Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01946/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01946-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 1

Procedure 15(a)(1), was dismissed with leave to amend. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WADE LEE WOLFE, No. CIV S-09-1946-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

PURCELL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a county jail inmate who is proceeding pro se with this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and no other party has been served or appeared in the action. 

Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. 11).1

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was dismissed as it failed to name a proper

defendant and failed to allege sufficient facts related to any defendant. He has attempted to cure

those defects in his second amended complaint, but the second amended complaint also suffers

from defects. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint named only two defendants, Purcell and the

Solano County Sheriff’s Department. In his second amended complaint, he now names the

following defendants: the California Forensic Medical Group, Inc.; Solano County Jail Medical

Department; Solano County Sheriff Coroner’s Office Custody Division; Ravinder Kadervari,

M.D.; Katrina Purcell, R.N.; Kate Cordero, R.N.; P.A. Cory; Cpt. Bevins; Lt. Marsh; Sgt.

Campbell; Sgt. Jorgensen; and Deputy Riojas-Gaxiola. While Plaintiff now names individuals as

defendants, his allegations continue to be vague. In addition, his second amended complaint,

which consists of over 120 pages including his exhibits violates Rule 8’s requirements of a short

concise statement of his claim. Plaintiff will be provided one more opportunity to cure some of

the defects in his complaint, as discussed below.

/ / /

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

It appears from the complaint that medical care at the Solano County Jail is 2

provided by California Forensic Medical Group, Inc.

3

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s alleges in his second amended complaint that he has suffered from

severe deprivation and deliberate indifference to his medical needs by the medical department at

the Solano County Jail. He claims the defendants have intentionally delayed, denied, deprived

2

and interfered with his medical treatment. He makes several vague and conclusory statements

regarding the lack of treatment he has been subjected to during the time he has been in custody. 

He appears to be complaining about the lack of medical treatment for his seizures, a lump in his

neck and hemorrhoids. He purports to give examples of how his medical treatment has been

insufficient, but the examples he gives are insufficient to cure the defects noted herein. He

claims receipt of his seizure medication was delayed for four months despite Chief Medical

Director Kadervari knowing he needed the medication. He also appears to claim that in addition

to Dr. Kadervari, Nurse Purcell, “along with other authorities and medical staff” knew of his

condition. He also continues to refer to his inmate grievances to which Dr. Kadervari and nurse

Purcell responded. 

As to the correctional staff, Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations, such as

defendants Riojas-Gaxiola and Jorgensen knowing about the lack of treatment and refusing to

remedy it. He also claims the named defendants “have all been made aware of my diognosis

[sic] and all partys [sic] showed and continue to show me delibrate [sic] indifference.” (Am.

Comp. at 8). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff was informed by the court in the previous order what was required to

state a claim for depravation of medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must

allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the

named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v.

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does

an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in

civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff

must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s

causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the

conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to

scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and

unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31

(1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth

Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of

dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement

may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must

provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical

care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,

1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively,

the official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results

in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities;

and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted

unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment,

a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or

injury, or risks of serious injury or illness, gives rise to a claim

under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see

also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as

dental and mental health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d

1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is sufficiently

serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in

further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th

Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546

(9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a

reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of

comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the

prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic

and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent

in medical needs cases than in other Eighth Amendment contexts

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

because the responsibility to provide inmates with medical care

does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. 

See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be

given to the judgment of prison officials as to decisions concerning

medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th

Cir. 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may

constitute deliberate indifference. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801

F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also

constitute deliberate indifference. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. 

Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060.

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition

does not, however, give rise to a claim under the Eighth

Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a difference

of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning

the appropriate course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth

Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332

(9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations continue to be conclusory and vague, and they fail to

inform the court and the defendants how he believes the defendants violated his Eighth

Amendment rights. He claims he was denied seizure medication for four months, even though

the defendants knew about his condition. He fails to identify, however, who denied him the

medication. While he states Dr. Kadervari and the other defendants knew of his condition,

apparently through the inmate grievance he filed, he does not specify who actually denied him

the medication. Knowledge of his condition is insufficient to support the claim that the

defendants purposefully denied him necessary medication. As this defect is curable, Plaintiff

will be provided another opportunity to amend his complaint. 

Plaintiff is advised to note that to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants

and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in

another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s

causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th

Cir. 1988).

In addition to the individuals named in the second amended complaint, Plaintiff

names the California Forensic Medical Group, Inc., Solano County Jail, and the Solano County

Sheriff’s Department as defendants. 

However, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits

brought against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks

v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition

extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t

of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state

agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

(1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th cir. 1993) (en banc).

The Eleventh Amendment also bars actions seeking damages from state officials

acting in their official capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995);

Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment

does not, however, bar suits against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id. 

Under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not

bar suits for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official

capacities. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh

Amendment also does not bar suits against cities and counties. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978). 

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

To the extent these defendant agencies are state agencies, Plaintiff cannot state a

claim against them. These defendants, as the Eleventh Amendment bars actions against them,

must be dismissed from this case. As Plaintiff will be provided one more opportunity to cure the

defects in his complaint, he can either choose to remove these agencies as defendants, or if he

continues to name them, the court will issues appropriate orders to dismiss them.

Finally, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not meet the Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8 standards. Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain a short and plain statement

of the claim. Plaintiff’s complaint refers to over 100 pages of attached documents which

purportedly support the vague allegations against the defendants. This pleading method does not,

however, satisfy the requirement of Rule 8(a) that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and

directly. To the contrary, plaintiff’s complaint would require the court to comb through over 100

pages of documents in order to even guess at plaintiff’s claims. The court is unwilling to do this

in part due to limited judicial resources but also because it is for plaintiff – not the court – to

formulate his claims. While the court had addressed above those claims which are discernable

from his complaint in order to provide Plaintiff some guidance, the court is unwilling to use the

documents attached in an attempt to provide sufficient factual support for the claims Plaintiff

appears to be raising. Rather than attaching exhibits to a complaint in support of the claims

raised therein, a complaint is required to contain a short, concise statement of the claim, with

specific factual allegations in support thereof, linking the individual defendants to the alleged

constitutional violation.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is insufficient to meet this standard. As this

defect is curable, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend his complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the

entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following

dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged

in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order

to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 15-220. An amended

complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by

amendment, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now

has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the

claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and

the court will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which

continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue appropriate

orders dismissing such claims and/or defendants from this action, as well as such other orders as

may be necessary to address the remaining claims.

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 11-110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to

comply with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule

41(b). See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s second complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file a third amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

DATED: May 4, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:09-cv-01946-CMK Document 12 Filed 05/04/10 Page 9 of 9