Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_19-cv-00265/USCOURTS-alsd-1_19-cv-00265-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARY HARRIS, )

)

 Plaintiff, ) 

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-00265-CG-N

 )

MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC )

LIBRARY BOARD OF TRUSTEES; )

MONROE COUNTY COMMISSION )

et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) filed by 

Defendant Monroe County Commission (“MCC”), the Motion to Dismiss as to Counts

I, II and IV (Doc. 33) filed by Defendant Steve Stacey (“Stacey”), and the Motion to 

Dismiss as to Counts I and II (Doc. 35) filed by Defendants Monroe County Public 

Library Board of Trustees (“the Board”), Shannon Powell (“Powell”), Ann Pridgen 

(“Pridgen”), and Jerome Sanders (“Sanders”). The assigned District Judge has 

referred said motions to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action 

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 

72(a). See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (10/22/2019, 10/25/2019, & 10/29/2019 electronic 

references). In reaching the conclusions herein, the undersigned has considered the 

aforementioned motions, the responses to all motions (Docs. 34-1, 39) filed by the 

Plaintiff Mary Harris (“Harris”), the Defendants’ Replies to the Responses (Docs. 40, 

41, 42), and related exhibits.

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I. Applicable Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” the Court construes 

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “accepting all well-pleaded 

facts that are alleged therein to be true.” Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 

1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1328 

(11th Cir. 2006)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ 

” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). That “standard ‘calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable 

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the claim.” Am. Dental Ass'n v. 

Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but [rather] 

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where 

a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendants liability, it 

‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations omitted). 

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, quoting in part FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(a)(2).

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FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) generally sets the benchmark for determining whether 

a complaint’s allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (“Under [Rule] 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain 

a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ 

As the Court held in Twombly, . . . the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not 

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”).

Indeed, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if 

it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); compare Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1381 (“[G]iven the pleading 

standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal, [plaintiff] must do more than recite 

statutory elements in conclusory fashion. Rather, his allegations must proffer 

enough factual content to ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” 

(emphasis added)), with Robinson v. Correctional Med. Assocs., Inc., Civil Action No. 

1:09–cv–01509–JOF, 2010 WL 2499994, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2010) (“Factual 

allegations in a complaint need not be detailed but ‘must be enough to raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the 

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(internal citations and emphasis omitted and added))).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

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plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks 

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief. . . .

[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a 

motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. 

But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more 

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but 

it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); compare 

id. at 680 (a plaintiff must nudge his claims “across the line from conceivable to 

plausible.”), with Patel v. Georgia Dep’t BHDD, 485 F. App’x 982, 983 (11th Cir. Aug. 

8, 2012) (per curiam) (“In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’ rather than merely 

conceivable.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). In addition to the pleading 

requirements of Rule 8, FED. R. CIV.P. 10(b) provides that “[i]f doing so would promote 

clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated 

in a separate count.”

II. Well-Pleaded Allegations & Causes of Action

Plaintiff Harris, an African-American, is a former Assistant Librarian and 

Interim Director of the Monroeville Library, for which she worked from 1980 until 

her termination on September, 11, 2017. (Doc. 1, PageID.2-4, ¶¶ 9, 16). The Board 

oversees the library’s operation. (Id., PageID.3, ¶ 12). At all times relevant to the 

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complaint, Pridgen served as Chairman of the Board, while Powell, Stacey, and 

Sanders served as Board members. (Id., ¶¶ 12-15).

Beginning in January 2016, Harris served as interim Library Director. (Id., 

PageID.5, ¶ 23). In September 2016, Harris formally applied to become the Library 

Director, presenting letters from a cross section of the community advocating for her 

selection. (Id., ¶¶ 23-24). The Board refused to formally give Harris the “Director” 

title, though she received the appropriate pay for the Director job while serving as 

interim Director. (Id., ¶¶ 26 – 27). In refusing to formally make Harris Library 

Director, Pridgen told Harris that she could not be officially promoted because she 

was “a dinosaur” and that the library needed someone with “fresh ideas and 

youthfulness.” (Id., ¶ 28).

After applying for the Library Director position, Harris was subjected to hostile 

acts from Board members. (Id., ¶ 30). The Board requested that the local District 

Attorney investigate Harris over library finances from the 2012-2015 time period, 

even though Harris was not serving as Library Director during that time frame, 

forcing Harris to hire an attorney at her expense to respond to the district attorney’s 

subpoena. (Id., PageID.6, ¶¶ 31-32). Stacey made public allegations on Facebook, in 

the local newspaper, and on radio disparaging Harris’s job performance, claiming she 

had stolen money. (Id., ¶ 33). Stacey also verbally abused Harris and disparaged her 

job performance in front of library patrons, causing patrons to be concerned for 

Harris. (Id., ¶ 34, 36). On August 2017, the District Attorney declined to bring 

charges over the 2012-2015 library finances. (Id., ¶ 38).

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Harris then filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) protesting her treatment. (Id., ¶ 39). The charge 

also contained an allegation that the library hosted a celebration event in honor of 

the Confederate flag that was attended by “70 known affiliates of the KKK.” (Id., 

PageID.4, ¶ 18). Harris and other patrons were upset and distressed that the library 

was being used to host the Confederate flag celebration. (Id.). After receiving the 

EEOC charge, the Board terminated Harris without further inquiry. (Id., ¶ 19). 

Harris’s termination letter, signed by each Board member, acknowledged receipt of 

the EEOC charge and shock at the allegation about “known affiliates of the KKK,” 

explaining that women are excluded from being KKK members. (Id., ¶ 20). The letter 

also stated that unnamed attendees of the meeting were upset and planned to sue 

over the contents of Harris’s EEOC charge, though the letter did not explain how the 

contents of the charge were shared. (Id., PageID.5, ¶ 22). Harris was replaced with 

a white female who was in the same age range as her. (Id., ¶ 29). 

Based on the foregoing allegations, Harris alleges the following causes of 

action:

• Count 1 – causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1981, and 1981a, against 

all Defendants;

• Count 2 – cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Equal 

Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 

“(and/or the rights or privileges otherwise guaranteed to her by federal law)” 

(Doc. 1, PageID.9), against all Defendants;

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• Count 3 – racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, against MCC only; and

• Count 4 – libel, slander, and defamation, against Stacey only.

III. Analysis

In addition to arguing that the Defendants’ various motions to dismiss should 

be denied, Harris also argues, in the alternative, that she be allowed to file an 

amended complaint, and has attached a proposed amended complaint to her first 

response (see Doc. 34-3). Only MCC notes the amended complaint in its reply, and no 

defendant substantively addresses the allegations in the proposed amended pleading. 

Accordingly, in addressing the defendants’ various arguments for dismissal, the 

undersigned will consider whether the amended complaint cures or otherwise 

addresses the claimed deficiencies.

A. Alabama’s Volunteer Service Act

Alabama’s Volunteer Service Act (VSA), Ala. Code § 6-5-336, provides that 

“[a]ny volunteer shall be immune from civil liability in any action on the basis of any 

act or omission of a volunteer resulting in damage or injury if: (1) The volunteer was 

acting in good faith and within the scope of such volunteer's official functions and 

duties for a nonprofit organization, a nonprofit corporation, hospital, or a 

governmental entity; and (2) The damage or injury was not caused by willful or 

wanton misconduct by such volunteer.” Ala. Code § 6-5-336(d). For purposes of the 

VSA, a “volunteer” is “[a] person performing services for a nonprofit organization, a 

nonprofit corporation, a hospital, or a governmental entity without compensation, 

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other than reimbursement for actual expenses incurred. The term includes a 

volunteer serving as a director, officer, trustee, or direct service volunteer.” Id. § 6-5-

336(c)(4). Stacey, Pridgen, Powell, and Sanders all argue that, as volunteers, they are 

immune from the claims asserted against them in the complaint.

The VSA only provides immunity for volunteers whose misconduct was not 

“willful or wanton.” Id. § 6-5-336(d)(2). First, because the VSA appears to be an 

affirmative defense, Harris is not required to plead facts expressly negating its 

application. See Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 

1984) (“Generally, the existence of an affirmative defense will not support a motion 

to dismiss.”), on reh'g, 764 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (affirming and 

reinstating the panel opinion). Second, while “a complaint may be dismissed under 

Rule 12(b)(6) when its own allegations indicate the existence of an affirmative 

defense,” the defense must “clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint.” Id. Here, 

construing the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to Harris, as the 

Court must, at least some of Stacey, Pridgen, Powell, and Sanders’s alleged conduct

could plausibly be considered “willful” or “wanton.”1 Accordingly, the VSA does not 

 1 See Brewer v. Atkinson, 262 So. 3d 663, 670–71 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018):

Willfulness is not equivalent to wantonness. Lyons v. Walker Reg'l Med. Ctr., 

868 So. 2d 1071 (Ala. 2003). That is, proof that one had “ ‘knowledge and 

consciousness that the injury is likely to result from the act done or from the 

omission to act,’ ” Mazda Motor Corp. v. Hurst, 261 So. 3d 167, 189 (Ala. 2017) 

(quoting Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 181 So. 3d 325, 333 

(Ala. 2015) ), although sufficient to establish wantonness, is not sufficient to 

establish that one has acted willfully. To be sure, more recent cases have, in 

discussions of wantonness, discussed “willful and wanton” or “willful or 

wanton” conduct as if the two are simply interchangeable terms for the same 

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provide a basis for dismissing Harris’s claims against Stacey, Pridgen, Powell, and 

Sanders under Rule 12(b)(6).2

 

level of culpability. See, e.g., Mazda Motor Corp., 261 So. 3d at 188-93 

(discussing the proof required to support a claim of wantonness); see also Ex 

parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So. 3d at 333 (discussing whether 

the defendant had engaged in “willful or wanton misconduct” under Ala. Code 

1975, § 6–5–336(d)(2)). However, we do not perceive these sometimes 

confusing statements as an intent to change the long-standing law governing 

the separate concepts of willfulness and wantonness.

“An approved definition of wantonness is the conscious failure of one 

charged with the duty to exercise due care and diligence, to prevent 

an injury after discovery of peril. Or, under circumstances where one 

is charged with the knowledge of such peril, and conscious that injury 

will likely, probably or inevitably result from his actions, or his 

failure to act, he does not take the proper precautions to prevent 

injury.

“To constitute ‘willful or intentional injury,’ there must be 

knowledge of danger accompanied with a design or purpose to 

inflict injury, whether the act be one of omission or commission. 

To constitute ‘wantonness’ the design may be absent if the act is 

done with knowledge of its probable consequence and with a 

reckless disregard of those consequences.”

English v. Jacobs, 263 Ala. 376, 379, 82 So. 2d 542, 544–45 (1955); see also

Porterfield v. Life & Cas. Co. of Tennessee, 242 Ala. 102, 105, 5 So. 2d 71, 

73 (1941).

2 Though Harris does not raise this point, the undersigned is also dubious that the 

VSA, a state law, can serve to immunize these defendants from the federal causes of 

action asserted against them in Counts 1 and 2, given that federal law is the supreme 

law of the land. Stacey, Pridgen, Powell, and Sanders do not attempt to provide an 

answer, instead simply citing to Ewing v. Moore, No. 7:17-CV-00743-LSC, 2018 WL 

3852297 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2018). While the district court in Ewing did dismiss § 

1983 claims based on VSA immunity, it did so without any explanation of how the 

VSA could serve to trump federal law. See 2018 WL 3852297, at *8-9.

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B. Libel, Slander, and Defamation

Under Alabama law, “[t]he elements of a cause of action for defamation are: 1) 

a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged 

communication of that statement to a third party; 3) fault amounting at least to 

negligence on the part of the defendant; and 4) either actionability of the statement 

irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication 

of the statement.” McCaig v. Talladega Pub. Co., 544 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala. 1989) 

(emphasis in original). Stacy argues that the libel, slander, and defamation claims 

against him in Count 4 are due to be dismissed because, inter alia, Harris fails to 

allege that any of his alleged defamatory statements were false. On this point, the 

undersigned agrees.

Harris alleges that, after the local District Attorney opened an investigation 

into 2012-2015 library finances, “Stacey publicized allegations on Facebook, in the 

local newspaper, on the radio disparaging Harris’ job performance claiming she had 

stolen money.” (Doc. 1, PageID.6). However, nowhere in her complaint, or in her 

proposed amended complaint, does Harris ever allege that Stacey’s statements were 

false. While Harris appears to ask the Court to infer falsity based on the fact that 

the District Attorney declined to bring any charges based on the investigation, that 

decision could have been made for any number of reasons that have no bearing on the 

truthfulness of Stacey’s claims of theft by Harris (e.g., statute of limitations issues, 

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insufficiency or staleness of evidence uncovered, prosecutorial discretion).3 Because 

Harris’s well-pleaded facts in support of her Count IV claims “do not permit the court 

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, [her] complaint has alleged—

but it has not shown—that she is entitled to relief on her libel, slander, and 

defamation claims. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. See also Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 

605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Court held in Iqbal, as it had in Twombly, 

that courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint obvious 

alternative explanations, which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful 

conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” (quotation omitted)). For this 

reason, Count 4 is due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).4

C. Section 1981 & 1981a Claims

In Count 1, Harris alleges claims against all defendants under §§ 1981 and 

1981a, in addition to claims under § 1983. Section 1981a does not provide an 

independent cause of action, but rather was part of a 1991 amendment to Title VII 

specifying what kinds of damages are available for violations of that law. See King v. 

 3 Harris argues that an accusation of theft is defamation per se under Alabama law. 

See Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1091–92 (Ala. 1988) (“Spoken 

words that impute to the person of whom they are spoken the commission of an 

indictable criminal offense involving infamy or moral turpitude constitute slander 

actionable per se. An oral publication imputing a crime of larceny falls within this 

definition.” (citations omitted)). However, classifying defamation as per se simply 

means that the statement is “actionable without having to prove special harm[,]” id.

at 1091, and does not relieve a plaintiff of the burden of showing that the statement 

was false.

4 Accordingly, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to address Stacey’s additional 

argument that Harris has failed to sufficiently allege that he acted at least 

negligently in publishing any of the alleged defamatory statements.

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Fulton Cty., Ga., No. CIV.A. 1:08CV3729TWT, 2009 WL 1322341, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 

May 11, 2009) (“42 U.S.C. § 1981a was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and amends 

Title VII. West v. Boeing Co., 851 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D. Kan. 1994) (explaining the 

difference between § 1981 and § 1981a). Section 1981a authorizes the recovery of 

compensatory and punitive damages to remedy intentional employment 

discrimination, as an additional remedy to equitable relief provided under Title VII. 

Section 1981a is not a separate statutory violation. It merely provides additional 

remedies for violations of Title VII. Id.”). 

As for § 1981, the Eleventh Circuit has “held that § 1981 does not provide an 

implicit cause of action against state actors; therefore, § 1983 constitutes the 

exclusive federal remedy for violation by state actors of the rights guaranteed under 

§ 1981.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1288 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Butts v. 

County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894–95 (11th Cir. 2000)). As all defendants here are 

state actors, the undersigned must proceed against them solely under § 1983 rather 

than § 1981.

Accordingly, Harris’s §§ 1981 and 1981a claims are due to be dismissed under 

Rule 12(b)(6).

D. Respondeat Superior

MCC argues that the § 1983 claims against it in Counts 1 and 2 are due to be 

dismissed because Harris has failed to allege sufficient facts plausibly suggesting 

that she is attempting to establish MCC’s liability under any theory other than an 

impermissible respondeat superior theory. The undersigned agrees.

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The Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal liability 

under § 1983. A county's liability under § 1983 may not be based on the 

doctrine of respondeat superior. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 

109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A county is “liable 

under section 1983 only for acts for which [the county] is actually 

responsible.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1027 (11th Cir.2001) 

(en banc ). Indeed, a county is liable only when the county's “official policy” 

causes a constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018. 

Thus, [a plaintiff] must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused 

[his] injury.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.1998) 

(quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (citing Bd. of County

Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626

(1997)).

Grech v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). “A plaintiff, like 

[Harris], has two methods by which to establish a county's policy: identify either (1) 

an officially promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice of the 

county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county.” Id.

Harris, however, has failed to identify any policy supporting MCC’s liability 

under § 1983. Indeed, beyond the fact that MCC appointed the Board member 

defendants, Harris has failed to allege any facts, in either her operative complaint or 

her proposed amended complaint, indicating how MCC was involved in the events 

underlying her claims.5 Accordingly, Harris’s § 1983 claims against MCC in Counts 

1 and 2 are due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

 5 Harris claims she is not pursuing a “a respondent [sic] superior theory” against 

MCC, but then in the very next paragraph asserts that MCC should be liable for the 

actions of the Board because it “is appointed exclusively by the Monroe County 

Commission[,]” which is the epitome of respondeat superior liability. (Doc. 34-1, 

PageID.168-169). The sole district court opinion Harris cites in support of her 

contention that MCC can be sued solely based on the Board’s actions, Cobb v. 

Montgomery Library Board, 207 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ala. 1962), was issued over 

fifteen years before the United States Supreme Court made clear in Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that municipal liability under § 

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E. The Board’s Capacity to Be Sued

The Board claims that all claims against it are due to be dismissed because it 

is not an independent legal entity capable of being sued. The undersigned, however, 

is not persuaded. Alabama law provides that “[t]he county commissions of the 

counties of this state and municipalities, through their governing bodies, may 

establish and maintain or aid in establishing and maintaining free public libraries 

for the use of the citizens of the respective counties or municipalities[,]” Ala. Code § 

11-90-1, with “[t]he government and supervision of such libraries ... vested in a 

library board consisting of five members who shall be appointed by the county 

commission or the governing body of the municipality.” Ala. Code § 11-90-2. Such 

library boards “have full power and authority to: (1) Control the expenditure of all 

funds received or appropriated for such libraries; (2) Erect or rent buildings to cost 

not in excess of the funds available to it; (3) Purchase books and equipment; (4) 

Provide a system of library service to be made easily available to all citizens of the 

county or municipality through central library, branches, stations, book truck service, 

 

1983 could not be premised on respondeat superior. See also Pembaur v. City of 

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1986) (“The ‘official policy’ requirement was 

intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the 

municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for 

which the municipality is actually responsible. Monell reasoned that recovery from a 

municipality is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts ‘of the municipality’—

that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.”). Moreover, 

as MCC correctly points out, the court in Cobb ultimately found the defendant

Montgomery city commissioners could be liable for the actions of the library board 

they appointed because, the court found, all defendants were pursuing a 

discriminatory policy, custom or usage, which is consistent with what Monell requires 

to show municipal liability under § 1983.

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or other appropriate means; (5) Elect a librarian and other employees; and (6) Manage 

and control the said library...” Ala. Code § 11-90-3(a). These statutes strongly 

indicate that the Board has the capacity to be sued, and the Board fails to address 

them.6 Accordingly, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not warranted based on the 

Board’s assertion it lacks the capacity to be sued.

F. Title VII Employer

Title VII prohibits discriminatory behavior by “employers.” 40 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a). “Under Title VII, an ‘employer’ is defined as ‘a person engaged in an industry 

affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a 

person.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). A ‘person’ includes ‘individuals, governments, 

 6 The lone case the Board cites in support of its argument that it is not capable of 

being sued, Murdock v. Birmingham Jefferson City Transit Authority, No. 2:18-CV00808-KOB, 2018 WL 5923766 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 13, 2018), is unpersuasive for several 

reasons. First, that case concerned the Board of Directors of the Birmingham 

Jefferson County Transit Authority (BJCTA), not a library board organized under the 

aforementioned statutes. Second, Murdock found that “no law establishes the 

Board’s legal existence separate from BJCTA[,]” 2018 WL 5923766, at *3, but here 

the aforementioned Alabama statutes strongly suggest that Alabama library boards 

do have a separate legal existence from the governmental entities that appoint them. 

Third, while Murdock asserted that “numerous cases recognize that a board is not 

the appropriate entity to sue[,]” the court cited only two decisions in support of that 

statement, one of which, United States v. Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d 640 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(per curiam), reached the exact opposite conclusion. See Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d at 643 

(finding that the Board of Regents as the head of Florida’s university system, and not 

the University of Florida itself, was an entity “endowed with an independent 

corporate existence or the capacity to be sued in its own name”). The other case 

Murdock relied on, Kelley v. Troy State University, 923 F. Supp. 1494 (M.D. Ala. 

1996), found that the Board of Directors of Troy State University did not have the 

capacity to be sued, with “that status ... reserved for Troy State University itself[,]” 

but based this decision on an Alabama statute specific to Troy State University. See 

923 F. Supp. at 1499. As noted above, the statutes specific to Alabama library boards 

are strongly indicative of a capacity to be sued. See Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d at 643 (“The 

capacity to be sued is determined by state law.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b))).

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governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions....’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).” Peppers 

v. Cobb Cty., Ga., 835 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2016). MCC moves to dismiss the 

Title VII claims asserted against it in Count 3 because it was not Harris’s “employer.”

Harris submitted 2 charges of discrimination to the EEOC prior to filing this 

suit, both naming “Monroe County Public Library” as the discriminating entity. (See

Doc. 34-2, PageID.183-184, 186). In the right-to-sue letters issued on each of those 

charges, the EEOC represented that it was closing its file on the charge because the 

Monroe County Public Library “employs less than the required number of employees 

or is not otherwise covered by the statute.” (Id., PageID.182, 185). In her complaint, 

Harris asserts that MCC is her employer for purposes of Title VII. In her proposed 

amended complaint, however, Harris argues that the Board and MCC should be 

considered a single employer for purposes of Title VII.

Courts in this circuit “accord a liberal construction to the term ‘employer’ under 

Title VII. In keeping with this liberal construction, we sometimes look beyond the 

nominal independence of an entity and ask whether two or more ostensibly separate 

entities should be treated as a single, integrated enterprise when determining 

whether a plaintiff's ‘employer’ comes within the coverage of Title VII.” Lyes v. City 

of Riviera Beach, Fla., 166 F.3d 1332, 1341 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citations 

omitted).

[W]hen assessing whether multiple governmental entities are a single 

“employer” under Title VII, we begin with the presumption that 

governmental subdivisions denominated as separate and distinct under 

state law should not be aggregated for purposes of Title VII. That 

presumption may be rebutted by evidence establishing that a governmental 

entity was structured with the purpose of evading the reach of federal 

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employment discrimination law. Absent an evasive purpose, the 

presumption against aggregating separate public entities will control the 

inquiry, unless it is clearly outweighed by factors manifestly indicating that 

the public entities are so closely interrelated with respect to control of the 

fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that they should be 

counted together under Title VII.

Id. at 1345. “Useful ‘indicia of control’ may be drawn from the agency context, 

including: ‘ “the authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge; the 

authority to establish work schedules or direct work assignments; [and] the obligation 

to pay or the duty to train the charging party.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Oaks v. City of 

Fairhope, Ala., 515 F. Supp. 1004, 1035 (S.D. Ala. 1981) (quoting Barbara Schlei and 

Paul Grossmann, Employment Discrimination Law 846 (1st ed. 1976))).

As the Alabama statutes noted above in Section III(D) make clear, library 

boards are separate and distinct from the county commissions or municipal 

authorities that create them. They are vested with the “full power and authority to 

... [e]lect a librarian and other employees[,]” and to otherwise “manage and control” 

its libraries. Ala. Code § 11-90-3(a). While a county commission is charged with 

appointing the library board, see Ala. Code § 11-90-1, nothing in the statute indicates 

that a commission possesses any separate authority to review or otherwise control a

library board’s hiring, firing, and promotion decisions. Indeed, a county commission 

does not even possess the ability to hire and fire library board members at will, 

instead appointing them for fixed terms of office. See Ala. Code § 11-90-2. Based on 

the foregoing Alabama statutes, another judge of this district previously found that 

a library board should not be considered a joint employer with the municipality that 

appointed it. See Oaks, 515 F. Supp. at 1035-37. Moreover, as noted above in Section 

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III(C), Harris has failed to allege facts indicating that MCC had any direct 

involvement in any of the events underlying her causes of action. 

In sum, Harris has failed to plausibly show that MCC and the Board are so 

closely interrelated with respect to control of the fundamental aspects of Harris and 

the Board’s employment relationship that the presumption against aggregating those 

two entities for Title VII purposes is overcome.7 For this reason, the Title VII claims 

against MCC in Count 3 are due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).8

 7 Harris claims that, because she began working for the Monroe County library 

when it was still controlled by MCC and before the Board’s creation, “her Title VII 

protections should by grandfathered-in.” (Doc. 34-1, PageID.175). Harris fails to cite 

any authority or offer any substantive reasoning in support of this novel theory, and 

the undersigned is not persuaded, particularly given that a “Title VII workplace 

discrimination claim can only be brought by an employee against his employer[,]” 

which is the person or entity that “ ‘is in control of the fundamental aspects of the 

employment relationship that gave rise to the claim.’ ” Peppers, 835 F.3d at 1297 

(quoting Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1345). In short, Harris cannot hold a past employer liable 

for the actions of the employer that committed the discriminatory acts at issue. 

Harris also argues that the Court should infer MCC created the Board with 

evasive intent because it was created only seven months after the Oaks decision was 

issued. However, the relevant inquiry for evasive intent is whether the State of 

Alabama granted county commissions and municipalities the ability to create library 

boards for the purpose of evading Title VII. See Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1344 (“There are 

few things closer to the core of a state's political being and its sovereignty than the 

authority and right to define itself and its institutions in relation to each other. Of 

course, states cannot abuse that power to evade federal law, but it is unlikely that a 

state would structure its state and local entities with that purpose in mind ... [I]f it 

is established that a state's purpose in creating or maintaining nominally separate 

entities was to evade the reach of the federal employment discrimination laws, that 

alone is enough for those entities to be aggregated when counting employees.”). Here, 

MCC points out, and Harris agrees, that the last amendments to the statutes 

governing the creation and authority of library boards occurred in 1939, before Title 

VII was even enacted. Accordingly, Harris has failed to plausibly show evasive intent 

by the state.

8 In both of her pre-suit EEOC charges, Harris listed the Monroe County Public 

Library as the entity that discriminated against her, and did not otherwise mention 

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Moreover, because Harris appears to concede the EEOC’s findings that the 

Monroe County Public Library does not employ the requisite number of employees to 

be considered an “employer” subject to Title VII, her proposed amendment to her 

complaint adding the Board to her Count 3 Title VII claims should be denied as 

futile.9

 

MCC. (See Doc. 34-2, PageID.183-184, 186). MCC has argued that Harris’s Title VII 

claims against it are also due to be dismissed for failure to name MCC in her EEOC 

charges.

“Ordinarily, a party not named in the EEOC charge cannot be sued in a 

subsequent civil action. This naming requirement serves to notify the charged party 

of the allegations and allows the party an opportunity to participate in conciliation 

and voluntarily comply with the requirements of Title VII. However, courts liberally 

construe this requirement. Where the purposes of the Act are fulfilled, a party 

unnamed in the EEOC charge may be subjected to the jurisdiction of federal courts.” 

Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations 

omitted). “In order to determine whether the purposes of Title VII are met, courts do 

not apply a rigid test but instead look to several factors including: (1) the similarity 

of interest between the named party and the unnamed party; (2) whether the plaintiff 

could have ascertained the identity of the unnamed party at the time the EEOC 

charge was filed; (3) whether the unnamed parties received adequate notice of the 

charges; (4) whether the unnamed parties had an adequate opportunity to participate 

in the reconciliation process; and (5) whether the unnamed party actually was 

prejudiced by its exclusion from the EEOC proceedings. Other factors may be 

relevant depending on the specific facts of the case.” Id. at 1359 (citation omitted).

Neither party cites Virgo or its multi-factor analysis. Nevertheless, Harris at 

least puts forth some argument that touches on a Virgo factor, suggesting there may 

be sufficient similarity of interest between the Monroe County Public Library and 

MCC to excuse failing to name MCC in her EEOC charges. MCC, on the other hand, 

has not attempted, in either its initial brief or its reply, to argue relevant factors 

weighing against excusing the omission, instead taking the position that failure to 

name MCC is itself determinative. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that MCC has 

not sufficiently demonstrated in its present motion that dismissal of Count 3 under 

Rule 12(b)(6) would be warranted for this reason.

9 “The U.S. Supreme Court has held that ... futility [is an] adequate bas[i]s for 

denying leave to amend.” Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 

1999) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962)).

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G. Proposed ADEA Claims

Harris’s proposed amended complaint adds a fifth count raising claims of 

discrimination and retaliation against all defendants in violation of the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.10 Like 

Title VII, however, the ADEA’s prohibitions only apply to a plaintiff’s “employer.” See

29 U.S.C. § 623. For the same reasons as with Harris’s Title VII claims, Harris has 

failed to demonstrate that MCC should be considered her employer, either instead of 

or jointly with the Board. Moreover, because “there is no individual responsibility” 

under the ADEA, the Board members cannot be liable under the ADEA in their 

individual capacities. Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996). While 

the Board members can be sued under the ADEA in their official capacities, such 

claims would be redundant of those already asserted against the Board, since 

“[o]fficial-capacity suits ... generally represent only another way of pleading an action 

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 

165 (1985) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, because Harris’s proposed ADEA claims 

 

Harris argues that the Board could still be held liable under Title VII as an agent of 

MCC. However, because Harris has failed to demonstrate that MCC is his “employer” 

for Title VII purposes, the Board cannot be held liable under Title VII as an agent of 

MCC, since only an “agent” of an “employer” is subject to Title VII liability. See 42 

U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry 

affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each 

of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any 

agent of such a person...” (emphasis added)).

10 Both of Harris’s EEOC charges alleged violations of the ADEA as well as Title VII.

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would be futile against any defendant but the Board, she should be permitted to 

amend her complaint to add ADEA claims against the Board only.11

H. Repleading

The Board and the individual Defendants also press various arguments that 

Harris has failed to plausibly allege a valid § 1983 claim against them in either Count 

1 or 2. However, they have also argued that Count 2 is an impermissible shotgun 

pleading for which a more definite statement should be ordered under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(e). Upon consideration, the undersigned declines to consider,

for now, the defendants remaining arguments on the merits of Harris’s § 1983 claims, 

and instead finds that Harris should be made to replead her § 1983 claims to identify 

with specificity what causes of action she is raising under that statute.

Under Rule 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a 

pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Moreover, Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) provides: “A party must state its claims or defenses in 

 11 For purposes of the ADEA, the term “employer” generally “means a person engaged 

in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each 

working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 

calendar year...” 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(b). However, “[t]he term also means ... a State or 

political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a 

political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency, but such term does not 

include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the 

United States.” Id. The Supreme Court has held that § 630(b)’s “twenty or more 

employees” confining language “is tied to § 630(b)’s first sentence, and does not limit 

the ADEA’s governance of the employment practices of States and political 

subdivisions thereof.” Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 24 (2018). 

Accordingly, the Board appears to be an “employer” under the ADEA regardless of 

how many people it employs.

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numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of 

circumstances ... If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate 

transaction or occurrence ... must be stated in a separate count or defense.” 

Complaints that violate Rule 10(b) “are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun 

pleadings.’ ” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th 

Cir. 2015). See also id. at 1322 (noting that a type of shotgun pleading “is one that 

commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim 

for relief). Counts 1 of Harris’s current operative complaint alleges at least 3 different 

causes of action under § 1983, while Count 2 contains a catch-all provision asserting 

§ 1983 claims based on “the rights or privileges otherwise guaranteed to her by 

federal law” (Doc. 1, PageID.9), in effect alleging all conceivable causes of action 

under § 1983, regardless of whether the underlying facts support them. Harris’s 

proposed amended complaint suffers from the same defects, and even adds to the 

jumble by asserting both Equal Protection and Due Process claims in Count 2 (in 

addition to the same catch-all provision noted above). Such scattershot and openended pleading fails to adequately apprise the Defendants or the Court of what claims

Harris is asserting, and hampers the Defendants’ ability to prepare a response to 

those claims. Exacerbating this deficiency is the fact that, in both the operative and 

proposed amended complaint, Harris simply incorporates her statement of facts into 

each count of the complaint in full, without making clear which allegations are 

supposed to support which claims. Cf. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322 (noting that other 

examples of shotgun pleading are “a complaint containing multiple counts where each 

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count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, and one that is “replete with 

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular 

cause of action”).

Accordingly, Harris should be ordered to amend her complaint to set forth each 

cause of action she is asserting under § 1983 in a separate count, and to omit any sort 

of catch-all provision like the one noted above. In the interest of consistency, Harris 

should also be ordered to allege her claims for discrimination and retaliation under 

the ADEA in separate counts as well. For each separate count, Harris must identify 

with reasonable specificity the factual allegations that support the asserted claim. 

IV. Conclusion & Recommendations

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the undersigned RECOMMENDS 

the following:

1. that MCC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) be GRANTED as to all 

claims against it in this action;

2. that Stacey’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (Doc. 33) be GRANTED as to the 

libel, slander, and defamation claims in Count 4 of the complaint, and as to the 

§§ 1981 and 1981a claims in Count 1; DENIED as to his assertions of 

immunity under the Alabama Volunteer Service Act; and DENIED without 

prejudice as to his remaining arguments to allow Harris the opportunity to 

file an amended complaint;

3. that the Board, Powell, Pridgen, and Sanders’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

(Doc. 35) be GRANTED as to the §§ 1981 and 1981a claims in Count 1; 

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DENIED as to assertions of immunity under the Alabama Volunteer Service 

Act and the Board’s lack of capacity to be sued; and DENIED without 

prejudice as to their remaining arguments to allow Harris the opportunity to 

file an amended complaint;

4. that Harris be DENIED leave to amend her complaint to assert Title VII 

causes of action against the Board, and causes of action under the ADEA 

against any defendant but the Board;

5. that Harris be GRANTED leave to amend her complaint to assert the new 

factual allegations, the new ADEA claims against the Board, and the new 

causes of action under § 1983 against all defendants except MCC, set forth in 

her proposed amended complaint (Doc. 34-3);12 and

6. that, in filing her amended complaint, Harris be required to (1) set forth each 

distinct cause of action under § 1983 and the ADEA in a separate count, 

regardless of how many causes of action are asserted under the same statute 

(e.g., one count asserting racial discrimination under § 1983, one count 

asserting due process violations under § 1983, one count asserting 

discrimination under the ADEA, one count alleging retaliation under the 

ADEA), (2) omit “and/ or the rights or privileges otherwise guaranteed to her 

 12 In recommending that Harris be allowed to amend her complaint to assert these 

new claims, the undersigned is expressing no opinion as to whether those claims can

ultimately withstand a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings directed 

at the amended complaint. Rather, the undersigned simply concludes it is not readily 

apparent that permitting Harris to assert those claims would be entirely futile at this 

time.

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by federal law” and any similar catch-all provision purporting to assert claims 

not specifically stated in the amended complaint, and (3) identify with 

reasonable specificity the factual allegations underlying each separate cause 

of action.

DONE and ORDERED this the 22nd day of May 2020.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything 

in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file 

specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh 

Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was 

informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing 

to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on 

appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In 

order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation 

to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers 

to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

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