Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-05239/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-05239-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TURTLE ISLAND RESTORATION NETWORK and

MAYPORT VILLAGE CIVIC ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Defendant. /

No. 09-5239 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS 

(Docket No. 17)

 Plaintiffs Turtle Island Restoration Network (TIRN) and

Mayport Village Civic Association allege that Defendant United

States Department of State does not satisfy its obligations under

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered

Species Act (ESA) when it certifies that foreign nations meet the

requirements of section 609(b)(2) of Public Law 101-162, 103 Stat.

988, 1037-38 (Nov. 21, 1989) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 note). 

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs oppose

the motion. The motion was heard on June 3, 2010. Having

considered oral argument and all the papers submitted by the

parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion. 

BACKGROUND

Passed by Congress in 1989, section 609(b)(1) of Public Law

101-162 bans the importation of shrimp harvested with technology

that may adversely affect sea turtles. 103 Stat. at 1037. Under

section 609(b)(2), this ban “shall not apply if the President shall

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determine and certify to the Congress” that

(A) the government of the harvesting nation has provided

documentary evidence of the adoption of a regulatory

program governing the incidental taking of such sea

turtles in the course of such harvesting that is

comparable to that of the United States; and

(B) the average rate of that incidental taking by the

vessels of the harvesting nation is comparable to the

average rate of incidental taking of sea turtles by

United States vessels in the course of such harvesting;

or

(C) the particular fishing environment of the harvesting

nation does not pose a threat of the incidental taking of

such sea turtles in the course of such harvesting.

103 Stat. at 1038. The certification authority under section

609(b)(2) has been delegated to Defendant. Delegation of Authority

Regarding Certification of Countries Exporting Shrimp to the United

States, 56 Fed. Reg. 357 (Dec. 19, 1990). 

The certification process under section 609(b)(2) is

implemented through guidelines promulgated by Defendant. These

guidelines have been revised on several occasions since they were

first promulgated in 1991. The version currently in use was

promulgated in 1999. See generally Revised Guidelines for the

Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the

Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64

Fed. Reg. 36,946 (July 8, 1999) (1999 Guidelines). Since the

inception of the certification program, several parties have

challenged the various iterations of Defendant’s implementation

guidelines. 

In 1992, Earth Island Institute, of which TIRN was formerly a

part, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California,

asserting that Defendant had improperly implemented and

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administered the section 609(b)(2) certification process and had

not banned the importation of shrimp as required by section

609(b)(1). See generally Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d

648 (9th Cir. 1993) (Earth Island I). The district court dismissed

the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that

Earth Island’s challenge to section 609(b) fell within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of International

Trade (CIT). The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that section 609(b)

concerns an embargo on the importation of merchandise, which lies

within the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). 

Earth Island I, 6 F.3d at 651.

Earth Island then filed suit in the CIT, alleging that the

certification process, as provided for by the implementation

guidelines, did not comport with section 609. See Earth Island

Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 562 (CIT 1995) (Earth

Island II); see generally Revised Guidelines for Determining

Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in

Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 9,015 (Feb. 18, 1993)

(1993 Guidelines). Specifically, Earth Island complained that the

1993 Guidelines impermissibly restricted the geographical scope of

the ban imposed by section 609(b)(1). Id. at 562. Earth Island

also objected to how Defendant determined whether the incidental

taking of sea turtles was “comparable to that of the United

States.” Id. The court agreed that Defendant inappropriately

limited the areas to which the ban applied, but concluded that the

record did not, at that time, support a finding that the 1993

Guidelines contravened section 609(b)(2). Earth Island II, 913 F.

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Supp. at 579-80. 

In a subsequent suit, Earth Island, which TIRN eventually

replaced as a named plaintiff, asserted that Defendant’s 1999

Guidelines did not comport with section 609(b)(2). See generally

Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (CIT 1999); Turtle

Island Restoration Network v. Mallett, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (CIT

2000). In particular, TIRN complained that the 1999 Guidelines

impermissibly provided for a procedure through which shipments of

shrimp from uncertified countries could be imported into the United

States. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans, 284 F.3d

1282, 1286-87 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Earth Island III). Although the

CIT agreed with TIRN’s position, the Federal Circuit reversed,

concluding that the 1999 Guidelines reflected a reasonable

interpretation of section 609(b). Earth Island III, 284 F.3d at

1297. 

The 1999 Guidelines were promulgated in response to objections

raised by the World Trade Organization on behalf of foreign

countries that argued that section 609(b) violated the 1994 General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Earth Island III, 284 F.3d at

1289. Defendant intended the revisions contained therein “to

increase the transparency and predictability of the certification

process and to afford foreign governments seeking certification a

greater degree of due process.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 36,946. To this

end, the 1999 Guidelines define when the section 609(b)(1) ban

applies, list factors Defendant considers when certifying countries

under section 609(b)(2) and prescribe a timeline and procedures for

making certification decisions. Id. at 36,949-51. 

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In this action, TIRN and Mayport Village, a Florida-based

organization that represents the interests of businesses and

residents of Mayport, Florida, complain that Defendant’s

certification process violates the NEPA and the ESA. In

particular, Plaintiffs contend that the individual certification

decisions made pursuant to the 1999 Guidelines are “major federal

actions that have significant impacts on the human environment,”

requiring environmental review and public disclosure under the

NEPA. Compl. ¶¶ 30-31. Plaintiffs also assert that these

decisions may affect sea turtle species listed as threatened or

endangered under the ESA, triggering the consultation requirement

under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Plaintiffs seek a declaration

that Defendant violates the NEPA and the ESA and an injunction

requiring Defendant to comply accordingly. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides,

“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to

delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly

establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of

fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.,

Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that, based on the final judgments in Earth

Island II and Earth Island III, res judicata bars TIRN’s claims in

this action. Because venue in this case is based on TIRN’s

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residence within this judicial district, Defendant asserts that

Mayport Village’s claims must be dismissed for improper venue. 

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to state a

claim. Alternatively, Defendant contends that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction because the CIT has exclusive

jurisdiction over claims arising out of the administration and

enforcement of section 609(b). 

I. Res Judicata

“Res judicata bars a suit when ‘a final judgment on the merits

of an action precludes the parties or their privies from

relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that

action.’” ProShipLine Inc. v. Aspen Infrastructures Ltd., 594 F.3d

681, 688 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94

(1980)). Res judicata applies “when there is ‘(1) an identity of

claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or

privity between parties.’” ProShipLine, 594 F.3d at 688 (quoting

Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). TIRN

does not dispute that Earth Island II and Earth Island III

constitute final judgments on the merits or that it is in privity

with Earth Island. 

To determine whether an identity of claims exists, a court

considers four factors: “(1) whether the two suits arise out of the

same transactional nucleus of facts; (2) whether rights or

interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or

impaired by prosecution of the second action; (3) whether the two

suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether

substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions.” 

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ProShipLine, 594 F.3d at 688 (citation omitted; emphasis in

original). “Whether two suits arise out of the ‘same transactional

nucleus’ depends upon ‘whether they are related to the same set of

facts and whether they could conveniently be tried together.’” Id.

(quoting W. Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1992))

(emphasis in original). “Reliance on the transactional nucleus

element is especially appropriate because the element is outcome

determinative.” ProShipLine, 594 F.3d at 689 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). 

An identity of claims exists between this action and the

earlier Earth Island litigation and, as a result, res judicata bars

TIRN’s current claims. TIRN complains here that Defendant fails to

comply with the NEPA or the ESA in the context of its certification

decisions. As explained above, the 1999 Guidelines prescribe the

factors Defendant considers in making certification decisions and

the procedures through which such decisions are made. The process

and, specifically, the 1999 Guidelines were at issue in Earth

Island III, and Plaintiff does not assert that either have

materially changed. 

At the time of that litigation, it was known that Defendant’s

process and the 1999 Guidelines did not require that, when it makes

certification decisions, it engage in the environmental review and

public disclosure that are required when the NEPA applies or the

consultation mandated when the ESA applies. As noted above,

Defendant intended the 1999 Guidelines to delineate for foreign

countries exactly what it considers when making certification

decisions. The 1999 Guidelines say nothing about an environmental

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1

 The 1999 Guidelines provide for consultation with other

federal agencies in limited circumstances. In assessing any

information on a country’s efforts to protect sea turtles outside

the context of “commercial shrimp trawl harvesting,” Defendant must

“rely on the technical expertise of [the U.S. National Marine

Fisheries Service] and, where appropriate, the US Fish and Wildlife

Service to evaluate threats to sea turtles and the effectiveness of

sea turtle protection programs.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 36,951. 

2 TIRN correctly asserts that “the CIT does not have

jurisdiction over cases involving only NEPA and ESA claims.” Opp’n

at 14. However, the CIT can hear such claims when they are plead

along with claims within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Defenders of

Wildlife v. Hogarth, 330 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Because the CIT had jurisdiction over the claims raised in the

litigation underlying Earth Island III, it could have heard TIRN’s

NEPA and ESA claims. 

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review or general consultation with other federal agencies.1 This

placed TIRN on notice that Defendant does not undertake these

procedures when certifying foreign countries. Thus, TIRN could

have raised its current claims in its prior litigation before the

CIT but chose not to do so.2

TIRN asserts that Defendant mischaracterizes its claims. It

argues that it is not challenging the 1999 Guidelines, but rather

Defendant’s “failure to act in compliance with NEPA and section 7

of the ESA.” Opp’n at 10. TIRN cannot artfully plead its NEPA and

ESA theories to elude the res judicata bar of its claims. American

Bird Conservancy v. FCC, 545 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008), which

addressed an attempt to plead around a jurisdictional bar, is

instructive. There, the plaintiffs filed suit under the ESA in

federal district court, asserting that “the FCC had not complied

with its statutory obligation to consult with the Secretary of the

Interior when it granted the registration applications for the

seven communications towers.” Id. at 1192. The district court

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dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, concluding that they were actually challenging the

FCC orders that granted the licenses, the exclusive review of which

was vested in the courts of appeals. Id. On appeal, American Bird

contended that it was not challenging the tower registrations, but

rather was objecting only “to the FCC’s failure to consult with the

Secretary before granting the tower registrations.” Id. at 1193

(emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’

“artful pleading,” stating, 

American Bird does not object to the agency’s failure to

consult in the abstract; rather, it identifies seven

discrete tower registrations that it alleges were not

supported by adequate environmental investigation. The

tower registrations are therefore inextricably

intertwined with the FCC’s obligation to consult with the

Secretary. American Bird recognizes as much; in its

notice of filing suit, it stated that it would “file

litigation to enforce the ESA’s requirements should the

FCC continue to authorize operation of the subject

structures in an unlawful manner.” American Bird cannot

elude the Communications Act’s exclusive review provision

by disguising its true objection to the tower

registrations as a “failure to act” claim.

Id. (emphasis and editing marks omitted). 

Similarly here, TIRN is objecting to Defendant’s failure to

act in compliance with the NEPA and the ESA when it certifies

foreign countries under section 609(b)(2). This failure to act is

in the context of Defendant’s certification process, as prescribed

by the 1999 Guidelines. The certification decisions, the process

through which they are made and the 1999 Guidelines prescribing the

process are, as in American Bird, inextricably intertwined. Thus,

even though TIRN phrases its current claims as challenges to

Defendant’s failure to comply with the NEPA and the ESA, its claims

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are in fact directed at the 1999 Guidelines. 

TIRN analogizes this case to Fund for Animals v. Lujan, in

which the Ninth Circuit held that res judicata did not bar the

plaintiff’s claims. 962 F.2d 1391, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). There,

the federal government defendants asserted that the action was

barred because the plaintiff, in earlier litigation, challenged a

1985 decision to allow bison to leave Yellowstone National Park. 

Id. at 1398. The court rejected this argument because the

plaintiff’s action concerned a 1990 bison management plan, which

the court stated differed “significantly from the passive conduct

of the named federal defendants in 1985 in failing to prevent bison

from leaving Yellowstone.” Id. at 1399. Because the two actions

challenged different conduct, res judicata did not apply. Id.

Here, in contrast, the same government conduct is at issue: the

procedures Defendant uses to certify nations under the 1999

Guidelines. As noted above, TIRN does not contend that either the

process or the 1999 Guidelines have materially changed since Earth

Island III was litigated. 

TIRN also cites Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. United

States Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2005), which is

equally inapposite. In a prior action, the plaintiff had alleged

that the Forest Service violated the NEPA by relocating a portion

of a trail without filing an environmental impact statement. Id.

at 690. The court concluded that this did not bar the plaintiff’s

subsequent suit, in which it complained that “parts of the trail

remain inside the Wilderness after the relocation.” Id. at 691

(emphasis in original). Unlike TIRN here, Hells Canyon challenged

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the defendant’s conduct following a change in the facts. No such

shift has occurred here. TIRN contends that it is challenging the

certification process under the NEPA and the ESA, not section

609(b)(2). However, Defendant has not altered how it determines

whether to certify foreign nations. This action does not reflect a

change in facts, but rather a different legal theory TIRN is

employing to challenge the 1999 Guidelines. 

Finally, TIRN contends that the recent NEPA and ESA violations

they allege could not have been raised in Earth Island II or Earth

Island III because they had not yet occurred. This is true to the

extent that Defendant makes certification decisions annually that,

according to TIRN, do not comply with the NEPA and the ESA. 

However, TIRN does not dispute that this challenge could have been

raised with respect to the 1999 Guidelines in the Earth Island III

litigation. By asserting legal theories that could have been

adjudicated earlier, TIRN impermissibly attacks the 1999 Guidelines

in a piecemeal fashion; allowing TIRN to do so would contravene the

purposes of res judicata. 

Accordingly, because TIRN’s claims arise from the same

transactional nucleus of facts as the previous Earth Island

litigation, res judicata bars its claims under the NEPA and the ESA

against Defendant’s 1999 Guidelines. Res judicata, however, does

not bar Mayport Village’s claims because it lacks privity with any

plaintiff in the previous Earth Island litigation. 

II. Improper Venue

Generally, a civil action in which a defendant is an agency of

the United States may “be brought in any judicial district in which

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(1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of

the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is

situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is

involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. 1391(e). 

Absent TIRN’s participation in the suit, Mayport Village does

not establish venue in the Northern District of California. 

Mayport Village may file suit in either the District of Columbia,

in which Defendant resides and a substantial part of the events

underlying this suit occurred, or in the Middle District of

Florida, in which it is a resident. 

Accordingly, Mayport Village’s claims are dismissed for

improper venue. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docket No. 17.) TIRN’s claims are

dismissed with prejudice as barred by res judicata. Mayport

Village’s claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in a

proper venue. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. The

parties shall bear their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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