Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-01228/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-01228-44/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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Case No. 00-CV-01228-LHK

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CURTIS LEE ERVIN,

Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden, California State 

Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

Case No. 00-CV-01228-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18

Re: Dkt. No. 213

I. INTRODUCTION

Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to all 37 claims contained 

in Petitioner’s amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner opposes Respondent’s 

motion and requests an evidentiary hearing on 15 claims. This Order addresses Petitioner’s claims 

14–15 and 17–18. Petitioner does not request an evidentiary hearing as to these four claims. For 

the reasons discussed below, Respondent’s motion with respect to these claims is GRA NTED. 

The remainder of Petitioner’s claims shall be addressed in subsequent Orders. 

II. BACKGROUND

The background and procedural history of this case are discussed in detail in this Court’s 

Order of December 11, 2015, (ECF Doc. No. 271) and shall not be repeated herein except for the 

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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recapitulation below.

Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of Alameda County of first degree murder 

with the special circumstance finding of murder for financial gain for the November 7, 1986 

killing of Carlene McDonald. Evidence at Petitioner’s trial established that Robert McDonald, the 

victim’s former husband, hired Petitioner and Arestes Robinson, to kill Carlene for $2,500.00. 

Petitioner’s acquaintance, Armond Jack, drove Petitioner and Robinson to the victim’s apartment 

in El Sobrante on the night of the murder. Petitioner and Robinson then abducted Carlene. Using 

Carlene’s vehicle, Petitioner and Robinson took Carlene to Tilden Park and stabbed Carlene to 

death and left her body. The men were armed with a BB gun that looked like a .45 caliber pistol 

as well as the knife used to kill Carlene. A patrol officer found Carlene’s body the next afternoon. 

Petitioner admitted various incriminating aspects of the crime to David Willis, Zane 

Sinnott, Gwyn Willis, and the investigating officer, Sergeant Dana Weaver. According to these 

witnesses, Petitioner admitted that he and Robinson confronted Carlene, pointed the BB gun at 

her, forced her into her car and drove her to Tilden Park, where Petitioner stabbed her to death 

while Robinson held her. The prosecutor also introduced the prior testimony of Robinson’s 

girlfriend, Gail Johnson, who stated that Robinson admitted participating in the murder. 

Robinson, McDonald and Petitioner were tried together. Petitioner made no claims of 

innocence, but sought to impeach or discredit the testimony of prosecution witnesses Jack, Sinnott 

and David Willis. Additionally, Dr. Fred Rosenthal, a psychiatrist, testified that cocaine 

consumption may have impaired Petitioner’s thought processes.

During the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence of Petitioner’s prior bank 

robbery conviction and some minor jail disciplinary problems. The prosecutor also introduced 

evidence of uncharged assaults involving Robinson as perpetrator. Petitioner introduced 

mitigating evidence regarding his character, employment, family, drug use, religious involvement 

and musical skills. Codefendants McDonald and Robinson also introduced mitigating evidence.

The jury returned death verdicts for Petitioner and McDonald, but chose life imprisonment 

without parole for Robinson. 

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Case No. 00-CV-01228-LHK

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 6, 2000, the California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and 

sentence. People v. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th 48, 66 (2000). On November 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court. (ECF Doc. No. 32) The Court stayed the 

federal habeas proceedings so that Petitioner could return to state court to exhaust his claims. 

(ECF Doc. No. 46) 

On September 7, 2007, following the completion of exhaustion proceedings, Petitioner 

filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising thirty-seven claims. (ECF Doc. No. 

97) On March 7, 2008, Respondent filed a response to the amended petition. (ECF Doc. No. 110) 

Petitioner filed a traverse on November 13, 2008. (ECF Doc. No. 133) 

After the completion of discovery proceedings, Respondent filed a motion for summary 

judgment on February 14, 2012. (ECF Doc. No. 213) On January 8, 2013, Petitioner filed an 

opposition to respondent’s motion for summary judgment and a request for an evidentiary hearing. 

(ECF Doc. No. 249) Respondent filed a reply on May 10, 2013. (ECF Doc. No. 259) Petitioner 

filed a reply to Respondent’s opposition to Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing on 

August 16, 2013. (ECF Doc. No. 266) 

The case was transferred to the undersigned judge on January 7, 2015. (ECF Doc. No. 

268) On December 11, 2015, this Court granted summary judgment on claims 1–5 and requested 

the submission of affidavits in relation to claim 6. (ECF Doc. No. 271)

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT (“AEDPA”)

Because Petitioner filed his original petition in 2002, well after AEDPA’s effective date of 

April 24, 1996, the standards of AEDPA apply to this case. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 

202, 206 (2003). Pursuant to AEDPA, a district court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

In determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief under this provision, a federal court’s 

review “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 

merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011).

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” prongs of section 2254(d)(1) have 

separate and distinct meanings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). A state court’s 

decision is “contrary to” clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law if that decision fails to apply 

the correct controlling authority or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts 

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different 

result. Id. at 412–13. A decision is an “unreasonable application” of U.S. Supreme Court law if 

“the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that 

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. Importantly, “an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit is not unreasonable “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on [its] correctness.” Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the only 

definitive source of clearly established federal law under section 2254(d)(1). See Williams, 529 

U.S. at 412; see also Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (per curiam) (“AEDPA permits habeas 

relief only if a state court’s decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law’ as determined by this Court, not by the courts of appeals.”). 

While a federal court may “look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether [the circuit] has already 

held that the particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent,” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (per curiam), “[c]ircuit precedent cannot refine or 

sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the 

Supreme] Court has not announced,” Lopez, 135 S. Ct. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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To find under section 2254(d)(2) that a state court’s decision was based on “an 

unreasonable determination of the facts,” a federal court “must be convinced that an appellate 

panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the 

finding is supported by the record before the state court.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014). In other words, 

“a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court 

would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 

(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, “where the state courts plainly 

misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a 

material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension can fatally 

undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding unreasonable.” Taylor

v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

In the event that a federal court “determine[s], considering only the evidence before the 

state court, that the adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision contrary to or 

involving an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the state court’s 

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” the federal court evaluates the 

petitioner’s constitutional claim “de novo.” Hurles, 752 F.3d at 778. If constitutional error is 

found, however, habeas relief is warranted only if that error “had substantial and injurious effect 

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

Under this standard, petitioners “may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they 

are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 

‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 

(1986)); accord Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015).

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine disputes of 

material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see 

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the Court 

“does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a 

genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559–60 (2006). A fact is “material” 

if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute as to a material 

fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of 

the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Bald 

assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist,” however, “are insufficient.” Galen v. Cnty. of 

Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. 

Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a 

plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory 

allegations.”). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary 

judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 14

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to sever his 

penalty phase trial from that of co-defendants McDonald and Robinson. Petitioner argues that the 

mitigating evidence offered in support of his co-defendants eclipsed evidence favorable to him.

After the penalty phase commenced, but before any mitigating evidence was presented, 

Petitioner moved to sever his case from McDonald’s because his role in Carlene’s murder was 

more direct than McDonald’s. The trial court denied this motion. After evidence of McDonald’s 

participation in various activities involving sports, music, and religion was introduced, Petitioner, 

joined by Robinson, renewed his severance motion. The trial court denied this motion and found 

that instructions requiring separate penalty determinations should suffice to eliminate any possible 

prejudice resulting from the joint trial. Petitioner now argues that mitigating evidence of good 

character and social standing introduced in support of McDonald eclipsed evidence favorable to 

him. He alleges that McDonald was viewed by the jury as an accomplice, while Petitioner was 

characterized as a principal whose culpability was greater than McDonald’s. Petitioner further 

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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argues that the fact that Robinson was given life without parole despite copious evidence of a 

violent past demonstrates that in comparison, the jury viewed Petitioner to be more culpable. 

Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court reasonably denied Petitioner’s claim.

The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s claim on direct appeal as follows:

Defendant contends that the court’s failure to sever prejudiced his 

right to the jury’s “individualized consideration” of his character and 

record in deciding the penalty issue. He argues that under the 

evidence presented at the joint trial, McDonald was arguably simply 

an “accomplice” whose culpability in the jury’s eyes was probably 

greatly overshadowed by defendant’s role as a cold-blooded hired 

killer. According to defendant, under the evidence, the jury could 

only compare him unfavorably to McDonald. We note, of course, 

that the supposed “comparison” failed to benefit McDonald, who 

also received a death verdict.

Similarly, defendant observes that the jury evidently found 

Robinson less culpable than it found him, a conclusion supported by 

its verdict of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 

Robinson. Defendant opines that, despite Robinson’s “record of 

violence,” the jury focused on the facts that defendant planned the 

murder and Robinson was brought into the scheme at the last 

minute. Defendant speculates that, had the trials been severed, the 

jury would have been less likely to compare his culpability with that 

of his codefendants. Defendant suggests the trial court had 

reasonable alternatives to a joint trial, including trying his case first 

so that his jury would not be “tainted” by the mitigating evidence 

introduced on behalf of the other defendants. 

We need not address the Attorney General’s argument that 

defendant’s motion to sever the penalty trial was untimely, as the 

court clearly acted within its broad discretion in denying the motion 

on the merits. As we previously observed (ante, at p. 69) in 

reviewing defendant’s similar guilt phase contention, in light of the 

statutory preference for joint trials (see § 1098), severance remains 

largely within the trial court’s discretion. No abuse appears here.

We see nothing in the record suggesting the jury assigned undue 

culpability to defendant after hearing his codefendants’ mitigating 

evidence. Defendant had ample opportunity to present, and did 

present, testimony and argument regarding his own good character 

and rehabilitation. The prosecutor made it clear to the jury that 

McDonald’s role as “mastermind” of his ex-wife’s murder fully 

justified imposing a death sentence on him. The fact that the jury 

returned a death verdict for McDonald shows it was not unduly 

impressed by the array of mitigating evidence introduced on his 

behalf. Robinson’s lesser verdict can only reflect the jury’s careful 

consideration of the respective culpability of the three codefendants.

Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 95-96.

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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On habeas, a federal court’s review of a state court’s denial of a severance motion is not 

governed by state laws relating to severance. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 

1997) (“We do not depend on the state law governing severance in state trials”). Nor is it 

governed by federal rules addressing severance in federal trials. Id.; see Collins v. Runnels, 603 

F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that United States Supreme Court decisions 

addressing severance under federal rules do not apply to analysis of whether joinder in state courts 

was constitutional). Rather, its inquiry is limited to the petitioner’s right to a fair trial under the 

United States Constitution. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370. To prevail, a petitioner must demonstrate 

that the state court’s joinder or denial of his severance motion resulted in prejudice great enough to 

render his trial fundamentally unfair. Id.

Petitioner fails to establish that the trial court’s joinder rendered his trial fundamentally 

unfair. Petitioner presented ample evidence regarding his good character and argued that twentyfive mitigating factors applied to him. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 12602. The prosecutor, in 

turn, characterized McDonald as the “mastermind” of Carlene’s murder, RT 12498, and as a 

remorseless and despicable man whose friends and family, with the exception of his daughter, 

failed to ask the jury to spare his life, RT 12502, 12506–08. The fact that the jury returned a 

verdict of death for McDonald shows that it was not impressed by the evidence of his civic 

involvement and social stature. Furthermore, the verdict of life without parole returned for 

Robinson demonstrates that each of the defendants received individualized consideration from the 

jury. Nothing in the record demonstrates that Petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of the joint 

penalty phase trial.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s denial of his claim was 

unreasonable. Summary judgment on claim 14 is granted.

B. Claim 15

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights during the penalty 

phase trial by allowing the prosecutor to introduce, in the form of rebuttal evidence, irrelevant and 

prejudicial evidence that was used as a non-statutory aggravating factor by the prosecutor. At the 

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penalty phase trial, Petitioner offered the testimony of an Alameda County jail deputy to the effect 

that he had worked efficiently and satisfactorily as an inmate trustee for several months. In 

rebuttal, over the defense’s objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence 

that Petitioner’s jail privileges had been suspended for a 10-day period and that a jail deputy had 

found a bag of a homemade alcoholic beverage (“pruno”) behind Petitioner’s bunk. Petitioner 

contends that because the evidence introduced by the prosecution in rebuttal was outside the scope 

of whether he was a good worker, it was irrelevant and inadmissible, and prejudiced his mitigation 

case because it was used by the prosecution to argue that Petitioner would be a disciplinary risk in 

a prison setting in the future. Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court reasonably 

denied this claim.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed this claim as follows:

Defendant next contends the court erred in allowing the prosecutor 

to introduce, in the form of rebuttal evidence, defendant’s 10-day 

suspension of his jail privileges in 1987 and his further infraction for 

possessing an unlawful alcoholic beverage in 1991. We find no 

prejudicial error.

This evidence was admitted to rebut defendant’s evidence showing 

his good conduct in county jail while awaiting trial. Defendant had 

elicited testimony from an Alameda County jail deputy to the effect 

that defendant worked efficiently and satisfactorily as an inmate 

trustee for several months. On rebuttal, and over defense objection, 

the court permitted the prosecution to introduce jail records 

indicating defendant suffered a 10-day suspension of jail privileges, 

without reference to the reason for the suspension.

Additionally, the prosecution called a jail deputy to relate that he 

found a plastic bag containing “pruno” (a homemade alcoholic 

beverage) behind defendant’s bunk. The prosecutor later briefly 

referred to this rebuttal evidence in arguing that defendant posed a 

possible disciplinary risk if a life sentence were imposed.

Relying on the “satisfactory work performance” testimony he had 

elicited earlier, defense counsel in surrebuttal argument took the 

position that defendant was not a disciplinary problem. Defendant 

now asserts the jail record that memorialized his 10-day suspension 

was inadmissible hearsay offered to prove his underlying conduct. 

(See People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 298-300 [14 

Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938].) But, as we have seen, the record 

admitted into evidence here was silent regarding the cause for 

defendant’s suspension. It was not admitted to show his underlying 

conduct but only that he suffered a suspension of privileges. 

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Accordingly, the record was properly admitted as a business or 

official record. (Evid. Code, §§ 1270, 1271; see People v. Ray

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846] 

(conc. opn. of George, C. J.).)

Defendant contends that neither the suspension record nor the 

“pruno” incident was properly admitted to rebut evidence of his 

satisfactory work performance while in jail. (See People v. Ramirez

(1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1193 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; 

People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791-792, and fn. 24 [230 

Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) We disagree. Defendant offered 

evidence of his work performance to convince the jury that he could 

function satisfactorily as a prisoner. The prosecutor’s rebuttal 

evidence was directly relevant to cast doubt on that premise.

Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 96–97.

A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific 

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of 

the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031

(9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). 

The United States Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or 

overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of 

the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that trial court’s 

admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally unfair” under Ninth Circuit 

precedent but not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States 

Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)); see also Zapien v. Martel, 805 F.3d 862, 869 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (because there is no United States Supreme Court case establishing the fundamental 

unfairness of admitting multiple hearsay testimony, Holley bars any such claim on federal habeas 

review). Here, absent such “clearly established Federal law,” the Court cannot conclude that the 

state court’s ruling was an “unreasonable application” thereof. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 

70, 77 (2006) (“Given the lack of holdings from this Court . . . it cannot be said that the state court 

‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.’”). 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s denial of his claim was 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Summary judgment 

on claim 15 is granted.

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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C. Claim 17

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to give

special instructions permitting the jury to consider his history of alcohol and drug addiction, and 

whether this addiction contributed to his criminal conduct. Respondent contends that the 

California Supreme Court reasonably denied this claim.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed this claim as follows:

Defendant contends the court erred in refusing to give special 

instructions permitting the penalty jury to consider his history of 

alcohol and drug addiction, and whether this addiction contributed 

to his criminal conduct. The court did instruct that the jury could 

consider the defendant’s lack of capacity to appreciate the 

criminality of his conduct, or conform to the law, due to mental 

disease or defect or the effects of intoxication. (See § 190.3, factor 

(h).) Additionally, the court instructed the jury to consider “any 

other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even 

though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or 

other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant 

offers as a basis” for mitigation. (See § 190.3, factor (k); People v. 

Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10 [196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 

P.2d 813].) Moreover, the court also stated that “[i]f a mitigating 

circumstance or an aspect of a defendant’s background or his 

character ... arouses sympathy or compassion, such as to persuade 

you that death is not the appropriate penalty, you may act in 

response thereto ....”

Defendant contends the instructions given were inadequate to permit 

the jury to consider his substance abuse disorder. We disagree. The 

court’s instructions clearly told the jury it could consider any 

mitigating, sympathetic, or extenuating circumstance, including 

defendant’s substance abuse disorder. (See People v. Ray, supra, 13 

Cal.4th at p. 359 [factor (k) catchall provision broad enough to 

include defendant’s mental condition].)

Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 97–98.

A state trial court’s refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable 

in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 

1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.

“The significance of the omission of . . . an instruction may be evaluated by comparison 

with the instructions that were given.” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) 

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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(quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 156 (1977)). Moreover, “‘[i]t is not reversible error 

to reject a defendant’s proposed instruction on his theory of the case if other instructions, in their 

entirety, adequately cover that defense theory. ’” United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 

(9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Dees, 34 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1994)). The omission of 

an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Henderson, 431 U.S. 

at 155. Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction 

bears an “especially heavy burden.” Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155).

Petitioner fails to establish that the trial court’s omission of his requested jury instructions 

resulted in a violation of due process. See Murtishaw, 255 F.3d at 971 (question on habeas is 

whether ailing or omitted instruction so infected entire trial that resulting conviction violates due 

process). A review of the record reveals that the instructions given by the trial court covered the 

gist of Petitioner’s requested special instructions regarding his alcohol and drug addictions. The 

court instructed that in determining penalty, the jury could consider “whether or not at the time of 

the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 

his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the 

effects of intoxication.” Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) 1221. The trial court also instructed the jury to 

consider “any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a 

legal excuse for the crime [and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or 

record [that the defendant offers] as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to 

the offense for which he is on trial . . . .]” Id. Finally, the trial court stated that “[i]f a mitigating 

circumstance or an aspect of defendant’s background or his character, as shown by the evidence, 

or your observation of the defendant, arouses sympathy or compassion such as to persuade you 

that death is not the appropriate penalty, you may act in response thereto and impose a punishment 

of life without the possibility of parole on that basis.” CT 1203. The record thus supports the 

California Supreme Court’s finding that the trial court’s instructions adequately permitted the jury 

to consider Petitioner’s substance abuse disorder. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 98.

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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 14–15 AND 17–18 

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Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s denial of his claim was 

unreasonable. Summary judgment on claim 17 is granted.

D. Claim 18

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it overruled 

Petitioner’s objection to Robinson’s counsel’s assertion during the penalty phase trial that 

Robinson was under Petitioner’s substantial domination. Petitioner’s counsel objected on the 

grounds that the comment was not supported by the evidence, but the trial court ruled that the 

statement was within the scope of permissible argument. Respondent argues that the California 

Supreme Court reasonably rejected this claim.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court denied this claim as follows:

Defendant next argues the court improperly overruled his objection 

to codefendant Robinson’s closing argument to the effect that 

Robinson was under the “substantial domination” of defendant, who 

“badgered” him into participating in the crime. The trial court ruled 

the argument was “within the scope of permissible argument” and 

observed that the jury would decide whether it was sufficiently 

supported by the evidence. We uphold that ruling.

The evidence showed that Robinson was a person of low 

intelligence who (1) functioned as a 12-year-old child, (2) joined in 

the plot to kidnap Carlene McDonald at the last minute, (3) was 

nodding off from heroin use just before the abduction, and (4) was 

kept awake by defendant. Contrary to defendant, we think this 

evidence could support an inference, and permit the argument, that 

he was the more dominant personality and induced Robinson to join 

the plot.

In any event, it is not reasonably possible that Robinson’s counsel’s 

mere argument to this effect could have affected the verdict. The 

jurors were aware from the court’s instructions that attorneys’

statements made during the trial are not evidence, and that the jury 

must decide all questions of fact in the case from the evidence and 

from no other source.

Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 98.

Citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), Petitioner contends that Robinson’s 

counsel, by arguing that Robinson was under Petitioner’s domination, improperly acted as a 

second prosecutor. In Darden, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s due 

process rights were violated when a prosecutor’s misconduct renders a trial “fundamentally 

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unfair.” Id. at 181. The Darden Court determined that the prosecutor’s closing argument which 

(1) attempted to place some blame for defendant’s crime on the conduct of the Division of 

Corrections, (2) stated that death would be the only guarantee against defendant’s future violence 

and (3) referred to defendant as an animal, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial in view of 

the facts that the statements were to some extent invited by defendant’s closing argument and that 

heavy evidence weighed against the defendant. Id. at 179–182. Nothing in Darden supports 

Petitioner’s suggestion that Robinson’s counsel’s comment rendered Petitioner’s trial 

fundamentally unfair. 

Moreover, the California Supreme Court reasonably determined that Robinson’s counsel’s 

arguments were supported by the record. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 98. Robinson’s counsel stated that 

Dr. White testified that Robinson functioned as a 12-year-old, RT 12630–31, and that Armond 

Jack testified that prior to the murder, Robinson was high on heroin, RT 12629. The jurors were 

also instructed that the arguments of counsel were not evidence and that that their decision must be 

based on the evidence alone. CT 1205. The California Supreme Court thus reasonably concluded 

that Robinson’s counsel’s argument was supported by the evidence and could not have improperly 

affected the verdict. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 98.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s denial of his claim was 

unreasonable. Summary judgment on claim 18 is granted.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, summary judgment on claims 14–15 and 17–18 is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2016

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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