Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_09-cv-00250/USCOURTS-almd-1_09-cv-00250-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GLENN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, )

LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 1:09-cv-250-MEF

)

BELL AEROSPACE SERVICES, INC., )

et al., ) (WO – PUBLISH)

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action arises out of the construction of a helicopter hangar at Defendant Bell

Aerospace Services, Inc.’s (“Bell Aero”) facilities in Ozark, Alabama (“the Project”).

Bell Aero was the owner of the Project and Defendant Barge, Waggoner, Summer &

Cannon, Inc. (“BWSC”) was the project engineer (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff

Glenn Construction Company, LLC (“Glenn Construction”) was hired as the general

contractor for the Project on February 2, 2007. Mike Wolfe (“Wolfe”) is the co-owner

and president of Glenn Construction. Glenn Construction brings claims for breach of

contract, negligence, wantonness, fraud, and intentional interference with contractual

1

 This claim is brought solely against Bell Aero. In its response to the motions for 1

summary judgment, Glenn Construction admits that there is no contract between itself and

BWSC. Furthermore, in the final pre-trial conference held on May 6, 2011, Glenn Construction

clarified that the breach-of-contract claim was only against Bell Aero. As discussed further

below, the parties dispute whether the tort claims were brought against both Defendants or only

BWSC. 

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 1 of 78
relations. This cause is now before the Court on seven motions. Three are motions for

2

summary judgment: (1) Bell Aero’s first motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 32), filed

on November 9, 2010; (2) Bell Aero’s alternative motion for summary judgment, (Doc. #

54), filed on January 14, 2011; and (3) BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. #

49), filed on January 14, 2011. Glenn Construction has filed two additional motions: a

motion to strike two affidavits by BWSC’s non-retained experts, (Doc. # 80), filed on

February 28, 2011 and a motion to supplement its evidentiary submissions, (Doc. # 78),

filed on February 16, 2011. On February 28, 2011, BWSC opposed the motion to

supplement and moved to strike it. (Doc. # 82). Finally, BWSC filed a motion to strike

the affidavit of Mac Brittingham (“Brittingham”)—Glenn Construction’s previously

undisclosed retained expert witness—on February 14, 2011. (Doc. # 75).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1332 (diversity). Venue is proper in this district pursuant to § 1391(a)(2). The parties do

3

 On December 21, 2009, upon consideration of Bell Aero’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. # 2

7), filed on April 23, 2009, this Court dismissed Counts 4 and 5 for work on an open account and

for work and labor done. (Doc. # 18). 

 As a limited liability company, Glenn Construction is a citizen of all states in which its 3

members are citizens. See Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374

F.3d 1020, 1021–22 (11th Cir. 2004). Glenn Construction is made up of two members, Mike

Wolfe (“Wolfe”) and Janet Wolfe, both of whom are citizens of Alabama. Thus, Glenn

Construction is a citizen of Alabama. Bell Aero is a citizen of Delaware, its state of

incorporation, and Texas, where its principal place of business is located. BWSC is a citizen of

Tennessee, which is both its state of incorporation and the location of its principal place of

business. 

2

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 2 of 78
not dispute personal jurisdiction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Facts

This action arises out of a $6,000,000 contract (“the Contract”) between Glenn

Construction and Bell Aero for the construction of the helicopter hangar at Bell Aero’s

facilities in Ozark, Alabama.

A. The Formation of the Contract and Relevant Provisions

In 2005, Bell Aero contacted BWSC regarding the Project and began preparing for

the bidding process. Bell Aero selected BWSC to serve as the engineer on the Project.

According to Bell Aero, prior to submission of its bid, Glenn Construction had a complete

copy of the Project Manual. (Doc. # 55, at 2 (citing Doc. # 56 Ex. 2, Wolfe Dep.

92:11–17)). The Instruction to Bidders section of the Project Manual permitted bidders to

“access the site to conduct such investigations and tests as each [b]idder deems necessary

for submission of his bid with prior approval of OWNER or ENGINEER.” (Doc. # 57

Ex. 41). Glenn Construction did not do any such investigations or tests prior to bidding

on the Project. (Doc. # 56 Ex. B, Wolfe Dep. 95:11–96:23). The Instruction to Bidders

section also stated that “[t]he submission of a bid will constitute an incontrovertible

representation by the Bidder . . . that the Contract Documents are sufficient in scope and

detail to indicate and convey understanding of all terms and conditions for performance

of the work.” (Doc. # 57 Ex. 41).

3

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 3 of 78
On January 4, 2007, Glenn Construction submitted its bid for the Project. (Doc. #

66 Ex. 12). On February 2, 2007, Bell Aero awarded the $ 6,000,000 Contract for the

Project to Glenn Construction and a notice to proceed was prepared that same day. (Doc.

# 66 Ex. 13). Glenn Construction received the notice to proceed and began work on

February 7, 2007. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 14). Pursuant to the notice to proceed, Glenn

Construction was to complete the Project within 226 days making September 21, 2007 the

date of completion. (Doc. # 57 Ex. 4). Additionally, the Contract contained General

Conditions, drawings, and Specifications, which were also found in the Project Manual.

i. BWSC’s Responsibilities as Engineer

The Contract described the engineer as the owner’s “representative” on the Project,

(Doc. # 57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 9.01), and the owner was to communicate with

the contractor through the engineer. (Id. § 8.01). Under the Contract, the engineer had

several responsibilities related to supervising the Project and rendering impartial, binding

decisions on various matters. For example, the engineer was to make site visits at

“intervals appropriate to the various stages of construction as [it] deems necessary,” (Id.

§ 9.02(A)). The engineer’s responsibilities also included issuing, “with reasonable

promptness,” written clarifications or interpretations of the requirements of the Contract

as it “may determine necessary.” (Id. § 9.04). Such decisions were binding on both the

owner and the contractor. (Id.). The engineer was also permitted to “authorize minor

variations” in the Project and such decisions were again binding on both the owner and

4

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 4 of 78
the contractor. (Id.§ 9.05). The engineer could recommend change orders which the

4

parties “shall execute.” (Id.§ 10.03). Furthermore, the engineer was to act as an impartial

“interpreter and judge” on disputes—referred to as “claims” under the Contract—about

the Contract’s price or time limits. (Id.§ 9.09(B)). Its decisions on such claims were

“final and binding upon OWNER and CONTRACTOR” unless the decision was appealed

or a party provided written notice within thirty days and filed suit within sixty days. (Id.§

10.05(B)). Finally, the engineer was also responsible for reviewing applications for

payment and either “indicat[ing] in writing a recommendation of payment and

present[ing] the application to OWNER or return[ing] the [a]pplication to

CONTRACTOR indicating in writing” why the application was rejected. (§

14.02(B)(2)).

ii. Provisions for Making Changes to the Project

Section 3.04 explains that “the Contract documents may be amended to provide for

additions, deletions and revisions in the Work or to modify the terms and conditions

thereof in one or more of the following ways: (i) a Written Amendment; (ii) a Change

Order[;] or (iii) a Work Change Directive.” (Id. § 3.04(A)). Engineering or technical

 A change order is defined as “[a] document recommended by ENGINEER which is 4

signed by CONTRACTOR and OWNER and authorizes an addition, deletion or revision in the

Work or an adjustment in the Contract Price or the Contract Times, issued on or after the

Effective Date of the Agreement.” (Doc. # 57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 1.01(9)). 

5

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 5 of 78
changes are to be made by a change order or a work change directive. (Id. §§ 1.01(9),

5

1.01(49)). However, § 9.5 states that the engineer “may authorize minor variations in the

Work from the requirements of the Contract Documents which do not involve an

adjustment in the Contract Price or the Contract Times and are compatible with the design

concept of the completed Project as a functioning whole as indicated by the Contract

Documents.” (Id. § 9.05(A) (emphasis added)). Such minor variations may be made by a

field order, (id.), which is defined as “[a] written order issued by ENGINEER which

requires minor changes in the Work but which does not involve a change in the Contract

Price or the Contract Times.” (Id. § 1.01(21)).

iii. Provisions Regarding Unforeseen Conditions

Furthermore, it was “the intent of the Contract Documents to describe a

functionally complete Project (or part thereof) to be constructed in accordance with the

Contract Documents.” (Id. § 3.01(B)). At the same time, § 4.03 explained what the

 A work change directive is defined as follows: 5

A written statement to CONTRACTOR issued on or after the Effective Date of the

Agreement and signed by OWNER and recommended by ENGINEER ordering an

addition, deletion or revision in the Work, or responding to differing or unforeseen

subsurface conditions under which the Work is to be performed or to emergencies. 

A Work Change Directive will not change the Contract Price or the Contract Times

but is evidence that the parties expect that the change ordered or documented by the

Work Change Directive will be incorporated in a subsequently issued Change Order

following negotiations by the parties as to its effect, if any, on the Contract Price or

Contract Times.

(Id. § 1.01(49)). 

6

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 6 of 78
contractor is to do upon discovering a subsurface or physical condition that “is of an

unusual nature, and differs materially from conditions ordinarily encountered and

generally recognized as inherent in work of the character provided for in the Contract

Documents.” (Id. § 4.03(A)). If the contractor discovered such a condition, it was

required to notify the owner and engineer “before further disturbing the subsurface or

physical conditions or performing any Work in connection therewith.” (Id.).

iv. Provisions Regarding Closeout Procedures for Final Payment

Once the contractor provided notice that the Project was complete, the engineer

had to make a final inspection and notify the contractor in writing of all deficiencies. (Id.

§ 14.06). The parties refer to this written notice as a “punch list”—i.e. a list of things that

the engineer determines needs to be fixed. The contractor was to fix the items on the

punch list prior to seeking final payment. Section 14.07 provided that—once the

contractor had completed the items on the punch list to the engineer’s satisfaction and had

provided certain documents—the contractor could apply for final payment. Similarly,

6

the application for final payment must be accompanied by all documentation called for by

the Contract Documents, consent of the surety to final payment, and either lien waivers

from the subcontractors or an all-bills-paid affidavit from the contractor. (Id. §

 In applying for final payment, the contractor had to follow the procedures set forth for 6

progress payments, including providing “an affidavit . . . stating that all previous progress

payments received on account of the Work have been applied on account to discharge

CONTRACTOR’s legitimate obligations associated with prior Applications for Payment.” (Id. §

14.02(A)(2), 14.07(A)(1)).

7

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 7 of 78
14.07(A)(2), (3)). Once the engineer was satisfied that the work was completed and all of

the contractor’s obligations under the Contract were fulfilled, it would either recommend

that the owner make final payment or it would return the application to the contractor

with its reasons for refusal. (Id. § 14.07(B)). In the latter situation, the contractor was to

make “the necessary corrections” and resubmit the application. (Id.). The owner had to

make final payment within 30 days of receiving the engineer’s recommendation for

payment.

C. BWSC’s Alleged Prior Knowledge of Problems with the Foundation

i. The Underground Stream

One of the major problems during the Project involved an underground stream

located on the property. Soon after construction began, the site work contractor

discovered underground water, initially believed to be an isolated pocket. (Doc. # 66 Ex.

9, Wolfe Aff. at 2). It was later discovered that the water was actually an underground

stream. (Id.). BWSC had been involved with several projects on the property in question

since 1997. (Doc. # 56 Ex. 3, Mott 22:1–25:5). Glenn Construction claims that BWSC

7

knew of the underground stream before the Project began because of its prior work at the

location. Glenn Construction claims that BWSC had geotechnical reports and a

8

topographical map prior to the Project that showed the underground stream. (Doc. # 66, at

 James Barry Mott (“Mott”) is the Vice President of BWSC. (Doc. # 56 Ex. 3, Mott 7

Dep. 16:8–10). 

8

8

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 8 of 78
7; id. Exs. 10–11; see also Doc. # 56 Ex. 3, Mott Dep. 24:2–9, 25:7–11). Wolfe, one of

the owners of Glenn Construction, stated that a contractor who had previously worked on

a BWSC project at the same location had encountered similar water issues on the

previous project and had informed BWSC of them. (Id. (citing Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe

Aff. at 4)). BWSC contends that it “did not have knowledge of the existence of the

underground stream until it was discovered by [Glenn Construction] during the [P]roject.”

(Doc. # 50, at 2 (citing Doc. # 56 Ex. 2, Cole Dep. 157:1–158:25, 160:3; Ex. 3 Mott Dep.

25:12–26:9)).

9

ii. The Anticipated Column Loads

Glenn Construction contends that BWSC miscalculated the anticipated column

loads for the foundations which allegedly caused significant delays on the project. The

column load is the “outward force pushing the columns horizontally at the point where

they connect to the foundation.” (Doc. # 66, at 4). Glenn Construction claims that BWSC

knew of the miscalculation prior to submitting the Project to bid. In July 2006, Ted

Persing (“Persing”), a structural engineer at BWSC, instructed Michael Cole (“Cole”), the

 Prior to bidding, BWSC contracted with Carmichael Engineering “to perform

9

geotechnical site work in preparation of the Project.” (Id.). However, Glenn Construction

alleges that the initial report from Carmichael Engineering “failed to recognize any significant

underground water features.” (Id.). After discovery of the underground stream, Carmichael

Engineering issued a supplement to their report on February 24, 2007, acknowledging the

existence of “an old drainage feature . . . [that had] been filled in along the eastern section of the

planned aircraft pad.” (Doc. # 66 Ex. 15). According to Glenn Construction, this supplemental

report was initially withheld by BWSC and only forwarded to Glenn Construction after it had

stopped work due to the soil conditions. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 2–3). 

9

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 9 of 78
Project Coordinator at BWSC, to include in the Requests for Proposals that “the largest

anticipated column load is approximately 70” kps. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 1). In September of

2006, Persing received estimated column loads for a metal building of the same size and

shape as the Project’s hangar. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 2). However, Glenn Construction claims

that these were “generic designs” that “did not contain several features specific to the

Project that would add additional . . . loads, including sprinkler and fire suppression

systems and a ten ton crane.” (Doc. # 66, at 4). According to Glenn Construction,

BWSC included these generic loads into the Requests for Proposals without recalculating

them “to reflect the increase caused by these additional features.” (Id.). On December

18, 2006, BWSC issued final construction plans establishing that it was “solely

responsible” for the design of the foundation, including the columns. (Id. (citing Doc. #

66 Ex. 4)).

Glenn Construction claims that BWSC knew of the miscalculated loads. On

January 3, 2007, a bidder and potential contractor e-mailed BWSC stating that its own

metal building manufacturer had calculated an approximate column load of 164 kps for

one of the columns—over twice as much as originally calculated. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 5). The

bidder confirmed this load calculation two weeks later and asked BWSC to review the

loads and determine whether the foundations needed to be redesigned. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 6).

Despite this information, the drawings given to the bidders reflected only a 76 kps load.

These same drawings were later incorporated into the Contract. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 7).

10

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 10 of 78
Eventually, as discussed further below, BWSC revised these drawings during the Project

to reflect increased column loads.

D. Problems with the Metal Hangar Designs

While BWSC was solely responsible for the design and construction of the

foundation, Glenn Construction contracted with a metal building manufacturer—OSI

Building Systems, Inc. (“OSI”)—to design and build the metal hangar. (Doc. # 50, at 5).

According to Glenn Construction, BWSC represented at a pre-bid meeting that it “would

send a structural engineer to whomever the metal building subcontractor was to review

metal building submittals on site.” (Doc. # 66, at 6 (citing Doc. # 56 Ex. 2, Cole Dep.

139:1–141:2); Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 1–2). Cole, BWSC’s coordinator on the

Project, admitted that such a practice would be atypical but that it would expedite the

schedule by allowing the engineers to review the materials together and avoid “lag time

for deliveries.” (Doc. # 56 Ex. 2, Cole Dep. 139:20–140:4; see also Doc. # 66 Ex. 9,

Wolfe Aff. at 1–2). BWSC claims that its intent throughout the Project was to expedite

the review of submittals, including by “sending engineers to the site of the metal building

manufacturer.” (Doc. # 50, at 3 (citing Doc. # 56 Ex. 3, Mott Dep. 33:14–34:11)).

In order to design and fabricate the hangar, OSI needed a set of drawings. BWSC

instructed Glenn Construction to have its subcontractors access BWSC’s website and

download drawings as needed. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 5). BWSC provided the

website address, username, and password required to access the drawings and “advised

11

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 11 of 78
[Glenn Construction] to forward it to all subcontractors and suppliers for their use.” (Id.).

However, the drawings posted by BWSC on the website and downloaded for use by OSI

“were obsolete and not identical to the printed sets provided to Glenn Construction.”

(Id.). However, because both drawings were stamped “ISSUED FOR

10

CONSTRUCTION, Dated 12/18/2006,” Cole admitted that it was impossible to discern

from the scanned drawings on the website that they were not final. Wolfe testified that

the miscalculation of the loads and posting of obsolete drawings combined to

significantly delay the Project. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 5–6).

As Wolfe testified, “[i]t takes 12–16 weeks to fabricate a metal building once

plans are approved.” (Id. at 6). On March 5, 2007, Glenn Construction notified BWSC

that the OSI drawings would be available for BWSC’s review on March 13, 2007. (Id.).

However, despite BWSC’s pre-bid promise to review the drawings on site, Cole informed

Wolfe that BWSC would not do so unless Glenn Construction paid for the cost of sending

the engineer. (Id.). On March 13, 2007, OSI completed the design based on the

11

 Indeed, Wolfe testified that BWSC “acknowledged . . . that the drawings on the 10

website had not been revised as the ones provided on paper.” (Id.). The drawings on the website

included two notes concerning load not included in the final hard copies. (Doc. # 56 Ex. 2, Cole

Dep. 121:18–124:7). The failure to remove these loads on the scanned copies resulted in them

showing “a higher loading” than the final paper copies because the notes concerned “additional

loads that had already been included in the collateral loads.” (Id. 123:18–124:7). Glenn

Construction contends that these notes “would affect the OSI design of the hangar

superstructure.” (Doc. # 66, at 12). 

 Wolfe further testified that when he complained, Cole “admitted that even if Glenn 11

[Construction] paid the cost, BWSC would not be able to send a licensed Alabama engineer who

could approve OSI submittals.” (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 6).

12

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 12 of 78
obsolete drawings downloaded from the website. (Id.). BWSC received OSI’s drawings

through the mail on March 14, 2007. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 16). BWSC determined that the

drawings were incorrect and provided comments within 24 hours. (Id.).

On March 22, 2007, BWSC received a second submittal from OSI. (Id.). Wolfe

claims that BWSC promised to return their comments the “next day.” (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9,

Wolfe Aff. at 6). However, BWSC again returned the submittal on April 3, 2007 with

instructions to “revise and resubmit.” (Doc. # 66 Ex. 16). During an April 4, 2007

conference call, the parties realized that scanned drawings OSI used were obsolete. (Doc.

# 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 7; see also id. Exs. 17–18). The following day, Glenn

Construction submitted a revised schedule indicating that the time for completing the

metal hangar had been pushed back by two months. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 7).

Finally, on April 19, 2007, OSI mailed submittals based on the correct drawings to

BWSC, who received them the next day. (See id.; Doc. # 66 Ex. 16). At this time, Glenn

Construction stated its belief that the planned installation of a twenty-foot crane would be

impossible because “[t]he combination of the loading requirements and a height

limitation on the building would not allow a 20-foot crane lift height.” (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9,

Wolfe Aff. at 7–8). On May 1, 2007, BWSC disapproved OSI’s designs, in part, because

they could not meet the twenty-foot crane height requirement. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe

Aff. at 9). Later in May, BWSC suggested changing the slope of the hangar building to

accommodate the crane height requirements; however, Glenn Construction alleges that

13

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 13 of 78
such a change would require OSI to completely redesign the hangar. (Id.). “On May 9,

2007, OSI notified BWSC [that] . . . the hangar could not be built even as originally

designed by BWSC.” (Id. at 10; see also Doc. # 66, at 15). On May 13, 2007, BWSC

again told OSI to “revise and resubmit” their drawings. (Doc. # 66, at 15). Eventually,

Bell Aero approved a crane height of less than twenty feet. (Wolfe Aff., Ex. 9, at 8). OSI

notified Glenn Construction that the fourth and final design package would be ready for

review on May 18, 2007. (Id.). That day, BWSC sent engineer Michael Petrin (“Petrin”)

to review the documents in Montgomery, Alabama. (Doc. # 69 Ex. 4, Ashley Dep.

12

27:7–28:8).

E. Problems with the Foundation’s Pedestals

As previously discussed, BWSC included anticipated column loads for the

foundations of approximately 70 kps in the Contract. However, on May 17, 2007, the day

before BWSC approved OSI’s final drawings for hangar, Dan Bartholomew

(“Bartholomew”)—BWSC’s structural engineer of record for the Project—issued a

revised set of structural drawings that listed anticipated column loads as high as 141 kps.

(Doc. # 66 Ex. 8). The underground stream limited how deep the foundation could go

into the ground. According to Glenn Construction, the shallower depth and the increased

loads increased the requirements for the pedestals bearing the loads, including the

pedestal size and the amount of reinforcing steel needed. (Doc. # 66, at 17). These

 Glenn Construction designated Stuart Ashley (“Ashley”), a professional engineer at 12

OSI, as a non-retained expert witness.

14

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 14 of 78
changes particularly affected two types of pedestals: the type P-3 pedestals located along

the side walls of the hangar and designed to bear the majority of the loads and the type P3B pedestals located under the corners of the hangar supporting the hangar doors.

Additionally, the new drawings added new P-3B pedestals that did not appear in the

original drawings from December of 2006. (Id.).

With respect to the P-3 pedestals, Glenn Construction alleges that it’s reinforcing

subcontractor could not fit the reinforcing bars required by the revised drawings into the

space indicated. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 11). When Glenn Construction sought

clarification from BWSC’s on-site representative, the representative allegedly

acknowledged an apparent engineering design problem and contacted the BWSC

structural engineer. (Id.). According to Glenn Construction, after a ten-minute phone call

and without checking structural design calculations, BWSC’s representative conceded

that the designs were defective and told Glenn Construction to deviate from the new

designs. (Id.). BWSC provided the reinforcing subcontractor with a revised plan for the

13

P-3 pedestals; however, Glenn Construction informed BWSC that its drawings did not

show which direction to orientate the hook on the dowels used in the reinforcements.

(Id.). Glenn Construction also informed BWSC that its drawings were not done to scale

 Specifically, the reinforcing subcontractor found a conflict between the reinforcing 13

bars, anchor bolts, and sheer lug end of the dowels needed to attach the bars of reinforced steel. 

BWSC’s representative removed two of the reinforced bars, positioned the remaining bars, and

instructed Glenn Construction to install the foundations using six dowels with a bend instead of

the eight pieces indicated on the plans. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. At 11). 

15

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 15 of 78
and did not accurately show dimensions. (Id.). On July 5, 2007, Glenn Construction

issued a formal Request for Information seeking clarification as to the reinforcing bars’

placement in the drawings for the P-3 pedestals. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 22). That same day,

Bartholomew issued two new revised drawings for the P-3 pedestals.

On July 11, 2007, Glenn Construction issued a Request for Information regarding

problems with the P-3B pedestals. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 25). BWSC engineer Eriks Jekabsons

(“Jekabsons”) issued a response instructing Glenn Construction to remove two of the

reinforcement bars. (Id.). That same day, Glenn Construction issued another Request for

Information about the positioning of the anchor bolts in the revised drawings, and

Jakabsens responded that the drawings were “for illustrative purposes only” and directed

Glenn Construction to “field adjust to accommodate [the] anchor bolts.” (Doc. # 66 Ex.

26). The following day, Glenn Construction issued another Request for Information

asking BWSC to run the reinforcement data through a three-dimensional (“3D”) software

program. Glenn Construction claimed that the program would show BWSC the

impossibility of fitting the designs into the space. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 27). Glenn

Construction told BWSC that “the drawings are inadequate to accurately locate the

reinforcements” and asked BWSC to revise them. (Id.). Jekabsons again responded that

the drawings were “for illustrative purposes only.”

On July 23, 2007, Mott sent an email to BWSC employee’s expressing concern

about producing a 3D drawing. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 29). Specifically, he was worried

16

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 16 of 78
because, “[u]p until this point, [BWSC] had told [Glenn Construction] that it is not

[BWSC’s] responsibility to do this” and because he could “see [Glenn Construction]

saying that if BWSC had done this four weeks ago, there would not [have been] any

delays with the rebar placement.” (Id.). That same day, Petrin responded and told Mott

that he had “asked [BWSC’s] structural group to draw a plan and section (not a 3D

drawing) showing all bars drawn to scale in the correct locations.” (Id.). Petrin assured

Mott that the drawings were “intended for internal use” and not for issuance to Glenn

Construction. (Id.). Petrin testified that he asked for these to-scale drawings to make

sure that BWSC’s designs were possible. (Doc. # 69 Ex. 1, Petrin Dep. 161:7–164:18).

Glenn Construction never saw the internal drawings during the Project. On July 25,

14

2007, Glenn Construction again sent a Request for Information stating that its “drawings

do not have dimensions for the proper placement of the reinforcement.” (Doc. # 66 Ex.

28).

Glenn Construction claims that BWSC admitted on July 27, 2007 that it was

physically impossible to fit the required number and type of reinforcement bars in the

space called for in the drawings. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 13). BWSC then

instructed Glenn Construction to stagger the reinforcing bars so that they would overlap

 Initially, the parties believed that these internal, allegedly to-scale drawings were no 14

longer in existence. (Doc. # 66 Ex. 30; see also Doc. # 78). However, after the motions for

summary judgment were filed, the parties were able to locate the internal drawings in BWSC’s

initial disclosures. These internal drawings as well as a second affidavit by Wolfe are the subject

of Glenn Construction’s motion to supplement. (Doc. # 78). 

17

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 17 of 78
each other. (Id.). BWSC, Glenn Construction, and Bell Aero held an on-site meeting.

(Id.). Neither of the two persons sent by BWSC were licensed structural engineers, but

they told Glenn Construction to “field adjust” in placing the reinforcing steel. (Id.).

15

Wolfe told BWSC that the structural engineer of record would need to approve any

changes to the placement or permit someone to make that approval on his behalf. (Id.).

On August 14, 2007, Glenn Construction requested that the structural engineer of record,

Bartholomew, inspect and approve the pedestal reinforcement. (Id. at 15). BWSC agreed

to send a representative to inspect the pedestals. (Id.). On August 17, 2007, BWSC sent

Robert Caster (“Caster”), an employee of BWSC’s consulting structural engineer PSI,

instead of Bartholomew. (Id.). Glenn Construction alleges that Castor twice falsely

represented that he was a licensed professional structural engineer in Alabama. (Id.).

On August 20, 2007, Glenn Construction outlined the continuing problems with

the reinforcement bars to BWSC, stating in pertinent part:

We are at a work stoppage on the P3 & P3B pedestals due to continuing

conflict with embedded items, anchor bolts and reinforcement. We have

repeatedly requested accurately dimensioned or scalable drawings to properly

[do] the reinforcement in these pedestals. BWSC has refused to provide these

drawings . . . . Had BWSC taken the time to review the ‘detail drawings’ as

 On August 2, 2007, BWSC published and distributed Sketch No. SK-P3B which 15

indicated how the bearing plates on the reinforcing bars bearing plates were to overlap. (Id.). 

However, this drawing failed to have the large nuts that held the plates in position drawn to scale. 

(Id.). Glenn Construction alleges that had BWSC drawn to scale, then it “would have discovered

that it was not possible to overlap the plates as indicated because of interference with the large

nuts and the adjacent steel bearing plates.” (Id.). Glenn Construction alleges that it advised

BWSC of this fact. (Id.). 

18

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 18 of 78
requested they would have seen enormous conflict with these items and

corrected them weeks ago. These are structural issues that can only be

resolved by the structural engineer of record. This delay and obvious failure

to cooperate has caused extensive delay of this project that continues today.

(Doc. # 68 Ex. 2). That same day, Glenn Construction sent a letter to Bell Aero

requesting assistance on the problems with the P3 and P3-B pedestals. (Doc. # 68 Ex. 3).

Glenn Construction explained that, as per the Contract and building codes, BWSC needed

to provide dimensioned drawings and that Glenn Construction could not place the

reinforcements without these drawings.

Four days later, BWSC informed Glenn Construction that its “senior professional

structural engineers [had] review[ed] the plans multiple times and . . . determined that

there [were] no design problems with the plans.” (Doc. # 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 16).

Glenn Construction then “requested a copy of any and all reports issued by the consulting

structural engineer PSI.” (Id.). BWSC refused to provide the reports but agreed to

inspect the pedestals and provide comments on any deficiencies. (Id.). Glenn

Construction then told BWSC that it would be ready for installation of the pedestals on

September 5, 2007 if BWSC would have a structural engineer available that day. (Id.).

On September 5, 2007, BWSC sent a licensed structural engineer to the site. The

structural engineer told Glenn Construction to remove specific types of reinforcing bar

assemblies and to place them into different locations than indicated on the drawings. (Id.

at 17). Glenn Construction contends that it was generally able to proceed with its work

on these pedestals unimpeded from that day forward. (Id.).

19

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 19 of 78
F. Glenn Construction’s Subcontractors

Glenn Construction also alleges that BWSC interfered with its subcontractors.

For example, Glenn Construction contends that “BWSC directed the site work contractor

to tear out and raise a storm water inlet” even though it had been installed according to

the plans and specifications. (Id. at 21). Glenn Construction protested this action. (Id. at

21). Glenn Construction also alleges that BWSC directed the site work contractor to

perform extra work that should have been covered by a change order. (Id. at 20).

According to Glenn Construction, BWSC later changed its mind. (Id.).

According to Glenn Construction, BWSC and Bell Aero pressured it into firing its

concrete contractor, Skipper Construction Company (“Skipper Construction”). BWSC

allegedly later hired that contractor. Bell Aero points out that Skipper Construction and

another subcontractor, Team Building Construction, were not licensed as required by

Alabama law. See Alabama’s General Contractor’s Practice Act (“AGCPA”), Alabama

Code § 34-8-1 et. seq.; Doc. # 57 Exs. 39–40. Wolfe stated that Skipper Construction

provided him “with a false contractor’s number” while Team Building “did little or no

actual work on the [P]roject.” Wolfe testified that he did not check with the Alabama

Licensing Board for General Contractors to see if Skipper Construction was licensed, nor

did he get any references from Skipper Construction. (Doc. 57 Ex. 3, Wolfe Aff.

228:11–229:15). Bell Aero further points out that Glenn Construction’s subcontractors

also delayed the Project and that Glenn Construction back-charged Skipper Construction

20

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 20 of 78
for $415,548.62 for delays and defective work. (Doc. # 55, at 5; id. Ex. 45).

G. Glenn Construction’s Alleged Claim Submission and Completion of the

Project

In the midst of the problems associated with the Project, Glenn Construction

contends that it submitted its first claim on July 6, 2007 requesting that BWSC approve

an increase the Contract price and an extension of the Contract time. This claim

described the allegations regarding the underground stream, the posting of obsolete

drawings to the website, the revised drawings for the foundations, and BWSC’s failure to

provide to-scale drawings. (Doc. # 68 Ex. 10). However, on August 7, 2007, BWSC

16

requested additional information to determine the extent of damages. (Id. Ex. 11). Glenn

Construction replied on August 14, 2007 and stated that damages had increased since the

claim’s filing. (Id. Ex. 12). Nearly a month later, on September 25, 2007, BWSC

responded again to the July 6, 2007 claim and again asked Glenn Construction for more

documentation. (Id. Ex. 42). Wolfe testified that, on September 27, 2007, all three

parties “agreed to table any claims process to allow construction to proceed.” (Doc. # 66

Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 18).

 Under the claims process in the Contract, Glenn Construction must submit written 16

notice of a claim or dispute to BWSC and Bell Aero within thirty days of “the start of the event

giving rise” to the claim. (Doc. # 57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 10.05(A)). Glenn Construction

must then provide notice of the amount or extent of the claim and “supporting data” within sixty

days of the start of the event unless BWSC allows additional time for it to submit supporting

data. (Id.). Bell Aero is given thirty days to respond after receipt of the last of these

submissions. BWSC is to act as an impartial judge and resolve the dispute between the parties. 

(Id.§ 9.09(B)).

21

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 21 of 78
According to Glenn Construction, it substantially completed the Project on

February 28, 2008 and attempted to schedule an inspection of the hangar building. (Doc.

# 66 Ex. 9, Wolfe Aff. at 18). BWSC declared substantial completion on March 14,

2008. (Doc. # 68 Ex. 4). Three days later, BWSC certified Glenn Construction’s

application for all remaining payments under the Contract except for $6,933.33 needed to

fully complete the Project and the five percent retainage of $302,750.62. (Doc. # 68 Ex.

5). By approving this application, BWSC “certified . . . that to the best of [BWSC’s]

knowledge, information and belief the Work has progressed as indicated, the quality of

the Work is in accordance with the Contract Documents, and the Contractor is entitled to

payment of the AMOUNT CERTIFIED.” (Id.). By this point, the total Contract price

had increased to $6,061,945.89 and BWSC had approved payments totaling

$5,752,261.74, including those requested in this application. (Id.). The parties had also

increased the Contract time by 15 days and gave Glenn Construction credit for an

additional 14 days for delays at the beginning of the Project. (Doc. 55, at 5; Doc. # 57

Ex. 5). Thus, the Project was deemed 98.89% complete. (Doc. # 68 Ex. 5).

However, BWSC had not yet ruled on Glenn Construction’s alleged claim for additional

increases in time and price.

On June 18, 2008, Glenn Construction issued an application for final payment,

seeking payment of the balance of the Contract and the retainage. (Doc. # 68 Ex. 15). On

July 7, 2008, BWSC sent a letter to Bell Aero advising it not to process any paperwork

22

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 22 of 78
from Glenn Construction without BWSC’s review. (Id. Ex. 16). BWSC claimed that

Glenn Construction’s application was deficient because Glenn Construction had failed to

(1) complete items on the punch list, (2) provide submittal documents, (3) provide its

subcontractors’ lien wavers, and (4) provide an all-bills-paid affidavit. On September 3,

2008, Glenn Construction requested a final decision on its July of 2007 claims and

allegedly submitted additional claims. (Id. Ex. 20). Glenn Construction and BWSC

corresponded back and forth over the next several months whereby BWSC sought

additional documentation and Glenn Construction insisted that it had complied with the

Contract’s requirements for submittals of claims. (Id. Exs. 21–29). According to

Defendants, Glenn Construction did not follow the Contract’s claim procedure because it

refused to provide the proper supporting data. On January 12, 2009, BWSC informed

Glenn Construction that it had not filed a cognizable claim under the Contract because of

the lack of supporting data. However, it went ahead and denied the alleged claims.

Glenn Construction contends that it was not aware of any decision as to the claims until

early February 2009.

II. Procedural History

Glenn Construction filed suit on March 25, 2009. On November 9, 2010, Bell

Aero filed its first motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 32). On January 14, 2011,

17

 This first summary judgment motion stemmed from requests for admissions which 17

Glenn Construction which became admitted by operation of law when Glenn Construction did

not respond. On November 30, 2010, Glenn Construction was permitted to amend its responses. 

(Doc. # 43). 

23

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 23 of 78
BWSC and Bell Aero filed two more motions for summary judgment. (Docs. # 49, 54).

Glenn Construction responded on February 7, 2011 and included an affidavit by Mac

Brittingham (“Brittingham”), a retained expert. (Docs. #66–68). BWSC moved to strike

Brittingham’s affidavit. (Doc. # 75). On February 16, 2011, Glenn Construction filed a

motion to supplement its evidentiary submission for its response to summary judgment.

(Doc. # 78). BWSC opposed this motion to supplement and moved to strike it. (Doc. #

82). Finally, on February 28, 2011, Glenn Construction moved to strike the affidavits of

two of BWSC’s non-retained experts. (Doc. # 80).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate “if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). The party asking for

summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex.

18

 “An issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence, or if it is created by evidence

18

that is ‘merely colorable’ or is ‘not significantly probative.’” Lewis, 908 F. Supp. at 943–44.

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). “Similarly, a fact is not

material unless it is identified by the controlling substantive law as an essential element of the

24

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 24 of 78
477 U.S. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there

is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present

evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of

proof. Id. at 322–23; see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115–16 (11th

Cir. 1993) (“For issues, however, on which the non-movant would bear the burden of

proof at trial, . . . ‘[t]he moving party may simply show[]—that is, point[] out to the

district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s

case.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437–38 (11th

Cir. 1991)).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant must “go beyond the

pleadings” and show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see

also Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely

disputed must support the assertion by (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials

cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse

party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”). To avoid summary

judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 944 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

25

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 25 of 78
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (emphasis added). A plaintiff must present evidence

demonstrating that he can establish the basic elements of his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322. A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the

non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving

party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. After the nonmoving party has responded to

the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

DISCUSSION

I. BWSC’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Fraud

Glenn Construction brings the following fraud claims: (1) BWSC fraudulently

suppressed the existence of the underground stream; (2) BWSC fraudulently

misrepresented the provision of structural engineering services; (3) BWSC fraudulently

misrepresented the turnaround of submittal approvals; (4) BWSC fraudulently

misrepresented that its original metal building designs were adequate; and (5) BWSC

misrepresented that its foundation design were adequate. (Doc. # 1, at 50–52 ¶¶

221–229).

19

 In its response, Glenn Construction appears to contend that it has fraudulent 19

suppression claims regarding the column loads and BWSC’s internal pedestal drawings. (Doc. #

26

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 26 of 78
i. Fraudulent Suppression of the Underground Stream’s Existence

Under Alabama law, a plaintiff must prove five elements to establish a claim for

fraudulent suppression:

(1) that the defendant had a duty to disclose an existing material fact; (2) that

the defendant suppressed that existing material fact; (3) that the defendant had

actual knowledge of the fact; (4) that the defendant’s suppression of the fact

induced the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting; and (5) that the plaintiff

suffered actual damage as a proximate result.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 323–24 (Ala. 1999) (citations

omitted); see also Ala. Code § 6-5-102 (“Suppression of a material fact which the party is

under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud.”). BWSC contends that Glenn

Construction cannot establish the third element—namely, that BWSC had actual

knowledge of the underground stream prior to Glenn Construction’s discovery of it. See

Glass v. S. Wrecker Sales, 990 F. Supp. 1344, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Albritton, J.) (“An

action for suppression will lie only if the defendant actually knows the fact alleged to be

suppressed.”) (citing McGarry v. Flournoy, 624 So. 2d 1359 (Ala. 1993)). Glenn

Construction, on the other hand, argues that it has presented sufficient admissible

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether BWSC had actual

knowledge of the underground stream prior to Glenn Construction’s discovery of it.

66, at 50). A close reading of the Complaint reveals no factual allegations supporting such

claims. As such, Glenn Construction cannot bring the fraudulent suppression claims regarding

the BWSC internal drawings and the column loads. See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382

F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that the liberal pleading standard does

not allow a plaintiff to raise a new claim at the summary judgment stage). However, the Court

will consider this evidence as it relates, if at all, to the claims properly pled in the Complaint.

27

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 27 of 78
Specifically, Glenn Construction points to the following facts: (1) BWSC had been

involved in several projects on the property in question since 1997; (2) BWSC was aware

of and had several geotechnical reports done on that property before December of 2006;

(3) BWSC had a topographical map prior to 2005 which showed the presence of an old

stream within the Project’s location; and (4) a contractor who had previously worked with

BWSC on a project at the site informed Wolfe that he had encountered similar issues with

underground water and had advised BWSC of it.

Again, BWSC contends that “there is absolutely no admissible evidence that

BWSC had any knowledge of the underground stream prior to its discovery during

construction.” (Doc. # 50, at 10; Doc. # 76, at 12). Although BWSC does not explain it

as such, it appears that the contractor’s statements about previously discovering and

advising BWSC of underground water is inadmissible hearsay that this Court cannot

consider on summary judgment because it is not reducible to admissible form at trial. See

Pritchard v. S. Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1135 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[The plaintiff] cannot

use inadmissible hearsay to defeat summary judgment when that hearsay will not be

reducible to admissible form at trial.”); see also Macuba v. DeBoer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1325

(11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court impermissibly considered inadmissible

hearsay because it would not be admissible at trial under an exception to the hearsay rule).

However, BWSC fails to explain or argue why the remaining pieces of evidence are

inadmissible.

28

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 28 of 78
Upon consideration of these first three pieces of evidence, this Court is satisfied

that a reasonable jury could find that BWSC possessed documents—either the

geotechnical reports or the cited topographical map—showing the underground stream’s

existence because of its prior work on other projects in the location. Thus, a reasonable

jury could find that BWSC had actual knowledge of the underground stream. See e.g.,

Roland v. Cooper, 768 So. 2d 400, 406 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (holding that documents in

the defendant’s possession which demonstrated the fact he allegedly suppressed were

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact). In other words, if a jury finds that

BWSC possessed these documents, it could also find that BWSC had actual knowledge of

the underground stream. On the other hand, a reasonable jury could find that BWSC had

no actual knowledge of the underground stream. Such a genuine issue of material fact

precludes this Court from granting BWSC summary judgment on this claim. Thus,

BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49), is due to be DENIED with respect

to the claim of fraudulent suppression regarding the underground stream’s existence.

ii. The Remaining Fraud Claims

Alabama law provides causes of action for both fraud, also called legal fraud, and

promissory fraud. Under Alabama law, “fraud is the false representation of a material

existing fact inducing reliance and causing damages.” Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v.

Doan, 529 So. 2d 201, 206 (Ala. 1988) (citing Ala. Code §§ 6-5-101 (1975) et seq.) (per

curium) (emphasis in original). Thus, to establish a prima facie case of fraudulent

29

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 29 of 78
misrepresentation under Alabama law, a plaintiff must show “(1) that [the defendant]

made a false misrepresentation, (2) that the misrepresentation involved a material

[existing] fact, (3) that the [plaintiff] relied on the misrepresentation, and (4) that the

misrepresentation damaged the [plaintiff].” AmerUs Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 5 So. 3d 1200,

1207 (Ala. 2008); accord Eley v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 2:09-cv-958-MEF, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 16528, at *29–30 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 18, 2011) (Fuller, C.J.); AstraZeneca LP

v. State, 41 So. 3d 15, 26 (Ala. 2009). There is no requirement of fraudulent intent when

bringing a claim for fraud based upon misrepresentation of a material existing fact. Ala.

Code § 6-5-101 (“Misrepresentations of material fact made willfully to deceive, or

recklessly without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake

and innocently and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal fraud.”) (emphasis

added); accord Eley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16528 at *28; Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.

Warren, 574 So. 2d 758, 766–77 (Ala. 1990); Coaker v. Washington Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,

646 So. 2d 38, 42 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).

Promissory fraud, on the other hand, occurs by the failure to perform a

promise—i.e. the failure to perform some promised future act. See, e.g. Eley, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 16528 at *39 n.12; Scott v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 749 F. Supp.

1089, 1093 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (Hobbs, J.); Brown-Marx Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Sav.

Bank, 703 F.2d 1361, 1370–71 (N.D. Ala. 1983). In order to establish promissory fraud,

a plaintiff must also prove “that at the time the promise was made, there was an intent not

30

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 30 of 78
to perform the promised act.” Green Tree Acceptance, 529 So. 2d at 206 (citing Ala.

Code § 6-5-102; Purcell Co. v. Spriggs Enters., Inc., 431 So. 2d 515, 519 (Ala. 1983)).

Furthermore, the mere failure to fulfill the promise is insufficient to establish an intent to

deceive. See, e.g., Scott, 749 F. Supp. at 1093 (“[U]nder Alabama law the failure to

perform a promise is not itself sufficient to support a charge of fraud. Absent any

evidence from the plaintiff that the representation was made with the intent to deceive,

the fraud count fails.”) (citations omitted); Brown-Marx, 703 F.2d at 1370 (“[U]nder

Alabama law failure to fulfill promises does not give rise to actionable fraud unless it is

alleged and proved that the representations were made with intent to deceive and with no

intent at the time the representations were made to carry them out. Failure to perform a

promise is not of itself adequate evidence of intent to support an action for fraud.”)

(citations omitted).

a. Fraudulent Misrepresentation of the Turnaround of

Submittal Approvals: BWSC’s Pre-Bid Statement Regarding

the Review of the Hangar Submittals

Here, BWSC argues that its representation during the pre-bid meeting that it would

send a structural engineer to review metal building submittals on site is a claim for

promissory fraud. (Doc. # 50, at 11). This Court agrees that this representation was not

made regarding a material existing fact, but rather was a promise to perform a future act.

See, e.g., Penmont, LLC v. Blue Ridge Piedmont, LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273 (M.D.

Ala. 2009) (Thompson, J.) (holding that the defendant’s statement that it would return a

31

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 31 of 78
non-refundable earnest purchase deposit if a commercial real-estate transaction did not go

through was promissory fraud). BWSC further argues that Glenn Construction cannot

establish an intent to deceive at the time this misrepresentation was made. (Doc. # 50, at

11; Doc. # 76, at 12–13). Glenn Construction correctly points out that “[t]he question of

the defendant’s intention in making the alleged representation is ordinarily a question of

fact for the jury.” (Doc. # 66, at 48) (quoting Hillcrest Ctr., Inc. v. Rone, 711 So. 2d 901,

905 (Ala. 1997) (citations omitted)).

However, the only evidence before this Court with respect to this promise is that

BWSC refused to send their structural engineer to the metal building manufacturer unless

Glenn Construction paid for it and that, when a structural engineer was sent months later,

it was not the structural engineer of record. (Doc. # 66, at 6). “[T]he plaintiff must show

more than that the defendant failed to fulfill the promised act.” Hillcrest, 711 So. 2d at

905 (quoting Nat’l Sec. Ins. Co. v. Donaldson, 664 So. 2d 871, 876 (Ala. 1995)); see also

Rhodes v. Unisys Corp., 170 Fed. Appx. 681, 683 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary

judgment on a promissory fraud claim because the plaintiff’s only evidence of an intent to

deceive was an “attempt[] to rely on an inference of intent not to perform, which might be

drawn from [the defendant’s] failure to perform, rather than providing any actual

evidence of [the defendant’s] intent to deceive.”). Indeed, Glenn Construction makes no

argument with respect to the promise to send a structural engineer on site to review the

32

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 32 of 78
submittals for the metal hangar. Because there is no evidence before this Court

20

sufficient to establish an intent to deceive regarding the promise to send a structural

engineer on site to review the metal hangar submittals, BWSC is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law as to this claim. Thus, BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. #

49), is due to be GRANTED with respect to the claim of promissory fraud regarding the

pre-bid promise to send a structural engineer to review the metal hangar submittals on

site.

b. Fraudulent Misrepresentation of the Provision of Structural

Engineering Services: Statements Made During

Construction about Sending a Structural Engineer On Site

to Inspect the Foundation

Glenn Construction also brings promissory fraud claims based upon BWSC’s

several promises during construction to send a structural engineer on site to review the

issues with the foundation. (Doc. # 66, at 48–49). In support of this claim, Glenn

Construction points to BWSC’s email exchange regarding the production of internal

drawings and Mott’s concern that Glenn Construction would rely upon them to claim that

 In its Response, Glenn Construction contends that a jury could find that BWSC

20

“intended to deceive Glenn Construction on several occasions.” (Doc. # 66, at 48). It appears

that this argument is relating to the promises to send a structural engineer on site to review the

issues with the foundation, not the promise to have the structural engineer review the metal

building submittals on site. (Id. at 48–49 (arguing that the alleged concealment of internal

drawings relating to the foundation and the refusal to send a structural engineer “to perform an

onsite inspection” evidenced an intent to deceive because it would establish BWSC’s plans for

the foundation were wrong)). None of this relates to an intent to deceive during the pre-bid

meeting regarding BWSC’s promise to send a structural engineer to review submittals for the

metal hangar.

33

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 33 of 78
the weeks-long delays in the reinforcement bar placing was BWSC’s fault. (Id. at 48).

Glenn Construction contends that “a jury could also infer from this exchange that BWSC

did not intend to send a structural engineer to perform an [on-site] inspection at the time

the promise was made.” (Id.; see also id. at 49 (“[T]he jury could infer that the drawing

confirmed Glenn Construction’s complaints about the P-3 and P-3B pedestals, and that

BWSC did not intend to send a structural engineer to the site because his visit [would]

similarly confirm that the drawings kept from Glenn Construction were right (and

BWSC’s initial plans were wrong), and that BWSC would be ‘liable’ to Glenn

Construction for delays based on the confirmation.”)). BWSC contends that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed evidence demonstrates its intent to

expedite the Project. (Doc. # 76, at 13 (citing Doc. # 56 Ex. 3, Mott Dep. 33:14–34:11)).

However, this Court agrees with Glenn Construction that there is genuine issue of

material fact as to whether BWSC intended to deceive Glenn Construction when it

repeatedly promised to send a structural engineer to review the issues with the foundation

on-site. Mott’s email expressed concern about rendering 3D, to-scale drawings because

he could “see [Glenn Construction] saying that if BWSC had done this four weeks ago,

there would not [have been] any delays with the rebar placement.” (Doc. # 66 Ex. 29).

Indeed, Petrin responded to this concern by saying that the drawings would be kept

internal and never given to Glenn Construction. (Id.). A jury could reasonably infer that

BWSC did not want provide Glenn Construction with these drawings because they could

34

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 34 of 78
potentially demonstrate that BWSC’s designs for the foundation were incorrect and that

Glenn Construction was not at fault for the delay in placing reinforcement bars.

Similarly, a jury could reasonably infer based on these emails that BWSC did not intend

to send a structural engineer to perform an on-site inspection because that could also

show Glenn Construction that the designs were defective and that Glenn Construction

was not at fault for the delays. Because a reasonable jury could find that BWSC intended

to deceive Glenn Construction when it repeatedly said it would send a structural engineer

to review the foundation issues on site, BWSC is not entitled to summary judgment on

these promissory fraud claims. Thus, BWSC’s motion for summary judgment is due to be

DENIED with respect to the promissory fraud claim regarding the promises made during

construction to send a structural engineer to review the foundations on site.

c. The Fraudulent Misrepresentation Claim Regarding the Adequacy

of the Designs for the Hangar and the Foundation

With respect to the fraud claims regarding the adequacy of the BWSC’s designs

for the metal building and the foundation, BWSC argues that it is entitled to summary

judgment because Glenn Construction “has offered no evidence that BWSC had any

knowledge that the structural design of the metal building and foundation were

inadequate.” (Doc. # 50, at 11). However, whether the designs were adequate when

BWSC made the representations relates to an existing fact and not a promise to perform

some act in the future. As previously stated, a Plaintiff need not establish an intent to

deceive when bringing a fraud claim based upon a material existing fact. Ala. Code § 6-

35

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 35 of 78
5-101 (“Misrepresentations of material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly

without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and

innocently and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal fraud.”) (emphasis added);

see also Eley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16528 at *28 (“[F]raud under Alabama law need

not include an intent to deceive or defraud.”) (citations omitted); Burlington, 574 So. 2d

at 766–77; Coaker, 646 So. 2d at 42. Because Glenn Construction need not establish that

BWSC knew that the designs were inadequate and because BWSC makes no further

argument with respect to these claims, BWSC is not entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Thus, BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49), is due to be DENIED

21

with respect to the representations concerning the adequacy of the designs for the metal

hangar and the foundation.

B. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

The elements for a claim of intentional interference with a contractual relationship

are as follows: (1) the existence of an enforceable contract; (2) of which the defendant

 Glenn Construction cites to Burlington, 574 So. 2d at 767, for the proposition that 21

statements of fact made recklessly, without knowledge, or by mistake, and acted upon are

actionable even without fraudulent intent. (Doc. # 66, at 49). Glenn Construction also contends

that, “[i]n other words, these drawings fraudulently misrepresented that the pedestals could be

constructed in the manner described.” (Id.). Although Glenn Construction does not make this

same argument with respect to the design of the metal hangar, it is clear that the issue of the

adequacy of the design for the metal building is also one relating to an existing fact. As courts

may only grant summary judgment where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), this Court cannot grant summary judgment to BWSC on the fraud claim

relating to the design of the metal building based upon BWSC’s alleged lack of knowledge where

the claim does not require knowledge.

36

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 36 of 78
knew; (3) to which the defendant was a stranger; (4) with which the defendant

intentionally interfered; and (5) damage. Compare White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II,

LLC, 32 So. 2d 5, 14 (Ala. 2009) (describing the elements of a claim for tortious

interference with a business relationship wherein the only difference is that the first

element is “the existence of protectible business relationship”) with Hope for Families &

Cmty. Serv. v. Warren, 721 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1077 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (Watkins, J.)

(explaining that tortious interference with a business relationship is a separate tort from

tortious interference with a contractual relationship because the latter “presupposes the

existence of an enforceable contract” but that “[o]therwise, the elements of both torts

overlap”); see also MAC East, LLC v. Shoney’s, 535 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“[A] tortious interference claim can be maintained only when the defendant is

independent of or a stranger to the relation or contract with which he allegedly

interfered.”) (citing Tom’s Foods, Inc. v. Carn, 896 So. 2d 443, 454 (Ala. 2004)).

Here, BWSC contends that it was not a “stranger” to the contractual relationship

between Glenn Construction and Bell Aero and, thus, cannot be liable for tortious

interference. (Doc. # 50, at 12–14). Glenn Construction contends that BWSC was a

stranger to the Contract to the extent that it acted outside of its legal rights under the

Contract. (Doc. # 66, at 51–54). Furthermore, Glenn Construction argues that BWSC

intentionally interfered with its contractual relationships with its subcontractors when it

provided designs directly to OSI over the website, directed Skipper Construction and the

37

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 37 of 78
site work contractor to perform extra work that should have been covered in a change

order, and directed the site work contractor to tear out a the properly installed storm water

inlet. (Id. at 52).

i. The Claims for Intentional Interference with the Contractual

Relations Between Glenn Construction and its Subcontractors

BWSC argues that Glenn Construction cannot bring tortious interference claims

based on the contractual relationships with the subcontractors because such claims were

not encompassed in the Complaint. (Doc. # 76, at 13). In support of this contention,

BWSC argues the following:

[Count 3] alleges that BWSC interfered with Glenn Construction’s

‘performance’ of its Contract. . . . Glenn Construction was to tender such

performance to the owner, Bell Aero. However, Plaintiff’s [Response] Brief

alleges that BWSC interfered with Glenn Construction’s Subcontractors

performance to Glenn Construction. Plaintiff has not alleged a cause of action

in its Complaint for tortious interference with those relationships.

(Id. at 13–14). “[I]f a plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a claim in [his] complaint, []he

may not amend [his] complaint through argument made in opposition to a defendant’s

motion for summary judgment.” Webster v. Wynne, No. 2:08-cv-849, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 136998, at *20 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 28, 2010) (Fuller, C.J.) (citing Gilmour, 382 F.3d

at 1314).

However, a review of the Complaint here reveals that Glenn Construction did, in

fact, sufficiently allege a claim for intentional interference with its contractual relations

with its subcontractors. Count 3 itself lays out a claim for such tortious interference with

38

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 38 of 78
the contractual relationships with the subcontractors based upon BWSC’s actions which

allegedly led to Bell Aero denying payment to Glenn Construction. (Doc. # 1, at 53 ¶ 234

(“BWSC also acted so as to prevent the timely payments of monies that were due and

owing by Bell Aero with the result that Glenn Construction has been made the subject of

claims of subcontractors and Glenn Construction has been damaged in its relationship

with said subcontractors and other valuable business contacts.”) (emphasis added)).

Additionally, Count 3 incorporates all prior paragraphs in the Complaint. (Id. at 52 ¶

230). These incorporated paragraphs includes sections entitled “Obsolete and Defective

Structural Drawings Prepared by BWSC and Posted on BWSC Website” and

“Interference with Subcontractors” which include the factual allegations underpinning

these claims. (Id. at 9–16 ¶¶ 43–86; id. at 39–40 ¶¶ 195–199). As BWSC makes no

further arguments regarding the claim of tortious interference with Glenn Construction’s

contractual relationships with the subcontractors, this Court finds that BWSC’s motion

for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49), is due to be DENIED with respect to the intentional

interference claims regarding the contractual relations between Glenn Construction and

its subcontractors.

ii. The Claims for Intentional Interference with the Contractual

Relations Between Glenn Construction and Bell Aero

With respect to the tortious interference claims regarding Glenn Construction’s

contractual relationship with Bell Aero, BWSC contends that it was not a stranger to the

Contract. That BWSC be a stranger to the Contract is a necessary element of Glenn

39

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 39 of 78
Construction’s prima facie case. See e.g., MAC East, 535 F.3d at 1297; Waddell & Reed,

Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1153 (Ala. 2003). Glenn

Construction cites to the case of Colonial Bank v. Patterson for the proposition that

“when there exists a tri-partite relationship between the parties, a party . . . can be liable

for tortuous interference when its conduct is not appropriate under its contract with the

other two parties.” (Doc. # 66, at 51 (citing Colonial Bank v. Patterson, 788 So. 2d 134,

138 (Ala. 2000), overruled on other grounds by White Sands Grp., 32 So. 3d at 14)).

Glenn Construction thus argues that BWSC was a stranger to the Contract because

BWSC did not act within its rights under the tri-partite relationship.

Glenn Construction’s argument arises from a misunderstanding of Alabama law.

The Alabama Supreme Court held in Colonial Bank that one cannot be liable for tortious

interference “when tripartite relationships exist and disputes arise between two of the

three parties” and the third party engages in conduct “that is appropriate under its contract

with the other two parties.” 788 So. 2d at 138 (citations omitted). However, it did not

hold that the opposite was true—i.e. that one whose conduct goes beyond its rights is

automatically a stranger to the contract between the two other members of the tri-partite

relationship. Indeed, this same argument was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in MAC

22

 Glenn Construction also relies upon Waddell, in which the plaintiff had argued that the 22

defendant must be a stranger to the contract because its conduct was not appropriate under its

contract with the other two parties. 875 So. 2d at 1155. However, the Alabama Supreme Court

did not decide this issue because it found that the defendant’s conduct was indeed appropriate

because it was “conduct a party has the legal right to take even if the plaintiff objects to the

conduct.” Thus, the Waddell court did not hold that one who acts outside of his legal rights is

40

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 40 of 78
East, which held that the district court erred in finding that, in a tri-partite relationship,

the defendant “effectively became a non-party or stranger to the business relation between

[the plaintiff] and [a third party]” when it engaged in an unauthorized course of conduct.

535 F.3d at 1297. The Eleventh Circuit explained that Alabama law recognizes multiple

situations in which a party is not a stranger to a contract. Mac East, 535 F.3d at 1297 (“A

defendant is not a stranger to a contract or business relationship when: (1) the defendant

is an essential entity to the purported injured relations; (2) the injured relations are

inextricably a part of or dependent upon the defendant’s contractual or business relations;

(3) the defendant would benefit economically from the alleged injured relations; or (4)

both the defendant and the plaintiff are parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of

contract relations.”) (quoting Waddell, 875 So. 2d at 1156); see also Edwards v. Prime,

Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, (11th Cir. 2010); Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga.

604, 608 ([I]n order for a defendant to be liable for tortious interference with contractual

relations, the defendant must be a stranger to both the contract and the business

relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract.”) (cited with approval by

Waddell, 875 So. 2d at 1154–55).

Here, it is undisputed that BWSC was hired as the engineer on the Project by Bell

Aero. Thus, the Contract between Bell Aero and Glenn Construction is “inextricably

dependent upon [BWSC’s] contractual or business relations” with Bell Aero. Mac East,

automatically a stranger for purposes of tortious interference. 

41

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 41 of 78
535 F.3d at 1297 (quoting Waddell, 875 So. 2d at 1156). Furthermore, BWSC’s

agreement to act as the engineer on the Project and its performance as engineer were

essential to formation of the Contract and the completion of the Project. See Lynn v.

Romar Marina Club, LLC, No. 07-0173-KD-C, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111333, at

*56–57 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2009) (holding that the defendant was not a stranger to a real

estate transaction where his financing was essential to the ability of the parties to the

contract to close on the transaction and because he was involved in the comprehensive

interwoven set of contractual or business relations); BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Cellulink,

Inc., 814 So. 2d 203, 214 (Ala. 2001) (holding that where a contract would not have been

consummated without the participation of a certain party, that party is “anything but a

stranger to the relationship”) (citations omitted). Furthermore, BWSC exercised control

over the relationship between Bell Aero and Glenn Construction because its

recommendations were necessary for submission of claims to Bell Aero and for Glenn

Construction to seek final payment. Tom’s Foods, Inc. v. Carn, 896 So. 2d 443, 454 (Ala.

2004) (“[A] defendant is not a party in interest to a [business or contractual] relationship

if the defendant has any beneficial or economic interest in, or control over, that

relationship.”) (quoting Waddell, 875 So. 2d at 1154). Thus, BWSC was not a stranger to

the Contract between Bell Aero and Glenn Construction. This Court therefore holds that

BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49), is due to be GRANTED with

respect to the intentional interference claim regarding Glenn Construction’s contractual

42

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 42 of 78
relations with Bell Aero.

C. The Negligence Claims

The Alabama Supreme Court defines negligence as “the failure to do what a

reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances.”

Ford Motor Co. v. Burdeshaw, 661 So. 2d 236, 238 (Ala. 1995) (citing Elba Wood

Prods., Inc. v. Brackin, 356 So. 2d 119, 122 (Ala. 1978)); accord Thomas v. Jim Walter

Homes, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 1498, 1502–03 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (Albritton, J.). A plaintiff

must establish four elements under a typical negligence claim: “(1) that the defendant

owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that the plaintiff

suffered a loss or an injury; and (4) that the defendant’s negligence was the actual and

proximate cause of that loss or injury.” Id. (citing Lollar v. Poe, 662 So. 2d 902, 905

(Ala. 1993)); accord Thomas, 918 F. Supp. at 1503. Furthermore, with respect to

professional negligence claims, the Alabama Supreme Court has held the following:

Alabama law requires that expert testimony establish the appropriate standard

of care that professionals,such as architects and engineers, must exercise. R.L.

Reid, Inc. v. Plant, 350 So. 2d 1022, 1027 (Ala. 1977). This standard is based

upon the learning, skill, and care ordinarily possessed and practiced by those

ordinarily skilled in that profession. Looker v. Gulf Coast Fair, . . . 81 So. 2d

832, 835 (1919).

Collins Co. v. Decatur, 533 So. 2d 1127, 1134 (Ala. 1988).

The only argument that BWSC makes with respect to the negligence claims is that

it has put forth expert testimony—namely, Cole and Petrin’s affidavits—showing that all

of the services performed by BWSC met the applicable standard of care. (Doc. # 50, at

43

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 43 of 78
8). Thus, BWSC contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Glenn

Construction has presented no expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care and

breach by BWSC so as to create a genuine issue of fact. In response, Glenn Construction

filed a motion to strike Cole and Petrin’s affidavits. (Doc. # 80). Furthermore, it argues

that it need not have expert testimony as to the standard of care and breach by BWSC

where it is “so obvious that any reasonably person could see.” (Doc. # 66, at 44 (quoting

Watson, Watson, Rutland/Architects, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty Bd. of Educ., 559 So. 2d

168, 173 (Ala. 1990)). Finally, Glenn Construction argues that, even if it is required to

have such expert testimony, then it has met that burden by virtue of Brittingham’s

affidavit and Ashley’s testimony. (Id. at 42–44). BWSC has filed a motion to strike

Brittingham’s affidavit. (Doc. # 75).

i. The Motions to Strike

Glenn Construction first seeks to strike the affidavits of Cole and Petrin on the

grounds that BWSC did not comply with the new Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (Doc. # 75). This amended rule became effective on December 1, 2010 and

requires parties to disclose the subject matter of a non-retained expert’s expected

testimony as well as “a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is

expected to testify.” (Doc. # 80 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)). However, the Court

need not consider whether the affidavits should be struck because BWSC would still be

entitled to summary judgment if Glenn Construction has failed to present any evidence as

44

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 44 of 78
to the standard of care and breach by BWSC. Celotex. 477 U.S. at 322–23 (holding that

the movant can meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the non-moving

party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it

bears the ultimate burden of proof); accord Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115–16. Thus, the

ultimate issue is whether Glenn Construction has presented sufficient expert testimony

regarding the standard of care and its breach by BWSC. If it has, then either BWSC has

failed in its initial burden to establish its entitlement to summary judgment or, in the

alternative, Glenn Construction has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that

should go to a jury. Either way, summary judgment would be inappropriate.

Additionally, BWSC filed a motion to strike Brittingham’s affidavit on the

grounds that Glenn Construction failed to timely designate him as an expert. That motion

also need not be decided because Ashley’s testimony covers the same issues as

Brittingham’s testimony—namely, that the revised designs for the drawings in May of

2007 were virtually impossible to construct and that BWSC failed in its responsibility to

provide more detail once the congestion and conflict with the reinforcement bars came to

its attention. (Doc. # 68 Ex. 7, Brittingham Aff. at 2–4). Because no one has moved to

strike Ashley’s testimony on substantially the same issues, this Court need not and will

not consider Brittingham’s affidavit. In sum, Glenn Construction’s motion to strike Cole

and Petrin’s affidavits, (Doc. # 80), and BWSC’s motion to strike Brittingham’s affidavit,

(Doc. # 75), are both due to be DENIED as MOOT.

45

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 45 of 78
ii. Analysis of the Negligence Claims

In arguing that Glenn Construction failed to meet the expert testimony

requirement, BWSC relies upon three Alabama Supreme Court cases. Two of these

cases, Collins and Watson, involved no expert testimony whatsoever by the plaintiff

regarding the alleged bases of his claims. In Collins, the plaintiff, a general contractor,

sued the owner and engineer of a construction project for failing to advise him on the

application of differing wage rates. 533 So. 2d at 1129. Two experts testified in the case,

and both stated that the engineer properly submitted the wage information to the plaintiff.

Id. at 1134. One further testified that it was “neither the custom nor practice in the State

of Alabama for engineers to advise contractors what wages to apply to various portions of

the construction project.” Id. As there was no other expert testimony, the Alabama

Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendants on this claim. Id. The

Watson case involved, in pertinent part, a claim by the owner of a building against the

architect for that building with respect to the architect’s alleged breach of a weekly

inspection provision in the contract. The alleged breach resulted in a leaking roof. 559

So. 2d at 169–70. The Alabama Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff “presented no

expert testimony regarding the [a]rchitect’s inspections and any deficiencies in those

inspections” nor did it present “expert testimony regarding the standard of care imposed

within the architectural profession by the weekly inspection provision contained in this

contract.” Id. at 174. Indeed, there was “no expert evidence that the standard was

46

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 46 of 78
breached by the [a]rchitect.” In fact, the only expert that testified regarding the leaks

stated that it would not be within the standard of care under the weekly inspection

provision to keep track of each and every source of the leaks. Id.

In Reid, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not present

sufficient evidence of the professional standard of care and breach thereof. 350 So. 2d at

1027. The plaintiff’s expert had testified that there were multiple possible solutions to the

safety problem at issue. Id. Furthermore, the defendant’s experts presented undisputed

testimony that the solution recommended by the defendant would have met the standard

of care existing at the time of the alleged breach had it been followed. Id. Thus, the

testimony of the plaintiff’s expert that one particular solution should have been

recommended merely stated his own personal preference and was insufficient to establish

a breach. Id.

Turning now to the evidence presented by Glenn Construction in support of its

negligence claims, this Court is satisfied that the expert testimony of Ashley, a

professional engineer at OSI, suffices to establish the requisite standard of care and

breach thereof with respect to some of these claims. Additionally, the Court further finds

that some of the standards of care and breaches thereof would be obvious, thus rendering

expert testimony unnecessary.

a. Negligence as to the Original Foundation Designs

First, regarding the designs for the foundation, Ashley opined that once a structural

47

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 47 of 78
engineer receives generic metal building loads, “[t]hey must apply engineering knowledge

to verify, based on their opinion, that those reactions are correct.” (Doc. # 69 Ex. 4,

Ashley Dep. 18:8–14) (emphasis added). Ashley’s testimony indicates that the ordinary

standard of care imposed upon structural engineers when reviewing generic designs is to

verify them and that the failure to do so is a breach of that standard. Ashley further

testified that, in his opinion, there were engineering criteria known to BWSC when they

issued the designs that were not reflected in those designs, that the anticipated loads were

“grossly undersized,” and that the difference between the anticipated loads and actual

loads was “not within normal ranges of variation.” (Doc. # 69 Ex. 4, Ashley Dep.

18:15–23, 31:15–20). In other words, this testimony sufficiently indicates that BWSC

breached this standard of care by failing to verify the designs and/or incorporate known

engineering criteria. Thus, Glenn Construction has presented sufficient evidence of a

negligence claim for the allegedly inadequate foundation designs based upon the use of

incorrect anticipated loads. Thus, BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49),

23

is due to be DENIED with respect to this claim.

b. Negligence Claims for the Revised Foundation Designs in

 This Court notes that, unlike Reid, this is not a case where there are multiple solutions 23

to a problem such that the standard of care incorporates various options. Rather, there are only

two possible answers regarding the standard of care: either the standard of care encompassed

verifying the foundation designs or it did not. Ashley was not merely stating his preference for

one particular option amongst many. Rather, Ashley testified that, in his expert opinion, a

structural engineer must verify generic drawings and incorporate known features which might

change them. Additionally, unlike Watson and Collins, this case does not involve the complete

lack of expert testimony by the plaintiff regarding the standard of care and the breach thereof.

48

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 48 of 78
May of 2007

With respect to the revised foundation designs of May of 2007, this Court agrees

with Glenn Construction that the standard of care and alleged breach thereof at issue here

does not require expert testimony. See e.g., Dews v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 659 So. 2d

61, 63 (Ala. 1995) (holding that there is an exception to the general rule requiring expert

testimony in medical malpractice cases where “the lack of care is so apparent as to be

within the ken of the average layman”) (citations omitted); see also Aetna Ins. Co. v.

Hellmuth, Obata, & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472, 478 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding, under a

similar requirement for expert testimony, that “there are certain duties patently required of

the architect that are within the common knowledge and experience of laymen serving as

jurors” and that expert testimony is “not necessary in passing on commonplace factual

situations that the ordinary jury laymen can readily grasp and understand”); Milton J.

Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So. 2d 62, 65–66 (La. Ct. App. 1987).

Here, the evidence establishes that BWSC was solely responsible for the

foundation design and that the revised drawings provided to Glenn Construction were not

done to scale such that the location of the reinforcement bars could be seen to fit properly.

A reasonable jury could find that the revised foundation designs were impossible to do in

the space provided, as Ashley testified, and that BWSC failed to exercise reasonable care

when it provided Glenn Construction with these illustrative drawings. Cf. Milton, 509 So.

2d at 67 (holding that an architect’s failure “to take reasonable steps to determine the

49

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 49 of 78
location of structural elements” did not require expert testimony to establish the standard

of care and breach thereof). However, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence

to establish that BWSC acted with reckless indifference when it issued the revised

designs for the foundation in May of 2007. Thus, Glenn Construction has presented

sufficient evidence of a negligence claim as to the revised foundation designs, and

BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49), is due to be DENIED as to this

claim.

c. Negligence Claim from the Alleged Repeated Refusals to

Correct the Problems With the Reinforcement Bars

Furthermore, Ashley testified that it is generally the engineer’s responsibility “to

determine what to do when there is a conflict or congestion issue between the

reinforcement bars and other material in a pedestal”—i.e. that this is the ordinary standard

of care for engineers. (Id. 40:13–18). He further testified that it would be “not [be]

reasonable for the structural engineer of record to not give further clarification” as to the

placement of reinforcement bars in such a situation. (Id. 43:6–9). This indicates that it is

a breach of the ordinary standard of care for the engineer of record to fail to provide

clarification when there is a conflict or congestion with respect to the placement of those

bars. Ashley further testified that, in such a situation, it would “absolutely incumbent”

upon the structural engineer to issue dimension drawings showing the location or the steel

or to remove steel. (Id. at 76:10–22). Thus, Glenn Construction has presented sufficient

evidence of a negligence claim based upon BWSC’s failure to provide instruction or

50

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 50 of 78
clarification as to the congestion or conflict with the reinforcement bars caused by the

revised drawings issued in May of 2007. Thus, BWSC’s motion for summary judgment,

24

(Doc. # 49), is due to be denied as to this claim.

d. Negligence Regarding the Posting of Obsolete Drawings

Additionally, with respect to the posting of obsolete drawings on the website, this

Court finds that it is obvious that the standard of care in this situation involves the

exercise of ordinary care in posting the correct drawings and that the failure to do so

would be an obvious breach of that duty. Thus, Glenn Construction has presented

sufficient evidence of a negligence claim regarding the posting of obsolete drawings.

Watson, 559 So. 2d at 173 (“[I]n cases dealing with an alleged breach of a duty by . . . [a]

professional, unless the breach is so obvious that any reasonable person would see it,

then expert testimony is necessary to establish the alleged breach.”) (emphasis added).

Therefore, BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49), is due to be DENIED as

to this negligence claim.

e. Negligent Supervision

Similarly, this Court finds that the standard of care for Glenn Construction’s

negligent supervision claim does not require expert testimony. See Jaeger v. Henningson,

 Again, unlike Reid, Ashley is not merely stating his preference for one appropriate 24

option over the other, but rather what the appropriate duties are for a structural engineer in such a

situation—namely, to clarify and correct problems with the placement of reinforcement bar. His

testimony is also enough to distinguish this case from Watson and Collins where the plaintiffs

failed to present any expert testimony whatsoever. 

51

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 51 of 78
Durham & Richardson, Inc., 714 F.2d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding a distinction

between negligent supervision by an architect and negligence in preparing plans and

holding that the former falls within the “common knowledge” exception to the rule

requiring expert testimony); see also Edwards v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 603 F.

Supp. 2d 1336, 1357 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (Thompson, J.) (holding that a negligent

supervision claim exists where (1) an employee committed an underlying tort, (2) the

employer had actual notice or would have gained such notice if it had exercised

reasonable care, and (3) the employer “failed to respond . . . adequately”) (emphasis

added). Thus, BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49), is due to be DENIED

as to the negligent supervision claim.

f. The Remaining Negligence Claims

Finally, with respect to any remaining negligence claims, this Court finds that

Glenn Construction has failed to provide sufficient evidence as to the standard of care and

breach and that such standards of care and breach are not obvious. For example, Glenn

Construction’s Complaint alleges claims for BWSC’s alleged failures in performing

timely inspections, issuing change orders, and recommending claims to Bell Aero. (Doc.

# 1, at 44 ¶¶ 217(h), (k), (p), (x)). Such claims require expert testimony as to the ordinary

standard of care in the industry regarding BWSC’s duties as an engineer and alleged

breach thereof. However, none of the experts provided by Plaintiff address these issues.

In sum, BWSC’s motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED with respect to

52

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 52 of 78
the remaining negligence claims.

D. The Wantonness Claims

Wantonness is defined under Alabama law as “[c]onduct which is carried on with

a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Ala. Code § 6-11-

20(b)(3); IMAC Energy, Inc. V. Tittle, 590 So. 2d 163, 169 (Ala. 1991) (“[W]antonness is

the doing of some act or the omission to do some act with reckless indifference that such

act or omission will likely or probably result in injury.”); accord Blizzard v. Food Giant

Supermarkets, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (Albritton, J.) (citations

omitted). Under Alabama law, wantonness is qualitatively different from negligence. See

Tolbert v. Tolbert, 903 So. 2d 103, 115 (Ala. 2004) (“Wantonness is not merely a higher

degree of culpability than negligence. Negligence and wantonness, plainly and simply,

are qualitatively different tort concepts of actionable culpability.”). Indeed, Alabama law

recognizes that “a jury may find a defendant wanton without finding the defendant

negligent.” Sparks v. Ala. Power Co., 679 So. 2d 678, 682 (Ala. 1996). BWSC’s sole

argument with respect to the wantonness claims is that Glenn Construction has failed to

put forth expert evidence as to the professional standard of care. However, all of the

cases cited to by BWSC require expert testimony in professional negligence claims.

Indeed, this Court cannot find any case applying the expert testimony requirement for

negligence claims to wantonness claims. Because wantonness is qualitatively different

from negligence and because a jury may find wantonness without finding negligence,

53

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 53 of 78
BWSC has not proven that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law—i.e. it has not

proven that Glenn Construction must establish a standard of care by expert testimony to

prevail on the wantonness claims. Thus, summary judgment is due to be DENIED as to

the wantonness claims.

E. Glenn Construction’s Motion to Supplement, (Doc. # 78), and BWSC’s

Motion to Strike that Motion to Supplement, (Doc. # 82)

 Glenn Construction’s seeks to supplement its response with the internal drawings

referenced in the July 23, 2007 emails between BWSC employees as well as a second

affidavit from Wolfe discussing these internal drawings. Glenn Construction contends

that the internal drawings “demonstrate, unequivocally, the exact inference Glenn

Construction argued their absence would have created, i.e., that BWSC attempted to

prepare to-scale drawings but halted the process when it became obvious that they could

not fit all the specified steel into the pedestals as drawn and that BWSC suppressed this

information from, apparently, both Bell Aero and Glenn Construction.” (Doc. # 78, at 5).

BWSC opposes this motion to supplement and moves to strike it. (Doc. # 82). Bell Aero

has also joined in BWSC’s opposition and motion to strike. (Doc. # 84).

However, this Court has already determined that Glenn Construction failed to

properly plead a fraudulent suppression claim based on these internal drawings. See

infra, at 27 n.15. Furthermore, Glenn Construction provided other evidence—i.e.

Ashley’s expert testimony, that the foundations were impossible to design according to

the May of 2007 revised drawings. Finally, the legitimate inferences which Glenn

54

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 54 of 78
Construction states these drawings “unequivocally show” were already recognized and

relied upon by this Court in considering the previously discussed fraud, negligence, and

wantonness claims. As such, the motion to supplement, (Doc. # 78), and the motion to

strike that motion to supplement, (Doc. # 82), are due to be DENIED as MOOT.

II. Bell Aero’s First Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 32)

Bell Aero filed its first motion for summary judgment on November 9, 2010.

(Doc. # 32). The motion’s factual basis stemmed from Bell Aero’s requests for

admissions, which Glenn Construction had not responded to in time. Thus, Bell Aero

argued that they were deemed admitted and, therefore, demonstrated that Glenn

Construction failed to satisfy express conditions precedent to receipt of final payment.

On November 12, 2010, Glenn Construction filed a motion to withdraw or amend the

responses to these requests for admissions. (Doc. # 37). On November 30, 2010, Glenn

Construction’s motion was granted because Glenn Construction had not received the

requests for admissions. (Doc. # 43). Thus, the requests for admission are no longer

deemed admitted by operation of law, and Bell Aero’s motion for summary judgment

based upon those requests for admissions, (Doc. # 54), is due to be DENIED as MOOT.

25

 Bell Aero contends that this first summary judgment motion is still due to be granted

25

“because in response [Glenn Construction] failed to satisfy the burden of submitting evidence

necessary to create a genuine issue of material fact.” (Doc. # 55, at 14 n.2). This argument is

unconvincing. Bell Aero bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The magistrate judge determined

that Glenn Construction had never received the requests for permission and permitted Glenn

Construction to respond to the requests. Because of this decision, Bell Aero’s arguments were

insufficient to meet its initial burden on a motion for summary judgment. 

55

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 55 of 78
III. Bell Aero’s Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 54)

Bell Aero filed its alternative motion for summary judgment on January 14, 2011,

(Doc. # 54). One main dispute with respect to Glenn Construction’s claims against Bell

Aero is whether Bell Aero is responsible for BWSC’s actions based on agency law or the

theory of respondeat superior. Glenn Construction argues that Bell Aero is

responsible—in tort and on the breach-of-contract claims—for BWSC’s actions based on

the theory that BWSC was Bell Aero’s agent. Bell Aero disagrees. Before considering

the specific tort and breach-of-contract claims, this Court will first resolve the issue of the

relationship between Bell Aero and BWSC.

A. The Relationship between Bell Aero and BWSC

The parties dispute whether Bell Aero’s supposed liability for the actions of

BWSC stems from general agency principles or from the more specific principle of

respondeat superior. Glenn Construction argues that it need only establish that BWSC is

Bell Aero’s agent. Bell Aero, on the other hand, contends that Glenn Construction must

satisfy the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under either test, Glenn Construction bears

the burden of establishing the appropriate relationship. See Glass v. Southern Wrecker

Sales, 990 F. Supp. 1344, 1352 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Albritton, J.) (agency relationship)

(citing Wood v. Shell Oil Co., 495 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Ala. 1986)); Ramsey v. Gamber,

No. 3:09-cv-919, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11893, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2011)

(Thompson, J.) (respondeat superior) (citing Ala. Power Co. v. Key, 224 Ala. 286, 287

56

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 56 of 78
(Ala. 1932)). However, this Court need not decide which test applies because the two

tests are so similar and because there is no evidence on the record before this Court by

which a reasonable jury could find either a general agency relationship or respondeat

superior liability.

With respect to the existence of an agency relationship, this district has explained

that

[u]nder Alabama law, the test of agency is the right of control, whether

exercised or not. Brown v. Commercial Dispatch Publishing Co., 504 So. 2d

245 (Ala. 1987). For one to be an agent, the other party must retain the right

to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the results

to be accomplished, or, in other words, not only what shall be done, but how

it shall be done. Id. at 246. ‘Control must be proven; and proof of control

requires more than proof of mere right to determine if the person claimed to

be an agent is conforming to the requirements of a contract.’ Malmberg v.

American Honda Motor Company, Inc., 644 So. 2d 888 (Ala. 1994).

Id. Similarly, under the theory of respondeat superior, the plaintiff must “establish the

26

 Where the principal actually has the right to control the agent, an actual agency 26

relationship exists. If a purported principal does not actually have the right to control but his

conduct causes a third party to believe that it had the right to control the purported agent, then an

apparent agency exists. See Bengston v. Bazemore, No. 3:06-vc-569-MEF, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 84199, at *15–16 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Fuller, C.J.) (“[B]ecause of the conduct of the

principal, the third party must believe that there is a principal-agent relationship under which the

principal has the right to control the agent.”). 

Here, Glenn Construction only argues that there was an actual agency relationship

between Bell Aero and BWSC. (Doc. # 66, at 40 (“[U]nder agency principles, ‘an express

agency is an actual agency created as a result of the oral or written agreement of the parties, and

an implied agency is also an actual agency, the existence of which as a fact is proved by

deductions or inferences form the other facts and circumstances of the particular case, including

the words and conduct of the parties.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Fisher v. Comer Plantation,

Inc., 772 So. 2d 445, 465 (Ala. 2000)). However, even if Glenn Construction hard argued

apparent authority, this Court finds that there is no evidence on the record that Bell Aero ever

acted as if it had the right to control BWSC’s performance. 

57

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 57 of 78
status of employer and employee—master and servant—and establish that the act was

done within the scope of the employee’s employment.” Chamlee v. Johnson-Rast &

Hays, 579 So. 2d 580, 582 (Ala. 1990) (citations omitted). In the establishment of the

first prong—i.e. the existence of an employer-employee or master-servant

relationship—control by the purported employer is again the key. Tyson Foods, Inc. v.

Stevens, 783 So. 2d 804, 808 (Ala. 2000) (“Whether a relationship is an independent

contractor relationship or is a master-servant relationship depends on whether the entity

for whom the work is performed has reserved the right to control the means by which the

work is done.”).

Here, Glenn Construction relies heavily upon the Alabama Supreme Court case of

Berkel & Company Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hospital, 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984).

(Doc. # 66, at 40, 55). In Berkel, a subcontractor of the general contractor sued the owner

and architect for claims arising out of a construction project. Id. at 498. In a footnote, the

Berkel court discussed the issue of whether the architect was an agent of the owner:

Under the traditional owner-architect-general contractor arrangement,

Alabama law recognizes ‘the well established proposition that an architect is

the agent for the owner and the owner is responsible for any damages caused

by the architect’s deficiencies [in supervision and coordination] insofar as the

other parties are affected thereby.’

454 So. 2d at 502 n.3.

Whatever may be the “traditional” owner-architect-general contractor relationship

referred to in Berkel, the Alabama Supreme Court subsequently made clear in Collins

58

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 58 of 78
Company v. Decatur that the issue of agency between the engineer and the owner on a

construction project is one that must be based “upon the peculiar facts” of each case. 533

So. 2d 1127, 1132 (1988). Indeed, in Collins, the owner had “entered into a contract by

which [the engineer] was to provide general engineering supervision, to draw plans and

specifications, to prepare the project bid and construction documents, and to assist [the

owner] in awarding the construction contract.” Id. Under this agreement, the owner only

“retained authority to change construction specifications.” Id. Thus, the Alabama

Supreme Court specifically found that the engineer was not the owner’s agent, but rather

an independent contractor, because the owner “gave [the engineer] full authority to

supervise, manage, and inspect the construction” and only “retained . . . the right to sign

orders that materially changed construction specifications.” Id. at 1132. As the Collins

case illustrates, the issue of agency is a peculiar to the facts of each case and does not

automatically occur simply because of an owner-engineer-general contractor relationship.

Id. Such a finding comports with general Alabama agency law which holds that “[w]hen

a defendant’s liability is to be based on agency, agency may not be presumed; . . . the

party asserting agency has the burden of presenting [sufficient] evidence of the alleged

agency. see also John Deere, 883 So. 2d at 178 (emphasis added).

Glenn Construction also points to several portions of the Contract as evidence of

the existence of an agency relationship between Bell Aero and BWSC. Glenn

Construction initially points to the fact that the Contract describes BWSC as Bell Aero’s

59

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 59 of 78
“representative” on the Project during construction. (Doc. # 57 Ex. 1, General Conditions

§ 9.01). However, under Alabama law, “agency is to be determined by the facts and not

by how the parties characterize the relationship.” Anglin v. Household Retail Servs., 17 F.

Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Albritton, J.) (noting also that the “key . . . is that

there must be an indicia of control”). Glenn Construction further points to the following

specific duties of BWSC while acting as Bell Aero’s “representative” under the Contract:

(1) communicating on behalf of Bell Aero ([Id.] § 8.01); (2) making site visits

at “intervals appropriate” ([Id.] § 9.02(A)); (3) issuing reasonably prompt

clarifications and interpretations that are binding on Bell Aero and Glenn

Construction (Id. § 9.04); (4) authorizing minor variations in work via Field

O[r]der to be binding upon Bell Aero (Id.§ 9.05); rendering impartial decisions

as interpreter and judge of a claim (Id. § 9.09(B)); reviewing the application

for final payment to ‘determine generally’ that the content of the application

complies with the Contract; (6) recommend[ing] change orders (§ 10.03(A));

(7) rendering decisions on claims for adjustment in price [and time] . . . (§

10.05(A) & (B)); and reviewing applications for payment (§ 14.02).

(Doc. # 66, at 39). Regarding the fact that Bell Aero was to communicate to Glenn

Construction through BWSC under § 8.01 of the Contract, merely acting as an

intermediary between two parties is insufficient to establish an agency or master-servant

relationship with either party. See Glass, 990 F. Supp. at 1352–53 (holding that an

intermediary between the buyer and seller of a vehicle was not an agent of the seller

where there was “no evidence from which to draw a conclusion that [the seller] had the

right to control the manner in which [the intermediary] conducted business”) (citing

Matsumura v. Eilert, 74 Wash. 2d 362, 444 (Wash. 1968) (no agency relationship found

between intermediary and seller where intermediary not acting under control of seller)).

60

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 60 of 78
Furthermore there is absolutely no evidence before this Court which demonstrates

that Bell Aero had any control over when and how BWSC went about its duties as the

engineer on the Project—whether it be issuing field orders or rendering decisions on

claims. The Contract gave BWSC independent responsibilities over which neither party

had control. For example, BWSC was to make site visits whenever it deemed them to be

necessary. (Doc. # 57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 9.02(A)). Similarly, BWSC was to

issue clarifications or interpretations of the Contract as it deemed them to be necessary.

Bell Aero had no right to control when or how BWSC made such site visits or issued such

clarifications. (Id. § 9.04). BWSC also had the power to independently authorize minor

variations in the Project and to independently make decisions as to recommending change

orders. (Id.§§ 9.05, 10.03). Finally, BWSC was to act as an impartial decisionmaker with

respect to claims—i.e. neither Bell Aero nor Glenn Construction had the right to control

how BWSC decided the claim at issue. (Id.§ 9.09(B)). Indeed, BWSC’s actions

regarding clarifications in the Contract, authorizations of minor variations,

recommendations of change orders, and decisions on claims were to be binding on both

parties.

In sum, neither Glenn Construction nor Bell Aero had the right to control how

BWSC performed its engineering responsibilities. Indeed, this Court finds the instant

action to be analogous to Collins whereby an engineer was deemed not to be the agent of

the owner when the owner “gave [the engineer] full authority to supervise, manage, and

61

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 61 of 78
inspect the construction.” 533 So. 2d at 1132; see also Fisher v. Comer Plantation, Inc.,

772 So. 2d 445, 464 (Ala. 2000) (holding that a real estate appraiser was acting as an

independent contractor when it made its appraisal because neither the property owner nor

the real-estate brokerage firm “retained the right to direct the manner in which [the

appraiser] prepared the appraisal”). As there is no evidence before this Court that Bell

Aero had the right to control BWSC on the Project, this Court holds that BWSC was not

Bell Aero’s agent or servant.

B. The Tort Claims Based Upon Bell Aero’s Independent Actions

i. Fraud, Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, and

Wantonness

Bell Aero argues, and this Court agrees, that Glenn Construction’s Complaint

failed to allege sufficient facts to provide notice of any independent tort claims against

Bell Aero for fraud, intentional interference with contractual relations, and wantonness.

As a plaintiff may not raise new claims on summary judgment, see Gilmour, 382 F.3d at

1314, Bell Aero’s alternative motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 54), is due to be

granted as to these claims. Additionally, even assuming that such claims were

sufficiently plead in the Complaint, there is no evidence on the record sufficient to

establish prima facie cases for fraud, intentional interference with contractual relations,

and wantonness against Bell Aero based solely upon Bell Aero’s own actions. For this

additional reason, Bell Aero’s alternative motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 54), is

due to be GRANTED as to these claims.

62

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 62 of 78
ii. Negligence

In its response, Glenn Construction contends that it has alleged independent

negligence claims against Bell Aero—namely, that Bell Aero “fail[ed] to reign [sic] in

[its] architect and exercise some modicum of control over the Project and the subsequent

claims process” and that “Bell Aero negligently relied on BWSC’s determination of

Glenn Construction’s claims when BWSC was inherently conflicted during this process

(i.e. Glenn Construction’s claims required BWSC to admit wrongdoing).” (Doc. # 66, at

55). Bell Aero makes several arguments applicable to this claim: (1) that Glenn

Construction did not plead negligence against Bell Aero; (2) that Bell Aero abandoned

these claims; and (3) that these claims can only be brought as breach-of-contract

claims—i.e. that they are ex contractu.

27

 Bell Aero’s final contention is that Glenn Construction cannot avoid a bar to 27

contractual recovery by seeking the same damages in tort. (Doc. # 66, at 20 (citing Bruce v.

Cole, 854 So. 2d 47, 58 (Ala. 2003); Holman v. Childersburg Bancorp., Inc., 852 So. 2d 691,

699–02 (Ala. 2002); Ex parte Bad Toys Holdings, Inc., 958 So. 2d 852, 859 (Ala. 2006); Smith v.

Smith, 466 So. 2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1985); White v. Miller, 718 So. 2d 88, 90 (Ala. 1998); Hurst v.

Cook, 981 So. 2d 1143, 1155-56 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)). However, none of these cases are

applicable here.

Smith did not even involve tort claims, but rather a contract claim for specific

performance of an oral promise that was barred by the Statute of Frauds. 466 So. 2d at 924.

Similarly, Bruce, Holman, and Hurst concerned situations where the plaintiff sought to bring tort

claims based upon oral agreements that were barred by the Statute of Frauds. Bruce, 854 So. 2d

at 57–58; Holman, 852 So. 2d 699–700; Hurst, 981 So. 2d at 1155–56. Here, there is no dispute

as to the existence of the Contract, which is not barred by the Statute of Frauds. In Bad Toys,

unlike here, the plaintiff could not bring tort claims because they were actually for nonfeasance

under a contract—i.e. it was a contractual claim that could not be brought in tort. 958 So. 2d at

859. Finally, in White, the plaintiff was an unlicensed subcontractor who sought to recover in

tort for the work and labor done under a contract that was void. White, 718 So. 2d at 90. Here,

although it is undisputed that Glenn Construction employed unlicensed subcontractors, the Court

finds that this does not render the Contract with Bell Aero void or unenforceable. See Med Plus

63

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 63 of 78
a. Negligence Claims in the Complaint

Bell Aero initially contends that the Complaint does not state any negligence

claims against it. This Court disagrees. Count 1 is specifically brought against both

Defendants and alleges negligence claims as well as wantonness and breach-of-contract

claims. Futhermore, this Court is satisfied that it has sufficiently pled these negligence

claims. (See Doc. # 1, at 43 ¶ 217(g) (stating that Defendants are liable for “[r]equiring

Glenn Construction to process claims for defective plans and poor supervision of BWSC

through BWSC, an entity not a disinterested party in the dispute thereby delaying

resolution of the claims of Glenn Construction”), 46 ¶ 217(q) (stating that Defendants are

liable for “[f]ailing to supervise and/or control employees of BWSC so as to cause or

allow such employees to wrongfully cause injury to Glenn Construction by the acts

described herein”)).

28

b. Abandonment

Bell Aero also claims that Glenn Construction abandoned whatever tort claims it

pled against Bell Aero during the course of this litigation. Bell Aero points to its Motion

Props. v. Colcock Cosntr. Grp., 628 So. 2d 370, 374–75 (Ala. 1993) (affirming a jury verdict for

a licensed general contractor against the owner because, in part, the contract between the parties

was enforceable where the licensed contractor worked with an unlicensed contractor because a

reasonable jury could have found that there was no scheme to circumvent the licensing

requirements).

 To the extent that Bell Aero objects to the Complaint as a shotgun pleading, (Doc. # 28

73, at 16 n.4), the Court notes that the appropriate remedy for that would have been for Bell Aero

to move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th 1996). 

64

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 64 of 78
to Dismiss whereby it moved for dismissal of the Complaint against it and addressed only

three types of claims: (1) the breach-of-contract claims; (2) the claims for open account;

and (3) the claims for work and labor done. (Doc. # 7). Similarly, Bell Aero points to its

first summary judgment motion wherein it stated that the “sole remaining claim against

Bell Aero is for breach of contract.” (Doc. # 32, at 1; Doc. # 33, at 2). In its responses to

both these motions, Glenn Construction addresses Bell Aero’s arguments on the breachof-contract claims and fails to assert that it has alleged tort claims against Bell Aero.

However, the cases cited to by Bell Aero are not factually analogous to the instant

case. For example, in Crayton v. Valued Services of Alabama, LLC, the plaintiff was

deemed to have abandoned particular claims pled in the Complaint where her response to

summary judgment “fail[ed] to address [the] many arguments with respect to the

perceived infirmities” in those claims. 737 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1331 (M.D. Ala. 2010)

(Capel, M.J.). Here, the earlier motions to dismiss and motion for summary judgment

made no arguments whatsoever to which Glenn Construction could respond. Here, Bell

Aero asks this Court to hold properly-pled claims abandoned where the plaintiff fails to

recognize a single sentence stating those claims do not exist or fails to notice that the

defendant seeks dismissal of the whole complaint against it and only argues the breachof-contract claim. This Court finds such an argument to be unpersuasive. Cf. In re

Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (considering a motion to

set aside a default judgment and stating that there “is a strong policy for determining

65

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 65 of 78
cases on their merits”); 5 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1471 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that one of the central purposes of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “is to provide maximum opportunity for each claim

to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural technicalities”). Thus, Bell Aero is

29

not entitled to summary judgment on these grounds.

c. Ex Contractu

Under Alabama law, there is a distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance in

the performance of a contract. Nonfeasance—i.e. the failure to do what one has promised

to do—carries no tort liability absent a duty to act apart from the promise made; however,

misfeasance or negligent affirmative conduct in the performance of a promise can subject

an actor to both tort and contract liability. Morgan v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d

107, 114 (Ala. 1985). (citing C & C Prods. Inc. v. Premier Indus. Corp., 290 Ala. 179,

186 (Ala. 1972); Garig v. E. End Mem’l Hosp., 279 Ala. 118 (Ala. 1966)). As the

Alabama Supreme Court in Ex Parte Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London

[I]f there is [a] failure or refusal to perform a promise the action is in contract;

if there is a negligent performance of a contractual duty or the negligent breach

of a duty implied by law, such duty not being expressed in the contract, but

arising by implication of law form the relation of the parties created by the

 Bell Aero also points to Glenn Construction’s motion seeking permission to amend its 29

responses to requests for admissions. (Doc. # 37). Glenn Construction had failed to respond to

these admissions and they were deemed admitted by operation of law. In seeking to amend them,

Glenn Construction stated that “[t]he merits of [its] breach of contract action would be served by

allowing it to amend/withdraw these supposed admissions . . . .” (Id. at 5). Glenn Construction’s

use of the phrase “breach of contract action” is not dispositive because, again, Bell Aero had only

argued the breach of contract claim. 

66

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 66 of 78
contract, the action may be either in contract or [in] tort. In the latter instance,

whether the action declared is in tort or [in] contract must be determined from

the gist or gravamen of the complaint.

815 So. 2d 558, 563 (Ala. 2001); see also Morgan, 466 So. 2d at 114 (stating that “there

30

will be liability in tort whenever misperformance involves a foreseeable, unreasonable

risk of harm to the interests of the plaintiff or where there would be liability for

performance without the contract” and finding tort liability although “the relationship

between plaintiffs and defendants was primarily a contractual one”).

Here, nothing in the Contract imposes upon Bell Aero the duty to control BWSC

or to exercise independent judgment as to the claims process. The Court notes that this

finding may appear to conflict with its earlier holding that Bell Aero had no right to

control BWSC’s performance of its duties under the Contract. However, even though

Bell Aero had no right to control BWSC’s performance of its engineering duties for

agency or respondeat superior purposes, it may be that Bell Aero had a duty to Glenn

Construction to remove BWSC as the engineer if BWSC could no longer act impartially.

 The Alabama Supreme Court has explained this difference by the following analogy:

30

For instance, if the declaration allege the hiring of a horse to ride a certain place, and

that the defendant rode him so immoderately that he died, this would be [tort]; for the

contract of hiring imposed upon him the [independent] duty to ride in reason, or not

unreasonably fast; but if the declaration alleged the hiring, and that he promised to

ride with reasonable speed, but not regarding his promise he rode the horse

immoderately, whereby he died, the action may be considered [contract].

Wilkinson v. Mosely, 18 Ala. 288 (1850); see also Garig v. E. End Mem’l Hosp., 279 Ala. 118

(Ala. 1966).

67

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 67 of 78
Furthermore, Bell Aero made the argument regarding lack of right to control

BWSC’s performance solely in regards to whether an agency or master-servant

relationship existed between the parties for purposes of holding Bell Aero responsible for

BWSC’s actions. Whether Bell Aero had an independent non-contractual duty to Glenn

Construction is a separate issue that Glenn Construction will need to establish at trial. See

Morgan, 466 So. 2d at 114 (noting that the three primary considerations are “(1) the

nature of the defendant’s activity; (2) the relationship between the parties; and (3) the

type of injury or harm threatened”). There is no burden upon a district court to distill

every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on

summary judgment; the onus is in the parties to formulate arguments. See, e.g.,

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995); Blue Cross

& Blue Shield of Ala. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990); Chase v. Kawasaki

Motors Corp., U.S.A., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (Albritton, J.). As

such, Glenn Construction may properly bring these claims in tort and Bell Aero’s

31

motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 54), is due to be DENIED as to these negligence

claims.

C. The Breach of Contract Claim

 However, the Court notes that Glenn Construction will need to establish the existence 31

of such duties at trial. See Morgan, 466 So. 2d at 114 (noting that the three primary

considerations are “(1) the nature of the defendant’s activity; (2) the relationship between the

parties; and (3) the type of injury or harm threatened”).

68

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 68 of 78
The remaining independent claim that Glenn Construction brings against Bell Aero

is for breach of contract in failing to make final payment. Under Alabama law, a plaintiff

must establish four elements for a breach-of-contract claim: “(1) a valid contract binding

the parties; (2) the plaintiff’s performance under the contract; (3) the defendant’s

nonperformance; and (4) resulting damages.” Cook’s Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, 28 So.

3d 716, 728 (Ala. 2009) (citations omitted); accord Claybrook v. Cent. United Life Ins.

Co., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (Thompson, J.). Bell Aero contends

that Glenn Construction has failed to present sufficient evidence its own performance

under the Contract and of Bell Aero’s nonperformance

i. Glenn Construction’s Alleged Performance

Bell Aero contends that Glenn Construction has not established its own

performance under the Contract because it used unlicensed subcontractors, failed to

satisfy express conditions precedent, and failed to abide by the mandatory dispute

resolution procedures of the Contract.

a. Unlicensed Subcontractors

The parties do not dispute that two of Glenn Construction’s

subcontractors—Skipper Construction and Team Building Construction—were

unlicensed and in violation of Alabama law. See Alabama General Contractor’s Practice

Act (“AGCPA”). Ala. Code § 34-8-1, et seq. Under the Contract, Glenn Construction

was required to “comply with all Laws and Regulations applicable to the performance of

69

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 69 of 78
the Work.” (Doc. # 57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 6.09(A)). Glenn Construction was

also “fully responsible . . . for all acts and omissions of the Subcontractors.” (Id. §

6.06(C)). Because Glenn Construction’s obligations under the contract were “absolute,”

(id. § 6.19(B)), Bell Aero contends that Glenn Construction breached the Contract by

employing unlicensed subcontractors and that this breach precludes Glenn Construction’s

contract claims against Bell Aero.

32

However, this Court finds that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Glenn

Construction substantially performed its promise to comply with all laws and regulations.

First, Glenn Construction has presented evidence that Team Building “did little or no

work” on the Project as Glenn Construction was reviewing his credentials. The AGCPA

only requires subcontractors to be licensed “prior to beginning work on the project.” Ala.

Code § 34-8-7(5). Thus, if Team Building did no work on the Project, as can reasonably

be inferred from Glenn Construction’s evidence, then there was no violation of the

 Bell Aero also argues that Glenn Construction had an affirmative obligation under the 32

AGCPA to ensure that its subcontractors were licensed. (Doc. # 73, at 31 (citing Ala. Code § 34-

8-6(a)). The Court is not convinced that this is the case. Section 34-8-6(a) punishes, in pertinent

part, “any person including an owner, architect, engineer, construction manager, or private

awarding authority who considers a bid from anyone not properly licensed under this chapter.” 

Ala. Code § 34-8-6(a). Subsection (d) further absolves liability when the contractor submits his

license number prior to bidding. Id. § 34-8-6(d). However, subcontractors are permitted to be

unlicensed during bidding and only need be licensed “prior to beginning work on the project.” 

Id. § 34-8-7(5). Thus, § 34-8-6(a) appears to require owners to ensure that general contractors

are licensed; however, it says nothing about whether general contractors must ensure that their

subcontractors are licensed. Bell Aero has not sufficiently argued that this provision applies to

general contractors who contract with subcontractors. Even if it did apply to this situation, there

is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Skipper Construction’s provision of a false

license number would absolve Glenn Construction of liability. 

70

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 70 of 78
AGCPA. Additionally, with respect to Skipper Construction, Glenn Construction

presented evidence of fraud on the part of Skipper Construction in its provision of a false

licensing number to Glenn Construction. Whether Glenn Construction substantially

performed under these provisions of the contract is a question of fact for the jury. See

Bay City Constr. Co. v. Hays, 624 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (Ala. 1993).

33

b. Express Conditions Precedent Independent of BWSC’s

Failure to Give a Recommendation

Bell Aero also points to several express conditions precedent to final payment

which are independent of BWSC’s failure to recommend final payment. (Doc. # 55, at

16) In particular, Bell Aero points out that Glenn Construction must provide (1) all

documentation called for by the Contract Documents, (Id. § 14.07(A)(2)(i)), (2) consent

of the surety to final payment, (Id. § 14.07(A)(2)(ii)), and (3) either lien waivers from the

subcontractors or an all-bills-paid affidavit from Glenn Construction. (Id. §

 Bell Aero argues that Glenn Construction breached the provision in the Contract 33

requiring it to use its progress payments to pay subcontractors, vendors, suppliers, and

materialmen. (See Doc. # 57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 14.02(A)(2). It claims that the breach

is evident from the fact that, when Glenn Construction sought final payment, it still owed its

subcontractors approximately $365,000. The Court finds this argument unconvincing. Glenn

Construction’s contentions in this lawsuit is that it was required to perform extra work because of

BWSC’s tortious conduct. Thus, a jury could find that Glenn Construction did not breach the

Contract—i.e. that it used the progress payments to pay its subcontractors but that the payments

were insufficient to cover all of the additional work required by BWSC’s tortious conduct. 

Alternatively, it may be that the amounts owed to these subcontractors were incurred after

the last progress payment—i.e. that Glenn Construction had paid all debts up to the last progress

payment and that these debts had accrued since then. Bell Aero has not pointed to any evidence

that establishes when the previous progress payment occurred, when these debts to the

subcontractors accrued, or whether the progress payments were sufficient to cover the costs of

the allegedly additional work. 

71

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 71 of 78
14.07(A)(2)(iii), (3)). This Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Glenn Construction provided all of the required documents. That two of Glenn

Construction’s subcontractors filed liens against Bell Aero and that one subcontractor

made a claim against the surety suggests that these documents were not provided.

However, the mere fact that one files a lawsuit does not necessarily mean they have a

valid claim—i.e. the subcontractors could sign lien waivers and still file suit, although

they may not be actually entitled to prevail. Furthermore, Wolfe testified in his

deposition that Glenn Construction had obtained lied waivers from its subcontractors as

well as consent of the surety and had provided all required documentation. Finally, that

Glenn Construction still owed money to some subcontractors is not dispositive of whether

they signed lien waivers because one can sign a lien waiver when one would otherwise

have a valid lien. See Marx Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 703 F.2d 1361, 1369

(11th Cir. 1983) (“Under Alabama law, waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of

a known right.”) (emphasis added).

As for the all-bills-paid affidavit, the Court notes that it is undisputed that Glenn

Construction never provided such a document. However, the Contract contains

conflicting provisions of whether or not the all-bills-paid affidavit is required in addition

to the lien waivers or as an alternative to the lien wavers. (Compare Doc. # 57 Ex. 1,

General Conditions § 14.07(A)(2)(iii), (3) (stating that they are alternative options) with

Doc. # 57 Ex. 16, Specifications § 01700 (stating that both are required)). Both the

72

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 72 of 78
General Conditions and the Specifications are part of the Contract Documents. (Doc. #

57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 1.01(12) (incorporating the Specifications into the

Contract)). However, under Alabama law, where a contract contains two conflicting

provisions, courts are to abide by the first provision. See e.g., Voyager Life Ins. Co. v.

Whitson, 703 So. 2d 944, 949 (Ala. 1997). Here, because the General Conditions

incorporate the Specifications at issue, the first provision is that contained in the General

Conditions—i.e. that an all-bills-paid affidavit is an alternative to the provision of lien

waivers. Glenn Construction’s failure to provide an all-bills-paid affidavit does not

preclude him from seeking final payment. Thus, Bell Aero has not proven that there is

34

no genuine dispute as to material fact or that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

due to Glenn Construction’s alleged failure to fulfill express conditions precedent.

ii. Bell Aero’s Alleged Nonperformance

Bell Aero contends that its nonperformance cannot be established because “the

only event which could trigger any obligation requiring Bell Aero to make any payment”

to Glenn Construction is a recommendation by BWSC. (Doc. # 55, at 17). Bell Aero

 Bell Aero also points to § 14.07(A) of the General Conditions as requiring an all-bills- 34

paid affidavit. As previously discussed, § 14.07(A) requires Glenn Construction to abide by the

provisions of for progress payments. Section 14.02(2) requires Glenn Construction to provide an

affidavit stating that “all previous progress payments received on account of the Work have been

applied on account to discharge [Glenn Construction’s] legitimate obligations associated with

prior application payments.” (Doc. # 57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 14.02(A)). This does not

require an all-bills-paid affidavit for the entirety of the work done, but rather an affidavit saying

that all prior payments have gone towards the payment of Glenn Construction’s obligations. 

That Wolfe testified that he provided all necessary documentation is sufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether these affidavit was provided. 

73

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 73 of 78
contends that its obligation to make final payment never arose for several reasons. First,

it argues that the condition precedent is not excused because Glenn Construction has

failed to put forward evidence of the professional standard of care for engineers.

Additionally, Bell Aero contends that Glenn Construction’s failure to abide by the

mandatory dispute resolution procedures in the Contract precludes a finding of bad faith

or fraud on the part of BWSC and that the decision as to the claims is therefore binding

under the Contract.

a. Expert Testimony as to the Professional Standards

As previously stated, the expert testimony requirement for professional standards

of care has only been applied on professional negligence claims, as opposed the to

allegations of bad faith or fraud with respect to BWSC’s denial of Glenn Construction’s

claims and its refusal to certify final payment. Thus, even without finding negligence, a

reasonable jury could find that BWSC acted in bad faith or fraudulently in denying the

claims and refusing to certify final payment. See Bd. of Water & Sewer Comm’rs v. Bill

Harbert Constr. Co., 870 So. 2d 699, 708 (Ala. 2003) (“A report known by [an

independent third-party referee] to be false, working substantial injury to a party relying

thereon, is a fraud.”). Although Bell Aero is not liable for BWSC’s actions under agency

principles or respondeat superior, such a finding would still excuse the condition

precedent of BWSC’s recommendation. See Catanzano v. Jackson, 73 So. 510, 512 (Ala.

1916) (“While the parties to a contract may stipulate that the estimates of the work done

74

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 74 of 78
and of the compensation to be paid therefor shall be made by a third party, who shall also

have power and be charged with the duty to pass upon the character of the workmanship

employed and upon the quality of the materials used, yet in this regard the action of such

third party will be final and binding on the parties only in the absence of fraud and bad

faith.”) (emphasis added). As such, Bell Aero has not established that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law as to its argument that it had no obligation to perform

because of the failure of the BWSC to issue a recommendation.

b. Failure to Abide by the Mandatory Dispute Resolution

Procedures

Bell Aero contends that Glenn Construction failed to abide by the dispute

resolution procedures in the Contract in two ways. First, it contends that Glenn

Construction failure to provide sufficient supporting data for its claims precludes a

finding of bad faith or fraud on the part of BWSC. While it appears that the Contract

requires specific documentation for an increase in the Contract price, it does not appear to

require the same specificity with respect to an increase in Contract time. Compare Doc. #

57 Ex. 1, General Conditions § 12.01(B)(3) (explaining that changes to the Contract price

where the parties do not agree on a lump sum will be made based upon the cost of the

work as determined under § 11.01) and 11.01(A)–(B) (stating the specific items that are

included and excluded in the cost of the work) with § 12.02(B) (explaining that changes

to the Contract time are determined according to § 12) and § 12.05 (stating that the

contractor is entitled to “an amount equal to the time lost due to . . . delay” where the

75

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 75 of 78
delay is beyond the control of the owner and the contractor). Thus, even if Glenn

Construction is not entitled to “an increase in the amount of any potential Final Payment,”

(Doc. # 73, at 3), Bell Aero has not shown that Glenn Construction failed to submit a

proper claim for a further increase in the Contract time such that its alleged final

completion of the Project would be within the Contract time.

Second, Bell Aero argues that Glenn Construction did not challenge BWSC’s

decision regarding its claims for increases in price and time within the 60-day period

called for in the Contract. Bell Aero contends that it is now “undisputed that the decision

was rendered and emailed to [Wolfe’s] correct email address on January 12, 2009.” (Doc.

# 73, at 34). In support of this, Bell Aero relies upon the presumption of receipt and

argues that Glenn Construction is presumed to have received BWSC’s decision on

January 12, 2009. Alabama courts recognize “a rebuttable presumption exists that a

letter, mailed with postage prepaid and properly addressed was received in due course by

the addressee.” Davis v. Ala. Dep’t of Indus. Rel’ns, 641 So. 2d 810, 812 (Ala. Civ. App.

1994). Bell Aero seeks to extend this rebuttable presumption beyond stamped and

properly addressed letters to emails by relying upon an Eighth Circuit case. (Doc. # 73, at

34 n.8 (citing Am. Boat Co., Inc. v. Unknown Sunken Barge, 418 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir.

2005)). However, Bell Aero has presented no evidence that this is the rule of law in

Alabama courts. Furthermore, even if the email is presumed received, the presumption

would be a rebuttable one. Davis, 641 So. 2d at 812. Under Alabama law, an alleged

76

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 76 of 78
recipient’s testimony denying receipt of the letter can be sufficient to rebut the

presumption. See Pittman v. Gattis, 534 So. 2d 293, 195 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); see also

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Reed, No. 107605, 2010 Ala. LEXIS 109, at *17 (Ala.

June 25, 2010) (“The presumption could have been rebutted by [the alleged recipient’s]

denial that it received the cancellation notice.”). Here, Wolfe testified that he never

35

received the January 12, 2009 email and that he only learned of BWSC’s decision

denying its claim in early February of 2009. Under Alabama law, such evidence is

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Glenn Construction

received the decision on January 12, 2009 such that it cannot challenge BWSC’s decision.

Thus, Bell Aero’s alternative motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 54), is due to be

DENIED as to the breach-of-contract claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Evidentiary Submittal in Opposition to

Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants, (Doc. # 78), is DENIED as

MOOT.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Affidavits of Michael Cole and Michael Petrin,

(Doc. # 80), is DENIED as MOOT.

 Bell Aero relies upon the Eleventh Circuit case of In re Farris, 365 Fed. Appx. 198, 35

200 (11th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that “[t]he mere denial of receipt, without more, is

insufficient to rebut the presumption.” (Doc. # 73, at 34 n.8). However, Farris was applying

Georgia law. Alabama law is clear that, even when considering properly addressed and stamped

letters, “[e]vidence denying receipt of the letter does not render the evidence of the mailing

inadmissible. Neither is it conclusive. Whether it was so mailed and received becomes a jury

question.” Sullivan v. E. Health Sys., Inc., 953 So. 2d 355, 360 (Ala. 2006).

77

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 77 of 78
3. BWSC’s motion to strike the motion to supplement, (Doc. # 82), is

DENIED as MOOT.

4. BWSC’s motion to strike Brittingham’s affidavit, (Doc. # 75), is DENIED

as MOOT.

5. BWSC’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 49), is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part.

6. Bell Aero’s first motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 32), is DENIED as

MOOT.

7. Bell Aero’s alternative motion for summary judgment, (Doc. # 54), is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

DONE this the 19 day of May, 2011.

th

/s/ Mark E. Fuller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

78

Case 1:09-cv-00250-MEF-TFM Document 100 Filed 05/19/11 Page 78 of 78