Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02353/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02353-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

On June 16, 2015, the action was reassigned to the undersigned.

2

Under the Local Rules of this District, any opposition was due no later than June 22,

2015. See Civil L. R. 7-3(a). Even assuming Castillo was of the view that the deadline to

file opposition ran from the date on which Wells Fargo renoticed the motion, any opposition

would have been due by July 6, 2015. See id.

3

Wells Fargo’s request, filed July 16, 2015, to appear by telephone is hereby

DENIED as moot. For future reference, Wells Fargo is advised that the Court does not

conduct telephonic hearings on motions.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA C. CASTILLO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., NDEX WEST

LLC,

Defendants. /

No. C-15-2353 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

WELLS FARGO BANK’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; VACATING HEARING;

DENYING AS MOOT REQUEST TO

APPEAR BY TELEPHONE; DISMISSING

COMPLAINT; AFFORDING PLAINTIFF

LEAVE TO AMEND; CONTINUING CASE

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Before the Court is defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s (“Wells Fargo”) “Motion to

Dismiss Complaint,” filed June 3, 2015, and renoticed June 17, 2015.1 Plaintiff Maria C.

Castillo (“Castillo”) did not file opposition,2

 which Wells Fargo noted in a July 9, 2015,

filing titled “Notice of Non-Receipt of Opposition.” Having read and considered the papers

filed in support of the motion, the Court finds the matter suitable for determination on the

moving papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for July 24, 2015,3

 and rules as

Case 3:15-cv-02353-MMC Document 22 Filed 07/17/15 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Although Castillo has not challenged the Court’s jurisdiction over this removed

action, the Court has considered the issue. Wells Fargo’s showing that defendant NDeX

West, LLC (“NDeX”) is diverse from Castillo is insufficient (see Notice of Removal at 4:25-

27 (asserting unnamed “individuals” who are sub-members of NDeX are “residents of the

State of Texas”)), as Wells Fargo has not shown that each of NDeX’s sub-members is a

“citizen” of a specified state differing from California, the state of which plaintiff is a citizen. 

See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding “[a] person

residing in a given state is not necessarily domiciled there, and thus is not necessarily a

citizen of that state”). Wells Fargo, however, has sufficiently shown that NDeX is a

“nominal” defendant (see Notice of Removal at 5:17-24), and, consequently, NDeX’s

citizenship is disregarded. See also Prasad v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 4074300,

at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. September 13, 2011) (holding trustee is “nominal” defendant, and its

citizenship is disregarded, where complaint does not include “substantive allegations”

against trustee). Accordingly, the Court is satisfied it has diversity jurisdiction over the

instant action.

2

follows.4

1. The First Case of Action, titled “Violation of California Homeowners’ Bill of

Rights,” is subject to dismissal, as Castillo fails to allege sufficient facts to support a finding

that the alleged violations of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (“HBOR”) were

“material,” e.g., that any such violation prejudiced Castillo’s ability to obtain a loan

modification. See Cal. Civil Code § 2924.12(a) (providing borrower entitled to relief under

HBOR only to “enjoin a material violation”).

2. The Second Cause of Action, titled “Statutory Unfair Competition - California

Business and Professions Code § 17200,” is subject to dismissal, as it is entirely derivative

of the First Cause of Action, and, additionally, Castillo fails to allege facts to support a

finding that she “lost money or property” as a result of the alleged violations of HBOR. See

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204.

3. The Third Cause of Action, titled “Common Law Unfair Competition,” is subject to

dismissal, as a common law unfair competition claim can only be brought by one

competitor against another competitor. See Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th

1254, 1263-64 (1992) (holding scope of common law unfair competition law limited to “the

act of ‘passing off’ one’s goods as those of another” and “acts analogous to ‘passing off’,”

and does not provide “remedy for consumers”).

4. The Fourth Cause of Action, titled “Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Case 3:15-cv-02353-MMC Document 22 Filed 07/17/15 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Dealing,” is subject to dismissal, as Castillo fails to identify any facts to support a finding

that the parties’ loan agreement requires Wells Fargo to offer, or even consider, a loan

modification. See Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. California Dep’t of Parks and Recreation, 11

Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1031-32 (1992) (holding “implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing rests upon the existence of some specific contractual obligation”; reversing

judgment finding defendant breached covenant by not agreeing to modify existing contract,

as “[t]here existed no express contractual obligation . . . to negotiate a modification”).

5. The Fifth Cause of Action, titled “Negligence,” is subject to dismissal. Although

“[t]he California Courts of Appeal have reached different conclusions as to whether lenders

owe borrowers a duty of care when considering a loan modification application,” see

Carbajal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 2454054, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April, 10, 2015)

(citing cases), the Court need not determine whether a duty of care was owed here, as,

even assuming Wells Fargo owed Castillo a duty not to give her “vague . . . explanations”

or “unjustified excuses” (see Compl. ¶ 66), Castillo fails to allege sufficient facts to support

a finding that any such conduct caused a cognizable injury. Cf. Alvarez v. BAC Home Loan

Servicing, L.P., 228 Cal. App. 4th 941, 948–951 (2014) (holding, where lender “agree[s] to

consider modification,” lender has “duty to use reasonable care in the processing of a loan

modification”; finding plaintiffs sufficiently stated claim for negligence, where plaintiffs

alleged “they would have received [a modification] had their applications been properly

reviewed, and, alternatively, that the delay in processing deprived them of the opportunity

to seek relief elsewhere”).

6. The Sixth Cause of Action, titled “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress,” is

subject to dismissal for the reasons stated above with respect to the Fifth Cause of Action.

7. The Seventh Cause of Action, titled “For Declaratory Relief,” is subject to

dismissal, as it seeks a finding that Wells Fargo violated HBOR (see Compl. ¶ 78), and,

consequently, is duplicative of the First Cause of Action. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476

F.3d 756, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2007) (“To the extent [a plaintiff] seeks a declaration of

defendants’ liability for damages sought for his other causes of action, the claim is merely

Case 3:15-cv-02353-MMC Document 22 Filed 07/17/15 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

duplicative and [is] properly dismissed.”).

8. The Eighth Cause of Action, titled “For Injunctive Relief,” is subject to dismissal,

as “injunctive relief” is not a claim, but, rather, a remedy. See County of Del Norte v. City of

Crescent City, 71 Cal. App. 4th 965, 973 (1999) (holding “[a] permanent injunction is an

equitable remedy, not a cause of action, and thus it is attendant to an underlying cause of

action”); Mangindin v. Washington Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 700, 709 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

(dismissing cause of action for “injunctive relief” on ground it does not state independent

claim).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss is hereby

GRANTED, and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

If Castillo wishes to amend to cure the deficiencies identified above, any First

Amended Complaint shall be filed no later than August 3, 2015.

In light of the above, the Case Management Conference is hereby CONTINUED

from August 28, 2015, to October 16, 2015, at 10:30 a.m. A Joint Case Management

Statement shall be filed no later than October 9, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2015 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-02353-MMC Document 22 Filed 07/17/15 Page 4 of 4