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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

NORMAN R. AKERS and ) 

VICKI AKERS PRATT, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

DONALD HODEL, Secretary of ) 

the United States Department ) 

of the Interior, ) 

) 

Defendant/Appellee. ) 

) 

) 

IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF ) 

VICTOR AKERS, Unallotted Osage ) 

Indian Deceased; MARY MONETTE ) 

AKERS, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

and DONALD HODEL, Secretary of ) 

the United States Department ) 

of the Interior, ) 

) 

Respondents. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 2 41989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

86-2898 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(Consolidated D.C. Nos. 86-C-43-C and 86-C-48-C) 

F. Browning Pipestem (Jess L. Burris on the briefs), Pipestem & 

Rice, Norman, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellants Norman R. Akers 

and Vicki Akers Pratt. 

Robert E. Martin, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant Mary 

Monette Akers. 

Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 1 
Phil Pinnell, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. Graham, 

United States Attorney with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Defendant/Appellee. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

This case concerns the will of Victor N. Akers, a deceased 

Indian with both Osage and Pawnee property interests that he 

bequeathed to his wife and two grown children. Because of his 

tribal affiliations and the nature of his holdings in Indian 

country, his will was subject to approval or disapproval by the 

Secretary of the Interior. If Akers fell within the Congressional 

definition of an Osage Indian, then under authority delegated by 

the Secretary, the Osage Agency Superintendent was to review the 

will. If, on the other hand, he fell within the Congressional 

definition of a Pawnee Indian, then an Interior Department 

administrative law judge was to review the will. In either event 

the will could not be probated without approval from the proper 

Interior Department authority. 1 If Akers• will were to be 

1 A will of an Osage Indian devising Osage mineral and other 

property interests with federally imposed restrictions on 

alienation falls under the Osage Indian Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-

456, 92 Stat. 1660, 1661 (1978), as amended. That statute 

requires the Secretary to approve the will prior to its probate in 

the Oklahoma courts. Under regulations implementing the will 

provision, the Osage Agency Superintendent is responsible for 

approving or disapproving the will. 25 C.F.R. § 17.12. Under 

departmental policies, the decision of the Superintendent is 

appealable to the southwest Regional Solicitor for the Interior 

Department. 

A will of a Pawnee Indian, on the other hand, is subject to 

25 u.s.c. § 373, whereby the Secretary of the Interior must 

(footnote cont'd on next page) 

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disapproved, then it would be invalid, and inheritance would 

proceed under the Oklahoma intestacy provisions. 

Akers filed his will with the Osage Agency in Pawhuska, 

Oklahoma. After Akers' death on January 22, 1984, the Osage Field 

Solicitor held a hearing on the will and thereafter recommended to 

the Osage Agency Superintendent that the will be disapproved. The 

Superintendent accepted the recommendation, finding that although 

Akers possessed testamentary capacity and the will had been 

properly executed, Akers' refusal therein to acknowledge an 

illegitimate son as his child was the result of an insane delusion 

that materially affected the terms of the will. This finding was 

upheld by the southwest Regional Solicitor of the Interior 

Department, acting for the Secretary. 

(footnote cont'd from previous page) 

approve wills devising interests in Indian trust allotments or 

federally restricted real estate. This will provision applies to 

all "persons" with the exception of "the Five Civilized Tribes or 

the Osage Indians •. " Regulations promulgated to implement this 

provision assign responsibility to an administrative law judge to 

review the will and probate it if approved. The decision of the 

administrative law judge is appealable to the Department's Board 

of Indian Appeals. 43 C.F.R. S 4, subpt. D. 

Under either statute, the Secretary's actions can be reviewed 

in federal court after administrative remedies have been 

exhausted. The standard of judicial review is slightly different, 

however, under the two statutes. Under the Osage Indian Act, the 

Secretary's decision to approve or disapprove the will is subject 

to reversal in federal court if it is "clearly against the weight 

of the evidence or erroneous in law." 92 Stat. 1660, 1661. 

Review under the second statute, applicable to Pawnee Indians, is 

governed by the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). See 

Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 u.s. 598 (1970). Under the APA, the 

Secretary's decision to approve or disapprove the will is subject 

to reversal in federal court if "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," or 

"unsupported by substantial evidence in a case • • • reviewed on 

the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; ••• " 5 

u.s.c. s 706(2}(A) and (E). 

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After completion of the Secretary's administrative review 

process, Akers' grown children, Norman and Vicki, sought reversal 

of the Secretary's decision in federal court. An action by Akers' 

widow, Mary Monette Akers, was consolidated with that of the two 

children, who were apparently from a former marriage. At this 

stage new attorneys were utilized by both sets of plaintiffs. At 

the status conference, agreement was reached that the district 

court would treat the case as an appeal to be decided after 

briefing and oral argument before a federal magistrate. In 

federal court the plaintiffs asserted for the first time that 

Akers did not meet the legal definition of an Osage Indian and had 

chosen to be enrolled as a Pawnee; therefore, they asserted that 

the Osage Agency did not have jurisdiction over the will. The 

plaintiffs sought to void the already exercised Osage Agency 

jurisdiction, urging a remand to the Secretary for reconsideration 

of Akers' will by the Pawnee Agency. Alternatively, the 

plaintiffs argued that if Osage Agency jurisdiction was correct, 

then the Secretary erred in finding that Akers was subject to an 

insane delusion materially affecting the terms of his will. The 

district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation that the 

Secretary's actions be upheld. 

The same challenges to the Osage Agency's jurisdiction and to 

the Secretary's disapproval of the will are raised on appeal. 

After careful review of the record and upon close consideration of 

the statutes governing the Osage and Pawnee Indians, plus the 

relevant legislative history, we uphold the Osage Agency finding 

that Akers was an Osage Indian and therefore affirm the Osage 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 4 
Agency jurisdiction for purposes of approving or disapproving 

Akers' will. We reverse, however, with respect to the Secretary's 

conclusion that Akers was subject to an insane delusion. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Akers executed a will on June 15, 1983 and filed it with the 

Field Solicitor at the Osage Agency at Pawhuska. The will had 

been prepared by an attorney and its form had been approved by the 

Osage Field Solicitor. In his will Akers stated, "I have but two 

children and . . . the names of such children are Norman Akers and 

Vicki Akers Pratt. II Exh. 1 at Will Hearing before the Field 

Solicitor, June 19 and August 30, 1984. In two subsequent 

paragraphs he stated: "I give the sum of $5.00 and nothing more to 

any person other than Norman Akers and Vicki Akers Pratt who 

claims to be my child • . I give and bequeath to Lone Elk 

Akers the sum of $5.00, love and affection and nothing more." Id. 

Akers' wife Mary and the two acknowledged children received equal 

life estate interests in the bulk of his estate, which included 

3.06186 Osage headright (mineral) interests valued at more than 

$400,000, Pawnee oil royalties and rent payments, and 260 acres of 

federa~ly restricted real estate. He also gave a life interest in 

his home at Grayhorse Indian Camp (an Osage Village) to his 

daughter. Id. 

The Osage Superintendent, on the recommendation of the Field 

Solicitor, disapproved Akers' will for Akers' failure to 

acknowledge Lone Elk Monte Akers ("Lone Elk") as his child, 

finding that Akers had previously so recognized Lone Elk in a 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 5 
paternity affidavit bearing his signature. 2 At the will hearing 

before the Field Solicitor, Lone Elk's mother, Ella Robedeaux Ross 

("Ross"), introduced photographs of Akers with Lone Elk, and 

testified that Akers gave Lone Elk occasional gifts and had 

acknowledged him as his son in the presence of friends. Copies of 

Lone Elk's birth certificate and certificate of degree of Indian 

blood were also introduced, both giving the father's name as 

Victor Akers. Copies of court documents were introduced, showing 

that in December 1977, approximately eleven months after Lone 

Elk's birth, Ross had filed suit against Akers for child support 

and obtained a temporary injunction and child support order. By 

April 21, 1978, Akers was shown on court records as having moved 

out of Oklahoma and unable to be served with a citation for 

failure to comply with the child support order. No further 

judicial action was taken.3 

The administrative record also contains copies of letters 

revealing that as early as April 20, 1978, Akers had written to 

the Osage Agency seeking information as to whether he could give 

2 No one challenged the authenticity of Akers' signature on the 

affidavit, in spite of the fact that Akers' alleged signature 

therein bears little resemblance, superficially at least, to the 

signature authenticated as his in his will. Lone Elk's mother 

testified that Akers, a periodic heavy drinker, signed the 

affidavit when he was sober; no cross-examination of her testimony 

was conducted. 

3 Notably, the attorney who represented Ross in her child 

support proceedings is the same attorney who drew Akers' will some 

six years later and who drafted the term of the will that stated 

"I have but two children." At the time the child support order 

was filed, Ross alleged that she was married to Akers, but no 

documentation establishing a marriage is in the record, and the 

attorney for Lone Elk never asserted that Ross had been legally 

married to Akers. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 6 
life estates in his headrights to his "two children." Exh. 2 at 

Will Hearing of June 19 and August 30, 1984. He inquired twice 

more in succeeding weeks before receiving a response from the 

Agency. In other words, around the time he moved out of state and 

could not be served with a judicial citation, he was omitting in a 

series of letters to the Osage Agency any reference to a third 

child. The letters do not deny paternity of Lone Elk, but they do 

indicate that whether or not he viewed Lone Elk as his child, as 

far back as 1978 Akers had no interest in devising a share of his 

headright interests to any children other than Norman and Vicki. 

With respect to Akers' Osage and Pawnee affiliations, the 

following information appears in the administrative record. At 

the agency hearing, Ross stated that Akers was both Osage and 

Pawnee. Will Hearing of August 30, 1984 at 7. She stated that 

she met him in 1967 at the Osage dances at Fairfax. Id. at 3. In 

a letter signed by Ross dated July 17, 1977, and received at the 

Osage Agency, Ross wrote that the attached copy of Lone Elk's 

birth certificate was to be filed in the "family history files of 

Victor N. Akers, unallotted Osage Indian." 4 R. Vol. III at tab 2. 

Bill Bigheart, a witness to Akers' will, testified that he had 

worked for a number of years at the Osage Agency and had known 

Akers because of his frequent visits to the Agency to pick up his 

"IIM funds" on deposit there. Will Hearing of June 19, 1984 at 

29. Furthermore, no one denies that Akers himself filed his will 

with the Osage Agency. Additionally, in his application for 

4 The term "unallotted" refers to the fact that Akers was not 

among the original 1906 Osage "allottees" of Osage tribal land. 

See discussion at page 11. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 7 
• 

approval of the will, the executor of Akers' estate stated that 

Akers was an adult member of the Osage Tribe. R. Vol. III at tab 

1. Finally, on all documents related to the will hearing, Akers 

is referred to as unallotted Osage. 5 

In his written disapproval of the will, the Superintendent 

found that Akers was an Osage Indian "with 3.06186 headright 

interests and real estate and personal property subject to 

jurisdiction of the Osage Agency." Although authenticated 

documentary evidence of Akers' enrollment on the census records of 

the Osage Agency was not entered in evidence, there was no 

challenge at the administrative level to the evidence that Akers 

was an Osage Indian. Evidence in Lone Elk's certificate of Indian 

blood that Akers was part Pawnee was not used to suggest that he 

was not an Osage Indian.6 

I. 

Norman, Vicki, and Mary Akers ("appellants") assert that the 

Secretary erred in finding that Victor Akers was an Osage Indian 

for purposes of will approval, and that, therefore, the Osage 

Agency exceeded the scope of its authority. They urge a remand to 

5 We take judicial notice of the fact that, as the 

holder of more than three headright interests 

uncontested descendant of an original allottee (or 

Akers was entitled to vote in Osage tribal elections. 

uncontested 

and as the 

allottees), 

6 At the bottom of Lone Elk's Certificate of Degree of Indian 

Blood filed with the Pawnee Agency, the name of Lone Elk's father 

is given as Victor Akers, followed by the phrase: "listed as 1/4 

Pawnee, # 18." See Exh. 2 at Will Hearing before the Field 

Solicitor, June 19 and August 30, 1984. This was the extent of 

the record evidence available on appeal to suggest that Akers was 

not enrolled as an Osage Indian. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 8 
the Secretary for review of Akers' will by the Pawnee Agency. 

They make two arguments. The first argument is that, under the 

relevant federal statutes, Akers is not an Osage Indian because he 

was not enrolled as a member of the tribe when the statutory roll 

designating tribal members closed on July 1, 1907. The second 

argument is that Akers' Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood 

filed with the Pawnee Agency and submitted to the federal court 

(but not to the Secretary) is proof that Akers was legally 

enrolled as a member of the Pawnee tribe and therefore could not 

be enrolled simultaneously in the Osage tribe. The Secretary, in 

response, asserts that (1) the appellants' interpretation of what 

constitutes a statutory definition of an Osage Indian for will 

approval purposes is incorrect as a matter of law, (2) the record 

established that Akers was an Osage Indian under the ~ongressional 

definition, and (3) in any event, additional evidence is 

inadmissible at this point. If Akers is found to fit the 

statutory meaning of an Osage Indian, both sides agree that S 5(a} 

of the Osage Indian Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-456, 92 Stat. 1660, 

1661 governs; if instead Congress would consider him to be 

enrolled as Pawnee, both sides agree that 25 u.s.c. S 373 is the 

applicable provision. 

Preliminarily, we note that there is no challenge to the 

jurisdiction of the Secretary, just to whether the Osage Agency 

was the proper agency to exercise the Secretary's jurisdiction. 

This challenge to whether the Interior Department followed its own 

procedures depends on a mixed issue of law and fact: under 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 9 
existing federal legislation and under the facts as developed in 

the record, is Akers an Osage Indian or a Pawnee Indian? 

Although review of the disapproval of an Osage Indian will is 

governed by the standard of review found in section S(a) of the 

Osage Indian Act of 1978, the appellants argue that a decision as 

to whether the correct agency reviewed the will in the first place 

is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). 

Appellees argue that section S(a) governs both the review of the 

will's disapproval and the preliminary question of whether the 

will was, in fact, made by an Osage Indian. Neither side cites 

relevant case law to support its argument. In our view, the 

standards established by the APA govern a situation alleging that 

the Osage Agency illegally exercised jurisdiction over a Pawnee 

Indian. 7 The relevant APA standards. of review require that a 

reviewing court set aside agency action found to be "not in 

accordance with law" or "unsupported by substantial evidence in a 

case • • • reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 

statute. II 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(A) and (E). If the appellants 

are correct that only Osage Indians on the roll authorized by the 

Act of June 28, 1906 are considered by Congress to be Osage 

Indians today, then the Osage Agency did not act in accordance 

with law because Akers had not been born when the roll closed. 

If, on the other hand, the appellants are incorrect, then we must 

7 Were we to accept section S(a) of the Osage Indian Act of 

1978 as creating the correct standard of review for the 

preliminary jurisdictional question, it would not change the 

outcome. Section S(a) provides that decisions with respect to 

will approval are not to be reversed unless "against the clear 

weight of the evidence or erroneous in law." 92 Stat. 1662. The 

decision that Akers was Osage Indian was neither. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 10 
determine whom Congress considers to be an Osage Indian and 

whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the 

conclusion that Akers was one. 

The original federal law regulating the property and affairs 

of the Osage Indians, including their tribal government and tribal 

property, is the Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539 

(1906). See H.R. Rep. No. 1459, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978). 

The Act has been amended numerous times in subsequent decades, 

including by the Osage Indian Act of 1978. We must examine the 

implications of the original 1906 Act and its subsequent 

amendments to determine whether federal legislation contemplates a 

finding that Akers is an Osage Indian for purposes of will 

approval. 

The 1906 Act provided for a closed roll of Osage Indians for 

the stated purpose of allotting in severalty to individual Osage 

Indians most of the lands in Oklahoma territory belonging to the 

Osage tribe, subject to restrictions on alienation. A small 

amount of territory was reserved for tribal purposes, and the 

mineral interest in all the lands was retained in trust by the 

federal government. Under the 1906 Act, the roll, actually 

prepared in 1908, 8 was to consist of those recorded on the 

official roll at the Osage Agency as of January 1, 1906, plus all 

children born to those enrollees between January 1, 1906 and July 

1, 1907, plus all children already born to those enrollees but 

whose names were not on the roll as of January 1, 1906. 34 Stat. 

539. The Osage lands were divided among these persons, i.e., 

8 H.R. Rep. No. 963, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 11 
essentially among those who by mid-1907 were members of the tribe. 

The roll authorized by the 1906 Act was said to constitute "the 

legal membership" of the tribe. Id. The primary purpose of the 

roll was to determine the persons entitled to share in the 

distribution of tribal funds and to receive an allotment of the 

surface lands. See United States v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 769, 770-71 

(D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 u.s. 575 (1941). Each person 

constituting a legal member of the tribe at that time was referred 

to as an "allottee." The mineral estate was not allotted but 

remained tribal property held in trust by the federal government. 

Funds earned by the trust were distributed per capita to the 

allot tees. This "headright" interest (the term commonly used to 

designate the per capita share in the tribal mineral estate) could 

be conveyed to heirs and devisees, but since 1984 no more than a 

life estate in the headright can be conveyed to one who is not an 

Osage Indian. Osage Tribe of Indians Technical Corrections Act of 

1984 ("Technical Corrections Act"), Pub. L. 98-605, 98 Stat. 3163, 

§ 7 ( 1984). 

The first will provision specific to the Osage was introduced 

in a 1912 amendment to the 1906 Act. Section 8 of 37 Stat. 86 

stated: 

"[A]ny adult member of the Osage Tribe of Indians 

not mentally incompetent may dispose of any or all of 

his estate, real, personal, or mixed, including trust 

funds, from which restrictions as to alienation have not 

been removed, by will, in accordance with the laws of 

the State of Oklahoma: Provided, That no such will 

shall be admitted to probate or have any validity unless 

approved before or after the death of the testator by 

the Secretary of the Interior." 

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Act of April 18, 1912, ch. 83, 37 Stat. 86. In 1912 the only 

adult members of the tribe would have been those included on the 

1908 roll because children born since 1907 would not yet have 

reached adulthood. Over time, however, the issue would arise as 

to whether those born after the roll closed could mature into 

adult "members of the tribe" for purposes of the will provision. 

If not, then only original allottees were required to have their 

wills approved by the Secretary~ those inheriting the same 

allotments would not be similarly bound but could devise any 

inherited Osage allotments without Department approva1. 9 

Recognition of two distinct subsets of Osage Indians appeared 

in statutory language as early as 1929. In that year, an 

amendment to the 1906 Act provided that "[t]he restri~tions 

concerning lands and funds of allotted Osage Indians shall 

apply to unallotted Osage Indians born since July 1, 1907 

and to their heirs [presumably heirs of both subsets] of Osage 

Indian blood, • " Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 493, 45 Stat. 

1478, S 5 (1929) (emphasis added). Despite this recognition of 

two types of Osage Indians for the purpose of maintaining 

restrictions on alienation of Osage lands and funds, arguably the 

9 A rationale for such differentiated treatment could have been 

that by the time the first unallotted Osages reached the age of 

maturity in 1928, they would have been assimilated into American 

culture and would have been presumed competent to make a will 

devising restricted property without federal government review. 

Whether this was originally the presumption or not, it did not 

remain so. See footnote 10. 

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question remained as to whether unallotted Osage were to be 

considered Osage for purposes of will approva1.10 

In 1978, the will provision of the 1912 statute was amended 

in pertinent part, as follows, (as subsequently amended by the 

Technical Corrections Act of 1984): 

"Any person of Osage Indian blood, eighteen years of age 

or older, may dispose of his Osage headright or mineral 

interest and the remainder of his estate (real, 

personal, and mixed, including trust funds) from which 

restrictions against alienation have not been removed, 

by the terms of a will • • • executed in accordance with 

the laws of the State of Oklahoma • • • : Provided, 

That the will of any Osage Indian shall not be adm~tted 

to probate or have any validity unless approved after 

the death of the testator by the Secretary of the 

Interior. • • • All evidence relative to the validity 

of the will of an Osage Indian shall be submitted to the 

Secretary within one hundred and twenty days after the 

date the petition for approval of such will is filed 

with the Secretary, • • " 

Osage Indian Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-496, 92 Stat. 1661, S 5(a) 

(1978), as amended by The Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. 98-

605, 98 Stat. 3166, S 3 (1984), both amending the Act of April 18, 

1912, 37 Stat. 86, S 8 (1912) (emphasis added). 

10 F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 791, n. 195 (1982 

ed.) supports the Secretary's v~ew that they are: "For many years after 1906, the term 'members' of the Osage tribe meant only 

persons on the 1906 roll. After passage of the 1929 Act, the term 

came to include unenrolled Osages who succeeded to trust property. 

• • • [T]he term is now used to include all persons of Osage 

ancestry on BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] records." 

The 1929 statute makes clear that unallotted Osages were 

bound by the same restrictions on alienation as the original 

allottees, whether disposing of allotted lands and funds by will 

or otherwise. In other words, any notion that unallotted Osage 

would not be held to the federal restrictions because they were 

assimilated had been undermined by the 1929 provision. Although 

the will of an unallotted Osage still might not be subject to 

aP?roval ~ the Secretary, previously existing restrictions on al~enation could not be removed by the will of an unallotted Osage 

Indian. 

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Both parties concede that the Osage Indian Act of 1978, 

including the above will provision, does not define the term 

"Osage Indian" as used therein. After examining the prior and 

concurrent legislative histories and subsequent amendments to the 

1978 Act, we are convinced that appellants are incorrect in 

arguing that the term "Osage Indian" means only those recognized 

by the 1906 Act as legal members of the tribe. 

As described in the legislative history accompanying 1972 

amendments to the 1906 Act, "Osages born since July 1, 1907, when 

the legal membership roll was closed are known as 'unallotted' 

members of the tribe. They cannot vote in tribal elections, hold 

tribal office, or share in the quarterly distribution of tribal 

income unless they become an heir or oevisee of a deceased 

'allotted' member." H.R. Rep. No. 963, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 

( 197 2) (emphasis added) • According to the same legislative 

history, the Osage population by 1972 had increased to 8,224, up 

from the original count of 2,229 when the roll was closed in 1907. 

Four hundred and forty-seven of the 2,229 enrollees were still 

living. Those 447 had 2,384 living descendants~ deceased 

enrollees had 5,413 descendants. Id. at 2. Only living enrollees 

and heirs of deceased enrollees have shares in the original 

allotment. For instance, in 1972 there were only 3,270 owners of 

Osage headrights. Id. at 9. In other words, all living Osages do 

not share in the original land allotment or in the headright 

interest if they are not heirs or devisees. See F. Cohen Handbook 

of Federal Indian Law 790-91 (1982 ed.). Notwithstanding the 

limited rights of unallotted Osage Indians who are not heirs or 

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devisees of an allotted Osage, the above descriptions make clear 

that unallotted Osage Indians are not relegated by Congress to the 

category of non-Osage Indians. 

Turning to the language of the 1978 Act itself, the term 

"member of the tribe" is used only once (in S 6(b)) to designate a 

class of persons, and it is eliminated by the Technical 

Corrections Act of 1984, which substitutes the term "Osage Indian" 

in its place. 98 Stat. 3163, 3164 S 2(d). The plain inference to 

be drawn from the substitution of terms is that the original usage 

of the phrase "member of the tribe" in the 1906 Act, designating 

membership for allotment purposes, is not to be read into the 1978 

Act. Moreover, in section S(b) of the 1978 Act the term "Osage 

Indian" is substituted for the term "allottee" used in the 

predecessor section (S 3) of the 1912 statute, suggesting that 

both allotted and unallotted Osage are to be covered by the 

amended provision. The legislative history of the 1978 Act 

confirms this reading of the will provision.11 

It is unmistakable that an "Osage Indian" encompasses a 

broader group than those considered members of the tribe when the 

1908 roll was drawn up in accordance with the 1906 Act. 12 On the 

11 See H.R. Rep. No. 1459, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), 

stating that "the laws of the State of Oklahoma are applicable to 

all Osage Indians whether they are allotted or una1lotted •••. " 

(emphasis added). See also the same report, describing the Osage 

Tribe as consisting of "9,205 persons of Osage blood who are 

carried on the Agency census records." Id. at 3. 

12 Further evidence that this is the correct conclusion is 

provided by section 7 of the 1978 Act, as amended by the Technical 

Corrections Act of 1984. 98 Stat. 3164. Section 7, as amended, 

prohibits any person who is not "an Osage Indian" from receiving 

more than a life estate in an Osage headright owned by an Osage 

(footnote cont'd on next page) 

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other hand, it is also clear that an Osage Indian is more than 

merely someone of some Osage blood. Support for the conclusion 

that Congress did not use the terms "Osage Indian" and "person of 

Osage Indian blood" synonymously is provided not only by the 

express and repeated use of these two different terms within the 

same paragraphs of the 1978 Act but by the Technical Corrections 

Act of 1984, which substituted the phrase "not an Osage Indian" 

for the phrase "person not of Osage Indian blood" found in section 

7 of the 1978 Act. 92 Stat. 1663. If the terms were synonymous, 

there would have been no need for the technical correction. 

Furthermore, if one is 1/32 Osage but has severed all ties with 

the tribe and is not listed on the census rolls, it makes little 

sense to require the Secretary's approval of such a person's will. 

In fact, there is no way that the Secretary would even know that 

the testator was 1/32 Osage if not so listed on the rolls of the 

tribe. The most natural reading of the 1978 will provision is 

that while anyone of Osage blood, who is of age, can make a will, 

only those who are considered Osage Indians must have the will 

approved. Although those of Osage blood who are not considered 

Osage Indians need not be subject to the approval 

(footnote cont'd from previous page) Indian. The plain meaning is that if one is an Osage Indian, one 

may receive more than a life estate. If Osage Indians were 

limited to those on the 1908 roll, then as soon as all original 

enrollees had died (the youngest would have been seventy-one in 

1978), there would be no Osage Indians left to inherit more than a 

life estate, and, thereafter, only life estates would be possible. 

The details of section 7, as amended, seem to contemplate no such 

result; on the contrary, they indicate that a headright held by a 

non-Osage shall vest first in designated Osage Indian 

remaindermen, then Osage Indian heirs, and only in the tribe 

itself if there are no remaindermen or heirs. 

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provision, they are, however, subject to other provisions 

restricting alienation of Osage headrights and certain other 

property interests. 

Given that the term Osage Indian requires more than just any 

quantum of Osage blood but less than enrollment as an original 

allottee, it was not legal error for the Osage Agency to exercise 

jurisdiction on the basis that Akers was "unallotted Osage." 13 

Finding no legal error in the Osage Agency interpretation of the 

meaning of the term Osage Indian, nor any factual error in its 

prima facie determination that Akers fit the legal definition, we 

proceed to examine whether the Secretary's factual determination 

was rebutted by alleged evidence of Akers' enrollment as Pawnee. 

The specific question is whether evidence that the Pawnee Agency 

showed Akers as having some Pawnee blood precluded Akers' 

enrollment as Osage under Congressional enactments gov~rning Osage 

Indians. 

Evidence of a Pawnee Agency record of Akers' Pawnee blood 

does not undermine the evidence allowing the Secretary to conclude 

that Akers was an Osage Indian. Lone Elk's certificate of Indian 

blood filed with the Pawnee Agency and showing that Akers was 

"listed as 1/4 Pawnee, I 18" was never established to be evidence 

of Akers' enrollment as Pawnee. It establishes on its face no 

more than that the Pawnee Agency apparently had Akers on some kind 

of a list showing degrees of Pawnee blood for some undesignated 

13 There is no quarrel over whether or not Akers had Osage 

blood. Appellants acknowledged before the federal magistrate that 

Akers was the grandchild of an Osage allottee, thereby conceding 

that Akers had Osage blood and was not a non-Osage heir or devisee 

of Osage headright interests. R. Vol. II at 3. 

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purpose. Appellants themselves concede that Lone Elk's 

certificate of Indian blood did not indicate that Victor Akers was 

enrolled in the Pawnee tribe. Appellants' Reply Brief at 11. 

Furthermore, we cannot ascertain from Akers' own certificate of 

Indian blood, submitted to the federal court as additional 

evidence, that Akers was enrolled in the Pawnee tribe for federal 

will-approval purposes. 14 It is entirely possible to be both 

Osage and Pawnee for Indian purposes, i.e., each tribe could 

recognize Akers as a member for voting or other purposes. See F. 

Cohen Handbook of Federal Indian Law 137 (1942, reprinted by the 

University of New Mexico Press). See also F. Cohen Handbook of 

Federal Indian Law 23 (1982 ed.) ("Congress has the power to 

define membe_rship differently from the tribe when necessary for 

administrative purposes.") Dual citizenship among Indian tribes 

was implicitly acknowledged in this circuit as far back as Mandler 

v. United States, 49 F.2d 201, reh'g denied, 52 F.2d 713 (lOth 

Cir. 1931). If Akers was carried for some Pawnee purpose on a 

Pawnee Agency record, that fact does not establish that he was not 

enrolled as Osage for purposes of will approva1. 15 We conclude 

14 Akers' own certificate was not entered into the 

administrative record but was only submitted afterwards to federal 

district court. Since it goes to the question of Osage Agency 

jurisdiction over Akers' will, it can be accepted as collateral 

evidence not originally entered into the administrative record. 

It does no more, however, than confirm what Lone Elk's certificate 

indicated, i.e., that Victor Akers was listed with the Pawnee 

Agency as 1/4 Pawnee. The form shows Akers as having an 

identification number (but, significantly, not an enrollment 

number} of 0018. Supplemental Vol. I at 10. 

15 In fact, there is evidence in the record that dual Interior 

Department Indian records are kept for dual purposes. A "marriage 

card" at the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"} showed only Lone 

(footnote cont'd on next page} 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 19 
that the Secretary had substantial and even abundant evidence on 

the record to conclude that Akers was an Osage Indian for purposes 

of will approval. Evidence that Akers was listed with the Pawnee 

agency as having Pawnee blood does nothing to undermine the 

cumulative evidence that he was Osage for purposes of will 

approva1. 16 

(footnote cont'd from previous page) 

Elk's Osage and Otoe-Missouria bloodlines from his mother and, in 

the column entitled "Census or Allotment No.," showed him as 

"Enrolled 1-281980 unalot. [unallotted]." Presumably, he was 

enrolled as either Osage or Otoe-Missouria or both. Yet, Lone Elk 

also has a "Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood" filed with the 

Pawnee Agency showing him as part Pawnee and part Otoe-Missouria, 

reflecting information on the form that both his mother and father 

were part Pawnee but not reflecting either parent's Osage blood. 

In other words, BIA records show that Lone Elk was both Osage and 

Pawnee, yet the Pawnee Agency certificate shows no Osage blood, 

while the marriage card shows no Pawnee blood. The marriage card 

supports the conclusion that his certificate filed with the Pawnee 

Agency apparently did not preclude ~is enrollment on BIA records 

as an Indian of another tribe. Logically, the same result could 

obtain for Victor Akers. 

16 If the evidence had established conclusively that Akers was 

legally enrolled as both Osage and Pawnee, the question would have 

arisen as to which tribal enrollment Congress would recognize for 

will approval purposes. It has long been recognized that Congress 

can designate single membership for its own legal purposes even 

when dual membership has been established for Indian purposes. 

With respect to allotment and other distribution of tribal 

property or federal benefits, it is "well established policy" that 

a "person cannot be a member of two tribes at once." F. Cohen, 

Handbook of Federal Indian Law 137 (1942, reprinted by the Un~vers~ty of New Mex~co Press}. Arguably, will approval is in 

the nature of a protective benefit, and it makes sense to suppose 

that the Secretary would want a dually enrolled Indian to fall 

under one will-approval process or the other rather than be 

subject to multiple and possibly conflicting review and probate 

procedures. We need not decide this issue, however, because the 

record does not establish that Akers was, in fact, dually 

enrolled. 

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II. 

We turn next to the question of whether the Secretary was 

justified in finding that Akers had an insane delusion that 

materially affected the terms of the will. The basic standard for 

review of the Secretary's decision approving or disapproving an 

Osage will is found in the Osage Indian Act of 1978. In pertinent 

part, the Act provides that "[The Secretary's] decisions shall be 

binding and shall not be reversed unless the same is against the 

clear weight of the evidence or erroneous in law." 92 Stat. 1661, 

§ 5{a). Although this standard requires considerable deference to 

the decision of the Secretary, it gives somewhat more discretion 

to the courts than would review under an arbitrary and capricious 

standard, and perhaps even under abuse of discretion and 

substantial evidence standards. In any event, after reviewing the 

Secretary's factual findings and conclusions of law, we have no 

trouble determining that the Secretary's decision was both legally 

erroneous and against the clear weight of the evidence. 

The sole evidence of an insane delusion was the contradiction 

between the Secretary's finding that Lone Elk was Akers' 

illegitimate son and the phrase in Akers' will stating "I have but 

two children and • their names are Norman Akers and Vicki 

Akers Pratt." Appellants insist that these words did no more than 

reflect Akers' intention not to bequeath a share of his estate to 

Lone Elk. That intention was expressed as far back as the time of 

Ross's claim for child support in 1978. The Secretary argues that 

·since Akers previously had acknowledged Lone Elk as his son, his 

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words evidenced an insane delusion rather than any rational intent 

to disinherit. 

The burden of proof to establish an insane delusion falls on 

the will contestant. See In re Holmes Estate, 270 P.2d 320, 321 

(Okla. 1954); ~also Attocknie v. Udall, 261 F. Supp. 876, 882 

(W.O. Okla. 1966), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 390 F.2d 636 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 393 u.s. 833 (1968). Where there is no 

extrinsic evidence to support a claim of insane delusion, the 

burden is not met. A determination that the testator had an 

insane delusion cannot arise solely from a phrase in a will 

recognizing only two of three previously acknowledged children. 

The Oklahoma cases do not argue otherwise, a fact that has eluded 

the Secretary. 

The leading Oklahoma cases involving insane delusion are Winn 

v. Dolezal, 355 P.2d ·859 (Okla. 1960) and In re Robertson's 

Estate, 189 P.2d 615 (Okla. 1948). Both involved testators whose 

wills did not acknOwledge certain alleged children of the 

testators as their own. The children had been born while the 

testators were married to the children's mothers. In both cases, 

extrinsic evidence was offered to substantiate the existence of an 

insane delusion or its absence. 

The Winn court summarized the meaning of an insane delusion 

under Oklahoma law as follows: 

"An insane delusion may exist notwithstanding full 

mental capacity in other respects and the test as to 

validity of a will when contested upon the ground that 

testator was laboring under an insane delusion is not 

whether testator had general testamentary capacity, but 

whether an insane delusion materially affected the will. 

An insane delusion is a belief in things which do not 

exist, and which no rational mind would believe to 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 22 
exist. The essence 

no basis in reason, 

can be accounted 

disorder." 

of an insane delusion is that it has 

cannot be dispelled by reason, and 

for only as the product of mental 

Winn, 355 P.2d at 861. In other words, the belief must be (1) 

false, (2) irrational, and (3) explainable only as the product of 

mental disorder. In Winn, the court found the evidence sufficient 

to support the testator's view that the children born during his 

marriage to their mother were fathered by another man. Therefore, 

they found no false belief and, ! fortiori, no insane delusion 

reflected in his testamentary denial of paternity, which clearly 

was meant to be taken literally.l7 

On the other hand, in In re Robertson's Estate, 189 P.2d 615, 

(Okla. 1948), it is more difficult to deduce whether the testator 

declined to acknowledge his children because he rationally wished 

to disinherit them or because he was insanely deluded into 

believing that they were not his. Robertson concerned an elderly 

testator who had married for the fourth time and was alleged to be 

under the influence of his fourth wife. He bequeathed only five 

dollars apiece to two grown children who were found to be the 

legitimate offspring of his first marriage. His will declared "I 

have no children ••• [and] in event any person shall legally 

17 The testator's will stated that "the above named children are 

to receive nothing further from my estate; said children were born 

to my said former wife during the time that I and she were husband 

and wife, but which said children I am not the father of and do 

not acknowledge either of them as being my children; however in 

any event said above named children are to be fully bound by the 

above provisions herein made for them, and in the event they are 

[sic] either of them, should attempt to contest this Will or the 

provisions so made for them, then and in that event said 

contesting person or persons shall receive nothing from my 

estate." Winn, 355 P.2d at 860-61. 

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prove themselves to be my children, • I leave them the sum of 

One Dollar." 189 P.2d at 617. A county court heard and 

apparently gave some credit to expert and lay testimony 

questioning Robertson's testamentary capacity in general. 

Although it found that Robertson was mentally competent to make a 

will and had not been unduly influenced by his fourth wife, it 

also found that the will was the product of an hallucination that 

he had no children. An Oklahoma district court reversed the 

finding of insane delusion, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

reversed the district court. In so doing, the supreme court found 

no rational basis for Robertson's intent to disinherit his own 

legitimate children, and it construed the language of the will 

literally as confirmation of an insane delusion. 

Both Winn and Robertson were distinguished in Attocknie v. 

Udall,. 261 F. Supp. 876, as cases concerning children born in 

wedlock. The reasoning of Attocknie is apposite here. 18 In 

Attocknie, a Comanche Indian stated in his will, "I leave nothing 

to Willis Attocknie because he is not my son." Although the 

Secretary of the Interior found that Willis was the illegitimate 

son of the testator, he nonetheless approved the will against 

claims that Attocknie was insanely deluded into believing that 

18 Attocknie was reversed on the grounds that the federal court 

lacked jurisdiction under 25 u.s.c. § 373 to review the 

Secretary's decision. 390 F.2d 636 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 393 

u.s. 833 (1968). The effect of the reversal on the Secretary's 

decision was the same as the ruling of the district court: the 

Secretary's decision to approve the will was valid. Two years 

later, the Supreme Court took certiorari in the case of Too~hnippah v. Hickel, 397 u.s. 598 (1970), and held that the 

federal courts had jurisdiction to review the Secretary's decisions under 25 u.s.c. § 373. 

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Willis was not his son. In upholding the Secretary, the federal 

district court found no authority for application of a rule that 

would find an insane delusion simply on the basis of the 

incongruity of the language of the will and actual evidence of 

paternity. 261 F. Supp. at 881. "[P]roof of a change of attitude 

[toward paternity] is not ••• evidence of an insane delusion. 

Further, it is equally absurd to suggest that the inconsistency 

between the language in the will and the original findings of fact 

tends to prove an 'insane delusion.'" Id. at 882. The court then 

focused on the disputed evidence as to paternity and stressed that 

it could not determine that Attocknie truly had a false belief 

that Willis was not his son. Although upholding the Secretary's 

findings as to paternity under a substantial evidence standard, 

the court concluded that the paternity findings could be false or, 

even if true, not shared 

placed on the fact that where 

by the testator. 

the child is 

rational doubt as to paternity may linger. 

Heavy emphasis was 

illegitimate, some 

In Akers' hearing, the evidence of paternity was not 

disputed. Nonetheless, and even if one concedes that the language 

of the will apparently evidenced a false belief that Lone Elk was 

not his son, we cannot determine that the belief defied rational 

explanation and could be explained only as the product of a mental 

disorder. On the contrary, the language can be read as evidence 

that Akers had changed his mind as to paternity and was now 

disputing it. No evidence other than that offered by Lone Elk's 

mother ever established that Akers was the father. The paternity 

affidavit, the birth certificate, and Lone Elk's certificate of 

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Appellate Case: 86-2898 Document: 01019300940 Date Filed: 03/24/1989 Page: 25 
Indian blood were all offered into evidence by Ross, and only the 

paternity affidavit bore Akers' alleged signature. Also, there is 

no evidence that a change of mind, if in fact there was one, was 

based on insane hatred, insane prejudice, or an unjustified sense 

of being wronged by the child who was disavowed. See In re 

Robertson's Estate, 187 P.2d at 617-18, quoting Rood, Wills 102, 

§ 137 (2d ed.)(suggesting that these are common grounds for 

finding a delusion that avoids a will). On the contrary, the 

evidence is to the effect that Akers continued to have a casual 

relationship with Lone Elk, seeing him and giving him small gifts 

occasionally. Furthermore, the will declared Akers' love and 

affection for Lone Elk. This evidence does not suggest crazed 

behavior on the subject of paternity~ if anything, it tends to 

suggest that even if Akers doubted his paternity, he was not 

holding it against Lone Elk in ways other than not wishing him to 

share in his estate. 

extrinsic evidence 

following tab 19. 

Even the magistrate found that there was no 

of any mental derangement. R. Vol. I at 5 

Assuming arguendo that Akers had some doubt about paternity, 

we conclude that Lone Elk, the contestant of the will, did not 

meet his burden of proving that doubt as to paternity was 

irrational. See Attocknie v. Udall, 261 F. Supp. at 882 

(contestant failed to prove false belief); In re Holmes Estate, 

270 P.2d 320, 321 (Okla. 1954) and In re Lillie's Estate, 159 P.2d 

542, 544 (Okla. 1945) (burden falls on contestants to prove lack 

of testamentary capacity). 

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Alternatively, and unlike the testator's words in Winn, 

Akers' words "I have but two children" cannot be determined to 

reflect a sincere denial of paternity of a third child; instead 

they are susceptible to the construction that they were simply 

invoked for the purpose of disinheriting one who might otherwise 

be judged a rightful heir. Significantly, they were common 

formula words, symbolic of an intent to disinherit for reasons 

other than an insane delusion. They were drafted by an attorney--

the same attorney, in fact, who filed Ross' child support claim 

against Akers in 1977. Similar language in other wills has been 

interpreted by the Oklahoma courts as evidence of a clear intent 

to disinherit, although in the context of whether a child was a 

pretermitted heir rather than in the context of an allegation of 

insane delusion. See In re Estate of Hester, 671 P.2d 54 (Okla. 

1983) (statement that "I have no children" held to evidence intent 

to omit testator's natural son where fact that he had a son was 

undisputed}; O'Neill v. Cox, 270 P.2d 663, (Okla. 1954} (statement 

that "I have no children and have never had any children" held to 

express intent to disinherit legal son); Dilks v. Carson, 168 P.2d 

1020 (Okla. 1946) (statement that "I have no child nor children 

except William Dilks and Gladys Dilks . • • and I do hereby 

exclude any and all other persons claiming to be my child ••.. " 

held to express ambiguity regarding intent, allowing its 

interpretation in light of circumstances under which they were 

made; court then ruled that natural daughter had been deliberately 

excluded from will). 

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The Robertson case relied on so heavily by the Secretary 

ignored the Dilks case in which the testator had used language 

similar to that used in Robertson. Instead, the Robertson court 

commented: "That testator did believe the declaration [that he 

had no children] to be true is evidenced by the fact that he put 

that solemn declaration in the instrument itself." 189 P.2d at 

618. Yet in post-Robertson cases, courts considering "omitted 

child" issues have concluded that the testator's language denying 

the existence of a child need not be construed literally. See 

generally, ~' Hester, 671 P.2d 54; O'Neill, 270 P.2d 663. The 

Secretary's decision in Akers, construing the testator's language 

literally and finding an irrational contradiction between the 

language and previously acknowledged paternity, is not supported 

by this line of Oklahoma cases. We conclude that there is no 

sound reason for the Secretary to assume mechanically that the 

testamentary language must be read literally as soon as a 

contestant alleges an insane delusion.l9 

We see little difference between language denying paternity 

and omitting any reference to a previously acknowledged child and 

language denying paternity and then explicitly limiting the 

inheritance of a previously acknowledged child. While one is 

governed by rulings determining whether the child is a 

pretermitted heir and the other is not, the language denying 

paternity is frequently the same. Whether Akers considered Lone 

19 While a literal construction might have the salutary effect 

of requiring testators to more openly and directly disinherit a 

child rather than doing it by denying paternity, such is not 

required by the law of Oklahoma. 

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Elk to be his son or not is immaterial if the will evidences a 

clear intention not to leave him a share of the estate, and there 

is no other evidence suggesting the intention was based on an 

insane delusion. 

Taken as a whole, the evidence utterly fails to suggest an 

insane delusion. Instead, the clauses in question evince a clear 

intent to preclude a possible claim by Lone Elk as a pretermitted 

child. He is mentioned specifically in the will but is not 

acknowledged as a child, anyone so claiming is given $5.00, and 

that is that. The Secretary's conclusions at every step are 

against the clear weight of the evidence. Furthermore, it is 

erroneous in law to find an insane delusion from nothing but the 

contradiction between a finding of paternity and testamentary 

language commonly used to preclude a pretermitted heir claim. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SECRETARY TO APPROVE THE WILL. 

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