Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00211/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00211-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA, ex rel.

BILL LOCKYER, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

No. CIV. S 05-0211 MCE GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

In this case, Plaintiff the People of the State of

California (“State”) challenges Defendants’ 2004 Sierra Nevada

Forest Plan Amendment (“2004 Framework”). The State alleges that

Defendants United States Department of Agriculture, United States

Forest Service, et al. (“Defendants”) violated federal

environmental and administrative laws in preparing and approving

the Final Environmental Impact Statement and the Record of

Decision for the 2004 Framework. 

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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

An action in parens patriae is one in which a state alleges 2

injury to a general “quasi-sovereign” interest, which is either

the health and well-being of the state’s citizens or the state’s

being denied its rightful status in the federal system. Alfred

L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).

Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 3

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

Defendants now move to dismiss the State’s complaint for lack of

standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).1

Defendants contend that the California Attorney General

(“Attorney General”) is representing the People of California

solely as parens patriae in this action against the federal

government.2

As set forth below, federal case law indicates that a state

cannot maintain parens patriae standing against the federal

government. Consequently, the State has not established standing

in its complaint as presently constituted, and this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

therefore GRANTED. Because the State may be able cure these 3

deficiencies by amending the complaint, however, the State shall

have leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Defendants drafted the 2004 Framework to change the

vegetation management strategy described in the original 2001

Sierra Nevada Forest Plan. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Ex. C at 3. 

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3

The State’s complaint alleges that Defendants failed to take the

required “hard look” at the potential impact of their action,

violating the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),

42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and that they acted arbitrarily and

capriciously, violating the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),

5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 5. The State seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the Court to set aside

the 2004 Framework.

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, contending that

the State lacks standing as parens patriae in this action against

the federal government. According to Defendants, the State does

not assert injuries to any sovereign or proprietary interests

beyond the general welfare of the citizens of California. Defs.’

Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2. Accordingly, Defendants ask this

Court to find that the State lacks standing and to dismiss the

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The State

opposes Defendants’ motion, arguing that the complaint does

assert interests in protecting specific resources of the State of

California, not merely parens patriae interests, and that the

Attorney General has standing to sue in his own right. Pl.’s

Opp’n at 2.

STANDARD

In a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the moving party can challenge

the allegations of jurisdiction on the face of the complaint

(“facial attack”) or on issues of fact (“factual attack”). 

Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730,

733 (9th Cir. 1979); 

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Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d

Cir. 1977). A facial attack contends that the complaint fails to

allege grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction as

required by Rule 8(a). See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.,

328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). In the present action,

Defendants do not dispute issues of fact. Rather, Defendants

challenge the State’s basis for standing to sue. A challenge to

standing pertains to a federal court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Thus, Defendants facially attack the complaint.

When reviewing a facial attack, the Court must determine

whether a lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the “face of

the complaint.” Warren, 328 F.3d at 1139. The Court will review

the complaint as a whole to determine if other allegations in the

complaint clearly indicate federal jurisdiction. See Cook v.

Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1998). Further, for a

facial attack, the Court must presume that the factual

allegations in the complaint are true. Wolfe v. Sprankman, 392

F.3d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 2004); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d

404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

If the Court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then decide

whether to grant leave to amend. Generally, leave to amend

should be denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

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5

ANALYSIS

United States Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent

indicate that a state does not have standing as parens patriae in

an action against the federal government. Alfred L. Snapp & Son,

Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982); Nevada v.

Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, apart

from any parens patriae interests, the Court finds that the

Attorney General has not established standing properly in his own

right. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an

action brought by a plaintiff who does not have standing, and

such action should be dismissed. Cetacean Comty. v. Bush, 386

F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004). As delineated below, the

State’s failure to establish standing mandates that its complaint

be dismissed.

1. The State’s assertion of parens patriae interests is

insufficient to confer standing.

Defendants contend that the State alleges nothing more than

injuries to the health and well-being of the State’s citizens. 

The Court agrees. From the face of the complaint, the Court

finds no indication that the Attorney General, on behalf of the

State, asserts anything more than interests pertaining to the

health and well-being of California’s citizenry. The State’s

complaint clearly recites that in filing this action, the

Attorney General has acted pursuant to his “[state]

constitutional, common law, and statutory authority to represent

the public interest.” Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 10. 

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Moreover, the complaint alleges that the citizens of California

“have an interest in the use and enjoyment of the national

forests in the Sierra, and an interest in preserving and

protecting the natural resources of those forests.” Pl.’s

Compl., ¶ 8 (emphasis added).

Allegations of particular injuries to California do not

accompany these broad statements regarding the State’s general

interests. Plaintiff’s complaint simply does not extend beyond

mere parens patriae interests. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. This

is insufficient to state a cognizable claim against the federal

government. In actions regarding citizens’ rights relating to

the federal government, it is the United States, not an

individual state, that represents citizens as parens patriae. 

Id. at 610 n.16, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,

485-86 (1923).

While the State alleges that the 2004 Framework, if

implemented, would increase logging, grazing, and other

activities on forest land owned by the federal government (see

Pl.’s Compl., ¶¶ 33, 42, 55, 56), the State fails to allege any

injuries that such activities would cause to the land, resources,

and wildlife owned, used, and managed by the State of California. 

Such allegations are necessary in order to move past the confines

of the parens patriae doctrine. See City of Sausalito v.

O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004); Nevada v.

Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1990). As presently

constituted, the State’s allegations are nothing more than

generalized grievances that Defendants violated federal law and

injured the public interest. See Burford, 918 F.2d at 856-57. 

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The Court acknowledges that the State has moved to strike 4

Defendants’ argument that the Attorney General himself is not a

proper plaintiff. The State points out that this argument was

first raised in Defendants’ reply papers, and objects to that

late inclusion as untimely. Because the Court did not rely on

Defendants’ reply in ruling upon the matter presently before it,

however, the Court need not rule on the State’s request to strike

and declines to do so.

7

Consequently, the State cannot maintain this parens patriae

action against the federal government.

2. The facts as pled in the State’s complaint are insufficient to

confer any other basis for standing, and, hence, jurisdiction.

In its opposition to Defendants’ motion, the State contends

that its complaint alleges more than parens patriae interests

and, in so doing, establishes standing aside from any parens

patriae limitation. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. The Court nonetheless

finds that the State has not met the constitutional requirements

for standing in the complaint presently before it.4

In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy the

requirements under Article III of the Constitution

(“constitutional requirements”) as well as the requirements in

the statute under which the suit is brought (“statutory

requirements”). See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,

441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1323

(9th Cir. 1985). The constitutional requirements are as follows:

the party must have “‘(1) . . . suffered an “injury in fact” that

is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; 

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and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” City of

Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1197, citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). 

To meet the statutory requirements for standing (pursuant to

APA), a plaintiff must demonstrate that its claims fall within

the “zone of interests” protected by the statute that is the

basis for the claim, in this case, NEPA. 5 U.S.C. § 702; City of

Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1199-1200.

In the present action, the State fails the first prong of

the constitutional test for standing because the complaint does

not allege “concrete and particularized” injuries. The State’s

complaint focuses on procedural injuries suffered from

Defendants’ alleged failure to follow NEPA and APA. Pl.’s

Compl., ¶¶ 5, 8, 18-19, 34-57. Although the State can allege

procedural injuries, rather than substantive injuries, caused by

Defendants’ alleged procedural shortfalls (City of Sausalito, 386

F.3d at 1197), the State must also allege that the Defendants’

action threatens the state’s “‘concrete’ interest--such as an

aesthetic or recreational interest . . . .” Id. (internal

citations omitted). No such sovereign or proprietary interest

has been alleged in the State’s complaint, as described above.

In City of Sausalito, the plaintiff city challenged the

National Park Service’s development plan for a local

decommissioned military base. Id. at 1194. 

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Sausalito alleged that the Park Service violated NEPA procedures

and that such violation would threaten the city’s economy, harm

its natural resources, and compromise its aesthetic interests,

public safety, and management ability. Id. at 1199. Sausalito

specifically asserted injury to its natural resources by stating

the Park Service’s plan would increase the city’s noise and

trash, impair its air quality, and harm its marina, parks,

trails, and shoreline. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Given those allegations of injury, the appellate court found

Sausalito had met the constitutional requirements for standing

because it had alleged harm to its proprietary interests with

“sufficient detail” to constitute concrete and particularized

injuries. Id. The State’s complaint in the present action fails

to similarly allege threats of injury to concrete and

particularized proprietary interests, apart from the general

parens patriae interests of the People. Nevada v. Burford, 918

F.2d 854, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1990).

A plaintiff does not need to allege injuries in extensive

factual detail. Rule 8(a) requires nothing more than a “short

and plain statement” in a complaint to establish subject matter

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). However, Rule 8(a) and our

notice-pleading system are designed to give a defendant fair

notice of the plaintiff’s claims and grounds. Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). In the present case, the State’s

complaint, void of any concrete or particularized injuries, does

not give Defendants fair notice of the claims or the grounds upon

which they are based. 

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Because the State fails the constitutional requirements for 5

standing, the Court need not discuss whether the State satisfies

the statutory requirements for standing. However, Ninth Circuit

precedent indicates that the State of California, or the

appropriate state agency, would likely meet the statutory

standing requirements under NEPA and APA. See Sausalito, 386

F.3d at 1199-1200 (internal citations omitted); Port of Astoria,

Or. v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir. 1979).

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Consequently, the State has not met the constitutional

requirements for standing, and this Court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over the suit.5

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, with leave to amend. The State may file and serve an

amended complaint within twenty (20)days following service of

this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 18, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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