Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02310/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Gregory Linder Schlundt, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex, North Unit, in Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1).

BACKGROUND 

 On October 22, 1985, Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court (“Superior Court”), Case No. CR-152452, on charges of 

attempted first degree murder (Count I) and armed robbery (Count II). (Doc. 8-1, Exh. 

A.) Although Petitioner initially entered into a plea agreement on March 19, 1986 (Doc. 

8-1, Exh. D), he withdrew his plea (Doc. 8-1, Exh. F) and proceeded to trial. On June 17, 

1986, a jury found Petitioner guilty of both criminal counts, and that each was a 

dangerous felony offense. (Doc 8-1, Exh M.) On July 21, 1986, Petitioner was sentenced 

to a 21-year term of imprisonment on Count I, and a consecutive 18-year term of 

imprisonment on Count II. (Doc. 8-1, Exh. P, Q.) 

Gregory Linder Schlundt, 

 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Ron Lee, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-12-02310-PHX-JAT (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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 Petitioner, through counsel, timely filed a Notice of Appeal in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals (“Appellate Court”). (Doc. 8-1 at 120, Exh. R.) On or about December 24, 

1986, appellate counsel filed an opening brief. (Doc. 8-1, Exh. R.) In a memorandum 

decision filed on May 14, 1987, the Appellate Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. (Doc. 8-1, Exh. T.)1

 

 Prior to the Appellate Court’s decision, on April 15, 1987, Petitioner filed a 

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court. (Doc. 8-1, Exh. U, W.)2

Petitioner was appointed counsel (Doc. 8-1, Exh. Z; Doc. 8-2, Exh. AA), and an 

evidentiary hearing was held on the petition (Doc. 8-2, EE, FF). Following the hearing, 

on September 25, 1987, the Superior Court denied post-conviction relief, finding that 

Petitioner was not deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 8-2, Exh. 

FF.) Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for rehearing (Doc. 8-2, Exh. GG) which 

the Superior Court denied on October 20, 1987 (Doc. 8-2, Exh. II). Petitioner sought 

review on November 12, 1987, and in a memorandum decision filed on April 5, 1988, the 

Appellate Court granted review but affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. (Doc. 8-2, 

Exh. KK; Doc. 8-3, Exh. OOO.)3

 On October 16, 1990, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a second Petition for 

 

1

 Although Petitioner contends that he appealed the Appellate Court’s decision to 

the Arizona Supreme Court (Doc. 1 at 3, #9), there is no record of that appeal. (See Doc. 

8-3, Exh. MMM.) 

 

2

 While the petition was pending, on August 14, 1987, Petitioner filed a “Petition 

for Writ of Mandamus” in the Appellate Court. (Doc. 8-1, Exh. Z.) Finding that postconviction relief proceedings were pending, and that Petitioner had failed to respond to a 

State motion to dismiss, the Appellate Court dismissed the special action on September 4, 

1987. (Doc. 8-2, Exh. BB-DD; Doc. 8-3, Exh. NNN.) See Rule 1(a) and (b), Arizona 

Rules of Procedure for Special Actions (“writs of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition 

originating under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12- 2001, 12-2021 or the common law are special 

actions”). 

3

 Although Petitioner contends that he appealed the Appellate Court’s decision to 

the Arizona Supreme Court (Doc. 1 at 5, #11(d)(1)), there is no record of that appeal. 

(See Doc. 8-3, Exh. OOO.) 

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Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court (Doc. 8-2, Exh. LL, OO.)4 Finding that no 

material issue of fact or law existed which would entitle him to relief, the Superior Court 

dismissed the petition on June 10, 1991. (Doc. 8-2, Exh. WW.) Petitioner filed a Motion 

for Reconsideration (Doc. 8-2, Exh. XX) which was summarily denied on August 14, 

1991 (Doc. 8-2, Exh. ZZ). Petitioner then appealed the decision on August 27, 1991. 

(Doc. 8-3, Exh. AAA.) In a memorandum decision filed on May 14, 1992, the Appellate 

Court granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 8-3, Exh. BBB.) On June 19, 1992, 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 8-3, Exh. CCC; Doc. 8-3 

at 92, Exh. QQQ.) The Petition for Review was denied on October 23, 1992. (Doc. 8-3 at 

92, Exh. QQQ.) 

 On September 13, 2012, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a Notice and Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court. (Doc. 8-3, Exh. EEE, FFF.) In a minute 

entry dated October 12, 2012, the Superior Court dismissed the Notice of PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 8-3, Exh. HHH, KKK.) Petitioner did not seek review of that 

decision. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 

 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 on October 29, 2012. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 

8), to which Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 9). 

DISCUSSION 

 In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner raises one ground for relief. 

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; but 

for trial counsel’s misinformation concerning the possible sentence if convicted by a jury, 

he would not have rejected a plea offer and proceeded to trial. In response, Respondents 

contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is time-barred. Respondents alternatively argue 

that Petitioner did not exhaust his state court remedies and his claim is procedurally 

 

4

 On January 15, 1991, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action (Doc. 8-2, Exh. 

PP), over which the Appellate Court declined to exercise jurisdiction (Doc. 8-2, Exh. 

TT). 

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barred. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the habeas petition is barred by 

the statute of limitations, and will therefore recommend that it be denied on that basis. 

I. Legal Standard 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such petitions are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).5

 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “[W]ith respect to a state prisoner who does not seek review in a 

State’s highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time 

for seeking such review expires.” See Gonzalez v. Thaler, C U.S. C, 132 S.Ct. 641, 656 

(2012). Where a petitioner seeks direct review from the highest state court, “the period of 

‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner 

 

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 The AEDPA applies to cases filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996. See 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether 

or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 

(9th Cir. 1999); see also Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 The one-year filing deadline is statutorily tolled during the time in “which a 

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect 

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also Lott v. 

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). In Arizona, post-conviction review is 

pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed, even though the petition is not 

filed until later. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A proceeding is commenced by timely 

filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

An application is “pending” during the “time between a lower state court’s decision and 

the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 

(2002); Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the time 

between a first and second application for post-conviction relief is not tolled because no 

application is “pending” during that period. See Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. 

Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (The petitioner was “not entitled to tolling during the 

interval between the completion of one round of state collateral review and the 

commencement of a second round of review.”). Further, unlike finality under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1), statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) does not apply to the period to seek 

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 924 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

 In certain limited circumstances, the one-year filing deadline may be equitably 

tolled. Holland v. Florida, C U.S. C, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). See also Calderon v. 

United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that 

AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, 

not a jurisdictional bar), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States 

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). A petitioner is entitled to equitable 

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tolling if he can demonstrate that “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 

(2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” to prevent him from timely 

filing a petition. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S, 408, 

418 (2005)); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2010) (the petitioner must 

demonstrate “both that there were ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ and that the 

‘extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness’”) (quoting Bryant v. 

Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007)); Roy v. Lampert, 465 

F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Equitable tolling is applicable only if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

 Lastly, “an actual-innocence gateway claim” may serve as an exception to 

AEDPA’s limitations period. McQuiggin v. Perkins, C U.S. C , 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1926-

1927 (2013) (also referring to this exception as a “fundamental miscarriage of justice 

exception”); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). To qualify for 

this exception, a petitioner must present “new reliable evidence ... that was not presented 

at trial.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 938. But see McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the 

significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). The petitioner 

must then make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the district 

court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to 

find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995); 

Lee, 653 F.3d at 932 (where a petitioner passes the actual innocence “Schlup gateway” he 

may “have his otherwise time-barred claims heard on the merits”). However, “[t]his is a 

high threshold that is rarely met.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 945; McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1928 

(“tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare”). 

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II. Application 

 A. Commencement of Limitations Period 

On direct review, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences on May 14, 1987. Petitioner had thirty days, or until June 13, 1987, to file a 

petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). 

Petitioner did not do so; therefore, his convictions would have become final on June 13, 

1987 for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 

656. However, where a conviction became final before the enactment of the AEDPA, as 

here, the limitations period did not commence until April 24, 1996. Patterson v. Stewart, 

251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Petitioner argues alternatively that the limitations period did not commence until 

the issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012), 

because it announced a newly-recognized constitutional right. (Doc. 1 at 11.) See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Petitioner’s argument is unavailing. Lafler did not recognize a 

new constitutional right, rather, it “merely applied the Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel according to the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and established in the pleabargaining context in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 

(1985).” Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012). “Because the 

Court in ... Lafler repeatedly noted its application of an established rule to the underlying 

facts, [it] did not break new ground or impose a new obligation on the State or Federal 

Government.” Buenrostro, 697 F.3d at 1139. Therefore, Lafler does not qualify as a 

“constitutional right ... newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review” under § 2244(d)(1)(C). Consequently, the 

limitations period commenced on April 24, 1996 and, absent tolling, it continued to run 

until it expired on April 24, 1997. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246 (prisoners “whose 

convictions became final prior to AEDPA’s enactment, had a one-year grace period in 

which to file their petitions”). 

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B. Statutory Tolling

 Petitioner has not proffered any proceeding which statutorily tolled the limitations 

period. In 2012, more than 15 years after the grace period expired, Petitioner sought postconviction review for the third time. Because the AEDPA statute of limitations had 

already expired, the 2012 post-conviction notice did not toll the limitations period. 

Section 2244(d)(2) can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (state petition filed after the expiration of 

AEDPA’s one-year period does not revive a limitations period that ended before state 

petition was filed). Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed 

petition for post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 

276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).6

 Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is 

entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period.

C. Equitable Tolling

 Petitioner has also not presented any circumstance that justifies equitably tolling 

of the statute of limitations. Petitioner has not shown that he pursued his claim diligently, 

because the facts he cites in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim have 

been available to him such that he could have filed a timely petition. Further, Petitioner 

has not articulated, and the record does not reveal, any extraordinary circumstance which 

precluded him from timely filing. Petitioner concedes that his habeas petition is untimely 

under the AEDPA, but argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler warrants 

tolling. Even if Petitioner could argue that but for Lafler, he could not have prevailed on a 

federal habeas claim, he does not argue that he was prevented from preparing or filing a 

federal habeas petition. See Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1087-1088 (9th Cir. 

2005) cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1171 (2006). Petitioner has filed numerous pleadings in state 

court, yet has not explained his failure to timely petition this Court. Based on these 

 

6

 Further, the 1987 and 1990 post-conviction proceedings do not toll the limitations 

period, because they concluded before the one-year grace period even commenced in 

1996. See Patterson ,251 F.3d 1247.

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circumstances, the Court simply cannot say that extraordinary circumstances stood in 

Petitioner’s way and prevented him from timely filing a federal habeas petition.

 D. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice Exception 

 Lastly, Petitioner argues in his reply that his petition is “not barred by the statute 

of limitations by reason of a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” (Doc. 9 at 2.) “[A] 

petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him within the 

narrow class of cases ... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Lee, 653 F.3d 

at 937 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (“A 

petitioner invoking the miscarriage of justice exception” must present “evidence of 

innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial...”). 

Here, Petitioner does not attempt to cast “doubt on the conviction by undercutting the 

reliability of the proof of guilt” nor does he make any claim of actual innocence. Lee, 653 

F.3d at 937. Rather, Petitioner seeks to challenge the constitutional fairness of the 

sentences he received. Petitioner has not proffered any evidence or argument of actual 

innocence, and thus has not presented new evidence that justifies review of his timebarred claims under this exception. 

 In sum, here, the statute of limitations ran uninterrupted until the conclusion of the 

one-year grace period on April 24, 1997. Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition 

until October 29, 2012, more than 15 years after that period expired. Therefore, the Court 

finds that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely and barred by the statute of 

limitations. 

CONCLUSION

The record is amply developed, and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). Based on 

the above analysis, the Court finds that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred 

by the statute of limitations. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 12th day of August, 2013. 

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