Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00018/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00018-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TD Professional Services,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Truyo Incorporated, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-22-00018-PHX-MTL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order. (Doc. 53). 

The Motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 53, 55, 56), and the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 15, 2022, the Court held a scheduling conference to identify the deadlines 

that will govern this case. The parties disputed whether discovery should be bifurcated into 

claim construction and post-claim construction phases and whether Plaintiff should be 

allowed access to Defendants’ allegedly infringing product (the “Truyo Platform”) prior to 

claim construction. The Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing on these 

issues (Docs. 48, 49), ultimately bifurcating discovery into two phases and allowing

Plaintiff one month to access the Truyo Platform prior to claim construction. (Doc 51 at 1–

2). The Court also set a deadline for the parties to file a joint stipulated protective order by 

July 8, 2022. (Id. at 4). On July 8, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for a Protective Order 

outlining several contested issues pertaining to the protective order. (Doc. 53). 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 1 of 16
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Attorneys’ Eyes Only Designation

The parties appear to have mostly settled on an acceptable definition for material 

that will be designated as Attorneys’ Eyes Only (AEO), as noted in Exhibit C to 

Defendants’ Reply. (Doc. 56-3 at 4). However, there are two outstanding issues for the 

Court to resolve. 

First, Plaintiff seeks to change Defendants’ proposed language defining the scope 

of AEO material from “includes but is not limited to” to “consists of.” (Doc. 55 at 2–3). 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ proposed language impermissibly expands the definition 

of AEO such that Defendants will be able to use the AEO designation on any documents

regardless of their content. (Id. at 3). In response, Defendants agree to accept Plaintiff’s 

“consists of” language and other edits to the AEO definition, “so long as Defendants’ 

acceptance of Plaintiff’s edits are not deemed an admission that any items deleted from the 

section are not AEO,” such as the deleted category of “planned commercial products.” 

(Doc. 56 at 3). In Defendants’ view, even though planned commercial products would be 

removed from the definition of AEO material, to the extent that such products also include 

trade secrets or other categories of information subject to an AEO designation, Defendant 

should still be able to designate those as AEO materials. (Id. at 3). The Court agrees that 

the proposed protective order allows for a document containing both non-AEO material 

and AEO material to be designated as containing AEO material and accepts this proposed 

change to limit the scope and definition of AEO material to the necessary categories agreed 

on by the parties. 

Next, the parties dispute whether “any other sales and profit information” is properly 

considered AEO material. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits the Court to issue 

protective orders “for good cause” to “protect a party or person from annoyance, 

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” during the discovery process. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “A party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each particular 

document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 2 of 16
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

protective order is granted.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ sales and profit information should only be 

classified as confidential, not AEO, because Plaintiff’s counsel needs to be able to share 

Defendants’ revenue from sales of the allegedly infringing product with Plaintiff to 

formulate Plaintiff’s damages theories. (Doc. 55 at 6). Defendants maintain that “detailed 

sales and profit information about specific Truyo customers is highly sensitive information 

[] and is not necessary for strategic purposes” related to Plaintiff’s damages theories. (Doc. 

56 at 3–4). Defendants offer compromise language limiting the AEO designation to “any 

other customer-specific sales or profit information.” (Id. at 4). The Court agrees that 

Defendants’ revised language strikes an appropriate balance between Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

need to discuss damages theories with Plaintiff while also safeguarding Defendants’ 

proprietary sales data and related information. “The Court notes that, ‘even with the best 

intentions,’ Plaintiffs may not be able ‘to avoid even the subconscious use of confidential 

information revealed through discovery.’” Adlerstein v. United States Customs & Border 

Prot., No. CIV 19-500-TUC-CKJ, 2021 WL 6133955, at *3, n. 1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2021) 

(quoting TVIIM, LLC v. McAfee, Inc., No. 13-CV-04545-VC (KAW), 2014 WL 2768641, 

at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2014). The proposed language would provide Plaintiff’s counsel 

with access to the customer-specific sales and profit information but would restrict 

dissemination of that highly sensitive information to Plaintiff while still allowing Plaintiff 

and its counsel to discuss Defendants’ high-level sales and profit information to make its 

damages case. Including Defendants’ customer sales data as AEO material “will act to 

reduce any harm to Defendants’ interests in not allowing wide-spread dissemination of 

sensitive information.” Adlerstein, 2021 WL 6133955, at *4.

In sum, the Court finds Defendants’ position reasonable and accepts the parties’

edits regarding the definition of AEO material.

B. Source Code Inspection Prior to Claim Construction

Within the context of Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, the parties appear 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 3 of 16
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to argue over whether the source code underlying Defendants’ Truyo Platform should be 

made available for inspection alongside the platform as part of the limited pre-claim 

construction discovery. Defendants argue that access to the source code is unnecessary at 

the claim construction stage if Defendants’ Truyo Platform is made available, while

Plaintiff argues that the Court’s June 28, 2022, Scheduling Order clearly contemplates 

inspection of the source code because Defendants mentioned source code inspection and 

its burden on Defendants in their supplemental briefing. (Doc. 49 at 7–8). Plaintiff’s 

briefing on the issue did not address source code inspection and only requested access to 

the Truyo Platform itself. (Doc. 49). 

This Court’s June 28, 2022, Order states that Plaintiff be allowed to access the Truyo 

Platform prior to claim construction. (Doc. 51 at 1–4). That Order does not explicitly 

address whether Plaintiff’s inspection of the Truyo Platform prior to claim construction

includes source code inspection. As noted by Defendants, a software platform’s source 

code is routinely excluded from the finished software product, which is made up of 

machine-readable object code derived from the source code. (Doc. 56 at 9); Source Code, 

Oxford Dictionary, Mar. 2003 (“a code written in a high-level or assembly language, which 

is converted into object code by a compiler, assembler, or interpreter; a program in a source 

language”). Defendants aver that the underlying source code is not a component of the 

Truyo Platform that is provided to its customers, nor is source code review required to 

examine the Truyo Platform’s architectural functions. (Doc. 56 at 9–10). Defendants also 

agree that with the Truyo Platform inspection, Defendants will provide Plaintiff with “a 

system architecture diagram of the Truyo Product and a RESTful API Guide” that are 

provided to all customers along with access to the software. (Doc. 56 at 10–11).

In the interests of efficiency, the Court clarifies that Plaintiff’s pre-claim 

construction access to the Truyo Platform does not include a source code inspection. The 

purpose of bifurcating discovery in this action is to expedite claim construction discovery 

and minimize the associated cost and burden to the parties. Production of source code at 

this stage will heavily increase both parties’ burden and expenditures at this stage and is 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 4 of 16
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not proportional to Plaintiff’s present need to narrow claim construction to the claims at

issue in this action. Am. Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 

(“Where proof of either relevance or need is not established, discovery is properly 

denied.”). This is especially true here because Plaintiff’s asserted patents do not express 

the invention in terms of source code, but instead claim the invention with reference to

computing system architecture and its related functionality. At this stage, “[e]xamining 

source code is not the only means to determining functionality,” where the Plaintiff has yet 

to analyze the Truyo Platform and related technical documents. 3rd Eye Surveillance, LLC 

v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 103, 111 (2019).

C. Source Code Inspection After Claim Construction

The Court notes that inspection of Defendants’ source code may become relevant 

and proportional to the needs of the case after claim construction. See MVS Studio Inc. v. 

Bingo Bean, LLC, No. CV 10-07675 JHN SSX, 2011 WL 10538669, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 

24, 2011) (“Plaintiffs are entitled to access information that is relevant to proving or 

disproving their allegations.... This generally includes the disclosure of raw data (source 

code, schematics, formulas, etc.) sufficient to show the operation of the accused aspects of 

the products in order to allow the patentee to make it’s [sic] own determinations as to 

infringement.”) As such, including source code inspection provisions in the Protective 

Order now will expedite that future process should it be needed.

1. Availability of Source Code Inspection

To the extent that the parties seek an advance ruling on whether source code 

production and inspection will be made available in this case after claim construction, the 

Court declines to do so. The Court instead directs the parties to comply with the discovery 

dispute provisions laid out in the Scheduling Order after appropriate discovery requests 

and corresponding objections have been served, should the parties be unable to agree on 

what will be produced at the time such discovery is propounded.

The Court also finds that Defendants’ proposed additions to the AEO source code 

provisions stating “[t]o the extent the production or disclosure of computer source code 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 5 of 16
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

becomes necessary in this case” and “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Order 

should be construed as a determination of whether the production or disclosure of computer 

source code is or is not necessary in this case” are unnecessary. (See Doc. 56-3 at 4–5).

The Court also rejects Defendants’ addition of “If Source Code Material is needed” in 

Section 5(d)(iv) for the same reason. (Id. at 8). 

2. Source Code Definition

The parties dispute the definition of source code in the protective order. Defendant’s 

proposed protective order defines “Source Code Material” as:

Information that includes computer source code, object code, 

application programming interface (“API”), programming 

comments, or other extremely sensitive Information that 

describes in detail the algorithms or structure of software or 

hardware designs and/or live data (that is, data as it exists 

residing in a database or databases).

(Doc. 56-1 at 4). Plaintiff argues that this definition is so broad that “the term encompasses 

practically their entire software system,” but Plaintiff does not otherwise suggest revisions 

to the source code definition. (Doc. 55 at 3). Defendants’ Reply does not address Plaintiff’s 

objections to the source code definition. (See. Doc. 56). 

The Court has reviewed model protective orders from other jurisdictions containing 

source code definitions and does not find Defendants’ proposed definition to be any 

broader than necessary to cover Defendants’ proprietary software code absent specific 

objections from Plaintiff.1 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) 

1

Indeed, Defendants’ proposed source code definition largely tracks the model protective 

order for software patent litigation adopted by the Northern District of California. Section 

2.9 of that model protective order reads: 

“HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – SOURCE CODE” 

Information or Items: extremely sensitive “Confidential 

Information or Items” representing computer code and 

associated comments and revision histories, formulas, 

engineering specifications, or schematics that define or 

otherwise describe in detail the algorithms or structure of 

software or hardware designs, disclosure of which to another 

Party or Non-Party would create a substantial risk of serious 

harm that could not be avoided by less restrictive means.

See Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensitive Confidential 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 6 of 16
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order 

is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”); see World Champ Tech LLC v. 

Peloton Interactive, Inc., No. 21-cv-03202-SBA (KAW), 2022 WL 2159260, at *1 (N.D. 

Cal. Jun. 15, 2022) (approving use of the model protective order provisions for source 

code); see also Kelora Sys., LLC v. Target Corp., No. C 10-04947 CW LB, 2011 WL 

6000759, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (“[T]he court treats the model protective order 

as setting forth presumptively reasonable conditions regarding the treatment of highly 

confidential information.”)

3. Procedures for Source Code Inspection

The parties identify three disputes related to the source code inspection provisions: 

(1) computer specifications; (2) metadata; and (3) Plaintiff’s addition of specific categories 

of information to be produced along with source code material.2(Doc. 55 at 4–5; Doc. 56 

at 4–7).

i. Computer Specifications

Defendant’s Motion seeks to include a set of detailed procedures to govern

Plaintiff’s expert’s inspection of Defendants’ source code, including the use of a single, 

stand-alone computer without access to any network, located at Defendants’ office or that 

of their counsel. (Doc. 53-1 at 7). Plaintiff’s Response seeks an entirely different set of 

procedures that it claims are required for its experts to conduct their analysis, including the 

use of two computers connected to a local area network (LAN), with the ability to insert a 

thumb drive to install expert analysis tools. (Doc. 55-1 at 15). Defendants’ Reply offers 

another proposal for source code inspection as follows: 

Defendants propose the use of a third-party software escrow 

company that can load industry-standard, commercially 

available source code analysis tools that Plaintiff’s experts may 

Information and/or Trade Secrets, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California,

https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/model-protective-orders/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2022). 

2 The parties’ briefing also identified additional differences in earlier versions of the 

protective order, such as the number of allowed experts and use of the source code in expert 

reports, but Defendants’ revised protective order accepts those changes so the Court will 

not address them herein. (See Doc. 56-3 at 8–9).

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 7 of 16
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

require on the stand-alone computer to ensure that the source 

code remains safeguarded. To the extent Plaintiff’s expert 

requires additional help reviewing the source code (such as the 

use of multiple reviewing experts and/or a second, stand-alone 

computer with another copy of the source code), Plaintiff must 

bear the cost of any such additional accommodations. This 

includes any costs of having additional third-party personnel to 

observe Plaintiff’s expert’s use of the second computer, and

any additional time and resources needed to load industrystandard, commercially available source code analysis tools on 

the second computer. 

(Doc. 56 at 5). 

Various jurisdictions have differing default processes for source code inspection. 

For example, the District of Delaware developed a Default Standard for Access to Source 

Code that applies absent an agreement among parties. See Default Standard for Access to 

Source Code, U.S. District Court, District of Delaware, 

https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/default-standard-discovery (last visited Aug. 3, 2022). 

Delaware’s default provisions limit a receiving party’s source code access to a single 

electronic copy of the code on a password protected, stand-alone computer located at an 

independent escrow agency. Id. The stand-alone computer contemplated must be equipped 

with software programs that would allow the party’s experts to view, search, and analyze 

the source code. Id. As another example, the model source code provisions adopted by the 

U.S. International Trade Commission for its Administrative Protective Order contemplates 

the use of two stand-alone password protected computers. Source Code Provision to be 

inserted in Model Commission APO, U.S. Int’l Trade Commission, 

https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/featured_news/Ediscovery_attachment1.pd

f (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).

As another example, Section 9(d) of the Model Protective Order for software patent 

litigation from the Northern District of California provides: 

Any source code produced in discovery shall be made available 

for inspection, in a format allowing it to be reasonably 

reviewed and searched, during normal business hours or at 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 8 of 16
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

other mutually agreeable times, at an office of the Producing 

Party’s counsel or another mutually agreed upon location. The 

source code shall be made available for inspection on a secured 

computer in a secured room without Internet access or network 

access to other computers, and the Receiving Party shall not 

copy, remove, or otherwise transfer any portion of the source 

code onto any recordable media or recordable device.

Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensitive Confidential 

Information and/or Trade Secrets, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, 

https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/model-protective-orders/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).

Because Defendants’ proposed use of an independent escrow agency and a single 

stand-alone computer without network access or electronic recording capabilities is in line 

with standard practices approved for use in other jurisdictions, as discussed above, and 

strikes a balance between the Plaintiff’s need for access to the source code and Defendant’s 

risk of the disclosure of highly personal information, the Court adopts it. “[I]t is well 

recognized [] that source code requires additional protections to prevent improper 

disclosure because it is often a company’s most sensitive and most valuable property.” See 

Drone Techs., Inc. v. Parrot S.A., 838 F.3d 1283, 1300 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Plaintiff has 

not stated a compelling reason for its purported need to connect multiple source code 

analysis computers to a LAN or downloadable thumb drive and the Court notes that such 

procedures appear to be uncommon and impose inherent risks to the security of 

Defendants’ proprietary computer code. To the extent Plaintiff does need to use two 

computers to conduct its expert analysis, Defendants’ proposed language reasonably 

provides that Plaintiff will bear those costs. 

Defendants further assert that the parties dispute the extent to which Plaintiff’s 

experts can make copies or electronically store Defendants’ source code during analysis. 

(Doc. 56 at 5–6). However, Plaintiff made no edits to Defendants’ proposed Section 

5(d)(viii) that lays out Plaintiff’s ability to make reasonable copies of source code excerpts. 

(Doc. 55-1 at 17). Instead, Defendants’ revised protective order submitted with their Reply 

seeks to insert language to that section requiring Plaintiff’s counsel and experts to request 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 9 of 16
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

copies of the source code from Defendants’ in lieu of being able to print the copies 

themselves. (Doc. 56-2 at 9). Defendants’ proposed revisions inserting a request and 

approval process for copies are not responsive to Plaintiff’s objections and are without 

adequate explanation. Therefore, the Court declines to adopt them where the originally 

proposed provisions in Defendants’ proposed protective order appear reasonable and less 

burdensome on both parties.

ii. Metadata

The parties dispute whether the source code production and inspection should 

include “all metadata” associated with the source code. Plaintiff summarily states that 

“Source Code Material will need to include all metadata.” (Doc. 55 at 4). Defendants argue 

that such a request is ambiguous because it is unclear what would be included, but are

willing to agree to Plaintiff’s request for “all metadata” if the protective order also includes 

the caveat “to the extent it exists or is maintained.” (Doc. 56 at 6–7). The Court does not 

find Defendants’ added language helpful to clarify any alleged ambiguity in what is meant 

by “all metadata.” 

Moreover, it is canonical that a party is only required to produce material that is 

within their possession, custody, and control—Defendants would not be required to 

recreate or produce metadata for its source code that does not otherwise exist. Lipsey v. 

Depovic, No. 1:18-cv-00767-NONE-HBK, 2022 WL 36817, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2022) 

(“A party may request documents in another party’s “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1).”). Therefore, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s request to include source 

code metadata in any future source code inspection or production but rejects Defendants’ 

proposed edit “to the extent it exists or is maintained.” 

iii. Plaintiff’s Delineated Production Requirements

In Plaintiff’s revisions to Defendants’ proposed protective order, Plaintiff added the 

following language to the source code inspection requirements:

The Producing Party’s production shall not be limited to, but 

shall also include, the following: access to file server activity 

logs including cloud based servers and virtual machines that 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 10 of 16
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

contain records of file creation and deletion as well as user 

permissions activity for the lifetime of the software 

engineering process of the GDPREdge/Truyo platform. Access 

to source control systems and project management systems 

such as Jira, Azure DevOps, and GitHub for the full lifetime of 

the software engineering process of the GDPREdge/Truyo 

platform; and, Access to production management 

documentation detailing designs and architectures of the 

GDPREdge/Truyo platform for the lifetime of the development 

of the platform.

(Doc. 55-1 at 15–16). Plaintiff argues that it seeks access to this information “in order to 

test a key claim Defendants made in this case: that Defendants abandoned Plaintiff’s 

technology early on and switched to wholly different technology.” (Doc 55 at 4). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s proposed addition is an impermissible attempt to get 

around the discovery requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 and this Court’s 

discovery limits set forth in its June 28, 2022, Scheduling Order. (Doc. 56 at 6). The Court 

tends to agree with Defendants that such a specific delineation of documents and data to 

be produced is inappropriate for inclusion in the protective order and better suited for a 

request for production. See Cacique, Inc. v. Robert Reiser & Co., 169 F.3d 619, 622–23 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted) (the purpose of a protective order is “to prevent harm by 

limiting disclosure of relevant and necessary information”). The Court reminds Plaintiff 

that the current phase of discovery is limited to claim construction issues and Plaintiff’s 

review of the Truyo Platform. (See Doc. 51 at 1–4). Plaintiff has not provided a compelling 

reason for the Court to find that the requested documents and information encompass 

current functional aspects of the Truyo Platform or information that will simplify claim 

construction.

Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s proposed revision, as outlined above, in its 

entirety. The Court makes no advance judgment, however, on the relevance or 

discoverability of the categories of information contained in Plaintiff’s proposed revision

in later phases of discovery. 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 11 of 16
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D. Plaintiff’s Independent Expert Selection

The parties dispute who can serve as an independent expert and whether Defendants 

should have approval rights over disclosure of protected material to Plaintiff’s experts.

Defendants seek to limit the definition of “Independent Expert” in the protective 

order to exclude (i) a current or former employee of Plaintiff; (ii) a competitor of 

Defendants “offering or planning to offer products or services which address data privacy 

compliance”; and (iii) anyone associated with someone that falls under categories (i) or 

(ii). (Doc. 53-3 at 8–9). Defendants also seek to require Plaintiff to provide its proposed 

experts’ CVs to Defendants for approval before those experts gain access to any material 

designated as source code. (Id. at 9). Defendants argue that the intent of this provision is 

“to ensure that confidential information is only provided to an independent expert and not 

to a relative, friend or other third-party proxy of Mr. Hines or TD.” (Doc. 53 at 7). 

Plaintiff argues that it should have an unlimited right to choose its own experts and

instead proposes that the definition of independent expert be modified to allow Defendants’ 

competitors and the related associates of Plaintiff’s current and former employees to serve 

as experts. (Doc. 55 at 5; Doc. 55-1 at 18). Plaintiff’s proposed revisions also completely 

remove the disclosure approval section. Plaintiff argues that such procedures would 

amount to a broad expert disclosure that is not required at this stage of the case and would 

place the burden on Plaintiff to seek a court order should the parties disagree on Plaintiff’s 

chosen expert. (Doc. 55 at 5).

In Reply, Defendants reiterate that the information to be disclosed to Plaintiff’s

experts constitutes highly sensitive, confidential information that belongs to Defendants

and would be put at risk if it was shared with associates of Plaintiff’s employees or 

Defendants’ competitors. (Doc. 56 at 7). Defendants’ proposed protective order includes 

dispute resolution provisions by which Defendants can challenge Plaintiff’s experts and 

Plaintiff can seek relief from the Court if the parties fail to agree on a disclosure to an

expert. (Doc. 53-3 at 9). Defendants agree to shift the burden of persuasion on whether 

disclosure to a given expert is appropriate to the objecting party. (Doc. 56 at 7–8).

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 12 of 16
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Courts commonly issue protective orders limiting access to sensitive information 

to counsel and their experts.” Nutratech, Inc. v. Syntech (SSPF) Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 552, 

555 (C.D. Cal. 2007). The well-known purpose of a protective order is “to prevent harm 

by limiting disclosure of relevant and necessary information.” Cacique, 169 F.3d at 622–

23 (citations omitted). The very purpose of protective orders would be in jeopardy, then, if 

the Court were to allow Plaintiff to employ Defendants’ competitors or Plaintiff’s closely 

related associates to access Defendants’ highly sensitive and confidential business 

information. Courts have recognized that “[i]t is very difficult for the human mind to 

compartmentalize and selectively suppress information once learned, no matter how wellintentioned the effort may be to do so.” In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 605 F.3d 

1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). The Court also notes that both the 

District of Delaware’s Standard Default provisions and the Northern District of 

California’s Model Protective Order for software patent litigation contemplate a producing 

party’s expert approval rights where an expert will access AEO material or source code. 

See Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensitive Confidential 

Information and/or Trade Secrets, § 7.4(a)(2), U.S. District Court, Northern District of 

California, https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/model-protective-orders/ (last visited 

Aug. 3, 2022); see also Default Standard for Access to Source Code, § 4, U.S. District 

Court, District of Delaware, https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/default-standard-discovery

(last visited Aug. 3, 2022).

Accordingly, the Court finds that limiting Plaintiff’s independent experts to persons 

that are not affiliated with Plaintiff or one of Defendants’ competitors is a reasonable 

restriction on Plaintiff’s access to Defendants’ protected material. Corley v. Google, Inc., 

No. 16-cv-00473-LHK (HRL), 2016 WL 3421402, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2016) (noting 

an “unnecessary risk of competitive harm if the court permitted Plaintiffs to hire the former 

employees of [Defendant’s] competitors as experts.”); see also Olin v. Facebook, Inc., No. 

18-cv-01881-RS (TSH), 2019 WL 5802020, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2019) (citing Corley

approvingly); see also TVIIM, 2014 WL 2768641, at *2 (noting that the Northern District 

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 13 of 16
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of California “clearly requires that an ‘expert’ under the Protective Order may not be a 

‘past or current employee of a Party or a Party’s competitor.”). 

The Court further finds that allowing Defendants a limited right to prevent experts 

that are closely affiliated with Plaintiff or Defendants’ competitors from accessing its 

confidential information is a reasonable restriction considering the sensitive nature of the 

material to be disclosed. Providing its experts’ CVs to Defendants to ascertain affiliation 

with a competitor would have minimal burden on Plaintiff while affording Defendants

certainty that their source code and other proprietary material remains secure. Indeed, the 

proposed provisions do not give Defendants the right to choose or outright reject Plaintiff’s 

experts, but “merely provide[] an opportunity for the objecting party to seek an order from 

the Court precluding the disclosure of [source code material] to a particular witness.” 

Bethesda Management Co. v. Bernstein Management Corp., 2015 WL 13667752, at *2 (D.

D.C. Feb. 23, 2015). However, for the avoidance of doubt, the Court adds the following 

provision to Section 5(e): “The Producing Party’s basis for objecting to a disclosure to a 

Receiving Party’s Independent Expert shall be limited to an objection that the proposed 

expert does not meet the requirements of this section.”

E. Expert Acknowledgement

Defendant proposes a confidentiality acknowledgment and agreement to be bound 

by the terms of the protective order for Plaintiff’s experts that includes specific references 

to various sections of the protective order, including the AEO and source code designation 

provisions and an agreement not to use any of the protected information to compete with 

Defendants. (Doc. 56-3 at 25–26). Plaintiff agrees to the inclusion of an acknowledgment, 

but objects to the use of the specific section references and instead proposes a high-level 

agreement to be bound “[f]or purposes of simplicity and clarity.” (Doc. 55 at 6–7). The

Court has reviewed both parties’ proposed language and finds that Defendants’ reference 

to important sections of the protective order does not render the acknowledgement 

confusing or inappropriately complex given the highly sensitive nature of the information 

that will be disclosed under the protective order. Thus, the Court accepts Defendants’

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 14 of 16
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proposed Exhibit A to the protective order. (Doc. 56-3 at 25–26). 

F. Plaintiff’s Non-Substantive Changes 

Finally, Plaintiff proposes changes at page 2, lines 11-14 and page 7, lines 16-17 for 

clarity. (Doc. 55 at 7). 

Regarding Plaintiff’s changes at page 2, lines 11-14, Defendants do not address 

these proposed changes in their reply but appear to have accepted these proposed changes 

in their revised proposed protective order filed at Doc. 56-3. Accordingly, the Court accepts 

these changes.

Regarding Plaintiff proposes changes at page 7, lines 16-17, these edits are related 

to the description of the computers used during Plaintiff’s source code inspection. Thus, 

the Court rejects these changes to the extent they are inconsistent with the procedures 

outlined by the Court above.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order is granted as 

discussed in this Order. With the filing of this Order, the Court will enter a protective order 

as set forth herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the parties submit an updated joint 

protective order within seven days of this Order, including the agreed-to provisions as 

discussed in the parties’ briefing and those outlined in this Order. The parties are directed 

to include a redline identifying the changes as compared to Defendants’ original proposed 

protective order filed at Doc. 53-3. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the one-month period for Plaintiff to access 

Defendants’ allegedly infringing product now ends on September 2, 2022.

///

///

///

///

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 15 of 16
- 16 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the deadline for Plaintiff to serve its 

infringement contentions on Defendants is moved to September 9, 2022. No other 

deadlines in the Scheduling Order are affected. 

Dated this 4th day of August, 2022.

Case 2:22-cv-00018-MTL Document 58 Filed 08/04/22 Page 16 of 16