Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00801/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00801-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Juan Deshannon Butler, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Becky Clay, 

 Respondent. 

 CV12-0801-TUC-DCB (JR) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

 Petitioner Juan Deshannon Butler is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 6). This 

Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable David C. Bury, United 

States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules – Civil 72.1 and 

72.2. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, 

after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution, 

Tucson, Arizona. In the Petition, Petitioner challenges his 2006 sentence imposed 

based on his conviction in the Northern District of Oklahoma of Unlawful Possession 

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of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Convicted Felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1). Petitioner contends that his escape conviction under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 

443 was improperly used to enhance his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal 

Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because it does not qualify as a predicate 

offense. 

 A conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a 

Convicted Felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), carries a maximum penalty of 

10 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). However, the ACCA provides for a 

mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for a person who violates § 922(g) and 

“has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).1

 Based on that provision, on January 4, 2006, Petitioner was 

sentenced to a 180-month term of imprisonment. In a May 7, 2007 Opinion, the 

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569 (10th

Cir. 2007). 

 On September 10, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. In a January 23, 2009 Order, the 

trial court dismissed the § 2255 motion as untimely, finding that the filing deadline 

 

1

 The ACCA defines a “violent felony” as any felony, whether state or federal, that 

“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 

the person of another,” or that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 

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was August 6, 2008. In a February 25, 2009 Order, the trial court denied his motion 

to reconsider. On July 30, 2009, the Tenth Circuit denied Petitioner’s request for a 

certificate of appealability. In an October 1, 2012 Order, the Tenth Circuit denied 

Petitioner’s request for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. 

II. PETITIONER’S CLAIM 

 In his Amended § 2241 Petition, Petitioner claims his sentence exceeds the 

statutory maximum for a § 922(g)(1) conviction and alleges that his sentence was 

illegally enhanced because after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Begay v. United 

States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), and Chambers v United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), a 

“walk away escape” no longer constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of § 

924(e)(1). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 A. Jurisdiction 

 A federal prisoner who seeks to challenge the legality of his confinement must 

generally rely on a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to do so. Tripati v. 

Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). In contrast, a petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241 is available only to a prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions 

of his sentence. Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); Brown v. 

United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 The Court will not consider a § 2241 petition by a prisoner authorized to apply 

for § 2255 relief “if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by 

motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, 

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unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test 

the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 

297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997). This exception, often referred to as the “escape hatch,” see 

Lorensten v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000), is narrow. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 

F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). The escape hatch is available only where “a 

petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed 

procedural shot at presenting that claim.” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 959 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

 1. Actual Innocence 

 In Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit held that a 

§ 2241 petitioner who argued that he was erroneously sentenced as a career criminal 

did not qualify under the escape hatch. Id. at 1193; see also Rith v. Rios, 514 

Fed.Appx. 684 (9th Cir. 2013) (one cannot be “actually innocent” of a career offender 

status for sentencing purposes); Green v. Thomas, 485 Fed.Appx. 888 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(one cannot be innocent of being classified as a career offender under the Sentencing 

Guidelines because that is not a cognizable claim of actual innocence under the 

escape hatch). However, in reaching its conclusion in Marrero, the court stated that 

it has “not yet resolved the question whether a petitioner may ever be actually 

innocent of a non-capital sentence for the purpose of qualifying for the escape hatch.” 

682 F.3d at 1193. Later in the decision, the court added that “some of our sister 

circuits have recognized exceptions to the general rule that a petitioner cannot be 

actually innocent of a noncapital sentence under the escape hatch,” but found that it 

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did not need to decide whether to endorse any of the exceptions recognized in other 

circuits because the petitioner did not qualify for any of them. Id. at 1194-95. 

 One of the exceptions left open by the Ninth Circuit in Marrero was the 

possibility that § 2241 habeas jurisdiction may be proper where the career criminal 

enhancement places the sentence outside the statutory maximum for the underlying 

offense. Id. Although not expressly recognized by the Ninth Circuit, the exception 

has been recognized by the Eleventh Circuit. See Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 

1293, 1319 n. 20 (11th Cir. 2011) (“For that reason, a pure Begay error would fit 

within the government’s concession that the savings clause applies to errors that 

resulted in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum that would have applied but for 

the error.”). Here, Petitioner’s career criminal-enhanced sentence of 180 months 

exceeded the 10-year maximum penalty for a stand-alone conviction for the 

Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Convicted Felon. See 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). As Petitioner’s enhanced sentence did not 

fall within the statutory maximum for the underlying crime, § 2241 jurisdiction is not 

expressly foreclosed by Marrero. 

 2. Unobstructed Procedural Shot 

 In determining whether a petitioner has had an unobstructed procedural shot to 

pursue his claim, the court considers “(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s 

claim ‘did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 

motion;’ and (2) whether the law changed ‘in any way relevant’ to petitioner’s claim 

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after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (quoting Ivy, 328 F.3d at 

1060-61). 

 Petitioner bases his claim on Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), and 

Chambers v United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009). Chambers issued on January 13, 

2009. That date is well after the August 6, 2008, filing deadline for his § 2255 

petition and therefore was not available to him when that motion should have been 

filed. However, Begay issued on April 16, 2008, which is almost four months prior 

to his § 2255 filing deadline. Thus, if Begay provides the legal basis for his claim, 

the claim was available before he exhausted his opportunity to raise it through a 

timely-filed § 2255 petition. 

 In Begay, the Supreme Court held that driving under the influence is not an 

ACCA predicate because it is not purposeful, violent and aggressive. 553 U.S. at 

145-48. Prompted by that ruling, and prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Chambers, a number of defendants and habeas petitioners claimed that their prior 

convictions did not constitute crimes of violence under the ACCA or the Sentencing 

Guidelines.2

 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 2008 WL 2595190 (E.D. Wis. June 27, 

 

2

 The definition of “violent felony” under the ACCA is nearly identical to the 

definition of “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Compare 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Because of this, courts frequently 

use cases interpreting the term “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines 

to inform their interpretation of the term “violent felony” under the ACCA. See, e.g., 

United States v. Chandler, 743 F.3d 648, 650 and n. 1 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Because there 

is no meaningful distinction between the definitions, we have used our analysis of the 

definition of crime of violence in the Sentencing Guidelines to guide our 

interpretation of violent felony in the ACCA.”). 

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2008) (finding that conviction for fleeing constituted a crime of violence under the 

Sentencing Guidelines after Begay); United States v. Henry, 556 F.Supp.2d 133 (D. 

Conn. 2008) (considering whether a conviction for violating a protective order was a 

crime of violence under the ACCA after Begay); United States v. Harris, 2008 WL 

2228526 (E.D. Va. May 29, 2008) (finding that conviction for larceny from a person 

constituted a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines after Begay). In 

fact, in United States v. Charles, 566 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D. Kan. 2008), the defendant 

expressly relied on Begay to argue that his previous escape from the custody of a 

halfway house was not a crime of violence. Id. at 1232. After a lengthy discussion 

of Begay, the district court in Charles rejected the defendant’s argument. Id. at 1238. 

On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for 

reevaluation based on the intervening decision in Chambers. United States v. 

Charles, 576 F.3d 1060, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). On remand, the district court held 

that, based on Chambers, the defendant’s escape conviction was not a crime of 

violence for purposes of career offender sentencing. United States v. Charles, 667 

F.Supp.2d 1246, 1259 (D. Kan. 2009); see also United States v. Nichols, 563 

F.Supp.2d 631 (S.D. W.Va. 2008) (based on Begay finding that prior conviction for 

escape did not constitute a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines). 

 As the foregoing cases establish, prior to the August 6, 2008 deadline for 

Petitioner to file his § 2255 petition, the issue of Begay’s impact on the determination 

 

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of whether various crimes could properly serve as the predicate offense for enhanced 

sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines and the ACCA had been raised in a 

number of cases. Moreover, the Charles case arose in the Tenth Circuit, the same 

circuit that rejected Petitioner’s tardy § 2255 petition, and involved the same issue 

Petitioner attempts to raise here. Based on Charles and the numerous other cases 

raising sentencing claims, it is clear that the legal basis for Petitioner’s claim arose 

with the decision in Begay and was available prior to the deadline for Petitioner to 

file his § 2255 petition. Petitioner was entitled only to the opportunity to present his 

claim. Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060. Other than the unavailability of Begay and Chambers, 

Petitioner cites no other obstruction the prevented him from raising the present claim 

in a timely filed § 2255 petition. The cases reviewed above undermine his 

contention. Despite the fact that he failed to do so, Petitioner had an unobstructed 

procedural shot to raise the present claim and was obligated to do so. Prost v. 

Anderson, 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that petitioner did qualify for 

escape hatch because he could have raised his statutory innocence claim in his first § 

2255 petition). Because he did not, he does not satisfy the criteria for filing the 

instant petition under § 2241 pursuant to the “escape hatch” of § 2255 and the Court 

is without jurisdiction to consider the petition. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Petitioner Juan Deshannon Butler’s 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 6). 

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 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without 

first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 12-0801-TUC-DCB. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 19th day of November, 2014. 

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