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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 10, 2015 Decided December 29, 2015

No. 14-5224

WALTER J.JACKSON, JR.,

APPELLANT

v.

RAYMOND EDWIN MABUS, JR., SECRETARY OF THE NAVY AND 

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF NAVAL 

RECORDS,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01861)

John B. Wells argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

Wynne P. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Vincent H. 

Cohen Jr., Acting U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: In 2006, the U.S. Navy 

honorably discharged Petty Officer Walter Jackson. In so 

doing, the Navy recommended against re-enlistment. The 

recommendation against re-enlistment stemmed from 

Jackson’s unauthorized absence from his naval base, a 

subsequent disciplinary infraction, and two adverse 

performance evaluations. Since his discharge in 2006, 

Jackson has repeatedly asked the Board for Correction of 

Naval Records to correct his Navy record. Under 10 U.S.C. 

§1552(a)(1), the Board may correct any military record when 

“necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” The 

Board denied Jackson’s requests. Jackson filed suit, claiming 

that the Board’s denials contravened the Administrative 

Procedure Act, the Due Process Clause, and equitable 

principles. The District Court ruled against Jackson. Given 

Jackson’s infractions in the Navy, we likewise conclude that 

the Board reasonably denied Jackson’s requests for record

correction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the District 

Court. 

I

As of 2005, Jackson was stationed at the U.S. Naval 

Computer and Telecommunications Station in Bahrain. In 

February 2005, Jackson was counseled for departing base a 

day before his scheduled leave – in essence, he was warned 

that he had done something wrong and should not do it again. 

Later that year, a second incident occurred. Jackson 

scheduled leave from July 30 to August 15, 2005. Without 

first seeking a leave extension, Jackson left base on July 29 to 

catch a flight. According to Jackson, the command duty 

officer checked him out, even though Jackson’s leave did not 

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begin until the next day. Although a command duty officer 

lacks authority to approve leave extensions, Jackson said that 

the command duty officer allowed him to go. So Jackson 

departed one day earlier than his authorized leave date. 

Jackson then returned to base on August 16, after his 

authorized leave had expired. 

For exceeding his scheduled leave, Jackson was 

subsequently charged under the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice with unauthorized absence. See 10 U.S.C. § 886. 

Jackson elected a procedure known as nonjudicial punishment 

instead of a court-martial. Nonjudicial punishment is a less 

formal and speedier disciplinary process.

A servicemember who elects the nonjudicial punishment 

process is entitled to a hearing before his or her commanding 

officer or other designated official. At that hearing, the 

servicemember may be accompanied by a spokesperson and 

may present evidence and witnesses. If the commanding 

officer concludes that the servicemember did not commit the 

alleged offense, the commanding officer must terminate the 

nonjudicial punishment proceeding. If the commanding 

officer concludes that the servicemember committed the 

offense, the commanding officer may impose punishment on 

that servicemember without a court-martial. 

Here, the commanding officer found Jackson guilty of 

unauthorized absence and docked him a total of one month’s 

pay. The commanding officer also imposed a suspended 

punishment that would have reduced Jackson’s rank from 

Petty Officer First Class/E-6 to Petty Officer Second Class/E5. Importantly, however, the rank reduction was suspended 

for six months. Jackson would not have his rank reduced, so 

long as he did not commit any further disciplinary infractions 

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during that six-month period. Jackson was duly notified of 

his right to appeal his punishment. He declined to appeal.

During that six-month probationary period, however, 

Jackson disobeyed a direct order and engaged in a verbal 

altercation with a superior officer. He later appeared before a 

disciplinary military board, where he acknowledged his 

insubordination. In light of his prior suspended rank 

reduction, the disciplinary board recommended reducing 

Jackson’s rank. Following that recommendation, the 

commanding officer reduced Jackson’s rank to Petty Officer 

Second Class/E-5.

Based on his conduct, Jackson received two adverse 

performance evaluations. The evaluations referred to 

Jackson’s “inability to obey direct orders,” his “detrimental” 

effect on “unit cohesion and moral[e],” and the “significant 

deterioration in his job performance.”

That same month, July 2006, the Navy honorably 

discharged Jackson and recommended against re-enlistment.

In January 2007, Jackson asked the Board for Correction 

of Naval Records to correct his record by removing the 

nonjudicial punishment, the reduction in rank, and the later 

adverse evaluations.

Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1), the Board may amend any 

military record if the Board considers such action “necessary 

to correct an error or remove an injustice.” However, if the 

Board “determines that the evidence of record fails to 

demonstrate the existence of probable material error or 

injustice,” then it may deny an application for record 

correction. 32 C.F.R. § 723.3(e)(2).

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The Board denied Jackson’s request to correct his record. 

The Board’s decision cited Jackson’s unauthorized absence 

from base, his later disciplinary infraction, and his adverse 

evaluations. The Board concluded, among other things, that 

Jackson’s nonjudicial punishment for unauthorized absence 

was warranted. In support of that conclusion, the Board 

incorporated a letter by Jackson’s commanding officer 

explaining that Jackson was properly found guilty of 

unauthorized absence. The letter also noted that Jackson 

declined to appeal that finding despite being duly notified of 

his right to do so. 

Jackson later submitted several requests for 

reconsideration, which the Board denied. 

Jackson next filed suit in federal court. In the District 

Court, Jackson challenged the Board’s denial of his initial 

request for record correction as well as the denial of his last

request for reconsideration. The District Court granted 

summary judgment to the Board. Jackson v. Mabus, 56 F. 

Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014). We review the District Court’s 

grant of summary judgment de novo. See Roberts v. United 

States, 741 F.3d 152, 157-58 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

II

A

In considering Jackson’s initial request to correct his 

record, the Board applied 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). That 

statute permits the Board to amend any military record when 

“necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 

Primarily citing the Administrative Procedure Act, Jackson 

claims that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not 

correcting his naval record. The APA’s arbitrary and 

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capricious standard is deferential. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle 

Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 

Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“The scope of review 

under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a 

court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The question is not what 

we would have done, nor whether we agree with the agency 

action. Rather, the question is whether the agency action was 

reasonable and reasonably explained. Moreover, the arbitrary 

and capricious standard is even more deferential in the 

military records context. See Roberts v. United States, 741 

F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Here, the Board’s initial decision not to amend Jackson’s 

record was reasonable in light of the substantial evidence 

before it: Jackson was absent from his base without 

authorization – indeed, he was twice absent, in February 2005 

and again in July to August 2005; he committed a subsequent 

disciplinary infraction; and he received adverse evaluations.

Applying our deferential standard of review, we cannot 

say that the Board acted unreasonably by declining to amend 

Jackson’s naval record. Absence from base and 

insubordination are not insignificant offenses in the military. 

The Board reasonably concluded that Jackson had not shown 

an error or injustice in his nonjudicial punishment, his 

reduction in rank, or his adverse evaluations. 

B

As to the denial of Jackson’s request for reconsideration, 

the Board considered that request under 32 C.F.R. § 723.9. 

That regulation provides that the Board will consider requests 

for reconsideration only if they contain “new and material 

evidence or other matter not previously considered by the 

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Board.” Evidence is new if it was “not previously considered 

by the Board and not reasonably available to the applicant at 

the time of the previous application.” Id. And “[e]vidence is 

material if it is likely to have a substantial effect on the 

outcome.” Id.

With respect to Jackson’s request for reconsideration, our 

inquiry is this: Did the Board reasonably conclude that 

Jackson had not come forward with any new and material 

evidence, or other matter not previously considered by the 

Board, that would support amendment of his record? 

Jackson contends that his request for reconsideration 

supplied new and material evidence, and new legal 

arguments. He submitted a report prepared by a retired 

special agent of the Navy. According to Jackson, the report 

confirmed that he received authorization from his command 

duty officer to leave early. In addition, Jackson claimed that 

under relevant military regulations, his travel time did not 

count as leave, much less unauthorized leave. Jackson also 

submitted the results of a polygraph test. By Jackson’s 

account, those results verified that he did not believe he was 

violating military regulations by departing base a day before 

his scheduled leave began.

The Board concluded that those arguments and evidence 

did not require a different result. The Board reasoned, in 

essence, that Jackson had erred by taking a second 

unauthorized leave in July 2005 and that the new evidence 

showed at most that he was mistaken rather than willful in his 

violation. According to the Board, Jackson was not 

authorized under the relevant military regulations to extend 

his leave to cover travel time. Because his authorized time 

away from base started on July 30, Jackson was not 

authorized to depart on July 29. The leave regulation that 

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Jackson cites – Department of Defense Instruction 1327.6 –

says that travel time is not counted as leave. But that 

regulation can reasonably be read, as the Board necessarily 

did here, as inapplicable to Jackson’s case because Jackson 

did not seek authorization to be away from his base on July 

29. The regulation therefore does not disturb the conclusion

that Jackson left his base without authorization, received 

punishment, and did not challenge that punishment. Put 

another way, the regulation may affect how much leave a 

servicemember is counted as having taken during an 

authorized absence. It does not alter the period for which a 

servicemember is authorized to be absent. Moreover, the 

relevant military regulations made clear that the command 

duty officer was not authorized to extend Jackson’s leave. In 

addition, the nonjudicial punishment for that violation –

namely, a reduction in rank – was suspended. So long as 

Jackson stayed out of trouble for six months, he would have 

suffered no reduction in rank for his unauthorized leave in 

July 2005. Unfortunately for Jackson, he engaged in 

substantial misconduct – insubordination – while in that 

probationary status. In short, the Board acted reasonably in 

denying Jackson’s request for reconsideration. 

In his request for reconsideration, Jackson also claimed 

that his rank was reduced in violation of the procedures set 

forth in the JAG Manual. That reduction in rank occurred 

after Jackson’s disciplinary infraction, which he committed 

while he was in the six-month probationary status for his

unauthorized absence. Jackson says that JAG Manual section 

0118d entitled him to a hearing before a reduction in rank. In 

fact, that section states that a hearing is not always required. 

Under the circumstances here, the Board could reasonably 

have concluded that a hearing was not required. 

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C

Jackson advances two final claims before this Court. 

First, he claims that the Board violated his right to due 

process under the Fifth Amendment. According to Jackson, 

the Board did not afford him adequate opportunity to press his 

claims. That argument is meritless. Jackson advanced a 

number of theories, and the Board several times reviewed and 

considered Jackson’s claims. Jackson received adequate 

process. Second, he argues that the Board should have 

afforded him equitable relief. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552. But the 

Board necessarily possesses wide discretion whether to grant 

equitable relief under that statute. We have no basis to 

second-guess the Board’s decision not to grant equitable 

relief. 

* * *

This Court has previously cautioned the boards for

correction of military records that they must sufficiently 

explain their reasoning in order to have their decisions 

sustained. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 741 F.3d 152, 

159 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2014); Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 

176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Despite our admonitions, the 

Board’s explanation for denying Jackson’s request for 

reconsideration was thinner than it should have been – unlike 

the Board’s detailed explanation for denying Jackson’s initial 

application for correction. We again urge the relevant boards

to take care to sufficiently address each non-frivolous claim 

raised by an applicant for record correction. We affirm the 

judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered. 

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