Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01565/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01565-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANN HILL, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:09-cv-01565-GEB-GGH

)

v. ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION*

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; ROGER )

DICKINSON; ROBERTA MACGLASHAN; )

SUSAN PETERS; JIMMIE YEE; DON )

NOTTOLI; SACRAMENTO AIRPORT SYSTEM;)

and G. HARDY ACREE, ) 

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff Ann Hill (“Hill”) filed a motion for

reconsideration on July 19, 2010, in which she requests that this

Court’s order filed on July 30, 2009 be reconsidered under Local Rule

230(j), and the Court’s inherent power. The July 30, 2009 order

denied Hill’s motion for a preliminary injunction, in which Hill

argued the sublease under which she operated her Java City concession

in Terminal A at the Sacramento International Airport (the “Airport”),

was not extended or renewed because of racial discrimination against

her. Hill argues that “newly discovered evidence” entitles her to a

reconsideration of the July 30, 2009 order.

I. BACKGROUND

Hill alleges her complaint, which she filed on June 5, 2009,

that because of the County of Sacramento’s racial discrimination

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against her sublease which authorized her to own and operate a Java

City coffee concession in Terminal A of the Airport was allowed to end

under a term of her sublease contract. Hill filed a motion for

preliminary injunction on July 1, 2009, in which she argued that

allowing her to continue operating her concession business would

preserve the status quo. Hill further argued that the County, which

owns and operates the Airport and contracted with HMS Host

International (“Host”) to provide food and beverage concessions at the

Airport, should be prevented from excluding her minority owned

business from Terminal A.

Hill’s motion was denied because she “ha[d] not shown a

likelihood of success on the merits of her claims against the County.” 

(Docket No. 28, Order 7:3-4.) Specifically, Hill “ha[d] not provided

evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the

County is responsible for where her business is located in Terminal

A.” (Id. 7:7-10.) Further, Hill failed to provide evidence to

“support drawing the inference that the County took action against her

business interests based upon racial discrimination.” (Id. 7:21-23.) 

Nor had Hill “controverted . . . with sufficient probative evidence”

the “County’s declared purpose” for not extending Hill’s sublease,

“which [was] to increase competition and revenue.” (Id. 9:1-5.) 

Following the expiration of her contract with Host on July 31, 2009,

Hill ceased operating the Java City concession at the Airport.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Although Hill seeks reconsideration under the Court’s

inherent power, there is no need to decide whether Hill’s motion can

be decided under the Court’s inherent authority since Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) (“Rule 60(b)(2)”) states in pertinent part:

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“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from

a[n] . . . order . . . for newly discovered evidence, that with

reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered . . . .” “Relief

from [an order] on the basis of newly discovered evidence is warranted

if (1) the moving party can show the evidence relied on in fact

constitutes ‘newly discovered evidence’ within the meaning of Rule

60(b); (2) the moving party exercised due diligence to discover this

evidence; and (3) the newly discovered evidence must be of ‘such

magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to

change the disposition of the [motion].” Feature Realty, Inc. v. City

of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Coastal

Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 833 F.2d 208, 211

(9th Cir. 1987)); see also Frederick S. Wyle Prof’l Corp. v. Texaco,

Inc., 764 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that a party moving

under Rule 60(b)(2) “is obliged to show that [the] evidence was newly

discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it

could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such

evidence at the hearing”) (emphasis and quotations omitted). Further,

“[e]vidence is not newly discovered . . . if it . . . could have been

discovered with reasonable diligence.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26

F.3d 885, 892 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Coastal Transfer, 833 F.2d

at 211).

III. DISCUSSION

Hill argues she is entitled to reconsideration of the order

denying her request for a preliminary injunction because she presents

newly discovered evidence showing that the County participated in

deciding where concessions would be located at the Airport. 

Defendants counter Hill has failed to show that the evidence Hill

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presents as newly discovered evidence could not have discovered before

the hearing on Hill’s preliminary injunction motion.

Hill presents as newly discovered evidence several emails,

spreadsheets, and depositions. Hill states at the time of the

original motion “litigation was at such an early stage, the motion was

filed without the benefit of document discovery or depositions.” 

(Mot. 1:20-21.) Hill also produces the declaration of Patricia White,

a program manager with the Federal Aviation Administration, to which

ten additional exhibits are attached. (Caso Decl. Ex. K, White Decl.) 

However, White declares several of the exhibits referenced in her

declaration were letters provided to Hill prior to when Hill filed her

preliminary injunction motion. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 9.) 

Hill has not demonstrated that the evidence she argues is

newly discovered evidence could not “have been discovered with

reasonable diligence” before the hearing on her preliminary injunction

motion. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 892 n.6. Therefore, Hill’s motion for

reconsideration is DENIED.

Dated: August 16, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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