Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00318/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00318-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441lm Removal- Labor/Mgmt. Relations

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICKEY LEE DILTS, RAY RIOS, AND

DONNY DUSHAJ,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 08-CV-318 JLS (BLM)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION

(Doc. No. 24)

vs.

PENSKE LOGISTICS, LLC, PENSKE

TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P., et al.,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 24.) The

Court is also in possession of Defendants’ opposition and Plaintiffs’ reply. (Doc. Nos. 36 & 41.)

Plaintiffs’ motion to certify these class is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiffs ask this Court to certify six classes:

• Off-the-Clock Class: “All of Defendants’ California-based hourly-paid employees subject to

Defendants’ ‘auto-deduct’ time program from January 17, 2004 to present, and to whom

Defendants failed to pay wages pursuant to California law for all hours actually caused or

suffered to work for Defendants.”

• Meal Period Class: “All of Defendants’ California-based hourly-paid employees to whom,

from January 17, 2004 to the present, Defendants failed to provide 30-minute uninterrupted

meal periods, or one additional hour of compensation in lieu thereof, pursuant to applicable

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orders of the IWC, for each day that meal periods were not provided.”

• Rest Period Class: “All of Defendants’ California-based hourly-paid employees to whom, from

January 17, 2004 to the present, Defendants failed to authorize and permit paid 10-minute rest

periods for every four hours worked, or one additional hour of compensation in lieu thereof

pursuant to applicable orders of the IWC, for each day that rest periods were not provided.”

• 2802 Class: “All of Defendants’ California-based hourly paid employees to whom, from

January 17, 2004 to the present, Defendants failed to properly reimburse all reasonable and

necessary expenses incurred by said employees in order to perform Defendants’ work.”

• 203 Class: “All of Defendants’ California-based hourly-paid employees who separated from

their employment with Defendants at any time between January 17, 2004 to the present and

to whom Defendants willfully failed to pay all wages due upon said separation from

employment from Defendants.”

• 17200 Class: “All of Defendants’ California-based hourly-paid employees who, from January

17, 2004 to the present, were subjected to Defendants’ unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business

acts or practices in the form of Labor Code violations regarding off the clock work, missed

meal periods, missed rest periods, the failure to timely pay all wages owed and/or the failure

to properly reimburse employees for reasonable and necessary expenses incurred for the

benefit of Defendants.”

Defendant argues that the definitions for these classes are improper. “First, each [class

definition] is framed to include only those Penske employees who were actually harmed by the

complained of actions.” (Opp. at 25.) According to Defendant, “[c]ourts should refuse to certify

classes where . . . membership in the class cannot be determined through objective criteria.” (Id.)

“Second, Plaintiffs’ proffered class definition (sic) apparently seeks to cover all of Penske’s California

employees.” (Id. at 26.) Plaintiffs all “serviced only the Whirlpool account, one of Penske’s 19

California customers.” In light of these two problems, Defendant asks the Court to deny the motion

to certify.

Defendant is correct on these points. First, it is clear both from Plaintiffs’ papers and from

their admission at oral argument that they intended these classes to cover only employees working on

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the Whirlpool account. However, that intent is not conveyed in the class definitions. 

Further, by supplying the Court with class definitions where membership is not readily

determinable at present Plaintiffs have failed to carry their class certification burden. Although it is

not explicitly spelled out in Rule 23, Courts require an adequate class definition before they will

certify a class. This definition must identify “a distinct group of plaintiffs whose members [can] be

identified with particularity.” Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.

1978). The primary goal of this requirement “is to make it ‘administratively feasible’ for the court

to determine individual class membership.” Campbell v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 253 F.R.D.

586, 593 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 658 (E.D. Cal.1977)). Therefore,

courts look to whether the class definition supplies “objective criteria” by which membership may be

“presently ascertainable,” such as “a defendant's own actions and the damages caused by such actions,

or even just geographical boundaries.” Id. However, “the class need not be so ascertainable that

every potential member can be identified at the commencement of the action. As long as ‘the general

outlines of the membership of the class are determinable at the outset of the litigation, a class will be

deemed to exist.’” O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (internal

citations omitted). In this case, none of the classes’ membership is objectively ascertainable.

In light of these deficiencies, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’

motion. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that these definitions could be modified to

address the Court’s concerns. Although the Court has discretion to make such alterations, it will leave

the burden of proposing adequately defined classes on Plaintiffs. Campbell, 253 F.R.D. at 594. 

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Further, the Court believes this entire motion should be re-briefed in light of the relevant changes.

The updated class definitions may impact the questions this Court will ask under Rule 23, and the

parties should have a full opportunity to air their respective views. Thus, the Court’s denial of this

motion is without prejudice. If Plaintiffs wish to file a renewed motion for class certification

addressing the deficiencies identified by the Court, they SHALL FILE their motion within sixty days

of the date this order is electronically docketed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 23, 2009

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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