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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13595

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket Nos. 2:14-cv-14215-DLG; 2:91-cr-14025-DLG-2

RONALD MAURICE SMITH, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(February 9, 2016)

Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Federal prisoner Ronald M. Smith appeals the dismissal of his 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate as barred by the one-year statute of limitations 

of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Smith argues that his § 2255 motion 

is not time-barred because, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term 

“use” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), he was 

actually innocent of using a firearm during the bank-robbery crimes for which he 

was convicted in 1992. After review,1 we affirm.

Actual innocence, if proved, may serve as a gateway through which a 

petitioner may bring an untimely2 federal habeas petition. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (involving an untimely 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition). 

To meet the “actual innocence” threshold requirement, a petitioner must show that, 

“in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. A successful actualinnocence-gateway claim to overcome a procedural bar requires a petitioner to 

 1

 We review factual findings in § 2255 proceedings for clear error and questions of law 

de novo. Castillo v. United States, 200 F.3d 735, 736 (11th Cir. 2000). 

2

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing a § 2255 motion to 

vacate, which begins to run following the latest of four possible events. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 

These events include, inter alia, when the judgment of conviction becomes final, when the 

Supreme Court initially recognizes a right that it makes retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review, and when due diligence could have allowed for the discovery of facts 

supporting the claim or claims presented. Id. § 2255(f)(1), (3)-(4). Prisoners whose convictions 

became final before April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA, had one year from the 

AEDPA’s effective date to file their habeas actions. Goodman v. United States, 151 F.3d 1335, 

1337-38 (11th Cir. 1998). Smith does not argue his petition is timely.

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support his allegations of constitutional error “with new reliable evidence—

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or 

critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 324 (1995). 

In Bailey, the Supreme Court held that a conviction for the “use” of a 

firearm, under the version of § 924(c) then in effect, requires “active employment 

of the firearm,” as opposed to mere possession. See 516 U.S. at 143-45. The 

Court explained that use of a firearm under § 924(c) includes:

brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and most obviously, 

firing or attempting to fire a firearm. We note that this reading 

compels the conclusion that even an offender’s reference to a firearm 

in his possession could satisfy § 924(c)(1). Thus, a reference to a 

firearm calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the 

predicate offense is a ‘use,’ just as the silent but obvious and forceful 

presence of a gun on a table can be a ‘use.’

Id. at 148. In Bousley v. United States, a § 2255 proceeding involving a 

procedurally defaulted Bailey claim, the Supreme Court determined that Bailey 

was retroactively applicable on collateral review. 523 U.S. 614, 619-21 (1998). 

The district court did not err in dismissing Smith’s § 2255 motion as timebarred because Smith failed to make a threshold showing that he was actually 

innocent of using a firearm in connection with his crimes of violence. Smith failed 

to allege any factual basis supporting his claim of factual innocence. Even after he 

was put on notice by the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that the 

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court did not believe he had made a sufficient factual showing, he still did not 

point to any facts that supported his actual innocence. At no point, either before 

the district court or this Court, has Smith pointed to facts, either new or already in 

the record that show his actual, factual innocence. Significantly, he pointed to no 

“exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence” supporting his alleged innocence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

Finally, accepting the facts conceded in Smith’s initial brief on appeal, the 

facts were sufficient to convict under a § 924(c) aider and abettor theory. See 

Bazemore v. United States, 138 F.3d 947, 949 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that Bailey

did not abolish our precedent related to § 924(c) aider-and-abettor liability). Smith 

admits that two of the three bank robbers carried visible firearms, that one robber 

pointed a gun at a teller, and that one of the robbers fired a shot. Smith does not 

dispute that he was associated with the bank robbery. See id. (explaining in order 

to establish aider-and-abettor liability, the government must show a substantive 

offense was committed, the defendant associated himself with it, and the defendant 

committed some act that furthered the crime). Even assuming Smith did not 

actually carry a gun, he entered the bank with two other armed robbers, and knew 

that firearms were being used by his co-conspirators. Therefore, even using 

Smith’s version of the facts, a firearm was “use[d]” within Bailey’s definition of 

“use,” and Smith was at least an aider and abettor to the two robbers’ use of 

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firearms. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148; Bazemore, 138 F.3d at 949. While Smith 

asserts in his reply brief that none of the robbers “use[d]” a firearm, that bare 

assertion is in direct contrast to facts he set out in his own initial brief. Because he 

did not allege any facts to show that he was factually innocent of his conviction, 

the district court did not err in dismissing Smith’s petition as time-barred, and we 

affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

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