Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00832/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00832-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

CIVIL CASE NO. 07CV832 J

CRIM CASE NO. 05CR1626 J

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

 v.

RONALD TYRONE SLATER,

Defendant/Petitioner.

Before the Court is Petitioner Ronald Tyrone Slater’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Doc. No. 1.] “A

prisoner in custody under sentence of a court . . . claiming . . . that the sentence was

imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was

without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the

maximum authorized by law, . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to

vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2005). For the reasons set

forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition with prejudice.

Background

On June 15, 2005, Petitioner drove a car concealing approximately 6.43 kilograms

of methamphetamine from Mexico to the United States through the Calexico West

California Port of Entry. (Plea Agreement at 2.) 

On September 16, 2005, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment

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against Petitioner. [Doc. No. 1.] Count one charged Petitioner with importation of

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. [Id.] Count two charged

Petitioner with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). [Id.] On January 13, 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to count one of the

indictment. [Doc. No. 18.] On May 15, 2006, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 130

months in custody and five years of supervised release. [Doc. No. 21.]

On May 8, 2007, Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion claiming that the

Court’s imposition of supervised release constituted double jeopardy and violated his

constitutional rights. (See Pet. at 1.) Petitioner also claimed that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because his attorney’s improper application of the law resulted in a

longer sentence. (See id. at 13.)

Discussion

After reviewing the Petition and the Government’s opposition, the Court DENIES

the Petition because: (1) Petitioner waived his right to collateral attack; (2) Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that his term of supervised release was unconstitutional; and (3)

Petitioner was not denied his right to counsel.

I. Waiver of Right to Collaterally Attack Sentence

The Government contends that Petitioner waived his right to collaterally attack his

sentence when he entered into the Plea Agreement. (Gov’t Resp. at 3.) In support of this

argument, the Government provides evidence that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily

executed the Plea Agreement. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner does not address the Government’s

argument that he voluntarily entered into the Plea Agreement. Rather, he argues that the

waiver of his right to collateral attack is unenforceable because he “receive[d] a sentence

greater than the high end of the guideline range.” (Traverse at 2.) 

Petitioner’s waiver of his right to collateral attack is enforceable if: (1) he knowingly

and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement; (2) the plea agreement encompassed his

right to collateral attack; and (3) the conditions of the plea agreement have been met. See

United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996).

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A. Petitioner Knowingly and Voluntarily Entered Into the Plea Agreement

The Government contends that the Plea Agreement was made knowingly and

voluntarily. A court determines whether a petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered

into a plea agreement by “look[ing] to the circumstances surrounding the signing and entry

of the plea agreement.” Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 843. 

Here, the circumstances surrounding the signing and entry of the Plea Agreement

indicate that Petitioner’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The Court asked Petitioner a

series of questions to determine whether Petitioner understood the terms of the Plea

Agreement: 

THE COURT: Are you doing this freely and voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir, Your Honor. I am accepting full responsibilities

for my actions.

THE COURT: Do you believe you have had enough time to discuss your case

with Mr. McMullan?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.

THE COURT: Other than what is in this Plea Agreement, has anyone made any

promises to you in order to get you to plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir, Your Honor.

(Rep. Tr. at 12.)

The Court also asked Petitioner whether he understood that by signing the

agreement, he waived his right to collateral attack. (Id. at 15). Petitioner responded, “Yes,

Sir, Your Honor.” (Id.) Furthermore, this Court specifically asked Petitioner if he was

threatened or placed under duress to sign the Plea Agreement, and Petitioner responded that

he was not. (Id. at 11.) Petitioner also stated that he had all of the terms of the Plea

Agreement explained to him:

THE COURT: Before you put your signature on those spots, did you have read

and have explained to you all of the statements and answers that are in the

agreement as well as the declaration?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir, Your Honor.

(Id. at 7.) 

Section VI of the Plea Agreement also supports the Government’s argument that

Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered into the Plea Agreement: 

Defendant represents that: (a) Defendant has had a full opportunity to discuss all

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1

 The Plea Agreement did permit Petitioner to appeal his sentence if the Court found that

he was a career offender. (Plea Agreement at 7.) However, the Court did not find that

Petitioner was a career offender. (Rep. Tr. at 21.) Therefore, the provision permitting

Petitioner to appeal did not become operative.

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the facts and circumstances of this case with defense counsel, and has a clear

understanding of the charges and the consequences of this plea; (b) no one has

made any promises or offered any rewards in return for this guilty plea, other

than those contained in this agreement or otherwise disclosed to the court; (c)

no one has threatened defendant or defendant’s family to induce this guilty plea;

and (d) defendant is pleading guilty because in truth and in fact defendant is

guilty and for no other reason.

(Plea Agreement at 4.)

The Plea Agreement and the record of the disposition hearing demonstrate that the

terms of the Plea Agreement were explained to Petitioner, and Petitioner understood those

terms. The Court thus FINDS that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered into the

Plea Agreement.

B. The Waiver Encompassed Petitioner’s Right to Collateral Attack

The Government contends that the language of the Plea Agreement clearly waived

Petitioner’s right to collateral attack. Generally, courts will enforce a waiver of the right to

collateral attack if the language of the waiver encompasses a petitioner’s right to attack his

sentence on the grounds claimed. See United States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1270-71

(9th Cir. 1998). Here, Section XI of the Plea Agreement provides as follows:

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea agreement, defendant

waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack

the conviction and sentence, including any restitution order, unless the Court

imposes a custodial sentence greater than the high end of the guideline range (or

statutory mandatory minimum term, if applicable) recommended by the

Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing.

 (Id. at 7.) The plain language of the Plea Agreement provided that Petitioner “waive[d], to

the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the conviction and

sentence.”1

 (Plea Agreement at 7.) Accordingly, the Court FINDS that the waiver

encompassed Petitioner’s right to collateral attack.

 C. All Conditions of the Plea Agreement Have Been Met

 The Court next examines whether Petitioner’s sentence conformed with the terms of

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the Plea Agreement. Petitioner’s waiver of the right to collateral attack was conditioned

upon the Court not imposing a sentence greater than the high end of the guideline range. 

At sentencing, the Government recommended a total adjusted offense level of 27, which

was in accordance with the Plea Agreement. (Rep. Tr. at 29.) Further, the Government

recommended a guideline range of 130 to 163 months in custody and a five-year period of

supervised release, which was consistent with the terms of the Plea Agreement. (Id.) The

Court sentenced Petitioner to the recommended 130 months in prison and five years of

supervised release. [See Doc. No. 21.] Petitioner claims that he received a sentence of 190

months, and that the Court did not sentence him in accordance with the conditions of the

Plea Agreement. (Traverse at 2.) However, this assertion is incorrect because Petitioner

was not sentenced to 190 months in custody, but instead was sentenced to 130 months in

custody and five years of supervised release. Because the Court sentenced Petitioner

within the low-end range recommended by the Government, the Court FINDS that the

conditions of the Plea Agreement were met. 

In sum, all of the requirements necessary to establish waiver of the right to collateral

attack have been meet: (1) Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered into the Plea

Agreement; (2) the waiver encompassed his right to collateral attack; and (3) Petitioner was

sentenced in accordance with the Plea Agreement. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that

Petitioner waived his right to collateral attack.

II. The Court’s Imposition of Supervised Release is Constitutional

Even if Petitioner had not waived his right to collateral attack, his Petition fails on

the merits. Petitioner contends that supervised release violates his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights. (Pet. at 1.) Specifically, Petitioner states that “supervised release has

been imposed upon the [Petitioner] as a separate punishment, in and of itself, as a separate

type of restraint of liberty. A separate punishment after the [Petitioner] has already served

his sentence. Double punishment is Double Jeopardy.” (Id. at 2.)

 Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, supervised release is part of his original sentence,

and thus does not constitute double jeopardy. See United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908

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F.2d 425, 432 (9th Cir. 1990). Congress’ primary objective in creating the supervised

release regime “was to authorize a period of supervision, and perhaps imprisonment,

beyond what is provided by the sentencing guidelines and substantive criminal laws.”

United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, “the entire

sentence, including the period of supervised release, is the punishment for the original

crime.” Id.

Petitioner pled guilty to 21 U.S.C. § 960, which carried a mandatory five-year term

of supervised release. See 21 U.S.C. § 960 (2005) (“[A]ny sentence under this paragraph,

shall . . . impose a term of supervised release of at least 5 years . . . .”). The plain language

of 21 U.S.C. § 960 provides that supervised release must be part of any sentence imposed

under the statute. Because the statute that Petitioner violated explicitly mandates the

imposition of supervised release, Petitioner’s argument that supervised release constitutes

double jeopardy is without merit. 

In sum, Petitioner’s argument fails because the Ninth Circuit has found that

supervised release is constitutional and is part of the original sentence that is executed

when a defendant is returned to custody for violating the terms of his release. Therefore,

this Court FINDS that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that supervised release violates

his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner states that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was

“sentenced to more time than he should have.” (Pet. at 13.) Petitioner also contends that

his attorney improperly applied the law. (Id.) In opposition, the Government argues that

there is no basis to conclude that Petitioner’s attorney was ineffective in advising

Petitioner. (Gov’t Resp. at 10.)

In general, a defendant who pleads guilty to a criminal charge may not later seek

federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations. Hudson v.

Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985). He may, however, attack the voluntary

and intelligent character of the plea by demonstrating that the advice he received from

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counsel did not constitute effective representation. Id. A defendant challenging a guilty

plea for ineffective assistance of counsel must establish that his counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). In order to demonstrate prejudice in the plea context, the defendant

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not

have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Id. at 59; Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at

844. 

 Petitioner does not argue that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his waiver

involuntary. Rather, he merely asserts that his sentence should have been shorter. Because

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not challenge the validity of the

Plea Agreement, the Court FINDS that it is barred by Petitioner’s waiver of his right to

collateral attack. See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005). Even if

the claim was not barred by waiver, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s

performance was deficient or prejudicial, as discussed below.

A. Counsel’s Performance Was Not Deficient

The Court first addresses whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Petitioner

claims that his counsel’s performance was deficient because he received a longer sentence

than he should have. (Pet. at 13.) Petitioner also claims that counsel inappropriately

applied the law. (Id. at 13.) Petitioner must demonstrate that “counsel made errors so

serious that he was not functioning as ‘counsel.’ ” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984). Counsel’s performance was not deficient because the record indicates that

Petitioner’s counsel adequately explained the terms of the Plea Agreement:

THE COURT: Before you put your signature on those spots, did you have read

and have explained to you all of the statements and answers that are in the

agreement as well as the declaration?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Sir, your Honor.

THE COURT: You understand, by placing your signature in those locations, all

of the statements and answers in the agreement, as well as the declaration,

become your statements and answers?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.

(Rep. Tr. at 7.) Similarly, the Plea Agreement stated that Petitioner “has discussed the

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terms of this agreement with defense counsel and fully understands its meaning and effect.” 

(Plea Agreement at 9.) Furthermore, Petitioner’s counsel argued before the Court that

Petitioner was not a career offender, which enabled Petitioner to obtain a reduced sentence. 

(Rep. Tr. at 23.) Because Petitioner has failed to set forth specific facts indicating that

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, the Court

FINDS that the performance of Petitioner’s counsel was not deficient.

B. Counsel’s Performance Was Not Prejudicial 

The Court next examines whether Petitioner has demonstrated that counsel’s

performance was prejudicial. Petitioner must establish that his counsel’s alleged

“ineffective performance ‘affected the outcome of the plea process . . . [such] that absent

the erroneous advice, he would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at

844 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 58).

As previously discussed by the Court, the text of the Plea Agreement and

Petitioner’s statements during the disposition hearing suggest that Petitioner entered into

the Plea Agreement knowingly and voluntarily. In addition, Petitioner’s plea ultimately

resulted in a sentence of 130 months in custody. [Doc. No. 21.] Without a plea agreement,

Petitioner would have faced a sentence of life in prison. (Rep. Tr. at 10.) These facts

preclude a reasonable claim that absent counsel’s deficient performance, Petitioner would

have insisted on going to trial. Because Petitioner has failed to include specific

information in his Petition regarding how his counsel was ineffective, this Court FINDS

that Petitioner has failed to show that his counsel’s performance prejudiced his defense. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

A district court may not deny a section 2255 petition without a hearing “[u]nless the

motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled

to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In order for Petitioner to qualify for an evidentiary

hearing, he must “make specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him to

relief.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). “[N]o hearing is

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required if the allegations, viewed against the record, either fail to state a claim for relief or

are so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal. ” Shah v.

United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Petitioner’s section 2255 Petition and the record show that Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on his claims that his counsel was ineffective or that supervised release is

unconstitutional. Furthermore, there is no factual dispute for which an evidentiary hearing

would be needed to develop the record. The Court therefore FINDS that Petitioner does

not qualify for an evidentiary hearing.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to vacate, set

aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 14, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: All Parties

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