Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01551/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01551-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Andrew Christopher Wentworth,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 19-01551-PHX-JJT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Andrew Christopher Wentworth, who is confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex-Eyman, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer and Petitioner filed a reply. (Docs.

10, 11.)

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by jury trial in Pinal County Superior Court, case #CR

2016-02660, of sexual molestation of a minor and was sentenced to a 17-year term of

imprisonment. (Doc. 5; Doc. 10, Exhs. O, Q, R.) The Arizona Court of Appeals described

the facts of the case, as follows:

¶ 1 Andrew Wentworth appeals from his conviction and sentences for one

count of molestation of a child, arguing Arizona’s child molestation statute

violates due process and that the trial court illegally ordered him to reimburse

the state for the cost of a forensic examination. We affirm.

***

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¶ 2 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the

convictions.” State v. Fimbres, 222 Ariz. 293, ¶ 2 (App. 2009). On one

occasion between 2015 and 2016, Wentworth was home alone with his

six-year-old half-sister, C.C., when he pulled down his pants and showed her

his penis. He then told C.C. to remove her pants and underwear, asked her to

turn around, and touched her naked “butt” with his erect penis.

¶ 3 Following trial, the jury convicted Wentworth of one count of molestation

of a child under fifteen, a dangerous crime against children. The trial court

sentenced Wentworth to a presumptive, enhanced prison term of seventeen

years and ordered him to pay, among other fees, a $500 forensic interview

assessment. Wentworth appealed; we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, 13-

4033(A)(1).

State v. Wentworth, 2018 WL 357531 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018).

As indicated above, Petitioner filed an appeal arguing, as relevant to the instant

matter, that Arizona’s child molestation statute violates due process because it does not

require the State to prove sexual motivation, but rather, burden defendants with disproving

that element. He also challenged the statutory scheme as overbroad. See id.

On January 10, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim finding, as

follows:

¶ 5 In State v. Holle, our supreme court addressed these very arguments and

determined the statutory scheme did not violate due process. 240 Ariz. 300, ¶¶

17-19, 35, 41-44, 50 (2016). Thus, we are duty bound to follow our supreme

court’s determination in Holle that §§ 13-1407(E) and 13-1410 do not violate

due process as challenged. See State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n.4 (2004)

(“The courts of this state are bound by the decisions of [our supreme] court

and do not have the authority to modify or disregard [its] rulings.”). Moreover,

we have no choice but to decline Wentworth’s invitation to reconsider Holle

in light of May v. Ryan, 245 F.Supp.3d 1145 (D. Ariz. 2017), because the

decisions of federal district courts neither bind this court nor provide a basis

upon which we might overturn the decisions of our supreme court. See Arpaio

v. Figueroa, 229 Ariz. 444, ¶ 11 (App. 2012). Accordingly, we find no error.[]

Id.

The court also addressed Petitioner’s claim that the trial court should have sua sponte

instructed the jury on sexual intent, stating: “Because the court in Holle determined that

sexual motivation was not an element of child molestation, we likewise reject Wentworth’s

contention that the court was obligated to instruct the jury on sexual intent sua sponte. 240

Ariz. 300, ¶¶ 17-19.” Id.

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The record reflects that Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court on January 22, 2018. (Exh. Y.) The court summarily denied the petition on May 29,

2018. (Exh. AA.)

While his direct appeal was still pending, and thereafter, the record reflects that

Petitioner filed several notices of post-conviction relief (“PCR”), claiming that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel, the failure to timely file a PCR notice was not his fault, and

facts existed that established his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. (Exhs.

BB, CC, EE.) Petitioner claimed that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the

constitutionality of A.R.S. §§ 13-1410 and -1407(E) and for failing to challenge the alleged

burden-shifting that occurred by the statute’s requirement that he prove lack of sexual intent.

Petitioner also argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the court

instruct the jury, or object to the court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury, that it had to

find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he acted with sexual intent. (Exhs. BB, CC, EE.)

On July 12, 2018, Petitioner filed a PCR petition alleging: ineffective assistance of

counsel, the abridgement of a right guaranteed under the state constitution or law or the

federal constitution, the existence of newly discovered material stating that “May v. Ryan,

245 FSupp3d 1145 and 2018 HB 2283 are retroactive to me as a substantive change in the

law via the first exception to the non-retroactivity principle discussed in Teague v. Lane, 489

US 288,” and lack of jurisdiction of the trial court. (Exh. FF.)

Appointed counsel filed a notice of completion notifying the court that, after a review

of the record, she could find no claims for relief to raise in PCR proceedings. (Exhs. GG,

HH.) Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to file a pro per PCR petition, but instead, on

March 10, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss his PCR petition without prejudice, to

allow him to file another PCR notice “at some later date” because he had already initiated

habeas proceedings. (Exh. JJ.)

The trial court denied the motion and reaffirmed the April 19, 2019 deadline within

which to file his pro se PCR petition. (Exh. KK.) On May 21, 2019, the court dismissed the

PCR proceedings because no PCR petition had been filed. (Exh. LL.)

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

- 4 -

In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises one ground for relief, in which he asserts that

the State improperly denied him his due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments “when the State shifted the burden of proof to Petitioner to disprove sexual

intent, where the State did not prove or even argue that the Petitioner had acted with sexual

intent, and where the trial court did not instruct the jury to find that the Petitioner had acted

with sexual intent, in order to find him guilty of molestation under A.R.S. § 13-1410.”

In their Answer, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to the AEDPA1

, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102

(2011). It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which

demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When

applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a

state court ... .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

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‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated by

Arizona’s child molestation statute, A.R.S. § 13-1410, because it requires him to disprove

sexual motivation. Specifically, he argues that under A.R.S. § 13-1407(E), the affirmative

defense of lack of sexual motivation placed the burden of proof upon him. Petitioner relies

on the 2017 holding in May v. Ryan, 245 F.Supp.3d 1145 (D. Ariz. 2017), in which the

district court held that the burden-shifting scheme inherent in Arizona’s child molestation

law “violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1164.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. On January 10, 2018, citing to the

Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Holle, 379 P.3d 197 (2016), which held that

the statutory provisions in question, A.R.S. §§ 13-1407(E) and -1410, did not violate due

process – the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim, and affirmed his

conviction and sentence. See Wentworth, 2018 WL 357531. Further, the appellate court

declined to reconsider Holle in light of May v. Ryan, finding that federal district court

decisions neither bind the Court of Appeals nor provide a basis upon which it might overturn

decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court. The court also rejected Petitioner’s claim that the

trial court should have sua sponte instructed the jury on sexual intent because in Holle the

Arizona Supreme Court had determined that sexual motivation was not an element of child

molestation. See Wentworth, 2018 WL 357531.

Initially, the Court notes that the federal district court decision relied upon by

Petitioner to support his claim, May v. Ryan, 245 F.Supp.3d 1145 (D. Ariz. 2017), was

subsequently reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in May v. Ryan, 2020 WL

1492747 (9th Cir. March 27, 2020), holding that the petitioner “is not entitled to habeas relief

on any of the grounds he raises and thus [we] reverse.” In any event, the Arizona Court of

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Appeals was bound by the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Holle, 379 P.3d

197 (2016), which expressly rejected the burden-shifting contention that § 13-1410(A)

violates due process by not including sexual motivation among the elements of child

molestation, but instead designating the lack of motivation by sexual interest an affirmative

defense.

Assuming, however, that the alleged burden-shifting scheme set forth in Arizona’s

child molestation law violated due process,“[habeas] relief is proper only if the federal court

has ‘grave doubt whether a trial error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 135 S.Ct. 2187,

2197-98, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115

S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the facts and

record in this case, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the error he alleges “had substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id.

At trial, the victim testified that when she was six-years-old, Petitioner removed his

belt; pulled down his pants and underwear; showed the victim his penis; went to the

bathroom and urinated with the door open; returned and told the victim to touch his penis;

instructed her to take off her underwear, turn around, and stay still; and touched her exposed

buttocks with his penis. (Exh. J at 8-28.) Despite the fact that he denied these events at trial,

Petitioner admitted to police, on more than one occasion, that he put his penis on the victim’s

buttocks. (Exh. J at 205-09.)

During the time of the events in question, Arizona law provided “[a] person commits

molestation of a child by intentionally or knowingly engaging in or causing a person to

engage in sexual contact, except sexual contact with the female breast, with a child who is

under fifteen years of age.” A.R.S. § 13-1410(A). “Sexual contact” was defined as “any

direct or indirect touching, fondling or manipulating of any part of the genitals, anus or

female breast by any part of the body or by any object or causing a person to engage in such

contact.” A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(3). During that time, it was a defense “that the defendant was

not motivated by a sexual interest.” A.R.S. § 13-1407(E).

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Among the instructions given to the jury, the court stated, in pertinent part:

Definition of “Intentionally” or “With Intent To.” “Intentionally,” as used in

these instructions, means that a defendant’s objective is to cause that result or

to engage in that conduct.

Intent - Inference. Intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances

disclosed by the evidence. It need not be established exclusively by direct

sensory proof. The existence of intent is one of the questions of fact for your

determination.

Definition of “Knowingly.” “Knowingly” means that a defendant acted with

awareness of or belief in the existence of conduct or circumstances constituting

an offense. It does not mean that a defendant must have known the conduct is

forbidden by law.

***

Included Mental State – Knowingly. If the State is required to prove the

defendant acted “knowingly,” that requirement is satisfied if the State proves

that the defendant acted “intentionally.”

***

Molestation of Child. The crime of molestation of a child requires proof of the

following:

1. The defendant intentionally or knowingly caused a person to engage in any

direct or indirect touching, fondling, or manipulation of any part of the genitals

or anus by any part of the body or by any object or causing a person to engage

in such contact with a child; and

2. The child was under 15 years of age.

(Exh. N at 4-12.)

Petitioner did not assert lack of sexual motivation as an affirmative defense and did

not request a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of lack of sexual motivation at any

point during trial. (Exh. G at 154-61; Exh. N at 26-39; Exh. M at 3-5.) Lastly, the record

reflects that during deliberations, the jury did not submit any questions and deliberated for

under three hours before rendering its guilty verdict. (Exh. M at 12-13; Exh. P.)

Accordingly, even assuming the alleged burden-shifting scheme set forth in Arizona’s

child molestation law violated due process, specifically, A.R.S. § 13-1407(E), which required

a defendant to demonstrate the lack of sexual motivation as an affirmative defense, Petitioner

cannot show that the constitutional error resulted in “actual prejudice.” In light of (1) the

overwhelming evidence in this case, (2) the fact that the court correctly instructed the jury

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on the elements of the crime of molestation of a child, and (3) Petitioner never raised lack

of sexual motivation as an affirmative defense, and did not request a jury instruction on the

affirmative defense of lack of sexual motivation at any point during trial, Petitioner cannot

show that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353

(1993).

In view of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on his

claim.

CONCLUSION

The Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not established

actual prejudice arising from any alleged constitutional error.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

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review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 29th day of April, 2020.

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