Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05209/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 4, 1998 Decided July 17, 1998

No. 97-5209

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Appellee

v.

National Children's Center, Inc.,

Appellee

Lillie Grier, Individually and as Mother and Next Friend of

Linita Grier,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv00642)

Melissa Rhea argued the cause for appellant. James W.

Taglieri was on the brief.

Alan D. Titus argued the cause for appellees. H. Alan

Young, Thomas L. McCally and William J. Carter were on

the brief.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Silberman and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Lillie Grier appeals from the

district court's denial of her motion to intervene for the

limited purpose of obtaining access to documents under seal

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and to depositions covered by a protective order. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying

the motion, and accordingly vacate and remand.

I.

On March 10, 1995, Grier filed suit in the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia against the National Children's

Center ("NCC" or "Center"), Steve Austin (a bus driver

employed by NCC), and the District of Columbia. The

complaint stemmed from an alleged sexual assault of Grier's

blind and mentally handicapped daughter, who received care

at the Center. Grier alleged that Austin, when he was

supposed to be driving the younger Grier to her home,

sexually assaulted her while she was in the supervision of the

Center on July 24, 1994. Grier sought recovery from the

defendants based on claims of assault, battery, negligence,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Upon agreement of all parties, the District was dismissed

as a party shortly after the filing of the complaint. Following

discovery, the Superior Court granted NCC's motion for

summary judgment, concluding that Grier had failed to offer

any evidence that Austin had acted within the scope of

employment.

A few months later, we issued our decision in EEOC v.

National Children's Center, Inc., 98 F.3d 1406 (D.C. Cir.

1996) ("NCC"). The underlying suit was a Title VII action

brought against NCC in response to allegations of sexual

harassment, including both quid pro quo and hostile work

environment. After the filing of EEOC's action, two employees of the Center intervened as plaintiffs and alleged violations of Title VII and state law. The parties eventually

settled all suits, and a consent decree was entered in the

EEOC action. Over the Commission's objection, the district

court sealed the consent decree and portions of the record,

and also issued a protective order that prohibited the use of

the depositions taken in the case. Upon review, we reversed

the district court's order sealing the consent decree, and

remanded the case so that the district court could explain

both its decision to seal portions of the record and its decision

to issue a protective order as to the depositions. Specifically,

we required the district court to articulate its reasons for

sealing the record in light of the six factors delineated in

United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and

to consider whether "good cause" existed for issuance of a

protective order as explained in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).

After becoming aware of our ruling while reading The

Daily Washington Law Reporter, Grier suspected that there

might be additional information as to whether NCC knew or

should have known about the misconduct of its employees.

Grier searched through portions of the record not covered by

the district court's order, and discovered that Ron Austin,

NCC's Transportation Director and the brother of Steve

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Austin, had been the subject of a number of sexual harassment complaints in connection with his work at NCC. Grier

also learned that three former employees had filed sexual

harassment claims of their own against NCC. Based on this

new information, Grier filed a motion with the Superior Court

to vacate the order of summary judgment. The court granted the motion, observing that it appeared from the motion

and the attachments that NCC "may have been aware of

complaints about Defendant Steve Austin prior to the filing of

the instant action."

Before responding to our decision, the district court ruled

on a motion to intervene filed by the three women who had

brought sexual harassment claims against NCC. The movUSCA Case #97-5209 Document #367557 Filed: 07/17/1998 Page 3 of 13
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ants sought access to the sealed documents and to the

depositions covered by the protective order in NCC. The

court first granted their motion to intervene, observing that

"[i]ntervention is the proper vehicle by which third parties

should seek to alter protective orders and obtain access to

sealed documents even after a case is over...." The court

then ruled that they should have access to the documents and

depositions, subject to a protective order that restricted their

use and prohibited their public dissemination. The court

explained that the movants were "pursuing nearly identical

litigation against the same defendant in this Court and have a

significant interest in obtaining access to the documents in

the instant case." Granting access to the materials, the court

added, would "serve[ ] the interests of justice as well as

judicial economy, since plaintiff-intervenors might reasonably

seek to re-depose the participants in this case if they were

denied access."

Upon remand, the district court decided that a majority of

the Hubbard factors weighed in favor of keeping the documents under seal, except for three exhibits that it decided to

release. The court also found that good cause existed for

issuing the protective order, reasoning that the release of

untested allegations of wrongdoing would serve no useful

purpose and would invade the personal privacy of the individuals who were involved. Neither the EEOC nor NCC appealed the court's order.

Shortly thereafter, Grier filed a motion with the district

court to intervene in NCC. Like the three movants who had

successfully intervened before her, Grier sought intervention

so that she could obtain access to the documents under seal

and to the depositions covered by the protective order. The

district court denied her motion without explanation.

Grier filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

Third parties who seek to intervene in an action in federal

court must proceed according to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Rule 24 outlines two different avenues by

which a court can allow an outsider to intervene--intervention of right, and permissive intervention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.

This case involves only a motion for permissive intervention,

as Grier has never asserted that she had a right to intervene

in the NCC action.

Before addressing the issue of whether the district court

should have granted Grier's particular motion to intervene,

we pause to address the anterior question of whether intervention is a procedurally appropriate course for third-party

challenges to confidentiality orders.

A.

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Rule 24(b) sets the basic parameters for permissive intervention: "Upon timely application anyone may be permitted

to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United

States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an

applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a

question of law or fact in common." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

When "exercising its discretion," the district court "shall

consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." Id.

On its face, Rule 24(b) would appear to be a questionable

procedural basis for a third-party challenge to a confidentiality order. Absent a statutory basis for intervention, Rule

24(b) requires that the would-be intervenor advance a "claim

or defense" that shares a common question with the claims of

the original parties, with the apparent goal of disposing of

related controversies together. See Diamond v. Charles, 476

U.S. 54, 76 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The words

'claim or defense' manifestly refer to the kinds of claims or

defenses that can be raised in courts of law as part of an

actual or impending law suit ...."); see also Security Insurance Co. v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995)

("Perhaps the most obvious benefits of intervention in general

are the efficiency and consistency that result from resolving

related issues in a single proceeding."). Rule 24(c), which

establishes the procedure for intervention, similarly requires

the movant to "serve a motion to intervene upon the parties,"

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and to include "a pleading setting forth the claim or defense

for which intervention is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). This

language appears to limit permissive intervention to circumstances in which the putative intervenor seeks to become

involved in an action in order to litigate a legal claim or

defense on the merits. Intervenors such as Grier, however,

do not seem to fit within these parameters. Grier does not

seek to resolve an issue on the merits that is in common with

the claims of parties to the main action, but simply wants

access to materials gathered or prepared by the original

parties in the course of their litigation. Nonetheless, despite

the lack of a clear fit with the literal terms of Rule 24(b),

every circuit court that has considered the question has come

to the conclusion that nonparties may permissively intervene

for the purpose of challenging confidentiality orders. See

Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 783 (1st

Cir. 1988); Martindell v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 294 (2nd Cir. 1979); Pansy v.

Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 778 (3rd Cir. 1994); In

re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 589 F.2d 786, 789 (5th

Cir. 1979); Meyer Goldberg, Inc. v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823

F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1987); Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc.

v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1994);

Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Insurance Co., 966

F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Insurance Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990).

Several courts have interpreted the "claim or defense" language to apply to suits brought in other jurisdictions, see, e.g.,

United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427; Meyer Goldberg,

Inc., 823 F.2d at 162, while other courts have allowed outsiders such as newspapers to intervene, even though they did

not seek the information for use in other litigation, see, e.g.,

Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777-78; Grove Fresh Distributors, 24 F.3d

at 895-96. Although a strict reading of the rule might

suggest a contrary result, courts have been willing to adopt

generous interpretations of Rule 24(b) because of the need for

"an effective mechanism for third-party claims of access to

information generated through judicial proceedings." Public

Citizen, 858 F.2d at 783.

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In our prior cases, we have expressed a willingness to

adopt flexible interpretations of Rule 24 in special circumstances. See Textile Workers Union of America, CIO v.

Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (en banc)

("Obviously tailored to fit ordinary civil litigation, these provisions require other than literal application in atypical cases.");

see also id. at 768 ("[F]ailure to come within the precise

bounds of Rule 24's provisions does not necessarily bar

intervention if there is a sound reason to allow it."). In

particular, we have eschewed strict readings of the phrase

"claim or defense," allowing intervention even in "situations

where the existence of any nominate 'claim' or 'defense' is

difficult to find." Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C.

Cir. 1967) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The force of precedent therefore compels a flexible reading of

Rule 24(b). Given this flexible approach and our longstanding "tradition of public access to court records," In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1333

(D.C. Cir. 1985), we construe Rule 24(b) as an avenue for

third parties "to have their day in court to contest the scope

or need for confidentiality." Pansy, 23 F.3d at 780. Accordingly, we hold that third parties may be allowed to permissively intervene under Rule 24(b) for the limited purpose of

seeking access to materials that have been shielded from

public view either by seal or by a protective order.

B.

We turn next to the question of whether the district court

erred when it denied Grier's motion for permissive intervention. As its name would suggest, permissive intervention is

an inherently discretionary enterprise. Hodgson v. United

Mine Workers of America, 473 F.2d 118, 125 n.36 (D.C. Cir.

1972). Rule 24(b) provides that anyone "may" be permitted

to intervene if the requirements of the rule are satisfied, and

makes reference to the fact that a court must "exercis[e] its

discretion" when deciding whether to allow intervention. Cf.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (providing that anyone "shall" be

permitted to intervene in two specific circumstances). In

keeping with the wide latitude afforded to district courts

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under the rule, we review the denial of a motion for permissive intervention under the abuse of discretion standard.

Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575

(D.C. Cir. 1997).

In order to litigate a claim on the merits under Rule

24(b)(2), the putative intervenor must ordinarily present: (1)

an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction; (2) a

timely motion; and (3) a claim or defense that has a question

of law or fact in common with the main action. Beckman, 966

F.2d at 473. Because the district court denied Grier's motion

to intervene, without a recorded rationale, we do not know

whether the court concluded that Grier had failed to satisfy

one or more of the requirements, or whether the court had

some other reason for denying her motion. Whatever the

district court's rationale, we conclude that the denial of

Grier's motion to intervene without further explanation constituted an abuse of discretion.

The first requirement for permissive intervention--an independent basis for jurisdiction--stems not from any explicit

language in Rule 24(b), but rather from the basic principle

that a court may not adjudicate claims over which it lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 ("These

rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction

of the United States district courts...."). Prior to the

enactment of the current statute governing supplemental

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. s 1367, courts granted intervention as

of right without requiring an independent jurisdictional basis,

on the theory that such claims were within the ancillary

jurisdiction of the district courts. See Turner/Ozanne v.

Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1319 (7th Cir. 1997). Permissive intervention, in contrast, has always required an independent basis for jurisdiction. See 7C Charles Alan Wright et

al., Federal Practice and Procedure s 1917, at 464-70 (2nd

ed. 1986); 6 Moore's Federal Practice s 24.22 (3rd ed. 1998).

Requiring an independent basis for jurisdiction makes sense

in cases involving permissive intervention, because the typical

movant asks the district court to adjudicate an additional

claim on the merits. No less than the original claimants, a

third party who seeks to intervene in a federal action and

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litigate a claim on the merits must demonstrate that the claim

falls within the court's limited jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding the general requirement of an independent jurisdictional basis, courts have crafted a narrow exception when the third party seeks to intervene for the limited

purpose of obtaining access to documents protected by a

confidentiality order. See Beckman, 966 F.2d at 473; Pansy,

23 F.3d at 778 n.3. The rationale for this exception is

simple--such intervenors do not ask the district court to

exercise jurisdiction over an additional claim on the merits,

but rather to exercise a power that it already has, namely the

power to modify a previously entered confidentiality order.

See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 821

F.2d 139, 145 (2nd Cir. 1987) ("It is undisputed that a district

court retains the power to modify or lift protective orders

that it has entered."); see also 8 Charles Alan Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure s 2044.1, at 574-77 (2nd ed.

1994). An independent jurisdictional basis is simply unnecessary when the movant seeks to intervene only for the limited

purpose of obtaining access to documents covered by seal or

by a protective order, because the third party does not ask

the court to rule on the merits of a claim or defense.

Because Grier does not seek intervention to litigate a substantive claim, but rather to challenge the entry of an order

of confidentiality, the general requirement of an independent

jurisdictional basis would not prevent the district court from

granting her motion to intervene.

The second prerequisite under Rule 24(b)(2) is a timely

motion. Grier filed her motion to intervene on July 21, 1997,

almost two years after the original parties had settled the

case. Despite this considerable lapse in time, NCC concedes

that Grier's motion was timely, and we see no reason to reject

this concession. We simply note that there is a "growing

consensus among the courts of appeals that intervention to

challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a

case has been terminated." Pansy, 23 F.3d at 779; see also

United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427 (allowing intervention

three years after the case had been settled because intervention "was for the sole purpose of challenging a protective

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order"). As the Tenth Circuit explained, "Rule 24(b)'s timeliness requirement is to prevent prejudice in the adjudication

of the rights of the existing parties, a concern not present

when the existing parties have settled their dispute and

intervention is for a collateral purpose." United Nuclear

Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427.

The third requirement for permissive intervention under

Rule 24(b)(2) is a claim or defense that shares a common

question of law or fact with the main action. As we stated

above, other courts have afforded this requirement considerable breadth when the movant seeks to intervene for the

collateral purpose of challenging a confidentiality order. Several courts have held that the movant can satisfy the requirement by raising a common question in a suit in another

jurisdiction. See United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427;

Meyer Goldberg, Inc., 823 F.2d at 162. Other courts have

gone so far as to hold that the issue of the scope or need for

the confidentiality order itself presents a common question

that links the movant's challenge with the main action. See

Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777-78.

We need not conclude, as the Third Circuit appears to have

done in Pansy, that the commonality requirement is satisfied

whenever a third party objects to a confidentiality order,

because Grier's suit in the Superior Court plainly shares

common questions with the main action in NCC. The actions

brought by the EEOC and Grier have a number of factual

similarities: both suits were brought against NCC, based on

acts of sexual misconduct, that were allegedly committed by

NCC employees (two of the alleged perpetrators, it turns out,

were brothers), in the transportation department, during

roughly the same period of time. Grier's action is likely to

raise questions about the operation of the Center that were

also raised in the EEOC action, including whether there is a

pattern of sexual misconduct at the Center, whether NCC

knew or should have known about the alleged malfeasance of

its employees, whether NCC employees received adequate

training and supervision, whether NCC took sufficient steps

to prevent such incidents, and so on. Indeed, in a motion to

seal the record filed with the district court, NCC came close

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to conceding not only that there may be common questions,

but also that the record material in NCC might shed light on

the substance of Grier's suit: the Center specifically asked

the court to "seal those pleadings which are part of the record

which make reference to rape, sexual activities and sexually

offensive conduct...." Defendant National Children's Center, Inc.'s Supplement to its Motion to Seal the Record,

EEOC v. NCC, No. 94-0642, at Docket No. 153.

The Center, quite tellingly we believe, does not deny that

some of the material covered by the confidentiality order

might be useful to Grier in her action in Superior Court.

Instead, the Center draws attention to the legal and factual

differences between the two cases. It reminds us, for example, that the action brought by the EEOC dealt with the

sexual harassment of NCC employees, whereas Grier's suit in

Superior Court involves an alleged assault of a student/client

of NCC. We think, however, that the Center misses the

message of the case law that it repeatedly cites in its brief,

which is that "no particularly strong nexus of fact or law need

exist between the two suits" when a nonparty seeks to

intervene for the sole purpose of gaining access to documents

subject to a confidentiality order. United Nuclear Corp., 905

F.2d at 1427; see also Beckman, 966 F.2d at 474; Meyer

Goldberg, Inc., 823 F.2d at 164; Pansy, 23 F.3d at 778.

Indeed, courts have explicitly held that "specificity, e.g., that

the claim involve ... the same legal theory [as the main

action], is not required when intervenors are not becoming

parties to the litigation." Beckman, 966 F.2d at 474.

In sum, Grier plainly satisfied all three of the requirements

for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). We do not

know the basis for the district court's denial of her motion,

but if it was premised upon the misapprehension that Grier

had failed to satisfy one of the requirements in the rule, that

decision would warrant reversal even under the deferential

abuse of discretion standard.

C.

Our conclusion that Grier satisfied all of the requirements

of Rule 24(b)(2) does not compel the holding that the district

court committed reversible error in denying her motion to

intervene. Rule 24(b) vests district courts with considerable

discretion, providing that the court "may" allow intervention

if the requirements of the rule are met. Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(b). District courts have the discretion, in other words, to

deny a motion for permissive intervention even if the movant

established an independent jurisdictional basis, submitted a

timely motion, and advanced a claim or defense that shares a

common question with the main action. A district court's

exercise of this discretion, however, is not free from review.

As we stated above, the denial of a motion to intervene will be

reversed if the district court committed an abuse of discretion. Twelve John Does, 117 F.3d at 575.

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tion is a "very rare bird indeed." United States v. Pitney

Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 73 (2nd Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, on

the present record we cannot uphold this denial. Grier's

request for permissive intervention followed the court's consideration of a motion for intervention filed by the three

individuals who had filed a sexual harassment case against

the Center. Like Grier, the three movants sought to intervene "for the limited purpose of obtaining access to the

documents under seal and subject to protective order in this

case." The district court granted their motion to intervene,

noting that the "motion was timely" and that "[i]ntervention

is the proper vehicle by which third parties should seek to

alter protective orders and obtain access to sealed documents

even after a case is over." The court went on to hold that the

three intervenors should have access to the materials, subject

to a protective order that prohibited their public dissemination. Given the district court's decision to grant the motion

filed by those three movants, the unexplained denial of Grier's motion to intervene does not withstand scrutiny. The

lower court was presented with two different motions to

intervene in NCC, and in both instances the movants sought

intervention for the collateral purpose of obtaining access to

materials covered by the court's confidentiality order. In

both cases, the putative intervenors sought the materials for

use in litigation against the Center, and in both cases the

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underlying litigation involved allegations of sexual misconduct

by NCC's employees. The district court granted the first

motion, but denied the second without offering an explanation

for the disparate treatment. Perhaps the district court found

enough difference in the motions to support this difference in

result, but it did not provide us with a sufficient record to

support that exercise of its discretion. We therefore conclude

that we must vacate the court's decision denying without

explanation Grier's motion for permissive intervention.

III.

We vacate and remand the district court's order denying

Grier's motion for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2)

for the limited purpose of obtaining access to the materials

covered by the court's confidentiality order. We remand the

case to the district court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

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