Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00045/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1446pr Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSICA MANNER, individually and

on behalf of all other similarly

situated,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-00045-BAS(WVG)

ORDER GRANTING JOINT

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION

SETTLEMENT

(ECF No. 21)

v.

GUCCI AMERICA, INC., 

Defendant.

On December 8, 2014, Plaintiff Jessica Manner (“Plaintiff”) commenced this

class action in San Diego Superior Court, alleging that Defendant Gucci America, Inc.

(“Defendant” or “Gucci”) requested and recorded personal identification information 

from Plaintiff and putative class members in conjunction with credit card purchase

transactions in violation of the Song–Beverly Credit Card Act, California Civil Code

§ 1747.08. Thereafter, Defendant removed this action to federal court. (ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before this Court is the parties’ joint motion for preliminary approval of

class action settlement. (ECF No. 21.)

///

- 1 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 1 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

The proposed settlement agreement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”)

applies to class members (“Class” or “Class Members”) defined as: “all persons from

whom Defendant requested and recorded personal identification information in

conjunction with a credit card transaction in any of Gucci’s eight (8) freestanding,

full-priced California boutique stores during the period of December 8, 2013 through

the date of notice of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. Excluded fromthe Class

are any specific transactions that involved shipping, delivery, servicing, installation,

or a special order.” (Settlement at § 1.4.)1

The parties agree that the Class shall be provisionally certified and that, subject

to the Court’s approval, Blood Hurst & O’Reardon, LLP and Carpenter Law Group will

be appointed as Class Counsel and Plaintiff will be appointed as Class Representative. 

(Id. at §§ 1.6, 1.21, 2.1.)

The Settlement contemplates that all Settlement Class Members, defined as all

members of the Class who have not properly and timely opted out, automatically

receive by email or U.S. Mail a voucher, good for six months from the date it is sent,

redeemable for either one free Gucci gift item retailed between $40.00 and $120.00,

2

or a 15% discount on a single full price merchandise purchase transaction of up to

$10,000. (Id. at §§ 1.25, 1.26, 1.29, 2.2, Exh. E.) The discount shall be limited to

$1,500. (Id. at § 1.29.1, Exh. E.) The vouchers will be redeemable at one of eight

Gucci stores, and are non-transferrable, except to a family member. (Id. at § 1.29.2,

Exh. E.) 

In the proposed Settlement, Defendant also agrees to a change in business

practices in which it will no longer request or record personal identification

The Settlement is attached to the parties’ joint notice of settlement (ECF No. 1

24) as Exhibit 1. All capitalized terms in this Order shall have the same meaning as set

forth in the Settlement. (See Settlement at § 1 (Definitions).)

The free gift item will be selected by Gucci and “limited based on availability 2

at any Eligible Voucher Redemption Store.” Each store will offer two gift options,

with one retailed at $100.00 or more. (Settlement, § 1.29.1, Exh. E.)

- 2 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 2 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

information in conjunction with credit card purchase transactions, in order to fully

comply with California Civil Code § 1747.08. (Id. at § 2.3.) In addition, Defendant

agreesto pay all notice and administration costs, attorney’s fees, and Plaintiff’s service

award, if approved by the Court. (Id. at §§ 2.4–2.6.) 

The proposed Settlement further requires an independent claims administrator

to provide notice of the proposed Settlement by e-mail or first class mail, providing,

among other things, a description of the terms of the Settlement, instructions for

submitting a claim, and directions to accessing the Settlement website. (Id. at § 3.2,

Ex. B.) The claims administrator will send mail notice to any Class Member whose

email notice is returned undeliverable and will perform a re-mail for any returned mail

notice. (Id. at §§ 3.2.1 & 3.2.2.) In addition to mail and email notice, the claims

administrator will establish a Settlement website on which the administrator will make

available the Full Class Notice, Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff’s complaint, the order

granting preliminary approval, memorandum in support of final approval and award of

attorney’s fees, as well as the final order, if approved. (Id at § 3.2.3.) The notice will

also contain a toll-free number, hosted by the claims administrator, where Class

Members can obtain additional information about the proposed Settlement. (Id. at §

3.2.4.) After the notice mailing date, Class Members will have ninety (90) days to

submit a written objection indicating that they wish to object to the Settlement. (Id. at

§ 3.5.) Class Members may also send by mail a written Request for Exclusion

indicating they wish to opt out of the class. (Id. at § 3.6, Exh. B.) 

Class Counsel will file a motion requesting an award of attorneys’ fees and

expenses up to $450,000.00. (ECF No. 21 at p. 6.) That motion will also request a

service payment to Plaintiff not to exceed $5,000.00. (Id.) Each of these amounts are

subject to the Court’s approval. 

Following final court approval of the proposed Settlement, Plaintiff and

Settlement Class Membersshall be deemed to have released and discharged Defendant

from any and all claims that were alleged in the complaint or claims that could have

- 3 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 3 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

been asserted arising out of facts alleged in the complaint that took place during the

class period. (Settlement at §§ 4.3 & 4.4.)

II. ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit maintains a “strong judicial policy” that favors the settlement

of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir.

1992). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) first “require[s] the district

court to determine whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and

reasonable.” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)). Where the

“partiesreach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts must peruse the

proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and the fairness

of the settlement.” Stanton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). In these

situations, settlement approval “requires a higher standard of fairness and a more

probing inquiry than may normally be required under Rule 23(e).” Dennis v. Kellogg

Co., 697 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Class Certification

Before granting preliminary approval of a class-action settlement, the Court must

first determine whether the proposed class can be certified. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (indicating that a district court must apply

“undiluted, even heightened, attention [to class certification] in the settlement context”

in order to protect absentees).

The class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by

and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.

682, 700-01 (1979)). In order to justify a departure from that rule, “a class

representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the

same injury’ as the class members.” Id. (citing E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.

Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)). In this regard, Rule 23 contains two sets of

- 4 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 4 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

class-certification requirements set forth in Rule 23(a) and (b). United Steel, Paper &

Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v.

ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2010). “A court may certify a class

if a plaintiff demonstratesthat all of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been met, and

that at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) have been met.” Otsuka v. Polo

Ralph Lauren Corp., 251 F.R.D. 439, 443 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 

“Rule 23(a) provides four prerequisites that must be satisfied for class

certification: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable; (2) questions of law or fact exist that are common to the class; (3) the

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of

the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class.” Otsuka, 251 F.R.D. at 443 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). “A

plaintiff must also establish that one or more of the grounds for maintaining the suit are

met under Rule 23(b), including: (1) that there is a risk of substantial prejudice from

separate actions; (2) that declaratory orinjunctive relief benefitting the class as a whole

would be appropriate; or (3) that common questions of law or fact predominate and the

class action is superior to other available methods of adjudication.” Id. (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(b)). 

The parties seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). (ECF No. 21 at p. 28.) 

In the context of a proposed settlement class, questions regarding the manageability of

the case for trial are not considered. See Wright v. Linkus Enters., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 468,

474 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 620 (1997)(“Confronted

with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire

whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the

proposal is that there be no trial.”)).

///

///

///

- 5 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 5 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Numerosity – Rule 23(a)(1) 

Rule 23(a)(1) requiresthat the class be “so numerousthat joinder of all members

is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “[C]ourts generally find that the

numerosity factor is satisfied if the class comprises 40 or more members and will find

that it has not been satisfied when the class comprises 21 or fewer.” Celano v. Marriott

Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 544, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

The proposedClass consists of approximately 16,000 credit card consumersfrom

whom “Gucci requested and recorded the personal identification information . . . at its

eight freestanding, full-priced California boutique stores during the Class period.”

(ECF No. 21-1 at p. 18; ECF No. 21-2 (“O’Reardon Decl.”) at ¶ 6.) Thus, the Court

finds joinder of all members is impracticable for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(1).

2. Commonality – Rule 23(a)(2) 

Under Rule 23(a)(2), the named plaintiff must demonstrate that there are

“questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 

“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have

suffered the same injury[.]’” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw.

v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). However, “[a]ll questions of fact and law need

not be common to satisfy this rule.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019. “The existence of

shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core

of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges Defendant, by implementing an InformationCapture

Policy, requested and recorded personal identification information from each Class

Member in conjunction with a credit card purchase at certain Gucci retail stores. (See

Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 14.) In addition to sharing this “common core of salient facts,” Class

Members also share a common legal issue: whether Defendant’s alleged recording of

this information violated the Song–Beverly Credit Card Act. Accordingly, the Court

finds Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied.

///

- 6 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 6 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Typicality – Rule 23(a)(3) 

To satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), the named plaintiff’s claims must be typical of the

claims of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement is

“permissive” and requires only that the named plaintiff’s claims “are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. “The test

of typicality ‘is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the

action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether

other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’” Hanon v.

Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schwartz v. Harp, 108

F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). “[C]lass certification should not be granted if ‘there

is a danger that absent class members will suffer if their representative is preoccupied

with defenses unique to it.’” Id. (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990)).

Like the other Class Members, Plaintiff’s claimis that her personal identification

information was requested and recorded by Defendant in conjunction with her credit

card purchase transaction at a California Gucci store. Thus, Plaintiff and the Class

Members assert the same violation of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, arising from

the same course of conduct. (ECF No. 21-1 at p. 19; Compl. at ¶¶ 6, 17.) Plaintiff and

Class Members also seek the same relief for this alleged wrongful conduct. (Id.;

Compl. at ¶ 32.) Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims of

the Class Members, satisfying Rule 23(a)(3).

4. Adequacy – Rule 23(a)(4) 

Rule 23(a)(4)requiresthat the representative plaintiff “will fairly and adequately

protect the interest of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “To satisfy constitutional

due process concerns, absent class members must be afforded adequate representation

before entry of a judgment which binds them.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020 (citing

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940)). “Resolution of two questions

determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any

- 7 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 7 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conflicts ofinterest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their

counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Id. (citing Lerwill v.

Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978)).

The Court has no reason to believe that Plaintiff and her counsel have any

conflict of interest with the Class Members and they appear to have vigorously

investigated and litigated this action. (See ECF No. 21-1 at p. 20; O’Reardon Decl. at

¶ ¶ 3-5, 7.) Thus, the interests of Plaintiff and the Class Members are aligned. 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel are qualified in class-action litigation, having handled

numerous class actionsfocused on consumer protection,including several class actions

involving claims under the Song–Beverly Credit Card Act. (O’Reardon Decl. at ¶ 2,

Exh.. A; ECF No. 21-4 (“Carpenter Decl.”) at ¶¶ 2-5.) Therefore, the Court finds

Plaintiff and her counsel adequately represent the Class Members, satisfying Rule

23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement.

5. Predominance – Rule 23(b)(3)

 “The predominance inquiry focuses on ‘the relationship between the common

and individual issues’ and ‘tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to

warrant adjudication by representation.’” Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

571 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2009).

Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements

were added to cover cases in which a class action would

achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote

. . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,

without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about

other undesirable results. Accordingly, a central concern of

the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance test is whether adjudication

of common issues will help achieve judicial economy.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, a common issue predominates over any individual issue—specifically,

whether Defendant’s alleged policy ofrequesting and recording personal identification

information from consumers in conjunction with credit card purchase transactions

during the class period violates the Song–Beverly Credit Card Act. (Compl. at ¶¶ 2,

14.) Plaintiff states that this issue can be proven with the same class-wide evidence. 

- 8 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 8 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(ECF No. 21-1 at p. 21.) Because resolution of the issue can arguably be resolved for

all Class Members in a single adjudication, the Court finds the proposed Class is

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication byrepresentation, and thatRule 23(b)(3)’s

predominance requirement is satisfied.

6. Superiority – Rule 23(b)(3) 

“Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that a class action is‘superiorto other available

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’” Otsuka, 251 F.R.D.

at 448 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). “Where classwide litigation of common issues

will reduce litigation costs and promote greater efficiency, a class action may be

superior to other methods of litigation,” and it is superior “if no realistic alternative

exists.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1996). The

following factors are pertinent to this analysis:

(A) the class members’ interest in individually controlling

the prosecution or defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the

controversy already begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

As the parties point out, the alternative to a class action would be to have the

individual Class Members, which amount to approximately 16,000 individuals, file

separate lawsuits. Requiring Class Members to pursue individual actions would

potentially produce lawsuits numbering in the ten of thousands. That would be both

impractical and inefficient. Such individual litigation would consume judicial

resources, impose additional burdens and expenses on the litigants, and present a risk

of inconsistent rulings. In addition, “the potential monetary relief for each Class

Member . . . could be assmall as $0.01 even if liability is proven,” which means a Class

Member may not have an interest in bringing an individual action. (ECF No. 21 at p.

30.) Therefore, the Court finds Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement is also

- 9 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 9 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

satisfied.

For the foregoing reasons, with respectto the Class, the Court provisionally finds

the prerequisites for a class action under Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure have been met.

B. Preliminary Fairness Determination

Having certified the class, the court must next make a preliminary determination

of whether the class-action settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” pursuant to

Rule 23(e)(2). “It is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual

component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at

1026. A court may not “delete, modify or substitute certain provisions” of the

settlement; rather, “[t]he settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.” Id.

“[S]ettlement approval that takes placeprior to formal class certification requires

a higher standard of fairness.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. Consequently, a district

court “must be particularly vigilant not only for explicit collusion, but also for more

subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that

of certain class members to infect the negotiations.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.

Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). Other relevant factors to this

determination include, among others, “the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk,

expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining

class-action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of

discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of

counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class

members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026; see also Churchill

Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004).

Preliminary approval of a settlement and notice to the proposed class is

appropriate if “the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed,

non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant

preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within

- 10 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 10 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the range of possible approval.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d

1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the parties’ proposed Settlement agreement complies with all of these

requirements. The Court will address the relevant factors in further detail below.

1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case and Risk of Further Litigation

“[T]he very essence of a settlement is compromise, ‘a yielding of absolutes and

an abandoning of highest hopes.’” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the

City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982). As explained by the

Supreme Court, “[n]aturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise;

in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up

something they might have won had they proceeded with litigation.” United States v.

Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).

Here, presumably recognizing the merits of each side’s case, the parties agree

that Plaintiff and other Class Members would face substantial hurdles prior to

certification and trial. (ECF No. 21-1 at p. 9.) Defendant argues it has “several strong

defenses” that could make it difficult for Plaintiff and the Class to receive any damages

or relief, including “a company policy not to request customer information at the pointof-sale, and to make clear to customers that they are not required to share their

information.” (Id. at p. 10.) Furthermore, although the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act

subjects Defendant to a civil penalty of $250.00 for the first violation and up to $1,000

for each subsequent violation, the penalty award is discretionary and could be as little

as one cent. See Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 51 Cal. 4th 524, 536 (2011);

Cal. Civ. Code § 1747.08(e). Therefore, Defendant argues any civil penalty awarded

would be extremely small. (ECF No. 21-1 at p. 10.) 

The parties also recognize that further litigation would be “expensive, complex,

and time consuming” and that settlement provides the benefits of litigation to all Class

Members “without the risk and delays of continued litigation, trial, and appeal.” (ECF

No. 21 at pp. 10-11.) The parties anticipate that continued litigation of this matter

- 11 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 11 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

would include motions for summary judgment and trial. (Id. at p. 11.) Absent

settlement, the parties anticipate that they would be engaged in litigation for “at least

a year or two before Plaintiff or the Class would see any recovery.” (Id.)

The Court agrees with the parties that the proposed Settlement eliminates the

litigation risks and ensures that the Class Membersreceive some compensation for their

claims. Therefore, on balance, the strength of Plaintiff’s case and risk of further

litigation favor approving the proposed Settlement. See Morey v. Louis Vuitton North

America, Inc., No. 12-cv-02359, 2014 WL 109194, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014)

(Hayes, J.) (approving class-action settlement in an action brought under the SongBeverly Credit Card Act).

2. Amount of the Proposed Settlement

According to the parties, the Settlement provides automatic receipt of a voucher

by all Class Members, which may also be transferred to family members, providing

them with either free merchandise valued between $40.00 and $120.00, or a discount

up to $1,500 on a purchase up to $10,000. (ECF No. 21-1 at p. 12.) 

As previously noted, under the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, a plaintiff may

bring a civil penalty action to collect fees not exceeding $250 for the first violation or

$1,000 for each subsequent violation. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1747.08(e). While the

proposed Settlement provides merchandise valued much lower than the maximum

recovery, “‘[t]he fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the

potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is

grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.” Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151

F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998). Given the risk that recovery could be as little as

$0.01, the Court finds that the amount of the proposed monetary benefits to the Class

Membersisfair and reasonable. See Morey, 2014 WL at *6-7 (approving a class action

settlement in an action brought under the Song-BeverlyCredit Card Act in which Class

Membersreceivedmerchandise certificatesin the amount of $41.00). Therefore, under

the circumstances, the Court concludes that the amount offered in the Settlement

- 12 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 12 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

weighs in favor of approval. 

3. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of the Proceedings

Prior to negotiation and mediation, the parties requested and exchanged

discovery, including Defendant taking the deposition of Plaintiff and giving Plaintiff

and Class Counsel confidential information related to its policies and practices. 

(O’Reardon Decl. at ¶ 4; Settlement at § C; ECF No. 21-1 at pp. 3-4.) The proposed

Settlement was the result of “serious, informed, and non-collusive arm’s-length

negotiations” and mediation efforts overseen by retired United States Magistrate Judge

Edward Infante, who conducted a full-day mediation session on June 23, 2015. (ECF

No. 21-1 at pp. 4, 12; Id.at § D; O’Reardon Decl. at ¶ 7.) All terms of the Settlement

were “heavily negotiated” and numerous drafts of the Settlement were prepared before

formally memorializing the proposed Settlement for this Court’s approval. (ECF No.

21-1 at pp. 4, 12-13.) Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that this factor favors

approval.

4. Experience and Views of Counsel

The declarations that Class Counsel provide highlight their experience in class

actions, including being appointed as lead or co-lead class counsel in numerous

certified class actions in state and federal courts. (O’Reardon Decl. at ¶¶ 1-2, Exh. A;

Carpenter Decl. at ¶¶ 1-3.) Class Counsel also state that they had a “clear view of the

strengths and weaknesses of their case and were in a strong position to make an

informed decision regarding the reasonableness of a potential settlement.” (ECF No.

21-1 at p. 13.) Class counsel further declares that, at all times, the settlement

negotiations were adversarial, non-collusive, and conducted at arm’s-length. (Id. at pp.

12-13.) 

“The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of

reasonableness.” Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 

Accordingly, giving the appropriate weight to class counsel’s recommendation, the

Court concludes that this factor also weighs in favor of approval. See id.

- 13 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 13 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5. Reaction of the Class to the Settlement

The proposed Settlement agreement requirestwo methods of notifying the Class

Members. The proposed Settlement Agreement requires the claims administrator to

directly mail class members a summary version of the class notice to their respective

last-known addresses, or email a different summary notice to their last-known email

addresses, depending on which address Gucci has on file for each Class Member. 

(Settlement at § 3.2.) Moreover, the claims administrator will establish a Settlement

website on which the full class notice, complaint, Settlement Agreement, and other

relevant documents will be made available. (Id. at § 3.2.3.) Both forms of summary

notice provide this website address. (Id. at § 3.2.) 

Each method of notifying the Class of the Settlement provides directions to

where Class Members can learn about the proceduresregarding opting out or objecting

to the Settlement. (Id. at Exhs. B-D.) Consequently, Class Members will have an

opportunity to object or opt out of the Settlement. Thus, at this time, this factor weighs

in favor of approving the Settlement.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Settlement falls within the range of

reasonableness meriting possible final approval. The Court therefore preliminarily

approvesthe Settlement Agreement and the terms and conditions ofsettlement set forth

therein, subject to further consideration at the Final Approval Hearing.

C. Proposed Class Notice

Under Rule 23(c)(2)(B), “the court must direct to class members the best notice

that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members

who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 

The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily

understood language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the

definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues,

or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an

appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v)

that the court will exclude from the class any member who

requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for requesting

exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on

members under Rule 23(c)(3).

- 14 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 14 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)(2)(B). “[T]he mechanics of the notice process are left to the

discretion of the court subject only to the broad ‘reasonableness’ standards imposed by

due process.” Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 120 (8th Cir. 1975).

The proposed notices describe the litigation, the terms of the Settlement, and

each Class Members’ rights and options under the Settlement. (Settlement at Exhs. BD.) The claims administrator will mail the summary notices by first-class mail, postage

prepaid, to the last-known address of each Class Member, orsend the notice to the lastknown email address of each Class Member, for whom Defendants’ records contain

such information. Both forms of notice state the deadlines for opting out or objecting

to the Settlement, and direct the recipient to the Settlement website for further

information, including accessing the relevant documents. (Settlement at Exhs. C, D.) 

In addition, the proposed Settlement requiresthe claims administrator to operate a tollfree telephone number for Class Members to call for more information about the

Settlement. (Id. at § 3.2.4.)

Having reviewed the proposed class notices, the Court findsthat the methods and

contents of the notices comply with due process and Rule 23, are the best notice

practicable under the circumstances, and shall constitute due and sufficient notice to

all persons entitled thereto. Therefore, the Court approves, as to form and content, the

proposed notices to be provided to Settlement Class Members as set forth in Section

3.2 of the Settlement Agreement, which consist of the Email Notice, Full Class Notice,

and U.S. Mail Notice (collectively the “Class Notice”), which are attached collectively

as Exhibits B-D to the Settlement Agreement.

///

///

///

///

///

///

- 15 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 15 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the parties’ joint motion for

preliminary approval of the class action Settlement. Accordingly, the Court hereby

ORDERS the following:

(1) Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court

hereby conditionally certifiesthe following Class for settlement purposes

only: “All persons from whom Gucci requested and recorded personal

identification information in conjunction with a credit card transaction in

any of Gucci’s eight (8) freestanding, full-priced California boutique

stores during the period of December 8, 2013 through the Preliminary

Approval Order date. Excluded from the Class are any specific

transactions that involved shipping, delivery, servicing, installation, or a

special order.”

(2) The Court hereby appoints the Plaintiff in the Action as Class

Representative of the Class.

(3) The Court hereby appoints Thomas J. O’Reardon II, of Blood Hurst &

O’Reardon, LLP, and Todd D. Carpenter, of Carpenter Law Group as

Class Counsel to represent the Class.

(4) The Court hereby preliminarily approves the Settlement Agreement and

the terms and conditions of Settlement set forth therein, subject to further

consideration at the Final Approval Hearing.

(5) The Court will hold a “Final Approval Hearing” on August 22, 2016, at

10:30 a.m., in the Courtroom of the Honorable Cynthia Bashant, United

States District Court for the Southern District of California, Courtroom

4B (4th Floor - Schwartz), 221 West Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101,

for the following purposes:

(a) finally determining whether the Class meets all applicable

requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

- 16 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 16 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and thus, the claims of the Class should be certified for purposes of

effectuating the Settlement; determining whether the proposed

Settlement of the Action on the terms and conditions provided for

in the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate and

should be approved by the Court;

(b) considering the motion of Class Counsel for an award of Plaintiffs’

Counsel’s fees and costs;

(c) considering the motion of the Plaintiff for a service award, if any;

(d) considering whether the Court should enter the [Proposed] Final

Judgment and Order Approving Settlement;

(e) considering whether the releases by the Class Members asset forth

in the Settlement Agreement should be provided; and

(f) ruling upon such other matters as the Court may deem just and

appropriate.

(6) The Court may adjourn the Final Approval Hearing and later reconvene

such hearing without further notice to the Class Members.

(7) Any motion in support of the Settlement and any motion for an award of

Plaintiff’s Counsel’s fees and costs and/or Plaintiff’s service award, if

any, must be filed with the Court no later than June 1, 2016. Any

opposition must be filed no later than 14 days after the motion is filed,

and any reply must be filed no later than 28 days after the motion is filed.

(8) The Court approves the parties’ agreement to allow Gucci to designate a

nationally recognized claims administration company Gucci prior to the

Settlement Notice Date to serve as the Court-appointed Claims

Administrator for the Settlement. 

(9) The Claims Administrator shall carry out all duties set forth in the

Settlement Agreement in the manner provided in the Settlement

Agreement.

- 17 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 17 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(10) The costs of the Class Notice, processing of Vouchers, creating and

maintaining the Settlement Website, and all other Class Notice and Claim

Administration expenses shall be paid by Defendant in accordance with

the applicable provisions of the Settlement Agreement.

(11) All Settlement Class Members shall be bound by all determinations and

judgments in the Action concerning the Settlement, whether favorable or

unfavorable to the Settlement Class.

(12) TheCourt approvesthe Parties’ proposed formofthe Settlement Voucher.

Unless otherwise provided in the Settlement Agreement as it relates to

Settlement Class Members as described in Section 2.2 of the Settlement

Agreement, all Settlement Class Members will automatically receive

either by email or U.S. Mail a Voucher to be used at any Eligible Voucher

Redemption Store in accordance with the instructions contained therein.

(13) Any Settlement Class Member may enter an appearance in the Action, at

his or her own expense, individually or through counsel. All Settlement

Class Members who do not enter an appearance will be represented by

Class Counsel.

(14) Any person falling within the definition of the Class may, upon his or her

request, be excluded from the Settlement Class. This is also referred to

as “opting out” of the Settlement Class. Any person wishing to be

excluded from (opt out from) the Settlement Class must submit a written

“Request for Exclusion” to the Claims Administrator postmarked or

delivered no later than no later than ninety (90) calendar days after the

date of notice of entry of this Order (the “Exclusion Deadline”). The

Request for Exclusion must include: (a) the person’s name; (b) the

person’s address; (c) the person’s telephone number; (d) the person’s

signature; (e) a statement that the person is a Class Member and that he

or she wishes to be excluded from the Settlement Class; and (f) the case

- 18 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 18 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

name and number: Jessica Manner v. Gucci America, Inc., Case No.

3:15-cv-00045 (S.D. Cal.). Requests for Exclusion purportedly filed on

behalf of groups of persons are prohibited and will be deemed to be void. 

A Request for Exclusion must be written, and may not be asked for

telephonically or by email.

(15) Any Class Member who does not send a completed, signed Request for

Exclusion with the information listed in Paragraph 14 above to the Claims

Administrator postmarked or delivered on or before the Exclusion

Deadline will be deemed to be a Settlement Class Member for all

purposes and will be bound by all further orders of the Court in this

Action and by the terms of the Settlement, if finally approved by the

Court. All persons who submit valid and timely Requests for Exclusion

in the manner set forth in this Paragraph and Paragraph 14 above shall

have no rights under the Settlement and shall not be bound by the

Settlement Agreement or the Judgment and Final Approval Order

approving the Settlement.

(16) No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after the Exclusion Deadline, the

Claims Administrator shall cause to be filed with the Court a list

reflecting all Requests for Exclusions.

(17) Any Settlement Class Member who desires to object either to the

Settlement, the award of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s fees and costs, or Plaintiff’s

service award, if any, must timely file with the Clerk of this Court and

timely serve on the Parties’ counsel identified below by hand or first-class

mail a notice of the objection(s) and proof of membership in the

Settlement Class and the grounds for such objections, together with all

papersthat the Settlement Class Member desiresto submit to the Court no

later than the deadline as set forth in the Class Notice, which is ninety

(90) calendar days after the date of notice of entry of this Order (the

- 19 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 19 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Objection Deadline”). Settlement Class Members may not both object

and request exclusion (opt out). If a Settlement Class Member submits

both a Request for Exclusion and an objection, the Request for Exclusion

will be controlling. To be considered by the Court, the objection must

also contain all of the information listed in Paragraph 18 below. The

Court will consider such objection(s) and papers only if such papers are

received on or before the Objection Deadline, by the Clerk of the Court

and by Class Counsel and Defendant’s counsel. Such papers must be sent

to each of the following persons:

Clerk of the Court

United States District Court, 

Southern District of California

333 West Broadway, Suite 420

San Diego, CA 92101

Thomas J. O’Reardon II

toreardon@bholaw.com

BLOOD HURST & O’REARDON, LLP

701 B Street, Suite 1700

San Diego, CA 92101

Telephone: (619) 338-1100

Stephanie A. Sheridan

Stephanie.sheridan@sedgwicklaw.com

SEDGWICK LLP

333 Bush Street, 30th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94104

Telephone: (415) 627-1410

(18) All objections must include: (a) a heading which refers to the Litigation,

Jessica Manner v. Gucci America, Inc., Case No. 3:15-cv-00045 (S.D.

Cal.); (b) the objector’s full name, telephone number, and address (the

objector’s actual residential address must be included); (c) if represented

by counsel, the full name, telephone number, and address of all counsel;

(d) all of the reasons for his or her objection; (e) whether the objector

intends to appear at the Final Approval Hearing on his or her own behalf

or through counsel; (f) a statement that the objector is a Class Member;

and (7) the objector’s dated, handwritten signature (an electronic signature

- 20 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 20 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

or attorney’s signature are not sufficient). Any documents supporting the

objection must also be attached to the objection. If any testimony is to be

given in support of the objection, the names of all persons who will testify

must be set forth in the objection.

(19) All objections must be filed with the Clerk and served on the Parties’

counsel no later than the Objection Deadline. Objections that do not

contain all required information, or are received after the Objection

Deadline, will not be considered at the Final Approval Hearing. 

(20) Attendance at the Final Approval Hearing is not necessary; however, any

Class Member wishing to be heard orally with respect to approval of the

Settlement, the motion for an award of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s fees and

costs, or the motion for Plaintiff’s service award, if any, is required to

provide written notice of his or her intention to appear at the Final

Approval Hearing no later than the Objection Deadline by filing a “Notice

of Intention to Appear”. The Notice of Intention to Appear must include

the Class Member’s name, address, telephone number, and signature and

must be filed and served as described in Paragraph 17 of this Order. Class

Members who do not oppose the Settlement, the motion for an award of

Plaintiff’s Counsel’s fees and costs, or the motion for Plaintiff’s service

award, if any, need not take any action to indicate their approval. A

person’s failure to submit a written objection in accordance with the

Objection Deadline and the procedure set forth in the Class Notice waives

any right the person may have to object to the Settlement, the award of

Plaintiff’s Counsel’s fees and costs, or Plaintiff’s service award, if any, or

to appeal or seek other review of the final Judgment and Final Approval

Order approving the Settlement.

///

///

- 21 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 21 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(21) The parties are ordered to carry out the Settlement Agreement in the

manner provided in the Settlement Agreement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 16, 2016

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

- 22 - 15cv00045

Case 3:15-cv-00045-BAS-WVG Document 27 Filed 03/16/16 Page 22 of 22