Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02625/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02625-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

PATRICE AND JULIE MISSUD,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

D.R. HORTON, ET AL.,

Defendants. 

No. C 07-2625 SBA

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 6, 24, 29, 30]

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss [Docket No. 6] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure filed by defendants D.R. Horton, Inc., DHI Mortgage Company Ltd. and the

six individuals named in the complaint. After reading and considering the arguments presented by the

parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See FED.R.CIV. P. 78.

For the reasons that follow, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the purchase of a single family home in Nevada in November 2003 by the

plaintiffs, Patrice and Julie Missud. The defendants are D.R. Horton, Inc. (Horton), a large

corporate homebuilder, its mortgage subsidiary DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd. (DHI), and six

individuals associated with one or both of these companies. 

On November 11, 2003, Patrice and Julie Missud entered into a written sales contract with

Horton for the purchase of a residence at 1353 Romanesca Drive in Henderson, Nevada. See Docket

No. 10, Ex. A. The agreement required a down payment of approximately $40,000 and the

procurement of a loan of around $362,000. Id. In February 2004, Patrice Missud received a letter

from DHI, Horton’s mortgage subsidiary, stating he was not fulfilling the loan terms of his purchase

agreement. See Docket Nos. 9, Ex. A; 7, Ex. JN1. The letter provided notice that, if Missud could

not provide Horton or DHI with proof they were approved for a mortgage loan, he might put his

deposit money at risk. See Letter from Horton to Patrice Missud (Docket No. 9, Ex. A). Although it

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is unclear whether Missud used DHI or an outside lender to secure his loan, Missud states in his

complaint that he “fully performed under the terms of the Contract,” and there is no evidence in the

record that Missud in fact lost any portion of his initial deposit. See Docket No. 1 at 22.

On August 22, 2005, Missud filed a complaint in San Francisco Superior Court alleging

intentional infliction of emotion distress, claiming the defendants’ letter caused him “severe

abdominal pain and nausea for which he was intravenously administered narcotics for approximately

4 hours.” Compl. at 2, Missud v. Horton, et al., No. 05-444247 (filed Aug. 22, 2005). The

defendants responded by filing a motion to quash service or, in the alternative, a motion to dismiss

on the ground of forum non conveniens, based on the argument that all the events giving rise to the

claim occurred in Nevada. Ross Decl., ¶ 3. After Missud failed to respond to the defendants’

motion, San Francisco Superior Court James Warren ordered the entire case dismissed without

prejudice on November 9, 2005. Nov. 9, 2005 Order, Missud v. Horton, et al., No. 05-444247.

On December 9, 2005, Missud refiled his emotional distress complaint in San Francisco

Superior Court. Compl., Missud v. Horton, et al., No. 05-447499 (filed Dec. 9, 2005). The

defendants again filed a motion to quash service that was sustained as to all defendants except

Horton, which agreed to waive service to reach the merits of whether the court had personal

jurisdiction over Horton. On April 25, 2006, Judge Warren sustained the defendants’ motion to

quash service and again ordered the case dismissed without prejudice as to Horton, based on lack of

personal jurisdiction. April 25, 2006 Order, Missud v. Horton, et al., No. 05-447499. Missud

continued filing a variety of motions until the San Francisco Superior Court finally ordered the

entire case dismissed on January 11, 2007. Jan. 11, 2007 Order, Missud v. Horton, et al., No. 05-

447499.

On October 23, 2006, several months before the dismissal of Missud’s second emotional

distress complaint, Missud and his wife filed a third lawsuit against the same defendants, this time

alleging two counts of fraud, intentional misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory

relief and restitution. Compl., Missud et al. v. Horton, et al., No. 06-457207 (filed Oct. 23, 2006). 

The defendants once again filed a motion to quash, which was granted by Judge Busch on February

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1 The California statute states that “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not

inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10.

3

15, 2007. On the same day, the court ordered Missud’s entire case dismissed, and also ordered the

defendants’ motion to declare Missud a vexatious litigant to be taken off calender in light of the

court’s ruling on the motion to quash. Feb. 15, 2007 Order, Missud et al. v. Horton, et al., No. 06-

457207.

Missud then filed the present complaint in federal district court on May 17, 2007. See

Docket No. 1. In addition to the claims alleged in the three state court suits, Missud also alleges

retaliation under 18 U.S.C. § 1513 based upon his allegation that the defendants have interfered with

his contracting and legal practices by contacting the Nevada agency regulating engineers and the

California State Bar. Id.; See Docket No. 20 at 8. Missud is licensed to practice law in the state of

California. See Docket No. 21, ¶ 1.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant must be pursuant to constitutional principles of due process and the law of the state where

the district court sits. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1990). California Code of

Civil Procedure section 410.10, governing personal jurisdiction, is coextensive with federal due

process requirements, meaning that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent

allowed by constitutional due process principles.1 See Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1110

(9th Cir. 2002); Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). Under the Due

Process Clause, a nonresident defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state

such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006); Tuazon v.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 723

(2006). This means that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state must be such

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that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. See World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 

The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the

defendant. Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154; Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d

797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). If the Court rules without holding an evidentiary hearing, dismissal for

lack of personal jurisdiction is appropriate only if the plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing

of personal jurisdiction. Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1168; Myers v. Bennet Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068,

1071 (9th Cir. 2001). Although the plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of his

complaint, uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true in determining whether

the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at

800; American Tel. & Tel., 94 F.3d at 588-89. Conflicts between parties over statements contained

in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800; see also

Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Unless directly

contravened, [the plaintiff’s] version of the facts is taken as true, and conflicts between facts

contained in declarations submitted by the two sides must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor for

purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists”). 

ANALYSIS

A. Personal jurisdiction

There are two types of personal jurisdiction, specific and general, either of which will sustain

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie

Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996); Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 587

(9th Cir. 1993). A court may exercise specific jurisdiction where the suit arises out of or is related to

the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. 

See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1169. In a

controversy unrelated to a defendant’s contacts with the forum, a court may exercise general

jurisdiction only where the defendant has substantial or continuous and systematic contact with the

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state. See Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1169; Easter v. American West Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 960 (9th Cir.

2004).

1. Horton and DHI

The defendants contend they do not have sufficient contacts with California to support the

conclusion they have purposely directed their business to the forum state or purposely availed

themselves of California law. Horton is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Texas, and

conducts business in Nevada but not in California. See Docket No. 10 at ¶ 3. Horton’s vice

president and legal counsel states that Horton has no offices in California. Id. Likewise, DHI is a

Texas limited partnership that, at the time it worked on procuring Missud’s mortgage loan, was

operating under the name CH Mortgage Company I, Ltd., which transacted business only in Nevada. 

See Docket No. 10, ¶ 6.

Missud offers two arguments to sustain his burden of showing this Court has personal

jurisdiction over Horton and DHI. The first is that both companies “are residents and do business

within the Ninth Circuit in Nevada.” Docket No. 1 at 2. This argument fails because the territorial

region of the Ninth Circuit has no bearing upon the test of whether a nonresident defendant has

sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy,

453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006); Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1169

(9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 723 (2006) (emphasis added). It is the state of California

that represents the forum in this case – not the territory within the Ninth Circuit.

Missud’s second argument supporting personal jurisdiction for Horton and DHI relies on his

statement that “the corporate Defendants have contracted with over 40 California consumer

residents.” Docket No. 20 at 7. Although Missud does not dispute that these transactions have no

relation to the incidents giving rise to this claim, the plaintiff can still establish general personal

jurisdiction by showing the nonresident defendants have substantial or continuous and systematic

contact with the state. See Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1169; Easter v. American West Fin., 381 F.3d 948,

960 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Missud’s bald assertion, however, lacks any evidentiary support. Nothing in the record, such

as a declaration or affidavit, sheds light on whether these “40 California consumer residents” even

exist, let alone whether they transacted with the defendants in a substantial or continuous and

systematic way. Therefore Missud fails to sustain his burden to show this Court has personal

jurisdiction over the two corporate defendants, and the motion to dismiss must be granted in favor of

Horton and DHI. 

2. The six individual defendants

 Missud also claims this Court has personal jurisdiction over six individuals associated with

either Horton or DHI. See Docket No. 1 at 2. Annie Schankin, Michael Mason and Daniel Callihan,

three defendants employed by either Horton or DHI, work and reside in Nevada, and have no

contacts at all with California. See Docket Nos. 12 at 2; 9 at 2; 13 at 2. Missud alleges other

California families, the “Yoons” and the “Songs,” had direct contacts with Schankin, Mason and

Callihan during negotiations for their own home purchases. See Docket No. 20 at 9. But Missud

offers no proof of these contacts. Since Missud fails to offer any evidence rebutting the lack of

minimum contacts between California and Schankin, Mason and Callihan, these three defendants

must be dismissed from the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

A similar scenario exists for the three corporate officers named in the complaint: Donald

Horton, Donald Tomnitz and James Frasure. Horton is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of

Horton, Tomnitz is Horton’s Chief Executive Officer and Frasure is the president of Horton’s Las

Vegas division. See Docket Nos. 10, ¶ 9; 11, ¶ 1. Neither Horton nor Tomnitz had any involvement

in Missud’s real estate transaction, nor does either man reside or work in California. See Docket No.

10, ¶ 9. Likewise, Frasure lives and works in Nevada, and had no involvement in the day-to-day

handling of Missud’s real estate and mortgage transactions. See Docket No. 11, ¶¶ 2-3. As with the

other individual defendants, Missud offers no proof that Horton, Tomnitz or Frasure had any

contacts with California. Missud’s conclusory statements in his opposition papers, such as “[a]ll

Board members inclusive of both Tomnitz and Horton are responsible for the contents of their

contracts to which they systematically and continuously bind California consumers and other

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consumers nationwide,” fail to establish any facts supporting this Court’s personal jurisdiction over

these defendants. For these reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted in favor of the six individual

defendants.

B. Forum non conveniens

The defendants argue that even if personal jurisdiction exists, the complaint should be

dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens. A district court has discretion to decline to

exercise jurisdiction in a case where litigation in a foreign forum would be more convenient for the

parties. Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lueck

v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,

504 (1947)). In dismissing an action on forum non conveniens grounds, a court determines 1)

whether an adequate alternative forum exists, and 2) whether the balance of private and public

interest factors favors dismissal. Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002);

Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1142 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n. 22, 257 (1981);

Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507-09; Ceramic Corp. of America v. Inka Maritime Corp., 1 F.3d 947, 949

(9th Cir.1993). 

The private interests considered in determining whether to dismiss a case on forum non

conveniens grounds include 1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, 2) the availability of

compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses and the cost of obtaining attendance of

willing ones, 3) the possibility of viewing premises, if appropriate and 4) all other practical problems

that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Menken v. Emm, WL 2713139 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508); see Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 973

(9th Cir. 2002). Public factors include administrative difficulties from court congestion; the local

interest in having local controversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity

case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of

unnecessary problems in conflict of laws; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated

forum with jury duty. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); Lueck, 236 F.3d at

1147.

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In this case, an adequate alternative forum exists in Nevada because all corporate and

individual defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in that state. An important private interest

to consider in this case – perhaps the most important one – is the “relative ease of access to sources

of proof.” Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. Nine of out of ten of Missud’s claims involve state causes of

action related to fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and personal injury. See Docket

No. 1. By their nature, these claims place significant focus on the representations of the individual

employees of Horton and DHI, and their interactions with Missud. All of these employees or former

employees reside in Nevada. As noted above in the discussion of personal jurisdiction, the

defendants’ residence in the territory of the Ninth Circuit is irrelevant when considering the

difficulty in compelling witnesses to appear in a California district court. Missud’s assertion to the

contrary that “this Court can compel the availability of all witnesses, willing or not” is a

misstatement of law. See Docket No. 20 at 14.

Additionally, the state of Nevada has a far greater interest than California in suits involving

the conveyance of real property located in Nevada. The Nevada brokers, loan agents and real estate

agents involved in Missud’s transaction are all regulated by Nevada law. In his complaint, Missud

himself premises his fourth case of action, for breach of fiduciary duty, on Nevada state law. See

Docket No. 1 at 21. The purchase contract signed by Missud states that the agreement “shall be

construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada.” See Docket No. 10, Ex. A, Section

19(I).

For the reasons stated above, the district court in Nevada that presides over the region

including the real property that is the subject of this transaction is a more proper forum than this

Court. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted on the grounds of forum non conveniens.

C. Statutes of limitations

A statute of limitations defense may be properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Hyatt

Chalet Motels, Inc. v. Carpenters Local, 1065 430 F.2d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1970); Suckow Borax

Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 204 (9th Cir. 1951). Where there is no specific

federal statute, federal courts will apply the state statute of limitations. Intl. Union of Operating

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2

Defendants acknowledge they have not done a choice-of-law analysis to determine if the contract is

governed by Nevada or California law. The limitations period, however, is the same in both states for

claims of fraud. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(3)(d). The periods are also the same for emotion distress

claims. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e).

9

Engineers v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 350 F.2d 936, 938-939 (9th Cir. 1965).

1. The fraud claims

The defendants argue that Missud’s first three causes of action -- for fraud in the inducement,

fraudulent concealment and intentional misrepresentation -- should be barred by the applicable state

statutes of limitations. In California, a plaintiff must bring an action within three years “for relief on

the ground of fraud or mistake.”2 Cal. Code Civ. P. 338(d). The statute begins to run when “the

plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the underlying facts to his cause of action.” 

Solomon v. North American Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998).

Missud alleges in his complaint that on February 19, 2004, “D.R. Horton Inc. received

Plaintiffs’ certified, return receipt letters detailing the extensive fraud regarding the transaction of

the property.” Docket No. 1 at 6. In his opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Missud

explains that “since allegations for fraud must be pled with ‘particularity’ as per FRCP Rule 9, the

Plaintiff intentionally did not at that time claim any fraud.” Docket No. 20 at 11. Essentially

Missud concedes that, while he was aware of facts constituting an action of fraud as early as

February 2004, he made a conscious decision not to file a suit at that time based on his interpretation

of a procedural court rule. Federal Rule 9, which governs how a fraud claim must be pled, has no

relation to the rule governing when the statute of limitations begins running on a state fraud claim. 

Since Missud has admitted he was aware of facts constituting fraud as far back as February 2004,

and he filed the present action on May 17, 2007, California law bars his fraud-based claims in this

suit. 

2. Emotional distress claims

Defendants also argue that Missud’s sixth and seventh causes of action, for intentional

infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress, are likewise barred by

the applicable statute of limitations. California law sets two years as the period for emotional

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distress claims. Cal. Code Civ. P. 335(1); Pugliese v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1444, 1450

(Cal. Ct. App. 2007). In emotional distress claims, “the statute of limitations begins to run once the

plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of outrageous conduct on the part of the

defendant.” Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., 4 Cal. App. 4th 857, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).

In February of 2004, Missud alleges he received a letter from the defendants that caused him

“severe emotional distress, aggravating his normally benign congenital condition which required

immediate medical intervention within three hours [sic] receipt of letter.” Compl. at 24. Thus while

Missud concedes that his personal injury occurred in February 2004, he did not file the present

complaint until May 2007, long after the applicable statute of limitations had run. Missud offers no

legal support for his contention that his ongoing injury, in the form of kidney stones caused by the

emotional distress initiated by the defendants, bars application of the statute of limitations. When a

plaintiff alleges a continuing violation, “an overt act by the defendant is required to restart the statute

of limitations and the statute runs from the last overt act.” Columbia Steel Casting Co., Inc. v.

Portland General Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427, 1444 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Pace Industries, Inc. v.

Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 240 (9th Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, Missud’s emotional distress

claims must be dismissed as barred by California law.

Finally, prior judicial actions “do not toll the statute of limitations, no matter how close their

relationship to the one at bar.” Pace Industries, 813 F.2d at 240.

D. Defendants’ objections to plaintiffs’ evidence 

The defendants objected to certain parts of Missud’s declaration and to two pieces of

evidence: 1) a San Francisco police report detailing an act of vandalism to Missud’s car, and 2) a

declaration by Missud related to a letter he received from Horton stating it would contact the

California State Bar Association if Missud continued the activities alleged in the letter. See Docket

Nos. 29, 30. Neither of these pieces of evidence has any bearing on the narrow question of whether

this Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Horton’s letter stating what it

might do in the future fails to shed any light on whether it has sufficient minimum contacts with the

state of California. Additionally, the parts of Missud’s declaration objected to by the defendants

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were not considered in this discussion. For these reasons, this evidence was not considered and the

defendants’ objections are overruled as moot.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss [Docket No. 6] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is

GRANTED. Defendants’ objections to plaintiffs’ evidence [Docket Nos. 24, 29, 30] are

OVERRULED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 30, 2007 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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