Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02386/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02386-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983bv Bivens Non-Prisoner

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3:19-CV-2386-CAB-(BLM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS PASHUTA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-CV-2386-CAB-(BLM)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 11]

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint. [Doc. No. 11.] For the reasons set forth below, the motion is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

On April 2, 2019, Pashuta was in the lobby of the Embassy Hotel on Park 

Boulevard in San Diego. Experiencing a mental crisis, Pashuta believed himself to be 

invisible and was bathing in the hotel lobby’s drinking fountain. Pashuta was not 

behaving aggressively or violently in any way. [Doc. No. 9, ¶12.]

After the hotel manager called police to report Pashuta’s behavior, Dabbaghian 

arrived and confronted Pashuta. [Doc. No. 9, ¶13.]

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Dabbaghian demanded Pashuta’s identification. Mr. Pashuta, sweating profusely, 

exhibited mental confusion and responded by repeatedly asking, “You can see me? You 

guys can see me?” while spinning in circles. [Doc. No. 9, ¶14.]

When Dabbaghian told Pashuta to leave the hotel, Pashuta was compliant and 

began walking towards the exit, telling Dabbaghian, “We can go out that door,” pointing 

toward the exit. Pashuta was unarmed and posed no threat to anyone. [Doc. No. 9, ¶15.]

Instead of allowing Pashuta to leave the hotel, however, Dabbaghian forcefully 

grabbed and wrenched Pashuta’s arm, yanked him off his feet, and then body slammed 

him onto some nearby furniture. [Doc. No. 9, ¶16.]

In a state of confusion, Pashuta pleaded with the officer to give him time to process 

and comply with the officer’s commands. [Doc. No. 9, ¶17.]

Dabbaghian, however, proceeded to punch Pashuta repeatedly on the left side of 

his face with his closed right fist as Pashuta attempted to curl into a defensive position 

with his hands protecting the sides of his head. [Doc. No. 9, ¶18.]

Pashuta screamed and continued to exhibit clear signs of a mental crisis, telling 

Dabbaghian, “I will turn green, I will turn green!” [Doc. No. 9, ¶19.]

At this point, Tutt arrived on scene and joined in Dabbaghian’s assault on Pashuta. 

As Pashuta attempted to protect himself from the officers’ attacks, Dabbaghian 

positioned himself behind Pashuta and applied a blood chokehold, euphemistically 

referred to as a “carotid restraint,” to get Pashuta to pass out. [Doc. No. 9, ¶20.]

While Pashuta was choking in Dabbaghian’s grip, Tutt—in violation of SDPD 

policy and procedure—deployed her taser in dart mode. The barbs embedded themselves 

in the right side of Pashuta’s lower abdomen, and Tutt deployed a full, five second 

electrical shock to Pashuta’s body. And still the assault continued. [Doc. No. 9, ¶21.]

Dabbaghian applied another blood chokehold on Pashuta from behind, holding it 

until Pashuta lost consciousness and his body slumped to the floor. Finally, the officers 

handcuffed Pashuta’s limp body. All of this was recorded by the officers’ bodyworn 

cameras and witnessed by hotel staff. [Doc. No. 9, ¶22.]

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed the original complaint against Defendants 

City of San Diego, Nicholas Dabbaghian and Kalena Tutt. [Doc. No. 1.] On January 21, 

2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. [Doc. No. 8.] On February 

11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). [Doc. No. 9.] The FAC 

alleges five separate causes of action: (1) 42 U.S.C. §1983 (excessive force) against 

Defendants Dabbaghian and Tutt; (2) 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Monell) against Defendant City; 

(3) Cal. Civil Code §52.1(b) (Bane Act) against Defendants Dabbaghian, Tutt, and City; 

(4) Battery against Defendants Dabbaghian, Tutt, and City; and (5) Negligence against 

Defendants Dabbaghian, Tutt, and City. [Doc. No. 9.]

On February 25, 2020 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second and third 

causes of action of the FAC. [Doc. No. 11.] On March 17, 2020 Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to the motion. [Doc. No. 12.] On March 24, 2020 Defendants filed a reply to 

the opposition. [Doc. No. 13.]

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A 

court may dismiss “based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990).

Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” (Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)), in order to survive a 

motion to dismiss this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter ... 

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 

complaint must include something more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation” or “ ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining 

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whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a 

“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the interplay between 

the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the action. See 

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court must construe the complaint 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the factual allegations of the 

complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). This rule does not apply to “ 

‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’ ” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 

286 (1986) (quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), nor to “allegations that contradict 

matters properly subject to judicial notice” or to material attached to or incorporated by 

reference into the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988–89 

(9th Cir.2001).

DISCUSSION

A. Monell.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff merely alleges that the use of excessive force was a 

“result of practice or custom among the City’s law-enforcement officers of using 

excessive force in connection with detentions and arrests. . . “ [Doc. No. 11-1 at 6, 

quoting Doc. No. 9 at ¶46.] Defendants further argue the FAC does not state a claim for 

municipal liability, because the vague policy alleged in the FAC is merely a conclusory 

statement. [Doc. No. 11-1 at 6.] With regard to the policy, Plaintiff alleges the 

following:

This use of excessive force on Pashuta was consistent with, and a result of, a 

practice or custom among SDPD officers of using excessive in violation of 

SDPD’s express policies and procedures, and in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. Indeed, the frequent violation of policies and procedures 

regarding use of force, and violations of the Fourth Amendment right to be 

free from excessive force, in addition to the uniformity with which 

Dabbaghian and Tutt acted throughout this incident, evidence a deliberate 

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indifference to the training and supervision needs of the City’s lawenforcement officers. [Doc. No. 9, ¶23.]

. . . . .

Specifically, the excessive use of force on Pashuta resulted from the City’s

failure to train SPDP officers concerning the following customs and 

practices:

a. To use or tolerate the use of excessive and unreasonable force, 

including using blood chokeholds and tasers during detentions, 

arrests, and at other times in an unreasonable manner;

b. To fail to use appropriate and generally accepted law-enforcement

procedures in handling persons who are disabled and/or obviously

experiencing mental crises;

c. To fail to use appropriate and generally accepted law enforcement 

procedures in handling injured, disabled persons, and/or mentally ill 

individuals;

d. To cover-up violations of constitutional rights by any or all of the 

following:

i. By failing to properly investigate and/or evaluate complaints 

or incidents of excessive and unreasonable force, unlawful seizures,

and/or handling of emotionally disturbed persons;

ii. by ignoring and/or failing to properly and adequately 

investigate and discipline unconstitutional or unlawful police activity; 

and

iii. by allowing, tolerating, and/or encouraging police officers 

to: fail to file complete and accurate police reports; file false police 

reports; make false statements; intimidate, bias and/or coach witnesses 

to give false information and/or to attempt to bolster officers' stories; 

and/or obstruct or interfere with investigations of unconstitutional or 

unlawful police conduct, by withholding and/or concealing material

information; [Doc. No. 9, ¶28.]

To allow, tolerate, and/or encourage a code of silence among law

enforcement officers and police department personnel, whereby an officer or 

member of the department does not provide adverse information against a 

fellow officer or member of the department. [Doc. No. 9, ¶29.]

Plaintiff’s Monell claim is an amalgamation of two theories: 1) an official 

policy or settled practice of using excessive force in detentions and arrests; and 2) 

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a failure to train officers in the use of force, especially regarding the handling of 

mentally or emotionally disturbed people. 

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the City was on actual or constructive notice, 

at the time of this incident, that its officers were inadequately trained and illequipped to deal with numerous numbers of mentally ill individuals, and that this

was causing frequent constitutional violations. While Plaintiff does not describe 

any other similar incidents in detail, he does provide information from news

reports and studies describing a potential failure in this area. [Doc. No. 9, ¶¶23-27.]

Thus, Plaintiff has provided enough facts about the City’s policy that Defendants 

will be able to defend Plaintiff’s Monell claim based on a failure to train. See 

Johnson v. Shasta County, 83 F.Supp.3d 918, 932 (E.D. 2015); Boarman v. 

County of Sacramento, No. 2:11-cv-02825-KJM-KJN, 2013 WL 1326196, at *5 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013).

On the other hand, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a Monell claim

regarding a policy or custom of using excessive force in arrests and detentions. 

The allegations regarding Officer Dabbaghian and three other off-duty officers on 

November 7, 2018 [Doc. No. 9, ¶¶31-33] do not involve an arrest or detention and, 

therefore, are insufficient to state such a claim.

1

 Therefore, the motion to dismiss 

the second cause of action is DENIED to the extent the Monell claim is based on a 

failure to train; otherwise the motion to dismiss the second cause of action is 

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. Bane Act.

California’s Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1, provides that a person “whose 

exercise or enjoyment” of constitutional rights has been interfered with “by threat, 

intimidation, or coercion” may bring a civil action for damages and injunctive relief. Id. 

 

1 Paragraphs 31-33 of the FAC are STRICKEN pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). The Court takes no 

position as to whether evidence supporting such allegations is relevant to other claims in this case.

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The essence of such a claim is that “the defendant, by the specified improper means ... 

tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do 

under the law or force the plaintiff to do something he or she was not required to do.” 

Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883 (2007). The 

elements of an excessive force claim under § 52.1 are essentially the same as under § 

1983, Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014), though a 

Bane Act claim additionally requires a showing of “a specific intent to violate the 

arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure,” Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 

F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “[R]eckless disregard for a person’s 

constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.” 

Reese, 888 F.3d at 1043 (quoting United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 885 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded an excessive force claim against Defendants 

Dabbaghian and Tutt. Furthermore, because California law permits respondeat superior

liability for Bane Act violations, Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants Dabbaghian and 

Tutt is sufficient to state a claim against the City. K.T. v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 219 

F. Supp. 3d 970, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Gant v. Los Angeles Cnty., 772 F.3d 608, 

623 (9th Cir. 2014); Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a)3); Doc. No. 9, ¶ 10 (alleging 

Dabbaghian and Tutt were, at all relevant times, employees of the City).

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit specifically addressed a Bane Act claim based on 

excessive force in Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, and again clarified that the Bane Act does 

not “require[ ] coercion independent from the constitutional violation.” 888 F.3d at 1045. 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged Defendants used “threats, intimidation or coercion” 

against Plaintiff in saying that Defendants Dabbaghian and Tutt used excessive force 

against him during the incident on April 2, 2019. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the third cause of action is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint 

is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

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1. The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is DENIED to the extent the 

Monell claim is based on a failure to train; otherwise the motion to dismiss the 

second cause of action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

2. The motion to dismiss the third cause of action is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff shall have until April 30, 2020 to file a Second Amended Complaint. If 

Plaintiff does not file a Second Amended Complaint by April 30, 2020, then 

Defendants shall answer the FAC, as amended by this Order, by May 15, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2020

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