Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00662/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00662-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

In determining the filing date of a petition, pro se prisoners generally

are entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule,” which dictates that the

statutory filing date is the date a document was presented to prison

authorities for mailing to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276

(1988); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the

record does not reflect the date on which Petitioner presented his petition to

prison authorities, nor does it reflect the date on which he presented relevant

state-court filings while incarcerated. Because the presentation date is

unavailable, and to provide Petitioner the greatest benefit of the doubt, this

Court will use the filing date as the date on which the document was signed.

See Lopez v. Felker, 536 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1155 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (filing date

is date on which petition was signed). 

09cv662-BEN (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THADDEUS BOUDREAUX,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES WALKER, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Case No. 09cv0662-BEN (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Roger T. Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California.

On March 26, 20091, Petitioner Thaddeus Boudreaux, a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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currently before the Court. Doc. No. 1 (Petition). Petitioner

challenges the sentence imposed after his 1997 convictions for a variety

of crimes. Id. at 2. On September 23, 2009, Respondent filed a motion

to dismiss the petition on untimeliness grounds. Doc. No. 11-2 (Motion

to Dismiss).

This Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss, Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and

all other documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth

below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be

GRANTED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 8, 1997, in a retrial following the reversal of a prior

judgment, a San Diego jury convicted Petitioner of kidnaping with

personal use of a firearm in violation of California Penal Code (“Cal.

Penal Code”) §§207(a), 12022.5(a), attempted robbery with the personal

use of a firearm, Cal. Penal Code §§ 664, 211, 213(b), 12022.5(a),

assault with the personal use of a firearm, Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2)

kidnaping for sexual purposes with the personal use of a firearm, Cal.

Penal Code §§ 207, 208(d), 12022.5 (a), oral copulation while acting in

concert with the use of a firearm, having kidnaped the victim for the

purpose of committing a sexual offense, Cal. Penal Code §§ 288a(d),

12022.3(a), 667.8(a), forcible rape while acting in concert with the use

of a firearm, having kidnaped the victim for the purpose of committing

a sexual offense, Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2), 12022.3(a), 264.1,

667.8(a), two counts of forcible sodomy while acting in concert with the

use of a firearm, having kidnaped the victim for the purpose of

committing a sexual offense, Cal. Penal Code § 286(b), 12022.3(a),

667.8(a), forcible oral copulation with the use of a firearm, having

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kidnaped the victim for the purpose of committing a sexual offense, Cal.

Penal Code § 288a(c), 12022.3(a), 667.8(a), possessing a firearm after

having been convicted of a prior violent felony, Cal. Penal Code §

12021(a) and possessing a firearm as an ex-felon Cal. Penal Code §

12021(a). Lodg. 1 at 1-2. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

seventy-five years and eight months. Id. at 2. 

Petitioner appealed, and in an unpublished opinion filed May 25,

1999, the California Court of Appeal reduced Petitioner’s sentence by

nine years. Lodg. 1. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court, which the court denied on August 11, 1999.

Lodg. 2. Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari to

the United States Supreme Court. Doc. No. 1 at 3. 

On June 22, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court. Lodg. 3. The superior

court denied the petition on May 28, 2002, and again in a virtually

identical amended decision, issued June 19, 2002. Lodgs. 4 & 5.

More than five years later, on December 13, 2007, Petitioner filed

a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County

Superior Court, which was denied on February 22, 2008. Lodgs. 6 & 7.

On April 10, 2008, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state

appellate court, which the court denied on June 25, 2008. Lodgs. 8 & 9.

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on

August 5, 2008, which was denied on February 11, 2009. Lodgs. 10 & 11.

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on March 26, 2009. Doc.

No. 1.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2006).

DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed because

it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Doc. No. 11-2.

Petitioner asserts that he diligently attempted to obtain his court

transcripts and documents and that he did not learn of the factual

predicate of his claims until November 2007. Doc. No. 15-1 (Opposition

to Motion to Dismiss). Accordingly, Petitioner argues that either he is

entitled to an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations or his

petition is timely pursuant to subsection D of the AEDPA statute of

limitations. Id. at 6-9. 

A. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d) (West Supp. 2006). Section 2244(d)’s one-year limitations

period applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons in “custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Id. § 2244(d)(1). The oneyear limitations period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

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initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Here, the parties disagree as to which provision governs the

commencement of the limitations period. Because the limitations period

runs from the latest of the two dates (28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)), the Court

will address each provision separately.

B. Conclusion of Direct Review, 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A)

Subsection A provides that the statute of limitations begins to run

on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

first petition for review on direct appeal on August 11, 1999. Lodg. 2.

Petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court so the statute of limitations began to run ninety days

later on November 9, 1999. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th

Cir. 1999) (limitations period does not begin until after expiration of

ninety-day period for seeking certiorari). Absent tolling, the

limitations period expired one year later on November 9, 2000. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

petition until March 26, 2009, the petition is untimely unless

sufficiently tolled. 

1. Petitioner Is Entitled to Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino

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Here, Petitioner signed the habeas petition on June 22, 2000. Although it was

not filed in the California Superior Court until June 28, 2000, the mailbox rules

operates to make June 22, 2000 the constructive date of filing. Lopez, 536 F.Supp.2d

at 1155 n.1.

6 09cv662-BEN (BLM)

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute of

limitations is not tolled, however, “from the time a final decision is

issued on direct state appeal [to] the time the first state collateral

challenge is filed.” Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. Similarly, the

limitations period is not tolled after state post-conviction proceedings

are final and before federal habeas proceedings are initiated. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

In this case, the statute of limitations began to run on November

9, 1999. It was tolled when Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the

California Superior Court on June 22, 2000.2

 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2);

Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. Accordingly, 225 days of the limitations period

expired, leaving Petitioner with 140 days in which to timely file a

federal petition. But tolling merely pauses the clock; it does not

restart the limitations period. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the statutory clock began running again when

the San Diego County Superior Court issued its amended decision on June

19, 2002. To comply with the AEDPA statute of limitations, Petitioner

needed to file a federal petition on or before November 6, 2002. He did

not do so.

Instead, Petitioner waited until December 13, 2007, when he filed

a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County

Superior Court. There is no tolling for the period between sets of

state habeas petitions. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003)

(no tolling once California Supreme Court denied review; “[a]s of that

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 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether

§ 2244(d) allows for equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (assuming without deciding that equitable

tolling applies to the AEDPA’s limitations period).

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date, [Petitioner] ceased to have an application for post-conviction

review pending.”). Additionally, once the statute has run, a collateral

action cannot revive it. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.

2001). Accordingly, the instant petition, filed on March 26, 2009, is

untimely. 

2. Petitioner Fails to Show That Equitable Tolling Is Warranted

In the Ninth Circuit, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations

is subject to equitable tolling.3 See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051,

1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (confirming the Ninth Circuit holding that

§ 2244(d) allows for equitable tolling); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964,

970 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). While equitable tolling is “unavailable in

most cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), it is

appropriate where a habeas petitioner demonstrates two specific

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way,” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Petitioners face such a high bar

so as to effectuate the “AEDPA’s statutory purpose of encouraging prompt

filings in federal court in order to protect the federal system from

being forced to hear stale claims.” Guillory v. Rose, 329 F.3d 1015,

1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226

(2002)).

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because

“extraordinary circumstances beyond [his] control made it impossible to

file a petition on time.” Doc. No. 15-1 at 7. Petitioner explains that

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between April 12, 2002 and October 6, 2003, he attempted to obtain

court transcripts and documents from his attorney and between September

20, 2002 and March 22, 2004, he attempted to obtain the same documents

from the San Diego Superior Court. Id. at 8. He does not acknowledge

receiving correspondence from his lawyer but states that “[a]fter having

been told that [his] legal documents were contained in his CDC personal

property,” he attempted to obtain them, determined they were lost, and

challenged that loss via the inmate grievance process, in documents

allegedly submitted between May 16, 2002 and November 3, 2003. Id. at

8-9. Finally, Petitioner asserts that on December 18, 2004, he

solicited the assistance of another attorney in obtaining the documents.

Id. at 9. Petitioner alleges that all of his efforts were unsuccessful

and he was unable to obtain the requested documents. Id. at 8-9.

Petitioner’s claims, even if true, do not make his federal petition

timely.

Initially, even if the Court found that all of the time Petitioner

alleges he spent actively trying to obtain his legal documents (from

April 12, 2002 to December 18, 2004) was subject to equitable tolling,

Petitioner still missed the AEDPA deadline. As discussed above, 225

days expired before Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition so

only 140 days remained. If time was tolled until December 18, 2004,

Petitioner would have had to file his federal habeas petition by May 7,

2005. Petitioner did not file his next state habeas petition until

December 13, 2007 and his federal habeas petition until March 26, 2009.

Accordingly, even if Petitioner were entitled to equitable tolling, his

petition is untimely.

However, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. As noted

above, the equitable tolling analysis has both diligence and

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4

The evidence that Petitioner submits is not conclusive. Petitioner provides a

“Mail Card (CDC Form 119) Special Purpose Letters,” which purports to list the special

purpose letters that Petitioner mailed, and copies of several letters sent to or from

Petitioner regarding his efforts to obtain his court files. Doc. No. 15-2. However,

the Mail Card list does not appear to be comprehensive as it does not include at least

one of the letters sent by Petitioner. Id. at 2, 4 (list does not include 9/25/04

letter sent by Petitioner to Superior Court, which is depicted on page 4 of exhibit).

Similarly, the Mail Card list indicates that Petitioner received a letter from his

attorney on 9/25/03 but neither the exhibits nor Petitioner’s pleadings describe the

substance of this letter. Moreover, while the letters indicate that Petitioner is

asserting that he has not received his file from his lawyer, the letters do not explain

what response Petitioner’s lawyer provided. 

9 09cv662-BEN (BLM)

extraordinary circumstance components. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

Petitioner has not satisfied either component. 

While Petitioner presents some evidence4 that he repeatedly

attempted to obtain his court transcripts, he does not establish the

requisite level of diligence. Petitioner is challenging the

constitutionality of his custodial sentence, claiming that he illegally

received a greater sentence after his retrial. Doc. No. 1 at 8-12.

Petitioner does not allege that he was not present for the sentencing

and he fails to explain why he was unable to rely on his own knowledge

of what occurred at the sentencing hearing to file his petition in a

timely manner. Doc. No. 15-1. This does not establish diligence. See

Green v. Hornbreak, 312 Fed. Appx. 915, 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding

equitable tolling unwarranted based on lack of transcripts when diligent

petitioner was present at trial); Trudeau, v. Runnels, 2008 WL 544510

(E.D.Cal. Feb. 26, 2008) (stating that the need for transcripts was

obviated when Petitioner was present during trial as he was obviously

aware of the alleged errors that occurred); and United States v.

Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that "[s]urely due

diligence requires that [Petitioner] at least consult his own memory of

the trial proceedings”). Similarly, here, Petitioner knew that he had

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received an increased custodial sentence immediately upon his

resentencing.

Even if his conduct established the requisite showing of diligence,

Petitioner has failed to establish that the absence of his legal files

constituted an extraordinary circumstance preventing him from filing a

timely petition. See United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F.Supp. 1108, 1111

(C.D.Cal. 1997) (stating that habeas petitioner's lack of access to

trial transcripts is not an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting

equitable tolling). The Ninth Circuit has found that equitable tolling

may be warranted when a prisoner is unable to obtain his court

transcripts or access his legal files, however, this is true only where

the record shows that the lack of access actually prevented the prisoner

from seeking habeas relief. See Perez v. Hedgpeth, 2009 WL174145 at *4

(E.D.Cal. Jan. 23, 2009)(citing Battles, 362 F.3d. at 1198 and Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d. 918, 924-925 (9th Cir. 2005)). A prisoner must state

why the court transcripts are necessary for the preparation of a habeas

petition. See Van Poyck, 980 F.Supp. at 1111 (stating that without such

an explanation, a court cannot conclude that not having all of the

transcripts of proceedings related to a prisoner’s conviction and

sentence is an extraordinary circumstance). Here, Petitioner has not

explained how his failure to obtain court transcripts and other

documents prevented him from timely filing for federal habeas relief,

nor does he give concrete examples of the type of information he hoped

to obtain from the record. Moreover, Petitioner knew that he had

received the increased custodial sentence so he would be unable to make

such a showing. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable

tolling.

///

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5

While it is true that a judicial decision may serve as the starting point of the

AEDPA statute of limitations, this only applies where the United States Supreme Court

newly recognizes a federal constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)(limitations

period may begin when the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review). As

Pearce was decided in 1969, it does not constitute the required new law or right. 

11 09cv662-BEN (BLM)

C. Discovery of Factual Predicate, 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(D)

A fourth subsection of the AEDPA statute of limitations provides

for a later start of the limitations period in certain circumstances: 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall

run from the latest of the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(D). 

Petitioner argues that he diligently attempted to obtain his legal

documents but that he did not discover the legal authority establishing

the unconstitutionality of his sentence until November 3, 2007. Doc.

15-1 at 6-9. As discussed above, Petitioner asserts that he was

unsuccessful in obtaining court transcripts and legal documents, despite

repeated efforts. Id. Petitioner explains that on November 3, 2007, he

spoke with a prison law clerk who directed his attention to North

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), a case which according to

Petitioner, demonstrates the unconstitutional nature of his sentencing.

Id. Petitioner argues that this discovery, which could not have been

made earlier due to his inability to obtain his legal documents,

triggered a new statute of limitations period. Id. 

Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, belated knowledge of the

potential legal basis for a habeas petition does not constitute a new

“factual predicate” starting a new limitations period.5

 The “[t]ime

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begins when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discovery)

the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal

significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000)). In his

federal petition, Petitioner is challenging the increased sentence he

received after retrial. Doc. No. 1 at 8-9. Because the increased

sentence was known to Petitioner at the time of sentencing, there is no

new “fact” that would justify a new statute of limitations period under

section 2244(d)(1)(D). See, e.g., Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083

(9th Cir. 2005) (a new state court decision “arguably helpful to

petitioner’s claim does not constitute the ‘factual predicate’ for that

claim” justifying a new limitations period); Mathis v. Uribe, 2009 WL

3398791, *4-5 (S.D.Cal. October 20, 2009) (petitioner knew he was

sentenced to 15 years to life so section 2244(d)(1)(D) did not authorize

a new limitations period when he learned legal significance of

indeterminate life sentence); Lam v. Curry, 2010 WL 234892, *8-9

(N.D.Cal. January 14, 2010) (finding section 2244(d)(1)(D) inapplicable

to petitioner’s challenges to his plea agreement because he was knew the

terms of the agreement when he entered his guilty plea).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that section

2244(d)(1)(D) does not apply to the instant case and that section

2244(d)(1)(A) does. The Court further finds that the instant Petition

was filed after the statute of limitations expired and Petitioner has

not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling is

appropriate in this case. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the petitioner “bears the burden of

showing that equitable tolling is appropriate”). As a result, this

Court finds that the claims presented in the Petition are barred by the

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AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation; (2) granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss; and

(3) dismissing this action in its entirety with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 22, 2010 any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report

and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than March 15,

2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: February 1, 2010

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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