Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04009/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff was actually transferred to PBSP pursuant to the

Interstate Corrections Compact (Compact). (Young Decl., Ex. E at AG

0045.) However, both parties refer to the WICC when addressing

Plaintiff's claims. Except for the enumeration of signatories on the

WICC, the WICC and the Compact are identical in purpose and

construction, and both have been adopted by California and New Mexico.

See Cal. Penal Code §§ 11189, 11190. Therefore, the Court will

address Plaintiff's claim under the WICC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GOVERNOR ARNOLD

SCHWARZENEGGER, ET AL.,

Defendants. ___________________________

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No. C 05-4009 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Docket nos. 56, 64)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ricky Garcia is a prisoner of the State of New

Mexico who is incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP) under

the authority of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact

(WICC),1 which is a cooperative agreement enacted by participating

states to "improve their institutional facilities and provide

programs of sufficiently high quality for the confinement,

treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders." Cal.

Penal Code § 11190 art. I. As part of the WICC, participating

states provide facilities and programs on a cooperative basis in

order to serve the best interests of the offenders and society. 

Id. 

Plaintiff has filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional rights violations by

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PBSP prison officials and employees of the Departmental Review

Board (DRB) within the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR). 

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants'

motions are GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2003, Plaintiff filed a prior civil rights action against

New Mexico Corrections Department defendants alleging

unconstitutional classification and denial of recreation since he

was transferred to PBSP in 1994. See Garcia v. Lemaster, 439 F.3d

1215, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006). Among other claims, he alleged that

the defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

by unlawfully confining him in administrative segregation for

seventeen years and by denying him a classification hearing in

accordance with New Mexico law during his incarceration in

California. See id. at 1216. The New Mexico district court

granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Id.

at 1216-17. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed

and held that Plaintiff did not have a state-created liberty

interest in conditions of confinement in accord with New Mexico

regulations because the "[a]pplication of California's procedures

to out-of-state inmates housed in California prisons does not

impose an 'atypical and significant hardship' on such prisoners." 

Id. at 1219 (citation omitted).

On October 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed the present action.

In an Order dated February 24, 2006, the Court found that

Plaintiff's allegations presented cognizable claims for relief for: 

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 The Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program has been renamed the Pro

Se Prisoner Settlement Program.

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(1) the denial of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process

based on his indeterminate detention in the Security Housing Unit

(SHU); (2) the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment based on the alleged physical and

psychological injuries stemming from his prolonged SHU confinement;

(3) a conspiracy by prison officials to deprive him of these

rights; (4) the violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment

based on the compelled withdrawal and maintenance of his DNA in a

California database; (5) the deprivation of a state-created liberty

interest under the WICC; and (6) supplemental state law claims

based on PBSP officials' failure to comply with New Mexico

Corrections Department regulations. The Court dismissed all other

claims.

The Court found Plaintiff had named and directly linked to his

allegations the following Defendants: T. Schwartz, former PBSP

associate warden; J. Cox, PBSP correctional officer II and

classification review committee member; S. O'Dell, K.A. Nealy, T.

Fischer, former PBSP unit counselors and committee members for SHUC11 inmates; M.J. Nimrod, PBSP appeals coordinator; W.A. Duncan,

DRB Deputy Director of the Institution Division; L. Rianda, DRB

Chief of the Classification Services Unit; R. Hickman, DRB Regional

Administrator; E. Elmer, DRB Assistant Deputy Director; and J.

Diggs, DRB Chief of the Classification Services Unit.

Plaintiff's case was referred to Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas

for mediation proceedings pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation

Program (docket no. 12).2 The parties were unable to reach an

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 To date, Defendant Schwartz has not been served. On May 3,

2006, the Office of General Counsel informed the Court that service

could not be completed on Defendant Schwartz because he was no longer

employed at PBSP. A Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of

Service of Summons was mailed to Defendant Schwartz at his new

address. However, Defendant Schwartz did not respond. Therefore, he

does not join the other Defendants in their motion to dismiss or

motion for summary judgment.

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agreement (docket no 48). 

On November 22, 2006, all Defendants except Defendant Schwartz

filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment (docket

no. 56).3

 Defendants allege in their motion to dismiss that

Plaintiff's medical claim should be dismissed as unexhausted. In

support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants claim: 

(1) the evidence shows that Plaintiff's constitutional rights have

not been violated; (2) the WICC does not create a liberty interest;

(3) Plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his DNA;

and (4) absolute and qualified immunity protect them from liability

for the acts alleged in the complaint. Defendants also allege that

Plaintiff's claims are barred by issue preclusion and by the

statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed an opposition to

Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment

(docket no. 61). Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's

opposition (docket no. 63).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 16, 1979, Plaintiff was convicted of Armed Robbery and

incarcerated at the New Mexico State Penitentiary. (Young Decl.,

Ex. C at AG 0005.) On February 2 and 3, 1980, Plaintiff took part

in a Santa Fe, New Mexico prison riot in which thirty-three inmates

died. (Id., Ex. J at AG 0139.) Plaintiff was found to be in

possession of a weapon during the riot. (Id.) 

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On February 26, 1981, Plaintiff attacked and killed an inmate. 

He also stabbed and killed the correctional officer who was

attempting to stop the fight. (Id., Ex. D at AG 0019-20.) 

Plaintiff was convicted of both murders and was sentenced to death. 

(Id., Ex. C at AG 0010.) In 1986, his death sentence was commuted

by the governor of New Mexico. (Id. at AG 0018.)

Plaintiff also has a history of escape. On December 1, 1978,

Plaintiff escaped from the Albuquerque County Jail but was

recaptured. (Id., Ex. D at AG 0036.) He escaped again on April 6,

1979 but was again recaptured. (Id.) Eight months later,

Plaintiff escaped from the New Mexico State Penitentiary but was

later apprehended. (Id.) On May 3, 1980, New Mexico prison

officials disciplined Plaintiff for planning an escape when they

found his cell bars cut. (Id.) In November, 1992, Plaintiff was

transferred to the Minnesota Correctional Facility. (Id., Ex. E at

AG 0044.) Seven months later, the Minnesota Department of

Corrections requested Plaintiff be returned to New Mexico based on

his high escape risk. (Id., Ex. E at AG 0040.)

On March 18, 1994, the New Mexico Corrections Department

requested to transfer Plaintiff to a California facility pursuant

to the WICC. (Id., Ex. E at AG 0045.) California officials

agreed, and Plaintiff was received into PBSP on May 3, 1994. 

(Compl. at 11-12.) 

Two days later, Plaintiff appeared before PBSP's Institutional

Classification Committee (ICC) for his initial classification. 

(Young Decl., Ex. J at AG 0138.) The ICC decided to house

Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU status noting that his release to

the general population at this time "would pose an undo [sic]

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threat to the safety & security of this institution" based upon a

"lengthy disciplinary history noting I/M GARCIA's propensity to

carry out violent acts against staff and I/M's." (Id. at AG 0139.) 

Since his initial placement, the ICC has conducted annual

classification reviews. (Id., Ex. J at AG 0093-0138.) Plaintiff,

however, refused to attend his first four annual reviews. (Id.) 

Each time, the ICC has chosen to retain Plaintiff on indeterminate

SHU status, determining that he was a threat to the safety and

security of PBSP based on his history of violence and escape and

his affiliation with a prison gang. (Id., Ex. I.) Before each ICC

hearing, Plaintiff received written notice of the review and the

reasons supporting his indeterminate SHU placement. (Id.)

At his sixth classification hearing, on October 25, 2000,

Plaintiff requested that Defendants "conduct there [sic] hearing

under the New Mexico governing laws being that Plaintiff and the

defendants . . . are under a Compact contract." (Compl. at 13-14.) 

Defendants denied his request and referred Plaintiff to Title 15 of

the California Code of Regulations § 3001, which states that all

California inmates, regardless of commitment circumstances, are

subject to the rules and regulations of the Director of CDCR. 

(Young Decl., Ex. J at AG 0111.) 

On September 11, 2003, the DRB reviewed the ICC's decision to

continue housing Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU status. (Compl. at

15.) The DRB agreed that Plaintiff would pose an unacceptable risk

to the safety and security of staff and inmates if he was released

to general population. (Id.) Therefore, Plaintiff's indeterminate

SHU status was upheld. (Id.) 

PBSP's Unit Classification Committee (UCC) also reviewed each

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of the ICC's classification decisions. On February 24, 2004,

Plaintiff appeared before the UCC for a 180-day review of his

indeterminate SHU confinement. (Compl. at 15.) Plaintiff asked

Defendants Cox and O'Dell that "they conduct Plaintiff's hearing

under the governing laws of New Mexico" pursuant to the WICC. (Id.

at 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cox "than turn [sic] to

Defendant O'Dell and ordered him to get the Plaintiff out of there

[sic] committee." (Id.) Defendant O'Dell then "ordered the two

correctional officers . . . to escort the Plaintiff back to his

unit." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants Cox and O'Dell

continued the 180-day review without his presence. (Id.) The UCC

upheld the ICC's decision to hold Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU

status based on Plaintiff's history of violence and escape and his

affiliation with a prison gang. Plaintiff's classification chrono

of the UCC's 180-day review did not state that Plaintiff was

removed from the hearing prior to its completion. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants Cox and O'Dell covered up their actions of

"runing [sic] Plaintiff" out of his 180 day-review. (Id.) The

same day, Plaintiff filed a 602 inmate appeal stating he was "run

off from his committee hearing" for challenging the UCC's ability

to hold the meeting "when they have no authority or jurisdiction

over inmate's case." (Id., Ex. P.) Plaintiff requested that he be

released from indeterminate SHU status until a hearing could be

conducted under New Mexico law or, in the alternative, be

transferred back to New Mexico. (Id.)

On April 14, 2004, Plaintiff's appeal was rejected by

Defendant Nimrod, who stated, "You have raised the exact same

issues before concerning CDC jurisdiction . . . . This cannot be

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reappealed." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nimrod's

response to his appeal was "a smoke screen because he did not want

to investigate and interview the defendant's [sic] as to why they

ran the Plaintiff out from his 180-day review hearing." (Id. at

18.)

Plaintiff refused to attend any further classification or

review hearings unless they were held pursuant to New Mexico law.

(Young Decl., Ex. J.)

Plaintiff alleges that on April 28, 2005, PBSP officials

requested a DNA sample. (Compl. at 50.) Plaintiff refused

claiming that under the terms of the WICC he was not subject to

California laws. (Id.) He alleges he was threatened with physical

force to gain his compliance. (Id.)

On May 5, 2005, Plaintiff agreed "under protest" to submit to

DNA testing. (Id. at 51.) Five days later, Plaintiff filed a 602

inmate appeal requesting the DNA sample be destroyed. (Id.) 

Plaintiff's 602 inmate appeal was denied because the DNA sample was

ordered by the Department of Justice, and not by PBSP officials. 

(Id., Ex. R.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. Standard of Review

The Prison Litigation Reform Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to

provide, "No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The purposes of the exhaustion

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requirement set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) include allowing the

prison to take responsive action, filtering out frivolous cases,

and creating administrative records. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 525 (2002). In order to satisfy the requirement, the

exhaustion of all "available" remedies is mandatory; those remedies

need not meet federal standards, nor must they be "plain, speedy,

and effective." Id.; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5

(2001).

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the

right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision,

action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having

an adverse effect upon their welfare." See Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative

remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through

several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution; (2) formal

written appeal on a 602 inmate appeal form; (3) second level appeal

to the institution head or designee; and (4) third level appeal to

the Director of the CDCR. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985

F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). This satisfies the

administrative remedies exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). 

See id. at 1237-38.

When no other administrative remedy is available, the

exhaustion requirement is deemed fulfilled. See Booth, 532 U.S. at

736 n.4. The obligation to exhaust persists as long as some remedy

is available; when that is no longer the case, the prisoner need

not further pursue the grievance. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926,

934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). For example, a prisoner need not exhaust

further levels of review once he has either received all the

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remedies that are available, or been reliably informed by an

administrator that no more remedies are available. Id. at 935. By

contrast, an inmate was deemed not to have exhausted all available

remedies where he was informed at the second formal level that his

administrative appeal would be treated as a staff complaint, that

any non-staff claims should be separately appealed, that further

review was available if he was dissatisfied, and that his appeal

was denied. Id. at 940-43.

Non-exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. 

Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants have the burden of

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion, and inmates are not

required specifically to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their

complaints. Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 921-22. Because there can be no

absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, a

movant claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent

relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels or through

awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a result of

that process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir.

2005). 

B. Analysis

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is

unexhausted as to allegations of Defendants' failure to treat the

side effects of his thyroid disease. As evidence of absence of

exhaustion, Defendants point to Plaintiff's 602 inmate appeal no.

PBSP 05-02410, filed on September 1, 2005, alleging Defendants

ignored Plaintiff's request for treatment of his thyroid disease. 

(Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. L.) 

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The record shows that appeal no. PBSP 05-02410 was denied at

the informal level on September 6, 2005. (Id.) On September 12,

2005, Plaintiff filed a formal level appeal. While awaiting his

formal level appeal results, Plaintiff filed the present action on

October 4, 2005. Plaintiff's appeal was eventually exhausted on

May 10, 2006, when it was denied at the Director's level. Thus,

although the appeals process was exhausted, Plaintiff did not

satisfy the administrative remedies exhaustion requirement by

pursuing his claims to the Director's level until several months

after he filed this lawsuit.

Plaintiff maintains that he exhausted his administrative

remedies as to his medical claim through another 602 appeal, appeal

no. PBSP 00-02259. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 17.) However, a review of

appeal no. PBSP 00-02259 reveals that this appeal, although

exhausted, only addresses Plaintiff's contention that he is

entitled to the application of New Mexico law at his classification

hearings and makes no reference to Defendants' alleged failure to

treat Plaintiff's thyroid disease. (Young Decl., Ex. F at AG

0059.) Therefore, the record does not support Plaintiff's claim. 

Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies with respect

to his medical claim in a timely or complete manner. Accordingly,

Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim as unexhausted is GRANTED.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). A verified complaint may be used as an

opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is based on

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th

Cir. 1995).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

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(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

B. Legal Claims

1. State-Created Liberty Interest Claim

Plaintiff alleges that there exists a state-created liberty

interest in being housed in compliance with applicable New Mexico

regulations under the WICC. (Compl. at 58-59.) He contends that

the WICC "mandates [the] use of governing laws and regulations of

the state that convicted prisoner and sent prisoner to California

for incarceration when California provides any hearing." (Id. at

21-22.) 

In asserting his claim, Plaintiff relies on a WICC statutory

provision which states:

Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined

pursuant to this compact may be entitled by the laws of

the sending state may be had before the appropriate

authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving

state if authorized by the sending state. . . . In the

event such hearing or hearings are had before officials

of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that

of the sending state. . . . In any and all proceedings

had pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, the

officials of the receiving state shall act solely as

agents of the sending state and no final determination

shall be made in any manner except by the appropriate

officials of the sending state.

Cal. Penal Code § 11190 art. IV (f). Although this language

suggests Plaintiff may be entitled to hearings under New Mexico

law, a WICC provision will not support a § 1983 claim unless it

creates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. 

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A state-created liberty interest is found only where the state

"imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Ghana v.

Pearce, 159 F.3d 1206, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1998) In Ghana, the

plaintiff was transferred from the New Jersey state prison system

to the Oregon State Penitentiary pursuant to the Compact. The

plaintiff claimed that his disciplinary hearings were defective

because the Compact entitled him to the protections of the sending

state's procedural rules. Id. at 1209. The Ninth Circuit

disagreed and held that conducting the plaintiff's disciplinary

hearing under Oregon law instead of New Jersey law did not create

an "atypical and significant hardship" and thus no state liberty

interest was created under the Compact's statutory provisions. Id.

at 1208-09. As a result, the court concluded that any alleged

violations under the Compact are not actionable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See id. at 1209. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that, under New Mexico regulations, he

would be afforded better treatment than other prisoners housed at

PBSP because he would have access to programs and eventually be

released into general population. (Young Decl., Ex. F at AG 0059.)

Under Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, every

inmate, regardless of commitment circumstances, confined in a CDCR

facility is subject to the same rules and regulations and to the

procedures established by the warden or superintendent responsible

for that facility. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3001. The Court

finds that the application of California regulations and procedures

at Plaintiff's classification hearings at PBSP does not impose an

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atypical or significant hardship and, therefore, no state liberty

interest is created under the WICC. Therefore, the application of

California procedures could not form a basis for a § 1983 due

process claim. See Ghana, 159 F.3d at 1209; see also Stewart v.

McManus, 924 F.2d 138, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1991) (deciding inmate had

no liberty interest entitling him to application of sending state's

disciplinary rules to his disciplinary proceedings in receiving

state and the Compact is not federal law and cannot be a basis for

a § 1983 due process claim). 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff's state-created liberty interest claim as a matter of

law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Furthermore, even if the Court did find a state-created

liberty interest under the WICC, Defendants would be entitled to

absolute immunity from suit. The Eleventh Amendment provides

absolute immunity to state officials for suits in federal court

alleging breach of contract under state law. See Pennhurst State

Sch. & Hosp v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). The WICC, like

the Compact, is not federal law, but state law. See Ghana, 159

F.3d at 1208. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff claims that

Defendants have failed to abide by the terms of the WICC, such

claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

a. Indeterminate SHU Placement

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process because his indeterminate SHU placement

creates an "atypical and significant hardship." (Compl. at 61.) 

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Plaintiff also alleges that his due process rights were violated

when Defendants used an erroneous gang classification as evidence

to support his indeterminate SHU housing. (Id.)

Interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause may

arise from two sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and laws of

the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 

Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed

in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself. 

See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

In Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court held that indefinite

placement in Ohio's "supermax" facility, where inmates are not

eligible for parole consideration, imposes an "atypical and

significant hardship within the correctional context." 545 U.S.

209, 223-25 (2005). Because indefinite placement in California's

SHU generally renders inmates ineligible for parole consideration,

it appears that California prisoners also have a liberty interest

in not being placed indefinitely in the SHU. Accord id. at 224-25

(necessity of harsh conditions in light of danger that high-risk

inmates pose to prison officials and other inmates does not

diminish conclusion that conditions rise to a liberty interest in

their avoidance). The Court need not decide whether this is the

case, however, because even if an atypical and significant hardship

was imposed, Plaintiff received all of the due process to which he

was entitled. 

In Toussaint v. McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit approved what it

referred to as "substantive" requirements adopted by the district

court for use at periodic reviews. 801 F.2d 1080, 1101-02 (9th

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Cir. 1986). These requirements were that "a prisoner not be placed

or retained in segregation unless allowing the prisoner to remain

in the general population would severely endanger the lives of

prisoners, the security of the institution, or the integrity of an

investigation into suspected criminal activity or serious

misconduct." Id. at 1101. 

When prison officials initially determine whether a prisoner

is to be segregated for administrative reasons, due process

requires that they comply with the following procedures: (1) they

must hold an informal non-adversary hearing within a reasonable

time after the prisoner is segregated; (2) the prisoner must be

informed of the charges against him or the reasons segregation is

being considered; and (3) the prisoner must be allowed to present

his views. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100. Following placement

in administrative segregation, prison officials must engage in some

sort of periodic review of the inmate's confinement. See Hewitt,

459 U.S. at 477 n.9; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101. 

Upon arrival at PBSP, Plaintiff was brought before the ICC. 

At his initial screening, Plaintiff was informed that he was being

housed on indeterminate SHU status based on his history of extreme

violence and escape as well as his affiliation with a prison gang. 

Plaintiff's housing placement was also periodically reviewed by

both the UCC and the DRB. Finally, Plaintiff was afforded periodic

reviews of his SHU placement. Therefore, the Court finds

Defendants satisfied the due process requirements by complying with

the aforementioned procedures.

In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), the

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Supreme Court held that disciplinary proceedings do not satisfy due

process requirements unless there is "some evidence" in the record

to support the findings of the prison disciplinary board. The

Ninth Circuit requires that "some evidence" also support a decision

to place an inmate in segregation for administrative reasons. See

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104. 

Plaintiff argues that the evidence supporting his

indeterminate SHU confinement was insufficient because it did not

demonstrate that he had engaged in prison gang activity. Even if

Plaintiff could support his claim that he is not engaged in gang

activity, Defendants used Plaintiff's extensive history of

violence, against both correctional officers and inmates, along

with a history of escape as evidence to support their decision to

place Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU status. Therefore, the Court

finds that some evidence supports Defendants' decision. See

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden

of raising a genuine issue of fact to support his claim that his

confinement in the SHU on indeterminate status violates the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Accordingly,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's

Fourteenth Amendment claim.

b. Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Cox, O'Dell and Nimrod conspired

to deprive him of his due process rights when they had him removed

from his 180-day review hearing. 

To prove conspiracy between Defendants Cox, O'Dell, and

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Nimrod, an agreement to violate Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process must be shown. See Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d

435 (9th Cir. 1983). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no

factual basis to support his claim. Moreover, Plaintiff does not

show that any actual deprivation of his constitutional rights

resulted from the alleged conspiracy. See Singer v. Wadman, 595

F. Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985) (conspiracy allegation, even if

established, does not give rise to liability under § 1983 unless

there is an actual deprivation of civil rights). The Court finds

that Plaintiff's conclusory allegations that Defendants Cox, O'Dell

and Nimrod conspired do not support a claim for violation of his

constitutional rights under § 1983. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d

1089 (9th Cir. 1980); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 587 F. Supp. 631 (D. Cal.

1984) (allegations of conspiracy must be supported by material

facts, not merely conclusory statements). Accordingly, Defendants

Cox, O'Dell and Nimrod are entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff's conspiracy claim.

3. Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges his indeterminate SHU confinement for the

past eleven years violates the Eighth Amendment by subjecting him

to "severe physical and mental pain and suffering." (Compl. at

45.) Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that he suffers from

impaired vision, frequent headaches, shortness of breath, anxiety,

and depression due to his prolonged SHU confinement. (Id. at 46.) 

He alleges that he was required to spend twenty-two and a half

hours a day in his cell. (Id. at 45.) He claims that "Defendants

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only allowed Plaintiff to leave his cell to go to the 'dog walk,'

which is a small bare concrete indoor bunker with [a] high opaque

ceiling that block [sic] out direct light." (Id.) However, he

alleges that he was "forced to forgo fresh air and yard [time] for

weeks at a time" because he refused to use the shared common jacket

and demanded the prison provide him with his own thermal underwear,

gloves and jacket. (Compl. at 49.) Plaintiff maintains that he

had to "choose between exposing himself to infection, declining

yard [time] or being inadequately clothed in inclement weather." 

(Id.) 

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but

neither does it permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner receives in prison

and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to

scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual

punishment," the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison

officials. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The

Eighth Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must

provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal

safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County

Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982).

Exercise is one of the basic human necessities protected by

the Eighth Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)

(regular exercise). Some form of regular exercise, including

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outdoor exercise, "is extremely important to the psychological and

physical well being" of prisoners. See Spain v. Procunier, 600

F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979). Prison officials therefore may not

deprive prisoners long-term of regular outdoor exercise. Id.

The Court construes Plaintiff's claim of a deprivation of

fresh air and yard time as a claim of denial of outdoor exercise.

Deprivation of necessities by a prison official violates the

Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, see

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298), and

(2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of

mind, see id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). In determining

whether a deprivation of a basic necessity, such as outdoor

exercise, is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective

component, a court must consider the circumstances, nature and

duration of the deprivation. See Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. To

satisfy the subjective component, the requisite state of mind

depends on the nature of the claim. In prison-conditions cases,

the necessary state of mind is one of "deliberate indifference." 

See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (inmate safety). 

In Spain, the Ninth Circuit held that the deprivation of

outdoor exercise constituted cruel and unusual punishment where the

inmates were confined to continuous segregation for a period of

over four years under harsh conditions. See generally Spain, 600

F.2d at 189. The plaintiffs were in continuous segregation,

spending virtually twenty-four hours a day in their cells. Id.

They had little contact with other people, lived in degrading

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conditions, and there was an atmosphere of fear and apprehension. 

Id. In addition, the prison provided no programs of training or

rehabilitation. Id.

The denial of outdoor exercise for security reasons does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444,

1458 (9th Cir. 1993). In LeMaire, the Ninth Circuit reversed the

district court's post-trial findings that depriving the plaintiff

of outdoor exercise during his nearly five year confinement

amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. The plaintiff in

LeMaire had attacked two correctional officers and vowed to attack

again; therefore, the court found that restricting his exercise

privileges to exercising only within his cell did not meet the

subjective requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation because

"prison officials are authorized and indeed required to take

appropriate measures to maintain prison order and discipline and

protect staff and other prisoners from such violent inmates." Id.

Similarly, in Hayward v. Procunier, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

district court's denial of declaratory relief and rejection of the

Eighth Amendment claim where the plaintiffs were denied outdoor

exercise for five months following a lockdown in response to a

"genuine emergency." 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.

denied, 451 U.S. 937 (1981). 

Here, as mentioned above, Plaintiff was housed on

indeterminate SHU status based on his history of extreme violence

and escape and his affiliation with a prison gang. "Prison

officials are authorized and indeed required to take appropriate

measures to maintain prison order and discipline and protect staff

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4

 No majority was reached in Kincade regarding the proper

analytical framework for the analysis of DNA testing. The plurality

view was that DNA testing was permitted under the "totality of the

circumstances" rule from United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112

(2001), while the concurring judge agreed that DNA testing was

permissible but should have been analyzed under the special needs

rule. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839-40. 

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and other prisoners from such violent inmates." Lemaire, 12 F.3d

at 1458. Moreover, Plaintiff's confinement conditions were not as

harsh as the conditions in Spain. The record shows that he was

provided with one and a half hours per day of out-of-cell activity. 

Unlike the plaintiffs in Spain, Plaintiff had the opportunity to

exercise outdoors during this time; however, he refused to use the

shared common jacket and lost that opportunity. 

Thus, Plaintiff has not made a showing sufficient to survive

summary judgment on this claim. Accordingly, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim

stemming from the denial of outdoor exercise.

4. Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges a Fourth Amendment violation because he was

compelled to provide a DNA sample under the California DNA and

Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998 (DNA

Act), even though he was not convicted under California law. 

(Compl. at 51.) 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that mandatory

blood draws for DNA testing of persons on conditional release does

not offend the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Kincade, 379

F.3d 813, 839-840 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).4

 In an earlier case,

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Rise v. Oregon, the Ninth Circuit held that an Oregon statute

requiring convicted murderers and sex offenders to submit to blood

testing for DNA analysis did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 59

F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995). In Kincade, the Ninth Circuit,

reaffirmed Rise and held that "its reliance on a totality of the

circumstances analysis to uphold compulsory DNA profiling of

convicted offenders both comports with the Supreme Court's recent

precedents and resolves this appeal in concert with the

requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832. 

The DNA Act was enacted "to assist federal, state, and local

criminal justice and law enforcement agencies within and outside

California" to identify and prosecute suspects by use of their DNA. 

Cal. Penal Code § 295(c). As part of the DNA Act, an offender's

transfer to a California correctional facility pursuant to the WICC

"is conditional on the offender providing blood specimens, buccal

swab samples, and palm and thumb print impressions." Cal. Penal

Code § 296.1(a)(5)(A). Inmates transferred pursuant to the WICC

must submit DNA samples if they have been convicted of a qualifying

offense. Id. A felony conviction in any state, federal or

military court is considered a qualifying offense for offenders

transferred pursuant to the WICC. Cal. Penal Code § 296(a)(1). 

Here, Plaintiff's New Mexico murder conviction is a qualifying

offense making DNA sampling mandatory under California's DNA Act. 

The Court finds no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when

Defendants compelled Plaintiff to provide a DNA sample under the

DNA Act. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

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on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim.

C. Qualified Immunity 

In the alternative, Defendants claim that they are entitled to

summary judgment on all claims based on qualified immunity. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

of qualified immunity protects "'all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986)). Defendants may have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief

about the facts or about what the law requires in any given

situation. Id. "Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if

the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established'

or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d

624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). 

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity, the court must engage in the following inquiries. At the

outset, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged

the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Conn v.

Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). In other words, the court must

ask, "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

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injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right?" Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197

(2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If this inquiry yields a

positive answer, then the court proceeds to determine if the right

was "clearly established." Id.

The inquiry as to whether the right at issue was clearly

established must be made in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202. "Although earlier cases involving 'fundamentally similar'

facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that

the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a

finding." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). As the

Supreme Court has explained, "[O]fficials can still be on notice

that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances." Id. at 753. The plaintiff bears the burden of

proving the existence of a clearly established right at the time of

the allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate

Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). 

If the law is determined to be clearly established, the next

question is whether, under that law, a reasonable official could

have believed his or her conduct was lawful in the situation

confronted. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th

Cir. 1993). If the law did not put the officer on notice that his

or her conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on

qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

Therefore, qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when he

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 The Court will not address Defendants' qualified immunity

defense as to Plaintiff's conspiracy claim because his conclusory

allegations do not support a § 1983 claim.

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or she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient,

reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she

confronted. Id. at 206. The defendant bears the burden of

establishing that his or her actions were reasonable, even though

he or she violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Doe v.

Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995);

Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Maraziti,

953 F.2d at 523. 

The Court has already found that Defendants' actions do not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation as to any of

Plaintiff's claims. However, even if Plaintiff's rights had been

violated and his rights were clearly established at the time of the

violation, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because

they have produced sufficient evidence showing that they could have

believed that their actions were reasonable in the circumstances of

each claim as outlined below.5 

First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' failure to house him

in compliance with applicable New Mexico regulations under the WICC

violated a state-created liberty interest. A reasonable prison

official in the Defendants' position could have believed it was

reasonable to treat all inmates fairly and equally by applying

California regulations at Plaintiff's classification hearings. 

Therefore, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on this claim based on their qualified immunity defense. 

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Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants placed him on

indeterminate SHU confinement based on insufficient evidence,

constituting a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants'

decision to retain Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU confinement was

not based solely on Plaintiff's alleged prison gang affiliation,

but on his extensive history of violence against correctional

officers and inmates as well as his history of escape. A

reasonable prison classification board member in Defendants'

position could have thought it was necessary to maintain

Plaintiff's indeterminate SHU confinement to protect the safety of

prison staff and other inmates. Therefore, Defendants are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth

Amendment based on their qualified immunity defense. 

Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him

constitutionally adequate access to outdoor exercise, constituting

a violation of the Eighth Amendment. A reasonable prison official

in Defendants' position could have thought denying him exercise was

justified due to Plaintiff's failure to follow prison regulations

by wearing a shared common jacket during yard time. Therefore,

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim based on their qualified

immunity defense.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants compelled him to

submit to DNA testing even though he had not committed any crime

within California, constituting a violation of the Fourth

Amendment. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants' behavior was

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unreasonable from the perspective of a prison official in that

situation. A reasonable prison official in Defendants' position

could have thought his actions were justified because the Plaintiff

fit the criteria and was compelled to submit a DNA sample under

California's DNA Act. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment

claim based on their qualified immunity defense. 

III. State Law Claims

The Court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims

based on Defendants' failure to comply with New Mexico regulations

is supplemental in nature. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where "the

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Here, the Court has

dismissed Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim related to Defendants'

failure to treat his thyroid disease, and has found that Defendants

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's

remaining federal claims. Pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

state law claims. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED

without prejudice to re-filing in state court.

IV. Defendant Schwartz

As noted above, Defendant Schwartz has not been served and has

not joined the other Defendants in their motion to dismiss and

motion for summary judgment.

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It is apparent, however, that the claims against Defendant

Schwartz are without merit and subject to summary adjudication. 

The allegations against Defendant Schwartz in the complaint are the

same as those against the other Defendants. There is no suggestion

in the complaint, the exhibits attached thereto, or in the briefs

and exhibits filed in connection with the present motions, that the

analysis differs with respect to Defendant Schwartz as opposed to

the other Defendants. 

Summary judgment may be properly entered in favor of unserved

defendants where (1) the controlling issues would be the same as to

the unserved defendants, (2) those issues have been briefed, and

(3) Plaintiff has been provided an opportunity to address the

controlling issues. Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom

Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802-03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

178 (1995) (citing, inter alia, Silverton v. Department of the

Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir 1981)). Such is the case

here. The Court has found that Plaintiff has not shown that a

state-created liberty interest exists under the WICC or that his

constitutional rights were violated; therefore, he cannot prevail

on his claims against Defendant Schwartz. Accordingly, Defendant

Schwartz is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

Plaintiff's medical claim (docket no. 56) is GRANTED. This claim

is dismissed without prejudice. Defendants' motion for summary

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 Because the Court has granted Defendants' motion to dismiss and

motion for summary judgment, it need not address their allegations

that Plaintiff's claims are barred by issue preclusion or the statute

of limitations.

P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.05\Garcia4009.MTD&MSJ.frm 31

judgment (docket no. 56) is GRANTED as to all other claims and

judgment in favor of said Defendants, as well as Defendant

Schwartz, shall be entered.6

2. Plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED without

prejudice to re-filing in state court.

3. Plaintiff's motion entitled "Motion for Excusable

Neglect" (docket no. 64) is construed a motion for extension of

time to file his opposition to Defendants' motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff states that he filed his opposition late

because it was inadvertently sent by prison officials to the Ninth

Circuit. (Pl.'s Letter dated Feb. 15, 2007.) Therefore,

Plaintiff's motion (docket no. 64) is GRANTED. The time in which

Plaintiff may file his opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment will be extended nunc pro tunc to January 12, 2007, the

date Plaintiff's opposition was filed.

4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of

Defendants, terminate all pending motions and close the file.

5. This Order terminates Docket nos. 56 and 64.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 9/25/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-04009-CW Document 68 Filed 09/25/07 Page 31 of 32
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.05\Garcia4009.MTD&MSJ.frm 32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SCHWARZENEGGER et al,

Defendant.

 /

Case Number: CV05-04009 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 25, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Christopher Michael Young

Attorney General

Department of Justice

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

Ricky Garcia J-19600

C11-F-221

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95532

Dated: September 25, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-04009-CW Document 68 Filed 09/25/07 Page 32 of 32