Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05322/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW COHEN, TIMOTHY 

HORNICK, KALEAH C. ALLEN, 

NICHOLAS CARLSON, GLENN E. 

JACOBS, MARK WEILER, CHAD 

SMITH, SARAH D. SMITH, MATT 

KOPPIN, SCOTT CISCHKE, KRYSTLE 

FAERN, RODOLFO CABRERA, 

BRANDY DAVIS, WILLIAM ZIDE, 

ZACHARY GOMOLEKOFF, DAVID 

HEDICKER, NANCY MAEKAWA, 

CATHERINE GOODWIN, PAUL 

COLETTI, KATHLEEN BOGGS, 

KIMBERLY MODESITT, KIMBERLY 

BENJAMIN, MARK KUNZE, ARIANA 

RYAN, NATHAN COOPER, BECKY 

WELLINGTON, M. GAIL SUNDELL, 

VICTOR PERLMAN, and JUNE A. HALL, 

individually and on behalf of all other 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

APPLE INC.,

Defendant.

No. C 19-05322 WHA 

ORDER CONVERTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS INTO MOION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

ALLOWING IMMEDIATE 

DISCOVERY

In this putative class action for negligence, breach of warranty, consumer fraud, and 

unjust enrichment, defendant moves to dismiss the complaint. For the following reasons, this 

order converts the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and allows 

immediate discovery. 

Case 3:19-cv-05322-WHA Document 89 Filed 02/10/20 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court

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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Generally, district courts may not consider materials outside the 

pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Lee v. City 

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 12(d), however, provides that if 

“matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must 

be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” All parties must then be given a 

“reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion,” including 

the opportunity to take reasonable discovery to meet the issues raised by the extraneous 

material. 

Extraneous material, however, is allowed on a Rule 12 motion in two instances: Judicial 

notice under FRE 201 and the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Khoja v. Orexigen 

Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). Both of these procedures allow district 

courts to consider materials outside a complaint, but their use must be “consistent with the 

prohibition against resolving factual disputes at the pleading stage.” Id. at 1003.

A court may judicially notice a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it 

“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” FRE 201(b) (emphasis added). “Just because the document itself is susceptible 

to judicial notice[,]” however, “does not mean that every assertion of fact within that document 

is judicially noticeable for its truth.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999.

Incorporation-by-reference, in contrast, is a “judicially created doctrine that treats certain 

documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.” Id. at 1002. The doctrine prevents 

plaintiffs from cherry-picking portions of documents that support their claims, while omitting 

portions of the same documents that weaken their claims. Ibid. A defendant may seek to 

incorporate a document by reference “if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the 

document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim,” but the “mere mention of the existence of a 

document is insufficient to incorporate the contents of a document by reference.” United 

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 3:19-cv-05322-WHA Document 89 Filed 02/10/20 Page 2 of 4
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Apple’s motion to dismiss is an excellent example calling for application of the foregoing 

principles. The vast array of material presented outside of the pleadings, including supposed 

factual statements and findings of the Commission, triggers treatment of this motion as one for 

summary judgment. This motion cannot and should not be decided on this record. Further 

discovery into the issues presented is necessary.

For the guidance of counsel, the Court sees the following issues of particular concern. 

One issue is how two different “FCC-certified” labs could come to opposite conclusions 

applying the very same guidelines to identical Apple iPhones. Discovery should be taken to 

see how the lab used by the Chicago Tribune or any other labs (such as those used by the 

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the French National Frequencies Agency) conducted 

their tests, how they compare to the Commission’s testing, and how the labs construe the testseparation-distance requirements. These are not the only issues open for discovery.

The Court understands that the discrepancies revolve primarily around the test-separation 

distance used. Apple emphasized during the hearing that the testing could be done at any 

distance within twenty-five millimeters. This order pauses to note that following the hearing, a 

story was published that mischaracterized a comment made by the undersigned during the 

hearing regarding this rule. The headline read “Alsup Laments ‘Dumb’ FCC in IPhone 

Radiation Suit.” The headline said the opposite of how the comment was actually intended. 

The actual comment, “I can’t believe the FCC would be that dumb. That is a terrible rule . . . I 

can’t believe it can be manipulated like that[,]” criticized Apple’s supposed reading of the FCC 

protocol. As is clear from the complaint, as well as documents presented by Apple itself, the 

difference of a just a few millimeters can bring a phone in or out of compliance. If testing 

could be done at any distance within twenty-five millimeters — twenty-four and a half 

millimeters or two millimeters, for example — the certification process could be easily 

manipulated. The Commission’s guidance requires more than Apple admits.

The relevant portion of the Commission’s guidance reads as follows (Dkt. No. 64, Exh. 8 

at 10–11): 

A conservative minimum test separation distance for supporting offCase 3:19-cv-05322-WHA Document 89 Filed 02/10/20 Page 3 of 4
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

the-shelf body-worn accessories that may be acquired by users of 

consumer handsets should be used to test for body-worn accessory 

SAR compliance. This distance is determined by the handset 

manufacturer according to the typical body-worn accessories users 

may acquire at the time of equipment certification, but not more than 

2.5 cm, to enable users to purchase aftermarket body-worn 

accessories with the required minimum separation. The selected test 

separation distance must be clearly explained in the SAR report to 

support the body-worn accessory test configurations. Devices that 

are designed to operate on the body of users using lanyards and 

straps or without requiring additional body-worn accessories must 

be tested for SAR compliance using a conservative minimum test 

separation distance ≤ 5 mm to support compliance. 

Apple’s reading, as represented at the hearing, failed to disclose that the separation distance 

chosen (within twenty-five millimeters) must be explained and justified in the SAR report. 

Apple’s reading with such an omission was the dumb part, not the Commission’s guidance. 

In any event, Apple provided the Commission’s certification of its iPhones, but not the 

“SAR report” or any documents regarding how the test separation distance was determined. 

This factual dispute is crucial and warrants further discovery.

The Court is inclined to hold that if the Apple products ultimately satisfy the 

Commission’s standard, then all claims must be dismissed on preemption grounds. On the 

other hand, if the products in question do not meet the Commission standards, then the Court is 

inclined to let all of the claims go forward. This is not a final determination and discovery is 

needed, even into what and how the Commission’s guidance should be implemented.

The Rule 23 issues discussed during the hearing are not yet ready for decision.

As soon as adequate discovery to address issues raised by Apple’s motion, then Apple 

may renew its motion and plaintiffs may cross-move if they feel the record warrants a decision 

in their favor. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice as to renewal 

under Rule 56.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2020.

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:19-cv-05322-WHA Document 89 Filed 02/10/20 Page 4 of 4