Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00910/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00910-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1

 Unless otherwise noted, the facts have been taken from plaintiff’s amended complaint and

opposition. Defendant Esprit US has not disputed any of these facts for present purposes.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEVI STRAUSS & CO.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ESPRIT US DISTRIBUTION, LTD. et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-910 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE

STATEMENT 

Defendant Esprit US Distribution, Ltd. has filed a motion for a more definite statement pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). The motion is currently scheduled for hearing on April 4,

2008. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without

oral argument, and hereby VACATES the hearing. Having considered the papers submitted, the Court

hereby DENIES defendant’s request.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

In November 2004, plaintiff Levi Strauss and Company (“LS&CO.”) and defendants Esprit US

Distribution, Ltd., Esprit International, Esprit Wholesale GmbH, Esprit De Corp. France S.A., Esprit

Belgie Wholesale N.V., and Esprit Belgie Retail N.V. (collectively “Esprit”), entered into a worldwide

settlement agreement which resolved a dispute concerning defendants’ use of a number of “pocket labels

and/or stitching designs . . . that LS&CO. alleges violate its rights in the Tab and Arcuate Trademarks.”

Case 3:07-cv-00910-SI Document 85 Filed 03/28/08 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2

Compl. Ex. D at 2. By its terms, the scope of the settlement agreement “is worldwide and shall bind

and inure to the benefit of the parties, their affiliates, subsidiaries, assignees, licensees, successors,

officers, directors, and employees.” Id. at 3. The settlement agreement contains copies of the Tab and

Arcuate Trademarks and registration of these trademarks in various jurisdictions. Id. In the settlement

agreement, defendants represented and warranted the following:

[N]o later than August 1, 2004, they will permanently discontinue importing,

manufacturing, having manufactured, distributing, advertising, promoting, displaying,

offering for sale or selling bottoms (including without limitation jeans, pants, shorts and

skirts) that display any of the stitching designs in the form and placement illustrated in

[various exhibits], and/or any of the tabs in the form and placement illustrated in [various

exhibits]. 

Id. Attached to the agreement are exhibits with photographs of the specific Esprit stitching and tab

designs at issue. Defendants also agreed to the following:

[T]hey will not thereafter manufacture, have manufactured, import, distribute, advertise,

promote, offer for sale, sell or display, anywhere in the world: 

a. Bottoms that display any stitching design in the form and placement

illustrated in [various exhibits], or any de minimus variation thereof;

and/or

b. Bottoms that display any tab in the form and placement illustrated in

[various exhibits], or any de minimus variation thereof . . . .

Id. at 4. This portion of the agreement referred to the same attached exhibits with photographs of the

specific Esprit stitching and tab designs at issue. 

The settlement agreement also provides for a procedure by which defendants can submit

proposed designs to plaintiff for prior approval, and “[i]f LS&CO. indicates that it does not object to

use of the design, then the future use of such design by [defendants] shall not be deemed to violate any

provision of [the] Agreement and [plaintiff] shall not challenge such use by [defendants] in any forum.”

Id. at 5-6. The settlement agreement contains exhibits of Esprit designs to which plaintiff did not object

and which plaintiff agreed not to oppose or otherwise challenge. Id. at 6. The settlement agreement

includes a notice provision requiring plaintiff to give notice to defendants with 90 days to cure before

Case 3:07-cv-00910-SI Document 85 Filed 03/28/08 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

3

commencing any legal action or proceeding, if it believes defendants are in violation of the agreement

or of plaintiff’s rights in the Arcuate trademark. Id. at 6. The settlement agreement was signed by all

of the defendants in this action, plus an Esprit entity located in Canada. Id. at 11-12.

In August 2006, plaintiff discovered in France an Esprit stitching design that is allegedly

prohibited by the settlement agreement. On September 14, 2006, and again on October 20, 2006,

plaintiff notified defendants of this alleged violation, and defendants did not respond. In February 2007,

plaintiff filed this action for infringement of its mark and breach of the settlement agreement. In

November 2007, plaintiff’s counsel reviewed defendants’ websites and discovered additional designs

that allegedly “violate the 2004 agreement, infringe [plaintiff’s] rights in its Arcuate trademark, or

both.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. On February 8, 2008, plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint. On February

28, 2008, defendant Esprit US Distribution, Ltd. (“Esprit US”) filed the instant motion for a more

definite statement on behalf of itself only. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant Esprit US contends that plaintiff failed to satisfy the notice requirement of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) because its allegations regarding defendants’ alleged trademark

infringement are vague and ambiguous. Plaintiff argues that it has specifically identified the trademark

allegedly being infringed as well as the allegedly infringing products at issue and has fully met its

burden of notice pleading under the Federal Rules. 

Although Rule 8(a) requires only a short and plain statement of the relevant facts, the plaintiff

must set forth the theory of the case “with enough detail to guide discovery.” McHenry v. Renne, 84

F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) addresses the unfair burden that

Case 3:07-cv-00910-SI Document 85 Filed 03/28/08 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2

 Rule 12(e) states: 

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive

pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably

prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and

must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a

more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the

order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any

other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

4

complex or confusing complaints impose on litigants and judges.2

 See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179 (more

definite statement warranted when complaint failed to indicate which wrongs were committed by which

defendants). A defendant may move for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e), “but only

when a pleading ‘is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a

responsive pleading.’” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 290 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 1961) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(e)). Furthermore, Rule 12(e) is not intended to be a substitute for discovery. See id. (finding the

materials “sought to be produced were evidentiary in character and not necessary or appropriate for

pleading under the system of pleading provided by the Federal Rules”); see also Agilent Techs., Inc. v.

Micromuse, Inc., 2004 WL 2346152 *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[M]otions pursuant to Rule 12(e) are

generally disfavored where prompt resort to discovery may provide an adequate means for ascertaining

relevant facts . . . .”); Lincoln Labs., Inc. v. Savage Labs., Inc., 26 F.R.D. 141, 142-43 (D. Del. 1960)

(“It is not the function of 12(e) to provide greater particularization of information alleged in the

complaint or which presents a proper subject for discovery.”).

Here, Esprit US contends that the complaint is vague and ambiguous because: (1) it fails to

identify which version and registration of plaintiff’s trademark is allegedly being infringed; (2) it fails

to sufficiently identify which Esprit stitching designs are at issue; (3) it fails to distinguish between

Esprit designs that are allegedly “de minimus variations” of prohibited designs from the settlement

agreement, and Esprit designs that are otherwise allegedly prohibited by the settlement agreement; and

Case 3:07-cv-00910-SI Document 85 Filed 03/28/08 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

3

 Plaintiff has already agreed to provide Esprit US with legible copies of the infringing designs,

so the Court will not address this issue.

4

 Esprit US’ assertion that it needs to know which version or registration of the trademark has

allegedly been infringed is without merit. The Arcuate trademark design is the same for each

registration and version of that trademark. The only apparent difference is the jurisdiction in which the

Arcuate trademark has been registered. The specific jurisdictions in which the alleged Arcuate

trademark infringement has occurred can be determined through discovery.

5

(4) it fails to identify which Esprit entity is responsible for the particular infringing use in the breach of

settlement cause of action.3 

However, the Court finds that the complaint is not unintelligible and does provide defendants

with sufficient notice of the allegedly infringing Esprit designs and the trademark allegedly being

infringed for Esprit US to form a responsive pleading. See Lincoln Labs., Inc., 26 F.R.D. at 143

(“Where the information sought is not necessary to frame a responsive pleading, which might be a

general denial or a disclaimer of knowledge of the alleged facts, a 12(e) motion should not be granted.”).

 First, the complaint specifically identifies the Arcuate Stitching Design Trademark as the

trademark being infringed, and provides clear examples of its use on plaintiff’s jeans. This is the only

trademark design allegedly being infringed.4

 Furthermore, the Settlement Agreement provides specific

examples of Esprit designs that defendants agreed to discontinue, and of which defendants agreed to not

produce “de minimus variations.” It also provided specific examples of the Esprit designs to which

plaintiff had no objection. Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint provides sufficient notice

as to which trademarked design is allegedly being infringed.

Second, the complaint provides Esprit US with sufficient notice of which Esprit designs are at

issue. The complaint alleges that defendants “ha[ve] in the past and continue[] to manufacture, source,

market and/or sell jeans around the world that display designs on the rear pockets that are confusingly

similar to LS&CO.’s Arcuate trademark and/or are prohibited by the 2004 Settlement Agreement or are

de minimus variations of designs prohibited by the 2004 Settlement Agreement.” Thus, the complaint

Case 3:07-cv-00910-SI Document 85 Filed 03/28/08 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

6

provides Esprit US with notice that it is being sued for infringing designs on the rear pocket of jeans.

Furthermore, the complaint specifies in its Exhibit C the specific Esprit designs which allegedly infringe

upon the Arcuate Trademark. Exhibit C to the complaint contains twenty high-quality color copies of

Esprit rear jean pocket designs. That plaintiff does not limit its complaint to the designs shown in

Exhibit C does not render the complaint vague and ambiguous, but leaves plaintiff with the ability to

seek a remedy for additional allegedly infringing Esprit designs that may come to light through

discovery. Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint provides sufficient notice of which Esprit

stitching designs are at issue. See Agilent Techs., Inc., 2004 WL 2346152 at *5 (noting cases that stand

for the proposition “that a pleading need not identify every infringing product where some other limiting

parameter has been set forth or at least one purportedly infringing product has been identified”). Any

further detail required to determine which Esprit designs are allegedly “de minimus variations” of the

prohibited Esprit designs listed in the settlement agreement, and which Esprit designs allegedly

otherwise violate the settlement agreement and/or the Arcuate Trademark, can be ascertained through

discovery. See CMAX, Inc., 290 F.2d at 738.

Finally, the cause of action for breach of the settlement agreement provides sufficient notice of

which Esprit entity is being sued for what. It specifically alleges that all defendants are jointly and

severally liable for the following:

breach[ing] the terms of [Esprit’s] obligations under the 2004 Settlement Agreement by

manufacturing, distributing, marketing and/or selling jeans that display designs on the

rear pockets that are attached to the Agreement or are de minimus variations of designs

attached to the Agreement, and then refusing to meet and confer after having been given

notice.

Compl. ¶ 53. Thus each Esprit defendant is being sued for every Esprit design that allegedly violates

the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Court finds the complaint sufficiently clear on this point.

///

Case 3:07-cv-00910-SI Document 85 Filed 03/28/08 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

7

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES defendant’s motion for a more definite

statement [Docket No. 78].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2008 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00910-SI Document 85 Filed 03/28/08 Page 7 of 7