Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01797/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01797-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 10CV1797

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RALPH LEE BURTON,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 10-1797-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: 

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS (DOC. # 6)

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

STRIKE (DOC. #9)

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

(DOC. # 20)

Ralph Lee Burton (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, has filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §2254. Respondent Gary Sanders (“Respondent”) has filed a

Motion to Dismiss the Petition. Petitioner has filed an Opposition

to the Motion to Dismiss. Respondent has filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition. Petitioner also filed a Motion to Strike

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.

Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion to Strike. 

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition, Respondent’s Reply

and the lodgments presented therewith, as well as Petitioner’s

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1/

The Court gives Petitioner the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which deems

that a petition is constructively filed when it is delivered to prison officials

for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266(1988).

2 10CV1797

Motion to Strike and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, finds that

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and that

Petitioner’s Petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED and Petitioner’s Motion to Strike and Motion For

Evidentiary Hearing be DENIED.

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 16, 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of

rape in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2) and oral copulation

by force in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288(a)(c)(2). On November

14, 2006, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement wherein he was

sentenced to eight years imprisonment. 

Petitioner did not appeal his convictions or sentence.

On September 30, 2007, Petitioner constructively1/ filed a

Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 4). On February 1, 2008, the Superior

Court issued an Order To Show Cause for Respondent to file a Return

as to two of Petitioner’s three claims. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

4). On October 8, 2008, the Superior Court, at a hearing, denied

the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7; Petitioner’s Lodgment

No. 1 at 83-84).

On May 15, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition For Writ Of

Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 8). On August 5, 2009, the Court of Appeal denied the

Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9).

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3 10CV1797

On August 8, 2009, Petitioner filed a second Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10). On October 20, 2009, the Petition was

denied. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 11).

On October 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 12). On June 9, 2010, the California Supreme Court

denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 13).

On August 27, 2010, Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus that is now before this Court.

II

PETITIONER’S PETITION IS BARRED

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. The AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“the AEDPA”)

statute of limitations. The provisions of the AEDPA apply to

petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal court after

the AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). Therefore, because the

Petition was filed on August 27, 2010, the AEDPA applies to this

case.

Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA on April 24, 1996, “state

prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in deciding when to file

a federal habeas petition.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118

U.S. 897 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

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4 10CV1797

“[D]elays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a prisoner

from seeking relief.” Id. 

With enactment of the AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time frame

for seeking federal habeas relief was dramatically limited. The

AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by, in part, adding subdivision (d),

which provides for a one-year limitation period for state prisoners

to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d)

states, in pertinent part:

 (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

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5 10CV1797

Petitioner did not file an appeal after he was sentenced on

November 14, 2006. If a petitioner does not appeal the state court

judgment, his conviction becomes final on the date on which the time

for filing such an appeal expired. U.S. v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058 (9th

Cir. 2000); Miller v. Adams, 2009 WL 6526009 at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2009);

Kapral v. U.S., 166 F.3d 565, 575, 577 (3rd Cir. 1999); Lewis v.

Mitchell, 173 F. Supp 2d 1057, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2001). In California,

a conviction becomes final 60 days after the Superior Court

proceedings have become final. Lewis, 173 F. Supp 2d at 1060.

Therefore, absent tolling, Petitioner had one year or until

January 13, 2008, to file his Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus in

this Court. However, as explained in detail below, Petitioner waited

over one year to file the Petition that is now before the Court,

thus making it untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner filed several petitions for post-conviction relief

in the California Superior and Supreme Courts. The statute of

limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus

petition is “pending” in the state court. Under the holding of Nino

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), the “statute of

limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition

is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects petitioner’s

final collateral challenge,” provided the petitions were properly

filed and pending during that entire time. The statute of

limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is issued

on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral

challenge is filed because there is no case “pending” during that

interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006

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6 10CV1797

The meaning of the terms “properly filed” and “pending” in

Nino have been clarified by the United States Supreme Court. In

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Court held that the time

between denial in a lower California court and the filing of a

subsequent petition in the next higher court does not toll the

statute of limitations, if the petition is ultimately found to be

untimely. Id. at 223-226. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408

(2005), the Court held that statutory tolling is not available for

the period a petition is under consideration, if it is dismissed as

untimely. Id. at 413.

In Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006), the Court held that

in the absence of a clear indication by the California Supreme Court

that a petition is untimely, “the federal court must itself examine

the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would

have held in respect to timeliness.” Id. at 197. The Evans Court

gave some guidance in making that determination: federal courts must

assume (until the California courts state otherwise) that California

law regarding timeliness does not differ significantly from other

states which use thirty or sixty day rules for untimeliness and, a

six month unexplained delay is presumptively unreasonable. 

Statutory tolling is unavailable for the interval between

successive filings in the same court. Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984,

986 (9th Cir. 2001); Camacho v. Hernandez, 2009 WL 192483 at *4 (S.D.

Cal. 2009).

However, the Ninth Circuit applies a two part test to

determine whether the period between the denial of one petition and

the filing of a second petition in the same court should be tolled.

Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010), citing Hamerle v.

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2/

The Court of Appeal denied the Petition because Petitioner had failed to

supply the Court of Appeal with the order of the Superior Court denying the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in that court, or a transcript of the

proceedings in which the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9). Denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus is

final upon filing. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.387. 

7 10CV1797

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the court must

ask whether the petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to an

elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first

petition. King v. Roe, 340 F. 3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). If the

petitions are not related, the subsequent petition constitutes a new

round of collateral attack, and the time between them is not tolled.

Banjo, supra, at 969, citing Hemerle, supra, at 1075. If the

successive petition was attempting to correct deficiencies of a

prior petition, then the petitioner is still making “proper use of

state court procedures” and habeas review is still pending. Banjo,

supra, at 969, citing King, supra, at 823.

Petitioner’s first petition for relief after his convictions

and sentence became final was filed on September 30, 2007 in the San

Diego Superior Court. On October 8, 2008, the Superior Court denied

the Petition. From January 13, 2007 (the date Petitioner’s convictions and sentence became final) to September 30, 2007, (the date

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San

Diego Superior Court) (8 months, 17 days), the statute of limitations was not tolled because there was no case pending during that

interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

Petitioner waited until May 15, 2009 to file a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. On August

5, 2009, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition.2/ From October 8,

2008 (the date the San Diego Superior Court denied the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus) to May 15, 2009 (the date Petitioner filed

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A decision of the California Supreme Court is final upon filing. Phelps v.

Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule

8.532(b)(2)(A). There is no 30-day in finality as Petitioner suggests.

8 10CV1797

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal), (7 months, 5 days), the statute of limitations was not

tolled because a six month (or more) delay is presumptively

unreasonable and does not toll the statute of limitations. Evans,

546 U.S. at 197.

On August 8, 2009, Petitioner filed a second Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. On October

20, 2009, the Court of Appeal denied the second Petition. 

The Court determines that from May 15, 2009 (the date

Petitioner filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Court of Appeal) to October 20, 2009 (the date the

California Court of Appeal denied the second Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus), the statute of limitations was tolled because

Petitioner, by filing the second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

attempted to correct deficiencies in the first Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. Banjo, 614 F.3d at 969; King, 340 F.3d at 823.

From October 27, 2009 (the date Petitioner filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court) to June

9, 2010 (the date the California Supreme Court denied the Petition),

the statute of limitations was tolled because Petitioner was

properly pursuing his state court remedies.3/

On August 27, 2010, Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus that is now pending before this Court. From June 9,

2010 (the date the California Supreme Court denied the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus) to August 27, 2010, (2 months, 18 days), the

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statute of limitations was not tolled because there was no case

pending during that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

Adding together the three periods of time when the statute of

limitations was not tolled (8 months, 17 days + 7 months, 5 days +

2 months, 18 days), results in a total of one year, six months and

ten days, which is beyond the one year statute of limitations

mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner

failed to file his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in a timely

fashion and it is therefore barred.

2. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling of the

Statute of Limitations

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations because extraordinary circumstances

prevented him from filing a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in this Court. Specifically, he claims that he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because:

(A) he was housed in a prisoner Reception Center for ten

months, where he did not have access to a law library; 

(B) The Superior Court failed to send him a Notice of Entry

of Judgment for the denial of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in that court, which required him to wait for six months until the

Superior Court’s ruling became final;

(C) The Superior Court misadvised him to appeal the denial of

his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which he relied upon,

resulting in another six month delay;

(D) Petitioner’s counsel informed him that he would file a

Notice of Appeal, but did not do so, which caused: 

(i) Petitioner to believe that his claims were being pursued

via an appeal, and

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10 10CV1797

(ii) a delay in his filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the California Court of Appeal; and

(E) The Court of Appeal required him to file a copy of the

October 8, 2008 hearing transcript, but the Superior Court denied

his request for the transcript.

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that equitable tolling is

available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). see Holland v. Florida, 130

S.Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562 (2010). In Holland, the Court recognized

equitable tolling of the AEDPA one-year limitations period when the

prisoner can show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). The Ninth

Circuit has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is

subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d

530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted

that “equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Id. [quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States,

107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)]. The Beeler court wrote that

district judges must “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate

the federal habeas process” and “only authorize extensions when this

high hurdle is surmounted.” Id. at 1289.

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A prisoner Reception Center provides short-term housing to process,

classify and evaluate incoming prisoners. Martinez v. Brown, 2011 WL 1130458 (S.D.

Cal. 2011).

11 10CV1797

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary

circumstances” he has identified were the proximate cause of his

untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part.

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling “is

unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable

tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

 The obligation to act diligently “does not pertain solely to

the filing of the federal habeas petition, rather it is an obligation that exists during the period appellant is exhausting state

court remedies as well.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir.

2006) citing Lacava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3rd Cir. 2005). When

courts assess a habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable

tolling, they must conduct a “highly fact-dependent” inquiry.

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). The extraordinary

circumstances must be the “but-for and proximate cause” of the

untimely filing. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001).

A. Reception Center

Petitioner argues that for ten months, he was in a prisoner

Reception Center,4/ where he did not have access to a law library.

Respondent argues that Petitioner was not housed in a prisoner

Reception Center for more than 18 days. Respondent does not dispute

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that while Petitioner was at a prisoner Reception Center, he did not

have access to a law library.

A petitioner’s loss of access to his legal materials may

satisfy the “extraordinary” circumstances” requirement for equitable

tolling. Lott, 304 F.3d at 924-925. However, delays in utilizing the

prison library do not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,”

entitling a petitioner to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. Hood v. Galaza, 47 F. Supp 2d 1144, 1148 (S.D. Cal.

1999); Stinson v. Cate, 2010 WL 836930 at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2010),

citing Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) cert.

denied 525 U.S. 891 (1998).

Here, according to Petitioner’s prison Movement History

(Respondent’s Reply to Petitioner’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,

Exh. 1):

1. On January 18, 2006, Petitioner was admitted to a

Reception Center. 

2. On January 20 and 27, 2006, Petitioner was moved to a new

unit.

3. On February 5, 2006, Petitioner was transferred from the

Reception Center to another prison.

4. On July 27, 2007, Petitioner was transferred to another

prison.

5. On May 21, and August 28, 2008, Petitioner was temporarily

released to a hospital and returned the same day.

6. On September 24, 2008, Petitioner was temporarily

transferred to a Reception Center at another prison.

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7. On October 1, 2008, Petitioner was temporarily released to

a prison in San Diego for a hearing on his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus.

8. On October 15, 2008, Petitioner was returned to the

Reception Center where he was housed prior to his transfer to San

Diego.

9. On October 30, 2008, Petitioner was transferred to another

prison.

10. From October 30, 2008 to the present, Petitioner was

housed at various prisons and in various units which were not

Reception Centers.

Review of Petitioner’s Movement History shows that Petitioner

spent a total of 40 days in a Reception Center: from January 18,

2006 to February 5, 2006, from September 24, 2008 to October 30,

2008 and from October 15, 2008 to October 30, 2008. From January 18,

2006 to February 5, 2006 18 days elapsed. From September 24, 2008 to

October 1, 2008 7 days elapsed. From October 15, 2008 to October 30,

2008, 15 days elapsed. At all other times, except for Petitioner’s

movements to and from hospitals, Petitioner had access to law

library.

As previously noted in this Report and Recommendation, the

first interval in which the statute of limitations was not tolled

was from January 13, 2007 to September 30, 2007. Therefore,

Petitioner’s confinement in a Reception Center from January 18, 2006

to February 5, 2006 does not affect the statute of limitations in

this case.

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The second interval in which the statute of limitations was

not tolled was from October 8, 2008 to May 15, 2009. Petitioner was

housed at a Reception Center from September 24, 2008 to October 1,

2008 (7 days) and from October 15, 2008 to October 30, 2008 (15

days).

Since the statute of limitations was not tolled beginning on

October 8, 2008, Petitioner’s housing in a Reception Center from

September 24, 2008 to October 1, 2008 does not affect the statute of

limitations in this case.

Petitioner was housed in a Reception Center from October 15,

2008 (7 days after the statute of limitations was not tolled) to

October 30, 2008 (15 days after October 15, 2008). This totals 22

days when the statute of limitations was not tolled. However, a 22

day delay in not being able to utilize a prison law library does not

constitute extraordinary circumstances to justify the equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Hood, 47 F. Supp 2d at 1148;

Stinson, supra, at *6. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations while he was housed

at a prison Reception Center.

However, even if Petitioner’s lack of access to a law library

for 22 days did constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for the same amount

of time, Petitioner’s Petition is still time barred.

B. Failure of Superior Court To Issue Notice of Entry Of

 Judgment

Petitioner argues that since the Superior Court did not send

him a Notice of Entry of Judgment after it denied his Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus at the October 8, 2008 hearing, he had to wait

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5/

Petitioner cites to California Rules of Court, Rule 4.551(g) for the

proposition that a California court must issue a written statement of reasons for

a denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, that rule simply states

that, “An order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus must contain a brief

statement of the reasons of the reasons for the denial.” Here, the Superior Court

held a hearing in which it stated and discussed its reasons for its denial of

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner does not cite any

authority to support his assertion that the California court must issue a

statement of its reasons for denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

writing. 

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six months for the Superior Court’s ruling to become final.5/

Respondent argues that Petitioner is incorrect.

California Rules of Court, Rule 8.532(b)(2)(C) states that a

denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus within the original

jurisdiction of the court is final upon filing. Therefore, Petitioner did not have to wait six months for Superior Court’s ruling

to be final. 

Additionally, 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(D) states that the

statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the

factual predicate of the claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. On October 8, 2008, Petitioner knew that the Superior Court denied his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus because he was present at the hearing.

Petitioner’s ignorance of the above-noted rules is not an

extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

fn. 4 (9th Cir. 2009); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006).

Moreover, Petitioner did not wait six months to order a

transcript of the October 8, 2008 hearing. On November 11, 2008,

Petitioner wrote to the Superior Court asking for a copy of the

hearing transcript. (Petitioner’s Lodgment No. 10). On December 2,

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2008, the Superior Court informed Petitioner that he was not

entitled to a free copy of the transcript. (Petitioner’s Lodgment

No. 11). On December 17, 2008, Petitioner requested a transcript of

the hearing from the court reporter. (Petitioner’s Lodgment No. 12).

Some time prior to January 30, 2009, Petitioner received a copy of

the transcript after he paid for it. (Petitioner’s Lodgment No. 14).

The unavailability of transcripts is not an extraordinary

circumstance that requires equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. U.S. v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp 1108, 1111 (C.D. Cal.

1997); Perez v. Cate, 2009 WL 5199409 at *15 (S.D. Cal. 2009).

Additionally, Petitioner’s ignorance that he was not entitled to a

free transcript of the October 8, 2008 hearing is not an extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013, fn. 4; Rasberry, 448

F.3d at 1154.

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations in this regard.

C. Misadvisement By Superior Court

Petitioner claims that the Superior Court misadvised him to

appeal its denial of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which

he relied on, resulting in another six month delay. Respondent

argues that Petitioner’s allegations misstate the record.

The record reflects that the Superior Court believed that its

denial of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was

appealable. Petitioner’s own attorney corrected the court and stated

that Petitioner had to file another petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Petitioner’s Lodgment No.

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1 at 83). The court informed Petitioner of his appeal rights. The

court also informed Petitioner that in addition to, or in place of

an appeal, Petitioner had the right to file a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Petitioner’s

Lodgment No. 1 at 83). Then, the court stated, “... that’s something

I leave to you to address.” (Petitioner’s Lodgment No. 1 at 84).

Therefore, it is undisputed that Petitioner was advised to

file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus are original petitions

in all three levels of the California courts. A petitioner has no

right to appeal from a denial of a petition for writ of habeas

corpus. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767 (1993). 

Petitioner did not inform himself about whether he should

appeal the Superior Court’s denial of his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, or whether he should file a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. Petitioner’s

ignorance of the law is not an extraordinary circumstance that

warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. WaldronRamsey, 556 F.3d at 1013, fn. 4; Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations in this regard.

D. Petitioner’s Counsel’s Conduct

Petitioner argues that his counsel informed him that he would

file a Notice of Appeal of the Superior Court’s October 8, 2008

denial of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, but did not file

the Notice of Appeal. (Petitioner’s Declaration at paras. 13, 17,

22, 23). He asserts that his counsel’s failure led him to believe

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that his claims were being pursued by his counsel via an appeal,

which delayed the filing of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California Court of Appeal. Respondent argues that Petitioner

misstates the record.

Petitioner offers nothing but his own self-serving Declaration to support his assertion that his counsel told him that he

would file a Notice of Appeal, but did not do so. In fact, the

record presented to the Court belies Petitioner’s assertion. As

previously noted in this Report and Recommendation, Petitioner’s

counsel and the Superior Court advised Petitioner that an appeal of

the Superior Court’s denial was not procedurally available. Rather,

Petitioner was advised that the only avenue available was to file a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. (Petitioner’s Lodgment No. 1 at 83-84). Therefore, Petitioner knew, or should have known, that his attorney was not filing

an appeal of the Superior Court’s denial of his Petition.

Even if Petitioner’s assertion were to be believed, an

attorney’s negligence is not an extraordinary circumstance that

warrants the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Frye

v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001); Miranda v. Castro, 292

F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations in this regard.

E. Superior Court Denial of Transcript

Petitioner asserts that his first Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus to the California Court of Appeal was denied because he

failed to provide the court with a transcript of the October 8, 2008

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Superior Court hearing denying his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. He argues that, after he sought a transcript of the hearing

from the Superior Court, his request was denied. Respondent does

not address this argument.

The record presented to this Court reflects that on December

2, 2008, the Superior Court informed Petitioner that he was not

entitled to a free transcript of the October 8, 2008 hearing.

Petitioner’s ignorance in not knowing that he was not entitled to a

free transcript is not an extraordinary circumstance that requires

the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Waldron-Ramsey,

556 F.3d at 1013, fn. 4; Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Further, Petitioner argues that the Superior Court informed

him that he would receive a free transcript of the October 8, 2008

hearing. However, as previously noted in Section II(2)(C) of this

Report and Recommendation, the Superior Court advised him of his

appeal rights, believing that an appeal was the appropriate way to

have its ruling reviewed by a higher court. The court advised

Petitioner that, if an appeal was indeed appropriate, and he chose

to appeal the ruling, he would be provided a free transcript of the

hearing. Nevertheless, Petitioner’s attorney corrected the court

about the propriety of an appeal and stated that Petitioner had to

file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. The court did not advise Petitioner that he would be

entitled to a free transcript of the hearing if he filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal.

(Petitioner’s Lodgment No. 1 at 83-84).

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Moreover, Petitioner’s ignorance in not knowing that he was

not entitled to a free transcript of the hearing when he filed the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal, is not an extraordinary circumstance that requires equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at

1013, fn. 4; Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Further, in Section II(1) of this Report and Recommendation,

the Court ruled that the time interval from when Petitioner filed

his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court

of Appeal to when the California Court of Appeal denied his second

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, was tolled because Petitioner

was attempting to correct deficiencies in the first Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus.

As a result of the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner

has failed to establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court declines to

equitably toll the statute of limitations and finds that his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in this Court is untimely.

Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED.

 III

 EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Petitioner filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing. He claims

that his Petition should not be dismissed without an evidentiary

hearing.

An evidentiary hearing on a petition for writ of habeas

corpus is required when a petitioner’s allegations, if proved, would

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entitle him to relief, and no state court trier of fact has, after

a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.” Tinsley

v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1990) cert. denied 498 U.S. 1091

(1991); Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the facts pertaining to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,

Petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and Petitioner’s

assertions that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations, are fully developed in the record presented to the

Court by both Petitioner and Respondent. As a result, Petitioner has

not alleged facts which could entitle him to relief. Therefore,

there is no reason for this Court to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Hood, 47 F. Supp 2d at 1148, see Greyson v. Kellam, 937 F.2d 1409,

1412 (9th Cir. 1991). Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing be DENIED.

 IV

 MOTION TO STRIKE

Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss. He asserts that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is insufficient as a matter of law, in that Respondent’s contentions regarding

the delay between the Superior Court’s denial of his Superior Court

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the filing of a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal are

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6/

A California court may rule that a petitioner is unjustifiably delayed in

presenting his habeas corpus claims to a California court. This ruling, known as

the “untimeliness bar” is a California procedural rule which bars a petitioner

from bringing his claims in the California court that issued the ruling. Bennett

v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 577-580 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770,

780 (1998). In this case, no California court has ruled that Plaintiff’s claims

will not be reviewed due to the “untimeliness bar.” Therefore, the California

“untimeliness bar” is inapplicable in this case.

22 10CV1797

erroneous. Additionally, he contends that the untimeliness bar6/ is

inadequate and should not be applied in this case. 

Respondent argues that his contentions are based on the law

enunciated by the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) states in pertinent

part: “The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient

defense...”

Here, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss which contains

arguments that Petitioner’s Petition should be dismissed because it

was not timely filed. These arguments are simply arguments, not

defenses to Petitioner’s Petition.

Moreover, the Court finds that Respondent’s contentions are

not insufficient as a matter of law, and are not erroneous.

Further, the Court finds that the untimeliness bar is not applicable

in this case. Instead, Respondent’s arguments pertain to whether

Petitioner’s Petition was filed beyond AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s Motion to Strike be DENIED.

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 V

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

Court has determined that Petitioner has failed to comply with the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations and that he is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244(d).

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED. Further, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and Motion to Strike be

DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than Julu 18, 2011, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

August 1, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file 

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 17, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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