Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01668/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01668-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frank Hensel Harmon,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-07-1668-PHX-JWS-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Frank Hensel Harmon, presently incarcerated at the Great Plains

Correctional Facility, Hinton, Oklahoma, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are

the Petition (Dkt. 1), Respondents’ Answer to Petition (Dkt. 6), and Petitioner’s pro se Reply

(Dkt. 7). The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, dismiss the petition on the ground that it is time barred and the claim is

procedurally defaulted.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted, in absentia, on November 19, 2002, in the Superior Court

of Pima County of possession of narcotic drug for sale (crack cocaine), possession or use of

marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. (Dkt.

6, Ex. B at 42-46.) On November 14, 2003, he was sentenced to 9.25 years, and three

concurrent terms of 1.75 years imprisonment. (Id., Ex. C at 73-74.) On direct appeal,

Petitioner’s counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

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1 According to Respondents, the Maricopa County Superior Court does not have a

record or copy of this filing. Petitioner unquestionably submitted the PCR notice because the

superior court referenced the document in its order denying relief. (Dkt. 6, Ex. J.) The Court

notes that the prison log, exhibit A to Petitioner’s special action in the Arizona Court of Appeals,

shows that Petitioner mailed documents on May 20, 2006. (Dkt. 6, Ex. K.) Under the “prison

mailbox rule,” petitions are deemed “filed” when delivered by the prisoner to a prison official for

mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568,

574-75 (9th Cir. 2000). Because Petitioner does not aver before this Court that the May 20

mailing was the PCR notice, and he asserts that he filed the PCR on May 25, 2005 (Dkt. 1 at 3),

the Court will use May 25 as the filing date of the PCR notice. Even if the earlier date were

applied the Petition would still be untimely.

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(1967). (Id., Ex. D.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he

claimed his convictions were improper because his federal and state constitutional rights to

due process and privacy, as well as his right to be free from illegal search and seizure were

violated. (Id., Ex. E.) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s appeal on March

17, 2005. (Id., Ex. A.) On June 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review before

the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id., Ex. F.) On December 29, 2005, the Arizona Supreme

Court denied the Petition for Review. (Id., Ex. G.)

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-conviction Relief (PCR) on October 27, 2003, before

he was sentenced. (Id., Ex. H.) This PCR proceeding was dismissed as premature on April

1, 2004. (Id., Ex. I.) On May 25, 2006, Petitioner filed an action in the Superior Court

challenging his sentencing enhancement.1

 The Superior Court treated the filing as a notice

of PCR and dismissed it on June 8, 2006. (Id., Ex. J.) Thereafter, Petitioner brought a

special action in the Arizona Court of Appeals alleging that his sentence was unlawful. (Id.,

Ex. K.) On September 11, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept

jurisdiction. (Id., Ex. L.) Petitioner then filed a special action in the Arizona Supreme Court,

which was summarily denied on January 19, 2007. (Id., Exs. M, N.)

DISCUSSION

On August 30, 2007, Petitioner filed his present federal habeas petition. (Dkt. 1.) The

petition alleges one claim, Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when he was

improperly sentenced to an aggravated term of imprisonment based on two prior felony

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2 Petitioner made other conclusory allegations in his petition that his convictions

violated the Constitution and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Such vague

assertions with no supporting facts do not warrant habeas relief. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20,

26 (9th Cir. 1994); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989).

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convictions.2

Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) became effective on

April 24, 1996. Under the AEDPA, federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state

prisoners are governed by a one-year statute of limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The limitations period begins to run from the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id. 

In applying (d)(1)(A), the Court must assess when direct review of Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences became final. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on

Petitioner’s direct appeal on December 29, 2005, and his time to petition for a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court expired ninety days later, on Wednesday,

March 29, 2006. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Thus, the judgment against Petitioner became final on that

date. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “direct review”

includes the period during which a petitioner can petition for writ of certiorari, regardless of

whether the petitioner seeks such review); see also Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681,

685 (2009) (finding direct review to include the time up to the expiration of the period to

seek review by the Supreme Court).

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The statute of limitations is tolled during the time a properly filed state PCR

application is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner initiated a PCR proceeding by

filing a notice on May 25, 2006, which triggered tolling as of that date. See Isley v. Ariz.

Dep’t of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that tolling period begins

with filing of notice pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a)). The PCR

notice was dismissed on June 8, 2006. (Dkt. 6, Ex. J.)

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c) provides that a petitioner may file a

petition for review in the court of appeals within thirty days of the PCR court’s final decision

denying relief in a PCR proceeding. Petitioner’s time for filing a petition for review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals expired on Monday, July 10, 2006. Instead of petitioning for

review of the PCR court’s denial, Petitioner brought a special action before the Arizona

Court of Appeals. The only questions that may be raised in a special action are:

(a) Whether the defendant has failed to exercise discretion

which he has a duty to exercise; or to perform a duty required by

law as to which he has no discretion; or

(b) Whether the defendant has proceeded or is threatening to

proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority; or

(c) Whether a determination was arbitrary and capricious as an

abuse of discretion.

Ariz. R. P. Spec. Actions 3. The Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction

and the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied the action. (Id., Exs. L, N.) In short,

Petitioner elected an inappropriate remedy that did not challenge the PCR court’s ruling but

attempted to directly challenge the constitutionality of his sentence. Such a proceeding is

outside the PCR review process provided by the Arizona rules and outside § 2244(d)(2)’s

tolling provision applicable to PCR proceedings.

Once Petitioner’s time to file a petition for review from denial of his PCR proceeding

expired, on July 10, 2006, he no longer had a properly filed PCR proceeding pending in state

court. Thus, statutory tolling ended and the statute of limitations began to run again on July

10, 2006. Cf. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that time

between denial of state PCR petition at one level and timely petitioning for review at the

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appellate level is tolled because petitioner is attempting to exhaust “through proper use of

court procedures”). Petitioner filed the instant petition more than one year later, on August

30, 2007. Therefore, the petition is untimely under § 2254(d)(1)(A).

Petitioner does not assert, nor can the Court glean from the record, a basis for

equitable tolling. Petitioner has not demonstrated that an extraordinary circumstance

prevented him from timely filing nor that he diligently pursued his rights, as required for

equitable tolling. See Pace v. DeGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). To the extent

Petitioner was mistaken about the proper procedures, a mistake by the petitioner generally

does not warrant equitable tolling. See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.

2008). Further, pro se status alone does not warrant equitable tolling, see Roy v. Lampert,

465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006), nor does “lack of legal sophistication,” Raspberry v.

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Accordingly, the petition is untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and

Petitioner has not established entitlement to equitable tolling. Thus, the petition is timebarred.

Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner’s special actions tolled the statute of limitations

and the petition was timely, the singular claim in the petition is procedurally defaulted. The

only claim Petitioner raises is one alleging that the trial court’s use of Petitioner’s prior

felony convictions to enhance his sentence violated his right to due process. Petitioner did

not raise this claim on direct appeal. (Dkt. 6, Exs. A, D, E.) Although the Court does not

have a copy of Petitioner’s PCR petition, based on the PCR court’s ruling, it appears some

form of this claim was raised in the PCR proceeding. (Id., Ex. J.) The PCR court found the

claim precluded for failure to raise it on appeal, pursuant to Rule 32.2(a). (Id.)

First, by not filing a proper petition for review from denial of his PCR petition,

Petitioner failed to fairly present the operative facts and federal legal theory of this claim to

the state’s appellate court in a procedurally appropriate manner as required to exhaust his

state remedies. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459

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U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971). If Petitioner were to return

to state court now to litigate this claim, it would be found waived and untimely under Rules

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does not fall

within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, this

claim is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted.

Second, the state court imposed a bar that warrants a finding of procedural default.

The PCR court found Petitioner’s claim precluded as waived for failing to raise it on appeal,

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3). To the extent the special actions could

be construed as an appeal of that decision, the appellate courts did not issue a reasoned

decision; therefore, the Court looks through them to the PCR court’s default. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). Claims that were fairly presented in state court

but found defaulted on state procedural grounds will be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if the state procedural bar was independent of federal law and adequate to warrant

preclusion of federal review. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). Rule 32.2(a)(3)

is independent of federal law, see Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002), and the Ninth

Circuit has repeatedly determined that Arizona regularly and consistently applies its

procedural default rules such that they are an adequate bar to federal review of a claim. See

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly

followed and adequate); Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).

Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted and barred from review in this Court,

absent a showing of legitimate cause for the failure to properly exhaust in state court and

prejudice arising from the alleged constitutional violation, or that a fundamental miscarriage

of justice would result if the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. See

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). Petitioner has not alleged cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the default.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an

order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any objections

filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV-07-1668-PHX-JWS.

DATED this 8th day of October, 2009.

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