Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01457/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01457-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Upon screening of the First Amended Complaint, the Court dismissed the Maricopa

County Sheriff’s Office and Correctional Health Services as Defendants (Doc. #14).

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Oscar McCoy Nester, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-1457-PHX-SMM (GEE)

ORDER

Plaintiff Oscar McCoy Nester, Jr., brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (Doc. #13).1

 Defendant filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #67), which has been fully briefed (Doc. ##70-71, 73).

The Court will deny Defendant’s motion without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims arose during his confinement at the Maricopa County Madison

Street and Fourth Avenue Jails (Doc. #13 at 1). In Count I, he alleged that Defendant acted

with deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs; specifically, his “possible

walking pneumonia and stalph [sic] infection disease and suffering” (id. at 4). Plaintiff

asserted that on or around December 25, 2005, he informed the sheriff’s office staff and

health services staff that he had difficulty breathing. He claimed that, pursuant to

Defendant’s policies and directives, he was denied care and made to suffer (id.). Plaintiff

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further claimed that he filed numerous medical forms and grievances to notify Defendant of

Plaintiff’s difficulty breathing and need for medical treatment, but Defendant did not take

Plaintiff’s claims seriously, and Defendant failed to ensure timely treatment (id., attach.).

Plaintiff alleged that, as a result, his lungs filled with fluid and he suffered extreme pain for

10 days before he was hospitalized for 2 weeks with severe pneumonia (id.).

In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that the living conditions at the jails were deplorable (id.

at 5). He stated that there was overcrowding, the food was nutritionally inadequate,

conditions were hazardous, and diseases were rampant (id.). 

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, as the sheriff, has complete responsibility for

conditions and safety at the jail and implemented policies at the jail that led to Plaintiff’s

injuries (id. at 4-5). Plaintiff sued for compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and

injunctive relief (id. at 7). 

The Court ordered Defendant to respond to Counts I and II (Doc. #14), and Defendant

filed his Answer (Doc. #18). 

Defendant moved for summary judgment on Count I only (Doc. #67). He contended

that Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support his claims in Count I. Defendant argued

that the evidence reflects that Plaintiff’s medical requests were responded to timely and

appropriately both before and after Plaintiff’s hospitalization for pneumonia (id. at 6).

Defendant further argued that at most, Plaintiff can show only a difference of opinion about

the care he received but, because there is no evidence that medical needs were ignored, his

claim in Count I cannot survive (id.). And Defendant maintained that Plaintiff has not taken

steps to conduct discovery and prosecute this action, noting that Plaintiff did not disclose any

expert witnesses to support his claims nor has he deposed Defendant’s expert witnesses (id.

at 2-3).

Defendant submitted a Statement of Facts, which is supported by the affidavit of

Zelean Tademy, a Sergeant assigned to the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Inmate Hearing Unit

(Doc. #68, Ex. A, Tademy Aff. ¶ 1), the affidavit of William Arthur Mosier, a physician’s

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Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998).

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assistant who reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records (id., Ex. B, Mosier Aff. ¶¶ 1, 6), and

excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition (id., Ex. C, Pl. Dep., July 6, 2007). 

The Court issued an Order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the

summary judgment motion (Doc. #69).2

 In his response, Plaintiff asserted that much of

Defendant’s evidence actually supports his claim that he suffered a serious medical need and

that it took weeks for him to get adequate medical care. He explained that he was unable to

depose witnesses or adequately respond to Defendant’s summary judgment motion because

he is indigent (id. at 2-3). Yet he asserted that he has attempted to prosecute this action to

the best of his ability. Plaintiff requested that the Court stay his case for one year so that he

may prepare his case or, in the alternative, give Plaintiff “some remedies” that would level

the playing field (id. at 4). Attached to his response memorandum is the copy of a letter to

Defendant’s attorneys requesting certain discovery materials (id., attach.).

In reply, Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s response did not address the merits of

Defendant’s arguments nor did it present any specific facts or evidence showing a genuine

issue for trial (Doc. #71).

Plaintiff then filed a sur-response, in which he stated that he attempted to have the

U.S. Marshal serve subpoenas on nine witness, but that request was denied (Doc. #73). He

cited to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(d-f) and argued that summary judgment cannot

be granted without any testimony from these “vital” witnesses (id. at 2-3). 

II. Second Amended Complaint

On September 13, 2007, before Defendant filed his summary judgment motion,

Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, which set forth the same medical care and

conditions claims but added 37 Defendants (Doc. #53). Defendant’s summary judgment

motion does not address this amended pleading; it goes only to Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint.

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Under the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must seek leave to amend a

pleading and attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading to the motion. LRCiv 15.1.

Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint; however, he did not submit a motion

requesting leave to amend his pleading. As such, he has failed to comply with the local rules,

and his Second Amended Pleading will be stricken. 

III. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)

In both of his responses, Plaintiff argues for a stay so that he may have time to

adequately prosecute this action (Doc. #70, 73). He also cites to Rule 56(f) and suggests that

a summary judgment ruling is inappropriate until witness depositions and affidavits can be

obtained (Doc. #73 at 2).

Rule 56(f) “provides advice for litigants to avoid summary judgment when they have

not had sufficient time to develop affirmative evidence.” United States v. Kitsap Physicians

Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002). Under this Rule, the Court may grant a

continuance if the party opposing summary judgment needs additional time to discover “facts

essential to justify its opposition” to the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). To obtain a

continuance for further discovery, the opposing party must file a declaration that

demonstrates (1) facts establishing a likelihood that controverting evidence may exist as to

a material fact, (2) the specific reasons why such evidence could not be presented, and (3)

the steps the party intends to use to obtain such evidence. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff has not met these requirements. But as set forth in this Order infra, the

summary judgment analysis reveals that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether

Defendant is liable for a constitutional violation. Thus, there is no need to stay a ruling for

further discovery. Plaintiff’s request for a Rule 56(f) stay will be denied.

IV. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standards

1. Summary Judgment

A court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

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materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under summary judgment

practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion

and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323;

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 

If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden

then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue

for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995);

see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions

of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968). But conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Instead, the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate

specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249;

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.

In assessing whether a party has met its burden, the court views the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052,

1056 (9th Cir. 1995). 

2. Pretrial Detainee

Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause, which protects against the use of conduct by officials that amounts to

punishment. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir. 1991). For a particular governmental action to

constitute punishment, the action must cause the detainee to suffer some harm or disability,

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and the purpose of the action must be to punish the detainee. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d

1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). The harm or

disability caused by the government’s action must either significantly exceed or be

independent of the inherent discomforts of confinement. Demery, 378 F.3d at 1030 (citing

Bell, 441 U.S. at 537). And if a condition or governmental action is not reasonably related

to a legitimate governmental objective—“if it is arbitrary or purposeless”—a court may infer

that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. 

3. Medical Care

 Because pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable

to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment, the same standards are applied. Frost, 152

F.3d at 1128. To establish a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on

inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful

to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976). This requires the plaintiff to satisfy both the objective and subjective

components of a two-part test. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). First,

he must demonstrate that he suffered a serious medical need. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091,

9106 (9th Cir. 2006). Indications that a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment

include the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important

and worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly

affects an individual’s daily activities, or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds,

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s response to that serious medical

need was deliberately indifferent. “[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

needs is the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. An

official is deliberately indifferent if he both knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an

inmate’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Mere negligence or medical malpractice does not

establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d

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Defendant cites to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony to support the assertion that

Plaintiff was in the hospital from January 5 to January 18; however, the testimony only

confirms that Plaintiff was admitted on January 5, there is nothing about the discharge date

(Doc. #68, Ex. C, Pl. Dep. 66). Nonetheless, there appears to be no dispute that Plaintiff was

in the hospital for approximately two weeks. 

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458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). At the same time, a prisoner does not have to prove that he was

completely denied medical care in order to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference may be shown when an

official denies, delays, or intentionally interferes with treatment or by the way that a medical

professional provides care. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A difference of medical opinion,

however, is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). And a delay in providing medical treatment does not constitute

deliberate indifference unless the delay was harmful. Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198,

200 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404,

407 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); see Hallett, 296 F.3d at 746 (the Eighth Amendment is

only violated if “delays occurred to a patient with problems so severe that delays would cause

significant harm and that Defendants should have known this to be the case ”); Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1333-35 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a delay of several days

in receiving pain medication for a broken shoulder did not amount to a constitutional

violation). 

B. Parties’ Contentions

Initially, the Court notes that Defendant’s motion addresses Plaintiff’s medical care

at the jail both before and after his hospitalization for pneumonia (Doc. #67 at 6). Plaintiff

was hospitalized from January 5 to approximately January 18, 2006 (Doc. #68, Def.’s

Statement of Facts (DSOF) ¶ 10).3

 Although Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes

the allegation that Defendant has caused Plaintiff “long term suffering and continuious [sic]

medical problems over the past 11 months” (Doc. #13 at 4, attach.), his claim concerns the

lack of medical care before his hospitalization. His supporting facts focus on the denial of

care from December 25, 2005 to January 5, 2006; there are no allegations about the care or

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lack of care received after January 18, 2006 (id. at 4, attach.). Plaintiff’s reference to

continued medical problems supports his alleged injury and goes only to damages. 

1. Defendant

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was provided medical care as needed and when

requested in December 2005 and early January 2006. According to the affidavit of W.

Mosier, a physician’s assistant who reviewed the medical records, Plaintiff received the

following care during that period: on December 2, 2005, Plaintiff was seen for an infection

on his finger; he was given Augmentin and Ibuprofen (Doc. #68, Ex. B, Mosier Aff. ¶ 10).

Plaintiff was seen again by nurses on December 5 and December 6 (id. ¶¶ 11-12). And

Plaintiff was examined by another nurse on December 28 after complaining of chills,

abdominal cramps, and a fever; his vital signs were checked and were acceptable (id. ¶ 13).

On December 30, Plaintiff complained of right-sided chest pain and shortness of breath and

was evaluated that same day; his vital signs were again acceptable (id. ¶¶ 15-16). Plaintiff

was seen again later on December 30 when his complaints continued (id. ¶ 17). On January

1, 2006, Plaintiff complained of left-sided chest pain and was seen by a nurse, who noted that

Plaintiff had a non-productive cough for one week and his respirations were even (id. ¶ 18).

Then, on January 5, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Venkatabalajai after complaints of cough, fever

and shortness of breath; Dr. Venkatabalajai transferred Plaintiff to the hospital (id. ¶ 19).

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was seen by medical personnel in response to his

grievances and he even signed “informal resolutions” to his grievances, implying that his

complaints were resolved (Doc. #67 at 7). Defendant further argues that because Plaintiff

is not a medical professional, he is unqualified to render any medical opinion about his care

and his belief about his medical condition “is insufficient to prove the need for medical care

as of December 4” (id.). 

2. Plaintiff

Plaintiff testifies that he believed that incurring repeated staph infections ultimately

led to his pneumonia and that his symptoms included high fevers, night sweats, flu

symptoms, headaches, and stiffness (Doc. #68, Ex. C, Pl. Dep. 61:14-20). He states that he

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Because his First Amended Complaint is verified and sets forth specific facts based

on personal knowledge and admissible as evidence, the Court treats it as an opposing

affidavit under Rule 56 (see Doc. #13). See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th

Cir. 1995). 

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reported these symptoms to medical personnel to the best of his ability (id. 61:21-25).

Plaintiff alleges on or about December 25, 2005, he specifically told officials that he had

difficulty breathing and believed he may have walking pneumonia (Doc. #13 at 4).4

 As to

the period between December 30 and January 5, Plaintiff avers that he talked to several

nurses and officers and informed them that he could not breathe at certain times, yet he

received no care (Doc. #68, Ex. C, Pl. Dep. 66:7-12; 70:4-9). He further alleges that he

“begged for help and attention. I put in numerous medical tank orders and grievance forms

begging for treatment and help with no im[m]ediate response or emergency care” (Doc. #13

at 4, attach.). With respect to his suffering, Plaintiff alleges that for the ten days before his

hospitalization, he had no sleep, he endured pain he had never experienced before, and he

feared death (id.). He states that he was finally rushed to the hospital in an ambulance (id.).

Finally, Plaintiff insists that his grievances about medical care were not informally

resolved; he contends that the grievances were either not returned to him or officials did not

forward them to the next level in the grievance process (Doc. #70 at 2). 

C. Analysis

As to the first prong of the deliberate indifference test, Defendant makes no argument

that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need. Indeed, he identified Plaintiff’s medical

need as pneumonia (id. at 4). Without any argument to the contrary, and given that

pneumonia is a serious condition worthy of treatment that ultimately landed Plaintiff in the

hospital for two weeks, the Court finds that Plaintiff had a serious medical need. 

The Court therefore turns to the second prong of the deliberate indifference test. To

support his claim that he was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need,

Defendant relies almost entirely Mosier’s affidavit. Mosier did not treat Plaintiff and has no

personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s treatment while at the jail. Mosier’s affidavit is based

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Although Tademy’s affidavit refers to “Exhibit D,” and describes this exhibit as

copies of Plaintiff’s December 3 and 4, 2005 and January 20, 2006 grievances (Doc. #68, Ex.

A, Tademy Aff. ¶¶ 12-14), there is no Exhibit D attached to the affidavit or Statement of

Facts.

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solely on a review of Plaintiff’s medical records (Doc. #68, Ex. B, Mosier Aff. ¶ 6). But

none of Plaintiff’s medical records are attached to Mosier’s affidavit. If papers or documents

are referred to in an affidavit, “a sworn or certified copy must be attached to or served with

the affidavit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Without personal knowledge and without medical

records from the time period upon which Mosier relies, his affidavit is not competent

evidence in support of Defendant’s summary judgment motion. See Cermetek, Inc. v. Butler

Avpak, Inc., 573 F.2d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1978); see also School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah

County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993) (“if documentary evidence

is cited as a source of a factual contention, Rule 56(e) requires attachment,” even if the

affidavit is also based on personal knowledge). 

Regardless, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony contradicts Mosier’s statements about the

treatment Plaintiff received from December 30 to January 5. Contrary to Mosier’s claims

that Plaintiff was seen and evaluated a number of times in the week before his transfer to the

hospital, Plaintiff testified that during that period, he received no medical care beyond a

nurse “[j]ust hear[ing] my complaint or tak[ing] my medical paperwork” and the provision

of an inhaler and a few Tylenols or ibuprofen (Doc. #68, Ex. C, Pl. Dep. 70:4-71:3). 

The parties also dispute whether Plaintiff’s grievances, in which he requested

emergency medical treatment, were resolved informally or disregarded by jail staff. Like

Mosier’s affidavit, Tademy’s affidavit is based on a review of documents—grievance

forms—but none of these forms are attached to the affidavit (Doc. #68, Ex. A, Tademy Aff.

¶ 7).5

 Even considering Tademy’s affidavit, it appears to show that Plaintiff put jail staff on

notice of his serious medical need in a grievance dated December 4, 2005 (id. ¶ 12).

According to Tademy, in this grievance, Plaintiff complained that he had an infection on his

hand and chest pain and trouble breathing, that his requests to see a sergeant had not been

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Defendant presents no argument regarding whether this violation could have been

pursuant to a policy at the jail, which Plaintiff alleges (see Doc. #13 at 4). The Court cannot

address issues not presented in a motion for summary judgment. See Greene v. Solano

County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that if a claim is not raised in a

defendant’s motion, summary judgment on based on that claim is inappropriate). 

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met, that he filed two grievances already and his condition “is growing worse by the hour,”

and that anyone “would have been rushed to the hospital with such serious infections and

complications!” (id.). For relief, Plaintiff asked for “[e]mergency treatment in Jesus name”

(id.). 

Construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, there are material disputes whether

Plaintiff notified the staff of a serious medical need as early as December 4, whether the jail

was aware of Plaintiff’s continued requests for emergency medical care, and whether those

requests and his deteriorating condition were disregarded. Defendant does not dispute that

Plaintiff was taken to the hospital by ambulance on January 5 and hospitalized for two weeks

for severe pneumonia (see Doc. #13 at 4, attach; Doc. #68, DSOF ¶ 21). The inference is

that the delay in treating Plaintiff’s serious medical need was harmful. Consequently, there

is a genuine issue of material fact whether Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to medical

care was violated.6

 Plaintiff’s medical records, interpreted by a physician and presented to

the Court in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, may clarify or resolve this issue

in future motions. Based on the evidence currently before the Court, Defendant’s request for

summary judgment on Count I will be denied.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #53) is stricken.

(2) Plaintiff request for a Rule 56(f) stay (within Doc. #73) is denied.

(3) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #67) is denied without

prejudice.

//

//

//

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(4) Defendant may file a new summary judgment motion within 30 days from the date

of this Order.

DATED this 7th day of August, 2008.

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