Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02933/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02933-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Antonio Martinez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 04-2933-PHX-MHM (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Antonio Martinez has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. #1. Following a jury trial in Maricopa County Superior

Court, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and five counts of

misdemeanor endangerment. Doc. #7, Exh. G at 3. On April 6, 2001, Petitioner was

sentenced to concurrent terms of 10.5 years on each of the aggravated assault convictions.

Id. at 12. Regarding the endangerment convictions, Petitioner received "terminal

dispositions" given that he had already served more jail time than what the sentencing judge

imposed. Id. 

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The only issue

Petitioner raised in his direct appeal was whether the trial court properly instructed the jury

on the affirmative defense of justification-crime prevention. Doc. #7, Exh. H. In a published

Case 2:04-cv-02933-MHM Document 8 Filed 11/16/05 Page 1 of 9
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opinion, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petioner's claim and affirmed his convictions.

State v. Martinez, 202 Ariz. 507, 47 P.3d 1145 (App. 2002). A petition for review to the

Arizona Supreme Court was denied on December 3, 2002. Doc. #7, Exh. K.

On July 8, 2002, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. Doc. #7, Exh.

L. The public defender appointed to represent Petitioner in the state post-conviction

proceedings filed a notice on September 27, 2002, indicating that after reviewing the record,

he was unable to find any claims for relief to raise. Doc. #7, Exh. N. He further requested

that the trial court extend the time to file a post-conviction petition to allow Petitioner to file

a pro se petition. Id. The trial court granted the request and set November 4, 2002, as the

deadline for Petitioner to file his pro se petition. Doc. #7, Exh. O. Petitioner did not file his

pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief until December 24, 2002. Doc. #7, Exh. P. He

raised one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. In a minute entry issued on March

4, 2003, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction proceedings because the petition was

untimely. Doc. #7, Exh. Q. On March 24, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. #7, Exh. R. The Court of Appeals denied review on

April 8, 2004. Doc. #7, Exh. V.

On December 20, 2004, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

#1) in this court. Petitioner's claims are all contained in Ground One of the petition. He

alleges generally that his Sixth Amendment right to representation by a competent attorney

has been violated, though it is not clear if each of the three specific claims he raises is

intended to be an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner first claims that his

attorney "misrepresented" him with respect to discrepancies that existed between the police

reports and the 9-1-1 call. Second, Petitioner contends that the judge to whom the case was

initially assigned was changed before trial. Third, Petitioner alleges that after the police

report was submitted to prosecutors, the charges became more serious. On March 7, 2005,

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. #7. Petitioner has

not filed a reply.

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In its published opinion, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the

case:

Antonio Sanchez Martinez ("defendant") and a co-worker, Lesesma,

drank some beer together at Ledesma's home after work on September 6, 2000.

While at Ledesma's home, defendant called his girlfriend and argued with her.

After the call, the girlfriend telephoned the police and accused defendant of

committing a crime.

Defendant went home around 9:30 p.m. He lived in a trailer in a remote

area. Approximately one hour later (and two and one-half hours after the

girlfriend's call to the police), two police officers arrived at defendant's

residence. The officers parked their marked patrol car in a well lit area that

could be seen from the north window of defendant's trailer. The officers, in

uniform, knocked several times on defendant's door. The officers announced

who they were and asked defendant to come out.

Instead of opening the door, defendant fired one shot in the direction of

one of the officers. As other officers were dispatched to the situation, the two

initial officers heard defendant speaking in Spanish and English to someone

on the phone. Apparently, defendant had been calling Ledesma and 9-1-1.

At 11:23 p.m., defendant fired another shot through the trailer's

window. Defendant finally came out of his residence when ordered several

times to do so by a Spanish speaking detective over a bullhorn. Defendant

struggled with the officers. Defendant's speech was slurred, his eyes were

bloodshot, and there was a strong odor of alcohol on his breath.

Martinez, 202 Ariz. at 508-09, 47 P.3d at 1146-47.

 DISCUSSION

In their answer, Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his

claims by failing to raise two of the claims in the state court and by failing to file a timely

state petition for post-conviction relief. Before reaching the procedural default question,

however, the court will address the statute of limitations in light of a recent U.S. Supreme

Court case that applies here. 

A. Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A state prisoner must file a federal petition within one year from

"the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). However, "[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

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 "[T]he period of 'direct review' in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period

within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition." Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on

December 3, 2002, and under Supreme Court Rule 13, Petitioner had ninety days from that

date to file a petition for writ of certiorari.

2

 Rule 32.4(c)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure states that when a court

receives notice from counsel concluding no colorable claims can be raised, the court shall

grant petitioner 45 days from the date of the notice to file a pro se petition. The time can be

extended only upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32.4(c)(2).

Here, the court gave Petitioner 38 days from the date of the notice (9/27/02 to 11/4/02) to file

the pro se petition. However, because Petitioner did not file his petition until December 24,

2002, the extra seven days required under Rule 32.4(c)(2) would not have made a difference.

The petition for post-conviction relief still would have been untimely, producing the same

result.

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pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward" the limitations period.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Lott, 304 F.3d at 921. A state petition that is not filed

within the state's required time limit is not "properly filed" and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005). "When

a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, 'that [is] the end of the matter' for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2)." Id.

Here, the period for seeking direct review ended on March 3, 2003.1 Petitioner

therefore had one year from that date to file his federal habeas petition. Petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) because his state petition for post-conviction

relief was not "properly filed." After Petitioner's post-conviction attorney notified the trial

court that he found no issues to raise, the court issued a minute entry granting Petitioner until

November 4, 2002 to file his petition.2

 Doc. #7, Exh. O. Petitioner, however, failed to file

the petition until December 24, 2002. Doc. #7, Exh. P. The court then dismissed the petition

as untimely and the state court of appeals denied review. Doc. #7, Exh. Q, V. Without

statutory tolling during the pendency of his state post-conviction petition, and absent any

other basis to toll the statute of limitations, Petitioner's federal habeas petition was due no

later than March 3, 2004. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on December 20, 2004, more

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than nine months after the deadline. Based on Petitioner's failure to file his habeas petition

within the statute of limitations period, the court will recommend that the petition be

dismissed as untimely. 

Respondents did not raise a statute of limitations defense in their answer, presumably

because Pace, supra, was decided after their answer was filed. Nor has Petitioner presented

anything to refute a statute of limitations defense. Therefore, in an abundance of caution,

rather than relying solely on a violation of the statue of limitations, the court will also address

whether Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted. 

B. Procedural Default 

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). "[T]he state

prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents

those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

842 (1999). To properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims

to the state's highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Id. at 848. In Arizona, a

petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly

pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is

based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). 

If a petitioner has merely failed to exhaust available state court remedies, he may be

able to return to the state court to present his claims. Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376

(9th Cir. 2002). However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy

were he to return to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted.

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Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe, 314 F.3d at 376 (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court may decline to consider these claims unless

the petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause

for his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

A procedural default may also occur when a petitioner raises a federal claim in state

court but the state court declines to address the claim because the petitioner failed to meet

a state procedural requirement. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Federal habeas review is

precluded "if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the

federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Id. at 729. A state procedural bar

is "adequate" if the rule is "clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of

petitioner's purported default." Well v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). As with

defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, a federal court may still review the merits of

a defaulted claim based on a state procedural bar if the petitioner can establish cause and

prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

1. Claim One

Petitioner alleges in his first claim that his trial attorney provided ineffective

assistance by failing to argue the discrepancies between what was written in the police report

and what was recorded on the 9-1-1 tape. Petitioner raised this claim in his pro se state

petition for post-conviction relief. Doc. #7, Exh. P. He claims that highlighting the

discrepancies would have provided more support for his justification defense. Id. 

Although Petitioner raised the claim in the state court, the trial judge denied the

petition containing the claim because it was not filed before the deadline. Doc. #7, Exh. Q.

After Petitioner's post-conviction counsel filed a notice indicating he found no colorable

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3

 As noted in Footnote 2, Rule 32.4(c)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

requires the court to grant a 45 day extension under these circumstances. Here, Petitioner's

counsel requested only a 30 day extension for Petitioner to file a pro se petition. Doc. #7,

Exh. N. Although the court did not grant the full 45 days in this case, the petition was filed

more than a month after the 45 days expired and thus would still have been untimely under

the state procedural rules. 

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claims, the trial judge extended the deadline to file a pro se petition to November 4, 2002.3

When Petitioner failed to file his petition by the deadline, the trial court dismissed the postconviction proceedings. Doc. #7, Exh. Q. 

The timeliness ground relied on by the trial court to dismiss the post-conviction

petition is clearly independent of the federal question raised by Petitioner. Additionally, the

court finds that this state procedural bar is "adequate" in that a timely post-conviction petition

is a clear and well-established state procedural requirement. Accordingly, Petitioner's first

claim is procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner's habeas petition fails to show cause for the default, actual prejudice, or a

miscarriage of justice. Moreover, because Petitioner failed to file a reply, he has not

addressed Respondents' evidence of procedural default. Based on the procedural default and

the absence of a valid reason to excuse it, the court will recommend that the first claim be

denied.

2. Claims Two and Three

Petitioner alleges in his second claim that his trial and sentencing judge was different

from the judge that was initially assigned to the case. In his third claim, Petitioner contends

that he was charged with more serious offenses after the police report was submitted to the

prosecutors. Although Petitioner includes both of these claims under a general ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, it is not clear whether Petitioner is raising these as independent

constitutional claims or as issues that his counsel failed to raise. Regardless, none of these

claims were raised in either his direct appeal or the state post-conviction proceedings. See

Doc. #7, Exh. H, P. Petitioner therefore has failed to provide the state court with the

opportunity to address these claims. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731 ("This exhaustion

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4

 The time has passed to file requests for post-conviction relief in state court under

Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that

any of the exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

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requirement is also grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should

have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal

rights.").

By failing to "fairly present" his second and third claims to the state court, Petitioner

has not exhausted his state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a

remedy if he returned to the state court.4

 As a result, the claims are procedurally defaulted.

Because Petitioner has not shown cause for the default, actual prejudice, or a miscarriage of

justice, the court will recommend that these claims be denied.

B. Conclusion

The court concludes that Petitioner failed to file his federal habeas petition within the

statute of limitations period. The court further concludes that even if the habeas petition was

timely, the claims in the petition are procedurally defaulted. For these reasons, the court will

recommend that the petition be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 14th day of November, 2005.

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