Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00098/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00098-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALVARADO et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

 FEDEX CORPORATION,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-00098 SI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF

CHARLES GIBBS’ REQUEST FOR

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND MODIFYING

MARCH 13, 2006 ORDER RE:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Charles Gibbs has filed a request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of this

Court’s March 13, 2006 order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s request

concerns an error contained in the March 13, 2006 order; in that order, the Court incorrectly stated that

plaintiff’s state court action was filed on December 12, 2004, when in fact the state court action was

filed on December 12, 2002. Based on the December 12, 2004 date, the Court stated that all promotions

prior to December 12, 2002 were time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration contends that all promotion

denials occurring on or after December 12, 2000 are timely under § 1981. Plaintiff’s motion for leave

to file a motion for reconsideration specifically addresses two promotion denials, one occurring in

January 2001, and one occurring in September 2002. 

Plaintiff’s analysis of the statute of limitations is incorrect because plaintiff fails to take account

of the fact that the statute of limitations changed in January 2002. All promotion denials occurring prior

to December 12, 2001 are time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1;

Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro Bay LLC, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1029-30 (2004) (1 year statute of

limitations for claims arising in 2000 and 2001; new 2 year statute of limitations did not revive timebarred claims). Accordingly, the January 2001 position referenced in Gibbs’ motion for leave to file

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 376 Filed 04/04/06 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Gibbs does not assert that he applied for any promotions between December 12-31, 2001.

2

 Although Gibbs’ opposition brief states that the hiring manager for this position was Everett

Rey, the deposition testimony cited states that the hiring manager was Donna Escobar. See id.

2

a motion for reconsideration remains time-barred. 

Although plaintiff is correct that the promotion denials in 2002 are timely,1

 summary judgment

in favor of defendant is nevertheless warranted because plaintiff failed to meet his burden in opposing

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Gibbs asserts that he applied for nine or ten promotions in

2002. See Gibbs Decl. at 4-5 (document created by Gibbs listing 9 positions that he allegedly applied

for in 2002); see also October 4, 2005 Parker Decl. Ex. 2 to Gibbs Depo. (denial letter dated August 6,

2002). However, aside from asserting that he applied for and was denied these promotions, Gibbs’

opposition brief is devoid of any details or citations to evidence regarding all but one of these

promotions. It is not the Court’s task to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact,”

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1996), and “it need not examine the entire file for

evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers

with adequate references so that it could be conveniently found.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch.

Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Gibbs has failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination with regard to these promotions. See Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667,

671 (9th Cir. 1988) 

The only 2002 promotion that Gibbs specifically addressed in his opposition brief is a September

2002 position, and Gibbs asserts that although he was told ASPIRE candidates would not be hired for

that position, he later discovered that an ASPIRE candidate was hired. See Gibbs’ Opposition at 7:4-9.

Gibbs has not submitted any evidence to show that he was qualified for that position, or that a person

outside of the protected class was hired into that position. See Gibbs’ Depo. at 123-125 (stating he does

not know who was hired into that position).2

 Accordingly, Gibbs has failed to establish a prima facie

case with regard to that promotion. See Pejic, 840 F.2d at 671.

Gibbs’ motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration discusses another September 2002

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3

 As noted supra, although plaintiffs’ opposition refers to a September 2002 promotion for

which the hiring manager was Everett Rey, the evidence cited relates to a promotion for which the hiring

manager was Donna Escobar. Thus, the September 2002 promotion discussed in plaintiff’s motion for

leave to file a motion for reconsideration was not actually briefed in plaintiff’s October 5, 2005

opposition.

3

promotion for which the hiring manager was Everett Rey.3 Gibbs contends that summary judgment on

that claim is inappropriate because Ms. Parker submitted a declaration on November 20, 2005, the day

before the hearing, with evidence showing that a non-African American individual was hired into that

position. Gibbs also asserts that Ms. Parker addressed that promotion at the hearing. 

The Court finds plaintiff’s November 20, 2005 declaration is untimely. Plaintiff did not seek

leave of Court to file a late declaration, and indeed there appears to be no good cause for its untimely

filing since the attached deposition testimony was taken in April 2005. Plaintiff’s counsel have

repeatedly ignored the Civil Local Rules and court deadlines, and the Court will not condone such

conduct. Because plaintiff’s timely-filed October 5, 2005 opposition did not provide any details or cite

any evidence regarding this promotion, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

with regard to this promotion.

Moreover, even if the Court considered the November 20, 2005 declaration and concluded that

plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the Court concludes that FedEx met its burden of showing

that the successful applicant, James Friese, was more qualified because Rey testified that Friese was an

experienced manager, while Gibbs did not have any managerial experience. See Rey Depo. at 85-86.

Plaintiff did not submit any evidence of pretext. Thus, even if the Court considered plaintiff’s untimely

evidence, the Court would reach the same result.

Accordingly, because the factual error does not change the outcome of the March 13, 2006 order,

the Court DENIES plaintiff’s request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court STRIKES

Docket No. 320 as untimely. The Court MODIFIES the March 13, 2006 order as follows: Page 32,

lines 23-24 of the March 13, 2006 order are DELETED, and REPLACED with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 376 Filed 04/04/06 Page 3 of 3