Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01275/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01275-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ANDREW REDD

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-cv-1275 LAB (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: DENIAL OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

TRIMBLE, WARDEN, ET. AL.

Defendants.

I. 

INTRODUCTION

David Andrew Redd (“Petitioner”), a California inmate proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, challenges his conviction in San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCD220164 with a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”; Doc. No. 1) in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Petitioner is currently serving a state prison term of twenty years in accordance with his

plea of guilty to robbery as well as the admission of prior convictions. Petitioner claims his rights

under the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment were violated when the sentencing judge

imposed an upper term of five years for the robbery count without allowing a jury to determine

aggravating facts to support the imposition of an upper term. (Pet., Doc No. 1 at pp. 7-9; Traverse,

Doc. No.12 at pp. 3, 8).

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry A.

Case 3:11-cv-01275-LAB-WMC Document 13 Filed 11/08/11 Page 1 of 7
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Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule H.C.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. After reviewing the Petition and Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in support thereof [Doc. No. 1], Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in support thereof [Doc. No. 10], Petitioner’s Traverse [Doc. No. 12], and

all of the supporting documents submitted by the parties, the Court recommends the Petition be

DENIED for the reasons stated below.

II. 

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 17, 2009, Petitioner was charged with one count of robbery. The felony

complaint alleged several prior convictions including four convictions which qualified as serious

or violent under California’s Three Strike Law. Cal. Penal Code 667(b) (Lodgment 1.)

On October 1, 2009 Petitioner entered into a negotiated plea agreement with the prosecutor

and completed a change of plea form reflecting the agreement. The plea form indicates Petitioner

entered a plea of guilty to robbery, admitted only one of the prior strike allegations in order to

avoid receiving an indeterminate life term and admitted two prior serious felony priors. Petitioner

stipulated to a 20-year prison term which is also indicated on the plea form. (Lodgment 1 at pp. 3-

4.) Petitioner also completed an addendum to the plea form entitled “Blakely Waiver.” 

(Lodgment 1 at 6.) Petitioner initialed and signed the Blakely Waiver which: (1) states that he

waived the right to trial by jury, and (2) indicates Petitioner agreed to allow the sentencing judge

to determine whether to impose the upper term sentence. Id. 

On November 2, 2009, the trial court imposed the stipulated term of twenty years, which

comprised: the upper term for robbery consisting of five years, doubled to 10 years pursuant to the

Three Strikes law along with two additional and consecutive five-year terms for the two serious

felony priors (Lodgment 1 at p. 1.)

Petitioner filed three collateral challenges to the trial court’s sentence by filing habeas

corpus petitions at each state court level. (Lodgments 2-6.) Redd’s petition in the superior court

was filed on December 15, 2009 and denied on February 2, 2010. The superior court denied

Redd’s petition on the grounds that: (1) California changed the sentencing statute before his

sentencing hearing to eliminate the need for a jury to determine facts to support an upper term and

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(2) Petitioner signed a Blakely Wiaiver giving up his right to a jury trial on facts in aggravation

that could be used to impose an upper-term sentence. (Lodgment 2 at pp. 1-2.) The court of

appeal petition was filed on April 7, 2010 and denied on May 7, 2010. The court of appeal

denied the petition on the grounds that: (1) Redd waived the right to a jury’s determination of facts

in aggravation that could be used to increase his sentence in the Blakely Waiver form, and (2) the

sentence imposed by the trial court reflected his negotiated plea agreement and stipulation. 

(Lodgment 4.) Redd’s California Supreme Court petition was filed on July 6, 2010 and denied on

February 2, 2011 . Id. The California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or

citation. (Lodgment 6.) 

III. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code section 2254 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at Title 28, United States Code section 2254,

subpart(d)(1), sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. [. . .] 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d)(1)-(2).

When determining what constitutes “clearly established federal law” under section

2254(d)(1), federal courts look to U.S. Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state court’s

decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412) (2000)); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Andrade to

explain clearly established federal law is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the

U.S. Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision). In addition, Ninth Circuit law

may be considered for its “persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court law.” Lewis v. Mayle,

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391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir.

2000)), overruled in part on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)); see also Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting while circuit law may be persuasive

authority, “only the [U.S.] Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those

holdings need be reasonably applied”). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses contained in section 2254(d)(1)

have independent meaning. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Van Lynn v.

Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court if (1) the state court applies a

rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, but still

reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 412; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694

(2002); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. A state court

is not required to even be aware of clearly established applicable Supreme Court cases, so long as

“neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

 A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law if (1)

the state court identifies the correct governing rule, but unreasonably applies the rule to a new set

of facts, or (2) “the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to

a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new

context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520

(2003); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. For a state

court decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the state court

decision must be more than simply incorrect or erroneous; instead, the state court’s decision must

be “objectively unreasonable.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2009) (citing Wiggins, 539

U.S. at 520-21); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Vasquez, 572 F.3d 1029, 1035 (citing Andrade, 538

U.S. at 75); see also Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal habeas

courts determine the reasonableness of the state court’s decision, not its reasoning). Thus, this

Court will not disturb the decisions of the California state courts with respect to Petitioner’s claims

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unless the state courts’ resolutions of those claims were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d); see also Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the last reasoned state court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06

(1991); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006); Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035;

Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738. If, however, the relevant state court decision does not provide an

adequate explanation or a discernable basis for its reasoning on a particular claim, the federal court

must conduct “an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision

was objectively unreasonable.” Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on

other grounds, Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011) (quoting Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms,

461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006)); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

IV.

DISCUSSION

i. Summary of Claims

Petitioner contends the trial court erred at sentencing when it imposed the upper term

without allowing a jury to determine the aggravating factors which could support the imposition of

an upper term. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at pp. 7-9.) By failing to provide Petitioner a jury trial for this

purpose, Petitioner contends the sentencing court violated his rights under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 9.; see also Traverse, Doc. No.12

at pp. 3, 8) ii. Respondent’s Rebuttal

Respondent contends Petitioner’s claim should be rejected because Petitioner agreed to a

specific term and waived any right to a jury determination of facts that would permit imposition of

an upper term.. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 10 at pp.7-8.) 

iii. Relevant Law

“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added). The

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Supreme Court has held the “statutory maximum” for increasing a penalty for a crime “is the

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict

or admitted by the defendant . . . ”. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in

original). Specifically, the Supreme Court recently held the middle term, not the upper term, is the

“relevant statutory maximum” under California’s Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”), and an

upper term sentence could be imposed only if the trial judge found an aggravating circumstance. 

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 288 (2007).

 In response to Cunningham, the California Legislature amended the DSL to eliminate the

requirement that trial judges find an aggravating circumstance before imposing an upper term

sentence. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b); see also Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 652 n.20 (9th

Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 767 (2008) (“Following the decision in

Cunningham, the California legislature amended its statutes such that imposition of the lower,

middle, or upper term is now discretionary and does not depend on the finding of any aggravating

factors.”). Instead, “the choice of the appropriate term” now rests “within the sound discretion of

the court.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b).

The Court notes the Supreme Court has not held Cunningham applies to sentences resulting

from plea bargains as is the case here. This means two things relevant to the Court’s analysis. 

First, the relevant statutory maximum under California’s DSL may not always be limited to the

middle term. Second, the rule articulated in Blakely still applies, namely “[w]hen a defendant

pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant

either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310. 

Based on the continued viability of Blakely, the California Court of Appeal denied

Petitioner’s claim, stating: 

“The record shows, as part of the negotiated plea agreement, Redd waived his right to a

trial by jury. Redd also executed a Blakely waiver that stated he understood he had a right

to have a jury determine the existence of any fact in aggravation that could be used to

increase his sentence on any count or allegation to the upper or maximum term and he gave

up that right. Redd specifically ‘stipulated to the imposition of the [upper term] sentence

as indicated on the change of plea form.’ Redd received the benefit of his plea bargain and

the sentence is not unlawful.”

Lodgment 4.

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Here, Petitioner’s change of plea form and Blakely waiver addendum indicate Petitioner

pled guilty to the charged offense and stipulated to the prior strike conviction and the serious

felony priors in order to receive a determinate prison sentence of 20 years as opposed to an

indeterminate sentence. [Lodgment 1at p. 3.] As part of this plea agreement, Petitioner was also

advised of his right to have a jury determine any facts in aggravation, but expressly waived those

rights when he checked and initialed the box on the Blakely waiver form which reads: “I now give

up these rights and stipulate to the imposition of the [upper term] sentence as indicated on the

change of plea form.” [Lodgment 1 at p. 6.] Accordingly, the state court judge sentenced

Petitioner to the upper term on Count One as agreed by Petitioner. (Lodgment 1 at p. 2.) As a

result of Petitioner’s stipulation, the upper term imposition on Count One was proper under the

Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely. It is therefore RECOMMENDED the Court find the state

appellate court reasonably denied Petitioner’s claim and that federal habeas relief be DENIED.

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 29, 2011, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than December 20, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1553, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 8, 2011

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court

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