Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04884/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04884-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAD ANDREW LARSEN,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-04884-JST (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Chad Andrew Larsen, a California prisoner, has filed this pro se action seeking a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, and 

Petitioner has filed a traverse. The matter is now before the court for consideration of the merits 

of the habeas petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 9, 2008, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed an information 

charging Petitioner and his father, Dennis Larsen, with conspiracy to commit murder, Cal. Penal 

Code § 182(a)(1). Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (“CT”)1at 631–32. Petitioner was charged 

separately with two counts of solicitation to commit murder; one count was later dismissed by the 

district attorney prior to trial. CT at 631–33, 1137. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dennis Larsen pled no contest to one count of solicitation to 

commit murder and was granted probation. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”)2at 851. On March 25, 

2010, following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and 

 

1

The Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal is located at Docket No. 5, Exhibit A.

2

The Reporter’s Transcript is located at Docket No. 5, Exhibit B.

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solicitation to commit murder. CT at 1238–45. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 25 years to 

life for the conspiracy charge, and to a term of 9 years for the solicitation charge, to run 

concurrently with the sentence for conspiracy. 3 CT at 1323–26.

Petitioner directly appealed the judgment in the California Court of Appeal. Docket No. 5, 

Ex. D. On April 30, 2012, in a reasoned opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the 

judgment. Docket No. 5, Ex. G. On August 8, 2012 the California Supreme Court denied the 

petition for review. Docket No. 5, Ex. I.

The instant petition was filed on October 22, 2013.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following background facts describing the crime and evidence presented at trial are 

from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal3: 

In January of 2008, defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with felony 

violations of unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation with a minor (Pen. Code, §§ 

261.5, subd. (c), 288a, subd. (b)(1)), 16-year-old Jane Doe.1 While defendant was held in 

the Humboldt County Jail awaiting trial, his father, Dennis Larsen (Dennis) regularly 

visited him. To avoid the recording devices on jailhouse phones, defendant would often 

communicate with Dennis by holding up handwritten notes to the glass partition in the 

visiting room.

Fn 1. Subsequent statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

indicated.

During the first visit defendant told Dennis he “wasn’t guilty of what he was charged 

with,” and did not want the case “to go forward.” Defendant expressed apprehension to 

Dennis that should Jane Doe testify against him, he would be convicted.2 He hoped she 

would not testify because he feared going to prison and being required to register as a sex 

offender.

Fn 2. Defendant had been previously convicted of unlawful sex with a minor in 

2006, and was on probation at the time of the 2008 sex offenses.

Dennis soon realized that defendant “had had sex with a minor.” Defendant “was very 

concerned about scientific evidence” that may “support the charge against him of ... 

statutory rape.” He repeatedly asked Dennis to “wipe down the front seat” of his truck by 

 

3

This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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rubbing a “tri-tip roast” into the seat to eliminate “DNA evidence” linking him to Jane 

Doe. Dennis complied, using a towel soaked in tri-tip or other meat juice.

Evidence was presented that defendant contacted several fellow jail inmates with proposals 

to kill Jane Doe to prevent her from testifying at trial. Between February and June 2008, at 

defendant’s request Dennis sent two $500 money orders to two Humboldt County Jail 

inmates at different post office boxes, each addressed to “our friend.”

Defendant also approached fellow Humboldt County Jail inmate Scott Schwartz with a 

scheme for him to go to the victim’s residence, kick the door in, “pretend [to be] police and 

kill everybody in the house so she couldn’t testify.” In May of 2008, defendant enlisted 

Dennis to pay Schwartz, who by then had been released from jail, $1,500, and give him a 

ride to San Francisco, in exchange for carrying out the murder of Jane Doe.3 Dennis gave 

Schwartz the money and drove him to San Francisco, but Schwartz failed to perform the 

murder, and subsequently tried to blackmail Dennis and defendant.

Fn 3. Dennis later claimed the money was for a motorcycle defendant was buying 

from Schwartz, but the sale never took place.

On several occasions defendant offered another inmate he met in the “same tier” of the 

county jail, William Lenard, money to kill Jane Doe to prevent her from testifying. 

Defendant referred to the victim as a “little drug addict whore that didn’t deserve to live,”

and feared that he “would be sent to prison for a long time” if convicted. Over the course 

of two weeks, defendant first offered Lenard $1,500, then raised the price to $2,000, to 

“make sure his witness couldn’t testify.” Lenard finally told defendant, “I don’t want to 

hear it no more.”

Lenard testified that he overheard defendant talk to “other people” in the common area of 

the facility, one of them Schwartz, “about having the victim killed” and burying her on 

property he owned. Defendant often discussed “different ways” they could kill the victim 

and “get away with it,” and mentioned that if the victim “can’t show up,” they “don’t have 

a case.” When he was released from custody in May 2008, Lenard reported defendant’s 

murder proposals to his probation officer and a district attorney investigator.

Brian Ekker was defendant’s cell mate in Humboldt County Jail. Defendant told Ekker 

that he was “worried about” Jane Doe’s testimony. Defendant wanted to pay someone “on 

the outside” to “get rid of her” so she “would not testify.” He offered Ekker $1,000 and a 

“broken down three wheeler” to kill Jane Doe. Defendant suggested Ekker drive by Jane 

Doe and shoot her. Ekker refused the offer. Ekker testified that defendant told him he had 

asked other inmates, including Schwartz, to murder Jane Doe, but they “took the money”

and failed to do the job.

In late April or early May 2008, defendant met inmate Carlton Wallace in the jail. 

Defendant told Wallace he feared being convicted, and had offered Jane Doe money not to 

testify, to no avail. Defendant asked Wallace to murder Jane Doe for money. Defendant 

offered Wallace $5,000, saying Dennis would give him the money. Defendant told 

Wallace if he murdered Jane Doe he also could be defendant’s partner in a marijuana 

growing operation he was planning on his father’s farm. Wallace believed defendant’s 

proposal was serious.

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Defendant suggested that Wallace befriend Jane Doe, who defendant claimed was a drug 

addict, and give her a bag of “bad drugs” to kill her. According to defendant’s plan, 

Wallace would then take her body to Dennis’s farm on Port Kenyon Road in Ferndale. 

Wallace would place the body in a trough tied down with straps, pour concrete over the 

body, and deposit it under a concrete slab on the property. Defendant drew detailed maps 

showing where Jane Doe lived and gave them to Wallace. He also gave Wallace a detailed 

description of Jane Doe and wrote out detailed, step-by-step instructions for Wallace to 

carry out the murder plan. Defendant provided blueprints of the ranch showing Wallace 

the location of the materials defendant wanted him to use to conceal the body. Wallace, 

who was due to be released soon, was to contact Dennis and tell him, “I was the guy that 

would carry out the ... plan.” Defendant also directed Wallace to tell Dennis to visit him in 

jail immediately.

In what Wallace described as “the final plan,” he was to meet with Dennis to receive $200 

and a “bag of bad drugs” to be given to Jane Doe. Once he received the drugs, Wallace 

was supposed to convince Jane Doe to call her mother and say she was going to San 

Francisco for a week or two with some friends and “didn’t want to be bothered,” and post a 

similar message on her “My Space page.” Wallace was then to remove the battery from 

Jane Doe’s cell phone, and tell her to accompany him to San Francisco to bring “back 

some drugs to Humboldt,” in exchange for drugs and cash she would receive. Wallace was 

to give Jane Doe tainted drugs “that was supposed to kill her.” If that “didn’t kill her,”

Wallace was directed to snap her neck with “four pounds of pressure” necessary to “break 

someone’s neck.”

After Jane Doe was dead, the plan called for Wallace to take the body to the Ferndale farm 

where he would find shovels to dig a hole, a trough, some tie-down straps, and some fastdrying concrete. Defendant said he would arrange through Dennis to have the shovels and 

other materials there. Wallace was to strap Jane Doe’s body into a fetal position with the 

tie-down straps to make her more compact to fit into the trough, fill the trough with 

concrete, and bury it under a concrete slab, covering the hole with debris. Defendant told 

Wallace he would wait a year or two after he was released, dig up the body, put it in his 

boat, and dump it in the ocean. Defendant professed to Wallace that “he’d be safe,” and 

they would both “be rich” marijuana growers.

Defendant drafted a “blueprint of everything” for Wallace, including a drawing of the 

trough and a note stating exactly what Wallace was to say to Dennis. The note read as 

follows: “I know who your son knows and have spent two months with him. I’m the friend 

he mentioned.... To further your son’s, yours, and my own goals, I am going to need seed 

money and for your—and for you to gather enough QUIKRETE to have fill that gray 

trough so that I may build a support and the cement ramp and fill the hole. I have 

legitimate need myself to do this, and I will do it. I have no wire, no blackmail, and 

certainly no mistakes. This is the only and last time this will be talked about. And Chad is 

the one who will pay me when I’m out. Chad’s case will be dismissed when his witness 

runs away to Mendocino.” Defendant also provided Wallace with a picture of his dog 

“Wuffle” to give to Dennis, “a picture that he knew his son wouldn’t part with.”

Wallace believed he was being set up to take the blame for the murder. He revealed 

defendant’s plan to his attorney, Glenn Brown, and told Brown he did not want to be 

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involved. Brown reported the matter to the district attorney’s office, which sent Chief 

Investigator Hislop and two other investigators to interview Wallace. Wallace provided 

the investigators with some or all of the writings he received from defendant, presumably 

the detailed instructions and maps, plus a picture of a dog.

The investigators fitted Wallace with a recording device. Wallace recorded a conversation 

in which defendant again detailed the murder plot. In the recorded conversation, defendant 

tells Wallace: “[W]hat I was thinking is you go into my dad’s garage.... You grab three tiedown straps.... And the three tie-down straps, you put ‘em, you put her feet in ... fetal 

position. You tie one around one knee, one around her shin, and you crank down.”

Wallace asks, “While she alive?” Defendant replies, “Fuck no. When she’s dead. You 

crank down, crank down, crank down. Get her as small as possible, right?” He continues 

by saying that once Jane Doe was “compact” Wallace would put her in the “tub”—

presumably the trough—in the bottom of the hole (“put her one thirty pound ass in”), then 

fill it with concrete. Wallace asked what he should do if there were no concrete at the 

farm. Defendant replied, “I’ll ... just have dad go get it.”

On June 12, 2008, Wallace was released from the Humboldt County Jail, but was 

transferred to the Del Norte facility so defendant would think Wallace had been released 

from custody. At 11:00 that morning, Wallace called Dennis as defendant had directed and 

identified himself as Carl, someone who knew defendant. Wallace told Dennis to visit 

defendant in the jail immediately.

Dennis and Roy Potvin, a longtime family friend, visited defendant at the jail on June 12. 

Defendant held up a piece of paper for Dennis with Wallace’s name and phone number and 

told Dennis he must give Wallace $500 immediately. Dennis testified this note read, “You 

must pay this man $500 and here’s a phone number. You must call this. Don’t forget.”

Apparently, the note stated in large bold letters, “Last Time.”

Despite Dennis’s testimony on the content of the note defendant displayed to him during 

the visit on June 12, the record is less than clear on the exact text of the note. Wallace 

testified regarding two other notes which defendant may have held up during a visit with 

Dennis. One note read: “To show he’s legit, Carl will dig under the ramp behind the barn 

to put in the new foundation. Cash in McKinleyville. Buy five bags of Quickrete. Hand

Carl shovels, the gray three-layered trough, five-gallon buckets, a heavy chain, and three 

heavy duty, tie-down straps....” Another note read: “This is the final time. I go to court on 

Friday, 13th. I need my problem fixed. He knows my problems, friends. Talk to him.

Give him $500 from my bank account so he can buy supplies to build a cement support 

under the ramp.”

4

Fn 4. Defendant’s reference to a Friday the 13th court date is revealing. We take 

judicial notice that the day of the visit, June 12, 2008, was a Thursday.

On the afternoon of June 12th, Dennis went to the credit union, as defendant asked, to 

withdraw $1,000—$500 to pay some bills and $500 for “Carl.”

5

Later that day, Dennis 

received a second call purportedly from Carl, who this time was Probation Officer Greg 

Allen posing as Carlton Wallace. “Carl” told Dennis he needed shovels and $500. Dennis 

suspected there was going to be “a hit,” and someone may be killed. He expressed concern 

to friends that defendant was trying to have Jane Doe killed.

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Fn 5. Dennis testified he thought the $500 was money defendant owed Carl, or 

possibly for protection in jail or to help finance defendant’s planned marijuana farm.

Nevertheless, Dennis participated in the scheme described to him by the man he thought 

was defendant’s friend Wallace. Dennis and Potvin went to a hardware store where 

Dennis bought two shovels, some tape, and some permanent markers. They then went to 

Dennis’s ranch in Ferndale, and left the two shovels and $500 in an envelope next to the 

mailbox for Wallace. Dennis put a note in the envelope telling Wallace he would receive 

no more money. Dennis received a call from “Carl,” and told “Carl” the items were 

waiting for him.

Dennis received several more calls from “Carl” which were recorded by investigators. 

“Carl” spoke in detail about the murder plot. Dennis became uneasy and upset when 

“Carl” requested help to bury a body behind the barn, and told “Carl” that “the deal is off.” 

Dennis realized that “this person” intended to enlist his assistance in the commission of a 

murder, and went to the Ferndale property to attempt to retrieve the shovels and money—

which were gone, having been removed by investigators.6

Fn 6. According to Hislop’s testimony, this “final plan” for the hit—the placing of 

the shovels and money, presumably—was not something that originated from 

Wallace, but from “Carl” at Hislop’s direction. But the “final plan” was certainly 

consistent with the plans emanating from defendant.

For “damage control” and to “cover his ass,” Dennis reported the possible murder plot 

against Jane Doe to the Ferndale police at 5:00 that afternoon, and gave a voluntary 

statement to Investigator Hislop and another officer. Dennis was later arrested, and 

ultimately entered a plea of no contest to solicitation to commit murder (§ 653f, subd. (b)) 

and being an accessory to a crime (§ 32). Hislop subsequently interviewed Schwartz, who 

told him Dennis was part of the conspiracy to murder Jane Doe.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He admitted a prior conviction for “consensual 

‘sexual intercourse with a minor’” (§ 261.5, subd. (c)), and his 2009 convictions for sex 

offenses with Jane Doe.7 He did not contact Jane Doe after January of 2008.

Fn 7. We affirmed the convictions. (People v. Larsen (Dec. 8, 2010, A126424, 

2010 WL 4975560) [nonpub. opn.].)

Defendant denied that he paid Jane Doe any money, or ever personally or through Dennis 

contacted her parents or boyfriend to seek to prevent her from testifying against him. He 

never threatened her or her family. He never asked anyone to kill Jane Doe so she would 

not testify. The $500 payments that Dennis described making to various jail inmates had 

nothing to do with Jane Doe, but were payments for protection from physical assault inside 

the jail.

Defendant had problems growing up, including learning disabilities, and was not liked by 

his teachers or his classmates. As his problems continued in high school, his teachers 

recommended counseling. His counselors referred him to psychologists.

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Rather than socializing with others, defendant kept to himself and played video games or 

computer role-playing games, like Dungeons and Dragons and Pools of Radiance, that 

were derived from comic books. The comic books were all based “on female heroines 

combating crime, defeating the bad guys using friendship and teamwork.”

During high school, defendant spent more time participating in role-playing games, and 

made some friends “who liked to role play” on a serious level. Defendant testified that in 

role playing there is always a “game master” who defines the mission and the scenarios 

and takes command of the game.8

Fn 8. Defense witnesses testified the game master controls the game, selects the 

scenarios, selects the characters, and chooses what world the game occurs in. 

Scenarios can come from role-playing books, comic books, or movies.

While in county jail, defendant made two payments of $500 through Dennis to a fellow 

inmate Fred Schallenberg for protection. Defendant also approached Schwartz for 

protection from “an inmate named Josh Cooly” who repeatedly threatened to stab him. In 

exchange, defendant gave Schwartz food from his tray and “bought him commissary.” He 

also socialized with Schwartz; they read defendant’s comic books. Defendant testified that 

the $1,500 he paid to Schwartz was for a motorcycle and a ride to the Delancey Street 

program, not to kill Jane Doe.

Defendant met Wallace in jail through Schwartz. Defendant and Wallace exchanged 

information on their cases and people they knew in common, including Jane Doe and her 

friends Lindsay and Sarah. Wallace told defendant he was their “drug dealer.”

Defendant grew to trust Wallace, and they discussed a future marijuana cultivation 

operation on defendant’s property in Ferndale to be run by Wallace when they were 

released. The $500 defendant asked Dennis to give Wallace was for a soil analysis of the 

planned marijuana farm.

Defendant and Wallace began to engage in discussions about “role playing” related to their 

cases and “things that [they] knew in real life,” such as “keeping a witness from 

testifying.” He and Wallace engaged in “lots” of role-playing games. Wallace was the 

acknowledged “game master,” who orchestrated the role playing by giving defendant 

verbal or body language cues.9 Wallace threatened that he would not participate in the 

marijuana cultivation venture unless defendant followed his role playing signals.

Fn 9. Supposedly, Wallace had the words “game over” tattooed on his arms. If he 

folded his arms to reveal “game,” the game was on; to reveal “over,” the game was 

off. As defendant put it, “[A]s we were talking, I would slip back and forth 

between real and fake depending on how he would hold his arms.”

Their discussions about Jane Doe were not related to an actual conspiracy to kill her, but 

rather merely part of their role-playing games in which defendant and Wallace invented 

various scenarios based on comic book stories and role-playing books defendant had in 

jail. Defendant explained: “The quotes, the scenarios, some of the characters’ names such 

as Deacon, Sarah, Dennis, et cetera, which were also in the comic books and matched 

people we knew in real life.”

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As part of their role-playing game, the victim was to be buried in a gray water trough. 

Wallace used the trough because it was something from Dennis’s ranch with which 

defendant was familiar. One of the bases for their role-playing game was the heroine in 

the comic book Empowered, who is tied and chained up and compacted in a trough or oval 

hole, but is saved by her fellow heroes and does not actually get killed.10 Defendant 

testified, “No heroine ... ever gets killed in any of my comic books that I know of.”

Fn 10. Typically, some role players are villains and some are heroes. In the game 

World of Darkness, each player was to “start as a regular person” and then “work to 

becom[e] a hero and stop[ ] a great evil.”

Catherine Silver, a psychiatric physician’s assistant for Dr. Irving Tessler, testified as a 

defense expert on Asperger’s Syndrome and Autism. In her capacity as assistant to Dr. 

Tessler, Silver diagnosed and treated patients with Autism, Asperger’s Syndrome, and 

other psychiatric disorders. Asperger’s is a “high-functioning variant of Autism,” which 

manifests itself primarily in social dysfunction. A child with Asperger’s will have 

difficulty making friends. He will talk obsessively about topics that interest him without 

“picking up on social cues.” He will lack social or mental filters, and thus say whatever he 

is thinking without regard to whether it is appropriate.

Defendant was diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome around 1997, and became a patient of 

Dr. Tessler in the early 1990’s. Silver reviewed defendant’s records, examined him, and 

personally diagnosed him with Asperger’s Syndrome.

Silver testified that role playing is a “huge obsession” with defendant that occupies “hours 

and hours of time.” It provides him with a social outlet, a place where he can be accepted 

by others who are themselves obsessed or otherwise disabled. According to Silver, role 

playing occupies so much of defendant’s time that “he doesn’t live in the real world. He 

lives in a[n] intellectual fantasy world much of the time.”

Silver also testified that defendant is socially naïve and is susceptible to manipulation by 

others. He can be influenced to say things against his own interests that are consistent with 

his fantasies. Because defendant has no social filter and always speaks what is on his 

mind, a clever person can manipulate him to act contrary to his own interests. He also has 

a “desire at any cost” to please others and give them “something to get them to be his 

friends.” He is thus easily manipulated. He is prone to approach others to “have his own 

needs met.”

Silver also testified that as an Asperger’s patient defendant had impaired empathy for 

others and was inclined to manipulate others to meet his needs. He tends to have narrow 

interests and engage in obsessive thinking.

Two inmates who became acquainted with defendant in Humboldt County Jail recounted 

statements made to them by Wallace to the effect that “in exchange for a deal” to drop his 

charges, he had “given the DA everything” they needed for a case against defendant. 

According to the defense witnesses, Wallace manipulated defendant through an “RPG,”

role-playing game, to get him to “say anything he wanted him to say.” The manipulation 

was accomplished through timed signals that “involved tattoos and hand signs,” and 

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conveyed a message to defendant that prompted him to respond “on a wire” in the manner 

Wallace wanted.

People v. Larsen, 205 Cal. App. 4th 810, 814–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose 

v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 

to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of 

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, habeas 

relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “Under the 

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court 

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making 

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the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly 

established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s 

jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court 

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the 

precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 

(2003).

B. Instructional Error

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury with California 

Criminal Jury Instruction (“CALCRIM”) No. 3428 (Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific 

Intent or Mental State); refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment as to his father, Dennis Larsen; 

and refusing to instruct the jury that Dennis’s plea of no contest was not conclusive proof that 

Petitioner was guilty of conspiracy. 

1) Standard

Due process requires that “‘criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to 

present a complete defense.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). Therefore, a criminal defendant is entitled to 

adequate instructions on the defense theory of the case. Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (error to deny defendant’s request for instruction on simple kidnapping where such 

instruction was supported by the evidence). The defendant is not entitled to have jury instructions 

raised in his or her precise terms where the given instructions adequately embody the defense 

theory. See United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 

Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1979). 

A state trial court’s refusal to give an instruction does not by itself raise a ground 

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th 

Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial 

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guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 

Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the case 

and the overall instructions given to the jury. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973) and Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 

155 (1977)). The question is “whether, under the instructions as a whole and given the evidence 

in the case, the failure to give the requested instruction rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair 

as to violate federal due process.” Id. at 746 (citing Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147).

The omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the 

law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475–76 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Henderson, 431 U.S. at 

154). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction 

bears an “‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155). The significance of the omission of such an instruction 

may be evaluated by comparison with the instructions that were given. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 

255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 156).

A habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the instructional error “‘had substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 631 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The proper 

question in assessing harm in a habeas case is, “‘Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially 

influenced the jury’s decision?’” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). If the court is 

convinced that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 

judgment should stand. Id. at 437. If, on the other hand, the court is not fairly assured that there 

was no effect on the verdict, it must reverse. Id. In the “narrow circumstance” in which the court 

is in “grave doubt” about whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict, it must assume that the error is not harmless and the petitioner must 

win. Id. at 436, 438; see, e.g., id. at 436–44 (relief granted because record so evenly balanced that 

conscientious judge in grave doubt as to harmlessness of error); Chambers v. McDaniel, 549 F.3d 

1191, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting habeas relief based upon “grave doubt” as to 

harmlessness of erroneous first-degree murder instruction on premeditation, where error went to 

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“very heart of the case” and evidence against petitioner was not so great that it precluded a verdict 

of second-degree murder). 

2) Analysis – Mental Impairment Jury Instruction

Petitioner’s defense to the crimes was that he lacked the intent to kill due to his Asperger’s 

Syndrome. He stated that the plans to kill Jane Doe were part of a role-playing game initiated and 

controlled by Wallace, and that Petitioner’s participation in this game was due to his Asperger’s 

Syndrome. The trial court refused Petitioner’s request for the mental impairment pinpoint 

instruction, CALCRIM No. 3428, stating that the evidence did not support the instruction. 

Petitioner claims that the failure to give CALCRIM No. 3428 deprived him of his right to present 

a defense and to due process.

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant legal standards and denied 

Petitioner’s claim, finding that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it failed to 

instruct on mental disorder:

I. The Trial Court’s Failure to Give an Instruction on Mental Disorder.

Defendant contends the trial court infringed on his constitutional right to present a defense 

based on his purported mental impairment caused by Asperger’s Syndrome, and how it 

affected his perceptions and mental processes. He claims the evidence of his mental 

disorder supported his defense that the detailed plans for Jane Doe’s murder were part of 

an elaborate fantasy within the confines of a role-playing game. He thus claims he lacked 

the intent to kill. He argues the trial court infringed upon his right to present a mental 

impairment defense by refusing to give an instruction in the terms of CALCRIM No. 3428, 

which reads in pertinent part: “You have heard evidence that the defendant may have 

suffered from a mental (disease[,] / [or] defect[,]] / [or] disorder). You may consider this 

evidence only for the limited purpose of deciding whether, at the time of the charged 

crime, the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the intent or mental state required for that 

crime. [¶] The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant acted [or failed to act] with the required intent or mental state [required for the 

charged crimes].... If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not 

guilty of [the charged crimes].”

The trial court refused defendant’s request to give this instruction, ruling that “[t]here just 

simply isn’t any evidence that [defendant] didn’t have the mental capacity to form the 

mental—the specific intent or didn’t form that.” Defendant maintains “the record did 

indeed contain evidence that he lacked the intent to kill and that his Asperger’s Syndrome 

was relevant to that claim, and the court’s refusal to instruct the jury with CALCRIM [No.] 

3428 severely hampered the presentation of his defense,” in contravention of his due 

process rights.

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A. The Evidence to Support the CALCRIM No. 3428 Instruction.

Our inquiry into the trial court’s obligation to give the requested CALCRIM No. 3428 

instruction proceeds from the fundamental principle that a “defendant, upon proper request 

therefor, has a right to an instruction to direct the jury’s attention to evidence from which a 

reasonable doubt of his guilt could be inferred.” (People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 

917, 924–925, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86.) “The trial court has an ‘obligation to instruct on 

defenses, ... and on the relationship of these defenses to the elements of the charged 

offense ...’ where ‘[¶] ... it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if 

there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense....’ [Citations.]” (People v. 

Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1848, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765.) But, the court must “give 

a requested instruction concerning a defense only if there is substantial evidence to support 

the defense.” (People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1116, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 715; 

see also People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1176, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) 

“[A] trial judge must only give those instructions which are supported by substantial 

evidence,” and “has the authority to refuse requested instructions on a defense theory for 

which there is no supporting evidence.” (People v. Ponce (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1380, 

1386, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 422; see also People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1355, 37 

Cal.Rptr.2d 304.) “[T]he court is not obliged to instruct on theories that have no 

evidentiary support.” (People v. Joiner (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 946, 972, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 

270; see also People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 

P.2d 1094.)

Substantial evidence in this context “‘is “evidence sufficient ‘to deserve consideration by 

the jury,’ not ‘whenever any evidence is presented, no matter how weak.’” ‘[Citations.]” 

(People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 331, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758.) “In 

determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court 

does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was 

evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt....’ 

[Citations.]” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 

P.3d 40.) “‘“‘The fact that the evidence may not be of a character to inspire belief does not 

authorize the refusal of an instruction based thereon.’” ‘[Citations.] As an obvious 

corollary, if the evidence is minimal and insubstantial the court need not instruct on its 

effects.” (People v. Springfield (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1680, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 278.)

“‘“Doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions should be resolved 

in favor of the accused.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Even so, the test is not whether any 

evidence is presented, no matter how weak. Instead, the jury must be instructed when 

there is evidence that ‘deserve[s] consideration by the jury, i.e., “evidence from which a 

jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded”’ that the specific facts 

supporting the instruction existed. [Citations.]” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 

Cal.App.4th 663, 677, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 726.) “We review this issue as one of law.” (People 

v. Sinclair (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1017, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 626.)

The question, as it is “properly phrased” in CALCRIM No. 3428, “is ‘whether the 

defendant actually formed the required specific intent.’” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 

Cal.4th 769, 832, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 259 P.3d 370.) CALCRIM No. 3428 is a pinpoint 

instruction that must be given only if requested by the defendant, and only if substantial 

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evidence supports the defense theory that defendant’s mental disease or disorder affected 

the formation of the relevant intent or mental state. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 

91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Also, expert medical opinion testimony is 

necessary to establish that a defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect, or 

mental disorder within the meaning of CALCRIM No. 3428, because jurors cannot make 

such a determination from common experience. (People v. Moore, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 

1105, 1116–1117, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 715; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 

1229–1230, 1247–1249, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475; People v. Cox (1990) 221 

Cal.App.3d 980, 987, 270 Cal.Rptr. 730.)

In the present case, Catherine Silver, a psychiatric physician’s assistant, testified as an 

expert on the diagnosis and treatment of Asperger’s Syndrome. She was versed in 

psychiatric disorders, and had personal experience with both the diagnosis and treatment of 

defendant as an Asperger’s patient. Although the defense did not provide a foundation for 

a ruling that Silver was qualified as an expert, she testified in that capacity without 

objection from the prosecution.

We further conclude that Asperger’s Syndrome is a recognized mental diagnosis that 

warrants a mental disorder instruction, at least in the context of the conspiracy and 

solicitation to commit murder charges faced by defendant presented here.11 Both 

conspiracy and solicitation require proof of the element that defendant had the specific 

intent to commit or effectuate commission of the alleged underlying offense, in this case 

murder. (See People v. Superior Court (Decker ) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 11, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 

421, 157 P.3d 1017; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 120, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 

P.3d 400; People v. Herman (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1381–1382, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 

199; People v. Hall (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1094, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 279.) Solicitation 

as alleged may be complete when conversations occur, irrespective of any overt act 

committed by defendant to achieve the murder, or whether the object of the solicitation is 

ever actually undertaken or accomplished. (People v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 11, 58 

Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 157 P.3d 1017; People v. Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th 309, 328, 30 

Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758; In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377–1378, 

112 Cal.Rptr.2d 620; People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1708–1709, 54 

Cal.Rptr.2d 608.) Conspiracy, unlike solicitation, requires an agreement with another to 

commit or join in a feature of the alleged criminal object, along with an overt act in 

furtherance of the illegal objective. (People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 549, fn. 8, 

134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75; People v. Tatman (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1, 10–11, 24 

Cal.Rptr.2d 480.) Yet the focus is on the agreement with at least one other person to 

participate in an offense and no additional steps need be taken by the defendant towards its 

completion. (People v. Fenenbock, supra, at p. 1709, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608.) It is immaterial 

that the object of either the solicitation or the conspiracy is never achieved. (People v. 

Saephanh (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 460–461, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910.) The intent with 

which statements are made, plans are discussed, and agreements are confirmed, therefore 

becomes crucially important to prove solicitation or conspiracy accusations where no 

subsequent acts are undertaken by the defendant.

Fn 11. “Asperger’s Disorder is [defined as] an autism spectrum disorder 

characterized by a ‘severe and sustained impairment in social interaction ... and the 

development of restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, and activities.’ 

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental 

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Disorders 75 (4th ed. 1994) (DSM–IV); see also National Institute of Neurological 

Disorders and Stroke, Asperger Syndrome Fact Sheet, http://www.ninds.nih. 

gov/disorders/asperger/detail_asperger.htm [hereinafter NINDS, Fact Sheet ]. 

Persons with Asperger’s Disorder often exhibit ‘socially and emotionally 

inappropriate behavior’ and an ‘inability to interact successfully with peers.’ 

NINDS, Fact Sheet, supra. They have difficulty communicating with others and 

may not understand normal body language and gestures.” (State v. Burr (2008) 195 

N.J. 119, 123, fn. 2, 948 A.2d 627.)

Defendant’s request for the mental disorder instruction was appropriate in light of the 

evidence presented in the case to support the solicitation and conspiracy charges. The 

primary testimony offered against defendant was derived from conversations he had with 

other inmates in the closed, coercive structure of incarceration. The essential issue 

presented by the defense evidence, and brought into focus by Silver’s testimony, was 

defendant’s mental state—specifically, whether he intended by his statements to effectuate 

the killing of Jane Doe, or instead was merely engaging in role playing and seeking to 

curry favor with other inmates.

Of course, Silver did not, and could not, offer an opinion that defendant’s mental condition 

precluded him from entertaining the requisite intent for the charged offenses. Sections 28 

and 29 prohibit “an expert from offering an opinion on the ultimate question of whether the 

defendant had or did not have a particular mental state at the time he acted.” (People v. 

Nunn (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1364, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 294.) “Expert opinion on 

whether a defendant had the capacity to form a mental state that is an element of a charged 

offense or actually did form such intent is not admissible at the guilt phase of a trial. 

[Citation.] Sections 28 and 29 permit introduction of evidence of mental illness when 

relevant to whether a defendant actually formed a mental state that is an element of a 

charged offense, but do not permit an expert to offer an opinion on whether a defendant 

had the mental capacity to form a specific mental state or whether the defendant actually 

harbored such a mental state.” (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 582, fns. 

omitted, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081, overruled on unrelated grounds in Price v. 

Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618; 

see also People v. Cortes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 873, 902, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 605.)

Nevertheless, Silver offered expert medical testimony that defendant was suffering from a 

mental disorder at the time of the commission of the crime, thereby providing an 

evidentiary basis for the CALCRIM No. 3428 instruction. She not only testified 

definitively that defendant had been diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome, but also 

described defendant’s disorder to include features pertinent to the effort of the defense to 

negate the intent element of the solicitation and conspiracy offenses: his lack of social or 

mental filters, inclination to make inappropriate comments, inordinate desire to please 

others, susceptibility to manipulation, obsessive thinking, and compulsive fascination with 

fantasy role playing to the exclusion of reality. Silver specifically testified that defendant 

is socially naïve and subject to manipulation by others to say things adverse to his own 

interests. Silver’s opinion testimony on the effects of defendant’s Asperger’s Syndrome 

was both probative and admissible on the issue of whether defendant actually formed and 

expressed the requisite intent to procure Jane Doe’s murder. (See State v. Burr, supra, 948 

A.2d 627, 629; State v. Boyd (Mo.Ct.App.2004) 143 S.W.3d 36, 45–46.)

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Defendant’s testimony did not touch upon his mental condition, but somewhat 

substantiated the claim of lack of intent. He testified that he was a social misfit who 

gravitated to an impulsive obsession with fantasy role playing to escape reality. He denied 

that he intended to have Jane Doe killed, and asserted that his conversations with Wallace 

were all part of a role-playing fantasy game orchestrated by Wallace. Even if the defense 

evidence of mental disorder and absence of intent may be classified as less than highly 

persuasive and was disputed by conflicting evidence—of, for instance, the detailed notes 

and plans drawn for Wallace, and incriminating conversations with other inmates that did 

not seem to implicate defendant’s Asperger’s Syndrome—the court does not measure the 

substantiality of the evidence by weighing conflicting evidence or the credibility of the 

witnesses. (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 

1061; People v. Salas, supra, 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40; 

People v. Zamani (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 854, 885, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 608.) “In deciding 

whether defendant was entitled to the instructions urged, we take the proffered evidence as 

true, ‘regardless of whether it was of a character to inspire belief. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Petznick, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 726.)

We point out that to justify the CALCRIM No. 3428 instruction the defense was not 

required to either offer the theory or present additional evidence that defendant’s 

Asperger’s Syndrome impaired his ability to form the requisite criminal intent to commit 

the crime of solicitation to commit murder or conspiracy to do the same. The CALCRIM 

No. 3428 instruction, and sections 28 and 29, do not focus on whether a defendant had the 

mental capacity to form a specific intent, a prohibited inquiry in any event, but rather on 

“‘whether a defendant actually formed a mental state that is an element of a charged 

offense.’” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990, 

quoting People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th 529, 582, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 

1081.) It is the actual formation of intent in light of the defendant’s mental disorder, not 

the capability to do so, that is the fundamental inquiry posited by CALCRIM No. 3428. 

(People v. Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th 769, 832, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 259 P.3d 370.) 

Thus, the trial court’s announced finding, “There just simply isn’t any evidence that 

[defendant] didn’t have the mental capacity” to form the specific intent for the conspiracy 

and solicitation offenses, was off the mark. (Italics added.) The evidence that defendant 

suffered from Asperger’s Syndrome, and its manifested symptoms, directly and materially 

reflected on his claim that he did not actually intend to solicit the victim’s murder, but 

instead was engaged in some form of game-playing brought on by his mental disorder.

The concurring opinion argues there is a paucity of evidence defendant’s diagnosed 

Asperger’s syndrome precluded him from having specific intent. We believe the 

evidentiary hurdle presented in the concurrence intrudes on the jury’s function. 

CALCRIM No. 3428 presents two fundamental points: First, the jury is told “it has heard 

evidence the defendant may have suffered from a mental (disease[,] [or] defect[,] [or] 

disorder.)” Second, the jury is advised it “may consider this evidence only for the limited 

purpose of deciding whether, at the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted [or 

failed to act] with the intent or mental state required for the crime.”

Consequently, if there is evidence from a qualified expert the defendant suffered from a 

mental disease, defect or disorder at the time of the crime—as Silver testified here (i.e., 

that the defendant was treated since the seventh grade and suffered then and now from an 

autism spectrum disorder)—the particular mental disease, defect or disorder becomes a 

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matter for the jury to consider as that fact finder believes appropriate in deciding whether 

the defendant acted with the required mental state. Neither the language of CALCRIM No. 

3428 nor any case, mandates, as the concurring opinion seems to argue, there must be 

expert evidence showing the defendant suffers from a mental disorder like Asperger’s and 

that the identified mental disease, defect, or disorder “generally impairs criminal intent,” or 

does so in a “hypothetical situation” like the one present in the case. Indeed, it may be the 

case that evidence of the latter sort—the “hypothetical situation”—would come 

dangerously close to the territory precluded by sections 28 and 29.12

Fn 12. The concurring opinion discusses People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 25 

Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790, where the Supreme Court decided the defendant was 

not entitled to CALJIC No. 3.32, an equivalent to CALCRIM No. 3428, because 

there was no testimony from a medical expert defendant was actually suffering from 

a mental condition at the time of the crime. In that case, an emergency room 

physician who treated defendant more than 24 hours after the victim’s 

disappearance, noted the accused was psychotic and delusional. (Panah, supra, at 

pp. 484–485, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) The court noted there was no 

evidence of impairment when defendant assisted others in attempting to locate the 

missing victim before the ER visit. This was “at best” evidence defendant might 

suffer from some “long-standing latent psychosis,” but there was no evidence, let 

alone by a medical expert, the defendant was actually suffering from any mental 

problem at the time of the offense. (Ibid.) Here, there was expert medical testimony 

that defendant, at the time of the crimes, was suffering from an ongoing and 

manifest mental disorder—Asperger’s syndrome.

We conclude that the expert testimony of defendant’s mental disorder of Asperger’s 

Syndrome, in conjunction with the remaining evidence, was at least substantial on the issue 

of his actual formation of the specific mental state that is an element of the charged 

solicitation and conspiracy offenses. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to give the 

CALCRIM No. 3428 mental disorder instruction. (People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 

Cal.4th 1216, 1229–1230, 1247–1249, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475; People v. Cox, 

supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 980, 987–988, 270 Cal.Rptr. 730; People v. Aguilar (1990) 218 

Cal.App.3d 1556, 1569, 267 Cal.Rptr. 879, disapproved on other grounds in People v. 

Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 90–91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Molina

(1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171, 249 Cal.Rptr. 273; People v. Young (1987) 189 

Cal.App.3d 891, 907–909, 234 Cal.Rptr. 819.)

B. The Standard of Prejudicial Error.

We turn our inquiry to the prejudicial effect of the error. Our first task is to determine the 

applicable test of prejudicial error. Defendant asserts that the court’s failure to give the 

mental disorder instruction “infringed his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to 

present a defense” by preventing a “fair jury evaluation” of his mental impairment claim, 

and thus the governing test of prejudicial error is whether the error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 

L.Ed.2d 705 (Chapman).)

Existing case law fails to support defendant’s position. The California Supreme Court has 

directly declared, although without thorough discussion, that the error must be evaluated 

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under the much less stringent standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 

P.2d 243 (Watson). (People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 

P.2d 506; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 663, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 

101 P.3d 509; People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th 529, 583–584, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 

2 P.3d 1081, People v. Cortes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 873, 912, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 605.)

Upon analysis we agree that the Watson standard of review is appropriate to evaluate the 

instructional error at issue here. “Any ‘misdirection of the jury’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 

13), that is instructional error [citation], cannot be the basis of reversing a conviction 

unless ‘“an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,”’ indicates that the 

error resulted in a ‘“miscarriage of justice.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Canizalez (2011) 197 

Cal.App.4th 832, 858, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 565.) A distinction is drawn “between instructional 

error that entirely precludes jury consideration of an element of an offense and that which 

affects only an aspect of an element.” (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1315, 

18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) An instructional error that relieves the prosecution of the 

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each essential element of the charged 

offense, or that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense, violates the 

defendant’s rights under both the United States and California Constitutions, and is subject 

to Chapman review. (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 

L.Ed.2d 35; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339, 266 P.3d 

1030; People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425; 

People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 676–677, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 2 P.3d 1189; People v. 

Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 479–480, 502–503, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869; 

People v. Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 224, 241, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 609.) “If conflicting 

instructions on the mental state element of an alleged offense can act to remove that 

element from the jury’s consideration, the instructions constitute a denial of federal due 

process and invoke the Chapman ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard for assessing 

prejudice.” (People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1128, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335.) In 

contrast, “misdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly 

omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under 

the harmless error standard articulated” in Watson. (People v. Campos (2007) 156 

Cal.App.4th 1228, 1244, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 904; People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 

1141, 1157, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.)13

Fn 13. The argument by defendant regarding “structural error,” urged here, is 

inapplicable. “An error is ‘“structural,” and thus subject to automatic reversal, only 

in a “very limited class of cases,”’ such as the complete denial of counsel, a biased 

decision maker, racial discrimination in jury selection, denial of self-representation 

at trial, denial of a public trial, and a defective reasonable-doubt instruction. 

[Citation.] What unites this class of errors is ‘a “defect affecting the framework 

within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 

itself.” ... Put another way, these errors deprive defendants of “basic protections” 

without which “a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for 

determination of guilt or innocence ... and no criminal punishment may be regarded 

as fundamentally fair.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th 400, 410, 

135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339, 266 P.3d 1030.) No such structural error occurred in the 

present case.

Here, the court’s omission of the CALCRIM No. 3428 instruction did not remove from the 

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jury’s consideration or incorrectly define the intent element of the offenses. The jury 

received the necessary instructions that correctly stated the specific intent element of the 

solicitation and conspiracy offenses—an intent to kill the victim—and was advised to 

consider and evaluate expert opinion testimony. The intent to prove murder was also 

defined for the jury. Moreover, defendant was not denied the opportunity to present expert 

testimony and argument on the effect of his Asperger’s Syndrome on the intent element of 

the offenses. The defense did not challenge any other instructions at trial.

Nothing in the missing CALCRIM No. 3428 instruction resulted in a misstatement of the 

intent element of the offenses. CALCRIM No. 3428 does not delineate or describe an 

element of an offense. Rather, it is a pinpoint instruction relating particular facts to a legal 

issue in the case. (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 

P.2d 588.) As such it does not involve a “‘general principle of law’” as that term is used in 

cases that impose a sua sponte duty of instruction on the trial court. (Id. at p. 1120, 2 

Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588; see also People v. San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th 614, 669–

670, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509; and see People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 

674–675, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474.) Instead, it draws the jury’s attention to 

specific evidence that highlights the actual effect of a defendant’s mental disorder on his 

relevant mental state. (People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 

P.2d 506.) Erroneous failure to give a pinpoint instruction is reviewed for prejudice under 

the Watson harmless error standard. (People v. Ervin, supra, at p. 91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 

990 P.2d 506; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1111–1112, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 

P.2d 36; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 571, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290; 

People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1317, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 333.)

Reversal of a conviction in consequence of this form of instructional error is warranted 

only if, “‘“after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence” (Cal.Const., 

art. VI, § 13), it appears “reasonably probable” the defendant would have obtained a more 

favorable outcome had the error not occurred [citation].’ [Citation.] The question is not 

what a jury could have done, but what a jury would likely have done if properly 

instructed.” (People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 53, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 

quoting People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 177, 178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 

P.2d 1094.) “‘In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other 

things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and 

the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no

reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1432, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263.) 

We also consider the instructions as a whole, the jury’s findings, and the closing arguments 

of counsel. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 35–36, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 

1224; People v. Eid (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 859, 883, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 520.)

C. Evaluation of the Prejudicial Impact of the Instructional Error.

In our assessment of the prejudicial impact of the error, we start with awareness that 

defendant’s intent was the crucial issue in the case. And, as we have observed, the 

described symptoms of his mental disorder were imperative to the evaluation of the intent 

associated with his statements that established the solicitation and conspiracy offenses. 

The pinpoint instruction went to the heart of the lack of intent defense.

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The court’s evidentiary rulings and instructions did not, however, suggest that the defense 

evidence of mental disorder was irrelevant to the issue of intent. The instructions required 

the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, upon consideration of all of the evidence 

presented, that the specific intent to facilitate commission of the murder was established. 

The jury was admonished to consider Silver’s opinion, determine its “meaning and 

importance,” and evaluate the credibility of her testimony in accordance with the 

“instructions about the believability of witnesses generally.” A specific admonition was 

given to the jury that defendant’s testimony was not to be ignored or disbelieved merely 

because of his mental impairment. The instructions when viewed as a whole adequately 

informed the jury that it could consider the evidence of defendant’s mental disease or 

defect in deciding whether the People had carried their burden of proving the mental 

elements of conspiracy and solicitation beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. 

Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1249, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.)

The defense was essentially given the opportunity to both present expert opinion testimony 

on mental disorder and intent, and use the testimony to attempt to negate proof of the intent 

element of the crimes. During closing argument defense counsel emphasized defendant’s 

lack of restraint, his fixation with imaginary, fantastical plots, and his role playing with 

Wallace. The theme in defendant’s comic book that mimicked the plan of binding the 

victim with “three ties” and burying her in an “oval hole” was mentioned by defense 

counsel to support the role-playing theory. Defense counsel also stressed the court’s 

instruction that defendant’s “developmental disability” or “mental impairment” did not 

weaken his credibility as a witness.

Silver’s testimony was emphasized by the defense during closing argument. Defense 

counsel pointed out that Silver treated and diagnosed defendant with Asperger’s Syndrome 

in 2007, before the solicitation and conspiracy occurred, so the mental disorder claim was 

not concocted disingenuously to “develop a defense.” Counsel thoroughly summarized the 

expert’s explanation of Asperger’s Syndrome symptoms, and asserted that the diagnosis by 

Silver revealed defendant as a person “susceptible to somebody that could manipulate if 

they were able to tap into his fantasy, his role playing.” Finally, counsel argued that the 

flawed, illogical nature of the detailed murder plot as described by Wallace was 

“consistent” with Silver’s description of defendant’s unreal behavior and role playing. 

Defense counsel’s argument reinforced the concept that defendant’s mental disorder 

provided a basis to find that he did not intend the killing of Jane Doe.

While the prosecutor exhibited an inappropriately cavalier and even demeaning attitude by 

referring to the “Asperger’s Syndrome” defense as “insulting,” and advised the jury to 

consider Silver’s testimony that defendant was “bright” and “manipulative,” neither the 

prosecutor’s argument nor the refusal to give the CALCRIM No. 3428 instruction 

eviscerated the defense based on mental disorder and lack of intent.14 Silver’s testimony 

was admitted, and the jury was told to evaluate her expert testimony in the same manner as 

any other evidence. Unlike other cases in which prejudicial error has been found, 

defendant was not prevented from offering expert testimony to support the primary defense 

that his affliction with Asperger’s Syndrome impaired his ability to formulate the intent to 

commit the offenses. (Cf. People v. Cortes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 873, 912–913, 121 

Cal.Rptr.3d 605.) The sole impact of the instructional omission was the lack of specific 

directive to the jury to consider the expert testimony for the limited purpose of deciding 

whether, at the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted with the intent or mental 

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state required for the solicitation and conspiracy offenses. To be sure, the omission of a 

CALCRIM No. 3428 instruction deprived defendant of singular, distinctive focus on the 

expert testimony, but it did not leave the jurors with the misconception that they must in 

any way discount either Silver’s testimony or the Asperger’s Syndrome defense. Nothing 

in the instructions or argument precluded the jury from at least assessing the mental 

disorder evidence—and specifically the expert testimony—on the issue of intent.

Fn 14. The prosecutor also told the jury that the instruction on defendant’s mental 

disorder and evaluation of his credibility did not mean “that he shouldn’t be held 

accountable.”

The evidence that defendant intended to enter into a conspiracy with his father to carry out 

the murder of Jane Doe is particularly strong. The conspiracy charge as presented by the 

prosecution was based exclusively on defendant’s discussions and plot with his father, not 

Wallace. Thus, the connection between the symptoms of defendant’s Asperger’s 

Syndrome and the evidence of intent to commit the charged conspiracy was not at all 

persuasive, and the evidence of guilt was compelling.

The solicitation-to-commit-murder conviction necessitates a slightly different analysis due 

to the distinct nature of the offense and the associated implications of the error. Evidence 

of solicitation may be derived entirely from conversations, without evidence of any 

accompanying agreement or overt act in furtherance of the crime by anyone. “The essence 

of criminal solicitation is an attempt to induce another to commit a criminal offense.” 

(People v. Herman, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1381, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 199.) For 

solicitation, the crime is complete when the request is made; the harm is in the asking, and 

no further acts toward commission of the target crime need occur. (People v. Morante

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 420, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071; People v. York (1998) 60 

Cal.App.4th 1499, 1503, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 303; People v. Miley (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 25, 

33, 204 Cal.Rptr. 347.) Thus, proper and focused evaluation of the intent behind 

defendant’s conversations was more essential and probative to the defense of the 

solicitation charge.

The solicitation charge also focused on Wallace; he was the solicited party. His 

discussions with defendant formed the basis of the offense, and at the same time were the 

focal point for the defense evidence of the effect of Asperger’s Syndrome on defendant’s 

intent underlying his conversations with Wallace. Thus, the CALCRIM No. 3428 

instruction was more important to the defense to direct and assure the jury’s proper 

evaluation of the evidence of role-playing and manipulation caused by defendant’s 

Asperger’s Syndrome as related to the solicitation offense.

Nevertheless, in light of the overall strength of the evidence concerning guilt of both 

offenses, the nature of the argument presented, and the other instructions given to the jury, 

a verdict more favorable to defendant would not likely have been reached with a 

CALCRIM No. 3428 instruction. The evidence of defendant’s guilt was not only quite 

forceful, much of it was unrelated to manifestations of his Asperger’s Syndrome. The 

numerous and detailed discussions, plans, maps, and drawings, the procurement of 

equipment, the strategy expressed by defendant to strap and compact the intended victim 

for placement in a cement-filled trough, and the payments made by defendant’s father to 

several inmates, convincingly established that defendant pursued a serious scheme with his 

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father and Wallace to have Jane Doe killed. The tape-recorded conversations do not reveal 

any exploitation of defendant by Wallace, but rather a meticulous plot concocted by 

defendant to dispose of Jane Doe. Testimony that defendant expressed a fervent motive 

and interest in dispatching the sole witness in his pending criminal case came from a host 

of inmate witnesses in addition to Wallace, most of whom had little or no connection with 

the role playing and manipulation that may have characterized defendant’s relationship 

with Wallace or his father. Defendant’s strong motive and desire to kill Jane Doe was 

derived from the circumstances he faced, not his mental disorder. Finally, Silver did not 

testify that defendant’s Asperger’s Syndrome precluded or even affected his intent to 

conspire with his father or solicit others to procure the murder of Jane Doe, only that 

defendant was naïve, easily influenced, obsessive, and subject to prolonged bouts of 

fantasy in his discussions with others. (People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th 529, 584, 

97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081.)

We therefore conclude that the trial court’s failure to deliver a pinpoint instruction 

directing the jury’s attention to the expert testimony of Asperger’s Syndrome, while error, 

does not require reversal of the conspiracy or solicitation convictions. (See People v. 

Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Fudge, supra, 

7 Cal.4th 1075, 1111–1112, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36.)

Larsen, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 822–34.

Petitioner claims that it is reasonably likely that without the pinpoint instruction the jury 

believed that Petitioner’s mental impairment could not be used to negate the formation of the 

necessary mental state. The record does not support Petitioner’s claim. As the California 

appellate court correctly notes, the instructions given did not misstate the law, nor did they prevent 

the jurors from considering Petitioner’s mental impairment defense. Larsen, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 

830. The jury instructions clearly stated that the prosecution needed to prove that Petitioner 

intended for murder to be committed, both for the conspiracy charge and the solicitation charge. 

RT at 2162 and 2164–65. The jury instructions also acknowledged Petitioner’s mental 

impairment defense by instructing the jurors that they should not discount the testimony of a 

person with a cognitive or mental impairment solely because of the disability or impairment, id. at 

2155–56, and by instructing the jurors how they should evaluate the expert testimony on 

Asperger’s Syndrome that had been provided by Catherine Silver, id. at 2156. In addition, 

Petitioner was able to present a defense emphasizing his mental impairment. Silver testified that 

Petitioner’s Asperger’s Syndrome pre-dated his criminal offenses, id. at 1801–02, that Petitioner 

was susceptible to manipulation and eager to please others, id. at 1809–10, and that Petitioner 

regularly engaged in role-playing games, id. at 1808–09. Petitioner testified at length about his 

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involvement in role-playing games, id. at 1577–95; role playing with Wallace, id. at 1601–05, 

1612–15, and 1650–70; and how the alleged plot to kill Jane Doe was merely a role-playing game 

based upon plots in his favorite comic books, id. at 1690–99. The testimony presented and the 

jury instructions both afforded Petitioner a meaningful opportunity to present his defense that his 

Asperger’s Syndrome made it likely that he had been participating in a role-playing game and did 

not have the necessary intent for conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder. Petitioner has not 

shown that the omission of a pinpoint jury instruction on mental disorder had a substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 647. 

Accordingly, the state court decision rejecting Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 745. 

Moreover, there was no prejudicial error under Brecht. As the California appellate court 

noted, there was significant evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, unrelated to manifestations of his 

Asperger’s Syndrome. Other inmates who were not engaged in role-playing games with Petitioner 

testified that Petitioner had solicited their assistance in killing Jane Doe. RT at 647–51, 714, 733. 

There were detailed plans and drawings related to the plot created by Petitioner. Petitioner’s 

father purchased shovels, suspecting that the shovels were to be used to cover up the killing of 

Jane Doe. RT at 835, 838. The state court denial of this claim was a reasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 

3) Analysis – Entrapment Jury Instruction

Petitioner argues that he was entitled to a jury instruction on whether Dennis was 

entrapped and to a corresponding direction that if Dennis was found not guilty of conspiracy by 

reason of having been entrapped, then the jury should find Petitioner not guilty. 

The California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim as follows:

III. The Failure to Give an Entrapment Instruction

Defendant contends he was entitled to a jury instruction on the issue whether Dennis, not 

defendant was entrapped. His reasoning appears to be that (1) if Dennis were entrapped, 

and therefore innocent of any conspiracy, then (2) defendant’s conspiracy conviction must 

fail because there cannot be only one conspirator in a conspiracy case.

In a hypothetical setting, defendant’s argument provides some food for thought. It is true 

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that an entrapped defendant must be acquitted. (CALCRIM No. 3408; see Sherman v. 

United States (1958) 356 U.S. 369, 380 [2 L.Ed.2d 848, 78 S.Ct. 819]; People v. Barraza

(1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 686−687 [153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947] (Barraza).) Normally 

the entrapment defense cannot be asserted vicariously (People v. Holloway (1996) 47 

Cal.App.4th 1757, 1767 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547], overruled on unrelated grounds in People v. 

Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 947, fn. 11 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 941 P.2d 1189]), and 

assuming hypothetically that Dennis, although no longer a defendant, enjoyed the status of 

innocence due to entrapment, then the case would lack two wrongdoing conspirators 

necessary for a conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); People v. Morante, supra, 20 Cal.4th 403, 

416). This would render highly suspect, if not invalid, defendant’s conspiracy conviction. 

Thus, hypothetically, defendant’s reasoning tastes of a certain logic. 

But “Things sweet to taste prove in digestion sour.” (Shakespeare, Richard II, act I, scene 

3.) Defendant’s argument fails on the facts, for three reasons.

First, Dennis cannot be considered an innocent party because he pleaded no contest to 

solicitation of murder in the context of this case. His plea amounted to a plea of guilty (4 

Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Pretrial Proceedings, § 260, pp. 

468−469) and thus amounts to an admission of all the elements of the offense of soliciting 

Jane Doe’s murder. (Id. at § 259, p. 467; People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 748 [170 

Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837].) Dennis testified that he pleaded no contest to solicitation of 

murder. Dennis having admitted his complicity in that offense, it would have confused the 

jury to put before them the question of his entrapment and paint a potential picture of his 

innocence. 

Second, there is no evidence that Dennis was entrapped. The test for entrapment is well 

known: “was the conduct of the law enforcement agent likely to induce a normally lawabiding person to commit the offense?” (Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d 675, 689−690.) 

“Official conduct that does no more than offer an opportunity to the suspect—for example, 

a decoy program―is therefore permissible; but it is impermissible for the police or their 

agents to pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such as badgering, cajoling, 

importuning, or other affirmative acts likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to 

commit the crime.” (Id. at p. 690.) 

Certainly, Wallace’s wearing of a recording device at the behest of the investigators does 

not amount to entrapment. And as the Supreme Court pointed out, the use of decoys, such 

as the phone calls from the probation officer posing as “Carl,” is permissible conduct not 

rising to the overbearing behavior necessary for an entrapment finding. (See, e.g., Provigo 

Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 568−570 [28 

Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163]; People v. Graves (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1171, 

1177−1178 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 708]; Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2012) 

Related Issues to CALCRIM No. 3408, p. 1015.) 

Third, although the record could be clearer, Dennis went along with defendant’s plans to 

murder Jane Doe. He provided cash payments to defendant’s fellow inmates (although 

Dennis’s self-serving testimony offered up an innocent explanation for the payments). 

Dennis went along with defendant’s instructions on June 12, 2008, to give Carl $500. 

Dennis did so even though he thought defendant was setting up a hit on Jane Doe. Dennis 

may have seen other notes referring to detailed plans for the conspiracy, including a 

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reference to “fix[ing]” defendant’s “problem.” Once he received calls from someone he 

thought was defendant’s friend Wallace, Dennis went to a hardware store as instructed and 

bought shovels―despite his belief that defendant was planning a hit on Jane Doe through 

his agent, Wallace. While he may have later had second thoughts, Dennis was a willing 

partner in defendant’s conspiracy. 

Exhibit G at 27–29.

Due process does not require that an instruction be given unless the evidence supports it. 

See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982). The state court reasonably concluded that the 

evidence did not support a jury instruction on whether Dennis was entrapped. Under California 

law, as explained by the court of appeal, the test for determining entrapment is whether the acts of 

the law enforcement agent are “likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the 

offense.” People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 689–90 (Cal. 1979). Dennis suspected that Petitioner 

was setting up a hit on Jane Doe, RT at 835, but still followed Wallace’s directions and provided 

shovels and $500 to Wallace, RT at 838 and 840. In addition, Dennis testified that he entered a 

plea of nolo contendere (no contest plea) to solicitation of murder in the context of this case. RT 

at 851. Under California law, “the legal effect of [nolo contendere] plea . . . shall be the same as 

that of a plea of guilty for all purposes.” Cal. Penal Code § 1016(3); see also United States v. 

Anderson, 625 F.3d 1219, 1220 (9th Cir. 2010) (“a plea of nolo contendere is the functional 

equivalent of a guilty plea”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence does not support a 

jury instruction on whether Dennis was entrapped. Petitioner has therefore failed to demonstrate 

that the state court’s denial of this claim was either an unreasonable application of federal 

authority or on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. This claim is denied.

4) Analysis – Instruction Regarding Dennis’s Guilty Plea

Petitioner argues that the trial court should have instructed that, as a matter of law, the fact 

that Dennis pled guilty to one count of solicitation of murder was not conclusive evidence that 

Dennis had actually solicited murder and that even if the jury found that Dennis had solicited 

murder, this did not require the jury to conclude that Dennis was also guilty of conspiracy to 

commit murder.

The California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim as follows:

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IV. The Failure to Give an Instruction on Dennis’s Plea.

Defendant argues that the trial court should have sua sponte instructed the jury that 

Dennis’s no contest plea to solicitation is not conclusive proof that he was guilty of 

conspiracy.16 Apparently still following the notion that there must be at least two 

conspirators, defendant claims the trial court should have told the jury the no contest plea 

was not a conclusive admission that he actually committed the offense, and also did not 

require the jury to conclude that Dennis was guilty of conspiracy.

FN 16: In their respondent’s brief, the People content that the defendant never 

asked for such an instruction. Defendant does not dispute this assertion.

In the first place, defendant’s opening brief fails to apply the standards for when a trial 

court should give a sua sponte instruction. In the second place, defendant’s argument is 

difficult to follow because he cites civil cases for the principle that a no contest plea is not 

a conclusive admission in a subsequent civil case. (See, e.g., Rusheen v. Drews (2002) 99 

Cal. App. 4th 279, 284 [120 Cal. Rptr.2d 769].) But for purposes of criminal proceedings, 

Dennis’s no contest plea was an admission of each and every offense of the charge of 

solicitation of murder. In any case, the issue is tangential. The argument that the jury 

should have been told that a plea to solicitation does not imply guilt of another offense, i.e. 

conspiracy, overlooks the evidence that clearly shows Dennis participated in a conspiracy. 

Finally, the ultimate issue was the guilt or innocence of defendant, on which the jury was 

adequately instructed.

Exhibit G at 29–30.

The state appellate court’s denial of this claim was a reasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. As discussed above in Section 

B.3, Dennis pled guilty to solicitation of murder and the evidence supported a finding that Dennis 

participated in the conspiracy. Nor was the state appellate court’s denial of this claim an 

unreasonable application of federal authority. Due process entitles a defendant to adequate 

instructions on the defense theory of the case. See Conde, 198 F.3d at 739. As the state appellate 

court pointed out, the ultimate issue was the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The defense 

theory of the case was that Petitioner’s plot to kill Jane Doe was purely imaginary and was part of 

a role-playing game initiated and controlled by Wallace. As discussed above in Section B.2, the 

jury was adequately instructed on the defense theory of the case. 

Finally, the failure to instruct the jury that Dennis’s no contest plea to solicitation did not 

imply that Dennis was guilty of conspiracy did not result in prejudicial error under Brecht. There 

was evidence that Dennis had engaged in a conspiracy and that Petitioner intended to kill Jane 

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Doe. Dennis suspected that Petitioner was setting up a hit on Jane Doe, but still followed 

Wallace’s directions and provided shovels and $500 to Wallace. Petitioner had previously 

solicited other inmates to kill Jane Doe and there were detailed drawings and plans regarding the 

plot. This claim is denied.

C. Evidentiary Error

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by excluding certain defense evidence relevant to 

his mental impairment.

1) Standard

“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules 

excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) 

(alternation in original and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 

U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (holding that due process does not guarantee a defendant the right to present all 

relevant evidence). This latitude is limited, however, by a defendant’s constitutional rights to due 

process and to present a defense, rights originating in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324. “While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence 

under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are 

asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if 

its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at 325–26; see Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 42 (holding that 

the exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some 

principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 

fundamental”). But “at times a state’s rules of evidence cannot be mechanistically applied and 

must yield in favor of due process and the right to a fair trial.” Lunbery v. Hornbeak, 605 F.3d 

754, 762 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding California’s application of its evidentiary rules to exclude 

hearsay testimony that bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and was critical to the 

defense violated right to present evidence). The defendant, not the state, bears the burden to 

demonstrate that the principle violated by the evidentiary rule “is so rooted in the traditions and 

conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 47 (internal 

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quotation marks omitted). 

2) Analysis

The California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim as follows:

II. The Exclusion of Mental Impairment Defense Evidence.

Defendant also contends the trial court infringed upon his right to present a mental 

impairment defense by sustaining relevance objections to five areas of inquiry during 

defense counsel’s cross-examination of the People’s witnesses:

(1) Questioning jail inmate Lenard about whether inmates knew Schwartz was a 

recruiter for the Aryan Brotherhood;

(2) Questioning inmate Ekker about whether he saw inmates trying to take 

advantage of defendant, whether Wallace was a threatening person in jail, and whether 

Ekker saw any such threatening behavior;

(3) Questioning a district attorney’s investigator whether it became apparent to him 

during the course of his investigation that defendant may have psychological problems;

(4) Questioning Wallace about whether he felt defendant had psychological 

difficulties; and

(5) Questioning defendant about whether his teachers sent him to counseling while 

he was in school, whether he was receiving social security income on the recommendation 

of his therapist, whether he was given medication when he started going to counseling, and 

whether he had learning problems in high school.15

FN 15: The People’s objection to the question about learning problems in high 

school was overruled, but part of defendant’s answer was stricken as nonresponsive.

Defendant contends the relevance objections to (1) and (2) should have been overruled 

because the answers would have shown that there were inmates, especially a recruiter for a 

White supremacist group, who might have manipulated him in jail. He contends that the 

objections to (3) and (4) should have been overruled because the answers could have 

shown his psychological disabilities were evident to those around him. He contends the 

objection to (5) should have been overruled because the answers would have shown the 

long-standing impairment of his condition and that the fact it required medication and 

counseling.

We believe the objections were properly sustained to the questions as phrased. Whether 

certain inmates could have threatened defendant, or saw him as someone with 

psychological disabilities, has at best a tenuous connection to the issue of defendant’s 

mental state for the charged crimes. So, too, do the matters excluded in defendant’s own 

testimony, relatively minor matters such as social security income and medication. And 

even if the matters excluded in (1) through (5) were relevant, the trial court was within its 

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discretion to exclude them under Evidence Code 352 as being less probative of the issues 

than confusing and unduly time consuming. Moreover, the jury was able to consider 

Silver’s and defendant’s testimony about his Asperger’s Syndrome and the effect of his 

condition on his perceptions and behavior. No error in the exclusion of the proffered 

testimony was committed by the trial court.

Exhibit G at 26–27.

Petitioner’s defense was that Wallace deliberately set up Petitioner in order to reduce 

Wallace’s sentence; Petitioner’s Asperger’s Syndrome made him especially susceptible to 

manipulation by Wallace; and the plot to kill Jane Doe was merely part of an elaborate roleplaying game using the plots from comic books and details from Petitioner’s life. The trial court 

reasonably excluded evidence regarding whether other inmates might have manipulated Petitioner 

and evidence regarding Ekker’s impression of Wallace as having a tenuous connection to the issue 

of Petitioner’s mental state and as more confusing than probative. Petitioner’s manipulation by 

and fear of other inmates — and even of Wallace — does not preclude Petitioner from forming the 

intent to kill Jane Doe and plotting to achieve that goal. Similarly, the fact that his psychological 

disabilities were evident to those around him and that his Asperger’s Syndrome condition dates 

back to his childhood do not mean he could not form the intent to kill Jane Doe. This claim is 

denied.

D. Recusal Error

Petitioner argues that the Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office had an actual 

conflict of interest and that the trial court therefore erred in denying his post-verdict, presentencing motion to recuse the entire Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office.

The California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim as follows:

V. The Denial of Defendant’s Request to Recuse the District Attorney’s Office.

Finally, defendant contends the trial court should have granted his postverdict, 

presentencing motion to recuse the entire Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office. 

The motion was triggered by a 30-second television campaign ad for the re-election of the 

district attorney, which both parties describe as “sensational.” Defendant states the ad was 

part of the district attorney’s “tough on crime” election theme. The parties agree the ad 

featured voiceovers by District Attorney Gallegos and the trial counsel in defendant’s case, 

Deputy District Attorney Neel; focused on the dramatic “sting” operation to foil the 

murder of Jane Doe; pictured a freshly dug grave; and stated defendant had “drugged and 

raped” the vicitm.17

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FN 17: This is something of an exaggeration, but there is no excuse for defendant’s 

conduct with Jane Doe. She did actively seek cocaine from defendant on the night 

of the unlawful sexual encounters. (People v. Larsen (Dec. 8, 2010, A126424) 

[nonpub. Opn.], pp. 1–2.) But Jane Doe was a minor and defendant was an adult. 

She was legally incapable of consenting to sex and it is illegal to provide drugs to a 

minor.

Defendant contends the entire prosecutor’s office should have been recused because the ad 

could have triggered community pressure on law enforcement, the probation department, 

the prosecution, and the sentencing court, and thus adversely affect the sentencing decision 

– especially given the charges were inflammatory and the community was small. 

Defendant claims this created a conflict of interest which should have led to the recusal of 

the entire district attorney’s office. 

A motion to recuse a prosecutor is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and 

we review a denial of such a motion deferentially under a standard of abuse of discretion. 

(People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 366, fn. 5 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 

342]; Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th 706, 711, 713.) The defendant bears the burden of 

showing a conflict of interest, and the trial court should not grant a recusal motion unless 

there is a reasonable possibility the prosecution may not exercise its discretionary function 

in an evenhanded manner, to enable the fair treatment of the accused. (Haraguchi, supra,

at p. 709; Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th 580, 592.) “Recusal of an entire district attorney’s 

office is an extreme step. The threshold necessary for recusing an entire office is higher 

than that for an individual prosecutor.” (People v. Cannedy (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1474, 

1481 [98 Cal.Rptr.3d 596].) An entire office should not be recused “‘in the absence of 

some substantial reason related to the proper administration of criminal justice.’ 

[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1482.) 

We see no abuse of discretion in this case. First, the trial court observed that the question 

was not whether running the ad before sentencing was good or bad judgment, but whether 

it created a conflict of interest. The court found no such conflict and emphatically stated: 

“[N]othing about the advertisement has in any way, shape, or form affected me. And I’m 

the one [who] makes the ultimate decision in the case.” Second, the prosecution 

apparently did not submit a statement in aggravation at the time of sentencing, and the 25-

to-life sentence on the conspiracy conviction was statutorily mandated. (§§ 182, subd. (a), 

190, subd. (a).) The trial court did not err by denying the motion to recuse the entire 

prosecutor’s office.

Exhibit G at 30–32.

Petitioner has not identified any clearly established Supreme Court precedent requiring 

recusal of an entire prosecutor’s office on these facts — i.e., where the district attorney released a 

sensational ad regarding the defendant’s case after the jury reached its verdict but before the 

defendant was sentenced. In light of the absence of Supreme Court authority, it cannot be said 

that the state court’s denial of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

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established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the failure to recuse the Humboldt 

County District Attorney's Office negatively affected his sentence. Petitioner was sentenced to 25 

years to life on the conspiracy to commit murder charge, and the maximum sentence of nine years 

for the solicitation to commit murder charge, which was to run concurrently with his other 

sentence. CT at 1323–24. The 25 years to life sentence for conspiracy to commit murder was 

statutorily mandated, Cal. Penal Code §§ 182(a) and 190(a), and not within the discretion of the 

judge. The sentence for solicitation did not greatly effect the maximum term that Petitioner would 

receive. Furthermore, the record does not indicate that the District Attorney’s Office exhibited 

any bias with regard to Petitioner’s sentencing. CT at 1270 and RT at 2235. The prosecutor did 

not submit a statement of aggravation, and the probation department recommended that Petitioner 

serve the middle term of six years for the solicitation charge. 

Finally, the Court finds no merit in Petitioner’s claim that the Humboldt County District 

Attorney had a financial interest in the outcome of the trial that rendered Petitioner’s trial 

fundamentally unfair. Petitioner argues that the district attorney’s reelection campaign committee 

made significant expenditures on the television advertisement and that Petitioner’s acquittal would 

have resulted in the campaign committee having wasted a large portion of its “warchest.” 

Petitioner provides no evidence to support this allegation, and the financial interest is too 

attenuated to raise concern. See, e.g., Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(prosecutor’s direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case that has an impact on the 

prosecutor’s decision whether or not to enforce a particular statute may have constitutional 

ramifications) (citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980)). Moreover, as 

discussed above, there is no evidence that the television advertisement negatively affected this 

sentence. See id. (no prosecutorial misconduct will be found absent a showing of prejudice). 

This claim is denied.

//

//

//

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E. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, Petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and a 

certificate of appealability is DENIED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 23, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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