Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01984/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01984-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1984

___________________________

Micaiah Rey

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant

v.

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

 Submitted: April 13, 2015

 Filed: May 26, 2015

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Before WOLLMAN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges, and DOTY, District Judge. 1

___________

DOTY, District Judge.

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of 1

Minnesota, sitting by designation.

Appellate Case: 14-1984 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/26/2015 Entry ID: 4278147 
Micaiah Rey appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, 2

set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We affirm.

I.

On May 3, 2007, following a jury trial, Appellant Micaiah Rey was convicted

of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1), and 846. The jury specifically found that the conspiracy involved between

five and fifty grams of cocaine base. At sentencing, the district court determined, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that the conspiracy involved between fifty and 150

grams of cocaine base. Accordingly, the district court sentenced Rey to 240 months’

imprisonment. We affirmed. See United States v. Webb, 545 F.3d 673 (8th Cir.

2008). 

In August 2009, Rey filed a preprinted form entitled “Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.” Rey completed the thirteen-page

form in its entirety, including checking all relevant boxes and providing information

about his conviction and appeal. In response to the request for “every ground on

which you claim that you are being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States,” Rey responded that (1) he did not receive a fair trial, (2)

his trial counsel was ineffective, and (3) the district court sentenced him based on a

greater drug weight than found by the jury. Rey explained the motion was timely

because he was sent “this motion to vacate” soon after his direct appeal was denied. 

On the last page of the form, Rey requested the following relief: “motion for

assistance of counsel.” The preprinted form also included catch-all language

requesting “any other relief to which movant may be entitled.” Rey simultaneously

filed a financial affidavit for “counsel for motion 2255.” 

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern 2

District of Iowa. 

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Appellate Case: 14-1984 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/26/2015 Entry ID: 4278147 
The district court denied Rey’s § 2255 motion, concluding that Rey failed to

substantiate his claims that the trial was unfair and that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective. The court also rejectedRey’s argument that it improperly

determined the drug amount at the time of sentencing, noting the issue had already

been “raised, litigated and rejected on appeal.” In November 2009, Rey filed a letter

with the district court stating that he did not intend to file a motion under § 2255, but

instead was merely seeking the assistance of counsel to help himfile a § 2255 motion. 

Rey requested the opportunity to file a new motion under § 2255 based on ineffective

assistance of counsel. The court declined, finding that there was nothing for it do but

“await any further filing by the petitioner to determine whether it constitutes a second

or successive § 2255 petition.” 

On March 12, 2014, with the assistance of counsel, Rey filed a motion under

§ 2255 arguing that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment in light of the United

States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. —, 133

S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed.2d 314 (2013). The district court summarily dismissed the

3

filing as an uncertified second or successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (“A

4

second or successive motion must be certified ... by a panel of the appropriate court

of appeals to contain ... a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”). The

district court also determined that the motion was untimely because the Supreme

Court has not declared Alleyne to be retroactively applicable. In a separate order, the

district court denied Rey a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether his

filing was a second or successive petition, but granted a certificate of appealability

on the issue of whether Alleyne can be applied retroactively. We expanded the

Before doing so, Rey filed a motion to recall this court’s mandate due to the

3

holding in Alleyne. We denied the motion and Rey’s subsequent petition for

rehearing.

Rey has not requested certification under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 4

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Appellate Case: 14-1984 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/26/2015 Entry ID: 4278147 
certificate of appealability to include the issue of whether Rey’s filing was a

successive petition. 

II.

Rey argues that the district court erred in denying his motion as a second or

successive petition under § 2255 and in failing to consider whether Alleyne is

retroactively applicable. We review both issues de novo. Thomas v. United States,

737 F.3d 1202, 1206 (8th Cir. 2013); Williams v. Norris, 461 F.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir.

2006). 

The district court properly construed Rey’s first motion as one for relief under

§ 2255. “A post-conviction filing that fits the description of § 2255 ... is a motion

under § 2255, and subject to its restrictions, no matter what the pleader says.” 

Godoski v. United States, 304 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2002). Section 2255 reads in

relevant part:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court

which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

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Appellate Case: 14-1984 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/26/2015 Entry ID: 4278147 
Rey’s initial motion fits within that description in both form and substance.5

Rey sought relief on the grounds that the trial was unfair, his counsel wasineffective,

and the district court improperly determined the drug amount, all in violation of the

Constitution. The fact that Rey did not formally request relief beyond the

appointment of counsel does not undermine the district court’s determination,

especially given the form’s phrase requesting “any other relief to which movant may

be entitled.” Liberal construction of Rey’s pro se filing does not compel a different

conclusion because doing so does not alter the substance of his filing. See Stone v.

Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When we say that a pro se complaint

should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is

discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court

should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be

considered within the proper legal framework.”).

Under the circumstances presented, the district court properly determined that

Rey’s original motion was brought under § 2255, and assuch his second such motion

was properly dismissed. Because the instant § 2255 motion must be denied assecond

or successive, we do not reach the merits of his claim. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court.

______________________________

This case is distinguished from those in which a filing isin substance a § 2255 5

motion, but is titled otherwise. In such cases, courts are required to warn movants of

the restrictions on second or successive petitions and allow them the opportunity to

consent to the reclassification or withdraw the motion. Morales v. United States, 304

F.3d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 2002). This process does not apply here, however, because

Rey’s filing was a motion for relief under § 2255 in name and in substance. It would

be untenable to require district courtsto confirm that a movant truly intended to bring

an otherwise unambiguous motion under § 2255. 

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Appellate Case: 14-1984 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/26/2015 Entry ID: 4278147