Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00365/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00365-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 315
Nature of Suit: Airplane Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Airline Crash

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

SHERYL ANN RAFFILE,

Plaintiff,

vs. No. CIV 11-0459 JB/WPL

EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE,

a/k/a COPPER STATE TURBINE ENGINE

COMPANY; BARRON THOMAS

SCOTTSDALE, LLC; STEVEN W. 

SAUNDERS; and DOES 1-50, Inclusive,

Defendants.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) Defendant Executive Aircraft

Maintenance’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, filed June 1, 2011 (Doc.

4)(“Executive Aircraft MTD”); and (ii) Defendant Steven W. Saunders’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Personal Jurisdiction, filed in state court on April 13, 2011 (Doc. 12, Ex. A at 16-19)(“Saunders’

MTD”). The Court held a hearing on November 15, 2011. The primary issues are: (i) whether the

Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Executive Aircraft Maintenance (“Executive

Aircraft”); and (ii) whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Steven W. Saunders. 

The Court will grant Executive Aircraft’s and Saunders’ motions.

1

The Court files this Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order to include another citation

to the Transcript of the Hearing and more fully explain why the Court lacks personal jurisdiction

over Defendant Steven W. Saunders. The Court’s additions are included on page 24 of this

Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order. 

Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 1 of 26
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Executive Aircraft is an Arizona corporation, and its principal place of business is in

Arizona. See Affidavit of James Nordstrom ¶ 5, at 1 (executed May 27, 2011), filed June 1, 2011

(Doc. 4)(“Nordstrom Aff.”). Executive Aircraft provides “certain aircraft maintenance and

inspection services in Arizona.” See Nordstrom Aff. ¶ 6, at 1. Executive Aircraft “is not licensed

to do business in the State of New Mexico; it does not pay taxes in New Mexico; and it does not own

property in New Mexico.” Nordstrom Aff. ¶ 8, at 1. “Executive Aircraft does not directly or

intentionally advertise or solicit consumers in New Mexico.” Nordstrom Aff. ¶ 9, at 1. It “does not

have any employees, agents, representatives, statutory agents, physical presence, or offices, or

property in New Mexico.” Nordstrom Aff. ¶ 7, at 1. Steven W. Saunders is a resident of Nevada. 

See Complaint ¶ 4, at 2.

On June 2, 2009, Christopher Morrell, a non-party and Connecticut resident, contracted with

Executive Aircraft in Arizona to perform inspection and maintenance/repair services in Arizona on

a Beechcraft model 35-A33 Bonanza aircraft. See Affidavit of James Butler ¶¶ 6-8, at 1 (executed

June 1, 2011), filed June 1, 2011 (Doc. 4); Contract between Executive Aircraft Maintenance and

Chris Morrell at 1, filed June 1, 2011 (Doc. 4). Executive Aircraft performed the inspections,

service, and repairs in Glendale, Arizona and completed them on July 7, 2009. See Nordstrom Aff.

¶¶ 12,14 at 2. Morrell purchased the aircraft on July 9, 2009, from Saunders, through Defendant

2

 The facts are undisputed. Raffile’s response to the Executive Aircraft Motion to Dismiss

does not raise any disputes of fact and none were discussed at the November 15, 2011 hearing. See

Response to Defendant Executive Aircraft Maintenances’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction at 1-5, filed June 20, 2011 (Doc. 13).

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 2 of 26
Barron Thomas Scottsdale, LLC, an aircraft broker company located in Scottsdale, Arizona.3

 See

Complaint ¶¶ 3, 4 at 4, ¶¶ 19, 20 at 6. See also Answer of Barron Thomas Scottsdale, LLC ¶¶ 7-8,

at 5, filed April 11, 2011 (Doc. 12, Ex. A)(stating that “Defendant Thomas admits that he was the

individual that sold the subject aircraft to Mr. Christopher Morrell” and that “the previous owner

of the aircraft was Steven Saunders”). On July 10, 2009, Morrell was piloting the aircraft when it

lost power and crashed near Las Vegas, New Mexico. See Complaint ¶¶ 10-12, at 5.

Plaintiff Sheryl Ann Raffile is a Connecticut resident who was a passenger in the aircraft

when it crashed. See Complaint ¶¶1, 10, at 1, 5. She contends that Executive Aircraft failed to

“exercise reasonable care in the testing, inspection, and maintenance of all component parts of the

aircraft,” Complaint ¶ 38, at 8, and that all Defendants failed to adequately warn Morrell about

certain defects in the aircraft that made it “not capable of sustaining airworthy flight,” Complaint

¶ 31, at 6. She also bases her claims on the theory of strict product liability. See Complaint ¶¶ 23-

24, at 4-5. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Raffile filed her lawsuit in New Mexico state court in a case styled Raffile v. Executive

Aircraft Maintenance, No. D412CV 201100099 (Fourth Judicial Court, San Miguel County , State

of New Mexico), filed February 28, 2011 (Doc. 1-1). Executive Aircraft timely removed the case

to federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal by Executive Aircraft

Maintenance ¶ 15, at 4, filed May 31, 2011 (Doc. 1).

3

 Although, at the November 15, 2011 hearing, Saunders’ counsel represented that Saunders

was only a previous owner of the Beechcraft and that he sold the plane to Barron Thomas Scottsdale,

LLC, see Transcript of Hearing at 7:10-16 (November 15, 2011)( Racca). Saunders did not,

however, submit an affidavit attesting to that fact; thus, the Court must accept as true the allegations

in the Complaint for the purpose of analyzing the jurisdictional issues.

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 3 of 26
Executive Aircraft and Saunders move the Court, pursuant to rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Executive

Aircraft MTD at 1; Saunders’ MTD at 17. Both Executive Aircraft and Saunders contend that the

Court should dismiss Raffile’s Complaint against them, because she has failed to show that they

have sufficient minimum contacts with New Mexico to support jurisdiction under the Due Process

Clause and, therefore, taking jurisdiction over them in New Mexico is unconstitutional. See

Executive Aircraft MTD at 4; Saunders’ MTD at 18. Both Executive Aircraft and Saunders support

their motions with memoranda of points and authorities, and Executive Aircraft also filed affidavits

and a copy of the Contract between Executive Aircraft and Morrell. Raffile filed a response arguing

that it was foreseeable that the aircraft would be used in the states surrounding Arizona, including

New Mexico. See Response to Defendant Executive Aircraft Maintenance’s Motion to Dismiss for

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at 5, filed June 20, 2011 (Doc. 13)(“Response”). Raffile did not file

any affidavits or exhibits, and Executive Aircraft and Saunders filed notices that briefing was

complete. See Notice of Completion of Briefing, filed July 5, 2011 (Doc. 18); Notice of Completion

of Briefing, filed July 11, 2011 (Doc. 19). 

At the November 15, 2011 hearing on the motions, however, Raffile’s counsel admitted that

her response “certainly falls short of the issues raised in the motion” and asked “for a little leeway

to address some of the issues of the motion separate from our response.” Transcript of Hearing at

4:15-22 and 8:24 to 9:9 (taken November 15, 2011)(Heath)(“Tr.”).4 Counsel then submitted,

without objection, fifteen exhibits, including Morrell’s affidavit, in an attempt to show that the

4

The Court’s citations to the transcript are to the Court Reporter’s original, unedited version. 

A final version may have slightly different line or page numbers.

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 4 of 26
Court has personal jurisdiction over Executive Aircraft.

LAW REGARDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The plaintiff has the burden of proving personal jurisdiction. The court’s jurisdiction may

rest on specific or general personal jurisdiction. Due process, however, limits any state statutory

basis of personal jurisdiction.

1. Burden of Proof.

“[W]hen the court’s jurisdiction is contested, the plaintiff has the burden of proving

jurisdiction exists.” Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995). 

When jurisdiction is “decided on the basis of affidavits and other written materials,

the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing” of facts that would support the

assertion of jurisdiction. [Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d at 1505]. “The

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true to the extent they are

uncontroverted by the defendant’s affidavit.” Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n,

744 F.2d at 733. When, however, a defendant presents credible evidence through

affidavits or other materials suggesting the lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff

must come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material

fact on the issue. See Doe v. Nat’l Med. Servs., 974 F.2d 143, 145 (10th Cir. 1992).

Only if the plaintiff meets the obligation of contesting the credible evidence that the

defendant presents does the court resolve the factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff.

See Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d at 1505; Behagen v. Amateur Basketball

Ass’n, 744 F.2d at 733.

Clark v. Meijer, Inc., 376 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1082 (D.N.M. 2004)(Browning, J.). When, however,

“personal jurisdiction is assessed in an evidentiary hearing . . . , the plaintiff generally must

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that personal jurisdiction exists.” Dudnikov v. Chalk

& Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070, n.4 (10th Cir. 2008). 

Where a federal lawsuit is based on diversity of citizenship, the court’s jurisdiction

over a nonresident defendant is determined by the law of the forum state. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(e). The party seeking to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign

litigant must make two showings: first, that the exercise of jurisdiction is sanctioned

by the state’s long-arm statute; and second, that it comports with the due process

requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

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Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, No. 10-3285, 2011 WL 5084997, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2011). 

New Mexico’s long-arm “statute extends the jurisdictional reach of New Mexico courts as far as

constitutionally permissible.” Tercero v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, Conn., 132 N.M.

312, 315, 48 P.3d 50, 54 (2002). Consequently, the court “need not conduct a statutory analysis apart

from the due process analysis.” Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, 2011 WL 5084997, at *3 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

2. General and Specific Jurisdiction.

Depending on the character and extent of a defendant’s contacts, a court may exercise

specific or general personal jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,

466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 

General jurisdiction is based on an out-of-state defendant’s “continuous and

systematic” contacts with the forum state, and does not require that the claim be

related to those contacts. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, is premised on

something of a quid pro quo: in exchange for “benefitting” from some purposive

conduct directed at the forum state, a party is deemed to consent to the exercise of

jurisdiction for claims related to those contacts.

Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d at 1078. Thus, “[s]uch contacts may give

rise to personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant either generally, for any lawsuit, or

specifically, solely for lawsuits arising out of particular forum-related activities.” Shrader v.

Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011). 

3. Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction.

The due process analysis is also two-fold: First, [the defendant] must have

“minimum contacts” with the forum state, demonstrating that he “purposefully

availed” himself of the protections or benefits of the state’s laws and “should

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-76 . . . (1985); see also Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 618

F.3d at 1159-60 (reiterating the Burger King standard). Although agreements alone

are likely to be insufficient to establish minimum contacts, “‘parties who reach out

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 6 of 26
beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of

another state are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other state for the

consequences of their activities.’” TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace Eur. Grp.

Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1287-88 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at

473, 478 . . . . 

Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, 2011 WL 5084997, at *4. 

A defendant may reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in the forum state “if the

defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, and the

litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.”

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 . . . (1985) (internal citation

omitted); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 . . . (1958) ( “[I]t is

essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully

avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.”).

TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace Eur. Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d at 1287-88. Thus, to establish specific

personal jurisdiction that satisfies due process, a plaintiff must present evidence of “three salient

factors that together indicate ‘purposeful direction’: (a) an intentional action . . . that was (b)

expressly aimed at the forum state . . . with (c) knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt

in the forum state.” Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d at 1239-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Supreme Court of the United States has held, however, that the mere foreseeability of harm

occurring in a particular forum will not support a finding of minimum contacts. See World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)(holding that, although “an automobile

is mobile by its very design and purpose,” thus indicating that it is foreseeable that a particular

automobile may cause injury in a forum state, “‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient

benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause”). In Roberts v. Piper Aircraft

Corp., 100 N.M. 363, 670 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1983), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico similarly

rejected the argument that foreseeability could establish minimum contacts, and found no personal

jurisdiction or minimum contacts in the following circumstances:

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 7 of 26
[T]he record is devoid of any contact between Scenic Aviation and New Mexico. 

Scenic Aviation is a fixed-base operator selling aviation fuel in Las Vegas, Nevada. 

There is no evidence that Scenic Aviation advertises in New Mexico, or sells fuel to

New Mexico residents. Without “contacts, ties, or relations” with New Mexico the

fact that fuel sold by Scenic Aviation found its way into our state does not support

a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction.

100 N.M. at 367, 670 P. 2d at 948. “[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is

not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably

anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at

297. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has further explained, because

“mere foreseeability” is not sufficient to establish minimum contacts, a plaintiff “must establish .

. . not only that defendants foresaw (or knew) that the effects of their conduct would be felt in the

forum state, but also that defendants undertook intentional actions that were expressly aimed at that

forum state.” Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d at 1077. 

Similarly, to find general jurisdiction over a defendant, contacts must be “continuous and

systematic” -- therefore, “[s]imply because a defendant has a contractual relationship and business

dealings with a person or entity in the forum state does not subject him to general jurisdiction there;” 

“correspondence with a forum resident does not support general jurisdiction;” and “sporadic or

isolated visits to the forum state will not subject the defendant to general jurisdiction” because a

“[defendant’s] lack of a regular place of business in [the forum state] is significant, and is not

overcome by a few visits.” Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d at 1247. “[G]eneral jurisdiction over a

web site that has no intrinsic connection with a forum state requires commercial activity carried on

with forum residents in such a sustained manner that it is tantamount to actual physical presence

within the state.” 633 F.3d at 1246. When analyzing minimum contacts sufficient for general

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 8 of 26
jurisdiction in regard to the operation of a web site, the Tenth Circuit has referred to, without

adopting, a “sliding scale” framework. 633 F.3d at 1242 n.5.

At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business

over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign

jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files

over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations

where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is

accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more

than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for

the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive

Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these

cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of

interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on

the Web site. 

633 F.3d 1242 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).

If [the defendant] is found to have the requisite minimum contacts with [the

forum state], then we proceed to the second step in the due process analysis: ensuring

that the exercise of jurisdiction over him “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’” See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444

U.S. 286, 292 . . . (1980) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

. . . (1945)). [The defendant] bears the burden at this stage to “present a compelling

case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction

unreasonable.” See Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063,

1080 (10th Cir. 2008). We consider the following five factors, . . . in deciding

whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair:

(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state’s interests in

resolving the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving

convenient and effectual relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s

interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,

and (5) the shared interest of the several states or foreign nations in

furthering fundamental social policies.

Id. (brackets omitted); see also OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1095 (applying these

factors in a case involving a Canadian corporation). “[T]he reasonableness prong of

the due process inquiry evokes a sliding scale: the weaker the plaintiff’s showing on

minimum contacts, the less a defendant need show in terms of unreasonableness to

defeat jurisdiction.” TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC, 488 F.3d at 1292 (internal

quotation marks and brackets omitted).

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Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, 2011 WL 5084997, at *4-5. 

4. New Mexico’s Long-Arm Statute.

New Mexico’s long-arm statute provides, in relevant part, that its courts may exercise

personal jurisdiction over a party “whether or not a citizen or resident of this state . . . as to any

cause of action arising from: (1) the transaction of business within this state . . . [or] (3) the

commission of a tortious act within this state . . . .” NMSA 1978 § 38-1-16. For New Mexico courts 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident, out-of-state defendants, the

following three-part test must be satisfied:

(1) the defendant’s act must be one of the five enumerated in the

long-arm statute; (2) the plaintiff’s cause of action must arise from

the act; and (3) minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due process

must be established by the defendant’s act.

State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conyers, 109 N.M. 243, 244, 784 P.2d 986, 987 (1989)

(citing Salas v. Homestake Enterprises, Inc., 106 N.M. 344, 345, 742 P.2d 1049,

1050 (1987)). The first and third step of this test have been “repeatedly equated”

with the due process standard of “minimum contacts.” Kathrein v. Parkview

Meadows, Inc., 102 N.M. 75, 76, 691 P.2d 462, 463 (1984) (citing Telephonic, Inc.

v. Rosenblum, 88 N.M. 532, 534, 543 P.2d 825, 827 (1975)). Because we have

interpreted the long-arm statute as extending our personal jurisdiction as far as

constitutionally permissible, United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 91 N.M.

41, 42, 570 P.2d 305, 306 (1977), it is not necessary to determine whether the

[defendants] transacted business within New Mexico in any technical sense. When

the state courts have construed the state long-arm statute as being coextensive with

the requirements of due process, “the usual two-step analysis collapses into a single

search for the outer limits of what due process permits.

F.D.K. v. Hiatt, 117 N.M. 461, 463, 872 P.2d 879, 881 (1994). “When negligent acts occur outside

New Mexico which cause injury within the state, a ‘tortious act’ has been committed for purposes

of the long-arm statute.” Tercero v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, Conn., 132 N.M. at 319,

48 P.3d at 57. “As with the transaction of business analysis, rather than engage in a technical

analysis of whether the defendant committed a tortious act, we must equate the ‘tortious act’ which

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the defendant is alleged to have committed with minimum contacts to determine if due process has

been satisfied.” 132 N.M. at 319, 48 P.3d at 57 (alteration omitted)(internal quotation marks

omitted).

ANALYSIS

Raffile has not established that Executive Aircraft or Saunders have sufficient minimum

contacts to support a theory of general or specific personal jurisdiction over them. Raffile’s analysis

is based on products-liability cases, but she principally contends that Executive Aircraft and

Saunders committed the torts of negligence and failure to warn in Arizona that ultimately caused

injury to her in New Mexico. See Complaint ¶ 23, at 4; ¶¶ 30-31, at 8; ¶¶ 36-39, at 7-8.

I. NEW MEXICO DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER

EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT.

As Executive Aircraft and Saunders point out, Raffile alleged no facts in her Complaint and

presented no other evidence sufficient to indicate that they have sufficient minimum contacts with

New Mexico that will support personal jurisdiction over them. Therefore, it would violate the Due

Process Clause for the Court to exert jurisdiction over them. The Court will grant the motions to

dismiss.

A. NEW MEXICO DOES NOT HAVE GENERAL OR SPECIFIC

JURISDICTION OVER EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT.

At the November 15, 2011 hearing, the parties agreed that the central issue in this case is

whether New Mexico has specific jurisdiction over the Defendants. See Tr. at 4:15-22 (Worischeck)

and 8:24-9:9 (Heath). In her briefing, Raffile only discussed whether Executive Aircraft had

committed an enumerated act under New Mexico’s long-arm statute, but she did not discuss the

determinative issue of minimum contacts, see Response at 4-5, or point to any facts indicating that

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Executive Aircraft had “‘purposefully directed’ [its] activities at residents of the forum, and the

litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). Nor did she demonstrate that Executive Aircraft

committed any other intentional action “expressly aimed at the forum state . . . with . . . knowledge

that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state,” Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d at 1239-

40, that it had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of New Mexico laws, see

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253, or had such significant consistent and systematic business

contacts in New Mexico that the Court could assert specific or general jurisdiction over it, see

Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d at 1078. Instead, Raffile argued only that

Executive Aircraft committed torts that resulted in her injury in New Mexico, and that “it was

foreseeable by [Executive Aircraft] that the subject aircraft would be used for air transportation in

not only Arizona, but also in the surrounding States, specifically New Mexico.” Response at 5. 

At oral argument, despite the concession that only specific jurisdiction was at issue, Raffile

submitted fifteen exhibits. Exhibit 1 shows that Executive Aircraft’s website states that it provides

“global service” to customers who reside in various nations who “ship your parts or engines to EAM

for repair, or we orchestrate a ‘road trip’ to your facility to repair an aircraft.” Exhibit 2 is an

Executive Aircraft’s “contact form” that requests information from a prospective customer,

including “country.” Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 are “press releases” or articles from Executive Aircraft’s

website, Aviators Hot Line website, and Director Of Maintenance Magazine’s website stating that

Executive Aircraft was established “to support customers in 24 countries, from locations in Arizona

and Alaska.” Exhibit 6 is a “media kit” from Director Of Maintenance Magazine, which has as its

purpose assisting people and companies “to reach the management of aircraft maintenance

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 12 of 26
facilities.” Exhibit 7 is an article from Aviation International News’ official website stating that

Executive Aircraft has been authorized to overhaul various Honeywell turboprop engines. Exhibit

8 states that Aviation International News covers aviation news and trade shows world wide. Exhibit

9 is Aviation International News’ “media kit”that states that Aviation International News has a

“world wide distribution that precisely matches the distribution of turbine business airplanes.” 

Exhibit 10 is a document from the National Agricultural Aviation Association (“NAAA”) stating

that Executive Aircraft is one of its “allied member companies,” and Exhibit 11 states that NAAA

has 1500 members in 46 states. Exhibit 12 is Executive Aircraft’s ad in the National Business

Aviation Association’s directory from its 2011 annual meeting. Exhibit 13 is Executive Aircraft’s

Facebook page stating that it provides “airline industry services” in “Scottsdale, Arizona.” Raffile’s

counsel argued at the hearing that these thirteen exhibits demonstrate that Executive Aircraft does

not limit its services to states other than New Mexico and that Executive Aircraft’s advertisements

are widely distributed, and, therefore, the Court should find that Executive Aircraft purposefully

directs its advertising for services to New Mexico residents through these websites and publications. 

See Tr. at 12:1-14:14 (Heath). He argued that the negative ruling in World-wide Volkswagen should

be distinguished, because it is not unfair to hale Executive Aircraft into New Mexico courts when

its advertisements could reach New Mexico consumers. See Tr. at 15:5-16:25 (Heath). He noted

that the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that New Mexico courts had jurisdiction over one of

the defendants in the Roberts v. Piper Aircraft case, because that defendant advertised in a national

trade journal circulated in New Mexico, the company had performed some work for other New

Mexico residents, and, therefore, the company had solicited business in New Mexico and had the

minimum contacts to satisfy due process. See Roberts v. Piper Aircraft, 100 N.M. at 367-68, 670

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P.2d at 978-79. Because the exhibits Raffile submits relate only to Executive Aircraft’s general

systematic or continuous business contacts, and not to the specific torts it is alleged to have

committed, this argument goes to general, and not specific, jurisdiction, see Dudnikov v. Chalk &

Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d at 1078 n.4. Raffile, on the other hand, concedes that this Court

does not have general jurisdiction over Executive Aircraft and that, if the Court has personal

jurisdiction over Executive Aircraft, jurisdiction is based on specific personal jurisdiction, see Tr.

at 8:24-9:9 (Heath).

In response, Executive Aircraft contends that the existence of indirect advertising through

web sites is not sufficient to establish minimum contacts where there is no evidence that Executive

Aircraft targeted New Mexico, and that Raffile has not rebutted Nordstrom’s affidavit that Executive

Aircraft “does not directly or intentionally advertise or solicit consumers in New Mexico.” 

Nordstrom Aff. ¶ 9, at 1. The Court agrees.

At the hearing, the parties all agreed with the Court that the Court is not bound by the New

Mexico Court of Appeals’ opinions regarding the federal question whether minimum contacts exist

to satisfy due process under the federal constitution. See Tr. at 5:9-13 (Worischeck), 10:12-15

(Heath). The Court finds that the more recent cases from the Tenth Circuit are binding precedent. 

In Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., a specific-jurisdiction case, see 514 F.3d

at 1070-71 (noting that plaintiffs had not appealed adverse ruling on general jurisdiction and

“cabin[ing] our inquiry in this case to what ‘minimum contacts’ means for purposes of specific

jurisdiction”), the Tenth Circuit noted the distinction between tort claims and contract claims in

jurisdictional analyses.

In the tort context, we often ask whether the nonresident defendant “purposefully

directed” its activities at the forum state; in contract cases, meanwhile, we sometimes

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ask whether the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of conducting

activities or consummating a transaction in the forum state. In all events, the shared

aim of “purposeful direction” doctrine has been said by the Supreme Court to ensure

that an out-of-state defendant is not bound to appear to account for merely “random,

fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” with the forum state.

514 F.3d at 1071. In tort cases, “the forum state itself must be the ‘focal point of the tort.’” Id. at

1075 n.9. The defendant in Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc. intentionally directed

its tortious acts at a Colorado resident; its “intended end [was] cancelling plaintiffs’ auction in

Colorado;” and “defendants e-mailed plaintiffs directly in Colorado threatening them with suit in

federal court.” 514 F.3d at 1075. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado courts could properly

assert personal jurisdiction, because the defendant/commercial actor’s “efforts are ‘purposefully

directed’ toward residents of another State, [and the Supreme Court had] consistently rejected the

notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” 514 F.3d at 1075-

76 (internal quotation marks omitted). See id. at 1076 (noting that specific jurisdiction existed in

Colorado, because the defendants “are alleged to have intended their extra-forum conduct to reach

and affect plaintiffs’ business operationsin Colorado”). Similarly, in Silver v. Brown, 382 F.App’x

723 (10th Cir. 2010)(unpublished), the Tenth Circuit concluded that New Mexico had specific

personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, because the defendant intentionally and

purposefully posted a defamatory blog about a New Mexico resident and his New Mexico company,

while knowing “that the brunt of the injury to [the New Mexico resident] would be felt in New

Mexico.” 382 F.App’x at 729-30. In the specific-jurisdiction tort context, the Tenth Circuit focused

on the facts that the defendant who committed the tort actually knew that the plaintiff he was

intentionally negatively affecting waslocated in New Mexico and that the defendant “conducted his

business [which was also harmed] from there.” 382 F.App’x at 730.

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Here, neither Raffile nor Morrell are residents of New Mexico, and there are no facts or

evidence to indicate that Executive Aircraft purposefully directed its aircraft service activities that

are allegedly associated with Raffile’s injuries toward New Mexico residents or to the State. This

case, therefore, isfactually distinguishable from Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc. and

Silver v. Brown. Exhibits 1-13 do not provide any evidence that Executive Aircraft purposefully

directed any of its activities or advertising toward New Mexico residents or that Raffile’s injuries

arose out of Executive Aircraft’s forum-related activities, see Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d at

1239, in a way giving rise to specific jurisdiction over it. 

Nor are there sufficient facts to demonstrate general jurisdiction. Raffile points to Roberts

v. Piper Aircraft, in which the Court of Appeals of New Mexico concluded that New Mexico had

general personal jurisdiction over Custom Airmotive, an out-of state company that repaired airplane

engines, on two facts: (i) the president of the company admitted that the company, “on limited

occasions, performed aircraft repair and overhaul operations for residents of the State of New

Mexico,” but that the work performed was “minimal”; and (ii) he admitted that, “[p]rior to the

accident alleged in this suit, Custom Airmotive did advertise in national aircraft publications,

namely Trade-A-Plane, and Aircraft Mechanic Journal, which publications your Affiant is informed

to believe are circulated in the State of New Mexico.” 100 N.M. at 367-68, 670 P.2d at 979. The

Court of Appeals concluded that these two categories of contacts were sufficient minimum contacts

to satisfy due-process concerns, even though Custom Airmotive did not have a telephone listing in

New Mexico and it required the customer “to ship the aircraft component to it in Oklahoma.” 100

N.M. at 367-368, 670 P.2d at 979. Raffile suggests that, because she can show that Executive

Aircraft has advertised in national trade magazines, Executive Aircraft has had the minimum

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contacts to satisfy due process. 

The Court disagrees that advertising in national trade magazines is enough to constitute

minimum contacts. In Shrader v. Biddinger, the Oklahoma plaintiff brought tort claims for

defamation against non-residents in Oklahoma, which derived “from an email drafted by [defendant]

Mr. Stewart briefly explaining why the two parted ways.” 633 F.3d at 1237-38. 

Mr. Stewart sent the email to a list of his customers. Mr. Biddinger [another

defendant] then expanded its audience by posting it to a traders’ forum on the

Wave59 web site in response to an inquiry about Mr. Shrader’s materials. Finally,

the email remained accessible on the forum for some time as a result of the Beann

defendants’ failure to promptly remove it.

633 F.3d at 1238. All three defendants moved for dismissal based on the absence of personal

jurisdiction. The Court noted that there is an “overarching requirement of continuous and systematic

contacts for general jurisdiction.” 633 F.3d at 1239. The Court noted:

A number of circuits have addressed personal jurisdiction in the internet context,

considering whether, when, and how such peculiarly non-territorial activities as web

site hosting, internet posting, and mass emailing can constitute or give rise to

contacts that properly support jurisdiction over the host, poster, or sender. The basic

problem with relating such activities directly to the general principles developed

pre-internet is that, in a sense, the internet operates “in” every state regardless of

where the user is physically located, potentially rendering the territorial limits of

personal jurisdiction meaningless.

633 F.3d at 1240. To avoid an “untenable result” of making every person who places information

on the Internet subject to personal jurisdiction in every State that the information can reach, the

Court held that the analysis of personal jurisdiction had to be adapted “by placing emphasis on the

internet user or site intentionally directing his/her/its activity or operation at the forum state rather

than just having the activity or operation accessible there.” 633 F.3d at 1240 (emphasis in original). 

Thus, the Tenth Circuit adopted the principle that

[a] State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person

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outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2)

with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the

State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of

action cognizable in the State’s courts. Under this standard, a person who simply

places information on the Internet does not subject himself to jurisdiction in each

State into which the electronic signal is transmitted and received. Such passive

Internet activity does not generally include directing electronic activity into the State

with the manifested intent of engaging business or other interactions in the State thus

creating in a person within the State a potential cause of action cognizable in courts

located in the State.

Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d at 1240-41 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit

held that “[t]he maintenance of a web site does not in and of itself subject the owner or operator to

personal jurisdiction, even for actions relating to the site, simply because it can be accessed by

residents of the forum state.” 633 F.3d at 1241. When “considering what ‘more’ could create

personal jurisdiction for such activities, courts look to indications that a defendant deliberately

directed its message at an audience in the forum state and intended harm to the plaintiff occurring

primarily or particularly in the forum state.” 633 F.3d at 1241. 

The Tenth Circuit noted that, for general jurisdiction to be found, commercial contacts from

a web site “must be of a sort that approximate physical presence in the state -- and engaging in

commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that

approximates physical presence within the state’s borders.” 633 F.3d at 1243 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit noted that, while “operating a web site selling products to

residents of a state can subject the seller to general jurisdiction in that state, depending on the nature

and degree of commercial activity with the forum state[,] . . . case law sets the bar quite high, . . .

denying general jurisdiction absent substantial sales.” 633 F.3d at 1243 (emphasis original)(citing

cases where the numbers were not substantial enough to establish general jurisdiction). The Tenth

Circuit held that 

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the best general formulation for this niche of the law may have been provided by the

district court in Oklahoma: “A web site will subject a defendant to general personal

jurisdiction only when the defendant has actually and deliberately used its website

to conduct commercial transactions on a sustained basis with a substantial number

of residents of the forum.” Smith v. Basin Park Hotel, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 1225,

1235 (N.D. Okla. 2001)(emphasis added).

633 F.3d at 1243 (emphasis in original). Although the plaintiff in Shrader v. Biddinger submitted

exhibits “relating to commercial activity on the Wave59 site, which show that (1) he purchased

books, courses, and a data feed from Wave59; (2) another person from Tulsa purchased a book from

Wave59; and (3) Wave59 advertized in a magazine called TradersWorld, which was available for

purchase at a Tulsa bookstore,” 633 F.3d at 1244, the Tenth Circuit held that “[t]his showing is

clearly insufficient to warrant the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over the Beann

defendants,” noting that “[t]here is no indication that TradersWorld is an Oklahoma magazine. We

have repeatedly held that advertizing in nationally distributed magazines does not support general

jurisdiction.” 633 F.3d at 1243-44 & n.6. 

As in Shrader v. Biddinger, Raffile has failed to show through Exhibits 1-13 Executive

Aircraft’s deliberate, continuous and systematic business contacts, such as deliberately using its web

site “to conduct commercial transactions on a sustained basis with a substantial number of residents

of the forum.” 633 F.3d at 1243 (emphasis omitted). There is no evidence that Executive Aircraft

specifically directed its advertising to NewMexico orthat the advertisements drummed up any work

in New Mexico. Because it is contrary to Shrader v. Biddinger’s principles that “advertizing in

nationally distributed magazines does not support general jurisdiction”; that “engaging in commerce

with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical

presence within the state’s borders”; and that a plaintiff must show that the defendant “has actually

and deliberately used its website to conduct commercial transactions on a sustained basis with a

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substantial number of residents of the forum,” 633 F.3d at 1243-44 & n.6 (emphasis original), the

Court is concerned that the conclusion suggested in Roberts v. Piper Aircraft that advertising in a

national trade magazine which reaches New Mexico and that performing a limited amount of work

outside New Mexico for New Mexico residents -- satisfies the federal Due Process Clause’s

minimum-contacts test for general personal jurisdiction. 

The Court concludes that, under Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc. and Shrader

v. Biddinger, Raffile cannot show that Executive Aircraft’s general advertising on web sites or in

national trade magazines are sufficient minimum contacts to support general personal jurisdiction

over it. 

At the hearing, Raffile submitted two additional exhibits in support of her claim that the

Court has personal jurisdiction over Executive Aircraft. Exhibit 14 is Morrell’s affidavit. In it,

Morrell states that he “had just purchased the Beech aircraft, N4334W, from Barron Thomas

Aviation and I had some maintenance performed on the aircraft, by Executive Aircraft Maintenance,

while I was still in the Phoenix area.” Affidavit of Christopher Morrell ¶ 2, at 1 (executed

November 15, 2011). He “chose the mechanic that did the maintenance on the Beech Aircraft[,]

partly because the mechanic was also a flight instructor who gave me a check out in the airplane.” 

Morrell Aff. ¶ 3, at 1. After the maintenance was complete, Morrell began his flight back to

Connecticut, but “[p]rior to leaving . . . I informed the mechanic at [Executive Aircraft] that I would

be flying across the southern U.S. and then up the east coast to Connecticut . . . [and] that I would

be flying over New Mexico.” Morrell Aff. ¶ 4, at 1; ¶ 5,at 2. 

Exhibit 15 is typewritten notes of a “phone interview of James Butler” taken on July 15,

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2009 by “Inspector Donald D. Halbert, ABQ FSDO.”5

 It states that Butler, who worked for

Executive Aircraft, “talked to the pilot before he left” and that the pilot told him he “planned to

follow Interstate 40 to Amarillo, TX, [to] spend the night . . . .” Raffile’s counsel obliquely argued

at the hearing that these two exhibits demonstrate not only foreseeability, but that the presence of

the Beechcraft in New Mexico was not “fortuitous,” thereby distinguishing it from the negative

ruling in World-Wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson. See Tr. at 15:5-16:21, 19:9-15 (Heath).

World-Wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson is a products-liability case, in which the Supreme

Court used a stream-of-commerce analysis that does not appear to be applicable to Executive

Aircraft or Saunders.6

 See 444 U.S. at 297-98 (“The forum State does not exceed its powers under

the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products

5

 Raffile’s counsel did not state who Inspector Donald D. Halbert is, but the Court assumes

that he is the FAA inspector who investigated the crash.

6

Although Raffile brings her action for strict-products-liability against “all defendants,” New

Mexico follows the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which provides:

Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective

Products

(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products

who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to

persons or property caused by the product defect.

(b) A product is defective if, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a

manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of

inadequate instructions or warnings.

Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 123 N.M. 170, 174, 936 P.2d 852, 856 (Ct. App.

1997). Because no facts indicate that either Executive Aircraft or Saunders are engaged in the

business of selling or distributing airplanes, or that Executive Aircraft manufactured any part of the

aircraft, it appears that they cannot be held liable for a manufacturing defect in the Beechcraft under

this theory. Cases discussing general personal jurisdiction over manufacturers or companies that

place a defective product into the stream of commerce are therefore distinguishable.

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 21 of 26
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the

forum State.”). Even if the stream-of-commerce analysis applied, however, as the Tenth Circuit

noted, 

[a]bsent at least the seller’s foreknowledge that the buyer was going to take the

product into a particular forum, the defendant cannot reasonably be said to have

purposefully directed its activities at the forum. The defendant’s only contact, the

presence of its product in the forum, is the result of the act of someone else and not

the defendant’s own intentional conduct.

Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d at 1074. Telling an employee of

Executive Aircraft where he was going to fly after Executive Aircraft had repaired the Beechcraft

says little about what Executive Aircraft knew about the use of the plane in New Mexico when it

signed a contract with a Connecticut resident to repair an airplane, and repaired the airplane in

Arizona. According to Raffile’s Complaint, when Executive Aircraft made the repairs, Morrell did

not own the airplane. There is no indication either in the Morrell affidavit or in the Inspector’s notes

that, before Executive Aircraft agreed to service and repair the Beechcraft for Morrell, that

Executive Aircraft knew that Morrell was definitely going to purchase the airplane and intended to

later fly the plane over New Mexico, or that Executive Aircraft intentionally directed its allegedly

negligent conduct toward New Mexico.

The Court will, pursuant to rule 12(b)(2), dismiss Raffile’s claims against Executive Aircraft

because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Executive Aircraft.

B. THE COURT WILL DENY RAFFILE’S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY.

At the November 15, 2011 hearing, Raffile’s counsel requested a 120-day discovery period

in which to attempt to find contracts showing that Executive Aircraft has repaired aircraft for New

Mexico residents. See Tr. at 17:1-7 (Heath). The Court concludes that, not only is this request

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 22 of 26
untimely, given that Plaintiff has had over five months to make such a request and allowed the

briefing period to pass without making such a request, but that this fishing expedition would not

likely result in evidence to show that Executive Aircraft initiated the kinds of continuous,

systematic, and substantial commercial contacts that would give rise to general jurisdiction over it. 

See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d at 1243 (stating that “engaging in commerce with residents of

the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within

the state’s borders”). Raffile did not request further discovery regarding Saunders’ contacts with

New Mexico. Of course, if Raffile discovers, in its discovery against the remaining Defendant, more

evidence that suggests specific jurisdiction over Executive Aircraft or Saunders, she may move the

Court to reconsider or re-add Executive Aircraft and/or Saunders.

II. NEW MEXICO DOES NOT HAVE GENERAL OR SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

OVER SAUNDERS.

As noted above, Raffile’s Complaint states only that Saunders is a resident of Nevada, see

Complaint ¶ 4, at 2, and that Defendant Barron Thomas Scottsdale, LLC sold the Beechcraft to

Morrell on Saunders’ “behalf,” Complaint ¶ 20, at 6. Raffile has not submitted any additional facts

or evidence to suggest that Saunders had the minimum contacts with New Mexico to satisfy due

process. See Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d at 1070 & n.4. At the

hearing, Raffile’s counsel did not attempt to rebut Saunder’s contention that Raffile had alleged

nothing to show that Saunder “had any contact with New Mexico, much less minimal contacts to

give the court jurisdiction under the due-process clause of the constitution.” Tr. at 7:17-19 (Racca). 

Saunders’ attorney represented during the hearing that he had sold the plane to Barron Thomas and

that the relevant transaction was between Barron Thomas and Morrell. See Tr. at 8:4-16 (Court,

Racca). Raffile’s counsel stated that his understanding of Saunders’ involvement in the case was

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that he made a “consignment sale,” and, if Saunders’ representation about his involvement were true,

it changed “the shape of the case for just Mr. Saundersindividually.” Tr. at 19:4-8 (Heath). Raffile

conceded that, “if Saunders had transferred title to this Arizona firm and they sold it, I suppose that

would be a bird of a different feet there.” Tr. at 19:8-10 (Heath). In response to a question from the

Court about exercising personal jurisdiction over Saunders, Raffile’s counsel conceded: “I’m not

sure we could, Judge.” Tr. at 19:11-21 (Court, Heath). Thus, if the facts are as Saunders represents,

Raffile appears to concede there is no personal jurisdiction; and if the facts are as Raffile thought

they were before she filed suit, there is no jurisdiction because New Mexico does not have general

jurisdiction over him, and, on the record before the Court, Saunders did not purposefully direct any

actions towards New Mexico. Because she has failed to meet her burden of establishing personal

jurisdiction over Saunders, the Court will, pursuant to rule 12(b)(2), dismiss Raffile’s claims against

Saunders. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Saunders. 

IT IS ORDERED that: (i) Defendant Executive Aircraft Maintenance’s Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 4); and (ii) Defendant Steven W. Saunders’ Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 12, Ex. A at 16-19), are granted. Raffile’s claims

against them will be dismissed without prejudice.

________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Counsel:

Steven Errante

Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Errante, P.C.

New Haven, Connecticut

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 24 of 26
--and--

Patrick E. Bailey 

Keith Lovendosky

Bailey & Partners, P.C.

Santa Monica, California

--and--

Turner W. Branch

Frank V. Balderrama 

Branch Law Firm

Albuquerque, New Mexico

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

Mark G. Worischeck

Shanks Leonhardt

Sanders & Parks, P.C.

Phoenix, Arizona

--and--

R. Nelson Franse

Lisa Chavez Ortega 

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. 

Albuquerque, New Mexico

Attorneys for Defendant Executive Aircraft Maintenance

Barron Thomas 

Barron Thomas Scottsdale, LLC

Scottsdale, Arizona

Defendant pro se

Jerry Daniel Herrera 

Albuquerque, New Mexico

--and--

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Case 2:12-cv-00365-DGC Document 30 Filed 12/03/11 Page 25 of 26
Greg J. Racca

Racca Law Firm

Albuquerque, New Mexico

Attorneys for Defendant Steven W. Saunders

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