Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00118/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00118-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE L. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. CHAPPARRO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00118-AWI-SMS PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH LEAVE

TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Terence L. Davis (“plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

February 3, 2006. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred while plaintiff was incarcerated at the

California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff

is seeking money damages and trial by jury. Plaintiff names prison staff members L. Chapparro, J.

Bolland, J. Ward, R. Frost, U. Klassen or U. Klarren, R. Rollins, B. Ndoh, and A. Santa Cruz as

defendants. Plaintiff alleges claims under section 1983 for denial of access to the courts and denial

of due process.

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28 The court takes judicial notice of its docket, and the dismissal of the case on February 7, 2002, for failure 1

to exhaust the available administrative remedies.

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1. Denial of Access to the Courts

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Chapparro denied him access to the courts, which affected

his ability to re-file case number 2:01-cv-00082-LKK-GGH Davis v. Solano State Prison within one

year of the dismissal.1

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil

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rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration

or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from

the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). For backward-looking claims such

as that at issue here, plaintiff “must show: 1) the loss of a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying

claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) a remedy that may be awarded as

recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.” Phillips v. Hust, No. 04-36021, 2007

WL 446593, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007).

The first element requires that plaintiff show he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out

of court. Harbury 536 U.S. at 415; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Phillips, 2007 WL 446593, at *3. The

second element requires that plaintiff show defendant Chapparro proximately caused the alleged

violation of plaintiff’s rights, “[t]he touchstone . . . [for which] is foreseeability.” Id. Finally, the

third element requires that plaintiff show he has no other remedy than the relief available via this suit

for denial of access to the courts. Id. at *6.

Although the court is mindful that the federal system is one of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a), plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim for relief under section 1983 for

denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff has not done so. Plaintiff’s complaint is long on immaterial

details but short on factual allegations supporting a claim under section 1983. The court has supplied

plaintiff with the requisite legal standard and will permit plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended

complaint, in the event that plaintiff believes in good faith he has a cognizable access claim.

2. Inmate Appeals Process

Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth extensive factual allegations concerning his use of the inmate

appeals process and the response to his appeals by various defendants. “[A prison] grievance

procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.”

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8,

10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)) (emphasis added); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003)

(no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure

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confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Actions

in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983

action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

The actions of defendants in reviewing and resolving plaintiff’s inmate appeals do not

support any claims for relief under section 1983. Plaintiff’s attempt to impose liability on defendants

based on their involvement in responding to his appeals fails as a matter of law.

3. Disciplinary Hearing

Finally, plaintiff alleges in his complaint that after he was found guilty of a disciplinary

violation by defendant Santa Cruz, he lost thirty days of time credits, and lost yard, day room, phone,

special purchase, and quarterly package privileges for ninety days.

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.”

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, No. 04-15770, 2007 WL 400759,

at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2007). 

There is no protected liberty interest at stake with respect to the loss of yard, day room,

phone, special purchase, and quarterly package privileges for ninety days. Id. Therefore, plaintiff

may not pursue a due process claim premised on the basisthat he was deprived of a protected liberty

interest in these privileges without due process of law. However, plaintiff does have a protected

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28 Plaintiff is no longer in custody. Therefore, his claim is not barred by the favorable termination rule. 2

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004). 

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liberty interest in his time credits. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78, 115 S.Ct. at 2297 (citing with 2

approval Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (state-created interest in shortened prison

sentence is an interest of “real substance”)). 

Once the existence of a protected liberty interest has been established, the inquiry turns to

what procedural process was due. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal

prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, the

minimum procedural requirements that must be met are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least

24 hours between the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that

the prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they

rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his

defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or

correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues

presented are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. As long as the five minimum Wolff requirements are

met, due process has been satisfied. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994). In this

instance, plaintiff has not established that he was deprived of any of the procedural protections he

was due under federal law. Plaintiff’s disagreement with the issuance of the Rules Violation Report

and plaintiff’s disagreement with the finding of guilt by defendant Santa Cruz are insufficient to

support a claim that plaintiff’s federal rights were violated. 

4. Rule 8(a)

The court has screened plaintiff’s complaint and found that it does not state any claims for

relief under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended

complaint. In addition, plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, which calls for a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader need

only give the opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

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Rule 8(a) does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately rely upon

at trial, but only a statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 47. 

In drafting his amended complaint, plaintiff is warned that the amended complaint must

comply with Rule 8(a). Plaintiff should clearly and briefly set forth the facts in support of each claim

and should supply the facts necessary to link the alleged violation of his constitutional right to acts

or omissions of the named defendants. However, plaintiff should not argue and should not set forth

a lengthy description of immaterial facts.

 C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended

complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted;

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2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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