Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_13-cv-02037/USCOURTS-alnd-3_13-cv-02037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

STEPHEN FINCH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV-13-S-2037-NW

)

THE HILLSHIRE BRANDS )

COMPANY, HILLSHIRE )

BRANDS SEVERANCE PAY )

PLAN, and THE HILLSHIRE )

BRANDS EMPLOYEE )

BENEFITS ADMINISTRATIVE, )

COMMITTEE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Stephen Finch, filed a complaint on November 6, 2013, asserting a

single claim for payment of severance benefits pursuant to the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. He named the 1

following defendants: (1) The Hillshire Brands Company (“the Company”), his

former employer; (2) Hillshire Brands Severance Pay Plan (“the Plan”), an employee

welfare benefit plan established by the Company to provide, among other things,

severance benefits to terminated employees; and (3) The Hillshire Brands Company

Employee Benefits Administrative Committee (“the Committee”), the Plan

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint). 

1

FILED

 2014 Jan-06 AM 09:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:13-cv-02037-CLS Document 15 Filed 01/06/14 Page 1 of 9
Administrator. The case presently is before the court on a motion to dismiss, filed 2

jointly by the Company and the Plan, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Upon consideration of the motion, pleadings, and briefs, the court 3

concludes that the motion should be denied. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a

complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),

which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that 

pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court explicated that standard in Iqbal,

saying that:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S.,

at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]”

devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

Id. ¶¶ 2-4. 2

 Doc. no. 11. 3

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To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at 557

(brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint states

a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

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Case 3:13-cv-02037-CLS Document 15 Filed 01/06/14 Page 3 of 9
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis added). 

II. ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT4

As the factual allegations of plaintiff’s complaint are relatively brief, it will be

helpful to set them forth in full for purposes of discussing the motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff alleges:

7. Plaintiff was an employee of the Company from March 1, 2004

through August 3, 2013.

8. Plaintiff served the Company as a loyal, honest and dedicated

employee. Plaintiff was appointed to the position of Manager, Plant

Operations II on July 1, 2007 and remained in this capacity until

termination.

9. On or about May 15, 2012, the Company provided Plaintiff with

a Performance Improvement Plan, notwithstanding a February 17, 2012

mid-year job evaluation wherein it was stated: “Steve has had a good

start for [Fiscal Year] 12. The facility is on track to meet all KPI’s and [5]

that could not have happened without the influence that Steve has had on

the operations group.” Prior to this date, Plaintiff had not been the

subject of a Performance Improvement Plan.

10. On August 3, 2013, and within a matter of weeks of the

Performance Improvement Plan being developed for Plaintiff, the

Company terminated Plaintiff’s employment.

All allegations of plaintiff’s complaint have been taken as true for purposes of ruling on the 4

motion to dismiss.

 The term “KPI’s” is not defined in the complaint or in the parties’ briefs. 5

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Case 3:13-cv-02037-CLS Document 15 Filed 01/06/14 Page 4 of 9
11. The Company did not provide Plaintiff with written notice of

termination. The Company did not provide Plaintiff with written notice

of what severance benefits he was or was not entitled to. The Company

never provided Plaintiff with a copy of the Plan nor a summary

description of the Plan.

12. After a number of weeks, Plaintiff was finally required to

retain the assistance of an attorney to determine what severance benefits

were available to a terminated employee and the process required to

obtain the benefits.

13. Plaintiff has exhausted the administrative process required

under the Plan to obtain the severance benefits he is lawfully entitled to.

14. Defendants have denied payment of severance benefits due to

Plaintiff.

15. Although Plaintiff was an “at will” employee of the Company

and exercised its right to terminate Plaintiff’s employment [sic],

Defendants have taken the position that the employment decision was due

to the “unsatisfactory performance” of Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that the

reason given is a subterfuge and intended solely to avoid Defendants’

obligation to pay Plaintiff, a long-time valued employee of the Company,

the severance benefits he is lawfully entitled to.6

Plaintiff requests to be awarded all benefits due under the Plan, plus interest, attorney’s

fees, and costs.7

III. DISCUSSION

The Company and the Plan argue that plaintiff’s claims against them should be

dismissed because they are not the proper defendants. In the Eleventh Circuit, actions

 Complaint ¶¶ 7-15 (alterations and footnote supplied). 6

Id. at 4. 7

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to recover ERISA benefits are considered equitable in nature. Hunt v. Hawthorne

Associates, Inc., 119 F.3d 888, 907-08 (11th Cir. 1997). As such,

an in personam order enjoining the payment of benefits under section

502(a)(1)(B) must be directed to a person or entity other than the plan

itself. While ERISA § 502(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1), does state that

“[a]n employee benefit plan may sue or be sued . . . as an entity,” nothing

in ERISA permits the district court to issue an injunctive order solely

against the plan. Rather, the case law of this circuit demonstrates that an

order enjoining the payment of benefits from an ERISA plan must issue

against a party capable of providing the relief requested. See, e.g.,

Shannon[ v. Jack Eckerd Corp.], 113 F.3d [208, 209-10 (11thCir. 1997)];

Godfrey[ v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.], 89 F.3d [755, 756-57

(11th Cir. 1996)]; cf. Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073,

1074 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s

second amended complaint in part for failure to name the plan

administrator as an “indispensable party”). We therefore reject the notion

that an injunctive order to pay benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) of

ERISA can issue solely against an ERISA plan as an entity.

Hunt, 119 F.3d at 908 (emphasis and alterations supplied). Because the Plan

Administrator generally has the authority to administer benefits under an ERISA plan,

the Administrator generally is a proper defendant to a claim for ERISA benefits. 

Hamilton v. Allen-Bradley Co., Inc., 244 F.3d 819, 824 (11th Cir. 2001).

Here, the Company and the Plan assert that the Committee is the only proper

defendant, because the Committee is designated as the Plan Administrator, and it has

full discretionary authority to make benefit determinations under the Plan. It is true 8

See doc. no. 11, Exhibit A (Copy of the Severance Pay Plan), Summary Plan Description, 8

at 6 (“The Employee Benefits Administrative Committee of the Company (the ‘Committee’) is the

Plan Administrator . . . . The Committee, as the Plan Administrator, shall have the sole authority

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that the Committee is the sole Administrator explicitly designated in the Plan itself.9

Even so, as plaintiff points out, an employer can also serve as a de facto Plan

Administrator, even if a different entity or individual is designated as the Plan

Administrator in the Plan document. See Hamilton, 244 F.3d at 824 (“Proof of who

is the plan administrator may come from the plan document, but can also come from

the factual circumstances surrounding the administration of the plan, even if these

in the exercise of its discretion to interpret, apply, and administer the terms of the Plan and to

determine eligibility for benefits of the Plan and the amount of any benefits under the Plan, and its

determination of any such matters shall be final and binding. Benefits under the Plan will be paid

only if the Committee determines in its discretion that a participant or beneficiary is entitled to them. 

The Committee may designate one or more individuals to carry out its function as Plan

Administrator.”).

The copy of the Plan submitted by defendants bears the title “Sara Lee Corporation

Severance Pay Plan (As Amended and Restated Effective as of January 1, 2009).” See doc no. 11,

Exhibit A, at 1. Defendants explain in their brief that the Sara Lee Corporation was renamed the

Hillshire Brands Company on June 29, 2012. Doc. no. 11, at 4-5 n.1. Plaintiff did not dispute this

statement, and the court accepts it as true for purposes of ruling on the present motion to dismiss. 

Considering the language of the Plan and Summary Plan Description does not require

conversion of defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Rule 12(d) states:

If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings

are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for

summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable

opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, the Eleventh Circuit “has recognized an important qualification to

this rule where certain documents and their contents are undisputed: ‘In ruling upon a motion to

dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiff’s

claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.’” Speaker v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human

Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1379 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations

omitted). There is no question as to the authenticity of the Plan documents, or their centrality to

plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, the documents may be considered without converting the motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 

See Plan language quoted in the preceding footnote. 9

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Case 3:13-cv-02037-CLS Document 15 Filed 01/06/14 Page 7 of 9
factual circumstances contradict the designation in the plan document.”) (emphasis

supplied) (citing Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191, 193 (11th Cir.1992)). The court

agrees with plaintiff that discovery should be conducted to determine what role, if any,

the Company played in the administration of the Plan. 

10

The court also concludes that the Plan should not be dismissed at this stage of

the litigation. The ERISA statute explicitly states that “[a]n employee benefit plan may

sue or be sued under this subchapter as an entity.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1). Defendant

has not cited any contrary authority indicating that the Plan cannot be sued. The Hunt

opinion, interpreting § 1132(d)(1), held that an injunctive order requiring the payment

of benefits could not be issued solely against the Plan; it did not hold that the Plan is

not a proper defendant. See Hunt, 119 F.3d at 908. Similarly, the Hamilton case held

that the ERISA statute conferred “a right to sue the plan administrator for recovery of

benefits.” Hamilton, 244 F.3d at 824. It did not hold that the Plan Administrator was

the only proper defendant. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the motion to dismiss

filed by the Company and the Plan is DENIED. The case will proceed to discovery

See doc. no. 13 (plaintiff’s response brief), at 2 (“Plaintiff submits that it is premature to 10

dismiss the Company as a party defendant. Discovery will further establish what part the Company

has in administration of The Hillshire Company Severance Pay Plan (the ‘Plan’) and in

determination of who is entitled to receive severance benefits under the Plan.”).

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Case 3:13-cv-02037-CLS Document 15 Filed 01/06/14 Page 8 of 9
against all defendants named in plaintiff’s complaint. If discovery produces evidence

to support defendants’ dismissal arguments, they may re-assert those arguments in a

motion for summary judgment. 

DONE this 6th day of January, 2014.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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