Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AMY McCONNELL and AMY

McCONNELL on behalf of her

four minor children, A.B.,

A.B. J.M. and J.M.,

NO. CIV. S-05-0909 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

(DIRECTOR OF CALIFORNIA STATE

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES)

LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

JAMES CHAPMAN, BOB PYLE, LLOYD

KEIFER, BRIAN DAHLE and JACK

HANSON, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

OF LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

MARGARET CROSBY, DIRECTOR OF

CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES,

LASSEN COUNTY, TERRY CHAPMAN,

LOEL GRIFFITH and DIRECTOR OF

CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

 

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1 Plaintiff Amy McConnell brings this action on her own

behalf and on the behalf of her four minor children. 

2 On June 10, 2005, plaintiff filed the first amended

complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rule 15 provides that “a party may amend the pleading

once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive

pleading is served . . . . [o]therwise a party may amend the

party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of

the adverse party.” (emphasis added). On August 22, 2005,

plaintiff filed a second amended complaint without leave of

court. The second amended complaint is stricken, but will be

viewed as a proposed complaint for the purpose of assessing the

plaintiff’s ability to allege sufficient and definite facts

against defendant should leave be granted. Therefore, the ruling

on defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for a more definite

statement addresses the sufficiency of the allegations in

plaintiff’s first amended complaint only. 

3 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

4 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,

the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

5 The facts of this case are set out in the order regarding

Lassen County et al.’s motions, and are thus not repeated herein.

2

This matter comes before the court on defendant Director of

California State Department of Social Service’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s1 first amended complaint2 (“complaint”) pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.3 For the reasons set forth below,4 defendant’s

motions are granted in part and denied in part. 

STANDARD5

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Eleventh Amendment limits the subject matter

jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Seminole Tribe of

Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996). Lack of subject

matter jurisdiction may be asserted by either party or the court,

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sua sponte, at any time during the course of an action. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Once challenged, the burden of establishing a

federal court’s jurisdiction rests on the party asserting the

jurisdiction. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut.

Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990). There are two forms

of 12(b)(1) attacks on subject matter jurisdiction: facial and

factual attacks. See Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. &

Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). In an action

such as this, where defendant contends that the lack of federal

jurisdiction appears from the “face of the complaint,” the

allegations in the complaint are taken as true for the purposes

of the motion. Id.

B. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

 Cir. 1986).

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Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant[]

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

To the extent plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is brought against

defendant Director of California State Department of Social

Services in his official capacity, that claim is, as a matter of

law, asserted against the State of California itself, Brandon v.

Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985), and therefore is generally

barred on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. See Dittman v.

California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Eleventh

Amendment bars actions for damages against state officials who

are sued in their official capacities in federal court.”)

(citations omitted). Absent a waiver by the state or a valid

congressional override, “[u]nder the eleventh amendment, agencies

of the state are immune from private damage actions . . . brought

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in federal court.” Id. at 1025 (quoting Mitchell v. Los Angeles

Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983

claim as to defendant Director of California State Department of

Social Services in his official capacity is GRANTED with

prejudice.

Plaintiff contends that she has sued defendant Director of

Department of Social Services in his personal capacity. The

caption of this action does not indicate whether defendant is

sued in his personal or official capacity. The Ninth Circuit has

created a presumption that “officials necessarily are sued in

their personal capacities where those officials are named in a

complaint, even if the complaint does not explicitly mention the

capacity in which they are sued.” Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d

1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v.

Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994); Cerrato

v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 n. 16

(9th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, to the extent that defendant is

sued in his personal capacity, the Eleventh Amendment poses no

bar to plaintiff’s action and defendant’s motion is DENIED.

B. Absolute Immunity

Defendant Director of California State Department of Social

Services argues that he is entitled to absolute immunity from the

federal civil rights allegations. State executive branch

officials charged with constitutional violations are entitled to

absolute immunity under certain limited circumstances. Mishler

v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993)). “It is well settled that

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judges and prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity.” Id.

at 1003. State actors are granted absolute immunity when

performing functions analogous to judges or prosecutors. Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514-15 (1978); Romano, 269 F.3d at 1186.

In evaluating whether an official is entitled to absolute

immunity, the court must look to “the nature of the function

performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” 

Romano, 269 F.3d at 1186. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute

immunity when performing activities closely associated with the

judicial process. Id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,

430-31 (1976)). “Quasi-prosecutorial immunity, however, does not

attach to administrative or investigatory acts by prosecutors

unrelated to their preparation for and initiation of

prosecution.” Id. Unless the state actor’s activity has the

requisite connection to the judicial process, only qualified

immunity is available. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896

(9th Cir. 2003); Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc.

Servs., 812 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 1987). “The presumption is

that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to

protect government officials in the exercise of their duties.” 

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 n. 4 (1993).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to act after finding

violations of law by Lassen County CPS. To the extent that these

allegations implicate defendant’s discretionary decision not to

adjudicate claims against Lassen County in judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, defendant is entitled to absolute immunity

and defendant’s motion is GRANTED with prejudice. See Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978) (“An agency official, like a

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prosecutor, may have broad discretion in deciding whether a

proceeding should be brought and what sanctions should be

sought.”) 

However, it is unclear from the face of the complaint that

defendant’s alleged acts and omissions may only be interpreted as

discretionary decisions closely associated with the judicial

process. Government officials are not protected by absolute

immunity when their actions are regulatory in nature, not

adversarial. See Schlegel v. Bebout, 841 F.2d 937, 944 (9th Cir.

1988) (holding that the Oregon Public Utilities Commissioner was

not entitled to absolute immunity for actions done to ensure

compliance with procedures). On a motion to dismiss, the court

must read the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. The allegations in the complaint against defendant

may implicate actions associated with ensuring compliance, not in

preparation for an adversarial proceeding. Therefore, the

actions alleged in the complaint may not be quasi-judicial in

nature. See id. Thus, to the extent that the complaint alleges

acts or failures to act that are regulatory in nature, defendant

Director of Department of Social Services is not entitled to

absolute prosecutorial immunity and defendant’s motion is DENIED. 

C. Section 1983 Claims

Defendant contends that plaintiff fails to state sufficient

allegations to support a § 1983 claim. To state a claim under 

§ 1983, plaintiff must plead that (1) defendant acted under color

of state law, and (2) defendant deprived plaintiff of rights

secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. U.S.,

781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Plaintiff’s complaint must allege a causal connection

between personal conduct by defendant Director of Department of

Social Services and the alleged constitutional violation. See

Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir.

2001). “The Supreme Court has concluded that in enacting section

1983 Congress did not intend to ‘impose liability vicariously on

[employers or supervisors] solely on the basis of the existence

of an employer-employee relationship with the tortfeasor.’” Id.

(quoting Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692

(1978)). To be liable under § 1983, a defendant must subject the

plaintiff to the deprivation of a constitutional right through an

affirmative act or an omission to perform an act which he is

legally required to perform. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

(9th Cir. 1978). “The requisite causal connection can be

established not only by some kind of direct personal

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a

series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably

should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional

injury.” Id. at 743-44. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant acted with deliberate

indifference in the delegation of duties to Lassen County. 

Defendant asserts that he cannot be liable for this delegation

because, as a matter of law, the legislature, not defendant,

delegated the duty to Lassen County. The California Welfare and

Institution Code provides that the “administration of public

social services in each of the several counties of the state is

hereby declared to be a county function.” Cal. Welf. & Inst.

Code § 10800 (West 2005). Therefore, the delegation of duties to

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Lassen County is not an act of defendant and he is not liable for

constitutional violations arising therefrom. Defendant’s motion

as to this allegation is therefore GRANTED.

D. State Law Claims

Government Code § 820.2 provides immunity to a public

employee for injuries resulting form “his act or omission where

the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the

discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be

abused.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2 (West 2005). Generally, “a

discretionary act is one which requires the exercise of judgment

or choice.” Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426,

1437 (1988). However, California courts have not set forth a

definitive rule which resolve every case. Id. Rather, the

California Supreme Court has adopted an analysis that relies on

the “policy considerations relevant to the purpose of granting

immunity to the governmental agency whose employees act in

discretionary capacities.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions

which have been expressly committed to coordinate

branches of government, and as to which judicial

interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ Such areas of

quasi-legislative policy-making are sufficiently

sensitive to call for judicial abstention from

interference that might even in the first instance

affect the coordinate body’s decision-making process.

 

Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal. 4th 676, 685 (2000). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant promotes a system that has

a policy of paying local agencies “to remove children from their

families with knowledge that the system was being abused by

virtue of this policy.” (Pl’s 1st Am. Compl. at 11.) On the

face of the complaint, plaintiff’s allegations assert that this

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is a policy decision. Moreover, defendant’s policy implicates

“questions of budgetary and fiscal policy, personnel

administration standards, allocation of available resources

according to variable priorities of need, and choices between

competing plans for accomplishing approved objectives,” rendering

the policy both political and discretionary. Taylor v. Buff, 172

Cal. App. 3d 384, 390 (1985). Defendant therefore has immunity

for any injuries resulting from his discretionary policy

decisions regarding funding of Lassen County CPS. Defendant’s

motion is GRANTED with prejudice for any state tort claims

arising out of allegations regarding these decisions. 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant failed “to carry out

to resolution an investigation that clearly indicated that the

local Lassen County CPS was not in compliance with the law.” 

(Pl’s 1st Am. Compl. at 11.) The decision whether or not to

initiate disciplinary proceedings and what discipline to impose

is a discretionary decision. See Kemmerer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at

1438. “The decision involves the exercise of analysis and

judgment as to what is just and proper under the circumstances

and is not a purely ministerial act.” Defendant has immunity for

any failure to bring the claim “to resolution” under § 820.2. 

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED with prejudice for any state tort

claims arising out of allegations regarding these decisions. 

To the extent that plaintiff may raise claims in a second

amended complaint that defendant failed to perform any mandatory

duties, § 820.2 does not apply. Defendant is not immune from

claims that allege breach of a mandatory duty under this section.

/////

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E. Compliance with the California Torts Claim Act

Defendant Director of Department of Social Services alleges

that plaintiff’s state tort claims should be dismissed because

the complaint fails to plead compliance with the California Tort

Claims Act. In order to state a tort claim against a public

entity, the California Tort Claims Act requires “the timely

presentation of a written claim and the rejection of the claim in

whole or in part.” Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Mangold v.

Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff

must present claims to the government entity for money or damages

with few exceptions. Cal. Code § 905 (West 2005). Tort claims

such as the instant claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress and negligence are not listed among the

exceptions to § 905. Moreover, under Government Code § 945.4,

no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim

is required to by presented in accordance with Chapter

1 (commencing with section 900) and Chapter 2

(commencing with section 910) of Part 3 of this

division until a written claim therefore has been

presented to the public entity and has been acted upon

by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected

by the board. 

Cal. Code § 945.4 (West 2005). Finally, under Government Code 

§ 950.2, any suit against a public employee is barred in cases

where a plaintiff’s action against the agency is barred for

failure to present a claim. The 1965 Amendment to § 950.2 makes

it clear the “the presentation of a claim to the employing public

entity is a prerequisite to suit against an employee.” Id.

Plaintiff has the burden of pleading compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act in their complaint. Wood v. Riverside

General Hospital, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Moreover,

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compliance with the California claims statutes is mandatory. 

City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 4447, 454 (1974). 

Federal courts have recognized these requirements. See Ortega v.

O’Connor, 764 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other

grounds, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987) (failure to comply with claimfiling requirements imposed by California Tort Claims Act bars

pendent state claims). Finally, where employees of the agency in

question act within their express or implied authority, despite

the wrongful nature of their actions, a complaint based on the

employees’ actions may be properly dismissed for failing to

allege proper filing of the claim with the employing government

entity. Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 877-78 (1973).

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege compliance with the

California Tort Claim Act procedures. As such, and given that

plaintiff has not alleged that defendant acted outside of her

express or implied authority, defendant’s motion to dismiss as to

plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional

distress and negligence is GRANTED.

D. Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be

granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). Plaintiff’s second amended complaint demonstrates her

ability to allege further facts with greater specificity as they

relate to this matter. Therefore, justice requires that

plaintiff be granted leave to amend the first amended complaint. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Director of California

State Department of Social Services’ motions are DENIED in part

and GRANTED in part. Because plaintiff has demonstrated the

possible ability to plead sufficient and definite allegations

against defendant Director of California State Department of

Social Services in the proposed second amended complaint,

plaintiff is granted fifteen (15) days from the date of this

order to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this

order. Defendants are granted thirty (30) days from the date of

service of plaintiff’s second amended complaint to file a

response thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2005 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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