Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02221/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lance Dale McPherson,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-02221-PHX-DWL (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Lance Dale McPherson has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.)

I. Summary of Conclusion. 

Petitioner raises eight grounds for relief in his Petition. The Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are either unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, or fail on the merits. 

Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

II. Background.

a. Facts of the Crimes.

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts and trial proceedings:

McPherson moved into an apartment next door to L.R. and her 

children in 2009. He subsequently started dating L.R., and eventually moved 

in with her and her children. L.R. would leave her five children with 

McPherson if she had to leave the house. And when her sister, J.V., needed, 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 1 of 24
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

McPherson would also watch her three children. 

McPherson, however, began to molest and engage in sexual conduct 

with one of L.R.’s children, S.V., who was then eight years old. His conduct 

continued for three years. He also molested and had sexual contact with 

M.M., J.V.’s child, who was also eight at the time. 

On February 1, 2012, M.M. told her sister that she and S.V. had been 

molested by McPherson, and the sister told her mother. J.V. called L.R., who 

was having a family dinner at a restaurant with McPherson, and told her 

about the accusations. L.R. immediately took her children outside, and S.V. 

confirmed the accusation. L.R. then took her children, left the restaurant, and 

called the police.

State v. McPherson, No. 1 CA-CR 14-0551, 2015 WL 4504117, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 

23, 2015).

b. Jury Trial and Sentencing. 

The State filed an indictment in Maricopa County Superior Court charging 

McPherson with the following:

• One count of attempted molestation of a child, a Class 3 felony (Count 1).

• Six counts of sexual conduct with a minor, each a Class 2 felony (Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 

6, and 9).

• One count of molestation of a child, a Class 2 felony (Count 7).

• One count of attempted child molestation, a Class 3 felony (Count 8).

(Doc. 13-1, Ex. A, at 5.) Count 6 was dismissed at the close of the State’s case on 

McPherson’s motion for judgment of acquittal. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. I, at 37.) A jury convicted 

Petitioner of Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. L, at 48-50.)

On August 8, 2014, the court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive terms of 

imprisonment, including a life sentence. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. N, at 59-65.). 

c. Appellate Proceedings.

On April 12, 2015, McPherson’s appellate counsel filed an opening brief, advising 

the court that counsel failed to find any colorable issues to raise. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. O, at 74.)

On May 18, 2015, McPherson filed a pro per supplemental opening brief, asking the court 

to address (1) whether the trial court improperly dismissed certain jurors while keeping 

other biased jurors; and (2) whether the court erred in denying McPherson’s motion for 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 2 of 24
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. (Doc. 

13-1, Ex. P, at 77-87.) 

On July 23, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed McPherson’s convictions 

and sentences in a memorandum decision. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. Q, at 95.) On February 16, 2016, 

the Arizona Supreme Court denied McPherson’s petition for review. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. R, 

at 97.)

d. Post-Conviction Review Proceedings.

On March 2, 2016, McPherson filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 13-1, Ex. S, at 106-09.) On July 26, 2016, McPherson’s counsel filed a notice stating 

that he had reviewed the record and had found no colorable issues to argue in a PCR 

petition. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. T, at 111.) On November 21, 2016, McPherson filed a pro per 

PCR petition. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. V, at 117-49.) 

On August 14, 2017, the PCR court dismissed McPherson’s petition, finding that 

the majority of his claims (juror misconduct, denial of equal protection, perjured testimony 

at trial, insufficiency of evidence, judicial bias, structural error, and prosecutorial 

misconduct) were precluded from review pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure

32.2(a)(2). (Doc. 13-1, Ex. Z, at 245.) The court also found that McPherson failed to show 

that the claimed deficient performance by his trial counsel prejudiced his defense and found 

that his claims as to appellate counsel and post-conviction counsel were without merit. 

(Id.). 

On October 20, 2017, McPherson appealed the PCR court’s ruling. (Doc. 13-2, 

Ex. AA, at 2.) On April 17, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief in a 

memorandum decision, finding that McPherson had failed to establish that the trial court 

abused its discretion. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. CC, at 33.)

e. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition.

On April 3, 2019, McPherson filed this Petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court has 

summarized his claims as follows:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges a claim of juror misconduct. In Ground 

Two, Petitioner alleges that his equal protection rights were violated. In 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 3 of 24
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his accuser perjured herself. In Ground 

Four, Petitioner alleges that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction. In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges that the trial judge was biased 

against him. In Ground Six, Petitioner alleges a claim of “structural error”

when certain jurors were allowed to remain on the jury. In Ground Seven, 

Petitioner alleges a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. And in Ground Eight,

Petitioner alleges that his attorney provided ineffective assistance.

(Doc. 6 at 1-2.) 

On August 7, 2019, Respondents filed a Response to the Petition. (Doc. 13.) On 

September 25, 2019, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 16.)

III. Standard of Review.

a. Exhaustion and Procedural Default.

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless 

a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state 

remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits 

of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court in a 

procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o provide 

the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in 

each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the 

claim”).

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See id. at 33. A “state prisoner 

does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or 

brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, 

such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion 

requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . (2) through the proper 

vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.”

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes comity 

by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged violations of 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 4 of 24
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001); Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also require federal courts to 

respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. See Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 731-32. Under these principles, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from 

federal review in two situations.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus 

review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but returning 

to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such as waiver 

or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See Teague v. 

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). If 

no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in state 

court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See Beard v. 

Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State’s 

procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state courts of an 

opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. In 

this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court opinion relies “on 

a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an 

‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989).

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, “if 

the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as a 

result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732); see also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners and 

to those represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 5 of 24
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

procedural rules. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986)). “‘[P]rejudice’ is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error.” Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, the court need not reach the 

other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); Cook, 

538 F.3d at 1028 n.13.

b. Merits.

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision 

which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Davis 

v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the “last reasoned decision”

from the state court, “which means that when the final state court decision contains no 

reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state court that provides a reasoned 

explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 441 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only 

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an 

unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively 

unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, as 

a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal 

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded 

disagreement.

White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014).

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate 

claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal 

habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. 

AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on 

the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.”

Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-787, [] (2011). “If this standard 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 6 of 24
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

is difficult to meet”—and it is—” that is because it was meant to be.” [] 131 

S. Ct. at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice 

system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal 

habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at ––––, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting the 

governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of 

facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches 

a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in a 

way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly established 

legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See McNeal 

v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s determination of a 

habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under clearly 

established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] 

governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should have controlled.”

Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state court’s decision is an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it can be considered 

objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An 

unreasonable application of law is different from an incorrect one. See id.; Cooks v. 

Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one and does not 

permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly applied 

federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 

2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2010).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 7 of 24
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray, 745 F.3d at 998. Pursuant 

to § 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a state-court’s factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have 

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, the 

Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the state’s 

ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the AEDPA 

otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 

953-54 (2007). Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not harmless: “For 

reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas 

relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’”

Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2197.

IV. Ground One – Juror Misconduct.

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges the trial judge denied him “due process” and 

“abused his discretion” by allowing a juror to remain on the jury. (Doc. 1 at 6.) On the third 

day of trial, Juror 11 informed the judge that she knew one of the victims. (Id.) Petitioner 

argues the juror should have been dismissed. (Id.) Petitioner asserts that “[i]t is also known 

that Juror #11 has a close relationship with the accuser ([M.M.]) . . . . Juror #11 works with 

the aunt in an 8-person office. She has known and socialized with her and the family for 7 

years . . . [and] they spoke about the case prior to trial.” (Id.). Petitioner alleges that Juror 

11 “failed to disclose the intimate 7-year relationship upon hearing the names involved.”

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 8 of 24
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Id.) Petitioner’s claim is not supported by the trial transcript. Juror 11 told the court that 

she worked “with somebody that [she] noticed in the audience.” (Doc. 13-2, Ex. DD, at 

145.) Juror 11 did not know that person’s connection to the case and agreed not to speak 

to that person while the trial was ongoing. (Id. at 180.) Juror 11 agreed she could make “an 

independent decision” in the case. (Id.) The judge declined to dismiss Juror 11. 

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. The Arizona Court of Appeals found:

Finally, McPherson also asserts the court improperly refused to 

dismiss juror 11, even after learning she was a co-worker of M.M.’ s aunt. 

During the third day of trial, M.M.’s aunt sat with the victims’ family in the 

courtroom. Juror 11 noticed her co-worker and sent a note to the court. At 

the end of the day recess, and out of the presence of the others, juror 11 told 

the court that she was surprised to see a woman she worked with in the 

audience in the courtroom. She was questioned by the court, and juror 11 

thought she could be independent and fair as long as she did not have any 

communication with her co-worker. After having juror 11 leave the 

courtroom, the court questioned M.M.’ s aunt. And based on her answers, the 

court did not excuse juror 11.

Although the matter was resolved, later in the trial the State noted that 

the “aunt ha[d] voluntarily excluded herself from the courtroom since [the 

day she was questioned].” Consequently, based on the information the court 

had - the juror’s surprise to see a co-worker, the court’s questions and her 

answers, as well as the fact that M.M.’ s aunt did not attend the proceedings 

after the third day of trial, the court did not abuse its discretion by keeping 

juror 11 on the jury.

McPherson, 2015 WL 4504117, at *2.

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted because he did not fairly present this claim as a federal claim in the state courts. 

(See Doc. 13 at 13-14 (citing Doc. 13-1, Ex. P at 79-86).) Petitioner replies that he failed 

to present this claim as a federal claim due to lack of access to “an adequate and meaningful 

law library or to persons trained in the law.” (Doc. 16 at 11.) Rather than address whether 

Petitioner’s lack of law library access demonstrates cause to excuse his procedural default, 

the Court elects to review the issue on the merits.

Here, Petitioner fails to show the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals was 

clearly unreasonable. The trial judge determined that Juror 11 could remain fair and 

impartial even though Juror 11 worked with the victim’s aunt. The juror did not know the 

co-worker was the victim’s aunt and agreed not to speak with the co-worker about the case.

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 9 of 24
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“The determination of whether a juror is actually biased is a question of fact, and thus 

accorded deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 

(9th Cir. 2008). Thus, this Court must uphold the state court finding unless it amounts to 

“an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Cook v. Lamarque, 593 F.3d 810, 816 (9th 

Cir. 2010); Velasco v. Allison, 645 Fed. Appx. 598 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming denial of 

habeas relief where juror “admitted remembering that a former coworker committed a 

similar crime to” petitioner’s because “it was not unreasonable for the state court to find 

that Juror 112 was believable when she promised to adhere to the judge’s instructions.”). 

Petitioner’s claim in Ground One fails.

V. Ground Two – Denial of Equal Protection.

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges the trial judge “acted in a capricious and arbitrary 

manner, favoring the prosecution” when the judge dismissed Juror 8. (Doc. 1 at 7.) Juror 8 

revealed during the second day of trial that his son was convicted of a sex crime and he did 

not think that his son was treated fairly. (Id.). Despite Juror 8’s assurances that he could 

still be a fair juror, the judge dismissed Juror 8. (Id.). The Petitioner alleges that the 

disparate treatment of Juror 11 and Juror 8 constitutes a violation of equal protection. (Id.)

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. The Arizona Court of Appeals found:

Here, juror 8 had gone through the voir dire screening process and 

was selected to serve on the jury. He, however, waited until the second day 

of trial to tell the court that he and his son had convictions for driving under 

the influence, and that his son was charged with a sexual offense when he 

was twenty years old and, after an appeal, was ultimately convicted of a 

misdemeanor offense. The court questioned him out of the presence of the 

other jurors, and juror 8 indicated that he thought his son was treated unfairly 

by the justice system in the sexual offense case. The court then released juror 

8 from further jury service. Based on our review of the record, and given the 

nature of the allegations against McPherson, the court did not abuse its 

discretion by dismissing him.

McPherson, 2015 WL 4504117, at *2.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals was 

clearly unreasonable. Juror 8 “waited until the second day of trial” to disclose significant 

information regarding his impartiality. Juror 8 failed to disclose a prior DUI conviction and 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 10 of 24
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

thought the criminal justice system treated his son unfairly in a sexual offense case. The 

disclosures of Juror 8 are markedly different from the statement of Juror 11 that she knew 

a person watching the trial. Given that trial courts are “best situated to determine 

competency to serve impartially,” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039 (1984),

Petitioner’s claim in Ground Two fails.

VI. Ground Three – Perjury.

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his conviction was obtained using perjured 

testimony. (Doc. 1 at 8.) Petitioner claims that one of the victims was asked if her testimony 

had been truthful, and she responded, “Only some of it.” (Id.)1 Petitioner writes that this 

“created a Giglio error.” (Id.) Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal, so his 

claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if he properly 

pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct appellate process of the state, or (2) 

throughout one entire judicial postconviction process available in the state.”). 

The Court notes that, in his supplemental brief on direct appeal, Petitioner did assert 

that “[t]hroughout [M.M.’s] testimony many of her statements were pointed out and 

questioned. [M.M.] was then asked if her testimony had been truthful, she stated only some 

of it[,]” and asserted that “[M.M.] admitt[ed] she had lied.” (Doc. 13-1, Ex. P, at 85-86.) 

But Petitioner did not argue that the witnesses committed perjury. Petitioner argued that 

the testimony of the victims was inconsistent and did not support a guilty verdict. Petitioner 

did not “fairly and fully present” his claim that his conviction was based on perjured 

testimony for state court review. Nothing in Petitioner’s supplemental brief can be 

1 The following exchange occurred on redirect of Petitioner’s accuser, M.M.: 

Q. So everything that we have talked about today, is everything the truth?

A. Yes.

MR. FINEFROCK: Objection. That’s the province of the jury.

THE COURT: Well, maybe you can just rephrase that.

Q. BY MR. COHEN: Have you told the truth today?

A. Some of it. Like the parts I already told you wasn’t the truth.

Q. But everything that you ever said in court today is the truth?

A. Yeah.

(Doc. 13-2, Ex. EE, at 247-48.)

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 11 of 24
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

construed to state a claim for “perjury[,]” much less provide an explanation of the federal 

basis for such a claim. (See Doc. 13-1, Ex. P, at 76-87.) Petitioner was capable of raising a 

perjury claim on direct appeal, but he did not do so. Petitioner’s claim is procedurally 

defaulted without excuse because any alleged lack of access to a law library did not impair 

his ability to raise this claim.

VII. Ground Four – Insufficient Evidence.

In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that insufficient evidence supported his 

convictions at trial. (Doc. 1 at 9, 12-16.) Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal in his 

supplemental brief (doc. 13-1, Ex. P, at 78-85), which the Arizona Court of Appeals 

construed as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding 

that Petitioner was guilty on those counts for which he was convicted (doc. 13-1, Ex. Q, at 

93-94).

On direct appeal, Petitioner’s supplemental brief argued that “there was insufficient 

evidence for the jury to convict him.” McPherson, 2015 WL 4504117, at *3. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals found there “was substantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find that 

the State met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

Finally, McPherson asserts that the court erred in denying his motion 

for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence for the jury 

to convict him. Specifically, McPherson identifies information and testimony 

he considers to be inconsistent with what is in the police reports, the 

testimony of each victim, and the lack of physical evidence. We review the 

denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. State v. Harm, 236 

Ariz. 402, 406, ¶ 11, 340 P.3d 1110, 1114 (App.2015). But, we review the 

evidence “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and resolve 

all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. at 

588–89, 951 P.2d at 463–64. As a result, a judgment of acquittal can only be 

granted “if there is no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.” Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 20(a). Substantial evidence is “proof that reasonable persons could 

accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67, 796 P.2d 

866, 869 (1990) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see State v. 

Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 500, 892 P.2d 216, 220 (App.1995).

Here, the State was required to prove each element of each offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. McPherson, by counsel, was able to crossexamine each witness, as well as give a closing argument summarizing all 

the perceived problems with the State’s case. The jury, in listening to the 

testimony and reviewing the evidence, had to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses and weigh any conflicting testimony. In fact, the jury was duly 

instructed to take into account the witnesses’ ability and opportunity to 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 12 of 24
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

observe, their memory, their manner while testifying, any motive or 

prejudices they might have, and any inconsistent statement they might have 

made in light of all the evidence in the case. We do not weigh or re-weigh 

the evidence. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 

(1989), State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6, 99 P.3d 43, 46 (App.2004) 

(“Although the record contains some conflicting evidence, it was for the jury 

to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.”).

Although there were inconsistencies between the victims’ testimony, 

both victims testified that on multiple occasions McPherson touched their 

respective private parts, which included digital penetration, and made them 

touch his private parts. The jury had to determine whether their testimony, 

individually or collectively, was compelling and believable. See State v. 

Bronson, 204 Ariz. 321, 328, ¶ 34, 63 P.3d 1058, 1065 (App. 2003) 

(“Because a jury is free to credit or discredit testimony, we cannot guess what 

they believed, nor can we determine what a reasonable jury should have 

believed.”). In addition to the victims’ testimony, the jury heard from the 

victims’ mothers, S.V.’s sister, the investigating police officers, and 

Detective Sonia Stanley, who conducted a forensic interview of the victims. 

Moreover, the jury also heard from McPherson, who testified on his own 

behalf, as well as the testimony of Dr. Phillip Esplin, a psychologist. The jury 

was able to watch all the witnesses, weigh the testimony of all, and determine 

their credibility, while deciding what facts the State did or did not prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreover, although there was no physical evidence to support the 

charges, physical evidence “is not required to sustain a conviction where the 

totality of the circumstances demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 149, ¶ 42, 42 P.3d 564, 580 

(2002); see State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 427, 590 P.2d 1366, 1373 

(1979) (“In child molestation cases, the defendant can be convicted on the 

uncorroborated testimony of the victim.”); see also State v. Williams, 111 

Ariz. 175, 178, 526 P.2d 714, 717 (1974) (conviction may rest on 

uncorroborated testimony of the victim of a sexual assault unless “the story 

is physically impossible or so incredible that no reasonable person could 

believe it”). As a result, and based on the record, there was substantial 

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the State met its burden of proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict McPherson. Consequently, the 

court did not err by denying McPherson’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

McPherson, 2015 WL 4504117, at *3.

A federal court reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims in habeas review must 

uphold the state court decision if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[T]he 

standard must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal 

offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 324 n.16. A federal court must first look to state law 

to establish the elements of the crime, “and then turn to the federal question of whether the 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 13 of 24
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

[state court] was objectively unreasonable in concluding that” sufficient evidence 

supported the conviction. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1278 n.14 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Petitioner argues that the victims’ testimony was inconsistent regarding 

Counts 1,3,4,7, and 9. (Doc. 1 at 9, 12-16.) The jury weighed any conflicting testimony. A 

federal habeas court faced with a factual record “that supports conflicting inferences must 

presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, 

and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. See Bruce v. Terhune, 376 

F.3d 950, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Except in the most exceptional of circumstances, 

Jackson does not permit [the Court] to revisit . . . credibility determinations.”). 

Petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence to establish the date of offense for 

Counts 1 and 4. (Doc. 1 at 9, 13-14.) For Count One, victim SV testified that Petitioner 

committed the offense in 2009, which was within the dates alleged in Count One. 

(Doc. 13-2, Ex. DD, at 48-50.) For Count Four, Petitioner argues that the victim did not 

testify the incident occurred around January 31, 2012. (Doc. 1 at 13.) Petitioner agrees that 

“the state refers to this incident [as] the day before the Oliver Garden” trip. (Id.) But victim 

S.V. testified that Petitioner committed the offense before her trip to the Olive Garden 

restaurant. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. DD, at 49-50.) She testified the crime occurred “during the time 

period” of the “day before Olive Garden.” (Id. at 52). The victim also testified the conduct 

occurred “like every day or every other day” during the summer break “before Olive 

Garden.” (Id. at 53-54.) She testified it also happened during the summer. (Id.)2

Petitioner further argues there was no physical evidence to support the verdicts. 

(Doc. 1 at 14.) Physical evidence is not required to sustain a verdict. United States v. 

Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Circumstantial evidence and inferences 

drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.”).

The evidence presented at trial, when viewed “in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution,” supports the state court’s conclusions. (See Doc. 13-1, Ex. Q, at 93-

95); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (“the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence 

2

In the Anders brief, Petitioner’s counsel also outlined the dates and facts for each offense. 

(Doc. 13-1, Ex. O, at 71-73.)

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 14 of 24
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate the ruling of the Arizona Court of Appeals was unreasonable. 

VIII. Grounds Five, Six, and Seven – Claims Not Raised on Appeal.

Petitioner’s claims in Grounds Five, Six, and Seven are unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not raise them on direct appeal.

In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges judicial bias against the trial judge. (Doc. 1 at 17.) 

Juror 8 was dismissed, and Jurors 10 and 11 were both retained. Petitioner alleges that the 

judge did not dismiss Jurors 10 and 11 because it would have forced him to call a mistrial. 

(Id.) Petitioner alleges that the “jury issues show judicial bias, judicial misconduct, an 

abuse of discretion, all of which are prejudicial against the defendant, denying due process 

and creating structural error. The Constitutional right to a fair trial includes the right to a 

fair and impartial judge.” (Id.)

In Ground Six, Petitioner alleges structural error stemming from several sources. 

Petitioner alleges that because Jurors 10 and 11 did not disclose information during voir 

dire, the petitioner was denied preemptory challenges. (Id. at 18.) Secondly, Petitioner 

alleges the trial was structurally unfair because the trial court did not allow two cross 

examination questions to proceed. Both questions were designed to elicit information 

regarding the victim’s sexual knowledge. (Id.) Petitioner argues the following first question 

was posed to S.V.’s mother, Liahla, and asked whether she “ever caught or learned about 

[her] children being exposed to any type of nudity?” (Id.) The court sustained a relevance 

objection before this question was answered. The second question was posed to M.M.’s 

mother, Jessica, who testified that “[M.M.’s] dad’s girlfriend’s daughter had [M.M.] google 

‘sex.’” (Id.) The defense attorney asked Jessica, “How old was the girlfriend’s daughter at 

the time?” The prosecution objected on the basis of relevance, and court again sustained 

the objection before the question was answered. (Id.) Petitioner alleges that the judge 

“failed to allow adequate investigation into the facts” and, therefore, “the trial judge abused 

his discretion and showed bias.” (Id.) 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 15 of 24
- 16 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Ground Seven, Petitioner alleges the prosecution committed misconduct by (1) 

eliciting the perjured testimony alleged in Ground Three from the victim; (2) continuing to 

use the perjured testimony during closing arguments; and (3) making “statements not in 

evidence at trial” (Id. at 19-20.)

On direct appeal, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief that asked the 

court to review the entire record for fundamental error. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. O, at 74.) A request 

for Anders review does not exhaust all claims. See Reed v. Schriro, 2008 WL 3977604, at 

*1 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2008) (“The fact that the Arizona Court of Appeals complied with 

[Petitioner’s] [Anders] request to ‘search the record for fundamental error’ was not 

sufficient to exhaust the claim.”); Smiley v. Ryan, 2014 WL 7272474, *13 (D. Ariz. Dec. 

18, 2014) (“Petitioner’s claims were not exhausted simply by virtue of the review for error 

pursuant to Anders.”). Petitioner did not exhaust these claims because he did not raise them 

on direct appeal. In his supplemental pro se brief, Petitioner raised only two issues to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals: juror misconduct and insufficient evidence. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. P, 

at 86.) 

Petitioner is barred from returning to state court to exhaust his claims. Arizona Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) precludes post-conviction relief on any claim that could 

have been raised on direct appeal. Murray, 745 F.3d at 1051. Petitioner’s claims do not fall 

under any of the categories of exceptions under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) and 32.2(b), and 

as such, federal habeas review of Petitioner’s claims is barred. Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 

665 (procedural default “applies to bar federal habeas review when the state court has 

declined to address the petitioner’s federal claims because he failed to meet state procedural 

requirements”). Petitioner does not argue that he was unable to raise these claims in his 

supplemental brief. Accordingly, Grounds Five, Six, and Seven must be dismissed.

IX. Ground Eight.

In Ground Eight, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel, appellate counsel, and PCR 

counsel were each ineffective. (Doc. 1 at 21-27.) The Court will discuss each claim. 

a. Legal Standard.

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 16 of 24
- 17 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner 

must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and that (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88. The 

inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”

Id. at 689. Regarding Strickland’s second prong, a petitioner must affirmatively prove 

prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

The federal habeas court’s review of a § 2254 claim asserting ineffective assistance of 

counsel is doubly deferential. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) 

(explaining that in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 case, deference is due both to defense counsel’s 

performance and to the state court’s ruling). A habeas court reviewing a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel must determine “whether there is a reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC 

claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no 

reasonable jurist could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 

418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

b. Trial Counsel.

Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: (1) trial 

counsel did not question S.V. about her accusations; (2) trial counsel failed to impeach 

S.V. with her inconsistent statements; (3) trial counsel failed to use the police report as 

impeachment evidence against S.V.; (4) trial counsel failed to review discovery materials, 

as shown by his failure to impeach witnesses on cross-examination; (5) trial counsel failed 

to impeach M.M. with her inconsistent statements; (6) trial counsel failed to obtain 

McPherson’s “daily reports;” (7) trial counsel failed to call a medical expert witness or any 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 17 of 24
- 18 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

other witnesses; (8) trial counsel failed to “mention or introduce into evidence that Liahla 

has a history of doing this to other men”; and (9) trial counsel did not perform due diligence 

in preparing and conducting a thorough defense. (Doc. 1 at 21-25.) Petitioner’s arguments 

fail. 

1. Failure to impeach S.V. with her accusations. 

Petitioner first argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he “never 

questioned [S.V.] about her accusations,” and that “a rigorous cross-examination would 

have brought to light a variety of reasons to doubt accuser’s testimony.” (Doc. 1 at 21.) 

Petitioner’s argument does not satisfy the first prong of Strickland. 

As an initial matter, a review of the trial transcript shows that counsel did question 

S.V. about her accusations. (See Doc. 13-2, Ex. DD, at 71-73.) In any event, crossexamination of witnesses is a matter of trial tactics. United States v. Rodriguez- Ramirez, 

777 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1985). And a “difference of opinion with respect to trial tactics 

. . . alone generally does not constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel.” United 

States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (acts or 

omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel). “Under Strickland, cross-examination must be only objectively 

unreasonable, not flawless or to the highest degree of skill.” Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 

487 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Although Petitioner may have wanted his counsel to pursue a more thorough crossexamination of the victim, that desire does not establish that counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient. Id. (“[C]ounsel’s tactical decisions at trial, such as refraining 

from cross-examining a particular witness or from asking a particular line of questions, are 

given great deference and must similarly meet only objectively reasonable standards.”). 

Additionally, Petitioner fails to show that counsel’s “failure” resulted in prejudice, as 

required by Strickland. Thus, Petitioner’s first claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel must fail. 

2. Failure to impeach S.V. and M.M. with their inconsistent 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 18 of 24
- 19 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

statements.

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to impeach the 

victims with their inconsistent statements made during trial and during their forensic 

interviews. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his counsel did not adequately impeach the 

ten and eleven-year-old victims. (See Doc. 1 at 21-23 (“Defense counsel was ineffective as 

he failed to impeach the accusor’s [sic] testimony with evidence accusor [sic] made prior 

inconsistent statements to investigators.”).) The Court disagrees. 

The record shows that trial counsel’s cross-examination did highlight the 

inconsistencies in the children’s testimony. (See Doc. 13-2, Ex. DD, at 65-70; Doc. 13-2, 

Ex. EE, at 235-42.)3 And to the extent Petitioner argues trial counsel should have engaged 

in additional impeachment of the victims, Petitioner’s argument fails because, as discussed 

above, impeachment strategy is a matter of trial tactics. Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 

901, 905 (9th Cir. 1980). “It could have been a reasonable trial strategy not to aggressively 

attack children testifying about sexual and physical abuse.” Contreras v. Ryan, 2014 WL 

6668468, *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 2014). Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s 

general claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the children’s 

testimony with prior inconsistent statements are insufficient to satisfy the first prong of 

Strickland.

3. Failure to obtain “Daily Reports.”

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “obtain a copy of 

the detailed daily work reports that were turned in weekly by caregiver, [S.V.’s] mother.”

(Doc. 1 at 23.) He asserts that “these records would show sufficient doubt and/or innocence 

of accusations on days in question.” (Id.) But Petitioner does not explain how the use of 

these daily reports may have aided his defense, and thus any harm caused by counsel’s 

3 Doc. 13-2, Ex. DD, at 65 (eliciting testimony that S.V. had previously “gotten into trouble 

for not telling the truth”), 69-70 (eliciting testimony that S.V. had never seen Petitioner 

naked)); Doc. 13-2, Ex. EE, at 235 (eliciting testimony from M.M. about how she lied to 

police about witnessing Petitioner assault another child), 237-38 (eliciting testimony from 

M.M. that both she and S.V. had seen Petitioner’s catheter changed), 242 (eliciting 

testimony from M.M. that she had been in trouble for searching the term “sex” on the 

internet, and that she did not remember doing it).

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 19 of 24
- 20 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

failure to obtain the reports is speculative. Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 

2001) (petitioner’s speculation that certain evidence might have provided helpful 

information if investigated is not enough to support an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1060 

(11th Cir. 2002) (any alleged failure to make certain discovery requests is not 

ineffectiveness absent evidence of what would be discovered.). Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

claim fails.

4. Failure to call medical expert or other witnesses.

Petitioner next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a 

medical expert witness or other witnesses on his behalf. (Doc. 1 at 23-24.) The record 

shows that Petitioner and Dr. Phillip Esplin testified for the defense. (Doc. 13-1, Exs. I & J, 

36-42.) Petitioner does not identify a specific witness he wanted to testify at his trial, nor 

does he explain what the missing testimony would establish. (Doc. 1 at 23-24.)

As discussed above, mere speculation that certain evidence would have proven 

useful is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance. See Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088; see 

also Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (what an expert would have 

said is insufficient to establish prejudice for incompetence). What is more, counsel has 

discretion to determine who to call and how to examine the witness. Gonzalez v. United 

States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008). Generally, an attorney’s decision not to call a witness is 

a matter of trial tactics that a reviewing court will not second guess. See United States v. 

Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988); see also United 

States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 855 (11th Cir. 1982) (“this Court will not second-guess 

tactical decisions of counsel in deciding whether to call certain witnesses”).

In addition to showing that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, a petitioner must also show prejudice. United States v. Schaflander, 743 

F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 1984).

[C]omplaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus 

review because allegations of what the witnesses would have testified are 

largely speculative . . . . In addition, for [petitioner] to demonstrate the 

requisite Strickland prejudice, [he] must show not only that [the] testimony 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 20 of 24
- 21 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

would have been favorable, but also that the witness would have testified at 

trial.

Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Dows, 

211 F.3d at 486 (denying ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on lack of 

preparation for failure to call witnesses when no affidavits were submitted to support 

petitioner’s assertion as to what testimony would have been provided).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner cannot establish prejudice because he 

has not presented any evidence regarding who would testify, what they would testify to, or

explained how the testimony would have changed the outcome of his trial. United States v. 

Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (no ineffective assistance based upon 

counsel’s failure to call a witness where, among other things, there was no evidence in the 

record that the witness would have testified). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim must be 

denied.

5. Failure to introduce evidence that Liahla “has a history of doing 

this to other men.”

Petitioner next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “mention or 

introduce into evidence that Liahla has a history of doing this to other men.” (Doc. 1 at 24.) 

In his Petition, Petitioner states that Liahla “called the cops” when she ended her two 

previous relationships and both men were arrested. (Id.) Petitioner fails to explain how this 

evidence would have affected the outcome of his trial.

Counsel’s decision not to present this evidence amounts to a strategic choice, and, 

as such, is “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. What is more, any 

claim that the jury would have been influenced by this evidence is speculative, and such 

speculation is insufficient to establish deficient performance and resulting prejudice under 

Strickland. Id. at 687-94. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 

conclusory allegations may be summarily rejected); United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1008, 

1110 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that vague or speculative claims may be summarily rejected). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that this claim must also fail.

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 21 of 24
- 22 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6. Failure to act with due diligence in preparing the defense.

Petitioner argues that “[d]efense counsel failed to investigate, interview and call at 

trial witnesses defendant told him would provide testimony helpful to his defense. Defense 

counsel did not perform due diligence in preparing and conducting a thorough defense in 

a manner that is required as my advocate.” (Doc. 1 at 24-25.) Petitioner does not elaborate 

on how counsel failed to prepare or investigate. (See id.) Nor does Petitioner explain what 

information his counsel should have investigated, the witnesses he should have called and 

their proposed testimony, or how his counsel was deficient in preparing Petitioner’s 

defense. 

“In order to prevail on an allegation that defense counsel conducted an insufficient 

investigation resulting in ineffective assistance, the petitioner must show specifically what 

that investigation would have produced.” Adame v. Ryan, 2011 WL 2604767, *12 (D. Ariz. 

April 28, 2011). Here, Petitioner’s claim of a defective defense fails because he has not 

identified what information his counsel should have presented. James, 24 F.3d at 26 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (“Again, petitioner’s claim is baseless” because “petitioner does not identify 

what evidence counsel should have presented” to assist in petitioner’s defense.).

In sum, Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claims essentially amount to a difference of 

opinion with his trial counsel as to trial tactics. Such differences of opinion cannot form 

the basis of an ineffectiveness claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90 (“The proper measure 

of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 

norms” and “[s]trategic choices made after a thorough investigation of law and facts 

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable[.]”). Accordingly, the Court 

finds that this claim of ineffective assistance also fails.

c. Appellate Counsel.

Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective because they “failed to 

present and/or argue significant issues on appeal” including “juror misconduct, denial of 

equal protection, perjured testimony, insufficiency of evidence, judicial bias, structural 

error, [and] prosecutorial misconduct.” (Doc. 1 at 25.) 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 22 of 24
- 23 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff did not raise this same claim in his petition for post-conviction relief (see 

doc. 13-1, Ex. V, at 145), and thus Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted. To be sure, in his 

PCR petition, Petitioner argued that “[a]ppellate counsel failed to present significant and 

obvious issues on appeal.” (Doc. 13-1, Ex. V, at 145.) But Petitioner did not articulate what 

those “significant and obvious issues” were. Indeed, that single line in Petitioner’s PCR 

petition is the only mention of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel. (Id.) Such a 

conclusory allegation cannot constitute proper exhaustion of a claim. See Scott, 567 F.3d 

at 582 (“Full and fair presentation . . . requires a petitioner to present the substance of his 

claim to the state courts[.]”); Casey, 386 F.3d at 916 (to properly exhaust, the claim must 

be raised at all appellate stages afforded under state law as of right by that procedure).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective must be 

dismissed.

d. Post-Conviction Relief Counsel.

Petitioner also argues that post-conviction relief counsel was ineffective due to a 

“severe” lack of communication. (Doc. 1 at 25-26.) Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable 

under AEDPA or Supreme Court authority. Section 2254(i) expressly states that “the 

ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral postconviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 

2254.” Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated “[t]here is no constitutional right to an 

attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s claim does not state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief and must be 

denied. 

X. Conclusion.

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims in Grounds

One. Two, Four, and Eight fail. Petitioner’s claims in Grounds Three, Five, Six, and Seven 

are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. The Court will therefore recommend that the 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 23 of 24
- 24 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 12th day of March, 2020.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:19-cv-02221-DWL Document 18 Filed 03/12/20 Page 24 of 24