Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-05-56559/USCOURTS-ca9-05-56559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUFACTURED HOME COMMUNITIES 

INC., a corporation,

No. 05-56401 Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No. v. 

CV-03-02342-

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; DIANNE NAJ/BLM

JACOB,

Defendants-Appellees. 

MANUFACTURED HOME COMMUNITIES 

INC., a corporation, No. 05-56559 Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v.  CV-03-02342-NAJ

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; DIANNE OPINION JACOB,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Napoleon A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 7, 2007—Pasadena, California

Filed March 6, 2008

Before: Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

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COUNSEL

David J. Bradford, Jenner & Block LLC, Chicago, Illinois, for

the plaintiff-appellant; Elliot L. Bien, Bien & Summers LLP,

Novato, California, was on the briefs. 

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William A. Johnson, Jr., Senior Deputy, San Diego, California, for the defendants-appellees; John J. Sansone, County

Counsel, County of San Diego, and James M. Chapin, Senior

Deputy, San Diego, California, were on the brief.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: 

We must decide whether a county supervisor’s hostile public statements directed at a company owning and managing

several local mobile home parks were actionable as a matter

of law.

I

Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. (“MHC”), a real

estate investment trust headquartered in Chicago, owns and

operates mobile home parks through the United States. The

three parks at issue here—Lamplighter, Rancho Valley, and

Rancho Mesa—lie within unincorporated areas of San Diego

County’s (“County”) Supervisorial District Two. At all relevant times Dianne Jacob (“Jacob”) served as the county

supervisor for that district. 

Beginning in July 2002, MHC initiated phased rent

increases at the three parks after sending 90-day notices as

required by local law. In response to the rent increases, tenants of Lamplighter park contacted Jacob, leading to the following actions complained of by MHC, as summarized by the

district court: 

On November 15, 2002, Jacob issued a news advisory stating that MHC was preying upon elderly tenants with fixed incomes by raising rents by 25%. 

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On November 16, 2002, Defendant Jacob attended

a tenants meeting at Lamplighter Park, where Defendant Jacob made several allegedly false statements

about [Plaintiff], including the following: (1) statements that MHC is a greedy, profit-driven company

that enjoys forcing the elderly out of their homes in

order to move in more expensive homes for a greater

profit; (2) a statement that “it would be interesting to

see” if Plaintiff had engaged in any fraudulent

actions; and (3) a statement that Defendant Jacob

had spoken with County Counsel and District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis, who were “very interested” in

following up on whether civil or criminal actions

should be pursued against Plaintiff. 

In a letter dated November 18, 2002, to Plaintiff’s

Chairman, Sam Zell, and distributed to Lamplighter

Park tenants and attached to a subsequent civil complaint, Defendant Jacob made the following allegedly false statements: (1) Plaintiff’s actions were

“rent gouging at its worst” and indicative of “corporate greed”; (2) some “residents have already been

forced to surrender their homes”; and (3) Plaintiff’s

rent increase was well above the 2003 Fair Market

Rent of $539 for manufactured home spaces. 

On or about December 10, 2002, Defendant Jacob

allegedly stated to local media that MHC had lied to

the Department of Environmental Health about

[Plaintiff’s] clean-up effort in response to a sewage

spill at Rancho Valley Mobile Home Park . . . .

Defendant Jacob allegedly also stated: (1) that Plaintiff is a “bad company” and that she wanted them

“out of town,” (2) that they “shouldn’t get away

with” their lies, and (3) that she wanted “to make

sure that they’re cited for every single offense . . .

and whatever actions need to be taken are taken,

civil [sic] or criminally.” 

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On January 9, 2003, the San Diego Union Tribune

published an article with Defendant Jacob’s statements “to the effect that [Plaintiff] was ‘preying on

older people of limited economic means,’ and that

she was going to ‘mak[e] things even hotter for the

predatory company.’ ” 

On April 5, 2003, Defendant Jacob allegedly

falsely stated to tenants that Plaintiff made a practice

of buying “distressed properties with the intent to

run out the older residents to bring in newer homes,”

and told tenants that since no rent control ordinance

had been passed “ ‘we need to take other measures

. . . like litigation.’ ” 

On at least six other occasions in 2003, Jacob made similar

statements about MHC’s conduct. 

On November 24, 2003, MHC filed suit against the County,

lodging a variety of federal claims.1 On December 30, 2004,

MHC amended the complaint to add a federal claim against

Jacob based on the alleged violation of MHC’s First Amendment rights. On February 1, 2005, MHC amended its complaint a second time to add state law claims of defamation and

tortious interference with prospective economic advantage,

against both the County and Jacob. On May 19, 2005, the district court granted defendants’ Motion to Strike State Tort

Causes of Action, brought under the California anti-SLAPP

(“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) law and

awarded attorneys’ fees to the County and Jacob on the

motion to strike. And on May 25, 2005, the district court dismissed MHC’s remaining claims on summary judgment. 

1

In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants as to these issues. See

Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Diego, Nos. 05-

56401 & 05-56559 (filed March 6, 2008). 

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MHC timely appeals.

II

A

[1] California enacted its anti-SLAPP law in reply to a “disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the

valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of

speech.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a). The statute is

designed to allow the swift dismissal of meritless claims that

are aimed not at remedying legally cognizable harms but at

chilling expression. To prevail on a motion to strike, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the suit arises

from activity in furtherance of First Amendment rights of

petition or free speech; once such a showing has been made,

the plaintiff must then demonstrate a probability of prevailing

on the claims. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097,

1110 (9th Cir. 2003). 

[2] A threshold question as to the probability of success on

the merits is whether the statements giving rise to the complaint are actionable at all. The critical determination is

whether the allegedly defamatory statements “convey[ ] a

false factual imputation.” Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244,

249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). But, “where potentially defamatory

statements are published in a public debate, a heated labor

dispute, or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions

by the use of epithets, fiery rhetoric, or hyperbole, language

which generally might be considered as statements of fact

may well assume the character of statements of opinion.”

Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 P.2d 425, 428

(Cal. 1976). Ordinarily, this context-bound determination is a

question of law for the court, but if the challenged statement

or statements are “reasonably susceptible of an interpretation

which implies a provably false assertion of fact,” then they

may be considered by the jury “to determine whether such an

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interpretation was in fact conveyed.” Kahn, 284 Cal. Rptr. at

250. 

B

Here, the district court found that the County and Jacob had

succeeded in showing that Jacob’s statements giving rise to

the lawsuit were in furtherance of rights to petition or free

speech, and MHC does not challenge that determination. Thus

the burden fell to MHC to make a showing as to the probability of success on the merits. 

On that issue, the County and Jacob asserted, and the district court agreed, that the statements giving rise to the lawsuit

were merely statements of opinion, rather than provably false

assertions of fact, and were therefore not actionable.2 The district court thus granted the motion to strike. While MHC concedes that some of Jacob’s statements were opinions uttered

in the heat of political battle, it contends that a reasonable fact

finder could find some of the statements to be actionable as

provably false assertions of fact. 

Specifically, MHC notes, for instance, Jacob’s statement

that MHC “lied to the County. Said to the County that everything was fine, the sewage situation was fixed. And, in fact,

it was not.” MHC argues that this statement refers to specific

circumstances and times and therefore is susceptible of interpretation as a provably false assertion of fact. The district

court found this statement to be “nothing more than rhetorical

hyperbole and subjective opinion.” Similarly, MHC argues

that a reasonable person could interpret Jacob’s statement that

MHC “has a reputation throughout the country of running

people out of older mobilehome parks, increasing the value of

2There is no categorical exemption of “opinion” from defamation law,

but if in context no reasonable person would interpret the challenged statement to be conveying a false factual imputation, then the First Amendment

protects the speech from liability. Kahn, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 249-250. 

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the park, and then selling it at a profit” as a falsifiable assertion of fact. Finally, MHC calls attention to Jacob’s claim that

the incoming District Attorney was “very interested in following up to determine whether there are civil and/or criminal

actions that should be filed against” MHC. In these instances,

too, the district court found that the statements were not reasonably susceptible of interpretation as provably false assertions of fact. 

[3] While the district court may have been correct in its

assessment that each of these statements is properly interpreted as an assertion of opinion rather than fact, a reasonable

factfinder could disagree with that assessment. It does not

seem unreasonable to imagine, for instance, that a juror could

conclude Jacob meant as a matter of fact that MHC had lied

about the sewage situation, or that she meant it as fact that

MHC had a reputation for driving out elderly tenants. Nor

does it seem unreasonable to imagine a juror interpreting a

statement about the intentions of the incoming district attorney as a statement of fact, rather than mere opinion.3

 Indeed,

the district court’s decision, before concluding that this statement was not falsifiable, also declared that it was “not factually untrue.”

4

 If the district court can assess the truth or falsity

3The dissent gives persuasive reasons why a fact finder might well

regard these statements as non-actionable opinions, but that is not enough.

While we might, as fact finders, be persuaded by the dissent’s arguments,

we cannot conclude that they provide the only reasonable interpretation of

the statements at issue, and under California law—and United States

Supreme Court precedent, see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, 19

(1990)—we must conclude that the district court erroneously determined

that Jacob’s statements were non-actionable. 

4

It is not clear whether the district court meant by calling the statement

“not factually untrue” that it was making a finding that the statement was

true as a description of the incoming district attorney’s intentions or indicated, as the district court also suggests, “nothing more than . . . Jacob’s

strong opinion that [MHC’s] actions should be investigated.” We conclude, in any event, that MHC ought to be given the opportunity to put the

statement before a jury to determine whether an ordinary person would

have understood the statement as a factual assertion, and whether it was

false. 

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of the claim, that seems a strong indication that it was a provably false assertion of fact, and therefore actionable. 

[4] Thus, as to the statements concerning these matters, we

cannot declare as a matter of law that no reasonable person

could construe them as provably false. Accordingly, we

reverse the judgment of the district court as to these statements.5

[5] In addition, we reverse the district court’s award of

attorneys’ fees associated with the motion to strike. 

C

The dissent disagrees with our treatment of the reasonable

juror standard regarding actionable statements, and urges that

the California Supreme Court gives wide latitude to judges to

take such issues away from juries where the statements in

question were made in the course of public debate. However,

as the dissent recognizes, an essential component of an opinion is that it be “wholly subjective.” See Copp v. Paxton, 52

Cal. Rptr. 2d 831 (1996) (“In making the distinction [between

fact and opinion], the courts have regarded as opinion any

broad, unfocused and wholly subjective comment.”) (internal

quotation removed). Even under the standard adopted by the

dissent, however, a reasonable listener could conclude that

Jacob’s statements were founded in part on an objective, factual basis, especially in light of Jacob’s role as a public servant and her having made some of the relevant statements in

response to a news reporter’s questions. 

Likewise, we leave it to the jury to determine whether

Jacob’s statements were opinions based upon express facts. A

reasonable juror could conclude that Jacob did not “outline[ ]

5We agree with the district court, however, that Jacob’s statements that

MHC is “unscrupulous” and “greedy” and engaged in “rent gouging” were

the kind of heated commentary that is often part of such public debates,

and are not actionable as provably false assertions of fact. 

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the facts available to [her]” sufficient to “mak[e] it clear that

the challenged statements represent [her] own interpretation”

of express facts. Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1156-

57 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Jacob’s statements were not clearly

attached to such an outline of fact, nor did she explicitly link

her statements to an express factual basis. See id. at 1156

(holding that statements in a published work were nonactionable opinions because they were preceded by an extensive factual discussion, such that the author “can only be said

to have expressed his own opinion after having outlined all

the facts that serve as the basis for his conclusion”); Standing

Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438-40 (9th

Cir. 1995) (holding that a declarant’s statement was nonactionable opinion where he explicitly disclosed its factual

basis). Accordingly, unlike Partington and Standing Committee, in this case a reasonable listener could conclude that

Jacob “impl[ied] there are other, unstated facts supporting”

her comments. Franklin v. Dynamic Details, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d

429, 436, 438 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The dispositive question is

whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published

statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of

fact.”). 

The dissent also would hold that MHC failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish a probability of success on the

merits. However, the district court granted Jacob’s motion to

strike solely on the erroneous ground that her statements were

non-actionable opinions. MHC’s probability of success was

not addressed in the parties’ briefs or at oral argument.

Accordingly, we leave it to the district court to consider that

issue in the first instance.

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and

REMANDED for further proceedings. The parties shall bear

their own costs. 

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CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. 

The California Legislature’s explicit purpose in enacting

California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 was to declare

“that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial

process.” Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 425.16(a). Therefore, we

must construe the statute broadly to protect public participation and free speech. Id. Manufactured Home Communities,

Inc. (“MHCI”) is attempting to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the

redress of grievances by filing a lawsuit against county supervisor Dianne Jacobs based on media interviews about an issue

of public controversy. I would construe the statute broadly to

conclude that not only were Supervisor Jacob’s statements

opinions in the context they were given, but also that MHCI

failed to demonstrate with admissible evidence that they were

factually untrue so as to show a probability of prevailing on

the merits as required by Code of Civil Procedure

§ 425.16(b). 

I agree with the majority that the County of San Diego and

Supervisor Jacob demonstrated that MHCI’s rent increases

and operation of the mobile home park were issues of public

concern. The majority identifies three potential defamatory

statements: 1) that MHCI lied about fixing a sewage leak in

one of their parks; 2) that MHCI enjoys driving out elderly

tenants; and 3) that the district attorney was interested in

investigating MHCI’s operation of its mobile home parks.

The majority then applies a reasonable juror standard taken

from Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (Ct. App. 1991),

to conclude that it is possible that Supervisor Jacob’s statements are “reasonably susceptible of an interpretation which

implies a provably false assertion of fact” and therefore

MHCI’s claims survive an anti-SLAPP motion. The majority

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evaluates Supervisor Jacob’s statements for whether a “reasonable person could construe them as provably false.” I disagree with applying this more lenient standard when

distinguishing between an opinion and an assertion of fact in

ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion because Supervisor Jacob’s

statements were opinions based on expressed facts and

because the statements were substantially true. See Franklin

v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429, 437-38 (Ct.

App. 2004) (discussing opinions accompanied by expressed

facts). When plaintiffs bring suit concerning statements about

matters of public significance, they bear the burden of establishing a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits,

and MHCI has failed to satisfy its burden in this case. See

Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 50 P.3d 733, 739 (Cal.

2002) (explaining that a plaintiff facing an anti-SLAPP

motion “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally

sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing

of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”) 

I. Supervisor Jacob’s statements were opinions based on

expressed facts.

“It is an essential element of defamation that the publication be of a false statement of fact rather than opinion.” Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802, 821

(Ct. App. 1999). An opinion is any “broad, unfocused and

wholly subjective comment.” Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury

News, 264 Cal. Rptr. 699, 708 (Ct. App. 1989). “Under the

common law privilege of fair comment, an honest expression

of opinion on matters of public interest is privileged.” Eisenberg, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821. In the context of discussions of

matters of public interest, “courts apply the Constitution by

carefully distinguishing between statements of opinion and

fact, treating the one as constitutionally protected and imposing on the other civil liability for its abuse.” Gregory v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1976). 

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When deciding whether or not a statement is an opinion as

a matter of law, “the court must place itself in the position of

the hearer or reader, and determine the sense or meaning of

the statement according to its natural and popular construction.” Baker v. Los Angeles Herald, 721 P.2d 87, 90 (Cal.

1986). California assesses whether statements are opinions or

statements of fact by examining the totality of the circumstances with particular attention to the context of the statement. Id. at 90-91. “Thus, where potentially defamatory

statements are published in a public debate, a heated labor

dispute, or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions

by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, language which

generally might be considered as statements of fact may well

assume the character of statements of opinion.” Gregory, 552

P.2d at 428. 

Given the context and content of Supervisor Jacob’s statements, the district court properly concluded that they were

statements of opinion as a matter of law. Whether published

material is reasonably susceptible of an interpretation which

implies a provably false assertion of fact “must be resolved by

considering whether the reasonable or ‘average’ reader would

so interpret the material.” Couch v. San Juan Unified Sch.

Dist., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 854 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis

added). Rather than considering whether the three statements

implied facts that a reasonable person could construe as provably false, I would affirm the district court’s conclusion that,

given the context and content of the statements, no reasonable

person would have concluded that Supervisor Jacob was

implying that she had additional, defamatory, factual information.

Supervisor Jacob made the statements that MHCI lied

about a sewage spill, and that the company has a reputation

for running people out of mobile home parks during interviews with television stations covering the sewage spill. In the

context of the news report and the reporter’s request for

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Supervisor Jacob’s comments on the situation and MHCI’s

operation of the park, a reasonable listener would conclude

that her responses were opinions. See Standing Comm. on

Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1995)

(noting distinction between opinions based on implied facts

and opinions based on express facts). Similarly, Supervisor

Jacob’s statement about talking to the County Counsel and the

incoming district attorney were accompanied by Jacob’s disclosure that she spoke with attorneys who were interested in

investigating MHCI’s management of the mobile home parks.

Her interpretation of their responses is an opinion accompanied by expressed facts, not a statement that implies additional defamatory facts. See Franklin, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 438

(discussing effect of expressed facts on statement of opinion).

In this case, each of Supervisor Jacob’s opinions were

accompanied by the facts she was asked to comment on, or

the facts upon which she based her statement. As a result, her

statements “can be punished only if the stated facts are themselves false and demeaning.” Id. (quoting Standing Comm., 55

F.3d at 1439). If the statements were accompanied by the

expressed facts that formed the basis for Supervisor Jacob’s

opinions, whether or not a reasonable listener could have

thought that the statements implied untrue facts is irrelevant

because “no reasonable reader would consider the [statement]

anything but the opinion of the author drawn from the circumstances related.” Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d

1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Partington v. Bugliosi,

56 F.3d 1147, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting reasoning of

other circuits “that when an author outlines the facts available

to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements

represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the

reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are

generally protected by the First Amendment.”). Therefore, I

would affirm the district court’s conclusion that under the circumstances, Supervisor Jacob’s statements were opinions. 

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II. MHCI has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating

a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits.

Supervisor Jacob’s statements were about matters of public

concern. Therefore, the burden shifted to MHCI to show “a

probability of prevailing on the claims.” Cal. Code of Civ. P.

§ 425.16(b). The California Supreme Court has interpreted

this to mean that the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient

prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment

if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Wilson,

50 P.3d at 739. Not only must the plaintiff demonstrate that

prevailing is possible, it must demonstrate that prevailing is

a “reasonable probability.” Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d 713,

724 (Cal. 2006) (noting that “the trial court correctly found

that there was no reasonable probability” of plaintiff prevailing and affirming grant of the anti-SLAPP motion); Wilcox v.

Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 455 (Ct. App. 1994)

(concluding that “probability” is equivalent to a “reasonable

probability” of prevailing) overruled on other grounds by

Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685,

694 n. 5 (Cal. 2002). If the plaintiff has the burden of proving

an element of his claim under a certain evidentiary standard,

then in evaluating the plaintiff’s prima facie showing, a court

must apply the same evidentiary standard. See Padres v. Henderson, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) (“plaintiff

must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment under the applicable evidentiary standard.”); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d

464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (applying clear and convincing standard of proof where plaintiff had to prove actual malice by

that standard). 

In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990),

the Supreme Court rejected an opinion privilege for defamation actions and concluded that if an opinion implies a provably false fact, courts should analyze “whether a reasonable

factfinder could conclude” that the publication asserted the

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defamatory fact. California adopted this standard for evaluating demurrers and motions for judgment on the pleading to

this specific species of opinion in Kahn, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 250.

Unlike demurrers and motions for judgment on the pleading,

however, special motions to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute are evaluated based on whether, “as a matter of law, the

defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.”

Wilson, 50 P.3d at 739. “Thus, a plaintiff’s burden as to the

second prong of the anti-SLAPP test is akin to that of a party

opposing a motion for summary judgment.” Yu v. Signet

Bank/Virginia, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 530 (Ct. App. 2002). 

Under California law, the plaintiff must prove the falsity of

the underlying, implied fact in order to survive summary

judgment. Eisenberg, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822-23 (affirming

grant of summary judgment in defamation action when plaintiff could not prove that the underlying assertions of fact were

false). In this case, MHCI has not satisfied its evidentiary burden to demonstrate the falsity of any underlying facts. See

Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752, 766 (Ct. App. 2007)

(noting that truth defense is satisfied if the “gist” or “sting”

of the statement is substantially true). The evidence submitted

showed that MHCI’s representatives assured county officials

that plumbers and other repair work had begun on the sewage

leak when the problem had not been fixed. This was reported

and documented by two local television stations and confirmed by the residents of the flooded unit. Furthermore,

Supervisor Jacob did online research to discover that there

were complaints throughout the country about MHCI and

their business practices. The disproportionate effect of

MHCI’s rent increases on the elderly and residents on fixed

incomes was confirmed by the homeowners. Finally, the

incoming district attorney testified that she was interested in

investigating MHCI’s activities, and the county opened a formal investigation into MHCI’s handling of the sewage spill.

MHCI failed to present any evidence to prove the falsity of

the alleged facts it claims were implied by Supervisor Jacob’s

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statements. Because all of the expressed facts, and whatever

facts were implied by Supervisor Jacob’s statements, were

“substantially true,” and because MHCI failed to present any

evidence that any allegedly defamatory fact was false, I would

affirm the district court’s order granting Supervisor Jacob’s

anti-SLAPP motion and the award of attorney’s fees. 

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