Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02718/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02718-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD BROMLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security,

1

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-2718 DB

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.2 

Plaintiff’s motion argues that the Administrative Law Judge’s treatment of the medical opinion 

evidence, subjective testimony, and step five conclusion were erroneous. 

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1 Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on June 17, 2019.

See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited by the court on July 30, 2019). 

Accordingly, Andrew Saul is substituted in as the defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding 

the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).

2 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See ECF Nos. 7 & 8.)

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For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 

the payment of benefits. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June of 2015, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) 

under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning on October 10, 

2014. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 15, 169-74.) Plaintiff’s alleged impairments included learning 

disability, back pain, and paranoia. (Id. at 193.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, (id. at 

103-07), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 111-15.) 

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing and a hearing was held before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May 19, 2017. (Id. at 33-74.) Plaintiff was represented by 

an attorney and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 33-35.) In a decision issued on

December 1, 2017, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 28.) The ALJ entered 

the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2019. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since October 10, 2014, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et 

seq.). 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: intellectual 

disability, unspecified learning disorder, degenerative disc disease

of the cervical and lumbar spines, and mild degenerative disc 

disease of the thoracic spine with scoliosis. (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform 

light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant is 

able to lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds 

occasionally; he is able to sit for six to eight hours of an eight hour 

workday; he is able to stand and/or walk for six to eight hours of an 

eight hour workday; he requires the ability to briefly change 

positions from sitting to standing, and vice versa, every thirty 

minutes, but he is able to remain at the work station while doing so;

he is precluded from climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; he is 

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limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; he is limited to 

occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; he is able to 

perform simple, repetitive tasks; he is limited to no more than 

occasional in-person interaction with the public[.]

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 

CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant was born [in] 1964 and was 50 years old, which is 

defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age, on the 

alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563).

8. The claimant has a marginal education and is able to communicate 

in English (20 CFR 404.1564).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of 

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-

41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 

CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from October 10, 2014, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)). 

(Id. at 17-28.)

On August 10, 2018, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s December 1, 2017 decision. (Id. at 1-5.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on October 9, 2018. (ECF. No. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

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466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 

1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If 

so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 

disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to 

perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 

the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

Plaintiff’s pending motion argues that the ALJ committed the following four principal 

errors: (1) the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error; (2) the ALJ’s 

treatment of the subjective testimony constituted error; (3) the ALJ improperly rejected lay 

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witness testimony; and (4) the ALJ’s step-five finding was not supported by substantial evidence. 

(Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 9-15.

3

)

I. Medical Opinion Evidence

The weight to be given to medical opinions in Social Security disability cases depends in 

part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or nonexamining health 

professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). “As a 

general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion 

of doctors who do not treat the claimant[.]” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This is so because a treating 

doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 

individual. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990).

The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be rejected only for 

clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of a treating or examining physician that is 

controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. “The opinion of a nonexamining 

physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 

of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” (Id. at 831.) Finally, although a 

treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to significant weight, “‘[t]he ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.’” Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661,

671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 

2009)). 

A. Dr. Jacklyn Chandler, Ph. D

Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the examining opinion of Dr. Jacklyn 

Chandler. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 9-10. The ALJ discussed Dr. Chandler’s opinion, stating:

3 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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In June 2015 Jacklyn L. Chandler, Ph.D.4performed a psychological 

disability evaluation on the claimant. Due to difficulty with reading 

and writing, Dr. Chandler relied on the claimant’s sister to provide 

some information. The claimant reported that he was independent 

with activities of daily living, and he could take the bus by himself,

drive a car, wash dishes, do laundry, prepare meals, shop for 

groceries unattended, and dress and groom himself. On examination,

the claimant appeared unkempt and he had limited vocabulary and 

compromised insight and judgment. Furthermore, the claimant 

demonstrated moderately to markedly decreased attention and 

concentration, he worked at a slow pace, and he was unable to read 

and complete his history form. However, the claimant had linear 

thought processes, logical thought content, and full affect. 

Additionally, he was cooperative, he displayed adequate effort, and 

he displayed adequate persistence.

Dr. Chandler administered the WAIS-IV to the claimant to assess his 

cognitive functioning. The claimant scored a 70 in verbal 

comprehension, 77 in perceptual reasoning, 69 in working memory,

71 in processing speed, and 67 overall. The claimant’s verbal 

comprehension, perceptual reasoning, and processing speed scores 

were in the borderline range and his working memory score and 

overall IQ were in the extremely low range. The claimant was also

assessed with the WSM-IV to test his memory and a Trail-Making 

Test to test his visual scanning speed and concentration. The 

claimant’s performance on the WSM-IV fell within the average 

range for all four categories suggesting adequate memory 

functioning. His performance on part A of the Trail-Making test fell 

in the moderate impaired range and his performance on part B fell in 

the markedly impaired range suggesting difficulties in the areas of 

visual scanning speed and concentration. 

(Tr. at 23.) 

The ALJ afforded Dr. Chandler’s opinion only “partial weight,” stating: 

Jacklyn L. Chandler, Ph.D. opined that the claimant is likely to have 

mild to moderate difficulty understanding, remembering, and 

carrying out simple job instructions, marked difficulty with complex 

instructions, moderate to marked difficulty maintaining attention and 

concentration, mild to moderate difficulty functioning under normal 

stress in a work setting, and moderate difficulty relating to and 

interacting with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. 

Additionally, the claimant’s difficulties in reading, spelling, and 

arithmetic are likely to interfere with tasks requiring these skills. The 

undersigned affords Dr. Chandler’s opinions partial weight. There 

is no medical evidence of record that supports the claimant’s 

allegations and the claimant’s behavior was within his volitional 

4 The opinions of medical specialists regarding the specialist’s area of expertise “are given more 

weight than the opinions of a nonspecialist.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir.

1996); see also Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Each rheumatologist’s 

opinion is given greater weight than those of the other physicians because it is an opinion of a 

specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty.”).

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control. Moreover, the claimant’s linear thought processes, logical 

thought content, and cooperative attitude, adequate effort and 

persistence, adequate memory functioning, and ability to take the bus 

by himself, drive a car, wash dishes, do laundry, prepare meals, shop 

for groceries unattended, and dress and groom himself, are 

inconsistent with a finding that the claimant has marked limitations 

maintaining attention and concentration, moderate difficulties 

understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple job 

instructions, and moderate difficulties functioning under normal 

stress in a work setting.

(Id. at 26.)

To assert in a vague and conclusory manner that there was “no medical evidence of 

record” to support Dr. Chandler’s opinion, before simply listing evidence the ALJ believed 

undermined Dr. Chandler’s opinion—such as plaintiff’s “cooperative attitude,” and ability to 

“wash dishes”—was erroneous. (Id.)

To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient 

objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions 

mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of 

specificity our prior cases have required, even when the objective 

factors are listed seriatim. The ALJ must do more than offer his 

conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain 

why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 

1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The ALJ must set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary 

support for his interpretation of the medical evidence.”); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

602 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Broad and vague” reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion do 

not suffice).

Moreover, 

[c]ourts have recognized that a psychiatric impairment is not as 

readily amenable to substantiation by objective laboratory testing as 

is a medical impairment and that consequently, the diagnostic 

techniques employed in the field of psychiatry may be somewhat less 

tangible than those in the field of medicine. In general, mental 

disorders cannot be ascertained and verified as are most physical 

illnesses, for the mind cannot be probed by mechanical devices in 

order to obtain objective clinical manifestations of mental illness . . . 

[W]hen mental illness is the basis of a disability claim, clinical and 

laboratory data may consist of the diagnoses and observations of 

professionals trained in the field of psychopathology. 

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Averbach v. Astrue, 731 F.Supp.2d 977, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Sanchez v. Apfel, 85 

F.Supp.2d 986, 992 (C.D. Cal. 2000)). 

Nonetheless, Dr. Chandler’s opinion was supported by medical evidence of record. In this 

regard, Dr. Chandler’s examination included testing that provided objective evidence in support 

of the opinion. Specifically, “WAIS-IV” testing found plaintiff’s “Verbal Comprehension 

Index,” “Perceptual Reasoning Index,” and “Processing Speed Index” score fell “within the 

borderline range.” (Tr. at 270.) Plaintiff’s “Working Memory Index” and “Full Scale IQ” scores 

fell within the “extremely low range.” (Id.) These scores, and “[c]linical observation,” suggested 

that plaintiff had “verbal intellectual ability within the borderline to extremely low range and 

visuomotor/visuospatial ability within the borderline range with moderately to markedly 

decreased attention and concentration and moderately to markedly impaired processing speed.”5 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff’s score on “Part A of the Trail-Making Test . . . was within the moderately 

impaired range,” while the score of the “Part B” test “was within the markedly impaired range.” 

(Id.) These scores were consistent with plaintiff having “difficulties in the areas of visual 

scanning speed and concentration.” (Id.)

With respect to the ALJ’s reliance on plaintiff’s ability to take the bus, drive a car, wash 

dishes, do laundry, prepare meals, shop for groceries, dress, and groom

[t]he critical differences between activities of daily living and 

activities in a full-time job are that a person has more flexibility in 

scheduling the former than the latter, can get help from other persons 

... and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as she 

would be by an employer. The failure to recognize these differences 

is a recurrent, and deplorable, feature of opinions by administrative 

law judges in social security disability cases.

Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly 

asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery 

shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her 

credibility as to her overall disability. One does not need to be utterly incapacitated in order to be 

5 Even defendant acknowledges that plaintiff “had borderline intellectual functioning” and could 

not “perform complex or higher functioning mental functions.” (Def.’s MSJ (ECF No. 17) at 7.) 

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disabled.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 

759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014), 759 F.3d at 1016 (citation omitted) (“[I]mpairments that 

would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will often 

be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day.”). 

Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ failed to offer a specific and legitimate, let alone 

clear and convincing, reason for rejecting Dr. Chandler’s opinion.

B. Dr. Alberto G. Lopez, M.D.

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the examining opinion offered by Dr. 

Alberto Lopez. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 10-11.) The ALJ discussed Dr. Lopez’s opinion, 

stating: 

Two years later, in April 2017, Alberto G. Lopez, M.D. completed 

an independent medical evaluation at the request of the claimant’s 

attorney. The claimant and his sister reported that the claimant could 

not read signs, he largely relied on his sister to care for him, he kept 

to himself, and his sister must encourage him to bathe and change 

clothes. On examination, the claimant appeared disheveled and

agitated with incoherent speech. He also exhibited unusual thought 

content and reported that he was followed at times. Moreover, he 

only recalled one out of three objects with delay, he was unable to 

perform serial sevens or calculate change, and he could not identify 

similarities. 

(Tr. at 23-24.)

The ALJ afforded Dr. Lopez’s opinion only “partial weight,” stating:

Alberto G. Lopez, M.D. opined that the claimant is unable to meet 

competitive standards or has not (sic) useful ability to function in all 

areas of mental ability and aptitudes needed to perform work,

including in areas of understanding, remember, and carrying out 

instructions and interacting with others. Dr. Lopez further opined 

that the claimant has marked limitations in activities of daily living,

maintaining social functioning, concentrating, persistence, and 

maintaining pace. Additionally, the claimant will miss more than 

four days of work per month. Finally, Dr. Lopez opined that the 

claimant is not able to tolerate the rigors of 8 hours per day or 40 

hours per week. The undersigned affords Dr. Lopez’s opinion partial 

weight. Despite his mental impairments the claimant worked for 

many years with (apparently) the same alleged mental deficits, he is 

not receiving treatment, and he was able to work an SVP 4 job for 

many years. Moreover, the claimant’s linear thought processes,

logical thought content, and cooperative attitude, adequate effort and 

persistence, adequate memory functioning, and ability to take the bus 

by himself, drive a car, wash dishes, do laundry, prepare meals, shop 

for groceries unattended, and dress and groom himself, are at odds 

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with a finding that the claimant is unable to meet competitive 

standards or has not (sic) useful ability to function in all areas of 

mental ability and aptitudes needed to perform work. Furthermore,

there is no evidence, such as recurrent medical treatment or chronic 

fatigue, to support a finding that the claimant would miss 4 days of

work per month or be unable to sustain a 40 hour work week.

(Id. at 26.)

Dr. Lopez, however, was aware of plaintiff’s prior work experience, and opined that 

plaintiff’s “functioning . . . has now declined.” (Id. at 300.) With respect to the ALJ’s finding 

that plaintiff was “not receiving treatment,” defendant argues that it was reasonable for the ALJ to 

rely on plaintiff’s failure to “receive mental health treatment.” (Def.’s MSJ (ECF No. 17) at 18-

19.) 

However, Dr. Lopez’s opinion found that plaintiff suffered “Intellectual Disability” and an 

“Unspecified Learning Disorder.” (Tr. at 299.) It is not clear what type of treatment the ALJ 

believed plaintiff should have sought for these impairments, and the ALJ did not provide any 

specificity. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has

. . . particularly criticized the use of a lack of treatment to reject 

mental complaints both because mental illness is notoriously 

underreported and because “it is a questionable practice to chastise 

one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in 

seeking rehabilitation.”

Regennitter v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1299-300 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

The final reason given by the ALJ for rejecting Dr. Lopez’s opinion were the same 

erroneous reasons offered in support of rejecting Dr. Chandler’s opinion—conclusory reliance on 

selective findings, plaintiff’s ability to do daily activities, and “no evidence”—which the court 

rejected above. 

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court finds that the ALJ failed to offer a 

specific and legitimate, let alone clear and convincing, reason for rejecting Dr. Lopez’s opinion.

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II. Subjective Testimony

A. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s treatment of plaintiff’s subjective testimony. (Pl.’s 

MSJ (ECF No. 12) at 12-14.) The Ninth Circuit has summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to 

assessing a claimant’s credibility as follows:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the 

symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the ALJ 

may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply because 

there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the 

degree of symptom alleged.

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so[.]

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

cases.” Moore v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). “At 

the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking[.]” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012).

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.”6 Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 

6

In March 2016, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p went into effect. “This ruling makes 

clear what our precedent already required: that assessments of an individual’s testimony by an 

ALJ are designed to ‘evaluate the intensity and persistence of symptoms after the ALJ finds that 

the individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to 

produce those symptoms,’ and not to delve into wide-ranging scrutiny of the claimant’s character 

and apparent truthfulness.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 679 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting SSR 

16-3p) (alterations omitted). 

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599 (9th Cir. 1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other 

things, the “[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] 

testimony or between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work 

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect 

of the symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 

(9th Cir. 2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 

(9th Cir. 1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record, the court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id.

Here, the ALJ summarized plaintiff’s testimony as follows:

The claimant testified to the following: he stopped working due to 

hernia pain, but he feels that he is unable to work due to back pain. 

He cannot read or write in English and he is limited to performing 

basic math. He has a driver’s license and drives every day to get 

away from the house. During the day, he walks around, watches 

television, and plays with his dogs. He can walk for 30 to 40 minutes 

at a time, stand for 2 hours at a time, sit for 45 minutes at a time, and

lift 5 pounds. He takes pain medications 3 to 4 days a week and 

smokes Marijuana on a daily basis, but he does not take any 

medication for mental conditions or for any other physical condition. 

He can follow a television show, shop for groceries, sweep, and 

vacuum. He can get along with others, but he typically keeps to 

himself and is easily frustrated. 

(Tr. at 22.)

The ALJ found that plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the symptoms alleged, but that plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical 

evidence and other evidence in the record for the reason explained in [the] decision.” (Id. at 23.) 

The ALJ then stated that, with respect to plaintiff’s “statements about the intensity persistence 

and limiting effects of his symptoms the evidence of record does not fully support the severity the 

claimant alleges.” (Id.) The ALJ then acknowledged that the record revealed that plaintiff had 

intellectual disability, unspecified learning disorder, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and 

lumbar spines, and mild degenerative disc disease of the thoracic spine with scoliosis. (Id.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to discuss the opinions of Dr. Chandler and Dr. Lopez discussed 

above, and the remainder of the medical opinion evidence without providing any explanation or 

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support for the ALJ’s vague and conclusory findings with respect to plaintiff’s testimony. The 

ALJ then concluded, again in a vague and conclusory manner, that “the medical evidence of 

record does not fully support the severity the claimant alleges but it does support the above 

residual functional capacity.” (Id. at 24.) 

The ALJ repeated this pattern with respect to plaintiff’s “mental limitations,” stating:

As for the claimant’s mental limitations, the evidence reveals that the 

claimant has intellectual disability and unspecified learning disorder. 

Evaluations reveal that that the claimant’s verbal Comprehension, 

perceptual reasoning, and processing speed scores are in the 

borderline range and his working memory score and overall IQ are 

in the extremely low range. Additionally, his performance on the 

Trail-Making indicates that he has difficulties in the areas of visual 

scanning speed and concentration. However, the claimant’s 

performance on the WSM-IV fell within the average range for all 

four categories, suggesting adequate memory functioning. 

Additionally, the claimant has linear thought processes, logical 

thought content, and cooperative attitude. Moreover, he displayed 

adequate effort and persistence. Therefore, despite his abnormal 

findings, the claimant is able to perform simple, repetitive tasks and 

have no more than occasional in-person interaction with the public.

(Id. at 25.) 

The ALJ then again discussed the opinions of Drs. Chandler and Lopez before stating “the 

above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the objective evidence and medical 

findings established in this record,” and that “[t]o the extent that the claimant alleges she (sic) 

cannot work within the residual functional capacity the undersigned find the allegations not 

entirely supported based upon the above discussions.” (Id. at 26.)

However, “after a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of 

medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity” of the symptoms. Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Putz v. Astrue, 371 Fed. Appx. 801, 802-03 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“Putz need not present objective medical evidence to demonstrate the severity of her 

fatigue.”); Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (“the ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony

. . . simply because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the degree of 

symptom alleged.”); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1991) (“If an adjudicator 

could reject a claim for disability simply because a claimant fails to produce medical evidence 

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supporting the severity of the pain, there would be no reason for an adjudicator to consider 

anything other than medical findings.”). 

Moreover, as noted above, to reject plaintiff’s testimony the ALJ needed to offer specific, 

clear, and convincing reasons. “This is not an easy requirement to meet[.]” Garrison, 759 F.3d at

1015. Here, the ALJ offered only vague and conclusory findings. In this regard, it is entirely 

unclear what specific testimony the ALJ accepted, what specific testimony the ALJ rejected, and 

what specific evidence the ALJ relied on in support of the decision to reject which specific 

portions of plaintiff’s testimony. For example, it is entirely unclear why the ALJ’s notation that 

plaintiff “displayed adequate effort and persistence,” supports the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff 

can tolerate occasional in-person interaction with the public. (Tr. at 25.)

Accordingly, the ALJ failed to provide a clear and convincing reason for rejecting 

plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff, therefore, is also entitled to summary judgment as to this claim. 

III. Lay Witness Testimony

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the lay witness testimony. (Pl.’s MSJ 

(ECF No. 14) at 13-15.) The testimony of lay witnesses, including family members and friends, 

reflecting their own observations of how the claimant’s impairments affect his activities must be 

considered and discussed by the ALJ. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288; 

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). Persons who see the claimant on a daily 

basis are competent to testify as to their observations. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298; Dodrill v. 

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1993). If the ALJ chooses to reject or discount the 

testimony of a lay witness, he or she must give reasons germane to each particular witness in 

doing so. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298; Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. 

The mere fact that a lay witness is a relative of the claimant cannot be a ground for 

rejecting the witness’s testimony. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1298; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1289. 

Moreover, “the reasons ‘germane to each witness’ must be specific.” Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 

1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

However, the ALJ may cite the same reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s statements to reject thirdparty statements where the statements are similar. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (approving 

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rejection of a third-party family member’s testimony, which was similar to the claimant’s, for the 

same reasons given for rejection of the claimant’s complaints).

Here, the ALJ discussed the lay witness testimony offered by plaintiff’s sister. (Tr. at 22.) 

That testimony described plaintiff as “unable to read or write,” unable to prepare meals,” needing 

assistance to manage finances, and spending most time alone. (Id.) The ALJ purportedly

afforded this testimony “some weight,” but did not provide any further elaboration. (Id. at 23.) 

The ALJ then simply stated that the lay witness was “not a medical expert” and that the testimony 

did “not amount to evidence that would change the determinations made” in the decision. (Id.) 

The ALJ added that “the degree of limitation contemplated here is inconsistent with the objective 

findings” discussed elsewhere in the opinion. (Id.)

First, because the ALJ’s rejection of plaintiff’s testimony was erroneous, the ALJ cannot 

rely on the rejection of plaintiff’s testimony to provide a germane reason to reject the lay witness 

testimony. See generally Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(“Because the ALJ did not make a legally sufficient adverse credibility finding with regard to 

Robbins’s own testimony, we cannot say with respect to Rodney’s testimony that no reasonable 

ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a different disability 

determination.”).

Moreover, that the lay witness is not a medical expert is not a germane reason. A lay 

witness by definition is not a medical expert. Nor can the ALJ rely on vague and conclusory 

references to inconsistencies with objective findings. The ALJ failed to provide any specificity 

and, therefore, the court cannot determine if the ALJ provided a germane reason for rejecting the 

lay witness testimony.

Accordingly, plaintiff is also entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

IV. Step-Five Error

Finally, plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding at step five of the sequential evaluation. 

(Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 15.) At step five of the sequential evaluation, “the Commissioner has 

the burden ‘to identify specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that a 

claimant can perform despite his identified limitations.’” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 845 

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(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)) (alterations 

omitted). The ALJ can meet her burden by either taking the testimony of a Vocational Expert 

(“VE”) or by referring to the grids. See Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Here, the ALJ relied on testimony from a VE. (Tr. at 27.) 

While an ALJ may pose a range of hypothetical questions to a VE based on alternate 

interpretations of the evidence, the hypothetical question that ultimately serves as the basis for the 

ALJ’s determination, i.e., the hypothetical question that is predicated on the ALJ’s final residual 

functional capacity assessment, (“RFC”), must account for all of the limitations and restrictions of 

the particular claimant. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228. “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not reflect all of 

the claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to support a 

finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Id. (citation and quotation 

marks omitted); see also Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2011) (“Because neither the hypothetical nor the answer properly set forth all of 

Taylor’s impairments, the vocational expert’s testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence to 

support the ALJ’s findings.”). 

Because of the ALJ’s errors with respect to the treatment of the opinions of Drs. Chandler 

and Lopez, plaintiff’s testimony, and the lay witness testimony, the ALJ’s questioning of the VE 

did not account for all of plaintiff’s limitations. Accordingly, plaintiff is also entitled to summary 

judgment on the claim that the ALJ committed an error at step five of the sequential evaluation. 

CONCLUSION

After having found error, “‘[t]he decision whether to remand a case for additional 

evidence, or simply to award benefits[,] is within the discretion of the court.’” Trevizo, 871 F.3d 

at 682 (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). A case may be 

remanded under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

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claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. 

Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains 

“flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as 

to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 

1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court 

concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not 

remand with a direction to provide benefits.”); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,

775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is 

uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

Here, further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose as the record 

contains ample evidence, testimony, and medical opinion evidence. The ALJ failed to provide 

legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions of two examining physicians, plaintiff’s

testimony, and the corresponding lay witness testimony. If the improperly discredited evidence—

taken separately let alone cumulatively—were credited as true the ALJ would be required to find 

plaintiff disabled on remand, as evidenced by the VE’s testimony. (Tr. at 73.) “Such a finding by 

the vocational expert is a sufficient basis upon which to remand for determination of benefits.” 

Wechel v. Berryhill, 713 Fed. Appx. 559, 562 (9th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, the record as whole 

does not create serious doubt as to whether plaintiff is disabled. See Moe v. Berryhill, 731 Fed. 

Appx. 588, 592 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Remand for immediate award of benefits is appropriate in this 

case because all three factors of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, leaving no ‘serious doubt’ as 

to Moe’s disability.”).

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is granted;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is denied;

3. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed; 

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4. This matter is remanded for the payment of benefits; and

5. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for plaintiff and close this case.

Dated: March 10, 2020

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.soc sec\bromley2718.ord

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