Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00148/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00148-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Court substitutes the current warden, Mike Evans, for

Anthony Lamarque as Respondent.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY BARNES,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MIKE EVANS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-0148 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Troy Barnes, an inmate incarcerated at Salinas

Valley State Prison (SVSP) in Soledad, California, petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on several grounds. 

Respondent Mike Evans, Warden of SVSP, opposes the petition.1

Barnes also renews his motion for appointment of counsel, and moves

for an evidentiary hearing and expansion of time to file his

traverse (Docket Nos. 21, 22). The Court GRANTS Barnes’ motion for

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2

Joseph Mabrey is also referred to as "Stacy Mabrey" in the

record.

3Eyewitnesses testified that Mabrey was not the robber.

2

expansion of time to file his traverse, which was filed on June 19,

2006 and considered in deciding this matter. The Court DENIES his

motions for an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel, and

DENIES his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on all of his

claims. 

BACKGROUND

Unless indicated otherwise, the following facts are taken from

the State appellate court’s unpublished opinion ruling on Barnes’

direct appeal. Respondent’s Exhibit C. 

I. Trial 

On August 21, 1998, a man wearing a disguise consisting of a

hat, a wig, a fake nose and a fake goatee, and carrying a gun

robbed a Wells Fargo bank in Oakland. Witnesses testified that the

robber left the bank alone and drove away in a gold Mazda. 

Barnes’ cousin Joseph Mabrey2 testified that he gave Barnes a

ride on that day. Reporter's Transcript (R.T.) 699-700. Mabrey

further testified that Barnes was carrying a bag containing twenty

dollar bills and that Barnes said, “I hit one.”

The money that was stolen from the bank contained a tracking

device, which the Oakland police followed to Mabrey’s car, a red

Nissan. When the police pulled the car over, Mabrey got out of the

car and surrendered.3 Barnes slid from the passenger's seat into

the driver’s seat and drove away, leading the officers on a high

speed chase. Several other police cars joined the chase, which

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4

The record demonstrates that fifty-five shots were fired at

Barnes.

5The record demonstrates that Barnes was hospitalized and

required more than one surgery as a result of multiple gunshot

wounds, the impact of the car accident and being kicked by an

officer. Barnes' arm was also partially paralyzed.

3

ended when Barnes collided with a park ranger's truck and then hit

a pole. Two officers approached the car. One officer saw that

Barnes had a gun. After telling Barnes several times to drop the

gun, that officer believed that Barnes pointed the gun at the other

officer. The first officer fired his gun at Barnes until he

believed that Barnes had been hit, but resumed firing at him when

he saw Barnes was trying to clear a malfunction in his gun. By

that time several other officers were also shooting at Barnes. 

Barnes was shot and fell to the ground.4

 Several officers

converged on Barnes to subdue and arrest him.

At some point between the time Barnes was shot and lying on

the ground and the time he was arrested, a bystander started

videotaping the incident. Over Barnes’ objection, the court

granted the prosecution’s motion to exclude the videotape as

prejudicial. The parties agreed that the tape shows more than one

officer engaged in “over-zealous police behavior” between the time

that Barnes was on the ground and the time that he was handcuffed.5

After Barnes was arrested, the police found in the car the money

from the bank and the disguise the robber wore.

Barnes was charged by information with two counts of second

degree robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211), brandishing a firearm at a

police officer (Cal. Penal Code § 417, subd. (c)), and possession

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of a firearm by a felon (Cal. Penal Code § 12021). The amended

information also alleged personal use of a firearm (Cal. Penal Code

§§ 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022.5), a prior prison term (Cal. Penal

Code § 667, subd. (a)), and twelve strikes (Cal. Penal Code §

667(e)(2)). A jury convicted Barnes on all counts and found true

all of the sentencing enhancements. Barnes was sentenced to an

indeterminate sentence of seventy-five years to life in prison. 

The details of his trial as relevant to his claims for habeas

relief are discussed below. 

II. Appeals 

On August 30, 2002, the California Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment in an unpublished opinion and rejected Barnes’ claims

of trial court error based on: (1) excluding the videotape made at

the time of his arrest; (2) refusing to instruct the jury on use of

excessive force by the police; (3) allowing identification

testimony; (4) excluding expert testimony regarding eyewitness

identification; (5) refusing sanctions based on the destruction, in

violation of a court order, of the car Barnes was driving; 

(6) refusing to grant a mistrial based on alleged juror misconduct;

(7) denying Barnes’ motion for substitution of counsel; and 

(8) instructing the jurors to report misconduct by other jurors. 

Exhibit C.

On November 20, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied

Barnes’ petition for review. Exhibit E. On October 13, 2004, the

California Supreme Court summarily denied Barnes’ petition for a

writ of habeas corpus, which incorporated the claims from his

direct appeal and also claimed error based on (1) his sentence;

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6

In his traverse, Barnes concedes his claim of prosecutorial

misconduct under Brady v. Maryland, 873 U.S. 83 (1963). Traverse

at 31.

5

(2) the trial court's handling of his Faretta motion; (3) an

additional claim of juror misconduct; (4) prosecutorial misconduct

during closing arguments; (5) access to the courts; and 

(6) ineffective assistance of counsel. Exhibit K. 

Barnes filed an initial mixed petition including exhausted and

unexhausted claims in this Court in January 2004. He also moved

for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. The Court

granted Barnes a stay pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

in State court and denied without prejudice his motions for

appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. After the

California Supreme Court denied his State habeas petition, Barnes

filed his first amended petition on November 16, 2004. Barnes

petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus on each of the

grounds raised before the State courts.6

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), a district court may grant a petition challenging a State

conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on

the merits in State court only if the State court's adjudication of

the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

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7 Both prongs of § 2254(d)(1) apply to questions of law and

mixed questions of law and fact. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d

1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-74 (2003).

6

States;7 or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

"Clearly established federal law" refers to "the holdings, as

opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the

time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams (Terry) v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-04, 412 (2000). A State court decision

may not be overturned on habeas review simply because of a conflict

with circuit-based law. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000). However, circuit court decisions may be

persuasive authority to determine whether a particular State court

holding is an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent

or to assess what law is "clearly established." Id.; see also

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

124 S. Ct 446 (2003); Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th

Cir. 1997).

A State court's decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court law if

the State court "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached

by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law," or reaches a

different conclusion based on facts indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A State court's

decision constitutes an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court

precedent if the State court "either (1) correctly identifies the

governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way

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that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend

a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way

that is objectively unreasonable." Id. at 407. An “unreasonable

application” of federal law is different from an incorrect or

erroneous application of federal law. Id. at 412. Accordingly, 

"a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state

court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable." Id. at 411. The reasonableness inquiry under the

“unreasonable application” clause is objective. Id. at 409. 

In determining whether the State court's decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

State court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). If the State court considered only State law, the

federal court must ask whether State law, as explained by the State

court, is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law.

See Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). If

the State court, relying on State law, correctly identified the

governing federal legal rules, the federal court must ask whether

the State court applied them unreasonably to the facts. Id. at

1232. 

In the present case, eight of Barnes' claims were addressed in

State court in a reasoned decision, which primarily addressed state

law. His other claims were denied summarily by the California

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Supreme Court. Where the State court gives no reasoned explanation

of its decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no

reasoned lower court decision on the claim, a review of the record

is the only means of deciding whether the State court's decision

was objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848,

853 (9th Cir. 2003). When confronted with such a decision, a

federal court should conduct "an independent review of the record"

to determine whether the State court's decision was an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Suppression of the Videotape Evidence

Barnes argues that the trial court violated his right to

present a defense under the Sixth Amendment and his right to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment by suppressing a videotape

that a bystander took of the police officers shooting at Barnes and

beating him following the chase. Barnes asserts that the tape

demonstrates that the police used excessive force in his arrest,

which he argues constitutes a defense to the crime of brandishing a

weapon at a peace officer. Barnes also argues that the tape

demonstrates that he was unconscious at the time he allegedly

brandished the weapon. 

“Incorrect state court evidentiary rulings cannot serve as a

basis for habeas relief unless federal constitutional rights are

affected.” Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir.

2000) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, the “decision to

exclude certain evidence must be so prejudicial as to jeopardize

the defendant's due process rights.” Id. The Ninth Circuit

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considers five factors in determining whether the exclusion affects

constitutional rights: “(1) the probative value of the excluded

evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it

is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is

the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and 

(5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense.” 

Id.

 The State court's decision to exclude the evidence was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. At

trial, defense counsel conceded that the video only recorded events

after Barnes was shot and lying on the ground. Therefore, the acts

underlying the brandishing offense occurred before the taping began

and the tape is irrelevant to Barnes’ defense. The exclusion of

irrelevant evidence is not a constitutional violation. Wood v.

Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1550 (9th Cir. 1992). 

II. Jury Instructions on Excessive Force

Barnes argues that the trial court also violated his right to

present a defense when it refused to instruct the jury on excessive

force. California Jury Instructions-Criminal (CALJIC) Number 9.28

provides that an officer may not use excessive force in making an

arrest and if he or she does so, the individual being arrested “may

lawfully use reasonable force to protect himself.” CALJIC Number

9.29 provides that the State bears the burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that police officers have not used excessive

force. 

The State appellate court rejected Barnes’ argument for the

same reasons that it rejected his claims based on the suppression

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of the videotape. Because the arrest and use of force did not

occur until after Barnes brandished the weapon, he could not

proceed on a defense based on the officers’ use of excessive force. 

Further, as the State court noted, Barnes’ trial counsel agreed

that he could not proceed on such a theory. Therefore, Barnes'

argument that the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on

his theory of self-defense is unfounded. The Supreme Court has

held that “a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any

recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a

reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Mathews v. United States,

485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). Barnes fails to demonstrate that there is

sufficient evidence to support this theory of defense, and his

trial counsel specifically stated that he was not proceeding with

such a theory. Therefore, this claim does not provide grounds for

granting the petition. 

III. Identification Testimony

Barnes argues that he was prejudiced by improper

identification testimony based on two grounds. First, he argues

that the pretrial physical lineup was impermissibly suggestive

because he was the only individual appearing in the lineup who had

been injured. Second, he argues that the in-court identification

that took place at the preliminary hearing was unduly prejudicial

because he was the only injured African-American man in a jail

uniform in the courtroom when he was identified. He claims that

testimony about these identifications should not have been admitted

and that these procedures affected the witnesses' identification of

him at trial. 

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8

As discussed below, Barnes also argues that counsel was

ineffective for requesting this lineup.

11

On October 22, 1998, a lineup was conducted at the defense’s

request8 and Barnes was given the opportunity to select the other

participants in the lineup, which he declined. Counsel was present

at this lineup. Cassim Njaidi, a guard at the bank, put a question

mark by Barnes’ number at the lineup. At the preliminary hearing,

he identified Barnes as the man he had tentatively identified at

the lineup. He testified that he had selected Barnes in the lineup

by a process of elimination. After eliminating four individuals

based on complexion or age, Njaidi chose between the remaining two

based on the way that Barnes moved. Njaidi testified that there

was "something about [Barnes'] walk" that made him select Barnes. 

C.T. at 112. Njaidi also noted that he knew that the suspect had

been involved in a shootout and that Barnes moved as though he was

in pain. 

At trial, Njaidi again testified that he had selected Barnes

in the lineup by a process of elimination based on complexion,

height, weight and age. In addition, the fact that Barnes appeared

to be in pain played “a very small role” in Njaidi’s tentative

identification. R.T. 403. Njaidi testified that he could not

positively identify Barnes at the lineup as the robber because the

robber had been wearing a disguise. At trial, he could only

identify Barnes as the individual he had tentatively identified at

the lineup and the preliminary hearing.

At the lineup, Leroyn McDaniel, a teller at the bank, put a

question mark by Barnes’ number. At the preliminary hearing,

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McDaniel testified that it was “only possible” that Barnes was the

robber. Both at the preliminary hearing and at trial, McDaniel

testified that she was unable to make a positive identification at

the lineup because the robber was wearing a disguise at the time of

the crime. Her tentative identification at the lineup was based on

Barnes’ build, height, weight and skin tone, the way he spoke and

walked, the shape of his face and the fact that he did not have

gold teeth as did some of the others in the lineup. At trial,

McDaniel testified that she did not believe that anybody at the

lineup appeared to be in pain. Again, McDaniel testified that she

could not be sure that the man she identified was the robber. 

Barnes first argues that evidence about the pretrial

identifications should not have been allowed because the pretrial

identifications were both unreliable and unreasonably suggestive. 

The Supreme Court has held that the right to due process requires

the exclusion of “pretrial identification evidence obtained by a

police procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary.” Manson

v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977). "It is the likelihood of

misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due

process." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). 

The factors to be considered in determining the

constitutionality of a witness' testimony at trial regarding a

suggestive pretrial identification are set out in Biggers. These

include (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at

the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3)

the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4)

the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation; and (5)

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the time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers, 409

U.S. at 199-200. The corrupting effect of the suggestive

identification itself must be weighed against these factors. Id. 

Applying the factors set out in Biggers, Barnes' argument that

the witnesses' testimony regarding their identifications at the

lineup was unreliable because the lineup was unduly suggestive is

unpersuasive. Although Njaidi testified that the fact that Barnes

appeared to be in pain played a part in making his tentative lineup

identification, he also stated that that fact only played a very

small role in his tentative lineup identification and that each of

the individuals in the lineup was dressed as though he had the same

types of injuries as Barnes. McDaniel testified that nobody in the

lineup appeared to be in pain, further demonstrating that evidence

of Barnes’ pain was not suggestive at the lineup. 

Barnes also challenges the identification testimony as

unreliable because he was the only injured African-American man in

a jail uniform in the courtroom when he was identified at the

preliminary hearing. The Ninth Circuit has pointed out the

inherent suggestiveness of in-court identification procedures where

a witness points out the defendant who is seated at the table with

counsel. United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d 352, 358 (9th Cir.

1999); United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir.

1970). Although the court has advised using procedures which

minimize the prejudicial effect of in-court identifications, it has

held that "[t]here is no constitutional entitlement to an in-court

line-up or other particular method of lessening the suggestiveness

of an in-court identification . . . ." United States v. Domina,

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9Barnes also claims that his right to due process was violated

by the State court's decision to allow the identification testimony

because the robber was wearing a disguise and none of the witnesses

was able positively identify him. However, there is no due process

issue raised by the fact that a witness cannot identify a suspect

because he was wearing a disguise. When it rendered its verdict,

the jury was aware that the robber was wearing a disguise and that

no witness was able positively to identify Barnes.

14

784 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has "held

that the suggestive character of courtroom logistics [is] not

unnecessarily suggestive." Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929

(9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). 

Further, at the preliminary hearing and at trial, each witness

testified only that Barnes was the individual he or she tentatively

identified during the lineup, not that he was the bank robber. 

This demonstrates that any suggestiveness in the lineup did not

taint the in-court identification; there was no in-court

identification. This also demonstrates that the preliminary

hearing was not suggestive because the witnesses did not identify

Barnes as the robber, even though he was the only individual there

to identify.

The State court's finding that the identification testimony

was not unreliable due to unduly suggestive procedures was not an

unreasonable application of federal law.9 This claim does not

provide grounds for granting the petition.

IV. Exclusion of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness

Identification

Barnes further claims that the State court violated his right

to present a defense when it prevented him from presenting expert

testimony “on the psychological effects of identification at

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robberies and the psychological effects from suggestive

identification procedures.” Traverse at 16. However, the Ninth

Circuit has specifically noted that there is no federal authority

requiring the admission of expert testimony regarding the

reliability of eyewitness testimony and has upheld the refusal to

admit such testimony at trial. Jordan v. DuCharme, 983 F.2d 933,

939 (9th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the Court finds that there is no

clearly established federal law with which the State court decision

conflicts. 

Further, Barnes is unable to demonstrate how, even if the

exclusion of such evidence was in error, it could have prejudiced

him. As the State points out, “the witnesses’ identifications were

tentative and not the heart of the prosecution’s case against

Petitioner." Answer at 14. Barnes' identity as the bank robber

was established not by those tentative identifications, but by

Mabrey's testimony, as well as by his presence in the car carrying

the stolen money and the disguise used in the robbery. Trial

counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine each of the

eyewitnesses who testified and to clarify the circumstances

surrounding their tentative identifications. The Court finds that

the State courts' decisions on this point were not unreasonable

applications of federal law. 

V. Claims Related to the Destruction of the Vehicle

On August 24, 1998, two days after Barnes’ arrest, the car he

was driving was taken to the yard of A&B Towing (A&B), a company

under contract with the Oakland Police Department to tow and store

vehicles that may be used as evidence. On October 30, 1998 Barnes’

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trial counsel obtained a court order that the vehicle be maintained

as evidence, which A&B received on November 2, 1998. Nonetheless,

the vehicle was sent to the wrecker and destroyed on December 9,

1998. Testimony at trial established that the car was destroyed

based on an error at A&B towing, which mistakenly authorized the

destruction of the car in spite of the court order in its records. 

Counsel moved at the close of the prosecution's case to have

the information against Barnes dismissed based on the destruction

of the car. He argued that he would have inspected the car to

determine whether the car was actually aimed at the park ranger’s

vehicle prior to the crash, that he would have taken photographs to

demonstrate what the police officers actually would have been able

to see happening inside the car through the rear window and to

determine whether the front passenger window was rolled up or down. 

Counsel asserted that this evidence would have been material in

impeaching the officers’ testimony about the events that took place

following the chase. 

As an alternative to dismissal, counsel moved to have “all

evidence and testimony with respect to what went on inside the

vehicle . . . excluded” or to have the jury instructed that “all

testimony regarding what went on at the arrest scene after the

Nissan came to rest be looked at with great caution in light of

th[e] willful destruction of evidence.” R.T. 944-45. 

The trial court denied the motion, finding that counsel failed

to demonstrate either the materiality of the evidence he hoped to

glean from inspecting the car or any bad faith on the part of the

police department. Further, the trial court noted that counsel

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failed to inspect the car in the eleven months between the time of

the court order and the close of prosecution’s evidence.

Barnes now makes two claims related to the destruction of the

vehicle. First, he argues that he was denied due process by the

destruction of the vehicle and that his case should therefore have

been dismissed as a sanction against the prosecution for allowing

the destruction of the car. Second, Barnes argues that counsel was

ineffective based on his failure to view the car before it was

destroyed. The ineffective assistance claim is discussed below

with the other claims based on counsel's performance. 

Under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), "unless a

criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police,

failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute

a denial of due process of law." As the trial court noted, counsel

failed to demonstrate that the police were involved in the decision

to destroy the car, that they were aware the car had been destroyed

or that they did anything but attempt to make A&B aware of the

court order. The State court’s decision to deny sanctions based on

the destruction of the car was not contrary to clearly established

federal law. 

VI. Juror Misconduct

On September 27, 1999, juror seven sent a note to the court,

encouraging it to interview juror nine because he had his mind made

up from the start, made negative statements about the court, the

attorneys, the defendant and the judge, and was angry at the court,

the attorneys and the parties for forcing him to be there. 

Further, juror seven worried that juror nine was prejudicing the

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other jurors against Barnes. 

After the court received the note, counsel for both sides

stipulated to removing juror nine before the court questioned him. 

R.T. 1475. Juror nine admitted that he had made general comments

about the way the trial was being run, stating that he thought "if

this were a business, this would be out of business." R.T. 1479. 

Although the juror indicated that he was frustrated by the way the

trial was proceeding, he reassured the court that he did not think

his frustration had affected his ability to be fair. In addition

to his general frustration regarding the pace of the trial, juror

nine also indicated that he had made a comment during the previous

recess. He recalled his statement as, "Wow, that was a real tough

round for the defense. I thought that Mr. Hing [the prosecutor]

did a wonderful job as an attorney, I said I think Hing did a

great job that round." R.T. 1480. The juror assured the court

that he had only made an isolated comment and that it had not led

to a conversation. 

After the court removed juror nine and replaced him, defense

counsel moved for a mistrial. The court deferred ruling on the

motion until after it had an opportunity to ask the other jurors if

they heard juror nine's comments at any time during trial and if

those comments might influence their approach to the trial. Based

on that questioning, the court predicted, "If they all say, no

problem, judge, then, I think that, under the circumstances, since

he says he didn't engage in a dialogue with any one, rather he just

expressed his opinion, I think that that should be sufficient." 

R.T. 1483. The court asked counsel if they believed each juror

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should be questioned individually. Although defense counsel

originally thought individual questioning would be better, he

agreed to group questioning when he learned that the judge did not

intend to repeat what juror nine had said when questioning the

other jurors. R.T. 1484. 

Seven of the jurors and two alternates indicated that they had

heard juror nine make comments about the trial or individuals

involved in the trial and two jurors indicated that they had

overheard his comment during the previous recess. Both of those

jurors indicated that juror nine's comments had not impacted their

ability to act fairly. The court admonished the jurors not to

discuss juror nine's comments or dismissal or to allow those

factors to impact the way they approached the case.

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel renewed his

motion for a mistrial based on juror nine's "ongoing misconduct." 

R.T. 1505. The court denied the motion stating that it was

"satisfied that his conduct hasn't affected or influenced the rest

of the jurors." R.T. 1506. Barnes argues that the court erred

when it failed to question the jurors individually and when it

denied his motion for a mistrial.

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the criminally accused a

fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. U.S. Const. Amend. VI;

see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). "Even if only one

juror is unduly biased or prejudiced, the defendant is denied his

constitutional right to an impartial jury." Tinsley v. Borg, 895

F.2d 520, 523-34 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991). However, the Constitution

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"does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in

a potentially compromising situation." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.

209, 217 (1982). The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as

voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not

infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every

contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. 

See id.

 A petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be

established that misconduct by the jury had "'substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" 

Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1995)(quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 & n.9 (1993)); see Jeffries v.

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.

1191 (1994). In other words, a petitioner must establish that the

error resulted in "actual prejudice." See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637;

see also United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir.

1998), amended by, 161 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119

S. Ct. 1376 (1999) (requiring "actual prejudice" on federal direct

appeal). 

Here, the court did conduct an investigation into the

potential juror misconduct and took action by removing juror nine. 

Further, the court questioned the remaining jurors, found no

prejudice and instructed them not to let juror nine's comments or

his removal from the jury influence their decision. The State

court's denial of additional relief on this claim is not contrary

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law. This claim does not provide grounds for granting the

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10In Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d at 124, the California Supreme Court

held that the trial court deprived the defendant of his

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when it

denied his motion to substitute new counsel without giving him an

opportunity to state specific examples of inadequate

representation.

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petition. 

VII. Motion to Substitute Counsel

Following the jury’s verdict, Barnes filed a motion in pro per

to substitute counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118,

124 (1970).10 The trial court allowed Barnes to present the reasons

for his motion and counsel to respond. Barnes clarified that he

sought substitution of counsel for purposes of filing a motion for

a new trial and, should that motion be rejected, for sentencing,

and presented several reasons underlying his request. 

First, Barnes indicated a potential conflict of interest based

on a conversation that counsel had with his next door neighbor, an

Oakland police officer, about the case. Barnes stated that he

could not trust counsel based on his knowledge of that

conversation. Barnes also noted a confrontation in which counsel

told him that he should have taken the plea agreement offered and

that he should not have committed the crime. Second, Barnes argued

that counsel was ineffective based on several decisions made during

trial. Barnes pointed to counsel’s (1) decision not to file a writ

of mandate following the court’s denial of a § 1368 hearing on

Barnes’ competence to stand trial; (2) failure to inspect the car

before it was destroyed; (3) failure to call his investigator to

testify to impeach Mabrey; and (4) decision not to file a

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11A Pitchess motion is the procedural method established in

Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531 (1974), and later

codified by California Penal Code § 832.7 and California Evidence

Code §§ 1043 and 1046, that allows for discovery of otherwise

privileged personnel records.

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Pitchess11 motion to discover information from the personnel files

of all of the officers involved in pursuing and arresting Barnes. 

After hearing counsel’s responses to Barnes’ concerns, the

court denied Barnes’ request, citing the fact that counsel’s

conversation with his neighbor was not a breach of confidence, but

rather an effort to collect useful information for the case, that

Barnes had not demonstrated that his confrontation with counsel was

evidence of counsel’s inability competently to represent him, and 

the reasonableness of counsel’s decisions with respect to each of

the alleged instances of ineffectiveness. Barnes claims that the

trial court both failed to conduct a Marsden hearing and

erroneously denied his request to substitute counsel, in violation

of his rights under the Sixth Amendment.

In evaluating Sixth Amendment claims on habeas review, “the

appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the

accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such.” Wheat v. United

States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). Thus, “while the right to select

and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is comprehended by

the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is [not] to

ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the

lawyer whom he prefers.” Id. The Sixth Amendment guarantees

effective assistance of counsel, not a “meaningful relationship”

between an accused and his counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1,

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14 (1983).

Nonetheless, to compel a criminal defendant to undergo a trial

with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become

embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive the defendant of

any counsel whatsoever. United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154,

1159-60 (9th Cir. 1998). The denial of a criminal defendant’s

motion for substitution of counsel therefore may violate his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., id. at 1160 (where

irreconcilable conflict existed between defendant and counsel,

trial court’s failure to appoint substitute counsel was reversible

error); Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970)

(refusal to substitute new counsel violated the Sixth Amendment

where relationship between defendant and particular public defender

had completely collapsed). “Given the commands of Sixth Amendment

jurisprudence, a state trial court has no discretion to ignore an

indigent defendant's timely motion to relieve an appointed

attorney.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc). "[I]t is well established and clear that the Sixth

Amendment requires on the record an appropriate inquiry into the

grounds for such a motion, and that the matter be resolved on the

merits before the case goes forward." Id.

Barnes' claim that the trial court failed to conduct a Marsden

hearing does not give rise to a colorable claim for relief. The

trial court gave Barnes a full opportunity to voice his complaints

about counsel’s representation. The trial court denied Barnes'

motion because it found that counsel’s representation was adequate

and that Barnes' reasons for making his Marsden motion did not

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12The Court notes that Barnes re-filed his Marsden motion along

with his pro per motion for a new trial, which the court allowed

him to file to supplement the motion filed by counsel. The trial

court declined to re-hear the motion. Clerk's Transcript (C.T.)

964. However, the Court finds that the trial court's decision was

based on its prior consideration of the motion and its assessment

that there were no additional arguments presented. Therefore, the

Court finds that the State court's decision did not contravene

Schell.

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indicate that there was an irreconcilable conflict between himself

and counsel.12 

Because the record supports the trial court’s conclusions, the

Court finds that the denial of Barnes' Marsden motion did not

constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. This claim does not provide grounds for granting the

petition.

VIII. CALJIC Number 17.41.1

CALJIC number 17.41.1 instructs jurors to notify the court if

"any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to

disregard the law." Barnes argues that the instruction "is

patently invalid [because it] invades the province of the jury,

interferes with the defendant's right to a unanimous jury

exercising independent judgment, tramples on the defendant's and

jurors' right to nullification, and blatantly misadvises the jury,

directly and indirectly, as to its powers and its rights." 

Traverse at 27. However, as the State notes, this claim is

precluded by Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004),

where the Ninth Circuit held that "no Supreme Court case

establishes that an instruction such as CALJIC 17.41.1 violates an

existing constitutional right" and therefore upheld the denial of a

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13Claims IX-XXII were not raised in Barnes' direct appeal. 

These claims were presented for the first time in his State habeas

petition, which the California Supreme Court denied without

comment. Because there is no reasoned State court decision on

these claims, as noted above, this Court must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the State

court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law. 

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State habeas petition on such grounds. This claim does not provide

grounds for granting the petition.

IX. Sentencing Error13

Barnes claims that his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments were violated as a result of State court

sentencing errors. Barnes claims that the trial court's sentencing

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, but cites only California law. 

 Barnes' primary claim of sentencing error pertains to the

application of California Penal Code §654, which provides: "An act

or omission that is punishable in different ways by different

provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that

provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no

case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one

provision." Barnes maintains that "the trial judge had the

discretion to sentence petitioner to one term of 25 years to life

with the other counts to run concurrent" because each of his

offenses stemmed from one proceeding and were not tried separately. 

 Even if Barnes' State sentencing error claim were meritorious,

a claim of State sentencing error does not raise a federal

constitutional question. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783

(1990). An alleged violation of the California Penal Code

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therefore is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. See Watts v.

Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1989) (alleged violation of

§ 654 is State law claim not cognizable in federal habeas under 

§ 2254). State sentencing courts must be accorded wide latitude in

their decisions as to punishment. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d

470, 476 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, 488 U.S. 981

(1988). Generally, therefore, a federal court may not review a

State sentence that is within statutory limits. See id. A State

violates a criminal defendant's due process right to fundamental

fairness only if it arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a State

law entitlement. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). 

Barnes fails to state a claim under any constitutional provision. 

In fact, Barnes has not even demonstrated that State law was

misapplied. Under California law, to permit multiple punishments

"there must be evidence to support a finding the defendant formed a

separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was

sentenced." People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112, 162 (1989). Here,

the trial court rejected Barnes' request that his sentences for the

two robbery counts be served concurrently because "exercising its

discretion, [it] recognize[d] that these two offenses were

committed in the same event, same set of operative facts, but

they're against two separate victims." C.T. 974. There is no

evidence to support the proposition that the trial court's

sentencing decision was in excess of State law or was imposed

arbitrarily. Accordingly, Barnes fails to state a cognizable due

process claim. 

Barnes also claims for the first time in his traverse that the

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14Although he includes the Eighth Amendment in the caption for

this claim in his federal habeas petition, Barnes does not discuss

it in the body of his petition. In his State habeas petition,

Barnes also attempted to challenge the underlying prior strikes on

the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when

defending those convictions. This argument likewise is not

sufficient to satisfy the requirement that he fairly present his ex

post facto claim to the State courts. 

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application of California's three strikes provision to his case

violated the ex post facto clause because the earlier offenses upon

which the application was based occurred before the enactment of

the three strikes law. Because Barnes' three strikes claim in his

State habeas petition was based only upon the Eighth Amendment,

this ex post facto claim is unexhausted.14 See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b). Although the claim is unexhausted, the Court denies it

on its merits. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th

Cir. 2005) ("[A] federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on

the merits . . . when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does

not raise even a colorable federal claim."). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the application of a

sentencing enhancement statute does not violate the ex post facto

clause where the offense for which the punishment is imposed

occurred after the statute's enactment, even where the prior

offense upon which the enhancement is based occurred before the

statute's enactment. Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1040 (9th Cir.

2002), vacated on other grounds, 538 U.S. 901 (2003); United States

v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1989). Barnes does

not raise a colorable claim under the ex post facto clause. 

Therefore, the Court denies Barnes' petition for a writ of habeas

corpus to the extent it is based on this claim. 

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15In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), the

Supreme Court held that a defendant has a right under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to waive counsel and represent himself or

herself.

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X. Faretta Motion

On November 1, 1999, following the verdict and shortly after

the trial court denied Barnes' Marsden motion, Barnes made a

Faretta15 motion. After an extensive colloquy with the court,

Barnes agreed to withdraw his Faretta motion, with the

understanding that he could file a motion for new trial on any

grounds that counsel was unwilling to raise, in particular a motion

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. R.T. 1775. 

In his first amended petition, Barnes argues that he "was

deprived of the right to reasonable representation and a fair

trial" based on the trial court's decision "to allow petitioner to

represent himself without warning him of the possible dangers

involved." Petition at 42. In his traverse, Barnes suggests that

his decision to accept the court's compromise was based on the

court's alleged refusal to offer "adequate access to the resources

necessary to conduct his own defense through other means." 

Traverse at 30. 

The Court finds that these are two separate bases for relief,

and that only the first, that the court allowed Barnes to represent

himself without warning him of the possible dangers involved, was

exhausted in State court. See Ex. F at 42. Because the trial

court did not grant Barnes' Faretta motion, this claim is without

merit. In fact, it appears that the trial court made every effort

to ensure that Barnes could be represented by counsel but would

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also be allowed to bring some motions on his own to supplement the

representation. As stated above, the Court can deny an unexhausted

claim that does not raise a colorable basis for relief. Therefore,

the Court also denies Barnes' unexhausted subclaim based on the

trial court's alleged denial of the resources necessary for selfrepresentation. These claims do not provide grounds for granting

the petition. 

XI. Juror Misconduct

During the lunch break on the third day of trial, Barnes'

mother waited at a crosswalk with one of the jurors. After

exchanging greetings, the juror asked Barnes' mother if she was a

reporter, stating that she recognized her. After Barnes' mother

informed juror who she was, the conversation ended. The juror

wrote a note, bringing the interaction to the court's attention. 

The court showed the note to counsel. The court characterized the

interaction as "an on-the-street encounter with somebody who's been

here in the courtroom, and it appears to be nothing more than

somewhat inconsequential." R.T. 623. The juror confirmed that

"nothing was discussed," and counsel on both sides agreed that no

further inquiry was required. Id. Barnes contends that the trial

court failed adequately to investigate the interaction and that he

therefore was deprived of a fair and impartial jury.

As discussed above, the Sixth Amendment guarantees to the

criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. 

U.S. Const. Amend. VI; see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).

There is no evidence or reasonable inference that the interaction

between Barnes' mother and the juror had any effect or influence on

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the jury's verdict. Barnes argues that the fact that the juror

recognized his mother indicated that she had seen newspaper or

television reports of his case. However, at voir dire, it was

clear that many of the jurors had seen some media reports about the

case and those who had indicated that it did not impact their

impartiality. Further, the Court specifically asked the juror if

the interaction would effect her impartiality. She replied that it

would not.

Barnes fails to demonstrate that the interaction between the

juror and his mother deprived him of a fair and impartial jury.

This claim does not provide grounds for granting the petition. 

Because there was no basis for dismissing the juror following the

interaction with Barnes' mother, the Court also denies Barnes'

petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the extent it is based on a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for

a mistrial following the interaction.

XII. Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Arguments

Barnes further argues that he was deprived of his due process

right to a fair trial based on four acts of prosecutorial

misconduct during closing arguments. He points to the prosecutor's

(1) use of marks on the courtroom door to illustrate a point; 

(2) reference to the fact that Mabrey was not charged as an

accomplice in the case; (3) reference to the fact that the judge

walked with a limp; and (4) reference to Barnes' status as an exfelon. 

A defendant's due process rights are violated when a

prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial "fundamentally unfair." 

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Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Smith v. Phillips,

455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are

reviewed "on the merits, examining the entire proceedings to

determine whether the prosecutor's remarks so infected the trial

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process." Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir.)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1017 (1995). 

 The first factor in determining the prejudicial effect of

misconduct is whether the trial court issued a curative

instruction. When a curative instruction is issued, a court

presumes that the jury has disregarded improper argument and that

no due process violation occurred. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756,

766 n.8 (1987); Darden, 477 U.S. at 182. A court may also take

into account the following factors in determining whether

misconduct rises to a level of a due process violation: (1) the

weight of evidence of guilt, United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 19

(1985); United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 982 (9th Cir.

1987); (2) whether the misconduct was isolated or part of an

ongoing pattern, Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir.

1987); (3) whether the misconduct related to a critical part of the

case, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); and 

(4) whether a prosecutor's comment misstated or manipulated the

evidence, Darden, 477 U.S. at 182.

Barnes does not demonstrate that any of the prosecutor's

actions rises to the level of a due process violation. Barnes'

first claim of misconduct is that the prosecutor encouraged the

jurors to conduct an improper experiment when he put marks on the

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door to the courtroom. The prosecutor put the marks on the door at

five feet, five feet, six inches and six feet in order to

demonstrate how difficult it is to estimate how tall a person is. 

After the prosecution finished its argument, defense counsel

objected outside the presence of the jury and moved to dismiss the

charges against Barnes. The court denied the motion, stating that

he considered the act to be "done for demonstrative purposes"

rather than as an experiment or as encouragement for the jurors to

conduct an experiment. R.T. 1559. 

Even if this reference to the height markings on the door was

misconduct, Barnes has not demonstrated that it deprived him of due

process. The eyewitness identifications, which the prosecutor

hoped to support with his reference to the height markings, were

not the only basis on which the jury could find that Barnes was the

individual in the bank. The discovery of the disguise and money in

the car in which Barnes was riding and Mabrey's testimony also tied

him to the robbery. 

Barnes next contends that the prosecutor's argument that

Mabrey was not an accomplice was improper. His petition cites the

prosecutor's statement that "there's another instruction you're not

given in this case, and that's instructions [sic] about Mabrey

being an accomplice, because Mabrey is not an accomplice." R.T.

1551. The State contends that the prosecution made the reference

in anticipation of the defense's attempt to cast doubt on Mabrey's

testimony and to imply that he, not Barnes, was responsible for the

robbery. The prosecutor argued to the jury that if Mabrey had been

an accomplice, the judge would have so instructed the jury and

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would have told them to distrust Mabrey's testimony and that the

testimony would need to be corroborated to be believed. Because

the judge had not given such an instruction, the prosecutor argued

that Mabrey's testimony need not be corroborated. The prosecutor

was correct that Mabrey's testimony did not need to be

corroborated.

However, the prosecutor went on to state that the judge did

not give the instruction regarding accomplice testimony "because

Mabrey, by law, is not an accomplice." R.T. 1551. This argument

improperly suggests that the court made a finding that Mabrey was

not an accomplice and therefore could not have been the robber,

eliminating one of Barnes' potential defenses. Nonetheless, even

if this argument was improper, Barnes has not demonstrated that it

deprived him of a fair trial. Eyewitnesses had testified that

Mabrey was not the robber. 

Barnes also argues that the prosecutor improperly pointed out

that the judge was limping. This was to support the inference that

Mabrey could not have been the robber because Mabrey was injured

and walking with a limp at the time of the robbery. The

prosecution made that argument in response to the defense's

argument that, although none of the eyewitnesses testified that the

robber was limping, many of them could not see the robber's legs

because they were behind the counter. Therefore, the prosecution

pointed out that the jury could tell that the judge was limping

despite the fact that they could not see his legs behind the bench. 

Again, even if this was improper argument, there is nothing to

indicate that it rendered Barnes' trial fundamentally unfair.

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Barnes' final claim of misconduct is that the prosecution

improperly referred to his prior felony conviction in closing

argument. The trial court noted that the prosecutor twice "told

the jury [Barnes] should be convicted for another felony," which

was referring to the prior conviction "for a purpose other than

what it's permitted to be used for." R.T. 1559-60. However, the

court also noted that "it wasn't emphasized" and that it "[didn't]

consider it to be egregious." Id. The Court finds that the

prosecution's reference to Barnes' prior felony conviction did not

render his trial fundamentally unfair. The jury was already aware

of the felony convictions as stipulated for purposes of the charge

of felon in possession of a firearm, which minimized the harmful

impact of the prosecution's argument.

Because Barnes does not demonstrate that the prosecutor's

actions, even if construed as misconduct, rendered his trial

fundamentally unfair, his petition for writ of habeas corpus is

denied to the extent it is based on this claim. 

XIII. Access to Courts

Barnes claims that the police officers' failure to report

their use of force "in their initial and supplemental reports"

deprived him of meaningful access to the courts. He also notes

that, in discovery for his civil case against the officers, he

received reports of other instances in which the officers used

excessive force which were not disclosed to trial counsel. 

However, as discussed above, the officers' use of excessive force

was not relevant to any defense presented by Barnes. Therefore,

his petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied to the extent it

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is based on this claim.

XIV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Barnes raises eleven claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel based on counsel's: (1) failure to inspect the car Barnes

was driving at the time of his arrest; (2) failure to investigate

and discover that the gun Barnes possessed was inoperable at the

time of the offense; (3) failure to move based on the use of

excessive force at the time of the arrest to suppress the evidence

gathered from the car; (4) failure to present evidence related to

Mabrey's prior testimony at another individual's trial; (5) failure

to object to hearsay in Mabrey's testimony; (6) alleged errors at

sentencing; (7) failure to raise a diminished capacity defense; 

(8) failure to investigate or call witnesses; (9) failure to crossexamine Mabrey or to introduce evidence of a tape-recorded

interview of Mabrey; (10) motion for a pretrial physical lineup;

and (11) failure to call Barnes' sister to impeach Mabrey's

testimony or to allow Barnes to testify in his own defense. 

A. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id.

 In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

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counsel claim a petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that is,

that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance, that is, that "there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome. Id. However, "strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable." Id. at 690. The Strickland framework

for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

considered to be "clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States" for the purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-08. 

B. Failure to Inspect the Car

As discussed above, the car that Barnes was driving when he

was arrested was destroyed before trial counsel inspected it. 

Barnes argues that counsel's decision not to inspect the car

earlier was error. However, counsel made a strategic decision to

delay inspection of the car until after hearing the testimony of

the officers and made a reasonable effort to ensure that the

evidence would be preserved until that time. In moving to have the

charges dismissed based on the destruction of the car, counsel

argued to the trial court that he believed that there was a good

chance that the prosecution would present officer testimony

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regarding what they saw during their pursuit of Barnes. He also

stated that evidence related to the vehicle likely would be useful

in cross-examining those officers. However, counsel could not be

sure of the best use of that evidence until the prosecution put on

its case. Therefore, counsel obtained the court order to preserve

the vehicle and sent the investigator to see the car following the

officers’ testimony. 

Even if Barnes could demonstrate that counsel's strategic

decision was objectively unreasonable, he is unable to demonstrate

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s inability to examine the

vehicle. There were no charges related to the collision with the

ranger's vehicle. As the State court noted, little could be

determined about the view of the inside of the car because the back

windshield had been shot out, and many other factors, such as

lighting, would be hard to recreate. This claim does not provide

grounds for granting the petition.

C. Inoperable Gun

Barnes' first ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that

counsel failed to investigate, and therefore failed to discover,

that the gun was inoperable. However, the record demonstrates that

counsel was aware of this fact. He used it to argue at the

preliminary hearing and again immediately before trial that there

was no probable cause to support a charge of assault on a police

officer. C.T. 93. Prior to trial, the court set aside the

assault charge and the prosecution amended the information to

include the brandishing charge, which does not require an operable

weapon. Because counsel was aware that the gun was inoperable and

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used that fact to support his arguments, Barnes' claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily fails on this ground.

D. Fourth Amendment Claim

Barnes also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to

pursue a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the car

following Barnes' arrest. Barnes argues that counsel could have

demonstrated that the officers used excessive force in arresting

him and that the subsequent search of the car was therefore

prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

A claim that defense counsel failed to litigate (or properly

litigate) a Fourth Amendment claim is not barred by Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 494 (1976), which ordinarily bars

federal habeas relief on Fourth Amendment claims unless the State

did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of

those claims. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-83

(1986).

In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel based

on defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment issue,

a petitioner must show that: (1) the overlooked motion to suppress

would have been meritorious, and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict

absent the introduction of the unlawful evidence. Ortiz-Sandoval

v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kimmelman,

477 U.S. at 375).

Although there was evidence counsel could have used to

establish that the police used excessive force between the time

Barnes crashed the car into the pole and the time they completed

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16Barnes also claims that he was deprived of an effective

Fourth Amendment argument because one of two things must have

occurred: either counsel failed to pursue information related to

prior incidents in which the relevant officers used excessive force

or the prosecution failed to furnish this information. Because

there is no basis for the Fourth Amendment argument, the failure to

obtain or disclose the evidence could not have prejudiced Barnes.

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the arrest, Barnes has not demonstrated that he could have

succeeded on that basis on a motion to suppress any evidence found

in the car. Barnes cites no authority for the proposition that use

of excessive force provides grounds for suppression of the results

of a car search and the Court is aware of none. 

Because there are no grounds upon which counsel could have

filed a motion to suppress, Barnes cannot demonstrate prejudice

based on counsel's decision not to pursue such a motion. Further,

he cannot demonstrate that counsel's decision was objectively

unreasonable.16 This claim does not provide grounds for granting

the petition.

E. Welch Letter

Barnes also claims that counsel acted ineffectively when he

did not present evidence related to a letter he received from

another inmate against whom Mabrey had testified. Following trial,

counsel received a letter from David Welch, a death row inmate who

had been convicted of killing several members of Mabrey's family,

stating that Mabrey had testified at his trial and that the

testimony was false. Welch stated that he would be happy to

testify on Barnes' behalf about Mabrey's history of false

testimony. The letter acknowledged that his claims based on the

false testimony had been rejected by the courts that had considered

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them.

Barnes argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to

follow up with Welch prior to filing a motion for new trial. 

However, to establish prejudice caused by the failure to call a

witness, a petitioner must show that the witness was likely to have

been available to testify, that the witness would have given the

proffered testimony, and that the witness's testimony created a

reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a verdict

more favorable to the petitioner. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d

862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Welch made clear that he would have testified on Barnes'

behalf; however, there is little to indicate that his self-serving

testimony would have aided Barnes' case. Courts have recognized

that there are credibility problems associated with calling

convicted felons as witnesses on a defendant's behalf. See, e.g.,

United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, Welch could only have testified that he believed that Mabrey

lied in prior testimony. Welch's credibility would be undermined

by the fact that he had been convicted of killing Mabrey's

relatives and further undermined by the fact that the State courts

had already rejected his claims based on Mabrey's alleged

untruthfulness. 

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that particular

investigations are unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691;

Turner, 158 F.3d at 456. Strickland directs that “‘a particular

decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for

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reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure

of deference to counsel’s judgments.’” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d

825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 491). A

claim of failure to interview a witness cannot establish

ineffective assistance when the person's account is otherwise

fairly known to defense counsel. Eggleston v. United States, 798

F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986). When the record shows that the

lawyer was well-informed and the defendant fails to state what

additional information would be gained by the investigation he now

claims was necessary, an ineffective assistance claim fails. Id.

The Court finds that Barnes has failed to demonstrate that

counsel acted ineffectively in deciding not to pursue Welch's offer

to testify. Further, the Court finds that there is no reasonable

probability that the proffered testimony would have led to a new

trial, or if it had, would have led to a different result at trial.

F. Hearsay Testimony

Barnes' next claim is that counsel was ineffective when he

failed to object to Mabrey's hearsay testimony that Barnes told him

that he "hit one." However, the statement is admissible under the

party admission exception to the hearsay rule. Cal. Evid. Code 

§ 1220. Counsel cannot be said to act ineffectively by deciding

not to make a meritless objection, nor can the failure to make such

an objection be prejudicial to Barnes. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408

F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (failure to file a meritless motion

is not ineffective); Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir.

1999) (to show prejudice under Strickland from failure to file a

motion, petitioner must show that (1) had his counsel filed the

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17Further, the record demonstrates that Barnes instructed

counsel not to cross-examine Mabrey, but only to ask one question. 

R.T. 727-32. Therefore, any failure to impeach Mabrey was based on

Barnes' instruction and cannot form the basis for an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. 

42

motion, it is likely that the trial court would have granted it as

meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is likely that

there would have been an outcome more favorable to him).

Barnes further argues that Mabrey's testimony is unreliable,

characterizing him as a "co-conspirator" and an "in-custody

informant." However, the credibility of the witness is left to the

jury. A jury's credibility determinations are entitled to

near-total deference and may not be revisited by a federal habeas

court except in the most exceptional of circumstances. Bruce v.

Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004).17

G. Sentencing

Barnes claims that counsel was ineffective at sentencing

because "counsel argued for petitioner to receive 25 years to life. 

He argued that petitioner had committed the alleged robberies. He

was not cognizable with sentencing alternatives available to the

court, to make certain that the court was aware of such

alternatives." Amended Petition at 17. Barnes also asserts that

"counsel erroneously advised petitioner to admit his priors." Id.

The Supreme Court has not decided what standard should apply

to counsel's performance in non-capital sentencing proceedings. 

Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 442 (2005). Strickland declined to "'consider

the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which . . . may

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require a different approach to the definition of constitutionally

effective assistance'" and no later Supreme Court decision has done

so, either. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). However,

as the State notes, counsel argued for the most lenient sentence

available to Barnes based on his conviction. Further, counsel

asked the court to exercise its discretion to impose concurrent

rather than consecutive sentences because each of the charges

stemmed from the same events. The Court finds that Barnes has

failed to demonstrate that the State court's rejection of his claim

that counsel was ineffective at his sentencing was an unreasonable

application of federal law. 

H. Diminished Capacity Defense

Barnes argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise a diminished capacity defense and for failing to request a

psychiatric evaluation during trial. Barnes states that counsel

was aware that he had taken "large amounts" of cocaine and

"possibly" PCP at the time of the robbery and that he had been on

psychiatric medications since suffering head injuries as a child. 

First Amended Petition at 17. Further, Barnes alleges that trial

counsel knew that he was forced "to attend trial on large

quantities of psychiatric medication [which] rendered petitioner

unaware of critical stages of his trial and court proceedings." 

Id. Therefore, Barnes alleges that counsel should have raised a

diminished capacity defense and should have requested a psychiatric

evaluation at trial.

Barnes' claim with respect to the psychiatric evaluation fails

because counsel did in fact request an evaluation which was

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performed. On August 5, 1999, the trial court denied a defense

motion pursuant to California Penal Code § 1368, which provides for

a hearing into a defendant's mental competence to stand trial, and

ordered Barnes referred "for evaluation re trial competency." C.T.

408. On August 23, 1999, the trial court found that Barnes was

competent to stand trial after reviewing the evaluation report and

denied his motion pursuant to § 1368. C.T. 411. On September 14,

1999, the Court denied a subsequent § 1368 motion. C.T. 447.

The State argues that Barnes' claim based on diminished

capacity also fails, citing California cases holding that

diminished capacity is not a defense to general intent crimes. 

Points and Authorities at 47. While the brandishing offense is a

general intent crime for which the diminished capacity defense is

unavailable, robbery is a specific intent crime for which

diminished capacity can be a defense. People v. Hughes, 27 Cal.

4th 287, 340 (2002).

However, Barnes appears to base his diminished capacity claim

on voluntary intoxication but does not present any evidence or

allude to evidence that would demonstrate that he was so

intoxicated as to negate a finding of specific intent to rob the

bank. The Court notes that nothing in the record, including the

testimony of witnesses to the robbery, suggests that the robber was

intoxicated. Further, Barnes' theory at trial was that the

prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

the robber, not that he was unable to form the required intent to

commit the crime.

This claim does not provide grounds for granting the petition.

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I. Failure to Investigate or Call Witnesses

Barnes asserts that the police reports name over seventy-five

witnesses to the events underlying his brandishing conviction and

that "defense counsel made no attempt to contact any of them." 

First Amended Petition at 18. The State, apparently relying on the

claim's caption which refers to counsel's failure to call

witnesses, alleges that Barnes' claim must fail because he has not

established what the potential witnesses might testify about,

whether they would have been available to testify or that their

testimony would have a reasonable probability of impacting the

outcome of his case.

However, Barnes' claim extends beyond the failure to call the

witnesses at trial to counsel's failure to investigate. As stated

above, defense counsel has a general duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that a particular

investigation is unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Turner

v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 456. Therefore, the Court considers

Barnes' claim that counsel failed to interview or contact the

witnesses.

The Court finds that Barnes fails to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that further investigation would have changed the

outcome of his case. Barnes argues that the witnesses would have

supported his theories of self-defense and unconsciousness. 

However, as discussed above, it is undisputed that the brandishing

offense occurred before the use of excessive force or any potential

claim of unconsciousness. As Barnes' counsel conceded at trial, he

could not have raised those defenses to the brandishing offense. 

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Therefore, counsel's decision not to pursue this line of

investigation was not unreasonable. This claim does not provide

grounds for granting the petition.

J. Failure to Cross-Examine Mabrey or to Introduce Evidence

of his Tape-Recorded Interview

Barnes argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to use

a tape-recorded interview of Mabrey to impeach his testimony. 

Although the details of the interview are not clear from the

record, counsel referred during trial to a tape-recorded interview

conducted by a defense investigator. Barnes does not specifically

indicate how counsel might have used the tape to impeach Mabrey;

however, it is clear from the record that counsel made a reasoned

decision not to introduce the tape into evidence. 

When the court was considering Barnes' Marsden motion, based

in part on this claim, counsel indicated that there were two

reasons he chose not to call the investigator who interviewed

Mabrey to impeach his testimony. First, counsel indicated that

most of the inconsistencies were immaterial. Therefore, he was

unsure whether the court would allow him to introduce the evidence

to impeach Mabrey on collateral matters. Although he acknowledged

that these inconsistencies "did go on a certain level to his

credibility," he characterized the interview as "a two-edged

sword," recognizing that there was information in the tape that "is

consistent with and in fact in a couple instances goes further than

what he said to the police and his testimony at trial, which may

have in fact bolstered his credibility." R.T. 1664.

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As stated above, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The

Court finds that counsel's decision not to call the investigator or

to introduce the tape as impeachment was a strategic decision,

protected by Strickland. Further, the Court notes that Barnes

himself instructed counsel, against counsel's advice, to limit

cross-examination to one question, and only during the defense's

case was he recalled to be more fully cross-examined. This claim

does not provide grounds for granting the petition.

K. Lineup

Barnes contends that counsel's decision to move for a pretrial

physical lineup was unreasonable because he was still recovering

from the injuries related to his arrest. Further, Barnes claims

that counsel was aware that he was "on a very large amount of

psychiatric drugs and suffering from [post-traumatic stress

disorder] at the time of the line-up." First Amended Petition at

19. He also notes that counsel later argued that the lineup he had

requested prejudiced Barnes. Therefore, Barnes argues, counsel

acted unreasonably in requesting the lineup.

 However, the test for ineffective assistance of counsel is

whether counsel acted objectively reasonably at the time of the

decision, "not whether another lawyer, with the benefit of

hindsight, would have acted differently, but 'whether counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'" Babbitt v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Strickland,

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466 U.S. at 687). Therefore, counsel's later argument that the

lineup prejudiced Barnes does not factor into the Strickland

analysis. The question is whether the State court applied

Strickland unreasonably when it found that a reasonable attorney

could have requested a lineup at the time Barnes' counsel made the

request.

The Court finds that the State court's decision was not an

unreasonable application of federal law. Barnes' counsel might

have made a strategic decision to have the physical lineup

following the witnesses' inability to identify Barnes positively in

the photo arrays. As the State points out, counsel "was mostly

right" because the witnesses only tentatively identified Barnes at

the lineup. This claim does not provide grounds for granting the

petition. 

L. Failure to Call Barnes' Sister as a Witness or to Allow

Barnes to Testify in his Own Defense

Barnes' final claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

based on counsel's failure to call Barnes' sister, Kim Scott, to

impeach Mabrey or to allow him to testify on his own behalf. 

Barnes alleges that he and counsel agreed that Scott would testify

in order to impeach Mabrey and that Barnes would then testify as

well. 

Barnes argues that his sister could have impeached Mabrey by

testifying that Mabrey had been to her house, knew where she lived,

and knew what kind of car she drove, contrary to his testimony and

statements to the police. Traverse at 46. However, these

discrepancies, like those in Mabrey's interview with the defense

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investigator, are collateral and immaterial. While her testimony,

if admitted, might have gone generally to Mabrey's credibility,

Barnes has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability

that the jury would have reached a different decision if Scott had

testified. 

With respect to counsel's failure to call Barnes as a witness

in his own defense, Barnes does not state that he told his attorney

he wanted to testify. The Ninth Circuit has held that a

defendant's failure to indicate that he would like to testify when

counsel fails to call him constitutes a waiver of the right to

testify. See, e.g., Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir.

2005); Dows v. Woods, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000); United

States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1990).

This claim does not provide grounds for granting the petition. 

XV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Barnes' final claim is that there was insufficient evidence to

sustain his conviction. However, this claim simply alleges that

the conviction was based upon circumstantial evidence and restates

the claims regarding the police officers' use of excessive force.

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). However, a federal court

reviewing a habeas petitioner's claim that the evidence was not

sufficient to support the State court conviction does not determine

whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir.

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1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843 (1993). Rather, the federal

court "determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.'" See id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt is the evidence insufficient to support

the conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at

338; Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 992-93 (9th Cir.), amended,

768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, and

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d

1228, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984). 

Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that

evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Walters v.

Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, if

confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences, a

federal habeas court must presume that the trier of fact resolved

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and must defer to

that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. 

Barnes fails to demonstrate that no rational trier of fact

could have convicted him of robbery, brandishing a weapon at a

police officer, or possession of a firearm. Although the

individual who robbed the bank was wearing a disguise and there

were only tentative identifications of Barnes, the tentative

identifications together with Mabrey's testimony and the fact that

Barnes was riding in the car with the money taken from the bank and

the disguise worn by the robber is a sufficient basis from which a

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reasonable juror could infer that Barnes was the robber. Further,

it is undisputed that Barnes was the individual with the gun in the

car. Finally, it was stipulated at trial that Barnes had a prior

felony conviction. As discussed above, Barnes' defenses to the

brandishing offense fail for a variety of reasons. This claim does

not provide grounds for granting the petition.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Barnes' motion to

enlarge time to file his traverse (Docket Nos. 21, 22) and has

considered his traverse. The Court DENIES Barnes' motion for an

evidentiary hearing (Docket Nos. 21, 22) because he does not point

to any unresolved factual disputes which, if resolved in his favor,

would justify habeas relief. The Court DENIES the petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus (Docket No. 10) on all claims. 

Judgment shall enter accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/17/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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