Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00336/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00336-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY LYNN TAYLOR,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-336 LKK CHS P

vs.

JAMES A. YATES, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction and Background

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner seeks to challenge his 1985 voluntary

manslaughter conviction entered in Amador County pursuant to a plea of guilty.

On April 16, 2007, this court issued an order to show cause why the petition

should not be dismissed as untimely under the one year statute of limitations contained in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). 

Petitioner’s May 16, 2007 response and February 22, 2008 supplemental response are before the

court.

Before the statute of limitations issue was resolved, another potential problem

with the pending petition became apparent. In order for this court to have jurisdiction over this

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matter, petitioner must be challenging a judgment for which his is in custody. 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3); § 2254(a). Petitioner had not alleged that he was still in custody pursuant to the

challenged 1985 Amador County conviction. Rather, it appeared that the sentence for the 1985

Amador County conviction had expired but that he was nevertheless in custody on a subsequent,

unrelated 1987 conviction Santa Cruz County.

On December 16, 2009, respondents were ordered to file a brief statement

addressing the issue of whether this court has jurisdiction over the claims presented in the

pending petition. Their January 15, 2010 response is before the court. The documents attached

to the response indicate that the sentence for petitioner’s 1987 conviction was imposed

consecutively to the sentence for his 1985 conviction. Pursuant to the holding of the United

States Supreme Court in Garlotte v. Fordice, petitioner’s two consecutive sentences must be

viewed as a “continuous stream” and he remains in custody under both sentences until both are

served. 515 U.S. 39, 41 (1995); see also Allen v. State of Oregon, 153 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir.

1998). Petitioner is still “in custody” for his 1985 conviction and this court is assured of its

jurisdiction over the pending petition.

II. Statute of Limitations

In any event, however, the petition is untimely. The Anti-terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) became law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a

one year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Although the statute of limitations issue is not jurisdictional, a district

court has the authority to raise the issue sua sponte, even after the initial screening stage. Day v.

McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006). In an order dated April 16, 2007, the pending petition

was deemed untimely under the applicable one year statute of limitations and petitioner was

ordered to show cause why it should not be dismissed. As previously noted, his May 16, 2007

response and February 22, 2008 supplemental response are before the court.

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 It need not be decided whether the Supreme Court in Pace lowered the bar for equitable 1

tolling when it framed the standard in slightly different and less absolute terms than the Ninth Circuit

has used both before and after that case was decided. See Espinoza-Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026 at

n.5. Petitioner has not met the potentially less demanding standard of Pace in any event.

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As directed, petitioner has addressed the specific circumstances for which he

contends that equitable tolling is warranted. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to equitable

tolling because of two specific circumstances: (1) he was separated from all of his legal materials

during a temporary housing transfer which lasted for two years, and (2) he never received

transcripts and other desired documentation relating to the 1985 conviction.

“[E]quitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit has held that equitable tolling of the filing

deadline for a habeas petition is only available if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotations and citation omitted). This determination is highly factdependent, and petitioner bears the burden to show that equitable tolling is warranted. EspinozaMatthews v. People of the State of California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). In Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, the Supreme Court held that in order to meet the burden for equitable tolling, a

petitioner must demonstrate “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).1

In Lott v. Mueller, the Ninth Circuit found that a petitioner’s deprivation of legal

materials for 82 days due to temporary housing transfers was an “extraordinary circumstance”

sufficient to warrant equitable tolling for that time period. 304 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Similarly, equitable tolling has been applied where a petitioner demonstrated that, despite due

diligence, he had no access to his legal materials for approximately 11 months while he was

housed in administrative segregation. Espinoza-Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1027 (“After his release

from Ad/Seg, Espinoza-Matthews had only slightly over a month with his legal file to try to

prepare a proper petition. Under those circumstances Espinoza-Matthews is entitled to equitable

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tolling.”)

Citing the above cases, petitioner contends that he was separated from his legal

materials relating to the Amador County conviction for an even longer time, a full two years

beginning in May of 1985 when he was transferred to the Santa Cruz County Jail to await trial on

an unrelated matter. During this period of time, however, the AEDPA’s limitation period had not

begun to run since it had not yet been enacted. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting retroactive application of AEDPA’s

one year statute of limitations, which became law on April 24, 1996), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en

banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999). Thus equitable tolling cannot be applied for the first 

circumstance alleged by petitioner.

Petitioner’s second contention in support of equitable tolling is that he

was never given transcripts of either his pre-trial hearings, the trial,

or the post-trial hearings pertaining to the Amador County

homicide case. To this very day, 22 years later, Petitioner has been

unable to acquire them. The only documents related to the Amador

County case that Petitioner was ever able to acquire were a handful

of police reports and interviews. It was only due to the tireless

investigative efforts of Petitioner’s adult son Jerad Clinton Taylor,

over the past year, that enough of the police reports and interviews

were obtained to put together the instant federal habeas corpus

petition, memorandum of points and authorities, and supporting

exhibits.

(Pet. Resp. at 2.)

In Ford v. Hubbard, the Ninth Circuit specifically declined to decide whether “an

attorney’s failure or refusal to provide a habeas client with important parts of his legal file may

rise to the level of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ for purposes of equitable tolling.” 330 F.3d

1086, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted and overruled on other grounds in Pliler v. Ford, 124

S.Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004). In another, previous case, it was noted that a habeas petitioner could

potentially be entitled to equitable tolling if he could show that lack of access to transcripts was

an extraordinary circumstance that made it impossible to file on time. 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th

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Cir. 2002). That case was remanded to the district court so the record could be developed on the

issue of causation. Battles, 362 F.3d at 1198. 

Here, petitioner has had a chance to fully explain his argument for equitable

tolling based on the lack of access to transcripts and other documents. He alleges that he

attempted, unsuccessfully, to acquire the desired transcripts from both his trial attorney and the

attorney who represented him on appeal. Petitioner attached a copy of a October 22, 1994 letter

to his appellate attorney and the appellate attorney’s response indicating that he no longer had the

file as he believed he had already returned it to petitioner. Petitioner states that he also requested

his legal file and transcripts in 1992 and again in 2000 from the attorney who represented him up

to and during entry of his voluntary manslaughter plea. He received no response to these

requests. Petitioner has further attached a copy of a motion he filed in state court in 2005 entitled

“Ex Parte Motion for Production of Transcripts and other Court Documents...”

Only two of the demonstrated attempts to obtain the desired transcripts and

documents were undertaken after the date of the AEDPA’s enactment; petitioner unsuccessfully

requested materials from his former defense attorney in 2000 and unsuccessfully attempted to

obtain production of transcripts and other documents through the state court in 2005. These two

attempts to not show that petitioner was pursuing his rights diligently during the time that the

statute of limitations was running from the AEDPA’s enactment on April 24, 1996 until the

pending petition was filed on February 20, 2007.

Moreover, petitioner fails to explain exactly how the lack of access to documents

and transcripts actually prevented him from filing a timely federal habeas corpus petition. The

fact that petitioner ultimately filed a petition without access to the desired transcripts and

documentation does not necessarily mean that he could have previously made a timely filing such

that equitable tolling would be barred. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 at n.5 (“Were it otherwise, a

person who in desperation finally filed something anyway would be barred, ipso facto, whereas a

person who did not file at all would not be.”) Of course, a petitioner’s actual filing may show

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Though not relevant to the immediate issue of whether equitable tolling is warranted, it 2

appears that petitioner actually waived his right to bring most of the claims set forth in the pending

petition when he entered his guilty plea. See Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2006)

(holding that most antecedent constitutional claims are waived by the entry of a guilty plea, but that

a double jeopardy claim is not waived), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1168 (2006). A guilty plea is an

admission of guilt for the purposes of the case. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926).

When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is guilty of a charged offense

he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that

occurred prior to entry of the plea, but may only attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of the

plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

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that he was not truly delayed at all. Id. Here, petitioner states that he eventually managed to file

the pending petition by relying “mainly on his memory” in addition to utilizing some police

reports and interviews that were newly obtained. 

The content of the pending petition was additionally reviewed. Although

petitioner entered a guilty plea, he contends that he is actually innocent. He alleges that he

pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter after his murder trial began in order to protect his exwife, whom he says committed the crime with another man. Petitioner presents the following

seven grounds for relief in the petition: (1) his Sixth Amendment right to obtain counsel of his

choice and to post bail was violated; (2) his confession was illegally obtained in violation of the

Supreme Court’s mandate in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (3) the prosecution

illegally suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);

(4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to trial, during trial, and up to and during

entry of his guilty plea; (5) the prosecution engaged in misconduct that deprived him of a fair

trial; (6) there was insufficient evidence to support his guilty plea; and (7) the cumulative effect

of these alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial.2

Petitioner has thoroughly detailed in the pending petition the facts underlying each

of the foregoing claims without use of the desired transcripts and other documents. It is not

evident, nor does petitioner explain, exactly what the transcripts or other documents might show

in relation to these claims, or how he could have used them to file a timely petition. Based on the

foregoing, it does not appear that the lack of access to the desired transcripts or other documents

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actually stood in petitioner’s way of filing a timely petition. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

a causal relationship between the alleged extraordinary circumstances on which his claim for

equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing. See Battles, 362 F.3d at 1198; Valverde v.

Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000) (a petitioner must “demonstrate a causal relationship

between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the

lateness of his filing”); Rosati v. Kernan, 417 F.Supp.2d 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (petitioner not

entitled to equitable tolling because of allegedly missing transcripts where he did not explain

how the lack of transcripts prevented him from timely filing his petition).

III. Conclusion

“The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high,

lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation and brackets omitted). Here, petitioner has failed to carry his heavy burden of

demonstrating that equitable tolling should be applied to any length of time between the

enactment of the AEDPA on April 24, 1996, and the untimely filing of his petition more than ten

years later, on February 20, 2007. For this reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

pending petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 22, 2010

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