Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-36008/USCOURTS-ca9-09-36008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANK S. VAN DER HULE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney

General,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 09-36008

D.C. No.

9:05-cv-00190-

DWM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2012

Withdrawn November 2, 2012

Resubmitted July 9, 2014

Portland, Oregon

Filed July 16, 2014

Before: William A. Fletcher, Raymond C. Fisher,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

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2 VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER

SUMMARY*

Second Amendment / Firearms

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor

of the Attorney General of the United States in an action for

declaratory relief brought by Frank Van der hule, a former

felon whose civil rights were automatically restored under

Montana law, seeking approval of a proposed firearm

purchase.

The panel held that Montana’s prohibition on Van der

hule’s obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon was a

sufficient restriction of his firearm rights to trigger the

“unless clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). The panel also

held that Van der hule was forbidden to receive or possess a

firearm under federal law, and that ban did not violate his

Second Amendment rights.

COUNSEL

Quentin M. Rhoades (argued) and Robert Erickson, Sullivan,

Tabaracci & Rhoades, Missoula, Montana, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Adam C. Jed (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Michael W. Cotter,

United States Attorney; Mark B. Stern, Michael S. Raab, and

Abby C. Wright, Attorneys, United States Department of

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER 3

Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for DefendantAppellee.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

In this case we address two issues: (1) Whether Frank

Van der hule, who is prohibited under Montana law from

receiving a concealed weapons permit, is therefore prohibited

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) from possessing any firearms,

see Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998); and

(2) assuming he is barred by federal law, whether such

restriction violates Van der hule’s rights under the Second

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, see Dist. of Columbia

v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). We hold that Van der hule is

barred by federal law from possessing a firearm and that such

ban does not violate his Second Amendment rights. We

affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

In December 1983, Frank Van der hule pled guilty to

sexual assault and four counts of sexual intercourse without

consent in Montana. He was sentenced to 25 years’

imprisonment and completed his sentence in 1996. At the

completion of his sentence, Montana law automatically

restored to Van der hule his civil rights. See Mont. Const. art.

II, § 28(2) (“Full rights are restored by termination of state

supervision for any offense against the state.”); Mont. Code

Ann. § 46-18-801(2) (“[I]f a person has been deprived of a

civil or constitutional right by reason of conviction . . . and

the person’s sentence has expired . . . , the person is restored

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4 VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER

to all civil rights and full citizenship, the same as if the

conviction had not occurred.”).

In July 2003, Van der hule attempted to purchase a

firearm from a firearms dealer, who held a federal firearms

license, in Montana. The dealer began the National Instant

Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) process, and

the NICS examiner who processed the background check

concluded that Van der hule’s prior convictions precluded

him from receiving a Montana concealed weapons permit,

and therefore he was also prohibited under federal law from

possessing or receiving any firearm. The NICS examiner

informed the dealer that Van der hule should not be permitted

to purchase a firearm, and the dealer refused to make the sale. 

Van der hule filed an administrative appeal with the NICS

Appeal Services Team (“AST”), but the AST upheld the

examiner’s determination.

Van der hule then filed suit for a declaratory judgment

under 18 U.S.C. § 925A, requesting that the court order the

Attorney General to approve the proposed firearm transfer to

Van der hule. Van der hule argued that Montana and federal

law did not restrict him from obtaining a concealed weapons

permit or possessing any firearms. In September 2007, the

district court granted the government’s motion for summary

judgment in part but certified a question to the Montana

Supreme Court. It asked whether, under Montana law, Mont.

Code. Ann. § 45-8-321(1), a sheriff has the discretion to grant

a concealed weapons permit to someone with a criminal

history similar to Van der hule’s. In January 2009, the

Montana Supreme Court held that such a person was

prohibited from obtaining a concealed weapons permit under

Montana law and a sheriff had no discretion to grant him a

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VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER 5

permit. Van der hule v. Mukasey, 217 P.3d 1019, 1022

(Mont. 2009).

In the meantime, Van der hule amended his complaint to

add a claim that the federal and state laws depriving him of

his right to purchase a firearm violate the Second

Amendment. After the Montana Supreme Court rendered its

decision, the parties again filed cross-motions for summary

judgment, and the district court granted the government’s

motion. The district court held that Van der hule was

prohibited by federal law from possessing or receiving a

firearm by virtue of his restriction on obtaining a Montana

concealed weapons permit and that Van der hule, by virtue of

his prior felony conviction, had no federal constitutional right

to possess a firearm. Van der hule filed this appeal.1

II

A. The Statutory Scheme

The federal statutory framework at issue is Title IV of the

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.

L. No. 90-351, §§ 901–07, 82 Stat. 197, 225–35, amended by

the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82

Stat. 1213, 1213–26 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.

§§ 921–28).

The Act provides that:

It shall be unlawful for any person—

1 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

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6 VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER

(1) who has been convicted in any court

of, a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year;

. . . . .

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign

commerce, or possess in or affecting

commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to

receive any firearm or ammunition which has

been shipped or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Prior to 1986, the Supreme Court held

that federal law alone determined whether a conviction under

state law triggered the disability under § 922(g), and that

“expunction under state law [would] not alter the historical

fact of the conviction.” Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc.,

460 U.S. 103, 114–15 (1983); see Lewis v. United States, 445

U.S. 55, 62–65 (1980).

In 1986, however, Congress enacted the Firearms

Owners’ Protection Act (“FOPA”), expressing its intent to

roll back certain restrictions on the rights of citizens to

possess firearms. Pub. L. 99–308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449, 449

(1986). FOPA amended Title IV to provide that a “crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,”

[should] be determined in accordance with the

law of the jurisdiction in which the

proceedings were held. Anyconviction which

has been expunged, or set aside or for which

a person has been pardoned or has had civil

rights restored shall not be considered a

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VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER 7

conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless

such pardon, expungement, or restoration of

civil rights expressly provides that the person

may not ship, transport, possess, or receive

firearms.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added). The last clause of

this provision is known as the “unless clause.”

We follow a three-step procedure for determiningwhether

a state conviction is invalidated for purposes of the federal

felon-in-possession statute. We have adopted the following

formula:

1. Use state law to determine whether the

defendant has a “conviction.” If not, the

defendant is not guilty. If so, go to step 2.

2. Determine whether the conviction was

expunged, set aside, the defendant was

pardoned, or the defendant’s civil rights were

restored. If not, the conviction stands. If so,

go to step 3.

3. Determine whether the pardon,

expung[e]ment, or restoration of civil rights

expressly provides that the defendant may not

ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. 

If so, the conviction stands. If not, the

defendant is not guilty.

United States v. Valerio, 441 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, it is uncontested that Van der hule was convicted of “a

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

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8 VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER

year.” It is also uncontested that Van der hule has had his

civil rights restored by automatic operation of state law. See

Mont. Const. art. II, § 28(2); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-

801(2); Caron , 524 U.S. at 312–13. The dispute arises at the

third step, with the parties contesting whether Montana’s

concealed weapons statute triggers the “unless clause.”

Montana law defines “[c]oncealed weapon” generally as

“any weapon [mentioned in other provisions] that is wholly

or partially covered by the clothing or wearing apparel of the

person carrying or bearing the weapon.” Mont. Code. Ann.

§ 45-8-315. It punishes “[a] person who carries or bears

concealed upon the individual’s person a . . . pistol, revolver,

. . . or other deadly weapon.” Id. § 45-8-316(1). It provides

numerous exceptions, however, including allowing the

carrying of concealed weapons “outside the official

boundaries of a city or town,” by those “lawfully engaged in

. . . outdoor activit[ies] in which weapons are often carried for

recreation or protection,” and “on one’s own premises or at

one’s home or place of business.” Id. § 45-8-317(1)(i), (j). 

Montana also issues permits to carry a concealed weapon,

which allow a permit holder to carry “a handgun or a knife

with a blade 4 or more inches in length”—though not other

weapons otherwise prohibited from concealment—almost

anywhere except certain government buildings, financial

institutions, and places licensed to serve alcohol. Id. §§ 45-8-

315, -321, -328. Thus, under Montana law, a permit to carry

a concealed weapon allows the holder to conceal a handgun

in certain locations where it would otherwise be unlawful to

do so.

Montana is a “shall-issue” state in that it requires the local

sheriff to issue a concealed weapons permit when an

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VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER 9

applicant qualifies under the statute. Id. § 45-8-321(1). The

statute describing the permit provides that this

privilege may not be denied an applicant

unless the applicant . . .

has been convicted in any state or federal

court of:

(i) a crime punishable by more than 1 year

of incarceration; or

(ii) regardless of the sentence that may be

imposed, a crime that includes as an

element of the crime an act, attempted act,

or threat of intentional homicide, serious

bodily harm, unlawful restraint, sexual

abuse, or sexual intercourse or contact

without consent.

Id. § 45-8-321(1)(c)(i), (ii).

In response to the certified question from the district court

in this case, the Montana Supreme Court held that although

the statute only specifies that the privilege “may” not be

denied, when an applicant meets the description in Mont.

Ann. Code § 45-8-321(1)(c)(i) or (ii), a sheriff is prohibited

from issuing him or her a permit. Van der hule, 217 P.3d at

1020–22. Because Van der hule was convicted of the crimes

of sexual abuse and sexual intercourse without consent, the

sheriff cannot issue him a permit to carry a concealed

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10 VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER

weapon,2 which in turn restricts him from concealing a

handgun in certain locations.

The issue is whether this prohibition on carrying a

concealed weapon in certain locations is a restriction that

triggers the “unless clause” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). We

now turn to that question.

B. The Supreme Court and the “Unless Clause”

The Supreme Court addressed the reach of the “unless

clause” in Caron v. United States. In that case, the petitioner

had multiple prior felony convictions and was appealing his

recent conviction for carrying a rifle in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g), the felon-in-possession provision. 524 U.S. at

310–11. His civil rights had been restored by operation of

Massachusetts law, and because more than five years had

passed since his conviction, he was entitled to receive a

firearms identification card permitting him to own and

possess firearms, including handguns. Id. at 313, 316; Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 140, §§ 129B–29C; ch. 269, §10(a). Yet

because he had been convicted of a felony, he was unable to

obtain a license to carry and thus was prevented from being

able to lawfully carry a handgun outside of his residence or

place of business. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §§ 129C,

2 Although both subsections (i) and (ii) of Montana Code Annotated

§ 45-8-321(1)(c) preclude Van der hule from obtaining a concealed

weapons permit, after the Montana Supreme Court’s opinion, the statute

was amended and his restriction would now be removed if he had not been

convicted of a crime described in § 45-8-321(1)(c)(ii). Mont. Code Ann.

§ 45-8-321(6) (“A person, except a person referred to in subsection

(1)(c)(ii), who has been convicted of a felony and whose rights have been

restored pursuant to Article II, section 28, of the Montana constitution is

entitled to issuance of a concealed weapons permit if otherwise eligible.”).

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VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER 11

140; ch. 269, § 10(a). The First Circuit held that

Massachusetts’s restrictions were sufficient to trigger the

“unless clause” and bar him from possessing any firearms

under federal law. Caron, 524 U.S. at 311–12. Petitioner

appealed, arguing that the federal statute only prohibited what

was already prohibited by state law. Id. at 314.

The Supreme Court concluded that the phrase “may not

. . . possess . . . firearms” in § 922(g) must be interpreted

under an “all-or-nothing” approach. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Either it applies when the State forbids one

or more types of firearms, as the Government contends; or it

does not apply if state law permits one or more types of

firearms, regardless of the one possessed in the particular

case.” Id. Under the former approach:

[A] state weapons limitation on an offender

activates the uniform federal ban on

possessing any firearms at all. This is so even

if the guns the offender possessed were ones

the State permitted him to have. The State has

singled out the offender as more dangerous

than law-abiding citizens, and federal law

uses this determination to impose its own

broader stricture.

Id. at 315.

The Court held that this approach was the proper one. Id.

It determined that Congress’s purpose was “to keep guns

away from all offenders who, the Federal Government feared,

might cause harm, even if those persons were not deemed

dangerous by States.” Id. Congress had thus adopted “a

single, national, protective policy, broader than required by

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12 VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER

state law.” Id. at 316. The Court concluded that the

Massachusetts restriction triggered the “unless clause.” 

When “Massachusetts treats [the convict] as too dangerous to

trust with handguns, . . . . [f]ederal law uses this state finding

of dangerousness in forbidding [the convict] to have any

guns.” Id. at 316–17.

C. Montana’s Restriction on Possession

The issue before us is whether Montana’s restriction on

Van der hule concealing weapons he is otherwise permitted

to carry is a restriction on his right to “possess . . . firearms.” 

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).3 Montana’s restriction differs from

3 Only two other circuits have addressed the issue—one pre-Caron and

one post-Caron. In a pre-Caron case, the First Circuit observed that a

Maine statute that permitted a felon to carry a firearm five years after

discharge of his sentence but would not permit him to carry a concealed

weapon acted as “an explicit restraint on a felon’s ability to possess a

firearm.” United States v. Sullivan, 98 F.3d 686, 689 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1996). 

This observation was in dicta because the defendant was not yet eligible

for a carry permit; the court may have relied on his being prohibited from

carrying all firearms.

The Sixth Circuit has addressed this issue in two post-Caron cases. 

In the first case, the court suggested that there is a difference between a

state law that gives a felon the right to possess only certain types of

weapons, as in Caron, and one that gives the felon the right to possess all

types of weapons but not the right to conceal them. United States v.

Campbell, 256 F.3d 381, 394 n.9 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other

grounds by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). However, the

court provided no reasoning on this point and ultimately reached its

holding on grounds other than whether a restriction on concealment

triggers the “unless clause.” More recently, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the

case of a defendant who had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic

violence. United States v. Sanford, 707 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2012). The

defendant was ineligible under Michigan law for a concealed weapons

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VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER 13

Massachusetts’ restriction at issue in Caron in an important

regard. Massachusetts permitted Caron to own firearms,

including rifles, shotguns, and handguns, but he could not

carry the handguns outside of his home or business. Van der

hule, by contrast, may carry any firearms Montana permits

others to carry; he is restricted, however, in that he is barred

from obtaining a permit to carry concealed handguns. 

Montana’s scheme is thus less restrictive than

Massachusetts’.

This difference does not help Van der hule. In one sense

Montana does not restrict Van der hule from possessing any

firearms. There are no firearms that others may possess in

Montana that Van der hule cannot own; indeed, there are no

firearms that Van der hule cannot lawfully carry in Montana. 

Montana does, however, restrict the way in which Van der

hule can possess such firearms. Like Massachusetts’

restriction in Caron, Montana has effectivelyimposed a time,

place, and manner restriction on Van der hule’s right to

possess firearms. After Caron, we think that is sufficient to

trigger the “unless clause” in § 921(a)(20).

Our determination is consistentwith the general definition

of “possession.” As the Supreme Court has reminded us,

“there is no word more ambiguous in its meaning than

possession.” Nat’l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67

(1914). Yet, we have done our best to bring order out of

permit, and the court found that his inability to obtain the permit burdened

his ability to “transport firearms, even when unconcealed in a vehicle.” 

Id. at 598 (emphasis omitted) (citing § 921(a)(33)). Applying Caron, it

held that his “ineligibility for a concealed weapons permit trigger[ed] the

‘unless clause’ and permit[ed] his indictment for firearm possession in

violation of § 922(g)(9).” Id.

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14 VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER

semantic chaos. We have held that possession of a firearm

“involves the power to control and the intent to control.” 

United States v. Angelini, 607 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.

1979); see also United States v. Vasquez, 654 F.3d 880, 885

(9th Cir. 2011) (“‘Dominion and control’ means [the

defendant] had knowledge of the weapons and the power and

intent to exercise control over them.”). This is consistent

with standard definitions of the term. See, e.g., Black’s Law

Dictionary 1281 (9th ed. 2009) (“1. The fact of having or

holding property in one’s power; the exercise of dominion

over property. . . . 2. The right under which one may exercise

control over something to the exclusion of all others . . . .”);

id. at 1282 (“[A]ctual possession[—] . . . Physical occupancy

or control over property.”); see also Mont. Code. Ann. § 45-

2-101(59) (“‘Possession’ is the knowing control of anything

for a sufficient time to be able to terminate control.”). Van

der hule is more limited in the control he may exercise over

a handgun than a person with a permit to carry a concealed

handgun is because he may not place one underneath his

clothing or continue to carry it if his clothing obscures the

handgun. Quite simply, there are restrictions on the ways he

may use a handgun that do not apply to others who lack a

similar criminal history. These restrictions limit Van der

hule’s ability to possess a handgun and bring him within the

“unless clause” in § 921(a)(20). Accord Sanford, 707 F.3d at

598.

III

Van der hule argues that the “unless clause” is ambiguous

and does not clearly indicate that it covers restrictions on

concealed weapons. He asks that we grant him the benefit of

the doubt under the rule of lenity. Application of the rule of

lenity is reserved “for those situations in which a reasonable

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VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER 15

doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after

resort to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and

motivating policies’ of the statute.” Moskal v. United States,

498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting

Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)). It

“applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of

statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.” 

United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994).4

In Caron, the Court also addressed a rule of lenity

argument based on the “unless clause.” The petitioner argued

that because the phrase “may not . . . possess . . . firearms”

was susceptible to more than one possible construction, such

that it could be interpreted to apply only when a state has an

absolute ban prohibiting felons from possessing all firearms

rather than applying any time a state prohibits possession of

even one type of firearm, the “unless clause” should not

preclude his possessing a firearm allowed by state law. 

524 U.S. at 310. The Court found this mere “grammatical

possibility” insufficient to trigger the rule of lenity because

the petitioner’s reading was an “implausible reading of the

congressional purpose.” Id. at 316.

In this case, it is likewise possible that the phrasing “may

not . . . possess” would not reach concealment as a mere

manner of possession. Yet such a reading of the statute

would, as the Court explained in Caron, be implausible in

light of Congress’ purposes. Montana has imposed firearms

restrictions on Van der hule because he is “too dangerous to

4 Although the interpretation of the statute occurs here in the context of

Van der hule’s declaratory judgment action, because we are construing a

criminal statute, the rule of lenity is still applicable. See Leocal v.

Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).

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16 VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER

trust with handguns,” unlike someone without a similar

criminal history. Id. Although Montana has enacted only a

time, place, or manner restriction on Van der hule’s

possession of handguns, Congress has adopted “a single,

national, protective policy, broader than required by state

law.” Id. After Caron, no reasonable doubt persists about the

meaning of the statute.

IV

Van der hule argues in the alternative that § 922(g)(1)’s

ban should be analyzed under strict scrutiny and that it

unconstitutionally burdens his Second Amendment right to

keep and bear arms for personal protection. We addressed

whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment in

United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) and

determined that it did not. Id. at 1118; see also United States

v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding

§ 922(g)(1) did not violate convicted felon’s equal protection

rights). We see no reason to change our view now. Most

recently, in United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.

2013), we made it explicit that Second Amendment questions

are reviewed under heightened scrutiny, id. at 1137–38, and

upheld, under intermediate scrutiny, a subsection of § 922(g)

that barred firearm possession by anyone who has been

convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic

violence. Id. at 1140–41; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

In light of Chovan and Vongxay, we believe that

§ 922(g)(1) continues to pass constitutional muster. See

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be

taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons . . . .”). Accordingly, Van

der hule’s Second Amendment argument fails. 

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VAN DER HULE V. HOLDER 17

V

Montana’s prohibition on Van der hule’s obtaining a

permit to carry a concealed weapon is a sufficient restriction

of his firearm rights to trigger the “unless clause” of

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). He is, accordingly, forbidden to

receive or possess a firearm under federal law and that ban

does not violate his Second Amendment rights. The judgment

of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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