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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 1996 Decided December 20, 1996

No. 95-5433

PIER F. TALENTI,

APPELLANT

v.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON, AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE

UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv02001)

George W. Abbott, pro hac vice, argued the cause and filed the briefsfor appellant. Richard S. Basile

entered an appearance.

Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees, with

whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney,

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, and Ronald J. Bettauer, Assistant

Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant seeks to compel the President, the Secretary of State,

and the Acting Director of the International Cooperation Agency to withhold federal aid from Italy

under the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1).

Appellant also seeks a declaratory judgment that defendants have violated the terms of the

Hickenlooper Amendment. In addition, appellant invokes the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),

5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706, to compel the defendants to review the merits of his claim. The district court

dismissed appellant's case on the grounds that he lacked standing and that the government had not

waived sovereign immunity. Because we agree that appellant lacks standing to challenge the

President's failure to withhold foreign assistance, we affirm.

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I.

For purposes of ruling on the government's motion to dismissfor want ofstanding we accept

as true all material allegations of the complaint. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for

the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 264 (1991). Appellant, Pier Talenti, is an

Italian-born, naturalized United States citizen. In 1974, Talenti was charged in Italy, along with

members of the United States government, in connection with the so-called "Borghese Coup" to

overthrow the Italian government. Although charges were eventually dropped, Talenti did not return

to Italy for almost seven years for fear of arrest.

From 1974 until 1985, the Italian government rezoned and expropriated millions of dollars

worth of property owned or controlled by Talenti. For example, Salone, the Talenti family farm in

Rome, wasrezoned from "residential" to "parkland" preventing further development ofthe property.

While Talenti received some compensation for the expropriations, he claims that the compensation

was not "just and effective" as required by the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation

between the United States and Italy ("FCN Treaty"), February 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, art. V, 63 Stat.

2255, and as reflected in customary international law.

Beginning in 1975, Talenti sought support from the State Department in negotiating a

diplomatic resolution of his dispute. According to Talenti, several secretaries of state contacted the

United States Embassy in Rome to suggest that a diplomatic note be forwarded to the Italian

government on his behalf. Evidently, the Embassy repeatedly declined to dispatch the letters. In

1983, Talenti brought an action in Italian court seeking further compensation for the rezoned and

expropriated property. The Italian court denied relief in 1987. After unsuccessfully seeking review

with an intermediate appellate court, Talenti filed an appeal in 1992 with the final appellate court in

Italy, the Court of Cassation. In July 1994, the Court of Cassation denied his appeal. The United

States Embassy in Rome did not forward a formal demarche to the Italian government until August

1996. The letter, titled Diplomatic Note 674, cited Article V of the FCN Treaty and requested that

Italy negotiate a resolution of Talenti's claim.

Several months after Talenti filed his appeal with the Court of Cassation he filed this action

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1 The Hickenlooper Amendment was superseded, after the filing of this action, by the Helms

Amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. 22 U.S.C. § 2370a. As we discuss

below, the Helms Amendment, rather than Hickenlooper, governs Talenti's claim. 

in United States District Court. Talenti seeks to force the President, the Secretary of State, and the

Acting Director of the International Cooperation Agency to withhold federal funds from Italy under

the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1).1In addition,

Talenti seeks a declaratory judgment that defendants have breached their obligations under the

Hickenlooper Amendment.

The district court dismissed Talenti'srequestformandamus onthe groundsthat Talentilacked

standing to challenge the President's inaction and that the government had not waived sovereign

immunity. The district court also dismissed Talenti's request for declaratory judgment, holding that

this remedy is inappropriate where the declaratory judgment action is simply the duplication of

another claim. We agree that Talenti lacks standing and affirm the judgment of the district court.

II.

As an initial matter, we hold that Talenti's claim is governed not by the Hickenlooper

Amendment as cited in his complaint and in the district court opinion, but by the Helms Amendment

to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370a. The Helms Amendment, which

superseded the Hickenlooper Amendment shortly after Talenti filed this action, provides in relevant

part:

(a) Prohibition

None ofthe funds made available to carry out this Act, the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 [22 U.S.C.A. 2151 et seq.], or the Arms Export Control Act [22

U.S.C.A. 2751 et seq.] may be provided to a government or any agency or

instrumentality thereof, if the government of such country (other than a country

described in subsection (d) of this section)

(1) has on or after January 1, 1956

(A) nationalized or expropriated the property of any United States

person,

(B) repudiated or nullified any contract with anyUnited States person,

or

(C) taken any other action (such as the imposition of discriminatory

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taxes or other exactions) which hasthe effect ofseizing ownership or

control of the property of any United States person, and

(2) has not, within the period specified in subsection (c) of this section,

either

(A) returned the property,

(B) provided adequate and effective compensation for such property

in convertible foreign exchange or other mutually acceptable

compensation equivalent to the full value thereof, as required by

international law,

(C) offered a domestic procedure providing prompt, adequate and

effective compensation in accordance with international law, or

(D) submitted the dispute to arbitration under the rules of the

Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes or other

mutually agreeable binding international arbitration procedure.

* * *

(g) Waiver

The President may waive the prohibitions in subsections (a) and (b) of this

section for a country, on an annual basis, if the President determines and so notifies

Congress that it is in the national interest to do so.

(h) Definitions

For the purpose of this section, the term "United States person" means a

United States citizen or corporation, partnership, or association at least 50 percent

beneficially owned by United States citizens.

22 U.S.C. § 2370a.

A statute presumptively applies only to post-enactment conduct. Gersman v. Group Health

Assoc., Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1642 (1994). Therefore,

in the absence of a contrary congressional intent the Hickenlooper Amendment would apply to

Talenti's claim. However, the language in the Helms Amendment is clear that it applies retroactively

to any expropriation after January 1, 1956. 22 U.S.C. § 2370a(a)(1). Accordingly, although the

Hickenlooper Amendment applied at the time of the expropriations, the Helms Amendment will

govern this Court's review of Talenti's claim.

III.

Having held that the Helms Amendment applies to Talenti's claim, we turn to the question of

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standing. The case and controversy requirement of Article III limits the role of the federal judiciary

to resolving "Cases" and "Controversies." Art. III, § 2. The doctrine of standing is an "essential and

unchanging" component of this Article III requirement. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560 (1992). In order to establish standing, a litigant must demonstrate an injury in fact that is

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of action by some third

party not before the court. Id. 

The party asserting standing must also show that it is " "likely,' as opposed to merely

"speculative,' that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision.' " Id. at 561 (quoting Simon

v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). Fastidious commitment

to these requirements ensures that the federal judicial power is exercised only when the dispute is

amenable to judicialresolution. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,

218 (1974).

The district court held that Talenti lacked standing because his injury, the expropriation and

rezoning of his property without just and effective compensation, would not be redressed by a

decision in his favor by this Court. We agree. It is "mere speculation" to assume that a judgment in

Talenti's favor would at all ameliorate Talenti's injury.

When the plaintiff is not himself subject to the challenged government action or inaction, it

is "substantially more difficult" to establish redressability. Lujan, 504 F.2d at 562. In such cases, the

court's ability to redress the injury "depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors

not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot

presume either to control or to predict." ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion

of Kennedy, J.). Redressability is particularly problematic when the only challenged action is the

failure of the Executive Branch to impose penalties upon a third party. Branton v. F.C.C., 993 F.2d

906, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1610 (1994). For example, in Linda R.S. v.

Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (cited in Branton, 993 F.2d at 911), the Court held that a parent

does not have standing to compel the use of a criminal child support statute against the other parent.

The Court stated: "[I]f appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the jailing

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of the child's father. The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of

support can, at best, be termed only speculative." Id. at 618.

In Branton, we considered a radio listener's challenge to the FCC's failure to sanction a

network for using obscene language. We held that the listener lacked standing because it was

conjectural whether radio stations would respond to sanctions by broadcasting fewer indecencies.

We thought it equally plausible that the stations would decide that the benefits of broadcasting

indecencies outweighed the burden of the government fines. 993 F.2d at 911.

Likewise, it is not only speculative, but indeed doubtful whether action under the Helms

Amendment would alleviate Talenti's injury. First, the Helms Amendment does not require that aid

against Italy be suspended. The Helms Amendment states in relevant part that:

The President may waive the prohibitionsin subsections(a) and (b) of thissection for

a country, on an annual basis, ifthe President determines and so notifiesCongressthat

it is in the national interest to do so.

22 U.S.C. § 2370a(g). Because the statute confides authority to waive its provisions if the President

finds waiver in the national interest, the most Talenti can demand is a certification from the President

to Congress of his decision to continue providing foreign aid. In fact, of the many foreign

expropriations of American property, the Executive Branch opted to withhold aid under the

Hickenlooper Amendment only twice in the Amendment's thirty-four year history. See Christopher

N. Camponovo, Comment, Dispute Settlement and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on

Investment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181, 202 (1996).

The improbability of a decision to suspend aid to Italy is especially apparent given the nature

of the aid received by Italy. The government asserts, and Talenti concedes, that Italy receives no

direct financial assistance from the United States. Talenti contends, however, that Italy receives

indirect assistance through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), through the use of

United States military bases in Italy, and as part of the Defense Authorization Act. The only foreign

aid affected by the Helms Amendment isfunding provided under the ForeignRelations Authorization

Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or the Arms Export Control Act. Even assuming that the

sources offunding cited byTalenti are provided under these Acts, the nature and purposes ofmilitary

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funding suggest that the President may find the continuation of funding to be in the national interest.

Talenti argues that, even assuming the President files a waiver with Congress, the waiver

would redress his injury by bringing his claim to the highest diplomatic channels in the State

Department and by publicizing the Italian expropriations. However, Talenti's alleged injury is not a

lack of publication but a lack of compensation. Providing the one does not redress the lack of the

other. Talenti cannot demonstrate that congressional notification will cause the Italian government

to compensate him for the expropriations. See Aerotrade, Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., Dep't of

State, 387 F. Supp. 974, 975-76 (D.D.C. 1974). By Talenti's own admission, his case has already

received attention from the highest diplomatic channels and is a matter of public record here and in

Italy. Publication has not produced, nor is it likely to produce, any further action with respect to his

claim.

Even the improbable scenario of a decision to withhold assistance from Italy does not redress

Talenti'sinjury. As one court has noted, there is "considerable uncertainty as to whether such action

would aid plaintiff in collecting its debt or would tend to drive [the foreign government] into even

greater intransigence." Aerotrade, 387 F. Supp. at 975. In order to find standing, we would have

to assume that the Italian government would respond to the suspension of aid by negotiating a

resolution of Talenti's claim. We have no reason to think a foreign government would be so inclined.

The suspension of foreign assistance is a contentious act that may threaten diplomatic relations and

undermine American influence abroad. It seems equally plausible that a foreign government would

find it in the country's long-term interest to forego American aid to save face. In any case, "[a] court

is rightly reluctant to enter a judgment which may have no real consequence, depending on the

putative cost-benefit analyses of third-parties over whomit has no jurisdiction and about whomit has

almost no information." Branton, 993 F.2d at 922.

Talenti claims that his standing to bring a challenge to the inaction of the Executive Branch

is established bythe Supreme Court's opinion in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. AmericanCetacean Society,

478 U.S. 221 (1986). In that case, wildlife conservation groups sought to compel the Secretary of

Commerce to certify that Japan was conducting fishing operations in violation of international

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whaling agreements. Such a certification would have required the Executive Branch to impose

economic sanctions against Japan. Rejecting challenges to justiciability, the Court reached the merits

of the claim and held that the statute did not mandate certification.

We hold that Japan Whaling is readily distinguishable. In that case, once the Secretary of

Commerce made the requested certification, the Secretary of State was mandated to sanction the

offending nation by halving its allocation within the United States' fishery conservation zone. Id. at

226. There was, in addition, a track record suggesting that the threat of sanctions would compel

compliance with the whaling agreements. Violations of the whaling agreements had been certified

on five separate occasionseach under a prior law making the imposition ofsanctions discretionary.

On each occasion the threat of sanctions had caused the offending nations to conform their fishing

operations. Id. at 225.

In this case, as mentioned, the requested order would not mandate Executive Branch action

against Italy. Moreover, there is no track record suggesting that foreign expropriators would readily

relent in the face of the Helms Amendment.

For these reasons, we cannot conclude that action by the Executive Branch under the Helms

Amendment is likely to redress Talenti's injury.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Talenti does not have standing to bring his claim

and affirm the order of the District Court.

So ordered.

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