Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-03046/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-03046-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

REGGIE R. WILLIAMS, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary, 

Res ondent. 

CASE NO. 14cv3046-BEN (KSC) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 16] 

16 Petitioner Reggie R. Williams, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for 

17 Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 20,2014. [Doc. 1] 

18 The case was thereafter transferred from the Central District of California to this 

19 District on February 27,2014. [Doc. 4] Before the Court is respondentJeffrey Beard's 

20 Motion to Dismiss the Petition as untimely, filed on May 5, 2015. [Doc. 16] The 

21 petitioner filed a Response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on May 26,2015. 

22 [Doc. 18] 

23 This matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for preparation of 

24 a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Civil Local Rules 

25 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

26 California. Based on the moving and opposing papers, and for the reasons outlined 

27 below, this Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

28 II 

- 1 - 14cv3046-BEN (KSC) 

Case 3:14-cv-03046-BEN-KSC Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 1 of 14
1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

2 On December 6, 2007, a jury convicted petitioner Reggie R. Williams after trial 

3 of several criminal counts including forcible oral copulation in violation of California 

4 Penal Code § 288a( c )(2), false imprisonment in violation of California Penal Code 

5 § 236/237a, and two counts of corporal injury to a spouse in violation of California 

6 Penal Code § 273.5(a). [Lodg. 1, Vol. 6, pp. 1048-54] The trial court sentenced the 

7 petitioner to eleven years and four months in state prison on January 18,2008. [Lodg. 

8 2, Vol. 2, pp. 292-293] 

9 A. Direct Appeal 

10 The petitioner filed a direct appeal on June 13,2008. [Lodg. 4] The Court of 

11 Appeal affirmed his conviction on January 22,2009. [Lodg. 7] The California Supreme 

12 Court subsequently denied his petition for review on April 1, 2009. [Lodg. 9] The 

13 petitioner did not file a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Couti. 

14 B. Habeas Corpus Petitions Before the Superior Court 

15 The petitioner filed his first state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San 

16 Diego Superior Court on March 18,2010.1 [Lodg. 10] In the first petition, he raised 

17 four claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) prosecutorial misconduct based 

18 on the fact that the prosecutor tried his case with false evidence, (3) conviction based 

19 on false evidence, and (4) an improper sentencing enhancement !d. at 4-11. The San 

20 Diego Superior Court denied his first petition on May 24, 2010. [Lodg. 11] 

21 The petitioner filed his second state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San 

22 Diego Superior Court on November 6,2010. [Lodg. 12] He raised two constitutional 

23 claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) prosecutorial misconduct based 

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25 1 Like the respondent, this Court will construe the petitioner's filing date to be 

the date on which he signed his petition, not the date on which the petition was 

26 received by the California Court. [Doc. 16-1, p. 4] See Houston v. Lack, 487 US. 266, 

27 276 (1988) (setting forth the "mailbox rule" in which a notice of appeal by a pro se 

prisoner is deemed filed at the moment the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for 

28 forwarding to the clerk of court). The Court will refer to the date the petition was 

signed as the "constructive" filing date. 

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1 on the prosecutor's intimidation and coercion of trial witnesses. !d. at 3-6. The San 

2 Diego Superior Court denied his second petition on January 4, 2011. [Lodg. 13] With 

3 respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the San Diego Superior Court 

4 treated the second petition as a motion for reconsideration and stated, "[t]he court will 

5 not consider repetitive petitions." Id. at 2. However, the Court considered and denied 

6 the prosecutorial misconduct claim on the merits ofthe petitioner's allegations. Id. at 

7 2-3. 

8 C. Habeas Corpus Petitions Before the California Court of Appeal 

9 In response to the denial of his second petition, the petitioner filed a document 

10 titled "Petition for Writ ofMandatelProhibition" in the California Court of Appeal on 

11 January 19, 2011. [Lodg. 14] This document raised two issues: (1) ineffective 

12 assistance of counsel, and (2) prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 15-19. The Court of 

13 Appeal construed the filing as another state petition for writ of habeas corpus. [Lodg. 

14 15, p. 1] The Court of Appeal ruled on February 22, 2011, that the petition was 

15 procedurally barred because it exclusively presented issues that were raised and 

16 resolved (or could have been raised and resolved) on direct appeal. Id. 

17 The petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus before the Court 

18 of Appeal on April 18, 2011, raising a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

19 [Lodg. 16] The Court of Appeal denied this petition on May 13,2011. [Lodg. 17] The 

20 Court ruled that the petition was procedurally barred as it repeated issues previously 

21 raised on appeal and in the petitioner's first habeas corpus petition before the Court of 

22 Appeal. Id. at 2. 

23 On August 1, 2011, the Court of Appeal denied the petitioner's request for 

24 reconsideration of that court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. [Lodg. 18] The 

25 petitioner's original request for reconsideration was not included among the Lodgments 

26 filed by the parties in this case. However, it can be inferred from the Court of Appeal's 

27 written Order that on an unknown date, the petitioner filed a document titled "Denial 

28 and Exception to the Return" in which he sought reconsideration ofthe May 13,2011, 

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1 ruling on his petition. See id. at I. This "Denial and Exception to the Return" was 

2 summarily denied. Id. 

3 D. Habeas Corpus Petition Before the California Supreme Court 

4 On January 3,2013, the petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus 

5 before the California Supreme Court. [Lodg. 19] Therein, the petitioner re-raised his 

. 6 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. /d. at 11. However, he also added five new 

7 constitutional claims. Id. at 11-13. The six grounds raised in his petition were: (1) 

8 ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) Brady violation for failure to disclose potentially 

9 exculpatory evidence, (3) a violation of his confrontation clause rights, (4) two claims 

10 of instructional error, (5) sentencing error, and (6) actual innocence based on the fact 

11 that the alleged victims were not minors. Id. The California Supreme Court denied this 

12 petition without comment on May 2, 2013. [Lodgs. 20, 21] 

13 E. Federal Habeas Corpus Petition 

14 The petitioner constructively filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

15 corpus on February 10,2014. [Doc. 1] 

16 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

17 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (hereinafter "AEDP A") 

18 governs habeas corpus petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 

19 259,268 n.3 (2000). Under AEDPA, state prisoners must commence federal habeas 

20 corpus proceedings within one year of the date on which their convictions become 

21 final. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244( d)(1 )(A); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894,895 (9th Cir. 

22 2001). That period of limitations, however, is statutorily tolled during the time in 

23 which "a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review 

24 with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending .... " § 2244( d)(2); Wixom 264 

25 F.3d at 895-96. 

26 AEDPA's tolling provision protects the principles of comity, finality, and 

27 federalism, and "promot[es] the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the 

28 interest in the finality of state court judgments." Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222 

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Case 3:14-cv-03046-BEN-KSC Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 4 of 14
1 (2002) (citation omitted). It modifies the one-year filing rule in order to give states 

2 "the opportunity to complete one full round of review, free of federal interference." 

3 !d. The statute oflimitations is tolled for all of the time during which a state prisoner 

4 is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court 

5 remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application. Nino v. Galaza, 183 

6 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999). This includes the time between a lower court decision 

7 and the filing of a new petition in a higher court, so long as the petitioner has not 

8 unreasonably delayed in the filing of the new petition. Carey 536 U.S. at 222-23. As 

9 the Ninth Circuit has explained: 

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Typically, a California petitioner brings a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the state's Superior Court. If it is denied, the petitioner will 

assert claims, most commonly the same ones, in a new petition in the 

California Court of Appeal. If the Court of Appeal denies the petition, he 

will assert claims in yet another new petition in, or petition for review by, 

the California Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court held that 

application for state post-conviction relief filed in this fashion will be 

deemed "pending" for purposes of28 U.S.C. 2244( d)(2), even during the 

intervals between the denial of a petition by one court and the filing of a 

new petition at the next level, ifthere is not undue delay. 

17 Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

18 When, as here, a petitioner files multiple successive petitions in the same state 

19 court, the time between such petitions is not automatically tolled. Rather, the Ninth 

20 Circuit applies a two part test ("the King test") to determine whether AEDPA's one21 year statute of limitations clock continues to run during the gaps between those 

22 successive petitions. Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). Specifically: 

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[W]e ask whether the petitioner's subsequent petitions are limited to an 

elaboration ofthe facts relating to the claims in the first petition. If not, 

these petitions constitute a "new round" and the gap between the rounds 

is not tolled. But if the petitioner simply attempted to correct the 

deficiencies, then the petitioner is still making proper use of state court 

procedures, and his application is still "pending" for tolling 

purposes .... We then ask whether they were ultimately denied on the merits 

or deemed untimely. In the former event, the time gap between the 

petitions is tolled; in the latter event it is not. 

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Case 3:14-cv-03046-BEN-KSC Document 21 Filed 09/04/15 Page 5 of 14
1 Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 

2 823 (9th Cir. 2003». 

3 Finally, a petitioner may demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling even 

4 if he is not entitled to statutory tolling. Although a petitioner may be entitled to 

5 equitable tolling in a few cases, "the threshold necessary to trigger [it] is very high, lest 

6 the exceptions swallow the rule." Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796,799 (9th Cir. 2003). 

7 Equitable tolling is available to a petitioner when "(1) he has been pursuing his rights 

8 diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. 

9 DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418. The obligation to act diligently extends during the 

10 entire period the petitioner attempts to exhaust both his state and federal remedies. 

11 Lacava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271,277 (3rd Cir. 2005). The petitioner bears the burden of 

12 demonstrating he is entitled to equitable tolling. Id. at 1814. 

13 III. DISCUSSION 

14 AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations began running when the petitioner's 

15 state court conviction became final. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(I)(A). The California 

16 Supreme Court denied the petitioner's petition for review of his direct appeal on April 

17 1,2009. [Lodg. 9] Adding 90 days in which to file a petition for writ of certiorari to the 

18 United States Supreme Court, the petitioner's conviction became final on June 30, 

19 2009. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 

20 period of "direct review" under 28 U.S.C. § 2244( d)(1 )(A) includes the 90 days within 

21 which the prisoner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari). 

22 The petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on February 20, 2014. 

23 More than 3.5 years elapsed between the finality of his conviction and the filing of his 

24 federal habeas petition. Thus, in the absence of statutory or equitable tolling, the 

25 instant federal petition must be dismissed as untimely. The Court will evaluate each 

26 of these forms of tolling in tum. 

27 II 

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A. The Petitioner Is Only Entitled to Statutory Tolling for a Small Fraction of 

the Time in Which His State Habeas Petitions Were Pending 

The Court finds that AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations only tolled for a 

small portion ofthe time in which the petitioner was litigating habeas corpus petitions 

in the state courts. The following table provides a visual illustration of the Court's 

conclusions, which will be discussed at length in the following subsections: 

STATUTORY TOLLING TABLE 

First Event Second Event #of Time Total 

Days Tolls? Elapsed 

June 30, 2009 March 18, 2010 261 No 261 Days 

(Conviction becomes (1 sl H.C.2 filed in Sup. 

final) Ct.) 

March 18,2010 May 24, 2010 67 Yes 261 Days 

(1 sl H.C. filed in Sup. Ct.) (1 sl H.C. denied by Sup. 

Ct.) 

May 24,2010 Nov. 6, 2010 166 Yes 261 Days 

(1 sl H.C. denied by Sup. (2nd H.C. filed in Sup. 

Ct.) Ct.) 

Nov. 6, 2010 Jan. 4, 2011 59 Yes 261 Days 

(2nd H.C. filed in Sup. (2nd H.C. denied by Sup. 

Ct.) Ct.) 

Jan. 4, 2011 Jan. 19,2011 15 Yes 261 Days 

(2nd H.C. denied by Sup. (1 sl H.C. filed in App. 

Ct.) Ct.) 

Jan. 19,2011 Feb. 22,2011 34 Yes 261 Days 

(1 sl H.c. filed in App. (1 sl H.C. denied by App. 

Ct.) Ct.) 

Feb. 22,2011 April 18, 2011 54 No 315 Days 

(1 sl H.C. denied by App. (2nd H.C. filed in App. 

Ct.) Ct.) 

April 18, 2011 May 13,2011 25 No 340 Days 

(2nd H.C. filed in App. (2nd H.C. denied by App. 

Ct.) Ct.) 

2 "H.C." refers to a habeas corpus petition. 

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First Event 

Mal 13, 2011 

(2" H.C. denied in App. 

Ct.) 

Aug. 1,2011 

(3rd H.C. denied in App. 

Ct.) 

Jan. 3,2013 

(l st H.C. filed in Cal. S. 

Ct.) 

May 2, 2013 

(1 st H.C. denied by Cal. 

S. Ct.) 

Second Event 

Aug. 1,2011 

(3rd H.C. denied by App. 

Ct.) 

Jan. 3,2013 

(l st H.C. filed in Cal. S. 

Ct.) 

May 2,2013 

(1 st H.C. denied by Cal. 

S. Ct.) 

Feb. 20,2014 

(Federal Petition filed) 

1. Petitioner's Superior Court Petitions 

# of 

Days 

80 

521 

119 

294 

Time 

Tolls? 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

Total 

Elapsed 

420 Days 

941 Days 

941 Days 

1,235 

Days 

AEDP A's statute oflimitations is not tolled before a state court petition is filed, 

as no petition for post-conviction relief is "pending" during that interval within the 

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 

1999). 261 days after finality of direct review, Petitioner constructively filed a habeas 

petition in Superior Court on March 18, 2010, which was denied on May 24, 2010. 

[Lodgs. 10, 11] From March 18, 2010 through May 24, 2010 the statute was tolled due 

to the properly pending petition before the state court. 

Rather than moving up to the Court of Appeal following the Superior Court's 

ruling, Williams constructively filed a second petition in Superior Court on November 

6,2010, which was denied on January 4, 2011. [Lodgs. 12, 13] The second petition 

elaborated upon the same two arguments that were addressed and denied in the first 

habeas petition: ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. [Lodg. 

12, pp. 3, 6] After reviewing the first and second petitions filed in the Superior Court, 

this Court concludes that the second petition could be construed as a "new claim," as 

petitioner raises for the first time his argument of prosecutorial misconduct based on 

witness intimidation and coercion. See [Lodg. 12, p. 6] However, in the interest of 

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1 giving the petitioner the benefit of all doubt, the Court will construe his second petition 

2 as "an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition," as 

3 contemplated by King, 340 F.3d at 823. Because the California Superior Court denied 

4 the second petition on its merits rather than deeming it untimely, [Lodg. 13, p. 3], this 

5 Court concludes that the petitioner's second petition was still a proper use of state court 

6 procedures, and that his original state court habeas application should be deemed still 

7 "pending" for tolling purposes for the duration of the pendency of his second petition. 

8 See Stanele, 692 F.3d at 953. 

9 For these reasons, the Court finds that time should be tolled from the Superior 

10 Court's denial of the petitioner's first petition on May 24, 2010, through the Superior 

11 Court's denial of the second habeas petition on January 4,2011. 

12 2. Petitioner's Court of Appeal Petitions 

13 On January 19,2011, the petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas 

14 corpus in the California Court of Appeal. [Lodg. 14] The Court of Appeal denied the 

15 petition on February 22,2011, finding that the petition was procedurally barred as "a 

16 variation on a theme of issues raised and rejected on appeal or alternatively issues that 

17 could have been raised on appeal." [Lodg. 15, p. 2] (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 

18 767, n.7 (Cal. 1993)). Under Carey, 536 U.S. at 222-23, time is tolled between the 

19 Superior Court's denial of the petition and the petitioner's filing of that petition with 

20 the California Court of Appeal. Time is also tolled while the petition was pending 

21 before the Court of Appeal. 

22 On April 18, 2011, the petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus before 

23 the Court of Appeal, which was denied on May 13, 2011. [Lodgs. 16, 17] After 

24 reviewing both ofthe appellate petitions that were filed, this Court concludes that this 

25 second petition was not "limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in 

26 the first petition" or "simply [an] attempt[] to correct the deficiencies" of the first 

27 petition. Stancle, 692 F.3d at 954; King, 340 F.3d at 823. Nor was it a properly filed 

28 application for state post-conviction review within the meaning of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 

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1 § 2244(d)(2), as California law has no procedure for the filing of what is essentially a 

2 Motion for Reconsideration of a habeas petition. 

3 Had the Court of Appeal denied the petitioner's first appellate petition because 

4 it was lacking evidentiary or factual support, the petitioner's second petition could have 

5 been construed as an attempt to correct those deficiencies by providing additional 

6 factual detail. However, in this case, the petitioner's second appellate petition was 

7 simply a restatement of the arguments from his first petition, and it made no attempt 

8 to address the issue ofthe procedural bar. The second petition cannot be construed as 

9 a continuation of the petitioner's "first round" of appellate habeas review, and instead 

lOis more properly viewed as a new, successive round. See Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 

11 F.3d 817, 820 ("[E]ach time a petitioner files a new habeas petition at the same or 

12 lower level... the subsequent petition ... triggers an entirely separate round of review.") 

13 (citing Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048). 

14 Time is not tolled between separate successive rounds of habeas review at the 

15 same court level. King, 340 F.3d at 823. Accordingly, the AEDPA clock continued 

16 to run after the Court of Appeal's denial ofthe petitioner's first appellate petition on 

17 February 22, 2011. 

18 An August 1,2011, opinion from the Court of Appeal suggests that the petitioner 

19 may have filed a third successive habeas corpus petition in that same court, though no 

20 such petition has been included in the Lodgments provided to this Court. See [Lodg. 

21 18] From the substance of the opinion, it appears that the petitioner filed a document 

22 entitled "denial and exception to the return" that was construed as a motion to 

23 reconsider the May 13, 2011, Court of Appeal's ruling. Id. at 1. For the reasons 

24 explained above, this Court concludes that this subsequent filing was not limited to an 

25 elaboration of facts relating to the claims in the first appellate petition, or an attempt 

26 to correct the deficiencies therein. Accordingly, AEDPA's clock continued to run 

27 during the time that this "denial and exception to the return" was prepared, filed, and 

28 pending before the Court of Appeal. See King, 340 F.3d at 823. 

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1 3. Petitioner's Supreme Court Petition 

2 On January 3, 2013, the petitioner filed his first state habeas petition before the 

3 California Supreme Court, which was denied without comment on May 2, 2013. 

4 [Lodgs. 19, 20, 21] Because this was the petitioner's first round of Supreme Court 

5 review, and the petition was denied without comment by the Supreme Court (which is 

6 presumed to be a decision on the merits), this Court concludes that the petition was 

7 properly filed. AEDPA's clock therefore tolled during the time in which this petition 

8 was pending before the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(I)(A). 

9 As discussed in Section II.B.2, supra, time is typically tolled while a California 

10 petitioner moves his petition from a lower court to a higher court for review. Carey, 

11 536 U.S. at 222-23. However, the time between petitions at a lower level and a higher 

12 level is not tolled when the petitioner engages in undue delay. See id. California law 

13 imposes a general standard of "timeliness" rather than a specific filing deadline for 

14 habeas review applications. Id. at 223. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court 

15 has noted that most States provide for "short periods of time" such as 30 to 60 days for 

16 a petitioner to file an appeal to the next appellate level court. Evans v. Chavis, 546 

17 U.S. 189,201 (2006). The Evans Court further stated, "[w]e have found no authority 

18 suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that California would consider 

19 an unjustified or unexplained 6-month filing delay 'reasonable. '" /d. at 201. 

20 Here, the petitioner's first round of habeas review concluded in the Court of 

21 Appeal on February 22, 2011. [Lodg. 15] He filed his first petition with the California 

22 Supreme Court almost two years later. [Lodg. 19] A delay of nearly two years is far 

23 outside the scope of reasonableness, and no legitimate explanation for the delay is 

24 presented in the record. Accordingly, this Court concludes that time was not tolled 

25 between the conclusion ofthe petitioner's first round of appellate review, and the filing 

26 of his petition in the California Supreme Court. Furthermore, AEDPA's statute of 

27 limitations is not tolled after state habeas corpus review concludes, as no petition for 

28 

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1 post-conviction reliefis "pending" during that interval within the meaning of28 U. S. C. 

2 § 2244(d)(2). Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

3 4. Conclusion 

4 In conclusion, while the petitioner is entitled to short periods of statutory tolling 

5 during the time that his properly filed petitions were pending in the California state 

6 courts, the majority of the time between the conclusion of direct review and the filing 

7 of his federal habeas petition is untolled. As illustrated by the table on pages 8 and 9 

8 of this Order, the total number of un tolled days that elapsed between the finality of his 

9 conviction and the filing of the instant federal petition is 1,235 days, or 3.38 years. 

10 This far exceeds the one-year statute of limitations imposed by AEDP A. 

11 It is worth noting that even ifthis Court were to give the petitioner all benefit of 

12 the doubt and find that the statute of limitations were tolled for each and every gap 

13 between his successive state court habeas petitions (which, for the reasons discussed 

14 above, the Court does not), the petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition would still 

15 be time-barred under AEDP A. The petitioner delayed 261 days before filing his first 

16 state habeas corpus petition,3 and 282 days after the conclusion of state habeas review 

17 to file the instant federal petition.4 It is well established that AEDPA's statute of 

18 limitations is not tolled during those intervals, as no petition for post-conviction relief 

19 is "pending" within the meaning of28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 

20 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); see Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973,973 (9th Cir. 2001). 

21 Added together, this results in a total delay of 543 days - substantially more than the 

22 

23 3 The petitioner's conviction became final on June 30, 2009, and his first state 

24 habeas petition was filed in San Diego Superior Court on March 18,2010. [Lodg. 10] 

The gap between those two events - 261 days - counts towards the petitioner's one25 year filing deadline under AEDP A. 

26 4 The California Supreme Court denied the petitioner's petition for review of his 

27 habeas claim on May 2, 2013. [Lodg. 21] The petitioner constructively filed the instant 

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 10,2014. [Doc. 1] The AEDPA 

28 clock continued to run during the time between those two events - an additional 282 

days. 

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1 365 days permitted under AEDPA. The significance of this is that even ifthe District 

2 Court were to disagree with this Court's analysis in Subsections 2-3, above, this Court 

3 would still recommend that the petition be dismissed. 

4 B. The Petitioner Has Not Demonstrated That He Is Entitled To Equitable 

Tolling 5 Though the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the majority of the 

6 time that his petitions were pending in state court, his federal habeas petition might be 

7 considered timely if he could demonstrate that he is eligible for equitable tolling. 

8 Equitable tolling is available to a petitioner when "(1) he has been pursuing his rights 

9 diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. 

10 DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418. However, "[e]quitable tolling will not be available 

11 in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary 

12 circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on 

13 time." Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 

14 1997) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States 

15 Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530,540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

16 Here, the petitioner has not moved for equitable tolling. Indeed, the petitioner 

17 

appears confused as to why the respondent raised the issue of equitable tolling in his 

18 briefing. See [Doc. 18, p. 3] ("It is unsure to petitioner why respondent cite equitable 

19 tolling claims.") Nonetheless, this Court has conducted an independent review of the 

20 record and concludes that nothing in the record demonstrates that the petitioner is 

21 entitled to equitable tolling. To the contrary, the high number of his state and federal 

22 filings to date suggest that the petitioner has had adequate access to legal resources in 

23 prison and the opportunity to prosecute his claims. Furthermore, a pro se prisoner's 

24 lack oflegal sophistication or inability to calculate AEDPA's statute of limitations is 

25 not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry 

26 

v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 

27 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[I]gnorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se 

28 prisoner, generally does not excuse prompt filing."). 

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1 IV. CONCLUSION 

2 For the reasons outlined above, this Court finds that the petitioner's federal 

3 habeas petition [Doc. 1] is untimely filed in contravention of AEDPA's one-year statute 

4 of limitations, and the petitioner is not entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling 

5 sufficient to cure the defect Accordingly, this Court recommends that the District 

6 Court grant the respondent's Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 15] 

7 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court issue an order (1) 

8 approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and, (2) granting the 

9 respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT any party may file written objections with 

11 the District Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than October 5. 2015. The 

12 document should be entitled "Objections to Report and Recommendation." 

13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT any reply to the objections shall be filed 

14 with the District Court and served on all parties no later than October 19. 2015. The 

15 parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 

16 the right to raise those objections on appeal of the District Court's order. See Turner 

17 v. Duncan, 158 F.3d449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Marfinezv. Ylsf, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

18 Cir.1991). 

19 

20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

21 Date:~, 2015 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

tates Magistrate Judge 

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