Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00216/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00216-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION AND 

ENFORCEMENT CENTER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ASHFORD HOSPITALITY TRUST, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00216-DMR 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 

APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 66

Plaintiffs Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (“CREEC”), Ann CupoloFreeman, and Julie Reiskin move for preliminary approval of a class action settlement. [Docket 

No. 66.] Defendant Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc. (“Ashford”) does not oppose the motion. 

[Docket No. 70.] The court conducted a hearing on December 10, 2015. For the following 

reasons, the court grants preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Litigation History

In this class action, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq., and California’s Unruh 

Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51, regarding the provision of wheelchairaccessible transportation by hotels. Plaintiff CREEC is a civil rights organization based in 

Denver, Colorado that is dedicated to ensuring that “persons with disabilities participate in our 

nation’s civic life without discrimination.” [Docket No. 54 (Am. Compl.) ¶ 9.] Plaintiffs CupoloFreeman and Reiskin, who are CREEC members, each have disabilities within the meaning of the 

ADA and California law. Both use wheelchairs for mobility. Defendant Ashford is a publiclytraded real estate investment trust that owns approximately 125 hotels, 73 of which offer 

transportation services to their guests and are therefore subject to ADA transportation 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 1 of 12
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

requirements. These 73 hotels are spread among 20 states.

Plaintiffs assert that the ADA regulations require any Ashford hotel that offers 

transportation services to purchase accessible vehicles or to provide equivalent transportation 

services to persons with disabilities. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.101, 37.171. Whether the hotel must 

purchase accessible vehicles, or instead provide equivalent transportation services, depends upon 

the capacity of the vehicle (over 16 persons, or 16 persons or less) and whether the hotel operates 

a fixed route transportation system, or a demand-responsive system. The lowest requirement (in 

this case, for hotels with demand responsive systems using a vehicle with capacity for 16 persons 

or less) is that the hotel provide equivalent transportation services if they do not own an accessible 

vehicle. 

In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege two claims against Ashford: 1) disability 

discrimination under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), for failing to ensure that transportation 

vehicles in use at its hotels are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 

2) violation of California Civil Code section 51(b) for denying Plaintiffs and the class members’ 

rights to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services offered at 

Ashford’s hotels. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a permanent injunction requiring Ashford 

to comply with the ADA and the Unruh Act, as well as an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and 

costs. Plaintiffs do not seek damages on behalf of the class or the named plaintiffs.

B. Discovery and Mediation

The parties conducted an in-person mediation session in July 2015 before retired 

Magistrate Judge James Larson. They continued to negotiate by telephone and email after that 

session, and simultaneously engaged in discovery and investigation. Plaintiffs contacted 68 of the 

73 Ashford hotels that provide transportation services to investigate whether those hotels provide 

equivalent accessible transportation services. Plaintiffs also called third party transportation 

providers identified by Ashford to determine whether they were capable of providing equivalent 

accessible transportation services. 

Following continued negotiations, the parties agreed to settle this matter in September 

2015, and executed a settlement agreement on October 23, 2015. Plaintiffs filed an unopposed 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 2 of 12
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement on November 5, 2015. The court 

held a hearing on the motion on December 10, 2015.

C. The Settlement Agreement

The complete terms of the proposed settlement agreement are set forth in the Joint 

Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, which is attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs’ motion. Pls.’ 

Mot. Ex. A (Settlement Agreement). 

1. Injunctive Relief

The Settlement Agreement provides a comprehensive scheme for injunctive relief, 

requiring all Ashford-owned and/or operated hotels to come into compliance with ADA 

regulations that require hotels that offer transportation services to provide equivalent 

transportation services to people who use wheelchairs or scooters. The Settlement Agreement sets 

forth what “compliance” means, with specific attention to ensuring that any third party 

transportation providers utilized by Ashford hotels provide equivalent accessible transportation. 

Settlement Agreement ¶ 5. The Settlement Agreement explicitly requires that Ashford hotels 

provide accurate information to potential hotel guests so that no guests are erroneously deterred. 

Id. ¶ 5.c. Ashford will provide information to Plaintiffs regarding the current status of the hotels 

that provide transportation services to their guests, as well as any applicable third party 

transportation providers. Id. ¶ 4. Finally, Ashford will notify all companies that directly manage 

Ashford’s hotels about the Settlement Agreement and the management companies’ obligations 

under the law, as well as any hotel’s non-compliance with either. Id. ¶ 6. 

To ensure that Ashford hotels come into compliance, the Settlement Agreement sets forth a 

multistage, three-year monitoring process that involves both a third-party monitor and monitoring 

by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Id. ¶ 7. Ashford will continue to provide information to Plaintiffs 

throughout the monitoring process, and the monitoring and compliance process is designed to 

ensure that all hotels are in full compliance with the ADA by the end of the third year of the 

Settlement Agreement. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8. The parties have mutually selected a third-party monitor, 

Progressive Management Resources, Inc. (“PMR”), which is a firm with experience in compliance 

and monitoring with respect to public accommodations. Ashford will pay the fees and costs of 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 3 of 12
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

monitoring. Settlement Agreement ¶ 7. The parties have also agreed to a dispute resolution 

process during the term of the Settlement Agreement. Id. at ¶ 14.

2. Released Claims

The settlement agreement defines the class as 

all individuals with disabilities who use wheelchairs or scooters for 

mobility who, from January 15, 2013 to the date of preliminary 

approval of the Settlement, have been denied the full and equal 

enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at Hotels 

owned and/or operated by Ashford because of the lack of equivalent 

accessible transportation services at those Hotels. 

Settlement Agreement ¶ 1. Plaintiffs and the class members will release any and all past or 

present claims as of the date of preliminary approval of the settlement for injunctive or declaratory 

relief against Ashford or its subsidiary or affiliated entities that are based on the ADA, the Unruh 

Act, or any public accommodation provision of any federal, local, or state statutory, regulatory, or 

common law concerning the provision of wheelchair accessible transportation services at Ashford 

hotels. Id. at ¶ 15(a). While Plaintiffs Cupolo-Freeman and Reiskin further agree to release any 

claims for monetary damages against Ashford, its subsidiary, and affiliated entities, the Settlement 

Agreement does not release any claims on behalf of the class members for damages. Id. ¶ 15.

3. Class Notice

The parties propose dissemination of the class notice by emailing the notice to known 

disability advocacy groups and independent living centers. Plaintiffs have submitted a nationwide 

list of several hundred organizations to whom Plaintiffs propose sending the class notice. [Docket 

No. 73 (Campins Decl., Dec. 11, 2015 Ex. 3 (Class Notice Organizations List).] In addition, 

Plaintiffs will provide the notice to those persons with disabilities who have contacted CREEC 

about problems with accessible hotel transportation. The proposed class notice is attached as 

Exhibit B to Plaintiffs’ motion. Pls.’ Mot. Ex. B (Notice).

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Costs of Administration and Monitoring

The Settlement Agreement authorizes class counsel to seek an award of attorneys’ fees and 

costs up to $165,000. This amount includes fees for work performed in connection with this 

lawsuit as well as fees for future monitoring and evaluating compliance with the settlement. 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 4 of 12
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Settlement Agreement ¶ 11. Counsel estimates that the fees for monitoring the settlement in this 

case will total at least $30,000 over the course of three years. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Conditional Class Certification

Plaintiffs seek conditional certification of a settlement class under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2). A court may only certify a class action if it satisfies the four 

prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) and fits within one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). 

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). Class certification requires the 

following: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members individually is 

impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or 

defenses of the class representatives must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) 

the person representing the class must be able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of all 

class members. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“The four requirements of Rule 23(a) are commonly referred to as ‘numerosity,’ ‘commonality,’ 

‘typicality,’ and ‘adequacy of representation’ (or just ‘adequacy’), respectively.” United Steel, 

Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. 

ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2010). Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is 

appropriate where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 

generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 

appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). In the settlement context, 

the court must pay “undiluted, even heightened, attention” to class certification requirements 

because the court will not have the opportunity to adjust the class based on information revealed at 

trial. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 952-53 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620); Hanlon v. Chrysler 

Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (same).

Plaintiffs ask the court to conditionally certify the following class:

All individuals with disabilities who use wheelchairs or scooters for 

mobility who, from January 15, 2013 to the date of preliminary 

approval of the Settlement, have been denied the full and equal 

enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at Hotels 

owned and/or operated by Ashford because of the lack of equivalent 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 5 of 12
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

accessible transportation services at those Hotels. 

“Although there is no explicit requirement concerning the class definition in FRCP 23, courts have 

held that the class must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable before a class action may 

proceed.” Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183 F.R.D. 672, 679-80 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (citation 

omitted). The court finds that the class is clearly defined to identify the relevant time period, 

January 15, 2013 until the date of preliminary approval. It also clearly describes the people who 

are included in the class (persons who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility), what those 

individuals must have experienced (denial of full and equal enjoyment of transportation services 

because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services), and where those experiences 

must have occurred (at hotels owned and/or operated by Ashford). Accordingly, the class is 

clearly ascertainable. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., No. C 06-01802 MHP, 

2007 WL 1223755, at *4 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 2007) (finding class defined as “All legally blind 

individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Target.com and as a result have 

been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in Target stores” sufficiently 

ascertainable).

Once an ascertainable and identifiable class has been defined, the court must determine 

whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements under Rule 23(a). First, Rule 23(a) requires that 

“the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 

Plaintiffs assert that the proposed class satisfies the numerosity requirement because it covers 73 

hotels at which millions of persons have stayed during the class period, (see Campins Decl. Ex. 1), 

and highlight census figures that indicate that more than 3.6 million Americans use wheelchairs 

for mobility. McGarry Decl. Ex. 1. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, if “just 15 of those 3.6 million 

wheelchair users each year stayed at, or were deterred from staying at, one of the Ashford Hotels 

at issue since 2013, the numerosity requirement is met.” Pls.’ Mot. 13 (citing Hernandez v. Cty. of 

Monterey, 305 F.R.D. 132, 153 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“A class or subclass with more than 40 

members ‘raises a presumption of impracticability based on numbers alone.’” (citation omitted))). 

Further, the proposed class is geographically dispersed, covering hotels in 20 states, which 

supports a finding that joinder is impracticable. See Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 648 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 6 of 12
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(C.D. Cal. 1996). Using “common sense assumptions” and reasonable inferences, see 

Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 249 F.R.D. 334, 347 (N.D. Cal. 

2008), the court finds that Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23’s numerosity requirement. 

With respect to commonality, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or fact 

common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “All questions of fact and law need not be 

common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates 

is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the 

class.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019; see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 506 

(N.D. Cal. 2012). Commonality may be found where a defendant allegedly fails to have in place 

policies or practices required by law. See, e.g., Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 678 (9th Cir. 

2014) (affirming class certification based on common questions that included medical policies and 

practices that allegedly created a substantial risk of serious harm). Here, the issues facing the class 

arise from common questions involving Ashford’s obligations to provide ADA-compliant 

transportation services to guests. A common issue also exists regarding the impact of federal tax 

provisions governing real estate investment trusts. Specifically, one of Ashford’s defenses 

concerns tax provisions which condition favorable tax treatment of real estate investment trusts on 

limitations on their ability to operate or manage hotels that they own. As a result, Ashford 

contracts with third parties to manage its hotels. Ashford asserts in this litigation that those 

management companies are responsible for providing transportation services, and that it does not 

provide those third parties with any uniform policy or plan regarding the operation of 

transportation services at its hotels. Whether this is an adequate defense to ADA claims is a 

question common to every class member. The court finds that these issues are sufficient to 

establish commonality. 

Plaintiffs have also satisfied Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement. Typicality requires 

that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 

class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The purpose of the requirement “is to assure that the interest of 

the named representative aligns with the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 

976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). Typicality is “satisfied when each class member’s claim arises 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 7 of 12
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove 

the defendant’s liability.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Marisol v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2nd Cir. 1997)), abrogated on other 

grounds by Johnson v. Cal., 543 U.S. 499, 504-05 (2005). Here, the named Plaintiffs’ personal 

claims are similar to those of the absent class members; namely, Ashford’s hotels’ failure to 

provide accessible transportation services.

Finally, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately 

protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “To satisfy constitutional due process 

concerns, absent class members must be afforded adequate representation before entry of a 

judgment which binds them.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. To determine whether the adequacy 

prong is satisfied, courts consider the following two questions: “(1) [d]o the representative 

plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and (2) will the 

representative plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” 

Staton, 327 F.3d at 957 (citation omitted); see also Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 

F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that representative plaintiffs and counsel also must have 

sufficient “zeal and competence” to protect class interests). There is no indication of any conflict 

between the class and Plaintiffs and/or their counsel. Class counsel are highly skilled and 

experienced class action litigators. They also have significant expertise in vindicating the rights of 

disabled individuals. The court is well-satisfied that Plaintiffs and their counsel have and will 

continue to pursue this action vigorously on behalf of Plaintiffs and the proposed class members.

In addition to meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), a proposed class must be appropriate 

for certification under one of the categories in Rule 23(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Hanlon, 150 

F.3d at 1022. The court finds that certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2). Certification 

under Rule 23(b)(2) is proper where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 

grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 

declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied where 

“‘class members complain of a pattern or practice that is generally applicable to the class as a 

whole.’” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Walters v. Reno, 145 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 8 of 12
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998)). As discussed above, Plaintiffs allege that Ashford has a practice 

of failing to provide equivalent accessible transportation services at its hotels that provide 

transportation services to guests. Plaintiffs seek only injunctive and declaratory relief. 

In sum, the record is sufficient to support conditional certification of the class under Rules 

23(a) and 23(b)(2).

B. Preliminary Fairness Determination

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires the court to determine whether a proposed 

settlement is “‘fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.’” Staton, 327 F.3d at 952 (quoting 

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (court may only approve class action 

settlement based on finding that settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”). “The purpose of 

Rule 23(e) is to protect the unnamed members of the class from unjust or unfair settlements 

affecting their rights.” In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation 

omitted). “The initial decision to approve or reject a settlement proposal is committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial judge.” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 

(9th Cir. 1982).

To make a fairness determination, the court must balance a number of factors, including 

the strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further 

litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in 

settlement; the extent of discovery completed; the stage of the proceedings; and the experience and 

views of counsel. Staton, 327 F.3d at 959. In making this evaluation, the court is not to “reach 

any ultimate conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the 

dispute, for it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and 

expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements.” Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625. 

“The relative importance to be attached to any factor will depend upon and be dictated by the 

nature of the claim(s) advanced, the type(s) of relief sought, and the unique facts and 

circumstances presented by each individual case.” Id. Further, as some of these factors cannot be 

fully assessed until the court conducts its final fairness hearing, “a full fairness analysis is 

unnecessary at this stage.” Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 665 (E.D. Cal. 2008) 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 9 of 12
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Preliminary approval of a settlement and notice to the 

class is appropriate if “the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, 

non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential 

treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible 

approval.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing 

Manual for Complex Litigation, Second § 30.44 (2d ed. 1985)).

Here, the factors set forth in In Re Tableware Antitrust Litigation weigh in favor of 

preliminary approval of the settlement. First, the parties participated in private mediation, which 

“tends to support the conclusion that the settlement process was not collusive.” Villegas v. J.P. 

Morgan Chase & Co., No. CV 09-00261 SBA (EMC), 2012 WL 5878390, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

21, 2012). Additionally, the parties reached full agreement on the injunctive relief portion of the 

settlement before negotiating attorneys’ fees and costs. Campins Decl. ¶ 5. Second, there are no 

obvious deficiencies. The settlement provides significant and substantial injunctive relief to the 

class members, in that all Ashford hotels that provide transportation services to guests will provide 

either a wheelchair-accessible vehicle or equivalent accessible transportation. The hotels will be 

held accountable pursuant to a thorough monitoring process, which is designed to achieve full 

compliance with the ADA by the end of the third year of the Settlement Agreement. The 

settlement does not grant preferential treatment to the class representatives or segments of the 

class.

C. Class Notice

The court next considers the sufficiency of the parties’ notice plan. Where a proposed 

settlement has been reached by the parties, the “court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to 

all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). The court 

must ensure that the parties’ notice plan provides for “the best notice that is practicable under the 

circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through 

reasonable effort” and that the notice itself explains in easily understood language the nature of the 

action, definition of the class, class claims, issues and defenses, ability to appear through 

individual counsel, procedure to request exclusion, and the binding nature of the class judgment. 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 10 of 12
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

In this case, there is no practical way to create a list of individuals who use wheelchairs or 

scooters and patronize Ashford hotels. The parties propose dissemination of the class notice by 

emailing the notice to known disability advocacy groups and independent living centers. Class

counsel has compiled and submitted a nationwide list of several hundred organizations. In 

addition, Plaintiffs will provide the notice to those persons with disabilities who have contacted 

CREEC about problems with accessible hotel transportation. The court is satisfied that this notice 

plan is the best notice practicable under the circumstances. The court also finds that the proposed 

class notice adequately describes the nature of the action, summarizes the terms of the settlement, 

identifies the class and provides instruction on how to object, and sets forth the proposed fees and 

expenses to be paid to Plaintiffs’ counsel in clear, understandable language. In sum, the proposed 

notice plan satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the class action 

settlement is GRANTED as follows:

1. Pursuant to Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2), the 

court conditionally certifies, for settlement purposes only, a proposed settlement class comprised 

of all individuals with disabilities who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, from January 

15, 2013 to December 10, 2015, have been denied the full and equal enjoyment of transportation 

services offered to guests at Hotels owned and/or operated by Ashford because of the lack of 

equivalent accessible transportation services at those Hotels.

2. The settlement agreement is preliminarily approved as fair, reasonable, and 

adequate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).

3. Defendant shall issue CAFA notice to the appropriate government entities by no 

later than December 18, 2015.

4. The court approves the form of the proposed notice and notice dissemination plan 

and orders Plaintiffs to issue notice to the class by December 21, 2015 (the “notice deadline”).

5. Class Counsel and Plaintiffs shall file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and for 

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 11 of 12
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

final approval of the settlement within 45 days after the notice deadline. 

6. Any member of the settlement class who wishes to object to the settlement shall 

file any objections by February 19, 2016. 

7. A hearing on the final approval of the settlement will be heard on March 10, 2016 

at 11:00 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 18, 2015

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

Case 4:15-cv-00216-DMR Document 75 Filed 12/18/15 Page 12 of 12