Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02399/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02399-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2399

___________

Green Acres Enterprises, Inc.; Green *

Acres Land & Cattle Co.; Robert *

Jenkins; Kris Jenkins; Karl Jenkins; *

Marsha Jenkins; Hugh Jenkins; Barbara *

Jenkins; W. K. Jenkins; M. Earlene *

Jenkins; Mary Ann Green; Karla *

Jenkins Wilson; Patricia Inglish, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Appellants, * Western District of Missouri.

*

v. *

*

United States of America, *

*

Appellee. *

*

______________________ *

*

Pacific Legal Foundation, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of *

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 11, 2005

Filed: August 10, 2005 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

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The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Green Acres Enterprises, Green Acres Land & Cattle Co., and the individual

owners of each entity (collectively, the landowners) appeal from the district court’s1

grant of the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We affirm.

I.

The landowners are the former owners of two large properties located along the

Marmaton River—also known as the Little Osage River—in Missouri (the “Green

Acres farm” and the “Richter farm”). Until April 1998, the landowners farmed

portions of both properties and leased other portions to third-party farmers, who

planted and harvested the crops on the leased land for themselves. Since the 1960s,

each property had been protected from flooding by two large levee systems, which

were each composed of the levees themselves, a system of internal drainage ditches,

and large pumps that served to draw water from the farms and drainage ditches to the

river through pipes embedded in the levees.

Both levee systems, however, suffered extensive damage in the great flood of

1993. The landowners subsequently commenced repairs to the levee systems in the

spring of 1994. The government, claiming that such repairs violated the terms of

easements granted in favor of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps),

obtained an injunction prohibiting the landowners from carrying out the repairs. The

landowners appealed, and we held that the easements did not require the landowners

to obtain the Corps’s consent prior to repairing the levee systems. United States v.

Green Acres Enters., Inc., 86 F.3d 130, 135 (8th Cir. 1996) (Green Acres I).

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Although we held in Green Acres I that the landowners did not require the

Corps’s consent in order to commence repairs, see 86 F.3d at 135, the easements

themselves state that any use of the land must comply with federal and state water

quality laws.

3

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into navigable

waters, including “waters of the United States,” except in compliance with certain

statutory exemptions and permitting procedures. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7)

(definition of navigable waters), 1362(12)(A) (definition of discharge). Materials that

qualify as pollutants are, inter alia, dredged spoil, rock, and sand. 33 U.S.C. §

1362(6).

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Accordingly, we reversed and remanded the case to the district court with instructions

to vacate the injunction.2

 Id.

 In late 1996, the landowners sought to continue with and complete the repairs

to the Green Acres farm levee. The proposed repairs consisted of: (1) excavation of

the area surrounding a pump intake to allow the intake to operate properly; (2)

excavation of a drainage ditch system to remove silt and sediment deposited there by

flooding; (3) expansion of the levee at the pump station to enable vehicles to turn

around when fueling the pump; and (4) restoration of various damaged portions of the

levee to return them to pre-flood height. The landowners requested a formal

determination from the Corps—pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(6)—that the repairs

would not be subject to or would otherwise be exempted from the Clean Water Act

(33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, et seq.).3

In February 1997, the Corps sent a letter responding to the landowners’ request

(the “February 3 letter”) and determined that a portion of the proposed work would

require a specific Clean Water Act permit (known as a “section 404 permit”) because,

in the Corps’s opinion, the work would involve a discharge of dredged or fill material

into the wetlands surrounding the levee system. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (dredged and

fill material discharge permits); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (“waters of the United States”

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Although the landowners initially disputed that the Corps had determined that

the levee maintenance exception was inapplicable, the Corps clarified that

determination in a subsequent letter. The Corps contended that while the levee

maintenance exception applied to activities on the levee itself, it did not apply to

excavation or dredging activities conducted in connection therewith.

5

The American Mining Congress I court defined incidental fallback as “the

incidental soil movement from excavation, such as the soil that is disturbed when dirt

is shoveled, or the back-spill that comes off a bucket and falls back into the same

place from which it was removed.” 951 F. Supp. at 270.

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include wetlands adjacent to protected waters). The Corps also determined that a

number of nationwide permits (covering activities for which the landowners would

not be required to seek individual approval) were inapplicable to the proposed work

and that most of the proposed work was ineligible for either the Clean Water Act’s

levee maintenance exception, see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(B), or its ditch maintenance

exception, see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(C).4

The February 3 letter sparked an extended and increasingly contentious series

of correspondence between the landowners and the Corps. In their initial response

to the February 3 letter, the landowners disputed that the nationwide permits and the

ditch maintenance exception were inapplicable. More importantly, the landowners

argued that the Corps’s determination that a permit was required for the proposed

work was squarely in violation of a nationwide injunction entered against the Corps

by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in American Mining

Congress v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997)

(American Mining Congress I). The injunction prohibited the Corps from enforcing

the so-called Tulloch Rule, which had previously allowed the Corps to exercise Clean

Water Act jurisdiction over all excavation activities, including those that resulted

only in “incidental fallback,” on the theory that such activities almost always resulted

in a discharge into waters of the United States.5

 Id. at 270 & n.3. 

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The landowners contended that the February 3 letter violated the injunction

both generally by asserting Clean Water Act jurisdiction over the proposed work in

the first instance and specifically by making the following statement:

As you may know, because of a recent Federal case [(American Mining

Congress I)], the Corps has been directed to suspend enforcement of the

[Tulloch Rule] until the issue is ultimately settled in the courts.

However, until the Courts rule on the efficacy of the Tulloch Rule, we

advise you to not perform any work which would be considered a

discharge under the [Tulloch Rule]. 

 

The landowners asserted that these acts showed a conscious decision on the part of

the Corps to disregard the American Mining Congress I injunction. The Corps

clarified its position regarding the injunction in a subsequent letter (the March 13

letter):

[O]ur February 3, 1997 letter states “...the Corps has been directed to

suspend enforcement of the [Tulloch Rule] until the issue is ultimately

settled in the courts.” That remains our position. Our next statement

“...we advise you to not perform any work which would be considered

a discharge under the [Tulloch Rule].” is ambiguous and [we] will

clarify it.

Potential permit activities proposing activities involving only

incidental fallback, will not be required to obtain individual permits.

...

Our past experience with the work performed at the Green Acres

and Richter Farms is that it has involved bulldozer work where soil was

redeposited from one place to another in waters of the United States by

bulldozer blades, while trees, limbs, vegetation, root wads and brush

were pushed into stockpiles, and land was leveled. These kinds of

activities result in more than “incidental fallback”.

Correspondence between the landowners and the Corps continued for eight

months, with the landowners arguing that the Corps’s assertion of jurisdiction

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Counts 3 and 4 were voluntarily dismissed.

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violated the American Mining Congress I injunction and the Corps maintaining that

its actions fully comported with the injunction and, accordingly, that the proposed

projects on both the Green Acres farm and the Richter farm—which the landowners

detailed in another request for a 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(6) ruling—were properly

subject to the Clean Water Act. Finally, in November 1997, the landowners agreed

to sell both properties to the Missouri Department of Conservation. The sale was

consummated in April 1998.

In June 2002, the landowners filed suit against the government in the United

States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, pursuant to the Federal Tort

Claims Act (FTCA). Their complaint sought monetary relief on four counts: (1)

trespass; (2) nuisance; (3) substantive due process violations; and (4) inverse

condemnation. The government moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to dismiss for failure to state a claim or to

grant summary judgment. The district court found that counts 1 and 2 failed the

FTCA’s private analogue requirement, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), and were further

barred by the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). It

therefore concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear those claims and granted

the government’s motion to dismiss.6

 See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

II.

We review a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction de novo, placing the burden of proving the existence of subject

matter jurisdiction on the plaintiff. V S Ltd. Partnership v. Dept. of Housing and

Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). Because jurisdiction is a threshold

question, the court may look outside the pleadings in order to determine whether

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subject matter jurisdiction exists. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 728-30

(8th Cir. 1990).

The FTCA waives federal sovereign immunity and grants federal district courts

jurisdiction over a certain category of claims against the United States only to the

extent that a private person, under like circumstances, would be liable to the plaintiff

under the substantive law of the state where the alleged wrongful conduct took place

(in this case, Missouri). Washington v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 183 F.3d 868, 873

(8th Cir. 1999). Thus, to state a claim that is cognizable under the FTCA, a claim

against the government must have a “private analogue”; in other words, the claim

must be such that a similarly situated private party would be liable for the same

conduct in Missouri. Id.; Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915, 917 (11th Cir.

1991).

The landowners contend that a private analogue to their claims against the

government exists because, under Missouri law, the violation of an injunction

supports claims for trespass and nuisance if all other elements of the claims are

satisfied. Even assuming, arguendo, that this statement is true as a matter of law, the

landowners’ argument fails because the Corps did not violate the American Mining

Congress I injunction. 

The landowners assert that the injunction prevented the Corps from asserting

jurisdiction over any excavation activities. As both the District of Columbia Circuit

and the district court that issued the injunction later explained, however, the

injunction prohibited the Corps only from regulating excavation that produced

incidental fallback. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,

145 F.3d 1399, 1403-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2000) (American Mining

Congress II). Even after the issuance of the injunction, the Corps was permitted to

exercise jurisdiction over excavation activities that produced more than incidental

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fallback. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1405; American Mining Congress II,

120 F. Supp. 2d at 28-29. 

Our review of the correspondence between the landowners and the Corps

indicates that, rather than asserting unqualified jurisdiction over all excavation

activities, the Corps simply stated a single position: that it believed that the

landowners’ proposed projects were subject to the Clean Water Act because it

believed that the projects would produce more than incidental fallback. The March

13 letter stated this position explicitly, and the Corps’s subsequent correspondence

with the landowners repeatedly reaffirmed it. Given the “considerable deference”

shown by the District of Columbia Circuit toward the Corps’s attempt (post-American

Mining Congress I) to distinguish between incidental fallback and regulable

redeposits, see Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1405, we cannot say that the Corps’s

attempts to do so in this case violated the American Mining Congress I injunction.

The language contained in the February 3 letter does not alter our conclusion.

Although the landowners construe the Corps’s “advice” to them as an implicit threat

to enforce the Tulloch Rule even after the imposition of the American Mining

Congress I injunction, that language is tempered by the Corps’s representation that

it was doing so only because the validity of the Tulloch Rule had not been squarely

settled by the courts. In short, because the Corps could have filed either a motion for

reconsideration in the district court or a notice of appeal to the District of Columbia

Circuit—and in fact filed both—the statement in the February 3 letter warned the

landowners that they might be subject to enforcement actions by the Corps in the

event that the Tulloch Rule was upheld on reconsideration or on appeal. At worst,

the statement, when taken as a whole, is ambiguous (as the Corps acknowledged in

its March 13 letter, which was in turn a response to a March 5, 1997, letter from the

landowners’ counsel challenging the Corps’s assertion of jurisdiction over the

landowners’ proposed work), and is clarified when read in concert with the Corps’s

other correspondence with the landowners.

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Because we hold that the landowners have not satisfied the private analogue

requirement, we need not address the separate question of whether the discretionary

function exception of the FTCA applies in this case. Klett v. Pim, 965 F.2d 587, 590

n.5 (8th Cir. 1992).

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Because the Corps’s assertion of probable jurisdiction did not violate the

American Mining Congress I injunction, the landowners may satisfy the private

analogue requirement only if they show that a private person under like

circumstances, i.e., one who allegedly wrongfully determines that certain proposed

excavation projects are subject to the Clean Water Act, would be liable for trespass

and nuisance under Missouri law for engaging in such action. Because the Corps

alone has the authority to enforce the Clean Water Act and to make permit decisions,

see 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.2, 326.1-326.6, no private analogue exists for the relevant

conduct in this case. Thus, the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply,

and the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.7

The judgment is affirmed.

BEAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the court. I would, instead, reverse

the district court and remand this matter for a determination of liability and damages.

The appellants suffered substantial damage to their farmland as a result of the

catastrophic flood of 1993 on the Missouri River and its tributaries. Officials of the

United States Corps of Engineers (Corps) apparently saw this unfortunate occurrence

as an opportunity to help the Missouri Department of Conservation (MDC) obtain

title to appellants’ farm property. MDC wanted this land because of its view that the

property provided a strategic connection between two important state-owned wildlife

refuges. Accordingly, the Corps appears to have instituted a plan to use (actually

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misuse) governmental power to render the land valueless for agricultural purposes,

thus coercing a sale of the property to MDC.

The strategy commenced with the Corps’ effort to interfere with appellants’

attempt to fix levees damaged by the flood, remove sediment deposits and repair

drains. After preliminary contacts by Corps’ employees, which contacts carried with

them the obvious inference of Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA),

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), over at least some details of the restoration effort, the Corps

sought and obtained a United States District Court injunction prohibiting appellants’

work, some of which was underway. As noted by the court, we reversed this

injunction order and assessed fees and costs against the Corps, noting the weakness

of its legal position in the litigation. Judge Wollman’s opinion in this earlier case

highlights some of the inconsistent acts of the Corps. He said:

Although the government has vigorously asserted, both in the court

below and on appeal, that this is not a Clean Water Act case but is

instead an action for breach of contract, the only irreparable harm the

government has asserted is the landowners’ alleged violation of the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. The government has,

however, refused to address any of the landowners’ arguments that their

actions do not violate the Clean Water Act. The government cannot

have it both ways.

United States v. Green Acres Enters., Inc., 86 F.3d 130, 133 (8th Cir. 1996). Losing

on the contract litigation, the Corps undertook a bait and switch approach in which

it attempted to assert both CWA jurisdiction and uncertainty about CWA jurisdiction,

depending upon which approach seemed most expedient at the moment. In my view,

these activities spawned a “federal tort claim,” providing the appellants a valid cause

of action in this case.

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Footnote 8 of the Corps’ brief explains that “[a]s of January 1994, pursuant

to an interagency Memorandum of Agreement, the delineation of wetlands

(determination of whether land has the status of wetland) made by the [NRCS] on

agricultural lands was to be used by the Corps and the EPA as the official delineation

for the purpose of determining § 404 wetland jurisdiction.”

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As outlined in more detail later, the Corps told appellants that they needed an

excavation permit required under section 404 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). But,

the Corps has no jurisdiction under the CWA unless the proposed activities would

result in discharges into the “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),

1362(7), 1362(12)(A). “If an activity takes place outside the waters of the United

States, or if it does not involve a discharge [of prohibited pollutants], it does not need

a section 404 permit, whether or not it is part of an established farming, silviculture

or ranching operation.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii). Waters of the United States

include “wetlands.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2). So, unless appellants’ farmland was

classified as “wetlands” under the Act, the Corps had no jurisdiction over the work

proposed by appellants. Yet, even though authorized to determine jurisdiction under

the CWA, 33 C.F.R. § 325.9, the Corps failed to make this determination at any time.

Indeed, it refused to do so while at the same time threatening appellants with the

imposition of onerous CWA remedies. This refusal likely stemmed from the Corps’

belief that the long established farmable lands were not “wetlands” at all.

The Corps’ brief in this appeal discloses that as late as September 15, 1997,

well after the Tulloch Rule injunction violation, there had been no Natural Resources

Conservation Service (NRCS) delineation of wetlands for appellants’ property.8

 The

record establishes repeated attempts by the appellants to have the Corps seek such a

delineation and repeated refusals by the Corps to do so. Within this jurisdiction/no

jurisdiction framework came the February 1997 letter at issue in this case.

Janie Cavitt, an attorney in the Office of Counsel of the Kansas City District

of the Corps, speaking on behalf of the Acting District Engineer, Ronald Janak,

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In 1986, the Corps issued a regulation purporting to implement its section 404

CWA congressional authorization. In 1993, the Corps, in response to litigation

instituted by environmental groups, revised the regulation, greatly expanding its

claimed jurisdictional authority. The revised regulation became known as the Tulloch

Rule. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. United States Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1401-02

(D.C. Cir. 1998). The Tulloch Rule was then challenged in American Mining

Congress v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997).

This litigation resulted in a nationwide injunction entered by the District Court of the

District of Columbia on January 23, 1997, prohibiting implementation of the

regulation. Although stayed for a period of time beginning on June 25, 1997, the

injunction was in full force and effect during all times relevant to this action and was

ultimately affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit in 1998. National Mining Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1410.

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(clearly inferring Corps’ jurisdiction without any attempt to address the jurisdiction

issue) sent the February 3, 1997, letter stating, in part:

As you may know, because of a recent Federal case, the Corps has been

directed to suspend enforcement of the excavation rule until the issue is

ultimately settled in the courts. However, until the Courts rule on the

efficacy of the Tulloch[9] Rule, we advise you to not perform any work

which would be considered a discharge under the excavation rule.

Yet, at this point, the district court of the District of Columbia had indeed ruled

on “efficacy of the Tulloch Rule,” enjoining its implementation. The injunction was

in full force and effect and fully binding on the Corps at all times relevant to the

Corps’ actions at issue in this case. Without withdrawing its obvious violation of the

injunction, the Corps, in a follow-up letter dated April 28, 1997, expanded its

warning, speculating on the potential for additional CWA violations. All of this

occurred, as earlier indicated, without any determination by the Corps that appellants’

property was within the CWA jurisdiction of the Corps.

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Applying such tactics the Corps was again trying to have it “both ways.” That

is, it acted like it had section 404 CWA wetland jurisdiction while at the same time

insisting that it had no obligation to seek the NRCS determination. This approach

was likely dictated, as earlier noted, by the Corps’ recognition that the appellants’

farmland was very likely not CWA wetlands.

Whether or not the Corps had authority to interfere with the appellants’

property rights, it did so. In the process, it violated the Tulloch Rule injunction to the

clear detriment of appellants. In Missouri, evidence of the violation of an injunction

with full knowledge of its terms provides the basis for recovery of damages in tort.

Coleman v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1184, 1192 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that violation of a

viable injunction establishes a tort action remediable through the Federal Tort Claims

Act); State ex inf. Ashcroft v. Kansas City Firefighters Local No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99,

109-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that union’s act in defiance of court injunction

with knowledge of its contents provides basis for a tort recovery for damages);

Coonis v. Rogers, 429 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. 1968) (holding that violation of court

injunction by interfering with contract right with full knowledge of situation provides

tort claim supporting recovery for damages). This precedent establishes the private

analogue requirement of the FTCA.

I further note that the discretionary function defense in the FTCA does not

shield the Corps. Under the facts presented in this action, no properly assertable

element of judgment or choice was available to the Corps when it decided to violate

the injunction.

I would reverse and remand for trial.

______________________________

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