Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05635/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05635-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JILL BURNELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MARIN HUMANE SOCIETY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-05635-JSC 

ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 47, 49, 50

This action arises out of the Marin Humane Society’s seizure of four horses from the 

property of Plaintiffs Jill and Alex Burnell (“Jill” and “Alex” and together “Plaintiffs”) in 

December 2012 and January 2013 on the grounds that the animals were either severely 

malnourished or otherwise unhealthy. In the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs bring 

suit against the Marin Humane Society, Marin County (the “County”), and a number of individual 

Defendants, including: the Marin Humane Society’s CEO, four Marin Humane Society employees 

who act as humane officers, a member of the Marin Humane Society’s board of directors who also 

serves as its authorized spokesperson, a veterinarian whose clients include Plaintiffs and the Marin 

Humane Society, two individuals who reported Jill Burnell to the Marin Humane Society, and 

Albert Burnham (“Burnham”) the individual appointed as county hearing officer in administrative 

proceedings related to the seizure of the horses. (Dkt. No. 46.) Plaintiffs bring one count against 

all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the six other counts against various groupings of 

Defendants arise under state tort law, including trespass upon land, trespass to chattels, 

conversion, portraying Plaintiffs in a false light, public disclosure of private facts and invasion of 

Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to privacy, and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. (Id.) The Court earlier dismissed the initial complaint finding that Plaintiffs failed to 

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state a Section 1983 claim against any defendant and dismissed the claims against Burnham with 

prejudice on grounds of judicial immunity. Burnell v. Marin Humane Soc’y, No. 14-cv-05635-

JSC, 2015 WL 4089844, at *2, 4 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2015).

Now pending before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, to 

stay this case in favor of a pending state action; as with briefing regarding the initial complaint, the 

Marin Humane Society and all individual defendants filed one motion (referred to here as 

“Defendants’ Motion”), and the County filed separately (the “County’s Motion”). (Dkt. Nos. 47, 

50.) Defendants contend that the FAC fails to cure the defects the Court identified in Plaintiffs’ 

pleading and should be dismissed with prejudice. In addition, Burnham has moved for entry of 

judgment in his favor. (Dkt. No. 49.) Having considered the parties’ submissions, and having had 

the benefit of oral argument on October 8, 2015, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Before discussing the facts, an explanation of certain state laws and local regulations and 

ordinances regarding animal control and enforcing animal control regulations is helpful.

California Penal Code Section 597.1 makes it a misdemeanor for an animal owner to fail to 

provide proper care and attention to an animal and provides that when “a peace officer, humane 

society officer, or animal control officer” has “reasonable grounds to believe that very prompt 

action is required to protect the health or safety of [an] animal . . . the officer shall immediately 

seize the animal and comply with subdivision (f).” The “reasonable grounds to believe that very 

prompt action is required” is the equivalent of the exigent circumstances exception familiar to 

search and seizure law” that allows officers to act in “an emergency situation requiring swift 

action to save life, property, or evidence.” Broden v. Marin Humane Soc’y, 70 Cal. App. 4th 

1212, 1221 (1999). Subdivision (f), in turn, requires an administrative hearing regarding the 

proprietary of the animal seizure. Cal. Penal Code § 597.1(f).

Under California law, even absent such agreement, the Marin Humane Society is 

empowered to “enforce the provisions of laws of this state for the prevention of cruelty to animals, 

or arresting or prosecuting offenders thereunder, or preventing cruelty to animals.” Cal. Corp. 

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Code. § 14501. 

The County entered a contract with the Marin Humane Society, a private 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that promotes animal rights, for the Marin Humane Society to provide animalrelated services. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.) Specifically, the County has designated the Marin Humane Society 

as the “animal services agency” for the county, responsible for enforcing all state and local laws 

relating to the care, treatment, and impounding of animals, including issuing citations and making 

arrests, and vested in the Marin Humane Society authority to appoint suitable persons to act as 

animal service officers, who are deemed to be peace officers for the purpose of enforcing County 

animal control ordinances. Marin Muni. Code §§ 8.04.010, 8.04.110, 8.04.120. Defendants 

McKenney, Machado, Hill and Rogers were all Marin Humane Society employees during the 

relevant time period. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 13-17.)

B. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the FAC and documents of which the Court takes 

judicial notice.1Plaintiffs are a married couple who live in a trailer on a 35-acre parcel of 

 

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court “may judicially notice a fact that is not 

subject to reasonable dispute because it: (i) is generally known within the trial court's territorial 

jurisdiction; or (ii) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Judicial notice is appropriate for “materials incorporated into the 

complaint or matters of public record[,]” Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Here, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of Exhibits A-F. (Dkt. 

No. 48.) All of these documents are publicly filed documents from state court proceedings 

involving Plaintiffs, including the county-initiated administrative proceedings regarding the 

seizure of the horses, criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs regarding their care of the horses, and 

civil cases that Plaintiffs and others brought pertaining to the horses. All of these documents “can 

be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. And indeed, it is well established that a court may take judicial 

notice of records from other court proceedings, McMcMunigal v. Bloch, No. C 1002765 SI, 2010 

WL 5399219, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010), including state judicial and administrative 

proceedings in particular. Mack v. So. Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), 

abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991); 

U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); 

United States v. Epperson, 528 F.2d 48, 50 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirming district court’s decision to 

take judicial notice of an individual’s guilty plea). Of course, the court does not credit the truth of 

the facts or allegations set forth therein, but rather “only for the purposes of noticing the existence 

of the [prior] lawsuit[s], the claims made in the lawsuit[s], and the fact that various documents 

were filed therein.” McMunigal, 2010 WL 5399219, at *2 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs did not 

file a request for judicial notice but attached several documents to their opposition to the County’s 

motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. Nos. 54-1—54-4.) Despite the absence of a request for judicial 

notice, the Court will take notice of Exhibit B (Dkt. No. 54-2), portions of the Marin County 

Municipal Code. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. So. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 

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agricultural land they own in Marin County, California (the “Chileno Valley Road property”). 

(Dkt. No. ¶¶ 1-2.) Jill works as a livestock breeder of horses for the equestrian discipline known 

as “Hunters.” (Id. ¶ 3.) By December 2012, she owned over 35 horses—including stallions, 

broodmares, and their offspring—at the Chileno Valley Road property. (Id. ¶ 3.) The property, 

which is not visible from a public road, is fenced-in meadowland with a water well and electronic 

pump. (Id. ¶ 2.) In October 2012, Plaintiffs added internal pasture fencing, three walk-in sun 

shelters, wind breaks, stallion paddocks, and storage buildings for feed and equipment. (Id. ¶ 2.)

Of Jill’s 35 horses living at the Chileno Valley Road property, breeding stallion Romantic Star and 

broodmares Devil’s Sis (also known as Pookie) and Metsonized (also known as Nutsie)—whom 

Alex considered his pet—were particularly valuable. (Id.) Jill also had an established, 

economically advantageous client relationship with the owner of broodmare Lucky Karma. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs’ complaint details Defendants’ interference with these four horses.

Initial Investigation

In October 2012, Ricci made false reports to Rogers at the Marin Humane Society about 

the care and condition of the Plaintiffs’ horses. (Id. ¶ 22.) Specifically, Ricci told Rogers—who 

at some point unsuccessfully tried to sell a horse to Jill (id. ¶ 17)—that Plaintiffs had moved their 

40 to 50 breeding horses to Marin County without adequate food or shelter. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 35.) Ricci 

made these claims “for the purpose of redistributing [Plaintiffs’] horses to others.” (Id.) Based 

 

1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Municipal ordinances are proper subjects for judicial notice.”) (citation 

omitted). The Court will not judicially notice Exhibits C and D (Dkt. Nos. 54-3, 54-5), which are 

the declaration and testimony of Marin Humane Society Captain Cindy Machado in earlier 

proceedings, as the contents of a declaration or a deposition are not clearly established “facts” and 

therefore are inappropriate for judicial notice. See in re Oracle Corp Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 

386 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). Finally, in connection with Plaintiffs’ supplemental opposition, they 

submitted a request for judicial notice of three documents; the request itself cites no authority for 

the propriety of judicial notice of any of the documents. (Dkt. No. 66.) The first is a Roster of 

Public Agencies for Marin County stamped with the county seal. (Dkt. No. 66-1.) The document 

is undated, despite Plaintiffs’ assertion that it is from April 19, 2013. (Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 1.) The 

Court declines to take judicial notice of this document. Similarly, the second document is an April 

18, 2014 statement by McKenney, the Marin Humane Society’s CEO, explaining the agency’s 

seizure of Plaintiffs’ horses. (Dkt. No. 66-2.) The Court will not take judicial notice of this 

document, which is evidentiary in nature. But the Court will judicially notice the third document, 

the hearing officer’s Order on Scope of Hearing in the second round of administrative hearings. 

(Dkt. No. 66-3.) As above, the Court takes judicial notice only of the fact that the document was 

filed in the administrative proceeding. See McMunigal, 2010 WL 5399219, at *2.

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on Ricci’s reports, the Marin Humane Society opened an investigation into Plaintiffs’ horses. (Id.

¶ 22.) As part of that investigation, Rogers, Machado, and Hill met to discuss Plaintiffs twice 

weekly. (Id. ¶ 35.) Rogers and Machado then recruited Plaintiffs’ neighbors to surveil Plaintiffs

and report all vehicles and visitors to the property—in part, to harass and intimidate these visitors, 

including clients, veterinarians, and farriers caring for the horses—and to allow the Marin Humane 

Society access to their land to surveil Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36.)

In November, as the investigation continued, Rogers began posting information about 

Plaintiffs and her “case” against them on the internet, including on a bulletin board called the 

Chronicle of the Horse. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Rogers announced that she would assist any individuals

with business claims against Plaintiffs, that Jill had refused to speak with her, and that Plaintiffs’ 

horses were without shelter at the Chileno Valley Road Property. (Id. ¶ 37.) Over the course of 

the investigation, Rogers and Hill published photos of holes in Plaintiffs’ property contending, 

untruthfully, that the holes were used to hide human waste in violation of county zoning 

regulations. (Id. ¶ 18.) Rogers misreported to Plaintiffs’ vendors that Plaintiffs were prohibited 

from purchasing horse feed supplies and had poor credit. (Id.) Rogers reported that Plaintiffs’ 

horses were stripping trees on the property to feed themselves because they did not have adequate 

feed, when really the trees were trimmed to shelter the horses and the horses were in good health, 

not starving. (Id.) As a result of these internet postings, Jill’s breeding business was declining. 

(Id. ¶ 38.) Rogers intent in spearheading this investigation was to redistribute Plaintiffs’ horses to 

individuals whom Rogers believed would be better guardians of the animals. (Id. ¶ 37.)

The Marin Humane Society used the investigation against Jill to promote private 

fundraising for its animal rights activities. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs contend that the Marin Humane 

Society has a policy and practice of making false and reckless statements in order to create a 

pretext to seize animals from private persons. (Id.)

On December 18, 2012, Jill sold the stallion Romantic Star to a Georgia breeder for 

$100,000. (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiffs intended to use the money to improve the Chileno Valley Road 

Property. (Id.) That same day, Rogers surveilled Plaintiffs’ property from a neighbor’s. (Id.) 

Rogers waved Jill over, but she did not approach. (Id.) Rogers posted a “Notice of Correction” on 

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Plaintiffs’ fence, instructing Jill to contact the Marin Humane Society regarding inadequate shelter 

and thin, lame horses. (Id.) That day, Jill called Hill at the Marin Humane Society to complain 

about Rogers’ internet activity. (Id.) Hill responded that he would come out to the Chileno Valley 

Road property on December 28 to speak with her. (Id.)

On December 19, 2012, veterinarian Paul McEvoy visited the Chileno Valley Road 

Property and examined Romantic Star to prepare the stallion for transportation to Georgia 

pursuant to the sale. (Id. ¶ 39.) Dr. McEvoy found nothing amiss with Plaintiffs’ horses. (Id.)

The Seizures

On December 26, 2012, two of Plaintiffs’ stallions fought, including Romantic Star. (Id.

¶ 40.) Within two hours of the fight, veterinarian Steve Wood came to the property to treat the 

horses. (Id.) Romantic Star’s Georgia purchaser requested that Dr. McEvoy conduct a follow-up 

examination of the stallion in light of the fight, and arrangements were made. (Id.) 

Early the next morning, Ricci emailed Rogers describing the events of the following 

evening, reporting that two of the horses entered the same pen and fought, and that Dr. Wood was 

visiting the horses. (Id. ¶ 41.) Ricci learned that information from Ghilotti. (Id. ¶ 41 n.4.) At 

11:20 a.m., the Marin Humane Society sent a team—including Rogers, Hill, and veterinarian Dr. 

Keefer—to Plaintiffs’ property along with a Sheriff’s Deputy to remove the horses “on the pretext 

that mortally wounded horses had not received medical care after the stallion fight and were in life

threatening, emergency condition.” (Id.) 

At 4 p.m. that day, without seeking judicial consent, the Marin Humane Society seized two 

horses: Romantic Star and Devil’s Sis. (Id. ¶¶ 41-44.) Romantic Star was muddied and bruised, 

but medically stable and secured in his paddock. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 48.) Devil’s Sis was thin having 

recently weaned a foal, but not starving. (Id.) Both horses were standing and moving normally, 

could eat food, were provided food and water, had the benefit of shelter from their naturally hairy 

coats. (Id. ¶ 45.) Devil’s Sis was also wearing a horse blanket. (Id.) Feed was present on the 

property for the horses. (Id. ¶ 47.) Horses’ weight typically fluctuates seasonally. (Id. ¶ 46.) 

The next day, the Marin Humane Society published an appeal for public donations to care 

for the “Burnell horses” and raised over $50,000. (Id. ¶ 50.) On January 4, 2013, Rogers, Hill and 

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Machado returned to Plaintiffs’ property with another Sheriff’s deputy and searched the property 

and horses. (Id. ¶ 53.) They seized two more horses: Metsonized and Lucky Karma. (Id. ¶ 53.) 

Both horses could stand, walk, eat, and socialize, and had hairy coats to protect them from the 

elements. (Id. ¶ 53.) In other words, there was no emergency warranting their removal. (Id.)

Seizure Aftermath

On January 17, 2013, the Marin Humane Society and Wagman demanded that Plaintiffs 

pay $8,846.36 for fees incurred in the care of Romantic Star and Devil’s Sis to date, including 

impound fees, trailering fees, daily boarding costs, and veterinary bills. (Id. ¶ 58.) They 

demanded that if charges were not paid, the horses would be deemed abandoned and become the 

property of the Marin Humane Society. (Id.) They also warned that Plaintiffs would be 

responsible for further costs moving forward. (Id.) Similarly, on February 4, 2013 the Marin 

Humane Society and Wagman demanded that Plaintiffs pay $6,211.15 for fees associated with the 

seizure and care of Lucky Karma and Metsonized. (Id. ¶ 59.)

On February 4, 2013, the Georgia breeder who purchased Romantic Star sued the Marin 

Humane Society for conversion. (Id. ¶ 60.) The Marin Humane Society and Wagman then 

demanded $4,727.10 from her for costs incurred in the seizure and care of Romantic Star. (Id.

¶ 61.) That lien was paid. (Id. ¶ 63.) 

As a result of the actions described above, Jill’s breeding business is no longer profitable. 

(Id. ¶ 4.)

C. Procedural History

State Court Proceedings

On February 8, 2013, Machado made a criminal referral to the Marin County District 

Attorney’s Office requesting criminal prosecution of both Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 61.) The referral 

contained false statements including: that Plaintiffs denied having horses on the property, that the 

horses were without shelter, that the seized horses needed immediate veterinary care not provided. 

(Id. ¶ 62.) In December 2013 the felony allegations against both Plaintiffs were reduced to 

misdemeanors. (Id. ¶ 68.) In May 2014, Jill pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor charge of 

failure to provide an animal with proper shelter or protection from the weather in violation of 

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California Penal Code § 597(b) and was sentenced to a four-year term of supervisory probation 

that included continued monitoring by the Marin Humane Society.2 (Dkt. No. 48-2 at 4-5.) 

Pursuant to Cal Penal Code Section 597(f), on January 8 and January 24, 2013, the County 

held administrative hearings regarding the lawfulness of the seizures. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 20.) See also 

Burnell v. Marin Humane Soc’y, Nos. A140246, A140247, 2014 WL 5035723, at *2 (Cal. Ct. 

App. Oct. 9, 2014) (“Burnell Writ Review”) (describing the administrative hearings). Also on 

January 8, 2013, Jill filed an Ex Parte Writ of Mandate Compelling Return of Improperly Seized 

Animals in Marin County Superior Court, but the writ was summarily denied based on the judge’s 

conclusion that “this case is not an appropriate matter for this court.” (Dkt. No. 48-3 at 3.) 

Ultimately, the hearing officer, Burnham, upheld the seizures as lawful. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 20.) See 

Burnell Writ Review, 2014 WL 503824, at *2-3. 

At some point thereafter, Jill brought a civil action in Marin County Superior Court against 

the Marin Humane Society for conversion, but the court stayed that suit pending resolution of the 

administrative proceedings under Section 597.1, including appeal. (Dkt. No. 48-4.) And in fact, 

Plaintiff appealed the hearing officer’s administrative decision by filing a petition for writ of 

mandate in Marin County Superior Court, which found the seizures not justified and the 

administrative hearing defective due to the manner in which the hearing officer was selected. 

(Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 64-65.) The Marin Humane Society appealed, and the California Court of Appeal 

reversed the Superior Court’s order finding the seizures unlawful; the Court of Appeal, however, 

agreed that the hearings were defective due to the hearing officer selection and therefore instructed 

the trial court to remand the matter for new administrative hearings. Burnell Writ Review, 2014 

WL 503824, at *3. 

In late March 2015, a new round of Section 597.1(f) administrative hearings was held 

before a new hearing officer pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s order. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 71.) Both 

parties presented evidence, called witnesses, submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions 

 

2 While Plaintiffs alleged that the plea agreement required the Marin Humane Society to refrain 

from public comment about the case or to surveil Plaintiffs’ property without a neutral veterinarian 

present, this allegation conflicts with the language of the plea agreement Jill signed. (Compare

Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 69, with Dkt. No. 48-5 at 3.) The Court therefore does not credit the allegations.

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of law and had the opportunity to submit post-hearing briefs. (See Dkt. No. 48-5 ¶ 1.) On May 

15, 2015, the hearing officer issued a written decision finding the seizures of Plaintiffs’ horses 

lawful. (Id. at 39-40.) Plaintiffs have since filed a petition for writ of mandate in Marin County 

Superior Court challenging the hearing officer’s May 2015 decision. (Dkt. No. 48-6.)

The Instant Federal Action

Plaintiffs initiated this action in federal court on December 26, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) The 

Court dismissed the initial complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court addressed only the 

Section 1983 claim—noting that, without it, the Court would be hesitant to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over the other six state law claims—and noted that Plaintiffs “neither identif[y] the 

constitutional right at issue nor each defendant’s role in the alleged violation,” so the complaint

failed to state a Section 1983 claim. Burnell, 2015 WL 4089844, at *3. The Court granted 

Plaintiffs leave to amend to “clarify which constitutional rights each defendant violated” and to 

include facts that explained each defendant’s role. Id.

Plaintiffs’ FAC followed, which bring the same seven causes of action: a Section 1983 

claim by both Plaintiffs against all Defendants, and six tort claims arising out of state law against 

various groupings of Defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC, contending that 

Plaintiffs have failed to cure the defects the Court identified in its Order dismissing the initial 

complaint for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 47.) The Court allowed the parties to file 

supplemental briefing on this motion.3 (Dkt. No. 64.) The County filed a separate motion to 

dismiss, urging that the FAC fails to state a Monell claim under Section 1983 against the County. 

(Dkt. No. 50.) In addition, Defendant Burnham—who was dismissed from the complaint with 

prejudice—has filed a motion for entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54. (Dkt. No. 49.) The 

Court heard oral argument on October 8, 2015.

 

3

Specifically, the Court permitted supplemental briefing because Plaintiffs reportedly did not have 

access to the unpublished cases that Defendants cited in their motion. Defendants graciously 

provided copies of the authorities on which they relied to Plaintiffs shortly after Plaintiffs raised 

this concern, but the Court permitted supplemental briefing to allow Plaintiffs to distinguish or 

otherwise respond to these cases.

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DISCUSSION

I. Burnham’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment (Dkt. No. 49)

In reviewing the initial complaint, the Court dismissed with prejudice all claims against 

Burnham, who was sued in his capacity as administrative hearing officer who oversaw the first 

round of administrative proceedings into the propriety of the Marin Humane Society’s seizure of 

Jill Burnell’s horses. “It is well established that state judges are entitled to absolute immunity for 

their judicial acts.” Swift v. State of Cal., 384 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 

“Courts have extended absolute judicial immunity from damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

not only to judges but also to officers whose functions bear a close association to the judicial 

process[,]” including “hearing officers and administrative law judges” when they are performing 

adjudicative functions. Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156 (9th Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted). 

The Court noted that Plaintiffs’ allegations about Burnham all arise out of his capacity as 

administrative hearing officer, including that he should have disclosed that he was not qualified to 

serve in this position. The Court therefore dismissed with prejudice all claims against Burnham. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs name Burnham as a defendant in the FAC and continue to allege that his 

role as hearing officer violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (See Dkt. No. 46 at 1 & ¶ 20; see 

also id. ¶ 20 n.22 (noting that “Burnham was dismissed with prejudice from this action on a 

finding of judicial immunity”).) These claims have already been dismissed with prejudice. To 

clarify, this means Plaintiffs cannot bring claims against Burnham in any amended complaint.

Because the Court already dismissed all claims against Burnham with prejudice but 

Plaintiffs still appeared to renew their claims against him in the FAC, Burnham moves for entry of 

final judgment in his favor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). (Dkt. No. 49.) 

Rule 54(b) allows a court to direct entry of final judgment for the purpose of appeal as to one or 

more, but fewer than all, claims or defendants if the Court expressly determines that there is no 

just reason for delay. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). First, the Court must determine whether it is dealing 

with a final judgment. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980). Second, the 

Court must determine whether there is any just reason for delay, “tak[ing] into account judicial 

administrative interests as well as the equities involved.” Id. at 8. To determine if there is any just 

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reason for delay, “[a] district court may consider factors such as whether the claims under review 

were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated as well as whether the nature of the 

claims already determined is such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues 

more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.” Randhawa v. Skylux, Inc., No. CIV. 2:09-

02304 WBS DAD, 2013 WL 1152063, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2013) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

Although the order dismissing Burnham with prejudice suffices as a final judgment, the 

Court declines to enter judgment in Burnham’s favor at this time. Although the Court recognizes 

Burnham’s interest in finality, which would be best met by an entry of judgment, at oral argument 

Plaintiffs agreed that their inclusion of Burnham in the case caption and in the list of defendants 

was in error in light of the Court’s earlier order and also agreed to remove him from the case 

caption and narrative of any further amended complaint. In light of Plaintiffs’ recognition that 

Burnham is no longer in the case and her representation that he will be removed from any further 

pleadings, the Court DENIES Burnham’s motion for entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 47)

A. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not a “probability 

requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.

2008). “[D]ismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare 

Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see 

also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a 

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claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”).

Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), under 

which a party is only required to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 

are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.

2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations in a complaint 

or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain 

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.”). The court must be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 663-64.

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action is a Section 1983 claim against all Defendants. Section 

1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but rather “a method for vindicating federal rights 

elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). To state a claim under 

Section 1983, a complaint “must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by the federal 

Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was committed by a person acting 

under color of state law.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To 

adequately plead these elements, the complaint must identify what constitutional or other federal 

right each defendant violated, providing sufficient facts to plausible support each purported 

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violation. See, e.g., Drawsand v. F.F. Props., L.L.P., 866 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121 (“Aside from 

passing references to due process and equal protection, the Complaint fails to allege how 

[plaintiff’s] constitutional rights were violated and fails to identify each Defendant’s role 

therein.”); Walsh v. Am. Med. Response, No. 2:13-cv-2077 MCE KJN (PS), 2014 WL 2109946, at 

*7 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2014) (“Before any claims may be found to be cognizable, plaintiffs must 

separate each specific claim they wish to pursue, identify which defendants relate to each 

particular claim, and identify the Constitutional right implicated by each claim.”).

a. Constitutional Violation

In reviewing the initial complaint, the Court dismissed the Section 1983 claim in part 

because Plaintiffs failed to identify the particular constitutional right that each defendant was 

alleged to have violated. “Where multiple defendants are involved, the pleadings must establish a 

nexus between each defendant’s actions and the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights.” Drawsand, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1120-21. The FAC suffers from the same defect: it still 

asserts a laundry list of constitutional rights then urges generally that all Defendants have

interfered with the listed rights. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 2, 76.) While the FAC contains 48 pages of 

allegations that Plaintiffs incorporate in full into their 3-paragraph Section 1983 cause of action, 

they have not, at least in the FAC, specified which allegations pertain to which purported 

constitutional violation nor provided an affirmative link between each defendant’s actions and the 

claimed constitutional deprivation, as required. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 

1978).

At oral argument, the Court sought clarification from Plaintiffs on their claims, and 

counsel represented that Plaintiffs were alleging only the following four constitutional violations: 

(1) a violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment liberty interest in caring for their horses; (2) a Fifth 

Amendment double jeopardy claim; (3) an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive fines; and (4) a 

Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful seizure of Plaintiffs’ horses. The Court will therefore 

consider only these claims. See United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353, 1356 (noting that parties 

are generally bound by the statements of their attorneys) (citations omitted).

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i. First Amendment

Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants interfered with their “First Amendment liberty interests 

in privacy and property.” (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 76.) The FAC does not provide any further explanation 

of the theory of such violation, particular facts giving rise to the violation, or which Defendants 

contributed to the violation and how. In their opposition, Plaintiffs clarify the basis of their First 

Amendment claim: that California Penal Code Section 597.1 permits disagreement between 

Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding animal husbandry choices, such as the type of shelter required 

for horses or extent of allowable fluctuations in weight. (Dkt. No. 55 at 8.) Putting aside that, as 

the Court has already explained, the Court does not consider facts alleged for the first time in the 

opposition to a motion to dismiss, even considering these facts for the purposes of whether to 

grant leave to amend, this is not a First Amendment claim. Plaintiffs were unable to cite any 

authority either in their briefing or at oral argument that holds that an individual has a First 

Amendment right to animal husbandry choices, and the Court has found none. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim predicated on a violation of the First Amendment is dismissed with 

prejudice.4

ii. Fifth Amendment

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated their Fifth Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 46 

¶ 76.) At oral argument, Plaintiffs represented that their Fifth Amendment claim was solely a 

double jeopardy claim.5 The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits “(1) a second prosecution for the 

same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and 

(3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” Molina v. Harrington, No. CV 11-2073-RGK 

(PLA), 2012 WL 2262424, at *19 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2012). The gravamen of Plaintiff’s double 

jeopardy argument is that Section 597.1(f) administrative hearings are criminal in nature such that 

the subsequent criminal proceedings in which Jill ultimately pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor 

 

4 A dismissal with prejudice means that Plaintiffs are not permitted to allege a First Amendment 

claim in any amended complaint.

5

The double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969). Thus, this is 

technically a Fourteenth Amendment claim.

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violate the Fifth Amendment’s proscription against double jeopardy.

Section 597.1(f) administrative hearings are akin to civil forfeiture proceedings that often 

precede criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 

(1996), that in rem civil forfeiture of the plaintiff’s house for facilitating unlawful distribution of 

marijuana pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) did not constitute a second punishment for the same 

offense despite the defendant’s prior federal criminal conviction. Specifically, the Supreme Court 

concluded that “[t]hese civil forfeitures (and civil forfeitures generally) do not constitute 

‘punishment’ for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 

267, 270-71 (1996).

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Supreme Court’s holding in Ursery “was not

absolute, however.” U.S. v. $273,969.04 in U.S. Currency, 164 F.3d 462, 465 (1999) (“273”). 

Instead of create a per se rule that civil forfeitures do not trigger double jeopardy problems, the 

Supreme Court noted that “where the clearest proof indicates that [civil forfeiture proceedings are] 

so punitive either in purpose or effect as to be equivalent to a criminal proceeding, that forfeiture 

may be subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Ursery, 518 U.S. at 289 n.3 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Courts determining whether a forfeiture is civil or criminal in nature 

must apply the following test:

Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least 

initially, a matter of statutory construction. A court must first ask 

whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, 

indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or 

the other. . . . [W]e inquire further whether the statutory scheme 

was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was 

clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.

United States v. Reveles, 660 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Hudson 

v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (same). Applying these standards, the Ninth Circuit has 

found no double jeopardy where an individual was subject to: (1) an administrative hearing 

revoking a driver’s license for driving while intoxicated in connection with a subsequent 

prosecution for the same conduct, see Rivera v. Pugh, 194 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1999); (2) 

a civil fine for document fraud following prosecution for conspiracy to commit document fraud, 

see Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999); and (3) a civil forfeiture 

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action against currency and jewelry discovered on an individual at an airport following a criminal 

conviction for making a false statement to customs officials in connection with the same items, see 

273, 164 F.3d at 464. 

Here, although Section 597.1 is part of the Penal Code, which is plainly a criminal statute, 

the California legislature impliedly gave the administrative hearings provided for in subdivision 

(f) a civil label inasmuch as it makes clear that the administrative hearings occur “prior to the 

commencement of any criminal proceedings authorized by this section[.]” Cal. Penal Code 

§ 597.1. The legislature also provides for judicial review of the administrative findings apart from 

any criminal proceedings by allowing individuals to file petitions for writ of mandate pursuant to 

Civil Code Section 1054. Taken together, this is enough to establish a presumption that the 

Section 597.1 determination does not involve a criminal penalty. 

Nor is the provision punitive in either purpose or effect. Administrative hearings pursuant 

to Section 597.1(f) do not carry the possibility of any criminal penalties like fines or 

imprisonment. An administrative hearing does not run the risk of a determination of guilt. 

Instead, its sole purpose is to determine whether seizure of the animal was proper in the first 

instance. A finding that seizure was unlawful results in the return of the animal to the owner, and 

a finding that the seizure was lawful results only in possible fees for maintenance and care of the 

horse, but does not result in a criminal conviction for animal cruelty. Thus, it is not sufficiently 

punitive to give rise to double jeopardy. In fact, at least one California court has expressly held as 

much, concluding that criminal prosecution on animal cruelty charges following seizure or 

confiscation of animals pursuant to Penal Code Section 597.1 does not violate double jeopardy 

inasmuch as the seizure is a civil forfeiture that is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 

People v. Speegle, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1405, 1412 (1997) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that 

she was “‘punished’ by confiscation of her animals for treatment and placement, and thus filing a 

criminal complaint afterward amounted to an effort to punish her twice for the same conduct”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim is dismissed with prejudice.

iii. Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines

At oral argument, Plaintiffs confirmed that they are also bringing an Eighth Amendment 

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claim. As Plaintiffs’ counsel explained at the hearing, they claim that animal seizures under 

Section 597.1 render the animal owner liable for costs at the discretion of the animal services 

agency, and the actual costs imposed are arbitrarily high and have no relation to the actual cost to 

care for a horse such that they are the functional equivalent of a penalty or punishment.

The Excessive Fines clause of the Eighth Amendment limits the government’s power to 

extract payments as punishment for some offense. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 

(1998). Civil fines and sanctions can fall within the scope of the Eighth Amendment. See 

Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103 (“The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive civil fines, 

including forfeitures.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 829 (9th Cir. 

2001). An Excessive Fines clause analysis begins by determining whether the payment to the 

government constitutes punishment for an offense by considering whether it serves a retributive or 

deterrent, as opposed to remedial, purpose. Mackby, 261 F.3d at 829. To determine whether a 

civil sanction is punitive or remedial, “the court considers factors such as the language of the 

statute creating the sanction, the sanction’s purpose(s), the circumstances in which the sanction 

can be imposed, and the historical understanding of the sanction.” Id. at 830 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “Only where a court first determines that a sanction is imposed for punitive 

purposes, does the ultimate question of whether the payment is grossly disproportionate to the 

gravity of the defendant’s offense arise.” U.S. ex rel. Satalich v. City of Los Angeles, 160 F. Supp. 

2d 1092, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Mackby, 261 F.3d at 829).

Here, the statutory language regarding costs in Section 597.1 provides that “the full cost of 

caring for and treating any animal properly seized under this subdivision or pursuant to a search 

warrant shall constitute a lien on the animal and the animal shall not be returned to its owner until 

the charges are paid, if the seizure is upheld pursuant to this section.” Cal. Penal Code 

§ 597.1(a)(1). The animal owner becomes “personally liable to the seizing agency for the cost of 

the seizure and care of the animal[.]” Id. § 597.1(f)(4) & (h). The fees Plaintiffs identified in the 

FAC include an “impound fee,” “trailering fees,” “board at $75 per day,” and “veterinary costs.” 

(Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 58.) The Court is hard-pressed to even use the word “sanction” to define the 

payments that this law requires of animal owners, as the plain language of the statutory section 

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provides that it is intended to reimburse the agency’s cost of care and treatment only, which 

indicates a remedial purpose. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that fees meant to reimburse 

the government for investigation-related or other expenses are remedial, not punitive. See, e.g., 

Noriega-Perez, 179 F.3d at 1173 (holding that “reimbursing the government for enforcement 

expenditures” furthers a “non-punitive purpose”); Louis v. C.I.R., 170 F.3d 1232, 1235 (9th Cir. 

1999) (noting that additions to tax for fraud are remedial because they “are provided primarily as a 

safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy 

expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s fraud”) (citation omitted). 

Similarly, the statute allows for costs to be imposed solely upon an administrative finding that the 

seizure was lawful in the absence of a pending criminal case, let alone a conviction meriting 

punishment. Moreover, the statute suggests that payment is at the option of the animal owner; the 

owner has the choice to decline to pay the costs and forfeit ownership of the animal. See Cal. 

Penal Code § 597.1(h). For each of these reasons, the allegations in the FAC fail to plausibly 

establish that the costs imposed on Plaintiffs for care and treatment of the horses were punitive, 

and Plaintiffs therefore fail to state a claim for violation of their Eighth Amendment right to avoid 

excessive fines and penalties. Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim is therefore dismissed with 

prejudice.

iv. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure

Based on Plaintiffs’ explanation at oral argument, their final Section 1983 predicate 

constitutional violation is for unlawful seizure of property under the Fourth Amendment. “The 

simple language of the [Fourth] Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and to seizures 

of property.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). There was no warrant for the 

seizure of Plaintiffs’ horses. Normally the lawfulness of a warrantless seizure turns on whether 

there was probable cause—i.e., a fair probability—to believe that criminal activity was afoot. See

United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004). However, in the context of Section 

597.1 seizures, the Fourth Amendment claim turns on whether the officers had reasonable grounds 

to believe that very prompt action was required to protect the health and safety of the animals 

seized. See Cal. Penal Code § 597.1. As one California court has explained, this is “the 

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equivalent of the exigent circumstances exception familiar to search and seizure law.” Broden, 70 

Cal. App. 4th at 1220-21. Although not plainly set forth in the recitation of claims itself, the FAC 

alleges enough facts to plausibly establish that there were no reasonable grounds to believe 

Plaintiffs’ horses required such immediate care. For example, Plaintiffs allege that the seized 

horses were “standing and moving normally, could eat food, were provided food and water and 

were otherwise unremarkable in their condition[,]” “had the benefit of shelter of their naturally 

hairy coats[,]” that Defendants knew that horses were subject to seasonal weight fluctuations, and 

that there was feed present on the property. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 45-47, 53.) This is enough, at the 

motion to dismiss stage, to allege that there were no reasonable grounds for the officers to believe 

seizure of the horses was necessary to protect their health and safety. Thus, the factual allegations 

of the FAC state a claim for violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. But Plaintiffs must 

still amend the FAC to clearly set forth their theory of Fourth Amendment violation—and in 

particular, each defendant’s involvement—in the recitation of claims; as set forth below, the FAC 

does not state a claim for Fourth Amendment violation against each named defendant.

b. Committed by a Person Acting under Color of State Law

As the only Section 1983 claim remaining is the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court will 

address whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a claim against each defendant. The FAC 

alleges that Marin Humane Society officers Machado, Hill and Rogers were present at the Chileno 

Valley Road property and made the decisions to seize the horses. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 41, 44, 51, 53.) 

The FAC adequately alleges that Machado, Hill, and Rogers violated their Fourth Amendment 

rights by seizing Plaintiffs’ horses without reasonable grounds to believe that very prompt action 

was required to protect the health and safety of the horses, thus, with no probable cause to believe 

Plaintiffs were in violation of Penal Code Section 597.1. As these defendants were alleged to 

have been acting in their capacity as Marin Humane Society officers, the FAC sufficiently alleges 

that they were acting under the color of state law.

Although Section 1983 makes liable only those who act under color of state law, “even a 

private person can, in certain circumstances, be subject to liability under [S]ection 1983.” Villegas 

v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). To state a claim for 

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Section 1983 liability of a private person, the plaintiff must show that “the conduct allegedly 

causing the deprivation of a federal right [was] fairly attributable to the State.” Tsao v. Desert 

Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The 

Supreme Court has articulated four tests for determining whether a private [party’s] actions 

amount to state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the state 

compulsion test; and (4) the governmental nexus test.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444-45 (9th 

Cir. 2002). At oral argument, Plaintiffs noted that they are proceeding under the joint action 

theory.

The joint action test asks “whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert 

in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. at 445 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). This requirement can be satisfied by plausibly pleading “the existence of a 

conspiracy or by showing that the private party was ‘a willful participant in joint action with the 

State of its agents.’” Id. (quoting Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

“A private party is liable under this theory, however, only if its particular actions are ‘inextricably 

intertwined’ with those of the government.” Brunette v. Humane Soc’y of Ventura Cnty., 294 F.3d 

1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “[A] bare allegation of . . . joint action will not 

overcome a motion to dismiss; the plaintiff must allege facts tending to show that [private 

defendants] acted under color of state law or authority.” DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 

636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). And to show the conspiracy underlying joint action, a 

plaintiff must set forth facts that plausibly establish that “there was a meeting of the minds ex ante 

between the officers” and the private persons. Ennis v. City of Daly City, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 

1175 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2010) (citations omitted); see also Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th 

Cir. 1983 (“To prove a conspiracy between the state and private parties under [S]ection 1983, the 

[plaintiff] must show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.”). The 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that an individual defendant is a state actor. Florer v. 

Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011).

In their opposition, Plaintiffs argue generally that “[t]hese Defendants seek to enforce 

invalid state laws and regulations and/or policy therefore act under color of law.” (Dkt. No. 55 at 

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4.) This argument fails to tailor the color-of-law analysis to each defendant or to address the 

relevant points. The Court will do so here.

i. Defendant Wagman

According to the FAC, Wagman is the Chief Outside Litigation Director of the Animal 

Legal Defense Fund in San Francisco and also serves as a member of the Marin Humane Society 

Board of Directors and its authorized spokesperson. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 19.) Wagman “caused [the 

Marin Humane Society] to hire individuals with personal and political affiliations with himself 

(and the [Animal Legal Defense Fund]) to administer the reporting and referee and covertly or 

overtly directed those individuals in such a manner as to ensure the Plaintiffs would not have a fair 

[administrative] hearing[.]” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Wagman himself disrupted their first 

administrative hearing. (Id.) Plaintiffs further allege that Wagman made misrepresentations about 

the status of Plaintiffs’ horses online, violated a confidentiality agreement by making statements 

about Jill’s animal cruelty conviction, and advertised the Marin Humane Society’s plan to 

distribute Plaintiffs’ horses to new owners instead of returning them. (Id.) Beyond those facts set 

forth in the introduction of parties, the FAC also indicates that Wagman was involved in the Marin 

Humane Society’s incident with Plaintiffs’ horses only after the seizures had already occurred. 

Specifically, the Marin Humane Society and Wagman demanded that Plaintiffs pay fees incurred 

for the care of the seized horses or risk abandonment.6 (Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 58-61.) 

None of these facts pertain to the actual seizure of the horses and the alleged violation of 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a Fourth Amendment claim 

against Wagman. Nor have Plaintiffs established that Wagman was acting under color of state law 

for the purposes of any claim, as there are no facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that 

Wagman agreed in advance with the Marin Humane Society officers to participate in a scheme to 

 

6

Plaintiffs also allege that Wagman “ignored the restrictions on comment regarding the judicial 

proceedings or Jill Burnell” that were alleged to have been part of the “judicial settlement offer” 

that required that the Marin Humane Society refrain from publicly commenting about the case. 

(Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 69.) However, this allegation conflicts with Jill’s written plea agreement of which 

the Court takes judicial notice, which contains no such confidentiality clause. (Dkt. No. 48-2 at 4-

6.) The Court declines to accept as true a factual allegation that conflicts with judicially 

noticeable documents.

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violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Fonda, 707 F.2d at 438; Ennis, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 

1175. In short, though Plaintiffs have alleged that Wagman was involved with the Marin Humane 

Society and took some action relating to the agency’s legal action against Plaintiffs after their 

horses had been seized, there are no facts that plausibly establish that Wagman conspired in any 

way or cooperated in a substantial degree with Rogers, Hill, and Machado’s decisions to seize the 

horses on those two occasions in the first instance. Thus, the Section 1983 claim against Wagman 

must be dismissed.

ii. Defendant Ricci

Unlike Wagman, Defendant Ricci is not associated with the Marin Humane Society but 

rather is a private person. Thus, from the outset, her actions are all the more separated from the 

Marin Humane Society’s. Ricci is alleged to have “intentionally coordinated a series of false 

reports concerning the care and condition of the Burnells’ horses . . . to create ‘evidence’ that 

Plaintiffs were unable or unwilling to provide necessary care for their horses during the fall and 

winter of 2012 . . . for the purpose of redistributing [Plaintiffs’] horses to others.” (Dkt. No. 46 

¶ 22.) The Marin Humane Society opened its investigation into Plaintiffs in the Fall of 2012 based 

on a report from Ricci. (Id. ¶ 35.) Specifically, Ricci told the Marin Humane Society that 

Plaintiffs had moved their livestock breeding business from Sonoma County to Marin County and 

stated that Plaintiffs had 40-50 horses on the property without food and shelter. (Id.) The night 

before the first horse seizure, Ricci wrote an email to Rogers informing her that two of Plaintiffs’

stallions had gotten into a fight and noting that a particular veterinarian was going to the property 

to attend to the horses. (Id. ¶ 41.) Ricci learned this information from Defendant Ghilotti. (See 

id. ¶ 41 n.4.)

The FAC does not allege that Ricci was present when certain Marin Humane Society 

officers and the Sheriff’s deputy seized Plaintiff’s horses. Instead, Plaintiffs urge that Ricci 

participated in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their horses. Notably, there is no conspiracy 

allegation in the FAC. But even if there were, such a conclusory allegation would not suffice to 

plausibly allege that Ricci was acting under color of state law for the purposes of Section 1983 

liability. Moreover, the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Ricci’s reports to the Marin 

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Humane Society do not give rise to color-of-law Section 1983 liability, either. “[M]erely 

complaining to the police does not convert a private party into a state actor.” Collins, 878 F.2d at 

1154. Even if Ricci’s reports were false as alleged, the Court has already explained to Plaintiffs 

that “[p]roviding false information to the police does not transform a private individual into a state 

actor” absent sufficient facts from which the court could plausibly infer that the police knew the 

information was false and agreed with the informant to conspire against the plaintiff. Lauter v. 

Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 

F.2d 1350, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). The FAC does not include facts that 

plausibly allege either (1) that the police knew Ricci’s information was false or (2) that 

demonstrate a meeting of the minds between Ricci and the Marin Humane Society defendants to

conspire against Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a Section 1983 claim against Ricci.

iii. Defendant Ghilotti

The same holds true for Ghilotti, who is another horse breeder in the same discipline as Jill 

and her formerly close personal friend, competitor, and sometimes client. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 23.) 

Ghilotti visited Plaintiffs’ Chileno Valley Road Property in September 2012, when she transported 

two of Plaintiffs’ horses there from their former home in Sonoma County. (Id.) Ghilotti owes 

Plaintiffs money for goods and services Plaintiffs provided, and at some point agreed to provide 

construction materials and horse feed in lieu of money. (Id.) Ghilotti “coordinated the delay in 

delivery [of those items] with MHS and Ricci to create ‘evidence’ that Plaintiffs were unable or 

willing to provide necessary care for their horses and for the purpose of redistributing [Plaintiffs’] 

horses to others.” (Id.) Ghilotti also made false reports to Ricci and Rogers about Jill and her 

horses. (Id.) Ghilotti was present at the Chileno Valley Road Property on December 26, 2012—

the night of the stallion fight. (Id.) Upon arrival, Ghilotti urged that the stallions be shot dead 

because their injuries were mortal and unrecoverable. (Id.) These are the only allegations in the 

FAC about Ghilotti.

These allegations are not enough to state a Section 1983 claim against Ghilotti for 

violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. First, there are no allegations that Ghilotti was 

present and involved in the actual seizure of Plaintiffs’ horses. And to the extent that her other 

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alleged conduct relates to the seizure, the FAC still fails to state a claim. For the same reasons 

discussed above with respect to Ricci, merely making a false report to the police does not make 

Ghilotti a state actor for the purposes of Section 1983 absent allegations demonstrating that the 

Marin Humane Society officers knew the information was false and that Ghilotti and the Marin 

Humane Society reached an agreement to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The FAC does 

not plausibly allege such facts. While the FAC does state that Ghilotti “coordinated the delay in 

delivery” of feed and construction materials with the Marin Humane Society, there are no facts 

underlying this conclusory allegation. Accordingly, the FAC fails to demonstrate that Ghilotti was 

acting under color of law and, accordingly, fails to state a Section 1983 claim against her.

iv. Defendant Keefer

Defendant Nathan Keefer is a licensed veterinarian—though not an equine specialist—who 

lives and works in Sonoma County. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 21.) Both Plaintiffs and the Marin Humane 

Society have been clients of Dr. Keefer’s veterinary practice. (Id.) Dr. Keefer was present at the 

Chileno Valley Road Property during the December 27, 2012 seizure of the first two of Plaintiffs’ 

horses. (Id.) Because Dr. Keefer and Plaintiff had a pre-existing dispute regarding an unpaid 

veterinary bill, Dr. Keefer informed Rogers that he was not the appropriate person to evaluate 

Plaintiffs’ horses, but Rogers demanded that Dr. Keefer come because there were injured horses 

on the property that had not received veterinary care. (Id.) Dr. Keefer “failed to examine properly 

any horse present and failed to preserve evidence of the Plaintiffs’ horses’ good condition and did 

not make an accurate, contemporaneous medical record of his examination as his license requires 

him to do.” (Id.) The FAC alleges that Dr. Keefer “knew or should have known” that Rogers had 

an improper purpose calling him to Plaintiffs’ property and, accordingly, “knowingly and 

voluntarily allowed his presence to provide a patina of legitimacy” to the Marin Humane Society’s 

otherwise unlawful endeavor. (Id.) While the FAC describes the seizure in some detail, it 

provides no further detail regarding Dr. Keefer’s role, his conclusions or recommendations about 

the horses, or how the Marin Humane Society responded to him.

Dr. Keefer’s presence at the scene of the seizure is not itself dispositive, as participation in 

an allegedly unlawful seizure does not necessarily convert a private person into a state actor. 

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Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1210-11. Instead, courts consider whether the allegations indicate whether 

the private person planned the unlawful seizure, participated in briefings prior to the unlawful 

seizure, and was privy to confidential information disclosed prior to the seizure. Id. Again, at 

bottom, the question is whether the humane society and private actor acted independently for two 

independent purposes. Id.

Here, both Dr. Keefer and the Marin Humane Society were involved in an analysis of the 

condition of Plaintiffs’ horses. But there are no allegations that Dr. Keefer participated in 

planning an unlawful seizure. And despite the conclusory allegation that Dr. Keefer knew about 

Rogers’ improper purpose and knew that his presence made an otherwise unlawful seizure seem 

lawful, the actual facts alleged support a contrary conclusion. Specifically, instead of alleging that 

Dr. Keefer was in on a scheme to take Plaintiffs’ horses away at all costs, the FAC alleges that Dr. 

Keefer did not want to be involved given his history with Jill, but nonetheless joined the Marin 

Humane Society when they told him there were injured animals. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 21.) While 

Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Keefer “knew or should have known” that Rogers had an improper 

purpose in calling him to the task, there are no facts alleged to support this conclusory allegation, 

and no facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that Dr. Keefer and the Marin 

Humane Society defendants had a meeting of the minds in which they agreed to violate Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth Amendment rights by taking away her horses regardless of their condition. In short, 

Plaintiffs have alleged that Dr. Keefer was present and participated in the seizure, but have not 

plausibly alleged that Dr. Keefer acted under color of state law while there. The Section 1983 

claim against Dr. Keefer therefore must be dismissed.

v. Defendant McKenney

Defendant McKenney is the Chief Executive Officer and a supervisory employee of the 

Marin Humane Society. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 12.) McKenney “authorized or failed to act to ensure that 

[the] Marin Humane Society’s policies, practices and procedures (including training and 

supervision of employees) were lawful and/or non-negligent” and otherwise “set in motion a series 

of acts [and] knew and/or reasonably should have known that her subordinates were engaging in 

acts that would deprive Plaintiffs of their rights and failed to prevent her subordinates from 

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engaging in such conduct.” (Id.) 

“In a [Section 1983] action—where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—

the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government 

official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 677. The Ninth Circuit permits “plaintiffs to hold supervisors individually liable in 

[Section] 1983 suits when culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.” Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). “[A] supervisor faces liability under the Fourth 

Amendment only where it would be clear to a reasonable [supervisor] that his conduct was 

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To meet this standard, a plaintiff must allege a 

“factual basis for imputing . . . knowledge” of an unconstitutional practice undertaken by 

subordinates, coupled with culpable action or inaction.”7 Id. at 1111. Here, Plaintiff appears to 

allege both failure to train and deliberate indifference—essentially two sides of the same coin.

“[F]ailure to train . . . employees in a relevant respect must amount to ‘deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.” 

Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). “Deliberate indifference is a stringent 

standard of fault, requiring proof that a [government] actor disregarded a known or obvious 

consequence of his action.” Id. at 1360 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When a 

governmental supervisor is “on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their 

training program causes [subordinates] to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, [supervisors] may 

be deemed deliberately indifferent if the [supervisors] choose to retain the program. Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The FAC alleges no facts to support the inference that McKenney was responsible for 

training or supervising Rogers, Hill, and Machado—the Marin Humane Society officers alleged to 

 

7

The FAC does not indicate whether Plaintiffs bring the Section 1983 claim against McKenney in 

her individual capacity or her official capacity as Marin Humane Society CEO. This is a 

distinction without a difference as the same standard applies under either scenario. See Flores v. 

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2014) (“As to an official in his individual 

capacity, the same standard applies[.]”). 

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have violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by seizing their horses. In addition, the FAC 

fails to allege sufficient facts to permit a reasonable inference that McKenney “disregarded a 

known or obvious consequence” or her failure to properly train or supervise Marin Humane 

Society officers, let alone in particular on how and when it is appropriate to seize horses pursuant 

to Penal Code Section 597.1. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); 

see also Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360. Plaintiffs only allege that the Marin Humane Society 

unlawfully seized their horses. This single incident is not enough to give rise to deliberate 

indifference of a known risk of Fourth Amendment violations. See Frary v. Cnty. of Marin, 81 F. 

Supp. 3d 811, 840 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that the “single-incident” theory of deliberate 

indifference liability is possible only “in a narrow range of circumstances”); see also Cannon v. 

City of Petaluma, No. C 11-0651 PJH, 2012 WL 1183732, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) 

(“[Plaintiff’s] allegations in the SAC relate solely to his own, isolated experiences, which cannot 

support a Monell claim for failure to train or supervise.”). There are no other facts alleged that 

connect McKenney to a failure to train her employees or otherwise lead to the plausible inference 

that McKenney was aware of that the Marin Humane Society staff was likely to violate Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Section 1983 claim against McKenney is dismissed.

c. Monell Claim Against Marin Humane Society

The Marin Humane Society seeks to dismiss the Section 1983 against it on the grounds 

that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social 

Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).8 Municipalities can be held liable as 

“persons” under Section 1983, but not for the unconstitutional acts of their employees based solely 

on respondeat superior. Id. at 691. Instead, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a 

municipality under Section 1983 must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the 

plaintiff’s injury.” Johnson v. Shasta Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 930 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015) 

(citation omitted). A Monell claim can take one of three forms: “(1) when official policies or 

 

8

The Marin Humane Society is a private entity contracted with the local government to provide 

animal services. Though it is not a municipality, courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the Monell

analysis to such entities. See Young v. Cnty. of Hawaii, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1114 (D. Haw. 

2013) (citing Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012)).

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established customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when omissions or failures to act amount to 

a local government policy of ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional rights; or (3) when a local 

government official with final policy-making authority ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional 

conduct.” Brown v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. C 12-1923 PJH, 2014 WL 1347680, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 3, 2014) (citing Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

Whichever method is chosen, the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to plausibly establish that 

“the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 

654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011).

The FAC largely describes the conduct of Marin Humane Society employees Rogers, 

Machado, and Hill and the actions they took to seize Plaintiffs’ horses. The Marin Humane 

Society cannot be liable for their conduct solely on a respondeat superior basis. See Monell, 436 

U.S. at 690-91. The FAC does not clearly set forth how Plaintiffs are seeking to allege Monell

liability against the Marin Humane Society. At oral argument, Plaintiffs suggested that the 

“policy” at issue was the Marin Humane Society’s policy of allowing its animal services officers 

to act as humane officers or peace officers despite their lack of credentials required for those 

positions. (See also Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 10.) Even if this were so, Plaintiffs have not included 

allegations that would allow the Court to infer that their Fourth Amendment injury here—i.e., the 

seizure of the horses pursuant to Penal Code Section 597.1—was caused by that policy because 

the FAC alleges that a Sheriff’s deputy was present at the time of both seizures. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 51.) 

The FAC does not set forth any other policy or practice that might give rise to Monell liability. 

The Section 1983 claim against the Marin Humane Society is therefore dismissed with leave to 

amend. Plaintiffs shall have an opportunity to set forth in clear and precise terms what Marin 

Humane Society policy they contend is the moving force behind their Fourth Amendment 

violation.

2. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs also bring six state-law tort claims against all Defendants. Defendants appear to 

concede that Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for trespass to land, third cause of action for 

trespass to chattels, and fourth cause of action for conversion are adequately pleaded. However, 

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Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the fifth cause of action for portraying Plaintiffs in a false 

light, the sixth cause of action for public disclosure of private facts, and the seventh cause of 

action for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

a. State-Based Immunity

Before addressing whether Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded their state law claims, the 

Court first addresses whether the Marin Humane Society and its employees are immune from state 

law tort claims as Defendants argue. Plaintiffs, for their part, urge that the Marin Humane Society 

is not a public entity, but rather a private independent contractor of the county and therefore its 

employees are not public employees for the purposes of government immunity from tort suit.

The California Tort Claims Act provides that a “public entity is not liable for an injury, 

whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or 

any other person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. Similarly, “a public employee is not liable for an 

injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of 

the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Id. § 820.2. This 

discretionary immunity applies when the law imposes a discretionary duty on public employees. 

See Posey v. California, 180 Cal. App. 3d 836, 847 (1986). Courts have applied Section 815’s 

immunity to protect entities providing emergency dispatch services, Eastburn v. Regional Fire 

Protection Auth., 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1184 (2003), school districts, Patterson v. Sacramento City 

Unified Sch. Dist., 155 Cal. App. 4th 821, 828-29 (2007), and regional park districts, Bragg v. 

East Bay Regional Park Dist., No. No. C-02-3585-PJH, 2003 WL 23119278, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 

Dec. 29, 2003). In contrast, immunity does not apply to private correctional facilities, Lawson v. 

Super. Ct., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1383 (2010), or the Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and 

Transportation District, Michaeledes v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway & Transp. Dist., 202 F. 

Supp. 2d 1109, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

The first question is whether the Marin Humane Society qualifies as a public entity. The 

California Tort Claims Act defines “public entity” to include “the state, the Regents of the 

University of California, the Trustees of the California State University and the California State 

University, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political 

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subdivision or public corporation in the state.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 811.2. Of course, animal 

services agencies are not expressly included in this list.

The state empowers the Marin Humane Society to “enforce the provisions of laws of this 

state for the prevention of cruelty to animals.” Cal. Corp. Code § 14501; see also Animal Legal 

Defense Fund v. Mendes, 160 Cal. App. 4th 136, 142 (2008) (“[T]he law confers quasigovernmental powers on these corporations.”). In support of their contention that the Marin 

Humane Society and its employees are subject to state law immunity, Defendants rely on Jackson 

v. Silicon Valley Animal Control Authority, No. C 07-5667, 2008 WL 4544455, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 2, 2008). In Jackson, the Silicon Valley Animal Control Authority (“SVACA”) seized 

animals from the plaintiffs pursuant to Penal Code Section 597.1, then turned the animals over to 

the county humane society. Id. at *5-7. The court held that the Silicon Valley Animal Control 

Authority (“SVACA”), the City [ ], and the [SVACA] officers “are public entities or public 

employees entitled to immunity, to the extent they followed the procedures set forth in Section 

597.1, they cannot be liable for any state law tort against the [plaintiffs].” Id. In short, the court’s 

immunity finding was twofold: (1) SVACA and the officers are public entities and/or employees; 

and (2) SVACA and the officers were exercising discretion that Penal Code Section 597.1 sets 

forth. This conclusion did not apply to the humane society, which was not involved in the seizure 

and did not seek tort immunity.

Here, the Marin Humane Society and its employees were exercising discretion under Penal 

Code Section 597.1, like SVACA in Jackson. It is less clear whether the Marin Humane Society 

qualifies as a public entity.9 The Jackson court made clear that SVACA is a public entity created 

under the California Government Code. Id. at *2. In contrast, here, the Marin Humane Society is 

established under the California Corporations Code and operates in contract with the County. 

Plaintiffs are unable to cite a case to support their position that the Marin Humane Society is not a 

public entity for the purposes of the California Tort Claims Act. On the other hand, neither have 

 

9

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1983 actions is not dispositive, since different standards apply and immunity in this context is a 

matter of state statute. 

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Defendants cited any authority to show that it is, and Defendants bear the burden on a 12(b)(6) 

motion to show that immunity applies. Thus, the Court cannot conclude at this stage of the 

litigation that the Marin Humane Society is a public entity, and its employees public employees, 

entitled to immunity from state torts under California Government Code Section 815. 

c. Fifth Cause of Action: Portraying Plaintiffs in a False Light

Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action against Marin Humane Society, McKenney, Machado, 

Rogers, Ricci, Ghilotti, and Wagman is for portrayal in a false light. False light invasion of 

privacy “is the wrong inflicted by publicity which puts the plaintiff . . . in a false but not 

necessarily defamatory position in the public eye.” Benefield v. Bryco Funding, Inc., No. C 14-

1459 PJH, 2014 WL 2604363, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2014). Under California law, to state a 

claim for the tort of false light invasion of privacy a plaintiff must plead that “(1) the defendant 

caused to be generated publicity of the plaintiff that was false or misleading, and (2) the publicity 

was offensive to a reasonable person.” Pacini v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. C 12-04606 SI, 

2013 WL 2924441, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013) (citing Fellows v. Nat’l Enquirer, 42 Cal.3d 

234, 238-39 (1986)). “Publicity” requires that the defendant communicate the information “to the 

public in general or to a large number of persons as distinguished from one individual or few.” 

Mnatsakanyan v. Cal. Prof. Corp. Cavalry Portfolio Servs. LLC, No. CV 12-04358 MMM 

(FMOx), 2013 WL 10156242, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013) (quoting Porten v. Univ. of San 

Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 828 (1976)). “Even if they place the person in a less than 

flattering light, the published facts are not actionable if they are true or accurate.” Id. (citing 

Fellows, 42 Cal.3d at 238). In addition, California courts construe the “false light” cause of action 

as a substantive equivalent to libel, and therefore requires proof of malice. See Aisenson v. Am. 

Broad. Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 146, 161 (1990) (citing Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Assoc., Inc., 4 

Cal.3d 529, 543 (1971)).

Here, the FAC includes factual allegations about Rogers falsely reporting that Plaintiffs’ 

horses were starving and malnourished and were stripping trees of bark to feed themselves 

because Plaintiffs did not provide them enough feed, and that she posted information about the 

case against Plaintiffs on the Chronicle of the Horse online bulletin board. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 18, 

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37.) The FAC includes allegations that Wagman “caused untrue statements to be published 

concerning the Burnells” in the Chronicle of the Horse, RateMyHorsePro.com, and a magazine 

called The Horse and that Ricci made “false and/or malicious reports to [Rogers] regarding Jill 

Burnell, her mental health, business, horses and person that were intended to and did cause 

embarrassment, and other personal and commercial injury.” (Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.) The FAC further 

alleges that Machado has “falsely stated that Jill Burnell is in ‘violation’ of the terms of her 

probation. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 69.) McKenney is alleged to have “caused the facts of the Marin Humane 

Society investigation of [Plaintiffs] and fundraising for the Marin Humane Society to be 

misrepresented to the public[[.]” (Id. ¶ 12.) 

In the claim itself, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants caused dissemination of information 

that may be false or erroneous, placed Plaintiffs in a derogatory and false light; and that would be 

offensive to a reasonable person.” (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 100.) Plaintiffs do not identify the particular 

false statements disclosed, explain how or to whom the disclosure occurred such that the Court 

can determine whether there was publication, allege facts demonstrating the falsity of the 

statement, identify which disclosure was made by each defendant, or allege malice. Incorporating 

by reference the 42 pages of factual allegations into this claim is not enough. The claim is 

dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants Ricci and Ghilotti, as there are no factual allegations 

that they engaged in any publicity; instead, the FAC alleges that they made reports to Rogers, 

which is not “publicity.” See Porten, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 828; Mnatsakanyan, 2013 WL 10156242, 

at *9 (citation omitted). However, because the other Defendants are alleged to have reported 

information about Plaintiffs to the public or on the internet, the false light invasion of privacy 

claim against them is dismissed with leave to amend to cure the deficiencies outlined above. 

d. Sixth Cause of Action: Public Disclosure of Private Facts / Invasion of 

Constitutional Right to Privacy

Relatedly, Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action against the Marin Humane Society, McKenney, 

Machado, Rogers, Ricci, Ghilotti, and Wagman is for public disclosure of private facts and/or 

invasion of their right to privacy under the California constitution. Public disclosure of private 

facts is another version of the tort of invasion of privacy. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 18 

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Cal.4th 200, 214 n.4 (1998). The elements of a claim for public disclosure of private facts are “(1) 

public disclosure, (2) of a private fact, (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the 

reasonable person, and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.” Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 

683, 717 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. 

Supp. 3d 1018, 1061-62 (N.D. Cal. 2014). “[T]here can be no privacy with respect to a matter that 

is already public or which has previously become part of the public domain.” Daly v. Viacom, 

Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 54 Cal. 

Ap. 3d 1040, 1045 (1984). Just as with false light claims, public disclosure means 

“communicating [the information] to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter 

must be regarding as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” Hernandez v. 

Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515 YGR, 2012 WL 5194120, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012) (citing 

Cal. Jury Instr.-Civ. 7.21); see also Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265, 271 (1980).

Here, Plaintiffs allege generally that “Defendants caused the dissemination of private facts 

concerning Plaintiffs, their home, and business about which they had a reasonable expectation that 

intimate images would not be disseminated publicly” and the disclosure “was one that would be 

offensive to reasonable persons[.]” (Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 103-104.) Plaintiffs have not identified which 

defendant made a public disclosure of which private facts, so the Court is not in a position to 

assess whether the disclosure would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person nor 

whether the matter is not of legitimate public interest. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of these 

elements is not enough to state a claim. As with the false light cause of action, this claim is 

dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants Ricci and Ghilotti, as there are no factual allegations 

that they engaged in any publicity; instead, the FAC alleges that they made reports to Rogers 

about Plaintiffs’ horses, home and business. With respect to the other defendants, the FAC as 

written fails to state a claim because it does not identify the particular statement, make clear that 

the information was private, or—in some instances—provide facts in support of publication. For 

example, while allegations that Rogers published information on online blogs suffices to establish 

publication, the conclusory allegation that McKenney publicly shared information does not. 

Plaintiff must support this conclusory allegation with facts. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s public 

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disclosure of private facts cause of action is dismissed with prejudice as to Ricci and Ghilotti and 

with leave to amend as to the other Defendants.

e. Seventh Cause of Action: Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of 

Emotional Distress

Lastly, the seventh cause of action against all Defendants except the County is for 

intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. To plead a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to plausibly 

establish the following elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the 

intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the 

plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation 

of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Potter v. Firestone Tire & 

Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hughes v. 

Pair, 46 Cal. 4th. 1035, 1050 (2009; Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Conduct is “outrageous” if it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a 

civilized community.” Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001.

Plaintiffs’ IIED cause of action is inadequately pleaded. Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ 

conduct caused them to suffer severe emotional distress[,]” that their conduct was “extreme as to 

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community” and that Defendants intended 

to cause or acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing Plaintiffs severe emotional 

distress. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶¶ 109-111.) Merely parroting the elements of an IIED cause of action is 

not enough to state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal. Plaintiffs otherwise fail to identify what 

conduct purportedly gives rise to this cause of action, fails to indicate which Defendants engaged 

in which outrageous conduct, and is absent any facts pertaining to the nature and extent of 

Plaintiffs’ emotional or mental suffering. The claim therefore fails. 

Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claim fares no better. First, 

NIED similarly requires factual allegations that demonstrate that the plaintiff actually suffered 

serious emotional distress proximately caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct, see Austin, 

367 F.3d at 1172, and the FAC contains no such facts. Moreover, despite similar wording, unlike 

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the intentional formulation, NIED “is a form of the tort of negligence, to which the elements of 

duty, breach of duty, causation and damages apply.” Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., Inc., 6 

Cal. 4th 124, 129 (1993). The duty element “may be imposed by law, be assumed by the 

defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 985; see also Raynal 

v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., No. 11-cv-05599 NC, 2012 WL 5878386, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 

2012) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs do not allege facts that plausibly establish how all 

defendants except the County owed Plaintiffs a duty of care. In addition, “where the conduct is 

intentional, it cannot be used as the basis for a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.” 

Edwards v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d, 74 F.3d 

1245 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, although Plaintiffs appear to allege that the same conduct gives rise to 

both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, such cannot be the case. See id. 

For each of these reasons, Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action fails to state a claim against any 

defendant and is therefore dismissed with leave to amend.

* * *

In short, Plaintiffs’ fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action for portrayal in a false light, 

invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress are all inadequately pleaded and are 

therefore dismissed. The privacy torts are dismissed with prejudice as to Ricci and Ghilotti and 

without prejudice as to the remaining Defendants. The emotional distress cause of action is 

dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiffs choose to amend these claims, they should be 

parsimonious in choosing which Defendants to include in each cause of action, naming only those 

Defendants whose conduct Plaintiff can specifically identify as meeting the elements of the claim. 

In addition, buried in Plaintiffs’ opposition is a request to amend the FAC to add additional 

state-law causes of action alleging interference contract, defamation, fraud, and malicious 

prosecution. (Dkt. No. 55 at 7.) Of course, this request does not suffice as a formal motion for 

leave to amend and ordinarily the Court would not consider it. However, as the Court will allow 

Plaintiffs leave to amend their already-asserted state law claims, they may have leave to amend to 

add additional state law claims arising out of the same incidents, as well. Plaintiffs are cautioned 

that any newly added claims must comply with the pleading standards set forth above.

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3. Preclusion

The California Superior Court is now reviewing the administrative decision upholding the 

seizure as lawful. The potential preclusive effect of the state court proceedings looms large.

The Constitution provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 

public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. To 

effectuate this provision and extend its reach to the federal courts, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1738, which provides that the “Acts, records, and judicial proceedings” of “any State . . . of the 

United States . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States 

. . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such state . . . from which they are taken.” 

Section 1738 requires that federal courts “give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect 

as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” 

White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. 

Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). Accordingly, because this case involves prior actions in 

California state courts and administrative bodies, the Court applies California law on preclusion.

Issue preclusion “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” 

Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896 (2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “The doctrine applies only if the decision in the initial proceeding was final and 

on the merits and the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation is identical to that decided in 

the first action and was actually and necessarily decided in that action.” Lucido v. Super. Ct., 51 

Cal. 3d 335, 341 (1990). In addition, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the 

same as, or in privity with, the party to the first action. Id. In other words, even where the second 

cause of action is not barred by claim preclusion, judgment in an earlier case can “operate[ ] as an 

estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated 

and determined in the first action” between the same parties. Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 

24 Cal. App. 4th 327, 345 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 

Cal. 4th 61, 78 (2000) (listing the elements of issue preclusion as “identity of issues, finality of the 

decision, and identity or privity of the party against whom estoppel is sought”); Segal v. AT&T 

Co., 606 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, the hearing officer decided the Marin Humane 

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Society’s seizure of Plaintiffs’ horses was lawful. (See Dkt. No. 48-5 ¶ 11 (concluding that the 

Marin Humane Society officers “reasonably believed that very prompt action was necessary to 

protect the health and safety” of the seized horses such that the seizures were legally justified 

under California Penal Code Section 597.1”).) This same issue is a necessary element of 

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim that the Marin Humane Society and its employees violated 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully seizing their horses. That the issue is now 

reframed as an element of a federal civil rights claim is of no matter. See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1034. 

Thus, the issue is the same and was actually litigated and determined in the same action between at 

least some of the same parties.

Issue preclusion may operate as a bar to litigation of an issue decided in an earlier 

administrative proceeding. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 

(2015) (“[W]here a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency, preclusion often 

applies.”). Section 1738, discussed above, applies where administrative findings have been 

reviewed by state courts of general jurisdiction. Einheber v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 266 F. 

App’x 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 

326-27 (9th Cir. 1995)). But here, Section 1738 cannot yet apply because there is no state court 

decision reviewing the hearing officer’s May 2015 decision; in other words, the administrative 

decision is not yet final. 

Clemes v. Del Norte County Unified School District, No. C-93-1912 MHP, 1995 WL 

573691, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 1995), is instructive. There, a plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim 

arising out of his termination from employment. Id. at *1-2. The plaintiff’s claims initially 

proceeded to a hearing before a state administrative body, the Commission on Professional 

Competence, which decided to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. Id. Thereafter, when the 

plaintiff filed suit in federal court, the defendants contended that issue preclusion barred 

relitigation of the propriety of plaintiff’s termination. Id. at *4. The district court held that the 

plaintiff’s pending mandamus petition prohibited issue preclusion for lack of finality. Id. at *5 

(“[I]t is premature to apply collateral estoppel to the instant case because the Commission’s 

decision is not final.”) (citing Long Beach Unif. Sch. Dist. v. State of Cal., 225 Cal. App. 3d 155, 

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168-69 (1990)). Accordingly, the court stayed the federal case pending resolution of the state 

court proceedings. Id. at *6. Although Clemes involved a case at a later stage of litigation—

specifically, the parties had filed motions for summary judgment—this Court sees no reason to 

depart from the Clemes court’s reasoned and logical approach to the procedural problem of a

parallel mandamus petition and federal court action challenging the same action.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Wabakken v. California Department of Correction and 

Rehabilitation, 801 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2015), is unavailing. There, the plaintiff appealed his 

termination to the California State Personnel Board, where his termination was largely upheld in 

an administrative hearing. Id. at 1145. The plaintiff then filed suit in federal court challenging the 

same termination under the California Whistleblowers Protection Act. Relying on a case from the 

California Supreme Court, the Wabakken court held that the unique statutory structure of that Act 

meant that the administrative decision did not preclude later litigation; in particular, the Act 

provided that an employee could bring a separate action for damages notwithstanding the ruling of 

the administrative body. Id. at 1148-49. Wabakken is plainly distinguishable as Plaintiff has not 

identified any language in the seizure statute suggesting that issue preclusion should not apply to 

an administrative decision upholding the seizure’s lawfulness.

Thus, a final decision from the California courts upholding the lawfulness of the seizure of 

Plaintiffs’ horses will likely be fatal to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, the only 

federal claim now potentially remaining in this lawsuit. Accordingly, a stay of this action is 

appropriate pending resolution of Plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate in state court. At oral 

argument, Plaintiffs agreed that such a stay is warranted, and requested that this case be stayed in 

its entirety—including the deadline to file an amended complaint—pending resolution of the state 

court proceedings.

III. The County’s Motion to Dismiss

The only claim Plaintiffs allege against the County is a Section 1983 claim. The County is 

plainly a state actor acting under the color of law for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim. As for 

the violation of a constitutional right, in the FAC, Plaintiffs did not set forth the basis of the claim 

against the County. At oral argument, however, Plaintiffs represented that the County has a duty 

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not to have Marin Humane Society employees pretend to be peace officers, which the County is 

violating by allowing the agency to act without a certified humane officer. Put another way, 

Plaintiffs contend that the County’s ordinance allowing Marin Humane Society officers to enforce 

all state laws regarding animal control conflicts with other state laws that require certification 

before individuals may act as peace officers. According to Plaintiffs, this policy is a violation of 

their due process right to have state actors act lawfully. 

Plaintiffs have not been able to identify any authority holding that a county ordinance or 

regulation granting officer status to certain agency actors violates a citizen’s rights to due process. 

Notably, even if they had, they would not have shown that this violation was the moving force 

behind Plaintiffs’ constitutional violation, since the humane society officers brought a County 

Sheriff’s deputy with them on both occasions when the horses were seized. Plainly a Sheriff’s 

deputy is a certified peace officer authorized by law, if not local ordinance, to effect seizures of 

property. Thus, the claim against the County is dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Court DENIES Defendant Burnham’s motion for 

entry of judgment, GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and GRANTS the 

County’s separate motion to dismiss. The Section 1983 claims predicated on violations of the 

First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments are dismissed with prejudice. The Section 1983 claims

against Defendants Wagman, Ricci, Ghilotti, Keefer, McKenney and the County are dismissed 

with prejudice. The fifth and sixth causes of action for invasion of privacy torts are dismissed 

with prejudice as to Ricci and Ghilotti and without prejudice as to the remaining Defendants. The 

seventh cause of action for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress is 

dismissed without prejudice.

The Court hereby STAYS this action pending resolution of Plaintiffs’ state court 

proceedings. The parties shall file a joint status report within 30 days of the Superior Court’s 

decision on Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate. As this action is stayed in its entirety, 

Plaintiffs need not file a second amended complaint until further order of the Court.

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This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 47, 49, and 50.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 5, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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