Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04792/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04792-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Trent Xavier Bouhdida, Sr.,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-04792-PHX-DGC (MTM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Trent Xavier Bouhdida, Sr. has filed pro se a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1).

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Petitioner challenges the validity of his convictions in two separate cases in

Maricopa County Superior Court. Petitioner alleges that the Maricopa County Superior 

Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his cases, in violation of his Sixth 

Amendment rights (Ground One) and in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights (Ground Two). The Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted 

without excuse, not cognizable, or fail on the merits. Therefore, the Court will recommend 

that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 1 of 10
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Background.

a. Facts and Procedural Background.

1. CR 2009-030013.

On April 16, 2009, in CR 2009-030013, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County 

Superior Court on nine counts, including conspiracy to commit armed robbery (Count 1); 

assisting a criminal street gang (Count 2); armed robbery (Counts 3-6, 8); and attempted 

armed robbery (Counts 7, 9). (Doc. 11 at 3-4, citing Doc. 11-1 at 17-22). On November 

20, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty by plea agreement to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 8. (Doc. 11-1 at 

23-25). On August 11, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent five (5) year 

prison terms for Counts 1 and 4, and concurrent terms of probation for Counts 2 and 8, to 

commence after Petitioner’s prison terms expired. (Id. at 26-31). Petitioner did not file a 

notice of post-conviction relief; accordingly, pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.4(a), Petitioner’s conviction became final on November 9, 2010, 90 days 

after his sentencing. 

2. CR 2016-000961.

On January 13, 2016, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court in 

CR 2016-000961. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as 

follows:

Bouhdida met an undercover police officer in a 7-Eleven parking lot in 

Phoenix. The officer initially made contact with Bouhdida as part of a sting 

operation to recover stolen goods. Bouhdida and the officer exchanged phone 

numbers and on the following day Bouhdida sent a text message to the officer 

stating that he had marijuana for sale. The officer arranged to purchase 

marijuana from Bouhdida. Between May and July, Bouhdida sold marijuana 

to the undercover officer on four separate occasions.

The grand jury returned an indictment charging Bouhdida with four counts 

of the sale or transportation of marijuana. Each count of the indictment 

alleged that Bouhdida

knowingly did transport for sale, import for sale, import into 

this state, or offer to transport for sale or import into this state, 

sell, transfer or offer to sell or transfer an amount of marijuana 

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 2 of 10
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

having a weight of less than two pounds, in violation of 

[Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) ] §§ 13-3401, 13-3405, 

13-3418, 13-3701, 13-702, and 13-801.

The grand jury further alleged that Bouhdida committed the sales in 

Maricopa County. The State subsequently amended the indictment to allege 

several sentence enhancements, including four dangerous historical felony 

convictions from 2009.

A jury found Bouhdida guilty on all four counts. At sentencing, the court 

found that the State had proven all four of the dangerous historical felony 

convictions and sentenced him to four concurrent, presumptive prison terms 

of 11.25 years. The court revoked Bouhdida's probation he was serving for 

the prior felonies and imposed a consecutive sentence of five years.

State v. Bouhdida, No. 1 CA-CR 18-0015, 2019 WL 347720 *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 

2019).

1

b. State Habeas Petition.

On December 22, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

Maricopa County Superior Court, challenging the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial 

court in CR 2016-000961. (Doc. 11-4 at 1-10). The court denied the petition on February 

16, 2018. (Id. at 54-55). Petitioner did not appeal the denial of the petition.

c. Direct Appeal.

On March 21, 2018 and June 25, 2018, Petitioner filed two “opening briefs” with 

the Arizona Court of Appeals challenging the state trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 

over his two criminal cases. (Doc. 11-4 at 59-66, 67-78). The Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed the conviction in CR 2016-00961, and found that the trial court in CR 2009-

030013 had properly revoked defendant’s probation. Bouhdida, 2019 WL at *1. On 

February 19, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Doc. 11-5 at 66-113). On June 7, 2019, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied 

review. (Id. at 114).

1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the Court presumes that the state court’s recounting of the 

facts is correct. 

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 3 of 10
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

d. First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On May 14, 2018, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in both CR 2009-

030013 and CR 2016-000961. (Doc. 11-5 at 115). Petitioner identified six bases for relief: 

(1) inadmissible evidence introduced at trial pursuant to an unlawful arrest; (2) the 

introduction of an identification at trial obtained in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional 

rights; (3) violation of the right not to be placed in Double Jeopardy; (4) newly discovered 

evidence which requires the conviction to be vacated; (5) lack of jurisdiction of the court 

which entered the conviction; and, (6) failure by counsel to file a timely notice of appeal. 

(Id. at 121-22). Petitioner also asserted that the revocation of his probation in CR 2009-

030013 was unlawful because in Petitioner’s view the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the charges in CR 2016-000961. (Id. at 123).

On November 1, 2018, the Maricopa County Superior Court denied relief. The 

reviewing court found that the trial court in both of Petitioner’s cases properly exercised 

subject-matter jurisdiction; the reviewing court dismissed every other basis for relief for

failure to provide supporting evidence. (Id. at 139-40). The record does not indicate that 

Petitioner sought review of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 

e. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On December 11, 2018, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief. 

On January 9, 2019, the state trial court appointed counsel to review Petitioner’s claims. 

(Doc. 11-5 at 141-42). On April 30, 2019, the court permitted Petitioner to file a pro per 

petition for post-conviction relief after appointed counsel concluded that no colorable claim 

for post-conviction relief existed. (Id. at 144-45). On August 1, 2019, the court dismissed 

Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief for failure to prosecute. (Id. at 146). On August 

14, 2019, the court granted Petitioner’s motion to reinstate his petition and set a deadline 

of October 14, 2019 for Petitioner to file his petition. (Id. at 148). The record does not 

indicate that Petitioner ever filed a second petition for post-conviction relief.

III. The Petition.

On July 19, 2019, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 1). 

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 4 of 10
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On July 26, 2019, the Court summarized Petitioner’s claims as follows:

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges the 

Maricopa County Superior Court failed to prove that it had subject matter 

jurisdiction in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights. In Ground 

Two, he alleges that the Maricopa County Superior Court failed to prove that 

it had subject matter jurisdiction in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments.

(Doc. 4 at 2).

On September 12, 2019, Respondents filed a Response (doc. 11). Petitioner did not 

file a Reply.

IV. Analysis.

a. Timeliness and Procedural Default.

1. CR 2009-030013.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a one-year 

limitation period, which begins to run “from the latest of . . . the date on which the judgment 

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). A conviction becomes final for the purpose of 

the AEDPA limitations period when the petitioner either exhausts his state law remedies 

or fails to seek further post-conviction review. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th

Cir. 2007) (“Because a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form of direct review, AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 ofright proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for 

seeking such proceeding or review.”). Petitioner’s convictions in CR 2009-030013 became 

final on November 9, 2010, after Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)’s 90-day window to seek postconviction relief lapsed. Accordingly, the deadline for a timely federal habeas petition was 

November 9, 2011; Petitioner filed his petition eight years later, on July 19, 2019.

Petitioner offers no explanation for the delay in filing his Petition. Under AEDPA, the 

Petition is untimely as to Petitioner’s convictions in CR 2009-030013.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. While Petitioner eventually sought postCase 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 5 of 10
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conviction relief in state court in CR 2009-030013, the notices of post-conviction relief

were filed in 2018, more than six years after Petitioner’s convictions became final, and 

well after the expiration of the limitations period under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). A state 

petition that is not filed within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed;” as a 

result, petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 

(2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of 

the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (finding 

that inmate’s untimely state post-conviction petition was not “properly filed” under the 

AEDPA’s tolling provision). 

Petitioner also failed to properly exhaust his claims as to CR 2009-030013. In 

Arizona, a claim from a prisoner not sentenced to death is considered fully exhausted for 

purposes of the AEDPA when the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on the claim. 

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). The state prisoner must also 

“fairly present” his claims by describing both the operative facts and the federal legal 

theory to the state court. Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp.2d 736, 764 (D. Ariz. 2008), citing 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). Petitioner did not file a direct appeal to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals of his convictions in CR 2009-030013. Further, as described 

above, Petitioner’s notices of post-conviction relief were not timely filed, and, once denied, 

were not appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

2

Instead, Petitioner sought 

reconsideration by the state trial court. (Doc. 11 at 28, citing doc. 11-5 at 140).

Accordingly, because Petitioner never properly exhausted his claims in state court before 

proceeding to federal court, his claims are procedurally defaulted.

2. CR 2016-000961.

The Petition is timely as to CR 2016-000961. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

considered Petitioner’s direct appeal timely, Bouhdida, 2019 WL at *1, and issued its 

2

In his direct appeal in CR 2016-000961 Petitioner collaterally attacked his convictions in 

CR 2009-030013. The collateral attack in CR 2016-000961 did not cure his procedural 

default. Arizona law does not permit a challenge on direct appeal of the legal sufficiency 

of a prior conviction as a sentencing aggravator. Bouhdida, 2019 WL at *1 (collecting 

cases).

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 6 of 10
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

decision on January 29, 2019. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s 

case on June 7, 2019. (Doc. 11-5 at 114). Petitioner therefore had until June 7, 2020 to file 

a habeas petition in federal court. Because the Petition was filed on July 19, 2019, his 

Petition is timely for purposes of AEDPA as to Petitioner’s claims regarding CR 2016-

000961.

In his direct appeal of his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner 

argued that the Maricopa County Superior Court failed to properly establish subject-matter 

jurisdiction in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 11-

4 at 71). Therefore, the Court concludes Petitioner properly exhausted his claims in state 

court before proceeding to federal court.

b. Merits Review.

Petitioner’s constitutional claims lack merit.3 To prove a federal constitutional 

violation for an error of state law, a petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was 

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See also Lopez v. Smith, 

574 U.S. 1 (2014). 

Petitioner frames the violation of federal law as: “[t]he prosecutor must aver or cite 

a positive statement of subject matter, describing by what pursuant authority he seeks a 

judgment and or/declaratory injunctive relief in which the court can depend in trying the 

case.” (Doc. 1 at 15). In support of his argument, Petitioner cites one case involving a 

criminal proceeding. However, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) does not support 

Petitioner’s claim. The Court in Johnson v. Zerbst held that, absent a waiver by defendant,

a defendant in federal court cannot be deprived of the assistance of counsel. Petitioner was 

not charged or convicted in federal court. Petitioner has not identified any decision of the 

state trial court that was “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court 

precedent. 

3 As Petitioner’s claims relating to CR 2009-030013 are untimely and procedurally 

defaulted, the Court does not consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims. However, even if 

the Court considered claims relating to CR 2009-030013, Petitioner would still not be 

entitled to relief for reasons substantively similar to those explained in this section.

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 7 of 10
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner cites to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a) and 12(b)(6), to support his claim that the trial court failed to establish subject-matter 

jurisdiction. (See doc. 1 at 11). However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply 

to state proceedings, see State v. Checchi, No. 2 CA-CR 2007-0269, 2008 WL 4606549 *1 

n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2008), or to criminal proceedings, see United States v. AndradeLarrios, 39 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner has not demonstrated any violation of 

federal law in the state trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction.

To the extent Petitioner argues that the state courts erroneously applied the Arizona 

Constitution, that argument is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. Federal courts 

do not grant habeas relief for errors of state law. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 

(2011) (“We have stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors 

of state law.”). A petitioner seeking federal habeas relief cannot “repackage” an error of 

state law as a federal constitutional violation. Crawford v. Little, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 n.6 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of 

due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come 

here as a federal constitutional question.”).

Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of state law for which federal habeas relief 

is not available. Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the state trial court had 

subject-matter jurisdiction over Petitioner under the Arizona Constitution. Bouhdida, 2019 

WL at *2 (“The State has subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed within 

its territorial borders.”). A determination as to whether a state court is vested with subjectmatter jurisdiction is entrusted to the state court, not the federal judiciary. Rhode v. OlkLong, 84 F.3d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1996). See also, Lewis v. Ryan, No. CV-18-00220-PHXJAT, 2018 WL 655069 *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 1, 2018) (“[W]hether or not the Maricopa County 

Superior Court had jurisdiction over Petitioner’s case is a question of Arizona law.”), 

request for certificate of appealability denied, No. 18-15226, 2018 WL 3868757 (9th Cir. 

July 13, 2018). 

V. Conclusion.

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 8 of 10
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are barred from habeas relief, 

procedurally defaulted, or meritless. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

///

///

///

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 9 of 10
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 10th day of April, 2020.

Honorable Michael T. Morrissey

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:19-cv-04792-DGC Document 17 Filed 04/10/20 Page 10 of 10