Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07100/USCOURTS-caDC-08-07100-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 2009 Decided April 9, 2010

No. 08-7100

OSCAR SALAZAR, BY HIS PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS,

ADELA AND OSCAR SALAZAR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:93-cv-00452)

Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office

of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the

cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Peter J.

Nickles, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and

Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General. Robert C.

Utiger, Senior Assistant Attorney General, entered an

appearance.

Kathleen L. Millian argued the cause for appellees. With

her on the brief were Bruce J. Terris and Jane M. Liu.

Before: GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: In 1993, appellee

Medicaid recipients brought suit against the District of

Columbia (“the District”) alleging various violations of Title

XIX of the Social Security Act (“SSA”), 79 Stat. 343, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. III), and

its accompanying regulations. In October 1996, the District

Court held that the District was liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violating federal Medicaid requirements. Salazar v. District

of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278 (D.D.C. 1996). While judgment

was pending on an appeal by the District, the parties negotiated

a comprehensive settlement agreement setting forth detailed

requirements for the District’s operation of its Medicaid

program in compliance with the law. The District Court adopted

the agreement with an order issued on January 25, 1999.

Salazar v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 93-452, Order

Modifying the Amended Remedial Order of May 6, 1997 and

Vacating the Order of March 27, 1997 at 1-49 (D.D.C. Jan. 25,

1999) (“Settlement Order”), reprinted in Joint Appendix

(“J.A.”) 264-312.

On March 19, 2003, after repeated failures by the District

to comply with various requirements and deadlines under the

Settlement Order and related court orders, appellees moved to

establish a prospective, per diem penalty schedule of fines for

future violations. The District Court granted appellees’ motion

on July 10, 2006. Salazar v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action

No. 93-452, order at 1-3, slip op. at 1-4 (D.D.C. Jul. 7, 2006)

(“2006 Order”), reprinted in J.A. 484-90. The 2006 Order

directed appellees to file a praecipe with the District Court every

fiscal quarter, documenting any penalties allegedly accrued

during that three-month period. 

Between 2006 and 2008, appellees filed five quarterly

praecipes documenting penalties allegedly accrued by the

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District. Each praecipe was opposed by the District. On August

13, 2008, the District Court ruled on all five outstanding

praecipes and issued an order assessing $931,050 in penalties

against the District. Salazar v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action

No. 93-452, order at 1-2, slip op. at 1-15 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2008)

(“2008 Order”), reprinted in J.A. 618-35. The 2008 Order

addressed each of the praecipes separately. With respect to the

fourth praecipe, covering the third quarter of 2007, the District

Court, inter alia, assessed $370,500 in penalties for the

District’s alleged failure to “negotiate in good faith,” as required

by ¶ 80 of the Settlement Order.

On August 27, 2008, the District filed a motion for partial

reconsideration. The sole argument raised in that motion was

that the sanctions imposed for the District’s failure to timely

provide blood lead corrective action plans (“CAPs”) should be

vacated because the relevant underlying order had not been

violated. This motion was denied. On appeal, the District has

raised numerous issues that were never raised with the District

Court in the first instance, including, inter alia, claims that the

District Court (1) erred in imposing criminal contempt sanctions

in a civil proceeding and (2) erred in imposing excessive

penalties based on a misapplication of ¶ 80 of the Settlement

Order. Appellees, in turn, argue that this court lacks jurisdiction

to hear this appeal.

First, we hold that the 2008 Order is final and appealable

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We also hold that the 2006 Order is

reviewable to the extent that it is “‘inextricably bound up with’”

the 2008 Order. See Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1464

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 585

(D.C. Cir. 1987)). 

Second, we affirm the District Court’s judgment on all but

one issue. The District failed to raise and preserve most of the

claims that it now raises on appeal. “[C]ourts of appeals have

discretion to address issues raised for the first time on appeal,”

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but exercise it “only in exceptional circumstances,” Flynn v.

Comm’r, 269 F.3d 1064, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2001), or when the

trial court has committed “plain error,” United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1993) (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S.

407, 421 n.19 (1977) (civil appeal)). Because we find neither

exceptional circumstances nor plain error, we hold that the

District has forfeited most of the issues that it has raised with

this court. The one exception relates to the question regarding

the misapplication of ¶ 80. On this issue, we hold that the

District Court committed error in subjecting the District to a

126-day contempt fine for its failure to negotiate with appellees

under ¶ 80 of the Settlement Order. Although the 2006 Order

states that the “deadlines” enforceable through per diem fines

“include the negotiation requirement in paragraph 80,” it does

not say that per diem fines can be imposed for a failure to

negotiate beyond, rather than within, the 10-day window

specified in ¶ 80. The District Court erred in finding otherwise;

the error affected the District’s substantial rights and offended

the fairness and integrity of the proceedings under review. It

also constituted a miscarriage of justice. 

For the reasons outlined below, we affirm in part and

reverse in part. The case will be remanded to the District Court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Medicaid program entails joint federal and state

funding of medical care for individuals who cannot afford to pay

their own medical costs. The program was launched in 1965

with the enactment of Title XIX of the SSA. See Ark. Dep’t of

Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006).

“States are not required to participate in Medicaid, but all of

them do. The program is a cooperative one; the Federal

Government pays [a percentage] of the costs the State incurs for

patient care, and, in return, the State pays its portion of the costs

and complies with certain statutory requirements for making

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eligibility determinations, collecting and maintaining

information, and administering the program.” Id. (footnote

omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; 42 C.F.R. § 430.10

(requiring participating states to act “in conformity with the

specific requirements” of the federal Medicaid statute and

applicable federal regulations). The District participates in the

Medicaid program on the same terms as the states, because the

statute “treats the District . . . as a State.” See D.C. Hosp. Ass’n

v. District of Columbia, 224 F.3d 776, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 42

U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (Supp. III 1997).

In 1993, a number of Medicaid recipients brought suit under

§ 1983 against the District, alleging violations of Title XIX and

its accompanying regulations. After the District Court found the

District liable, Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. at

334, an appeal was taken. While the appeal was pending, the

parties reached a settlement which was adopted by the District

Court in the 1999 Settlement Order. Over time, additional

orders imposing additional requirements on the District were

added to the Settlement Order. 

In March 2003, after the District had repeatedly violated the

terms of the Settlement Order, appellees filed a motion with the

District Court for the establishment of a per diem penalty

schedule of fines for future violations. The motion was granted

on July 10, 2006, with the court’s issuance of the 2006 Order.

This order set forth a progressive, escalating fine schedule for

missed deadlines that compounds the total penalty for

noncompliance based on the number of days elapsed. See 2006

Order, order at 2, J.A. 485. The 2006 Order also directed

appellees to file a praecipe with the District Court every fiscal

quarter, documenting any penalties allegedly accrued by the

District during that three-month period. The District could file

an opposition and appellees could file a reply. The District

Court indicated that it would consider the praecipes and any

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mitigating circumstances, and then decide whether or not to

impose fines. 

Between 2006 and 2008, appellees filed five quarterly

praecipes documenting the penalties allegedly accrued by the

District. Each was opposed by the District. On August 13,

2008, the District Court ruled on all five outstanding praecipes

at the same time and assessed $931,050 in penalties against the

District. See 2008 Order, slip op. at 1-15, J.A. 621-35. 

In the first praecipe, covering the third quarter of 2006, the

District Court assessed $1,500 in penalties for the District’s

failure to provide discovery until nine days after the required

deadline. In the second praecipe, covering the fourth quarter of

2006, the District Court assessed $39,500 in penalties for the

District’s failure to distribute a dental brochure by a deadline set

forth in a 2004 order; the court also assessed a penalty of $300

for the District’s failure to seek a timely extension of time. In

the third praecipe, covering the second quarter of 2007, the

District Court (1) assessed $13,500 in penalties for the District’s

failure to timely provide blood level CAPs as required under a

2003 order; (2) assessed a penalty of $10,000 for the District’s

failure to submit a Provider Education Report; and (3) denied

appellees’ request to assess $110,500 in penalties for the

District’s alleged failure to complete an Annual Oral Health

Summary Report, finding that the requested sanction was

excessive. 

In the fourth praecipe, covering the third quarter of 2007,

the District Court (1) assessed $152,000 in penalties for the

District’s continuing failure to provide blood lead level CAPs

until 126 days after the required deadline; (2) assessed $290,500

in penalties for the District’s continuing failure to provide a

required Provider Education Report until 112 days after the

deadline; (3) assessed $370,500 in penalties for the District’s

alleged breach of ¶ 80 of the Settlement Order when it delayed

126 days before commencing to “negotiate in good faith” over

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an enforcement motion proposed by appellees; and (4) denied

appellees’ request to assess $265,000 in penalties for the

District’s alleged continuing failure to provide a complete

Annual Oral Health Summary Report. Finally, in the fifth

praecipe, covering the first quarter of 2008, the District Court

(1) assessed $11,500 in penalties for the District’s failure to

timely submit a Dental CAP as required by a 2004 order; (2)

assessed $2,250 in penalties for the District’s failure to timely

comply with discovery; (3) assessed $39,500 in penalties for the

District’s failure to timely provide annual notifications to

providers on reimbursement procedures; (4) denied appellees’

proposed penalty for the District’s allegedly deficient Annual

Oral Health Survey Report; and (5) denied appellees’ proposed

penalty for the District’s alleged failure to respond to certain

discovery requests.

On August 27, 2008, the District filed a motion for partial

reconsideration. See Def.’s Mot. for Partial Recons. of the

Court’s Order of Aug. 13, 2008 (Aug. 27, 2008), reprinted in

J.A. 636-42. The sole argument raised by the District in that

motion was that the penalties imposed for its alleged failure to

timely provide blood level CAPs should be vacated because the

relevant underlying order had not been violated. The District

did not contend that the penalties imposed by the District Court

improperly constituted sanctions for criminal contempt, that any

aspect of the 2008 Order was ambiguous or otherwise unclear,

or that the District Court had improperly failed to conduct an

evidentiary hearing. Id. at J.A. 636. The District’s motion was

denied. Salazar v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 93-

452, Minute Entry Order (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2009), reprinted in

J.A. 643-44.

On appeal to this court, the District argues that the District

Court committed a variety of errors, including imposing

criminal contempt sanctions in a civil proceeding, failing to

afford the District an evidentiary hearing prior to the imposition

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of sanctions for contempt, generally imposing excessive fines

based a mechanical application of the 2006 Order, and imposing

an enormously excessive fine based on a misapplication of ¶ 80

of the Settlement Order. Appellees, in turn, contend that this

court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

Appellees contest this court’s jurisdiction to hear this

appeal. Appellees contend that the 2008 Order is barred from

review because it is not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; and they

argue that appeal of the 2006 Order is untimely. Neither

contention has merit. 

The 2008 Order is final and hence appealable because the

District Court concluded that specific, unavoidable penalties

“have accrued and are hereby assessed” against the District. See

2008 Order, order at 2, J.A. 620. It is immaterial that the 2008

Order did not specify how the penalties were to be paid or

indicate the ultimate disposition of the funds. Even a

“conditional sanction” imposed for failure to comply with a

District Court order can be final and appealable. Armstrong

v. Exec. Office of the President, Office of Admin., 1 F.3d 1274,

1289 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Therefore, there hardly can be any doubt that the “accrued” and

“assessed” penalties imposed by the 2008 Order made the

District Court’s judgment final for purposes of review under

§ 1291. 

 This court also has jurisdiction to review the 2006 Order to

the extent that it is “‘inextricably bound up with’” the 2008

Order. See Hartman, 19 F.3d at 1464 (quoting Wagner, 836

F.2d at 585). It does not matter whether the 2006 Order,

without more, was final and appealable under § 1291. See

Hartman, 19 F.3d at 1463. So long as the 2008 Order is final,

this court’s “jurisdiction over that final decision extends as well

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to the interlocutory rulings that preceded it.” Ciralsky v. CIA,

355 F.3d 661, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

B. Standard of Review

“To preserve a claim of error on appeal, a party typically

must raise the issue before the trial court. . . . ‘No procedural

principle is more familiar . . . than that a . . . right may be

forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make

timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction

to determine it.’” In re Sealed Case, 552 F.3d 841, 851-52

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,

444 (1944)). None of the principal arguments advanced by the

District in this case – that the District Court improperly imposed

criminal contempt penalties in a civil proceeding and improperly

denied the District an evidentiary hearing prior to issuing

contempt sanctions; that the fines imposed were mechanical and

excessive; or that the trial court misapplied ¶ 80 of the

Settlement Order – was raised below. Generally, an argument

not made in the trial court is forfeited and will not be considered

absent “exceptional circumstances.” Nemariam v. Fed.

Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 491 F.3d 470, 483 (D.C. Cir.

2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“[C]ourts of appeals have discretion to address issues raised for

the first time on appeal,” but exercise such discretion “only in

exceptional circumstances, as, for example, in cases involving

uncertainty in the law; novel, important, and recurring questions

of federal law; intervening change in the law; and extraordinary

situations with the potential for miscarriages of justice.” Flynn,

269 F.3d at 1069. 

Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts may

take notice of “plain error[s]” not preserved below in criminal

cases. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Many courts have indicated

that plain error review is available in situations involving

unpreserved claims of error affecting substantial rights in civil

cases. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citing Connor, 431 U.S. at

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421 n.19 (1977)); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet

Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 396-97 (4th Cir. 2004); Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir. 1996);

see generally HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT,

FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 91-92 (2007). Olano allows

reversal for plain error where there is (1) “error” that is (2)

“plain,” (3) “affects substantial rights” of the parties, and (4)

“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “An error ‘affec[ts]

substantial rights’ if it is ‘prejudicial’ or ‘affected the outcome

of the district court proceedings.’” United States v. Perry, 479

F.3d 885, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at

734).

“Exceptional circumstances” and “plain error” review may

be related in certain instances. See, e.g., Long v. Howard Univ.,

550 F.3d 21, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We have yet to determine

whether the two inquiries are coterminous. To the extent that

plain error review applies, however, the court must “‘take[ ]

account of the differences’ between civil litigation and criminal

prosecution.” Muldrow ex rel. Estate of Muldrow v. Re-Direct,

Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 168 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting FED.R.

CIV.P.51 advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amendments); see

also Long, 550 F.3d at 26 & n.*. 

With respect to all but one of the District’s claims, we find

that the issues raised are subject to neither exceptional

circumstances nor plain error review. As explained below, the

one exception is the error the District Court committed in its

misapplication of ¶ 80 of the Settlement Order.

C. Criminal Versus Civil Contempt

The District claims that the trial court committed reversible

error by improperly imposing criminal sanctions in a civil

proceeding. We disagree. “At a minimum, a court of appeals

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cannot correct an error” under plain error review “unless the

error is clear under current law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. A

number of the fines imposed by the District Court were based on

a per diem calculation for contumacious conduct that had ceased

at the time of the 2008 Order. Under existing case law, it is not

entirely clear whether such fines constitute sanctions for civil or

criminal contempt.

The Supreme Court has described civil contempt sanctions

as “remedial” and criminal contempt sanctions as “punitive.”

Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.

821, 827-28 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). The Court acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a

bright line, however, since “‘[w]hen a court imposes fines and

punishments on a contemnor, it is not only vindicating its legal

authority to enter the initial court order, but it also is seeking to

give effect to the law’s purpose of modifying the contemnor’s

behavior to conform to the terms required in the order.’” Id. at

828 (quoting Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635

(1988)). As a result, “[m]ost contempt sanctions, like most

criminal punishments, to some extent punish a prior offense as

well as coerce an offender’s future obedience.” Id. 

Bagwell describes a civil contempt sanction as one with

respect to which “the contemnor is able to purge the contempt

. . . by committing an affirmative act.” Id. And the Court

describes a punitive, criminal contempt sanction as one that is

“imposed retrospectively for a completed act of disobedience

. . . such that the contemnor cannot avoid or abbreviate” the

penalty through “later compliance.” Id. at 828-29 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The Bagwell Court then

says that “per diem fine[s] imposed for each day a contemnor

fails to comply with an affirmative court order” are sanctions for

civil contempt, whereas “a flat, unconditional fine” with respect

to which “the contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to

reduce or avoid the fine through compliance” is a sanction for

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criminal contempt. Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

Under the disputed 2008 Order, the District Court imposed

fines in a number of instances for contumacious conduct that

had ceased at the time the contempt order issued. However, at

least in this case, the fact that the contumacious conduct had

ceased when the sanctions were issued would seem to be

irrelevant to the determination as to whether the sanctions were

civil or criminal. Under Bagwell, it would appear that the

disputed “per diem fines” were civil contempt sanctions

imposed in accordance with the schedule of fines under the

2006 Order for each day that the District violated applicable

terms of the Settlement Order. In other words, beginning in

2006, the District had fair notice and an opportunity to purge its

ongoing contumacious conduct and avoid penalties by acting in

compliance with the Settlement Order. The 2006 Order did not

penalize the District for the contumacious conduct that had

occurred before that order issued. Rather, it put the District on

notice that it would be fined for any such conduct that occurred

after the issuance of the 2006 Order. When the District

continued to violate the Settlement Order after the issuance of

the 2006 Order, it was made to account for its wrongdoing with

the issuance of the 2008 Order. It did not matter that some of

the violations finally ceased before 2008. The penalties imposed

by the 2008 Order could have been avoided only if the District

had fully complied with the Settlement Order following the

District Court’s issuance of the 2006 Order. 

A less likely, but not utterly implausible, construction of

Bagwell is to view the sanctions imposed by the 2008 Order as

“flat, unconditional fines,” and thus criminal sanctions, for past

wrongs committed by the District. In other words, under this

view, the District could claim that it should not have been

sanctioned, save through criminal contempt, for any

contumacious conduct that occurred after the issuance of the

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2006 Order but ceased before the trial court assessed the

praecipes and issued the 2008 Order. This position finds no real

support in the law of this circuit. Indeed, the case law goes the

other way.

A good example is NOW v. Operation Rescue, 816 F. Supp.

729, 736 (D.D.C. 1993). In that case, the District Court ordered

a party to appear in court on January 24, 1992, to show cause

why he should not be held in contempt for violating an earlier

injunction of the court. The party had actual notice of the trial

court’s order, yet he failed to comply. At a hearing held on

March 16, 1993, at which the party again failed to appear, the

trial court fined the appellant “the sum of $41,600, being

$100.00 per day for each day between January 24, 1992 and

March 16, 1993, without prejudice to future motions for

judgment in amounts equal to $100.00 per day each day which

passes until [the party] enters an appearance in the matter.” Id.

at 736. This order was affirmed on appeal. 

In this court’s review of the trial court’s contempt order in

Operation Rescue, we first held that Bagwell “did not call into

question the traditional classification of some categories of

contempt sanctions – compensatory fines, coercive

imprisonment, and per diem fines to coerce compliance with

affirmative court orders – as civil in nature.” Nat’l Org. for

Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646 , 659 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

We then held that the disputed “per diem fines totalling $41,600

($100 per day of violation) . . . for failure to appear in court in

violation of the court’s affirmative order to do so . . . are clearly

civil in nature under traditional classifications that remain

unchallenged by the Bagwell decision.” Id. at 660. It did not

matter to the court that the fines imposed applied to conduct that

had already occurred and whose amount could no longer be

reduced through compliance. The decision in Operation Rescue

surely supports the action of the District Court in this case. 

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This court’s later decision in Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d

1292 (D.C. Cir. 2000), adds some wrinkles to the analysis, but

it is not fundamentally at odds with the decision in Operation

Rescue with respect to the issue in dispute in this case. In

Evans, the District of Columbia appealed from an order of the

District Court imposing contempt fines of $5,096,340 for its

failure to comply with a consent decree addressing a panoply of

constitutional violations resulting from poor conditions at a

mental health facility. The District argued that “the fines were

indisputably not compensatory (a classic aspect of a civil fine),

for they were . . . not at all calibrated to the damage caused by

the District’s conduct. Moreover, the fines, according to the

District, were fixed and determinate; there was no opportunity

to escape their consequences by altering behavior, i.e., to purge

them once they were imposed. In other words, [in the view of

the District], the fines were designed primarily to punish past

acts rather than coerce future conduct and therefore should be

thought punitive.” Id. at 1295. The appellees, on the other

hand, argued “that the fines should be seen as coercive and

therefore civil in character because the schedule of prospective

fines was announced in advance.” Id. In other words, according

to the appellees, the District “had the capacity to avoid the fines,

so to speak to purge itself of contempt, by altering its conduct

prior to the time the fines accrued.” Id. 

In addressing the issues before it, the Evans court described

the differences between civil and criminal contempt, as follows:

Traditionally, whether a contempt is civil or criminal has

depended on the “character and purpose” of the sanction.

A sanction is considered civil if it is “remedial, and for the

benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal

contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority

of the court.” Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221

U.S. 418, 441 (1911). There also has been a traditional

distinction between mandatory and prohibitory orders. The

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“paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction . . .

involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he

complies with an affirmative command.” International

Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512

U.S. 821, 828 (1994). On the other hand, a fixed term of

imprisonment imposed retroactively to punish an act of

disobedience is criminal. This distinction has been

extended to fines, so that “a per diem fine imposed for each

day a contemnor fails to comply with an affirmative court

order” is civil, but an unconditional fine imposed “after a

finding of contempt is criminal if the contemnor has no

subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through

compliance.” Id. at 829. 

Id. at 1294-95. The Evans court then found that the fines

imposed for the discrete violations of the consent decree were

criminal sanctions. The court reached this conclusion because,

“for each act of contempt, the District was subjected to a

one-time determinate fine” that once imposed could not be

“eliminat[ed] . . . through future compliance.” Id. at 1296. 

Faced with the foregoing case law, the District Court in this

case concluded that the per diem fine schedule in the 2006

Order constituted a “civil, coercive remedy.” See 2006 Order,

slip op. at 3, J.A. 489. This conclusion seems most likely

correct in light of Bagwell, Operation Rescue, and Evans, so it

surely did not constitute plain error or an exceptional

circumstance warranting reversal. We recognize that there is

some tension between Operation Rescue and Evans, if one

views the discrete, past violations of the consent decree in Evans

as comparable to the District’s discrete, past violations of the

Settlement Order and 2006 Order in this case. But an argument

framed in this way cannot go very far. The decision in Evans

clearly recognizes that “a per diem fine imposed for each day a

contemnor fails to comply with an affirmative court order is

civil, but an unconditional fine imposed after a finding of

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contempt is criminal if the contemnor has no subsequent

opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance.”

206 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis added). In this case, the District was fined pursuant

to a schedule of per diem fines and it had an opportunity to limit

or avoid the fines altogether by complying with the Settlement

Order after the issuance of the 2006 Order. Even if Evans and

Operation Rescue leave some room for debate, there is nothing

in these decisions to indicate that the District Court in this case

committed plain error in reaching the conclusion that it did. 

The District Court cited both Bagwell and Evans in its 2006

Order, explaining the legal basis for its fine schedule. See 2006

Order, slip op. at 3, J.A. 489. The District, however, raised no

objections or questions regarding the civil nature of the

contempt proceedings either in 2006 or in 2008. The

preservation requirement is intended to give the parties an

opportunity to try the case on the grounds presented. Allowing

the District to raise this argument now would “skew the balance

between ‘our need to encourage all trial participants to seek a

fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence

that obvious injustice be promptly redressed.’” United States v.

Davis, 974 F.2d 182, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting United

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)). 

In sum, on the record in this case, neither plain error nor

exceptional circumstances lend merit to the District’s newly

raised challenge to the civil nature of the contempt proceedings

below.

D. Evidentiary Hearing

The District claims that the District Court erred in failing to

provide an evidentiary hearing before imposing the disputed

fines. This claim was never raised below so it is subject to

review only for plain error or if we find exceptional

circumstances. We find neither.

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It is true that, “[i]n this circuit, ‘[e]very civil contemnor

who asserts a genuine issue of material fact is entitled to a full,

impartial hearing.’” Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food &

Commercial Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 103 F.3d

1007, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Wash. Metro. Area Transit

Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 531 F.2d 617, 620

(D.C. Cir. 1976)). The District, however, has raised no genuine

issues of material fact warranting a hearing. The District has not

credibly contested its failure to meet any of the deadlines

pursuant to which it was fined. And it has cited no facts that

might raise any legitimate defense to its contumacious conduct.

Indeed, the District has not advanced a “good faith and

substantial compliance” defense, see Food Lion, Inc., 103 F.3d

at 1017, nor has it seriously argued “that it took all reasonable

steps within [its] power to comply with the court’s order,” as

required by that defense. Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

In these circumstances, the District’s claim cannot survive

plain error or exceptional circumstances review. 

E. The District’s Challenges to the Fines Imposed

The District makes two additional arguments generally

challenging the fines imposed. It claims, first, that the fines are

“[d]isproportionately [h]igh” for the violations at issue, and,

second, that the fines are unfair because they were “[i]mposed

[m]echanically” under the scheme set forth in the 2006 Order.

Appellant’s Br. at 35. These claims were never raised below so

they are subject to review only for plain error or if we find

exceptional circumstances. We find neither. 

This court typically reviews “contempt finding[s]” and

“sanction[s]” for abuse of discretion. See In re Fannie Mae

Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Food Lion, Inc.,

103 F.3d at 1016. Given this deferential standard of review, the

District would have been hard pressed to support its claims even

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if they had been properly raised and preserved. The trial court

imposed the fines pursuant to a previously announced fee

schedule, so the District had fair notice of the sanctions that

might follow any violations of the Settlement Order. The

District Court also specifically considered the severity of each

fine in relation to the harm caused. Moreover, under the scheme

set forth in the 2006 Order, fines are “not . . . automatic,” for

they may be “oppose[d]” by the District; and the District Court

has “discretion to consider any mitigating circumstances

pertaining to specific missed deadlines.” 2006 Order, slip op.

at 3, J.A. 489. Indeed, the District opposed each praecipe, and

the District Court exercised its discretion in declining to impose

contempt fines in some situations with respect to which it

believed that the District had violated the Settlement Order. See,

e.g., 2008 Order, slip op. at 6, J.A. 626.

In these circumstances, the District’s claims do not survive

either plain error or exceptional circumstances review.

F. Contempt for the District’s Alleged Violation of ¶ 80 of

the Settlement Order

Finally, the District argues that the District Court committed

reversible error in subjecting it to a 126-day contempt fine for its

alleged failure to negotiate with appellees under ¶ 80 of the

Settlement Order. This claim was not raised below. However,

the underlying facts are not in dispute, the parties have fully

briefed and argued the issue, and the trial court committed plain

error. We therefore reverse. 

Civil contempt may be imposed only when the underlying

order is clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., Broderick v.

Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Armstrong,

1 F.3d at 1289 (citing Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11,

16 (1st Cir. 1991)). “The judicial contempt power is a potent

weapon,” and “[w]hen it is founded upon a decree too vague to

be understood, it can be a deadly one. Congress responded to

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that danger by requiring that a federal court frame its orders so

that those who must obey them will know what the court intends

to require and what it means to forbid.” Int’l Longshoremen’s

Ass’n, Local 1291 v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76

(1967); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) (requiring “[e]very order

granting an injunction” to “state the reasons why it issued,”

“state its terms specifically,” and “describe in reasonable detail

. . . the act or acts restrained or required”). Furthermore, a

contemnor cannot be expected to purge civil contempt through

“reduc[tion] or avoid[ance],” see Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829,

without having clear and unambiguous notice of the proscribed

conduct.

Paragraph 80 of the Settlement Order is clear. It reads:

Before any party moves the Court to enforce or construe

[the requirements of the underlying Settlement Order] . . .

it shall give the other party 10 days’ notice of its intention.

During that 10-day period, the parties shall negotiate in

good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute without

seeking a decision from the Court.

Settlement Order at 46, J.A. 309 (emphasis added). The 2006

Order states that the “deadlines” enforceable through per diem

fines “include the negotiation requirement in paragraph 80.”

2006 Order, order at 2, J.A. 485. This provision was included

in the 2006 Order because,

[i]n many instances, after [appellees] filed requisite notices

[pursuant to] ¶ 80 of the Settlement Order, [the District]

failed to file any response indicating whether they did or

did not oppose the motion and whether they were prepared

to negotiate in good faith during the 10-day pre-filing

period in an effort to resolve the dispute without Court

intervention.

2006 Order, slip op. at 2, J.A. 488 (emphasis added). As the

District Court obviously recognized, the only timing

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requirement under ¶ 80 directs the parties to negotiate within the

specified 10-day period. In other words, the Settlement Order

says only that “during [the] 10-day period, the parties shall

negotiate in good faith.” It does not state that the District must

negotiate beyond, rather than within, this window. 

In short, the language of ¶ 80 is perfectly clear in what it

requires. And there is nothing in the 2006 Order that

forewarned the District that it might be liable for more than the

Settlement Order required. Indeed, ¶ 80 is not only clear, it is

quite sensible in requiring the appellees to afford the District a

small window of opportunity to negotiate any pending disputes

before appellees are allowed to seek judicial redress. But this is

all that ¶ 80 requires. 

Even if it were possible to conjure some “ambiguities or

uncertainties” in ¶ 80, we would still be required to read the

Settlement Order and the 2006 Order “in a light favorable to the

person charged with contempt.” See Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16.

Giving the District the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be

drawn from the language of ¶ 80, and giving full effect to the

important principle that “a federal court [must] frame its orders

so that those who must obey them will know what the court

intends to require and what it means to forbid,” Int’l

Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 389 U.S. at 76, we hold that the District

Court committed plain error in subjecting the District to a 126-

day contempt fine for its failure to negotiate with appellees

under ¶ 80 of the Settlement Order. 

We also hold that the District Court’s error affected the

District’s substantial rights, see Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35,

because the error obviously changed the outcome on an

important issue before the trial court. If the District’s fine had

been capped at 10 days, as it should have been, the resulting

sanction would have been $1,750 per violation (or $17,500), i.e.,

a sum far less than the $370,500 fine imposed by the District

Court. 

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In Olano, the Supreme Court makes it clear that “[i]f [a]

forfeited error is ‘plain’ and ‘affect[s] substantial rights,’ the

court of appeals has authority to order correction, but is not

required to do so.” 507 U.S. at 735; see also HARRY T.

EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF

REVIEW 94 (2007). “[T]he standard that should guide the

exercise of [this] remedial discretion . . . . [is that the] Court of

Appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting

substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at

736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160

(1936)). This standard is easily met in this case. As noted

above, “[t]he judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When

it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be

a deadly one.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 389 U.S. at 76.

When, as in this case, a District Court’s contempt sanction is

premised on an interpretation of a settlement order that finds no

support in the words of the order, “it cannot stand.” Id. “The

most fundamental postulates of our legal order forbid the

imposition of a penalty for disobeying a command that defies

comprehension.” Id. This is clearly an exceptional

circumstance warranting the exercise of our discretion to address

and correct the error.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and

reversed in part. The case is hereby remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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