Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00903/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00903-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC JON HASELTON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-0903 GEB JFM P

vs.

DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 judgment of

conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury and personally inflicting

great bodily injury on the victim. Petitioner admitted he had a prior serious felony conviction

which qualified as a strike under the Three Strikes law. Petitioner claims that his retained trial

attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel because a former co-defendant who testified

at trial was represented by the law partner of his trial attorney. This court has determined that the

petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Haselton, No. C032249 (September 19, 2000), a copy of which is

attached as Exhibit B to Respondent’s Answer, filed February 4, 2002.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

 The second amended information charged Dana Ruben

Franklin, Joseph Dewayne Randell, Rickie C. Sanford, and

[petitioner] with unlawfully assaulting and personally inflicting

great bodily injury on Ryan Jorgensen. Retained counsel Russell

Miller represented [petitioner], and his law partner Timothy Pappas

represented Randell. [Petitioner] had filed a written waiver of his

right to separate counsel at his September 8, 1998 arraignment,

which stated:

“1. I understand that I have a right to be represented by an

attorney who has no duty to represent any other defendant related

in any way to my case.

“2. I understand that if I am unable to pay for a separate

attorney, the Court will appoint a separate attorney for me in

accordance with the current law; which, depending on my

economic status, could be at no cost to me.

“3. My attorney has fully disclosed with me the risks and

dangers of his continued representation of both me and the other

defendant(s) in my case, and I understand the risks and dangers as

my attorney has explained them to me.

“4. My attorney has also informed me of my right to obtain

the opinion of another attorney, not involved with this case, about

the risks and dangers of my attorney’s continued representation of

both me and the other defendant(s) in my case.

“5. Having fully discussed each of the above items with

my attorney, I hereby freely and voluntarily waive (give up my

right to a separate attorney in this case and agree that my attorney

may continue to represent both me and the other defendant(s) in

my case.”

 There is no reporter’s transcript of the September 8, 1988,

arraignment, but the court clerk checked the box “INF. of RTS.” on

the minute order.

 At a September 28, 1998, hearing, the court began by asking,

“First off, isn’t there a conflict between Mr. Miller and Mr. Pappas,

aren’t they partners?” Miller responded, “Yes, we’re partners, your

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Honor. And we’ll file with the Court a statement of independent

counsel and a waiver thereof.” Only the above-quoted waiver

appears in the record.

 Franklin entered a plea on January 7, 1999, the first day of trial,

and testified for the prosecution. Part way through the presentation

of his evidence, the prosecutor moved to dismiss the case against

Randell based on insufficient evidence and in the interest of

justice. The prosecutor indicated he would call Randell as a

witness. Attorney Pappas said he would be available if the

prosecutor called his client to the witness stand. The court granted

the motion to dismiss.

 Randell testified [petitioner] was one of his best friends. He

said [petitioner] unsuccessfully attempted to break up the fight

between Richard Johnson and Jorgensen. Randell watched as

Franklin and Johnson kicked Jorgensen repeatedly in the upper

body and head after he fell to the ground. Randell testified he did

not see [petitioner] again until he returned to [petitioner’s] car to

leave. [Petitioner] got in the car, and pulled part way out of the

space. Shortly thereafter, Franklin and Johnson got into the car,

and [petitioner] drove them to a friend’s house. Police later

stopped and questioned Randell and [petitioner] en route to

Randell’s house. Randell admitted at trial that he lied when he

informed Officer Davis that he was not involved in the fight and

did not know the names of the people involved. He said he told

Officer Davis, “‘I never saw [petitioner] kick the . . . guy one

time.’” When the officer mentioned that [petitioner] had blood on

his shoes, Randell responded, “‘[Petitioner] may have kicked him

once I think.’” He explained at trial, “I thought maybe, you know,

maybe he did kick him since he had blood on his shoe, but since I

didn’t see him, I don’t know for sure.” Randell acknowledged he

did not tell Officer Davis [petitioner] tried to break up the fight. 

the prosecutor emphasized in closing argument that Randell never

said [petitioner] “‘didn’t do it.’”

(People v. Haselton, slip op. at 2-4.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues that his retained trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance

because counsel had a conflict of interest resulting from his law partner’s concurrent

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representation of petitioner’s co-defendant, Joseph Randell. Midway through the prosecution

case, the prosecutor dismissed charges against Randell and Randell was compelled to testify

against petitioner. At the time the charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence and in the

interest of justice, the trial court did not inquire of petitioner concerning the conflict of interest

and/or whether petitioner continued to waive his right to conflict-free counsel. 

A. Legal Standards

The United States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective

assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must

show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the

acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. 

Id. at 690. The federal court must then determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. 

Id. “We strongly presume that counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable

assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions

made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir.

2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . .

If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice 

. . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

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B. Conflict of Interest

Petitioner contends that defense counsel Russell W. Miller had a conflict of

interest resulting from his co-defendant Joseph Randell’s representation by Timothy R. Pappas, a

member of the same law firm, Law Offices of Pappas & Miller. (CT 13; see RT 10.) Both Miller

and Pappas were retained by petitioner and Randell, respectively. (See CT 165.) In addition,

while Miller was representing petitioner during trial, the prosecution moved to dismiss the case

against petitioner’s co-defendant on the basis of insufficient evidence and in the interest of justice. 

(RT 679, 687.) 

In this federal habeas proceeding petitioner now claims that defense counsel

Miller’s professional relationship with Pappas constituted an actual conflict of interest which

adversely affected his representation of petitioner. 

The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to the effective assistance of

counsel, unhindered by any conflicts of interest with her client. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; 

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). This right

contemplates counsel who is in a position both professionally and personally to represent his

client with undivided loyalty. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1981); See also Campbell

v. Rice, 302 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the state's conduct of a criminal trial itself

implicates the state in the defendant's conviction, courts do not distinguish between retained and

appointed counsel because it would deny equal justice to defendants who choose their own

lawyers. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344-45. 

Conflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty

to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a third

person or by his own interests. (See generally ABA, Model Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7 and

commentary (1983). Conflicts may occur in various factual settings. For example, conflicts may

arise in circumstances in which one attorney represents more than one defendant in the same

proceeding. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-91 (1978). Conflicts may also

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 The Burger court assumed “without deciding that two law partners are considered as

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one attorney.” Id. at 783. Because it is settled that joint representation is not a per se violation of

the right to effective assistance of counsel, Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482, petitioner must still

demonstrate an actual conflict of interest had an adverse affect on his lawyer’s performance. 

Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173-74. Thus, this court is not required to resolve whether two law

partners are considered as one attorney.

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arise in situations in which an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and currently

has or formerly had an attorney-client relationship with a person who is a witness in that matter. 

See, e.g., Thomas v. Municipal Court, 878 F. 2d 285 (9th Cir. 1989); Leversen v. Superior Court,

34 Cal.3d 530, 536-540 (1983); Cowell v. Duckworth, 512 F.Supp. 371 (D.C. Ind. 1981). 

Conflicts may also arise where law partners are appointed to represent coindictees in their

respective trials. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987).2

The rule against conflicts of interest serves to protect confidential information

obtained during the course of an earlier representation, ensure undivided attorney loyalty and

guard against infringement of the right to cross-examination. See Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d

1446, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1989);

United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1497 (9th Cir. 1987); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999

(9th Cir. 1980). It is more difficult for a defendant to show that counsel actively represented

conflicting interests in cases of successive rather than simultaneous representation. See Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1988). Courts “generally presume that the lawyer is fully

conscious of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client.” Burger v. Kemp, 483

U.S. 776, 784 (1987). 

In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict

of interest a petitioner must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s

performance. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,

348-350 (1980); Campbell, 302 F.3d at 897; Rosenwald v. United States, 898 F.2d 585 (7th

Cir.1990) (petitioner was entitled to habeas relief based on attorney’s simultaneous representation,

on unrelated civil matter, of the Government’s chief witness against defendant, after showing that

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 If a defendant fails to object to representation by an attorney with a conflict, but shows 3

on appeal that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance,”

reversal is required. Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1229-30 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348).

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attorney’s representation of defendant was affected by simultaneous representation); Mannhalt,

847 F.2d at 582 (adverse effects found where a conflict “may have impacted the manner of the

cross-examination” by the attorney). The existence of an actual conflict “cannot be governed

solely by the perceptions of the attorney; rather, the court itself must examine the record to discern

whether the attorney’s behavior seems to have been influenced by the suggested conflict.” 

Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1452.3

The mere possibility that an attorney had a conflict of interest is insufficient to

entitle a petitioner to relief. Rather, he must show that: (1) his attorney actively represented

conflicting interests, and (2) the conflict “actually affected” the adequacy of the attorney’s

representation. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50; see also Campbell, 302 F.3d at 897; Lockhart, 250

F.3d at 1229. A defendant “need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.” Cuyler, at

349-50. See also Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a defendant

must show that “the attorney’s behavior seems to have been influenced” by the conflict.” 

Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1452). “This showing need not rise to

the level of actual prejudice. . . . Nonetheless, it remains a substantial hurdle.” Id., (quoting

Maiden v. Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

 A defendant may “waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a

conflict of interests.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 n.5. See also Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193,

1195 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Even if counsel is subject to an actual conflict of interest, however, the

trial court may generally allow the attorney to proceed if the defendant makes a voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent waiver.”); Allen, 831 F.2d at 1494 (“[o]f course, a defendant may waive

his right to the assistance of an attorney who is unhindered by conflicts . . . provided the waiver is

given knowingly and intelligently.”) Whether there is a proper waiver is to be determined by the

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 The “objectively unreasonable” standard employed under Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 4

976, 983 (9th Cir. 2000) is inapplicable because in Delgado the state court provided no rationale

for its decision. In the instant case, the state court did not hold petitioner validly waived his right

to non-conflicted counsel but resolved the conflict of interest claim on other grounds. Thus, a de

novo review is appropriate. Lewis, 391 F.3d 996.

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trial court and any such waiver should appear on the record. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

464-65 (1938). Resolution of the issue of waiver depends “upon the particular facts and

circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the

accused.” Id.; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). 

C. Whether Petitioner Waived Right to Conflict-Free Counsel

The California Court of Appeal noted that there was no reporter’s transcript of the

September 8, 1998 arraignment. (People v. Haselton, slip op. at 9.) The minute order reflected

the clerk had checked a box marked “INF. of RTS.” However, 

[i]t is unclear from the minute entry whether the court’s

admonitions included those relating to waiver of conflict-free

counsel. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate the court confirmed

on the record that [petitioner] understood those rights and agreed to

waive them. Once trial commenced, there was no further discussion

of conflicts that might arise from [petitioner] and Randell being

represented by partners in the same law firm.

(Id. at 9-10.) The state court went on to analyze whether there was an actual conflict or that

petitioner’s right to effective representation was prejudicially affected, without specifically

addressing whether petitioner had exercised a valid waiver. (Id. at 10.)

Because the state court explicitly ruled on other grounds, this court does not apply

AEDPA’s deference to the discussion of petitioner’s waiver. Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996

(9th Cir. 2004). Rather, the court reviews de novo whether petitioner waived his right to conflict 4

free counsel, “while deferring to any factual findings made by the state court under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1).” Lewis, 391 F.3d at 996.

Petitioner may waive his right to the assistance of an attorney who is unhindered by

conflicts. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n.5 . . . (1978). A valid waiver

of conflict of interest must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, such that the

defendant is sufficiently informed of the consequences of his choice. Belmontes v.

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 At this hearing, Miller “stood in for” Pappas, representing petitioner’s co-defendant 5

Randell as well as petitioner. (RT 1.) On the December 9, 1998 hearing on the prosecution’s

motion to amend the complaint, attorney Pappas stood in for attorney Miller. (RT 6.)

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Woodford, 350 F.3d 861, 885 (9th Cir.2003). We are required to "ascertain with

certainty" that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that right by

"focusing on what the defendant understood." Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d

1223, 1233 (9th Cir.2001) (citations omitted).

Lewis, 391 F.3d at 996. 

In the instant case, it is undisputed that on September 8, 1988, petitioner signed a

“Notice of Right to Separate Counsel and Waiver” prior to trial. (CT 13.) However, there is no

reporter’s transcript of the trial court’s colloquoy, if any, with petitioner concerning the conflict

waiver. The minute order from the September 8, 1988 arraignment reflects the court clerk

checked the box marked “INF. of RTS.” 

On September 28, 1988, at a hearing on a motion to consolidate and join

defendants, the court inquired whether there was a conflict based on the law partnership of Miller

and Pappas. (RT 2.) Petitioner’s counsel informed the court that he would file with the court a 5

statement of independent counsel and a waiver. (RT 1-2.) The trial court did not inquire of

petitioner whether the waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. (RT 2.) No further

statement of independent counsel and waiver was subsequently filed. (See CT 15 - 267.) 

On January 20, 1999, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecution moved to

dismiss the charges against petitioner’s co-defendant Randell on the basis of insufficient evidence. 

(RT 679.) The trial court inquired whether the prosecution intended to call Randell as a witness. 

(RT 679.) The prosecution stated he would call Randell as a witness, adding he would not be

calling any other witness that was present at the scene of the assault other than Randell. (RT 680.) 

Randell’s attorney noted that there was no blood found on Randell’s shoes or socks. (RT 680.)

But the trial court noted that there was sufficient evidence if the jury believed the evidence:

And that is the concern the Court has. While many of the witnesses

were not able to identify him as being involved, there is evidence

that he was involved. If that evidence is believed, it’s sufficient for

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a conviction.

(RT 680.) The prosecution responded that based on Ms. Andrews’ testimony that only four

people were involved in the assault, her description of a guy in baggie pants and a white shirt

pointed to Richard Johnson, and she had identified petitioner and Mr. Sanford as the other two

perpetrators. (RT 680.) This information, coupled with their knowledge that Mr. Franklin was

the fourth perpetrator, meant that the prosecution could not in good faith argue that co-defendant

Randell committed the assault. (RT 680-81.) The trial court then took the prosecution’s motion

under submission and after a few moments told the prosecution he could make his formal motion

in the presence of the jury. (RT 682.) The court stated it had a number of concerns, at which

point the judge held a bench conference that was unrecorded. (RT 682.) 

On January 20, 1999, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court stated it would

entertain either an interest of justice dismissal or a combination of interest of justice and

insufficient evidence based upon the weight of the evidence dismissal. (RT 684.) The

prosecution indicated he would make a combination motion, and the trial court indicated it would

grant such a motion brought before the jury. (RT 684.) The prosecution asked the court to make

Randell available to call as a witness. (RT 684.) The trial court responded affirmatively that

“once the charges [were] dismissed against [Randell] with jeopardy having already set in, he

would be free for [the prosecution] to call as a witness.” (RT 684.) The court then went on to

discuss scheduling issues. (RT 684-86.)

The jury was called in and the court informed them that the prosecution had moved

to dismiss defendant Randell for insufficient evidence, but that the court held that one witness’

testimony would support charges against Randell, so that motion was denied. (RT 687.) The

court further explained to the jury that the prosecution had stated that based on the weight of the

evidence he would not be arguing for a conviction of defendant Randell, so the court had

suggested the prosecution move to dismiss based on insufficient evidence and in the interest of

justice. (RT 687.) At that time the prosecution so moved, and the trial court granted the motion

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to dismiss charges against defendant Randell. (RT 687.) The trial court noted defendant Randell

would remain in the courtroom stating, “because of double jeopardy, [Randell] can’t be charged

again, and the People have indicated they want to call him as a witness.” (RT 688.) 

This record fails to “demonstrate petitioner understood “any of the specific

ramifications of his waiver.” Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Although the September 8, 1998 minute order appears to reflect petitioner was informed of rights,

it does not specify the rights petitioner was informed about. The record reflects the trial court was

aware of a potential conflict. (RT 1-2.) Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner had earlier signed

a conflict waiver, the trial judge did not inquire further of petitioner as to whether it was a

knowing and voluntary waiver. There is no record to determine the extent of the trial judge’s

inquiry of petitioner, if any. “While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a

proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and

appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

465 (1938). There is no evidence petitioner was informed that his attorney owed him a continuing

duty of loyalty. Belmontes v. Woodford, 414 F.3d 1094, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005).

Moreover, even if petitioner understood the theoretical risk of his attorney being

biased by his law partner’s representation of petitioner’s co-defendant and dismissed that risk as

unlikely, it is less likely that petitioner foresaw other potential consequences of the waiver, for

example, the fact that the prosecution would dismiss the charges against Randell and force him to

testify against petitioner. Lewis, 391 F.3d 997. At the time defendant Randell was transformed

from defendant to witness for the prosecution, there was no mention of how this change in

circumstance might have presented a conflict of interest by the law partners’ simultaneous

representation of petitioner and Randell. (RT 679-88.) The trial judge did not revisit petitioner’s

earlier waiver. Although there was an unrecorded bench conference (RT 682), at which point the

trial judge could have raised conflict of interest issues, no mention of conflict of interest was

recorded during hearings held outside the presence of the jury, or when the court reconvened in

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 Federal courts have incorporated this duty into the Federal Rules of Criminal 6

Procedure. Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that whenever two or

more defendants are jointly charged or have been joined for trial, and are retained by counsel

who are associated in the practice of law, “the court shall promptly inquire about the propriety of

joint representation, and must personally advise each defendant of the right to the effective

assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Id. This procedural rule heightened the

federal trial court’s obligation set forth in previous case law: Trial courts presented with a

possible conflict have an affirmative duty to protect a defendant's rights, Glasser v. United States,

315 U.S. 60, 72 (1942), which duty arises when the possibility of conflict is "brought home to the

court." Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485 (quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76).

13

front of the jury. (RT 679-86.)

Thus, at a minimum, it was incumbent upon the trial judge to further inquire of

petitioner at the time the prosecution moved to dismiss the charges against Randell and it became

clear Randell would be compelled to testify against petitioner. A trial court has a duty to inquire

into a potential conflict of interest when it “knows or reasonably should know that a particular

conflict [of interest] exists.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347. The transformation from defendant to

6

witness for the prosecution should raise a conflict of interest red flag where petitioner was

represented by counsel who was a law partner to Randell’s counsel, and against whom Randell

would be testifying in the same proceeding. 

On this record, this court cannot find petitioner exercised a valid waiver of his right

to conflict-free counsel. Petitioner must now demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest

adversely affected his trial counsel’s performance. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173-74.

D. Actual Conflict that Adversely Affected Counsel’s Performance

On direct appeal, petitioner argued that the Pappas & Miller representation of

petitioner and his co-defendant Randell prevented Miller from effectively cross-examining

Randell because Miller had a duty to preserve Randell’s confidences, by virtue of his law

partnership with Pappas, who represented Randell. (Petitioner’s Opening Brief, appended to

Answer as Ex. A, at 31.) Petitioner further contended that Miller’s law partnership with Pappas

required Miller to take care not to expose Randell to a perjury charge. (Id.)

Petitioner contends that there was much Miller could have cross-examined Randell

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about, had his law partner not represented Randell. (August 1, 2005 Traverse at 6.) Miller could

have cross-examined Randell about:

the circumstances leading to the dismissal of the case against him. .

. , whatever negotiations took place between his lawyer and the

prosecution prior to the dismissal; whether his lawyer bargained for

a dismissal that would provide double jeopardy protections; whether

Randell agreed to be interviewed prior to his testimony as part of a

dismissal agreement; whether there were any other requirements or

understandings between the firm that represented Randell and

petition that could be construed in any way to be quid pro quo.

(Id. at 6.) Petitioner argues that it was unreasonable for the state court to ignore the possibility

that the dismissal was negotiated just because Randell did not testify pursuant to a plea agreement. 

Petitioner contends it was critical for the jury to learn of any circumstances surrounding the

dismissal to accurately assess Randell’s credibility when Randell testified that he lied when he

said petitioner was not involved in the assault. Because of his law firm’s duty of confidentiality to

Randell, Miller could not question Randell about that. Petitioner contends the key question courts

address in assessing a conflict’s adverse effect is “what the advocate finds himself compelled to

refrain from doing.” Holloway, 435 U.S. 490.

Petitioner further argues it was unreasonable for the state court to find Randell’s

testimony was generally favorable to petitioner when Randell’s testimony that he lied when he

claimed petitioner was not involved was “damning.” (August 1, 2005 Traverse at 6.)

Petitioner also argues that the state appellate court’s conclusion that there was no

adverse effect on Miller’s representation was objectively unreasonable. (August 1, 2005 Traverse

at 5.) Specifically, petitioner contends the state court’s finding that the fact that Randell did not

testify pursuant to a plea agreement but was forced to testify once the prosecution dismissed its

case against him did not demonstrate an adverse effect was objectively unreasonable. (Id. at 5.) 

Petitioner contends the state court overlooked the fact that the trial judge was troubled by the fact

that there was enough evidence of Randell’s involvement for the case against him to go to the

jury. (Id. at 5-6.) Despite this, the prosecution moved to dismiss the case and then called Randell

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to the stand where he elicited Randell’s testimony that when Randell previously denied petitioner

was involved in the assault, it was a “bold faced lie.” (Id. at 6, quoting RT 804.) Petitioner

contends that this enabled the prosecution to “successfully argue that if petitioner’s good friend

Randell could not vouch for his non-involvement in the assault, petitioner must be guilty.” (Id.,

citing RT 1448.)

Petitioner further argued that the joint representation may have affected plea

bargaining and sentencing. (Petitioner’s Opening Brief, appended to Answer as Ex. A, at 31.) 

i. Review by the State Court

The state court ultimately rejected petitioner ’s argument on this issue:

We conclude that even if the waiver was ineffective and the court

erred in failing to inquire into the possibility of conflict when

Randell was dismissed mid-trial, [petitioner] has not shown there

was an actual conflict, or that his right to effective representation

was prejudicially affected. (Citation omitted.)

Randell did not testify voluntarily as part of a plea agreement, but

was forced to testify when the prosecution dismissed the charges

against him. The principal defense theory was misidentification. 

After acknowledging he lied to police about not knowing who

kicked Jorgensen, Randell emphasized he did not see [petitioner]

kick Jorgensen. His statement to the officer that [petitioner] might

have kicked the victim once was in response to being told there was

blood on [petitioner’s] shoes.

[Petitioner] suggests that “[t]rial counsel’s performance was

adversely affected because he was hindered in his ability to crossexamine Randell by the fact that he had a duty to keep Randell’s

secrets and confidences.” He complains that “[i]n crossexamination, the defense did not – and could not because of his

ethical duty – seek to probe the truth of Randell’s actual degree of

involvement in the offense. Such cross-examination would have

strengthened Randell’s motivation to shift some blame to

[petitioner] and would have significantly undercut the prosecutor’s

claim that Randell implicated [petitioner] because [petitioner] was

guilty and for no other reason.”

This argument is inconsistent with the circumstances of the case. 

Regardless of the prosecutor’s “spin” on Randell’s testimony, the

fact remains it was generally favorable to [petitioner]. The court

had told the jury that the prosecution moved to dismiss the charges

against Randell on the grounds of insufficient evidence and in the

interest of justice. In this context, it would not have been to

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[petitioner’s] advantage for Miller to show in cross-examination

Randell was, in fact, involved in the fight.

(People v. Haselton, slip op. at 10-11.) 

ii. Cross Examination at Trial

During cross-examination, Randell confirmed that all the charges against him had

been dropped but denied he had made a deal with the prosecution to get the charges dropped. (RT

804.) Randell admitted the dismissal of the charges had come as a surprise. (RT 805.) Randell

denied he took the stand to purposefully lie and confirmed he was not lying for his friend,

petitioner, or that he felt any need to lie for himself. (RT 805.) 

Randell confirmed that some events stood out more clearly in his memory than

others. (RT 805.) Randell stated he remembered most of what he had told the officer the night of

the assault, but not everything. (RT 806.) 

Randell stated he saw most of the assault until he left. (RT 806.) He testified they

were still kicking the victim when he left the scene. (RT 806.) Randell testified it was not his

idea to take pictures of his hands after he and petitioner arrived at petitioner’s home. (RT 806.)

Randell admitted he was nervous and scared when he was talking to the officer

after the officer had pulled over petitioner’s car. (RT 806-07.) Randell admitted that when he

told the officer he didn’t know anybody who was involved in the assault it was a lie, and that he

was lying for the people who were involved and to protect himself from getting involved. (RT

807.) 

Randell confirmed that he was on federal probation at the time of the assault and

that his status as a probationer was on his mind that evening and continued to be on his mind

during the trial. (RT 807.) Randell admitted he was aware that if he perjured himself he could

have his probation violated, that the possibility concerned him and that concern prompted him to

tell the truth in his testimony. (RT 807-08.) 

Randell admitted that the officer who pulled over petitioner’s car told Randell that

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Eric had blood on his shoes. (RT 808.) When asked whether that gave Randell any reason to

think harder about where Eric was the entire time of the fight, Randell responded that it did. (RT

808.) He confirmed the officer stated “you know you guys were involved. You know you guys

kicked him.” (RT 808.) When asked whether he remembered telling the officer “maybe

[petitioner] kicked him once or a couple of times?” Randell denied remembering he told the

officer “or a couple of times.” (RT 808.) Randell admitted that the officer was unfriendly and

pressured Randell, accusing Randell of committing a crime Randell did not commit, and

repeatedly asking him the same questions over and over. (RT 809, 810.) Randell testified that

scared him. (RT 809.) When asked whether he changed his story from “I don’t know anything or

who it was” to “let me tell you what I do know” as a means to exonerate himself or separate

himself from the incident, Randell said yes. (RT 809.)

Randell admitted he felt bad about the victim being hurt but denied he would lie to

protect the people who hurt him. (RT 809.) Randell admitted he had twice been convicted of a

felony and had been involved with law enforcement when he was convicted of those two felonies. 

(RT 809-10.) Randell conceded that the officers treated him “a little bit” fairly and honestly in the

prior two convictions. (RT 810.) He stated he could not remember whether those officers made

things up. (RT 810.) 

On recross-examination, petitioner’s counsel asked Randell whether he was “lying

that night at your first statement to the officer because you were afraid for yourself?” (RT 814.) 

Randell answered affirmatively. (RT 814.) 

iii. Closing Argument at Trial

During closing argument, petitioner’s defense counsel Miller conceded petitioner

was in the area that night, but argued that petitioner had been misidentified. (RT 1488.) Miller

noted there were too many eyewitnesses in this case and argued that none of their testimony

matched perfectly. (RT 1489.) Miller pointed out that these witnesses had never seen anything

like this before in their lives, by their own testimony, and reminded the jury that these witnesses

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had emotions ranging from shock to crying, to panic, to nausea. (RT 1489.) Miller argued these

witnesses were under stress. (RT 1490.)

In addition, Miller argued that Franklin lied to gain a lighter sentence. (RT 1490;

1492.) Miller pointed out that during the first half of the interview Franklin had with the district

attorney, petitioner’s name was not mentioned. (RT 1490.) Miller argued that when it became

clear to Franklin that he wouldn’t be offered a deal, he quickly changed his story to reduce the

possible prison time he was facing. (RT 1490.) Miller argued that Franklin made a deal with the

prosecution. (RT 1491.)

Miller reminded the jury that the prosecution dismissed the charges against Randell

because there was no credible evidence pointing towards his guilt:

He was out. He was dismissed against. We heard he had been in

conversation with this attorney. He knew the level of evidence

against all the other defendants. And he knew what he had left to

bargain with. The only thing he had left was [petitioner].

He was going to admit he did it wrong. He was going to say that his

friend, Rich Johnson, did it wrong because Rich Johnson is not here

to be punished today with everybody. He knew the state of the

evidence against Joey Randell. Who was left. Eric Haselton.

(RT 1491-92.)

Miller argued that Avelee Andrews was wrong in her testimony. (RT 1492.) 

Miller pointed out that Ms. Andrews initially stated one of the perpetrators wore a white T-shirt. 

(RT 1492.) Later, after she went to the show up, and two young men stood by the side of the road

with a light shining on them and one is wearing a T-shirt that says SQA in big letters, then Ms.

Andrews changed her statement to say the perpetrator had been wearing an SQA T-shirt. (RT

1493.) Miller asked the jury whether Andrews just forgot that detail and then remembered it

when she saw them by the road? (RT 1493.) Or did Andrews see them detained by the road and

had been told it was the get-away vehicle and just presume it was the perpetrators? (RT 1493.) 

Miller argued that Andrews’ testimony was suspect because Andrews was

“positive” it was petitioner and Randell, that Andrews was really in shock, crying, and was putting

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two and two together. (RT 1493.) Miller pointed out that Andrews was the only witness using a

six foot tall 180 pound description. (RT 1493.) Miller argued Andrews had little credibility

because her facts rarely matched any of the other witnesses. (RT 1494.) Miller pointed out that

Andrews was the only witness who testified she saw petitioner go up to the driver’s side of the

jeep and punch the driver. (RT 1494.) 

Miller argued about the credibility of witness Kern’s and witness Lund’s

testimony. (RT 1494-5.) Miller pointed out that witness Brody Williams did not mention the

SQA or red dot – she saw a plain white T-shirt. (RT 1496.) Miller noted that the witnesses

deviated in their testimony as to when the assault happened, one said a year, one said hadn’t been

a year, etc. (RT 1497.) 

Miller argued that it was incredible that the witnesses testified they had not

discussed the incident with anyone. (RT 1497; 1498-99.) Miller noted there was inconsistent

testimony about when Kern left the fight area. (RT 1497.) Miller argued there were even more

inconsistencies about what happened when the fight stopped. (RT 1497-98.) Miller argued it was

implausible that everyone rushed to the victim’s aid and knelt by his head. (RT 1498.) 

Miller conceded that petitioner had blood all over his right shoe. (RT 1499.) 

Miller reminded the jury that there was expert testimony that petitioner’s right shoe was not the

shoe that caused the bleeding. (RT 1499.) In addition, Miller pointed out that petitioner had no

blood on his right sock, his left shoe or left sock. (RT 1499.) Miller also reminded the jury that

there was expert testimony that the two little droplets of blood they had were going in opposite

directions. (RT 1499.) Miller argued there at least two people were bleeding, the victim and Rich

Johnson. (RT 1500.) Miller noted that the expert could not tell what position petitioner’s shoe

was in when it got the blood on it. (RT 1500.) Miller argued that “blood was flying around.” 

(RT 1500.) Miller stated there was testimony petitioner was around the fight, tried to break it up,

grabbed people that were bleeding, was between people that were bleeding, and blood was on the

ground near the victim’s head. (RT 1500.) 

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Miller argued that while Officer Helfrick was at the scene, taking witness

Andrews’ statement, people were “yelling over her back or yelling from around her” (RT 1501),

equating it to an “auction for information.” (RT 1501.) Miller suggested the officer might have

made a mistake. (RT 1501.) Officer Helfrick testified it would have been better if more officers

had been there. (RT 1501.)

Miller argued that the line-up identification was suspect because the officer kept

making the witnesses keep looking, “proofread your own work.” (RT 1501.)

Miller argued about Randell’s testimony:

Did [Randell] have inconsistent statements? Yep. Did he start with

the three monkeys, see no evil, hear no evil. Right, say no evil. 

Almost the fourth monkey, you know, see no evil. He almost had

his hands on his rear end, didn’t he. I want to cover myself. Yes, I

had contact with law enforcement and, yes, it usually turns out

negative and, yes, I don’t want it anymore.

You have to consider the inconsistencies of his statements. That’s

what the instructions will tell you. You have to consider the

inconsistencies of his statement when you decide his credibility. 

That’s what you need to do.

But think about his personal circumstances each time he made the

statement. He testified here to you under oath after being

dismissed. Jeopardy is attached. They can’t do anything to him for

this crime. And he didn’t offer you up a lame excuse like Mr.

Franklin did. Well, you know I was under oath – I wasn’t under

oath, excuse me. 

Now, he sat there and he took the questions from the district

attorney. Without, obviously, answering my question, would any of

you like to truly be examined, cross-examined, reexamined, recross

/////

examined by this team of attorneys? Did you ever feel a little

nervous for the witnesses? Think how they felt.

(RT 1501-02.) 

Miller then pointed out that out of the 50 - 250 people present during the fight,

only a few actually testified at this trial. (RT 1502.) Miller pointed out that the witnesses were

not “knocking down the doors” to come testify. (RT 1502.) Miller reminded the jury that

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witnesses Lund and Trumbull testified because they were under subpoena to do so. (RT 1502.)

Miller argued that even under cross-examination witness Helmsin did not waiver

that she saw petitioner away from the area while she “believed the commotion was still going on.” 

(RT 1504.) Miller argued this testimony countered almost every prosecutorial witness who said

the defendants left together. (RT 1504.) Miller argued that Helmsin’s testimony demonstrated

petitioner wasn’t part of the fight. (RT 1504.) 

Miller argued the jury would have to weigh Sanford’s credibility. (RT 1504.)

Miller reminded the jury that witness Chris Wilmott testified he saw petitioner

pull, push, get involved and try to break up the fight. (RT 1504.) Miller denied there was a

conspiracy where everyone got together and made up a story. (RT 1505.) Miller argued that there

were a lot of people who saw a terrible event and they told what they believe they remember

seeing. (RT 1505.)

In closing, Miller argued that petitioner didn’t assault anyone. “He didn’t simply

assault anyone. He didn’t greatly assault anyone. He didn’t do it. . . . No, he didn’t do anything

wrong. . . . As a matter of fact, he tried to do something right. That’s what he wanted to do.” 

(RT 1506.) Miller argued the prosecution had not met its burden of proof and the jury must return

a verdict of not guilty. (RT 1506.) 

E. Analysis

At the time the prosecution moved to dismiss the charges against Randell,

attorneys Miller and Pappas were engaged in the representation of competing interests: Miller

was representing petitioner, a criminal defendant, and Pappas was representing Randell, now a

witness for the prosecution. 

Respondent contends that nothing in the record suggests that Miller and Pappas

worked together, noting that at trial each attorney only represented his own client. (Answer at 12.) 

However, just because the record does not reflect it, doesn’t mean these law partners did not

brainstorm, share defense strategies or other legal work prior to the dismissal of the charges

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against Randell, particularly when the dismissal occurred midway through the prosecution’s case. 

Certainly there is not the wealth of evidence in the record that counsel worked together as there

was in Burger, supra. However, there is some evidence in this record that counsel would appear

in court on each other’s behalf, suggesting some sharing of information was taking place. (See

n.4 supra.) On September 28, 1988, at a hearing on a motion to consolidate and join defendants,

attorney Miller stood in for attorney Pappas, representing petitioner’s co-defendant Randell as

well as petitioner. (RT 1.) At the December 9, 1998 hearing on the prosecution’s motion to

amend the complaint, attorney Pappas stood in for attorney Miller, representing petitioner as well

as Randell. (RT 6.) 

Petitioner’s argument that the joint representation “may” have affected plea

bargaining and sentencing is insufficient to demonstrate an actual conflict or prejudicial effect. 

Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.

However, upon reviewing the relevant record, the undersigned agrees that the

alleged conflict of interest resulting from the concurrent representation of Randell and petitioner

by law partners did not adversely affect counsel’s performance in this case. Even assuming an

actual conflict of interest that was not effectively “waived,” petitioner has failed to clear the

“substantial hurdle” of demonstrating that a conflict “actually affected” counsel’s performance in

an adverse way. See Lockhart, 250 F.3d at 1231. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that a conflict gives rise to an adverse

effect on counsel’s representation when it “‘prevent[s] an attorney . . . from arguing . . . the

relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by

emphasizing that of another.’” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (quoting

Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490). That is not the case here. There was no attempt by Miller to

minimize the culpability of Randell at the expense of petitioner. And, based on the evidence, such

a position would not have been prudent. There was no blood found on Randell’s shoes and little

evidence supporting Randell’s culpability, which is why the prosecution ultimately moved to

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dismiss charges against Randell. 

Moreover, Miller directly attacked Randell’s credibility, during cross-examination

and in closing argument. Miller asked Randell whether he had made a deal with the prosecution

to get the charges dropped. (RT 804.) In closing argument, Miller pointed out Randell’s

inconsistent statements. The record reflects that Miller’s cross-examination was thorough. It

does not appear that counsel’s overall performance was adversely affected by the possible

conflict. 

Petitioner argues that the conflict prevented Miller from asking specific questions

during Randell’s cross-examination, suggesting counsel should have inquired about the

circumstances leading to the dismissal of the case against him. However, counsel did inquire

during cross-examination whether Randell had struck a deal with the prosecution. Randell

confirmed the dismissal had come as a surprise. This court is not persuaded that further inquiry

into the surprise dismissal would have made petitioner’s counsel more effective in his defense.

Physical evidence demonstrated petitioner was more culpable than Randell. While Randell’s

testimony provided one more witness who claimed petitioner “may have” kicked the victim once,

which Randell uttered in response to the police officer’s comment that there was blood on

petitioner’s shoe, it was minimized by his unwavering testimony that he did not see petitioner kick

the victim. The court has reviewed Randell’s testimony and cannot find that the state court’s view

that Randell’s testimony was generally favorable to petitioner was an unreasonable determination

of the facts. Moreover, failure to cross-examine Randell in the areas now suggested by petitioner

did not result in prejudice to his cause. 

In light of all of the evidence presented at trial and the overall performance of

petitioner’s counsel, petitioner has failed to show that an actual conflict adversely affected the

performance of trial counsel Miller. Accordingly, this claim should be denied. 

F. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

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application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 26, 2005. 

hase0903.157

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