Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00412/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00412-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 IMMANUAL C. PRICE, Case No.: 3:16-cv-00412-BEN-PCL

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER:

13 v.

(1) ADOPTING IN PART REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION; 14 DEPUTY ALEXANDRU GALIU,

Deputy Sheriffin San Diego, 15

Defendant. (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS/AMENDED

MOTION TO DISMISS; and

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18 (3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

19 MOTION TO AMEND

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[Docket Nos. 7, II, 21,25]

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22 PlaintiffImmanual Price, proceedingpro se and informa pauperis, brought this

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a federal civil rights claim for cruel and unusual

punishment. (Docket No. Iat3.) Defendant Alexandru Galiu filed a motion to dismiss,

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i Due to an apparent clerical error in addressing the Proof of Service, Plaintiff did not

receive Defendant’s initial Motion to Dismiss. Defendant subsequently filed an

“Amended Motion to Dismiss,” in which Defendant refiled the same Motion to Dismiss

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and Plaintifffiled a motion to amend his complaint. (Docket Nos. 7,11, 21.) Plaintiffs

proposed amended complaint includes new facts and two additional defendants and

causes of action. (Docket No. 21.) Both motions have been fully briefed.

Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending this Court grant in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and deny

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. (Docket No. 25.) Specifically, the Report and

Recommendation found Plaintiffs claim against Defendant Alexandra Galiu was barred

as an improper collateral attack on his criminal conviction for possession of drags and

obstructing an officer with force pursuant to Heckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

that Plaintiffwas not required to prove exhaustion of administrative remedies, and that

Plaintiffs proposed amendments to his complaint were futile. {Id. at 5-7.) Plaintifffiled

objections to the Report and Recommendation and Defendant filed a reply to those

objections. (Docket Nos. 31, 33.) For the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS in

part the Report and Recommendation.

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BACKGROUND2

On February 28, 2014, Plaintiffwas searched for drags by two unidentified deputy

sheriffs in a dress out room in the San Diego Central Jail. (Compl. at 3.) The deputies

suspected Plaintiffhad drags in his mouth, and forced him into a sitting position while he

was naked. {Id.) A struggle ensued, and other deputies, including Defendant Galiu,

responded to the commotion. {Id.) Unidentified deputies forced their fingers into

Plaintiffs mouth in an attempt to prevent Plaintifffrom ingesting the marijuana. {Id.)

During the straggle, Plaintiffwas “flailing” and kicked Defendant Galiu in the

groin. {Id.) Subsequently, Defendant Galiu allegedly punched Plaintiffin the left eye.

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26 to correct the mistake. (Docket. No. 11.) The Court shall refer to both Motions as

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

2 The following overview ofthe relevant facts are drawn from the allegations of

Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint. (Docket No. 1.) The Court is not making findings offact.

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(Id.) Plaintifffurther alleges he was then “slammed to the ground,” and Defendant Galiu

“proceeded to knee [him] in the nose several times.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant’s

Galiu’s actions caused him to sustain an “orbital break,” for which he has undergone an

unsuccessful surgery, and a fractured nose. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition” of a

magistrate judge on a dispositive matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). “[T]he districtjudge must determine de novo any part ofthe [report and

recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

However, “[t]he statute makes it clear that the districtjudge must review the magistrate

judge’s findings and recommendations de novo ifobjection is made, but not otherwise.”

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also

Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). “Neither the Constitution nor

the statute requires a districtjudge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations

that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121.

Plaintiff objects that he is not precluded from bringing a Section 1983 claim for

cruel and unusual punishment against Defendant Galiu under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994). Plaintiff further objects that Judge Lewis erroneously found that his

proposed amended complaint failed to state a claim. For alternative reasons, the Court

disagrees, overrules Plaintiffs objections, and adopts in part the Report and

Recommendation.

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate if, taking

all factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief on its

face. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007);

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (requiring plaintiffto plead factual content

that provides “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”).

Under this standard, dismissal is appropriate ifthe complaint fails to state enough facts to

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raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence ofthe matter

complained of, or ifthe complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory under which reliefmay

be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “A claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” ZixiangLi v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999

(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Threadbare recitals ofthe elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678.

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The Court must assume the truth ofthe facts presented in Plaintiffs Complaint and

construe inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when

reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). The complaint is considered in its entirety, “as well as other sources courts

ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular,

documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters ofwhich a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. MakorIssues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007). Additionally, “a document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976)).

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Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that his claim

was barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).3 Under Heck, a section

1983 damages claim which effectively challenges a current conviction is not cognizable

under the law. Id. at 486-487. After reviewing Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court finds

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3 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss also argued that dismissal was warranted because

Plaintifffailed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Docket Nos. 7, 11.) Neither

party objected to Judge Lewis’s finding that Plaintiffwas not required to prove

exhaustion at this stage in the litigation. (Docket No. 25.) Therefore, the Court need not

review Judge Lewis’s finding regarding exhaustion.

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Heck analysis unnecessary to its conclusion that Plaintiffs complaint should be

dismissed for failing to state a claim.

The operative Complaint alleges Defendant violated Plaintiffs civil right to be

“ffee[] from cruel and unusual punishment.” (Docket No. 1 at 3.) In order to state a

claim for a civil right violation under section 1983, a plaintiffmust allege that: (1) the

conduct complained ofwas committed by a person acting under color ofstate law; and

(2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rinker v. Napa County, 831 F.2d

829, 831 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted.)).

To support his claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendant used excessive force against him

while he was in a “dress out room in San Diego Central Jail.” (Id.) The critical

deficiency ofPlaintiffs pleading is that he failed to allege his custodial status, i.e.

whether he was a pre-trial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time ofthe incident. It

is well established that the “the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all punishment of

pretrial detainees, while the Eighth Amendment only prevents the imposition of cruel and

unusual punishment on convicted prisoners.” Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1028-

1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). In failing to

identify his custodial status, Plaintiff has left the Court to speculate as to whether he can

state an Eighth Amendment claim at all.4

For this reason, the Court finds Plaintiffhas lacks “a cognizable legal theory under

which reliefmay be granted.” Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 556. Therefore, the Court

ADOPTS in part Judge Lewis’s recommendation to grant Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6).

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4 Even construing the Complaint liberally, it appears he has failed to state a claim for

reliefunder the Eighth Amendment. See Zixiang Li, supra, 710 F.3d at 999 (internal

citations omitted).

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1 Plaintiffs Motion to Amend

Leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) should be “freely give[n] . . . when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit “has noted on several occasions ..

. that the Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to heed carefully the

command ofRule 15(a),... by freely granting leave to amend when justice so requires.”

DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). “This policy is ‘to

be applied with extreme liberality.’” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d

1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d

708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Courts consider “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility

ofthe proposed amendment” in deciding whetherjustice requires granting leave to amend

under Rule 15. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.

1989) (citing Foman v. Davis, 370 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Although each factor may

warrant consideration, “prejudice to the opposing party ... carries the greatest weight.”

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. None ofthese factors weigh against granting leave.

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend seeks to allege three civil rights claims: (1) “excessive

force” against Defendant; (2) “excessive force” against John Doe 1; and (3)

“unreasonable search and seizure/abusive body cavity search” against John Doe 2, all

arising out ofthe incident on February 28, 2014, upon which his initial complaint is

based. (Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A.) Defendant opposes Plaintiffs Motion on the grounds that

Plaintiffis barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) from bringing a claim

against Defendant, and because the proposed amendments are unrelated to the existing

claim against Defendant and are futile. (Def.’s Opp’n at 1-2.)

Construing Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint liberally, it appears Plaintiff

seeks to re-characterize his prior “cruel and unusual punishment” claim against

Defendant as an “excessive force” claim. In the proposed claim for excessive force

against John Doe 1, Plaintiff alleges John Doe 1 yelled “Tase [his] balls, tase [his] balls”

B.

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after Defendant allegedly punched him in the eye and kneed him in the nose. (Id. at 3.)

The other proposed claim is for unreasonable search and seizure against John Doe 2 for

anally probing Plaintiff, which also allegedly occurred after Defendant’s alleged actions.

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The Report and Recommendation concluded that Plaintiffs proposed additional

claim for excessive force failed to state a claim because “the use ofvulgar language” is

not cognizable as an excessive force claim. (Docket No. 25 at 7) (citing Robinson v.

Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007,1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J., concurring)). In his

Objections to the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff conceded that “a deputy yelling

‘tase his balls’ would not reach constitutional dimensions.” (Docket No. 31 at 1.) The

Court agrees that Plaintifffailed to state a claim for excessive force against John Doe 1

for yelling “Tase [his] balls, tase [his] balls” and ADOPTS Judge Lewis’s

recommendation that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend be denied as to this proposed claim.

The Report and Recommendation also found Plaintiffs proposed claim for

unreasonable search and seizure failed to state a claim because “even ifthe anal probe

were a warrantless search, ‘the exigencies ofthe situation make the needs oflaw

enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment.’”5 (Docket No. 25 at 7.) For alternative reasons, the Court finds

Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim against John Doe 2 for

“unreasonable search and seizure/abusive body cavity search.”

Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint alleges: “John Doe [2], while Plaintiffwas

face down and fully naked probed Plaintiffs anus with his fingers. Apparently either to

embarrass Plaintiff or looking for something [sic].” This is the extent ofPlaintiffs

allegations against John Doe 2. (Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A at 4.) Plaintiffhas not provided

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enough facts to state any claim, let alone a plausible one, against John Doe 2.6 Again,

although the Court construespro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, Plaintiffs meagre

offerings provide no context as to his custodial status, whether he had any expectation of

privacy, or whether exigent circumstances existed at the time ofthe incident. See Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-546 (1979) (“simply because prison inmates retain certain

constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and

limitations. ‘Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of

many privileges and rights, a retractionjustified by the considerations underlying our

penal system.’ (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)) ... This principle

applies equally to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. A detainee simply does not

possess the full range offreedoms of an unincarcerated individual.”) In short, the Court

is once again left to speculate as to how Plaintiffs constitutional right was allegedly

violated.

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The Court acknowledges leave to amend should be freely given to pro se litigants.

See Lucas v. Dep't ofCorr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“unless it is absolutely

clear that no amendment can cure the defect... a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of

the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal ofthe

action.”). Therefore, because Defendant has not demonstrated that Plaintiffs Motion is

untimely, unduly prejudicial, or futile, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiffs Motion to

Amend. Plaintiffmay amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies identified by the

Court as to his claims against Defendant and John Doe 2 only.

CONCLUSION

The Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in part. Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff

has thirty (30) days from the date ofthis Order to file an amended complaint, in

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27 6 In particular, the Court has serious doubts regarding the viability Plaintiffs claim that

an officer’s search “embarrassed” him. (Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A at 4.) 28

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accordance with the Court’s rulings. Defendants shall file an answer or otherwise

respond to Plaintiffs FAC within twenty (20) days ofits filing.

IT IS SO ORDERED. ^

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DATED: January1^ , 5

HONVRq

6 United States District Judge

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