Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02741/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02741-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAMARA McANALLY,

 Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-CV-2741 W (KSC)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

v. DISMISS THE FAC [DOC. 25]

ERNEST L. MARUGG, et al.,

 Defendants.

Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint

(“FAC” [Doc. 21]) filed by Defendants County of San Diego, Dominic Dugo, Bonnie

Dumanis, and David Lattuca (the “Supervisor Defendants”). Plaintiff Tamara

McAnally opposes.

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See Civ. L. R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES

the motion [Doc. 25].

//

//

- 1 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the FAC.

In December 2002, Plaintiff Tamara McAnally and her husband, Jon McAnally,

formed a construction company, McAnally Inc., dba JDM Enterprises (“JDM”). (FAC,

¶ 21.) JDM did general contracting work, and also acted as a subcontractor on jobs for

other general contractors. (Id.) Tamara was JDM’s Secretary. (Id.)

In 2001, JDM worked as a framing subcontractor for Landco Construction Inc. 

(Id., ¶ 23.) Eventually, a dispute arose between JDM and Landco that resulted in

litigation. (Id.) Tamara contends that in retribution for the litigation, Landco filed a

complaint with the San Diego District Attorney’s office alleging, among other things,

that JDM and its officers, including Tamara and Jon, were mischaracterizing their

employees’ status in order to defraud their workers compensation insurance carrier, the

State Compensation Insurance Fund (“SCIF”). (Id., ¶¶ 22, 24.) Tamara contends the

1

allegations were false. (Id., ¶ 22.)

As a result of Landco’s allegations, SCIF conducted an audit, in conjunction with

the D.A.’s Office. (FAC, ¶ 25.) Defendant Ernest L. Marugg was the Deputy D.A. in

charge of the matter, and Defendant Alexander Lutzi was the investigator working for

Marugg. (Id.) The audit was completed on March 6, 2003. (Id., ¶ 25.) Despite the

lack of evidence of intentionalwrongdoing, Tamara and Jon were indicted forinsurance

and tax fraud. (Id., ¶ 33.) 

On April 19, 2004, Tamara and Jon pled guilty to conspiracy to commit

insurance fraud. (FAC, ¶¶ 43, 44.) Tamara contends the guilty pleas were entered in

response to the threat that they could go to prison if convicted, and because Marugg

represented that JDM and Jon would be allowed to retain their contractor license. (Id.,

¶ 42.) Jon’s plea agreement, therefore, provided:

Defendants SCIF and its employee, Defendant Kathey Bradley, were dismissed on

1

March 13, 2013, pursuant to a joint motion. (See Order [doc. 38].)

- 2 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

#2. I have not been induced to enter this plea by any promise or

representation of any kind, EXCEPT: . . . . The District Attorney

will cooperate with Contractors State License Board to allow Mr.

McAnally to maintain his contractors license.

* * *

#16. Could lose Contractors License ONLY if prison sentence.

(Id., ¶ 49.) The plea agreement also required Tamara and Jon to pay $334,940.30 in

restitution to SCIF, and $87,156.69 in restitution to EDD, in monthly installments of

$300 and $100, respectively. (Id., ¶¶ 45, 46.)

Notwithstanding the plea agreement, Tamara contends that Marugg essentially

feigned cooperating with the Contractors State License Board (the “Board”) to assist

Jon in maintaining his contractor license. Instead, Marugg used his position, and

exploited the McAnally’s dependence on him, to pursue a sexual relationship with

Tamara. As a result, from 2004 through 2009, Jon’s license was continually placed on

hold, causing significant financial problems for the McAnallys.

In late 2009, after Tamara had repeatedly refused Marugg’s pleas to start a sexual

relationship, Marugg stopped responding to Tamara’s requests for assistance with the

Board regarding Jon’s contractor license. (FAC, ¶¶ 79–84.) Then in December 2009,

Tamara received a call from Kim Alvarez, who identified herself as Marugg’s girlfriend,

and demanded to know why Tamara was calling Marugg. (Id., ¶ 85.) During the

conversation, Tamara learned that Marugg had also prosecuted Kim and her exhusband. (Id., ¶ 85.) In subsequent conversations, Kim told Tamara that Marugg

admitted having numerous relationships with female defendants, both during and after

he prosecuted them for insurance fraud. (Id., ¶ 86.) 

Based on the information Tamara learned from Kim, Tamara began investigating

Marugg. (FAC, ¶ 90.) Tamara contends that she learned that in 2001, Marugg’s

supervisors received a complaint that he was having an affair with Defendant Bradley,

who was in charge of investigating insurance fraud allegations on behalf of SCIF. (Id.,

¶ 91.) She also learned that between 2001 and 2009, Marugg had “taken numerous

- 3 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

female defendants that he had prosecuted to functions sponsored by the D.A.’s Office,

or where County officials were present, as well as on official business trips where

supervisory person[nel], including DUGO and LATUCCA were present.” (Id., ¶ 92.) 

Tamara also discovered that“numerous other criminal defendants had filed complaints

with the D.A.’s Office and other agencies alleging that MARUGG was having

inappropriate relationships with female criminal defendants, and falsifying evidence

during prosecution.” (Id., ¶ 95.) 

In August 2010, Tamara contacted the D.A.’s Office regarding the information

she learned about Marugg. (FAC, ¶ 103.) “On August 26, 2010, MARUGG received

notice of an Administrative Investigation related to allegations lodged by [Tamara].” 

(Id., ¶ 104.) During the investigation, Marugg allegedly admitted many of the

allegations, “including that he had inappropriate relationships with several former

defendants.” (Id., ¶ 106.) In exchange for the D.A.’s Office’s agreement to forgo

further investigation, Marugg agreed to retire. (Id., ¶ 107.) Therefore, no “further

disciplinary action was taken by the D.A., nor was any report made to the California

State Bar.” (Id.)

On April 12, 2011, Tamara filed a Writ of Coram Nobis seeking to have her

conviction overturned. (FAC, Ex. 4 at 2:1–2.) Based on the information gathered

from its investigation, the D.A. agreed not to oppose the writ, which was granted. (Id.) 

Then on May 16, 2011, the San Diego Superior Court entered an Order for Factual

Finding of Innocence and Destruction of Records. (Id., Ex. 3.) This lawsuit followed.

 

II. STANDARD

The Court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). A complaint may be dismissed as a

matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under

- 4 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a cognizable theory. Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990). In ruling on the motion, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact as

true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”

Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007).

Complaints must contain “a short plain statement of the claim showing the that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has

interpreted this rule to mean that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to rise above

the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). The

allegations in the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

Well-pled allegations in the complaint are assumed true, but a court is not

required to accept legal conclusions couched as facts, unwarranted deductions, or

unreasonable inferences. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, (1986); Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the federal and state claims are time barred because

Tamara was convicted in 2004, but did not file the lawsuit until November 22, 2011. 

Therefore, the claims are barred by the applicable 2-year limitations period, as well as

the 6-month time limit to file a government claim (applicable to Tamara’s state claims).

Tamara argues that because the conviction was not overturned and the order of

factual innocence was not entered until May 16, 2011, the limitations periods were

tolled and the lawsuit is timely. Defendants respond that because the FAC fails to

explain Tamara’s 7-year delay in moving to overturn her conviction, Tamara is not

entitled to tolling. The Court agrees with Tamara.

- 5 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Tamara’s federal claims are timely.

As an initial matter, Defendants fail to cite any authority for the proposition that

the statute of limitations began to run in 2004. They simply assert that the 2-year

statute of limitations expired in 2006 because “plaintiff was convicted in 2004.” (Mtn.

5:17–18, 10:10–11.) Given that Defendants are the moving party, they bear the burden

of establishing when Tamara’s claims accrued. Defendants failure to cite any

supporting legal authority or to explain why they believe the claims accrued in 2004 is

a sufficient basis to reject their argument.

Moreover, Defendants’ argument is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority. 

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Court held,

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction . . .,

or for harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make

such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing

that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under §1983. 

Id. at 486–487. Later, in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), the Supreme Court

reiterated that “the Heck rule for deferred accrual is called into play only when there

exists ‘a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated,’ that is to say, an

‘outstanding criminal judgment.’ It delays what would otherwise be the accrual date

of a tort action until the setting aside of an extant conviction which success in that tort

action would impugn.” Id. at 393.

Here, Tamara alleges, among otherthings, that“she was convicted of a crime she

did not commit” because Marugg fabricated evidence. (FAC, ¶ 114.) Her section 1983

claim, therefore, necessarily impugns the 2004 conviction, and under Heck did not

accrue until the San Diego Superior Court overturned the conviction on May 16, 2011. 

Accordingly, Tamara’s federal claims are timely.

- 6 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Tamara’s state-claims are timely.

With respect to Tamara’s state claims, Defendants again fails to cite any

authority for the proposition that the limitations period began in 2004. Regardless,

even assuming that Tamara’s claims accrued in 2004, the FAC’s allegations do not

support Defendants’ statute of limitations defense.

Several principles of California’s statute-of-limitations tolling law are relevant in

analyzing Tamara’s state claims. First, under California law, the limitations period is

tolled “until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover the cause of action. [¶] A

plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to

suspect a factual basis for its elements.’” Quarry v. Doe 1, 53 Cal.4th 945, 960 (2012). 

The discovery rule applies “when it is difficult for a plaintiff to observe or understand

the nature of a defendant’s wrongful act, or when an injury or its cause is hidden or

beyond that which an ordinarily reasonable person could be expected to understand.” 

Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 448 (2011). This

principle is important because based on the FAC’s allegations, it is reasonable to infer

that Tamara did not have reason to suspect the factual basis for her claims until 2010.

According to the FAC, it was not until late December 2009, when Kim Alvarez

contacted Tamara, that she learned that Marugg had previously pursued a sexual

relationship with a woman he prosecuted. (FAC, ¶ 85.) In subsequent conversations

with Kim, Tamara learned that Marugg had pursued sexual relationshipswith numerous

women he prosecuted, and that Kim believed Marugg manufactured evidence in her

case. (Id., ¶¶ 86–87.) Based on this information, Tamara contends that in early 2010,

she began to investigate the circumstances of her conviction, and realized the facts and

circumstances of her prosecution matched those surrounding Kim’s prosecution. (Id.,

¶ 90.) Based on these facts, it is reasonable to infer that Tamara did not suspect the

factual basis for her claim until 2010.

The FAC’s allegations also offer an explanation for Tamara’s failure to suspect

Marugg’s wrongful conduct before 2010. The allegations demonstrate that Marugg

- 7 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fostered a situation in which Tamara was dependent on his assistance and grew to trust

Marugg. 

Under the plea agreement’s terms, the McAnallys depended on Marugg’s

cooperation with the Board in order to maintain Jon’s contractor license. (FAC, ¶ 49.) 

The McAnallys were also required to send Marugg copies of all restitution payments. 

(Id., ¶ 48.) And despite Marugg’s obligation to cooperate with the Board, the FAC

alleges Marugg essentially feigned cooperation, resulting in the Board continually

placing a hold on Jon’s license, making the McAnallys more dependent on Marugg’s

assistance. (Id., ¶¶ 50, 55, 72.) Morever, as a result of the holds placed on Jon’s

license, Tamara was in frequent contact with Marugg. (FAC, ¶¶ 50–65.) Throughout

this period, Tamara alleges that Marugg acted as if he cared about her, eventually

volunteering to write a letter of recommendation and assist her in obtaining a realestate license. (Id., 65–74.) She further alleges that in 2005, Marugg offered to reduce

her felony conviction to a misdemeanor, and that he later told Tamara that he “hoped

that this action and the later offer to expunge the convictions of both TAMARA and

JON would convince TAMARA that he was sincere in his affection for her.” (Id., ¶

67.) Together, these facts support Tamara’s allegation that Marugg intentionally

fostered a dependant and trusting relationship that he used to try to start a sexual

relationship with her. (Id., ¶ 78.) Under these circumstances, Tamara did not have

reason to suspect before 2010 that Marugg fabricated evidence in her case.

The second California principle that is relevant to this case tolls the limitations

period “when a person has ‘several formal legal remedies and reasonably and in good

faith pursues one.’” Donoghue v. Orange County, 848 F.2d 926, 930 (9th Cir.

1987)(citing Jones v. Tracy School Dist., 27 Cal.3d 99, 108 (1980)). This principle is

significant because the FAC demonstrates that after discovering the factual basis for her

claims in 2010, Tamara reasonably and in good faith pursued her legal remedies, thus

continuing to toll the statute of limitations until her conviction was overturned. 

- 8 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Specifically, the FAC alleges that as a result of her investigation that began in

early 2010, Tamara learned, among other things, that “numerous other criminal

defendants had filed complaints with the D.A.’s Office and other agencies alleging that

MARUGG was having inappropriate relationshipswithfemale criminal defendants, and

falsifying evidence during prosecution.” (FAC, ¶ 95.) As a result, in August 2010,

Tamara contacted the D.A.’s Office, which began the Administrative Investigation of

Marugg. (Id., ¶¶ 103–104.) Then on April 12, 2011, Tamara filed the writ to overturn

her conviction. As a result of the investigation initiated by Tamara, the D.A. agreed

not to oppose the writ, which was granted on May 16, 2011. 

In short, based on the FAC’s allegations, it is reasonable to infer that Tamara did

not discover the factual basis for her claims until 2010. It is also reasonable to infer that

once she discovered the factual basis, Tamara reasonably and in good faith took steps

to overturn her conviction. Accordingly, the Court finds that the statute of limitations

on Tamara’s state claims also did not commence until May 16, 2011. 

C. At this stage, Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity.

The Supervisor Defendants argue that Tamara’s federal claims should be

dismissed on the following additional grounds: (1) the Supervisor Defendants have

absolute immunity for conduct related to their role as advocates; (2) Tamara has failed

to allege that the Supervisor Defendants’ acts or omissions led to the violation of her

constitutional rights; and (3) Tamara failed to allege Marugg’s conduct was pursuant

to a County policy or practice. (MTD, 6:11–7:20.) For the reasons discussed below,

the Court is not persuaded by these arguments.

2

 Neither party has raised the issue about whether Marugg’s conduct rises to the level 2

of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, in order to decide whether absolute immunity

applies, the Court assumes without deciding that Tamara has alleged a deprivation of a

constitutional right under § 1983. See Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 643–644 (9th

Cir. 2005).

- 9 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity “when performing the traditional

functions of an advocate.” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636 (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S.

118, 131 (1997)). However, a prosecutor’s conduct is not covered by absolute

immunity merely because it was performed by a prosecutor. Id. (citing Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). Instead, prosecutorial immunity “depends on

the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” 

Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127). 

Where the prosecutoris performing administrative functions or“investigative functions

normally performed by a detective or police officer,” the prosecutor is entitled to

qualified immunity. Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636.

“[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such

immunity is justified for the function in question.” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636 (citing

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494–96 (1991)). The presumption is that qualified

immunity, rather than absolute immunity, “is sufficient to protect government officials

in the exercise of their duties” and “the Supreme Court has ‘been quite sparing in its

recognition of absolute immunity, and has refused to extend it any further than its

justification would warrant.” Id. at 636–637 (internal brackets omitted). Thus, in

order to obtain absolute immunity, the prosecutor bears the burden of establishing that

the act in question is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.” Genzler, 410 F.3d 636 (citations omitted). 

Here, the Supervisor Defendants are being sued for their failure to properly train

or supervise Marugg. Accordingly, in order to determine if the Supervisor Defendants

are immune from liability, the Court must evaluate whether Marugg’s conduct was

intimately related to the judicial phase of the criminal prosecution. If it was, then the

Supervisor Defendants’ supervision and training of Marugg’s conduct is also covered by

absolute immunity. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004)

(evaluating the supervised conduct to determine if the supervisor is entitled to absolute

immunity); Genzler, 410 F.3d at 644. If Marugg was not engaged in such conduct, then

- 10 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Supervisor Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. For several

reasons, the Court finds that the Supervisor Defendants are not entitled to absolute

immunity based on the FAC’s allegations.

First, the Supervisor Defendants have failed to adequately identify the functions

that serve as a basis for Tamara’s claims. According to the motion, Marugg’s conduct

involved filing criminal charges in order to pursue sexual relationships, and a conflict

of interest involving the D.A. Office’s receipt of payments for prosecuting insurance

fraud cases. (MTD, 6:14–21.) This description is far too general, and ignores other

conduct identified in the FAC that does not appear to fall within the traditional role

of an advocate.

Tamara claims that Marugg fabricated evidence in order to obtain her

conviction. Whether absolute immunity applies to this claim depends on when the

fabrication occurred. If it occurred early in the investigation, before there was probable

cause for an arrest, the fabrication is not covered by absolute immunity. See Broam 320

F.3d at1033 (explaining that if the witness interview occurred “before probable cause

was established, only qualified immunity would apply . . . .”). 

In Buckley, the Supreme Court explained that a prosecutor is not absolutely

immune for conduct that, if performed by a police officer, would only be subject to

qualified immunity:

There is a difference between the advocate’s role in evaluating evidence

and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and

the detective’s role in searching forthe clues and corroboration that might

give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the

other hand. When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions

normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is “neither

appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect

the one and not the other.” 

Id., 509 U.S. at 273 (citation omitted).

Here, the Supervisor Defendants have failed to analyze the FAC in order to

determine when the fabrication occurred and thus have failed to satisfy their burden of

- 11 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

establishing that absolute immunity applies. Moreover, the FAC’s allegations suggest

the fabrication occurred before there was probable cause. According to the FAC,

before being indicted, Tamara provided “conclusive evidence” to Marugg that she had

not committed a crime. (FAC, ¶ 32.) This allegation is bolstered by the San Diego

Superior Court order finding Tamara factually innocent. (Id., Ex. 3.) Additionally, the

FAC’s allegations suggest that Marugg’s decision to prosecute Tamara may have

resulted from his desire to pursue a sexual relationship with her, as he had done with

numerous women. Based on these allegations, it is reasonable to infer that there was

3

never probable cause to arrest and prosecute Tamara, and thus the fabrication claim

is not covered by absolute immunity.

Tamara also charges Marugg with improper conduct lasting long after the

prosecution ended. Specifically, Tamara charges Marugg with improper conduct during

the duration of the plea agreement. As discussed above, the FAC alleges that the plea

agreement obligated Marugg to cooperate with the Board so that Jon could maintain

his contractor license. Despite this obligation, Marugg feigned cooperation, resulting

in the repeated suspension of Jon’s license and significant economic damages to the

McAnallys. Further, the FAC alleges that Marugg acted intentionally in order to gain

Tamara’s confidence and pursue a sexual relationship with her. 

The Supervisor Defendants’ papers have failed to explain how Marugg’s postconviction conduct is “intimately related” to the judicial phase of Tamara’s prosecution. 

Nor have the Supervisor Defendants cited any authority holding that a prosecutor’s

This inference is supported by the allegations that Lutzi, who was referred to as

3

Marugg’s “pimp,” would “tip” Marugg when Lutzi “believed that there were women that

MARUGG would find sexually attractive.” (FAC, ¶ 31.) Consistent with this practice, the

FAC alleges that after meeting Tamara, Lutzi arranged for the meeting between Marugg and

Tamara, during which time Marugg never discussed the case and instead talked exclusively

about personal matters, including Tamara’s marriage and family. (Id. ¶¶ 27– 29.) Tamara

further alleges that Marugg later admitted, “I knew I had to have you the first time I saw you.” 

(Id., ¶ 30, emphasis added.) 

- 12 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conduct long afterthe conviction was obtained constitutes advocacy intimately related

to the judicial system. And case law establishes that conduct occurring after a

conviction, and which is unrelated to an appeal, may not be covered by absolute

immunity. See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir.) (holding that

prosecutor’s post-conviction investigative conduct was not entitled to absolute

immunity); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1992) (same). Accordingly,

the Courtfinds that Marugg’s post-conviction conduct was notintimately related to the

judicial process, and thus the Supervisor Defendants’ alleged failure to adequately

supervise Marugg’s conduct is not covered by absolute immunity.

The Supervisor Defendants next argue that Tamara failed to allege Marugg’s

conduct was pursuant to a policy or practice, and that their acts or omissions led to the

violation of Tamara’s constitutional rights. Citing Iqbal, the Supervisor Defendants

argue that their alleged knowledge of Marugg’s actions is not enough to establish

supervisory liability. (MTD, 8:17–24.) 

But Iqbal dealt with a claim of purposeful discrimination against the United

States Attorney General and the Director of the F.B.I., in their capacity as supervisors. 

In light of the purposeful discrimination claim, the Courtrequired the plaintiff to “plead

and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose” which requires “more

than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

The Court further explained that the factors necessary to establish a claim against the

supervisors will depend on the constitutional provision at issue. Id. 

Based on this reading of Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that “[w]e have

long permitted plaintiffs to hold supervisors individually liable in § 1983 suits when

culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d

1202, 1205–1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). And a “custom or practice can be

‘inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for

which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.” Hunter,

- 13 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D.V.M., v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Here, Tamara alleges that the Supervisor Defendants were well aware of

Marugg’s improper conduct, but failed to discipline or reprimand him. Specifically,

Tamara alleges that the Supervisor Defendants were present at D.A. sponsored

functions and on official business trips, which Marugg used to pursue romantic

relationships with women he previously prosecuted. (FAC, ¶ 92.) Tamara further

alleges that the Supervisor Defendants were aware of pornographic emails that Marugg

was sending to previously prosecuted female defendants, and that over a half dozen

women had filed complaints with the D.A.’s Office alleging Marugg was “having

inappropriate relationships with female criminal defendants. . . .” (Id., ¶ 96.) Resolving

all reasonable inferences in favor of Tamara, the Court finds she has sufficiently pled

that the Supervisor Defendants were aware of Marugg’s alleged misconduct, yet 

ignored their supervisory responsibility and did nothing about the conduct. As such,

the Court finds Tamara has alleged a pattern and practice of conduct by the Supervisor

Defendants thatresulted in Marugg’s alleged violation of Tamara’s constitutionalrights.

D. State Immunities

The Supervisor Defendants also raise a number of state statutory immunities that

they contend bar Tamara’s state claims. At this stage in the litigation, the Court is not

persuaded that the immunities warrant dismissal of Tamara’s claims.

The Supervisor Defendants first argue the claims are barred by Government

Code § 820.2, which bars claims for injuries arising from instituting or prosecuting any

judicial or administrative proceedings, even if the employee acts maliciously and

without probable cause. Gov’t Code § 821.6; Kaplan v. LaBarbera, 58 Cal.App.4th

175, 180 (1997). As explained above, however, Tamara’s claims relate to a number of

different functions or conduct spanning from approximately 2004 through 2009. And

the Supervisor Defendant have failed to establish that Marugg’s conduct was related

- 14 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to “instituting or prosecuting any judicial proceeding.” Moreover, it is clear that at least

some of Tamara’s claims relate to Marugg’s post-conviction conduct, which does not

appear to fall within the scope of section 820.2. Accordingly, the Court finds dismissal

of Tamara’s state claims based on section 820.2 is not warranted at this time.

Defendants next argue that the claims are barred by Civil Code § 47, which

protects communications made in connection with the prosecution. Cal. Civ. Code §

47; GeneThera, Inc. v. Troy & Gould Professional Corp., 171 Cal.App.4th 901, 909

(2009). However, as Tamara points out, the Supervisor Defendants fail to identify how

this privilege applies to this case. Accordingly, dismissal on this ground is also denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to

dismiss [Doc. 25].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 3, 2013

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

- 15 - 11cv2741w

Case 3:11-cv-02741-JLS-KSC Document 39 Filed 07/03/13 Page 15 of 15