Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00543/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00543-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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In the alternative, Defendant Sears Roebuck, Inc. (“Sears”) sought an order from this Court compelling Plaintiff’s 1

Initial Disclosures, responses to Sears’ interrogatories, and requests for production of evidence, and attendance at her

disposition. See Def. Mot. Dismiss, 7-9 (Doc. 17). On April 23, 2007, Plaintiff satisfied those requests by attending a

deposition, giving Sears the initial disclosures and responding to the interrogatories and requests for production of evidence.

Therefore, that motion is moot. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONICA TREVINO, CASE NO. CV F 06-0543-LJO- NEW 

Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS;

vs. ORDER GRANTING SANCTIONS

SEARS ROEBUCK, INC. AND DOES

1 THROUGH 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Sears Roebuck, Inc. (“Sears”) seeks a dismissal of this case with prejudice pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute this claim. Sears also seeks sanctions against Plaintiff and her 1

counsel, Juan M. Falcon (“Mr. Falcon”) for the amounts incurred in filing this motion and attending

Plaintiff’s properly noticed deposition to which she failed to appear. Mr. Falcon opposes the motion

to dismiss, but agrees that monetary sanctions are reasonable. For the foregoing reasons, Sears’ motion

to dismiss is DENIED, but Sears request for sanctions is GRANTED. 

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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her complaint for wrongful and retaliatory termination on March 28, 2006. In

August, the parties met and conferred on the joint status report and the initial scheduling conference took

place on September 7, 2006. Thereafter, Sears’ counsel never heard from Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Juan

Falcon (“Mr. Falcon”). 

Until very recently, Mr. Falcon failed to prosecute this case. He failed serve the initial

disclosures, which were due on October 10, 2006. He failed to respond to the request for production of

evidence and did not answer the special interrogatories. Mr. Falcon did not respond to Sears’ counsel

at any time during the discovery period. 

Sears’ counsel never sought an order from this Court to compel discovery during the discovery

period. They sent initial disclosures, special interrogatories, and a request for production of evidence.

Sears’ counsel sent a letter on November 7, 2006, asking for the initial disclosures. Sears counsel served

a Deposition Notice on Plaintiff on January 12, 2007, which was rescheduled. On March 12, 2007,

Sears’ counsel sent another letter to Mr. Faclon, along with a Deposition Re-Notice. At the second

scheduled deposition, they waited for 15 minutes, but no one appeared. On April 3, 2007, discovery

closed pursuant to the Scheduling Order. Thereafter, Sears sought to dismiss this case with prejudice

for failure to prosecute and sanctions.

The instant motion caught the attention of Mr. Falcon. On April 13, 2007, Mr. Falcon agreed

to promptly produce Plaintiff for her deposition on shortened notice. The deposition of Plaintiff took

place on April 23, 2007. On that date, Plaintiff further provided the initial disclosures, the answers to

the special interrogatories and produced the requested evidence. 

On May 4, 2007, rather than reply to the instant motion, Sears filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment, based on the evidence received on April 23, 2007.

 

III. ARGUMENTS

Sears argues that dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) is

appropriate. Plaintiff must be held accountable for her counsel’s inexcusable conduct which as

prejudiced the Defendant. Further, Plaintiff has been put on notice of her dilatory behavior through

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letters and voice mail messages. Mr. Falcon’s behavior is completely inexcusable and should not be

condoned by this Court. Plaintiffs should be ordered to reimburse defendant for its expenses in bringing

this motion and for the deposition. Defendant has incurred in excess of $3,742 in attorneys’ fees and

costs in preparing to bring this motion. Defendant also incurred attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount

of $1,820 in attending Plaintiff’s deposition, to which she failed to appear. 

Plaintiff argues that the ultimate sanction of dismissal is not appropriate in this matter, given that

compliance with Rule 26 has been satisfied, the rescheduled deposition of Plaintiff has taken place, and

Plaintiff bore no responsibility in the belated discovery responses. Plaintiff further argues that there

were no prior warnings of dismissal or default by this Court and there was no prejudice to Sears, since

Sears was able to file a Motion for Summary Judgment even with Plaintiff’s belated discovery responses,

there was no prejudice to Defendant. Finally, at no time was Mr. Falcon ever willfully disobedient to

a court order. Instead, his pressing criminal calendar made the discovery responses late. Mr. Falcon

requests that the Court only issue a reasonable monetary sanction in the sum of one thousand dollars

($1000). The less drastic sanction of reasonable monetary sanctions has and will insure that there are

no further discovery violations in this matter.

IV. ANALYSIS

Under F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2), if a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery” a

court “may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,” including to:

1. Designate facts as established;

2. Refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims;

3. Prohibit the disobedient party from introducing designated matters in evidence;

4. Strike out pleadings or parts thereof;

5. Stay further proceedings until an order is obeyed;

6. Dismiss an action, proceeding or any part thereof; or

7. Render judgment by default against the disobedient party.

F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(e) authorizes monetary sanctions and states in pertinent part: 

In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require

the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or both to pay the

reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure unless the court

finds that failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award

of expenses unjust.

“Where the drastic sanctions of dismissal or default are imposed . . . the losing party’s nonCase 1:06-cv-00543-LJO -LJO Document 29 Filed 05/04/07 Page 3 of 5
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compliance must be due to willfulness, fault or bad faith.” Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943,

946 (9 Cir. 1993); Fjelstad v. American Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9 Cir. 1985). th th

“‘[D]isobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the litigant’ is all that is required to

demonstrate willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Henry, 983 F.2d at 948 (quoting Fjelstad, 762 F.2d at

1341.) A single willful violation may suffice depending on the circumstances. Valley Engineers, Inc.

v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9 Cir. 1998). th

A district court must consider five factors to determine whether to impose a severe sanction of

dismissal or default:

1. The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation;

2. The court’s need to manage its docket;

3. The risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions;

4. The public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and

5. The availability of less drastic sanctions.

Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at1057 (9 Cir. 1998); In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9 Cir. 1996); th th

Henry, 983 F.2d at 948; United States v. Kahaluu Constr. Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 600, 603 (9 Cir. 1988); th

Thompson v. Housing Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. th

829, 107 S.Ct. 112 (1986).

“What is most critical for case-dispositive sanctions, regarding risk of prejudice and of less

drastic sanctions, is whether the discovery violations ‘threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of

the case.’” Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Adriana International Corp. v. Thoeren, 913

F.2d 1406, 1412 (9 Cir. 1990)). th

The factors to determine whether to impose the severe sanction of dismissal weigh in favor of

the plaintiff in this case. The risk of prejudice to Sears has been greatly reduced by the belated discovery

responses Plaintiff provided on April 23, 2007. This is further evidenced by the motion for summary

judgment Searsfiled, which is based upon the evidence provided by Plaintiff. Less drastic sanctions

are available in this case to provide an effective deterrence for the violation. Mr. Falcon requests “that

the Court only issue reasonable monetary sanctions in the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). The

less drastic sanction of reasonable monetary sanctions has and will insure that there are no further

discovery violations in this matter.” Declaration of Juan Falcon, ¶ 15 (Doc. 21). Sears requests sanctions

be imposed in the amount of $5562, for costs associated with filing this motion ($3742) and for the

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Mr. Juan Falcon and the Plaintiff are hereby admonished to comply with all deadlines in this case. Failure to do 2

so will result in further sanctions, including the probability of dismissal. 

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deposition to which the Plaintiff failed to appear ($1820).

An important factor in determining the degree and amount of sanctions is whether the court had

warned the offending party that further discovery violations would result in dismissal or default. See

United States v. Kahluu Const. Co, 857 F.2d 600, 605 (requiring prior warning). In this case, Sears 2

never sought a court order to compel discovery during the discovery period. Understanding that they

had not heard from Mr. Falcon after a few months, Sears allowed the discovery deadline to pass without

alerting the court or seeking help in order to obtain the requested evidence. No prior warning was issued

by this Court and thus, there is no evidence of wilful disobedience of a court order by Mr. Falcon. 

Further, Sears went forward with the deposition and incurred those costs without having heard

from Mr. Falcon for five months and having a good reason to believe the deposition would not take

place. Those expenses could have been avoided if counsel for Sears had instead requested an order from

this Court to compel the discovery they sought. 

V. CONCLUSION

Because of the public policy favoring disposition ofthe case on themerits, the availability of less

drastic sanctions, and the lack of prejudice in this case, the Court hereby ORDERS:

I. Sears’ motion to dismiss is DENIED;

II. Sears’ motion for sanctions is GRANTED;

III. Monetary sanctions in the amount of $1500 are imposed on Mr. Falcon, to be paid to

counsel for Sears within 15 calendars days from the date of this Order; and

IV. The hearing for this motion currently set for May 14, 2007 is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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