Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00361/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00361-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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- 1 - 07cv0361-LAB (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC E. QUINTON,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv0361-LAB (WMc)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE

vs. OF APPEALABILITY

I. CLAY, Warden,

Respondent.

On August 31, 2009, the Court denied as untimely Petitioner’s request for a writ of

habeas corpus. Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal and requested a certificate of

appealability (“COA”).

A COA will issue only if Petitioner can show not only that his petition states valid

constitutional claims, but also that reasonable jurists would find this Court's procedural ruling

debatable. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, Petitioner filed or attempted to file two habeas petitions in state court. He

argues he first submitted a petition for mailing on August 30, 2005 and submitted a second

petition on October 14, 2005. The state court first received the petition submitted October

14, and received the other petition in December, 2005. The state court found the petition

it received in December was the second one Petitioner filed, and relied on this finding both

at the Superior Court level and the Court of Appeal level. 

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 The reason for Respondent’s failure to raise this specific argument appears to be 1

the change in the California Rules of Court, Rule 29.4(b)(2)(C) (later renumbered as Rule

8.532(b)(2)(C)), which provided as of January 1, 2003, the California Supreme Court’s denial

of a writ of habeas corpus is final on filing. See Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1125

n.7(9th Cir. 2009). Under the old rule, the limitations period would have begun to run thirty

days after the state supreme court denied the writ, or February 16, 2006. Under that regime,

Petitioner’s arguments might have succeeded.

- 2 - 07cv0361-LAB (WMc)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), a state court’s findings of fact can only be set aside on

clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner submitted substantial evidence in support of his

position, but the Court examined this in detail and found it did not meet the “clear and

convincing” standard. (See Order of March 17, 2008, 3:7–7:5.) Petitioner was then

permitted to conduct to discovery to gather any additional evidence he could to support his

claim, but he failed to find any.

As it turned out, the question of whether Petitioner first filed his state habeas petition

August 30 or October 14, 2005 is moot. Even if August 30 were the true filing date, his

petition is still late and thus time-barred under AEDPA. Magistrate Judge McCurine made

findings regarding the dates of various events. Except for the Petitioner’s argument that he

filed his first state habeas petition in August rather than October, he did not object to these

findings. Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 14, 2004. (Report and

Recommendation of Nov. 28, 2007 at 4.) Thus, as of August 30, 2005, 349 days of the

limitations period had passed. After the California Supreme Court denied his petition on

January 17, 2007, he waited until at least February 18, 2007 to file his federal habeas

petition. (Id. at 5.) This puts his federal petition well beyond the limitations period, and he

has raised no other adequate basis for tolling. (See Order of Aug. 31, 2009 at 5:1–25

(calculating running of limitations period); see also Report and Recommendation of Nov. 28,

2007 at 16:9–17:3 (unobjected-to findings that alleged mailroom delays and lockdowns did

not delay Petitioner’s filing of his federal petition).)

Even though Respondent addressed Petitioner’s arguments without specifically

pointing out the federal petition was untimely in any event, this defense has not been 1

waived and is subject to being raised by the Court sua sponte. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S.

198, 207–09 (2006); see especially id. at 209–10 (“We stress that a district court is not

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- 3 - 07cv0361-LAB (WMc)

required to doublecheck the State's math. . . . Nevertheless, if a judge does detect a clear

computation error, no Rule, statute, or constitutional provision commands the judge to

suppress that knowledge.”) Ordinarily the Court would give Petitioner a chance to respond,

id. at 210 (citation omitted), but as the petition was already in the process of being dismissed

as untimely on other grounds, the Court merely noted this as an alternate basis for its order.

Even if jurists of reason thought Petitioner had presented clear and convincing

evidence he had filed his first state petition on August 30, 2005, the running of the limitations

period is still evident from the record. Furthermore, although Petitioner addresses his other

arguments in detail in his notice of appeal, he fails to address the alternate basis for the

Court’s order. The COA is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 21, 2009

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00361-LAB-WMC Document 76 Filed 09/21/09 Page 3 of 3