Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-05384/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-05384-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The initial petition in this action was filed pro se. After respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

petition as untimely, the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel for petitioner. After

many delays, the evidentiary hearing was held on November 22, 2004. The parties thereafter submitted briefs

and, in February 2005, this Court found that the petition was filed by the deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and

denied the motion to dismiss. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROOSEVELT FRANKLIN,

Petitioner,

 v.

DERRAL ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 02-05384 SI

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Roosevelt Franklin filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on

November 13, 2002.1 Respondent filed his answer to the writ with the Court on April 1, 2005. Petitioner filed

his traverse on May 6, 2005. Having considered the papers, evidence and declarations submitted, the Court

hereby DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged by Complaint dated July 22, 1999 (Answer, Ex. 1) with first degree burglary,

a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 459. The Complaint charged six prior convictions, of which four were

charged as “serious felonies.” Id. 

On March 21, 2000, petitioner pled no contest to the charge of first degree burglary,. At that time,

petitioner acknowledged each of the following prior convictions: 

First Prior Conviction: second degree burglary on October 15, 1997; 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In their papers, the parties refer to the May 20, 1994 first degree burglary conviction as the “second

priorconviction”;therefore,the Court will hereinafter refer to the May 20, 1994 first degree burglaryconviction

as the Second Prior Conviction.

2

Second Prior Conviction: first degree burglary on May 20, 19942; 

Third Prior Conviction: first degree burglary on June 10, 1992; 

Fourth PriorConviction: petty theft with priors (Cal. Penal Code §§ 484/666) on February 27, 1992;

Fifth Prior Conviction: first degree attempted burglary on July 11, 1985; and 

Sixth Prior Conviction: first degree burglary on February 22, 1980. 

Answer, Ex. 3 at 8-9. 

The Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Prior Convictions were charged in the Complaint as “serious

felonies.” Answer, Ex. 1. At the plea hearing, there was a discussion as to whether the Second Prior

Conviction should be classified as a serious felony under Cal. Penal Code § 667(a). Under California law,

felonies listed in Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c) will be characterized as serious felonies for sentencing and

subject to a five-year enhancement. Cal. Penal Code § 667(a). Burglaries are classified as serious felonies

if they occur within “an inhabited dwelling house . . . or the inhabited portion of any other building.” §

1192.7(c)(18). At the hearing, the district attorney told the court that the parties agreed to amend the Second

Prior Conviction to no longer be classified as a serious felony. Instead, the Second Prior Conviction would

enhance Mr. Franklin’s sentence by one year for being a “prior separate prison term served for any felony.”

Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b). 

Following the district attorney’s explanation oftheir agreement to reduce the Second PriorConviction,

the court inquired as to Mr. Franklin’s understanding of the agreement. Mr. Franklin responded that he did

not understand what the district attorney had said, but that he did understand what his lawyer had told him.

Answer, Ex. 3 at 2. The record indicates there was an off the record discussion between Mr. Franklin and his

appointed counsel, Ms. Trina Stanley. The court then asked whether he understood what had taken place.

Mr. Franklin answered that he understood and was prepared to accept the plea proposal. Answer, Ex. 3 at

2-3. The court informed Mr. Franklin of his right to separately challenge each of the prior convictions and he

answered that he understood and was willing to waive those rights. Id. at 7. 

Based on the plea, the court found Mr. Franklin guilty offirstdegree burglary with six prior convictions.

The sentencing court imposed a six year sentence for the current first degree burglary conviction. Based on

Cal. Penal Code § 667(a), the sentencing court then enhanced Mr. Franklin’s sentence by five years for the
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priorseriousfelonies which occurred on February 22, 1980 (Sixth PriorConviction),July 11, 1985 (FifthPrior

Conviction), and June 10, 1992 (Third Prior Conviction). The sentence was enhanced under the definition of

serious felony as a “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house . . . or the inhabited portion of any other building.”

Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(18). The sentence was enhanced an additional year under § 667.5(b) for the

Second Prior Conviction. The resulting prison sentence totaled twenty-two years. 

Petitioner did not appealhis burglaryconviction. On January 10, 2002, petitioner filed a pro se petition

for writ of habeas corpus in Alameda County Superior Court, whichwas denied for a failure to state a prima

facie claim for relief on January 11, 2002. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal on February 22, 2002, and was denied on February 26, 2002. Petitioner next

petitioned the California Supreme Court on April 16, 2002, and was denied writ on October 2, 2002. 

Petitioner brought the current 28 U.S.C. § 2254 writ of habeas corpus on November 13, 2002.

Respondent brought a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely which, after an evidentiary hearing on

November 22, 2004, was denied by the court on February 7, 2005. Respondent filed its answer on April 1,

2005. Petitioner submitted its traverse on May 6, 2005, with the help of appointed counsel. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federalcourt is barred fromreviewing a question of federal law decided by a state court if the state

court decision rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support

the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The Supreme Court has stated:

When a federal habeas court releases a prisoner held pursuant to a state

court judgment that rests on an independent and adequate state ground,

it renders ineffective the state rule just as completely as if this Court had

reversed the state judgment on direct review. In such a case, the habeas

court ignores the State's legitimate reasons for holding the prisoner. 

Id. at 730 (citation omitted). Only when the state’s decision “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; [or] (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” may a state sentence be overturned

on a federal writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2). 
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For the Northern District of California

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The “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) allows the Court to grant a writ of habeas corpus when the

state court’s judgment differs from a Supreme Court ruling “on a question of law or if the state court decides

a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set ofmaterially indistinguishable facts.”Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A § 2254 federal habeas proceeding is only proper if the defendant was deprived

of constitutional due process, so that the admission ofevidence rose to an arbitrary or prejudicial level which

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986).

Insufficiency of the evidence: A state prisoner may seek federal habeas relief by alleging that the

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rationaltrier

offact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979). The Jackson

standard also applies to state sentence enhancements: a petitioner can obtain habeas relief if no rational trier

offact could find the elements ofthe enhancement true beyond a reasonable doubt. Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d

1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting habeas reliefbecause there was no evidence thatrobbery furthered other

gang criminal activity, an element of the gang sentencing enhancement in Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(b)(1)).

However, despite the challenges allowed by Jackson, a defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise

in habeas corpus proceedings independent claims relatingto the deprivationofconstitutionalrightsthatoccurred

before the plea of guilty. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (guilty plea forecloses

consideration of pre-plea constitutional deprivations); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973).

The only challengesleft open in federalhabeas corpus after a guilty plea is the voluntary and intelligentcharacter

of the plea and the nature of the advice of counsel to plead. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985);

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may only attack the

voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was

not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id.; Lambert v. Blodgett, 393

F.3d 943, 979 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Hudson v.

Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Ineffective assistance of counsel: In a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal judgment, a state

court conclusion that counselrendered effective assistance is not a fact binding on the federalcourtto the extent

stated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Both the performance and the prejudice components of the ineffectiveness
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inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 698 (1984). Claims

of ineffective assistance therefore require a review of the record.

In order to prevailona Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counselclaim, petitioner must establish two

things. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The

relevant inquiry is not what defense counselcould have done, but rather whether the choices made by defense

counsel were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). Judicial scrutiny

of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689. 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that “there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessionalerrors, the result ofthe proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. Id. Where the defendant is challenging his conviction, the appropriate question is “‘whether there

is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubtrespecting

guilt.’” Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner makes two claims to support his § 2254 habeas proceeding. First, petitioner argues that

there was insufficient evidence to establish that the prior convictions were serious felonies, to support

enhancements under Cal. PenalCode § 667(a). Second, petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object to the enhancements for serious felonies during the sentencing phase. 

1. Petitioner may only raise objections to the voluntariness of the guilty plea in the habeas

corpus proceedings

Petitioner’s contention that there was insufficient evidence that his prior convictions were serious

feloniesisimproperin this § 2254 habeas proceeding, since petitioner entered a guilty plea at trial. A defendant

who pleads guilty cannot laterraise inhabeas corpus proceedings independent claims relating to the deprivation

of constitutional rights that occurred before the plea of guilty. Haring, 462 U.S. at 319- 20. “A guilty plea
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represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process” negating any possible

pre-plea constitutional claim. Tollet, 411 U.S. at 267. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in

open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutionalrightsthat occurred priorto the entry ofthe guilty

plea.” Id. In order to uphold the certainty of the conviction, petitioner may not claim constitutional violations

regarding elements within the plea agreement after the guilty plea has been entered. 

As is discussed below, petitioner “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty

plea by showing that the advice he received fromcounselwas not within the standards setforth in [Strickland].”

Id. Petitioner’s claims as to the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to establish the sentence enhancements

may be relevant to whether counselshould had advised him to enter a plea of guilty, but cannot independently

support a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the Court rejects petitioner’s claims relating to the sufficiency

of the evidence. 

2. Effective assistance of counsel rendered the plea voluntary and intelligent.

Petitioner claims his counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the serious felony

enhancements at sentencing and by not informing him that he could contest the serious felony allegations.

Traverse at 2. To prove his ineffective assistance claim, petitioner must overcome the “strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range ofreasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. 

Petitioner contends a reasonable attorney would have contested classifications of the three prior

convictions as “serious felonies.” The Court disagrees. Petitioner had five prior convictions for burglary and

another for petty theft. Four of these prior convictions took place in inhabited dwellings, and thus would have

been established as serious felonies under Cal. PenalCode § 1192.7(c)(18). Therefore, the three strikes law

would apply, making Mr. Franklin eligible for a minimum twenty-five years to life sentence. 

In her pretrial negotiation letter (Answer, Ex. 5), Ms. Stanley articulated a clear understanding of the

facts of Mr. Franklin’s various burglaries of inhabited dwellings. Although she cast them in the light most

favorable to petitioner, byunderscoring petitioner’s non-violent and comparatively benign conduct whencaught,
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she outlinedcircumstancessquarely supporting the statutory classifications given. Ms. Stanley urged the District

Attorney that Mr. Franklin should be spared conviction under the three strikes law because he was not the

violent “type of offender contemplated by the statute.” Id. at 4. Clearly, Ms. Stanley foresaw the possibility

of a sentence under the three strikes law for over twenty-five years. Petitioner agreed to a plea arrangement

with a significantly lesssevere sentence than the possible sentence froma conviction under the three strikes law.

Petitioner received three five-year enhancements forserious felonies, and an additional one-year enhancement

for the second prior conviction. The Court finds Ms. Stanley’s decision to pursue a plea agreement to be a

reasonable choice under the circumstances of the case. 

Ms. Stanley encouraged petitioner to accept the plea agreement rather than face the possibility of a

twenty-five years to life sentence under the three strikes law. The prejudice element of Strickland is not met

if petitioner received significant benefits from his plea agreement. United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840,

846-847 (9th Cir. 1996). In Baramdyka, petitioner could not argue the ineffectiveness of his counsel for not

questioning the validity of a lesser crime that he plead guilty to, because he would have received a longer

sentence if he had been convicted of the charge dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Id. Mr. Franklin

similarly cannot argue his counsel’s performance prejudiced him since he received a lesssevere punishment by

agreeing to the guilty plea. A three strikes conviction would result in a sentence of twenty-five years to life,

without parole. Under the plea agreement, petitioner received a twenty-two year sentence and will be “eligible

for parole consideration in approximately 17 years 7 months.”Answer at 10. Ms. Stanley provided effective

assistance to petitioner, whereby no prejudice to the result of the proceeding can be found, since petitioner

received a much less severe punishment than he would have faced at trial.

Petitioner contends counsel’s deficient performance led to an involuntary guilty plea. To establish an

involuntary plea, petitionermustprove “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

 Following the reduction of the Second Prior Conviction from a § 667(a) “serious felony” characterization to

a one-year enhanced §667.5(b) classification, the trial court made inquiries into petitioner’s understanding of

the reduction at the plea hearing. Petitioner stated that he did not understand what the district attorney had just

said about the Second Prior Conviction, but that he understood what his attorney had told him. Answer, Ex.
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3 at 2. After an off the record discussion with counsel, petitioner stated that he understood the impact ofthe

Second Prior Conviction and wanted to accept the plea agreement. Id. at 2-3. 

Since petitioner understood the impact of the prosecution’s striking of the “serious felony”

characterizationofthe Second PriorConviction, it reasonably followsthatpetitionerunderstood the importance

of classifying a prior offense as a “serious felony.” During the plea, petitioner was reminded of and waived his

right to “challenge each and every one of those priors through the exercise of [his] rights.” Id. at 7. Therefore

being aware ofthe consequences of his prior convictions, petitioner voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea

as required by North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). Petitioner then admitted to the court his

cognizance of those rights he waived regarding his ability to contest the priors. Answer, Ex. 3 at 7. The Court

finds Mr. Franklin was informed ofthe sentencing consequences ofhis plea, and thus counselprovided effective

assistance allowing Mr. Franklin to make a voluntary and intelligent choice to plead guilty.

///
United States District Court

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The initial petition in this action was filed pro se. After respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

petition as untimely, the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel for petitioner. After

many delays, the evidentiary hearing was held on November 22, 2004. The parties thereafter submitted briefs

and, in February 2005, this Court found that the petition was filed by the deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and

denied the motion to dismiss. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROOSEVELT FRANKLIN,

Petitioner,

 v.

DERRAL ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 02-05384 SI

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Roosevelt Franklin filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on

November 13, 2002.1 Respondent filed his answer to the writ with the Court on April 1, 2005. Petitioner filed

his traverse on May 6, 2005. Having considered the papers, evidence and declarations submitted, the Court

hereby DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged by Complaint dated July 22, 1999 (Answer, Ex. 1) with first degree burglary,

a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 459. The Complaint charged six prior convictions, of which four were

charged as “serious felonies.” Id. 

On March 21, 2000, petitioner pled no contest to the charge of first degree burglary,. At that time,

petitioner acknowledged each of the following prior convictions: 

First Prior Conviction: second degree burglary on October 15, 1997; 
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In their papers, the parties refer to the May 20, 1994 first degree burglary conviction as the “second

priorconviction”;therefore,the Court will hereinafter refer to the May 20, 1994 first degree burglaryconviction

as the Second Prior Conviction.

2

Second Prior Conviction: first degree burglary on May 20, 19942; 

Third Prior Conviction: first degree burglary on June 10, 1992; 

Fourth PriorConviction: petty theft with priors (Cal. Penal Code §§ 484/666) on February 27, 1992;

Fifth Prior Conviction: first degree attempted burglary on July 11, 1985; and 

Sixth Prior Conviction: first degree burglary on February 22, 1980. 

Answer, Ex. 3 at 8-9. 

The Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Prior Convictions were charged in the Complaint as “serious

felonies.” Answer, Ex. 1. At the plea hearing, there was a discussion as to whether the Second Prior

Conviction should be classified as a serious felony under Cal. Penal Code § 667(a). Under California law,

felonies listed in Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c) will be characterized as serious felonies for sentencing and

subject to a five-year enhancement. Cal. Penal Code § 667(a). Burglaries are classified as serious felonies

if they occur within “an inhabited dwelling house . . . or the inhabited portion of any other building.” §

1192.7(c)(18). At the hearing, the district attorney told the court that the parties agreed to amend the Second

Prior Conviction to no longer be classified as a serious felony. Instead, the Second Prior Conviction would

enhance Mr. Franklin’s sentence by one year for being a “prior separate prison term served for any felony.”

Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b). 

Following the district attorney’s explanation oftheir agreement to reduce the Second PriorConviction,

the court inquired as to Mr. Franklin’s understanding of the agreement. Mr. Franklin responded that he did

not understand what the district attorney had said, but that he did understand what his lawyer had told him.

Answer, Ex. 3 at 2. The record indicates there was an off the record discussion between Mr. Franklin and his

appointed counsel, Ms. Trina Stanley. The court then asked whether he understood what had taken place.

Mr. Franklin answered that he understood and was prepared to accept the plea proposal. Answer, Ex. 3 at

2-3. The court informed Mr. Franklin of his right to separately challenge each of the prior convictions and he

answered that he understood and was willing to waive those rights. Id. at 7. 

Based on the plea, the court found Mr. Franklin guilty offirstdegree burglary with six prior convictions.

The sentencing court imposed a six year sentence for the current first degree burglary conviction. Based on

Cal. Penal Code § 667(a), the sentencing court then enhanced Mr. Franklin’s sentence by five years for the
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priorseriousfelonies which occurred on February 22, 1980 (Sixth PriorConviction),July 11, 1985 (FifthPrior

Conviction), and June 10, 1992 (Third Prior Conviction). The sentence was enhanced under the definition of

serious felony as a “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house . . . or the inhabited portion of any other building.”

Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(18). The sentence was enhanced an additional year under § 667.5(b) for the

Second Prior Conviction. The resulting prison sentence totaled twenty-two years. 

Petitioner did not appealhis burglaryconviction. On January 10, 2002, petitioner filed a pro se petition

for writ of habeas corpus in Alameda County Superior Court, whichwas denied for a failure to state a prima

facie claim for relief on January 11, 2002. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal on February 22, 2002, and was denied on February 26, 2002. Petitioner next

petitioned the California Supreme Court on April 16, 2002, and was denied writ on October 2, 2002. 

Petitioner brought the current 28 U.S.C. § 2254 writ of habeas corpus on November 13, 2002.

Respondent brought a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely which, after an evidentiary hearing on

November 22, 2004, was denied by the court on February 7, 2005. Respondent filed its answer on April 1,

2005. Petitioner submitted its traverse on May 6, 2005, with the help of appointed counsel. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federalcourt is barred fromreviewing a question of federal law decided by a state court if the state

court decision rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support

the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The Supreme Court has stated:

When a federal habeas court releases a prisoner held pursuant to a state

court judgment that rests on an independent and adequate state ground,

it renders ineffective the state rule just as completely as if this Court had

reversed the state judgment on direct review. In such a case, the habeas

court ignores the State's legitimate reasons for holding the prisoner. 

Id. at 730 (citation omitted). Only when the state’s decision “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; [or] (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” may a state sentence be overturned

on a federal writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2). 
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The “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) allows the Court to grant a writ of habeas corpus when the

state court’s judgment differs from a Supreme Court ruling “on a question of law or if the state court decides

a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set ofmaterially indistinguishable facts.”Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A § 2254 federal habeas proceeding is only proper if the defendant was deprived

of constitutional due process, so that the admission ofevidence rose to an arbitrary or prejudicial level which

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986).

Insufficiency of the evidence: A state prisoner may seek federal habeas relief by alleging that the

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rationaltrier

offact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979). The Jackson

standard also applies to state sentence enhancements: a petitioner can obtain habeas relief if no rational trier

offact could find the elements ofthe enhancement true beyond a reasonable doubt. Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d

1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting habeas reliefbecause there was no evidence thatrobbery furthered other

gang criminal activity, an element of the gang sentencing enhancement in Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(b)(1)).

However, despite the challenges allowed by Jackson, a defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise

in habeas corpus proceedings independent claims relatingto the deprivationofconstitutionalrightsthatoccurred

before the plea of guilty. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (guilty plea forecloses

consideration of pre-plea constitutional deprivations); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973).

The only challengesleft open in federalhabeas corpus after a guilty plea is the voluntary and intelligentcharacter

of the plea and the nature of the advice of counsel to plead. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985);

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may only attack the

voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was

not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id.; Lambert v. Blodgett, 393

F.3d 943, 979 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Hudson v.

Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Ineffective assistance of counsel: In a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal judgment, a state

court conclusion that counselrendered effective assistance is not a fact binding on the federalcourtto the extent

stated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Both the performance and the prejudice components of the ineffectiveness
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inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 698 (1984). Claims

of ineffective assistance therefore require a review of the record.

In order to prevailona Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counselclaim, petitioner must establish two

things. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The

relevant inquiry is not what defense counselcould have done, but rather whether the choices made by defense

counsel were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). Judicial scrutiny

of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689. 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that “there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessionalerrors, the result ofthe proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. Id. Where the defendant is challenging his conviction, the appropriate question is “‘whether there

is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubtrespecting

guilt.’” Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner makes two claims to support his § 2254 habeas proceeding. First, petitioner argues that

there was insufficient evidence to establish that the prior convictions were serious felonies, to support

enhancements under Cal. PenalCode § 667(a). Second, petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object to the enhancements for serious felonies during the sentencing phase. 

1. Petitioner may only raise objections to the voluntariness of the guilty plea in the habeas

corpus proceedings

Petitioner’s contention that there was insufficient evidence that his prior convictions were serious

feloniesisimproperin this § 2254 habeas proceeding, since petitioner entered a guilty plea at trial. A defendant

who pleads guilty cannot laterraise inhabeas corpus proceedings independent claims relating to the deprivation

of constitutional rights that occurred before the plea of guilty. Haring, 462 U.S. at 319- 20. “A guilty plea
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represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process” negating any possible

pre-plea constitutional claim. Tollet, 411 U.S. at 267. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in

open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutionalrightsthat occurred priorto the entry ofthe guilty

plea.” Id. In order to uphold the certainty of the conviction, petitioner may not claim constitutional violations

regarding elements within the plea agreement after the guilty plea has been entered. 

As is discussed below, petitioner “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty

plea by showing that the advice he received fromcounselwas not within the standards setforth in [Strickland].”

Id. Petitioner’s claims as to the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to establish the sentence enhancements

may be relevant to whether counselshould had advised him to enter a plea of guilty, but cannot independently

support a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the Court rejects petitioner’s claims relating to the sufficiency

of the evidence. 

2. Effective assistance of counsel rendered the plea voluntary and intelligent.

Petitioner claims his counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the serious felony

enhancements at sentencing and by not informing him that he could contest the serious felony allegations.

Traverse at 2. To prove his ineffective assistance claim, petitioner must overcome the “strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range ofreasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. 

Petitioner contends a reasonable attorney would have contested classifications of the three prior

convictions as “serious felonies.” The Court disagrees. Petitioner had five prior convictions for burglary and

another for petty theft. Four of these prior convictions took place in inhabited dwellings, and thus would have

been established as serious felonies under Cal. PenalCode § 1192.7(c)(18). Therefore, the three strikes law

would apply, making Mr. Franklin eligible for a minimum twenty-five years to life sentence. 

In her pretrial negotiation letter (Answer, Ex. 5), Ms. Stanley articulated a clear understanding of the

facts of Mr. Franklin’s various burglaries of inhabited dwellings. Although she cast them in the light most

favorable to petitioner, byunderscoring petitioner’s non-violent and comparatively benign conduct whencaught,
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she outlinedcircumstancessquarely supporting the statutory classifications given. Ms. Stanley urged the District

Attorney that Mr. Franklin should be spared conviction under the three strikes law because he was not the

violent “type of offender contemplated by the statute.” Id. at 4. Clearly, Ms. Stanley foresaw the possibility

of a sentence under the three strikes law for over twenty-five years. Petitioner agreed to a plea arrangement

with a significantly lesssevere sentence than the possible sentence froma conviction under the three strikes law.

Petitioner received three five-year enhancements forserious felonies, and an additional one-year enhancement

for the second prior conviction. The Court finds Ms. Stanley’s decision to pursue a plea agreement to be a

reasonable choice under the circumstances of the case. 

Ms. Stanley encouraged petitioner to accept the plea agreement rather than face the possibility of a

twenty-five years to life sentence under the three strikes law. The prejudice element of Strickland is not met

if petitioner received significant benefits from his plea agreement. United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840,

846-847 (9th Cir. 1996). In Baramdyka, petitioner could not argue the ineffectiveness of his counsel for not

questioning the validity of a lesser crime that he plead guilty to, because he would have received a longer

sentence if he had been convicted of the charge dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Id. Mr. Franklin

similarly cannot argue his counsel’s performance prejudiced him since he received a lesssevere punishment by

agreeing to the guilty plea. A three strikes conviction would result in a sentence of twenty-five years to life,

without parole. Under the plea agreement, petitioner received a twenty-two year sentence and will be “eligible

for parole consideration in approximately 17 years 7 months.”Answer at 10. Ms. Stanley provided effective

assistance to petitioner, whereby no prejudice to the result of the proceeding can be found, since petitioner

received a much less severe punishment than he would have faced at trial.

Petitioner contends counsel’s deficient performance led to an involuntary guilty plea. To establish an

involuntary plea, petitionermustprove “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

 Following the reduction of the Second Prior Conviction from a § 667(a) “serious felony” characterization to

a one-year enhanced §667.5(b) classification, the trial court made inquiries into petitioner’s understanding of

the reduction at the plea hearing. Petitioner stated that he did not understand what the district attorney had just

said about the Second Prior Conviction, but that he understood what his attorney had told him. Answer, Ex.
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3 at 2. After an off the record discussion with counsel, petitioner stated that he understood the impact ofthe

Second Prior Conviction and wanted to accept the plea agreement. Id. at 2-3. 

Since petitioner understood the impact of the prosecution’s striking of the “serious felony”

characterizationofthe Second PriorConviction, it reasonably followsthatpetitionerunderstood the importance

of classifying a prior offense as a “serious felony.” During the plea, petitioner was reminded of and waived his

right to “challenge each and every one of those priors through the exercise of [his] rights.” Id. at 7. Therefore

being aware ofthe consequences of his prior convictions, petitioner voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea

as required by North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). Petitioner then admitted to the court his

cognizance of those rights he waived regarding his ability to contest the priors. Answer, Ex. 3 at 7. The Court

finds Mr. Franklin was informed ofthe sentencing consequences ofhis plea, and thus counselprovided effective

assistance allowing Mr. Franklin to make a voluntary and intelligent choice to plead guilty.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge