Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06526/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06526-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 In its motion to dismiss, Respondent indicates that Mike Evans is the current Warden of Salinas Valley

State Prison and not W.A. Duncan. Accordingly, Respondent requests that the Court substitute Mike Evans as

Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1). Respondent’s request is granted and Mike Evans is substituted in place of

W.A. Duncan as Respondent in this action. 

2

 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer. 

3

 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT EVANS,

Petitioner,

v.

MIKE EVANS, Warden

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-6526 REC DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 10]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

On March 20, 2000, in the Fresno County Superior Court, a jury convicted Petitioner of

violating California Penal Code3 section 209, subdivision (b)(1), kidnaping to commit rape;

section 209.5, subdivision (a), kidnaping during the commission of a carjacking; section 215,

subdivision (a), carjacking; and section 211, robbery. Petitioner admitted that he suffered a

previous conviction within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court

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 An amended abstract of judgment was issued on May 29, 2002, reversing the carjacking conviction in

compliance with the California Court of Appeal’s opinion and the sentence was amended to reflect an indeterminate

state prison term of life with the possibility of parole, plus one year. (Respondent’s Lodged Doc. 3.) An appeal did

not follow.

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 The petition was originally received by the California Supreme Court on March 20, 2003, but was

returned unfiled due to the absence of an original signature on the petition. (Respondent’s Lodged Doc. 4.)

2

sentenced Petitioner to the indeterminate state prison term of life with the possibility of parole,

plus ten years. 

Petitioner appealed the sentence. On February 25, 2002, the California Court of Appeal,

Fifth Appellate District, issued its opinion and reversed the carjacking conviction and affirmed

the judgment in all other respects.4 (Respondent’s Lodged Doc. 2.) A petition for review was

not filed with the California Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed one post-conviction collateral challenge to his conviction. The challenge

was a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on March 25, 2003, in the California Supreme

Court.5 (Respondent’s Lodged Doc. 5.) The petition was denied on November 12, 2003. 

(Respondent’s Lodged Doc. 6.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 10,

2004. Now pending before the Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss, filed May 3, 2005. 

Petitioner did not file an opposition. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

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F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on March 20, 2000. The California Court of

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 Respondent incorrectly asserts that direct review ended upon the expiration of the 60-day period pursuant

to Rule 31(a). Because Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal, Rules 24 and 28, not 31, apply. 

7

 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

4

Appeal issued its opinion on February 25, 2002, and an amended abstract of judgment was issued

on May 29, 2002. Petitioner did not file a petition for review. According to the California Rules

of Court, a decision becomes final thirty (30) days after filing, and an appeal must be taken to the

California Supreme Court within ten (10) days of finality.6 Rule 24(a), 28(b), Ca.R.Ct. 

Therefore, direct review concluded on July 8, 2002. Petitioner had one year until July 8, 2003,

absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner

did not file the instant petition until November 10, 2004, over one year after the limitations had

expired. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.”7 Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

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Petitioner had one post-conviction challenge, a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in

the California Supreme Court on March 25, 2003. The petition was denied on November 12,

2003. (Respondent’s Lodged Docs. 5-6.) At the time of filing the state habeas petition at the

California Supreme Court, 260 days had run on the limitations period. See Nino, 183 F.3d at

1005 [Petitioner is not entitled to tolling from the time his direct review becomes final to the

time of filing the first collateral action because there is no case “pending” during that interval]. 

Petitioner is however entitled to tolling during the period in which the state habeas petition was

pending before the California Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to tolling from March

25, 2003 to November 12, 2003. The statute of limitations expired on February 25, 2004 - 105

days after November 12, 2003. As previously noted, Petitioner did not file the instant action

until November 10, 2004, and absent valid grounds for equitable tolling, the petition is therefore

untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. 

Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v.

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60 (1997);

(Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (noting that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's

control make it impossible to file a petition on time”). “When external forces, rather than a

petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999). 

In this case, petitioner did not oppose the Motion and thus, raises no assertion of

entitlement to equitable tolling. Accordingly, as the instant federal petition was filed after the

statute of limitations expired, it must be dismissed. 

///

///

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6

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus be GRANTED, the Petition DISMISSED, and the Clerk of Court DIRECTED

to enter judgment in the case. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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