Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01085/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01085-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Tai Edmund Fred Abreu asserts his civil rights were violated by prison guards during his 

incarceration at the California State Prison in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff contends he was employed 

by the prison in the kitchen, and suffered an injury due to the deliberate indifference of Defendants. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff contends Defendants are liable for a violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 

22 at 3) Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support his claim for relief, the First 

Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

I. Screening Requirement

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the complaint, and 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the action is “frivolous, malicious or 

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). The Court must screen the First Amended 

Complaint because an amended complaint supersedes the previously filed complaints. See Forsyth v. 

TAI EDMUND FRED ABREU,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAVINESS, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:15-cv-01085 - AWI - JLT

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 23 Filed 04/06/16 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

II. Pleading Standards

General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 

complaint must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may 

include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Federal Rules 

adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards” than those 

drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

A complaint must state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and succinct manner. 

Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The purpose of a complaint 

is to give the defendant fair notice of the claims against him, and the grounds upon which the 

complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers 

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 

factual enhancement.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation.] A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation.] The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation.] Where a complaint pleads 

facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). If factual allegations are well-pled, a court should assume 

their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; conclusions in the 

pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. 

The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court “may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 23 Filed 04/06/16 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim.” See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 

1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). 

However, the Court may grant leave to amend a complaint to the extent deficiencies of the complaint 

can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

III. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff seeks to assert violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 

1983”), which “is a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 

510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). An individual may bring a civil rights action pursuant to Section 1983, 

which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 

of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To plead a Section 1983 violation, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it may 

be inferred that (1) a constitutional right was deprived, and (2) a person who committed the alleged 

violation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Williams v. Gorton, 

529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976).

A plaintiff must allege he suffered a specific injury and show causal relationship between the 

defendant’s conduct and the injury. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976). Thus, Section 

1983 “requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the 

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff.” Chavira v. Ruth, 2012 WL 1328636 at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012). An individual deprives another of a federal right “if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do so that it causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). In other words, “[s]ome culpable action or in action must be attributable to 

defendants.” See Puckett v. Corcoran Prison - CDCR, 2012 WL 1292573, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 

2012).

IV. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that during April 2013, he was employed in the kitchen of CSP-Corcoran as a 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 23 Filed 04/06/16 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“linebacker,” which required him “to carry trays of food to the serving area from the kitchen and 

carry[] empty trays back from the serving area to [the] scullery through the kitchen.” (Doc. 22 at 8) He 

alleges that on April 13, he “slipped and fell during the course of [his] duties,” and his accident was 

witnessed by M. Caviness, the correctional supervisory cook. (Id. at 3) Plaintiff contends the fall “was 

caused by spilled chicken grease and the location of the fall is frequently spilled on in such a manner.” 

(Id.) According to Plaintiff, “Per policy, CSC Caviness does not allow cleaning materials to be 

accessed during food service.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he “subsequently complained daily to Defendant 

Miguel,” a correctional officer, who “disregarded” Plaintiff’s complaints and did not take any 

corrective actions. (Id.) He reports he also complained to Caviness, who also disregarded Plaintiff’s 

complaints. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that on April 20, “after complaining of spills in this same area to Defendants 

Miguel and Puga,” he again slipped and fell. (Doc. 22 at 4) Plaintiff asserts he injured his left wrist in 

the second fall, which “interfered with [his] daily activities and basic life functions for the next year.” 

(Id.) He asserts that “Defendants Miguel, Caviness, and Puga[] were each aware of the danger and 

failed to take corrective/preventative action at any time.” (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that after 

his injury, he “was moved to a non-pay position, denying [him] income.” (Id.) Based upon these facts, 

Plaintiff contends Defendants are liable for a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be “free[] 

from cruel and unusual punishment.” (Doc. 22 at 3) 

V. Discussion and Analysis

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from 

inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 

Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, “[p]rison officials have a duty to ensure that 

prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.”

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, a prisoner may not be “compelled 

to perform physical labor which is beyond their strength, endangers their lives or health, or causes 

undue pain.” Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).

To plead a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating 

that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 23 Filed 04/06/16 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(1994). Deliberate indifference in this context is a high standard, present only where the prison 

official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health and safety.” Id. at 837; 

Toguchi v. Chung, 291 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). In other words, “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. When a defendant should have been aware of the risk of 

substantial harm to the prisoner but was not, “then the person has not violated the Eighth Amendment, 

no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges he fell on April 13, 2013, and the fall was witnessed by Defendant 

Caviness. (Doc. 22 at 4) He asserts he complained “daily” to Defendant Miguel about the policy of 

“not allow[ing] cleaning materials to be accessed during food service.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts also that 

“[o]n days when Caviness was present, [he] complained to him as well.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff fails 

to allege any facts supporting the conclusion that Defendants were aware a lack of access to cleaning 

materials1posed a serious risk of harm to the plaintiff. Further, there are no facts supporting a 

conclusion that Defendants were aware of the wet floor when Plaintiff slipped on April 13 or on April 

20. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege any of the defendants were present in the kitchen when he fell and 

injured his wrist. Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show Defendants knew of and 

disregarded a serious risk to his safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

VI. Conclusion and Order 

Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient facts sufficient to support his claim for a violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. The Court will allow Plaintiff one final opportunity to cure the deficiencies 

identified in this order by providing additional facts to support his claims. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 

F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1128. If Plaintiff fails to provide 

information supporting his claims, the Court will find he is unable to do so.

Plaintiff is advised that the second amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. In addition, the amended complaint must be “complete in itself without 

 

1 The Court presumes that Plaintiff is claiming that had the cleaning materials been present, someone would have cleaned 

the spill before his fall. He does not explain why “cleaning materials” are needed to dry a spill, unless—and he does not 

state this—he means “towels” or “mops” when he refers to “cleaning materials.” Likewise, he does not explain whether 

he—or anyone else—was aware of the spill before he fell on either day.

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 23 Filed 04/06/16 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. The amended pleading must bear the 

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” Finally, Plaintiff 

is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an 

amended complaint are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing London v. 

Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981).

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend; 

2. Within twenty-one days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL file a 

Second Amended Complaint; and 

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the action will be dismissed for failure to 

prosecute and failure to obey the Court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 23 Filed 04/06/16 Page 6 of 6