Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01425/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01425-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KAMA CARROLL, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:10-cv-01425 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

CITY OF TEMPE, TEMPE POLICE )

DEPARTMENT, SGT.MICHELLE )

HATCHER, and SGT. SHELLY )

VANETTEN, ) [Re: Motion at Docket 16]

)

Defendants. )

)

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 16, defendants City of Tempe, the Tempe Police Department,

Sergeant Michelle Hatcher and Sergeant Shelly Van Etten move pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. At docket 22, plaintiff Kama Carroll opposes

the motion. Defendants reply at docket 23. Oral argument was not requested, and it

would not assist the court.

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 1 of 12
For purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint 1

are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

Doc. 1 at p. 6.

2

Id. at p. 7.

3

-2-

II. BACKGROUND1

In November 2008, Kama Carroll, who has over twenty years of service as a

correctional officer with the State of Nevada, applied for the position of jail administrator

with the Tempe City Jail. After Ms. Carroll interviewed for the position, Tempe Police

Department (“TPD”) personnel advised her that she was “a top candidate” for the

position and should expect to receive a formal offer. Shortly thereafter, TPD personnel

2

informed Carroll that the City of Tempe and TPD could not fund the jail administrator

position and therefore would not immediately fill the position. Instead, the City of

Tempe and TPD offered Ms. Carroll employment as a “line” detention officer. Ms.

Carroll accepted the offer.

Ms. Carroll commenced employment as a detention officer in November 2008.

Sergeant Jack Richards was her immediate supervisor. Shortly after beginning work at

the Tempe City Jail, Ms. Carroll observed that Sergeants Michelle Hatcher and Shelly

Vanetten, who also served as Carroll’s supervisors, acted “in a rude, offensive,

obnoxious, and improperly sexually charged manner towards other employees and the

prisoners,” including using profanity towards detention officers and prisoners. Hatcher 3

and Vanetten’s behavior offended Carroll.

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 2 of 12
Id. 4

Id. 5

Doc. 1 at p. 9.

6

-3-

On one occasion, Carroll witnessed Vanetten “intentionally spraying whipped

cream into the crotch of [a] male line [detention officer.]” Carroll reported the incident 4

to Sergeant Richards, who reported the incident to Commander Santos. In December

2009, Carroll made a verbal complaint to Commander Santos, “advising her of the

frequency of unprofessional and inappropriate conduct” by Sergeants Hatcher and 5

Vanetten. Commander Santos summarily dismissed the complaints.

In June 2009, Carroll met with Assistant Police Chief Angel Carbajal to complain

about “several distinct instances of unprofessional, inappropriate, and offensive

conduct” by Hatcher and Vanetten between December 2008 and June 2009. Carbajal

told Carroll that an investigation would be completed by TPD’s Internal Affairs

Department (“IAD”). At Carbajal’s request, Carroll sent Carbajal an e-mail outlining

fifteen incidents that she believed amounted to unprofessional, inappropriate, and

offensive conduct by Hatcher and Vanetten. The e-mail was forwarded to IAD.

At a sergeants’ meeting in August 2009, Commander Yenni, who had replaced

Commander Santos, informed all of the TPD jail sergeants that Carroll made a

complaint to IAD and warned them to be on their “best behavior” around Carroll or she

might report them. Commander Yenni further opined that Carroll had “jumped the chain

of command” by going directly to Assistant Chief Carbajal. Commander Yenni also told

Hatcher and Vanetten that Carroll’s IAD complaint pertained to their conduct.6

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 3 of 12
Doc. 1 at p. 12. 7

-4-

Following the sergeants’ meeting, Carroll began experiencing hostility from

Hatcher and Vanetten, as well as other detention officers and sergeants who were

friendly with Hatcher and Vanetten. The hostility toward Carroll included: Hatcher

telling other employees that she did not want to be in Carroll’s presence because she

“might get recorded”; a message posted on a wall in the jail control room about “staff

that tell on other staff”; Vanetten denying Carroll’s request for leave; and Carroll feeling

snubbed and excluded by several sergeants and other line detention officers.

In January 2010, Carroll met with IAD staff to inquire about the status of the

investigation. Carroll subsequently received a copy of the IAD investigation report,

which indicated that Hatcher and Vanetten “had engaged in improper, unlawful, and

unprofessional conduct in violation of TPD policies, rules, and regulations.” Of the 7

fifteen incidents Carroll reported, Hatcher was found responsible for two instances of

misconduct and Vanetten was found responsible for four instances of misconduct.

Carroll requested that either she or Vanetten and Hatcher be transferred to another

shift. There was no action on Carroll’s request for a transfer.

In February 2010, some of the supervising sergeants and line detention officers

began applying a “heightened level of scrutiny” to Carroll. One detention officer, a

friend of Vanetten, reported to another detention officer that Carroll was inappropriately

conducting pat down searches of prisoners. Commander Dorsey, who had replaced

Commander Yenni, investigated the allegations, concluded they were unfounded, and

verbally reprimanded the detention officer who made the allegations. Carroll met with

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 4 of 12
Doc. 1 at p. 14. 8

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 9

-5-

Commander Dorsey and repeated her complaints about the hostile work environment

created by Hatcher and Vanetten and other jail employees and demanded that he do

something.

In May 2010, Carroll learned that the jail administrator position for which she had

applied in November 2008 was again being offered. Carroll applied for the position and

attended one interview. After Commander Dorsey told Carroll that she “would not be

moving forward” in the selection process for the jail administrator position, Carroll

demanded that the “denial of her promotion” be documented in writing. On June 18,

2010, Commander Dorsey sent Carroll an e-mail, stating “[t]he decision to not move

you forward to the next process was based on the feedback from the testing process,

and more qualified candidates were selected to move forward.”8

On July 6, 2010, Carroll filed a complaint against the City of Tempe, TPD,

Hatcher, and Vanetten, alleging claims of disparate treatment - failure to promote,

hostile work environment, and retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, all under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition to direct and consequential 9

damages, Carroll’s complaint requests general and specific damages for pain and

suffering due to intentional infliction of emotion distress, and punitive damages.

Defendants now move to dismiss all of Carroll’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 5 of 12
De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978). 10

B alistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 11

Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997). 12

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 13

Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

14

S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citation omitted)).

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 15

Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 16

-6-

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. A 10

dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either “the lack of a cognizable

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”11

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[a]ll allegations of material fact in the

complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Conclusory allegations of law are not entitled to an assumption of truth. 12 13

 To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must aver in his or her

complaint “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 14

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” In sum, “the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and 15

reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

entitling the plaintiff to relief.”16

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 6 of 12
2009 WL 1407363 (D.Ariz. 2009). 17

2009 WL 2568640 (D.Ariz. 2009). 18

Williams, 2009 WL 2568640 at *2 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(2), (3))..

19

A.R.S. Const. Art. 14 § 1. 20

Williams, 2009 WL 2568640 at *2. 21

-7-

IV. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, defendants move to dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims

against defendant TPD on the grounds that TPD is a non-jural entity that is not subject

to suit in its own capacity. In support, defendants cite Skinner v. Pinal County and 17

Williams v. City of Mesa Police Department, both of which held that under Arizona law 18

a city police department is not a proper defendant. Although not controlling precedent,

these district court cases are persuasive. “The capacity to sue or be sued is

determined by the law of the state where the district court is located.” The Arizona 19

Constitution confers the right to sue or be sued on municipal corporations. In addition, 20

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d) provides that “[a]ctions brought by or against a

county or unincorporated city or town shall be brought in its corporate name.” Thus,

claims based on action by the TPD must be made in a suit against the City of Tempe.21

Plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s motion to dismiss TPD as a non-jural entity. The

court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against TPD. 

Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Title VII against

defendants Hatcher and Vanetten in their individual capacities on the grounds that Title

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 7 of 12
See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell’s International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993); 22

Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007).

88 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1996). 23

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 24

-8-

VII liability does not extend to supervisors and other individual employees. In her 22

opposition, plaintiff contends that her intention was to sue defendants Vanetten and

Hatcher in their official capacities and cites Ortez v. Washington County for the 23

proposition that supervisors can be sued in their official capacities under Title VII. The

court need not address the conflict between the parties’ cited authorities as to whether

supervisory employees may be liable in their official capacities under Title VII because

as discussed below the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief

under Title VII.

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the City of Tempe

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court considers each

of plaintiff’s disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims in turn. 

Disparate Treatment Claim 

Title VII prohibits discrimination “against any individual with respect to his [or her]

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” To establish a prima facie 24

claim for disparate treatment based on circumstantial evidence, plaintiff must

demonstrate that 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for her

position and performing her job satisfactorily; 3) she experienced adverse employment

actions, and 4) “similarly situated individuals outside [her] protected class were treated

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 8 of 12
Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) 25

(quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008) 26

(quoting Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003)).

-9-

more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action

give rise to an inference of discrimination.”25

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that she is a member of a protected class. 

Assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff’s membership in a protected class is

based on her sex, plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that she, or any other female

employee, suffered an adverse employment action because of her sex. Plaintiff’s

complaint also fails to allege that similarly situated male employees were treated more

favorably. To the contrary, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Vanetten intentionally

sprayed whipped cream on the crotch of a male detention officer. For the above

reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for disparate treatment upon which relief

may be granted.

Hostile Work Environment Claim

To state a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, plaintiff must allege

that 1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of her membership in

a protected class, 2) the conduct was unwelcome, and 3) “the conduct was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive

work environment.” “At the motion to dismiss stage, [plaintiff] need not support [her] 26

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 9 of 12
Id. 

27

Doc. 1 at p. 16. 

28

Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 29

quotation and citation omitted).

-10-

allegations with evidence, but [her] complaint must allege sufficient facts to state the

elements of a hostile work environment claim.”27

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that plaintiff was subjected to verbal or physical

conduct because of her membership in a protected class. Assuming plaintiff’s

membership in a protected class is based on her sex, plaintiff’s complaint fails to make

any allegations that Vanetten, Hatcher or any other co-worker harassed or subjected

plaintiff to a hostile work environment because of her sex. Plaintiff’s complaint instead

alleges that she was subject to “insults, other verbal comments, and intimidation based

upon her participating in protected activity.” 

28

Plaintiff’s complaint also fails to allege specific factual content allowing the court

to draw the reasonable inference that defendants’ alleged conduct was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and create a hostile

work environment. In considering whether discriminatory conduct was severe or

pervasive, the court looks to all of the circumstances, including “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or

a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s

work performance.” Again, plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege discriminatory conduct 29

based on membership in a protected class. Furthermore, construing the complaint’s

allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the complaint fails to allege sufficient

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 10 of 12
Draper v/ Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1998). 30

Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 525 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

31

2000e-3(a) (1981)).

Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations 32

omitted).

Id. at p. 526. 33

Doc. 1 at p. 17. 34

-11-

facts to support a “pattern of ongoing and persistent harassment severe enough to alter

the conditions of employment.” For the above reasons, plaintiff’s complaint fails to

30

state a hostile work environment claim upon which relief may be granted.

Retaliation Claim

The “opposition clause” of § 704 of Title VII “makes it illegal for an employer to

discriminate against an employee where the employee ‘has opposed any practice made

an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . .’” “Title VII prohibits, inter alia,

31

discrimination on the basis of [race, color, religion, sex, or national origin], and

retaliation against an employee for making a charge or otherwise participating in a Title

VII proceeding.” To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, plaintiff must 32

demonstrate that 1) she was engaging in a protected activity, 2) she suffered an

adverse employment decision, and 3) there was a causal link between her activity and

the employment decision.

33

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that she opposed any discriminatory practice

made unlawful by Title VII. To the contrary, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the

protected activity in which she engaged consisted of reporting “unprofessional and

inappropriate conduct, harassment, disparate treatment and/or excessive force.”34

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 11 of 12
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1), 1981a(a)(1). 35

-12-

Unprofessional and inappropriate conduct alone is not made unlawful under Title VII.

While a hostile work environment and disparate treatment may be unlawful under Title

VII, the harassment and disparate treatment plaintiff alleges in her complaint was not

related to her membership in a protected class. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state

a retaliation claim under Title VII.

Finally, defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s requests for “general and special

damages for pain and suffering due to intentional infliction of emotional distress” and for

punitive damages. Title VII allows a court to award compensatory damages for pain

and suffering and to award punitive damages where a plaintiff establishes that the

employer engaged in intentional discrimination. Because plaintiff’s complaint fails to

35

state a claim for relief under Title VII, her request for compensatory and punitive

damages also fails.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, defendants’ motion at docket 16 to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED, and plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED. The Clerk will please enter judgment for defendants.

DATED this 22nd day of December 2010.

 /S/ 

JOHN W. SEDWICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:10-cv-01425-JWS Document 24 Filed 12/22/10 Page 12 of 12