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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14623

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-04450-RWS

SHARRON BANKS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TANNER MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(October 21, 2016)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Sharron Banks, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit against Tanner Medical 

Center, Inc., alleging that it engaged in race discrimination and retaliated against 

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her. A magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court grant 

summary judgment to Tanner because Banks was judicially estopped from 

pursuing her claims and because her claims failed on the merits. Banks did not 

timely object, and the district court adopted the report and recommendation and 

granted summary judgment in Tanner’s favor. This is Banks’ appeal.1

I.

In September 2010 Tanner hired Banks, an African-American female and 

registered nurse, to work on an as-needed basis.

2

 Tanner requires every newly 

hired employee to complete an orientation that involves, among other things, a 

seasoned employee training the new employee on Tanner’s policies, protocols, and 

procedures. Tanner assigned two employees to train Banks. During that training,

one of those employees, John Larkee, made comments to Banks about her race and 

her blonde hair. Banks found the comments offensive but she offered no evidence 

 1 Eleventh Circuit Rule 3–1, which took effect on December 1, 2014, provides that “[a] 

party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations . . . waives the right 

to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions,” so long as the magistrate judge informs the party of, among other things, “the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object.” 11th Cir. R. 3–1. To the extent that the rule 

applies to appeals of orders entered before it took effect (such as the order appealed here), it does 

not apply to this appeal because the magistrate judge did not give Banks complete notice of the 

consequences of failing to timely object. Tanner argues that we should review for plain error 

under the standard we used before the enactment of Rule 3–1. We need not decide whether that 

standard applies here because even under a de novo standard of review, the summary judgment

against her is due to be affirmed.

2 “At summary judgment we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 963 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). We 

recount the facts in that light, drawing from the “evidentiary materials on file.” Id.

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showing that she complained to her supervisors or to the human resources 

department about them.

While the training component of the orientation process usually lasts 

between three and six weeks, Banks never completed her training to Tanner’s 

satisfaction during the fourteen months she worked there. During her first few 

months at Tanner, patient numbers were low and, because she was hired to work 

on an as-needed basis, she was seldom scheduled to work. And when patient 

numbers later increased, her supervisors believed that she needed additional 

training to refresh her memory on Tanner’s procedures because she had worked so 

infrequently in the previous months. Banks refused Tanner’s attempts to provide 

her with that additional training, and Tanner eventually stopped scheduling her to 

work at all. 

Banks contacted Dathan Sorrow, who worked in Tanner’s human resources 

department, to complain about how long her orientation was taking and about not 

being placed on the schedule to work. Sorrow in turn asked Banks’ supervisors,

Sharon Taylor and Natasha Ryles, why she was still in orientation and not being 

scheduled to work any shifts. Taylor explained that she had stopped placing Banks 

on the schedule because she had refused to complete her training. Sorrow, Taylor, 

and Ryles agreed that before they decided to terminate Banks’ employment, Ryles 

would contact her and see if she had changed her mind and was willing to finish 

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the training that they believed she needed. Ryles called Banks and left several

messages, but Banks did not return those calls. On November 22, 2011 Tanner 

terminated Banks’ employment, listing her failure “to fulfill [nursing]

[r]equirements” as the basis.

3

 Tanner hired an African-American male nurse to 

replace her. 

II.

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). When a plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimination, 

she may overcome summary judgment through the use of circumstantial evidence 

under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), and Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). Under this framework

the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing a prima facie case of 

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824. If 

the plaintiff makes that showing, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate 

some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id. 

 3 The record is unclear as to whether Sorrow, Taylor, and Ryles were the actual decision 

makers as to termination of Banks’ employment or whether they recommended it to someone

else who made the termination decision. We will assume that Sorrow, Taylor, and Ryles made 

the final decision because even if they did, Tanner is still entitled to summary judgment. 

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“[S]hould the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an 

opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons 

offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were pretext for 

discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252, 101 S. Ct. at 1093.

Banks contends that Tanner discriminated against her based on her race 

when it ended her employment. She offers no direct evidence of discrimination

and attempts to overcome summary judgment through the burden-shifting 

framework. To make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the 

burden-shifting framework, Banks must show that (1) she “is a member of a 

protected racial class”; (2) she “was qualified for the position”; (3) she 

“experienced an adverse employment action”; and (4) she “was replaced by 

someone outside of h[er] protected class or received less favorable treatment than a 

similarly situated person outside of h[er] protected class.” Flowers v. Troup Cty., 

Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Banks cannot make that showing because she cannot meet the fourth 

element — showing that she was replaced by someone outside of her protected 

class or received less favorable treatment than a similarly situated person outside 

of her protected class. Banks does not dispute that she was replaced by a black 

male, and she does claim discrimination on the basis of sex. Instead, she argues 

that she received less favorable treatment than a similarly situated person outside 

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of her protected class, pointing to Mary Caparo, a white nurse whom Tanner hired 

around the same time it hired Banks. Banks offers no evidence, however, that 

Tanner treated Caparo differently, and in fact the record shows that Tanner fired 

Caparo eight days after it fired Banks, with Caparo’s notice of termination listing

the same reason given for Banks’ termination: failure to fulfill nursing 

requirements. Because Banks points to no evidence that she received less 

favorable treatment than a similarly situated employee outside of her protected 

class, she cannot establish a prima facie showing of race discrimination. The 

district court properly granted summary judgment on that claim. 

Banks also contends that Tanner retaliated against her by firing her for 

complaining about co-employee Larkee. Under Title VII’s anti-retaliation 

provision it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee 

“because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 

this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated 

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Like her race discrimination claim, Banks’ retaliation claim 

fails because she has not established a prima facie case. To make a prima facie 

showing of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in protected 

conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse action; and (3) a causal relation exists between 

the protected conduct and adverse action. See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, 

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Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d

1370, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008)). 

While Banks asserts that she complained to supervisors about Larkee’s 

racial comments, she points to no evidence supporting that assertion. The evidence 

instead shows that when Banks complained, she complained about the scheduling 

and the fact that she was still in orientation, stating that “[i]t was obvious that the 

ball was dropped on [her]” and that she was “being punished and prosecuted for a 

mistake that lies with management and not [her]self.” Without evidence that she 

complained to supervisors or to the human resources department about Larkee’s

race-based comments, she has not made out a a prima facie case of retaliation. The 

district court’s grant of summary judgment in Tanner’s favor on her retaliation 

claim was proper.

4

AFFIRMED.

 4 In the report and recommendation addressing Tanner’s motion for summary judgment, 

the magistrate judge also recommended that the district court deny Banks’ four motions for 

default judgment against Tanner, which she had filed based on her belief that Tanner had 

committed discovery violations. To the extent Banks’ notice of appeal covers the district court’s 

adoption of that portion of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, she failed to 

discuss those claims in her brief and thereby abandoned them. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian 

Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that an appellant abandons a 

claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner 

without supporting arguments and authority.”).

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