Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00676/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00676-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Deborha D. Childers, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00676-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

Plaintiff Deborha Childers seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under sections 216(i), 

223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based 

on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed. 

I. BACKGROUND. 

A. Factual Background. 

Plaintiff was born in September 1950. She testified at her hearing that she has a 

B.A. in Business Administration and worked in the past as a controller for a car 

dealership. The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several severe impairments. A.R. 

15. The ALJ also found that the impairments were severe and will continue to cause 

more than minimal work-related functional limitations. A.R. 15. 

B. Procedural History. 

On August 6, 2009, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging 

disability beginning July 1, 2007. The claim was denied initially on September 29, 2009, 

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and upon reconsideration on March 25, 2010. Thereafter, the claimant filed a written 

request for a hearing on May 13, 2010. 20 C.F.R. 404.929 et seq. On November 2, 2011, 

she appeared with her attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational 

expert also testified. 

On November 30, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which 

supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

III. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION. 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

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has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final 

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of 

the Social Security Act through December 31, 2012, and that she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since July 1, 2007. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

has the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia and restless leg syndrome; 

osteoporosis; osteoarthritis; migraine headaches; balance problems; neck pain radiating to 

left shoulder; irritable bowel syndrome; status post cataract surgery (2008); and status 

post cervical cryosurgery (2010). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does 

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff: 

Ha[d] the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.1567(a) except for the following limitations: the 

claimant is capable of occasionally climbing ramps and stairs, 

balancing, stooping, crouching, crawling, and kneeling; but is 

precluded from climbing ladders, ropes, and/or scaffolds. 

The claimant is to avoid concentrated exposure to the use of 

moving machinery and to unprotected heights. 

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A.R. 17-18. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant 

work as a controller because it does not require the performance of work-related activities 

precluded by her RFC. A.R. 23. As such, the ALJ did not proceed to step five. 

IV. ANALYSIS. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is defective for four reasons: (1) the ALJ 

failed to set forth a function-by-function assessment of residual capacity; (2) the ALJ 

erroneously weighed medical source evidence; (3) the ALJ improperly evaluated 

Plaintiff’s credibility and discounted her subjective testimony; and (4) the ALJ failed to 

properly consider the third party report of Plaintiff’s husband, Donald Childers. The 

Court will address each argument below. 

A. Failure to Set Forth a Function-by-Function Assessment of RFC. 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to set forth a more 

detailed function-by-function assessment of her RFC. Doc. 17 at 8; SSR 96-8p, 1996 

WL 374184 (Jul. 2, 1996). She argues that the ALJ’s RFC is deficient for a number of 

reasons: the ALJ did not make specific findings as to the length of time that Plaintiff can 

sit, stand, or walk; the ALJ did not make specific findings as to the weight Plaintiff can 

lift or carry; the RFC does not discuss the frequency or severity of Plaintiff’s migraine 

headaches; the RFC does not discuss whether rest breaks or absences from work are 

required due to Plaintiff’s pain symptoms; and the RFC does not discuss Plaintiff’s 

difficulty in maintaining focus, reliability, attention, and concentration. Doc. 17 at 8. 

Plaintiff appears to assert that SSR 96-8p requires the ALJ to make findings and craft an 

RFC with respect to each limitation supported by evidence in the record. Id. The Court 

disagrees. 

Plaintiff argues that it was improper for the ALJ to express Plaintiff’s RFC in 

terms of a category of work – “sedentary work” – even though the ALJ went on to 

articulate additional limitations to the category. Id. at 9. The Ninth Circuit, however, has 

interpreted SSR 96-8p as permitting the use of categories such as “sedentary” in defining 

a claimant’s RFC. See Buckner-Larkin v. Astrue, 450 F. App’x 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2011) 

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(finding that ALJ expression of RFC as “sedentary” accords with SSR 96-8p because the 

definition of “sedentary” includes well-defined function-by-function parameters). 

In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform sedentary work 

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a).” A.R. 17. According to the Code of Federal 

Regulations: 

Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a 

time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket 

files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is 

defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of 

walking and standing is often necessary to carry out job 

duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are 

required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. 

20 CFR 404.1567(a). The ALJ’s expression of the RFC as “sedentary work,” when 

understood in terms of its predetermined function-by-function parameters, provides many 

of the limitations that Plaintiff claims are lacking. In addition, after introducing the RFC, 

the ALJ set forth a detailed discussion of the medical evidence in which he addressed 

each of the other limitations that Plaintiff claims should have been reflected in the RFC. 

Because the ALJ provided a thorough discussion of the evidence explaining how he 

resolved material inconsistencies and ambiguities in the record, the Court concludes that 

the ALJ did not commit legal error. See Mason v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 379 F. App’x 

638, 639 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ is not required, as [Plaintiff] contends, to engage in a 

function-by-function analysis under SSR 96-8p. SSR 96-8p requires only that the ALJ 

discuss how evidence supports the [RFC] assessment and explain how the ALJ resolved 

material inconsistencies or ambiguities in evidence[.]”). 

B. Weighing Medical Source Evidence. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons for discounting 

the opinions of four treating physicians and for crediting the opinions of non-examining 

physicians. Doc. 17 at 9. Many of Plaintiff’s objections are simply invitations to 

reconsider the balance of evidence in the record, which is not the Court’s role at this 

stage of the proceedings. The ALJ’s decision will be set aside only if it is not supported 

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by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Lewis, 236 F.3d at 517 n.13. The 

Court concludes that the ALJ did not commit legal error. 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when 

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, 

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective 

evidence). The opinion of a treating or examining physician can be rejected only for 

“clear and convincing” reasons if it is not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A 

contradicted opinion “can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). 

An ALJ can meet the “specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th 

Cir. 1986). But “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer [her] conclusions. [She] must set 

forth [her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 

correct.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. 

1. Thomas Perry, M.D. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by improperly discounting the 

opinion of her treating cardiologist, Dr. Thomas Perry, M.D. Doc. 17 at 11. On 

January 3, 2011, Dr. Perry completed a check-the-box form opining that, due to fatigue, 

diarrhea, and dizziness, Plaintiff was unable to perform eight hours of work per day for 

five days a week. A.R. 761-64. Dr. Perry opined that Plaintiff experiences headaches 

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once per day; irritable bowel syndrome twice per week; and “other” impairments 1-15 

times per day without specifying what the “other” impairments were. A.R. 761. He 

indicated that Plaintiff experienced shortness of breath, vertigo/dizziness, nausea, fatigue, 

and pain that were exacerbated by stress and physical activity. Dr. Perry also opined that 

Plaintiff could sit less than two hours, lift less than ten pounds, stand or walk less than 

two hours, and carry less than ten pounds during an eight hour work day. A.R. 763. A 

vocational expert testified at Plaintiff’s administrative hearing that an individual with 

such limitations would be unable to sustain full time competitive work. A.R. 67. The 

ALJ accorded Dr. Perry’s opinion little weight. A.R. 22. 

Dr. Perry’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinions of Drs. Green, 

Marella, and Disney, each of whom is a non-examining physician who opined that 

Plaintiff had abilities greater than those in Dr. Perry’s opinion. A.R. 21. Because Dr. 

Perry’s opinion was contradicted by these doctors, the ALJ could discount it for specific 

and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 

830-31. 

In giving Dr. Perry’s opinion little weight, the ALJ stated that the severity of Dr. 

Perry’s “opined work related physical restrictions is not supported by the medical 

evidence of record.” A.R. 22. The ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s diagnostic findings are 

mild and unremarkable (A.R. 264, 327, 381, 493, 653, 658, 734, 826, 828, 829, 831, 

965); physical examinations were consistently normal, with few trigger points (A.R. 323, 

326, 331, 334, 340, 342, 344, 353, 369, 370, 372, 378, 410, 414, 421, 426, 439, 449, 451, 

544, 547, 551, 554, 558, 560, 563, 566, 569, 575, 578, 581, 585, 589, 592, 596, 599, 664, 

693, 743, 745, 746, 750, 752, 767, 797, 822, 895, 909, 920, 953); Plaintiff has repeatedly 

indicated that her medications are effective and denied any side effects (A.R. 323, 338, 

345, 770, 875, 956); Plaintiff testified to activities of daily living far beyond the 

restrictions in Dr. Perry’s opinion, including swimming, caring for her elderly mother, 

and managing her household (A.R. 488, 923); the treatment record indicates that her 

impairments are improving or stabilized (A.R. 323, 326, 327, 331, 340, 341, 343, 344, 

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467, 469, 744, 746, 747, 895, 907); and Dr. Perry is Plaintiff’s cardiologist and has 

indicated that Plaintiff has no cardio limitations (A.R. 329-30, 646-47). 

The ALJ’s statements regarding the weight he accorded Dr. Perry’s opinion are 

found on page 10 of his decision (A.R. 22), and his detailed discussion of the medical 

evidence is found primarily on pages 6-8 of his decision (A.R. 18-20). Although this 

organization is not ideal, the decision makes clear that the ALJ relied on record evidence 

to support all of the reasons listed in his discussion of Dr. Perry’s opinion. The 

discussion of medical records on pages 6-8 addresses the ALJ’s findings in detail, with 

numerous citations to the record. The Court finds the ALJ’s explanation to be 

sufficiently clear to understand the basis for his decision. 

The ALJ’s detailed treatment of the medical evidence confirms that the specific 

and legitimate reasons that he identified are supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff 

vigorously argues that the ALJ committed legal error by relying on the medical opinions 

of non-treating physicians to discount Dr. Perry’s opinion. Doc. 17 at 17. Although 

Plaintiff is correct that ALJs must generally accord greatest weight to the medical opinion 

of a treating physician and must accord reduced weight to non-treating and nonexamining physicians, the contradicted opinions of treating physicians can be discounted 

for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff also 

argues that a lack of objective data is not a proper basis for rejecting treating physician 

opinions as to the effect of chronic widespread pain associated with fibromyalgia. 

Doc. 17 at 12; see Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding it 

legal error to “effectively require[e] ‘objective’ evidence for a disease that eludes such 

measurement.”). But the ALJ relied on more than a lack of objective data. He also relied 

on reports from physicians and Plaintiff herself that her condition was improving. The 

ALJ also relied on evidence indicating that Plaintiff’s medication was effective at 

managing pain. Each of these is a specific, legitimate, and permissible reason to discount 

Dr. Perry’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia. The Court concludes for the reasons 

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outlined above that the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Perry’s medical opinion was not 

legal error. 

2. Jason Swigert, M.D. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons for giving 

limited weight to the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Jason Swigert, M.D. Doc. 17 

at 11. On October 24, 2011, Dr. Swigert completed a check-the-box form opining that, 

due to chronic pain in her back, neck, and full body, fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue 

syndrome, severe depression, and restless leg syndrome, Plaintiff was unable to perform 

eight hours of work per day for five days a week. A.R. 961-62. Dr. Swigert opined that 

Plaintiff could sit less than two hours, lift more than 15 pounds but less than 20 pounds, 

stand or walk less than two hours, and carry more than 10 pounds but less than 15 

pounds. A.R. 961. A vocational expert testified at Plaintiff’s administrative hearing that 

an individual with such limitations would be unable to sustain full time competitive work. 

A.R. 67-68. The ALJ accorded Dr. Swigert’s opinion little weight. A.R. 23. 

Dr. Swigert’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinions of Drs. Green, 

Marella, and Disney, each of whom opined that Plaintiff had abilities that were greater 

than those in Dr. Swigert’s opinion. A.R. 21. The ALJ therefore could discount Dr. 

Swigert’s opinion for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

In giving Dr. Swigert’s opinion little weight, the ALJ stated that the severity of Dr. 

Swigert’s “opined work related physical restrictions is not supported by the medical 

evidence of record, including Dr. Swigert’s treatment records.” A.R. 22-23. The ALJ 

indicated that the same evidence in the record that undermines Dr. Perry’s opinion also 

undermines Dr. Swigert’s opinion. Plaintiff offers no reasons why the ALJ’s proffered 

reasons are not specific or legitimate as to Dr. Swigert’s opinion. The Court concludes 

for the same reasons outlined above that the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Swigert’s 

medical opinion was not legal error. 

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3. Nirmala Aryal, M.D. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by improperly discounting the 

opinion of her treating neurologist, Dr. Nirmala Aryal, M.D. Doc. 17 at 15. On 

September 28, 2011, Dr. Aryal completed a check-the-box form opining that, due to 

headaches that last 3 hours or more, Plaintiff had impairments that limited her ability to 

perform work related activities. A.R. 949-50. Dr. Aryal opined that these headaches 

occurred twice per week and could not be relieved with rest or medication. A.R. 949. A 

vocational expert testified at Plaintiff’s administrative hearing that an individual who 

“experiences headaches two times a week that lasted three hours or more, where they 

needed to go home and lay down,” would be unable to sustain full time competitive 

work. A.R. 67. Nowhere in Dr. Aryal’s opinion, however, does she state that Plaintiff’s 

headaches are so severe that she must go home and lay down. Nowhere does Dr. Aryal 

state that Plaintiff’s headaches occur during the workday. The vocational expert’s 

conclusion as to disability was therefore driven by facts introduced by Plaintiff’s counsel 

during the hearing. The ALJ accorded Dr. Aryal’s opinion no weight. A.R. 22. 

Dr. Aryal’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinions of Drs. Green, 

Marella, and Disney, each of whom opined that Plaintiff had abilities that were greater 

than those in Dr. Aryal’s opinion. A.R. 21. The ALJ therefore could discount Dr. 

Aryal’s opinion for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

In giving Dr. Aryal’s opinion no weight, the ALJ stated that the “opinion does not 

provide any specific work related physical limitations.” A.R. 22. In effect, the ALJ 

discounted Dr. Aryal’s opinion because it was conclusory and brief. See Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen evaluating conflicting medical 

opinions, an ALJ need not accept the opinion of a doctor if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”) (citation omitted). Dr. 

Aryal’s opinion does not state that Plaintiff is unable to perform work eight hours per day 

for five days a week; instead, it merely states that Plaintiff’s headaches limit her ability to 

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perform work-related activities. A.R. 949. The opinion is ambiguous as to the degree 

and debilitating effects of Plaintiff’s headaches and silent as to their timing. Dr. Aryal’s 

opinion provides nothing but a conclusory assertion that Plaintiff is limited in her ability 

to perform work-related activities. The Court concludes that the ALJ was warranted in 

disregarding Dr. Aryal’s opinion. See Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 

1986) (finding that an ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s opinion which is “brief 

and conclusory in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support [its] 

conclusion.”). In addition, the ALJ noted that Dr. Aryal’s opinion failed to indicate that 

the “limitation [can] reasonably be expected to result from objective clinical or diagnostic 

findings.” A.R. 22. The ALJ could have disregarded Dr. Aryal’s opinion on that basis 

alone. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216; Orn, 495 F.3d at 631 (listing factors relevant to 

evaluating a medical opinion, including the amount of relevant evidence that supports the 

opinion, the quality of the explanation provided in the opinion, and the consistency of the 

medical opinion with the record as a whole). The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to 

disregard Dr. Aryal’s opinion was not legal error. 

4. Ravi Bhalla, M.D. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons for giving 

limited weight to the opinion of her treating rheumatologist, Dr. Ravi Bhalla, M.D. 

Doc. 17 at 16. On September 26, 2011, Dr. Bhalla submitted a medical opinion in which 

he opined that Plaintiff’s “chronic musculoskeletal pain, weakness, and fatigue” is her 

“primary disabling symptoms,” and her “disability” is “based on joint pains and stiffness, 

fatigue, and muscle pain and weakness.” A.R. 951. He indicated he “cannot determine 

the impact of symptoms in relation to [Plaintiff’s] activities,” but “do[es] not question 

[Plaintiff’s] assertion that [she] is disabled for all competitive work requirements.” 

A.R. 951. The ALJ accorded Dr. Bhalla’s opinion little weight. A.R. 22. 

Dr. Bhalla’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinions of Drs. Green, 

Marella, and Disney, each of whom opined that Plaintiff had abilities greater than those 

in Dr. Bhalla’s opinion. A.R. 21. The ALJ therefore could discount Dr. Bhalla’s opinion 

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for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 

830-31. 

In giving Dr. Bhalla’s opinion little weight, the ALJ stated that Dr. Bhalla’s final 

statement in the opinion is a “vague, overgeneral conclusion [that] is not supported by the 

evidence of record.” A.R. 22. The ALJ noted that Dr. Bhalla admits that the opinion is 

based on the claimant’s subjective complaints. In addition, Dr. Bhalla failed to provide 

specific physical limitations, and admitted he “cannot determine the impact” of her 

symptoms “in relation to her activities.” A.R. 22. For the reasons outlined above, the 

Court concludes that the ALJ did not commit legal error by discounting the brief, 

conclusory, unsupported medical opinion submitted by Dr. Bhalla, which was also 

inconsistent with the medical record. 

Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ should have accorded Dr. Bhalla’s opinion 

controlling weight. Instead, she argues that Dr. Bhalla’s opinion “is verification of 

symptoms that are consistent with the opinions of Drs. Perry, Swigert, and Aryal, as well 

[sic] the testimony of [Plaintiff] and her husband.” Doc. 17 at 16-17. Plaintiff, in effect, 

argues that the Court should conclude from Dr. Bhalla’s opinion that the ALJ’s decision 

to discount the opinions of the other treating physicians and his ultimate decision in this 

case is inconsistent with the balance of the evidence. As explained above, however, the 

ALJ’s decision will be set aside only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is 

based on legal error. Lewis, 236 F.3d at 517 n.13. The Court concludes that the ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on legal error. 

5. State Agency Physicians. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by according “some weight” to 

the opinions of the State Agency’s reviewing physicians. Doc. 17 at 17. She asserts that 

the ALJ committed legal error by failing to provide “specific and legitimate reasons for 

crediting non-examining State Agency assessments over treating physician opinion.” Id. 

Plaintiff is incorrect. As outlined above, the ALJ provided numerous specific and 

legitimate reasons, drawn from the medical record, to justify the ALJ’s decision to credit 

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the opinions of Drs. Green, Marella, and Disney over the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating 

physicians. Because the opinions of Drs. Green, Marella, and Disney were supported by 

independent clinical findings, they constituted substantial evidence. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 

957 (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as 

substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings 

or other evidence in the record.”) (citation omitted). The Court concludes that the ALJ’s 

decision to credit the opinions of Drs. Green, Marella, and Disney was not legal error. 

C. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Credibility. 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine 

whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged; 

and, if there is no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of the symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the 

rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. A.R. 18. The ALJ then found 

Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

symptoms not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the RFC assessment. 

A.R. 18. In other words, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements not credible to the extent 

she claims she is unable to perform past relevant work. 

At the hearing Plaintiff testified that she quit her last job because she was unable 

to concentrate or remain alert and she was in pain, which caused her to make poor 

decisions. A.R. 43. Plaintiff also testified that she is unable to take most of the major 

drugs on the market to treat her fibromyalgia because she experiences strange side 

effects. A.R. 47. She stated that her lower back pain is very sharp and her pain is 

aggravated by repeated movements, such as housecleaning. A.R. 47. Plaintiff also 

testified that she gets headaches three or four times per week that require her to take 

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medication and go to sleep. A.R. 48. She also stated that she has numbness and tingling 

in her hands and feet, which prevent her from typing for longer than 20 minutes at a time 

or opening containers. A.R. 48-50. Plaintiff also testified that she needs to rest every 15 

minutes if she is “doing something,” that she can sit for an hour at most, that she can 

stand for five minutes at most, that she can walk for 15-20 minutes at most, and that she 

can lift 15 pounds at most. A.R. 52-53. She also stated that she can dust for 10-15 

minutes or vacuum for five minutes at a time, but that regular household chores hurt her 

back. A.R. 54. Plaintiff also stated that she is unable to concentrate and comprehend 

things she reads, which explains her recent difficulty in completing a PhD program. 

A.R. 55. 

The ALJ gave the following reasons for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not fully 

credible: (1) Plaintiff’s treatment regimen has been quite effective at managing her 

symptoms; (2) medication has been effective at managing her symptoms with no adverse 

side effects; (3) Plaintiff’s restless leg syndrome and migraine headaches are “stable” and 

she has been “doing very well” with her fibromyalgia; (4) physical examinations and 

diagnostic studies generally reported “unremarkable” and “normal” results; (5) Plaintiff 

engaged in many activities that are inconsistent with her allegations of disability; and 

(6) inconsistencies exist in the record. A.R. 19-20. The ALJ supported each of these 

reasons with many citations to the record. 

Plaintiff contends that the following assertions made by the ALJ are not supported 

by the record: the treatment regimen has been effective at managing her symptoms; 

medication has been effective at managing her symptoms with no adverse side effects; 

Plaintiff’s restless leg syndrome and migraine headaches are stable. Doc. 21-22. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ reached these conclusions by failing to view the record as a 

whole and isolating only a portion of the medical record to support a desired conclusion. 

Doc. 17 at 21; see Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining 

whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we must 

review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the 

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evidence and that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.”). The Court disagrees. 

The ALJ cited many diagnostic reports, physical examinations, medical notes, and 

statements made by Plaintiff to medical service providers to substantiate each reason 

given for the credibility determination. A.R. 18-20. “If the evidence can reasonably 

support either affirming or reversing the Secretary’s conclusion, the court may not 

substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.” Id. at 720-21 (citation omitted). After a 

careful review of the record, the Court concludes that the evidence reasonably supports 

the ALJ’s credibility determination. 

Plaintiff also argues that her daily activities are not inconsistent with her alleged 

limitations and that the ALJ erred by relying on them to impugn her credibility. Doc. 17 

at 24. As outlined above, Plaintiff testified that she could not perform household chores 

without breaks every few minutes. She also testified that she must lie down for hours 

after grocery shopping in order to recover her strength. A.R. 57. She also testified that 

she needs to rest every 15 minutes if she is “doing something” and that she can sit for an 

hour at most, stand for five minutes at most, walk for 15-20 minutes at most, and lift 15 

pounds at most. A.R. 52-53. The ALJ noted, however, that Plaintiff is the primary 

caretaker for her elderly mother who recently suffered a stroke. In addition, Plaintiff 

exercises three times a week for an hour by swimming laps. A.R. 488, 923. These 

activities seem inconsistent with the limitations Plaintiff alleged in her testimony. The 

Court cannot agree that the ALJ committed legal error by relying on these daily activities 

to undermine her credibility. 

Plaintiff disputes the validity of the “inconsistencies observed in the record” upon 

which the ALJ relied. Doc. 17 at 26. For example, the ALJ observed that a treating 

physician had recorded in his notes “[Plaintiff’s] gait is abnormal in so much as she 

shuffles and is unable to fully lift her leg and I am uncertain whether this is due to effort 

or pathology.” A.R. 964. Plaintiff asserts that there was no finding of questionable 

effort, but the physician clearly raised that possibility in the note. Because there are more 

than a sufficient number of specific, clear, and convincing reasons to justify the ALJ’s 

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credibility determination, the Court will not address Plaintiff’s remaining arguments 

regarding her credibility. 

D. The ALJ Did Not Err in His Use of Third Party Report. 

Plaintiff’s husband, Donald Childers, submitted two third-party function reports. 

A.R. 176-83, 196-203. The ALJ gave his reports great weight because they detailed 

extensive activities of daily living and physical capacities as demonstrated by her regular 

activities. A.R. 21. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in the use of her husband’s 

reports. Doc. 17 at 27. Because Mr. Childers reported that his wife experienced 

unpredictable periods of joint and muscle pain and that she needed time to recuperate 

from the performance of normal daily activities, Plaintiff argues that it was error to 

accord the reports great weight and claim that the reports support the ALJ’s conclusion of 

no disability. Id. The Court disagrees. Mr. Childers’ reports provide many examples of 

social and physical activities in which Plaintiff engages notwithstanding her limitations, 

including swimming, cleaning the house, preparing meals, shopping, walking, driving, 

attending church, hosting bible study sessions, going out alone, attending sporting events, 

reading, and watching television. Although Mr. Childers reported that his wife had 

decreased abilities to perform such activities, these limitations are reflected in the limited 

RFC – the RFC states that Plaintiff cannot engage in the full range of sedentary work. 

A.R. 17-18. Because Mr. Childers’ report is consistent with the RFC, the Court 

concludes that the ALJ did not commit legal error in relying on it. 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall terminate this case. 

Dated this 23rd day of April, 2014. 

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