Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-92-05271/USCOURTS-caDC-92-05271-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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*Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d). 

**American Library Ass'n, Freedom to Read Foundation, American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.,

American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, The American Society of Magazine

Photographers, Council for Periodical Distributors Ass'ns, Inc., International Periodical

Distributors Ass'n, Inc., National Ass'n of Artists' Organizations, National Campaign for Freedom

of Expression, IVR Management Co., Inc., d/b/a The Independent Video Retailers Ass'n,

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 9, 1993 Decided September 20, 1994

No. 92-5271

AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(D.D.C. No. 91cv00394)

Jacob M. Lewis, Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, with whomEric H. Holder, Jr., United States

Attorney, and Barbara L. Herwig, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, were on the briefs, for

appellants. Vincent M. Garvey and Thomas H. Peebles, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice,

entered appearances for appellants.

David W. Ogden, with whom Bruce J. Ennis, Ann M. Kappler, and Maureen F. Del Duca were on

the brief, for appellees.

Len L. Munsil was on the brief for amici curiae National Family Legal Foundation. Marjorie Heins,

Arthur B. Spitzer, John I. Stewart, Jr., and William D. Wallace were on the brief for amici curiae

American Civil Liberties Union, et al.

Before BUCKLEY and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and JOHN W. REYNOLDS,

* District Judge for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

Dissenting opinion filed by District Judge REYNOLDS.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: The district court has sustained appellees'** First Amendment

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Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., Hank Londoner Photography, Inc., Haaren Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Suze

Randall Photography. 

challenge to the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, as amended, and its

implementing regulations. These require producers of materials depicting sexually explicit acts to

maintain certain records documenting the names and ages of the persons portrayed and to attach

statementsto the materialsindicating where the records are located. Because we find the challenged

provisions to be content neutral and because, in most applications, they meet the intermediate level

of scrutiny established by the Supreme Court in such cases, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Framework

1. The statute

The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102

Stat. 4181, 4485-4503 (1988) ("1988 Act" or "Act"), as amended bytheChild ProtectionRestoration

and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4816-17 (1990)

("1990 amendments"), imposes record-keeping and disclosure requirements on the producers of

certain sexually explicit materials. This legislation represents the most recent of a series of laws,

beginning with the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-

225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) ("1977 Act"), that are designed to combat the sexual exploitation of children.

Among the offenses made criminal by the 1977 Act, as amended, are the production and knowing

distribution of materials visually depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2251(a), 2252(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).

The 1988 Act was passed by Congress on the recommendation of the Attorney General's

Commission on Pornography in order to address a problemthat had hindered the prosecution of child

pornography offenses. See American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

("ALA I"). In particular, the Commission found that because producers tended to use performers who

could pass for minors, distributors were able to avoid prosecution on a claim of ignorance of a child

performer's true age while producers could assert that they had been deceived. Id. In order to

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address this problem, the 1988 Act required producers (as defined) of materials containing visual

depictions of explicit sexual activity to determine the names and ages of the performers, maintain

records of this information, and indicate on each copy of the material where those records are kept.

18 U.S.C. § 2257 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Soon thereafter, several parties challenged the

constitutionality of these provisions. The district court ruled, inter alia, that significant parts of

section 2257 violated the First Amendment. American Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp.

469, 479 (D.D.C. 1989). Following the filing of an appeal, Congress responded by adopting the 1990

amendments, which "significantly altered" the "scope and burden" of the section's original

record-keeping requirements. ALA I, 956 F.2d at 1186. Accordingly, we "vacate[d] the portion of

the [district] court's judgment concerning the 1988 Act's recordkeeping provisions" as moot. Id. at

1187.

The Act provides that

[w]hoever produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other matter

which contains one or more visual depictions made after November 1, 1990 of actual

sexually explicit conduct ... shall create and maintain individually identifiable records

pertaining to every performer portrayed in such a visual depiction.

18 U.S.C. § 2257(a). It defines "actual sexually explicit conduct" as "actual but not simulated

conduct" involving (by reference to subsections 2256(2)(A)-(D)) sexual intercourse, bestiality,

masturbation, and sadistic or masochistic abuse. Id. § 2257(h)(1) (Supp. II 1990). Producers of

materials covered by the Act must, for every performer,

(1) ascertain, by examination of an identification document containing such

information, the performer's name and date of birth, and require the performer to

provide such other indicia of his or her identity as may be prescribed by regulations;

(2) ascertain any name, other than the performer's present and correct name, ever

used by the performer including maiden name, alias, nickname, stage, or professional

name; and

(3) record in the records required by subsection (a) the information required by

paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection and such other identifying information as

may be prescribed by regulation.

Id. § 2257(b). Such records generally must be kept at the producer's place of business. Id. §

2257(c). Moreover, "a statement describing where the records ... may be located" must be affixed

to the materials covered by the Act ("disclosure requirement"). Id. § 2257(e)(1). If the producer is

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an "organization," thisstatement must include "the name, title, and business address of the individual

employed by such organization responsible for maintaining the records...." Id. § 2257(e)(2).

2. The regulations

The AttorneyGeneral issued regulationsimplementing thisstatutory framework on April 24,

1992. See 57 Fed. Reg. 15017, 15021 (1992) ("Final Rule"). These divide producers into two

categories, "primary" and "secondary." 28 C.F.R. § 75.1(c) (1993). A primary producer is one who

"actually films, videotapes, or photographs a visual depiction of actualsexually explicit conduct," id.

§ 75.1(c)(1), while a secondary producer "produces, assembles, manufactures, publishes, duplicates,

reproduces, or reissues" materials containing such depictions that are "intended for commercial

distribution." Id. § 75.1(c)(2). The same person, of course, may be both a primary and a secondary

producer. Id. § 75.1(c)(3).

The regulationsrequire that all producers maintain recordsthat contain "[t]he legal name and

date of birth of each performer, obtained by the producer's examination of an identification

document...." Id. § 75.2(a)(1). Those records must include a "legible copy of the identification

document examined," id., as well as "[a]ny name, other than each performer's legal name, ever used

bythe performer, including the performer'smaidenname, alias, nickname,stage name, or professional

name." Id. § 75.2(a)(2). Moreover, these records must be so organized as to permit the retrieval of

information based on the legal and alternative names of the performers and "according to the title,

number, or other similar identifier of each book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other

matter." Id. § 75.3. A secondary producer, however, is permitted to "maintain records by accepting

from the primary producer ... copies of the records" aslong as he keeps the "name and address of the

primary producer." Id. § 75.2(b). Both classes of producers must make these records available "for

inspection at all reasonable times," id. § 75.5, at their places of business for "as long as the producer

remains in business" and "five years thereafter." Id. § 75.4.

Finally, the regulations addressthe disclosure requirement. They stipulate that the statements

that are to be affixed to materials containing depictions of actual sexually explicit conduct must

contain the "title," "identifying number or similar identifier" of the work, the "date of production,

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manufacture, publication, duplication, reproduction, or reissuance of the matter," and "[a] street

address at which the records ... may be made available." 28 C.F.R. § 75.6(a). Organizations must

also include in the statement "the name, title, and business address of the individual ... responsible for

maintaining the records...." Id. § 75.6(b). The statements are to be "prominently displayed" in or on

the materials, id. § 75.8, and "must be accurate as of the date on which the [material] is sold,

distributed, redistributed, or rereleased." Id. § 75.6(c).

Information obtained from the recordsthat producers are required to create or maintain may

not, "directly or indirectly, be used as evidence against any person with respect to any violation of

law" other than "in a prosecution or other action for a violation of [section 2257] or ... any applicable

provision of the law with respect to the furnishing of false information." 18 U.S.C. § 2257(d)(1) &

(2). A producer is subject to prosecution under section 2257 for, among other things, the failure to

create or maintain the required records and the knowing sale or "transfer, or offer forsale or transfer"

of materials depicting actual sexually explicit conduct that do not contain the requisite statement

disclosing the location of the records. Id. § 2257(f). Such violations are felonies: The maximum

punishment for a first-time offender is two years of imprisonment and a fine; repeat offenders are

subject to two to five years of imprisonment and a fine. Id. § 2257(i).

B. Procedural History

Appelleesinclude trade associations and corporationsthat are engaged in, or whose members

are engaged in, the "produc[tion] and distribut[ion of] visualimages containing actualsexual conduct

of adults." American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 416 n.4 (D.D.C. 1992) ("ALA II")

(emphasisin original). In presenting their case to the district court, they argued that, notwithstanding

the 1990 amendments, the Act's record-keeping and disclosure requirements continue to place an

unconstitutional burden on lawful speech and therefore violate the First Amendment. The district

court agreed, finding that the requirements were not "narrowly tailored to achieve a significant

legislative goal." Id. at 418. The court explained that

the Act's primary flaw is that it applies to all depictions of actual sexually explicit

conduct regardless of the age or even the apparent age of the model. Thus, the Act

sweeps equally under its scope visual depictions of people who are sixteen,

twenty-five, forty and sixty years old. While the government has every right to

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regulateor even bansuch depictions of underaged persons, it does not even bear

a rationalrelationship to its goal to regulate equally allsexually explicit art regardless

of the model's age, even when that age is known.

Id. at 417. The court also concluded that the Act's "severe" penalties and "extremely burdensome"

record-keeping requirementswould impose "substantial burdens" that would "stifle much of Plaintiff's

[sic] protected expression." Id. at 418. Accordingly, the court "enjoin[ed] enforcement of [the] Act

as it applies to records that must be kept pertaining to images of adult models," and ruled that the

"Act may not be applied to [appellees] and other producers ofsuch images who use due diligence to

satisfy themselves that the subjects in these images are over 18 years of age." Id. at 419. It found

the Act constitutional, however, "as applied to images of models under 18 years of age." Id.

II. DISCUSSION

We dismiss at the outset the Government's claim that appellees have brought a

pre-enforcement facial challenge to the Act and must therefore establish that the statute is

"unconstitutional in every conceivable application" or that it is "substantially overbroad," citing City

Council v. Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984), and NewYork v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,

771 (1982). Appellees respond that theirs is not a facial challenge; they assert that the Act is

unconstitutional asit appliesto them. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (noting

that litigants bring a facial challenge where they attack "a statute not because their own rights of free

expression are violated, but because ... the statute's very existence may cause others not before the

court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech"). To be sure, the Act has never been

enforced. It nonetheless imposes present-day burdens on several of the appellees as the producers

ofsexuallyexplicit materials. Should we credit their challenge, appellees presently are suffering injury

in violation of the First Amendment. As the district court noted, "[n]o jury conviction or

prosecutorial discretion can relieve them of the immediate burdens which compliance will bring."

ALA II, 794 F. Supp. at 416 n.4.

A. Standard of Review

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom

ofspeech." U.S. Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court has ruled that the production and distribution

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of pictures of adults engaged in sexual acts is protected by the First Amendment so long as they are

not obscene. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.

Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 79 (1989) (noting existence of "line between protected pornographic speech

and obscenity"). Under the Act and its implementing regulations, Congress has imposed certain

burdens on persons who produce such materials for commercial distribution in interstate or foreign

commerce. The question is whether these burdens unconstitutionally restrict the producers' protected

speech.

To answer that question, we must first determine the level ofscrutiny that is applicable to the

Act's record-keeping and disclosure requirements. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114

S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994) ("because not every interference with speech triggers the same degree of

scrutiny under the First Amendment, we must decide at the outset the level of scrutiny applicable").

"[T]he appropriate level of scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distinguishes between

prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of content." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481

(1988). If it does, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny. Id. "Content-based regulations are

presumptively invalid," R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992), and survive

constitutional review only if they promote a "compelling interest" and employ "the least restrictive

means to further the articulated interest." Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492

U.S. 115, 126 (1989).

In contrast, "regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an

intermediate level ofscrutiny because in most casestheypose a lesssubstantialrisk of excising certain

ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2445 (citation

omitted). Thus "content-neutral regulations that have an incidental effect on First Amendment rights

will be upheld ifthey further an important orsubstantial governmental interest." Walsh v. Brady, 927

F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is

content-based or content-neutral is not always a simple task." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at

2445. In order to determine whether a statute is content neutral,

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[t]he principal inquiry ..., in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases

in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because

of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the

controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content

of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers

or messages but not others. Government regulation of expressive activity is content

neutral so long as it is "justified without reference to the content of the regulated

speech."

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting, with emphasis, Virginia

Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (citations

omitted)). In the term just completed, the Supreme Court twice reemphasized the key role of the

Government's purpose in determining whether a particularstatute is content based or content neutral.

See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523 (1994) ("We thus look to the

government's purpose as the threshold consideration"); Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2461

("Congress' overriding objective in enacting [statute] was not to favor programming of a particular

subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve accessto free television programming for

the 40 percent of Americans without cable.")

Two cases are directly relevant to our inquiry. The first is United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.

367 (1968), where the Court upheld a law that prohibited the destruction of Selective Service

registration certificatesdraft cards. O'Brien noted that

[t]his Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in

the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in

regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First

Amendment freedoms.

Id. at 376 (emphasis added). In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the

Court used analogous reasoning to conclude that a zoning ordinance barring "adult" (but not

mainstream) movie theatresfrom locating within 1,000 feet of any residence, church, park, or school

was a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation. While acknowledging that "the

ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters," the

Court concluded that it was "aimed not at the content of the films shown at "adult motion picture

theatres,' but rather at the secondary effects ofsuch theaters on the surrounding community." Id. at

47 (emphasis in original). The Court later explained its decision in Renton in this manner:

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So long as the justifications for regulation have nothing to do with content, i.e., the

desire to suppress crime has nothing to do with the actual films being shown inside

adult movie theaters, we concluded that the regulation was properly analyzed as

content neutral.

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988). In both O'Brien and Renton, the Court applied an

intermediate level of scrutiny. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.

There can be no question but that Congress's sole purpose in adopting section 2257 was to

address what the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography found to be an important

deficiency in the existing child protection laws:

Despite the umbrella protection provided bytheChild ProtectionAct of 1984,

loopholes remain that permit the continued exploitation of children. For example,

experts and law enforcement officers have found it difficult to extend this protection

because in many instances, ascertaining the real ages of adolescent performers is

impossible. By viewing a visual depiction, how does one decide if the performer is

fourteen or eighteen, seventeen or twenty-one?

1 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, FinalReport at 620 (1986) ("FinalReport"). To

address this problem, the Commission urged adoption of the record-keeping requirements that

Congress incorporated in section 2257:

The recommended legislationwould require producersto obtain release forms

from each performer with proof of age. The forms would be filed at a specified

location listed in the opening or closing footage of a film, the inside cover of the

magazine or standard locations in or on other material containing visual depictions.

The name, official title and location of the responsible person or corporate

agent supervising such records would also be listed to avoid use of corporate shields.

The release forms should be available for inspection by any duly authorized law

enforcement officer upon demand as a regulatory function for the limited purposes of

determining consent and proof of age....

Aproducershould be required to maintainthese recordsfor a minimumperiod

of five years.... This legislation would not only protect minors from abuse, but it

would also place the burden of ensuring this protection wasimplemented squarely on

the producers of the materials. The proposed legislation would serve a record

keeping purpose comparable to that found in environmental and similar statutes.

Id. at 621-22 (footnotes omitted). The Commission also recommended that "[t]he recordkeeping

obligation ... be imposed on wholesalers, retailers, distributors, producers and any one [sic] engaged

in the sale or trade of sexually explicit material" in order to "afford protection to minors through

every level of the pornography industry." Id. at 619.

From the above, we conclude that the congressional purposes in enacting the challenged

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provisions are threefold: (a) to prevent the exploitation of children by requiring those responsible for

photographing or videotaping sexually explicit acts (those defined in the regulations as "primary

producers") to secure proof of the performer's age and to keep a record of the same as evidence of

their compliance, (b) to deprive child pornographers of access to commercial markets by requiring

secondary producersto inspect (and keep a record of) the primary producers' proof that the persons

depicted were adults at the time they were photographed or videotaped, and (c) to establish a system

by which a law enforcement officer in possession of materials containing depictions of sexually

explicit acts will be able to identify the performers and verify compliance with the Act.

Appellees argue, nevertheless, that whatever the purposes of the recordkeeping and disclosure

requirements, the Act must be deemed content based, and therefore subject to the strict scrutiny

standard, because itsrequirements are triggered by speech of a particular content. Cases like Renton

make clear, however, that a "valid basisfor according differential treatment to even a content-defined

subclass of proscribable speech [exists when] the subclass happens to be associated with particular

"secondary effects' ofthe speech...." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546. Our analysis here thus focuses upon

whether the Act is "justified without reference to the content of the ... speech." Id. (quoting Renton,

475 U.S. at 48; emphasis in original). Here, it is clear that Congress enacted the Act not to regulate

the content of sexually explicit materials, but to protect children by deterring the production and

distribution of child pornography.

That conclusion is reinforced by "[t]he design and operation of the challenged provisions."

Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2461. Section 2257 does not ban any kind of sexually explicit

materials; rather, it imposes certain requirements on those who produce them. In this respect, the

Act is comparable to the zoning ordinance at issue in Renton, which the Court found to be content

neutral. That ordinance "[did] not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely provide[d] that such

theaters may not be located within [certain areas]." 475 U.S. at 46. The Court found that the

ordinance "by itsterms[was] designed to prevent crime, protect the city'sretail trade, [and] maintain

property values..., not to suppress the expression of unpopular views." Id. at 48 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Act's record-keeping and disclosure requirements do not impinge on the content

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of the materials; rather, they are designed to deter the exploitation of children and to facilitate the

identification of performers depicted in sexually explicit materials. Compare Turner Broadcasting,

114 S. Ct. at 2468 (describing two state tax laws subjected to strict scrutiny because "[a]lthough

there was no evidence that an illicit governmental motive was behind either of the taxes, both were

structured in a manner that raised suspicions that their objective was, in fact, the suppression of

certain ideas"). In sum, while the Renton ordinance and section 2257 may impose certain obligations

on the speakers, they place no restrictions on the speech itself.

Appellees assert, however, that the Act must be deemed content based because it applies to

a category of personsthat is defined by the content of the materialsthey produce. But again, the fact

that those covered by the Act are content defined does not affect the content of the speech they are

engaged in producing and distributing. In Renton, the Supreme Court concluded that the zoning

ordinance at issue was content neutral even though it applied only to a content-defined class ofmovie

theaters. 475 U.S. at 47-48. There, the ordinance addressed collateral harms unrelated to whatever

thoughtsthe theaters'filmsmight communicate to their viewers. Id. at 48-49. Similarly, section 2257

applies to speech of a particular content not because of any concern over the thoughts it might

convey, but because the evil the law was designed to addressthe use of underage performershas

its locus in the speech's production. Cf. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (a "valid basis for according

differential treatment to even a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech [exists when] the

subclass happens to be associated with particular "secondary effects' of the speech so that the

regulation is "justified without reference to the content ofthe ...speech.' " (quoting Renton, 475 U.S.

at 48; emphasis in original)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[i]t would be error to conclude

... that the First Amendment mandates strict scrutiny for any speech regulation that applies to one

medium (or a subset thereof) but not others." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468. "[T]he fact

that a law singles out a certain medium ... "isinsufficient by itselfto raise First Amendment concerns.'

" Id. (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 452 (1991)).

Finally, appellees argue that section 2257 is content based because the record-keeping and

disclosure provisions are so burdensome that they will chill at least some constitutionally protected

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speech, citing the Supreme Court's decisionsinAustin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.

652, 658 (1990); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 254, 256 (1986); and

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976). Such requirements, to be sure, may "create a disincentive

... to engage in [protected]speech." Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 254. But the "mere

assertion of some possible self-censorship resulting from a statute is not enough to render [a] law

unconstitutional...." Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989). In any event, these

cases are readily distinguishable. All three deal with various issues of disclosure requirements and

contribution restrictionsin the context of politicalspeech. But more fundamentally, in none of them

does the Court discern a legislative purpose wholly unrelated to the suppression of speech. To the

contrary, allthree casesinvolve direct restraints on speech-related expenditures. SeeAustin, 494U.S.

at 655-56 (state statute barring corporations from making contributions and independent expenditures

in connection with state candidate elections); Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 241

(federal provision proscribing expenditures from corporation's treasury funds in connection with an

election); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (federal provision imposing limitations on expenditures "relative

to a clearly identified candidate"). The Act, by contrast, places no comparable restraints on speech.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the requirementsimposed by the Act are addressed

to legitimate governmental concerns that are unrelated to speech. Congress passed the Act in order

to prevent the use of underage performers in the production ofsexually explicit materials. The First

Amendment affords no protection to such conduct. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-66

(1982). Hence, the Act satisfies the content-neutral formulation established in O'Brien: Producers

of sexually explicit materials engage in conduct that potentially contains both protected (sexually

explicit depictions of adult performers) and unprotected (sexually explicit depictions of underage

performers) speech, and the Act permissibly targets the latter. Accord Turner Broadcasting, 114 S.

Ct. at 2464, 2469 (citing O'Brien to apply intermediate scrutiny to provisions requiring cable

companies to broadcast local programming because Congress's intent was to ensure that free local

broadcast television remained available to those without cable).

While the effects of the Act's record-keeping requirements on speech are not insubstantial,

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they are incidental and largely unavoidable. The Act will pass constitutional muster

if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important

or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the

suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First

Amendment freedomsis no greater than is essential to the furtherance ofthat interest.

O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. Later decisions make clear that once a regulation is deemed content

neutral, thisinquiry reducesto whether the requirements "are narrowly tailored to serve a significant

governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the

information." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Clark v. Community

for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 & n.8 (1984) (equating the O'Brien test with "the

standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions"). We turn now to this task.

B. Application

1. In general

Appellees concede, as they must, that the Government has a significantindeed

compellinginterest in the prevention of child pornography. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57

(upholding statute barring promotion of sexual performances by children under 16 and noting that

"a State'sinterest in safeguarding the physical and psychologicalwell-being of a minor is compelling")

(internal quotation marks omitted). Nor do they deny that the Act leaves open ample avenues for the

communication of sexually explicit materials. Indeed, the Act, by its terms, bans no form of

expression. Appellees' sole (and vigorously argued) complaint is that the Act's record-keeping

requirements are not narrowly tailored to the prevention of child pornography.

In addressing this argument, we are reminded that a narrowly tailored regulation "need not

be the least restrictive or least intrusive means" ofserving the government's content-neutral interests.

Ward, 491 U.S. at 798; accord Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S.

469, 478 (1989) ("to be "narrowly tailored' ... we have not insisted that there be no conceivable

alternative, but only that the regulation not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to

further the government's legitimate interests. And we have been loath to second-guess the

Government'sjudgment to that effect.") (citations and internal quotation marks deleted); Clark, 468

U.S. at 299 (rejecting the "view that the challenged regulation is unnecessary, and hence invalid,

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because there are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have satisfied the Government

interest"); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984) (plurality opinion) ("The

less-restrictive-alternative analysis ... has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a time,

place, and manner regulation"). But "[a] regulation is not narrowly tailoredeven under the more

lenient tailoring standards applied in Ward and Rentonwhere ... a substantial portion of the burden

on speech does not serve to advance [the State's content-neutral] goals." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.

New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 511-12 n.** (1991) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). We conclude that a regulation will meet the Supreme Court's "narrowly tailored"

requirement if a substantial portion of the burden it imposesfurthersthe Government'sinterest, even

though a less intrusive alternative might also exist.

Our inquiry, then, is whether the Act's record-keeping requirements are narrowly tailored to

the prevention of child pornography. To begin, it seems obvious to us that, as a general matter, the

requirements ofsection 2257 advance the abatement of child pornography in fundamental ways. By

requiring that primary producers inspect and make a record of documentary evidence of the

performers' ages and, in turn, that secondary producersinspect and retain a copy of the same, section

2257 forwards three goals: It ensures that primary producers actually confirm that a prospective

performer is of age; it deters children from attempting to pass as adults; and, most important, it

creates the only mechanism by which secondary producers (who by definition have no contact with

performers) can be required to verify the ages of the individuals pictured in the materials they will be

producing. Absent the primary producers' records, they can always plead honest mistake; and this

is precisely the problem that prompted the Commission to recommend passage of the Act:

The Commission found that producers, catering to the child pornography market,

often used very young-looking performersin order to give the viewer the impression

they were minors. Except in the most obvious instances, no one could be certain

whether the performersreally were under the age of eighteen. That not only hindered

prosecution of child pornography offenses but also provided an excuse to those in the

distribution chain, who could profess ignorance that they were actually dealing in

sexual materials involving children. Producers too could escape the laws' sanction

by claiming they were misled about the performer's age or did not know the

performer's true identity.

ALA I, 956 F.2d at 1182 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). Such defenses, of course,

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would be unavailing in a prosecution or other action for failure to create or maintain the records

required by the Act. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2257(f)(1). Primary producers of sexually explicit materials

are required to obtain information of the performer's age and identity, 28 C.F.R. § 75.2(a), and

secondary producers are prohibited from reproducing such materials without obtaining this

information from the primary producers. Id. §§ 75.1(c)(2), 75.2(b).

Appellees object that the Act will do little to encourage primary producers to secure

documentary confirmation of their subjects' ages because virtually all those engaged in providing

sexually explicit materials for commercial markets already require such evidence. They assert,

moreover, that as a practical matter a "reasonable mistake" defense is not available in child

pornography cases. Although they acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has held that the 1977 Act

as amended (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Supp. II 1990)) is "subject to a reasonable

mistake of age defense," United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d 534,

543 (9th Cir. 1988), they argue that that defense may only be used by those who have "diligently

investigated" the performers' age, and that such an investigation requiresthe viewing ofidentification

documents. Even assuming that these assertions are correct, however, the record-keeping obligations

imposed on primary producers remain elements of the statutory scheme that are critical to ensuring

that secondary producers deny child pornographers access to their markets.

In light of the above, we cannot agree with appellees that the Act serves no meaningful

purpose given the existence of other criminal laws prohibiting child pornography. While it is true that

we observed, in ALA I, that "it is hard to imagine anyone who would willingly risk 10 years of their

life to publish [child pornography], but would refrain if they also would be risking" confiscation of

propertyfor not abiding by the 1988 Act, 956 F.2d at 1191, that remark was addressed to the efficacy

of adding use forfeiture to the existing penalties. Here we deal with a law imposing new requirements

that have a significant independent enforcement purpose. After fourteen months of investigations,

the Commission on Pornography recommended that "Congress should enact a statute requiring the

producers ... of sexually explicit visual depictions to maintain records containing consent forms and

proof of performers' ages," preciselybecause of "gaps" and "loopholes" in existing law that facilitated

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the exploitation of children. Final Report at 618-20. The Act accomplishes these ends by ensuring

that honest but careless producerssecure documentary evidence of a performer's age and by denying

unscrupulous producers the defense that they reasonably believed the performer to be of age.

We also reject appellees' contention that the Act issubstantially overinclusive. Based on their

contention that little commercially produced child pornography exists, they maintain that the Act

applies almost entirely to constitutionally protected depictions of adults. This argument mistakenly

assumes that burdening such materials will not further the Government's interest in preventing child

pornography. To the contrary, the statutory scheme depends upon requiring producers to identify

and maintain records of every performer who appears in their sexually explicit materials. The entire

point of the Act is to prevent subjective determinations of age by implementing a uniform procedure

that appliesto all performers. Compare, e.g, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (requiring

employersto verify and maintain proof of verification of every employee'sright to work in the United

States).

Absent documentation, such determinations are not easy. Where pornographic materials are

concerned, "[p]erhaps the single most common feature of models is their relative, and in the vast

majority of cases, absolute youth," Final Report at 855, with most female models appearing to have

"[begun] their careers in their late teens." Final Report at 855. As the Commission points out, "[b]y

viewing a visual depiction, how does one decide if the performer is fourteen or eighteen, seventeen

or twenty-one?" Id. at 620. The Government must be allowed to paint with a reasonably broad brush

if it isto cover depictions of all performers who might conceivably have been minors at the time they

were photographed or videotaped. We agree with appellees' suggestion that certain applications of

the record-keeping requirementsmaywell exceed constitutionalbounds, an illustrated sex manualfor

the elderly being an obvious example. They fail to present us, however, with the concrete facts that

would enable us to test the limits of the Act. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit

Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) ("These cases do not require us to identify or define what

affirmative limits" the Constitution may impose.) Those are best determined in case-by-case tests.

Appellees also argue that the Act must be found unconstitutional on the basis of Simon &

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Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). The statute at issue in that

case required that any money earned by a criminal from a book describing his crime be paid into an

escrow fund for the benefit of any victim who secured a judgment against him. Applying strict

scrutiny, the Court found that "the State has a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime

are compensated by those who harm them," id. at 509, but concluded that the law was "significantly

overinclusive" because it applied to (and thus burdened) a large number of protected works in the

process. Id. at 511. The Court stated in dicta that the law was "so overinclusive" that it would fail

even were it content neutral. Id. at 511-12 n.**.

Appellees maintain that because the Act principally applies to adult performers, it mostly

burdens protected speech and is void under Simon & Schuster. We disagree. In that case, the

challenged law was found to be overbroad because it reached "a wide range of literature that does

not enable a criminal to profit from his crime while a victimremains uncompensated" and because the

statute wasso worded that it could apply to "any author who admitsin his work to having committed

a crime, whether or not the author was ever actually accused or convicted." Id. at 511. Moreover,

while the stated purpose of the law was to escrow the author's earnings for the benefit of victims, it

left untouched "any of the criminal's other assets." Id. at 510. The Act, by contrast, burdens only

that protected speech necessary to advance the Government's interest in preventing child

pornography. Unlike the law in Simon & Schuster, it is essential to Congress's design that the Act

impose its record- keeping requirements on all performers who appear in sexually explicit materials.

2. Objections to specific applications and provisions of the Act

Here, as elsewhere, the devil lies in the details. Appellees challenge a host of specific

requirements and applications of the Act and its implementing regulations. We address those that

merit discussion, beginning with challenges to the application of the record-keeping provisions.

a. Record-keeping requirements

The record-keeping required of producers can hardly be considered onerous. Such records

are routinely required to facilitate the enforcement of our immigration, labor, and tax laws. See, e.g.,

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (employers must verify identities of employees and maintain proof of

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verification); 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(3) (1993) (employers must, inter alia, verify their employees'

birthdates); 26 C.F.R. 31.6001-2(a)(1)(i) (1993) (employers must maintain records of employees'

names and addresses). Appellees maintain, nevertheless, that the Act's record-keeping requirements

impose an impermissible burden on secondary producers.

It should be noted at the outset that while secondary producers must maintain records of the

ages and identities of the performers depicted in their materials, they

may satisfy the[se] requirements... by accepting from the primary producer ... copies

of [the primary producer's] records ... [and by keeping records of] the name and

address of the primary producer from whom he received copies of the records.

28 C.F.R. § 75.2(b). The Justice Department interprets this provision as enabling secondary

producers not in privity with the primary producer to rely on the records provided them by the

immediately preceding secondary producer, and so advised the district court. See Reply Brief for

Appellant at 9.

Contrary to what appellees suggest, the secondary producers' records serve important ends.

They confirm the secondary producers' compliance with the Act and provide what is likely to be a

more reliable depository of the information identifying and establishing the ages of the persons

depicted. The photographer who sells a picture to a magazine may disappear three months later, and

his records with him. The magazine, on the other hand, is apt to remain in business. Furthermore,

because a given issue of a magazine or book may contain pictures of performers taken by several

photographers, it serves the interests of law enforcement efficiency to be able to verify their ages at

a single location. Finally, the requirements imposed on secondary producers serve the Government's

interests by denying their commercial markets to child pornographers.

Appellees assert, nonetheless, that specific features of the record-keeping requirements

unacceptably burden speech. They begin with the regulatory mandate that "[s]uch records ... be

maintained as long as the producer remains in business" and "for five years thereafter." 28 C.F.R. §

75.4. The Government's need to be able to identify performers and verify conformance with the Act

is not dependent on the producer remaining in business. Therefore, the section's requirement that the

records remain available for a minimum period of five years, whether or not the producer continues

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in existence, appearsreasonable. The obligation imposed by the regulation, however, is open ended.

The Government has offered no reason why the containment of child pornography requires the

maintenance of these records indefinitely, and we can think of none. We therefore set aside section

75.4's requirement that the records "be maintained as long as the producer remains in business."

Pending its replacement by a provision more rationally tailored to actual law enforcement needs, we

will accept a period offive years asreasonable. We do so because it conforms with both the five-year

statute of limitations applicable to the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988), and the minimum period

recommended by the Pornography Commission. Final Report at 621.

Appellees also challenge the Act's requirement that producers "ascertain any name ... ever

used by the performer," 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b)(2), and the regulation's requirement that their records

be cross-referenced and retrievable as to

[a]ll name(s) of each performer, including any alias, maiden name, nickname, stage

name or professional name of the performer; and according to the title, number, or

other similar identifier of each book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other

matter.

28 C.F.R. § 75.3. They maintain that these provisions are not only onerous (the first being virtually

impossible to satisfyshort of employing a detective agency), but do nothing to deter the production

of child pornography. The Government, however, interprets section 2257(b)(2) as merely requiring

that producersrecord the aliases and other names provided by the performer in response to a request,

citing the President's message transmitting the 1988 Act to Congress. See H.R. Doc. No. 100-129,

100th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1987) ("This requirement is satisfied if the producer asks the performer

for the information.").

So interpreted, the requirement that the primary producer record other names used by a

performer imposes a nominal burden at best. We find this appropriate to the protection of children

because it enables enforcement officials to detect forged documentation. To illustrate, if it is

determined that a particular woman had been pictured using aliases in 1990 and 1991 and using her

own name in 1992, and if the documentsin the recordsindicate an age of 18 on each occasion, it may

be inferred that at least two of them are forged and that she waslikely to be underage on the first two

occasions. The cross-referencing of the records allows enforcement officials to locate the documents

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for comparison.

b. Labeling requirements

We now address appellees' concerns over the statements that both primary and secondary

producers must affix to materials depicting sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(e). The

regulations provide, in relevant part:

(a) Every statement shall contain:

(1) The title of the book, magazine, periodical, film, or videotape, or other matter ...

or, if there is no title, an identifying number or similar identifier ...;

(2) The date of production, manufacture, publication, duplication, reproduction, or

reissuance of the matter; and

(3) A street address at which the records required by this part may be made

available....

...

(c) The information contained in the statement must be accurate as of the date on

which the book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other matter is sold,

distributed, redistributed, or rereleased.

28 C.F.R. § 75.6(a)-(c).

As a general matter, we find permissible the requirement that producers affix statements to

sexually explicit materials that identify where proof of the depicted performers' ages may be found.

Requiring the creation of records is of little avail if they cannot be readily located. We do not find

it overly burdensome to require that such statements be printed near the beginning of a book or

magazine, or placed at the beginning or end of a film or videotape. See 28 C.F.R. § 75.8. Appellees

nevertheless challenge, as both overbroad and unnecessary to the purposes of the Act, the

requirement that the statement be accurate "as of the date on which [the sexually explicit material]

is sold, distributed, redistributed, or rereleased." 28 C.F.R. § 75.6(c).

On its face, the regulations' updating requirement would reach wholesale and retail

transactions that lie entirely beyond the scope of the Act. See id. at § 75.1(d) (defining "sell,

distribute, redistribute, and rerelease" to include "commercial distribution of a book, magazine,

periodical, film, videotape, or other matter" covered by the Act). The Act, however, imposes the

obligation to keep records and affix statements only on those who "produce[ ] any book, magazine,

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periodical, film, videotape, or other matter which ... contains ... depictions ... of actual sexually

explicit conduct," 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a)(1); and it defines "produces" to mean "produce, manufacture,

or publish any [such material] ... and includes the duplication, reproduction, or reissuing of any such

matter." Id. § 2257(h)(3). Because the Act does not apply to those solely engaged in the sale of

these items, its requirements may not be imposed on them. The Act cannot be read to require a

magazine vendor, for example, to revise the statement in a pornographic periodical "as of the date

on which [it] is sold" to a consumer. We find, however, that it is entirely appropriate to require that

the information contained in the statement be accurate as ofthe date thatsuchmaterials are published,

produced, republished, or reproduced (in the sense of "produced anew"); and we uphold section

75.6(c) insofar asit isso applied. Cf. FinalRule, 57 Fed. Reg. at 15020 ("the location statement must

be current at the time of republication or reproduction").

Another objection concerns the application of the disclosure requirement to photographs

exhibited in an art gallery. Because section 75.8 requires that such statements "be prominently

displayed," appellees assume that the statement would have to be affixed to the front of the

photograph, thereby compromising its artistic integrity. This is sheer speculation. We suggest there

may be other ways in which the purposes of the Act may be achieved without interfering with the

aesthetics of photographs portraying sexual actssuch as affixing the statements to the backs of the

pictures. Be that as it may, this question, and others like it, cannot be decided on the basis of

hypotheticals. "We possess no factual record of an actual or imminent application of [the Act (or the

disclosure requirement) to photographs exhibited in an art gallery] sufficient to present the

constitutional issuesin clean-cut and concrete form." Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1991).

c. Other challenges

We are left with four "as applied" objections that warrant discussion, two of them advanced

bythe district court. The first objection involves "appropriationist artists," photographers who create

distinct works that incorporate photographs taken by otherstypically, without permission. The

record confirms that appropriationists constitute a recognized school of art photography. Appellees

assume that appropriationists are primary producers and assert that this imposes on them the

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impossible task of having to identify and maintain records of performers who appear in picturestaken

by other photographers whom they may not be able to locate and whose cooperation (if they are

located) can hardly be guaranteed. We disagree with their premise, but understand their mistake.

The regulations define a primary producer as "any person who actually films, videotapes, or

photographs a visual depiction of actualsexually explicit conduct," 28C.F.R. § 75.1(c)(1) (emphasis

added). The italicized language is a tautology, however, because the obvious purpose for creating

the category of primary producers is to identify those who have direct contact with the performers

and can therefore personally examine and record the identification documents presented by them.

Nevertheless, appropriationists appear to fall within the definition of "secondary producers." If they

do, the application of the Act to themwould raise a serious First Amendment problem because of the

difficulty they may encounter in securing the information that secondary producers are required to

keep on file. It is a problem, however, that cannot be resolved on the present record. See Renne, 501

U.S. at 321-22.

The next objection concerns the inclusion within the definition of "secondary producers" of

persons who duplicate or reproduce sexually explicit materials that are intended for commercial

distribution. 28 C.F.R. § 75.1(c)(2). Appellees point out that such persons include printers, film

processors, and video duplicators whose roles are functionally indistinguishable from that of photo

processors, who are specifically excluded from the definition of "producer." See id. § 75.1(c)(4)(i).

As we understand the photo processing exception, it appliesto personsto whom a producer delivers

films for development or the making of prints and who, on completing their work, return the films

and prints to the producer. The Government does not explain what interest is served by according

different treatment to printers, film processors, and video duplicators whose sole function is to

provide similar services to a producer. We agree, therefore, that the Act does not apply to persons

who perform such services and return their work product to the producer who employed them.

Third, we address the district court's contention that "the Act is overly burdensome because

it willinvade the privacyof adult models and discourage themfromengaging in protected expression"

because "[e]xposure of their true names, aliases, and addresses could subject them to stigmatization,

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harassment and ridicule from others." ALA II, 794 F. Supp. at 419. The Act and its implementing

regulations, however, do not require that this information be disclosed to anyone other than "the

Attorney General or his delegee," 28 C.F.R. § 75.5, the persons for whom they willingly pose while

engaged in sexual acts, and those who publish the resulting pictures or videotapes. The first of these

has a legitimate right to the information, and we believe we may safely assume that the performers

are not concerned over the prospect of being stigmatized, harassed, or ridiculed bythe producersthey

help enrich.

Finally, we reject the district court's complaint that the Act "will effectively ban foreign

produced images ofsexually explicit conduct." ALA II, 794 F. Supp. at 418. Foreign producers who

wish to peddle their products in the United States should be expected to abide by our laws no less

than domestic producers. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1988) (prohibiting the importation of

works that infringe on U.S. copyrights). Although the Government may not have other than a

humane interest in protecting foreign children from exploitation, it has a most definite interest in

plugging a loophole that would be created for domestic child pornographersif they were able to send

their wares to secondary producers abroad for reexport to the United States.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, we conclude that the Act is a content-neutral statute that

serves a compelling Government interest; and we find that its provisions meet the intermediate

scrutiny standard established by the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. We

acknowledge that certain provisions and potential applications of the regulations exceed or may

exceed constitutional bounds. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the Act and regulations are

constitutional as they apply to the vast majority of the materials affected by them, namely, the

commercially produced books, magazines, films, and videotapes that cater to "adult" tastes.

Therefore, although we disallow certain provisions or applications of the regulations, we reverse the

district court's holding that the Act is unconstitutional as it applies to materials depicting adults

engaged in actual sexual conduct.

So ordered.

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1

In order to determine whether material is "obscene," the Supreme Court has formulated a

three-part test:

(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards

would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;

(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual

conduct specifically defined by the applicable ... law; and

(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or

scientific value.

Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 

REYNOLDS, District Judge, dissenting. This law is overbroad, chilling, and a questionable

deterrent to child pornography, and thusruns contraryto the First Amendment. The majority opinion

permits an unwarranted intrusion into the First Amendment rights of citizens who are not child

pornographers. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

The statute regulates a wide variety of materialsome kinds more protected by the First

Amendment than others. Some material covered by the statute is "obscene" under Miller v.

California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),1or is child pornography, and not protected speech at all. See New

York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Some of the material is "indecent," but indecent, non-obscene

speech is protected by the First Amendment, albeit the trend in Supreme Court cases appears to be

to relax the standard of review forsuch speech. Compare Sable Communications of California, Inc.

v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (ban on indecent telephone message services violated the First

Amendment because it exceeded what was necessary to serve the compelling interest of preventing

exposure of minors to the messages) with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991)

(Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion) (nude dancing is only marginally within the parameters of First

Amendment protection). The law also regulates depictions which may have a significant educational,

artistic, or political value, and which receive full First Amendment protection.

Although the statute reaches far beyond depictions which involve or are likely to involve

children, it regulates each of these areas in the same burdensome manner. As such, the law is

overbroad and chilling, and it isimpossible to rewrite it through judicialmeansso that it survives First

Amendment scrutiny.

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2Under O'Brien, a content-neutral government regulation of expressive conduct is justified if

that regulation: (1) is within the government's constitutional power; (2) furthers a substantial

governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to free speech; (4) incidental

restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of

that interest." Id.

I am not convinced that this statute is "content neutral." On its face, it is directed at a

particular type of expression. This law does not have a merely "incidental limitation" on expression

protected by the First Amendment. However, even under the more relaxed standard applied to

content-neutral regulation of expressive conduct propounded in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.

367 (1968),2this statute must be stricken. There is enough "bite" left in the O'Brien standard to

strike a statute when it has more than incidental effects on First Amendment expression and does not

effectively further an important governmental interest. The statute cannot even be used for its

intended purpose of helping to prosecute child pornographers, because the Act itself precludes the

use of the records, directly or indirectly, in a child pornography prosecution.

Thus, I would affirm the lower court's opinion.

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