Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02031/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02031-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE PATRICK STONE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-2031 - IEG (BLM)

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

[Doc. No. 9]

AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE

TO AMEND [Doc. No. 8]

v.

CONRAD PREBY’S; SHARP MESA

VISTA HOSPITAL; DAVID BERMAN,

Doctor; ELLIOT KANTER; ALVARADO

HOSPITAL; SAN DIEGO COUNTY

SHERIFF; EL CAJON POLICE

DEPARTMENT; KFR STAR REALTY; EL

CAJON SUPERIOR COURT; ELLIOTT

KANTER LAW OFFICES; and SAN DIEGO

COUNTY HOUSING,

Defendants.

George Patrick Stone (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on August 17, 2012, attempting

to allege that his civil rights were violated. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”) with his complaint. [Doc. No. 2.] On August 21, 2012, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with

leave to amend. [Doc. No. 3.] Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on September

14, 2012. On October 9, 2012, the Court dismissed Defendant El Cajon Superior Court with

prejudice, and also dismissed Plaintiff’s FAC with leave to amend. [Doc. No. 7.] Plaintiff filed a

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on November 11, 2012. [Doc. No. 8.] Plaintiff

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subsequently filed a motion to appoint counsel. [Doc. No. 9.] For the foregoing reasons, the

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. Having considered Plaintiff’s SAC, the

Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s SAC without leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil action. 

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case unless an indigent

litigant may lose her physical liberty if she loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are

granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be exercised only

under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A

finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success on

the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate her claims pro se in light of the complexity of

the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be viewed together

before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.

1986)).

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827

F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

II. Sua Sponte Dismissal

A. Legal Standard 

After granting IFP status, the Court must dismiss the case if the complaint “is frivolous or

malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a

claim). 

“Dismissal is proper when the complaint does not make out a cognizable legal theory or

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does not allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Cervantes v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). In order to properly state a claim for

relief, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint

must contain more than a “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading

must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of]

a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. 

Although pro se complaints enjoy “the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), Rule 8 still “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The rule of liberal construction

“applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9

(1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of

the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Further, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that plaintiffs do not enjoy unlimited

opportunities to amend their complaints. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir.

1996) (affirming district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s third amended complaint without leave

to amend when it “restated the prior [complaints] without curing their deficiencies”).

B. Analysis of Federal Claims

In his SAC, Plaintiff again attempts to assert multiple federal law causes of action against

various Defendants. The Court considers each in turn:

1. ADA Claim against Conrad Preby’s

Plaintiff first attempts to assert an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim against

Defendant Conrad Preby’s (“Preby’s”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Preby’s violated the ADA

“by intentionally and willfully placing covert electronic devices throughout [his] unit.” [Doc. No.

8, SAC at 2.] The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s ADA claim on the grounds that Plaintiff

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did not allege that Defendant Preby’s discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. 

[Doc. No. 7.] In his SAC, Plaintiff attempts to rectify this omission by stating: “Conrad Preby’s,

and the above named defendants violated The Americans with Disabilities act [sic] along with

several Civil [sic] rights violations [sic] by intentionally discriminating against me on the basis of

my age, gender, race, sexual orientation and physical and mental disabilities.” [Doc. No. 8, SAC

at 2.]

A complaint must contain factual allegations, and not merely a “formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff’s SAC contains only a

conclusory statement that Defendant Preby’s discriminated against him on the basis of his

disability without providing any relevant factual allegations. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES

with prejudice Plaintiff’s ADA claim.

2. Constitutional Claims against El Cajon Police Department and San

Diego Sheriff

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant El Cajon Police Department violated his First, Second, and

Fourth Amendment rights. [Doc. No. 8, SAC at 4-5.] He also alleges that Defendant San Diego

Sheriff violated his Fourth Amendment rights. [Id. at 8.] Although Plaintiff does not specifically

state that his claims are being brought under § 1983, the Court affords Plaintiff the benefit of any

doubt, see Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342, and construes these Constitutional claims as being brought

under § 1983.

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s Constitutional claim against Defendants El

Cajon Police Department and San Diego Sheriff because Plaintiff did not plead that his alleged

deprivations are the product of policies, customs, or a failure to train, which is required to impose

liability on a local government under § 1983, see, e.g. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350,

1359 (2011). [Doc. No. 7.] In an attempt to rectify this omission, Plaintiff simply states: “Claim: 

1) Acting Under Color of Law. 2). Failure to train municipal employees adequately.” [Doc. No. 8,

SAC at 5.] The Court reiterates that a complaint must contain factual allegations, and not merely a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As

Plaintiff does not provide sufficient factual allegations to support his claim that there was a failure

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to train, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s Constitutional claims against Defendants

El Cajon Police Department and San Diego Sheriff.

3. Denial of Access to Mental Health Facility

Plaintiff in his FAC alleged that his “Constitutional right to access a Mental Health Facility

was breeched [sic].” [Doc. No. 4, FAC at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dr. David Borman

(“Borman”) told him that he would be escorted out of the hospital because “Conrad Preby’s [did]

not want [him] in this hospital.” [Id.; Doc. No. 8, SAC at 9.] Plaintiff did not specifically identify

which Defendants against whom he brought this claim in his FAC, but the Court construed his

claim as brought against Defendant Sharp Mesa Vista Hospital and Defendant Borman. The Court

dismissed the claim because Plaintiff failed to allege that Defendants were acting under color of

state law. [Doc. No. 7.]

In his SAC, Plaintiff does not specifically allege a breach of his Constitutional right to

access a mental health facility; rather, he states that he was denied access to a mental health

facility and that there were “Color of Law Civil Rights Violations.” He also alleges that his rights

under the ADA were violated. [Doc. No. 8, SAC at 9.]

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for breach of his Constitutional right to

access a mental health facility because he failed to allege that Defendants Sharp Mesa Vista

Hospital and Borman, which are private parties, were acting under color of state law. [Doc. No.

7.] Because Plaintiff again provides only a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and does not allege that Defendants were acting under color of

state law, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s claim for breach of his constitutional

right to access a mental health facility. The Court also DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s

claim that Defendants Sharp Mesa Vista Hospital and Borman violated his rights under the ADA

because he fails to provide any factual allegations regarding how Defendants discriminated against

him on the basis of his disability. 

4. Constitutional Claim Against KFR Star Realty

In his SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant KFR Star Realty violated his “Constitutional

right to participation in a program or activity receiving Federal [sic] financial assistance.” [Doc.

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No. 8, SAC at 6.] Before reaching the issue of whether Plaintiff has a Constitutionally-recognized

right to participate in a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, the Court

addresses whether Plaintiff may bring a Constitutional claim against Defendant KFR Star Realty, a

private party. Under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that the private party acted under color of state

law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Because Plaintiff does not allege

that Defendant KFR Star Realty acted under color of state law, the Court DISMISSES with

prejudice Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant KFR Star Realty violated his Constitutional right to

participation in a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.

5. Constitutional Claims against San Diego Sheriff, Conrad Preby’s, and

KFR Star Realty

Plaintiff asserts a new Constitutional claim against Defendants San Diego Sheriff and

Preby’s for violation of “[his] Constitutional right to ‘privacy’ by the vicious, malicious, ongoing,

systematic and willful use of concealed electronic devices throughout [his] unit.” [Doc. No. 8,

SAC at 3.] He also states that KFR Star Realty violated his Constitutional right to privacy. [Id. at

6.] Plaintiff did not assert violations of his Constitutional right to privacy in this FAC, but only an

invasion of privacy claim. [Doc. No. 7, FAC at 3.] It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to

transform his state law invasion of privacy claim into a federal law claim by simply inserting the

word “Constitutional” into his SAC.

Again, Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that Defendants Preby’s and KFR Star

Realty, private parties, acted under color of state law. In regards to Defendant San Diego Sheriff,

Plaintiff does not plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that his alleged deprivations are the product

of policies, customs, or a failure to train. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice

Plaintiff’s constitutional claim against Defendants San Diego Sheriff, Preby’s, and KFR Star

Realty for alleged violations to his right to privacy. 

B. Supplemental Jurisdiction over State Law Claims

With Plaintiffs federal claims dismissed, only state law claims remain. The Court has

supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), however, the

Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it] has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” A district court’s decision whether to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is

“purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 636, 639 (2009); accord

Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 649 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). In exercising its discretion, the

court may look to a host of factors, “including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature

of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the

state and federal claims.” City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997);

see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In the usual case,

where federal claims are dismissed before trial, “the balance of factors . . . will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Gini v. Las Vegas Metro.

Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation omitted); accord Religious

Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Scholar v. Pacific

Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 268 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992).

In this case, looking at the balance of factors—including the fact that this case is still in its

infancy and that no Defendants have filed a responsive pleading—the Court believes it is more

appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 

See Lacey, 649 F.3d at 1137; Gini, 40 F.3d at 1064. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. 

Further, as currently pleaded, even affording Plaintiff’s complaint the special consideration given

to pro se claimants, Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In light

of Plaintiff’s multiple failure to cure the deficiencies of his complaint, the Court DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s SAC without leave to amend. The Court will not entertain any further amended

complaints. The clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 10, 2013 ______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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