Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00955/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00955-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANKIE REIS VIEIRA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security,

1

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-0955 DB

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

2

 

Plaintiff’s motion argues that the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinion evidence, lay testimony, 

and Vocational Expert testimony constituted error.

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1 Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on June 17, 2019. 

See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited by the court on July 30, 2019). 

Accordingly, Andrew Saul is substituted in as the defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding 

the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).

2 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See ECF Nos. 8 & 9.)

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For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 

the payment of benefits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 10, 2010, plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) and for Supplemental Security 

Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act alleging disability beginning on January 14, 2008. 

(Transcript (“Tr.”) at 428-43.) Plaintiff’s alleged impairments included bipolar disorder, ADHD, 

right torn rotator cuff, and right arm numbness. (Id. at 475.) Plaintiff’s applications were denied 

initially, (id. at 279-83), upon reconsideration, (id. at 285-90), and later by an Administrative Law 

Judge. (Id. at 245-64.)

However, on February 28, 2014, the Appeal Council vacated the ALJ’s decision and 

remanded the matter to the ALJ for further proceedings. (Id. at 271-74.) After further 

proceedings the ALJ issued another decision on February 18, 2015, again finding that plaintiff 

was not disabled. (Id. at 39.) On May 29, 2015, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request 

for review of the ALJ’s February 18, 2015 decision. (Id. at 5-7.)

Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing a complaint in 

this court on August 7, 2015. (Id. at 1658.) On March 8, 2017, the court reversed the decision of 

the Commissioner and again remanded the matter for further proceedings. (Id. at 1670.) Yet 

another hearing was held before an ALJ on October 16, 2017. (Id. at 1508-36.) Plaintiff was 

represented by an attorney and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 1508-13.) 

In a decision issued on February 2, 2018, the ALJ again found that plaintiff was not 

disabled. (Id. at 1477.) The ALJ entered the following findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2012.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since January 14, 2008, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et 

seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: major 

depression, alcohol abuse disorder in remission, cannabis abuse 

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disorder, bipolar disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, cervical spine stenosis 

status post surgery with residual degenerative disk disease at the C3 

and C4 levels, status post bilateral posterior cervical 

foraminotomies at the C5-6 level, right shoulder arthritis, and 

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 

416.920(c)).[]

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 

and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b). The claimant can lift, carry, push and pull 20 pounds 

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. The claimant can stand 

and/or walk, with normal breaks, for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. 

The claimant can sit, with normal breaks, for 6-hours in an 8-hour 

workday. The claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds. The claimant can frequently kneel, crouch, bend, and can 

frequently climb ramps and stairs. The claimant can occasionally 

crawl. The claimant can frequently perform fingering, fine and 

gross manipulation with the bilateral upper extremities. The 

claimant can perform simple, repetitive, routine-type tasks. The 

claimant can frequently interact with supervisors, co-workers, and 

the public. The claimant can maintain concentration, persistence, 

and pace for simple, repetitive, and routine tasks. 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work prior 

to May 10, 2016 (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant was born [in] 1968, and was 39 years old, which is 

defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability 

onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate 

in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of 

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82- 41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could 

perform prior to May 10, 2016 (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a),

416.969, and 416.969(a)).

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11. As of May 10, 2016, the claimant had the additional severe 

impairment of lumbar spondylosis with possible radiculopathy and 

myalgia. (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).[]

12. As of May 10, 2016, the claimant does not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

13. After careful consideration of the entire record, as of May 10,

2016, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual 

functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). The claimant can lift, carry, push and 

pull 10 pounds occasionally and 5 pounds frequently. The claimant 

can stand and/or walk, with (sic) for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday,

with the ability to break every 2 hours to change position at his 

workstation in addition to his normal breaks. The claimant can sit 

for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, with the ability to break every 2 

hours to change position at his workstation in addition to his normal 

breaks. The claimant would not be off task. The claimant can never 

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can frequently 

kneel, crouch, bend, and can frequently climb ramps and stairs. The 

claimant can occasionally crawl. The claimant can frequently 

perform fingering, fine and gross manipulation with the bilateral 

upper extremities. The claimant can perform simple, repetitive,

routine-type tasks. The claimant can frequently interact with 

supervisors, co-workers, and the public. The claimant can maintain 

concentration, persistence, and pace for simple, repetitive, and

routine tasks.

14. As of May 10, 2016, the claimant is unable to perform any past 

relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

15. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity as of May 10, 2016, there are jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant 

can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and

416.969(a)).

16. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from January 14, 2008, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

(Id. at 1447-76.) 

After the Appeals Council failed to act on plaintiff’s request for review within 60 days, 

the ALJ’s decision became final, and plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on April 18, 2018. (ECF No. 1.)

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LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If 

so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 

disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to 

perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 

the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

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The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

Plaintiff’s pending motion argues that the ALJ committed the following three principal 

errors: (1) the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error; (2) the ALJ’s 

treatment of subjective lay witness testimony constituted error; and (3) the ALJ’s step-five 

finding was not supported by substantial evidence. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 19) at 23-32.

3

)

I. Medical Opinion Evidence

The weight to be given to medical opinions in Social Security disability cases depends in 

part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or nonexamining health 

professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). “As a 

general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion 

of doctors who do not treat the claimant[.]” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This is so because a treating 

doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 

individual. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990).

The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be rejected only for 

clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of a treating or examining physician that is 

controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. “The opinion of a nonexamining 

physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 

of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” (Id. at 831.) Finally, although a 

treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to significant weight, “‘[t]he ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

3 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.’” Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661,

671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 

2009)). 

A. Barbara McGlynn (nèe Nolet), ARNP

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion offered by Nurse Practitioner 

Barbara McGlynn (nèe Nolet). (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 19) at 24-25.) In remanding this matter 

previously, the court found that the ALJ failed to address Nurse Practitioner McGlynn’s August 

24, 2010 opinion. (Tr. at 1668.) On remand, the ALJ acknowledged McGlynn’s opinion stating: 

The claimant’s treating nurse practitioner, Barbara McGlynn, ARNP,

opined consistently with treatment records that the claimant’s 

condition would preclude work, noting her opinion was largely based 

on the claimant’s continued alcohol use. She said he requires 

sustained abstinence from such use. Ms. McGlynn, however, is not 

an acceptable medical source under the Regulations. However, the 

Regulations require consideration of such opinions and provide

detailed rules for such an evaluation. Areas we consider are: the 

examining and treatment relationship, length and frequency of the 

treatment relationship, the nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship, supportability, i.e. the degree to which the acceptable 

medical source presents an explanation and relevant evidence to 

support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory 

findings, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, specialization of the treating source, and any other relevant factors 

(SSR 06-03p, 20 CFR 404.1527(d)).

Ms. McGlynn has a long term and consistent treatment history with 

the claimant and indicated that the claimant’s polysubstance use 

exacerbated his psychiatric symptoms, causing behavioral outbursts,

fighting with family, significant others, and the police. However, the 

undersigned notes that disability opinions, such as those provided by 

Ms. McGlynn, are reserved for the Commissioner. These issues must 

be determined by the Administration Social Security Ruling 96-5p.

(Id. at 1467.)

The ALJ discussed Nurse Practitioner McGlynn’s (nèe Nolet) opinion later in the 

decision, stating:

The undersigned notes that, on an August 2010 Welfare-To-Work 

Exemption Request Form Barbara Nolet, PMHNP, opined that the 

claimant was severely disabled in his functional capacity to engage 

in training, education or work due to deficits in focus, concentration, 

an ability to complete tasks, impulsivity, irritability, anger outbursts,

moodiness, and insomnia. The undersigned notes, however, that 

disability opinions,such as those provided by Ms. Nolet, are reserved 

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for the Commissioner. These issues must be determined by the

Administration. In addition, Ms. Nolet’s conclusions are

inconsistent with the medical evidence of record as a whole including 

opinions made by medical consultants employed by the state,

demonstrating that the claimant has no more than moderate

psychological limitations.

(Id. at 1468-69.)

Although the ALJ’s decision acknowledged McGlynn’s opinion the ALJ does not address 

what weight was afforded the opinion or any of the specific opined limitations.

4

 With respect to 

the ALJ’s vague and conclusory assertion that disability opinions are reserved for the 

Commissioner, that is not a basis to reject an opinion. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 

1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (“an ALJ may not simply reject a treating physician’s opinions on the 

ultimate issue of disability”); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In 

disability benefits cases . . . physicians may render medical, clinical opinions, or they may render 

opinions on the ultimate issue of disability—the claimant’s ability to perform work.”); Hill v. 

Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Dr. Johnson’s statement that Hill would be 

‘unlikely’ to work full time was not a conclusory statement like those described in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(1), but instead an assessment, based on objective medical evidence, of Hill’s 

likelihood of being able to sustain full time employment given the many medical and mental 

impairments Hill faces and her inability to afford treatment for those conditions.”).

Moreover, “an ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while 

doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is 

more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis 

for his conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13; see also Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 

421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (“To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient objective 

findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions mandated by the objective findings does 

not achieve the level of specificity . . . required, even when the objective factors are listed 

4 Defendant argues that the ALJ afforded McGlynn’s opinion, “great weight.” (Def.’s MSJ (ECF 

No. 22) at 23.) Defendant, however, cites to the ALJ’s prior February 18, 2015 opinion, not the 

February 2, 2018 opinion at issue here. 

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seriatim. The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own 

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.”).

Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ’s treatment of Nurse Practitioner McGlynn’s 

opinion, yet again, constituted error.5

II. Lay Witness Testimony

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s subjective testimony and the lay 

witness testimony.

6

 (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 19) at 27-30.) The Ninth Circuit has summarized the 

ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility as follows:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the 

symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the ALJ 

may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply because 

there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the 

degree of symptom alleged.

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so[.]

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

cases.” Moore v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). “At 

the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

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5 Plaintiff argues that because Nurse Practitioner McGlynn worked directly under the supervision 

of an acceptable medical source, Nurse Practitioner McGlynn should have been considered an 

acceptable medical source whose opinion could only be rejected for clear and convincing, or 

specific and legitimate, reasons. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 19) at 25.) The ALJ’s treatment of 

McGlynn’s opinion, however, failed to satisfy an applicable standard. 

6 The court would normally address plaintiff’s testimony separately from lay witness testimony. 

However, the ALJ discussed the these items singularly and the court will do the same. 

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disability benefits would be available for the asking[.]” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012).

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.”7 Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 

599 (9th Cir. 1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other 

things, the “[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] 

testimony or between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work 

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect 

of the symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 

(9th Cir. 2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 

(9th Cir. 1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record, the court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id.

Moreover, the testimony of lay witnesses, including family members and friends, 

reflecting their own observations of how the claimant’s impairments affect his activities must be 

considered and discussed by the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288; 

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). Persons who see the claimant on a daily 

basis are competent to testify as to their observations. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298; Dodrill v. 

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1993). If the ALJ chooses to reject or discount the 

testimony of a lay witness, he or she must give reasons germane to each particular witness in 

doing so. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298; Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. 

The mere fact that a lay witness is a relative of the claimant cannot be a ground for 

rejecting the witness’s testimony. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1289. 

7 In March 2016, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p went into effect. “This ruling makes 

clear what our precedent already required: that assessments of an individual’s testimony by an 

ALJ are designed to ‘evaluate the intensity and persistence of symptoms after the ALJ finds that 

the individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to 

produce those symptoms,’ and not to delve into wide-ranging scrutiny of the claimant’s character 

and apparent truthfulness.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 679 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting SSR 

16-3p) (alterations omitted). 

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“[T]he reasons ‘germane to each witness’ must be specific.” Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 

1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)). However, 

the ALJ may cite the same reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s statements to reject third-party 

statements where the statements are similar. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (approving rejection 

of a third-party family member’s testimony, which was similar to the claimant’s, for the same 

reasons given for rejection of the claimant’s complaints).

Here, the ALJ first recounted the lengthy testimony offered by plaintiff and plaintiff’s 

mother, stating:

The claimant alleges disability due in part to neck and shoulder 

problems as well as to depression and attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder. Regarding depression, he said he experiences emotional 

breakdowns, anger, and irritability, and is unable to get along with 

people. He reported that as a result of attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder, he experiences a racing mind which medication has not 

helped. He has always had these problems but they have worsened 

over the years. He alleges he is not able to concentrate or remember 

well which interferes with his ability to do more than simple tasks 

and even then, he said he becomes easily sidetracked. He can make

simple meals, and do some household chores such as vacuuming, laundry, and dishes, but gets sidetracked or bored and does not finish 

tasks. He has difficulty following both written and spoken 

instructions alleging he cannot retain such information. He tried 

twice to obtain his GED and failed. Mostly, the claimant indicates 

he has difficulty getting along with others. He is angry and irritable 

and fights with his mother, step-father, girlfriends, uncle, and friends 

in general. He has gotten into fights with bosses and coworkers.

At the hearing held on September 17, 2012, the claimant alleged his 

neck and bilateral upper extremity symptoms including 

radiculopathy of the right upper extremity and pain down the right 

side of his neck worsened since the prior decision requiring 

multilevel surgery which did not provide sustained relief of his 

symptoms. He has neck spasms and numbness in his right fingers 

and hand. He has trouble fingering and holding onto things. He has 

more pain and numbness in the right dominant upper extremity. He 

takes Ibuprofen and Baclofen for his pain and spasms. He has 

difficulty sleeping due to neck pain and experiences fatigue, low 

energy, and decreased ability to focus.

The claimant reported he is able to drive but daydreams while doing 

so and gets into accidents. He cannot pay bills but can count money;

however, he said he tends to lose money. He sometimes goes 

shopping with his mother. He likes to play baseball and be outdoors. 

However, at the September 17, 2012, hearing, he said he has not 

played baseball since undergoing cervical spine surgery, although he 

attended his son’s baseball games.

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At the September 17, 2012, hearing, the claimant testified he stopped 

using alcohol in July 2012. He stopped because he was experiencing 

a lot of anger and getting into fights with people. He has not gotten 

into a fight since stopping his alcohol use. He used 

methamphetamine 15 years ago and he explained that a positive test 

for methamphetamine in 2010 was due to use of prescribed Ritalin. 

He has not smoked marijuana for two weeks.

The claimant’s mother Patricia E. Garcia prepared several statements 

on behalf of her son. She also reported that he is easily sidetracked,

has experienced many failed relationships, is unable to handle 

money, is violent, and he has memory difficulty. She said he 

struggles to perform simple tasks and requires reminders to attend 

appointments and must carry around a book of reminders. She 

confirmed he has difficulty understanding directions and cannot fill 

out or read paperwork. She does these tasks for him. He has mood 

swings and a neck problem, which causes numbness and pain in his 

arms and hands.

On May 9, 2011, Mrs. Garcia prepared another statement in which 

she said the claimant was threatening and uncontrollable. She related 

an incident at her home in which the claimant physically fought with 

his adult brother forcing her to obtain a restraining order against the

claimant. In early May 2011, the claimant returned to her home and 

was kicking and throwing things around in the garage and screaming 

and yelling. She said the police had to Taser the claimant and he was 

transported to the hospital but released a few hours later. A few days 

later, the claimant threatened to kill his step-father. Mrs. Garcia said 

when the claimant is in a manic state he talks fast, has violent 

tendencies, and moves fast. The only time she has observed that the 

claimant is focused is when he or his son plays baseball.

During his most recent hearing, the claimant testified that he could 

not remember when his back pain had begun. He stated that the pain 

went down his legs. Although he initially testified that he could not 

lift anything, he revealed that he could lift a coffee cup. He also 

stated that he could wash dishes, but not for long due to pain when 

standing for long periods. He noted that he could sometimes lift a 

small trash can and place it in a larger trash can; that his girlfriend 

would do the cooking; that he could not drive because he felt 

uncomfortable due to his medications; that he had not driven in 7 

years; and that he had lost his license prior to that due to not paying 

child support. The clamant further testified that he felt ok standing 

and walking for two to three hours but then he had to lay down. He 

stated that he would lay down twice a day and fall asleep for 3 to 4 

hours; that he had problems sleeping at night and took medications 

to help sleep; that he had tried physical therapy recently, but it 

resulted in too much pain. The claimant acknowledged that he had 

never tried aqua therapy, although it had recently been 

recommended. He also testified that he thought he would miss work 

3 days a week.

(Tr. at 1452-53) (citations omitted). 

////

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The ALJ then went on to discuss at considerable length the medical evidence and opinion 

evidence of record before returning to the lay witness testimony of plaintiff’s “mother and 

girlfriend,” stating: 

The undersigned has considered the statements of the claimant’s 

mother and girlfriend in accordance with SSR 06-03p, including the 

nature and extent of the relationship, whether the evidence is 

consistent with other evidence, and any other factors that tend to 

support or refute the evidence. The undersigned gives the claimant’s 

mother and girlfriend less weight regarding their allegations that the 

claimant has disabling limitations of memory and concentration, an 

inability to perform even simple tasks, an inability to function in a

normal workday, and an inability to get along with others such that 

he cannot work, as they are inconsistent with the medical evidence 

of record as a whole as discussed above including the opinions made 

by Dr. Goldberg and Dr. Franco demonstrating that the claimant had 

no more than moderate psychological limitations. Moreover, the 

claimant has demonstrated an ability to perform a significant number 

of activities of daily living, including playing in a baseball league

and coaching his son in baseball, which shows that he is able to 

perform, at the least, simple tasks as well as get along with others. 

Thus, the third-party statements are not consistent with the 

preponderance of the evidence in this case.

(Id. at 1469.) 

In this regard, the ALJ provided two reasons for rejecting the lay witness testimony: their 

alleged inconsistency with medical evidence and plaintiff’s activities of daily living. However, 

“[a] lack of support from medical records is not a germane reason” for rejecting lay witness 

testimony. Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Bruce v. Astrue, 

557 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Nor under our law could the ALJ discredit her lay 

testimony as not supported by medical evidence in the record.”). Nor does the ALJ explain with 

any specificity how the statements are “inconsistent with the medical evidence of record as a 

whole[.]” (Tr. at 1469.) Moreover, as discussed in detail below, the ALJ’s reliance on plaintiff’s 

activities of daily living was erroneous. 

After a brief discussion of Global Assessment of Functioning scores, the ALJ returned to 

the testimony of plaintiff and the lay witnesses, stating:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds 

that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the 

claimant’s, his mother’s, and his girlfriend’s statements concerning 

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the intensity persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are 

not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence 

in the record for the reasons explained in this decision. Despite their 

allegations, the claimant has demonstrated an ability to perform a 

significant number of activities of daily living, including playing 

baseball and coaching his son in baseball, which further 

demonstrates that he is able to interact with others in a team-like 

environment. In addition, the medical evidence of record as a whole 

including the opinions made by medical consultants employed by the 

state, demonstrates that the claimant is able to perform a reduced

range of light work with no more than moderate psychological 

limitations. In sum, the above residual functional capacity 

assessment is supported by the medical evidence of record as a

whole.

(Tr. at 1470.)

With respect to the ALJ’s reliance on plaintiff’s activities of daily living, 

[t]he critical differences between activities of daily living and 

activities in a full-time job are that a person has more flexibility in 

scheduling the former than the latter, can get help from other persons 

... and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as she 

would be by an employer. The failure to recognize these differences 

is a recurrent, and deplorable, feature of opinions by administrative 

law judges in social security disability cases.

Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly 

asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery 

shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her 

credibility as to her overall disability. One does not need to be utterly incapacitated in order to be 

disabled.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 

1016 (“[I]mpairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a 

workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all 

day.”). “Rather, a Social Security claimant’s activities of daily living may discredit her testimony 

regarding symptoms only when either (1) the activities ‘meet the threshold for transferable work 

skills’ or (2) the activities contradict her testimony.” Schultz v. Colvin, 32 F.Supp.3d 1047, 1059 

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050).

Here, the ALJ made no effort to explain how plaintiff’s alleged activities of daily living 

met the threshold for transferable work or contradicted plaintiff’s testimony. With respect to the 

ALJ’s vague and conclusory reference to the medical evidence of record as a whole, “after a 

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claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not 

reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully 

corroborate the alleged severity” of the symptoms. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th 

Cir. 2005); see also Putz v. Astrue, 371 Fed. Appx. 801, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Putz need not 

present objective medical evidence to demonstrate the severity of her fatigue.”); Lingenfelter, 504 

F.3d at 1036 (“the ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply because there is 

no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged.”); 

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1991) (“If an adjudicator could reject a claim for 

disability simply because a claimant fails to produce medical evidence supporting the severity of 

the pain, there would be no reason for an adjudicator to consider anything other than medical 

findings.”). 

Accordingly, the ALJ failed to provide a clear and convincing reason for rejecting 

plaintiff’s testimony and failed to provide a germane reason for rejecting the lay witness 

testimony. Plaintiff, therefore, is also entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

III. Step-Five Error

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s finding at step five of the sequential evaluation. (Pl.’s 

MSJ (ECF No. 19) at 31-32.) At step five of the sequential evaluation, “the Commissioner has 

the burden ‘to identify specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that a 

claimant can perform despite his identified limitations.’” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 845 

(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)) (alterations 

omitted). The ALJ can meet her burden by either taking the testimony of a Vocational Expert 

(“VE”) or by referring to the grids. See Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Here, the ALJ relied on testimony from a VE. (Tr. at 1471.) 

While an ALJ may pose a range of hypothetical questions to a VE based on alternate 

interpretations of the evidence, the hypothetical question that ultimately serves as the basis for the 

ALJ’s determination, i.e., the hypothetical question that is predicated on the ALJ’s final residual 

functional capacity assessment, (“RFC”), must account for all of the limitations and restrictions of 

the particular claimant. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228. “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not reflect all of 

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the claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to support a 

finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Id. (citation and quotation 

marks omitted); see also Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2011) (“Because neither the hypothetical nor the answer properly set forth all of 

Taylor’s impairments, the vocational expert’s testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence to 

support the ALJ’s findings.”). 

Here, because of the ALJ’s errors with respect to the opinion of Nurse Practitioner 

McGlynn, plaintiff’s testimony, and the lay witness testimony, the ALJ’s questioning of the VE 

did not account for all of plaintiff’s limitations. Accordingly, plaintiff is also entitled to summary 

judgment on the claim that the ALJ committed an error at step five of the sequential evaluation. 

CONCLUSION

After having found error, “‘[t]he decision whether to remand a case for additional 

evidence, or simply to award benefits[,] is within the discretion of the court.’”8

 Trevizo, 871 F.3d 

at 682 (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). A case may be 

remanded under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. 

Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains 

“flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as 

to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 

8 Having found multiple errors in the ALJ’s decision that require remand for the payment of 

benefits, the court need not reach plaintiff’s remaining claims of error. See Janovich v. Colvin, 

No. 2:13-cv-0096 DAD, 2014 WL 4370673, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (“In light of the 

analysis and conclusions set forth above, the court need not address plaintiff’s remaining claims 

of error.”); Manning v. Colvin, No. CV 13-4853 DFM, 2014 WL 2002213, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 

15, 2014) (“Because the Court finds that the decision of the ALJ must be reversed on the basis of 

the stooping limitation, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s remaining contentions.”).

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1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court 

concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not 

remand with a direction to provide benefits.”); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,

775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is 

uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

Here, it has been almost ten years since plaintiff first applied for benefits. The ALJ has 

issued erroneous decision, after erroneous decision, despite being given repeated opportunities to 

correct errors. Remanding for further proceedings yet again would seem to be both futile and 

unjust. See, e.g., Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing the 

Commissioner to decide the issue again would create an unfair ‘heads we win; tails, let’s play 

again’ system of disability benefits adjudication.”); Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (“The Commissioner, having lost this appeal, should not have another opportunity to 

show that Moisa is not credible any more than Moisa, had he lost, should have an opportunity for 

remand and further proceedings to establish his credibility.”).

More importantly, further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose as 

the record contains ample evidence, testimony, and medical opinion evidence. The ALJ failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinion of Nurse Practitioner McGlynn, 

plaintiff’s testimony, and the corresponding lay witness testimony. If the improperly discredited 

evidence were credited as true the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled on remand, as 

evidenced by the VE’s testimony. (Tr. at 1531-34.) “Such a finding by the vocational expert is a 

sufficient basis upon which to remand for determination of benefits.” Wechel v. Berryhill, 713 

Fed. Appx. 559, 562 (9th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, the record as whole does not create serious 

doubt as to whether plaintiff is disabled. See Moe v. Berryhill, 731 Fed. Appx. 588, 592 (9th Cir. 

2018) (“Remand for immediate award of benefits is appropriate in this case because all three 

factors of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, leaving no ‘serious doubt’ as to Moe’s disability.”).

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is granted;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) is denied;

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3. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed; 

4. This matter is remanded for the payment of benefits; and

5. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for plaintiff and close this case.

DATED: March 24, 2020 /s/ DEBORAH BARNES 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.soc sec\vieira0955.ord

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