous where it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that 

usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 259 

(1982). “The tort calls for intentional, or at least reckless conduct—conduct intended to inflict injury 

or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” Id. at 210 (upholding a finding of “no

reckless disregard” in IIED claim because officers’ conduct “was in no way due to any affirmative 

misconduct.”)

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Defendant Zeller contends that none of the evidence in the record indicates that she acted with 

any intent to injure Mr. Carrasquilla. Instead, Defendant Zeller asserts that while she may have been 

deceived into providing Mr. Carrasquilla’s charges to other inmates, there is no reason to believe that 

she did so with any intent to harm Mr. Carrasquilla. (Doc. 38, p. 17).

Plaintiffs counter that they have produced evidence from which a reasonable juror could 

conclude that Defendant Zeller purposefully responded to the kite knowing that by doing so Mr. 

Carrasquilla would be beaten. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Zeller received the kite, retrieved the 

information regarding Mr. Carrasquilla’s charges, and then returned the kite bearing the charging 

information to the cell bars knowing it could be retrieved by any inmate. Plaintiffs argue that 

Defendant Zeller did so despite knowledge as to the risks posed by the inmates in Mr. Carrasquilla’s 

cell should they discover or be made aware of his charges. Plaintiffs also point to evidence that 

Defendant Zeller did not mention the kite disclosing Mr. Carrasquilla’s status as an accused child 

molester in her report following her investigation into the beating of Mr. Carrasquilla. PSF 23. 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Zeller acted intentionally in answering the kite, and it is in genuine 

dispute whether she did so to help see Mr. Carrasquilla suffer punishment at the hands of his fellow 

inmates. 

Here, there is evidence before the Court raising triable issues whether Defendant Zeller acted 

with reckless disregard of the probability of cause harm. See generally Little v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. 

Co., 67 Cal.App.3d 451, 462 (1977). The Court finds, at a minimum, that Defendant Zeller knew Mr. 

Carrasquilla, by virtue of his child molestation charges, was at risk of a beating or other harm if his 

cellmates should discover or be made aware of those charges. PSF 14, 15, 18. Despite this 

knowledge, Defendant Zeller left the kite with Mr. Carrasquilla’s charging information on the cell bars 

where any inmate could retrieve it. PSF 20. She violated known police policy and practice of not 

disclosing confidential information. Soon after Defendant Zeller’s response, Mr. Carrasquilla was 

attacked. UMF 10. Thereafter, and for unknown reasons, Defendant Zeller failed to disclose in her 

investigation report that she provided a kite with written information regarding Mr. Carrasquilla’s 

charges just prior to the attack. UMF 10, PSF 23. Given these facts, the Court finds that there is 

genuine dispute as to whether Defendant Zeller acted intentionally, or at least recklessly, with the 

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realization that injury would result from disclosure of Mr. Carrasquilla’s charges. Defendant Zeller is 

therefore not entitled to summary judgment Mr. Carrasquilla’s claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. 

V. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, Defendant Stacey Zeller Johnson’s motion for summary judgment is 

HEREBY DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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