Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01502/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01502-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES

TO TOXICS, a non-profit

corporation, et al.,

NO. CIV. S-05-1502 LKK/JFM

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs Californians for Alternatives to Toxics, Forest

Issues Group, California Native Plant Society, California Indian

Basketweavers Association, Sierra Club -- Mother Lode Chapter,

Sierra Foothills Audubon Society, and South Yuba River Citizens

League (collectively, “plaintiffs”) have filed a motion for

attorney fees, costs, and other expenses under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, which they allege they incurred in a civil action

against defendants Steven Eubanks, Sam Wilbanks, and United States

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Forest Service (collectively, “defendants”). Plaintiffs seek an

award of $137,616 for attorney fees and $2,738.43 for costs. 

For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff’s motion is

granted in part. The court awards plaintiffs $129,837.18 in fees

and costs.

I. Procedural History

In July, 2005, the plaintiffs brought suit against the United

States Forest Service and related defendants pursuant to the

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq,

National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600, et seq, and the

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.

Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the Environmental Impact

Statement and Record of Decision that the defendants had issued,

which addressed the reforestation of the Cottonwood burn area of

the Tahoe National Forest. The plaintiffs sought declaratory

judgments that the defendants violated these statutes and an

injunction barring the defendants from implementing the project

described in the Environmental Impact Statement and Record of

Decision (the “Cottonwood Project”). 

In September, 2005, the court ordered the relating of this

action with the case numbered S-00-2016 LKK/JFM. In January, 2006,

the court issued an order requiring that motions for summary

judgment be filed no later than May 5, 2006. On May 3, 2006, the

parties stipulated to continue the briefing schedule to permit

opening briefs for motions for summary judgment be filed no later

than June 16, 2006.

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1 That petition was subsequently denied. Petition for

certiorari was later denied as well. United States Forest Service

v. Earth Island Institute, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1829 (March 19,

2007). 

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On June 15, 2006, the defendants filed a request to suspend

further briefing and hold the case in the abeyance, based upon a

recent decision issued by the Ninth Circuit. The defendants

contended that Earth Island Institute v. United States Forest

Service, 442 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. March 24, 2006), “impose[d]

burdensome new requirements for monitoring populations of

‘management indicator species’” and that the Environmental Impact

Statement and Record of Decision at issue in the present case did

not comply with the requirements of Earth Island Institute. The

defendants described Earth Island Institute’s holding as

unanticipated and wrongly decided, and informed the court that the

United States Forest Service had filed a petition for rehearing en

banc in Earth Island Institute.1 Finally, the defendants stated

that “[i]n the meantime, the government will refrain from

implementing the challenged decision.” 

A few hours after the defendants filed their motion, the

plaintiffs filed a response. The plaintiffs contended that Earth

Island Institute did not necessitate an abeyance in the present

case, but if one was granted, the court should enjoin defendants

from implementing the Cottonwood Project Record of Decision.

The next day, the court ordered that the present case be

stayed until appellate proceedings in Earth Island Institute were

concluded. Additionally, the court enjoined the defendants from

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implementing the Record of Decision while the case was stayed. The

court explained that its ruling was based on the parties’ briefing.

On May 4, 2007, the United States Department of Agriculture

withdrew the challenged Record of Decision in this case. In a joint

status report filed with this court on May 10, 2007, the parties

stated that “[i]n defendants’ view, withdrawal of the challenged

decision renders this case moot. . . .” On July 3, 2007, the court

dismissed the complaint pursuant to a stipulation by the parties.

Plaintiff now seeks attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)-(d). 

II. Standard

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a court “shall award”

attorney fees, costs and other expenses to a “prevailing party” in

a civil action “brought by or against the United States in any

court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds

that the position of the United States was substantially justified

or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(A).

In the absence of a statutory definition, a plaintiff is a

“prevailing party” for purposes of the EAJA if he or she

“succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves

some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” See

United States v. Real Property Known as 22249 Dolorosa Street, 190

F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted). A plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees, costs

and other expenses in a civil action against the United States,

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despite satisfying the “prevailing party” test, if the government,

bearing the burden of proof, demonstrates that its position “was

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award

unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d

1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff requests $140,354.43 in attorneys’ fees and costs.

For the reasons discussed herein, the court awards plaintiffs

$129,837.18.

A. Prevailing Party

A party is a prevailing party if it “succeed[ed] on any

significant issue in litigation which achiev[ed] some of the

benefits” it sought in bringing suit. National Wildlife Federation

v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 870 F.2d 542, 544 (9th Cir.

1989). The plaintiff’s success must not solely derive from the

defendant’s voluntary cessation of its conduct. Buckhannon Board

and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health, 532 U.S. 598

(2001). Instead, there must be a “judicial imprimatur” that changes

the legal relationship of the parties. Watson v. County of

Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendants contend that obtaining an enforceable judgment on

the merits or a court-ordered consent decree are the only means of

becoming a prevailing party. The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected

this argument in Watson. See 300 F.3d at 1096. There, the plaintiff

had sued his county employer for due process claim, some of which

related to a report his employer required him to write. Id. at

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1094. The plaintiff sought and was granted a preliminary injunction

against the use of the report in an administrative hearing against

him. Id. Later, his prayer for injunctive relief became moot when

his administrative hearing occurred, so the court dismissed that

cause of action. Id.

Although the plaintiff only obtained relief in the form of a

preliminary injunction that later became moot, this sufficed to

render the plaintiff the prevailing party. Id. at 1095-96. By

obtaining a preliminary injunction, he had prevailed on some of his

claims. Id. at 1095. The court rejected the argument that

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598, required a judgment on the merits or a

consent decree in order for a plaintiff to be considered a

prevailing party. Id. at 1096. Consent decrees and rulings on the

merits were simply examples of court actions that would satisfy the

standard. Id.; see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (characterizing

a judgment on the merits and a consent decree as “examples” of what

may confer prevailing party status). 

Watson further demonstrates that a plaintiff may be a

prevailing party if his claim later becomes moot. See 300 F.3d at

1096; see also Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir.

1980)(holding the plaintiff was a prevailing party after obtaining

a preliminary injunction, although his claims later became moot).

The Watson court distinguished this situation from one where the

plaintiff prevails on the preliminary injunction but loses on the

merits later. Id. In the latter, the plaintiff could not properly

be considered a prevailing party. Id.; see also Sole v. Wyner, __

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U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2188 (June 4, 2007)(“[p]revailing party status,

we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction

that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final

decision in the same case”). 

Finally, a preliminary injunction carries “judicial

imprimatur” sufficient to establish prevailing party status, even

where the defendant voluntarily agreed to refrain from the behavior

at issue. In comparable situations, the Ninth Circuit has

repeatedly held that a court action “materially alter[s] the legal

relationship between the parties, because the defendants were

required to do something directly benefitting the plaintiffs that

they otherwise would not have had to do.” Richard S. v. Department

of Developmental Services of the State of California, 317 F.3d

1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003)(legally enforceable settlement

agreement; italics supplied); see also Fisher v. SJB-P.D., Inc.,

214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)(same); Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429

F.3d 894, 900-901 (9th Cir. 2005)(court-ordered stay of

deportation, after stipulation by both parties). Although one party

or both may agree to a course of conduct, the legal relationship

between them is not changed until the court has mandated it through

some action of its own. See Carbonell, 429 F.3d at 901. Once that

occurs, there has been the “judicial imprimatur” necessary for

prevailing party status. See id.

Here, the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they were the

prevailing party in their action against defendants. They achieved

the results they sought, in obtaining an injunction against the

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defendants’ use of the Record of Decision and Environmental Impact

Statement at issue. This victory was not undone by a later adverse

ruling on the merits. See Sole, 127 S. Ct. 2188. Though the

plaintiffs’ claims were later mooted by the withdrawal of the

Record of Decision and Environmental Impact Statement, under this

circuit’s precedent, I conclude that the subsequent mooting of

plaintiff’s claims does not nullify the plaintiffs’ victory in

obtaining the preliminary injunction. See Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096;

Williams, 625 F.2d at 847. 

In the court’s order of June 16, 2006, the defendants were

enjoined from implementing the contested Record of Decision while

the case was stayed. This action by the court sufficed to give a

judicial imprimatur to the changed legal relationship between the

parties. See Richard S., 317 F.3d at 1087; Carbonell, 429 F.3d at

900-901. Although the defendants had indicated they voluntarily

would refrain from implementing the record of Decision while

appellate proceedings in Earth Island Institute were pending, such

a position is of no moment to the prevailing party analysis. The

court’s injunction required an action from the defendants that they

otherwise were not required to perform. See Carbonell, 429 F.3d at

900-901. Consequently, the plaintiffs were the prevailing parties

in their action.

B. Injustice of Awarding Fees

A prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover attorneys’

fees unless special circumstances would render such an award

unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134. 

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Here, defendant argues that the awarding of fees would be unjust

because the plaintiff “led this court into error” in the issuance

of the June 16, 2006 preliminary injunction. The court cannot

agree. 

At the time of the issuance of the injunction, the court had

before it defendants’ request for an abeyance, in which defendants

informed the court that a recent Ninth Circuit decision had made

unlawful the Record of Decision at issue in the instant case.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has characterized the decision to

issue a preliminary injunction as a sliding scale analysis, whereby

the district court consider the plaintiff’s likelihood of success

on the merit and possibility of irreparable harm. See Earth Island

Institute v. United States Forest Service, 351 F.3d 1291, 1297-98

(9th Cir. 2003). An injunction may issue where plaintiffs have

shown “probable success on the merits and the possibility of

irreparable harm.” Id. at 1298 (italics in original). In a case

such as this, where defendants themselves indicate that the

plaintiffs were extremely likely -- if not certain -- to prevail

on the merits, the issuance of the preliminary injunction was

proper. 

Moreover, the court observes that the defendants sought no

redress for the preliminary injunction that they now contend was

erroneous. Defendants neither moved for reconsideration nor

appealed to the Ninth Circuit. As such, it would not be unjust to

award attorneys’ fees in this case, based upon the issuance the

preliminary injunction that favored the plaintiffs. See Select Milk

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Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir.

2005)(holding that “it is not somehow unfair here to conclude that

[the plaintiffs] were the prevailing parties when the Government

voluntarily forfeited its right to appeal the injunction. . . .”).

C. Substantial Justification for Defendants’ Position

The court should not award attorneys’ fees, costs, and

expenses if it finds that the position of the United States was

substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). A position is

substantially justified if it has a reasonable basis in both law

and fact. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). This

determination turns on whether the government was substantially

justified either in taking its original action or in defending that

action in court. Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1988);

United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1164 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2002).

The defendant bears the burden of proof on this issue. Flores v.

Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, plaintiffs argue that defendants were not substantially

justified in their position because they approved the Cottonwood

Project without having complied with established monitoring

requirements for the Tahoe National Forest. Plaintiffs, therefore,

refer to the first alternative of Kali’s rule, that the defendants

were not substantially justified in their “original act,” which had

formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ claim. See 854 F.2d at 332. As

explained below, the court agrees with plaintiffs’ position.

The monitoring requirements to which the plaintiffs refer are

those contained in Appendix E of The Sierra Nevada Framework Plan

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Amendment (“2001 Framework”) and re-adopted in the 2004 amendment

to the 2001 Framework. Both Frameworks are comprehensive forest

plans for the national forests in the Sierra Nevada Mountains,

which includes the Tahoe National Forest. See Earth Island

Institute v. United States Forest Service, 442 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.

2006). Appendix E of the 2001 Framework lists Management Indicator

Species (MIS) that may be present in “old forest ecosystems” and

indicates which of these species it is expected will be monitored

for population levels. See Supplemental Declaration of Rachel Fazio

in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion (“Fazio Supp. Decl.”) Exh. 3.

The crux of defendants’ argument is that it was not until the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Earth Island Institute that the

defendants learned that Appendix E’s monitoring requirements were

mandatory. In Earth Island Institute, 442 F.3d 1147, the Ninth

Circuit held that the 2001 and 2004 Frameworks, as well as the

governing federal regulations, command the Forest Service to

monitor population levels of MIS. Id. at 1173-76. Furthermore, it

held that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously,

under the Administrative Procedures Act, in relying on an

alternative source for this data. Id. at 1176. 

The Ninth Circuit based its holding on several considerations.

First, the 2001 Framework plainly states that “population and/or

habitat monitoring will be conducted for all MIS and species at

risk.” Id. at 1173. The Framework goes on to describe the very

limited circumstances where habitat monitoring can replace

population monitoring. Id. Second, Appendix E of the 2001 Framework

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“makes explicit” that population data must be collected for certain

species. Id. Third, the regulations that apply to the 2001 and 2004

Frameworks clearly required population monitoring. Id. at 1173; see

36 C.F.R. § 219. 

The Earth Island Institute court discussed with approval Judge

England’s holding in Sierra Club v. Eubanks, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1070

(E.D. Cal. 2004). There, the government had contended that, under

the Tahoe Forest Plan, the Forest Service need not monitor

population levels so long as it concludes that the MIS’s habitat

would not be adversely affected by the contested action. Eubanks,

335 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. The court held that annual population

monitoring was required for the MIS listed in Appendix E and which

had check marks next to them, denoting the specific type of

monitoring. Id. The court also held that habitat analysis can

replace population data in some limited circumstances, and, after

finding that the government had not shown that there had existed

adequate habitat data at the time of the Forest Service’s action,

the court granted a preliminary injunction against the defendants.

Id. at 1802. 

The Earth Island Institute court stated that the defendants’

argument in that case suffered from the same deficiency as that in

Eubanks, in that the data describing habitat monitoring was

inadequate. 442 F.3d at 1175. Habitat monitoring can only replace

population monitoring where the Forest Service shows that it had

“(1) consulted field studies showing how many acres of territory

an individual species needed; (2) assumed that the amount of

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 It should also be noted that there are species, Sierra

Nevada Snowshoe Hare, White-tailed Hare or Mountain White-crowned

sparrow (either MIS or Species at Risk (SAR)), which were

referenced in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which are designated in

Appendix E as requiring monitoring (see Plaintiffs’ Supp. Fazio

Decl., Ex. 3, Appendix E, p. 64, Table E-9; p. 99, Table E-11), for

which habitat exists and which would be affected by the Cottonwood

project, and which the Cottonwood FEIS failed to mention, let alone

provide monitoring data for. See AR 3600-04 (Cottonwood Wildlife

Biological Evaluation); AR 3691-92 (MIS Report). 

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acreage remained constant no matter the actual size of the

individual species’ territory; and then (3) examined the proposed

alternatives to see how many acres of necessary habitat remained

after the timber was harvested.” Id. (citing Inland Empire Public

Land Council v. United States Forest Service, 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir.

1996)). The court held that the defendants had not met this

standard for replacing population data with habitat data. Id.

Under the circumstances, this court is not persuaded that

defendants’ position was substantially justified. The

administrative record shows that defendants had failed to monitor

MIS population levels, as required by Appendix E of the 2001

Framework. See AR 4432 (discussing Forest Service’s response to

Plaintiffs’ inquiries that monitoring has not occurred since 1996

and, even in 1996, the Forest Service had performed no population

monitoring for fourteen of thirty-two MIS); AR 3720 (no population

data for blue grouse); AR 3718-19 (no population data for mountain

quail).2 The defendants have directed the court to nothing in the

administrative record showing that the Forest Service has complied

with the Appendix E monitoring requirements, and the court’s

independent review of the record has likewise yielded nothing

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demonstrating that the Forest Service has complied with these

requirements.

Defendants contend that it was not until the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Earth Island Institute, 442 F.3d 1147, that it learned

that Appendix E’s monitoring requirements were mandatory. 

This decision, however, did not announce a surprising new

proposition of law, but rather based its holding on the longestablished rule that an agency must follow the plain language of

the regulations and rules binding it. See Earth Island Institute,

442 F.3d at 1173; see also Wilderness Society v. Babbitt, 5 F.3d

383, 388 (9th Cir. 1988)(holding that, under the EAJA, a government

action could not be considered substantially justified when the

action was contrary to the plain language and clear direction of

the law). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 2001 Framework, 2004

Framework, and 36 C.F.R. section 219 explicitly require population

monitoring of MIS. Id.; see also Eubanks, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.

The administrative record in the present case shows that the

defendants did not comply with these requirements.

Furthermore, the court is not persuaded that the defendants

were substantially justified in believing that theirs was one of

the limited situations where habitat data could be reported in lieu

of population data. Defendants contend that Island Empire, 88 F.3d

754, permits the Forest Service to report habitat data as a proxy

for population monitoring data. However a key distinction between

Island Empire and the present case is that, in Island Empire, there

were no requirements for MIS monitoring in the regulations at issue

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there. See 88 F.3d at 758-63. Additionally, the defendants have not

shown that, even if habitat monitoring would have been acceptable

in lieu of Appendix E’s population monitoring requirements, the

habitat data that the Forest Service relied on here met Island

Empire’s standard. See id. at 759; Earth Island Institute, 442 F.3d

at 1175 (describing Island Empire’s rule). 

In sum, the defendants’ position in this action was not

substantially justified, and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled

to attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under the Equal Access to

Justice Act.

D. Calculation of a Reasonable Fee

The starting point for calculating the amount of a reasonable

fee is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. 

1. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Under the EAJA, attorneys’ fees are award at an hourly rate

of $125, unless the court determines a cost-of-living increase or

“a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys for the proceedings involved” warrant a rate increase.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). A “qualified” attorney is one who

possesses “some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful

for the litigation in question.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,

572 (1988). An attorney with an identified practice specialty meets

this standard. Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that environmental

law is a practice speciality that requires distinctive knowledge.

Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492, 1496 (9th Cir. 1991). Finally, the

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plaintiff must show that, even if the attorneys possessed

specialized knowledge needed for the litigation, attorneys

possessing these skills were not available at the statutory rate.

Id. at 1495.

a. Sharon Duggan

Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Duggan has met the Love criteria,

justifying a rate increase. See 924 F.2d at 1492-93. Ms. Duggan has

practiced environmental law exclusively for over twenty years. See

Declaration of Sharon Duggan (“Duggan Decl.”) ¶ 2. She has also coauthored a treatise on forestry practice in California. Id. at ¶

9. The court previously has recognized that Ms. Duggan possesses

distinctive skills justifying a fee increase. See Soda Mountain

Wilderness Council v. Norton, No. 04-2583, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D.

Cal. July 21, 2006); Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v.

Dombeck, No. 00-0605, slip op. at 10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2004). The

plaintiffs have presented evidence that Ms. Duggan’s skills were

needed in this case and that those skills were unavailable

elsewhere at the statutory rate. See Declaration of David Edelson

(“Edelson Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4; Declaration of David Williams (“Williams

Decl.”) ¶¶ 5, 8, 11; Declaration of Thomas Lippe (“Lippe Decl.”)

¶¶ 5, 6, 7; Declaration of Patricia Clary (“Clary Decl.”) ¶ 3.

Although defendants argue that the plaintiffs have not shown what

efforts they took to find adequate counsel at the statutory rate,

the court has not found any authority, nor does defendant cite any,

requiring such a specific showing. Furthermore, defendants have not

presented the court with any evidence that such counsel was

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available at the statutory rate.

Plaintiffs request this court award an hourly rate of $425 for

Ms. Duggan’s work. The court concludes that a rate of $325 is

reasonable. Plaintiffs have shown that there is a “special factor”

here warranting an upward variation from the base statutory rate.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Love, 924 F.2d at 1495. A rate of

$325 was the rate awarded Ms. Duggan by the court just last year

in Soda Mountain Wilderness Council, taking into account Ms.

Duggan’s specialized skill and knowledge and the reasonable marketrate for the Sacramento area. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ own

declarant, David Edelson, stated that he believed $325 was a

reasonable rate for Ms. Duggan’s work. Edelson Decl. ¶ 5. 

b. Julia Olson

Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Olson has met the Love criteria,

justifying a rate increase. See 924 F.2d at 1492-93. Ms. Olson has

practiced environmental law exclusively for over nine years. See

Declaration of Julia Olson (“Olson Decl.”) ¶ 3. She has

successfully litigated environmental suits against federal

defendants in the Ninth Circuit and district courts throughout the

state. Id. at ¶ 4. The court previously has recognized that Ms.

Duggan possesses distinctive skills justifying a fee increase. See

Californians for Alternatives to Toxics, Wilderness Watch v.

Troyer, No. 05-1633, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Cal. August 11, 2006);

Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Dombeck, No. 00-605,

slip op. at 10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2004). The plaintiffs have

presented evidence that Ms. Olson’s skills were needed in this case

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and that those skills were unavailable elsewhere at the statutory

rate. See Edelson Decl. ¶¶ 3-4;Williams Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8, 11; Lippe

Decl. ¶¶ 5-7; Clary Decl. ¶ 3. As above, the court is not persuaded

by the defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs have not made an

adequate showing of the unavailability of counsel at the statutory

rate.

Plaintiffs request this court award an hourly rate of $325 for

Ms. Olson’s work. The court concludes that this rate is reasonable.

Plaintiffs have shown that there is a “special factor” here

warranting an upward variation from the base statutory rate. See

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Love, 924 F.2d at 1495. Moreover, $325

was the rate awarded Ms. Olson by the court last year in Troyer,

taking into account Ms. Duggan’s specialized skill and knowledge

and the reasonable market-rate for the Sacramento area.

c. Michael Graf

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Graf has met the Love criteria,

justifying a rate increase. See 924 F.2d at 1492-93. Mr. Graf has

practiced environmental law exclusively for ten years, and has

litigated in federal courts and state courts throughout California.

See Declaration of Michael Graf (“Graf Decl.”) ¶ 2. He also

received a Masters degree in Environmental Science, Policy and

Management. Id. He has published several articles in environmental

law journals. Id. at ¶ 3. The plaintiffs have presented evidence

that Ms. Olson’s skills were needed in this case and that those

skills were unavailable elsewhere at the statutory rate. See

Edelson Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Williams Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, 11; Lippe Decl. ¶¶

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4-7; Declaration of Don Rivenes (“Rivenes Decl.”) ¶ 4; Declaration

of Jason Rainey (“Rainey Decl.”) ¶ 2. As above, the court is not

persuaded by the defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs have not

made an adequate showing of the unavailability of counsel at the

statutory rate.

Plaintiffs seeks an hourly rate of $325 for Mr. Graf. The

court concludes that this rate is reasonable. Plaintiffs have shown

that there is a “special factor” here warranting an upward

variation from the base statutory rate. See 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A); Love, 924 F.2d at 1495. Furthermore, Mr. Graf’s

experience appears on par with that of Ms. Olson’s, for whom the

court has determined $325 is also a reasonable hourly rate.

d. Rachel Fazio

Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Fazio has met the Love criteria,

justifying a rate increase. See 924 F.2d at 1492-93. Ms. Fazio has

practiced environmental law exclusively for eight years. See

Declaration of Rachel Fazio(“Fazio Decl.”) ¶ 2. She has specialized

in suits against the United States Forest Service alleging

violations of NEPA and NFMA. Id. Moreover, she was counsel on

Sierra Club v. Eubanks, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1070, and Earth Island

Institute v. United States Forest Service, 442 F.3d 1147, two cases

that were highly relevant to the plaintiffs’ action in the present

case, which indicates the Ms. Fazio’s particular expertise in the

plaintiffs’ action. Id. at ¶ 3. The plaintiffs have presented

evidence that Ms. Fazio’s skills were needed in this case and that

those skills were unavailable elsewhere at the statutory rate. See

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Edelson Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; Williams Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, 11; Lippe Decl. ¶¶

4-7; Rivenes Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Rainey Decl. ¶ 2. As above, the court

is not persuaded by the defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs have

not made an adequate showing of the unavailability of counsel at

the statutory rate.

Plaintiffs seeks an hourly rate of $275 for 2005 and $300 for

2006 and 2007 for Ms. Fazio. The court concludes that this rate is

reasonable. Plaintiffs have shown that there is a “special factor”

here warranting an upward variation from the base statutory rate.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Love, 924 F.2d at 1495. Although Ms.

Fazio has slightly less experience than plaintiffs’ other counsel,

her very specialized expertise leads the court to conclude that

these rates are reasonable.

e. Attorneys Offering Declarations in Support of

Attorney Fees

Plaintiffs request $1587.50 for attorney fees for David

Williams, David Edelson, and Tom Lippe, each of whom submitted

declarations in support of plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs request

an hourly fee of $425 for Mr. Williams for 1.5 hours of work, an

hourly fee of $350 for Mr. Edelson for 1.5 hours of work, and an

hourly fee of $425 for Mr. Lippe for 1 hour of work. Although the

declarations of these individuals may show that they have a

specialized knowledge of environmental law, plaintiffs have not

shown that such a specialized knowledge is necessary for the

litigation of this motion nor that there were no attorneys with

comparable knowledge available at the statutory rate. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2412(d)(2)(A); Love, 924 F.2d at 1495. Because plaintiffs have

not carried their burden on this issue, the court awards plaintiffs

fees for Mr. Williams, Mr. Edelson, and Mr. Lippe’s time at the

statutory rate of $125 per hour. 

2. Reasonable Hours

A court may only award attorney fees for those hours

reasonably expended, excluding any “excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary” hours. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Time

expended on the fee motion can be included in the award.

Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 162 (1990). 

Here, plaintiffs seek attorney fees for time spent preparing

this motion (and reply) and their underlying action.

a. Fee Motion

Plaintiffs seek to recover fees for 76.3 hours for preparing

the fee request motion (46.3 hours) and reply (30 hours). The

majority of this time (37 hours for the motion and 20 hours for the

reply) represents time Mr. Graf spent researching and preparing

both documents, and the remainder of this time represents time

spent by co-counsel in reviewing, revising, and supplementing these

documents. See Duggan Decl. Exh. B; Olson Decl. Exh. A; Fazio Decl.

¶ 5; Graf Decl. ¶ 10; Supplemental Declaration of Michael Graf

(“Graf Supp. Decl.”) ¶ 4; Supplemental Declaration of Rachel Fazio

(“Fazio Supp. Decl.”) ¶ 2.

Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ recovery of fees for the entire

number of hours plaintiffs request on the grounds that plaintiffs’

counsel’s acts were duplicative and excessive. However, the court

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observes that plaintiffs reduced the number of hours for which they

seek recovery in an effort to offset possible duplication or

unnecessary time. See Graf Decl. ¶ 10 (counsel not requesting 30

hours expended on the motion for attorney fees); Graf Supp. Decl.

¶ 4 (counsel not requesting 25 hours expended on the reply to

defendants’ opposition to motion for attorney fees). Given the

length of both the motion and reply, as well as the complexity of

the law and facts discussed therein, the court is unpersuaded that

plaintiffs’ request is unreasonable.

The court awards fees for the hours requested for the work of

Ms. Duggan, Ms. Olson, Mr. Graf, and Ms. Fazio for the motion for

attorney fees and reply to defendants’ opposition to that motion.

b. Underlying Action

The plaintiffs seek to recover fees for a total of 338.45

hours for time spent on the underlying action in this case. This

includes preparing and filing two complaints, which were later

consolidated into one action; preparing and attending status

conferences; preparing for and litigating a discovery motion;

reviewing expert reports, which entailed learning the scientific

and technical issues relevant to the action; reviewing the

administrative record; and preparing plaintiffs’ summary judgment

brief. See Fazio Decl. Exh. A; Graf Decl. ¶¶ 7-9, Exh. A; Olson

Decl Exh. A; Duggan Decl. Exh. B. 

Defendants contest a recovery of fees for these hours for

several reasons. First, as with the fee motion, defendants assert

that many of plaintiffs’ counsels’ hours were spent communicating

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with one another and reviewing each other’s drafts. This time,

defendants contend, resulted from “four lawyers [doing] what any

one could do in a fraction of the time.” Defendants’ Opposition at

36. The court, however, is unpersuaded that plaintiffs’ request is

unreasonable as a result. The court is aware of no authority, and

defendants cite to none, holding that plaintiffs’ representation

by multiple counsel is necessarily unreasonable. In a situation

such as this one, where two actions were consolidated, it is

reasonable for the attorneys familiar with the respective actions

to remain involved in the case and to divide tasks among

themselves. In fact, that is what plaintiffs’ attorneys have done.

See Fazio Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. A; Graf Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A; Olson Decl.

¶ 7, Exh. A; Duggan Decl. Exh. B. Moreover, the plaintiffs are not

seeking recovery of fees for a total of 33.4 hours, in an exercise

of billing judgment. See Fazio Decl. Exh. A; Graf Decl. ¶ 9, Exh.

A; Olson Decl. Exh. A. Finally, the court is unpersuaded that

counsels’ communications with one another represent an unreasonable

use of time. On the contrary, such communications are necessary for

counsel to coordinate their efforts and present complete and

accurate filings to the court. The court finds that the hours for

which plaintiffs seek to recover fees are not unreasonable because

of the coordination required among counsel.

Second, defendants argue that plaintiffs should not recover

fees for the preparation of plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment, since plaintiffs never filed the motion. The court

disagrees. The defendants filed their motion to hold the case in

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abeyance one day before the time to file summary judgment motions

closed. It is not unreasonable for plaintiffs’ counsel to have

worked on a summary judgment motion up until that day. Furthermore,

defendants’ motion for abeyance was filed almost three months after

the issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Earth Island

Institute and eight days after the government had filed a request

for rehearing in that case. The plaintiffs cannot be faulted for

continuing to prepare a summary judgment motion during this time.

Finally, the defendants assert that plaintiffs should not

recover fees for time spent drafting the complaints in this case,

as the complaints were unreasonably long. The court has reviewed

both complaints. While the complaint filed by the Californians for

Alternatives to Toxics is reasonable in its length and contents,

the complaint filed by Forest Issues Group is not. The latter is

forty-eight pages long, containing only ten causes of action.

Several of the causes of action are described in detail over many

pages, and the sections describing the factual and statutory

background of the case are much more extensive than is necessary

for the court in understanding the basis of the complaint. As the

defendants correctly point out, this complaint more closely

resembles a briefing. Plaintiffs seek to recover fees for 34.2

hours of Mr. Graf’s time in drafting this complaint. Given its

unreasonable length, the court awards plaintiffs only fees for 13.5

hours of Mr. Graf’s time, which the amount of time Ms. Olson billed

for drafting her complaint for Californians for Alternatives to

Toxics.

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3. Litigation Expenses and Costs

The EAJA provides that the prevailing party can recover

litigation expenses and costs in addition to attorneys’ fees. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1); § 2412(d)(1)(A). “Expenses” includes those

that are normally billed a client, such as telephone calls,

postage, and attorney travel expenses. International Woodowrkers,

Local 3-98 v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1986). Recovery

is also permitted for the “reasonable expenses of expert witnesses”

whose work is “necessary for the preparation of the party’s case.”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Plaintiff requests a total of $2,738.43

in costs and other expenses, which includes filing fees, copying,

preparation of video for trial, The defendants do not contest this.

Therefore the court awards plaintiffs $2,738.43 for costs and other

expenses.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court awards plaintiff’s

attorneys’ fees and costs in the following amounts: 

Sharon Duggan: 20.6 hours @ $325/hr = $6,695.00

Julia Olson: 89.5 hours @ $325/hr = $29,087.50

Michael Graf: 244.2 hours @ $325/hr = $79,365.00

Rachel Fazio (2005): 8.15 hours @ $275/hr = $2,241.25

Rachel Fazio (2006-2007): 30.7 hours @ $300/hr = $9,210.00

Dave Williams: 1.5 hours @ $125/hr = $187.50

David Edelson: 1.5 hours @ $125/hr = $187.50

Tom Lippe: 1 hour @ $125/hr = $125.00

Litigation expenses and costs: $2,738.43

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Total attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs: $129,837.18

It is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’

fees and costs is GRANTED in the total sum of $129,837.18.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 10, 2007.

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