Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01780/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01780-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000ad Job Discrimination (Disability Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Lindsey Stewart,

Plaintiff,

v.

Chick-Fil-A, et al,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv1780-CAB-BGS

ORDER REGARDING (1) MOTION

TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO 

STRIKE[Doc. No. 28]; AND (2) 

MOTION TO TAKE LEAVE TO 

AMEND [Doc. No. 37]

On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Lindsey Stewart (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, 

filed a complaint against Danny Putnam, Becky Putnam, 3 Little Cows, Inc., dba ChickFil-A (“3 Little Cows”), and Chick-Fil-A, Inc (the Franchisor), for employment 

discrimination. [Doc. No. 1.] On November 6, 2019, Defendants filed motions to 

dismiss and strike the original complaint. [Doc. Nos. 5 and 7.] On January 17, 2020, this 

Court issued an order granting the motions to dismiss the original complaint with leave to 

amend. [Doc. No. 21.] 

On February 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). [Doc. 

No. 22.] On March 12, 2020, Defendants Danny Putnam and 3 Little Cows filed a 

motion to dismiss and strike the FAC. [Doc. No. 28.] On May 15, 2020, rather than 

filing an opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Take Leave to 

Amend. [Doc. No. 37.] On May 22, 2020, Defendants filed a reply brief in support of 

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their motion to dismiss and strike the FAC. [Doc. No. 38.] On June 4, 2020, Defendants 

filed an opposition to the motion for leave to amend. [Doc. No. 39.] To date, Plaintiff 

has not filed a reply to the opposition.

The Court deems the motions suitable for determination on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). 

ALLEGATIONS OF FAC

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s FAC continues to be that she allegedly observed 

another employee sexually harass several younger females at work, reported this to her 

superiors, and was then given a false negative performance review which led to her 

termination. [FAC ¶¶14-20.] 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”—

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand . . . more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially 

plausible when the collective facts pled “allow . . . the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be 

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. 

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Court need not accept as true “legal 

conclusions” contained in the complaint, id., or other “allegations that are merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” Daniels-Hall v. 

Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Defendant Chick-Fil-A, Inc.

The FAC does not contain any allegations as to Defendant Chick-Fil-A, Inc. (the 

Franchisor). Therefore, Defendant Chick-Fil-A, Inc. is HEREBY DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE and shall continue to be TERMINATED from the case.

C. Defendant Andrews Lagasse Branch + Bell (ALBB).

The FAC improperly names ALBB, counsel for Defendants, as a defendant based on 

alleged misconduct during an EEOC investigation, four months after her termination. 

First, Plaintiff did not have leave to add ALBB as a party. FRCP, Rule 15(a)(1)(B). 

Second, ALBB did not employ Plaintiff and, therefore, it cannot be a defendant in any of 

her employment-related claims. Therefore, Defendant ALBB is DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE and it shall be TERMINATED from the case.

D. Defendants Danny Putnam and 3 Little Cows.

a. Gender Discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must offer proof: (1) that 

the plaintiff belongs to a class of persons protected by Title VII; (2) that the plaintiff 

performed his or her job satisfactorily; (3) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (4) that the plaintiff's employer treated the plaintiff differently 

than a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same protected class as the 

plaintiff. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

Here, Plaintiff’s claim for gender discrimination fails for several reasons. First, 

she continues to fail to identify which defendants are being sued for each claim. 

However, assuming the claim is brought against her employer, 3 Little Cows, it fails to 

state a cause of action, as she fails to allege how she suffered an adverse employment 

action because of her gender. Rather, Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim continues to 

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relate only to her retaliation claim. Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Mr. Dufon 

relate to events that occurred after her termination and therefore cannot support a claim 

for gender discrimination. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the claim for gender 

discrimination is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

b. Sexual Harassment.

A prima facie hostile work environment claim is established by a showing by the 

plaintiff that: (a) she belongs to a protected group (female); (b) she was subjected to 

unwelcome sexual harassment; (c) the harassment complained of was based on sex; and

(d) the harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions 

of employment and create an abusive working environment. Priest v. Rotary, 634 

F.Supp. 571, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1986)(citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s claim for hostile work environment harassment is also deficient. First, 

Plaintiff was not given leave to add this new claim. FRCP Rule 15(a)(1)(B). Moreover, 

Plaintiff fails to identify which defendants are being sued on this claim. Finally, Plaintiff 

fails to allege that she was subjected to sexual harassment or that she personally 

witnessed harassment to the point that it created an abusive working environment. 

Rather, she alleges that she reported sexual harassment of other younger female 

employees, which is the basis of her retaliation claim. Therefore, the motion to dismiss 

the sexual harassment claim is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

c. Age Discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, plaintiff 

must show that she was: “(1) at least forty years old, (2) performing [her] job 

satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4) either replaced by substantially younger employees 

with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise ‘giving 

rise to an inference of age discrimination.’ ” Diaz v. Eagle Produce, Ltd., 521 F.3d 1201, 

1207 (9th Cir.2008) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s claim for age discrimination also fails. First, it does not identify the 

defendants. Second, Plaintiff fails to allege how her age led to her termination. Rather, 

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she continues to allege that her letter to management regarding harassment of others is 

what led to her termination. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the claim for age 

discrimination is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

d. Retaliation.

Under Title VII, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of retaliation by 

showing that (1) she engaged in activity protected under Title VII, (2) the employer 

subjected her to an adverse employment decision, and (3) there was a causal link between 

the protected activity and the employer's action. Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson 

Consumer Prods. Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000)(citations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation as to Defendant 3 Little Cows is sufficiently 

pleaded. Plaintiff alleges she observed another employee sexually harass several younger 

females at work, reported this to her superiors, and was then given a false negative 

performance review which led to her termination. [FAC ¶¶14-20.] This states a claim 

for retaliation under Title VII. While Plaintiff sets forth a viable claim for retaliation, she 

does not identify the specific defendant. Given that retaliation claims may only be 

asserted against the employer, the Court will allow the claim to go forward as to 

Defendant 3 Little Cows only. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the fourth cause of 

action is DENIED as to Defendant 3 Little Cows and GRANTED as to all other 

defendants.1

MOTION TO STRIKE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure Rule 12(f), the Court may strike “from any 

pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Motions to strike generally will not be granted 

unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could not have any possible bearing on the 

subject matter of the litigation. See LeDuc v. Kentucky Central Life Insurance Co., 814 

 

1 Given that there are no claims remaining as to Defendant Danny Putnam, he is HEREBY 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and TERMINATED as a defendant in this action.

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F.Supp. 820, 830 (N.D.Cal.1992). Allegations “supplying background or historical 

material or other matter of an evidentiary nature will not be stricken unless unduly 

prejudicial to defendant.” Id. Moreover, allegations which contribute to a full 

understanding of the complaint as a whole need not be stricken. See id.

Here, Defendants seek to strike all references to the Restaurant’s response to 

Plaintiff’s EEOC charge, as well as any references to ALBB’s post-termination legal 

representation of Defendants during the EEOC investigation. While the EEOC response 

(and similarly ALBB’s conduct) may not, in and of itself, support a claim for retaliation 

because it occurred post-termination, the response may lead to the discovery of relevant 

information. Therefore, the Court cannot, at this time, conclude that the allegations 

“could not have any possible bearing” on the litigation. Therefore, the motion to strike 

the allegations is DENIED.

MOTION TO TAKE LEAVE TO AMEND

Rather than oppose the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend her 

complaint, but she does not attach a proposed amended complaint, as is required by Local 

Rule 15(b). Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain how an amended complaint would cure 

the pleading deficiencies previously identified by the Court. Rather, Plaintiff argues that 

she should be allowed to conduct discovery before providing a proposed amended 

complaint. However, Plaintiff must satisfy the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] Rule 8 

pleading requirements “before the discovery stage, not after it.” Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 

771 F.3d 580, 593 & fn. 7 (9th Cir. 2014)(emphasis in original). Therefore, the motion to 

take leave to amend is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court orders as follows:

1) The motion to take leave to amend [Doc. No. 37]is DENIED;

2) The motion to strike is DENIED;

3) The motion to dismiss the FAC is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART AS FOLLOWS: The motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to all claims 

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and defendants EXCEPT that the fourth cause of action for retaliation shall 

proceed against Defendant 3 Little Cows only;

2

4) Defendant 3 Little Cows shall answer the FAC, as amended by this order, by 

July 6, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2020

 

2 To reiterate, the FAC shall now proceed only as to the claim for retaliation and only as to Defendant 3 

Little Cows. All other claims and defendants have been DISMISSED.

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