Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-01964/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-01964-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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28 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 08-1964 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR TRO

(JFLC2)

**E-filed on 4/16/08**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GENE RUGRODEN,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

STATE BANK OF PARK RAPIDS, et al.

 Defendants.

Case Number C 08-1964 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION 1

FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER

[re: docket no. 2]

On April 15, 2008, Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint against the City of Park

Rapids, located in Hubbard County, Minnesota, the State Bank of Park Rapids, two of the bank’s

officers and shareholders, the Northbeach Association, and an individual named Chuck Hagen. 

The complaint sets forth a single untitled claim alleging that Defendants “carried out a plan,

scheme and course of conduct” that has deprived Plaintiff of approximately one million dollars in

property rights. Complt. ¶ 48. The complaint does not make clear how this deprivation was

accomplished. Plaintiff alleges that he purchased several parcels of real estate in Hubbard

County, and appears to assert that he was deprived of his rights in those parcels as a result of the

following events: the county attorney switched the property description in the contract for deed

Case 5:08-cv-01964-JF Document 4 Filed 04/16/08 Page 1 of 5
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Case No. C 08-1964 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR TRO

(JFLC2)

with respect to “the Pines property”; Hagen, who controlled the water line serving the Pines

property, refused to deliver sufficient water to that property; a superior court judge “forbade”

Plaintiff from using an available well or drilling a new well to obtain water for the Pines property

and ordered that the sewer line from the property be disconnected; Hubbard County Sheriff’s

deputies harassed and intimidated Plaintiff by, among other things, informing a contractor that he

was not permitted to work on condominium units Plaintiff had purchased on another piece of

property, and terrorizing tenants on yet another piece of property. Plaintiff alleges that he has not

set foot in Hubbard County since 2004 because he fears for his safety there. Plaintiff further

alleges that the City of Park Rapids confiscated real and personal property with a value in excess

of $200,000, that Northbeach Association took over his condominium units, and that the State

Bank of Park Rapids took over the Pines property. It is unclear whether these actions were

pursuant to court orders.

Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed a one-page application for temporary restraining

order (“TRO”). Plaintiff seeks to “[s]tay Hubbard County Sheriff sale of Plaintiff’s real and

personal property in Hubbard County.” App. for TRO, p. 1. He appears to assert that the

property is scheduled for sale on April 24, 2008. He does not attach or describe any court order

authorizing the sale. There is no indication that Plaintiff gave notice of his TRO application to

Defendants, although he did represent orally to a member of the Court’s staff that he intended to

serve Defendants by mail. 

The standard for issuing a TRO is the same as that for issuing a preliminary injunction. 

Brown Jordan International, Inc. v. Mind’s Eye Interiors, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D.

Hawaii 2002); Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320,

1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In the Ninth Circuit, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show

either (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the

existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tipping in the

movant’s favor. Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1998); Apple Computer, Inc.

v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984). These formulations represent two

points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the

Case 5:08-cv-01964-JF Document 4 Filed 04/16/08 Page 2 of 5
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Case No. C 08-1964 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR TRO

(JFLC2)

probability of success decreases. Roe, 134 F.3d at 1402. 

A TRO may be granted without notice to the adverse party only if “(A) specific facts in

an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or

damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the

movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it

should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Moreover, in this district an applicant for

TRO must give notice to the adverse party “[u]nless relieved by order of a Judge for good cause

shown.” Civ. L.R. 65-1(b).

Plaintiff’s application will be denied without prejudice on several grounds. First,

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he gave timely and adequate notice to Defendants, and he

has failed to explain why he did not do so. Second, Plaintiff has failed to make clear precisely

what actions he wishes to enjoin. The complaint itself makes no reference to any court-ordered

foreclosure sale or any other official sale of Plaintiff’s property. It is a reasonable assumption

that some type of legal proceeding was involved in the alleged seizure of Plaintiff’s property,

particularly since the actions of a county judge and Sheriff are referenced in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

However, unless and until Plaintiff makes clear exactly how his property was taken, this Court

cannot make any determination as to the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. Additionally, the Court

notes that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to review state court rulings. District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th

Cir. 1994). To the extent that Plaintiff is requesting that this Court determine the validity of any

state court orders with respect to his property, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

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Case No. C 08-1964 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR TRO

(JFLC2)

ORDER

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s application for TRO is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

DATED: 4/16/08

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 08-1964 JF (RS)

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR TRO

(JFLC2)

This Order was served upon the following persons:

Plaintiff pro se:

Gene Rugroden

1157 Tilton Drive

Sunnyvale, CA 94087 

Case 5:08-cv-01964-JF Document 4 Filed 04/16/08 Page 5 of 5