Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00620/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00620-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aaron Shawn Bossardet, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 10-620-TUC-FRZ (GEE)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On October 15, 2010, Aaron Shawn Bossardet, an inmate confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex in Tucson, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title

28, United States Code, Section 2254. (Doc. 1) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Edmonds for report and recommendation. LRCiv 72.1

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the

record, enter an order denying the petition on the merits. Trial counsel was not ineffective.

Newly discovered evidence does not constitute a cognizable claim. The trial court’s failure to

instruct the jury on the “mere presence” defense sua sponte was not error. The prosecutor’s

alleged improper vouching did not violate due process. Bossardet’s natural life sentence does

not violate the Eighth amendment. 

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Summary of the Case

Bossardet was convicted after a jury trial of first degree murder, aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon, and three counts of kidnapping. (Doc. 1-4, p. 2) The trial court sentenced

him to various terms of imprisonment totaling natural life plus 10.5 years. Id., pp. 2-3.

At trial, the state presented evidence that “Bossardet kidnapped three individuals [West,

Muro, and Gutierrez] while trying to discover who had stolen money owed to him for an illegal

drug transaction.” Id., p. 3; (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2-3) “He beat, and eventually shot, one victim

[Gutierrez] who died as a result of the gunshot wound.” (Doc. 1-4, p. 3) After the shooting,

one of the kidnap victims, West, convinced Bossardet to drive them all to the Western Union

office on the pretext that he could use their phone to raise some money. (Doc. 1-2, p. 6) At

some point, West managed to ask one of the clerks to call the police. Id. Bossardet fled and

was later apprehended at a friend’s house. Id.

Bossardet argued on appeal that “the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike the

state’s notice of aggravating circumstance, refusing to excuse a juror, admitting into evidence

a recording of a jailhouse telephone, giving a Portillo jury instruction, and failing to give a

‘mere presence’ jury instruction.” Id. He further argued “the natural life sentence is excessive

and that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial.” Id. The court of

appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences on October 18, 2006. Id., pp. 2-18. Bossardet

appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, but that court summarily denied review on April 18,

2007. (Doc. 1-6)

Bossardet filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief arguing trial counsel was

ineffective for (A) failing to visit him in jail and noticing that he had a flat affect, (B) failing to

properly investigate, interview witnesses, review the evidence and prepare for trial, (C) failing

to file pretrial motions, (D) failing to submit voir dire, (E) failing to make proper objections, (F)

failing to submit jury instructions, (G) failing to advise him about testifying on his own behalf,

(H) failing to call defense witnesses, (I) failing to present mitigation evidence, and (J)

committing cumulative errors. (Doc. 1-9, p. 3) The trial court denied the petition on October

28, 2008. (Doc. 1-9, p. 2)

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1

 The record does not contain a copy of the petitioner’s appellate brief. The court is therefore

unable to verify that Bossardet raised the same claims before the court of appeals that he raised before

the trial court in his Rule 32 petition. Nevertheless, the court will assume that he did so because the

respondents concede that all of his claims were properly exhausted.

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Bossardet timely appealed,1 but though the court of appeals granted review, it denied

relief on May 14, 2009. (Doc. 1-11, pp. 2-6) The court of appeals discussed the merits of some

of Bossardet’s claims, but for the most part, it affirmed the trial court’s decision without

elaboration. (Doc. 1-11) Bossardet appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, but that court

summarily denied review on October 28, 2009. (Doc. 1-11, p. 7)

On October 15, 2010, Bossardet filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. (Doc. 1) He claims (1) trial counsel

was ineffective for (I) failing to spend enough time with him before trial, (II) failing to move

in limine that the state be precluded from referring to him by his nickname, “Joker,” (III) failing

to interview the pathologist and stipulating to the cause of death, (IV) failing to request that he

undergo a medical exam or investigate whether or not he was medicated during trial, (V) failing

to present exculpatory evidence, (VI) failing to request a continuance when confronted with new

evidence as to a phone call he made to his brother, failing to properly object, and failing to

strike portions of the call, (VII) failing to advise him about testifying in his own behalf, (VIII)

failing to make proper objections and failing to object to the prosecutor’s opening and closing,

(IX) failing to call character witnesses, (X) failing to file jury instructions such as a mere

presence instruction, and (XI) failing to request appointment of a mitigation specialist, file a

sentencing memorandum, or conduct a mitigation hearing; (2) he has newly discovered evidence

of post traumatic stress disorder; (3) the trial court failed to advise the jury of the mere presence

defense sua sponte; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir dire, in the opening

statement, and in the closing argument; and (5) his sentence of natural life was excessive. (Doc.

1)

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The respondents filed an answer on February 28, 2011. They concede the petition is

timely, and Bossardet’s claims are exhausted. They argue the petition should be denied on the

merits. Bossardet filed a reply on May 27, 2011.

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to prisoners in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. If the petitioner is in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, the writ will not be granted unless prior

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The petitioner must shoulder an additional burden if the state court

considered the issues and made findings of fact.

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of

a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The

applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (e)(1).

A decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if the “state court confronted a set

of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and

nevertheless arrived at a result different from Supreme Court precedent.” Vlasak v. Superior

Court of California ex rel. County of Los Angeles, 329 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2003). A

decision is an “unreasonable application” if “the state court identified the correct legal

principles, but applied those principles to the facts of [his] case in a way that was not only

incorrect or clearly erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.” Id. If the state court denied on

the merits but did not explain its reasoning, this court must independently review the record to

determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Pirtle

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v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 916 (2003). If the

highest state court fails to explain its decision, this court looks to the last reasoned state court

decision. See Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Federal review is limited to those issues that have already been fully presented to the

state court. This so-called “exhaustion rule” reads in pertinent part as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that – (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the

State. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This rule permits the states “the initial opportunity to pass upon and

correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275

(1971). 

To be properly exhausted, the federal claim must be “fairly presented” to the state courts.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In other words, the state courts must be apprised

of the issue and given the first opportunity to rule on the merits. Id. at 275-76. The petitioner

must present the state court with both the factual and legal basis of his claim. Weaver v.

Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In addition, the petitioner must explicitly alert the state court that he is raising a federal

constitutional claim. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d

666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), as modified 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d

828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). The petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either

by citing specific provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the federal basis of a

claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 1087 (2000), or by citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional

claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

 If the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a judgment imposed by the State of Arizona,

he must present his claims to the state appellate court for review. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). If state remedies have not been

exhausted, the petition may not be granted and should ordinarily be dismissed. See Johnson v.

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Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). In the alternative, the court has the authority to deny

on the merits rather than dismiss for failure to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

A claim is “procedurally defaulted” if the state court declined to address the issue on the

merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not fairly presented to the state court and it is

clear the state would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id.

A claim that is procedurally defaulted must be denied unless the petitioner can “demonstrate

cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).

Discussion: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel.” Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961(9th Cir. 2002), reissued as amended, 311 F.3d

928 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Habeas relief,

however, is available only if “counsel’s performance was deficient” and the “deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. To show prejudice, the petitioner “must demonstrate

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Because Bossardet challenges his conviction,

he must show “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would

have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id.

“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a

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 The court of appeals addressed on the merits only claims (1)(VII), (1)(IX) and (2). For the

remainder of the claims, this court analyzes the decision of the trial court. See Brown v. Palmateer,

379 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,

under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id.

(internal citation omitted).

In his first claim of attorney error, Bossardet argues trial counsel “spent under 6 hours

with petitioner.” (Doc. 1, p. 6.) The trial court addressed this issue below and found that trial

counsel visited Bossardet nine times and that investigators “made numerous other visits.” (Doc.

1-9, p. 4) Bossardet has presented no evidence to rebut the trial court’s factual findings, so they

may be presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (e)(1). The trial court2

 concluded

counsel’s performance was not deficient and Bossardet was not prejudiced.

The trial court’s decision on this issue was neither “contrary to” nor “an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Bossardet provides no evidence that the number of hours

counsel spent with Bossardet was so inadequate as to clearly violate Supreme Court precedent.

He therefore cannot establish counsel’s performance was deficient. He suggests that counsel

failed to adequately prepare him to testify, but he does not explain how his testimony would

have been different if he had had more time with his attorney to prepare. He cannot establish

prejudice.

Bossardet further claims counsel should have moved in limine to preclude the state from

using his nickname, “Joker.” (Doc. 1, p. 6) Apparently, Bossardet believes that the jury could

have incorrectly inferred from this nickname that he was a gang member. (Doc. 20, p. 10) The

trial court denied this claim finding it pure speculation that the jurors could have made this

inference. (Doc. 1-9, p. 6) 

The trial court’s holding was correct. Bossardet provided no evidence to the trial court

that anyone on the jury made this incorrect inference. His claim is purely speculative. He

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cannot establish prejudice. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“Such speculation is plainly insufficient to establish prejudice.”).

Bossardet further claims counsel was ineffective by failing to interview the pathologist

before trial and stipulating to the cause of death. (Doc. 1, p. 6) At trial, the prosecution

introduced evidence that Bossardet shot the victim, Gutierrez, in the leg intending to kill him.

(Doc. 1-9, pp. 5-6) Bossardet’s theory of the case was that the other two men present, West and

Muro, shot the victim because he had stolen their drug money. (Doc. 1-4, p. 12) The

prosecution did not call the pathologist to testify because Bossardet stipulated to the cause of

death. (Doc. 20, p. 7)

In this claim, Bossardet argues that trial counsel failed to interview the pathologist

because, if he had, he would have found out that the pathologist believes that “there may be a

lot of people that feel like it’s not possible to kill somebody with a – a shot to the leg.” (Doc.

20, p. 8) Assuming that trial counsel would have found this out, Bossardet argues that counsel

could have adopted a different trial strategy and argued there was no premeditation.

The trial court held that counsel’s failure did not result in prejudice because the

government had ample evidence of premeditation and therefore, even if the pathologist’s

opinion had been discovered, counsel still could have chosen to stick with his original theory

that Bossardet was not the one who shot the victim. (Doc. 1-9, pp. 5-6) One of the two other

men present, West, testified that Bossardet said to the victim, “You got my money; you got my

money stole. Now you are going to f’ing die.” (Doc. 1-9, p. 5) West testified that after the

shooting, Bossardet said, “I just f’ing killed him. You’re next. You’re next.” Id. West further

testified that Bossardet’s clothing was soaked with the victim’s blood and that Bossardet had

previously struck the victim in the head with his gun “a dozen times.” Id., pp. 5-6. In light of

this evidence of premeditation, counsel’s strategy to pin the blame on the other two men was

understandable. 

The trial court’s analysis of the prejudice prong was not unreasonable. Bossardet cannot

show the decision below was “contrary to or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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Bossardet further claims counsel should have requested that he undergo a mental exam

or investigate whether he was on medication during the trial. (Doc. 1, p. 6) Bossardet maintains

he was taking Doxepin, an anti-anxiety drug, at the time of the trial, and this drug caused him

to have a flat affect on the stand, which adversely affected his credibility. (Doc. 20, pp. 6-7)

He argues counsel should have noticed this flat affect although he does not specifically explain

what he believes counsel should have done about it. Id.

The trial court found that, while there was evidence that Bossardet had a prescription for

Doxepin, there was no evidence that the prescription was filled, that Bossardet took it during

trial, or that it produced in him a flat affect. (Doc. 1-9, p. 3) The court further questioned

Bossardet’s claim that he was sedated and impaired during the trial because Bossardet was able

to call his brother from jail and urge him to keep a witness from testifying. Id. pp. 3-4. The trial

court concluded that counsel did not notice Bossardet’s flat affect because he did not have one.

Id., p. 4. And if he did, there is no reason to expect that an attorney should have the ability to

recognize a flat affect when the client has one. Id. 

Bossardet has presented no evidence to rebut the trial court’s factual findings, so they

may be presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (e)(1). The trial court’s decision was

not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Bossardet further claims trial counsel missed an opportunity to impeach the

government’s witness, Leo Muro, by calling Steve Helsinger to testify about a prior statement

Muro made to police. According to Bossardet, Muro told the police that Bossardet drove him

(Muro), the victim, and West to a drive-in liquor store and was talking “shit” to the person there

and had a gun in his hand at the time. (Doc. 20, pp. 13-14) Although Muro testified at the trial,

he was not asked about this statement.

Bossardet argues trial counsel could have asked Muro about this prior statement. And,

assuming Muro repeated his earlier statement, trial counsel could have impeached Muro with

Helsinger’s contrary testimony. According to Bossardet, Helsinger would have testified that

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Bossardet did not “talk shit” to the person at the drive-through liquor store and that he

(Helsinger) did not see a gun in the defendant’s possession. Id. 

The trial court denied the claim as speculative because it is not clear what Muro would

have said had he been asked about this prior statement. (Doc. 1-9, p. 6) This court agrees.

Bossardet’s claim is entirely speculative.

Bossardet further claims trial counsel “failed to request a continuance during trial when

confronted with new evidence during trial (phone call between petitioner & his brother), made

incorrect objection to this evidence, and failed to strike certain portions of this phone call.”

(Doc. 1, p. 6) 

In the middle of the trial, the prosecution disclosed a recorded telephone call Bossardet

made to his brother from jail. In that call, Bossardet “conversed with his brother about

dissuading a State’s witness from coming to court, paying for a hotel room for that witness,

some reference to violence, and assurances that his cellmate would not be witness at this trial.”

(Doc. 20, p. 11) Over the objection of counsel, the call was used by the prosecution in its crossexamination of Bossardet. Id., p. 11, n. 4.

To begin with, Bossardet argues counsel should have asked for a continuance when the

evidence was disclosed. He does not, however, explain why one was necessary. (Doc. 1, p. 6)

He seems to imply that he needed a continuance to have a chance to discuss the new evidence

with counsel, but in his affidavit, he states that he and counsel did meet and discuss the

evidence. (Doc. 21-1, p. 2) He complains that counsel was angry at him and did not properly

discuss the “implications” of the call, but that is another issue. Id. The record shows Bossardet

had an opportunity to discuss the call with his attorney. The court finds that trial counsel’s

performance was not deficient, and even if it was, Bossardet cannot show prejudice.

Bossardet further argues counsel should have objected to the introduction of the evidence

on the basis of prejudice and foundation. (Doc. 20, p. 11) The court concludes that even if

counsel’s performance was deficient, Bossardet cannot show prejudice. 

First, the evidence was not prejudicial as that term is used by the Arizona Rules of

Evidence. On direct appeal, the court of appeals explained that the phone call was adverse to

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Bossardet’s case but did not evince “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper

basis . . . such as emotion sympathy, or horror.” (Doc. 1-4 p. 9) Accordingly, the phone

conversation was not prejudicial as the term is used in Rule 403, and a proper objection

(assuming one was not raised at the time) would not have been successful. See Id.

Second, as the trial court explicitly found, the evidence did not need a foundation. (Doc.

1-9, p. 8) Accordingly, counsel’s failure to object on the basis of foundation, assuming it was

deficient performance, did not result in prejudice.

Finally, Bossardet complains counsel should have stricken portions of the call. He does

not, however, explain what portions should have been stricken or discuss what grounds would

have supported such a motion. (Doc. 1, p. 6) Apparently, counsel later stated that he made no

motion to redact the call “for the sake of clarity.” (Doc. 20, p. 12) On its face, this may be

taken as a legitimate trial strategy. Bossardet offers nothing to the contrary. Bossardet can

show neither deficient performance nor prejudice.

Bossardet also claims his attorney failed to advise him about his right to testify on his

own behalf. He complains he was not told that the decision whether to testify or not was

entirely his own. (Doc. 20, p. 7) 

At trial, Bossardet testified that he was not the shooter. The trial court found no

prejudice because even if counsel had done a better job explaining his rights, Bossardet still

would have testified to support his theory of the case. (Doc. 1-9, p. 9) The court noted that “it

is very difficult to see how the defendant could have pursued the defense he did without

testifying.” (Doc. 1-9, p. 9) The court of appeals further noted that Bossardet never clearly

stated that he would have refused to testify if he had been better informed of his rights. (Doc.

1-11, p. 4) Accordingly, Bossardet cannot establish prejudice.

Bossardet also claims “counsel failed to make proper objections & failed to object to

arguments made by the prosecutor during her opening & closing statements.” (Doc. 1, p. 6)

Bossardet, however, does not explain what “proper objections” counsel should have made. Id.

In his reply brief, he explains further that he believes counsel should have objected when the

prosecutor said in opening that “at the end of the trial, I will ask you to find him (the defendant)

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guilty because as sure as each and every one of you came down here today, he is.” (Doc. 20,

p. 14) In closing, the prosecutor disparaged the defense theory that West and Muro could

“concoct a story and get it past the County Attorney’s office and get all the way to a first degree

murder trial and that nobody is the wiser for their lies from these smart, savvy criminals.” (Doc.

20, pp. 14-15) Bossardet argues that trial counsel’s failure to object caused him prejudice

because, if he had objected, this issue would have been reviewed for harmless error rather than

for fundamental error. (Doc. 20, pp. 16-17) 

The trial court found that counsel’s failure to object did not result in prejudice because

the statements were not impermissible vouching. (Doc. 1-9, p. 8) And even if they were, they

did not affect the verdict because the jury was instructed that the lawyer’s statements were not

evidence. (Doc. 1-9, p. 8)

 “Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through

personal assurances of the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that information not presented to

the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” U.S. v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.

2005). If the defendant objects at trial, the error is subject to harmless error on direct appeal.

U.S. v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 1994). Under the harmless error standard, “[r]eversal

is warranted only if it is more probable than not that the prosecutorial misconduct materially

affected the verdict.” Id. 

Even if the prosecutor’s statements were vouching, Bossardet cannot establish prejudice

from counsel’s failure to object because even under the harmless error standard, reversal was

not warranted. The vouching, assuming it was so, was not egregious. The jury was admonished

that the opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence. See Darden v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 168, 182, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2472 (1986) (Prosecutor’s improper argument did not

deprive the defendant of a fair trial in part because “[t]he trial court instructed the jurors several

times that their decision was to be made on the basis of the evidence alone, and that the

arguments of counsel were not evidence.”). Juries are presumed to follow their instructions.

Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct. 727, 733 (2000). The trial court’s decision

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on this issue was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” 

Bossardet further claims counsel was ineffective for failing to call character witnesses.

Bossardet argues he gave trial counsel a list of witnesses who would have testified to his good

character. (Doc. 20, p. 18) 

The trial court denied the claim because in his petition for post-conviction relief,

Bossardet “did not identify any specific witness, let alone establish that the witness would have

testified or what that testimony might have been.” (Doc. 1-11, p. 5) Accordingly, the trial court

concluded that Bossardet did not establish deficient performance nor prejudice. This court must

evaluate the state court’s decision in light of the evidence presented to that court. Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (“We now hold that review under §

2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on

the merits.”). On the facts before it, the trial court made the correct decision. See (Doc. 1-7,

pp. 25-26) 

Bossardet further claims “[t]rial counsel failed to file any jury instructions, specifically

a mere presence instruction, which was the theory of his case.” (Doc. 1, p. 6) He argues

counsel should have offered the instruction approved in State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 287,

928 P.2d 706, 711 (App. 1996). (Doc. 20, p. 20) 

The trial court denied the claim on prejudice grounds reasoning that counsel’s alleged

failure to submit a specific jury instruction was not error absent some evidence that the jury was

confused or the instructions given by the court were improper. (Doc. 1-9, p. 9) Moreover, the

trial court noted that “counsel conducted a thorough analysis of the proposed instructions and

provided substantial input.” Id. 

This court agrees. The trial court instructed the jury that “it could find him guilty only

if he had actually committed the charged acts with the required mental state.” (Doc. 1-4, p. 12)

Contrary to Bossardet’s argument, there is nothing wrong with this instruction. The addition

of a mere presence instruction is not necessary. (Doc. 1-4, p. 12) In fact, this is not a “mere

presence” case at all.

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In a “mere presence” case there is evidence that the defendant was in the presence of

others who committed a particular crime, but no specific evidence that the defendant himself

committed the crime. In such a case, there is a danger that the defendant will be convicted as

an accomplice, not because he “aided or attempted to aid with the intent to promote or facilitate”

the others, but because he was merely present when the others committed the crime. State v.

Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 287, 928 P.2d 706, 711 (App. 1996). 

In this case, there was no danger that Bossardet would be erroneously convicted as an

accomplice. The jury was presented with two alternate theories: Either Bossardet shot the

victim, or the other two men shot the victim. See (Doc. 1-4, p. 12) There was no evidence that

Bossardet and the two men, West and Muro, were working together. Indeed, West and Muro

testified that they were being kidnapped by Bossardet. (Doc. 1-4, p. 12)

As the court of appeals observed, this was not a “mere presence” case. (Doc. 1-4, p. 12)

Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to request a “mere presence” instruction did not cause

Bossardet prejudice.

Finally, Bossardet claims counsel failed to request appointment of a mitigation specialist,

failed to file a sentencing memorandum, and failed to conduct a mitigation hearing. (Doc. 1,

p. 6) He suggests counsel should have offered mitigating factors such as his lack of a felony

record, his impairment during the offense, or his potential for rehabilitation. (Doc. 20, p. 22)

The trial court denied this claim on prejudice grounds because “counsel’s performance

at sentencing was not lacking in any way.” (Doc. 1-9, p. 9) The trial court found, contrary to

Bossardet’s argument, that counsel did discuss mitigating factors such as “petitioner’s age, his

lack of prior convictions, and his chaotic and impoverished childhood, and his significant

impairment at the time of the crime.” (Doc. 1-9, p. 9) Bossardet presented no evidence to rebut

the trial court’s finding, so it may be presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (e)(1).

Bossardet cannot show counsel’s performance at sentencing caused him prejudice. The

trial court’s decision was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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Discussion: Newly Discovered Evidence

In his second ground for relief, Bossardet claims he has newly discovered evidence. On

April 30th and May 1st of 2007, approximately two years after the trial, Bossardet was examined

by Dr. Paul Beljan at the Arizona State Prison. (Doc. 20, p. 24) Beljan diagnosed Bossardet

with post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. Bossardet argues this new evidence is relevant on the

issue of premeditation. Id.

Unfortunately, a claim that newly discovered evidence has been found that bears on the

defendant’s guilt or innocence is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Herrera v. Collins,

506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860 (1993). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.

Discussion: Jury Instructions

In his third ground for relief, Bossardet claims his right to a fair trial was violated by the

trial court’s failure to give a “mere presence” instruction sua sponte. 

As explained above, this was not a “mere presence” case. See (Doc. 1-4, p. 12)

Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to give a “mere presence” instruction sua sponte was not

error. The decision of the court of appeals on this issue was not “contrary to” or “an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see (Doc.

1-4, p. 12)

Discussion: Prosecutorial Misconduct

In his fourth ground for relief, Bossardet claims prosecutorial misconduct violated his

“due process right to a fair trial.” (Doc. 1, p. 9) Specifically, he complains that the prosecutor

made improper comments at voir dire, during opening statements and during the closing

arguments.

Bossardet complains that the prosecutor asked during jury selection if a prospective jury

member “would disbelieve her witness if they admitted to using drugs.” Id. During opening

statements the prosecutor stated “at the end of trial, I will ask you to find him (petitioner) guilty

because as sure as each and every one of you came down here today he is.” Id. In rebuttal

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closing, the prosecutor argued that “[c]ounsel wants to paint this picture of Mr. West & Mr.

Muro committing this savage crime, who concoct a story and get it past the County Attorney’s

office and get it all the way to a first degree murder trial & that nobody is the wiser for their lies

from these smart, savvy criminals.” Id. Also, the prosecutor argued that Muro and West did the

right thing by testifying and the jurors should “do the same thing.” Id.

Bossardet does not clearly explain why the prosecutor’s comments at jury selection were

objectionable. The prosecutor’s other statements could be characterized as “vouching.” 

“Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through

personal assurances of the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that information not presented to

the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” U.S. v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.

2005). If the prosecutor engaged in improper argument, a habeas corpus petitioner is entitled

to relief only if “the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106

S.Ct. 2464, 2472, 2471 (1986) (punctuation modified). “[I]t is not enough that the prosecutor’s

remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Id.

Here, the prosecutor’s comments, assuming they were improper, were not so egregious

as to have resulted in a denial of due process. The comments “did not manipulate or misstate

the evidence, nor did [they] implicate other specific rights of the accused such as the right to

counsel or the right to remain silent.” Id. at 182, 2472. Moreover, the jury was instructed by

the trial court that opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence. (Doc. 12-1, p.

6); see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2472 (1986). And, juries

are presumed to follow their instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct.

727, 733 (2000). Assuming the prosecutor’s comments were improper, it is unlikely that they

had an adverse effect on the jury’s deliberation. The decision of the court of appeals denying

this claim was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see (Doc. 1-4, pp. 14-17)

Discussion: Eighth Amendment

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Finally, Bossardet claims his sentence of natural life violates his rights under the Eighth

Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “[e]xcessive bail shall

not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The

phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” includes sentences of incarceration that are grossly

disproportionate to the underlying offense. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A

sentence of incarceration will be found grossly disproportionate only in the “exceedingly rare”

and “extreme” case. Id. at 72-73.

As a first step in analyzing an Eighth Amendment claim, the court should conduct “a

threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed.” Gonzalez v. Duncan,

551 F.3d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). The court must “weigh the criminal offense and the resulting

penalty in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or to society and the culpability

of the offender.” Id. (internal punctuation removed). If this inquiry “leads to an inference of

gross disproportionality,” the court will widen the scope of its analysis and conduct an

intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparative analysis of the sentence. Id. at 887.

In this case, the court’s threshold analysis does not reveal an inference of gross

disproportionality. Bossardet’s sentence of natural life is extreme, but its severity arises from

the fact that Bossardet committed first degree murder, the most serious of all offenses. The

Supreme Court has allowed the same sentence under far less egregious circumstances. See, e.g.,

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994-95 (1991) (A sentence of life in prison without

the possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine imposed on a defendant without

a prior felony conviction did not violate the Eighth Amendment.). 

The court concludes Bossardet’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his offense

and therefore does not violate his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual

punishment. Accordingly, the decision of the state court was not “contrary to” or “an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see, e.g., U.S.

v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998) (A 95-year sentence for five counts of bank

robbery and five counts of use of a firearm when committing a crime of violence does not

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violate the Eighth Amendment.); Edwards v. Butler, 882 F.2d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1989) (A

sentence of life without parole for aggravated rape does not violate the Eighth Amendment.).

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this report and recommendation to the petitioner

and the respondents.

DATED this 3rd day of October, 2011.

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