Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55172/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NAJIJAWDAT HAMDAN; HOSSAM

HEMDAN; ACLU FOUNDATION OF

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE; FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, a component of the

U.S. Department of Justice; U.S.

NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAUINTERPOL, a component of the U.S.

Department of Justice; NATIONAL

SECURITY DIVISION, a component of

the U.S. Department of Justice;

DEPARTMENT OF STATE; UNITED

STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, a

component of the U.S. Department

of Defense; DEFENSE OFFICE OF

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, a

component of the U.S. Department

of Defense; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS &

BORDER PROTECTION, a component

of the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security; TRANSPORTATION

No. 13-55172

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-06149-

DSF-JEM

OPINION

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2 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, a

component of the U.S. Department

of Homeland Security; OFFICE OF

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE; U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF HOMELAND SECURITY;

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT, a component of the

U.S. Department of Homeland

Security; OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE

AND ANALYSIS, a component of the

U.S. Department of Homeland

Security,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 2, 2015—Pasadena California

Filed August 14, 2015

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit

Judges, and Edward R. Korman, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Gould

* The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3

SUMMARY**

Freedom of Information Act

The panel affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in

part, the district court’s summary judgment in favor of

several federal agencies in plaintiffs’ suit under the Freedom

of Information Act (“FOIA”), arising from their request for

information from a myriad of federal agencies about federal

investigations related to Naji Hamdan and anyU.S. role in his

detention and torture by United Arab Emirates.

The panel affirmed the district court’s rulings as to the

adequacy of the agencies’ search and the application of FOIA

exemptions. The panel held that the State Department and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation complied with their

obligations to search for records under FOIA. The panel also

held that the government properly withheld records under

FOIA Exemption 1 (which protects national security

information), Exemption 3 (which protects records exempt

from disclosure pursuant to a separate statute); and

Exemption 7(E) (which protects some records compiled for

law enforcement purposes). Specifically, the panel affirmed

the district court’s holding that the Defense Intelligence

Agency properly withheld records under Exemption 3

because those records were protected under 10 U.S.C. § 424.

FOIA provides that any “reasonably segregable portion

of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such

record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

this subsection.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The panel held that the

district court erred by not making findings on the issue of

segregability. As to all the records whose existence was not

itself classified, the panel directed the district court to

determine on remand whether there was any content that

could be segregated from the exempt information and turned

over to plaintiffs.

COUNSEL

Ahilan T. Arulanantham and Michael Kaufman, ACLU

Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, California;

Laboni A. Hoq (argued), Zulaikha Aziz, and Nicole Gon

Ochi, Asian Americans Advancing Justice–Los Angeles, Los

Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M.

Collette and H. Thomas Byron III (argued), Attorneys, Civil

Division, Appellate Staff, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; André Birotte, Jr., United States

Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 5

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Naji Hamdan, Hossam Hemdan, and the ACLU

Foundation of Southern California (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

several federal agencies in Plaintiffs’ suit under the Freedom

of Information Act (“FOIA”). Plaintiffs contend that: (1) two

agencies did not conduct adequate searches for records

responsive to Plaintiffs’ FOIA request; (2) two agencies

improperly invoked several exemptions to FOIA’s disclosure

requirements; and (3) the district court erred in not making

findings of fact about whether there was non-exempt

information in the withheld records that could be segregated

and disclosed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Because the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the

State Department conducted searches reasonably calculated

to produce records responsive to Plaintiffs’ request, and

because the FBI and the Defense Intelligence Agency

(“DIA”) properly withheld some records under several

exemptions to FOIA’s disclosure requirements, we affirm the

district court’s rulings on the adequacy of the agencies’

searches or the invocation of the challenged exemptions. But

because the district court did not make any findings as to

whether there was non-exempt information in the withheld

records that could reasonably be segregated and disclosed,

and we cannot say on this record that the error was harmless,

we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand this

case to the district court for a segregability analysis.

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6 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

I

Hamdan, a U.S. citizen born in Lebanon, moved to the

United States in 1984, moved to the United Arab Emirates

(“U.A.E.”) in 2006, and in 2009 was deported from the

U.A.E. to Lebanon, where he now lives.1 While in the United

States, Hamdan owned an auto-parts business, Hapimotors. 

Hamdan was a founding member and sometime-volunteer

imam at the Islamic Center of Hawthorne, a mosque in

Hawthorne, California. Hemdan, Hamdan’s brother, is also

a U.S. citizen and has lived in the United States since 1987. 

Hemdan now owns Hapimotors.

Since 1999, the FBI has questioned the brothers several

times, asking whether either was involved with terrorism and

about members of the mosque Hamdan attended. Other

friends, relatives, and business associates were also

questioned, including Jehad Suliman, then the manager of

Hapimotors.

In 2006, Hamdan moved with his wife and children to the

U.A.E., where he started a new business. On a brief visit to

the United States several months later, Hamdan was

questioned by federal agents for several hours after he

arrived, and thought that he was followed by federal agents

throughout his trip. In 2007, Hamdan’s wife and children

moved to Lebanon. In July 2008, Hamdan met with three

FBI agents—two from California and one from the FBI’s

Legal Attaché Office in the U.A.E.—at the U.S. Embassy in

Abu Dhabi to discuss an incident in January 2008 when

 

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from evidence submitted

by the parties in litigating the summary judgment motion, and Plaintiffs’

version of events is credited wherever there is a factual dispute.

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 7

Hamdan had been detained and abused by Lebanese

intelligence officials while visiting his family in Lebanon.

A month after that meeting, on August 26, 2008, Hamdan

was detained by the U.A.E. State Security service without

explanation. He was held in a secret location for three

months and tortured to extract false confessions of

involvement with terrorist activity. While in the secret

facility, Hamdan was approached by an English-speaker with

an American accent, whose shoes and pants, which Hamdan

could see under his blindfold, appeared Western. The man

warned Hamdan to cooperate with the State Security or he

would be harmed. On October 19, 2008, Hamdan was visited

by a U.S. consular official, to whom Hamdan was too afraid

to speak about his torture because there were State Security

officials present.

On August 28, 2008, days after Hamdan was detained, his

wife informed the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, and Hemdan

contacted the FBI in Los Angeles. But the consular visit

mentioned above did not occur until mid-October.Unsatisfied

with what they perceived as an insufficient response, in

November 2008, Hamdan’s family filed a habeas corpus

petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of

Columbia, contending that the U.S. government was

complicit in Hamdan’s detention. Hamdan was released from

detention a week after the petition was filed, and transferred

to a regular prison for criminal suspects. Hamdan was

convicted of terrorism-related offenses by an Emerati court. 

He was sentenced to time served and deported to Lebanon.

In July 2010, Plaintiffs filed a FOIA request seeking

information from a myriad of federal agencies about federal

investigations related to Hamdan and any U.S. role in his

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8 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

detention and torture by U.A.E. officials. They asked for

“any records . . . relating to or concerning” Hamdan,

Hemdan, Jehad Suliman, or Hapimotors, that were “prepared,

received, transmitted, collected and/or maintained” by the

Departments of Justice, State, Defense, and Homeland

Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency “and any of

their sub-agencies or divisions.”

In August 2010, Plaintiffs filed a FOIA complaint in the

district court. The State Department searched the record

systems of eleven internal offices or components, as well as

the U.S. Embassies in Abu Dhabi and Beirut and the U.S.

Consulate General in Dubai. The State Department did not

search the records of its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. 

The Bureau is the State Department’s main link to the

Defense Department, and provides “policy direction in the

areas of international security, . . . [and] military operations”

and “has the Departmental lead on . . . defense relations, . . .

and analyzing broad trends in international security affairs to

determine their effect on U.S. policies.” In response to the

FOIA request and to the suit, the State Department identified

1177 responsive records, releasing 533 documents in full and

258 in part, and withholding 386 documents in full, before

later identifying additional documents. Of the documents

released, one email mentioned communication between a

consular officer who visited Hamdan in detention and “Abu

Dhabi Pol/Mil,” and another email sent to the consular officer

suggested that he “ask POL Mail [sic] (they are UAE State

Security counterpart) to assist” in getting consular access to

Hamdan while he was detained in the U.A.E. But the State

Department’s affidavit explaining its FOIA response said that

no search was made of the Bureau’s records because despite

those mentions of an Abu Dhabi-based official, there appears

to be no indication that the Bureau was involved in matters

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 9

related to Hamdan and no indication of a connection between

Plaintiffs and the military functions performed by the Bureau.

The FBI searched its Central Records System (“CRS”),

which is an archive of its “administrative, applicant, criminal,

personnel and other files compiled for law enforcement

purposes,” but which the FBI also uses for responding to

FOIA requests. The search was done using the Automated

Case Support System, an index system which enables

searches. According to the FBI’s declarations justifying its

searches and exemptions filed in the district court, the

“decision to index names other than subjects, suspects, and

victims is a discretionary decision made by the FBI Special

Agent . . . assigned to work on the investigation, the

Supervisory [Special Agent]in the field office conducting the

investigation, and the SSA at” FBI headquarters. “The FBI

does not index every name in its files; rather, it indexes only

that information considered to be pertinent, relevant, or

essential for future retrieval.” The FBI also searched its

Electronic Surveillance (“ELSUR”) indices, which maintain

information on communications intercepted by FBI

surveillance.

The FBI searches identified 771 pages of responsive

records, of which 521 pages were disclosed in full or in part,

and 250 pages were withheld in full. The withholdings were

justified under FOIA Exemptions 1, 2, 5, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and

7(E) to FOIA’s disclosure requirements.2 The DIA’s search

(the adequacyof which Plaintiffs do not challenge), identified

2 Of the exemptions claimed by the FBI, Plaintiffs appeal only the

applicability of Exemptions 1 and 7(E).

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10 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

twenty-seven responsive records, but all were withheld under

Exemptions 1, 2, 3, and 6.3

The district court granted summary judgment to the

agencies. The district court held that the government’s

searches were adequate, and specifically that it was

reasonable for the State Department not to search the Bureau

of Political-Military Affairs records because there was no

reason to think Hamdan, his family, or his business associates

were involved in any of the military activities within the

Bureau’s purview. The district court also held that the FBI

and the DIA had properly withheld records under Exemption

1 for classified material, because the classification claims

were sufficiently supported by the declarations and there was

no reason to doubt the truth or good faith of those

declarations. Further, the court held that the DIA properly

withheld documents under Exemption 3 “because 10 U.S.C.

§ 424 prevents the disclosure of DIA activities and

organization,” and that the FBI had justifiably withheld

records under Exemption 7(E). Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II

We review summary judgment orders in FOIA cases in a

two-step process. Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th

Cir. 2007). First, we review de novo whether the documents

submitted by the agencies give an adequate factual basis for

the district court’s decision. Id. If there is an adequate

factual basis, we then determine “whether the district court’s

decision regarding [the] applicability of FOIA’s exemptions

was correct.” Id. Factual findings are reviewed for clear

error, but legal conclusions, including whether a document

 

3

 Only DIA’s invocations of Exemptions 1 and 3 are before us.

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 11

fits within one of FOIA’s exemptions, are reviewed de novo. 

Id.

We review “whether [an agency’s]indices and supporting

declarations constitute a sufficient Vaughn index4de novo.”

Citizens Comm’n on Human Rights v. FDA, 45 F.3d 1325,

1328 (9th Cir. 1995).

Where the government invokes FOIA exemptions in cases

involving national security issues, we are “required to accord

‘substantial weight’ to [the agency’s] affidavits.” Hunt v.

CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Miller v.

Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Those

affidavits “must describe the justifications for nondisclosure

with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the

information withheld logically falls within the claimed

exemptions, and show that the justifications are not

controverted by contrary evidence in the record or by

evidence of [agency] bad faith.” Id.

4 A “Vaughn index” is a document supplied by government agencies to

opposing parties and the court that identifies “each documentwithheld, the

statutory exemption claimed, and a particularized explanation of how

disclosure ofthe particular document would damage the interest protected

by the claimed exemption,” and the index is designed to provide reasoning

against which the requester can offer effective advocacy and a basis for

the court to reach a reasoned decision. Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 977

(9th Cir. 1991). “There is no fixed rule establishing what a Vaughn index

must look like, and a district court has considerable latitude to determine

its requisite form and detail in a particular case.” ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d

422, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The term derives from the D.C. Circuit’s

decision in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

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12 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

III

Government transparency is critical to maintaining a

functional democratic polity, where the people have the

information needed to check public corruption, hold

government leaders accountable, and elect leaders who will

carry out their preferred policies. Consequently, “FOIA was

enacted to facilitate public access to [g]overnment

documents” by “establish[ing] a judicially enforceable right

to secure [government] information from possibly unwilling

official hands.” Lahr v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d

964, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

FOIA recognizes that “an informed citizenry [is] vital to the

functioning of a democratic society.” Dep’t of Interior v.

Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 16 (2001)

(internal quotations omitted). In response to a FOIA request,

government agencies must conduct a reasonable search to

find any documents responsive to the request. Lahr, 569 F.3d

at 986. But “FOIA contemplates that some information may

legitimately be kept from the public” if it falls into one of

nine enumerated exemptions in the statute. Id. at 973.

Government agencies may not rely merely on a need for

heightened national security to justify erosion of statutory

entitlements to information, because we will hold agencies to

FOIA’s requirements. Our decision today relates to

intelligence and law enforcement records. Affidavits such as

those submitted by the agencies here may not be sufficient in

other contexts to satisfy the requirements of reasonable

specificity in explaining why the contents of certain records

cannot be disclosed. We will not, in cases raising issues of

national security, abdicate our role to ensure that Congress’s

commands in FOIA are followed. But when dealing with

properly classified information in the national security

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 13

context, we are mindful of our limited institutional expertise

on intelligence matters, as compared with the executive

branch. And we are also aware that it is in the nature of

intelligence data that disclosure of small pieces of a puzzle

may be aggregated and considered in context by an adversary,

giving some risk even to explication of grounds for

withholding documents.

In this case, the State Department and the FBI met their

obligations to conduct an adequate search for responsive

records and the FBI and the DIA demonstrated that the

information they withheld from Plaintiffs fell within the

statutorily enumerated exemptions. But the district court

must determine whether there is any information in the

withheld records that can reasonably be separated from the

properly withheld information and disclosed to Plaintiffs.

A. The FBI’s and State Department’s searches were

adequate.

Plaintiffs argue that the FBI’s and the State Department’s

searches for responsive records were not adequate. We

disagree and affirm the district court’s ruling on the adequacy

of the searches.

“FOIA requires an agency responding to a request to

‘demonstrate that it has conducted a search reasonably

calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’” Id. at 986

(quoting Zemansky v. EPA, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.

1985)). An agency can demonstrate the adequacy of its

search through “reasonablydetailed, nonconclusoryaffidavits

submitted in good faith.” Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 571. 

Affidavits submitted by an agency to demonstrate the

adequacy of its response are presumed to be in good faith. 

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14 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

Grand Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C.

Cir. 1981). In evaluating the adequacy of the search, the

issue “is not whether there might exist any other documents

possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the

search for those documents was adequate.” Lahr, 569 F.3d

at 987. “[T]he failure to produce or identify a few isolated

documents cannot by itself prove the searches inadequate.” 

Id. at 988.

Though Lahr made clear that a search is not inadequate

for failure to turn up a single document, see id. at 987 (citing

Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315

(D.C. Cir. 2003)), it may be the case that “if a review of the

record raises substantial doubt, particularly in view of welldefined requests and positive indications of overlooked

materials, summary judgment is inappropriate,” Iturralde,

315 F.3d at 314 (quotation omitted). But in a case we cited

approvingly in Lahr, the Eighth Circuit rejected a FOIA

requester’s challenge that the State Department had

conducted an inadequate search because the requester had

repeatedly identified certain documents that were not located

or released to him but were referenced in records that the

State Department did release. See Miller v. U.S. Dep’t of

State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1384–85 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The fact that

a document once existed does not mean that it now exists . . .

[and] the Department is not required . . . to account for

documents which the requester has in some way identified if

it has made a diligent search for those documents in the

places in which they might be expected to be found.”).

The State Department’s search was reasonably calculated

to uncover all records responsive to Plaintiffs’ FOIA request. 

Even though the Department did not search the records of the

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, there is no reason to

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 15

doubt the good faith of the Department’s declaration that

there is no apparent connection between Hamdan and the

militarymatters within the Bureau’s purview. Plaintiffs point

to the two emails the State Department’s search revealed

mentioning, respectively “Abu Dhabi Pol/Mil,” and getting

in touch with “Pol Mail [sic]” as the liaison to U.A.E. State

Security. But first, these are exactly the sort of isolated

records that Lahr says do not undermine the adequacy of a

search. Second, the State Department did search the records

of the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, which would likely have

uncovered any communications with “Abu Dhabi Pol/Mil.” 

More light may be shed on the role of “Abu Dhabi Pol/Mil”

in the records that the State Department searched turned up

but whose contents were withheld under FOIA’s exemptions. 

Plaintiffs do not challenge the propriety of the State

Department’s withholding records.

We hold that the FBI’s search was also reasonably

calculated to locate responsive records. Plaintiffs contend

that the FBI should have searched for records from the FBI’s

field offices in Los Angeles and Long Beach, California, the

email files of specific FBI personnel, and the records of the

FBI Legal Attaché in Abu Dhabi. The crux of their argument

is the FBI did not conduct an adequate search because: (1) the

FBI admits that the “decision to index names [in the CRS]

other than subjects, suspects, and victims is a discretionary

decision made by” FBI personnel; (2) the FBI admits that not

every email sent by or to every agent will be preserved; and

(3) the State Department searches located communications

between FBI and State Department officials that the FBI’s

search did not identify. We disagree.

First, the FBI affidavits state that the CRS and ELSUR

systems together constitute the means by which the FBI

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16 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

maintains its records for use in investigations. The FBI’s

decision to search those databases, using many variations of

the terms suggested by Plaintiffs to account for spelling or

other inconsistencies, was a “diligent search for . . .

documents in the places in which they might be expected to

be found.” Miller, 779 F.2d at 1385. Plaintiffs’ suggestion

that the FBI might be under-inclusive in uploading and

indexing records in the CRS to avoid FOIA disclosures is

unpersuasive. The CRS is used primarily as a law

enforcement tool to provide FBI personnel with a

comprehensive, searchable database for information to aid in

their mission. An under-inclusive approach to indexing

would undercut the CRS’s investigative value.

Second, we reject Plaintiffs’ reliance on Campbell v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28–29 (D.C. Cir. 1998), which

held that the FBI’s search of the CRS was insufficient if other

databases are likely to turn up the information requested. In

Campbell, the court explained that an agency has discretion

to conduct a standard search in response to a general request,

but must rethink its assessment of what is a “reasonable”

search in light of leads that emerge from its initial search that

suggest other records might be located elsewhere. Campbell,

164 F.3d at 28. But Campbell dealt with the FBI’s failure to

search its ELSUR database where records located by the CRS

search alluded to potentially responsive ELSUR records. 

Here, the FBI did search its ELSUR records. Moreover,

Plaintiffs have made no showing that by the close of the

FBI’s search, leads had emerged suggesting a need to search

other databases. Cf. id. That records identified by the State

Department’s search months later indicated that a few

documents may not have been located by the FBI is not

enough for us to call the FBI’s search unreasonable or

inadequate.

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 17

Plaintiffs were entitled to a reasonable search for records,

not a perfect one. And a reasonable search is what they got. 

The State Department and the FBI complied with their

obligations to search for records under FOIA.

B. The government properly withheld records under

FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and 7(E).

FOIA’s strong presumption in favor of disclosure places

the burden on the government to show that an exemption

properly applies to the records it seeks to withhold. Lahr,

569 F.3d at 973. But we also give considerable deference to

agency affidavits made in apparent good faith where the

affadavits reasonably describe the justifications for

nondisclosure and show that the content withheld falls within

one of FOIA’s exemptions. See Hunt, 981 F.2d at 1119. We

conclude that the FBI and the DIA adequately justified their

withholding of records under FOIA’s exemptions.

After a careful and searching review of the record, we

have no reason to doubt the agencies’ good faith. Affidavits

submitted by an agency to demonstrate the adequacy of its

FOIA response are presumed to be in good faith. Grand

Saucer Watch, 692 F.2d at 771. As the Supreme Court

cautioned in a case involving FOIA, government misconduct

is “easy to allege and hard to disprove, so courts must insist

on a meaningful evidentiary showing.” Nat’l Archives &

Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 175 (2004) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs have made

no such meaningful showing here, despite peppering their

briefs with allegations of FBI involvement in Hamdan’s

abduction and torture by Emirati authorities, and suggestions

that the agencies’ withholdings in this case are calculated to

cover up proxy detention practices that allegedlywould allow

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18 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

suspects to be detained and tortured by foreign governments. 

But there has been no evidence produced in this case to give

us good reason to doubt the agencies’ good faith. The State

Department communications that were disclosed reveal that

State Department personnel sought—and obtained—consular

access to Hamdan while he was detained and advised the

U.A.E. government that denyingHamdan consular access and

the delay in consular notification was a violation of the

U.A.E.’s treaty obligations. Plaintiffs’s contentions seem

based on coincidence and conjecture: the FBI questioned

Hamdan in the U.A.E. several weeks before his detention,

Hamdan was transferred to a regular detention facility from

his secret location shortly after his family’s habeas corpus

petition was filed, and Hamdan was questioned by someone

he thought was an American. But these facts do not prove,

and they barely suggest, that the FBI was involved in

Hamdan’s detention. It is certainly not the meaningful

evidentiary showing the Supreme Court says is needed to

undermine the presumption of good faith.

1. The FBI and DIA properlywithheld records under

Exemption 1.

Exemption 1 protects national security information, and

specifically exempts from disclosure records that are:

“(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an

Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national

defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly

classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(1).

The records withheld under Exemption 1 in this case are

classified under section 1.4 of Executive Order 13,526, which

protects, among other things, “foreign government

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 19

information,” “intelligence activities [and] intelligence

sources or methods,” and “foreign relations or foreign

activities of the United States, including confidential

sources.” 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 709 (Dec. 29, 2009). The parties

do not dispute the meaning of these phrases on appeal or that

Executive Order 13,526 provides classification criteria for

certain records. Rather, they dispute whether the FBI and the

DIA affidavits are sufficiently detailed to show that each

document withheld has been properly classified.

We held in Wiener that an agency must make an effort to

tailor the explanation for classification to the specific

document withheld. 943 F.2d at 979. In that case, a history

professor sought records concerning the FBI’s investigation

of John Lennon, of Beatles fame, in the 1960s and 1970s. Id.

at 976–77. To justify its Exemption 1 withholdings, the FBI

used “boilerplate” explanations taken from a “‘master’

response filed by the FBI for many FOIA requests.” Id. at

978. We concluded that the categorical approach to

explaining why documents were withheld did not give the

requester adequate opportunity “to argue for release of

particular documents.” Id. at 979. Unless the agency is as

specific as possible without thwartingExemption 1’s purpose,

“the adversarial process is unnecessarily compromised.” Id.

But the Supreme Court, our court, and other circuits have

emphasized the importance of deference to executive branch

judgments about national security secrets, and that is what is

before us here. In Hunt, we held that where affidavits give

reasonably detailed justifications for withholding, and they

appear to be in good faith, the inquiry ends and the

nondisclosure is upheld. 981 F.2d at 1119; see also CIA v.

Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985) (noting that decisions of CIA

director are given deference because of high stakes for

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national security); Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60, 76 (2d Cir.

2009) (noting that courts should be deferential to executive

predominance in FOIA cases involving national security);

Berman, 501 F.3d at 1141–42 (observing that judges are not

well-positioned to evaluate the sufficiency of CIA

intelligence claims). Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit has

explained, there is nothing suspicious about agencies using

“the same or similar language in different affidavits

supporting FOIA exemptions [because] when the potential

harm to national security . . . is the same, it makes sense that

the agency’s stated reasons for nondisclosure will be the

same.” Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 868 (D.C. Cir.

2009). Wiener itself, in discussing the FBI’s “boilerplate”

assertions, emphasized the conditional language in the FBI’s

Vaughn index, which included passages such as:

Information of this category is either specific

in nature or of a unique character, and thereby

could lead to the identification of a source.

For example, this information may contain

details obtained from a one-on-one

conversation between a source and another

individual. It may be of such detail that it

pinpoints a critical time frame or reflects a

special vantage point from which the source

was reporting. The information may be more

or less verbatim from a source’s report and

thus reveal a style of reporting peculiar to that

source along with other clues as to authorship,

such as handwritten or typewritten reports of

the informant. The nature of the information

may be such that only a handful of parties

would have access to it. It is the degree of

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specificity of this information that endangers

the source’s continued anonymity . . . .

Wiener, 943 F.2d at 978 (emphasis added by the Wiener

court). Wiener does not mean that an agency can never repeat

language to justify withholding multiple records, but rather

that in the context of Wiener, the FBI had not shown why the

records at issue could not be opened up for public inspection.

“Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a

FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or

‘plausible.’” Larson, 565 F.3d at 862 (quoting Wolf v. CIA,

473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Sitting en banc in

Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., we affirmed the

dismissal of a civil suit under the state secrets doctrine. 

614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Even the dissenters

in that case acknowledged that in FOIA cases, where

litigation is for the independent purpose of obtaining

disclosure of classified information, “the balance of interests

will more often tilt in favor of the Executive . . . . FOIA

therefore predictably entails greater deference to . . .

classification . . . .” Id. at 1096 n.9 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 

Here, awareness of our limited expertise relative to the

executive in national security matters leads us to conclude

that both the FBI and the DIA properly invoked Exemption

1 to withhold records whose contents were properly

classified.

In this case, the FBI’s explanations of its Exemption 1

withholdings discussed the general justifications for shielding

intelligence sources and methods and foreign government

information from public disclosure. But the affidavits also

explain the withholding of particular groups of documents. 

For example, the FBI explained that one document reflected

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a particular vantage point from which the source of the

intelligence might be identified, and that a group of

documents—each one identified by number—contains

detailed intelligence activities information gathered on a

specific individual or organization and that disclosure would

reveal the means used to gather the intelligence and the extent

of the FBI’s knowledge of a specific target during a specific

period in time. This has none of the conditional language we

found insufficient in Wiener, and we conclude that the FBI

has fairly provided as much detail as it can without

compromising the very secrets Exemption 1 is supposed to

protect. See Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979.

The DIA’s explanations are sparser and the question is

closer. After explaining the justifications for nondisclosure

of intelligence sources and methods generallyin its affidavits,

the DIA’s Vaughn index used identical language for all but

one entry, saying that disclosure “would reveal intelligence

sources and methods and compromise the intelligence

information collection mission effectiveness of the

intelligence community.” But the entry for one document

withheld under Exemption 1 says that in addition to revealing

intelligence sources and methods, the document contained

foreign government information that if disclosed, would

damage U.S. relations with that government. SeeExec. Order

13,526, § 1.4(d), 75 Fed. Reg. at 709. This detail suggests

that the same explanation was not repeated unthinkingly for

each document, and that no other information could be

revealed without revealing the very information Exemption

1 was designed to protect.

Plaintiffs argue that the DIA’s affidavits are less detailed

than the State Department’s. But FOIA only requires

reasonably specific justifications to enable a meaningful

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adversarial process and review by the courts. The fact that

the State Department can divulge more details justifying its

withholdings than the DIA is unsurprising: the DIA’s entire

public mission is to provide intelligence collection and

analysis for the Defense Department. That may require more

secrecy for its records than many State Department

documents need.

Similarly, Plaintiffs argue that Wiener demands more

detail than what the DIA has offered here. We disagree. 

Wiener demands that the government disclose what it can

without “thwarting the claimed exemption’s purpose.” 

943 F.2d at 979 (alterations omitted). It is reasonable to say

that the government can explain its reasons for withholding

the records at issue in Wiener, relating to the government’s

investigation of John Lennon twenty years earlier, with more

detail than the records at issue here, in a case that relates to

current intelligence and law enforcement activity of the

government, including sensitive issues that may involve

possible cooperation with foreign governments.

“Minor details of intelligence information may reveal

more information than their apparent insignificance suggests

because, much like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle, [every detail]

may aid in piecing together other bits of information even

when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in

itself.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 864 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Because here “[i]t is conceivable that the

mere explanation of why information must be withheld can

convey valuable information to a foreign intelligence

agency,” Sims, 471 U.S. at 179, we affirm the FBI’s and the

DIA’s invocations of Exemption 1.

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2. The DIA properly withheld records under

Exemption 3.

Plaintiffs challenge the DIA’s justification for

withholding certain records under FOIA Exemption 3. We

agree with the district court that the DIA has met its burden

to justify withholding the content of certain records under

Exemption 3.

Exemption 3 protects records exempt from disclosure

pursuant to a separate statute. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The

district court held that the DIA had properly withheld records

under Exemption 3 because those records were protected

under 10 U.S.C. § 424.5 Section 424 provides that no law

shall be interpreted to require disclosure of “(1) the

organization or any function of [the DIA]; or (2) the number

of [DIA personnel] or the name, official title, occupational

series, grade, or salary of any such person.” Id.

There is a two-step inquiry in deciding Exemption 3

questions. We ask first whether the statute identified by the

agency is a statute of exemption within the meaning of

Exemption 3, and then whether the withheld records satisfy

the criteria of the exemption statute. See Sims, 471 U.S. at

167. The answer to both inquiries is yes.

5 We need not decide whether the DIA properly invoked the National

Security Act of 1947 as an independent statutory basis for withholding

under Exemption 3 because the DIA invokes that statute’s protection of

records that would reveal sources or methods of intelligence, which is

coextensive with the analysis of the DIA’s Exemption 1 argument above. 

But because of the need for the district court to undertake a segregability

analysis on remand, we must decide whether the content that the DIA

seeks to withhold as an agency “function” is covered by § 424.

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The significance of § 424 for FOIA litigation is a question

of first impression among federal circuit courts. In this case,

the parties do not dispute that § 424 qualifies as a withholding

statute within the meaning of Exemption 3. Moreover, the

plain language of a statute stating that no law shall require

disclosure of certain records indisputably satisfies the criteria

of Exemption 3. See Sack v. CIA, 53 F. Supp. 3d 154, 174

n.17 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that § 424 falls within the scope

of Exemption 3); Physicians for Human Rights v. U.S. Dep’t

of Defense, 778 F. Supp. 2d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); cf.

Wilner, 592 F.3d at 72 (holding that similarly worded

provision related to the National Security Agency falls under

Exemption 3).

As for the second step, the parties disagree about whether

the DIA has shown that the content withheld falls under

§ 424. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the DIA’s invoking § 424

was proper to shield phone numbers, names, and email

accounts of DIA personnel, as well as web addresses on the

DIA’s classified network. But the DIA also withheld the

names of the countries and intelligence organizations with

which the DIA shares intelligence, claiming that it would

reveal a “function” of the agency within the meaning of

§ 424.

We must interpret the word “function” in § 424. 

Plaintiffs contend that § 424 covers only information related

to DIA organization and personnel, arguing that if “function”

referred to all the tasks that the DIA performs, the latter

provision protecting personnel information would be

superfluous. That is not so. Rather, reading § 424 to shield

only information about DIA personnel would effectively read

the first prong out of the statute. Understanding “function”

as referring to the DIA’s mission, but not to records unrelated

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to any DIA tasks would not make the prong shielding

personnel information meaningless. For example, an

aggrieved employee considering litigation about

discriminatory or other inappropriate conduct might seek

records of prior, similar conduct, which would not be exempt

from disclosure under the first prong of § 424. While the

DIA’s actual human resources and discrimination policies

might be “functions,” records of, for example, inappropriate

emails would not be, though the names and contact

information of the DIA personnel involved could be withheld

under § 424’s second prong, giving meaning to the entire

statute.

Plaintiffs cite Baker v. CIA, 580 F.2d 664, 669 (D.C. Cir.

1978), which interpreted a somewhat similar statute related

to the CIA and held that the statute only exempted records

related to CIA personnel from disclosure. But that statute

shielded “the organization, functions, names, official titles,

salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.” 

50 U.S.C. § 3507 (formerly 50 U.S.C. § 403g). Section 424,

by contrast, has separate provisions shielding, first, “the

organization or any function” of the DIA, and second,

information about DIA personnel. 10 U.S.C. § 424.

While it is publicly known that the DIA shares

intelligence with foreign governments—a “function” at the

highest level of generality—we conclude that the names of

the governments with which the DIA shares intelligence falls

within the category of properly withheld records under § 424. 

Otherwise, some governments might face severe political

consequences from their constituents or allies due to

cooperation with U.S. intelligence services, and the DIA’s

ability to gather intelligence would be compromised.

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The DIA’s Vaughn index is sufficiently detailed to justify

its Exemption 3 withholdings. For each document that would

identify the names of countries or agencies with which the

DIA shares intelligence, the index explained as much. We 

cannot imagine what further detail the DIA could have

provided without actually naming the country or the

organization.

We affirm the district court’s conclusion as to

Exemption 3.

3. The FBI properly withheld records under

Exemption 7(E).

Plaintiffs contend that the FBI did not adequately justify

withholding certain records under Exemption 7(E). We

disagree.

Exemption 7(E) protects records compiled for law

enforcement purposes from disclosure if those records

“would disclose techniques and procedures for law

enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose

guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions

if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk

circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). We

have held that “Exemption 7(E) only exempts investigative

techniques not generally known to the public.” Rosenfeld v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 1995). In

Rosenfeld, we decided that a pretext phone call was a

generally known law enforcement technique. Id. In that

case, the government argued that the technique at issue

involved the specific application of a pretext phone call,

because it used “the identity of a particular individual, Mario

Savio, as the pretext.” Id. We rejected that argument,

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reasoning that accepting it would allow anything to be

withheld under Exemption 7(E) because any specific

application of a known technique would be covered. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs challenge the complete withholding of

five documents and the partial withholding of ten under

Exemption 7(E). According to the FBI’s affidavit, those

records reveal “techniques and procedures related to

surveillance and credit searches,” and in one document, “a

stratagem, the details of which if revealed would preclude its

use in future cases.” It is true that credit searches and

surveillance are publicly known law enforcement techniques. 

But the affidavits say that the records reveal techniques that,

if known, could enable criminals to educate themselves about

law enforcement methods used to locate and apprehend

persons. This implies a specific means of conducting

surveillance and credit searches rather than an application. 

By contrast, withholding, for example, records under

Exemption 7(E) by claiming that they reveal the satellite

surveillance of a particular place would be an application of

a known technique under Rosenberg (though that information

might be protected by other exemptions). We conclude that

the affidavits, which state that further detail would

compromise the very techniques the government is trying to

keep secret, are sufficient to satisfy the FBI’s burden. Cf.

Bowen v. FDA, 925 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding

that additional details of law enforcement techniques were

exempt from disclosure under 7(E) even where some

information about those techniques had been previously

disclosed).

Plaintiffs also contend that the FBI must show that

disclosure would lead to a danger of future lawbreaking. The

exemption protects information that “would disclose

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HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 29

techniques and proceduresfor law enforcement investigations

or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law

enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure

could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the

law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). Plaintiffs argue that the FBI

must show that disclosure of its techniques would risk

circumvention of the law for Exemption 7(E) to apply. But

Plaintiffs’ argument is an unpersuasive reading of the

statutory text and structure. As the Second Circuit has

explained:

Beginning, as we must, with the plain

meaning of the statute’s text and structure, we

see no ambiguity. The sentence structure of

Exemption (b)(7)(E) indicates that the

qualifying phrase (“if such disclosure could

reasonably be expected to risk circumvention

of the law”) modifies only “guidelines” and

not “techniques and procedures.” This is

because the two alternative clauses that make

up Exemption 7(E) are separated by a comma,

whereas the modifying condition at the end of

the second clause is not separated from its

reference by anything at all. Thus, basic rules

of grammar and punctuation dictate that the

qualifying phrase modifies only the

immediately antecedent “guidelines” clause

and not the more remote “techniques and

procedures” clause.

Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Human Rights Project v. Dep’t of

Homeland Security, 626 F.3d 678, 681 (2d Cir. 2010)

(citations omitted).

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Finally, we reject Plaintiffs’ contention that Exemption

7(E) does not apply because the FBI is seeking to conceal

information about law enforcement techniques that are

“illegal or of questionable legality.” Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F.

Supp. 336, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1986). We need not address

whether Exemption 7(E) is so limited because there is no

indication that any of the techniques being protected from

disclosure are of questionable legality. The techniques the

FBIseeks to protect from disclosure relate to surveillance and

credit searches, and Plaintiffs have made no showing of any

unlawful uses of such techniques. Plaintiffs assert that

Exemption 7(E) is being used to cover up the FBI’s use of

proxy detention, but as we discussed above, there has not

been a sufficient showing of the FBI’s bad faith and nothing

in the affidavits suggests that information about proxy

detention is in the records the FBI has withheld under

Exemption 7(E).

We affirm the district court’s ruling as to Exemption 7(E).

C. The district court erred by not making findings on the

issue of segregability.

FOIA provides that any “reasonablysegregable portion of

a record shall be provided to any person requesting such

record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under

this subsection.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). We have held that “[i]t

is reversible error for the district court ‘to simply approve the

withholding of an entire document without entering a finding

on segregability, or the lack thereof,’ with respect to that

document.” Wiener, 943 F.2d at 988 (quoting Church of

Scientology v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 611 F. 2d 738, 744

(9th Cir. 1979)). Wiener reversed the district court and

remanded with an instruction that the court “must make a

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specific finding that no information contained in each

document or substantial portion of a document withheld is

segregable.” Id. “The burden is on the agency to establish

that all reasonably segregable portions of a document have

been segregated and disclosed.” Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v.

United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008). The

agency can meet this burden by providing the district court

with a reasonably detailed description of the withheld

material and “alleging facts sufficient to establish an

exemption.” Id.

Here, we do not know whether the district court ensured

that the agency met its burden to establish that all reasonably

segregable material had been separated and disclosed. That

is because the only mention of segregability in the district

court’s order was its statement in a footnote that it need not

“undertake an independent segregability analysis on each

document if the documents are withheld for attorney-client or

work product privilege.” That statement is insufficient to

demonstrate that the district court considered segregability as

it relates to the FOIA exemptions invoked below.

Because we have previously held that it is reversible error

for the district court to approve the withholding of a

document without a segregability finding, we now remand to

the district court for such a finding. That said, we recognize

that there is conflicting guidance within our circuit as to what

constitutes a proper segregability analysis. Compare Weiner,

943 F.2d at 988 (holding that the district court must conduct

a careful de novo review of the agency and remanding for the

district court to make a specific finding for each document as

to segregability), with Pac. Fisheries, 539 F.3d at 1150

(holding that a district court may rely on an agency

declaration that is reasonably detailed and remanding for the

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district court to make specific findings relating to

segregability for all documents). It is not reasonable to

interpret our precedent to require the district court to take on

the role of document clerk, reviewing each and every

document an agency withholds. A district court must take

seriously its role as a check on agency discretion, but this

does not require a page-by-page review of an agency’s work.

The district court may rely on an agency’s declaration in

making its segregability determination. Pac. Fisheries,

539 F.3d at 1148. Agency affidavits that are sufficiently

detailed are presumed to be made in good faith and may be

taken at face value. Hunt, 981 F.2d at 1119. In short, a

district court is not required to conduct an independent in

camera review of each withholding unless an agency

declaration lacks sufficient detail or bears some indicia of bad

faith by the agency. Of course, for those records, if any,

falling within a district court’s rulings on an agency’s

Glomar6or § 552(c)7submissions, no segregability analysis

would be necessary, because that would defeat the very

purpose of those doctrines.

6 The Glomar doctrine lets an agency refuse to confirm or deny whether

certain records exist. This is “an exception to the general rule that

agencies must acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a

FOIA request . . . [and is] permitted only when confirming or denying the

existence of records would itself cause harm cognizable under [a] FOIA

exception.” ACLU, 710 F.3d at 426 (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

7

5 U.S.C. § 552(c) provides that FOIA does not apply in situations

concerning certain law enforcement and intelligence activities where even

whether certain records exist is classified.

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Plaintiffs object to the withholdings by the State

Department, FBI, and DIA for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs

suggest that an agencymust describe what proportion of each

document is non-exempt material and how that material is

dispersed throughout the document. Second, Plaintiffs

suggest that withholding a document in full or using large

block redactions is inappropriate. We disagree.

An agency must describe the document or information

being withheld in sufficient detail to allow the plaintiffs and

the court to determine whether the facts alleged establish the

corresponding exemption. Pac. Fisheries, 539 F.3d at 1148. 

We have not held that the manner of that description must

take any particular format, so long as it is sufficiently

detailed. See id. In the interest of clarifying our circuit’s

segregability standard, we examine below whether and how

each agency complied with its obligations to establish “that

all reasonably segregable portions of [their documents] have

been segregated and disclosed.” Id.

The State Department’s declarations are sufficiently

detailed such that the district court could take them at face

value. The declarations identify the withheld documents

individually. They provide an individualized explanation of

the material being withheld. They identify the corresponding

exemption. And in some cases, they even note that the

“withheld portions are so inextricably intertwined with the

non-exempt portion, that any segregable material would not

be meaningful.” Moreover, there is ample evidence that the

State Department has acted in good faith in its dealings with

the district court and Plaintiffs, including re-reviewing

materials for release at Plaintiffs’ request and closely

scrutinizing what it releases. For example, the State

Department released a document to Plaintiffs in which there

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was only one sentence that was not redacted. Rather than

withhold the entire document, the State Department took the

correct view that it was required to release any information

that was not classified, even if it was a single sentence.

Though the FBI’s declarations are not as robust as the

State Department’s, they are still sufficiently detailed to

enable the district court to take them at face value. The

declarations identify documents by number. They provide

specific reasons why the disclosure of information would be

harmful. And, the FBI specifically states that “[n]o

reasonably segregable, nonexempt portions were withheld

from plaintiffs.” This is supported by the partially redacted

documents that the FBI produced. These documents

demonstrate that the FBIreleased large portions of previously

classified material, redacting only the bare minimum of

information.

In contrast, the DIA’s declarations lack sufficient detail

to allow the district court to determine that the claimed

exemptions apply throughout all of the documents.8 The DIA

provides little individualized information about the withheld

documents. The first eighteen documents in the DIA’s

Vaughn index vary in length from two to eight pages; some

are classified Secret, some Top Secret. But all are completely

withheld for the same reason. The DIA claims their release

would “reveal intelligence sources and methods” without

8 Our concern with the adequacy of the segregability issue does not

undermine our previous holding, that the DIA properly withheld records

under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. See supra Sections III.B.1 and 2. The

DIA’s declarations are sufficiently detailed for the determinations in

Section III.B butsimply lack the information necessary for a segregability

determination.

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providing any detail about whether or not the DIA considered

releasing reasonably segregable information. Nor does the

DIA provide us with any evidence of its good faith. All of

the DIA’s documents are completely withheld, so the district

court did not have the opportunity to observe the DIA’s

approach to redaction. Moreover, some of the DIA’s

declarations are self-contradictory. In its initial declaration,

the DIA identifies twenty-seven responsive documents that

must be withheld in full because of “FOIA exemptions (b)(1),

(b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6).” Yet the attached Vaughn index

never invokes FOIA exemption (b)(2). Without further detail

from the DIA it is not possible for the district court to

presume that the DIA’s declarations are made in good faith.9

We vacate the grant of summary judgment solely on the

issue of segregability. As to all of the records whose

existence is not itself classified, the district court should

determine on remand whether there is any content that can be

segregated from the exempt information and turned over to

Plaintiffs.

IV

We affirm the district court’s rulings as to the adequacy

of the agencies’ search and the application of the FOIA

exemptions. After a careful and searching review of the

record, we are satisfied that the agencies made reasonable

searches for responsive documents, that they gave reasonably

specific justifications for withholding or redacting

documents, and that the agencies’ claims of FOIA exemption,

9 This detail may be provided in a variety of ways. For example, the

district court may request a supplemental declaration, a revised Vaughn

index, or an in camera review of the documents.

 Case: 13-55172, 08/14/2015, ID: 9647014, DktEntry: 53-1, Page 35 of 36
36 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE

apart from the issue of segregability, should be held valid, as

the district court ruled. But we vacate the grant of summary

judgment and remand for the district court to make findings

as to segregability.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in

part.

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