Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03534/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03534-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE DIAMOND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CORIZON HEALTH, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.16-cv-03534-JSC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION 

FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS AND DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Plaintiffs filed suit against Corizon Health, Inc., the County of Alameda, Sheriff Gregory J. 

Ahern, and other unknown members of the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department as Does 1-50 

alleging various civil rights claims under Section 1983, negligence, and a violation of California 

Government Code § 845.6 arising out of the death of their relative, Bryan Steicher, while he was a 

pretrial detainee at Santa Rita Jail. Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss, for Judgment on the Pleadings, and/or to Strike the Section 845.6 claim and Plaintiffs’ 

request for injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 15.) After carefully considering the parties’ briefing, the

Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see Civ. L. R. 7-1(b), and (1) GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 845.6 claim as to Corizon without leave to amend; (2)

GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Section 845.6 claim alleged 

against the County defendants with leave to amend; (3) GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss

and motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief with leave to 

amend; and (4) DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

From June 18, 20141until his death five days later, Bryan Steicher was in custody at Santa 

Rita Jail in Dublin, California. (Compl. ¶ 18.) There, Bryan made several requests to obtain a 

medically necessary Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (“CPAP”) machine for his sleep apnea 

to assist with breathing during sleep. (Id. ¶ 16.) On June 18, 2014, Bryan asked his mother to 

provide him with a CPAP device. (Id. ¶ 17.) Two days later, he submitted to the jail a written 

request for a medical appointment. (Id.) On June 23, 2014, Bryan still had not received a CPAP 

device. At some point that evening, Sheriff’s Deputies discovered Bryan dead in his cell due to a 

sudden cardiac arrest related to cardiomyopathy. (Id.)

Plaintiffs are Bryan’s mother Christine Diamond and his surviving children Stephanie 

Fischer, Brittany Alperstein, and Minor A.S. Plaintiffs allege that during Bryan’s five days in 

custody at Santa Rita Jail, he was denied necessary medical attention and the ability to breathe 

from not receiving his CPAP machine, which caused his death while in custody. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiffs assert four claims for relief. The first alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They 

contend that Corizon, Sheriff Ahern, and Doe defendants violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments by depriving Bryan of the right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs while in custody, the right to be free from wrongful government interference with 

familial relationships, and Plaintiffs’ right to companionship, society, and support of each other. 

Second, Plaintiffs bring a municipal liability claim against Corizon, Sheriff Ahern, and Doe 

defendants under Section 1983 based on the same constitutional violations. Plaintiffs also bring a 

negligence claim and a claim for violation of California Government Code § 845.6 against all 

Defendants. Plaintiffs request general damages, punitive damages as to Corizon and the Doe 

defendants, attorneys’ fees and costs, and declaratory and injunctive relief.

Alameda County and Sheriff Ahern answered Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Dkt. No. 7.) 

Together with those two Defendants, Corizon then filed the instant motion to dismiss, for 

 

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Plaintiffs allege that events occurred in both 2014 and 2016. (Compare Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17, with 

id. ¶ 18.) It appears from the parties’ briefing that the incidents alleged actually occurred in 2014 

and that the 2016 references are typos. Accordingly, this Order assumes that the events occurred 

in 2014.

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judgment on the pleadings, and/or to strike Plaintiffs’ Section 845.6 claim for failure to state a 

claim and their request for injunctive relief due to lack of standing. (Dkt. No. 15.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all factual allegations pled in the 

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Cahill 

v. Liberty Mut. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). “[F]or a complaint to survive a motion 

to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must 

be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Plausibility 

requires pleading facts, as opposed to conclusory allegations or the formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings 

are “virtually interchangeable.” Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 311 F. Supp. 

2d 898, 902 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (citation omitted). The main difference between a Rule 12(b) motion 

and Rule 12(c) motion is the time of filing. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 

1192 (9th Cir. 1989). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “must be made before the responsive 

pleading.” Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) (emphasis in original). By contrast, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the 

pleadings is only authorized after an answer has been filed. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 

1093 (9th Cir. 1980). Otherwise, “the motions are functionally identical” and “the same standard 

of review” applies for both a Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motion. Dworkin, 867 F.2d at 1192. 

For motions under both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c), the court should grant leave to 

amend even if no request for leave to amend has been made, unless amendment would be futile. 

See Pac. W. Grp., Inc. v. Real Time Solutions, Inc., 321 F. App’x 566, 569 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted). 

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II. Motion to Strike

A Rule 12(f) motion to strike enables a district court to “strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) motions are generally disfavored and “should not be granted unless the 

matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of the litigation[.] If 

there is any doubt whether the portion to be stricken might bear on an issue in the litigation, the 

court should deny the motion.” Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 

(N.D. Cal. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Motions to strike should be granted “when 

necessary to discourage parties from raising allegations completely unrelated to the relevant 

claims and when the interests of justice so require.” Sapiro v. Encompass Ins., 221 F.R.D. 513, 

517 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Fourth Cause of Action – Violation of California Government Code § 845.6

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ Section 845.6 claim must be dismissed, adjudicated on 

the pleadings, or stricken for two reasons. First, they argue that it must be dismissed against 

Corizon because Section 845.6 only authorizes claims against a “public entity” or “public 

employee,” and Corizon is a private company. Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to 

state a plausible Section 845.6 claim against any defendant. The Court will address each argument 

in turn.

A. Whether Plaintiffs Can Bring a Section 845.6 Claim against Corizon, a Private Entity

Section 845.6 states, in relevant part, that “a public employee, and the public entity where 

the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has 

reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take 

reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6 (emphasis added). By 

its very terms, Section 845.6 only applies to a “public employee” or “public entity[.]” The 

California Government Code defines “public entity” to include “the State, the Regents of the 

University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other 

political subdivision or public corporation in the State.” This definition “is intended to include 

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every kind of independent political or governmental entity in the State.” Lawson v. Super. Ct., 

180 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1396 (2010) (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiffs do not allege that Corizon is an independent political or governmental entity. 

Instead, they describe Corizon as a Delaware corporation that provides healthcare services under 

contract with the County. Section 845.6 liability does not extend to private entities under contract 

with the State. See id. at 1400 (holding that a private entity operating a residential correctional 

facility under contract with the State was not a public entity and thus, not within the scope of 

Section 845.6 liability).

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Plaintiffs’ attempt to expand Section 845.6 liability to Corizon is unpersuasive. “If there is 

no ambiguity in the language, [courts] presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain 

meaning of the statute governs.” Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1103 

(2007). The statute clearly defines “public entity” and there is no ambiguity in the statutory 

language. The Court must therefore presume that the Legislature intended Section 845.6 only to 

apply to a “public entity” or “public employee.” Indeed, Plaintiffs concede that courts have found 

Section 845.6 to apply only to “public entities” and their employees, yet urge the Court to go 

beyond the literal interpretation of “public entity.” (Dkt. No. 18 at 4.) But they do not cite any 

cases that have done so. The Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to be the first. 

Plaintiffs’ reliance on West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) does not change the Court’s 

conclusion. In Atkins, the state hired a doctor to provide medical services to state prison inmates. 

Id. The court held that Section 1983 liability extended to the doctor because he was acting under 

color of state law and concluded that his liability could be imputed to the state. Id. at 54. 

Plaintiffs contend that because liability for deliberate indifference to medical needs extends to an 

independent contractor hired to perform state functions in Atkins, Section 845.6 liability should 

extend that far as well. But Atkins involved Section 1983 liability, which only requires that a 

 

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In Lawson v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1372 (2010), the court also noted that while the 

California Tort Claims Act does not expressly address whether governmental immunity extends to 

independent contractors of the state, it “strongly implies that the Legislature did not intend to 

confer such immunity” because an independent contractor is not a public employee or entity. Id. 

at 1397 n.23. Thus, even if Plaintiffs alleged that Corizon operated as the County’s independent 

contractor, Corizon would still not be a public entity subject to Section 845.6 liability.

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defendant act “under color of state law,” not the statutory “public entity” requirement in the 

California Government Code.

Because Corizon is not a public entity or public employee, the Court dismisses the Section 

845.6 claim against Corizon without leave to amend. The Court denies Defendants’ motion to 

strike this claim, as they have not met any of the standards for striking a claim and the motion in 

any event is moot.

B. Sufficiency of Factual Allegations 

Of course, the above analysis does not dispose of the Section 845.6 claim against the 

County Defendants. To that end, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to allege a violation of 

Section 845.6 because there are no factual allegations that plausibly establish any of the elements 

of such a claim.

“[T]o state a claim under [Section] 845.6, a prisoner must establish three elements: (1) the 

public employee knew of or had reason to know of the need (2) for immediate medical care, and 

(3) failed to reasonably summon such care.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6). “Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious 

medical conditions requiring immediate care.” Lucas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 

277, 287-88 (1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiffs fail to respond to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs fail to allege a Section 

845.6 claim as to the County Defendants and thus concede this point. See Ardente v. Shanley, No. 

07-4479 MHP, 2010 WL 546485, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (“Plaintiff fails to respond to this 

argument and therefore concedes it through silence.”).

Accordingly, the Court grants the County Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 

pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ Section 845.6 claim with leave to amend as it pertains to the County 

Defendants. The Court denies the County Defendants’ motion to strike this claim, as they have 

not met any of the standards for striking a claim.

II. Plaintiffs’ Request for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief including orders requiring Defendants to institute and 

enforce policies and procedures for handling inmates with serious medical needs and training 

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medical professionals in their care. (Compl. at 11-12.) Defendants urge the Court to dismiss, 

strike, or adjudicate Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief on the grounds that Plaintiffs lack 

standing to request injunctive relief. 

Defendants’ bring their motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), both of which involve failure 

to state a claim. However, lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush,

386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 

(1998). When a defendant “alleges only jurisdictional grounds for dismissal, the proper course is 

to consider the motion as one to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” HellmannBlumberg v. Univ. of Pac., No. 2:12-CV-00286-GEB, 2013 WL 1326469, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

29, 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court will therefore analyze 

Defendants’ motion as a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Machlan v. Proctor & 

Gamble Co., 77 F. Supp. 3d 954, 958-59 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (addressing lack of standing to seek 

injunctive relief under Rule 12(b)(1)); San Luis Unit Food Producers v. United States, 772 F. 

Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 709 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2013) (treating a jurisdictional 

challenge brought under Rule 12(c) as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion). 

For injunctive relief, plaintiffs must demonstrate that there is “a sufficient likelihood that 

[they] will again be wronged in a similar way” and establish a “real and immediate threat of 

repeated injury.” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff may show likelihood that her injury 

will reoccur by showing “that the defendant had, at the time of the injury, a written policy, and 

that the injury ‘stems from’ that policy.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 865 (9th Cir. 2001), 

abrogation recognized on other grounds by Nordstrom v. Ryan, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal citation omitted). Federal standing to pursue injunctive relief under Article III requires 

plaintiffs to “allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action 

before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493, (1974)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief because they have not alleged a 

real or immediate threat of future injury. Plaintiffs’ reliance on their “status as successor[s] in 

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interest to the harm perpetrated on the decedent” fails to demonstrate a “likelihood of substantial 

and immediate irreparable injury” to Plaintiffs. Neuroth v. Mendocino Cnty., No. 15-CV-03226-

NJV, 2016 WL 379806, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016) (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “Because the injury was perpetrated on the decedent, there is no risk of future harm.” 

Id.

Plaintiffs also fail to demonstrate a risk of repeated injury because the repeated injury

would require a string of contingencies to occur to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ alleged threat of injury 

would first require their arrest and placement in custody at an Alameda County jail. Plaintiffs 

concede that to obtain injunctive relief, they must “demonstrate a realistic threat of repetition” of 

the suffered injury. (Dkt. No. 18 at 6.) Yet it is pure speculation that Plaintiffs—who include 

Bryan’s minor child—may have a future encounter in an Alameda County jail at all, let alone may 

experience a failure by Alameda County employees to summon immediate medical care for their 

serious medical needs. “[S]peculative claims do not show a likelihood of substantial and 

immediate irreparable injury.” Haynie v. Harris, No. C 10-1255 SI, 2011 WL 5038357, at *8

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011). For these reasons, Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue the injunctive 

relief sought.

Plaintiffs cite Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1142 (N.D. 

Cal. 2000), for the proposition that many courts have recognized that allegations of a policy, 

pattern, and practice of constitutional violations demonstrate a real and immediate threat of future 

injury to allow for injunctive relief. But Rodriguez is distinguishable. There, the plaintiffs alleged 

that various state law enforcement agencies had a policy of racial profiling motorists. Id. at 1142. 

The court concluded it was possible that the plaintiffs could show that they were likely to be 

subjected to future racial profiling due to the policy. Id. This likelihood was sufficient for 

injunctive relief because plaintiffs risked repeated injury anytime they were to drive in the future 

as a result of the policy. By contrast, Plaintiffs must show a sufficient likelihood that they will be 

arrested and detained in an Alameda County jail, experience a serious medical need, and a failure 

by Alameda County employees to summon immediate medical care for that need. Plaintiffs have 

failed to show that such a string of contingencies is sufficiently likely to occur to warrant 

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injunctive relief.

Nor have Plaintiffs asserted any hindrance to Santa Rita jail inmates’ ability to protect their 

own interests to allow for third party standing. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)

(noting that “there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own 

interests” to assert third party standing). While other prisoners in Santa Rita Jail may face a risk 

of a future injury similar to that alleged by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue 

injunctive relief on their behalf based on this speculation. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (“In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert 

the rights of third persons.”). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss and 

motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief for lack of 

standing with leave to amend. The Court denies Defendants’ motion to strike this claim, as they 

have not met any of the standards for striking a claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

Section 845.6 claim as to Corizon without leave to amend and GRANTS the motion for judgment 

on the pleadings as to the Section 845.6 claim alleged against the County Defendants with leave to 

amend. The Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the 

pleadings on Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief with leave to amend for lack of standing. 

Finally, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike as to all claims.

Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. 

If no amended complaint is filed, the Section 845.6 claim against the County Defendants will be 

dismissed with prejudice and the injunctive relief claim dismissed without prejudice as dismissal 

for lack of jurisdiction is always without prejudice. If Plaintiffs are later able to make allegations 

sufficient to confer standing for injunctive relief, they may move for leave to amend under 

whatever standard applies at that time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2016

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JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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