Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00703/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00703-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the federal habeas corpus statute that permits a prisoner to challenge

his imprisonment on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States. See generally Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barry R. Schotz, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Craig Apker,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-09-703-TUC-FRZ (DTF)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241.1

 Petitioner, Barry R. Schotz, currently confined in

the Federal Prison Camp in Tucson, AZ, alleges that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to

apply the appropriate factors when designating Petitioner’s place of imprisonment, thereby

denying him placement in a Residential Re-entry Center (RRC); failed to request a transfer for

Petitioner; and abused its discretion by not considering RRC placements for inmates until the

last 17-19 months of an inmate’s sentence. Petitioner requests immediate consideration for

transfer to an RRC. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Ferraro for a Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are the Petition

and supporting Memorandum (Docs. 1, 5, 7, 8), Respondent’s Answer (Doc. 15), and

Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 17). The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

independent review of the record, dismiss the petition.

 SUMMARY OF THE CASE

Petitioner is serving a 189-month sentence, followed by 3 years of supervised release,

for wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (Doc. 15-1 at 9.) He is projected to be released

from prison via good time conduct on June 23, 2019. (Id.)

Petitioner was initially incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center, Rochester, Minnesota,

in October 2005. (Doc. 15-1 at 6; Doc. 1 at 89; Doc. 7 at 5.) In July 2006, Petitioner was

transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) at Big Spring, Texas, due to a BOP

reassignment of inmates. (Doc. 1 at 89; Doc. 15-1 at 6; Doc. 7 at 5.) In September 2009, after

Petitioner’s custody classification was designated as minimum, he was transferred to the camp

at the United States Penitentiary (USP), Tucson. (Doc. 7 at 5; Doc. 15-1 at 5.)

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Respondent contends Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to

filing the pending petition. In response, Petitioner contends that exhaustion would have been

futile.

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging any

circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Martinez v.

Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). The exhaustion prerequisite for filing a § 2241

petition is judicially created; it is not a statutory requirement. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533,

535 (9th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54!55 (1995).

Thus, “[b]ecause exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not jurisdictional.” Brown, 895 F.2d

at 535. If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the district court, in its discretion,

may either “excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits, or require the petitioner to

exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court.” Id.; McCarthy v. Madigan,

503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (“Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. . . .

But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.”

(internal citations omitted)), superceded on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

As discussed below, the Court finds that Petitioner exhausted only Claim 2. However,

because exhaustion is not jurisdictional and the petition is without merit, the Court finds it most

expedient to address the claims on the merits. 

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner’s general argument is that BOP has failed to consider placing him in a nonfederal facility, i.e., an RRC. Specifically, Petitioner alleges BOP failed to consider the

mandatory criteria under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) when addressing his designation/transfers, refused

to request a transfer for him, and has a policy of not considering RRC placement until the last

19 months of an inmate’s sentence. As pointed out by Petitioner in his Reply (Doc. 17),

Respondent did not address Petitioner’s three delineated arguments; rather, Respondent’s

Answer addressed only Petitioner’s general request for immediate RRC consideration (Doc. 15).

Claim 1

Petitioner alleges BOP failed to consider an RRC placement when designating him to

Rochester, Minnesota in October 2005; when transferring him to Big Spring, Texas in April

2006; when considering his near-home transfer request in August 2008; and when considering

his second near-home transfer request in March 2009. (Doc. 7 at 5.) Petitioner clarified in his

Reply that he never has made a direct request for placement in an RRC. (Doc. 17 at 2.)

Accordingly, Petitioner did not exhaust any part of this multi-part claim.

Petitioner asserts that, in designating and transferring him, BOP failed to apply the

mandatory factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) and categorically excluded considering an RRC

placement for him. Section 3621 provides, in relevant part:

(b) Place of imprisonment.--The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of

the prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or

correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability

established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or

otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which the person

was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable,

considering–

(1) the resources of the facility contemplated; 

(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; 

(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner; 

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence-- 

(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to

imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or 

(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as

appropriate; and 

(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission

pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.

. . . .

The Bureau may at any time, having regard for the same matters, direct the

transfer of a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another.

18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).

Petitioner has presented no evidence, either by declaration or document, demonstrating

that when BOP designated his place of incarceration it failed to consider the five factors in

violation of the statute. Moreover, Petitioner only alleges factor number 4 was not considered.

To support this argument Petitioner merely asserts BOP failed to consider the sentencing court’s

recommendation that he be housed near his family. Again, there is no evidence to support this

contention. The fact that he was not transferred to the only facility he considers close enough

to his family, does not indicate BOP failed to consider the court’s recommendation. Petitioner’s

assertions are not evidence, hence his argument that these transfers violated § 3621(b) is without

support.

Petitioner argues that the statute requires the BOP to consider ALL correctional facilities,

whether operated by BOP or “otherwise,” each time an inmate is designated to a facility. The

statute does not support that interpretation. Rather, BOP is required to consider five factors –

resources of facility under consideration, offense circumstances, prisoner characteristics,

sentencing court input, and Sentencing Commission policy statements – each time it designates

or transfers an inmate. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). By virtue of the fact that one of the criteria is the

resources of “the facility” contemplated, the statute necessarily envisions that BOP be assessing

one or a group of facilities, not every facility, at the time it applies the mandatory criteria. This

point is illustrated by Petitioner’s transfer requests. He requested a transfer to a specific facility

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 These requests were denied based on population pressure at BOP’s western region

facilities. (Doc. 1 at 76.) Petitioner alleges that this response necessarily proves that BOP did not

consider an RRC facility. As discussed above, nothing in the statute or any regulation or policy

requires that BOP consider alternative placements when an inmate requests a transfer to one specific

location.

- 5 -

– FCI Lompoc (or another low security western facility) in 2008 and 2009. BOP considered

these requests but denied them.2

 He was subsequently transferred to the camp at USP Tucson.

Nothing in § 3621(b) required BOP to consider an RRC placement when Petitioner requested

transfer to a BOP facility. Similarly, there is nothing in the record suggesting BOP did not

consider the five mandatory criteria when assessing Petitioner’s transfer requests.

Petitioner argues that BOP did not consider an RRC placement due to governing BOP

regulations, 28 U.S.C. §§ 570.20, 570.21. Petitioner is correct that those regulations previously

precluded RRC consideration if an inmate was beyond the last ten percent of his sentence.

However, they were invalidated for that reason. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180

(9th Cir. 2008). These regulations were subsequently revised and no longer preclude RRC

placement based on the remaining length of a prisoner’s sentence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 570.20, 570.21

(2010). In conjunction with that change, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum to

BOP on November 14, 2008, addressing inmate requests for RRC transfers more than twelve

months from the end of their sentences. (Doc. 15-1 at 17.) That memorandum informs BOP

staff that RRC placement is an option any time during an inmate’s prison sentence and, in

assessing such a request, staff should consider the five factors from § 3621(b). (Id. at 17-18.)

This memorandum is in accord with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that if transfer to an RRC is

requested, BOP must consider these same factors and cannot categorically exclude such

placement based on the length of an inmate’s sentence. Rodriguez, 541 F.3d at 1187. 

In sum, Petitioner has never requested RRC placement, the governing statutes and

regulations do not preclude such placement, and he has not demonstrated that he has ever been

denied such placement on the unlawful ground he alleges.

Claim 2

Petitioner alleges that, from July 17, 2006, to August 19, 2008, the warden refused to

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

request that the Designation and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC) transfer Petitioner. In

support of this claim, Petitioner cites generally the entirety of exhibit A, which is more than fifty

pages long. (Doc. 7 at 6; Doc. 1 at 16-67.) Based on review of that exhibit, the Court

ascertained the following relevant facts. Petitioner asked that the warden request a “nearerrelease” transfer for him to FCI Lompoc, California. His request was denied because he had

not served eighteen months in the general population at his current facility, FCI Big Spring,

Texas. (Doc. 1 at 31, 35.) However, on August 19, 2008, and March 16, 2009, the warden

requested a transfer on his behalf to FCI Lompoc or another “low” institution in the west. (Doc.

1 at 90, 92.) Petitioner completed a full round of administrative exhaustion on this issue in

2007. (Doc. 1 at 30-35; Doc. 15-1 at 15.)

To obtain a writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner must show that “[h]e is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or statutes of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

Petitioner has not alleged what federal law or constitutional provision was violated by the denial

of his transfer request, therefore, habeas relief is not available. Further, there is no remedy

currently available for the alleged violation. See Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 776 (9th

Cir. 1991) (dismissing a complaint as moot because the court was without power to grant the

requested relief). After the time period in which Petitioner alleges the violation occurred, up

to August 2008, the warden made two requests for Petitioner’s transfer. Petitioner subsequently

was transferred to the camp at USP Tucson. Additionally, Petitioner’s only requested relief in

his habeas petition – immediate consideration for RRC placement – has no relationship to this

claim.

Claim 2 fails because Petitioner has not alleged a federal violation and because Petitioner

does not seek, nor is there available, any remedy for the alleged violation.

Claim 3

Petitioner alleges that BOP policy violates 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) by precluding

consideration of RRC placement until the last 17 to 19 months of an inmate’s sentence.

Petitioner alleges that BOP calculates a “pre-release preparation date” based on ten percent of

the imprisonment term, and refuses to discuss RRC placement until that time. Petitioner has not

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Petitioner submitted a June 24, 2010 guidance memo addressing RRC placements for

pre-release inmates, pursuant to § 3624. (Docs. 19, 22.) Because he is not in “pre-release status” this

memo is irrelevant to his claim.

4

 A Program Statement is an internal, interpretive rule promulgated by the BOP. See

Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2008). Program Statement 7310.04 is available at

http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/7310_004.pdf (last viewed 1.1.10).

5 The term Community Corrections Center (CCC) was the previous term for what is now

referred to as a Residential Re-entry Center.

- 7 -

exhausted this claim.

The governing statutes and BOP policies do not support Petitioner’s argument. The

Ninth Circuit, in accord with several other circuits, held that BOP cannot categorically exclude

prisoners from consideration for placement in an RRC based on the length of their remaining

sentence. Rodriguez, 541 F.3d at 1187; see also Wedelstedt v. Wiley, 477 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir.

2007); Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir.

2006); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3rd Cir. 2005). Current statutes and

regulations are in compliance with these rulings. There is a statutory provision regarding

release that requires BOP to consider inmates for placement in an RRC for some portion of the

final year of their sentence.3

 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). However, the courts have said that language

does not restrict BOP from placing an inmate in an RRC prior to the final year of their sentence,

based on the criteria set forth in § 3621. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 541 F.3d at 1184-85. The release

statute was subsequently revised to provide, “[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to

limit or restrict the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under section 3621.” 18

U.S.C. § 3624(c)(4). 

Petitioner has not pointed to any regulations or BOP policy that precludes RRC

consideration prior to the last ten percent of an inmate’s sentence. The regulations that used to

provide such a restriction were held invalid and revised to remove the prohibitory language.

See 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20, 570.21. Additionally, Program Statement 7310.044

 clarifies that “the

Bureau is not restricted by § 3624(c) in designating a CCC5

 for an inmate and may place an

inmate in a CCC for more than” the last ten percent of the sentence or more than six months.

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Id. at 4. Finally, governing regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 570.22, and BOP policy (Doc. 15-1 at 18)

provide that when BOP considers an inmate for placement in an RRC, it is to utilize the five

factors sets forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).

The only document Petitioner cites in support of this claim is a February 6, 2009 form,

called “Life Skills Development Plan.” The only relevant item on this form is one line that

states he is not eligible for RRC due to his release date. (Doc. 1 at 68-69.) This form, with no

context or explanation, fails to establish BOP policy. Additionally, the form may reflect

Petitioner’s ineligibility for RRC pre-release placement under § 3624(c), while indicating

nothing about his eligibility to request transfer to an RRC. Petitioner confirmed that he has

never requested placement in an RRC, therefore, there is no basis for his allegation that BOP

refuses to consider him for that placement based on the remaining length of his sentence.

Petitioner has failed to establish that BOP policy violates 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), therefore,

he is not entitled to relief.

C. Additional Filings

In addition to the briefs allowed in the Court’s scheduling order, Petitioner has filed

numerous additional documents. Many of these documents have been filed since briefing was

completed with the filing of Petitioner’s Reply on June 2, 2010 (Doc. 17).

On May 18, 2010, Petitioner requested a case status and the setting of a briefing

schedule. (Doc. 12.) After Petitioner received the Court’s May 13, 2010 scheduling order, he

withdrew his request for status (Doc. 14 at 2); therefore, the May 18 motion for status is moot.

Additionally, Petitioner clarified his claims and sought confirmation of service (Doc. 14), issues

that now also are moot.

Petitioner subsequently filed three motions seeking status and/or summary judgment.

(Docs. 18, 24, 29.) Because the Court is now ruling on his petition, the requests for status are

moot. (Docs. 18, 24.) Further, because Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his petition, the

motions for summary judgment should be denied. (Docs. 18, 24, 29.)

Petitioner also has filed three documents alleging retaliation for his legal work on behalf

of himself and other inmates. (Docs. 21, 23, 27.) Petitioner appears to be apprising the Court

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 To the extent Petitioner may be trying to set forth an independent claim for retaliation,

such a claim is not properly raised in a habeas petition, which addresses solely whether an inmate’s

custody violates federal law. 

- 9 -

of the alleged retaliation as support for the Court issuing an immediate ruling, rather than as a

basis for relief. These issues have no bearing on his entitlement to, and are not grounds for,

habeas relief.6

Petitioner filed multiple documents alleging that BOP is not providing him adequate

medical care. (Docs. 9, 25, 26, 28, 29.) He has clarified that he is not attempting to add a claim

for inadequate medical care; rather, he asserts that his medical issues highlight the need for BOP

to consider him for placement in an RRC. (Doc. 9 at 1; Doc. 25 at 2; Doc. 29 at 3.) Petitioner

has never requested that BOP consider RRC placement due to his medical issues nor is this

issue included in the petition. Additionally, deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs

is not a ground for habeas relief. Therefore, these filings are irrelevant to the pending petition.

The pending motions for status should be denied as moot (Docs. 12, 14, 18, 24) and the

motions for summary judgment should be denied because Petitioner is not entitled to relief

(Docs. 18, 24, 28).

CONCLUSION

BOP has considered Petitioner for transfers and has transferred him, however, he objects

to not being granted his highly specific request on his desired schedule. Petitioner has not

demonstrated that the failure to accommodate his requests or current BOP policy, generally or

as applied to him, is in violation of federal law. Although Petitioner seeks immediate

consideration for placement in an RRC, he has never requested such placement. Additionally,

Petitioner’s arguments are premised on old regulations and BOP policy that has been held

invalid and revised. For these reasons and the specific reasons discussed with respect to each

claim, Petitioner’s pending motions and the petition should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 7).

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 09-703-TUC-FRZ.

DATED this 6th day of December, 2010.

Case 4:09-cv-00703-FRZ Document 30 Filed 12/06/10 Page 10 of 10