Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01531/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01531-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., a Delaware

corporation, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, 

vs.

Avago Technologies Limited, a Singapore

corporation; Avago Technologies U.S.,

Inc., a Delaware corporation, Avago

Technologies Wireless IP (Singapore) Pte.,

Ltd., a Singapore corporation, 

Defendants/CounterClaimants.

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No. CV 09-1531-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the parties’ Joint Motion to Vacate Orders of the Court

(Doc. 590) and the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice (Doc. 591). 

I. BACKGROUND

This case began when Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant TriQuint Semiconductor,

Inc. (“TriQuint”) brought suit against Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs Avago

Technologies Limited, Avago Technologies U.S., Inc., and Avago Technologies Wireless

IP (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. (collectively, “Avago”). TriQuint accused Avago of patent

infringement and antitrust violations and sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement

and invalidity of several Avago patents. Avago counterclaimed for patent infringement,

trade secret misappropriation, copyright infringement, violation of various state laws, and

also sought declaratory judgments in its favor. 

As this case has progressed, the Court has held several hearings and considered and

ruled on numerous motions filed by both parties. After a Markman hearing, the Court issued

Case 2:09-cv-01531-JAT Document 601 Filed 05/17/12 Page 1 of 5
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a decision construing the parties’ patent claims. Also, after considering the parties’ motions

for partial summary judgment and hearing oral argument on those motions, the Court granted

some of the motions and denied others. Both parties sought reconsideration of the Court’s

decisions on summary judgment, and the Court subsequently issued an order in which it

declined to alter any of its summary judgment rulings, though it did offer clarification of

those rulings. Additionally, the Court has issued numerous orders on various other motions

in this case, including the parties’ multiple requests to file documents in this case under seal.

On May 15, 2012, approximately two months before an estimated two-month jury trial

was set to begin, the parties advised the Court that they had reached a settlement and filed

a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice (Doc. 591). The parties concurrently filed the

pending joint Motion asking the Court to vacate all of the orders entered in this action, except

for those related to the parties’ requests to seal documents. Furthermore, the parties’ binding

memorandum of understanding (“MOU”), which provides the basis for their settlement,

“contemplates this Court vacating the substantive orders previously entered in this action

beyond those related to confidentiality and sealing.” Doc. 590 at 2.

II. ANALYSIS

In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, the Supreme Court crafted

a default rule against vacatur resulting from settlement at the appellate level. 513 U.S. 18,

29 (1994). Noting that “exceptional circumstances” may occasionally warrant such vacatur,

however, the Supreme Court also discussed the policy considerations relevant to such a

determination. Id. With regard to “the public interest,” the Court noted that “[j]udicial

precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They

are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that

the public interest would be served by a vacatur.” Id. at 26-27 (internal quotation omitted).

The Court also acknowledged that the availability of vacatur may facilitate settlement with

“resulting economies for the federal courts.” Id. at 28. However, the Court also expressed

concern that vacatur at the appellate level may deter settlement at an earlier stage, and further

noted that “the economies achieved by settlement at the district-court level are ordinarily

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much more extensive than those achieved by settlement on appeal.” Id.

Judge Dyk of the Federal Circuit has suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Bancorp is consistent with the practice of a district court vacating its non-final decisions in

conjunction with a settlement in order “to prevent interim decisions . . . from having

collateral estoppel effects in future third party litigation.” Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342

F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in

[Bancorp] held only that such a vacatur was inappropriate by the Supreme Court and the

courts of appeals on review of a final district court decision. . . . Bancorp did not, however,

address the power of the district court to vacate non-final orders pursuant to a settlement

agreement. Indeed, by its terms, Bancorp does not apply to district courts but rather only to

the Supreme Court and to courts of appeals.” (internal citations omitted)). Other district

courts have adopted this view and vacated non-final decisions in conjunction with settlement

after consideration of the reasoning in the Bancorp decision. See, e.g., Lycos, Inc. v.

Blockbuster, Inc., C.A. No. 07-11469-MLW, 2010 WL 5437226 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2010)

(granting motion to vacate non-final orders); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Telcordia Technologies, Inc.,

590 F. Supp. 2d 828 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (same); but see Allen-Bradley Co. LLC v. Kollmorgen

Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (denying motion to vacate non-final order).

Consistent with this approach, the Court will decide the pending Motion “as an exercise of

its equitable discretion by considering the concerns articulated by Bancorp, despite the fact

that Bancorp does not establish a binding standard in these circumstances.” Lycos, 2010 WL

5437226, at *3.

Here, the Court finds that vacatur of all of its non-final orders, with the exception of

the orders concerning the sealing of documents, is appropriate. First, the Court notes that

none of the orders entered in this case can properly be deemed final because none of the

orders “end[ed] litigation on the merits and [left] nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment.” Int’l Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 476 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)). Thus, the Court

is free to modify those orders at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment. Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 54(b).

Second, vacatur of the orders will serve the interests of the parties and judicial

efficiency. The parties have entered into a binding MOU that will allow them to avoid

expending any more resources on this litigation. And as they have stated in their pending

Motion, their MOU contemplates vacatur of the orders. The settlement resulting from the

binding MOU will avoid expending the vast judicial resources that would be required to see

this case through a very lengthy trial. Further, settlement at this time will also avoid the

possibility of expending any additional future judicial resources on appeals.

Third, the Court does not find that vacatur in this case is contrary to the public

interest. Unlike appellate opinions, district court opinions are not precedential. See Bank of

Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 189 n.1 (9th Cir. 1965) (“[A] district court decision which

has not withstood the acid test of appellate review cannot be regarded as authoritative, much

less dispositive of an appeal, but it may well be persuasive.”), rev’d on other grounds, 385

U.S. 99 (1966). Thus, the Court’s orders, which may merely provide persuasive reasoning

to the legal community, will have the same value to the public regardless of whether they are

vacated in conjunction with the parties’ settlement. Further, preventing these orders from

potentially having unpredictable collateral estoppel effects in any future third party litigation

arguably benefits the public interest, as well as the interests of the parties. See Dana, 342

F.3d at 1328 (Dyk, J., concurring).

In sum, the Court finds that vacatur of its orders in this action, with the exception of

those orders relating to the sealing of documents, is appropriate. The vacatur only applies

to the Court’s holdings as to these parties and not to the Court’s legal reasoning in the orders.

Further, the vacatur is granted solely to facilitate the parties’ settlement and is consistent with

the policy considerations of the Supreme Court’s Bancorp decision insofar as it promotes

greater judicial efficiency and serves the interests of the parties without adversely impacting

the public interest.

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting the parties’ Joint Motion to Vacate Orders of the Court

(Doc. 590). All orders previously entered in this matter with the exception of Doc. Nos. 72,

73, 87, 90, 127, 128, 145, 187, 299, 300, 371, 376, 378, 391, 406, 410, 432, 438, 454, 462,

492, 495, 498, and 571 are hereby vacated. The parties shall jointly file within ten days a list

by docket number of all orders to be vacated. The Clerk shall note in the docket that those

orders are vacated.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal with

Prejudice (Doc. 591). All claims and counterclaims in this action are dismissed with

prejudice. Each party shall bear its own costs of suit and attorneys’ fees incurred in

connection with this litigation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying all other pending motions and stipulations

as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating the final pretrial conference set for June 25,

2012 and the trial set to begin on July 10, 2012.

The Clerk of the Court shall close this case. 

DATED this 17th day of May, 2012.

 

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