Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01222/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01222-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1Former plaintiff K.F. has reached a settlement with

Defendants, and her claims against them have been dismissed. See

July 7, 2006 Stipulation and Order for Dismissal. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

K.F. and C. Oluka,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GUARDSMARK, LLC, SHERMAN FORD and

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-1222 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Guardsmark, LLC moves for summary adjudication of

Plaintiff Chuks Oluka's claims against it.1

 Defendant Sherman Ford

separately moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's claims

against him. Plaintiff opposes the motions with respect to his

claims for retaliation and disability discrimination, but not his

claim for defamation. The matters were taken under submission on

the papers. Having considered the papers filed by the parties, the

Court GRANTS Defendants' motions for summary adjudication of

Plaintiff's defamation claim, but otherwise DENIES the motions for

summary adjudication. 

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BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the facts below are either undisputed

or refer to the evidence submitted by Plaintiff in support of his

opposition to Defendants' motions. 

Plaintiff's claims arise out of his employment as a security

guard with Guardsmark, a company that provides private security

services to business clients. In November or December of 2002,

Plaintiff, who is originally from Nigeria, began working part time

as a guard at a site at 560 Mission Street, working a day shift. 

Levy Decl., Ex. I, Oluka Dep. 67:25-68:2, 80:5-11. At that time,

former plaintiff K.F., a refugee from Liberia, also worked at the

560 Mission Street site. Mr. Ford was the "site manager" at the

560 Mission Street site. 

According to Plaintiff, another co-worker, Jonathan Low, was

spreading rumors about "sexual activities" between K.F. and Mr.

Ford, and suggesting that African-American Guardsmark employees,

including K.F. and Plaintiff, had gotten their jobs because they

were black, or, in the case of females, because they were having

sex with Mr. Ford. Oluka Dep. 190:1-4. On February 10, 2003, in

response to these rumors, Plaintiff wrote a letter addressed to

"The Account Manager," as well as Mr. Ford and Leroy Hawkins,

stating, in part,

I would like to bring to your attention, the tension that is

currently building amongst us, the security officers working

at the loading dock of 560 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA. 

The situation is generated by claims and allegations of

racism, sexism, discrimination and favoritism against

management by Jonathan Lo. The continued spread of these

unsubstantiated allegations is creating a disruptive and

hostile environment for us as we perform our duties.

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Oluka Decl., Ex. B, Feb. 10, 2003 Letter To Guardsmark Account

Manager from Chuks Oluka. 

After K.F. saw a copy of the letter, she explained to

Plaintiff that she was having sexual relations with Mr. Ford, but

that the relationship was not consensual. Levy Decl., Ex. E, K.F.

Dep. 168:12-18. Plaintiff urged her to report this, but K.F.

responded that she could not, because Mr. Ford had threatened that

"he would make me lose my job and be deported." K.F. Decl. ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff tried talking to K.F. and checking on her to see if she

would talk to someone, but she would not. K.F. Dep. 178:17-19. 

K.F. begged Plaintiff not to tell anyone about it. Id. 178:21-22. 

Mr. Ford started to ask K.F. "what Mr. Oluka knew about what Mr.

Ford was doing to me," so she warned Plaintiff "to be careful." 

K.F. Decl. ¶ 7. 

In June, 2003, at a work party, Plaintiff saw K.F. and another

female Guardsmark employee walking away from Mr. Ford; K.F. later

explained that Mr. Ford had been seeking sexual favors. Oluka Dep.

152:18-153:7. Plaintiff told Emily Fan, the manager of

Guardsmark's San Francisco branch office, that he would like to

talk to her "about things going on before they got out of hand." 

Id. 156:12-15. Ms. Fan did not ask what Plaintiff meant, but said

that she would make arrangements to talk to him later. Id. 158:5-

12. Plaintiff never heard from Ms. Fan. Id. 158:13-16. The other

female employee stopped working for Guardsmark two weeks after the

party, and K.F. subsequently told Plaintiff that she hadn't been

bothered by Mr. Ford since the party, so Plaintiff decided it was

not necessary to pursue the issue. Id. 159:9-16. 

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In June, 2003, Plaintiff began to experience difficulty

sleeping. Oluka Dep. 105:23-25. At that time, he was working the

10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. graveyard shift and attending about one day

of classes per week. Id. 106:8-16. He would stay awake for hours,

and couldn't sleep in the day or night. Id. 106:3-4. Plaintiff

asked for a transfer to the day or swing shift "just about every

week," explaining that "every time there was an opening or I saw, I

heard rumors of an opening," he spoke with Mr. Velasquez or Yasir

Basheer. Id. 99:4-11. Plaintiff did not receive a shift change,

even though priority was usually give to people already working on

a site who wished to switch to the day shift. Velasquez Dep.

85:20-24. Both Jim Velasquez, a supervisor, and his successor

David Garcia, informed Plaintiff that it was Mr. Ford who refused

to grant Plaintiff's transfer out of the graveyard shift. Oluka

Decl. ¶ 4; Oluka Dep. 122-23. Similarly, Plaintiff asked the 560

Mission Street Account Manager, Luis Estrera, why his requests for

shift changes had not been granted despite many openings and many

swing shift vacancies filled, and Mr. Estrera told him that it had

to do with Mr. Ford. Oluka Dep. 122:15-22. In November, 2003,

Plaintiff informed Mr. Estrera that he would like to change shifts

in order to sleep better; Mr. Estrera referred Plaintiff back to

Mr. Ford. Oluka Dep. 120:13-21. 

In October, 2003, Sara Mendoza replaced Mr. Basheer as

Plaintiff's shift supervisor. Oluka Dep. 99:19-24. Ms. Mendoza

also testified that she was told by Mr. Velasquez that all requests

by Plaintiff were to go to Mr. Ford; similarly specific

instructions were not given with respect to any other employee. 

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2

Defendants object to this and other portions of K.F.'s and

Plaintiff's declarations on grounds including relevance and

hearsay. Testimony about what Mr. Ford or others said is

admissible not to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein,

but as evidence of knowledge and intent. 

Otherwise, to the extent the Court relies upon Plaintiff's

evidence, Defendant's objections to it are overruled. To the

extent the Court does not rely on that evidence, Defendant's

objections are denied as moot. 

5

Mendoza Dep. 142:13-19. When asked if she thought this was

unusual, Ms. Mendoza responded, "I kind of questioned it, but I

didn't say anything." Id. 143:2-3. Ms. Mendoza was not aware of

any employee, other than Plaintiff, whose requests for a shift

change were not granted. Id. 134:12-15. 

In December, 2003, while K.F.'s boyfriend was out of town, Mr.

Ford again began approaching her and pressuring her

inappropriately. K.F. Decl. ¶ 10. K.F. told Plaintiff about Mr.

Ford's renewed, unwanted attention. Id. She again warned

Plaintiff to be careful, explaining that "Mr. Ford has been asking

a lot of questions" about Plaintiff, and that the supervisor had "a

lot of ears and agents who report" on their conversations. Oluka

Dep. 164:17-25, 165:4-14. According to K.F., Mr. Ford asked her

what Plaintiff knew about Mr. Ford's misconduct, but she was

"evasive" in her responses.2 K.F. Decl. ¶ 11. 

About two days after his December conversation with K.F.,

Plaintiff again contacted Ms. Fan. He reminded her of his June,

2003 request for a meeting, and asked to speak with her in person,

off the premises, explaining that he needed to talk to her "ASAP

before these things escalated." Oluka Dep. 170:4-10. Although

Plaintiff said he wanted to meet sooner, Ms. Fan indicated that the

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earliest she could meet was January 2, 2004. Id. 171:16-23. 

On December 30 or 31, Ms. Mendoza brought a disciplinary

report against Plaintiff. Id. 251. According to Plaintiff, she

explained that Mr. Ford had asked her to give the report to

Plaintiff, and that she was being "forced to take a disciplinary

action against me that she knows was not correct." Id. 251:17-

252:15. According to the disciplinary report, dated December 29,

2006, Plaintiff was disciplined because,

For the month of December on different dates Tuesday December

2, 2003, Thursday December 18, 03, Friday December 26, 03 and

Saturday December 27, 03 you were scheduled to work grave

shift and failed to show up for work stating that you were

sick. Because of your failure to show up for work the company

fell short in manpower and had to pay for overtime to cover

your shift. If this occurres [sic] one more time during a 30

day period you will be suspended and or terminated from this

site.

This type of conduct/inefficiency will not be tolerated

by Guardsmark. Further actions of this nature by you will

result in your removal from this account and possible

immediate termination. 

Oluka Decl., Ex. C, Employee Disciplinary Rep. (capitalization

omitted). Plaintiff testifies that at least one of the dates

mentioned in the report was a day he was not even scheduled to

work, and that on the other days, he was sick due to lack of sleep

and notified Guardsmark ahead of time of his inability to work. 

Oluka Dep. 241:11-24. On January 4, 2004, Plaintiff wrote a letter

of protest to Mr. Ford, stating that he felt that the disciplinary

report was a "case of 'giving a dog a bad name in order to hang

it.'" Oluka Decl., Ex. D, Jan. 4, 2004 Letter from Plaintiff to

Mr. Ford. He also complained that, despite six months of requests,

he had been denied a transfer to the swing shift, resulting in

sleeping problems, including "instances when I could not sleep for

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up to 48 hours." Plaintiff did not receive a response to his

letter. Oluka Decl. ¶ 7. During this litigation, Defendants

subpoenaed Plaintiff's medical records from the office of his

physician, Dr. Jim Savage, who produced a Certificate of No

Records. Leader Supp. Decl., Ex. A, Certificate of No Records. 

Plaintiff's sleep disturbance ended when his employment status

changed later in January. Oluka Dep. 119:5-8. 

Plaintiff's meeting with Ms. Fan was moved to January 9, 2004. 

According to a later February 6, 2004 report to Guardsmark

corporate headquarters, Plaintiff informed her at the meeting that

Mr. Ford had "used his position to coerce [K.F.] into having sex

with him." Levy Decl., Ex. A. Ms. Fan testified that she

understood that Plaintiff was reporting that Mr. Ford had raped

K.F. Fan Dep. 134:4-7. After her meeting with Plaintiff, Ms. Fan

told Mr. Ford that she had received a "allegation of sexual

harassment" against him. Id. 81:15-15-25. She asked him if the

allegations were true, and he denied them. Id. 82:1-8. Ms. Fan

states that she "may" have disclosed K.F. as one of the women Mr.

Ford was alleged to have harassed. Id. 82:3-5. It didn't occur to

Ms. Fan to remove Mr. Ford from the site pending an investigation. 

Id. 83:3-10. 

Ms. Fan interviewed several women in a conference room, on the

same floor as Mr. Ford's cubicle; she did not think about whether

it might make some of them uncomfortable to speak freely in close

proximity to Mr. Ford. Id. 89:4-15. K.F. explains that she did

not report Mr. Ford's sexual assaults to Ms. Fan because she was

afraid. Id. 63:10-12. According to K.F.,

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Mr. Ford called me prior to the interview with Ms. Fan, he

asked me if I was the one who had complained. He made it

clear that I was not to tell her anything. He also asked me

to tell Ms. Fan that Mr. Oluka was trying to cause problems

and that Mr. Oluka and I had a romantic relationship.

K.F. Decl. ¶ 12. All of the women Ms. Fan questioned denied being

sexually harassed or sexually assaulted by Mr. Ford. 

On about January 20, 2004, Ms. Fan told Mr. Ford that he had

been exonerated. Ford Dep. 172:11-16. On January 21, Mr. Ford

asked Plaintiff if he was the one who had complained to Ms. Fan;

fearing retaliation, Plaintiff denied filing a complaint. Oluka

Decl. ¶ 9. At that time, Mr. Ford told Plaintiff that he "had

ordered Ms. Mendoza to write the December 2003 Disciplinary Notice

for possible use when needed." Oluka Decl. ¶ 9. On January 26,

2004, Plaintiff was again written up by Ms. Mendoza, who stated

that she and Plaintiff had argued, culminating in Plaintiff yelling

at her, raising his hands and threatening to "tare [sic] me apart." 

Levy Decl., Ex. B, January 26, 2004, Interoffice Memorandum from

Ms. Mendoza to Mr. Ford. Plaintiff denies that he argued with or

threatened Ms. Mendoza. Oluka Dep. 297:8-16. Mr. Ford was called

to the site, and he told Ms. Mendoza that he had been having

"issues" with Plaintiff. Mendoza Dep. 142:6-12. Mr. Ford ordered

Plaintiff to turn over his badge and escorted him out of the

building. Id. 302:8-16. 

On January 26, 2004, the day after Plaintiff was removed by

Mr. Ford, K.F. went to the Guardsmark office and admitted to Ms.

Fan that she had been harassed by Mr. Ford. Levy Decl., Ex. A,

February 6, 2006 Memo from Emily Fan and Luis Estrera to Donna

Smith. The investigation of Mr. Ford was reopened. K.F.'s

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attorney sent a letter to Guardsmark, which caused Ms. Fan to

suspend Mr. Ford on February 5, 2006. Fan Dep. 185:1-14. Mr. Ford

retired from Guardsmark in March, 2004, before the investigation

into K.F.'s allegations was complete. Id. 270:10-16. 

Meanwhile, Ms. Fan told Plaintiff that there "appears to be a

misunderstanding," and that he might be able to return to the 560

Mission Street site "after the allegations of sexual harassment are

concluded." Oluka Dep. 306:13-18. Ms. Fan explained to him that

"by educated guesswork, they may have discovered that I spoke to

her about the sexual harassment." Id. 307:7-9. After Plaintiff's

removal from the 560 Mission Street site, he continued to work

eight hours per week for Guardsmark at the Dolby Labs site, where

he had worked part time since fall, 2003. Oluka Decl. ¶ 12. 

February 27, 2004 was Plaintiff's last day at Dolby Labs, because

the person for whom he had been substituting returned from

vacation. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff worked for another security company

that paid less in order to make up for the hours he had lost at

Guardsmark. Id. ¶ 15. On March 16, 2004, Plaintiff reminded Mr.

Estrera that he lacked work, and Mr. Estrera suggested that

Plaintiff submit a request for pay in lieu of vacation "to ease the

financial burden," which Plaintiff did. Id. ¶ 16. Mr. Estrera

disputes Plaintiff's account, stating that he offered Plaintiff a

full-time position elsewhere, which Plaintiff turned down "because

he was planning to take vacation and did not want to accept or

train for any new assignment until he returned from vacation." 

Estrera Decl. ¶ 11. On March 17, 2004, Marjorie Saenz, the Account

Manager for the Dolby Labs site, offered Plaintiff another

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temporary, full-time job at Dolby Labs, again as a substitute for

someone who was going on vacation, for sometime in April, but she

did not know when. Oluka Decl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff does not dispute

that he did not accept this assignment.

On April 4, 2004, Plaintiff wrote to Mr. Estrera and Ms. Fan

and complained that, after the disciplinary incident with Ms.

Mendoza,

I was then reduced to working eight (8) hours a week till the

end of February on another post from my average of 58 hours a

week. That reduction in work hours has cost me not less than

$5,000 in the past eight weeks. I had considered being

'employed' for eight (8) hours a week as making a mockery of

my job until you informed me during our meeting that I will be

returned to my position as soon as your investigations in to

allegations of sexual harassment in the building are

concluded. I am still waiting to see any genuine efforts to

return me to my post. The eight hours a week that I was

working was a temporary relief shift that was previously

scheduled to last for four weeks as overtime. 

Oluka Decl., Ex. F, April 5, 2004 Letter From Plaintiff to Mr.

Estrera and Ms. Fan. On April 14, 2004, Donna Smith, a Guardsmark

Vice President at its corporate office in Tennessee, responded to

Plaintiff acknowledging receipt of his letter and stating,

We are giving the concerns you raised a fresh look and are reevaluating the circumstances surrounding the December 29, 2003

disciplinary action and those following your notification of

alleged sexual harassment. The branch has been requested to

provide relevant information to me for review. 

You remain an employee in good standing, and we are

anxious to return you to work as soon as you are ready. You

should contact Emily Fan to discuss available openings. 

I will be out of the office next week and would request

that should you have additional questions, that you direct

them to Emily Fan in my absence. I would anticipate that we

will have a full written response to you by month end.

Oluka Decl., Ex. E, April 14, 2004 Letter from Ms. Smith to

Plaintiff. Plaintiff never received any further response from Ms.

Smith. Oluka Decl. ¶ 18. According to Ms. Mendoza, no one talked

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to her about the disciplinary incident at any point between January

26 and mid-April, 2004. Mendoza Dep. 126:1-6. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

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Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

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obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

I. Retaliation Claim

Defendants move for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's claim

for retaliation on the grounds that Plaintiff (1) cannot establish

that Guardsmark or Mr. Ford took any adverse employment action

against him and (2) cannot show a connection between his alleged

protected activities and any alleged adverse employment action. 

California Government Code § 12940(h) forbids employers from

retaliating against employees who have acted to protect the rights

afforded by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),

Government Code § 12900 et. seq. In order to establish a prima

facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that he or she

(1) engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer thereafter

subjected him or her to adverse employment action, and (3) there

was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. Mathieu v. Norrell Corp., 115 Cal. App. 4th

1174, 1185 (2004) (citing Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 51

Cal. App. 4th 345, 367 (1996)); see also Brooks v. City of San

Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A. Adverse Employment Action

The California Supreme Court has recently held that 

the proper standard for defining an adverse employment action

is the 'materiality' test, a standard that requires an

employer's adverse action to materially affect the terms and

conditions of employment, rather than the arguably broader

'deterrence' test.

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Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1036 (2005)

(internal citation omitted). However, the court made clear that

the "'terms, conditions, or privileges' of employment must be

interpreted liberally and with a reasonable appreciation of the

realities of the workplace." Id. at 1054. Any adverse treatment

"that is reasonably likely to impair a reasonable employee's job

performance or prospects for advancement or promotion falls within

reach" of California anti-discrimination law. Id. An employer's

alleged retaliatory acts are to be considered collectively, and

need not separately constitute adverse employment action. Id. at

1055-56. "Retaliation claims are inherently fact specific, and the

impact of an employer's action in a particular case must be

evaluated in context." Id. at 1052. Therefore, the determination

of whether an employer's acts rise to the level of actionable

conduct must "take into account the unique circumstances of the

affected employee as well as the workplace context of the claim." 

Id. 

Applying the law as set forth in Yanowitz, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has shown evidence sufficient to raise a dispute of

fact as to whether Guardsmark and Mr. Ford subjected him to adverse

employment action by repeatedly denying his requests to transfer to

a swing shift position, removing him from his full-time position at

560 Mission Street and issuing false disciplinary reports against

him. Guardsmark's analysis improperly describes certain acts in

isolation, and relies on testimony by Mr. Estrera that was

contradicted by Plaintiff. Mr. Ford's assertion that he "merely"

sent Plaintiff home for the evening and submitted a written report

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of the disciplinary incident with Ms. Mendoza likewise both

minimizes the significance of those acts, which together may have

materially impacted the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's

employment, and ignores Plaintiff's other allegations, such as that

Mr. Ford caused Plaintiff to be unfairly disciplined. Defendants'

request that the Court disregard certain of Plaintiff's allegations

as beyond the scope of his Complaint is not well taken. The

allegations contained in the Complaint were sufficient to notify

Defendants of the basis of Plaintiff's present claims against them. 

See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 35 (alleging that Defendants retaliated

against Plaintiff by reducing his hours to eight per week). 

Therefore, Defendants' motions for summary adjudication of this

portion of Plaintiff's prima facie case are denied. 

B. Protected Activity and Causal Connection

In addition to showing an adverse employment action, a

plaintiff must also show the existence of a causal connection

between the adverse employment action and protected activities. In

order to qualify as protected activities, an employee need not use

"legal terms or buzzwords when opposing discrimination. The court

will find opposing activity if the employee's comments, when read

in their totality, oppose discrimination." Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th

at 1047 (quoting Wirtz v. Kansas Farm Bureau Servs., Inc., 274 F.

Supp. 2d 1198, 1212 (D. Kan. 2003)). 

Standing alone, an employee's unarticulated belief that an

employer is engaging in discrimination will not suffice to

establish protected conduct for the purposes of establishing a

prima facie case of retaliation, where there is no evidence

the employer knew that the employee's opposition was based

upon a reasonable belief that the employer was engaging in

discrimination. Although an employee need not formally file a

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charge in order to qualify as being engaged in protected

opposing activity, such activity must oppose activity the

employee reasonably believes constitutes unlawful

discrimination, and complaints about personal grievances or

vague or conclusory remarks that fail to put an employer on

notice as to what conduct it should investigate will not

suffice to establish protected conduct.

Id. at 1046-47 (internal citations omitted). 

A causal connection between protected activities and adverse

employment actions may be established "with evidence that the

employer was aware of the protected activities and the adverse

actions followed each within a relatively short time." Cal. Fair

Housing and Employment Comm'n v. Gemini Aluminum Corp., 122 Cal.

App. 4th 1004, 1020 (2004). 

Plaintiff identifies as alleged protected activities his

February 10, 2003 letter to Mr. Ford, his December, 2003 request

for an urgent meeting with Ms. Fan and the allegations disclosed in

his January, 2004 meeting with Ms. Fan. 

Defendants argue that the first two incidents are irrelevant

for the purposes of establishing a causal connection because they

do not constitute "protected activity." They argue that

Plaintiff's February 10, 2003 letter cannot be interpreted as

opposing discrimination because, at that time, Plaintiff did not

know that Mr. Ford had sexually assaulted K.F., and in fact

asserted that such rumors were "unsubstantiated." However,

Plaintiff could reasonably have believed that the rumors regarding

Mr. Ford's preferences for African-Americans and women resulted in

a hostile or discriminatory work environment towards those

employees; indeed, Plaintiff clearly stated that his co-worker's

unchecked rumors were creating a "disruptive and hostile

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environment for us as we perform our duties." Plaintiff's letter

opposes conditions implicating his employer that are not analogous

to a co-worker's single derogatory remark, which courts have held

is not sufficient to support a prima facie case for retaliation. 

See Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 142 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding

that opposition of an employee to a co-worker's racially derogatory

remark was not protected by Title VII); Little v. United Techs.,

Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1997)

(following Silver and holding that opposition to racial remark by

co-worker was not protected activity). The fact that Plaintiff was

not apprised of the true facts at the time he wrote his first

letter does not mean that the letter was not protected. 

Plaintiff's December, 2003 request for a meeting with Ms. Fan

for unspecified, urgent reasons is not, in itself, protected

activity, sufficient to support Plaintiff's retaliation claim

against Guardsmark. However, Plaintiff may be able to prove at

trial that Mr. Ford knew that Plaintiff had taken steps to report

K.F.'s sexual harassment and assault to Ms. Fan. In light of

evidence such as Mr. Ford's alleged questions to K.F. about

Plaintiff, Mr. Ford's alleged orders that any shift change request

from Plaintiff be denied and alleged preparation of an earlier

false disciplinary report, a triable question of fact exists as to

the extent of Mr. Ford's awareness of Plaintiff's involvement and

whether Mr. Ford took adverse action against Plaintiff both as a

result of, and in anticipation of, his complaints. 

With respect to Plaintiff's alleged removal from the 560

Mission Street site and accompanying reduction in hours and pay,

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Plaintiff has shown both a temporal connection as well as direct

evidence of a causal link, namely Plaintiff's testimony that Ms.

Fan told him he might be allowed to return to work at the 560

Mission Street site once the investigation into his allegations of

sexual harassment concluded. 

For these reasons, Defendants' motions for summary

adjudication of this portion of Plaintiff's prima facie case are

denied. 

C. Pretext

In their reply, Defendants assert that Guardsmark articulated

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for removing Plaintiff from

the 560 Mission Street site, and that Plaintiff has failed to raise

a dispute of fact as to pretext. The Court finds that Plaintiff

has shown evidence of pretext, such as the alleged failure to

investigate the claimed disciplinary incident with Ms. Mendoza and

Plaintiff's statement that Mr. Ford told him that he had ordered

preparation of the earlier false disciplinary report. 

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' motions for summary

adjudication of Plaintiff's claim for retaliation. 

II. Mr. Ford's Liability

Mr. Ford moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's

retaliation claim on the grounds that he cannot be held

individually liable for personnel decisions made in his capacity as

Plaintiff's supervisor. 

Defendants argue that California courts have not yet settled

whether a supervisor may be held personally liable for a claim of

retaliation under FEHA, and urge the Court to apply the reasoning

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in Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640 (1998), where the California

Supreme Court held that plaintiffs bringing a claim of

discrimination under FEHA or a claim of wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy could sue and hold liable their

employers, but not their individual supervisors. However, courts

that have considered this question have refused to apply Reno to

retaliation claims, distinguishing the law at issue in Reno from

"the statutory language regarding retaliation and the reference to

'person' indicating a legislative intent to allow individual

liability for retaliatory acts by supervisors." Walrath v.

Sprinkel, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1242 (2002) (counting cases); see,

e.g, Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276,

1288 (9th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Reno and holding that

supervisors can be held liable for retaliation under FEHA). 

Nothing in these decisions suggests that their holdings should be

limited to situations in which retaliation is intertwined with

discriminatory harassment. Plaintiff has shown evidence from which

a reasonable jury could infer that Mr. Ford took adverse action

against Plaintiff based on a retaliatory motive. Therefore, the

Court denies Mr. Ford's motion for summary adjudication on this

ground. 

III. Disability Claim

Guardsmark moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's claim

against it for violation of FEHA based on a failure to engage in an

interactive process regarding his alleged sleep disorder, on the

grounds that Plaintiff has failed to show evidence (1) that he had 

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a disability as defined by FEHA; (2) that Guardsmark knew of the

disability; or (3) that he requested reasonable accommodation for

that disability. 

A. Applicable Law

California Government Code § 12940(n) makes it unlawful

For an employer or other entity covered by this part to fail

to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with

the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable

accommodations, if any, in response to a request for

reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a

known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.

The law "contains broad definitions of physical disability, mental

disability, and medical condition." Cal. Govt. Code § 12926.1(b). 

A "physical disability" is defined to include, "but is not limited

to": 

Having any physiological disease, disorder, condition,

cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of

the following: 

(A) Affects one or more of the following body systems:

neurological, immunological, musculoskeletal, special

sense organs, respiratory, including speech organs,

cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary,

hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. 

(B) Limits a major life activity . . . .

Cal. Gov. Code § 12926(k)(1). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that

sleeping is a major life activity. McAlindin v. County of San

Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999). 

An employer's obligation to engage in an interactive process

is triggered when an employee "gives the employer notice of the

employee's disability and the desire for a reasonable

accommodation." Williams v. Genentech, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 4th

357, 381 (2006) (citing Jensen v. Wells Fargo Banks, 85 Cal. App.

4th 245, 261 (2000)). An employee need not "speak any magic words"

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in order to request accommodation. Prilliman v. United Airlines,

Inc., 53 Cal. App. 4th 935, 954 (1997) (quoting Schmidt v. Safeway,

Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D. Or. 1994)). However, an employee

must demonstrate that his or her "injury or physical condition

. . . makes 'difficult' the achievement of work or some other major

life activity." Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th

34, 47 (2006). Although an employer's knowledge of the employee's

disability can be inferred from circumstances, knowledge "will only

be imputed to the employer when the fact of disability is the only

reasonable interpretation of the known facts." Brundage v. Hahn,

57 Cal. App. 4th 228, 237 (1997). 

B. Analysis

In his January 4, 2004 letter, Plaintiff explicitly notified

his employer that he was experiencing severe sleeping problems as a

result of the graveyard shift, including instances where he could

not sleep for up to forty-eight hours. Plaintiff requested

transfer to a swing shift. Plaintiff received no response to his

letter. 

Defendants maintain that, as a matter of law, a sleeping

disorder caused by shift work does not constitute a disability. In

Baulos v. Broadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir.

1998), the Seventh Circuit held that an "inability to drive sleeper

trucks because of sleep deprivation" was not an "impairment that

substantially limits the major life activity of working," as

defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in part

because the plaintiffs' complaints of sleep deprivation were common

among truck drivers assigned to sleeper truck duty. See also

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Williams v. City of Charlotte, N.C., 899 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (D.C.

N.C. 1995) (holding that alleged "shift work sleep disorder"

experienced by the "overwhelming majority" of night shift workers

was not a disability under the ADA); Mont-Ros v. City of West

Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1356 (D.C. Fla. 2000) (finding that

plaintiff with sleep apnea failed to show that his condition

substantially limited a major life activity as required by the

ADA). However, all of the cases cited by Defendants rely on the

ADA's definition of disability: an impairment that "substantially

limits" a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis

added). FEHA's definition of disability is broader and includes

any impairment that "limits" or "makes 'difficult'" a major life

activity. Government Code § 12926(k)(1)(B); Gelfo, 140 Cal. App.

4th at 47. As the California legislature has clarified,

the definitions of 'physical disability' and 'mental

disability' under the law of this state require a 'limitation'

upon a major life activity, but do not require, as does the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a 'substantial

limitation.' This distinction is intended to result in

broader coverage under the law of this state than under that

federal act.

Cal. Govt. Code § 12926.1(c). Furthermore, unlike in Baulos and

Williams, here there is no evidence that Plaintiff's impairment,

which sometimes involved being unable to sleep for forty-eight

hours in a row, was a common condition suffered by most graveyard

shift workers. Defendants offer no legal authority for their

argument that Plaintiff cannot prove disability on the basis of his

own self-reporting, and no factual support for their assertion that

Dr. Savage concluded that Plaintiff's inability to sleep was not a

"physiological condition." Therefore, the Court cannot decide as a

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matter of law that Plaintiff was not disabled under FEHA. 

Likewise, the Court denies Defendants' request for summary

adjudication that, because Plaintiff did not have a disability or

provide Guardsmark with a physician's note, he cannot have given

Guardsmark legally sufficient notice of his disability. Plaintiff

did not need to invoke any "magic words" in order to trigger

Defendants' obligations under FEHA, and Defendants have offered no

reasonable interpretation of the facts Plaintiff presented in his

letter other than that he had a physiological impairment that

limited his ability to sleep. The fact that Plaintiff thought that

his impairment was caused by working the graveyard shift and might

be alleviated by a transfer does not necessarily mean that

Plaintiff's condition was not "physiological" in nature. Although

Guardsmark was entitled to inquire into Plaintiff's ability to

perform job-related functions and to respond to Plaintiff's request

for accommodation, California Government Code § 12940(e)(2), it did

not do so. 

Therefore, the Court denies Guardsmark's motion for summary

adjudication of Plaintiff's disability claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants'

motions for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's defamation claim

but otherwise DENIES the motions for summary judgment (Docket No.

60). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/26/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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