Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-01351/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-01351-176/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AND THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT COMPOSED OF THREE JUDGES 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 2284, TITLE 28 UNITED STATES CODE

RALPH COLEMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P

THREE-JUDGE COURT

MARCIANO PLATA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C01-1351 TEH

THREE-JUDGE COURT

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OR,

ALTERNATIVELY, SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

This three-judge proceeding arises from two cases in their remedial phases, Plata v.

Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, and Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520

LKK JFM P, in which courts have found constitutionally inadequate levels of medical and

mental health care in California’s prisons. In 2007, this court was convened pursuant to the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B), to determine whether to

issue a “prisoner release order” directed at alleviating those unconstitutional conditions. 

Before issuing such an order, we must determine that crowding of California prisons is the

primary cause of the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and that no other relief will

remedy the violation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(3)(E)(i), (ii). 

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Pending before the Court is Defendants’ September 15, 2008, motion for dismissal or,

alternatively, summary judgment. Defendants seek dismissal for failure to exhaust and lack

of jurisdiction. In the alternative, Defendants contend that there is no genuine issue of

material fact as to whether overcrowding is the “primary cause” of the violation of Plaintiffs’

right to adequate medical and mental health care. We deny the motion.

I. Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal for Failure to Exhaust

Defendants first contend that this proceeding must be dismissed because Plaintiffs

failed to “exhaust[] their current complaints of overcrowding as the primary cause of the

alleged unconstitutional medical care or request the remedy of a prisoner release order in an

administrative grievance.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12. Plaintiffs argue that exhaustion is

not required, and we agree.

The PLRA provides, in part, that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). Here, we have two

preexisting lawsuits in which the constitutionality of the prison conditions has already been

determined adversely to Defendants. Defendants do not contend that those preexisting

actions, Plata and Coleman, should be dismissed for failure to exhaust. Instead, they argue

that additional exhaustion is required because Plaintiffs assert before this three-judge court

“that overcrowding is the primary reason for the alleged unconstitutional conditions” and

because Plaintiffs “request . . . a prisoner release order.” In essence, Defendants argue that

the three-judge court proceeding is a new “action” for purposes of § 1997e(a), and that the

issue as to “primary cause” and the request as to the remedy of a prisoner release order must

accordingly be exhausted. However, proceedings before a three-judge court convened to

consider a request for a particular form of relief in cases in which prison conditions have

already been found to be unconstitutional are not new “action[s]” under § 1997e(a), and

accordingly that section is not applicable to such proceedings. Instead, a three-judge court is

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1

The Stipulation also states that the court “shall have the power to enforce the

Stipulation through specific performance and all other remedies permitted by law.” Id.

(emphasis added). 

2

In this regard, the present proceeding is functionally identical to Clarkson v.

Coughlin, No. 91-CIV-1792 (RWS), 2006 WL 587345 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2006), in which

the district court rejected the defendant’s argument that exhaustion was required before the

plaintiffs could file a motion “that exclusively [sought] the enforcement of the terms of” a

consent decree. Id. at *3.

3

convened under the PLRA only for the purpose of considering whether overcrowding is the

primary cause of the constitutional violation and whether the requested relief is warranted

under that act.

In this proceeding, Plaintiffs seek to implement orders obtained in the preexisting

actions. The Coleman Plaintiffs seek to implement a judgment entered against the state of

California in 1995 (before the enactment of the PLRA). See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.

Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995). The Plata Plaintiffs seek to implement a Stipulation for

Injunctive Relief, which provides that, if the state “does not provide a level of medical care

sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, the Court may grant relief as authorized under the [PLRA].” Stipulation for

Injunctive Relief, Plata v. Davis, No. C-01-1351 (TEH) (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2002) at 14.1

 

Plaintiffs merely seek to implement these prior orders with additional forms of relief.2

The PLRA itself squarely refutes Defendants’ argument that this proceeding is a new

action. The PLRA provisions governing three-judge court proceedings clearly demonstrate

that these proceedings are a part of preexisting civil actions, not a new action. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(3)(B) (“In any civil action in Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a

prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-judge court . . . .” (emphasis added)). 

Most notably, the PLRA permits “a Federal judge before whom a civil action with respect to

prison conditions is pending” to “sua sponte request the convening of a three-judge

court . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(D) (emphasis added). Furthermore, a plaintiff seeking a

prisoner release order need not prepare an amended complaint, but must simply “file . . . a

request for such relief” along with “a request for a three-judge court and material sufficient to

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demonstrate that the requirements of [18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)] have been met.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(3)(C). If three-judge court proceedings involved new “actions,” it would be

impossible for a federal judge to initiate such proceedings sua sponte or for a plaintiff to

initiate such proceedings without amending the complaint. Because the proceeding now

before us is not a new action but rather a part of a preexisting civil action, the exhaustion

requirement is not applicable. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Alternatively, when we examine separately the issues Defendants contend must be

exhausted, we conclude that exhaustion would not be required even if a new action were

before us rather than the proceeding at issue.

As to Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs must exhaust their “claim” that

overcrowding is the primary cause of the constitutional violations, the PLRA requires

exhaustion of claims only “with respect to prison conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The

prison conditions underlying this proceeding are constitutionally inadequate medical and

mental health care; those claims have already been adjudicated in the Plata and Coleman

lawsuits. The primary cause of the failure to provide the constitutionally required care is not

in itself a “prison condition.” It is simply a legal relationship that the courts must determine

with respect to the reasons the unconstitutional condition exists in order to order a particular

form of relief.

The PLRA provides that a prisoner release order cannot be issued absent clear and

convincing evidence that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation.” 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3626(a)(3)(E)(i). The text of the PLRA demonstrates that this requirement is not an

element of the claim regarding unconstitutional prison conditions but a limitation on the

court’s remedial authority. Section 3626 as a whole is titled “Appropriate remedies with

respect to prison conditions,” and § 3626(a) enumerates the “[r]equirements for relief” in a

civil action regarding prison conditions. The PLRA is explicit in limiting the court’s

authority rather than altering the elements of the underlying claim. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A) (“The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless . . . .”);

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A) (“[N]o court shall enter a prisoner release order unless . . . .”). The

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We note that our interpretation of the PLRA and the California regulations as not

requiring exhaustion of mere means to a requested end accords with and promotes the

PLRA’s purpose of increasing the state’s freedom to manage its prisons by choosing how to

address prisoner complaints.

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specific provision at issue in this proceeding provides that “[t]he three-judge court shall enter

a prisoner release order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E). Because

the factual findings required by the PLRA are not elements of the claim of unconstitutional

prison conditions but are pre-conditions to the exercise of the Court’s remedial authority,

Plaintiffs’ contentions regarding “primary cause” need not be exhausted.

We reach the same conclusion as to Plaintiffs’ request for relief in the form of a

prisoner release order. First, like the “primary cause” issue, the particular form of relief

requested in litigation is not a “prison condition.” Second, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731

(2001), suggests that the form of relief a prisoner seeks in court is irrelevant to the exhaustion

inquiry. Id. at 739. Following Booth, the Seventh Circuit held that “no administrative

system may demand that the prisoner specify each remedy later sought in litigation. . . .” 

Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Booth, 532 U.S. 732). Finally,

“[c]ompliance with prison grievance procedures . . . is all that is required by the PLRA to

‘properly exhaust.’” Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007). California’s regulations

require that prisoner grievances “describe the problem and action requested.” Cal. Code

Reg., tit. 15, § 3084.2. Here, the “problem” is the denial of constitutionally adequate medical

and mental health care, and the “action requested” is the provision of adequate medical and

mental health care. The prisoner release order is simply one of numerous means to that end,

and nothing in the regulations suggests that the prisoner must describe all of the possible

means by which a requested action could be accomplished by the state in the exercise of its

discretion. What means will best help remedy the constitutional violation – for example,

building additional facilities, hiring additional doctors, implementing new quality control

mechanisms, or releasing prisoners – is a question the prisoner is in no position to evaluate.3

Accordingly, under the California regulations that define proper exhaustion in the present

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4

Because we do not believe exhaustion of either the primary cause issue or the request

for relief is required as a general matter, we need not address whether the particular

circumstances of Coleman and Plata – in particular, the fact that Coleman proceeded to

judgment prior to the passage of the PLRA and that, in Plata, the state entered into an

agreement that “irrevocably waive[d]” its exhaustion defense in any civil lawsuit brought by

Plaintiffs and their lawyers seeking injunctive relief on the basis of inadequate medical care

in California’s prisons – render exhaustion unnecessary here.

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We reject Defendants’ argument that we have “indicated [our] view of this

proceeding as akin to a new action through [our] handling of the issues.” Our reliance on the

adjudicatory procedures established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflects nothing

more than our judgment about the best method for determining whether to issue a prisoner

release order.

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proceeding, Plaintiffs are not required to specify a request for a prisoner release order when

exhausting the administrative process under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).4

Because the present proceeding is not a new action and because neither of the issues

before the Court in this proceeding would require exhaustion in any event, Plaintiffs are not

required to exhaust their contentions regarding the relationship between overcrowding and

inadequate medical and mental health care in California’s prisons or their request for a

prisoner release order before seeking such an order from this Court.5

II. Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction

Defendants next raise two jurisdictional arguments. First, they argue that the threejudge court was improperly convened because “no federal judge has ordered less intrusive

relief directed at addressing prison overcrowding.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 15. Even if the

Defendants could properly raise this argument now, over a year after the motion to convene

the court was granted, Defendants’ argument is contrary to the PLRA’s plain language. The

PLRA permits a three-judge court to be convened if “a court has previously entered an order

for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to

be remedied through the prisoner release order,” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i), and if

Defendants have had a reasonable amount of time to comply with that order, id.

§ 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii). Here, both parties agree that the federal right sought to be remedied is

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6 Roberts v. County of Mahoning, 495 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ohio 2006), cited by

Defendants, is distinguishable because the court in that case found that overcrowding itself

was a “component of the unconstitutional conditions in the jail.” Id. at 696. Here, Plaintiffs

do not argue that overcrowding itself is unconstitutional.

7

the Plaintiffs’ right to constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care.6

 Defendants

do not dispute that the Plata and Coleman courts have entered orders for less intrusive relief

directed at remedying the deprivation of that right. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Convene Three-Judge Court, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2122657, *3 (N.D. Cal.

July 23, 2007); Order, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2122636, *2 (E.D. Cal. July 23,

2007) (“Since February of 1996, this court has issued at least seventy-seven substantive

orders to defendants in an effort to bring the CDCR’s mental health care delivery system into

compliance with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.”). Defendants’ first

jurisdictional challenge thus fails.

Second, Defendants cite to Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), and argue that

Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a prisoner release order directed at the general prison

population. But Lewis held that systemwide relief for prison inmates was inappropriate in that

case not because of a lack of standing but because remedies must be “limited to the

inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.” Id. at 357, 360

n.7. Here, both the Coleman and Plata courts have found systemic constitutional injury. See

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re Appointment of Receiver, Plata v.

Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253, *34 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005); Order, Coleman v.

Schwarzenegger, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995). Broad relief that affects individuals

other than the plaintiffs may be appropriate in cases of systemwide injury. See Columbus Bd.

of Ed. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 463-65 (1979) (holding that the record supported the district

court’s order requiring defendants to submit a systemwide desegregation plan). In any event,

the appropriateness of the prisoner release order and its scope are questions to be addressed by

the Court when formulating an order granting relief, and do not affect Plaintiffs’ standing. 

We therefore deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

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III. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The PLRA requires that before entering a prisoner release order the three-judge court

must find by clear and convincing evidence that “crowding is the primary cause of the

violation of a Federal right,” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) – in this instance the right to a

constitutionally adequate level of medical and mental health care in California’s prisons. 

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because

there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether crowding is the primary cause of the

violation of that right. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). Defendants, being the moving party, have

the initial responsibility of informing this court of the basis for its belief that there is an

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). Defendants may meet this burden by “produc[ing] evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s claim,” or by “show[ing] that the nonmoving party does not

have evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” See

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

In moving for summary judgment, Defendants misconstrue the “primary cause”

standard. They make much of statements by a Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Ronald Shansky, by the

Coleman Special Master, and in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding the

Appointment of a Receiver in Plata, to the effect that the problems underlying the

constitutional delivery of medical care are “interrelated” and “polycentric,” and that

population reduction alone may not bring the level of care to a constitutionally acceptable

level. Mello Decl. Ex. A, Shansky Dep. 12:22-13:7, 88:20-24, 132: 6-9, 61:14-24, Dec. 10,

2007; Special Master’s Response to Court’s May 17, 2007 Request for Information at 15,

May 31, 2007 (Coleman Docket #2253); Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law re Receiver,

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253, *25 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005). But “[p]robably

it cannot be said of any event that it has a single causal antecedent; usually there are many.” 

4 Harper, James and Gray on Torts § 20.2 (3d ed. 2007). The “primary cause” standard does

not require that crowding be the exclusive cause of the unconstitutional prison conditions – it

requires only that it be the “primary” one. Accepting, arguendo, Defendants’ definition of

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“primary” as “first or highest in rank or importance; chief; principal,” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss

at 18 (citing Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1537 (2d ed. 1998)), that there

are multiple, interrelated causes of inadequate care does not mean that one cause cannot be

the most important. 

Similarly, Defendants misunderstand the inquiry in arguing that crowding is not the

“primary cause” because the Receiver’s remedial efforts have led to some improvement in the

delivery of medical care. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 19; Reply at 12. As the Plata and

Coleman courts found in granting the motion to convene this three-judge court, prior remedial

efforts not directed at reducing the prison population level have failed to bring the delivery of

medical and mental health care to constitutionally acceptable levels. See Plata, 2007 WL

2122657 at *3; Coleman, 2007 WL 2122636 at *3. This may be some evidence that

overcrowding is the primary cause of the violation at issue here. Moreover, “crowding” refers

to population density: it does not mean only that the prison population is large, but that it is

large in relation to the available resources and facilities. Therefore, evidence that an increase

in resources has improved or will improve conditions could even indicate that crowding is the

primary cause of the constitutional violation. And Defendants’ suggestion that “populationrelated problems” could be addressed through measures other than a prisoner release order,

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 19, confuses the “primary cause” issue with the appropriateness and

the proper scope of a prisoner release order. 

Defendants also make the peculiar argument that overcrowding is not the primary

cause of the constitutional violations because the Plata court stated, and Plaintiffs’ expert

agreed, that “a single root cause of this crisis” is the “historical lack of leadership, planning,

and vision by the State’s highest officials during a period of exponential growth of the prison

population.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re Receiver, Plata, 2005 WL 2932253

at *25 (emphasis added); see Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 18-19. Defendants’ inability or

unwillingness to tackle the problem of the increasing prison population does not support the

contention that overcrowding is not the primary cause of the unconstitutional delivery of

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medical or mental health care. It simply helps explain why overcrowding exists and has now

become a problem that may be the primary cause of the constitutional violation.

Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have no evidence to show that crowding is the

primary cause of the constitutional violation. Plaintiffs have, however, presented sufficient

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether crowding is the primary

cause of inadequate care. See, e.g., RJN Ex. A at 1, Letter from the Receiver, July 24, 2006

(“[T]he overcrowding and medical crises are integrally related . . . [and] [i]t will not be

possible to raise access to, and quality of, medical care to constitutional levels with

overpopulation at its current levels.”); RJN Ex. B at 1, Letter from the Receiver, Vol. 1,

Number 4, Oct. 27, 2006 (“[I]t is clear that overcrowding is at the root of many of the

difficulties that afflict medical care.”); Special Master’s Response to Court’s May 17, 2007

Request for Information, supra, at 7 (“The struggle for acquisition of a meaningful portion of

healthcare clinical space, already able to meet just half the medical demand, escalates

relentlessly. . . . Excessive population, thus, results in a reduction of programming space now

occupied by inmate bunks, greater competition for use of the diminishing available space;

fewer escorting correctional officers to permit access to the diminishing space; and,

ultimately, the increasing frustration and demoralization of clinicians trying to provide the

treatment.”); id. at 14 (“It is easy to conclude that defendants’ ability to provide required

mental health services would be enhanced considerably by a reduction in the overall census of

CDCR.”). From this evidence alone, inferences can be drawn that create a genuine issue of

fact as to whether overcrowding is the primary cause of the constitutional violation.

In addition, Dr. Shansky’s reports set forth specific facts that lead him to conclude that,

factually, “overcrowding is the primary cause of the current status of medical crisis in the

CDCR.” Shansky Decl., Ex. A at 50 (Nov. 9, 2007); see also id., Ex. C at 36 (Sept. 9, 2008). 

Although the primary cause issue is ultimately a question of law for the three-judge court to

decide, the Federal Rules of Evidence allow experts to express opinions that embrace the

ultimate issue in a case. Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). Dr. Shanksy’s statement is thus admissible to

the extent that it is his opinion on the factual cause of the constitutional violation. See

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3 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 7:20 (3d ed. 2007)

(“Fed. R. Evid. 704 removes an obstacle that might otherwise block expert testimony on

issues of cause . . . .”); Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that

expert testimony on whether the driver’s sleep deprivation was the primary cause of the

accident was properly admitted because “there was a factual dispute as to whether the driver

was fatigued, and whether that fatigue could have caused the driver to hit [the] construction

bucket”); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1484-1486 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the

district court properly allowed expert testimony that there was a causal link between the

reckless failure to adequately train police officers and plaintiffs’ injuries), overruled on other

grounds by Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1556 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Defendants also raise a hearsay objection to Dr. Shansky’s reports, but “experts are entitled to

rely on hearsay in forming their opinions.” Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270

F.3d 863, 873 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Evid. 703 (“If of a type reasonably relied upon by

experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or

data [on which the expert relies for his opinion] need not be admissible in evidence in order

for the opinion to be admitted.”). Defendants’ objections based on relevance and lack of

foundation also fail: Dr. Shansky’s opinion regarding the cause of the inadequate medical care

in California prisons is clearly relevant and has an adequate foundation – the factual bases

disclosed in the reports. In sum, whether we consider only the facts upon which Dr. Shansky

based his expert opinion as to the primary cause of the constitutional violation and draw from

them the inferences most favorable to Plaintiffs, or we consider the conclusion that he himself

drew, as an expert, Dr. Shansky’s reports provide sufficient admissible evidence to create a

genuine issue of material fact. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and drawing all

justifiable inferences in their favor, as we are required to do for the non-moving party on

summary judgment, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), we

conclude that there is sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether

Plaintiffs can prove by clear and convincing evidence that crowding is the primary cause of

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the constitutional violations found in Coleman and Plata. For the foregoing reasons, we deny

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

IV. Conclusion

The motion for dismissal or for summary judgment is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ and

Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice are GRANTED. To the extent that we rely in the

above order on Dr. Shansky's reports, Defendants’ objections to those reports are

OVERRULED. We find no need to reach the balance of Defendants’ evidentiary objections

at this time and will not resolve them for the purposes of this summary judgment motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/03/08 /s/ 

STEPHEN REINHARDT

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Dated: 11/03/08 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: 11/03/08 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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