Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08204/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08204-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

John Paul Vicente 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

City of Prescott, Arizona, et al. 

Defendants.

No. CV-11-8204-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants have filed a motion to join indispensable parties and amend their 

answer. Doc. 39. The motion has been fully briefed and no party has requested oral 

argument. Docs. 41, 45. For the reasons stated below, the motion will be granted. 

I. Background.

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants illegally retaliated against him for actions he took 

as the Chapter Vice President of the United Yavapai Firefighters, Prescott Chapter, 

International Association of Fire Fighters Local 3066. Doc. 1 at 7. In addition to other 

forms of retaliation, Plaintiff alleges that he was pressured under false pretenses to enter 

into the Deferred Retirement Option Plan (“DROP”). Id. at 11. Plaintiff asks that the 

Court rescind his forced enrollment in the DROP program. 

II. Motion to Amend. 

Rule 15 makes clear that the Court “should freely give leave [to amend] when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The policy in favor of leave to amend must 

not only be heeded, see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), it must be applied 

with extreme liberality, see Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 

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880 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may deny a motion to amend if there is a showing 

of undue delay or bad faith on the part of the moving party, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party, or futility of the proposed amendment. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.

 Defendants seek to amend their answer to include the affirmative defenses of 

waiver, release, and estoppel. Defendants argue that this does not prejudice Plaintiff or 

delay the proceedings because discovery has just begun and Defendants have previously 

raised waiver and release in their February 10, 2012 motion to dismiss. Defendants 

additionally argue that the motion to amend is not futile because Plaintiff signed forms 

waiving his claims and entering into a covenant not to sue. 

 Plaintiff argues that the amended answer was unduly delayed because the 

affirmative defenses could have been raised at the time Defendants filed their answer and 

there has been no showing that Defendants received any new information. Plaintiff does 

not explain how this delay has caused him prejudice, and, absent prejudice, “[u]ndue 

delay . . . is insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 

F.3d 752, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1999). Further, the motion to amend was filed within the time 

limits set by the Court. Doc. 20 at 1. 

III. Motion to Join Parties.

 Pursuant to Rule 19, Defendants request that the Court join Plaintiff’s spouse and 

the Prescott Fire and Police Boards of the Public Safety Personnel Retirement System 

(“the Board”) as required parties. Rule 19(a) states that a nonparty is necessary if (1) in 

the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or 

(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 

disposition of the action in the person’s absence may, as a practical matter, impair the 

person’s ability to protect that interest or leave any of the persons already parties subject 

to a risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 

interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). 

A. Plaintiff’s Spouse. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s spouse is a necessary party because, in the event 

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Defendants succeed, costs and possibly attorney’s fees will be awarded against Plaintiff’s 

marital community. Plaintiff argues that the Court should wait to join his spouse until it 

becomes clearer that Defendants will succeed. 

 Under Arizona law, spouses must be sued jointly to reach community assets. 

A.R.S. § 25-215; Eng v. Stein, 599 P.2d 796, 798 (Ariz. 1979). Plaintiff could ultimately 

be responsible for costs and attorneys’ fees in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); TutorSaliba Corp v. City of Haley, 452 F.3d 1055, 1061-64 (9th Cir. 2006); A.R.S. §12-

341.01; A.R.S. §12-349. Plaintiff’s spouse must be joined if an award of costs and fees is 

to be enforceable against the marital community. This meets the requirements of 

Rule 19, and the Court sees no point in postponing her joinder. 

 B. Board. 

 Defendants argue that the Board is a necessary party under Rule 19 because the 

Board is responsible for administration of DROP and any injunctive relief concerning 

DROP must include the Board. Plaintiff does not dispute this factual assertion. Plaintiff 

instead argues that the Court can enforce an injunction against the Board without it being 

a party. Plaintiff’s argument implicitly accepts that an injunction binding the Board is 

necessary in this case. 

 Plaintiff bases his argument on a quotation from Reebok Intern. Ltd. v. 

McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1995), stating that “[t]he nationwide scope of 

an injunction carries with it the concomitant power of the court to reach out to nonparties 

who knowingly violate its order.” But this statement merely quotes the district court 

decision that the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 1388. Other Ninth Circuit cases have held 

that a party is necessary under Rule 19 if that party is a necessary subject of the 

injunctive relief requested by the plaintiff. See E.E.O.C. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 

F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2005); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power 

Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion (Doc. 39) is granted. Defendants 

shall file their amended answer on or before November 28, 2012. Plaintiff’s spouse is 

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joined as a Plaintiff for purposes of any eventual award of fees and costs, and the Board 

is joined as a Defendant for purposes of injunctive relief only. 

 Dated this 21st day of November, 2012. 

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