Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01559/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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Criminal Case No. 95-cr-1307 

Civil Case No.: 16-cv-1559

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

THOMAS JAMES KELSEY, 

Petitioner,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

 Criminal Case No. 95-cr-1307 

Civil Case No.: 16-cv-1559 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTIONS TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT SENTENCE 

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [ECF 

NOS 52, 55]; and 

(2)DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY. 

 Petitioner, Thomas James Kelsey, represented by counsel, has filed a motion 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence by person in federal 

custody. The Government filed a response in opposition, and Petitioner filed a reply. For 

the reasons outlined below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner was charged by Indictment on August 16, 1995, with two counts of Armed 

Bank Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2113(a) and (d), and two counts of Use and 

Carrying of a Firearm During the Commission of a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A). Petitioner pled guilty on February 21, 1996 to one count of Armed 

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Robbery and one count of Use of a Firearm During the Commission of a Crime of 

Violence. He was found guilty by a jury of the remaining two counts. 

On May 8, 1996, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 46 months for the two counts of 

Armed Robbery and a statutorily mandated sentence of five years for the first firearm 

count and twenty years for the second firearm count under §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (C)(i) to 

be served consecutively. [ECF NO. 35.] Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Ninth 

Circuit and the appellate court affirmed. United States v. Kelsey, 121 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 

1997)(unpublished). The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. 

On March 1, 1999, Petitioner filed a §2255 petition pro se in this Court arguing that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue for an insanity defense, in addition to 

other claims. The Court denied that petition on June 23, 1999. 

After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 

2551 (2015), Petitioner, represented by counsel, filed a protective 2255 petition with this 

Court on June 17, 2016 to protect the one-year statute of limitations. Petitioner 

subsequently filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit requesting permission to file a second or 

successive petition in this Court. The appellate court granted his request, and Petitioner 

filed the current petition on September 20, 2016. The Government filed a Response in 

Opposition on February 23, 2018. [ECF NO. 58.] Petitioner filed a Reply on March 5, 

2018. [ECF NO. 59.] 

II. STANDARD 

A prisoner in custody may move the court that imposed his sentence to vacate, set 

aside, or correct the judgment under section 2255 on the ground that: 

The sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a 

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by 

law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 

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 Such motions must be filed within one year from the date upon which a 

petitioner’s conviction becomes final, unless an exception applies. United States v. 

Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994). One such exception dictates that the 

limitation period runs from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized 

by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(f)((3). 

Section 2255 provides that a hearing must be granted to determine the validity of a 

petition brought under that section ‘[u]nless the motions and the files and records of the 

case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.’” Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 

1465. A Petitioner may file a second or successive petition with the sentencing court only 

if he has sought and received permission from the appropriate court of appeals. 28 

U.S.C. §2255(h). 

Petitioner may file this second section 2255 because he has received permission from 

the Ninth Circuit to file a second or successive motion, and his claim is cognizable under 

section 2255 because he asserts a claim under Johnson, which announced a new 

substantive rule of law and is retroactively applicable. See Kelsey v. United States, No. 

16-71401 (9th Cir. 2016); Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016) (“Johnson

announced a new substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral 

review.”) 

III. DISCUSSION 

The substance of Petitioner’s claim is that the twenty-five year sentence enhancement 

he received pursuant to §924(c) was unconstitutional because his armed bank robbery 

convictions under 18 U.S.C. §2113(a) do not constitute “crimes of violence” after the 

Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Therefore, 

he argues his sentence must be vacated and the Court must resentence him. 

 In opposition, the government contends that Petitioner’s claim is foreclosed by the 

recent holding in United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2018) which held that 

“armed bank robbery remains a crime of violence under the force clause sufficient to 

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sustain a conviction.” (Oppo. at 2). For this reason, the Government argues that 

Petitioner’s motion must be denied. 

Under section 924(c), a Court must impose a mandatory consecutive term of 

imprisonment for using or carrying a firearm “during or in relation to any crime of 

violence.” 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). A “crime of violence” is defined as any offense that 

is a felony and 

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person or property of another, or 

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against 

the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing 

the offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The first clause is referred to as the “force clause” while the 

second clause is referred to as the “residual clause.” United States v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 

1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017). To qualify as a “crime of violence” under the force clause, an 

offense must have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent 

physical force defined as force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another 

person. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 

To determine whether armed bank robbery fits this definition, the Court must 

employ the categorical approach and compare the least serious form of the offense with 

the standard above. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013). 

 The pertinent portion of the federal bank robbery statute provides: 

Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts 

to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to 

obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value 

belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, 

any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association [shall be 

punished according to law]. 

18 U.S.C. §2113(a). 

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A. Armed Bank Robbery- Crime of Violence 

Petitioner argues that armed bank robbery under section 2113(d) does not qualify as a 

crime of violence under the “force clause” of section 924(c)(3((A) because bank robbery 

does not require the intentional use or threat of violent physical force, but instead it may 

be accomplished through unintentional or non-violent “intimidation.” (Mot. at 4). He 

also contends that armed bank robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under 

the force clause because it does not require the mens rea of intentional use or threatened 

use of physical force that is required for an offense to qualify as a crime of violence. (Id. 

at 9). Nor does armed bank robbery qualify as a crime of violence under the residual 

clause of section 924(c)(3)(B) because this clause is now void for vagueness under the 

holding of Johnson, in Petitioner’s view. (Id.) 

 The Court in Watson succinctly addressed the same arguments Petitioner raises and 

determined that armed bank robbery is a “crime of violence.” First, the Court noted that 

that intimidation under section 2113(a) requires that the defendant seize property in a 

manner that would make an ordinary, reasonable person afraid they would be physically 

harmed, therefore bank robbery by intimidation necessarily involves the force required to 

meet the standard. Watson, 881 F.3d at 784. As a result, the Court concluded that bank 

robbery qualifies as a crime of violence because even intimidation, its least violent form, 

“requires at least an implicit threat to use the type of violent physical force necessary to 

meet the Johnson standard.” Id. (citing United States v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254, 1256-

57 (9th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Watson, therefore, the holding 

controls this Court’s disposition of Petitioner’s claim and Petitioner’s armed bank 

robbery conviction qualified as a crime of violence under the force clause sufficient to 

enhance his sentence. 

 Similarly, the Watson Court found that bank robbery by intimidation meets 

the mens rea requirement for a crime of violence holding that “a defendant may 

not be convicted if he only negligently intimidated the victim . . . The offense must 

at least involve the knowing use of intimidation, which necessarily entails the 

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knowing use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force.” Watson, 

881 F.3d at 784 (internal citation omitted). For the same reasons, Petitioner’s 

argument that armed bank robbery lacks the required mens rea component fails. 

Because the Court can conclusively dispose of Petitioner’s claims with reference to 

the motions, files and records of the case, there is no need for an evidentiary 

hearing. Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1465. 

 The Court need not address Petitioner’s contention that his sentence was 

predicated on the residual clause because there is sufficient support for his 

sentence under the force clause. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s 

motion. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

A certificate of appealability is authorized “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To 

meet this standard, Petitioner must show that “jurists of reason could disagree with the 

district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the 

issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Petitioner does not have to show “that he should 

prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that endeavor.” Lambright v. Stewart, 

220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). 

 Having reviewed the matter, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right and the Court is not 

persuaded that jurists could disagree with the Court’s resolution of his claims or that the 

issues presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability is DENIED. 

// 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to 

vacate, set aside, or correct sentence are DENIED [ECF NOS. 52, 55.] and a Certificate 

of Appealability is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 14, 2018 

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