Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05059/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05059-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 14, 2013 Decided August 5, 2014

No. 10-5059

JEREMY PINSON, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

(No. 1:10-cv-00092)

Dawn E. Murphy-Johnson, appointed by the court, argued

the cause as amicus curiae for appellants. With her on the briefs

was Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by the court.

Wynne P. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellees. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen,

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

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SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: Jeremy Pinson is a federal

prisoner serving a twenty-year sentence for threatening the

President, knowingly and willfully making a false statement to

a United States Marshal, and mailing threatening

communications. Pinson has made frequent use of the federal

courts during his time in prison, having filed more than 100 civil

actions and appeals across the nation. In this case, filed in the

District of Columbia, Pinson challenges the conditions of his

confinement at the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega,

Alabama. The district court determined that venue in the

District of Columbia was improper and ordered the action

transferred to the Northern District of Alabama. Pinson then

filed a mandamus petition in this court seeking to vacate the

district court’s transfer order, and also to compel the district

court clerk to accept certain rejected filings. Four fellow

prisoners join his petition, and all of them seek to proceed in

forma pauperis in this court. Pinson and one other petitioner

also moved to stay collection of the filing fees, arguing that the

federal in forma pauperis statute entitles them to defer the

payment of fees in this case until they complete their payment

of fees owed in other cases.

Because Pinson has run afoul of the Prison Litigation

Reform Act’s three-strikes provision and has failed to

demonstrate that he qualifies for the imminent danger exception,

we deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. We also hold

that the remaining petitioners lack standing to challenge either

the transfer order or the clerk’s rejection of the filings. Finally,

we deny the motion to stay the collection of filing fees pending

the payment of fees in other cases.

I.

In December 2009, Pinson filed a complaint in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, naming

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several Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials as defendants. At the

time, he was incarcerated in the Special Management Unit

(SMU) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega. 

SMUs house gang-affiliated and other disruptive inmates who

present unique security concerns. See BOP Program Statement

5217.01 (Nov. 19, 2008). Pinson’s complaint alleged that SMUs

are “unconstitutionally violent and dangerous” in violation of

the Eighth Amendment. App. 9. He claimed that his

designation to an SMU placed him “in imminent danger”

because BOP officials failed to identify him as a former

associate of a gang and to separate him from members of rival

gangs. App. 8-9. He further alleged that the defendants knew

that he was a homosexual who thus would “face[] a substantial

risk of harm” if designated to an SMU. App. 8. Pinson moved

to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915.

In January 2010, the district court issued an order

transferring Pinson’s case to the Northern District of Alabama. 

The court determined that venue did not properly lie in the

District of Columbia “[b]ecause none of the alleged events

forming the basis of the complaint occurred in the District.” 

Transfer Order, ECF No. 3, App. 21. The court stated that

Pinson’s IFP application would be decided by the transferee

court. Id.

In March 2010, after unsuccessfully moving for

reconsideration of the transfer order, Pinson filed a notice of

appeal. This court construed the notice as a petition for a writ

of mandamus, and ordered Pinson to pay the $450 docketing fee

or to file a motion to proceed IFP. Pinson moved to proceed

IFP, as well as to stay any collection of filing fees until he

completed payment of filing fees owed in other cases he had

brought.

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Pinson, joined by several fellow SMU inmates, then

submitted a “Motion for Joinder of Appellees and for

Appointment of Counsel.” According to that motion, the other

inmates had attempted to join Pinson’s lawsuit by filing a

“Motion for Joinder” in the district court. The prisoners claimed

to have submitted the Motion for Joinder twice, once prior to the

transfer of the case and once as an accompaniment to Pinson’s

motion for reconsideration of the transfer order. The prisoners

argued that the district court clerk exceeded his authority by

allegedly returning the motion unfiled on both occasions. They

also submitted an amended notice of appeal clarifying their

intention to challenge both the transfer order and the clerk’s

rejection of the Motion for Joinder. This court construed the

amended notice of appeal to be a supplement to the mandamus

petition.

Over the next several years, the parties engaged in an

extended back-and-forth concerning Pinson’s eligibility for IFP

status and his motion to stay the collection of filing fees. A

motions panel of this court dismissed all the prisoners

attempting to join the case (for failure to prosecute) except

Andrew Hobbs and Jeremy Brown, both of whom were granted

IFP status. The panel also appointed an amicus curiae to present

arguments in favor of the petitioners. Another motions panel

later reinstated two of the previously dismissed prisoners,

Antoine Bruce and John Leigh, as petitioners, and ordered them

to file completed motions for leave to proceed IFP. Bruce also

joined Pinson’s motion to stay the collection of filing fees.

II.

We first consider Pinson’s request to proceed IFP before

this Court, which we deny. The federal IFP statute, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 1915, generally authorizes courts to waive ordinary

filing fees for an indigent litigant seeking to bring a lawsuit. See

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In 1996, prompted by widespread

concerns that inmates had been flooding the courts with

meritless claims, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA). See Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d

1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The PLRA substantially amended

28 U.S.C. § 1915 with regard to prisoner-litigants. Unlike other

litigants, prisoners accorded IFP status can no longer avoid

payment of filing fees altogether. They instead are permitted to

pay in monthly installments rather than in one, up-front

payment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

Additionally, prisoners who have incurred three or more

“strikes” face a potential bar against proceeding IFP:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or

appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under

this section [authorizing IFP proceedings] if the

prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an

action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C § 1915(g). Because it is undisputed that Pinson has

accumulated at least three strikes, the statute prohibits him from

proceeding IFP unless he falls within the imminent danger

exception. 

In assessing imminent danger, we examine the conditions

faced by Pinson at the time he initiated his action. Both sides

urge us to broaden the inquiry to encompass later developments. 

Amicus points to the August 2010 murder of another SMU

inmate (who was an attempted co-petitioner), as well as an

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alleged January 2011 incident in which Pinson was nearly

stabbed. The government, for its part, contends that Pinson’s

relocation to an Administrative Maximum facility in Florence,

Colorado, renders moot his claim of imminent danger

concerning his confinement in the Talladega SMU. We reject

the invitation to take into account those subsequent events.

Our decision in Mitchell v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 587

F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2009), precludes consideration of postcomplaint developments when assessing the applicability of the

imminent danger exception. We explained there that “we assess

the alleged danger at the time [the prisoner] filed his complaint

and thus look only to the documents attesting to the facts at that

time, namely his complaint and the accompanying motion for

IFP status.” Id. at 420. That approach squares with the statute’s

temporal reference point: the initial act of “bring[ing]” a lawsuit. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047,

1052-53 (9th Cir. 2007). Section 1915(g) directs attention to

whether the prisoner “is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury” when he “bring[s]” his action, not to whether he

later in fact suffers (or does not suffer) a serious physical injury. 

The provision’s status as a mere “screening device”

reinforces that understanding. Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1050, 1055. 

Otherwise, the inquiry into imminent dangerousness could

require examining myriad post-filing developments and

adjustments of confinement conditions that maytranspire during

the course of a lawsuit (and that often attend an inmate’s

imprisonment). Restricting the inquiry to the allegations in a

prisoner’s complaint better coheres with § 1915(g)’s “limited

office.” Id. at 1055.

Turning, then, to the allegations in Pinson’s complaint (and

his accompanying motion for IFP status), his claim of imminent

danger closely resembles one we rejected in Mitchell. 

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Mitchell’s complaint alleged that “even though BOP knew he

had testified for the government, it illegally transferred him to

USP Florence, a prison known for murders and assaults on . . .

anyone who has been known as a snitch, and where he was

nearly murdered.” 587 F.3d at 420-21 (ellipsis in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). This court found that

Mitchell had “failed to allege that the danger he faces is

imminent.” Id. at 421. With respect to the alleged attack

against Mitchell, the court noted that he had “wait[ed] until

seventeen months after the . . . attack to file his complaint.” Id.

With respect to his general allegation that the facilitywas known

to present dangers to inmates who testify for the government,

the court concluded that “neither the complaint nor his IFP

motion alleges any ongoing threat.” Id.

Pinson’s allegations of imminent danger are materially

indistinguishable from those found inadequate in Mitchell. 

Pinson contends that, as a homosexual and former gang

member, his designation to the Talladega SMU alongside

members of rival gangs placed him in imminent danger of death

or serious bodily injury. Like Mitchell, Pinson’s claim rests on

the BOP’s decision to designate him to a particular facility

notwithstanding its reputation as a dangerous place for inmates

possessing certain characteristics—here, as a rival gang-member

and homosexual, and in Mitchell, as a government “snitch.” The

Mitchell court found such contentions insufficient to satisfy the

imminent danger exception, even though Mitchell, unlike

Pinson, further alleged that he had already been attacked by the

time he filed his complaint. We see no ground for reaching a

different conclusion here.

Because Pinson fails to qualify for the imminent danger

exception to the three-strikes rule, we deny his motion for IFP

status. If he wishes to proceed, he has thirty days from the date

of this opinion to pay the filing fee up front. See Mitchell, 587

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F.3d at 422. If he elects not to proceed, no fees will be

collected. See Smith v. District of Columbia, 182 F.3d 25, 30

(D.C. Cir. 1999). Pinson’s co-petitioners, by contrast, have not

accumulated three strikes. This court already granted IFP status

to Hobbs and Brown, and we now grant IFP status to Bruce and

Leigh. We therefore proceed to consider the mandamus petition

with regard to those four petitioners.

III.

The mandamus petition challenges both the district court

clerk’s refusal to docket a “Motion for Joinder” and the district

court’s transfer of the case to the Northern District of Alabama. 

We conclude that the remaining petitioners lack standing to raise

either of those claims.

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “(1) [he] has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is

(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to

the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as

opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (quoting Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)). 

Because the elements of standing “are not mere pleading

requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s

case, each element must be supported in the same way as any

other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,

i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the

successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 

Here, moreover, petitioners seek mandamus relief, a “drastic”

remedy “invoked only in extraordinary situations.” Kerr v. U.S.

Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).

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Petitioners contend that the district court clerk twice refused

to file a “Motion for Joinder” which they had submitted in an

attempt to join the action below. While petitioners aver in their

pleading that they were injured as a result of the clerk’s alleged

actions, they provide no evidence that the Motion for Joinder in

fact existed, let alone that it was submitted to the district court. 

The record contains no reference to any such motion despite

petitioners’ contention that it was twice returned to Pinson

stamped “received.” Nor do petitioners give any explanation for

the absence of any reference to the motion in the record. In

those circumstances, petitioners fail to support their claim of

injury “with the manner and degree of evidence required” for

mandamus relief. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see Sierra Club v.

EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898-902 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Petitioners also lack standing to challenge the transfer of

Pinson’s complaint to the Northern District of Alabama. 

Petitioners were not parties to the suit below, and “non-parties

usually lack standing to challenge venue dispositions.” In re

Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1992); see

also United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, S. Dist. of Tex., 506 F.2d

383, 384 (5th Cir. 1974) (nonparty lacked standing to compel

transfer of venue via mandamus). We have no occasion to

assess whether our conclusion might be different if petitioners

had substantiated their allegations that they attempted to join the

suit below and had demonstrated that the district court

improperly denied their request. Cf. Alt. Research & Dev.

Found. v. Veneman, 262 F.3d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per

curiam) (suggesting that non-party might have standing to

appeal a stipulated dismissal where intervention is improperly

denied). 

Amicus argues that petitioners can establish standing based

on their general interest in the lawsuit, citing Aurelius Capital

Partners v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2009). 

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In Aurelius Capital, the Second Circuit determined that a

nonparty with an “interest affected by the district court’s

judgment” had standing to appeal the judgment. Id. at 127-29. 

But the nonparty in Aurelius Capital had a direct property

interest in certain funds deemed subject to attachment and

execution by the lower court’s order. Id. at 128. Even if that

sort of direct property interest would justify non-party standing,

petitioners’ generalized “interest in the lawsuit challenging

SMU procedures” does not suffice. Amicus Br. 38.

IV.

The remaining issue concerns the manner in which filing

fees should be collected from petitioner Bruce. Under the

federal IFP statute as amended by the PLRA, prisoners granted

IFP status must make an initial partial payment at the time of

filing followed by monthly installments until they pay the full

fees. Section 1915(b) sets out the payment structure as follows: 

(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a) [which

encompasses non-prisoner litigants], if a prisoner

brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma

pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full

amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess and,

when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any

court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of

20 percent of the greater of—

(A) the average monthly deposits to the

prisoner’s account; or

(B) the average monthly balance in the

prisoner’s account for the 6-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the

complaint or notice of appeal.

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(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the

prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments

of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited

to the prisoner’s account. The agency having custody

of the prisoner shall forward payments from the

prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time

the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing

fees are paid.

Pinson moved to stay the collection of the monthly

installments due in this case until he fulfilled his obligation to

pay the filing fees he owed in other cases. That issue is moot as

to Pinson in light of our conclusion that he may not proceed IFP. 

But we must still decide the issue on behalf of Bruce, who

joined Pinson’s motion and to whom we have granted IFP

status. See supra Part II.

The courts of appeals are divided concerning the manner in

which the PLRA calls for collection of installment payments

from prisoners who simultaneously owe filing fees in multiple

cases. The Second and Fourth Circuits interpret § 1915(b) to

cap the monthly exaction of fees at twenty percent of a

prisoner’s monthly income, regardless of the number of cases

for which he owes filing fees. Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237,

252 (4th Cir. 2010); Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 277 (2d

Cir. 2001). Under that “per prisoner” cap, a prisoner would

satisfy his obligations sequentially, first fully satisfying his

obligation for his earliest case before moving on to the next one,

at no time making any payment that would take his cumulative

payments for that month beyond an overarching twenty-percent

ceiling. By contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth

Circuits have held that § 1915(b) requires a prisoner to make a

separate installment payment for each filing fee incurred as long

as no individual payment exceeds twenty percent of his monthly

income. Christensen v. Big Horn Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,

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374 F. App’x 821, 833 (10th Cir. 2010); Atchison v. Collins, 288

F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2002); Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Grp., 146

F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998); Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429,

436 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Lee

v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000), and Walker v.

O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000). Under that “per case”

cap, a prisoner simultaneously makes payments towards

satisfaction of all of his existing obligations.

This court, contrary to amicus’s contention, has yet to

choose between those approaches. Amicus errs in reading

Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998), to have

adopted a per prisoner cap. In that case, a North Carolina

inmate challenged the PLRA’s filing fee requirement, arguing

that it denied him “due process of law by forcing him to choose

between filing a lawsuit and being able to buy the necessities of

life.” Id. at 1298. In rejecting Tucker’s challenge, we observed

that “the payment requirement of the PLRA never exacts more

than 20% of an indigent prisoner’s assets or income.” Id. That

statement did not adopt a per-prisoner cap. Tucker involved an

as-applied challenge to the PLRA by a prisoner who had filed

one suit and thus owed a single twenty-percent installment each

month. Id. Unsurprisingly, the decision at no point mentions or

contemplates the possibility of multiple simultaneous suits. In

context, the observation relied on by amicus is best read to

explain that the PLRA’s payment structure “never exacts more

than 20%” of a prisoner’s monthly income for a given suit. See

id. at 1297-98. And insofar as the statement could be

understood to speak to a multiple-suit scenario not presented by

the case, it would constitute non-binding dicta. See Torres, 612

F.3d at 242 n.3 (referring to the statement from Tucker as dicta).

Considering the issue afresh, we conclude that the per-case

approach adopted by the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth

Circuits is the better understanding of the statute. We begin

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with the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the

words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view

to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v.

Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Taken

as a whole, the language and operation of § 1915 indicate that its

provisions apply to each action or appeal filed by a prisoner;

and subsection (b)(2), governing the payment of fees in

installments, is no exception. See Torres, 612 F.3d at 256

(Niemeyer, J., dissenting).

Subsection (b)(1) of § 1915 addresses the threshold

obligation to make an initial partial payment. The provision

instructs that, “if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an

appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay

the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall . . . collect, as a

partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial

partial filing fee . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The plain text

of the provision calls for assessment of the initial partial filing

fee each time a prisoner “brings a civil action or files an appeal.” 

Id. Amicus acknowledges that the initial partial filing fee

accrues in each case, regardless of the number of suits initiated.

Subsection (b)(2), the immediately ensuing provision, then

states that, “[a]fter payment of the initial partial filing fee, the

prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20

percent of the preceding month’s income.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(2) (emphasis added). Because the initial partial filing

fee imposed in subsection (b)(1) acts as the “triggering

condition” for the monthly installments required by subsection

(b)(2), the two provisions should be read in tandem. Torres, 612

F.3d at 256 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Given that the initial fee

required by subsection (b)(1) applies on a per-case basis, it

follows that subsection (b)(2)’s monthly payment obligation

likewise applies on a per-case basis. See id. at 256-57.

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The remainder of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 fortifies that per-case

understanding. Subsection (a)(2), for example, states that a

“prisonerseeking to bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in

a civil action or proceeding without prepayment of fees or

security therefor . . . shall submit a . . . trust fund account

statement . . . for the 6-month period immediately preceding the

filing of the complaint or the notice of appeal.” Id. § 1915(a)(2)

(emphasis added). Subsection (e)(2) provides that,

“[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that

may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time

if the court determines that” the case is defective. Id. §

1915(e)(2) (emphasis added). Subsection (f)(1) allows a court

to render judgment for costs “at the conclusion of the suit or

action.” Id. § 1915(f)(1) (emphasis added). Interpreting

subsection (b)(2) to dictate the amount a prisoner may be

required to pay each month for all his cases in toto would be

incongruous with the rest of the statute.

Amicus responds that § 1915(b)(1) terms the initial partial

filing fee payment a “payment of any court fees required by

law.” And because “any” means “any and all,” amicus

contends, § 1915(b)(2) contemplates taking no more than twenty

percent from an inmate’s monthly income as payment for “all”

court fees owed in all cases. Subsection (b)(1)’s reference to

“any” court fees, however, must be read in context: when a

prisoner “brings a civil action or files an appeal,” he must pay an

initial filing fee and monthly installments thereafter as payment

of any (and all) court fees required for that action or appeal. Id.

§ 1915(b)(1); see Torres, 612 F.3d at 258 (Niemeyer, J.,

dissenting). A straightforward reading of § 1915 thus indicates

that both the initial payment required by subsection (b)(1) and

the monthly installments required by subsection (b)(2) apply on

a per-case basis. Nothing in the statute suggests that a second or

third action should be treated any differently than the first.

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Amicus urges us to adopt the per-prisoner approach to avoid

unconstitutionally constraining a prisoner’s access to the courts. 

But the PLRA’s safety-valve provision, § 1915(b)(4), separately

serves that function. Under that provision, “[i]n no event shall

a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing

a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has

no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing

fee.” Moreover, § 1915(b)(2) calls for collection of the required

monthly installments only if the amount in a prisoner’s account

exceeds $10. As a result, even if 100 percent of a prisoner’s

income were subject to recoupment for filing fees, the statute

assures his ability to initiate an action (provided of course that

he faces no bar against proceeding IFP altogether by virtue of

having accumulated three strikes). And because prison officials

are constitutionally required to afford inmates “‘adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care,’” our adoption of the percase approach will not force a prisoner “to choose between the

necessities of life and his lawsuit.” Tucker, 142 F.3d at 1298

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).

Finally, the per-case approach comports with the PLRA’s

basic object. The “PLRA was designed to deter prisoners from

filing frivolous lawsuits, which waste judicial resources and

compromise the quality of justice enjoyed by the law-abiding

population.” In re Kissi, 652 F.3d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Capping monthly

withdrawals at twenty percent of an inmate’s income, regardless

of the number of suits filed, would diminish the deterrent effect

of the PLRA once a prisoner files his first action. See Newlin,

123 F.3d at 436. And although some of the legislative history

cited by amicus suggests a disinclination to impose excessive

fees on a prisoner for filing a lawsuit, there is no indication of an

intention to refrain from imposing the same, non-excessive

payment structure each time a prisoner initiates an action. See,

e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement

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of S. Kyl) (“The filing fee is small enough not to deter a prisoner

with a meritorious claim, yet large enough to deter frivolous

claims and multiple filings.”).

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Pinson’s motion to

proceed IFP and Bruce’s motion to stay collection of fees. We

also dismissthe mandamus petition with respect to the allegedly

rejected filings. With respect to the challenge to the transfer

order, Pinson has thirty days from the issuance of this opinion

to pay the filing fee and proceed. The other petitioners,

although permitted to proceed IFP, lack standing to challenge

the transfer. The clerk’s office therefore should collect the

applicable fees from each petitioner in accordance with

§ 1915(b).

So ordered.

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