Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02921/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02921-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

----oo0oo---- 

THERESA MARIE NIESEN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

L. GARCIA, YOLO COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPUTY; J. CEJA, 

YOLO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPUTY; 

J. LAZARO, YOLO COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPUTY; M. NEVIS, 

YOLO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPUTY;

OFFICER BIGELOW, ANIMAL 

CONTROL OFFICER FOR YOLO 

COUNTY; YOLO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT; YOLO COUNTY 

PROBATION DEPARTMENT, and 

Does 1 through 50, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Civ. No. 2:14-2921 WBS CKD 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

----oo0oo---- 

Plaintiff Theresa Niesen brought this civil rights 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants violated 

her Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully seizing her dogs and 

arresting her following a probation search of her home. The 

matter is now before the court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 56, on (1) defendants Yolo County Sheriff’s Deputies 

Lech Garcia, Juan Ceja, and Jerry Lazaro’s (“Deputies”) motion 

for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims, (Docket No. 

20), and (2) defendants Yolo County Animal Control Officers 

Michael Nevis and Vanus Bigelow’s (“Officers”) motion for summary 

judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims, (Docket No. 21). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

On June 26, 2012, Shane Edington was sentenced in the 

Superior Court of California, County of Yolo, to three years’ 

summary probation for various misdemeanor convictions. (Req. for 

Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Ex. A (Docket No. 20-3).)1

 The terms of 

Edgington’s probation required him to submit to any search of his 

person, vehicle, or residence for stolen property “at any time of 

day or night[,] with or without [a] warrant, upon the request of 

any peace officer.” (Id.) 

In December 2012, Yolo County Sheriff’s Deputy Lazaro 

planned to conduct a probation search of Edgington. (Dehoff 

Decl. Ex. H (“Lazaro Dep.”) at 6:25-22:6 (Docket No. 20-4).) To 

obtain Edgington’s most recent address, Deputy Lazaro spoke with 

 1

 Plaintiff does not oppose defendants’ requests for 

judicial notice. The court “may take notice of proceedings in 

other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 

system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at 

issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens 

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citation omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 201. The court takes 

judicial notice of the following records filed in Yolo County 

Superior Court in People v. Edgington, No. CR-M-12-58, and People 

v. Niesen, No. CR-F-12-2023-2: (1) Edgington’s June 26, 2012 

probation sentence; (2) August 10, 2012 and January 15, 2013 

bench warrants for Edgington; and (3) August 10 and October 23, 

2012 docket entries and minute orders as to Edgington. 

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a confidential informant that he had used on five previous 

occasions and believed to be reliable. (Id.) The informant told 

Deputy Lazaro that Edgington resided with plaintiff, his 

girlfriend, at 138 Antelope Street in Woodland, California (the 

“House”). (Id.) Deputy Lazaro then followed up with Yolo County 

Superior Court’s Criminal Division to inquire about Edgington’s 

most recent listed address. (Id.) The court informed Deputy 

Lazaro that its master court file listed Edgington’s current 

address as 138 Antelope Street in Woodland, California. (Id.; 

see Dehoff Decl. Ex. G.) 

Based on this information and believing that Edgington 

resided in the House, Deputies Lazaro, Ceja, and Garcia arrived 

at the House on December 17, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. to conduct the 

probation search. (Lazaro Dep. at 22:16-24:10.) Plaintiff, who 

resided in the House, was not home at the time of the probation 

search. (Dehoff Decl. Ex. L (“Van Asperen Dep.”) at 9:14-15:19; 

Dehoff Decl. Ex. N (“Niesen Dep.”) at 12:9-13:11.) The Deputies 

knocked on the front door and announced themselves as sheriffs. 

(Lazaro Dep. at 23:1-23.) After receiving no response, the 

Deputies entered the House through the front door. (Id.; Dehoff 

Decl. Ex. J (“Garcia Dep.”) at 12:16-15:19.) The Deputies 

encountered one male, Vincent Van Asperen, and one female, Carol 

Vitalie, on the sofa in the living room. (Lazaro Dep. at 23:24-

24:10.) Van Asperen and Vitalie consented to a search of their 

persons, which revealed a methamphetamine glass pipe in each of 

their possessions. (Id. at 61:1-21; Garcia Dep. at 15:20-18:18.) 

Deputy Lazaro performed a protective sweep of the House 

and found a bedroom with a closed door in the back of the House. 

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(Lazaro Dep. at 27:16-30:10.) Upon partially opening the bedroom 

door, Deputy Lazaro observed three pit bull terriers barking and 

growling, video monitoring equipment that showed the front of the 

House, and an open sliding glass door on the other side of the 

room leading out to the backyard. (Id.) Suspecting that 

Edgington was in the bedroom and had taken off, Deputy Lazaro 

called Animal Control to secure the three pit bulls so the 

Deputies could search the bedroom.2 (Id. at 58:21-59:2; Dehoff 

Decl. Ex. I (“Ceja Dep.”) at 52:11-53:14.) 

Animal Control Officer Nevis arrived a short time later 

with a snare pole used for catching, holding, and releasing 

animals. (Lazaro Dep. at 30:11-32:14; Dehoff Decl. Ex. K (“Nevis 

Dep.”) at 12:5-13:25.) Officer Nevis and Deputy Lazaro, who had 

his Taser out, partially opened the bedroom door and observed the 

three pit bulls barking and growling inside. (Lazaro Dep. at 

30:11-32:14.) Officer Nevis snared the first pit bull and began 

to lead it out of the bedroom. (Id.) As Nevis was leading the 

snared dog out of the door, the second pit bull jumped over the 

snared dog and advanced toward Officer Nevis. (Id.) Deputy 

Lazaro tased the second pit bull and momentarily subdued it. 

(Id.) The third pit bull then ran out of the bedroom and, in 

doing so, dislodged the Taser wires attached to the second dog, 

which stopped the shocking process and freed it. (Id.) The two 

 2

 The Yolo County Animal Control Division, also known as 

Animal Services, is a division of the Yolo County Sheriff’s 

Department that provides animal control services to the County 

and cities therein, including the City of Woodland. See Yolo 

County Code §§ 6-1.201, 6.1-202; City of Woodland, Cal. Code of 

Ordinances § 3-1-1. 

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free pit bulls then ran down the hallway toward the living room, 

and Deputy Lazaro yelled a warning to the other Deputies. (Id.; 

Nevis Dep. at 12:5-13:25.) 

One pit bull ran toward Deputy Ceja, who initially shot 

it three times and then four additional times when it “continued 

to come at [him].” (Ceja Dep. at 19:15-23:12, 28:2-23, 54:7-

55:3.) The other pit bull ran toward the sofa where Van Asperen, 

Vitalie, and Deputy Garcia were. Deputy Garcia shot the pit bull 

twice from six to eight feet away as it ran toward them. (Garcia 

Dep. at 24:24-26:1; Van Asperen Dep. at 40:24-41:9.) Animal 

Control Officer Bigelow subsequently arrived at the House and 

took possession of the snared dog from the bedroom, as Officer 

Nevis and Deputy Ceja placed the two wounded pit bulls in Nevis’ 

vehicle and Nevis drove them to an animal clinic at the 

University of California at Davis, School of Veterinary Medicine. 

(Ceja Dep. at 27:12-17, 29:4-12; Dehoff Decl. Ex. O-1 (“Bigelow 

Dep.”) at 15:17-17:12 (Docket No. 21-3).) By the time Officer 

Nevis reached the clinic, however, the dogs had died from their 

wounds. (Nevis Dep. at 14:7-9, 20:16-21:24.) 

The Deputies then searched the remainder of the House. 

In the bedroom they found (1) .35 grams of methamphetamine; (2) a 

glass smoking pipe; (3) a letter from Yolo County Superior Court 

addressed to Edgington at the House’s address; and 

(4) Edgington’s name written on boxes containing clothes and 

other belongings. (Lazaro Dep. at 37:1-52:7, Ex. 5.) The 

Deputies and Officers also found three more pit bulls in a kennel 

in the backyard and another pit bull in the garage of the House. 

(Id.; Ceja Dep. at 31:13-35:25; Niesen Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 (Docket No. 

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26-1).) 

Officer Nevis returned to the House and, together with 

Officer Bigelow, snared and removed the remaining dogs and 

transported them to the Yolo County Animal Services shelter 

pending reclamation by their owner. (Ceja Dep. at 31:13-16; 

Nevis Dep. at 22:7-254:7; Bigelow Dep. at 17:18-18:23; Niesen 

Decl. ¶ 12.) Van Asperen and Vitalie were placed under arrest 

for possession of drug paraphernalia and transported to Yolo 

County Jail. (Lazaro Dep. at 61:1-63:13; Garcia Dep. at 30:2-17; 

Van Asperen Dep. at 31:7-33:15.) At approximately 11:40 a.m., 

the Deputies declared the House secure and left the premises. 

(Ceja Dep. at 36:16-17.) 

Upon returning from the search, Deputy Lazaro filled 

out and signed a declaration for probable cause to arrest 

plaintiff for possession of a controlled substance and drug 

paraphernalia based on the .35 grams of methamphetamine and glass 

smoking pipe found in her bedroom. (Lazaro Dep. at 45:19-46:14.) 

On December 19, 2012, pursuant to the probable cause declaration, 

Deputy Ceja returned to the House with three other deputies and 

arrested plaintiff. (Ceja Dep. at 37:19-40:23, 59:20-65:3.) 

Plaintiff spent two days in Yolo County Jail because she was 

unable to post bail. (Niesen Decl. ¶¶ 18-20.) On December 21, 

2012, she was released and informed that the District Attorney 

declined to prosecute her for the drugs and paraphernalia found 

during the December 17, 2012 search. (Id. ¶ 20; Niesen Dep. at 

175:19-176:21.)3 Following the incident, plaintiff could afford 

 3

 At the time, and unrelated to the events in this case, 

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to retrieve only three of her five dogs from Animal Services. 

(Niesen Decl. ¶¶ 14-16.) 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for damages on September 

12, 2016, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputies 

Lazaro, Ceja, and Garcia and Officers Bigelow and Nevis. (Compl. 

¶¶ 1-14 (Docket No. 1).)4 Plaintiff alleges that (1) the killing 

of her two dogs and seizure of her five other dogs on December 

17, 2012 constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in 

violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) plaintiff’s 

arrest on December 19, 2012 and ensuing detention violated her 

Fourth Amendment rights because “there was no evidence that 

Plaintiff had committed any crime.” (Id. ¶¶ 17-25.)5

Plaintiff seeks emotional distress and punitive damages 

and compensatory damages for the loss of the value of her two 

dogs that were killed, the amount she paid to retrieve three of 

her other dogs from Animal Services, and the loss of the value of 

 

plaintiff was already being separately prosecuted for felony 

possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of drug 

paraphernalia. (RJN Ex. F.) 

4

 Counsel for plaintiff acknowledged at the hearing that 

Officer Nevis was incorrectly identified as a deputy sheriff in 

the Complaint. (See Compl. ¶ 10; Nevis Dep. at 6:7-14.) 

5

 On April 16, 2015, the court dismissed plaintiff’s 

third and fourth claims for violation of her due process rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment and Monell claim against the 

individually-named defendants. (Docket No. 14.) The court also 

dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims against Yolo County. (Id.) 

Though the court granted plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint, 

plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition to the court’s 

dismissal on May 8, 2015 and asked that her current Complaint 

proceed in accordance with the court’s dismissal Order. (Docket 

No. 15.) 

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the two remaining dogs she could not afford to retrieve. (Id. 

¶¶ 5, 20.) The Deputies and Officers now move for summary 

judgment on plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims. (Docket Nos. 

20-21.) 

II. Legal Standard 

 A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or 

defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper if 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Summers v. 

Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997). A 

material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the case. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

genuine issue exists if the evidence produced would allow a 

reasonable trier of fact to reach a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 

 The moving party bears the initial burden of 

establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to 

the particular claim or defense. Id. at 256. Where the moving 

party seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense for which it 

bears the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively 

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the 

non-moving party on that claim or defense. Soremekun v. Thrifty 

Payless Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 994 (9th Cir. 2007). If summary 

judgment is sought on a claim or defense for which the non-moving 

party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must 

either (1) produce evidence negating an essential element of the 

non-moving party’s claim or defense, or (2) show that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

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element of its claim or defense. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

 Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce concrete, 

specific evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. 

Id. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. To carry this burden, the 

non-moving may not rely “solely on conclusory allegations 

unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, it must produce sufficient 

evidence beyond the pleadings that would allow a reasonable trier 

of fact to find in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. If it 

does so, then “there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a 

trial.” Id. at 257. 

 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court 

may not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or 

determine the truth of the matters asserted, and it must view all 

inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 249, 255; Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

“Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it 

must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party” unless 

that evidence is “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and “comes from 

disinterested witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (citation omitted). 

III. Discussion 

 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person 

who, under color of any [state law] subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

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deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not create substantive 

rights; it merely serves as the procedural device for enforcing 

substantive provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes.” 

Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 

Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 

(1979)). 

 To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show 

both (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution 

and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was 

caused by a person acting under color of state law. Am. Mfrs. 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Chudacoff 

v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2011). Section 1983 “contains no state-of-mind requirement 

independent of that necessary to state a violation of the 

underlying constitutional right.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 

327, 329–30 (1986). There is no dispute here that the various 

defendants acted under color of state law. 

A. Shooting of the Two Dogs 

 The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right “to 

be secure in their . . . effects[ ] against unreasonable searches 

and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The killing of a 

dog is a destruction recognized as a seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment and can constitute a cognizable claim under § 1983.” 

San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San 

Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Hells Angels”) 

(quotation marks and alterations omitted). Plaintiff’s first 

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§ 1983 claim alleges that the Deputies’ shooting of her two dogs 

constituted unlawful seizures in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment.6

1. Deputies’ Liability for Shooting the Dogs 

 The Deputies argue that summary judgment is warranted 

because (1) they acted in self-defense in shooting plaintiff’s 

two dogs and thus did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

right; and (2) even if the court finds a Fourth Amendment 

violation, the Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity 

because a reasonable deputy under the same circumstances would 

have believed that the probation search could not occur without 

removing the dogs from the bedroom, Animal Control was the best 

way to remove the dogs from the bedroom safely, and self-defense 

justified the shootings when the dogs unexpectedly escaped from 

the bedroom. 

 In suits under § 1983, qualified immunity “shields 

government officials from civil damages liability unless the 

official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was 

clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” 

Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam). 

Qualified immunity is an “immunity from suit rather than a mere 

defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 

 6

 Plaintiff’s contention that defendants were “negligent 

in their efforts to secure” the dogs, (Compl. ¶ 19), is 

immaterial to her § 1983 claim. “Section 1983 imposes liability 

for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for 

violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for 

the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under 

traditional tort-law principles.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 

137, 146 (1979). 

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(1985). “The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless 

of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of law, a 

mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and 

fact.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation 

marks omitted). “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] 

protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) 

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

 “Determining whether a defendant is entitled to 

qualified immunity involves a two-pronged analysis,” which first 

assesses whether, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the 

party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the 

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and, if so, 

“whether the right was clearly established.” Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

 Courts have discretion to decide “which of the two 

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed 

first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at 

hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The Supreme Court has 

recognized that delving into difficult constitutional questions 

may be unnecessary when a court can resolve the case on qualified 

immunity based on the lack of a clearly established right at the 

time of the defendants’ alleged misconduct. See al-Kidd, 563 

U.S. at 735 (“Courts should think carefully before expending 

‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult and novel 

questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will 

‘have no effect on the outcome of the case.’” (citing Pearson, 

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555 U.S. at 236-42)). 

 After considering the difficulty of the Fourth 

Amendment question in this case, the court finds that this is the 

type of case the Supreme Court had in mind when it determined 

that a court may assume the existence of a constitutional 

violation on the first inquiry and then determine whether the 

constitutional right was clearly established. See Reichle v. 

Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (“[C]ourts may grant 

qualified immunity on the ground that a purported right was not 

‘clearly established’ by prior case law, without resolving the 

often more difficult question whether the purported right exists 

at all. This approach comports with our usual reluctance to 

decide constitutional questions unnecessarily.”). The court will 

therefore assume, without deciding, that the Deputies violated 

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right when they shot her two dogs 

and determine whether the Deputies are nonetheless entitled to 

qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established. 

 “To be clearly established, a right must be 

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 

2093 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). “Whether the law 

was clearly established is an objective standard; the defendant’s 

subjective understanding of the constitutionality of his or her 

conduct is irrelevant.” Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 

F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 

736 (stating that “[t]his approach recognizes that the Fourth 

Amendment regulates conduct rather than thoughts”). “If the 

controlling law is not clearly established, an official cannot be 

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liable, because a reasonable person would not be expected to know 

how to structure his conduct to avoid liability.” Cruz v. Kauai 

County, 279 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks 

omitted). 

 The right must be defined in a “particularized, and 

hence more relevant, sense.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 

(1991); see also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) 

(per curiam) (“[C]ourts should define the clearly established 

right at issue on the basis of the specific context of the case.” 

(quotation marks omitted)). The court must therefore strike a 

balance between defining a right too generally so that the 

definition necessarily leads to the conclusion that the right is 

clearly established and defining it too narrowly so that prior 

precedent must mirror the facts of the case in order to conclude 

that the right has been clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. 

at 202-03. The Supreme Court has emphasized that it has 

“repeatedly told courts--and the Ninth Circuit in particular--not 

to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. 

The general proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search 

or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is of little help in 

determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is 

clearly established.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (citation 

omitted). 

 “Even if the violated right was clearly established, 

the Supreme Court recognized that it may be difficult for a 

police officer fully to appreciate how the legal constraints 

apply to the specific situation he or she faces. Under such a 

circumstance, if the officer’s mistake as to what the law 

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requires is reasonable, the officer is entitled to the immunity 

defense.” Sjurset v. Button, 810 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(alterations omitted) (citing Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 

F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007)). If reasonable officers could 

disagree on whether they would have taken the alleged action, 

qualified immunity must be granted. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 

982, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 341) 

(emphasizing that if “officers of reasonable competence could 

disagree on th[e] issue, immunity should be recognized”). 

“[W]hether the law governing the conduct at issue is 

clearly established is a question of law for the court.” Act 

Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “The plaintiff 

bears the burden to show that the contours of the right were 

clearly established.” Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1109. 

 For purposes of the qualified immunity analysis and 

determining the facts relevant to the clearly established 

inquiry, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff and resolve all factual disputes in favor 

of plaintiff. See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 477 (“Where [factual] 

disputes exist, summary judgment is appropriate only if 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the facts as 

alleged by the non-moving party.”). Here, it is undisputed that 

the plaintiff’s dogs were full-grown pit bulls. (Van Asperen 

Dep. at 62:1-3; Nevis Dep. at 17:18-21.) There are genuine 

disputes, however, about the propensities of the dogs leading up 

to the shootings. Defendants have consistently testified that 

the dogs were extremely aggressive prior to the shootings. (See, 

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e.g., Lazaro Dep. at 29:23-30:7 (describing the dogs as “really 

big, aggressive, mean, barking, scratching, biting dogs”); Nevis 

Dep. at 12:14-19 (testifying that, when he arrived to assist the 

Deputies, the pit bulls in the bedroom were barking aggressively 

and growling at him).) 

 Plaintiff, on the other hand, indicates that her pit 

bulls were “family dogs and are friendly.” (Niesen Decl. ¶ 13.) 

Van Asperen also testified that he had encountered plaintiff’s 

dogs twenty to thirty times over the course of several years and 

had “[n]ever seen any of her dogs be aggressive” or bite anybody 

and that they were “good pups” and were always friendly to 

visitors. (Van Asperen Dep. at 23:4-23, 38:9-40:23, 59:10-60:7.) 

According to Van Asperen, the pit bull running toward Deputy 

Garcia was a “[t]ail wagging, want to jump up on your lap, lick 

you type of dog” and merely wanted to “give [him] a kiss because 

that’s what [plaintiff’s] dogs do.” (Id. at 27:5-8, 39:19-21, 

60:8-16.) 

At the same time, however, plaintiff acknowledges in 

her Complaint that the pit bulls that “came out of the bedroom 

. . . were obviously upset at having strangers in their home.” 

(Compl. ¶ 19); see Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 

224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Factual assertions in pleadings . . . 

are considered judicial admissions conclusively binding on the 

party who made them.”). It is also undisputed that the dogs were 

running toward the Deputies when they exited the bedroom. (See, 

e.g., Van Asperen Dep. at 64:20-22; Ceja Dep. at 21:23-22:6, 

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25:3-6.)7 Although there is a dispute as to whether the dogs 

were barking when they ran out of the bedroom, (see Ceja Dep. at 

25:8-11 (barking); Garcia Dep. at 25:5-6 (barking); Van Asperen 

Dep. at 27:16-21, 39:11-14 (not barking); Vitalie Dep. at 60:19-

25 (barking)), it is undisputed that they were barking before 

they escaped from the bedroom, (see Garcia Dep. at 25:11-12; Van 

Asperen Dep. at 26:10-12, 38:21-23; Vitalie Dep. at 60:5-12). 

 Resolving these factual disputes in favor of plaintiff, 

the question here is whether it was clearly established on 

December 17, 2012 that an officer’s shooting of a dog while 

conducting a lawful residential search violates the Fourth 

Amendment when the dog is running toward the officer after 

unexpectedly escaping from a room and after less intrusive 

methods to control the dog have failed. Although the Supreme 

Court does “not require a case directly on point” to clearly 

establish the right at issue, “existing precedent must have 

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. 

 Plaintiff contends that this right was clearly 

established in light of Hells Angels. In that case, the Ninth 

Circuit held it was clearly established in 2005 “that the Fourth 

Amendment forbids the killing of a person’s dog, or the 

destruction of a person’s property, when that destruction is 

 7

 Although Van Asperen believed one of the dogs was 

running to him, it is undisputed that Deputy Garcia “was right in 

front of” Van Asperen when the pit bull ran toward them and that 

Deputy Garcia’s firearm was approximately “a foot” from Van 

Asperen’s face when he shot the pit bull. (Van Asperen Dep. at 

28:3-7, 41:11-13, 64:18-22.) 

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unnecessary--i.e., when less intrusive, or less destructive, 

alternatives exist.” Hells Angeles, 402 F.3d at 977-78. The 

Hells Angels court concluded that “[a] reasonable officer should 

have known that to create a plan to enter the perimeter of a 

person’s property, knowing all the while about the presence of 

dogs on the property, without considering a method for subduing 

the dogs besides killing them, would violate the Fourth 

Amendment.” Id. at 978. 

 The Hells Angels case addressed the unconstitutionality 

of the shooting of dogs in two different searches conducted 

simultaneously as part of the same investigation. Id. at 967. 

In the first search of James Souza’s residence, the officers 

learned about one week prior to the search that the Souzas had 

two guard dogs, one of which was a Rottweiler that was known to 

attack without provocation. Id. at 968. Despite their knowledge 

of these dogs in the week prior to the search, the only plan that 

the officers developed to handle the dogs was to “isolate or to 

shoot.” Id. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the officers had 

“no plan to use non-lethal methods of incapacitation,” never 

formulated a “specific plan for ‘isolating’ the dogs,” and never 

intended to give “Souza the opportunity to isolate his Rottweiler 

himself.” Id. At the time the officer shot Souza’s Rottweiler, 

the search team was already “safely inside” the Souza residence 

and the dogs were in the backyard without access to the inside of 

the house. Id. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, “the teams 

could have conducted their search inside the house without 

hurriedly dealing with the dogs in the backyard.” Id. 

 The second search and shootings in Hells Angels 

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occurred at the Vieira residence. The officers also had about 

one week to plan for that search, knew that there might be dogs 

present, and learned during their briefing on the morning of the 

search that the residence was guarded by three large dogs. Id. 

at 969. The officers’ plan to deal with the dogs at the Vieira 

residence was to “poke them through the fence with [a] shotgun 

and try to scare them” and, “[i]f that did not work, . . . to 

assess the situation and engage the dogs.” Id. When the 

officers encountered the dogs, they were behind a tall, padlocked 

fence that the officers wanted to enter to gain access to the 

residence. Id. The dogs therefore did not pose an immediate 

threat to the safety of the officers, but the officers did not 

give the Vieiras the opportunity to restrain the dogs because 

they wanted “to secure quick entry to preserve an element of 

surprise and prevent the possible destruction of evidence.” Id. 

After unsuccessfully attempting to prompt the dogs to retreat 

from the gate by yelling at them and poking one with a gun, an 

officer shot two of the dogs at point blank range and killed 

them. Id. 

 Unlike the shootings in Hells Angels, the Deputies here 

had no advance notice that pit bulls were on the premises to be 

searched. (See Lazaro Dep. at 46:21-48:13.) It is undisputed 

that Deputy Lazaro asked his confidential informant for 

Edgington’s address only “days before” the probation search and 

followed up with Yolo County Superior Court to confirm the 

address “either the day of or the day before” the search. (Id. 

at 7:25-8:2, 13:14-21.) It is also undisputed that Deputies Ceja 

and Garcia were only briefed on the probation search “that same 

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day, prior to going there.” (Ceja Dep. 6:24-7:20; Garcia Dep. at 

11:2-4.) Plaintiff conceded that none of the Deputies had ever 

visited her House prior to the probation search, (Niesen Dep. at 

87:9-88:22), and the Deputies had no evidence particular to 

plaintiff’s House prior to the search that suggested dogs would 

be there, (see Lazaro Dep. at 46:21-48:13). Unlike in Hells 

Angels, therefore, the need to develop a plan to handle dogs at 

the House would not have been as obvious to a reasonable officer 

in this case. 

Of equal importance is the fact that, unlike the 

officers in Hells Angels, the Deputies here did not immediately 

resort to shooting plaintiff’s dogs. Initially, the Deputies 

asked Van Asperen to clear the pit bulls from the bedroom, which 

is exactly the type of response the Ninth Circuit suggested the 

officers in Hells Angels should have considered. See 402 F.3d at 

968 (emphasizing that the officers’ plan did not include “giving 

Souza the opportunity to isolate his Rottweiler himself” and that 

the officers “had no intention of calling on the Vieiras to 

control their dogs”). Although plaintiff contends the Deputies 

should have contacted her to remove the dogs, there is no 

evidence that, at the time of the search, the Deputies knew the 

dogs belonged to plaintiff, knew where plaintiff was, or knew how 

to reach her. (See Lazaro Dep. at 46:21-48:13; Ceja Dep. at 

36:19-24; Garcia Dep. at 36:20-25; Nevis Dep. at 22:21-25.) 

 Despite having been in the House with the dogs while 

plaintiff was gone, Van Asperen refused to remove the dogs from 

the bedroom because he was concerned that they would bite him if 

he went inside the bedroom: “I thought it could be a possibility 

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if I tried to go in [the bedroom] . . . I could be bit.” (Van 

Asperen Dep. at 58:16-18.) He states that the Deputies’ 

probation search “had the dogs riled up. And there’s no way I’m 

going in there. You know, that’s [the pit bulls’] place. That’s 

their house . . . yeah, I was actually scared. Get the dogs all 

riled up and then send me in there. I don’t think so.” (Id. at 

23:21-24:3; see also id. 24:10-12 (testifying that, “if someone 

[the dogs] didn’t know went into [plaintiff’s bedroom] without 

her being there, I don’t know what they would do”).) 

 After Van Asperen refused to go in the bedroom to 

secure the dogs, the Deputies requested Animal Control to help 

remove the dogs and waited for their arrival. (Lazaro Dep. at 

29:23-30:7.) The Animal Control Officers intended to safely 

remove the dogs from the room with a snare pole. (Nevis Dep. at 

12:5-13:25.) When that plan unexpectedly went awry because the 

second dog jumped over the snared dog, Deputy Lazaro attempted to 

subdue the second dog with his Taser. (Lazaro Dep. at 30:11-

32:14.) Again, this is exactly the type of force the Ninth 

Circuit suggested should have been utilized in Hells Angels 

before the officers shot the dogs. See 402 F.3d at 969 & n.8 

(noting that none of the officers attempted to use the pepper 

spray they had or brought a Taser with them). Only after the 

third dog unexpectedly dislodged the Taser wires and the two dogs 

escaped from the bedroom, did the Deputies resort to deadly 

force. (Ceja Dep. at 21:1-23:12.) 

It is also undisputed that Deputy Ceja observed 

Deputy Lazaro’s failed attempt at using his Taser to subdue the 

second pit bull. (Id. at 20:17-21:24.) The undisputed evidence 

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also establishes that the Deputies were surprised at the pit 

bulls’ escape from the bedroom. (See id.; Nevis Dep. at 12:5-

13:25); cf. Hells Angels, 402 F.3d at 977 (recognizing that “the 

governmental interest of [officer] safety might have provided a 

sound justification for the [killing of the dogs] had the 

officers been surprised by the presence of the dogs”). 

 The risk to the Deputies at the time the force was used 

is also distinguishable from Hells Angels. At the Souza 

residence, the officer shot the dog in the backyard even though 

it did not pose any threat to the safety of the search team in 

the house and there was no immediate need to go into the 

backyard. Hells Angels, 402 F.3d at 968. Similarly, at the 

Vieira residence, the officers were protected from the dogs by a 

locked fence and the officers’ only reason for shooting the dogs 

was to allow quicker access to the house. Id. at 969. The Ninth 

Circuit emphasized that the officers killed the dogs only to 

advance their “interest in preserving evidence,” id. at 978, not 

to protect their safety. 

 In finding that reasonable officers would have known 

that the shootings in Hells Angels ran afoul of the Fourth 

Amendment, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the case from “the 

kind where the officer was reacting to a sudden unexpected 

situation, where the officers were confronted with exigent 

circumstances.” Id. The Supreme Court has also emphasized that 

courts must allow “for the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are 

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force 

that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham v. Connor, 

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490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); see Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 

442 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying this principle to the clearly 

established inquiry). This is precisely that type of case, where 

the officers attempted to use several less intrusive methods to 

remove the dogs without harming them and resorted to shooting 

them only after those attempts were unsuccessful and the dogs 

unexpectedly escaped and were running toward the officers. 

 While plaintiff does not dispute that the Fourth 

Amendment would have allowed the Deputies to shoot her dogs if 

they posed an imminent threat to the Deputies, she strongly 

disputes whether her dogs were attempting to attack the Deputies 

or would have attacked them if they had not been shot. Even 

assuming, as the court must on summary judgment, that the dogs 

were friendly and merely running toward the Deputies to greet 

them and thus the Deputies mistakenly believed that the dogs were 

going to attack them, the court finds for purposes of qualified 

immunity that such a mistake of fact was reasonable. See 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (stating that “qualified immunity 

applies” to an official’s “mistake of fact”). The objective 

facts known to the Deputies at the time the dogs were running 

toward them were that the dogs had been isolated from the other 

occupants of the House in a bedroom where they were barking and 

riled up and Van Asperen, who was familiar with the dogs, did not 

want to go into the bedroom to remove them because of how the 

dogs were reacting to the Deputies’ search. 

The Deputies were also dealing with a breed of dog that 

is known for fighting, aggressive behavior, and causing serious 

injury. These general characteristics made the belief that this 

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breed of dog is more likely to attack and was about to attack 

even more reasonable. (See Nevis Dep. at 27:11-17 (explaining 

that the typical breed that officers see for fighting dogs are 

pit bulls); see also United States v. Sutton, 336 F.3d 550, 551 

(7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he police discussed several potential 

threats to officer safety--including the fact that pit bull dogs 

(known for their hostility to strangers) had been seen on the 

property.”); Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 206 (4th 

Cir. 2003) (“[P]it bulls, like Rottweilers, are a dangerous breed 

of dog.”); Vanater v. Village of South Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 

1240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (“Pit Bulls . . . possess the quality of 

gameness, which is not a totally clear concept, but which can be 

described as the propensity to catch and maul an attacked victim 

unrelentingly until death occurs, or as the continuing tenacity 

and tendency to attack repeatedly for the purpose of killing. It 

is clear that the unquantifiable, unpredictable aggressiveness 

and gameness of Pit Bulls make them uniquely dangerous.”); see 

generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity and 

Construction of Statute, Ordinance, or Regulation Applying to 

Specific Dog Breeds, Such as “Pit Bulls" or “Bull Terriers”, 80 

A.L.R. 4th 70 (1990). 

Unlike people, dogs can never state their “intent” and, 

while an owner of a dog may develop such a bond that allows her 

to better predict what the animal might do based on its behavior, 

a dog’s behavior can never be predicted with certainty and none 

of the Deputies were familiar with plaintiff’s dogs so as to give 

them any insight into their tendencies. (See, e.g., Lazaro Dep 

at 55:7-11 (stating that “[p]it bulls are difficult to read 

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[because] they could have the same look whether they’re going to 

bite you or . . . they want to get pet”).) After the dogs had 

unexpectedly escaped from the bedroom in which they were confined 

and barking and were running toward the Deputies, a reasonable 

conclusion of the Deputies, if not the only reasonable 

conclusion, was that the dogs were about to attack the strangers 

in the House. (See, e.g., Nevis Dep. at 33:10-12 (testifying 

that the pit bulls appeared very much like they were going to 

attack).) 

“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require omniscience, 

and absolute certainty of harm need not precede an act of selfprotection.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quotation marks omitted). A reasonable officer would thus 

not believe that, after exhausting less intrusive methods, the 

law required him to give the dog the benefit of the doubt and 

wait until the dog’s jaws are locked on the officer before 

shooting. Accord Dziekan v. Gaynor, 376 F. Supp. 2d 267, 272 (D. 

Conn. 2005) (“Defendant had heard from plaintiff that the dog 

would not bite, but he had no way to ascertain the truth of that 

representation within the time period at issue. Under such 

circumstances, the law does not require the officer to wait until 

the approaching animal is within biting distance or is leaping at 

him before taking protective action.”); Birkes v. Tillamook 

County, Civ. No. 09-1084 AC, 2011 WL 1792135, at *7 (D. Or. May 

10, 2011) (“Here, [the officer] was faced with a pit bull moving 

toward him in a rapid manner which the dog’s guardian could not 

restrain. . . . [T]hese facts are enough to establish that [the 

officer] acted reasonably [in shooting the dog].”); Perez v. City 

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of Placerville, Civ. No. S-07-927 FCD GGH, 2008 WL 4279386, at 

*7-8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (citing Hells Angels in holding 

that an officer “did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

rights” in killing the plaintiff’s dog where the officer 

“responded first with pepper spray,” only when “that did not work 

did he use his weapon to shoot [the dog],” and “[w]ithin twenty 

minutes of the shooting, the officers transported [the dog] to 

the nearest veterinarian’s office”); cf. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 

U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (“Th[e] accommodation for reasonable error 

exists because ‘officials should not err always on the side of 

caution’ because they fear being sued.” (citation omitted)). 

 Accordingly, because the Deputies resorted to shooting 

the dogs only after less intrusive methods had proven 

unsuccessful and were reasonable in believing that the pit bulls 

running toward them were about to attack, they did not violate a 

clearly established Fourth Amendment right and are thus entitled 

to qualified immunity. The court must therefore grant the 

Deputies’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment claim based on the shooting of her dogs.8

2. Officers’ Liability for Shooting the Dogs 

 The Officers argue that they cannot be held liable for 

seizing the killed dogs because they did not participate in 

shooting the dogs. The Ninth Circuit has “reject[ed] the idea 

that mere presence at a search or membership in a group, without 

 8

 Because the court determines that the Deputies are 

entitled to qualified immunity, it need not address Deputy 

Lazaro’s separate argument that he cannot be liable for the 

shootings because he did not participate in them. 

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personal involvement in and a causal connection to the unlawful 

act, can create liability under section 1983.” Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir. 2002). Consequently, an 

officer who is merely a bystander to his colleagues’ allegedly 

unlawful conduct cannot be found to have caused any injury. 

Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 770 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 

Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a 

jury instruction in a § 1983 case allowing the jury to “lump all 

the defendants together, rather than require it to base each 

individual’s liability on his own conduct”). 

 Under the integral participation doctrine, the Officers 

may be liable under § 1983 for the shooting of the two dogs if 

they were “fundamentally involved” in the shootings by (1) being 

aware of the plan to shoot the dogs or having reason to know of 

such a plan without objecting to it; and (2) providing some 

affirmative physical support at the scene of the shootings. 

Monteilh v. County of Los Angeles, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1089 

(C.D. Cal. 2011). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that 

a plan to shoot the dogs existed or, that once the split-second 

decision to shoot was made, the Officers knew or had reason to 

know of the decision. Plaintiff also fails to put forth any 

evidence that Officer Bigelow was inside the House at the time 

Deputies Ceja and Garcia shot plaintiff’s two pit bulls. Nor 

does plaintiff dispute defendants’ evidence that Officer Bigelow 

arrived on the scene after the shootings and that his only 

involvement was in removing the remaining five dogs from the 

House. (Nevis Dep. at 14:7-10; Bigelow Dep. at 15:17-17:12.) 

 As a matter of law, therefore, neither Officer Nevis 

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nor Officer Bigelow was an integral participant in the shooting 

of plaintiff’s two dogs. See Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 770 (“[I]t is 

clear that an officer who waits in the front yard interviewing a 

witness and does not participate in the unconstitutional search 

in any fashion cannot be held liable under [§ 1983].”); 

Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 n.12 (“Roman, who arrived on the 

scene after the arrest was completed, and Montano, who at most 

provided crowd control, did not participate in any integral way 

in the arrest. Therefore, summary judgment in their favor was 

properly granted.”). Accordingly, the Officers cannot be held 

liable under § 1983 for the shooting of the two dogs and, even if 

they could, they would be entitled to qualified immunity for the 

same reasons as the Deputies. 

B. Removal of the Remaining Dogs 

 1. Officers’ Liability for Removing the Dogs 

 The Officers contend that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity for removing the remaining five dogs from the 

House. The court will again assume, without deciding, that the 

Officers’ removal of plaintiff’s five dogs violated her Fourth 

Amendment right for purposes of qualified immunity and determine 

whether that right was clearly established. See Reichle, 132 S. 

Ct. at 2093. 

It is undisputed that Van Asperen and Vitalie, who were 

the only occupants in the House after the shooting, were arrested 

and thus the five remaining dogs would have been left unattended 

if they were not removed. (Nevis Dep. at 22:19-23:19.) The 

relevant inquiry is thus whether, at the time the Officers 

removed plaintiffs’ dogs on December 17, 2012, it was clearly 

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established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited animal control 

officers who are lawfully inside a home to remove dogs when the 

only occupants are arrested and the dogs would remain unattended. 

 “[A]n officer who acts in reliance on a duly-enacted 

statute or ordinance is ordinarily entitled to qualified 

immunity.” Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Under California Penal Code § 597.1, which was in 

effect at the time of the dogs’ removal, “[e]very owner, driver, 

or keeper of any animal who permits the animal to be in any 

building [or] enclosure . . . without proper care and attention 

is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Cal. Penal Code § 597.1(a)(1) 

(2012).9

 Section 597.1 specifically provides that “[a]ny peace 

officer . . . or animal control officer shall take possession of 

the stray or abandoned animal and shall provide care and 

treatment for the animal until the animal is deemed to be in 

suitable condition to be returned to the owner.” Id. “When the 

officer has reasonable grounds to believe that very prompt action 

is required to protect the health or safety of the animal or the 

health or safety of others, the officer shall immediately seize 

the animal . . . .” Id. Officer Nevis explained that, “[i]f a 

person ends up going to jail, we take their dogs or their fish or 

their goat or their snake or whatever [the animal] happens to be. 

We end up taking it and putting it in our custody” because “if 

you’re taking away the only people that are going to be there, 

you can’t leave those [animals] by themselves.” (Nevis Dep. at 

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 The statute was amended on January 1, 2013 without 

substantive change. 

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23:3-19.) 

 There is no evidence suggesting that the Officers knew 

when someone might return to care for the dogs and ensure that 

they had adequate food and water. (See id. at 22:17-23:24.) The 

removal also occurred in mid-December and there is no evidence 

that the dogs in the backyard kennel were sheltered from the cold 

or rain. Officer Nevis further testified that, as he and Officer 

Bigelow were removing the remaining dogs from the House following 

the shooting, plaintiff’s next-door neighbor approached them and, 

after describing the dogs as “aggressive,” told the Officers: 

“Thank God you’re taking these dogs because they get out all the 

time and they chase people on a regular basis.” (Id. at 31:21-

32:11.) The circumstances and neighbor’s statements could 

provide reasonable animal control officers in the same situation 

additional reasonable grounds to believe that the dogs’ removal 

was “required to protect the health or safety of the [dogs] or 

the . . . safety of” the surrounding neighbors and, thus, that 

they were required to “seize the animal[s]” pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 597.1(a)(1). 

 Plaintiff has not provided and the court cannot find 

any authority prohibiting the Officers’ conduct or establishing 

that the removal of the dogs under the circumstances of this case 

violated the Fourth Amendment. In the absence of any statutory 

or case law contrary to the clear duties imposed by California 

Penal Code § 597.1, the contours of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

right were not sufficiently clear such that every reasonable 

animal control officer would have suspected, let alone have fair 

notice, that his conduct amounted to an unreasonable seizure of 

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plaintiff’s property. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 314 

(2015) (per curiam) (“[T]he crux of the qualified immunity test 

is whether officers have ‘fair notice’ that they are acting 

unconstitutionally.”). Accordingly, because the Officers are 

entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s claim for the 

unlawful seizure of her dogs, the court must grant their motion 

for summary judgment on that claim. 

2. Deputies’ Liability for Removing the Dogs 

 Even assuming that the Deputies were integral 

participants in the removal of the five remaining dogs from 

plaintiff’s House and may be liable under § 1983, the Deputies 

would be entitled to qualified immunity for the same reasons as 

the Officers and thus the court must grant the Deputies’ motion 

for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim against them for the 

unlawful seizure of her remaining dogs. 

C. Unlawful Arrest 

 Plaintiff alleges that she “was arrested and held in 

custody for two days even though there was no evidence that she 

had committed a crime.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) At oral argument, 

counsel for plaintiff conceded that only Deputies Lazaro and Ceja 

had any involvement in plaintiff’s arrest. 

“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 

as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was 

without probable cause or other justification.” Lacey, 693 F.3d 

at 918 (quotation marks omitted). Probable cause exists if the 

arresting officers “had knowledge and reasonably trustworthy 

information of facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a 

prudent person to believe that the arrestee had committed or was 

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committing a crime.” Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 

941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and alterations omitted). 

Under the collective knowledge doctrine, a court looks to the 

collective knowledge of all the officers involved in the criminal 

investigation. Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 

1207 (9th Cir. 2008). Once probable cause is established, “an 

officer is under no duty to investigate further or to look for 

additional evidence which may exculpate the accused.” Cameron v. 

Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 

 It is undisputed that Deputy Lazaro, after returning 

from the December 17, 2012 probation search, filled out and 

signed a declaration for probable cause to arrest plaintiff for 

possession of .35 grams of methamphetamine, a felony at the time, 

and possession of drug paraphernalia found in her bedroom. 

(Lazaro Dep. at 45:19-46:14.) It is also undisputed that, on 

December 19, 2012, Deputy Ceja arrived at plaintiff’s House with 

three other deputies who were not involved in the probation 

search--Deputies Hembree, Whitehead, and Mount--and arrested 

plaintiff pursuant to Deputy Lazaro’s probable cause declaration. 

(Ceja Dep. at 37:19-40:23, 59:20-65:3.) It is further undisputed 

that Deputy Ceja received and read the probable cause declaration 

before arresting plaintiff and that he relied on the declaration 

in arresting plaintiff. (Id. at 59:20-65:3.) 

As a matter of law, probable cause existed to arrest 

plaintiff on December 19, 2012, and counsel for plaintiff 

conceded as much at oral argument. Accordingly, because there 

was probable cause to arrest plaintiff on December 19, 2012, the 

court must grant defendants’ motions for summary judgment on her 

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unlawful arrest claim.10

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) defendants Lech Garcia, Juan Ceja, and Jerry 

Lazaro’s motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 20), be, and 

the same hereby is GRANTED on all of plaintiff’s claims; and 

(2) defendants Michael Nevis and Vanus Bigelow’s motion 

for summary judgment, (Docket No. 21), be, and the same hereby 

is, GRANTED on all of plaintiff’s claims. 

Dated: July 5, 2016 

 10 Although plaintiff argues that Deputy Lazaro and Ceja 

arrested her to intimidate her so that she would not complain 

about what had happened to her dogs, the Deputies’ subjective 

intent is not relevant to determining probable cause. See 

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“Our cases make 

clear that an arresting officer’s state of mind . . . is 

irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”). 

 Plaintiff argues in her opposition that Deputy Ceja 

used force when arresting her, but counsel acknowledged at oral 

argument that those allegations are not relevant to plaintiff’s 

wrongful arrest claim and that she did not assert an excessive 

force claim in her Complaint. See Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 

F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the unlawful arrest 

and excessive force inquiries are distinct). 

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