Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03237/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03237-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONNIE KAUFMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE & 

WAREHOUSE UNION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03237-JST 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: ECF No. 21

Pending before the Court is Defendants International Longshore and Warehouse Union and 

ILWU Local 34’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 22. For the reasons set forth below, 

the Court will grant the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Parties, Claims, and Procedural History

Plaintiffs Ronnie Kaufman and Alphonce Jackson, proceeding pro se, bring claims against 

Defendants International Longshore and Warehouse Union (“ILWU”) and ILWU Local 34 

(“Local 34”) for violations of section 501 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 

of 1959 (“LMRDA”) and section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). See

Second Amended Compl., ECF No. 18. Plaintiffs are marine clerks and members of Local 34. 

ECF No. 25-1, Ex. A, Kaufman Depo. Tr. 8:4-17; ECF No. 25-2, Ex. B, Jackson Depo. Tr. 9:5-10. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached the duty of fair representation by conspiring to 

form and promote a rival union consisting of office clerical workers and by failing to preserve 

seniority rights and vesting rights in allowing unregistered workers obtain clerk planner jobs 

before registered marine clerks. See generally ECF No. 18. They also allege that Defendants 

breached their fiduciary duty by using membership dues in a manner that did not solely benefit 

Local 34 and its members. Id. at 10. Jackson also claims that the ILWU breached its duty of fair 

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representation when it changed its pension policies and denied him the ability to concurrently 

work and collect his pension. See id. at 9; Jackson Depo. Tr. 24:25-25:10. Plaintiffs request that 

the Court issue an injunction giving registered marine clerks access to planner jobs on a seniority 

basis. Id. at 11.

On July 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, and on July 31, 2015, filed their amended 

their complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 9. On November 5, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their second amended 

complaint. ECF No. 18. On July 23, 2015, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. 

ECF No. 22. 

B. Facts

The ILWU is an international labor organization with local affiliates representing workers 

primarily in the maritime industry. ECF No. 23, Decl. of Russell Bargmann ¶ 3. Local 34 is a 

chartered, affiliated local representing maritime workers in the San Francisco Bay Area. ECF No. 

24, Decl. of Sean Farley ¶ 3. The majority of Local 34’s members are marine clerks and 

longshore workers who are a part of a coast-wide bargaining unit. Id. ¶ 9. Workers in that 

bargaining unit are employed by the Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”) and its member 

companies in ports along the West Coast. Bargmann Decl. ¶ 8. The ILWU serves as the exclusive 

bargaining representative for marine clerks and longshore workers working for PMA members. 

Id. 

The collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) between the ILWU and its locals and 

PMA, on behalf of its member companies, govern the terms and conditions of longshore and 

marine clerk work in all ports on the Pacific Coast. Farley Decl. ¶ 10. The CBA consists of the 

Pacific Coast Clerk’s Contract Document (“PCCCD”), which governs the terms and conditions of 

employment for marine clerks employed by PMA member companies, and the Pacific Coast 

Longshore Contract Document (“PCLCD”), which governs the terms and conditions of 

employment for longshore workers employed by PMA member companies. Id. 

Section 8 of the PCCCD specifically sets out the employment and dispatch priority for 

marine clerks:

8.14 Clerks not on the registered list shall not be dispatched from the 

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dispatching hall or employed by any employer while there is any 

man on the registered list qualified, ready, and willing to do the 

work. 

8.41 First preference of employment and dispatch shall be given to 

fully registered clerks who are available for employment covered by 

Section 1 of this Contract Document in accordance with the rules 

and regulations adopted by the Joint Port Labor Relations 

Committee. A similar second preference shall be so given to limited 

registered clerks. The Joint Coast Labor Relations Committee shall 

be authorized to effectuate such preferences in such manner and for 

such times and places as it determines in its discretion. 

ECF No. 28, Ex. G. Section 17 of the PCCCD describes the exclusive, multi-step grievance and 

arbitration procedure used to settle disputes related to the agreement. Farley Decl. ¶13; ECF No. 

28, Ex. G. The Joint Port Labor Relations Committee, comprising of employer and union 

representatives at a specific port, first hears the dispute. Id. Next, any unresolved dispute is then 

referred to an arbitrator. Id. The arbitrator’s decision can be appealed to the Coast Labor 

Relations Committee – comprised of members from the ILWU and the PMA. Id. Finally, if the 

dispute remains unresolved, it may be submitted to the Coast Arbitrator. Id. The grievance 

procedure must be exhausted before members seek other remedies. Id. 

Pension benefits for marine clerks are administered by the ILWU-PMA Pension Plan, a

separate entity from the ILWU. Bargmann Decl. ¶ 15. 

Plaintiffs are registered marine clerks and members of Local 34. Kaufman Depo. Tr. 8:4-

8; Jackson Depo. Tr. 9:5-10. Kaufman joined Local 34 in February 2007 and has worked as a 

marine clerk since then. Kaufman Depo. Tr. 8:15-17. Jackson began as a longshoreman in 1960 

and became a registered marine clerk in 2001. Jackson Depo. Tr. 9:11-25. Marine clerks are 

responsible for performing clerical functions related to cargo coming into and out of marine 

terminal facilities. ECF No. 28, Ex. G.

Local 34 also represents office clerical workers, who are a part of the “Allied Workers 

Division” referenced in Article XIV of Local 34’s Constitution. Farley Decl. ¶ 18; see ECF 24-1 

at 24. The office clerical workers are employed by three companies –Yusen, Maersk, and 

SSA/Matson – in the Port of Oakland. Farley Decl. ¶ 18. The office clericals at SSA/Matson 

became a part of Local 34 in 1978, the office clericals at Yusen in 1996, and the office clericals at 

Maersk in 1997. Id. ¶ 22. Office clerical workers are part of separate bargaining units with their 

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own collective bargaining agreements negotiated and administered by Local 34. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. 

Office clerical workers do not work under the PCCCD and are not bound by provisions in the 

PCCCD. Id. ¶18. Along with Local 34 serving as the bargaining agent, the President of Local 34 

also represents office clerical members in grievance hearings. Id. ¶ 19. Office clericals book 

cargo onto ships, prepare maintenance records, perform vessel planning work, and act as boarding 

agents on behalf of shipping lines. Id. ¶ 21. 

In 2012 and 2013, Local 34, a committee of office clerical workers, and PMA met to 

discuss merging the office clerical workers into the same coast-wide bargaining unit as the marine 

clerks. Id. ¶ 23. This merger was rejected, and consequently, marine clerks and office clericals 

have remained in separate bargaining units. Id. ¶ 22. The status of Local 34’s contract 

negotiations for the office clerical workers was reported in membership-wide meetings in 2012 

and 2013 and in Local 34’s newsletters. Id. ¶¶ 24-26, Exs. C, D.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” FED R. CIV. P. 56(c). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must 

show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the 

non-moving party’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant 

has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to 

designate “specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The court draws all 

reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “[A]t the summary judgment stage,” courts are “not permitted to weigh 

evidence.” Zobmondo Entm’t, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment as to each of Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF No. 22. 

Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because the claims are untimely, 

Plaintiffs did not exhaust internal and administrative remedies, and the claims fail on their merits. 

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Id.

A. Section 501 of the LMRDA

Section 501 of the LMRDA outlines the general fiduciary responsibility for officers and 

employees of labor organizations. That section gives a union member the right to sue an “officer, 

agent, shop steward, or representative” of a labor organization “to recover damages or secure an 

accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization” whenever such 

person has violated her fiduciary duties to the union or its members. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). Under 

section 501, “officers of labor unions are held to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical 

conduct in administering the affairs of the union.” Servs. Employees Int’l Union v. Nat’l Union of 

Healthcare Workers, 718 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2013). A court’s ability to intervene, however,

is tempered by the “well-established federal policy of avoiding unnecessary interference in the 

internal affairs of unions.” Teamsters Joint Council No. 42 v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 82 F.3d 

303, 306 (9th Cir.1996). 

1. Prerequisites to Filing Suit

Before bringing suit under section 501, a plaintiff must meet certain conditions precedent: 

First, the labor organization or its governing board must have 

refused or failed “to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting 

or other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being 

requested to do so” by a member. Second, a complaint may be filed 

only upon leave of the court obtained after the plaintiff has (a) filed 

a verified application, and (b) shown there is good cause for filing 

the complaint. The application may be made ex parte. 

Cowger v. Rohrbach, 868 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 501(b)). These 

conditions are designed to protect unions from unduly harassing litigation. Id. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by not spending “union 

money solely for the benefit of the organization and its members” and instead using the marine 

clerk membership dues to benefit office clericals. ECF No. 18 at 10. Kaufman testified that Local 

34 breached this duty because the President of Local 34 is paid through marine clerk membership 

dues, yet serves as the business agent for the office clerical units. Kaufman Depo. Tr. 71:9-25. 

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated their respective constitutions by failing to preserve

seniority rights, when Defendants allowed casual workers to be dispatched before registered 

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workers, and jurisdictional rights, when Defendants did not give marine clerks first access to

available planner jobs. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to meet section 501’s two conditions precedent

before filing their complaint. Defendants offer evidence that Plaintiffs did not ask the ILWU or 

Local 34 to pursue their section 501 claim on their behalf. Indeed, both Plaintiffs acknowledged 

as much in their depositions. See Kaufman Depo. Tr. 30:8-15; Jackson Depo. Tr. 45:12-22. 

Defendants also offer evidence that Plaintiffs did not file an application for leave to file their

complaint. See Kaufman Depo. Tr. 34:15-20; Jackson Depo. Tr. 50:13-16. Plaintiffs offer no 

evidence in rebuttal. Defendants have established that Plaintiffs did not follow the procedures 

required to bring a section 501 claim. See Shek v. California Nurses Ass’n/Caregivers & 

Healthcare Employees Union, No. C-10-1483 EMC, 2010 WL 3155830, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 

2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s 501 claim because he failed to seek leave of court).

2. Suits Against Unions

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for an additional reason: section 501

provides a right of action against the officers and employees of a labor organization, but not 

against the labor organization itself. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (providing a right of action against an 

“officer, agent, shop steward, or representative” of a union); Stelling v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 

Workers Local Union No. 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1386 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Section 501 does not 

provide for suit against a labor organization[.]”) Both ILWU and Local 34 are labor 

organizations. 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ section

501 claims. See Masters v. Screen Actors Guild, No. 04-2102 SVW (VBKX), 2004 WL 3203950, 

at *15 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2004) (granting partial summary judgment to defendant because the 

defendant was not proper party to the 501 claim and because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate 

that he requested the union to take remedial action). 

3. Statute of Limitations

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs failed to bring their section 501 claim within the 

statute of limitations. The LMRDA does not include a statute of limitations provision, and the 

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courts have taken a variety of approaches in setting one. 

Generally, when federal law fails to “provide explicitly for a limitations period for a 

federal action,” courts borrow “the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law” 

unless doing so is “at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law.” DelCostello 

v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 161 (1983). LMRDA claims that are analogous to 

fair representation claims borrow the six-month statute of limitations period applicable to unfair 

practices claim under section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. Gardner v. Int’l Tel. 

Employees Local No. 9, 850 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1988). However, some courts have applied 

the federal doctrine of laches when the 501 claims are equitable in nature. See, e.g., Fonti v. 

Health Prof’ls & Allied Emps., No. 13-4231 ES, 2015 WL 1523834, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2015) 

(applying the doctrine of laches, rather than a specific statute of limitations, to the section 501 

claim); Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 764 v. Greenawalt, 880 F. Supp. 

1076, 1084 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (applying the doctrine of laches because the 501 claim was analogous 

to an equitable accounting claim). Other courts have applied the analogous state statute of 

limitations for breach of fiduciary actions. See, e.g., Austin v. Trandell, 207 F. Supp. 2d 616, 623 

(E.D. Mich. 2002) (applying Michigan’s statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty actions 

brought against corporate officers because section 501 claims are akin to a shareholder derivative 

action). 

Because the Court grants summary judgment on other grounds, it need not determine the 

appropriate statute of limitations here, and does not reach Defendants’ argument. 

B. Section 301 of the LMRA

Section 301 provides a right of action for a union’s violation of the duty of fair 

representation. 29 U.S.C. § 185. “In order to maintain an action for breach of the duty of fair 

representation, a claimant must establish that the union has acted toward him in an arbitrary, 

discriminatory, or bad faith manner.” Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 919-20 (9th Cir. 

1985) (citation omitted). 

1. Exhaustion

Before bringing a claim under section 301, a member of the collective bargaining unit must 

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first exhaust any contractual grievance procedures. Carr v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 904 F.2d 1313, 1317 

(9th Cir. 1990). The exhaustion requirement is waived in two situations:

First, where the union has sole power under the contract to invoke 

the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and if . . . the 

employee-plaintiff has been prevented from exhausting his 

contractual remedies by the union’s wrongful refusal to process the 

grievance; second, where grievants allege a breach of the duty of fair 

representation with regard to negotiating the collective bargaining 

agreement. 

Id. at 1319 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Otherwise, “failure to utilize the grievance 

procedures, or to invoke them in a timely manner, bars grievants from pursuing remedies in 

court.” Id. at 1317. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached the CBA and their duty of fair representation by 

dispatching casual workers before registered workers in violation of Plaintiffs’ seniority rights,

and not giving marine clerks priority in filling available planner jobs in violation of Plaintiffs’ 

jurisdictional rights. But the PCCCD, which sets out the grievance-arbitration procedure for 

resolving disputes arising under the agreement, requires that Plaintiffs exhaust its grievance 

procedure before filing suit. See ECF No. 28, Ex. G (“[N]o other remedies shall be utilized by 

any person with respect to any dispute involving this Agreement until the grievance procedure has 

been exhausted”). Defendants put forth evidence establishing that neither Kaufman nor Jackson 

pursued their claims through a grievance procedure. See Kaufman Depo. Tr. 37:9-18; Jackson 

Depo. Tr. 31:20-32:2. Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence (or even argument) that the 

exhaustion requirement was waived. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on 

this claim. 

2. Violations of the PCCCD

Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs’ section 301 claim, that claim would still fail 

on the merits. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the PCCCD by allowing unregistered office 

clerical workers access to jobs that should have been performed by registered marine clerks. 

However, the dispatch priority and seniority rights outlined in the PCCCD apply to marine clerks, 

not to workers outside of the bargaining unit. See ECF No. 28, Ex. G; Farley Decl. ¶¶ 9-10. 

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Office clerical workers are outside the bargaining unit and are not bound by the PCCCD. Id. 

The Court will grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ section 301 claim on this ground as 

well. 

3. Statute of Limitations

Although section 301 of the LMRA does not contain a statute of limitations, the Supreme 

Court has held that a six-month statute of limitations governs section 301 claims against a union 

for breach of a collective bargaining agreement and breach of the duty of fair representation. 

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165. Claims for breaching the CBA, with no related duty of fair 

representation allegations, are subject to the state statute of limitations for breach of contract. See

UA Local 343 United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of 

U.S. & Canada, AFL-CIO v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994). In 

California, a breach of contract claim is subject to a four-year period. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 

337. 

Defendants contend that regardless of whether the six-moth or the four-year time period 

applies, the claims are time-barred. Plaintiff Jackson testified in his deposition that the practice of 

dispatching non-registered workers before registered workers began in the early 2000’s. Jackson 

Depo. Tr. 34:12-17. Plaintiffs have not offered any contrary evidence. The Court holds that 

Plaintiffs’ section 301 claim is also time-barred.

C. Duty of Fair Representation1

The duty of fair representation requires that a union “serve the interests of all members 

without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith 

and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). The duty 

is a corollary of the union’s status as the exclusive representative of all employees in a bargaining 

unit. Id. at 177. A union breaches its duty of fair representation when it acts in a way that is 

 

1 Defendants read Plaintiffs’ complaint as presenting a free-standing claim for breach of the duty 

of fair representation. ECF No. 21 at 10. In the Court’s reading of the complaint, however, all of 

Plaintiffs’ claims are grounded in either section 501 of the LMRDA or section 301 of the LMRA. 

See ECF No. 18 at 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. The Court errs on the side of caution and addresses the freestanding claim. 

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“arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Id. at 190. “The doctrine of fair representation serves 

both as a limited check on the arbitrary exercise of union power and, through its limitations, 

allows unions wide latitude in effectively serving the interests of the bargaining unit.” Adkins v. 

Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ duty of fair representation 

claim for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ claims fall outside of the applicable statute of limitations. 

Second, on the merits, Plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could find in their favor on the claim. 

1. Statute of Limitations

Claims against a union for breaching the duty of fair representation are subject to a sixmonth statute of limitations period. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172 (applying the six-month statute 

of limitation set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) to a suit against a union for breach of duty of fair 

representation). Following DelCostello, the Ninth Circuit also applies a six-month statute of 

limitations to LMRDA claims that are analogous to fair representation claims. Gardner, 850 F.2d 

at 522. The six-month period generally begins to run “when the employee discovers, or in the 

exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered,” the alleged breach of duty of fair 

representation by a union. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir.1986). 

Plaintiffs first filed their complaint on July 17, 2014. See ECF No. 1. If Plaintiffs knew or 

should have known about Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing before January 17, 2014, then their 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached its duty of fair representation because 

Defendants formed and promoted a rival union, the “Marine Clerks Association ILWU 34 Office 

Clerical Unit O.C.U.,” in violation of the ILWU and Local 34’s constitutional prohibitions on 

“dual unionism.” ECF No. 18 at 5. Local 34’s bylaws state that “[i]n accordance with the 

International Constitution, no member shall be allowed to belong to, or advocate the joining of any 

dual union.” ECF No. 24-1, Ex. A at 27 of 35. 

Defendants argue that this claim is time-barred, and point to several items of evidence that 

Plaintiffs were, or should have been, aware of this claim. Office clerical workers became part of 

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Local 34 not later than 1997 and negotiations to merge the office clericals’ bargaining units into 

the coast-wide bargaining unit failed in 2013. Farley Decl. ¶ 22. In his deposition, Jackson 

acknowledged that office clerical units were established many years ago before he became a 

registered marine clerk. Jackson Depo. Tr. 14:1-17. Defendants have also submitted executive 

meeting minutes from January 10, 2012, May 8, 2012, and March 2013, at which Sean Farley, the 

President of Local 34, discussed the ongoing negotiations for, and ratification of, office clerical 

units’ contracts with Local 34. ECF No. 24-4, Ex. C; Farley Decl. ¶¶ 24-25. Defendants have 

also introduced newsletters from November 2012 that discuss Local 34’s role as the bargaining 

agent for the office clerical unit contracts, and ones from March 2013 that discuss ratification of a 

new contract for the office clerical unit at Yusen Terminals. See ECF No. 24-4, Ex. D. At their 

depositions, Plaintiffs acknowledged that they receive or obtain Local 34’s newsletters and read 

them with some regularity. Kaufman Depo. Tr. 16:22-17:16; Jackson Depo. Tr. 12:17-25. The 

newsletters were also available at the union dispatch hall. Kaufman Depo. Tr. 17:2-16.

The totality of this evidence is compelling, and Plaintiffs have offered nothing in rebuttal. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claim – that Defendants’ breached the duty of fair 

representation by promoting and forming a “dual union” – is time-barred. 

Plaintiffs also allege that the ILWU breached the duty of fair representation when it made 

changes to the ILWU Pension Plan because ILWU officers also serve as trustees. ECF No. 18 at 

9. Specifically, Jackson stated at his deposition that Defendants breached the duty when Jackson

was denied the opportunity to collect his pension while also working. Jackson Depo. Tr. 24:25-

25:10. Jackson testified that he first became aware of this practice in 2009. Id. at 25:5. Plaintiffs 

do not dispute or offer other evidence on the issue of when they discovered the alleged 

wrongdoing. This claim is also time-barred.2 

Plaintiffs’ fair representation claims fall outside of the applicable statute of limitations, and 

Plaintiffs have neither pled nor argued that they are entitled to equitable estoppel or equitable 

 

2 Defendants also argue that they are separate entities from the pension plan and that neither 

defendant “operates a pension plan or controls the administration and distribution of pension 

benefits for its members.” ECF No. 22 at 15. Because the Court will grant summary judgment on 

other grounds, it does not reach this argument. 

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tolling of the statute of limitations. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims. 

2. Arbitrary, Discriminatory, or Bad Faith Conduct

Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs’ claim, the Court would still grant summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants, because Plaintiffs have not provided evidence that would allow a 

reasonable jury to find in their favor. 

“A union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either ‘arbitrary, 

discriminatory, or in bad faith’ applies to all union activity.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. 

O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190). The Ninth Circuit uses a twostep analysis to determine whether a union has breached its duty. A court must first “decide 

whether the alleged union misconduct involved the union’s judgment, or whether it was 

procedural or ministerial.” Marino v. Writers Guild of Am., E., Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted). If the conduct was procedural or ministerial, “then the 

plaintiff may prevail if the union’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Id. If 

the conduct involved the union’s judgment, then “the plaintiff may prevail only if the union’s 

conduct was discriminatory or in bad faith.” Id. “[C]ourts should accord substantial deference to 

the union’s decisions.” Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1983).

The decision to add new bargaining units or safeguard certain jobs involves the exercise of 

the union’s judgment and is not procedural in nature. Thus, Plaintiffs must show that the conduct 

was discriminatory or in bad faith. See Marino, 922 F.2d at 1486. 

Defendants defend the decision to expand Local 34 by arguing that adding bargaining units 

and additional workers strengthens the union. ECF No. 21 at 12; ECF No. 24-4, Ex. D. 

Defendants further point out that Local 34’s bylaws, which prohibits participation in a union 

separate from the ILWU, does not affect the formation of other locals within the ILWU or 

bargaining units within Local 34. Farley Decl. ¶ 8. While Plaintiffs identify that the Local 34 

bylaws prohibit “dual unionism,” Plaintiffs have not shown how adding the office clerical 

bargaining units to the same union (Local 34) violates this bylaw. 

In the face of this showing, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence showing that Defendants 

acted discriminatorily or in bad faith by adding additional bargaining units to Local 34. The Court 

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Northern District of California

grants summary judgment on this ground as well.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. All 

pending deadlines and hearings in this action are vacated. Defendants shall submit a proposed 

form of judgment within seven days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 3:14-cv-03237-JST Document 31 Filed 09/29/15 Page 13 of 13