Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02233/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02233-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Derrick L. Span,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Pinal County Community College District,

Defendant.

No. CV-23-02233-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

At issue is Defendant Pinal County Community College District’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 30, MSJ), to which Plaintiff Derrick Span filed a Response 

(Doc. 34, Response) and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 36, Reply). Defendant supports its 

Motion with a Statement of Facts (Doc. 31, SOF), and Plaintiff supports his opposition to 

the Motion with a Controverting Statement of Facts (Doc. 35, CSOF). The Court finds this 

matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The parties dispute the law applicable to the facts of this case, but, with one 

exception noted below, the facts themselves are not in dispute. (See CSOF at 1.) On April 7, 

2022, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC) alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff began experiencing difficulties logging into the EEOC portal, 

which is the primary mechanism by which the EEOC communicates with its petitioners. 

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Plaintiff communicated extensively with EEOC personnel about his inability to access the 

portal. Throughout the majority of his interactions with the EEOC, Plaintiff used the email 

address “scholaradddsss@gmail.com.” Plaintiff eventually came to suspect that his email 

address was contributing to his technical difficulties accessing the portal, so on April 21, 

2023, he amended his log-in credentials with a new email address, 

“scholar1014637@gmail.com.” Plaintiff also informed the EEOC by telephone message 

of his new email address and specifically asked that the EEOC send any notices thereto. 

On June 20, 2023, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue by simultaneously posting it

on the portal and emailing it to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims to have not received either method 

of transmission because (1) he did not see the notice on the portal and (2) the EEOC sent 

the notice to his old email address, instead of his new email address as he had requested.

Regarding the first point, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was unable to access the portal until 

July 1. On that day, however, Plaintiff did access the portal but apparently failed to see the 

notice. It is unclear how Plaintiff overlooked the notice. Although Plaintiff insinuates 

obliquely that the notice was not “visible or available,” (see CSOF ¶ 13), there is no 

evidence supporting that indirect allegation. Regarding the second point, it is not clear to 

which email address the EEOC sent the notice because the EEOC redacted the recipient 

address in its document production, (see SOF Ex. D), but the evidence strongly suggests 

that the EEOC sent the notice to Plaintiff’s old email address. (See SOF Ex. F.)

Whatever the cause of Plaintiff’s ignorance of the notice, the evidence makes clear 

that Plaintiff was subjectively unaware of the notice until he was verbally informed of such 

on the phone on July 26, 2023. On this phone call, according to Plaintiff, he and his EEOC 

case manager determined that the notice had been sent to his old email address. (See

CSOF ¶ 15; CSOF Ex. 1, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff requested that the case manager forward the notice 

to his new email address, but the case manager responded that she could not do so and that 

Plaintiff would need to contact an official at the Department of Justice (DOJ) to receive 

the notice at his new email address. (See CSOF ¶ 15; CSOF Ex. 1, ¶ 14.)1 At no point has

1 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s entire conversation with his case manager, 

including her directing him to the DOJ, is inadmissible hearsay that cannot support 

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Plaintiff explained why he was unable to simply log into his old email and access the notice 

there. After contacting an official at the DOJ as instructed, Plaintiff received a second 

notice of his right to sue from the DOJ on July 28, 2023. (See SOF Exs. G, H.) Both the 

second notice and the DOJ email to which it was attached stated that the 90-day limitations 

period within which Plaintiff could file suit would begin to run upon Plaintiff’s receipt of 

the second notice. (See SOF Exs. G, H.) Plaintiff confirmed receipt of the second notice 

via email on the same day it was sent.

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 27, 2023, which was 129 days after the 

issuance of the first notice and 91 days after the issuance and undisputed receipt of the 

second notice. Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to commence this lawsuit one day prior, on 

October 26, which would have been 90 days after receipt of the second notice, but he 

inadvertently filed a complaint that “did not correspond” to this case. Thus, although 

Plaintiff filed a Summons and Civil Cover Sheet within 90 days of receiving the second 

notice, Plaintiff did not file his Complaint until the 91st day.

Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed 

to file his Complaint within the relevant limitations period. There is no dispute that 

Plaintiff’s Complaint was subject to a 90-day limitations period that began running upon 

his receipt of a notice of his right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). There is also no 

dispute that Plaintiff failed to meet this deadline. The parties’ disagreement concerns the 

Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment. (Reply at 7.) Defendant does not develop this 

argument. In particular, Defendant does not explain how Plaintiff’s description of his 

conversation with his case manager constitutes hearsay. Plaintiff submits that evidence not 

to establish the truth of anything his case manager asserted, but instead to establish the fact 

that he was directed to the DOJ regarding his request to receive the notice at his new email 

address. It makes no difference to Plaintiff’s argument whether his case manager was 

legally correct in so directing him. All that matters is that the conversation occurred. The 

Court therefore rejects Defendant’s evidentiary argument and will treat this fact as 

undisputed for purposes of resolving the instant Motion. See Alvarado v. Mine Serv., Ltd., 

626 F. App’x 66, 70 (5th Cir. 2015) (“To consider the EEOC investigator’s out-of-court 

statement in deciding which letter was the ‘correct’ one would be using the statement for 

the truth of the matter it asserts—that the July letter was, in the eyes of the EEOC, the valid 

one. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). But for purposes of the tolling analysis, what matters is not 

which EEOC letter is legally speaking the correct one, but the effect the EEOC’s statements 

had on how Alvarado and his attorney decided to proceed with the case. Considering a 

statement not for its truth but as an explanation of why the listener acted in a certain manner 

is a hornbook example of nonhearsay.”).

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nature of Plaintiff’s delay and the extent to which the doctrine of equitable tolling excuses 

his delay. Defendant also presents an alternative argument that, to the extent Plaintiff’s 

Complaint was timely, it should be narrowed to reflect only those issues encompassed by 

the charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate 

when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ only if it might affect the 

outcome of the case, and a dispute is ‘genuine’ only if a reasonable trier of fact could 

resolve the issue in the non-movant’s favor.” Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, 

LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986)). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.

Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011).

The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of 

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 232. 

When the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of proof, it “must either produce 

evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show 

that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry 

its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., 

210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party carries this initial burden of 

production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense. 

Id. at 1103. Summary judgment is appropriate against a party that “fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

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In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the 

non-moving party’s evidence, as long as it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary 

material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, the non-moving party may not merely rest 

on its pleadings; it must produce some significant probative evidence tending to contradict 

the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a material question of fact. Id. at 256–57

(holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly 

supported motion for summary judgment); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on 

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.” (citation omitted)).

III. Discussion

A. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff and Defendant dispute several components of the limitations analysis. First, 

the parties disagree whether Plaintiff ever received the first notice. Second, in the event 

that Plaintiff did receive the first notice, the parties contest whether the doctrine of 

equitable tolling applies to excuse the 38 days of tardiness that accrued between the first 

and second notices. Third, the parties debate whether the doctrine of equitable tolling 

operates to excuse the one-day delay caused by Plaintiff’s counsel’s clerical error in filing 

the Complaint. The Court examines each issue in turn.

1. Receipt

The 90-day deadline set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) is not a jurisdictional 

bar. Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, “this ninety-day 

period operates as a limitations period,” and it begins running when the EEOC’s notice 

arrives at the claimant’s “address of record.” Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 

495 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2007). The parties agree that the same rules governing notice 

by post apply to digital notice. Therefore, the digital receipt of an emailed notice and the 

digital placement of the notice on the EEOC’s portal both constitute receipt in the same 

manner as would traditional post. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Model T Casino Resort LLC, No. 

3:22-CV-00094-MMD-CSD, 2024 WL 1619362, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2024) (“Based 

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on common sense, the Court finds that the upload date and receipt date of a notice of the 

right to sue sent via the EEOC portal are necessarily the same.”); Long v. Amazon.com 

Servs. LLC, No. C23-209RSL, 2024 WL 1860168, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2024) 

(“When a plaintiff is notified of a Right to Sue Notice via an email directing them to the 

EEOC online portal, the plaintiff cannot postpone the beginning of the 90-day clock to file 

a civil suit simply by refusing or neglecting to access the portal.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

There are two potential avenues of receipt regarding the first notice: (1) the email 

sent to Plaintiff’s old address and (2) the digital posting of the notice on the EEOC portal.

Although the EEOC redacted the recipient address in its document production, thereby 

precluding definitive knowledge of the email address to which it sent the first notice, there 

is no genuine dispute as to where the notice was sent. Defendant asserts that the EEOC sent 

the first notice to Plaintiff’s old email, (Reply at 4), and Plaintiff himself states repeatedly 

that the notice was sent to his old email address. (See CSOF ¶ 15; CSOF Ex. 1, ¶ 14; SOF 

Ex. F.) Moreover, Plaintiff can presumably still access his old email address and therefore

could confirm or disprove whether the EEOC sent the first notice thereto. The fact that he 

has neither done so nor explained why he is unable to do so renders any question as to the 

destination of the EEOC’s email inauthentic. But the mere fact that the EEOC directed the 

first notice to Plaintiff’s old email address does not end the analysis. The limitations period 

begins running on “the date on which a right-to-sue notice letter arrived at the claimant’s 

address of record.” Payan, 495 F.3d at 1122 (emphasis added). Prior to the issuance of the 

first notice, Plaintiff lodged a request with the EEOC that the commission send the notice 

to his new email address. Neither party addresses whether Plaintiff’s request served to 

formally amend his address of record. Thus, although Defendant has established the fact 

that the first notice was received by Plaintiff’s old email, it remains unclear whether that 

receipt triggered the 90-day limitations period. The Court must therefore consider whether 

the digital posting of the notice to the EEOC’s portal independently commenced the 

limitations period.

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As noted above, “the upload date and receipt date of a notice of the right to sue sent 

via the EEOC portal are necessarily the same.” Holcomb, 2024 WL 1619362, at *2. There 

is no genuine question that the EEOC uploaded the notice to the portal on June 20, 2023. 

(See SOF Ex. E.) However, it is undisputed that longstanding technical difficulties 

prevented Plaintiff from accessing the portal. Plaintiff claims, and Defendant does not 

dispute, that he was unable to access the portal until July 1. In a recent order, the District 

of Hawaii grappled at great length with the question of whether technical difficulties defeat 

the presumption that a claimant receives a notice letter on the day that the letter lands in 

his email and/or the EEOC portal. Asuncion v. Austin, No. CV 23-00119 LEK-KJM, 2023 

WL 5983760, at *4–7 (D. Haw. Sept. 14, 2023). The facts of Asuncion and the cases cited 

therein are distinguishable from those of the instant case, but the analysis is still instructive. 

The court held in relevant part that:

Asuncion does not contest that [a certain date] is when he received notice.

Rather, he states that he was unable to access the file. But, like in Lax and 

McDonald, the ninety-day filing window started when Asuncion received the 

email, not when he was able to access the document. See Lax v. Mayorkas, 

20 F.4th 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 2021); McDonald v. Saint Louis Univ., No. 

4:22-CV-01121-SRC, 2023 WL 4262539, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2023). 

The issue of when Asuncion opened the document is not relevant to the start 

of the filing window, but instead goes to whether equitable tolling is 

applicable. See McDonald, 2023 WL 4262539, at *5 (“But while her 

counsel’s inability to access the portal may be relevant to the application of 

equitable tolling, it does not delay the start of the ninety-day filing window.” 

(citing Lax, 20 F.4th at 1182–83)).

Asuncion, 2023 WL 5983760, at *7. The Court agrees with its sister district that, 

irrespective of Plaintiff’s uncontested inability to access the notice letter on the EEOC 

portal until July 1, the law deems that he received the notice on the date that it was 

uploaded. Therefore, as in Asuncion, the Court will consider the technological impediments 

suffered by Plaintiff within the framework of the equitable tolling analysis, not the receipt 

analysis.

. . . 

. . . 

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2. Equitable Tolling: First Iteration

At the outset, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant waived its 

counter-argumentation regarding the doctrine of equitable tolling. (See Response at 8.) 

Defendant was under no duty to develop a counter-argument in its MSJ prior to Plaintiff’s 

having made the primary argument in his Response. The proposition urged by Plaintiff 

would render reply briefing superfluous.

“The ninety-day period within which to file a civil action after dismissal of the 

charge by the EEOC is a statute of limitations subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling.” 

Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1997). “In employment 

discrimination cases, our circuit has adopted a broader application of equitable tolling, 

consistent with the remedial purposes of the Title VII statutory scheme.” Veronda v. Cal.

Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 11 F. App’x 731, 734 (9th Cir. 2001). “Equitable tolling in 

an employment discrimination case focuses on whether there is excusable delay by the 

plaintiff and does not depend on any wrongful conduct by the defendant.” Id. at 735.

The parties dispute whether the second notice equitably tolled the limitations period 

established in the first notice. That issue, if resolved in the affirmative, moots the 

preliminary issue identified in the preceding section, namely whether Plaintiff’s technical 

difficulties in accessing the portal constitute an independent source of equitable tolling. For 

the reasons explained below, the Court holds that the second notice equitably tolled the 

first notice in its entirety. Therefore, the Court need not address the now-moot issue of 

whether Plaintiff’s technical difficulties also merit application of equitable tolling.

2

2 Moreover, even if the Court were to equitably toll the limitations period in light of 

Plaintiff’s technical difficulties, such tolling would only extend to July 1, not July 28 as 

Plaintiff urges. Plaintiff accessed the portal on July 1, at which time the notice had already 

been uploaded. The law is clear that a claimant receives a notice upon the notice being 

made available to him, “regardless of whether the claimant personally saw the right-to-sue 

letter.” Payan, 495 F.3d at 1122. Plaintiff has adduced no evidence that the notice was 

unavailable to him when he accessed the portal on July 1. Plaintiff claims not to have seen 

the notice, and he submits argumentation seeking to establish his honesty in making that 

claim, (see Response at 11), but Plaintiff’s honestly is neither in question nor relevant. 

Defendant has presented evidence indicating that the notice was present on the portal on 

July 1, and there is no controverting evidence regarding that fact. The issue of the first 

notice’s precise date of receipt is academic, however, as the second notice effectively 

displaced it.

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In Nelmida, the Ninth Circuit declined to equitably toll the limitations period where 

a plaintiff failed to bring suit within 90 days of receiving a notice letter but succeeded in 

bringing suit within 90 days of receiving a “copy” of the notice. 112 F.3d 380, at 382, 385. 

Here, Plaintiff did not receive a mere copy of the original notice, but instead received a 

new notice with a new date that specifically confirmed in more than one location that the 

limitations period would not begin running until his receipt of the new notice. This case is 

therefore distinguishable from Nelmida. It is more similar to Bernstein v. Maximus Fed. 

Servs., Inc., 63 F.4th 967 (5th Cir. 2023), in which the Fifth Circuit applied the 

well-recognized proposition that “one such situation in which equitable tolling may be 

warranted is when the EEOC misleads the plaintiff about the nature of his rights.” 63 F.4th 

at 970 (cleaned up) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court held that “a

‘two-letter situation’ like Bernstein’s in which the EEOC advises a claimant in a later letter 

of an incorrect filing deadline is one where the EEOC has affirmatively misled the plaintiff 

about the nature of his rights.” Id. “Though the initial notice sent to Bernstein’s attorney 

was adequate to initiate the filing period, the subsequent correspondence misled Bernstein 

about a material aspect of the time he had to file, namely when the clock began to run.” Id.

The present case is materially similar to Bernstein, and the Court finds the reasoning of 

that case persuasive.3

All three of Defendant’s attempts to distinguish Bernstein ring hollow. First, 

Defendant notes that Bernstein originates from the Fifth Circuit. (Reply at 8.) Unless 

Defendant can identify a contrary case from this Circuit, the mere fact that a cogent opinion 

3 Bernstein is consistent with caselaw from the Second Circuit, which has held that 

“[g]enerally courts do not penalize litigants for EEOC’s mistakes and misinformation.” See

Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 248 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Johnson v. Al 

Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the explanation 

“that an EEOC official had erroneously advised him that the complaint could be filed late” 

“has been recognized as justification for equitable tolling of the 90-day rule”). However, 

Bernstein may conflict with caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit holding that the 

“reissu[ance]” of a notice does not equitably toll the limitations period where the reissuance 

addresses mere technical defects. See Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 232 F.3d 823, 825

(11th Cir. 2000). Bernstein is both more recent and more thoroughly reasoned than Santini. 

Therefore, to the extent that Santini might be germane here, which is not evident from the 

face of the rather short opinion, the Court would nevertheless apply Bernstein. Moreover, 

Defendant did not cite Santini or any other similar case. Defendant has therefore waived 

this argument.

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originates from a sister circuit hardly constitutes a reason not to apply it. And Bernstein is 

not contrary to the law in this Circuit. For instance, in Asuncion the District of Hawaii 

declined to equitably toll the limitations period because, unlike in the instant case, an

EEOC employee informed the claimant’s attorney “that she would not issue a second 

certificate of service.” 2023 WL 5983760, at *8. The obvious implication of that holding 

is that where the EEOC does issue a second notice expressly altering the limitations period, 

equitable tolling is appropriate.

Second, Defendant states that the second notice “was sent by the DOJ, not the 

EEOC.” (Reply at 8.) The Court fails to see the significance of this fact. Both notices were 

sent by the same official, and both notices contained letterhead indicating that they 

originated from the DOJ. (SOF Exs. C, D, G, H.)

Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling because, by 

not retrieving the notice from his old email upon his learning of its presence there on 

July 26, he failed to vigorously pursue his claim. Vigorous pursuit of one’s claim is indeed 

a prerequisite to application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Bernstein, 63 F.4th at 970. 

As noted above, Plaintiff has not explained why he did not simply retrieve the original 

notice from his old email upon being informed on July 26 that it was in his inbox. That 

question of fact notwithstanding, the Court disagrees that Plaintiff failed to vigorously 

pursue his claim. Plaintiff emailed an official at the DOJ requesting a right-to-sue notice 

letter, as expressly instructed by his EEOC case manager, on the same day that he spoke 

with the case manager and learned of the original notice’s issuance. This course of conduct, 

although perhaps not the most efficacious, certainly satisfies the requirement of vigor. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that the second notice, which explicitly created a new 

limitations period that displaced that of the first notice, equitably tolled the original 90-day 

filing deadline.

3. Equitable Tolling: Second Iteration

As explained above, the 90-day limitations period began to run upon receipt of the 

second notice. After erroneously filing an incorrect complaint, Plaintiff initiated this 

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lawsuit 91 days after receipt of the second notice. Although Plaintiff directs the Court’s 

attention to the accurate summons and civil cover sheet that Defendant received within the 

90-day limitations period, (Response at 7–8), Plaintiff does not appear to seriously contest 

the proposition that it is the filing of a complaint that initiates a lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”). Instead, Plaintiff 

argues that his one-day delay should be excused by a second application of the doctrine of 

equitable tolling. Defendant asserts otherwise. Both parties address this issue in a highly 

generalized manner. Plaintiff merely quotes rule statements from caselaw recognizing that 

equitable tolling is available to a complainant who has “actively pursued his judicial 

remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period.” See O’Donnell v. 

Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006); (Response at 13–14). Defendant’s 

counterargument is similarly nonspecific, consisting of little more than the proposition that 

equitable tolling ought to be applied “sparingly” in a manner that excludes “garden variety 

claim[s] of excusable neglect.” See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); 

(Reply at 6–9). Neither party identifies any caselaw in which a court considers facts 

analogous to those presented here.

Although many cases courts have analyzed scenarios in which complainants have

filed complaints in incorrect fora, see e.g., Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 

(1965), the Court is unaware of any cases in which a complainant has timely filed an 

incorrect complaint in the correct forum, as occurred here. As between the parties’ 

competing rule statements, the Court finds Plaintiff’s more compelling. Although the filing 

error committed by Plaintiff’s counsel could be described as “garden-variety” by virtue of 

its simplicity, it would also seem to be a quintessential “defective pleading” subject to 

equitable tolling. The Court concludes such circumstance—a promptly corrected filing 

defect by which Plaintiff filed a correct summons and civil cover sheet but an incorrect 

PDF of a complaint—is amenable to equitable tolling. This holding is consistent with 

similar, albeit factually distinct, caselaw from this Circuit. For instance, the Northern 

District of California has held that equitable tolling was available to a pro se complainant 

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who filed two different “defective pleading[s]” in the form of complaints that were 

administratively rejected for failing to include accurate civil cover sheets. Cheyssial v. 

McCarthy, No. 20-CV-03214-WHO, 2021 WL 3487121, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2021). 

Although Plaintiff here is not pro se, “[t]he fact that a complainant is represented, though, 

does not automatically bar the application of equitable tolling.” Granger v. Aaron's, Inc., 

636 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2011). In the absence of any compelling caselaw to the 

contrary, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s one-day filing delay is equitably tolled based on 

the unique facts of this case. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint was timely, and Defendant is not 

entitled to summary judgment.

B. Narrowing of the Complaint

Defendant argues in the alternative that “even if this Court concludes that Plaintiff’s 

claims were timely filed, it should limit them to those issues that he raised in his Charge of 

Discrimination.” (MSJ at 6.) “Under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust [his] administrative 

remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC, or the appropriate state agency, thereby 

affording the agency an opportunity to investigate the charge.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police 

Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002). The scope of a Title VII claim “depends upon 

the scope of both the EEOC charge and the EEOC investigation.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 

F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff may bring suit upon claims related to both 

(1) the actual investigation conducted by the EEOC and (2) any “EEOC investigation 

which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id.

(emphasis in original) (quoting Green v. L.A. Cnty. Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 

1476 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts three claims, two of which allege a racially hostile 

work environment and one of which alleges retaliation for submitting an internal complaint 

related to alleged workplace racial discrimination. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 31–48.) In 

support of these claims, particularly the claims pertaining to an allegedly hostile work 

environment, the Complaint avers facts depicting a course of racially discriminatory 

conduct extending back to 2011. (Complaint ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that the workplace 

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environment created by Defendant suffers from pervasive racism and that he has attempted 

to raise this issue to Defendant on numerous occasions, never to any avail. 

(Complaint ¶¶ 21–25.) Rather than remedy its endemic workplace racism, Defendant has 

repeatedly penalized Plaintiff for his attempts at effecting change. (Complaint ¶¶ 21–25.) 

Although Plaintiff’s Complaint describes a wide variety of allegedly discriminatory 

conduct spanning over a decade, his charge of discrimination focuses upon one particular 

occurrence of racial hostility occurring in 2021–2022. In his filing with the EEOC, Plaintiff 

alleged a pattern of racially discriminatory conduct related to a “secret” investigation 

intended to discredit Plaintiff as retaliation for his filing a prior internal complaint of 

discrimination regarding derogatory use of the phrase “brown division.” (SOF Ex. B.)

Plaintiff claims that he reported derogatory use of the term “brown division” to Defendant 

on several occasions. (SOF Ex. B.) Defendant has not taken Plaintiff’s internal complaints 

seriously. (SOF Ex. B.) Additionally, Defendant has deprived Plaintiff of interactions with 

his supervisors, has excluded him from committees, and has prevented him from reporting

other instances of racially discriminatory behavior. (SOF Ex. B.) The “brown division” 

allegations are also present in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Complaint ¶ 23.) Defendant requests 

that the Court excise from the Complaint all factual allegations except those relating to the 

“brown division” assertions contained in the charge of discrimination. (MSJ at 6.) 

Defendant does not seek to limit Plaintiff’s claims. Instead, Defendant requests that the 

Court limit the “allegations” and factual “issues” that Plaintiff may use to support his 

claims. (MSJ at 5–6; Reply at 9.) The Court finds that such excision is not appropriate here.

The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint pertaining to instances of racial hostility are 

sufficiently related to the allegations of racial hostility in his EEOC filing that the latter 

constitutes administrative exhaustion regarding the former. Neither party has submitted 

any evidence regarding what the EEOC’s actual investigation encompassed, and both 

parties seek to place on the other party the burden of production and the concomitant failure 

to produce. (Response at 15; Reply at 10.) The dearth of evidence is inconsequential, 

however, because the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint fall within the scope of an EEOC 

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investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of his charge of discrimination. 

It is self-evident that a reasonable EEOC investigation into a charge asserting race 

discrimination might encompass related acts of race discrimination that occurred in the 

recent past and that involved the same parties. See Fox v. MHM Health Pros. LLC, No. 

CV-23-00190-PHX-DWL, 2024 WL 4364133, at *16 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2024) (“The 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted an expansive policy that allows for a finding 

of exhaustion as to all allegations of discrimination that either fell within the scope of the 

EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected 

to grow out of the charge of discrimination . . . . The inquiry is broad in scope and requires 

a determination of: (1) whether the agency actually did investigate the type of claim that is 

deficient on the face of the charge of discrimination; or (2) whether the agency should have 

investigated the type of claim that is deficient in the charge of discrimination.” (quoting 

Vasquez v. Kiewit Infrastructure W., Co., No. CV 19-00513 HG-WRP, 2020 WL 2842671, 

at *5 (D. Haw. June 1, 2020)).

Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination does not use technical legal terms such as 

“retaliation” or “hostile work environment,” but the course of conduct described therein 

clearly depicts a racially hostile work environment. Although the charge of discrimination 

alleges discrete acts of retaliation, it also alleges a broader pattern of racial hostility. For 

instance, Plaintiff asserted in his EEOC filing that “I have no direct supervisor to report 

any continued acts of racial behaviors.” (SOF Ex. B.) To be sure, the allegations in the 

Complaint are more temporally expansive than those contained in the charge of 

discrimination, but the Court finds that any reasonable investigation of Plaintiff’s EEOC 

filing would tend to include within its scope similar past instances of racist behavior, 

including those which Plaintiff describes in his Complaint. Plaintiff’s charge of 

discrimination depicts what is, in essence, a racially hostile work environment. Claims of

hostile work environments naturally encompass a course of conduct beyond mere discrete 

acts. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). “Their very nature 

involves repeated conduct.” Id. It would therefore be inappropriate for the Court to 

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artificially constrain this lawsuit to only those exact facts alleged in the charge of 

discrimination.

Defendant has not argued that any facts or claims pled in the Complaint fall outside 

of any relevant limitations period regarding the time within which to file an EEOC charge. 

Defendant’s argument is focused solely on whether the “issues” described in the Complaint 

bear a substantive relation to the facts alleged in the charge of discrimination such that 

Plaintiff may be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court 

concludes that they do.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 30).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED lifting the stay of discovery imposed by the Court’s 

prior Order (Doc. 39).

Dated this 12th day of December, 2024.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

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