Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-02099/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-02099-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Property Damage

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Diane Mann, as Trustee for )

the Estate of LeapSource, )

Inc., et al. )

)

Plaintiffs, ) No. CIV 02-2099-PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., )

a Delaware limited liability )

company., et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

On July 11, 2001, LeapSource Inc. filed a Chapter 7 Petition

in the Bankruptcy Court, 01-9020-PHX-JMM, and Diane Mann was

appointed as Trustee. Mot. (doc. 312) at 4. In 2002, the Trustee

initiated this adversary proceeding against Defendants ICG Group,

Inc. ("ICG Group") and Michael Makings ("Makings"). Id.

Thereafter, the case was withdrawn to this Court, CIV-02-2325-PHXRCB, and consolidated into related case, CIV-02-2099-PHX-RCB. Id.

On January 20, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint

("Amend. Complt."), asserting three claims against either Makings

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1 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also named Marcia Makings

as a defendant solely for purposes of binding Makings' marital

community. Amend. Complt. (doc. 310) at 2. 

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or ICG Group. Amend. Complt. (doc. 310).1 

On February 2, 2006, the Trustee filed a motion for summary

judgment on the preferential transfer claim (Count 3). Mot. (doc.

312). This motion was fully briefed on April 20, 2006, and argued

orally on July 31, 2006. Reply (doc. 374); (doc. 415). Having

carefully considered the arguments presented by the parties, the

court now rules. 

I. Background Facts

ICG Group provides consulting services to large corporations

to help them integrate their financial and accounting systems. 

PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 1; DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶ 1. The ICG business

("ICG") was founded in approximately 1990, and Makings was one of

the two co-founders. PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 2; DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶

2. ICG was owned by Image Consulting Group, Inc., which was later

changed to ICG Consulting, Inc. Id. At all times prior to the

year 2000, Makings was ICG Consulting, Inc.'s 50% shareholder, one

of its two directors, and its president. Id.

On January 1, 2000, LeapSource Inc. ("Debtor") purchased the

ICG business from ICG Consulting, Inc. for $10 million. PSOF (doc.

313) at ¶ 3; DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶ 3. Debtor paid $5 million in

cash (including $2.5 million to Makings and $2.5 million to his

partner) and delivered $5 million worth of promissory notes,

including a $2.5 million Promissory Note to ICG Consulting, Inc.

(the "Note"), which it assigned to Makings. Id.

After that purchase, Debtor hired Makings as an employee. 

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PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 4; DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶ 4. Makings also

became a shareholder of Debtor. Id. Makings continued to operate

the ICG business, integrated the business into a division of

Debtor, and did sales and marketing for Debtor on other accounts

related to ICG. Id. The parties dispute whether, in October 2000,

Debtor made Makings its Chief Operating Officer, however, they

agree that on or before February 27, 2001, Debtor made Makings its

CEO and a director. Id.

In January 2001, Makings accelerated the entire balance owed

on the Note, $2.5 million plus interest, due to Debtor's default. 

PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 5; DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶ 5. Thereafter, in

early March 2001, Makings began planning a reacquisition of ICG. 

PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 6. On March 16, 2001, Makings incorporated a

new entity, ICG Group, and has been at all times ICG Group's sole

shareholder and sole director. Id.; DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶ 6.

On March 20, 2001, Makings formally resigned as the CEO and as

a director of Debtor. PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 7; DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶

7. On March 29, 2001, Debtor's board of directors accepted

Making's resignation as a director, which was characterized as

effective on March 22, 2001. Id. Defendants assert, however, that

Makings' resignation was effective on March 20, 2001. DSOF (doc.

351) at ¶ 7. 

By Asset Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") dated March 23,

2001, but allegedly signed on March 30, 2001, Debtor sold its ICG

division (the "ICG Asset") to ICG Group. PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 8;

DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶ 8. According to the Agreement, the "purchase

price" for the transfer consisted of ICG Group's forgiveness of the

Note that Debtor owed to Makings, which he had assigned to ICG

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Group. Id. Additionally, ICG Group also agreed to assume several

third party liabilities owned by LeapSource, including telephone

lease payments, building lease payments, copier lease payments,

various accounts payable, and past and future payroll expenses. 

DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶ 8. 

Pursuant to the Agreement, the ICG Asset was transferred to

ICG Group on March 30, 2001. PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 10; DSOF (doc.

351) at ¶ 11. The Agreement specifically states that,

The Closing ("Closing") of the sale and purchase

of the Assets and the assignment and assumption of

the Assumed Liabilities as well as the

consummation of the other transactions

contemplated herein shall take place on March 30,

2001.

Exbt. 2 (doc. 313), Asset Purchase Agreement § 2.1. ICG Group

still owns and operates the ICG Asset under the name ICG

Consulting. PSOF (doc. 313) at ¶ 11; DSOF (doc. 351) at ¶ 12.

II. Standard of Review

To grant summary judgment, the Court must determine that the

record before it contains "no genuine issue as to any material

fact" and, thus, "that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether to

grant summary judgment, the Court will view the facts and

inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

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317, 322 (1986). "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine

issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323. In

such a case, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law. Id.

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue

of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is any factual dispute that

might affect the outcome of the case under the governing

substantive law. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute

in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest

upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but

instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue

for trial. See id. at 250. Finally, if the nonmoving party's

evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, a

court may grant summary judgment. See, e.g., California

Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d

1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

III. Discussion

Under § 547 (b)(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee may

recover certain transfers made by the debtor within one year before

the bankruptcy petition was filed. A transfer by Debtor

constitutes an avoidable preference if six elements are shown: (1)

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a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property; (2) to or for

the benefit of a creditor; (3) for or on account of an antecedent

debt; (4) made while the debtor was insolvent; (5) made to an

insider between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing

of the petition; and (6) that enables the creditor to receive more

than such creditor would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the

estate. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). Here, the only elements in dispute

are elements five and six, which involve the requirements that the

creditor be an "insider" and receive more than such creditor would

receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the estate. Resp. (doc. 350)

at 9-14. Defendants also assert that they fall under the new value

exception of 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(c)(1) and 547(c)(4), which defeats

any preference claim. Id. at 7-9

A. Insider Status (Element Five)

First, Defendants assert that element five of the preferential

transfer claim, which requires that the Trustee show that the

creditor was an "insider," is a factual issue that is not

appropriate for summary judgment. Resp. (doc. 350) at 11-14. 

Specifically, Defendants contest that Makings or ICG Group were

"insiders" at LeapSource. Id. at 12-14. 

At the outset, they note that, although not exclusive, the

statutory definition of "insider" does not include "former

directors or officers." Id. at 12-13 - (noting that "[t]he

statutory definition of 'insider,' where the debtor is a

corporation such as LeapSource, includes the debtor's: directors,

officers, persons in control, partnerships in which the debtors

[sic] is the general partner, general partners, and their

relatives"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B). Defendants assert

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that Congress' enumeration of these positions in the statute should

be read to exclude individuals that were formerly in such

positions. Id. at 13. They note that it is undisputed that the

Agreement was executed after Makings had resigned and no longer had

control over LeapSource. Resp. (doc. 350) at 13. Thus, Defendants

assert that this alone disqualifies Makings as an "insider." Id.

at 13-14, (citing In re Coors of N. Miss. Inc., 66 B.R. 845, 863-64

(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1986)). 

In any event, Defendants argue that the Trustee fails to show

that Makings or ICG Group "commanded preferential treatment by the

debtor" that would make them "insiders." Id. at 13. Defendants

note that the new management of LeapSource, after Makings'

resignation, "was under a fiduciary duty of loyalty to LeapSource

which prevented them from treating ICG Group and Makings

preferentially." Id. In addition, Defendants argue that Makings'

long relationship with ICG does not independently qualify him as an

"insider." Id. "Just because Makings had knowledge of the ICG

business based on his former employment does not render him an

insider." Resp. (doc. 350) at 13, citing In re Friedman, 126 B.R.

63, 69-70 (9th Cir. BAP 1991). Lastly, Defendants contend that

Makings' influence on LeapSource, despite his title, was minimal,

as LeapSource was controlled by GTCR at all times. Id. at 14.

In contrast, the Trustee maintains that, although Makings had

resigned at the time of the execution of the Agreement, such facts

do not conclusively exempt him from "insider" status. Reply (doc.

374) at 2. She argues that "[s]uch a position turns the policies

of § 547(b)(4)(B) on their head, and has been rejected many times." 

Id. Generally, the Trustee contends that Makings should be

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considered an "insider" for purposes of § 547(b)(4)(B), because he

put together the transfer while he was still working for

LeapSource, hence, at the time the transfer was "arranged," Makings

was technically an "insider." Id. at 2-3, citing In re EECO, Inc.,

138 B.R. 260 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re F&S Cent. Mfg. Corp.,

53 B.R. 842, 849 (Bankr. N.Y. 1985). Moreover, the Trustee argues

that Makings had a "sufficiently close relationship" with Debtor,

making him an "insider." Id. at 3, citing In re Friedman, 126 B.R.

at 69-70. 

Courts have split on the exact meaning of the "at the time of

such transfer" language found in Section 547(b)(4)(B). See In re

EECO, 138 B.R. at 263. One line of cases, which the Trustee urges

the Court to follow, holds that a "creditor who is an insider at

the time of transfer of the debtor's property is arranged is an

insider at the time of the transfer." Id. A second line of cases,

to which Defendants encourage the Court to adhere, hold that the

language of the statute clearly states that an insider relationship

is to be determined on the exact date of the challenged transfer. 

Id. at 264. 

The court in In re EECO described a situation in which it

believed the statute requires "insider" status be imposed even if

the creditor has resigned from the debtor company. In re EECO, 138

B.R. at 264. 

[I]f an insider put together a transfer for

himself, formally resigned, and then a minute

later received the monetary benefits from the deal

he had made while an insider, it would be clear

that the transfer would be avoidable, even without

a showing of fraud or intent to delay or hinder

required by 11 U.S.C. § 548. The insider's formal

resignation did not change the nature of the

transfer in any way. Further, to hold that one

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could gain non-insider status in such a manner

would thwart § 547's goal of recovering assets

from insiders.

Id. The court noted that Congress established the one-year reachback provision in order to "ameliorate the insider's potential

leverage in dealing with the debtor shortly before bankruptcy." 

Id. at n.2 (citing Hahn v. Economy Car Leasing (In re Henderson),

96 B.R. 820, 825 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)). "Because of his close

relationship with the debtor, an insider typically knows more about

the debtor's financial affairs than the debtor's other creditors,

and is often in the position to influence or control, at least in

part, the debtor's actions." Id. The court in In re EECO held

that "an insider is no longer an insider when the transfer is no

longer a function of or result of that entity's or person's insider

status." 138 B.R. at 265. "One who...uses an insider position to

put in motion a step-transaction, such as a golden parachute

severance package or stock buyout agreement, cannot become a noninsider for purposes of that transaction by simply saying 'I

resign.'" Id. Moreover, although some cases have found that a

long term relationship between the creditor and debtor does not

conclusively make the creditor an "insider," "a common basis for

these rulings was the perception that, so long as the parties

transact their business at arm's length, such circumstances do not

necessarily give rise to insider status." In re Friedman, 126 B.R.

at 70. Here, the Trustee encourages the Court to follow the logic

expressed in the above mentioned cases. The Court, however, does

not agree that such an analysis is appropriate.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that, prior to his

resignation, Makings began planning a reacquisition of the ICG

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Asset and began negotiating with Debtor for such reacquisition. In

relation to this planning, Makings incorporated a new entity, ICG

Group, for the purpose of reacquiring and operating the ICG

business. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Makings formally

resigned as the CEO and as a director of Debtor on March 20, 2001. 

The Agreement, which was drafted by Debtor's attorneys, was entered

into between three and ten days later, on either March 23, 2001

(the date on the Agreement) or March 30, 2001 (the alleged date

that the Agreement was signed), and the ICG Asset was transferred

to Makings on March 30, 2001. Exbt. 2 (doc. 313), Asset Purchase

Agreement § 2.1. 

Defendants do not assert that Makings was not involved in

negotiating the Agreement prior to his resignation. They instead

argue that Makings received non-insider status on the date of his

resignation. Defendants cite In re Coors in support of this

contention, however such case is distinguishable from the case at

bar. 66 B.R. 845. In In re Coors, the contested transfers that

the debtor sought to avoid occurred around six months after the

creditor sold his stock in the company, extinguishing his status as

a shareholder, director or officer at the company. 66 B.R. at 851,

863-64. The factual circumstances in the case at bar, where

Makings received the transfer of the ICG Asset three to ten days

after his resignation from LeapSource, are not completely on par

with those in In re Coors. Thus, the Court finds the authority

cited by both parties to be fairly uninstructive on this matter. 

Regardless, the Court notes that it is not bound by the conclusions

reached by the courts in such cases. 

The Bankruptcy Code does not provide a static definition of

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"insider." Specifically, it provides that if a debtor is a

corporation, the term "insider" includes directors, officers,

persons in control of the debtor, partnerships in which the debtor

is the general partner, general partners of the debtor, and their

relatives. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 25 (1978)

("An insider is one who has a sufficiently close relationship with

the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than

those dealing at arms length with the debtor."). In any event, to

avoid a transfer, Section 547(b)(4)(B) requires that the creditor

be an "insider" at "the time of [the] transfer." 11 U.S.C.

547(b)(4)(B). 

The term "transfer" means–

(A) the creation of a lien;

(B) the retention of title as a security 

interest;

(C) the foreclosure of a debtor's equity of 

redemption; or

(D) each mode, direct or indirect, absolute 

or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of 

disposing of or parting with–

(i) property; or

(ii) an interest in property.

11 U.S.C. § 101(54). The Code further explains that a transfer is

made,

(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between

the transferor and the transferee, if such

transfer is perfected at, or within 30 days after,

such time, except as provided in subsection

(c)(3)(B);

(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if

such transfer is perfected after such 30 days; or

(C) immediately before the date of the filing of

the petition, if such transfer is not perfected at

the later of--

(i) the commencement of the case; or

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(ii) 30 days after such transfer takes effect

between the transferor and the transferee.

11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2). Hence, the Court concludes that, to avoid

the transfer of the ICG Asset under section 547, the Trustee must

show that Makings was an insider "at the time [the] transfer [took]

effect between [LeapSource] and [ICG Group];" thus, at the time the

Agreement was effectuated on March 30, 2001. Id.; see also Exbt. 2

(doc. 313), Asset Purchase Agreement § 2.1. The Trustee has failed

to show this. 

The parties do not dispute that Makings had resigned from his

position as CEO and as a director of LeapSource at the time the

Agreement was effectuated. The Trustee raises no further arguments

or evidence that indicates that Makings was a person "in control of

LeapSource," as defined by the statute, at the time of the

transfer. Consequently, Makings was not an "insider" at the time

of the transfer. In light of this fact, the Court finds that the

analysis regarding the preferential transfer ends here.

Although there does not appear to be a disputed genuine issue

of material fact on this matter, the Trustee is not entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. In light of the Court's conclusion

that the Trustee has not established that Makings was an insider

"at the time of [the] transfer," the Court need not analyze the

remaining elements of the preferential transfer claim or the other

issues raised by the parties on this matter. The Trustee's motion

for summary judgment on the preferential transfer claim (Count 3)

shall be denied. 

 Therefore, 

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IT IS ORDERED that the Trustee's motion for summary judgment

on the preferential transfer claim (Count 3) (doc. 312) is DENIED. 

DATED this 28th day of August, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record.

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