Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02381/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02381-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN LELAND COMBS,

Reg. No. 63884298,

Plaintiff,

vs.

NORBERTO RIBAC, U.S. Border Patrol 

Agent; JORGE ARTILES, U.S. Border 

Patrol Agent; UNITED STATES 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER 

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-02381-WQH-BGS

ORDER

Plaintiff John Leland Combs, a federal detainee currently housed at the Metropolitan 

Correctional Center (“MCC”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Combs claims 

Defendants Norberto Ribac and Jorge Artiles, both U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 

Agents, together with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border 

Protection Agency (“CBP”), violated his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

by racially profiling him and using excessive force during the course of his arrest near a 

checkpoint in Tecate, California, on September 2, 2017. Compl. at 1–9. Combs has not 

prepaid the $400 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action; 

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2).

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Combs has also filed a Motion and letter addressed to the Clerk of Court requesting

an extension of time in which to prosecute this case until his “criminal trial concerning this 

same matter is complete.” (ECF No. 4 at 1; ECF No. 6 at 2–3). The Court may “take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 

1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2002)). The Court takes judicial notice of United States v. Combs, S.D. Cal. Criminal 

Case No. 3:17-cr-03026-CAB-1, currently pending before Judge Bencivengo, in which a 

criminal complaint filed on September 5, 2017 charges Plaintiff with one count of assault 

on a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 and one count of high speed flight from 

an immigration checkpoint in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 758. A jury trial in United States v. 

Combs, S.D. Cal. Criminal Case No. 3:17-cr-03026-CAB-1, is currently set for March 

19, 2018. 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is 

granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or 

“installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016), and regardless of whether 

his action is ultimately dismissed, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 

(eff. June 1, 2016)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 

proceed IFP. Id.

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Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance 

in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no 

assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody 

of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding 

month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those 

payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 

136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Combs has submitted a copy of his Federal Bureau of 

Prisons “Trulincs” Commissary and Trust Account Activity. See ECF No. 2 at 3–4; 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements 

show that while Combs has had a total of $175 deposited to his account since September 

12, 2017, he had an available balance of only $.44 at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 

3–4. Thus, the Court assesses Combs initial partial filing fee to be $5.83 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), but acknowledges he may be unable to pay that fee at this time. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil 

action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has 

no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available 

to him when payment is ordered.”).

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Combs’ Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), 

declines to exact the initial filing fee because his trust account statements indicate he may 

have no means to pay it, and directs the Warden of the MCC or his designee to instead 

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collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward 

them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

II. Initial Screening 

A. Standard of Review

Because Combs is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a 

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires a complaint 

to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations

omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.

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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 

F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). Combs is a federal pretrial detainee 

seeking to sue the CBP and two of its agents for allegedly violating his constitutional rights 

during the course of his arrest. Compl. at 2–12. Combs fails to allege that any Defendant 

acted under color of state law. Therefore, he may not proceed under § 1983. Tsao, 698 

F.3d at 1138.

C. Bivens

Because Combs is proceeding without counsel, however, the Court will liberally 

construe the constitutional claims alleged to have arisen at the time of his arrest under 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971). Bivens is the “federal analogue” to § 1983. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254, 

255 n.2 (2006). In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for 

damages against federal officers for alleged violation of a citizen’s rights under the Fourth 

Amendment. 403 U.S. at 397; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. After Bivens, the Supreme Court 

has recognized a similar cause of action implied against federal actors for alleged violations 

of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 

61, 67–68 (2001).

In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court explained that

the Court has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a

“disfavored” judicial activity. This is in accord with the Court’s observation 

that it has “consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new 

category of defendants.” Indeed, the Court has refused to do so for the past 

30 years.

137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court stated, “The 

Court’s precedents now make clear that a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are

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‘special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’” 

Id. (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 1, 18 (1980)). The Supreme Court further 

instructed that the district court must determine whether a particular case presents a new 

Bivens context in addition to determining whether to proceed with a special factor analysis. 

Id. at 1864. 

1. Defendant CBP

As noted above, Combs seeks to sue two CBP agents as well as the CBP agency 

itself. Compl. at 1–2. However, a Bivens claim may only be maintained against officials 

acting under color of federal law in their individual capacities—neither the United States, 

nor any of its agencies, is a proper defendant. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) 

(federal agencies are not proper defendants in a Bivens action). Because CBP is a federal 

agency and not an official, it may not be sued under Bivens. Accordingly, CBP must be 

dismissed as a Defendant in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

See Bucio v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. CIV. 06-0917 BEN(JMA), 2007 WL 

173838, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2007) (sua sponte dismissing Bivens action against CPB 

for failing to state a claim per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)).

2. Defendants Ribac and Artiles

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court concluded that a § 

1983 claim which “necessarily implies the invalidity” of an underlying criminal judgment 

is not cognizable until the criminal judgment has been reversed, set aside, expunged, 

invalidated, or called into question on federal habeas review. Id. at 486–87; see also Martin 

v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Heck’s favorable termination rule to 

Bivens actions). Combs contends that Ribac and Artiles violated his Fourth, Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights on September 2, 2017, by “racially profiling,” and 

prolonging his detention after he consented to a search of his vehicle, and then 

“aggressively” “div[ing] through the driver[’]s window” of his car while “striking” and 

“punching” him in the head. Compl. at 3–6, 8–9. Combs’ Fourth Amendment claims 

against Defendants Ribac and Artiles could be barred by Heck to the extent they may 

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“necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal judgment should he ultimately be 

convicted for the crimes for which he is currently awaiting trial before in U.S. v. Combs, 

S. D. Cal. Criminal Case No. 3:17-cr-03026-CAB-1. 

However, Heck is only implicated when there exists “‘a conviction or sentence that 

has not been . . . invalidated,’ that is to say, an ‘outstanding criminal judgment.’” Wallace 

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87). In Wallace, the 

Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that “an action which would impugn an 

anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set 

aside.” Id. at 393 (italics in original). Thus, if a plaintiff raises Fourth Amendment claims 

in a § 1983 or Bivens action while he remains subject to criminal prosecution, but before 

he is convicted or exonerated, as Combs has here, or if he “files any other claim related to 

rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial, it is within the 

power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action 

until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”

2 Wallace, 549 U.S. 

at 393–94 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487–88, n.8). “If the plaintiff is then convicted, and if 

the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck requires dismissal; otherwise, the 

case may proceed.” Id.

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Combs’ Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Warden of the MCC, or his designee, to collect from Combs’

trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly payments from 

his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income 

and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Combs’

account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE 

 

2 Wallace holds that a stay of the civil action is proper, because under common law, a prisoner’s false 

arrest claim accrues “when legal process was initiated against him.” 549 U.S. at 390.

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CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Wayne 

Smith, Warden, Metropolitan Correctional Center, 880 Union Street, San Diego, 

CA 92101.

4. DISMISSES Defendant United States Customs and Border Protection Agency 

and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to terminate the United States Customs and Border 

Protection Agency as a party to this action based on Combs’ failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

5. GRANTS Combs’ Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No. 6) and DIRECTS

the Clerk of the Court to STAY the remainder of the proceedings in this civil action pending 

resolution of Combs’ criminal proceedings in United States v. Combs, S.D. Cal. Civil 

Criminal Case No. 3:17-cr-03026-CAB-1.

6. ORDERS Combs to file a Motion requesting the stay in these proceedings be 

lifted, together with a Motion requesting U.S. Marshal service upon Defendants Ribac and 

Artiles pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), within 30 days of the 

conclusion of his criminal case.

Dated: March 7, 2018

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