Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07776/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07776-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD PRENTICE, CHRISTIAN MILLER,

and TIFFINEY PETHERBRIDGE, on their

own behalf and on behalf of classes

of those similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FUND FOR PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH,

INC.,

Defendant.

 

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No. C-06-7776 SC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL

COLLECTIVE ACTION

CERTIFICATION, HOFFMANLA ROCHE NOTICE, AND

EQUITABLE TOLLING

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Richard Prentice, Christian Miller, and Tiffiney

Petherbridge ("Plaintiffs") move the Court to conditionally

certify this suit as a collective action under the Fair Labor

Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; to authorize the

mailing of a notice to prospective plaintiffs allowing them to

opt-in to the collective action; and to toll the applicable

statute of limitations. See Motion, Docket No. 28. Defendant

Fund for Public Interest Research ("Defendant" or "the Fund") does

not oppose conditional certification of the collective action, but

does oppose the notice and consent forms proposed by Plaintiffs,

and does oppose tolling the statute of limitations. See Docket

Nos. 49, 50. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS

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1Plaintiffs also allege violations of California and New York

state law, the details of which are not directly relevant to the

motion now before the Court.

2

IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' motion.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant is in the business of providing canvassing services

to other organizations on a contract basis. See Compl., Docket

No. 1, ¶ 4; Mullan Decl., Exs. A, C. Plaintiffs were employed by

the Fund as Field Managers and Canvassers and were responsible for

canvassing door to door or in public locations to solicit

donations and collect signatures on behalf of third-party nonprofit and advocacy organizations. See, e.g., Prentice Decl. ¶¶

5, 8; Miller Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8; Petherbridge Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8-9. 

Plaintiffs allege that the Canvassers and Field Managers (together

"Canvassing Staff") had the same responsibilities and were subject

to the same purportedly unlawful policies, and may therefore be

grouped as a single class. See, e.g., Prentice Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7;

Miller Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7; Petherbridge Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7 

Plaintiffs allege, on behalf of themselves and those

similarly situated, that the Fund unlawfully classified them as

exempt from overtime payment under federal law, that the Fund

refused to pay them overtime wages for overtime worked, that the

Fund refused to pay minimum wages, and that the Fund failed to

keep certain employment records required by law. See Compl. ¶ 1.1

By this action, Plaintiffs seek damages as well as injunctive and

declaratory relief.

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III. CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION

A. Standard For Conditional Certification of Collective

Action

Section 16(b) of the FLSA provides employees with a private

right of action to sue an employer for violations of the Act "for

and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees

similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). To join an FLSA

"collective action" as a plaintiff, an employee must affirmatively

opt-in by filing a written "consent to join" in the court where

the action is pending. See id.

A majority of courts, including district courts in this

circuit, have adopted a two-stage certification procedure for

collective actions brought under the FLSA. See, e.g., Adams v.

Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., No. 06-5428 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

26881, at *10-12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007); Beauperthuy v. 24 Hour

Fitness USA, Inc., No. 06-715 SC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21315, at

*18-19 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 2007); Gerlach v. Wells Fargo & Co.,

No. 05-585 CW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24823, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March

28, 2006); Wynn v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1082-84

(C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267

F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001)). At the first stage, the

district court approves conditional certification upon a minimal

showing that the members of the proposed class are "similarly

situated"; at the second stage, usually initiated by a motion to

decertify, the court engages in a more searching review. 

Beauperthuy, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21315, at *19. 

The FLSA does not define "similarly situated," and the Ninth

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Circuit has not spoken to the issue. The Supreme Court, in

Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), also left

the term undefined, but indicated that a proper collective action

encourages judicial efficiency by addressing in a single

proceeding claims of multiple plaintiffs who share "common issues

of law and fact arising from the same alleged [prohibited]

activity." Id. at 170. This has been distilled by lower courts

into a requirement that a proponent for conditional certification

present the court with "nothing more than substantial allegations

that a putative class members were together the victims of a

single decision, policy, or plan." Thiesen, 267 F.3d at 1102

(internal quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Gerlach, 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 24823 at *6-7. Given that a motion for conditional

certification usually comes before much, if any, discovery, and is

made in anticipation of a later more searching review, a movant

bears a very light burden in substantiating its allegations at

this stage. See, e.g., Beauperthuy, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21315,

at *20.

B. Collective Action Is Appropriate

Plaintiffs have met the burden for conditional certification

of the collective action. First, Plaintiffs have shown that all

of the Canvassing Staff had the same primary job responsibilities. 

See, e.g., Prentice Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8; Miller Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8;

Petherbridge Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8-9. Additionally, Plaintiffs have shown

that all of the Canvassing Staff were subject to the same Fund

policies that the Plaintiffs challenge here -- specifically, the

Fund classified all Canvassing Staff as exempt from the FLSA

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overtime requirements. See, e.g., Prentice Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7; Miller

Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7; Petherbridge Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7. Finally, the Fund does

not oppose conditional certification of the class of Canvassing

Staff employees. See Docket No. 49. The Court concludes that

certifying this action as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. §

216(b) will allow for more effective case management from this

point forward. The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for

conditional certification of the collective action. 

IV. EQUITABLE TOLLING

Plaintiffs ask the Court to toll the statute of limitations

as of the date they filed the Complaint, December 19, 2006,

through the deadline for opting into the collective action. See

Mot. at 15. The Ninth Circuit has implied the doctrine of

equitable tolling into the FLSA. See Partlow v. Jewish Orphans

Home of S. Cal., Inc. 645 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1981) (abrogated

on other grounds by Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. 165). "[E]quitable

tolling concerns itself with the equities of dismissal for

untimely filing caused by factors independent of the plaintiff. 

Accordingly, we must ask whether it would be unfair or unjust to

allow the statute of limitations to act as a bar to [a

plaintiff's] claim." Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992,

1004 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, "[e]quitable tolling applies when the

plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct

on the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances

beyond the plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim

on time." Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Neither basis for equitable tolling is present here. 

Plaintiffs do not allege that extraordinary circumstances beyond

their control prevented them from filing their claims sooner, so

the focus must be on the Defendant's conduct. Plaintiffs assert

that the Fund did two things which justify tolling. 

First, Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant's allegedly

incorrect classification of Canvassing Staff as exempt misled

potential class members regarding the facts and the law governing

overtime wages. See Mot. at 15. This argument lacks merit. 

Plaintiffs offer no evidence that they were misled, other than the

exempt classification itself. None of the declarations supporting

Plaintiffs' motion even suggests that the Canvassing Staff were

misled or identifies a misleading statement that caused them to

refrain from filing their claims sooner. See Prentice Decl.;

Miller Decl.; Petherbridge Decl.; Oehler Decl.; Stein Decl.; Rose

Decl.; Steely Decl; Wakefield Decl.; Schultz Decl.; Burghardt

Decl. Absent other evidence, Plaintiffs' argument is simply that

any incorrect classification of an hourly employee as exempt from

overtime justifies tolling the FLSA statute of limitations. To

grant equitable tolling in such circumstances would void the

statute of limitations entirely, as any FLSA plaintiff would

qualify. See also Veliz v. Cintas Corp., No. C 03-1180 SBA, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24428, at *17 (N.D. Cal. March 20, 2007) (tolling

the statute of limitations through the date for opting into the

suit "effectively eviscerates the statutory limitations period in

nearly all collective actions"). Had Congress wished to provide

unlimited time for filing FLSA actions, the statute would not

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contain a limitations period. See, e.g., Grayson v. K Mart Corp.,

79 F.3d 1086, 1106 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing the legislative

history of 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 256).

The second purportedly wrongful act by Defendant on which

Plaintiffs rely is equally unavailing. Plaintiffs claim the

Defendant improperly withheld the names and contact information

for potential class members. See Mot. at 15; Reply, Docket No.

53, at 1. Defendant maintains that it was not required to produce

the contact information in response to an informal request, and

that it would have risked violating California privacy laws if it

had complied with Plaintiffs' request. See Opp'n at 6. The

appellate courts have not provided guidance on this issue, and

other district courts appear to be split. Compare Adams, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26881, at *40 (tolling statute of limitations

where defendant had refused to turn over contact information),

with Gerlach, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24823, at *16-17 (holding that

under the law of this Circuit, equitable tolling is not

appropriate where defendants refuse to disclose contact

information for potential plaintiffs). 

The FLSA, however, does not require Defendants to provide

contact information for potential plaintiffs until after the court

certifies the collective action. See Adams, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

26881, at *39 (citing Hoffman-Laroche, 493 U.S. at 170). In

Adams, Judge Patel held that, although the statute does not

require defendants to disclose potential plaintiffs prior to

certification, defendants gain an unfair advantage if they do not

disclose, and equitable tolling is appropriate to mitigate that

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2Hoffman-La Roche addressed a collective action brought under 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which, the Court

recognized, incorporates § 16(b) of the FLSA. 493 U.S. at 170. 

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advantage. See id. The Court respectfully disagrees with Judge

Patel's approach. If refusal to disclose contact information is

sufficient basis to grant equitable tolling, either the FLSA

statute of limitations is meaningless or the Courts are reading a

disclosure requirement into the FLSA where the statute does not

contain such a requirement. Neither outcome is appropriate. 

Where a defendant has committed no misconduct aimed at preventing

potential plaintiffs from joining the suit, there is no reason to

toll the statute of limitations.

Here, the Fund did nothing wrong and should not be penalized. 

Other than the Fund's refusal to disclose, Plaintiffs do not

identify any other circumstance beyond their control which may

have prevented other potential plaintiffs from filing suit. The

Court therefore DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for equitable tolling of

the FLSA statute of limitations.

V. FORM OF ORDER, NOTICE, AND CONSENT

In Hoffman-La Roche, the Supreme Court recognized the

discretion of district courts to facilitate the process by which

potential plaintiffs are notified of FLSA collective actions in

which they may be members of the class. 493 U.S. at 169-70.2 The

parties here do not dispute whether notice pursuant to Hoffman-La

Roche is appropriate, but they do dispute the form of such notice. 

Each party has submitted its own proposed Order, Notice, and

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Consent to Join documents. See Proposed Order, Docket No. 37,

Exs. A, B; Opp'n, Exs. E, F. The differences between the parties'

proposed forms focus on the time allotted for different stages of

the notice process as well as certain procedural issues. 

Generally, each party wants more time to complete its own

obligations and less time for the other party to do the same. 

Both parties are willing to adopt an Order, Notice, and Consent to

Join form like those the Court recently approved in Beauperthuy,

with modifications appropriate to the instant case. See Opp'n at

9-10; Reply at 6-7. The Court addresses each of the disputed

items below.

First, the parties disagree about how to define the group of

potential plaintiffs. Plaintiffs would define the group of

"Covered Employees" as those who were employed in the Covered

Positions "at any time between the earliest date covered by the

first Fund for Public Interest Research, Inc. pay date falling

after December 19, 2003 through the date of the filing date of

this Order." See Proposed Order ¶ 3. Defendant would limit

potential plaintiffs to those who were employed in Covered

Positions "during the preceding three (3) years." Opp'n at 7, Ex.

E ¶3. Because the Court denied Plaintiffs' request for equitable

tolling, there is no basis for going as far back as December,

2003. The Court therefore adopts Defendant's definition of

"Covered Employees."

Plaintiffs request an opt-in period of 120 days for all

potential plaintiffs to respond to the Notice and join the suit. 

See Reply at 3-4. Defendant proposes a 60 day limit. Opp'n at 7-

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8. The parties both recognize that the group of potential

plaintiffs is exceedingly large and geographically dispersed. 

Opp'n at 8; Reply at 6. Plaintiffs further note that given the

size of the class, multiple mailings may be necessary to reach all

potential plaintiffs. Defendant states, without support, that an

opt-in period of 120 days is "simply too long" and is "excessive." 

Opp'n at 8, 9. The Court disagrees. In light of the fact that

the Court rejected equitable tolling, Defendant faces no prejudice

from a longer opt-in period, while all potential plaintiffs will

still have an incentive to act promptly. The Court therefore sets

the opt-in period to 120 days.

Defendant seeks to increase from 10 days to 60 days the

amount of time it has to collect and produce the contact

information for all potential plaintiffs. See Opp'n at 7. 

Plaintiffs are willing to extend this time, provided the Court

tolls the statute of limitations. Reply at 6. As explained

above, the Court will not toll the statute of limitations. 

However, the Court recognizes that the group of potential

plaintiffs is large, and 10 days may not be sufficient. Defendant

should not need 60 days to collect and produce this information. 

Defendant likely began investigating who all of the possible

plaintiffs were as soon as the suit was filed. The Court

therefore extends the time for Defendant to produce the contact

information for all potential plaintiffs from 10 days to 30 days.

The parties also dispute whether the Notice should include

the caption of the case. The Court agrees with Defendant that the

it should not. Including the full caption may give a false

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impression of judicial endorsement of Plaintiffs' position where

none exists. See, e.g., Flores v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., 289 F.

Supp. 2d 1042, 1046-47 (N.D. Ill. 2003). That the Notice will

include a statement of judicial neutrality would not, alone, be

enough to cure this defect, as the caption would appear at the top

of the Notice and give the wrong impression almost immediately. 

However, the Consent to Join form may include the full caption, as

the Consent to Join used in Beauperthuy did.

Defendant also requests that the notice incorporate language

informing potential plaintiffs that if they join the collective

action, they may be required to answer questions in writing or in

deposition, or to give testimony at trial. Opp'n at 10. Such

language is unnecessary and inappropriate. As Plaintiffs note,

individualized discovery is rarely appropriate in FLSA collective

actions. Reply at 7-8; see also McGrath v. City of Philadelphia,

Civ. No. 92-4750, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1495, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb.

14, 1994) ("Although the present case is not a Rule 23 class

action, principles of discovery developed in Rule 23 cases apply

to this § 216 'class action' by analogy. It is well established

that individualized discovery . . . is inappropriate in a class

action lawsuit." (citations omitted)). Including a warning about

possible discovery when that discovery is unlikely will serve no

purpose other than deterring potential plaintiffs from joining the

suit based on unfounded concerns about the hassle of discovery.

Defendant also requests that the Notice be sent and the

Consent to Join forms be processed by a third party administrator. 

The Court agrees that using a third party is the best way to

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ensure the neutrality and integrity of the opt-in process. The

Court does not agree, however, with Defendant's assertion that

Plaintiffs' counsel should be prohibited from communicating with

potential plaintiffs. See Opp'n at 8-9. Restricting

communication between counsel and clients, or potential clients,

is an extraordinary measure, and would require a much stronger

showing of misconduct or impropriety than Defendant's mere

assertion that statements on Plaintiffs' counsel's website are

"dubious." See, e.g., Flores, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 ("An order

seeking to bar or limit communications between a party and

potential class members should be based on a clear record and

specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a

limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the

parties.").

 Finally, the parties disagree about whether the Consent to

Join form should include a waiver of any conflict which may arise

from Plaintiffs' attorneys' representation of multiple collective

action members. See Opp'n at 10; Reply at 9. Defendant asserts

that many potential plaintiffs would not even understand what they

are being asked to waive. Defendant provides no authority for its

assertions about the legality and propriety of such a waiver,

however. The Court will leave this issue to the parties to

resolve by meeting and conferring.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that this

action is appropriate for certification as a FLSA collective

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action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Court further finds that

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in this suit is

not appropriate. The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN

PART Plaintiffs' Motion, and ORDERS as follows:

1. This action is certified as a collective action pursuant

to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Covered Employees include all

past, present, and future employees of the Fund for

Public Interest Research, Inc., who have been employed

as Canvassers or Field Managers during the preceding

three (3) years.

2. The parties shall meet and confer to resolve any

remaining disputes regarding who qualifies as a

potential plaintiff or regarding the form of the Opt-In

Order, Notice, and Consent to Join. The parties shall

submit no later than ten (10) days from the date of this

Order a Joint Proposed Opt-In Order, a Joint Proposed

Notice, and a Joint Proposed Consent to Join form, all

modeled after those issued by this Court in Beauperthuy.

3. In addition to filing the Proposed Order, Notice, and

Consent to Join through the normal electronic filing

procedures, the parties shall submit all three documents

in WordPerfect format to the Court's proposed order

email account, scPO@cand.uscourts.gov.

4. To the extent that the parties cannot reach an agreement

on an issue, each party may submit a brief of no more

than five (5) pages addressing the outstanding issues at

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the time the parties submit the Joint Proposed Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2007

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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