Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00866/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00866-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON BROWN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-0866 FCD EFB P

vs.

DIANA K. BUTLER,

Respondent. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner without counsel seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254. This action proceeds on the petition filed May 2, 2005. On October 12, 2005,

respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that this action was untimely. The court denied that

motion and directed respondent to answer the petition. Respondent now moves to dismiss on the

ground that the petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Petitioner opposes. 

For the reasons explained below, the court finds that the petition is mixed and gives petitioner

the opportunity to request that the proceedings be stayed and held in abeyance while he exhausts

available state remedies with respect to one claim.

I. Procedural History

On April 4, 2000, petitioner was charged with robbery and being a felon in possession of

a firearm. Resp.’s Mot. to Dism., filed Oct. 4, 2006, Ex. E at 9. Following a jury trial, petitioner

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was acquitted of robbery but convicted the firearm charge, and on February 21, 2001, he was

sentenced to serve 25 years to life in prison. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 12021(a), 667(b)-(I),

1170.21. Resp.’s Mot. to Dism., Ex. B. Petitioner appealed, raising the following issues: (1) the

trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must arrive at a unanimous verdict on a single charge

consisting of two acts; (2) the offense for which petitioner was convicted was not the offense for

which evidence was adduced at the preliminary hearing; (3) defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to argue that petitioner was tried for an offense not supported by the evidence at the

preliminary hearing; (4) petitioner’s admission of the facts supporting the enhancement of his

sentence did not comport with state law procedural requirements. Id., at Ex. 6. The appellate

court affirmed the judgment. Doc. #2 Lodged in Supp. of Resp.’s Oct. 12, 2005, Mot. to Dism. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, seeking review of the

appellate court’s rulings on each of petitioner’s claims on appeal. Id., at Lodged Doc. #3. The

petition for review was denied. Id., at Lodged Doc. #4.

Petitioner thereafter sought and was denied habeas relief in the trial and appellate courts. 

Id., at Lodged Docs. # 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Following the denial of relief in the appellate court,

petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Id., at

Lodged Doc. #11. As grounds for relief, petitioner alleged: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective

by failing to argue that trial counsel should have objected to false testimony by Officer Nygren,

which she would have discovered had she adequately investigated and obtained a 911 incident

history report, reviewed prior testimony in the matter given by a different officer and examined

photographs of the crime scene; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to argue trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to object to the in-court identification of petitioner upon the

ground that it resulted from impermissibly suggestive identification procedures; (3) newly

discovered evidence that one of the firearms found at the scene is missing one of the serial

numbers demonstrates that petitioner actually is innocent; (4) appellate counsel was ineffective

by failing to argue that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony about one of the

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firearms; (5) appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to argue that trial counsel’s

investigation was inadequate in that trial counsel failed to interview and subpoena both the

owner of one of the guns found at the scene and the officer who returned the gun to the owner,

and failed to present reasonably available exculpatory evidence with respect to the gun and its

owner; (6) appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to argue that the trial judge acted in

excess of his jurisdiction when he instructed the jury that the guns found at the crime scene

satisfied the firearm element of the possession charge; (7) petitioner has been unable fully to

develop the factual and legal basis of his first ground for relief and appellate counsel was

ineffective because trial counsel did not relinquish the documents based upon which he advised

petitioner to admit the prior violent felonies and counsel failed to obtain a court order directing

trial counsel to produce them; (8) state officials have prevented petitioner from developing the

factual and legal basis for his first, third, fourth, fifth and seventh grounds for relief because they

have not properly responded to his public records requests and the state courts have refused to

order the production of documents; (9) petitioner’s sentence of life without the possibility of

parole for 25 years is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.,

at Lodged Doc. #11. The California Supreme Court summarily denied relief. Id., at Lodged

Doc. #12.

In his May 2, 2005, federal petition, petitioner enumerates ten separate grounds for relief. 

He attaches a photocopy of the April 9, 2004, petition he filed in the California Supreme Court

and specifically incorporates them into the federal petition. Therefore, nine grounds for relief

are identical to those presented to the California Supreme Court. As his first “ground” for relief

in this court, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to disclose material, exculpatory

information. Petition at 5. The body of the claim, however, essentially repeats the allegations

that petitioner made in a motion for an evidentiary hearing filed in the California Supreme Court. 

Petition, Attach. 2 at 2. He identifies a police report he believes exists but has not been

disclosed, but nowhere does he allege the information contained therein. Petition at 5, 8-11. He

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argues that the report or live testimony of the reporting officer will provide factual support for

“grounds 1-5, and 7-8 of his state and now Federal Habeas petition,” emphasizing that the

information is especially crucial to his second ground for relief. Id. at 8, 11.

II. Standards 

A district court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless “the applicant

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,” or unless there is no State

corrective process or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion

requirement by presenting the “substance of his federal habeas corpus claim” to the state courts. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971) (no exhaustion where the petitioner presented

operative facts but not legal theory to state courts); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995)(to exhaust a claim, a state court “must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are

asserting claims under the United States Constitution”). Furthermore, the claim must be

presented in a procedure that enables a court to reach it. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346

(1989) (claims raised in petition for allocatur but not in state post-conviction proceedings

unexhausted where review on allocatur was discretionary but review in post-conviction

proceedings was not); see also Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36 (9th Cir. 1994) (presenting in

habeas corpus claims cognizable only in motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to rule of

criminal procedure does satisfy exhaustion requirement). A claim is unexhausted if any state

remedy is available. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (petitioner must seek

discretionary review from state court of last resort); Roberts v. Arave, 874 F.2d 528, 529 (9th

Cir. 1988)(no exhaustion where state supreme court referred petitioner’s appeal of trial court’s

denial of post-conviction relief to lower appellate court and petitioner failed to appeal lower

court’s disposition of that appeal to state supreme court). A mixed petition, i.e., one containing

exhausted and unexhausted claims, ordinarily must be dismissed. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

522 (1982). However, the court may stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present

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unexhausted claims to the state courts. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). To

decide whether to stay an action while petitioner exhausts available state remedies, the court

must determine whether petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, whether the

unexhausted claim is potentially meritorious and whether petitioner engaged in intentionally

dilatory litigation tactics. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-278. 

III. Analysis

As stated above, respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed because it is

mixed. Petitioner argues that it is too late for respondent to assert failure to exhaust as a defense

and that the court cannot consider the motion because respondent did not obtain leave to file it

pursuant to Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court considers petitioner’s

procedural objections before reaching the merits of the motion. The court cannot deem the

exhaustion requirement to have been waived and cannot grant relief on any unexhausted claim

unless respondent specifically waives the exhaustion requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). The

corollary to these principles is that a respondent may raise the defense at any time. Petitioner’s

opposition on this basis is without merit.

With respect to the mechanism by which respondent elected to raise the defense, i.e., a

motion, it is not subject to the requirements of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Rule 15(d) applies in these proceedings insofar as it is not inconsistent with the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. However, Rule 15(d)

requires parties to obtain leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading. A pleading, i.e., a

petition or answer, makes or defends against a claim for relief, whereas a motion or other paper

is an application to the court for an order. See Rules 2, 5, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), (b). Respondent has yet to file an answer to the petition. Instead, she seeks

by way of a second motion, an order dismissing the petition without prejudice. Petitioner’s

opposition on this basis also is without merit.

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Finally, petitioner contends that the motion should be denied because the court ordered

respondent to file and serve an answer to the petition, asserting that respondent’s motion violates

an order of this court. Petitioner is correct that the court directed respondent to file and serve an

answer. See Order filed May 31, 2006. However, insofar as respondent has a good faith basis

for believing that the petition is mixed, she is justified in filing a second motion. The better

practice in light of the May 31, 2006, order would have been to seek leave to file a second

motion, stating the reasons therefore. However, this court cannot consider a mixed petition and

it is respondent’s obligation to raise the issue. Therefore, petitioner’s opposition on this basis

cannot be sustained.

Turning to the merits, respondent asserts that petitioner did not present to the California

Supreme Court his first or fourth claims made in the federal petition. The court first considers

the nature of the argument that petitioner designates as his first ground for relief in the petition,

i.e., there exists a police report that the prosecution has not turned over to petitioner which

contains material, exculpatory information necessary to support other grounds for relief asserted

in the petition. As explained above, although petitioner designates this as a ground for relief, he

does not allege facts to support the ground for relief. Instead, he argues that unless he obtains

this report, he cannot allege the particular facts contained therein in support of a different ground

for relief. This argument appears to be more in the nature of a request for an evidentiary hearing

and an explanation of why he failed to develop the factual basis in state court (which need not be

exhausted) than a ground for relief. But in opposition to respondent’s motion, petitioner asserts

that he “presented his proper request for a State Evidentiary hearing and the claims contained

therein” to the California Supreme Court in a request for a hearing in that court. Thus, petitioner

seems to concede that he attempts to make a claim for relief based on a due process violation. 

Petitioner did not present this claim to the California Supreme Court in a habeas petition or in a

petition for review; and, therefore that court could not address the claim. The court concludes

that the due process claim is not exhausted.

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Respondent also contends that petitioner has not exhausted the claim that trial counsel

was ineffective by not objecting to the in-court identification of petitioner upon the ground it was

impermissibly suggestive. Resp.’s Mot. to Dism., at 7. In a footnote, counsel acknowledges that

petitioner all along has claimed that appellate counsel should have challenged trial counsel’s

failure make this objection. Id., at 8. He asserts, however, that somewhere in “ground four” of

the petition, petitioner now makes a free-standing claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not

objecting to the in-court identification. Id. Thus, the fourth ground in the federal petition would

be the third ground in the state petition. As stated above, the first ground for relief in the federal

petition was not included in the petition filed in the California Supreme Court. By incorporating

the petition filed in the California Supreme Court, the remainder of the federal petition presents

an additional, consecutively numbered nine grounds for relief. Petitioner attaches a photocopy

of that petition. Ground three of the attached petition alleges that newly discovered evidence,

i.e., one of the firearms found at the scene is missing one of digit of the serial number,

demonstrates that petitioner actually is innocent. Petition, Attach. 1 at 38. Petitioner refers to

the testimony of the witness who identified him in court, arguing that since her testimony was

not credible on the question of the identity of the perpetrator, it should not be deemed credible on

the question of whether petitioner used a firearm. Petition, Attach. 1 at 44. First, the court notes

that this is not a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, freestanding or otherwise. Second, the

identical allegations are included at page 44 of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court. 

Doc. #11 Lodged in Supp. of Resp.’s Oct. 12, 2005, Mot. to Dism., at 44. Thus, respondent’s

contention fails. 

For the reasons stated herein, the court finds that petitioner has not presented to the

California Supreme Court his claim that the state withheld material, exculpatory evidence as

alleged in ground one of the federal petition. See Petition at 5. However, the court further finds

that petitioner presented to the California Supreme Court the other grounds contained in the

federal petition. Therefore, the petition is mixed and respondent’s motion must be granted.

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Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that petitioner has 30 days from the date of this

order to request the court to stay this action and hold it in abeyance while he presents his due

process claim to the state courts. Failure to make such a request will result in an order

dismissing the petition with leave to file an amended petition containing only the exhausted

claims.

Dated: July 10, 2007.

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