Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03364/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03364-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (No. 14-cv-03364-HSG (LB)) 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

BAY AREA PAINTERS AND TAPERS 

PENSION TRUST FUND, AND ITS JOINT 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

VENTURA FINISHING SYSTEMS,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03364-HSG (LB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT

Re: ECF No. 43

INTRODUCTION

This is a case about delinquent contributions under collective bargaining and trust agreements. 

(Complaint, ECF No. 1.)1The plaintiffs, Bay Area Painters and Tapers Pension Fund, et al., allege 

that the defendant, Ventura Finishing Systems, failed to make required payments. (See generally 

id.) Ventura Finishing answered the complaint, and then its counsel withdrew; Ventura Finishing

thereafter failed to obtain new counsel on the timeline that the district judge ordered. (Answer, 

ECF No. 12; Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 34.) As a corporation, it could not represent itself. 

Thus, the district judge gave leave to Bay Area Painters to file the pending default-judgment 

motion. (Minute Order, ECF No. 38; Motion, ECF No. 43.) Ventura Finishing then obtained new 

 

1 Citations are to the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated 

page numbers at the tops of documents.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (No. 14-cv-03364-HSG (LB)) 2

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counsel. (See Notice of Appearance, ECF No. 49.) The motion was referred to the undersigned for 

a report and recommendation. (Order Referring Case, ECF No. 62.)

The court recommends that the district court exercise its discretion and deny the motion for 

default judgment. First, the clerk never entered default, which—under the plain language of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55— is a prerequisite for a default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2). 

Second, Ventura is defending itself in the action and the disputes can be resolved on the merits. 

STATEMENT

On July 24, 2014, the plaintiffs Bay Area Painters and Tapers Pension Trust Fund, et al. (“Bay 

Area Painters”), sued the defendant Ventura Finishing Systems,

2

for unpaid contributions pursuant 

to bargaining and trust agreements.3 Ventura Finishing timely answered the complaint, denying 

the allegations and asserting sixteen affirmative defenses.4

Early in the litigation, counsel for both parties attended an ADR phone conference, during 

which Ventura Finishing’s counsel informed Bay Area Painters’ counsel that they would be filing

a motion to withdraw.

5 As a result, Bay Area Painters requested a ninety-day continuance of the

initial case management conference, which Judge White granted.6 Ventura Finishing’s counsel 

subsequently filed a motion to withdraw.7

Judge White conditionally granted the motion on December 1, 2014.8 He permitted withdrawal 

provided that “documents pertaining to [the] action [would] continue to be served on [former 

counsel]” until Ventura Finishing obtained new counsel.9 Because Ventura Finishing is a 

corporation and cannot appear without counsel, Judge White further ordered that it file a 

substitution of attorney by February 13, 2015.10 He advised “that if it [failed] to secure counsel by 

 

2 Complaint, ECF No. 1.

3

Id. ¶¶ 15-21.

4 Answer, ECF No. 12.

5 Order to Continue Case Management Conference, ECF No. 20 at ¶¶ 2-4.

6

Id. ¶ 6.

7 Motion to Withdraw, ECF No. 21.

8 Order Granting Motion to Withdraw, ECF No. 24.

9

Id. at 1-2.

10 Id. at 2.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (No. 14-cv-03364-HSG (LB)) 3

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that date, the result could be that judgment [would] be entered against it.”11 Moreover, Judge 

White ordered former counsel to “file a declaration that he [had] provided [Ventura Finishing] 

with notice of [the] ruling by” December 12, 2014.12

The following relevant events ensued: 

Date Event Substitute Counsel Status

1/30/2015 Case management conference 

continued for thirty days.13

Venturing Finishing had not 

yet obtained substitute 

counsel.14

2/13/2015 Case reassigned to Judge 

Gilliam.15

N/A.

3/2/2015 Case management statement 

filed.16

Ventura Finishing had not yet 

obtained substitute counsel.17

As of March 13, 2015, one month after the deadline, Ventura Finishing had not filed a 

substitution of counsel and former counsel had not filed a declaration. 18 Judge Gilliam ordered 

Ventura Finishing to show cause “as to why default judgment should not be issued against it for its 

failure to” obtain new counsel.

19 Judge Gilliam ordered former counsel to show cause in writing 

for its failure to file the ordered declaration and set a hearing for March 18, 2015.20 Former 

counsel filed the required declaration and appeared at the hearing/case management conference; 

Ventura Finishing still had not obtained new counsel.21 Judge Gilliam then allowed Bay Area 

Painters “to file a motion for default judgment pursuant to Rule 55 by Wednesday, April 1, 

2015.”22 This deadline was twice extended because of the parties’ informal settlement discussions: 

first to April 15, 2015, then to June 11, 2015.

23 Bay Area Painters then filed the motion.24 New 

 

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Order Granting Motion to Continue Case Management Conference, ECF No. 27.

14 Id. ¶ 7.

15 Case Reassigned (no ECF No. associated with this entry).

16 Case Management Statement, ECF No. 28.

17 Id. ¶ 4.

18 Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 34 at 1.

19 Id.

20 Id. at 1-2.

21 Response to Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 36; 3/18/15 Minute Entry, ECF No. 38.

22 3/18/15 Minute Entry.

23 3/26/15 Order, ECF No. 40; 4/13/15 Order, ECF No. 42.

24 Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 43. 

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counsel appeared on behalf of Ventura Finishing on June 25 and, after stipulated extensions, 

opposed the motion for default judgment on August 3, 2015, on the ground that it was defending 

the case.

25 Then, the parties continued to negotiate settlement. This table shows the timeline: 

Date Event Reason New Hearing Date

10/5/2015 Stipulated order to continue 

the default judgment 

hearing.26

Ventura Finishing provided 

documents for Bay Area 

Painters’ audit review “in 

furtherance of the parties’ 

efforts to resolve [the] 

matter.”27

December 10, 2015

10/26/2015 Substitution of counsel for 

Ventura Finishing.

28

N/A. N/A.

12/4/2015 Stipulated order to continue 

the default judgment 

hearing.29

Ventura Finishing’s 

cooperation in producing 

documents, Bay Area 

Painters’ review thereof, and 

the parties’ discussions 

regarding informal 

resolution.30

February 22, 2016

1/22/2016 Stipulated order to continue 

the default judgment 

hearing.31

Audit of documents 

completed and the parties 

need additional time “to 

discuss the revised findings 

and attempt to reach an 

informal resolution of [the]

matter.”32

March 31, 2016

2/25/2016 Revised proposed judgment 

on motion for default 

judgment.33

Reflects changes in the 

amount owed by defendant to 

plaintiffs, discovered as a 

result of the auditors’ review 

of documents produced.34

N/A.

3/11/2016 Substitution of counsel for 

Ventura Finishing.

35

N/A. N/A.

 

25 Notice of Appearance, ECF No. 49; Response, ECF No. 55.

26 10/5/15 Stipulation and Order to Continue, ECF No. 68.

27 Id. ¶ 4.

28 10/26/15 Notice of Change in Counsel, ECF No. 70.

29 12/4/15 Stipulation and Order to Continue, ECF No. 72.

30 Id. ¶ 5-6.

31 1/22/16 Stipulation and Order to Continue, ECF No. 74.

32 Id. ¶ 5.

33 Proposed Order, Revised Proposed Judgment, ECF No. 78.

34 See generally Revised Proposed Judgment; Stafford Decl., ECF No. 79, ¶¶ 4-5, 16.

35 3/9/16 Substitution of Counsel, ECF No. 81; Order Granting Motion to Substitute, ECF No. 85.

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Following these events, Bay Area Painters filed a status report on March 24, 2016, one week 

before the scheduled hearing,

36 stating that, despite its “attempts to reach an informal resolution of 

[the] matter with [Ventura Finishing], the parties have been unable to resolve [the] matter 

informally.”37 It thus asked the undersigned to address the pending default-judgment motion 

without a hearing.38 Ventura Finishing “has no objection to the motion being heard on the papers, 

without oral argument,”

39 but said that it would “continue to meet and confer with [Bay Area 

Painters] in an attempt to resolve any outstanding issues without judicial intervention.”40 The court 

held a hearing on the motion on March 31, 2016.

41

GOVERNING LAW 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), a plaintiff may apply to the district court 

for—and the court may grant—a default judgment against a defendant who has failed to plead or 

otherwise defend an action. See Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 1986). Rule 55 

sets forth the procedures for entering default and default judgment. There are generally two steps. 

First, a plaintiff must apply to the clerk of court to enter default when a defendant fails to plead or 

otherwise defend an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, for sum-certain claims and at the 

plaintiff’s request, the clerk must enter default judgment against the defendant. Id. 55(b)(1). For all 

other claims, the plaintiff must apply to the court for entry of default judgment. Id. 55(b)(2). “[A] 

plain reading of Rule 55 demonstrates that entry of default by the clerk is a prerequisite to an entry 

of default judgment.” Vongrabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318 (S.D. Cal. 2004).

A defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.

Draper, 792 F.2d at 924-25. That decision lies within the court’s discretion. Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. 

Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Also, the district court has discretion to 

set aside a default or a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), 60(b); Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. 

 

36 Plaintiffs’ Status Report, ECF No. 86.

37 Id. ¶ 6.

38 Id. ¶¶ 6-7.

39 Defendant’s Status Report, ECF No. 87. 

40 Id.

41 3/31/16 Minute Entry, ECF No. 89.

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of Florida, 653 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2011). More specifically, under Rule 55(c), a court 

may set aside an entry of default for “good cause.” See United States v. Signed Personal Check 

No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Mesle”). To determine whether 

a defendant has shown good cause to justify vacating entry of default, a court considers three 

factors: 1) whether the defendant engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; 2) whether 

the defendant lacked a meritorious defense; and 3) whether reopening the default would prejudice 

the plaintiff. See id. (citing Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rests. Group., Inc., 375 F.3d 

922, 925 (9th Cir. 2004)). This standard is disjunctive, meaning the court may deny the request to 

vacate default if any of the three factors is true. See id. (citing Franchise Holding II, 375 F.3d at 

925). “Crucially, however, ‘judgment by default is a drastic step appropriate only in extreme 

circumstances; a case should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Falk v. 

Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)).

The standard to set aside an entry of default is the same standard used to determine whether a 

default judgment should be set aside under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), except that in 

the Rule 55(c) context, courts have greater discretion and can apply the standard more liberally to 

grant relief from entry of default because there is no interest in the finality of a judgment. See id.

at 1091 n.1 (citations omitted); TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 

2001); Hawaii Carpenters’ Trust Fund v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir. 1986); Mendoza v. 

Wight Vineyard Mgmt., 783 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1986). When considering whether to vacate 

entry of default under Rule 55(c), the court’s “underlying concern . . . is to determine whether 

there is some possibility that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result 

achieved by the default.” Hawaii Carpenters’ Trust Fund, 794 F.2d at 513. The inquiry “is at 

bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s 

omission.” Brandt, 653 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Ass’n Ltd., 507 

U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). The decision ultimately lies in the discretion of the court. Id. at 1111-12.

As the party seeking to set aside entry of default, a defendant bears the burden of showing 

good cause under this test. Hawaii Carpenters’ Trust Fund, 794 F.2d at 513-14. To ensure that 

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cases are decided on the merits whenever possible, the court resolves any doubt regarding whether 

to grant relief in favor of vacating default. O’Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994).

ANALYSIS

1. The clerk did not enter default under Rule 55

The clerk did not enter default. (See generally Docket.) Although a court does have inherent 

authority to sanction a party with default judgment, see Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 

F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987), that is not what happened here. Instead, during a time when Ventura 

Finishing was not represented (and thus could not defend itself), the district judge authorized Bay 

Area Painters to seek a default judgment. Entry of default would have been procedurally 

appropriate in March 2015 because Ventura Finishing was not represented and could not defend 

itself pro se. It thus “failed . . . to otherwise defend.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). But the clerk’s 

entry of default is a prerequisite to a party’s default judgment motion. See id. at 55(a) & (b)(2).

2. Discretion of the court to grant or deny

If default were entered now to cure any procedural deficiency under Rule 55(a), or if entry 

default can be construed from the prior proceedings, the undersigned recommends that the district 

judge exercise discretion and set aside the default because Ventura Finishing is defending the case.

2.1 Culpability

The first question under Rule 55(c) is “whether [the defendant] engaged in culpable conduct 

that led to the default.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091. “[A] defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has 

received actual or constructive notice of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer”

or otherwise defend the action. Id. at 1092 (quoting TCI, 244 F.3d at 697 (emphasis in original)); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). From this point the analysis divides into two streams.

Where a party is not represented by counsel, and is itself legally unsophisticated, its default is

intentional only if it “acted with bad faith.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1092 (quoting TCI, 244 F.3d at 

697). Bad faith would include an “intention to take advantage of the opposing party, interfere with 

judicial decision making, or otherwise manipulate the legal process.” Id. (quoting TCI, 244 F.3d at 

697). The Ninth Circuit has “typically held” that a defendant’s conduct was culpable under this 

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inquiry where the defendant’s conduct can be explained only as a “devious, deliberate, willful, or 

bad faith failure to respond.” Id. (quoting TCI, 244 F.3d at 698).

Culpability under Rule 55(c) is more readily found where the defaulting defendant was legally

sophisticated or was represented by counsel. See id. at 1093. There is then no need to show that 

the defendant acted in bad faith. Id. “When considering a legally sophisticated party’s culpability 

in a default, an understanding of the consequences of its actions may be assumed, and with it, 

intentionality.” Id. With notice of the lawsuit, in other words, a represented party who defaults is 

culpable under Rule 55(c). Id.

Here, Ventura Finishing is a corporate entity intermittently represented by counsel. While 

represented by counsel, Ventura Finishing answered the complaint.42 After initial counsel 

withdrew, Ventura Finishing twice failed to abide by the court’s orders: first, it failed to file 

substitution of counsel by February 13, 2015; second, it failed to show cause why default 

judgment should not be entered against (which would have required appearing with counsel).

43

But otherwise, Ventura Finishing has engaged in the litigation and manifested its intent to defend 

the action. This intent is apparent in three different periods of the litigation.

First, Ventura Finishing filed an answer. Second, after the district judge authorized it to seek 

default judgment, and before it filed its motion, it engaged in robust settlement discussions with 

Bay Area.44 Ventura Finishing contacted Bay Area Painters’ counsel “to discuss the amounts 

owed” and “the documents needed by [Bay Area Painters] to complete the audit of [Ventura 

Finishing]’s payroll records. [Ventura Finishing] indicated [its] willingness to attempt to resolve 

[the] matter without the need for further litigation.”45 Also, Ventura Finishing “retained new 

counsel for purposes of facilitating potential settlement” who contacted Bay Area Painters’ 

counsel “on April 9, 2015 to discuss potential resolution of the matter without the need for further 

litigation.”

46 Ventura Finishing’s counsel obtained the documents “necessary to complete the audit 

 

42 Answer.

43 Order to Show Cause; 3/18/15 Minute Entry.

44 3/26/15 Order Granting Extension of Time; 4/13/15 Order Granting Extension of Time.

45 3/26/15 Order Granting Extension of Time ¶ 3.

46 4/13/15 Order Granting Extension of Time ¶ 4.

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of [Ventura Finishing]’s payroll records.”47 As a result of these discussions, the parties twice 

agreed to extend the time to file the current motion.48 Bay Area Painters then filed the motion on 

June 11, 2015.49

Third, after the motion was filed, Ventura Finishing obtained new counsel on June 25, 2015, 

which resulted in further discussions between the parties.50 Ventura Finishing provided “a large 

volume of documents to [Bay Area Painters] in furtherance of the parties’ efforts to resolve [the] 

matter.”51 These documents were related to Bay Area Painters’ audit of Ventura Finishing’s 

payroll records.52 Because of the large number of documents produced, Bay Area Painters’ audit 

required additional time.

53 Because Ventura Finishing “cooperated by providing the requested 

documents,” and once the audit was complete, the parties needed an opportunity to “attempt to 

reach an informal resolution of [the] matter.”54 As a result of this cooperation and review, the 

parties stipulated to three continuances of the hearing on the default-judgment motion.55 The 

parties continue to work collaboratively toward resolution with Ventura Finishing’s new counsel, 

who substituted into the case earlier this month.56 Indeed, at the hearing, the parties agreed to a 

further status conference in May because they continue to work together toward resolution.57

The court can choose to set aside a default. “A district court may exercise its discretion to deny 

relief to a defaulting defendant based solely upon a finding of defendant's culpability, but need 

not.” Brandt, 653 F.3d at 1112. The Ninth Circuit has explained that, even where a defendant has

acted culpably in defaulting, a court deciding a Rule 55(c) motion must consider all three factors 

(culpability, meritorious defense, and prejudice), “taking account of all relevant circumstances 

 

47 Id.

48 3/26/15 Order Granting Extension of Time; 4/13/15 Order Granting Extension of Time.

49 Motion.

50 Notice of Appearance, ECF No. 49.

51 10/5/15 Stipulation and Order to Continue ¶ 4.

52 Id.

53 12/4/15 Stipulation and Order to Continue ¶¶ 5-6.

54 Id. ¶ 6; 1/22/16 Stipulation and Order to Continue ¶ 5.

55 10/5/15 Stipulation and Order; 12/4/15 Stipulation and Order; 1/22/16 Stipulation and Order.

56 ECF Nos. 81, 85.

57 3/31/2016 Minute Entry.

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surrounding the party’s omission,” in view of the law’s strong preference for trying cases on their 

merits. See id. at 1111-12.

The court’s view is that the default-judgment process arose only because Ventura Finishing 

did not then have counsel. Fairly soon after the district judge authorized Bay Area Painters to seek 

default judgment, Ventura Finishing obtained counsel and thereafter participated in the litigation 

and continues to defend the action. This is not the ordinary context for a default judgment, and the 

court does not think default judgment is appropriate on this record. 

2.2 Meritorious defense

With respect to the second factor — whether the defendant lacked a meritorious defense — a 

defendant must allege “specific facts” that, if true, would constitute a defense. See Mesle, 615 F.3d 

at 1094 (citing TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700). Although in this regard the burden on the defendant 

is “not extraordinarily heavy,” id. (citing TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700), “[a] ‘mere general denial 

without facts to support it’ is not enough to justify vacating a default or default judgment,” 

Franchise Holdings II, 375 F.3d at 926.

Here, Ventura Finishing generally asserted in its answer that it lacked sufficient information or 

knowledge to admit the allegations alleged in the complaint.58 It also asserted sixteen affirmative 

defenses.59 In its opposition to the current motion, moreover, Ventura Finishing addresses certain 

deficiencies in Bay Area Painters’ complaint and supporting evidence.60 For example, according to 

Ventura Finishing, the complaint fails to address additional agreements on which the claims rely.61

Ventura Finishing also argues that the complaint inadequately establishes the calculations used to 

support the claimed delinquent contributions.62 In sum, Ventura Finishing “disputes the scope of 

the proposed judgment and disputes that [Bay Area Painters] have substantiated their proposed 

judgment amount.”63 Ventura Finishing has thus raised specific facts—i.e. substantiation of 

 

58 Answer, ¶¶ 1-21.

59 Id. at 5-7.

60 Opposition at 10-16.

61 Id. at 11-13,

62 Id. at 13-14.

63 Id. at 16.

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claims—that if true, would constitute a defense. As such, this factor weighs against granting 

default judgment. 

2.3 Unfair prejudice

Bay Area Painters argue that it will be prejudiced if default judgment is not granted.64

Asserting that its claims are “sound and well [pled],” Bay Area Painters argues further delay “in 

securing judgment only serves to increase the chances that [it] will not be able to recover the 

amounts due by [Ventura Finishing].”65 In essence, Bay Area Painters argues that continued delay 

will cause it prejudice. 

The record, however, shows that the only reason default-judgment proceedings have continued 

this long is because the parties requested multiple extensions. First, the parties twice extended the 

time for Bay Area Painters to file the motion to allow document production, an audit, and 

settlement discussions.

66 Second, the parties extended the motion hearing three times to allow 

Ventura Finishing to finish its document production and Bay Area Painters to conduct its audit.

67

The delay so far cannot be prejudicial; Bay Area Painters asked for the extensions and ultimately 

obtained the information it needed to prove up its damages. Moreover, it does not seem prejudicial 

to now require Bay Area Painters to litigate the matter through ordinary channels after working 

cooperatively with Ventura Finishing to obtain the documents and attempt informal resolution of 

the case.

This conclusion is supported by the legal context for default judgments; the law urges courts, 

“whenever possible,” to try cases on their merits, and the court’s final obligation is to consider “all 

relevant circumstances” and then do equity. See Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091 (merits); Brandt, 653 

F.3d at 1111 (equity); Pioneer Investment, 507 U.S. at 395 (same); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 

1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (default judgments generally are disfavored because “[c]ases should be 

decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible”). Indeed, under the Eitel factors, default 

 

64 Motion at 15.

65 Id.; accord Reply, ECF No. 61 at 7.

66 3/26/15 Order Granting Extension of Time; 4/13/15 Order Granting Extension of Time.

67 10/5/15 Stipulation and Order to Continue; 12/4/15 Stipulation and Order to Continue; 1/22/16

Stipulation and Order to Continue.

Case 4:14-cv-03364-HSG Document 90 Filed 03/31/16 Page 11 of 12
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (No. 14-cv-03364-HSG (LB)) 12

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Northern District of California

judgment is not appropriate for reasons that include an analysis of the prejudice to the plaintiff (in 

the form of a delay to date with its acquiescence and the ability now to litigate the merits of its 

claims), the parties’ apparent dispute about (at least some) material facts, a default attributable to 

excusable neglect in the form of a corporation’s delay in obtaining counsel (and its inability to 

defend itself without counsel), and “the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” 782 F.2d at 1471-72.

CONCLUSION

The court recommends that the district judge deny default judgment because the clerk never 

entered default (a prerequisite for a default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55) 

and even if it had, Ventura Finishing is defending itself in the action, and the disputes can be 

resolved on the merits. The court sets a further case-management conference for May 5, 2016, at 

11 a.m. to discuss the parties’ ongoing negotiations (probably in furtherance of a stipulated 

judgment). The parties must file a short joint update by April 28, 2016.

Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge within

fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 

N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72. Failure to file an objection may waive the right to review of the issue in 

the district court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2016

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:14-cv-03364-HSG Document 90 Filed 03/31/16 Page 12 of 12