Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00592/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00592-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The sentence provided for two $800.00 restitution fines; the second fine was suspended,

conditioned on petitioner’s not violating the terms of his parole.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALONZO L. TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

JIM HAMLET, Warden,

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 03-0592 MMC (PR)

ORDER RE: PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DIRECTING RESPONDENT TO

FILE STIPULATION OR

NOTICE OF INTENT NOT TO

FILE STIPULATION WITH

RESPECT TO FINE

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the above-entitled petition for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On remand from the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, this Court ordered respondent to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer and memorandum in support

thereof. Although granted an opportunity to do so, petitioner has not filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND

While serving a sentence on an unrelated offense, petitioner received a letter

containing marijuana. He pleaded nolo contendere to a violation of California Penal Code 

§ 4573.6, possession of a controlled substance while in prison, and was sentenced to a term

of four years in state prison along with a fine of $800.1

 On direct appeal petitioner

challenged his conviction, alleging imposition of the fine was a breach of his plea agreement

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and that he would not have entered the plea had he known such fine would be imposed. The

California Court of Appeal found petitioner had not been informed of the fine prior to

entering his plea, reduced the fine to $200, held a penalty in that amount was not significant

in the context of the plea agreement as a whole, and affirmed petitioner’s sentence. The

Supreme Court of California denied review. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Habeas relief is

warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001)

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). A federal court must presume

the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

B. Legal Claim

The claim set forth in the petition reads, in its entirety:

Petitioner Denied Due Process When Ability To Pay Hearing Not provided

Where Penalty Assessment & Fines Imposed

Negotiated plea entered for 4 year term. Day of sentencing, Petitioner

appeared and additional two $800 restitution fines imposed. Subsequently

modified by Court of Appeal, Petitioner exposed to punishment and fines not

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This Court had not addressed the additional issue, as the petition contains no reference to an

“involuntary” plea or any statement to the effect petitioner would not have entered his plea had he

known he would be assessed a restitution fine. In his request for a certificate of appealability,

petitioner did reference his state court motion to set aside the fine or to withdraw the plea, wherein he

stated he would not have entered the plea had he known about the fine. That motion, however, was not

attached to the instant petition or to the request for a certificate of appealability, nor was it otherwise

provided to this Court prior to the dismissal of the petition or the appeal thereof to the Ninth Circuit. 

The motion is included in the state court record that subsequently was lodged with this Court. See

Resp. Ex. 2.

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part of agreement.

Petition at 5. This Court dismissed the claim as not cognizable because the challenge to the

restitution fines did not affect the fact or duration of petitioner’s custody. See Calderon v.

Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) (limiting § 2254 habeas to challenges to fact or duration

of custody); United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding challenge to

restitution fine not cognizable on habeas). Petitioner appealed. Although the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the above analysis, the Ninth Circuit

further held: “[Petitioner] also contends that his plea was involuntary because he would not

have entered it had he known that the trial court would impose restitution. See Torrey v.

Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant entitled to be informed of direct

consequences of plea).” See Taylor v. Hamlet, No. 03-15676, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. 2004).2

The Court now addresses this claim.

As noted, the California Court of Appeal found petitioner, prior to entering his plea,

was not informed of the possibility of his receiving a fine, a factual finding not disputed by

either party. People v. Taylor, No. H022294, slip op. 1, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2001)

(hereinafter “slip op”). That court, however, did not address the claim identified by the Ninth

Circuit, namely, whether petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the fine rendered his plea

involuntary. Instead the state court determined the fine to be an immaterial breach of the plea

agreement under People v. Walker, 54 Cal.3d 1013 (1991). Slip op. at 5. 

The Supreme Court has held that due process requires a guilty plea to be both

knowing and voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). A plea is not

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voluntary unless it is “entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences” of the plea. 

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). Although the United States Supreme

Court has not provided a precise definition of a “direct consequence” of a guilty plea, a

“direct consequence” has been defined by the circuit courts as anything having a definite,

immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of punishment, see e.g., Wilson v.

McGinnis, 413 F.3d 196, 199 (2nd Cir. 2005); Bryant v. Cherry, 687 F.2d 48, 49-50 (4th Cir.

1982); Warren v. Richland County Circuit Court, 223 F.3d 454, 457 (7th Cir. 2000); Torrey

v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1986), and a number of those courts have held that a

fine must be disclosed to a defendant in order for the plea to be found voluntary, see e.g.,

Fong v. United States, 411 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1969); Barbee v. Ruth 678 F.2d 634, 635 (5th

Cir. 1982); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3rd Cir. 1991). In the instant

case, the fine was imposed pursuant to California Penal Code § 1202.4, which mandates

imposition of a fine ranging from $200 to $10,000 for a felony conviction, absent a finding

by the trial court of “extraordinary and compelling reasons not to do so.” See Cal. Pen. Code

§ 1202.4(b). Consequently, every person convicted of a felony in the state of California

faces the possibility and, indeed, probability, that a fine will be imposed as a consequence of

his conviction. Exposure to such penalty thus is a direct consequence of a defendant’s plea,

of which the defendant must be made aware in order to satisfy the knowing-and-voluntary

standard set forth in Boykin. It follows that the trial court’s failure to notify petitioner of the

restitution fine at issue herein rendered his plea involuntary and, in turn, violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

This constitutional error, however, does not by itself necessitate the granting of habeas

relief. This Court next must decide if the constitutional error resulted in “actual prejudice,”

i.e., that it “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the outcome of the case. 

See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,

328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); Carter v. McCarthy, 806 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding

failure to inform petitioner of direct consequence of plea was subject to harmless error

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As Carter was decided before Brecht, it applied the pre-Brecht harmlessness standard set forth

in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 806 F.2d at 1377. 

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At the preliminary hearing, a corrections officer testified that marijuana was found in an

envelope sent to petitioner. The officer further testified that he thereafter interviewed the person who

sent petitioner the marijuana and that the sender advised him she had visited petitioner in prison, at

which time she and petitioner discussed her sending him the marijuana; she also told the corrections

officer she had sent petitioner marijuana on two occasions prior to the instant violation. 

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The Court is aware that, on occasion, courts, without conducting a hearing, have found the

failure to inform a defendant of the consequences of his plea to be harmless. See United States v.

Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 969-71 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d 36, 41-42 (1st Cir.

1994). Those cases, however, involved error under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, not the constitutional question at issue here and in Carter. 

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analysis).3

Here, as set forth in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, petitioner contends he would not have

pled guilty if he had known a fine would be imposed. Respondent argues that such assertion 

“strains credulity” because petitioner faced a potential Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to

life plus up to $10,000 in fines if convicted after a trial, and that there was strong evidence of

his guilt.4

 Nonetheless, what petitioner considered important in this case may have differed

from the considerations weighed by many other defendants, because at the time of the plea at

issue, petitioner already was serving a life sentence. Moreover, respondent cites no

authority, and this Court is aware of none, allowing the Court, given the claim presented

herein, to make such a credibility determination without hearing evidence on the issue. In

Carter, for example, the district court’s factual determination, that the petitioner therein

would not have pled guilty had he known about a mandatory parole term, was made only

after that court had conducted an evidentiary hearing.5

 See id. It thus would appear

necessary for the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining

whether petitioner would have pled guilty had he known he would be subject to a $200

restitution fine. 

Prior to setting an evidentiary hearing, and appointing counsel to represent petitioner

for that purpose, however, the Court will afford respondent the opportunity to obviate the

need for such hearing, specifically, by stipulating that petitioner may be relieved of his

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As noted, imposition of a restitution fine is not mandatory under California Penal Code 

§ 1202.4, which provides that the fine need not be imposed if there are “compelling and extraordinary

reasons for not doing so.” See Cal. Pen. Code § 1202.4(b). The constitutional error resulting from the

trial court’s failure to inform petitioner of the fine prior to his entry of the plea would appear to qualify

as a “compelling and extraordinary” reason.

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obligation to pay the $200 restitution fine imposed in connection with his guilty plea.6 See,

e.g., id at 1377 (affirming, where defendant had not been informed of mandatory parole,

district court’s order directing parolee’s immediate release from parole in lieu of remanding

case to state court); see also Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2003)

(ordering petitioner’s immediate release, rather than remanding to state court, where

petitioner’s sentence was in breach of plea agreement and defendant had served in excess of

sentence for which she had bargained).

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. Before the Court can determine whether the trial court’s error, specifically, the

failure to inform petitioner he would be assessed a restitution fine as a consequence of his

guilty plea, constituted harmless error, an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the

question of whether petitioner would have entered the plea had he known he would be

assessed the fine. 

2. Within 30 days of the date this order is filed, respondent shall file either (1) a

stipulation and proposed order relieving petitioner of his obligation to pay the $200

restitution fine imposed, or (2) a notice that respondent does not stipulate to such an order. A

reasonable extension of the 30-day deadline will be granted upon a showing of good cause. 

If respondent elects not to file the foregoing stipulation and proposed order, the Court will

schedule the evidentiary hearing described above, and will appoint counsel to represent

petitioner in connection therewith pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 28, 2006 ____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

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