Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02162/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02162-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

George W. Clifton, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

David Arredondo, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02162-PHX-DGC

 ORDER 

 Defendant David Arredondo has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff George 

Clifton’s complaint. Doc. 3. The motion is fully briefed and no party has requested oral 

argument. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff’s complaint arises out of an incident that allegedly occurred on May 27, 

2012. Doc. 5 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that he “was driving his vehicle westbound on 

Madison Street – between 12th and 13th avenues,” when “he noticed a Phoenix Police 

vehicle (#111361),” which he alleges was illegally parked against the flow of traffic. 

Doc. 1-3 at 3. Plaintiff claims that he stopped his vehicle alongside the police vehicle 

and Defendant approached his passenger window. Id. Plaintiff then asserts that he 

“politely and calmly asked him if his police car needed to be parked with the flow of 

traffic,” and that the Defendant “pretended” not to hear or understand Plaintiff. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant became angry and began to yell at him after he said “Oh, 

I see, are you corrupt and above the law?” Id. 

 After this exchange, Plaintiff claims he parked his car in a nearby parking lot and 

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returned “to the scene in order to protest both [Defendant’s] very unprofessional behavior 

and the parking matter.” Id. He alleges that as he was “verbally protesting,” the 

Defendant “flew out of the police vehicle and ran right up to [his] face,” “yelled and 

cussed at [him] and told [him] that [he] was on private property” and that he had to leave. 

Id. Plaintiff states that he then walked from the north side of the street to the south side 

and that Defendant “continued his actions.” Id. The parties allegedly engaged in a 

continued shouting match during which Plaintiff claims that Defendant was “constantly 

bumping his body into mine, and kicking me all over my shod feet.” Id. Plaintiff further 

alleges that he attempted to call 911, but that Defendant continued yelling so loudly that 

he was unable to hear the operator. Id. at 4. Plaintiff finally alleges that Defendant 

“shone his police vehicle’s spotlight” right in his face as he waited for a response to his 

911 call and as he ultimately walked away. Id. Plaintiff claims that he returned to the 

area the following day to protest and was permitted to protest without interruption. Id. 

 Plaintiff filed a complaint in Justice Court, alleging that Defendant’s actions 

deprived him of his rights under the First Amendment and asserting that Defendant 

“thereby violat[ed] 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,” making Defendant “liable to [Plaintiff] ‘in 

an action at law . . . for redress.’” Id. 

II. Legal Standard. 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim to relief under Rule 

12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009), and therefore are 

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re Cutera Sec. 

Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the 

complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This plausibility standard “is not 

akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

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defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

III. Analysis. 

 A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. 

Defendant argues that he was not timely served by Plaintiff and that the Court 

therefore does not have personal jurisdiction over him. Doc. 3 at 3. He cites Rule 113(i) 

of the Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that “[a]fter at least twenty 

(20) days notice to plaintiff, the court may dismiss a complaint as to any defendant who 

has not been served with the summons and complaint within [120] days after the filing of 

the complaint.” Id. (emphasis added). Defendant contends that the 120-day window for 

service expired on September 25, 2013, and that Defendant was not served until 

October 3, 2013. Id. Defendant argues that he has not waived any challenge to personal 

jurisdiction by removing the action this court. Id. He further argues that Arizona law 

requires proper, effective service as a prerequisite to a court’s exercise of personal 

jurisdiction. Id. (citing Barlage v. Valentine, 110 P.3d 371, 373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)). 

 The fact that Defendant was served outside of the 120-day window discussed in 

the Justice Court rules does not alone render service ineffective. Defendant admits that 

he was properly served on October 3, 2013, does not allege any other defects in the 

service, and does not identify any prejudice suffered as a result of the late service. 

Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this ground. 

B. 1983 Claims. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983 because he 

cannot establish injury from the alleged constitutional violation. Doc. 3 at 4. “To state a 

claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must [allege] that they were 

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the 

alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

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Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive 

rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 

443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)). 

 To prevail on his First Amendment claim, Plaintiff must provide evidence 

showing that Defendant “deterred or chilled [his] political speech” and that “such 

deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor in [Defendant’s] conduct.” Menotti v. 

City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 

1462, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant contends that 

Plaintiff’s complaint “fails to demonstrate that he was deterred from making political 

speech or that such deterrence was the substantial or motivating factor in [Defendant]’s 

conduct.” Doc. 3 at 5. The Court does not agree. 

 If the Court accepts as true Plaintiff’s factual allegations about Defendant’s 

conduct, as it must at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff has stated a claim under the 

First Amendment. He has pleaded facts alleging that he stopped his protest on a public 

sidewalk in response to Defendant’s conduct. He has also pleaded facts alleging that the 

Defendant repeatedly and aggressively told him to leave the area because he was on 

private property. The facts alleged in the complaint do not suggest any reason for 

Defendant’s conduct toward Plaintiff other than the fact that Plaintiff was protesting 

Defendant’s actions. This could constitute evidence that deterring Plaintiff’s protest was 

a substantial or motivating factor in Defendant’s conduct. Further, that Plaintiff went 

back to the same area to protest the following day does not suggest that Plaintiff’s right to 

protest was not impacted by Defendant’s conduct on the day in question. The Court will 

deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this ground. 

C. Qualified Immunity. 

Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity even if Plaintiff has 

stated a claim. Doc. 3 at 6. To rule on this argument, the Court first must ask whether 

Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that the state actor violated Plaintiff’s 

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constitutional rights. Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2001); Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the facts alleged show a constitutional violation, the 

Court must determine whether the law was clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

Finally, if the law was clearly established, yet based on the circumstances, the state actor 

made a mistake regarding what the law required, the officer will be entitled to immunity 

if the mistake was reasonable. Id. at 205. 

 Defendant argues that there was no constitutional violation. Whether a violation 

occurred has not been determined, but Plaintiff has pled a First Amendment claim, as 

discussed above. 

Defendant argues that “Plaintiff cannot establish that he had a clearly established 

right to block traffic while chastising a police officer’s parking job, nor can he establish 

that he had a clearly established right to harangue [Defendant] on the sidewalk.” Doc. 3 

at 7-8. Plaintiff does not claim that he had a right to block traffic. Rather, he claims that 

he had a constitutional right to protest on a public sidewalk. It is clearly established that 

“[p]ublic streets and sidewalks are the archetype of a traditional public forum,” and that 

“[r]egulation of speech in a traditional public forum is subject to the highest scrutiny.” 

Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Defendant does not argue that he made any mistake regarding 

the state of the law. Accordingly, the Court will not grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

on this ground. 

 D. City of Phoenix. 

Defendant’s motion also requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against 

the City of Phoenix. Doc. 3 at 8-9. Because the Court has already entered an order 

terminating the City of Phoenix (Doc. 8), the Court will deny this portion of Defendant’s 

motion as moot. 

 

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 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) is denied. 

 Dated this 23rd day of January, 2014. 

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