Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02042/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02042-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

NIKOLAY OTCHKOV, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ALAN EVERETT, in his official and 

individual capacities as Director of the 

Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses 

and Control; Former Director of the 

Arizona Department of Liquor and 

Licenses Control JERRY OLIVER Sr., 

in his official and individual capacities; 

OSCAR CORTEZ in his official and 

individual capacities as an officer in the 

Phoenix Police Department; CITY OF 

PHOENIX; Attorney JESS LORONA, 

and the law firm LORONA, DUCAR & 

STAINER LTD., 

Defendants. 

No. 12-CV-02042-PHX-JAT 

ORDER

 Pending before the Court are Defendant Jess Lorona’s and Lorona, Ducar & 

Stainer’s (collectively “Lorona” or “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) and pro se

Plaintiff Nikolay Otchkov’s Motion to Strike the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17). The Court 

grants Defendants’ motion and denies Plaintiff’s motion for the following reasons. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In 2000, Plaintiff opened and began operating a restaurant and sports bar called 

“Famous Sam’s.” (Doc. 1 at 3). On June 14, 2007, City of Phoenix officials, including 

Defendant Cortez of the Phoenix Police Department, conducted an inspection of Famous 

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Sam’s. (Id. at 4). As a result of the inspection, the Phoenix Police Department issued 

Plaintiff an “Arizona Traffic Ticket and Complaint” for no game center license, operating 

games of chance, and operating untagged coin operated games. (Id.). Plaintiff was 

allegedly not handcuffed or detained but was read his Miranda rights. (Id.). Plaintiff was 

ordered to appear in the City of Phoenix Municipal Court on June 28, 2007. (Id.). 

Plaintiff appeared in Court but was allegedly told by the court clerk that no complaint had 

been filed against him and none existed against him in the court file. (Id.). 

 In 2007, Plaintiff changed the name of the restaurant to “Big Nixx.” (Id. at 3). 

In January 2008, the Arizona State Liquor Board (the “Board”) audited Big Nixx and 

found multiple violations of Arizona law. (Id.). Plaintiff was required to surrender his 

current liquor license and acquire a series 6 liquor license. (Id.). In front of Phoenix City 

Hall, on January 24, 2008, Defendant Cortez allegedly told Plaintiff something like, “You 

Bulgarians never gonna learn to obey laws and that is why you never gonna get a license 

in this City.” (Id.). 

 To acquire a series 6 license Plaintiff had to enter the Arizona Liquor License 

Lottery. (Id.). On May 4, 2008, Plaintiff was randomly selected in the lottery, which 

allowed Plaintiff to apply for a series 6 license with the Department of Liquor Licenses 

and Control (“DLLC”). (Id.). To obtain a series 6 license, Plaintiff was required to apply 

with the DLLC and pay a “nonrefundable fifty percent (50%) deposit of the Fair Market 

Value” of his series 6 license which was “$55,834.00.” (Id.). Plaintiff paid the 

$55,834.00 “nonrefundable deposit” to the DLLC. (Id.). Plaintiff claims he was never 

warned that DLLC would keep his “nonrefundable deposit” in the case his application was 

disqualified by the Board. (Id.). Plaintiff also filed the application with the DLLC. (Id. at 

4). 

 In the application, one question asks “Have you ever been detained, cited, arrested, 

indicted or summoned into court for violation of any law or ordinance?” (Doc. 1-1 at 13). 

Plaintiff answered the question by saying he was warned in June 2007 for possible game 

violations. (Id.). Another question asks “Have you or an entity in which you have held 

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ownership, been an officer, member, director or manager, ever had a business, 

professional or liquor application or license rejected, denied, revoked, suspended or fined 

in this or any other state?” (Id.). In answering the question, Plaintiff failed to disclose 

some violations and the fine he was assessed for violations. (Id.). 

 In July 2008, the Phoenix City Council recommended disapproval of Plaintiff’s 

application for a series 6 license based on information provided by Defendant Cortez and 

the Phoenix Police Department regarding Plaintiff’s past violations. (Doc. 1 at 4). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cortez falsely accused Plaintiff of falsifying his series 6 

license application. (Id.). 

 In order to resolve the issues presented by the Phoenix City Council’s 

recommendation, the Board set a hearing. (Id.). Plaintiff retained assistance of attorney 

Jerry Lewkowitz for the hearing. (Id.). The hearing was held on December 8, 2008. (Id.). 

 On December 8, 2008, Defendant Cortez also allegedly entered Big Nixx and 

ordered the customers to leave and the bartender to close the restaurant. (Id.). 

 On December 19, 2008, the Board denied Plaintiff’s application for a series 6 

liquor license, allegedly solely on the basis of the information provided by Defendant 

Cortez—that Plaintiff had been arrested before and had falsified his application. (Id. at 5). 

As a result of his application denial, Plaintiff forfeited the $55,834.00 “nonrefundable 

deposit.” (Id.). Plaintiff did not appeal the Board’s decision because Lewkowitz advised 

Plaintiff that an appeal would be futile because the City of Phoenix based its 

recommendation on Defendant Cortez’s information. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff contacted Defendant Oliver, the former director of the Arizona DLLC, 

and apparently asked for his nonrefundable deposit back. Oliver refused to return the 

deposit and advised Plaintiff to seek legal counsel in order to dispute the issue in court. 

(Id.). In March 2010, Plaintiff hired Defendant Lorona to pursue a claim in an attempt to 

get the deposit back. (Id.). 

 On June 28, 2010, the DLLC sent a letter to Plaintiff signed by Defendant Alan 

Everett, the Director of the DLLC, re-asserting that the DLLC would not refund the 

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deposit that Plaintiff paid in May 2008 because the deposit was nonrefundable (Doc. 1-1 

at 25). The letter also informed Plaintiff that he had the option to pay the remaining fee 

owed on the license in the next ninety days even though he could not qualify for the 

license himself. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lorona expressed to Plaintiff that this 

letter was an acknowledgment by the DLLC of wrongful acts and that the letter would be 

useful inculpatory evidence against the DLLC in a forth coming section 1983 claim. 

(Doc. 1 at 5). Lorona also advised Plaintiff not to pay the remainder of the license fee. 

(Id.). 

 In September 2010, Defendant Lorona advised Plaintiff that there may be some 

issues preventing Plaintiff from being successful on a claim under section 1983. (Id. at 6). 

Nevertheless, Lorona still sent a letter to Everett and the DLLC demanding return of 

Plaintiff’s nonrefundable deposit. (Id.). In December 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint 

with another judge in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Arizona, the 

DLLC, City of Phoenix, and the Police Department. (Doc. 1-1 at 29-39). The complaint 

was eventually dismissed for failure to serve the defendants. In January 2011, Defendant 

Lorona and his law firm informed Plaintiff that the firm would no longer represent 

Plaintiff because Lorona had determined that Plaintiff had no legal claim. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff alleges he was deceived and betrayed by Lewkowitz and Defendant 

Lorona because they allegedly acted in favor of the DLLC and the City of Phoenix. (Id.). 

On June 16, 2011, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Everett which was referred to the 

Arizona Department of Administration Risk Management Division. (Doc. 1-1 at 41). The 

Department sent a letter back to Plaintiff on September 27, 2011, denying the claims 

Plaintiff presented and explaining that an investigation into Plaintiff’s application denial 

had revealed that Plaintiff’s application was handled and processed in accordance with 

established procedures and Arizona law. (Id.). 

 On September 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) in this Court 

alleging five counts against Alan Everett, Director of the Arizona DLLC, Jerry Oliver Sr., 

former Director of the Arizona DLLC, Oscar Cortez of the Phoenix Police Department, 

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the City of Phoenix, and Attorney Jess Lorona, and the law firm Lorona, Ducar & Stainer 

Ltd. (Doc. 1). 

 On November 26, 2012, Lorona filed the pending Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13). In 

response, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion to Strike the Motion to Dismiss (“Motion to 

Strike”) on December 10, 2012 (Doc. 17). Lorona then filed a Response to Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Strike (Doc. 21) and Plaintiff filed a Reply to Lorona’s Response to the Motion 

to Strike (Doc. 24). 

II. MOTION TO STRIKE 

 As an initial matter, the Court will address and deny Plaintiff’s motion to strike. 

Plaintiff has raised no valid reason to strike Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. It appears to 

the Court that Plaintiff believes that the Motion to Dismiss deviates from the Rule 16 

Scheduling Order. (Doc. 17 at 1). The Motion to Dismiss was filed in accordance with 

both Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court will deny 

Plaintiff’s motion to strike and consider all arguments made for and against Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss. 

III. MOTION TO DISMISS 

 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint against them 

because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court may dismiss 

a complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 

two reasons: 1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or 2) insufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990) (citing Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533–34 (9th Cir. 

1984)). 

 To survive a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet 

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so 

that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(quoting Conley v. 

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Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

 Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed 

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The factual 

allegations of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a speculative 

level. Id. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of 

entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see 

how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the 

nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright 

& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1202, pp. 94-95 (3d ed. 2004)). 

 Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that offers nothing more than naked assertions 

will not suffice. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its 

face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility 

requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

 Plaintiff has alleged three claims against Lorona and has not specified which 

claims, if any apply to the law firm of Lorona, Ducar, & Stainer. Plaintiff’s claims against 

Lorona include: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Count One for “conspiracy” with other 

defendants to deprive Plaintiff of “property and privilege” without “due process of law” in 

violation of the “Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution” (Doc. 1 at 6-7); that Lorona 

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is liable again in Count Three under section 1983 for “conspiracy” with other defendants 

to deprive Plaintiff “of property and privileges through deception and fraud . . . in 

violation of [the] First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at 8); and that Lorona 

and other defendants are liable in Count Five under State law for the tort of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress (id. at 9-10). 

A. Counts One and Three 

 Counts One and Three are both conspiracy claims under section 1983 to deprive 

Plaintiff of property. Section 1983 requires the violation of a constitutional right and a 

showing that a defendant acting under color of state law committed the deprivation. See

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A private person acts “under color of” state law 

when involved in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive someone of federal rights. 

See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). Plaintiff merely alleges “[a]t all times 

relevant herein, the defendants were state actors and their conduct was subject to 42 

U.S.C. secs. 1983.” (Doc. 1 at 7). Assuming, arguendo, this conclusory statement is 

enough to establish that Lorona acted under color of state law, the Court still finds 

Plaintiff has failed to allege a sufficient conspiracy claim. 

 “To state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under 

section 1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed 

conspiracy.” Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Coverdell 

v. Dept. of Soc. and Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 769 (9th Cir.1987)). In Olsen v. Idaho 

State Board of Medicine, the plaintiff made a conspiracy claim against defendants. The 

district court held that plaintiff’s “complaint lacks any facts specific to a conspiracy and 

the claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 

363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals and asserted that her complaint provided sufficient evidence of conspiracy by 

setting forth numerous allegations concerning defendants’ conduct. Id. The Court of 

Appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal and found it dispositive that, “[i]n fact, 

[plaintiff’s] complaint is devoid of any discussion of an agreement amongst the appellees 

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to violate her constitutional rights.” Id. 

 By way of contrast, in Goodrick v. Clegg the Court of Appeals overturned the 

district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s conspiracy claim because the complaint alleged 

facts showing an agreement had been made. 210 F.3d 382, at *2 (9th Cir. 2000). The 

Court of Appeals found that because the complaint stated that defendants “acted together 

to promulgate a policy that violated the rights of the inmates at the jail” that “[t]he facts 

appear to constitute ‘specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.’” 

Id. (quoting Burns, 883 F.2d at 821). 

 Similar to the claim in Olsen and unlike the complaint in Goodrick, in this case 

Plaintiff has failed to plead facts showing any agreement between the Defendants to 

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff merely states in Count One that “[a]s a 

direct result of Defendants’ concerted unlawful and malicious conspiracy, Plaintiff 

suffered property and privilege deprivation, and he was deprived of his right to due 

process . . .” (Doc. 1 at 7). Count Three is no more specific; Plaintiff states “[a]s a direct 

result of their concerted unlawful and malicious conspiracy of Defendants . . . Plaintiff 

was deprived of property and privileges . . .” (Id. at 8). The remainder of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint alleges no specific agreement, policy, or coordinated effort by Defendants to 

do anything to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to offer anything more than 

naked assertions and has not made his claims plausible. Therefore, the Court will grant 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Three. 

B. Count Five 

 In Count Five, Plaintiff claims Lorona “intentionally and willfully inflicted [ ] 

emotional distress on Plaintiff by abusing the lawful process by unlawful purpose, or by 

violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Doc. 1 at 9 ¶76). Because Plaintiff’s claim in 

Count Five is a state law tort claim and the claim is only before the Court on the basis of 

supplemental jurisdiction, the Court must apply Arizona substantive law. Mason and 

Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Int’l LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“When a district court sits in diversity, or hears state law claims based on supplemental 

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jurisdiction, the court applies state substantive law to the state law claims.”). Plaintiff 

“may recover for [intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)] only where the 

defendant’s acts are ‘so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond 

all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 

civilized community.”’ Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 578 P.2d 152, 

155 (Ariz. 1978) (in banc) (quoting Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 460 P.2d 666, 668 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1969)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d.. The elements of a cause of 

action for IIED are: 

 [F]irst the conduct by the defendant must be “extreme” and 

“outrageous”; second, the defendant must either intend to 

cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near 

certainty that such distress will result from his conduct; and 

third, severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result 

of defendant’s conduct. 

Johnson v. McDonald, 3 P.3d 1075, 1080 ¶23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Ford v. 

Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987)). “It is the duty of the court as society’s 

conscience to determine whether the acts complained of can be considered sufficiently 

extreme and outrageous to state a claim for relief.” Patton, 578 P.2d at 155 (citation 

omitted); see also Lucchesi v. Stimmell, 716 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1986) (“It is for the 

court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably 

be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is 

necessarily so.”). 

 In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state an IIED claim 

against Lorona. First, Plaintiff’s allegations against Lorona do not show extreme or 

outrageous conduct. Plaintiff merely alleges in the Complaint that Lorona advised 

Plaintiff not to pay the remainder of the license fee addressed in Everett’s letter; that 

Lorona then determined that there were issues that could prevent the success of Plaintiff’s 

section 1983 claim; that Lorona took action on behalf of Plaintiff and sent a letter to the 

DLLC demanding return of Plaintiff’s nonrefundable deposit; that Lorona filed an 

insufficient complaint predisposed for failure without serving defendants; and that Lorona 

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informed Plaintiff that he would no longer be able to represent Plaintiff because Lorona 

had determined that Plaintiff had no legal claim. (Doc. 1 at 5-6). Plaintiff has not cited a 

single example of similar conduct that meets the “extreme” or “outrageous conduct” 

threshold. Further, the Court has not found an example of comparable conduct that would 

lead the Court to conclude that the allegations against Lorona are sufficient to state an 

IIED claim. 

 Second, Plaintiff has made no factual allegation that Lorona intended to cause 

emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the results of his actions. Accordingly, the 

Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for IIED upon which relief can be granted. 

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count Five against Lorona as well. 

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 

In this case, Plaintiff has not amended nor sought leave to amend his Complaint as 

a matter of right under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the 

twenty-one day time frame to file an amendment following a motion to dismiss has 

expired, Plaintiff has lost his right to amend the Complaint as a matter of course. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1). While previous precedent from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

instructed that district courts should grant leave to amend sua sponte when granting a 

motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals has recently called that precedent into question in 

light of the recent revision of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. See Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court of Appeals has also 

held that “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend 

unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. 

Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 

 In this case, Plaintiff’s claims against Lorona are dismissed for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. While the Court finds it unlikely, it is not 

absolutely clear to the Court that the deficiencies of Plaintiff’s claims against Lorona 

could not be cured by amendment and substantial additional facts. Accordingly, because 

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the Court has “an obligation where the petitioner is pro se . . . to construe the pleadings 

liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212, 

the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint with regard to the claims 

against Defendant Lorona only. 

 Plaintiff is reminded that the Court will only consider the amended complaint as 

the operative pleading. An amended complaint must stand on its own. The Court will not 

incorporate by reference any exhibits, factual allegations, or legal claims made in prior 

versions of the complaint. See LRCiv 15.1 (“The proposed amended pleading is not to 

incorporate by reference any part of the preceding pleading, including exhibits”). Plaintiff 

is forewarned that if he elects to file an amended complaint and it fails to comply with the 

Court’s instructions or case law explained in this order, the action will be dismissed with 

prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See McHenry v. 

Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of prolix, 

argumentative, and redundant amended complaint that did not comply with Rule 8(a)); 

Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673–74 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming 

dismissal of amended complaint that was “equally as verbose, confusing, and conclusory 

as the initial complaint”); Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1965) (affirming 

dismissal without leave to amend of second complaint that was “so verbose, confused and 

redundant that its true substance, if any, [was] well disguised”). 

V. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

// 

// 

// 

// 

// 

// 

// 

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Lorona’s and the law firm of Lorona, Ducar, & 

Stainer’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is granted. Plaintiff may file an amended 

complaint against Defendant Lorona within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this 

order; if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within this deadline, the Clerk of the 

Court shall enter judgment, dismissing this case with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 17) is denied. 

 Dated this 4th day of September, 2013. 

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