Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02567/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02567-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jenghiz K. Stewart, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-2567 PHX MHM (VAM)

)

Canteen Food Services, et al., ) O R D E R

)

 Defendants. )

On March 8, 2006, plaintiff filed a Motion to Appoint

Counsel. (Doc. 25). There is no constitutional right to

appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Ivey v. Board of

Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982);

Randall v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1981). Moreover, the

only statutory authority creating a basis for appointment is 28

U.S.C. §1915(e)(1), which confers on the court the discretion to

appoint counsel to represent an indigent civil litigant. Aldabe

v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court cannot compel

a lawyer to represent an indigent plaintiff. Mallard v. U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296

(1989). An appointment of counsel may be requested under 28

U.S.C. §1915(e)(1) only in "exceptional circumstances." Aldabe,

616 at 1089; Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1986).

This rule is derived from Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598,

600 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845, 84 S.Ct. 97, 11

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L.Ed.2d 72 (1963) which held that "the privilege of pleading in

forma pauperis . . . in civil actions for damages should be

allowed only in exceptional circumstances." See Wilborn, 789 F.2d

at 1328. Weller was extended, without apparent comment, to

"appointment of counsel" in United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792,

794 (9th Cir. 1965). Madden was then cited for the rule in

Alexander v. Ramsey, 539 F.2d 25, 26 (9th Cir. 1976); United

States v. McQuade, 579 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1978), on appeal

after remand, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455

U.S. 958, 102 S.Ct. 1470, 71 L.Ed.2d 677 (1983); Aldabe, 616 at

1093; and Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984).

A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation

of both "the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability

of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved." Weygandt v. Look, 718

F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983), quoted in Richards v. Harper, 864

F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1988). Neither of these factors is dispositive

and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision on a

request for counsel under section 1915(d). Wilborn, 789 F.2d at

1331.

Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success

on the merits. In addition, plaintiff has failed to show that any

difficulty he is experiencing in attempting to litigate this case

is derived from the complexity of the issues involved. While most

actions, such as the instant case, require development of

supporting facts during litigation and a pro se litigant will

seldom be in a position to investigate easily the facts to support

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the case, this does not equate with showing the complexity of the

relevant issues. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the constitutional right of

access to the courts requires that the state provide assistance

only through the pleading stage. Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894,

898 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033, 116 S. Ct. 2580 

(1996). This case is beyond the pleading stage and at the present

time does not present "exceptional circumstances" requiring the

appointment of counsel.

On March 8, 2006, plaintiff filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court's Order dated February 22, 2006. 

(Doc. 26). "Motions to reconsider are appropriate only in rare

circumstances." Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F.Supp.

1342, 1351 (D.Ariz. 1995). "Reconsideration is appropriate if the

district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence,

(2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly

unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling

law." School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). "The purpose of a motion for

reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to

present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki,

779 F.2d 906, 909 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171

(1986). Such motions should not be used for the purpose of asking

a court to "to rethink what the court had already thought 

through--rightly or wrongly." Defenders of Wildlife, 909 F.Supp.

at 1351 (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing,

Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)."

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Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration does not raise any new

issues, present any new facts or show any change in the law. 

There has been no change in the law and the Motion for

Reconsideration will be denied.

On April 24, 2006, plaintiff filed with the Court his first

set of interrogatories, first request for production of documents

and first set of requests for admissions. (Docs. 27, 28, 29). 

Plaintiff is advised he is not to file his discovery requests with

the Court. Under the Rules, plaintiff is required to serve the

original on opposing counsel and merely file a notice with the

Court indicating that such documents have been sent to opposing

counsel. In the future, plaintiff is directed not to file his

discovery requests unless the Court allows such filing. 

On April 24, 2006, plaintiff filed a "Petition for Leave of

Court to Take Written Depositions of Witnesses." (Doc. 30). In

this request, plaintiff asks to take written depositions of

numerous persons. The people are referred to as "correction

officers located at both CB6 and South Unit kitchen" and

"convicted felons who worked in the kitchen...convicted felons who

were housed in the same section of CB6 as the plaintiff..." The

Court also notes that plaintiff seeks leave to depose several

other parties as well. The number of persons listed for

depositions is 30. Plaintiff has not shown cause for leave of

Court to send written questions to these 30 individuals. 

Plaintiff has not made a showing of the questions that would be

asked of these witnesses. The Motion will be denied. Leave of

court to proceed with written depositions of persons who are not

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Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998).

5

parties to the lawsuit is typically not granted in the prison

context because of its disruption to prison operations. Plaintiff

has not shown sufficient cause or relevance for the Court to allow

30 written depositions. 

On May 16, 2006, defendant Kline filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 31). Plaintiff filed a response on May 16, 2006

before receiving the Court's Rand notice. Therefore, the Court

will now give plaintiff a Rand notice and give him an opportunity

to supplement his response no later than June 30, 2006.

NOTICE--WARNING TO PLAINTIFF

THIS NOTICE IS REQUIRED TO BE GIVEN TO YOU BY THE COURT1

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment seeks to have your

case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your

case.

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--that is,

if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the

result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment

that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. 

Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do

not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

LRCiv 56.1 of the Rules of Practice of the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona also requires, in

addition, that you include as a part of your opposition to a 

Motion for Summary Judgment a separate statement of facts in

opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 

(a) Any party filing a motion for summary judgment

shall set forth separately from the memorandum of law,

and in full, the specific facts on which that party

relies in support of the motion. The specific facts

shall be set forth in serial fashion and not in

narrative form. As to each fact, the statement shall

refer to a specific portion of the record where the fact

may be found (i.e., affidavit, deposition, etc.). Any

party opposing a motion for summary judgment must comply

with the foregoing in setting forth the specific facts,

which the opposing party asserts, including those facts

which establish a genuine issue of material fact

precluding summary judgment in favor of the moving

party. In the alternative, the movant and the party

opposing the motion shall jointly file a stipulation

signed by the parties setting forth a statement of the

stipulated facts if the parties agree there is no

genuine issue of any material fact. As to any

stipulated facts, the parties so stipulating may state 

that their stipulations are entered into only for the

purposes of the motion for summary judgment and are not

intended to be otherwise binding.

Additional provisions of LRCiv 7.2, Rules of Practice of the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona are as

follows:

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Subparagraph (e) of that Rule provides:

Unless otherwise permitted by the Court, a motion

including its supporting memorandum, and the response

including its supporting memorandum, each shall not

exceed seventeen (17) pages, exclusive of attachments

and any required statement of facts. Unless otherwise

permitted by the Court, a reply including its supporting

memorandum shall not exceed eleven (11) pages, exclusive

of attachments.

Subparagraph (i) of LRCiv 7.2 provides:

If a motion does not conform in all substantial respects

with the requirements of this Local Rule, or if the

opposing party does not serve and file the required

answering memoranda, or if counsel for any party fails

to appear at the time and place assigned for oral

argument, such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to

the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may

dispose of the motion summarily.

It is plaintiff's obligation to timely respond to all

motions. The failure of plaintiff to respond to defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment may in the discretion of the Court be

deemed a consent to the granting of that Motion without further

notice, and judgment may be entered dismissing the complaint and

action with prejudice pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i). See Brydges v.

Lewis, 18 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

On May 16, 2006, defendant Kline filed an Opposition to

plaintiff's Petition for Leave of Court to Take Written

Depositions and Cross-Motion to Stay Discovery. (Doc. 35). The

Court has already ruled that the Motion to take written

depositions will be denied. The Motion to Stay Discovery is well

taken. It requests a stay of discovery based on defendant Kline's

Motion for Summary Judgment which raises qualified immunity. The

Motion further points out that the discovery which plaintiff

attempted to serve was served improperly and is particularly

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objectionable. Many of the discovery requests, which were

improperly served, ask for irrelevant information, are

argumentative, are not questions but rather statements of

plaintiff's position and make very personal inquiries which do not

appear to be relevant. Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories,

first set for requests for admissions and first request for

production of documents to defendant Kline need not be answered as

they have not been properly served. In addition, the Court will

grant the request for stay of discovery filed by defendant Kline

as the Motion for Summary Judgment may well dispose of all issues

with regard to defendant Kline. Also, because the Motion raises

qualified immunity, a stay is proper pursuant to Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). If plaintiff believes 

discovery is necessary to oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment,

plaintiff's attention is directed to Rule 56(f), F.R.Civ.P. 

Defendant Kline's Motion to Stay Discovery will be granted and

discovery is stayed.

On May 15, 2006, plaintiff filed a "Motion for

Clarification." (Doc. 36). In the Motion, plaintiff asks what it

means to "withdraw the reference to the Magistrate Judge." 

Plaintiff has correctly construed what it means to withdraw the

reference; that is, it means that the presiding judge in this

case, Judge Murguia, will rule on the motion rather than the

Magistrate Judge. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying without prejudice plaintiff's

Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. 25).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying plaintiff's Motion for

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Reconsideration. (Doc. 26).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting defendant's Motion for Stay of

Discovery filed by defendant Kline. (Doc. 35). Discovery is

stayed as to defendant Kline. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying plaintiff's Petition for Leave

of the Court to Take Written Depositions of Witnesses. (Doc. 30).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff wishes he may file a

supplemental response to defendant Kline's Motion for Summary

Judgment no later than June 30, 2006.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the Motion for Clarification

as set forth above. (Doc. 36).

DATED this 5th day of June, 2006.

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