Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00661/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00661-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ANTHONY RENDON,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRESNO POLICE DEPARTMENT,

POLICE OFFICER MARCUS K.

TAFOYA, POLICE SGT. MIKE

MANFREDI, POLICE OFFICERS JOHN

DOES 1029 AND THE CITY OF

FRESNO,

Defendants.

1:05-CV-00661 OWW/DLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR,

ALTERNATIVELY, SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION

GABRIEL RODRIGUEZ AND REBECCA

RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, MARCUS TAFOYA,

individually and as an officer

of the Fresno Police

Department; and DOES 1 through

50,

Defendants.

1. INTRODUCTION

Defendants City of Fresno and Marcus Tafoya (“Tafoya”) move

for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively, for summary

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adjudication. (Doc. 53, Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed June

9, 2006.) Plaintiff David Anthony Rendon (“Plaintiff”) opposes

the motion. (Doc. 76, Plaintiff’s Opposition, Filed July 10,

2006.) 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on May 20, 2005. 

(05-CV-00661, Doc. 1., Complaint.) Plaintiff filed a first

amended complaint (“FAC”) on August 29, 2005. (05-CV-00661, Doc.

29, FAC, Filed August 29, 2005.) Defendants filed an answer to

Plaintiff’s complaint on August 30, 2005. (05-CV-01017, Doc. 8.,

Answer.) On June 2, 2006 Rendon v. City of Fresno, et al., 05-

CV-00661 was consolidated with Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, et

al., 05-CV-01017 for trial purposes. (05-CV-00661, Doc. 50,

Order Consolidating, Filed June 2, 2006.) 

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in the

alternative a Motion for Summary Adjudication against the

Plaintiff. (05-CV-00661, Doc. 53, Motion for Summary Judgment,

in the alternative, Summary Adjudication, Filed July 9, 2006.)

On July 10, 2006, Plaintiff opposed the motion. (05-CV-00661,

Doc. 76, Plaintiff’s Opposition.) On July 17, 2006, Defendants

filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. (05-CV-00661, Doc. 86,

Defendants’ Reply.)

3.FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Confrontation at the Party 

i. Undisputed Facts

On March 5, 2005, a party took place at the Rendon residence

at 4519 E. Mono Ave., Fresno, California (hereinafter “the

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residence”). (DSUF, No. 1.) The stated purpose of the party was

to celebrate the return of George Rendon, brother of Plaintiff. 

(DSUF, No. 2.) George Rendon is a United States Marine who

safely returned from the War in Iraq. (Doc. 82, Declaration of

David A. Rendon, Filed July 12, 2006), Exhibit A, Deposition of

David A. Rendon, (“Plaintiff’s Depo.”), 165:9-12.) The party

started at approximately 6:00 p.m. (DSUF, No. 3.) There were

approximately 50 persons attending the party and approximately 15

of them were children. (DSUF, No. 4.) During the party a

confrontation took place in front of the Rendon residence between

two men, Chris Martinez (“Martinez”) and Rudy Escobar

(“Escobar”). (DSUF, No. 5.) During this confrontation, Martinez

punched Escobar in the face. (DSUF, No. 6.) A crowd of

approximately 15-20 persons gathered in the front yard. (DSUF,

No. 7.) Plaintiff’s father, David J. Rendon, told everyone to

“go home.” (DSUF, No. 8.)

After the confrontation between Martinez and Escobar, Ralph

Rendon, Plaintiff’s brother, came out of the house and had to be

restrained from assaulting Rudy Escobar. (DSUF, No. 9.) 

Plaintiff described Ralph Rendon as having had “too much to

drink” that evening. (DSUF, No. 10.) Plaintiff’s brother,

Lawrence Rendon also had to restrain Ralph Rendon. (DSUF, No.

11.) At this point, a “mob of people” had gathered in the front

yard area, and people were shouting to the point where Plaintiff

“couldn’t hear anything.” (DSUF, No. 12.) The crowd in the

front yard started pushing against each other, to the point where

people started falling. (DSUF, No. 13.) Plaintiff’s father

started spraying the crowd with a water hose. (DSUF, No. 14.)

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Plaintiff’s clothing became wet and muddy. (DSUF, No. 16.) At

this point Plaintiff’s siblings Lawrence Rendon, George Rendon,

and Lupe Martinez were with Ralph Rendon. (DSUF, No. 19.) 

ii. Disputed Facts

Plaintiff asserts that the confrontation between Martinez

and Escobar took place before the police arrived. (Plaintiff’s

Depo., 175:18 - 177:17; Doc. 82, Declaration of David A. Rendon,

Filed July 12, 2006, Exhibit C, Deposition of Eloy Escareno,

23:5-21). Plaintiff further asserts that the confrontation was

over and that Martinez had apologized to Escobar by the time

Plaintiff’s father told everyone to “go home.” (Plaintiff’s

Depo., 181:13 - 182:3; 213:15-214:9)

Defendants claim that the confrontation caused the crowd in

the front yard to start pushing and, as a result, Plaintiff fell

down with his cousin, Gennero Vega, on top of him. (DSUF, No.

15.) Plaintiff disputes this statement and also raises an

objection as “out of order.” When Plaintiff got up off the

ground, Gennero Vega held on to him and said, “don’t fight.” 

(DSUF, No. 17.) Plaintiff claims that he did not see anybody

fighting and said, “What is he talking about?” (Plaintiff’s

Depo., 197:15-200:11; Generro Vega Depo., 66:1-63:23). 

Defendants claim that after Plaintiff got up off the ground, the

crowd was “really, really loud, yelling ‘Ralph calm down. Ralph

calm down.’” (DSUF, No. 18.) Plaintiff, however, asserts that

the yelling came from several women who were wet from his

father’s water hose and, as a result, were yelling “Ralph calm

down. Ralph calm down.” (Plaintiff’s Depo., 199:15-206:21)

Defendants claim that Plaintiff began to go over to the crowd to

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“start breaking people up.” (DSUF, No. 20.) Plaintiff claims

that upon trying to start to break people up he said “What’s

going on?” and “What are you guys doing?” because no one was

fighting. (Plaintiff’s Depo., 206:9-208:2.)

B. Arrival of the Police 

i. Undisputed Facts

At approximately midnight on March 5, 2005, Sgt. Michael

Manfredi (“Manfredi”) and Officer Marcus Tafoya (“Tafoya”)

received a disturbance call concerning a fight described as

involving 50 people at the residence. (DSUF, No. 21.) Manfredi

and Tafoya were approximately a block away from the residence

when the disturbance call came in. (DSUF, No. 22.) Manfredi and

Tafoya responded to the disturbance call at the residence within

seconds, and were the first police officers to arrive. (DSUF,

No. 23.) Plaintiff’s wife informed him that the police were

coming to the residence. (DSUF, No. 24.) Plaintiff formed the

impression that the police were coming to the house because of

the loud noise. (DSUF, No. 25.) 

When the police officers arrived at the residence,

approximately 30 persons were still at the party. (DSUF, No.

26.) There were also approximately 20-25 persons outside of the

house in the front yard. (DSUF, No. 27.) When Manfredi and

Tafoya arrived at the scene, the overhead lights and siren on

their patrol vehicle were activated but the siren was deactivated

once the patrol car stopped. (DSUF, No. 28.) 

Manfredi saw a “big disturbance” in the front yard with

approximately 20-25 persons fighting in the yard and the porch. 

(DSUF, No. 31.) There were lawn chairs and beer bottles being

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thrown across the yard. (Id.) Manfredi saw persons running away

from the house, as well as running toward the house. (DSUF, No.

32.) Manfredi saw that the disturbance seemed to be primarily at

the front door to the residence. (DSUF, No. 33.) He saw several

persons including females and an older male, on the front porch. 

(Id.) These females and older males appeared to be trying to

keep one group of people from coming into the house while

appearing to get others into the house at the same time. (Id.) 

Officer Escareno saw the disturbance from approximately 10-15

feet behind Manfredi and Tafoya, and observed ladies crying and

yelling in the front of the residence. (Escareno Depo, 25:1923;

31:20-24.)

ii. Disputed Facts

Plaintiff claims that once the police arrived, he entered

the residence with his wife so that he could put on a shirt and

“clean up” to be presentable to talk to the officers.

(Plaintiff’s Depo., 208:3-210:21; 211:11-21; Claudia Rendon

Deposition, 60:5-61:9.) Defendant asserts that as Manfredi and

Tafoya exited the patrol vehicle, Manfredi placed a Code 3 call

from his lapel microphone because of the size of the disturbance. 

Plaintiff disputes this fact. (DSUF, No. 30.) 

Manfredi considered the possibility that a gang was trying

to crash the party because the area was dominated by the

“Bulldogs,” a local gang. (DSUF, No. 34.) According to

Plaintiff, Manfredi stated that he had no reason to believe that

the people he was dealing with were “Gang Related”, or that it

was a “Gang Party.” (Manfredi Depo, 41:12-23). 

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After Manfredi exited the patrol vehicle, his main concern

was for the people at the front door, who looked like they were

trying to protect the front of the house. (DSUF No., 35.) 

Plaintiff also disputes this fact and the fact that Manfredi

considered the circumstances he was facing. (DSUF, No. 36.)

According to Plaintiff, Officer Escareno did not see any

immediate threat upon arriving. (Escareno Depo., 59:1-4; 58:4-

8.)

C. Disputed Facts As To Incidents Outside the Residence

Manfredi and Tafoya made their way up to the front porch of

the residence, advising, “Police, stop fighting.” (DSUF, No.

37.) As Manfredi approached the porch, he pulled people apart

who were fighting, and tried to get them away from the residence. 

(DSUF, No. 38.) Manfredi also noticed approximately twelve

persons fighting on the front porch, including several females

and an older male. (DSUF, No. 39.) 

Manfredi stepped up onto the stairs on the left side of the

front porch, with Tafoya several feet away on his right. (DSUF,

No. 40.) On the front porch, Lawrence and Ralph Rendon appeared

on the left side of the porch and George Rendon was on the right

side of the porch. (DSUF, No. 41.) Manfredi separated Lawrence

Rendon and an unknown male, who were locked in a struggle on the

porch. (DSUF, No. 42.) Once Manfredi separated two other

unknown males, Plaintiff’s brother Lawrence Rendon came from one

side and hit Manfredi on the back of the head and left shoulder. 

(DSUF, No. 43.) After Manfredi was struck by Lawrence Rendon,

Ralph Rendon looked at Manfredi’s badge and medals, and punched

him two times in the right temple and the cheek. (DSUF, No. 44.) 

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At this point, Lawrence, Ralph, and George Rendon pushed Manfredi

backward off the porch. Manfredi landed on his back, with his

head and neck striking both the concrete and the grass. (DSUF,

No. 45.) After falling to the ground, Ralph, Lawrence and George

Rendon, as well as others were on top of Manfredi, and he was

unable to move because of the weight of people on top of him. 

(DSUF, No. 46.) Defendants claim that while Manfredi was on the

ground, he was stuck by the individuals who were on top of him. 

(DSUF, No. 47.) Manfredi also felt his gun being lifted out of

his holster and yelled to Tafoya that somebody was “trying to get

my gun.” (DSUF, No. 48.) Tafoya started pulling subjects off

Manfredi. (DSUF, No. 49.) Manfredi grabbed the hand of the

person who was lifting his gun, who was Ralph Rendon. (DSUF, No.

50.) 

Plaintiff provides a different account of what occurred. 

Plaintiff asserts that Officer Escareno testified he “did not”

observe any individuals engaged in a fight. (Escareno Depo.,

23:5-9.) Claudia Rendon observed Lawrence Rendon inside the

living room standing next to the bookcase. (Claudia Rendon

Depo., 61:7-18.) Plaintiff asserts that Officer Escareno

testified he did not see or otherwise observe any individuals at

the residence, hit or kick Manfredi or Tafoya. (Escareno Depo.,

23:16-21; 31:20-32:19; 36:24-37:4; Claudio Rendon Depo., 61:10-

67:7.) Plaintiff further claims that Claudia Rendon witnessed

Tafoya enter the home and then strike Lawrence Rendon with his

baton. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Officer Escareno observed

Manfredi fall out of the crowd with Ralph Rendon and that he fell

on top of “the Hispanic male.” (Escareno Depo., 36:24-37:4;

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31:20-32:19; Tafoya Depo., 100:18-24.) Contrary to Defendants’

accounts, Plaintiff claims that Manfredi then straddled “the

unknown Hispanic male” who was not resisting him or the other

Defendants. (Escareno Depo., 36:24-37:4; 31:20-32:19; 2317-21;

58:4-8; 59:1-4; 66:6-13.) Officer Escareno stood approximately

two feet behind Manfredi and provided cover to his backside,

while Manfredi pointed his gun at a non-resisting Ralph Rendon. 

(Escareno Depo., 36:24-37:4; 31:20-32:19; 23:17-21; 58:4-8; 59:1-

4; 66:6-13.) At no time during this event did Officer Escareno

feel threatened or witness any officer being assaulted by the

people who were outside the residence during this time. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Officer Escareno and Tafoya never witnessed

Ralph Rendon at any time trying to take Manfredi’s gun. 

(Escareno Depo., 42:14-23; 43:24-44:5; 46:2-47:23, 50:18-51:9.) 

Plaintiff claims that Officer Escareno never observed Plaintiff

attempt to commit the act of resistance, by being combative, or

make an attempt to grab for the gun. (Escareno Depo, 50:18-51:9;

Tafoya Depo 100:18-24.)

Defendants claim that during this altercation Manfredi and

Tafoya heard sirens. (DSUF, No. 51.) Tafoya heard an individual

yell out “leave my family alone.” (DSUF, No. 52.) Tafoya then

directed his attention toward the direction of where he heard

this and that Plaintiff struck him in the face with a closed

fist. (DSUF, No. 53.) Officer Tafoya observed Plaintiff flee

inside the Rendon residence. (DSUF, No. 54.) Next, Tafoya

directed his attention toward Lawrence Rendon, who was standing

on the front porch. (DSUF, No. 55.) Defendants’ assert that

Lawrence Rendon lunged over people and struck Tafoya on top of

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his head with his left fist. (DSUF, No. 56.) Tafoya executed

one or more forward strikes at Lawrence Rendon with his

expandable baton in an attempt to keep from being hit again. 

(DSUF, No. 57.) After Lawrence Rendon was struck with the baton,

he fled toward the inside of the residence. (DSUF, No. 58.) At

this point, Tafoya began to be pushed and shoved toward the front

door of the residence by a large group of unknown persons. 

(DSUF, No. 59.) Tafoya tried to get out of the way of this

group, but was unable to do so, and was pushed inside of the

residence. (DSUF, No. 60.)

Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ factual allegations by

stating that he never encountered or assaulted Tafoya outside the

residence that night. (Escareno Depo., 31:25-32:7; 32:25-33:9.)

Further, Officer Escareno did not see or otherwise observe any

individuals at the Rendon residence, hit or kick Manfredi or

Tafoya. (Id.) Claudia Rendon stated that she and Plaintiff

entered the home before the police arrived. (Claudia Rendon

Depo., 57:12-21; 58:18-21.) Plaintiff claims that Officer

Escareno approached the Rendon residence at different intervals

while he maintained a constant view of Defendants Manfredi and

Tafoya and that he never witnessed or observed individuals

outside the residence being combative, hitting, kicking, or

otherwise formed the impression that any individuals threatened

him or the Defendants. (Escareno Depo., 31:20-32:7; 32:25-33:9.)

Rather than being pushed inside the house, Plaintiff claims that

Tafoya quickly walked inside the residence swinging his baton,

and he seemed upset, angry and hostile. (Claudia Rendon Depo.,

61:7-18.)

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D. Disputed Facts As To Incidents Inside The Residence

Defendants claim that while Tafoya was inside the residence

he was to be struck by unknown subjects in different locations. 

(DSUF, No. 61.) At this point, Tafoya was “scared to death.” 

(DSUF, No. 62.) Plaintiff’s father locked the security door when

Officer Tafoya was inside of the residence. (DSUF, No. 63.) 

Tafoya noticed that the front door was shut. (DSUF, No. 64.) 

Tafoya advised over his lapel microphone that he needed Code 3

assistance inside of the residence. (DSUF, No. 65.) Tafoya then

saw persons identified as Plaintiff and Lawrence Rendon, and

advised them that they were in custody and to get on the ground. 

(DSUF, No. 66.) At different intervals, Tafoya was attacked

physically and verbally inside of the residence by several

persons, including David J. Rendon, Gabriel Rodriguez, Rebecca

Rodriguez, and John Nunez. (DSUF, No. 67.) While Officer Tafoya

was in the residence, several officers arrived at the scene,

including Officer Escareno. (DSUF, No. 68.) 

Plaintiff claims that at no point in time was Tafoya

physically attacked or pushed by any individuals inside the

house. (Claudia Rendon Depo., 69:20-70:4; 75:20-76:1.) There

was no threat to Tafoya or any other police officer present at

the scene. (Id.) Instead, Plaintiff claims that people inside

the house were fearful of Tafoya and that people were crying out

for help because Tafoya was out of control. (Escareno Depo.,

99:16-25, 100:8-17; Claudia Rendon Depo., 74:1-13.; 75:22-76:1.)

Plaintiff claims that David J. Rendon walked inside the

residence as Tafoya struck Gabriel Rodriguez, and yelled “Stop.

What are you doing? What are you doing to my family?” 

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(Plaintiff’s Depo., 269:15-24; 270:3-8.) David J. Rendon then

locked the screen door. (Id.) Plaintiff, without providing any

support, claims that at no time was the front door shut and that

only the security door was shut. Plaintiff claims Tafoya walked

inside the house, struck Lawrence Rendon, then gave a command

“get down.” He then proceeded to strike Gabriel and Rebecca

Rodriguez in a violent manner, with his expandable baton, then

gave a general command that “everybody get down.” (Claudia

Rendon Depo., 61:7-18.) Plaintiff claims that at no point in

time while inside the house was Tafoya physically attacked or was

his life in danger. (Escareno Depo., 197:21-197:1-11.)

Manfredi was concerned for Tafoya’s safety, and instructed

Officer Escareno to find him. (DSUF, No. 69.) Officer Escareno

and Officer Ryan Stockdale (“Officer Stockdale”) came up to the

security door and requested entry. (DSUF, No.70.) Plaintiff’s

father opened the security door and allowed entry to officers

Stockdale and Escareno. (DSUF, No. 71.) Officer Escareno

approached Tafoya, and helped him place John Nunez and another

male subject in custody. (DSUF, No. 72.) Tafoya started walking

toward the front door, and then directed officers to arrest

Gabriel and Rebecca Rodriguez. (DSUF, No. 73.) Outside of the

residence, Manfredi eventually took control of Ralph Rendon, and

handed him to Officer Marshall Chun. (DSUF, No. 74.) Manfredi

then entered the residence through the front door, and took

Lawrence Rendon into custody. (DSUF, No. 75.) Manfredi then

authorized a protective sweep of the residence. (DSUF, No. 76.) 

Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ account. According to

Plaintiff, upon Officer Escareno’s arrival on the scene, he

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observed Manfredi and Tafoya running up to the crowd. (Escareno

Depo., 10:5-11; 10:6-13.) Officer Escareno was concerned that he

did not see Tafoya. (Escareno Depo., 66:20-67:1-10.) Plaintiff

claims that only Officer Escareno came up to the security door at

the front of the residence and requested entry. (Escareno Depo.,

70:21-71:25;. 72:1.) Plaintiff, further, claims that, once

inside, Officer Escareno approached Tafoya in the back family

room and asked him to exit the residence, as he had witnessed

people were fearful of and upset by Tafoya’s presence. (Escareno

Depo., 99:3-100:8-20.)

According to Plaintiff, Tafoya escorted Gabriel Rodriguez

outside of the residence after attacking him, Rebecca Rodriguez,

and Lawrence Rendon. (Escareno Depo., 103:22-104:1-11; 107:10-

20.) Plaintiff also claims that an officer soon returned and

started walking to the front door into the house. (Id.) It is

unclear whether Plaintiff is referring to Tafoya. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that this officer stopped and assaulted another

individual by kicking him. (Id.) With the help of another

officer they took the individual down to the ground to arrest

him. This individual was not combative, struggling, or fighting

back. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that Manfredi struck

Ralph Rendon with the end of his revolver, while the suspect was

on the ground, handcuffed behind his back and that Manfredi has a

history of using excessive and unnecessary force. (Escareno

Depo., 160:2-13, 161:22-162;1-11.) 

//

//

//

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E. Plaintiff’s Arrest. 

i. Undisputed Facts

Eventually, Plaintiff was asked by a police officer to stand

up, and he was escorted out of the house without handcuffs, or

any sort of control hold. (DSUF, No. 77.) Outside of the

residence, Plaintiff was handcuffed by a female officer. (DSUF,

No. 78.) Other than checking for tattoos, Plaintiff did not

receive any treatment from this officer that he found

objectionable. (DSUF, No. 79.) Plaintiff was then placed in a

patrol vehicle without incident. (DSUF, No. 80.) 

ii. Disputed Fact

Manfredi and Tafoya prepared their police reports

independently, and did not conspire to falsify their police

reports. (DSUF, No. 81.) However, Plaintiff claims that Officer

Escareno had a conversation with Tafoya later that evening

regarding Anaya writing an original report about the incidents of

March 6, 2005 of which she had not been a witness and had “came

after the fact.” (Escareno Depo., 205:21-206:11.)

F. Lack of Government Claim Filing 

Plaintiff never filed a claim for damages as required by the

California Government Code with the City of Fresno. (DSUF, No.

82.) 

4. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©;

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California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56© mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

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Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996).

B. Summary Judgment in a Qualified Immunity Case

In this case, Defendants assert the defense of qualified

immunity on behalf of all the individual defendants. Deciding

qualified immunity entails a two-step analysis. First, a court

must ask whether a constitutional violation occurred at all. If

the answer to this question is yes, the court must then inquire

whether the right violated was “clearly established” by asking

whether a reasonable officer could believe that the defendant’s

actions were lawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). 

The traditional summary judgment approach should be used in

analyzing the first step of the Saucier analysis: 

A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity

issue must consider, then, this threshold question:

Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?

Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility are manifestly the

province of a jury.

Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110-1111 (9th Cir.

2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the second

step, the court must ask whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

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confronted. Although this inquiry is primarily a legal one,

where the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that his conduct

was lawful “depends on the resolution of disputed issues of

fact...summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins v. City of

Oakland, 364 F.3d 949, 1110-11 (9th. Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier,

533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg J., concurring)). 

C. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336

F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The

rights guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and beneficently

construed.’” Id. (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443

(1991). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff may bring a

civil action for deprivation of rights under the following

circumstances: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For

the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia

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 Although Monell dealt with a municipal government’s 1

liability under § 1983, the standard there announced was

more broadly framed in terms of “a local government.” Brass

v. County of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to 2

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth

Amendment.’” Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v.

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shall be considered to be a statute of the District

of Columbia. 

D. Fourth Amendment 

Under the Fourth Amendment the right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S.

Const. amend. IV.; Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F. 3d 1113,

1152 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has held that “in the

ordinary case, seizures of personal property are unreasonable

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, without more, unless

accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued by a neutral

and detached magistrate after finding probable cause. Id. 

However, when faced with special law enforcement needs, the

Supreme Court has found that certain general, or individual,

circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure

reasonable. Id. 

E. The Monell Doctrine

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for 1

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen v. 2

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Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). There is no “basis for

concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal

liability.” Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.

445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530

(1890)).

 In Brass v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit 3

followed evolution of municipal liability from Monroe to

Monell: 

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 [](1961), the

Supreme Court held that municipal corporations

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Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)) (also

finding the fact that “local governments can be sued under § 1983

necessarily decides that local government officials sued in their

official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 in those cases in

which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own

name”). “[T]he legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of

1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend

municipalities and other local government units to be included

among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Id. at 690. “Local

governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983

for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here,

the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers...[or

for] deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even

though such a custom has not received formal approval through the

body’s official decision making channels.” Id. 690-91. 3

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were not subject to liability under § 1983. In

Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, the Court, based upon

its “fresh” review of the legislative history of

the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the statutory

predecessor to § 1983), “overrule[d] Monroe v.

Pape...insofar as it holds that local

governments are wholly immune from suit under §

1983.” Id. at 663 (footnote omitted). The

Court, however, upheld Monroe “insofar as it

holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior

is not a basis for rendering municipalities

liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts

of their employees.” Id. at 663 n.7. It stated

that “the language of § 1983, read against the

background of the same legislative history,

compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless

action pursuant to official municipal policy of

some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id.

at 691.

328 F.3d at 1198. 

20

A local government’s liability is limited. Although a local

government can be held liable for its official policies or

customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s actions

outside of the scope of these policies or customs. “[T]he

language of § 1983, read against the background of the same

legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to

official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional

tort. In particular,...a municipality cannot be held liable

solely because it employs a tortfeasor, in other words, a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The statute’s

“language plainly imposes liability on a government that, under

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color of some official policy, [that] ‘causes’ an employee to

violate another’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 692. 

Therefore, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for

an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead,

it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury

that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” 

Id. at 694.

F. Suits Against Government Officials: Official Capacity

and Individual Capacity Suits

“1983 claims against government officials in their official

capacities are really suits against the governmental employer

because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” Butler v.

Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ky. v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Doe v. Lawrence Livermore

Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that “a

suit against a state official in his official capacity is no

different from a suit against the [official’s office or the]

State itself”)(citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). In such suits, the real party in interest

is the entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 25 (1991). A federal action for monetary damages

against an individual state official acting in his official

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capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the same way that

an action against a State is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore

Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). “As the Supreme

Court has stated, ‘official-capacity suits...generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167

F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at

165). “‘As long as the government entity receives notice and an

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n.3 (quoting Graham, 473

U.S. at 166.)

By contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985))(internal quotations omitted). To establish personal

liability in a §1983 or §1985 action, it is enough to show that

the official, “acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal

quotations omitted). Public officials sued in their personal

capacity may assert personal liability defenses, such as

qualified immunity. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. 

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Plaintiff does not indicate whether he is suing Defendants

in their official capacity, individual capacity, or both. 

Plaintiff names Chief Dyer as a Defendant in this case even

though there is nothing in the record to indicate that Chief Dyer

was present at the residence on the evening of March 5, 2005. It

appears that Plaintiff is suing Chief Dyer only in his official

capacity. Plaintiff appears to be suing Manfredi and Tafoya in

their individual capacities. 

5. DISCUSSION

A. Qualified Immunity of Officers Tafoya and Manfredi

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to overcome

qualified immunity. Qualified immunity grows out of the policy

concern that few individuals would enter public service if they

risked personal liability for their official decisions. Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The immunity protects

"all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991), and

"spare[s] a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but

unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a

long drawn out lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232

(1991). Qualified immunity is not a defense on the merits; it is

an “entitlement not to stand trial or face the burdens of

litigation” that may be overcome only by a showing that (1) a

constitutional right was in fact violated and (2) no reasonable

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officer could believe defendant’s actions were lawful in the

context of fact-specific, analogous precedents. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 200-202 (2001). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Manfredi and Tafoya violated

his Fourth Amendment rights based on their alleged use of

excessive force, their illegal entry into the residence, and his

false arrest. Merging the Fourth Amendment standard with the

qualified immunity presumption results in a two step inquiry in

which Plaintiff must establish that (1) the officers in fact

lacked probable cause to believe that there was a threat and (2)

that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer,

confronting the same circumstances, that the actions of Tafoya

and Manfredi were unlawful. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

1. Excessive Force 

a. Constitutional Violation

The initial question under Saucier is whether there was any

type or amount of force inflicted on Plaintiff as a result of

Defendants’ response to the incident on March 5, 2005. 

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used

excessive force in seizing and arresting him which resulted in

various injuries being sustained. (05-CV-00661, Doc. 29, FAC,

Filed August 29, 2005.) However, Plaintiff fails to provide any

facts to show that he sustained any injuries as a result of

Defendants’ response to the events at the residence or as a

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result of his arrest. Defendants contend that Tafoya saw

Plaintiff and Lawrence Rendon inside the house and advised them

that they were in custody and to get on the ground. (DSUF, No.

65) Plaintiff describes his encounter with Tafoya on March 5,

2005 as follows: “Tafoya walked in the house, struck Lawrence

Rendon, then gave a command ‘get down.’ Tafoya then proceeded to

strike Gabriel and Rebecca Rodriguez in a violent manner with his

expandable baton.” (Claudia Rendon Depo., 61:7-18.) Plaintiff

David Rendon, however, provides no facts to show that Tafoya or

any other officer inflicted bodily harm on his person. Plaintiff

also fails to show any other type or amount of force was

inflicted on him. Plaintiff admits that upon his arrest he was

asked by a police officer to stand up, and he was escorted out of

the house without handcuffs, or any sort of control hold. (DSUF,

No. 77.) Plaintiff admits to being handcuffed by a female

officer outside of the residence. (DSUF, No. 78.) Plaintiff did

not identify any treatment by this officer that he found

objectionable other than her checking him for tattoos. (DSUF,

No. 79.) Plaintiff then admits he was placed in the patrol

vehicle without incident. (DSUF, No. 80.) Ultimately, Plaintiff

alleges excessive force against people other than himself. 

Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be

vicariously asserted. United States v. Pulliam, 405 F.3d 782,

789 (9th Cir. 2005); see also, United States v. 100,348.00 in

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United States Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004). The

constitutional doctrine of standing guarantees that only those

people whose rights are violated may sue for their restoration. 

100,348.00 in United States Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1125

(citing, Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418

U.S. 208, 221 (1974)) (standing requires that the complaining

party suffer a particular injury caused by the action challenged

as unlawful.) 

Based on the facts viewed in light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the nature and quality of the alleged intrusions

surrounding his arrest, if any, were minimal. There are no facts

to show that Plaintiff’s right to be free from excessive force

was violated. There is no basis upon which to find Defendants

liable for the alleged use of excessive force. 

Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff David

Rendon’s excessive force claim is GRANTED. 

b. Reasonableness

In determining the reasonableness of a seizure effected by

non-deadly force, we balance the nature and quality of the

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against

the countervailing government interests at stake. Miller v.

Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal

quotations omitted). The analysis proceeds in three steps. Id. 

First, an assessment is made into the gravity of the particular

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intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests by evaluating the type

and amount of force inflicted. Id. Second, we assess the

importance of the government interest at stake by evaluating: (1)

the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

(3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. Third, the gravity of

the intrusion on the individual is balanced against the

government’s need for the intrusion to determine whether it was

constitutionally reasonable. Id. 

In addition, consideration of reasonableness must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to

make split second judgments in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation. Jackson v. City of

Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001). 

2. Unlawful Entry

It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable. Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct.

1943, 1947 (2006) (citing, Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559

(2004)). Nevertheless because the ultimate touchstone of the

Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, the warrant requirement is

subject to certain exceptions. Id. (citing, Flippo v. West

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Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999)). Some specific instances where

law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto

private property are to fight a fire and investigate its cause,

to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, or to engage in

hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. Id. (internal citations

omitted). The Ninth Circuit recognizes two general exceptions to

the warrant requirement. United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d

1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the exigency doctrine, entry

into a home is permitted if (1) there is probable cause and (2)

exigent circumstances exits. see, Id. Exigent circumstances are

those circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to

believe that entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the

officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence,

the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly

frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. Id. (internal

quotations omitted). One exigency obviating the requirement of a

warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured

or threatened with such injury. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. at 1947. The

need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is

justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an

exigency or emergency. Id. Accordingly, law enforcement

officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency

assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from

imminent injury. Id. It would be silly to suggest that the

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police would commit a tort by entering to determine whether

violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to

(or soon will) occur. Id. 

Alternately, the emergency exception to the warrant

requirement contains three requirements: 

(1) The police must have reasonable grounds

to believe that there is an emergency at

hand and an immediate need for their

assistance for the protection for life

or property

(2) The search must not be primarily

motivating by intent to arrest and seize

evidence 

(3) There must be some reasonable basis,

approximating probable cause, to

associate the emergency with the area or

place to be searched. 

Id. 

a. Constitutional Violation under Saucier: Did

Defendants Have Probable Cause to Believe

There was a Threat of Harm Inside The

Residence?

It is undisputed that during the party a violent

confrontation between two men took place in front of the

residence. (DSUF, No. 5.) During this confrontation, Chris

Martinez punched Rudy Escobar in the face. (DSUF, No. 6.) The

undisputed facts show that there was alcohol involved and that

Ralph Rendon had “had too much to drink”. (DSUF, No. 10.) A

“mob of people” had gathered in the front yard area, and people

were shouting to the point where Plaintiff “couldn’t hear

anything.” (DSUF, No. 12.) 

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At approximately midnight on March 5, 2005 Manfredi and

Tafoya received a disturbance call concerning a fight described

as involving 50 people at the residence. (DSUF, No. 21.) Upon

arrival Manfredi saw a “big disturbance”. (DSUF, No. 31.) There

were approximately 20-25 persons involved in a melee. (Id.) 

Manfredi saw persons running away from the house, as well as

running toward the house. (DSUF, No. 32.) Manfredi saw that the

disturbance seemed to be primarily at the front door to the

residence. (DSUF, No. 33.) He saw several persons trying to

keep one group of people out of the house while trying to get

others into the house at the same time. (Id.) Officer Escareno

saw the disturbance from approximately 10-15 feet behind Manfredi

and Tafoya, and observed ladies crying and yelling in the front

of the residence. (Escareno Depo, 25:1923; 31:20-24.) 

There are no facts in dispute as to the existence of a

disturbance or that Manfredi and Tafoya got a call at midnight

regarding a disturbance at the residence. Plaintiff also does

not dispute that there was yelling and crying during the

disturbance. The undisputed facts viewed in the light most

favorable to the non moving party sufficiently show that Manfredi

and Tafoya had probable cause to believe there was a potential

threat or harm to the safety of the public and that crimes were

being committed in the officers’ presence, such as disturbing the

peace, battery, fighting in public, public intoxication, and

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others. 

b. Could A Reasonable Officer Believe The

Circumstances At The Residence Were Exigent

Circumstances Such That a Warrantless Entry

Was Necessary To Prevent a Harm or Threat

Inside The Residence?

It is critical to define the right allegedly violated with

the appropriate level of specificity when deciding whether it

would be “clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202. If no reasonable officer would believe Manfredi or Tafoya’s

actions were lawful under the circumstances, they are not

entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The parties

and facts are in dispute as to the nature and gravity of the

surrounding circumstances and whether Defendants’ actions were a

reasonable response. 

As Manfredi and Tafoya exited the patrol vehicle, Manfredi

placed a Code 3 call from his lapel microphone because of the

size of the disturbance. (DSUF, No. 30.) Defendants claim that

there was fighting in the yard and the porch, with lawn chairs

and beer bottles being thrown across the yard. (DSUF, No. 31.) 

Plaintiff disputes that the 20-25 people in the front yard of the

residence were engaged in a fight. (Escareno Depo, 20:6-13;

23:5-21; 25:12-23.) Plaintiff claims that the confrontation

between Martinez and Escobar took place before police arrived on

the scene and that, by that time, Martinez had apologized to

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Escobar for hitting him. (Plaintiffs Depo., 175:18-177:17,

181:13-182:3, and 213:15-214:9; Escareno Depo., 23:5-21.) 

Manfredi considered the possibility that a gang was trying

to crash the party because the area was dominated by the

“Bulldogs,” a local gang. (DSUF, No. 34.) However, Plaintiff

claims that Manfredi had no reason to believe that the people he

was dealing with were “Gang Related,” or that it was a “Gang

Party.” (Manfredi Depo, 41:12-23.) This dispute however is

immaterial as the officers recognized the residence as being

Bulldog gang territory. Manfredi considered the circumstances he

faced to be dangerous. (DSUF, No. 36.) However, according to

Plaintiff, Officer Escareno did not see any immediate threat upon

arriving. (Escareno Depo., 59:1-4; 58:4-8.)

The facts also show that there is a material dispute as to

whether a reasonable person would have believed Defendants’

warrantless entry was necessary to prevent the escape of a

suspect, for the prevention of harm to officers or others, for

emergency assistance, or for some other consequence frustrating a

legitimate law enforcement efforts. 

i. Officer Tafoya’s Reasonable Belief

Tafoya claims that while he was breaking up the altercation

on the porch of the residence he heard an individual yell out

“leave my family alone.” (DSUF, No. 52.) Tafoya directed his

attention toward the direction of where he heard this voice and

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an individual, later identified as Plaintiff, struck him in the

face with a closed fist. (DSUF, No. 53.) Officer Tafoya

observed the person who hit him in the face, later identified as

Plaintiff, flee inside the Rendon residence. (DSUF, No. 54.) 

Defendants argue that Tafoya was also struck by Lawrence Rendon

who lunged over people and hit Tafoya on top of his head with his

left fist. (DSUF, No. 56.) Defendants claim that Lawrence

Rendon fled inside the residence after Tafoya struck him with his

expandable baton to keep from getting hit. (DSUF. No 58.) 

Plaintiff on the other hand claims that he never encountered

or assaulted Tafoya outside the residence that night. (Escareno

Depo., 31:25-32:7; 32:25-33:9.) Plaintiff also offers as

evidence testimony from Officer Escareno that he did not see or

otherwise observe any individuals at the residence hit or kick

Manfredi or Tafoya. (Id.) Plaintiff also offers testimony from

Claudia Rendon who stated that she and Plaintiff entered the home

before the police arrived. (Claudia Rendon Depo., 57:12-21;

58:18-21.) Plaintiff further disputes the fact that Lawrence

Rendon was outside on the porch. According to Plaintiff, Claudia

Rendon observed Lawrence Rendon inside the living room standing

next to the bookcase. (Claudia Rendon Depo., 61:7-18.) 

Plaintiff claims that he never struck Tafoya and walked inside

the home with his wife Claudia Rendon prior to their arrival. 

(Claudia Rendon Depo., 57:12-21; 58:18-21; Escareno Depo., 31:25-

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32:7; 32:25-33:9.) Plaintiff also claims that Officer Escareno

never observed any individual at the residence strike, kick, or

be combative with the Defendant officers. (Id.) 

Lastly, Defendants claim that Tafoya was pushed and shoved

toward the front door of the residence by a large group of

unknown persons (DSUF, no. 59.) Tafoya claims that he tried to

get out of the way from this group but was unable to. (DSUF, No.

60.) However, Plaintiff claims that Tafoya “quickly walked”

inside the residence swinging his baton seemingly upset, angry,

and hostile. (Claudia Rendon Depo., 61:7-18.) 

Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff

who is the non-moving party, if no individual present was engaged

in violence or offering a threat to the officers, no reasonable

officer would have believed it was necessary to have used force

and make arrests or enter the residence. Tafoya is not entitled

to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

ii. Sargent Manfredi’s Reasonable Belief

The undisputed facts show that Manfredi and Tafoya arrived

at the Rendon residence past midnight on March 5, 2005. Prior to

their arrival a physical confrontation had taken place between

two guests at the party. Upon arrival, Manfredi and Tafoya

encounter a crowd of approximately 15-20 people gathered in the

front yard. Some guests at the party were drinking alcohol. 

Some of the guests were shouting. 

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Tafoya had entered the residence before Manfredi. 

35

While there is a dispute as to the reasonableness of Officer

Tafoya’s entry into the residence, there is no dispute as to

Manfredi’s reasonable belief that he faced exigent circumstances

such that his warrantless entry was necessary to prevent harm. 

Defendants argue that, given the scene outside the residence upon

the officers’ arrival, Manfredi was concerned for Tafoya’s safety

after Tafoya entered the residence. (DSUF, No. 69.) Based on 4

this concern, Defendants argue that Manfredi instructed Officer

Escareno to find Tafoya. (Id.) At that point, Officer Escareno

and Officer Stockdale requested entry into the residence and were

allowed entry by Plaintiff’s father. (DSUF, No. 71.) At oral

argument, Defendants further argued that Manfredi proceeded to

enter the residence out of continued concern for Tafoya. (DSUF,

No. 75.) Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts. Further,

Plaintiff offers testimony by Officer Escareno that he too was

concerned that he did not see Tafoya outside the residence upon

his arrival. (Escareno, Dep., 66:20-67:1-10.) 

Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff

who is the non-moving party, if there had been an earlier

altercation at the residence, some guests were drinking alcohol,

some guests were shouting, and the officers were outnumbered by

guests in an area that is known to be Bulldog gang territory, it

was reasonable for Manfredi to enter the residence after Tafoya

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out of concern for Tafoya’s safety. Manfredi is entitled to

qualified immunity as a matter of law. 

c. Emergency Exception 

i. Did Defendants Have Reasonable Grounds

to Believe That There Was An Emergency

At Hand and An Immediate Need for Their

Assistance? 

The Ninth circuit has also applied an emergency exception to

unlawful entry. The parties dispute the nature of the

circumstances Defendants were faced with on March 5, 2005. 

Defendants claim that there was fighting when they arrived and

that they became involved in pulling people apart during that

fighting outside of the residence. Defendants claim that they

believed a Gang could be involved in the altercation and that the

situation they were faced with was dangerous. 

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that by the time

that the police arrived at the residence any altercation that may

have occurred was over. Plaintiffs also offer facts to show that

there was no immediate threat to police officers upon arrival at

the residence. 

Defendants claim that as Manfredi and Tafoya were attempting

to pull people apart during the fighting on the porch, Manfredi

was struck by both Lawrence and Ralph Rendon who then fled into

the house. Tafoya claims that he was struck by Plaintiff who

then fled inside the house. Plaintiff, however, has testified

that Manfredi and Tafoya were at no time assaulted by anyone at

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the party and were never under any threat of immediate harm at

the party. 

There is also a dispute between the parties as to whether an

emergency existed inside the residence on the night in question,

such that Manfredi and Tafoya had reasonable grounds to enter

without a warrant. Defendants claim that Tafoya was pushed and

shoved toward the front door of the residence by a large group of

unknown persons. (DSUF, No. 59.) Tafoya tried to but was unable

to get out of the way of this group. (DSUF, NO. 60.) Plaintiff

disputes these facts and claims that Tafoya quickly walked inside

the residence swinging his baton seemingly upset, angry and

hostile. (Claudia Rendon Depo., 61:7-18.) 

Tafoya claims that he began to be struck by unknown subjects

in different locations and that at this point he was “scared to

death”. (DSUF, nos. 61-62.) Tafoya noticed that the front door

was shut once he entered the residence. (DSUF, No. 64.) Tafoya

claims that at different intervals he was attacked, physically

and verbally, inside the residence by several persons including

David J. Rendon, Gabriel Rodriguez, Rebecca Rodriguez, and John

Nunez. (DSUF, No. 67.) Tafoya advised over his lapel microphone

that he needed Code 3 assistance inside the residence and then

proceeded to advise Plaintiff and Lawrence Rendon that they were

under arrest and to get on the ground. (DSUF, No. 66.) 

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Plaintiff provides a different account of what occurred

inside the residence. Plaintiff claims that at no time was the

front door shut, but only the screen door was shut. (Plaintiff’s

Depo., 269:15-24; 270:3-8.) Plaintiff also claims that upon

walking inside the house, Tafoya struck Lawrence Rendon and gave

a command to “get down.” Tafoya then proceeded to strike Gabriel

and Rebecca Rodriguez in a violent manner with his expandable

baton. (Claudia Rendon Depo., 61:7-18.) Plaintiff claims that

at no point in time while inside the house Tafoya was physically

attacked or was his life in danger. (Escareno Depo., 197:21-

197:1-11.) Plaintiff further claims that Officer Escareno at one

point approached Tafoya and asked him to exit the residence, as

he had witnessed that people were fearful and upset by Tafoya’s

presence. (Escareno Depo., 99:3-100:8-20.) 

Viewing these facts in light most favorable to the non

moving party, if the plaintiff’s version of the events is

accurate, no reasonable officer would have believed that the

actions of Tafoya and Manfredi were lawful under the

circumstances. Qualified immunity cannot be decided as a matter

of law. 

ii. Was The Search Primarily Motivated By an

Intent to Make An Arrest and Seize

Evidence? 

Apart from the officers’ reasonable belief that an emergency

required their intervention, it cannot be said that there is no

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issue of material fact as to whether the entry was primarily

motivated by an intent to make an arrest and seize evidence

rather than individuals. Defendants claim that after Manfredi

exited the patrol vehicle, his main concern was for the people at

the front door, who looked like they were trying to protect the

front of the house. (DSUF, No. 35.) Plaintiff disputes this

fact. Further, the facts viewed in light most favorable to the

non moving party, established there was no altercation or

circumstance that would require Tafoya or Manfredi’s entry into

the residence or their arrest of individuals inside the

residence. Nevertheless Tafoya walked toward the front door and

directed officers to arrest Gabriel and Rebecca Rodriguez. 

(DSUF, No. 73.) Plaintiffs claim that Tafoya escorted Gabriel

Rendon outside the residence and that soon came back to the front

of the house only to stop and assault an individual by kicking

him. (Escareno Depo., 103:22-104:1-11; 107:10-20.) Plaintiff’s

claim that with the help of another officer, Tafoya took this

individual down to the ground and arrested him even though he was

not combative, struggling, or fighting back. (Id.) 

Defendants claim that outside of the residence Manfredi took

control of Ralph Rendon and eventually handed him to Officer

Chun. (DSUF, No. 74.) Plaintiff claims that Manfredi struck

Ralph Rendon with the end of his revolver, while the suspect was

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on the ground, handcuffed behind his back. (Escareno Depo.,

160:2-13, 161:22-162:1-11.) 

Based on these facts it cannot be said that there are no

issues of material fact that the entry into the residence was not 

primarily motivated by an intent to make an arrest without

probable cause. 

iii. Is There A Reasonable Basis For Probable

Cause?

The undisputed facts show that Manfredi and Tafoya received

a disturbance call at approximately midnight on March 5, 2005. 

Upon arrival Manfredi saw a large disturbance involving

approximately 20-25 people outside the Rendon residence. 

Manfredi also saw persons running away from and toward the

residence. The disturbance was primarily located at the front

door to the residence. Manfredi saw several persons at the front

door trying to keep one group of people out of the house while

trying to get others into the house at the same time. Officer

Escareno saw the disturbance from approximately 10-15 feet behind

Manfredi and Tafoya, and observed ladies crying and yelling in

the front of the residence. These facts create a dispute about

the nature and intensity of the gathering in front of the

residence and whether there was probable cause to enter the

residence. 

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There are issues of material fact as to whether Tafoya had

reasonable grounds to believe that his assistance was required

under emergency conditions or that the arrest was not primarily

motivated by an intent to make an arrest. However, upon Tafoya’s

entry into the residence, it was reasonable that Manfredi be

concerned about Tafoya’s safety and enter the residence as a

result of this concern. 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

unlawful entry claim against Officer Tafoya is DENIED. 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

unlawful entry claim against Sargent Manfredi is GRANTED.

3. False Arrest 

In the FAC Plaintiff claims that he was “deprived of his

right to be secure in his person against unreasonable seizure in

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

Constitution. (05-00661, Doc. 29, FAC. Filed August 29, 2005.) 

Defendant argues that the Court dismissed this claim pursuant to

Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. 

According to a November 23, 2005 Order, Plaintiff appeared

to “waive” any false arrest claim that might have been stated in

the initial complaint. (05-00661, Doc. 38, Order Re Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, Filed November 23, 2005 (citing to Doc. 22,

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 16, Filed July 21,

2005).) 

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 At oral argument on August 7, 2006 Plaintiff presented the 5

court with a letter indicating that any criminal charges against

him were dismissed. Plaintiff argued that the dismissal of the

criminal charges against him is evidence of that Defendant

officers had no probable cause to arrest him. Even if Plaintiff

were to reallege a false arrest claim, the mere fact that charges

were dismissed against him have no bearing on whether Defendant

officers had probable cause to arrest him. A probable cause

inquiry involves a determination that the evidence available and

known to the officers at the time of Plaintiffs arrest supported

a reasonable belief that Plaintiff’s conduct warranted the

arrest. See, Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1994.) 

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In the November 23, 2005 Order, the court noted that

Plaintiff stated in his opposition to the first motion to dismiss

that he would “waive a ‘false arrest’ claim at this point, but

will reserve that claim since Counsel has opened the door.” The

court reasoned, however, that despite Plaintiff’s stated intent

to “reserve” the claim, he offered no legal or factual authority

to oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss the false arrest claim. 

The court further reasoned that because Plaintiff made no attempt

to re-plead any such claim in the first amended complaint, he is

not entitled to bring up such a claim at the 12(b)(6) stage. 

(Doc. 38, Order at 2-3 n.2). 

5

B. Conspiracy Claim

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges a conspiracy

between Tafoya and Manfredi to falsify their police reports. 

Plaintiff fails to specify what kind of conspiracy claim he is

bringing. To prove a conspiracy, Plaintiff must show “an

agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional

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rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted). Each individual does not need to know the

plan; sharing the common purpose of the conspiracy is sufficient. 

Id. A private individual may be liable if he conspired with a

state actor. Id. (internal citations omitted).

The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation and

operation of a conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of

the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from wrongful conduct.

Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th

503, 511 (Cal. 1994). A conspiracy does not stand as an

independent action, rather it is a legal doctrine to establish

joint liability by the conspirators for the underlying tort. See

Entm’t Research Group v. Genesis Creative Group, 122 F.3d 1211,

1228 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Applied Equipment Corp., 7 Cal. 4th

at 511). If a plaintiff fails to plead the underlying claim, the

corresponding conspiracy claim must also fail. Id. (“It is the

acts done and not the conspiracy to do them which should be

regarded as the essence of a civil action.”) (internal citation

omitted).

Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that Manfredi and Tafoya

falsified their police reports in order to justify their unlawful

acts and conduct. (Doc. 29, FAC, Para. 36.) Plaintiff claims

that the alleged falsifications deprived him of his rights

secured under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

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Constitution of the United States. However, Plaintiff fails to

provide facts showing that Tafoya and Manfredi formed or operated

a conspiracy to falsify their police reports or violate

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff also fails to

provide facts to show Manfredi engaged in wrongful conduct in

furtherance of the conspiracy. Defendant claims that Manfredi

and Tafoya prepared their police reports independently and did

not conspire to falsify their police reports. (DSUF, No. 81.) 

However, Plaintiff disputes this fact. Plaintiff offers

testimony claiming that Officer Escareno had a conversation with

Tafoya later that evening regarding Anaya writing an original

report about the incident of March 6, 2005 of which she had not

been a witness to and had “came after the fact.” (Escareno

Depo., 205:21-206:11.) 

Plaintiff’s disputing the fact that Manfredi and Tafoya did

not conspire to falsify their police report coupled with his

claim that someone other than Manfredi or Tafoya apparently wrote

the report is insufficient to show a conspiracy. Even if

Plaintiff were to show facts to support a conspiracy claim,

Plaintiff has not provided any facts for the underlying claim

that Tafoya and Manfredi falsified their reports. 

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim does not implicate 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3), conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Elements of

a 1985(3) claim are: (1) existence of a conspiracy to deprive

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Plaintiff of equal protection under the law; (2) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) a resulting injury. 

Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

An essential requirement for a 1985(3) claim is that there

must be some racial or otherwise class-based “invidious

discriminatory animus” for the conspiracy. Bray v. Alexandria

Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1993) (citing

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Section

1985(3) was not meant to apply to all tortious conspiracies to

deprive the rights of another. Id. Section 1985(3) does not

extend to classes beyond race unless that class can show that the

government has determined that class members “require and warrant

special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights.” 

Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff does not satisfy a § 1985(3) action because he

does not claim a racially-motivated animus, nor that he is a

member of a class that requires special federal protection. He

is a state corrections officer. Further, the facts do not allege

the elements of a 1985(3) action, such as the existence of a

conspiracy or acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. Consequently,

a 1985(3) action does not apply.

//

//

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 “[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he 1

causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his

constitutional rights.’” Brass, 328 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Baker

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979)(citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). “‘Section 1983 imposes liability for

violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for

violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” Brass,

328 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 146).

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C. Plaintiff’s Monell Claim

To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government

under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: (1)

The official(s) must have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights; (2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and 1

may not be an isolated incident; and (3) A nexus must link the

specific policy or custom to the plaintiff’s injury. See Monell,

436 U.S. at 690-92. There are three ways to show a policy or

custom of a municipality:

(1) By showing a longstanding practice or

custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local

government entity; 

(2) By showing that the decision-making

official was, as a matter of state law,

a final policymaking authority whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of

decision or 

(3) By showing that an official with final

policymaking authority either delegated

that authority to, or ratified the

decision of, a subordinate. 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005).

A municipal policy may be inferred from widespread practices or

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evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the

errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded. 

Id.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ alleged constitutional

violations were according to official or tacitly approved policy,

practice and custom of the City of Fresno. (Doc. 29, FAC, ¶ 6.) 

Plaintiff further argues that Defendants City of Fresno and Chief

Dyer negligently hired, trained, staffed, and supervised

Defendant officers by failing to adequately and properly

supervise, control, and discipline them in their duties to

refrain from unlawfully and maliciously assaulting and injuring

citizens and otherwise using unreasonable and excessive force

before, during, and after making an arrest or seizure. (Id. at

¶¶ 26-27.) 

In support of his claims Plaintiff states that Manfredi has

a history of using excessive and unnecessary force. (Escareno

Depo., 160:2-13, 161:22-162:1-11.) However, Plaintiff has not

introduced evidence creating a material issue of fact as to

whether the Defendant officers were acting pursuant to a

municipal policy or custom. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

have an excessive history of complaints, shootings, and lawsuits

alleging civil rights violations and the use of excessive force. 

However, Plaintiff provides no facts in his declaration to

support this allegation. Plaintiff also provides no facts to

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show that his alleged constitutional violation was part of a

policy or custom of the City of Fresno. Plaintiff provides no

other evidence in the form of affidavits or testimony that

establishes any of the following: (1) a longstanding practice or

custom by the City of Fresno constituting a standard operating

procedure to hire and keep “rogue cops” (2) that the Defendant

Officers’ acts were, as a matter of state law, representative of

the City of Fresno’s official policy, or (3) that the alleged

violation of his alleged constitutional right was the result of

the City of Fresno or Chief Dyer delegating their authority to or

ratifying the actions of the Defendant Officers present at the

residence on March 5, 2005. 

Based on the total evidence in the record, and viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are no

material issues concerning the adequacy of training, hiring, and

supervisory measures by the City of Fresno. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s

Monell claim is GRANTED.

D. State Law Claims

1. Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 1367(a)

Title 28 U.S.C. section 1367(a) provides in pertinent part:

“In any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district court shall have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that

are so related to the claims in the action within such

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same

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case or controversy under Article III of the United

States Constitution.” 

Plaintiff alleges a § 1983 claim for Fourth Amendment

violations. Plaintiff’s state law claims invoke supplemental

jurisdiction and arise from the same controversy as his §1983

claim. 

2. California Tort Claims Act

In California, a person making a claim against a public

entity or a public employee must present such a claim in writing

to the clerk, auditor or secretary of the local public entity

within six months after the accrual of the cause of action. Cal.

Gov. Code § 911.2.; see also Javor v. Taggart, 98 Cal. App. 4th

795, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (submission of a claim to a public

entity pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act is a condition

precedent to a civil action against the state or its employees

and failure to present the claim bars the action.) A person may

not maintain a cause of action against a public entity or public

employee without having first presented a claim as required by

California Statute. Cal. Gov. Code 945.4. Cal. Gov. Code

section 954.6 requires that a claimant file a civil action within

six months after the public agency issues its decision. Javor,

98 Cal. App. 4th at 804. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff never filed a claim for

damages pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act. (DSUF, No.

82.) Plaintiff argues in his opposition that he filed a

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“Citizens Complaint” pursuant to § 832 of the California Penal

Code with the City of Fresno. However, the provisions of Cal.

Pen. Code § 832 address Training Course Requirements for Peace

Officers and make no mention of any requirements for a “citizen’s

complaint” or any grievance filing requirements under Cal. Gov.

Code § 945.2. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants. 

3. California Constitution §§ 7 and 13

Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution provides: 

“A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law or denied equal protection of the

laws.” 

Article I, § 13 of the California Constitution provides:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches

may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly

describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to

be seized.” 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s may not bring a damages

claim directly under §§ 7 and 13 of the California Constitution

because alternative statutory and/or common law causes of action

are available to redress Plaintiff’s grievance. In support of

their proposition, Defendant cite to Katzberg v. Regents of the

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 In Katzberg, Plaintiff sought monetary damages based on 3

Defendant’s alleged violation of his due process liberty interest

under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution by

failing to provide him with a timely “name-clearing” hearing

after his removal as department chairman at a university medical

center. The court concluded that an action for damages is not

available. Katzberg, 29 Cal. 4th at 303. 

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University of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 303 (2002). In

Katzberg, the issue was whether an individual may bring an action

for money damages on the basis of an alleged violation of the

California Constitution in the absence of a statutory provision

or an established common law tort authorizing such a damage

remedy for constitutional violation. Katzberg, 29 Cal. 4th at 3

303. According to Katzberg, Plaintiff cannot bring a damages

claim under §§ 7 or 13 of the California Constitution, in part

because alternative statutory and/or common law causes of action

are available to redress his grievance. See, Katzberg, 29 Cal.

4th at 303.; see also, Rendon v. City of Fresno, 2005 U.S. Dist.

Lexis 31623 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 

Summary judgment is GRANTED.

4. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52 and 52.1

Cal. Civ. Code § 52 sets forth a damages remedy for civil

rights violations under California Law. Koebke v. Bernardo

Heights Country Club, 36 Cal. 4th 824, 836 (Cal. 2004). Cal.

Civ. Code § 52.1(a) provides that if a person interferes, or

attempts to interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion,

with the exercise or enjoyment of the constitutional or statutory

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rights of an individual or individuals, a civil action may be

brought for equitable or injunctive relief. Venegas v. County of

Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 841 (Cal. 2004). Cal. Civ. Code §

52.1(b) allows any individual so interfered with to sue for

damages. Id. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(g) states that an action

brought under § 52.1 is independent of any other action, remedy

or procedure and may be available to an aggrieved individual

under any other provision of law. Id. 

Defendants claim that the undisputed material facts

demonstrate Plaintiff lacks the evidence to maintain any

constitutional claims under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52 and 52.1. 

However a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding

Plaintiff’s unlawful entry claim in violation of his Fourth

Amendment Rights. 

Defendants motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs

claims under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52 and 52.1 is DENIED.

5. Cal Penal Code §§ 118(a) and 181

Cal. Penal Code § 118 provides the definition of perjury

under California law: 

“Every person who, having taken an oath that

he or she will testify, declare, depose, or

certify truly before any competent tribunal,

officer, or person, in any of the cases in

which the oath may be law of the State of

California be administered, willfully and

contrary to the oath, states as true any

material matter which he or she knows to be

false and every person who testifies,

declares deposes, or certifies under penalty

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of perjury and willfully states as true any

material matter which he or she knows to be

false is guilty of perjury.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 181 addresses the infringement of personal

liberty or attempt to assume ownership of persons under

California criminal law. Cal. Penal Code § 181 provides: 

Every person who holds, or attempts to hold,

any person in involuntary servitude, or

assumes or attempts to assume, rights of

ownership over any person, or who sells or

attempts to sell, any person to another, or

receives money or anything of value, in

consideration of placing any person in the

custody, or under the power or control of

another, or who buys, or attempts to buy, any

person, or pays money, or delivers anything

of value, to another, in consideration of

having any person placed in his custody, or

under his power or control, or who knowingly

aids or assists in any manner any one thus

offending, is punishable by imprisonment in

the state prison for two, three or four

years. 

No private right of action may be asserted for violation of

these criminal laws. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to these claims. 

6.CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

• As to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for excessive use

of force, summary judgment is GRANTED. 

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• As to the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful

entry against Defendants, summary judgment is DENIED AGAINST

OFFICER TAFOYA, and GRANTED FOR SARGENT MANFREDI. 

• As to Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy, summary judgment is

GRANTED. 

• As to Plaintiff’s claim for Monell liability, summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

• As to Plaintiff’s state law claims under the California Tort

Claims Act, summary judgment is GRANTED.

• As to Plaintiff’s claim under California Constitution,

Article I, sections 7 and 13 summary judgment is DENIED.

• As to Plaintiff’s claim under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52 and 52.1

is summary judgment is DENIED.

• As to Plaintiff’s claim under Cal Penal Code §§ 118 (a) and

181 summary judgment is GRANTED. 

SO ORDERED

Dated: September 18, 2006 /s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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