Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00734/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00734-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Keith P Nance, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

Allen Miser, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-00734-PHX-RCB

 O R D E R 

 Currently pending before the court is a “Motion for Violation of [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 

Eleven[,]” filed by plaintiff pro se Keith P. Nance (Doc. 88). Because there is no factual 

or legal basis for plaintiff’s motion, the court will deny it. Further, as detailed herein, the 

parties shall participate in a telephonic Pretrial Conference to discuss, among other 

things, the “Defendants’ Portion of the Joint Proposed Pretrial Order” lodged on January 

28, 2014 (Doc. 93). 

Background

 On December 13, 2013, this court ordered the plaintiff and defense counsel to 

prepare a proposed Joint Final Pretrial Order (“PJPTO”) “and lodge it with the . . . Court 

by no later than January 13, 2014.” Ord. (Doc. 79) at 1:24-25. The court placed the 

“responsibility” on plaintiff Nance “to ensure that the [PJPTO] is properly prepared and 

timely lodged[,]” while simultaneously requiring the defendants to “fully cooperate with 

the plaintiff” in that regard. Id. at 1:26-28. 

 Slightly less than a week later, on December 19, 2013, defense counsel, Michael 

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J. Hrnicek, informed the plaintiff that after it received his input, Hrnicek’s office would 

prepare the PJPTO. Nance Decl’n (Doc. 89), exh. 2 thereto at 8. On January 3, 2014, 

the plaintiff mailed a copy of his PJPTO to the defense counsel (Doc. 82). On January 9, 

2014, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking a one week extension of time in which to lodge 

the PJPTO. Joining in that motion, attorney Hrnicek advised the court that “[t]he parties 

ha[]d exchanged various drafts of the [PJPTO].” Resp. (Doc. 85) at 1:20. As relevant 

here, attorney Hrnicek further advised the court that after receiving plaintiff’s “handwritten 15-page portion[,]” he and his secretary “compiled and forwarded a typed 22-

page draft of the [PJPTO]” to the plaintiff two weeks earlier. Id. at 1:24-2:1. Granting 

the plaintiff’s motion for an extension, the court ordered the parties to lodge their PJPTO 

by January 21, 2014, at the latest. 

 The parties did not do that. Instead, on that date the plaintiff filed this motion 

claiming violations of Fed.R.Civ.P. by attorney Hrnicek. The plaintiff baldly asserts that 

attorney Hrnicek “fail[ed] to confer with [him] as ordered by the court[.]” Mot. (Doc. 88) 

at 2. In addition, the plaintiff claims that attorney Hrnicek violated Rule 11 because 

supposedly there was no “evidentiary support” for two factual assertions in the 

defendants’ response to his motion for an extension of time (“the Response”). See id. 

First, the plaintiff disagrees that the parties “exchange[d] various drafts of their 

[PJPTO].” See Resp. (Doc. 85) at 20; see also Nance Decl’n (Doc. 89) at 3, ¶¶ 9-10. 

Second, the plaintiff denies ever having received the 22-page draft PJPTO. Nance Decl’n 

(Doc. 89) at 3, ¶ 10. Plaintiff indirectly challenges attorney Hrnicek to provide a 

“certificate of service” to “validate[:]” (1) the exchange of the draft PJPTOs; and (2) the 

forwarding of the 22 page draft PJPTO to the plaintiff. Mot. (Doc. 88) at 2; see also 

Nance Decl’n (Doc. 89) at 4, ¶ 12. Plaintiff Nance is not, however, seeking any of the 

suggested sanctions in Rule 11(c). 

 Opposing this motion, the defendants state that certificates of service are not 

required when exchanging draft PJPTOs. They also state that Rule 11 “does not apply to 

draft exchanges of the [PJPTO][.]” Resp. (Doc. 97) at 1:24-25, ¶ 2. The former 

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statement is accurate, but the latter misapprehends the plaintiff’s motion. As the court 

construes this motion, the alleged Rule 11 violation is not based upon the exchange of the 

draft PJPTOs per se. Rather, in addition to alleging failure to confer, the plaintiff is 

alleging that the defendants’ Response contained two factual misrepresentations. 

Construing plaintiff’s motion in that way, the court will turn to an examination of Rule 

11. 

Discussion 

 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides for the imposition of sanctions when 

a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation or brought for an 

improper purpose.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citation omitted), cert. granted, --- U.S. ---, 134 S.Ct. 50, 186 L.Ed.2d 962 (2013). 

Pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of that Rule, “[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, 

written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the 

best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 

reasonable under the circumstances: the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, 

if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 

opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3). “A motion 

for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and must describe the 

specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2). As the party 

moving for sanctions, “[t]he burden of proof and persuasion rests on” plaintiff Nance. 

See TEGG Corp. v. Beckstrom Electric Co., 2008 WL 5216169, at *3 (W.D.Pa. Dec. 10, 

2008) (citing, inter alia, G. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF 

LITIGATION ABUSE, § 17(A)(5) (2008)); see also Phinney v. Paulshock, 181 F.R.D. 

185, 197 (D.N.H. 1998). 

 Additionally, as the party seeking Rule 11 sanctions, plaintiff Nance must comply 

with Rule 11(c)(1)(A)’s “strict procedural requirements[.]” Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. 

Co., 254 F.3d 772, 788 (9th Cir. 2001). That Rule “gives an attorney the opportunity to 

withdraw or correct a challenged filing by requiring a party file a Rule 11 motion to serve 

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the motion 21 days before filing the motion.” Retail Flooring Dealers of Am., Inc. v. 

Beaulieu of Am., LLC, 339 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Rule 11(c)(2) 

requires a motion for sanctions to “be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be 

presented to the court if the challenged paper, . . . , contention or denial is withdrawn or 

appropriately corrected within 21 days after service[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2). The Ninth 

Circuit has explained “that ‘[t]he purpose of the safe harbor . . . is to give the offending 

party the opportunity, within 21 days after service of the motion for sanctions, to 

withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions.’” Retail Flooring, 339 

F.3d at 1150 (quoting Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in 

original)). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has consistently held “that the procedural 

requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A)’s ‘safe harbor’ are mandatory.” Radcliffe, 254 F.3d at 

789 (quoting Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1998)). As such, the 

Radcliffe Court reversed and found that the district court abused its discretion when it 

awarded Rule 11 sanctions where the defendant did not comply with that Rule’s safe 

harbor provision. See id. at 789. 

 In the present case, the plaintiff did not serve his Rule 11 motion 21 days prior to 

its filing, as Rule 11(c)(2) mandates. Plaintiff directs his Rule 11 motion to defendants’ 

Response, filed an served on January 13, 2014. But, the plaintiff did not, as Rule 

11(c)(2) requires, give the defendants the opportunity to withdraw that supposedly 

“offensive” Response. See Retail Flooring, 339 F.3d at 1150 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Instead, the plaintiff served his motion by mail on January 16, 

2014, and filed it on January 21, 2014. See Mot. (Doc. 88) at 2. Plaintiff Nance’s failure 

“to comply with Rule 11’s procedural requirements” renders his “ request for sanctions 

‘procedurally defective.’” Chavez v. Northland Group, 2011 WL 317482, at *9 (D.Ariz. 

Feb. 1, 2011) (quoting Potter v. Crosswhite, 2010 WL 5573635 at *8 (D.Or. Dec. 2, 

2010) (denying motion for Rule 11 sanctions that was not filed until after plaintiff's 

claims had been dismissed because filing the motion at such time deprived defendant of 

an opportunity to correct the alleged Rule 11 violation.)). Thus, because plaintiff Nance 

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“deprived [the defendants] of the opportunity to correct the alleged Rule 11(b) violation 

and violated the procedural requirements of Rule 11(c)(2)[,]” the court denies his motion 

for Rule 11 sanctions. See Chavez, 2011 WL 317482, at *9; see also Huminski v. 

Heretia, 2011 WL 2910536, at *3 (D.Ariz. July 18, 2011) (citation omitted) (denying 

motion for Rule 11 sanctions where the plaintiff did not give the defendant “the 

opportunity to correct the issue as required by Rule 11(c)(2)’s ‘safe harbor provision[]’”). 

 Even if plaintiff Nance had followed Rule 11(c)’s procedural safeguards, he has 

not met his burden on the merits. His unsupported and conclusory allegation that 

attorney Hrnicek did not confer with him is not a sufficient basis for awarding Rule 11 

sanctions. See Azizkhan v. First Franklin Loan Servicing, 2010 WL 2231999, at *2 

(E.D.Cal. June 3, 2010). Similarly, by demanding that the defendants provide a 

certificate of service to support assertions in their Response, the plaintiff is impermissibly 

shifting the burden of proof to the defendants, the non-moving party. “No party should 

have the burden of proving the validity of its factual assertions until the party seeking 

sanctions first makes a specific showing that the facts asserted are, in fact, not wellgrounded in fact.” See Pruitt v. Russell, 1992 WL 535789, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 

1992). Plaintiff Nance has made no such showing. 

 For these reasons, the court hereby ORDERS that: 

 (1) plaintiff pro se Keith P. Nance’s “Motion for Violation of Rule Eleven, 

F.R.C.P.” (Doc. 88) is DENIED; and 

 (2) on March 3l, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., the parties SHALL participate 

telephonically in a Pretrial Conference to discuss the lodged “Defendants’ Portion of the 

Joint Proposed Pretrial Order” (Doc. 93). The plaintiff shall appear by telephone. 

Counsel for the defendants shall provide the Court with a telephone number where 

plaintiff may be contacted and make the necessary arrangements for his appearance by 

. . . 

 

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telephone at the hearing. Following that Pretrial Conference, the court will issue the 

Final Pretrial Order and set a trial date for this action. 

 Dated this 7th day of March, 2014. 

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