Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01236/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01236-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TED HORNSBY II, 

 Plaintiffs,

vs.

COUNTY OF TULARE, CALIFORNIA, JOSEPH 

ENGLAND, BRADLEY MCLEAN, JOSEPH 

CAMPOS, AND BILL WITTMAN IN HIS 

CAPACITY AS SHERIFF, COUNTY OF 

TULARE, CALIFORNIA,

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01236 EPG

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANTS 

ENGLAND, MCLEAN, AND CAMPOS 

BASED ON THE FOURTH 

AMENDMENT CLAIMS AND 

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AS TO DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF 

TULARE AND BILL WITTMAN IN 

HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF, 

COUNTY OF TULARE ON THE 

MONELL CLAIM

(ECF No. 27)

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants County of Tulare, Joseph England, Bradley McLean, Joseph Campos, and Bill 

Wittman in his capacity as Sheriff (―Defendants‖), have moved for summary judgment on all claims 

and defendants. (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff Ted A. Hornsby II (―Plaintiff‖) filed an opposition (ECF 

No. 28) and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 31). The Court heard argument on April 15, 2016 

(ECF No. 32). William Romaine appeared telephonically for Plaintiff and Judith Chapman appeared 

telephonically for Defendants. At the hearing, Plaintiff represented that he had neglected to file the 

exhibits he intended to attach to his opposition brief and the Court provided him leave to submit 

Case 1:14-cv-01236-EPG Document 40 Filed 05/16/16 Page 1 of 22
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those exhibits after the hearing. Defendants were also granted leave to file supplemental authorities 

in support of their motion and were provided an opportunity to respond to Plaintiff‘s late filed 

evidence. (ECF Nos. 33, 35, 38.) The matter is now before the Court.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court denies summary judgment regarding Plaintiff‘s 

Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants England, McClean, and Campos. Furthermore, 

construing the facts in favor of the Plaintiff, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on 

those claims. The Court holds, however, that Defendants Wittman and Tulare County are entitled to 

summary adjudication on Plaintiff‘s Monell claim. As a result, the Court grants in part and denies in 

part Defendants‘ Motion.1

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the underlying complaint based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 6, 2014. (ECF 

No. 1.) In it, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated during the search and 

seizure leading to his arrest that took place the evening of March 8, 2012 at 21205 Avenue 144, in an 

unicorporated area of the County of Tulare, State of California. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was a lawful occupant of that property. That evening, defendants 

Joseph England (―England‖) and Bradley McLean (―McLean‖), Tulare County Sheriff Deputies, 

drove onto the property without a search warrant. Defendants England and McLean handcuffed 

Plaintiff, searched his pockets without Plaintiff‘s consent, and placed Plaintiff in the patrol car. 

Defendants then searched Plaintiff‘s truck. These searches revealed what Defendants contend were

cannabis and methamphetamine. Defendants England and McLean then contacted Joseph Campos 

(―Campos‖), in his capacity as Sergeant, Tulare County Sheriff‘s Department, who came to the 

property. Defendants arrested Plaintiff and charged him with possession of cannabis and 

methamphetamine. They also seized a shotgun and Plaintiff‘s truck. 

 

1 The Court notes that Defendants previously filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21), but were later 

granted additional time to fully complete their briefing. (ECF No. 26.) At the time that extension was granted, 

Defendants represented that they intended the current Motion to supersede the originally-filed motion. The original 

motion will thus be denied as moot.

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The facts regarding the search are discussed in detail below, but it is worth noting at the 

outset that the initial search of the premises was requested by Plaintiff‘s sister, Teddie Mitchell, who 

called the sheriff‘s department to report potential criminal activity on the property and to ask the 

deputies to come search the property. The transcription of that call provides, in relevant part:

My name is Teddie Mitchell. I live at 21205 Avenue 144. And my 

brother has taken up residence in the barn and he‘s got a small party 

going back out there, and I see cars going in and out back out there, 

and I‘ve got an alarm on the house, and I‘ve got an ought-six my son 

left with me, but, you know, he‘s done drugs in the house. I don‘t 

know if he‘s cooking stuff or growing—he‘s had weed growing out 

there before, and, you know, you guys need to come in here and break 

this up.

(ECF No. 27-16, at p. 4.) Defendants thus argue that they had consent and/or probable cause for the 

search and arrest based on this information, as well as the seizure of drugs and weapon found on the 

property. 

According to Plaintiff‘s complaint, ―[t]he search and seizure as hereinabove alleged was 

unreasonable and therefore was done in violation and deprived Hornsby of rights secured to him by 

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as incorporated by the Amendment XIV of 

the United States Constitution to secure those rights to Hornsby inviolable by the State of 

California.‖ (ECF No. 1, at p. 8.) Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment arguing 

that based on the undisputed facts, the search was lawful. Alternatively, defendants argue that they 

were protected by qualified immunity.

Notably, two criminal cases against Plaintiff were filed and ultimately dismissed. In each 

criminal proceeding, the state courts suppressed evidence from the May 8, 2012 search.

III. PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF THE STATE’S SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE

Before turning to an independent assessment of the merits of the case, this Court must 

determine if it is bound by the prior state court rulings suppressing the evidence obtained from these 

searches in the two criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. It is undisputed that both courts in 

Plaintiff‘s criminal proceedings granted motions to suppress the evidence that resulted from the 

searches that night. (ECF No. 31-1, MF. 30 at 3-4, and MF. 37 at 5.) Plaintiff argues that the state 

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court decisions are binding on this Court as a matter of issue preclusion and establish as a matter of 

law that the searches violated the Fourth Amendment.

Federal courts follow state law to determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment. 

Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1982) 

(―Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that 

those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged‖). The 

California Supreme Court describes the contours of issue preclusion, also known as collateral 

estoppel, as follows:

Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided 

in prior proceedings. Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine only 

if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought 

to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a 

former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually 

litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been 

necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in 

the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the 

party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in 

privity with, the party to the former proceeding. The party asserting 

collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements. 

Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341 (1990) (internal citations omitted). 

A. Analysis of Privity

It is undisputed that the Defendants in this case were not parties to the criminal proceeding. 

They did not testify at that hearing and did not join in any of the papers filed by the government. 

Thus, the decision cannot have preclusive effect against them (assuming the other criteria are met) 

unless defendants are considered in privity with the state prosecutors. 

According to the California Supreme Court, ―[a]s applied to questions of preclusion, privity 

requires the sharing of  ̳an identity or community of interest,‘ with  ̳adequate representation‘ of that 

interest in the first suit, and circumstances such that the nonparty  ̳should reasonably have expected 

to be bound‘ by the first suit. A nonparty alleged to be in privity must have an interest so similar to 

the party's interest that the party acted as the nonparty's  ̳virtual representative‘ in the first action.‖ 

DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 826 (2015), reh'g denied (Aug. 12, 2015) (internal 

citations omitted).

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As an initial matter, neither party presents a case that squarely addresses the preclusive effect 

of a suppression order on a subsequent civil case against the officer. Instead, the parties largely base

their arguments on the equities involved. Plaintiff argues that application of the state court decision 

would preserve the integrity of the judicial process, promote judicial economy, and preclude relitigation. Defendants argue, in contrast, that issue preclusion would be inequitable because

suppression motions are brought by prosecutors, who do not face any personal liability, in expedited 

proceedings. Civil cases against officers, in contrast, involve personal liability for the officers and 

have substantially more extensive procedures to protect the officers‘ rights. Defendants contend that 

holding an officer individually liable without an opportunity to be heard whenever a suppression 

motion is granted would destabilize law enforcement and unfairly expose officers to liability without 

due process. 

The Court has independently found cases squarely addressing the point, although none are 

binding authority. For example, the issue was addressed in the case of Sanders v. City of 

Bakersfield, No. CIV-F04-5541 AWI TAG, 2005 WL 6267361, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005), on 

reconsideration in part, No. CIV-F-04-5541 AWI TAG, 2009 WL 734059 (E.D. Cal. March 7, 

2009). In that case, like in this one, plaintiffs sued officer defendants for, among other things, 

violating Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search of plaintiff‘s home 

without consent or exigent circumstances. In the civil case, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary 

judgment and argued that the defendant officers were precluded from claiming that the search of 

Plaintiff‘s home was lawful due to the state court‘s decision granting the motion to suppress

evidence from the search. Id. at *10. While noting in frustration that, ―[t]he case law suggests the 

jurisprudence on privity lacks theoretical coherence,‖ the Sanders court ultimately held that privity 

did not exist between the officers and the state prosecutors for purposes of issue preclusion:

[T]he court finds that the Police Defendants do not share a sufficient 

community of interest with the criminal prosecution. . . . While police do 

aspire to enforce the law, individual officers can not be said to have a personal 

stake in ensuring conviction. . . . The Defendants' financial interests were not 

represented in the criminal prosecution the same way the welfare department 

or state personnel board were. . . . [C]ases suggest that all governmental 

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entities are in privity with the state's criminal prosecution as they share the 

duty of providing rules, public order, and justice. However, as individual 

Police Defendants cannot be characterized as governmental bodies, there is no 

reason to apply privity on this basis. 

Id., at *12-13. The Court went on to review other courts‘ holdings on this issue:

Though there is no Ninth Circuit precedent that is binding, that court has not 

been completely silent on the issue. In an older Section 1983 suit against 

police officers, the Ninth Circuit determined that a plaintiff was not allowed to 

assert issue preclusion on the issues of consent to entry and probable cause to 

search though these issues had been adjudicated in favor of plaintiff when his 

criminal conviction was overturned on appeal: ―The defendants were city 

police officers not directly employed by the state; they had no measure of 

control whatsoever over the criminal proceeding and no direct individual 

personal interest in its outcome. In these circumstances there was no privity 

sufficient to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel.‖ Davis v. Eide, 439 

F.2d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir.1971). The case pre-dated the U.S. Supreme Court's 

declaration in Migra that federal courts must look to state law to determine 

preclusive effect. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Education, 465 

U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). With Eide, it is unclear 

whether the ruling was based on federal or California standards of issue 

preclusion. Nevertheless, the reasoning of Eide 's holding is in accord with 

California privity standards. Having independently reviewed the logic behind 

Eide, this court concludes that it remains good law.

While the issue of privity must be determined with reference to California 

law, when dealing with issue preclusion, ―it is often appropriate to look to the 

law as it is generally applied in other jurisdictions for additional guidance 

[unless] ... the state-law question is not a particularly difficult one.‖ Haring v. 

Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983). California 

law on privity is anything but clear cut. In looking at issue preclusion in other 

states, the majority of federal courts have come to the conclusion that privity 

does not exist between law enforcement officers and the criminal prosecution. 

See, e.g., Kinslow v. Ratzlaff, 158 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying 

Oklahoma law); Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1998) 

(applying Vermont law); Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1050–51 (7th 

Cir. 1995) (applying Illinois law); Smith v. Holtz, 30 F.Supp.2d 468, 477 

(M.D.Pa. 1998) (applying Pennsylvania law). The Eighth Circuit, in a case 

applying North Dakota law, has found privity to exist between police officers 

and the criminal prosecution. Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1369 (8th 

Cir. 1985) (―the deputies in this case can be properly considered in privity 

with the state in the prior adjudication and thus bound by the state court's 

determination that the arrest was illegal‖). However, the Eighth Circuit's 

decisions dealing with other states' laws have followed the majority view. See 

Turpin v. County of Rock, 262 F.3d 779, 782–83 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying 

Nebraska law, ―Collateral estoppel cannot be used against the officers in our 

case, as the officers were neither parties nor in privity with the State in the 

criminal action and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

issues in the criminal action.‖); Duncan v. Clements, 744 F.2d 48, 51 (8th Cir. 

1984) (applying Missouri law, ―collateral estoppel is not appropriate in this 

case because [police officer], the party against whom collateral estoppel is 

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asserted, was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the prior state 

criminal proceeding‖).

Id., at *13-14. 

Other courts in this jurisdiction have similarly held that there is no privity between state 

prosecutors and individual officers in the same context. Adams v. Nocon, No. CIV. S–07–02083 

FCD EFB, 2009 WL 799278, at *4 (E.D. Cal. March 23, 2009) (―the individual deputies were not 

parties to the criminal case and were not represented by counsel. In fact, two of the deputies, 

Deputies Davis and Seto, did not even testify at the criminal proceeding, and Deputies Bruegel and 

Nocon only participated as witnesses. For these reasons, the court cannot find that the deputies were 

 ̳in privity with a party at the first proceeding‘; nor can the court find that the deputies had a  ̳full and 

fair opportunity‘ to litigate the issue in the first proceeding‖) (internal citations omitted); Saunders v. 

Knight, No. CV F 04–5924 LJO WMW, 2007 WL 3482047, at *8–9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2007) 

(―Defendants exercised no measure of control over the criminal action and lacked a personal interest 

in it. Defendants did not appear as parties or witnesses in the criminal action. The criminal action's 

preliminary hearing rulings are not entitled to preclusive effect here.‖); Willis v. Mullins, No. CIV F

04-6542 AWI LJO, 2005 WL 3500771, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2005) (―While police do aspire 

to enforce the law, individual officers cannot be said to have a personal stake in ensuring 

conviction.‖).

Upon consideration, this Court follows these sister courts and holds that there is no privity 

between defendants and the state prosecutors for purposes of collateral estoppel. The defendants 

were not parties to the state prosecution, did not participate in litigating the issue, were not witnesses 

at the state proceedings, and did not have the same stake in the outcome. Under the circumstances, 

state prosecutors cannot be said to have adequately represented the defendant officers‘ interests in 

such a way that the officers should reasonably have expected to be bound by the results of the 

motion to suppress. The state prosecutors represented the state‘s criminal enforcement interests, and 

cannot be said to be virtual representatives of the officers. 

Therefore, the state ruling granting the motion to suppress does not have preclusive effect on 

this case.

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B. Further Analysis of State Court Suppression Decisions

That said, this Court looks to the state courts‘ reasoning in suppressing the evidence for 

guidance. Upon closer examination, such guidance is limited, however, because their decisions

relied on a rule uniquely applicable to suppression hearings that excluded from consideration 

evidence about the dispatch, in which Plaintiff‘s sister requested the search of the premises. 

Specifically, during the first state criminal proceeding, the state prosecutor argued that the state court 

could not consider the information relayed in the dispatch from Plaintiff‘s sister, which arguably 

provided consent to search the premises, based on the state court common law rule referred to as 

Harvey-Madden-Remers. The California Surpreme Court has recently described that rule as follows:

An officer may arrest or detain a suspect based on information 

received through official channels if a 911 call has sufficient indicia of 

reliability a dispatcher may alert other officers by radio, who may then 

rely on the report, even though they cannot vouch for it. However, 

upon proper objection the People must prove that the source of the 

information is something other than the imagination of the officer who 

does not become a witness. This requirement can be met by calling 

the police dispatcher as a witness at the suppression hearing or by 

introducing a recording of the 911 call. 

People v. Brown, 61 Cal. 4th 968, 983 (2015), reh'g denied (Sept. 30, 2015) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Because the prosecution failed to call the dispatcher or another witness to 

verify the information provided in the dispatch call to the police and it had not been directly received 

by the officers who conducted the search, the state court disregarded the dispatch in determining the 

legality of the search. The court explained its decision as follows:

So I am sustaining the Harvey objection, and the evidence relating to 

what was—what the dispatcher relayed to the officer is stricken. 

This information from the dispatch was certainly germane and would 

be germane to whether there was reasonable cause to believe that Mr. 

Hornsby possibly had a weapon. Without it, the information available 

to the officer, in other words, the evidence presented to the court, is 

that the officer had a cooperative person who was apparently about to 

put his hands in his pocket. The officer told him not to, and Mr. 

Hornsby complied. 

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The following pat down did not occur during a valid detention based 

upon the evidence presented. There is no evidence to believe that 

there was a possibility that Mr. Hornsby might have a weapon and 

might use it against the officer.

. . . 

So based on those reasonings, I will on the 14th grant the motion [to 

suppress].

(ECF No. 27-13, at pp. 3-4). 

In the second state court case, the motion to suppress omitted any information about the 

identity of the caller in the dispatch, and thus did not consider whether consent to search had been 

provided. (ECF No. 27-27, at p. 5). As a result, that state court also made the decision to suppress

the evidence without the benefit of the very relevant information that someone who purported to 

have lawful possession of the property gave consent for the police to search the premises, and 

relayed arguably reliable additional information about potential criminal activity. 

Based on the reasons for the state court decision, issue preclusion is inappropriate for the 

additional reason that the issue is not in fact the same as before this Court, i.e., whether considering 

all evidence, including the dispatch, the search violated Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights. That said, 

the Court notes for guidance purposes that, setting aside the issue of consent to search the premises, 

two judges found that the searches that followed were unlawful. 

IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND ARREST OF 

PLAINTIFF

The Court now turns to its independent assessment of whether Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on the ground that the undisputed facts preclude a finding that the search, 

seizure, and arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment protects ―[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .‖ U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 

―A Fourth Amendment  ̳search‘ occurs when the government infringes on a subjective expectation 

of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.‖ United States v. Pope, 686 F.3d 1078, 

1081 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., 

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concurring). It is undisputed in this case that the officers did not have a warrant. ―Because 

warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, the government bears the burden of 

showing that a warrantless search or seizure falls within an exception to the Fourth Amendment's

warrant requirement.‖ United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012).

A. Search of the Premises

The first search to which the Fourth Amendment attached was the search of the premises 

surrounding the home at 21205 Avenue 144. This area around the home falls into the category of 

―curtilage,‖ where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 

F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)

(―Because the curtilage is part of the home, searches and seizures in the curtilage without a warrant 

are also presumptively unreasonable.‖); United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2012) (―Warrantless trespasses by the government into the home or its curtilage are Fourth

Amendment searches.‖). 

The Court finds that this search of the premises around the home was lawful under the 

exception to the warrant requirement based on consent. ―A warrantless search conducted pursuant to 

a valid consent is  ̳constitutionally permissible.‘‖ Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 

S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The consent must be given by ―a person in control of the 

premises.‖ United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 622 (9th Cir.1990). 

Here, defendant officers had consent to search the premises. Teddie Mitchell, Plaintiff‘s 

sister, who lawfully resided at the property, had called the Sheriff‘s Department and asked them to 

conduct the search. (ECF No. 27-16, at p. 4.) Ms. Mitchell was a person in control of the premises. 

(ECF No. 31-1 at p. 12 (indicating that it is undisputed that ―The Trustee authorized Plaintiff‘s sister 

Teddie Mitchell to reside on the property and authorized her with control over the property and all 

structures on the property‖)). 

Thus, based on undisputed facts, defendants‘ search of the premises did not violate Plaintiff‘s 

Fourth Amendment rights. 

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B. Pat Down Search of Plaintiff

At some point during the search of the premises, Defendant McLean conducted a pat-down 

search of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 31-1, at p. 19.) In his motion for summary judgment, Defendant 

McLean argues that the pat-down search was permitted based on the exception for officer safety. 

A warrantless search for weapons is permitted so long as the officer has a reasonable basis 

for believing the Plaintiff is armed and dangerous. Thomas v. Dillard, No. 13-55889, 2016 WL 

1319765, at *5 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016) (―a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable 

suspicion that a suspect  ̳is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others‘‖); see Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (―there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable 

search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is 

dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to 

arrest the individual for a crime‖). 

Regarding the pat down search, Officer McLean has submitted a declaration explaining that 

he had a reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was armed and dangerous:

As we approached each other, the subject, later confirmed to be Mr. 

Hornsby, appeared to be reaching into his front pocket. I could 

observe that Mr. Hornsby had bulges in the front pockets, the contents 

of which, [sic] I could not identify. 

Out of concern for my safety, believing that Plaintiff may have a gun 

in reliance on the information that had been provided concerning Mr. 

Hornsby‘s access to guns, and drawing on my experience that it is not 

uncommon for gun owners to have multiple guns, combined with the 

possiblity that the subject was under the influence, I ordered Mr. 

Hornsby to stop so that I could perform a pat down search for 

weapons. Mr. Hornsby stopped and cooperated with the pat down.

(ECF No. 27-9, at p. 5.) It is undisputed that Ms. Mitchell, Plaintiff‘s sister who had made the call 

requesting the search, had indeed reported to the dispatcher that ―he‘s [Plaintiff] got a 410 and he‘s 

got my dad‘s shotgun now . . . .‖ (ECF No. 27-16, at p. 7.) 

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Given the undisputed information from Ms. Mitchell indicating that Plaintiff may be armed, 

and in light of defendant McLean‘s declaration, the Court finds that the pat down search by 

defendant McLean fell within the exception for warrantless searches for a frisk for weapons based 

on officer safety.

C. Search of Plaintiff’s Pocket

After the pat down search, defendant McClean proceeded to search Plaintiff‘s pockets, which 

led to the discovery of a bag of what appeared to be a controlled substance, i.e., kief. This 

warrantless search was subject to the Fourth Amendment because Plaintiff had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the contents of his pockets. See United States v. Pope, 686 F.3d 1078, 

1081 (9th Cir. 2012) (―The government concedes that Pope had a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in the contents of his pockets.‖). It is thus the government‘s burden to prove defendant McClean 

was acting under a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant requirement.

Defendant McLean jusifies the search of Plaintiff‘s pocket in his declaration as follows:

During the pat down, I felt multiple items in Mr. Hornsby‘s front 

pockets that I couldn‘t identify. Out of concern that one of the items 

may be a weapon, or an item that might be used as a weapon, and 

concern for my safety, I advised Mr. Hornsby that I was going to feel 

the inside of his pockets for weapons. Mr. Hornsby was cooperative. 

As I reached into Mr. Hornsby‘s pockets, I felt a small baggie that was 

tied in a knot with a tail. 

(ECF No. 27-9, at p. 5-6.) 

This search of Plaintiff‘s pockets following the pat-down search raises Fourth Amendment 

concerns. The dispatch call discussed the presence of a shotgun and a ―401,‖ which is a type of rifle. 

Neither of those weapons could have been in Plaintiff‘s pockets without Deputy McLean feeling

them quite clearly during his pat-down search. 

In considering this search of Plaintiff‘s pockets, this Court looks to the Ninth Circuit‘s 

direction regarding when a search for weapons is appropriate:

A frisk for weapons is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the 

person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong 

resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. As the Supreme 

Court recognized in fashioning the stop-and-frisk exception to 

probable cause, people have a strong interest in personal security, and 

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routine police intrusions breed resentment within communities they 

serve. Accordingly, Terry was careful to craft a standard for a frisk 

that was both protective of law enforcement officers who confront 

potentially dangerous individuals and consistent with the objective, 

fact-based approach traditionally required to justify invasions into 

areas protected by the Fourth Amendment. 

To establish reasonable suspicion a suspect is armed and dangerous, 

thereby justifying a frisk, the police officer must be able to point to 

specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. A mere 

inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch that a person is 

armed and dangerous does not establish reasonable suspicion, and 

circumstances suggesting only that a suspect would be dangerous if

armed are insufficient. There must be adequate reason to believe the 

suspect is armed. 

Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard, asking whether a 

reasonably prudent person would have been warranted in believing the 

suspect was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety 

while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. This inquiry 

requires consideration of all the facts and circumstances an officer 

confronts in the encounter; we consider the totality of the 

circumstances . . . 

In assessing the totality of the circumstances, relevant considerations 

may include: observing a visible bulge in a person's clothing that could 

indicate the presence of a weapon; seeing a weapon in an area the 

suspect controls, such as a car, ―sudden movements‖ suggesting a 

potential assault or ―attempts to reach for an object that was not 

immediately visible,‖ ―evasive and deceptive responses‖ to an officer's 

questions about what an individual was up to; unnatural hand postures 

that suggest an effort to conceal a firearm, and whether the officer 

observes anything during an encounter with the suspect that would 

dispel the officer's suspicions regarding the suspect's potential

involvement in a crime or likelihood of being armed.

Thomas v. Dillard, No. 13-55889, 2016 WL 1319765, at *6 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted).

With this in mind, the Court finds that defendant McLean is not entitled to summary 

judgment regarding the constitutionality of the search of Plaintiff‘s pocket. Deputy McLean had just 

conducted a pat down search and had not found anything that felt like a weapon. Although he states 

that he had concern that something unidentifiable might be a weapon, he does not state that he felt 

something that could be hard, metallic, and gun shaped—something that could, in other words, be 

the weapons described by Ms. Mitchell. A baggie of kief does not feel like a gun or weapon. The 

undisputed facts thus do not establish that Defendant McLean‘s belief that the baggie could have 

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been either the 401 rifle or the shotgun described by Ms. Mitchell was reasonable under the totality 

of the circumstances. Summary judgment as to this issue is thus denied.

D. Search of Car

Defendant England also searched Plaintiff‘s truck without a warrant that evening. ―Under 

the automobile exception, police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable

cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.‖ United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 

1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2010). ―Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, 

there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.‖

United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted).

Defendant England described the basis for the search of the vehicle as follows:

From my vantage point outside the vehicle I observed that the 

compartment area of the vehicle was in disarray, that there were 

multiple items in the back of the passanger compartment of the 

vehicle, that included papers and clothing. I observed an open beer in 

the center console of the vehicle, and a baggie sitting on an open area 

or shelf, on the dashboard of the vehicle, beneath the radio. The 

baggie was partially hanging out and I could see that it was tied in a 

knot, and contained a long tail in plain sight from my vantage point 

outside the truck. I do not have an independent recollection of 

whether the baggie was clear or opaque; however, after reading my 

report, which was prepared by me close in time to the event in the 

regular course of scope of my position as a Deputy and after reviewing 

the lab report, I recall that the baggie was clear and that the baggie 

contained a white powdery substance.

(ECF No. 27-8, at p. 6.)

Plaintiff contests these facts and has submitted the declaration of Plaintiff, which states the 

following:

There was no methamphetamine, or any other controlled substance in 

any vehicle I owned or possessed on the premises at 21205 Avenue 

144, Porterville, California at any time and any contraband that any 

defendant in the above-entitled matter claims to have found in my 

vehicle was placed there deliberately by such defendant after 

searching.

(ECF No. 33, at p. 23.) 

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This Court finds that summary judgment is not available based on the evidence before it. 

There is a factual dispute about what, if anything, was found in the car. Moreover, it is not clear 

from even Officer England‘s recitation of events whether he saw sufficient evidence of a crime from 

outside the vehicle to justify a search. Summary judgment on the constitutionality of the search of 

the car is thus denied. 

\\

E. Detention and Arrest of Plaintiff

Following the search of Plaintiff‘s pocket, Defendant McLean handcuffed Plaintiff and 

placed him in the patrol vehicle. (ECF No. 31-1, at p. 21.) After all searches were completed, 

Plaintiff was put under arrest. (ECF No. 27-9, at p. 7.) Defendants McLean, England, and Campos 

were present for the arrest. 

―If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very 

minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the 

offender.‖ Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). ―Officers have probable cause

for an arrest if at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of 

which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 

believing that the defendant committed an offense.‖ United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1028-

29 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). ―A finding of probable cause must be 

supported by the objective facts known to the officer at the time of the search. Id. at 1029. 

Defendant McClean explained in his declaration that ―Mr. Hornsby was then placed under 

arrest for suspicion of various drug related crimes, including possession of kief, possession of 

methamphetamine, and for being under the influence . . . .‖ (ECF No. 27-9, at p. 7.) Defendant 

England‘s declaration does not describe the arrest in particular, but states the following regarding 

Plaintiff‘s manner:

I observed that Mr. Hornsby had difficult remaining still, was fidgety, 

had exhibited signs of involuntary movements of his hands and 

fingers, his eyes were twitching, and he appeared to be exhibiting 

some eyelid tremors. His pulse was mildly elevanted at 104 beats per 

minute when 60 to 90 beats per minute is normal; however given the 

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circumstances, I believed it was not outside of what could be 

considered normal. While Mr. Hornsby was able to accurately 

estimate the lapse of time, based on my training and experience, it is 

not uncommon for a long term drug user to be able to accurately 

estimate short periods of time.

ECF No. 27-8, at p. 9. 

Defendant Campos‘s declaration also does not address the arrest specifically, but states the 

following regarding Plaintiff‘s manner:

[Plaintiff] was extremely fidgety, his speech was abnormally fast, his 

eyes were twitching, and he continued to smack his lips as if he was 

thirsty. Out of concern for his safety, I asked Mr. Hornsby if he 

remembered me, advised him that I remembered him, and asked him 

in a rhetorical manner, ―When are you going to give this up‖ meaning 

when are you going to give up this lifestyle? . . . . He stated that he 

remembered me, hung his head and stated, ―Yeah I know.‖

ECF No. 27-7, at p. 5. 

In light of the Court‘s rulings regarding the search of Plaintiff‘s pocket and car, it does not 

appear that undisputed evidence establishes probable cause for arrest based solely on evidence and 

observations garned through unquestionably constitutional searches. In other words, if not for the 

search of the pocket and car, the only evidence of a crime would be Plaintiff‘s own manner, which is 

only established by the Officer‘s own statements and does not clearly and undisputably lead to the 

conclusion that there was probable cause that a crime had been committed. 

Summary judgment is thus denied regarding the arrest of Plaintiff.

F. Impounding of the vehicle

Following Plaintiff‘s arrest, defendants towed Plaintiff‘s car. Defendants argue that 

summary judgment is warranted on the Fourth Amendment claim as it relates to seizing Plaintiff‘s 

car based on exigent circumstances and the community caretaker exception. (ECF No. 27-1, at p. 

25.)

The ―exigent circumstances exception‖ applies when ―the exigencies of the situation make 

the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment.‖ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). Exigent

circumstances exist if law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe a crime has been 

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committed or is being committed and a reasonable belief that entry is ―necessary to prevent physical 

harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, 

or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.‖ United 

States v. Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2002). ―The government bears a heavy burden 

of demonstrating that exceptional circumstances justified a departure from the normal procedure of 

obtaining a warrant.‖ U.S. v. Alvarez, 810 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1987). ―Exigent circumstances 

are those in which a substantial risk of harm to the persons involved or to the law enforcement 

process would arise if the police were to delay a search until a warrant could be obtained.‖ United 

States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

―Under the community caretaking exception, police officers may impound vehicles that 

jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. Once a vehicle has been 

legally impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search, as long as it conforms to the 

standard procedures of the local police department. However, an inventory search must not be a ruse 

for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.‖ United States v. Cervantes, 

703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). ―[T]he 

reasonableness of the impoundment depended on whether the impoundment fits within the authority 

of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety 

and convenience.‖ United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotations omitted).

Defendant Campos discusses the justification for the vehicle tow as follows:

I directed the officers to have the vehicle towed for multiple reasons, 

including but not limited to, Mr. Hornsby was being arrested, 

suspected methamphetamine and a pipe (a felonious crime) had been 

located inside the passenger area of the vehicle, Mr. Hornsby had been 

driving the vehicle, and exited the vehicle immediately prior to his 

arrest, the cabin of the vehicle contained multiple items, and I believed 

that it was probable that the vehicle contained other evidence of the 

crime that had not yet been discovered or the nature of the evidence 

not yet appreciated. It was unclear if other persons would respond to 

or arrive at the property or near the property, who had access to the 

property, who might move or alter the vehicle. It appeared that Mr. 

Hornsby was not on the permises with permission of the resident, and 

Mr. Hornsby was unclear where he was living while he was at the 

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scene. I had concern that the resident and/or thirs person might move 

or alter the vehicle. It did not appear that Mr. Hornsby had a valid 

license. Given the totality of the circumstances, I believes that I had 

authority to tow the vehicle.

(ECF No. 27-7, at p. 6). 

The Court holds that sumary judgment is not appropriate on this seizure. The car was on 

private property. No other people were present. The search of the car resulting in finding potential 

contraband does not appear jusitified, as described above, but in any event the desire to search for 

additional evidence does not provide exigent circumstances. There was no imminent danger posed 

by the car. It was not on a public road or posing a hazard to safety. Thus, the officers were not 

entitled to seize the car without a warrant. See United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141-42 

(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that seizure of car was unconstitutional where ―[n]either Sanchez nor Colley 

provided any testimony that Cervantes's vehicle was parked illegally, posed a safety hazard, or was 

vulnerable to vandalism or theft. . . . [T]he government presented no evidence that the vehicle would 

be vulnerable to vandalism or theft if it were left in its residential location, or that it posed a safety 

hazard, and thus failed to meet its burden to show that the community caretaking exception 

applied‖).

The Court notes that California Vehicle Code § 22655.5 does not change this result. Putting 

aside whether a California statute can permit an otherwise unconstitutional search, the towing of this 

vehicle does not fit the terms of the statute, which allows a peace officer to remove a motor vehicle:

(a) When any vehicle is found upon a highway or public or private 

property and a peace officer has probable cause to believe that the 

vehicle was used as the means of committing a public offense.

(b) When any vehicle is found upon a highway or public or private 

property and a peace officer has probable cause to believe that the 

vehicle is itself evidence which tends to show that a crime has been 

committed or that the vehicle contains evidence, which cannot readily 

be removed, which tends to show that a crime has been committed.

Cal. Veh. Code § 22655.5. Here, there is no allegation that the car itself was used to commit a 

public offense. Moreover, there is no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence 

of a crime that could not be readily removed (and as explained above, there appears to be a dispute 

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of fact as to the existence of that evidence). In any case, the cited statute does not justify towing the 

car and summary judgment on this basis is thus inappropriate. 

G. Seizure of the shotgun

Defendants also seized a shotgun from the premises. Defendant England describes his 

justification as follows:

I located a firearm (a shotgun) that was in plain view, that was either 

hanging over a railing or saw horse inside the barn, rendered the 

weapon safe, and brought the gun to my vehible in the event that there 

was someone hiding at or near the barn that we had missed and who 

might pose a risk to officer safety. . . . I rendered the firearm safe, and 

seized the firearm because there was no way to secure the firearm in 

light of the open nature of the barn and the possibility that thirs 

persons at or near the barn would have easy access to the firearm.

(ECF No. 27-8.) In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that ―seizure of the gun 

was similarly necessary because there was no way to return the gun to the barn and properly secure 

the gun as the barn due [sic] to the open and accessible nature of the barn. There was no one on the 

premises to accept responsiblity for the gun.‖ (ECF No. 27-1, at p. 25.)

The Court denies summary judgment on this claim as well. Defendants do not even suggest 

that they seized the gun because they had probable cause to believe it was connected to a crime at 

the time of the seizure. No third parties were ever seen on the property. The officers had already 

―rendered the firearm safe.‖ The Court is not aware of any law allowing police officers to seize any 

weapon on a property merely for fear that someone could come on the property and use it in an 

illegal manner.

V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Defendants next contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ―Qualified immunity

shields a police officer from suit under § 1983 unless (1) the officer violated a statutory or 

constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.‖ 

Thomas v. Dillard, No. 13-55889, 2016 WL 1319765, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016); Carillo v. Cnty. 

of Los Angeles, 798 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 2015) (―An officer cannot be said to have violated a 

clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable 

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official in his shoes would have understood that he was violating it, meaning that existing precedent 

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.‖). 

The Court holds that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons stated 

above, summary judgment is not appropriate regarding whether the officers violated Plaintiff‘s 

Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment rights explained above are well 

settled in case law and clearly established, stemming from both the Fourth Amendment and Ninth 

Circuit, if not Supreme Court, precedent. If, as Plaintiff claims, the officers looked in Plaintiff‘s 

pockets without having reasonable suspicion that they held a weapon, the officers should have 

understood that that search violated Plaintiff‘s rights. 

VI. MONELL CLAIM AGAINST THE SHERIFF AND THE COUNTY

Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s claim that the County of Tulare and 

Sheriff Wittman had a policy of authorizing, encouraging, and permitting searches without a warrant 

and without a reasonable belief that probable cause exists. 

Under the U.S. Supreme Court case of Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978):

Local governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for 

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action 

that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 

promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover, although the 

touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body is an 

allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights 

protected by the Constitution, local governments, like every other § 

1983 ―person,‖ by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for 

constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ―custom‖ 

even though such a custom has not received formal approval through 

the body's official decisionmaking channels.

Id. at 690-91. Defendants have submitted excerpts from the Sheriff‘s Policy Manual, (ECF No. 27-

22, at p. 4-7) to support their contention that the policy at the Sheriff‘s Department is consistent with 

the law. 

In opposition, Plaintiff points to testimony by Defendant Campos indicating that he reviewed 

the reports of what happened and believed based on those reports and his personal observation that 

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defendants were properly executing official customs, policies, and practices of the Tulare County 

Sheriff‘s department. (ECF No. 28, at p. 21.) 

The Court holds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Monell claim as 

against the Sheriff‘s Department and County of Tulare. Defendants have submitted evidence of a 

constitutional policy and Plaintiff has not set forth contrary evidence. Defendant‘s statement does 

not indicate that an unconstitutional policy or custom exists, but rather that he believed the searches 

done were constitutional and consistent with a legal policy. Such a defense of the officers‘ conduct 

falls short of establishing a dispute over fact regarding a Monell claim. 

\\

VII. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants‘ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) is 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically:

1. Summary adjudication is granted in favor of Defendant Bill Wittman in his capacity 

as Sheriff of Tulare County;

2. Summary adjudication is granted in favor of the County of Tulare;

3. Summary adjudication is granted in favor of Defendants as to the search of the 

premises surrounding the home at 21205 Avenue 144;

4. Summary adjudication is granted in favor of Defendants as to the pat down search of 

Plaintiff; and,

5. Summary adjudication is denied with respect to:

a. The search of Plaintiff‘s pocket;

b. The search of Plaintiff‘s car;

c. The detention and arrest of Plaintiff;

d. The impoundment of Plaintiff‘s car; and,

e. The seizure of the shotgun in the barn.

Defendants‘ initial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) was superseded by the 

second motion for summary judgment and is thus DENIED AS MOOT.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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