Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02570/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02570-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Derrick Julius Van,

Petitioner,

v. 

Maricopa County Superior Court,

Respondent.

No. CV-18-02570-PHX-JJT (BSB)

ORDER 

At issue is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 29) submitted in this 

matter by United States Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine, which recommends denial of 

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Petitioner 

timely filed Objections (Doc. 30) to the R&R, and Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 32) 

to those Objections. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will overrule the Objections, 

adopt in whole the R&R, and deny the Petition.

This Court initially denied the Petition without prejudice on the basis of Younger

abstention, as the sole ground of the Petition dealt with a state court’s decisions in an 

ongoing state criminal proceeding. (Doc. 5 at 3.) On appellate review, the Ninth Circuit 

correctly noted the dismissal Order gave no indication that this Court had considered the 

impact of the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 

2018), in determining to dismiss the Petition, and remanded the matter for this Court to 

evaluate Arevalo’s impact on Petitioner’s claims. (Doc. 9 at 1.) On that basis this Court 

concluded that reconsideration was appropriate. (Doc. 10.) Upon remand, the Court 

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referred the matter to Judge Fine to evaluate Petitioner’s constitutional claim on its merits. 

Upon independent consideration of Petitioner’s claim, with benefit of the R&R, Objection 

and Response, the Court concludes: 1) Judge Fine’s analysis in the R&R is thorough, 

exhaustive and correct; 2) consideration of Petitioner’s claim on the merits—either because 

one of the Younger factors required for abstention is not met or because one of the Arevalo

exceptions is triggered, and therefore abstention is inappropriate yields that the June 8, 

2017 release hearings and related proceedings conducted in the State case at issue 

comported with the applicable due process protections set forth in United states v. Salerno, 

481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987); therefore 3) denial of the Petition is appropriate.

Judge Fine’s thorough merits analysis concludes that the Arizona State 

constitutional and statutory provisions upon which the state judge made her detention 

decision—A.R.S. Const. Art. 2, § 22(A)(2, 3) and A.R.S. § 13-3961(d)—comport with the 

dues process requirements as distilled by the Supreme Court in Salerno. The Arizona 

Supreme Court has come to the same conclusion in Simpson v. Miller, 241 Ariz. 341, 349 

(2017), and this Court finds persuasive its reasoning.

In his Objections, Petitioner does not address this analysis. Instead, he raises several 

arguments premised on incorrect interpretation of the applicable law. First, Petitioner 

appears to argue that Arevalo dictates a finding that the detention hearing the State court 

conducted in this matter—and potentially all detention hearings conducted according the 

Arizona state law provisions set forth above—are infirm. That argument misses the mark 

wholly. Arevalo provides in relevant part that even if all of the Younger factors are met for 

abstention, a federal court still should not abstain if one or more of a narrow list of 

exceptions exists. The posture of this matter is beyond Arevalo, as this Court has already 

concluded it would reconsider and review Petitioner’s claim on its merits rather than 

abstain. To the extent Petitioner argues that Arevalo dictates a finding on the merits in this 

case, one way or the other, he is wrong, and he ignores the specific facts of his own matter 

and how they differ from those in Arevalo. 

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Second, Petitioner argues that the state judge improperly considered certain 

evidence in reaching the detention decision as to Petitioner, including 1) a conviction 

Petitioner had sustained in another state for making threats, which conviction has since 

been expunged or sealed; 2) hearsay testimony that he uttered a threat to a security guard 

that he would blow up one or multiple buildings; and 3) physical evidence and admissions 

that tend to inculpate Petitioner in the pending state drug charges, which evidence police

obtained after a traffic stop for charges that subsequently were dismissed. Where, as here, 

Petitioner raises arguments for the first time in his Objections, this Court exercises its 

discretion not to consider them. E.g., United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 

2000). But even if it considered these arguments, none would succeed. The Illinois 

conviction for threats was not expunged until approximately two years after the Arizona 

state judge rendered the detention decision. The judge properly considered a then-extant 

conviction of record at the time she made the detention decision. 

Next, the applicable state rules, as well as their federal counterparts, allow for 

hearsay evidence at detention hearings. Finally, dismissal of a state charge does not equate 

to suppression of any evidence gathered in the associated stop for that charge. Had a court 

suppressed the evidence from the stop or dismissed the traffic charges for an express Fourth 

Amendment violation or related bad faith behavior by the officers involved, then 

Petitioner’s “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument might have merit. But Petitioner has 

made no such showing or even argued the stop itself was infirm. Petitioner merely provided 

a Phoenix Municipal Court document entitled “Notice of Dismissal” (Doc. 30 Exh. 9), 

which provides no indication of anything other than that the red light violation and driving 

with license suspended charges were dismissed. For that and the several other reasons 

correctly set forth in Respondents’ Response to Objections (Doc. 32 at 6-8), which the 

Court will not reiterate here, Petitioner’s evidentiary arguments would fail, were the Court 

to exercise discretion to consider them.

. . . . 

. . . . 

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Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED overruling Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. 30) to the R&R 

(Doc. 29) and adopting the R&R in whole.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 

1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying a Certificate of Appealability to Petitioner. 

He has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The Court 

finds that jurists of reason would not find its assessment of Petitioner’s constitutional 

claims to be debatable or wrong, as that standard is set forth in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Dated this 27th day of January, 2020.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

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