Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04838/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04838-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OSSIE GILES,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. REYES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04838-YGR (PR) 

ORDER SERVING COGNIZABLE 

EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM; AND 

DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Ossie Giles, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison 

(“SQSP”), has filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, who claims 

he suffers from severe back pain which eventually led to emergency back surgery, alleges that 

Defendants failed to give him treatment for his back pain while he was housed at California State 

Prison - Solano (“CSP-Solano”) from 2006 until the date he was transferred to SQSP on 

December 8, 2009. Dkt. 1 at 3-4.1 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants at SQSP continued to 

deny him treatment for his back pain after he was transferred there. Id. at 4-7. In April of 2014, 

Plaintiff claims he could no longer walk, and he had to undergo emergency back surgery on May 

20, 2014. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

His motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted in a separate written 

Order. 

Venue is proper because some of the events giving rise to the claim are alleged to have 

occurred at SQSP, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 

In his complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants at SQSP: Doctors D. Reyes 

and J. Espinoza; and Chief Medical Officer E. Tootell. He also names the following Defendants at 

CSP-Solano: Doctors B. Naki, T. Tran and Yuen Chen. 

 

1

Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by Plaintiff. 

Case 4:15-cv-04838-YGR Document 8 Filed 03/28/16 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 

claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West 

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

1. Claims Against Defendants at CSP-Solano 

 Plaintiff complains of various problems during his incarceration at CSP-Solano, which is 

where he was housed prior to his transfer to SQSP on December 8, 2009. Dkt. 1 at 3-4. Because 

CSP-Solano is located within the venue of the Eastern District of California, these claims against 

Defendants Naki, Tran and Chen are DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling them in a 

new civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. 

See In re Hall, 939 F.2d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1991) (dismissal on venue grounds without prejudice). 

2. Remaining Eighth Amendment Claim Against Defendants at SQSP 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, 

WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Jones v. 

Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves 

an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of 

the defendant’s response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A “serious” medical 

Case 4:15-cv-04838-YGR Document 8 Filed 03/28/16 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or 

the “[u]nnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). A prison 

official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from serious medical needs, specifically his severe back 

pain. Dkt. 1 at 3-8. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Reyes, Espinoza and Tootell were 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs for failing to provide him treatment for his 

back pain from the time he was transferred to SQSP on December 8, 2009 until he had to receive 

emergency back surgery on May 20, 2014. Id. at 5-8. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations 

relating to the aforementioned actions state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs against Defendants Reyes, Espinoza and Tootell. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

1. Plaintiff’s claims relating to all problems during his incarceration at CSP-Solano 

against Defendants Naki, Tran and Chen are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff 

refiling them in a new civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of California. 

2. Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs against Defendants Reyes, Espinoza and Tootell.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint 

and all attachments thereto (dkt. 1) and a copy of this Order to the following Defendants at SQSP: 

Doctors D. Reyes and J. Espinoza; and Chief Medical Officer E. Tootell. The Clerk shall also 

mail a copy of the complaint and a copy of this Order to State Attorney General’s Office in San 

Francisco. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.

4. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Case 4:15-cv-04838-YGR Document 8 Filed 03/28/16 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on 

behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, Defendants will be required to 

bear the cost of such service unless good cause be shown for the failure to sign and return the 

waiver form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the 

date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be 

required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for 

waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 

summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the 

waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 

service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before 

Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on 

which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed, 

whichever is later. 

5. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action: 

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date their answer is due, Defendants 

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion must be 

supported by adequate factual documentation, must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from 

the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand2

notice 

so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to 

oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out 

in Rand must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss 

for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be accompanied by a similar notice. 

However, the Court notes that under the new law of the circuit, in the rare event that a failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, Defendants may move for dismissal under Rule 

 

2

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Case 4:15-cv-04838-YGR Document 8 Filed 03/28/16 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

12(b)(6) as opposed to the previous practice of moving under an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. 

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 

1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under 

the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), should be raised by a defendant as an 

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Otherwise if a failure to exhaust is not clear on the face of the 

complaint, Defendants must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a motion for summary 

judgment under Rule 56. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff shows a failure to exhaust, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. 

Id. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the district judge 

rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. at 1168. 

If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

Defendants shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All 

papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff. 

 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 

and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which 

Defendants’ motion is filed. 

c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you 

must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 

be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact—that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradicts the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

Case 4:15-cv-04838-YGR Document 8 Filed 03/28/16 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154 

F.3d at 962-63. 

Plaintiff also is advised that—in the rare event that Defendants argue that the failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint—a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. To avoid dismissal, you have the right to present any evidence to show that you did 

exhaust your available administrative remedies before coming to federal court. Such evidence 

may include: (1) declarations, which are statements signed under penalty of perjury by you or 

others who have personal knowledge of relevant matters; (2) authenticated documents—

documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are 

authentic, or other sworn papers such as answers to interrogatories or depositions; (3) statements 

in your complaint insofar as they were made under penalty of perjury and they show that you have 

personal knowledge of the matters state therein. As mentioned above, in considering a motion to 

dismiss for failure to exhaust under Rule 12(b)(6) or failure to exhaust in a summary judgment 

motion under Rule 56, the district judge may hold a preliminary proceeding and decide disputed 

issues of fact with regard to this portion of the case. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168. 

(The notices above do not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve similar notices again 

concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and 

motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935.) 

 d. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the 

date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

 e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

6. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to 

depose Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison. 

7. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants or 

Defendants’ counsel, once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 

Case 4:15-cv-04838-YGR Document 8 Filed 03/28/16 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

them.

8. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

9. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the 

deadline sought to be extended. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: ______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 

 United States District Judge 

March 28, 2016

Case 4:15-cv-04838-YGR Document 8 Filed 03/28/16 Page 7 of 7