Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00758/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00758-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LePATNER C3, LLC, 

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14-CV-758-H (JMA)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT S’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

[Doc. Nos. 8, 10, & 16]

vs.

THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF

LAW; EPSTEN GRINNELL &

HOWELL APC; and HUGHES

ASSOCIATES, INC.;

Defendants.

On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff LePatner C3, LLC filed a complaint against

Defendants Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC, and

Hughes Associates, Inc. alleging copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 etseq.

(Doc. No. 1.) On April 23, 2014, Defendant Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC filed a

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack ofstanding and failure to state a claim. 

(Doc. No. 8.) On May 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed its opposition. (Doc. No. 13.) On May

23, 2014, Defendant filed its reply. (Doc. No. 14.) On April 29, 2014, Defendant

Hughes Associates, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to

state a claim. (Doc. No. 10.) On May 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed its opposition. (Doc.

No. 12.) On May 23, 2014, Defendant filed its reply. (Doc. No. 15.) On May 28,

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2014, the Court vacated a hearing scheduled for June 2, 2014, and submitted the

motion. (Doc. No. 17.) The Court denies Defendants’ motions to dismiss. 1

Background

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant ThomasJefferson School of Law

began a project to develop a new campus building (“the Project”) in 2008. (Doc. No.

1, Compl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that, in 2011, Defendant enlisted Plaintiff as a

consultant to help resolve construction problems and create remediation plans for the

Project. (Id. ¶ 17.) The Complaint centers on two expert reports that Plaintiff

commissioned as an agent for, and with the approval of, Defendant Thomas Jefferson

School of Law. First, on or about May 31, 2012, Plaintiff retained Dillon Consulting

Engineers, Inc. to help remediate defects related to the Project’s defective

pressurization that included preparing an expert report (the “Dillon Report”). (Id. ¶ 21-

23.) Second, on September 12, 2012, Plaintiff retained CCRD to help remediate

defects related to the Project’s fire protection, HVAC/mechanical, and electrical

engineering designs, including the preparation oftechnical drawings and another expert

report (the “Smoke Control Testing Report”). (Id. ¶ 26-28.) 

Dillon applied for and received a copyright registration, No. VAu 1-153-533, 

for the Dillon Report with an effective registration date of January 3, 2014. (Id. ¶ 25.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Dillon assigned all rights and interestsin the copyright to Plaintiff.

(Id.) CCRD applied for and received a copyright registration, No. VAu 1-153-528, for

the Smoke Control Testing Report with an effective registration date of January 3,

2014. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that CCRD assigned all rights and interests in this

copyright to Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Dillon and CCRD assigned

to Plaintiff their rights to receive payment for these services. (Id. ¶ 22 & 27.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ThomasJefferson School of Law “refused to pay

On May 28, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion stipulating that Defendant 1

Thomas Jefferson School of Law agreed to be bound by the Court’s rulings on coDefendants’ pending motions to dismiss. (Doc. No. 16.) The Court, for good cause

shown, grants the joint motion.

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and instead terminated the services of the LePatner firms and their subcontractors

Dillon and CCRD.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants continued with

the remediation project, hiring Defendant Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC as

replacement legal counsel and Defendant Hughes as a replacement engineering firm. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants continued to use the Dillon Report and the

Smoke Control Testing Report thereafter without paying Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 32.)

Analysis

I. Legal Standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the

pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A complaint generally must satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to evade dismissal under a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that

a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of

‘further factual enhancement,’” and the reviewing court need not accept “legal

conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

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matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Hartmann v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a

cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097,

1104 (9th Cir. 2008). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court reviews the contents

of the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.

Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011). “[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well

as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to

dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and

matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007).

II. Analysis

Defendant Epsten argues that Plaintifflacks standing, that its complaint does not

adequately plead a cause of action for copyright infringement, and that California’s

litigation privilege bars this suit. (See Doc. No. 8-1.) Defendant Hughes also argues

2

that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to satisfy the applicable pleading standard. (Doc. No.

10.) Plaintiff responds that its complaint adequately alleges facts to support its

standing and its copyright infringement claim, and argues that California’s litigation

privilege does not bar this suit. (See Doc. Nos. 12 & 13.) 

To pursue a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must have constitutional and

Under California law, the litigation privilege immunizes litigants, witnesses, 2

and other participants “from liability for torts arising from communications made

during judicial proceedings.” Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 214 (1990) (citing

Cal. Civ. Code § 47). Defendant Epsten has not cited a case where California’s

litigation privilege bars a federal copyright infringement claim. (See Doc. Nos. 8 &

14.) Further, Defendant Epsten does not identify any entities or proceedings to which

the privilege would apply in this case, relying instead on assertions in its motion that

the reports at issue were prepared for mediation or litigation purposes. (Doc. No. 8-1

at 16.) The Court concludes that such arguments are better suited for a motion for

summary judgment on a more developed record. Accordingly, the Court denies

without prejudice Defendant’s motion to dismiss on grounds of privilege.

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prudential standing. Where a plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact that is redressable

by a decision in plaintiff’s favor, it has constitutional standing. Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). For prudential standing, a plaintiff must be

asserting its “own legal rights as the real party in interest.” Dunmore v. United States,

358 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a), “[a]n action must

be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” In a suit arising out of a

copyright interest, the owner of the copyright “isthe real party in interest and is entitled

to sue for copyright infringement.” Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424,

1429 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Court takes judicial notice of the copyright registrations at issue in this case. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[U]nder Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of

public record.’”). The public record shows that Randolph Tucker is the registered

author and copyright claimant of the Smoke Control Testing Report, and that Michael

Earl Dillon is the registered author and copyright claimant of the Dillon report. (Doc.

No. 8-2, Epsten’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff alleges, and

Defendants do not dispute, that Randolph Tucker is the principal of CCRD and

Michael Earl Dillon is the principal of Dillon. (See Doc. Nos. 13 & 14.) As noted

above, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that CCRD and Dillon assigned all rights and

interest in these copyrights to Plaintiff. (See Doc. No. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 25 & 30.) Further,

the complaint alleges that “Plaintiff has a valid right, title, and interest in the Dillon

Report and Smoke Control Testing Report.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges that the

owners of record assigned their interests to Plaintiff, stating sufficient factual detail

that, if true, make a plausible case that Plaintiff is the real party in interest. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has satisfied its burden to show both constitutional and

prudential standing.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under the

applicable pleading standard. (Doc. Nos. 8 & 10.) A claim for direct copyright

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infringement is comprised of two elements: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and

(2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc.

v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). As stated above, Plaintiff has

adequately pled ownership of the copyrights at issue. Plaintiff also alleges that

Defendants “appropriated and converted the Dillon Report and the Smoke Control

Testing Report . . . by using, and continuing to use, these copyrighted materials to

remediate and complete the Project.” (Doc. No. 1, Compl., ¶ 32.) Furthermore,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Thomas Jefferson School of Law approved the reports

at issue in connection with its project remediation plans (id. ¶¶ 21 & 26), and that the

Defendants together proceeded with the remediation plan after refusing to pay Plaintiff

for these and other services (id. ¶ 31). 

Plaintiff has alleged facts that, if proved, state a plausible claim on which the

Court may grant relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Court denies

without prejudice Defendants’ arguments. The Court notes that such arguments are

better suited for a motion for summary judgment on a more developed record. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 30, 2014

______________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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