Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02284/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02284-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS KNOWLES AND THOMAS HICKS,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, 

DEANNA RADFORD, AND DOES 1-20,

 Defendants.

 /

No. C 07-2284 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO

DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE

TO AMEND

Defendants Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) and Deanna

Radford move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) to

dismiss Plaintiffs' first, second, third, and fifth claims as timebarred and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Defendant International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers, Local 1245 (IBEW) moves separately pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiffs' fourth

claim as time-barred and for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Plaintiffs oppose these motions. The

motions were heard on March 6, 2008. Having considered oral

argument on the motions and all of the papers filed by the parties,

Case 4:07-cv-02284-CW Document 69 Filed 05/05/08 Page 1 of 18
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this Court GRANTS PG&E and IBEW's motion to dismiss, without leave

to amend. 

BACKGROUND

The facts are described in the Court's November 29, 2007

Order. Additional relevant facts are taken from Plaintiffs' First

Amended Complaint (FAC) and from the documents of which the Court

took judicial notice in the November 29, 2007 Order. (November 29,

2007 Order at 6.) 

Plaintiffs allege that PG&E, through its employee Deanna

Radford, orally represented to them that they were entitled to a

sixty-month preferential re-employment benefit, although they do

not say when she did so. (FAC at ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs' employment

with PG&E was terminated on May 7, 2001. (Id. Exh. 4, at 5, 8

(Employee Notices.)) They signed severance agreements in June,

2001. Prior to January 24, 2006, Plaintiffs both requested reemployment with PG&E, but PG&E denied their requests and denied

ever making a promise of re-employment. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs

allege that they approached IBEW for assistance, and were told that

their problem was not a union issue so IBEW could not help them. 

(Id. at ¶ 10.) 

Plaintiffs do not provide the date that they first complained 

to IBEW. They do say that they tried to exercise their reemployment rights with PG&E, that they went immediately to IBEW

upon PG&E's denial, and that they then sent PG&E a demand letter on

January 24, 2006. (Id. at ¶ 68.) On November 26, 2007, Plaintiffs

sent a letter to IBEW in which they requested enforcement of PG&E's

promise of the sixty-month right to re-employment preference. (Id.

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1

At the time PG&E filed its motion to dismiss, Radford had not

yet been served.

3

at ¶ 11). 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 23, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an action in state court

against Defendant PG&E for failing to provide the sixty-month

preferential re-employment benefit, alleging five state law causes

of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) request for specific

performance; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing; (4) age discrimination in violation of the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code 

§ 12940(a); and (5) malice, oppression and fraud. On October 16,

2006, Defendants removed that action to this Court. See Knowles v.

Pacific Gas & Electric, C 06-6430 EMC. On October 30, 2006,

Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that case without prejudice in

order to pursue arbitration.

On April 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a new federal complaint

against PG&E and Deanna Radford, a PG&E employee. Plaintiffs

alleged the same five causes of action they had stated in their

August 23, 2006 complaint. 

On November 29, 2007, this Court granted, with leave to amend,

Defendant PG&E's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, 

concluding that Plaintiffs' causes of actions for breach of

contract, specific performance, breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, and age discrimination under FEHA were

preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).1

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The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend to state a claim under

LMRA. In the November 29, 2007 Order, the Court also dismissed

Plaintiffs' fraud claim and granted leave to amend to plead fraud

with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

9(b). 

This Court explained:

When § 301 preempts a state law claim, that

claim may be effectively re-characterized as

one brought under § 301 for breach of the

collective bargaining agreement. Young, 830

F.2d at 997. However, an "employee seeking a

remedy for an alleged breach of the collective

bargaining agreement must attempt to exhaust

any exclusive grievance and arbitration

procedures established by that agreement before

he may maintain a suit . . . under 301(a) of

the Labor Management Relations Act." Clayton

v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and

Aqr. Implement Workers of Am., 451 U.S. 679,

681 (1981). Moreover, in order for an employee

to recover under § 301, he must also show that

his union breached its duty of representation. 

Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No.

391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990).

. . . 

The Supreme Court has held that actions under

the LMRA are governed by the six-month statute

of limitations set out in § 10(b) of the

National Labor Relations Act. DelCostello v.

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-164 (1983). 

Claims outside of that six-month period are

subject to dismissal. Id. at 155. However, a

statute of limitations may be tolled under

either the doctrine of equitable tolling or the

doctrine of equitable estoppel. Huseman v.

Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 471 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th

Cir. 2006). Therefore, if Plaintiffs file an

amended complaint, they must allege the LMRA

claims are exhausted and timely, and if not,

they must allege how equitable tolling or

equitable estoppel apply. They must also

allege, if they can truthfully do so, that

their union violated its duty of fair

representation.

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(November 29, 2007 Order at 20-21.) 

On December 5, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their FAC in which they

allege the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract

against Defendants PG&E and Deanna Radford in violation of § 301 of

the LMRA; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing against Defendants PG&E and Deanna Radford in violation of

§ 301 of the LMRA; (3) age discrimination in employment under FEHA

against Defendants PG&E and Deanna Radford; (4) breach of the duty

of fair representation by IBEW in violation of § 301 of the LMRA

and (5) fraud against Defendants PG&E and Deanna Radford. 

In the November 29, 2007 Order, Plaintiffs were instructed

that their age discrimination in employment claim was preempted by

the LMRA and could only be stated as a claim under § 301 of the

LMRA. (November 29, 2007 Order at 15.) Despite this instruction,

Plaintiffs again plead a FEHA claim. (FAC at ¶ 44.) Therefore,

the FEHA claim construed as an LMRA claim. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the

defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds

on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). Although a Rule 12(b)(6) motion usually is

not available to raise an affirmative defense, it may be used when

the complaint contains allegations showing a complete defense or

bar to recovery, such as the statute of limitations. See Jablon v.

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Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). Dismissal on

statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) “only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the

required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that

the statute was tolled.” Id.

In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a

claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and

construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Although the court is generally confined to consideration of the

allegations in the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by

attached documents, such documents are deemed part of the complaint

and may be considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th

Cir. 1987).

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97. The court has broad discretion to deny

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leave to amend once the plaintiff has already had an opportunity to

amend. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

DISCUSSION

I. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation Against IBEW 

A. Statute of Limitations 

Under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29

U.S.C. § 160(b), a plaintiff has six months to bring a claim

against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation. 

DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172

(1983). Generally, the limitations period begins to run when the

employee "discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence

should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged

[violation]." Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir.

1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When the claim

is based on a failure of the union to process a grievance, the

cause of action generally accrues when the employee learns or

should have learned of the union's decision. Id.

In their FAC, Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action alleges that

IBEW breached its duty of fair representation by failing to

investigate Plaintiffs' oral complaints, to pursue administrative

remedies for Plaintiffs, to communicate with Defendant PG&E

regarding Plaintiffs' grievances and to enforce the collective

bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs allege that IBEW's actions were

arbitrary, discriminatory and in bad faith. Defendant IBEW argues

that Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the statute of limitations and,

alternatively, fails to allege facts giving rise to a claim against

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it. 

Plaintiffs respond that their complaint is timely because the

statute of limitations is tolled under the doctrine of equitable

estoppel, equitable tolling or the relation back doctrine. 

Plaintiffs do not provide the dates of certain relevant events. 

However, by at least January 24, 2006, the date that Plaintiffs

sent a letter to PG&E after they allegedly were turned away from

IBEW, Plaintiffs had notice of both PG&E's and IBEW's adverse

decisions. 

Plaintiffs' cause of action against IBEW, therefore, accrued

before January 24, 2006. Under the six-month statute of

limitation, Plaintiffs had, at the latest, until July 25, 2006 to

file a claim against IBEW. Plaintiffs filed their claim against

IBEW on December 5, 2007, after the statute of limitations had run. 

Therefore, if neither equitable tolling nor estoppel applies,

Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action against IBEW is time-barred.

1. Equitable Estoppel 

 "Equitable estoppel focuses primarily on the actions taken by

the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit." Santa

Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000). To

invoke equitable estoppel, plaintiffs must allege facts indicative

of "improper purpose by the defendant, or of the defendant's actual

or constructive knowledge that its conduct was deceptive." 

Stallcop v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.

1987). "Conduct or representations" by the defendant that "tend to

lull the plaintiff into a false sense of security can estop the

defendant from raising the statute of limitations, on the general

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equitable principle that no man may take advantage of his own

wrong." Atkins v. Union Pacific R. Co., 685 F.2d 1146, 1149 (9th

Cir. 1982) (internal quotations omitted); Huseman v. Icicle

Seafoods, Inc., 471 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff

must show that the defendant engaged in "affirmative misconduct." 

Diaz v. Safeway Inc., 2007 WL 2793367, at *5 (N.D. Cal.) (citing

Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)).

"Affirmative misconduct" involves "a deliberate lie" or "a pattern

of false promises." Id.

Although Plaintiffs state that they relied upon IBEW's

representation that their right to re-employment was not a union

issue, they fail to allege facts indicating that IBEW acted

deceptively. (FAC at ¶¶ 68, 74.) Plaintiffs only allege that they

were "haphazardly dismissed by the union." (Id.) IBEW's alleged

"haphazard" dismissal does not amount to deception. At most, based

on the allegations in the FAC, someone in the IBEW office gave

Plaintiffs incorrect information. (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs'

allegation that PG&E's actions lulled them into a false sense of

security does not implicate IBEW in any misrepresentation. (Id. at

¶ 74.)

Plaintiffs argue that their allegations that IBEW's failure to

investigate their complaint, to pursue administrative remedies, to

communicate with Defendant PG&E regarding their grievances and to

enforce the collective bargaining agreement were arbitrary,

discriminatory and in bad faith are sufficient to show equitable

estoppel. Plaintiffs are mistaken. These conclusory allegations

comprise their duty of fair representation claim but do not also

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serve to state the deception requirement for equitable estoppel. 

Plaintiffs argue that, because IBEW told them their claim was

not a union issue, they did not have notice of a claim against IBEW

until the hearing when the Court ruled that their claims were

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. This argument is unpersuasive. 

Plaintiffs had notice of their claim against IBEW on the day that

the union refused to represent them, which was before January 24,

2006. Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to provide factual allegations

supporting a basis for equitable estoppel. 

2. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling may be invoked to "excuse a claimant's

failure to comply with the time limitations where she had neither

actual nor constructive notice of the filing period." Leorna v.

United States Dep't of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997). 

"Equitable tolling focuses on whether there was excusable delay by

the plaintiff and may be applied if, despite all due diligence, a

plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the

existence of his claim." Huseman, 471 F.3d at 1120 (9th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

"If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of

a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable

tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing

suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs." 

Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Courts apply the doctrine of equitable tolling only sparingly, and

are "much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the

claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal

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rights." Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96

(1990). Moreover, "'once a claimant retains counsel, tolling

ceases because [the claimant] has gained the means of knowledge of

[the claimant's] rights and can be charged with constructive

knowledge of the law's requirements.'" Johnson v. Henderson, 314

F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Leorna, 105 F.3d at 551.) 

 According to their FAC, not only had Plaintiffs' grievance

been rejected by IBEW, but Plaintiffs had retained counsel by at

least January 24, 2006. (FAC at ¶ 68.) Therefore, by that date,

Plaintiffs had constructive if not actual knowledge of IBEW's

possible breach of duty.

Plaintiffs contend that they waited until August, 2006 to file

their state law claims because they first wanted to receive rightto-sue letters from the California Department of Fair Employment

and Housing (DFEH). (Id. at ¶ 68). However, Plaintiffs did not

need right-to-sue letters from the DFEH to sue their union for

breach of duty of representation under the LMRA. Plaintiffs do not

explain why exhaustion with the DFEH should toll the statute of

limitations on their LMRA claim against IBEW. Therefore, equitable

tolling does not apply. 

3. Relation Back 

Plaintiffs argue that their duty of fair representation claim

relates back to the date of their original complaint, which was

filed on August 23, 2006. (Id. at ¶ 78.) Under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(c), a new claim relates back to the date of an

original pleading if it "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original

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pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644,

656 (2005). "The relation back doctrine allows untimely claims to

be deemed timely by treating the claims as if they had been filed

when the timely claims were filed." Mandacina v. United States,

328 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2003). The relation back doctrine

does not help Plaintiffs here because even their original complaint

was filed after the July 25, 2006 deadline. 

Furthermore, for relation back to apply, a new defendant must

have had notice of the claim against it. Plaintiffs fail to allege

that IBEW received notice before Plaintiffs wrote to it on November

26, 2007, after the statute of limitations had run. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

Even if Plaintiffs' claims here were not time-barred, they

fail to state a claim that IBEW breached its duty of fair

representation. In order to bring a successful claim for breach of

the duty of fair representation under the LMRA against a union, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the union's "actions are either

'arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,'" a standard that

applies to "all union activity." Air Line Pilots v. O'Neill, 499

U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190

(1967)). The Supreme Court explained that a "union's actions are

arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at

the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far

outside a 'wide range of reasonableness,' as to be irrational." 

Id. (citations omitted). For a plaintiff to prove that a union's

actions were discriminatory or in bad faith, "[t]here must be

‘substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest

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conduct.’" Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach

Emp. of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971) (quoting

Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)). 

Plaintiffs do not allege that the union acted with fraud,

deceit, or misconduct. Instead, Plaintiffs summarily contend that

"by failing to investigate Plaintiffs' complaint, failing to

provide administrative remedies, failing to communicate with

Defendant PG&E regarding Plaintiffs' grievances, and failing to

enforce the collective bargaining agreement, Defendant IBEW's

conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory and in bad faith." (FAC at 

¶ 51). Plaintiffs do not provide any facts that explain how IBEW's

failure to act constituted fraud, deceitful action or dishonest

conduct. In fact, Plaintiffs later characterize IBEW's actions as

"haphazard," which undercuts their contention that IBEW was driven

by an illegal motive. (FAC at ¶ 66.) Even if Plaintiffs' claims

were not time-barred, they would be dismissed for failure to state

a claim under the LMRA. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the duty of fair 

representation against IBEW is dismissed. Leave to amend is denied

because Plaintiffs have been given an opportunity to allege any

facts that would excuse the fact that the claim was filed outside

the statutory time limit, and they have not done so. 

II. Claims Against PG&E

A. LMRA Claim

In their first, second and third causes of action, Plaintiffs

allege PG&E violated § 301 of the LMRA. In order to bring a claim

under § 301 of the LMRA against an employer, plaintiffs must have

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first exhausted any contractual remedies in the collective

bargaining agreement and must show that their union breached its

duty of fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-86

(1967); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165. Under the LMRA, claims

against an employer are "inextricably interdependent" with claims

against a union. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164. Although a

plaintiff is not required to sue the union in order to bring a

claim against an employer, a plaintiff is required to "carry the

burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the Union." Id. at

165. Plaintiffs have six months after their cause of action

accrues to file a § 301 claim against an employer. Id. at 171-172. 

Because Plaintiffs do not have a viable claim against IBEW, their §

301 claims against PG&E must fail. 

Defendants PG&E and Deanna Radford also move to dismiss

Plaintiffs' LMRA claims as time-barred and argue that neither

equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel apply. 

1. Statute of Limitations 

The six-month limitations period of Section 10(b) begins to

run on the date that Plaintiffs "knew or should have known of the

defendant's wrongdoing." Allen v. United Food & Commercial Workers

Int'l Union, 43 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Acri v.

International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d

1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986)). Based on their allegations,

Plaintiffs knew of Defendant PG&E's wrongful conduct by January 24,

2006. (FAC at ¶ 68.) Plaintiffs filed their complaint against

Defendant PG&E in August, 2006, after the six month statutory

period had run. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims against PG&E are

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time-barred, unless equitable estoppel or equitable tolling

applies. 

a. Equitable Estoppel 

Plaintiffs argue that PG&E lulled them into a false sense of

security and, therefore, should be estopped from raising the

statute of limitations. (FAC at ¶ 74.) A plaintiff's reliance

upon a defendant's representations during litigation does not

trigger equitable estoppel because the opposing party has no duty

to inform the plaintiff of the statute of limitations. Lehman v.

United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Stallcop

v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Moreover, it is a plaintiff's responsibility to adhere to the

procedural requirements underlying his claim and it is not the

defendant's duty to advise the plaintiff where an action might be

present. Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir.

1983); Diaz v. Safeway Inc., 2007 WL 2793367, *5 (N.D. Cal.). 

Plaintiffs contend that they relied on PG&E's argument that

their August, 2006 state court complaint should be dismissed to

pursue arbitration. They allege that, once in arbitration, PG&E

"claimed that Plaintiffs' causes of action are not arbitrable and

they must exclusively be handled at the federal level." (FAC at 

¶ 70.) Plaintiffs' argument fails for three reasons. First,

PG&E's actions occurred after the statute of limitations had run;

thus they have no bearing upon Plaintiffs' failure to file within

the statute of limitations. Second, Defendant PG&E had no duty to

advise Plaintiffs' counsel on the procedural requirements for

pursing an LMRA claim. Third, Plaintiffs' counsel could not rely

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on arguments made by PG&E regarding the proper procedure to pursue

Plaintiffs' claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs' argument for equitable

estoppel fails. 

b. Equitable Tolling

As stated previously, equitable tolling focuses on whether

there was excusable delay by the plaintiff and may be applied if,

despite all due diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital

information bearing on the existence of his claim. Huseman, 471

F.3d at 1120. Plaintiffs do not allege that they were unable to

obtain vital information bearing on the existence of their LMRA

claim. Therefore equitable tolling does not apply, and Plaintiffs'

LMRA claims against PG&E must be dismissed as time-barred. 

 B. Fraud

In the November 29, 2007 Order, the Court granted Plaintiffs

leave to amend to plead a fraud claim with the particularity

required by Rule 9(b). (November 29, 2007 Order at 17.) Such

allegations must be “specific enough to give defendants notice of

the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud

charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just

deny that they have done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780

F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Statements of the time, place and

nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are sufficient, Wool v.

Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987)

(superseded on other grounds), provided the plaintiff sets forth

“what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is

false.” In re GlenFed, Inc., Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th

Cir. 1994) (superseded on other grounds). 

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In their FAC, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants PG&E and 

Radford's oral promise of a sixty-month right to re-employment was

a material misrepresentation intended to induce Plaintiffs into

"entering into Severance Agreements and working during the O&M

period." (FAC at ¶ 58.)

Plaintiffs have not provided the date that PG&E and Radford

made the oral promise, but they allege the oral promise was made to

induce them (1) to continuing working during the O&M period and (2)

to enter into the severance agreements. These two time periods

were over two years apart. The first was during their employment

with PG&E and the second was after they were laid off. 

A fraud claim may be preempted by the LMRA. The preemptive

force of § 301 of the LMRA "extends to fraud claims when resolution

of the claims is inextricably intertwined with terms in a labor

contract." Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d

1010, 1016 (9th Cir 2000); Bale v. General Telephone Co., 795 F.2d

775, 779-80 (9th Cir. 1986). 

If the oral promise was made during the O&M period, when

Plaintiffs' employment was covered by the CBA, their fraud claim

would be preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and would be time-barred. 

If the oral promise was made to induce Plaintiffs to enter

into the severance agreements, after they were no longer employed

by PG&E or covered by the CBA, then the oral promise could be

covered by the severance agreements' arbitration clause. In fact,

on December 3, 2007, the arbitrator issued an interim award that

held in part, "Claimants’ allegation of an oral agreement to

provide them a sixty month preferential right to rehire -- as part

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of the Severance Agreement and Release, or to induce them to sign

it -- is arbitrable." 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' fraud claim must be dismissed, either

as preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, or as subject to arbitration. 

III. Claims Against Deanna Radford

Because Deanna Radford is not a proper defendant in a LMRA

claim, all LMRA claims against her are dismissed without leave to

amend on this ground as well. Williams v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 2006

WL 213745, *2 (N.D. Cal.) (explaining that "§ 301 suits are

confined to Defendants who are signatories of the collective

bargaining agreement under which they are brought.") 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motions to dismiss are

granted. Dismissal is without leave to amend. The clerk shall

enter judgment. Each party shall bear its own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/5/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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