Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00162/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00162-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICHIA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SEOUL SEMICONDUCTOR LTD., et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-06-0162 MMC

ORDER DENYING CREATIVE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT; GRANTING

CREATIVE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT;

VACATING HEARING

Before the Court are two motions, filed April 5, 2006 on behalf of defendants

Creative Technology, Ltd., Creative Labs, Inc., and Creative Holdings, Inc. (collectively,

“Creative Defendants”): (1) a motion to dismiss plaintiff Nichia Corporation’s (“Nichia”)

complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement, pursuant to Rule 12(e); and

(2) a motion to strike a portion of the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(f), or, in the

alternative, for a more definite statement, pursuant to Rule 12(e). As to each motion,

Nichia has filed an opposition and Creative Defendants have filed a reply. Having

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court deems

the matters suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for May

12, 2006, and rules as follows.

Case 3:06-cv-00162-MMC Document 69 Filed 05/09/06 Page 1 of 4
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I. Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, for More Definite Statement

In their motion seeking dismissal or a more definite statement, Creative Defendants

argue the complaint fails to state a claim for patent infringement because it does not

identify specific products sold by Creative Defendants that infringe Nichia’s design patents.

The complaint alleges Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd (“SSC”) manufactures light emitting

diodes (“LEDs”), (see Compl. ¶ 19), that Creative Defendants distribute, sell, and import

“consumer products containing LEDs manufactured by SSC,” (see Compl. ¶¶ 21-23), and

that “each [d]efendant has made, used, imported, sold and/or offered for sale products that

infringe [the patents at issue], including but not limited to products designed in the ‘902'

series,” (see Compl. ¶¶ 25, 30, 35, 40). Taken together, the above-referenced statements

allege that Creative Defendants sell consumer products that contain “902 series” LEDs

manufactured by SSC. Creative Defendants argue, however, that Nichia is required to

allege the specific consumer products sold by Creative Defendants that contain 902 series

LEDs as a component. According to Creative Defendants, they have not been afforded fair

notice of the basis of Nichia’s infringement claim in the absence of such additional

information. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding Rule 8(a) requires

statement "that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests”).

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the following allegation of patent

infringement is sufficient for purposes of Rule 8(a): “Defendant has for a long time past

been and still is infringing [plaintiff’s] Letters Patent by making, selling, and using electric

motors embodying the patented invention, and will continue to do so unless enjoined by

this court.” See Appendix of Forms to Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 16; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 84

(providing forms in appendix to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “are sufficient under the

rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules

contemplate”). Here, Nichia’s allegation that Creative Defendants are infringing Nichia’s

patents by selling consumer products containing a specific type of LED, the “902 series”

manufactured by SSC, is at least as specific, if not more so, than “electric motors

Case 3:06-cv-00162-MMC Document 69 Filed 05/09/06 Page 2 of 4
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embodying the patented invention,” see Appendix of Form to Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 16, and,

consequently, is sufficient for purposes of Rule 8(a). See, e.g., Ergobilt, Inc. v. Neutral

Posture Ergonomics, Inc., 1998 WL 483626, *1 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding, in design patent

infringement case, allegation defendant “has been and still is infringing the [ ] patent by

making, selling, offering to sell, and using chairs practicing the patented invention” sufficient

under Rule 8(a) because allegation “conform[s]” to Form 16). Further, where a patent

complaint is sufficient under Rule 8(a) in light of the exemplar set forth in Form 16, the

complaint is likewise sufficient to withstand a motion for a more definite statement. See,

e.g., Dome Patent L.P. v. Permeable Techs., Inc., 190 F.R.D. 88, 90-91 (W.D. N.Y. 1999)

(citing cases)

Accordingly, Creative Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more

definite statements, will be denied.

II. Motion to Strike, or, Alternatively, for More Definite Statement

In their motion to strike or for a more definite statement, Creative Defendants argue

that the prayer for an award of treble damages (see Compl., prayer for relief ¶ F), should be

stricken because the complaint does not include facts to support such an award.

“A motion to strike may be used to strike any part of the prayer for relief when the

damages sought are not recoverable as a matter of law." Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922

F.Supp. 1450, 1479 n. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1996). In a patent infringement case, “[u]pon a finding

of willful infringement, a district court may, at its discretion, grant up to treble damages.” 

Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 185 F. 3d 1259, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1999) “To

willfully infringe a patent, the patent must exist and one must have knowledge of it.” State

Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F. 2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Here, the complaint alleges that SSC “had notice and actual knowledge of the

[patents] before the filing of this suit,” (see Compl. ¶¶ 27, 32, 37, 42), but does not include

any allegation that Creative Defendants had knowledge of such patents, nor does it include

any other allegation that, if proven, might support an award of treble damages. Nichia

argues one may “presume[ ] that [SSC] informed the Creative Defendants . . . of the

Case 3:06-cv-00162-MMC Document 69 Filed 05/09/06 Page 3 of 4
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Nichia also argues that a finding of willful infringement can be based solely on a

defendant’s conduct during litigation and, consequently, that a plaintiff need not plead any

facts to support willfulness. Although at least one court has noted that bad faith conduct

during the course of litigation “might be viewed as evidence of another wrong, that is,

evidence that the acts of infringement were ‘willful’ or ‘in bad faith,’” see Sharper Image

Corp. v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 222 F.R.D. 621, 629 n. 14 (N.D. Cal. 2004), Nichia cites no

authority holding that a finding of willful patent infringement can be based solely on how a

party conducts litigation, cf. id. (distinguishing “‘bad faith’ conduct of litigation from

culpability accompanying the infringing behavior itself”). 

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In light of this ruling, the Court need not address Creative Defendants’ alternative

motion for a more definite statement.

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patents-in-suit.” (See Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Strike at 4:14-18.) Even assuming,

arguendo, such notice would suffice to support a finding of willfulness, the instant complaint

includes no allegation from which any such presumption could be drawn.1

 Accordingly, the prayer for treble damages, as applicable to Creative Defendants,

will be stricken.2

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Creative Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite

statement is hereby DENIED.

2. Creative Defendants’ motion to strike is hereby GRANTED, and the prayer for

treble damages, as applicable to Creative Defendants, is STRICKEN, without prejudice to

Nichia’s seeking leave to amend in the event it has, or becomes aware of, a factual basis

for such prayer for relief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00162-MMC Document 69 Filed 05/09/06 Page 4 of 4