Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-02622/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-02622-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

**E-filed 07/13/2010** 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

URSULA MCCOMAS, et al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

EARL L. WALLACE, et al., 

 Defendants, 

____________________________________/

No. C 10-2622 RS 

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION 

FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND SETTING HEARING 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

This a putative class action in which a large number of named plaintiffs have sued many 

individual attorneys and law firms, asserting violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and 

related claims arising from foreclosure and eviction efforts taken against plaintiffs’ homes. 

Two plaintiffs, Jim and Danielle Earl, now move for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 

injunction, or in the alternative, a stay of state court proceedings, in connection with their eviction 

from their home, following a non-judicial foreclosure and an unlawful detainer judgment that was 

entered against them. Although the Earls present a highly compelling story of the personal hardships 

they and their children are facing as the result of the eviction, they have not established that a 

temporary restraining order should issue here. In addition to all of the issues enumerated below, the 

fact that they did not file this motion until after the eviction, even though the action was pending 

before that time, weighs heavily against any conclusion that some additional delay involved in 

hearing the matter on preliminary injunction presents an undue hardship. Accordingly, the matter 

Case 3:10-cv-02622-RS Document 30 Filed 07/13/10 Page 1 of 4
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United 

States District 

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For the Northern District of California 

shall be set for a preliminary injunction hearing on Tuesday, July 20, 2010, at 1:30 p.m., without 

prejudice to the Court’s discretion to take the matter under submission without oral argument, 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1. In light of the issues identified below, the Earls may file 

additional papers in support of the preliminary injunction no later than 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, July 

15, 2010. Defendants may file opposition no later than 12:00 p.m. on Monday, July 19, 2010. No 

reply shall be filed unless requested by further court order. 

 The following additional considerations supported this denial of a temporary restraining 

order, and presently appear to weigh against issuance of a preliminary injunction: 

1. The cases cited in the moving papers for the standards under which preliminary relief 

may be granted all predate Winter v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). While it is 

true that the Ninth Circuit standards prior to Winter permitted a preliminary injunction to 

issue where only “serious questions” on the merits had been shown, provided the 

showing of irreparable harm was high enough, post-Winter a plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish that he or she is likely to succeed on the merits and 

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, as well as that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. 

Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374.1

2. The Earls have moved for relief as against all the named defendants in this action, even 

though it appears most of them had no involvement in or connection to the foreclosure 

and eviction proceedings involving the Earls. 

3. Even assuming the motion is limited to the particular attorneys involved with the Earls, it 

is unclear on what basis the particular injunctive relief sought could be entered against 

 

1

 In American Trucking Association v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that 

Winter rejected the Ninth Circuit’s preliminary injunction standard as “too lenient.” 559 F.3d 1046, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit then recited Winter’s standard (which speaks only of a 

“likelihood” of success) and insisted that, “[t]o the extent that our cases have suggested a lesser 

standard, they are no longer controlling, or even viable.” Id. See also McDermont v. Ampersand 

Pub., LLC, 593 F.3d 950, 965 (2010) (noting where district court erroneously applied the pre-Winter 

standard, that “serious” questions going to the merits “would not be enough to support the entry of a 

preliminary injunction, regardless of the other factors”). 

Case 3:10-cv-02622-RS Document 30 Filed 07/13/10 Page 2 of 4
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United 

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For the Northern District of California 

those attorneys. Plaintiffs assert that this entire action was brought in light of the 

Supreme Court’s recent holding in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich 

LPA, 130 S.Ct. 1605 (2010). Plaintiffs contend Jerman stands for the proposition the 

attorneys may be held personally liable under the FDCPA in circumstances like these. In

Jerman, however, there was no foreclosure or eviction. An attorney had initiated a

judicial foreclosure under Ohio law, but dismissed the suit after being advised that the 

debt had actually been paid off. 130 S.Ct. at 1609. The Jerman plaintiff then brought 

suit regarding an alleged FDCPA violation within a “notice” that had been served with 

the foreclosure action. Id. There was no dispute in Jerman that an attorney engaging in 

debt collection activities is potentially liable under the FDCPA. The only issue decided 

by the Jerman court was whether an attorney's mistake of law (as opposed to a mistake 

of fact) can ever be a “good faith mistake” that does not give rise to liability. See Jerman, 

130 S.Ct. at 1608. (“This case presents the question whether the “bona fide error” 

defense in § 1692k(c) applies to a violation resulting from a debt collector’s mistaken 

interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA.”) The notion that plaintiffs may 

have claims for damages against any of the defendants here who violated the FDCPA, is 

unremarkable. Nothing in Jerman, however, supports a claim for injunctive relief to stop 

foreclosure proceedings, whether or not an eviction has already taken place. 

4. Moreover, even assuming the Earls would have had a right under their state law claims 

to injunctive relief to stop the attorneys from proceeding with their collection efforts, the 

foreclosure, the unlawful detainer case, or the subsequent eviction pursuant to the writ of 

possession, they have not explained what effective injunctive relief against these 

defendants could be issued at this juncture. Indeed, their notice of motion merely seeks 

an injunction restraining defendants from “instituting, commencing or proceeding with” 

any eviction of the Earls from their home. As the motion elsewhere reveals that the 

eviction has already taken place and that Earls are living in a motel, the motion, by its 

own terms, is moot. 

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5. To the extent the Earls are seeking some other form of injunctive relief, notwithstanding 

their notice of motion, such as restoring them to possession, they have not shown how 

these defendants would be the proper persons to seek such relief against. 

6. The Earls assert that it is “commonly known that securitizers create fraudulent 

documents to foreclose” and that “[t]hey did so in this case.” The Earls’ subsequent 

description of the various title documents includes a variety of conclusory assertions that 

some of them are fraudulent or there is no evidence that they were executed with proper 

authority. To the extent the Earls are complaining about a lack of evidence to support 

documents that are regular on their face, they mistake their burden of proof at this 

juncture. To the extent the Earls are arguing that the alleged fraud is discernable on the 

face of the documents, they have not adequately explained their contentions. 

7. To the extent that the Earls seek the alternative relief of having state court proceedings 

stayed, they face the same mootness problem as with their injunction. It does not appear 

there are any ongoing state court proceedings to be stayed, even assuming the serious

jurisdictional barriers to a federal court staying state court proceedings could be 

overcome. 

8. To the extent the Earls were only attempting to restrain the actions of attorney 

defendants, or are only seeking damages from them, no obvious venue problem appears. 

To the extent, however, that they seek to affect the Superior Court proceedings or the 

title to the property at issue, it is not apparent that they could pursue such matters in this 

district. 

Accordingly, the motion for a temporary restraining order is denied, and briefing on the motion 

for a preliminary injunction shall proceed as set out above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 07/13/2010 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:10-cv-02622-RS Document 30 Filed 07/13/10 Page 4 of 4