Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00412/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00412-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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06CV0412

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DALE RAY HURD

Plaintiff,

v.

L.E. SCRIBNER, WARDEN

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 06CV0412 JAH(LSP) 

ORDER OVERRULING

PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS,

ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE

JUDGES'S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND

DENYING THE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus challenging disciplinary action taken against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an answer to the petition and Petitioner filed a traverse. The Honorable

Judge Leo S. Papas, United States Magistrate Judge, thereafter submitted a report and

recommendation recommending the petition be denied in its entirety. Petitioner filed

objections to the report and recommendation. Now, after a thorough review of the

pleadings and relevant exhibits submitted by the parties, as well as the magistrate judge's

Report, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court OVERRULES petitioner's

objections, ADOPTS the report and recommendation and DENIES the petition in its

entirety.

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BACKGROUND

 On March 6, 2004, Petitioner was ordered by prison officials to submit a urine

sample for random drug testing, but refused to submit a sample. He was therefore

charged with “refusing to submit a urine sample” in violation of California Code of

Regulations, title 15, §3290(d). Petitioner was found guilty at the disciplinary hearing and

disciplined with a 90-day ‘good time’ credit forfeiture, 30 days of lost phone privileges,

and a 10 day loss of yard privileges. Petitioner challenged the disciplinary action through

the California Department of Corrections’ administrative appeals process and, on

March 25, 2005, his appeal was denied at the final level of review. Additionally,

Petitioner filed various state court habeas petitions challenging the action, all of which

became final on January 4, 2006, when the California Supreme Court issued a final order

denying his claims.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

a) Scope of Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The district court’s role in reviewing a magistrate judge’s Report and

Recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the district

court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which

objection is made,” and “ may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings or

recommendation made by the magistrate [judge].” Id. It is well settled, under Rule 72(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that a district court may adopt those parts of a

magistrate judge’s report to which no specific objection is made, provided they are not

clearly erroneous. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153 (1985).

b) Scope of Review of Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

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custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") "worked

substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) now reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court's decision may be found to be “contrary to” clearly established

Supreme Court precedent: (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [the Court's] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless

arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 405-06 (2000); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). A state court

decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case,” or, “if the state

court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 539 U.S. at 407; Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76.

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1 The magistrate judge also determined that, if Petitioner had sought relief based on a violation of

his First Amendment rights (which he did not), that claim would fail. See Report at 7-9. Petitioner does

not present any objections to this portion of the Report. This Court has conducted an independent de novo

review of the magistrate judge’s Report and determines that the magistrate judge has presented a cogent

analysis of First Amendment law as it applies to Petitioner and, therefore, adopts the analysis in full. 

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2. Analysis

In the instant petition, Petitioner alleges (1) that prison officials infringed his

constitutional rights by disciplining him because they failed to follow the California Code

of Regulations and the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”) Operations

Manual; (2) Petitioner was denied due process of law during the disciplinary proceedings;

and (3) the state court abused its discretion by rejecting petitioner’s claims concerning the

application of state law. See Doc. # 1 at 7-9. 

The magistrate judge found that Petitioner’s claim that the failure to follow the

California Code of Regulations and the CDC Operations Manual, resulting in a loss of

good time credits after prison disciplinary proceedings, is not a cognizable claim on federal

habeas corpus review. See Report at 4. The magistrate judge also determined that, even

if Petitioner had presented a cognizable claim, the state court’s ruling on the claim was not

an abuse of discretion nor was it objectively unreasonable. Id. at 5-7. The magistrate

judge further found that the disciplinary proceedings satisfied the requirements of

procedural due process. Id. at 13. The magistrate judge concluded that Petitioner was not

entitled to relief and recommended that the instant Petition be denied in its entirety.1

 Id.

at 14.

Petitioner presents several objections to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation. Specifically, Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s (a) factual

findings; (b) findings on cognizability; and (c) findings on the merits of Petitioner’s due

process claim.

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a. Factual Findings

Petitioner first objects to the magistrate judge’s statement that Petitioner was

charged with “‘refusing to submit a urine sample’ in violation of California Code of

Regulations, title 15, § 3290(d)’ [because] ... the regulation only makes punishable

refusing to ‘provide a urine sample when ordered to do so pursuant to these regulations.”

Objections at 2 (quoting Report at 2). Petitioner challenges this statement as inaccurate

because “Petitioner ... does not ... believe the request for urinalysis was made ‘pursuant to

these regulations.’” This Court finds this first objection fails because Petitioner does not

challenge the accuracy of the factual finding but, instead, challenges whether the statute,

as quoted by the magistrate judge, was applied correctly. Therefore, Petitioner’s objection

to this factual finding is OVERRULED. 

Petitioner similarly objects to the magistrate judge’s description of CDC Operations

Manual § 52010.12 as including “‘general population inmates’ in the group of inmates

subject to random urinalysis” because § 52010.12 does not specifically so state. Id.

(quoting Report at 5). However, the magistrate judge explained that, even though §

52010.12 does not specifically state general population inmates are included in the group

of inmates subject to random urinalysis testing, the inclusion may be inferred through

proper statutory construction because the Goal Statement for the CDC Manual states that

“‘[a]ll CDC populations, including felon and civil addict inmates and parolees are subject

to testing.’” Report at 5. This Court finds the magistrate judge’s description of this

section is a reasonable statutory construction. Therefore, Petitioner’s objection to this

factual finding fails and, accordingly, is OVERRULED.

Lastly, petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s “conclusion that: Petitioner

responded ‘Yes’ when asked if he understood he would be disciplined for refusing to

submit a urine sample,” contending that even though he did say “yes,” he never

understood that he would be disciplined because he believed that the regulation did not

apply to him. See id. at 3-4. Because Petitioner is not disputing whether or not he said

the word “yes,” Petitioner’s objection to this factual finding also fails and, therefore, is

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OVERRULED. 

b. Cognizability

Petitioner further objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Petitioner’s claim

that he was unconstitutionally disciplined is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus

review. A federal habeas corpus petition must allege a deprivation of one or more federal

rights to present a cognizable claim pursuant to § 2254. A state’s interpretation of its laws

or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief when no federal constitutional

question arises. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (stating that federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, and federal courts may not reexamine state

court determinations on state law issues). Federal habeas courts may not reexamine state

court's application of state law. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Federal courts

may only intervene in state judicial proceedings to correct errors of federal constitutional

magnitude. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F. 2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In his petition, Petitioner claimed the state court’s determination that Petitioner

was correctly selected for urinalysis testing based on the requirements set forth in the CDC

Operations Manual and California state law was constitutionally in error. See Doc. # 1

at 8. In the Report, the magistrate judge concluded that: 

Whether CSP officials complied with the California Code of Regulations and the CDC Operations Manual are questions of state law. Since a federal court

on federal habeas review cannot challenge a state court’s interpretation of state law, Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

Report at 5. Petitioner objects to this conclusion, arguing that there must be exceptions

to the holding in Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983) (stating that “the views

of the state’s highest court with respect to state law are binding on the federal courts”).

Petitioner contends that “where the views of the state's highest court with respect to the

state law implicate federal constitutional concerns, federal court intervention is entirely

appropriate.” Objections at 5. In support of his contention, Petitioner relies on

Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), which holds that determinate

sentencing law requires the judge, not the jury, to find facts which would expose defendant

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2 Petitioner also objects to the magistrate judge's determinations on the merits of his state law claims.

However, because this Court ultimately finds Petitioner's state law claims are not cognizable on federal

habeas review, this Court does not address Petitioner's objections to the magistrate judge's report on that

basis and OVERRULES them as moot.

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to an elevated upper term sentence, violated defendant's sixth amendment right. 

Petitioner is incorrect in his reliance on Cunningham because, in the instant case,

no constitutional protections were violated by the California Court of Appeal’s

interpretation of their own state laws. In Cunningham, the state court found that the

application of state law violated the defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury.

Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 856. The instant case is distinguishable from Cunningham

because Petitioner’s claims concern an alleged improper interpretation of state law, not

whether the application of state law violated one of his constitutionally protected rights.

Because the California Court of Appeal’s interpretation of its own laws is not an issue

cognizable on federal habeas review, the magistrate judge’s determination that Petitioner’s

claims based on state law are not cognizable is correct. Accordingly, Petitioner’s objection

to the magistrate judge's finding on cognizability is OVERRULED.2

c. Due Process

Petitioner also objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that the prison disciplinary

proceedings satisfied the requirements of due process. See Objections at 17-18. Procedural

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires

that “government action depriving a person of life, liberty or property . . . be implemented

in a fair manner.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). In a prison

disciplinary hearing, the prison disciplinary board must provide: (1) advance, written

notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to respond; (3) a written statement of the

evidence relied upon by prison officials and the reasons for the disciplinary action; and (4)

the disciplinary board’s findings supported by some evidence in the record in order to

satisfy the minimum due process safeguards. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454

(1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). 

In the Report, the magistrate judge found that Petitioner received advance written

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notice of the charges, a written statement of the evidence relied upon by prison officials,

the reasons for the disciplinary action, and that he had an opportunity to respond. The

magistrate judge also found that the disciplinary board’s findings were supported by “some

evidence” in the record. See Report at 14. Based on this evidence, the magistrate judge

held that:

[s]ince the disciplinary proceedings were consistent with and satisfied the

Due Process requirements of Wolff and Hill, the disciplinary proceedings could not be 'contrary to' or an 'unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.'

Report at 14 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge's

finding that the disciplinary board provided “some evidence” that was supported by the

record. Petitioner disagrees with the magistrate judge’s determination that his response

of “yes” when told that he would be disciplined for refusing to submit a urine sample and

the CDC employee's written report was sufficient evidence to meet the due process

requirements under Wolff and Hill and, therefore, the State court's determination on the

issue was not “contrary to clearly established federal law.” Objections at 19-20. 

 This Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s finding that the evidence before the

disciplinary board was sufficient to meet due process requirements. The standard of “some

evidence” is not as stringent for prison disciplinary hearings as are the evidentiary

requirements in criminal proceedings. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Hill,

472 U.S. at 455. Here, the evidence before the Board included the written report of the

employee who ordered Petitioner to submit to the urinalysis as well as the testimony from

the CDC employee stating that the Petitioner understood he would be punished for not

following the regulation. See Report at 14. The procedural due process rights of a

prisoner, in this context, require only that there be “some evidence” to support the

findings made by the disciplinary board. See Hill 472 U.S. at 457. The magistrate judge

properly outlined the factors required by Hill and found that the disciplinary board

satisfied all four requirements, including the fact that there was “some evidence” before

the Board. Therefore, this Court finds Petitioner’s objections to the magistrate judge's

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finding on Petitioner’s procedural due process claim unpersuasive and, accordingly, the

objections are OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

This Court has conducted an independent review of the record, the pleadings

presented by the parties and the magistrate judge’s Report. This Court’s review reveals

that the magistrate judge provided a thorough and cogent analysis of the claims presented.

This Court, thus, finds that the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions are not clearly

erroneous. Therefore, this Court adopts the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions

on petitioner’s claims in toto. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation

are OVERRULED in their entirety;

2. The magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions contained in the report and

recommendation are ADOPTED in full; and

3. The instant petition is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

Dated: May 2, 2007

HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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