Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00294/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Notice of Removal - Suit against Federal Officer

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BETTY L. SIMS

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv00294-JAH

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS [Doc. No. 3]; 

AND (2) DISMISSING THE 

COMPLAINT WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [Doc. No. 5]

On October 14, 2016, Plaintiff Betty L. Sims, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se

(“Plaintiff”), filed a claim against the United States Social Security Administration 

(“Defendant”) in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, Small Claims 

Division. See Doc. No. 2. On February 6, 2017, Plaintiff dismissed her small claim action

without prejudice. Id. On February 14, 2017, Defendant, unaware that the underlying 

matter was dismissed, removed the action to this Court. See Doc. No. 1. Two days later, 

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on February 16, 2017, Defendant learned that Plaintiff dismissed her case, and notified the 

Court of the same. See Doc. No. 2. On June 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 3. On 

June 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a document captioned “Amended Complaint,” requesting only 

that the Court “preside over [this] case.” See Doc. No. 5 at 2. The Court construes this 

filing as Plaintiff’s Complaint. On the same date, Plaintiff filed a document captioned 

“DOCUMENT TITLE (e.g. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR STRIKING 

PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT).” See Doc. No. 7. The Court construes this filing as a 

supplement to the Complaint. Id.

After a careful review of the entire record, and for the reasons set forth below, the 

Court (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP, [doc. no 2]; (2) 

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s entire Complaint, [doc. no. 7], without prejudice (and with leave 

to amend) for failure to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted; and (3) 

GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five days leave to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies described in this Order. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of 

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 492 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts grant leave to proceed IFP when 

 

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. 

See U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 

2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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plaintiffs submit an affidavit, including a statement of all of their assets, showing the 

inability to pay the statutory filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

In support of her IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted an application to proceed in 

district court without paying fees or costs. See Doc. No. 3. Plaintiff’s application indicates 

that she is currently unemployed, and has earned no job-related income during the past two 

years. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff receives no income from real property, investments, 

retirement accounts, gifts, alimony, or child support. Id. Plaintiff’s sole source of income 

is a disability payment in the amount of $889.00. Id. Plaintiff’s average monthly expenses 

are $805.00. Id. Plaintiff indicates that she owns two checking accounts: one with $0.00

balance, and the other with a $40.00 balance. Id. Plaintiff also owns stock worth $298.00. 

Id. Plaintiff anticipates changes in the next twelve months, if she loses her social security 

benefits. Id. Based on these representations, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently shown 

that she is unable to pay the fees required to commence her lawsuit. Therefore, the Court 

GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 

2. Accordingly, her Complaint is subject to sua sponte review, and mandatory dismissal, if 

it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – (A) 

the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or malicious; 

[or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”)’ Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires, a 

district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U,S. 544, 555 

(2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]... a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss. V. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F. 3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”).

However, while the court “has an obligation where the petitioner is pro se... to 

construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 

1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not 

initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 

Cir. 1982). 

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Here, the record reflects that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief. See Doc. No. 5.

Specifically, her Complaint fails to include “a short and plain statement of the claim” which 

explains the facts at issue and the relief sought. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, Plaintiff’s 

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complaint merely states that she wants the Court to “preside over [her] case.” See Doc. No. 

5. In Plaintiff’s supplemental briefing, she adds allegations of witness tampering by 

Defendant, and disputes the denial of her benefits by the Social Security Administration. 

See Doc. No. 7. The Court finds that the totality of these allegations fail to include “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Detailed factual allegations are not required,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 

however, it is unclear, for example, whether Plaintiff seeks this Court’s review of a final 

decision from the Commissioner of Social Security. 

C. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend her pleading to state a claim unless it 

is absolutely clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1130 (noting that leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect[.]”). 

Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted and fails to properly state the relief sought, it will provide her a chance 

to cure the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order, if she can. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 

698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992)). 

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), [Doc 

No. 3]; 

2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failing to state a claim [Doc. No. 5]; and 

3. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to file an Amended Complaint 

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, that should she choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must

be complete by itself, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including 

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Rule 8(a), and that any claim not realleged will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 

1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”; Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 963 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed 

with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled.”

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATED: July 21, 2017

 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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