Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02720/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02720-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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MH 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Victor Pianka, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles DeRosa, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 14-2720-PHX-DGC (MHB) 

ORDER 

On December 18, 2014, Petitioner Victor Pianka, who is confined in the Eloy 

Detention Center, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. On January 26, 2015, he paid the required $5.00 filing fee. In an Order filed 

March 17, 2015, the Court dismissed the Petition with leave to amend so Petitioner could 

allege facts to show that he was still in custody when his Petition was filed. 

On April 16, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Disqualification and En Banc 

Review (Doc. 7), a Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 9), an Amended Petition (Doc. 

10), and a Motion to Designate the Amended Petition a Writ of Audita Querela or Coram 

Nobis (Doc. 11). The Court will deny Petitioner’s Motion for Disqualification and En 

Banc Review. The Court will also deny the Motion to Designate the Amended Petition a 

Writ of Audita Querela or Coram Nobis. Petitioner’s Amended Petition will be 

dismissed, along with this action, and his Motion for Injunctive Relief will be denied as 

moot. 

. . . . 

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I. Motion for Disqualification or En Banc Review 

Petitioner has filed a Motion seeking to “disqualify Judge Campbell, Judge Snow, 

and Magistrate Burns” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 455(a) provides that a 

United States judge or magistrate judge “shall disqualify” him or herself in any 

proceeding in which his or her “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Section 

455(b)(1) provides that a judge must also disqualify him or herself if he or she “has a 

personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed 

evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]” 

 Recusal pursuant to § 455(b) is required only if the bias or prejudice stems from 

an extra-judicial source, not from conduct or rulings during the course of the proceedings. 

See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1046 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 496 U.S. 543 

(1990); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (judge’s prior adverse 

rulings are insufficient cause for recusal). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never 

constitute [a] valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 

540, 555 (1994). Further, where the judge forms opinions in the courtroom, either in the 

current proceeding or in a prior proceeding, these opinions “do not constitute a basis for a 

bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that 

would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. 

 Petitioner fails to set forth a legitimate basis for recusal under § 455. In his 

Motion, Petitioner recounts several adverse rulings he received in connection with other 

proceedings in this District. He also recites a litany of fantastic allegations concerning 

interactions he purportedly had with members of the judiciary in this District. However, 

as noted above, adverse rulings are not a basis upon which the Court’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned for purposes of § 455(a). And Petitioner’s irrational allegations 

concerning prior interactions with members of the court do not provide a reasonable basis 

for questioning the impartiality of any of the Judges identified in his Motion. 

Accordingly, disqualification is not warranted. 

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 In the alternative, Petitioner requests that “En Banc review . . . be taken in this 

case” – and in all other actions Petitioner has pending in this Court1

 – “to ensure that 

fair[,] constitutional judicial determinations are taken.” Neither the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure nor the Local Rules of this court provide for the “en banc” review that 

Petitioner seeks. And even if such relief were available to Petitioner, as noted above, he 

has no valid basis for questioning the impartiality of this Court. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

Motion for Disqualification and Motion for En Banc Review will be denied in its 

entirety.

II. Motion to Designate as Writ of Audita Querela or Error Coram Nobis

 The common law writs of audita querela and coram nobis can be used to “fill in 

the gaps” in post-conviction remedies. United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077, 

1079 (9th Cir. 2001). As discussed below, however, neither form of relief is available 

here. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Designate the Amended Petition a Writ of 

Audita Querela or Coram Nobis will be denied. 

A. Writ of Error Coram Nobis 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the scope and nature of the federal 

writ of error coram nobis in Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42 (9th Cir. 1994): 

The writ of error coram nobis affords a remedy to attack an 

unconstitutional or unlawful conviction in cases when the 

petitioner already has fully served a sentence. The petition 

fills a very precise gap in federal criminal procedure. A 

convicted defendant in federal custody may petition to have a 

sentence or conviction vacated, set aside or corrected under 

the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

However, if the sentence has been served, there is no 

statutory basis to remedy the “lingering collateral 

consequences” of the unlawful conviction. Recognizing this 

statutory gap, the Supreme Court has held that the common 

law petition for writ of error coram nobis is available in such 

situations, even though the procedure authorizing the issuance 

 

1

 This order pertains only to 14-2720-PHX-DGC (MHB). To the extent Petitioner 

is seeking relief in another action before this Court, he must file a motion therein. 

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of the writ was abolished for civil cases by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b). 

Id. at 45 (internal citations omitted). In Telink, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “a 

petition for the writ of error coram nobis is a step in the original criminal proceedings, 

not the beginning of a separate civil action.” Id. at 46. 

 Because a petition for writ of error coram nobis is a step in the original criminal 

proceeding, it may only be maintained in federal court to challenge a federal conviction. 

This Court may not entertain a writ of error coram nobis to challenge a state criminal 

conviction because the federal district courts have no direct authority or jurisdiction over 

original state criminal proceedings and, therefore, cannot take “steps” in furtherance of 

those proceedings. See Finkelstein v. Spitzer, 455 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (a district 

court “lacks jurisdiction to grant [a writ of coram nobis] with respect to a judgment of a 

state court”); Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 718 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“coram nobis is 

not available in a federal court as a means of attack on a state criminal judgment”); 

Sinclair v. Louisiana, 679 F.2d 513, 514 (5th Cir. 1982) (“It is well settled that the writ of 

error coram nobis is not available in federal court to attack state criminal judgments.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Booker v. Arkansas, 380 F.2d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 

1967) (“Relief by the writ . . . is available, if at all, only in the court which rendered the 

judgment under attack.”), abrogated on other grounds by Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct. 

of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 

1964) (“Error coram nobis ... cannot issue under the instant proceeding . . . for the 

judgments are not in the court which Thomas has petitioned.”); Rivenburgh v. Utah, 299 

F.2d 842, 843 (10th Cir. 1962) (“[U]se of the writ is limited by tradition and rule . . . and 

cannot be used as a . . . collateral writ of error between state and federal jurisdictions”). 

Thus, even if Court were to designate the Amended Petition a petition for writ of coram 

nobis, it would lack jurisdiction to grant relief. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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B. Writ of Audita Querela 

 “At common law,” the writ of audita querela “was available only to relieve a 

judgment debtor where a legal defense or discharge arose subsequent to the judgment.” 

Doe v. Immigration and Naturalization Servs., 120 F.3d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1997). To the 

extent it survives, the writ of audita querela is only available to a Petitioner who alleges 

that a legal defect in his conviction or sentence arose after judgment was entered. Id. 

Petitioner has not alleged that a legal defense to his 2012 conviction or sentence 

for possession of drug paraphernalia in Maricopa County Superior Court, case #CR2011-

160573, arose after judgment was entered in that case. Accordingly, the writ of audita 

querela does not provide Petitioner an avenue for relief. See Doe, 120 F.3d 200, 203 (9th 

Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(“Whereas coram nobis could attach to a judgment that was infirm at the time it was 

rendered (for reasons that later came to light), audita querela attached to a judgment that 

was correct when rendered, but was later rendered infirm by events that occurred after the 

judgment.”); United States v. Bravo-Diaz, 312 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming 

denial of writ of audita querela where “there were no allegations of a legal defense . . . 

having arisen since [petitioner’s] conviction”). Petitioner’s motion to designate the 

Amended Petition a Writ of Audita Querela will be denied. 

III. Amended Petition 

 As the Court noted in its March 17, 2015 Order, federal habeas relief under § 2254 

is available “only on the ground that [an inmate] is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The United 

States Supreme Court has interpreted “the statutory language as requiring that the habeas 

petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his 

petition is filed,” though he need not be physically confined to challenge a sentence on 

habeas corpus. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989). The Supreme Court has 

interpreted the phrase ‘in custody’ to include both physical detention and “other restraints 

on a man’s liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally.” Jones v. Cunningham, 

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371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963) (parolee was “in custody” for purposes of § 2241 where parole 

order confined him to particular community, house, and job; required periodic reporting; 

and permitted parole officer to visit his home and job at any time); see also Hensley v. 

Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973 (convict released on his own recognizance 

pending execution of sentence is “in custody”) Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 

(9th Cir. 2005) (petitioner was “in custody” while he remained subject to probation at the 

time he filed his habeas petition); but see Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 

1999) (sex offender registration requirement is merely a collateral consequence of 

conviction that does not, in itself, satisfy “in custody” requirement). “Once the sentence 

imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that 

conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ for the 

purposes of a habeas attack upon it.” Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492). 

 In his Amended Petition, Petitioner challenges a 2012 state court conviction that 

resulted in a sentence of 18 months’ probation. Petitioner does not allege that he was 

serving a sentence for the 2012 conviction when he commenced this case on 

December 18, 2014. Indeed, court records available online2

 indicate that Petitioner’s 

probation was terminated on January 18, 2014. Because Petitioner was not “in custody” 

for purposes of § 2254, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Amended Petition and it will 

be dismissed, along with this action. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Petitioner’s Motion for Disqualification and En Banc Review (Doc. 7) is 

denied. 

(2) Petitioner’s Motion to Designate the Amended Petition a Writ of Audita 

Querela or Coram Nobis (Doc. 11) is denied. 

(3) Petitioner’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 9) is denied as moot. 

 

2

See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/012014/m6120224.pdf (last visited May 27, 2015). 

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(4) Petitioner’s Amended Petition (Doc. 10) is dismissed without prejudice. 

(5) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 

(6) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, in the 

event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability 

because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Dated this 9th day of June, 2015. 

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