Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_13-cv-00088/USCOURTS-alnd-6_13-cv-00088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

SHANE ALAN RICKMAN, )

)

Petitioner )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:13-cv-00088-SLB-HGD

)

FREDDY BUTLER, Warden, and )

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF )

THE STATE OF ALABAMA, )

)

Respondents )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Shane Alan Rickmon, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 1

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges the validity of his 2008 convictions

after a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Walker County on two counts of first degree

rape and two counts of first degree sodomy.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 27, 2008, petitioner wasfound guilty by a jury of two counts of first

degree rape and two counts of first degree sodomy. On May 1, 2008, petitioner was 2

Petitioner’s last name is actually “Rickmon.” However, all court records use the spelling 1

“Rickman.”

Petitioner also was convicted of one count of first degree sexual abuse, but the trial court 2

vacated the conviction on the ground that it was a lesser-included offense of one of the other

convictions and therefore violated double jeopardy principles. 

FILED

 2014 May-07 PM 01:24

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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sentenced to serve three concurrent life sentences, two for the convictions of first

degree rape and one for a conviction for first degree sodomy. In addition, he was

sentenced to life for the other conviction of first degree sodomy, to be served

consecutively to the three concurrent life sentences. 

Upon conviction and sentencing, petitioner appealed to the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals. Trial counsel also represented petitioner on direct appeal. He

raised two issues on direct appeal: 

(1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Rickmon’s motion

for relief from the State’s alleged noncompliance with a discovery order

issued by the Winston County District Court (RX-2 at 6-9) ; and

3

(2) the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the admission

into evidence of the audio recording of the rape and sodomy made by

the victim. (RX-2 at 10). 

The facts developed at trial were accurately summarized by the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals as follows:

The State presented evidence that, on January 24, 2007, the appellant

engaged in sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse with his

girlfriend’s sixteen-year-old daughter by forcible compulsion. The

victim testified that she complained to her mother, but she did not

believe her. Because she suspected the appellant would attempt to force

her to have oral sex and sexual intercourse with him based on previous

occurrences, she secretly recorded the January 24, 2007, incident on an

electronic MP3 device for recording and playing audio media. That

recording contains discussion between the victim and the appellant in

The Court cites records and documents from respondents’ exhibits as “RX-[Exhibit No.]. 3

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which the appellant admits to previously engaging in deviate sexual

intercourse and sexual intercourse with the victim.

The victim testified at trial about multiple instances of sexual

intercourse in which the appellant placed his penis in her vagina. She

also testified about multiple instances of deviate sexual intercourse

including instances during which the appellant placed his penis in her

mouth and instances during which the appellant placed his penis in her

anus. The victim further testified that all such encounters with the

appellant were against her will. 

(RX-3 at 2). 

In the first issue, Rickmon alleged that he was entitled to a new trial because

the State did not provide the defense with a list of the witnesses it intended to present

at trial, including the testimony of a children’s therapist and advocate who explained

that the multiple retractions and other alleged lies of the victim were not unusual. 

(RX-2 at 6-9). In his second issue, petitioner alleged that the admission by the trial

court of the victim’s recording of his sexual assault on her was reversible error

because the recording constituted hearsay under Rule 802, Ala.R.Evid. (Id. at 13).

On April 24, 2009, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

Rickmon’s convictions. (RX-3). As to his first claim, the appellate court noted that

the appellate record before the court did not include any written motion for discovery

by Rickmon. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that it was Rickmon’s duty to

check the record to ensure that it was complete. Because the record submitted

contained no motion for discovery, the Court questioned whether it could properly

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review this claim. (RX-3 at 2-3). Further, the Court found that under Rule 16.1(e),

Ala.R.Crim.P., the discovery and inspection of witness lists was not authorized. 

None of the exceptions to this exclusion were applicable in this case. Thus, the Court

held that petitioner was not entitled to the requested information. (Id. at 3). 

With regard to the victim’s recording of her conversation with petitioner and

the ensuing sexual assault, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that Rickmon’s

statements on the recordings were admissions that were not hearsay pursuant to Rule

801(d)(2)(A), Ala.R.Evid. Some of the victim’s remarks were admissible as

exceptions to the prohibition against hearsay because they were present sense

impressions pursuant to Rule 803(1),Ala.R.Evid., excited utterances pursuant toRule

803(2), Ala.R.Evid., and/orstatements ofthen-existing mental, emotional or physical

condition pursuant to Rule 803(3), Ala.R.Evid. The Court further found that some

of the victim’s statements also constituted adoptive admissions by Rickmon because

he manifested an adoption of belief in the truth of the statements when she made

them. Any remaining statements were admissible as part of the res gestae of the

offenses. Finally, the portions of the recordings capturing the sodomies and rapes

were admissible as direct evidence of the rape and sodomy offenses. (RX-3 at 3-7). 

Rickmon did not file an application for rehearing in the Court of Criminal

Appeals. On May 13, 2009, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued a Certificate of

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Judgment affirming Rickmon’s convictions and sentences. (RX-4). Rickmon did not

file a petition requesting certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court. 

On November 12, 2009, Rickmon filed a petition for relief fromhis convictions

and sentences pursuant to Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P. (RX-5 at 12). Rickmon raised two

claims for relief. In his first claim, he alleged:

Conviction obtained by unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to

disclose to the defendant evidence favorable to the defendant.

Was granted full motion of discovery and the D.A. withheld reports,

medical examinations, such as doctor report done on day of supposed

rape, rape kit held 11 months before sent to look for D.N.A. Kept

complete witness list hidden including supposed expert witness that I

never spoke to until the trial proceedings.

(RX-5 at 13).

Rickmon’s second claim alleged:

Lawyer who was appointed conveniently lost critical pieces of evidence. 

Failed to ask questions I specifically asked him to ask of witnesses. Did

not correspond with me during appeal and let appeal finalize without

any notification. Has withheld all my paperwork after numerous

attempts by me to get it from him. Including unethical response to a

State Bar complaint.

(Id. at 14). 

On October 26, 2010, the trial court entered an order denying the Rule 32

petition. (Id. at 43-44). The trial court denied relief on the first claim on the basis

that the claim was no more than bare assertions that were “woefully inadequate to

meet the specificity requirement of Rule 32.6(b).” Additionally, it held that all

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discovery matters were addressed by the trial court in a pretrial hearing three months

prior to trial. The trial court further noted that alleged discovery violations were also

raised on direct appeal and addressed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in

its memorandum opinion of April 24, 2009. (Id. at 43). The trial court found the

claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel also to be “woefully inadequate in its

compliance with [Ala.R.Crim.P.] 32.6” and the requirements of proving ineffective

assistance of counsel because Rickmon failed to demonstrate any deficiencies by

counsel at trial or on appeal and how he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiencies. 

(Id. at 44). 

Rickmon appealed this decision to the Alabama Court ofCriminal Appeals and

claimed that he was denied discovery to which he was entitled in the Rule 32

proceedings. The case was remanded by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

with instructions to the trial court to determine if Rickmon was provided with the

documents he requested and which the State admitted he was entitled to receive. 

Subsequently, the trial court directed the Winston County Clerk of Court to

mail Rickmon copies of the trial transcript, all court orders and defense counsel’s

briefs. However, the court specifically found that Rickmon was not entitled to the

audio recording of the rape and sodomy because it found he had not shown just cause

that he was entitled to it, but had merely described it as a “trial exhibit.” (RX-8 at 2-

3). 

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On March 23, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion

on return to remand. While noting that the trial court exceeded the scope of its

remand order, it agreed with the Circuit Court’s conclusions that petitioner had been

denied documents that he was entitled to receive. It reversed the summary denial of

Rickmon’s Rule 32 petition and remanded the case to allow Rickmon the opportunity

to amend his petition. (RX-9). 

The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court that the recording of

the rapes and sodomies was not a public record under Alabama law and that Rickmon

had not shown just cause as to why he was entitled to a copy. (RX-9 at 9-11). 

Although given until May 7, 2012, to file an amendment to his petition,

Rickmon failed to do so. On May 18, 2012, the Winston County Circuit Court 

reaffirmed its previous findings and held that Rickmon’s claim that the State failed

to disclose exculpatory evidence was a bare assertion that wasinadequate to meet the

specificity requirements of Rule 32.6(b), Ala.R.Crim.P. Moreover, the court found

that Rickmon had raised this argument on direct appeal and that the claim lacked

merit. As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the circuit court held that

Rickmon had made a bare assertion and did not make the showings required by

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),

because he failed to demonstrate any deficient performance by counsel at trial or on

appeal, or that he was prejudiced in any way. (RX-10 at 48-49). 

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The case was returned to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals which, on

June 22, 2012, affirmed the denial of Rickmon’s Rule 32 petition. (RX-11). On

July 11, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a Certificate of

Judgment on the Rule 32 appeal. (RX-12). On August 15, 2012, Rickmon filed a

Motion for Rehearing. (RX-13). On August 20, 2012, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals ordered the application for rehearing to be stricken, finding that it

was not timely filed in accordance with Rule 40, Ala.R.App.P., which requires such

applications to be filed within 14 days of the issuance of the decision. (RX-14). See

Ala.R.App.P. 40(c). 

Rickmon filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme

Court. However, on August 19, 2012, that court struck the petition for failure to

comply with Rule 39, Ala.R.App.P., which states that the filing of a motion for

rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is a prerequisite to the filing of

a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court. (RX-17). See

Ala.R.App.P. 39(c).

Rickmon filed his first federal habeas petition on April 29, 2010. However,

because his Rule 32 petition was still pending, this petition was dismissed without

prejudice on November 22, 2010, based on his failure to exhaust his state remedies. 

Rickman v. Butler, Case No. 6:10-cv-01356-RBP-HGD (N.D.Ala.). For reasons

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explained below, his present habeas petition is deemed to have been filed on

January 13, 2013.

DISCUSSION

Statute of Limitations

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitations

shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” It further provides, in pertinent part, that

the limitations period runs from the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

On January 10, 2013, Rickmon executed his present petition for a writ of

habeas corpus challenging his 2008 convictions for rape and sodomy. Included with

this petition was an application for leave to file a second or successive habeas corpus

petition. (Doc. 1-1). That document was executed January 13, 2013. (Doc. 1-1 at 7). 

Both documents were stamped “filed” by the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Alabama on January 15, 2013. (Doc. 1 at 1; Doc. 1-1 at 1). 

Under the “mailbox rule,”a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed on the date

it is delivered to prison officials for mailing, absent evidence to the contrary. 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2382-83, 101 L.Ed.2d 245

(1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); Garvey v.

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Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993). “Absent evidence to the contrary in the

form of prison logs or other records, [this court must] assume that [Rickmon’s]

motion was delivered to prison authorities the day he signed it. . . .” Washington v.

United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). In this case, Rickmon’s

application for leave to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition, included

with the second petition, was dated January 13, 2013. This is evidence that Rickmon

could not have delivered his habeas petition to prison authorities for mailing before

January 13, 2013. Therefore, based on the evidence, for purposes ofthe mailbox rule,

the date this habeas corpus petition was delivered to prison authorities for mailing

was January 13, 2013. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) providesthat “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under thissection.” In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court interpreted the

word “pending” to “cover the time between a lower state court’s decision and the

filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court.” 536 U.S. 214, 217, 122 S.Ct.

2134, 2136, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). “[U]ntil the application has achieved final

resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains

‘pending.’” Id. at 220, 122 S.Ct. at 2138. The Supreme Court has further explained

that a claim is “pending” during “the period between (1) the lower court’s adverse

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determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the

filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S.

189, 191, 126 S.Ct. 846, 849, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006) (emphasis added, citation

omitted). Nothing in the case law dictates that the appeal must be taken for the claim

to remain pending. Moreover, logic dictates that the claim is pending regardless of

whether the inmate actually files the notice of appeal. “Pending” refers to the

continuation of the process, or the time until the process is completed. Carey, 536

U.S. at 219-20, 122 S.Ct. at 2138; Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir.

2004). The process is not complete until there is no other avenue the prisoner could

pursue. Thus, the claim remains pending until the time to seek review expires.

Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals on April 24, 2009. Petitioner did not file a motion for rehearing or

file an application for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court on direct

review. Under Rule 40, Ala.R.App.P., Rickmon had 14 days to file a motion for

rehearing. This step is mandatory before an application for a writ of certiorari in the

Alabama Supreme Court can be properly filed. The time to do so expired on May 8,

2009. Arguably, petitioner’s one-year time limit for filing a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under the AEDPA, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), began on the

following day. However, respondents assert that it began on the date the Court of

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Criminal Appeals issued its Certificate of Judgment, May 13, 2009. Therefore, the

4

undersigned will count the days for purposes of the § 2244(d) one-year statute of

limitations using both dates. In either case, petitioner did not file his petition before

the statute of limitations expired.

Petitioner executed his Rule 32 petition in state court on November 12, 2009. 

At this time, a total of 183 days had elapsed between the issuance of the Certificate

of Judgment on direct appeal and the filing of the Rule 32 petition, if counting begins

on the day of the issuance of the Certificate of Judgment. A total of 187 days elapsed

if the time is computed from the date of petitioner’s time for filing a motion for

rehearing expired. 

On June 22, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial

of Rickmon’s Rule 32 petition. (RX-11). The Certificate of Judgment in the Rule 32

proceedings was issued by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on July 11, 2012. 

Under Evans v. Chavis, supra, the time that petitioner could have properly filed an

application for rehearing is counted as time a post-conviction petition is “pending.”

Rickmon had 14 days to file a motion for rehearing pursuant to Rule 40(c),

If not suspended by the filing of a timely-filed motion for rehearing, Ala.R.Crim.P. 41 4

requires that a certificate of judgment be entered 18 days after the entry of judgment in a case, unless

that time is enlarged or shortened by order. Since petitioner did not file a motion for rehearing within

14 days of judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its certificate of judgment 18 days

thereafter.

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Ala.R.App.P. This time expired on July 6, 2012. Thus, the clock arguably began

ticking again on the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations on July 7, 2012. 

However, respondents assert that the limitation period began to run again on the date

the Certificate of Judgment was issued, July 11, 2012. (RX-12).

Although Rickmon eventually filed an application for rehearing in theAlabama

Court of Criminal Appeals and an application for a writ of certiorari in the Alabama

Supreme Court, the application for rehearing was untimely and the application for the

writ was not properly filed because Rickmon had not properly filed an application for

rehearing. The filing of an application for rehearing is mandatory before a petition

for a writ of certiorari can be filed under the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Governing case law likewise permits tolling under § 2244(d)(2) only when a

petitioner has “properly filed” an application for state-post conviction relief. Evans

v. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 191, 126 S.Ct. at 849 (“The Act tolls this 1-year limitations

period for the ‘time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.”’); Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 11, 121 S.Ct. 361, 364, 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) (“[A]n application is

‘properly filed’ [for purposes of tolling under § 2244(d)(2)] when its delivery and

acceptance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws and rules governing

filings.”); Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d at 1259 (tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

“depends on how long [a petitioner’s] application for state post-conviction relief was

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‘properly filed’ and ‘pending.’”); Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir.

2004) (“Under § 2244(d)(2), . . . statutory tolling is available only if an application

for review is filed” in the state court.); Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th

Cir. 2003) (“The statutory tolling provision does not encompass a period of time in

which a state prisoner does not have a ‘properly filed’ post-conviction application

actually pending in state court.”); Hurley v. Moore, 233 F.3d 195, 1297-98 (11th Cir.

2000) (“Where the petition is not ‘properly filed’ there is no tolling of the one-year

limitations period.”). Thus, the time that these applications were pending does not

toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.

Petitioner executed his petition for federal habeas relief in this case on

January 10, 2013. However, as noted above, it could not have been placed in the

hands of prison officials for mailing until January 13, 2013. Thus, counting the days

beginning with the issuances of the Certificates of Judgment as asserted by

respondents, until January 13, 2012, another 186 days elapsed. Combined with the

183 days that elapsed between the time petitioner’s conviction was final on direct

appeal and the filing of his (second) Rule 32 petition, 369 days had elapsed under the

5

AEDPA statute of limitations. If the days are counted from the dates that petitioner’s

time to timely file appeals from the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals on

Because his Rule 32 petition was pending at the time petitioner filed his first federal habeas

5

petition, the AEDPA statute of limitations was already tolled. 

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direct appeal and of the Rule 32 decision lapsed (rather than the date when the

6

Certificate of Judgments were entered), a total of 377 days elapsed. In either event,

Rickmon’s petition for a writ of habeas corpusistime-barred under the AEDPA oneyear statute of limitations, unless he can present evidence of actual innocence or that

he otherwise is entitled to equitable tolling.

Actual Innocence

As noted above, the AEDPA contains a one-year statute of limitationsin which

a prisoner convicted of a state crime may file a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). Petitioner claims that an actual innocence exception to AEDPA’s time

bar exists and argues that he has made a sufficient showing of actual innocence in

order for his § 2254 petition to proceed. (Doc. 8 at 7). With respect to his claim of

actual innocence, petitioner submitted a report from the Alabama Department of

Forensic Sciences which examined vaginal and oral swabs from the victim and

processed her clothing allegedly worn at the time of the last rape and sodomy for the

presence of DNA. This report states, in pertinent part, “Due to the limited quantity

of the sample, no genetic traits other than those of [the victim] were detected in the

stain from the crotch area of the panties.” (Doc. 10 at 3).

 190 days. 6

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Cases refer to an “actual innocence” claim in at least three different types of

habeas cases. In the first type, a petitioner’s actual innocence is itself the

constitutional basis of the habeas petition. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,

400, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (holding that no federal habeas

relief is available for freestanding, non-capital claims of actual innocence); Jordan

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007) (same).

In the other two types of actual innocence claims, the petitioner’s assertion of

innocence is not itself a freestanding claim, but merely serves as a “gateway” to get

the federal court to consider claims that the federal court otherwise would be barred

from hearing. “To successfully plead actual innocence, a petitioner must show that

his conviction resulted from ‘a constitutional violation.’” Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)). 

In the second type, a petitioner’s actual innocence serves as a gateway to

consideration of constitutional claims procedurally defaulted in state court, such as

failure to exhaust state remedies, failure to satisfy state filing requirements, etc. See 

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that claim of

actual innocence must be supported by “reliable evidence not presented at trial”

(internal quotation mark omitted)); see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. at 865

(holding that for habeas court to consider procedurally barred constitutional claims,

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petitioner must present “new reliable evidence” of actual innocence). To bypass such

a procedural bar, a petitioner must show either (1) cause and prejudice or (2) a

miscarriage of justice or “actual innocence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314-15, 115 S.Ct.

at 860-61. The actual innocence exception to the procedural bar is not meant to

remedy ordinary errors in criminal judgments but is narrowly reserved for only

“fundamental miscarriage[s] of justice.” Id. at 315, 115 S.Ct. at 861. To overcome

procedural default through a showing of actual innocence, the petitioner must present

“reliable evidence . . . not presented at trial” such that “it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have convicted him of the underlying offense.” Johnson,

256 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327, 115 S.Ct. at 865, 867

(internal quotation mark omitted)).

In the third situation, a habeas petitioner claims his actual innocence should

serve as a gateway to consideration of constitutional claims time-barred under

AEDPA’s one-year limitation period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Johnson, 513 F.3d

at 1333-34; Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1244-46 (11th Cir. 2006); Rozzelle v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1010-12 (11th Cir. 2012). That is the situation

presented by Rickmon. Because the standards for actual innocence in cases of

procedural default and untimely federal habeas petitions derive from the Supreme

Court’s decision in Schlup, these two case types have at times been conflated. See 

Arthur, 452 F.3d at 1245 (applying the concept of the actual innocence exception to

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“procedural bar” to the Arthur case involving an AEDPA-time-barred § 2254

petition). Therefore, like the actual innocence exception for procedural default, the

alleged exception for AEDPA untimeliness would require the petitioner (1) to present

“new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial,” Arthur, 452 F.3d at 1245

(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. at 865), and (2) to show “that it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt” in light of the new evidence. Johnson, 513 F.3d at 1334 (quoting

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538,

126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006).

Further, as noted above, an AEDPA-time-barred petitioner must make a

threshold showing of actual innocence before a court will tackle whether the

Suspension Clause requires an actual innocence exception to AEDPA’s one-year

filing window. Arthur, 452 F.3d at 1244. The Eleventh Circuit has never decided

that constitutional question because no petitioner has yet demonstrated his actual

innocence. Johnson, 513 F.3d at 1333; see House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S.Ct. at 2077

(“[T]he Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the extraordinary

case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). According to the EleventhCircuit, if such

an exception exists, it exists only for actually innocent petitioners. Rozzelle, 672 F.3d

at 1012.

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Rickmon has failed to present evidence of actual innocence. The forensic

report he presents merely reflects that the examiner was unable to obtain DNA

sufficient for testing due to the “limited quantity” of the sample, other than one

sample which proved to have come from the victim herself. This is not evidence of

petitioner’s actual innocence. Even if the lack of DNA were to be considered as

exculpatory, the audio recordings of the admissions by petitioner that he had

previously assaulted the victim, and of the actual rape and sodomy, make any claim

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt totally without merit.

Equitable Tolling

It is clear in this Circuit that “[e]quitable tolling can be applied to prevent the

application of the AEDPA’s statutory deadline when ‘extraordinary circumstances’

have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his

petition.” Helton v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.

2001). Although “[e]quitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is typically

applied sparingly,” Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Irwin

v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435

(1990)), it is “appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary

circumstancesthat are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.”

Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).

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The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with

the petitioner. See, e.g., Helton, 259 F.3d at 1313-14 (denying equitable tolling in

light of petitioner’s failure to present necessary evidence); see also Justice v. United

States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The burden is on the plaintiff to show

that equitable tolling is warranted.”).

In order to be entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling, a petitioner must act

with diligence, and the untimeliness of the filing must be the result of circumstances

beyond his control. Petitioner has made no such showing. The only argument he

makes in this regard is that respondents failed to file a response within 20 days as

ordered by the court. Petitioner alleges that respondents were one day late filing their

response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause and that, therefore, his late filing should

also be excused. (Doc. 8 at 5). However, even if this were to be considered a valid

reason to accept the late filing of his habeas petition, it is without merit. The Order

to Show Cause required respondentsto file a response within 20 days. The Order was

entered on February 20, 2013, and the response was filed on March 12, 2013. 

According to Rule 6(a)(1)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P., “[w]hen the period is stated in days or

a longer period of time” courts “exclude the day of the event that triggersthe period.”

Thus, counting February 21, 2013 as Day 1, Day 20 fell on March 12, 2013, the date

on which respondents filed their response. Petitioner has stated no other events

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beyond his control as a basis for granting equitable tolling, nor has he demonstrated

due diligence. Therefore, he is not entitled to any equitable tolling.

Grounds for Relief

In his federal petition, Rickmon makes the following claims:

1. His conviction was obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the

prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the petitioner.

2. He received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel

lost petitioner’s statement to D.H.R. and investigating officer and sent 7

a “4 or 5 page letter to a state bar complaint of how guilty, combative

and how he was unable to do his job to the Alabama State Bar.” 

(Doc. 1 at 5).

In his application to the United StatesCircuitCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit for leave to file a second or successive petition, he states, as to Claim 1, that

the assistant district attorney withheld evidence and witness lists until the day of trial

and “cited he did not have to process said evidence instead of filing an objection to

[trial] Judge Newell’s . . . motion of discover granted me.” (Doc. 1-1 at 6).

As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim set out as Claim 2, he stated:

My lawyer lost plaintiff’s statements, failed to show supporting material

on direct appeal, kept trial transcripts from me for three years and wrote

a four page letter in response to a State Bar complain of how guilty I

was and how combative in pretrial preparations and that he had limited

access to me to prepare.

The “D.H.R.” referenced by petitioner is presumed to be the Alabama Department of 7

Human Resources.

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(Doc. 1-1 at 5).

He also claims that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim relied on newly

discovered evidence. Specifically, the newly discovered evidence was the letter to

the Alabama State Bar Association filed by his trial attorney in response to the

complaint Rickmon filed against him with the Bar and the memorandum opinion of

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Doc. 1-1). 

Procedural Default and Exhaustion

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) provides that an applicant for a writ of habeas

corpus shall not be granted unlessthe applicant has exhausted the remedies available

to him in the state court. A state habeas corpus petitioner who fails to raise his

federal claims properly in state court is procedurally barred from pursuing the same

claim in federal court absent a showing of cause for and actual prejudice from the

default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594

(1977). Such procedural default can arise in two ways. First, where the state court

correctly applies a procedural default principle ofstate law to arrive at the conclusion

that the petitioner’s federal claims are barred, Sykes requires the federal court to

respect the state court’s decision. Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 956 (11th Cir.

1992), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1165, 115 S.Ct. 2624, 132 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995);

Meagher v. Dugger, 861 F.2d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 1988). Where the laststate court

rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests

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on a state procedural bar, the claim is procedurally defaulted in the federal courts. 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989).

Second, if the petitioner simply never raised a claim in state court, and it is

obvious that the unexhausted claim would now be procedurally barred due to a

state-law procedural default, the federal court may foreclose the petitioner’s filing in

state court; the exhaustion requirement and procedural default principles combine to

mandate dismissal. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 737 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 963, 119 S.Ct. 405, 142 L.Ed.2d 329 (1998), see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted

unlessit appearsthat the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts

of the State. . . .”). 

In Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989),

the Supreme Court held that a federal habeas court could hold claims to be

procedurally defaulted and therefore exhausted “if it is clear that [the] claims are

procedurally barred under [state] law.” 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S.Ct. at 1060. The

Court further held that the rule requiring state court procedural bar holdings to be

clearly and expressly stated “is simply inapplicable in a case such as this one, where

the claim was never presented to the state court.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-

99, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1061, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). 

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In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2557 n.1, 115

L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the Court reiterated that the clear-expression rule “does not

apply if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet her exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Thus, any issue

unexhausted in State court for which an attempt to exhaust would result in a State

procedural bar, is also procedurally barred from relief in federal court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Accord Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Furthermore, a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court

in a petition for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirements

for federal habeas corpus relief, when discretionary review is part of the ordinary

appellate review procedure in the State. Federal habeas relief is available to state

prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court. Because the

exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to

resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal

courts, state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established

appellate review process. Consequently, because an appeal to the Alabama Supreme

Court is a normal, simple and established part of Alabama’s appellate review process,

claims not raised in a petitioner’s appeal of Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

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decisions on direct appeal or in a collateral proceeding (i.e., a Rule 32 petition) to the

Alabama Supreme Court cannot be raised in a subsequent federal habeas petition. 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); Smith

v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 2001) (failure to pursue issue on direct

appeal); Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003) (failure to pursue

issue on collateral appeal).

Rickmon did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme

Court on direct appeal asking that Court to review the decision of the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals on his issues concerning the prosecution’s compliance with the

Winston County District Court’s discovery order. Therefore, the claim is not

exhausted in the state courts. Furthermore, he cannot now return to the Alabama

Supreme Court and file a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to

review this claimbecause the time for doing so under the Alabama Rules of Appellate

Procedure has long since expired. See Ala.R.App.P. 39(c). This claim is

procedurally defaulted. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, supra.

Petitioner’s claim alleging the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, to

the extent that it is the same claim raised in his habeas petition, wasraised in his Rule

32 petition and addressed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (RX-5 at 12;

RX-9 at 2). However, Rickmon did not exhaust this claim because he did not timely

file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court after the

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affirmance of the denial of his Rule 32 petition by the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals, which held that the claim wasinsufficiently pled. Because he cannot return

to the Alabama Supreme Court to exhaust this claim, it is procedurally defaulted in

federal court. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, supra.

Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding

that this claim was inadequately pled under Rule 32.6(b), Ala.R.Crim.P. Recent

Eleventh Circuit precedent now holds that application of Rule 32.6(b) is an

adjudication on the merits. In Powell v. Allen, 602 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2010), the

court of appeals addressed a habeas claim that was rejected by the state courts

because the petitioner (Powell) “failed to plead facts on which an ineffective

assistance claim could be based and, for that reason, denied Powell’s claim and

request for an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 1272, citing Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.6. The

Court then explained the effect of this state-court ruling:

We thus review the Rule 32 court’s rejection of Powell’s claim as a

holding on the merits. Judd [v. Haley], 250 F.3d at 1313; Stokes v.

Anderson, 123 F.3d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding no procedural bar

from state court ruling on similar pleading rule because the ruling

“require[d] some evaluation, however cursory, of the merits of a

petitioner’s claim”).

Id. at 1272 (emphasis added). 

Therefore, in conducting a habeas analysis, this court must “examine the

reasonableness of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s adjudication of [the petitioner’s]

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claims based upon the allegations contained in his” Rule 32 petition. Borden, 646

F.3d at 816-17. 

[The] task . . . is to evaluate whether the Court of Criminal Appeals’s

determination that [petitioner]’s relevant ineffective assistance of

counsel claims were due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim with

sufficient specificity under Rule 32.6(b) was “contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1).

Id. at 817-18 (alteration supplied). A review of the holding on the exculpatory

8

evidence claim does not reflect that it was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, United States Supreme Court law. The claim is vague and unspecific

as to the exculpatory nature of the evidence allegedly withheld. Furthermore,

petitioner made no showing how this evidence would have resulted in a different

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) states: 8

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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outcome to the proceedings. Therefore, this claim is also without merit pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

In addition, though petitioner alleges that the state withheld exculpatory

evidence, a closer reading of his petition reflects that he is complaining about the

State’s failure to comply with a discovery obligation under Rule 16, Ala.R.Crim.P.,

and the trial court’s failure to provide the defense a remedy under Rule 16.5,

Ala.R.Crim.P. (RX-2 at 6-8). Petitioner’s actual complaint was that the State failed

to provide him with a witness list in advance of trial pursuant to the state district

court’s discovery order. To the extent that the discovery claimraised on direct appeal

is the claim Rickmon raises in his federal habeas petition, he is not entitled to relief

because the issue is purely one of state law and does not raise a federal constitutional

or statutory violation. Thus, it is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Carrizales

v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1054-55 (11th Cir. 1983). A state’s interpretation of

its own laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since no

question of a constitutional nature is involved. Id. at 1055.

The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also raised in petitioner’s

Rule 32 petition. In his Rule 32 petition, he alleged:

Lawyer who was appointed conveniently lost critical pieces of evidence. 

Failed to ask questions I specifically asked him to ask of witnesses. Did

not correspond with me during appeal and let appeal finalize without

any notification. Has withheld all my paperwork after numerous

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attempts by me to get it from him. Including unethical response to a

State Bar complaint. 

(RX-5 at 14).

However, to the extent that it was presented in state court, this claim also is

unexhausted because petitioner did not seek review of the denial of this claim with

the Alabama Supreme Court. Therefore, this claim is unexhausted in state court and

procedurally barred here. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, supra. 

Furthermore, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied this claim on the

ground that it was inadequately pled and thus lacking in merit pursuant to Rule 32.6,

Ala.R.Crim.P., and Strickland v. Washington. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court established a twoprong test to evaluate ineffective assistance claims. To obtain reversal of a

conviction, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome

of the proceeding. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct at 2064-65. In deciding whether a

counsel’s performance was ineffective, a court must consider the totality of the

circumstances. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that petitioner’s ineffective

assistance claims were bald generalizations which were too vague to warrant relief.

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Petitioner did not state with the required specificity what part of his attorney’s

performance was deficient, how it was deficient, or the prejudice to Rickmon caused

by counsel’s alleged failure to provide him with all the documents he requested or

caused by any other acts of trial counsel. Thus, the state court’s adjudication of the

claim was not contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court law, nor

was its decision based on an unreasonable application of the facts submitted in the

Rule 32 proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner has failed to make a

showing under either section of this statute. Therefore, no relief is due to be granted

on this claim. Furthermore, even if the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in

Rickmon’s § 2254 petition is not the same as that raised in his Rule 32 petition, it is

still procedurally defaulted because it was not presented to the State courts and its

presentation there would be barred by the preclusionary rules of Rule 32.2,

Ala.R.Crim.P. See Snowden, 135 F.3d at 737. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled

to any relief under this claim. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, it is RECOMMENDED that Rickmon’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

Any party who objectsto thisreport and recommendation must, within fourteen

(14) days of the date on which it is entered, file specific written objections with the

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clerk of this court. Any objections to the failure of the magistrate judge to address

any contention raised in the complaint or petition also must be included. Failure to

do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal

conclusions of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111,

106 S.Ct. 899, 88 L.Ed.2d 933 (1986); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.

1982) (en banc). In order to challenge the findings of the magistrate judge, a party

must file with the clerk of the court written objections which shall specifically

identify the portions ofthe proposed findings and recommendation to which objection

is made and the specific basis for objection. Objections not meeting this specificity

requirement will not be considered by a district judge. IT IS NOT NECESSARY

FOR PLAINTIFF OR PETITIONER TO REPEAT HIS LEGAL ARGUMENTS. AS

TO THE FACTS, IF PLAINTIFF OR PETITIONER DOES RESPOND, HE

SHOULD LIMIT HIMSELF TO ADDRESSING THE STATEMENTS OF FACT

CONTAINED IN THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO WHICH HE

OBJECTS. HE ALSO SHOULD OBJECT TO ANY FACTS NOT INCLUDED IN

THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WHICH HE CONTENDS SHOULD

HAVE BEEN INCLUDED. THE FILING OF OBJECTIONS IS NOT A PROPER

VEHICLE TO MAKE NEW ALLEGATIONS OR PRESENT ADDITIONAL

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EVIDENCE. A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the

action.

Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above,

a United States District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions

of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and

may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate judge. The district judge, however, need conduct a hearing

only in his discretion or if required by law, and may consider the record developed

before the magistrate judge, making his own determination on the basis ofthatrecord. 

The district judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the

matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

A party may not appeal a magistrate judge’s recommendation directly to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only

from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a district judge.

DONE this 7th day of May, 2014.

 

HARWELL G. DAVIS, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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