Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00471/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00471-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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15-CV-471-AJB(WVG) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMIR SWEIS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

J. MORALES, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15-CV-471-AJB(WVG) 

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO APPOINT COUNSEL 

[Doc. No. 51.] 

 Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel. As explained below, Plaintiff’s motion 

is DENIED without prejudice. However, the Court will revisit this request sua sponte as 

the cases proceeds farther along to trial. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Morales on March 2, 2015, alleging Morales 

violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Morales failed to protect him from attack in 

the San Diego County George Bailey Detention Facility. Once Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint survived a motion to dismiss, the Court issued a Scheduling Order regulating 

discovery and pretrial dates on February 16, 2017. The instant motion for appointment of 

counsel is Plaintiff’s first such request. 

II. APPLICABLE LAW 

“There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v. 

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (partially overruled en banc on other 

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15-CV-471-AJB(WVG) 

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grounds). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments 

of counsel.” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. 

$292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts do have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 

1915(e)(1), to request that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of 

exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th 

Cir. 2004). “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance 

requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and 

an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of 

the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff seeks appointed counsel because (1) he is unable to afford counsel, (2) his 

imprisonment will greatly limit his ability to litigate this case, (3) the issues in this case are 

complex and will require significant research and investigation, (4) he has limited access 

to the law library and has limited knowledge of the law, and (5) an attorney could better 

handle trial in this case, (6) granting this motion will not prejudice Defendant, and (7) he 

has made repeated attempts to obtain an attorney. 

As an initial matter, the Court agrees that granting the motion will not prejudice 

Defendant (reason 6), but Plaintiff’s attempts to obtain an attorney are not a factor the Court 

finds persuasive (reason 7). 

Moreover, reasons 1, 2, and 4 are generic factors that every incarcerated pro se

plaintiff faces and are not convincing reasons to grant the motion. Were these compelling 

reasons to grant the motion, every incarcerated plaintiff would receive appointed counsel 

and the rule requiring exceptional circumstances to appoint counsel would be turned on its 

head. 

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15-CV-471-AJB(WVG) 

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As for Plaintiff’s third reason, the Court is familiar with the facts here and does not 

find this case complex. It further appears that Plaintiff has a higher degree of sophistication 

than other incarcerated plaintiffs. He was able to successfully amend his complaint on his 

first attempt and was able to survive a second motion to dismiss. It is also apparent that he 

is actively participating in the discovery process, as he has propounded requests for 

production of documents and has also sought to perpetuate testimony under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 27. The Court acknowledges the greater difficulty Plaintiff’s 

incarceration poses, but is not prepared to grant his motion at this time given that it appears 

he is making efforts to obtain discovery and has been creative enough to attempt to leverage 

a nuanced rule to obtain testimony. 

Finally, as for Plaintiff’s reason 5, the Court agrees that any pro se litigant “would 

be better served with the assistance of counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, so 

long as a pro se litigant, like Plaintiff in this case, is able to “articulate his claims against 

the relative complexity of the matter,” the exceptional circumstances which might require 

the appointment of counsel do not exist. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (finding no abuse of 

discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when district court denied appointment of counsel 

despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well have fared better-particularly in the realms of 

discovery and the securing of expert testimony”). 

Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is DENIED without prejudice. The 

Court will revisit this motion sua sponte if and when the case proceeds to trial. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 15, 2017 

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