Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04063/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04063-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 

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 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for acting Commissioner 

 Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “Doc. No.” The transcript pages for

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this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

LINDA K. THORNTON PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 4:06-cv-04063

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE DEFENDANT

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Commissioner, Social Security Administration 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Linda K. Thornton (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social

Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006), seeking judicial review of a final decision of

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental SecurityIncome (“SSI”) under Titles II and

XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any

and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment,

and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. (Doc. No. 4). Pursuant to this authority, the Court 2

issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter. 

1. Background:

Plaintiff’s applications for DIB and SSI now before this Court were protectively filed on

November 14, 2002. (Tr. 46, 205). These applications allege an onset date of April 6, 2002. See

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id. In these applications, in other documents filed with the SSA, and in her testimony at the

administrative hearing on September 29, 2004, Plaintiff alleges she is disabled due to her severe

headaches, constant pain in her left elbow, arthritis in her knees, high blood pressure, vision

problems, neuropathy, a heart murmur, high cholesterol, back pain, depression, and diabetes. (Tr.

72, 240-242, 248-254). Plaintiff claims her disabilities first began to bother her, and she became

unable to work, on April 6, 2002 after she was involved in a horseback riding accident. (Tr. 84,

230).

Plaintiff’s applications were initially denied on January 31, 2003 and were denied again on

reconsideration on March 21, 2003. (Tr. 26-29). Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing which

was held on September 29, 2004 in Texarkana, Arkansas. (Tr. 220-269). Plaintiff was present and

was represented by an attorney, Terry Diggs, at the hearing. See id. Plaintiff, Tony Thornton

(Plaintiff’s husband), and Millard Sales (a vocational expert) testified at this hearing. See id. At the

time of the hearing, Plaintiff was thirty-five (35) years old (classified as a “younger individual,” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (2007)), was married, lived in Lockesburg, Arkansas, had a General Education

Development (G.E.D.) diploma, and had completed approximately thirteen (13) hours of college

classes. (Tr. 16, Findings 6-7, 224-225). 

On November 1, 2004, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a written opinion. (Tr. 12-

17). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements on her alleged onset date

and continued to meet them through December 31, 2005. (Tr. 16, Finding 1, 50). The ALJ

determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) at any time since

her alleged onset date or since April 6, 2002. (Tr. 16, Finding 2). The ALJ found Plaintiff had been

treated for diabetes, depression, a left elbow fracture, hypertension, and knee pain. (Tr. 16, Finding

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3). The ALJ determined these were severe impairments but did not find that Plaintiff had an

impairment or a combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, Appendix

1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. See id.

The ALJ also evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined Plaintiff’s Residual

Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 16, Findings 4-5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints pursuant to Social Security Regulation (“SSR”) 96-7p and Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d

1320 (8th Cir. 1984) and determined that Plaintiff’s testimony and Plaintiff’s husband’s testimony

was not fully credible. (Tr. 16, Finding 4). The ALJ then gave reduced weight to Plaintiff’s

allegations regarding her pain and limitations to the extent they impact her ability to do basic work.

(Tr. 15). Second, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the following: 

[L]ift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and stand/walk 6 hours

in an 8 hour day. She is restricted to using the left upper extremity as an assistive

device; unable to perform bilateral hand usage; can occasionally reach in all

directions using the left upper extremity; and occasionally push/pull using the left

upper extremity. 

(Tr. 16, Finding 5). 

Based upon this RFC determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her Past

Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 16, Finding 9). Vocational Expert (“VE”) Millard Sales, a full-time

self-employed independent vocational expert, testified at the hearing and addressed this issue. (Tr.

260-269). The VE testified that Plaintiff’s PRW included work as a mobile home sales person

(semi-skilled, light), cashier (semi-skilled, light), certified nursing assistant (semi-skilled, medium),

and stocker/cleaner (unskilled, medium). (Tr. 16, Finding 8). The VE testified that a hypothetical

person with the same limitations as Plaintiff, and with the same RFC, could still perform Plaintiff’s

PRW as a mobile home sales person. (Tr. 263-264). Based upon the VE’s testimony, the ALJ

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determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 16, Finding 10). 

On June 2, 2006, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s November 1, 2004

hearing decision. (Tr. 5-7). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the present action. (Doc. No. 1). This case

was referred to the undersigned on February 22, 2007. Plaintiff and Defendant have both filed

appeal briefs. (Doc. Nos. 13-14). This case is ready for decision. 

2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than

a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).

As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the

Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have

supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See

Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible

to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the

findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,

1068 (8th Cir. 2000). 

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one

year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any SGA. See Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206

(8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental

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impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her disability,

not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A). 

To determine whether the claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the

familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)

whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment

listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work

experience); (4) whether the claimant has the RFC to perform his or her relevant work; and (5) if the

claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are

other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work

experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920. 

3. Discussion:

Plaintiff brings the present appeal claiming that the ALJ’s disability determination is not

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. (Doc. No. 13, Pages 9-14). More

specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred (A) by failing to take into account the combined impact

of her impairments, (B) by ignoring the side effects of her medication and how they may limit her

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ability to work, and (C) by improperly discounting the credibility of Plaintiff and her husband. See

id. Defendant claims that substantial evidence supports the SSA’s disability determination that

Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 14, Pages 3-8).

In response to Plaintiff’s arguments, Defendant claims that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence

in the record and considered Plaintiff’s impairments in combination, properly considered Plaintiff’s

medication, and properly evaluated the credibility of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s husband. See id. at 4-6.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving that she was unable to

perform her PRW and that since Plaintiff did not meet this burden, the ALJ properly determined

Plaintiff can perform her PRW. See id. at 7-8. This Court will address Plaintiff’s arguments in order.

A. Plaintiff’s Impairments in Combination

Plaintiff argues that she suffers from a “unique combination of impairments both physical

and mental” and that the ALJ did not properly consider these impairments in combination. (Doc.

No. 13, Page 10). Plaintiff claims that she suffers from depression, severe knee pain and swelling,

severe elbow pain and numbness, back pain, diabetes, high blood pressure, headaches, a heart

murmur, and high cholesterol and claims that the ALJ should have evaluated these impairments “in

totality.” See id. at 9-11. Defendant argues that the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence in

the record, including Plaintiff’s multiple impairments, when making his disability determination.

(Doc. No. 14, Page 4-6). Defendant also argues that “the different exertional and nonexertional

functional limitations specified by the ALJ in his residual functional capacity determination establish

that the ALJ considered the combined effect of Plaintiff’s impairments.” See id. at 5. 

 Under the facts in the present case, this Court finds that the ALJ properly considered

Plaintiff’s impairments in combination. The Social Security Act requires the ALJ to consider the

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combined impact of all of the claimant’s impairments without regard to whether any such

impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity to be disabling. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1523 (2007). In the present action, in reviewing Plaintiff’s claimed impairments, the ALJ

stated several times in his opinion that “the evidence does not document the existence of any

impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals the level of severity for any

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P, Regulations No. 4." (Tr. 13, 16, Finding 3) (emphasis

added). The ALJ also reviewed, and included in his opinion, a summary of Plaintiff’s medical

records and of the mental and physical problems experienced by Plaintiff. (Tr. 12-15). This

statement and summary are sufficient in the Eighth Circuit to establish that the ALJ properly

considered the combined effect of Plaintiff’s impairments. See Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th

Cir. 1994) (holding that statements such as “the evidence as a whole does not show that the

claimant’s symptoms . . . preclude his past work as a janitor” and “[t]he claimant’s impairments do

not prevent him from performing janitorial work . . .” sufficiently establish that the ALJ properly

considered the combined effects of a plaintiff’s impairments). 

Thus, pursuant to the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Hajek, this Court finds the ALJ properly

considered the Plaintiff’s impairments in combination. Plaintiff has alleged that she suffers from

a number of impairments. (Doc. No. 13, Pages 9-11). However, this Court is not required to find

that Plaintiff is disabled simply because she has alleged a long list of medical problems. The ALJ’s

opinion sufficiently indicates that the ALJ properly considered the combined impact of Plaintiff’s

impairments, and this Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the severity of the combination

of Plaintiff’s impairments. See Hajek, 30 F.3d at 92.

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B. Side Effects of Plaintiff’s Medication

Plaintiff claims the ALJ failed to properly consider the side effects of her medication and

failed to find that her medication’s side effects limit her ability to work. (Doc. No. 13, Page 11-12).

Plaintiff notes that she is taking twelve different medications: “2 for diabetes, 4 for arthritic

symptoms, 2 to control blood pressure, 1 for blood clots and heart murmur, 1 for cholesterol control,

1 for regulating menstrual cycle, and 1 for acid reflux.” See id. Plaintiff claims that these

medications have a number of different side effects, including “muscle cramps” and “nervousness

and anxiety, dry or ‘cotton’ mouth, and sleepiness.” See id. Plaintiff claims that, pursuant to the

Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Porch v. Chater, 115 F.3d 567 (1997), the ALJ is required to examine

the side effects of a claimant’s medication when making a disability determination and incorporate

those side effects into his or her RFC or disability determination. See id. 

In response to Plaintiff’s argument, Defendant claims that the “ALJ considered the

medications used byPlaintiff,” but the Defendant did not otherwise address Plaintiff’s argument that

the ALJ should have considered the side effects of Plaintiff’s medication. See id. Defendant also

did not address Plaintiff’s argument that pursuant to Porch v. Chater, 115 F.3d 567 (1997), the ALJ

was required to evaluate, and alter his disability determination, based upon the impact the side

effects of Plaintiff’s medication may have on Plaintiff’s ability to perform her work. 

This Court finds that the facts in Porch are distinguishable from the facts in the present action

and that the ALJ did not err by giving little or no weight to the side effects of Plaintiff’s medication.

In Porch, the Eighth Circuit held that an ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence

partly because the ALJ did not give proper weight to the side effects of the plaintiff’s medication.

115 F.3d at 572. The Eighth Circuit, however, decided Porch under facts very different from the

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facts in the present action. See id. Importantly, in Porch, the ALJ found the plaintiff’s testimony

regarding these side effects was credible and “credited Porch’s [the plaintiff’s] testimony regarding

the side effects of her medications.” 115 F.3d at 572. In the present action, the ALJ did not find that

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the side effects of her medication was credible and properly

discredited this testimony regarding the side effects of her medication. See Discussion 3.C, infra.

An ALJ is not required to give any weight to subjective allegations that the ALJ properly discredits.

See Davis v. Barnhart, No. 05-2189, 2006 WL1544379, at *586-87 (8th Cir. April 10, 2006) (noting

that an RFC determination and its corresponding hypothetical need only include the limitations the

ALJ finds credible). Therefore, in this case, the ALJ was not required to give any weight to these

claimed side effects and did not err in finding that the side effects of Plaintiff’s medication do not

limit her ability to work. 

C. ALJ’s Credibility Determination 

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s and Plaintiff’s husband’s

subjective complaints. (Doc. No. 13, Pages 12-13). More specifically, Plaintiff claims that her

ability to do some limited household tasks does not indicate that she is able to perform work at a fulltime job. See id. Plaintiff claims that she suffers from severe and intense pain that should have been

more fully considered by the ALJ in evaluating Plaintiff’s and her husband’s subjective complaints.

See id. Defendant claims that the ALJ did not err in his credibility determination and that the ALJ

properly and fully considered the Polaski factors prior to discounting Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints. (Doc. No. 14, Page 6). 

In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five

factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and

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20 C.F.R. § 416.429. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). These factors, which provide

as follows, must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain:

(1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the

precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication;

and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322. The ALJ is not required to

methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior

to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th

Cir. 2000). Furthermore, an ALJ’s credibility determination is generally entitled to deference. See

Woodruff v. Astrue, No. 06-1818, 2007 WL 913854, at *1 (8th Cir. March 28, 2007). As long as the

ALJ properly applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for his or her finding that the

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is

entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ,

however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical

evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility

determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any

inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th

Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find

a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but

whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.

See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991). 

In the present action, the ALJ properly applied all five of these factors and properly

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Plaintiff claims that her ability to perform simple household tasks should not be the sole basis for

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discrediting her subjective complaints of pain. (Doc. No. 13, Pages 12-13). Plaintiff is correct in her claim. See

Swope v. Barnhart, 436 F.3 1023, 1023 (8th Cir. 2006). However, the ALJ did not base his entire credibility

determination upon his finding that Plaintiff can perform simple household tasks. (Tr. 12-17). Instead, the ALJ had

several bases for discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; and because the ALJ gave several valid reasons for

discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s disability determination is entitled to deference and should

be affirmed. 

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discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Tr. 12-15). In his credibility analysis, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not entirely credible based upon the following

five findings: (1) Plaintiff’s daily activities include walking, driving, shopping, attending church,

doing laundry, washing dishes, running errands, cooking, paying bills, and reading; (2) Plaintiff

complains of knee pain, but her medical records indicate that she has good range of motion in her

knees and can walk one-fourth (1/4) of a mile; (3) Plaintiff complains of problems with her vision,

but she can both drive and read; (4) Plaintiff complains of numbness in her extremities, but there is

no evidence that she has ever been diagnosed with diabetic neuropathy; and (5) Plaintiff complains

of serious depression, but her depression is only situational in nature. Taken together, these are five

valid reasons that the ALJ used in support of his credibility determination. Since the ALJ’s

credibility determination is supported by several valid reasons, his decision is entitled to deference

and should be affirmed. See Woodruff, 2007 WL 913854, at *1.3

Furthermore, the ALJ properly discredited the testimony of Plaintiff’s husband, Mr.

Thornton. Although the ALJ should “fully consider” the testimony of every claimant and witness,

the ALJ is not required to accept the testimony of a witness if that testimony is motivated by a

possible financial gain. See Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1007-08 (8th Cir. 2000). In the present

action, the ALJ did not fully credit the testimony of Mr. Thornton because, as the ALJ noted, he was

“to some degree . . . motivated by the desire to see her [Plaintiff] obtain benefits.” (Tr. 15). The

ALJ’s reason for discrediting Mr. Thornton’s testimony was permissible pursuant to Buckner and

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should be affirmed by this Court. 

4. Conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits to Plaintiff, is supported

by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. A judgment incorporating these findings will be

entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58. 

ENTERED this 26 day of July, 2007. 

th

 /s/ Barry A. Bryant 

 Honorable Barry A. Bryant 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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