Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00377/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00377-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Property Damage

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1 The motions to quash are virtually identical; both sets of defendants seek to quash

the depositions of Floragon Timber, LLC and Floragon Manufacturing, LLC set for May 24 and

25, 2007. (Doc. 230, at 2; Doc. 243, at 1)

2 This motion (Doc. 247) is GRANTED and Mr. Fleming’s affidavit has been

considered by the undersigned.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA PEACOCK, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 05-0377-BH-C

BURNEY H. MERRILL, et al., :

Defendants.

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on the Floragon defendants’ motion to

quash and for protective order (Doc. 230), the Merrill defendants’ motion to

quash and for protective order (Doc. 243),1

 plaintiff’s oppositions to the

motions to quash (Docs. 240 & 246), and the Merrill defendants’ motion for

leave to file affidavit in response to plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to

the motion to quash (Doc. 247).2

 Having considered the contents of these

pleadings, and recognizing the time-sensitive nature of a ruling on same, this

order is entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Rule 72.2(a).

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 250 Filed 05/22/07 Page 1 of 6
2

In seeking to quash the corporate depositions of defendant Floragon

Timber, LLC and defendant Floragon Manufacturing, LLC and obtain a

protective order, the moving parties cite solely to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, the Merrill defendants for the proposition that a court shall

limit the scope of discovery if the discovery sought is “‘unreasonably

cumulative or duplicative’” (Doc. 243, at 7, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C))

and both defendants for the proposition that a court may grant a protective

order “‘which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’” (Doc. 230, at 12

and Doc. 243, at 7, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c))

Floragon respectfully requests that this Court quash the

deposition notices for Floragon Manufacturing, LLC (Document

226) and Floragon Timber, LLC (Doc. 225), and to Order that

no more depositions of any Floragon entity be allowed, or in the

alternative to limit any future deposition time to less than two

hours. In insisting that her own deposition be limited to one day,

and for time to be split amongst 10 defendants (the three Merrill

Defendants, and the 7 Floragon Defendants) it was Plaintiff’s

contention that this is a “simple case based on a one page

contract”. (Doc. 175, p.4, line 8). In this “simple” case, Plaintiff

has now deposed Floragon for more than a day, deposed four of

the six Floragon shareholders individually, and is scheduled to

depose the President of Floragon (who is also a shareholder),

Ben Beddingfield, on May 23. Plaintiff is also scheduled to

depose Floragon’s in house lawyer, Jerry Lawson, on May 22.

This is all in a pursuit of claims against Floragon, for tenuous

allegations relating to Floragon’s alleged failure to recognize

Plaintiff as a shareholder, even though Plaintiff readily admits

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(without any bona fide explanation) that she did not send any

documentation of her alleged purchase to Floragon between

March 20, 2002 (the date of the alleged signed “sale

agreement”) and May 5, 2005. Since receiving that

documentation on May 5, 2005, Floragon has ensured that

Peacock’s potential interest (depending upon the outcome of this

suit) has been protected.

The Floragon Defendants base their request on Rule

26(c), which allows for relief “which justice requires to protect

a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,

or undue burden or expense.” Rick Schaefer has already sat for

deposition questioning for 10 hours (longer than Plaintiff).

Schaefer will continue to be the corporate deponent should the

Court require him to sit for more testimony. If Plaintiff is

allowed to sparse out the deposition of Floragon entities, under

the technical rules as contended by Plaintiff, Plaintiff could

conceivably depose Rick Schaefer six more times for the

remaining Floragon Companies, which at seven hours per

deposition would be 42 more hours of testimony (in addition to

the 10 he has already given). Floragon contends that this is

clearly the type of annoyance, oppression, and undue burden

contemplated by Rule 26, and that its request for relief should be

granted.

Wherefore, the premises considered, Floragon

respectfully requests that this Court quash all future depositions

of Floragon (including pending deposition notices Docs. 225

and 226), and Order that all Floragon companies be deposed no

more. If the Court is inclined to allow any more deposition

testimony from Floragon, Floragon requests that its witness,

Rick Schaefer, only be deposed for no more than two hours.

(Doc. 230, at 11-13; see also Doc. 243, at 6-8)

Rule 26(c) provides that “[u]pon motion by a party or by the person

from whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the

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movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected

parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good

cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on

matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition

is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or

person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or

expense[.]” Id. (emphasis supplied). The Eleventh Circuit, in addition to

requiring good cause, requires “the district court to balance the interests of

those requesting the order.” McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Polk County, 876

F.2d 89, 91 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co.,

758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (“While Rule 26(c) articulates a single

standard for ruling on a protective order motion, that of ‘good cause,’ the

federal courts have superimposed a somewhat more demanding balancing of

interests approach to the Rule. . . . Under that standard, the district court’s duty

was to balance P & G’s interest in obtaining the names and addresses of the

study participants against the Center’s interest in keeping that information

confidential.”). The moving parties in this case do not once mention Rule

26(c)’s good cause requirement and certainly do not analyze how their

recitations of the facts surrounding the discovery depositions taken in this case

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 250 Filed 05/22/07 Page 4 of 6
3 (See Doc. 140, at ¶ 10.b. (“Discovery is limited as follows: . . . Not more than 15

depositions may be taken by each party, limited in duration as expressed by the parties in ¶ 9 of

their Report[.]”)) In truth, the parties did not express a duration limitation in their Report. (See

Doc. 138, ¶ 9) Therefore, the duration limitation set forth in Rule 30(d) is controlling in this case

such that each deposition taken in this case “is limited to one day of seven hours.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

30(d)(2). 

5

establish good cause for the Court’s issuance of the requested protective order.

In addition, when the undersigned balances plaintiff’s interest in

comprehensively preparing her case against the numerous corporate

defendants, seven of whom are Floragon corporations, against the corporate

defendants’ protestations that additional depositions of the corporations will

be unduly expensive and amount to nothing more than annoyance--since it will

name the same person as the 30(b)(6) designee of each defendant Floragon

corporation--the plaintiff’s interest need prevail particularly in light of the fact

that no showing has been made that plaintiff has exceeded the number of

depositions set forth in the Rule 16(b) scheduling order.3 

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motions to quash and

for protective order filed by the Floragon defendants (Doc. 230) and the

Merrill defendants (Doc. 243). The corporate deposition of Floragon Timber,

LLC is limited to one day of seven hours as is the corporate deposition of 

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Floragon Manufacturing, LLC.

DONE and ORDERED this the 22nd day of May, 2007.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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