Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00026/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00026-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441oc Removal- Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO PACIFICVU LLC, GREG 

HINCHY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EARL WADE, KARLA AUZU, DOES 1 

through 3,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-0026-AJB-RBB

ORDER: 

(1) SUA SPONTE REMANDING FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION; AND 

(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS, (Doc. No. 2)

On January 9, 2017, Defendant Earl Wade (“Defendant”), acting pro se, filed a 

notice of removal, (Doc. No. 1), and application to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. No. 

2). The notice of removal seeks to remove an unlawful detainer proceeding initiated in San 

Diego Superior Court by Plaintiffs San Diego Pacificvu LLC and Greg Hinchy

(“Plaintiffs”). (Doc. No. 1-2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court sua sponte

REMANDS the action to San Diego Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

and DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 

2.)

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LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction 

only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action to federal 

court only if the district court would have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(a). “[R]emoval statutes are strictly construed against removal.” Luther v. 

Countywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). There is a 

“strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and the party seeking removal always 

bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 

566 (9th Cir. 1992). If there is any doubt as to the propriety of removal, federal jurisdiction 

must be rejected. Id. at 566–67.

“[F]ederal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction[.]” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). Accordingly, 

“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

DISCUSSION

As set forth in the notice of removal, Defendant alleges the Court has federal 

question jurisdiction over the present action. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 5–14.) Federal question

jurisdiction exists over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Jurisdiction in 

a federal question case is “governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides 

that federal [question] jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the 

face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California ex rel. Sacramento Metro. 

Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Audette v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 195 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 

1999)); see Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921). Accordingly, 

the federal question may not be aided by the notice of removal, Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 

299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936), nor may a case be removed on the basis of a federal defense, 

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Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987), or counterclaim, Holmes Grp., 

Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831–32 (2002).

Defendant’s entire assertion of federal question jurisdiction is based upon the 

argument that Plaintiffs have artfully pled a federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act 

(“PTFA”) claim disguised as an unlawful detainer action. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 5–7.) However, 

the face of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges only a single claim for unlawful detainer, which is 

a California state law cause of action. (Doc. No. 1-2.) Wells Fargo Bank v. Lapeen, No. C 

11-01932 LB, 2011 WL 2194117, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2011) (“An unlawful detainer 

action, on its face, does not arise under federal law but is purely a creature of California 

law.”).

Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs’ right to relief rests on the resolution of an 

embedded federal PFTA question, (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 9–10), likewise carries no clout. As 

stated, the complaint invokes only state unlawful detainer law. While PFTA may provide 

Defendant with a defense to the unlawful detainer claim,1federal question jurisdiction 

cannot be predicated upon a defense to the complaint; rather, the complaint itself must raise 

the federal question. Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“the existence of a defense based upon federal law is insufficient to support [federal 

question] jurisdiction,” (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 

U.S. 1, 10–12 (1983))); Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, No. CV 10-8203 GAF (SSx), 

2010 WL 4916578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010) (“The PTFA’s provisions requiring 

that notice be given ninety days in advance and preventing termination of a bona fide lease 

unless a purchaser will occupy the unit as a primary residence, see P.L. No. 111-22 § 

 

1 Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ three-day notice is insufficient notice under PFTA. 

(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 7.) While Defendant argues that “PFTA is not a defense, but the entire basis 

for the action to eject a bona fide residential tenant of a foreclosed landlord,” (Doc. No. 1 

¶ 13), nothing on the face of the complaint suggests he is being ejected because the former 

landlord was foreclosed upon. Rather, the complaint states Plaintiffs instituted the unlawful 

detainer proceedings because Defendant has failed to pay rent in compliance with the 

written agreement. (See Doc. No. 1-2 at 3 ¶¶ 10, 17.c.)

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702(a)(2)(A), offer Kreisel a federal defense to an unlawful detainer action where the 

plaintiff fails to comply with these requirements. A federal defense, however, does not 

support federal-question jurisdiction.”).

Finally, to the extent Defendant contends that PFTA preempts state-law unlawful 

detainer actions, (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 6), “[h]e is incorrect. The PTFA creates no cause of action 

allowing for evictions, either explicitly or implicitly.” Wescom Credit Union, 2010 WL 

4916578, at *3. For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint neither 

explicitly invokes federal law nor “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually 

disputed and substantial” that the Court “may entertain without disturbing any 

congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & 

Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court sua sponte REMANDS this action in its entirety 

to San Diego Superior Court. Because the Court remands this action pursuant to its 

“independent obligation to examine [its] own jurisdiction,” FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 231, 

the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s application to proceed in forma pauperis.

(Doc. No. 2.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 10, 2017

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