Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-01111/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-01111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Execution of Vaughan’s sentence was stayed pending resolution of his direct appeal.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

 _______________________________

ROLAND H. VAUGHAN *

Petitioner, *

 v. * 2:03-CV-1111-MEF

 (WO)

D.T. MARSHALL, et al., *

Respondents. * 

 _______________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Roland Vaughan [“Vaughan”], by and through counsel, filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition for habeas corpus relief on November 13, 2003. On March 15, 2002, a jury sitting

before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Alabama, found Vaughan guilty of failing

to disclose a conflict of interest, in violation of Ala. Code § 13A-10-62. The trial court

sentenced Vaughan on April 30, 2002 to a term of 12 months imprisonment in the

Montgomery County Detention Facility. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed

Vaughan on 12 months probation. The trial court also imposed 40 hours of community

service and a $2,000.00 fine.1

Vaughan appealed the conviction to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing

that (1) the compensation paid to him by the State did not constitute more than 50% of his

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In his response to Respondents’ answer, Vaughan disputes Respondents’ contention that he puts

forth five claims for federal review, stating instead, that his petition sets out only three claims, i.e., that

Ala. Code § 13A-10-62 is void for vagueness, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and

the indictment failed to provide adequate notice of the nature and cause of the accusation again him. 

(Doc. No. 16, pgs. 2-3.) In this same response, Vaughan states that he withdraws the third claim, i.e., that

the indictment was insufficient. (Id. at pg. 3.) The court, therefore, will only address Vaughan’s claims

that the statute under which he was indicted is void for vagueness and the evidence against him was

insufficient to sustain his conviction. 

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income, and thus, under the definition of “public employee” in the Alabama ethics law, his

indictment failed to charge the offense of conflict of interest; (2) his indictment was void

because it failed to adequately place him on notice of the nature of the conflict of interest

with which he was charged ; (3) the statute making it a criminal offense for failing to disclose

a conflict of interest was unconstitutionally vague; (4) the trial court’s jury instruction

regarding definition of “substantial discretionary function” was misleading; and (5) the

evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The appellate court, in a lengthy, wellreasoned opinion, affirmed the trial court’s judgment in its entirety on June 27, 2003, and

Vaughan’s application for rehearing was denied August 15, 2003. The Alabama Supreme

Court denied Vaughan’s petition for writ of certiorari on November 7, 2003. (Doc. Nos. 1,

15 Exhs. 2-5.)

 In the instant application for habeas relief, Vaughan presents the following two issues

for review:2

1. Ala. Code § 13A-10-62 is void for vagueness; and

2. The evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. 

II. DISCUSSION

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A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982), before a Petitioner may seek habeas

relief in federal court, he must exhaust each claim presented to the federal court by pursuing

remedies available in state court. This exhaustion requirement is satisfied by seeking review

of the claim in the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider the claim. O'Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838 (1999); 28 U.S.C. §2254(b) and (c). In Alabama, this may be

accomplished by raising certain claims on direct appeal and by way of post-conviction

proceedings. Exhaustion is not required if, at the time a federal habeas corpus petition is

filed, petitioner has no available state remedy. Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 297-98

(1989). Here, Vaughan raised all his current arguments in the state court and, therefore,

exhausted his state court remedies for the purposes of federal habeas review.

B. Disposition of Claims

In their answer, Respondents maintain that Vaughan’s claims were properly

adjudicated on the merits by the state courts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05

(2000). Petitioner filed a response to the answer of Respondents. (Doc. No. 16.) Upon

review of the § 2254 petition, the answer of Respondents, and Vaughan’s response, the court

concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required and that the petition is due to be denied in

accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United

States District Courts.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court; or

(2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

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C. Standard of Review

To prevail on his § 2254 claims, Vaughan must show that a decision by the Alabama

state courts was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts, in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2);3 see Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court’s

decision can be “contrary to” federal law either (1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling

authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts “materially

indistinguishable” from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result.

Id. at 405-06. A state court’s decision can involve an “unreasonable application” of federal

law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of

facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend a clearly

established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Id. at

407. “Federal habeas relief is available under the ‘unreasonable application’ standard only

if the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively

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unreasonable.’” Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at

409). It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision

that this court must decide. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. A responsible, thoughtful

decision that is made after a full opportunity to litigate suffices, “even if it is wrong.” Lindh

v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).

Further, a state court’s determinations of fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the

habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear

and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “However, the statutory presumption

of correctness applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to mixed

determinations of law and fact.” Parker, 244 F.3d at 835 (citing McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d

962, 971 (11th Cir. 1994)). 

D. The Void for Vagueness Claim

Vaughan argues that Ala. Code § 13A-10-62 is unconstitutionally vague because (1)

the term “substantial discretionary authority” is not defined in the Code and (2) it fails to

provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand what conduct it

prohibits. Under § 13A-10-62(a), a public servant commits the crime of failing to disclose

a conflict of interest “if he exercises any substantial discretionary function in connection with

a government contract, purchase, payment or other pecuniary transaction without advance

public disclosure of a known potential conflicting interest in the transaction.” “A ‘potential

conflicting interest’ exists, but is not limited to, when the public servant is a director,

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In its opinion, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals spelled Petitioner’s name “Vaughn.” For

purposes of this opinion, when not quoting the decision of the appellate court, the undersigned uses the

spelling of Petitioner’s name as it is reflected in the pleadings before the court, i.e. “Vaughan.”

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president, general manager or similar executive officer, or owns directly or indirectly a

substantial portion of any non-governmental entity participating in the transaction.” Ala.

Code § 13A-10-62 (b). “Public disclosure includes public announcement or notification to

a superior officer or the Attorney General.” Ala. Code § 13A-10-62 (c).

During Vaughan’s appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that Ala.

Code § 13A-10-62 was not unconstitutionally vague. Vaughan now argues that the appellate

court’s decision was incorrect because the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly

established the void for vagueness doctrine, and the state court’s decision was “contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of” that doctrine. 

A review of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision demonstrates that the

appellate court applied the correct law as established by the United States Supreme Court and

that its decision was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application” of that law. The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated in its opinion:4

“‘The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New

Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is

the basis for striking down legislation which contains

insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United

States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29, 83

S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963).

“ ‘Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility

should not attach where one could not reasonably understand

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that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v.

Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811, 98 L.Ed. 989,

996 (1954). A vague statute does not give adequate “notice of

the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties,”

Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct.

329, 330, 96 L.Ed. 367, 371 (195[2] ), is not “sufficiently

focused to forewarn of both its reach and coverage,” United

States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. at 33,

83 S.Ct. at 598, 9 L.Ed.2d at 566, and “may trap the innocent by

not providing fair warning,” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408

U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972).

“ ‘As the United States Supreme Court observed in Winters v.

New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948):

“‘“There must be ascertainable standards of guilt.

Men of common intelligence cannot be required

to guess at the meaning of the enactment. The

vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to

persons within the scope of the act, or in regard to

the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.”

 “‘333 U.S. at 515-16, 68 S.Ct. at 670, 92 [L.Ed.

at] 849-50 [citations omitted].’

“McCrary v. State, 429 So.2d 1121, 1123-24

(Ala.Cr.App.1982), cert. denied,464 U.S. 913, 104 S.Ct. 273, 78

L.Ed.2d 254 (1983).”

McCall v. State, 565 So.2d 1163, 1165 (Ala.Crim.App.1990).

“‘ “As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires

that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct

is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.

352 [357], 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)

(citations omitted). A statute challenged for vagueness must

therefore be scrutinized to determine whether it provides both

fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and

minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that

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proscription. See Kolender, supra; Grayned v. City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).’”

Timmons v. City of Montgomery, 641 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1993),

quoting McCorkle v. State, 446 So.2d 684, 685 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).

However,

“‘“[t]his prohibition against excessive vagueness does not

invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could

have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes will

have some inherent vagueness, for ‘[i]n most English words and

phrases there lurk uncertainties.’ Robinson v. United States, 324

U.S. 282, 286, 65 S.Ct. 666, 668, 89 L.Ed. 944 (1945). Even

trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal

dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say

with any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid.”’”

Sterling v. State, 701 So.2d 71, 73 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), quoting Culbreath

v. State, 667 So.2d 156, 158 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), abrogated on other grounds

by Hayes v. State, 717 So.2d 30 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), quoting in turn, Rose

v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975).

“‘Mere difficulty of ascertaining its meaning or the fact that it is susceptible

of different interpretations will not render a statute or ordinance too vague or

uncertain to be enforced.’” Scott & Scott, Inc. v. City of Mountain Brook, 844

So.2d 577, 589 (Ala.2002), quoting City of Birmingham v. Samford, 274 Ala.

367, 372, 149 So.2d 271, 275 (1963). The judicial power to declare a statute

void for vagueness “should be exercised only when a statute is so incomplete,

so irreconcilably conflicting, or so vague or indefinite, that it cannot be

executed, and the court is unable, by the application of known and accepted

rules of construction, to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty,

what the legislature intended.” Jansen v. State ex rel. Downing, 273 Ala. 166,

170, 137 So.2d 47, 50 (1962).

Contrary to Vaughn’s contention, as noted in Part I.A. of this opinion, § 13A10-62 clearly governs conduct by public servants, and the term public servant

is plainly and unambiguously defined in §§ 13A-10-60(b)(3) and 13A-10-1(7),

Ala.Code 1975. In addition, although the term “substantial discretionary

function” is not specifically defined in the criminal code, we do not find this

to be fatal. See, e.g., State v. Randall, 669 So.2d 223, 226 (Ala. Crim. App.

1995) (holding that Alabama’s stalking law, § 13A-6-90 et seq., Ala.Code

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1975, was not void for vagueness, even though the terms “repeatedly” and

“series” were not specifically defined); Musgrove v. State, 519 So.2d 565,

582-83 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd, 519 So.2d 586 (Ala. 1986)(holding that the

kidnapping statute, § 13A-6-43, Ala.Code 1975, was not void for vagueness,

even though the term “terrorize” was not specifically defined); and Farris v.

State, 432 So.2d 538, 539-40 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that § 13A-7-

44, Ala.Code 1975, criminal possession of explosives, was not void for

vagueness, even though the term “explosives” was not specifically defined).

Compare McCorkle, 446 So.2d at 685 (holding that § 13A-14-1, Ala.Code

1975, was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define the term “legal

duty” which, the Court said, had “several established meanings”).

“It is well accepted that a court, in interpreting a statute, will give words used

therein their ‘“natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.”’”

State v. Randall, 669 So.2d at 226, quoting Ex parte Etowah County Board of

Education, 584 So.2d 528, 530 (Ala. 1991).

“‘Although penal statutes are to be strictly construed, courts are

not required to abandon common sense. Absent any indication

to the contrary, the words must be given their ordinary and

normal meaning.’”

Musgrove, 519 So.2d at 582, quoting Walker v. State, 428 So.2d 139, 141

(Ala. Crim. App. 1982).

The commentary to § 13A-10-62 provides, in part: “The public servant must

be in a position to ‘exercise any substantial discretionary function,’ e.g.,

approve a contract, negotiate the terms, etc.” This is the only indication in the

Code of the scope of the term substantial discretionary function and this list of

examples is clearly not exhaustive. Thus, we must look to the ordinary and

common meaning of the terms. “Discretionary function” or “discretionary act”

is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 467 (6th ed.1996), as “[t]hose acts

wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to [the] course of conduct that one

must or must not take” and “[o]ne which requires exercise in judgment and

choice and involves what is just and proper under the circumstances.” FN9

“Substantial” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1428 (6th ed. 1996), as

“[o]f real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable ···

[s]omething worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or

merely nominal” and as being “[s]ynonomous with material.” The trial court

instructed the jury on these commonly understood definitions in its oral

charge.FN10

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FN9. This term is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 479 (7th

ed.1999), as “[a] deed involving an exercise of personal

judgment and conscience.”

FN10. See Part III of this opinion.

When the ordinary and common meaning of the term “substantial discretionary

function” is applied to this statute as well as the definitions of “public servant”

and “potential conflicting interest,” it is clear that § 13A-10-62 governs the

conduct of any person acting as an advisor or consultant to the government in

performing a governmental function and that it prohibits any such person who

is exercising his or her judgment and choice on a matter material to any

government contract, purchase, payment, or other pecuniary transaction from

owning directly or indirectly a substantial portion of any non-governmental

entity involved in that government contract, purchase, payment, or pecuniary

transaction. 

 Section 13A-10-62 defines the offense of failing to disclose a conflict of

interest with sufficient definitiveness that ordinary people are provided fair

warning of what conduct is prohibited and who falls within the scope of the

statute. Therefore, we hold that § 13A-10-62 is not unconstitutionally void as

being vague.

(Doc. No. 15, Exh. 4 at pgs. 38-45.)

In this case, Vaughan has failed to demonstrate how the state court’s decision

constituted an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. He argues that §13A-10-62

is so vague as to prevent people of ordinary intelligence from knowing what actions are legal

and which are illegal. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, however, determined that

the statute in question clearly governs conduct by public servants, as such term is plainly and

unambiguously defined in § 13A-10-60(b)(3) and § 13A-10-1(7), and that while the term

“substantial discretionary function” is not specifically defined in the Alabama criminal code,

when the ordinary and common meaning of “substantial discretionary function” is applied

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to the statute along with the definitions of “public servant” and “potential conflicting

interest,” § 13A-10-62 is not so vague that a person of common intelligence would not be on

fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. Thus, despite Vaughan’s arguments to the contrary,

the court agrees with the state court that the term “substantial discretionary function” is not

so vague as to make this statute unconstitutional. 

In this situation, Vaughan has failed to establish, and this court cannot find, that the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court law. The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals cited the correct legal standards for the void for vagueness doctrine as established

by the Supreme Court and its application of those standards was not unreasonable.

Accordingly, Vaughan is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his void for vagueness claim.

E. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim.

Vaughan’s second argument is that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain

his conviction for failing to disclose a conflict of interest. He maintains that there was no

substantial evidence tending to prove all the elements of the offense charged and that the

evidence in the case was so lacking that no rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond

a reasonable doubt that the State had proven every element of the offense. As a result,

Vaughan now argues that the state court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to

sustain his conviction was incorrect because the Supreme Court has clearly established the

legal standard for assessing such claims and the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of” this precedent and constituted “an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a criminal conviction

“except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Under § 2254 , habeas relief on a claim of

insufficient evidence is appropriate only “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced

at trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781

(1990).

But this inquiry does not require a court to “ask itself whether it

believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” ... [I]nstead, the relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-319. Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by

state law. Id. at 324 n.16.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals conducted a thorough analysis of the

evidence in the record and concluded that there was sufficient proof of guilt of each of the

elements of failing to disclose a conflict of interest. The appellate court stated in its opinion:

“‘In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a

reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State,

accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence

in a light most favorable to the prosecution.’” Ballenger v. State, 720 So.2d

1033, 1034 (Ala. Crim. App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State, 471 So.2d 485,

488 (Ala. Crim. App.1984), aff'd, 471 So.2d 493 (Ala.1985). “‘The test used

in determining the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is whether,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational

finder of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

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doubt.’” Nunn v. State, 697 So.2d 497, 498 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), quoting

O'Neal v. State, 602 So.2d 462, 464 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). “‘When there is

legal evidence from which the jury could, by fair inference, find the defendant

guilty, the trial court should submit [the case] to the jury, and, in such a case,

this court will not disturb the trial court's decision.’” Farrior v. State, 728

So.2d 691, 696 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Ward v. State, 557 So.2d 848,

850 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). “The role of appellate courts is not to say what the

facts are. Our role ... is to judge whether the evidence is legally sufficient to

allow submission of an issue for decision [by] the jury.” Ex parte Bankston,

358 So.2d 1040, 1042 (Ala.1978).

Moreover, any “inconsistencies and contradictions in the State’s evidence, as

well as [any] conflict between the State’s evidence and that offered by the

appellant, [goes] to the weight of the evidence and [creates a question] of fact

to be resolved by the jury.” Rowell v. State, 647 So.2d 67, 69-70 (Ala. Crim.

App.1994). “‘“[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight or probative force

of testimony is for the jury to judge and determine.”’” Johnson v. State, 555

So.2d 818, 820 (Ala.Crim.App.1989), quoting Harris v. State, 513 So.2d 79,

81 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), quoting in turn Byrd v. State, 24 Ala.App. 451, 451,

136 So. 431, 431 (1931). “We have repeatedly held that it is not the province

of this court to reweigh the evidence presented at trial.” Johnson, 555 So.2d

at 820. “‘When the jury has passed on the credibility of evidence tending to

establish the defendant’s guilt, this Court cannot disturb its finding.’” Rowell,

647 So.2d at 69, quoting Collins v. State, 412 So.2d 845, 846 (Ala. Crim.

App.1982). Furthermore, “‘[t]his Court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State, and “draw all reasonable inferences and resolve

all credibility choices in favor of the trier of fact.”’” D.L. v. State, 625 So.2d

1201, 1204, (Ala. Crim. App.1993), quoting Woodberry v. State, 497 So.2d

587, 590 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). 

To establish the offense of failing to disclose a conflict of interest under §

13A-10-62, the State was required to prove the following three elements: (1)

that Vaughn was a public servant; (2) that Vaughn exercised a substantial

discretionary function in connection with a government contract, purchase,

payment, or other pecuniary transaction; and (3) that Vaughn failed to provide

public disclosure of a known potential conflicting interest.

Vaughn makes three specific contentions. First, Vaughn contends that the State

failed to prove that he was a public servant because, he says, the State failed

to prove that the compensation he received from the State of Alabama for the

comparative site analysis constituted more than 50% of his income. However,

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as noted in Part I.A. of this opinion, whether the compensation paid to Vaughn

for the analysis constituted more than 50% of his income was not an element

of the offense of failing to disclose a conflict of interest under § 13A-10-62;

thus, the State did not have to prove that he received more than 50% of his

income from his fee for performing the comparative site analysis. “Public

servant” is defined in § 13A-10-1(7), Ala.Code 1975, as “[a]ny officer or

employee of government, including legislators and judges and any person or

agency participating as an advisor, consultant or otherwise in performing a

governmental function.” (Emphasis added.) The evidence was undisputed that

Vaughn was hired as a consultant to conduct a comparative site analysis for the

State of Alabama; thus, he clearly fell within the definition of a “public

servant.” FN14

FN14. In fact, Vaughn does not dispute that he falls within

the definition of “public servant” in § 13A-10-1(7); his only

argument is that he does not also fall within the definition of

“public employee” in § 36-25-1(23), Ala.Code 1975.

Second, Vaughn contends that the State failed to prove that he exercised a

substantial discretionary function because, he says, the analysis he submitted

to the State recommending the Ripley Street property for the warehouse

project was actually a collaborative recommendation by him and the two

agency heads - Randall Smith of the ABC Board and Shane Bailey of ADECA

- and that he never had any discretion in what site to recommend because

Smith and Bailey had already determined that the Ripley Street property was

the only site they wanted for the project.

The evidence showed that Vaughn was hired to perform a comparative site

analysis of three potential sites for the State of Alabama and to recommend a

site based on that analysis for the State of Alabama to purchase in order to

build a warehouse facility for the ABC Board and ADECA. Although Garver

testified that Vaughn had no discretion in which property to recommend by the

time he submitted his reports in October and December 2000 because, Garver

said, the decision had been made in July 2000 when Smith indicated that he

was not interested in the west Montgomery property and Bailey indicated that

he was not interested in the DYS property, both Bailey and Smith refuted

Garver's testimony. Bailey testified that both he and Smith were interested in

the DYS property and that they both thought that the DYS property was a good

prospect. In addition, both Bailey and Smith testified that no decision had been

made in the summer of 2000. Smith testified that, although the group was

“beginning to lean toward” the Ripley Street property in the summer of 2000,

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the decision had not actually been made and the other properties had not been

excluded from consideration. (R. 387.) In addition, Bailey specifically testified

that it was not until after “the analysis was complete and we were going to

compare the three sites and try to make a decision” that the State decided to

focus on the Ripley Street property. (R. 364.)

As noted above, conflicting evidence is for the jury to resolve, not for this

Court. Based on the testimony presented at trial, the jury could have

reasonably concluded that Vaughn’s analysis and recommendation was not the

result of Bailey and Smith’s deciding that the Ripley Street property was the

only alternative, but was, in fact, Vaughn’s recommendation based on the

exercise of his own judgment and choice and on what he felt was just and

proper under the circumstances, i.e., a discretionary act. Although there is no

doubt that input from Smith and Bailey regarding the needs of the ABC Board

and ADECA was of paramount importance in the analysis and

recommendation, there was evidence - specifically, Smith and Bailey’s

testimony - from which the jury could have concluded that it was Vaughn, and

not Smith and Bailey, who made the ultimate decision as to which property to

recommend to the State. In addition, the jury could have concluded from the

evidence that Vaughn’s analysis and recommendation was of value and

importance and was material to the State’s ultimate decision with respect to the

three parcels of property, i.e., that it was substantial. Therefore, we find that

there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the jury could have

reasonably concluded that Vaughn exercised a substantial discretionary

function when doing the comparative site analysis and recommendation.

Finally, Vaughn contends that the State failed to prove that he had a known

potential conflicting interest because, he says, even assuming that the site

analysis constituted a substantial discretionary function, he did not acquire any

interest in C & H investments until “well after the property had been selected

and after the State of Alabama had decided not to purchase the property.”

(Vaughn's brief at p. 44.) Vaughn’s argument in this regard is based on his

testimony at trial and Nolin’s testimony at trial that he did not purchase his

50% of C & H Investments until December 11, 2000, after the State realized

in November that it did not have the funds to purchase the property and only

four days before his final analysis was submitted to the State on December 15,

2000.

Although Vaughn and Nolin testified that Vaughn did not acquire any interest

in C & H Investments until December 11, 2000, Terry Wilson, who drew up

the bill of sale, testified that the bill of sale was executed within “a couple of

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weeks” of the formation of C & H Investments, i.e., sometime in midSeptember 2000. (R. 222.) If the jury believed this testimony as well as the

testimony of Bailey that no final decision was to be made regarding the Ripley

Street property until after Vaughn’s analysis and recommendation was

submitted to the State, it could have reasonably concluded that Vaughn

“own[ed] directly or indirectly a substantial portion of [a] nongovernmental

entity participating in the transaction,” i.e., that he had a known potential

conflicting interest. § 13A-10-62(b), Ala.Code 1975.FN15

FN15. In addition, Vaughn does not dispute that he did not make a

“public announcement or notification to a superior officer or the

Attorney General” regarding his interest in C & H Investments. § 13A10-62(c), Ala.Code 1975.

Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and

resolving all credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict, as we must, we

conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have

reasonably concluded that Vaughn was a public servant who exercised a

substantial discretionary function and who did not disclose a known potential

conflicting interest.

(Doc. No. 15, Exh. 4 at pgs. 51-59.)

The court finds the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ well-reasoned disposition

of Vaughan’s sufficiency claim was neither contrary to nor or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. Moreover, the state court properly adjudicated this claim

based on a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The appellate court cited case law that plainly incorporated the

Jackson standard and explained and supported its conclusion that a rational trier of fact could

have found Vaughan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failing to disclose a conflict of

interest in violation of Ala. Code § 13A-10-62. Therefore, Vaughan is entitled to no relief

on this claim.

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III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that

the petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Roland Vaughan be DENIED and that this case

be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

It is further 

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on

or before April 12, 2006. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 31st day of March, 2006.

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/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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