Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00276/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00276-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frank Miguel Leon, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. 10-CV-276-TUC-RCC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the August 9, 2011, Report and Recommendation (R&R)

from Magistrate Judge Ferraro (Doc. 14) recommending that this court dismiss Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Petitioner timely

filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 15), and the objections have been fully briefed. For the

following reasons, this court will adopt the R&R. 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2005, Petitioner entered a guilty plea in Pima County Superior Court to

one count of negligent homicide and one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving

a death. Petitioner’s Presentence Report (PSR) listed four prior convictions: one felony drug

conviction, one misdemeanor drug conviction, and two non-violent or property

misdemeanors. The trial judge relied on these four prior convictions as the basis for finding

a criminal history aggravating factor. Petitioner’s trial counsel did not contest the accuracy

of the felony drug charge. Petitioner was then sentenced to the presumptive term on both

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counts – six years for negligent homicide and three and a half years for leaving the scene of

an accident – to be served consecutively. 

Petitioner thereafter filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition in Pima County

Superior Court, citing two grounds for relief: ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and a

due process violation. Both of Petitioner’s PCR claims were based on the trial judge’s

reliance on inaccurate information at sentencing. The PCR judge, the same judge who

sentenced Petitioner, acknowledged that Petitioner’s prior marijuana conviction was a

misdemeanor and not a felony as erroneously identified in the PSR and at sentencing.

However, the judge concluded that this error did not prejudice Petitioner, stating:

In imposing sentence, the Court cited the defendant’s prior

criminal record as one of three aggravating factors. The Court

also found as aggravating facts the great emotional harm he

created for non-victims. Thus, the marijuana conviction at issue

was only a subpart of one aggravating factor. Had the Court

known at the time [of sentencing] that the marijuana offense had

been designated as a misdemeanor instead of a class 6 felony, it

still would have found the defendant’s “criminal record” to be

an aggravating factor. More importantly, the Court would have

weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors in the same

matter.

(Doc. 9, Exh. F at 1). Thus, the court denied relief on Petitioner’s PCR petition. Petitioner

then sought relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which affirmed the PCR court’s ruling.

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review, and Petitioner subsequently filed a habeas

petition in district court (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. .

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The duties of the district court in connection with a R&R are set forth in Rule 72 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U .S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may

“accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return

the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The Court will not disturb a Magistrate Judge's Order unless his factual findings

are clearly erroneous or his legal conclusions are contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

“[T]he magistrate judge's decision ... is entitled to great deference by the district court.”

United States v. Abonce-Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir.2001). Where the parties object

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to a R&R, “[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). 

III. DISCUSSION

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court dismiss Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus because Petitioner failed to show he was prejudiced by

the sentencing judge’s findings as to Petitioner’s criminal history. The Magistrate Judge

noted that the state court judge who ruled on Petitioner’s PCR petition is the same judge that

sentenced Petitioner. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge found that “[t]he relief Petitioner seeks

in [district court] – reconsideration of his sentence based on accurate information – has

already been given by the state courts” and “to send the case back to state court for

resentencing ‘would be a looking-glass exercise in folly.’” (Doc. 14 at p. 5) (citing Gerlaugh

v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Petitioner makes five objections to the R&R. First, Petitioner claims the Magistrate

Judge incorrectly identified the ultimate question to be resolved. The Magistrate Judge found

that, with respect to Petitioner’s due process claim, “[t]he ultimate question is whether

Petitioner’s sentence might have been different if the judge had known that he did not have

a felony drug conviction but, rather, a second misdemeanor drug conviction.” (Doc. 14 at

p. 4). This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s description of the ultimate question, as

it came directly from United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972), which involved

similar facts.

Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge “conflate[d] the concept of a due process

violation arising from ineffective assistance of counsel . . . with the concept of a due process

violation arising from sentencing based upon materially false criminal history information,

which does not require a showing of prejudice[.]” (Doc. 15 at p. 3). Petitioner also argues

that the mere fact that the trial judge considered inaccurate criminal history information

during sentencing is grounds for re-sentencing, and this Court should not speculate on how

the sentencing judge’s decision may or may not have been affected had he been presented

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with accurate criminal history information. 

Even if these contentions are true, Petitioner nonetheless received the relief he seeks

in his habeas petition when the sentencing judge considered the corrected criminal history

information during the PCR hearing and concluded that the sentence would have been the

same had he been aware of the discrepancy at sentencing. This Court does not have to

speculate as to what the sentencing judge may have done.

In his next two objections, Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge’s interpretation

of United States v. Tucker and Townsend v. Burke was incorrect. The Magistrate Judge did

not err in citing to Tucker for the ultimate question. Moreover, in Townsend, the Supreme

Court determined that the prisoner’s due process rights were violated when he “had no

opportunity to correct” the inaccurate information used to determine his sentence. 334 U.S.

736, 741 (1948). That is not the case here. Petitioner was able to correct the information,

and the judge who sentenced him determined that this new information would not change

Petitioner’s sentence. 

In his fourth objection to the R&R, Petitioner states that the Magistrate Judge erred

in analyzing his IAC claim. Petitioner states that “relief is mandatory unless the reviewing

court can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the sentence.”

(Doc. 15 at p. 7). This Court can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not

affect Petitioner’s sentence, as the sentencing judge has already acknowledged the error and

stated that his sentencing decision would have been the same. 

Finally, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge Ferraro’s reference to Gerlaugh v.

Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997). In Gerlaugh, the Ninth Circuit stated:

[T]o send this case back to the state trial court to hear the

evidence counsel failed to develop or to introduce . . . would be

a looking-glass exercise in folly. The trial and sentencing judge

has already considered all of this information in the postconviction hearing and has held that none of it would have

altered his judgment as to the proper penalty for Gerlaugh.

Id. This is almost identical to the facts of the current case, where the sentencing judge has

considered the corrected criminal history information and determined that it would not have

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altered his judgment as to Petitioner’s sentence. 

This Court finds, after consideration of all matters presented, including the objection,

and after an independent review of the record herein, that the findings of the Magistrate

Judge as set forth in the Report and Recommendation shall be accepted and adopted as the

findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Before Petitioner can appeal this Court's judgment, a certificate of appealability must

issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(1). Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 22(b) requires the district court that rendered a judgment denying a petition made

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to “either issue a certificate of appealability or state why a

certificate should not issue.” Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) provides that a certificate

may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” In the certificate, the court must indicate which specific issues satisfy

this showing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). A substantial showing is made when the

resolution of an issue of appeal is debatable among reasonable jurists, if courts could resolve

the issues differently, or if the issue deserves further proceedings. See Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484–85, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Upon review of the record,

and in light of the standards for granting a certificate of appealability, the Court concludes

that a certificate shall not issue as the resolution of the petition is not debatable among

reasonable jurists and does not deserve further proceedings. Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Ferraro’s Report and Recommendation (Doc.

14) is hereby ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as the findings of fact and conclusions of law

by this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1) is denied without leave to amend, and this action is dismissed with prejudice, and the

Clerk shall enter judgment and close this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to issue a certificate of

appealability.

DATED this 20th day of December, 2011.

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