Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05333/USCOURTS-caDC-15-05333-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 25, 2016 Decided January 31, 2017

No. 15-5333

CONTINENTAL RESOURCES, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

SALLY JEWELL, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-00065)

L. Poe Leggette argued the cause for Appellant. With him

on the briefs were Rosario C. Doriott Domínguez and Alexander

K. Obrecht.

Tamara N. Rountree, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for Appellees. With her on the brief were John

C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and David Gunter,

Attorney.

Before: BROWN and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: The district court

dismissed as untimely an action Continental Resources, Inc.

brought for judicial review of a decision of the Department of

the Interior. Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Jewell, 134 F. Supp. 3d 231,

237 (D.D.C. 2015). The question on appeal is whether, as the

district court ruled, Continental filed its action more than 180

days after its “receipt of notice” of Interior’s “final decision.” 

30 U.S.C. § 1724(j) & (h)(2)(B). 

Continental extracts gas from leased federal land and pays

royalties to the Interior Department. On May 5, 2010, an agency

within the Interior Department began an administrative

proceeding against Continental by issuing an order demanding

more than $1.7 million in additional royalties. Continental took

an administrative appeal to the agency’s director. From the date

of the agency’s order, the Secretary or a designee had thirtythree months to reach a final decision in this matter. See 30

U.S.C. § 1724(h)(1) & (2); Murphy Exploration and Production

Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 480-82 (D.C. Cir.

2001). Under § 1724(h)(2)(B), if the Secretary fails to reach a

final decision within that time, the Secretary “shall be deemed

to have issued a final decision” against the lessee when the

amount in controversy is $10,000 or more, as it was here. 30

U.S.C. § 1724(h)(2)(B). 

 “The 33-month period may be extended by any period of

time agreed upon in writing by the Secretary and the appellant.” 

Id. § 1724(h)(1). In July 2010, Continental and the Interior

agency entered into such an extension agreement, placing

Continental’s appeal “on hold from June 12, 2010 through

December 13, 2010, pending completion of settlement

discussions.” Joint Appendix 151. Extension agreements are

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apparently common. See Agency’s Mot. for Recons. 7-10,

Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Jewell, No. 1:14-cv-00065-RDM (D.D.C.

Sept. 25, 2013), ECF No. 21-3. Continental’s written agreement

also stated that the parties extended “for the same number of

days the 33-month time frame for processing appeals as set out

in 30 U.S.C. 1724(h)(1),” but that either party could terminate

the agreement. Joint Appendix 151. Approximately three

weeks later, on August 18, 2010, the Interior agency informed

Continental that it had decided not to enter into settlement

negotiations.

In April 2013, Continental received an unfavorable decision

from the agency’s director. The company filed an

administrative appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals. 

The Board, concerned about its jurisdiction, issued a show-cause

order questioning whether the “deemed final” provision had

already been triggered, thus ending all administrative

proceedings with a final decision of the Secretary. In response,

Continental argued that the August 2010 letter from the Interior

agency terminated their extension agreement and that the

deadline for the Secretary’s decision therefore passed on June

15, 2013.1

 Interior argued that the letter had not terminated the

extension agreement and that the deadline would not be reached

1

 The Board would find for Continental and hold that the deadline

passed on June 17, 2013. That June 15, 2013, was a Saturday may

explain this discrepancy. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a). But this

discrepancy, like others in the parties’ proposed chronologies, does

not affect the outcome of this appeal.

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until August 12, 2013.2

 In a five-page opinion, the Board ruled

that the deadline passed on June 17, 2013, at which time the

Secretary’s non-decision became “deemed final.”3 Cont’l Res.,

Inc., 184 IBLA 59, 64 (2013). The Board issued its opinion on

July 29, 2013. 

Under 30 U.S.C. § 1724(j), Continental had 180 days from

“receipt of notice” of the final agency action to file its

complaint. Continental filed the complaint in the district court

on January 16, 2014. Interior moved to dismiss it, arguing that

the complaint was untimely because more than 180 days had

passed from the date of the Secretary’s “deemed final decision,”

which Interior identified as June 17, 2013, the date given in the

opinion of the Board of Land Appeals. The district court agreed

and dismissed Continental’s complaint. Cont’l Res., 134 F.

Supp. 3d at 237. 

2

 This proposed deadline created another discrepancy in the

record. Interior argued for the August 12 deadline by adding 154 days

to the 33-month period, but it later conceded that under its own theory

of the case, the extension was for 184 days. See Agency’s Mot. for

Recons. 5 n.3, Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Jewell, No. 1:14-cv-00065-RDM

(D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2013), ECF No. 21-3. 

 3 As the Board recognized, the thirty-three months plus extension

should have been calculated from the time Interior issued its order

requiring Continental to pay up (May 5, 2010), rather than from the

time Continental took an appeal from that order (June 10 or 11, 2010).

Cont’l Res., Inc., 184 IBLA 59, 62 n.3 (2013). See also 30 U.S.C.

§ 1702(18); Murphy Exploration, 252 F.3d at 480-82. This error does

not affect the outcome of the appeal.

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Did the 180-day period begin on June 17, 2013, as Interior

argued and the district court decided, or on July 29, 2013, the

date of the Board’s decision, as Continental argued? If June 17,

Continental’s complaint is time-barred;4 if July 29, the

complaint is timely.

In answering this question we understand that the 180-day

period for seeking judicial review did not run from the date of

final agency action. The 180-day period ran instead from the

date Continental received notice of that action. Section 1724(j)

is quite clear about this. The provision states that “a judicial

proceeding challenging the final agency action” is “timely so

long as such judicial proceeding is commenced within 180 days

from receipt of notice by the lessee or its designee of the final

agency action.” 30 U.S.C. § 1724(j). 

So when did Continental receive notice of the Secretary’s

“deemed final” decision? The date of notice could not possibly

have been earlier than the ruling of the Board of Land Appeals

on July 29, 2013. Until then neither Continental nor Interior

could know what date the Board would designate as the date of

the Secretary’s final decision. Both sides had presented

colorable arguments to the Board. Needless to say, one cannot

be on notice of final agency action while the date of that action

has not yet been determined. Only when the Board ruled on July

29, 2013, did Continental learn that § 1724(h) had converted

4 The district court treated this as a matter of “subject-matter

jurisdiction.” Cont’l Res., 134 F. Supp. 3d at 233. United States v.

Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015), decided five months before

the district court decision, makes it doubtful that the 180-day period

is jurisdictional, but nothing in our opinion turns on the point. 

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Interior’s inaction into a “final decision in favor of the

Secretary” on June 17, 2013. The Board’s ruling, and

Continental’s “receipt of notice” of that ruling, triggered the

running of the 180-day period under § 1724(j). It follows that

Continental commenced this action within the 180-day period. 

The company filed its complaint on January 16, 2014, 171 days 

after the Board’s ruling of July 29, 2013.

The district court decided that the 180-day period ran from

June 17, 2013, the date of the Secretary’s deemed-final decision. 

But as we have pointed out, § 1724(j) provides that the 180-day

period runs not from the date of the final decision, but from the

lessee’s “receipt of notice” of the final decision. To explain the

discrepancy, the district court stated that “although the plaintiff

did not receive notice of final agency action until July 29, 2013,

the plaintiff received notice by operation of law that the

Secretary had not issued a decision within the 33 month period.”

Cont’l Res., 134 F. Supp. 3d at 237. “Operation of law”?5

 What

“law”? The “law” here is § 1724(h)’s 33-month provision and

§ 1724(j), pursuant to which the 180-day period runs “from

receipt of notice.” If the district court believed that § 1724(h)

5

 When courts have interpreted “receipt of notice” in other

contexts, the discussion has often focused on a question not presented

here – namely, who must receive the mailed notice. We have held that

in some instances the litigant must personally receive the notice, Bell

v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1977), while receipt by the

litigant’s attorney sufficed in others, Rao v. Baker, 898 F.2d 191, 198

(D.C. Cir. 1990). See also Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.

89, 91-93 (1990); Christmas v. Spellings, 404 F. Supp. 2d 239, 240-41

(D.D.C. 2005) (collecting cases). We have never held that a party

received notice by “operation of law” and we are not aware of any

decision to that effect in the other courts of appeals.

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somehow triggered § 1724(j), it offered no basis for that belief. 

It instead relied on the “operation of law,” and thereby read

§ 1724(j)’s “receipt of notice” requirement out of the statute. 

We do not decide what level of notice is required in other

situations. This case does not involve, for instance, the

§ 1724(h) conversion deadline passing without dispute or the

Secretary issuing a timely decision on the merits. We hold only

that because Continental could not have known the date of final

agency action until July 29, 2013, receipt of notice could not

have occurred before then. Continental’s complaint was

therefore timely. The judgment of the district court is reversed

and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

So ordered.

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