Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-02065/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-02065-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jaime Flores, 

Petitioner, 

v.

Terry L. Stewart; and the Arizona

Attorney General,

Respondents.

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No. CV-02-2065-PHX-DGC (CRP)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Petitioner Jaime Flores’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus and United States Magistrate Judge Morton Sitver’s Supplemental Report and

Recommendation (SR&R). Docs. ##1, 41. The R&R recommends that the Court deny the

petition. Doc. #41. Petitioner has filed objections to the SR&R. Doc. #48. The Court

requested a response from Respondents. Doc. #51. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court will accept the R&R and deny the petition.

I. Background.

In November 1997, Petitioner was charged in state court with six criminal offenses

including kidnapping, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and assisting a criminal street gang.

Doc. #22. While in jail in April 1998, Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to sell or

transfer dangerous drugs, participation in a criminal street gang, and use of a wire

communication in a drug-related transaction. Id. 

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In November 1998, Petitioner entered into plea agreements and pled guilty to the

charges of kidnapping, aggravated assault, assisting a criminal street gang, and conspiracy

to sell or transfer dangerous drugs. Id. at 2-3. The plea agreements called for a

minimum sentence of eight years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of sixteen years

imprisonment. Id. In January 1999, the state court held a sentencing hearing and found no

mitigating factors and several aggravating factors: the use of an accomplice, pecuniary gain,

serious physical injury to the victim, a horrible and heinous crime, three prior felonies, and

a probation violation. Id. at 3. Petitioner was sentenced to five concurrent, aggravated

prison terms, the longest of which was sixteen years. Doc. #12 at 4. Petitioner is confined

at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Buckeye. Doc. #1. 

Petitioner timely filed a state petition for post-conviction relief in June 2000. Doc.

#12 at 4. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition in July 2000 and denied a motion

for rehearing in September 2000. Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review in May

2001, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review in November 2001. Id.

After his state post-conviction relief efforts were unsuccessful, Petitioner filed a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging three grounds for relief: (1) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to properly investigate Petitioner’s mental

condition before his change of plea hearing, (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel when

counsel failed to request a competency hearing and argue Petitioner’s diminished capacity

as a mitigating sentencing factor, and (3) Petitioner did not knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily plead guilty because he was medicated when he entered into his plea agreements

and at his change of plea hearing. Id. at 1. The petition was referred to United States

Magistrate Judge Morton Sitver for report and recommendation. Judge Sitver recommended

denial of the petition. Doc. #22. This Court rejected the recommendation and referred the

petition back to Judge Sitver for further consideration. Doc. #26 at 7. Judge Sitver

appointed counsel for Petitioner, received supplemental briefing, and filed a detailed

supplemental report and recommendation that the petition be denied (SR&R). Doc. #41.

Petitioner has filed objections, and Respondents have filed a response. Docs. ##48, 51.

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II. Standard for Relief.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Court

may not grant habeas relief unless Petitioner has exhausted his claims in state court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996). If Petition has

exhausted his claims, the Court may not grant habeas relief unless the state’s adjudication

of the claims resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the

Untied States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 27 (2004); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839 (1999). “The Supreme Court has said that § 2254(d)(1) imposes a ‘highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).

III. First and Second Claims for Relief.

Petitioner argues that while housed at the Maricopa County Jail, including when he

entered his plea agreement, he was treated for a psychiatric condition. Petitioner claims that

his trial counsel was on notice of his mental condition, yet failed to reasonably investigate

it and therefore prejudiced his case. Doc. #1. 

Upon review of the record, the SR&R found no evidence to support Petitioner’s claim

that his trial counsel was on notice that Petitioner suffered from diminished mental capacity.

 Doc. #41. The SR&R concluded that Petitioner’s counsel had neither the actual nor the

constructive notice necessary to create an affirmative duty to investigate his client’s mental

capacity. Id. 

Petitioner objects to these findings and reasserts that trial counsel had actual notice

and a duty to investigate his client’s mental capacity. Doc. #48 (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that counsel has a duty to make reasonable

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investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary)). Petitioner bases this argument on a single document that was never

mentioned in briefing before Magistrate Judge Sitver – a 12-11-97 record of a telephone call

from a lawyer, with a different name and gender than Petitioner’s trial counsel, to a

psychiatrist, about Petitioner’s suicidal tendencies. Id. 

The Court first concludes that this evidence provides no basis for rejecting Judge

Sitver’s recommendation. For the reasons stated in detail in the SR&R, Petitioner has

presented no colorable evidence to support his claim that his state trial counsel was on actual

or constructive notice of his alleged mental health issues. The existence of the 12-11-97

record, which reflects a call from a lawyer with a different name and gender from Petitioner’s

trial counsel, does not alter this conclusion and does not provide a basis for concluding that

the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Additionally, Petitioner did not fairly present the 12-11-97 record to the state courts

for consideration. Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must give

the state the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoner’s federal

rights. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 275 (1971)); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Hiivala v. Wood, 195

F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982)). A state

has “been given a sufficient opportunity to hear an issue when the petitioner has presented

the state court with the issue’s factual and legal basis.” Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359,

364 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Duncan 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d

1404, 1411-12 (9th Cir.1998) (factual basis)) (emphasis added).

Petitioner cannot satisfy the “fair presentation” requirement. He failed to provide the

state trial court with the 12-11-97 record upon which he now relies for his objection to the

SR&R. Doc. #13, Ex. N, Ex. C. Although Petitioner apparently attempted to attach the

record to his brief in the state appellate court, Respondent cites ample authority to show that

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If Petitioner were to return to state court now to present the factual basis offered in

support of his first and second claims for relief, the claims would be precluded as waived and

untimely under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Ariz. Rs. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3),

32.4(a). Petitioner’s first and second claims are thus technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. 

2

 Petitioner does not object to the portion of the SR&R which rejects his third claim

for relief. Any objections to this portion of the SR&R have been waived. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). Petitioner’s attempt to incorporate all arguments made before the Magistrate

Judge is also ineffective. See Sullivan v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1516005 (D. Ariz., May 30,

2006). The Court also notes, however, that Petitioner specifically told the sentencing court

that he had not taken any drugs, alcohol or medication within 24 hours prior to the hearing.

Doc. #13, Ex. G. The SR&R’s correctly concludes that Petitioner was legally competent to

enter his plea and that his third claim for relief is without merit.

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Arizona appellate courts confine their review of factual matters to evidence presented in the

state trial court. Doc. #51 at 5 & n. 1. As a result, Petitioner did not fairly present the state

courts with the factual basis upon which he now seeks relief. Petitioner accordingly cannot

show that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).1

Furthermore, Petitioner objects to the SR&R as incorrectly applying the second prong

of the Strickland test. Doc. #48. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Ninth Circuit recently

has held, however, that Strickland does not apply to non-capital sentencing cases and that

“there is no clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in this

context.” Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner therefore cannot

show that the Arizona courts unreasonably applied federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court, and therefore fails to satisfy the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).2

 

IV. Evidentiary Hearing.

Petitioner objects to the R&R’s conclusion that an evidentiary hearing is not

warranted. Petitioner argues that he has presented ample facts to necessitate an evidentiary

hearing, and relies on the standards developed in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313

(1963), to support this assertion. Respondents suggest this unqualified reliance is misplaced,

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3

 Because Petitioner has not met the standards set forth in § 2254(e)(2)(A), section (B)

of the statute need not be addressed. Section 2254(e)(2)(B) further narrows the

circumstances in which an evidentiary hearing is justified, requiring a showing that “the facts

underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that

but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). 

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and no hearing is warranted. The Court agrees.

The AEDPA, which was passed after Townsend, explains that if a petitioner fails to

develop the factual basis for his claim in state court, the federal court shall not hold an

evidentiary hearing unless the applicant shows that the claim is based on “(i) a new rule of

constitutional law” that was previously unavailable, or “(ii) a factual predicate that could not

have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2)(A). Petitioner makes no showing.3

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s Supplemental Report and Recommendation (Doc. #41)

is accepted.

2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. #1) is denied.

3. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 11th day of August, 2006.

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