Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00408/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00408-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSIE MOREHEAD,

Plaintiff,

v.

KERN VALLEY STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-0408- MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 

FAILURE TO EXHAUST 

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

(ECF NO. 23)

CASE CLOSED

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for 

screening. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. (ECF No. 23.) 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, who at all relevant times was an inmate housed at Kern Valley State 

Prison, brings a due process claim against Defendants Officer Anderson, Officer Hough,

and Officer Loveall for the destruction or loss of Plaintiff’s personal clothing. 

IV. ANALYSIS

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) stipulates, “No action shall be brought 

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by 

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Therefore, prisoners are required to exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to 

filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). This requirement is mandatory 

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regardless of the relief sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) 

(overruling Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because exhaustion must 

precede the filing of the complaint, compliance with § 1997e(a) is not achieved by 

exhausting administrative remedies while the lawsuit is pending. See McKinney v. 

Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).

A prison inmate in California satisfies the administrative exhaustion requirement 

by following the procedures set forth in §§ 3084.1-3084.8 of Title 15 of the California 

Code of Regulations. In California, inmates “may appeal any policy, decision, action, 

condition, or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate...can demonstrate as 

having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). The inmate must submit their appeal on the proper form, and 

is required to identify the staff member(s) involved as well as describing their 

involvement in the issue. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a). These regulations 

require the prisoner to proceed through three levels of appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, §§ 3084.1(b), 3084.2, 3084.7. A decision at the third formal level, which is also 

referred to as the director's level, is not appealable and concludes a prisoner's 

departmental administrative remedy. See id.

“[I]nmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their 

complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is not 

jurisdictional; it creates an affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove. Id.

However, “in those rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the 

complaint,” dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate, even at the screening 

stage. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Wyatt v. Terhune, 

315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “[a] prisoner's concession to 

nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal”), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 

747 F.3d at 1166; Sorce v. Garikpaetiti, 2014 WL 2506213 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) 

(relying on Albino and dismissing the complaint on screening because “it is clear from 

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the face of [plaintiff's] pleading that he has conceded that he failed to exhaust all 

available administrative remedies ... before he commenced this action”).

In the “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies” portion of the form Amended 

Complaint filed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff states: “Yes it’s at the (Second Level) of review of 

$50 ... . Yes, I’m waiting on 3rd Level or any type of reimbursements so technically it’s 

completed waiting on final response ... .” First Am. Compl. 2. 

Based on Plaintiff's concession of nonexhaustion, which is clear and unequivocal 

on the face of the First Amended Complaint, see Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169, the Court 

finds Plaintiff's case must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which any relief 

may be granted. Jones, 549 U.S. at 215; 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The “exhaustion 

requirement does not allow a prisoner to file a complaint addressing non-exhausted 

claims.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing McKinney, 311 

F.3d at 1199).

While the Court typically grants leave to amend in a pro se cases, Plaintiff’s

clearly conceded failure to exhaust cannot be cured by the allegation of additional facts. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Saul v. United 

States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A district court does not err in denying leave 

to amend where the amendment would be futile.”).

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's action is 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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