Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00526/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00526-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Oliver Michael Pryor,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-00526-TUC- BGM 

AMENDED ORDER 

(Amended as to first line only) 

 Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Oliver Michael Pryor’s pro se

First Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person 

in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (“First Amended Petition”) (Doc. 11). 

Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 17). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 21). The First Amended Petition is ripe for 

adjudication. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

The Arizona Court of Appeals stated the facts1

 as follows: 

 1

 As these state court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and Petitioner 

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 The victims, M. and K., were the granddaughters of Pryor’s wife, 

Gail. Gail often watched the girls for her daughter Michelle while Michelle 

worked. Gail also worked, and at times, Pryor took care of the girls when 

both Gail and Michelle were working. During the summer of 2004, when 

school was not in session, the girls would spend a few days each week at 

Pryor and Gail’s home, sleeping there some of the nights. Once school 

started in August, the girls would spend the night with Pryor and Gail if 

Michelle was on call at work and they could not stay with their father. 

Michelle testified that at one point during the summer, the girls no longer 

wanted to go to Gail’s home. Over Pryor’s objection, Michelle testified 

that in February 2006, the children had told her Pryor had touched them 

without their clothes on. The girls had told two of their cousins what had 

happened, and the cousins urged the girls to tell their mother. Michelle 

called the Pima County Sheriff’s office, and Tucson Police Department 

Detective Katherine Kragnes subsequently responded. The girls were 

interviewed by a person qualified to conduct a forensic interview of 

children. 

 K. testified she had been eight or nine years old when the detective 

had interviewed her. She stated her grandpa more than once had put his 

mouth on her vagina. A drawing she had provided police was admitted as 

an exhibit; she explained the drawing depicted M. and Pryor in bed and 

showed his penis, which she explained had some “[l]ittle hairs.” She also 

admitted telling the detective Pryor had “rubb[ed]” her “butt” with his 

hand. She recalled telling the detective about one incident in which Pryor 

had kissed her and her sister “in the wrong places” and about how she had 

seen “white stuff c[o]me out” of his penis. She admitted telling the 

prosecutor and defense counsel during an interview that “white stuff . . . 

went in [her] mouth sometimes.” She also testified she and her sister had 

seen a videotape at Pryor’s house that showed a man putting his mouth on 

and rubbing a girl’s private parts and a woman putting her mouth on a 

man’s private parts. 

 M. testified about a number of incidents during which Pryor had 

touched her on her “chest, . . . bottom, . . . [and] private area.” She 

described how Pryor squeezed her breasts under her clothes and how, on 

many occasions, he had gone into the room where she and her sister K. 

were sleeping and told her to lick his penis. He also made her “[p]ut [her] 

 

has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the findings are erroneous, the Court 

hereby adopts these factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 

465, 473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007); Wainwright v. Witt, 469, U.S. 412, 

426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519, 102 S.Ct. 

1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). 

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mouth around it.” She and K. licked his penis and “white stuff” came out. 

He also twice touched her inside her private parts with his hand. She 

described a game in which she and K. would take turns to see who could 

make him “happy fastest,” which she said meant ejaculate. Pryor once paid 

K. $20 for making him happy fastest. 

 Michelle’s husband Jeff, the children’s stepfather, confronted Pryor 

at Gail’s house after the children told Michelle what had been happening. 

Pryor denied molesting them. Detective Kragnes confronted Pryor and 

asked him if he would talk to her. She met with him and took a statement 

from him, which she recorded. 

Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Ct. of Appeals Mem. Decision (Exh. “G”) at ¶¶ 2–5 (alterations 

in original). 

Petitioner was charged with two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child, 

dangerous crimes against children, and two counts of furnishing obscene or harmful 

items to minors. Id., Exh. “G” at ¶ 1. On September 15, 2008, a jury found Petitioner 

guilty of all counts. Id., Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Minute Entry 9/15/2008 (Exh. 

“A”) at 1–2. On October 23, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of 

twenty (20) years imprisonment for each count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, to 

run consecutively. Id., Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Order 10/23/2008 (Exh. “B”) at 

2–3. Petitioner was also sentenced to the presumptive term of 2.5 years for each count of 

furnishing harmful items to a minor, to run concurrently with each other, but 

consecutively from the second twenty (20) year term. Id., Exh. “B” at 3–4. 

A. Direct Appeal 

 On October 23, 2008, Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal. Answer (Doc. 17), 

Notice of Appeal 10/23/2008 (Exh. “C”). On April 7, 2009, Petitioner filed his Opening 

Brief. Id., Appellant’s Opening Br. 4/7/2009 (Exh. “D”). Petitioner alleged three (3) 

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claims for relief, including that (1) the trial court “abused its discretion in denying the 

motion in limine to preclude evidence of Appellant’s arrest in Mexico[,] [and] giving a 

flight instruction unsupported by the facts[;]” (2) the trial court “erred in denying 

[Appellant’s] Rule 20 motion challenging that the state had not proved continuous sexual 

abuse per statute in counts one and two[;]” and (3) the trial court erred in “admit[ting] the 

testimony of Michelle Wright regarding what the girls told her, it being inadmissible 

hearsay and not within any proper exception[.]” Id., Exh. “D” at 25–39. 

 On October 21, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions. See Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 10/21/2009 (Exh. 

“G”). In assessing Petitioner’s claim regarding the trial court’s admission of evidence 

regarding Petitioner’s move to Mexico prior to being charged, the court of appeals 

recognized that “[t]he mere fact that Pryor had an explanation for why he left the country 

did not render the evidence irrelevant.” Id., Exh. “G” at 7. Relying on Arizona state case 

law and procedural rules, the court of appeals determined that the “alternative 

explanation for flight goes to weight not admissibility of evidence and does not preclude 

instruction.” Id. (citing State v. Hunter, 136 Ariz. 45, 49, 664 P.2d 195, 199 (Ariz. 

1983)). Again relying on state case law, the court of appeals further found that the 

evidence was not unduly prejudicial. Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “G” at 8. As such, the 

court of appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id., Exh. “G” at 7–

8. 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals also rejected Petitioner’s contention “that the trial 

court erred when it instructed the jury it could infer guilt from evidence of flight.” Id., 

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Exh. “G” at 8. The court of appeals noted that although Petitioner objected to the 

evidence of flight, he did not expressly object to the instruction. Id., Exh. “G” at 9. As 

such, Petitioner’s only ground for relief in the appellate court was one for fundamental 

error. Id. (citing State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, ¶ 51, 207 P.3d 604, 617 (Ariz. 2009)). 

Again relying on state law, the court of appeals went on to hold that in light of the 

evidence, the jury had been properly instructed, and even if the instruction were 

fundamental error, Petitioner had not met his burden of establishing prejudice. Id., Exh. 

“G” at 9–10. 

 Regarding Petitioner’s Rule 20 motion, the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized 

that “[a] Rule 20 motion should only be granted if there is no substantial evidence to 

support the conviction.” Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “G” at 10 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

20(a)). The court defined “substantial evidence” as “more than a mere scintilla and is 

such proof that ‘reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id., Exh. “G” at 10–11 

(quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67, 796 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. 1990)). Upon 

review of the evidence presented at trial, the court of appeals held that “reasonable jurors 

readily could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pryor had engaged in at least three 

sexual acts with the victims for a period of three months or longer[,]” and as such the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s Rule 20 motion. Id., Exh. “G” at 

11–12. 

 Concerning Petitioner’s contention that “the trial court erred in admitting the 

statements the victims had made to their mother over his [hearsay] objection[,]” the court 

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of appeals held that “[t]o the extent the testimony . . . was presented for the truth of the 

matter asserted it was cumulative.” Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “G” at 12–13. The court 

further held that “[a]ny error in its admission was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id., Exh. “G” at 13 (citing State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 19, 926 P.2d 468, 486 

(Ariz. 1996); State v. Eastlack, 180 Ariz. 243, 256–57, 883 P.2d 999, 1012–13 (Ariz. 

1994)). 

 Petitioner did not seek review of this decision with the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Ct. App. Mandate 12/2/2009 (Exh. “H”); Petition (Doc. 1) at 3. 

B. Initial Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On February 3, 2010, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(“PCR”). Answer (Doc. 17), Not. of PCR 2/3/2010 (Exh. “I”). On September 10, 2010, 

Petitioner filed his Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Answer (Doc. 17), Pet. for PCR 

(Exh. “L”). Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to 

challenge the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes based on gender.” Id., Exh. “L” at 5. 

In furtherance of this argument, Petitioner alleged that trial counsel’s failure to challenge 

the prosecution’s peremptory challenges “fell below prevailing norms” and that Petitioner 

was prejudiced by the “structural error” resulting from the alleged deprivation of having 

an impartial jury decide his case. Id., Exh. “L” at 9. 

 On November 3, 2010, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR petition. See

Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “O.” The trial court recognized that “[t]o state a colorable claim 

for ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must satisfy a two-part test: (1) a 

petitioner must show that his or her counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

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standard of reasonableness; and (2) a petitioner must show that the deficient performance 

resulted in actual prejudice to his case.” Id., Exh. “O” at 1–2 (citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The Rule 32 court found that it need not decide 

whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a Batson challenge, because the 

Petitioner had “failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that his case was in fact 

prejudiced.” Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “O” at 2. The Rule 32 court noted that “a 

defendant is not constitutionally entitled to [a] balanced jury, nor a jury comprised of the 

same proportions of genders as exist in the community generally.” Id., Exh. “O” at 2 

(citing State v. Williams, 111 Ariz. 175, 178, (Ariz. 1976)). The Rule 32 court further 

noted that “[a]n examination of the jury roster . . . reveal[ed] that of the fifty-four jurors 

questioned in voir dire, only nineteen were men[,] [and] [o]f these, eleven were struck for 

cause.” Id., Exh. “O” at 2. The Rule 32 court held that “nothing about this factual 

scenario indicates that the prosecutor intentionally used her strikes to remove men from 

the panel[,] . . . [and] Petitioner has offered no evidence that his conviction was, in fact, 

the result of gender bias.” Id., Exh. “O” at 2. As such, the Rule 32 court determined that 

“Petitioner ha[d] failed to show that he was actually prejudiced in this case, and thus 

ha[d] failed to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test[,]” and denied relief Id., 

Exh. “O” at 2. 

 On December 27, 2010, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review from Denial of 

Rule 32 Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See 

Answer (Doc. 17), Pet. for Review from Denial of Rule 32 Pet. For PCR 12/27/2010 

(Exh. “Q”). On April 7, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied 

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relief. Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 4/7/2011 (Exh. “R”). The court 

of appeals considered Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to an 

alleged failure “to raise a claim based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), that the 

state had improperly used its peremptory strikes to remove several male jurors.” Id., Exh. 

“R” at 2. The court of appeals found that “[e]ven assuming . . . that Pryor ha[d] 

demonstrated his counsel should have raised a Batson challenge, that alone is not 

sufficient to show prejudice.” Id., Exh. “R” at 3. The court of appeals stated that 

Petitioner must also “show a reasonable probability a Batson challenge would have 

resulted in a different jury[.]” Id., Exh. “R” at 3 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

The court of appeals held Petitioner failed to make “a colorable showing of such a 

probability.” Id., Exh. “R” at 3. 

 On April 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was 

summarily denied eight (8) days later. See Answer (Doc. 17), Pet.’s Mot. for Recon. 

(Exh. “S”) & Ariz. Ct. of Appeals Order 4/19/2011 (Exh. “T”). On April 21, 2011, 

Petitioner sought review of the denial of his PCR petition by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

See Answer (Doc. 17), Pet. for Review to Ariz. Supreme Ct. 4/19/2011 (Exh. “U”). On 

September 27, 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment. 

Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Supreme Ct. ME 9/27/2011 (Exh. “V”). 

C. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On October 27, 2011, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. See 

Answer (Doc. 17), Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Exh. “W”). Petitioner argues that 

“[b]ecause Arizona law prohibits raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims within a 

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direct appeal, to deprive Pryor of effective counsel in a Post-Conviction Proceeding . . . 

[violates] Article 2 § 24 of the Arizona Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution.” Answer (Doc. 17), Def.’s (Subsequent) Petition for PCR 

10/27/2011 (Exh. “X”) at 5. Petitioner further argued that “[b]oth Appellate [c]ounsel 

and Post-Conviction counsel were ineffective for failing to previously present th[e] issue 

[of Petitioner’s competency] to the [c]ourt for consideration.” Id., Exh. “X” at 5. 

Petitioner argues that his sleep deprivation due to sleep apnea was such that a 

competency hearing was required to assess whether he could “knowingly and 

intelligently” reject a plea, stand trial. Id., Exh. “X” at 5–8. Petitioner further asserts that 

this failure violated his Due Process rights. Id., Exh. “X” at 8. 

 On May 17, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner second PCR petition. See 

Answer (Doc. 17), In Chambers Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 5/17/2012 (Exh. “AA”). The 

trial court analyzed whether Petitioner’s claim regarding his alleged incompetency 

because he was not permitted to use his Continuous Positive Air Pressure (“CPAP”) 

machine while incarcerated at the Pima County Jail could be raised under Rule 32.2, 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. “AA” at 2. The trial court observed that 

“Petitioner’s claim that he was not competent does not fall under any of the exceptions 

listed in Rule 32.2(b)[,] . . . [and] could have been raised on direct appeal[.]” Id., Exh. 

“AA” at 2. The trial court further noted that although Petitioner outlined this claim to the 

court of appeals, it was not properly presented for review. Id., Exh. “AA” at 2–3. The 

trial court found that “Petitioner’s failure to fully raise the issue on direct appeal 

constitutes a waiver, and Rule 32.2(a) precludes Petitioner from raising the issue in this 

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subsequent Petitioner for Post Conviction Relief.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 3. 

 In analyzing Petitioner’s claim regarding allegedly ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel, the trial court again looked to the state procedural rules. Answer (Doc. 

17), Exh. “AA” at 3. The trial court found that “Petitioner’s argument . . . [did] not fall 

under any of the exceptions listed in Rule 32.2(b)[, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure] 

. . . [and] Petitioner could have argued that he received ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel in his first Petition for Post Conviction Relief.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 3. As such, 

the trial court deemed Petitioner’s claim regarding ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel waived, and precluded from review. Id., Exh. “AA” at 3. 

 Concerning Petitioner’s allegation that he received ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel due to the latter’s failure to argue ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the 

trial court held that this claim was without merit. Id., Exh. “AA” at 3. Relying on 

Arizona state law, the court recognized that “non-pleading defendants have no right to 

effective PCR counsel.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 3. 

 On May 30, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing of the Court’s May 16th 

[sic], 2012 Order, which was denied without comment on June 7, 2012. Answer (Doc. 

17), Mot. for Rehr’g of the Court’s May 16th [sic], 2012 Order (Exh. “BB”) & Ariz. 

Superior Ct. Order 6/7/2012 (Exh. “CC”). Subsequently, on June 27, 2012, Petitioner 

filed a pro se Petition for Review. Answer (Doc. 17), Pet. For Review (Exh. “DD”). 

Relying on Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), Petitioner argued that the trial court 

erred (1) by holding that the “Petitioner was not entitled to effective assistance of counsel 

in his first Rule 32 Petition[;]” and (2) “by failing to address the issues of competency 

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when it relied on State case law for ‘preclusion[.]’” Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “DD” at 4. 

Petitioner further asserted that “under new federal law, Arizona defendants, who go to 

trial, are now constitutionally guaranteed the 6th Amendment right to effective counsel in 

a collateral proceeding, attacking the ineffectiveness of all previous counsel.” Id., Exh. 

“DD” at 5. Additionally, Petitioner framed the issue of competency as whether he “was 

coherent and competent enough to weight those very benefits and consequences [of a 

plea agreement], and make a knowing and intelligent refusal of that plea agreement.” Id., 

Exh. “DD” at 7. Petitioner asserts that his sleep deprivation made him incompetent, and 

that the trial courts denial of a competency hearing deprived him of his right to a fair trial, 

as did his prior counsel’s failure to raise the issue for review. Id., Exh. “DD” at 8–9. 

 On October 12, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied 

relief. See Answer (Doc. 17) Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 10/12/2012 (Exh. “EE”). As 

an initial matter, the court of appeals corrected Petitioner’s misapprehension of the 

Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Martinez, recognizing that “the Court did 

not ground its decision in a constitutional right, instead determining that defendants had 

an ‘equitable’ right to the effective assistance of initial post-conviction counsel and 

limited [this] decision to the application of procedural default in federal habeas review.” 

Id., Exh. “EE” at 3 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. at 1319–20). The 

court of appeals held that nothing in Martinez altered Arizona law that “a claim that Rule 

32 counsel was ineffective is not a cognizable ground for relief in a subsequent Rule 32 

proceeding.” Id., Exh. “EE” at 3–4. As such, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief. 

Id., Exh. “EE” at 4.

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 Petitioner did not seek review with the Arizona Supreme Court. First Amended 

Petition (Doc. 11) at 5. 

D. The Instant Habeas Proceeding 

 On December 11, 2012, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death 

Penalty) (Doc. 11). Petitioner claims five (5) grounds for relief. First, Petitioner alleges 

the trial court erred by denying his “motion in limine to preclude evidence of his arrest in 

Mexico and giving a flight instruction unsupported by the facts creating prejudice 

outweighing any probative value to the State,” thereby denying Petitioner a fair trial in 

violation of the Due Process Clause and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

First Amended Petition (Doc. 11) at 6. Second, Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred 

in denying his “Rule 20 Motion,” in which he argued that the “State failed to prove all the 

necessary elements required to find the Defendant guilty of continuous sexual abuse in 

counts one and two[.]” Id. at 7. Petitioner further alleges that “[t]here [was] no 

testimony to tell when the 90 day period started or ended[,] . . . [and] without the required 

testimony, it is impossible to convict the Defendant ‘beyond a reasonable doubt[.]’” Id. 

Third, Petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it admitted “the testimony of 

Michelle Wright (complainant’s [sic] mother) regarding what [M. and K.] (complainants) 

told her, being it was inadmissible hearsay and not within any proper exception.” Id. at 8. 

Petitioner asserts that this violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment. Id. Fourth, Petitioner asserts that “trial counsel render[ed] ineffective 

assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the Prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes 

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against jurors, based on gender[.]” First Amended Petition (Doc. 11) at 9. Fifth, 

Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based upon “appellate and first Rule 

32 counsels’ failure to challenge defendant’s conviction based on defendant’s 

competency, due to sleep deprivation[.]” Id. at 10. On April 1, 2013, Respondents filed 

their Answer (Doc. 17), and on May 8, 2013, Petitioner filed his Reply (Doc. 21). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. In General

 The federal courts shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus 

by a person in state custody: 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 

179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal 

habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Ultimately, “[t]he statute’s design is to ‘further the principles of 

comity, finality, and federalism.’” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S.Ct. 

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2842, 2854, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 

123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meet 

and highly deferential “for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 

1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims 

have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 

L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must 

“presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this 

presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider whether the state court’s 

determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Id., 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. at 

1939; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). Such a determination is 

unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal principles 

delineated by the Supreme Court, but when the court applies the principles to the facts 

before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 

770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 

L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“AEDPA requires ‘a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 

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being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 10 (quoting 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103, 131 S.Ct. at 786–87) (alterations in original). 

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

 Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must 

exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 

“provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims 

to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). As such, the 

exhaustion doctrine gives the State “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged 

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 

1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he 

exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts’ role in the 

enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Rose, 

455 U.S. at 518, 102 S.Ct. at 1203 (internal citations omitted). This upholds the doctrine 

of comity which “teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its 

jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already 

cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Id. (quoting 

Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950)). 

 Section 2254(c) provides that claims “shall not be deemed . . . exhausted” so long 

as the applicant “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 

procedure the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has 

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been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The fair 

presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the 

presence of a federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim “federal” or expecting 

the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition is insufficient. Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting 

petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the 

state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal 

law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the 

federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because 

petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Furthermore, in order to 

“fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court.” 

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the 

exhaustion requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct 

appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire judicial postconviction process 

available in the state.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (9th ed. 

1998)). 

 In Arizona, however, for non-capital cases “review need not be sought before the 

Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 

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2007); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Additionally, the 

Supreme Court has further interpreted § 2254(c) to recognize that once the state courts 

have ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for an applicant to seek collateral relief for 

the same issues already decided upon direct review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 

350, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). 

C. Procedural Default 

 “A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the 

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ 

to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 

650 (1991). Moreover, federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided 

by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent 

of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id., 501 U.S. at 728, 111 

S.Ct. at 2254. This is true whether the state law basis is substantive or procedural. Id.

(citations omitted). Such claims are considered procedurally barred from review. See 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the difference between exhaustion 

and procedural default as follows: 

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been 

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that 

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In 

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim 

applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, 

but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that 

the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to 

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exhaust a federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. See 

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002); Beaty v. Stewart, 

303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if 

the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.’”) 

(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a prisoner’s habeas 

petition may be precluded from federal review due to procedural default in two ways. 

First, where the petitioner presented his claims to the state court, which denied relief 

based on independent and adequate state grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2254. Federal courts are prohibited from review in such cases because they have “no 

power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, 

resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the 

judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Id. Second, where a “petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n.1 (citations omitted). Thus, the 

federal court “must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently 

available state remedy.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621 n.6 (quoting Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). 

 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

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103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice); see 

also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) 

(recognizing “that a federal habeas court must evaluate appellate defaults under the same 

standards that apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial.”). “[T]he 

existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner 

can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to 

comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 

S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner 

must show actual prejudice, meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . 

created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 

477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. at 2648 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 

Without a showing of both cause and prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome the 

procedural default and gain review by the federal courts. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2649. 

 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that “the cause and prejudice 

standard will be met in those cases where review of a state prisoner’s claim is necessary 

to correct ‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 

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S.Ct. 1558, 1572–73, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice 

exception is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with 

a colorable showing of factual innocence.’” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 

S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. 

Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986)). Thus, “‘actual 

innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a 

habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered 

on the merits.” Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. at 862. Further, in order to 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must “establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). 

 In Arizona, a petitioner’s claim may be procedurally defaulted where he has 

waived his right to present his claim to the state court “at trial, on appeal or in any 

previous collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). “if an asserted claim is of 

sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant ‘knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently’ waived the claim.” Id., 2002 cmt. Neither Rule 32.2. nor 

the Arizona Supreme Court has defined claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” 

requiring personal knowledge before waiver. See id.; see also Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 

446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that this 

assessment “often involves a fact-intensive inquiry” and the “Arizona state courts are 

better suited to make these determinations.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622. 

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III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

 As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner’s petition is 

barred by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 

2002). The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to 

applications for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period shall run from the 

latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “The time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of Pryor’s petition. The Court has 

independently reviewed the record and finds that the First Amended Petition (Doc. 11) is 

timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

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IV. ANALYSIS 

A. Ground One: Defendant’s Move to Mexico and Flight Instruction 

 Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine “to 

preclude evidence of Petitioner’s arrest in Mexico and [by] giving a flight instruction 

unsupported by the facts[,] [thereby] creating prejudice outweighing any probative value 

to the State, [and] denying the defendant a fair trial[.]” First Amended Petition (Doc. 11) 

at 6. Petitioner argues that this error resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights to 

due process and a fair trial. Id. Respondents assert that “Petitioner did not ‘fairly 

present’ this claim to the state courts.” Answer (Doc. 17) at 9. Respondents point out 

that Petitioner’s pretrial motion argued “the evidence was irrelevant and unduly 

prejudicial, and thus inadmissible pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Evidence[,] . . . [and] 

Petitioner did not object at trial to the trial court’s giving the jury a flight instruction.” 

Id.; see also Answer (Doc. 17), Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. “D”) at 26–30; Trial Tr. 

9/9/2008 (Doc. 18-2) 95:23–102:17; Trial Tr. 9/12/2008 (Doc. 18-7) 13:20–21:7. 

Additionally, Respondents argue that Petitioner made only a passing reference to an 

alleged violation of his fair trial right in his reply brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

and as such the argument was waived. Answer (Doc. 17) at 9 (citing State v. Ruggiero, 

211 Ariz. 262, 267 n. 2, 120 P.3d 690, 695 (Ct. App. 2005)). 

 The Court agrees with Respondents and finds that Petitioner did not “fairly 

present” these claims to the Arizona state courts. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 

124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his 

claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not 

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indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was 

not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 

petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner 

presented claim in state court only on state grounds). “Fair presentation” requires 

alerting “each appropriate state court” to the presence of a federal claim, which Petitioner 

failed to do. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. As such, the claim is 

unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 

1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state 

remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in 

order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally 

barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the 

federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause 

and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 

1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate 

proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and 

prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, 

but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations 

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omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as 

such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). As such, 

Petitioner’s habeas claim must fail. 

B. Ground Two: Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 

 Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of 

acquittal based upon the State’s alleged failure “to prove all the necessary elements 

required to find the defendant guilty of continuous sexual abuse in counts one and two.” 

First Amended Petition (Doc. 11) at 7. Petitioner argues that this error resulted in a 

violation of his Due Process rights under the United States Constitution. Id. 

Respondents assert that “Petitioner did not ‘fairly present’ this claim to the state courts[,] 

[because] Petitioner’s motion at trial was based on Arizona’s Rule 20.” Answer (Doc. 

17) at 11. 

 The Court agrees with Respondents and finds that Petitioner did not “fairly 

present” these claims to the Arizona state courts. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 

124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his 

claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not 

indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was 

not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 

petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner 

presented claim in state court only on state grounds). As such, the claim is unexhausted, 

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and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 

541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly 

present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . 

[and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). As such, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

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C. Ground Three: Admission of Hearsay 

 Petitioner alleges that admitting hearsay testimony of Michelle Wright violated his 

rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment. First Amended 

Petition (Doc. 11) at 8. Respondents assert that “Petitioner did not ‘fairly present’ this 

claim to the state courts[,] [because] Petitioner objected to this testimony at trial on the 

ground it was hearsay . . . citing the Arizona Rules of Evidence.” Answer (Doc. 17) at 

11–12. Respondents further note that in his opening appellate brief and in reply, 

Petitioner only made passing reference to a denial of a “fair trial.” Id. at 12. 

 The Court agrees with Respondents and finds that Petitioner did not “fairly 

present” these claims to the Arizona state courts. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 

124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his 

claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not 

indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was 

not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 

petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner 

presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” 

or making a passing reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair 

presentment.” See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 115 S.Ct. 887, 888, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (“If state 

courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal 

rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under 

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the United States Constitution”). As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be 

precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 

S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the 

prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is 

procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the 

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a 

habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are 

prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual 

prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

 . . . 

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D. Grounds Four and Five: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 For cases which have been fairly presented to the State court, the Supreme Court 

elucidated a two part test for determining whether a defendant could prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to overturn his conviction. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, Petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. “This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, Petitioner 

must show that this performance prejudiced his defense. Id. Prejudice “requires showing 

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose 

result is reliable.” Id. Ultimately, whether or not counsel’s performance was effective 

hinges on its reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; see also State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 771 P.2d 1382 (1989) 

(adopting Strickland two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). The Sixth 

Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance is not meant to “improve the quality of 

legal representation,” rather it is to ensure the fairness of trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. “Thus, ‘[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 

must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 at 686) (emphasis and alteration in original). 

 “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ . 

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. . and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so[.]” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 105, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citations omitted). 

Judging counsel’s performance must be made without the influence of hindsight. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. As such, “the defendant must overcome 

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 

considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 

S.Ct. 158, 164, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). Without the requisite showing of either “deficient 

performance” or “sufficient prejudice,” Petitioner cannot prevail on his ineffectiveness 

claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. “[T]he question is not whether 

counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 

F.3d 884, 899 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S.Ct. at 788) 

(alterations in original). “The challenger’s burden is to show ‘that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In the instant case, the Rule 32 court properly stated 

the Strickland rule, and this ruling was adopted by the Arizona Court of Appeals. In 

Chambers Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 8/4/2010 (Doc. 1-4) at 4; Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. 

Decision 2/8/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 36; see also Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E.” Accordingly, 

this Court must determine whether the State courts’ conclusions were an unreasonable 

application thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 . . . 

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1. Ground Four: Failure to make a Batson challenge 

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective “by failing to challenge the 

prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes against jurors, based on gender . . . in violation of 

the 6th Amendment . . . and 14th Amendment . . . of the United States Constitution[.]” 

Petition (Doc. 11) at 9. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he [court of appeal’s] decision erred by 

requiring the Defendant to prove all three prongs of Batson without the benefit of an 

evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 9A. 

a. State Court Decisions 

The Rule 32 court stated that “[t]o state a colorable claim for ineffective assistance 

of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy a two-part test: (1) a petitioner must show that his or 

her counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and, (2) a 

petitioner must show that the deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice to his 

case.” Answer (Doc. 17), In Chambers Ruling: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

11/3/2010 (Exh. “O”) at 1–2 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 

The court found that Petitioner “failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that his case 

was in fact prejudiced.” Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “O” at 2. The Rule 32 court noted that: 

[O]f the fifty-four jurors questioned in voir dire, only nineteen were men. 

Of these, eleven were struck for cause. Given the composition of this jury 

pool, it is extremely likely that the empaneled jury would consist of more 

women than men. Indeed, the final jury included only three men, one of 

whom was the foreperson. 

Id., Exh. “O” at 2. The Rule 32 court went on to indicate that the prosecutor used one of 

her strikes to remove a woman. The court also found that a previous Batson challenge 

made against the same prosecutor failed, because the strikes were gender-neutral. Id., 

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Exh. “O” at 2. Based on these facts, the Rule 32 court denied post-conviction relief 

finding that “Petitioner ha[d] failed to state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel[.]” Id., Exh. “O” at 2. 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. See Answer 

(Doc. 17), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 4/7/2011 (Exh. “R”). The appellate court 

recognized that “[e]ven assuming, without deciding that Pryor ha[d] demonstrated his 

counsel should have raised a Batson challenge, that alone is not sufficient to show 

prejudice. He also must show a reasonable probability a Batson challenge would have 

resulted in a different jury.” Id., Exh. “R” at 3 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24 & 100). Relying on the same facts as those found by the 

Rule 32 court, the court of appeals found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion 

in finding that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate a colorable claim of prejudice. 

b. Batson Challenge 

 “Because we are evaluating the likelihood of success of [Petitioner’s] hypothetical 

[Batson] objection in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, he has the burden to 

show under Strickland a reasonable probability he would have prevailed on a [Batson] 

claim.” Carrera v. Ayers, 699 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (assessing prisoner’s 

habeas claim for ineffective assistance of counsel for an alleged failure to make a 

Wheeler objection – the California equivalent of a Batson challenge). Batson requires 

that (1) a defendant must “make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by 

showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 

purpose[;]” (2) once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the 

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State to explain adequately the racial exclusion . . . [by] demonstrat[ing] that ‘permissible 

racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic 

result[;]’” and (3) “the trial court must undertake a ‘factual inquiry’ that ‘takes into 

account all possible explanatory factors’ to determine if the defendant proved purposeful 

racial discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–95, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1721–22, 

90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (citations omitted). This analysis also applies to challenges of 

peremptory strikes based upon gender. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 

1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (extending Batson to intentional discrimination on the basis 

of gender). 

 In the instant case, nineteen (19) out of fifty-four (54) jurors were men. See

Answer (Doc. 17), Case Info. Sheet – Panel Jury 9/9/2008 (Exh. “GG”). Of these, eleven 

(11) men and seventeen (17) women were struck for cause. See id. As such, the initial 

panel was comprised of eighteen (18) women and eight (8) men.2

 See id. The trial court 

judge presided over voir dire, asking the majority of the questions. Trial Tr. 9/9/2008 

(Doc. 18-2) 6:6–83:19. The prosecutor, Ms. Araneta, asked three questions of the entire 

panel, as follows: (1) “[I]f you heard testimony from a child, are there any of you that 

would not believe that testimony simply because they are a child?” (2) “[I]s there 

anybody that would require eyewitness testimony to the acts that are alleged before they 

could convict?” and (3) [I]s there anyone that for whatever reason feels that they could 

not sit in judgment of another human being?” Id. at 64:4–25. None of the jury panel 

answered “yes” to the prosecutor’s questions. Id. Of the individuals that the prosecutor 

 2

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struck with peremptory challenges, one woman indicated that she had previously sat on 

several juries, two of which the defendant was found guilty of a lesser included charge; 

one male stated that his “wife’s occupation is to take care of me[;]” three men were 

engineers; and one male was brought in at the very end of voir dire to replace a panel 

member who the court excused due to scheduling conflicts. Id. at 70:18–24, 71:16–

72:12, 73:25–74:6, 75:6–10, 78:13–81:15. The final panel, not including the two 

alternates, consisted of nine (9) women and three (3) men.3

 In the state courts, Petitioner 

also introduced evidence that the same prosecutor had been challenged pursuant to 

Batson in another case, ostensibly to show a pattern of discriminatory conduct. See

Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “O,” Ariz. Superior Ct. ME 7/25/2006 (Exh. “HH”); Batson, 476 

U.S. at 95–96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (citations omitted) (“a consistent pattern of official 

racial discrimination is not a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause”). This prior challenge failed, however. See Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “O.” 

 Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Petitioner is 

unable to establish a prima facie case under Batson. The majority of the venire consisted 

of women, and the percentage of men represented in venire and the final panel was 

similar. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for prosecutors to strike engineers from the 

panel, as three of the men struck were. Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds 

from the Garden: Lawyers Speak About Voir Dire, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 163, 313–315, 352 

(attorneys interviewed discuss striking engineers and other technically minded 

prospective jurors because of how they view reasonable doubt). One man appears to be a 

 3

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chauvinist, which one might surmise would be undesirable in a juror of a sexual abuse 

case. Trial Tr. 9/9/2008 (Doc. 18-2) 71:16–22. Additionally, the last male was brought 

in at the very end of voir dire and was young, single, and without children, whereas the 

other panel members chosen for the jury were older, married/divorced, and/or had 

children. Id. at 69:10–83:5; see also Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “GG.” 

c. Strickland Error 

 Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Arizona courts did not 

unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in 

light of the evidence presented. Therefore, Petitioner cannot meet his burden to show 

prejudice. See Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 991. Based upon the totality of the 

circumstances, Petitioner cannot establish a prima facie case under Batson, and as such 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding counsel’s alleged failure to 

challenge the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes must fail. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 

104 S.Ct. at 2064. 

2. Ground Five: Failure to challenge competency 

Petitioner claims that his appellate and first Rule 32 counsel were ineffective for 

failing “to challenge defendant’s conviction based on defendant’s competency, due to 

sleep deprivation[,]” because Petitioner did not have his continuous positive airway 

pressure (“CPAP”) machine while incarcerated in the Pima County Jail, and therefore 

could not “knowingly and voluntarily” reject the State’s plea offer and was not competent 

to stand trial. First Amended Petition (Doc. 11) at 10–10B. 

 . . . 

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a. Appellate Counsel

 In his second PCR petition, Petitioner argued that “[b]oth Appellate [c]ounsel and 

Post-Conviction counsel were ineffective for failing to previously present th[e] issue [of 

Petitioner’s competency] to the [c]ourt for consideration. Answer (Doc. 17), Def.’s 

(Subsequent) Petition for PCR 10/27/2011 (Exh. “X”) at 5. Regarding Petitioner’s claim 

for allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the Rule 32 court found that 

“Petitioner’s argument . . . [did] not fall under any of the exceptions listed in Rule 

32.2(b)[, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,] . . . [and] Petitioner could have argued 

that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his first Petition for Post 

Conviction Relief.” Answer (Doc. 17), In Chambers Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 5/17/2012 

(Exh. “AA”) at 3. As such, the Rule 32 court deemed Petitioner’s claim regarding 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel waived, and precluded from review. Id., Exh. 

“AA” at 3. Petitioner again argued ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his 

Motion for Rehearing. See Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “BB.” Petitioner did not appeal the 

Rule 32 court’s finding that his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was 

precluded from review. See Answer (Doc. 17) Petition for Review 6/27/2012 (Exh. 

“DD”), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 10/12/2012 (Exh. “EE”) at 3 n. 1. 

As such, Petitioner failed to “fairly present” this claim “in each appropriate state 

court.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). 

Moreover, the state court’s determination that this claim was waived based upon state 

procedural grounds, means that it is procedurally barred from federal habeas review. See 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Accordingly, 

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Petitioner’s habeas claim regarding ineffective assistant of appellate counsel must be 

denied. 

b. PCR Counsel

 As noted in Section IV.D.2.a, supra, Petitioner asserted that his Post-Conviction 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims related to competency due to sleep 

deprivation in his Second PCR Petition. Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. “X” at 5. More 

specifically, Petitioner alleges that his Rule 32 counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the effectiveness of his appellate counsel. See id., Exh. “X” at 3–5. 

 The Rule 32 court held that “ineffective assistance of Post Conviction Relief 

counsel is not a valid claim for defendants who were convicted at trial.” Answer (Doc. 

17), In Chambers Ruling Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 5/16/2012 (Exh. “AA”) 

at 3 (citing State v. Krum, 183 Ariz. 288, 291–92 (1995)). 

 In his pro se Petition for Review, Petitioner relied on Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 

1309 (2012), to argue that the trial court erred (1) by holding that the “Petitioner was not 

entitled to effective assistance of counsel in his first Rule 32 Petition[;]” and (2) “by 

failing to address the issues of competency when it relied on State case law for 

‘preclusion[.]’” Answer (Doc. 17), Pet. For Review (Exh. “DD”) at 4. Petitioner further 

asserted that “under new federal law, Arizona defendants, who go to trial, are now 

constitutionally guaranteed the 6th Amendment right to effective counsel in a collateral 

proceeding, attacking the ineffectiveness of all previous counsel.” Id., Exh. “DD” at 5. 

 The court of appeals corrected Petitioner’s misapprehension of the Supreme Court 

of the United States’ decision in Martinez, recognizing that “the Court did not ground its 

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decision in a constitutional right, instead determining that defendants had an ‘equitable’ 

right to the effective assistance of initial post-conviction counsel and limited [this] 

decision to the application of procedural default in federal habeas review.” Answer (Doc. 

17) Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 10/12/2012 (Exh. “EE”) at 3 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 

— U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. at 1319–20). The court of appeals held that nothing in Martinez

altered Arizona law that “a claim that Rule 32 counsel was ineffective is not a cognizable 

ground for relief in a subsequent Rule 32 proceeding” and denied relief. Id., Exh. “EE” 

at 3–4. 

 The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “a criminal defendant has no 

right to counsel beyond his first appeal in pursuing state discretionary or collateral 

review[.]” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2568, 115 L.Ed.2d 

640 (1991). As such, the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly found Petitioner’s reliance 

on Martinez v. Ryan, – U.S. –, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012) misplaced. The 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also observed that “Martinez did not create a 

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in PCR proceedings.” Dickens v. 

Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). “Thus, the claim of ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel used to establish cause in the narrow circumstances outlined in Martinez is an 

equitable claim and not a constitutional claim[.]” Id. As such, any attempt by Petitioner 

to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his PCR counsel must fail. 

 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons delineated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

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 1) Petitioner’s First Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 11) is DENIED; 

 2) A certificate of appealability is DENIED, because reasonable jurists would not 

find the Court’s ruling debatable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; 

 3) This matter is DISMISSED with prejudice; and 

 4) The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close its file in this matter. 

 Dated this 28th day of September, 2015. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald

United States Magistrate Judge 

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