Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02296/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02296-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Because Carignan’s Amended Petition is not consecutively

paginated, the Court will cite this document using the numbers

assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICARDO A. CARIGNAN,

Petitioner,

v.

R. ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 08cv2296 BTM (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING FIRST AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[DOC. NO. 4]

Petitioner Ricardo Carignan, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 10, 2008 [doc. no.

1], and a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

February 11, 2009 [doc. no. 4].1

 Petitioner asserts his Sixth

Amendment rights were violated due to ineffective assistance of

counsel, and his Fourteenth Amendments rights were violated when

the trial court admitted evidence of Petitioner’s parole status

and a prior act of assaulting an ex-girlfriend. (Am. Pet. 6-11.) 

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On April 13, 2009, Respondent filed an Answer, a Memorandum

of Points and Authorities, and a Notice of Lodgment [doc. no. 9]. 

Petitioner’s Traverse was filed nunc pro tunc to July 2, 2009

[doc. no. 13].

The Court has reviewed the Amended Petition, Respondent’s

Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Petitioner’s

Traverse, and the lodgments. For the reasons discussed below, the

Court recommends that Carignan’s Amended Petition be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In April 2006, Carignan, his girlfriend, Karla Cardenas, and

her three children lived together in a Chula Vista, California,

apartment. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 1, 120-21,

Dec. 5, 2006.) At Petitioner’s trial, Cardenas testified that on

the night of April 22, 2006, she and Carignan got into an argument

after they attended her daughter’s birthday party. (Id. at 120-

22.) Carignan became upset because he saw an individual at the

party that he believed Cardenas’s family had invited so she could

“hook-up” with him. (Id. at 123.)

 At the apartment, Petitioner told Cardenas that she was “a

bitch, a slut, [and] a whore.” (Id. at 124.) While Carignan

continued to call her names, she became “fed up” and reacted by

pouring water on him and telling him, “Get the fuck out.” (Id. at

124, 126.) Petitioner, who had been lying in bed, got up and

began to push and hit Cardenas as she backed away from the bedroom

and moved down a hallway. (Id. at 126-27.) As Cardenas was

backing up, she tripped and fell backwards in the kitchen. (Id.

at 128-29.) While she was on the ground, Carignan got on top of

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her, hit her, and “got an extension cord and [held] it around the

front part of [her] neck.” (Id. at 130.)

After struggling on the floor for some time and telling

Cardenas, “this what [you] want,” Carignan got off her and went

into the bedroom to put on his shoes. (Id. at 135, 136-37.) She

returned to the bedroom and told Carignan that he was a “monster”

and told him to leave. (Id. at 137.) Carignan again held

Cardenas down and choked her with his hands. (Id.) She was able

to escape his grasp once but was put into a headlock by

Petitioner. (Id. at 138.) While in the headlock, Cardenas bit

Carignan and he released her. (Id. at 139.) As she attempted to

flee the bedroom, Cardenas fell and was immediately kicked and

punched by Petitioner. (Id. at 139-40.) After she repeatedly

asked to be left alone, Carignan stopped kicking and punching her

and went into the kitchen. (Id. at 141.)

In the kitchen, Carignan told Cardenas, “Watch, you’re going

to see right now. Watch, you’re going to see.” (Id.) Petitioner

was sifting through the utensil drawer, where the knives were

kept, so she called 911. (Id. at 142.) Carignan saw her and

ripped the phone out of the wall. (Id.) Petitioner said, “You

called the cops, you rat bitch. I can’t believe you called the

fucking cops, you rat bitch.” (Id. at 143.) Cardenas ran on to

the balcony and screamed for help. (Id. at 145.) Petitioner

followed, pushed her out of the way, and closed the door. (Id. at

145-46.) 

After the April 22, 2006, incident, Cardenas decided that she

no longer wanted to see Carignan, so she removed the apartment key

and the key to her mother’s house from his key ring. (Id. at

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149.) She left the apartment, and some time later, Petitioner

called her and indicated he was leaving the apartment to get some

food. (Id. at 152.) Cardenas went back to the apartment and

locked the door. (Id.) Petitioner returned but was locked out;

he “kept calling [Cardenas’s] cell phone and he [rang] the door

bell.” (Id.) For the next week, Carignan did not stay or go

inside the apartment. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 2,

169-71, Dec. 6, 2006.) But the two talked on the phone everyday. 

(Id. at 169.) 

On April 30, 2006, Petitioner called Cardenas and asked how

she was feeling. (Id. at 171.) She responded, “I am doing much

better. As a matter of fact tomorrow will be a better day and

everyday will get better and better.” (Id.) Carignan replied,

“What do you mean? You’re going to go to the police you rat

bitch. Just know that if you go to the cops I’ll send some crazy

motherfucker to get you. Watch your babies.” (Id. at 171-72.) 

Cardenas hung up the phone, but Petitioner called her again. (Id.

at 173.) Carignan told her that he believed she was going to go

to Steve, his parole officer, and again called her a “rat.” (Id.) 

After this conversation, Cardenas went to the Chula Vista Police

Station and filed a report against Carignan. (Id. at 175.) 

At trial, Cardenas testified that she knew Petitioner had

harmed others in the past and that “he knew people that were

capable of hurting other people[.]” (Id. at 172-73.) The

prosecutor asked, “During the course of your relationship, did

[Carignan] discuss with you that in the past he has beat up an exgirlfriend because she ratted on him?” (Id. at 173.) Cardenas

responded, “Yes, he did mention that.” (Id.) She admitted that

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the fact Petitioner had assaulted a former girlfriend for going to

the police came to mind when he threatened her over the phone. 

(Id.) Carignan’s statement scared her; she was “in shock.” (Id.

at 172.) Cardenas stated, “He threatened my children. They’re

children . . . it’s not their fault we were not working out and

they have nothing to do with this.” (Id.) She confessed, “I

didn’t know what will –- I was scared for my children. I wanted

to go to the police.” (Id.) 

She also testified that she had been assaulted five times by

Carignan before the incident in question. (Id. at 222.) Cardenas

stated that on the five previous occasions, Petitioner would choke

her and “hit [her] in the head.” (Id.) She admitted that before

the April 22, 2006, incident, she had not reported Carignan’s past

abuse. (Id.) She had only told her family about one of the prior

assaults, but Carignan’s mother and her daughters witnessed two

prior assaults. (Id. at 223.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2006, a jury convicted Petitioner of

inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant (count one), assault

by force likely to produce great bodily injury (count two), making

a criminal threat (count three), attempting to dissuade a witness

or victim of a crime from reporting a crime (count four), and

three counts of violating a protective order regarding domestic

violence (counts six, seven, and nine). See Cal. Penal Code §

136.1(b)(1 ) (West Supp. 2009); Cal. Penal Code §§ 245(a)(1),

273.5(a) (West 2008); Cal. Penal Code §§ 422, 667(b)-(i) (West

1999); (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., 89-92, 94-95, 97.) Carignan

waived a trial on the alleged prior convictions and admitted a

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serious felony prior and a strike prior. See Cal. Penal Code §§

667(a)(1), 668, 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 2009); Cal. Penal Code §§

667(b)-(I), 1170.12 (West 2004); (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

vol. 1, 164, Dec. 12, 2006.)

On January 24, 2007, Carignan was sentenced to a total of

fourteen years and four months in prison. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 117, Jan. 24, 2007.) For count one,

Petitioner was sentenced to the middle term of three years, which

was doubled to six years because of his prior strike. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 4, 529-30, Jan. 24, 2007.) 

Petitioner was given a two-year sentence for count two, which was

consecutive to all other terms of imprisonment. (Id. at 531.) 

Carignan also received a consecutive sentence of sixteen months

for count three. (Id.) The court did not impose a sentence for

count four because it was barred by California Penal Code § 654. 

(Id.) But the court imposed a five-year consecutive sentence

because of Petitioner’s admission that he had a serious felony

prior conviction. (Id.)

On January 31, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 9,

Carignan v. People, No. HSC10875 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 31,

2007 ) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The superior court

denied Carignan’s petition on February 1, 2007, pursuant to the

“Dixon rule,” because “the sentence was only recently imposed,

[and] the issues raised in the Petition may be included in a

forthcoming appeal.” (Lodgment No. 10, In re Carignan, No.

HSC10875 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2007 ) (order denying petition));

see also In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P. 2d 513 (1953). 

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2

 Neither party provided the Court with Carignan’s

resentencing information; however, Petitioner does not challenge

this aspect of his confinement.

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Carignan then filed a direct appeal of his conviction,

alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by the

admission of evidence of his parole status and prior assault on a

former girlfriend, and the court erred by giving Petitioner a

consecutive sentence of two years for count two in violation of

California Penal Code § 654. (Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening

Br. at 14, 22, 29, People v. Carignan, No. D050301 (Cal. Ct. App.

Dec. 7, 2007).) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment in part and reversed in part. (Lodgment No. 6, People v.

Carignan, No. D050301, slip op. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2007).) 

The state appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting evidence that Carignan was on parole and

had previously assaulted a former girlfriend. (Id. at 8-10.) The

court also determined, “[T]he jury’s verdict on counts 1 and 2

reflects a finding of a single ‘act . . . punishable in different

ways by different provisions’ and cannot, under section 654,

support separate punishments under each of those provisions.” 

(Id. at 14.) Thus, the California Court of Appeal remanded the

case for resentencing.2 (Id. at 15.)

Carignan filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court on January 14, 2008. (Lodgment No. 7, People v.

Carignan, No. S159880 (Cal. filed Jan. 14, 2008 ) (petition for

review).) The court summarily denied the petition. (Lodgment No.

8, People v. Carignan, No. S159880, Order (Cal. Feb. 20, 2008).) 

On January 25, 2008, while his petition for review was

pending, Carignan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

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the California Supreme Court alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel. (Lodgment No. 11, Carignan v. Almager, No. S160301 (Cal.

filed Jan. 25, 2008 ) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The

petition was denied, without comment, by the state supreme court

on July 7, 2008. (Lodgment No. 12, In re Carignan, No. S160301,

order (Cal. July 9, 2008).)

On December 10, 2008, Carignan filed his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this Court [doc. 1]. Petitioner named Warden

Smelosky and California Attorney General Brown as the Respondents. 

Due to overcrowding in California state prisons, Petitioner was

relocated to a prison in Mississippi [doc. 3]. On February 11,

2008, Carignan’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

was filed in this Court [doc. 4]. In his Amended Petition,

Carignan named Warden Adams and California Attorney General Brown

as the Respondents.

Because Petitioner is in custody under a state court

judgment, the respondent must be the state officer who has custody

of Carignan. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 2006); see Rules Governing

§ 2254 Cases, Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (West 2006). 

Warden Adams is the correct Respondent because he is the Warden of

Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility, in Tutwiler,

Mississippi, where Petitioner is currently in custody. (Answer

1.)

Petitioner also named California Attorney General Brown as a

Respondent in both his Petition and Amended Petition. “The

state’s attorney general is a proper party only if the petitioner

is not then confined, but expects to be taken into custody.” 

Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 190 (7th Cir. 1996); See Rules

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Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 2(b), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. “If

the petitioner is in prison, the warden is the right respondent.” 

(Id.) Because Carignan is incarcerated, the only proper

respondent is Warden Adams. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Carignan filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, it

is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) of 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2008). Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2008); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Carignan’s Petition was filed on December 10, 2008,

so AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204.

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. 

Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885

(9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir.

1988).

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A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990 ) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of

state law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation).

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). 

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to

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adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question that

matters under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” (Id. at 71) (citation omitted). In

other words, a federal court is not required to review the state

court decision de novo. (Id.) Rather, a federal court can

proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis under §

2254(d)(1). (Id.) 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

“explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

‘clearly established’ rules.” (Id.) “[A] state court decision

may not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for example,

because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108

F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state court

decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of,’ an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” (Id.)

(citing Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997);

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996).) 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

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28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claim One -- Sixth Amendment Violation

In ground one of his Amended Petition, Carignan alleges that

he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial

attorney, Roger Christiansen, failed to prepare a defense and

neglected to communicate with him before trial. (Am. Pet. 6.) 

Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court reasonably

denied Carignan’s claim because he failed to meet his burden under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (Answer Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 5-7.)

When deciding a § 2254 habeas corpus petition, the Court must

“look to the last reasoned decision of the state court as the

basis of the state court’s judgment.” Polk v. Sandoval, 503 F.3d

903, 909 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874,

880 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002). When there is no reasoned state court

decision, “an independent review of the record is required to

determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application

of controlling federal law.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982

(9th Cir. 2000); see also Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 766

n.21 (9th Cir. 2008); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir.

2005); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner did not submit a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the San Diego Superior Court or the California Court of Appeal. 

He filed his petition in the California Supreme Court; however,

his petition was summarily denied. (Lodgment No. 12, In re

Carignan, No. S160301.) Thus, this Court must conduct an

independent review of the record. See Delagado, 223 F.3d at 982.

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To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the inquiry

is whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

First, the petitioner must show that the attorney’s performance

was deficient. Id. at 687. Second, “the [petitioner] must show

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. In

other words, “[t]here is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Id. at 694. 

For Carignan to prevail on his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, he must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test. 

Id. at 687. But courts need not address both prongs if the

petitioner alleging ineffective assistance makes an insufficient

showing on one. Id. at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be

followed.” Id. Under the prejudice prong, Carignan carries the

heavy burden of showing that the outcome of his trial would have

been different if his attorney had not made unprofessional errors. 

Petitioner asserts that Christiansen initially convinced him

to go to trial; then counsel failed to visit him in prison to

discuss the case and failed to communicate with him for at least

two months. (Am. Pet. 6.) Carignan believes that Christiansen

wrongly assumed that Petitioner was going to take the plea deal

offered to him the day before trial. (Id.) Because of his

attorney’s mistaken belief that Petitioner was going to accept the

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plea bargain, Christiansen did not have a defense prepared when

they went to trial the next day. (Id.) To support his claim that

his counsel was deficient, Petitioner argues that Christiansen

“did not move for a continuance nor remove himself from the case.” 

(Id.) In his Traverse, he also asserts that counsel’s failure to

submit a limiting instruction prejudiced Carignan’s case. 

(Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P & A. 11.)

i. Lack of Communication 

Petitioner contends that his attorney’s lack of communication

and visitation constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. (Am.

Pet. 6.) Carignan claims, “County jail log-in records will

reflect that Christiansen did not visit petitioner before trial. 

And phone records will indicate collect calls were blocked for

over two months before trial.” (Am. Pet. 6.) Petitioner asserts

that after he and his attorney decided to go to trial, counsel

stopped visiting him for three months. (Id.) Carignan does not

allege the number, content, or length of his prior conversations

with his attorney.

“Adequate consultation between attorney and client is an

essential element of competent representation of a criminal

defendant.” United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir.

1983). “While the amount of consultation required will depend on

the facts of each case, the consultation should be sufficient to

determine all legally relevant information known to the

defendant.” Id. at 581-82 (footnote omitted). In Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 457 (9th Cir. 1998), without addressing the

content of their consultation, the Ninth Circuit concluded,

“Counsel’s admission that he spent at most forty-five minutes with

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Turner prior to trial demonstrates deficient performance.” The

trial in Turner lasted a day and a half.

Here, Carignan’s trial spanned several days, but there was

only a day and a half of testimony. (Lodgment No. 1, People v.

Carignan, No. D050301 137-41, 143-46, 148-49 (Dec. 5, 6, 7, 2006 )

(mins.).) Petitioner has not shown what he could have told his

lawyer that would have affected his case, other than he was

rejecting the plea offer. There is no evidence that earlier

consultation with Christiansen would have changed the outcome. 

Carignan has not demonstrated that during the course of his

conversations with counsel, his defense attorney had not obtained

all legally relevant information known to Petitioner. Without

this showing, Petitioner has not established deficient

performance. Even if the limited contact between Carignan and his

attorney, by itself, establishes deficient representation, unless

Petitioner was prejudiced, he is not entitled to relief.

ii. Lack of Defense

 Petitioner also alleges that his attorney failed to prepare

a defense, but he has not explained what defense his attorney

should have presented. (Am. Pet. 6); see United States v.

Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Opening statements were not given by either the prosecution

or Petitioner’s counsel. Christiansen did, however, pursue a

defense theory. He cross-examined Cardenas about her motive in

pressing charges against Petitioner in an effort to undermine her

credibility. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 2, 220.) 

He asked Cardenas if she knew about Carignan’s recent production

of a music CD. (Id.) Christiansen asked her, “Isn’t it true that

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you’re very jealous of the CD because of the success?” (Id.) He

continued to press Cardenas on whether she was jealous of

Petitioner’s music career. “And [the production of the CD] was

with a very pretty women [sic], wasn’t it?.” (Id.) Christiansen

also asked, “Isn’t true that you were very concerned that you had

no way to hold [Petitioner] after he became successful?” (Id. at

221.) 

Defense counsel called witnesses on Carignan’s behalf. 

First, Christiansen called Hortencia Padilla, Petitioner’s mother,

as a witness. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep’s. Tr. vol. 2, 297-98 (Dec. 6,

2006)). Counsel elicited testimony from her that shortly before

Petitioner’s arrest, Cardenas had threatened to call the police if

he didn’t repay a thousand dollar loan. (Id. at 305-06.) She

would threaten to call his probation officer if Carignan did not

do what Cardenas wanted. (Id. at 312-13, 315-16.) Defense

counsel also called Petitioner’s brother, Angelo Carignan, as a

witness. (Id. at 323-24.) Angelo also testified that Cardenas

frequently threatened to call Petitioner’s parole officer or the

police if Petitioner did not do as she asked. (Id. at 327-28.) 

According to Angelo, Cardenas was jealous of the female singer

working with Petitioner on a CD, and Cardenas feared that she was

going to lose Petitioner once he became a successful musician. 

(Id. at 332-34.) When Petitioner told Cardenas their relationship

was over, she said, “We’ll see who gets the last laugh.” (Id. at

334.) Angelo stated, “[Cardenas] said she was going to call the

police and [Petitioner’s] parole officer to come get him.” (Id.

at 336.)

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Defense counsel also called Petitioner’s sister, Ydima

Carignan, to testify. (Id. at 370-71.) She said that Cardenas

was jealous of the female working with Petitioner on his CD and

video. (Id. at 377-78.) She testified that Cardenas made several

threats to call Petitioner’s parole officer. (Id. at 381-83.) 

Cardenas told Petitioner’s sister that now that it looked like

Petitioner “was going to be successful, he was just going to leave

her.” (Id. at 385.)

In closing argument, Christiansen stressed to the jury that

Cardenas was jealous that Carignan was associating with the woman

he worked with on the CD. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr.,

vol. 3, 451, Dec. 7, 2006.) Christiansen argued that Cardenas

knew Petitioner was socializing with an attractive blond woman,

and she went to the police to “get him back” for using her. (Id.) 

Christiansen told the jury, “She [Cardenas] lied on all of it. 

She was out to get Ricardo at any cost. He was about to make it

big in the music business and she wasn’t coming along . . . .” 

(Id. at 453.) Carignan’s attorney called witnesses and presented

a defense to the jury. This aspect of Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance claim is not supported by the record.

iii. Failure to Ask for a Continuance 

Although Petitioner claims that Christiansen should have

moved for a continuance of the trial, (Am. Pet. 6), “broad

discretion [is] granted [to] trial courts on matters of

continuances[.]” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983).

Carignan has not established why a continuance was necessary, how

the conduct of the trial would have differed if a continuance was

granted, or how the result of the trial would have differed. He

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offers no compelling reason for a continuance. There is no basis

for concluding that a continuance would have been granted.

“Where a motion for continuance would prove futile, failure

to seek one cannot constitute ineffective assistance.” United

States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 495 (7th Cir. 1994 ) (citing United

States v. Kamel, 965 F.2d 484, 498 (7th Cir. 1992)). Carignan has

not established that the failure to seek a continuance of the

trial constituted deficient performance. This claim does not

entitle him to habeas relief.

iv. Failure to Submit a Limiting Instruction

Belatedly, in his Traverse, Carignan asserts that if his

attorney had requested a limiting instruction concerning his

parole status, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 

(Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P & A. 11.) “A traverse is not the

proper pleading to raise additional grounds.” Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). This Court has the

discretion to consider claims raised for the first time after the

filing of the Petition. See Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742, 745 (9th

Cir. 2002 ) (discussing equitable tolling argument raised by

petitioner for the first time as an objection to the magistrate

judge’s findings and recommendation). Federal habeas courts have

considered claims that are raised for the first time in a

traverse. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 656 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The late claim, however, may be unexhausted because it was not

previously presented to the state courts. See id. at 656-57. 

Even so, an unexhausted claim can be denied on the merits. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2).

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Generally, trial counsel’s “decision not to request a

limiting instruction is ‘solidly withing the acceptable range of

strategic tactics employed by trial lawyers in the mitigation of

damning evidence.’” Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 846 (9th

Cir. 2009 ) (citing United States v. Gregory, 74 F.3d 819, 823

(7th Cir. 1996)). An attorney’s failure to seek a limiting jury

instruction is not prejudicial if there is overwhelming evidence

of guilt. United States v. Noske, 117 F.3d 1053, 1058-59 (8th

Cir. 1997 ) (explaining that counsel’s failure to request a

limiting instruction was harmless error because there was

overwhelming evidence against appellant Joan); Avila v. Adams,

2009 WL 995557, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2009 ) (holding

counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction regarding

evidence of gang activity was not prejudicial due to overwhelming

evidence of defendant’s involvement in the crime). 

Christiansen told the trial judge that he was unsure whether

he wanted a limiting instruction about Petitioner’s parole status. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 2, 215.) The trial judge

stated, “[T]here’s no reason [for the jury] to concern themselves

with the fact he’s on parole. That’s not the issue before the

jury.” (Id.) It was not unreasonable for Christiansen to

conclude that asking for a limiting instruction would only

highlight Carignan’s criminal background. 

Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence of guilt from

witnesses, photographs, and a previously issued protective order

against the Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol.

1, 127, 130, 140; id. vol. 2, 177-81, 194, 222, 274, 275.) 

Cardenas described the altercation. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

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Appeal Tr., vol. 1, 120-56; id. vol. 2, 167-84, 190-201, 216-53,

258-70.) She claimed that “[h]e was mad” and “was hitting me and

then he got an extension cord and he was holding it around the

front part of my neck.” (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol.

1, 127, 130.) She testified that Carignan kicked and stomped on

her with his tennis shoes and punched her with his fists. (Id. at

140.) This evidence supported Petitioner’s conviction for

inflicting corporal injury upon a cohabitant and assault by force

likely to produce great bodily injury. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

Tr., vol. 1, 53-54, 56-57.) 

Witness Robin Romby testified that she saw two thumb print

marks on Cardenas’s neck two days after the incident. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 2, 274.) She also saw “a bruise on

[Cardenas’s] back shoulder . . . two bruises on her arms . . . a

bruise on her chest and she had a bruise on her back.” (Id. at

275.) Some of the bruises were “really large, brown welts –- not

brown, but black and purple, that look[ed] really new, freshly new

bruises.” (Id.) Romby asserted that Cardenas told her that “her

and her partner, Ricky, had a fight that weekend or the night

before.” (Id. at 274.) 

Police pictures of Cardenas, taken one week after she

reported the crime, were admitted into evidence. (Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 2, 176-81.) The photos showed bruises on

her right and left arms. (Id. at 177-78.) Pictures of the

bruises on her right leg and right shoulder were also admitted

into evidence. (Id. at 179-81.) 

Cardenas obtained a protective order against Carignan on May

3, 2006, which directed that he have “no personal, telephonic or

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written contact with [Cardenas].” (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

vol. 1, 6, May 3, 2006; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 2,

182-83). In spite of the order, Petitioner called Cardenas on May 

4, 5, 20, and 25, 2006. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol.

2, 190, 193 -94, 197.) Cardenas testified that during a collect

call on May 5, 2006, Petitioner admitted, “I didn’t mean to

threaten the kids, only you.” (Id. at 194.) This admission was

evidence that Petitioner intended that his statement be understood

as a threat, an element of the charge of making a criminal threat. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 62.) 

The police photos and Robin Romby’s testimony corroborated

the victim’s testimony and supported the jury’s verdict that

Carignan was guilty of inflicting corporal injury upon a

cohabitant and assault by force likely to produce great bodily

injury. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 53-54, 56-57.) 

Carignan has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that

an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of his parole

status would have altered the outcome. There was overwhelming

evidence connecting him to the crimes. Petitioner has made an

insufficient showing that defense counsel’s failure to request a

limiting instruction was deficient performance or that Carignan

suffered prejudice due to counsel’s omission. The Strickland test

for ineffective assistance is not satisfied, so the Court should

DENY habeas relief on this ground. 

B. Claims Two and Three -- Fourteenth Amendment Violations

Carignan alleges that his right to a fair trial was violated

by the trial court’s admission of evidence that he was on parole

(ground two) and that he had previously assaulted a former

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girlfriend (ground three). (Am. Pet. 7, 10.) Respondent argues

that both grounds fail to raise a federal question, and the state

court properly admitted the evidence without violating clearly

established Supreme Court law. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

10-13.) 

Absent exceptional circumstances, federal courts “defer to

state-court factual findings, even when those findings relate to a

constitutional issue.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 366

(1991); see also Synder v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1213 (2008).

Factual determinations by state courts are presumed

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary . . . and a decision adjudicated on the merits

in a state court and based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented in the state-court proceeding . . . . 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). But whether

evidence is admissible is a legal conclusion. McKinney v. Rees,

993 F.2d 1378, 1382 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993 ) (“The legal conclusions

regarding the admissibility of evidence, however, are not findings

of fact, and are not binding on this court.”). 

“Federal courts ‘will not review a question of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a

state law grounded that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment.’” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d

1000, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008 ) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729 (1991)). “[F]ailure to comply with the state’s rules of

evidence is neither necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting

habeas relief.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

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“The Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements

of fairness in a criminal trial.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,

563-64 (1967). This guarantee does not transform the federal

courts into a “rule-making organ for the promulgation of state

rules of criminal procedure.” Id.; see also Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991). Because Carignan claims that his right to

a fair trial was violated, the Court must consider “whether the

admission of the evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as

to render them fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. 

“[T]he trial court [must not have] committed an error which

rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it

violated federal due process.” Id. at 920 (quoting Reiger v.

Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986)). On habeas

corpus review, federal courts do not consider whether state

evidentiary rulings were in error; the inquiry is whether the

admission of the evidence violated the petitioner’s due process

right to a fair trial. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

This Court must determine whether evidence that Carignan was

on parole and that he had previously assaulted an ex-girlfriend

was relevant to an essential element of the prosecution’s case or

whether it was improperly used to show a propensity for violence. 

Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that “all relevant

evidence is admissible . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant

evidence is “any evidence having the tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence

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“may merely be a waste of time, may confuse the jury, or may cause

serious prejudice to the defense.” McKinney, 993 F.2d at 1380. 

Although a person’s character may be relevant, it is

inadmissible to show the person had a propensity to act in

conformity with prior bad acts. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a); Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997); United States v.

Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2007). Prior bad acts,

crimes, or wrongs are usually not admissible to prove the

character of the person or to show action in conformity with that

character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). They may be admissible to prove

a person’s “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” so long

as the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Id.;

United States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2008 )

(finding appellant’s prior involvement with transporting drugs

was probative of his knowledge or familiarity with the modes of

transportation used to transport drugs and was not outweighed by

its prejudicial effect).

“[E]vidence of a prior bad act . . . may not be offered to

prove the defendant’s criminal propensity but it is admissible if

it is relevant to a material issue . . . .” United States v.

Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.

Rodriguez, 45 F.3d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1995 ) (“Evidence of the

fight would be admissible under Rule 404(b) only if the fight

itself, and not [Petitioner’s] character implied by the fight,

provided an independent basis for establishing intent, motive or

purpose in possessing the object the month earlier.”) 

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If a prior bad act is relevant to a material issue, it is

still subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and can be

inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by

its prejudicial effect. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v.

Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2007); Curtin, 489 F.3d at 957;

see also United States v. Pilgrim, 270 F. App’x 662, 663,

available at 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6922, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 20,

2008) (holding petitioner’s prior act was admissible to establish

knowledge and absence of mistake, and admissibility was not

outweighed by its prejudicial effect because petitioner’s defense

was “lack of knowledge”). 

“Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may

draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. 

Even then, the evidence must ‘be of such quality as necessarily

prevents a fair trial.’” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920 (citation

omitted ) (emphasis in original). False material evidence

admitted at trial deprives a petitioner of his right to a fair

trial. See Hall v. Dir. of Corr., 343 F.3d 976, 978, 985 (9th

Cir. 2003) (holding that a due process violation occurred where no

physical evidence linked petitioner to the crime and the

prosecution relied on an informant’s “jailhouse notes” that were

false); Collins v. Scully, 755 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1985 )

(finding a violation of petitioner’s due process rights when

“crucial, critical [and] highly significant” evidence that was

“sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction” was

erroneously admitted ) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d

410, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1982)); cf. Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d

395, 407 (9th Cir. 2006 ) (holding there was a violation of the

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Due Process Clause when the sole evidence for finding that

petitioner submitted a frivolous asylum application did not meet

the court’s standard of trustworthiness and reliability). 

i. Parole Status -- Ground Two

Carignan was charged and ultimately convicted of attempting

to dissuade a witness or victim from reporting a crime. See Cal.

Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1); (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1,

92.) California law provides, “Seldom will evidence of a

defendant’s prior criminal conduct be ruled inadmissible when it

is the primary basis for establishing a crucial element of the

charged offense.” People v. Garrett, 30 Cal. App. 4th 962, 967,

36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 36 (1994); see also (Lodgment No. 6, People

v. Carignan, No. D050301, slip op. at 9.) 

Federal law provides that “[a] defendant’s prior conviction

is relevant and admissible when such a conviction is an element of

a defendant’s charged offense.” United States v. Aliso, 152 F.3d

1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519

U.S. 172 (1997)). But when a criminal statute only requires that

a prior conviction fall within a broad category of felonies in

order to satisfy an element of a current charge, the charge and

nature of the prior offense are inadmissible. Old Chief, 519 U.S.

at 186. 

 If prior criminal conduct or a prior bad act has been used

to establish a defendant’s propensity, the Supreme Court has

“express[ed] no opinion on whether a state law would violate the

Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’

evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.” Estelle,

502 U.S. at 75 n.5; see also Garceau v. Woodward, 275 F.3d 769,

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774 (9th Cir. 2001) rev’d on other grounds, Woodward v. Garceau,

538 U.S. 990 (2003). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that

under AEDPA, federal courts must defer to a state’s decision when

the Supreme Court fails to “‘squarely address[] the issue in th[e]

case’ or establish a legal principle that ‘clearly extend[s]’ to a

new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court. ” Moses

v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The state trial court held an in limine hearing to consider

the admissibility of evidence disclosing Carignan’s parole status.

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 1, 49-55, 64.) The court

ruled:

I will grant the motion in limine with respect to

being a parolee, as to the fact that she knew he was on

parole, that he had a parole agent and admitted – - I

[am] permitting it, because I do believe it goes to the

charge and specifically the charge in count 4; that is,

attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime. 

And I do find it represents it goes to the element of

the offense he threatens to or tells him that [s]he

intends to call the person she knew to be his parole

agent.

(Id.)

The California Court of Appeals agreed that Petitioner’s

parole status was admissible at trial, and it did not violate his

due process rights because it was relevant to establish an element

of count four. Carignan “attempted to prevent Cardenas from

reporting a crime to ‘a peace officer or state or local law

enforcement officer or probation or parole or correctional

officer, prosecuting agency or to any judge.” (Lodgment No. 6,

People v. Carignan, No. D050301, slip op. at 9 ) (emphasis in

original).) 

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 At the trial, Cardenas testified that Petitioner threatened

her if she told Steve” about the assault. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Appeal Tr., vol. 2, 171-72.) Carignan’s parole status was

disclosed to identify “Steve” as Petitioner’s parole officer. A

jury could have reasonably believed that Carignan’s threat was an

attempt to dissuade Cardenas from going to Petitioner’s parole

officer and reporting a crime. Carignan’s parole status was

introduced at trial to satisfy an element of the crime charged in

count four, attempting to prevent Cardenas from reporting a crime

to a parole officer. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Carignan, No.

D050301, slip op. at 9.) 

Moreover, the fact that Petitioner was on parole was not

admitted to prove that he had a propensity to commit the current

crimes. The offense which led to his prior conviction and the

reason for Carignan’s parole were not introduced at trial. 

Although Petitioner claims that a limiting instruction should have

been given, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has not “held

that a limiting instruction is always necessary to protect

defendant’s due process rights.” Basurto v. Luna, No. 08-35277,

291 F. App’x 41, 43, available at 2008 WL 3861813, at *1 (9th Cir.

Aug. 18, 2008 ) (emphasis in original). Even if Carignan’s status

as a parolee could be used to infer he had a propensity to commit

the crime, “[t]he Supreme Court has never held that the admission

of prior bad acts evidence to prove propensity is

unconstitutional.” Id. (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5;

accord Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2008));

Alberni v. McDonnell, 458 F.3d 860, 863-67 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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Lastly, the state appellate court concluded that the evidence

was relevant, and although Carignan’s parole status “had the

potential for some prejudice,” the court could not conclude that

the “potential [prejudice] substantially outweighed the probative

value.” (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Carignan, No. D050301, slip

op. at 9-10.) On federal habeas review, the Court does not

reexamine whether under California law the evidence was

inadmissible because it was more prejudicial than probative. 

McKinney, 993 F.2d at 1384. Instead, this Court must determine

whether Petitioner was denied a fair trial. The state court

addressed this issue as well. “Having determined that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Carignan’s parole

status and prior assault into evidence, we also reject, for the

same reasons, the conclusory claim that admission of the evidence

violated his constitutional due process and fair trial rights.” 

(Id. at 10, n.6.) The state court’s decision was not an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law or based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Mejia v. Garcia, 534

F.3d at 1046.

Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief on ground two should be

DENIED.

ii. Assault on Ex-Girlfriend -- Ground Three

Carignan’s third ground for relief mirrors ground two, except

the evidence he believes violated his right to a fair trial was a

prior assault of a former girlfriend. (Am. Pet. 10.) The state

appellate court found that Petitioner’s prior assault of an exgirlfriend for “ratt[ing] him out” to the police was relevant to

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the criminal threat charge. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Carignan,

No. D050301, slip op. at 6-7.)

 The jury was instructed that to convict for a criminal

threat, the prosecution must prove the following: 

1) the [Petitioner] willfully threatened to unlawfully

kill or unlawfully cause great bodily injury to Karla

Cardenas; 2) the [Petitioner] made the threat to Karla

Cardenas orally; 3) [Carignan] intended that his

statement be understood as a threat; 4) the threat was

so clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific that it

communicated to Karla Cardenas a serious intention and

the immediate prospect that the threat would be carried

out; 5) the threat actually caused Karla Cardenas to be

in sustained fear for her own safety or the safety of

her immediate family; and 6) [her] fear was reasonable

under the circumstances.

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 62.) The prosecution had

the burden to present evidence of Cardenas’s state of mind,

specifically that she reasonably feared for her or her immediate

family’s safety and that the fear was reasonable. See Cal. Penal

Code § 422; (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 62.) 

The California Court of Appeal noted that in criminal cases

where the defendant is charged with making a criminal threat,

“‘evidence of past domestic abuse was highly relevant and

probative’ with respect to a victim’s mental state in § 422

prosecution.” (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Carignan, No. D050301,

slip op. at 7 ) (citing People v. McCary, 58 Cal. App. 4th 159,

172, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 872, 880 (1997)).) Cardenas testified that

she was scared, in shock, and wanted to go to the police when

Carignan told her, “Just know that if you go to the cops I’ll send

some crazy motherfucker to get you. Watch your babies.” 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 2, 172.) Petitioner told

her that he previously beat up an ex-girlfriend for going to the

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police. (Id. at 173.) The California Court of Appeal found this

evidence relevant to whether Cardenas’s fear was reasonable and

whether Petitioner meant his statement as a threat. (Lodgment No.

6, People v. Carignan, No. D050301, slip op. at 7-8.) 

Petitioner argues that his prior assault of an ex-girlfriend

should not have been admitted into evidence because the jury could

have relied on Cardenas’s testimony that Carignan previously

physically abused her to establish that she reasonably feared any

threats he might have made. (Am. Pet. 10-11.) This issue was

also considered by the trial court during an in limine hearing. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 1, 52, 61.) Cardenas

“outlined a series of incidents that were going through her mind,

which include[d] the fact that he had shot at people, beat up

people. He had beaten up an ex-girlfriend.” (Id. at 61.) The

court found the testimony was relevant and highly probative, which

outweighed any prejudicial effect. (Id. at 81-82, 84-85.) 

The state appellate court concluded that although the

prosecution could have relied on other evidence, the trial court

did not have to reject evidence that Carignan assaulted a former

girlfriend because she went to the police. (Lodgment No. 6,

People v. Carignan, No. D050301, slip op. at 8.) The court held

that the prosecution could choose what evidence to present, and

section 352 of the California Evidence Code did not require that

the prior assault be excluded. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends that the evidence was primarily presented

to prove he had a propensity to commit the crimes. (Traverse

Attach. #1 Mem. P & A. 9.) The evidence was probative of whether

the threat caused Cardenas to fear for her safety or for the

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safety of her immediate family and whether her fear was

reasonable. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 62.) This

evidence was relevant. 

Carignan claims that his prior assault of an ex-girlfriend

for going to the police was so prejudicial that it outweighed the

probative value of the evidence. (Am. Pet. 10.) On habeas

review, the Court is “only concerned with its relevance.” See

McGivney, 993 F.2d at 1384. Petitioner’s prior assault of his

former girlfriend was relevant to the case. “Only if there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its

admission violate due process.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

Consequently, the state appellate court’s determination that

Petitioner’s prior act was admissible did not violate his due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The state court

decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law

or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The

admission of the prior assault, even if characterized as

propensity evidence, is not contrary to clearly established law. 

See Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d at 1046.

Petitioner’s claim for relief on ground three should be

DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends that

Carignan’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED in its

entirety. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the

United States District Court Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz, assigned

to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\CARIGNAN 2296\R&R03(2).wpd 33 08cv2296 BTM (RBB)

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties on or before November 23, 2009. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before

December 7, 2009. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157

(9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: October 20, 2009 ______________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Moskowitz 

All parties of record 

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