Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06057/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 00:0000 Cause Code Unknown

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GIL MCDOUGALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

O.A.R.S., INC., a corporation,

OARS CANYONLANDS, INC., a

corporation, GEORGE WENDT, an

individual, M/V METAL CRAFT JET

BOAT bearing VIN

1FWE02522XAO23408, her engines,

tackle, apparel, furniture and

appurtenances, and DOES 1

through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

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1:04-cv-6057 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO TRANSFER DISTRICT

(28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants O.A.R.S., Inc., OARS Canyonlands, Inc., and

George Wendt (“Defendants”) move to transfer venue to the

District of Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiff

Gil McDougald (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion.

//

//

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1 Plaintiff learned this information from Defendant George

Wendt at his deposition. (Pl.’s Opp. 7, citing Micklow Decl. Ex.

2 at 15; Ex. 1 at 20-1). O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc., is

incorporated in Utah. Its corporate office is located at Angel’s

Camp, California. Defendant George Wendt and his wife are the

sole shareholders of O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc. O.A.R.S.

Companies, Inc., is headquartered in Angel’s Camp on a permanent,

year-round basis. (Id.).

2

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his original complaint against

O.A.R.S., Inc., OARS Canyonlands, Inc., North American River

Expeditions, Inc., and M/V Metal Craft Jet Boat bearing VIN

1FWE02522XAO23408, on August 5, 2004. (Doc. 1, Compl.). 

Plaintiff moved to amend on December 12, 2004, and was granted

leave to amend by the magistrate judge on January 24, 2005. 

(Doc. 10, Motion to Amend; Doc. 14, Order). The operative First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was also filed on January 24, 2005. 

(Doc. 18, FAC). Plaintiff dismissed North American River

Expeditions, Inc., as a defendant and added George Wendt as a

defendant. (See id.). Plaintiffs’ claims include: (1) Jones Act

Negligence, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688; (2) Unseaworthiness; and (3)

Maintenance and Cure. 

The current named defendants are: O.A.R.S., Inc.;

OARS Canyonlands, Inc. (“Canyonlands”); M/V Metal Craft Jet Boat

bearing VIN 1FWE02522XAO23408; and George Wendt (collectively,

“Defendants”). Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant

O.A.R.S., Inc., is not properly named because it is not the

parent company of Canyonlands, and that instead,

O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc., is the parent company of Canyonlands.1

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2 Defendants note that disputed between the parties

(although not at issue in this motion) are Plaintiff’s status as

a “seaman” under the Jones Act or under common law doctrine of

“Maintenance and Cure;” whether Plaintiff was “in navigation” for

purposes of the Jones Act; whether the relevant part of the

Colorado River in Utah is a “navigable” waterway pursuant to the

Jones Act (Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem. 4). 

3

(Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 7). Plaintiff intends to move to dismiss

O.A.R.S., Inc., from the case and add OARS Companies, Inc.,

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, although has not yet done so. 

Defendants O.A.R.S., Inc., Canyonlands, and George Wendt answered

the FAC on March 3, 2005. (Doc. 19, Canyonlands Answer; Doc. 20,

O.A.R.S, Inc., Answer; Doc. 21, Wendt Answer).

Defendants move to transfer venue to the District of Utah. 

(Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem., filed March 1, 2005). Plaintiff opposed. 

(Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp., filed Mar. 15, 2005). Defendants replied. 

(Doc. 27, Def.’s Reply, filed Mar. 22, 2005).

Oral argument was heard on April 11, 2005. Jack C. Nick

appeared on behalf of defendants. Kurt Micklow appeared on

behalf of Plaintiff.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence under

46 App. U.S.C. § 688 (“Jones Act”). (Doc. 18, FAC ¶ 1). The

Jones Act allows seamen to recover for injuries sustained as a

result of their employers’ negligence.2 Id.; see also Ribitzki

v. Canmar Reading & Bates, Ltd. P’ship, 111 F.3d 658, 662

(9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff alleges venue in this district is

proper pursuant to 46 App. U.S.C. § 688(a).

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3 Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not produced a

complete set of medical records. Defendants based their summary

of Plaintiff’s medical treatment on the purportedly incomplete

records that have been produced to date.

4

Plaintiff is a resident of Moab, Utah. (See Doc. 23,

McDougald Decl. ¶ 1). Plaintiff was employed by Defendant

Canyonlands on a seasonal basis as a “Jet Boat pilot” from 2000

to 2003. (Id. at ¶ 2). Plaintiff’s duties included towing a 24-

foot Jet Boat from Moab to a boat launch on the Colorado River,

launching the Jet Boat, piloting the Jet Boat and leading

customers on tours, returning the Jet Boat to the launch, loading

the Jet Boat back onto the trailer, and towing the Jet Boat back

to Moab. (Id.). The incident from which this litigation arose

occurred on September 10, 2003, when Plaintiff alleges he injured

his back while loading the Jet Boat back onto the trailer after a

boat tour. (Id. at ¶ 3; Doc. 18, FAC ¶ 10). No one witnessed

the incident.

A. Medical Witnesses Regarding Plaintiff’s Injury.

Plaintiff sought and received treatment for his injury from

several doctors, and also underwent back surgery. Plaintiff

underwent all of his medical treatment in Utah. All of his

doctors are residents of Utah. All of his medical records are

located in Utah. The physicians who treated him after his

purported injury on September 10, 2003, include:3

- Dr. Jonas Munger, M.D., a Utah resident, who examined

Plaintiff and prescribed Flexeril and Vicodin. (Doc. 16,

Def.’s Mem. 6).

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5

- Dr. Paul Asmar, M.D., a Utah resident. Dr. Asmar 

performed an MRI exam on Plaintiff on September 23, 2003. 

(Id.).

- Dr. Jackson Maddux, M.D., a Utah resident. Dr. Maddux

prescribed medication and recommended Plaintiff use an

electrical stimulation unit.

- Dr. Gary L. Halversen, M.D., a Utah resident, who

performed an MRI exam on Plaintiff and who prepared a report

comparing the September 2003 results and the November 2003

results. (Id. at 6-7).

- Dr. Robert Peterson, M.D., a Utah resident, who examined

Plaintiff in November 2003 and prepared a report. (Id. at

7).

- Dr. Stephen J. Warner, M.D., a Utah resident, who examined

Plaintiff in March 2004 and prepared a report. (Id. at 8).

- Dr. Les Harris, M.D., a Utah resident, who examined

Plaintiff at least ten times. Dr. Harris recommended

surgery for Plaintiff, and referred Plaintiff to Dr. Kade

Huntsman, M.D. (Id. at 8-9).

- Dr. Kade Huntsman, M.D., a Utah resident, who performed

back surgery on Plaintiff on October 26, 2004. (Id. at 9).

Plaintiff asserts that he had “four treating physicians,”

but names only Dr. Harris and Dr. Huntsman. (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp.

18). Plaintiff does not identify the other two “treating

physicians,” although Plaintiff does not dispute that all of this

physicians are Utah residents.

The parties dispute, among other things, whether Plaintiff

had a preexisting back injury. (Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem. 4). During

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oral argument, Plaintiff, through his attorney, conceded that,

during his previous employment, Plaintiff had a “slip-and-fall”

accident involving his back. Plaintiff contends, however, that

this accident was not causally related to the injury that

purportedly resulted from the September 10, 2003, accident at

Canyonlands. In their reply, Defendants identified five

additional physicians whom they assert treated Plaintiff (in

Utah) after the previous “slip and fall” accident:

- Dr. S. Rouzer, whom Plaintiff visited a number of times

between October 1998 and March 2003 complaining of back

pain. Dr. Rouzer prescribed the pain medication Percocet

and Valium and referred Plaintiff to Dr. Kopel for

acupuncture.

- Dr. Kopel, a chiropractor, who treated Plaintiff at least

twice.

- Dr. Chris Dutton, a chiropractor. Defendants assert that

Plaintiff informed Dr. Rouzer that he had “been going to a

chiropractor Chris Dutton but ha[d] not had any success.” 

- Dr. Stanford, whose role Defendants do not clarify. 

- Dr. Murray, who was mentioned by Dr. Rouzer as having

treated Plaintiff for back pain in the past. 

(Doc. 27, Def.’s Reply 7).

At oral argument, Plaintiff did not dispute having been

treated by the above-listed physicians after his earlier “slipand-fall” accident. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff

underwent all of his medical treatment for the slip-and-fall

accident in Utah and that all of his medical records are located

in Utah. 

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7

B. Liability Witnesses.

The following individuals have been identified by the

parties as potential witnesses regarding the September 10, 2003,

incident:

- Erik Thompson is a former Canyonlands employee. Although 

Mr. Thompson did not witness the September 10, 2005,

incident, he was with Plaintiff on the boat tour that day

and was witness to the conditions on the day the incident

occurred. Erik Thompson is a resident of Oregon.

- Brian Stepek was Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor at the

time of the incident and is expected to testify regarding

Plaintiff’s report of the incident and to the condition of

the trailer. (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 11; Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem.

10). Mr. Stepek is a Wyoming resident who has worked parttime in Utah. (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 11; Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem.

11).

- Dennis Smoldt was Plaintiff’s supervisor before Mr.

Stepek, and was identified by Plaintiff as a person with

knowledge of the incident. (See Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 18). 

Mr. Smoldt is a resident of Utah. (Id. at 18.).

- Dave Bodner was Plaintiff’s supervisor before Mr. Smoldt,

and trained Plaintiff how to load and unload the Jet Boat

and use the equipment. (Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem. 10). Mr.

Bodner is a Utah resident.

- Nathan Bricker is the current regional manager of OARS

Companies, Inc. He was not employed by O.A.R.S. Companies,

Inc., until after the September 10, 2003, incident, but he

was assigned to investigate the incident in 2004 and made

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two trips to Utah. (Id. at 18). Mr. Bricker is a resident

of California. (See Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem. 16). The parties

have stipulated to the authenticity of photographs taken Mr.

Bricker in the course of his investigation and that Mr.

Bricker will not testify at trial. (Doc. 27, Def.’s Reply

4).

- Richard Weiss was the regional manager for O.A.R.S.

Companies, Inc., at the time of the September 10, 2003,

incident. (Doc. 27, Def.’s Reply 4). Mr. Weiss is a

resident of California. Plaintiff does not specify what

knowledge he has of the September 10, 2003, incident,

although Plaintiff claims Mr. Weiss has information

regarding the maintenance and cure issues, equipment

replacement and repair, and drafting of safety manuals. 

(Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 13). Defendants assert that Mr. Weiss

“was only peripherally involved in OARS Canyonlands

operations at the time of Plaintiff’s accident” and is

therefore not a crucial witness. (Doc. 27, Def.’s Reply 4).

- Rocko Digilio was identified by Plaintiffs as a potential

witness. (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 13 n. 34). According to

Defendant’s counsel, Mr. Digilio was a California resident

and worked at the Angel’s Camp location and was an

accountant and bookkeeper for OARS Companies, Inc. 

Plaintiff claims that Mr. Digilio can testify to the nonpayment of Plaintiff’s maintenance and cure, authorizations

for equipment replacement and repair, and the drafting of

safety manuals. (Id. at 12-3). Defendants asserted during

oral argument that Mr. Digilio is no longer employed by

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O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc. Defendants stated that they

believe, although they were not able to confirm, that

Mr. Digilio has re-joined the armed forces and is now

serving in the Middle East.

Defendants also assert that the following current and former

Canyonlands Jet Boat operators can testify to the proper

procedures for loading the Jet Boat onto the trailer, Plaintiff’s

training regarding the procedure, and water levels around the

time of the incident: Christian Dean, Scott Morrison, and

Jason Taylor. (Id. at 5). Mr. Dean, Mr. Morrison, and Mr.

Taylor are Utah residents. During oral argument, Plaintiff

asserted that none of these employees were Jet Boat operators and

in fact, Mr. Dean operated rafts (not Jet Boats); Mr. Morrison

was a part-time mechanic; and Mr. Taylor was a manager. 

Defendants maintained during argument that part of the

responsibilities of each was to operate Jet Boats. The parties

dispute the relevance and importance of these four witnesses. 

Canyonlands also asserts that the following current and

former employees were working in the Moab office on the date of

the incident and may be able to testify to Plaintiff’s actions

after the accident: Dan Phillips, Stephen Kenner, Lars Haarr,

and Marlene Moody. (Id.). Mr. Phillips, Mr. Kenner, and

Mr. Haarr, and Ms. Moody are Utah residents. During oral

argument, Plaintiff asserted that he did not speak with any of

these individuals after the accident, and that the only person he

spoke with was Mr. Thompson. Defendants assert all of these

individuals are Utah residents. The parties dispute the

relevance and importance of these four witnesses.

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4 Ms. Helmbrecht is not a party-controlled witness because

she is employed by O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc., which is not, as of

yet, a named defendant in this case.

10

C. Alter-Ego Witnesses.

Plaintiff asserts that alter-ego liability is an issue that

will dominate this litigation. The following individuals have

been identified by the parties as potential witnesses regarding

alter-ego liability:

- Joyce Helmbrecht is the O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc.

“controller.” (See Doc. 24, Micklow Decl., Ex. 2 Helmbrecht

Dep. 11). Plaintiff asserts Ms. Helmbrecht has knowledge of

the corporate and financial affairs of the companies. (Doc.

22, Pl.’s Opp. 12). Plaintiff also asserts Ms. Helmbrecht

can testify to the maintenance and cure issues. (Id. at 12-

3). Ms. Helmbrecht is a resident of California.4

- Kelly Caverli is the bookings supervisor for OARS

Companies, Inc. Ms. Caverli is a resident of California. 

Plaintiffs assert she can speak to the corporate and

financial affairs of the companies. Defendants respond that

Ms. Caverli was responsible for customer bookings and did

not interact with Plaintiff on a regular basis. (Id.; Doc.

27, Def.’s Reply 4). Defendants asserted during oral

argument that instead, Ms. Caverli called a person named

Maureen at the Moab, Utah, office with customer booking

information.

D. Workers’ Compensation Witnesses.

Plaintiff brought a workers’ compensation claim in Utah

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through the Workers Compensation Fund (“WCF”), which Defendants

assert is Canyonlands’ workers compensation insurer. The WCF

adjusters assigned to handle Plaintiff’s claim were Shannon Harte

and Jennifer Oswald, who are both Utah residents. (Doc. 16,

Def.’s Mem. 5). Defendants contend that the adjusters can

testify to information they reported by telephone conversations

and by way of official records, to Canyonlands regarding

Plaintiff’s claim and treatment.

E. United States Geological Survey (“USGS”) Witnesses.

Defendants contend in their reply that United States

Geological Survey (“USGS”) officials can testify to water level

for the area where Plaintiff was loading and unloading the Jet

Boat on September 10, 2003. These officials reside, and their

respective records are located, in Utah.

F. Witnesses Regarding Loss of Past and Future Income.

Plaintiff’s loss of past and future earnings is also at

issue in this case. Two of Plaintiff’s employers in the last ten

years are headquartered outside of Utah (Kejana Development

Corporation, San Mateo, California; and IT Corporation, North

Tawanda, New York). Two of Plaintiff’s employers are

headquartered in Utah (Jordan Valley Drywall, West Jordan, Utah;

and Canyonlands, Moab, Utah). (Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem. 9). It

appears from the parties’ submissions that Plaintiff’s place of

employment for these companies was Utah. Plaintiff maintains

that it is not necessary to call any witnesses from these

employers and that instead, earnings information can be obtained

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by way of business records. (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 12). 

G. Relationship and Residence of the OARS Defendants.

Defendant Canyonlands is a corporation incorporated under

the laws of the state of Utah. Canyonlands operates a

recreational boating business and Canyonlands maintains a

seasonal office in Moab, Utah, to run that business. Canyonlands

asserts it “contracts” with its parent company (i.e., O.A.R.S.

Companies, Inc.) to provide administrative services. Based on

the deposition testimony of Joyce Helmbrecht, Plaintiffs assert

that these services include payroll, banking, accounting,

advertising, bookings, record-keeping, budgeting, insurance,

taxes, and preparation of safety manuals. (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp.

6; Doc. 24, Micklow Decl. Ex. 1, Helmbrecht Dep. 17-30, 37-40). 

Defendant OARS is a corporation that is incorporated under

the laws of the state of Utah. (Doc. 20, O.A.R.S., Inc., Answer,

¶ 3). OARS’s principal place of business is in Angel’s Camp,

California. (Id.). O.A.R.S., Inc.’s relationship to Defendant

Canyonlands its parent O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc., or Defendant

Wendt is not clear.

Defendant George Wendt and his wife are the sole

shareholders of O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc. O.A.R.S. Companies,

Inc., manages and operates all of Defendant Wendt’s companies

from its Angel’s Camp location. (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 7).

O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc., is not a named defendant. 

O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc., is incorporated under the laws of the

state of Utah, and has its principal place of business at

Angel’s Camp, California. 

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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Defendants move to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a). Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience

of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district

court may transfer any civil action to any other district or

division where it might have been brought.” Id. Defendants

contend that the Eastern District of California is an

inconvenient venue because, although Defendants’ principal place

of business is at Angel’s Camp, California, in the Eastern

District, venue is more convenient in Utah for the witnesses. 

(See Doc. 27, Def.’s Reply 2). Motions to transfer for improper

venue are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Defendants

have not raised § 1406(a). 

Motions to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

presuppose two forums in which venue is proper. See Chicago R.

I. & P. R. Co. v. Egoe, 212 F.2d 378, 379 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1954). 

The first issue is whether venue is proper in both the Eastern

District of California and the District of Utah. The second

issue is whether the factors to be considered by the district

court on a motion to change venue pursuant to § 1404(a) weigh in

favor of Defendants.

A. Whether Venue Is Proper in Both the Eastern District of

California and in the District of Utah.

Venue is proper in Jones Act cases “in the district in which

the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office

is located.” Id. This provision incorporates the general

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5 Section 688(a) states: “Jurisdiction in [Jones Act]

actions shall be under the court of the district in which the

defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is

located.” It has long been settled that the term “jurisdiction”

refers only to venue. Pure Oil, 384 U.S. at 203.

14

definition of residence contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which

allows suit against a corporation in any judicial district in

which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or in which

it is doing business. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 204

(1966); Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406,

1409 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In Pure Oil, the Court ruled that venue

for a seaman’s Jones Act...claim was proper under a general venue

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) [(1964)], under which the defendant

corporation could be sued in any district in which it transacted

business, even though the Jones Act had its own venue provision,

under which venue would have been proper only where the defendant

resided or had its principal place of business.” (emphasis in

original)). The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1996)

provides: “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to

reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to

personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”5

Defendant Canyonlands was Plaintiff’s employer. (Doc. 19,

Canyonlands Answer ¶ 8). Canyonlands is a Utah corporation. 

(Id. at ¶ 3; see also Doc. 16, Def.’s Mem. 15). It has a

seasonal office in Utah and a permanent corporate office in

Angel’s Camp, California. While Defendants’ papers are not

clear, Canyonlands seems to dispute that its principal place of

business is in Angel’s Camp. (Doc. 27, Def.’s Reply 2

(“CANYONLANDS is not attempting to transfer the case to a foreign

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6 Defendant Canyonlands does not specify what

“administrative services” are performed at the Angel’s Camp

office. Plaintiff asserts that the activities listed are

performed there, and Defendant does not dispute that it maintains

its corporate office at Angel’s Camp, California. 

15

district, it is seeking to transfer to its home state.”)

(emphasis in original)). However, regardless of the location of

Canyonlands’ “principal place of business,” venue is proper in

the Eastern District of California because Canyonlands’ principal

place of business is its corporate office in Angel’s Camp,

California, which is located in that district. Specifically,

Canyonlands conducts various administrative services, which may

include “payroll, banking, accounting, advertising, bookings,

record-keeping, budgeting, insurance, taxes, and preparation of

safety manuals.”6 (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Mem. 6; see also Doc. 27,

Def.’s Reply 2, 4). Likewise, venue is also proper in the

District of Utah because Canyonlands does business in Utah

through its Moab, Utah seasonal office and its operation the

recreational boating business there. (Id.). Venue is proper in

a district where “any defendant resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). 

Defendant Canyonlands “resides” in both California and Utah (for

venue purposes). Venue is proper in both California and Utah.

Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant O.A.R.S., Inc., is not

properly named because it is not the parent company of

Canyonlands, and that instead, O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc., is the

parent company of Canyonlands. (Doc. 22, Pl.’s Opp. 7). 

Regardless, O.A.R.S., Inc. is still a named defendant. 

O.A.R.S., Inc., is incorporated in Utah and its principal place

of business is in Angel’s Camp, California. As to defendant

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7 O.A.R.S., Companies Inc., is incorporated in Utah, with

its principal place of business at Angel’s Camp, California. 

Because O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc. is not a named defendant, a

determination of proper venue for this entity is not necessary. 

16

O.A.R.S., Inc., venue is therefore proper in both California and

Utah.7

Defendant Wendt is a resident of the state of California

within the Eastern District of California. (Doc. 21, Wendt

Answer, filed Mar. 30, 2005, ¶ 4). Venue is therefore proper in

the Eastern District of California and improper in the District

of Utah as to Defendant Wendt. However, because venue is proper

in the district where “any defendant resides,” improper venue as

to one defendant does not preclude a finding of proper venue for

a case with multiple defendants, like this case. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(a).

For all the reasons stated above, venue is proper in both

the Eastern District of California and the District of Utah.

B. Whether Venue Should Be Transferred Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a).

1. Legal Standard.

Motions to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) may be

brought in Jones Act cases. See e.g., Mitchell v. Farrell Lines,

Inc. v. Univ. Terminal and Stevedoring Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1325,

1326 (E.D. Penn. 1972). The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is to

prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect

litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary

inconvenience and expense. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612,

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616 (1964).

Transfer will not be allowed merely to shift the

inconvenience from one party to another. Id. at 635-7; Dual Lock

Partition Sys., Inc. v. Ridgeview Glass, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1432,

1438 (D. Or. 1995). The party seeking transfer bears the burden

of showing that the balance of convenience clearly favors

transfer. Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279

(9th Cir. 1979). The decision whether to transfer is within the

sound discretion of the trial court. Id.

District courts employ a wide range of factors in deciding

motions to transfer. See 15 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. 2d

(“Wright & Miller”) § 3847 n. 7.2 (listing district court cases

and variety of factors considered by each). Defendant cites a

District of Columbia case, Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Page

Airways, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 461 (D.D.C. 1978), that considered

six factors, and Defendant structures its brief around those

factors. Specifically, the Page Airways court considered: 

[1] convenience of witnesses of plaintiff and defendant; [2]

ease of access to sources of proof; [3] availability of

compulsory process to compel the attendance of unwilling

witnesses; [4] the amount of expense for willing witnesses;

[5] the relative congestion of the calendars of the

potential transferee and transferor courts; [6] and other

practical aspects of expeditiously and conveniently

conducting a trial. 

464 F. Supp. at 463. The Page Airways court noted that the

factors to consider in deciding a § 1404(a) motion “are generally

a matter left to the discretion of the trial court.” Id. 

Federal district courts in California have likewise

considered a variety of factors. For example, the court in

E. & J. Gallo Winery v. F. & P. S.p.A., 899 F. Supp. 465, 466

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(E.D. Cal. 1994), considered “convenience of the parties,

convenience of the witnesses, and interest of justice.” In its

analysis, the Gallo Winery court broke down these broad factors

into more specific inquiries, including “convenience of

witnesses, judicial economy, relative ease of access to proof,

and compulsory process.” Id; see also Broadcast Mktg. Int’l,

Ltd. v. Prosource Sales & Mktg., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1064

(N.D. Cal. 2004) (considering “1) the location of the events

giving rise to the suit; 2) the convenience of the parties; 3)

the convenience of the witnesses; 4) the relative ease of access

of proof; 5) the availability of process for unwilling witnesses;

6) plaintiff's choice of forum; 7) a forum's familiarity with the

governing law; 8) trial efficiency; and 9) the interest of

justice.”).

The Ninth Circuit considers these factors: 

(1) the location where the relevant agreements were

negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar

with the governing law, the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4)

the respective parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) the

contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the

chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation

in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory

process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party

witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof.

Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir.

2000); see also Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805

F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The key purpose and inquiry of discretionary transfer of

venue under § 1404(a) is the relative convenience of the forum to

the parties and the witnesses. The party seeking to transfer has

the burden to show that the balance of convenience clearly favors

transfer. Savage, 611 F.2d at 279. 

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At issue between the parties here is whether Utah or

California is a more convenient forum. Plaintiff brings three

claims against defendants: Negligence under the Jones Act;

Unseaworthiness; and Maintenance and Cure. Plaintiff also

alleges that Defendant Wendt is the alter ego of the OARS

companies and that the corporate veil should be pierced. 

Plaintiff alleges the OARS Defendants failed to purchase adequate

insurance. Plaintiff also alleges the OARS Defendants were

negligent in failing to provide a safe work environment and that

the Jet Boat was “unseaworthy.” Plaintiff alleges he was

disabled as a result of his injury and prevented from performing

similar work, and that he is therefore entitled to recover

compensatory damages for his medical treatment “until he has

reached a state w[h]ere there can be no possible improvement in

his physical condition.” (Doc. 18, FAC ¶ 22).

The key factors in this case, as they relate to the relevant

facts and key issues, are: the location of the parties; location

of key witnesses; availability of compulsory process for

unwilling witnesses; ease of access to sources of proof;

familiarity with governing law; and plaintiff’s choice of forum.

1. Location of Parties.

Defendant Canyonlands is a Utah corporation that operates a

seasonal boating business in Moab, Utah. Canyonlands’

administrative tasks, including payroll, banking, accounting,

advertising, bookings, record-keeping, budgeting, insurance,

taxes, and preparation of safety manuals, are conducted in

Angel’s Camp, California. Because Canyonlands essentially

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8 Defendant O.A.R.S., Inc., has been improperly named, and

its location is not relevant to this inquiry.

20

conducts about half of its operations in Utah and half of its

operations in California, the relative convenience for Defendant

Canyonlands does not weigh in favor of either forum.8

Defendant Wendt is a resident of California. Wendt is the

owner of O.A.R.S. Companies, Inc., which is the parent company of

Defendant Canyonlands. Defendants provided no evidence or

indication that Defendant Wendt travels to Utah for duties and

activities associated with Canyonlands’ operations there. 

California is ostensibly a more convenient forum for Defendant

Wendt.

2. Location of Key Witnesses.

(a) Liability witnesses.

The witnesses who can best testify to the negligence and

unseaworthiness causes of action include Canyonlands employees

who have personal knowledge of the working conditions and

procedures at Canyonlands’ Moab, Utah, facility; the condition of

the Jet Boat that is the subject of this dispute; and Plaintiff’s

training regarding boating, loading, and unloading procedures. 

The key witnesses as to the above-listed issues include: Erik

Thompson (an Oregon resident), Brian Stepek (a Wyoming resident),

Dennis Smoldt (a Utah resident), and Dave Bodner (a Utah

resident). 

Erik Thompson is a former Canyonlands employee who was with

Plaintiff on the boat tour on the day of the incident, although

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he did not witness Plaintiff’s accident. Utah and California are

likely equally as inconvenient for Mr. Thompson, since he is a

resident of Oregon and would have to travel to either state. 

Mr. Stepek was Plaintiff’s supervisor at the time of the

incident and is expected to testify to the condition of the

equipment and to Plaintiff’s report of the incident. Because

Mr. Stepek lives and works for part of the year in Utah, Utah

would likely be a slightly more convenient forum than California

for Mr. Stepek. 

Mr. Smoldt is Plaintiff’s former supervisor and was

identified by the parties as a person with knowledge of the

incident. Mr. Smodt is a resident of Utah and Utah is a more

convenient forum for him.

Mr. Bodner is Plaintiff’s former supervisor and trained

Plaintiff in loading and unloading procedures. Mr. Bodner is a

Utah resident and Utah is a more convenient forum for him.

Other witnesses identified by Defendant who may be able to

testify as to loading and unloading procedures and as to the

conditions on the day of Plaintiff’s accident include the

following six current and former Canyonlands employees (all Utah

residents): Christian Dean, Scott Morrison, Jason Taylor, Dan

Phillips, Stephen Kenner, Lars Haarr, and Marlene Moody. At oral

argument, the parties disputed the substance of the testimony of

these witnesses. However, Defendants do not explain the

substance of the information these individuals can add to the

testimony of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Stepek, Mr. Smoldt, and

Mr. Bodner. That these individuals are residents of Utah does

not necessarily weigh in Defendants’ favor without a showing that

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they can provide material non-cumulative information.

Other witnesses identified by the parties do not appear to

be key witnesses for issues relating to the Negligence and

Unseaworthiness causes of action, and their residency is not

afforded as much weight as the key witnesses. Nathan Bricker (a

California resident) is not expected to testify at trial. The

parties dispute the importance of the testimony of Richard Weiss

(a California resident), who was the regional manager at the time

of the incident. Defendants assert that he was only

“peripherally” involved in Canyonlands at the time of the

incident. Plaintiffs provided no evidence or argument to the

contrary. Mr. Weiss is likely not a key witness. 

Because Mr. Thompson is an Oregon resident, Mr. Stepek is a

Utah resident, Mr. Smoldt is a Utah resident, and Mr. Bodner is a

Wyoming resident who works part-time in Utah, the location of the

key liability witnesses slightly favors transfer to Utah.

(b) Damages witnesses.

The witnesses who can testify to the damages element (i.e.,

Plaintiff’s alleged physical and emotional injuries) include his

treating physicians. Plaintiff underwent all of his medical

evaluation and treatment in Utah. All of Plaintiff’s medical

records are located in Utah. Utah is a more convenient forum for

Plaintiff’s treating physicians, if they were to offer live

testimony.

Plaintiff cites two cases to support his contention that

transfer may be denied in Jones Act cases even if medical

evidence is located outside of the district. De Moraes v. Amer.

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Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Penn.

1968); Williams v. Centr. Gulf Steamship Corp., 240 F. Supp. 562

(E.D. Penn. 1965). The De Moraes court denied the motion to

transfer from Philadelphia to New York, holding that the fact

that the medical records were located in New York City did not

establish such inconvenience in defending case in Philadelphia. 

289 F. Supp. at 862. The Gulf Steamship court denied the motion

to transfer from Pennsylvania to Louisiana, where the plaintiff

underwent medical treatment in Louisiana for about a year, was

thereafter treated in New Jersey and New York. 240 F. Supp. at

563. The court reasoned that Defendants had not met their burden

to show it would be too inconvenient and expensive to defend the

case in Pennsylvania, where the treating physicians were U.S.

government doctors whose testimony was most often given by way of

deposition and who had rarely appeared for in-court testimony. 

The court also considered other factors in denying the transfer

motion, including that the out-of-state witnesses were seamen and

rarely available for testimony.

Defendants correctly note that neither of these cases held

that the location of the treating physicians was unimportant;

instead, the cases held that the balance of factors, including

the location of the physicians and medical records, did not weigh

in favor of transfer. Plaintiff argues that the residency of the

treating physicians should not be afforded much weight because

the parties will likely hire their own medical experts to

evaluate and interpret the Plaintiff’s medical history and to

testify at trial. Counsel for Plaintiff noted that treating

physicians rarely testify at trial in Jones Act cases and that

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much more often, their testimony is taken by way of deposition. 

(Doc. 24, Micklow Decl. ¶ 10).

Facts that weigh in favor of the district of Utah as a more

convenient forum include that Plaintiff was treated in Utah by at

least eight physicians (as well as other physicians Defendants

list in their reply), that Plaintiff’s medical records are

located in Utah, and that the location of any future medical

evaluations will likely occur in Utah (including those by

independent medical experts hired by the parties). However, even

if that Plaintiff’s treating physicians are unlikely to offer

live testimony, and Plaintiff’s medical records are obtainable

through discovery requests or by subpoena, Plaintiff is a Utah

resident, future medical treatment and evaluation will be in

Utah. This factor favors Utah.

(c) Alter-ego witnesses.

The witnesses who can testify to the corporate structure of

the OARS companies include OARS companies’ employees with

personal knowledge of those issues. The key witness (other than

Defendant Wendt) regarding these issues appears to be Joyce

Helmbrecht, the OARS Companies, Inc., “controller.” 

Ms. Helmbrecht is a resident of California and California is a

more convenient forum for her. 

Another potential witness regarding alter-ego issues is

Rocko Diglio, a Utah resident and the Defendants’ former

accountant and bookkeeper. Mr. Digilio is no longer employed by

the Defendants. According to information the parties have to

date, Mr. Digilio re-joined the armed forces and is currently

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serving in the Middle East. Mr. Digilio does not seem to be a

key witness. It is not clear what information he could provide

regarding the OARS Companies’ purchase of insurance for its

employees, or if he could provide such information, whether he

could provide non-cumulative testimony that would differ from or

supplement that of Ms. Helmbrecht’s. Mr. Digilio’s residency is

not afforded much weight. Plaintiff also asserts that Kelly

Caverli, a California resident, can testify to corporate and

financial affairs; however, Defendants respond that Ms. Caverli

is in charge of booking customers on boating trips, and

Plaintiffs offered no evidence or argument to the contrary. Ms.

Caverli is not a key witness and her residence is afforded little

weight. 

Because Ms. Helmbrecht, a California resident, appears to be

the only witness (other than Defendant Wendt) for alter ego

issues, the location of alter ego witnesses weighs in favor of

California.

(d) Witnesses regarding Defendants’ insurance and

workers’ compensation coverage.

The witnesses who can testify to the insurance and

compensation structure for work-related injuries include the

Canyonlands employees who can testify to those issues, as well as

the claims adjusters at WCF. The key witness (other than

Defendant Wendt) regarding the structure of the OARS Companies

appears to be Ms. Helmbrecht, a California resident. 

The WCF claims adjusters are Utah residents, and Utah would

be a more convenient forum for them. Under most circumstances,

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the WCF claims adjusters would be unlikely to testify at trial

because the only admissible, non-hearsay evidence they would

likely offer are (1) records relating to Plaintiffs’ workers’

compensation claim kept in the ordinary course of business; and

(2) records of communications with Defendants to show Defendants’

state of mind in rejecting Plaintiffs’ claim for maintenance and

cure. However, during oral argument, Defendant argued that the

WCF claims adjusters would offer live testimony regarding

telephone conversations they had with Defendants to show

Defendants’ state of mind regarding maintenance and cure issues. 

There is no evidence to support Defendant’s assertion at oral

argument that there were communications between the WCF adjusters

and Defendants regarding Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation

benefits or proceedings. However, if such testimony was offered,

Utah would be a more convenient forum for the adjusters. The

location of the WCF adjusters could weigh in favor of Utah.

(e) Witnesses regarding Plaintiffs’ past and

future income.

The witnesses who can testify to the past and future

earnings of Plaintiff include Plaintiff’s former employers. One

of Plaintiff’s former employers is headquartered in Utah. Two

are headquartered in other states (New York and California). It

is unlikely, however, that live testimony from the former

employers would be offered to show Plaintiffs’ earning potential. 

This information is accessible from record and will be presented

by an economist or vocational rehab counselor. This factor does

not weigh in favor of either forum. 

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(f) United States Geological Survey Witnesses.

Defendants argue that officials from the United States

Geological Survey (“USGS”) in Utah would testify regarding the

water levels of the Colorado river on the day of the accident. 

The level of the river is relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that

because the river level was low, he had to hoist the boat up onto

the trailer with his shoulder and back, which he alleges

contributed to his back injury. However, USGS officials are

unlikely to offer live testimony, since water level statistics

are available from official records that are admissible without

in-court testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (public records

exception). This factor does not weigh in favor of either forum.

3. Availability of Compulsory Process on Unwilling

Witnesses.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1)(2) provides that no district court

may subpoena a witness to testify at trial or produce documents

who resides more than 100 miles from the place of trial or as

permitted under the law of the state in which the district court

is located. California law permits statewide service. Cal. Civ.

Proc. § 1989. Nevertheless, Utah residents are not subject to

compulsory service in the Eastern District of California. 

Likewise, California residents are not subject to compulsory

service from a Utah court.

Defendants have identified the following witnesses who would

not be subject to subpoena in California: Plaintiff’s treating

physicians in Utah; Plaintiff’s supervisors and co-workers who

are Utah residents; WCF claims adjusters; Plaintiff’s former

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employers; and United States Geological Survey (“USGS”) officials

with knowledge of the water levels on the day of the accident. 

(Doc. 27, Def.’s Reply 5-6). 

While Plaintiff’s treating physicians reside in Utah, it is

unlikely they would testify at trial. If necessary, the

physicians could be subpoenaed for deposition testimony in Utah. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(3)(B). 

Also, it is likely that these issues can be addressed by the

parties’ respective experts, who can be hired anywhere. 

Compulsory process is not an issue as to the treating physicians.

Also, Eric Thompson, one of the four witnesses regarding the

Jet Boat, loading and unloading procedures, Plaintiff’s training,

and conditions on the day of the accident, is not subject to

compulsory process in either California or Utah because he is an

Oregon resident. Mr. Bodner and Mr. Smoldt, as Utah residents

are not subject to subpoena in California. Mr. Stepek, the other

witness regarding these issues, works part time in Utah and

therefore may be subject to compulsory process in Utah if present

in the state at the relevant time.

As discussed above, the lack of compulsory process for USGS

officials, WCF adjustors, and Plaintiffs’ previous employers does

not weigh in Defendants’ favor, as these witnesses are not likely

to testify at trial in any event.

The availability of compulsory process weighs in favor of

transfer to Utah.

4. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof.

The Jet Boat, named as a defendant, and trailer are located

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in Utah and, according to Plaintiff, “will never be admitted into

evidence regardless of the venue of the trial.” Plaintiff argues

that the parties’ respective experts would inspect the boat in

Utah and that the resulting photographs and reports could be made

available in either Utah or California. This is a close

question. This factor does not clearly weigh in favor of one

forum or the other. 

5. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum.

Plaintiff argues that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is

afforded great deference in venue transfer cases. Defendant

argues that Plaintiff’s choice of forum is afforded little if any

deference in Jones Act cases where the plaintiff is not a

resident of the chosen forum state and where the incident giving

rise to the cause of action occurred outside the chosen forum.

The plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally afforded

considerable deference in venue transfer cases. Decker Coal, 805

F.2d at 843. However, the plaintiff’s choice of forum is

afforded less weight when the chosen forum is not his state of

residence. Gemini Capital Group, Inc. v. Yap Fishing Corp., 150

F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Bowman, 157 F. Supp.

2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730,

739 (9th Cir. 1987); Carolina Cas. Co. v. Data Broadcasting

Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2001). However, the

plaintiff’s choice of forum is afforded more weight when the

balance of factors does not strongly weigh in favor of transfer. 

Gallo, 899 F. Supp. at 466; see also In re Nat’l Presto Indus.,

Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2003) (“When plaintiff and

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defendant are in different states there is no choice of forum

that will avoid imposing inconvenience; and when the

inconvenience of the alternative venues is comparable there is no

basis for a change of venue; the tie is awarded to the

plaintiff....”).

Defendants cite Loftin v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 1994 WL

793717, 1995 A.M.C. 982 (D. Alaska, Sept. 30, 1994), to support

their position that Plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be

afforded as much weight in deciding motions to transfer venue

under § 1404(a) in Jones Act cases. Loftin, however, is

distinguishable. The issue in Loftin was whether to transfer the

case from the District of Alaska to the District of Washington

where the accident giving rise to the cause of action occurred

outside Alaska; the majority of witnesses were from outside

Alaska; all parties were non-residents of Alaska; there was

greater ease of access to sources of proof (including medical and

employment records) in Washington; there was greater availability

of compulsory process in Washington; and the cost of obtaining

attendance of willing witnesses was lower in Washington. Id. at

*6. In Loftin, the balance of all the factors weighed heavily in

favor of transfer from Alaska to Washington State. That is not

the case here. 

The burden is on the moving party to show that the balance

of factors strongly favors transfer. Gallo, at 467; Decker Coal,

805 F.2d at 843. If the balance of factors is only slightly in

favor of transfer, or if the balance is more or less equal, and

would only shift the burden of inconvenience to the parties and

witnesses, then transfer should not be allowed. Decker, 805 F.2d

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at 843; see also In re Nat’l Presto, 347 F.3d at 663-4

(“[U]nless the balance [of factors] is strongly in favor of the

defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be

disturbed.”) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,

508 (1947)). It is not an abuse of discretion for the district

court to deny a motion to transfer when inconvenience would

merely be shifted, rather than eliminated. Decker Coal, 805 F.2d

at 843.

While both the Eastern District of California and the

District of Utah are technically the proper venue for this case,

Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show that the

balance of factors clearly weighs in favor of transfer. Savage,

611 F.2d at 279; see also Mincy v. Detroit & Cleveland Nav. Co.,

96 F. Supp. 505, 505-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 

Here, the Defendants’ corporate headquarters and principal

place of business is in California, and Joyce Helmbrecht, the

main witness regarding a variety of corporate issues (including

but not limited to alter ego issues, whether Defendants

adequately insured their employees, and maintenance and cure

issues), resides in California. That Plaintiff resides and the

incident occurred in Utah weighs in favor of transfer. That two

of the witnesses to the accident are Utah residents also weighs

in favor of transfer. However, two of the witnesses to the

accident are non-Utah residents and a transfer would only mean a

shift in the burden of inconvenience, which would not serve the

purpose of transferring venue. Also, Defendants have not made a

strong showing that the potential witnesses who reside in Utah

will actually offer live testimony. The treating physicians can

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provide deposition testimony in Utah. The parties will likely

hire medical experts to offer live testimony, and there was no

showing that it would be more difficult or burdensome to hire

medical experts in the Eastern District of California than in the

District of Utah. The primary evidence that the WCF claims

adjusters, the USGS officials, or plaintiff’s former employers

are likely to offer are official business records or statistics,

which are likely to be admissible without live testimony. See

Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (public records exception).

Defendants argue that policy interests weigh in favor of

Utah because among the disputed legal issues in this case are

whether a Utah recreational boat operator has standing to sue

under the Jones Act, and whether a particular section of the

Colorado River, in Utah, is a “navigable waterway” under the

Jones Act. There was no discussion at oral argument whether law

in the Ninth Circuit (where the Eastern District of California is

located) regarding the Jones Act differs from law in the Tenth

Circuit (where the District of Utah is located). However, a

federal court in Utah would be just as familiar with maritime law

as a federal court in California and more familiar with the

navigable waters of Utah.

The factors that most favor transfer are that the incident

giving rise to this action occurred in Utah and that the issues

to be decided involve Utah waterways. These factors do not tip

the balance in favor of transfer. Inconvenience would result if

this case were tried in either Utah or California. Shifting the

balance of inconvenience is not the purpose of venue transfers

under § 1404(a). Defendants have failed to meet their burden to

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show that Utah is clearly a more convenient forum than

California. 

V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to

Transfer District Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May _23__, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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