Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02420/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02420-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVAD TREW,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNATIONAL GAME FISH ASSOCIATION,

INC., and DOES 1 through 20,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-2420 CW

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant International Game Fish Association, Inc., (IGFA)

moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to

dismiss the first amended complaint (FAC) filed by Plaintiff Javad

Trew. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The matter was heard on

November 18, 2005. Having considered the papers filed by the

parties and oral argument on the motion, the Court grants

Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice to refiling in

State court. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's complaint and the attached exhibits allege the

following. On or about March 29, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a 2004

IGFA World Record Application (Application) for a world record in

largemouth bass two-pound tippet fly fishing. He also enclosed a
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1

 The dates on the four IGFA applications attached as

Plaintiff's exhibits 1 through 4 do not match the submission dates

alleged in the complaint. However, because the date of submission

is not in dispute, this discrepancy is irrelevant to the issues

discussed below. 

2

$50.00 check for IGFA membership and the Application processing

fee. On or about April 14, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a 2004

Application for a world record in largemouth bass four-pound tippet

fly fishing. He enclosed a $25.00 check for the Application

processing fee. On or about April 28, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a

2004 Application for a world record in largemouth bass twenty-pound

tippet fly fishing. He enclosed a $25.00 check for the Application

processing fee. On or about May 23, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a

2004 Application for a world record in largemouth bass two-pound

line class, rod and reel. He enclosed a $25.00 check for the

Application processing fee.1 Plaintiff fulfilled the requirements

of the 2004 Applications by signing the accompanying notarized

affidavit and submitting evidence such as photographs, samples of

his fishing lines and the signed testimony of witnesses to the

weighings of his award-sized catches.

Each above referenced Application bears the following

statements under a section marked "Affidavit": "I understand that

IGFA reserves the right to employ verification procedures. I agree

to be bound by any ruling of the IGFA relative to this

application." FAC Ex. 1-4. The following information appears at

the top of each Application: "Read all IGFA angling rules and world

record requirements before completing and signing this application

. . . . This application must be accompanied by line or tippet
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2 Plaintiff argues that Defendant's motion to dismiss should

be treated as a motion for summary judgment because Defendant

submitted material outside the pleadings. Defendant argues that

when a complaint quotes selectively from a document, the court may

consider the full text of the document without converting the

motion into one for summary judgment. A court may consider

documents "whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose

authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically

attached to the pleading." Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454

(9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds in Galbraith v. County

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the

complaint expressly refers to the 2004 World Record Requirements, 

Defendant's attachment of these requirements is not outside the

pleadings and, therefore, the Court will not treat Defendant's

motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion. 

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samples and photographs as specified in the World Record

Requirements." FAC Ex. 1-4. The 2004 IGFA "International Angling

Rules, Rules for Fishing in Fresh Water, and Rules for Fly Fishing"

(World Record Requirements) state that, 

1. Protested applications or disputed existing records will be

referred to the IGFA Executive Committee for review. Its

decision will be final. IGFA reserves the right to refuse to

consider an application or grant a claim for record

application. All IGFA decisions will be based upon the intent

of the regulations. . . .

3. In some instances, an IGFA officer or member of the

International Committee or a deputy from a local IGFA member

club may be asked to recheck information supplied on a claim. 

Such action is not to be regarded as doubt of the formal

affidavit, but rather as evidence of the extreme care with

which IGFA investigates and maintains its records.

Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A at 3.2

On or about January 18, 2005, IGFA representatives Ray Scott,

member of IGFA Board of Trustees, Robert Cramer, President of IGFA

and Jason Schratweiser, World Record Administrator of IGFA,

telephoned Plaintiff and requested that he take a polygraph test to

verify the information in his submitted Applications. Scott told

Plaintiff that Scott would use Plaintiff for endorsements and that
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Plaintiff's awards would be "worth a lot of money." Plaintiff

refused IGFA representatives' request to take a polygraph test. 

Defendant did not award Plaintiff any world records.

Plaintiff sues Defendant for breach of contract, alleging that

Defendant failed and neglected to perform the agreement by refusing

to award the world records to Plaintiff even though he complied

with all 2004 IGFA rules and requirements. He seeks general

damages according to proof and damages of loss of property, loss of

income and loss of profits, all according to proof. In addition,

Plaintiff alleges that there is an actual controversy between

Plaintiff and Defendant as to whether Plaintiff must undergo a

polygraph test to be awarded his world records. He seeks

declaratory relief for this bona fide dispute under Title 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), and 57. Finally,

Plaintiff demands judgment requiring Defendant to perform the

agreement and officially award Plaintiff the four world records,

retroactive to the dates of the Applications.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be

denied unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts which would entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957); Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of

S.F., 792 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986). All material

allegations in the complaint will be taken as true and construed in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the court is

generally confined to consideration of the allegations in the
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pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by attached documents,

such documents are deemed part of the complaint and may be

considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). 

A court may consider documents which are not expressly incorporated

into the complaint, but "upon which the plaintiff's complaint

necessarily relies." Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

 Dismissal of a complaint can be based on either the lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the lack of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). When granting a motion

to dismiss, a court is generally required to grant a plaintiff

leave to amend, even if no request to amend the pleading was made,

unless amendment would be futile. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.

Northern Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir.

1990). In determining whether amendment would be futile, a court

examines whether the complaint could be amended to cure the defect

requiring dismissal "without contradicting any of the allegations

of [the] original complaint." Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912

F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's contract claim fails because

the Application is not an agreement manifesting mutual assent. 

Defendant further argues that even if the Application is treated as

a contract, Defendant has properly complied with its terms. 

Plaintiff contends that the Applications are judicially enforceable
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contracts because they were written offers by Defendant, which

Plaintiff accepted, and the $25.00 Application fee was his

consideration for the contract. Pl.'s Opp'n at 12. As such,

Plaintiff equates Defendant's refusal to award him the world

records to a breach of contractual obligations. 

Whether parties have mutually assented to enter into a

contractual relationship is determined with reference to an

objective standard. Zurich General Accident & Liability Assurance

Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 132 Cal. App. 101, 103-

04 (1933). The outward manifestations or expressions of consent to

a contract are controlling; mutual assent is gathered from the

reasonable meanings of the words and acts of the parties, not their

unexpressed intentions or understandings. Mercer County Sheriff's

Employees' Assoc. v. County of Merced, 188 Cal. App. 3d 662, 670

(1987). 

The reasonable meaning of the language in the Applications and

in the 2004 World Record Requirements fails to establish that

Defendant agreed to award Plaintiff his world records upon 

submission of the Applications, the processing fees and supporting

evidence. Instead, this language merely states that Defendant

agrees to review the completed Applications to determine whether or

not a world record has been accomplished and to "employ

verification procedures" to ensure the accuracy of information

contained therein. This language is sufficient to undermine

Plaintiff's contention that the Applications are contracts

manifesting mutual assent to award Plaintiff the world records. 

Although Defendant's argument that "applications are not
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contracts," Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3, is over-broad, see, e.g.,

Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 396 N.E.2d

1225, 1233 (Ill. 1979)(finding that complaint properly alleged

contract between the parties which was formed in connection with

the application plaintiff had submitted to defendant), the

Applications at issue here do not constitute a contract because of

the absence of mutual assent. 

Even if the Applications are treated as contracts, Plaintiff

fails to state that Defendant has breached them. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant was contractually obliged to award him the world

records subject to the rules and requirements of the 2004

Application and the 2004 World Record Requirements. This is all

that Defendant promised and it delivered on its promise by

requesting a polygraph test to determine the authenticity of

Plaintiff's statements in the Applications before awarding the

world records. In doing so, Defendant complied with the directions

on the Application to verify world record claims using

"verification procedures." FAC Ex. 1-4. Plaintiff consented to

Defendant's use of verification procedures and the result thereof

when he agreed "to be bound by any ruling of the IGFA relative to

this application." FAC Ex. 1-4. Thus, based on the language in

the Application and the World Record Requirements, the FAC fails to

allege a cause of action for breach of contract. 

Plaintiff argues that the term "verification procedures" in

the Application is unenforceable because it is vague, ambiguous and

insufficiently definite. Under California law, when a contract "is

so uncertain and indefinite that the intention of the parties in
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material particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void

and unenforceable." Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Stone, 35 Cal. App.

3d 396, 407 (1973). To be enforceable, a contract must be definite

enough that a court can determine both the scope of the duties and

the limits of performance involved in the contract, such that it

has a rational basis for assessing damages. Id. The language of

the Application is unambiguous and expressly reserves Defendant's

right to employ verification procedures to test the truth of the

claims. Therefore, the phrase "verification procedures" is

enforceable.

Plaintiff further asserts that the overriding issue in this

case is whether Defendant could require him to take a polygraph to

verify the Applications. Nothing in the 2004 Application and the

2004 World Record Requirements limits the verification procedures

available to Defendant. Contrary to Plaintiff's claim, there is no

need for this Court to consider the "admissibility" of a polygraph

test because Plaintiff never took this test and such a test is not

being submitted as evidence.

Therefore, in the absence of a contract or the breach thereof,

Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief. For this reason, the

Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend. At

the November 18, 2005 hearing, the Court stated that if Plaintiff

chose to file an amended complaint, he must make allegations that

indicate that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction and that

if he claims jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, he

must allege facts indicating that he could be awarded more than
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3 District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil

actions "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value

of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . 

citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 

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$75,000 in damages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).3 See McNutt

v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)(party

invoking jurisdiction bears burden of establishing good faith

expectation of recovery of at least the jurisdictional amount). At

the hearing, the Court indicated that if Plaintiff chose to file an

amended complaint, he must do so within two weeks from the date of

the hearing. 

More than two weeks have passed since the date of the hearing

and Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint. Therefore, this

case is dismissed without prejudice to refiling in State court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's complaint (Docket no. 13) is GRANTED. The complaint is

dismissed without prejudice to refiling in State court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/13/05 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge