Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-02450/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-02450-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAREN BETH GOLDMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security,

1

Defendant.

No. 2:17-cv-2450 DB

ORDER

Plaintiff brought this action seeking judicial review of a final administrative decision 

denying an application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. 

By order filed February 8, 2019, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was granted, the 

decision of the Commissioner was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.2 

(ECF No. 18.) 

1 Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on June 17, 2019. 

See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited by the court on July 30, 2019). 

Accordingly, Andrew Saul is substituted in as the defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding 

the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).

2 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See ECF Nos. 4 & 5.)

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On March 16, 2020, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF No. 22.) At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and 

plaintiff’s counsel entered into a contingent-fee agreement. (ECF No. 22-2.) Pursuant to that 

agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $32,368.90, which 

represents 25% of the retroactive disability benefits received by plaintiff on remand, for 

approximately 45.9 hours of attorney time expended on this matter. (ECF No. 22-3; ECF No. 22-

4.) Defendant did not object to plaintiff’s motion. 

Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 

security claimants.

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under 

this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 

the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a 

reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 

the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by 

reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 

may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney 

out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits.

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 

U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 

party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). Although an attorney fee 

award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is not paid by the government, the Commissioner has 

standing to challenge the award. Craig v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 864 F.2d 324, 

328 (4th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. The goal of fee 

awards under § 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to attorneys for representing claimants 

while ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted. 

Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir. 1989).

The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 

ensure that the fee actually requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“[Section] 

406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) 

instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). “Within the 25 

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percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is 

reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a 

reasonable fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee

arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 

Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793 & 808). 

The Supreme Court has identified five factors that may be considered in determining 

whether a fee award under a contingent-fee arrangement is unreasonable and therefore subject to 

reduction by the court: (1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved by the 

representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the 

accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison to the 

amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours worked and 

counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for noncontingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 

(citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing 

whether the fee requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable.

Here, there is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 

performance by counsel. Rather, plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a 

successful result for plaintiff. There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any 

dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $32,368.90 fee, which 

represents 25% of the past-due benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits 

awarded. In making this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case 

and counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to represent plaintiff on 

such terms. See Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Finally, 

counsel has submitted a detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. (ECF No. 22-

3.)

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 

counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. See generally Azevedo v. Commissioner of Social 

Security, No. 1:11-cv-1341 AWI SAB, 2013 WL 6086666, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013) 

(granting petition pursuant to 406(b) for $17,893.75 in attorney’s fees); Coulter v. Commissioner 

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of Social Security, No. 1:10-cv-1937 AWI JLT, 2013 WL 5969674, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 

2013) (recommending award of $15,084.23 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 406(b)); Taylor v. 

Astrue, No. 1:06-cv-00957-SMS, 2011 WL 836740, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011) (granting 

petition pursuant to 406(b) for $20,960 in attorneys’ fees); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 1:09cv0490 

LJO DLB, 2011 WL 587096, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011) (recommending award of $34,500 in 

attorney fees pursuant to 406(b)).

An award of § 406(b) fees is, however, normally offset by any prior award of attorney’s 

fees granted under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 

U.S. at 796. Here, plaintiff’s counsel was previously awarded $7,200 in EAJA fees and the award 

under § 406(b) must be offset by that amount. (ECF No. 21.)

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s March 16, 2020 motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), (ECF 

No. 22), is granted;

2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $32,368.90 in attorney fees under § 406(b). The 

Commissioner is directed to pay the fee forthwith and remit to plaintiff the remainder any 

withheld benefits; and

3. Upon receipt of the $32,368.90 in attorney fees pursuant to § 406(b), counsel shall 

reimburse plaintiff in the amount of $7,200 previously paid by the government under the EAJA.

Dated: April 24, 2020

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.soc sec\goldman2450.406(b).ord

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