Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02209/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SINH TRAN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Acting Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-2209 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging the California Board of Prison Terms' ("BPT") June 1, 2004

decision to deny him parole. 

Per order filed on October 3, 2005, the court found that petitioner's claim

that the BPT's decision finding him not suitable for parole does not comport with

due process appears colorable under § 2254, when liberally construed, and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted. Respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

California inmates do not have a liberty interest in early release on parole that is

protected by federal due process because the Supreme Court of California held in

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), that the language of California Penal

Code section 3041, setting forth California's parole scheme, is not mandatory.

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Per order filed on September 6, 2006, the court denied respondent's

motion on the ground that the "Ninth Circuit recently rejected respondent's

argument and made clear that 'California inmates continue to have a liberty

interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005).' Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, No. 05-16455, slip op. 10563, 10566 (9th Cir.

Aug. 31, 2006)." Sept. 6, 2006 Order at 2. The court reinstated its previous

order and again ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has now filed an answer to the order to show

cause and petitioner has filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND

On December 20, 1995, petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder in

the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Orange and

was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life. 

On June 1, 2004, petitioner appeared with counsel before a BPT panel for

an initial parole consideration hearing and was found not suitable for parole. The

panel found that petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society

or a threat to public safety if released from prison, and denied a subsequent

parole hearing for three years. 

Petitioner challenged the BPT's June 1, 2004 decision in the state superior,

appellate and supreme courts. After the Supreme Court of California denied his

petition for review on February 23, 2005, the instant federal petition for a writ of

habeas corpus followed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas

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petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even

when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction.” 

White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this

court may entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a California state

inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any

claim on the merits: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential

standard, federal habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this] court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining

whether the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent, the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT's June 1, 2004

decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent

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hearing for three years, on the ground that the decision does not comport with

due process. Petitioner claims that the BPT’s decision is not supported by some

evidence in the record, and is improperly based on the unchanging facts of his

offense and ten-year old prison disciplinary violations. Petitioner also claims that

the BPT violated his plea agreement by declaring his offense egregious and

thereby depriving him of the reduced punishment he bargained for when he

entered a guilty plea to the charged offense.

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses,

or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In making this determination, the

board must consider various factors, including the prisoner’s social history, past

criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including behavior

before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in

release on parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128

(9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). It

matters not that, as is the case here, a parole release date has never been set for

the inmate because “[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole

date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that "some evidence" support the

parole board's decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125

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(holding that the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions

in § 2254 habeas petition); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d

at 904 (same). This "some evidence" standard is minimally stringent and ensures

that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining

whether this requirement is satisfied “does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's

decision have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 904. Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded

an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v.

California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on

other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). In sum, if the parole board's determination

of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence,

with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428

F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows that the BPT afforded petitioner and his counsel an

opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to

review petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents and

provided them with a reasoned decision in denying parole. The panel explained

that it found that the crime was an especially violent and brutal attack on multiple

victims demonstrating a callous disregard for human suffering – petitioner

discharged seven gun shots from a .45 caliber firearm at a group of rival gang

members, fatally striking one of them in the head. The panel also found that

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petitioner had an escalating pattern of criminal conduct and a record of violence,

including prior criminal convictions for burglary, auto theft and false

imprisonment; had an unstable social history and had failed to profit from

society's previous attempts to correct his criminality; had failed to demonstrate a

positive change in his behavior while incarcerated, noting various misconduct

and disciplinary infractions; and had unfavorable psychological and institutional

evaluations, with the latter predicting that he posed a high degree of risk to the

public if released. The panel commended petitioner for receiving no disciplinary

write-ups since 1995, obtaining his GED and 12 college units, a positive work

record, receiving a vocational certificate in landscaping and remaining out of

gang life while incarcerated, among other things, but concluded that "these

positive aspects of his behavior do not outweigh the factors of unsuitability." 

Hr’g Tr at 51 (Resp’t Ex. 2). 

The state superior court upheld the decision of the BPT and the state

appellate and supreme courts summarily affirmed. The superior court found that

the record "adequately establishes due consideration of petitioner's eligibility for

parole and reveals ample evidentiary support for the Board's decision." In re

Sinh Tran, No. M-10304, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 8, 2004) (Resp't Ex.

3). The court noted that the commitment offense had been carried out in a

violent, brutal manner demonstrating a callous disregard for human life; multiple

victims had been attacked; petitioner had an unstable social history and an

escalating pattern of criminal conduct reflected in his association with criminal

street gangs and prior convictions for armed second degree robbery, first degree

burglary, auto theft and false imprisonment; petitioner had sustained disciplinary

action for institutional misconduct; petitioner's psychological evaluation deems

him an average to above average risk to the community if released on parole; and

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petitioner's institutional evaluation deems him as currently posing a high degree

of risk to the public if released on parole. Id. at 2. The state court's rejection of

petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Hill

standard, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s June 1, 2004 decision to deny petitioner parole

after his first parole consideration hearing is supported by some evidence in the

record and that evidence bears some indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Rosas, 428

F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole based on gravity of offense and

psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of parole based

solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior to imprisonment); Morales, 16

F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole based on criminal history, cruel nature

of offense, and need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry under Hill is

simply "whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the [BPT]." Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 

There is – the facts surrounding the crime reasonably suggest that it was carried

out in a cruel and callous fashion; petitioner has a pre-commitment record of

escalating criminal activity; and petitioner's psychiatric and institutional

evaluations were not completely satisfactory. Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(c) & (d) (listing circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and

circumstances tending to show suitability). It is not up to this court to “reweigh

the evidence." Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner's reliance on Biggs does not compel a different result. In Biggs,

the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release date based solely on

the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, but

cautioned that, over time, denying a prisoner parole strictly because of the nature

of his offense and his prior conduct “would raise serious questions involving his

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The Sass panel questioned Biggs by noting that "it is not our function to

speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129.

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liberty interest in parole . . . and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs,

334 F.3d at 916-17.

The Ninth Circuit recently emphasized the continuing vitality of Biggs,

but found that relief for the petitioner was precluded by the Sass decision, which

upheld a denial of parole based in reliance on a commitment offense that was less

callous and cruel than Irons’s. Irons v. Carey, No. 05-15275, slip op. 8335,

8348-49 (9th Cir. July 13, 2007).1

 However, the Ninth Circuit made a point of

noting that all of the cases in which it had previously held that a denial of parole

based solely on the commitment offense comported with due process involved

situations where the prisoner had not yet served the minimum number of years

required by his sentence. Id. at 8349. “All we held in those cases and all we hold

today, therefore, is that, given the particular circumstances of the offenses in

these cases, due process was not violated when these prisoners were deemed

unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms.” Id.

In this case, petitioner was deemed unsuitable for parole after his first

parole consideration hearing, which took place nine years into his sentence and 

well before the expiration of his minimum term of 15 years. "[G]iven the

particular circumstances of [petitioner's offense], due process was not violated

when [he was] deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration of [his]

minimum term[].” Id. Moreover, the BPT's denial was not based solely on his

commitment offense and pre-commitment conduct. Each of the other cited

factors also constitutes some evidence under Hill.

/

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Petitioner claims that the BPT violated his plea agreement by declaring his

commitment offense egregious and thereby depriving him of the reduced

punishment he bargained for when he entered a guilty plea to second degree

murder. The state superior court rejected petitioner's claim:

Petitioner pled guilty to and was convicted of second degree

murder resulting in a sentence of 15 years to life in state prison. An

indeterminate sentence is in legal effect a sentence for the

maximum term, that is, for life. (People v. Dyer (1969) 269

Cal.App,2d 209, 214.) An inmate serving an indeterminate life

term in state prison is not entitled to release on parole until he is

found suitable for such release by the Board of Prison Terms. (Pen.

Code § 3041(b); Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a)).

In re Sinh Tran, No. M-10304, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 8, 2004). The

state court's rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state

court reasonably determined that petitioner only bargained for the "possibility" of

release on parole and that he consequently may be lawfully retained in custody

for a term of life unless he is found suitable for release on parole by the BPT. 

See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1987) (construction of state court

plea agreement is governed by state contract law, and federal court should not

disturb a reasonable state court interpretation); see also Evenstad v. United

States, 978 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1992) (change in the law regarding

parole eligibility does not render an earlier guilty plea involuntary).

/

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/

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CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief because the state courts'

rejection of his federal claims was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The petition

for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Sept. 19, 2007 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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