Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01447/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01447-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTHA L. ROS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv1447-GPC(BGS)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Dkt. No. 4.] 

vs.

U.S. BANK, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR

THE HOLDERS OF THE BEAR

STEARNS ARM TRUST,

MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-7;

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. D/B/A

BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING,

LP; AND DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

INCLUSIVE

Defendants.

On June 14, 2012, Plaintiff Martha Ros filed a complaint against Defendants

U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the Holders of Bear Stearns Arm Trust,

Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7 (“U.S. Bank”) and Bank of

America, N.A. as successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (“BOA”)

(erroneously sued as “Bank of America N.A. D/B/A BAC Home Loans Servicing,

LP”). (Dkt. No. 1.) On August 27, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 4.) On October 9,

2012, the case was transferred to the undersigned judge. (Dkt. No. 7.) On February

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13, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to file an

opposition. (Dkt. NO. 10.) On February 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Dkt.

No. 11.) Defendants filed a reply on March 1, 2013. (Dkt. No. 12.) The motions are

submitted on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

After a review of the briefs, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Background

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff has been the owner ofreal property at 1548

Apache Drive, #B, Chula Vista, CA 91910. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 6.) Around April

5, 2006, Ros obtained title to the property by grant deed. (Dkt. No. 1-2, Compl., Ex.

A.) She also executed a Mortgage Note in favor of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

(“Countrywide”) secured by a Deed of Trust on the property. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 27;

Ex. B.) The Deed of Trust named Recontrust Company, N.A. asthe Trustee and named

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) as “beneficiary.” (Id.) 

On November 15, 2010, MERS assigned the beneficial interest in the Deed of

Trust to U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for the Holders of Bear Stearns

ARM Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7 (“Assignment”). (Id.,

Ex. C.) The Assignment was recorded with the San Diego Recorder’s Office on

November 17, 2010. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Countrywide attempted to securitize and sell her loan to

U.S. Bank but contends that Countrywide never sold, transferred or granted her Note

or Mortgage to U.S. Bank as they failed to comply with the Pooling and Servicing

Agreement (“PSA”) by failing to properly endorse, transfer, accept and deposit with

the Securitization Trust before the “closing date” on the prospectus. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 28-33.) 

 Attempts at a loan modification failed and BOA declared a “default” on the

Note. (Id. ¶ 63.) On July 21, 2009, Defendants sent Plaintiff a “Notice of Default and

Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust” whereby US Bank demanded payment of

$15,745.00. (Id. ¶ 67.) On October 27, 2009, Defendants issued a “Notice of Trustee

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Sale” that informed Plaintiff that her property would be sold absent a voluntary

payment under the Note and Deed of Trust. (Id.) The most recent Notice of Trustee’s

Sale was recorded on January 23, 2012. (Dkt. 4-4, Ds’ RJN, Ex. D.) 

Plaintiff alleges eight causes of action: 1) declaratory relief; 2) negligence; 3)

quasi-contract; 4) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”),

12 U.S.C. § 2605; 5) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),

15 U.S.C. § 1692, etseq.; 6) violation ofCalifornia’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL),

California Business & Professions Code section § 17200 etseq.; 7) accounting; and 8)

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2)- extortion. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

A. Legal Standard on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for "failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory

orsufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required only to set forth a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for

a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and

reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

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entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009) (quotations omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as

true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of

the plaintiff. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a Court may consider

exhibits attached to the complaint, matters subject to judicial notice, or documents

necessarily relied on by the complaint whose authenticity no party questions. See

Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007); Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 688–689 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908

(9thCir. 2003) (“A court may, however, consider certain materials-documents attached

to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of

judicial notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment.”). 

B. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants seek judicial notice of documents recorded in the official records of

the San Diego County Recorder’s Office, (Dkt. No. 4-3, Exs. A-D), and documents

filed in the case of Ros v. U.S. Bank, et al., Case No. 37-2012-00091736-CU-CO-CTL,

in the San Diego Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 4-3, Exs. E-I.) Plaintiff does not oppose

the request. The Court finds that the documents are all part of the public record and

may be judicially noticed. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d

741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request

for judicial notice. 

C. Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata

Defendants argue that the complaint should be barred by the doctrine of

collateral estoppel and resjudicata. Plaintiff argues that this argument is not proper on

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a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). 

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The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requiresthat we “give the same

preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that State would give.” 

Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1986). Under California

law,

the doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former

judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy. The

doctrine has a double aspect. In its primary aspect, commonly known

as claim preclusion, it operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second

suit between the same parties on the same cause of action. In its

secondary aspect, commonly known as collateral estoppel, the prior

judgment . . . operates in a second suit . . . based on a different cause

of action . . . as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication asto such issues

in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the

first action. The prerequisite elements for applying the doctrine to

either an entire cause of action or one or more issues are the same: (1)

A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or

issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted

in a final judgment on the merits; and 3) the party against whom the

doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the

prior proceeding.

Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal. 4th 788, 797-98 (2010) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

“To determine whether two proceedings involve identical causes of action for

purposes of claim preclusion, California courts have consistently applied the primary

rights theory.” Boeken, 48 Cal. 4th at 797 (internal quotations omitted). “Under this

theory, a cause of action arises out of an antecedent primary right and corresponding

duty and the delict or breach of such primary right and duty by the person on whom the

duty rests.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Of these elements, the primary right and

duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause of action in the legal sense

of the term.” Id. at 797-98 (internal quotations omitted). As, for purposes of applying

the doctrine of res judicata, “the cause of action is the right to obtain redress for a harm

suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory (common law or

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, resjudicata is appropriately raised on a motion

1

to dismiss. See Brambila v. Wells Fargo Bank., No. 12cv4224 NC, 2012 WL 5383306,

at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012). 

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statutory) advanced.” Id. at 798. In other words, “one injury gives rise to only one

claim for relief.” Id. Thus, “under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor

is the harm suffered,” and “[w]hen two actions involving the same parties seek

compensation for the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.” Id.

What is key to the analysis is “ ‘the harm suffered.’” San Diego Police Officers'

Ass’n v. San Diego City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932 (1970)). “[I]f two actions involve

the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same

primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories

of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” 

Id. (quoting Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174 (1983)). In other

words, so long as the same primary right is at issue, res judicata “prevents litigation of

all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties,

regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” Kay

v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 504 F.3d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s state court action, filed on February 2, 2012, sought declaratory relief

stemming from the assertion that Defendants U.S. Bank, BOA and Recontrust

Company are not the successors, purchasers or assignors to Countrywide Home Loan

relative to the Mortgage Note and have no standing to seek or collect payments as

Defendants do not have actual possession of the Note and failed to provide Plaintiff

with any documents concerning the transfer of the Note and Deed of Trust. (Dkt. No.

4-4, Ds’ RJN, Ex. E. ) In this case, Plaintiff allege additional facts, based on the

securitization and failure to comply with the PSA, explaining why Defendants U.S.

Bank and BOA are not the successors of the Note and Deed of Trust. 

It appears that the primary right is the same in both the state and the instant

federal complaint. While this complaint provided additional facts and asserts

additional legal theories, not provided in the state court complaint, the harm to

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Plaintiff, of having paid Defendants moneys that they were not entitled to, and the

alleged wrong by Defendants, of collecting payments from Plaintiff that they were not

entitled to, is the same. 

Another factor to address is whether “the prior proceeding resulted in a final

judgment on the merits.” Boeken, 48 Cal. 4th at 797. In California, “a judgment

entered after the sustaining of a general demurrer is a judgment on the merits, and, to

the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not establish a cause of action, it

will bar a second cause action on the same facts.” Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n

v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1993). Further, a “dismissal [of a

complaint] with prejudice is the equivalent of a final judgment on the merits, barring

the entire cause of action.” Boeken, 48 Cal.4th at 793. “Where the court prevents the

litigation of matters which inhere in the cause of action, on the ground that they are not

pleaded, plaintiff’s remedy is either to seek to amend or to have the ruling, if erroneous,

corrected by appropriate proceedings for review. An erroneous judgment is as

conclusive as a correct one.” Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. , 21 Cal.2d 636,

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640 (1943). 

Here, on June 1, 2012, the San Diego Superior Court, in a minute order,

sustained Defendants’ unopposed demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint without leave to

amend for failure to state a cause of action, and ordered that the action be dismissed

with prejudice which was later accompanied by a proposed order sustaining demurrer

to Plaintiff’s complaint. (Dkt. No. 4-4, Ds’ RJN, Exs. G, H.) On June 11, 2012, the

Superior Court issued an order sustaining the demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint and

judgment was entered for Defendants on June 11, 2012. (Id., Ex. H.) A notice of entry

of judgment was served on Plaintiff on June 25, 2012. (Id., Ex. I.) 

The Court notes that Plaintiffshould have either sought to amend his complaint 2

with the Superior Court or to have the ruling corrected by appropriate proceedings in

state court. See Panos, 21 Cal. 2d at 640. Instead, four days after the Superior Court

sustained the demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint and eleven days before Plaintiff

received the notice of entry of judgment, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court

seeking relief. 

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The underlying purpose of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to prevent the

relitigation of claims and issues already decided on the merits in a prior case. It

contemplatesthat the prior court adjudicated or considered the merits of the case. This

is a unique situation where Defendants’ demurrer was unopposed and the Court

sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the complaint with

prejudice. It is not clear whether the state court’s order was based on a review or actual

determination on the merits. Defendants have not provided the Court with authority

that such a situation, where the court sustains an unopposed demurrer without leave to

amend and dismisses the complaint with prejudice, constitutes a final judgment on the

merits. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants have failed to establish that

res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Plaintiff’s complaint. 

D. Tender

Defendant argues that all claims as to all causes of action are predicated on

allegations of a wrongful foreclosure and that the complaint should be dismissed

because Plaintiff did not tender the full amount of the debt. Plaintiff argues that she

has properly tendered and can easily cure any defect by appropriate amendment. She

further argues that even if she did not tender, the exception to tender applies as she is

attacking the validity of the underlying debt.3

“As a condition precedent to an action by the borrower to set aside the trustee’s

sale on the ground that the sale is voidable because of irregularities in the sale notice

or procedure, the borrower must offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the

property was security.” Lona v. Citibank, NA, 202 Cal. App. 4th 89, 112 (2011);

Onofrio v. Rice, 55 Cal. App. 4th 413, 424 (1997) (the borrower must pay, or offer to

pay, the secured debt, or at least all of the delinquencies and costs due for redemption,

Plaintiff argues that the complaint challenges the validity of the underlying debt and therefore,

3

the exception to tender applies. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff does not dispute that a balance is due

on the Note. (Dkt. No.1, Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff does not challenge the validity of debt but disputes

the identify of her creditor. See Williams v. One West Bank, FSB, No. EDCV12-1695 JGB(OPx),

2013 WL 1390038, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2013) (tender was required because plaintiffs were

disputing the identify of their creditor, not the debt itself). Therefore, that exception to tender does

not apply.

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before commencing the action.) “The rationale behind the rule is that if [the borrower]

could not have redeemed the property had the sale procedures been proper, any

irregularities in the sale did not result in damages to the [borrower].” FPCI RE–HAB

01 v. E & G Investments, Ltd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1022 (1989). 

There are, however, four exceptions to the tender requirement. Tender is not

required “1) if the borrower’s action attacks the validity of the underlying debt; 2) if

the person who seeks to set aside the trustee’s sale has a counter-claim or set-off

against the beneficiary; 3) where it would be inequitable to impose such a condition on

the party challenging the sale; and 4) where the deed is void on its face.” Albano v.

Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., No. 4:12cv4018 KAW, 2012 WL 5389922, at *7-8

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012) (citing Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal. App. 4th 89, 112

(2011)). 

Here, Plaintiff challenges the allegedly improper transfer of the Note and Deed

of Trust from Countrywide to U.S. Bank and not any irregularity in the sale procedure.

Because Plaintiff is not attacking a trustee’s sale for irregularities in the notice or sale 4

procedure, Plaintiff’s causes of action is not subject to the tender requirement. The

Court willthus determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently stated her remaining claims.

E. First Cause of Action - Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants do not have a “secured or unsecured legal,

equitable, or pecuniary interest in the lien evidenced by the Deed of Trust and that its

purported assignment or substitution has no value since the Deed of Trust is wholly

unsecured.” (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 84.) Plaintiff requests that the Court find that

Defendants “have no right or interest in Plaintiff’s Note, Deed of Trust, or the Property,

which authorized them. . . to collect Plaintiff’s mortgage payments or enforce the terms

of the Note or Deed of Trust . . . .” (Id. ¶ 87.) 

Defendants move to dismiss arguing that because all other claims fail, Plaintiff

has no right to relief as declaratory relief is an additional remedy. Plaintiff opposes. 

In fact, it is not clear whether the property has been subject to a sale. 

4

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The Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”) provides that, “[i]n a case of actual

controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of

an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any

interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be

sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. “A declaratory judgment offers a means by which rights

and obligations may be adjudicated in cases‘brought by any interested party’involving

an actual controversy that has not reached a stage at which either party may seek a

coercive remedy and in cases where a party who could sue for coercive relief has not

yet done so.” Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The DJA’s operation “is procedural only” in that it provides a remedy and defines

procedure in relation to cases and controversies in the constitutional sense. See Aetna

Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). Thus, a “claim” for declaratory

relief does not by itself state a claim. Audette v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 195 F.3d 1107, 1111 n .2 (9th Cir. 1999); Realty Experts Inc.

v. RE Realty Experts, Inc., No. 11cv1546-JLS(CAB), 2012 WL 699512, at *2 (S.D.

Cal. Mar.1, 2012). 

As discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all

causes of action. Therefore, the declaratory relief claim fails as there are no remaining

causes of action, and declaratory relief, by itself, cannot state a claim. Accordingly,

the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action for

declaratory relief without prejudice. 

F. Second Cause of Action - Negligence

Plaintiff contendsthat Defendants breached their duty to exercise reasonable care 

to “follow California law with regard to enforcement of monetary obligations and to

refrain from taking or failing to take any action against Plaintiff that they did not have

the legal authority to do.” (Dkt. No., 1, Compl. ¶ 93.) She alleges that U.S. Bank

breached that duty when it “failed to follow guidelines established in the PSA requiring

the transfer of the Note and Deed of Trust into the Bear Stearns Arm Trust, Mortgage

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Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7 by the requisite closing date.” (Id. ¶ 95.) As

a direct and proximate result of the negligence, Plaintiff suffered general and special

damages. (Id. ¶ 96.)

Defendants argue that there is no duty of care owed to Plaintiff because a lenderborrower relationship does not give rise to a special or fiduciary relationship. Plaintiff

maintains that Defendants owed her a duty of care because of their unconventional

relationship.

Under California law, the elements of a claim for negligence are that: (1)

defendant had a legal duty to plaintiff, (2) defendant breached this duty, (3) defendant

was the proximate and legal cause of plaintiff's injury, and (4) plaintiff suffered

damage. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714; Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 465, 500 (2001). 

As a general rule, under California law, “a financial institution owes no duty of

care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not

exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.” Nymark v. Heart

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095–96 (1991). However, “liability

to a borrower for negligence arises only when the lender actively participates in the

financed enterprise beyond the domain of the usual money lender.” Id. at 1096;

Ansanelli v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank. N.A., No. C 10-3892 WHA, 2011 WL 1134451,

at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011) (court found duty of care where complaint alleged that

defendant went beyond its role as a silent lender and loan servicer to offer an

opportunity to plaintiffs for loan modification and to engage with them concerning the

trial period plan. Contrary to defendant, thisis precisely “beyond the domain of a usual

money lender.” Plaintiffs’ allegations constituted sufficient active participation to

create a duty of care to plaintiffs to support a claim for negligence). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s assertions are contradictory because, in the Complaint, 

she states that Defendants are “third-party strangers to her mortgage loan and have no

ownership interest entitling them to collect payment or declare a default.” (Dkt. No.

1, Compl. ¶ 1.) Yet, in opposition, Plaintiff claims she and Defendants had an

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unconventional relationship which creates a special duty. Moreover, Plaintiff has not

provided any legal support that this alleged “unconventional relationship” creates a

legal duty between Plaintiff and Defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the negligence claim without prejudice.

G. Third Cause of Action - Quasi-Contract/Unjust Enrichment

In the third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were unjustly

enriched because they collected Plaintiff’s monthly mortgage payments even though

Defendants did not have an interest in Plaintiff’s Note. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 98-101.) 

Plaintiff seeks restitution for any payments she made to U.S. Bank and BOA. 

Defendants argue that the recorded document of the Assignment of the Deed of

Trust to U.S. Bank is evidence of Defendants’ interest in the Note and Deed of Trust. 

Plaintiff opposes arguing that the legitimacy ofthisrecorded assignment wasfabricated

and fraudulent. 

“The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit whichmay

not justly be retained, to return either the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party

so as not to be unjustly enriched.” Othworth v. So. Pac. Trans. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d

452, 460 (1985). “[A]n individual may be required to make restitution if he is unjustly

enriched at the expense of another. A person is enriched if he receives a benefit at

another’s expense. The term ‘benefit’ denotes any form of advantage . . . . Even when

a person has received a benefit from another, he is required to make restitution only if

the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons,

it is unjust for him to retain it.” F.D.I.C. v. Dintino, 167 Cal. App. 4th 333, 346–47

(2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit established that

a claim of quasi-contract “does not lie when an enforceable, binding agreement exists

defining the rights of the parties.” Paracor Finance, Inc. v. General Electric Capital

Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In Hunt, Plaintiffs signed a Note and a Deed of Trust and it was not disputed that

any payments made were rightfully due under the Note. Hunt v. U.S. Bank, No. EDCV

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12-2171-VAP(OPx), 2013 WL 1398964, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013). The district

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court noted that to the extent that Defendants were unjustly enriched by collecting

money due another, Plaintiffs were not the “aggrieved party.” Id. The “aggrieved”

party would be the lender who was actually entitled to collect the debt payment, not

Plaintiffs. Id. Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff does not dispute that payment is due

under the Note. (See Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 24.) While Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

were unjustly enriched by receiving payments from Plaintiff, as required under the

Note, she is not the “aggrieved party” and cannot bring a claim for quasi-contract. See

Hunt, 2013 WL 1398964 at *8. Moreover, the underlying Note and Deed of Trust, the

validity of which is not in dispute, is an enforceable, binding agreement defining the

rights of the parties. Therefore, a quasi-contract claim cannot lie. See Niranjan v.

Bank of America, N.A, No. C12-5706 WHA, 2013 WL 2931636, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June

13, 2013) (quasi-contract claim fails because underlying deed of trust is still valid

despite argument that the deed and note were void at the time the note was sold into

asset-backed securities pool and MERS had no authority to transfer the deed). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the quasi-contract

claim with prejudice. 

H. Fourth Cause of Action - RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2605

Plaintiff alleges that on March 21, 2012 and again on April 26, 2012, she sent

a qualified written request (“QWR”) to U.S. Bank and U.S. Bank failed to provide the

required information which violated 12 U.S.C. § 2605. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 104,

107.) 

Defendants argue that the RESPA claimfails because U.S. Bank was not the loan

servicer at the time she sent the qualified written request. In addition, Defendants

maintain that the complaint fails to allege the “actual damages” she suffered as a result

of Defendants’ failure to properly respond to the QWR. Plaintiff disagrees. 

Only servicers are required to respond to a QWR. See 12 U.S.C. § 

Plaintiff’s counsel in Hunt is the same counsel for Plaintiff in this case. 

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2605(e)(1)(A); Consumer Solutions REO, LLC v. Hillery, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1014

(N.D. Cal. 2009). Here, BOA is the servicer of the loan, not U.S. Bank. Plaintiff has

failed to allege a cause of action under 12 U.S.C. § 2605. 

Moreover, RESPA provides that “[w]hoever fails to comply with any provision

of thissection shall be liable” for “any actual damagesto the borrower as a result of the

failure.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A). 

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that damagesinclude the “overcalculation and

overpayment of interest on Plaintiff’s loan, the costs of repairing Plaintiff’s credit, the

reduction and/or elimination of Plaintiff’s credit limits, costs associated with removing

the cloud on her property title and setting aside the trustee’s sale, and attorneys’ fees

and costs . . . .” (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 108.) These conclusory damages do not explain

the connection between these alleged damages and any failure to respond to Plaintiff’s

QWR. See Derusseau v Bank of America, N.A., No. 11cv1766-MMA(JMA), 2011 WL

5975821, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2011) (same damage request considered general

allegation of harm and insufficient under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)). 

Moreover, under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(a), a loan servicer has an obligation to act

when it receives a QWR from the borrower or borrower’s agent “for information

relating to the servicing of [the] loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A). Servicing “means

receiving any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower . . . and making the

payments of principal and interest and such other payments with respect to the amounts

received from the borrower.” Id. § 2605(i)(3).

In this case, Plaintiff’s letter of March 21, 2012 and April 26, 2012 dispute the

validity of the loan and not its servicing. See Consumer Solutions REO, LLC, 658 F.

Supp. 2d at 1014 (dismissing 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) with prejudice as letter simply

disputed the validity of the loan and not its servicing). Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES the RESPA claim with prejudice. 

I. Fifth Cause of Action - Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect

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on the Note under false pretenses, namely that Defendants were assigned Plaintiff’s

debt when in fact they were not. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 112.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege Defendants are “debt collectors”

as defined under the FDCPA. U.S. Bank is the assignee of the Loan and BOA is the 

the Loan servicer and they argue they not subject to the FDCPA. They also argue that

Plaintiff does not identify any specific improper debt collection activities. Plaintiff

opposes. 

A debt collector is defined as “any person who uses any instrumentality of

interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the

collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or

indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. §

1692a(6). The term does not include any person who collects any debt owed or due to

the extentsuch activity concerns a debt which “was originated by such person” or “was

not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(6)(F)

(ii); (iii). The FDCPA’s definition of debt collector “does not include the consumer’s

creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or any assignee of the debt, so long as the

debt was not in default at the time it was assigned.” Nool v. HomeQ Serv., 653 F.

Supp. 2d 1047, 1053 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197,

1208 (5th Cir. 1985)).

First, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants are engaged in business with

the “principal purpose” of collecting debts or that Defendants are persons who

“regularly”collect debts on behalf of others. Moreover, U.S. Bank, as the assignee of

the debt, and BOA, as the mortgage servicing company, are not subject to the FDCPA. 

See Nool, 653 F. Supp. at 1053. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion

to dismiss the claim under the FDCPA with prejudice. 

J. Sixth Cause of Action -California Business and Professions Code section

17200

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for violation of California Business and

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Professions Code section 17200 is grounded on Defendants’ conduct described above. 

 (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 119.)

Section 17200 provides a cause of action for “unfair competition,” which is

defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 17200. “Unlawful” practices include “anything that can properly be

called a business practice and at the same time is forbidden by law.” Farmers Ins.

Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383 (1992). Section 17200 “borrows”

violations of other laws and treats themas unlawful practicesindependently actionable

under section 17200. Id. “Unfair” means any practice whose harm to the victim

outweighs its benefits. Olsen v. Breeze, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 608, 618 (1996). 

“Fraudulent” as used in the statute does not refer to the common law tort of fraud, but

rather requires a showing that members of the public are likely to be deceived. Id.;

Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267 (1992). Plaintiffs’ UCL

claim is dependent on the substantive causes of action alleged in the first amended

complaint. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, LLC, 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 178 (2001). 

Since the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all causes of action,

the Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the claim of unfair

business practices pursuant to California Business & Professions Code section 17200

without prejudice

K. Seventh Cause of Action - Accounting

Plaintiff alleges she is entitled to an accounting because she made mortgage

payments to Defendants for many years and is due money which cannot be ascertained

without an accounting. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 129-131.) 

“A requestfor a legal accounting must be tethered to relevant actionable claims.”

Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Cal.

2009). Because each of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal, she has not 

“anchored her request to any viable claims” and her accounting claim cannot survive. 

See id. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s cause of action for accounting must be dismissed

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without prejudice. 

L. Eighth Cause of Action - Extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2)

Plaintiff claims that Defendants have violated the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §

1951(b)(2), a criminal extortion statute, by falsely asserting a right to payments on the

Note and Deed of Trust “as well asthe filing and recording of multiple notices with the

County Recorder designed to wrongfully threaten the Plaintiff with dispossession of

her home absent voluntary payments as demanded by and on behalf ofthe Defendants.” 

(Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 134.)

No private right of action exists under the Hobbs Act. See Wisdom v. First

Midwest Bank, 167 F.3d 402, 408–409 (8th Cir. 1999); Alexandre v. Phibbs, No.

96-55434, 1997 WL 341830, at *1 (9th Cir. June 19, 1997); Kissi v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 793 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235 (D.D.C. 2011).

As Plaintiffs cannot make out a valid claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for extortion with prejudice.

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Specifically, the Court:

1) DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff’s first cause of action for declaratory

relief; 

2) DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence;

3) DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s third cause of action for quasi-contract;

4) DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for violation of

RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2605;

5) DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for violation of

FDCPA, 12 U.S.C. § 692 et seq.;

6) DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for violation of

California’s Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq.;

7) DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for an

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accounting;

8) DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff eighth cause of action for violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).

Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days from the date this Order is filed to file an

Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies set forth above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 20, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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