Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01685/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01685-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

NANCY E. APPLETON, TRUSTEE OF

THE 4347 VINTAGE OAKS LANE J &

N APPLETON TRUST OF 1999,

NO. CIV. S-05-1685 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, DISTRICT

ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF

SACRAMENTO, SUPERIOR COURT OF

CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, DAVID L.

RAY, and DOES 1 through 10,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Nancy Appleton’s second amended complaint

(“SAC”) seeks an injunction staying the disbursement of funds

resulting from a judicial sale authorized by the Superior Court

of California in and for the County of Sacramento. Plaintiff

also seeks general damages. Defendants County of Sacramento, the

District Attorney of Sacramento County, and court-appointed

receiver David L. Ray move to dismiss plaintiff’s SAC, pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief

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can be granted.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 11, 2001, the state court found Alden J.

Appleton (Jonathon Appleton) guilty of fraudulent business

practices. State v. Appleton, No. 99AS00592, slip op. at 2 (Cal.

Super. Ct. July 11, 2001). The state court ordered civil

penalties in the amount of $1,250,000 and determined that a

receiver would accomplish restitution. Id. at 10. On or about

August 14, 2001, the court appointed defendant David L. Ray to

fill the position of receiver. (SAC ¶ 14.) 

In February 2004, over objections that plaintiff lodged

with the state court, Ray obtained an order authorizing the sale

of a residence at 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane, Fair Oaks, California

(“the property”). (Id. ¶ 16.) With the help of a real estate

agent and with leave of the court, Ray completed the sale of the

property on or about August 23, 2005 for the purchase price of

$860,000. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.) 

During the course of these events, plaintiff, a trustee

of The 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane J & N Appleton Trust of 1999, was

not a party to the state court action. (Compl. ¶ 15.) She never

“intervene[d], move[d] for reconsideration, or appeal[ed] the

court’s decision[s].” (Aug. 24, 2005 Order (per Chief Judge

Levi) (denying plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining

order (“TRO”)).) However, “on August 19, 2005, plaintiff filed

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal court.” (Id.) As the

sale was still pending, she immediately filed for a TRO, arguing

that “a decision of the state court permitting sale of the

residence [would] violate her constitutional rights because she

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[had] not had a sufficient opportunity to participate in the

state court action to defend her property rights.” Id.

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order

was “denied principally because it [was] untimely.” (Id.) Judge

Levi further explained that

[t]here [was] no reason why this . . . request for stay

should not have been filed [earlier]. By waiting to

file this action until the state court was prepared to

issue a final ruling, plaintiff . . . misused the

temporary restraining order. E.D. Cal. L.R. 65-231(b). 

Furthermore, the showing on the merits [was]

not persuasive. It [was] unclear whether plaintiff

ha[d] any interest in the property. The state court

[had] recently found the claim “meritless” in a

tentative ruling.

(Id.) Following suit, this court denied plaintiff’s second

motion for a TRO, which sought to enjoin the disbursement of the

proceeds of the sale. Appleton v. County of Sacramento, No.

S-05-1685, 2005 WL 2643174, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2005).

Shortly thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss this

action for failure to state a claim. The court granted those

motions without prejudice on December 23, 2005 and gave plaintiff

30 days to file a SAC to remedy the deficiencies in her

pleadings. Appleton v. County of Sacramento, No. S-05-1685, 2005

WL 3555470, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2005). Presently before

the court are defendants’ motions to dismiss the SAC, again for

failure to state a claim. 

II. Discussion

In its December 23, 2005 order, the court made the

following determinations: (1) the District Attorney was

absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit for damages based on

activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

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Significantly, plaintiff failed to identify, and still 1

has not named, a county official that deprived her of her

constitutional rights. Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *5

(observing that “none of the actors identified by name in the

complaint are subject to defendant County’s control”).

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criminal process”; (2) to the extent that plaintiff sought to

enjoin some conduct of the District Attorney, this court should

abstain based on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (3)

receiver Ray, acting within the scope of his authority as

provided by valid court orders, was entitled to derivative

judicial immunity; and (4) plaintiff had not stated a claim

against the County because she had failed to identify a policy or

custom of the County, the execution of which deprived of her

constitutional rights. To survive the instant motion to 1

dismiss, plaintiff’s SAC must address these shortcomings.

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Dismissal is

appropriate only when “it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th

Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957). The court does not, “however, necessarily

assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are

cast in the form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council v.

Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). “[A] simple declaration

that defendant’s conduct violated the ultimate legal standard at

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issue . . . does not suffice.” Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687,

692 (2d Cir. 2001); see Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 (“[A complaint

must] give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” (emphasis added)).

Additionally, although the court may not consider

material other than the facts alleged in the complaint when

deciding a motion to dismiss, it may rely on matters of public

record. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“A motion to dismiss . . . must be treated as a motion for

summary judgment . . . if either party . . . submits materials

outside the pleadings in support or opposition to the motion, and

if the district court relies on those materials.”); Mack v. S.

Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986),

abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.

Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (holding that reliance on matters

of public record “does not convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one

for summary judgment”). As the court observed in its previous

order dismissing plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”), the

several orders issued by the state court and submitted for this

court’s consideration here, including those entering judgment

against Mr. Appleton and authorizing the actions of the courtappointed receiver, are matters of public record, on which the

court can rely. See Kent v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 200 F. Supp.

2d 1208, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[L]egal decisions by California

courts . . . are matters of public record . . . .”).

///

///

///

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Plaintiff also stresses that the orders obtained by the 2

District Attorney, which established “that every entity with any

relation to Jonathon Appleton was an alter ego of each other,”

were allegedly procedurally defective. (SAC ¶ 26.) However, the

court has already established that the District Attorney’s filing

of claims that resulted in the sale of the property constituted

acts that were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of

the criminal process” and therefore within the scope of

prosecutorial immunity. Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *2

(quoting Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1984)

(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976))). 

Plaintiff’s suggestion that the District Attorney was

overreaching by going after assets over which the state court

allegedly had no jurisdiction does not impact the applicability

of this immunity doctrine. See Broam v. Bogan, 230 F.3d 1023,

1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If the action was part of the judicial

process, the prosecutor is entitled to the protection of absolute

immunity whether or not he or she violated the civil plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.”).

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B. District Attorney of Sacramento County

In her SAC, plaintiff adds the following facts to

support her claims against the District Attorney: (1) the

District Attorney accompanied the county officers when they

executed a warrant for Jonathon Appleton’s arrest “with guns

drawn”, and (2) “during the State Court Action,” the District

Attorney “performed a document inspection at Jonathon Appleton’s

office and brought officers with weapons onto Mr. Appleton’s

business premises.” (SAC ¶¶ 25, 27 (emphasis added).) 

Plaintiff asserts that these actions were taken “for the purpose

of harassing and intimidating Mr. Appleton.” (Id. ¶ 27 2

(emphasis added).)

It is unclear what plaintiff hopes to accomplish by

including these additional facts. The court recognizes that a

prosecutor is afforded only qualified immunity when performing

investigatory or administrative functions, rather than the

absolute immunity applicable to traditional prosecutorial duties. 

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Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 and

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). Thus, when

the District Attorney allegedly participated in search and

seizure activities and “essentially function[ed] as a police

officer or detective,” he was entitled only to qualified

immunity. Id.; see also Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2d

Cir. 1987) (“Absolute immunity . . . does not apply when the

prosecutor . . . assists in the execution of a search and seizure

. . . .”). 

However, the allegations do not suggest that the

District Attorney deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the

Constitution when he undertook these activities. Significantly,

a third party cannot claim “a ‘derivative’ . . . violation [of

constitutional rights] on the basis of an intrusion of another’s

privacy or property.” Wilkinson v. F.B.I., 99 F.R.D. 148, 153

(C.D. Cal. 1983); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,

139-41, 150 (1978) (holding that evidence seized during an

unreasonable search of one person can be used against another

person because the constitutional right allegedly violated is a

personal one). Thus, even if the District Attorney was entitled

only to qualified immunity for allegedly assisting with searches

and seizures, affording him such immunity under these

circumstances is proper. Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028 (“A state actor

. . . is entitled to qualified immunity in an action filed under

§ 1983 if his or her conduct during a criminal investigation . .

. does not violate a federal constitutional right [of the

claimant].”). Plaintiff has not alleged facts that support a

cognizable legal theory for the District Attorney’s liability for

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damages.

In its previous order, the court also declined to

entertain claims against the District Attorney for injunctive

relief pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, which

counsels federal courts to abstain from cases when there is an

ongoing state judicial proceeding that implicates an important

state interest and offers an adequate opportunity to raise

federal questions. Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court, 883 F.2d

810, 814 (9th Cir. 1989). In such cases, federal court

interference is inappropriate unless “bad faith, harassment, or

other exceptional circumstances dictate to the contrary.” 

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.

423, 437 (1982); World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc., v. City of

Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987). This court

consequently held that Younger abstention was applicable because

plaintiff had failed to allege that the state court proceedings

were “initiated with and . . . animated by a retaliatory,

harassing, or other illegitimate motive.” Appleton, 2005 WL

3555470, at *3 (quoting Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282

F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2002)). 

Plaintiff has since added such allegations to her

complaint; however, she still fails to state a claim against the

District Attorney for injunctive relief. Significantly, the

court notes that it undertook the Younger abstention analysis

“assuming that there is some action by the District Attorney that

the court might enjoin . . . .” Id. But like the FAC, the SAC

does not identify an activity of the District Attorney that the

court might enjoin. The complaint only seeks an injunction “to

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prohibit (a) the disbursement of the proceeds of the sale of the

Subject Property; and (b) the transfer, directly or indirectly,

of the proceeds of the sale of the Subject Property.” (SAC

(Prayer for Relief).) These assets are not under the control of

the District Attorney and the court cannot award the relief

sought against this particular defendant. Therefore, plaintiff

has not stated a claim against the District Attorney for

injunctive relief. 

C. State Court Receiver David L. Ray

Plaintiff likewise has failed to remedy the

deficiencies in her claims against defendant Ray. In its

previous order, the court found that Ray’s activities as a

receiver appointed by the state court were covered by the

doctrine of derivative judicial immunity. Specifically, the

court noted that “[b]ecause a receiver ‘functions as an arm of

the court by making decisions . . . the judge otherwise would

have to make,’ he is, like a judge, entitled to immunity when he

performs an act that is judicial in nature and he does not act in

the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Appleton, 2005 WL

3555470, at *3 (quoting New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869

F.2d 1298, 1302, 1303 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989)) (alterations in

original). 

In her SAC, plaintiff attempts to show that Ray acted

“in clear absence of all jurisdiction” by adding allegations that

he “included in his damages claim and accounting in the State

Court Action, improper and unverified items including emotional

distress and other forms of relief in which the claimants are not

entitled.” (SAC ¶ 29; Pl.’s Opp’n to Ray’s Mot. for Summ. J. 8.) 

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As Ray notes, plaintiff’s claim that he exceeded his 3

authority by allowing claimants to request emotional distress and

other unauthorized forms of relief is refuted by Ray’s “Petition

for Instructions Re: Allowed and Disallowed Claims”, which was

submitted to the state court to obtain an order approving Ray’s

assessment of the claims and to this court for judicial notice. 

(Ray’s Feb. 6, 2006 Request for Judicial Notice Ex. 1 (Petition

at 10).) The petition specifically states that Ray “disallowed

that portion of a claim that sought attorneys fees, damages for

emotional distress and other speculative damages . . . .” (Id.) 

As indicated above, however, the court does not need to question

the truth of plaintiff’s allegations in order to grant Ray’s

motion to dismiss.

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Plaintiff claims that these actions were “in excess of Defendants

Ray’s and Superior Court’s jurisdiction.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) 

However, in making these assertions, plaintiff misconstrues the

jurisdiction requirement for judicial immunity.

The Ninth Circuit has determined that judicial immunity

should be “freely granted and the exceptions . . . narrowly

drawn.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Accordingly, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of his authority.” New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869 F.2d at

1301-02 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). 

“Judicial immunity is a defense so long as ‘the judge’s ultimate

acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction.’” Id. at 1302 (quoting Ashelman, 793 F.2d at

1078).

In other words, even if Ray improperly requested, and

the state court allowed him to award, forms of relief to which

Jonathon Appleton’s judgment creditors were not entitled, this 3

does not constitute conduct “in clear absence of all

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The Supreme Court has previously distinguished between 4

“lack of jurisdiction” and “excess of jurisdiction”: 

[I]f a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills

and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be

acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would

not be immune from liability for his action; on the

other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should

convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would

merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and

would be immune. 

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n.7 (1978). In other words,

[If a criminal judge] should sentence a party convicted

to a greater punishment than that authorized by the law

upon its proper construction, no personal liability to

civil action for such acts would attach to the judge,

although those acts would be in excess of his

jurisdiction . . . . 

Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 352 (1871); Sadoski v.

Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).

Such errors are the proper focus of collateral review 5

on appeal, not a § 1983 case against the acting judicial

officers. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)

(reasoning that it is acceptable to liberally apply judicial

immunity because “[m]ost judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to

correction through ordinary mechanisms of review, which are

largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably associated

with exposing judges to personal liability.”).

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jurisdiction.” Rather, plaintiff’s allegations at most suggest 4

that Ray and the state court judge erred in applying California

law or perhaps acted in excess of authority. In exercising 5

control over the res of The 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane J & N Appleton

Trust of 1999, defendants did not stray from the subject matter

over which they have jurisdiction. See Appleton, 2005 WL

3555470, at *4 (identifying the various statutes that empower

California state courts to appoint and authorize the activities

of receivers). Consequently, because Ray acted pursuant to valid

court orders that the court had jurisdiction to issue, he is

entitled to derivative judicial immunity despite plaintiff’s

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Similarly, plaintiff’s additional allegations that the 6

state court acted without jurisdiction over the Trust do not

pierce the veil of judicial immunity. (See SAC ¶ 28.) Even

assuming arguendo that plaintiff’s allegations are true, the

Ninth Circuit has held that “a judge is entitled to immunity even

if there was no personal jurisdiction over the complaining

party.” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076; New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869

F.2d at 1076 (same). 

Plaintiff’s SAC does not address the court’s prior 7

observation that: 

Plaintiff’s claims against Ray appear to be in his

individual, rather than official, capacity and are thus

assumedly for damages. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish

& Game Comm'n, Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir.

1994) (“Where state officials are named in a complaint

which seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is

presumed that the officials are being sued in their

individual capacities” if “the complaint is silent as

to capacity . . . .”).

Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *4 n.3.

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allegations that these orders were defective.6

 Regarding Ray’s immunity from suit for injunctive

relief, the court’s prior order noted that, assuming plaintiff’s

complaint seeks such relief from Ray, “Younger abstention, as 7

discussed above, would lead to the dismissal of any claims

against Ray for injunctive relief, even if he was not protected

from the claims against him by the cloak of judicial immunity.” 

Appleton, 2005 WL 3555470, at *4 n.3 (emphasis added). Plaintiff

now alleges that the defendants engaged in a “conspiracy” to

retaliate against Jonathon Appleton and harass the entire family,

including plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 23.) While such allegations may

be sufficient to qualify for an exception to the Younger

abstention doctrine, Younger was not the only ground on which the

court based its holding regarding Ray’s immunity from suit for

injunctive relief. The court only mentioned Younger in passing

as an additional reason for dismissing the complaint in case the

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Congress added this provision in 1996 in response to 8

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), where the Court

held that judicial immunity does not apply in suits against

judges for injunctive relief. Plaintiff has not alleged that a

declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was

unavailable. Moreover, it appears that declaratory relief would

have been available, had plaintiff sought it. Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 1060 (“Any person . . . who desires a declaration of his

or her rights or duties . . . in respect to, in, over or upon

property . . . may, in cases of actual controversy relating to

the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an

original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a

declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises . . .

. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties,

either alone or with other relief . . . .”).

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judicial immunity discussed did not extent to claims for

injunctive relief against Ray. 

Significantly, according to the plain language of §

1983, the cloak of judicial immunity that affords Ray protection

from a personal suit for damages also guards against suits for

injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“[I]n any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be

granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory

relief was unavailable.”); Kuhn v. Thompson, 304 F. Supp. 2d 8

1313, 1322 (M.D. Ala. 2004). The fact that plaintiff has alleged

a conspiracy to deprive her of due process has no bearing on this

application of judicial immunity as long as the harm “was

inflicted [through judicial] acts to which absolute immunity

would apply . . . .” Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 523 (5th

Cir. 1985); see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980);

Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1987). Because the

only claims against Ray are for judicial actions taken pursuant

to court orders, he is immune from a suit for damages and

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The SAC does appear to allege involvement of County 9

officers in the arrest and investigation of Jonathon Appleton. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 25-27.) However, as explained above, plaintiff cannot

base her § 1983 claim on the alleged violation of another’s

constitutional rights.

14

injunctive relief based on the facts alleged in the SAC.

D. County of Sacramento

As the court noted in its order dismissing the FAC, to

bring a § 1983 claim against the County of Sacramento, “plaintiff

must allege that [she] suffered a constitutional deprivation that

was the product of a policy or custom of the local government

unit.” Collins v. County of Kern, 390 F. Supp. 2d 964, 976 (E.D.

Cal. 2005); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The court also expressed doubt “that a

local policy, custom, or practice of the County resulted in

plaintiff’s deprivation of due process [in this case,] when no

agent or representative of the County capable of carrying out

this policy [had yet] been identified.” Appleton, 2005 WL

3555470, at *5 (explaining that despite their proper names, the

Superior Court in and for the County of Sacramento, the receiver

appointed by that court, and the District Attorney of Sacramento

County are not agents of the County).

Plaintiff’s SAC likewise fails to identify any agent of

the County who deprived her of a constitutional right. She only 9

provides a conclusory allegation that she “is informed and

believes and, on that basis, alleges that a local policy, custom

or practice of Defendant County of Sacramento resulted in [her]

deprivation of due process.” (Compl. ¶ 30.) This bald assertion

does not sufficiently state a claim against the County. See

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“If judicial and prosecutorial immunity bar recovery,” 10

as they do in this case, “no amendment [can] cure the

deficienc[ies]” and dismissal, without leave to amend, is

warranted. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075.

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Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 (“[A complaint must] give the defendant

fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” (emphasis added)). 

III. Conclusion

In its December 23, 2005 order, the court gave

plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that addressed the

deficiencies in her FAC. The court must assume that the SAC is

the best plaintiff can do to state a claim against defendants. 

For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff is obviously unable to

remedy the shortcomings in her pleadings.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motions to

dismiss the SAC for failure to state a claim be, and the same

hereby are, GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.10

DATED: March 8, 2006

Case 2:05-cv-01685-WBS -KJM Document 73 Filed 03/09/06 Page 15 of 15