Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01520/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01520-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAMES KOTROUS, individually

and doing business as THE

MATTRESS FACTORY,

NO. CIV. S-02-1520 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

GOSS-JEWETT COMPANY OF

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC., et

al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Bayer

Cropscience Inc.’s motion for certification for interlocutory

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Defendant also moves to

stay discovery proceedings if this court grants its motion for

certification. Plaintiff James Kotrous and crossclaimant Edward

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2 The facts of this case are set out in detail in the

court’s order denying defendant Bayer’s motion to dismiss. 

(Order, filed June 16, 2005). Therefore, the court only

discusses those facts relevant to defendant’s motion for

certification. 

2

Anselmo oppose the motions. For the reasons set forth below,1

defendant’s motions are GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff commenced this action on July 15, 2002, asserting

claims for contribution under CERCLA; declaratory relief under

CERCLA and the Declaratory Judgment Act; and various claims under

state law. (Pl’s Compl., filed July 15, 2002). On April 26,

2005, defendant Bayer Cropscience Inc. filed a motion for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 

(Def.’s 12(c) Mot., filed Apr. 26, 2005). Defendant argued that

plaintiff’s contribution claims under CERCLA should be dismissed

because plaintiff did not and could not allege the standing

requirements of CERCLA § 113(f). (Id. at 2). Defendant further

argued that plaintiff’s remaining federal claims should be

dismissed because they are predicated upon the contribution

claim. (Id.) If all federal claims were dismissed, defendant

argued that the state claims should be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. (Id.)

On June 16, 2005, the court denied defendant’s motion to

dismiss. (Order, filed June 16, 2005). The court based its

order on the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Pinal Creek Group v.

Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997), and Western

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Properties Service Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678 (9th Cir.

2004). (Id. at 7-8). In Pinal Creek, the Ninth Circuit

concluded “that § 107 implicitly incorporates a claim for

contribution.” Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1301. The Ninth

Circuit further clarified that “the enactment of § 113 . . . did

not replace the implicit right to contribution . . . recognized

in § 107(a).” W. Props. Serv. Corp., 358 F.3d at 685. Thus, the

court held that a responsible party (“PRP”) may maintain a claim

for contribution under § 107 without meeting § 113 standing

requirements. (Order, filed June 16, 2005, at 8). The court did

not reach the issue of whether plaintiff could meet § 113(f)’s

standing requirements because it relied on Ninth Circuit

precedent recognizing an implied right of contribution in § 107. 

(Id. at 6-7).

On August 23, 2005, the court denied defendant’s motion for

reconsideration. (Order, filed Aug. 23, 2005). On September 6,

2005, defendant filed the instant motion to certify the court’s

June 16, 2005 order, and the related August 23, 2005 order for

immediate interlocutory appeal. Defendant also moves to stay

discovery proceedings if the court grants its motion for

certification. 

STANDARD

1. Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

The general rule is that an appellate court should not

review a district court ruling until after entry of a final

judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474

(1978); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th

Cir. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

U.S. 1190 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. There is however, an

exception to this general rule: 

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable under this section,

shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal from the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he

shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals . . . may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . .

. if application is made to it within ten days . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The party seeking certification of an

interlocutory appeal has the burden to show the presence of those

exceptional circumstances. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at

474-75.

Section 1292 identifies three factors that must be present

in order for the court to certify an appeal. First, the issue to

be certified must involve a controlling issue of law. An issue

is “controlling” if “resolution of the issue on appeal could

materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district

court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026 (citing

U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)). 

Second, there must be substantial ground for difference of

opinion on that issue. A party’s strong disagreement with the

court’s ruling is not sufficient for there to be a “substantial

ground for difference”; the proponent of an appeal must make some

greater showing. Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. Bakersfield, 634 F.

Supp. 656, 667 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part

on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). Third, an

interlocutory appeal must be likely to materially speed the

termination of the litigation. This factor is linked to whether

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

an issue of law is “controlling” in that the court should

consider the effect of a reversal by the court of appeals on the

management of the case. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673

F.2d at 1026.

2. Stay Pending Appeal

Both Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) give the

district court discretion to stay the proceedings pending an

appeal. Moreover, this court possesses the inherent power to

control its own docket and calendar. Mediterranean Enters., Inc.

v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983)

(citations omitted). 

A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient

for its own docket and the fairest course for the

parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending

resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon

the case. This rule . . . does not require that the

issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling

of the action before the court.

Id. (quoting Leyva v. Certified Grocers, 593 F.2d 857, 863-64

(9th Cir. 1979).

ANALYSIS

1. Controlling Issue of Law

Defendant argues that the court’s ruling with respect to

whether a PRP must meet the standing requirements of CERCLA § 113

before bringing a § 107 contribution claim is a controlling issue

of law because resolution of the issue determines whether

plaintiff’s claims are viable. (Def.’s Mot., filed Sept. 5,

2005, at 4-5). If a § 107 contribution claim requires plaintiff

to meet § 113 standing requirements, defendant argues that

plaintiffs claims must be dismissed. (Id.) Defendant argues that

plaintiff has not alleged compliance with § 113 standing

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

requirements in his first amended complaint, nor could plaintiff

likely plead § 113 standing requirements if given leave to amend

the complaint. (Id. at 5).

An issue is “controlling” if “resolution of the issue on

appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the

district court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at

1026. If a PRP is required to fulfill the standing requirements

of § 113 in order to bring contribution claims, plaintiff’s

federal claims for contribution under CERCLA may be dismissed. 

Plaintiff’s other federal claims are for declaratory relief

relating to rights, duties, and liabilities for future recovery

of cost or damages. (Pl.’s First Amended Compl., filed Nov. 22,

2002, ¶¶ 67-72). These claims are dependant upon plaintiff’s

contribution claims. See Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d

1177, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000). If plaintiff’s federal claims for

contribution must be dismissed for lack of standing, the federal

declaratory relief claims will be dismissed, and plaintiff’s

complaint will only allege state law claims. The resolution of

whether a PRP must meet § 113 standing requirements to bring an

action for contribution will determine whether plaintiff has

jurisdiction to bring an action in this court. Thus, the court’s

June 16, 2005 order denying Bayer’s motion to dismiss includes a

controlling issue of law.

Crossclaimant Anselmo argues that even if § 113 standing is

required, the court will still have jurisdiction if plaintiff and

crossclaimant are allowed to amend the complaint to state a cause

of action for injunctive relief under the Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). (Crossclaimant’s Opp’n, filed Sept.

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

20, 2005, at 5-6). This argument is unavailing. A contribution

action under CERCLA and an injunctive relief action under RCRA

are two entirely different claims for relief. Even if the court

grants leave to amend, the issue of whether § 107 contains an

implied right of action separate from § 113 standing requirements

is a controlling issue of law because it will materially affect

the outcome of the litigation.

2. Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion

Defendant argues that there is a substantial ground for

difference of opinion as to whether a PRP must allege § 113

standing requirements in order to properly plead a § 107

contribution claim. (Def.’s Mot. at 5-6). Defendant points to

the Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.

Aviall, 125 S.Ct. 577 (2004) and the decision of the Central

District of California in City of Rialto v. United State

Department of Defense, No. EDCV 04-00079 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug.

16, 2005). (Id.)

In Aviall, the Supreme Court held that a PRP who

“voluntarily” incurs response costs cannot assert a claim for

contribution under § 113(f). 125 S. Ct. at 583. The Court

expressly declined to decide whether the plaintiff has an implied

right of contribution under § 107. Id. at 586. However, the

Court noted that it had “visited the subject of implied rights of

contribution before” and cited cases rejecting the creation of

such rights. Id. The Court did not overrule the cases from this

circuit that recognize an implied right to contribution in § 107,

but did express considerable skepticism regarding whether courts

should find such an implied right. Id.

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The Eastern District of California held that a PRP may

bring a CERCLA § 107 claim without meeting § 113 standing

requirements. Adobe Lumber v. Taecker, No. CV S02-186, 2005 WL

1367065, *1 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2005). The Northern District of

California also held that § 113 standing requirements did not

need to be met. Ferguson v. Arcata Redwood Co., No. C 03-05632,

2005 WL 1869445, *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005). 

8

In Rialto, the Central District of California interpreted

the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Western Properties and Pinal

Creek as requiring a PRP to satisfy § 113 standing requirements

in order bring a § 107 contribution claim. No. EDCV 04-00079, at

7-8. The Rialto court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a §

107 contribution claim is available regardless of the a party’s

ability to satisfy § 113 standing requirements. Id. at 8-9. 

Specifically, the Rialto court held that, although the Ninth

Circuit distinguished the matter decided in Western Properties

from that decided by the Supreme Court in Aviall based upon the

plaintiff’s allegation under § 107(a), the Ninth Circuit

ultimately based its conclusion that jurisdiction was proper upon

the plaintiff’s compliance with § 113 standing requirements. Id.

at 9-10. Therefore, the Rialto court dismissed the plaintiff’s

claims for failure to allege facts that satisfy § 113 standing

requirements. Id. at 14.

The Supreme Court’s skepticism in Aviall in conjunction with

the alternate interpretation of Ninth Circuit precedent by the

district court in Rialto demonstrate that reasonable jurists may

differ in determining the standing requirements for a CERCLA

contribution claim. While two other district courts have agreed

with this court’s interpretation of Ninth Circuit precedent,3 the 

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

issue is by no means unambiguous. Thus, a substantial ground for

difference of opinion exists.

3. Materially Speed the Termination of Litigation

If § 113 standing requirements must be satisfied to bring a

§ 107 claim, plaintiff’s CERCLA contribution claims may likely be

dismissed, resulting in a lack of federal subject matter

jurisdiction. Based upon the importance of this issue in

determining the jurisdiction of the court, resolution of this

issue by the Ninth Circuit will materially speed the termination

of litigation.

4. Timeliness of Defendant’s Certification Motion

Plaintiff and counterclaimant argue that defendant’s motion

should be denied because it was not brought in a timely manner. 

Specifically, they contend that defendant’s delay in bringing

this motion until three months after the entry of this court’s

order waives the right to seek this remedy. (Counterclaimant’s

Opp’n at 2; Pl’s Opp’n at 6-7). Section 1292(b) contemplates an

expedited procedure for interlocutory appeals. See Martens v.

Smith Barney, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 596, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

(denying motion for interlocutory appeal where plaintiffs allowed

almost 5 months to pass before filing the motion and offered no

reasonable explanation for the delay). However, in this case,

there is a reasonable justification for defendant’s delay. The

Central District of California’s decision in Rialto was filed on

August 16, 2005. Defendant filed the motion on September 6,

2005. Therefore, because defendant filed this motion in a timely

manner after discovering information relevant to the 

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

certification motion, plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s

motion is untimely is unavailing. 

5. Stay of Discovery Proceedings

Defendant requests a stay of discovery, pending the Ninth

Circuit’s ruling on the issue. (Def.’s Mot. at 7-8). “A

district court has inherent discretion to control the disposition

of the causes on its docket in a manner which will promote

economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for

litigants.” Filtrol Corp. v. Kelleher, 467 F.2d 242 (9th Cir.

1972). Because the issue before the Ninth Circuit may be

dispositive of plaintiff’s federal claims, a stay of the

proceedings at this point will promote economy of time and effort

for both the parties and the court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, defendant’s motion for

certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is GRANTED. 

Defendant’s motion to stay proceedings pending the outcome of its

interlocutory appeal is GRANTED. All dates are hereby VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 4, 2005.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:02-cv-01520-FCD-CKD Document 171 Filed 10/04/05 Page 10 of 10