Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02043/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-02043-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES LIGHTNER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA; DEPUTY DAVID

CUSHMAN, in his individual capacity;

DEPUTY J. PATZER, in his individual

capacity; DEPUTY J. VORHAUER, in his

individual capacity,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-2043 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 14)

Defendants County of Contra Costa and Deputies Cushman, Patzer

and Vorhauer move to dismiss Plaintiff James Lightner’s civil

rights action for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff opposes the

motion. The motion was taken under submission on the papers. 

Having considered all the papers submitted by the parties, the

Court GRANTS in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENIES it in

part.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from Plaintiff’s allegations that

Defendants violated his civil rights. In May, 2007, Defendants

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1

 Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of public

records relating to the arrest. Because the certified copies of

the felony complaint filed against Plaintiff, a Clerk’s Docket and

Minutes from Plaintiff’s criminal case and Plaintiff’s Advisement

of Rights, Waiver and Plea Form are not subject to reasonable

dispute, the Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice

of these documents. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. The Court denies

Defendants’ request as to the reports of the deputies on the arrest

because they contain facts that are subject to reasonable dispute. 

2 Plaintiff asserts several of his claims against “Doe

Officers” and “Doe Supervisors.” The use of Doe defendants is not

(continued...)

2

Cushman, Patzer and Vorhauer entered Plaintiff’s residence to

arrest him for a parole violation. Plaintiff maintains that, while

Deputies Patzer and Vorhauer had restrained him with his face down

on the floor and his hands behind his back, Deputy Cushman released

a police dog and commanded it to attack him. The dog bit

Plaintiff, allegedly causing injury that required medical care. 

Plaintiff maintains that the individual Defendants did not provide

him with access to medical treatment. 

Plaintiff asserts that he did not resist or attempt to evade

arrest and that he did not pose an imminent threat of death or

serious bodily injury. He claims that Deputy Cushman was not

justified in releasing the dog. Plaintiff attributes Deputy

Cushman’s alleged use of excessive force to a purported failure of

the County to provide adequate training.

Based on the events leading to his arrest, Plaintiff was

charged with resisting arrest in violation of California Penal Code

section 69.1

 Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), Ex. B. 

Plaintiff plead nolo contendere to this charge. RJN, Exs. C-D.

Plaintiff brings three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Against

the individual Defendants,2

 Plaintiff asserts claims of excessive

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2

(...continued)

favored in the Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d

637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). However, where the identity of alleged

defendants cannot be known prior to the filing of a complaint the

plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to

identify them. Id. Failure to afford the plaintiff such an

opportunity is error. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160,

1163 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court, on its own motion,

DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe

Defendants. Should Plaintiff learn of the Doe Defendants’

identities through discovery, he may move for leave to file an

amended complaint to add them as named defendants. See Brass v.

County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 2003).

3

force. As to Deputy Cushman, Plaintiff asserts a claim of failure

to provide medical care. Finally, Plaintiff seeks “municipal

liability for unconstitutional custom or policy” against the

County. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages for his claims. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the

defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds

on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to

state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

However, this principle is inapplicable to legal conclusions;

“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not taken as true. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

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3 In California, a plea of nolo contendere has the same

effect as a guilty plea or guilty verdict for the purposes of a

Heck analysis. See Nuno v. County of San Bernardino, 58 F. Supp.

2d 1127, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 

4

DISCUSSION

I. Excessive Force Claim 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the

Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff may not recover damages for

“harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid” unless he or she can prove that the

conviction or sentence has been overturned, expunged or declared

invalid. 512 U.S. at 486-87. The test is “whether a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of

[the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487. 

As stated above, Plaintiff plead nolo contendere to a charge

of violating California Penal Code section 69,3 which provides:

Every person who attempts, by means of any threat or

violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from

performing any duty imposed upon such officer by law, or

who knowingly resists, by the use of force or violence,

such officer, in the performance of his duty, is

punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars

($10,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison, or in

a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such

fine and imprisonment.

A defendant cannot be convicted under section 69 “unless the

officer was acting lawfully at the time the offense against the

officer was committed.” In re Manuel G., 16 Cal. 4th 805, 815

(1997). Defendants assert that, if Plaintiff were to prevail on

his excessive force claim, this result would entail a finding that

the individual Defendants acted unlawfully, which would invalidate

Plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea.

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Plaintiff cites Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th

Cir. 2005), in which the Ninth Circuit held, “In California, the

lawfulness of the officer's conduct is an essential element of the

offense of resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer.” 

The court ruled that, if an officer used excessive force at the

time of an arrest, the arrest would be unlawful and the arrestee

could not be convicted of resisting. Id. at 695-96. However, the

Smith court ruled that the defendants in that case were not

entitled to summary judgment under Heck because it was not clear

from the record whether Smith had plead guilty to resisting,

delaying or obstructing the officer based upon his actions during

his arrest (which would have triggered Heck), or based upon his

actions prior to his arrest when officers were attempting to

conduct an investigation at Smith’s house and had not yet attempted

to detain him. Id. at 697-98.

At this early stage, the record is not sufficiently developed

for the Court to determine whether Heck bars Plaintiff’s claim

against Deputy Cushman. As in Smith, the record does not show

whether the conduct for which Plaintiff was charged coincided with

Deputy Cushman’s release of the dog. If the two correspond, Heck

would bar Plaintiff’s claim against Deputy Cushman. 

Defendants analogize Plaintiff’s case to Truong v. Orange

County Sheriff’s Department, in which a state appellate court

concluded, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, that Heck

barred the plaintiff’s excessive force claim. 129 Cal. App. 4th

1423, 1427-30 (2005). There, the plaintiff admitted that, during

her booking at the county jail, she initially refused to disrobe

and shower despite sheriff’s deputies’ instructions. Id. at 1425. 

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She alleged that, as she began to comply with the instructions by

removing her sweater, several deputies twisted her arms and struck

her body. Id. at 1426. Although she subsequently plead guilty to

a charge under California Penal Code section 148 for resisting the

exercise of lawful duty, the plaintiff maintained that the

deputies’ actions were excessive because they struck her after she

had started to comply. Id. The state court rejected this

argument, concluding “that Truong’s refusal to obey the lawful

order and the events that led to her injuries are part of an

unbreakable chain of events.” Id. at 1429. In other words, the

defendants’ alleged violations of the plaintiff’s civil rights were

intertwined with the conduct that precipitated the charge against

her and, as a result, Heck barred her claims. 

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations, which must be taken as true on

this motion, do not suggest that Deputy Cushman’s alleged use of

excessive force was necessarily part of a chain of events tied to

Plaintiff’s resisting arrest. As stated above, he pleads that

Deputies Patzer and Vorhauer had already restrained him and that he

was in a prone position when Deputy Cushman released the dog. The

actions of Deputies Patzer and Vorhauer could have broken the

chain.

However, Plaintiff does not plead sufficient facts that tend

to show that Deputies Patzer and Vorhauer acted with excessive

force. He only alleges that they “fully restrained” him and that

“one or two of them were on top of” him. Compl. ¶ 13. This does

not suggest that they used excessive force. To the extent that

Plaintiff intends to complain that Deputies Patzer and Vorhauer

were involved in the release of the police dog, which could

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constitute excessive force, he must allege factual support. 

Currently, he simply avers that they acted “in concert with

Cushman . . . .” Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff must truthfully allege

facts showing that Deputies Patzer and Vorhauer were personally

involved in the release of the dog. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring personal participation by a

defendant for liability to accrue under § 1983). 

 Accordingly, on this motion, the Court does not conclude that

Heck bars Plaintiff’s excessive force claims against Deputy

Cushman. However, the Court dismisses with leave to amend

Plaintiff’s claims against Deputies Patzer and Vorhauer. 

II. Failure to Provide Medical Care

A claim for failure to provide medical care while in police

custody arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In analyzing such a claim, a court applies the same standard used

for claims under the Eighth Amendment for violation of a prisoner’s

right to health care. Id. “In order to violate the Eighth

Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, there

must be a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of” the

plaintiff. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish

deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the official

delayed, denied or intentionally interfered with medical treatment. 

Id.

Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to support his claim against

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4

 Plaintiff brings this claim only against Deputy Cushman,

even though he makes allegations against Deputies Patzer and

Vorhauer concerning their failure to provide him with medical care. 

If Plaintiff intends to assert this claim against Deputies Patzer

and Vorhauer, he must amend his complaint to reflect as much. 

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Deputy Cushman.4 Plaintiff asserts that Deputy Cushman, among

others, knew of his injuries, but nevertheless failed to provide

him with access to proper medical care. Defendants cite Shehee v.

Lutrell, 199 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 1999), to argue that liability

under § 1983 cannot be based on a failure to act. However, Shehee

addressed liability against the supervisors of offending employees,

not the employees themselves. Id. at 300. Here, Plaintiff

complains that Deputy Cushman failed to provide him with medical

care. Because he was allegedly present when Plaintiff required

such care, these allegations support his claim that Deputy Cushman

was deliberately indifferent. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENIES it in part. (Docket No.

14.) Plaintiff’s excessive force claims against Deputies Patzer

and Vorhauer are dismissed with leave to amend to cure the

deficiencies discussed above. Defendants’ motion is denied in all

other respects. Within twenty-one days of the date of this Order,

Defendants shall answer Plaintiff’s claims against Deputy Cushman

and the County. 

On its own motion, the Court DISMISSES all claims asserted

against Doe Defendants without prejudice to Plaintiff moving for

leave to amend his complaint at a later date to identify these

Defendants. 

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Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to cure the

deficiencies noted above within twenty-one days from the date of

this order. If Plaintiff does so, Defendants may file a motion to

dismiss, based on Plaintiff’s new pleadings, three weeks

thereafter, with Plaintiff’s opposition due two weeks following and

Defendants’ reply due one week after that. If a motion to dismiss

is filed, it would not be fully briefed before the case management

conference (CMC) scheduled for April 27, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. The

Court accordingly continues the CMC to June 3, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

March 29, 2010

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