Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02420/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02420-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

06cv2420-WQH (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TEDDY LEROY WILSON, Jr., CDCR

#78443,

Plaintiff,

v.

ISMAEL BRIZYELA, et al.,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 06cv2420-WQH (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 25]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil

Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California.

On November 1, 2006, Plaintiff Teddy Leroy Wilson, Jr., who is

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights suit

against several defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. No. 1. The

district judge sua sponte screened and dismissed his Complaint and

subsequent First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff ultimately filed a

Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 13]. The district judge sua sponte

screened the Second Amended Complaint and dismissed without leave to

Case 3:06-cv-02420-WQH-BLM Document 46 Filed 01/30/08 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The instant facts are those from the SAC pertaining to claims that survived

the district judge’s final screening on June 12, 2007. 

2 For ease of reference, the Court relies on the page numbering at the top

of the SAC, which was affixed by the Court’s electronic filing system.

2 06cv2420-WQH (BLM)

amend all but Plaintiff’s excessive force claims asserted in Count 2 of

his Second Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 14. 

On July 18, 2007, Defendants Hector Rubio and Ismael Brizuela, the

only defendants remaining in the case, filed a motion to dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. Doc.

No. 25. After requesting and receiving several extensions of time to

respond, Plaintiff filed a timely opposition. Doc. No. 44. Defendants

filed a reply on January 29, 2008. Doc. No 45. 

This Court finds the issue appropriate for decision on the papers

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.(d)(1). See Doc. No. 42. The Court

has considered the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition, Defendants’ Reply and all supporting

documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below,

this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 25]

be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff claims Defendants Ismael Brizuela and Hector Rubio, both

parole officers in the El Cajon parole office, used excessive force

against him in violation of the Constitution after he already had been

discharged from parole. SAC at 82. Specifically, Plaintiff explains

that on March 17, 2006, Officers Brizuela and Rubio stopped his car

while he was driving home from his drug treatment program. Id.

According to Plaintiff, when he exited the car, an unknown man pointed

Case 3:06-cv-02420-WQH-BLM Document 46 Filed 01/30/08 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Plaintiff utilized the standardized section 1983 complaint form provided

by the Southern District of California. 

3 06cv2420-WQH (BLM)

a gun at him and then Officers Brizuela and Rubio “attacked” him, forced

his hands behind his back, pushed him to the ground, punched him in the

face, sprayed him with something, punched him again, kicked him, then

put him in handcuffs and leg chains. Id. at 8-9. They allegedly told

him during this struggle that they just wanted to talk to him, but

wanted him to be handcuffed first. Id. Plaintiff claims he was never

told he was being placed under arrest, but he was taken to the El Cajon

parole office and talked to before being released. Id. at 9-10. 

In his SAC, Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing the officers

from retaliating against Plaintiff for filing the instant action and

$7,000,000.00 in punitive damages. Id. at 17.

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s SAC on the ground that

they are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment because

Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages were brought against them solely

in their official capacities. Defs.’ Mem. at 1-2. In response,

Plaintiff points out that he, in fact, sued Defendants in both their

official and individual capacities, as reflected on page two of his SAC

where he checked the boxes for both individual and official capacities

for each officer.3 Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. 

It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment bars a

prisoner’s § 1983 claims for monetary damages against state actors sued

in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 71 (1989) (emphasizing that the amendment

prohibits damages actions against the “official’s office,” in other

Case 3:06-cv-02420-WQH-BLM Document 46 Filed 01/30/08 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 06cv2420-WQH (BLM)

words, actions that are in reality suits against the state itself,

rather than its individual officials); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469,

472 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff sued Defendants in

their official capacities seeking monetary damages as a remedy for his

excessive force claims, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment

and must be dismissed. 

However, it is equally well-established that the Eleventh Amendment

does not bar damage actions against state officials sued in their

personal capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991). A

personal capacity suit is one in which the plaintiff seeks to impose

individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under

color of state law. Id. at 25. 

While Defendants argue essentially that it is immaterial that

Plaintiff checked the “individual capacity” box because he wrote “in

their official capacity” within his description of the his excessive

force claims (see Def.’s Reply at 1-2), the Court disagrees. Where a

section 1983 plaintiff is proceeding pro per and in forma pauperis, the

Court has a duty to construe his complaint liberally in determining the

capacity in which the defendants are being sued. Ashker v. California

Dept. of Corr., 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, the Ninth

Circuit repeatedly has held that “a section 1983 suit against state

actors necessarily implies a suit against the defendants in their

personal capacities.” Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26

F.3d 968, 973 n.16 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, Plaintiff specified

clearly in his SAC that he intended to sue Defendants in their

individual capacities, that he was seeking to hold Defendants liable for

actions they took “under color of law” and that he was seeking monetary

damages. See SAC at 2, 8, 13, 17. Because Plaintiff is proceeding both

Case 3:06-cv-02420-WQH-BLM Document 46 Filed 01/30/08 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 06cv2420-WQH (BLM)

pro per and in forma pauperis, the Court finds these allegations

sufficient to sustain his SAC against Defendants in their individual or

personal capacities. See Ashker, 112 F.3d at 395. 

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report

and Recommendation, (2) granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to

Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their official

capacities, and (3) denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to

Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their individual

capacities.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

February 14, 2008. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than February

28, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: January 30, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02420-WQH-BLM Document 46 Filed 01/30/08 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 06cv2420-WQH (BLM)

COPY TO: 

HONORABLE WILLIAM Q. HAYES

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

Case 3:06-cv-02420-WQH-BLM Document 46 Filed 01/30/08 Page 6 of 6