Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02370/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02370-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KENNETH WILLIAM VINES, JR.,

NO. CIV. S-05-2370 FCD PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

On February 5, 2008, defendant United States of America

(“defendant” or “the government”) filed a motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Plaintiff initially failed to file an opposition or

response in compliance with Local Rule 78-230(c). Subsequently,

after the court issued an Order to Show Cause and postponed the

hearing date on defendant’s motion, plaintiff Kenneth W. Vines

(“plaintiff” or “Vines”) filed an opposition and request for a

continuance to permit further discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). 

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (See Plaintiff’s Resp. to Def.’s Sep. Stmt. of

Undisp. Facts (“PUF”), filed Mar. 7, 2008). Where the facts are

disputed, the court recounts plaintiff’s version of the facts. 

(See Pl.’s Stmt. of Genuine Issues (“PDF”), filed Mar. 7, 2008).

2

For the reasons set forth below,1

 plaintiff’s motion to continue

the hearing on defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED.

BACKGROUND2

On October 26, 2005, plaintiff filed this medical

malpractice complaint in Shasta County Superior Court against

Thomas M. Keller, M.D. and the United States Department of

Veterans Affairs, alleging that on April 21, 1999, defendants

inserted an object into plaintiff’s back during a spinal injury

and negligently left the object there. (PUF ¶ 1). Plaintiff

claims the retained object has caused him injuries. (PUF ¶ 1). 

The United States of America substituted itself as the defendant

in place of its employee, Dr. Keller, and removed the case to

this court. (PUF ¶ 2). The government has defended this medical

malpractice lawsuit as an action under the Federal Tort Claims

Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80, and denies that it was negligent. 

(PUF ¶ 3).

On May 3, 2007, the court issued the operative Pretrial

Scheduling Order (“PSO”) in this case. (Pretrial Scheduling Order

[Docket #32], filed May 3, 2007). The PSO provides that all

discovery was to be completed by October 31, 2007, experts were

to be designated by November 14, 2007, and supplemental expert

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witness disclosures were to be filed by November 27, 2008. (Id.

at 2). The PSO provides that each designation or supplemental

designation shall be accompanied by a written report prepared and

signed by the witness. (Id.) The PSO further provides that

“[f]ailure of a party to comply with the disclosure schedule . .

. in all likelihood will preclude that party from calling the

expert witness at the time of trial.” (Id.) The deadline for

hearing dispositive motions was set for March 7, 2008. (Id. at

3). 

On November 14, 2007, both plaintiff and defendant filed

designations/disclosures of expert witnesses. 

(Designations/Disclosures [Docket #33-34], filed Nov. 14, 2007). 

Plaintiff’s disclosure identifies six non-retained expert

witnesses. (PUF ¶ 10). However, the disclosure did not include

any written reports, medical records, or other information, and

plaintiff has neither supplemented his witness disclosure nor

tendered any written reports or information. (PUF ¶ 11). 

Plaintiff failed to disclose any expert to establish the medical

standard of care applicable during the April 1999 surgery at

issue in this lawsuit or to establish how defendant deviated from

that standard of care. (PUF ¶ 13). Plaintiff also failed to

disclose any expert to establish that the object at issue is the

source of plaintiff’s complaints of pain. (Id.)

From December 2007 through January 2008, counsel for the

government and counsel for plaintiff exchanged communications

regarding the extension of discovery deadlines. (Ex. D-J to

Decl. Marc C. Barulich in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for S.J.

(“Barulich Decl.”), filed Mar. 7, 2008). The communications

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allude to the difficulty in scheduling the depositions of two of

defendant’s witnesses, plaintiff’s treating physicians in the

1999 surgery, because (1) Dr. Keller is no longer a federal

employee; and (2) Dr. Sipos is an active duty Air Force surgeon

currently stationed in Italy. (Id.) By letter dated January 4,

2008, the government represented that it would agree to the

extension of the deadline for expert discovery and all subsequent

dates, but would not agree to extend the initial or supplemental

disclosure dates. (Ex. F to Barulich Decl.). By letter dated

January 11, 2008, plaintiff’s counsel asserted that he did not

agree with the proposal by the government because, until he was

able to take depositions of defendant’s experts, he would not

have any evidence to present to an expert as a basis for an

opinion. (Ex. G to Barulich Decl.). Subsequently, by letter

dated January 15, 2008, the government again reiterated its

position that it would allow for an extension of expert discovery

cut-off, but would not agree to extension of the deadlines for

expert disclosure. (Ex. H to Barulich Decl.). At no time did

any party to this action file a stipulation regarding new

discovery deadlines or a motion to extend any of the deadlines

set forth in the PSO.

On February 5, 2008, the government filed a motion for

summary judgment based primarily upon plaintiff’s lack of expert

testimony on the issues of duty and causation. Plaintiff failed

to reply to this motion within the requisite time period as set

forth by the local rules. In response to an Order to Show Cause

issued by the court, plaintiff’s counsel and counsel’s assistant

filed declarations addressing the failure to timely file a

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response to defendant’s motion. Plaintiff’s counsel and

counsel’s assistant assert that from January 31 to February 25,

counsel’s assistant took a leave of absence due to a family

emergency and death. (Decl. of Janice Hess in Resp. to Order to

Show Cause (“Hess Decl.”), filed Feb. 29, 2008, ¶¶ 2-3). 

Plaintiff’s counsel also asserts that on February 24, 2008, two

days after the response to defendant’s motion for summary

judgment was required to be filed, he experienced chest and arm

pain while pheasant hunting at a private club. (Decl. of Marc C.

Barulich in Resp. to Order to Show Cause, filed Feb. 29, 2008, ¶

4). In compliance with the court’s Order to Show Cause,

plaintiff filed an opposition to defendant’s motion on March 7,

2008. In addition, plaintiff’s counsel filed a Rule 56(f)

declaration in support of plaintiff’s request for more time to

conduct discovery before the court adjudicates defendant’s

summary judgment motion. 

STANDARD

When a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot

present “facts essential to justify his opposition” to the

motion, Rule 56(f) permits the party to submit an affidavit

stating such reasons, and the court may continue or deny the

motion if the opposing party needs to discover essential facts. 

Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518

(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term

Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Specifically, Rule 56(f) provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party

opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons

stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify

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the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the

application for judgment or may order a continuance to

permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be

taken or discovery to be had or may make such other

order as is just.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(f). The burden is on the party seeking

additional discovery to demonstrate that the information sought

exists, and that it would prevent summary judgment. Nidds v.

Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 921 (9th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 369 (1997). The moving party must also

demonstrate that it diligently pursued previous discovery

opportunities. Qualls v. Blue Cross of California, 22 F.3d 839,

844 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has noted that “denial of

a Rule 56(f) application is generally disfavored where the party

opposing summary judgment makes (a) a timely application which

(b) specifically identifies (c) relevant information, (d) where

there is some basis for believing the information sought actually

exists.” Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784

F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff presents evidence, through the declaration of his

counsel, that he needs more time to conduct discovery, designate

experts, and conduct expert discovery. Specifically, plaintiff

asserts that he needs to obtain defendant’s pre-op radiological

records to determine whether the subject sponge was present prior

to the April 1999 surgery and take the depositions of Dr. Keller

and Dr. Sipos. (Barulich Decl. ¶ 16). Plaintiff’s counsel

asserts that if the subject sponge was present prior to the April

1999 surgery, the case will be dismissed. (Id.) Moreover,

plaintiff’s counsel asserts that he was not able to retain

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experts because he was not able to depose Dr. Keller and Dr.

Sipos. (Id. ¶ 23). Counsel asserts that without this deposition

testimony he was not able to give sufficient evidence to

potential expert witnesses to form a basis for expert opinion. 

(See id.; Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for S.J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), filed

Mar. 7, 2008, at 5). As such, plaintiff has met his burden of

demonstrating that specific additional discovery is needed (1) to

uncover critical and potentially dispositive information

regarding whether defendant caused the sponge to be lodged in

plaintiff’s spine; and (2) to retain and disclose necessary

expert witnesses on the issues of duty and causation. See

Garrett, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that

plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Rule 56(f) where

plaintiff’s declaration made clear that he sought personnel

records for the purpose of demonstrating that similarly situated

employees were being treated different on the basis of race). 

Plaintiff’s counsel contends that he “was clearly lulled

into believing” that the parties would have more time to conduct

discovery and that he would have more time to disclose

supplemental experts based upon the depositions of defendant’s

experts. His belief represents a clear misunderstanding of the

court’s scheduling order and the communications between the

government and himself. The PSO establishes that (1) fact

discovery closed prior to expert designations; (2) expert

disclosures and designations require written reports and were to

be filed prior to expert discovery; and (3) all expert discovery

was to be completed by January 4, 2008. Moreover, the

communications between the government and plaintiff’s counsel

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show that the government’s unwavering position was that defendant

was amenable to the extension of expert discovery and subsequent

dates, but did not agree to the extension of expert disclosures. 

When this became clear, plaintiff should have filed a motion to

modify the PSO to extend all dates, including expert designation

and disclosures. However, plaintiff did not do so. Instead,

plaintiff now accuses the government of bad faith litigation

tactics. (Barulich Decl. ¶ 24; Pl.’s Opp’n at 6). The court

does not take such accusations lightly and nor should plaintiff.

However, based upon the record of communications between

plaintiff’s counsel and the government from early December 2007

through January 2008, and based upon the representations of the

personal issues of plaintiff’s counsel and his assistant that

arose during February 2008, the court finds that plaintiff’s

counsel was sufficiently diligent in attempting to work out

discovery disputes with opposing counsel and in pursuing such

discovery to support a continuance of the pending motion for

summary judgment. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174

(9th Cir. 1007) (stating that counsel often agree to continuances

as a matter of courtesy and holding that it was an abuse of

discretion to deny plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) motion where plaintiff

timely noticed the deposition, defendant had requested it be

delayed on multiple occasions, and the deponent failed to appear

as scheduled). 

Therefore, because plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated

that additional discovery is essential to justify his opposition

to plaintiff’s motion and because plaintiff’s counsel was

sufficiently diligent in pursuing discovery in this matter, the

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3 The court’s PSO remains valid and in effect to the

extent it is not modified by this order. However, the dates set

forth in the May 3, 2007 PSO are vacated.

9

court continue’s defendant’s motion for summary judgment pending

further discovery in accordance with this order. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to continue

defendant’s motion for summary judgment pending further discovery

pursuant to Rule 56(f) is GRANTED. Additional discovery shall be

completed in conformance with the court’s May 3, 2007 PSO3 and as

set forth below:

(1) All discovery shall be completed by April 18, 2008. In this

context, “completed” means that all discovery shall have

been conducted so that all depositions have been taken and

any disputes relative to discovery shall have been resolved

by appropriate order if necessary and, where discovery has

been ordered, the order has been obeyed. All motions to

compel discovery must be noticed on the magistrate judge’s

calendar in accordance with the local rules of this court.

(2) Counsel are to designate in writing, file with the court,

and serve upon all other parties the name, address, and area

of expertise of each additional expert that they propose to

tender at trial not later than May 2, 2008. The designation

shall be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed

by the witness. The report shall comply with Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(a)(2)(B). By May 16, 2008, any party who previously

disclosed expert witnesses may submit a supplemental list of

expert witnesses who will express an opinion on a subject

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covered by an expert designated by an adverse party, if the

party supplementing an expert witness designation has not

previously retained an expert to testify on that subject.

The supplemental designation shall be accompanied by a

written report which shall also comply with the conditions

as stated above.

(3) Failure of a party to comply with the disclosure schedule as

set forth above in all likelihood will preclude that party

from calling the expert witness at the time of trial. An

expert witness not appearing on the designation will not be

permitted to testify unless the party offering the witness

demonstrates: (a) that the necessity for the witness could

not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the list

was proffered; (b) that the court and opposing counsel were

promptly notified upon discovery of the witness; and (c)

that the witness was promptly made available for deposition.

(4) For purposes of this order, an “expert” is any person who

may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702,

703, and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which include

both “percipient experts” (persons who, because of their

expertise, have rendered expert opinions in the normal

course of their work duties or observations pertinent to the

issues in the case) and “retained experts” (persons

specifically designated by a party to be a testifying expert

for the purposes of litigation). Each party shall identify

whether a disclosed expert is percipient, retained, or both.

It will be assumed that a party designating a retained

expert has acquired the express permission of the witness to

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be so listed. Parties designating percipient experts must

state in the designation who is responsible for arranging

the deposition of such persons.

(5) All experts designated are to be fully prepared at the time

of designation to render an informed opinion, and give their

bases for their opinion, so that they will be able to give

full and complete testimony at any deposition taken by the

opposing party. Experts will not be permitted to testify at

the trial as to any information gathered or evaluated, or

opinion formed, after deposition taken subsequent to

designation. 

(6) All expert discovery shall be completed by June 13, 2008.

(7) All dispositive motions, except motions for continuances,

temporary restraining orders or other emergency

applications, shall be heard no later than August 22, 2008.

(8) The Final Pretrial Conference is set for October 17, 2008 at

1:30.

(9) The trial is set for December 9, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 24, 2008.

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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