Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02342/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD LEE ROLIN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Acting Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-2342 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging the California Board of Prison Terms' ("BPT") January 8, 2004

decision to deny him parole. 

Per order filed on October 3, 2005, the court found that petitioner's claim

that the BPT's decision finding him not suitable for parole does not comport with

due process appears colorable under § 2254, when liberally construed, and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted. Respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

California inmates do not have a liberty interest in early release on parole that is

protected by federal due process because the Supreme Court of California held in

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), that the language of California Penal

Code section 3041, setting forth California's parole scheme, is not mandatory.

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Per order filed on September 6, 2006, the court denied respondent's

motion on the ground that the "Ninth Circuit recently rejected respondent's

argument and made clear that 'California inmates continue to have a liberty

interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005).' Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, No. 05-16455, slip op. 10563, 10566 (9th Cir.

Aug. 31, 2006)." Sept. 6, 2006 Order at 2. The court reinstated its previous

order and again ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has now filed an answer to the order to show

cause. Petitioner did not file a traverse.

BACKGROUND

In 1985, petitioner was convicted by a Kern County superior court jury of

second degree murder and felony hit-and-run with death or bodily injury. He was

sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison. 

Petitioner has been found not suitable for parole each time he has appeared

before the BPT. On January 8, 2004, petitioner appeared before the BPT for a

subsequent parole consideration hearing. The BPT again found him not suitable

for parole and denied him a subsequent hearing for three years. Petitioner

challenged the BPT's January 8, 2004 decision in the state superior, appellate and

supreme courts. After the Supreme Court of California denied his final state

habeas petition on May 18, 2005, the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas

corpus followed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas

petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even

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when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction.” 

White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this

court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a California state

inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any

claim on the merits: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential

standard, federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this] court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining

whether the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT's January 8,

2004 decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent

hearing for three years, on the ground that the decision does not comport with

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due process. Petitioner claims that the BPT’s decision is not supported by some

evidence in the record and instead is improperly based on the unchanging facts of

his commitment offense and pre-commitment conduct. Petitioner also claims

that the BPT is biased. 

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In making this determination, the

board must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior

before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128

(9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). It

matters not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has never been set for

the inmate because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that "some evidence" support the

parole board's decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125

(holding that the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions

in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d

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at 904 (same). This "some evidence" standard is minimally stringent and ensures

that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining

whether this requirement is satisfied “does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's

decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 904. Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded

an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on

other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). In sum, if the parole board's determination

of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence,

with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428

F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows that the BPT afforded petitioner and his counsel an

opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to

review petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents and

provided them with a reasoned decision in denying parole. The panel explained

that it found that the crime was carried out "in a very cruel and quite callous

manner" demonstrating "a total and very callous disregard for any human

suffering" and that the "motive for the crime was very trivial in relation to the

offense." Hr’g Tr. at 57 (Resp’t Ex. 2). Petitioner tried to make contact with his

wife from whom he was separated; when she took off in her car, he got in his car

and chased her, bumping her car on two or three occasions at a high rate of speed,

causing her car to go off the road, rolling, ejecting and killing her at the scene. 

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The panel also found that petitioner had an escalating pattern of criminal conduct

and extensive record of violence, including an arrest for a previous murder where

he was involved in an altercation and stabbed two people, convictions for battery

and involuntary manslaughter and an escape from state prison; had an unstable

social history and had failed to profit from society's previous attempts to correct

his criminality; had failed to demonstrate a positive change in his behavior while

incarcerated, noting a July 2003 disciplinary write-up for battery on another

inmate; had failed to participate sufficiently in self-help and therapy groups, and

upgrade educationally and vocationally, while in prison; and had inadequate

parole plans. Id. at 57-60. The panel noted that petitioner's most recent

psychological evaluation estimated that, if released, petitioner's violence

potential would be "significantly above average when compared to the average

citizen in the community." Id. at 60. The panel commended petitioner for

participating in AA and taking other self-help classes and receiving certificates

for several Bible classes, but concluded that "these positive aspects of his

behavior do not outweigh the factors of unsuitability." Id. at 61-62. 

The state superior court upheld the decision of the BPT and the state

appellate and supreme courts summarily affirmed. The superior court reviewed

the evidence relied on by the panel – including the commitment offense,

petitioner's pre-commitment criminal conduct, recent disciplinary write-ups, lack

of viable parole plans and unfavorable psychological evaluation – and

determined that "there is some evidence to support the BPT's decision to deny

parole." In re Gerald Lee Rolin, No. HC008623, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct.

Jan. 25, 2005) (Resp't Ex. 3). 

The state court's rejection of petitioner's due process claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Hill standard, or was based on

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In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release

date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that, over time, denying a prisoner parole strictly

because of the nature of his offense and his prior conduct “would raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest in parole . . . and could result in a due

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an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s

January 8, 2004 decision to deny petitioner parole is supported by some evidence

in the record and that evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Rosas,

428 F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole based on gravity of offense and

psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of parole based

solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior to imprisonment); Morales, 16

F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole based on criminal history, cruel nature

of offense, and need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry under Hill is

simply "whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the [BPT]." Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 

There is – the facts surrounding the crime reasonably suggest that it was carried

out in a cruel and callous fashion; petitioner has a pre-commitment record of

escalating criminal activity; petitioner received a disciplinary write-up for battery

on another inmate only a few months before the January 8, 2004 parole

consideration hearing; petitioner did not have firm parole plans; and petitioner's

psychological evaluation was not favorable. Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(c) & (d) (listing circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and

circumstances tending to show suitability). It is not up to this court to “reweigh

the evidence." Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner argues that the BPT's continued reliance on the immutable

circumstances of his murder offense and pre-commitment conduct conflicts with

the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Biggs.

1

 The superior court rejected petitioner's

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process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17.

2

Petitioner's additional claim that the composition of the BPT panel

violates California Penal Code section 5075 does not state a cognizable claim

under § 2254. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (federal habeas

relief not available for violations of state law or error in application of state law). 

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argument on the ground that "the panel's denial of parole was not based solely on

the commitment offense and Petitioner's conduct prior to incarceration. As

discussed above, the panel's decision was also based on other relevant factors

specified by statute and regulation." In re Gerald Lee Rolin, No. HC008623, slip

op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2005) (emphasis in original). This court agrees. 

Ample other evidence in the record (e.g., a recent disciplinary infraction, a lack

of firm parole plans and an unfavorable psychiatric evaluation) constitutes some

evidence under Hill. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (inquiry

under Hill is simply whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the BPT).

Petitioner also claims that he did not receive a fair hearing because the

BPT is biased against granting parole to life inmates. Petitioner has set forth no

evidentiary support for his bias claim. But even if he had, there is no evidence in

the record indicating that this alleged bias affected the BPT’s decision or served

as the basis for denying parole. To the contrary, the transcript from petitioner’s

January 8, 2004 parole hearing demonstrates that he received an individualized

assessment of his potential parole suitability. Petitioner’s reliance on the high

percentage of parole denials for life inmates provides no proof of the BPT’s

alleged bias against parole. Cf. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514

U.S. 499, 510-11 (1995) (citing that 90 percent of all California inmates are

found unsuitable for parole as evidence that deferring annual parole suitability

hearings was lawful and reasonable) .2

 

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CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Sept. 20, 2007 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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