Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06243/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 46:688 Jones Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAMAR SHAW,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06243-PJH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 13

Defendant the United States of America’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 

came on for hearing before this court on January 9, 2019. Plaintiff Damar Shaw 

appeared through his counsel, Nick Neidzwski. The United States of America appeared 

through its counsel, Eric Kaufman-Cohen. Having read the papers filed by the parties 

and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good 

cause appearing, the court hereby DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss, for the 

following reasons.

BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2018, Shaw filed this action against defendants the United States 

of America, Ocean Shipholdings, Inc., and Ocean Duchess, Inc. (the latter two together 

are the “Operators”). Compl., Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured while aboard a 

ship called the SS ALGOL, which is owned by the United States by and through the 

Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration.

1

 The vessel is operated on 

 

1 The term the United States as used in this order refers to the United States and its 

agencies.

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behalf of the United States by Ocean Duchess, and Ocean Shipholdings is the parent of 

Ocean Duchess. Shaw asserts 3 claims: (1) Jones Act negligence; (2) unseaworthiness; 

and (3) maintenance, cure, and wages under maritime law. Compl. Shaw seeks general 

damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and punitive damages. 

The United States has moved to dismiss all claims against Ocean Duchess and 

Ocean Shipholdings. Dkt. 13.

On January 22, 2016, Ocean Duchess entered into a ship manager contract to 

crew, maintain, and operate the SS ALGOL. Dkt. 30, Ex. A (the “Agreement”). 

Defendant filed certain excerpts from the Agreement with its motion, and on reply it filed a 

complete copy of the Agreement.

On May 27, 2018, plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Ocean Duchess 

and/or Ocean Shipholdings and working aboard the SS ALGOL. The vessel was docked 

at Pier 80 in San Francisco next to another ship. That day, the ALGOL was moved to 

allow the other ship to depart the pier, and then the ALGOL was moved back to its 

position on the pier. During that operation, a mooring line between the pier and the ship 

snapped and struck Shaw, causing various severe injuries. Plaintiff contends that the 

Operators knew that the mooring lines were worn and needed to be replaced. 

Plaintiff was hospitalized and underwent multiple surgeries. He has since received

extensive medical care.

Following the incident, plaintiff submitted a claim for personal injury and wages to 

the United States. The United States denied the claim, and plaintiff filed this action. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests the 

subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 

F.3d 1036, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2003). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and

may only hear cases where they have jurisdiction over the “subject matter” of the dispute, 

as determined by federal law and the Constitution. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

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Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 U.S. 

368, 376–77 (2012); see also Chen–Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 

975 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal courts have no power to consider claims 

for which they lack subject-matter jurisdiction.”). If a federal district court does not 

have subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

Although lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is an affirmative defense, the burden of 

proof in a 12(b)(1) motion is on the party asserting jurisdiction, and the court will presume 

a lack of jurisdiction until the pleader proves otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.

A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 

373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the attack is facial, the court determines 

whether the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face to invoke 

federal jurisdiction, accepting all material allegations in the complaint as true and 

construing them in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. Id.

Where the attack is factual, however, “the court need not presume the truthfulness 

of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a 

factual dispute as to the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court may review 

extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into one 

for summary judgment. See id.; McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 

1988) (a court “may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve 

factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction”). “Once the moving party has 

converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other 

evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish 

affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

The court can resolve factual disputes to determine its jurisdiction, however 

resolving “genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when . . . . the question of jurisdiction 

is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits.” Id.; see also

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).

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B. Analysis

The Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of 

admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “The Constitution’s grant of 

federal jurisdiction for admiralty, ‘codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), allows the filing of 

claims related to maritime contracts and maritime torts.’” Ali v. Rogers, 780 F.3d 1229, 

1234–35 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, 570 F.3d 1124, 1126 

(9th Cir. 2009)). In order to determine whether the court has federal admiralty 

jurisdiction, the court assesses “whether a claim has sufficient ‘maritime flavor[.]’” Id. at 

1235. 

The Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901 et seq. (“SIAA”), together with the 

Clarification Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4701, waive sovereign immunity for the United States in 

cases where “a civil action in admiralty could be maintained” against a private person in 

the same situation. 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a). If a vessel is owned by the United States, and 

someone is harmed by the vessel or one of its employees, then the person may bring any 

admiralty claim against the United States. Id.; see Ali, 780 F.3d at 1233; Dearborn v. Mar 

Ship Operations, Inc., 113 F.3d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1997). “In plain terms, the SIAA

applies when (1) a vessel is owned by the United States or operated on its behalf, and (2) 

there is a remedy cognizable in admiralty for the injury.” Ali, 780 F.3d at 1233.

Here, the United States does not dispute that the court has admiralty jurisdiction 

over plaintiff’s claims against the United States or that it has waived sovereign immunity 

with respect to those claims.

“Any remedy available under the SIAA is exclusive of any other remedy ‘arising 

out of the same subject matter’ that the plaintiff might bring against the individual who 

actually caused the harm at issue.” Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30904). “That is, ‘where a 

remedy lies against the United States, a suit against an agent of the United States ‘by 

reason of the same subject matter’ is precluded.’” Id. (quoting Dearborn, 113 F.3d at 

997). The prohibition of suits against private parties acting as agents of the United States 

limits the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to those parties. Ali, 780 F.3d at 

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1237 (plaintiff “was required to bring his claims against the United States, not against 

Rogers [the United States’ agent]. Since he did not, the district court rightly concluded 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.”); Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 

406, 409 (9th Cir. 1985) (“there was a total want of jurisdiction” over agent of the United 

States); see also Sharian v. United States, Case No. 98-cv-4578, 1999 WL 1427723 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 1999). “[T]he remedy available against the United States need not be 

the same as that available against a private party for this provision to apply.” Ali, 780 

F.3d at 1234.

Here, the United States argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over 

plaintiff’s claims against the Operators because the Operators were acting as agents of 

the United States within the meaning of the SIAA when plaintiff was injured. Dkt. 13 at 6–

8; see generally Dearborn, 113 F.3d at 995 (“We must determine on this appeal whether, 

at the time plaintiff . . . was injured, defendant . . . was acting as an ‘agent or employee of 

the United States,’ within the meaning of the Suits in Admiralty Act[.]”).

To determine whether an agency relationship exists under the SIAA, courts in this 

circuit “use the common law definition of agency as a starting point for our analysis and 

will then consider the relevant case law as well as the specific provisions of the 

agreement between” the United States and the ship operator. Dearborn, 113 F.3d at 

997. “The Restatement of Agency defines an agency relationship as ‘the fiduciary 

relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the 

other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to 

act.’” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) (1958)). “Two characteristics 

appear most often to be dispositive” in cases concerning the SIAA: “in order to find that a 

charterer is an agent of the United States, 1) the United States must exercise significant 

control over the charterer's activities—either day to day control or overall control and

direction of the mission, and 2) the charterer must be engaged in conducting the 

business of the United States.” Id. at 997–98 & n.3 (noting such considerations may 

make principles of agency “apply more broadly in this context than it does elsewhere”). 

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Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the Operators were acting on their own behalf and 

not as agents of the United States when performing the acts underlying plaintiff’s claims.

Compl. ¶ 9. Defendant has presented a contract between the United States and Ocean 

Duchess, Inc. pursuant to which the company agreed to perform certain tasks on behalf 

of—and sometimes as an agent of—the United States.

2 See generally Agreement. But 

the contract does not undermine plaintiff’s allegation that the Operators were acting 

outside the scope of their agency relationship when plaintiff was injured. Nor has 

defendant presented any evidence that an agency relationship existed aside from the 

language in the contract. As such, the contract alone is insufficient to convert

defendant’s motion into a factual motion with respect to whether the Operators were 

acting as agents of the United States when conducting the activities that allegedly injured 

Shaw.

3

 

Because defendant does not challenge the complaint’s allegations that give rise to 

this court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the court construes plaintiff’s motion as a facial 

attack. The court finds that the complaint sufficiently alleges that the Operators were 

acting outside the scope of their agency relationship with the United States when plaintiff 

was injured, and therefore plaintiff has sufficiently invoked federal jurisdiction. See

Compl. ¶ 9.

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

2 Defendant argues that the parties’ contract has a provision stating that the Operators 

are always agents of the United States for purposes of the SIAA, but that term is not 

dispositive of the factual question of agency. See, e.g., Dearborn, 113 F.3d at 997 (“We, 

too, will use the common law definition of agency as a starting point for our analysis”); 

Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 60 Cal. 4th 474, 501 (2014) (“the parties’

characterization of their relationship in the . . . contract is not dispositive”). Moreover, the 

contract also has provisions providing that the Operators are not agents of the United 

States under certain circumstances. E.g., Agreement § G.8.1.1.1 (“nothing contained 

herein shall be deemed to extend to the ship manager the status of ‘agent of the United 

States’ under any laws relating to contracts”); cf. Agreement § G.8.1.1 (purporting to 

create an agency relationship for all actions subject to the SIAA and certain other acts).

3 An early summary judgment motion—or another challenge to this court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction—may be appropriate following discovery on the issue of agency.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 18, 2019

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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