Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04152/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANA FREDIANI,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of 

Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-4152 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OR REMAND AND

GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Diana Frediani moves for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, for remand. (Docket No. 6.) Defendant Jo Anne

Barnhart, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (Commissioner), opposes the motion and cross-moves

for summary judgment. (Docket No. 8.) Having considered all of

the papers filed by the parties, the Court denies Plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment or remand and grants Defendant's crossmotion.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On April 1, 2003, Plaintiff filed an application for

disability insurance benefits under Title II and for supplemental

security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security

Act, claiming a disability onset date of September 1, 2001. 

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1Although Plaintiff applied for benefits under Title II and

XVI, apparently she is already receiving benefits under Title XVI. 

See AR 306. Therefore, only disability benefits under Title II are

at issue here.

2

(Administrative Record (AR) at 57-59, 303.)1 She claimed an

inability to work because of severe pain in her left knee. (AR

64.) On August 27, 2003, Plaintiff's claim was denied and she

moved for reconsideration. (AR 29, 32.) On October 8, 2003, the

motion for reconsideration was denied. (AR 34-38.) On November 4,

2003, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ). (AR 39.)

On June 3, 2004, a hearing was held before an ALJ. (AR 294.) 

Plaintiff, who was not represented by counsel, testified at the

hearing. (AR 296-297.) 

On November 26, 2004, the ALJ issued an opinion finding that

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act. (AR 17.) Plaintiff's request for administrative

review by the Appeals Council was denied. (AR 6.) Plaintiff then

initiated the instant action for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 405(g), seeking an award of benefits, or in the alternative,

remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings.

II. Factual History

A. Work Experience

Plaintiff was born on June 8, 1938, in San Francisco,

California. (AR 300.) She received an Associate of Arts Degree in

1959 and later received training in computers, note taking, and

other skills required for the performance of clerical work. (AR

301.) Plaintiff worked as an office assistant or technician from

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2

Plaintiff stated that the office assistant and office

technician jobs involved identical job duties. Her job title

changed in 1994, but her duties remained the same. 

3

1981 to 2001, when she retired.2 As an office assistant and

technician, Plaintiff operated a computer, worked in customer

service, performed radio dispatch, wrote reports, filled out forms,

filed, and worked in a stockroom and a mailroom. (AR 76-78.) 

Plaintiff subsequently worked five hours a week for about two weeks

as an accounts receivable clerk from September to October, 2002,

before being laid off. (AR 79; 302.) 

B. Medical History

Plaintiff claims disability based on an injury sustained while

at work in June, 1992 when she tripped over a cord at her desk and

twisted her knee. (AR 103.) In June, 1992, she was referred to

physical therapy by Dr. Aldis Baltins, M.D., an orthopedist. (AR

102.) In July, 1992, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Gerald King,

M.D., an orthopedist, who diagnosed a left knee injury, probably

related to a medial meniscal tear. (AR 103.) In July, 1992,

Plaintiff underwent arthroscopic surgery of the left knee where

abrasion osteoplasty was performed. (AR 111.) In November, 1992,

Dr. Baltins observed that Plaintiff was making slow progress with

her left knee after the surgery. (AR 105.)

In December, 1992, Dr. Gilbert J. Kucera, M.D., an

orthopedist, examined Plaintiff in the capacity of an Agreed

Medical Examiner for the State Compensation Insurance Fund. (AR

143.) Dr. Kucera reported that Plaintiff's left knee injury

precluded her from prolonged standing and very heavy lifting. (AR

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3Derangement means "a disturbance of the regular order or

arrangement." Stedman's Medical Dictionary (478) (27th Ed. 2000).

4Crepitus is a condition of "noise or vibration produced by

rubbing bone or irregular degenerated cartilage surfaces together

as in arthritis and other conditions." Stedman's Medical

Dictionary 424 (27th ed. 2000).

4

141.) 

On October 19, 1993, Plaintiff underwent a second arthroscopic

surgery on the left knee for internal derangement.3 (AR 152.)

In May, 1994, Dr. James Damon, M.D., an orthopedist,

concluded, in a Qualified Medical Examination for the State

Compensation Insurance Fund, that Plaintiff should be precluded

from repetitive kneeling or squatting and prolonged standing or

walking. (AR 125.) He also advised that Plaintiff could not work

in a position that required her to perform any heavy lifting. 

(Id.) 

In July, 1994, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Steven Smith,

M.D., an orthopedist. (AR 146.) Plaintiff reported increased

swelling and pain in her left knee. (Id.) Two weeks later,

Plaintiff reported improvement after starting on a non-steroidal

anti-inflammatory treatment. (AR 147.)

In July, 1994, Dr. Kucera performed an Agreed Medical Legal

Evaluation Reexamination for the State Compensation Insurance Fund

and found that Plaintiff had crepitus4 and chronic degenerative

changes in her left knee. (AR 129; 132.) Dr. Kucera reported that

Plaintiff's disability precluded her from prolonged standing and

very heavy lifting and that Plaintiff will "eventually require a

total knee replacement within a few years." (AR 133.) 

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5

Celebrex is indicated for "relief of the signs and symptoms

of osteoarthritis." Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR), 60th ed.,

3131 (2006). 

5

In June, 1997, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Smith that she had

left knee pain but no swelling, locking, or giving way. (AR 144.) 

X-rays were unchanged from 1994 and Dr. Smith advised continuation

of anti-inflammatory medication, as needed, conservative management

and home exercise treatment. (Id.)

In December, 1998, Plaintiff received authorization for a knee

brace and a disabled placard from her family physician. (AR 198.) 

In March, 1999, Humboldt Orthopedic Associates reviewed x-rays

taken over the previous six years and noted progressive narrowing

and enlargement of a spur at the medial joint margin of the left

knee. (AR 166.) Plaintiff was advised to use a cane for long

walks. (AR 167.)

In March, 2000, Humboldt Orthopedic Associates reported that

Plaintiff had moderate left knee medial compartment arthritis but

was able to do office work activities. (AR 164.)

In December, 2001, an x-ray showed degenerative changes in

Plaintiff's left knee. (AR 225.)

In 2001 and 2002, Plaintiff visited Dr. Laurence Alavezos,

M.D., for her knee arthritis and pain. In September, 2001, Dr. 

Alavezos gave Plaintiff Celebrex5

 for her arthritis. (AR 197.) In

July, 2002, Dr. Alavezos observed continued crepitus in Plaintiff's

left knee. (AR 185.) Dr. Alavesos advised Plaintiff that she

might need a prosthesis and suggested she would benefit from a

cortisone shot. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Dr. Alavesos that she

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6Debridement is an "excision of devitalized tissue and foreign

matter from a wound." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 460 (27th ed.

2000).

7Meniscus is "a crescent-shaped fibrocartilaginous structure

of the knee, the acromio- and sternoclavicular and the

temporomandibular joints." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1091 (27th

ed. 2000).

6

did not want a cortisone shot or a prosthesis at that time. (Id.) 

In August, 2002, Dr. Alavezos noted that Plaintiff walked with a

limp, had pain with manipulation of the knee, and confirmed the

diagnosis of degenerative joint disease. (AR. 184.)

In December, 2002, Dr. Eric Schmidt, M.D., reported that xrays showed Plaintiff's right knee spurring with severe joint space

narrowing in her left knee. (AR 264.) In April, 2003, Dr. Schmidt

reported that Plaintiff's knee condition appeared to have worsened

because she was using a treadmill and he advised her to use a

stationary bicycle or Nordic Track. (AR 260.)

In May, 2003, Plaintiff underwent a third arthroscopic surgery

with debridement6 and meniscus7 excision. (AR 255.) On May 21,

2003, after Plaintiff's left knee surgery, Dr. Schmidt reported

that Plaintiff was ambulating without a cane and had full range of

motion. (AR 292.) In January, 2004, Dr. Schmidt reported that

Plaintiff was progressing well but had good days and bad days, was

using a cane for balance, and had continued knee pain. (AR 287.)

Plaintiff received physical therapy from Bob Hassett, M.S.,

P.T., from November, 2001, through May, 2003. In November, 2001,

Hassett reported that Plaintiff was able to walk without a

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8

An antalgic gait is "a characteristic gait resulting from

pain on weightbearing in which the stance phase of gait is

shortened on the affected side." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 722

(27th Ed. 2000).

7

supportive device but had an antalgic gait8. (AR 251.) In

December, 2001, Hassett reported that Plaintiff began walking on a

treadmill and doing kinetic exercises which decreased her pain from

a scale of seven out of ten, ten being the highest level of pain,

to four out of ten. (AR 249.) 

In January, 2002, Hassett reported that Plaintiff was doing

"extremely well on her recovery program." (AR 248.) In March,

2002, Plaintiff told Hassett that the pain still bothered her but

she "just lives with it." (AR 245.) Plaintiff also said that she

was contemplating skiing. (Id.) Hassett advised her to ski

cautiously and carefully and reported that he thought "this would

be a good test to find out her stability." (Id.) 

On May 16, 2002, Hassett reported that Plaintiff's symptoms

appeared to be vacillating, which is common with osteoarthritic

medial knee pain. (AR 243.) Hassett also reported that Plaintiff

said she felt better when she cut back on her exercise program. 

(Id.) On May 29, 2002, Hassett reported that Plaintiff had not

attended seven out of her last ten authorized visits, and he

encouraged Plaintiff to resume her attendance at the health club

located at the physical therapy office. (AR 242.) Plaintiff

resumed her exercise program in June, 2002 and reported a decrease

in knee pain from seven to eight out of ten to three out of ten. 

(AR 241.) 

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In August, 2002, Hassett observed that Plaintiff was able to

"walk in and out of the office, sit and stand, and move fairly

comfortably," but he noted that five years ago Plaintiff's

orthopedist recommended total knee replacement. (AR 240.) 

Plaintiff told Hassett that she was not ready for surgery but

wanted to continue with an exercise program. (Id.) In September,

2002, Hassett reported that Plaintiff's knee intermittently became

inflamed and was moderately inflamed during her visit. (AR 239.) 

In October, 2002, Plaintiff reported a pain level of four to six

out of ten. (Id.) In November, 2002, Plaintiff reported feeling

"very good" after her last physical therapy session and that her

knee pain had diminished by approximately fifty percent. (AR 237.) 

In December, 2002, Hassett gave Plaintiff a neoprene knee brace and

reported that she was vacillating between good days and bad days. 

(AR 236.) 

In January, 2003, Hassett reported that Plaintiff was not

improving from therapy in the long run but she "gets good relief in

the short term." (AR 235.) In February, 2003, Plaintiff was

fitted for an osteoarthritic brace. (AR 234.) In May, 2003,

Plaintiff's knee was showing continuing signs of degeneration

despite use of a variety of strengthening, stabilization and antiinflammatory treatments. (AR 231.) Hassett stated that Plaintiff

would potentially need a total knee replacement in the future and

that he did not think that Plaintiff "will ever be able to return

back to the work force because of the severe arthritic problems." 

(Id.) 

On May 27, 2003, after Plaintiff's third arthroscopic surgery,

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she was referred back to physical therapy. (AR 230.) Hassett

reported that Plaintiff was not doing an exercise program at home

but he would get her started on one. (Id.) Plaintiff stated at

the ALJ hearing that the reason she was not doing home exercises at

that time was because she considered going to physical therapy to

be sufficient. (AR 315.)

In August, 2003, state agency medical consultant Dr. Sandra

Clancey, M.D., completed a Physical Residual Capacity Assessment of

Plaintiff based on review of her record and concluded that

Plaintiff could lift and carry ten pounds frequently, stand or walk

for two hours in an eight hour day and sit for six hours in an

eight hour day. (AR 266.) Dr. Clancey indicated that Plaintiff

was limited to occasional pushing and pulling with the left lower

extremity, occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing,

stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling and should use a handheld assistive device, as needed for prolonged ambulation. (AR

265-267.) Dr. Clancey reported that Plaintiff was not capable of

climbing ropes and scaffolds, and could not walk on uneven

surfaces. (AR 267, 269.) In September, 2003, state agency medical

consultant Dr. Antoine Dipsia, M.D., also completed a Physical

Residual Capacity Assessment of Plaintiff and reported that

Plaintiff could lift and carry a maximum of ten pounds frequently

and twenty pounds occasionally, stand and walk for four hours out

of eight hours; sit for six hours in an eight hour day with normal

breaks; and occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop and

crouch. (AR 279.) Dr. Dipsia indicated that Plaintiff could not

operate lower extremity foot controls, climb ladders, ropes or

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scaffolds, kneel or crawl. (AR 279-280.)

C. Lay Testimony

In a letter dated February 26, 2004, Marlene Thompsen,

Plaintiff's supervisor immediately prior to her claimed disability

onset date, wrote that Plaintiff had varying degrees of pain in her

left knee and right hip area and had to take time off from work for

doctors' appointments. (AR 100.) Thompsen also noted that

Plaintiff avoided using the stairs at work, had trouble sitting for

long periods at her desk, and had to sit on a stool when filing

because she could not kneel or stoop. (Id.) Thompsen also

observed Plaintiff taking pain medication regularly. (Id.) 

In a February 24, 2004 letter, Plaintiff's neighbor Sally L.

Johns stated that Plaintiff had three surgeries and would need

total knee replacement surgery in the future. (AR 101.) She also

stated that Plaintiff is in a great deal of pain and takes pain

medications. (Id.)

D. Plaintiff's Testimony

In June, 2004, Plaintiff testified at the hearing before the

ALJ. As of the June, 2004 hearing, Plaintiff was living with her

seventeen year old grandson, whom she had raised since his infancy. 

Plaintiff has three adult children. (AR 300; 307; 318.) 

Plaintiff testified that her daily activities include dressing

and grooming herself, preparing light meals and taking a nap for an

hour to two hours in the afternoon. (AR 314; 318.) Plaintiff also

testified that she goes grocery shopping once a week but does not

carry the bags, does dishes on occasion, makes beds once a month,

tries to go to church once a week and spends time with friends. 

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Darvocet is indicated for the "relief of mild or moderate

pain." Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR), 60th ed., 3497 (2006). 

11

(AR 318-321.) Her grandson takes care of the laundry and she hires

people to do her housecleaning and yard work. (AR 324; 318-319.) 

Plaintiff watches television, pays bills, uses a laptop computer

for internet and email for about one hour a day and reads for about

one hour a day. (AR 323-325.) She also attends her grandson's

school events, helps him with his homework and drives him places. 

(AR 324.) Plaintiff used a treadmill and a stationary bike in 2003

but stopped because these activities were causing pain in her knee. 

(AR 260; 320.) From 2001 to 2003, Plaintiff went downhill skiing

on three occasions. (AR 322.) Plaintiff drove five hours in 2001

to take a church youth group skiing at Mount Shasta. (AR 322.) 

Plaintiff also has been to Santa Rosa and attended a friend's

wedding in Ukiah. (AR 322-323.) 

Plaintiff testified that she can lift ten pounds occasionally,

can sit for thirty minutes at a time and can stand for thirty

minutes at a time. (AR 309.) She also stated that she could sit

for a total of four hours and stand for a total of six hours during

an eight hour day. (Id.) 

Plaintiff testified that since 2001 the average pain level in

her knee was eight and a half out of ten. (AR 311.) 

Plaintiff testified that she took Celebrex and Darvocet9 to

manage her pain. (AR 311-312.) She stated that she does not have

side effects from these medications and that each medication

reduces her pain level to five out of ten. (AR 312.) She received

prescriptions for these medications from Dr. Schmidt but did not

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remember exactly when. (AR 311.)

Plaintiff also testified that her symptoms were worse at the

June 3, 2004 hearing than they were in September, 2001, when she

retired.

E. Vocational Expert Testimony and ALJ's Findings

The ALJ found Plaintiff's allegations regarding her

limitations only partly credible. (AR 24; 25.) The ALJ found

Plaintiff's testimony about her ability to function credible but,

after reviewing Plaintiff's activities and her medical records,

found that Plaintiff's testimony about the disabling nature of her

pain was not credible. (AR 24.)

The ALJ determined Plaintiff's residual functional capacity

(RFC) by considering the May, 1994 Qualified Medical Evaluation of

Plaintiff by Dr. Damon (AR 125); the March, 2000 report by Humboldt

Orthopaedic Associates, Inc., stating that Plaintiff was "able to

do office working activities" (AR 164); the August, 2003 Physical

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment performed by medical

consultant Dr. Clancey (AR 265); reports that Plaintiff improved

after knee surgery in May, 2003 (AR 255; 287; 290; 292); and

Plaintiff's testimony about her own abilities. (AR 308-311.) The

ALJ stated that she gave less weight to the opinions of the state

agency's reviewing doctors and more weight to Plaintiff's testimony

and reports by doctors who actually examined Plaintiff. (AR 24.) 

The ALJ stated that where the RFC reported by the state agency

consultants differed from Plaintiff's testimony as to her own

abilities, the ALJ deferred to Plaintiff's testimony and that

Plaintiff's testimony about her on-the-job functioning was the

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basis for the hypothetical the ALJ gave to the vocational expert. 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to lift ten

pounds occasionally, stand for a half hour at a time and about six

out of eight hours, sit for a half hour at a time and about four

out of eight hours, with no repetitive kneeling or squatting or

prolonged standing or walking, and with an option to stand or sit

while working. The ALJ asked Vocational Expert (VE) Malcom

Brodzinsky if a hypothetical person with Plaintiff's RFC could

perform Plaintiff's last relevant work. The VE testified that such

a person could perform Plaintiff's past relevant work as an

administrative assistant, as it is performed in the national

economy. (AR 333.) He also testified that Plaintiff could work as

a radio dispatcher, with 90,000 jobs across the United States and

1,200 in the region, noting that she had experience as a radio

dispatcher while performing her past relevant work. (AR 336-337.)

In her ruling, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met steps one and

two of the five-step analysis to establish disability under 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b)-(f). (AR 25.) At step one, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff was not currently engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); (Id.). At step two, the ALJ

found Plaintiff's degenerative joint disease of the left knee and

bursitis of the right hip to be "severe" based on the requirements

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). (Id.) At step three, the ALJ did not

find these impairments met or equaled any of the listed impairments

in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. 20 C.F.R. § 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1. (Id.). At step four, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff's RFC did not preclude her from performing her past

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relevant work as an administrative assistant. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(e). (AR 26.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Overturning a Denial of Benefits

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ's

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Martinez v.

Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir.

1995). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 

Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not just

the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that supports the

Commissioner's conclusions and that which does not. Martinez, 807

F.2d at 772. 

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be upheld even

when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v. Secretary, 602

F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979), or when the evidence is

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susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If supported by

substantial evidence, the findings of the ALJ as to any fact will

be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710,

712 (9th Cir. 1981). 

II. Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act 

Under the Social Security Act, "disability" is defined as the 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

months. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The impairment must be so

severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous

work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the

impairment must result "from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(3). 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Regulations set out

a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b)-(f);

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991); Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). The burden of proof is

on the claimant in steps one through four. Sanchez v. Secretary of

Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). In

step one, the claimant must show that she or he is not currently

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engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

In step two, the claimant must show that he or she has a "medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments" that significantly

limits his or her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)); Bowen

v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If the claimant does not, he or she is

not disabled. Otherwise, the process continues to step three for a

determination of whether the impairment meets or equals a "listed"

impairment which the regulations acknowledge to be so severe as to

preclude substantial gainful activity. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141;

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If

this requirement is met, the claimant is conclusively presumed

disabled; if not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. At step

four, it must be determined whether the claimant can still perform

"past relevant work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(e). If the claimant can perform such work, he or she is

not disabled. If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an

inability to perform prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner for step five. At step five, the Commissioner must

show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work

that exists in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20

C.F.R. § 1520(f).

DISCUSSION

I. Failure to Develop the Record 

Plaintiff argues that the decision of the ALJ is not supported

by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to develop the

record in that she relied on a residual functional capacity

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evaluation from 1994 and did not request a more contemporaneous

evaluation. Both parties agree that the Title II disability claim

requires Plaintiff to prove that she was disabled prior to her date

last insured (DLI), which is September 30, 2003. 

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof and must prove that she

was "either permanently disabled or subject to a condition which

became so severe as to disable her prior to the date upon which her

disability insured status expire[d]." Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d

1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff also must prove that she was

disabled for twelve continuous months before her DLI. See 42

U.S.C. § 423(c). Although the claimant has the burden of proof,

the ALJ has a duty to assist in developing the record. DeLorme v.

Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The “ALJ has [a] basic duty to inform himself about facts

relevant to his decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted). 

DeLorme, 924 F.2d at 849. The ALJ can fulfill his or her

obligation by making a reasonable attempt to obtain medical

evidence from the claimant’s treating sources, or by ordering a

consultative evaluation when the medical evidence is incomplete or

unclear. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B); Harper v. Chater, 1996 WL

193860, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

However, the ALJ’s duty to investigate does not extend to a

duty to generate evidence of a disability that is not clearly

indicated on the record. Turner v. Califano, 563 F.2d 669, 671

(5th Cir. 1977); Landshaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,

803 F.2d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1986). The ALJ is not required to

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order a consultative evaluation on the basis of a mere allegation

of impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Ladue v. Chater, 1996 WL

83880, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

The medical evidence reviewed by the ALJ regarding Plaintiff's

disability claim includes records from Plaintiff's treating

physician, orthopedists, physical therapist and State agency

physicians' evaluations, from 1992 through 2003. This detailed

eleven-year medical history of Plaintiff's knee and hip problems

provided a sufficient record to conclude that the ALJ fulfilled her

duty to inform herself about the medical facts relevant to her

determination of Plaintiff's RFC. A consultative evaluation was

not necessary because Plaintiff's medical records are complete and

clear.

In determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ not only considered

the May, 1994 Qualified Medical Evaluation by Dr. Damon (AR 125),

but also considered the March, 2000 report by Humboldt Orthopaedic

Associates, Inc., stating that Plaintiff was "able to do office

working activities" (AR 164), the August, 2003 Physical Residual

Functional Capacity Assessment performed by consultant Dr. Clancey,

a state agency medical consultant (AR 265), reports that Plaintiff

improved after knee surgery in May, 2003 (AR 255; 287; 290; 292),

and Plaintiff's testimony about her own abilities. (AR 308-311.) 

In addition, the ALJ gave less weight to the opinions of the state

agency's reviewing doctors and more weight to Plaintiff's

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testimony. (AR 24.) Where state agency doctors' RFC differed from

Plaintiff's testimony as to her abilities, the ALJ deferred to

Plaintiff's testimony. For example, Dr. Clancey concluded that

Plaintiff could sit for six hours in an eight hour day, but the ALJ

deferred to Plaintiff's testimony that she could only sit for four

out of eight hours. Plaintiff also testified that she asked either

Dr. Schmidt or Dr. Alavezos about whether she should return to work

and was told that it was her decision. (AR 326.) In addition, in

May, 2003, Plaintiff's physical therapist reported that, after left

knee surgery, Plaintiff was ambulating without a cane and had full

range of motion. (AR 292.)

Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that she had the RFC used by

the ALJ, that her medications reduced her pain level to a five out

of ten without side effects and that she could perform activities

such as reading, using the internet, emailing, socializing, grocery

shopping and driving. Given Plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ could

conclude that further development of the record was not necessary

and that Plaintiff's pain was not disabling.

Citing Armstrong v. Commissioner, 160 F.3d 587, 589 (9th Cir.

1998), Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to seek

the help of a medical advisor to determine Plaintiff's disability

onset date. 

Social Security Ruling 83-20 sets out guidelines for the

determination of the onset of disability. It provides, in relevant

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part:

The onset date of disability is the first day an

individual is disabled as defined in the Act and the

regulations. Factors relevant to the determination of

disability onset include the individual's allegation, the

work history and the medical evidence. These factors are

often evaluated together to arrive at the onset date.

However, the individual's allegation or the date of work

stoppage is significant in determining onset only if it is

consistent with the severity of the condition(s) shown by

the medical evidence. A title II worker cannot be found

disabled under the Act unless insured status is also met

at a time when the evidence establishes the presence of a

disabling condition(s).

SSR 83-20.

In Armstrong, 160 F.3d at 590, the Ninth Circuit concluded

that when evidence regarding the onset date is ambiguous and a

medical inference must be made, SSR 83-20 requires the ALJ to "call

upon the services of a medical advisor and obtain all evidence

which is available to make the determination." In Armstrong, the

ALJ found that the plaintiff was disabled from the date he had

filed his application for benefits. Id. Because the plaintiff

suffered from physical and mental impairments prior to the date he

filed his application, and because the record was not clear as to

when those impairments became disabling, the court concluded that

the ALJ erred because he failed to call a medical advisor to aid in

determining the date of onset. Id.

Unlike in Armstrong, the ALJ here did not find that Plaintiff

was disabled. Under these circumstances, where there is no

disability, there is no date of onset to be determined. 

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For the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that the

record was sufficiently developed and there was no reason for the

ALJ to have sought the advice of a medical advisor.

II. Credibility Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff was

not credible was based on her mischaracterization of Plaintiff's

testimony regarding her activities of daily living because it was

not every day that she went skiing, drove to Mount Shasta, attended

church, went to Santa Rosa and Ukiah, used a treadmill or used a

stationary bicycle.

In Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth

Circuit developed a threshold test to determine the credibility of

a claimant's subjective symptom testimony. Under Cotton, a

claimant "must produce objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment 'which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain

or other symptoms alleged.'" Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341,

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407-

08); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. Cotton requires "only that

the causal relationship be a reasonable inference, not a medically

proven phenomenon." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. Therefore, a

claimant is not required to produce objective medical evidence of

the pain itself or its severity. Id. (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at

347-48). "It is improper as a matter of law for an ALJ to

discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not

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fully corroborated by objective medical findings." Cotton, 799

F.2d at 1407; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Once a claimant meets the Cotton test, "the Commissioner may

not discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms

merely because they are unsupportable by objective evidence. 

Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is

malingering, the Commissioner's reason for rejecting the claimant's

testimony must be 'clear and convincing.'" Lester, 81 F.3d at 834

(quoting Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989));

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. When outlining the findings supporting a

conclusion that a plaintiff's testimony is incredible, the ALJ must

consider "all of the available evidence" in analyzing the severity

of the claimed pain. SSR 88-13. Factors to be analyzed include:

(1) the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation,

and intensity of any pain; (2) precipitating and aggravating

factors; (3) type, dosage, effectiveness and adverse side effects

of any pain medications; (4) treatment, other than medication, for

relief of pain; (5) functional restrictions; and (6) the

plaintiff's daily activities. Id.; see Fair, 885 F.2d at 603

(types of activities ALJ may rely on to find pain allegations

credible include the type of daily activities performed by

plaintiff and whether plaintiff sought or followed treatment);

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding

rejection of plaintiff's alleged pain justified where plaintiff had

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little evidence of spinal abnormalities, had not used strong pain

medication, had not participated in pain management or physical

therapy, and limited daily activities by choice not necessity). 

However, medical evidence is still relevant in determining the

severity of a plaintiff's alleged pain and its disabling effects. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857

(9th Cir. 2001). 

In support of Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony,

including lower back pain and abdominal pain, she presented

objective medical evidence of her physical impairments as required

by the Cotton test. Because the ALJ cites no affirmative evidence

that Plaintiff is malingering, she must present clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony.

In support of her determination that Plaintiff was not

credible, the ALJ cited Plaintiff's testimony that she went

downhill skiing once a year during 2001, 2002 and 2003, a time when

she claims to have been disabled; drove a church youth group on a

five-hour trip to Mount Shasta in 2001; looked for work in 2003;

and was raising her grandson, who was seventeen years old at the

time of the hearing. (AR 24.) The ALJ stated that Plaintiff was

not credible regarding the extent of her pain because she "attends

church, uses a treadmill and stationary bicycle, goes to her

grandson's school events, travels to Santa Rosa and north of Ukiah,

uses a computer and drives." (Id.) The ALJ included these

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activities in a paragraph discussing Plaintiff's activities of

daily living. Although it is obvious that Plaintiff was not

involved in all of these activities every day, they are relevant to

whether or not Plaintiff's testimony is credible because the

activities she performed during the time when she claimed to be

disabled are not consistent with the activities of a person who is

disabled from knee and hip pain. Therefore, the ALJ properly

considered them in her analysis that Plaintiff's claim of

disability is not entirely credible.

Citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998),

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not accurately characterize

Plaintiff's testimony and thus the decision is not supported by

substantial evidence. Plaintiff points out that the ALJ stated

that Plaintiff "attends church," but Plaintiff testified that she

tries to "go to church every week" (AR 24, 307); the ALJ stated

that Plaintiff "cooks," but Plaintiff testified that she cooks

"light meals" (AR 24, 318); the ALJ stated that Plaintiff uses a

treadmill and a stationary bike, but Plaintiff reported that she is

no longer doing so because using them made her pain worse (AR 24,

320); the ALJ stated that Plaintiff "goes to Santa Rosa," but

Plaintiff testified that she's "been to Santa Rosa" (AR 24, 322);

and the ALJ stated that Plaintiff "travels north of Ukiah," but

Plaintiff testified that she went to Ukiah once for a wedding and

her grandson helped her drive (AR 24, 323). 

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In Reddick, the plaintiff attested that her activities were

sporadic and punctuated with rest due to chronic fatigue syndrome

(CFS). Id. The court found that the evidentiary basis for the

ALJ's decision did not properly characterize the plaintiff's

testimony, including the content or tone of the record, and held

that there was considerable evidence in the record to belie the

ALJ's conclusions. Id. at 723-724. 

This case is distinguishable from Reddick because here the ALJ

did not misunderstand or mischaracterize Plaintiff's testimony in

any substantial way. 

Furthermore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not fully comply

with medical advice because she rejected cortisone shots, failed to

undertake the home physical therapy program prescribed by physical

therapist Bob Hassett and refused to have total knee replacement

surgery. (Id.) The ALJ also noted the fact that Plaintiff's

testimony that her pain had averaged eight and a half out of ten

since 2001 was not consistent with medical records that report that

she had a pain level of three out of ten in July, 2002 and a level

of four to six out of ten in October, 2002. (Id.) 

Based on the above, the Court finds that the ALJ supported her

credibility determination with clear and convincing reasons. 

III. Failure to Address Lay Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because she failed to

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address the lay testimony from Plaintiff's neighbor and from her

former supervisor.

In a claim for disability benefits, the ALJ will consider

"observations by non-medical sources" as evidence of the claimant's

impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(e)(2). Lay witness testimony by

friends, neighbors, and family members in a position to observe the

claimant's symptoms is competent evidence and, therefore, cannot be

disregarded without comment. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232

(9th Cir. 1987); Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 2050, 2053. Therefore,

if the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of lay witnesses, he

must give reasons pertinent to each witness. Id. If the ALJ fails

to address competent lay testimony favorable to the claimant, the

error cannot be considered harmless unless a reviewing court "can

confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting

the testimony, could have reached a different disability

determination." Id. at 1056.

In her decision, the ALJ did not address the letters from

Plaintiff's neighbor and her former supervisor. However, the

witnesses' statements about Plaintiff's pain and the reasons she

retired are necessarily based on Plaintiff's statements to them. 

The remaining information offered by these witnesses merely repeats

information in Plaintiff's medical records which the ALJ considered

in her analysis: doctors' appointments, pain medication, surgery

and possible knee replacement surgery. Therefore, no reasonable

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ALJ could have reached a different disability determination based

on the letters. Accordingly, this claim does not support

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or remand.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment or for remand is denied and Defendant's cross-motion for

summary judgment is granted. Judgment shall enter accordingly. 

Each party shall bear her own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/2/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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