Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00579/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00579-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Valoy S. Woods, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 08-0579-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion for Award of

Attorney’s Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Dkt. #34). Defendant has filed a Response and

Plaintiff’s counsel has filed a Reply. (Dkt. #36, 37). 

I. BACKGROUND

On February 4, 2010, this Court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for

Attorney’s fees, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A)

(“EAJA”), in the amount of $5,210.83 for 30.2 hours of attorney work. (Dkt. #33). On April

2, 2010, Plaintiff’s Attorney filed the instant Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion for Award of

Attorney’s Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and subsequent Memorandum in Support of

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. §406(b). (Dkt. #34, 35). Defendant

filed a Response to Counsel’s Petition for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§406(b)(1)(A), in which the Commissioner states that, as “a trustee for the claimants,” he

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neither opposes nor assents to the requested fee. (Dkt. #36).

II. DISCUSSION

The court has reviewed the record before it and finds that Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled

to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §406(b). Section 406(b) states, in pertinent part:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was

represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow

as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess

of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is

entitled by reason of such judgment.

42 U.S.C.A. § 406(b)(1)(A). The attorneys’ fees are payable from funds withheld from a

claimant’s past-due benefits by the Social Security Administration for work performed by

the claimant’s counsel before the district court on his or her claim for Title II disability

benefits under the Social Security Act. 

In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, the United States Supreme Court stated that a district court

reviews a petition for Section 406(b) fees “as an independent check” to assure that

contingency fee agreements between Social Security claimants and their attorneys will “yield

reasonable results in particular cases.” 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Fee agreements are not

enforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due

benefits. Id. Within the 25 percent boundary, the attorney “must show that the fee sought

is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. In making that determination, the district court

should consider, among other things, the character of the representation and the results

achieved in making its determination. Id. at 808. Also, a reduction in attorney fees may be

warranted in certain circumstances, such as when the benefits are large in comparison to the

amount of time counsel spent on the case or when the attorney is responsible for delay, so

that the attorney will not profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the

case in court. Id. See generally Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009).

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $8,138.90. (Dkt. #34). This amount is subject to the

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) offset of $5,210.83, resulting in a net out-of-pocket

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 As mentioned above, this Court previously awarded Plaintiff’s counsel $5,210.83

in attorneys’ fees pursuant to EAJA, which was enacted to “eliminate the barriers that

prohibit small businesses and individuals from securing vindication of their rights in civil

actions and administrative proceedings brought by or against the Federal Government.”

Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 406 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 96-1005, p.9). The 1985

amendments to the EAJA, moreover, instruct a claimant’s attorney to refund the smaller fee

received when the attorney has received fees for the same work under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b). Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183. Therefore, an award

of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) obligates Plaintiff’s counsel to refund the previouslyawarded fee under the EAJA. 

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 The Commissioner does not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to approximately

$35,184.80 and that, under Plaintiff’s counsel’s approximation, $8,138.90 is twenty-five

percent of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Dkt. #36).

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award of $2,928.07.1

 Counsel’s attached Itemization of Services indicates that he worked

approximately 30.2 hours representing Plaintiff at the district court level. (Dkt. #35, Exh.

4). This results in an average attorney fee rate of $269.50 per hour ($8,138.90 divided by

30.2 hours). In support of his request for the full twenty-five percent of Plaintiff’s award of

past-due benefits, Plaintiff’s counsel thoroughly addresses the legality of the agreement, the

nature of the high risk of loss in Social Security disability appeals, and the proportionality

of Plaintiff’s award to the attorneys’ fee requested.2

 The Court finds that the rate does not

appear excessive, given counsel’s extensive experience in Social Security disability law and

his successful representation on Plaintiff’s behalf. Accordingly, the Court also finds that

counsel has met his burden of “proving that the fee sought is reasonable for the services

rendered.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. 

Further, it does not appear that Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to cause any delays in

order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits nor that counsel’s representation

was substandard. On the contrary, Plaintiff’s counsel was entirely successful in providing

Plaintiff with the relief sought. In light of the contingency fee agreement – by which Plaintiff

agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past-due benefits that counsel recovered on appeal

– and “the reasonableness factors noted in Gisbrecht, including the attorney’s risk of loss, the

nature and character of the representation, future benefits accruing to the petitioner from

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counsel’s work, delays caused by counsel and other uncertainties,” Black v. Astrue, 229

Fed.Appx. 515, 517 (9th Cir. 2007), the Court finds the amount sought to be reasonable. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s

Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Dkt. #34). Plaintiff’s counsel is awarded attorney’s fees

in the amount of $8,138.90.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing Plaintiff’s counsel, after receipt of the

awarded fee, to refund to Plaintiff the fee previously awarded under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, in the amount of $5,210.83.

DATED this 25th day of June, 2010.

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