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Nature of Suit Code: 210
Nature of Suit: Land Condemnation
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED Unit~d States Co~wt of Appeals 

Tenth CL·; •'lt 

AUG 16 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

ROBERT L. HOECKEL 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

1002.35 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR 

LESS, SITUATE IN WASHINGTON 

COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA; 

CLYDE G. LAYTON, et. al., and 

all unknown owners; TOG GEORGE, 

Trustee for the benefit of 

Allied Bank of Texas, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

75.00 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR 

LESS, SITUATE IN WASHINGTON 

COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA; 

FITZ-LOWE, INC., a corporation, 

et. al., and Unknown Owners; 

TOG GEORGE, Trustee for the 

benefit of Allied Bank of Texas, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 90-5019 

(D.C. No. 79-C-688-E) 

No. 90-5020 

(D.C. No. 79-C-689-E) 

Appellate Case: 90-5021 Document: 01019731406 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 1 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

2560.00 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR 

LESS, SITUATE IN WASHINGTON 

COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA; 

THOMAS CONNELLY WALLINGFORD; 

EARL G. WALLINGFORD, III; 

GEORGE WALTER WALLINGFORD; 

CLAIRE L. WALLINGFORD, et. al., 

and Unknown owners; DR. EARL 

LAUGHLIN, JR.; CYDE G. LAYTON; 

R. M. LAYTON; WILLIAM DOUGLAS 

LAYTON; LAYTON OIL COMPANY, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 90-5021 

(D.C. No. 79-C-687-E) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C. 

(Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, Nancy Nesbitt Blevins, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Jacques B. Glein 

and Robert L. Klarquist, Assistant Attorneys General, Washington, 

D.C., with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

James E. Poe, Covington & Poe, Tulsa, Oklahoma, (John s. Athens, 

Bruce w. Freeman, Conner & Winters, Donald M. Bingham, Stephanie L. 

Theban, Chapel, Riggs, Abney, Neal & Turpen, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with 

him on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees. 

TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and KANE, Senior District Judge* 

KANE, Senior District Judge 

*Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., United States Senior District Judge 

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5021 Document: 01019731406 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 2 
This is an appeal from the district court's order granting the 

landowners' petition for attorney fees and related expenses, 

including expenses for expert witnesses and consultants, in the 

total amount of $295,647.37. Jurisdiction is admitted. It is 

based on 28 u.s.c. § 1291. The question presented for review is 

whether Subsection (d) (2) (H) of Section 2412 of the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (EAJA), 28 u.s.c. § 2412(d) (2) (H), controls the award 

of attorney fees and expenses in cases pending when the subsection 

was added to the statute by the Equal Access to Justice Act, 

Extension and Amendment (1985 EAJA Amendments), Pub. L. No. 99-80, 

99 Stat. 183 (1985). The standard of review in this purely legal 

issue is de novo. See Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266, 1267 (10th 

Cir. 1988) (district court's application of correct legal standard 

under EAJA reviewed de novo). 

The facts underlying this controversy are set forth in our 

earlier opinion in this case. See United States v. 2,560.00 Acres 

of Land, More or Less, situate in Washington County, Okla., 836 

F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1988). We repeat only those necessary to our 

resolution of this appeal. 

These consolidated condemnation actions were commenced by the 

United States in the fall of 1979. The cases were referred to a 

commission for trial. The commission found that, al though the 

government's complaints and declarations of taking expressly 

subordinated only 3,637 subsurface acres, the taking would also 

adversely affect the value of an additional 1,995.53 acres. The 

government presented cumulative valuation testimony of $326, 000 and 

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Appellate Case: 90-5021 Document: 01019731406 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 3 
$441,000, while the landowners' expert valued the takings at nearly 

$11, 000, 000 in all. The commission recommended an award of 

$4,890,000, with one commissioner filing a minority report valuing 

the landowners' interests at $927,000. The United States filed 

objections to the commission report which were overruled by the 

district court. Final judgment entered on May 3, 1985. 

The United States appealed to this Court, which affirmed the 

district court on January 4, 1988. The cases then returned to the 

district court for disposition of pending petitions for attorney 

fees. The various landowners had filed petitions seeking attorney 

fees under EAJA shortly after the district court had entered final 

judgment on May 3, 1985, but before Congress had enacted the 1985 

EAJA Amendments. The 1985 EAJA Amendments added Subsection 

(d) (2) (H) which provides that a landowner may be considered a 

prevailing party for EAJA purposes in eminent domain proceedings 

only if the ultimate award is as close or closer to the valuation 

which the landowner advocated at trial than that award is to the 

figure for which the government contended. The ultimate amounts 

awarded to each of the three groups of landowner interests were all 

closer to the government's dollar amounts testified to at trial 

than they were to the valuation figures testified to on behalf of 

the landowners. 

The district court referred the attorney fee petitions to a 

magistrate for a recommendation. The United States objected to the 

landowners' EAJA petitions, contending, among other things, that 

the landowners were not the prevailing parties within the meaning 

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Appellate Case: 90-5021 Document: 01019731406 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 4 
of Subsection (d) (2) (H) because the ultimate award of $4,890,096 

was closer to the government's high valuation testimony of $441,000 

than it was to the landowners' testimony of almost $11 million. 

on September 29, 1988, the magistrate recommended that 

attorneys fees and related expenses be awarded to the landowners 

under the EAJA. Regarding the government's contention that no fees 

may be awarded under EAJA because the landowners were not the 

"prevailing parties" within the meaning of Subsection (d) (2) (H), 

the magistrate found "that the 1985 amendment is not binding in 

this case, as the issues arose and were resolved well in advance of 

the amendment." The magistrate further stated "[t}he question thus 

becomes, prior to 1985, at the time of this trial, what standard 

was applied to determine 'prevailing party'?" The magistrate then 

applied the standard which the Fifth Circuit had earlier adopted in 

United States v. 329. 73 Acres of Land, Situated in Grenada & 

Yalobusha Counties, Miss., 704 F.2d 800, 809 (5th Cir. 1983), under 

which a landowner is considered the prevailing party for EAJA 

purposes if he succeeds in recovering "far more than the government 

had offered or admitted liability for in a condemnation case." 

Under this standard, the magistrate found the landowners must be 

considered to be the prevailing parties as they recovered millions 

more than the government had offered. The magistrate acknowledged 

that this sum was less than half of what was sought by the 

landowners, but, he reasoned, under the 329.73 Acres standard, "g, 

strict numerical analysis is not the standard to be applied. 11 The 

magistrate also found that the position of the United States was 

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Appellate Case: 90-5021 Document: 01019731406 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 5 
not substantially justified. 

The United States objected to the magistrate's recommendation. 

The district court, by order entered November 30, 1988, adopted the 

magistrate's report and recommendation. As to the government's 

argument concerning the "prevailing party" issue, the court stated: 

Although this Court is of the opinion that the 1985 

amendments to the Equal Access to Justice Act should 

normally be applied retroactively, this Court finds that 

such retroactive application would in this case result in 

manifest injustice and thus the new definition of 

"prevailing party" should not properly be applied. See 

Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 

94 s.ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed. 476 (1974). 

The district court found the landowners were the prevailing 

parties and that the government's position was not substantially 

justified. Further proceedings were held for the purposes of 

determining the reasonableness of attorney hours properly compensable under EAJA, as well as related expenses. Final orders awarding 

attorney fees and related costs were entered on December 5, 1989. 

It is not necessary for us to review the district court's 

finding that the government's position was not substantially 

justified. Such review is limited to determining whether the trial 

court abused its discretion. See Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d at 

1267. For the specific purposes of this appeal, however, we accept 

the finding. 

A party may be awarded attorney fees and related costs and 

expenses under Subsection (d) of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 

28 u.s.c. § 2412(d), only if it is the "prevailing party" and the 

position of the United States was not "substantially justified." 

See United States v. Charles Gyurman Land & Cattle Co., 836 F.2d 

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Appellate Case: 90-5021 Document: 01019731406 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 6 
480, 483 (10th cir. 1987) . Here the condemnation award of 

$4,890,000 was closer to the government's highest figure attested 

to at trial ($441,000) than it is to the landowners' figure of 

almost $11 million. Hence, as the magistrate's report and the 

district court's confirming order acknowledge, the landowners 

cannot be prevailing parties if Subsection (d) (2) (H) is applicable. 

The district court found, however, that the provision was not 

applicable. 

Section 7 of the 1985 EAJA Amendments states that the 

amendments "shall apply to cases pending on or commenced on or 

after the date of the enactment of the (amending] Act (August 5, 

1985]. 11 Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 7(a), 99 Stat. at 186. Although the 

district court had entered judgment in this case on May 3, 1985, 

the government's appeals and the EAJA fee petitions were still 

pending when the 1985 EAJA Amendments were enacted. A case is a 

"pending" one for the purposes of applying the 1985 EAJA Amendments 

if an appeal on the merits was pending when the Amendments were 

enacted. United states v. 1,378.65 Acres of Land, More or Less, 

Situate in Vernon County, Mo., 794 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1986). 

Moreover, we have repeatedly applied the 1985 EAJA Amendments in 

cases where the only matter still pending before the district court 

on the date that the Amendments were enacted was the attorney fee 

petition. Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 968 n.1 (10th Cir. 

1987). 

The First Circuit's decision in United States v. 6.93 Acres of 

Land, 852 F.2d 633 (1988), is on point. That decision concerned 

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Appellate Case: 90-5021 Document: 01019731406 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 7 
two condemnation actions where the litigation on the merits had 

concluded in January 1984 and May 1984, respectively. In each 

case, the landowners had received awards which were substantially 

greater than the figures which the government had advocated at 

trial, but which were nonetheless still closer to the government's 

testimony than to the values advanced at trial on behalf of the 

landowners. Al though the fee petitions had been filed in the first 

half of 1984, the district court did not rule upon them until 1987, 

when it granted them over the government's objections. Id. at 633-

34. 

The First Circuit reversed, holding that Subsection (d) (2) (H) 

governs the disposition of the pending EAJA petitions. The court 

first noted that Section 7 of the 1985 EAJA Amendments expressly 

provides that the Amendments shall apply to pending cases. Id. at 

634. Accordingly, the court found, Subsection (d) (2) (H) must be 

applied, following the enactment of the Amendments, to determine 

the "prevailing party" whenever a court rules upon EAJA petitions 

in condemnation actions, including cases where the fee petition was 

the only remaining i tern on the docket when the Amendments were 

enacted. Id. at 635-36. 

The district court here acknowledged that the 1985 Amendments 

should normally be applied to pending cases. The court, however, 

citing Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), 

refused to apply Subsection (d) (2) (H) because application of that 

provision here would result in "manifest injustice." 

Bradley is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the Court, 

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Appellate Case: 90-5021 Document: 01019731406 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 8 
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in stating that existing law will normally be applied except when 

such applications would result in "manifest injustice," was 

considering a statute which disclosed no express direction by 

Congress whether it was applicable to pending cases. See id. at 

716, n. 23. Here, however, Section 7 of the 1985 EAJA Amendments 

expressly directs that the Amendments are to apply to pending 

cases. 

Courts are not at liberty to create exceptions to the application of a statute when Congress expressly directs its application. 

Absent constitutional defects, courts will give effect to a statute 

as Congress has written it. Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 

386, 398 ( 1984) . In instances where Congress is silent or the 

statute is ambiguous, courts can proceed by assuming that Congress 

authorizes them to prevent manifest injustice. Where, however, 

Congress expressly provides, as it did in the 1985 EAJA Amendments, 

that a statute "shall apply to cases pending on or commenced on or 

after the date of the enactment," courts have no choice but to 

follow its dictates. 

According to the unambiguous terms of the statute, the 

landowners were not the prevailing parties. The district court had 

no authority to exempt the parties from the application of the 

statute in order to prevent manifest injustice. Accordingly, the 

order of the district court granting the landowners' petition for 

attorney fees and related expenses is REVERSED. 

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