Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00543/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00543-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEXT GENERATION CAPITAL LLC, 

DBA NEXT GENERATION CAPITAL II, 

LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEBRA A. FOLINO AND DOES 1 

THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,

 Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-0543-TLN-KLN

SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Debra A. Folino’s (“Defendant”)

Notice of Removal and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) For the reasons 

set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is GRANTED and the Court 

hereby remands the action to the Superior Court of California, County of San Joaquin, due to lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 21, 2016, Plaintiff Next Generation Capital LLC, DBA Next Generation 

Capital II, LLC (“Plaintiff”) brought an action against Defendant for possession of the real 

property known as 1818 Westmora Avenue, Stockton, California (“the Property”). (Notice of 

Removal, ECF No. 1 at 22.) The Complaint alleges that Defendant was the foreclosed upon 

Case 2:16-cv-00543-TLN-KJN Document 4 Filed 03/21/16 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

owner of the Property and continued to occupy the Property despite having no ownership or 

possessory interest in the Property. (ECF No. 1 at 22–23.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was

served a “Notice to Quit” on January 13, 2016, yet continues to occupy the property. (ECF No. 1 

at 23.) On March 15, 2016, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal removing this unlawful detainer 

action from the San Joaquin County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 

proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 

filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 

improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 

v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 

U.S. 974 (2005).

The “presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. 

Removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim raising a 

federal question, whether filed in state court or federal court. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 

U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). 

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant’s 16 page Removal Notice (ECF No. 1) is difficult to understand and lists at 

least 10 different basis for removal, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(b), 1334(6), 1441, 1443, 1446, 

1447(b) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985. Many of these statutes are not even 

relevant to the issue of removal of this action from state court. These types of cases place a 

Case 2:16-cv-00543-TLN-KJN Document 4 Filed 03/21/16 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

significant drain on this Court’s resources. “Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the 

heaviest caseloads in the nation, and this Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources 

to individual cases and matters.” Cortez v. City of Porterville, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1162 (E.D. 

Cal. 2014). Accordingly, the Court will address only those arguments that are relevant to the 

issue of removal.

It appears, based upon the title and opening paragraph of the Removal Notice, that 

Defendant’s main argument for removal is 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) 28 U.S.C. § 

1441 provides two paths to removal: 1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and 

2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Again, Defendant’s removal action is difficult

to follow, but it appears Defendant argues her “constitutional rights for a home” (ECF No. 1 at 2) 

and “one’s constitutional rights to due process” (ECF No 1 at 4) are the basis for federal question 

jurisdiction. 

With respect to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the complaint itself 

contains only a single claim for unlawful detainer. (ECF No. 1 at 9–10.) The Defendant fails to 

identify any federal law under which the action was brought. Defendant vaguely states that “The 

Federal question law is the Federal protection of homeowner discrimination against the poor and 

in favor of the rich.” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) However, Defendant cites no specific federal law in 

support of this assertion and the Court is unaware of any law to this effect. Under the wellpleaded complaint rule, “federal [question] jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. 

The instant complaint relies solely on California state law and does not mention expressly or 

impliedly any federal law or statute. The well-pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff the 

master of his claim, so he may avoid federal jurisdiction by basing his claim exclusively on state 

law, as is the case here. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.

Removal under diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be citizens of different states 

and that the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Defendant simultaneously lists 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship and amount in 

controversy) as a basis of removal (ECF No. 1 at 9), while also stating “THIS IS NOT BASED on 

Case 2:16-cv-00543-TLN-KJN Document 4 Filed 03/21/16 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

grounds of diversity of citizenship, amount in controversy in excess of $75,000 does not apply.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 9.) Even if Defendant is arguing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is a basis for removal, she has 

failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy has been met. 

Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he removing 

defendant has always borne the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, including any 

applicable amount in controversy requirement.”). Moreover, Defendant has similarly failed to 

make any argument to indicate her state citizenships are diverse from Plaintiff. Id. Therefore, the 

Court cannot find a basis for removal under diversity jurisdiction.

A notice of removal based on § 1443(1) must satisfy the two-part test articulated by the 

Supreme Court in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788-92 (1966) and City of Greenwood, Miss. 

v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824-28 (1966). See also Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 998-99 

(9th Cir. 2006). “First, the petitioners must assert, as a defense to the prosecution, rights that are 

given to them by explicit statutory enactment protecting equal racial civil rights.” California v. 

Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635, 636 (9th Cir.1970). “Second, petitioners must assert that the state courts 

will not enforce that right, and that allegation must be supported by reference to a state statute or 

a constitutional provision that purports to command the state courts to ignore the federal rights.” 

Id. “The ground for removal under section 1443(1) is both specific and extremely narrow.” JP 

Morgan Chase Bank, NA vs. Omry Reznik, No. CV1506590RGKAJWX, 2015 WL 5156442, at 

*2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (citing Davis v. Super. Ct. of State of Cal., 464 F.2d 1272, 1273 (9th 

Cir. 1972)).

The Defendant seeks removal of this action under 28 U.S.C. 1443, but has failed to satisfy 

the two requirements of the test. First, the Defendant fails to identify the “explicit statutory 

enactment protecting equal racial civil rights” that is violated by the State’s action. Sandoval, 434 

F.2d at 636. The Defendant’s reliance on the 14th Amendment alone is not sufficient to meet the 

first prong of the test. Id.

The Defendant also fails to satisfy the second criteria of the test. Even if the Defendant

had properly identified a right to equal protection under the United States Constitution, she has 

failed to demonstrate that California state courts will not enforce that right. The Defendant does

Case 2:16-cv-00543-TLN-KJN Document 4 Filed 03/21/16 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

not and cannot identify any California state law or constitutional provision that commands state 

courts to ignore an amendment to the United States Constitution. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. 

Corp. v. Cantillano, No. CV 12-01641, 2012 WL 1193613, *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2012); HSBC 

Bank USA v. Cabal, No. 10cv1621 WQH (POR), 2010 WL 3769092, *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 

2010); see also Sandoval, 434 F.2d at 636 (“Bad experiences with the particular court in question 

will not suffice”)).

“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always 

has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. For the reasons 

stated, the Defendant has failed to demonstrate that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to

hear this action. Therefore, it is appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal 

jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (“the district court ha[s] a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the 

removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Thus for the reasons stated above, the Court hereby remands this action to the Superior 

Court of California, County of San Joaquin. Additionally, the Court has reviewed Defendant’s 

motion for in forma pauperis status (ECF No. 2) and finds that she meets the requisite standard. As 

such, Defendant’s motion for in forma pauperis status is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2016

Case 2:16-cv-00543-TLN-KJN Document 4 Filed 03/21/16 Page 5 of 5