Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03977/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03977-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAYJOY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-03977-HSG 

ORDER DISMISSING CASE AS MOOT

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are under submission. Dkt. Nos. 15, 19. 

Because it belatedly has been brought to the Court’s attention that Plaintiff’s second H1-B visa 

petition to classify Quihan Xie as a temporary worker in a specialty occupation was granted, the 

Court finds that the action is moot and the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND

On May 6, 2019, PayJoy, Inc. (“PayJoy” or “Plaintiff”) filed a Petition for a Nonimmigrant 

Worker (Form I-129) with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), applying for 

a H-1B visa to classify Ms. Xie as a temporary worker in a specialty occupation. Dkt. No. 2-2 

(“AR”) at 16–108. The H1-B visa program permits employers to temporarily employ 

nonimmigrant workers in specialty occupations. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H). PayJoy sought to 

obtain for Ms. Xie an H-1B visa for a “Financial Analyst” position in its San Francisco office. AR 

at 16.

On June 18, 2019, USCIS denied PayJoy’s application, finding that it had failed to meet 

any of the four criteria detailed in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). First, it determined that PayJoy did 

not show that the financial analyst position required a bachelor’s degree or higher in a specific 

specialty, finding that “a position that allows for a degree in accounting, economics, finance, 

statistics, and mathematics, is too broad.” AR at 7. USCIS further stated that it “consistently 

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interprets the term ‘degree’ in the criteria at 8 C.F.R § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any 

bachelor’s or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered 

position.” AR at 5. Second, PayJoy failed to “submit evidence to demonstrate that a degree in a 

specific field of study is common to the financial services industry in parallel positions among 

similar organizations” or provide “evidence showing the unique or complex nature of the 

position.” Id. at 8–9. Third, PayJoy failed to “provide corroborating evidence such as copies of [] 

employee degrees, pay records, job titles, description of duties, etc.” to support the Vice President 

of Finance’s letter, which indicated that PayJoy normally requires a bachelor’s degree or higher. 

Id. at 9. Finally, USCIS found that the “provided duties were described in generalized and 

abstract terms that lack sufficient details to show that the nature of the duties were so specialized 

and complex” to satisfy the final requirement. Id. at 10.

The Court heard arguments on the parties’ summary judgment motions on March 12, 2020. 

See Dkt. No. 23. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to “actual, ongoing 

cases or controversies.” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Lewis 

v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). To sustain jurisdiction, “[a] case or 

controversy must exist at all stages of review, not just at the time the action is filed.” Id. “A case 

may become moot . . . when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. This Court is “without power to decide questions that 

cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [it].” Oregon v. F.E.R.C., 636 F.3d 1203, 

1206 (9th Cir. 2011).

III. ANALYSIS

On March 26, 2020, Defendant’s counsel notified the Court that Plaintiff’s counsel had 

told her that on September 4, 2019, more than six months earlier, USCIS approved a second H1-B 

visa petition that PayJoy filed on behalf of Ms. Xie to employ her in a Financial Analyst position. 

See Dkt. No. 25. The Court subsequently ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not 

be dismissed as moot in light of the approval of the second petition. See Dkt. Nos. 26, 27. In 

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responding to the OSC, after a somewhat roundabout recounting of the course of events,

Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that “Plaintiff and undersigned counsel do not object to dismissal of 

the case,” and that he had otherwise sought “to work with defendant’s counsel to dismiss the case” 

in light of the approval of the second petition. Dkt. No. 28 at 3.1 It does not appear from the 

government’s filing that it disputes that the case is moot. See Dkt. No. 25 at 3 (prefacing 

argument with the qualifier “[t]o the extent the Court does not find this case moot”). Because the 

exact relief sought in this action, requiring Defendant to approve a H1-B petition on behalf of Ms. 

Xie, has already been granted, the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the case. See Calderon v. 

Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (case should be dismissed as moot “when, by virtue of an 

intervening event, [the Court] cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the 

[Plaintiff]”) (internal quotations omitted).

Accordingly, the case is DISMISSED as moot. The clerk is directed to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

1 Plaintiff’s counsel cryptically explains that he learned of the grant sometime “[f]ollowing 

submission of briefs in this case,” Dkt. No. 28 at 1, but does not say when. It should go without saying 

that if counsel learned this obviously relevant information before the hearing on the cross-motions, he 

should have shared it with the Court before the hearing (or at the hearing, at the latest), to avoid the 

needless use of Court and party resources that appears to have occurred here.

4/9/2020

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