Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01232/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01232-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID W. WILSON, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1232 MCE GGH P

vs.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court are: 1) defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on 12/03/07, to which

plaintiff filed opposition; 2) plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed on 1/22/08, to which

3) defendants’ filed, on 1/29/08, a motion for denial of continuance of the motion.

Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights under the First, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments in this suit for money damages and prospective injunctive relief. He also

brings allegations of violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA) at California Medical Facility-Vacaville (CMF). Defendants are

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); Correctional Officer (C/O)

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Nesbeth; C/O Hislip; C/O Baker; N. Grannis. Plaintiff alleges that he, an individual suffering

from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and a diagnosed schizophrenic in the Enhanced

Outpatient program (EOP) at CMF, has been denied “reasonable modifications of program half

(1⁄2) hour cell/program unlocks, and count clear unlocks to programs, and access to Dayroom

program under claimed ADL/Housekeeping....” Second Amended Complaint (SAC), p. 2.

The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that at CMF violations of the ADA have

occurred in that EOP inmates, such as himself, have been denied equivalent access to showers and

dayroom as general population inmates. Moreover, defendants Nesbeth, Hislip and Baker

discriminated against him and acted in retaliation against him by denying plaintiff (and other EOP

inmates) such equivalent access, plaintiff’s complaints about such treatment having precipitated

unwarranted cell searches and retaliatory disciplinary action against him by these individuals. 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Grannis denied his constitutional rights and his rights under

the ADA in appeal denials about the allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory activity. SAC, pp. 1-

10. 

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for

plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. Defendants move for dismissal of plaintiff’s ADA injunctive

relief claims and his claims against defendant Grannis. As plaintiff has been transferred to

another facility, defendants contend that plaintiff’s prospective injunctive relief claims have

become moot. Motion to Dismiss (MTD), pp. 1-8.

Legal Standard

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it

must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “The pleading must

contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89

S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 35 (1969). The court will “‘presume that

general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” NOW,

510 U.S. at 256, 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561,

112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard

than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972).

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider

facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385,

1388 (9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers

filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

Argument/Discussion

Defendants first argue that defendant Grannis should be dismissed because plaintiff

has not set forth sufficient facts to establish a causal link between her conduct and the alleged

constitutional deprivation, and her review of plaintiff’s inmate appeal cannot serve as a basis for

her liability. Defendants contend that there is no liability under the civil rights act where there is

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

no personal involvement in the deprivation of constitutionally protected rights and that inmates

have no constitutional right to an administrative grievance process. MTD, pp. 2-4. 

Plaintiff argues that the defendants, including Grannis, denied EOP inmates at

CMF access to dayroom, yard, showers, library, law library, canteen, church services,

medical/dental ducat passes by failing to proved half hour program unlocks that GP inmates

receive. Opposition (Opp.), p. 1. Plaintiff seeks to impute liability to defendant Grannis for her

failure, at the director’s level of review, to rectify the putative violations of his constitutional

rights and his rights under the ADA and RA, contending that she thereby participated in the

wrongdoing and failed to meet her job responsibilities. Id. at 2. He includes as an exhibit to his

opposition, a document identified as Ex. PP(17)e2, which is a copy of second level appeal

response, dated 1/18/05, to plaintiff’s appeal on behalf of himself and L-1 EOP inmates, Log No.

05-M-2571, filed on 12/03/05 and bypassed to the second level, alleging that EOP inmates, most

of whose cells are clean, are being forced to their cells on the ostensible ground that they must do

so for ADL/housekeeping, depriving them of dayroom and program activity access and that EOP

inmates are kept locked up for count clears and not allowed half-hour unlocks for, inter alia,

showers on Thursdays. As plaintiff points out, this appeal was partially granted at the second

level to the extent that “the Appellant has proven that the unit half hour unlocks are not being

conducted according to the unit log book.” Opp., p. 5 & Ex. PP(17)e2. The decision states that

“staff will be directed to perform the unit one-way unlocks as stated in their Post Orders.” Id. 

Notwithstanding, plaintiff contends, his appeal to the third level was denied by

defendant Grannis. Id. Although plaintiff does not include his written third level appeal for Log

No. 05-M-2571 with his opposition, he does attach it to his second amended complaint as Ex.

PP(16). In his third level appeal, plaintiff complains mostly of the actions of defendant Baker in

purportedly preventing half hour and count clear unlocks, as well as inappropriately delegating his

responsibilities to inmates, apparently while he watches TV. Plaintiff also contends that he

informed a staffmember and a judge in an unspecified conference call that defendant Baker was

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

going to manufacture a threat in order to have plaintiff placed in ad seg, which occurred on

1/31/06, because plaintiff had appealed for the unlocks. Plaintiff claims that defendant Grannis

participated in the retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights by her response. Opp.,

pp. 6-7. Plaintiff’s Ex. PP (18) is a copy of the director’s level appeal decision for Log No. 05-M2571 (designated a “group appeal), dated 5/17/06, denying the appeal, but noting that at the

second level “staff have been directed to provide unlocks (one-way) on the half-hour pursuant to

their post orders.” The decision finds that evidence in EOP Activity Schedule supports the

finding that plaintiff is being provided with shower and recreational activity access and notes that

the EOP “provides that most intensive level of outpatient mental health care in the Mental Health

Services Delivery System,” including psychotherapy, medication management, and other

programs and that plaintiff’s designated housing has restricted access and alternative work,

recreational and educational opportunities, designed for inmates who have a mental illness which

precludes their ability to be placed with the GP and participate in GP activities. Ex. PP (18) to

Opp. 

The gravamen of plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Grannis in her individual

capacity appears to be her alleged failure to investigate some of the allegations of his inmate

appeal, Log No. 05-M-2571, or to respond to the grievance in a manner plaintiff deemed

appropriate. To the extent that plaintiff seeks to implicate this defendant with regard to the

processing of any other appeal he made to the director’s level, there is insufficient information

provided as to whether or not any other grievance related to the issues herein was filed to that

level. Prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance

procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Mann v. Adams, 855

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Even the non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to

properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise

constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). See also, Buckley v.

Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991). Azeez v.

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 “[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 1

which are protected by the Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.

369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones,

445 U.S. 480, 493, 100 S.Ct.1254, 1263-1264 (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington, 494

U.S. 210, 221- 222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037 (involuntary administration of psychotropic

drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, supra. 

6

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural

right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise

to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth

amendment”). Specifically, a failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional

violation. Buckley, supra. State regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due

Process Clause of the federal constitution only if those regulations pertain to “freedom from

restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). 

1

Plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant Grannis, to the extent he makes one, should be

dismissed.

A defendant sued in an individual capacity must be alleged to have: personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; known of the violations and failed

to act to prevent them; or implemented a policy that repudiates constitutional rights and was the

moving force behind the alleged violations. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th

Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642 (9 Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040 (9 Cir. th th

1989). “Although a § 1983 claim has been described as ‘a species of tort liability,’ Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S. Ct. 984, 988, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, it is perfectly clear that not

every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under that statute.” 

Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S. Ct. 553, 559 (1980). “Without

proximate cause, there is no § 1983 liability.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

(9 Cir. 1996). th

The search, which was performed in accordance with this

constitutionally valid strip search policy, was subsequently ratified

by the School Board when Mr. Williams filed a grievance. 

Therefore, Williams’ only grasp at evoking municipal 

liability under § 1983 is to show that this subsequent ratification is

sufficient to establish the necessary causation requirements. Based

on the facts, the Board believed Ellington and his colleagues were

justified in conducting the search of Williams. There was no

history that the policy had been repeatedly or even 

sporadically misapplied by school board officials in the past. 

Consequently, the School Board cannot be held liable for the

ratification of the search in question, because this single, isolated

decision can hardly constitute the “moving force” behind the alleged

constitutional deprivation.

Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884-885 (9 Cir. 1991). th

This court is unwilling to adopt a rule that anyone involved in adjudicating a

grievance after the fact is per se potentially liable under a ratification theory. However, this is not

to say that persons involved in adjudicating administrative disputes, or persons to whom

complaints are sometimes made, can never be liable under a ratification theory. If, for example, a

reviewing official’s rejections of administrative grievances can be construed as an automatic

whitewash, which may have led other prison officials to have no concern of ever being

reprimanded, a ratifying official may be liable for having put a defective policy in place. 

In this instance, plaintiff alleges that defendant Grannis, in essence, participated in

the alleged retaliation against him by failing to rectify the disparate and retaliatory action of

defendant Baker, et al. However, the third level decision notes that the staff has been directed to

see to it that they follow their post orders with regard one-way unlocks (one-way) on the halfhour, which appears to largely address the heart of plaintiff’s grievance. Thus, plaintiff has not set

forth facts with regard to defendant Grannis sufficient to suggest that she is liable to him under a

ratification theory (of alleged retaliation), and she should be dismissed on that ground as well, as

well as on his claims in his second amended complaint that she violated his rights under the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by her response. Nor can plaintiff proceed against this

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

individual defendant on his claims for violations of Title II of the ADA. Vinson v. Thomas, 288

F.3d 1145, 1156 (9 Cir. 2002) (holding “that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § th

1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the

ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”) This action now proceeds on a second amended

complaint, such that plaintiff has been provided ample opportunity to amend. Liberality in

granting a plaintiff leave to amend “is subject to the qualification that the amendment not cause

undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not futile.” Thornton v.

McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 799 (9 Cir. 2001), quoting Bowles v. Reade, 198 th

F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir.1999). At this point, having had three opportunities to proceed on a

colorable claim against defendant Grannis, the court does not find that further leave to amend as

to this defendant is warranted.

Defendants also contend that plaintiff may not proceed on his claim for prospective

injunctive relief because such matters are already subject to enforcement under the Armstrong

class action, which addresses violations of the ADA/RA with regard to disabilities of state

prisoners and parolees under the Armstrong Remedial Plan. MTD, pp. 4-6. Plaintiff, on the other

hand, maintains that he is not a member of the Armstrong class because that action embraces

inmates with serious mobility, hearing, visual and/or speech impairments. Opp., p. 7. Instead,

plaintiff asserts that he is a class member under Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, CIV-S-90-0520

LKK JFM P, which includes mentally impaired inmates such as himself. Opp., p. 3. Further, he

maintains that he contacted unspecified government officials and Coleman plaintiffs’

representatives about his allegations herein but obtained no relief. Id. The court will not reach

this ground of defendants’ motion, however, because defendants also point out that plaintiff, now

transferred to California State Prison-Lancaster (CSP-LAC), contending that his injunctive relief

claims only implicate conditions at CMF. MTD, pp. 6-7. While plaintiff concedes that he was

transferred to CSP-LAC as of September of 2007, he argues in his opposition that he has fought

the transfer (in spite of the apparently unfair conditions there) and was placed back for transfer

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

there in October, 2007, citing Ex. H (14). Opp., p. 9. The court can locate no such exhibit

attached to his opposition. Nor is any such exhibit appended to his second amended complaint or

his putative motion for summary judgment. Moreover, assuming any such transfer was

authorized in October of last year, for which plaintiff provides no evidence whatever, nearly a

year has passed since any such authorization might have been made, leading to the inevitable

inference that such an authorization has been withdrawn or otherwise rescinded. Defendants are

correct that plaintiff’s prospective injunctive relief claims under the ADA against CDCR and

CMF appear to have been mooted by his transfer to CSP-LAC. When an inmate seeks injunctive

relief concerning an institution at which he is no longer incarcerated, his claims for such relief

become moot. See Sample v. Borg, 870 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1989); Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d

874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff having demonstrated no reasonable possibility that he will be incarcerated at CMF at any

predictable time in the future, defendants’ motion should be granted on that ground. 

Motion for Summary Judgment/Motion for Denial/Continuance

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking judgment in his favor on his

claims within the second amended complaint. Defendants protest, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), 

that plaintiff has filed the motion prematurely in that at the time of filing the court had not yet

ruled on the motion to dismiss, discovery had not yet been commenced by the parties, defendants

have not yet filed an answer and the court has yet to issue either discovery or scheduling orders. 

Motion for Denial/Continuance, Declaration of David N. Sunada. Defendants’ motion to deny

plaintiff’s summary judgment motion as premature should be granted. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on 12/03/07 (# 21), be granted and

plaintiff’s claims against defendants Grannis and the CDCR, and his claims for injunctive relief

under the ADA/RA be dismissed;

\\\\\

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

2. This action proceed only as to plaintiff’s First, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment claims against defendants Nesbeth, Hislip, and Baker for money damages only.

3. Defendants’ 1/29/08 (# 24) motion for denial/continuance of plaintiff’s

summary judgment motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), be granted, and plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment, filed on 1/22/08 (#23), be denied as premature.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 08/28/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

wils1232.mtd+

Case 2:06-cv-01232-FCD-GGH Document 29 Filed 08/28/08 Page 10 of 10