Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00185/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILMA L. KOPF, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, 

a Delaware Limited Liability 

Company; REAL TIME 

RESOLUTIONS, INC., a Texas 

corporations; and DOES 1 through 

100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-185 BTM-BLM

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

[ECF NOS. 4, 6]

Defendants Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”) and Real Time 

Resolutions, Inc. (“Real Time”) have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff Wilma L. 

Kopf’s Complaint. (ECF Nos. 4, 6). For the reasons discussed below, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims that she obtained two mortgage loans (“First Mortgage” and 

“Second Mortgage”), secured by real property, that were serviced by Defendants. 

Nationstar serviced the First Mortgage while Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 

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(“Countrywide”) serviced the Second Mortgage. (ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 6, 7). 

On October 7, 2011, Countrywide subsequently transferred servicing of the 

Second Mortgage to Real Time, who then transferred servicing to Nationstar. Id. ¶ 

8. 

On November 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id. ¶ 9. On 

February 19, 2014, Plaintiff received a discharge from the debts that resulted from 

the First Mortgage and Second Mortgage. Id. ¶ 10. Subsequent to the discharge, 

Nationstar and Real Time sent Plaintiff billing statements demanding payment 

toward the discharged debt. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. Plaintiff did not enter into a reaffirmation 

agreement with Nationstar or Real Time. Id. ¶ 15. 

On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, alleging two causes of 

action against Defendants: (1) violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) and (2) violation 

of 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Id. ¶¶ 17, 27. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)

11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) provides that a discharge “operates as an injunction 

against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of 

process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability 

of the debtor.” Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ billing statements, mailed 

subsequent to the discharge, violate § 524 and demands relief in the form of an 

injunction and damages. Compl. at 11-12. However, this Court is not the 

appropriate forum for Plaintiff’s demands.

The Ninth Circuit has “previously ruled after significant discussion that the 

availability of contempt proceedings under § 105 for violation of a discharge 

injunction under § 524 does not create a private right of action for damages.” 

Barrientos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 633 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011).”[T]he 

Bankruptcy Rules require that an action for contempt arising out of the violation of 

an order issued in a bankruptcy case must be brought by motion in the bankruptcy 

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case.” Id. at 1189; see also Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 507, 

510 (9th Cir. 2002) (“we cannot say that Congress intended to create a private 

right of action under § 524, and we shall not imply one” because “contempt is the 

appropriate remedy and no further remedy is necessary”).

Because Plaintiff may not litigate an alleged violation of § 524 against 

Defendants outside of a bankruptcy proceeding, the Court grants Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss as to this cause of action.

B. 15 U.S.C. § 1692, FDCPA

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated §§ 1692(d), (e)(2), (e)(8), and 

(e)(10) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) “by engaging in 

conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any 

person,” “by falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of any 

debt,” “by communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit 

information which is known or should be known to be false, including the failure to 

communicate that a disputed debt is disputed,” and “by the use of any false 

representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to 

obtain information concerning a consumer.” Compl. ¶¶ 35-38. However, Plaintiff’s 

factual allegations indicate that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is predicated on the alleged 

§ 524 violation, as Plaintiff merely realleges, accompanied by no additional facts,

the same billing statements sent by Defendants that form the basis of her § 524 

cause of action. See Compl. ¶¶ 30, 32. 

Where a “FDCPA claim is based on an alleged violation of § 524,” the 

“simultaneous FDCPA claim is precluded.” Walls, 276 F.3d at 510-11. “To permit 

a simultaneous claim under the FDCPA would allow through the back door what 

[a plaintiff] cannot accomplish through the front door—a private right of action. This 

would circumvent the remedial scheme of the Code under which Congress struck 

a balance between the interests of debtors and creditors by permitting (and 

limiting) debtors' remedies for violating the discharge injunction to contempt.” Id.

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at 510. To the extent that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is based on Defendants’ violation 

of § 524, it is precluded. See Gadomski v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 2018 WL 1243579, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018) (“A plaintiff cannot base an FDCPA claim on a violation of 

the Bankruptcy Code because the Ninth Circuit has rejected attempts to use the 

FDCPA as remedy for a Bankruptcy Code violation.”).

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss on this cause of 

action.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss (ECF Nos. 4, 6). The Plaintiff shall have until October 1, 2018 to file an 

Amended Complaint only as to the FDCPA claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2018 

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