Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00638/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00638-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC MCDAVID,

No. 2:06-cv-0638-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, LOU

BLANAS, Sheriff of Sacramento

County, an individual, UNITED

STATES MARSHALS SERVICE,

ANTHONY AMADOR, United States

Marshal of the Eastern

District of California, an

individual, and DOES 1 through

50,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

By Memorandum and Order filed June 27, 2006, this Court

granted the Motion to Dismiss brought be Defendants County of

Sacramento and Lou Blanas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). 

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Case 2:06-cv-00638-MCE -GGH Document 30 Filed 10/24/06 Page 1 of 5
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While Federal Defendants’ Notice of Motion appears to 1

indicate in its first paragraph that judgment on the pleadings is

sought only as to Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action

(for violations of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

RLUIPA, respectively, the remainder of the Notice makes it clear

that moving Defendants also seek judgment as to the remaining

claim premised on the Eighth Amendment (as stated in Plaintiff’s

Third Cause of Action). In addition, because the Bivens claim

alleged in the Fourth Cause of Action is specifically predicated

on the existence violations under RLUIPA and the First and Eighth

(continued...)

2

The Court determined that dismissal was warranted because

Plaintiff was unable to state a cognizable claim predicated on

either the First Amendment (free exercise of religion), the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc (“RLUIPA”), or the Eighth Amendment (infliction of cruel

and unusual punishment). No leave to amend was accorded given

the Court’s finding that the deficiencies of Plaintiff’s

Complaint could not be cured through amendment.

In addition to the County of Sacramento and its Sheriff,

Defendant Blanas, Plaintiff also named as Defendants the United

States Marshal’s Service and Anthony Amador, United States

Marshal for the Eastern District of California (“Federal

Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that, as a pretrial detainee in

a federal criminal case, he is in the custody of the Federal

Defendants even though he is being housed at the Sacramento

County Jail as operated by the County and Mr. Blanas. (Pl.’s

Compl., 1:3-5, 3:11-22).

The Federal Defendants now move for Judgment on the

Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on

grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint shows on its face that

Plaintiff cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1

Case 2:06-cv-00638-MCE -GGH Document 30 Filed 10/24/06 Page 2 of 5
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(...continued) 1

Amendments, it too hinges on whether the underlying violations

asserted in the preceding causes of action can be established. 

Consequently, the Court believes that the instant Motion is

directed to all claims asserted against the Federal Defendants

and will treat it accordingly.

Federal Defendants do assert an additional argument that 2

they cannot be liable for the actions of independent contractors,

claiming that the County and Blanas are in that position given

Federal Defendants’ contract with the County to house federal

prisoners awaiting trial. It is not necessary to reach that

argument, however, since as Federal Defendants point out the

Court has already determined that the County and Blanas are not

liable to Plaintiff in any event. Consequently any imputed

liability, or lack thereof, by virtue of the County’s status with

the Federal Defendants need not be addressed.

The only procedural difference between the two motions is 3

that a motion for judgment on the pleadings, unlike a Rule 12(b)

motion cannot be brought until after the pleadings are closed. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Since the Federal Defendants are the

only remaining Defendants in this matter, and since an answer on

their behalf was filed on May 30, 2006, that requirement has been

satisfied.

3

The grounds asserted by the Federal Defendants for judgment on

the pleadings mirror the grounds upon which this Court dismissed

all claims against the County of Sacramento and Sheriff Blanas,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), in its June 27, 2006 Memorandum and

Order. The Court’s rationale in dismissing the claims against 2

the County and Blanas apply equally to the Federal Defendants and

mandates that the Federal Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings be granted.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state

a claim is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Craigs, Inc.

v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993). 

3

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 4

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

(continued...)

4

That standard is set forth in the Court’s June 27, 2006

Memorandum and Order which is incorporated herein by reference as

if fully set forth.

The Court’s reasoning in rejecting Plaintiff’s claims is

also fully explicated in its prior June 27, 2006 Memorandum and

Order. That Order, as stated above, concluded that Plaintiff

could not, as a matter of law, state a claim under the facts as

alleged in his pleadings for violations of either RLUIPA, the

First Amendment, or the Eighth Amendment. These same claims are

posited against all Defendants, including the Federal Defendants. 

The only additional claim asserted against the Federal Defendants

is found within the Fourth Cause of Action, which states a Bivens

claim on grounds that the Federal Defendants “deprived

[P]laintiff of his First and Eighth Amendment rights under the

[United States] Constitution and applicable federal statutes as

set forth above...” (Pl.’s Compl., 10:7-9). Hence the viability

of the Fourth Cause of Action necessarily depends on the

viability of its three predecessor claims, and any such viability

has already been rejected by this Court.

Significantly, too, Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the

instant motion. Given that non-opposition, as well as the fact

that the Court’s prior June 27, 2006 Memorandum and Order is

controlling in any event as to the claims asserted against the

Federal Defendants, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

brought by the Federal Defendants is GRANTED. 

4

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(...continued) 4

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

5

No leave to amend will be permitted in accordance with that prior

Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 24, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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