Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-22-35271/USCOURTS-ca9-22-35271-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PROJECT VERITAS; PROJECT 

VERITAS ACTION FUND, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

MICHAEL SCHMIDT, in his official 

capacity as Multnomah County 

District Attorney; ELLEN 

ROSENBLUM, in her official 

capacity as Oregon Attorney General, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No.22-35271 

D.C. No. 3:20-cv01435-MO 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2022

Pasadena, California

Filed July 3, 2023

Before: Carlos T. Bea, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Morgan 

Christen, Circuit Judges.

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2 PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT

Opinion by Judge Ikuta; 

Dissent by Judge Christen 

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights / First Amendment

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a 

complaint challenging, as an unconstitutional restriction of 

protected speech, Section 165.540(1)(c) of the Oregon 

Revised Code, which generally prohibits unannounced 

recordings of conversations, subject to several exceptions. 

Section 165.540(1)(c) of the Oregon Revised Statutes

provides that a person may not obtain or attempt to obtain 

the whole or any part of a conversation by means of any 

device if not all participants in the conversation are 

specifically informed that their conversation is being 

obtained. The law provides two exceptions relevant to this 

appeal: (1) section 165.540(1)(c) does not apply to a person 

who records a conversation during a felony that endangers 

human life, Or. Rev. Stat § 165.540(5)(a); and (2) section 

165.540(1)(c) allows a person to record a conversation in 

which a law enforcement officer is a participant if the 

recording is made while the officer is performing official 

duties and meets other criteria. Plaintiff Project Veritas, a 

non-profit media organization that engages in undercover 

investigative journalism, states that it documents matters of 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT 3

public concern by making unannounced audiovisual 

recordings of conversations, often in places open to the 

public.

Applying Animal Legal Def. Fund. v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 

1184 (9th Cir. 2018), the panel held that section 

165.540(1)(c) regulates protected speech (unannounced 

audiovisual recording) and is content based because it 

distinguishes between particular topics by restricting some 

subject matters (e.g., a state executive officer’s official 

activities) and not others (e.g., a police officer’s official 

activities). As a content-based restriction, the rule fails strict 

scrutiny review because the law is not narrowly tailored to 

achieving a compelling governmental interest in protecting 

conversational privacy with respect to each activity within 

the proscription’s scope, which necessarily includes its 

regulation of protected speech in places open to the public. 

Thus, citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971), 

and Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000), the panel 

held that Oregon does not have a compelling interest in 

protecting individuals’ conversational privacy from other 

individuals’ protected speech in places open to the public, 

even if that protected speech consists of creating audio or 

visual recordings of other people. The panel further 

determined that section 165.540(1)(c) burdens more speech 

than is necessary to achieve its stated interest and there were 

other ways for Oregon to achieve its interests of protecting 

conversational privacy. Finally, addressing the dissent, the 

panel determined that severing the exceptions that made the 

general prohibition content based and extending the general 

prohibition to those protected First Amendment activities, 

would create significant constitutional issues rather than 

cure them. Because section 165.540(1)(c) is not a valid 

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4 PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT

time, place, or manner restriction, it cannot be saved by 

striking the two exceptions at issue here.

Dissenting, Judge Christen stated that because the 

majority does not dispute that the State has a significant 

interest in protecting the privacy of Oregonians who engage 

in conversations without notice that their comments are 

being recorded, the court’s analysis should be 

straightforward. First, principles of federalism require that 

the panel begin from a premise of reluctance to strike down 

a state statute. Next, following Supreme Court precedent, 

the panel should sever the two statutory exceptions that 

Project Veritas challenges, apply intermediate scrutiny to the 

content-neutral remainder, recognize that the statute is welltailored to meet Oregon’s significant interest, and uphold 

section 165.540(1)(c) as a reasonable time, place, or manner 

restriction. Judge Christen stated that the purpose Oregon 

advances is its significant interest in protecting participants 

from having their oral conversations recorded without their 

knowledge. The majority recasts the State’s interest as one 

in “protecting people’s conversational privacy from the 

speech of other individuals.” That reframing of the 

legislature’s purpose serves as the springboard for the 

majority’s reliance on an inapplicable line of Supreme Court 

authority that pertains to state action aimed at protecting 

people from unwanted commercial or political speech, not 

protection from speech-gathering activities like Project 

Veritas’s, which are qualitatively different because they 

appropriate the speech of others.

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PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT 5 

COUNSEL

Benjamin Barr (argued), Barr & Klein PLLC, Bull Valley, 

Illinois; Stephen Klein, Barr & Klein PLLC, Washington, 

D.C.; for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Philip M. Thoennes (argued), Assistant Attorney General; 

Michael A. Casper, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 

Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General; Ellen F. Rosenblum, 

Attorney General of Oregon; Office of the Oregon Attorney 

General; Salem, Oregon; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge: 

Oregon law generally prohibits unannounced recordings 

of conversations, subject to several exceptions. We 

conclude that Oregon’s law is a content-based restriction that 

violates the First Amendment right to free speech and is 

therefore invalid on its face. 

I 

A 

Section 165.540(1)(c) of the Oregon Revised Statutes

provides: “[A] person may not . . . [o]btain or attempt to 

obtain the whole or any part of a conversation by means of 

any device . . . if not all participants in the conversation are 

specifically informed that their conversation is being 

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6 PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT

obtained.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(1)(c).1 The statute 

defines “[c]onversation” as “the transmission between two 

or more persons of an oral communication which is not a 

telecommunication or a radio communication, and includes 

a communication occurring through a video conferencing 

program.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.535(1). Because this section 

explicitly applies to the recording of a video conference and 

bars individuals from obtaining a conversation “by means of 

any device,” it applies to both audio and video recordings of 

a conversation. Indeed, the Oregon courts have interpreted 

the statute as applicable to video recordings of conversations 

and other conduct.2 See State v. Copeland, 522 P.3d 909, 

911–12 (Or. Ct. App. 2022) (applying section 165.540(1)(c) 

to “the video and audio recording of [a] shooting taken by 

the victim on his body camera”).3 

1 Oregon is one of a few outliers in enforcing such a broad prohibition 

on unannounced recordings of conversations. Only five states, including 

Oregon, prohibit individuals from making recordings without providing 

notice to or obtaining the consent of the recording’s subjects in a place 

open to the public where the subjects lack a reasonable expectation of 

privacy. See Appendix A.

2 Because both the statutory text and judicial opinions confirm that 

section 165.540(1)(c) applies to video recordings of conversations, the 

dissent’s assertion that “the statute does not sweep in . . . video 

recordings” is incorrect. Dissent at 59.

3 Contrary to the dissent’s argument that section 165.540(1)(c) applies 

only to oral communications, Dissent at 48 n.6, Copeland did not 

differentiate between the video recording of a “heated discussion,” 522 

P.3d at 911, and the video recording of a shooting, id. at 912 (noting that 

“[t]he state sought to introduce the video and audio recording of the 

shooting taken by the victim on his body camera”). 

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PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT 7

This general rule is subject to numerous exceptions. See 

Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(2)–(7), (9).4 Two are relevant here. 

First, section 165.540(1)(c) does not apply to a “person who 

records a conversation during a felony that endangers human 

life.” Id. § 165.540(5)(a). This exception applies even if the 

recording “was initiated before the felony began.” 

Copeland, 522 P.3d at 912. Second, section 165.540(1)(c) 

allows “[a] person [to] record[] a conversation in which a 

law enforcement officer is a participant” if the recording is 

“made while the officer is performing official duties” and 

meets other criteria.5 Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b). The 

Oregon courts have not yet interpreted this exception. 

4 The statute provides that section 165.540(1)(c) does not apply to: (1) 

“subscribers or members of their family who perform the acts prohibited 

in [§ 165.540(1)] in their homes,” Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(3); (2) 

“[p]ublic officials in charge of and at jails, police premises,” and “other 

penal or correctional institutions,” id. § 165.540(2)(a)(B); or (3) persons 

who use unconcealed recording devices to “intercept oral 

communications that are part of” specified “[p]ublic or semipublic 

meetings,” “[r]egularly scheduled classes or similar educational 

activities in public or private institutions,” or “[p]rivate meetings or 

conferences if all [participants] knew or reasonably should have known 

that the recording was being made,” id. § 165.540(6). 

5 The exception from section 165.540(1)(c) applies only if: 

(A) The recording is made while the officer is performing 

official duties;

(B) The recording is made openly and in plain view of the 

participants in the conversation; 

(C) The conversation being recorded is audible to the 

person by normal unaided hearing; and 

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The general rule in section 165.540(1)(c) and the two 

relevant exceptions to the rule evolved over a lengthy period 

of time. According to the Oregon Supreme Court, the state 

legislature first enacted section 165.540(1)(a) in 1955 “to 

allow the police to record telephone conversations when one 

party consents to the recording.” State v. Lissy, 747 P.2d 

345, 347–49, 347 n.3 (Or. 1987). In 1959, the legislature 

amended section 165.540 to add section 165.540(1)(c), 

which prohibited tape recording of face-to-face 

conversations without all participants’ consent. Id. at 350 & 

n.4. Twenty years later, in 1979, some legislators attempted 

to amend this provision because of concerns “that a person 

who tape records a public meeting, public speech or 

classroom lecture without ‘specifically informing’ all 

participants that the discussion is being taped is guilty of a 

Class C felony.” Id. at 351 (citation omitted). This effort to 

amend the law failed. See id. 

But in 1989, legislators succeeded in making an 

exception to section 165.540(1)(c) for felonies endangering 

human life, resulting in section 165.540(5)(a). Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 165.540(5)(a) (1989). According to the legislative history 

of this amendment, the change was made to enable police 

officers to use a body wire to record a “situation [that] 

involves [a] felony where drugs are involved or human life 

is endangered” without first obtaining a court order. AEngrossed H.B. 2252, 65th Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1 (Or. 

1989); see also Or. H.R. Staff Measure Summary, H.B. 2252, 

(D) The person [recording] is in a place where the person 

lawfully may be.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b). “Law enforcement officer” is generally 

defined as a person authorized to enforce criminal laws. Id.

§§ 133.726(11); 165.540(10)(b). 

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65th Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1989) (“This measure would 

eliminate the requirement that police officers obtain prior 

court approval before using a ‘body wire’ where felony drug 

offenses or life-endangering felonies are being 

committed.”); Hearing on H.B. 2250, 2251, 2252 Before the 

Subcomm. on Crime & Corrs. of the H. Comm. on the 

Judiciary, 65th Assemb., Reg. Sess. 11–12 (Or. 1989) 

(statement of Cap. Will Hingston, Or. State Sheriffs’ Ass’n) 

(stating that section 165.540 “causes a great deal of concern 

for officer safety and informant safety during a narcotics 

transaction” because “there is little consistency in obtaining 

a court order for a body wire before a transaction goes 

down,” and the “amendment will afford officers in their 

performance a great deal more safety and rapid support when 

doing a narcotics transaction”). 

In 2015, the legislature added another exception to 

section 165.540(1)(c) to allow a person to record a 

conversation in which a law enforcement officer is a 

participant, resulting in section 165.540(5)(b). Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 165.540(5)(b) (2015). According to testimony by the 

ACLU submitted to the state judiciary committee in support 

of this amendment, this change was necessary because 

otherwise the statute was “inconsistent with the vast and 

developing consensus among courts and legal scholars 

confirming that the right to record on-duty police is 

constitutionally protected.” Hearing on H.B. 2704 Before 

the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1 

(Or. 2015) (testimony of Kimberly McCullough, ACLU 

Leg. Dir.). The ACLU further testified that “because it is 

common knowledge that the public has a right to record onduty police, people all over Oregon are unintentionally 

violating Oregon’s eavesdropping statute when they openly 

record without a warning.” Hearing on H.B. 2704 A Before 

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10 PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT

the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1 

(Or. 2015) (testimony of Kimberly McCullough, ACLU 

Leg. Dir.). 

B 

Project Veritas is a non-profit media organization that 

engages in undercover investigative journalism. Project 

Veritas stated that it documents matters of public concern by 

making unannounced audiovisual recordings of 

conversations, often in places open to the public. In the past, 

Project Veritas journalists have used undercover recordings 

to document the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, 

Virginia, to record campaign workers for presidential 

candidates, to capture the efforts of campaign staff to stir up 

violence at rallies of the opposing candidate, and to 

interview the staff for a gubernatorial candidate who 

confirmed the candidate’s more controversial views and 

efforts to conceal them. 

Project Veritas stated that it would conduct similar 

investigations in Oregon but for Oregon’s prohibition on 

unannounced in-person audiovisual recordings. Among 

other things, Project Veritas alleged it would investigate 

corruption at the state agency responsible for enforcing

Oregon’s public records law by recording undercover 

interviews with officers and staff in locations open to the 

public, like restaurants, parks, and sidewalks. In addition, 

Project Veritas alleged it would investigate the “rise in 

violent protests in Portland between the police and members 

of Antifa and other” groups by secretly recording 

interactions between police officers and protesters. Project 

Veritas would also send undercover journalists into groups 

of police and protesters to engage them in conversation and 

record their candid remarks. Outside of organized rallies, 

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Project Veritas would “do most of its [undercover] recording 

on public sidewalks, public parks, or in other areas held open 

to the public.” Project Veritas alleged that the safety and

even lives of its journalists would be endangered if they were 

to record conversations openly and in plain view or to inform 

participants that they are being recorded. 

Project Veritas sued the Oregon Attorney General, Ellen 

Rosenblum, and the District Attorney of Multnomah 

County, Oregon, Michael Schmidt (collectively, Oregon), 

challenging section 165.540 as an unconstitutional 

restriction of protected speech. Project Veritas’s complaint 

alleged that because section 165.540 favored recording some 

subjects, but disfavored others, the differential treatment 

rendered section 165.540(1)(c) and its exceptions 

unconstitutional. For instance, the complaint alleged that 

under Oregon law, an individual could record the police in 

particular circumstances, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b), 

and make a “secret audio recording” during a felony that 

endangers human life, see id. § 165.540(5)(a), but “may not 

openly record the conversations of city council members, 

school board members, or any other government actors 

without specifically notifying them,” see id. § 165.540(5)(b). 

Project Veritas sought to enjoin defendants from enforcing 

section 165.540(1)(c) and to obtain a declaratory judgment 

that the law is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to 

Project Veritas. 

Oregon moved to dismiss the complaint. The district 

court partially granted the motion, and the parties agreed to 

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dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice.6 Project 

Veritas timely appealed. 

II

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a 

complaint for failure to state a claim. See In re Cutera Sec. 

Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). “[W]e have an 

independent obligation to ensure that we have subject matter 

jurisdiction,” which includes a determination that Project 

Veritas has standing to bring its pre-enforcement claim. 

Airline Serv. Providers Ass’n v. L.A. World Airports, 873 

F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2017). 

Project Veritas’s allegations are sufficient to establish 

standing for a First Amendment pre-enforcement claim. 

Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must 

establish “the irreducible constitutional minimum of 

standing,” by showing that they suffered an injury in fact, 

that there is “a causal connection between the injury and the 

conduct complained of,” and that it is likely that “the injury 

will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). “Because constitutional 

challenges based on the First Amendment present unique

standing considerations, plaintiffs may establish an injury in 

fact without first suffering a direct injury from the 

challenged restriction.” Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 

785 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). In a pre-enforcement 

6 Project Veritas’s complaint challenged sections 165.540(1)(c) (making 

unannounced recordings), 165.540(1)(d) (obtaining such recordings 

from others), and 165.540(1)(e) (distributing such recordings). The 

district court denied Oregon’s motion to dismiss with respect to Project 

Veritas’s section 165.540(1)(d) and (1)(e) claims, but the parties later 

agreed to dismiss those claims with prejudice. 

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PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT 13

challenge, plaintiffs can show injury in fact by establishing 

that (1) they intend to violate the law; and (2) have shown a 

reasonable likelihood that the government will enforce the 

statute against them. Id. 

For purposes of this pre-enforcement challenge, Project 

Veritas makes a clear showing of injury in fact. First, Project 

Veritas alleged that but for section 165.540(1)(c), it would 

make unannounced recordings of conversations in a manner 

that would violate the general prohibition and not fall within 

an exception, and described in great detail the persons, 

conversations, and events it would like to record. See supra

p. 10–11. For its part, Oregon has prosecuted individuals for 

violating section 165.540(1)(c) in the past7 and does not state 

that it would refrain from prosecuting Project Veritas for 

creating such recordings, if the recordings were made in 

violation of the law. Finally, Project Veritas alleged a causal 

connection between the challenged statute and its inability 

to carry on its undercover journalistic endeavors and that it 

is likely that its injury will be redressed by a favorable 

decision.8 

We reject Oregon’s arguments that we lack jurisdiction 

because Project Veritas asserts an as-applied challenge 

which is not ripe. Project Veritas’s claim is properly 

construed as a facial challenge to section 165.540. “A facial 

challenge is an attack on a statute itself as opposed to a 

7 See, e.g., State v. Neff, 265 P.3d 62, 63 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); State v. 

Depeche, 255 P.3d 502, 503–04 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Bichsel, 

790 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Knobel, 777 P.2d 985, 

987 (1989).

8 Because we conclude that section 165.540(1)(c) is facially 

unconstitutional, we do not evaluate Project Veritas’s alternative 

challenge that the statute is overbroad. 

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particular application,” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 

U.S. 409, 415 (2015), while “[a]n as-applied challenge 

contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the 

litigant’s particular speech activity, even though the law may 

be capable of valid application to others,” Foti v. City of 

Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, 

Project Veritas attacks the statute itself as an 

unconstitutional regulation of unannounced recordings of 

nearly all conversations held in places open to the public—

not only those conversations that Project Veritas seeks to 

record.9

III

The First Amendment, applicable to the States through 

the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall 

make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.

CONST. amend I. “While the First Amendment literally 

forbids the abridgment only of speech, the Supreme Court 

has long recognized that its protection does not end at the 

spoken or written word.” United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 

299, 310 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). We have recognized there is no material 

“distinction between the process of creating a form of pure 

speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these 

processes (the essay or artwork) in terms of the First 

Amendment protection afforded.” Anderson v. City of 

Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Indeed, “we have never seriously questioned that the 

processes of writing words down on paper, painting a 

9 Because we must analyze section 165.540(1)(c) with respect to the full 

scope of its prohibition, it is irrelevant that “Project Veritas seeks to 

record only in public places” or “avers only that most of its recording 

will occur in public places.” Dissent at 49. 

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PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT 15

picture, and playing an instrument are purely expressive 

activities entitled to full First Amendment protection.” Id.

at 1062. 

A 

Here, the state law at issue regulates individuals’ conduct 

in making an audio or video recording. Under our case law, 

such conduct qualifies as speech entitled to the protection of 

the First Amendment. See Animal Legal Def. Fund. v. 

Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Wasden involved “a secretly-filmed exposé of the 

operation of an Idaho dairy farm,” which showed dairy 

workers who “dragg[ed] a cow across the ground by a chain 

attached to her neck; twist[ed] cows’ tails to inflict 

excruciating pain; and repeatedly beat[], kick[ed], and 

jump[ed] on cows to force them to move.” Id. at 1189. This 

2012 exposé distributed by an animal rights group, Mercy 

for Animals, resulted in the Idaho legislature enacting a 

statute targeting undercover investigation of agricultural 

operations, which criminalized, among other things, “a 

person from entering a private agricultural production 

facility and, without express consent from the facility owner, 

making audio or video recordings of the ‘conduct of an 

agricultural production facility’s operations.’” Id. at 1203 

(citation omitted). The statute defined its scope broadly and 

did not exclude audio or video recordings of conversations. 

See id. In enacting the law, members of the Idaho legislature 

“discussed the bill as protecting against two types of 

perceived harm to agricultural producers,” specifically: 

“concerns about farm security and privacy” and concerns 

about damage caused by investigative reporting itself. Id. at 

1192. One legislator “described the[] videos as used . . . 

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‘publicly [to] crucify a company’ and ‘as a blackmail tool.’” 

Id. 

After noting the “tension between journalists’ claimed 

First Amendment right to engage in undercover 

investigations and the state’s effort to protect privacy and 

property rights,” id. at 1190, we held that the animal rights 

activist’s conduct—creating an unannounced recording—

was constitutionally protected First Amendment speech, id. 

at 1203–04. Wasden reached this conclusion in two steps.

First, Wasden extended our prior ruling that “there is ‘a 

First Amendment right to film matters of public interest,’” 

id. at 1203 (emphasis added) (citing Fordyce v. City of 

Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995), to hold that “[t]he 

act of recording is itself an inherently expressive activity” 

protected by the First Amendment, id. (emphasis added). 

We reasoned that audio and video recordings require 

“decisions about content, composition,” and the like, which 

decisions are just as expressive as “the written word or a 

musical score” ultimately disseminated to the public. Id. 

“Because the recording process is itself expressive and is 

‘inextricably intertwined’ with the resulting recording, the 

creation of audiovisual recordings is speech entitled to First 

Amendment protection as purely expressive activity.” Id. at 

1204 (citation omitted). 

Second, given that the act of recording is protected 

speech, Wasden held that the statute’s prohibition of 

recording “the conduct of an agricultural production 

facility’s operations” without “express consent from the 

facility owner” constituted a regulation of a form of 

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protected speech, which triggered First Amendment 

scrutiny. Id. at 1203–04.10

Applying Wasden’s conclusion here, section 

165.540(1)(c) prohibits making audio and visual recordings 

unless all participants in the conversation are informed of the 

recording. Under Wasden, the recording itself is protected 

speech, and therefore the Oregon statute constitutes a 

regulation of protected speech. We conclude that section 

165.540(1)(c) triggers First Amendment scrutiny.

B

Because we must determine the constitutionality of 

section 165.540(1)(c) under the First Amendment, we next 

turn to the question whether it is content based or content 

neutral. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 

(2015). A law is content based if it “single[s] out any topic 

or subject matter for differential treatment.” City of Austin

v. Reagan Nat’l Ad. of Austin, LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 1472 

(2022). 

10 Wasden’s conclusion is consistent with our sister circuits, which have 

held that creation of audio and video recordings constitutes First 

Amendment-protected speech. See, e.g., People for the Ethical 

Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Fed’n, Inc., 

60 F.4th 815, 821–23 (4th Cir. 2023) (rejecting argument that the 

creation of unauthorized recordings of “images or sound occurring 

within an employer’s premises” as part of undercover investigations 

conducted by PETA to publicize animal cruelty was not speech protected 

by the First Amendment); Am. C.L. Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 

583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The act of making an audio or visual recording 

is necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of 

speech and press rights.”); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 

1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “[t]he First Amendment protects the 

. . . right to record matters of public interest”). 

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1

Wasden again guides our analysis. After holding that the 

creation of audio and video recordings was speech entitled 

to full First Amendment protection, Wasden held that the 

Idaho statute at issue in that case, which required the facility 

owner’s consent to make unannounced recordings of “the 

conduct of an agricultural production facility’s operations,” 

was “an ‘obvious’ example of a content-based regulation of 

speech because it ‘defin[es] regulated speech by particular 

subject matter.’” 878 F.3d at 1204 (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at 

163). We gave two reasons for this conclusion. First, the 

statute drew “a distinction ‘on its face’ regarding the 

message the speaker conveys.” Id. (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at 

165). Specifically, it “would permit filming a vineyard’s art 

collection but not the winemaking operation.” Id. 

“Likewise, a videographer could record an after-hours 

birthday party among co-workers, a farmer’s antique car 

collection, or a historic maple tree but not the animal abuse, 

feedlot operation, or slaughterhouse conditions.” Id. 

Second, we reasoned that “only by viewing the recording can 

the [state] authorities make a determination about criminal 

liability” because the application of the exception “explicitly 

pivots on the content of the recording.” Id.

Our second rationale (that a law regulating the act of 

making specified recordings is content based if state 

authorities cannot apply the law without viewing or listening 

to the particular recording at issue) requires some further 

examination. After we decided Wasden, the Supreme Court 

rejected a per se rule “that a regulation cannot be content 

neutral if it requires reading the [speech] at issue.” City of 

Austin, 142 S. Ct. at 1471. Instead, City of Austin held that 

location-based rules, such as a rule differentiating between 

signs on a premise that advertise an on-site business from 

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signs that advertise some off-site matter, are not content 

based, even though city authorities had to review the sign’s

message to apply the rule. Id. at 1472. When a rule is merely 

a “location-based and content-agnostic on-/off-premises 

distinction,” it does not “singl[e] out specific subject matter 

for differential treatment.” Id. at 1475 (citation omitted). 

Instead, the sign’s message merely “informs the sign’s 

relative location.” Id. at 1473. But as the Court clarified, 

this exception for location-based rules does not affect the 

Court’s longstanding holding that “regulations that 

discriminate based on the topic discussed or the idea or 

message expressed . . . are content based.” Id. at 1474 

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

Wasden did not address a location-based rule akin to an 

“on-/off-premises distinction,” but considered a rule that 

singled out “specific subject matter for differential 

treatment” and discriminated based on “the topic discussed 

or the idea or message expressed.” Id. at 1474–75. As a 

result, City of Austin’s analysis does not conflict with our 

holding in Wasden, which remains binding. See Miller v. 

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a 

three-judge panel is bound by precedent unless it “is clearly 

irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening 

higher authority”). Therefore, we continue to consider 

whether a law “pivots on the content of the recording,” 

Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204, in determining whether the law 

discriminates on the basis of “the topic discussed or the idea 

or message expressed” and is, therefore, content based, City 

of Austin, 142 S. Ct. at 1474 (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at 171).

Applying Wasden here, section 165.540 is a contentbased restriction on speech. On its face, section 

165.540(1)(c) and its exceptions draw a distinction between 

topics. The speech regulated by section 165.540(1)(c) is the 

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act of making a recording, which means that the activity 

captured by a recording constitutes the content or subject 

matter of that speech. Because the rules imposed by section 

165.540 vary depending on the activity being recorded, the 

statute clearly draws content-based distinctions under 

Wasden. The law’s applicability plainly “pivots on the 

content of the recording”—namely, what the recording 

captures. Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204. For example, the law 

applies no restrictions to recording law enforcement officials 

engaged in their official duties, see Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 165.540(5)(b), but prohibits recording other government 

officials performing official duties unless they are informed 

that their conversation is being recorded. Similarly, the 

statute distinguishes between recording felonies 

endangering human lives, id. § 165.540(5)(a), and recording 

similar conduct during the commission of a misdemeanor. 

These distinctions are “obvious” examples of a contentbased regulation of speech because they “define regulated 

speech by particular subject matter.” Wasden, 878 F.3d at 

1204 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). In addition, state 

“authorities [can] make a determination about criminal 

liability” under the law “only by viewing the recording.” Id. 

This serves as further evidence that the applicability of 

section 165.540(1)(c) pivots on the content of the recording, 

thereby demonstrating that the law is content based. 

2

Oregon argues that section 165.540(1)(c)’s general 

prohibition on the act of making unannounced recordings is 

a content-neutral speech regulation for two reasons. Neither 

is persuasive.

Oregon first argues that the statute is content neutral 

because the statute’s exceptions are not based on the words 

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spoken and recorded, and therefore state authorities do not 

have to listen to and analyze the recording to determine 

whether an exception applies. We disagree. The statute at 

issue in Wasden did not distinguish based on the words 

spoken in a recording, but we nevertheless held that it was 

content based because it discriminated on the basis of subject 

matter to be recorded. 878 F.3d at 1204. For the same 

reason, it is the statute’s differential treatment of recordings 

based on their subject matter (e.g., whether the speaker’s 

recording obtains the conversation of Oregon police officers 

or Oregon executive officers) that makes the statute content 

based, not the words exchanged in the conversation.

Second, Oregon argues that we can consider section 

165.540(1)(c) as a stand-alone provision, and ignore the 

exceptions to the general prohibition. But this approach is 

foreclosed by binding precedent. To start, it is wellestablished that when a court evaluates the constitutionality 

of a general prohibition, it must consider any exceptions to 

the general rule. “[A] rule [is] content-based when it 

establishes a general ban on speech, but maintains 

exceptions for speech on certain subjects.” Glendale 

Assocs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Stated differently, where exceptions to a restriction of 

protected speech “are based on content, the restriction itself 

is based on content.” Nat’l Ad. Co. v. City of Orange, 861 

F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); see also 

Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 

2347 (2020) (plurality opinion) (holding that a prohibition of 

robocalls was content based due to its exception for 

robocalls collecting government held debts); Foti, 146 F.3d 

at 636 (holding that an ordinance’s general ban of “all signs 

on all public property” was content based due to its 

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“exemptions for open house signs and safety, traffic, and 

public informational signs”).11 

Moreover, any exception to a general restriction on 

protected speech—even if the exception applies to speech 

that our case law has recognized as receiving First 

Amendment protection, like recording police officers 

performing official duties in public, see Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 

439; Askins v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 

1044 (9th Cir. 2018)—necessarily renders the restriction 

content based. The Supreme Court analyzed a similar 

situation in Reed, where the challenged state law generally 

restricted the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but 

exempted signs that had ideological and political messages, 

which implicate speech that case law has recognized as 

receiving First Amendment protection. 576 U.S. at 164–65. 

Despite these exceptions, the Court held that the law as a 

whole was content based and subject to strict scrutiny, 

“regardless of the government’s benign motive, contentneutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas 

11 The district court concluded that the law enforcement exception did 

not render section 165.540(1)(c) content based because recordings of 

“conversations where a law enforcement officer is a speaker” is 

“government speech,” which “is generally not subject to First 

Amendment challenges.” Oregon does not rely on this argument, and 

we conclude the government speech doctrine is not applicable here. 

Although the Supreme Court has held that a government entity’s 

expression of its own views does not violate the speech rights of 

individuals who disagree, see Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 

460, 467 (2009), this case does not involve a suit against the government 

for expressing its views. Rather, it involves a statute that impinges on a 

private individual’s speech by restricting the ability to record public 

officials. The individual engaging in the speech being regulated is the 

private party that makes the recording—not the government. Therefore, 

the government speech doctrine is inapposite. 

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contained’ in the regulated speech.” Id. at 165 (citation 

omitted). Therefore, under this precedent, we must analyze 

both the general prohibition and the exceptions as one 

regulatory regime. Doing so makes clear that section 

165.540 is a content-based regulation of speech.12

C 

Because we conclude that section 165.540(1)(c) and its 

exceptions constitute a content-based speech restriction, we 

can uphold the statute only if it survives strict scrutiny. See 

Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204. Strict scrutiny requires the 

government to show that the speech restriction is “narrowly 

tailored to address the State’s compelling governmental 

interests.” Victory Processing, LLC v. Fox, 937 F.3d 1218, 

1229 (9th Cir. 2019). Under strict scrutiny, the challenged 

law must be constitutional with respect to “each activity 

within the proscription’s scope.” Berger v. City of Seattle, 

569 F.3d 1029, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 

487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988)). It does not matter that a narrower 

restriction on speech activities could have been justified by 

the government’s interest. See Watchtower Bible & Tract 

Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168 

(2002). For instance, a law that generally prohibits 

canvassers from engaging in door-to-door advocacy without 

a permit is facially unconstitutional. Id. Although the 

government’s “interest in preventing fraud could adequately 

support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial 

transactions and the solicitation of funds,” the interest in 

fraud prevention does not justify the ordinance insofar as it 

12 The dissent concedes that the statutory exceptions to the general ban 

on unannounced recordings render section 165.540 content based. 

Dissent at 50. 

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applies “to [Jehovah Witnesses who offer religious 

literature], to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for 

unpopular causes.” Id. 

In Wasden, we applied strict scrutiny to the contentbased Idaho statute. 878 F.3d at 1204. We assumed that 

Idaho’s asserted interest in protecting both property and 

privacy interests in an agricultural production facility was a 

compelling government interest, see id., but concluded that 

Idaho had not satisfied the narrow tailoring requirement 

because, among other reasons, there were “various other 

laws at Idaho’s disposal that would allow it to achieve its 

stated interests while burdening little or no speech,” id. at 

1205 (cleaned up) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

“For example, agricultural production facility owners can 

vindicate their rights through tort laws against theft of trade 

secrets and invasion of privacy.” Id. And, as another 

example, “[t]o the extent the legislators expressed concern 

that fabricated recordings of animal abuse would invade 

privacy rights, the victims can turn to defamation actions for 

recourse.” Id. Further, we explained, “‘the remedy for 

speech that is false is speech that is true’—and not, as Idaho 

would like, the suppression of that speech.” Id. (cleaned up) 

(citation omitted). Therefore, we struck down Idaho’s ban 

on creating audio and visual recordings as failing to survive 

First Amendment scrutiny. Id.

Applying strict scrutiny to section 165.540(1)(c) in light 

of these precedents, we must consider whether that section 

is constitutional with respect to “each activity within the 

proscription’s scope,” Berger, 569 F.3d at 1053, which 

necessarily includes its regulation of protected speech in 

places open to the public, see supra pp. 14 n.9, 23–24. 

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1

We first consider the nature of Oregon’s interest here. At 

the outset, Oregon does not assert it has a compelling 

interest, but argues only that it has a significant 

governmental interest in protecting individuals’ 

conversational privacy. In analyzing this interest, we are 

bound by Wasden’s conclusion that “[t]he act of recording is 

itself an inherently expressive activity” that merits First 

Amendment protection. 878 F.3d at 1203. Therefore, 

prohibiting a speaker’s creation of unannounced recordings 

in public places to protect the privacy of people engaged in 

conversation in those places is the equivalent of prohibiting 

protesters’ or buskers’ speech in public places for the same 

purpose. See Berger, 569 F.3d at 1054. Thus, we must 

analyze Oregon’s interest in conversational privacy as 

protecting people’s conversational privacy from the speech 

of other individuals, even in places open to the public. 

In general, the government does not have a compelling 

interest in protecting individual privacy against unwanted 

communications (including the “speech” comprised of 

recording others) in areas open to the public unless the 

audience’s “substantial privacy interests are being invaded 

in an essentially intolerable manner.” Cohen v. California, 

403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 

703, 717 (2000) (recognizing that the government’s interest 

in protecting privacy “varies widely in different settings”). 

Courts have recognized such a compelling interest only 

when patients seeking medical care are bombarded by “the 

cacophony of political protests” and individuals at their 

homes are confronted with unwanted speech. Hill, 530 U.S. 

at 716. The government’s interest in protecting the public’s 

privacy from unwanted speech (including recordings of 

people’s conversations) “is far less important” for 

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individuals engaging in recreational, social, or commercial 

activities in places open to the public, such as “strolling 

through Central Park,” id., or “waiting in line or having 

lunch outdoors in a public park,” Berger, 569 F.3d at 1054. 

Indeed, we have held that the government does not even 

have a “significant interest in protecting [individuals] from 

unpopular speech” where those who constitute the intended 

audience are commercial patrons of “a place of public 

entertainment.” Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 861 

n.10 (9th Cir. 2004). Applying this framework here, Oregon 

does not have a compelling interest in protecting individuals’ 

conversational privacy from other individuals’ protected 

speech in places open to the public, even if that protected 

speech consists of creating audio or visual recordings of 

other people. 

2

Nor is Oregon’s rule narrowly tailored to be “the least 

restrictive or least intrusive means of” achieving the 

government’s interest in conversational privacy, as required 

to pass strict scrutiny review. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 

491 U.S. 781, 798–99 & n.6 (1989). Under strict scrutiny, a 

speech restriction must “target[] and eliminate[] no more 

than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” 

Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted). A law is not 

narrowly tailored if it restricts “speech that do[es] not cause 

the types of problems that motivated the [law].” Comite de 

Journaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 

657 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In addition, a 

law is not narrowly tailored if it is over-inclusive because it 

suppresses more speech than is necessary to further 

Oregon’s goal of protecting people’s conversational privacy. 

See Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1205.

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Applying this test, we conclude that section 165.540 

burdens more protected speech than is necessary to achieve 

its stated interest. See id. The law regulates protected speech 

to avoid impinging on people’s conversational privacy. But 

in public places, speech does not intrude on privacy unless it 

intrudes in “an essentially intolerable manner.” See Berger, 

569 F.3d at 1056 (holding that a statute prohibiting “passive 

and unthreatening acts” such as offering a handbill or 

displaying a sign, even if the communications were 

unwanted, was not narrowly tailored under intermediate 

scrutiny). As the Supreme Court has explained, “it is 

difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited 

approaches . . . regardless of how peaceful the contact may 

be, without burdening more speech than necessary to prevent 

intimidation.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 

U.S. 753, 774 (1994). Section 165.540(1)(c) does not 

distinguish between “passive and unthreatening” acts and 

intolerable intrusions. Under our case law, that does not 

constitute narrow tailoring.

Moreover, where speech occurs in places open to the 

public, the privacy interest of other individuals in those 

public areas is implicated only if and where the speech is 

unwanted. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 716; Berger, 569 F.3d at 

1056. Yet section 165.540(1)(c) does not distinguish 

between wanted and unwanted speech (including wanted or 

unwanted recordings).13 For example, protesters 

demonstrating in favor of their political views may have no 

objection to unannounced recordings of conversations, 

which would provide more publicity about their goals and 

13 For its part, the dissent apparently assumes without explanation that 

all unannounced recordings are unwanted speech and all announced 

recordings are welcomed speech. Dissent at 53–61. 

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beliefs. While some people may desire privacy for a 

conversation held in places open to the public, such instances 

cannot justify Oregon’s wholesale restriction on protected 

speech (i.e., recordings) in public areas. See Rock Against 

Racism, 491 U.S. at 799 (stating that a speech restriction 

“may not regulate expression in such a manner that a 

substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to 

advance its goals”). 

The dissent argues that Berger and its progeny are 

inapplicable to section 165.540(1)(c) because “state action 

aimed at protecting people from unwanted commercial or 

political speech” is “qualitatively different” than state action 

protecting people “from speech-gathering activities like 

Project Veritas’s . . . because they appropriate the speech of 

others.” Dissent at 45. According to the dissent, the sort of 

speech that includes the “appropriation of another person’s 

speech” (i.e., recordings) is qualitatively more burdensome 

than other types of speech that might intrude on a person’s 

privacy. Dissent at 64. 

This position is foreclosed by Wasden, which did not 

accord any special attention to the privacy interests of people 

whose speech might be recorded. Rather, Wasden held that 

a state law prohibiting audio or video recordings of the 

conduct of an agricultural production facility’s operations, 

which necessarily would include conversations, directions, 

and other forms of oral communications, “suppresse[d] more 

speech than necessary to further Idaho’s stated goals of 

protecting property and privacy.” 878 F.3d at 1205. 

Wasden’s analysis of recordings under the same framework 

applicable to other sorts of protected speech is consistent 

with precedent: for example, under our case law, we analyze 

expressive conduct that merits First Amendment protection 

as symbolic speech in the same manner as we analyze oral 

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communications. See Swisher, 811 F.3d at 318 (“Contentbased prohibitions of speech and symbolic speech are 

analyzed under the same framework.”).14 

Finally, as in Wasden, the rule is not narrowly tailored 

because “there are various other laws at [Oregon’s] disposal 

that would allow it to achieve its stated interests while 

burdening little or no speech.” 878 F.3d at 1205 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). Individuals whose 

conversation is captured in public by unannounced 

recordings “can vindicate their rights” through an invasion 

of privacy tort. See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank 

of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 531–32 (Or. 1985) (en banc) 

(noting that Oregon has recognized the common law privacy 

torts of appropriation, offensive publication of private facts, 

and intrusion upon exclusion); State v. Lien, 441 P.3d 185, 

193 (Or. 2019) (“Tortious invasion of privacy is one of the 

limited number of torts in Oregon in which a plaintiff may 

be awarded damages consisting solely of mental suffering 

caused by the violation.”); Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos., 

712 P.2d 803, 814 (Or. 1986) (explaining instances where a 

television program airing photographs of an accident victim 

could give rise to a tortious invasion of privacy claim); 

14 The dissent’s reliance on Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & 

Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), for the argument that 

speech involving the creation of a recording that captures people’s 

speech “implicates the ‘principle of autonomy to control one’s own 

speech’” is misplaced. Dissent at 57–58. Hurley held that the First 

Amendment prohibits the state from forcing a speaker to incorporate a 

message that the speaker does not want to convey. See id. at 559, 581. 

To the extent Hurley has any bearing on this case, it supports our view 

that a law raises serious constitutional issues if it prohibits a speaker from 

conveying the message the speaker wants to convey—candid responses 

to issues of controversy—by making unannounced recordings.

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McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 345–46 (Or. 

1975) (holding that unannounced recordings of the plaintiff 

“engaged in various activities on his property outside his 

home” were not actionable as invasion of privacy torts 

because the recordings “were done in such an unobtrusive 

manner that plaintiff was not aware that he was being 

watched and filmed” and the plaintiff “could have been 

observed by . . . [a] passerby”). Or if the recording is 

fabricated, “the victims can turn to defamation actions for 

recourse.” Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1205; see also Neumann v. 

Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1120–21 (Or. 2016).

15

3

We conclude that section 165.540(1)(c) regulates 

protected speech (unannounced audiovisual recording), and 

is content based because it distinguishes between particular 

topics by restricting some subject matters (e.g., a state 

executive officer’s official activities) and not others (e.g., a 

police officer’s official activities). As a content-based 

restriction, the rule fails strict scrutiny review because the 

law is not narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling 

governmental interest in protecting conversational privacy 

with respect to “each activity within the proscription’s 

scope,” Berger, 569 F.3d at 1053, and there are other ways 

15 The dissent’s concern regarding “deepfakes” is overblown. Dissent at 

56–57, 72 n.16. As we explained in Wasden, victims of such fabrications 

can vindicate their rights through tort actions. See 878 F.3d at 1205. 

Moreover, deepfakes are not a problem unique to unannounced 

recordings. Such “deepfakes” can be created just as easily with 

announced recordings. As the dissent states, all one needs is “audio and 

video of the person to be modeled” to create a “deepfake.” Dissent at 

56–57, 72 n.16. 

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for Oregon to achieve its interests, see Wasden, 878 F.3d at 

1205. 

IV

The dissent agrees with our holding that section 

165.540(1)(c) and its exceptions constitute a content-based 

speech restriction that fails strict scrutiny review. Dissent at 

50, 63. This should end our analysis. 

Instead, the dissent argues that section 165.540(1)(c)’s 

general prohibition should be analyzed as a stand-alone 

provision that, by itself, is a constitutional content-neutral 

speech restriction. Dissent at 53–54. To reach that 

conclusion, the dissent relies exclusively on its argument 

that the court should offer Oregon a remedy of severability. 

Dissent at 50–53. Oregon chose not to make this argument 

to the district court or to our court. But we briefly address it 

here. Cf. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 

at 951 n.10 (declining to sever a subsection of a challenged 

statute “[b]ecause the City ha[d] [forfeited] any argument 

regarding severability by failing to raise it in its briefs or at 

oral argument”).16

A

“Severability is of course a matter of state law.” Leavitt 

v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996). To determine whether 

a state statute is severable, we are bound by state statutes and 

state court opinions. See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, 

Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 

16 The dissent cites several Supreme Court cases decided before we 

issued Comite de Jornaleros. Dissent at 51–52, 52 n.7. But we are 

bound by our precedent unless it is irreconcilable with a subsequent 

higher authority. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 893. 

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The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the “nature of 

severability” in State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95, 99 (Or. 2004) (en 

banc).17 According to the Oregon Supreme Court, the 

relevant statute, “[section] 174.040[,] governs decisions 

regarding severability.” Id. This statute provides that “it is 

the legislative intent, in the enactment of any statute, that if 

any part of the statute is held unconstitutional, the remaining 

parts shall remain in force” unless an exception applies.18 

The exceptions to this presumption (that the legislature 

would prefer an unconstitutional part of a statute to be 

severed and the rest to remain in force) include 

circumstances where “parts of the statute are so 

interconnected that it appears likely that the remaining parts 

would not have been enacted without the unconstitutional 

part, or . . . [if] the remaining parts are incomplete and cannot 

be executed in accordance with legislative intent.” Outdoor 

17 Dilts provided a generally applicable analysis of Oregon severability 

law. Nothing in the opinion suggests that this analysis would be different 

if a party proposed severing the unconstitutional portion of a civil statute, 

rather than a criminal statute. But see Dissent at 65.

18 Section 174.040 of the Oregon Revised Statutes provides in full: 

It shall be considered that it is the legislative intent, in the 

enactment of any statute, that if any part of the statute is 

held unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall remain in 

force unless: 

(1) The statute provides otherwise; 

(2) The remaining parts are so essentially and 

inseparably connected with and dependent upon 

the unconstitutional part that it is apparent that the 

remaining parts would not have been enacted 

without the unconstitutional part; or 

(3) The remaining parts, standing alone, are

incomplete and incapable of being executed in 

accordance with the legislative intent. 

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Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 132 P.3d 5, 18 

(Or. 2006).

Based on this statute, and Oregon Supreme Court cases, 

severability analysis applies “when part of a statute is held 

to be unconstitutional.” Dilts, 103 P.3d at 99. Under such 

circumstances, a court must consider “whether that part of 

the statute can be severed and the remaining parts of the 

statute saved.” Id. Namely, under this framework, a court 

must make two determinations. First, it must conclude that 

part of the statute is unconstitutional. Second, it must 

conclude that the rest of the statute can be “saved,” meaning 

it would be deemed constitutional, if the unconstitutional 

part were severed. “When a party contends the entire act is 

unconstitutional,” then “severability is not germane until the 

constitutional claim is . . . resolved.” Bernstein Bros. v. 

Dep’t of Revenue, 661 P.2d 537, 539 (Or. 1983). 

As a general rule, under Dilts and section 174.040, a 

court’s threshold determination is whether a part of the 

statute is unconstitutional. Indeed, Dilts rejected Oregon’s 

severability argument in that case because no party alleged 

that the specific provision the state proposed to sever was 

unconstitutional. 103 P.3d at 99. Nevertheless, when a 

statute raises First Amendment concerns because it is 

content based, the Oregon Supreme Court has considered

whether to sever a portion of the statute that singles out a 

topic or subject matter for differential treatment, even if that 

portion is not itself unconstitutional. See Outdoor Media 

Dimensions, Inc., 132 P.3d at 19. 

In this context, Outdoor Media Dimensions considered a 

state statute that “requir[ed] a permit for a sign whose 

message does not relate to the premises on which the sign is 

located while providing an exemption for a sign whose 

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message does relate to the premises on which the sign is 

located.” Id. at 7. The court first held that by exempting onpremises signs from the permit requirement, the statute was, 

“on its face, an impermissible restriction on the content of 

speech” in violation of the Oregon constitution. Id. at 18. 

Turning to the issue of severability, the court explained that 

to remedy the constitutional violation it could either 

invalidate the permit requirement or sever the exception for 

on-premises signs. Id. at 19. The court determined that 

“faced with that choice, the legislature would not have been 

willing to extend the [statute’s] permit and fee requirements 

to . . . on-premises signs,” and, therefore, the court held that 

“the appropriate remedy” was to invalidate the permit 

requirement. Id. 

B 

1 

Under Outdoor Media, we may consider whether 

severing the exceptions to section 165.540(1)(c) would 

“save” that section’s general prohibition, even though the 

exceptions are not themselves unconstitutional. Assuming 

that section 165.540(1)(c), considered by itself, is content 

neutral, it can be “saved” as constitutional if it qualifies as a 

valid time, place, or manner restriction. Such a restriction 

must (1) be content neutral, (2) survive intermediate scrutiny 

review, and (3) “leave open ample alternative channels for 

communication of the information.” Hoye v. City of 

Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 844 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Rock 

Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791); see also Regan v. Time, 

Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984). Assuming that section 

165.540(1)(c) would be content neutral if it were a standalone provision and would survive intermediate scrutiny 

review, we conclude it does not satisfy the third requirement.

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“[A] regulation that forecloses an entire medium of 

public expression across the landscape of a particular 

community or setting fails to leave open ample alternatives.” 

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Loc. 586 v. 

NLRB, 540 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir. 2008). Regulations may 

not hamper a speaker’s preferred mode of communication to 

such an extent that they compromise or stifle the speaker’s 

message. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 487–90 

(2014). Alternatives that are “less effective media for 

communicating the [speaker’s] message . . . . are far from 

satisfactory.” Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of 

Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). “[F]ree speech 

protections extend to the right to choose a particular means 

or avenue of speech in lieu of other avenues.” United Bhd., 

540 F.3d at 969 (cleaned up) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, while the “[g]overnment may regulate the 

manner of speech in a content-neutral way,” the government 

“may not infringe on an individual’s right to select the means

of speech.” Foti, 146 F.3d at 641–42.

For example, in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Supreme 

Court held that an ordinance that prohibited displaying signs 

in front of one’s residence did not leave open ample 

alternative channels of communication. 512 U.S. 43, 56 

(1994). In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court 

rejected the city’s argument that the law left open ample 

alternative channels of communication because “residents 

remain free to convey their desired messages by other 

means, such as hand-held signs, letters, handbills, flyers, 

telephone calls, newspaper advertisements, bumper stickers, 

speeches, and neighborhood or community meetings.” Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the 

Supreme Court explained that “[d]isplaying a sign from 

one’s own residence often carries a message quite distinct 

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form placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the 

same text or picture by other means.” Id. Indeed, it is 

“[p]recisely because of their location [that] such signs 

provide information about the identity of the speaker.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted). To illustrate, the Supreme Court 

noted that “[a] sign advocating ‘Peace in the Gulf’ in the 

front lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran may 

provoke a different reaction than the same sign in a 10-yearold child’s bedroom window or the same message on a 

bumper sticker of a passing automobile.” Id. Likewise, 

“[a]n espousal of socialism may carry different implications 

when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than 

when pasted on a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich 

board.” Id. at 56–57. Moreover, the intention behind 

placing a sign at one’s residence may be “to reach neighbors, 

an audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other 

means.” Id. at 57 (emphasis omitted). In some instances, 

barring a means of speech effectively eliminates a message. 

For speakers “of modest means or limited mobility, a yard 

or window sign may have no practical substitute.” Id. And 

for others, “the added costs in money or time of taking out a 

newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street, 

or standing in front of one’s house with a handheld sign may 

make the difference between participating and not 

participating in some public debate.” Id. 

In light of this understanding of what case law requires 

for a speech restriction to leave open ample alternative 

channels for communication, it is clear that section 

165.540(1)(c) does not meet the mark. It functions as “an 

absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression”—the 

creation of unannounced audiovisual recordings. United 

States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). Though section 

165.540(1)(c) allows individuals to record conversations 

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where participants are “specifically informed that their 

conversation is being obtained,” such notification would 

effectively destroy the intended content of the recording. 

The subject matter of unannounced recordings is the 

subjects’ candid responses to issues of controversy. Because 

the protected speech is the recording of subjects’ unfiltered 

responses, see Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204, a rule that requires 

the person creating the recording to provide notice 

extinguishes that speech. In other words, creating 

announced recordings is not an adequate alternative channel 

of speech for creating unannounced recordings.19

Nor does after-the-fact reporting of an undercover 

interview or encounter provide an adequate alternative 

method of communication. Audiovisual recording is a 

unique medium of communication. It captures in real time 

both the sounds and sights of an event, making it more 

trustworthy and persuasive—and thus having vastly greater 

impact—than post-hoc written or oral accounts. See Fields 

v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017) 

(noting that audiovisual recordings “corroborate[] or lay[] 

aside subjective impressions for objective facts”); Am. C.L. 

Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595, 607 (7th Cir. 

2012) (stating that the “self-authenticating character” of 

audiovisual recordings “makes it highly unlikely that other 

methods could be considered reasonably adequate 

substitutes”). Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the 

importance of audiovisual recording as corroborating or 

disproving testimony in Scott v. Harris. Even on summary 

19 In fact, the dissent expressly acknowledges these attributes, which are 

unique to unannounced recordings. Dissent at 55. But by recognizing 

that unannounced recordings are unique, the dissent has necessarily 

conceded that other forms of media are inadequate substitutes. 

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judgment when “courts are required to view the facts and 

draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the 

party opposing the [summary judgment] motion,’” the court 

must rely on “the record of a videotape capturing the events 

in question,” when it “clearly contradicts the version of the 

story told by” the nonmoving party. 550 U.S. 372, 378 

(2007) (citation omitted). Audiovisual recordings are also 

unique because they can readily be disseminated to a wider 

audience when incorporated into news programming. See 

Fields, 862 F.3d at 359 (“Recordings also facilitate 

discussion because of the ease in which they can be widely 

distributed via different forms of media.”); Am. C.L. Union 

of Illinois, 679 F.3d at 607 (noting that audiovisual 

recordings are “powerful methods of . . . disseminating 

news and information”). Accordingly, section 165.540(1)(c) 

does not leave open alternative channels to real-time, 

unannounced audiovisual recordings. And we therefore 

conclude that section 165.540(1)(c) (if read as a stand-alone 

provision, without exceptions) is not a valid time, place, or 

manner restriction.

In opposing this analysis, and arguing that section 

165.540(1)(c) leaves open ample alternative channels of 

communication, the dissent reframes the medium of public 

expression sought by Project Veritas at a high level of 

generality. According to the dissent, the relevant medium of 

communication is not the unannounced recordings that 

capture candid responses, but rather “investigative 

journalism” generally. Dissent at 61–63. At this high level 

of generality, the dissent insists section 165.540 does not 

prevent Project Veritas from engaging in investigative 

journalism of some sort. And it claims that we previously 

held that restricting unannounced recording does not 

foreclose the medium of investigative journalism. See

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Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). 

Dissent at 55–56, 62 & n.11, 65.

We disagree with this analysis. First, the dissent again 

fails to recognize the implications of Wasden. Under 

Wasden, the creation of an unannounced recording of a 

subject’s unguarded conduct (which would include any 

statements made in the course of such conduct) is itself a 

form of protected speech and constitutes “a significant 

medium” of public expression. 878 F.3d at 1203 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). As explained above, section 

165.540(1)(c) does not leave ample alternative channels for 

Project Veritas’s mode of speech. Thus, the dissent’s 

argument that section 165.540(1)(c) does not foreclose 

investigative journalism as a journalistic approach misses 

the mark. At some level of generality, “art” can be made 

without a paint brush—but neither sculpture nor architecture 

is a substitute for painting.

Moreover, the dissent’s reliance on Dietemann is 

misplaced. Dissent at 55–56, 62 & n.11, 65. In Dietemann, 

two journalists used a ruse to gain entry to the plaintiff’s 

home and then surreptitiously photographed and recorded 

him without consent. 449 F.2d at 245–46. We held that the 

plaintiff could state a claim for invasion of privacy under 

California law because the conduct occurred inside the 

plaintiff’s home, id. at 248, and because the First 

Amendment did not “accord newsmen immunity from torts 

or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering,” 

id. at 249. But Dietemann has no bearing on the question 

whether a rule prohibiting unannounced recordings in public 

places fails to leave open ample alternative channels of 

communication. 

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For this reason, the dissent’s argument that a parade of 

horribles will result from our analysis—such as the 

invalidation of “eavesdropping statutes”—is not well-taken. 

Dissent at 73. As explained, see supra Section III.A., the 

threshold question is whether the challenged law restricts 

First Amendment protected speech. Under Wasden, the 

creation of an unannounced recording is speech protected by 

the First Amendment. But we are not aware of any cases 

holding that eavesdropping (without more) is protected 

speech. Therefore, the First Amendment would not 

constitute grounds to invalidate a statute prohibiting that 

conduct. Moreover, we analyzed section 165.540(1)(c) as a 

prohibition of First Amendment protected speech in public 

places. See supra Section III.C. Our analysis of the state’s 

asserted governmental interest and whether its restriction on 

speech is narrowly tailored would necessarily be different in 

the context of eavesdropping, where an individual’s 

heightened privacy interests in his own home are at stake. 

Nothing we have said today impugns the well-established 

rule that the First Amendment does not “accord [a speaker] 

immunity from torts or crimes committed” in service of his 

speech. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.20 

2

Because we conclude that section 165.540(1)(c) is not a 

valid time, place, or manner restriction, it cannot be “saved” 

by striking the two exceptions at issue here. Therefore, 

20 The dissent argues that our conclusion that section 165.540(1)(c) is not 

a valid time, place, or manner restriction, means that the Oregon 

legislature is “in a catch-22.” Dissent at 69. But a judicial determination 

that a statute is unconstitutional does not put the legislature in a catch-22 

situation; rather, it merely tells the legislature that its enactment has 

impermissibly infringed on the First Amendment rights of its citizens. 

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“severability is not germane.” Bernstein Bros., 661 P.2d at 

539. Further, under Outdoor Media Dimensions, we also 

conclude that the Oregon legislature would not intend the 

exceptions to be severed, because when Oregon courts 

analyze severability, they “assum[e] that the legislature 

prefers to avoid enacting a bill that raises serious questions 

of constitutionality.” State v. Borowski, 220 P.3d 100, 109 

(Or. Ct. App. 2009).

If the exceptions were removed, section 165.540(1)(c) 

would raise serious constitutional issues. This section would 

prohibit the unannounced recording of police officers 

performing their official duties or a felony endangering 

human life. But we have consistently and repeatedly held 

that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to photograph 

and [to] record matters of public interest,” Askins, 899 F.3d 

at 1044, which includes the right to “observ[e] 

government[al] operation[s],” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 

1196, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017), and the commission of a crime, 

see Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1291–

92 (9th Cir. 2014). Requiring a citizen to inform all parties 

involved to capture governmental officials’ performance of 

official duties in public places, for example, would 

substantially impede this speech right by foreclosing a major 

avenue for citizens to “[g]ather[] information about 

government officials in a[n unaltered] form that can readily 

be disseminated to others,” despite the fact that this type of 

speech “serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in 

protecting and promoting ‘the free discussion of 

governmental affairs.’” Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 

(1st Cir. 2011) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 

(1966)). Further, an announced recording of a felony in 

progress would not only tend to reduce the opportunity to 

capture such evidence, but also tend to imperil the person 

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recording. Given the impetus for this exception was to 

enable police officers to make unannounced recordings of 

felony drug transactions and felonies endangering human 

life without first obtaining a court order, see supra pp. 8–9, 

the legislature would not choose to endanger police by 

eliminating this exception to the general rule.

The dissent suggests that removing the exceptions from 

the general prohibition in section 165.540(1)(c) would not 

raise constitutional issues because a court would likely deem 

section 165.540(1)(c) unconstitutional as applied to an 

individual who filmed police or other matters of public 

interest in public places. Dissent at 68–69. But such a 

conclusion merely acknowledges that the general 

prohibition itself raises serious constitutional issues. 

Therefore, severing the exceptions that make the general 

prohibition content based, and extending the general 

prohibition to these protected First Amendment activities, 

would create significant constitutional issues rather than 

cure them. Under Outdoor Media, we must presume that the 

Oregon legislature would not retain such a law.21

21 The dissent argues that the legislature would want to retain section 

165.540(1)(c) as a stand-alone provision, even if the exception in section 

165.540(5)(b) for recording police officers were severed, because the 

general prohibition in section 165.540(1)(c) “was freestanding for fiftysix years before the legislature adopted the exception that allows the 

recording of law enforcement officers performing official duties in 

public.” Dissent at 51; see also Dissent at 67–68. This evinces a 

misunderstanding of the relevant legislative history. The legislature 

adopted section 165.540(1)(c) long before Fordyce made clear that such 

a general prohibition on filming matters of public concern raises serious 

constitutional questions. See 55 F.3d at 439. Following Fordyce and 

subsequent opinions reiterating this rule, the legislature added the 

exception in section 165.540(5)(b)—likely to eliminate this 

constitutional concern. (Unfortunately, the addition of this exception

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* * * 

Reading section 165.540(1)(c) as a whole, we conclude

that it is a content-based speech restriction that cannot 

survive strict scrutiny because Oregon has not asserted a 

compelling government interest and because the statute is 

not narrowly tailored. The statute is also not a valid time, 

place, or manner restriction because it does not leave open 

ample alternative channels for communication. Applying 

Oregon law, we may not sever the exceptions because 

severing them would not render section 165.540(1)(c) 

constitutional. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is 

facially unconstitutional. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

“The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the 

unrestrained right to gather information.” Zemel v. Rusk, 

381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). 

When it adopted Oregon Revised Statutes 

section 165.540(1)(c), the Oregon legislature required that 

notice must be given before in-person oral conversations 

may be recorded. With this statute, the legislature ensured 

rendered section 165.540 a content-based speech restriction, which 

created a different First Amendment issue.) Given that the Oregon 

legislature already evinced its intent to avoid the constitutional questions 

raised when section 165.540(1)(c) was a standalone provision, we must 

conclude that the legislature would not sever the exception in section 

165.540(5)(b), which would merely bring back to life the same 

constitutional issue that the Oregon legislature faced prior to enacting 

this exception.

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that Oregonians would be free to engage in the “uninhibited 

exchange of ideas and information,”1 without fear that their 

words could be broadcast beyond their intended audience, 

appear on the evening news, or worse, be manipulated and 

shared across the internet devoid of relevant context.

Project Veritas engages in undercover investigative 

journalism, and it finds Oregon’s protection against the 

secret recording of oral conversations a hindrance to its 

operations. Project Veritas seeks a ruling declaring section 

165.540(1)(c) unconstitutional, arguing there is no 

distinction between hearing a conversation and secretly 

recording it. Because the majority does not dispute that the 

State has a significant interest in protecting the privacy of 

Oregonians who engage in conversations without notice that 

their comments are being recorded, our court’s analysis 

should be straightforward. First, principles of federalism 

require that we begin from a premise of reluctance to strike 

down a state statute. Next, following Supreme Court 

precedent, we should sever the two statutory exceptions that 

Project Veritas challenges, apply intermediate scrutiny to the 

content-neutral remainder, recognize that the statute is welltailored to meet Oregon’s significant interest, and uphold 

section 165.540(1)(c) as a reasonable time, place, or manner 

restriction. 

The majority takes a very different path. It begins by 

straining to avoid the conclusion that the two exceptions to 

section 540(1)(c)’s notice requirement that Project Veritas 

challenges are severable. From there, the majority concludes 

that severance is inappropriate by implausibly speculating 

that the Oregon legislature—which the majority faults for 

1 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001) (citation omitted).

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overzealously protecting privacy—would have preferred to 

jettison all of section 540(1)(c) rather than striking the two 

exceptions.

My colleagues do not contest that Oregon has a 

significant interest in protecting people from unannounced 

recordings of in-person conversations, but they rewrite the 

State’s articulated purpose. The purpose Oregon advances 

is its significant interest in protecting participants from 

having their oral conversations recorded without their 

knowledge. The majority recasts the State’s interest as one 

in “protecting people’s conversational privacy from the 

speech of other individuals.” Slip Op. at 25. (emphasis 

added). That reframing of the legislature’s purpose serves 

as the springboard for the majority’s reliance on an 

inapplicable line of Supreme Court authority that pertains to 

state action aimed at protecting people from unwanted 

commercial or political speech; not protection from speechgathering activities like Project Veritas’s, which are 

qualitatively different because they appropriate the speech 

of others. 

The majority glosses over this important distinction, and 

in the end, it declares that all of section 165.540(1)(c) is 

unconstitutional by concluding that the State’s ban on 

unannounced recordings leaves no adequate alternative 

channel of communication. This final rationale is contrary 

to the reasoning of our own court, which has explained that 

“hidden mechanical contrivances are [not] ‘indispensable 

tools’ of newsgathering. Investigative reporting is an 

ancient art; its successful practice long antecedes the

invention of miniature cameras and electronic devices.” 

Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). 

Because modern technology now allows voice recordings to 

be manipulated and disseminated worldwide with a few 

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keystrokes and clicks, the protection afforded by section 

165.540(1)(c) is more important than ever. 

For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

I.

In 1955, the Oregon legislature enacted what is now 

section 165.540 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, a 

wiretapping law that requires the consent of one party before 

a telecommunication or a radio communication may be 

recorded in Oregon. See State v. Lissy, 747 P.2d 345, 350 

(1987); Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(1)(a) (1955).2 The 

legislature amended section 165.540 in 1959 to require that 

anyone wishing to record an in-person conversation must 

first specifically inform all participants.3 Lissy, 747 P.2d at 

350 & n.4. “[T]he primary concern underlying [§] 

165.540(1)(c) was the protection of participants in 

conversations from being recorded without their 

knowledge.” State v. Neff, 265 P.3d 62, 66 (Or. Ct. App. 

2011). The 1959 amendment was codified as 

2 The original wiretapping statute provided, in relevant part, that a person 

may not “[o]btain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a 

telecommunication or a radio communication to which such person is 

not a participant, by means of any device, contrivance, machine or 

apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, unless 

consent is given by at least one participant.” Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 165.540(1)(a) (1955).

3 The section was later amended to include face-to-face conversations 

conducted via video conference. Compare Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(6)(a) 

(2022), with Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(6)(a) (2019). My use of the term 

“in-person conversation” encompasses the audio portion of 

conversations conducted by video conference.

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section 165.540(1)(c) of the Oregon Revised Statutes, and it 

is the focus of Project Veritas’s appeal.4

Two exceptions to Oregon’s ban on recording in-person 

oral conversations are at issue. The first, adopted by the 

legislature in 1989, allows the unannounced recording of “a 

conversation during a felony that endangers human life.” 

Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(a) (1989). The second 

exception, adopted in 2015, permits the unannounced 

recording of “a conversation in which a law enforcement 

officer is a participant,” provided that certain conditions are 

met. Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b) (2015).5 As to this 

exception, the majority recognizes that our own court has 

squarely held that the right to record law enforcement 

officers performing official duties in public is protected by 

the First Amendment. See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 

436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); Askins v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018). The majority 

takes the position that federal law also protects recording 

during a felony that endangers human life. Assuming the 

exceptions to section 540(1)(c) are indeed co-extensive with 

4 Section 165.540(1)(c) provides that no person may “[o]btain or attempt 

to obtain the whole or any part of a conversation by means of any device, 

contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical, 

manual or otherwise, if all participants in the conversation are not 

specifically informed that their conversation is being obtained.” Or. Rev. 

Stat. § 165.540(1)(c) (1961). The term “conversation,” is defined to 

include only “oral communications.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.535(1).

5 Specifically, the officer must be “performing official duties,” the 

recording must be made “openly and in plain view,” the conversation 

must be “audible to the person by normal unaided hearing,” and the 

person recording must be “in a place where the person lawfully may be.” 

Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b).

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conduct protected by the federal constitution, the exceptions 

do not change the speech that is permitted in Oregon.

II.

Project Veritas challenges section 165.540(1)(c)’s 

requirement that a participant must give notice before 

recording an in-person conversation in Oregon. This 

provision applies to unannounced recordings of 

“conversations,” which, as explained, are defined to include 

only “oral communications.” 6 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 165.535(1), 

165.540(1)(c) (emphasis added). Project Veritas proposes to 

investigate the Oregon Public Records Advocate and Public 

Records Advisory Council by conducting surreptitious or 

unannounced recordings of conversations in areas open to 

the public, including cafes, parks, and sidewalks. Project 

Veritas also proposes to investigate violent protests in 

Portland by: (1) secretly recording conversations between 

police and protestors; (2) secretly recording conversations 

6 The majority asserts that section 165.540(1)(c) applies to both audio 

and video recordings. It supports this statement with the observation that 

the statute “bars individuals from obtaining a conversation ‘by means of 

any device,’” Slip Op. at 6 & n.3 (quoting State v. Copeland, 522 P.3d 

909, 911–12 (Or. Ct. App. 2022)), and the observation that the term 

“conversation” is defined to include both in-person oral communications 

and those conducted via video conference. Neither observation changes 

that the statute expressly requires notification only before recording an 

oral communication. A video recording that does not include an 

accompanying audio recording of an oral communication is not subject 

to the statute. The majority resists the result of the clear statutory 

language by arguing Copeland did not differentiate between a video of a 

“heated discussion” and a video of a shooting. Slip Op. at 6 n.3. But 

that case concerned a video that captured both a conversation and a 

shooting, and nothing in that opinion implies that section 165.540(1)(c) 

would apply to a video that did not capture an oral communication. See 

Copeland, 522 P.3d at 912–13.

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between its journalists and police; (3) secretly recording 

conversations between its journalists and protestors; and (4) 

openly recording conversations with protestors without 

providing notice of the recording. The majority repeatedly 

suggests that Project Veritas seeks to record only in public 

places, but Project Veritas avers only that most of its 

recording will occur in public places. It does not identify the 

other venues that it has in mind. 

Project Veritas acknowledges the validity of Oregon’s 

prohibition on “eavesdropping,” and explicitly disavows any 

intention of eavesdropping. As Oregon defines that term, 

this means Project Veritas will not intercept wire or oral 

communications to which Project Veritas is not a party, 

without the consent of the participants. Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 165.543(1). Instead, Project Veritas plans to record 

conversations in which its reporters participate by using 

concealed recording devices and not giving notice that the 

conversations are being recorded. Project Veritas argues 

that such recording is protected speech under the First 

Amendment and that the other participants in these 

conversations have only a “limited,” “tenuous,” and 

“minimal” privacy interest in not having their speech 

recorded. 

A.

In defining the scope of First Amendment protection, our 

precedent draws no distinction between the process of 

creating speech and speech itself. Anderson v. City of 

Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010). 

We have explained that “[b]ecause the recording process is 

itself expressive and is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the 

resulting recording, the creation of audiovisual recordings is 

speech entitled to First Amendment protection as purely 

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expressive activity.” Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 

878 F.3d 1184, 1204 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson, 621 

F.3d at 1062) (reasoning that the act of creating a recording 

is itself expressive, much like writing a book or painting a 

picture). But unlike writing a book or painting a picture, 

recording a conversation involves the appropriation of 

others’ speech. To be clear, I agree that Project Veritas’s act 

of creating a recording is protected speech, but it is important 

to recognize that the type of speech Project Veritas plans to 

engage in—unannounced in-person recordings of oral 

conversations—infringes upon other speakers’ competing 

interest in conversational privacy. That competing interest 

plays a critical role when we assess whether the State’s time, 

place, or manner restriction is reasonable and sufficiently 

tailored to the State’s significant interest.

Project Veritas argues that the dangerous-felony 

exception and the law-enforcement exception are both 

content based, rendering all of section 165.540(1)(c) content 

based. For purposes of this analysis, I assume this is correct. 

Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict 

scrutiny, Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204, and Oregon does not 

argue that section 165.540(1)(c) can satisfy that heightened 

standard. But even assuming that section 165.540(1)(c) fails 

strict scrutiny if the two challenged exceptions are 

considered, the question we should ask next is whether the 

two statutory exceptions are severable. 

B.

The Supreme Court recently reiterated in Barr v. 

American Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc. [AAPC], 140 

S. Ct. 2335 (2020), that when confronted with an exception 

that renders a restriction on speech impermissibly content 

based, we apply ordinary severability principles, starting 

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with a “strong presumption of severability” that dates back 

to the Marshall Court. Id. at 2350; see Free Enter. Fund v. 

Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010). 

“The Court’s presumption of severability . . . allows courts 

to avoid judicial policymaking or de facto judicial legislation 

in determining just how much of the remainder of a statute 

should be invalidated.” AAPC, 140 S. Ct. at 2351. The 

presumption of severability applies with particular force 

where, as here, the legislature “added an unconstitutional 

amendment to a prior law. In those cases, the Court has 

treated the original, pre-amendment statute as the ‘valid 

expression of the legislative intent.’” Id. at 2353 (quoting 

Frost v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 278 U.S. 515, 526–27 

(1929)). We need not guess at whether the Oregon 

legislature intended its previously enacted protection for inperson conversations to exist independently, because 

section 165.540(1)(c) was a freestanding provision for thirty 

years before the legislature adopted the dangerous-felony 

exception, and it was freestanding for fifty-six years before 

the legislature adopted the exception that allows the 

recording of law enforcement officers performing official 

duties in public. As the majority points out, the Oregon 

legislature’s statutory scheme is among the nation’s 

strongest protections for conversational privacy. Slip Op. at 

6 n.1. What the majority overlooks is that this makes it 

particularly implausible that the legislature intended 

Oregon’s entire conversational privacy statute to be struck 

down rather than have the two challenged exceptions 

severed. The majority suggests that it addresses severability 

only because I rely on it, Slip Op. at 31, but the Supreme 

Court has made clear that striking down a statute before 

considering severability is not an option.

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We have an obligation to consider severability regardless 

of whether litigants raise it.7 Principles of federalism make 

it particularly important that we apply a surgical approach in 

this case and sever any constitutionally suspect provisions, 

because we are a federal court treading on a state statute. 

The majority acknowledges that the “[s]everability [of a 

state statutory provision] is of course a matter of state law,” 

Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (per curiam), 

and both Oregon statutory law and Oregon Supreme Court 

precedent require us to apply a presumption in favor of 

severability, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.040; Outdoor Media 

Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 132 P.3d 5, 18 (Or. 

2006). Specifically, Oregon Revised Statutes 

section 174.040 provides:

It shall be considered that it is the legislative 

intent, in the enactment of any statute, that if 

any part of the statute is held 

unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall 

remain in force unless:

(1) The statute provides otherwise;

7 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992) (“Having 

determined that the take title provision exceeds the powers of Congress, 

we must consider whether it is severable from the rest of the Act.” 

(emphasis added)); accord Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 

491, 507 (1985) (rejecting appellees’ argument that appellants had 

forfeited the severability issue before our circuit and concluding that our 

circuit should have considered severability before striking down a state 

statute); see Brief for All Appellees at 44, Brockett, 472 U.S. 491 (Nos. 

84-28, 84-143), 1984 WL 565782, at *44; see also Nat’l Ass’n for Gun 

Rights, Inc. v. Mangan, 933 F.3d 1102, 1122 (9th Cir. 2019) (addressing 

severability sua sponte even though neither litigant addressed it on 

appeal or in the district court).

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(2) The remaining parts are so 

essentially and inseparably 

connected with and dependent 

upon the unconstitutional part 

that it is apparent that the 

remaining parts would not have 

been enacted without the 

unconstitutional part; or

(3) The remaining parts, standing 

alone, are incomplete and 

incapable of being executed in 

accordance with the legislative 

intent.

In Outdoor Media Dimensions, the Oregon Supreme 

Court explained that “[o]rdinarily, when one part of a statute 

is found unconstitutional, this court’s practice (and the 

legislature’s stated preference) is to sever the offending part 

and save the remainder of the statute, unless the legislature 

has directed otherwise, unless the parts of the statute are so 

interconnected that it appears likely that the remaining parts 

would not have been enacted without the unconstitutional 

part, or unless the remaining parts are incomplete and cannot 

be executed in accordance with legislative intent.” 132 P.3d 

at 18. None of Oregon’s exceptions to the presumption of 

severability apply here, so we should sever the two 

exceptions Project Veritas challenges and evaluate the 

constitutionality of the remaining notice requirement.

C.

No one disputes that section 165.540(1)(c) is content 

neutral if the two challenged exceptions are severed, so 

intermediate scrutiny applies. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 

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v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). To survive intermediate 

scrutiny, a time, place, or manner restriction on speech must 

be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 

interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for 

communication of the information.” Ward v. Rock Against 

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. 

for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). The 

narrow-tailoring requirement does not mean that the 

government’s restriction on speech must be the “least 

restrictive or least intrusive means” of serving the state’s 

interest, but the government cannot “regulate expression in 

such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on 

speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Id. at 798–99.

1.

Oregon’s attorney general argues that section 

165.540(1)(c)’s restriction on recording in-person 

conversations is justified by Oregon’s significant interest in 

ensuring that Oregonians know whether their conversations 

are being recorded. This is unquestionably a significant state 

interest. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[p]rivacy 

of communication is an important interest” and that 

restrictions protecting this interest can “encourag[e] the 

uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among 

private parties.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 

(2001) (citation omitted). The Court has also recognized that 

“the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might 

well have a chilling effect on private speech.” Id. at 533; 

accord Am. C.L. Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 605 

(7th Cir. 2012) (“[Conversational privacy] is easily an 

important governmental interest.”).

Project Veritas does not dispute this point. Indeed, it 

acknowledges that “[p]rivacy is an important governmental 

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interest that eavesdropping and wiretapping prohibitions are 

narrowly tailored to protect.” Nevertheless, Project Veritas 

argues that if one of its undercover reporters consents to 

having an in-person conversation recorded, the other party 

to the conversation has only a “limited,” “tenuous,” and 

“minimal” privacy interest in not being recorded. To reach 

this implausible conclusion, Project Veritas begins from the 

assertion that “[a]n audio recording by a party is little more 

than a more accurate record of what one party is already, in 

the overwhelming majority of circumstances, entitled to 

share in a free society.” In other words, in Project Veritas’s 

view, having one’s oral communication secretly recorded 

imposes no greater burden on privacy than merely having the 

same comments heard—never mind that recorded comments 

can be forwarded to vast audiences, posted on the internet in 

perpetuity, selectively edited, presented devoid of context, 

or manipulated using modern technology. 

Project Veritas’s premise is emphatically wrong. In 

Dietemann, we reasoned: 

One who invites another to his home or office 

takes a risk that the visitor may not be what 

he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all 

he hears and observes when he leaves. But 

he does not and should not be required to take 

the risk that what is heard and seen will be 

transmitted by photograph or recording, or in 

our modern world, in full living color and hifi to the public at large or to any segment of 

it that the visitor may select. A different rule 

could have a most pernicious effect upon the 

dignity of man and it would surely lead to 

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guarded conversations and conduct where 

candor is most valued . . . . 

449 F.2d at 249. This rationale is not limited to 

conversations within private residences, nor does Project 

Veritas represent that it intends to limit its unannounced 

recordings to public places, despite the majority’s 

suggestions to the contrary. Ironically, Project Veritas 

argues that “audiovisual recordings are uniquely reliable and 

powerful methods of preserving and disseminating news and 

information,” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted), but sees no contradiction in its assertion that 

turning these “uniquely reliable and powerful methods” on 

private conversations poses no threat to privacy. 

The secret recording of speech is far more destructive to 

one’s privacy than merely having oral communications 

heard and repeated. Recorded speech can be stored 

indefinitely, disseminated widely, and viewed 

repeatedly. In the age of the internet and generative artificial 

intelligence (AI), surreptitious recording of in-person 

conversations risks massive and ongoing invasions of 

privacy. Today, anyone can access and learn how to use AIpowered generative adversarial networks to create 

convincing audio or video “deepfakes” that make people 

appear to say or do things they never actually did.8 With 

these tools, “the only practical constraint on one’s ability to 

produce a deepfake [is] access to training materials—that is, 

8 Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deepfakes and the New 

Disinformation War, Foreign Affairs (Dec. 11, 2018), 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-11/deepfakesand-new-disinformation-war [https://perma.cc/TW6Z-Q97D]. 

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audio and video of the person to be modeled.”9 Id. The 

importance of the right to have notice before one’s oral 

communications are recorded cannot be overstated because 

technology now allows recordings to be selectively edited, 

manipulated, and shared across the internet in a matter of 

seconds.

Project Veritas acknowledges the privacy interest at 

stake in Oregon’s ban on eavesdropping, yet it denies that 

the same privacy interests are at stake in Oregon’s ban on 

secret recording of in-person conversations. This position is 

unsupportable. The privacy interest implicated by secret 

recordings of in-person conversations is grounded in the 

same concerns as the privacy interest implicated by 

eavesdropping; in both circumstances, a person’s oral 

communications are shared with an unintended audience and 

the speaker loses the ability to knowingly choose to speak, 

or not speak, based upon that audience.

There is no question that journalists perform a vital role 

in our society and their ability to engage in speech is entitled 

to constitutional protection, but Project Veritas’s speech is 

not the only speech implicated by the issues in this appeal. 

By striking down Oregon’s carefully crafted statute, the 

court denies Project Veritas’s interviewees the opportunity 

to knowingly choose not to participate in the recordings 

Project Veritas plans to create. Respectfully, the majority 

overlooks that secret recordings can incorporate and 

disseminate oral comments in ways the original speaker did 

9 The majority argues this concern about deepfakes is overblown because 

a person’s voice can also be captured through announced recording. This 

misses the critical point: once a person has notice that her conversation 

will be recorded, she can choose not only what to say, but also whether 

to speak at all.

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not intend, and that this implicates the “principle of 

autonomy to control one’s own speech.” See Hurley v. IrishAm. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 

574 (1995). As the Supreme Court has explained, “The First 

Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or 

decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily 

when speakers assert the right to make other people’s 

speeches.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) 

(emphasis added) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to 

a copyright extension); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, 

Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) 

(recognizing, along with the freedom to express one’s views 

publicly, the “concomitant freedom not to speak publicly” 

(quoting Est. of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 

N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968))).

Project Veritas stresses that its clandestinely recorded 

conversations will be held mostly in public places like cafes 

or parks. But the State has a significant interest in preventing 

the secret recording of private conversations even when 

those conversations occur in public or semi-public locations. 

Everyday experiences tell us that “private talk in public 

places is common.” Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606 (citation 

omitted). In many circumstances, even if a conversation 

may be heard or overheard by multiple people, the State 

maintains a significant interest in preventing its recording. 

For example, the State of Oregon points out that this interest 

is most obvious in multiparty gatherings that welcome 

members of the public yet expect that attendees will not 

make secret recordings of each other, such as twelve-step 

groups, bible study, and religious services. Our society 

respects those boundaries. Oregon has a significant interest 

in preventing unannounced recordings of oral in-person 

conversations.

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2.

The next question is whether section 165.540(1)(c) is 

narrowly tailored to that interest. I conclude it is. By 

requiring that participants in a conversation be informed 

before it is recorded—but not requiring that they consent to 

the recording—the statute infringes as little as possible on 

the process Project Veritas intends to use to create its speech, 

while still protecting the interviewees’ right to knowingly 

participate in Project Veritas’s speech—or not. Once a 

person is on notice that she will be recorded, recording does 

not violate any privacy interest. Keeping the Oregon 

legislature’s actual purpose in mind, the statute is 

exceptionally well tailored to ensuring that Oregonians’ 

conversations will not be recorded without their knowledge. 

Consistent with that interest, the statute does not sweep in 

photography or video recordings—but rather applies only to 

recordings of oral communications.10 

There are some settings in which people cannot 

reasonably expect not to have their oral statements recorded, 

and the Oregon legislature crafted its statute to account for 

those situations:

The prohibitions in subsection (1)(c) of this 

section do not apply to persons who intercept 

or attempt to intercept oral communications

that are part of any of the following 

10 Although “private talk in public places is common,” Alvarez, 679 F.3d 

at 606 (citation omitted), and people may reasonably expect, even in 

public places, that their private conversations will not be recorded, a 

person cannot reasonably expect that his visual image will not be 

captured in public. 

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proceedings, if the person uses an 

unconcealed recording device . . . :

(A)Public or semipublic meetings such as 

hearings before governmental or 

quasi-governmental bodies, trials, 

press conferences, public speeches, 

rallies and sporting or other events;

(B) Regularly scheduled classes or 

similar educational activities in 

public or private institutions; or

(C) Private meetings or conferences if all 

others involved knew or reasonably 

should have known that the recording 

was being made.

Or. Rev. Stat. §165.540(6)(a). The exceptions in section 

165.540(6)(a) permit Project Veritas to openly record at 

public protests as it proposes to do. Project Veritas points 

out that this exception does not render section 540(1)(c) 

perfectly tailored to Oregon’s stated purpose. For example, 

the law prohibits recording “a loud argument on the street, a 

political provocateur on a crowded subway, [or] a drunk, 

hate-filled conversation in a parking lot,” even though the 

participants in such conversations lack any expectation that 

their words will not be recorded. Section 165.540(1)(c)’s 

notice requirement may be overbroad as applied to these 

fringe cases, but far from demonstrating that a “substantial 

portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance 

[Oregon’s] goals,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, Project Veritas’s 

resort to these niche examples illustrates that the bulk of 

Oregon’s protection against secret audio recording is 

targeted at achieving the State’s significant interest. Nothing 

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more is required to meet intermediate scrutiny’s tailoring 

requirement.

3.

Section 165.540(1)(c) also leaves open ample alternative 

channels of communication for Project Veritas to engage in 

investigative journalism and to communicate its message. It 

is well-settled that an alternative channel need not be ideal, 

but merely adequate. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 

Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981); Reynolds v. 

Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 232 n.5 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The 

available alternatives need not be the speaker’s first or best 

choice or provide the same audience or impact for the 

speech.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 

Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1041 (7th Cir. 

2002) (“An adequate alternative does not have to be the 

speaker’s first choice.”). A restriction runs afoul of the 

“alternative channels” requirement if it eliminates the only 

method of communication by which speakers can convey 

their message to a particular audience. See, e.g., Bay Area 

Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229–30 (9th 

Cir. 1990). But a regulation does not fail intermediate 

scrutiny merely because the other available channels of 

communication would convey the same message somewhat 

less conveniently or effectively. See, e.g., Santa Monica 

Nativity Scenes Comm. v. City of Santa Monica, 784 F.3d 

1286, 1298–99 (9th Cir. 2015); One World One Fam. Now 

v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 

1996).

“We have observed that the Supreme Court generally 

will not strike down a governmental action for failure to 

leave open ample alternative channels of communication 

unless the government enactment will foreclose an entire 

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medium of public expression across the landscape of a 

particular community or setting.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 

409 F.3d 1113, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration accepted) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Project 

Veritas has no colorable argument that it would be unable to 

gather information to engage in investigative journalism, to 

communicate its message “across the landscape of a 

particular community or setting,” or to reach a particular 

audience if it cannot secretly record in-person oral 

interviews. Indeed, we made clear in Dietemann that 

restricting surreptitious recording does not foreclose an 

entire medium.11 449 F.2d at 249. 

Project Veritas retains ample alternative means of 

engaging in investigative journalism and expressing its 

message. It can employ all the tools of traditional 

investigative reporting, including but not limited to talking 

with whistleblowers and other inside sources, crowdsourcing information, researching public records, taking 

photographs and recording videos that do not capture oral 

conversations, and using Oregon’s freedom-of-information 

laws. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 192.311–.431, 192.610–

.695. It can also openly record during public and semipublic meetings and events, Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 165.540(6)(a)(A), and, in other settings, provide notice 

that it is recording without announcing that it is engaging in 

investigative journalism. These many approaches to 

11 The majority protests that Dietemann addressed whether the First 

Amendment barred state tort liability for invasion of privacy, but my 

colleagues do not try to explain why Dietemann’s observations about the 

nature and history of investigative reporting are not applicable here.

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traditional investigative reporting satisfy the alternativechannels requirement. 

III.

Rather than taking the straightforward path that this case 

calls for, the majority strikes down all of section 

165.540(1)(c) by making several unjustified leaps. First, the 

majority decides that the two content-based exceptions 

Project Veritas challenges cannot be severed because, it 

reasons, the exceptions themselves are not unconstitutional 

and severing them would raise other constitutional 

questions. Despite strong indications to the contrary, the 

majority next decides that the Oregon legislature would

rather strike down the state’s entire statutory protection for 

conversational privacy rather than sever the two exceptions. 

The majority also errs by invoking case law that addresses 

statutes and ordinances adopted to protect others from 

unwanted commercial or political speech. Finally, my 

colleagues conclude that even if the two exceptions were 

severed, section 165.540(1)(c) would still be 

unconstitutional because it fails to leave open ample 

alternative channels of communication. The majority makes 

several missteps in its analysis.

A.

I agree that section 165.540(1)(c) would not survive 

strict scrutiny viewed as a whole—indeed, Oregon never 

argues otherwise. But the State of Oregon specifically 

describes Oregon’s interest in in this statute as “protecting 

Oregonians from having their private conversations 

unwittingly made the subject of audio recordings without 

their knowledge.” See Neff, 265 P.3d at 66 (“[T]he primary 

concern underlying [section] 165.540(1)(c) was the 

protection of participants in conversations from being 

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recorded without their knowledge.”). The majority redefines 

Oregon’s interest, reasoning, because the act of recording a 

conversation is protected speech, Oregon’s interest is more 

accurately stated “as protecting individuals’ conversational 

privacy from the speech of other individuals, even in places 

open to the public.” Slip Op. at 25. 

The analogy the majority draws, to case law addressing 

statutes protecting individuals from the unwanted speech of 

others, is flawed. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 

(1971); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000); Berger 

v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (en 

banc); Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Association, 387 F.3d 850, 861 

n.10 (9th Cir. 2004)). The cases the majority cites involve 

restrictions on speech intended to further different interests, 

such as preventing the display of profane slogans in a 

courtroom (Cohen); limiting abortion protestors’ unwanted 

approaches toward clinic patients (Hill); shielding parkgoers from obnoxious behavior by street performers 

(Berger); and protecting commercial patrons from the 

speech of protesters (Kuba). None of the cases cited by the 

majority address one speaker’s appropriation of another 

person’s speech, as Project Veritas proposes to do. Our court 

gravely missteps by ignoring that this appeal implicates not 

only the First Amendment rights of the person creating a 

recording, but also the First Amendment rights of those who 

do not wish to have their speech recorded. 

The majority incorrectly asserts that Wasden forecloses 

my analysis. Slip Op. at 28. Wasden concerned a video of 

cows being abused at an agricultural facility, not a secretly 

recorded audio conversation between people. See 878 F.3d 

at 1189–90. Wasden cannot bear the weight the majority 

places on it because the video in that case did not require the 

court to confront a secret audio recording that invaded 

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conversational privacy and captured the oral 

communications of other people. The majority is also 

incorrect to suggest that Wasden foreclosed any argument 

that unannounced recordings that appropriate others’ speech 

place a greater burden on privacy than other types of 

unwanted expressive conduct. Wasden held that the creation 

of a recording is speech protected by the First Amendment, 

see id. at 1203; it did not purport to address whether the 

invasion of privacy caused by secret recording of private 

conversations is equivalent to the invasion of privacy caused 

by being bombarded with unwanted speech in public places. 

B.

The majority agrees that Oregon law governs 

severability, but it concludes that the dangerous-felony and 

law-enforcement exceptions cannot be severed from section 

165.540(1)(c) for three wobbly reasons. First, the majority 

decides that even without these exceptions, the statute would 

be unconstitutional because it fails to leave open ample 

alternative channels. I disagree with this conclusion for 

reasons previously explained, and because my colleagues’ 

rationale contravenes our own court’s recognition that 

investigative journalism does not require secret recording 

devices or hidden cameras. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249. 

The majority also argues that Oregon law does not 

permit the two challenged exceptions to be severed because 

the exceptions themselves are not unconstitutional. The 

majority misreads Oregon law. In particular, its reliance on 

State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95 (Or. 2004) is sorely misplaced. 

There, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated 

when a judge imposed a sentence above the state-law 

guidelines without providing the defendant an opportunity to 

argue the facts justifying an increased sentence to the jury. 

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Id. at 99. On appeal, the prosecution asked the court to sever 

the state-law requirement that the defendant’s sentence be 

within the guidelines even though neither party had 

challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory guidelines. 

Id. In other words, the prosecution asked the court to sever 

the requirement not because it rendered the statute 

unconstitutional, but because it rendered the defendant’s 

sentence unconstitutional. It was only in response to the 

prosecution’s unusual argument that the Oregon Supreme 

Court explained it would not sever a statute that neither party 

claimed was unconstitutional. Id.

The Oregon Supreme Court makes no bright-line 

distinction between exceptions that are themselves 

unconstitutional and exceptions that render the remainder of 

a statute unconstitutional. For instance, in Outdoor Media 

Dimensions, the Oregon Supreme Court evaluated a 

multifaceted state statute that regulated highway signs. 132 

P.3d at 7. The plaintiffs challenged several of the statute’s 

provisions, including one that required permits for highway 

signs unrelated to the premises but exempted on-premises 

signs. Id. at 9. The permit requirement and exemption were 

adopted at the same time. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 377.725, 

377.735 (1971). The court concluded that the on-premises 

exemption was content based and that it rendered the 

permitting requirement unconstitutional, but it upheld the 

rest of the statute. Outdoor Media Dimensions, 132 P.3d at 

19. Notably, the court did not consider the constitutionality 

of the exemption—which allowed on-premises signs 

without a permit—in isolation. Rather, the court concluded 

that the “on-premises/off-premises distinction” was 

unconstitutional and that severance of that provision was 

appropriate. Id.; see also City Univ. v. State, Off. of Educ. 

Pol’y & Plan., 885 P.2d 701, 703, 706–07 (Or. 1994) 

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(severing an exception that caused an Oregon statute to 

discriminate against out-of-state schools in violation of the 

Commerce Clause). 

Turning to the remedy, the Outdoor Media Dimensions

court considered “the same two unpalatable choices that the 

legislature would face,” namely, whether to strike only the 

exemption from the permitting requirement, and require 

permits for “thousands of individuals and businesses”; or to

instead strike the permitting requirement entirely. 132 P.3d 

at 19. The court decided the outcome should turn on 

legislative intent alone, and ultimately invalidated the entire 

permitting requirement because it concluded that the 

legislature would not have enacted it without the 

simultaneously enacted exemption. Id. Here, by contrast, I 

see no viable argument that the Oregon legislature did not 

intend the dangerous-felony exception and law-enforcement 

exception to be severable, because section 165.540(1)(c) 

was operative for decades before these exceptions were 

added. See AAPC, 140 S. Ct. at 2353. The legislature did 

not direct that the exceptions may not be severed, they are 

not interconnected, nor is the remaining part of the statute 

incomplete or inoperable without them. Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 165.540. 

Finally, the majority argues that Oregon courts would 

invalidate all of section 165.540(1)(c), not just the contentbased exceptions, because severing those exceptions would 

raise other constitutional concerns.12 To support this 

contention, the majority cites State v. Borowski, 220 P.3d 

12 The majority also relies on the legislative history of the challenged 

exceptions, taking the unusual step of calling out statements made by the 

Oregon State Sheriffs’ Association and the ACLU to divine legislative 

intent. Slip Op. at 9–10.

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100, 109 (Or. Ct. App. 2009), which considered, among 

other factors, the legislature’s preference to avoid enacting 

bills that raise serious questions of constitutionality. But 

Borowski, much like Outdoor Media Dimensions, concerned 

an exception enacted simultaneously with the challenged 

provision. See id. at 109; Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.887 (1999). 

Because the Oregon legislature enacted section 

165.540(1)(c) as a stand-alone provision that operated for 

decades before it adopted either of the challenged 

exceptions, we are not left to wonder whether the legislature 

would enact section 165.540 on its own—it did exactly that 

in 1959. See State ex rel. Musa v. Minear, 401 P.2d 36, 39 

(Or. 1965) (declaring an amended state statute invalid and 

reverting to the pre-amendment statute).

Failing to sever the two exceptions makes even less 

sense when one considers that the majority concedes the 

First Amendment protects the right to record lawenforcement officers in public and the right to make 

unannounced recordings during felonies that endanger 

human life. See Askins, 899 F.3d at 1044; Obsidian Fin. 

Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).13 

13 Other circuits agree. On recording law-enforcement officers, see, for 

example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011); Fields v. City 

of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017); Turner v. Lieutenant 

Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017); Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583; Smith 

v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). Indeed, the 

First Circuit has held that the First Amendment right to record law 

enforcement is “clearly established” even for the purposes of qualified 

immunity. See Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (“[A] citizen’s right to film 

government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the 

discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and wellestablished liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment.”). On 

recording crimes, see, for instance, Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. 

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Because the exceptions to section 540(1)(c) permit conduct 

protected by the federal constitution, both exceptions could 

be struck without changing the speech that is permitted in 

Oregon. Cf. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608 (enjoining Illinois 

from enforcing its recording prohibition as applied to open 

audio recording of law-enforcement officers engaged in their 

official duties in public places). Nevertheless, the majority 

concludes that because the Oregon legislature included these 

carveouts, Oregon’s entire notice requirement must receive 

strict scrutiny. The majority’s reasoning places the 

legislature in a catch-22: the First Amendment requires it to 

carve out the two challenged exceptions, but because the 

legislature included the carveouts, the majority decides the 

entire statute becomes subject to strict scrutiny. We need not 

adopt this topsy-turvy approach; we should simply sever the 

two challenged exceptions. 

C.

Perhaps the weakest link in the majority’s opinion is its 

conclusion that section 165.540(1)(c) does not leave open 

ample alternative channels of communication because it 

constitutes an “absolute prohibition on a particular type of 

expression,” namely “unannounced audiovisual recordings.” 

Setting aside that the statute does not address video 

recording,14 I disagree that Oregon’s ban on unannounced 

audio recording eliminates an entire medium of public 

expression. The majority cites Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. 

Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (observing that speech 

that “alleged violations of federal gun laws” involved a matter of public 

concern); Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that 

an article addressing art-market fraud “is certainly protected” under the 

First Amendment).

14 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.535(1).

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Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977); City of 

Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56–57 (1994); McCullen v. 

Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 487–90 (2014); United Bhd. of 

Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Loc. 586 v. NLRB, 540 F.3d 

957, 969 (9th Cir. 2008); and Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 

F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) in support of its alternativechannels holding, but these cases all miss the mark. 

In Linmark, the Supreme Court invalidated as content 

based a township’s ban on “For Sale” signs, which it had 

enacted “to stem what it perceive[d] as the flight of white 

homeowners from a racially integrated community.” 431 

U.S. at 86. The Court stressed that the township council was 

concerned “with the substance of the information 

communicated” by the signs and that the ban was not 

“unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” Id. at 93, 

96 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 

(1968)). Linmark’s language cannot be stretched to imply 

that any alternative that is “less effective” than a speaker’s 

chosen medium is “far from satisfactory.” Slip Op. at 35

(quoting Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93). Rather, Linmark

explained that the Court doubted whether the ordinance left 

open “ample alternative channels for communication” 

because the alternatives were “less effective,” and also 

because those alternatives “involve[d] more cost and less 

autonomy than ‘For Sale’ signs [and] [we]re less likely to 

reach persons not deliberately seeking sales information.” 

Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93 (internal citations omitted). After 

Linmark, the Supreme Court clarified that an alternative 

need not be a speaker’s first or best choice, but is adequate 

if it “permits the more general dissemination of a 

message.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988); see 

Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647 (“[T]he First Amendment does not 

guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times 

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and places or in any manner that may be desired.”). Project 

Veritas does not argue that alternatives to surreptitious 

recording involve more cost, or less autonomy, or otherwise 

make their message less likely to reach its intended audience. 

Project Veritas’s complaint is that Oregon’s statute will 

impede its ability to gather information.

City of Ladue also fails to support Project Veritas’s 

cause. There, the Supreme Court held that a restriction on 

residential signs did not leave open adequate alternative 

channels of communication because “[d]isplaying a sign 

from one’s own residence often carries a message quite 

distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or 

conveying the same text or picture by other means.” 512 

U.S. at 56. City of Ladue emphasized the long-held tradition 

of respect for individual liberty in the home and for a 

person’s ability to speak there. Id. at 58. Here, by contrast, 

Project Veritas does not argue that reporting on in-person 

oral conversations without surreptitiously obtained audio 

recordings would convey a different message, only that its 

information gathering would be somewhat less effective, and 

there is no comparable tradition of respect for surreptitious 

recording. Indeed, surreptitious recording is generally 

considered a breach of journalistic ethics except when 

certain narrow criteria are met.15 

McCullen is even less applicable. There, the Court 

struck down a statute establishing buffer zones around 

abortion clinics because the statute was insufficiently 

tailored. The Court did not even reach “whether the Act 

15 See, e.g., Radio Television Digital News Ass’n (RTDNA), Guidelines 

for Hidden Cameras, https://www.rtdna.org/hidden-cameras 

[https://perma.cc/8MQ3-P8A9].

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leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.” 

McCullen, 573 U.S. at 496 n.9. 

The majority correctly observes that the First 

Amendment’s protections “extend to the ‘right to choose a 

particular means or avenue of speech . . . in lieu of other 

avenues,’” United Bhd., 540 F.3d at 969 (quoting Foti, 146 

F.3d at 641), but section 165.540(1)(c) governs how, not 

whether, Project Veritas can use recording devices. The 

statute thus permissibly “regulate[s] the manner of speech in 

a content-neutral way,” without “infring[ing] on an 

individual’s right to select the means of speech.” Foti, 146 

F.3d at 641–42.

The majority and Project Veritas both argue that 

recordings are unique in their trustworthiness, “selfauthenticating character,” and ease of distribution, ignoring 

that surreptitious audio recording is a uniquely effective 

means for reporters to gather information precisely because 

it is uniquely effective at invading privacy. The very aspects 

of surreptitious audio recording that render it distinct from 

other modes of communication, such as its discreetness and 

its ability to widely disseminate the contents of a 

conversation, are the same aspects that render it particularly 

damaging to privacy.16 

The majority’s alternative-channels analysis is 

particularly concerning because it has no obvious limits. My 

colleagues suggest that their opinion will be cabined because 

16 It is also worth noting that the self-authenticating character of audio 

recordings is rapidly eroding as modern technology renders “deepfakes” 

ever more accessible and difficult to distinguish from actual recordings. 

See generally Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A 

Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 

CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1755–68 (2019).

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they view section 165.540(1)(c) as an outlier among other 

states’ limitations on recording conversations. But if it is 

enough to show that newsworthy information could be 

obtained by a particular method, the majority’s rationale 

might well apply to Oregon’s eavesdropping statute, or to 

narrower conversational privacy statutes adopted in other 

states. After all, eavesdropping and unannounced recording 

in non-public locations are also effective methods to gather 

information of public concern that cannot be otherwise 

obtained. Though the majority disavows the suggestion that 

its reasoning could be applied to strike down eavesdropping 

statutes, it is hard to see why the forty other states that have 

adopted more limited conversational privacy statutes are not 

vulnerable in light of today’s opinion.

IV.

“[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First 

Amendment simply because their enforcement against the 

press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report 

the news.” Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 

(1991). In this case, we should simply sever the 

constitutionally suspect exceptions that Project Veritas 

challenges, and uphold the remainder of 

section 165.540(1)(c).

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Appendix A

States allowing recording without providing notice to 

or obtaining consent from the recording’s subjects when 

created in a place where the subjects lack a reasonable 

expectation of privacy:

Alabama: Ala. Code §§ 13A-11-30, 13A-11-31; Chandler v. 

Alabama, 680 So. 2d 1018, 1026 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) 

Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3001(8), 13-

3005(A)(2), 13-3012(9); Arizona v. Hauss, 688 P.2d 1051, 

1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)

Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-16-101(a), (b), 5-60-120(a)

California: Cal. Penal Code § 632; Flanagan v. Flanagan, 

27 Cal. 4th 766, 768 (2002); Kearney v. Salomon Smith 

Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 117–18 (2006)

Colorado: Colo Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-9-301(8), 18-9-

304(1)(a)

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-189a(a)(1); 

Connecticut v. Panek, 177 A.3d 1113, 1126 (Conn. 2018)

Delaware: Del Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 2401(13), 2402(a)(1), 

(c)(4)

District of Columbia: D.C. Code §§ 23-541(2), 23-542(a)(1), 

(b)(3)

Florida: Fla. Stat. §§ 934.02(2), 934.03(1)(a), (2)(d); 

McDonough v. Fernandez-Rundle, 862 F.3d 1314, 1319 

(11th Cir. 2017); Florida v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272,

1275 (Fla. 1985); Dept. of Ag. & Con. Servs. v. Edwards, 

654 So. 2d 628, 632–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-60(3), 16-11-62(1), 16-

11-66(a); Suggs v. Georgia, 854 S.E.2d 674, 680 (Ga. 2021)

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Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 803-41, 803-42(a)(1), (b)(3)(A); 

Hawaii v. Graham, 780 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Haw. 1989)

Idaho: Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18-6701(2), 18-6702(1)(a), 

(2)(d)

Illinois: 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §§ 5/14-2(a)(1), (2), 5/14-

1(a), (d), (g)

Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §§ 727.8(2), (3)(a), 808B.1(8), 

808B.2(1)(a), (2)(c)

Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6101(a)(4), (f)

Louisiana: La. Stat. Ann. §§ 15:1302(15), 15:1303(A)(1), 

(C)(4); Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 731 

F.3d 488, 495 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2013)

Maine: 15 Me. Rev. Stat. §§ 709(4), (5), 710(1)

Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 10-401(13), 

10-402(a)(1), (c)(3); Agnew v. Maryland, 197 A.3d 27, 34–

35 (Md. 2018)

Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.539a, 750.539c, 

750.539d(1), Bowens v. Ary, Inc., 794 N.W.2d 842, 843–44 

(Mich. 2011); Kasper v. Rupprecht, No. 312919, 2014 WL 

265542, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014) (per curiam);

Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2003); Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58, 60–61 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 1982) (per curiam)

Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 626A.01, 626A.02; Minnesota v. 

Vaughn, 361 N.W. 2d 54, 57–58 (Minn. 1985)

Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-29-501(j), 41-29-

531(e), 41-29-533(1); Jackson v. Mississippi, 263 So. 3d 

1003, 1011 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018); Ott v. Mississippi, 722 

So. 2d 576, 582 (Miss. 1998)

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Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86-283, 86-290(1)(a), 

(2)(c); Nebraska v. Biernacki, 465 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Neb. 

1991)

Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.650; Lane v. Allstate 

Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 938, 940 (Nev. 1998)

New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 570-A:1(II), 570-

A:2(I)(a); Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A.2d 396, 401 (N.H. 

1999); New Hampshire v. Lamontagne, 618 A.2d 849, 851 

(N.H. 1992)

New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:156A-2(b), 2A:156A3(a), 2A:156A-4(d) 

North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 15A-286(17), 15A287(a)(1)

North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 12.1-15-02(1)(a), 

(3)(c), 12.1-15-04(5)

Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2933.51(B), 2933.52(A)(1), 

(B)(4); Ohio v. Childs, 728 N.E.2d 379, 388 (Ohio 2000)

Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 176.2(12), 176.3(1), 

(2), 176.4(5); K.F. v. Oklahoma, 797 P.2d 1006, 1007 (Okla. 

Crim. App. 1990)

Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5702, 5703(1), 

5704(4); Pennsylvania v. Mason, 247 A.3d 1070, 1081 (Pa. 

2021)

Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 11-35-21(a)(1), 

(c)(3), 12-5.1-1(10)

South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-30-10, 17-30-15(2), 

17-30-20(1), 17-30-30(C)

South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws §§ 23A-35A-1(6), (10), 

23A-35A-20(1), (2); South Dakota v. Owens, 643 N.W.2d 

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735, 753 (S.D. 2002); South Dakota v. Braddock, 452 

N.W.2d 785, 788 (S.D. 1990)

Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-601(a)(1)(A), (b)(5), 

40-6-303(14)

Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 16.02(b)(1), (c)(4); Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18A.001(19)

Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-3(13), 77-23a-4(1)(b)(i), 

(7)(b)

Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-61, 19.2-62(A)(1), (B)(2)

Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.73.030(1)(b); 

Washington v. Roden, 321 P.3d 1183, 1188 (Wash. 2014) 

(en banc); Washington v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Wash. 

2014) (en banc)

West Virginia: W. Va. Code §§ 62-1D-2(i), 62-1D-3(a)(1), 

(e); West Virginia v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 187 (W. Va. 

2007)

Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 968.27(12), 968.31(1)(a), 

(2)(c)

Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-701(xi), 7-3-702(a)(i), 

(b)(iv) 

States prohibiting recording without providing notice 

to or obtaining consent from the recording’s subjects 

when created in a place where the subjects lack a 

reasonable expectation of privacy:

Alaska: Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 42.20.390(9), 42.20.310(a)(1)

Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 526.010, 526.020

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Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 99(B)(2), 

(4), (C)(1); Curtatone v. Barstool Sports, Inc., 169 N.E.3d 

480, 483 (Mass. 2021) 

Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213(1)(c); Montana v. 

DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 263 (Mont. 2003); Montana v. Lynch, 

969 P.2d 920, 922 (Mont. 1998)

Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(1)(c)

States without laws regarding the recording of inperson conversations:

Indiana, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Vermont

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