Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00927/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00927-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

M.J., a minor, by and through

his parents, G.J. and J.J.,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-00927 OWW LJO

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a minor with special education needs, filed this

lawsuit on July 18, 2005, originally seeking a declaratory

judgment that Defendant Clovis Unified School District (“CUSD”)

breached a settlement agreement Plaintiff and CUSD entered into

in the course of a special education due process proceeding,

conducted pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in

Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. (Doc. 10,

First Am. Compl., filed Aug. 30, 2005.) The original complaint

was dismissed, but Plaintiff sought and was granted leave to

amend to allege a “stay put” claim under IDEA. (Doc. 32, filed

Sept. 15, 2006.) 

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Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 5, 2006,

which does not allege a “stay put” claim. Rather, Plaintiff now

alleges that Defendant Clovis Unified School District (“CUSD”)

(1) violated the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act,

as amended in 2005, (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq., by

failing to provide Plaintiff with a Free and Appropriate Public

Education (“FAPE”); (2) violated Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504”), by

subjecting Plaintiff to a “one size fits all” educational

program, rather than an individualized program, and by exhibiting

a “pattern, policy and practice” of failing to address the

individualized needs of its students with autism; (3) violated

Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42

U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., by, among other things, maintaining a

pattern, policy and practice of failing to address the

individualized needs of its students with autism; and (4)

violating California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 51, by subjecting Plaintiff to the discriminatory practice of

denying Plaintiff the benefits of CUSD’s special education

instruction and services. Finally, Plaintiff once again seeks

declaratory relief that CUSD District (“CUSD”) breached the

settlement agreement.

Defendant moves to dismiss the second amended complaint,

first arguing that Plaintiff was only granted leave to amend to

add a “stay put” claim. Alternatively, Defendant moves for

dismissal on a number of grounds, including: (1) that Plaintiff’s

declaratory relief claim fails for the same reasons it was

previously dismissed; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

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administrative remedies prior to bringing his claims under IDEA;

(3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either Section 504 or

the ADA; and (4) Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim fails for, among

other things, lack of exhaustion. (Doc. 34, filed Oct. 16, 2006.)

II. BACKGROUND

M.J. resides in the Clovis Unified School District (“CUSD”)

within Fresno County. In 1999, a CUSD psychologist determined

that M.J. is “autistic-like,” which qualified M.J. for special

education services under the IDEA and California special

education laws. (Doc. 33 at ¶7.) 

In December 2001, Plaintiff’s fifth grade year, an

Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) team assembled by CUSD

recommended that Plaintiff be referred to Fresno County

Department of Children and Family Services (“FCDCFS”) for mental

health services. (Id. at ¶8.) In 2002, this recommendation was

incorporated into Plaintiff’s IEP. (Id. at ¶9.) In an

assessment conducted by FCDFS, Plaintiff was diagnosed with

“anxiety disorder” and secondary diagnosis of “Asperger’s,”

“ADHD,” “Tourette’s,” and “ODD” (oppositional defiance disorder). 

FCDCFS recommended that Plaintiff’s services should consist of

“talk therapy,” which allows Plaintiff to express to a therapist

those issues that might be leading to his behavioral problems. 

(Id.)

In February 2002, FCDFS provided a mental heath assessment

report on Plaintiff to CUSD, indicating that Plaintiff’s

treatment would consist of “outpatient mental health treatment”

and that his relevant history included “symptoms of anxiety and

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ADHD.” Plaintiff’s autism was not noted as being relevant to the

provision of services. (Id. at ¶10.)

In 2002, CUSD conducted its triennial evaluation, confirming

that Plaintiff’s diagnosis was “autism” and that Plaintiff’s

language skills ranged from “low to high average.” CUSD’s

language specialist noted that “[h]is receptive vocabulary is low

for his age, which affects his ability to understand, process and

express information.” (Id. at ¶11.)

During Plaintiff’s sixth grade year, the IEP team placed

Plaintiff in CUSD’s Elementary Intervention Program (“EIP”),

primarily designed to serve severely emotionally disturbed

students. This placement was made in part because of Plaintiff’s

behavioral problems, which Plaintiff alleges are the result of

his autism. The EIP program required Plaintiff to receive

specific, pre-determined services, without adapting those

services to Plaintiff’s needs as a child with autism. (Id. at

¶12.) Participation in the EIP also required Plaintiff’s

continuous referral to FCDCFS, an agency which Plaintiff alleges

has a “policy and practice of refusing to diagnose a child with

Autism and thus to provide appropriate services designed to

address the needs of an Autistic child.” (Id. at ¶12.) Despite

Plaintiff’s participation in the EIP and continued referral to

FCDCFS, CUSD and Plaintiff’s parents reported increases in the

frequency and severity of Plaintiff’s behavior problems. (Id. at

¶12.) 

In January 2003, the second half of Plaintiff’s sixth grade

year, CUSD suggested Plaintiff’s parents home school Plaintiff. 

The parents did so for the remainder of the school year. (Id. at

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 The Hearing Officer subsequently ruled against FCDCFS, 1

finding that it failed to comply with the IDEA. Unsatisfied with

the relief ordered by the Hearing Officer, Plaintiff, through his

parents, sought review of the decision in this court. In late

December 2005, Plaintiff reached a settlement with the FCDCFS,

which was subsequently dismissed from this suit. (See Doc. 28,

filed Dec. 20, 2005.) 

5

¶13.) Although home schooling resulted in some improvements,

Plaintiff’s parents felt that home schooling increased

Plaintiff’s isolation from his peers. (Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff

was subsequently re-enrolled in a CUSD school for his seventh

grade. (Id. at ¶14.)

During Plaintiff’s seventh grade year, the IEP team placed

Plaintiff in CUSD’s Intermediate Intervention Program (“IIP”). 

Like EIP, IIP is designed for students with severe emotional

disturbances. Plaintiff alleges the IIP also provided services

that “were inappropriate for Plaintiff’s disabilities,” including

a mandatory referral to FCDCFS, despite the fact that FCDCFS

refused to diagnose the disability of autism and thus to provide

services appropriate for Plaintiff’s disability. (Id. at ¶15.) 

Throughout his seventh grade year, Plaintiff’s parents continued

to receive reports from CUSD that Plaintiff’s behavior problems

increased in frequency, intensity and duration. (Id. at 16.)

M.J.’s parents pursued a due process proceeding against both

CUSD and FCDCFS before the California Special Education Hearing

Office on January 27, 2005. On the first day of the hearing,

before the hearing was concluded, Plaintiff entered into a

settlement agreement with CUSD, and CUSD was dismissed as a

defendant. (Id. at ¶18.) 

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Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that CUSD failed to

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adhere to its obligations under the settlement agreement. 

Subsequently, an IEP meeting was convened, at which time CUSD

offered virtually the identical services and placement options

that had been the subject of the due process proceeding. (Id. at

20.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result his “Parents were forced

out of the CUSD system and to this date Plaintiff has yet to

receive the [FAPE].” (Id.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction (Fed. R. Civ. Pro 12(b)(1)).

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They

possess only that power authorized by Constitution and

statute....It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this

limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary

rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)(internal

citations omitted); see also Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a

Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001)(plaintiff

bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction).

A motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds can be “either

facial or factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.

2000). In a facial attack, a court must “take all of the

allegations of material fact stated in the complaint as true and

construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” See Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir.

2002). In a factual challenge, “a court may look beyond the

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complaint to matters of public record without having to convert

the motion into one for summary judgment...It also need not

presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs’ allegations.” White,

227 F.3d at 1243.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Fed. R.

Civ. Pro 12(b)(6)).

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it

“appears beyond doubt that the non-movant can prove no set of

facts to support its claims.” Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc.,

452 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, dismissal

can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory. SmileCare

Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783

(9th Cir. 1996). In evaluating such a motion “[a]ll allegations

and reasonable inferences are taken as true, and the allegations

are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, but conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” 

Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1046. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Scope of the Leave to Amend Granted Plaintiff. 

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff did not have leave to

amend to add any claims other than a “stay put claim.” Plaintiff

responds that “both the Court’s statements at the hearing on

Defendant’s motion to dismiss... and the order granting

Defendant’s motion provided leave for Plaintiff to amend to

allege any and all causes of action that he might have against

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Defendant.” (Doc. 39 at 1 n.1.) Plaintiff is incorrect. The

order granting Defendant’s prior motion to dismiss first found

that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction

over the only then-remaining claim, Plaintiff’s request for a

declaratory judgment that the settlement agreement had been

breached. (Doc. 32 at 3-8.) The court then analyzed Plaintiffs’

specific request for leave to amend his complaint to assert a

motion to stay put, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). While

finding “persuasive” CUSD’s suggestion that it would be futile

for Plaintiff to bring a stay put claim, the district court

concluded: 

Nevertheless, it is impossible to determine in the

abstract whether any of these arguments will ultimately

operate to bar Plaintiff’s proposed stay put claim. In

view of the liberal policy favoring amendment and

because unintended delay by the court in issuing this

ruling should not prejudice either party, Plaintiff is

granted leave to amend his complaint.

[] CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, CUSD’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amendment

shall be filed with twenty (20) days following the date

of service of this decision.

Although the language used under the conclusion heading is

generic, the reasoning of the order expresses the intent to grant

Plaintiff leave to allege only a stay put claim. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff correctly notes that during oral

argument on the first motion to dismiss, the district court

tentatively indicated an intent to grant Plaintiff broader leave

to amend as to all claims. (Transcript of Oct. 31, 2005 hearing,

at 13-16.) Therefore, it is appropriate to construe Plaintiff’s

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opposition to this second motion to dismiss as a motion for leave

to amend his complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1(a)5

explains that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice

so requires.” For example, leave to amend is warranted where

there has been an intervening change in the applicable law. See

Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 530 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Here, Plaintiff suggests that there has been a change in law

since he filed his first amended complaint. Specifically,

Congress amended the IDEA in 2005 to include certain provisions

regarding federal court jurisdiction over certain types of

special education settlement agreements. See 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(e)(2)(F). Although Defendant disputes whether these

amendments apply to the settlement agreement in this case, the

change in law justifies at least examining whether the new

amendments change the jurisdictional analysis. Treating

Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the existence of new law as a

motion for leave to amend, amendment is justified and analysis of

the merits of the motion to dismiss as to all claims is

warranted.

Assuming, arguendo, that the district court has jurisdiction

to adjudicate the declaratory judgment claim and further assuming

that the settlement agreement is set aside, the district court

might have jurisdiction to adjudicate some, if not all, of

Plaintiff’s IDEA, Section 504, ADA, and Unruh act allegations. 

Whether the declaratory relief claim, or any of the other claims,

survive this motion to dismiss is discussed below.

B. Motion to Dismiss.

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1. Declaratory Relief Re: Breach of Settlement

Agreement.

The district court previously found that it did not have

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim,

concluding that the claim was essentially a state law claim for

breach of contract. (Doc. 32 at 4.) Plaintiff now reasserts

essentially the same claim, relying on the 2005 amendments to the

IDEA. Although it is not entirely clear on which provision(s)

Plaintiff relies, in a cryptic footnote, Plaintiff points to 20

U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). (Doc. 39 at 6.) To understand what

this provision means, it is helpful to consider it in the context

of the amended section as a whole, which sets up several

alternative means of dispute resolution. First, subsection (e)

describes a mediation system:

(e) Mediation

 (1) In general

Any State educational agency or local educational agency

that receives assistance under this subchapter shall

ensure that procedures are established and implemented

to allow parties to disputes involving any matter,

including matters arising prior to the filing of a

complaint pursuant to subsection (b)(6) of this section,

to resolve such disputes through a mediation process.

(2) Requirements

Such procedures shall meet the following requirements:

(A) The procedures shall ensure that the mediation

process--

(i) is voluntary on the part of the parties;

(ii) is not used to deny or delay a parent's right to

a due process hearing under subsection (f) of this

section, or to deny any other rights afforded under

this subchapter; and

(iii) is conducted by a qualified and impartial

mediator who is trained in effective mediation

techniques.

***

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(F) Written agreement

In the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the

complaint through the mediation process, the parties

shall execute a legally binding agreement that sets

forth such resolution and that--

(i) states that all discussions that occurred during

the mediation process shall be confidential and may not

be used as evidence in any subsequent due process

hearing or civil proceeding;

(ii) is signed by both the parent and a representative

of the agency who has the authority to bind such

agency; and

(iii) is enforceable in any State court of competent

jurisdiction or in a district court of the United

States.

***

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(emphasis added). The underlined portion

explains that, if a resolution is reached through mediation, the

parties must execute an agreement that, among other things, is

“enforceable in any...district court of the United States.” 

Prior to the 2005, amendments, the language of subsection (e) was

substantially similar to its current form, except that the

language conferring jurisdiction upon the federal district courts

to enforce settlement agreements reached through the mediation

process was not present. See P.L. 105-17 (June 4, 1997). 

Plaintiff directly relies upon similar language found in

sub-section (f), which provides in pertinent part: 

(f) Impartial due process hearing

 (1) In general

(A) Hearing

Whenever a complaint has been received under subsection

(b)(6) or (k) of this section, the parents or the local

educational agency involved in such complaint shall have

an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing,

which shall be conducted by the State educational agency

or by the local educational agency, as determined by

State law or by the State educational agency.

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(B) Resolution session

(i) Preliminary meeting

Prior to the opportunity for an impartial due process

hearing under subparagraph (A), the local educational

agency shall convene a meeting with the parents and the

relevant member or members of the IEP Team who have

specific knowledge of the facts identified in the

complaint--

(I) within 15 days of receiving notice of the

parents' complaint;

(II) which shall include a representative of the

agency who has decisionmaking authority on behalf of

such agency;

(III) which may not include an attorney of the local

educational agency unless the parent is accompanied

by an attorney; and

(IV) where the parents of the child discuss their

complaint, and the facts that form the basis of the

complaint, and the local educational agency is

provided the opportunity to resolve the complaint,

unless the parents and the local educational

agency agree in writing to waive such meeting, or

agree to use the mediation process described in

subsection (e) of this section.

***

(iii) Written settlement agreement

In the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the

complaint at a meeting described in clause (i), the

parties shall execute a legally binding agreement that

is--

(I) signed by both the parent and a representative of

the agency who has the authority to bind such agency;

and

(II) enforceable in any State court of competent

jurisdiction or in a district court of the United

States.

***

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(emphasis added). Plaintiff asserts that the

underlined language confers jurisdiction upon this court to

adjudicate his dispute with CUSD over CUSD’s compliance with the

settlement agreement reached prior to the due process hearing. 

But, the plain language of § 1415(f) indicates that it only

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applies to resolutions reached during a “resolution session” that

satisfies the terms of § 1415(f)(i). Unlike the mediation

process set forth in subsection (e), which existed prior to the

2005 amendments, the entire “resolution session” section, subpart

(f), was added by the 2005 amendments to IDEA. Therefore, it is

arguably impossible for a settlement agreement reached prior to

the 2005 amendments to be covered by § 1415(f).

In support of his position that these amendments confer

jurisdiction upon the district court to resolve his declaratory

relief claim, Plaintiff cites an unpublished decision in which

this provision was applied: C.T. ex rel. D.T. v. Vacaville

Unified Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 2092613 *6-7 (E.D. Cal., July 27,

2006). In C.T, the plaintiff sought to enforce a settlement

agreement that was allegedly made under the pre-2005 mediation

provision (subsection (e)). The C.T. court assumed, in the

context of a motion to dismiss, that the settlement agreement had

been entered into pursuant to the mediation process as alleged. 

Examining the statutory language, the C.T. court concluded that

the relevant language in subsection (e) expressed Congress’

unequivocal intent “to confer jurisdiction upon federal courts

and an express right of action to parties over claims arising

from agreements made pursuant to § 1415(e)(2).” Although the

settlement agreement in C.T. was reached during a mediation

session in May 2004, id. at *2, prior to the addition of the

language conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts, the

remainder of the mediation provision was in place as of 2004 in

substantially the same form. 

Plaintiffs do not here allege that the settlement agreement

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in this case was reached during a formal mediation session under

§ 1415(e)(2). Rather, Plaintiffs suggest that the settlement

agreement falls under the current“resolution session,” language

now contained in § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). However, as discussed, the

pre-2005 § 1415 contained no language referring to a “resolution

session.” It is not reasonable to assume that Congress intended

to confer jurisdiction retroactively upon the federal courts for

settlement agreements made prior to the 2005 amendments simply

because the agreements were concluded prior to the due process

hearing. The judicial provision was added to confer jurisdiction

precisely because such jurisdiction did not previously exist. 

The process of conducting a “resolution session” was described

for the first time in the 2005 amendments. C.T. is

distinguishable.

Congress specifically indicated that only those settlement

agreements reached “at a meeting described in clause (i) [a

resolution session, with specific procedural requirements]”

should be “enforceable...in a district court of the United

States.” Another district court, construing a similar argument

based on the same language, rejected a party’s contention that

the specific jurisdictional language contained in §§ 1415(e) and

(f) should be extended to settlement agreements reached in other

contexts. Bowman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2221703

(D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2006). The district court in Bowman reasoned: 

Perhaps it is true, as plaintiffs suggest, that a

district court's exercise of subject matter

jurisdiction over disputes involving settlement

agreements like those in this case would be "a logical

extension," Pls.' Opp'n at 4, of the jurisdictional

provisions in § 1415 and would advance Congress's goal

of facilitating non-judicial resolution of

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IDEIA-related disputes. But it is not the role of the

courts to append new provisions to statutes whenever

doing so might comport with some of Congress's goals.

See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998);

Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069, 1081 (D.C.Cir.1984).

This is especially true when other parts of the Act

indicate that Congress also wanted to encourage

plaintiffs to resolve their disputes only through

certain formal administrative procedures. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(D)(ii) (forbidding the awarding of attorneys'

fees relating to an IEP Team meeting "unless such

meeting is convened as a result of an administrative

proceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of

the State, for a mediation described in subsection (e)

of this section."). The language that plaintiffs rely

on is not ambiguous, nor would its literal application

produce absurd or unjust results. Consequently, there

is no reason to go beyond the application of the law as

written. The court therefore declines to confer

jurisdiction on itself where Congress has not done so.

Id. at *2. 

 Section 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) does not alter the jurisdictional

picture discussed in the prior memorandum decision. The district

court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s

allegation that CUSD breached the settlement agreement, entered

into prior to the effective date of the 2005 amendments and

outside the framework of any alternative dispute resolution

procedure previously or currently described in § 1415. 

2. IDEA Claims.

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that CUSD violated

the IDEA by failing to provide Plaintiff a FAPE during the 2001-

02, 2002-03, and 2003-04 school years. (SAC ¶¶ 24-28.) The

second cause of action alleges that CSUD violated the IDEA by

failing to adhere to the settlement agreement. (SAC ¶¶ 29-35.) 

Because the district court cannot determine whether the

settlement agreement has been breached, it also arguably cannot

adjudicate either of these claims, both of which turn on the

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validity of the settlement. The second cause of action directly

relies upon the premise that the settlement agreement is void

because of CUSD’s alleged breach. The first cause of action

alleges CUSD’s pre-settlement conduct violates IDEA. Any such

claims are barred until the still-operative settlement agreement

is declared void. 

Nevertheless, even if these claims were not barred for this

reason, Plaintiff’s IDEA claims must be dismissed on other

grounds. 

a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

IDEA provides that: 

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict

or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available

under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.], title V of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791 et

seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of

children with disabilities, except that before the

filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief

that is also available under this subchapter, the

procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this

section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would

be required had the action been brought under this

subchapter.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). This provision has been interpreted by the

Ninth Circuit to mean that if a plaintiff has alleged injuries

that could be “redressed to any degree by the IDEA's

administrative procedures and remedies...exhaustion of those

remedies is required.” Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. #403, 308 F.3d

1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). “Exhaustion of the administrative

process [in IDEA cases] allows for the exercise of discretion and

educational expertise by state and local agencies, affords full

exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development

of a complete factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency by

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giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct

shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled

children.” Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298,

1303 (9th Cir. 1992).

Whether exhaustion is required in particular circumstances

requires that a court examine the “nature of the alleged

injuries,” rather than “the specific remedy requested.” Robb,

308 F.3d at 1050. “Where the IDEA’s ability to remedy a

particular injury is unclear, exhaustion should be required to

give educational agencies an initial opportunity to ascertain and

alleviate the alleged problem.” Id. 

Here, the injuries alleged in Plaintiff’s first and second

claims all concern CUSD’s failure to provide him with a FAPE. 

This is an injury that can be redressed by IDEA’s procedures. 

Therefore, exhaustion is required. The question then becomes

whether Plaintiff has either complied with the exhaustion

requirement or is otherwise relieved of the responsibility. 

With respect to compliance, it is undisputed that Plaintiff

dismissed CUSD as a party on the first day of the due process

hearing, which concerned the 2001-2002 through 2003-2004 school

years, before the hearing was completed. (SAC at ¶¶ 17-18.) 

Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies with

respect to his first cause of action.

Plaintiff also alleges in his second cause of action that

CUSD failed to provide Plaintiff with a FAPE after entering into

(and then allegedly breaching) the settlement agreement. These

claims are also subject to the exhaustion requirement, as the

allegation (that CUSD’s conduct failed to provide a FAPE) may be

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redressed by IDEA’s administrative procedures. There is no

evidence indicating that Plaintiff has pursued administrative

remedies with respect to any post-settlement conduct. 

A party need not exhaust IDEA’s administrative processes

where resort to those processes would either be futile or

inadequate. Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303-04. Here, Plaintiff argues

that pursuing his administrative remedies would be futile because

the California Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) has

determined that it has no jurisdiction to address compliance with

settlement agreements entered into pursuant to the IDEA. See

C.T., 2006 WL 2092613 at *8-*9 (finding that plaintiff was not

required to exhaust because OAH lacks jurisdiction to determine

that issue). Defendant rejoins by pointing to examples of cases

in which OAH has reviewed settlement agreements where they were

relevant to a party’s claims or defenses on the issue of a FAPE. 

See Vacaville Unif. Sch. Dist, OAH No. N2005070520. (Attached to

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice at Ex. A.) Critically,

even if Plaintiff is correct that OAH lacks jurisdiction to

review the settlement agreement, this only would excuse Plaintiff

from the requirement to exhaust his allegation that the

settlement agreement has been breached. This is wholly

irrelevant to the question of whether plaintiff must exhaust his

administrative remedies with respect to his underlying IDEA

claims, if the settlement agreement is set aside by a court. 

Plaintiff also argues that the exhaustion requirement should

be excused here because it is improbable that he can obtain

adequate relief within the administrative system. Plaintiff

contends that the administrative process would be inadequate

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because: 

Should [a court] ultimately determine that the

settlement agreement was breached, then, according to

CUSD, Plaintiff’s only remedy would be to reinitiate a

due process proceeding, raising all claims that were

previously released through the settlement agreement.

However, CUSD’s position would require the Plaintiff to

be bounced back and forth between federal court and OAH

– all due to the fact that CUSD failed to adhere to its

obligations under the settlement agreement. Such a

result is inequitable and would result in extraordinary

delays in the provision of educational services to

Plaintiff such that he would be harmed irreparably.

Plaintiff has already been without any services

provided by CUSD for well over a year and without

services designed to address his needs for over five

years. Plaintiff now has less then two years left of

his schooling in which to make up more than five years

of neglect on the part of CUSD. Requiring Plaintiff to

return to OAH to litigate the issues subject to the

settlement agreement would both irreparably harm

Plaintiff in his education and would not be adequate

relief for Plaintiff given the anticipated delay of

proceeding to OAH.

Moreover, such a circumstance would create the

undesirable incentive of discouraging students engaged

in special education due process hearings from settling

for fear that the district will simply breach the

agreement, force the student to court to have that

breach identified by a court and then shunted back to

OAH to begin the process anew.

(Doc. 39 at 8-9.) But, Plaintiff cites no authority for the

proposition that the delay that would result from remand to the

administrative system is sufficient to warrant a finding that the

administrative process would be “inadequate.” 

3. Section 504 & ADA Claims.

a. Cognizability of Plaintiff’s Legal Theory.

While IDEA provides a substantive right to a FAPE, Section

504 and the ADA prohibit intentional discrimination on the basis

of disability. Section 504 provides:

No otherwise qualified individual with a

disability...shall, solely by reason of her or his

disability, be excluded from the participation in, be

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CUSD mistakenly suggests that Plaintiff’s Section 504 2

and ADA claims should be dismissed because they are “uncertain”

in that they generally claim that CUSD has a “pattern, policy,

and practice” of failing to address the individual needs of its

autistic students. However, under the liberal pleading standard

set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, dismissal is not

warranted on this ground. 

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denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The ADA similarly provides:

[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

To make out a prima facie case under Section 504, he must

demonstrate that: (1) he “is a qualified individual with a

disability; (2) he “was denied the benefits of a program or

activity of a public entity receiving federal funds;” and (3) he

“was discriminated against based on [his] disability.” M.P. v.

Independent Sch. Dist., No. 721, New Prague, Minn., 439 F.3d 865,

867 (8th Cir. 2006)(citing Christopher S. v. Stanislaus County

Office of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2004)( district

wide policy shortening school day for autistic children stated a

claim under § 504). Although plaintiff correctly argues that he

is not required to plead all the elements of a prima facie case

in order to survive a motion to dismiss in federal court,2

dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory. 

SmileCare, 88 F3d at 783. 

CUSD argues that Plaintiff’s allegations that CUSD

discriminated against Plaintiff by denying him a FAPE or by

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otherwise failing to provide him with adequate services is not a

cognizable legal theory under either Section 504 or the ADA. 

First CUSD asserts that Section 504 never applies where a

plaintiff is merely alleging denial of a FAPE. Sellers by

Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of City of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th

Cir. 1998)(“To prove discrimination in the education context,

‘something more than a mere failure to provide [a FAPE] required

by IDEA must be shown.”). However, if a plaintiff alleges “that

they were excluded from participation in the IDEA, denied the

benefits of the IDEA, or subjected to discrimination under the

IDEA, solely by reason of their disability,” this might support a

claim under § 504. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 372 F. Supp. 2d 591, 603

(D. Haw. 2005). Here, to the extent that Plaintiff is arguing

that he was subject to discrimination under the IDEA because he

is autistic, as opposed to having a type of disability for which

appropriate services are routinely provided, he has stated a

cognizable § 504 claim. Because the ADA regulations adopt the

standards found in § 504, see 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a), the same

conclusion applies to his ADA claim.

b. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

To the extent that Plaintiffs seek relief that is also

available under the IDEA, Rehabilitation Act claims and ADA

claims are subject to the same exhaustion of administrative

remedies requirement as relief that sought under the IDEA. The

exhaustion requirement contained within the IDEA is: 

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict

or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available

under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.], title V of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791 et

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seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of

children with disabilities, except that before the

filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief

that is also available under this subchapter, the

procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this

section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would

be required had the action been brought under this

subchapter.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). Here, Plaintiff’s Section 504 and ADA

claims are based on the same conduct that is the subject of their

IDEA claims for which relief is available under IDEA. See also

Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 51-52 (1st Cir.

2000)(requiring plaintiff to exhaust IDEA procedures before

filing retaliation claim under Section 504).

Exhaustion may be excused when an ADA or § 504 claim alleges

a “systemic” violation of the IDEA, but, to qualify as

“systemic,” the alleged violation must “implicate[] the integrity

or reliability of the IDEA dispute resolution procedures

themselves, or require[] restructuring the education system

itself in order to comply with the dictates of the Act.” Doe v.

Ariz. Dept. of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff has not alleged such a systemic failure. 

For the same reason that Plaintiff’s IDEA claims must be

dismissed for failure to exhaust, dismissal of his section 504

and ADA claims is required.

4. Unruh Act Claim.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that CUSD’s conduct violates

California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, which provides, in pertinent

part: 

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are

free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race,

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color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability,

medical condition, marital status, or sexual

orientation are entitled to the full and equal

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or

services in all business establishments of every kind

whatsoever.

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(a). 

a. Uncertainty.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Unruh act claim must be

pled with the specificity that would be required if the claim had

been brought in state court. Under California’s Tort Claims Act,

“every fact material to the existence of [a public entity’s]

statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity.” Lopez

v. S. Cal. Rapid Tansit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 795 (1985). But, 

the liberal notice pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8 applies to claims brought under the Unruh Act

in federal court. See Marsh v. San Diego County, 432 F. Supp. 2d

1035, 1059 (S.D. Cal. 2006).

b. Failure to “Establish a Prima Facie Case.”

Defendant next asserts that Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim

fails because Plaintiff has not alleged that he was treated

differently than a non-disabled individual and because he has not

pleaded that CUSD intentionally discriminated against him. Again

it is not necessary for Plaintiff to plead all of the elements of

his discrimination claims.

c. Exhaustion

CUSD also argues that exhaustion is required for Plaintiff’s

Unruh Act claim. Although acknowledging that the Unruh Act

itself contains no exhaustion requirement, CUSD asserts that

exhaustion is nevertheless required because it is required under

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the IDEA. The relevant provision of the IDEA that requires

exhaustion in Rehabilitation Act and ADA cases provides: 

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict

or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available

under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.], title V of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791 et

seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of

children with disabilities, except that before the

filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief

that is also available under this subchapter, the

procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this

section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would

be required had the action been brought under this

subchapter.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). This provision specifically concerns

“rights, procedures, and remedies available under the

Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42

U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791 et seq.], or other Federal laws

protecting the rights of children with disabilities....” It does

not address state laws that might protect children with

disabilities. CUSD points to no other authority that requires

exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to the filing of

Plaintiff’s Unruh act claim. Whether it is appropriate for this

court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law

claim is a separate question that is addressed below. 

d. Treble Damages

CUSD also argues that Plaintiff “fails to state a claim for

treble damages.” This contention is construed as a motion to

strike the request for treble damages. 

California Government Code § 818 permits a plaintiff who

alleges injury caused by a public entity to recover actual, but

not punitive, damages for that injury. See Kizer v. County of

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San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d 139, 145 (1991). CUSD is a public entity

entitled to the protection of § 818. Treble damages provisions

in specific statutes are not intended to abridge the § 818

protection unless the legislature expressly states an intention

to do so. Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation, 39 Cal. 4th

1164, 1196 (2006)(finding that treble damages provision found

within California’s False Claims Act did not abridge public

entity’s immunity from punitive damages set forth in § 818). 

The relevant damages provision in the Unruh Act specifies

that any defendant who is liable under the Unruh act, is “liable

for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any amount

that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a

jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage

but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any

attorneys’s fees that may be determined by the court in addition

thereto....” Cal. Civil Code § 52. This provision expresses no

intention to apply a punitive damages provision to a public

entity. Therefore, under Wells, § 52 does not abridge the

protections contained within California Government Code § 818. 

Treble damages are not available against CUSD. The allegations

for treble damages are stricken.

5. Exercise of Suppemental Jurisdiction.

Having found that the district court does not have federal

question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim

and that Plaintiff’s federal claims, brought under IDEA, Section

504, and the ADA, must be dismissed for failure to exhaust, the

remaining question is whether the district court should exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh act claim and/or

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his state law claim for breach of contract.

In response to the last round of motions to dismiss in this

case, where all federal causes of action had been dismissed, the

district court reasoned:

A district court may, in its discretion, decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims when all remaining federal claims have been

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). It is

appropriate to decline Supplemental jurisdiction under

§ 1367(c)(3) when it serves objectives of economy,

convenience and fairness to the parties, and comity. 

Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health,

et al. v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maintenance, Inc.,

333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Among other considerations, “[n]eedless decisions of

state law should be avoided.” Id.

Kokkonen provides guidance. There, Kokkonen filed suit

in state court against an insurance company for

terminating his general agency agreement. The

defendant removed the case to federal court on the

basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 376. The case

was resolved by a settlement agreement, but the

agreement did not provide that the district court

retain enforcement jurisdiction. Id. at 376. Later,

the parties disagreed over the scope of certain

obligations created by the settlement agreement. 

Kokkonen moved in the district court to enforce the

agreement’s terms. The Defendant objected on

jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court examined

whether it was appropriate for the district court to

exercise ancillary jurisdiction, a doctrine that

“recognizes federal courts’ jurisdiction over some

matters (otherwise beyond their competence) that are

incidental to other matters properly before them.” 

Generally ancillary jurisdiction is asserted “for two

separate, though sometimes related, purposes: (1) to

permit disposition by a single court of claims that

are, in varying respects and degrees, factually

interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function

successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings,

vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” 

Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted). Although the

judicially created doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction

is not exactly parallel to the statutory factors to be

considered in deciding whether to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s reasoning is

instructive. Applying the two ancillary jurisdiction

factors, the Court reasoned that “the facts underlying

[the] dismissed claim for breach of [the] agency

agreement and those underlying [the] claim for breach

of the settlement agreement have nothing to do with

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each other; it would neither be necessary nor

particularly efficient that they be adjudicated

together.” Id. at 380.

Plaintiff suggests that there are practical

considerations here that warrant departure from

Kokkonen’s reasoning. Essentially, Plaintiff maintains

that forcing his declaratory judgment action back to

state court would needlessly complicate the course of

the litigation:

If, as CUSD suggests, Plaintiff’s action may only

be maintained in state court, then Plaintiff will

be forced to file a state court action declaring

CUSD’s consideration under the Settlement

Agreement forfeit[]. If Plaintiff is successful,

then Plaintiff will be forced to take two parallel

routes[:] (1) to refile a due process [state

administrative] proceeding against CUSD in order

to demonstrate that CUSD violated the IDEA and to

obtain an order requiring CUSD to provide services

since it refuses to do so in accordance with the

Settlement Agreement; and (2) to refile a

discrimination claim in this [c]ourt for the

violations of law by FRESNO COUNTY which CUSD is

rightfully held liable for under the IDEA and

Section 504.

(Doc. 20 at 4.) 

Plaintiff’s argument has some practical merit. It

might be more efficient for the claim to enforce the

settlement agreement to remain in federal court if, at

the end of the day, Plaintiff has to return to federal

court to ultimately adjudicate his rights under the

DEA. However, the IDEA’s statutory scheme is set up to

give the state administrative system the first chance

to correct any mistakes in administration of federally

funded programs for special needs students. See Hoeft

v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303

(9th Cir. 1992)(“Exhaustion of the administrative

process [in IDEA cases] allows for the exercise of

discretion and educational expertise by state and local

agencies, affords full exploration of technical

educational issues, furthers development of a complete

factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency by

giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct

shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled

children.”).

The settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and CUSD

dismissed CUSD as a defendant from the state due

process administrative hearing before that hearing was

completed. As Defendant correctly points out, even if

the settlement agreement is nullified, Plaintiff would

not be eligible to directly return to federal court. 

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Plaintiff also suggests that he “will simply need to 3

amend his action in federal court in order to allege a

discrimination claim against CUSD for the violations of law by

Fresno county which CUSD is rightfully held liable for under the

IDEA and Section 504.” (Doc. 20 at 4.) But, Plaintiffs offer no

authority to support the proposition that any such claim would be

exempt from the exhaustion requirements. 

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First, Plaintiff would be required to exhaust his

administrative remedies against CUSD. See id.; see 3

also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). The existence of this

exhaustion requirement in connection with the

“traditionally strong state and local interest in

education, as reflected in the statute's emphasis on

state and local responsibility,” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at

1302, counsel against the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal declaratory

relief claim. 

Nothing has changed since the issuance of that ruling to

warrant a different conclusion. For all these reason,

supplemental jurisdiction will not be exercised over either

Plaintiff’s Unruh act claim or his state-law breach of settlement

agreement claim.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint is dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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