Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00513/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Julian Mendoza, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 09-01406 PHX SRB

v. ) CIV 11-00513 PHX SRB(MEA)

)

United States of America, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

Plaintiff/Respondent. )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On or about March 18, 2011, Mr. Julian Mendoza

(“Movant”) filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Respondent filed a

response to Movant’s motion to vacate or set aside his sentence

on October 27, 2011. See Civil Doc. 15.

I Procedural History

Movant and five co-defendants were arrested on November

3, 2009. On November 4, 2009, a complaint was filed charging

Movant and his co-defendants with conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine. See

Criminal Doc. 1. On November 10, 2009, a federal grand jury

returned a three count indictment against Movant and his codefendants, charging one count of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine (Count 1),

and one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute

Case 2:11-cv-00513-SRB Document 16 Filed 12/08/11 Page 1 of 13
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5 kilograms or more of cocaine (Count 2), and possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Count 3).

See Criminal Doc. 17. 

On October 4, 2010, pursuant to a written plea

agreement lodged on October 4, 2010, see Criminal Doc. 163,

Movant entered a guilty plea on a lesser included offense of

Count 1 of the indictment. See Criminal Doc. 162 & Doc. 164.

The lessor offense was conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. See Criminal Doc. 163.

The plea agreement noted the maximum sentence possible

for this crime was forty years imprisonment and that the

statutory minimum sentence was five years imprisonment. See id.

The written plea agreement provided that Movant would be

sentenced to no more than the “high end” of the sentencing range

provided by the “final advisory guideline range” as determined

by the Court. Criminal Doc. 163 & Doc. 394. The plea agreement

stipulated the guideline range would reflect Movant’s possession

of a weapon in furtherance of the count of conviction.

See Criminal Doc. 394. The plea agreement also stipulated that

Movant would be allowed to argue “sentence entrapment” at his

sentencing hearing and that imposition of a mandatory minimum

sentence was not appropriate. Id. The plea agreement provided

that, however, Movant would not be allowed to appeal an

unfavorable decision by the Court on the issue of imposition of

a mandatory minimum sentence. Id.

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The plea agreement further states:

The defendant waives any and all motions,

defenses, probable cause determinations, and

objections which the defendant could assert

to the indictment or information or to the

Court’s entry of judgment against the

defendant and imposition of sentence upon the

defendant, providing the sentence is

consistent with this agreement. The

defendant further waives (1) any right to

appeal the Court’s entry of judgment against

defendant; (2) any right to appeal the

imposition of sentence upon defendant under

Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742

(sentence appeals); and (3) any right to

collaterally attack defendant’s conviction

and sentence under Title 28, United States

Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral

attack. The defendant acknowledges that this

waiver shall result in the dismissal of any

appeal or collateral attack the defendant

might file challenging his conviction or

sentence in this case.

Id.

On January 3, 2011, before his sentencing and three

months after signing the plea agreement, Movant filed a pro se

motion seeking to change counsel and seeking to withdraw from

his plea agreement and asking the Court for a trial. See

Criminal Doc. 322. On January 21, 2011, Movant sent a letter to

the Court referencing his prior pro se motion and requesting a

change of counsel and again asking to withdraw from his plea

agreement. See Criminal Doc. 334. 

On February 3, 2011, Movant filed another pro se motion

asking to withdraw from the plea agreement, citing his counsel’s

ineffective representation. See Criminal Doc. 346. On February

8, 2011, Movant, through counsel, filed a motion seeking

resolution of the issue of Movant’s counsel. See Criminal Doc.

351. On March 7, 2011, Movant, through counsel, filed a motion

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seeking to withdraw from his guilty plea. See Criminal Doc.

366. On March 7, 2011, Movant, through counsel, also filed

objections to the presentence report and a motion seeking a

downward departure from the statutory sentence and applicable

sentencing guideline range. See Criminal Doc. 367 & Doc. 368.

At Movant’s sentencing hearing on March 14, 2011, he

requested he be allowed to withdraw his motions seeking to

withdraw from the plea agreement and his motions to change

counsel, which request was granted by the Court. See Criminal

Doc. 386. At his sentencing Movant’s final adjusted guideline

sentencing range was determined to be 188 to 235 months. See

Response (Civil Doc. 15), Exh. 2. At that time the Court

granted Movant’s motion at Criminal Doc. 368, seeking a variance

from the statutory sentence. See id. Movant was sentenced to

a term of 78 months imprisonment, with credit for time served

prior to the date of sentencing. Id.

In his section 2255 motion Movant asserts his counsel

was ineffective because he allegedly misrepresented Movant’s

potential sentence. Movant also contends that the government

improperly withheld information regarding a confidential

informant. Movant further argues he is entitled to relief

because his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate

the issue of the confidential informant. Movant also contends

that he was entrapped into committing the crime of conviction.

In response, Respondent argues:

Defendant waived his right to assert a

Section 2255 motion in his plea agreement.

Further, at his sentencing, defendant moved

to withdraw his two pro se motions that, as

will be discussed shortly, contained the same

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allegations that are found in his Section

2255 motion, thereby waiving these specific

issues from consideration. Lastly, there was

no discovery violation for his counsel to

investigate. None of defendant’s assertions

have any merit, nor are they borne out by the

record.

Civil Doc. 15 at 4.

II Analysis

Waiver of the right to a collateral attack

Respondent asserts that this section 225 action must be

dismissed because Movant waived his right to collaterally attack

his conviction and sentence in the written plea agreement. The

plea agreement signed by Movant expressly waived his right to

collaterally attack any matter pertaining to Movant’s conviction

and sentence if the sentence imposed was consistent with the

written terms of the agreement. The sentence imposed on Movant

was consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. Because

the sentence imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement,

the plea agreement is valid. Therefore, Movant is bound by the

plea agreement’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action, his section 2255 motion may be summarily denied.

See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543,

2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled that a voluntary and

intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has

been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally

attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the context of a direct

appeal wherein the Movant waived his right to directly appeal or

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collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a plea

agreement); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

A defendant’s waiver of his right to a direct appeal

and a section 2255 action is enforceable if the language of the

waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised,

and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. See United

States v. Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005).

However, a plea agreement which waives the Movant’s right to

collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable if the

waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Washington v. Lampert, 422

F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2005). See also United States v.

White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). A collateral attack

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating a plea

agreement may be brought notwithstanding a waiver of this right

in a plea agreement if the agreement was involuntary or

unknowing or where the agreement was otherwise unlawful. See

United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.

2001)(“[A] waiver of appeal may not be enforced against a

section 2255 petitioner who claims that ineffective assistance

of counsel rendered that waiver unknowing or involuntary.”);

Bridgeman v. United States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

At Movant’s sentencing hearing, in direct response to

the Court’s query regarding Movant’s previous request to change

counsel, Movant informed the Court that he had read the plea

agreement and sentencing report and discussed them with his

counsel and that he was satisfied with his counsel’s

representation. Civil Doc. 15, Exh. 5 at 6-7. Movant’s

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contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the

plea agreement carry substantial weight in determining if his

entry of a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See United

States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991); United States

v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that “a

straightforward and simple ‘Yes, your Honor’ is sufficient to

bind a Movant to [the] consequences [of a plea agreement].”).

Additionally, because he was adequately informed of the

consequences of his plea, Movant’s guilty plea can be considered

voluntary and knowing. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,

242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969). The undersigned concludes

Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and made intelligently. See

Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986); United

States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be

denied and dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994).

Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

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been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

See also United States v. Thomas, 417 F. 3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.

2005).

The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to “a

reasonably competent attorney, whose advice is within the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044-45

(1984) (internal quotations omitted). In order to find that

Movant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and

grant him relief on this claim pursuant to section 2255 the

Court must conclude counsel’s performance was deficient and that

the deficient performance prejudiced Movant. See United States

v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2011). Movant

bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the

Court can conclude his counsel’s representation was

unconstitutionally ineffective. Id. In the context of a

defendant who pleads guilty, to be entitled to relief, the

movant must establish that, but for his counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance, the movant would have chosen not to plead

guilty but to proceed to trial. See, e.g., Bethel v. United

States, 458 F.3d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 2006).

Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is

unreasonable, or not “within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

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S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be “highly deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. See also Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 248-49 (4th Cir.

2002). Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Ferreira-Alameda,

815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Molina,

934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Movant asserts his plea was “unlawfully induced”

because his defense counsel told him he would receive a sentence

of “0-5 years” and that his sentence would be based upon

“Sentencing Entrapment and Robbery guidelines.” Movant contends

his counsel encouraged him to take the plea because a jury would

not believe that Movant had been entrapped into committing the

crime. See Civil Doc. 1 at 5. 

Movant’s counsel was not unconstitutionally ineffective

because he allegedly advised Movant that a jury would probably

find him guilty notwithstanding an entrapment defense. As noted

by Respondent, the Court had occasion to evaluate the argument

that Movant was entrapped in the context of another codefendant’s trial, other co-defendants’ pleadings, and Movant’s

counsel’s statements prior to and at the sentencing hearing. 

Additionally, had he not accepted the plea agreement

and proceeded to trial, Movant faced a sentence substantially in

excess of the 78 month sentence imposed. Respondent notes:

Based upon the drug quantity, had defendant

been convicted at trial of Count 3 and either

Count 1 or Count 2, the district court would

have been required by statute to sentence

defendant to no less than 15 years (180

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months). In fact, as detailed in defendant’s

Presentence report, based upon drug quantity

and upward adjustments for body armor and

firearms, his post-trial advisory guideline

sentencing range would have been 322 to 387

months, reflecting of a guideline range of

262 to 327 months prison for Counts 1 and 2,

coupled with an mandatory minimum additional

60 consecutive months for Count 3.

Civil Doc. 15 at 11.

The plea agreement specified that Movant would be

sentenced at the “high end” of the applicable sentencing

guideline range, which was determined to be 188 to 235 months.

Movant’s counsel’s efforts resulted in the Court agreeing to

depart downward from the statutory and sentencing guideline

sentence and Movant was sentenced to a term of 78 months

imprisonment, a vastly shorter time than the 235 months that

would be allowed by the guideline range and plea agreement and

a vastly shorter term of incarceration than the 40 years

possible if Movant had gone to trial on this charge alone.

Additionally, the plea agreement allowed Movant to challenge his

conviction based on the theory that Movant was entrapped.

Movant has not established that his counsel’s advice

with regard to the potential sentence he faced if he accepted

the plea was unconstitutionally deficient or prejudicial. “To

establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on

alleged erroneous advice regarding a guilty plea, a petitioner

must demonstrate more than a ‘mere inaccurate prediction.’”

Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 2004),

quoting Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1986).

Defense counsel’s alleged erroneous predictions as to the likely

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sentence following a guilty plea, “are deficient only if they

constitute ‘gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome’ of

a plea bargain ‘combined with ... erroneous advice on the

probable effects of going to trial.’” Id., quoting United

States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990).

Furthermore, if the defendant was informed prior to entering his

guilty plea of the potential sentence he could receive, he

cannot establish prejudice from counsel’s incorrect prediction

as to his sentence. See Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998,

1003-4 (9th Cir. 2007). See also United States v. Garcia, 909

F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that an erroneous

sentence prediction “does not entitle a defendant to challenge

his guilty plea”); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162

(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that an inaccurate sentence prediction

was not prejudicial).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, in

the context of a defendant who pleads guilty, an attorney’s

performance may only deemed unconstitutionally deficient when

counsel “grossly” mischaracterizes the likely sentence to be

received when counseling the defendant to plead guilty. See

Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990).

In cases where the Ninth Circuit has found gross

mischaracterization the sentence received by the defendant was

of a different order of magnitude than what Movant asserts in

this matter as constituting counsel’s deficient performance.

Compare Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994),

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Morris v.

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Woodford, 229 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2000) (three months

predicted; ten years imposed); Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865.

III Conclusion

Movant waived his right to collaterally attack his

convictions and sentences in his plea agreement. Movant has not

established that his waiver of these rights was not knowing and

voluntary. Additionally, Movant has not established that he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel because

his counsel allegedly misrepresented the length of the sentence

which was imposed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Mendoza’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

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Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 7th day of December, 2011.

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