Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02437/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02437-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOHAMAD ALI SAID,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv2437-GPC(RBB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Dkt. No. 52.]

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, DEPUTY

SHERIFF PATRICK LOPATOWKY,

DEPUTY SHERIFF BRIAN

BUTCHER, DEPUTY SHERIFF LEE

SCOTT, and DOES 1-50,

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendants County of San Diego, Patrick Lopatosky and

Brian Butcher’s motion for partial summary judgment filed on February 23, 2015. 

(Dkt. Nos. 52, 55 .) Plaintiff Mohamad Said filed an amended opposition on March

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23, 2015. (Dkt. No. 55.) A reply was filed on April 1, 2015. (Dkt. No. 63.) After a

review of the briefs, supporting documentation, and the applicable law, the Court

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment. 

Procedural Background

On October 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint

On February 24, 2015,Defendantsfiled an amended memorandumof points and

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authorities and amended separate statement of undisputedmaterialfacts. (Dkt. No. 55.) 

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against County of San Diego (“County”), Deputy Sheriff Patrick Lopatowsky

(“Lopatowsky”), Deputy Sheriff Brian Butcher (“Butcher”), and Deputy Sheriff Scott

Lee (erroneously named as Lee Scott). (Dkt. No. 1.) On May 15, 2013, the Court

granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. (Dkt. No.

16.) On June 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 17.) On

October 30, 2013, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended

complaint with one final opportunity to amend. (Dkt. No. 22.) On November 19,

2013, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”). (Dkt. No. 23.) On January

21, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

(Dkt. No. 31.) Specifically, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the cause

of action for equal protection and all causes of action against Defendant Scott Lee, and

the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the causes of action for excessive

force, false arrest, denial of medical attention, malicious prosecution, § 1983 cause of

action against the County of San Diego and all state law causes of action. (Id.) 2

Defendants now seek partial summary judgment on the causes of action against

the County of San Diego for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against Defendants

Lopatowsky and Butcher for unlawful arrest, inadequate medical care, and malicious

prosecution under § 1983 and state law claims for false arrest and violation of

California Civil Code section 52.1. 

Factual Background

On June 16, 2009, a domestic violence misdemeanor complaint for the use of

force and violence and the infliction of injury on his spouse, Walla Said, aka Walaa

Alqershi (“Alqershi”) was filed against Plaintiff in the Superior Court of California,

County of San Diego, East County Division. (Dkt. No. 57, Ds’ NOL, Ex. 1.) The

complaint alleged three counts consisting of: 1) corporal injury to spouse and/or

The state law causes of action against all Defendants consist of negligence, 2

battery, false arrest and violation of California Civil Code section 52.1. (Dkt. No. 23,

SAC.)

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roommate in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) section 17(b)(4); 2)

battery of a current or former significant other in violation of Penal Code section

243(e)(1); and 3) battery in violation of Penal Code section 242. (Id.) A criminal

protective order against Plaintiff in favor of Alqershi as the protected person was

issued on July 13, 2009. (Id., Ex. 2.) On March 24, 2010, a jury found Plaintiff guilty

of the crime of battery of a significant other in violation of Penal Code section

243(e)(1), and simple battery in violation of Penal Code section 242. (Id., Ex. 4.) On

May 24, 2010, Plaintiff was sentenced to, among other things, three years of summary

probation, a condition of which was compliance with a criminal protective order that

prohibited Plaintifffromhaving any personal, electronic, telephonic, or written contact

with Alqershi or from coming within 100 yards of her. (Id., Exs. 4, 5.) The protective

order was to expire on May 23, 2013. (Id., Ex. 5.) 

Plaintiff was informed of the meaning of the protective order at his sentencing

hearing. (Dkt. No. 52-4, Karnavas Decl., Ex. 7 (CD audio recording of Plaintiff’s

sentencing on 5/24/10.)) The sentencing judge explained to Plaintiff that under the

protective order, even if Alqershi called him, he must hang up the phone and walk

away. (Id.) At his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he understood his sentence and

that he wassubject to a full protective order and wasto stay away from Alqershi. (Dkt.

No. 52-4, Karnavas Decl., Ex 4, Said Depo. at 144:12-17; 146:21-24; 170:8-10;

176:22-177:4; 177:24-178:24; 180:10-14; 185:2-7.) He was also aware that only the

Court could rescind the protective order and that neither he nor Alqershi could do it on

their own. (Id. at 185:2-7.) Plaintiff had an Arabic interpreter at his trial and

sentencing. (Id. at 144:12-17.) Subsequently, Alqershi returned to Plaintiff and

became pregnant with Plaintiff’s second child, a daughter, to whom she gave birth in

October 2011. (Id. at 222:2-24.) 

On January 24, 2012, at approximately 5:51p.m., the Sheriff’s Department

communications center received a 911 call from a woman identifying herself as Walaa

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Alqershi. (Dkt. No. 52-7, Harb Decl., Ex. A, 911 CD audio recording.) She stated that

she was in the house with Plaintiff and lives with him. (Id.) She was fearful because

he threatened to kill her if she called the cops, and then kill himself. (Id.) Alqershi

explained thatshe had a restraining order against her husband, but was living with him

and that he was driving her crazy, and she was afraid he was going to kill her. (Id.) 

She also said she just recently came back from a mental institution and it was her fault

thatshe went back with him. (Id.) Alqershi requested law enforcement assistance and

while on the phone, she indicated she was leaving her house located at 3755 El Canto

Dr. and was walking to her neighbor’s house located at 3725 El Canto Dr. (Id.) 

On the evening ofJanuary 24, 2012, Butcher and Lopatosky received a radio call

to respond to 3755 El Canto Dr., Spring Valley, California to contact an individual who

may have been “5150”, in other words, a person who, as a result of a mental health

disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or is gravely disabled. (Dkt. No.

52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 2.) At some point, the

contact address was changed to 3725 El Canto Dr. which is a house a couple of houses

down from the original address. (Dkt. No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 52-6,

Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 2.) Psychiatric Emergency Response Team (“PERT”) clinician,

Cynthia Van Lom (“Van Lom”), was assigned to work with Butcher and was riding

with him in his patrol vehicle. (Dkt. No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 2.) Butcher and Van

Lom arrived first at 3725 El Canto Dr. and made contact with Alqershi. (Id.) They

determined that Alqershi was not “5150” but was upset with her husband. (Id.) 

Butcher was aware that Alqershi and her husband had a history of domestic violence

because he had arrested Plaintiff for spousal abuse in violation of Penal Code section

273.5(a) back in April 2009. (Id.) Alqershi told Butcher and Van Lom that she and

Plaintiff had been living together, and that on that evening, Plaintiff had threatened to

kill her and any cops that showed up if she called the cops. (Id. ¶ 3.) Alqershi wanted

Plaintiff arrested. (Id.) Lopatosky arrived at the scene shortly after Butcher and Van

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Lom. (Id. ¶ 4.) Butcher told him that he had spoken with Alqershi, and that he believed

this was a violation of a restraining order call. (Dkt. No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 4; Dkt.

No. 52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 2.) Lopatosky took over as the primary deputy on the

scene and also spoke directly to Alqershi. (Dkt. No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 4; Dkt. No.

52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 2-3.) Alqershi told Lopatosky that she and Plaintiff had been

married for about 5 years, that they currently live together, and have two children

together, a four year old and a 3 month old. (Dkt. No. 52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 2-3.) 

Alqershi indicated that she had been the victim of domestic violence by her husband

about a year and a half earlier, and that as a result of that incident, a restraining order

was issued against him, that he had been served with the order, and that he was not to

be within 100 yards of her. (Dkt. No. 52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 3.) Alqershi indicated

that she had stayed at a shelter called Becky’s House after the domestic violence

incident but that after her stay at Becky’s House, Plaintiff picked her up and they had

been living together ever since, even though the restraining order was still in place. 

(Id.) Alqershi told Lopatosky that on that evening, her husband had threatened to kill

her, kill any responding law enforcement, and then kill himself, but that he had not

done anything to her physically. (Id.) Alqershi wanted Plaintiff arrested. (Id.) 

Lopatosky also confirmed that while Alqershi appeared upset by the circumstances

with her husband, she did not appear to be suffering from any type of mental health

disorder. (Id.) 

Butcher conducted a records check through theSheriff’s inquiry channel, and the

records check revealed there was an active domestic violence criminal protective order

issued in case number C291668, listing Plaintiff asthe restrained person, and Alqershi

as the protected person. (Dkt. No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 5.) The protective order was

set to expire on May 23, 2013, and the terms of the order prohibited Plaintiff from

having any contact with Alqershi. (Id.)

Lopatosky and Butcher went to contact Plaintiff at 3755 El Canto Dr. (Dkt. No.

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52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff was handcuffed

and thereafter complained of injury to his arm. (Dkt. No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 6; Dkt.

No. 52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 5.) Deputy Butcher immediately summoned the Fire

Department for paramedic assistance. (Dkt. No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 52-

6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 5.) The paramedics arrived approximately five minutes later and

Plaintiff was taken to the hospital for evaluation. (Dkt. No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 6;

Dkt. No. 52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 5.) 

In his declaration, Plaintiffstatesthat his ex-wife Alqershi was alcohol and drug

dependent and she became uncontrollable and started running away from home. (Dkt.

No. 60-3, Said Decl. ¶ 3.) He alleges she fabricated stories against him in order to

show Plaintiff was a villain. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff also states that he was never served

with a copy of the protective order and that he did not respond to the judge’s question

asking whether he understood the order. (Id. ¶ 6.) In fact, Plaintiff claims he asked for

an explanation but the judge stated that someone else will explain; however, Plaintiff

was never contacted. (Id.) He also states that Alqershi did not live at the house and

she was there for a few minutes because he did not allow her to be near the children

because child protective services did not want her near the children. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff

states that he never threatened his ex-wife or the officers. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Discussion

A. Legal Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary

judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just,

speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue asto any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact

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is material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any

genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can

satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to bear the

initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the

nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60

(1970). 

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest

on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient

showing of an element of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Id. at 325. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In

making this determination, the court must “view[] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir.

2001). The Court does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing of evidence,

or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are for the trier of

fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

B. § 1983 Monell Claim as to County of San Diego

Defendant County of San Diego argues that Plaintiffmakes numerous allegations

of unlawful policies, customs and habits but has provided no evidentiary facts to

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support the elements of a Monell claim. Plaintiff opposes. 3

Cities, counties and other local government entities are subject to claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658

(1978). While municipalities, their agencies and their supervisory personnel cannot be

held liable under § 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability,

they can, however, be held liable for deprivations of constitutionalrights resulting from

their formal policies or customs. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-693. Plaintiffs must

establish that “the local government had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that

was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [they] suffered.” AE ex rel.

Hernandez v. Count of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Whitaker v.

Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

The elements of a Monell claim are (1) plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional

right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force

behind the constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432,

438 (9th Cir.1997)). 

A public entity and supervisory officials may be held liable when

“implementation of . . . official policies or established customs inflicts the

constitutional injury” or when a failure to act amounts to “deliberate indifference to a

constitutional right” or when “an official with final policy-making authority . . .ratifies

a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action. Clouthier v. County of Contra

Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010). 

A “policy” is a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from

among various alternatives by the official or officialsresponsible for establishing final

policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824,

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

3

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834 (9th Cir. 2008); Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.

2006). A “custom” for purposes of municipal liability is a “widespread practice that,

although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent

and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates,

907 F.2d 879, 890 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1231–32

(9th Cir. 1991). Random acts or isolated events are not sufficient to establish custom. 

Gates, 907 F.2d at 890. 

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the County has “unlawful

policies, customs and habits of improper and inadequate hiring, training, retention,

discipline and supervision of its sheriff’s deputies, proximately causing the

constitutional deprivations, injuries and damages alleged in the First Cause of Action.” 

(Dkt. No. 23 SAC ¶ 39.) He also alleges that the Defendant has an unlawful policy,

custom or habit of permitting unlawful searches and seizures, false arrests and the

unnecessary and excessive use of force by sheriff deputies and failing to take action

against deputies who commit acts of excessive force. (Id. ¶ 40.) He further specifically

complains that the County has inadequate policies relating to “1) enlisting domestic

violence victims to participate in contacting and arresting domestic violence suspects.

2) warrantless detentions and arrests of citizens for mere suspicions and without

probable cause. 3) use of excessive force by deputies and 4) writing false police reports

as a method of covering up acts of excessive force and other improprieties by sheriff’s

deputies.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff also alleges that County and its sheriff’s department

“have refused to investigate, or have inadequately investigated, numerous complaints

of false arrest, excessive force and unlawful searches and seizures made by citizens

against its sheriff’s deputies over many years, including complaints that resulted in

substantial jury verdicts against the deputies and the County.” (Id. ¶¶ 39, 42.) 

DefendantCounty argues that Plaintiff asserts numerous allegations of “unlawful

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policies, customs and habits” but has presented no evidentiary support during

discovery. In support, the County cites to the Plaintiff’s unresponsive, argumentative

answers to interrogatories that asked Plaintiff to state the facts to support his Monell

claim against the County. (Dkt. No. 52-4, Karnavas Decl., Ex. 1.) In opposition,

Plaintiff fails to oppose the motion for partial summary judgment with specific facts

from affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. First,

Plaintiff’s brief does not address any of the allegations presented in his complaint.

4

Second, he merely presents argument and presents a conclusory statement that “much

more evidence and facts were discovered consequently that make Defense argument

futile.” (Dkt. No. 60-1, P’s Response to Ds’ SUF at 1.) No facts are alleged to support

any of the allegations in the second amended complaint against the County for a § 1983

cause of action.

In his own statement of undisputed facts, Plaintiff cites to the arrest report and

deposition of Butcher and Lopatosky and presents his interpretation of the facts and

5

summarily asserts that Defendants misreported or falsified the incident. (Dkt. No. 60-

2, P’s SUF Nos. 1-7.) However, even if Plaintiff’s interpretation of the arrest report

is correct, the arrest report, itself, concerning this incident is not sufficient to

demonstrate the County had a widespread custom or policy that deprived Plaintiff of

his constitutional rights. See Gates, 907 F.2d at 890.

Here, Plaintiff has failed to produce any factual support of his claim of a Monell

In fact, he appearsto raise a new allegation that the County of San Diego “failed

4

to train its officers and prosecutors adequately about their duty to produce exculpatory

evidence such as the name of an eye witness or the reason for the initial visit which has

caused this new attorney a lot of time wasted to get information readily available.” 

(Dkt. No. 60 at 6.) Even if this allegation were in the second amended complaint,

Plaintiff has failed to provide any factual support. 

TheCourt notes that while Plaintiff cites to Lopatosky’s deposition, the relevant 5

portions of his deposition are not contained in the Shashaty declaration. (Dkt. No. 60-

4.) While some portions of Lopatosky’s deposition are provided in Defendants’

motion, many citations to support Plaintiff’s arguments are not. 

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claim against the County of San Diego. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. Accordingly,

the Court GRANTS Defendant County of San Diego’s motion for partial summary

judgment on the § 1983 cause of action. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Causes of Action as to Defendants Lopatosky and Butcher

Defendants Butcher and Lopatosky seek summary judgment on the causes of

action for unlawful arrest, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and

malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

1. Unlawful Arrest

“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the

Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other

justification.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012). Probable

cause exists when the officer has “a reasonable belief, evaluated in light of the officer’s

experience and the practical considerations of everyday life, that a crime has been, is

being, or is about to be committed.” Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 527

(9th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotations omitted). “Probable cause existsif the

arresting officers‘had knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts and

circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee] had

committed or was committing a crime.’ ” Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 697 F.3d

941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 342 (9th

Cir.1990)).

“In establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim of a

citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the

basis of the witness’ knowledge or interview other witnesses.” Arpin v. Santa Clara

Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Fuller v. M.G.

Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991)). A sufficient basis of knowledge is

established if the victim provides “facts sufficiently detailed to cause a reasonable

person to believe a crime had been committed and the named suspect was the

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perpetrator.” Peng v Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1444). 

The “presence of a factual dispute regarding a victim’s complaint at the scene

of an alleged domestic disturbance does not defeat probable cause if: 1) the victim’s

statements are sufficiently definite to establish that a crime has been committed; and

2) the victim’s complaint is corroborated by either the surrounding circumstances or

other witnesses.” Id. 

In this case, Plaintiff was arrested, among other things, for violating a protective

order pursuant to California Penal Code section 166(c)(1), and 273.6(a). (Dkt. No. 6 7

57, Ds’ NOL, Ex. 6.) In support of Defendants’ argument that they had probable cause

to arrest Plaintiff, they cite to California Penal Code section 836(c). 

California Penal Code Section 836(c) provides:

When a peace officer is responding to a call alleging a violation of a

domestic violence protective or restraining order . . .and the peace

officer has probable cause to believe that the person against whom the

order is issued has notice of the order and has committed an act in

violation of the order, the officer shall . . . make a lawful arrest of the

person without a warrant and take that person into custody whether or

not the violation occurred in the presence of the arresting officer. The

officer shall, as soon as possible after the arrest, confirm with the

appropriate authorities or the Domestic Violence Protection Order

Registry . . .that a true copy of the protective order has been registered,

unless the victim provides the officer with a copy of the protective

order.

Cal. Penal Code § 836(c)(1). Under state law, a peace officer may make a lawful arrest

without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the offender has

California PenalCode section 166(c)(1) provides, “[n]otwithstanding paragraph

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(4) of subdivision (a), a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or

stay-away court order described as follows shall constitute contempt of court, a

misdemeanor . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 166(c)(1).

California Penal Code section 273.6(a) provides: (a) Any intentional and

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knowing violation of a protective order . . . is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of

not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for

not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. Cal. Penal Code §

273.6(a)

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notice of the protective order and has committed an act in violation of the protective

order, even if the violation did not occur in the officer’s presence. Id. 

Alqershi called 911 and reported that she needed help because she was afraid

Plaintiff was going to kill her because he threatened to kill her and kill himself if she

called the cops. According to the 911 call, she initially called from inside the home

where Plaintiff was in another room, located at 3755 El Canto Drive, and then during

the call, she walked two houses down to 3725 El Canto Drive to go to a neighbor’s

house where she told the dispatcher she would be waiting. She informed the dispatcher

that she had a restraining order against Plaintiff but that she was living with him. 

When the Deputy Defendants arrived, Alqershi told them that she and Plaintiff were

living together and had two young children. She informed themthatshe wasthe victim

of a domestic violence by her husband about a year and a half earlier, and as a result,

a restraining order wasissued against him. She informed them that Plaintiff was aware

of the protective order. She told them that Plaintiff had threatened to kill her, kill any

officers if she called them and then kill himself. She wanted him arrested. Defendant

Butcher then conducted a records check through the Sheriff’s inquiry channel, and the

records check revealed there was an active domestic violence criminal protective order

issued in case number C291668, listing Plaintiff asthe restrained person, and Alqershi

as the protected person which was set to expire on May 23, 2013. (Dkt. No. 52-5,

Butcher Decl. ¶ 5.) The terms of the protective order prohibited Plaintiff from having

any contact with Alqershi. (Id.) 

At the time of the arrest, the Deputy Defendants were told that there was a

protective order against Plaintiff in favor of Alqershi, Alqersi informed them that

Plaintiff threatened to kill her if she called the police, and that Plaintiff had notice of

the protective order. Moreover, Defendant Butcher was aware that Plaintiff had been

arrested in 2009 for domestic violence. Based on this information, Defendants

conducted a records search to corroborate Alqershi’s allegations concerning the

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protective order. A records search confirmed Alqershi had an active domestic violence

protective order against Plaintiff which was still effective on the date of the incident. 

The Deputy Defendants had a sufficient basis of knowledge based on the detailed facts

provided by Alqershi and had corroborating evidence of the protective order to have

a reasonable belief that Plaintiff violated the protective order. Thus, the Court

concludes that Deputy Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. 

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff only addresses the legal standard on false arrest

without citation to authority. (Dkt. No. 60 at 3-4.) He does not dispute Defendants’

statement of undisputed facts with specific evidence in the record and only presents

arguments. In his declaration, Plaintiff states that he was at home minding his own

business and taking care of his children and did not violate the protective order. It was

Alqershi who came to his house and initiated the contact and made the 911 call. 

According to Plaintiff, the Deputy Defendants did not provide any proof of any

misconduct. He also alleges that he did not affirmatively respond to the judge’s

question whether he understood the protective order and in fact was unable to

comprehend what was happening. Therefore, he did not agree to the full protective

order sentenced by the state court judge. However, Plaintiff’s undisputed facts are not

supported. 

The Court listened to the 911 recordings and the state court sentencing

proceeding. At sentencing, although very faint, the interpreter responded, “yes” to the

judge’s question whether Plaintiff understood the contents of the protective order. 

(Dkt. No. 52-4, Karnavas Decl., Ex. 7.) At the hearing, contrary to his declaration,

Plaintiff did not ask for an explanation of the protective order but asked for

clarification regarding the public works he was sentenced to. Therefore, Plaintiff has

not created a genuine issue of fact as to whether he consented to and was aware of the

protective order. 

Despite Plaintiff’s facts concerning his version of what happened prior to the

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Deputy Defendants’ arrival, the Court looks at the facts at the time of the arrest. See

Peng, 335 F.3d at 978 (whether threat of force was in fact used by offender is not

material asto what officer knew at the time of arrest). At the time of the arrest, Alqershi

told the Deputy Defendants that Plaintiff threatened to kill her if she called the police,

that there was a protective order against Plaintiff even though she was now living with

him, and that Plaintiff was aware of the protective order. The Deputy Defendants were

also aware that Plaintiff had previously been involved in a prior domestic violence

incident as Defendant Butcher had arrested Plaintiff in the prior incident. The facts

were corroborated with a records check which revealed that there was an active full

protective order protecting AlqershifromPlaintiff. Deputy Defendants had knowledge

and reasonably trustworthy information of the facts to lead a prudent person to believe

that Plaintiff had committed an offense. See Maxwell, 697 F.3d at 951; see also Peng,

335 F.3d at 978 (“an officer who is investigating a domestic dispute must make snap

decisions regarding whether there is probable cause to arrest. Where, as here, the victim

alleges that force, or a threat of force, existed, it is important for officers to err on the

side of safety for the victim in order to prevent further violence and allow the parties to

cool down.”). 

Plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants Butcher

and Lapotasky’s motion for partial summary judgment on the § 1983 claim for false

arrest. 

2. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Defendants Butcher and Lopatosky argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate

that they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff

does not oppose Defendants’ argument. 

“The due process clause requires responsible governments and their agents to

secure medical care for persons who have been injured while in police custody.” 

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Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing City of

Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a pretrial detainee the right to receive adequate

medical care, and that right is violated if officials are deliberately indifferent to the

detainee’s serious medical needs. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232,

1242–43 (9th Cir. 2010). Deliberate indifference exists when an official knows of and

disregards a serious medical condition, i.e., when an official is “aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and

actually draws that inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

Here, the second amended complaint states that Defendants used unreasonable

force when they twisted his right arm and caused his elbow to become dislocated. (Dkt.

No. 23, SAC ¶ 53.) He alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s medical needs when Lopatosky knew that the forceful twisting caused the

injury, and elected to keep the handcuffs on and then proceeded with the other officers

to pull Plaintiff barefoot outside the house to his wife's location. (Id. ¶ 55.) He alleges

that Lopatosky and the other officers should have called the paramedics immediately

but they chose to ignore and subject Plaintiff to unnecessary pain and possible

exacerbation of his injury. (Id.) Moreover, the ambulance did not arrive until two hours

later even though the defendants knew he was suffering from excruciating pain. (Id. ¶

21.) 

Defendants present the uncontradicted declarations of Defendants Butcher and

Lopatosky who state that as soon as Plaintiff complained his arm had been injured,

Butcher immediately summoned the Fire Department for paramedic assistance. (Dkt.

No. 52-5, Butcher Decl. ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 52-6, Lopatosky Decl. ¶ 5.) The paramedics

arrived about five minutes later and Plaintiff was taken to the hospital via ambulance. 

(Id.) Plaintiff also testified that the ambulances came within minutes of the call. (Dkt.

No. 52-4, Karnavas Decl., Ex. 4, Said Depo. at 88:2-8.) Therefore, Defendants have

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demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact on this cause of action. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants motion for partialsummary judgment on

the § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 

3. Malicious Prosecution

Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff

has provided no evidence that Defendants took any action to compromise the

prosecutor’s independent judgment to overcome the Smiddy presumption. Plaintiff

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opposes. 

In the Ninth Circuit, a claim for malicious prosecution is not cognizable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a

remedy. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations

omitted). However, if malicious prosecution is “conducted with the intent to deprive

a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to

a denial of constitutional rights”, a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is

available. Id. at 562 (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

To state a claim for malicious prosecution in California under § 1983, a plaintiff must

plead the “(a) the initiation of criminal prosecution, (b) malicious motivation, and (c)

lack of probable cause.” Id. 

The filing of a criminal complaint by the district attorney gives rise to a

presumption that a decision to file a criminal complaint is presumed to result from an

independent decision on the part of the district attorney and would preclude liability for

those who participated in the investigation or filed a report that resulted in the initiation

of proceedings. Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Smiddy I”)

overruled on other grounds by Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir.

2008)). However, the presumption can be rebutted if the investigating official

“improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to

Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981). 8

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him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith

conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.” 

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Smiddy I

presumption to malicious prosecution case). A “plaintiff’s account of the incident in

question, by itself, does not overcome the presumption of independent judgment.” 

Newman v. County of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Butcher and

Lopatosky illegally arrested him, falsified the police reports and as a result, criminal

proceedings were initiated. (Dkt. No. 23 SAC ¶¶ 62-64.) Eventually, the criminal

charges were dropped before trial. (Id. ¶ 62.) The SAC also asserts that Defendant

Lopatosky fabricated many liesto cover his and his partners’ use of excessive force that

led to his injury. (Dkt. No. 23, SAC ¶ 61.) By doing do, Lopatosky knew that Plaintiff

would be maliciously prosecuted. (Id.) Three charges were filed against Plaintiff to

deter and scare him from filing this action. (Id. ¶ 62.) 

On January 22, 2012, Plaintiff was charged with violation of California Penal

Code sections 69 for resisting executive officer; section 273.6(a) for disobeying court

order and section 166(c)(1) for violating the protective order in connection with the

incident that is subject to this lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 57, Ds’ NOL, Ex. 6.) On April 16,

2012, on motion by the People, the case was dismissed. (Dkt. No. 60-4, Shashaty Decl.,

Ex. 8.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff, in his brief,makessummaryconclusions that Defendants’

arrest report prompted the filing of the criminal action, the criminal case ended in

Plaintiff’s favor, there was no probable cause and the action was brought with malice

toward the victim. (Dkt. No. 60 at 4.) Plaintiff only cites to the arrest report to oppose

Defendants’ motion and makes arguments in support. He does not provide any other

admissible evidence to support his opposition. Plaintiff even fails to provide a

declaration as to these issues. Moreover, the citation to Lopatosky’s deposition does

not support Plaintiff’s statements. 

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Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants falsified their arrestreports bysolely citing

to the arrest report is not sufficient to rebut the Smiddy presumption. See Newman, 457

F.3d at 994; see also Cervantes v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 12-9889 DDP

(MRWx), 2014 WL 5528342, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014). Therefore, the Smiddy

presumption applies, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact

that Defendants are liable for malicious prosecution. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendants Lopatosky and Butcher’s motion for partial summary judgment on the §

1983 claim based on malicious prosecution. 

D. State Law Causes of Action as to all Defendants

1. False Arrest

Defendants Butcher and Lopatowsky argue that their actions are supported by

probable cause under California common law and their actions are statutorily immune

under California Penal Code section 847(b). TheCounty argues it isstatutorily immune

under California Government section 815.2. Plaintiff opposes. 

Under California law, an officer has probable cause for a warrantless arrest “if the

facts known to him would lead a [person] of ordinary care and prudence to believe and

conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a

crime.” People v. Adams, 175 Cal. App. 3d 855, 861 (1985) (citation and quotations

omitted); see also People v. Lewis, 109 Cal. App. 3d 599 (1980). The test under federal

law and state law are similar. Peng, 335 F.3d at 976. Penal Code section 847(b) states

that a peace officer shall not be civilly liable for false arrest if the “arrest was lawful or

the officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was

lawful.” Cal. Penal Code § 847(b). “Reasonable cause to arrest exists when the facts

known to the arresting officer would lead a reasonable person to have a strong suspicion

of the arrestee’s guilt.” O’Toole v. Super. Ct., 140 Cal. App. 4th 488, 511 (2006). This

is an objective standard and where the facts are not disputed, reasonable cause for an

arrest can be decided as a question of law. Id. 

As discussed above on the § 1983 false arrest cause of action, because Deputy

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Defendants had reasonably sufficient, trustworthy information to establish probable

cause to arrest Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s state law false arrest claim

also fails. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants Butcher and Lopatosky’s

motion for partial summary judgment on the state law false arrest claim. 

As to the County, it argues it is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to

California Government Code section 815.2. Section 815.2 provides,

(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his

employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have

given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal

representative.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable

for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the

public entity where the employee is immune from liability.

Cal. Gov’t Code 815.2. Public entitles are liable for the actions of their employees. 

Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 393 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing California

Government Code section 815.2(a)). However, if the employees are immune from

liability, the public entitles are also immune. Id. (citing California Government Code

section 815.2(b)). 

Here, since DeputyDefendants are entitled to summary judgment on the state law

false arrest claim, the County is also entitled to summary judgment. See Cal. Gov’t

Code § 815.2(b). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS all Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the state law false arrest cause of action. 

2. California Civil Code Section 52.1

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot prevail on a violation of California Civil 

Code section 52.1 cause of action because the undisputed facts demonstrate that

Plaintiff can prove no constitutional violation based on unlawful arrest, inadequate

medical care, malicious prosecution and excessive force. 

The second amended complaint assertsthat Plaintiff’s rights under the federal and

state constitutions were committed by threats, intimidation and/or coercion by

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Defendants. (Dkt. No. 23, SAC ¶ 79.) 

While Plaintiff does not address this issue in his brief, he raises facts in support

of his separate statement of undisputed facts on this issue. (Dkt. No. 60-2.) However,

these facts are not material to a cause of action under section 52.1 and do not support

Plaintiff’s allegations. In essence, Plaintiff has not opposed or met his burden in

opposing Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment for violation of section

52.1. 

California Civil Code section 52.1 establishes a private right of action for

damages and other relief against a person who “interferes by threats, intimidation, or

coercion,” or attempts to interfere, with the exercise or enjoyment of a individual’s

constitutional or other legal right. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. If there are no federal

constitutional violations and no conduct that constitutes a state constitutional violation,

there is no conduct upon which to base a claim for liability under California Civil Code

section 52.1. Reynolds v. Cnty. of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1996),

overruled on other grounds by Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc)). Section 52.1 does not provide any substantive protections; it allows

individuals to sue for damages due to constitutional violations. Id. at 1170. 

Here, the Court concluded that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a federal

constitutional violation as to false arrest, inadequate medical care, and malicious

prosecution. Therefore, to the extent that the section 52.1 claim is based on these three

constitutional causes of action, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for partial

summary judgment. Defendants further argue, without legal authority, that there can

be no section 52.1 liability for excessive force, by itself. Since the excessive force

cause of action is not before the Court, it is not clear how Plaintiff will raise the section

52.1 issue as to excessive force. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion

for partial summary judgment as to section 52.1 on the excessive force cause of action. 

E. Qualified Immunity

Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

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Since the Court findsthat Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact

asto all causes of action brought on Defendants’ motion for partialsummary judgment,

the Court need not address whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

F. Evidentiary Objections

Defendants filed evidentiary objections to evidence submitted by Plaintiff. (Dkt.

No. 63.) The Court notes their objections. To the extent that the evidence is proper

under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court considered the evidence. To the extent

that the evidence is not proper, the Court did not consider it. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants

County of San Diego, Lopatosky and Butcher’s motion for partial summary judgment. 

The Court GRANTS the entirety of Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment

with the exception that the Court DENIES all Defendants’ motion on the state law cause

of action for violation of section 52.1 based on excessive force. The hearing date set

for April 10, 2015 shall be vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 9, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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