Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01812/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01812-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES MONROE, Civil No. 08cv1812 L (JMA)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE:

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND

(2) DENYING REQUEST FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

vs.

A. HEDGPETH, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

James Monroe, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction in

case number SCD189308. The Court has considered the Petition and Exhibits, Respondent’s

Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse and all the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based

upon the documents, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition

and Monroe’s request for an evidentiary hearing be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion,

People v. Monroe, No. D048740, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2008). This Court gives

deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct; Petitioner may rebut

the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

Case 3:08-cv-01812-L-JMA Document 13 Filed 06/26/09 Page 1 of 21
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§ 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical

fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption

of correctness). The facts as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

A. People’s Case

1. L.Y.

In January 2005 L.Y. was working as a prostitute on El Cajon Boulevard

in San Diego. L.Y. saw Monroe drive by her a couple of times in a burgundy Ford

Expedition. He stopped his car in the middle lane and asked L.Y. if she wanted

a ride. He said no one would see her if she hurried and got into the car. After

Monroe denied being a cop, she got into his car. L.Y. told him her name was

Sarah, and he told her his name was Yohan. L.Y. agreed to orally copulate and have sex with Monroe for $100.

Monroe drove to a residential area about 10 blocks away and parked his car

on the street. L.Y. turned to her right to see if her passenger door was locked and

felt something poking her in the side. Monroe had a gun pointed at her left rib

cage and his penis was pulled out of his pants. Monroe told her, “Give me some

head.”

L.Y. screamed and asked Monroe, “[W]hat are you doing?” Monroe kept

jabbing her with the gun and demanding that she “give [him] some head.” L.Y.

decided to cooperate with Monroe so he would not shoot her. She reached for a

condom and Monroe told her not to use one because he did not like condoms.

L.Y. performed oral sex on Monroe while he pointed the gun at her back, pushing

down on her head with his other hand.

While L.Y. was orally copulating Monroe, he demanded that she “[g]ive

[him] some pussy.” L.Y. lied and told him she could not have sex because she had

recently had an abortion. Once they were finished, Monroe put the gun in the

pocket of the driver’s side door. L.Y. began crying. Monroe apologized and

dropped her off in the same vicinity where he had picked her up. As Monroe was

dropping her off, he moved the gun to the back seat of his car. He also told L.Y.

that next time he would give her money.

L.Y., who was hysterical at this point, looked for a police officer, and then

called her boyfriend on a pay phone and asked him to pick her up. Meanwhile, a

man saw L.Y. and asked her if she wanted to call the police. She told him “no”

because she had a warrant out for her arrest. L.Y. asked, and the man gave her a

ride home.

The next day, L.Y. called S.T. and some other prostitutes to warn them not

to get into Monroe’s car. A few weeks later, when she was working as a

prostitute, she saw Monroe’s car. A few weeks after that, she heard that Monroe

had raped S.T. Thereafter, L.Y. contacted the police and told them what happened

to her.

L.Y. admitted she had prior misdemeanor convictions for prostitution and

loitering for prostitution. She also believed there was a warrant out for her arrest

because she failed to obtain a court-ordered AIDS test.

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2. S.T. [Footnote 2]

[Footnote 2: S.T. was not present at trial and her preliminary hearing

testimony was read to the jury. The propriety of the court declaring her an

unavailable witness to allow that testimony to be read to the jury is discussed in

more detail post.]

On February 14, 2005, S.T. parked her car on Ohio Street and walked to El

Cajon Boulevard to engage in prostitution. Monroe pulled up next to her in a

burgundy Ford Expedition and told her to get in. S.T. ignored Monroe and kept

walking down El Cajon Boulevard. Monroe pulled up next to her again, got out

of the car and said, “My money’s not good enough?” S.T. replied, “No. Leave me

alone.” S.T., who is also Black, explained that, for a variety of reasons, most

prostitutes “don’t date Black guys.”

S.T. turned around and began walking back to her car. As she was walking

down Ohio Street, she saw Monroe walking towards her, near where she had

parked her car. S.T. turned around again and began walking back to El Cajon

Boulevard. Monroe approached her from behind, pointed a gun in her back and

said, “Don’t move. Don't make any sounds or I'll shoot you.” Monroe forced S.T.

into the back seat of his car and drove to the parking lot of an office building on

Camino Del Rio South. All the while, Monroe pointed his gun at her.

Monroe told S.T. to pull down her pants. She started to pull them down but

Monroe became impatient and yanked them down. Monroe climbed into the back

seat with her, removed his shirt, and told her to orally copulate him.

S.T. told Monroe that she needed to use the bathroom. However, he would

not let her out of the car, so she urinated a little on the back seat. Monroe then let

S.T. out of the car to urinate, while holding the hood of her jacket and pointing the

gun at her. She then got back in the car, leaving the passenger door unlocked.

Monroe forced her to perform oral sex on him without a condom until he

became erect. Monroe then climbed on top of her and told her, “I want some

pussy.” He then had intercourse with S.T. without a condom.

Monroe was interrupted when he saw Jeffrey Barber leave the office

building and walk to his car. S.T. took the opportunity to flee from Monroe’s car

through the unlocked passenger door. Monroe grabbed her jacket, ripping it, and

S.T. began to scream. She was able to break loose and ran towards Barber. She

climbed over and then fell down a four-foot wall separating the level of the

parking lot where Monroe was parked and the lower level where Barber was

parked. She then ran to Barber’s car.

When Barber reached his car, he heard someone screaming, “Help me,

please. Don’t leave. Stop. He’s raping me. Gun. Help, help, help, help. Stop.

Help.” Barber looked to the right and saw S.T. fall to the asphalt from the wall.

S.T. ran to Barber’s car and got in the front passenger side. S.T. was completely

nude except for a white puffy jacket. S.T. was hysterical. Barber got out of his

car and saw a man next to a sports utility vehicle (SUV), with its driver’s side

front and rear doors open, reaching into the back seat. Barber grabbed S.T. by the

jacket and they jumped over a retaining wall and ran west. Barber then saw the

man with the SUV start his car and drive away. Barber and S.T. returned to

Barber’s car and he called 911.

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San Diego Police Officer David Spitzer responded to the scene. S .T. told

him that she was working as a prostitute when Monroe forced her into his car at

gunpoint, forced her to orally copulate him, and then raped her for about five

minutes until she escaped. Officer Spitzer took S.T. to the hospital for a sexual

assault examination. Officer Gary Hill located what appeared to be a puddle of

urine in the parking lot.

S.T. told police that she had made two “house calls” earlier that day. She

also remembered L.Y. telling her to stay away from a man named Yohan who was

possibly in the military and drove a Ford Expedition. She also admitted she was

on probation for prostitution.

Both L.Y. and S.T. identified Monroe in photo lineups. Monroe’s house

was searched and it was determined he owned a burgundy 2000 Ford Expedition.

He was arrested shortly thereafter.

B. Defense Case

Detective Thomas Joy described an incident on January 1, 2005, when he

was working undercover to catch prostitutes. That evening, S.T. solicited sex to

Detective Joy and was arrested.

Criminalist Sean Soriano examined the back seat of Monroe’s car and

found semen. Soriano did not test the back seat to determine if there was urine

there.

Skin scrapings underneath S.T.’s fingernails were checked for a DNA

analysis because S.T. had reported, “I had my nails in his back when he was on

top of me.” In the scrapings, criminalist Ian Fitch found semen cells as well as

skin cells belonging to S.T. and another woman. There were not enough sperm

cells to run a DNA analysis and identify the donor.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 18 at 3-8.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 2, 2006, the District Attorney for the County of San Diego filed an Amended

Information charging James Monroe with eight counts related to the sexual assaults of two

victims. The information alleged two counts of forcible oral copulation (Cal. Penal Code

§ 288a(c)(2)); one count of assault with intent to commit oral copulation (Cal. Penal Code

§ 220(a)); two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (Cal. Penal Code § 12021(a)(1)); one

count of kidnaping for rape (Cal. Penal Code § 209(b)(1)); one count of forcible rape (Cal. Penal

Code § 261(a)(2)); and one count of assault with intent to commit rape. (Cal. Penal Code

§ 220(a)). (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1, Vol. 1 at 76-82.)

On March 10, 2006, after a jury trial, Monroe was convicted of all eight counts. The jury

also found that Monroe had personally used a firearm as to four of the counts (Cal. Penal Code

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§ 12022.3(a)); committed an offense against more than one victim (Cal. Penal Code § 667.61

(a), (c), (e)); and kidnaped a victim for the purpose of committing a sexual offense (Cal. Penal

Code § 667.8(a); 667.61 (a), (c), (d)). (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., Vol. 2 at 177-

86.) Monroe also admitted having five prior convictions, including a prison prior, a serous

felony prior and one strike prior under California’s Three Strikes law (Cal. Penal Code §§

667.5(a)(1), (b)-(i); 668; 1170.12; and 1192.7). On May, 31 2007, the court sentenced Monroe

to 109 years to life in prison. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr., Vol. 2 at 0265-67.)

Monroe appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division

One. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 15.) On February 29, 2008, the appellate court affirmed

Monroe’s conviction in an unpublished decision. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 18.) Monroe filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 19.) The court

denied the petition without comment on May 14, 2008. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 20.)

On October 3, 2008, Monroe filed the instant Petition in this Court. [Doc. No. 1].

Respondent filed an Answer on January 12, 2009 [Doc. No. 7], and Petitioner filed his Traverse

on January 26, 2009 [Doc. No. 9]. 

IV. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current petition is governed by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim – 

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Monroe must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds

by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus

claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result

of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision

will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

Monroe raises three grounds for relief: (1) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated

when the trial court permitted the preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims, who did

not testify at trial, to be admitted as evidence; (2) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated

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when the trial court permitted the transcript of the non-testifying victim’s 911 emergency call

to be admitted as evidence; and (3) his Due Process rights were violated when the jury was

instructed, pursuant to California Jury Instructions - Criminal (“CALJIC”) Numbers 220 and

222. (See generally, Pet. at 6-9.) Monroe also requested an evidentiary hearing. (See Traverse

at 11.) Respondent argues that the state appellate court’s denial of these claims was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law and that Monroe is not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (See generally, Answer.)

1. Preliminary Hearing Testimony of S.T.

In his first claim, Monroe argues his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against

him was violated when the preliminary hearing testimony of S.T. was read at trial, in lieu of her

testimony. Monroe argues that S.T. was not “unavailable” because the prosecution failed to

exercise due diligence in attempting to locate S.T. (See Pet. at 6; see also Pet. Att. at 28-55.)

Respondent counters that the state exercised good faith in attempting to locate S.T. for trial and

that the state court’s denial of Monroe’s Sixth Amendment claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. (Answer at 7-10.)

a. Background and State Court Decision

Monroe raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme

Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 19.) That court denied the petition without comment or citation.

(See Resp’t Lodgment No. 20.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state

appellate court’s opinion as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

The state appellate court determined that Monroe’s Sixth Amendment rights were not

violated because the prosecutor exercised due diligence in attempting to locate S.T. Therefore,

S.T. was “unavailable” and her preliminary hearing testimony could be read into the record at

trial. The court stated:

Monroe asserts the court erred in declaring S.T. an unavailable witness and

allowing her preliminary hearing testimony to be read to the jury, as the People

did not make diligent efforts to secure her attendance at trial. This contention is

unavailing.

/ / /

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A. Background

Prior to jury selection in this matter, the prosecutor informed the court that

it had made ongoing efforts to secure the attendance of L.Y. and S.T. with

subpoenas, despite the fact trial had been continued on several occasions. The

prosecutor told the court the People had successfully made contact with L.Y., but

not with S.T. Based upon the People’s inability to secure the attendance of S.T.

at trial, the court held a hearing to determine whether the People had exercised due

diligence in locating S.T. and whether it would be appropriate to declare her

unavailable, thus allowing the People to read her preliminary hearing testimony

to the jury. [Footnote 3. The court also held a hearing on the prosecution’s due

diligence in securing the attendance of L.Y. at trial. However, because L.Y. did

appear and testify, we limit our discussion to the hearing on the prosecution’s

efforts to locate and secure the attendance of S.T.]

On July 19, 2005, the July 22 trial date was continued to September 13,

2005, at Monroe’s request. On July 26 a subpoena was issued to an address in

Northridge, California, which S.T. had given to police when she reported her rape.

Debbie Lauerman, a paralegal at the San Diego County District Attorney’s office,

had maintained telephone contact with S.T. Each time there was an impending

trial date, Lauerman called S.T.’s cell phone and left a voicemail message. On

each occasion, S.T. returned Lauerman’s calls.

On September 1, 2005, the trial was continued until December 1, again at

Monroe’s request. On September 10 a second subpoena was issued for the

Northridge address. On September 19 the first subpoena was returned marked

“return to sender.” On that day, a new subpoena was prepared, without specifying

an address, and an investigative service request (ISR) was prepared, including two

possible San Diego addresses: S.T.’s mother’s address in El Cajon and a prior

address for S.T. in San Diego. Sometime in September Lauerman lost contact

with S.T. Lauerman called S.T.’s cell phone number, but it was no longer in

service.

The new subpoena and ISR were assigned to Maria Garcia, a process

server. Garcia attempted to serve S.T. at both addresses, but she was not at either

address.

On November 18, the trial was continued to December 15, 2005. On

December 3, a fourth subpoena was issued, with another ISR. On December 14,

Lauerman contacted S.T.’s victim’s advocate, who was not of assistance. The

next day, trial was continued until February 28, 2006, at Monroe’s request. On

December 20, 2005, another ISR was prepared, instructing Garcia to run a

computer check for S.T.’s address. On February 8, 2006, Garcia ran a computer

check on S.T. through multiple government and law enforcement sites, and

discovered a possible address in Tustin, California. She forwarded the

information to her supervisor, who later determined the address was not valid.

At around that time, San Diego Police Detective Joe Yamane came into

contact with S.T., who gave him her new cell phone number. On February 17 the

number was forwarded to Garcia.

On February 22, San Diego Police Detective John Zimmerman was

assigned to locate S.T. Over a period of nine days, Detective Zimmerman ran

S.T.’s information through every available database and came across addresses in

San Diego, Long Beach, Tustin, Northridge, and El Cajon. None were valid.

Officer Zimmerman went to S.T.’s mother’s house in El Cajon. She confirmed

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that S.T. was no longer in Tustin and confirmed her current phone number. S.T.’s

mother stated that S.T. was living in Las Vegas, but she did not know where.

Detective Zimmerman called S.T.’s newest number and left messages for

her. He also enlisted the help of L.Y., who also left messages for S.T. on her new

number. Zimmerman ran the number through multiple databases and determined

it was a valid number. He contacted local precincts and the vice squad to let them

know he was looking for her. He posted an officer notification entry (ONS),

which is a countrywide database informing officers that if they come into contact

with S.T. they are to notify Detective Zimmerman. Detective Zimmerman

continued to leave messages for S.T. and continued to run her rap sheet.

After hearing the above evidence and arguments of counsel, the court found

the People had exercised sufficient diligence to secure S.T. as a witness. The

court noted problems with witnesses often arise when there are multiple

continuances because once a trial date is vacated, so is the subpoena directing

attendance at the original trial date. The court also found the subpoenas went out

in a timely fashion. The court rejected defense counsel’s argument that the

investigator should have gone to El Cajon Boulevard and “hit the streets,” finding

that notifying law enforcement agencies in the area to be on the lookout for S.T.

was a more effective approach.

B. Applicable Legal Principles

The confrontation clauses of both the United States and California

Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to confront the witnesses

against them. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) However, this

right is not absolute. (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 295.) “An

exception exists when a witness is unavailable and, at a previous court proceeding

against the same defendant, has given testimony that was subject to

cross-examination. Under federal constitutional law, such testimony is admissible

if the prosecution shows it made ‘a good-faith effort’ to obtain the presence of the

witness at trial. [Citations.] California allows introduction of the witness’s prior

recorded testimony if the prosecution has used ‘reasonable diligence’ (often

referred to as due diligence) in its unsuccessful efforts to locate the missing

witness.” (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 892 (Cromer).) It is the

burden of the proponent of the evidence to prove unavailability and due diligence.

(People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1296.)

We review de novo a court’s finding of due diligence by the prosecution

in its unsuccessful efforts to locate an absent witness to determine the validity of

its subsequent declaration of unavailability warranting an exception to a

defendant’s constitutionally protected right of confrontation at trial. (Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 901.) “What constitutes due diligence to secure the

presence of a witness depends upon the facts of the individual case. [Citation.] The

term is incapable of a mechanical definition. It has been said that the word

‘diligence’ connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in good earnest,

efforts of a substantial character. [Citation.] The totality of efforts of the

proponent to achieve presence of the witness must be considered by the court.

Prior decisions have taken into consideration not only the character of the

proponent’s affirmative efforts but such matters as whether he reasonably believed

prior to trial that the witness would appear willingly and therefore did not

subpoena him when he was available [citation], whether the search was timely

begun, and whether the witness would have been produced if reasonable diligence

had been exercised [citation].” (People v. Linder (1971) 5 Cal.3d 342, 346-347.)

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C. Analysis

The People acted with due diligence in attempting to secure S.T.’s presence

at trial. At the time of the preliminary hearing, S .T. was cooperative and testified

for the People. She remained cooperative until September 2005, when she

stopped contacts with Lauerman. After she disappeared, the prosecution made

diligent efforts to locate her, contacting family, enlisting the help of local police,

and even having L.Y. assist them. The People’s attempt to make her available for

trial was hampered by several continuances, most at Monroe’s request. This

evidence demonstrates the prosecution undertook timely and serious efforts to

locate S.T. and diligently pursued all pertinent information. (See People v. Wilson

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 342 [due diligence shown by investigator’s two-day effort

to locate a witness for retrial by visiting the witness’s last known address,

attempting to locate his known associates, and checking police, county, and state

records using the witness’s aliases]; People v. Diaz (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 695,

706-707 [due diligence shown by investigator’s speaking with a witness’s mother

and brother, going to schools the witness had attended, asking patrol officers to

look for the witness, and checking hospital, arrest and Department of Motor

Vehicles records].)

In asserting that the prosecution did not exercise due diligence, Monroe

relies on Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th 889. Cromer is distinguishable. In Cromer, the prosecution was on notice of a witness’s disappearance less than two weeks

after the preliminary hearing and over two months before the original trial date.

Although a subpoena was issued for the witness to attend trial, the prosecution

made no effort to serve it on the witness. (Id. at p. 903.) The prosecution did not

make any effort to serve a subsequently issued subpoena for the witness to appear

on a rescheduled trial date. Even though the prosecution knew that the witness

had disappeared from the neighborhood where she had lived months before the

original trial date, it was not until shortly before the continued trial date that

investigators made a few visits to her former residence. (Ibid.) Trial was continued

again; it was not until after the case had been called for trial that the prosecution

finally learned the witness was living with her mother in San Bernardino. (Ibid.)

Despite the imminence of trial, the prosecution waited two full days to follow up

on this information and obtain the relevant address. (Id. at pp. 903-904.) After

jury selection had begun, an investigator went to the mother’s residence, where he

learned the mother would return the next day. Despite the fact the mother was the

person most likely to know the witness’s whereabouts, the investigator did not

return to the residence and undertook no other efforts to contact the mother. (Id. at p. 904.) On the basis of this chronology, the court concluded that “serious

efforts to locate [the witness] were unreasonably delayed, and investigation of

promising information was unreasonably curtailed.” (Ibid.)

Here, by contrast, as described in detail ante, the prosecution made

adequate and diligent efforts to secure S.T.’s presence at trial.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 18 at 8-14.)

b. Analysis

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. While certain types of hearsay may be admitted without the

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benefit of confrontation, the Supreme Court held in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68

(2004) that the Sixth Amendment places certain restrictions on the admission of testimonial

hearsay evidence, stating “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment

demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for

cross-examination.” Although the Crawford court did not explicitly define what kind of

evidence is “testimonial,” testimony at a preliminary hearing is without question “testimonial”

evidence. See id. at 52. Monroe does not argue that he was deprived an opportunity to crossexamine S.T. at the preliminary hearing. Thus, this claim turns on whether the state court

properly determined that S.T. was “unavailable.” See id. at 42.

Under clearly established Supreme Court law, “‘a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for

purposes of the . . . exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial

authorities have made a good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.’” Ohio v. Roberts, 448

U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1969), overruled on other

grounds by Crawford, 541 U.S. 68. The Roberts Court defined “good faith effort” this way:

The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus if no possibility of

procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness’ intervening death),

“good faith” demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a possibility,

albeit remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the

obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation. “The lengths to which the

prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of reasonableness.”

California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 189 n.22, 90 S.Ct. at 1951 (concurring opinion,

citing Barber v. Page, supra). The ultimate question is whether the witness is

unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and

present that witness. As with other evidentiary proponents, the prosecution bears

the burden of establishing this predicate.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75 (emphasis in original).

Here, the state court’s conclusion that the state made good faith, diligent efforts to locate

S.T. and produce her to testify at trial was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonably application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Although much its analysis was based on state law,

the appellate court articulated the correct federal standard. Moreover, the same facts identified

by the state court which showed due diligence on the part of the prosecutor showed good faith.

Specifically, each time a trial date was set, the District Attorney’s Office attempted to serve S.T.

with a subpoena. The first two subpoenas were sent in a timely fashion (after the trial date was

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set, then postponed) to the Northridge address S.T. had provided to authorities. (Resp’t

Lodgment No. 5, Rep.’s Tr., Vol. 1 at 78-79, 102-03; see also Resp’t Lodgment No. 2, Clerks’s

Tr., Vol. 2 at 276-78.) And, for a period of time before the trial, Debbie Lauerman, a paralegal

for the District Attorney’s Office was in phone contact with S.T. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 5,

Rep.’s Tr., Vol. 1 at 102-103.) 

In mid-September, once Lauerman lost phone contact with S.T. and learned that S.T. had

not received the subpoenas, immediate steps were taken to locate and serve S.T personally. A

third subpoena was prepared and given to a process server, Maria Garcia. Attempts were made

to serve S.T. at her mother’s address in El Cajon and S.T.’s prior address in Southeast San

Diego. S.T. was not at either address. (Id. at 119.) Lauerman attempted to contact S.T. through

her victim’s advocate but was unsuccessful. When the trial date was continued once again, a

fifth subpoena was prepared. Garcia ran S.T.’s information through multiple government and

law enforcement sites but was unable to locate her. (Id. at 121-23, 140.) 

In the meantime, a detective had come into contact with S.T. and he passed her new

cellular phone number on to Garcia. (Id. at 94, 110.) Both Laurerman and Detective

Zimmerman attempted to call S.T. several times and left messages for her at that phone number

but S.T. never returned their calls. (Id. at 109, 112, 139.) Zimmerman also searched numerous

databases and enlisted the help of S.T.’s family and her acquaintance (and fellow victim) L.Y.,

in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade S.T. to come forward. (Id. at 138-39.) Officers went to

S.T.’s mother’s home and S.T.’s former home. S.T.’s mother told officers she thought S.T. was

in Las Vegas but that she did know where. (Id. at 140-41.) Zimmerman contacted local

precincts and the vice department to let them know he was looking for S.T. He also posted an

“Officer Notification Entry,” on a countrywide database by which Zimmerman informed law

enforcement officers to notify him if they came into contact with S.T. (Id. at 143.) 

The efforts of the District Attorney’s Office and investigators in this case are similar to

those which the Ninth Circuit has found sufficient to constitute good faith. In Dres v. Campoy,

784 F.2d 996, 999 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that

the prosecutor made a good faith effort to procure a witness’s testimony where the prosecution

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attempted to locate the witness by: (i) calling numbers from which the witness had previously

called her mother; (ii) contacting a local police department to determine the witness was not in

custody and not living with her mother; (iii) visiting areas frequented by the witness and showing

her picture; (iv) verifying the witness was not in a juvenile facility or hospital; (v) checking with

the Department of Motor Vehicles for tickets issued to the witness; and (vi) visiting the witness’s

prior residences. Dres v. Campoy, 784 F.2d 996, 999 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, likewise , investigators from the District Attorney’s Office repeatedly called phone

numbers believed to be those of S.T. See id. Furthermore, as in Dres, investigators contacted

local precincts and vice departments and made them aware they were looking for S.T.

Investigators visited both S.T.’s prior residence and her mother’s residence, and efforts were

made to contact S.T. through L.Y. and S.T.’s family. Finally, as in Dres, the prosecution

conducted a search of S.T.’s personal history and searched numerous databases. See id. These

efforts were no avail, but were reasonable under the circumstances and more than enough to

constitute good faith. See Dres, 784 F.2d at 999; see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75.

Petitioner’s claim that more could have been done does not negate the fact that the prosecution

made a good faith effort to locate S.T., which is all the Confrontation Clause requires. See

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998); Christian v. Rhodes, 41 F.3d 461, 467

(9th Cir.1994) (stating that “while no court has articulated a standard for the diligence required

of the prosecution . . . it is clear that herculean efforts are not constitutionally required”). 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The Court therefore recommends this claim be DENIED.

2. Transcript of S.T.’s 911 Call

In his second claim, Monroe argues that the transcript of S.T.’s 911 call should not have

been entered into evidence because it was testimonial and Monroe did not have an opportunity

to cross-examine S.T. at trial. Monroe raised this claim in a petition for review to the California

Supreme Court and it was denied without comment or citation. Accordingly, the Court looks

to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion. In denying the claim, the state court cited to the

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Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) and concluded that

S.T.’s 911 call was not “testimonial” because it was made while seeking assistance for an

ongoing emergency. Specifically, the court stated:

S.T.’s 911 call was not testimonial under Crawford and Davis. Her

primary purpose in making the call was to secure police assistance to meet an

ongoing emergency and get medical attention following her rape. As in Davis, the

questions by the 911 dispatcher demonstrated that the operator’s primary purpose

was to obtain crucial information necessary to aid the police in meeting the

emergency and not to establish or prove some past fact. The dispatcher’s

questions were directed towards determining S.T.’s location and type of help she

needed. S.T. gave a description of Monroe, his vehicle and the direction he went;

told the operator he had a handgun and described the nature of her injuries and her

location. That information was necessary to provide the operator with information

necessary to locate her, provide her with medical assistance, locate Monroe and

inform officers of the threat he posed.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 18 at 19.)

 The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established law. As discussed above, the second prong of the Sixth

Amendment analysis under Crawford requires the Court to examine whether the defendant was

provided a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. “The

central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against

a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding

before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). “Cross-examination is

the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are

tested.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). The Supreme Court has held, however, that

a face-to-face encounter is not required in every instance. Rather, “. . .the Clause permits, where

necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the

defendant’s inability to confront the declarant at trial.” Id. at 847-48. 

The Supreme Court considered a similar issue in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813

(2006). In determining whether a statement, such as a 911 call, is “testimonial” the Supreme

Court held: 

/ / /

/ / /

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Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation

under the circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the

interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They

are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such

ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 

Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.

Barber, the witness, placed the initial call to 911 and reported that an attempted rape had

occurred. Barber then gave the phone to S.T. The following exchange took place:

911: Okay, when did this happen?

S.T.: This just happened like less then 5 minutes ago.

911: How did he try to hurt you?

S.T.: He, umm, he was like, I was on El Cajon Boulevard. He was like

following me and he got out the car. So, I just kinda like u-turned like

down like a back street and he got out the car and he like pointed a gun to

my back and told me to get into his vehicle. So, I got into his car ‘cause he

said he was going to shoot me. And then he bring me to this parking lot

and he.

911: Did you see a gun?

S.T.: Yes, he pulled it out on me.

911: Okay.

S.T.: He put it to my head.

911: Okay, just a moment, I’m going to put a supervisor on the phone okay?

S.T.: Yes.

911: You, you don’t this [sic] guy, right.

S.T.: No, I don’t know this guy.

911: Okay, stay on the phone.

SUP: Go ahead.

911: Okay, there [sic] saying it’s a 261 attempt. She was threatened with a gun

and she’s now with a cabbie, who heard her screaming and the, uh suspect

just left.

SUP: The suspect left on foot or in a car?

ST: He left in a car.

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SUP: What type of car?

ST: Ford Explorer.

SUP: Right, Ford Explorer, it’s listed at 1108.

S.T.: Expedition, an Expedition, a 4-door.

SUP: What color?

S.T.: Burgundy or maroon.

SUP: Which way did he go?

911: Umm, he proceeded to the left.

911: Towards Texas or?

ST: Yeah, towards Texas.

911: Okay. And he had a gun, a hand gun?

ST: Yes.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. Vol. 1 at 86-88.) 

The call continued and the emergency operators asked S.T. if she required medical

attention. S.T. replied that she was not physically hurt. The operators then asked S.T. for a

description of her assailant. She described him as black, between the ages of 25 and 30, wearing

blue shorts and blue t-shirt, shaved head, 6’ 2 ” tall and weighing between 180 and 200 pounds.

(Id. at 88-90.) The operator also asked for additional details about the car the suspect was

driving. S.T. reported that the SUV was an older model, possibly 1998 to 2000 and did not have

special tire rims. (Id. at 90.) 

In sum, S.T.’s statements to the emergency dispatchers were for the purpose of helping

emergency responders to locate S.T. and assist her as well as finding the suspect who was

reportedly still armed with a handgun. The emergency call was made immediately after S.T. was

assaulted. She described her attacker and his vehicle, and provided the direction of his escape

while emergency responders were sent to her location to assist her and search for her assailant.

The primary purpose of the call was to get law enforcement’s assistance with an ongoing

emergency. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. Thus, as the state court found, the statements were not

testimonial. See id. (finding that the “statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present

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emergency . . . [t]hat is true even of the operator’s effort to establish the identity of the assailant,

so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon”).

The state court denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28

U.S.C. § 2254. This Court recommends the claim be DENIED.

3. CALJIC Numbers 220 & 222 

It his third claim, Monro argues his right to due process was violated when the trial court

instructed the jury in accordance with California Jury Instructions – Criminal (“CALJIC”)

Numbers 220 and 222. Monroe claims that the instructions precluded the jury from finding

reasonable doubt based on lack of evidence. Respondent counters that the state court’s denial

of the claim was reasonable. (See Answer at 15-16.) The California Supreme Court denied the

claim without comment or citation. Accordingly, this Court must look to the state appellate

court’s decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In denying this claim, the court of appeal stated:

Monroe asserts that the court erred in instructing the jury under CALCRIM

Nos. 220 and 222, as they precluded the jury from considering his defense that the

absence of scientific evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 

. . .

Two recent appellate decisions, including one by this court, have rejected

the exact contention put forward by Monroe: That the. . . language in CALCRIM

Nos. 220 and 222 prevented him from arguing that the lack of evidence raised a

triable issue of fact as to his guilt. (People v. Westbrooks (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th

1500 (Westbrooks); People v. Flores (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1088 (Flores).)

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 18 at 20-21.)

It is clearly established that due process requires “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of

every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged. In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The instructions, taken as a whole, “must correctly convey the

concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994); Lisenbee v.

Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999). In reviewing instructions regarding the burden of

proof, a court must “determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury

understood the instruction to allow a conviction predicated on proof that was insufficient to meet

the requirements of due process.” Lisenbee, 166 F.3d at 999. 

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First, the Court of Appeal’s denial of the claim was not contrary to clearly established

federal law. The two cases cited by the appellate court – Flores and Westbrooks – analyze

CALJIC Numbers 220 and 222 under the appropriate federal standard, discussed above. See

Flores, 153 Cal.App.4th at 1092-93 (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 631-32 and Victor, 511 U.S. at

5); Westbrooks 151 Cal.App.4th 1508 (same). 

Second, the state court decision reasonably applied federal law in denying the claim. The

jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC Number 220, which states, in part: “In deciding whether

the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and

consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence

proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you

must find him not guilty.” (Resp’t Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. Vol. 1 at 127.) Under CALJIC

Number 222, the jury was instructed regarding “evidence,” specifically: “You must decide what

the facts are in this case. You must use only the evidence that was presented in this courtroom.

“Evidence” is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence and

anything else I told you to consider as evidence.” (Id. at 128.) Monroe argues that these two

instructions precluded the jury from considering whether reasonable doubt existed based on the

lack of any evidence. His argument is without merit.

The jury instructions Monroe challenges, when considered in context of the trial and the

instructions as a whole, did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. The jury was properly

instructed as to the burden of proof. The trial court instructed the jurors that every element of

the offenses must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, CALJIC Number 220

specifically states that a defendant is entitled to acquittal “unless the evidence proves the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” CALJIC Number 220. The instruction merely

informs the jury that the state cannot satisfy its burden of proof based on evidence other than that

offered at trial. The instruction does not tell the jury that it may not consider any perceived lack

of evidence in determining whether there is a reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s guilt. If there

was a “lack” of evidence to support any element of an offense, as Monroe suggests, then the

juror would not have the necessary evidence to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Further,

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the remainder of the instructions clearly conveyed to the jury the notion that the People had the

burden of proving Monroe’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was meticulously

instructed as to the elements of each charged offense and specifically, that the “People must

prove” each one beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1 at 149-

161; CALJIC Nos. 890, 2511, 1203, 1000, 1015, 2511, 3146, 3175, 3179 and 3181.) When

considering all of the instructions as a whole, there was no “reasonable likelihood that the jury

understood the instruction to allow a conviction predicated on proof that was insufficient to meet

the requirements of due process.” Lisenbee, 166 F.3d at 999. 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Therefore, the Court recommends the claim be DENIED. 

4. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, Monroe makes a general request for an evidentiary hearing. (See Traverse at 11.)

Evidentiary hearings in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases are governed by the AEDPA, which

“substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)

control this decision:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that – 

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the

applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

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The Ninth Circuit has outlined the procedure for district courts to follow in determining

whether to grant a request for an evidentiary hearing. First, the Court must “determine whether

a factual basis exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078). If not, the Court must

“ascertain whether the petitioner has ‘failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in State

court.’” Id. A failure to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court implies “some lack

of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432. The Supreme Court has said that “[d]iligence will require in the usual

case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner

prescribed by state law.” Id . at 437. If the petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis for

his claim in state court, “the court must deny a hearing unless the applicant establishes one of

the two narrow exceptions set forth in section 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B).” Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d

at 669-70. 

Moreover, “[b]ecause a federal court may not independently review the merits of a state

court decision without first applying the AEDPA standards, a federal court may not grant an

evidentiary hearing without first determining whether the state court’s decision was an

unreasonable determination of the facts.” Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005

(citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71.) 

The Court concludes that Monroe is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any of his

claims. First, there is a sufficient factual basis for Monroe’s claims in the record. As to the

claim regarding S.T.’s unavailability, the state trial judge held a hearing during which evidence

was presented regarding the attempts made to locate S.T. The evidence presented at the hearing

by Monroe’s counsel and the District Attorney provide a sufficient factual basis for the Court

to resolve Monroe’s claim regarding S.T.’s availability. See Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 669-70.

Similarly, the transcript of S.T.’s 911, in conjunction with Barber’s testimony, is sufficient for

this Court to resolve Monroe’s Confrontation Clause claim pertaining to S.T.’s statements made

to the 911 operator. No additional evidence is necessary to resolve Monroe’s jury instruction

claim. 

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In addition, Monroe did not request an evidentiary hearing in state court. (See Resp’t

Lodgement Nos. 15, 19.) Thus, to the extent he now seeks to introduce new evidence, he has

“failed to develop” those facts in state court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 437. Because neither of the

two exceptions outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) applies, Monroe is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 669-70. The Court therefore recommends the

request be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Judge

M. James Lorenz, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition

with prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 30, 2009, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than August 20, 2009. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 26, 2009

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01812-L-JMA Document 13 Filed 06/26/09 Page 21 of 21