Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-00741/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-00741-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 01cv0741

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALDO MEDRANO AYALA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 01cv0741 BTM

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS GROUP FOUR

CLAIMS; GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

vs.

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Warden of

California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

Respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment on the Group Four Claims

(Claims 10-11, 37-50, 67, and 70-71 of the Second Amended Petition). Respondent has

also filed a motion to dismiss the majority of the Group Four Claims on the basis of state

procedural bars and/or pursuant to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Petitioner has

filed a motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for evidentiary hearings on these

same claims. Given the very extensive briefing and the nature of the claims, the Court finds

these motions fully suitable for decision on the papers without oral argument. For the

reasons discussed below, Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED,

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Petitioner’s

motion for summary judgment and/or an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

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I. BACKGROUND 

On April 17, 1997, Petitioner filed his automatic appeal with the California Supreme

Court, and filed a reply brief on April 27, 1998. On July 23, 1998, Petitioner filed a habeas

petition with the California Supreme Court. On June 8, 2000, the California Supreme Court

denied the appeal. See People v. Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th 225 (2000). On June 8, 2000, the

California Supreme Court also summarily denied the habeas petition without comment.

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme

Court, which was denied on March 5, 2001. 

On May 3, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. Shortly thereafter, the Court dismissed without prejudice

certain claims presented in the Petition in order to permit Petitioner to exhaust those claims

in state court. The Court stayed the federal proceedings pending the exhaustion of state

court remedies.

On September 23, 2002, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the California Supreme Court. On September 10, 2003, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition.

On November 14, 2003, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this case. He subsequently filed a Second Amended Petition for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus, the operative pleading in this action.

II. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

When a state court’s rejection of a federal claim is based on a violation of a state

procedural rule that is adequate to support the judgment and independent of federal law,

a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). A state procedural rule is adequate if it has been “firmly

established and regularly followed” by the state court. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411,

424 (1991). The procedural rule is independent if it is not “interwoven with the federal

law.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). If a state procedural ground is

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an adequate and independent ground for dismissal, habeas corpus relief is unavailable in

federal court unless a petitioner can show cause for the default and resulting prejudice,

or show that a failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

In the instant case, Petitioner filed his automatic appeal on April 17, 1997, and

filed his first state habeas petition on July 23, 1998. Petitioner then raised the contested

claims in a second state (exhaustion) petition, filed on September 23, 2002. The

September 10, 2003 California Supreme Court order denying the second state petition

concluded that Claims 10, 11, 38, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 70, and 71 are

“procedurally barred, separately and independently, as untimely. In re Robbins, 18 Cal.

4th at 780-781 (1998); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 763-799 (1993).” The California

Supreme Court also barred Claim 39 as untimely, excluding “insofar as it refers to

permitting evidence to be introduced of other unadjudicated prior crimes.” The court also

found that Claims 10, 11, 38, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 70, and 71 are “procedurally

barred, separately and independently, as successive. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 767-768;

In re Horowitz, 33 Cal. 2d 534, 546-547 (1949).” The court also barred Claim 39 as

successive, again excluding from the procedural bar a portion of that claim “insofar as it

refers to permitting evidence to be introduced of other unadjudicated prior crimes.” 

The California Supreme Court additionally found Claims 11, 38 (“insofar as it

refers to Walter Joe Lewis and invokes the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution”), 39 (“insofar as it refers to permitting evidence to be

introduced of petitioner’s killing John Casas in prison”), 42, and 46 “procedurally barred,

separately and independently, as repetitive of a claim raised on appeal. In re Harris, 5

Cal. 4th at 824-849; In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 225 (1965).” Finally, the court found

Claims 10, 38 (“under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied

to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under

California constitutional provisions, insofar as it refers to not permitting adequate crossexamination of Walter Joe Lewis, and also insofar as it refers to Richard Christiansen”),

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40, 41, 45, 48, 49, 50, and 71 “procedurally barred, separately and independently, as

pretermitted because they could have been, but were not, raised on appeal. In re Harris,

5 Cal. 4th 813, 824-829; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759.” The California

Supreme Court also denied all of Petitioner’s claims on the merits. 

A. Repetitive (In re Waltreus)

Waltreus provides that “in the absence of strong justification, any issue that was

actually raised and rejected on appeal cannot be renewed in a petition for habeas

corpus.” In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 829. In Waltreus, the California Supreme Court stated

“habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal.” Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d at

225.

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the rule announced in Waltreus “is not

sufficient to bar federal relief.” Calderon v. United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d

1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996); Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1982);

LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d, 702, 705 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001). In Forrest v. Vasquez, 75

F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit explained, “[A] Waltreus denial on state

habeas has no bearing on [a habeas petitioner’s] ability to raise a claim in federal court.” 

The Ninth Circuit reiterated this conclusion in Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 798 (9th Cir.

2003), stating, “[t]he California Supreme Court’s reliance on In re Waltreus does not bar

federal review.” 

In accordance with Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court holds that the Waltreus rule

is not sufficient to bar federal review of Petitioner’s claims.

B. Untimely and Successive (In re Robbins and In re Clark)

In their briefing on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Group Three Claims based on

procedural bars, the parties relied upon the motion papers previously submitted in

support of the Group Two claims. In the Court’s Order dated September 27, 2007, the

Court conducted an analysis of the California Supreme Court’s application of the

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untimeliness and successiveness procedural bars (In re Clark and In re Robbins) and

found that California’s untimeliness and successiveness procedural bars were

inadequate to bar consideration of Petitioner’s Group Three claims on the merits. 

In the briefing filed in support of the motions on the Group Four claims, the parties

again rely primarily on the papers previously submitted in support of the Group Two

Motions. Therefore, as with the Group Three claims, this Court cannot conclude that the

application of these procedural rules is sufficient to prohibit the consideration of these

claims on the merits. Therefore, the procedural bars imposed by the California Supreme

Court in its September 10, 2003 order on the grounds of untimeliness and

successiveness will not bar this Court from considering those claims on the merits. 

C. Pretermitted (In re Dixon)

The California Supreme Court has held that “[t]he general rule is that habeas

corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal, and, in the absence of special

circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie

where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal

from a judgment of conviction.” In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759.

1. Independence

A state procedural rule is “independent” if it is not interwoven with federal law. 

LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704. “A state law ground is so interwoven if ‘the state has made

application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law [such as]

the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.’” Park v.

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,

75 (1985)). 

In 1998, the California Supreme Court declared that it would no longer consider

federal law when denying a habeas claim as procedurally defaulted. In re Robbins, 18

Cal. 4th at 811-12. 

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Moreover, in Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 582-83 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth

Circuit stated:

[W]e respect the California Supreme Court’s sovereign right to interpret its

state constitution independent of the federal law. Applying Robbins

prospectively, we [conclude] that the California Supreme Court’s post-Robbins

denial of [a] state petition for lack of diligence (untimeliness) was not

interwoven with federal law and therefore is an independent procedural

ground.

Although Bennett concerned only the untimeliness (Clark) bar, the analysis in that case

compels the same result for claims barred pursuant to the rule established by Dixon. The

pre-Robbins application of the two procedural bars was similar in that the invocation of

either Dixon or Clark required the state court to determine if there existed fundamental

constitutional error that would excuse the petitioner’s default, and such an analysis

necessarily involved the consideration of federal law. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581-82. See

also LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 707 (observing that consideration of federal law in barring

claims as pretermitted is “analogous” to consideration of federal law in barring claims as

untimely).

While the Ninth Circuit has yet to specifically determine whether a post-Robbins

application of the Dixon rule is independent of federal law, the Ninth Circuit has generally

stated, “[t]he California Supreme Court has adopted in Robbins a stance from which it will

now decline to consider federal law when deciding whether claims are procedurally

defaulted.” Park, 202 F.3d at 1152. Furthermore, in Protsman v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp. 2d

1004, 1007-08 (S.D. Cal. 2004), the court found a post-Robbins application of Dixon to

be independent of federal law. The Court agrees with that conclusion. 

Petitioner’s state habeas petition was filed in the California Supreme Court on

September 23, 2002, and the court denied the petition on September 10, 2003, well after

the Robbins decision was issued in 1998. Thus, the state court’s decision invoking Dixon

was independent of federal law.

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2. Adequacy

A state procedural rule is “adequate” if it is “clear, consistently applied, and wellestablished” at the time of the default. Calderon (Bean), 96 F.3d at 1129. In Bennett, the

Ninth Circuit adopted a new burden-shifting test for determining the adequacy of a state

procedural bar. The Ninth Circuit held that:

[T]he ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of the California state bar is

upon the State of California. . . . Once the state has adequately pled the

existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an

affirmative defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the

petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including

citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule. Once

having done so, however, the ultimate burden is the state’s. [¶] Accordingly,

because it is the State who seeks dismissal based on the procedural bar, it is

the State who must bear the burden of demonstrating that the bar is

applicable . . . .

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585-86.

A court cannot prevent a petitioner from seeking habeas relief on alleged

violations of his federal constitutional rights unless the state procedural rule that purports

to bar adjudication on the merits is a “firmly established and regularly followed state

practice.” Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357

U.S. 449, 457 (1958)). If a state procedure is not consistently applied before a petitioner

runs afoul of it, then the rule cannot fairly prevent federal review of that petitioner’s

claims, for a procedural bar “must be sufficiently clear as to put a petitioner on notice that

he must raise all claims or risk default . . . .” Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1212 (9th

Cir. 1999).

While the independence of a procedural rule is examined at the time at which it is

to be applied, (see Park, 202 F.3d at 1151, 1153), the adequacy of a rule is determined

at the time of a petitioner’s default. See Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 760-61 (9th

Cir. 1997). See also Calderon v. United States District Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 75

(9th Cir. 1996). 

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a. Respondent’s Initial Pleading Requirement

Under Bennett, the state must first “adequately ple[a]d the existence of an

independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense.” Id. at

586. Respondent’s initial burden is modest, and he is required only to plead the

existence of a procedural bar that is applicable to the claims at issue. See King v.

LaMarque, 464 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Rule 5, Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (providing that a respondent’s answer to

a petition “must state whether any claim in the petition is barred by . . . a procedural

bar.”). 

In the Answer to the Second Amended Petition, Respondent identified each of

Petitioner’s claims that he asserts was procedurally defaulted under Dixon. (Answer at

52, 103-04, 112-13, 114-15, 127, 135-36, 138, 141-42, 171.) He repeated his assertions

of procedural default for each of these claims in his Motion to Dismiss the Group Four

Claims. (Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Group Four Claims [“Resp.’s MTD.”] at 2,16-

17, 30, 38-39, 78, 97, 100, 106, 114.)

Respondent has therefore satisfied his initial burden of pleading the “affirmative

defense” of a procedural bar for these claims. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586.

b. Petitioner’s Interim Burden

Once the state properly pleads the existence of an independent and adequate

procedural bar, the burden shifts to the petitioner to place that defense in issue, and

“[t]his must be done, at a minimum, by specific allegations by the petitioner as to the

adequacy of the state procedure. The scope of the state’s burden of proof thereafter will

be measured by the specific claims of inadequacy put forth by the petitioner.” Bennett,

322 F.3d at 584-85.

In measuring the effectiveness of any procedural bar, the state must establish that

the bar was truly adequate on the date the default was “committed.” Calderon (Hayes),

103 F.3d at 74. In Hayes, the Ninth Circuit found that a petitioner defaulted when he had

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the opportunity to raise the claims on direct appeal or in a first state habeas petition but

failed to do so. Id. In this case, Petitioner’s procedural default with respect to the Dixon

bar occurred on April 17, 1997, the date on which Petitioner filed his opening brief on

direct appeal.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the procedural bars relating to untimely and

successive claims “were not firmly established and consistently applied at least prior to

1993.” Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Fields, 125

F.3d at 765. Petitioner has noted that where the Ninth Circuit has previously found a

procedural rule to be too ambiguous to bar federal review during a specific time period,

simply “contesting the adequacy” of that rule is sufficient to meet a petitioner’s burden

under Bennett. King, 464 F.3d at 967. However, the Ninth Circuit found that the Dixon

bar was inadequate prior to the issuance of Harris in 1993, rendering the King decision of

limited use to the instant issue of whether the Dixon rule was adequate at the time of

Petitioner’s default in 1997. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146 (9th Cir. 2000), lends no support to Petitioner’s argument because the Park court

held that the Dixon rule was not independent at the time of the petitioner’s default and

made no ruling on whether the rule was adequate. Id. at 1152-53.

In the Group Four merits briefing, Petitioner specifically refers the Court to the

procedural default arguments he previously advanced in connection with the Group Two

Claims. (See Petitioner’s Group Four Opposition [“Petr’s Opp.”] at 130.) In the Group

Two Reply brief, Petitioner details the outcomes of a number of capital habeas cases in

an attempt to demonstrate inconsistent application of the procedural bar rules in

California. (Petr’s Group Two Reply at 54-56, 65-66.) Petitioner presented the Court with

citations to 94 capital habeas petitions decided by the California Supreme Court in which

procedural defaults due to untimeliness and successiveness occurred or arguably could

have occurred between 1985 and 2004. (Petr’s Group Two Reply at 54-55.) 

Petitioner asserts that the California Supreme Court was also inconsistent in

applying the Dixon procedural bar in capital habeas cases as demonstrated by the state

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court’s inconsistent application of the untimeliness and successiveness procedural bars. 

Petitioner explains, “At the outset, it should be noted that at least as a practical matter, it

is not possible to undertake the same sort of study of the court’s practice with regard to

Dixon defaults as can be conducted with respect to Clark defaults.” (Petr’s Group Two

Reply at 66.) Petitioner acknowledges that he does not offer any case citations to

support his allegations regarding Dixon, maintaining that “[a]scertaining whether a Dixon

default could have been imposed, but has not been, is an entirely different matter [from

the untimeliness and successiveness defaults]. Each claim in the petition must be

reviewed and analyzed to determine whether it is based entirely on the trial record. And,

this would not be limited to the 94 cases identified above, but would necessarily include

the far greater number of petitions filed during the pendency of the automatic appeal. 

This undertaking would not only be time-consuming and expensive, but is precisely the

sort of undertaking Bennett prohibits.” (Petr’s Group Two Reply at 66-67.) Petitioner

adds, “It strains credulity to suggest, as Respondent must, that despite the overwhelming

evidence that the California Supreme Court does not apply Clark evenhandedly, it applies

Dixon in an altogether evenhanded manner.” Id.

The Court disagrees with Petitioner’s contention that Dixon is not amenable to the

analytical framework set forth by the Ninth Circuit, and takes judicial notice of several

cases in which California district courts have found the state court’s application of the

Dixon bar to be inconsistent. See Vaughn v. Adams, 2006 WL 1439400 (E.D. Cal. May

22, 2006) (explaining, “Petitioner cites fourteen cases wherein the California Supreme

Court issued a silent ‘postcard’ denial, without reference to the Dixon bar, despite the fact

that the Petitioners had failed to raise all the claims in the direct appeal,” and finding this

showing sufficient to meet petitioner’s interim burden under Bennett); Monarrez v.

Alameda, 2005 WL 2333462 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2005) (noting that in addition to citing

an appellate court decision that failed to apply Dixon when it should have been applied,

“Petitioner also directs the court’s attention to his own survey of 210 non-capital habeas

corpus petitions . . . showing inconsistent application of the Dixon rule by the California

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Supreme Court in that the Dixon bar was applied in only 19 cases, less than 10 percent

of those decided,” and finding that the petitioner had met his interim burden under

Bennett).

Based on these cases, the Court is persuaded that the interim burden has been

satisfied in this case. 

c. Respondent’s Ultimate Burden to Prove Adequacy of Procedural Bars

The Ninth Circuit has stated the government holds the “ultimate burden” of

pleading and proving the independence and adequacy of the state procedural bar. 

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585-86. Respondent has not provided the Court with any evidence

to demonstrate that the Dixon procedural bar is consistently applied, and thus has not

met the “ultimate burden” under Bennett of proving the adequacy of the procedural rules

relied on by the California Supreme Court in the denial of Claims 10, 38, 40, 41, 45, 48,

49, 50, and 71. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that the application of the procedural

rules in question is sufficient to prohibit the consideration of these claims on the merits.

D. Conclusion

The Court finds that the Waltreus rule is not sufficient to bar federal review of

claims 11, 38, 39, 42 and 46. The Court further finds that Respondent has failed to carry

his ultimate burden of demonstrating that the untimeliness, successiveness, and

pretermitted (Dixon) bars are consistently applied. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude

those procedural bars are sufficient to prohibit the consideration of Claims 10, 11, 38, 40,

41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 70, and 71 on the merits.

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III. TEAGUE V. LANE

The United States Supreme Court, addressing perceived inconsistencies in its

prior retroactivity jurisprudence, held that “new” constitutional rules of criminal procedure

will not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall within two

narrow exceptions. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). A new rule is one that “breaks

new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or

one whose “result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s

conviction became final.” Id. at 301. The two exceptions to the Teague rule are: (1)

rules placing certain kinds of private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal

law to prohibit, and (2) procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty without which

the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492

U.S. 302, 305 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

(2002); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993). 

When the state properly argues that a “defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule

of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague v. Lane before considering the merits

of the claim.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). Under Teague, habeas relief

is generally unavailable if based “on a rule announced after [a petitioner’s] conviction and

sentence became final.” Id. The first step in a Teague analysis, therefore, is to

determine whether a petitioner is seeking the benefit of a constitutional rule announced

after his or her conviction became final. Id. at 389-90. 

In the Answer to the Second Amended Petition (“Answer”), Respondent asserts

the Teague bar for eighteen claims - every claim in Group Four except for Claim 44.

However, the state only makes brief mention of Teague in regard to Claims 38, 41, 42,

45, 46, 50, and 70. Respondent’s argument on those claims (in the combined pleadings

and briefs filed with this Court) generally consists of the contention that “Petitioner fails to

show that the claim does not rest upon a new rule barred under Teague v. Lane.” 

The Ninth Circuit recently expressed its view on the duties placed on the state to

properly raise and plead a claim made under Teague:

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If a state seriously wishes to press Teague upon us, at a minimum Teague

should be identified as an issue (indeed the first issue) on appeal, the new rule

of constitutional law that falls within its proscription should be articulated, the

reasons why such a rule would not have been compelled by existing precedent

should be explained with particular reference to the appropriate universe of

precedent, and an argument should be made why the rule contended for is not

within one of Teague’s exceptions. 

Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781-782 (9th Cir. 2004).

Respondent first references Teague in the Answer. However, Respondent fails to

properly develop his Teague argument with respect to Claims 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 50, and

70 in the merits briefing. The Ninth Circuit places the burden on the state to articulate

and present this argument, and Respondent’s burden to raise and plead a Teague claim

is not satisfied by little more than a one-line citation to Teague. Therefore, the Court will

not conduct an analysis on whether the above seven claims are barred under Teague v.

Lane.

The Court points out that despite Respondent’s assertions to the contrary,

Petitioner does not have the burden of demonstrating that each claim pled in his habeas

petition does not rest upon a new rule barred under Teague v. Lane. (See Answer at 52,

52-53, 53, 101, 104, 106, 113, 115, 119, 120, 127, 132, 134, 136, 138, 142, 163, 169,

171.) (“Petitioner fails to show that the claim does not rest upon a new rule barred under

Teague v. Lane.”) The Ninth Circuit clearly and squarely places the duty to raise and

prove any Teague issues in the lap of the state. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has been

unwilling to require a Petitioner to present a case “involving identical facts, circumstances

and legal issues” in order to clear the Teague threshold. Keating v. Hood, 191 F.3d

1053, 1061 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999); abrogated on other grounds, Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292

F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).

Applying Ninth Circuit case law, it is arguable whether Respondent’s arguments in

connection with Claims 10, 11, 37, 39, 40, 43, 47, 48, 49, 67, and 71 are sufficient to

“press Teague upon us.” Arredondo, 365 F.3d at 781. Nevertheless, in the interest of

providing a thorough record for the Court of Appeals, and being mindful of the Court’s

role as a fact-finding body, the Court will engage in a Teague analysis on these claims. 

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The Teague issue will be independently examined for each of these claims in the merits

section of this order.

The Court notes the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct appeal on

June 8, 2000, and denied rehearing on August 23, 2000. The United States Supreme

Court denied certiorari on March 5, 2001, at which time Petitioner’s conviction became

final. Snook v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir. 1996.) Under Teague, Petitioner may

not avail himself of a decision announced after his conviction was finalized, nor may he

advocate a decision by this court which would create a new rule of criminal procedure.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Standard of Review under AEDPA

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997), the United States Supreme Court

held that the new provisions of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) “generally apply only to cases filed after the Act became effective.” In capital

habeas actions, cases are typically commenced by the filing of requests for appointment

of counsel and stays of execution of the petitioners’ death sentences. Petitioner filed his

request for appointment of counsel and stay of execution on April 27, 2001 and filed his

petition with this Court on May 3, 2002. AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996,

when the President signed it into law. See id. Accordingly, AEDPA applies to this case.

Relevant to this case are the changes AEDPA rendered to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

which now reads:

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 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if it fails to apply the correct

controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a

different result. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves

an “unreasonable application” of federal law if “the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner's case.” Id.; Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2004).

Even when the federal court undertakes an independent review of the record in

the absence of a reasoned state court decision, the federal court must “still defer to the

state court’s ultimate decision.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). If

the state court decision does not furnish any analytical foundation, the review must focus

on Supreme Court cases to determine “whether the state court’s resolution of the case

constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal courts also look to Ninth Circuit

law for persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court law and to determine whether a

particular state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court

precedent. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 

B. Standard for Evidentiary Hearing 

AEDPA also limited the circumstances under which district courts may grant an

evidentiary hearing. Section 2254(e)(2) provides:

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If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing

unless the applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence;

and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

Under AEDPA, when determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the

district court must first ascertain whether the petitioner has failed to develop the factual

basis of a claim in state court. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir.

2005). As explained by the Supreme Court:

For state courts to have their rightful opportunity to adjudicate federal rights,

the prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and presenting, if

possible, all claims of constitutional error. If the prisoner fails to do so,

himself or herself contributing to the absence of a full and fair adjudication

in state court, § 2254(e)(2) prohibits an evidentiary hearing to develop the

relevant claims in federal court, unless the statute’s other stringent

requirements are met.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000).

If the petitioner has not failed to develop the facts in state court, an evidentiary

hearing is required if (1) the petitioner establishes a colorable claim for relief – i.e.,

petitioner alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle him to habeas relief; and (2) the

petitioner did not receive a full and fair opportunity to develop those facts. Earp v.

Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). The second requirement is met by a

showing that: 

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2)

the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole;

(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate

to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly

discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at

the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of

fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair hearing.

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). 

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V. DISCUSSION

The Group Four claims consist of allegations of a multitude of trial court errors at

all stages of Petitioner’s case - during pre-trial hearings and motions, voir dire, the guilt

and penalty phases of trial, and in post-trial proceedings. The Court incorporates the

Group Three Order’s overview of the evidence presented during the guilt and penalty

phases of trial. (Doc. No. 236.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that

none of the Group Four claims merits habeas relief.

A. Claim 10 - Acts of Prison Violence as Penalty Phase Aggravation

Claim 10 alleges that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of unadjudicated

prison assaults and murder in the penalty phase, and that the prosecutor engaged in

misconduct in introducing those crimes into evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s rights

under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner alleges that these

acts, which included the Williams, Christiansen and Macugay assaults and the Casas

murder, were actually the product of the state’s intentional encouragement and/or

conditioning of prison violence among inmates. 

1. Teague

Respondent asserts, “Petitioner’s new rule, which would foreclose the admission

of penalty phase evidence based on the creation of a ‘hostile environment,’ is not

dictated by existing precedent.” Respondent adds, “Specifically, Petitioner fails to point

to any established rule of criminal procedure that prohibits the admission of penalty

phase evidence of a defendant’s prior acts of violence because the state indirectly

allowed such acts by creating a hostile environment.” (Resp.’s MTD at 2-3.) 

Petitioner responds, “Here, the question is whether Respondent has met his

burden of demonstrating that Petitioner is seeking to apply a ‘new rule’ to the facts of this

claim. He cites no authority for that proposition, and does not purport to rely on any case

at all; rather, he simply conclusorily states that there is no ‘rule of criminal procedure’

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which requires the exclusion of jailhouse-created acts of violence from consideration by

the jury as aggravating factors. While there may not be a statutory criminal rule of

procedure, long-held Constitutional law is readily applied to these facts.” (Petr’s Opp. at

11.) 

The Supreme Court explains that “[s]entencing courts have not only taken into

consideration a defendant’s prior convictions, but have also considered a defendant’s

past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior.” Nichols v.

United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994). The Ninth Circuit has held that a sentencer

may rely on prior criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction if the evidence in question

has “some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” McDowell v. Calderon,

107 F.3d 1351, 1366 (9th Cir. 1997), amended 116 F.3d 364 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated in

part by 130 F.3d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

In this claim, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his prior

criminal conduct, not because of any failure to meet the “minimal indicium of reliability,”

but because the acts were the product of the state’s encouragement of prison violence

among inmates. Petitioner is seeking to create a new rule of criminal procedure, one

whose “result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s conviction

became final.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Furthermore, Petitioner’s proposed rule does

not satisfy either exception to Teague. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 305; Graham, 506 U.S. at

478. 

However, even assuming Claim 10 would not be barred under Teague, it is without

merit for the reasons set forth below.

2. Merits

Petitioner asserts that his Constitutional rights were violated when the prosecution

was allowed to present in aggravation acts of prison violence that prison authorities

knowingly created or allowed to occur. Petitioner alleges that the prisons in which he was

housed at the time of the Williams, Christiansen, and Macugay assaults and the Casas

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murder encouraged and condoned racial violence, which led to these assaults.

In support of this contention, Petitioner relies on a portion of Wallace Williams’

penalty phase testimony, in which Williams testified:

Q: After the incident of November 23rd, 1975, that you had been

describing, were you approached by any officers in the course of

investigating what had happened on that day?

A: If I recall correctly there was a Sergeant Perkins approached me,

and from my understanding it was like he was trying to agitate me

because he thought that I was resisted upon. So it was a thing like

trying to get me to do something else in return.

Q: In your experience was that kind of agitation by - - well, did that kind

of agitation by staff occur in the tension that existed in lockup in

1975?

A: From what I could witness from my own point of view, yes.

(RT 17208.)

The Court is not persuaded that, as Petitioner contends, this claim posits “nothing

more than an extension of the kinds of prosecutorial misconduct which has been found to

be constitutionally infirm.” (Petr’s Opp. at 12.) The legal authority Petitioner cites in

support of this claim is distinguishable. Unlike the facts of United States v. Henry, 447

U.S. 264, 274 (1980), this case does not involve a situation where the government

created a situation to induce Petitioner to make incriminating statements outside the

presence of counsel. See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Maine v.

Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985). Moreover, Petitioner has failed to establish that the state

engaged in any “outrageous government conduct.” Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d

783 (9th Cir. 1971). 

Petitioner has failed to establish that the government engaged in behavior as to

the assaults and murder, requiring the preclusion of the evidence at issue. The

testimony from Williams alone was vague and speculative. Furthermore, there was no

evidence that prison officials encouraged the other assaults or Casas’s murder. In any

event, the jury heard and considered Williams’s allegation of officer agitation. 

///

///

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The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Therefore,

habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.

B. Claim 11 - Non-Statutory Aggravation

Claim 11 asserts the prosecutor introduced non-statutory factors in aggravation

during both the guilt and penalty phase proceedings, in the form of references to

Petitioner’s alleged membership in or affiliation with the Mexican Mafia prison gang, in

violation of Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

1. Teague

Respondent contends that “[t]o the extent Petitioner could show the prosecution

was precluded from introducing evidence that bore upon an aggravating factor because it

constituted a ‘bad act,’ such a conclusion would constitute a prohibited new rule barred

under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 288.” (Resp.’s MTD at 6.) 

The Supreme Court has held that the introduction of a defendant’s gang affiliation

at trial may establish a constitutional violation if the introduction of the evidence was

irrelevant to the charged offenses or the evidence offered in aggravation. Dawson v.

Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992). Petitioner alleges that arguments and testimony

regarding his affiliation with a prison gang, referred to at trial as the Mexican Mafia, EME

or the “Southern Group,” was erroneously introduced during the guilt and penalty phases

of his trial. The Supreme Court has held that a decision is not new if “it has simply

applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely

analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law.” Penry,

492 U.S. at 314. Dawson was clearly established federal law at the time Petitioner’s

conviction was finalized, and the fact pattern proposed here is not “so novel” that it seeks

to extend United States Supreme Court precedent. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,

229-32 (1992). Petitioner’s claim is not barred under Teague.

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2. Merits

Petitioner alleges that “[d]uring closing argument in the guilt phase of Petitioner’s

trial, the prosecution made numerous references to facts not in evidence, including

Petitioner’s affiliation with the ‘Southern Group’ of a prison gang, that certain witnesses

feared retribution from this ‘Southern Group’ and that Petitioner had influence over this

‘Southern Group.’” (Petitioner’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment and/or Evidentiary Hearing [“Petr’s Mem.”] at 42.) 

Petitioner’s claim is not supported by citation to the record, and the Court’s

examination of the prosecutor’s closing guilt phase arguments find no references to any

“Southern Group.” However, Petitioner’s claim is not entirely without factual foundation. 

During the guilt phase of trial, witness Rafael Mendoza-Lopez testified that Petitioner had

influence over a “southern group” of inmates. (RT 16415-18.) However, the prosecutor

only elicited this testimony after defense counsel opened the door by inquiring after

Mendoza Lopez’s own gang affiliation. (RT 16378-80.) During the guilt phase closing,

the prosecution stated that witness Castillo was “frightened of what the defendant stood

for” and was frightened “of those people who associated with the defendant.” (RT 16607-

08.) Later in the closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that Mendoza Lopez was

afraid of being killed “either by the defendant or by those with whom the defendant

associates.” (RT 16659.)

During the penalty phase presentation, the prosecution called a witness who

testified that Petitioner went to stand with other members of the Mexican Mafia after the

Christiansen assault. (RT 17350.) Alex Macugay, the victim of a prison assault, testified

that he tried to stay away from the Southern Group of inmates, which included Petitioner,

because Macugay was himself from the North. (RT 17392.) During penalty-phase

closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that after the Christiansen attack, Petitioner

went to stand “where there were a group of other members of the Mexican Mafia

standing around,” implying that Petitioner was a member of the group. (RT 19060.) 

However, it is clear that defense counsel made a tactical decision to allow

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references to gangs during the penalty phase. During a conference outside the presence

of the jury, defense counsel explained:

I should make it clear, I think, as a matter of record, that as a tactical

decision I think the defense has decided to present evidence in this regard

because it is our position essentially that the – that the way in which the

climate of fear was created by the evidence presented at the guilt phase I

think is worse than simply fully presenting this issue to the jury and allowing

the jury to decide what it will with a full understanding of the circumstances

that existed in prison during the 70's and the early 1980's. 

(RT 17281.) Given defense counsels’ deliberate strategy to allow gang references during

the penalty phase and the fact that any explicit references to gangs in the case came

only after the defense opened the door, there was no trial court error in admitting the

evidence.

Relying on Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), Petitioner argues that

evidence of his gang membership was irrelevant to the issues in his penalty phase

proceedings and that the introduction of the evidence violated his constitutional rights. 

However, in addition to trial counsels’ express decision to introduce the evidence of

gangs during the penalty phase, the jury was instructed on the circumstances in

aggravation they were allowed to consider. The trial court specifically informed the jury:

“You are not permitted to consider any factor as aggravating unless it is specified on the

list of factors you have been given previously.” (RT 19032; CT 5375.) 

In Dawson, the Supreme Court found that the introduction of a defendant’s gang

affiliation at trial constituted a violation of that petitioner’s constitutional rights because

the gang evidence was irrelevant to the charged offenses or the evidence offered in

aggravation. However, the Supreme Court allowed that “evidence concerning a

defendant’s associations might be relevant in proving other aggravating circumstances.” 

Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166. Evidence of Petitioner’s gang affiliation was not offered as a

non-statutory factor in aggravation; instead, it was offered as context for the statutory

aggravating factors of the Christiansen and Macugay assaults. Upon consideration of the

legitimate purpose of the gang references, coupled with the fact that defense counsel

opened the door to these references, the Court concludes that the state court did not err

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in rejecting this claim on appeal. 

Petitioner makes an additional argument that the prosecution failed to provide him

with notice of the aggravating evidence prior to trial, as required under California Penal

Code § 190.3. However, according to Respondent, nine months prior to jury selection,

the prosecution apprised Petitioner they would seek to introduce the Casas homicide and

the three prison assaults as factors in aggravation. (CT 2159.) Petitioner does not

dispute this.

Petitioner has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights, and the

state court adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. Williams, 429 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

C. Claim 37 - Use of Magnetometer Outside Courtroom

Claim 37 alleges that the trial court erred in ordering heightened security

measures in the courtroom without first conducting an evidentiary hearing where a proper

record could be created regarding the need for such measures, resulting in a violation of

Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

1. Teague

Respondent’s argument primarily consists of the contention that “[t]o the extent

Petitioner could show the State must justify the use of a magnetometer, such a rule

would constitute a new rule of criminal procedure barred under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

at 288.” (Resp.’s MTD at 12.)

However, Petitioner contends that the placement of a metal detector outside a

courtroom should be examined under the same rules that govern other security

measures – e.g., the use of a security courtroom, the placement of security personnel in

the courtroom, or shackling of the defendant during court proceedings - and that the state

must justify the use of such measures prior to their implementation.

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The use of “security measures” in a courtroom is governed by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), which is not a “new” rule

under Teague. In Holbrook, the Supreme Court held that an “inherently prejudicial”

security practice must be justified by an essential state interest, but did not specifically

require a trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to reach such a conclusion. In the

instant claim, Petitioner’s argument centers on his assertion that due process required a

hearing before the magnetometer was used. Because clearly established federal law

does not currently require such a hearing, it appears that “granting the relief sought would

create a new rule because the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby

extending the precedent.” Stringer, 503 U.S. at 228. Therefore, Petitioner is advocating

a decision by the Court that would constitute a new rule of procedure barred under

Teague.

However, even assuming Claim 37 would not be barred under Teague, it is without

merit for the reasons set forth below.

2. State Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on direct appeal, rejecting it

as follows:

Defendant contends that placing a magnetometer (i.e., a metal detector) at the

public entrance to the courtroom violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and

their equivalent guaranties [sic] in the California Constitution.

The prosecution, stating that defendant had a history of violence and was

reported to be a member of a well-known prison gang, some of whose

members might wish to attend the trial, moved to have a magnetometer placed

outside the courtroom. The motion stated that the security measure was

needed to safeguard defendant himself and those who might testify against

him. It stated specifically that “Castillo is, as a matter of record, in the witness

protection program and past solicitations to kill him are a matter of record.”

The prosecution noted that it was not requesting that defendant be shackled

as long as “there is some reasonable assurance that spectators who may

attend the court proceedings are not armed . . .”

Defendant responded to the request on procedural and substantive grounds.

He requested an evidentiary hearing to refute the motion’s factual allegations.

He asserted that his constitutional right to due process of law compelled the

trial court to convene such a hearing. And, arguing as a matter of state law,

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he maintained that a magnetometer’s presence would prejudice the jury

against him.

Without calling witnesses, the trial court conducted a hearing. After hearing

argument, it stated that “[t]his court would be naive, and I think counsel would

be naive, to assume that this court has not become aware of allegations that

have surfaced concerning the membership in various gangs of various

potential witnesses in this case. It’s also a known fact that threats allegedly

were made as to Mr. Castillo.” The court also noted that one potential

witnesses had claimed to have been a member of the Mexican Mafia (a

prison-based gang also known as La Eme, the Spanish word for the letter “M,”

and frequently referred to in the trial proceedings by that term), and that

another may have been a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a different prison

gang. Describing a magnetometer as “unobtrusive” and “nondiscriminatory,”

the court decided that it would order one to be used during the evidentiary

portion of the trial. It implicitly denied defendant’s request for an evidentiary

hearing.

Defendant apparently sought a writ of mandate against the order in the Court

of Appeal, which rejected it. Thereafter he moved for the trial court to

reconsider its decision, but it also refused. Instead, at his request, it instructed

the jury, immediately after the alternate jurors had been sworn, to disregard

the magnetometer’s presence. “[I]t is my policy in serious felony cases to have

everyone except jurors pass through a metal detector before entering the

courtroom. [¶] Therefore, you can expect that a metal detector will be placed

outside the courtroom when the trial begins, and it will remain throughout the

course of the trial. [¶] The practices of other judges in this courthouse differ

from courtroom to courtroom. You should not view the presence of a metal

detector outside this courtroom, or the absence of one outside other

courtrooms, as a reflection on either party or any of the witnesses. [¶] It is

solely a matter of my personal policy.”

In bringing his claim, defendant relies, as he did at trial, on People v. Duran

(1976) 16 Cal.3d 282 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 90 A.L.R.3d 1].

Though he labels his claim one of constitutional error, its substance is one of

state law error, namely a violation of Duran.

Through Duran and its progeny, it has become settled that “because of its

potentially prejudicial impact on the jury, shackling should be ordered only as

a last resort and only upon a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.

[Citations.] Any restraints should be as ‘unobtrusive as possible, although as

effective as necessary under the circumstances.’ [Citation.] Although these

restrictions make the trial court’s discretion to order restraints ‘relatively

narrow’ [citation], the court’s ruling will be upheld on appeal absent a showing

of a manifest abuse of that discretion.” (People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th

759, 774 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].)

But Duran is inapposite. Here, unlike the situation in People v. Duran, supra,

16 Cal.3d 282, defendant was not shackled. Rather, a magnetometer was

placed by the courtroom door. Unlike occasions on which the government can

be accused of creating a public spectacle or directing suspicion at a criminal

defendant by parading him or her in shackles, or driving him or her to court in

an ostentatious manner, the trial court’s use of a magnetometer was, as it

observed, “nondiscriminatory.” (Cf. Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560,

567 [106 S.Ct. 1340, 1344-1345, 89 L.Ed.2d 525].)

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In People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, we stated that the presence of

armed guards ordinarily “need not be justified by the court or the prosecutor.”

(Id. at p. 291, fn. 8; see also generally Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, 475 U.S. 560

[discussing the presence of uniformed and armed personnel].) “We believe

that the use of a metal detector outside a courtroom, like the use of additional

security forces within the courtroom, is not . . . inherently prejudicial . . . Unlike

shackling and the display of the defendant in jail garb, the use of a metal

detector does not identify the defendant as a person apart or as worthy of fear

and suspicion.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 996 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d

377, 997 P.2d 1044].)

To the extent the metal detector’s use focused attention on the proceedings,

it pointed to the nature of the case, not to defendant’s character. (See People

v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 114-115 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].)

The distinction is crucial. Nor did the magnetometer improperly highlight the

nature of the case. The jurors already knew they were hearing a multiple

murder trial and that “the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there

by choice or happenstance.” (Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, 475 U.S. 560, 567

[106 S.Ct 1340, 1345].) Hence the magnetometer’s presence did not

objectionably dramatize the proceedings. The device was, in its neutrality,

akin to that of, and indeed likely less dramatic than, the use of armed guards

in the courtroom.

“A trial court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly

proceedings.” (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d

211, 989 P.2d 645].) Accordingly, we review the court’s decisions regarding

security measures in the courtroom, including deploying a magnetometer at

the entrance, for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22

Cal.4th 990, 997.) We find none. The court was entitled to rely and act on the

prosecutor’s representations, as an officer of the court, that bringing the case

to trial posed certain risks. There was no violation of state law, and because

defendant’s constitutional claims are predicated on his assertion that state law

was violated, they too must fail.

We turn next to defendant’s procedural claim: that it violated due process to

install a magnetometer without an evidentiary hearing. We do not agree that

due process requires a contested evidentiary proceeding. It is well known that

“[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the

particular situation demands.” (People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68,69

[284 Cal.Rptr. 288, 813 P.2d 1318].) [Internal quotation marks omitted.] We

have already explained that defendant’s interest in a fair trial was unaffected

by installing a magnetometer outside the courtroom: it was a neutral measure

that did not focus attention on him. Holding a contested evidentiary hearing

would not have been useful: it would have imposed a needless burden on the

trial court, which, as we have explained, enjoys wide discretion to maintain

courtroom security. It might have resulted in a wasteful minitrial at which

witnesses would have had to testify about their gang affiliations or other

potential for generating security problems. Neither the federal nor the state

Constitution requires such consumption of the parties’ and the trial court’s

time. Indeed, by holding a hearing of any kind, the trial court gave defendant

more than he was entitled to. (People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1211,

1268.)

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 250-53.

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3. Merits

In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), the Supreme Court held:

Where a petitioner challenges security measures imposed by a state trial

court, the task of a federal court considering a habeas petition is not to

determine whether it might have been feasible for the State to have employed

less conspicuous security measures in the courtroom. . . . All a federal court

may do in such a situation is look at the scene presented to jurors and

determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an

unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial; if the challenged practice

is not found inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual

prejudice, the inquiry is over. 

Id. at 572.

Following Holbrook, the Ninth Circuit held that while shackling was an inherently

prejudicial practice, the use of a security courtroom was not, and, as a result, no

essential state interest was required to justify the practice. See Morgan v. Aispuro, 946

F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit later ruled that the presence of three

sheriffs guarding a defendant at trial also was not an inherently prejudicial measure. See

King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1992). A fortiori, use of a magnetometer

does not constitute an inherently prejudicial measure. 

With respect to the issue of whether the court was required to hold an evidentiary

hearing, in Jones v. Meyer, 899 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit emphasized,

“[W]e have never held, and we refuse to hold now, that a trial court must conduct a

hearing and make findings before ordering that a defendant be shackled.” Id. at 886. If

due process does not require a trial court to conduct a formal hearing prior to

implementing an “inherently prejudicial practice” such as shackling, certainly the

implementation of a less conspicuous security measure cannot require a hearing to

satisfy due process. 

California state law under Duran requires trial courts to put their reasons for

shackling on the record. Although the trial court in this case did not order shackling, the

trial court nonetheless articulated the reasons for the metal detector’s placement outside

the courtroom on the record. See Duran, 16 Cal. 3d 282 (1976). The Court can see no

violation of due process in this procedure. 

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Furthermore, Petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial,

which includes the presumption of innocence. See Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 831

(9th Cir. 1990). Although certain courtroom conditions may prejudice this presumption – 

see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (defendant clothed in prison clothes may

affect judgment of the jury); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (prejudice may ensue

from defendant appearing before the jury bound and gagged) – mere use of a

magnetometer does not.

In rejecting this claim on appeal, the California Supreme Court distinguished the

shackling of a defendant from the placing of a metal detector at the entrance to the

courtroom. The California Supreme Court noted that the trial court, after hearing

argument from both the prosecutor and defense counsel, deliberately chose the metal

detector as a less potentially prejudicial means of securing the courtroom and declined to

utilize shackling. Petitioner’s contention that the failure to conduct a full evidentiary

hearing on this issue resulted in a deprivation of due process is without merit. 

Moreover, the trial court gave a curative instruction to the jury, on defense

counsel’s request, offering a neutral reason for the metal detector. Any potential

prejudice Petitioner may have suffered from the court’s decision to utilize a

magnetometer outside the courtroom was ameliorated by the trial court’s instruction to

the jury:

A final thing I would like to leave you with is that it is my policy in serious

felony cases to have everyone except jurors pass through a metal detector

before entering the courtroom. Therefore, you can expect that a metal

detector will be placed outside the courtroom when the trial begins, and it will

remain throughout the course of the trial. The practices of other judges in this

courthouse differ from courtroom to courtroom. You should not view the

presence of a metal detector outside this courtroom or the absence of one

outside other courtrooms, as a reflection on either party or any of the

witnesses. It is solely a matter of my personal policy.

(RT 11581-82.)

///

///

///

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Petitioner has failed to show the state court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim. 

D. Claim 38 - Penalty Phase Cross-Examination

Claim 38 alleges that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner the right to confront

and cross-examine penalty phase prosecution witnesses, including Walter Lewis and

Richard Christiansen, with evidence of prior acts of misconduct, in violation of his rights

under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

1. State Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on direct appeal, rejecting it

as follows:

Defendant claims that the trial court erred under Evidence Code section 352

and that the proceedings violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution when the court refused to allow

him to inquire of Walter Joe Lewis, whose testimony is summarized ante, 96

Cal.Rptr.2d page 725, 1 P.3d page 42, whether he had made threats and

committed violent acts. 

Defendant wanted to ask Lewis on cross-examination whether he had

committed murder and assaults in prison. He asserted that if his character

was on trial in the penalty phase, so should be the adverse witnesses’; but the

trial court disagreed. It ruled that impeaching character evidence in the form

of specific instances of Lewis’s conduct was unduly prejudicial character

evidence, and that “we’re not going to try Mr. Lewis.”

Though it did not cite a statute in the record, the trial court may have made its

ruling under Evidence Code section 787, which provides that “evidence of

specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his

character is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness.” The

trial was completed before we filed People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047,

255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619, in which we held that the California

Constitution forbade applying section 787 in criminal cases. (Harris, at p.

1081, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619.) Our holding responded to the

People’s argument that “the statutory limitations on the admission of evidence

relevant to a witness’s honesty or veracity are no longer applicable in criminal

cases, except to the extent that exclusion is ordered pursuant to Evidence

Code section 352.” (Ibid.) Our holding that section 787 could no longer be

applied in criminal cases should be viewed in the context of that argument.

(See also People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th 284, 299, fn. 10, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d

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418, 841 P.2d 938 [limiting and clarifying Harris].) 

Defendant did not raise the claim at trial that Evidence Code section 787 had

been abrogated. He thus failed to preserve it for review. (People v. Von Villas

(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 201, 267-268, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 62.) In any event, as

implied by the context of Harris, Von Villas correctly held that the California

Constitution did not, notwithstanding the limitation of Evidence Code section

787, forbid excluding evidence that fell within that statute’s ambit if a trial court

properly ruled that the evidence should also be excluded under Evidence Code

section 352. (Von Villas, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 268-269, 13 Cal.Rptr.

2d 62.) Implicitly, the trial court here ruled that the evidence would “mislead

[ ] the jury” (Evid.Code, § 352) because it would be confusing to appear to

place Lewis on trial with side issues regarding credibility. We review the ruling

accordingly.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion. (Evid.Code, § 352) “[T]he latitude

section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases

is broad. The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from

degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.”

(People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th 284, 296, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d

938.) Impeaching Lewis with inquiries into his own violent conduct – an inquiry

that would not have borne on any question of veracity or honesty – would have

been collateral. Moreover, the jury already knew that Lewis had committed

two murders and that he had been a member of a prison gang. There was no

abuse of discretion.

As for defendant’s constitutional claim, we have repeatedly held that “not every

restriction on a defendant’s desired method of cross-examination is a

constitutional violation. Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the

trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive,

prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance.” (People v. Frye,

supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 946, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) The

constitutional claim is without merit.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 300-01.

2. Merits

Although the opportunity of cross-examination is central to a defendant’s

constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause, the right is not boundless. The

United States Supreme Court has held that while a trial court may not prevent the

defendant from cross-examining a prosecution witness, the court may place reasonable

limits on cross-examination based on the need for fairness and order in the proceedings. 

Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). “The Confrontation Clause

guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is

effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. (quoting

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Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).

To determine whether a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a

witness against him has been violated by the exclusion of evidence on crossexamination, a court “must inquire whether: (1) the excluded evidence was relevant; (2)

there were other legitimate interests outweighing the defendant’s interest in presenting

the evidence; and (3) the exclusion of evidence left the jury with sufficient information to

assess the credibility of the witness.” United States v. Beardslee, 197 F.3d 378, 383 (9th

Cir. 1999). Upon consideration of these three factors, the Court concludes that

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated.

Walter Lewis testified at the penalty phase that he had seen Petitioner kill fellow

inmate John Casas. (RT 17652-53.) Defense counsel sought to cross-examine Lewis

about “various acts of misconduct” that he had committed, including threats to other

inmates and extortion attempts. The trial court held that the desired cross-examination

constituted collateral impeachment and excluded the evidence under Evidence Code §

352. (RT 17724-25.) Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in foreclosing defense

counsel’s attempt at impeaching Lewis’s statement that he came forward to testify

against Petitioner in an attempt to engage in “positive activities.” (RT 17719.)

Although this excluded evidence was arguably relevant, the trial court voiced the

legitimate interest of preventing the jury from confusion over collateral matters. See

Beardslee, 197 F.3d at 383. Further, the jury knew that Lewis was a twice-convicted

murderer. (RT 17626.) The jury was also informed that Lewis was previously affiliated

with the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang. (RT 17694.) Lewis testified that he wrote a

number of letters to prison officials and made offers to inform on inmates in an attempt to

receive a transfer out of the Security Housing Unit (SHU). (RT 17693-95.) Lewis also

stated that he threatened to refuse to testify if he was not transferred. (RT 17699.) 

Lewis testified that “they [prison officials] believed me, but I couldn’t pass the polygraph”

and that was the reason he had not yet received his desired transfer. (RT 17696.) 

Taking into account the numerous areas of cross-examination, the jury was provided with

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sufficient evidence to evaluate the credibility of Walter Lewis. See Beardslee, 197 F.3d

at 383. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding trial counsel from crossexamining Lewis on the other acts of misconduct.

Regarding the testimony of Richard Christiansen, Petitioner does not provide the

Court with any argument, nor does he assert any facts that demonstrate the defense was

precluded from cross-examining Christiansen at trial. Petitioner’s allegation, unsupported

by any factual basis, is insufficient to merit relief on this claim.

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the alleged error had a “substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637. With respect to the Casas homicide, the additional testimony Petitioner sought to

produce would not have further affected Lewis’s credibility. Lewis had already been

impeached, and Albrecht had also testified to the events surrounding the murder.

Petitioner fails to show that the state supreme court’s rejection of this claim was an

unreasonable application of clearly established law, or involved an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

E. Claim 39- Admission of Murder of Casas in Penalty Phase

Claim 39 alleges that the trial court erred in admitting the unadjudicated murder of

John Casas into evidence as an aggravating factor during the penalty phase

proceedings, violating Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. 

1. Teague

Petitioner asserts a due process violation arising from the eight-year delay in

presenting evidence of the Casas murder against him. Respondent counters that

Petitioner fails to identify any clearly established federal law requiring the exclusion of

penalty phase evidence regarding criminal offenses which could have been charged at

an earlier time. Petitioner relies largely on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States

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v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), arguing that due process is implicated whenever there is

a pre-indictment delay that creates prejudice at trial.

In Marion, the Supreme Court considered the significance, for constitutional

purposes, of a lengthy pre-indictment delay, holding that proof of actual prejudice to the

defense could constitute a meritorious due process claim. Id. at 326. Petitioner urges

this Court to apply Marion to the prosecution’s introduction of evidence of an

unadjudicated crime during the penalty phase of his trial, claiming that “it simply cannot

be denied that the same Due Process considerations which apply to a pre-indictment

delay before an ordinary trial are only heightened when applied to a pre-indictment delay

in connection with the use of unadjudicated crimes in a penalty phase.” (Petr’s Opp. at

32.)

Respondent contends that Marion does not extend to the presentation of penalty

phase evidence and asserts that “unlike the constitutional concerns present in the

context of pre-indictment delay, evidence of prior criminality presented at the penalty

phase acts as background for the sentencer and does not provide an independent basis

for punishment,” and notes that Petitioner uses a considerable portion of his argument to

“assail generally against the use of any unadjudicated offenses.” (Resp.’s Reply at 10.)

The Court acknowledges that this issue presents a close question, but declines to

reach a ruling on the Teague issue, as this claim clearly fails on the merits. 

2. State Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on direct appeal, rejecting it

as follows:

As stated ante, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d at page 725, 1 P.3d at page 42, John Casas

was killed in 1980. Defendant claims that failing to try him at the time and

presenting evidence of the killing eight years later violated his rights under the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, and [A]rticle I, section 15 of the California Constitution. He

asserts that because an exculpatory witness was lost in the interim and he

suffered other disadvantages through the passage of time, the law invalidly

“required him to defend against stale acts.” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10

Cal.4th 764, 822, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) At oral argument, his

counsel emphasized the evidence’s probable severe impact: the prosecution

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was presenting the jury with evidence suggesting that, as someone who had

already murdered while in prison, he was highly unsuitable for life

imprisonment. Nevertheless, we have repeatedly rejected this claim. (Ibid.)

We decline to reconsider our prior decisions. 

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 300.

3. Merits

In McDowell v. Calderon, the Ninth Circuit upheld a conviction, finding that the

admission of previously unadjudicated prior offenses did not in that case violate due

process. Id. at 1366. In rejecting the petitioner’s due process argument, the Ninth Circuit

noted, “A sentencer may rely on criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction if the

evidence has ‘some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.’” Id.

The evidence of the Casas homicide introduced during the penalty phase of

Petitioner’s trial bore at least the “minimal indicium of reliability” required to satisfy due

process. Glenn Albrecht, a fellow inmate, testified that he saw Petitioner hit Casas

several times in the chest and then saw Casas lying on the ground in a pool of blood. 

(RT 17527-34.) Walter Lewis, another inmate, testified that he saw Petitioner lunge

toward the victim with a weapon in a towel, after which the victim staggered toward the

stairs and fell down bleeding. (RT 17650-55.) A correctional officer testified that after the

incident, officers recovered a bloody knife concealed in a towel in the area of the murder. 

(RT 17759-60.) 

Petitioner argues that there was no legitimate justification for the eight-year delay

in prosecuting the Casas homicide and that he suffered actual prejudice from the delay

because of the loss of “highly” exculpatory witness Robert Dufton. Notes of an interview

conducted with Dufton shortly after the murder show that Dufton claimed to have seen

the knife used to kill Casas in the cell of an inmate called Mancha at some point before

the murder. About ten minutes prior to the killing, Dufton allegedly saw another inmate,

Victor Murillo, give the knife to Mancha when he picked up his towel. Dufton claimed that

he was in the area of the murder, saw Casas fall to his side, and thought Casas was

///

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having a seizure until he saw the hole in his back. According to Dufton, only inmates

Murillo and Mancha were involved in the murder.

Defense counsel’s attempts to locate Dufton were unsuccessful. However, the

trial court denied defense counsel’s motion to exclude evidence of the Casas murder,

reasoning:

Clearly, prejudice, assuming prejudice, has to be weighed against

any justification for the delay . . . [A]nd really I guess the bottom line is that

it has to be shown that the delay is purposeful or oppressive, and even

smacks of deliberate obstruction on the part of the prosecution in order to

justify the relief sought by [the defense] . . . [¶] Clearly, there is a

reasonable basis for the delay in this case. Witnesses have changed their

minds, agreed to testify now against Mr. Ayala. Certainly the record is clear

that that’s something they would not do in 1980. 

The People, in point of fact, as compared to the documents reviewed

by the court, would appear to have a significantly improved case as

opposed to that in 1980. The reasons for the delays, at the very least,

appear to be very legitimate, and certainly, there’s no hint of obstruction or

bad faith, and the motion will accordingly be denied. 

(RT 17070-71.)

The Court agrees with the California Supreme Court that Petitioner fails to

demonstrate actual prejudice from the loss of Robert Dufton as a witness. Dufton never

claimed to have witnessed the actual murder or to have seen the perpetrator. Dufton

only claims he saw another inmate with a knife shortly before the stabbing, which does

not exculpate Petitioner, nor does it contradict the testimony of Albrecht or Lewis.

Furthermore, because Dufton apparently did not witness the murder, his assertion that

only inmates Murillo and Mancha were involved in the attack is factually unsupported. 

Petitioner also asserts constitutional error arising from the trial court’s failure to

instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of the Casas homicide in aggravation only

if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner had committed the offense. 

(Second Amended Petition [“Pet.”] at 137; Petr’s Mem. at 57.) However, immediately

after listing the potential aggravating circumstance of the Casas homicide during penalty

phase instructions, the court explained: “Before you may consider any of such criminal

acts as an aggravating circumstance in this case, you must first be satisfied beyond a

reasonable doubt that Ronaldo Ayala did commit such criminal acts.” (RT 19029)

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(emphasis added).

The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

did it involve an unreasonable application of, federal law. Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim.

F. Claim 40 - Mendoza Lopez Rebuttal Testimony

In this claim, Petitioner asserts the trial court “failed to properly evaluate the

admissibility of the proffered evidence before permitting [Rafael] Mendoza Lopez to

testify” and erred in denying Petitioner’s objections to this testimony and request for a 

Evidence Code § 402 hearing, in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

1. Teague

Respondent argues that Petitioner “fails to point to any controlling authority

disallowing rebuttal testimony of a witness who has previously testified,” and that granting

relief on this claim would require the creation of a new rule of criminal procedure barred

under Teague. (Resp.’s Opp. at 30.) In response to the Teague assertions by

Respondent, Petitioner argues that he “seeks to impose no new obligation on the state

but simply asks the state to implement federal constitutional guarantees as set forth in

then-existing decisional law.” (Petr.’s Reply at 5.)

The Court could plausibly conclude that this claim is barred as a “new rule”

because Petitioner asks the Court to hold that the admission of rebuttal testimony by a

witness who previously testified amounts to a violation of the United States Constitution,

a result that was not dictated by precedent at the time Petitioner’s conviction was

finalized. However, bearing in mind the Ninth Circuit’s unwillingness to require a

Petitioner to present a case “involving identical facts, circumstances and legal issues” in

order to clear the Teague threshold, Keating, 191 F.3d at 1061 n.11, the Court takes the

more sensible approach of concluding that Petitioner does not seek to impose a new

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rule, but, rather, seeks to apply to the facts of his case established law that an improper

admission of evidence at trial may, in certain circumstances, constitute a due process

violation. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991). Therefore, Petitioner’s

claim is not barred under Teague.

2. Merits

Petitioner alleges that the trial court failed to properly evaluate the admissibility of

the proffered recantation evidence before permitting Mendoza Lopez to testify. Petitioner

further alleges that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s objections to the

admissibility of the recantation as well as their request for an Evidence Code § 402

hearing on the voluntariness of the rebuttal testimony. Petitioner claims that as a

consequence of the court’s actions, unreliable and prejudicial testimony was presented to

the jury, resulting in a violation of Petitioner’s due process right to a fair trial and reliable

penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s claim that

Mendoza’s recantation constituted improper rebuttal evidence. The California Supreme

Court explained:

Far from being improper, Mendoza’s testimony was, in respect of its

evidentiary effect and importance, the ideal rebuttal: the witness repudiated his

own testimony. Moreover, as the People observed at oral argument, it was

among the most justifiable of all rebuttals, because it could not have been

presented during the prosecution’s or even the defense’s case-in-chief. There

was no error under state law in admitting the evidence. . . . Moreover, to the

extent defendant argues that the trial court should have screened Mendoza’s

proposed rebuttal testimony so as to decide its reliability in limine, he failed to

seek such clearance from the court in any meaningful way, notwithstanding his

fleeting reference to the admissibility of the testimony, and he has failed to

preserve the claim for review.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 275.

The California Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to, nor did it involve an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Mendoza’s testimony was

significant and could only have been presented during rebuttal. As pointed out by the

California Supreme Court, trial counsel did not ask the trial court to screen Mendoza’s

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proposed rebuttal testimony beforehand for purposes of determining reliability. 

Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the court was not aware of the alleged

inconsistencies between Mendoza’s rebuttal testimony and Mendoza’s taped testimony

or other evidence presented at trial. Similarly, the evidence regarding Rudy “Green Eyes”

Ybarra was presented on surrebuttal and was not known to the court previously. 

At any rate, even if the court knew about the inconsistencies alleged by Petitioner,

it would not have been error for the court to allow the rebuttal testimony. As explained by

the California Supreme Court: “Generally, ‘doubts about the credibility of [an] in-court

witness should be left for the jury’s resolution.’” People v. Mayfield, 14 Cal. 4th 668, 735

(1997) (quoting People v. Cudjo, 6 Cal. 4th 585, 609 (1993)). Petitioner’s counsel were

free to point out any inconsistencies in Mendoza’s rebuttal testimony, leaving it to the

finder of fact to weigh the evidence. There does not appear to be any legal authority

supporting the proposition that a trial court violates a defendant’s due process rights by

allowing a witness to recant his prior testimony on rebuttal in the face of inconsistencies

that call into question the truthfulness of the rebuttal testimony. 

Petitioner’s argument that the trial court should have granted a voluntariness

hearing under Cal. Evid. Code § 402 fails because the trial court was not presented with

evidence indicating that Mendoza was coerced into changing his story. Trial counsel

speculated that Detective Chacon used information that Mendoza was an informant to

pressure Mendoza into changing his testimony. However, trial counsel did not have any

evidence to this effect. 

During an in camera hearing (Supplement to Record of Trial Volume 81-1), trial

counsel explained to the court that after Mendoza changed his story, Chacon and Gloria

Michaels of the District Attorney’s Office, visited Javier Hernandez (“Pelon”). Chacon

allegedly told Pelon, “I know your carnales, your brothers in the EME. Mr. Ayala has no

power left. You had better tell the truth. You’re going to need a lawyer . . . She [Semel]

can’t protect you anymore.” Trial counsel stated that Hernandez had no gang affiliation,

did not know the Ayalas, and felt threatened and intimidated by what occurred. Based on

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what happened to Hernandez, trial counsel believed that Mendoza might have been

frightened into changing his testimony. 

However, based on Mendoza’s taped statements, Detective Chacon and the

prosecution had reason to believe that Hernandez had lied on the stand and had

conspired with Mendoza to make up stories to protect the Ayalas. Although Chacon

applied some pressure to Hernandez to tell the truth, there is no evidence that he did

anything improper. Chacon’s statement about Semel not being able to “protect”

Hernandez anymore does not necessarily have a sinister meaning. It seems that Chacon

was talking about protection from prosecution for perjury, an interpretation that is

supported by Chacon’s preceding statement that Hernandez was going to need a lawyer.

During his taped statement, Mendoza insisted that his decision to change his story

was completely voluntary. There was no evidence to the contrary that would form the

basis of a § 402 hearing. 

The admission of Mendoza’s rebuttal testimony did not violate state law, and

Petitioner has failed to establish that any of his constitutional rights were violated. 

Therefore, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim.

G. Claim 41 - Gang Evidence in Guilt and Penalty Phase

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erroneously allowed the admission of

irrelevant and prejudicial gang evidence during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. 

Petitioner claims that he was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present

evidence in his own defense due to the trial court’s erroneous rulings in violation of the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

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1. State Court’s Decision 

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s claims that

the trial court erred in failing to exclude evidence relating to gang affiliation or

involvement, and that the court’s failure to set out clear rules regarding the admissibility

of gang-related evidence caused defense counsel to become “gun-shy.” The California

Supreme Court explained:

Various witnesses against defendant feared the Mexican Mafia, and that fear

at times explained their prior conduct, their motivation to testify, or their

accepting government protection - items that bore on the witnesses' credibility,

and thus items that they needed to explain. The trial court agreed that

evidence of defendant's involvement in the Mexican Mafia would be unduly

prejudicial, thus giving itself and the parties the task of excluding inflammatory

references to the gang while enabling witnesses to explain the basis for their

testimony. [Footnote omitted.] The court made diligent efforts to try to achieve

this balance, ordering that witnesses refer by various euphemisms to

pressures from others unless the defense opened the door to naming the

Mexican Mafia.

The result was successful. We have already explored this issue at some

length ante, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d at pages 712-714, 1 P.3d at pages 30-33, in our

review of issues surrounding Richard Ortiz Savocchio and Rafael Mendoza

Lopez. And as alluded to in the statement of facts, the prosecution needed to

explain Pedro Castillo's reticence and evasions when the police first

interviewed him, and why he changed his mind and decided to denounce the

murderers. So it was also with other witnesses, such as Juan Manuel Meza,

who needed to explain the consideration, in the form of protection for his

family, that the state was extending him.

There was no error in presenting such evidence, which affected the witnesses'

credibility. And the parties and trial court succeeded in doing it without

exposing the jury to testimony about the Mexican Mafia or about prison-based

gangs in general - the very thing about which defendant expressed concern

before and during the trial.

As a result of the trial court's efforts, the jury never heard the names Mexican

Mafia or La Eme. As stated ante, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d at pages 712-714, 1 P.3d at

pages 31-33, the jurors heard only sanitized references to other people or

groups that might wish to influence a witness's conduct or testimony or

retaliate against the witness for harming the defense.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 276-77.

2. Merits

As explained by the California Supreme Court, there were no explicit references to

gangs or Petitioner’s membership in a gang during the guilt phase. The trial court

properly allowed Castillo to testify regarding his fear for himself and his family to explain

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why he did not identify the Ayalas and Moreno immediately. Similarly, it was necessary

for Meza to testify about his fear for his life to explain why he did not go along with the

Ayalas’ proposed plan and to explain the reason for the protection the state was

providing him. As for Mendoza, the prosecution had to elicit the reason why Mendoza

lied on the stand in the first place. Because Petitioner was incarcerated in a different

institution than Mendoza at the time Mendoza testified on direct, it was necessary for

Mendoza to explain his belief that Petitioner had influence over a group of people who

existed inside and outside of prison. Although jurors may have been able to guess that

the “southern group” was a euphemism for a gang, there was little more the court could

do to sanitize the testimony.

 Petitioner contends that as a result of the introduction of evidence relating to

gangs, his defense was crippled because his trial counsel were faced with the choice of

fully examining Castillo, Meza, and Mendoza and introducing additional gang-related

evidence, or foregoing examination in crucial areas. To the extent trial counsel chose not

to impeach with certain evidence to avoid the introduction of other gang evidence, trial

counsels’ decisions were a matter of trial strategy and cannot be blamed on the trial

court. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 265 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1959) (“There is no

warrant of course for relieving the accused of the consequences of what appears to have

been a planned defense stratagem, by the device of condemning as ‘clear error’ of the

trial court a seemingly calculated risk of defense counsel which happened not to achieve

the intended result with the jury.”) For example, trial counsel could have chosen to

inquire about Castillo’s receipt of $15,000 per year from the San Diego County District

Attorney. However, the trial court properly ruled that the prosecution could then admit

evidence that the $15,000 was in connection with the witness protection program. Trial

counsel made the decision that it was not worth the risk. 

Trial counsel may have been “gun shy” to present any evidence that had anything

to do with gangs. However, trial counsels’ perhaps unwarranted nervousness about all

evidence touching upon gangs was not the fault of the trial court. In this Court’s Group

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Three Order (Claim 18), the Court explained that with respect to Savocchio, the trial court

ruled that the prosecution would be allowed to introduce evidence that Savocchio had

lied about having problems with the EME. The trial court did not rule that the prosecution

could introduce evidence regarding Savocchio’s actual dealings, if any, with the EME. 

Therefore, there was no danger that Savocchio’s testimony would link Petitioner with

gang activity. This Court further explained that if trial counsel were confused about the

scope of the impeachment allowed by the trial court’s in limine ruling, trial counsel should

have sought clarification. This evidentiary ruling does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995)

(explaining that a state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review

unless it resulted in a violation of federal law “either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally

fair trial guaranteed by due process.”).

The Court rejects Petitioner’s claim that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s

numerous references during closing argument to Petitioner’s alleged dangerousness. In

its Group Three Order (Claim 26), the Court held that there was no prosecutorial

misconduct during closing argument. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error in

overruling any objections to alleged prosecutorial misconduct that may have been made

during closing argument.

Petitioner has failed to establish that the trial court’s guilt-phase evidentiary rulings

regarding gang-related evidence were erroneous and had “substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. Therefore, the

California Supreme Court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim regarding gang-related

evidence during the guilty phase was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law.

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Petitioner’s claim regarding gang references during the penalty phase also lacks

merit. During the testimony of Mr. Blasingame, a correctional officer who witnessed the

events surrounding the assault of Richard Christiansen, Blasingame referred to a

diagram of the yard that contained the initials “EME” to indicate where Mexican inmates

were standing and where Petitioner went after his encounter with Christiansen. Defense

counsel did not object to the diagram or Blasingame’s references to the EME. On crossexamination, defense counsel even clarified that where Blasingame saw large groups of

Mexican inmates, he placed “EME” on the diagram. (RT 17350.) The fact is that

defense counsel made a tactical decision to allow references to gangs during the penalty

phase. During a conference outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel explained:

I should make it clear, I think, as a matter of record, that as a tactical

decision I think the defense has decided to present evidence in this regard

because it is our position essentially that the – that the way in which the

climate of fear was created by the evidence presented at the guilt phase I

think is worse than simply fully presenting this issue to the jury and allowing

the jury to decide what it will with a full understanding of the circumstances

that existed in prison during the 70's and the early 1980's. 

(RT 17281.)

In the Group Three Order, the Court held that trial counsels’ decision to change

strategy during the penalty phase was reasonable under Strickland (Claim 30). Given

defense counsels’ deliberate strategy to allow gang references during the penalty phase,

there was no trial court error in admitting the evidence, and Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim.

H. Claim 42 - Defense Motions for Mistrial

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights when it denied five separate motions for mistrial. As

discussed below, Petitioner’s claim, with respect to each of the five motions for mistrial,

fails on the merits.

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1. Denial of Mistrial After Inquiries Regarding Threats to Eduardo (“Lalo”)

Sanchez

On redirect, the prosecutor asked Sanchez whether he had received any threats

with respect to his testimony in the case. (RT 13255.) Defense counsel objected that the

question was improper and beyond the scope of examination. (Id.) Outside the

presence of the jury, the prosecutor made an offer of proof that a defense investigator

had told Sanchez something to the effect that he better tell the truth or a bus might run

over him some day. (RT 13255-56.) Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial. 

Upon questioning outside the presence of the jury, Sanchez confirmed that on one

occasion, an investigator came up to him and indicated that something could happen to

him while he was waiting to catch a bus. (RT 13261-62.) The name of the investigator

was Paul. (RT 13263-64.) Sanchez told the investigator the same thing he testified to at

trial. (Id.) The investigator’s threat did not make him afraid to tell the truth, and he has

told the truth. (Id.) Defense counsel explained that the investigator was Paul Pickering,

who was employed by Hector, not Ronaldo. (RT 13265.) The prosecutor asserted that

Pickering was, however, accompanied by Hart, Petitioner’s investigator. (RT 13266.)

The trial court concluded that the prosecutor asked the question about threats to

Sanchez in good faith. (RT 13267.) The court noted that from a legal standpoint, it did

not matter which investigator delivered the threat, and gave defense counsel the option

of keeping out the testimony and instructing the jury that the prosecutor’s question was

not evidence. (RT 13266.) Defense counsel concluded that an admonition would not

cure the problem and chose to allow the testimony regarding Sanchez’s encounter with

Paul Pickering. (RT 13268.) 

On further redirect, Sanchez stated that he was not afraid to testify regarding what

he knew about the case. (RT 13270.) On further recross, Sanchez testified that Paul

told him, “If you don’t say the truth, when you – you can stay waiting for the bus and

something can happen to you.” (RT 13272.) Sanchez explained that he was not afraid

at the time of the threat and is still not afraid to tell the truth. (Id.) On further redirect,

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Sanchez said that he did not know that Paul was a defense investigator and confirmed

that Paul was accompanied by Eric Hart. (RT 13274-76.) 

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the trial

court violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion for mistrial. The California

Supreme Court explained:

The trial court ruled that the prosecutor had asked the question in good faith

and denied the motion for mistrial, which defendant made on state law

grounds. It did not abuse its discretion. The record, described above, supports

its conclusion that the prosecutor asked the question in good faith. Because

there was no prosecutorial misconduct as defined in state law, there was no

basis for a finding of mistrial.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 284.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the California Supreme Court’s decision was

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The record shows that the prosecutor had a factual

basis for asking the question regarding threats and did not commit misconduct. 

Furthermore, the trial court offered to exclude the testimony regarding Pickering’s

statement and to instruct the jury that the question was not evidence. The exclusion of

the testimony and the curative instruction would have minimized any damage that might

have been done by the question. Defense counsel’s decision to delve into what

Pickering said to Sanchez, as opposed to keeping out the evidence and having the jury

instructed that the question was not evidence, was a tactical choice, not an unavoidable

consequence of trial court error. 

Accordingly, the prosecutor’s question regarding threats to Sanchez did not "so

infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Similarly, the

prosecutor’s question did not have a "substantial or injurious effect in determining the

jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief on this claim.

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2. Denial of Mistrial After Detention of the Oteros

On the first day of trial, defense counsel complained to the court that plain-clothed

Sheriff’s deputies were accosting people attempting to come into the courtroom. (RT

11835-38.) According to defense counsel, one woman, Mrs. Otero, was accosted by

Deputies Apodaca and Roberson and was prevented from entering the courtroom. (RT

11838, 11861.) Upon examination by the court, Deputy Apodaca admitted that he

approached Mr. and Mrs. Otero as they were walking out of the courtroom. (RT 11863.) 

The jury had just left the courtroom and there were members of the public present. (RT

11864.) Deputy Apodaca explained that he quietly identified himself to the Oteros and

asked if he could speak to them down the hall. (RT 11863.) Apodaca requested

identification and then Mr. Otero raised his voice a little. (RT 11867.) Apodaca went

inside the courtroom to advise prosecutor Gloria Michaels of the situation. (Id.) Deputy

Roberson told the bailiff not to let the Oteros enter the courtroom until the deputies

received clarification from Ms. Michaels. (Id.) Ms. Michaels told the deputies that as long

as the individuals passed through the metal dectector, they could go into the courtroom. 

(RT 11866.) 

Deputy Apodaca explained that he thought that the District Attorney’s Office had

authorized him to ask for identification. (RT 11861.) However, nobody from the District

Attorney’s Office or the Sheriff’s Office ever said that he could ask for identification. (RT

11862.) He understood that his job was to provide perimeter security and look out for

suspicious looking people. (RT 11862.) The Oteros were the first people the deputies

had approached and asked for identification. (RT 11866.) The court emphasized that

the deputies were not to approach members of the public or stop them from entering the

courtroom. (RT 11862.) 

Defense counsel moved for mistrial, arguing that the jurors may very well have

seen defense counsel communicating with the Oteros. (RT 11868.) Apparently, the

Oteros were seated near defense counsel. (Id.) Defense counsel argued that the

deputies’ actions added to the “atmosphere of fear” that the prosecution was trying to

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1

 Defense counsel apparently never scheduled a hearing to present Mrs. Otero’s

testimony or the testimony of the other individuals who allegedly claimed that they were told

to move from certain seats in the courtroom.

47 01cv0741

create. (Id.) The trial court denied the motion for mistrial. (RT 11869.)

The next day, defense counsel asked the court to reconsider its ruling on the

motion for mistrial. (RT 11884.) Defense counsel offered the declaration of Mrs. Otero,

who apparently claimed that she was physically handled by one of the deputies. (RT

11885.) Defense counsel also represented that the deputies had told the Oteros and two

other individuals that certain seats were reserved and that they could not sit in them. (RT

11886.) Defense counsel argued that the deputies’ actions were intimidating to

spectators and posed a real threat to Petitioner’s right to a fair trial. (Id.) The

prosecution objected to the hearsay nature of the evidence presented by defense

counsel. (Id.) The court agreed that defense counsel would have to present the

witnesses for examination. (RT 11887.) Defense counsel indicated that they were

prepared to call Mrs. Otero and the other individuals who were told to move. (RT 11888.) 

The court responded, “If you desire to have that type of hearing to perfect your record,

schedule it on a Friday and subpoena the people.” (Id.) There is no record of any

subsequent hearing. 

The California Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Petitioner’s motion for mistrial. The California Supreme Court explained:

The trial court was able to gauge the extent of the disruption of the

proceedings and the effect on the jury, and found that nothing justified a

mistrial. On this record, we agree. The question is whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that the incident prejudiced the jurors against

defendant. (See In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d

403, 975 P.2d 600.) We discern no such likelihood.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 285.

The California Supreme Court’s decision was not unreasonable. The record

shows that there was one incident where Sheriff’s deputies approached the Oteros and

quietly requested identification.1 Jurors may or may not have seen the encounter. 

However, even assuming some jurors witnessed the incident, there was no reason for

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them to believe that the security measures were because Petitioner was dangerous or

involved with dangerous people. The security measures were not an inherently

prejudicial practice, see Morgan v. Aispuro, 946 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1991); King v.

Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354,1358 (9th Cir. 1992), and, contrary to Petitioner’s claims,

nothing about the incident “single[d] out [Petitioner] as a particularly dangerous or guilty

person.” (Petr’s Mem. at 81.) 

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the public was denied access to the trial. 

The deputies asked only the Oteros for their identification. Although the Oteros were

initially denied entry to the courtroom during a recess, the situation was quickly rectified

and they were allowed to enter the courtroom after going through the magnetometer.

(RT 11837.) Thereafter, the court explicitly admonished the deputies not to approach or

stop any other members of the public. There is no evidence that Petitioner was denied

his right to a public trial.

In sum, Petitioner has failed to show that the incident involving the Oteros denied

him his right to a public trial or so infected the trial as to deny him due process. See

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. Therefore, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13.

3. Denial of Mistrial After Wrongful Admission of Evidence of Petitioner’s

Prior Criminality

 Before Meza took the stand, he was admonished not to make any references to

the Mexican Mafia or to the fact that Petitioner had been in prison. (RT 14310-11.) 

During direct examination, Meza testified that he knew Petitioner since 1973 or 1974 and

knew Hector since 1975. The following exchange then took place:

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Q: Can you describe for us, say how frequently you would come across the

path of either – well, first of all, Ronaldo Ayala? How frequently would you

see him?” 

A: Dating that far back, it wouldn’t be very often. I’d hear a lot about him in

prison and – 

Ms. Semel: Your Honor

The Witness: – we didn’t actually – 

Ms. Semel: There’s a motion at this time.

(RT 14368-69.) 

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the

ground that Meza had made a deliberate attempt to place Petitioner’s status as a

convicted felon before the jury. (RT 14369.) The prosecutor argued that Meza was

referring to a time when he himself was in prison. (RT 14370.) Meza confirmed that this

was the case, and the court denied the motion for mistrial. The court gave defense

counsel the option of having Meza’s answer stricken or having Meza clarify his answer.

(RT 14371.) Defense counsel chose the latter option. When the jury returned, the

following testimony took place:

Q: Mr. Meza, when I was asking you some questions about how frequently you

saw Mr. Ayala, were you talking about a time in about 1975 or ‘76 when you,

yourself, were in prison?

A: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q: And was that as a result of a conviction for the crime of robbery?

A: Yes, it was.

Q: Now, with regard to your own contact with Mr. Ayala, let me ask you how

frequently – and just stick to this particular question – how frequently, say from the

time that you first met Hector Ayala did you come across him, actually, physically,

see him, or do something physically with him?

A: 1980, ‘81.

(RT 14372.)

Petitioner contends that the error was not cured by Meza’s subsequent testimony. 

According to Petitioner, Meza’s subsequent explanation strengthened the allusion to

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Petitioner’s prior criminality, the obvious implication being that Meza came across

Petitioner or saw him in 1975 when they were both in prison. The California Supreme

Court held otherwise:

Even if Meza's initial volunteered and nonresponsive comment -“I'd hear a lot

about [defendant] in prison” - was ambiguous, the prosecutor, at the court's

instruction following its denial of defendant's mistrial motion, erased any

ambiguity before the jury by asking Meza a question that made clear he was

discussing events during his own confinement in prison. He made no

suggestion that defendant was also in prison. The claim is without merit, and

the motion for mistrial was properly denied.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 285. 

The California Supreme Court’s decision was reasonable. Just because Meza

heard about Petitioner while Meza was in prison does not mean that Petitioner was in

prison as well. Similarly, it was unclear from Meza’s initial answer whether his limited

physical encounters with Petitioner were during the same time period that Meza

frequently heard about Petitioner in prison. It is possible that Meza saw Petitioner

infrequently prior to the time that Meza was incarcerated. Therefore, the fact that Meza

was incarcerated was not evidence of Petitioner’s criminal status. 

In any event, Petitioner brought out the fact that he was on parole in his case to

show that he was subject to urine tests. (Testimony of Parole Agent Williams, RT

14946.) The Court gave a limiting instruction in regard to Petitioner’s parole status. (RT

14948.)

Meza’s testimony that he heard about Petitioner while Meza was in prison did not

“so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. Indeed, the jury later heard through the defense

that Ayala was on parole and would infer that he had been prison. Therefore, Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas relief on this aspect of Claim 42.

/// 

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4. Denial of Mistrial After Meza and Mendoza Were Housed Together in 

the Same Protective Custody Unit

On September 23, 1988, Mendoza told the prosecution that he would recant his

testimony. (RT 16037.) The next day, he gave his taped interview. (RT 16037.) 

Subsequently, Mendoza was placed in protective custody at the South Bay facility of the

San Diego County Jail. Meza was also housed in the protective custody module of the

South Bay facility. (RT 16573-54.) On September 26, 1988, the prosecution informed

the Sheriff’s Department that it was permissible for Mendoza and Meza to talk to each

other. (RT 16551.) Mendoza testified in rebuttal on September 29, 1988. (RT 16329.)

On October 4, 1988, defense counsel moved to reopen its case based on their

discovery of Mendoza’s housing arrangements. (RT 16550.) Defense counsel’s motion

was based on Exhibit JJJJ, a document drafted by Deputy Sheriff Valdez that revealed

that someone with the prosecution gave permission for Mendoza and Meza to talk to

each other while in protective custody. (RT 16551.) Petitioner argued that by authorizing

Mendoza and Meza to talk to each other, the prosecution violated the court order

forbidding witnesses to discuss their testimony. (RT 16551-52.) Defense counsel

requested a mistrial or, in the alternative, permission to reopen its case and/or instruct

the jury regarding the effect of improper attempts to influence a witness’s testimony. (RT

16560.)

The prosecution pointed out that Mendoza’s taped recantation took place before

he was placed in protective custody. (RT 16553-54.) The prosecution also explained

that the reason why both men were in the South Bay protective custody module was

because downtown San Diego’s protective custody facility was not secure enough and

the El Cajon jail lacked protective custody housing. (Id.) In addition, the reason the

prosecution told the South Bay facility that Meza and Mendoza could interact was to

apprise the deputies that the men did not pose a danger to each other. (Id.)

Furthermore, just because the men could interact did not mean that they were not still

bound by the court’s order forbidding witnesses to discuss their testimony. (Id.)

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The trial court denied the defense motion, reasoning:

The court has no facts before it to show the scheme of the People to

procure false testimony. In point of fact this record would seem to speak to

just the opposite. The taping occurred well before this memo [Ex. JJJJ]. 

The reasons given for the placement certainly make sense in terms of

protecting inmates.

(RT 16562.) 

At the penalty phase, the court allowed the defense to present evidence that Meza

and Mendoza were housed together. Deputy Valdez testified that Mendoza was placed

in protective custody on September 26, 1988. (RT 17924.) At the time, there were two

other inmates in the four-cell protective custody module. (RT 17924-26.) Deputy Valdez

asked a representative of the District Attorney’s Office whether Mendoza could speak

with the other inmates because Valdez had safety concerns. (RT 17925.) Valdez

explained that protective custody inmates are allowed out of their cells to watch

television. If, however, the deputies have reason to believe that there is a conflict

between inmates, the inmates are released from their cells one at a time. (RT 17931.)

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court properly

denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen and motion for mistrial. The California Supreme

Court concluded that there was no prosecutorial misconduct and no irreparable damage

to Petitioner’s right to a fair trial: 

Defendant could produce no evidence that the prosecution enabled Mendoza

and Meza to confer and tailor their testimony, or that of Mendoza, or that

Mendoza's testimony was altered as a result of his lodging in the South Bay

jail. Nor was defendant denied any right to present a defense, or more

precisely, evidence relevant to the theory of his defense. Such a right does not

require “the court [to] allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters,” which

this surely was; rather, “the proffered evidence must have more than slight

relevanc[e].” (Ibid.) Finally, because informing defendant of the two men's

confinement arrangement would not have created a reasonable probability of

a different outcome, we discern no violation of the due process right to be

provided with favorable material evidence. Nor do we discern the denial of any

right to a reliable guilt and penalty determination.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 282.

The California Supreme Court’s decision was reasonable. The prosecution had a

valid explanation for why Mendoza and Meza were housed together and why permission

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was given for the two witnesses to interact. This evidence supports the California

Supreme Court’s conclusion that there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Furthermore,

because Mendoza and Meza were not housed together until after Mendoza recanted his

former testimony, there was no evidence of collusion. 

Petitioner argues that the fact that the prosecutor deliberately violated the court’s

order that witnesses not discuss their testimony violated Petitioner’s due process rights,

regardless of whether the violation had any effect on the trial. Petitioner cites several

cases for the proposition that the violation of a court order in and of itself constitutes a

due process violation. However, in each of these cases, the violation of the court order

had a negative impact on the defendant at trial. See Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647

(D. Tex. 1977) (failure to disclose that psychiatrist was going to testify regarding the

defendant’s “dangerousness” deprived defense of opportunity to effectively crossexamine psychiatrist and to present their own experts); State v. Butler, 255 Conn. 828

(Conn. 2001) (prosecutor’s improper remarks to the jury bolstered the credibility of the

government’s witness, the only witness who tied defendant to the murder); United States

v. Andrews, 824 F. Supp. 1273 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (evidence that government witnesses

were able to communicate with each other and share information before and during trial

was Brady material that reflected on the credibility, bias, and reliability of the

government’s witnesses). 

In Petitioner’s case, any violation of the trial court’s order did not have an effect on

the trial proceedings. Therefore, there was no due process violation, see Donnelly, 416

U.S. at 64, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

 5. Denial of Petitioner’s Motion for Mistrial Based on Admission of

 Mendoza Lopez’s Recantation Testimony

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial he

made after learning that Mendoza was going to recant his prior testimony on rebuttal. 

The California Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

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denying the motion for mistrial:

[Defense] counsel argued in essence that the jury would inevitably, in the

course of the parties' examination of Mendoza on rebuttal, have to hear

prejudicial evidence of his involvement with the Mexican Mafia. Counsel also

argued that defense counsel might be required to testify, and that some of

Mendoza's taped assertions impugned her integrity, so that counsel might

have a conflict of interest in continuing to represent defendant. But as we have

explained, ante, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at page 714, 1 P.3d at page 32, no

references to the Mexican Mafia resulted. With regard to a possible conflict

of interest, the motion was premature - Mendoza's taped statement did not

inevitably require testimony that might create a conflict of interest. The court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 285-86.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the California Supreme Court’s decision was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Here, Petitioner argues that his motion should have been granted because the defense

team based their entire defense strategy around the idea that gang references would not

be before the jury, foregoing opportunities to impeach prosecution witnesses when there

would be a risk of opening the door to the admission of gang evidence. According to

Petitioner, the entire defense strategy was destroyed by Mendoza’s recantation

testimony. However, Petitioner does not cite to any federal authority establishing a right

to a mistrial when defense counsel pursues a certain strategy that ends up falling short

due to unforeseen events that are not the fault of the court or the prosecution. Cf.,

Edwards v. United States, 265 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1959) (“There is no warrant of course

for relieving the accused of the consequences of what appears to have been a planned

defense stratagem, by the device of condemning as ‘clear error’ of the trial court a

seemingly calculated risk of defense counsel which happened not to achieve the

intended result with the jury.”) 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

///

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I. Claim 43 - Voluntariness of Meza’s Testimony

In this claim, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the

unreliable and involuntary statements of Juan Meza, and to exclude his trial testimony. 

1. Teague

Respondent argues that “Petitioner fails to cite any existing authority entitling him

to an indefinite hearing to demonstrate a witness’s testimony is coerced.” (Resp.’s MTD

at 61.) In response to the majority of Respondent’s Teague assertions, Petitioner argues

that he “seeks to impose no new obligation on the state but simply asks the state to

implement federal constitutional guarantees as set forth in then-existing decisional law.” 

(Petr.’s Reply at 5.)

With respect to this claim, Petitioner explains that he “moved to exclude the trial

testimony of Meza on the ground that it was involuntary,” and contends that the

admission of such evidence constituted a denial of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights to a fair trial.” (Pet. at 169.) Although Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in

curtailing his efforts during the 403 hearing to prove Meza’s testimony was coerced, the

thrust of his claim is that of a due process violation arising from the admission of Meza’s

testimony at trial.

Therefore, as with Claim 40, the Court reaches the determination that Petitioner

does not seek to apply a new law, but, rather seeks to apply to the facts of his case

established law that an improper admission of evidence at trial may, in certain

circumstances, constitute a due process violation. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501

U.S. 808, 824 (1991). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is not barred under Teague.

2. Merits

In a pretrial motion, Petitioner moved to suppress statements and exclude trial

testimony by Meza on the ground that Meza’s testimony was involuntary and was a

product of prosecutorial misconduct. According to the defense, Chacon used the fact

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that Meza was a Mexican Mafia drop-out to intimidate him and coerce him to testify

falsely.

The trial court held a hearing pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 403 to determine

whether Meza was testifying voluntarily. At the hearing, Meza testified that in 1987, while

he was incarcerated in the Vista jail (for possession for sale of narcotics), he spoke to his

attorney David McKenzie about providing information about the homicides. (RT 14224.) 

Meza stated his attorney did not threaten him or coerce him to provide the information.

(Id.) After the meeting with his attorney, he had about five meetings with Michael Rolan,

Gloria Michaels, Carlos Chacon, and his attorney. (RT 14225.) He was never

threatened by any of these people to provide information. (RT 14227.) Meza explained

that he was testifying voluntarily, not as a result of direct or implied threats by anyone. 

(RT 14228.) In exchange for Meza’s truthful testimony, the DA’s Office agreed to petition

the court for early release pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 11770(d), provide use

immunity, and provide protection to Meza and his family. (RT 14229-31.)

On cross-examination, the defense asked Meza about his relationship with

Chacon and Chacon’s visits with Meza in jail over the years. Meza testified that he had

known Chacon since 1965. (RT 14235.) After Meza was arrested in 1987, Chacon

came to see him in the South Bay jail. (RT 14234.) Meza was not aware that Chacon

kept a file on him. (RT 14237.) 

Meza testified that since 1983, he had seen Chacon about five or six times

(excluding the meetings with the DA’s Office in 1987). (RT 14247-48.) Meza did not

recall specifically discussing the Mexican Mafia during these meetings although “maybe

names were dropped.” (RT 14244.) Meza did not know that Chacon was involved with

gang investigations and did not discuss prison gangs during the visits. (RT 14248-49.) 

Meza became a member of the Mexican Mafia in 1978. (RT 14251.) The court

sustained the prosecution’s objection to questions regarding when Meza was no longer a

member of the Mexican Mafia. (RT 14252.) However, Meza subsequently testified that

he was not in the Mexican Mafia in 1985 or 1984. (RT 14254.)

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Meza recalled that in or about May 1985, when he was in custody on a probation

violation, he discussed the homicides and the Ayalas/Moreno with Chacon. (RT 14257-

59.) He did not ask Chacon for help in connection with the probation violation. (RT

14260.) Chacon and Meza did not discuss the fact that Meza had dropped out of the

Mexican Mafia and did not talk about what Chacon could do for him in that regard. (RT

14261.) Chacon did not offer to help him in anyway for the information. (Id.) Meza did

not recall discussing what happens to Mexican Mafia drop-outs or Chacon expressing

concern for his safety or offering protection. (RT 14263.) 

Meza recalled that Chacon visited him again later in 1985. (RT 14265.) Meza did

not recall whether the homicides were discussed during this meeting. (RT 14266.) In

1986, Meza ran into Chacon on the street. (RT 14268.) During this encounter, they did

not discuss the Mexican Mafia, the homicides, gangs, or people involved in gangs. (RT

14268.) 

In 1987, Meza contacted Chacon. (RT 14267.) At this time, Meza was in

protective custody due to his status as an EME drop-out, and Meza discussed that

arrangement with Chacon. (RT14271.) Chacon did not express concern for his safety. 

(Id.) During this meeting, Meza talked about Hector in connection with the homicides. 

(RT 14273.) Chacon did not ask Meza what he could do to help Meza with his criminal

case. (RT 14274.) Meza talked to Chacon again about two weeks later. (RT 14277-78.) 

During this meeting, Chacon asked for information regarding prison gang activity and

Meza provided him with the information. (Id.) Meza also provided information regarding

the homicides and the Ayalas and Moreno. (RT 14280-81.)

Meza testified that Chacon was present during the meetings with the DA’s Office

at Meza’s request. (RT 14283.) Meza did not recall asking everyone to leave except for

Chacon. (RT 14284.) Meza had not seen Chacon since July 1987. (RT 14286.)

Meza denied asking the DA’s office for anything in exchange for his testimony

during the first, second, or third meeting. (RT 1487-88.) Since going to state prison in

1987, he met with the DA’s office three times. (RT 14285.) The DA’s office did not show

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him reports or documents to help his recollection. (RT 14267.)

The trial court imposed some limits on the scope of the defense’s questioning of

Meza. Defense counsel argued that Chacon’s process of intimidation involved seeing

Meza whenever he was in jail, soliciting information from him, doing favors for him, and

letting him know what information Chacon had on him. (RT 14238-39.) Therefore,

defense counsel argued, it was necessary to inquire into the number of visits, what was

said in each visit, what threats were made, what promises were made, and what

information was extracted. (Id.) The court ruled that defense counsel could inquire

whether, as to any or all of the meetings between Chacon and Meza, there was

intimidation as to the content or conduct of the meetings. However, the court cautioned,

“I’m not going to go through a discovery process or a deposition in terms of what they

discussed in all those instances. If you can focus, and get to the issue of intimidation by

Detective Chacon, whether the Mexican Mafia is used as [a] source of intimidation, fine,

do it.” (RT 14241.)

Accordingly, the trial court sustained the prosecution’s objections to general

questions regarding how many times Chacon saw Meza in jail and whether Chacon

visited Meza in jail in May 1985. (RT 14236-37.) Meza provided testimony regarding

both of these topics later in the hearing. (RT 14247-48, 14257-59.) The trial court also

sustained the prosecution’s objection to a question regarding whether the names

“dropped” by Meza during the meetings with Chacon had any relation to the Mexican

Mafia and questions regarding when Meza left the Mexican Mafia. (RT 14246, 14252-

54.) Meza testified that he was no longer in the Mexican Mafia in 1984 or 1985. (RT

14254.)

Eventually, the court brought the hearing to a close, observing that it seemed that

defense counsel was on “a fishing expedition” and that Meza’s testimony did not tie in to

the defense’s offer of proof. (RT 14294.) Defense counsel objected that the trial court

had foreclosed pertinent areas of inquiry into the relationship between Chacon and Meza. 

The trial court rejected defense counsel’s claim that the court had tied the defense’s

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hands: 

Miss Semel, you made an offer of proof with reference to Detective

Chacon. It’s somewhat interesting to the court that a part of my ruling in

this case has been to keep out of the hearing of jurors any gang affiliation. 

Your offer of proof went to the fact that gang affiliation would – or possibly

would show a motive in terms of intimidation in terms of Mr. Meza’s

testimony. It was with that idea in mind, and basically me thinking that

maybe if in fact there was talk about gangs, if in fact he provided

information, these questions I allowed you to ask Miss Semel, then very

conceivably Detective Chacon might say, “Well, if you don’t continue to

provide the information, if you don’t do what I ask that you do, then I’m

going to turn you to the wolves,” basically intimidation for testimony.

I allowed that inquiry and it turned up absolutely nothing, this over

the objection of the People, over the objection of the previous rulings of the

court that gang affiliation has absolutely nothing to do with the issues before

the court; but certainly in terms of whether or not Mr. Meza’s appearance is

voluntary, I allowed that inquiry.

You indicated a relationship between Mr. Meza and Detective

Chacon that in and of itself some way would establish a – nonvoluntariness

of Mr. Meza’s presence. With that offer of proof, I certainly have allowed

you to establish the nature of that relationship, how often, when, whether or

not things were discussed concerning the Mexican Mafia, what was said by

Detective Chacon ostensibly to procure the testimony. All of these things,

again over objection, I’ve allowed based on your offer of proof.

The answers that have been forthcoming certainly aren’t prejudged

by the court. The answers are the answers to those questions.

Now I gather from your comment you want to go into detail as to

what was discussed in every conversation that occurred with Mr. Meza and

any person that he happed to talk to; and you’re absolutely correct, the

court is sustaining the objection. That won’t happen.

 (RT 14298-300.)

The California Supreme Court held that there was no merit to Petitioner’s claim

that the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by

failing to give him an adequate opportunity to try to prove that the People coerced the

testimony Meza gave against him at trial. The state court reasoned: 

[T]he record shows that he was able to question Meza about whether he had

been coerced, and he denied that he had been. [¶] In People v. Badgett,

supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 351, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, we stated that

“if the issue is not litigated below because the defendant has been precluded

by an erroneous ruling on standing from attempting to carry his burden of

demonstrating that third party testimony is coerced, there will not be an

adequate record for the appellate court to review.” Defendant asserts that this

error occurred in his case. But the record shows that the trial court gave him

sufficient opportunity to show that Meza's testimony was coerced. Defense

counsel was unable to establish any coercion in her examination of Meza, and

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in fact she established the opposite. The factual predicate of defendant's

claim of constitutional error is faulty, and so the claim itself is unavailing.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 271.

The California Supreme Court’s decision is supported by the record. Defense

counsel was given ample opportunity to question Meza regarding any direct or implied

threats by Chacon. Despite the latitude granted by the court, defense counsel was

unable to prove that there was any coercion. The 403 hearing was not for the purpose of

giving the defense the opportunity to conduct discovery and test out their theories.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in placing limits on the defense’s inquiry and

ultimately bringing the hearing to a close.

The Court notes that even if the trial court erroneously limited the examination of

Meza, there is no evidence offered by Petitioner that the answers would have countered

Meza’s own assertions of no coercion. Any subtle inferences of coercion would not have

precluded Meza’s testimony, but, rather, would have been properly presented to the jury

as part of the cross-examination. Because there was no clear evidence that Meza’s

testimony was involuntary, there was no violation of due process by its admission. The

right of confrontation accorded Petitioner was the safeguard allowing the jury to

determine whether Meza’s testimony was truthful or coerced. The rejection of this claim

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. Therefore, Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

J. Claim 44 - Statements of Deceased Witnesses

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by denying his motion to admit testimony by private investigators Bill

Papenhausen and Carlos Vasquez regarding statements made by deceased witnesses

Ignacio Vejar and Arthur Castro. Petitioner also alleges that if it were not for the

prosecution’s late filing of its notice of aggravating factors pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §

190.3, Vejar and Castro would have been alive to testify at trial. 

In a pretrial motion in limine, Petitioner requested the court to admit statements

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made by Vejar and Castro to defense investigators Papenhausen and Vasquez. 

Petitioner submitted declarations by Papenhausen and Vasquez summarizing the

statements of the deceased witnesses.

Papenhausen explained that Castro was interviewed at Folsom State Prison by

himself and defense counsel. According to Castro, he went to the body shop the day

before the homicides to purchase heroin from Dominguez. (CT 4831-32.) He had never

met Dominguez but was referred to him by a friend. (Id.) When he arrived at the body

shop, Castro heard arguing coming from the office area. (CT 4832.) 

Castro observed three men speaking in Spanish. (CT 4832.) The men initially

stopped talking when they saw Castro, but continued arguing, apparently thinking that

Castro did not speak Spanish. Castro speaks Spanish fluently and understood that the

men were arguing about $20,000 or $40,000. Castro went across the street and bought

a beer. When he returned, he observed three males driving away in a large car with blue

and white Mexican plates. Two of the men had been arguing with Dominguez in the

office. All three were from the other side of the border - one was wearing a white

guyabera shirt.

After the three men left, Dominguez came of out of the garage and introduced

himself. (CT 4832.) Dominguez seemed irritated and angry. Castro decided that he was

not going to deal with Dominguez but asked Dominguez if he could “try some stuff” out of

politeness. Dominguez said that he did not have any. Castro felt that the three male

Mexicans were Dominguez’s “connection.” According to Papenhausen, Castro

accurately described Dominguez’s office and Dominguez’s physical appearance. (CT

4833.) Papenhausen reinterviewed Castro on March 21, 1988. Castro provided

Papenhausen with the same information.

Vasquez declared that he and Robert Boyce interviewed Vejar on August 24,

1988. (CT 4834.) Vejar explained that on the date of the homicides, he drove his brother

Henry to work at the tire shop at about 8:00 or 9:00 in the morning. Vejar returned to the

tire shop at about 6:00 p.m. All the businesses appeared to be closed – the large

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corrugated door of the body shop was shut. Pelon and Bobby Garcia told Vejar that

Henry had just left but would be back. (CT 4835.) Vejar sat down in front of the tire shop

to wait for Henry. During this time, Pelon went in and out of the ice cream truck and

Vejar could hear a baseball game in the background. Bobby Garcia came out of the ice

cream truck and asked Vejar if he wanted a beer. Vejar declined the beer but said that

he would like an ice cream bar. Garcia and Vejar went across the street to purchase an

ice cream bar.

When Garcia and Vejar returned, Garcia left in the direction of the ice cream truck. 

(CT 4835.) The ice cream truck was blocking Vejar’s view of the body shop. A short time

later he heard a shot and saw Castillo run into the street and fall down. Castillo was

laying face down with his head pointed away from the body shop and was bleeding. 

Castillo remained in that position until the police and Vejar helped Castillo out of the

street and over to the patrol car. 

According to Vejar, ten to fifteen minutes passed from the first gun shot to the time

Castillo was moved to the patrol car. (CT 4835.) Castillo told Vejar that he did not want

to talk about what had happened. (CT 4836.) While the police officers, Vejar, and

Castillo were standing near the police unit, they heard three shots from the garage area. 

(CT 4836.) They did not see anyone running from the garage area. Vejar suggested to

the black officer that he go around the back to see if anyone was there. The officer

appeared hesitant and suggested opening the door. Vejar and one of the officers began

to open the garage door. (CT 4837.) When the garage door was partially open, they

heard a sound and the officer dropped the door. Vejar suggested that they try to open

the door again. While they were holding the door open, more police arrived and pulled

Vejar away. Vejar did not think “the ice cream truck boys” expected him to be present.

 

1. State Court’s Decision 

The California Supreme Court held that the trial court did not violate Petitioner’s

constitutional rights by refusing to admit the hearsay statements of Vejar and Castro. 

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The California Supreme Court also held that there was no merit to Petitioner’s claim that

he was entitled to relief because improper delays on the prosecution’s part caused the

unavailability of Vejar and Castro at trial.

The California Supreme Court explained:

The question presented in this claim is whether defendant had either a

constitutional or a state law right to present exculpatory but unreliable hearsay

evidence that is not admissible under any statutory exception to the hearsay

rule. We hold that he did not.

. . . .

In denying defendant's motion to introduce the statements, the trial court

implied that they could be introduced if they showed aspects of

“trustworthiness, or other indicia of reliability.” But it found that they did not

have such indicia. The court also concluded that other witnesses had already

provided evidence that Castillo did not want to discuss events immediately

after being shot and stabbed, and so Vejar's statement would be cumulative

in that regard.

Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (b) provides that “Except as provided

by law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible,” and the parties do not point to any

provision of the Evidence Code that would provide an exception to the hearsay

rule for the purported witness statements. But “'[l]aw' includes . . . decisional

law” (Evid. Code, § 160), and California decisional law includes our own

comment that “exceptions to the hearsay rule are not limited to those

enumerated in the Evidence Code; they may also be found in . . . decisional

law” (In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 376 [272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d

1244]), and our affirmation of that principle in In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th

15, 26 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 803, 947 P.2d 1340].

Nevertheless, defendant cites no law of this state, whether “constitutional,

statutory, [or] decisional” (Evid. Code, § 160), that would have required the trial

court to permit the investigators to testify about Castro's and Vejar's

statements. He relies on In re Carmen O. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 908 [33

Cal.Rptr.2d 848]. Carmen O. applied the rule that the appellate courts of this

state may recognize exceptions to the hearsay rule beyond those listed in the

Evidence Code. It created an exception for the out-of-court statement of

four-year-old Carmen O. that her father had sexually abused her.

In In re Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th 15, we approved Carmen O.'s creation of

a judicially announced exception to the hearsay rule, and refined the rule

ourselves. But we warned that “in developing new exceptions to the hearsay

rule, courts must proceed with caution. The general rule that hearsay evidence

is inadmissible because it is inherently unreliable is of venerable common law

pedigree.” (Id. at p. 27.) And we stated that appellate courts “may not create

evidentiary exceptions in conflict with statute.” ( Id. at p. 28.) We approved of

the exception announced in Carmen O. because it was needed to effectively

prosecute child sexual abuse cases with reticent, very young direct witnesses.

(See also In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1238-1239 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d

56, 998 P.2d 1019] (plur. opn.).) 

There is, by contrast, no proper exception to the hearsay rule that would have

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permitted defendant to introduce Castro's and Vejar's statements. There are

no indicia of reliability surrounding those statements even remotely similar to

those that have justified the exception for certain hearsay statements of very

young children. Via cross-examination or further investigation the prosecutors

might have discovered evidence, for example, that defendant had coerced

Castro and Vejar into making them, just as they had introduced evidence that

he induced Rafael Mendoza Lopez to perjure himself regarding the presence

of Mexican men at the body shop on the day of the murders. Indeed, that part

of Castro's statement referring to Mexican visitors buttressed aspects of

Mendoza's initial testimony, which Mendoza himself later repudiated as having

been fabricated at defendant's behest. Moreover, on cross-examination the

prosecution could have questioned Castro about why Dominguez and the

Mexican visitors would continue to discuss large sums of money in front of a

total stranger, particularly if it involved sales of heroin, and about the basis for

his view that they thought he could not understand Spanish. There was no

state law error.

Defendant urges, as noted, that the trial court infringed on various

constitutional guaranties when it barred the jury from hearing potentially

exculpatory evidence. But it did not. “Few rights are more fundamental than

that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. [Citations.] [But

i]n the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must

comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure

both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.”

(Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 284, 302 [93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049].)

Thus, “[a] defendant does not have a constitutional right to the admission of

unreliable hearsay statements.” (Com. v. Piper (1997) 426 Mass. 8, 11 [686

N.E.2d 191, 194]; accord, People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1123 [31

Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36].) Moreover, both we (People v. Hawthorne

(1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 56 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118]) and the United

States Supreme Court (United States v. Scheffer (1998) 523 U.S. 303, 316

[118 S.Ct. 1261, 1268, 140 L.Ed.2d 413]) have explained that Chambers is

closely tied to the facts and the Mississippi evidence law that it considered.

Chambers is not authority for the result defendant urges here.

The foregoing principles were applied to a case with facts similar to the matter

herein in State v. Bunyan (1998) 154 N.J. 261 [712 A.2d 1091].) In Bunyan,

the defendant, convicted of murder, had sought to introduce the exculpatory

hearsay statement of a witness who later died. The witness, shown a

photograph of Bunyan out of court, told an investigator that he was not the

killer. The witness refused to execute a written statement before dying.

Moving for a new trial, Bunyan sought to introduce the investigator's affidavit

memorializing his conversation with the witness. The New Jersey Supreme

Court held that the statement was inadmissible hearsay under state law, and

that relevant provisions of the federal Constitution (it emphasized the right to

a fair trial) did not compel its consideration. “There is no 'particularized

guarantee[ ] of [its] trustworthiness.' [Citation.] Her statement was not against

her interests. She made it years after the crime occurred. After making her

statement to a private investigator, [she] immediately threatened to disavow

it. Additionally, . . . there will be no opportunity to cross-examine [her; she] is

now deceased. And [her] statement . . . was not spontaneous. On the

contrary, she gave it in response to questions posed by a private investigator

defendant hired.” (State v. Bunyan, supra, 154 N.J. 261, 271 [712 A.2d 1091,

1095-1096].)

Not all of these factors apply to the statements of Castro and Vejar. Castro's

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statement may have been against his interest: he was admitting that he had

gone to the body shop to buy heroin; but on the other hand, Papenhausen

interviewed him in prison and double jeopardy might have barred any

prosecution for Castro's act. As far as is known, neither witness disavowed his

statement after making it; indeed, Papenhausen's affidavit declared that

Castro later reaffirmed his statement. Nevertheless, other factors mentioned

in Bunyan are significant: the statements were given to a person seeking

exculpatory evidence, they were not spontaneous, and there was no

opportunity for cross-examination. California has an interest “in ensuring that

reliable evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial.” (United

States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. 303, 309 [118 S.Ct. 1261, 1268].) Given

the potential unreliability of Castro's and Vejar's statements and the evidence

of defendant's attempt to supply false evidence to the jury that bore a similarity

to Castro's statement, we are unable to discern any constitutional violation in

the trial court's refusal to admit the investigators' accounts of those

statements.

Defendant also renews a claim that improper delays in bringing his case to trial

caused the delay that in turn caused Castro and Vejar to become unavailable

because of death. His claim is perfunctory, and he does not cite any statute,

rule, or legal tenet that the prosecution may have violated. The claim is without

merit.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th 266-70.

2. Merits

The Court concludes that the California Supreme Court’s decision was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), did not generally hold that a

defendant is denied a fair opportunity to defend himself whenever a state or federal rule

excludes favorable evidence. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 316 (1998). The

ruling of Chambers was limited to the “facts and circumstances” of that particular case. 

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300.

The facts and circumstances of this case are vastly different from those of

Chambers. The testimony in Chambers was “critical” to the defense because it

established that someone else confessed to the murders. Petitioner does not explain

why the statements of Vejar, which did not reveal any remarkable information, were

critical to the defense. Petitioner argues that Castro’s statements were invaluable

because he saw three Mexican men, which was consistent with Castillo’s initial claim that

three Mexican men had committed the murders and Mendoza’s testimony on direct that

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he saw some Mexicans at the shop on the day of the killings. However, Castro saw the

men the day before the homicides. Castro did not provide reasons for his conclusions

that the men he saw were from across the border and were Dominguez’s drug

connection. In addition, Castro did not provide any physical descriptions that would link

the men he saw with the men described by Castillo. Although Castro’s statements might

have helped the defense argue that Castillo and Mendoza were telling the truth the first

time around, the evidence was not directly exculpatory. See United States v. Fowlie, 24

F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Chambers on the ground that the hearsay

evidence in Chambers was directly exculpatory whereas the hearsay evidence at issue in

the case before it had an attenuated connection to the defendant’s innocence). 

In addition, as reasoned by the California Supreme Court, there was insufficient

indicia of reliability. Vejar and Castro made their statements in response to questions by

defense investigators. There was no opportunity for cross-examination. In addition,

there was no substantial corroborating evidence. The fact that Castro accurately

described Dominguez and his office carries little significance; Castro could have gathered

this information if he had visited the body shop at anytime or talked to someone else who

was familiar with Dominguez and the shop. There is no direct link between the three

Mexican men Castro claims he saw the day before the homicides and the Mexicans

described by Mendoza on direct or the three Mexicans initially described by Castillo. 

Vejar’s statements regarding the timing and sequence of events on the night of the

homicides were contradicted by witnesses including Castillo, Officers Weston and

McElroy, Miguel Lopez and Traci Pittman, whose testimony established that the police

arrived on the scene after all of the gunshots had been fired. Furthermore, according to

the prosecution, a review of Castro’s records revealed that Castro had 24 convictions, 16

of which were for felonies, and had used thirteen different aliases, six dates of birth, and

five social security numbers. (CT 4863.) Thus, the reliability of his statements, especially

without cross-examination, was clearly suspect. Ultimately, there would have been a real

risk that the jury would have believed that Castro, who was in prison, had similar fears as

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Mendoza Lopez and therefore gave false seemingly helpful information to Petitioner’s

investigators. If there was error in the preclusion of these statements, there was no

prejudice. The state court’s adjudication of this aspect of Claim 44 was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

With respect to Petitioner’s argument of improper delay, Petitioner has failed to

show that any delay caused by the prosecution was purposeful or a result of bad faith

tactics. Petitioner does not identify any legal authority establishing that in the absence of

prosecutorial misconduct, the unforseen deaths of defense witnesses before trial is a

ground for habeas relief. Therefore, the state court’s denial of this aspect of Claim 44 is

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. 

K. Claim 45 - Evidence of Collusion Between Meza and Mendoza Lopez

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen to present

evidence of collusion between Mendoza and Meza violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

1. Merits

For the reasons discussed in connection with Claim 42 (denial of motion for

mistrial based on the fact that Mendoza and Meza were housed together), supra,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. There was no showing that the

housing of Meza and Mendoza in the same unit affected either witness’s testimony.

L. Claim 46 - Excusal of Jurors Who Disfavored Capital Punlishment

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in improperly excluding from the venire

three jurors who, while having reservations about capital punishment, remained able to

perform their duties as instructed by the court, in violation of Petitioner’s rights under the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

///

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1. State Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on direct appeal, rejecting it

as follows:

Defendant contends that the trial court violated the Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it excused

certain prospective jurors. He claims that he received a lack of due process

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and denial of his right to a

reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

A juror may be excused for cause based on his or her views concerning capital

punishment only if they would prevent or substantially impair the performance

of the duties defined by the trial court’s instructions and the juror’s oath. (Ross

v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 85, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80

[speaking of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment].) As a

general matter, “‘the determinant is ‘whether the juror’s views about capital

punishment would prevent or impair the juror’s ability to return a verdict of

death in the case before the juror.”’ [Citation.] If the prospective juror’s

responses to voir dire questions are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s

determination of the juror’s true state of mind is binding upon the reviewing

court.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1318-1319, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d

145, P.2d 259.)

On Hovey voir dire (Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80-81, 168

Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301), the trial court granted the prosecution’s

challenges to Prospective Jurors Marie B., Fidelia C., and Bertram E. for

cause.

When the trial court asked Marie B. if she would vote against a first degree

murder verdict or find false a special circumstance allegation “just to avoid the

penalty issue,” she stated, “I would have to avoid the penalty issue. I do not

believe in capital punishment and the death penalty.” In response to another

question, she stated that it would be “difficult” to impose the death penalty no

matter what evidence was presented.

On examination by counsel for the defendant, Marie B. retreated somewhat

from the implications of her initial comments, or gave answers inconsistent

with them. She clarified that she could find defendant guilty or not guilty

despite her opposition to the death penalty. Still, she found the punishment

“barbaric” and she “could not impose it.” In response to another question,

however, she stated that she could put aside her feelings and follow the

court’s instructions, even if she did not “believe I could be in favor of anyone

getting the death penalty.”

But on further examination by the prosecutor, Marie B. agreed that the

prosecution would be “wasting its time,” in the prosecutor’s words, to ask her

to return a verdict of death.

The trial court ruled in essence that Marie B.’s opposition to the death penalty

either substantially impaired or entirely negated her ability to follow her oath

as a juror. 

Fidelia C. also stated, in answer to the trial court’s question, that it would be

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difficult to impose the death penalty no matter what evidence was presented.

On examination by counsel for defendant, the prospective juror wavered. She

answered essentially in the affirmative leading questions about her ability to

follow her oath. But then she volunteered that she did not “want to be part of

a jury if it comes to a death penalty or life in prison,” “because it is going to be

in my conscience. I don’t want to be the one who decides” on life or death.

Counsel reverted to leading questions, and Fidelia C. stated that she thought

she could follow the law.

Examined by the prosecutor, Fidelia C. gave inconsistent answers. She

denied being in the group of people who would be so preoccupied with the

question of penalty that she could not consider defendant’s guilt or the truth

of the special circumstance allegations. This answer came in answer to a

compound question that asked her, in part, whether she could not sit on a

death penalty case because she opposed the penalty. The nature of the

question left her response ambiguous. In the next question, the prosecutor

asked directly whether Fidelia C. would “want to decide” on life or death, and

she said no, because she opposed capital punishment. But asked whether

that feeling would “make it very difficult for you to return a verdict of death, no

matter what you heard,” she responded, “I don’t know. I really don’t know

now.”

The prosecutor continued. She asked her own series of leading questions,

which generated equivocal answers. Defense counsel asked more questions,

receiving more equivocal answers; the trial court could not hear one of them.

Finally, the trial court asked Fidelia C., “are you indicating . . . that assuming

that you are at the penalty phase and assuming that in your heart you felt that

death was the appropriate penalty, would you be able to come into court and

voice a vote for the death penalty? Would you be able to do that?” She

answered, “I don’t think so, your Honor.”

After hearing argument from both parties, the trial court ruled that Fidelia C.

would be excused for cause. “It is painfully clear,” the court explained, “that

the notion of a death penalty verdict is something that she would be incapable

of doing even if the evidence justifies that in her mind . . . Her whole demeanor

is one of trepidation, fear and indeed extreme emotional pain just at the

thought of being included on this particular jury. [¶] I think it is also clear . . .

just during the first phase of the trial that she would be substantially impaired

because of a preoccupation with maybe having to deal with the issue of the

death penalty, that she could not be fair to the facts or to the parties.”

Bertram E., who had served on approximately three juries, answered the

court’s questions by stating that he did not “believe in the death penalty . . . [¶]

. . . [¶] [u]nder certain circumstances,” and that he “would be prepared to say

the person isn’t guilty. I kind of feel the death penalty hasn’t proved anything

heretofore as far as being a deterrent to murder.”

Questioned by counsel for defendant, Bertram E. retreated, stating that he

could follow an instruction to consider guilt without contemplating punishment.

Bertram E. also stated that he was not automatically opposed to the death

penalty. He could impose it in cases involving airplane hijacking with hostages

or the sale of large amounts of narcotic drugs. With regard to murder

simpliciter, he stated, “we have murdered other people because they have

murdered somebody. That hasn’t deterred it in the past . . . I don’t think it will

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deter [murder] in the future. Consequently, I don’t think that it’s effective.” He

also stated that if he were punished for murder, he would prefer execution to

life imprisonment.

Informed by defense counsel that the case involved allegations of the sale of

narcotics, and over the prosecution’s objection that she was asking the

prospective juror to prejudge the case, (an objection that the trial court later

agreed was proper, but overruled anyway so as to obtain the most information

possible), Bertram E. said that “you can’t kill a person for having a few

marijuana cigarettes in his pocket. But if he had a couple hundred

thousand...marijuana cigarettes in his possession, he’s affecting that many

people, cocaine, or heroin, or whatever. Then I would come down much

harder on that person . . . .” Thus, he agreed in response to counsel’s words,

which are quoted in this sentence, that the involvement of a large quantity of

drugs would be a “factor” that could lead him to impose “a more severe

punishment.”

The prosecutor then questioned Bertram E. She asked him again whether he

would avoid convicting defendant of a crime or finding true a special

circumstance allegation that would make him death eligible. Bertram E.

hesitated, then said “I would have to say my answer is yes on that.” The

prosecutor pointed out that the case was a murder case, not a drugs or

hijacking case, and Bertram E. acknowledged that under that circumstance he

would only vote for life imprisonment, even if he was able to consider the

presence of drugs as a circumstance of the crimes during the penalty phase.

Counsel then argued whether Bertram E. should be excused for cause.

Defendant’s counsel agreed that his answers were in “clear conflict” and

“equivocal.”

The trial court ruled that Bertram E. was “very clear that he . . . would not

consider the death penalty” “for a triple homicide.” It ruled that the prospective

juror did not have “an open mind,” and that his ability to follow the law was

“substantially impaired.”

In excusing the prospective jurors for cause, the trial court ruled that they could

not impose the death penalty against defendant even if they thought the

evidence merited it. That determination of their state of mind is binding on us.

State law required the court to excuse them, for they acknowledged their

inability “to act with the ‘entire impartiality’ required of jurors.” (People v.

Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 183 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; see now

Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C) [same].) There was no constitutional

impediment to the exercise of state law, for their ability to perform their duties

was at least substantially impaired – in fact their views prevented them from

following the law. The court did not deprive defendant of due process or

violate any other constitutional guaranty by excusing the prospective jurors.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 257-261.

2. Merits

The United States Supreme Court has held that a sentence of death cannot be

upheld if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding prospective

jurors who expressed opinions against the death penalty, but remained willing to follow

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the law as instructed by the trial court. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23

(1968). The Supreme Court further held that “a juror may not be challenged for cause

based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or

substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his

instructions and his oath.” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); Wainwright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985) (affirming the Adams standard as the proper means by which

to evaluate a claim of juror exclusion due to his or her views on capital punishment).

Appellate review of a trial court’s decision regarding issues arising from juror voir dire is

obligatorily deferential, as a “reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from

voir dire, is not as well-positioned as the trial court to make credibility determinations.” 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003).

In response to an initial Hovey question posed by the trial court regarding whether

she would automatically vote not guilty or fail to find the special circumstances true to

avoid a penalty phase, Marie Brunner answered, “I would have to avoid the penalty issue. 

I do not believe in capital punishment and the death penalty.” (RT 7423.) While Ms.

Brunner affirmed that she could be fair on the guilt phase, when asked if she could

envision a situation in which the death penalty was justified, she replied, “Oh certainly,

but I – I could not impose it,” and added, “I just feel it’s barbaric, period.” (RT 7425,

7427.) Responding to further questions concerning her ability to follow the trial court’s

instructions regarding capital punishment, Ms. Brunner maintained, “I would follow his

instructions. I would consider it, but I still don’t believe I could be in favor of anyone

getting the death penalty.” (RT 7428.)

Ms. Brunner then agreed with the prosecutor, who queried whether he would be

wasting his time trying to convince her to vote for the death penalty, adding, “I do not

want to take that responsibility.” (RT 7429-30.) Even after repeated questions on her

ability to impose the death penalty, Ms. Brunner stated in turn, “I do not want to take that

responsibility” and “I do not believe I could.” (RT 7430.) During argument, defense

counsel voiced their concern regarding keeping jurors who could be fair in the guilt

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phase, but appeared to concede Ms. Brunner’s inability to be fair during the penalty

phase. (RT 7431.) Ultimately, the trial court concluded, “It’s clear, in this court’s opinion,

that she does in fact qualify for exclusion, or a challenge based on Witherspoon and

Witt.” (Id.) 

Fidela Camero answered affirmatively the trial court’s inquiry on whether her views

were such that it would be hard for her to vote for the death penalty no matter the

circumstances. (RT 8340.) Many of Ms. Camero’s answers to the questions posed by

both the trial court and counsel were variations on “I think so,” or “I don’t know.” (RT

8342, 8344, 8345; 8346, 8347, 8348, 8354.) However when Ms. Camero was asked if

she could have an open mind as to punishment, she answered, “But, well, I said earlier

that I don’t want to be part of a jury if it comes to a death penalty or life in prison,” adding,

“because it is going to be in my conscience. I don’t want to be the one who decides for a

person’s life or something.” (RT 8344-45.) 

Ms. Camero admitted that she was personally against the death penalty. (RT

8347.) She then informed the court that the prospect of being a juror on the trial “is

causing me a big problem at home, because I can’t sleep.” (RT 8349.) She stated, “I

have been thinking about it, you know, for a long time.” (Id.) When asked if she could

return a death penalty verdict against the defendant in open court, Ms. Camero

responded, “I don’t think I can face that.” (RT 8351.) Ms. Camero said that she was

unsure if she could even handle sitting as a jury member for the guilt phase of trial: “I

don’t know if I can do that. It would be so hard for me thinking of punishment.” (RT

8354.)

Defense counsel argued Ms. Camero’s answers “were equivocal. They were not

absolute,” and pointed out that jurors who equivocated on the other side of the death

penalty issue were allowed to stay on the panel. (RT 8356.) The trial court ultimately

disagreed, concluding:

Clearly because a juror is conscientious or a juror believes this is, in

fact, a serious case, that it is a case that involves a searching of the soul, if

you will, does not exclude a juror, nor does it make a juror substantially

impaired. Miss Camero goes beyond that. I think the answers are not

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equivocal.

It is painfully clear that the notion of a death penalty verdict is

something that she would be incapable of doing even if the evidence

justifies that in her mind . . . . I think it is also clear in terms of substantial

impairment just during the first phase of the trial that she would be

substantially impaired because of a preoccupation with maybe having to

deal with the issue of the death penalty, that she could not be fair to the

facts or the parties.

Miss Camero is an excludable juror under the Witt standard as being

substantially impaired. 

(RT 8356-57.)

When asked whether he may consider voting not guilty or false as to the special

circumstances during the guilt phase to avoid a potential penalty phase, Bertram Estwick

stated, “If I were to be honest I would feel that I would have to consider the death penalty

and maybe in that sense say, yes, I would be prepared to say the person isn’t guilty. I

kind of feel the death penalty hasn’t proved anything heretofore as far as being a

deterrent to murder.” (RT 8879.) Despite this statement, Mr. Estwick affirmed he could

follow the court’s instructions during the first phase of trial. (RT 8883.) Mr. Estwick also

believed the death penalty was justified in certain circumstances, such as hijacking and

the sale of narcotics. (RT 8884-85.) When it came to imposing the death penalty for

homicide, Mr. Estwick opined, “[t]he crime of murder, we have murdered other people

because they murdered somebody. That hasn’t deterred it in the past. We have been

doing this since the beginning of time. I don’t think it will deter in the future. 

Consequently, I don’t think that it’s effective. [¶] I believe that if I were accused of – if I

had murdered someone, I do believe that I would prefer the death penalty rather than

staying my whole lifetime in jail. I think that is more effective as far as murder.” (RT

8885.) 

When asked if he could have an open mind on punishment, Mr. Estwick admitted,

“I’m afraid not.” (RT 8887.) After counsel and the court engaged Mr. Estwick in a short

discussion regarding aggravation, mitigation and other crimes that might justify the use of

capital punishment, the prosecutor asked Mr. Estwick if he would automatically vote not

guilty to avoid the penalty phase in a case that did not involve hijacking or major narcotic

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trafficking, to which Mr. Estwick replied, “It’s a hard question,” and added, “I would have

to say my answer is yes on that.” (RT 8892-93.) Mr. Estwick also agreed that trying to

convince him to vote for the death penalty in such a case would be a waste of the

prosecutor’s time. (RT 8894.)

After argument and discussion by the court and counsel, the trial court ultimately

concluded:

I’m also firmly convinced that for a triple homicide, which is the case

in this particular situation, his answers are unequivocal, that he is very clear

that he not only would not vote, he would not consider the death penalty. 

Certainly he is not possessing of an open mind. It is clear from Mr.

Estwick’s position and his philosophy as he enunciated so clearly that he

truly would hamper the constitutional scheme of the death penalty in

California, and that he is, in fact, substantially impaired pursuant to which if

not opposed to the death penalty in the Witherspoon standard, I think it

might even reach that because his feelings for the death penalty only come

to the fore if it is a hijacking or a major drug supplying-type scheme. 

In any event, he is substantially impaired and will be excluded from

this particular jury.

(RT 8896.)

 

The United States Supreme Court explains that when reviewing habeas claims

based on alleged errors during voir dire, deference must be paid to the trial judge who

had the opportunity to observe the jurors first-hand:

[M]any veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the

point where their bias has been made “unmistakably clear”; these

veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the

death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their

true feelings. [Footnote omitted.] Despite this lack of clarity in the printed

record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the

definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and

impartially apply the law. For reasons that will be developed more fully

infra, this is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and

hears the juror.

Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26. As observed by the Supreme Court, a trial judge’s “power of

observation often proves the most accurate means of ascertaining the truth.” Id. at 434.

///

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The Court finds substantial support for the trial court and the California Supreme

Court’s conclusions that prospective jurors Marie Brunner, Fidela Camero, and Bertram

Estwick were “substantially impaired” in their ability to perform as jurors due to their views

on the death penalty. Id. at 433. The California Supreme Court’s determination that the

trial judge did not commit error in excusing these three prospective jurors was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. This claim does

not merit habeas relief. 

M. Claim 47 - Denial of Challenges for Cause to Prospective Jurors

In Claim 47, Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in its refusal to excuse

certain prospective jurors from the venire for cause due to their actual bias against

Petitioner, and that the seating of one of the challenged jurors on Petitioner’s jury, with

two additional challenged jurors seated as alternates, violated Petitioner’s rights under

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Petitioner’s counsel only exercised

nine of the twenty allotted peremptory challenges. When the Court asked counsel for her

tenth challenge, she stated, “The defense is satisfied with the jury as presently

constituted, your Honor.” (RT 11505.)) 

1. Procedural Bar

In addition to invoking the procedural bars discussed in Section II, supra,

Respondent contends Claim 47 is procedurally barred because Petitioner did not exhaust

all his peremptory challenges and express dissatisfaction with the jury. See People v.

Osband, 13 Cal. 4th 622, 670 (1996). However, Petitioner maintains that his failure to

exhaust his peremptory challenges is not an absolute bar to the Court’s consideration of

the merits of this claim, for “[t]o preserve a claim of error in the denial of a challenge for

cause, the defense must either exhaust its peremptory challenges and object to the jury

as finally constituted or justify the failure to do so.” People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal. 4th 988,

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1005 (1994). 

The state court, in reviewing Petitioner’s claim on appeal, held that by failing to

exhaust his peremptory challenges, Petitioner waived his claim that certain prospective

jurors should have been excused for cause. Petitioner claims that he is able to justify his

failure to use the full complement of peremptory challenges and details the voir dire

process at his trial, listing the order in which the prospective jurors were drawn and

indicating how each side used their peremptory challenges. Petitioner asserts that using

all twenty peremptory challenges would have resulted in a jury that included three jurors

who had previously been the subject of a defense challenge for cause, rather than the

one previously challenged juror that actually sat on his jury.

Rather than engage in a lengthy and intricate examination of the procedural bar,

the Court follows established precedent in this Circuit that allows a court to exercise

discretion and decide the merits of a claim if such a course proves to be less complicated

and less time-consuming than adjudicating the issue of procedural default. See

Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982).

2. Teague

Respondent maintains that this claim is partially Teague barred “because

[Petitioner] fails to demonstrate that a court’s failure to remove a juror for cause violates

the federal Constitution, at least when the defense subsequently utilizes a peremptory

challenge to remove the juror.” (Resp.’s MTD at 93.) Respondent does not assert that

the claim is Teague-barred as to James Cosgrove, who sat as a juror in Petitioner’s case. 

Accordingly, the Court will not conduct a Teague analysis with respect to Claim 42 as it

relates to Cosgrove. The Constitution requires that a defendant be tried by a fair and

impartial jury that is comprised of members who will not automatically vote for the death

penalty, and will fairly consider the evidence offered in mitigation. Morgan v. Illinois, 504

U.S. 719 (1992).

To the extent Petitioner asserts the trial court erred in denying challenges for

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cause against members of the jury pool who did not sit on Petitioner’s trial jury, the claim

is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Any claims that the impartiality of the jury

was not properly determined must focus on the individuals who actually sat on the jury. 

See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988). The Court need not decide whether any

claim by Petitioner regarding potential jurors who did not end up on the jury is Teaguebarred because such claim simply fails on the merits.

3. State Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on direct appeal, rejecting it

as follows:

Next, defendant contends that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section

16 of the California Constitution were violated by rulings that a number of

prospective jurors need not be excused for cause.

In defendant’s view, the prospective jurors were predisposed in favor of the

death penalty without sufficient regard for the legal standards to be applied to

facts that might eventually be presented – in other words, they could not be

impartial as to penalty – and should have been excused for cause.

Defendant concedes that he did not use all his peremptory challenges.

Accordingly, he has waived his claim that the prospective jurors should have

been excused for cause. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 670, 55

Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640; see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar

(2000) 528 U.S. 304, 313-314, 120 S.Ct. 774, 780-781, 145 L.Ed.2d 792, 801-

802.) He now claims perfunctorily that he was dissatisfied with the jury, but

this “belated recitation” (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1211, 14

Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1), though understandable given his death

sentence, is insufficient (ibid.). “To preserve a claim of trial court error in

failing to remove a juror for bias in favor of the death penalty, a defendant

must either exhaust all peremptory challenges and express dissatisfaction with

the jury ultimately selected or justify the failure to do so.” (People v. Williams

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) Defendant did

not fulfill these requirements. Rather, he told the trial court he was satisfied

with the jury as constituted, even though it included a juror whom he had

previously challenged for cause.

Defendant also urges that he has justified his failure to express dissatisfaction

with the jury as constituted because the trial court used the “struck jury”

selection system rather than the “jury box” method. He asserts that he

challenged approximately 30 jurors for cause because of their attitude toward

either the death penalty or him, that most of those challenges were rejected,

that the number of peremptory challenges remaining when he indicated

satisfaction with the jury was insufficient to purge the prospective jurors he had

challenged for cause, and therefore exhausting his “remaining eleven

peremptories would result in an equally, if not more, unfavorable jury.” But we

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have previously rejected the argument that the struck jury system permits

exceptions to the exhaustion rule (People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183,

1211, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1), and we decline to reexamine our

reasoning (accord, People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 622, 670, 55

Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640). Even if defendant had not explicitly said that

he was satisfied with the jury, we would not be persuaded by his argument.

As we stated in Johnson: “‘Regardless of the system of jury selection, a party’s

failure to exercise available peremptory challenges indicates relative

satisfaction with the unchallenged jurors. Having so indicated in this case,

defendant cannot reasonably claim error.’” (Johnson, at pp. 1211-1212, 14

Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.)

In any event, the jury’s composition did not prejudice defendant in any way.

The parties agree that only one seated juror, James C., was the subject of a

challenge for cause by defendant. Our review of James C.’s Hovey voir dire

testimony satisfies us that the trial court properly denied the challenge. James

C. initially testified that he favored imposing the death penalty in 80 percent of

murder cases, though “if there were mitigating circumstances, I would take

them into [account] and weigh them.” And he agreed that the death penalty

was, in counsel’s words, “justified” in the abstract for the killings of three

people execution style. But he also testified that he would follow instructions

to impose life imprisonment if he found that the mitigating and aggravating

evidence was in balance, and to impose the death penalty only if he found that

the aggravating evidence substantially outweighed the mitigating. He further

testified that he would be receptive to mitigating evidence at the penalty phase

even if the defendant had been convicted of three execution-style murders.

Following defendant’s challenge for cause, the trial court ruled that James C.’s

views on the death penalty did not substantially impair his ability to follow his

oath as a juror. The ruling was proper.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 261-62.

4. Merits

 The Sixth Amendment “guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel

of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Green v. White,

232 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2000). As stated earlier, any claims that the impartiality of

the jury was not properly determined must focus on the individuals who actually sat on

the jury. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 86; Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 (1984).

Petitioner alleges that the court erroneously allowed a large number of prospective

jurors to remain on the panel, including prospective jurors Bautista, D’Amato, Micheletti,

Wood (who served as an alternate juror), Siebuhr, Haskins, Beresford, Harshbarger,

Salas, Owens, Davis (who served as an alternate juror), Hailand, McTaggart, Graham,

Cosgrove (who actually sat as a juror), Stevens, and Barfield. Petitioner claims that

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these prospective jurors were allowed to remain in the jury venire despite a variety of

deficiencies, which included: pro-death penalty views resulting in impairment of their

ability to be impartial, an inability to be impartial on the issue of drugs, past work in law

enforcement, knowledge of prison gangs, an inability to accept the presumption of

defendant’s innocence, an inability to accept the burden of proof in guilt and/or penalty

phases, a belief that the defendant should testify, being visibly uncomfortable with the

defendant’s presence in court, and a reversal of the burden of proof in the penalty phase. 

Essential to this Court’s determination of the claim on the merits is that none of the

above jurors, except for Mr. Cosgrove, sat on the jury that deliberated. Wood and Davis

sat as alternates but did not deliberate. As previously stated, the relevant inquiry is

whether the individuals who actually sat on the jury and decided the case were biased. 

See Ross, 487 U.S. at 86. The Court previously considered the issue of Mr. Cosgrove’s

bias in the Group Three Claims (Claim 34) and held that Mr. Cosgrove’s presence on the

jury did not deprive Petitioner of a fair and impartial jury. 

As noted in the Court’s Group Three Order at pages 9-11, this Court cannot say

that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied U.S. Supreme Court law in

holding that juror Cosgrove’s “views on the death penalty did not substantially impair his

ability to follow his oath as a juror.” Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 261-62. In Morgan v. Illinois,

504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992), the Supreme Court held that:

A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will

fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such

a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or

absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely

irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the requirement of

impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective

juror who maintains such views. If even one such juror is empaneled and

the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the

sentence.

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It is clear from Cosgrove’s voir dire that he was predisposed toward imposing the

death penalty (80% likely) for a conviction for murder. Cosgrove did say that he would

take into account and weigh mitigating evidence. He also stated he would follow the

court’s instructions. However, Cosgrove made it clear that he would be “predisposed

towards the death penalty.” (RT 9214.)

The parties have not directed the Court to any case where the court held that a

juror’s predisposition for or against imposition of the death penalty violates the Supreme

Court’s holding in Morgan that a juror who would “automatically” vote for death is

substantially impaired in his ability to perform his duties as a juror in accordance with the

instructions and his oath. The Court does note, however, the similar circumstances

before the Court in United States v. Fulks, 454 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2006). In Fulks, juror

Goehring stated that he would automatically impose the death penalty for a conviction for

intentional murder. He later qualified his answer in response to a question from the

defense as to whether he would consider the defendant’s background. Goehring said

such circumstances would weigh into his decision but that 90 per cent of the time, unless

there was outrageous abuse in the defendant’s background, he would vote for the death

penalty. 

On appeal from his federal death sentence, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit rejected the argument that Goehring was not qualified, given his predisposition, to

sit as a juror in a death penalty case. The court reasoned:

Although the issue may be close, the court did not abuse its discretion in

qualifying Goehring to serve on Fulks's jury. As we have recognized,

Morgan only requires the exclusion of jurors who would categorically reject

any mitigating evidence offered by the defendant. See Tipton, 90 F.3d at

878; see also Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir.1999)

(observing that only those jurors who would fail to consider mitigating

evidence must be removed for cause). Although Goehring initially advised

defense counsel that he would automatically impose the death penalty on

any defendant who committed a knowing and intentional murder, he also

repeatedly asserted that he would consider mitigating evidence.

Nevertheless, according to Fulks, Goehring's statement that he would vote

for the death penalty “90 percent of the time” belies the truth of his

assertions that he would consider mitigating evidence and demonstrates a

strong predisposition toward imposing the death penalty. We agree with

Fulks that Goehring's “90 percent” statement reveals that only a strong case

for mitigation would convince him that a convicted murderer deserves

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mercy. That fact alone, however, did not require his exclusion, for although

a juror must be willing and able to consider mitigating evidence, he is

entitled to “determine the weight to be given” to any such evidence. 

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1

(1982). Taken as a whole, Goehring's statements demonstrate that he was

willing to consider the mitigating evidence that Fulks could muster. That he

might not accord such evidence as much weight as his fellow jurors did not

render his qualification by the court an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 428-29.

Although Cosgrove appeared more likely to consider mitigating evidence than

Goehring, Cosgrove was clearly predisposed toward imposing the death penalty. 

However, the question is not whether this court would have disqualified Cosgrove had it

presided over the trial. Rather, the narrow scope of review is whether the California

Supreme Court’s decision that Cosgrove was not substantially impaired was an

unreasonable application of Morgan and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 

Certainly, the court in Fulks would not so hold. While reasonable judges may disagree on

whether Cosgrove was substantially impaired, the Court cannot find that the California

Supreme Court’s decision was unreasonable. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

N. Claim 48 - Number of Peremptory Challenges

Claim 48 alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to grant Petitioner twenty-six

peremptory challenges, granting him only twenty, in violation of his rights under the Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, in addition to violating Cal. Penal Code § 3,

an ex post facto prohibition which precludes retroactive application of amendments or

additions to the penalty code unless expressly declared, and Article I, § 10, clause 1 of

the United States Constitution.

1. Teague

Respondent argues that this claim is barred as a new rule “because there is no

controlling authority prohibiting the reduction of peremptory challenges after the

commission of a crime.” (Resp.’s MTD at 97; Resp.’s Opp. at 25; Resp.’s Reply at 24.) 

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The Court could construe this claim narrowly and conclude that it is barred as a “new

rule” because Petitioner asks the Court to hold that the Constitution prohibits the

reduction of peremptory challenges after the commission of a crime, a result that was not

dictated by precedent at the time Petitioner’s conviction was finalized. However, the

Court again defers to the Ninth Circuit’s unwillingness to require a Petitioner to present a

case “involving identical facts, circumstances and legal issues” in order to clear the

Teague threshold, Keating, 191 F.3d at 1061 n.11, and takes the more sensible

approach of concluding that Petitioner does not seek to impose a new rule, but, rather,

seeks to apply to the facts of his case established standards regarding ex post facto

laws. Accordingly, the Court will review this claim on the merits.

2. Merits

The United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex

post facto Law.” Art. I, § 10. The United States Supreme Court has held that for a law to

violate the provision against ex post facto laws, the contested measure must be

retrospective, and must disadvantage the accused. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29

(1981). The Supreme Court clarified that there is no ex post facto violation if the change

in question is merely procedural and does not alter a substantive right. Id. at 29 n. 12. 

Petitioner states that at the time of the crimes for which he was charged and

convicted (April 26, 1985), California law provided that a defendant in a capital case was

to receive twenty-six (26) peremptory challenges on voir dire. Cal. Penal Code § 1070.

Before Petitioner’s case was called for trial on April 15, 1988, this section of the Penal

Code was amended, and the number of peremptory challenges in a capital case was

decreased to twenty, effective January 1, 1988. Accordingly, in pre-trial proceedings, the

trial court stated that each side would have twenty peremptory challenges for voir dire at

Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner filed a motion requesting twenty-six challenges and asserting

an ex post facto violation. (CT 3577-89.) The trial court denied the motion. (RT 5980.)

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that peremptory

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challenges are not of a constitutional dimension. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar,

528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000); Ross, 487 U.S. at 88; Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 663

(1987). Peremptory challenges are a “necessary part of trial by jury.” Swain v. Alabama,

380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). See also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992). 

However, because peremptory challenges are not required by the Constitution, “it is for

the State to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their

purpose and their manner of exercise.” Ross, 487 U.S. at 89. The Ninth Circuit explains

that “[n]either the number of peremptory challenges nor the manner of their exercise is

constitutionally secured,” but recognizes that the peremptory challenge is “one of the

most important rights secured to the accused.’” United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 535,

538 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 538, 589 (1919)).

The change in Cal. Penal Code § 1070 between the time of Petitioner’s charged

offense and his trial did not effect a change in any substantial right because peremptory

challenges are not a substantial right guaranteed by the Constitution. Moreover,

Petitioner has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s refusal to

grant him the additional six peremptory challenges, especially in light of Petitioner’s

failure to use the twenty peremptory challenges he was granted under California law. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. The state court’s determination that the trial judge did not

commit error in denying Petitioner’s motion for the additional peremptory challenges was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

O. Claim 49 - Testimony of Family Members at Penalty Phase

Claim 49 alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to

present evidence during penalty phase proceedings of the impact Petitioner’s death

would have on his family members, in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments.

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1. Teague

Respondent argues that the claim is barred under Teague because “there is no

existing authority that requires a state to admit evidence of the effect of an execution on

third parties.” (Resp.’s MTD at 99.) In Washington v. Texas 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the

United States Supreme Court held that testimony relevant and material to the defense is

essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial, but acknowledged its holding did not extend

to allowing the defense to put on any evidence he chooses. Id. at 23. In Lockett v. Ohio,

438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), the Supreme Court noted that “any aspect of the defendant’s

character or record” is potentially relevant mitigation evidence. Here, however, Petitioner

does not claim that the trial court disallowed family member testimony that would have

enlightened the jury to any aspect of the defendant’s character or record. Rather,

Petitioner asserts a constitutional violation arising from the trial court disallowing

evidence of the impact of an execution on Petitioner’s family and loved ones.

 Granting relief on this claim would impermissibly create a new rule of federal

criminal procedure, one whose “result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time

defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Furthermore,

Petitioner’s proposed rule does not satisfy either exception to Teague. See Penry, 492

U.S. at 305; Graham, 506 U.S. at 478. However, even assuming this claim would not be

barred under Teague, it is without merit for the reasons set forth below.

2. Merits

The United States Supreme Court has held that a capital case jury must make an

“individualized determination” on the penalty issue based “on the character of the

individual and the circumstances of the crime.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879

(1983) (emphasis in original). To this end, the Supreme Court has held it of importance

to the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial that “the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind

of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a

defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the

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defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.

In addition, the state cannot preclude a sentencer from considering “any relevant

mitigating evidence” offered to support a sentence less than death. Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982).

The United States Supreme Court decision in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496

(1987), in effect at the time of Petitioner’s trial, specifically prohibited the admission of

victim impact statements at the penalty phase of trial. A later decision, Payne v.

Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), overruled Booth, holding that the “impact of the murder

on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death

penalty should be imposed.” Id. at 827.

Petitioner argues that (1) members of his family were set to testify on the effect

Petitioner’s death would have on them; (2) the trial court refused to allow the defense to

ask questions on this topic; and (3) pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §190.3, Petitioner

should have been allowed to present this evidence in mitigation. However, Petitioner

fails to substantiate this claim with even a modicum of case law or evidence (i.e., citations

to the transcript where the trial court allegedly prevented counsel from eliciting the

contested testimony or declarations from family members regarding the substance of

their desired testimony). Petitioner does not even apprise the Court of the identity of the

family members who would have testified on his behalf. 

Upon examination of the record, it appears that the trial court did prohibit defense

counsel from asking Petitioner’s family members any direct questions regarding the

impact Petitioner’s death would have on them. (RT 18317, 18228.) However, the court

allowed witnesses, for example Petitioner’s sister, to “speak to the characteristics of your

brother that you feel the jury should know about.” (RT 18228.) The trial court explained

that although direct questions regarding the impact Petitioner’s execution would have on

family members were impermissible, defense counsel could ask open-ended questions

regarding witnesses’ thoughts about Petitioner:

I’ve given counsel the leeway, and in all candor she asked the

question today in terms of what this particular witness would like to tell this

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jury in a very open-ended way about his uncle, the redeeming things, if you

will, about his uncle. And I think that is the appropriate way to get into it,

and I’ve certainly allowed that. 

(RT 18820.)

In response to defense counsel’s argument that their questions regarding the

impact of an execution on the family members were designed to illuminate qualities of the

defendant, the trial court explained:

Sure. And I think this is something you need to bring out if you can,

Mr. Boyce; But that’s one reason why I allowed the open-ended question. 

“He’s sensitive. He’s been there for me,” all of those things I think are

legitimate and you can bring them out.

To elicit that – for example, that he has a daughter that’s going to

miss him and – a whole lot which came out with another witness gets into

the parameters of Booth, but I don’t know how better to give you an openended opportunity than the open-ended question I’ve allowed you to ask.

I would agree that we have a problem with Booth the way the

previous question was focused, but even if you want to lead a little bit, you

know, “He’s been kind and I’m going to miss the kindness; He’s given me

advice; He’s been an advisor or whatever,” I don’t – you know, it’s all “k”

factors.

(RT 18821.)

State law allows that family members may offer testimony on the impact an

execution would have on them “if by doing so they illuminate some positive quality of the

defendant’s background or character.” People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th 353, 445 (1998). 

See also People v. Carter, 30 Cal. 4th 1166, 1205 (2003). As discussed above, although

defense counsel could not ask direct questions about the impact Petitioner’s execution

would have on family members, defense counsel were free to elicit testimony regarding

Petitioner’s positive qualities through open-ended inquiries. The details of how

Petitioner’s execution would impact his family members do not, on their own, bear upon

either the circumstances of the capital crime or the character and background of

Petitioner. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion, and the court

did not err in foreclosing Petitioner’s desired inquiry during the penalty phase

proceedings. Finally, even if there was error, Petitioner was not prejudiced. His family

members, including Barbara Ayala Moreno, Ernestina Meyer, Marjorie Suarez, Richard

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Suarez, and Rita Jenkins, testified about their relationship with Petitioner. It would be

apparent to the jury that Petitioner’s death would impact them. Failure to bring out what

was obvious did not affect the jury’s decision to impose the death penalty. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of

this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

this claim.

P. Claim 50 - Phone Call from Mexico to Castillo

In Claim 50, Petitioner alleges that the trial court erroneously allowed the

prosecution to present rebuttal evidence regarding a telephone call intended for another

“Pedro Castillo” that Castillo received while recovering in the hospital. Petitioner

contends that the trial court violated his rights to a fair trial and cross-examination under

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a fair and individualized determination of

penalty in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and to due process under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

1. State Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s claim that the trial court

violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing the prosecution to

present rebuttal evidence regarding the telephone call from Mexico. The California

Supreme Court’s decision provides, in relevant part:

When Pedro Castillo was in the hospital, he received a phone call from

Mexico. The caller said that she was trying to reach a Pedro Castillo, whom

she believed to be in that hospital. Castillo testified that the caller was trying

to reach someone with the same name either in the next bed or at least on the

same floor.

To challenge the veracity of Castillo's testimony and suggest his involvement

with a Mexican heroin connection, the defense introduced evidence that there

was no other patient named Pedro Castillo in that hospital at that time.

In rebuttal, after the trial court overruled defendant's objection of improper

rebuttal and improper failure to disclose to him certain evidence regarding the

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phone call, the prosecution called Castillo's wife Maria, who had answered the

call. Maria Castillo testified that the caller was a Benita Gonzalez, and that

she was looking for her son, a different Pedro Castillo. At the telephone

operator's request, she wrote down Gonzalez's name and phone number in an

address book, and she gave that information to the prosecution about six

months before she testified.

After Maria Castillo testified, defendant moved to bar any further rebuttal

testimony on the question of the phone call from Mexico. Again the grounds

for his motion were improper rebuttal and improper failure to disclose evidence

regarding the phone call. [Footnote omitted.]

The trial court denied the motions. It ruled explicitly that the prosecution had

not violated its discovery orders, and also ruled implicitly that further testimony

would not constitute, in a categorical sense, improper rebuttal.

The prosecution evidently gave notice that it intended to call Ernesto Castillo,

the brother-in-law of Benita Gonzalez, to testify about her phone call from

Mexico. In response to the trial court's request that the prosecution explain

why Gonzalez herself was not testifying, it called Louis Richard Velasquez to

testify at an in limine hearing about the authorities' investigation of the phone

call.

The clerk's transcript shows that Velasquez, an investigator for the district

attorney's office, had interviewed Benita Gonzalez by telephone call to Ciudad

de Valles, San Luis Potosí State, Mexico, on November 24, 1986. He prepared

a written report on the call two days later. The report said that Gonzalez was

trying to call her brother-in-law, the different Pedro Castillo, who she said was

elsewhere in the United States. 

At the in limine hearing, Velasquez stated that he had recently tried to locate

Gonzalez but without success, for she had left her husband and her residence

in Ciudad de Valles. Velasquez reached Gonzalez's estranged husband,

Plutarco Castillo, who referred him to his brother, Ernesto Castillo.

The prosecution brought Ernesto Castillo (also possibly known as Ernesto

Castillo Reyna) from Mexico. He testified before the jury that he was retired

from his post of Commandant of the Police of San Luis Potosí State. He

confirmed that his brother Pedro Castillo was in the United States in 1985, but

he did not know where. He provided a photograph of his brother Pedro, and

a birth certificate showing that his brother was born in 1951 in San Ciro de

Acosta, San Luis Potosí, Mexico. At closing argument, the prosecution argued

without refutation from the defense that there were two Pedro Castillos, that

the person in the photograph Ernesto Castillo supplied was “clearly not the

same fellow” as the prosecution's witness, and that the phone call was a

coincidence.

Defendant renews the claims he raised at trial: the testimony was improper

rebuttal, and the prosecution violated the trial court's discovery orders in failing

to alert him to Velasquez's memorialized evidence. He also claims that the

failure to disclose it amounted to a violation of the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Before trial, the trial court had ordered the prosecution to disclose “[a]ll notes

or memoranda, handwritten or typed, by an investigating officer, peace officer,

or deputy district attorney of their conversations with any witness which is

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relevant to said witnesses' credibility or upon the issues of defendants' guilt or

innocence of the crimes or special circumstances charged in the complaint

filed herein.” The order is reasonably read as continuing in nature.

Nevertheless, we disagree with defendant that the prosecution was required

to disclose Velasquez's November 26, 1986, memorandum. We turn first to his

constitutional claim.

As is well known, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution creates a duty in the prosecution to disclose certain

evidence to a defendant. (See, e.g., United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S.

667, 674-677 [105 S.Ct. 3375, 3379-3381, 87 L.Ed.2d 481].) The evidence,

however, must be both “favorable” to the defendant and “ 'material' ” to either

guilt or penalty. (Id. at p. 674 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3379].) Favorable evidence is

evidence that the defense could use either to impeach the state's witnesses

or to exculpate the accused. (Id. at p. 676 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3380].) “Bagley held

that . . . favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its

suppression . . ., 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.' ” (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 [115 S.Ct. 1555,

1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490].) A “reasonable probability” is one sufficient to

“undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome.” (United States v. Bagley, supra,

473 U.S. at p. 678 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3381].)

Because there is no reasonable probability that had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense the outcome would have differed, there was no due

process violation. The question of the Mexican phone call was utterly ancillary

to the question of defendant's guilt of three murders and to any question

regarding penalty. The trial court opined that “this whole area is collateral,”

and we agree. Even as a distraction, it was insignificant.

We next discuss defendant's state law claim. We do not believe that the trial

court's order was violated. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including

evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having

any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) The

entire question of the phone call from Mexico was of no consequence to the

verdict in this case. To repeat: the matter was utterly collateral. We therefore

reject defendant's claim. [Footnote omitted.]

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 277-80.

///

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///

///

///

///

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2. Merits

The California Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or based on an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. As pointed out by the

California Supreme Court, there was no violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), because there was no reasonable probability that had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the outcome would have been different.

This court does disagree with the trial court and the California Supreme Court as

to whether there was a violation of the trial court’s discovery order. Initially, there was no

need to disclose the information regarding the phone call because it did not relate to guilt

or credibility of a witness. However, once the issue of the phone call was brought out

upon cross-examination of Castillo, the prosecution’s information was relevant to

Castillo’s credibility, albeit, to show that he was not lying. As the California Supreme

Court noted, the duty to disclose was continuing. Nevertheless, the whole issue was

collateral, and if there was error in admitting the evidence, it was harmless and had no

effect on the verdict.

There is no merit to Petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his right to crossexamination under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner had every

opportunity to cross-examine Castillo as well as Maria Castillo and Ernesto Castillo. 

Although Petitioner’s cross-examination on the issue of the telephone call ultimately was

not very effective due to the rebuttal evidence, there was no violation of Petitioner’s right

to cross-examination. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (a defendant is

guaranteed the right to cross-examination, “not cross-examination that is effective in

whatever way, and to whatever extent, a defendant might wish.”) The state court’s

rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. 

Q. Claim 67 - Requests to Unseal Portions of the Record

Claim 67 alleges that the trial court erroneously denied a post-trial motion to

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review previously sealed portions of the record, consisting of in camera proceedings

concerning informants who testified at the guilt and penalty phases of trial, in violation of

his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also

asserts that “[t]his court must not only review these materials to determine if the trial court

erred in failing to disclose the documents to Petitioner’s trial counsel, but should also

permit Petitioner’s present counsel to review the materials to provide additional guidance

to the Court regarding the importance of particular items to Petitioner.” (Pet. at 206.)

1. Teague

Petitioner asserts that his state appellate counsel was erroneously denied access

to sealed proceedings relating to informants who were witnesses at Petitioner’s trial, in

violation of his Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Respondent contends

that the claim is barred because “the essence of Petitioner’s claim is an attack upon the

state’s post-conviction review process,” and the claim “would require this Court to

announce a new rule allowing Petitioner to attack a state court post-conviction review.” 

(Resp.’s MTD at 108.) Respondent explains that Ninth Circuit law is clear that “[A]

petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process is not addressable

through habeas corpus proceedings.” Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir.

1989) (per curiam). 

Petitioner counters that Respondent’s argument is devoid of substance and that

Respondent has waived his Teague argument by his failure to cite relevant authority. In

addition, Petitioner asserts that this claim “is based upon his appellate right to review the

record and his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel.” (Petr’s Reply at 62-63.)

The United States Supreme Court has held that a decision is not new if “it has

simply applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely

analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law.” Penry,

492 U.S. at 314. The Supreme Court has also held that the record of trial proceedings

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must be sufficient to permit adequate and efficient appellate review. See Griffin v. Illinois,

351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). However, granting Petitioner a right of access to sealed trial

proceedings is not compelled by the existing Supreme Court precedent guaranteeing a

petitioner an adequate appellate record. Petitioner’s proposed rule indeed “breaks new

ground or imposes a new obligation on the State or the Federal Government,” and,

therefore, the Court’s remaining inquiry is whether either exception to Teague applies to

this “new” rule. Id. at 301. 

A rule granting a federal habeas petitioner access to documents sealed at trial

does not place private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to prohibit,

nor can this rule be considered of a “watershed” nature. Id. at 311. See also Penry, 492

U.S. at 305; Graham, 506 U.S. at 478. Granting Petitioner relief on this claim, that is,

access to the sealed ex parte trial proceedings, would result in the creation of a new rule

of criminal procedure which does not fall under either of the exceptions to Teague. 

However, even assuming this claim would not be barred under Teague, it is without merit

for the reasons set forth below.

2. State Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on direct appeal, rejecting it

as follows:

Defendant contends that the trial court violated the Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and state law,

when it denied his postjudgment motion, filed July 18, 1991, to unseal certain

portions of the record on appeal. The court ruled in essence, in a tentative

decision and order filed September 18, 1991, that apparently became final,

that it lacked the authority to do so. 

There was no constitutional violation. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324,

495-494 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].) Nor was there a violation of state

law. (Ibid.) Indeed, rule 39.51(b) of the California Rules of Court, put into

effect March 1, 1997, provides: “All transcripts of in camera proceedings shall

be sealed and copies provided only to the reviewing court and to counsel for

those parties present at the proceedings.” (Italics added.) Rule 33.5(b), put

into effect July 1, 1990, has the same effect.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 303.

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3. Merits

In post-trial proceedings, Petitioner moved the court to unseal portions of the trial

record. On July 29, 1991, Petitioner filed a motion to review sealed transcripts. 

(Lodgment No. 58.) In that motion, state appellate counsel requested authorization to

review the transcripts from in camera hearings at which either defense counsel, the

prosecution, or both parties were excluded from attending. (Aug. RT 1955-61.) On

August 7, 1991, the Attorney General’s office filed an Opposition. (Aug. RT 1964.) 

Petitioner filed a Reply on August 20, 1991 and a Supplemental Reply on August 27,

1991. (Aug. RT 1973, 1981.)

The trial court issued a tentative decision and order on September 18, 1991,

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than augment the record. (Aug.

CT 1984.) The trial court held that “even if the Court had the jurisdiction to do this post

trial review, there is no factual or legal authority presented by defendant AYALA which

would justify such a review” of the sealed hearings regarding confidential informants and

materials reviewed for discovery. (Aug. RT 1985.)

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to disclose these sealed

documents to trial counsel and that the state court erred in not permitting counsel to

review the records pursuant to Rule 39.5 of the California Rules of Court and Cal. Penal

Code § 109.7. Petitioner additionally notes that “any Brady material included in what was

withheld from trial counsel is an ongoing violation of that doctrine.” (Petr’s Reply at 63.)

Notwithstanding the Teague bar, the Court finds Petitioner’s claim also fails on the

merits. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a

defendant’s right to a fair trial and the government’s interest in protecting confidential

information were secured by submitting the records in question to the trial court for an in

camera review. In so holding, the Supreme Court specifically noted that an “advocate’s

eye,” that is, review of the documents by the defendant’s attorney rather than in camera

by the court, was not necessary to ensure a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. at 60. 

Significantly, the Court also noted “[d]efense counsel has no constitutional right to

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conduct his own search of the States’ files to argue relevance.” Id. at 59.

In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Supreme Court held, on

direct appeal, that an in camera review by the trial court of electronic surveillance

material obtained without probable cause was inadequate considering the complexity of

the case and the large volume of documents. However, in Alderman, the Supreme Court

distinguished the facts in that case from other situations involving sealed proceedings,

stating “[i]n both the volume of material to be examined and the complexity and difficulty

of the judgments involved, cases involving electronic surveillance will probably differ

markedly from those situations in the criminal law where in camera procedures have

been found acceptable to some extent.” Id. at 182 n. 14. Finally, Alderman was a Fourth

Amendment exclusionary rule case involving the fruits of an illegal search, and disclosure

was limited to conversations that actually included the defendant or took place on his

premises. Id. at 185. At issue here are law enforcement and correctional department

files that the trial court ruled were either not relevant or privileged. Furthermore, the

continued sealing of these materials was upheld by the California Supreme Court.

The trial court sealed these materials on privilege asserted by either the

prosecutor, the City Attorney, or the Attorney General representing other various

agencies, and Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s denial of access to those

files was objectively unreasonable. In addition, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that

the refusal of the state court to provide appellate counsel with access to the sealed

proceedings caused Petitioner to receive constitutionally ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The mere fact that appellate counsel

was unable to directly review the documents does not establish any constitutional

violation that would entitle Petitioner to habeas relief. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60. Petitioner

has not demonstrated that the California Supreme Court’s adjudication of this claim was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

Petitioner argues that as an alternative to public release of the documents, “this

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Court should carefully examine the alternative of allowing habeas counsel to review the

transcripts and/or documents under orders not to disclose, to Petitioner or any other

person, any previously unknown information thereby acquired.” (Pet. at 207.) In support

of this proposition, Petitioner cites to three cases: United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d

724 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ordonez, 722 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1983); and United

States v. De Los Santos, 819 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1987). All three of these cases are

distinguishable. 

All three cases cited by Petitioner were direct appeals that involved a defendant’s

request for disclosure of the identity of an informant. In contrast, Petitioner in this case

seeks review of sealed files that are much greater in scope. Additionally, Petitioner is not

directly appealing a trial court’s decision, but, rather, is challenging the state court’s

rejection of his claim that the trial court erred in refusing to allow counsel access to

sealed documents. Moreover, in Anderson, the Ninth Circuit ultimately rejected the

defendant’s claims of error, holding that the trial judge exercises discretion whether to

allow defense counsel or a defendant to be present at an in camera hearing regarding an

informant and that the trial judge’s decision will be reversed only if it “constitutes an

abuse of discretion or constitutional error.” Id. at 730. In De Los Santos, the Fifth Circuit

agreed with Anderson’s holding that the exclusion of the defendant and defense attorney

from a pre-trial hearing at which an informant’s identity was revealed did not violate the

Confrontation Clause. Id. at 97. In Ordonez, the Ninth Circuit granted relief in the form of

disclosure of an informant’s information, holding that the inadequacy of the record made

it impossible to determine if the district court had balanced the interests of the parties

according to the requirements of Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). In

Rovario, the Supreme Court held that in determining whether the identity of an informant

should be disclosed to the defense, a trial court must balance the individual’s right to

prepare his defense against the public’s interest in protecting the flow of information. Id.

at 62. Here, however, Petitioner seeks access to sealed files which contain not only

informant files, but also work-product as well as files the trial court deemed not relevant.

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The cases cited by Petitioner do not support his position that the denial of access to the

documents at issue violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, this claim is denied on

the merits.

Petitioner seeks to have this Court examine the sealed in camera proceedings to

determine whether any exculpatory information was withheld from him. He also seeks

access to the materials. As noted above, Petitioner has no right of access to properly

sealed records. Nevertheless, the Court treats his request as one for discovery of the

sealed proceedings. See, e.g., Murdoch v. Castro, 365 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 2004.) 

The parties are ordered to appear before the Court on June 3, 2008 at 4:00 p.m. to

discuss the discovery request. The Court has not been provided with a list of the sealed

proceedings. Therefore, counsel for Petitioner and Respondent shall file with the Court a

joint list of the sealed proceedings and a generalized statement of why they were sealed,

one week prior to the hearing.

R. Claim 70 - Juror Misconduct

Claim 70 alleges that juror misconduct violated Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the jury

concluded he was guilty prior to beginning any deliberations.

Petitioner ‘s claims is based on the following facts. During the early stages of the

guilt phase, while counsel were conferring with the judge, a female juror was heard

remarking, “This is the best jury he’ll ever get.” The juror’s remark resulted in laughter

from a large portion of the jury, and the bailiff admonished the jurors to refrain from

making any further remarks of that type. 

As this Court previously held in denying relief on Claim 36, brought as a part of the

Group Three Claims, Petitioner provides no evidence to support his conclusions that the

jury made a premature conclusion as to Petitioner’s guilt. The Supreme Court has held

that under the Constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed a fair trial with “a jury

capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.” McDonough

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Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (quoting Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)). While the actual “presence of a biased juror cannot

be harmless,” Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998), and requires a

reversal and new trial without a showing of prejudice, the courts have not held that the

failure to investigate potential juror bias presents any such structural error. United States

v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 899 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999). The courts have also held that it is

paramount “not that jurors keep silent with each other about the case but that each juror

keep an open mind until the case has been submitted to the jury.” Davis v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 628, 653 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th

Cir. 1974)).

Petitioner presents no evidence to suggest that any of the jurors relied on extrinsic

statements or evidence in reaching a verdict or that any juror reached a determination on

defendant’s guilt or innocence prematurely. The bare statement of the female juror and

the ensuing laughter fall far short of demonstrating that any juror had prejudged the case

“to the extent that he has not received a fair trial.” Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053,

1099 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner has not established that the California Supreme Court’s

rejection of this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, and this claim does not merit

relief.

S. Claim 71 - Underrepresentation of Groups in Jury Venire

Claim 71 alleges that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s challenge to the

composition of the jury venire based on the underrepresentation of Hispanics and

younger adults in the jury pool, in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments.

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1. Teague

Respondent asserts the claim is Teague barred to the extent that Petitioner

argues that the young constitute a distinctive class under the test established in Duren v.

Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). However, Petitioner’s allegations are governed by wellestablished Supreme Court jurisprudence that guarantees a criminal defendant the right

to a fair and an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community. Despite

Respondent’s claim to the contrary, Petitioner is seeking relief under a rule of

constitutional law that was established by the United States Supreme Court in Duren v.

Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), which was announced long before Petitioner’s judgment

became final in March 2001. 

Even if Petitioner does not seek to apply a decision creating a new rule, “it is

necessary to inquire whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because

the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.” 

Stringer, 503 U.S. at 228. This is not such a case. Petitioner is not attempting to apply

the rule in a novel setting or to novel facts, he is simply advocating the application of a

long-established rule of criminal procedure regarding the constitution of a jury venire to a

different group of individuals contained in that venire. As stated previously, the Ninth

Circuit has been unwilling to require a Petitioner to present a case “involving identical

facts, circumstances and legal issues” in order to clear the Teague threshold. Keating,

191 F.3d at 1061 n.11.

2. State Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court considered this claim on direct appeal, denying it as

follows:

Defendant, who is Hispanic, contends that underrepresentation of Hispanics

in the jury pool violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79,

106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148

Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) He brought the same claim at trial, but the trial

court rejected it.

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The claim is without merit.

“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section

requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be

excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation

of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and

reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and

(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group

in the jury-selection process.” (Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364,

99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579.) 

Defendant satisfies the first of these requirements. “Whether characterized on

the basis of a Spanish surname or self-identification, Hispanics are a

cognizable population...” (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1154, 64

Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) 

Defendant cannot establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of

Hispanics merely by presenting statistical evidence of underrepresentation in

the jury pool, venire, or panel. He must show that any underrrepresentation

“is the result of an improper feature of the jury-selection process.” (People v.

Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1160, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) The

parties stipulated to use the prior testimony of the San Diego County

coordinator of jury services. That individual had testified that every year the

commissioner’s office compiles the names of all registered voters and persons

with a California driver’s license or an identification card onto a source list,

which contains 2.5 million people. The county then uses a “sophisticated

random sampling” technique to draw names from the source list to create a

master list of 350,000 people, from which in turn individuals are summoned via

a “second sophisticated random sampling” to form a venire.

The foregoing method does not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or

national origin. (People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156, 64

Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Hence, defendant has not shown that the jury

selection process contained an “improper feature” (People v. Howard, supra,

1 Cal.4th 1132, 1160, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315).

Defendant also claims that underrepresentation of the young violated his Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. With regard to young people, the trial

court ruled that the young are not a cognizable group, but even if it were, there

was no improper exclusion of them in the jury-selection process.

“California courts have not been receptive to the argument that age alone

identifies a distinctive or cognizable group within the meaning of [the

representative cross-section] rule.” (People v. McCoy (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th

778, 783, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 599 [citing cases].) We need not decide, however,

whether peremptory challenges on the basis of age violate the strictures of

Batson or Wheeler; defendant simply does not persuade, any more than he

does regarding Hispanic jurors, that the young were improperly excluded under

the jury-selection system in place. As the People observe, aside from a

mention of statistical disparity in the presence of young people as a result of

the jury-selection process, a factor that does not by itself establish systematic

exclusion, the only fault defendant finds with the process is that the master list

of the jury pool was only updated annually, so that those who turned 18 during

the year would not be included and some 18-year-olds would turn 19. We do

not believe that amounts to systematic exclusion. In order to avoid that effect

or a similar one, the master list would have to be updated daily. The law does

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not require such diligence.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 256-57. 

3. Merits

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a criminal

defendant has the right to a jury trial with an impartial jury selected from a representative

cross-section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). There exists

a well-established three-part test to determine whether there has been a violation of the

constitutional guarantee to a jury comprised of a fair cross-section of the community. 

The United States Supreme Court has held:

In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross section

requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be

excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation

of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and

reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and

(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group

in the jury-selection process.

Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.

If a defendant is able to make a prima facie showing under Duren, the burden will

shift to the state to justify the infraction by a “demonstration that attainment of a fair cross

section is incompatible with a significant state interest.” Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147,

1150 (9th Cir. 1998).

In an evidentiary hearing before the trial court, the parties stipulated to the

testimony previously presented in the Samayoa case. People v. Samayoa, San Diego

Superior Court Case No. CR 84618. (RT 6222.) Both Petitioner and his brother Hector

Ayala joined in the challenge to the composition of the jury venire, and counsel for both

defendants were present at the hearing. There were several witnesses in that case

whose testimony pertains to the allegations contained in this claim. 

Geraldine Stevens, Coordinator for Jury Services, testified on the procedures San

Diego County used in compiling the jury pool venire list. Stevens explained that

prospective jurors were sent an initial summons, and if they did not respond, they were

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also sent two subsequent notices by regular mail and a final summons by certified mail. 

Dr. John Weeks compared the amount of Hispanic jurors to the number of

Hispanic residents in San Diego County at the time of trial. Dr. Weeks undertook a

statistical analysis, and found that while Hispanics comprised 12.3% of the jury eligible

population in San Diego County, they comprised only 10.7% of the actual jury duty

venire. Dr. Weeks calculated the “absolute disparity,” a measure of the difference

between the proportion of Hispanics in society and the proportion of Hispanics

represented in the jury venire list. Dr. Weeks concluded that the absolute disparity of

1.6% found in this case was not a “statistically significant” figure given the size of the

sample. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that while Hispanics were a cognizable

group, Petitioner had failed to show an underrepresentation of Hispanics in the venire

sufficient to demonstrate any constitutional violation. (RT 6357.)

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he second prong of the Duren test requires

proof, typically statistical data, that the jury pool does not adequately represent the

distinctive group in relation to the number of such persons in the community.” United

States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 1996). The courts use an absolute

disparity analysis, as the trial court did in Petitioner’s case, to determine whether a

defendant meets this second prong. United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547

(9th Cir. 1989).

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims of underrepresentation in cases

where the absolute disparity was significantly greater than the 1.6% absolute disparity

found in the instant case. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1977)

(2.7%); United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1977) (2.7%);

Thomas, 159 F.3d at 1151 (5%); Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727 (4.9%); United States v.

Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 749 (9th Cir. 1982) (7.7%).

Although Petitioner’s claim regarding the underrepresentation of Hispanics meets

the first prong of the Duren test, see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977),

Petitioner fails to demonstrate an underrepresentation of Hispanics in the San Diego jury

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venire and systematic exclusion of Hispanics in the jury selection process. Thus,

Petitioner fails to establish a violation of his constitutional rights as articulated by Taylor v.

Louisiana.

The three-part test of Duren also applies to Petitioner’s claim that he was denied

his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as a result of the

underrepresentation of the young in the jury venire. United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d

781, 782 (9th Cir. 1992). To demonstrate that the young constitute a “distinctive” group,

Dr. Paul Strand conducted a study comparing the attitudes of young people, defined as

those between the ages of 18 and 24, to those of older people. Dr. Strand opined that

the differences in the survey responses between youth and non-youth supported the

conclusion that young people were a cognizable group. Dr. Strand also found that the

differences in responses in many instances appeared to be unique vis-a-vis other groups

such that their perspective was not represented by any other group. Dr. Weeks agreed

with Dr. Strand, testifying that young people were a distinctive group. 

To demonstrate that the young were underrepresented in San Diego County

venires in 1987 and 1988, Petitioner relied on the testimony of Dr. Weeks. Dr. Weeks

opined that in 1987 and 1988 respectively, there was a 13.7 and 13.9 percentage point

absolute disparity between the number of 18 to 24-year-olds in San Diego County and

those who were jury eligible during those years

Finally, Dr. Weeks opined that there were two systemic flaws in the jury system: 

(1) there was a two-month time lag between the receipt of voter registration records from

the DMV and the creation by the Jury Commissioner of the master list; and (2) the Jury

Commissioner did not update the master list during the year. 

The trial court found that young people were not a cognizable group. (RT 6357-

59.) The trial court further found that even if young people constituted a cognizable

group, they had not been systematically excluded from the venires. (RT 6359.)

Applying the first prong of the Duren test, Petitioner has not demonstrated that

young persons are a distinctive group. The Ninth Circuit has found on several occasions

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that young persons are not a cognizable group, and Petitioner has not provided the Court

with any evidence that distinguishes the instant case from precedent. United States v.

Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977) (“young adults” are not a cognizable

group); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977) (young persons,

between the ages of 18 and 34, are not a cognizable group); United States v. Ross, 486

F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1971) (persons between ages of 21 and 24 are not a distinct

group); United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d 781, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1992) (college students

are not a distinctive group). 

Even assuming that the young constitute a distinctive group, Petitioner fails to

establish the third prong of the Duren test – i.e., that any underrepresentation of 18 to 24-

year-olds in the San Diego County jury venire was a result of systematic exclusion. A

disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group is not unconstitutional unless it is

systematic. Randolph v. State of California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004); United

States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.2d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2005). Circumstances where

courts have found systematic exclusion include (a) a jury selection system which allowed

women to opt-out of service more easily than men (Duren, 439 U.S. at 370); (b) a

computer error resulted in individuals from two largely racial and ethnic minority regions

being excluded from the jury venire (United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246-47

(2d Cir. 1995); and (c) where jurors were selected based on wholly subjective criteria

(Gibson v. Zant, 705 F.2d 1543, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1983)). 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of this claim was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that the

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. This claim does not merit habeas relief.

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Group Four

Claims on procedural bar grounds (In re Clark, In re Robbins, In re Waltreus, In re Dixon) 

is DENIED. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Group Four Claims pursuant to Teague

v. Lane is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and/ or Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED

as to all claims. Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Group Four Claims

is GRANTED. The Court will, in the final judgment, GRANT a Certificate of Appealability

(“COA”) on Claims 37, 39, 41, 43, 44 (as to the exclusion of Castro’s statement), 47 (as

to juror Cosgrove only), and 49 and DENY a Certificate of Appealability on Claims 10, 11,

38, 40, 42, 44 (as to the exclusion of Vejar’s statement), 45, 46, 47 (as to all jurors other

than Cosgrove), 48, 50, 70, and 71.

Counsel for the parties shall appear before the Court on June 3, 2008 at 4:00

p.m. to discuss the aforementioned discovery concerning the sealed proceedings. 

Counsel for Petitioner shall appear telephonically given that they are located in the

Central District of California. One week prior to the hearing, counsel for Petitioner and

Respondent shall file with the Court a joint list of the sealed proceedings and a

generalized statement of why they were sealed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 16, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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