Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00630/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00630-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRADY LEE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-0630 DAD PS

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster

General, U.S. Postal Service Agency, ORDER

Defendant.

 /

This case came before the court on September 21, 2007, for hearing of

defendant’s motion for summary judgment or partial summary adjudication and plaintiff’s

counter-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeared on his own behalf, and E. Robert

Wright, Esq., appeared for defendant. At that time the court denied plaintiff’s counter-motion

but granted plaintiff leave to file supplemental opposition to defendant’s motion and set a new

hearing date. The case came before the court again on November 30, 2007, for hearing of

defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appeared on his own behalf, and E. Robert Wright appeared for

defendant. The parties were heard, and the court took defendant’s motion under submission.

Upon consideration of the parties’ statements in open court on September 21,

2007 and November 30, 2007, as well as all written materials submitted in connection with

defendant’s motion, the undersigned will grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this action on March 24, 2006, by submitting a pro se

complaint with the required filing fee. Plaintiff alleges that a supervisor at his place of work

created a hostile work environment by repeatedly harassing plaintiff and using a racial epithet on

one occasion. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injury and pursued administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff seeks $350,000 in damages.

Defendant filed an answer to the complaint on January 10, 2007. The case was

reassigned to the undersigned magistrate judge on March 27, 2007. Pursuant to the Status

(Pretrial Scheduling) Order filed March 27, 2007, discovery closed on November 9, 2007, and

the last day for motions to be heard is January 8, 2008. Final pretrial conference is set for March

14, 2008, and trial is set for May 5, 2008.

STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);

Owen v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992).

A party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the

‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Celotex Corp., 477

U.S. at 323. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also First Nat’l

Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles,

607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

ANALYSIS

Defendant seeks summary judgment or partial summary adjudication on the

ground that plaintiff cannot demonstrate as a matter of law that the United States Postal Service

subjected plaintiff to a hostile work environment or retaliated against him. Defendant asserts that

plaintiff failed to timely exhaust administrative remedies as to several incidents of allegedly

harassing conduct and that the two exhausted incidents occurred on the same day during a single

course of events during which a supervisor used a racial epithet in reference to plaintiff. 

Defendant contends that one use of a racial epithet is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

claim for racial discrimination and plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a prima facie

case of retaliation.

Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts is supported by citations to plaintiff’s

complaint, the transcript of plaintiff’s deposition taken April 23, 2007, and four exhibits attached

to counsel’s declaration: Exhibit B, Postal Service EEO Case Partial Acceptance/Dismissal

dated December 3, 2004, in Agency Case No. 1F-957-0058-04; Exhibit C, Final Agency

Decision dated April 26, 2005, in Agency Case No. 1F-957-0058-04; Exhibit D, Decision of the

EEOC dated November 7, 2005, in Appeal Case No. 01A54157; and Exhibit E, Denial of

Request for Reconsideration by EEOC dated December 28, 2005, in Appeal Case No. 01A54157. 

(Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Wright Decl., Exs. B - E.)

Defendant’s evidence demonstrates that plaintiff is a mail handler/group leader

working at the United States Postal Service’s West Sacramento Post Office and that plaintiff,

who is African American, brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e alleging claims for hostile

work environment and retaliation. Defendant summarizes the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint

as follows: plaintiff has been harassed by Wayne Thompson, a supervisor at the West

Sacramento Post Office; Thompson is also African American; Thompson’s harassment of

plaintiff was racially motivated; the Postal Service allowed Thompson to remain in a position of

authority over plaintiff; on February 21, 2004, Thompson instructed plaintiff to perform acts he

believed to be inconsistent with proper operations; when plaintiff objected, Thompson conducted

a disciplinary meeting without allowing plaintiff to contact a union representative; when plaintiff

contacted a union representative after the meeting, Thompson issued plaintiff a disciplinary letter

of warning; also on February 21, 2004, Thompson instructed plaintiff to stop using the machine

he was operating, but plaintiff refused to listen; in June 2004, Thompson obtained a copy of

plaintiff’s worker’s compensation paperwork and told plaintiff that he was not eligible for leave

buyback; on July 4, 2004, Thompson issued a seven-day suspension to plaintiff because of

attendance issues, although management had already issued plaintiff a paper suspension for the

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

same issues; on August 27, 2004, Thompson attempted, without authority, to reassign plaintiff to

a position directly subordinate to Thompson; when plaintiff confronted Thompson on August 27,

2004, about the attempt to reassign him, Thompson said, “Shut up, nigger. Go move that mail.”

Defendant’s evidence establishes the following events related to plaintiff’s

exhaustion of administrative remedies: plaintiff sought EEO counseling and filed an informal

complaint on September 8, 2004; plaintiff filed a formal EEO complaint with the Postal Service

on October 17, 2004; the agency found that plaintiff’s complaint concerned three incidents in

2004; the first incident occurred on February 21, 2004, when plaintiff was subjected to an

investigative interview without a union steward; the second incident occurred on July 4, 2004,

when plaintiff was issued a seven-day calendar paper suspension; the third incident occurred on

August 27, 2004, when Thompson called plaintiff “nigger”; the agency declined to investigate

the February 21 and July 4 incidents because plaintiff’s informal complaint was not timely filed

as to those claims, the incidents were not consistent with a claim of a hostile work environment,

and there was no evidence that plaintiff suffered any measurable personal harm from the

incidents; the agency investigated the August 27 incident and determined that managers had

taken immediate and proper action and plaintiff had not presented evidence sufficient to indicate

that any agency official harbored discriminatory animus toward plaintiff; the EEOC subsequently

determined that the agency properly dismissed plaintiff’s claims regarding the incidents on

February 21 and July 4; with regard to the August 27 incident, the EEOC determined that the

single use of a racial epithet was insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment; the EEOC

declined plaintiff’s request for reconsideration.

Defendant’s evidence reveals the following remedial actions: after a union

grievance and arbitration process, the Postal Service dismissed the two letters of warning that had

been issued to plaintiff on February 21, 2004, and those letters were eventually removed from

plaintiff’s employment record; regarding the issue of leave buyback, plaintiff filed a grievance

through his union, and Jeff Davis, a supervisor, settled that matter; the Postal Service rescinded

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

the seven-day suspension plaintiff had received on July 4, 2004; on August 27, 2004, plaintiff

sought out Angela Batista, Manager of Distribution Operations, to inquire about Thompson’s

authority to reassign him; Batista informed plaintiff that Thompson did not have authority to

reassign him, and she instructed plaintiff to return to work.

With respect to Thompson’s use of the word “nigger” and whether such use

proves racial motivation, defendant cites plaintiff’s deposition testimony that Thompson used the

word “nigger” in reference to plaintiff on only one occasion during the period of time in which

the allegedly harassing actions took place and that Thompson has not subsequently used the word

in reference to him. Plaintiff testified that Thompson referred to him as a “nigger” on one

occasion “a couple years before” in an attempt to be “sarcastic” but the remark on that occasion

was not made in a hostile manner. Plaintiff admitted that Batista had initiated an investigation

regarding the August 27, 2004 incident and determined that Thompson had in fact referred to

plaintiff with the racial epithet, after which the Postal Service issued a letter of warning to

Thompson, informing Thompson that he might be terminated for future incidents. Defendant’s

evidence reflects that Thompson was moved out of the automation unit and in June 2005 was

moved to the night shift.

Defendant argues that all of the allegedly discriminatory incidents that occurred

before August 2004 are barred because an aggrieved federal employee is required to consult with

a counselor within 45 days after an allegedly discriminatory action. Defendant cites extensive

authority for the proposition that failure to consult with a counselor within the 45-day period

constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and bars the unexhausted claims from

further consideration. Thus, defendant argues, plaintiff’s failure to seek EEO counseling prior to

September 8, 2004, means that plaintiff failed to exhaust incidents that occurred more than 45

days prior to that date and is barred from bringing suit related to those incidents.

Defendant concedes that plaintiff has asserted a hostile work environment claim

but argues that a court cannot consider every incident that occurred in the context of an allegedly

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

hostile work environment where intervening remedial actions were taken by the employer. 

Defendant argues that the Postal Service addressed and remedied all of the incidents alleged to

have occurred in this case more than 45 days prior to September 8, 2004, thus eliminating those

incidents from consideration as part of a hostile work environment. Defendant reiterates that (1)

the Postal Service dismissed the two letters of warning Thompson issued to plaintiff on February

21, 2004, and the letters were removed from plaintiff’s employment record; (2) the Postal

Service settled the leave buyback issue with plaintiff; and (3) the Postal Service rescinded the

letter of warning that was issued to plaintiff regarding the seven-day suspension. Defendant

asserts that the agency’s intervening actions demonstrate the desire of higher level managers to

prevent the development of a hostile working environment and show that no underlying

discriminatory employment policy existed. Defendant concludes that the agency’s intervening

actions rendered each individual incident a discrete act for purposes of determining whether

plaintiff timely exhausted administrative remedies.

Defendant also argues that the discriminatory incidents that occurred on August

27, 2004, are insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. Defendant asserts that, to

prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must allege and prove a pattern of ongoing and persistent

harassment severe enough to alter the conditions of his employment. Defendant contends that

the plaintiff in this case has not alleged continuing violations and cannot demonstrate that the

conditions of his employment were altered. It is undisputed that plaintiff complained to a

manager about Thompson’s attempt to reassign plaintiff to a position directly subordinate to

Thompson and that the manager reassured plaintiff that Thompson did not have the authority to

make such a reassignment. As for the subsequent confrontation during which Thompson used a

racial epithet, defendant points to plaintiff’s admission that Thompson’s use of the racial epithet

on August 27, 2004, was the only such occurrence during the relevant time period. Defendant

argues that the one-time usage of a racial epithet fails to support a conclusion that Thompson

harbored a racial animus toward plaintiff. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

67 (1986) (holding that mere utterance of a racial epithet that engenders offensive feelings in an

employee is insufficient to violate Title VII).

Defendant distinguishes Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), a

case cited in plaintiff’s EEOC brief, in which the Court ruled that an employer may be held

vicariously liable for harassment by a supervisor unless the employer takes corrective actions. 

Defendant asserts that the Postal Service is not liable for Thompson’s actions because the agency

remedied each incident alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. See McGinest v. GTE Service Corp.,

360 F.3d 1103, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an employer may avoid liability by

undertaking remedial measures, including disciplinary action, reasonably calculated to end the

harassment); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that not all harassment

warrants dismissal of the supervisor). Defendant argues that the Postal Service took corrective

action and remedied each incident complained of that occurred prior to August 27, 2004, and,

with regard to the events of August 27, 2004, the evidence shows that a manager took immediate

corrective action with regard to Thompson’s attempt to reassign plaintiff, initiated a formal

investigation into Thompson’s use of a racial epithet later that day, found that Thompson had

used the racial epithet, and issued a letter of warning advising Thompson that he could be

terminated for further incidents.

Defendant’s final argument is that plaintiff’s allegation of retaliation fails to make

out a prima facie case because a plaintiff asserting such a claim must demonstrate that (1) he was

engaged in a protective activity, (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment

action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ray v.

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). Defendant concedes that, although plaintiff did

not initiate EEO proceedings until September 8, 2004, he had previously complained to Postal

Service managers and had filed union grievances about Thompson’s alleged harassment on

several occasions. Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff had engaged in protected activities

prior to at least some of Thompson’s allegedly harassing actions but argues that plaintiff has not

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

pointed to any evidence that his employer subjected him to a materially adverse employment

action and has not shown that any alleged retaliatory action might have dissuaded a reasonable

worker from making a charge of discrimination. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,

 U.S. , , 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). Defendant asserts that no adverse employment

action was taken against plaintiff, and plaintiff was not dissuaded from engaging in further

protected activity.

The court finds that defendant’s contentions are supported by the evidence and by

the authorities cited. Defendant has met his initial responsibility as the party moving for

summary judgment, and the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue as to any

material fact does exist and that defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiff’s initial opposition to defendant’s motion consists of four pages of

argument without citation to evidence or legal authorities. Plaintiff asserts that he is “claiming

hostile work environment and retaliation” and that the incidents of harassment were “motivated

by retaliation not by race.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Mot. for Summ. J. filed Sep. 18, 2007, at 1.) 

Plaintiff argues that there were eight incidents of harassment by Thompson and, although he

attempted to exhaust administrative remedies as to all eight, the agency chose not to consider five

of the incidents. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff contends that the eight incidents were not discrete acts but

repeated acts of harassment that created a hostile work environment. (Id. at 2.)

Although plaintiff’s initial opposition challenges some of the facts asserted by

defendant, the opposition fails to cite evidence establishing the existence of a factual dispute. 

Plaintiff argues that he was subjected to ongoing and persistent harassment severe enough to alter

the conditions of his employment, but he fails to cite evidence in support of the argument. With

regard to remedial actions, plaintiff asserts that the letters of warning issued by Thompson were

dismissed by an arbitrator rather than by agency managers. Plaintiff alleges that Thompson

previously assaulted another employee and spent time in prison. Plaintiff states that his

“retaliation claim was a description and motivation of Thompson’s behavior and not meant as a

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

legal retaliation claim.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff emphasizes the harm he has suffered and concludes

with an allegation that the agency allowed Thompson “to continue his outrageous behavior.” (Id.

at 4.)

At the hearing on September 21, 2007, the court provided plaintiff with a copy of

Local Rule 56-260 and granted plaintiff leave to file supplemental opposition to defendant’s

motion. Subsequent to the hearing, defendant filed a notice advising plaintiff of supplemental

case authority relevant to defendant’s legal arguments. Plaintiff did not file a supplemental

memorandum of points and authorities but did file a response to defendant’s statement of

undisputed facts as well as a separate statement of additional disputed facts.

Plaintiff admits all but five of defendant’s 33 facts. (Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s

Undisputed Facts filed Nov. 1, 2007.) Three of the five denials are supported only by general

reference to plaintiff’s brief in support of his EEOC appeal. The court finds that the three

general denials fail to refute the facts asserted by defendant. For example, plaintiff denies

defendant’s statement that “Lee also alleges that Thompson’s harassment was racially

motivated.” (See Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 6.) Plaintiff asserts that he “alleged

that Thompson [sic] action were [sic] motivated by retaliation and race.” (Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s

Undisputed Facts, No. 6.) Plaintiff’s assertion does not contradict defendant’s statement that

plaintiff “also” alleged a racial motivation for Thompson’s harassment. Defendant supported

Undisputed Fact No. 6 with a citation to the first sentence of plaintiff’s EEOC brief, which refers

to plaintiff’s “complaint of race discrimination (hostile work environment/retaliation).” (Pl.’s

Compl., Attach. at 1:20-21.) The court finds that the document cited by defendant supports the

statement that plaintiff “also alleges that Thompson’s harassment was racially motivated” and

that plaintiff’s general citation to the same document does not demonstrate the existence of any

disputed issue of material fact. Plaintiff’s denials of Undisputed Facts No. 10 and 27 are

deficient in the same way and fail to establish the existence of a disputed issue requiring trial.

/////

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

Citing his own deposition testimony, plaintiff denies’ defendant’s statement that

the Postal Service dismissed the letters of warning issued on February 21 after a union grievance

process and that the letters were removed from Lee’s employment record. (See Def.’s Statement

of Undisputed Facts No. 22, citing Lee Dep. at 65:7-24, 68:23-69:15.) Plaintiff instead asserts

that he had to go to an arbitrator to get the letters removed. (Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s Undisputed

Facts, No. 22, citing Lee Dep. at 69:12.) Plaintiff’s citation to one line of the same testimony

cited by defendant does not refute the fact that after a grievance process the letters were in fact

removed from Lee’s employment record. Again, plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of a

disputed issue of material fact in this regard.

Finally, plaintiff denies a portion of defendant’s statement that the Postal Service

declined to investigate the February 21 and July 4 claims because they were untimely, the

incidents were not consistent with a hostile work environment, and there was no evidence of

measurable personal harm. (See Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 18, citing Def.’s Mot.

for Summ. J., Wright Decl., Ex. B at 2-5.) Plaintiff asserts that, with regard to the July 4 claim

about the paper suspension, “they never stated that these incidents were not consistent with an

hostil [sic] work environment.” (Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s Undisputed Facts, No. 18.) The Postal

Service’s EEO Partial Acceptance/Dismissal explicitly rejected the February 21 and July 4

claims as untimely. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Wright Decl., Ex. B at 3.) It is not clear whether

the agency rejected both claims as inconsistent with a claim of hostile work environment. On

page 4 of the agency’s partial acceptance/dismissal, the agency set forth the law governing hostile

work environment claims and stated that plaintiff “does not assert, nor does the record reflect,

that he was subjected to disciplinary action or any other adverse affect on a term, condition, or

privilege of employment as a result of these incidents.” (Id., Ex. B. at 4.) Defendant’s

interpretation of “these incidents” as a reference to the incidents of February 21 and July 4 is not

unreasonable. To the extent that there is a dispute concerning the agency’s reasons for deciding

not to investigate the July 4 incident, the dispute is not material. It is undisputed that both

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Although the document as filed on November 1, 2007, concludes with the language to 1

be used in an unsworn statement signed under penalty of perjury, it was not signed. At the

hearing on November 30, 2007, plaintiff was provided with a copy of the document for signature

and filing, if it was his intention to sign it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (requiring the court to strike

an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the party’s

attention). A signed copy of the declaration was filed on November 30, 2007.

12

incidents were rejected as untimely. Moreover, defendant contends that plaintiff failed to

exhaust administrative remedies on any incident that occurred prior to August 2004.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment may file a concise statement of

disputed facts, citing sources in the record, of “all additional material facts as to which there is a

genuine issue precluding summary judgment or adjudication.” Local Rule 56-260(b). Plaintiff’s

concise statement of disputed facts contains legal conclusions and arguments rather than facts. 

Plaintiff begins by asserting that the agency misapplied the law in its final decision as well as in

its partial acceptance/dismissal, ignored five of plaintiff’s issues, and instructed the investigator

not to investigate harassment issues. The court finds that all of the statements proffered by

plaintiff as disputed facts are either undisputed, such as the fact that Thompson was disciplined

by the agency, or not material to the legal issues presented by defendant’s motion, such as facts

concerning the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injury.

Attached to plaintiff’s concise statement of disputed facts is a four-page document

titled “Declaration” that is virtually identical to the document previously filed as plaintiff’s

opposition to defendant’s motion. The document presents opinions and argument. Also 1

attached to the concise statement of disputed facts are 60 pages of documents comprised of

copies of an EEO complaint filed by plaintiff in October 2004, the complaint filed in this case,

and duplicates of some of defendant’s exhibits. On November 27, 2007, plaintiff submitted a

copy of the investigative file compiled by the Postal Service during its investigation of the EEO

complaint at issue in this case.

In reply to plaintiff’s supplemental filings, defendant argues that there are no

disputed issues of material fact and contends that plaintiff has not submitted anything

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

demonstrating the existence of material facts requiring a trial. Defendant asserts that the papers

filed by plaintiff demonstrate the existence of a personality conflict between plaintiff and

Thompson and notes that Title VII “does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the American

workplace.’” White, 124 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523

U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). Defendant points out that plaintiff has admitted virtually all of the facts

asserted by defendant, including the dates supporting defendant’s arguments concerning

exhaustion and the agency’s corrective actions as to each incident.

Upon careful consideration of the parties’ arguments and evidence, the court finds

that plaintiff’s allegations reflect discrete acts of discrimination rather than a hostile work

environment. “A discrete act of discrimination is an act that in itself ‘constitutes a separate

actionable “unlawful employment practice”’ and that is temporally distinct.” Ledbetter v.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., U.S. , , 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2175 (2007) (quoting Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 117 (2002)). Examples of unlawful

employment practices include termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to

hire. 127 S. Ct. at 2175 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114). “A hostile work environment, on the

other hand, typically comprises a succession of harassing acts, each of which ‘may not be

actionable on its own.’” Id. (quoting 536 U.S. at 115-16). In contrast to a discrete act of

discrimination, a hostile work environment claim cannot be said to have occurred on any

particular day because it is the environment that constitutes the actionable wrong, not the

individual acts that created the environment. Id. (citing 536 U.S. at 115-16).

The plaintiff in this case has presented a series of temporally distinct

discriminatory events that occurred in 2004. Plaintiff alleges unlawful employment actions that

are independently identifiable and actionable. The fact that he filed union grievances on most, if

not all, of the actions confirms that each action was independently identifiable and actionable. 

/////

/////

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As the interior group leader on his shift, plaintiff moves about the building, and any 2

supervisor can give him instructions at any time during the day. (Lee Dep. at 42-43.) Thompson

was not plaintiff’s direct supervisor at the times relevant to plaintiff’s EEO claims. (Id. at 73.) 

14

First, on February 21, 2004, Thompson, a supervisor, subjected plaintiff to a disciplinary 2

interview without allowing him to obtain union representation, then issued plaintiff a disciplinary

letter of warning for allegedly being out of his assigned work area when he went to talk to a

union representative, and finally attempted to embarrass plaintiff in front of his crew and issued

plaintiff another disciplinary letter of warning when plaintiff reacted by going to lunch. All

disciplinary actions taken by Thompson on February 21, 2004 were rescinded within four

months. (See Lee Dep. at 65-71.) Second, in June 2004, Thompson interfered in a leave issue

connected with a period of time plaintiff received worker’s compensation. Plaintiff filed a

grievance, and the leave issue was settled in plaintiff’s favor by a manager. (See Lee Dep. at 72-

75, 91.) Third, on July 4, 2004, Thompson issued plaintiff a seven-day paper suspension for

attendance reasons, when such a suspension had already been issued by management, and also

issued plaintiff a letter of warning. Plaintiff filed a grievance, and the suspension and letter of

warning were rescinded about a month later. (See Lee Dep. at 75-76, 92.) Fourth, on August 27,

2004, Thompson attempted, without authority, to reassign plaintiff to a position directly under

his supervision. This unlawful action by Thompson was corrected the same day by the manager

plaintiff went to for help. Later that day, when plaintiff confronted Thompson about his lack of

authority to reassign plaintiff, Thompson said, “Shut up, nigger. Go move that mail.” Plaintiff

filed a grievance, sought EEO counseling, and filed an informal EEO complaint on September 8,

2004. (See Lee Dep. at 82-86.) The August 27, 2004 incident was investigated by management,

it was determined that Thompson had in fact referred to plaintiff with the racial epithet, and a

letter of warning was issued to Thompson, informing him that he might be terminated for future

incidents. Thompson was moved out of the automation unit and in June 2005 was moved to the

night shift to prevent him from having contact with plaintiff. (See Lee Dep. at 99-100, 103-12.)

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

The court finds that the agency correctly determined that plaintiff’s EEO

complaint alleged discrete discriminatory incidents. In the absence of allegations stating a hostile

environment claim, the agency correctly declined to investigate discriminatory incidents that

occurred more than 45 days prior to September 8, 2004. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (2007). 

Plaintiff’s failure to consult with an EEO counselor within 45-days after any of the pre-August

2004 incidents constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to those incidents and

bars consideration of these unexhausted claims. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir.

2002) (“Exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title VII requires that the complainant file

a timely charge . . . .”); Johnson v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 27 F.3d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1994)

(affirming judgment against plaintiff because his complaint to the EEO counselor was untimely);

Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff was

precluded from pursuing his claim in federal courts because he failed to bring his grievance to the

attention of the EEO counselor within the time limit). Plaintiff has not responded to defendant’s

motion with any allegations or evidence of waiver, equitable tolling, or estoppel. Accordingly,

defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all claims that plaintiff failed to exhaust by filing

timely EEO complaints.

The court finds that the events of August 27, 2004, and in particular Thompson’s

use of a racial epithet, do not demonstrate the existence of a hostile work environment. See

Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a plaintiff

must allege and prove a pattern of ongoing and persistent harassment severe enough to alter the

conditions of his employment).

The court also finds that plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of

retaliation. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was subjected to any materially adverse

employment action on August 27, 2004, see Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir.

2000), and he has not shown that the allegedly retaliatory actions by Thompson on that date

/////

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination, see

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.

In sum, plaintiff’s evidence and arguments do not refute defendant’s evidence and

arguments and do not establish any disputed issues of material fact. Defendant is entitled to

judgment in his favor on all claims presented in this action.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s August 1, 2007 motion for summary judgment is granted and this

action is dismissed in its entirety.

2. The pretrial conference set for March 14, 2008 and jury trial set for May 5,

2008 are vacated and dropped from the court’s calendar.

DATED: December 17, 2007.

DAD:kw

ddad1\orders.consent\lee0630.msj.ord

Case 2:06-cv-00630-DAD Document 48 Filed 12/17/07 Page 16 of 16