Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01989/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01989-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Martial Ledvina, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Town of Marana, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-01989-TUC-CKJ

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Martial Ledvina filed this civil rights Complaint alleging constitutional 

deprivations in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state-law claims against 

numerous Defendants. (Doc. 1.) On June 9, 2014, Defendant Sheriff Clarence Dupnik 

filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which Plaintiff 

opposes. (Docs. 10, 12.) On September 9, 2014, Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro 

issued a Report and Recommendation (R & R) recommending that the Motion to Dismiss 

be granted. (Doc. 19.) Plaintiff filed objections to the R & R, and Defendant has filed a 

response. (Doc. 27, 28.) 

 The Court will overrule Plaintiff’s objections, adopt the R & R, grant the Motion 

to Dismiss, and give Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint. 

I. Governing Standard 

 The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the Report and 

Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court reviews for 

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clear error the unobjected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation. Johnson v. 

Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); See also, Conley v. Crabtree, 14 

F.Supp.2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998). 

II. Factual Background and the Report and Recommendation 

The action arises from Plaintiff’s arrest on January 14, 2013, for alleged domestic 

abuse and his subsequent one-day confinement in the Pima County Adult Detention 

Complex (P.C.A.D.C.). On January 7, 2015, Plaintiff stipulated to dismiss the claims 

against the Marana Defendants—the Town of Marana, Rozeman, and Dittinger; these 

federal and state claims concerned the arrest. (Doc. 26.) The remaining claims are 

against Sheriff Dupnik for failure to provide a nurse and Plaintiff’s heart medication; 

these claims include § 1983 claims and state-law claims. (Doc. 1.) 

 The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was booked into the P.C.A.D.C. on January 

14, 2013, and released at noon on January 15, 2013. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff 

was an 83-year old man with a heart condition; he alleges he was denied medical 

attention at P.C.A.D.C. when he advised a Correctional Officer that he had a heart 

condition and needed a nurse. He did not receive his heart medication until he was 

released at noon. 

 Sheriff Dupnik moves to dismiss the § 1983 constitutional claim (Count 1, in part) 

on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that anyone at the P.C.A.D.C. 

acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and (2) Plaintiff did not 

adequately allege that Sheriff Dupnik was personally involved in or sufficiently causally 

connected to the alleged constitutional violation. (Doc. 10.) All Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s state-law claims (Counts 2-6) are time-barred by Arizona’s statute of 

limitations.1

 (Docs. 10, 15.) 

 

1

 The R & R observes that Plaintiff’s Complaint does little to explain which claims are 

alleged against which defendant and that “from the parties’ briefing it can be surmised 

that the claims specific to Sheriff Dupnik are an Eighth Amendment Civil Rights 

violation under Count 1 and Counts 3-6.” This Court finds that Count 2—battery, and 

Count 3—false imprisonment, mention only the conduct of now-dismissed Defendant 

Dittiger, not Sheriff Dupnik. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes in the Objections that because 

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 The Magistrate Judge held that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege a constitutional 

violation because it does not adequately allege the existence of harm, and it does not 

adequately allege conduct by Sheriff Dupnik connecting him to an alleged constitutional 

violation. Finally, the Magistrate Judge found that the state-law claims had accrued on 

January 14, 2013, and were therefore, time barred because the Complaint was not filed 

until March 27, 2014. (Doc. 19; Doc. 1.) 

 As to harm, the R & R states that under the applicable standard, a constitutional 

violation regarding medical care occurs when there is (1) a deliberate indifference to the 

serious medical needs of a prisoner that (2) results in “unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Although the Magistrate Judge 

held that the first part of the Estelle test had been met, he also held that Plaintiff has not 

adequately alleged a harm that satisfies the second part of the Estelle test. Noting that a 

plaintiff need not allege or prove substantial harm, the Magistrate Judge correctly held 

that alleged indifference to the serious medical need must have resulted in a more than de 

minimis Eighth Amendment harm. The Magistrate Judge found that the only harm 

alleged in the Complaint is temporary “anxiety” precipitated by P.C.A.D.C. staff’s refusal 

to provide heart medication in a timely fashion; he did not allege that he experienced any 

pain, or that he suffered further medical complications due to this anxiety. Mere delay in 

receiving treatment or care is insufficient to state a claim unless that delay was harmful. 

See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 The Magistrate Judge also found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim because he 

did not adequately allege that Sheriff Dupnik was personally involved in or causally 

related to the alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff is suing Sheriff Dupnik in his 

individual and official capacities. As to individual liability, the Magistrate Judge noted 

that a “plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based 

upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his 

 

the Marana Defendants have been dismissed, the only state-law claims remaining are 

Counts 4-6. (Doc. 27 at 5.) 

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or her subordinates.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). A defendant may be liable if: (1) he is personally 

involved in the constitutional violation; or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection 

between his conduct and the violation. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 

1989). 

 The Magistrate Judge found that although the Complaint must adequately allege a 

sufficient causal connection between Sheriff Dupnik’s acts and the constitutional 

violation, Plaintiff’s Complaint does no more than state conclusory allegations not 

entitled to a presumption of truth when considered during a motion to dismiss and it does 

not offer adequate (or any) factual foundation upon which these conclusions rest. The 

Complaint baldly alleges that: (1) Defendant maintained polices and/or long standing 

practices or customs that resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s rights; (2) those polices, 

practices, and customs were inadequate; and (3) those polices, practices, and customs 

demonstrated deliberate indifference. (Doc. 1 at 5.) And as to an official-capacity claim, 

the Magistrate Judge found only bald assertions. He also rejected Plaintiff’s argument 

that he should be permitted to do discovery first. 

 The Magistrate Judge also found that the state-law claims are barred by the statute 

of limitations; in Arizona, all actions against public entities and public employees “shall 

be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 12-821. The parties disputed when the statute of limitations accrued for each 

claim. The Magistrate Judge held that they all accrued on January 14, 2013, because 

Plaintiff was present and aware of the injury and by whom it was inflicted. 

III. Objections, Response, and Analysis 

 A. Constitutional Claim 

In his Objections, as to harm, Plaintiff argues that his Complaint alleges “much 

anxiety, “severe emotional distress,” “mental distress,” and “suffering” and that this 

psychological pain is sufficient to state a claim. (Doc. 27 at 3.) It appears to this Court 

that Hudson v. McMillian, which is cited in the R & R and which involved use of force, is 

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not relevant to the issue here. 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). In Hudson the Supreme Court held 

that de minimis uses of physical force were generally not prohibited by the constitution; 

on the other hand, the Court held that extent of the inmate’s injuries provided no basis for 

dismissal of his § 1983 claim for excessive force. Id. at 9-10. In Oliver v. Keller, 

however, the Ninth Circuit held that a claim for a constitutional violation as to conditions 

of confinement requires a showing of more than de minimis harm. 289 F.3d 623, 627 

(9th Cir. 2002). The Oliver court also construed 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which provides 

that a prisoner may not bring a civil action for mental or emotional injury without a prior 

showing of “physical injury.” The court held that this means that a prisoner may not 

obtain compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury if the “physical injury” is 

de minimis. But the physical injury requirement applies only to claims for mental or 

emotional injuries and does not bar claims for compensatory, nominal or punitive 

damages. Id. at 630. In Oliver, the Court determined that even absent physical injury, a 

prisoner was entitled to seek compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages premised on 

violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 629-30. 

 Here, as the Magistrate Judge correctly found, the only harm that Plaintiff alleged 

that is clearly related to the incident at P.C.A.D.C. is “much anxiety.’’ (Doc. 1 ¶14.) The 

Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that, without more, this is de minimis harm and 

fails to state a claim. The Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection. 

 The Court also agrees that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim 

because they do not tie Sheriff Dupnik’s conduct to any alleged constitutional violation.2

 

To state a claim against a supervisory official, the civil rights complainant must allege 

that the supervisory official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or 

that the supervisory official was aware of widespread abuses and, with deliberate 

indifference to the inmate=s constitutional rights, failed to take action to prevent further 

 

2

 In addition, the Complaint makes no specific allegations against any of the Doe 

Defendants. 

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misconduct. See Ortez v. Washington County, Or., 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 

(9th Cir. 1987); see also Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978). Individual liability hinges upon a defendant’s participation in the deprivation of a 

constitutional right. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). 

This participation may involve setting in motion acts that cause others to inflict 

constitutional injury. Id. On the other hand, a suit against a municipal officer or official 

in that person’s official capacity is treated as a suit against the entity of which the 

municipal officer or official is an agent. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55; Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). However, although “a municipality can be sued 

under § 1983, . . . it cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the 

constitutional injury.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and 

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 

446 (9th Cir. 1996) rev=d on other grounds, 523 U.S. 835 (1998). In an official-capacity 

suit, a defendant’s liability is connected to the entity’s policy or custom that played a part 

in the violation of federal law. McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1986). 

 An unconstitutional policy need not be formal or written to create municipal 

liability under § 1983; however, it must be so permanent and well settled as to constitute 

a custom or usage with the force of law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-

68, (1970). And “[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient 

to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was 

caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed 

to a municipal policy maker.” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985); see

Avalos v. Baca, No. 07-56511 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2010) (quoting Avalos v. Baca, 517 F. 

Supp. 2d 1156, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 

 In his Objections, Plaintiff again asserts that he should be permitted to do 

discovery and that “there is a logical presumption that policies exist governing the giving 

of medication to jail inmates.” (Doc. 27 at 4.) While the P.C.A.D.C. no doubt has 

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dozens of policies and practices, the Court disagrees that the Complaint is sufficient to 

survive the Motion to Dismiss. As the Magistrate Judge observed, to adequately state an 

official-capacity claim, a complaint must do more than “simply recite the elements of a 

cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts.” AE ex rel. 

Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). “Plaintiff’s Complaint 

does no more than baldly assert the elements of such a claim without providing any 

factual support.” (Doc. 19 at 9; ref. Doc. 1 ¶20.) 

 In fact, the Complaint does not even generally describe the alleged P.C.A.D.C. 

policy or practice that resulted in Plaintiff not receiving his medication. The Court 

believes this is a particularly significant deficiency where the allegations of the 

Complaint show that Plaintiff was at the P.C.A.D.C. for a single day, and he alleges that 

on the day he did not receive medication, he “observed several inmates going up to see 

the nurse but, he was never called up.” (Doc. 1 ¶14.) In other words, the facts alleged 

suggest that the policy or practice is to provide health care. As Plaintiff himself notes, 

the facts alleged “must show that a violation is plausible, not just possible.” (Doc. 27 at 

4, citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not 

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Id.

 The Complaint fails to adequately state a claim. But because Plaintiff may be able 

to amend the Complaint to state a claim, leave to amend will be granted. 

B. State-Law Claims 

 Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge dismissing the state-law claims with 

prejudice, but the argument is difficult to comprehend as it applies to the remaining statelaw claims against Sheriff Dupnik. Plaintiff first acknowledges that the claims against 

the Marana Defendants have been dismissed and that the remaining state-law claims are 

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Counts 4 through 6 (intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and gross 

negligence). He then argues that 

the actions of the Marana Defendants were a precipitating element of the 

legal analysis and steps taken by Plaintiff. Specifically, the state law claims 

of Battery and False Imprisonment, if not legally justified by the Marana 

Defendants, form the basis of the cause of action against them. . . If the 

Magistrate’s application of the law is correct, and a claim for false arrest 

and imprisonment accrues on the date of arrest, a person who believes he 

has been wrongfully arrested would be forced to lodge a notice of claim 

while the criminal prosecution is ongoing. . . and to plead the factual and 

legal theories of liability underlying his civil claims, he would have to 

discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding his prosecution and, in 

doing so, would waive his Fifth Amendment right not to discuss the 

criminal case. Requiring the date a cause of action accrues in a civil case 

where criminal charges were filed against the Plaintiff to be strictly 

determined to be the date of Plaintiff’s arrest would require such Plaintiffs 

to be unlawfully forced to choose between two fundamental rights. 

(Doc. 27 at 5-6.) He concludes that “[a]s it pertains to the state law claims against 

Defendant Dupnik, Plaintiff maintains that judicial economy and public policy favor the 

joining of all known and available tortfeasors as defendants in one action and that 

whenever possible, all claims should be disposed of in one action and that when the cause 

of action accrues is usually a question for the jury.” (Id. at 7.) 

 The Court overrules this objection. The claims against the Marana Defendants 

have been dismissed by stipulation. And as the Magistrate Judge held, in this case, the 

dismissal of the criminal charges had no relevance to Plaintiff’s knowledge of the alleged 

damage and cause for the claims against Sheriff Dupnik for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, negligence, or gross negligence; the elements for the claims were 

known to Plaintiff on January 14 or 15, 2013. The Complaint was not filed until March 

27, 2014. (Doc. 1.) Thus, the claims against Sheriff Dupnik are barred by the statute of 

limitations. The Court need not address the findings in the R & R regarding the claims 

against the dismissed Defendants. 

 Accordingly, 

/// 

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IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 19) is adopted. 

 (2) Defendant Sheriff Dupnik’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is granted; the 

state-law claims in the Complaint are dismissed with prejudice, and the federal 

constitutional claim is dismissed with leave to amend the Complaint. 

 (3) Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this Order to file a first amended 

complaint. 

 (4) Defendants Town of Marana, Rozeman, and Dittiger’s Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 15) is denied as moot. 

 Dated this 2nd day of February, 2015. 

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