Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02345/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02345-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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07cv2345

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARON YOLANDA WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

DEBORAH L. PATRICK, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 07-CV-2345-JLS(JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. Introduction

Sharon Yolanda Williams (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging her San

Diego Superior Court sentence in case number SCD 192976. (See

Petition, Ground One.) Petitioner contends that the trial court

violated her due process rights by enhancing her sentence based

on a 1986 felony conviction. (Id.) 

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss the Petition, Petitioner’s Reply, and all the

supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the

documents and evidence presented in this case, and for the

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reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled

to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by

the state appellate court are as follows:

[¶]... On February 10, 2005, San Diego Police officers

stopped Williams for a traffic violation. After

learning her driver’s license was suspended, they

arrested her and found 11.56 grams of cocaine base in

her pocket. In 198[6], Williams had been convicted of

assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd.(a)(1)) after

she shot the victim, a prior strike.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 2.)

III. Procedural Background

Petitioner’s sentence resulted from guilty plea convictions

in four separate cases, involving numerous criminal charges,

pertaining to criminal conduct occurring within a one-year

period. The arrests, charges, pleas, and sentences pertaining to

the individual cases are set out below.

A. Case No. SCD 192976

On February 10, 2005, Petitioner was arrested and charged

with unlawful transportation of cocaine base in violation of

California Health and Safety Code (“H&S”) § 11352(a) within the

meaning of H&S § 11370.2(a) and possession of cocaine base for

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1

Because Petitioner was previously convicted of the crime of

unlawfully possessing narcotics in violation of H&S § 11351.5, H&S §

11370.2 mandates a full, separate, and consecutive three-year term. 

See H&S § 11370.2 (2007). 

2

Because Petitioner was previously convicted of the crime of

unlawful possession of narcotics in violation of H&S § 11351.5, PC §

1203.07 proscribes granting probation or suspending her sentence. See

PC § 1203.07 (2004).

3

Petitioner was previously convicted of assault with a firearm in

violation of PC §§ 245(A)(2) and 12022.5 on February 26, 1986 in case

number CR72953. (Augmented CT at 13.)

4

The transportation of the controlled substance was not for

personal use. 07cv2345

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sale in violation of H&S § 11351.51 within the meaning of H&S §

11370.2(a) and California Penal Code (“PC”) § 1203.07(a)(11)2. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 8-10.) On May 24,

2006, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to count two, knowingly

possessing cocaine base for sale in violation of H&S § 11351.5,

and she admitted a prior conviction for violation of H&S §

11370.2(a) as well as a 1986 strike prior pursuant to PC §§

667(b-i), 668, and 1170.12.3 (Id. at 11-14.) The prosecution

agreed to dismiss the balance of the charges in case number SCD

192976 as well as the charges in case number SCD 191374, and the

sentence, when pronounced, was to run concurrent with the

sentences in case numbers SCS 192457 and SCS 193480. (Id. at

11.) 

B. Case No. SCS 192457

On March 10, 2005, Petitioner was arrested and charged with

possession of cocaine base for sale in violation of H&S §

11351.5, transportation of cocaine base in violation of H&S §

11352(a) within the meaning of PC § 1210(a)4, possession of

cocaine base in violation of H&S § 11350(a), possession of

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5

Because Petitioner was arrested for a secondary offense which

was alleged to have been committed while she was released from custody

on a primary offense (out on bail), she was subject to a penalty

enhancement of an additional two years in state prison to be served

consecutive to any other term imposed by the court. See PC §

12022.1(b) (2000).

07cv2345

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paraphernalia used for narcotics in violation of H&S § 11364, and

unlawfully driving a motor vehicle with a suspended driver’s

license in violation of California Vehicle Code (“VC”) §

14601.1(a). (Lodgment No. 1, Augmented Clerk’s Transcript

(“ACT”) at 61-65.) On March 14, 2005, Petitioner was arrested

and charged with possession of cocaine base in violation of H&S §

11350(a) within the meaning of PC § 12022.1(b)5, resisting a

police officer in violation of PC § 148(a)(1), and possession of

paraphernalia used for narcotics in violation of H&S § 11364. 

(Id.) On June 14, 2005, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to

count three, possession of a controlled substance in violation of

H&S § 11350(a). (Id. at 66-68.) The prosecution dismissed the

balance of charges in case number SCS 192457, and the sentence,

when pronounced, was to run concurrent with case number SCS

193480. (Id. at 66.) 

C. Case No. SCS 193480

On May 14, 2005, Petitioner was arrested and charged with

possession of cocaine base in violation of H&S § 11350(a),

possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics in violation of

H&S § 11364, and driving a motor vehicle with a suspended

driver’s license in violation of VC § 14601.1(a). (ACT at 32-

35.) On June 14, 2005, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to count

one, unlawful possession of a controlled substance in violation

of H&S § 11350(a). (Id. at 36-38.) The prosecution dismissed

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the balance of charges in case number SCS 193480, and the

sentence, when pronounced, was to run concurrent with case number

192457. (Id. at 36.)

D. Case No. SCS 198779

On December 10, 2005, Petitioner was arrested and charged

with smuggling a controlled substance into jail in violation of

PC § 4573 within the meaning of PC § 12022.1(b), possession of

cocaine in violation of H&S § 11350(a) within the meaning of PC §

12022.1(b), receiving stolen property in violation of PC § 496(a)

within the meaning of PC § 12022.1(b), and forgery of checks in

violation of PC § 470(d) within the meaning of PC § 12022.1(b). 

(ACT at 5-8.) On May 24, 2006, Petitioner entered a guilty plea

to count three, receiving stolen property in violation of PC §

496(a) within the meaning of PC § 12022.1(b). (Id. at 9-11.) 

The prosecution dismissed the balance of charges in case number

SCS 198779 as well as charges from case number SCD 191374, and

the sentence, when pronounced, was to run concurrent with case

numbers SCS 192457 and SCS 193480. (Id.)

E. Motions Submitted Prior to Sentencing

On July 27, 2006, Petitioner filed a Request for

Consideration of Dismissal (“Motion to Strike “Strike” Prior),

requesting that the sentencing court strike her 1986 felony

conviction and sentence her to a low term of three years in case

number SCD 192976, with the additional three-year prior

allegation, for a total of six years in state prison (with

sentences in all other cases to run concurrently). (CT at 24-

30.) On July 31, 2006, the prosecution filed an Opposition to

Petitioner’s Motion to Strike “Strike” Prior. (Id. at 47-56.) 

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On August 1, 2006, at the time of sentencing, the court denied

Petitioner’s Motion to Strike “Strike” Prior. (Lodgment No. 8,

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 20.) 

F. August 1, 2006 Sentencing

The court sentenced Petitioner on August 1, 2006. (RT at

13-22.) With respect to case number SCD 192976, the court

imposed, among other things, the low term of three years on count

two, doubled to six years because of the strike prior, plus an

additional three years consecutive pursuant to H&S § 11370.2(a),

for a total of nine years in state prison. (Id. at 20-22.) With

respect to case number SCS 198779, the court imposed, among other

things, the middle term of two years in state prison on count

three, to run concurrent with the nine-year sentence in case

number SCD 192976, and two years consecutively for the PC §

12022.1(b) enhancement. (Id.) With respect to case number SCS

193840, the court imposed, among other things, the middle term of

two years in state prison on count one to run concurrent with the

nine-year sentence in case number SCD 192976. (Id.) With

respect to case number SCS 192457, the court imposed the middle

term of two years on count three to run concurrent with the nineyear sentence in case number SCD 192976. (Id.) The total

sentence imposed was eleven years in state prison. (Id.)

G. Motion to Recall Sentencing

On August 16, 2006, Petitioner filed a Request for

Consideration to Recall Sentence (“Motion to Recall Sentence”)

pursuant to PC § 1170(d). (ACT at 12-18.) On August 30, 2006

the prosecution filed an Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to

Recall. (Id. at 19-25.) 

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H. September 6, 2006 Recall of Sentence

On September 6, 2006, the court recalled on its own motion

Petitioner’s eleven-year sentence pronounced August 1, 2006

because “[a]t the time of the plea agreement, there was no

meeting of the minds that the [PC] section 12022.1 enhancement,

which is attached to case ending ‘779, was required to be imposed

consecutively.” (RT at 34-35; see also CT at 83.) With respect

to case number SCD 192976, the court imposed the low term of

three years in state prison on count two, doubled to six years

because of the strike prior, and dismissed the H&S § 11370.2(a)

allegation “in furtherance of justice and given the fact that ...

the prior is somewhat old,” for a total sentence of six years. 

(RT at 35-36; CT at 83.) With respect to case number SCS 198779,

the court imposed one-third the middle term of two years, or

eight months, in state prison on count three. (RT at 36.) The

court also imposed, among other things, a consecutive two years

for the PC § 12022.1(b) enhancement. (Id.) The two-year, eightmonth prison term on this case was to run consecutive to the

sentence on case number SCD 192976. (Id.) With respect to case

number SCS 192457, the court imposed, among other things, the

middle term of two years on count three (3) to run concurrent

with the sentence in case number SCD 192976. (Id.) With respect

to case number SCS 193840, the court imposed, among other things,

the middle term of two years in state prison on count one to run

concurrent with the sentence in case number 192976. (Id. at 37.) 

The total prison sentence imposed was eight years and eight

months. (Id.)

//

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I. Post-Sentencing

On September 27, 2006, Petitioner filed a direct appeal

challenging her eight-year eight-month sentence in the California

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (CT at

61; Lodgment Nos. 2-4.) On June 19, 2007, in an unpublished

opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

sentence. (Lodgment No. 5.) On July 26, 2007, Petitioner filed

a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which was

denied without comment. (Lodgment Nos. 6-7.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on December 17, 2007. 

[Doc. No. 1.] Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition Writ

of Habeas Corpus on February 25, 2008, and Petitioner filed a

“Reply to Respondent’s Answer” on March 18, 2008. [Doc. Nos. 5

and 8.] 

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

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 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy

either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

& (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, this Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate

court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-806

(1991). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving claims presented on direct or collateral review. Early

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the

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reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts

[Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will

not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Enhance 

Petitioner’s Sentence in Violation of Due Process

Petitioner contends that the state court violated her due

process rights by improperly imposing an enhanced prison sentence

based on a 1986 felony conviction (strike). (See Petition,

Ground One.) Generally, matters relating to sentencing are

governed by state law and do not raise a federal constitutional

question. Federal habeas corpus relief is granted “only on the

ground that [the state prisoner] is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Mere errors of state law are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 67-68 (1991); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). 

Moreover, this Court defers to and is bound by a state court’s

interpretation of its own laws. Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S.

78, 84 (1983).

The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits

state courts from depriving persons of liberty except to the

extent authorized by law. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,

689 n.4 (1980). Under narrow circumstances, a misapplication of

state sentencing law may violate due process. “[T]he federal,

constitutional question is whether [the erroneous sentencing

decision] is ‘so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an

independent due process ... violation.’” Richmond v. Lewis, 506

U.S. 40, 50 (1992)(citation omitted).

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A brief recitation of California law regarding the

consideration of strike offenses in sentencing is instructive:

California trial courts retain the power to dismiss a defendant’s

prior conviction, for purposes of enhancing a sentence, on their

own in the interests of justice. See PC § 1385(a) (2000). 

Acting under PC § 1385(a), a court may strike a prior felony

conviction alleged in cases brought under the Three Strikes Law. 

People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 529-30

(1996). “[I]ntended to restrict courts’ discretion in sentencing

repeat offenders, ... the Three Strikes law does not offer a

discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but

establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case

where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike, unless

the sentencing court ‘conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme

should be made because, for articulable reasons which can

withstand scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be treated as

though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme.’” 

People v. Carmony, 33 Cal. 4th 367, 377 (2004)(citing Romero,

supra, 13 Cal. 4th 497 at 528; People v. Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th

328, 337 (2001)). 

The court in Carmony went on to say that the trial court

will only abuse its discretion in limited circumstances, such as,

when the court is unaware it has discretion to dismiss a strike

or where the court utilized impermissible factors in declining to

strike the strike. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal. 4th at 378 (citing

People v. Langevin, 155 Cal. App. 3d 520, 524 (1984); People v.

Gillispie, 60 Cal. App. 4th 429, 434 (1997)). “On appeal, ...

‘[t]he burden is on the [petitioner] to clearly show that the

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sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. In the absence

of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to

achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary

determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set

aside on review’ ... [or] reversed merely because reasonable

people might disagree.” People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), 14

Cal. 4th 968, 977-78 (1997)(internal citation omitted)(citing

People v. Supreme Court (Du), 5 Cal. App. 4th 822, 831 (1992);

People v. Preyer, 164 Cal. App. 3d 568, 573 (1985)). 

The sentencing court denied Petitioner’s Motion to Strike

“Strike” Prior because “[s]he has not led a morally crime-free

life from the strike, even though it was some years past, and

[she] is not an appropriate candidate to strike the strike.” 

(Lodgment No. 8 at 20.) Petitioner argued in her state appeal

that the sentencing court failed to balance the relevant facts

concerning her criminal history, specifically the nature and

circumstances surrounding her 1986 strike conviction for assault

with a firearm. (See Lodgment No. 2 at 8-14; Lodgment No. 4 at

2-6; see also CT at 38-46.) Petitioner noted that the conviction

occurred 20 years ago when she was 23 years old, and it arose

from a “lover’s triangle” situation in which the victim

repeatedly struck Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 2 at 12; Lodgment No.

4 at 2.) Petitioner was pregnant at the time. (Id.) At the

time Petitioner was sentenced on that assault with a firearm

conviction, the probation officer recommended probation, which

the court determined appropriate, because the victim initiated

and provoked the incident, the crimes occurred as the result of

an unusual circumstance, and Petitioner’s prior criminal history

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was deemed insignificant. (Lodgment No. 4 at 13.) 

Additionally, Petitioner contended in the state appellate

court that the trial court failed to consider that, aside from

her prior strike, none of her offenses was violent, but rather

involved the personal use of drugs. (Lodgment No. 2 at 11-12.) 

Petitioner offered the opinion of clinical psychologist, Dr.

Thomas Barnes, Ph.D, who attributed Petitioner’s criminal

activity to a significant addiction to crack cocaine. (See CT

32-36.) Finally, Petitioner argued that the trial court failed

to consider that she remained sober and crime-free for twelve

years, demonstrating her ability to live a law-abiding life. 

(Lodgment No. 2 at 13.) Given these reasons, Petitioner

contended it was improper for the court not to dismiss her 1986

felony conviction at the time of her August 6, 2006 sentencing. 

(Id. at 11.) 

In denying Petitioner’s direct appeal, the California Court

of Appeal stated:

[¶] Whether to strike a prior conviction is in the

trial court’s discretion. (People v. Superior Court

(Romero)(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530.) A trial

court’s decision not to strike a strike prior will be

upheld unless the decision is irrational or arbitrary. 

(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.) 

That reasonable minds might differ or that we would

have exercised discretion differently is not

sufficient. (Ibid.) In ruling whether to dismiss a

strike prior, the court must consider whether, in light

of the nature and circumstances of his or her present

criminal activity and prior serious and/or violent

felony convictions, the defendant may be deemed outside

the spirit of the three-strikes law and should be

treated as though he or she had not committed one or

more strike priors. (People v. Williams (1998) 17

Cal.4th 148, 162-163.) Over the past 25 years,

Williams has been the subject of juvenile court true

findings and has been repeatedly convicted of criminal

acts including: petty theft (§§ 484 and 488)(three

offenses); resisting arrest (§ 148)(two offenses);

assault with a deadly weapon; petty theft with a prior

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theft conviction (§§ 666/484)(two offenses); failure to

appear while released on bail (§ 1320.5); drafting a

check with insufficient funds (§ 476a); possessing a

controlled substance for sale; possessing a controlled

substance (Health and Saf. Code, § 11350, subd.(a))(two

offenses); receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd.

(a)); and the present charge of possession of a

controlled substance for sale. Williams does not fall

outside the scheme of the three strikes law. The trial

court was not arbitrary or capricious in denying the

motion to strike the prior strike.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 2-3.)

Given Petitioner’s extensive criminal history, the Court

of Appeal was correct in finding that the trial court was not

irrational or arbitrary in denying Petitioner’s Motion to

Strike “Strike” Prior. Petitioner has committed a host of

criminal offenses over the past 25 years and continues to

demonstrate recidivist behavior. (See CT at 17-18.) Despite

several mitigating factors that set the assault with a firearm

conviction apart from the rest of her offenses, the trial court

reasonably viewed the extent of her criminal activity after

1986 as evidence that Petitioner was an inappropriate candidate

to receive the benefit of a strike dismissal. 

Petitioner was indeed crime-free for a twelve year period,

but she relapsed with intensity in 2005, habitually violating

California laws prohibiting possession of cocaine base for

personal use and for sale. At one point, Petitioner was

arrested and charged with possession and transportation of

cocaine base for sale, and, just four days later, she was

arrested again for possession of cocaine base. (See ACT at 61-

65.) Twice, in the span of two months, Petitioner was stopped

driving under a suspended driver’s license with cocaine base

and drug paraphernalia present in her car. (See ACT 32-35, 61-

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Because the Petition fails on its merits, the Court need not

consider Respondent’s procedural arguments. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2)(2006); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir.

2005).

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65.) Finally, Petitioner’s recidivism climaxed in December

2005 when she was caught attempting to smuggle cocaine into

jail, along with stolen property and forged checks. (See CT 5-

8.) 

Although Petitioner accurately contends that none of these

offenses was a violent crime, this does not render the trial

court’s decision arbitrary or capricious. Clearly, when the

trial court considered Petitioner’s Motion to Strike “Strike”

Prior, it evaluated both the nature and frequency of her past

criminal activity. Despite Petitioner’s twelve years of lawabiding behavior, she has demonstrated periods of acute

criminal activity and recidivism. While reasonable minds could

differ regarding dismissal of the strike, that is simply not

enough to justify federal habeas relief. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to deny

Petitioner’s Motion to Strike her 1986 strike was not arbitrary

or capricious, Petitioner’s sentence does not constitute a

violation of due process, and the claim should be dismissed

with prejudice.6

V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not

shown that she is entitled to federal habeas relief under the

applicable legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned

magistrate judge hereby recommends that Respondent’s Motion to

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Dismiss be GRANTED and that the Petition be DENIED WITH

PREJUDICE and that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that not later than August 27, 2008, any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed not later than September 5, 2008. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 5, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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