Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02511/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02511-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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1 The remaining named defendants, Brandon Jimenez, Joe

Elsey, Jr., and Lenai Sanchez were dismissed by order dated March

28, 2005, pursuant to plaintiffs’ Request for Partial Dismissal

and Order, filed March 23, 2005. Consequently, the court refers

(continued...)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CHRISTINE MCCULLOUGH DAVIS;

JOSEPH DAVIS for the ESTATE OF

MARK EDWARD DAVIS,

NO. CIV. S-03-2511 FCD PAN

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN; OFFICER

B. JIMENEZ; OFFICER ELSEY;

OFFICER SANCHEZ; and DOES 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on motion by defendant

County of San Joaquin (“County” or “defendant”) for summary

judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).1 Plaintiffs, Davis’

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1(...continued)

throughout only to defendant, County of San Joaquin, despite the

fact that the motion was filed on behalf of all defendants. 

2 While the caption of the complaint indicates that the

name of Davis’ son is Joseph Davis, the body of the complaint

refers to him as “Brent Davis”. 

3 Defendant objects to plaintiffs’ Response Undisputed

Facts ¶¶ 2,5, 6 and 8, which contained facts not included in

defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. Pursuant to E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 56-260(b), “any party opposing a motion or summary

judgment or summary adjudication shall reproduce the itemized

facts that are undisputed and deny those that are disputed . .

..” Local Rule 56-260(b) does not provide for the party opposing

the motion to include additional facts within the response to the

(continued...)

2

mother, Christine McCullough Davis and son, Joseph Davis2

(collectively “plaintiffs”), oppose the motion, asserting that

triable issues exist. In addition, plaintiffs request the motion

be dismissed or deferred pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to

provide plaintiffs additional time to conduct discovery and

obtain an expert witness regarding decedent’s cause of death. 

Court heard oral argument from parties’ counsel on April 15,

2005. For the reasons stated herein, defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED in part, and plaintiffs’ motion to

defer ruling on the summary judgment motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(f) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Following are the facts taken in the light most favorable to

plaintiff. On March 1, 2002, decedent, Mark Edward Davis

(“Davis” or “decedent”), was arrested by the Stockton Police

Department for multiple felonies following a car chase, which

ended in a collision. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Und. Statement of

Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. UF”) ¶ 1.)3 After Davis’ arrest, he was

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3(...continued)

movant’s statement of undisputed facts, though the party may file

“a concise Statement of Disputed Facts.” E.D. Local Rule

56.260(b). The court construes plaintiffs’ “undisputed facts”

2,5,6, and 8 as disputed facts properly submitted under the Local

Rule. 

3

transported to the San Joaquin County Hospital for treatment of

injuries he sustained in the collision. (Id. UF ¶ 3.) After

examination, the hospital staff determined that Davis was fit for

incarceration, cleared him for release, and transferred him to

the San Joaquin County Jail. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Sometime shortly

after Davis’ arrival at the Jail, Brandon Jimenez, a correctional

officer employed by the San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department,

conducted an initial intake evaluation of Davis. (Dec. of

Brandon Jimenez in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Jimenez Dec.”) ¶

3.) According to Jimenez, this examination occurred around 12:40

a.m., though he admits he cannot recall the exact time. (Id.) 

Among other questions, Jimenez asked Davis whether he was

suicidal. (Id. ¶ 4; San Joaquin County Jail Intake Sheet

prepared on March 2, 2002, attached as Ex. D to Dec. of Robert

Rodriguez in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Rodriguez Dec.”).) In

response, Davis denied having any suicidal ideations. (Id.) 

Jimenez states that “[a]t no time while I observed Mr. Davis did

he ever indicate he was suicidal. In fact, at all time I

observed him, he was cooperative and had a calm demeanor.” (Id.

¶ 5.) Jimenez indicated on the County Jail Intake Sheet that he

called a nurse to perform a medical evaluation of Davis at 12:40

a.m. “According to jail policy and practices, if an inmate does

not display suicidal behavior or make statements that he or she

is going to harm himself or others, clothing and a belt will not

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4 Plaintiffs exhibits attached to the Washington

Declaration are not properly identified or authenticated. The

court issued a Minute Order April 7, 2005 directing plaintiffs’

counsel to file a supplemental declaration identifying and

authenticated the exhibits on or before April 13, 2005. The

court received no supplemental declaration. Accordingly the

exhibits should be stricken from the record as inadmissible

evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). However, the court considers

Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Washington declaration in deciding the

motion for summary judgment notwithstanding the failure of

plaintiffs’ counsel to properly identify them. Based on the

declaration submitted, the court can ascertain that the exhibits

are exact copies of documents provided by defendant in response

to discovery requests and, based on the documents’ subjects, can

infer that their general nature. Exhibit 1 appears to be an

incident report prepared after Davis’ suicide. It is entitled

“Documented Report San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department.” 

Exhibit 2 is entitled “Booking” and states that it describes the

“Pre-Book and Pat Down Search” procedure, presumably of the San

Joaquin County Jail. 

5 This inference reasonably can be drawn from the

evidence, including that no County employees indicate they were

with Davis during this period, and deputy Jimenez states he tried

to locate Davis when he did not respond to the call for his

medical intake interview. 

4

be removed from the inmate. Only money, jewelry and other

personal affects [sic] will be removed from all inmates when

booked.” (Ex. 1 to Dec. of David Washington in Supp. of Opp’n

to Summ. J. (“Washington Dec.”).)4 

At the conclusion of the initial intake evaluation, Davis

was escorted to have his photograph taken. (Id.) Davis then was

brought to the main seating section in the booking area and

apparently left unsupervised.5 (Id.) Sometime shortly after

1:00 a.m., a booking nurse asked Jimenez to locate Davis, who had

not responded to her request that he report for a medical

examination. (Jimenez Dec. ¶ 6.) In an effort to locate Davis,

Jimenez knocked on the door of the single stall bathroom area to

which individuals in the booking area have access. (Id. ¶ 7.) 

There was no response. (Id.) After Jimenez noticed that the

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bathroom door was locked from the inside, he unlocked the door

and discovered Davis hanging by his belt, which was attached to

the handicap rail. (Id.) County employees unsuccessfully

attempted to revive Davis by CPR, but he later died. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

The coroner determined, and all medical experts working on this

case concur, that the cause of Davis’ death was suicide by

hanging. (Pl.’s Resp. UF ¶ 11; Coroner’s Autopsy Report at 6,

Ex. F to Rodriguez Dec.)

On May 6, 2003, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior

Court of San Joaquin County asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for violation of decedent’s Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment Rights, and state law claims for wrongful

death pursuant to Cal. Code. Civ. P. § 377.60, and for common law

negligence. On December 2, 2003, defendants removed the action

to this court. After the close of formal discovery, on March 1,

2005, defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. 

STANDARD

Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary judgment on all or 

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal.

1995). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). One of the principal purposes of the rule is to dispose

of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

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6

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962). If the moving party does not bear the burden of

proof at trial, he or she may discharge his burden of showing

that no genuine issue of material fact remains by demonstrating

that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party

meets the requirements of Rule 56 by showing there is an absence

of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case, the burden

shifts to the party resisting the motion, who “must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). 

Genuine factual issues must exist that “can be resolved only

by a finder of fact, because they may reasonably be resolved in

favor of either party.” Id. at 250. In judging evidence at the

summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. See T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626,

630-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The evidence

presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and

moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and

defeat summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City

of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Thornhill

Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

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7

ANALYSIS

I. Section 1983 Claim - Municipal Liability

Plaintiffs contend that the County is liable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violating decedent’s Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .

. . subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and its laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities are included among “person[s]”

who may be held liable under § 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, a municipality may

be held liable under § 1983 only when the municipality inflicts

an injury; it may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat

superior. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). The Ninth Circuit recently

discussed the two routes by which a plaintiff can seek to impose

municipality liability under § 1983: 

First, a plaintiff can show that a municipality itself

violated someone’s rights or that it directed its

employee to do so. Alternatively, in limited

situations, a plaintiff can demonstrate that a

municipality is responsible for a constitutional tort

committed by its employee, even though it did not

direct the employee to commit the tort.

 

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

To impose liability using the first, “direct” route, the

plaintiff can demonstrate that “the municipality acted with the

state of mind required for the underlying [constitutional]

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violation, just as a plaintiff does when he or she alleges that a

natural person has violated his federal rights.” Id. 

Under the second route to municipal liability, a plaintiff

can allege that, through its omissions, the municipality is

responsible for a constitutional violation committed by one of

its employees, even though the municipality’s policies were

facially constitutional, the municipality did not direct the

employee to take the unconstitutional action, and the

municipality did not have the state of mind required to prove the

underlying violation. Id. at 1186. The plaintiff must show that

the municipality’s deliberate indifference led to its omission

and that the omission caused the employee to commit the

constitutional violation. Id. To prove deliberate indifference,

the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality had actual

or constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a

constitutional violation. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 841 (1994)). 

In the present case, plaintiffs allege four underlying

violations of decedent’s constitutional rights. The court will

address each in turn. 

A. Fourth Amendment 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim appears predicated on

allegations in the complaint that County employees “assaulted,

battered, and strangled” Davis prior to his death. (Pls.’ Comp. ¶

31.) In opposition to summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted no

evidence to support this allegation. (Deposition of Marvin

Pietruszka, M.D., at p. 65:1-10, Ex. A to Rodriguez Dec.; Dep. Of

Robert D. Lawrence, M.D., at p. 29:3-17, Ex. B to Rodriguez Dec.;

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6 The court cannot locate any express reference to an

Eighth Amendment claim in plaintiffs’ complaint. However, since

defendant moves for summary judgment of an Eighth Amendment claim

and the complaint can be construed to raise such a claim, the

court addresses the issue. 

9

Dep. of John T. Cooper, M.D., at pp. 38:4-22, 47:2-18.) 

Plaintiffs now concede that Davis’ death was self-inflicted. 

(Pls.’ Resp. UF ¶ 11.) In fact, plaintiffs do not specifically

address their Fourth Amendment claim in the memorandum in

opposition to summary judgment. Accordingly the court finds

plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact

with respect to their claim that defendant violated decedent’s

Fourth Amendment Rights. 

B. Fifth Amendment 

In the complaint, plaintiffs refer to the due process clause

of the Fifth Amendment. However, the Fifth Amendment due process

clause applies only to actions of the federal government, not

those of state and local governments. Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Schweiker v.

Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 227 (1981)). Instead, the Fourteenth

Amendment due process clause applies to state and local

government actions. The sole remaining defendant, the County,

indisputably is not a federal entity. Accordingly, plaintiffs

claim for violation of decedent’s Fifth Amendment rights fails as

a matter of law.

C. Eighth Amendment6

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual

punishment” applies only “after conviction and sentence.” Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 & n. 6 (1989)(citing Ingraham v.

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Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40 (1977)). Pretrial detainees “are

not convicted prisoners.” Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th

Cir. 1996). Therefore, pretrial detainees are accorded no rights

under the Eighth Amendment. See id. Instead, their rights arise

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

id. (citing Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244

(1983)). Here, decedent had been arrested, but not tried or

convicted. Thus, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment he was a

detainee, not a convicted prisoner. Accordingly, plaintiffs’

Eighth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law.

D. Fourteenth Amendment

“Persons in custody have the established right to not have

officials remain deliberately indifferent to their medical

needs.” Gibson, 864 F.3d at 1461. Jail officials “show

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” if they fail to

provide access to medical and psychiatric care, including staff

who are “competent to deal with prisoners’ problems.” Id.;

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir.

1988); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.3d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). 

However, mere inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical

care does not constitute deliberate indifference. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976). To be liable for denying a

prisoner medical care, a person must “know of and disregard an

excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at

1187-1188. Actual knowledge is required; it is insufficient that

the person is aware of facts from which the inference of risk

could be drawn, he must also draw the inference. Id. (citing

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001.) 

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7 As articulated in the complaint, plaintiffs’ Fourteenth

Amendment claim is predicated on the fact that County employees

violently assaulted decedent, thereby causing his death. The

evidentiary support for such allegations has not materialized,

and plaintiffs now concede that decedent in fact committed

suicide. (See Pls.’ Resp. UF ¶ 11.)

8 Plaintiffs also make reference in the opposition to the

fact that “the San Joaquin Police Department failed to train its

employees on how to properly assess and process suicidal-risk

detainees.” (Id. at 5.) However, plaintiffs have submitted no

evidence, such as expert opinion testimony, from which a jury

could infer that the County’s training was inadequate. In fact,

there is no evidence at all regarding the training actually

provided to Jimenez and other officers and how it was inadequate. 

Assuming plaintiffs in fact intended to assert a Monell claim for

failure to train, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of

demonstrating the existence of a triable issue with respect to

such a claim. Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary judgment. 

11

Here, plaintiffs seek to hold defendant liable for

decedent’s suicide.7 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the

County itself inflicted an injury on decedent by adopting a

detainee intake policy which was deliberately indifferent to the

medical needs of decedent because, under the County’s policy,

inmates who deny suicidal intentions but who could be concealing

such plans, retain their clothing and belt during the booking

process.8 (Pls.’ Opp’n at 4.) It thus appears that plaintiffs

have chosen the direct route to liability outlined by the Ninth

Circuit in Gibson. 290 F.3d at 1185-1187. 

Under this theory of municipal liability, “the focus is on

the municipality’s ‘policy, statement, ordinance, regulation or

decision. . ..’” Id. at 1187. To survive summary judgment,

plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable jury could conclude

that the County (1) had a policy that posed a substantial risk of

serious harm to Davis, and (2) knew that its policy posed such a

risk. Id. at 1188-1189.

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12

Neither party accurately summarizes the evidence submitted

regarding defendant’s policy. Defendant appears to contend that

the record contains no evidence regarding its policies. By

contrast, plaintiffs characterize the County policy as follows:

In the policy of the San Joaquin County the interview

question regarding suicide is the only basis of

evaluating whether a person is suicidal, which does not

consider that the mere question may put the idea in a

border line person or that the person may wish to

conceal their true thoughts from authorities. If the

detainee responds in the negative to this question, the

detainee is allowed to keep their [sic] belt an [sic]

other items which they can hang themselves. During the

remainder of the booking process detainees are left

alone with little or no supervision and have access to

a bathroom, which they can lock themselves inside. 

Pls.’ Opp’n at 4.

However, plaintiffs submit insufficient evidence for a jury

finding that defendant has a practice or policy of leaving

inmates unsupervised during portions of the booking process. 

While it is true that Davis apparently was left unattended in

this case, proof of a single incident is insufficient to

establish a custom or policy. Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1460 (citing

City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). Moreover,

the County’s policy appears to consider several factors,

including a detainee’s response to the question regarding

suicide, in determining whether the detain should retain his or

her clothing during the booking process. (See Exs. 1 and 2 to

Washington Dec.)

The following is a summary of the evidence actually

submitted regarding the County’s policy with respect to intake

and booking of pretrial detainees:

• The County Jail has an Initial Intake Evaluation

procedure pursuant to which a County employee questions

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detainees regarding drug use, suicidal thoughts, and 

past suicide attempts. In addition the employee

records observations regarding whether the detainee’s

behavior “appears bizarre, suicidal or assaultive,” or

appears to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 

In addition, the employee must record whether he or she

has called a nurse to perform a medical evaluation of

the detainee. (County Jail Intake Sheet, Ex. D to

Rodriguez Dec.)

• “According to jail policy and practices, if an inmate

does not display suicidal behavior or make statements

that he or she is going to harm himself or others,

clothing and a belt will not be removed from the

inmate. Only money, jewelry and other personal affects

[sic] will be removed from all inmates when booked.” 

(Ex. 1 to Washington Dec.) 

• At or around the time of the initial intake evaluation,

the detainee is subjected to a pat-down search of

his/her body and clothing. After the pat down search,

the officer removes the detainee’s handcuffs and

directs the arrestee to remove his/her shoes, socks and

belt. The Booking Officer inspects the shoes, socks

and belt for contraband, and, if none is found, returns

the items to the detainee “to keep them on his/her

person until he/she is formally booked and processed.” 

(Ex. 2 to Washington Dec.) 

• A Medical evaluation by a nurse follows the initial

intake evaluation. (County Jail Intake Sheet Question

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17, Ex. D to Rodriguez Dec.) 

• Prior to being classified and housed at the San Joaquin

County Jail, detainees undergo a psychiatric evaluation

(Kelso Dec. ¶ 8.) 

Thus, the question presented is whether a reasonable jury

could find that the above-outlined policy posed a substantial

risk of serious harm to Davis. The court finds that a reasonable

jury could not so find. From the evidence submitted, it appears

that, under the County’s policy, County employees question

detainees regarding their propensity for suicide on three

occasions prior to their being housed at the Jail: at their

initial intake by a non-medical employee, by a nurse during the

medical interview, and finally during a psychiatric evaluation. 

(Kelso Dec. ¶¶ 6-8.) No reasonable jury could conclude that this

policy, under which law enforcement and trained medical staff

attempt at multiple stages to identify individuals who pose a

suicide risk, posed a substantial risk of harm to Davis. See

e.g., Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1189 (noting that County policy of

screening all incoming detainees for “obvious” signs of mental

illness and providing treatment, if necessary was “assuredly

constitutional.”) Nor did the County’s policy of permitting

detainees to retain their clothing, including shoes, socks and

belts, until formally booked and processed – unless their

behavior or statements indicates they pose a threat to themselves

or others – pose a substantial risk of harm to Davis. 

Essentially, plaintiffs contend that the County must treat all

detainees as presumptive suicide risks, even if they expressly

state that they are not suicidal and do not otherwise appear to

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be a danger to themselves or others. This is not required by the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-106

(“mere inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care does

not constitute deliberate indifference.”); Gibson, 290 F.3d at

1187-1188 (finding that a person must “know of and disregard an

excessive risk to inmate health and safety” to be liable for

denying a prisoner medical care); see also Sibley v. Lemaire, 184

F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 1999)(affirming summary judgment and finding

deputies’ were not deliberately indifferent to detainee’s medical

needs where deputies failed to call doctor when pretrial

detainee’s mental condition appeared to worsen but nothing that

detainee did clearly indicated an intent to harm himself);

Williams v. Kelso, 201 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2000)(affirming

summary judgment of § 1983 claim that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to medical needs of detainee who

committed suicide and holding that officials were not required by

the Eighth Amendment to provide immediate medical attention to a

disoriented, confused, belligerent detainee who smelled of

alcohol, in the absence of any indication of harm to himself). 

II. Rule 56(f) Continuance

Rule 56(f) permits a court to deny or continue a motion for

summary judgment if the opposing party demonstrates through

affidavit that he cannot present facts essential to him

opposition and further discovery is necessary to allow the

opposing party to obtain the necessary information. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(f). The opposing party bears the burden of showing that

the additional evidence sought exists, and that it would prevent

summary judgment. Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac, Inc., 242 F.3d

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1151, 1161 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2001). “The mere hope that further

evidence may develop prior to trial is an insufficient basis for

a continuance under Rule 56(f).” Continental Maritime of San

Francisco, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Metal Trades District Council,

817 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987). Granting a Rule 56(f)

request is particularly inappropriate when the party has failed

to diligently pursue discovery throughout the course of the

litigation. Chance, 242 F.3d at 1161 n. 6. 

Initially, the court notes that plaintiffs’ counsel has

failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f). While it

in not necessarily fatal that plaintiffs did not separately move

for a continuance, plaintiffs failed file any affidavit to

support their request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f); Garrett v. City

and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987)

(pending motion to compel discovery sufficient to raise Rule

56(f) consideration). Moreover, plaintiffs did not identify any

discovery that would assist them in opposing summary judgment. 

Plaintiffs indicate they need additional time to find an expert

on decedent’s cause of death. However, plaintiffs no longer

dispute that decedent’s death was self inflicted. (See Pl.’s

Resp. UF ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs’ entire theory now turns on

defendant’s failure to prevent decedent’s suicide. Under these

circumstances, the court cannot see how an expert on cause of

death will affect the outcome of this case. 

Certainly, plaintiffs’ evidence is weak, and the court could

imagine that plaintiffs’ claims would be bolstered by additional

evidence regarding the County’s policies, practices and training

procedures. However, plaintiffs fail to identify such evidence

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or to demonstrate that such evidence likely exists and would

defeat summary judgment. See Chance, 242 F.3d at 1161 n. 6. 

Moreover, this is not a situation in which defendants filed a

summary judgment motion before plaintiff has had a full

opportunity to pursue discovery and obtain the evidence necessary

to defeat a summary judgment motion. Discovery closed on

February 1, 2005, and plaintiffs were required to identify any

expert witnesses by November 22, 2004. Plaintiffs did not move

to amend the court’s pretrial scheduling order to extend

discovery, and they have not explained why they were unable to

obtain the necessary evidence during the allotted time for

discovery. The court finds that, under these circumstances, a

continuance under Rule 56(f) is unwarranted. 

III. State Law Claims

Subject to the conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c),

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114

F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). The court’s decision

whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed

by values of “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id.

at 1001 (citations omitted). However, primary responsibility for

developing and applying state law rests with the state courts. 

Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial,

district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

350 (1988); Gini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 40 F.3d

1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Schneider v. TRW Inc., 938

F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). Because all federal claims have

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been dismissed, the court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court makes the following

orders:

(1) Plaintiffs’ motion to defer ruling on the summary

judgment motion to enable plaintiffs to conduct further discovery

is DENIED.

(2) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs’

§ 1983 claims is GRANTED. 

(3) The court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims. Such claims are

hereby remanded to the Superior Court of San Joaquin County. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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