Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_13-cv-00231/USCOURTS-ared-3_13-cv-00231-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

JONESBORO DIVISION 

JOHNNY GRANT PLAINTIFF 

v. No. 3:13-cv-231-DPM 

CITY OF BLYTHEVILLE, ARKANSAS DEFENDANT 

ORDER 

Johnny Grant, an older African American gentleman, worked for the 

Blytheville street department for almost thirty years. He worked his way up 

to be a driver of a truck that hauled two other workers around to weed-eat 

and pick up litter. Being the driver was a position of some prestige. One 

member of the crew passed away, and the other quit. Marvin Crawford, the 

director of the Blytheville Public Works department, then called Grant in for 

a conversation. According to Grant, it went this way: 

[Crawford] told me that I wouldn't be driving the truck no 

more. I said "Well that ain't no problem. I mean, you're the 

boss, that ain't no problem." And he said, "Well, what you 

gonna do?" And he said, "What you gonna do, quit?" I told him, 

"No, no, I'm not gonna quit." And he said, "You ain't gonna 

quit? Well, you're fired, then." And I said, "Well, okay." 

NQ 33-1 at 7. According to Crawford, and others present, Grant refused to 

work on the truck unless he could drive it. NQ 33-2at17-19; NQ 33-5at10; NQ 

33-3 at 9. Mr. Crawford testified: 

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CRAWFORD: [A supervisor] came back to me and told me that 

Johnny said he wasn't going to do it. 

COUNSEL: Wasn't going to do what? 

CRAWFORD: Let the new man drive the vehicle .... I walked up 

there and I asked Johnny, I said "Johnny," I said, 

"what do you mean, you're not going to do it?" He 

says, "I ain't gonna do it." I said, "Well, Johnny," I 

said, "what do you want to do? Are you gonna 

retire?" He said, "Nope, not going to retire." I said, 

"well, Johnny," I said, "if you don't do what I ask, 

then I've got no use for you." He said, "well." I said, 

"The only thing I know to do is just go up and see Ms. 

Andrews." 

Ng 33-2 at 18. 

Under Arkansas law, Grant was an employee at will. That doctrine 

casts a shadow over his whole case. For example, Grant's Fourteenth 

Amendment claim fails as a matter of law because he didn't have any 

protected property interest in his job. Thompson v. Adams,268 F.3d 609, 611-13 

(8th Cir. 2001). Blytheville could fire him at any time for a good reason, bad 

reason, or no reason at all, so long as no impermissible factor- such as race 

or age- motivated the City's decision. Ball v. Arkansas Department of 

Community Punishment,340Ark.424,430, 10S.W.3d873,877 (2000). Granthas 

also made those kinds of claims, arguing that his African-American race, and 

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his being 59 years old, prompted Crawford's decision. Grant has made a 

prima facie case of discrimination. His job performance was excellent; he is a 

member of both these protected groups; and he has provided some facts that 

raise an inference of discrimination based on race and age. The question is 

whether Grant has presented sufficient evidence that Blytheville' s reason for 

firing him-insubordination -was a pretext for discrimination. Torgerson v. 

City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1046 (8th Cir. 2011). 

The Court is not persuaded by Grant's argument that Blytheville' s 

reason for firing him is unworthy of being credited because it has no basis in 

the facts. As Grant points out, Roy Simmons and Sylvia Campbell both heard 

Grant say that he wasn't going to quit. Ng 33-5 at 7; Ng 33-3 at 9. But each of 

them also heard Grant refuse to work on the truck if he couldn't be the driver. 

Ng 33-5 at 7-8; Ng 33-3 at 8-9. Crawford's insubordination rationale therefore 

had a factual basis. Muor v. U.S. Bank National Association, 716 F.3d 1072, 

1076-77 (8th Cir. 2013); Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1051. 

Grant's race discrimination claim fails for lack of a sufficient 

comparator. At the pretext stage, the test for determining whether employees 

are similarly situated is rigorous. Johnson v. Securitas Security Services USA, 

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Inc., 769 F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2015 WL 504942 ( 30 March 

2015). Grant must show that he and at least one other employee outside of his 

protected class "were similarly situated in all relevant respects." Ibid. They 

must have dealt with the same supervisor, been subject to the same standards, 

and engaged in misconduct of comparable seriousness without any mitigating 

or distinguishing circumstances. Ibid.; see also Ridout v. JBS USA, LLC, 716 

F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2013). Grant has offered no valid comparator. 

Both blacks and whites in the sanitation department had been fired 

under Crawford's supervision. One of these individuals was a white truckdriver. And Grant has provided no evidence that another employee of a 

different race failed to follow an order about a work assignment, but received 

more lenient discipline. Importantly, Grant's intended replacement as a 

driver, Steven Walker, is also black. Grant's reliance on Crawford's handling 

of a co-worker's racial slurs on the job doesn't save this claim. Simmons 

testified that he told Crawford about the racial remarks twice and Crawford 

fired the employee thereafter. Although Crawford's having fired four blacks 

and only two whites indicates some disparity, there were more black workers 

in the street department than white workers. 

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On his age discrimination claim, Grant must present evidence that 

11 creates a fact issue as to whether the defendant's proffered reasons are 

pretextual" and raises /1 

a reasonable inference that age was a determinative 

factor in the adverse employment decision." Tusing v. Des Moines Independent 

Community School District, 639 F.3d 507, 516 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotations omitted). But Grant hasn't shown that any similarly situated 

younger employee received more favorable treatment. Johnson, 769 F.3d at 

613. Grant's intended replacement was younger than him. But age alone is 

not dispositive. There's no evidence that his replacement was insubordinate 

or engaged in similar misconduct. There's no evidence-for example, unfair 

discipline or derogatory remarks- that Crawford had it in for older workers. 

There are situations where an age claim is for the jury because of 

evidence that some other factor was a proxy for age. For instance, an 

employer's considering an employee's medicare or retirement eligibility 

might allow a reasonable inference of age discrimination. Hilde v. City of 

Eveleth, 777 F.3d 998, 1006 (8th Cir. 2015). Grant made about$ 9.00/hour 

based on his many years of good work. His salary was thus higher than 

many of his co-workers. But Grant has no evidence tending to show that 

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Crawford considered the salary as a proxy for age. Erickson v. Farmland 

Indus., Inc.,271F.3d718, 725 (8th Cir. 2001). Grant's testimony that Crawford 

didn't like it that Grant had a higher salary doesn't create an inference of age 

discrimination. Hanebrink v. Brown Shoe Co., 110 F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 1997). 

The only reasonable inference is that Blytheville may have fired Grant partly 

to save some money. If true, this was unfair but not forbidden by the ADEA. 

That statute requires evidence that age was the determinative factor in the 

firing decision. Tusing, 639 F.3d at 516. 

Though Grant doesn't argue the point, the Court acknowledges 

Crawford's testimony on deposition that, during the firing meeting, Crawford 

referred to the new driver as "the young man" and asked Grant if he was 

retiring. These passing references, in context, do not show age-based animus. 

Referring to a worker as young, without more, is innocent. Sims v. 

Chezik/Sayers Iowa, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 926, 933 (S.D. Iowa 2005). And 

Crawford asked about retirement only in response to what he says was 

Grant's refusal to work. The only reasonable inference is that Crawford was 

seeking an explanation, not nudging Grant toward retirement based on his 

age. Montgomery v. John Deere & Co., 169 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 1999). 

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Moreover, Grant didn't testify that Crawford asked him about retirement; he 

testified that Crawford asked him if he was going to "quit." NQ 33-1 at 7. 

To support both of his discrimination claims, Grant focuses on the street 

department's demographics. Statistics, though, must evaluate comparable 

employees to be meaningful indicators of pretext. Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, 

Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 958 (8th Cir. 2001). The numbers here simply do not create 

a dispute of material fact because there's no indication that any of the other 

employees were subject to the same circumstances as Grant. There's no 

evidence of a demonstrated pattern of preferring for younger workers. In 

fact, half of the employees hired under Crawford's supervision were more 

than 40 years old. NQ 38-11 at 1-3. And the affidavits from two former 

employees are nothing more than generalized statements about Crawford's 

treatment of older black employees. This is insufficient. Burkett v. Glickman, 

327 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 2003). Grant's failure to present any 

details-particular incidents of race and age animus - is fatal to his claims. 

Finally, no substantial change in the reason for firing Grant occurred. 

Neither Crawford nor Andrews offered two completely different reasons for 

Grant's firing. E.E.0.C. v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 462 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir. 

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2006). Blytheville has been consistent: Grant was insubordinate to Crawford 

when the driving responsibilities were eliminated. The fact that Andrews 

didn't witness the conversation but wrote a statement describing the event 

doesn't affect the reason given for Grant's termination and certainly doesn't 

create any inconsistency. 

Grant's motion for leave to file a surreply, NQ 44, is denied. The Court 

has taken the record in the light most favorable to Grant, giving him all 

reasonable inferences. There's just insufficient evidence to support a verdict 

that discrimination based on his age or his race prompted his firing. As an 

employee at will, Grant may have been treated unfairly. But that doesn't 

mean he was discriminated against. 

* * * 

Blytheville's motion for summary judgment, NQ 31, is granted. 

Blytheville' s motion in limine, NQ 42, is denied as moot. Grant's motion to file 

a surreply, NQ 44, is denied. 

So Ordered. 

tl D .P. Marshall Jr. 

United States District Judge 

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