Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00770/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00770-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRED FULFORD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DON M. GRIFFITH, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 16-0770 MEJ (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at the California Medical Facility, filed this pro se civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against medical staff at San Quentin State Prison

(“SQSP”), where he was previously incarcerated. He has been granted leave to proceed in

forma pauperis in a separate order. The Court now conducts its initial review of the

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the

statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds

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upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . .

a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations

omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible

on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges the following. At some point in 2010, plaintiff was seen by his

primary care physician, defendant medical doctor Denise Reyes. During that appointment,

he complained of pain and swelling in his left foot. Dr. Reyes referred plaintiff to an SQSP

podiatrist, defendant Dr. Don M. Griffith. Dr. Griffith had x-rays taken and diagnosed

plaintiff with plantar fibromatosis in the mid-arch of his left foot. On December 15, 2010,

Dr. Griffith performed surgery on plaintiff’s left foot. After the surgery, Dr. Griffith

informed plaintiff that plaintiff had developed “serious bleeding” during the surgery “that

took some work to get stopped.” Specifically, Dr. Griffith informed plaintiff that he had to

cut deeper into the foot then he had intended and that the foot would take time to heal.

Plaintiff experienced severe pain after the surgery and reported to Dr. Griffith that the

foot was not healing. His foot went numb if he stood in one place for more than a few

minutes, and he experienced sharp pains traveling from his toes to the bottom of his foot. On

December 1, 2011, Dr. Griffith determined that plaintiff was experiencing nerve damage

from the first surgery. Dr. Griffith thereafter performed a second surgery. After the

procedure, Dr. Griffith reported to plaintiff that the surgery had gone well and there were no

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problems.

A few days after the surgery, however, plaintiff’s foot swelled again and he was

unable to put weight on the foot. The swelling became so severe that his toe nails popped off

and his third toe released blood and puss. Plaintiff had another set of x-rays taken, at which

point plaintiff learned that a piece of bone had been removed from his third toe, leaving his

toe deformed. Plaintiff continues to experience pain in his foot on a daily basis. He alleges

that Dr. Griffith finally admitted that “he had done the wrong surgery on [plaintiff’s] foot but

would not tell [plaintiff] why he had cut so deep nor why he had cut the bone out of

[plaintiff’s] toes.”

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976). A “serious medical need” exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104),

overruled in part on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prison official is “deliberately indifferent” if he knows that

a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Neither negligence nor gross negligence warrant liability under the Eighth

Amendment. Id. at 835-36 & n4. An “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he

should have perceived but did not, . . . cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction

of punishment.” Id. at 838. Instead, “the official’s conduct must have been ‘wanton,’ which

turns not upon its effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints facing the official.” 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

302-03 (1991)). Prison officials violate their constitutional obligation only by “intentionally

denying or delaying access to medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. 

When liberally construed, the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint state a cognizable

claim that defendant Dr. Griffith was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical

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 If defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies

as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendant must raise such argument in a motion for

summary judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162

(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003),

which held that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act, should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Such a

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needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also names as defendants, Dr. Reyes

and SQSP Dr. John Cranshaw. The complaint, however, includes no facts whatsoever

linking these defendants to any of plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, they are dismissed from

the action. If plaintiff can allege facts to establish liability against Dr. Reyes and Dr.

Cranshaw, he may move to amend his pleadings. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as follows:

1. The FAC states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs as against Dr. Griffith. The Clerk shall terminate Dr.

Reyes and Dr. Cranshaw from the docket in this action.

2. The Clerk shall issue a summons and Magistrate Judge jurisdiction consent

form and the United States Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, the summons,

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction consent form, a copy of the complaint with attachments and a

copy of this order on Dr. Don. M. Griffith at San Quentin State Prison.

The Clerk also shall mail a courtesy copy of the complaint and a copy of this order to

the California Attorney General’s Office. 

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendant must

file and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for

summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have

fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. 

Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for

summary judgment).1

 

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28 motion should also incorporate a modified Wyatt notice in light of Albino. See Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120, n.14 (9th Cir. 2003); Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th

Cir. 2012).

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If defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary

judgment, defendant must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive

motion must be filed with the Court and served upon defendant no later than 28 days from

the date the motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding

summary judgment provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion

for summary judgment. 

c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion. 

4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you

must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact - that is, if there is no real

dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for

summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported

by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the

facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine

issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A). 

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5. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendant’s

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendant’s counsel. The Court may

disregard any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until

defendant’s counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document

directly to defendant, but once defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be

mailed to counsel rather than directly to defendant.

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local

Rule 16 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep

the Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of

change of address in every pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

8. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline

sought to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

9. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for 

this case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

Maria-Elena James

United States Magistrate Judge

April 11, 2016

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