Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00311/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00311-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERESA CARRIER, et al., )

Plaintiffs, ) 

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00311-KD-C

 )

NAVIKA CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc. 21) and Notice of 

Voluntary Dismissal of Markeisha Stokes (Doc. 20). Additionally, currently pending is 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 16), which is impacted by Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.

The Complaint was filed on July 8, 2014. (Doc. 1). On September 23, 2014, the Court 

ordered Plaintiffs to show cause as to why service of process had not been effected on the 

Defendants. (Doc. 5). On October 1, 2014, Plaintiffs responded, explaining that they were 

awaiting a waiver of service from opposing counsel. (Doc. 6). On November 25, 2014, Plaintiffs 

sought, and obtained, a 30 day extension within which to serve the Defendants. (Docs. 7, 8). The 

Complaint was served on Defendants Navika and Shah on January 7, 2015, and on Silverstone on 

January 28, 2015. (Docs. 12, 13, 19). On January 28, 2015, all of the Defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss the complaint citing, in part, untimely service of process. (Doc. 16). On February 20, 

2015, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (Doc. 21) and Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of 

Markeisha Stokes (Doc. 20). 

Plaintiffs did not seek leave of Court to amend the complaint, and were not required to do so. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) applies to amendments before trial, and provides in 

relevant part as follows:

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(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of 

course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a 

responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days 

after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.

Fed.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 15(a)(1) (emphasis added). Additionally, Rule 6 provides that for computing 

any time period specified in the rules, when the period is stated in days, the day of the event that 

triggers the period is excluded (Rule 6a)(1)(A)), and that “[w]hen a party may or must act within a 

specified time after service and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F), 3 days are 

added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a)[]” (Rule 6(d)). Moreover, Rule 

5(b)(2)(E) provides for service via electronic means if the person consented in writing to same (i.e., 

service via CM/ECF in this Court). 

Concerning Rule 15(a)(1)(A), Plaintiffs’ February 20, 2015 amended complaint cannot be 

construed as having been filed under same -- once as a matter of course within 21 days of serving it –

as to Defendants Navika and Shah. Those defendants were served on January 7, 2015, and so

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint would have been due by the end of January 2015. However, 

Defendant Silverstone was served on January 28, 2015 and so Plaintiffs’ amended complaint would 

be timely as to that defendant under this sub-section.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint can be construed as having been filed under

Rule 15(a)(1)(B), as the original complaint was a pleading to which a responsive pleading was

required and Defendants filed a Rule 12(b) motion in response. Under the rules, three (3) days are 

added to Rule 15(a)(1)(B)’s 21 day time period, giving Plaintiffs 24 days from the day after

Defendants’ January 28, 2015 motion was filed (the triggering day is excluded under the rules) 

within which to file an amended complaint as a matter of course – Saturday, February 21, 2015. 

Because Rule 6(a)(1)(C) provides that the last day cannot be a Saturday or Sunday, “the period 

continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday[]” –

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Monday February 24, 2015. Thus, Plaintiffs had until February 24, 2015 within which to amend the 

complaint as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)(B). Plaintiffs’ February 20, 2015 amended 

complaint is accordingly timely and properly filed as a matter of course.1

Turning to the substance of the amended complaint, it does not merely remove Markeisha 

Stokes as a plaintiff. Rather, the amended complaint also adds more specific allegations for each 

plaintiff against the defendants (Doc. 21 at 6-20 at ¶¶22, 24, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 42, 55, 58, 

61, 64), changes an address for a defendant (id. at 5 at ¶20), and removes reference to certain 

statutory provisions (id. at 2, 22 at ¶¶2, 62). In light of the amended complaint, which changes the 

substantive allegations against the Defendants as well as removes plaintiff Markeisha Stokes from 

this case, the motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is MOOT. 

Further, because amendment of the complaint -- not dismissal -- is the proper vehicle when a 

plaintiff seeks to dismiss less than all parties and/or less than all claims,2 and Plaintiffs have 

simultaneously filed an amended complaint, Plaintiff Markeisha Stokes’ Notice of Dismissal (Doc. 

20) is MOOT.

DONE and ORDERED this the 12th day of March 2015.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 1 Further, “[t]he thrust of Rule 15(a) is to allow parties to have their claims heard on the merits, and 

accordingly, district courts should liberally grant leave to amend when “the underlying facts or circumstances relied 

upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In re Engle 

Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1109 (11th Cir. 2014). 

2 Rule 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss “an action” – i.e., all of its claims, but “its text does not permit 

plaintiffs to pick and choose, dismissing only particular claims within an action...” Klay v. United Healthgroup, 

Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004). Accord Campbell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 605 F.3d 839, 841 n.1 (11th 

Cir. 2010); IberiaBank v. Coconut 41, LLC, 984 F.Supp.2d 1283, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (“In the Eleventh 

Circuit...a plaintiff can only seek to dismiss its entire action and cannot pick and choose which claims are to be 

dismissed[]”). In order for a plaintiff to “eliminate particular claims or issues from the action” it “should amend the

complaint under Rule 15(a) rather than dismiss under Rule 41(a).” Klay, 376 F. 3d at 1106.

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