Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_05-cv-00256/USCOURTS-ared-3_05-cv-00256-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question-Marine Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JONESBORO DIVISION

DANNY VANOVEN, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

vs. * 3:05CV00256 SWW

*

WESTERN RIVERS BOAT MGMT., INC., *

*

Defendants. *

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Plaintiff Danny Vanoven brought this action against defendant Western Rivers Boat

Management, Inc. for negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness. The matter was tried

to a jury on April 23-27, 2007, in Jonesboro, Arkansas. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and

awarded him compensatory damages in the amount of $900,000.00. The matter is now before the

Court on defendant’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, and motion for judgment

as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds the

motions should be denied. 

Motion for New Trial

“A motion for a new trial may be ‘bottomed on the claim that the verdict is against the

weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not

fair to the party moving; and may raise questions of law arising out of alleged substantial errors in

admission or rejection of evidence or instructions to the jury.’” Children’s Broadcasting Corp. v.

Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008, 1017 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan,

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311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). In deciding defendant’s motion for a new trial, the Court must find “that

prejudice or error has crept into the record, that the verdict is against the clear weight of the

evidence, or that substantial justice has not been done.” Greenwood v. Dittmer, 596 F. Supp. 235,

239 (W.D.Ark. 1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985). 

Defendant argues it suffered prejudice because plaintiff did not provide it with a computation

of his damages prior to trial and because the Court allowed a witness to testify in contravention of

the Court’s order granting defendant’s motion in limine. Defendant asserts these errors deprived

it of a fair trial.

1. Computation of Damages 

According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(C), 

a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties:

. . . .

(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,

making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other

evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such

computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries

suffered; . . .

Defendant states plaintiff never supplied it with any disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1), much

less a computation of damages. Defendant says it sought by way of interrogatories to ascertain the

computation of damages but plaintiff did not provide such computation prior to trial. On April 24,

the second day of trial, defendant’s attorney asked plaintiff on cross-examination to tell the jury the

amount of damages he would ask them to award. Plaintiff responded that he did not know what

amount he was asking the jury to award for future lost wages or pain and suffering. He said he was

leaving those numbers up to his lawyers. Tr. vol. 2 at 258.

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Although the 2-page compilation was not signed by plaintiff, defendant’s counsel agreed to accept

it as a sworn answer.

2

The figures appear to show future lost earnings at $8 per hour to age 67 to be $395,523.00, and at

$10 per hour to age 67 to be $342,563.00.

3

On April 25, after plaintiff rested, defendant moved for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

50(a). The Court asked defendant to postpone making his motions but would consider them having

been made at the close of plaintiff’s case in chief. Tr. vol. 3 at 450-3. Later that day, after

defendant’s last witness of the day concluded his testimony, the Court heard defendant’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 560. Defendant moved the Court to dismiss the case because

plaintiff did not testify as to any amount of damages. Defendant argued plaintiff’s failure to

supplement his interrogatory answers of record effectively meant he was seeking zero dollars in

damages. Id at 571. The Court denied the motion at that time, but reserved defendant’s right to

renew its motion after the close of all the evidence. The Court further directed plaintiff’s counsel

to produce a computation of damages which plaintiff would ask the jury to award, stating defendant

is “entitled to know what to anticipate.” Id. at 571-2.

On the morning of April 26, the fourth day of trial, plaintiff’s counsel produced a handwritten set of numbers to defendant’s counsel. The figures, which defendant complained did not

conform to the federal rules,1

 showed that plaintiff would seek a maximum of $342,563.00 for future

lost earnings2 and between $318,840.00 and $585,560.00 for past and future pain and suffering. See

Ex. A, Def’s. Mot. New Trial. After the lunch break, however, and, according to defendant, after

unsuccessful settlement negotiations, plaintiff’s counsel provided defendant’s counsel with a new

set of damage figures, which totaled $1,659,773.00, over $500,000.00 more than the first set of

figures. Plaintiff’s counsel explained that the first set of numbers contained a miscalculation of

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days, but defendant claims plaintiff’s counsel used a different multiplier rate. Tr. vol. 4 at 694-

6;700-01. Defendant asked the Court for permission to use both sets of figures as sworn answers

to interrogatories. The Court ruled, however, that defendant could use only the second set. Id. at

700. Later that day, at the close of all the evidence, defendant renewed its motion for judgment as

a matter of law. The Court denied the motion. Id. at 715.

During closing argument, plaintiff’s counsel asked the jury to award plaintiff damages for

loss of future earning capacity using either the defendant’s or the plaintiff’s expert witness’s figures.

Tr. vol. 5 at 796-7. Dr. Talbert, the witness for plaintiff, testified his highest calculation totaled

$395,523.00. Tr. vol. 4 at 431. According to defendant, plaintiff’s counsel then asked the jury to

award $1,264,250.00 as damages for past and future pain and suffering. Tr. vol. 5, 797-800. In

total, plaintiff asked for damages of over $1.6 million.

Defendant argues it was deprived of the opportunity to full cross-examine plaintiff because

even he did not know what numbers would be submitted to the jury. Further, defendant asserts it

was denied an opportunity to take discovery to dispute the validity of the computations and could

not adequately prepare for trial or develop a strategy which might have resolved the case prior to

trial.

Defendant filed a motion in limine asking the Court to preclude plaintiff from offering or

presenting to the jury a “unit of time” or per diem argument. After the testimony at trial had

concluded, the Court ruled in defendant’s favor and ordered plaintiff’s counsel not to make any per

diem argument to the jury. Tr. vol. 4 at 751-2. Defendant was not unaware of the range of amounts

of damages plaintiff was seeking. The parties engaged in at least two settlement negotiation

sessions. Plaintiff refers to a mediation session on March 1, 2007, during which he says he provided

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defendant with a method of computing plaintiff’s damages, yielding a $2.4 million award. Tr. vol.

3 at 573. Defendant states in its Pretrial Disclosure dated March 29, 2007, that plaintiff would not

agree to settle for less than a seven-figure amount. See docket entry 57. Also, according to

defendant, the parties discussed settlement during the course of the trial. 

The Court finds defendant’s claim of prejudice unpersuasive. Counsel for defendant knew

before trial that plaintiff might make a per diem argument and successfully prevented his counsel

from doing so. There is nothing in the record to indicate defendant was not aware of the range of

damage amounts plaintiff was seeking or that plaintiff withheld any prepared computations from

defendant. While the Court prevented plaintiff’s counsel from presenting to the jury a “unit of time”

or per diem argument, it was clear that this was the method plaintiff’s counsel employed in coming

up with his figures. 

2. Testimony of Jerry Ancell

On March 20, 2007, the Court granted defendant’s motion in limine, pursuant to an

agreement between the parties, to preclude plaintiff from presenting any evidence at trial

“concerning any wrongdoing on the part of Western Rivers . . . including, but not limited to, any

evidence that concerns wrongdoing on the part of Western Rivers, paints Western Rivers in a ‘bad

light,’ or criticizes Western Rivers in any respect whatsoever.” Docket entry 56. The Court reserved

the right to revisit the ruling “should circumstances associated with the trial of this matter so

warrant.” Id.

Plaintiff called Jerry Ancell as a witness and finished his direct examination of Ancell on the

evening of the second day of trial. Ancell testified about the condition of the engine room where

plaintiff claims he was injured, and opined that it was not a reasonably safe place to work. Tr. vol.

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2 at 349. The next morning, defendant cross-examined Ancell as to any bias he might have. Ancell

admitted he had dinner with plaintiff and his attorneys the night before, stated he had driven 3 1/2

to 4 hours to come to court to testify, and that plaintiff paid Ancell’s wages for the day he came to

testify. Tr. vol. 3 at 375, 380. After cross-examination, plaintiff’s counsel asked Ancell why he was

willing to come and testify at the trial. Ancell answered: “Mr. Thackston, I got my girlfriend

pregnant when I was 16 years old, joined the Marine Corps, been making my living with my back

my whole life, and I am an old hillbilly. And I have seen companies like Western Rivers take

advantage of hard-working people, and I felt it was time for somebody to show up and tell the truth.”

Id. at 400.

Upon hearing this response, defendant moved for a mistrial on the basis that plaintiff had

violated the Court’s order. The Court acknowledged the testimony violated the order but did not

strike the response or give a curative instruction, finding that Ancell’s response could be helpful to

defendant because “he obviously has something out for them.” Id. at 401. Defendant contends it

is entitled to a new trial because the Court committed prejudicial error in denying its motion for a

mistrial. 

The Court finds defendant was not denied a fair trial by allowing Ancell’s testimony and

declining to declare a mistrial. Defendant questioned Ancell about his motives in traveling to

Jonesboro and suggested he might be biased based on the fact that he was dining with plaintiff and

that plaintiff was reimbursing Ancell for the wages he lost by coming to testify. As the Court

observed in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial, Ancell’s response, which included some

totally unanticipated remarks, could easily be interpreted by the jury as showing his bias against

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defendant and, therefore, weigh on his credibility. The Court finds defendant fails to establish a

basis for a new trial. 

Motion for Judgment As a Matter of Law

The grant of judgment as a matter of law “is appropriate ‘only if the evidence points all one

way and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the non-moving party.’”

Hauser v. Kubalak, 929 F2d 1305, 1307 (8th Cir. 1991)(quoting Glass Design Imports, Inc. v. Import

Specialties, 867 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1989)(citation omitted)). The standard that must be met

is a rigorous one. The Court must

(1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, (2)

assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in favor of the prevailing

party, (3) assume as proved all facts that the prevailing party’s evidence tended to

prove, and (4) give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that

may reasonably be drawn from the facts proved.

Western American, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.Co., 915 F.2d 1181. 1183 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court

must then deny the motion “if reasonable persons could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from

the evidence.” Id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on his negligence claim under

the Jones Act. Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of causation.

 “In Jones Act cases the verdict must stand if ‘the proofs justify with reason, the conclusion

that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death. . . .’”

Alholm v. American S.S. Co., 144 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1998)(internal citation omitted). The

plaintiff’s burden in a Jones Act case has been described as “featherweight.” Cella, II v. United

States, 998 F.2d 418, 427 (7th Cir. 1993). “In a Jones Act case, a trial court can direct a jury verdict

against a plaintiff ‘only in those extremely rare instances where there is a zero probability either of

employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to the injury of an employee.’”

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Southard v. Indep. Towing Co., 453 F.2d 1115, 1118 (3rd Cir. 1971)(emphasis in original)(citation

omitted).

Plaintiff claims he was injured when he fell down from the starboard shaft alley platform and

stairs. He testified he fell sometime between January 29 and January 31, 2005, and continued to

work as an oiler until the regular oiler, Ancell, returned to the boat on February 15, 2005. Tr. vol.

2 at 123-4. Thereafter, plaintiff worked aboard the vessel as a deckhand, performing heavy manual

labor. Id. at 226. Plaintiff testified that oil on the stairs caused him to fall, and the oil was not there

on his prior watch. Id. at 128-9. Plaintiff said he thought he had pulled a muscle when he fell. Id.

at 132-3. Plaintiff testified he filled out an accident report on February 11, 2005, because his pain

kept getting worse. Id. at 140. He said his leg was hurting, not his back. Id. at 227-8. When

plaintiff got off the vessel on February 22, id. at 226-7, he sought treatment. A nurse practitioner

prescribed muscle relaxants for his pain. When plaintiff went back to the doctor two weeks later,

he was referred for an MRI. The MRI revealed a herniated disk in his back. Tr. vol. 2 at 162-4.

Plaintiff underwent two surgeries because of the herniated disk 

Defendant argues plaintiff

may not have herniated his disk as a result of his fall, but instead may have herniated

his disk after he returned to the deck and was lifting ratchets, carrying wires, and

doing the heavy labor required of a deckhand. It is equally likely that the disk was

not herniated when [plaintiff] fell, but the disk subsequently ruptured while he

continued to work in the engine room as an oiler, which then caused the pain in his

leg to increase.

Def’s. Mem. in Supp. at 7 [docket entry 104]. Defendant also asserts plaintiff’s neurosurgeon did

not render any medical opinion that the slip and fall was related to plaintiff’s back injury. Defendant

points out Dr. Tonymon’s testimony that when a disk ruptures, a person experiences “a pretty

significant back pain, and some people identify that pain as different than their regular run-of-theCase 3:05-cv-00256-SWW Document 107 Filed 06/12/07 Page 8 of 10
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mill muscle and ligament pain.” Tr. vol. 2 at 278-9. Defendant argues that if plaintiff had herniated

his disk when he fell, he would have experienced a different type of pain and some significant back

pain, and he never complained of back pain.

In Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959), a seaman was thrown to the deck

during heavy seas. He brought suit under the Jones Act seeking damages, claiming that the fall

activated or aggravated a latent tubercular condition. None of the three medical witnesses who

testified said that the accident in fact caused the illness. One testified that the tuberculosis “might”

have been a consequence of his accident. Another said the accident and the plaintiff’s pre-existing

diabetic condition most likely aggravated the tuberculosis. The third said the accident “probably

aggravated” the plaintiff’s condition. Id. at 109. The jury found that the accident had legally caused

the injury. The court of appeals reversed. In reversing the court of appeals to preserve the jury

determination regarding medical causation, the Supreme Court noted: 

The jury's power to draw the inference that the aggravation of petitioner's tubercular

condition, evident so shortly after the accident, was in fact caused by that accident,

was not impaired by the failure of any medical witness to testify that it was in fact

the cause. Neither can it be impaired by the lack of medical unanimity as to the

respective likelihood of the potential causes of the aggravation, or by the fact that

other potential causes of the aggravation existed and were not conclusively negated

by the proofs. . . . The members of the jury, not the medical witnesses, were sworn

to make a legal determination of the question of causation. They were entitled to

take all the circumstances, including the medical testimony, into consideration.

Id. at 109-110. 

No one disputes that plaintiff fell while on the ship or that he suffered an injury, a herniated

disk. Defendant asks the Court to set aside the jury’s finding of negligence on the basis that plaintiff

could have herniated his disk sometime after his fall, when he continued to work in the engine room

as an oiler, or when he returned to work as a deckhand performing heavy labor. Defendant points

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out that plaintiff never complained about back pain until after he left the boat and had received

medical treatment.

As the Supreme Court said in Sentilles, it is not the function of a court to search the record

for conflicting circumstantial evidence which supports alternative theories of causation, but rather

the focal point of judicial review in such cases is the “reasonableness of the particular inference or

conclusion” drawn by the jury. 361 U.S. at 110 (internal quotation omitted). The Court finds the

jury’s conclusion that the fall caused plaintiff’s herniated disk was not an unreasonable one. The

evidence shows plaintiff experienced leg pain after his fall, and Dr. Tonymon testified that a

ruptured disk may get on a root nerve and cause leg pain. Tr. vol. 2 at 279. The Court, therefore,

finds that defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law should be denied.

Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion for new trial [docket entry 101] and the

motion for judgment as a matter of law [docket entry 103] are denied.

DATED this 12th day of June 2007.

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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