Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20905-48/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-filed: 1/5/08 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR U.K. LTD., and

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

DEUTSCHLAND GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAMBUS INC.,

Defendant.

No. CV-00-20905 RMW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS

IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON

COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE

TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

[Re Docket Nos. 2651 and 2660]

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 2969 Filed 01/05/08 Page 1 of 12
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28 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 2

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC., 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P., 

 No. C-05-00334 RMW

[Re Docket No. 564 and 569]

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P.,

Defendants.

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

U.S.A.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-02298 RMW

[Re Docket No. 409 and 411]

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., and

MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,

INC.

Defendants.

No. C-06-00244 RMW

[Re Docket No. 251 and 256]

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 2969 Filed 01/05/08 Page 2 of 12
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28 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 3

This order addresses two motions brought by Rambus seeking to exclude the testimony of

Dr. Christopher McArdle. Motion In Limine No. 4 challenges the reliability of his opinions on the

costs of implementing the Manufacturers' proposed alternatives to all of Rambus's technologies at

the time that SDRAM and DDR standards were being discussed at JEDEC. The motion also objects

to Dr. McArdle's competence to testify as to whether a JEDEC memory engineer would have

considered such costs in deciding what standard to adopt. Motion In Limine No. 5 seeks to exclude

Dr. McArdle's testimony relating to "lock in" costs (costs that would have been incurred by the

electronics industry in making an abrupt or gradual change away from the use of Rambus's DRAM

technologies following the adoption of the JEDEC standard). The Manufacturers jointly oppose the

motions. The court has reviewed the papers and considered the arguments of counsel. 

For the reasons set forth below, the court denies Motion In Limine No. 4 to the extent it seeks

to preclude Dr. McArdle's opinion on the cost differences between the disputed Rambus

technologies and the suggested alternative approaches and grants the motion insofar as it seeks to

exclude Dr. McArdle's opinion on the effect these cost differentials would have had on the decisionmakers at JEDEC. The court denies Motion In Limine No. 5 to the extent that Dr. McArdle may

testify about the "lock-in" phenomenon generally and how the Manufacturers would incur switching

costs were they to make a gradual change away from the use of Rambus's technologies in DRAM

products. Dr. McArdle may not testify as to his "abrupt change" scenario, nor may he testify to his

dollar estimates of "lock-in" damages in the "gradual change" scenario.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. An expert must

be qualified by virtue of his or her "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Fed. R.

Evid. 702. Experience is often the only basis for reliable expert testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 702,

adv. committee note (2000). An expert who relies on experience, however, must "explain how that

experience leads to the conclusion reached, why the experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion,

and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts." Id. The court may not "simply tak[e] the

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1

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 4

expert's word for it." Id. (internal quotations omitted). To illustrate, the District Court of Alaska

recently exercised its discretion and excluded an expert's opinion based upon nothing more than a

statement of experience. Adams v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1036-37 (D.

Alaska 2005). In that case, an environmental engineer opined that a feasibility study would have

cost $1 million and a site investigation would have cost $5 million. Id. at 1036. The engineer based

his estimates on his "professional judgment and experience," but consulted no sources in making his

estimates and knew virtually nothing about the case at the time he made his estimates. Id. at 1036-

37. The court held that this explanation failed to satisfy Rule 702. Id. at 1037; accord Daubert v.

Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We've been presented with

only the experts' qualifications, their conclusions and their assurances of reliability. Under Daubert,

that's not enough.").

Nevertheless, "[a] review of the caselaw after Daubert1

 shows that the rejection of expert

testimony is the exception rather than the rule." Fed. R. Evid. 702, adv. committee note (2000). In

fact, "[i]n certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great deal of expert

testimony." Id. For example, in First Tennessee Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Barreto, the court of appeals

upheld the admission of expert testimony that a bank did not act in accordance with prudent banking

standards based upon the witness's own practical experiences in the banking industry. 268 F.3d 319,

335 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Hangarter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1017 fn

14 (9th Cir. 2004) (pointing out that cross-examination is an effective way to attack the factual basis

for an opinion).

Also, reliable testimony must be (1) "based upon sufficient facts or data," (2) "the product of

reliable principles and methods," and (3) the witness must reliably apply the principles to the facts. 

Id. "Facts or data" may include other experts' reliable opinions or hypothetical facts that are

supported by the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 702, adv. committee note (2000). 

As an initial matter, the parties here debate how a court should exercise its "gatekeeper"

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CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 5

obligation regarding expert testimony. Rambus emphasizes the "substantial danger" and "quite

misleading" nature of improper expert testimony. Mot. 4 at 3 (citing cases). The Manufacturers

contend that the court's gatekeeper role is a "limited" one and that "the standard is not that high." 

Opp. 4 at 4 (citing 4-702 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.05 (2007)). Putting aside the parties'

characterizations of the gatekeeper role, the party offering expert testimony must demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that its expert's opinions are reliable. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB

Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743-44 (3d Cir. 1994). While the court has broad discretion in deciding whether

that standard has been met, the court cannot shirk its gatekeeper duties. See General Elec. Co. v.

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142, 146 (1997); compare with id. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring). With these

standards in mind, the court addresses the challenged aspects of Dr. McArdle's opinions.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Dr. McArdle's Reports and Qualifications

Dr. McArdle has filed three reports. His first report contains his opinion regarding the costs

associated with an abrupt disruption of the availability of DRAM technologies. See Eskovitz Decl.,

Ex. A at 13 (Jan. 13, 2005) (hereinafter "McArdle I"). His second report rebuts a Rambus expert's

testimony regarding the costs of implementing various alternatives to Rambus's DRAM technologies

before any specific implementation of Rambus's technologies. See Eskovitz Decl., Ex. G at 4 (Jul. 7,

2006) (hereinafter "McArdle II"). Finally, Dr. McArdle's third report supplements the opinions he

gave in his two prior reports. See Eskovitz Decl., Ex. L at 4 (Aug. 1, 2007) (hereinafter "McArdle

III"). Dr. McArdle has now been deposed four times in connection with this litigation. See Eskovitz

Decl. at 3-4; Exs. B (deposition transcript, Nov. 17, 2005), E (deposition transcript, Apr. 20, 2006),

K (deposition transcript, Jul. 24, 2006), & M (deposition transcript, Sept. 20, 2007).

Dr. McArdle has over 25 years of experience in the electronics industry. McArdle I at 5. He

holds a Ph.D. in microelectronics and is a fellow of the Institution of Electrical Engineers. Id. Over

his career, he has been responsible for the design and manufacture of "a wide range of electronic,

microelectronic and software products." Id.

Dr. McArdle has not, however, designed or supervised the design of any DRAM chips. 

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28 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 6

Eskovitz Decl., Ex. B at 5:6-15. He acknowledged that DRAM design "is a very specialist field that,

you know, as I've said, I don't have experience." Id. at 149:24-150:8. He clarified that while the

"core memory elements of a DRAM" are specialized, the design of an interface to a DRAM is

analogous to any other digital logic work. Eskovitz Decl., Ex. K at 173:15-23. Nevertheless, he has

not designed an interface for any SDRAM, DDR SDRAM, DDR2 SDRAM, or RDRAM products. 

Id. at 173:24-174:6. He has worked for a number of companies (see McArdle I at 5), but has never

worked for a DRAM manufacturer. Eskovitz Decl., Ex. B at 144:7-9. He has no JEDEC or DRAM

standard setting experience, nor has he ever attended a JEDEC meeting or participated in any

DRAM standard-setting activities. Id. at 140:20-23, Eskovitz Decl., Ex. K at 51:10-12; Eskovitz

Decl. Ex. M at 140:14-23, 156:6-8.

B. Rambus's Objections

1. Lack of Qualifications

Rambus's primary complaints concerning Dr. McArdle's alternative cost differentials are that

Dr. McArdle lacks the requisite qualifications to render such estimates and that the estimates are

based upon Dr. McArdle's "own unsupported — and uniformed — personal opinions." Mot. at 2:10-

11. It is important to recognize that Dr. McArdle is not offering an opinion on the viability of design

alternatives but rather merely commenting on the potential difference in the costs of using those

alternatives identified by Joe McAlexander and Graham Allen compared to the costs of

implementing the Rambus technologies. Therefore, Dr. McArdle's lack of specific DRAM interface

design experience does not necessarily mean that he cannot estimate the costs of implementing

someone else's design. Dr. McArdle states in his second report that "[he is] able to comment on the

likely level of information available to [memory technology engineers] and their likely conclusions

as, during the period in question, I specified, designed and managed the design of a wide range of

products in semiconductor and other electronic technologies across a wide range of application

areas[.]" McArdle II at 8. The court finds that Dr. McArdle by education and experience has

sufficient expertise to justify offering his cost differential opinion to the jury.

2. Bases of Cost Opinion

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CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 7

Dr. McArdle's report discusses a number of factors that influence the cost of implementing

the respective technologies. In each instance, Dr. McArdle is responding to the report of a Rambus

expert, Michael Geilhufe. After discussing various factors affecting the costs of alternative

technologies, Dr. McArdle renders his estimate of the additional cost of implementing each

alternative technology identified by McAlexander and Allen over the cost of implementing the

corresponding Rambus technology. Rambus correctly points out that some of Dr. McArdle's

assumptions are based upon little, if anything, other than his purported personal experience and

knowledge. For example, Dr. McArdle in discussing amortization costs states that the industry

commonly "re-uses" chip designs, and product life cycles are longer than the one year utilized by

Mr. Geilhufe. Id. at 9. He does not explain, however, the basis of his opinion that "the cost of the

design of the interface circuits could be spread over just 5 devices (5 x 20 million = 100 million)"

and, therefore, a "more suitable figure for amortisation [sic]" is in excess of 100 millions units. Id. 

Dr. McArdle's report only justifies spreading the cost of a design over five devices rather than one

by the statement that the "approach of 'design re-use' has been followed in the industry for many

years and is a major consideration in the design of a modern product." Id. 

Nevertheless, despite some marginally supported statements, the court finds Dr. McArdle has

adequately supported his alternative cost differentials. See id. at 7-32; McArdle III at 20-23. The

court, therefore, in its discretion, finds Dr. McArdle's alternative cost differential opinion

sufficiently reliable to allow it into evidence subject, of course, to testing by cross-examination.

C. JEDEC Evaluations of the Cost of Alternative Technologies

Aside from the question of the reliability of Dr. McArdle's opinion of the difference in costs

between the Rambus technologies and the Manufacturers' proposed alternatives, Rambus challenges

Dr. McArdle's ability to testify to whether a JEDEC memory technology engineer would have

considered such costs in deciding which technology to adopt. Dr. McArdle's final conclusion is that

"the people at JEDEC making the decision would be unlikely to be convinced of which approach to

adopt purely on the basis of cost." McArdle II at 32; McArdle III at 24. Rambus's challenge focuses

on Dr. McArdle's qualifications. Rambus emphasizes that Dr. McArdle has never attended a JEDEC

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CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 8

meeting, read JEDEC minutes, or talked to anyone that has attended JEDEC. See, e.g., Eskovitz

Decl., Ex. B at 140:20-141:5. Although Dr. McArdle has years of experience in deciding what

weight to assign costs in a variety of electronics fields, the court finds that he is not qualified to

express an opinion of the effect of costs on JEDEC decisions. First, it seems to the court that costs

are inextricably intertwined with effectiveness of the design of the DRAM interface technology and

Dr. McArdle does not have that design experience. Second, he has no basis for concluding how a

JEDEC decision-maker would weigh the cost factor. Although the Manufacturers can argue that in

light of the limited cost differential, a JEDEC member voting on the standard to be adopted would

have voted against the adoption of the Rambus technology as the standard, Dr. McArdle has no

specialized knowledge on this question. Therefore, although he can testify on the cost differential of

the alternatives proposed by Allen and McAlexander, he cannot give his opinion on how a JEDEC

member would have voted.

D. Extent of "Lock In"

Rambus challenges each of Dr. McArdle's opinions on the extent of damages allegedly

caused by the DRAM industry being "locked in" to using Rambus's technologies. Dr. McArdle has

submitted two reports on the subject, which outline an "abrupt change" theory of "lock-in" damages

(McArdle I) and a "gradual change" theory of lock-in damages (McArdle III). 

1. The "Abrupt Change" Hypothesis

Dr. McArdle's "abrupt change" theory of damages begins with the assumption that

"following the dispute between Rambus and Hitachi in 2000, the DRAM technology then

predominant in the industry became abruptly unavailable and needed to be quickly replaced by a

technology which did not contain any of the features that were the substance of that dispute." 

McArdle I at 6. From that basis, Dr. McArdle concludes that major DRAM manufacturers

(Samsung, Micron, Infineon, Hynix, Nanya and Elpida) would have chosen to adopt a new DRAM

technology. Id. at 39. These companies, he asserts, would have suffered $5,538,000,000 in

damages from scrapping their inventory and losing sales and $459,948,000 in new product

introduction costs. Id. Dr. McArdle also expresses opinions on the costs imposed on other

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CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 9

industrial sectors by an abrupt unavailability of DRAM technology. See id. at 40-54.

To be admissible, expert testimony must be helpful to a jury in deciding an issue of fact. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). A

reasonable jury cannot credit testimony that fails to reflect reality. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass'n,

Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1040-42 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (granting directed

verdict on antitrust claim where plaintiffs' expert's testimony "contains entirely too many

assumptions and simplifications that are not supported by real-world evidence"). The foundation for

Dr. McArdle's "abrupt change" hypothesis and damage estimates are so unmoored from reality as to

be unhelpful to a jury. For example, he did little to verify or support design costs, the number and

volumes of allegedly affected motherboard companies and retail outlets, training expenses, costs

incurred by companies other than Hynix in developing products, and the status of Rambus licensees. 

He did no economic analysis of the industry during the time period of the "abrupt change." Another

example of the lack of reality is his failure to consider that Samsung, the largest DRAM

manufacturer at the time, was a Rambus licensee during the period of the assumed abrupt change. 

Samsung would have had no reason to scrap inventory or develop a new product when it was freely

able to continue selling licensed DRAMs. In his deposition, Dr. McArdle conceded that his analysis

did not take into account whether any DRAM manufacturers were licensed to use Rambus's

technology. See generally, Eskovitz Decl., Ex. B at 31:19-37:22. Given that some DRAM

manufacturers had licenses to use Rambus's technology, Dr. McArdle also admitted that his scenario

and testimony were inconsistent with reality. Id. at 36:10-37:13. Because Dr. McArdle's "abrupt

change" scenario has no basis in reality, it cannot be presented to the jury.

2. The "Gradual Change" Hypothesis

Dr. McArdle's most recent report builds on his prior work to introduce a theory of how much

it would have cost to gradually move away from using Rambus's claimed technology. See McArdle

III at 3. While suggesting that there are many "non-abrupt change" scenarios, Dr. McArdle in his

report describes a situation where a manufacturer would choose to develop an alternative product in

parallel with a standardized product to minimize risk. See id. at 10-13. Only after being convinced

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2 Dr. McArdle also suggests a collective radical change where an industry migrates to a

new standard all at once. He considers such a scenario unlikely. McArdle III at 12-13.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 10

that consumers would switch to an alternative product, Dr. McArdle hypothesizes, would a

manufacturer be willing to stop making the standardized product. Id. at 12.2

After describing various processes of adopting a new standard, Dr. McArdle estimates the

costs of doing so. To provide a "best-case" or lowest cost estimate, Dr. McArdle assumes that the

entire industry would adopt a changed interface technology when migrating to the next generation

memory device. Id. at 14. He then takes his estimate for engineering costs from his first report to

suggest a range for the amount the memory industry would have to spend to migrate to an alternative

standard. See id. at 15. Dr. McArdle also states that switching to a new standard would result in

lower initial yields (reflecting the industry's unfamiliarity with making a new product). Id. at 15-16. 

This would result in delays to introducing the product, and delays lead to reduced sales. Id. at 16-

19. Dr. McArdle then suggests the general magnitude of such costs. Id. at 20.

Rambus challenges Dr. McArdle's qualifications to offer such opinions, argues that Dr.

McArdle did not rely on sufficient facts or data to make his analysis reliable, and that Dr. McArdle's

methodology for approximating costs is unreliable. Rambus's arguments regarding the quality of

McArdle's data and the accuracy of his methods are meritorious. Dr. McArdle did not adequately

testify to the source of his cost data regarding DRAM design despite being asked in multiple

depositions. See Eskovitz Decl., Ex. B at 58:8-14 & Ex. M at 33:11-36:4. Dr. McArdle's first report

suggested that he relied on "interviews and teleconferences with major memory, chipset, tester, IP,

software and related organizations." See McArdle I at 9. When pressed, however, he conceded that

these "interviews and teleconferences" consisted of a total of six conversations, most around thirty

minutes long. See generally Eskovitz Decl., Ex. E at 50:10-57:18.

The Manufacturers are not making damages claims beyond their attorneys' fees. 

Accordingly, the magnitude of Dr. McArdle's "lock-in" estimates are not of critical importance. 

While Rambus's objection to how Dr. McArdle constructed his estimates is meritorious, Dr.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 11

in" and the type of economic considerations that would come into play in a gradual change to

different technology. The court finds that Dr. McArdle's background in engineering and product

development does qualify him to testify to his opinion on this subject. See McArdle I at 5. 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part Rambus's Motions In

Limine Nos. 4 and 5:

1. Dr. McArdle may testify as to his opinion on the cost differences between the disputed

Rambus technologies and the alternative approaches suggested by Allen and McAlexander;

2. Dr. McArdle is precluded from expressing an opinion on the effect these cost differentials

would have had on the decision-makers at JEDEC;

3. Dr. McArdle may testify about the "lock-in" phenomenon generally and how the

Manufacturers would incur switching costs were they to make a gradual change away from the use

of Rambus's technologies in DRAM products;

4. Dr. McArdle may not testify as to his "abrupt change" scenario; and

5. Dr. McArdle may not express an opinion on the dollar amount of "lock-in" damages in

the "gradual change" scenario.

DATED: 1/5/08 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 2969 Filed 01/05/08 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RAMBUS'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 4 & 5 RELATING TO DR.

CHRISTOPHER McARDLE'S OPINIONS ON COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND "LOCK IN" COSTS

C-00-20905; C-05-00334; C-05-02298; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 12

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Craig N. Tolliver ctolliver@mckoolsmith.com 

Pierre J. Hubert phubert@mckoolsmith.com 

Brian K. Erickson berickson@dbllp.com, 

David C. Vondle dvondle@akingump.com 

Gregory P. Stone gregory.stone@mto.com 

Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke luedtkech@mto.com 

Peter A. Detre detrepa@mto.com 

Burton Alexander Gross burton.gross@mto.com, 

Steven McCall Perry steven.perry@mto.com

Jeannine Y. Sano sanoj@howrey.com 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Matthew D. Powers matthew.powers@weil.com 

David J. Healey david.healey@weil.com 

Edward R. Reines Edward.Reines@weil.com

John D Beynon john.beynon@weil.com

Jared Bobrow jared.bobrow@weil.com

Leeron Kalay leeron.kalay@weil.com

Theodore G. Brown, III tgbrown@townsend.com

Daniel J. Furniss djfurniss@townsend.com

Jordan Trent Jones jtjones@townsend.com

Kenneth L. Nissly kennissly@thelenreid.com 

Geoffrey H. Yost gyost@thelenreid.com 

Susan Gregory van Keulen svankeulen@thelenreid.com

Patrick Lynch plynch@omm.com 

Jason Sheffield Angell jangell@orrick.com

Vickie L. Feeman vfeeman@orrick.com

Mark Shean mshean@orrick.com 

Kai Tseng hlee@orrick.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered

for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 1/5/08 TSF

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:00-cv-20905-RMW Document 2969 Filed 01/05/08 Page 12 of 12