Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01803/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01803-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dawn D Williamson,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-01803-PHX-ESW

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Dawn D Williamson’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the Social 

Security Administration’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. Under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon the pleadings and 

transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. Both 

parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 12).

Albeit for different reasons, the parties agree that the Administrative Law Judge’s 

(“ALJ”) decision does not properly evaluate the medical opinions concerning Plaintiff’s 

limitations. (Docs. 16, 26, 27). The Commissioner requests that the Court remand this 

matter for further proceedings. Plaintiff asserts that the matter should be remanded for an 

immediate award of benefits. In moving for remand for further proceedings, the 

Commissioner does not address Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to provide legally 

valid reasons for discounting her symptom testimony. (Doc. 16 at 21-27). Plaintiff asserts 

WO

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that this error alone requires remand for an award of benefits. (Id. at 27). 

When evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff’s testimony regarding subjective pain 

or symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 

586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). In the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment “which could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff does not have to show that the 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptoms. Rather, 

a plaintiff must only show that it could have caused some degree of the symptoms. Smolen 

v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).

If a plaintiff meets the first step, and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, 

the ALJ can only reject a plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of his or her symptoms 

by offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The 

ALJ cannot rely on general findings. The ALJ must identify specifically what testimony 

is not credible and what evidence undermines the plaintiff’s complaints. Berry v. Astrue, 

622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). In weighing a plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ can 

consider many factors including: a plaintiff’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent 

statements concerning the symptoms, unexplained or inadequately explained failure to 

seek treatment, and the plaintiff’s daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see also 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (Social Security must consider whether there are conflicts between 

a claimant’s statements and the rest of the evidence). 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, but concluded that Plaintiff’s 

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for

the reasons explained in this decision.” (A.R. 20). As discussed below, the ALJ committed 

harmful error in discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

In explaining why he found Plaintiff’s testimony not credible, the ALJ first noted 

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that Plaintiff ceased working because she was laid off, not because of disabling conditions. 

(Id.). A disability claimant’s reason for leaving employment is a valid consideration in 

evaluating the claimant’s symptom testimony. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 

828 (9th Cir. 2001); Page v. Colvin, 620 F. App’x 605, 605 (9th Cir. 2015) (an ALJ may 

discredit a claimant’s testimony by citing a claimant’s nondisability reasons for leaving 

employment immediately preceding the alleged onset date of disability). Here, however, 

Plaintiff explained to the ALJ: “my boss allowed me to just answer the phones for a little 

while until, you know, they were about to close. He allowed me to do that because he 

knew the situation.” (A.R. 50). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s reason for leaving her last 

job is a valid consideration in weighing Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Yet, as explained 

below, the other reasons the ALJ provided for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony

are not clear and convincing. Because the record suggests that Plaintiff’s employer made 

significant accommodations for Plaintiff before she was laid off, the Court does not find 

Plaintiff’s reason for leaving is a sufficient sole basis on which to discount her testimony. 

As another reason for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the ALJ stated 

that the medical portion of the record is “somewhat sparse, which undermines the 

claimant’s disability claim to some degree because one would expect such an individual to 

have obtained more extensive treatment for conditions which are allegedly disabling.” 

(A.R. 21). Although an ALJ may consider a lack of objective evidence as one element in 

his or her analysis, a claimant’s testimony of disabling symptoms cannot be discredited 

“merely because [it is] unsupported by objective evidence.” See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; 

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[O]nce the claimant produces 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, [the ALJ] may not reject a 

claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to 

fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.”). Further, “the fact that treatment may be 

routine or conservative is not a basis for finding subjective symptom testimony unreliable 

absent discussion of the additional, more aggressive treatment options the ALJ believes are 

available.” Moon v. Colvin, 139 F.Supp.3d 1211, 1220 (D. Or. 2015) (citing Lapeirre–

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Gutt v. Astrue, 382 F. App’x 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2010)) (“A claimant cannot be discredited 

for failing to pursue non-conservative treatment options where none exist.”). The Court 

finds that the ALJ’s second reason for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony does not 

satisfy the specific, clear, and convincing standard.

The ALJ’s decision also states that:

In terms of activities of daily living, the claimant complained 

of continuing significant impacts on activities of daily living 

due to her multiple medical conditions. She is able to complete 

self-care activities including meals, hygiene, and light 

housework, but she said these tasks are progressively difficult 

due to her multiple medical conditions and that they take an 

extended period of time to complete. She is not confined to 

bed and admits to frequent difficulties sleeping due to her 

multiple medical conditions. She does hold a valid Arizona 

driver’s license and states that she has not driven a vehicle 

since September 2017 due to poor visual acuity. She states that 

she no longer has any hobbies in which she participates. 

Despite her alleged restrictions, elsewhere in the record the 

claimant reported taking care of her elderly mother (B8A/10, 

B8E). In December 2017, the claimant reported that she 

planned on visiting her husband in Jamaica, which suggests her 

restrictions and limitations are less disabling than alleged 

(B24F/2).

(A.R. 21). “[D]isability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal 

lives in the face of their limitations.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. The ALJ’s decision does 

not adequately explain how Plaintiff’s daily activities translate to the ability to sustain 

competitive employment on a full-time basis. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 

(9th Cir. 2014) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly warned that ALJs must be 

especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about 

pain, because impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures 

of a workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting 

in bed all day”). For the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ committed harmful 

legal error in discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.

Ninth Circuit jurisprudence “requires remand for further proceedings in all but the 

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rarest cases.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 n.5 (9th Cir. 

2014). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a test to determine when a case should be remanded 

for payment of benefits in cases where an ALJ has improperly rejected claimant testimony 

or medical opinion evidence. Id. at 1100-01; Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. This test is 

commonly referred to as the “credit-as-true” rule, which consists of the following three 

factors: 

1. Has the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical 

opinion? Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100-01. 

2. Has the record been fully developed, are there outstanding 

issues that must be resolved before a disability determination 

can be made, or would further administrative proceedings be 

useful? Id. at 1101. To clarify this factor, the Ninth Circuit 

has stated that “[w]here there is conflicting evidence, and not 

all essential factual issues have been resolved, a remand for 

an award of benefits is inappropriate.” Id. 

3. If the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, 

would the ALJ be required to find the claimant disabled on 

remand? Id.; Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020.

Where a court has found that a claimant has failed to satisfy one of the factors of the 

credit-as-true rule, the court does not need to address the remaining factors. Treichler, 775 

F.3d at 1107 (declining to address final step of the rule after determining that the claimant 

has failed to satisfy the second step). Moreover, even if all three factors are met, a court 

retains the discretion to remand a case for additional evidence or to award benefits. Id. at 

1101-02. A court may remand for further proceedings “when the record as a whole creates 

serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. In Treichler, the Ninth Circuit noted 

that “[w]here an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the 

proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.” 775 F.3d at 1105.

It is appropriate to remand this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings 

as the record creates a serious doubt as to whether Plaintiff suffers from impairments that 

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would preclude her from working. For instance, certain medical records indicate that 

Plaintiff’s asthma is well-controlled with Singulair. (A.R. 423, 554). A June 13, 2017 

record states that Plaintiff is “doing well . . . She has been walking daily. Just got married 

in Jamaica. . . . Current symptoms: The patient is experiencing no shortness of breath, no 

paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea, no orthopnea and no pedal edema. The patient has no new 

complaints.” (A.R. 479). Numerous other records indicate a lack of disabling symptoms. 

(See, e.g., 532, 535, 539, 543, 555-56, 584-85). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

and remanding for further administrative proceedings. The ALJ shall issue a new decision 

that is consistent with applicable law. The ALJ, however, is not precluded from reopening 

the hearing to receive additional evidence if deemed appropriate. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 

accordingly.

Dated this 28th day of January, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

 

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