Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-21-56295/USCOURTS-ca9-21-56295-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, 

INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MICHELLE ASCENSION, in her 

official capacity as City Clerk for the 

City of Oxnard, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-56295 

D.C. No. 2:20-cv04122-CBM-AFM 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 9, 2023

Pasadena, California

Filed December 20, 2024

Before: Mark J. Bennett* and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit 

* Judge Paul J. Watford was a member of the panel at the time the case 

was argued and submitted. Following Judge Watford’s resignation, 

Judge Bennett was randomly drawn as a replacement judge pursuant to 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 1 of 57
2 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

Judges, and Stephen Joseph Murphy III,** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Collins; 

Dissent by Judge Bennett 

SUMMARY***

First Amendment/Campaign Contribution Limits

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to the City of Oxnard, California, and remanded 

with instructions to grant summary judgment to plaintiff, 

Moving Oxnard Forward (“MOF”), in a case in which MOF 

challenged certain campaign finance limitations in the 

Oxford City Code as a violation of the First Amendment. 

The City adopted campaign finance limitations that 

would have little practical impact on any recent candidates 

for municipal elections except for one—Aaron Starr, the 

President of MOF, a nonprofit corporation whose purpose, 

according to Starr, is to ensure local government 

efficiency. Starr had, among other things, engineered recall 

efforts against a majority of the City Council and came in 

second in the Mayor’s race, consistently relying on largerdollar contributions. In 2019, the City Council placed 

General Order § 3.2.h. Judge Bennett has reviewed the briefs, the record, 

and the video of the oral argument.

** The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy III, United States District 

Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 2 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 3

Measure B on the ballot, limiting an individual’s 

contributions to candidates for City Council and various 

other City offices. After voters approved Measure B, MOF 

challenged the campaign finance limitations as a violation of 

the First Amendment.

Although courts ordinarily should defer to the legislature 

in determining whether contribution limits are closely drawn 

to the legitimate governmental interest of avoiding quid pro 

quo corruption or its appearance, the panel held that the 

City’s contribution limits presented sufficient danger signs 

of constitutional risks to the democratic electoral process to 

require the panel to examine the record independently and 

carefully. Specifically, the record showed a significant risk 

that the City may be engaged in invidious discrimination 

against Starr, who has repeatedly challenged the incumbent 

City government and its policies. The legislative record 

indicated that (1) Starr and his contributions were a target of 

the City Council when it proposed and promoted Measure B; 

(2) Starr was the person who would most be affected by 

Measure B’s passage; and (3) there was a considerable 

history of antipathy between Starr and the City’s elected 

officials over the years immediately preceding Measure B’s 

adoption.

Reviewing the record independently and carefully, the 

panel concluded that Measure B’s contribution limits were 

not narrowly tailored to match the City’s interest in avoiding 

the reality or appearance of quid pro quo corruption. The 

City’s asserted reliance on remedying problems identified in 

a 2010 City corruption scandal bore, at best, a weak and 

tenuous relationship to Measure B’s contribution limits. On 

this record, Measure B’s campaign finance limits were much 

more closely drawn to the prohibited objective of stopping 

Starr rather than remedying corruption concerns. The panel, 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 3 of 57
4 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

therefore, concluded that the challenged per-candidate 

aggregate contribution limitations violate the First 

Amendment. 

Dissenting, Judge Bennett would hold that the City’s 

contribution limits passed First Amendment scrutiny. The 

City’s asserted interest in preventing actual or perceived 

quid pro quo corruption was fairly supported by the record 

and Measure B’s limits were closely drawn to that 

interest. The majority’s conclusion that the City may be 

engaged in invidious discrimination against Starr, even if it 

could be considered outside of the equal protection 

framework, lacked support in the record. Moreover, in 

assessing whether the contribution limits were closely drawn 

to match the City’s interest, the majority contravened 

precedent by applying a motive test instead of a tailoring 

test.

COUNSEL

Chad D. Morgan (argued), Law Office of Chad Morgan, 

Anaheim, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Holly O. Whatley (argued) and Liliane M. Wyckoff, 

Colantuono Highsmith & Whatley PC, Pasadena, California, 

for Defendant-Appellee.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 4 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 5

OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

In this case, Defendant City of Oxnard, California (“the 

City”) adopted campaign finance limitations that, as 

explained in the City’s supporting materials, would have 

little practical impact on any recent candidates for municipal 

elections except for one—Aaron Starr, the President of 

Plaintiff Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. (“MOF”). Starr has 

been very active in Oxnard politics, and in doing so he has 

consistently relied on larger-dollar contributions that, as the 

City notes, made him a “stark” “outlier” among local 

candidates. The new campaign contribution limitations, 

which the City admits “will force [Starr] to change this 

practice,” were proposed by the City the year after Starr 

engineered an ultimately unsuccessful recall effort against a 

majority of the City Council and came in second in the race 

for Mayor. And prior to that, Starr and MOF had 

successfully supported a ballot initiative that overturned an 

increase in certain fees that was passed by the City Council 

and that then became the subject of litigation between Starr 

and the City. MOF challenged these new campaign finance 

limitations as a violation of the First Amendment, but the 

district court granted summary judgment to the City. MOF 

now appeals.

We conclude that, on this record, the City’s contribution 

limits present sufficient “danger signs” of “constitutional 

risks to the democratic electoral process” to require us to 

“examine the record independently and carefully to 

determine whether [the City’s] contribution limits are 

‘closely drawn’ to match” the asserted interest in avoiding 

the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Randall v. 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 5 of 57
6 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248–49, 253 (2006) (plurality). 

Specifically, the record reflects a significant risk that the 

City may be engaged in “invidious discrimination” against 

Starr and challengers like him. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 

1, 31 (1976). And, upon conducting that independent and 

careful review, we conclude that the City’s contribution 

limits are not “narrowly tailored.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 261. 

Accordingly, we hold that the City’s contribution limits 

violate the First Amendment.

I

A

Aaron Starr is a resident of Oxnard and the President of 

MOF. MOF is a nonprofit corporation whose purpose, 

according to Starr, “is to make local government more 

efficient and make sure that residents receive value for the 

taxes and fees they pay.” Toward that end, “MOF engages 

in advocacy for and against proposed legislation and ballot 

measures in the City.” In addition, several of MOF’s

members have run for local office or have supported the 

campaigns of local candidates.

The electoral efforts of MOF and its members have had 

mixed success. Starr unsuccessfully ran for a spot on the 

City Council in 2014, 2016, and 2020, and he came in second 

in the 2018 mayoral race. MOF, however, had greater 

success in sponsoring ballot initiatives. In 2016, Oxnard 

voters passed MOF-sponsored “Measure M,” which 

repealed an increase in the City’s wastewater fees.1 In 2020, 

1 Measure M, however, was subsequently invalidated in state court on 

state-law grounds. See City of Oxnard v. Starr, 2020 WL 6042024 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 2020).

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 6 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 7

four MOF-supported initiatives were on the local ballot, and 

three of them were approved by the voters.2

In supporting these various campaigns, MOF’s and 

Starr’s preference has been, as the City puts it, “to raise large 

sums of money from a small number of donors.” For 

example, in 2018, Starr raised $8,250 from just five 

contributors, and more than half of the money he raised 

involved contributions in excess of $500. However, in 

October 2019, the Oxnard City Council placed Measure B 

on the ballot to coincide with the March 2020 presidential 

primary election. Among other things, Measure B would 

limit an individual’s contributions to City Council 

candidates to $500 per election and to citywide candidates 

(such as for Mayor) to $750. The voters approved Measure 

B, and it took effect on May 1, 2020.

B

Four days after Measure B took effect, MOF filed this 

§ 1983 action against the Oxnard City Clerk in her official 

capacity.3 The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive 

relief against Measure B on behalf of MOF and its members. 

As relevant here, the complaint asserts two federal claims. 

MOF’s first cause of action alleges that the various percandidate contribution limits imposed by Measure B violate 

the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, as made 

applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Specifically, MOF challenges the following limits on 

2 The City challenged two of the three successful initiatives in state court 

and prevailed as to one on state-law grounds and lost as to the other. City 

of Oxnard v. Starr, 303 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 823–24 (Ct. App. 2023).

3 Because the action against the Clerk in her official capacity is 

functionally against the City, see Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 162 

(2017), we will refer to the Defendant as “the City.”

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 7 of 57
8 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

contributions that may be made by a “person” to a “candidate 

for elective office” under the provisions that Measure B 

added to a new Article VI of Chapter 2 of the Oxnard City 

Code:

• An aggregate limitation of $500 per

election for any given individual’s

contributions to any one candidate for City 

Council. See OXNARD CITY CODE § 2-

243(A).

• An aggregate limitation of $1,000 per 

election for contributions by any given 

“political action committee” to any one 

candidate for City Council. Id.

• Comparable aggregate contribution limits 

for candidates for Mayor, City Clerk, and 

City Treasurer, except that the 

contribution limitation for individuals to 

such candidates is $750 and the limit for 

political action committees is $1,500. Id. 

§ 2-244(A).

• An aggregate limitation of $500 per 

election for any loan to any candidate for 

any elected City office. Id. §§ 2-243(B), 

2-244(B).

These City Code provisions further specify that these 

numerical contribution limits “shall be adjusted every two 

(2) years by resolution of the City Council” in accordance 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 8 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 9

with a specified formula. Id. §§ 2-243(A), 2-244(A); see 

also id. § 2-245.4

MOF’s second cause of action challenges an additional 

feature of the contribution limits enacted by Measure B. 

Specifically, in calculating the aggregate contributions made 

by an individual or by a political action committee for 

purposes of the measure’s contribution limitations, these 

provisions include, not just contributions to the candidate, 

but also “contributions or loans to all political committees or 

broad-based political committees controlled by the 

candidate and in-kind contributions.” OXNARD CITY CODE

§§ 2-243(A), 2-244(A). MOF alleges that, as applied to a 

candidate for City office who simultaneously controlled a 

political committee supporting or opposing a City ballot 

initiative—as Starr had done—these provisions would force 

that candidate “to choose between receiving a maximum 

contribution to either his or her campaign or to the ballot 

measure committee or . . . to divide the maximum 

contribution in some way between the two.” MOF alleges

that, because an individual who is not a candidate for City 

office is not subject to any limits on how much he or she may

4 In challenging these provisions, MOF claims that these limits on 

contributions by any “person” to a “candidate” also apply to 

contributions made by the candidate to his or her own campaign. The 

district court rejected this reading of Measure B, and we agree. By using 

the distinct terms “person” and “candidate,” the measure’s language is 

more naturally read as denoting that those individuals are not the same. 

And if we had any residual doubt on this score, the canon of 

constitutional avoidance would require us to reach that same conclusion, 

because, as the City concedes, a contrary reading would render Measure 

B patently unconstitutional. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53 (holding that a 

limitation on a candidate’s expenditures on his or her own campaign 

would violate the First Amendment). Accordingly, we proceed on the 

understanding that Measure B does not apply to a candidate’s 

contributions to his or her own campaign.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 9 of 57
10 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

contribute to a ballot initiative campaign, the resulting 

asserted disparate treatment violates both the Free Speech 

Clause of the First Amendment as well as the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5

In late April 2021, the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. The district court granted the City’s 

motion, denied MOF’s motion, and entered judgment for the 

City on all claims. MOF timely moved to alter or amend the 

judgment, and the district court denied that motion. MOF 

timely appealed the next day. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment de novo. See Sandoval v. County of 

Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2018).

II

We begin by addressing MOF’s first cause of action, 

which asserts that Measure B’s various contribution limits 

violate the First Amendment. 

A

Under Thompson v. Hebdon, 589 U.S. 1 (2019), the 

controlling standards for assessing whether a campaign

contribution limit violates the First Amendment are set forth 

in Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion in Randall v. Sorrell, 

548 U.S. 230 (2006).

6 Under Randall, “contribution 

5 Measure B also enacted additional provisions that limited gifts to 

certain City officials, see OXNARD CITY CODE §§ 2-250, 2-251, as well 

as provisions instituting term limits for City elected officials, see id. 

§§ 2-3, 2-4. Although MOF initially challenged the gift limitations in a 

third cause of action in its complaint, MOF has expressly abandoned any 

such challenge in this court.

6 In Thompson, this court had declined to apply the Randall plurality 

opinion because no opinion in that case had “commanded a majority of 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 10 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 11

limitations are permissible as long as the Government 

demonstrates that the limits are ‘closely drawn’ to match a 

‘sufficiently important interest.’” 548 U.S. at 247 (plurality) 

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). 

The Supreme Court has “identified only one legitimate 

governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: 

preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206–07 (2014)

(plurality).

7 “Moreover, while preventing corruption or its 

the Court.” Thompson, 589 U.S. at 4 n.* (quoting Thompson v. Hebdon, 

909 F.3d 1027, 1037 n.5 (9th Cir. 2018)). The Supreme Court 

unanimously reversed our decision, noting that 10 other circuits had 

“correctly looked to Randall in reviewing campaign finance 

restrictions.” Id. Indeed, the settled rule is that “[w]hen a fragmented 

Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys 

the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 

position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 

narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In Randall, Justice 

Breyer’s plurality opinion for three Justices applied a form of lesser 

scrutiny rooted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in striking down 

the contribution limitations at issue there, see Randall, 548 U.S. at 246–

62 (Breyer, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J.), and two other 

Justices applied strict scrutiny in reaching the same result, see id. at 267–

73 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The 

“lowest common denominator” between those two opinions, see Nichols 

v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994), is the plurality’s narrower 

holding that the contribution limits were invalid even under a lesser form 

of scrutiny than strict scrutiny. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 272 (Thomas, 

J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the plurality did not “err[] in 

concluding that these limits are too low to satisfy even Buckley’s lenient 

standard”). Accordingly, under both Marks and Thompson, the Randall

plurality opinion is controlling. 

7 As in Randall, Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment in 

McCutcheon, adhering to his view that campaign contribution limitations 

should be subject to strict scrutiny. See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 228 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 11 of 57
12 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

appearance is a legitimate objective, [a legislative body] may 

target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ 

corruption,” a phrase that refers only to “a direct exchange 

of an official act for money.” Id. at 192, 207 (reaffirming 

that “[i]ngratiation and access are not corruption” 

(simplified)); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 

359 (2010) (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently 

important governmental interest in preventing corruption or 

the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to 

quid pro quo corruption.”). “And because the Government’s 

interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is 

equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo

corruption, the Government may not seek to limit the 

appearance of mere influence or access.” McCutcheon, 572 

U.S. at 208 (emphasis added). 

In order to justify any limit on campaign contributions 

based on this asserted interest, a legislative body cannot rely 

on “mere conjecture” and must instead point to some 

threshold evidentiary basis for concluding that voters in that 

jurisdiction “would tend to identify a big donation with a 

corrupt purpose.” Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 

377, 391–92 (2000); see also McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 218 

(plurality) (holding that “speculation . . . cannot justify the 

substantial intrusion on First Amendment rights” involved in 

a limitation on campaign contributions); Lair v. Motl, 873 

F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the 

government must carry this “threshold” burden to show 

“whether any level of limitation is justified”). Our precedent 

(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Because the McCutcheon

plurality’s reasons for invalidating the limits at issue in that case reflect 

the “narrowest grounds” for sustaining that judgment, the McCutcheon

plurality’s opinion, like the Randall plurality’s opinion, is binding on us. 

See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; see also supra note 6.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 12 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 13

has described this threshold burden as a low one that merely 

requires a showing that “the perceived threat” of corruption 

“is not illusory.” Lair, 873 F.3d at 1178 (simplified); but cf. 

Thompson, 589 U.S. at 3 (noting that this court has also 

“acknowledged that ‘McCutcheon and Citizens United

created some doubt as to the continuing vitality of [this] 

standard’” (citation omitted)).

If the government carries this threshold burden to 

“offer[] adequate evidence that its [contribution] limits 

further the important state interest of preventing quid pro 

quo corruption or its appearance,” we must next consider 

whether the particular contribution limit at issue is “closely 

drawn” to this sole legitimate interest. Lair, 873 F.3d at 

1180. With respect to this inquiry, the Supreme Court has 

cautioned that the courts are poorly positioned to “determine 

with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction 

necessary to carry out” this “legitimate objective[].” 

Randall, 548 U.S. at 248. Because legislative bodies are 

generally “better equipped to make such empirical 

judgments,” Randall explained, the courts “ordinarily” 

should “defer[] to the legislature’s determination of such 

matters.” Id. 

Randall also noted, however, that there will be 

circumstances in which a restrictive contribution threshold 

will present “constitutional risks to the democratic electoral 

process” that are “too great.” 548 U.S. at 248. In such cases, 

deference is inappropriate, and the courts must exercise 

“independent judicial judgment.” Id. at 249. Thus, “where 

there is strong indication in a particular case, i.e., danger 

signs, that such risks exist (both present in kind and likely 

serious in degree), courts, including appellate courts, must 

review the record independently and carefully with an eye 

toward assessing the statute’s ‘tailoring,’ that is, toward 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 13 of 57
14 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

assessing the proportionality of the restrictions.” Id. In 

assessing a statute’s tailoring when such danger signs are 

present, the courts must consider “the serious associational 

and expressive problems” presented by the statute and 

determine whether there is “any special justification” that 

would warrant upholding the statute’s restrictions in light of 

those concerns. Id. at 261. 

B

The parties here vigorously disagree as to whether the 

City carried its threshold burden to show that Measure B’s 

individual contribution limitations “further the important 

state interest of preventing quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance.” Lair, 873 F.3d at 1180. We need not resolve 

this question. Even assuming that the City cleared that 

threshold, we conclude that (1) Measure B presents 

sufficient “danger signs” to warrant our “examin[ing] the 

record independently and carefully to determine whether 

[Measure B’s] contribution limits are ‘closely drawn’ to 

match” the asserted interest in avoiding the appearance of 

quid pro quo corruption, Randall, 548 U.S. at 253; and 

(2) Measure B’s individual contribution limits do not 

survive that independent scrutiny. 

1

The City contends that, under Randall, the “danger 

signs” that would trigger independent scrutiny are limited to

the following four specific danger signs that the Court 

identified in that case: (1) the contribution limits at issue 

apply “per election cycle, which includes both a primary and 

a general election”; (2) the “limits apply both to 

contributions from individuals and to contributions from 

political parties”; (3) the “limits are well below the limits 

th[e] Court upheld in Buckley” and “below the lowest limit 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 14 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 15

th[e] Court has previously upheld”; and (4) the limits are 

“substantially lower than . . . comparable limits in other 

States” and are not “indexed for inflation.” Randall, 548 

U.S. at 249–53, 261 (emphasis added). However, nothing in 

Randall suggests that this list of “danger signs” is 

exhaustive. On the contrary, Randall frames a general 

standard that asks whether a given set of limitations presents 

“constitutional risks to the democratic electoral process” 

that are “too great.” Id. at 248 (emphasis added). An 

example would be, as in Randall, when the extremely 

restrictive nature of the contribution limit threatens to “harm 

the electoral process by preventing challengers from 

mounting effective campaigns against incumbent 

officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.” 

Id. at 249. But nothing in Randall suggests that that is the 

only manner in which a contribution limitation may be said 

to present “constitutional risks to the democratic electoral 

process.” Id. at 248.

Moreover, Buckley itself underscored that its more 

lenient standard of review only applies “[a]bsent record 

evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a 

class” or against candidates with particular “present 

occupations [e.g., non-incumbents], ideological views, or 

party affiliations.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 (emphasis 

added). Given that Buckley confirms that such invidious 

discrimination would preclude application of Buckley’s 

deferential scrutiny, it follows that, under Randall, such 

discrimination is also the sort of “constitutional risk[] to the 

democratic electoral process” that would require courts to 

assess the “tailoring” of the contribution limits 

“independently and carefully.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 248–

49, 253.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 15 of 57
16 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

We have explained that, in this context, “invidious 

discrimination” includes discrimination on constitutionally 

suspect grounds, such as race or sex, as well as 

“discrimination that tends to harm or repress minority 

parties” or “independent candidacies.” National Comm. of 

the Reform Party of the U.S. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 

168 F.3d 360, 366 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. 

at 34). Moreover, it is well settled that “invidious” 

discrimination includes “an effort to suppress the speaker’s 

activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view,” Metro 

Display Advert., Inc. v. City of Victorville, 143 F.3d 1191, 

1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), and that such 

discrimination may be present even with respect to 

ostensibly facially neutral laws, see NAACP v. City of 

Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Under these standards, we conclude that the undisputed 

facts concerning Measure B raise a sufficient danger of 

invidious discrimination to warrant application of 

“independent[] and careful[]” scrutiny under Randall. 548 

U.S. at 249, 253. In particular, there are “danger signs” in 

the record that Measure B, both in its formulation and in its 

operation, differentially targets Starr, who has repeatedly 

challenged the incumbent City government and its policies.

First, the legislative record indicates that Starr and his 

reliance on larger-size contributions were a target of the City 

Council when it proposed and promoted Measure B. In his 

declaration in the district court, City Manager Alexander 

Nguyen stated that, “to educate the voters about Measure B 

in advance of the March 3, 2020 election,” his office

“maintained a page on the City’s website titled ‘About 

Measure B—The Oxnard Government Accountability and 

Ethics Act.’” Among the materials uploaded onto that 

webpage was a PowerPoint slide deck that Nguyen used to

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 16 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 17

give a presentation in February 2020 to the “InterNeighborhood Council Organization,” a group “made up of 

the chairpersons of each active neighborhood council.” The 

PowerPoint, entitled “Measure B: The Oxnard Government 

Accountability and Ethics Act,” provides an overview for 

voters of what Measure B would and would not do. The 

PowerPoint’s 15 slides describe the measure’s various 

provisions concerning gifts, term limits, and campaign 

contributions in largely general terms, with one notable 

exception. The last two slides consist of graphics devoted to 

showing a particular “[e]xample of the size and volume of 

campaign contributions for one candidate over [the] past 

several years.” Although these two slides do not name who 

that “one candidate” is, there is no dispute that it is, in fact, 

Aaron Starr.

The first of these two slides consists of a map of the 

United States and a separate close-up map of California, with 

visual pins identifying each city from which Starr received a 

contribution, together with the amount of that contribution.8 

Many of the contributions listed are modest, but several are 

quite large, including a $12,000 contribution from someone 

in Woodland, California, and one for $8,000 from a resident 

of Austin, Texas. The slide contains, in the upper right, a 

large green banner stating “$70,000 RAISED OUTSIDE OF 

OXNARD.” The second slide provides a pie chart and 

accompanying numbers summarizing the extent to which 

Starr relied on large contributions. The pie chart shows that, 

in terms of the number of contributions Starr had received, 

68% of them were in an amount that was less than or equal 

to $750, and 32% were in amounts larger than $750. The 

slide also showed that, despite the smaller percentage of 

large contributions, the total amount raised from such 

8 The slides are attached as an Appendix to this opinion.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 17 of 57
18 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

contributions was much larger: the total raised from 

contributions that were over $750 each was $102,400, 

whereas the total of the smaller-sized contributions was only 

$15,650. Next to the pie chart, there is a depiction of a large 

cartoon of green dollar bills adjacent to the following 

statement written in bold-face, all-capitals type: “TOTAL 

CAMPAIGN DONATIONS: $118,050.” The number 

“$118,050” appears in oversized green font to match the 

dollar-bill color scheme.

In his declaration in connection with the summary 

judgment proceedings below, Starr expressly asserted that 

the record concerning Measure B’s enactment demonstrated 

that it was proposed by the City Council “as a way to reduce 

the amount of money [Starr] spend[s] in the City, both on 

[his] personal campaigns and in support of ballot measures 

[he] ha[s] proposed.” In response, the City did not directly 

deny that Starr’s fundraising practices had been a factor in 

the City Council’s proposing of Measure B. Instead, it 

simply stated that (1) its purpose was “to minimize the 

perception that the City’s elected officials are indebted to 

those who can provide . . . large campaign contributions”; 

and (2) “[n]either Measure B, nor the associated ballot 

materials mention[ed] Aaron Starr” by name.

Second, the record makes clear that, in terms of its 

practical effect on then-existing fundraising practices within 

the City of Oxnard, Starr was the person who would most be

affected by Measure B’s passage and that few others would 

be significantly impacted. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu 

Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993) 

(“[T]he effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence 

of its object.”). The City submitted an expert report that 

tallied the donations made in the 2018 election, which was 

the last election conducted before Measure B took effect and 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 18 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 19

the first that was held after the City’s shift from an at-large 

to a district-based City Council. The report concluded that 

“the sorts of large contributions that [Measure B] prohibits 

were quite rare even before its adoption.” As the report 

explained, “[o]nly 18 of the 287 donors (6.3% of the donors) 

giving in Oxnard elections that year contributed sums that 

would have exceeded the limits” of Measure B, and the total 

amount of the raised funds by all candidates that exceeded 

those limits (i.e., $25,200) represented 25.4% of the total 

raised (i.e., $99,168). “For nearly all candidates,” the report 

stated, “the proportions of their contributions that exceeded 

the limits were quite small.” But there were a few 

exceptions. In particular, the report noted that “[o]nly two 

candidates raised the majority of their funds in contributions 

that . . . exceeded the limits,” and “[o]ne was mayoral 

candidate Aaron Starr.” With respect to Starr’s campaign, 

57.6% of his total funds raised came from contributions 

exceeding Measure B’s limits. By contrast, as the City notes 

in its appellate brief, Starr’s opponent—then-incumbent 

Mayor Tim Flynn—“would have lost less than 10% of the 

funds he raised if Measure B had been in effect,” because 

“[o]nly one of Mr. Flynn’s 76 donors made a contribution 

that would have exceeded Measure B’s limits.” As the City 

aptly summarizes, “Starr is an outlier among candidates,” 

and “Starr’s outlier status is even more stark when compared 

to other candidates’ fundraising in the 2018 election.”

Third, the record reveals a considerable history of 

antipathy between Starr and the City’s elected officials over 

the years immediately preceding Measure B’s adoption. 

Starr has been a sharp critic of the City’s elected officials, 

and he was the “proponent of four recall petitions that 

triggered a special election” in May 2018 to decide whether 

to remove the Mayor and three other City Council members. 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 19 of 57
20 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

These recall efforts all failed, however, and the four targets 

of the recall were still on the City Council when it 

unanimously decided to submit Measure B to the voters in 

October 2019. Starr and MOF also successfully proposed 

Measure M in 2016, which then became the subject of 

litigation between Starr and the City, with the City prevailing 

in its efforts to invalidate that measure in state court. See 

supra at 6 & note 1. Starr also unsuccessfully ran for City 

office himself on multiple occasions, coming in second 

against incumbent Mayor Flynn in the 2018 election. See 

supra at 6. As noted, all but one of Flynn’s campaign 

contributions complied with the limits later proposed in 

Measure B, while most of Starr’s did not. Less than a year 

after defeating Starr, Flynn voted in favor of Measure B, 

which the City notes “will force” Starr “to change” his

fundraising practices and to “reach out to a broader base for 

smaller donations.”

Taken together, these circumstances raise a sufficient 

constitutional risk of invidious discrimination against Starr 

and other outsiders like him. Given the substantial history 

of political disagreement between Starr and the City’s 

elected officials; the singular and disproportionate burden 

that the campaign finance restrictions placed on Starr; and 

the City’s stark use of Starr as the poster child for why these 

limits should be adopted, there are ample danger signs here 

that the City’s action in proposing Measure B may reflect 

“an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to 

disagreement with the speaker’s view,” Metro Display 

Advert., Inc., 143 F.3d at 1194 (citation omitted), or to “harm 

or repress . . . independent candidacies,” National Comm. of 

the Reform Party, 168 F.3d at 366 (quoting Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 34). Accordingly, under Randall, we do not apply 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 20 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 21

deferential review in examining Measure B’s contribution 

limits.

2

We therefore proceed to “examine the record 

independently and carefully to determine whether [Measure 

B’s] contribution limits are ‘closely drawn’ to match” the 

interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of quid pro quo

corruption. Randall, 548 U.S. at 253. 

As an initial matter, we reject the City’s and the dissent’s

threshold contention that we are limited to considering only

the particular “five sets of considerations” that the Randall

Court evaluated. 548 U.S. at 261. Nothing in Randall

suggests that the Court there was prescribing a mandatory 

checklist that must be mechanically applied in assessing 

narrow tailoring. Moreover, the “danger signs” that trigger 

independent scrutiny here are distinct from the specific 

concerns that were presented in Randall. Indeed, in

addressing the issue of tailoring in Randall, the Court simply 

identified four case-specific features that presented 

particular concerns before asking, more generally, whether 

there was “any special justification that might warrant a 

contribution limit so low or so restrictive as to bring about 

the serious associational and expressive problems that [the 

Court] ha[s] described.” Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court 

has made clear that, with respect to tailoring, the overall 

issue remains whether there is “a substantial mismatch 

between the [City’s] stated objective” of combating 

corruption “and the means selected to achieve it.” 

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199 (plurality). Accordingly, we 

are not limited to the specific considerations identified in 

Randall and must instead broadly consider whether, given 

the danger signs presented here, there is an unwarranted

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 21 of 57
22 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

mismatch between the City’s chosen means and professed 

objective.

In addressing that issue, we begin by assessing whether 

Measure B’s contribution limits are more “closely drawn” to 

fit (1) the City’s asserted legitimate interest in avoiding 

actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption or (2) an alleged 

prohibited objective of squelching the political activities of 

Starr and others like him.9

9 The dissent errs in suggesting that this amounts to nothing more than a 

subjective inquiry into legislative motivation. See Dissent at 50–54. 

Rather, the tailoring question is an objective one that asks whether the 

challenged measure is sufficiently closely drawn to the legitimate goal 

of avoiding the appearance or reality of quid pro quo corruption so as to 

dispel the particular “constitutional risk[]” that triggered the application 

of independent scrutiny, Randall, 548 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added)—

which here is the risk of invidious discrimination aimed at “suppress[ing] 

the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view,” 

Metro Display Advert., Inc., 143 F.3d at 1194 (citation omitted). 

Insisting on sufficient tailoring to dispel the risk of invidious suppression 

of political opponents is not the same as finding the reality of such 

suppression. Indeed, settled First Amendment doctrine regularly 

employs different levels of scrutiny and associated tailoring 

requirements to address the ultimate risk that “the government has 

adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 

message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 

(1989); see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 

642 (1994) (“[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are 

subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, because in most cases they 

pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from 

the public dialogue.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Leathers v. 

Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (noting that “differential taxation of 

First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens

to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints,” but that 

there was no indication that the tax challenged in that case was 

objectively “structured so as to raise suspicion that it was intended” to 

“interfere with [cable television’s] First Amendment activities”

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 22 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 23

In asserting that Measure B’s particular contribution 

limits are needed to combat the appearance of corruption in 

Oxnard specifically, the City relies heavily on a corruption 

scandal that occurred in Oxnard in 2010. After a May 2010 

article in the Ventura County Star asserted that various City 

officials had improperly received significant gifts and failed 

to report them, the Ventura County District Attorney 

undertook an extensive investigation that included the 

execution of search warrants at City Hall and at the homes 

of several City officials. Although the District Attorney 

ultimately concluded that “the most serious allegations of 

criminal conduct [we]re unsupported by the evidence,” his 

nearly 100-page report in April 2012 revealed at least the 

following five specific areas of concern: (1) a “clear pattern 

of fiscal waste by a small number of city officials” that 

allowed City officials to “spend excessively while traveling 

on city business”; (2) “an improper $10,000 personal loan of 

city funds” taken out by the then-City Manager, who also 

“implemented an improper retirement benefit for himself 

and other city management employees”; (3) improper use of 

funds regarding “a grand opening celebration at a city water 

facility”; (4) the fact that “several Oxnard officials received 

gifts of expensive meals, rounds of golf, and a small number 

of event tickets,” and “did not publicly disclose the gifts as 

required by law”; and (5) the fact that “[c]lose relationships 

(emphasis added)). Moreover, contrary to what the dissent suggests, see

Dissent at 47 n.16, it is certainly not a point in the City’s favor that the 

record evidence of the risk of invidious discrimination here may also 

suggest the reality of such discrimination. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 

505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992) (noting that the “possibility” that the 

challenged ordinance’s content-based selectivity creates for “seeking to 

handicap the expression of particular ideas” is “alone . . . enough to 

render the ordinance presumptively invalid,” even while noting that the 

record evidence “elevate[d] the possibility to a certainty” (emphasis 

added)).

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 23 of 57
24 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

existed between several city officials and private individuals 

conducting multi-million dollar transactions with the city.” 

The District Attorney ultimately deferred to the judgment of 

others as to what changes in policies and practices should be 

made, but his report did indicate that some of these issues 

may be ones “requiring reform.”

For several reasons, this 2010 corruption scandal and 

resulting investigation bear, at best, a weak and tenuous 

relationship to Measure B’s contribution limits. First, as 

counsel for the City conceded at oral argument, the problems 

canvassed in the District Attorney’s 2012 report had nothing 

to do with campaign contributions, or indeed with campaign 

financing at all. Campaign contributions were not identified 

as a source of corruption in the report, and the report does 

not recommend campaign contribution limits as a solution to 

any of the five problems it does identify. While Measure B’s 

separate gift restrictions may well be closely drawn to the 

problems identified in the District Attorney’s report, those 

restrictions are not at issue here. Second, the City waited 

until late 2019 before proposing Measure B’s gift restrictions 

and campaign finance restrictions. That timing is a full 

seven years after the District Attorney’s report, but only one 

year after (1) Starr had forced a recall election against the 

Mayor and three other members of the City Council; and 

(2) Starr himself had run against the Mayor, both at the recall 

election and in the 2018 general election. Third, the 2010 

scandal and the 2012 report are not even mentioned as 

justifications for Measure B’s campaign finance limitations 

in the City’s explanatory PowerPoint; rather, that document 

focuses on Starr’s receipt of campaign contributions in large 

dollar amounts and from out-of-State contributors. On this

record, Measure B’s campaign finance limits are much more 

“closely drawn” to the prohibited objective of stopping Starr 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 24 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 25

than they are to remedying the problems identified in the 

District Attorney’s 2012 report. 

The City also notes that, prior to proposing Measure B, 

the City commissioned a general “Issues Survey” and that 

survey showed that 77% of voters “would support a 

Government Accountability measure.” The City further 

observes that, when presented to the voters, Measure B 

passed with 82% of votes cast in favor. But given that 

“Government Accountability” covers a number of different 

concerns and Measure B likewise contained a varied mix of 

provisions governing term limits, gift restrictions, and 

campaign finance limits, these points provide little, if any, 

basis for concluding that Measure B’s campaign finance 

restrictions—as opposed to its other provisions—were 

specifically tailored to the public’s concerns about local 

corruption.

The practical effect of Measure B’s campaign finance 

limitations also underscores the comparatively closer fit 

between these restrictions and the objective of squelching 

Starr. As the City’s own expert and briefing repeatedly 

stress, Measure B’s financing limitations would have little 

practical effect on anyone other than Starr, whom the City 

describes as a “stark” outlier. Although the City emphasizes 

that its campaign finance restrictions are in line with those 

of other comparably sized jurisdictions, that does not mean 

that Oxnard’s restriction is closely drawn to the legitimate 

interests invoked by those other jurisdictions. As the City’s 

PowerPoint makes clear, Measure B’s contribution limits 

were knowingly set at a level that, in their practical 

operation, would seriously and differentially affect Starr, 

while having minimal, if any, effect on every other politician 

identified in the City’s briefing. 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 25 of 57
26 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

We also note that these concerns about the practical 

effect of Measure B are exacerbated by the fact that its 

campaign finance limits lack an adequate mechanism to 

ensure that they will be “adjusted for inflation.” Randall, 

548 U.S. at 261. The City points to the fact that Measure B 

added § 2-245 to the City Code, which states that the City 

Clerk shall adjust the contribution limits every two years to 

account for “changes in the Consumer Price Index.” 

OXNARD CITY CODE § 2-245(A). But rather than make such 

changes automatically effective according to the specified 

formula, the City Council expressly reserved to itself the 

authority to review and adopt these changes “by 

resolution.”10 Id. Given that a resolution of the City Council 

is required to make any change to the limits—just as would 

be required to formally amend them—Measure B, as a 

practical matter, provides insufficient assurance that the 

limits will be raised as warranted by inflation.

Finally, we discern no “special justification” in the 

record that might show that these contribution limits are 

warranted despite the significant concerns that we have 

described. Randall, 548 U.S. at 261. Accordingly, our

“independent[] and careful[] review” of the record confirms 

that Measure B’s contribution limits are not “‘closely drawn’ 

to match the [City’s] interests” in avoiding the reality or 

appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Id. at 253. The 

challenged per-candidate aggregate contribution limitations 

in Oxnard City Code §§ 2-243(A)–(B), 2-244(A)–(B) 

therefore violate the First Amendment. 

10 The dissent accepts the City’s argument that Measure B supposedly 

creates a “ministerial” duty that binds future City Councils to pass 

legislation approving the City Clerk’s handiwork, see Dissent at 45 n.14,

but nothing in the text of the measure says that.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 26 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 27

III

MOF’s second cause of action challenges one specific 

feature of these same contribution limits, namely, that they 

assertedly include, as counting toward the amount of funds

that may be contributed to a candidate, any contributions 

made to political committees supporting or opposing ballot 

initiatives if those committees are controlled by someone 

who is simultaneously a candidate for office. The City 

contends that this claim is based on a misreading of Measure 

B and that such contributions to ballot initiative committees 

do not count towards the per-candidate aggregate 

contribution limits. We need not resolve this issue. Given 

that we have concluded that, even apart from this alleged 

feature, the challenged contribution limits are invalid, any

dispute concerning this additional issue is moot.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to the City Clerk and remand 

with instructions to grant summary judgment to MOF 

holding invalid the per-candidate aggregate contribution 

limitations in Oxnard City Code §§ 2-243(A)–(B), 

2-244(A)–(B).

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 27 of 57
28 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

BENNETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In 2020, 82% of Oxnard residents who voted on the City 

of Oxnard’s Ballot Measure B approved per-candidate 

contribution limits for municipal elections by passing the 

measure. Under the limits, an individual may contribute up 

to $500 to a candidate for City Council and up to $750 to a 

candidate for Mayor, City Clerk, or City Treasurer in each 

election. Moving Oxnard Forward (MOF) challenges the 

constitutionality of these limits under the First Amendment.1 

Campaign contribution limits pass First Amendment 

scrutiny if the government (1) “demonstrates a sufficiently 

important interest” and (2) “employs means closely drawn 

to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam); accord

1 MOF also challenges Measure B’s “aggregate contribution limits,” 

which impose a $1,000 limit on total contributions from political action 

committees to a candidate for City Council—“including contributions or 

loans to all political committees or broad-based political committees 

controlled by the candidate”—and a $1,500 limit on such contributions 

to candidates for Mayor, City Clerk, and City Treasurer. Interpreting 

candidate-controlled committees to encompass committees formed to 

support or oppose ballot measures, MOF argues that aggregate limits are 

unconstitutional because they “treat[] candidates who support or oppose 

ballot measures differently from other candidates and otherwise restrict[] 

their ability to both run for office and campaign for or against a ballot 

measure.” But as confirmed by the City Attorney’s “Impartial Analysis 

for Measure B,” the aggregate limit provisions do not apply to 

committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures. Oxnard, Cal., 

Ordinance 2976, §§ 2-243(A), 2-244(A) (May 1, 2020). The majority

does not reach MOF’s challenge to the aggregate limits since it finds that 

“even apart from this alleged feature, the challenged contribution limits 

are invalid.” Maj. at 27. I would affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the City on this claim.

MOF initially challenged Measure B’s ban on gifts to elected city 

officials, but it abandons this challenge on appeal. 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 28 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 29

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247 (2006) (plurality 

opinion). Because I would find that the City’s contribution 

limits satisfy this test, I respectfully dissent.2

I

In determining the constitutionality of contribution 

limits, we first ask “whether ‘there is adequate evidence that 

[the government’s] limitation[s] further[] . . . [the] important 

state interest’ of preventing actual or perceived quid pro quo 

corruption.” Lair v. Motl, 873 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 

2017) (alterations besides first in original) (quoting Mont. 

Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th 

Cir. 2003)). The majority assumes without deciding that the 

City has demonstrated this important interest. Maj. at 14. I 

believe that the record shows that the City has so 

demonstrated.

A

As the majority correctly notes, “preventing corruption 

or the appearance of corruption” is the “only . . . legitimate 

governmental interest for restricting campaign finances” that 

has been recognized by the Supreme Court. McCutcheon v. 

FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206 (2014) (plurality opinion); accord

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010). The 

Court has narrowed this interest to the prevention of quid pro 

quo corruption, including “actual quid pro quo 

arrangements” and “‘the appearance of [quid pro quo] 

2 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted 

summary judgment to the City. Neither party argued below that disputed 

issues of material fact precluded the district court from ruling on the 

summary judgment motions. Neither party argues on appeal that there 

are disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. And 

my review of the record does not reveal any disputed issues of material 

fact. 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 29 of 57
30 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

corruption stemming from public awareness of the 

opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 

individual financial contributions’ to particular candidates.”3 

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 207 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

27). 

Below and on appeal, the City has contended that 

Measure B furthers its interest in preventing “[t]he risk of 

actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption.” At summary 

judgment, the district court did not expressly identify quid 

pro quo corruption as one of the City’s interests before 

finding that the City had satisfied its “‘evidentiary 

obligation’ to demonstrate a sufficiently important 

governmental interest in contribution limits.” The district 

court instead referred to the purposes listed in the ordinance 

enacted by Measure B,4 which directly quotes one purpose 

3 The Supreme Court has defined quid pro quo corruption as “dollars for 

political favors.” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l 

Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). The Court 

has also provided examples of what is not quid pro quo corruption: 

“[s]pending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in 

connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s 

official duties,” or “the possibility that an individual who spends large 

sums may garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or 

political parties.” Id. at 208 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359).

4 The full provision reads: 

The purpose of this Article is to advance compelling 

City interests by limiting large contributions from 

single sources to candidates for Mayor, members of 

City Council, City Clerk and City Treasurer, and by 

imposing reporting and accounting procedures for

local campaigns. The City’s interests are to provide a 

representative government which is accessible to all 

citizens, to deter corruption and the appearance of 

corruption caused by the coercive influence of large 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 30 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 31

from the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo: 

deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption caused 

by the “coercive influence of large financial contributions on 

candidates’ positions.” 424 U.S. at 25. Buckley predates the 

Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United and 

McCutcheon, in which the Court “limited the important state 

interest . . . to preventing ‘quid pro quo corruption, or its 

appearance,’” Lair, 873 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Lair v. 

Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2015)). But even if the 

“coercive influence of large financial contributions on 

candidates’ positions” does not equal quid pro quo 

corruption, we may affirm “on any ground raised below and 

fairly supported by the record.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 

F.3d 1059, 1076 (2015) (quoting Columbia Pictures Indus., 

Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013)). The City 

asserted an interest in preventing actual or perceived quid 

pro quo corruption below and on appeal. Since, as explained 

in the next section, this interest is fairly supported by the 

record, I would affirm the district court’s holding that the 

City has demonstrated a constitutionally permissible interest 

in contribution limits.

B

To demonstrate its interest, the government “must show 

the risk of actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption is 

more than ‘mere conjecture.’” Lair, 873 F.3d at 1178 

(quoting Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092). The government 

“need not show any completed quid pro quo transactions to 

satisfy its burden.” Id. at 1180. It “must show only that the 

financial contributions on candidates’ positions, and to 

inform the electorate as to the sources and uses of 

political contributions.

Oxnard, Cal., Ordinance 2976, § 2-240 (May 1, 2020). 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 31 of 57
32 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

perceived threat is not illusory.” Id. at 1178 (cleaned up) 

(quoting Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092). Though “[t]he 

quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened 

judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or 

down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification 

raised,” the Supreme Court has recognized that “the dangers 

of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large 

contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible.” 

Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) 

(citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27). If the government asserts 

an interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption, there is a 

“low [evidentiary] bar.” Lair, 873 F.3d at 1172.

To substantiate its asserted interest in preventing quid 

pro quo corruption, the City relies on: (1) coverage of a 

corruption scandal that came to light in 2010, including a 

2012 report by the Ventura County District Attorney; 

(2) support of a “government accountability measure” by 

more than 75% of voters surveyed by the City in 2019; and 

(3) approval of Measure B by 82% of those who voted on it 

in 2020. In reviewing a challenge to Missouri’s contribution 

limits in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the 

Supreme Court found comparable evidence to be sufficient: 

“newspaper accounts of large contributions supporting 

inferences of impropriety,” an affidavit from a state senator 

stating that “large contributions have ‘the real potential to 

buy votes,’” and approval of the measure by “[a]n 

overwhelming 74 percent of the voters of Missouri [who] 

determined that contribution limits are necessary to combat 

corruption and the appearance thereof.” 528 U.S. at 393–94. 

That evidence “d[id] not present a close call” as to whether 

the state had met its “evidentiary obligation.” Id. at 393.

I believe the evidence here is comparable, though our 

record may present a slightly closer call. As both MOF and 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 32 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 33

the majority contend, the past instances of alleged corruption 

involved gifts to already elected officials, rather than 

campaign contributions to candidates,5 and became public 

nine years before Measure B was proposed. Maj. at 24. But

the City need not provide proof of completed quid pro quo 

transactions through campaign contributions to satisfy its 

evidentiary burden. Lair, 873 F.3d at 1180. And evidence 

of the “gifts of vacations, meals, rounds of golf, and event 

tickets from companies doing significant business with the 

city” to elected officials6 suffices to show that the “perceived 

threat” of quid pro quo corruption is “not illusory.” Id. at 

1178 (cleaned up) (quoting Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092). 

An expert for the City also attested that the 2010 “scandal, 

as well as new allegations of corruption, . . . featured 

prominently [in] the debate” over Measure B. This 

5 The District Attorney’s 2012 report cited alleged gifts in 1998, 2000, 

2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 to Tom Holden, who served on City 

Council from 1993 to 2002 and served consecutive two-year terms as 

Mayor from 2004 to 2012. The report also cited alleged gifts in 2005, 

2006, 2007, 2008, and 2010 to Andres Herrera, who served on City 

Council from 2002 to 2010. Though the 2010 scandal did not expose 

alleged instances of quid pro quo corruption through campaign 

contributions, it did feature alleged gifts made to elected officials during 

years in which they ran for reelection.

6 One example discussed in the District Attorney’s report concerns a trip 

to Napa by then-Mayor Holden. Holden traveled to Napa on the private 

jet of businessman Bernard Huberman and charged his hotel stay to 

Huberman’s credit card. Within three months of the trip, BLT 

Enterprises, a company affiliated with Huberman, submitted a bid for a 

contract with the City alongside six other applicants. The City’s Utilities 

Task Force, on which Holden served as the ranking member, selected 

BLT Enterprises to negotiate the new multimillion-dollar contract. The 

District Attorney’s investigation found “no evidence of criminal 

activity,” but the report notes that “suspicions of city leaders’ 

relationships with Bernard Huberman ran high among some city officials 

and employees.” 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 33 of 57
34 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

testimony confirms that coverage of the scandal, along with 

the survey and vote results, evinces at least the perception of 

quid pro corruption. The City’s evidence—uncontroverted 

by MOF—clears the “low bar” of showing that the risk of 

actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption exceeds “mere 

conjecture.” Id. at 1172. Thus, the City has demonstrated 

its sufficiently important interest.

II

Having determined that the City has demonstrated a 

sufficiently important interest in enacting campaign 

contribution limits, we next ask whether the challenged 

limits are “closely drawn” to match the government’s 

asserted interest. Shrink Mo., 528 at 387–88 (quoting 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). But as part of that inquiry we must 

preliminarily determine whether the limits are “so low as to 

exhibit [the] ‘danger signs’” that were first identified in 

Randall v. Sorrell. Thompson v. Hebdon, 7 F.4th 811, 822 

(9th Cir. 2021); see also id. at 818. The presence of any of 

these four “danger signs” warrants a court’s closer review of 

both the record and “five sets of considerations” (also listed 

in Randall) to determine whether the limit is closely drawn 

to the government’s interest. Id. at 818. Absent these danger 

signs, the court’s “closely drawn” analysis need only 

confirm that the limits “(a) focus narrowly on the state’s 

interest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate with a 

candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficient 

resources to wage an effective campaign.” Eddleman, 343 

F.3d at 1092.

The majority’s analysis at this second step suffers from 

two flaws: First, the majority’s conclusion that “the record 

reflects a significant risk that the City may be engaged in 

‘invidious discrimination,’” Maj. at 6 (quoting Buckley, 424 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 34 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 35

U.S. at 31)—which the majority takes to be a new danger 

sign warranting heightened review under Randall, Maj. at 

16—lacks support in the record. Second, the majority’s 

“more ‘closely drawn’” analysis, Maj. at 22 (emphasis 

added), contravenes precedent by applying a motive test 

instead of a tailoring test. I would find that no Randall

danger signs are present and that, even under Randall’s more 

searching five-factor tailoring test, Measure B’s limits are 

closely drawn to the City’s asserted interest.

A

The Randall plurality identified four “danger signs” 

indicating that contribution limits are low enough to “harm 

the electoral process by preventing challengers from 

mounting effective campaigns against incumbent 

officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.” 

548 U.S. at 249. As the majority notes, in Thompson v. 

Hebdon, 909 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2018), we declined to 

consider Randall “because no opinion [had] commanded a 

majority of the Court.” Id. at 1037 n.5; Maj. at 10 n.6. The 

Supreme Court unanimously vacated our decision and 

remanded the case with the instruction to treat Randall—

including its “danger signs”—as “precedent.” Thompson v. 

Hebdon, 589 U.S. 1, 4 & n.*, 5–6 (2019) (per curiam). 

Those four danger signs are: (1) the limits are below 

“limits upheld by the Court in the past”; (2) the limits are 

below limits “in force in other States”; (3) the limits apply 

“per election cycle” (including both primary and general 

elections), rather than applying per election; and (4) the 

limits apply to contributions not only from individuals but 

also political parties, “whether made in cash or in 

expenditures coordinated (or presumed to be coordinated) 

with the candidate.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 249; see id. at 268 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 35 of 57
36 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (enumerating the 

four danger signs analyzed by the plurality). None of the 

four are present here. 

First, the City’s limits of $500 for candidates for City 

Council and $750 for candidates for Mayor, City Clerk, and 

City Treasurer are not below those upheld by the Supreme 

Court and other courts. Courts in this circuit have found 

comparable limits for two other Californian cities to be 

constitutional: a $500 limit in West Covina, Sotoodeh v. City 

of West Covina, No. CV 22-07756, 2024 WL 4113280, at 

*1, *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2024), and a $500 limit in San 

Diego, Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, No. 09-CV-2862, 

2012 WL 177414, at *8–9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012). The 

Supreme Court and this court have even upheld comparable 

statewide contribution limits. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 383 

($275 to $1,075 for statewide office); Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 

1088 ($100, $200, and $400 for statewide office).7 Second, 

the City’s expert presented evidence that Measure B’s limits 

are around the median for limits enacted by California cities 

of comparable size. Third, Measure B’s limits apply per 

election, not per election cycle. Fourth, Measure B’s limits 

do not apply to political parties. Thus, none of the danger 

signs identified by the Randall plurality are present here. 

Rather than checking for the four danger signs the 

Supreme Court specifically listed, the majority recognizes a 

fifth.8 Maj. at 14–16. It finds “a sufficient danger of 

7 Even adjusting for inflation per the Consumer Price Index, Shrink 

Missouri’s $275 to $1,075 1998 limits equate to about $435 to $1,700 in 

2020, and Eddleman’s $100, $200, and $400 1994 limits equate to about 

$175, $350, and $700 in 2020.

8 The majority appears to be the first and only court to identify a danger 

sign other than the four listed in Randall. Such action is not barred by 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 36 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 37

invidious discrimination” against “minority parties” or 

“independent candidacies,” and it holds that this type of 

discrimination constitutes a new Randall danger sign. Maj. 

at 16 (quoting Nat’l Comm. of the Reform Party of the U.S. 

v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 168 F.3d 360, 366 (9th Cir. 

1999)). The majority justifies its action because this type of 

supposed discrimination presents “constitutional risks to the 

democratic electoral process.” Maj. at 15 (quoting Randall, 

548 U.S. at 248). The majority also notes that “Buckley itself 

underscored that its more lenient standard of review only 

applies ‘[a]bsent record evidence of invidious 

discrimination against challengers as a class.’” Maj. at 15

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31). And on the majority’s 

read, “the record reflects a significant risk that the City may 

be engaged in ‘invidious discrimination’ against Starr and 

challengers like him.” Maj. at 6 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. 

at 31). Even assuming that invidious discrimination could 

be a danger sign warranting heightened review under 

Randall, the record here does not support the majority’s 

“conclu[sion] that the undisputed facts . . . raise a sufficient 

danger of [such] discrimination.” Maj. at 16.

Courts have analyzed whether contribution limits 

“work . . . invidious discrimination” when plaintiffs have 

alleged discrimination in violation of equal protection. 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30; see, e.g., Nat’l Comm. of the Reform 

Party, 168 F.3d at 366. Addressing equal protection 

challenges, the Supreme Court and this court have 

circumscribed what it means for limits to discriminate

against nonincumbent challengers and have required a 

factual showing from plaintiffs when such discrimination is 

alleged. “Absent record evidence of invidious 

Randall or other Supreme Court cases, but the majority is the first court 

in the more than eighteen years since Randall to do so.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 37 of 57
38 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

discrimination against challengers as a class, a court should 

generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its 

face imposes evenhanded restrictions.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

31. While the Supreme Court has acknowledged, as a reality 

of our political process, that “[t]hird parties have been 

completely incapable of matching the major parties’ ability 

to raise money and win elections,” id. at 98, the Court has 

never recognized this difference in “funding position relative 

to their major-party opponents” to constitute invidious 

discrimination against minority parties, id. at 34; see Nat’l 

Comm. of the Reform Party, 168 F.3d at 366. Rather, to 

determine whether a contribution limit poses a risk of 

invidious discrimination, the Supreme Court and this court 

have looked for evidence that the limit “w[ould] have a 

serious effect on the initiation and scope of minor-party and 

independent candidacies.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 34; 

Nat’l Comm. of the Reform Party, 168 F.3d at 366 (“[T]he 

Buckley Court was reserving the possibility that in the future, 

plaintiffs might be able to demonstrate that the fundraising 

constraints actually harmed or injured the voting strength of 

minority parties or their ability to field candidates.” 

(emphasis added)). But a minority-party challenger’s 

argument that a contribution limit “has prevented it from 

receiving and spending as much money as the major parties” 

is “not the kind of claim that the Supreme Court reserved for 

future consideration as invidious discrimination.” 

Nat’l Comm. of the Reform Party, 168 F.3d at 366.

To start, MOF has not advanced equal protection, due 

process, or any other claims based on discrimination by the 

per-candidate contribution limits.9 MOF does not allege that 

9 MOF does challenge Measure B’s aggregate limits on equal protection 

grounds, but this challenge fails for the reasons explained above. See 

supra note 1. 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 38 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 39

Measure B’s facially neutral per-candidate limits have an 

unconstitutionally disparate impact, whether on MOF, MOF 

president Aaron Starr, or all nonincumbent challengers like 

Starr. At issue is only the constitutionality of the limits 

themselves—i.e., whether they are “‘closely drawn’ to 

match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’” Shrink Mo., 528 

U.S. at 387–88 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). 

Even assuming that the majority can consider invidious 

discrimination outside of the equal protection framework by 

treating it as a Randall danger sign, MOF’s own allegations 

do not raise the specter of such discrimination. At most, 

MOF argues that Measure B’s per-candidate limits are so 

low as to trigger Randall’s concern of “insulat[ing] 

legislators from effective electoral challenge.”10 548 U.S. at 

248 (quoting Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 404 (Breyer, J., 

concurring)). This concern stems from “the typically higher 

costs that a challenger must bear to overcome the namerecognition advantage enjoyed by an incumbent,” id. at 256, 

and therefore amounts to an argument that the limits 

“prevent[] [MOF] from receiving and spending as much 

money as the major [or incumbent] parties,” Nat’l Comm. of 

the Reform Party, 168 F.3d at 366. Absent any alleged harm 

to MOF’s “voting strength” or “ability to field candidates,” 

this is not the kind of claim that the Supreme Court reserved 

for future consideration as invidious discrimination. Id.

And there is no allegation, let alone evidence, of 

“invidious discrimination against challengers as a class.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added); see Nat’l Comm. 

of the Reform Party, 168 F.3d at 366 (“The term ‘invidious 

10 As discussed below, MOF’s contention that Measure B’s limits will 

prevent nonincumbents from mounting effective campaigns also lacks 

support in the record.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 39 of 57
40 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

discrimination’ generally refers to treating a class differently 

in order to harm or repress it. . . . The Court used ‘invidious’ 

in Buckley in the same sense, i.e., to describe discrimination 

that tends to harm or repress minority parties.”). Even the 

majority’s independent review of the record fails to identify 

evidence of discrimination against any class. Looking to 

references to “Starr and his reliance on larger-size 

contributions” in materials advocating for Measure B, Maj. 

at 16, the fact that “Starr was the person who would most be 

affected by Measure B’s passage,” Maj. at 18, and the 

“considerable history of antipathy between Starr and the 

City’s elected officials,” Maj. at 19, the majority leaps to the 

conclusion that “[t]aken together, these circumstances raise 

a sufficient constitutional risk of invidious discrimination 

against Starr and other outsiders like him,” Maj. at 20

(emphasis added). But each circumstance cited by the 

majority is unique to Starr.11 No other challengers are 

identified. The inference that candidates “like” Starr would 

face the same circumstances is not supported by the record 

nor even advanced by MOF.12

Attempting to individualize the definition of “invidious 

discrimination,” the majority cites Metro Display 

Advertising, Inc. v. City of Victorville, 143 F.3d 1191 (9th 

Cir. 1998), for the proposition that “it is well settled that 

‘invidious’ discrimination includes ‘an effort to suppress the 

11 And as discussed above, MOF does not allege that Measure B’s percandidate limits discriminate against a class of one—i.e., Starr.

12 Indeed, at oral argument, when asked about the presence of other 

“danger signs” beyond those enumerated in Randall, MOF’s counsel 

responded: “If we were to look for other danger signs, I think one would 

be the inference that Measure B was specifically targeted at reducing the 

influence of a singular person in the city.” Oral Argument at 14:31–42 

(emphasis added). 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 40 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 41

speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s 

view.’” Maj. at 16 (quoting Metro Display, 143 F.3d at 

1194); see also Maj. at 22 n.9 (quoting Metro Display, 143 

F.3d at 1194). The case is not on point. Metro Display

concerned not “invidious discrimination” inhibiting 

association but “‘invidious’ restraints” on speech. 143 F.3d 

at 1194. Contribution limits, unlike expenditure limits, 

largely do not implicate restraints on speech. Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 21 (“[A contribution] limitation . . . involves little 

direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits 

the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a 

contribution but does not in any way infringe the 

contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.”); 

Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“Limitations on contributions affect the right of association, 

but unlike expenditure limits, do not primarily implicate the 

contributor’s speech rights.”), overruled in part on other 

grounds by Bd. of Trs. of the Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. 

v. Chambers, 941 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Thus, 

Metro Display does not support the majority’s definition of 

“invidious discrimination” or its conclusion that there is a 

sufficient risk of such discrimination so as to present a new 

danger sign.

B

Here, there are no danger signs present. But even if 

danger signs are present, that does not end the inquiry in a 

plaintiff’s favor. “[C]ourts, including appellate courts, must 

review the record independently and carefully with an eye 

toward assessing the [contribution limits’] ‘tailoring,’ that is, 

toward assessing the proportionality of the restrictions.” 

Randall, 548 U.S. at 249 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers 

Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)). In particular, 

Randall outlines “five sets of considerations” that may mean

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 41 of 57
42 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

that contribution limits are not “closely drawn to meet [their] 

objectives”: (1) the “contribution limits will significantly 

restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to 

run competitive campaigns”; (2) “political parties [must] 

abide by exactly the same low contribution limits that apply 

to other contributors”; (3) volunteer services or expenses are 

considered contributions that would count toward the limit; 

(4) the limits are “not adjusted for inflation”; or 

(5) “nowhere in the record [is there] any special justification 

that might warrant a contribution limit so low or so 

restrictive as to bring about . . . serious associational and 

expressive problems,” such as whether “corruption (or its 

appearance) in [the government] is significantly more 

serious a matter than elsewhere.” Id. at 253–61; see also 

Thompson, 7 F.4th at 819–23. Even assuming that 

heightened review under Randall is warranted, these five 

factors support that Measure B’s limits are closely drawn to 

the City’s asserted interest. 

First, the record does not support that Measure B’s 

contribution limits will “significantly restrict” challengers’ 

ability to run competitive campaigns. Randall, 548 U.S. at 

253. In Shrink Missouri, the Supreme Court found that the 

district court’s finding of candidates’ continued ability “to 

raise funds sufficient to run effective campaigns” was 

“buttressed” by the state’s evidence that in the last election 

before the challenged limits took effect, 97.62% of 

contributors to candidates for one statewide office (to be 

subject to a $1,075 limit in the next election) had made 

contributions not exceeding $2,000. 528 U.S. at 396. The 

City presents a similar and even clearer picture here: in the 

last election before Measure B took effect, 93.7% of 

contributors to candidates for all citywide offices made 

contributions not exceeding Measure B’s actual limits. 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 42 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 43

The only contrary evidence MOF offers on this point is 

testimony from its president, Starr:

In each of my prior campaigns, I have 

solicited and received contributions in excess 

of $500, the limit applicable to my 2020 city 

council campaign. In 2020, my fundraising 

was limited because there was little point in 

expending the effort to raise money in such 

small increments. If I was not able to fund 

my own campaign, it would have been 

impossible for me to raise sufficient funds to 

wage a competitive campaign with Measure 

B’s $500 limit. Even if it would have been 

possible, I would have had to spend all my 

time fundraising rather than campaigning 

such that the funds would have been 

meaningless because I would not have had 

time to do anything with them.

At his deposition, Starr confirmed that he “wasn’t pursuing 

donors as much because it’s a lot of time to consume to get 

money at 200, 300, $400 a crack.” Starr testified that he 

“pretty much fore[went] most all of the fundraising [he] 

would have done because there [wa]s just no point in asking 

people for small amounts of money.” He estimated that he 

had spent “not a whole lot more” than ten hours on 

fundraising for his 2020 race. Even viewed in the light most 

favorable to MOF, Starr’s testimony about his resulting 

reluctance to fundraise does not create a triable issue of fact 

as to whether Measure B’s limits “prevent[] challengers [like 

Starr] from mounting effective campaigns against 

incumbent officeholders.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 249 

(emphasis added). And as the Shrink Missouri Court 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 43 of 57
44 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

recognized, even assuming “that the contribution limits 

affected [one candidate’s] ability to wage a competitive 

campaign . . . , a showing of one affected individual does not 

point up a system of suppressed political advocacy that 

would be unconstitutional.”13 Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 396.

Second, Measure B does not require “political parties 

[to] abide by exactly the same low contribution limits that 

apply to other contributors.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 256. In 

fact, Measure B’s limits do not apply to political parties. 

This factor favors the City. See Thompson, 7 F.4th at 821.

Third, volunteer services and expenses are not 

considered contributions that would count toward Measure 

B’s limits. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 259. The ordinance 

provides that “unless the contrary is stated or clearly appears 

from the context, the definitions set forth in Chapter 2 of 

Title 9 of the Government Code of the State of California 

(commencing at Section 82000) shall govern the 

construction, meaning, and application of words and phrases 

used in this Article.” Oxnard, Cal., Ordinance 2976, § 2-241 

(May 1, 2020). And the California Government Code 

excludes from the definition of “[c]ontribution” “[v]olunteer 

personal services or payments made by any individual for 

the individual’s own travel expenses.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 82015(c)(3). This factor favors the City. See Thompson, 

7 F.4th at 821.

Fourth, the limits are “adjusted for inflation.” Randall, 

548 U.S. at 261. The ordinance provides that the City Clerk 

will adjust the contribution limits every two years for 

13 Indeed, Starr’s testimony makes many of the City’s points for it. Why 

would it be some sort of constitutional negative that contribution limits 

require candidates to try to raise funds from the many, rather than the 

very rich few? 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 44 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 45

“changes in the Consumer Price Index,” round the amount 

to the nearest multiple of 100, and present the new limits to 

the City Council for “approval by resolution.” Oxnard, Cal., 

Ordinance 2976, § 2-245 (May 1, 2020). According to the 

majority, because the adjustments are not “automatically 

effective according to the specified formula” but require the 

City Council to “review and adopt these changes,” there is 

“insufficient assurance that the limits will be raised” with 

inflation. Maj. at 26. The majority cites no fact or law to 

support its finding of insufficiency, let alone its treating the 

“insufficiency” as presenting a danger sign. Both the 

Randall plurality and courts applying Randall have treated 

this factor as presenting a danger sign only if the measure 

outright “fail[s] to index for inflation.” Id. at 252 (emphasis 

added); Thompson, 7 F.4th at 821. As explained by the 

Randall plurality, the motivating concern behind this factor 

is that the burden of updating the limits over time will be 

placed on “incumbent legislators who may not diligently 

police the need for changes in limit levels to ensure the 

adequate financing of electoral challenges.” Randall, 548 

U.S. at 261. The City’s mechanism for indexing addresses 

this concern by mandating the City Clerk to calculate 

adjustments every two years.14 So this factor weighs in the 

City’s favor. 

14 The majority suggests the City Council could decline to adopt the 

inflation-adjusted limits presented by the City Clerk, but this risk is 

speculative. See Maj. at 26. At oral argument, when asked if this were 

possible, the City’s counsel responded that the council “would be then 

subject to a state writ of mandate claim forcing them to comply with their 

own code” because the ordinance imposes a “ministerial” duty, which 

the City has “no choice to ignore.” Oral Argument at 29:53–30:02, 

31:27–37. “A traditional writ of mandate under [California] Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1085 is a method for compelling a City to 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 45 of 57
46 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

Fifth, the City does not offer any “special justification” 

for the level of Measure B’s limits, so the last factor is not 

relevant. Randall, 548 U.S. at 261. With this factor neutral 

and the other four favoring the City, the tailoring of Measure 

B’s limits passes muster under even Randall’s five-factor 

test. Absent any factors weighing against the City, Randall 

counsels that we should recognize that “the legislature is 

better equipped to make such empirical judgments,” 

acknowledge legislators’ “‘particular expertise’ in matters 

related to the costs and nature of running for office,” and 

“defer[] to the legislature’s determination of such matters.” 

Id. at 248 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 

(2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 

U.S. 310).

Once again, rather than applying Randall, the majority 

decides “we are not limited to the specific considerations 

identified in Randall and must instead broadly consider 

whether, given the danger signs presented here, there is an 

unwarranted mismatch between the City’s chosen means and 

professed objective.” Maj. at 21–22. As explained above, 

no danger signs are presented here. But the majority also 

misstates the inquiry at the second step. The majority frames 

the inquiry as “whether Measure B’s contribution limits are 

more ‘closely drawn’ to fit (1) the City’s asserted legitimate 

interest in avoiding actual or apparent quid pro quo 

corruption or (2) an alleged prohibited objective of 

squelching the political activities of Starr and others like 

him.” Maj. at 22. Rather than analyze the fit of the 

contribution limit to the government’s asserted interest, the 

perform a legal, usually ministerial duty.” Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 

Inc. v. Kent, 909 F.3d 272, 280 n.1 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kreeft v. City 

of Oakland, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1998)).

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 46 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 47

majority requires a “comparatively closer fit”15 with the 

asserted interest over the alleged interest for the limit to pass 

constitutional muster. Maj. at 25 (emphasis added). This 

comparative framing is incorrect. It requires scrutiny into 

legislative motive,16 which this court has rejected at step two 

15 The majority does not define “more ‘closely drawn,’” Maj. at 22, or 

“comparatively closer fit,” Maj. at 25. 

16 The majority purports to apply not “a subjective inquiry into legislative 

motivation” but “an objective [test] that asks whether the challenged 

measure is sufficiently closely drawn to the legitimate goal of avoiding 

the appearance or reality of quid pro quo corruption so as to dispel the 

particular ‘constitutional risk[]’ that triggered the application of 

independent scrutiny—which here is the risk of invidious 

discrimination.” Maj. at 22 n.9 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 

(quoting Randall, 548 U.S. at 248). There are two problems with the 

majority’s characterization of its tailoring test. 

First, it is not the test dictated by controlling precedent. Indeed, the 

majority reaches for cases involving restraints on speech to support its 

contention that “settled First Amendment doctrine regularly employs 

different levels of scrutiny and associated tailoring requirements to 

address the ultimate risk that ‘the government has adopted a regulation 

of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’” Maj. 

at 22 n.9 (emphasis added) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 

U.S. 781, 791 (1989), and citing Metro Display, 143 F.3d at 1194; 

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); Leathers v. 

Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 

377, 394 (1992)). In so doing, the majority ignores settled First 

Amendment doctrine specific to campaign contribution limits, which 

prescribes the levels of scrutiny and associated tailoring requirements to 

apply to these regulations that “involve[] little direct restraint” on speech. 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21; see id. at 18 (distinguishing caselaw on time, 

place, and manner restrictions on speech). Randall’s tailoring test for 

contribution limits is concerned with one particular “constitutional 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 47 of 57
48 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

in evaluating the constitutionality of contribution limits and 

which the Supreme Court has rejected in the broader context 

of constitutional adjudication. 

In Lair v. Motl, we reviewed a First Amendment 

challenge to Montana’s limits on contributions to candidates 

for statewide office, passed by ballot initiative. 873 F.3d at 

1172. Citing justifications advanced by the initiative’s 

sponsors in a “Voter Information Pamphlet” that went 

beyond quid pro quo corruption,17 the district court 

determined that the Montana voters who approved the 

initiative “acted with an impermissible motive, meaning the 

limits ‘could never be said to focus narrowly on a 

risk[]”—that the limits are not “too low” to “prevent[] challengers from 

mounting effective campaigns.” 548 U.S. at 248–49.

Second, the majority’s characterization of its tailoring test is not the 

test that it ultimately applies. As discussed above, the majority’s 

conclusion that “the record reflects a significant risk that the City may 

be engaged in ‘invidious discrimination,’” Maj. at 6 (quoting Buckley, 

424 U.S. at 31), relies on evidence unique to Starr: references to Starr in 

materials advocating for Measure B, Maj. at 16–18, the relative impact 

of Measure B on Starr, Maj. at 18–19, and the “considerable history of 

antipathy” between Starr and the City, Maj. at 19. Whether framed as a 

search for tailoring sufficient “to dispel . . . th[at] risk,” Maj. at 22 n.9, 

or as a search for a “comparatively closer fit” with the City’s asserted 

interest over its interest as alleged by MOF, Maj. at 25, the majority’s 

test is preoccupied not with objective risks to challengers generally but 

with the City’s subjective motive as it concerns Starr.

17 The pamphlet “argued ‘[t]here is just way too much money in Montana 

politics’ and urged voters . . . to prevent ‘[m]oney from special interests 

and the wealth’ from ‘drowning out the voice of regular people,’ reasons 

that are inadequate to justify contribution limits under McCutcheon.” 

Lair, 873 F.3d at 1183–84 (alterations in original).

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 48 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 49

constitutionally-permissible anti-corruption interest.’” Id. at 

1183–84. We reversed, holding:

The district court incorrectly cast the 

narrow focus test as a motive inquiry that 

looks at the voters’ underlying intent when 

they enacted the limits. The narrow focus 

test, however, is a tailoring test, not a motive 

test. It measures how effectively the limits 

target corruption compared to how much they 

inhibit associational freedoms . . . .

Id. at 1184 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28; Eddleman, 343 

F.3d at 1094). Finding “no case looking to underlying 

legislative or voter intent in making this evaluation,” we 

noted that the touchstone at step two was not legislative 

motive but “the actual content and effect of the limits”—that 

is, whether the limits “target the contributions most likely to 

generate corruption or its appearance.” Id.

The “narrow focus” language in Lair comes from our 

formulation of the standard for the constitutionality of 

contribution limits, first articulated in Montana Right to Life 

Association v. Eddleman: 

After Buckley and Shrink Missouri, state 

campaign contribution limits will be upheld 

if (1) there is adequate evidence that the 

limitation furthers a sufficiently important 

state interest, and (2) if the limits are “closely 

drawn”—i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on 

the state’s interest, (b) leave the contributor 

free to affiliate with a candidate, and 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 49 of 57
50 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

(c) allow the candidate to amass sufficient 

resources to wage an effective campaign.

343 F.3d at 1092; Lair, 873 F.3d at 1175–76. In Thompson, 

we applied the Eddleman standard and declined to consider 

the plurality opinion in Randall, as discussed above. 

Thompson, 909 F.3d at 1037 n.5. The Supreme Court 

vacated our decision, noting that our failure to apply Randall

in favor of “relying on [our] own precedent predating 

Randall by three years” (referring to Eddleman) represented 

a divergence from ten of our sister circuits. Thompson, 589 

U.S. at 4 & n.*. On remand, we considered Randall’s five 

“danger signs” in analyzing whether the challenged limits 

were “closely drawn” to meet the state’s asserted interest in 

combating “actual quid pro quo corruption or its 

appearance.” Thompson, 7 F.4th at 817, 819–27. Like 

Eddleman, Randall understood the “closely drawn” analysis 

as a question of “narrow[] tailor[ing].” Randall, 548 U.S. at 

261. Nothing in Randall undercuts our characterization in 

Eddleman of the “closely drawn” analysis as a narrow focus 

test, 343 F.3d at 1092, or our characterization in Lair of that 

test as a “tailoring test, not a motive test,” 873 F.3d at 1184. 

The Randall plurality did not look to legislative motive in its 

analysis of any of the five factors it identified to evaluate the 

tailoring of contribution limits: 

(1) whether the limits would significantly 

restrict the amount of funding available for 

challengers to run competitive campaigns; 

(2) whether political parties must abide by 

the same low limits that apply to individual 

contributors; (3) whether volunteer services 

or expenses are considered contributions that 

would count toward the limit; (4) whether the 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 50 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 51

limits are indexed for inflation; and 

(5) whether there is any “special 

justification” that might warrant such low 

limits.

Thompson, 7 F.4th at 818 (citing Randall, 548 U.S. at 244–

62). Even in analyzing the last factor, the Randall plurality 

considered “justifications the State ha[d] advanced in 

support of such limits.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 261 (emphasis 

added). 

The majority points to “no case looking to underlying 

legislative or voter intent” in assessing the constitutionality 

of contribution limits. Lair, 873 F.3d at 1184. And I believe 

precedent counsels our not doing so. The Supreme Court 

has specifically instructed courts to not “second-guess a 

legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic 

measures where corruption is the evil feared.” FEC v. Nat’l 

Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982); accord

FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 157 (2003). And we have 

followed the Supreme Court’s instruction in evaluating First 

Amendment challenges to contribution limits. Jacobus, 338 

F.3d at 1098, 1115 (contributions to political parties); Lair, 

873 F.3d at 1179–80 (contributions to candidates); see also 

Lair v. Motl, 889 F.3d 571, 581 (9th Cir. 2018) (Fisher & 

Murguia, JJ., responding to the dissent from the denial of 

rehearing en banc) (quoting Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 

U.S. at 210, to explain that the Lair majority followed 

longstanding precedent of deferring to legislative 

determinations of the need for prophylactic contribution 

limits).

To defend its searching scrutiny into the City’s “true” 

motive, the majority cites only to Church of the Lukumi 

Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)—

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 51 of 57
52 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

a free exercise case—for the proposition that “the effect of a 

law in its real operation is strong evidence of its 

object.” Id. at 535 (plurality opinion). The Lukumi plurality 

attempted to “determine the city council’s object from both 

direct and circumstantial evidence,” such as “the historical 

background of the decision under challenge, the specific 

series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in 

question, and the legislative or administrative history, 

including contemporaneous statements made by members of 

the decisionmaking body.” Id. at 540. Declining to join this 

portion of the opinion, Justice Scalia objected to the 

plurality’s motive inquiry:

[Such an inquiry] departs from the opinion’s 

general focus on the object of the laws at 

issue to consider the subjective motivation of 

the lawmakers, i.e., whether the Hialeah City 

Council actually intended to disfavor the 

religion of Santeria. . . . [I]t is virtually 

impossible to determine the singular 

“motive” of a collective legislative body, and 

this Court has a long tradition of refraining 

from such inquiries.

Perhaps there are contexts in which 

determination of legislative motive must be 

undertaken. But I do not think that is true of 

analysis under the First Amendment (or the 

Fourteenth, to the extent it incorporates the 

First).

Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment) (citations omitted).

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 52 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 53

It is a “fundamental principle of constitutional 

adjudication” that courts “will not strike down an otherwise 

constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit 

legislative motive.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 

383 (1968) (declining to invalidate a statute with an 

allegedly suspect motive when the legislature “had the 

undoubted power to enact” it, id. at 384); accord Turner 

Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994); City of 

Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 

(1986). The Supreme Court “has long disfavored arguments 

based on alleged legislative motives,” out of recognition that 

“inquiries into legislative motives ‘are a hazardous matter.’” 

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 253 

(2022) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383) (collecting cases). 

“Even when an argument about legislative motive is backed 

by statements made by legislators who voted for a law, [the 

Court] ha[s] been reluctant to attribute those motives to the 

legislative body as a whole.” Id. at 253–54. After all, 

“[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a 

statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to 

enact it.” Id. at 254 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384). A 

motive inquiry becomes even more unworkable when the 

law was placed on the ballot and passed by voters. And we 

have “refuse[d] to impute upon . . . voters the allegedly 

invidious motivations” of a ballot measure’s sponsors. 

Boardman v. Inslee, 978 F.3d 1092, 1119 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(rejecting an equal protection challenge to a ballot initiative 

because “there [was] no evidence in the record . . . indicating 

that the more than 2.2 million Washington voters who voted 

in favor of Initiative 1501 were motivated” in the same way 

as its union sponsors allegedly were). 

The majority nonetheless dives headfirst into a 

legislative motive inquiry. Its case for the City’s alleged 

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 53 of 57
54 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

illicit “objective of squelching Starr” rests in large part on 

two slides of a PowerPoint presentation created by the City’s 

unelected City Manager. Maj. at 25; see Maj. at 16–18; App. 

The majority fails to consider that what motivated a city 

employee to make a PowerPoint presentation about a law is 

not necessarily what motivated thousands of others to enact 

it. No evidence shows that the 25,393 Oxnard voters (again, 

82% of those who voted on the measure) who cast a ballot 

in favor of Measure B were motivated by whatever had 

motivated the City Manager or sponsors of Measure B. And 

any “alleged illicit legislative motive” is irrelevant because 

the City—and its voters—“had the undoubted power to 

enact” these campaign contribution limits for their 

candidates for elected office. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383–84.

* * *

Because the City’s contribution limits are closely drawn 

to its interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption, I would 

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

City. I therefore respectfully dissent.

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 54 of 57
 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 55

APPENDIX

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 55 of 57
56 MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 56 of 57
MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. ASCENSION 57

Case: 21-56295, 12/20/2024, ID: 12917503, DktEntry: 42-1, Page 57 of 57