Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02190/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STANLEY EZELL SINGLETON,

CDCR# T-01626,

Civil No. 07-2190 IEG (LSP)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILURE TO PAY CIVIL FILING

FEES MANDATED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

[Doc. No. 2] 

vs.

OFFICER STINSON, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the California Men’s Colony located in

San Luis Obispo, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that various San Diego Police Department

Officers violated his constitutional rights when he was arrested on October 1, 2007. (Compl.

at 3-6.) As a result of his arrest, Plaintiff’s parole was revoked. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff seeks three

hundred thousand in compensatory damages and three million in punitive damages. (Id. at 11.)

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 The Ninth Circuit has held that section 1915(g) does not violate a prisoner’s right to access

to the courts, due process or equal protection; nor does it violate separation of powers principles or

operate as an ex post facto law. Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1179-82; see also Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1123

(noting constitutionality of § 1915(g)).

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Instead of prepaying the $350 civil filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), Plaintiff

filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc No.

2]. 

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

“In general, filing an action IFP is a privilege, not a right.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d

1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999). This privilege is codified in section 1915 of Title 28 of the United

States Code, which allows certain impoverished litigants to pursue civil litigation without the

full prepayment of fees or costs. Id. at 1177; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 

However, regardless of indigence, subsection (g) bars a prisoner from proceeding IFP:

... if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The objective of § 1915(g), which has become known as the “three strikes” provision,

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005), is to further “the congressional goal

of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310,

1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot

proceed IFP.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. “‘Strikes’ are prior cases or appeals, brought

while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were dismissed ‘on the ground that [they were]

frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.” Id. Thus, once a prisoner has accumulated

three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other civil action or IFP

appeal in a federal court unless he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).1

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While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his

request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket

records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under

§ 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and

other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a

strike under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Andrews

further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight or

importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual

allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an

arguable basis in either law or in fact .... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint,

embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d

at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

II. APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

The Court notes as an initial matter that Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that he is

in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Rodriguez, 169 F.3d

at 1178; Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (§ 1915(g)’s imminent

danger “exception applies [only] if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner

faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”); see also Ashley v.

Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that “allegations that the prisoner faced

imminent danger in the past” are insufficient to trigger section 1915(g)’s imminent and serious

physical injury exception). Thus, regardless of Plaintiff’s financial status, he may not proceed

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IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if he has, on three prior occasions while incarcerated, had

federal civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failing to state a claim.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119-20; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1178. 

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v.

Moynihan, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 4198211 *10 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2007) (No. 05-16752), slip op.

at 15354 (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (alterations

in original); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 971 F.2d 244,

248 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

Here, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has had more than three prior prisoner

civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. See e.g., Singleton v. Torras, So. Dist. Cal. Civil Case

No. 94mc454 K (Order of Dismissal per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) dated April 4, 1995), aff’d,

Singleton v. Torras, Ct. App. Doc. No. 95-55626 (Order dated Aug. 5, 1996); Singleton v.

Ingalls, So. Dist. Cal. Civil Case No. 95-384 K (BTM) (Order of Dismissal with prejudice per

FED.R.CIV. P. 12(b)(6) dated Aug. 29, 1995), aff’d, Singleton v. Torras, Ct. App. Doc. No. 95-

56371 (Order dated June 6, 1996); Singleton v. Groch, So. Dist. Cal. Civil Case No. 95-2423 K

(LSP) (Order of Dismissal with prejudice per FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) dated April 26, 1996),

aff’d, Singleton v. Groch, Ct. App. Doc. No. 96-55712 (Order finding appeal “insubstantial,”

dated Sept. 16, 1996); and Singleton v. Poleate, So. Dist. Cal. Civil No. 95-2205 T (RBB) (Order

of Dismissal dated May 5, 1996). 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three

“strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and does not presently allege facts sufficient to show that he is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury, the Court DENIES his Motion to Proceed IFP

[Doc. No. 2]. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121; Rodriguez, 167 F.3d at 1178.

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III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [Doc. No. 2] and DISMISSES the case without prejudice

for failure to pay the full $350 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 17, 2007

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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