Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03916/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03916-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY BACKUS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BISCOMERICA CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No.16-cv-03916-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 9

Pending before the Court is Defendant Biscomerica Corporation’s motion to dismiss the 

Class Action Complaint (“Compl.”).

1

 Dkt. No. 9. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff Troy 

Backus’ claims are preempted by federal law, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this purported nationwide class action against Biscomerica for 

manufacturing, distributing, and selling packaged cookies that contain partially hydrogenated oil

(“PHO”), an artificial form of trans fat. Compl. ¶¶ 4–6, 97. Plaintiff alleges that “trans fat is a 

toxic carcinogen” and PHO is consequently an “illegal, dangerous additive.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 

According to Plaintiff, PHO “causes cardiovascular heart disease, diabetes, cancer, and 

Alzheimer’s disease” and also “accelerates memory damage and cognitive decline.” Id. ¶ 17; see 

also id. ¶¶ 24–55. Plaintiff cites several medical publications to support his allegation that “[t]here 

is ‘no safe level’ of artificial trans fat intake.” Compl. ¶ 18. He alleges that because of these 

negative health effects he consequently “suffered physical injury when he repeatedly consumed 

Defendant’s [cookies] . . . .” Id. ¶ 89.

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) prohibits “[t]he introduction or 

 

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The Court finds that this matter is appropriate for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. 

Civ. L.R. 7–1(b).

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delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food . . . that is adulterated . . . .” 21 

U.S.C. § 331(a). This includes food additives that are “not generally recognized, among 

[qualified] experts . . . to be safe under the conditions of its intended use.” Id. § 321(s); see also

21 C.F.R. 170.3(i) (defining “safe” as “a reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scientists 

that the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use.”). Sections 342 and 348 

further describe the conditions under which food and food additives may be considered “unsafe” 

or “adulterated.” Id. §§ 342(a)(1), 342(a)(2)(C)(i), 348.

On November 8, 2013, the federal Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) “tentatively 

determined that there is no longer a consensus among qualified scientific experts that PHOs . . . 

are safe for human consumption . . . .” Tentative Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated 

Oils, 78 Fed. Reg. 67169–01, 67170 (Nov. 8, 2013). The FDA confirmed this determination on

June 17, 2015. Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils (“Final 

Determination”), 80 Fed. Reg. 34650–01 (June 17, 2015). The President then signed the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act (“Act”) into law on December 18, 2015, which — consistent 

with the FDA’s Final Determination — stated that PHO would not be considered unsafe or 

adulterated under Federal law until the June 18, 2018, compliance date. Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 754, 129 Stat 2242, 2284 (2015).

Plaintiff faults Defendant for continuing to use PHO in its cookies, even after the FDA’s 

Final Determination in June 2015. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8. Relying on the FDA’s findings, Plaintiff 

brings several causes of action under state law, including violations of: (1) California’s Unfair 

Competition Law (“UCL”); (2) Nuisance; and (3) the Implied Warranty of Merchantability. 

Plaintiff has brought similar actions in this district against other manufacturers of products that 

contain PHO. Several district courts have dismissed such claims. See, e.g., Backus v. Conagra 

Foods, Inc., No. C 16-00454 WHA, 2016 WL 3844331, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016); Backus v. 

Nestlé USA, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2016).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must dismiss a complaint if it 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

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dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard

requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true a

plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and construes all factual inferences in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Id. However, a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and 

conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court does not credit allegations that are “merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Wilson v. HewlettPackard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1145 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. UCL Claims

California’s UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and 

unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The three 

“prongs” of the UCL are independent of each other and may be asserted as separate claims. CelTech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (Cal. 1999). The 

“unlawful” prong of the UCL incorporates other laws and treats violations of those laws as 

unlawful business practices independently actionable under state law. McKell v. Washington 

Mut., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1474 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). The “unfair” prong treats as 

actionable conduct that “violates established public policy or . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive 

or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” Id. at 1473. The 

UCL cannot, however, be used to proscribe otherwise permitted conducted. Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th 

at 182 (“If the Legislature has permitted certain conduct or considered a situation and concluded 

no action should lie, courts may not override that determination.”). Plaintiff brings UCL claims 

under both the “unlawful” and the “unfair” prongs.

Defendant argues that both of Plaintiff’s UCL claims are nonetheless preempted by the 

FDCA because under federal law there is a grace period for discontinuing the use of PHO in food 

products. A federal statute has preemptive effect if it conflicts with state law. Ting v. AT&T, 319 

F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). This can occur when “compliance with both federal and state 

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regulations is a physical impossibility” or when “state law stands as an obstacle to the 

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. The Court 

must look to the language of the statute and the overall statutory purpose to determine whether it is 

preempted. Id. at 1136.

1. Unlawful Business Practices

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s use of PHO in its cookies was unlawful under both 

federal and state law. The Court disagrees.

Plaintiff first argues that the use of PHO violated the FDCA because PHO is not generally 

recognized as safe and its use rendered Defendant’s cookies “adulterated,” as defined by 21 U.S.C. 

§ 342(a)(2)(C). This squarely conflicts with the FDA’s Final Determination and the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act. The Act explicitly stated that PHO would not be considered unsafe or 

adulterated under the FDCA until June 18, 2018:

No partially hydrogenated oils . . . shall be deemed unsafe within the 

meaning of [21 U.S.C. § 348(a)] and no food that is introduced or 

delivered for introduction into interstate commerce that bears or 

contains a partially hydrogenated oil shall be deemed adulterated 

under [21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) or § 342(a)(2)(C)(i) by virtue of 

bearing or containing a partially hydrogenated oil until the 

compliance date . . . (June 18, 2018).

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, PL 114–113, December 18, 2015, 129 Stat 2242 (2015). 

This is not an exercise of “prosecutorial discretion,” by merely delaying enforcement, as Plaintiff 

urges. See Dkt. No. 11 at 1, 3, 9. Instead, Congress declared that food containing PHO will not 

even be considered unsafe or adulterated until June 2018. This is in keeping with the FDA’s

acknowledgment that ongoing scrutiny of the health effects of PHO is appropriate as “knowledge 

advances and evolves over time.” Final Determination, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650–01, 34653. The FDA 

specifically solicited additional “scientific evidence,” noting that the compliance date would 

“allow time for such petitions and their review.” Id.

Plaintiff next argues that Defendant’s use of PHO violated California’s Sherman Food, 

Drug and Cosmetics law (“Sherman Law”). Yet California’s Sherman Law does not specifically 

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prohibit the use of PHO. Nor does it completely ban the use of trans fats. Instead the Sherman 

Law largely tracks federal law, prohibiting the sale or advertisement of “adulterated” food and 

food additives. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 110398, 110545, 110620. Far from 

contradicting federal law, the Sherman Law actually adopts all FDA regulations as state

regulations. See Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 110085, 110115. Regardless, to interpret the 

Sherman Law’s broad prohibition of “adulterated” food as covering PHO would effectively negate 

Congress’ decision to set the compliance date in June 2018.

Yet the June 2018 date was not arbitrary. Rather, the FDA chose a compliance date that 

would serve the interests of both consumers and the industry. During this compliance period, the 

FDA could engage in further information gathering about PHO, its health implications, and its

possible ongoing uses. Final Determination, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650–01, 34653, 34668–69. The FDA 

also understood that there were market limitations preventing the immediate “transition to new 

oils.” Id. at 34669. With this additional time, the FDA reasoned, the industry could identify, 

grow, harvest, and process suitable replacement ingredients for PHO. Id. The industry could also 

“exhaust existing product inventories, and [] reformulate and modify labeling of affected 

products.” Id. at 34668–69. Plaintiff’s interpretation of the Sherman Law would render the use of 

PHO immediately unlawful. The FDA would not have additional time to assess the scientific 

evidence on PHO nor could the industry research and vet replacement oils. The Supreme Court 

has previously acknowledged that providing time to phase in new standards is a legitimate 

objective. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875, 881–82 (2000) 

(recognizing that the Department of Transportation’s passive restraint standard “would bring about 

a mix of different devices introduced gradually over time . . . [and] would thereby lower costs, 

overcome technical safety problems, encourage technological development, and win widespread 

consumer acceptance.”).2 Plaintiff’s interpretation of California law, however, would “stand[] as 

 

2

Plaintiff’s reliance on Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2015), is misplaced. It 

does not stand for the broad proposition that federal law cannot preempt state law food 

regulations. There, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the FDA’s labeling requirements 

permitted companies to claim a product was “trans fat free,” even if it contained low levels of 

trans fats. Id. at 962–63. The Ninth Circuit also found that an FDA letter did not have the force of 

law necessary to raise preemption concerns. Id. at 963–65.

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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 

Ting, 319F.3d at 1136.

Plaintiff points out that the FDA left open the door for states to specifically legislate in this 

area by stating, “[t]here is no statutory provision in the [FDCA] providing for express preemption 

of any state or local law prohibiting or limiting use of PHOs in food, including state or local 

legislative requirements or common law duties” and that it “believes” such laws “are not likely to 

be in conflict with federal law, or to frustrate federal objectives.” Final, 80 FR 34650–01, 34655. 

The Court agrees with the analysis of the court in Backus v. Nestlé USA, Inc. finding that this 

language is not dispositive. 167 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 

555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009)). The FDA actually asserted it was not “tak[ing] a position regarding 

the potential for implied preemptive effect of this order on any specific state or local law” and 

noted it would require a case-by-case analysis. See Final Determination, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650–01, 

34655. The Act, for its part, is silent as to preemption. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

interpretation of California’s Sherman Law — as requiring an immediate ban on PHO — would 

conflict with the FDA and Congress’s decision not to deem foods containing PHO unsafe or 

adulterated until June 18, 2018.

2. Unfair Business Practices

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant’s conduct was “unfair” similarly fails as it is preempted by 

the FDCA. As discussed above, Congress established a compliance date, before which time 

companies can still use PHO in their products. Plaintiff cannot sidestep this by “relabel[ing] the 

nature of the action as one brought under the unfair competition statute.” Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at

182 (quotation omitted). Plaintiff has not identified any action that Defendant took independent 

from the use of PHO in its cookies to support this claim.

B. Plaintiff’s Nuisance Claim Fails

In addition to his UCL claims, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s sale of the cookies

constitutes a public nuisance under California law. This makes an end-run around federal law, as 

 

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explained above, and regardless is unsupported by California law. A public nuisance is broadly 

defined as “[a]nything which is injurious to health . . . so as to interfere with the comfortable 

enjoyment of life or property . . . which affects at the same time an entire community or 

neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons.” Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3479–80. Yet an 

individual can only maintain such suits if the conduct is “specially injurious to himself, but not 

otherwise.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3493. California courts have interpreted this to require an injury 

that is “different in kind — not merely in degree — from that suffered by the general public.” 

Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

Plaintiff has failed to explain how his injury differs from that of any other member of the 

public. Plaintiff suggests that it is enough that he alleged “physical and emotional harm” and “lost 

money” from consuming products that contain PHO. Compl. ¶ 89, 134. He contrasts that injury 

with the general public’s concern for the “right to a safe food supply” and “interest in ensuring 

that only safe, uncontaminated foods [are] available for purchase.” Compl. ¶¶ 129–135. Yet PHO 

constitutes a general health hazard to anyone who consumes it. Both Plaintiff and the public 

consequently face the same risk of harm due to the consumption of PHO and the cost of 

purchasing products containing it. Plaintiff cannot artificially limit the public’s injury in order to 

evade the law’s special injury requirement.

C. Plaintiff’s Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability Fails

Plaintiff’s last claim is a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. This claim

similarly fails. In California, “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a 

contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” Cal. Com. 

Code § 2314(1). This implied warranty requires that goods “[a]re fit for the ordinary purposes for 

which such goods are used.” Id. § 2314(2)(c). The implied warranty, however only provides for a 

minimum level of quality. To breach the implied warranty, a product must lack “even the most 

basic degree of fitness for ordinary use.” Mocek v. Alfa Leisure, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 402, 406 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Cal. Comm. Code § 2314(2)). Moreover, “there is no implied 

warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed 

to [a consumer].” Cal. Com. Code § 2316.

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Here, as explained above, the FDA did not determine that products that contain PHO are 

unfit for human consumption. Instead they provided a three-year window for further investigation 

and phasing out. The FDA recognized that people would continue to consume products 

containing PHO up until the compliance date as companies “exhaust[ed] existing product 

inventories.” Final Determination, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650–01, 34669. Additionally, Plaintiff does 

not suggest that the products did not disclose the presence of PHO on their labels or that 

Defendant otherwise hid their presence. Plaintiff simply alleges that he “is a busy person and 

cannot reasonably inspect every ingredient of every food that he purchases for himself and others, 

and he was unaware that [Defendant’s Products] were dangerous when he purchased them.” 

Compl. ¶¶ 92–93, 96. On this basis, Plaintiff suggests that including PHO in the products was a 

“latent defect.” Although the implied warranty is designed to protect consumers against 

undisclosed defects, Plaintiff does not provide any authority to support a claim where the 

consumer is simply too busy to read the ingredients. Cf. Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 

4th 1297, 1305 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“Undisclosed latent defects . . . are the very evil that the 

implied warranty of merchantability was designed to remedy.”).

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 21 days of the 

date of this Order if he is able to allege claims against Defendant that are not preempted by the 

June 2018 compliance date. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, 

§ 754, 129 Stat 2242, 2284 (2015). As explained above, Plaintiff’s entire theory as to each cause 

of action currently pled is deficient as a matter of law, so Plaintiff must either (1) plead a different

and sufficient basis for these claims if he can do so consistent with his obligations under Rule 11; 

or (2) confirm that he does not wish to amend and request dismissal with prejudice, see Edwards 

v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1063–66 (9th Cir. 2004). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

3/27/2017

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