Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-00877/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-00877-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No. 14-cv-00877-PSG

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUNG LAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00877-PSG

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW 

TRIAL

(Re: Docket No. 166)

On January 3, 2014, San Jose police officer Dondi West shot Hung Lam on his front lawn, 

rendering him a paraplegic.1 A jury found that West used unreasonable force against Lam, that 

she interfered with his exercise of constitutional rights and that she acted negligently towards him, 

even as it also found that she had not committed battery.

2

 Arguing that the jury’s verdict was both 

inconsistent and against the clear weight of the evidence, West and the City of San Jose now move 

for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).3 After considering the parties’ arguments and 

reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court cannot say that the weight of the evidence cuts 

so clearly in Defendants’ favor. Even if the jury’s verdict was internally inconsistent, the Ninth 

Circuit has long preserved to the jury the prerogative of issuing a legally irreconcilable general 

verdict.

4

 The motion is DENIED.

 

1

See Docket No. 171 at 496:20-497:25, 499:23-500:15; Docket No. 173 at 1092:2-11.

2

See Docket No. 139 at 2-3. The court bifurcated the trial between liability and damages phases; 

in the second phase, the jury awarded Lam $11.3 million in damages. See Docket No. 153 at 2.

3

See Docket No. 166.

4

See Wei Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035-37 (9th Cir. 2003); Int’l 

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I.

Lam filed this suit in February 2014, bringing claims against West in her individual and 

official capacities, the City of San Jose and Defendant Larry Esquivel in his capacity as San Jose 

police chief.

5

 Lam’s complaint included six causes of action: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for unreasonable force and malicious prosecution against West; (2) a claim under Section 1983 for 

inadequate training against Esquivel and the City of San Jose; (3) assault and battery against West; 

(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress against West; (5) a claim under Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 52.1, known as the Bane Act, against West and (6) negligence against West.6 After fact and 

expert discovery concluded, Defendants moved for summary judgment on both Section 1983 

claims,7and the court granted the motion only with respect to the claim against Esquivel and the 

City of San Jose.8 The remaining claims proceeded to trial.9

Although the parties disagree—to say the least—about many of the circumstances 

surrounding the shooting, some facts are undisputed. Two days beforehand, on New Year’s Day, 

2014, Lam was behaving erratically. He spent much of the day in the driveway of the San Jose 

house he shared with his boyfriend, Kevin Wade, refusing to go indoors because he was afraid 

there might be someone inside.

10

 Lam eventually called the police, who placed him under an

involuntary psychiatric hold at a hospital nearby.

11

 The hospital released Lam two days later.12 

 

Longshoremen’s Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 226 F.2d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1955).

5

See Docket No. 1.

6

See id. at ¶¶ 27-46.

7

See Docket No. 37.

8

See Docket No. 82.

9

See Docket No. 122.

10 See Docket No. 171 at 528:6-23, 529:8-530:8, 608:25-611:12.

11 See id. at 530:9-531:17, 611:20-614:3.

12 See id. at 531:5-17; 614:11-615:3.

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

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Seeing that Lam still seemed upset, Wade suggested that the two of them visit Lam’s family in 

Sacramento, and Lam agreed.13

When they stopped at home to pick up Lam’s clothes, though, Lam again started acting 

strangely, picking up a knife and looking for an intruder.14 Wade coaxed him outside, but Lam 

refused to leave and began threatening to cut himself with the knife.15 Lam had Wade’s phone, 

but Wade was able to flag down their next-door neighbors, Herman and Helen Anderson, to call 

the police.

16

 Herman Anderson went into his house and called 911, while Helen Anderson—a 

retired deputy sheriff—walked over to Lam, who was still standing on his lawn, and started 

talking to him.

17

 Anderson kept on her side of the lawn, which was easy to identify because the 

Andersons’ lawn was mostly dirt while Lam’s had grass.18 Wade stayed somewhere nearby; he 

remembers being on the lawn near Lam, but Anderson says that he actually was standing across 

the street.19 The conversation between Lam and Anderson was calm, but Lam still was agitated

and periodically motioned as if to cut his wrist.

20

West arrived on the scene a few minutes later,

21 responding to a police dispatch about an 

 

13 See id. at 531:19-535:20.

14 See id. at 536:15-539:14.

15 See id. at 541:8-543:11.

16 See id. at 548:11-549:25; Docket No. 172 at 763:4-764:19.

17 See Docket No. 171 at 550:5-552:15; Docket No. 172 at 761:1-14; 765:3-766:20, 767:2-768:9.

18 See Docket No. 171 at 569:18-23; Docket No. 172 at 780:9-18.

19 See Docket No. 171 at 551:5-9; Docket No. 172 at 766:21-767:1.

20 See Docket No. 171 at 551:20-553:25, 640:8-641:15; Docket No. 172 at 768:11-775:5. Lam 

himself did testify at trial, but he could recall little of the incident other than wanting to cut 

himself and feeling upset because he had not seen Wade during his two-day hold at the hospital. 

See Docket No. 173 at 1096:16-1103:19, 1115:6-1117:21.

21 See Docket No. 171 at 554:1-18; Docket No. 172 at 775:6-16.

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incident involving two men arguing, one armed with a knife.22 The dispatcher also mentioned that 

a female retired sheriff’s deputy—meaning Anderson—was talking to the man with the knife.23 

When West reached the scene, she got out of her squad car and moved quickly towards Lam with 

her gun drawn while ordering Anderson to get back and loudly commanding Lam to drop the 

knife.24 Later on, a second officer, Dan Phelan, joined West and then went back to the trunk of his 

squad car to retrieve a 40 mm “less-lethal” weapon.25

On the critical facts, however, the parties’ accounts differ dramatically. As West

remembered it, Lam first dropped his cell phone, which she initially thought was a knife, in 

response to her command, leaving his hands empty.

26 But when West approached Lam to subdue

him—with Phelan, who had arrived by then—Lam appeared to pull a knife out of his waistband.27 

West testified that she saw the knife and backed away, and Lam walked forwards, away from her, 

while poking the knife into his stomach; West interpreted that gesture to mean that Lam may have 

been suicidal.

28

 Phelan then went back to his car to retrieve the 40 mm weapon.

29

 When Lam

reached the driveway, however, West said that he began to walk towards her—at times moving

 

22 See Docket No. 170 at 254:22-24, 255:21-256:10, 331:22-24, 412:5-13; Docket No. 173 at 

1237:3-21.

23 See Docket No. 170 at 421:22-25, 432:24-433:10; Docket No. 173 at 1240:20-1241:6.

24 See Docket No. 170 at 436:4-9, 438:2-13, 450:17-451:24; Docket No. 171 at 554:1-25; Docket 

No. 172 at 775:6-778:15, 817:18-818:24; Docket No. 173 at 1246:17-25, 1249:15-23, 1253:1-5.

25 See Docket No. 170 at 256:21-257:6, 260:15-261:17, 264:5-7, 281:24-282:8, 283:5-7; Docket 

No. 171 at 487:2-23, 559:14-560:1. Anderson did not remember Phelan’s presence at all until 

after Lam was shot. See Docket No. 172 at 823:15-25, 824:11-14.

26 See Docket No. 170 at 450:11-451:22, 455:15-456:7; Docket No. 173 at 1257:22-1259:10.

27 See Docket No. 170 at 452:15-17, 453:12-454:10, 459:2-462:6; Docket No. 173 at 1260:9-

1262:14, 1264:23-1265:20, 1266:4-23, 1270:10-21.

28 See Docket No. 170 at 463:7-9, 464:4-15, 467:7-468:4; Docket No. 173 at 1266:2-3, 1267:10-

1268:23.

29 See Docket No. 170 at 465:22-466:7, 467:2-4; Docket No. 171 at 486:12-487:23; Docket No. 

173 at 1269:6-13.

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backwards while looking at her over his shoulder, and at times facing her.

30

 She retreated from 

him, but she felt her right foot hit a bush and could not go any further backwards.

31

 When Lam 

had gotten within eight to ten feet of her, West fired the first time.

32

 He turned around slightly and 

took a few more backwards steps towards her while looking over his shoulder at her.

33

 She fired 

again, and he fell.34

Anderson, who had a clear view of the entire incident,

35 recalled it very differently. She 

testified that she moved back about eight or ten feet when West asked her to.36 After that, 

Anderson said that West, while standing in or near the Andersons’ yard, ordered Lam to drop the 

knife and get down on the ground.37 Lam threw his cell phone down a few feet in front of him, 

turned away from West and started poking at his stomach with the knife.38 Anderson said that 

West, from a range of ten or fifteen feet, fired twice immediately afterwards, and Lam fell to the 

ground.

39

 Anderson estimated that the whole incident—from West’s arrival until the shooting—

took ten or fifteen seconds; “[i]t was a continuous movement from the time [West] got out of the 

car through telling [Anderson] to move, telling [Lam] to drop the knife . . . it was bang, bang, 

 

30 See Docket No. 171 at 494:22-496:15; Docket No. 173 at 1273:10-16, 1274:16-20, 1275:6-

1276:10. 

31 See Docket No. 171 at 502:3-503:9; Docket No. 173 at 1274:21-1275:20, 1279:14-1280:6.

32 See Docket No. 171 at 496:20-24; Docket No. 173 at 1281:16-22, 1284:2-12.

33 See Docket No. 171 at 496:25-497:8; Docket No. 173 at 1284:13-1285:12.

34 See Docket No. 171 at 497:9-10, 499:23-25, 500:6-15; Docket No. 173 at 1285:13-1286:23.

35 See Docket No. 172 at 779:7-12.

36 See id. at 777:24-778:10, 778:24-779:6, 816:18-21.

37 See id. at 779:13-16, 816:22-817:3, 818:10-819:7.

38 See id. at 779:17-780:5, 819:3-820:9, 822:2-22; Docket No. 174 at 1390:24-1391:8.

39 See Docket No. 172 at 784:25-785:22, 822:23-823:18, 824:15-17.

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bang, bang.”40 Anderson also said that Lam had the knife in his right hand the entire time and 

never pulled it from his waistband.41

Two other percipient witnesses offered their accounts at trial as well. Wade agreed with 

Anderson that Lam had the knife in his hand throughout the encounter.

42

 According to Wade, 

when West first arrived, she bore down on Lam while yelling commands at him, and Lam turned 

his back to her.

43

 Sometime after that, Wade said he moved across the street, from where he saw 

Phelan get the 40 mm weapon but not West shooting Lam.

44

 As far as Wade remembered, Lam 

always stood in the middle of his yard, while West stayed close to the Andersons’ yard.45

As for Phelan, he said that Lam’s hands were empty and in the air when Phelan arrived.

46

 

Phelan ran up beside West with his gun drawn, and West told him that Lam had dropped a knife.47 

But when the pair of officers approached Lam, West told Phelan that Lam now had a knife, and 

Phelan retreated to get the 40 mm weapon from his car.48 Phelan first saw the knife, which he 

described as pressed to Lam’s stomach, when he was running back to his vehicle.

49

 Phelan said 

 

40 Id. at 824:18-825:21; see id. at 797:9-20.

41 See id. at 809:3-24.

42 See Docket No. 171 at 557:6-19.

43 See id. at 559:4-11.

44 See id. at 559:14-561:2, 580:12-581:23, 603:3-5, 666:3-668:3.

45 See id. at 561:3-562:14, 582:22-583:2, 665:24-666:8, 684:17-22.

46 See Docket No. 170 at 262:24-263:24, 270:23-271:4.

47 See id. at 271:5-9, 272:15-16, 281:12-14.

48 See id. at 282:13-18.

49 See id. at 281:1-11, 281:21-23, 282:13-284:21.

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that Lam was moving throughout in an erratic pattern.

50

 In the moments when West shot Lam, 

however, Phelan did not remember Lam advancing towards West.51

The remaining evidence presented at trial—including physical and documentary evidence 

and expert testimony—was not conclusive in either direction. Photographic evidence did establish 

that Lam was shot only once, in the back.52 Most notably for the purposes of this motion, some of 

the evidence undercut Anderson’s account in some important respects. First, although Anderson 

recalled the whole incident occurring very quickly, a police radio recording shows that over a 

minute elapsed between when West arrived at the scene and when Phelan and West radioed that 

shots had been fired.53 Second, though Anderson said that neither West nor Lam moved 

significantly from where they stood when West first arrived, the cell phone was at least ten feet 

away from Lam when he fell.54 Furthermore, given the location of the shell casings, West could 

not have been standing where Anderson says West was when she fired.55

In their closing arguments, Defendants understandably made much of these 

contradictions.56 Nevertheless, the jury found for Lam on his claims under Section 1983, under 

the Bane Act and for common-law negligence.57 At the same time, the jury found for West on 

 

50 See id. at 264:8-14, 274:17-275:3.

51 See id. at 297:23-298:8, 307:14-23, 320:1-25.

52 See Trial Exs. 138, 139.

53 See Trial Ex. 103 at 2:54-4:20.

54 See Trial Exs. 3L, 3M (depicting the cell phone at the location marked “4,” whereas Lam fell 

near his clothes at the location marked “8”).

55 See Docket No. 174 at 1426:7-14; Trial Ex. 30.

56 See Docket No. 175 at 1659:21-1663:5.

57 See Docket No. 139 at 2-3. On the negligence claim, the jury assigned Lam 35% of the 

responsibility for the shooting. See id. at 3.

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Lam’s claim for state-law battery.58 The trial continued to the damages phase, where the jury 

awarded Lam $11.3 million in economic and noneconomic damages.59 Defendants filed no 

motions for judgment as a matter of law during trial but now move for a new trial on a number of 

grounds.60

II.

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The parties further consent

to the jurisdiction of the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).61

 

58 See id. at 2.

59 See Docket No. 153 at 2.

60 See Docket No. 166. Defendants ask the court to evaluate the merits of their motion in light of 

“the public discussion and controversy about police shootings” during the weeks and months 

preceding and during the trial. Id. at 5-6; see Docket No. 185 at ¶¶ 2-3, 8-9. Most notably, on the 

first day of testimony in the trial in this case, San Francisco police officers shot and killed Mario 

Woods, who may have been holding a knife in his hand, in an encounter that several bystanders 

captured on video. See Docket No. 185 at ¶ 4; Docket No. 185-1, Ex. B (television news 

broadcasts describing the shooting). On the day the jury began deliberating, Lam’s counsel held a 

press conference with Woods’ mother announcing that he would represent her in her suit against 

the city of San Francisco; the press conference was covered on television and radio outlets, and 

pictures of Lam’s counsel with Woods’ mother appeared in a prominent San Jose newspaper. See

Docket No. 185-1, Exs. D, E. The protests that followed the Woods shooting, including calls for 

issuing more non-lethal weapons to police officers, also were covered in the news media. See

Docket No. 185 at ¶ 5; Docket No. 185-1, Ex. C.

Defendants raised this issue at the start of the next trial day after Woods was shot, and they 

successfully persuaded the court to issue a preemptive instruction that the jury should ignore this 

coverage in deciding West’s liability. See Docket No. 171 at 482:9-484:12. Accordingly, the 

court told the jury to set aside its thoughts about any other events “and ultimately deliberate and 

focus on what you’re hearing in this courtroom and from these witnesses and from your reading 

from these documents and other things that are admitted. That’s what this case is about and 

should be about.” Id. at 485:11-22. Defendants brought the issue up again after Lam’s counsel 

held the press conference with Woods’ mother, but Defendants sought no further relief. See

Docket No. 177 at 1745:2-1749:8. The court sees no reason to doubt that the jury did exactly 

what the court asked it to do, and it does not consider these extraneous circumstances in ruling on 

the motion at issue here.

61 See Docket Nos. 7, 13, 25.

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III.

Rule 59(a)(1)(A) says that the court may order a new jury trial “for any reason for which a 

new trial has heretofore been granted in an action in federal court.” Although “Rule 59 does not 

specify the grounds on which a motion for a new trial may be granted,” courts are “bound by those 

grounds that have been historically recognized.”62 These grounds “include, but are not limited to, 

claims ‘that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or 

that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.’”63 The Ninth Circuit has 

elaborated that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the clear 

weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of 

justice.”

64

 “Therefore, in a nut shell, the district court may grant a new trial ‘[i]f, having given full 

respect to the jury’s findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . .’”65

In making this determination, the court “is not required to view the trial evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict.”

66 “Instead, the district court can weigh the evidence and 

assess the credibility of the witnesses.”67 The court may “set aside the verdict of the jury, even 

though supported by substantial evidence, where, in [the court’s] conscientious opinion, the 

verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.”68 However, “[i]t is not the courts’ place to 

 

62 Wei Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1035.

63 Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. 

v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940)).

64 Id. (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n.15 

(9th Cir. 2000))).

65 Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2009) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 

1987)).

66 Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, 762 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Kode v. Carlson, 596 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)).

67 Id.

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substitute our evaluations for those of the jurors.”69 As a result, “a district court may not grant a 

new trial simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict.”

70

 

First, Defendants contend that the jury’s verdicts against West on the Section 1983 claim, 

the battery claim and the Bane Act claim were against the clear weight of the trial evidence. For 

the Section 1983 claim, the Fourth Amendment standard of “objective reasonableness” governs 

the use of force by police officers.71 Relevant factors include the severity of the crime, the 

immediate threat posed by the suspect and whether the suspect is actively resisting or evading 

arrest.72 Of these, the most important factor is the immediate threat that the suspect posed.73 

“These factors are not exclusive, and [courts] consider the totality of the circumstances.”74 

Officers should be judged “without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight,” and the court should take into 

account that police officers often must make split-second decisions in uncertain and rapidly 

changing situations.75

The key issue at trial—and the most important factor in the Fourth Amendment analysis—

was whether Lam posed a threat to West or to anyone else. Anderson and Wade testified 

unequivocally that he did not. Defendants correctly observe that, in some important respects, their 

accounts cannot be reconciled with the physical or documentary evidence. But the fact remains 

 

68 Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 

183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990)).

69 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 331 F.3d 735, 743 (9th Cir. 2003).

70 Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001).

71 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-99 (1989); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381-83 (2007).

72 See Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Graham, 

490 U.S. at 396).

73 See id.

74 Id. at 793-94.

75 Id. at 794.

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that, discrepancies in timing and location aside, Anderson in particular saw the incident from start 

to finish and testified repeatedly, on both direct and cross-examination, that Lam never moved 

towards West. Defendants raised legitimate issues about her credibility, but the jury still was 

entitled to give her story some weight. Also, on one important point, the physical evidence 

supported Anderson’s testimony: Lam was shot in the back.

Even West’s testimony, taken alone, lends some support to the notion that Lam posed no 

threat. At no point did she see Lam directing any sort of menacing gesture at her. Instead, West, 

like Phelan, saw Lam poking the knife into his stomach and felt that he might be suicidal. And 

throughout the incident, Lam never raised his knife at West or even moved quickly in her 

direction. To be sure, West testified that when Lam was walking towards her with the knife, she 

felt that her life was in danger and that she had to shoot him.

76

 But the standard for unreasonable 

force is an objective one.77 After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

shooting—or, put another way, after “slosh[ing] [their] way through the factbound morass of 

‘reasonableness’”78—the jury concluded that West’s subjective fear was unreasonable, and so was 

her use of force. Even assuming the court would have reached the opposite result, a difference in 

opinion is not justification for a new trial.

The same goes for the negligence claim. In California, negligence “liability can arise if the 

tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of deadly force show, as part of the totality of 

circumstances, that the use of deadly force was unreasonable.”79 Lam argued to the jury that West 

acted negligently by failing to de-escalate the situation when she first arrived, instead choosing to 

 

76 See Docket No. 173 at 1275:4-5, 1280:21-1281:21, 1285:10-12.

77 See Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Deorle v. 

Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001)) (“[W]hen we consider whether there was an 

immediate threat, a ‘simple statement by an officer that he fears for his safety or the safety of 

others is not enough; there must be objective factors to justify such a concern.’”).

78 Scott, 550 U.S. at 383.

79 Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 626 (2013).

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move in with her gun drawn while giving loud commands to Lam. Lam successfully persuaded 

the jury either that this pre-shooting conduct did not meet the applicable standard of care or that 

the shooting itself did not. Neither is reason for a retrial.

Finally, no new trial is required for the Bane Act claim.80 Defendants argue that “the trend 

[in Bane Act claims] is to require proof of additional facts establishing ‘threats, intimidation, or 

coercion’ independent of the Fourth Amendment violation itself.”81 But Defendants failed to raise 

this purely legal argument in a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment or a motion for 

judgment as a matter of law.82 Such a “legal matter cannot be appropriately considered on a 

motion for a new trial, where the issue is whether the jury’s verdict is against the clear weight of 

the evidence.”83 On that ground alone, the court denies the motion for a new trial on the Bane Act 

claim.

In any case, although Defendants suggest a “trend,” the cases actually reveal a split of 

 

80 The Bane Act creates a cause of action when someone “interferes by threat, intimidation, or 

coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws 

of this state.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a).

81 Docket No. 184 at 27.

82 Defendants did not move to dismiss or for judgment as a matter of law, but Defendants did 

move for summary judgment on several other issues. See Docket No. 37. As above, the court 

granted that motion in part. See Docket No. 82. Defendants first argued their interpretation of the 

Bane Act in their trial brief, see Docket No. 62 at 15-16, and when objecting to Lam’s proposed 

jury instruction. See Docket No. 102 at 18-19.

83 Tortu, 556 F.3d at 1085; see also Parton v. White, 203 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 59 

motions cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments 

that could have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment.”); Grumman Aircraft Eng’g 

Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Ordinarily Rule 59 motions for 

either a new trial or a rehearing are not granted by the District Court where they are used by a 

losing party to request the trial judge to reopen proceedings in order to consider a new defensive 

theory which could have been raised during the original proceedings.”), rev’d on other grounds, 

421 U.S. 168 (1975); Lombino v. Bank of Am., N.A., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1081 (D. Nev. 2011) 

(“Defendants’ post-trial legal arguments are not properly before the court on a motion for new 

trial.”).

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authority on whether the coercion inherent in the use of excessive force can constitute a violation 

of the Bane Act.84 The recent decisions in Allen v. City of Sacramento85 and Lyall v. City of Los 

Angeles86 leave the ambiguity intact because they involved only an allegedly unlawful detention or 

search.

87

 Several courts in this district “have applied the Bane Act to a claim of excessive force 

alone.”88 In this procedural posture, the court cannot order a new trial to resolve the split. That is 

the job of the appellate court alone.

Second, Defendants raise another problem with the jury’s verdict: it was inconsistent as a 

matter of law. The jury found West liable for using unreasonable force against Lam, but it also 

found that West had not battered him, even though the latter claim also turned on whether West’s 

use of force was reasonable. California courts analyze the reasonableness of the use of force in the 

context of a battery claim under the Fourth Amendment standard.89 Defendants therefore argue 

that under the circumstances of this case, the two causes of action must rise and fall together as a 

matter of law.

 

84 See Davis v. City of San Jose, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1007-08 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (recognizing and 

discussing the split of authority); Haynes v. City & County of San Francisco, Case No. 09-cv00174, 2010 WL 2991732, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2010) (same).

85 234 Cal. App. 4th 41 (2015).

86 807 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2015).

87 See Lyall, 807 F.3d at 1196 (citing Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 69; Quezada v. City of Los 

Angeles, 222 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1008 (2014); Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 

4th 947, 959 (2012)) (“Numerous California decisions make clear that a plaintiff in a search-andseizure case must allege threats or coercion beyond the coercion inherent in a detention or search 

in order to recover under the Bane Act.”); Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 69 (citing Shoyoye, 203 Cal. 

App. 4th at 960) (“[W]e conclude a wrongful arrest or detention, without more, does not satisfy 

both elements of [the Bane Act].”).

88 Davis, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 1008 (citing Cardoso v. County of San Mateo, Case No. 12-cv-05130, 

2013 WL 900816 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013); Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, Case No. 10-cv-01370, 

2013 WL 6415620, at *10-13 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013)); see also Russell v. City & County of San 

Francisco, Case No. 12-cv-00929, 2013 WL 2447865, at *15-17 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2013).

89 See Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 527-28 (2009).

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Surprisingly, the parties give short shrift to the threshold question of how to characterize 

the verdict,

90 which “is a prerequisite analytical step in determining how to treat inconsistent jury 

findings.”

91

 Although the parties gloss over this issue, the court cannot. As Defendants 

acknowledge, “inconsistent general verdicts on separate claims are typically permitted to stand.”92 

By contrast, “irreconcilably inconsistent special verdicts require a new trial.”93

The Ninth Circuit has explained in some detail how to distinguish a general verdict from a 

special one. “If the jury announces only its ultimate conclusions, it returns an ordinary general 

verdict; if it makes factual findings in addition to the ultimate legal conclusions, it returns a 

general verdict with interrogatories.”94 “A jury may return multiple general verdicts as to each 

claim . . . without undermining the general nature of its verdicts.”95

Under this standard, the jury delivered a general verdict on both claims. On the Section 

1983 claim, the court asked only two questions: (1) “Do you find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Defendant Officer Dondi West used unreasonable force against Plaintiff Hung 

Lam?” and, if so, (2) “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Officer West 

substantially caused Mr. Lam to suffer any injury caused by Officer West’s unreasonable force in 

Question 1 above?”96 On the battery claim, the verdict form was even more basic: “Do you find 

 

90 Defendants address the question only in passing, see Docket No. 184 at 24-25, while Lam 

ignores it entirely.

91 Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1219 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 

(citing Wei Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1031).

92 Id. at 1219 (citing Wei Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1036-38).

93 Id. (citing Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)).

94 Wei Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1031. A pure special verdict, where the jury “returns only factual 

findings, leaving the court to determine the ultimate legal result,” clearly does not apply here. Id.

95 Id.

96 Docket No. 133 at 1.

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by a preponderance of the evidence that Officer West battered Mr. Lam?”97 The jury announced 

only its ultimate legal conclusions on each of these causes of action, and its verdicts were general 

in nature. Even assuming that these two general verdicts were inconsistent—an issue that the 

court need not and does not reach—they may stand as they are.

Defendants nevertheless argue that these verdicts must be reconciled because they 

“entail[ed] implied resolution of factual disputes underlying the legal question.”98 That argument 

is not persuasive. Duhn Oil Tool, the case Defendants cite in support, involved a legal conclusion 

that was “an absolute prerequisite” to another.

99

 As the Duhn Oil Tool court noted, the Ninth 

Circuit explicitly considered this possibility in Wei Zhang when it held that inconsistent general 

verdicts must stand “[u]nless one legal conclusion is the prerequisite for another.”100 But here, 

Lam’s Section 1983 and battery claims were independent. Defendants’ proposed rule would 

entirely undermine Wei Zhang—every general verdict on an independent cause of action entails 

the implied resolution of a factual dispute.101

To be sure, the court could have eliminated this risk entirely by adopting Defendants’ 

proposal to instruct the jury that the standard for excessive force was the same for purposes of 

both state-law battery and the Fourth Amendment.102 Although doing so may have eliminated any 

 

97 Id.

98 Docket No. 184 (quoting Duhn Oil Tool, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 1221). 

99 818 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.

100 Wei Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1034.

101 In fact, in Wei Zhang, the party seeking a new trial argued that a federal claim and a state law 

claim “were legally indistinguishable under any set of facts and thus that no rational jury could 

find liability on one and not the other claim.” Id. at 1032. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless declined 

to order a new trial because the jury had issued a general verdict. See id. at 1034. Defendants’ 

argument here is essentially identical.

102 See Docket No. 102 at 17; Docket No. 174 at 1552:17-1554:4. The Wei Zhang court suggested 

that district courts should address the potential for a legally irreconcilable verdict through jury 

instructions. See 339 F.3d at 1037. The Ninth Circuit went on to say that an “[o]bjection to an 

inconsistency between two general verdicts that is traced to an alleged error in the jury instruction 

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chance of a split verdict on these causes of action, the court was not convinced that the two claims 

necessarily rose and fell together. Instead, the court elected to minimize any risk of error by 

offering instructions for these claims that were based on the relevant model jury instructions and 

that accurately captured the applicable law. If the result of this decision really was an inconsistent 

verdict—again, a question the court does not resolve—it still was preferable to possibly resolving 

a question of law prematurely and incorrectly. All in all, these arguably inconsistent general 

verdicts do not necessitate a new trial.

Third, Defendants seek a new trial on the basis of the court’s decision not to ask the jury 

for a factual determination of the circumstances surrounding the shooting. Such an interrogatory, 

Defendants argue, was the only fair way to adjudicate whether West was entitled to qualified 

immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”103 There are two steps in 

a qualified immunity analysis: (1) “whether a constitutional right was violated, which is a question 

of fact,” and (2) “whether the right was clearly established, which is a question of law.”104 

Ordinarily, litigants cannot seek a new trial on the basis of this second prong; instead, they must 

raise this issue through motions for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.105 In 

this case, however, Defendants mount a less direct challenge, disputing the process of deciding 

qualified immunity rather than the outcome.

The problem with Defendants’ approach is that the Ninth Circuit has foreclosed this 

 

or verdict sheet is properly made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.” Id. (quoting Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 

283 F.3d 33, 56 (2d Cir. 2002)). Defendants do not raise such an objection now.

103 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

818 (1982)).

104 Tortu, 556 F.3d at 1085.

105 See id.

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specific line of argument,106 largely because the court has wide discretion in deciding whether to 

give special interrogatories to the jury.107 Here, the court did not provide a special interrogatory 

because each of the factors that may have rendered her use of force unreasonable came from wellestablished law. When West shot Lam, it was well-established Ninth Circuit law that the use of 

deadly force could be unreasonable if Lam posed no threat of serious physical harm to West or to 

others.108 It also was well established that, before using deadly force, West should have 

considered the availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing Lam109 and whether 

Lam was emotionally disturbed.

110 The court’s instruction to the jury on the Section 1983 claim 

included each of these factors.111 If the jury found that West violated Lam’s rights under the 

Fourth Amendment, then, those rights already were well established at the time that she acted.112 

Under these circumstances, a separate special interrogatory was unnecessary.113 The court 

 

106 See Acosta v. City & County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated 

on other grounds by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); see also Willis v. City of Fresno, 

Case No. 09-cv-01766, 2014 WL 1419239, at *15-18 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2014) (denying a motion 

for new trial on this basis).

107 See Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 521 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 49(b).

108 See Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 

U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).

109 See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 703 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted).

110 See Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011); Bryan v. MacPherson, 

630 F.3d 805, 831 (9th Cir. 2010); Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1283.

111 See Docket No. 132 at 12.

112 Defendants rely on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in City and County of San Francisco v. 

Sheehan, where the Court held that defendant police officers were entitled to qualified immunity 

against a claim that they violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by reentering her room 

when they knew she was suffering from mental illness. 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775-78 (2015). That 

case is inapposite because the use of force itself was not in issue. See id. at 1775 (“We also agree 

with the Ninth Circuit that after the officers opened Sheehan’s door the second time, their use of 

force was reasonable.”).

113 Although Defendants suggested that the court should give the jury a special interrogatory on 

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therefore declined to include such an interrogatory in the verdict form, and it acted well within its 

discretion in doing so.

Fourth, Defendants argue that the jury instructions on the Section 1983 claim failed to 

properly explain Fourth Amendment liability. The court’s instruction directly followed the Ninth 

Circuit’s model jury instructions,114 but Defendants believe those instructions do not explain 

sufficiently that whether the victim poses an immediate threat to the officer is the most important 

factor in the reasonableness analysis.

115

 Defendants also argue that the instruction failed to 

explain that West’s allegedly wrongful conduct in approaching Lam, such as a failure to deescalate the situation, could not form the basis for a Fourth Amendment violation.

The instruction was correct. “[J]ury instructions must fairly and adequately cover the 

issues presented, must correctly state the law, and must not be misleading.”116 It is true that “a

district court’s ‘[u]se of a model jury instruction does not preclude a finding of error.’”117 But

here, the model jury instruction accurately captured the relevant factors that were to guide the jury 

in deciding what level of force was appropriate. As the court explained during the charge 

conference,118 under Ninth Circuit precedent the jury could consider aspects of West’s conduct 

prior to the shooting in deciding the reasonableness of her use of force.

119

 And Defendants 

 

this issue, see Docket No. 62 at 11-12; Docket No. 174 at 1550:6-10, they did not include such an 

interrogatory in their proposed verdict form. See Docket No. 114.

114 Compare Docket No. 132 at 12, with Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions 

§ 9.23 (2007), available at http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Civil_Instructions_2016_4.pdf.

115 See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d at 702.

116 Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dang v. Cross, 

422 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 2005)).

117 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dang, 422 F.3d at 805).

118 See Docket No. 174 at 1550:14-1552:6.

119 See Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Scott, 550 U.S. at 384) (“The parties[’] ‘relative culpability[,]’ i.e., which party created the 

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could—and did—argue to the jury that the threat that Lam posed to West, or at least that West 

reasonably believed that Lam posed, rendered her use of deadly force reasonable.120 The jury 

instructions “provided [Defendants] with ample room to argue [their] theory of the case to the 

jury.”121 They do not provide grounds for a new trial.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2016

_________________________________

PAUL S. GREWAL

United States Magistrate Judge

 

dangerous situation and which party is more innocent, may also be considered.”); Smith v. City of 

Hemet, 394 F.3d at 703 (citing Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1431, 1440 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994)) (“[A]n 

additional factor that we may consider in our Graham analysis is the availability of alternative 

methods of capturing or subduing a suspect.”).

120 See Docket No. 175 at 1658:24-1659:12.

121 Brewer v. City of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 

F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1995)).

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