Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00471/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00471-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Damian Dudley, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00471-PHX-SMM (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Damian Dudley has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner raises twelve grounds for relief in his timely Petition. Petitioner’s claims 

are either procedurally defaulted or meritless. Therefore, the Court will recommend that 

the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

II. BACKGROUND

a. Facts of the Crimes 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found the following facts as true:1

 

1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ recitation of the facts is presumed correct. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2012) (rejecting argument that statement of facts in state appellate court’s opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness). 

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 In the evening of May 2, 2007, defendant followed the victim, an 

elderly woman, as she left the grocery store. Victim noticed the defendant 

and asked if he was following her. Defendant approached the victim and hit her on the side of the head. The victim fell to the ground. Defendant proceeded to kick the victim and then took her purse. Defendant removed the victim’s credit cards and put the cards in his pocket. Defendant told the victim that if she got up, he would kick her again. Several nearby witnesses intervened and called 911, one witness tried to distract defendant. At the 

same time, victim tried to stand a couple of times, but defendant would hit her and prevent her from getting up. The victim dropped to the ground in a fetal position. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and placed defendant in 

custody. 

 Defendant was charged with one count of robbery, a class 4 felony, one count of kidnapping, a class 2 felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a class 6 felony. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of 

all charges. 

State v. Dudley, No. 1 CA-CR 10-0053, 2012 WL 724059, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 

2012). 

b. Sentencing of Petitioner 

 On January 14, 2010, the court found Petitioner had two prior felony convictions 

and sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of which was 

17 years. (Doc. 19-1, Exs. C, D, at 14-21.) 

c. Petitioner’s Direct Appeal

 On February 25, 2011, Petitioner’s counsel filed an opening brief with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 19-1, Ex. F, at 27.) Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), counsel stated she 

searched the record on appeal and “found no arguable question of law that is not 

frivolous.” (Id. at 37.) 

 On October 13, 2011, Petitioner filed a supplemental opening brief with the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 19-2, Ex. G, at 2.) Petitioner raised the same grounds 

that are alleged in Grounds One through Seven of the instant Petition. 

 On March 6, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences. Dudley, 2012 WL 724059, at *4. In a response to Petitioner’s Motion for 

Reconsideration (Doc. 19-2, Ex. I, at 40), the court found Petitioner “has not offered any 

credible evidence that he was not represented by counsel in his prior conviction to 

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overcome the presumption of regularity” (Doc. 19-2, Ex. J, at 51). 

 On April 3, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 19-2, Ex. K, at 75.) On July 24, 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review. (Doc. 19-3, Ex. L, at 2.) 

d. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On August 20, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 19-2, 

Ex. N, at 6.) On September 20, 2012, counsel appointed for Petitioner filed a notice with 

the court that he “completed his review of Petitioner’s case and is unable to find a 

meritorious issue.” (Doc. 19-3, Ex. P, at 14.) On October 22, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro 

se petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 19-3, Ex. Q, at 17.) On February 11, 2013, the 

trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR petition. (Doc. 19-3, Ex. R, at 33.) 

 On March 11, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 19-4, Ex. S, at 2.) On July 28, 2014, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review but denied relief. State v. Dudley, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0217-PR, 

2014 WL 3732476, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 28, 2014); (Doc. 19-9, Ex. U, at 5). On 

January 20, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review without 

comment. (Doc. 19-9, Ex. V. at 9.) 

e. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition 

 On July 1, 2015, Petitioner filed this habeas Petition. (Doc. 1.) On September 9, 

2015, Respondents filed a Limited Answer to the Petition. (Doc. 8.) On October 8, 

2015, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 9.) Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: 

1. Petitioner’s indictment violated the Sixth Amendment because it did 

not allege venue; 

2. there were numerous errors that could not have been harmless; 

3. the prosecutor failed to properly show that the admission of Petitioner’s Massachusetts prior conviction for use as a sentencing enhancement did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights; 

4. Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the prosecutor referred to facts that were not proven; 

5. Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated because the trial 

transcripts are not accurate; 

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6. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because Arizona’s kidnapping statutes are vague and ambiguous; 

7. Petitioner’s preliminary hearing was vacated in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, thus allowing Petitioner to be indicted on the 

12th day; 

8. Post-conviction relief Counsel was ineffective when counsel failed 

to argue trial counsel was ineffective regarding issues related to 

venue, a freetalk, failing to interview a witness, an undisclosed 

agreement, a prior conviction, and other trial issues; 

9. Trial IAC: Trial counsel was ineffective when counsel did not 

accompany Petitioner to a 2008 freetalk with police, did not interview witness Jason Gerrich, and did not object at sentencing when the court failed to rule on a motion; 

10.Counsel was ineffective by failing to object to lack of venue in 

indictment; 

11.Appellate counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to argue Grounds One, Two, and Seven on appeal; and 

12.Counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to litigate the issues in Ground Eight. 

 (Doc. 1.) 

III. THE PETITION 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

The Petition is timely. 

a. Procedural Default

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

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federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id.at 31–

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . 

(2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis 

for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet 

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the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731–32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, 

“if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as 

a result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as well as to those 

represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-

89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, the court need 

not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1999); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has 

‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” 

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See also Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by 

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“persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be 

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error 

with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

b. Merits Review 

 The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision 

was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 

F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the 

“last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that when the final state 

court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state 

court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 

418, 441 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000)). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this 

Court’s decisions. And an unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, as a 

condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement. 

White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a 

formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires 

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“a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the 

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 

S.Ct. 770, 786–787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to 

meet”—and it is—”that is because it was meant to be.” [] 131 

S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s 

criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. 

Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013). 

 A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 

 A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state 

court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it 

can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 

S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An unreasonable application of law is different from an 

incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 

(9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court to grant relief 

simply because the state court might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a 

certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also 

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray, 745 F.3d at 998. Pursuant to 

section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a state-court’s factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have 

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 

(9th Cir. 2014)). 

 If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

AEDPA otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 

U.S. 930, 953–54 (2007). Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not 

harmless: “For reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not 

entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 

‘actual prejudice.’” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

a. Ground One 

Petitioner asserts that the indictment was deficient because “nowhere in the 

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indictment does the venue of where the crime took place ever appear.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) 

Petitioner argues that the crime occurred at “3rd Ave and Camelback” and that location is 

not listed in the indictment. (Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals found the “indictment 

here included sufficient detail to apprise defendant of the charges in order for him to 

prepare a defense and to protect him against double jeopardy. An exact address of the 

crime is not required. We hold the indictment was therefore legally sufficient.” Dudley, 

2012 WL 724059, at *1. 

 An indictment is sufficient under federal law when it charges a crime with 

sufficient precision to inform the defendant of the charges he must meet and with enough 

detail that he may plead double jeopardy in a future prosecution based on the same set of 

events. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962). Here, the indictment 

alleges the crime took place in Maricopa County, Arizona, and no more is required if 

Petitioner had sufficient notice to defend his case. Petitioner does not allege that he was 

unable to defend the case. See United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 673 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(finding no prejudice where the indictment charged an incorrect location because “there 

could have been no confusion as to what charges he would need to defend against”). 

Petitioner’s claim fails. 

b. Ground Two

 Petitioner alleges that errors committed during his trial cumulatively violated his 

due process rights. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Respondents contend that the cumulative error doctrine 

is not clearly established federal law. (Doc. 19 at 10.) To support this contention, 

Respondents cite to Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 816 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(“[C]umulative error claims are not cognizable on habeas because the Supreme Court has 

not spoken on this issue.”). 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that “the Supreme Court has clearly established that the 

combined effect of multiple trial errors may give rise to a due process violation if it 

renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error considered individually would 

not require reversal.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court 

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explained that “cumulative error warrants habeas relief only where the errors have ‘so 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.’” Id. at 927 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). 

 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. There are no individual errors, so 

there is no cumulative error. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 525 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“Because we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative 

prejudice is possible.”). 

c. Ground Three

 Petitioner alleges that “nowhere in [the allegation of prior convictions] does it 

show Petitioner was represented by counsel” in a 1991 Massachusetts conviction, which 

was used to aggravate Petitioner’s sentence. (Doc. 1 at 10.) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals rejected this claim when it found Appellant has not offered any credible 

evidence that he was not represented by counsel in his prior conviction to overcome the 

presumption of regularity. See State v. Mccann, 200 Ariz. 27, 31, ¶15, 21 P.3d 845; 849 

(2001).” (Doc. 19-2, Ex. J, at 51.)2

 

 If a defendant “seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the 

burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently 

waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 

468-69 (1938). A defendant “must prove the invalidity of a prior conviction by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Allen, 153 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 

1998). A “presumption of regularity” attaches to prior convictions offered for purposes of 

sentence enhancement, and a defendant must do more than merely pointing to a missing 

or silent trial transcript. United States v. Mulloy, 3 F.3d 1337, 1339–40 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Instead, “the petitioner must make an ‘affirmative showing’ that overcomes the 

presumption of regularity that accompanies final judgments of conviction.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner asserts in his Reply that he was represented by counsel in his “unarmed 

 

2

 The court of appeals issued this order in response Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration filed after the court filed its memorandum opinion on direct appeal. 

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robbery Massachusetts case” but “the day that Petitioner changed his plea his counsel had 

a last minute emergency and could not attend his proceedings.” (Doc. 25 at 22.)3

 The 

prosecutor also avowed to the court that Petitioner “pled to unarmed robbery” in the 

Massachusetts conviction. (Doc. 19-5, Ex. S, at 61.) The sentencing documents from 

Massachusetts state that on March 6, 1991, Petitioner entered a “plea [of] guilty to each 

count.” (Doc. 19-6, Ex. S, at 5.) Petitioner asserts in his Petition that he “took a plea 

agreement.” (Doc. 1 at 10.)4

 Petitioner has failed to make an “affirmative showing” of unconstitutionality 

sufficient to overcome the presumption that his Massachusetts conviction is valid. 

Petitioner has presented nothing other than his claim, in the Petition (Doc. 1) and 

Amended Affidavit (Doc. 15), that he was not represented by counsel when he pleaded 

guilty and was sentenced. A defendant’s testimony is insufficient to overcome the 

presumption of regularity. See Allen, 153 F.3d at 1042 (finding “Allen’s testimony at the 

1997 resentencing hearing was insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity”). 

d. Ground Four

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor improperly referred, in the prosecutor’s 

opening statement, to a witness (Rhiannon Motley) who did not subsequently testify at 

the trial. In opening statement, the prosecutor said “Well, luckily, on that evening, 

Margaret Smith had four heroes that were standing by. These heroes, Michael Bryant, 

Jason Gerrich, Rhiannon Motley, and Heather Moses (sic) saw what was going on.” 

(Doc. 19-10, Ex. Y, at 21.) The prosecutor later said: “And you’re going to be able to 

hear from all the witnesses, all the heroes that were there that day.” (Id. at 22.) There was 

 

3

 This is the prior felony conviction used to enhance Petitioner’s sentence. (Doc. 

19-2, Ex. C, at 16.) 

4

 In a pretrial hearing, Petitioner told the court that his Massachusetts prior was the result of a trial where he was “represented by a lawyer.” (Doc. 19-9, Ex. X, at 19.) 

Respondents rely, in part, on this avowal. (Doc. 19 at 19.) The Arizona Court of Appeals, on PCR review, found that “Dudley admitted in open court he had been represented by counsel during his out-of-state proceedings.” State v. Dudley, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0217-

PR, 2014 WL 3732476, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 28, 2014). Petitioner’s claim here is 

that although he was represented by counsel, his counsel was not present at the change of plea and sentencing. 

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no other reference to Rhiannon Motely. The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the 

“discrepancy between the prosecutor’s opening statement and the evidence presented is 

not grounds for reversal.” State v. Dudley, 2012 WL 724059, at *2. 

 In evaluating Petitioner’s due process claim, “[t]he relevant question is whether 

the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) 

(citation omitted). The state court’s denial of Petitioner’s due process claim is entitled to 

deference. Linebaugh v. Belleque, 385 F. App’x 751, 753 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). 

 Petitioner’s claim is meritless. The only claim made regarding Rhiannon Motley 

was that she would testify at the trial. Petitioner claims “the state’s reference to facts 

never proven” violated Petitioner’s rights. (Doc. 1 at 11.) But the prosecutor never 

referred to any fact to which Rhiannon Motley would testify. Importantly, the jury heard 

from the victim and witnesses Michael Bryant, Jason Gerrich, and Heather Monk. (Doc. 

19-12, Ex. AA, at 8, 16.) The Arizona Court of Appeal’s determination that there had 

been no violation was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of any holding of 

the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 

63, 71 (2003). 

e. Ground Five

 Petitioner alleges the trial transcripts are inaccurate and were changed “to bolster 

the State’s case against Petitioner.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) Petitioner alleges that the transcript 

regarding witness Jason Gerrich is “inaccurate,” and statements from the victim were 

“added to change the evidence against Petitioner.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) On direct appeal, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals ruled: “Upon our review of the record, we find no evidence 

indicating the transcripts have been tampered with or altered. Moreover, the appellate 

forum is not the appropriate one in which to develop facts and receive evidence. Any 

evidence of document tampering must be presented in a Rule 32 proceeding.” Dudley, 

2012 WL 724059, at *3. Petitioner, however, did not raise this issue in his postconviction review petition. In his Amended Affidavit, Petitioner asserts he did not have 

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access to legal materials, attorney advice, and “did not submit his tampering with 

document argument in his petition for post-conviction relief...because he did not was to 

lose the issue by filing the same issue twice.” (Doc. 15 at 3-6.) In his Reply, Petitioner 

asserts that he was not required to raise this issue on post-conviction review after fairly 

presenting it on direct appeal. (Doc. 25 at 28.) Petitioner cites to Castille v. Peoples, 489 

U.S. 346 (1989), and Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state 

courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the 

claim to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. Castille, 489 U.S. 

at 351. Procedural default occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the state courts, 

but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim because the petitioner failed to 

follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals directed Petitioner to raise this issue in his post-conviction 

relief motion so the facts of the issue could be developed. In his Amended Affidavit, 

Petitioner acknowledges that he chose not to pursue this claim on PCR review because he 

did not want to lose it “twice.” (Doc. 15 at 4.) Petitioner failed to raise the issue as 

directed, and thus this claim is not exhausted. Further, the claim is now procedurally 

barred because Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) 

preclude Petitioner from returning to state court to raise this claim. A successive petition 

for post-conviction relief would be untimely under Rule 32.4, and his claims would be 

precluded from Rule 32 review because they could have been raised in Petitioner’s prior 

post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a). 

 Petitioner has failed to establish a claim for default. He knowingly declined to 

raise the issue on PCR review, and he could have argued the issue just as he did on direct 

appeal. He has also failed to establish that failure to review this claim will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice, which is that he is actually innocent of this offense. 

Four witnesses testified to the facts of the case, and Petitioner has not demonstrated 

actual innocence. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim in Ground Five is procedurally barred 

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from review. 

f. Ground Six 

 Petitioner alleges the Arizona kidnapping statute is “vague, indefinite and 

uncertain” and it is vague because “it can turn a mutual combat fight into a kidnapping 

statute.” (Doc. 1 at 13-14.) The Arizona Court of Appeals found: 

 We find no ambiguity in the statute. “The ‘restraint’ required for kidnapping also may occur when one confines the victim without consent.” 

State v. Latham, 223 Ariz. 70, 74 n. 3, ¶ 16, 219 P.3d 280, 284 n. 3 

(App.2009). Thus, “the crime occurs absent any movement by the victim.” 

Id. The state presented evidence at trial that defendant confined the victim 

without her consent. Defendant told the victim that if she got up, he would kick her again. When victim tried to stand, defendant would hit her and 

prevent her from getting up. 

Dudley, 2012 WL 724059, at *3. 

 “[C]riminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made 

criminal before it is done are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law.” Jordan 

v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) (citations omitted). A Petitioner may challenge a 

state statute on habeas review. See McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1989) (affirming state conviction on habeas review—where petitioner challenged state 

statute as ambiguous—because it “cannot be said under these circumstances that 

appellant’s guilt was evaluated under a standard below that required by the 

Constitution”). The question is whether the Arizona court’s interpretation of the 

kidnapping statute “was so unforeseeable as to deprive the defendant of the fair warning 

to which the Constitution entitles him.” Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 

(1964). 

 Petitioner claims the kidnapping statute is vague, and it can “turn a mutual combat 

fight into a kidnapping statute.” (Doc. 1 at 14.) In his Reply, Petitioner argues the statute 

“fails to alert ordinary people of what conduct is prohibited. . . .” (Doc. 25 at 37.) 

Petitioner was charged with a violation of A.R.S. § 13–1304(A)(3) “by knowingly 

restraining another person with the intent to . . . [i]nflict death, physical injury or a sexual 

offense on the victim, or to otherwise aid in the commission of a felony.” “‘Restrain’ 

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means to restrict a person’s movements without consent.” A.R.S. § 13–1301(2). Arizona 

courts have determined a kidnapping occurs when a victim is moved or confined. See 

State v. Latham, 219 P.3d 280, 283, ¶ 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (“To satisfy the plain 

meaning of the kidnapping statute’s restraint requirement, the defendant either must 

move the victim from place to place or confine the victim.”).5

 The federal offense of 

kidnapping occurs when one “unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, 

abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person” in 

interstate/foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). The federal courts have long 

approved similar language related to the two statutes. See Chatwin v. United States, 326 

U.S. 455, 464 (1946) (“The act of holding a kidnapped person for a proscribed purpose 

necessarily implies an unlawful physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period 

against the person’s will and with a willful intent so to confine the victim.”). Petitioner 

was not in a “mutual combat fight” with the 64-year-old victim,6

 and the Petitioner’s guilt 

was not evaluated under a standard below that required by the Constitution. 

g. Ground Seven

 Petitioner alleges his preliminary hearing was vacated in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 15.) Petitioner argues he was arrested on May 2, 2007, but “the 

Superior Court granted the State’s motion to continue the tenth day” and he was 

“subsequently indicted on the twelfth day.” In Petitioner’s previous § 1983 action, the 

Court rejected Petitioner’s argument: 

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights 

were violated by the County Attorney’s motion to continue the preliminary hearing, the court’s granting of the continuance, the County Attorney’s notice to vacate the continued preliminary hearing, and the court’s vacatur of the 

preliminary hearing because Plaintiff was not afforded a 

prompt determination of probable cause for his arrest. Under 

the Fourth Amendment, there must be a reasonably prompt 

5

 Petitioner cites to several Arizona cases (Doc. 25 at 38), but they are inapposite. 

See, e.g., State v. Tschilar, 27 P.3d 331, 338 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (finding “no ambiguity” in the kidnapping statute regarding lesser included offenses); State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 1105 (Ariz. 1983) (defendant not charged with kidnapping). 

6

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judicial determination of probable cause following a warrantless arrest “as a prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty following arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 

114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). 

... Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights because a magistrate made a reasonably prompt determination of probable cause for his arrest. 

Plaintiff was not otherwise entitled to a preliminary hearing under the Fourth Amendment, or for that matter under the due 

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where he was 

indicted by a grand jury. 

Dudley v. Maricopa Cty., No. CV-08-2168-PHX-SMM LOA, 2009 WL 32412, at *4 (D. 

Ariz. Jan. 5, 2009). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found: 

Defendant’s initial appearance took place on May 3, 2007, and his preliminary hearing was scheduled for May 14, 2007. Defendant argues that ten days from May 3 was May 13 and that the preliminary hearing should have occurred by that date. However, May 13, 2007 was a Sunday. Pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3, when the last day of a period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, “the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a legal holiday.” Thus, the preliminary hearing was scheduled within the ten day period. 

Dudley, 2012 WL 724059, at *3. The court also found “Defendant’s argument is of no 

consequence, however, because the preliminary hearing was vacated due to a 

supervening indictment.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner’s claim is meritless. Petitioner’s preliminary hearing was properly set, 

and Petitioner may not contest state procedural rules regarding preliminary hearing and 

indictment on habeas review. See Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir.1999) 

(“Federal habeas courts lack jurisdiction . . . to review state court applications of state 

procedural rules.”). 

h. Ground Eight

 Petitioner alleges his PCR counsel (Mr. Gorman) was ineffective, in violation of 

his Fourteenth Amendment rights, for failing to allege four of his prior attorneys provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

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counsel, Petitioner must show that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness, and (2) the deficiency in counsel’s performance prejudiced 

him. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). To establish 

prejudice, the defendant “must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s 

unreasonable failure . . . he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 

U.S. 259, 285 (2000). 

 Petitioner’s claims fail for several reasons. The Supreme Court has held that 

“[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. 

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

in such proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citations 

omitted). Moreover, Petitioner raised these claims in his pro se PCR petition, (Doc. 19-2, 

Ex. G, at 2; Doc. 19-3, Ex. Q, at 2), and the Arizona courts found the claims to be 

meritless. Assuming PCR counsel did not raise the claims, Petitioner was not prejudiced 

because the arguments were decided by the state courts. Petitioner’s claims also fail on 

the merits. 

i. Trial Counsel (Mr. Valverde)

 Petitioner alleges PCR counsel (Mr. Gorman) was ineffective when he failed to 

allege trial counsel (Mr. Valverde) was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss 

the indictment based upon lack of venue. (Doc. 1 at 16.) Petitioner raises this claim in 

Ground One of the Petition. The Court finds Ground One lacks merit, and thus PCR 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this claim on PCR review. See Sexton v. 

Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Counsel is not necessarily ineffective for 

failing to raise even a nonfrivolous claim, so clearly we cannot hold counsel ineffective 

for failing to raise a claim that is meritless.” (citations omitted)). Therefore, the Court 

finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

ii. Trial Counsel (Mr. Goldstein) 

 Petitioner alleges PCR counsel (Mr. Gorman) was ineffective when he failed to 

allege trial counsel (Mr. Goldstein) was ineffective for allowing Petitioner to “participate 

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in a freetalk without the aid of counsel. . . .” (Doc. 1 at 16.) The trial court determined: 

“During the ‘free talk’, Defendant at no point indicated that he did not wish to speak to 

the detective. The Defendant initiated the telephone conversation.” (Doc. 19-3, Ex. R, at 

35.) Petitioner presented no argument in his trial court PCR that he was prejudiced by this 

conduct. Petitioner cannot prevail on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel 

unless he demonstrates prejudice. This exhausted claim fails. 

 In his Reply, Petitioner expands upon his argument that he provided information 

to the State about a criminal defense attorney (Jason Keller) and 18 Mexican Mafia 

members, which led to prosecutions. (Doc. 25-1 at 14.) Petitioner argues that if he had a 

freetalk agreement, then he would have been “compensated” but instead he “did not 

receive anything.” (Id.) Petitioner claims that if “attorney Goldstein accompanied 

Petitioner on his free talk there’s a strong chance that Petitioner would have received 

some kind of benefit....” (Doc. 25-1 at 15.) This claim is unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted. Petitioner did not argue prejudice to the trial court or the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (See Doc. 19-3, Ex. Q at 20; Doc. 19-4, Ex. S, at 6.) 

 Petitioner’s claim nonetheless fails on the merits because the trial court was 

advised of Petitioner’s cooperation and considered it. At sentencing, Petitioner’s counsel 

told the trial court: “He has really put himself on the line, because he’s going to be living 

with the people in close proximity that he has basically turned into the police.” (Doc. 19-

7, Ex. S, at 39.) The trial court stated: “And I do agree that I think in dealing with 

members of the Mexican Mafia, you do put yourself at exceptional risk within the prison 

system and so on when you take on a group as highly organized as that.” (Id. at 44.) The 

trial court also discussed Petitioner’s desire to cooperate against attorney Keller, and 

determined the State was within its discretion to decline that cooperation. (Id.) 

Ultimately, Petitioner’s cooperation was disclosed to the trial court, even if Petitioner’s 

attorney (Mr. Goldstein) did not accompany him to a freetalk. There was no prejudice, 

and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 Petitioner also alleges PCR counsel (Mr. Gorman) was ineffective when he failed 

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to allege trial counsel (Mr. Goldstein) was ineffective for failing to interview witness 

Jason Gerrich. (Doc. 1 at 16.) The trial court denied this claim, finding: “The decision 

whether to interview witnesses, file motions, call witnesses at trial or which defenses to 

pursue is a matter of trial strategy and unless counsel has no reasonable basis, cannot 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 19-3, Ex. R, at 35.) Before the trial 

court and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner failed to argue how he was prejudiced 

by this failure. Petitioner’s claim before both courts was “Attorney Goldstein was 

ineffective for not interviewing state’s witnesses Jason Gerrich and Michael Bryant.” 

(See Doc. 19-3, Ex. Q at 24; Doc. 19-4, Ex. S, at 9.) Petitioner’s claim that he was 

prejudiced by this failure was not raised before the State courts, and is unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted. 

 Petitioner now argues prejudice because “Mr. Gerrich testified to witnessing the 

whole crime and no robbery occurred.” (Doc. 1 at 16.) In his Reply, Petitioner adds that 

“when Mr. Gerrich was on the witness stand ‘he testified that he saw the entire crime and 

Petitioner did not rob the victim’ (that testimony is not in the trial transcripts).” (Doc. 25-

1 at 16.) Petitioner fails to establish that the trial transcripts are inaccurate. (See Ground 

Five.) Moreover, a review of the transcript of Mr. Gerrich’s testimony does not support 

Petitioner’s claim. Mr. Gerrich testified that the Petitioner was “screaming” at the victim 

to “[g]ive me my money.” (Doc. 19-10, Ex. Y, at 60.) Mr. Gerrich testified Petitioner did 

not punch the victim and that “she dropped to the ground and just stayed there kind of 

like almost in a fetal position.” (Doc. 19-10, Ex. Y, at 63.) Petitioner’s claim regarding 

Mr. Gerrich is meritless because Mr. Gerrich’s testimony was not favorable to Petitioner. 

Therefore, there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome if counsel had 

interviewed Mr. Gerrich. 

iii. Trial Counsel (Ms. Schaffer) 

 Petitioner alleges PCR counsel was ineffective when he failed to allege trial 

counsel (Ms. Schaffer) was ineffective for (1) entering into an agreement with the State 

without informing Petitioner, and (2) not objecting to Petitioner’s 17-year aggravated 

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sentence. (Doc. 1 at 16.) 

 Petitioner alleges Ms. Schaffer (sentencing counsel) was ineffective “for entering 

into an agreement with the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office for Petitioner to return to 

ADOC at a later date and testify for the State without informing the Petitioner of the 

agreement.” (Doc. 1 at 16-17.) In his Reply, Petitioner asserts he “was to testify against 

one of ex-attorney Jason Keller’s codefendant’s John Farinas.” (Doc. 25-1 at 18.) 

Petitioner claims he refused to testify “because he was not getting any deal.” (Id.) He 

alleges there was a secret agreement regarding his testimony because when “Petitioner 

was on the witness stand he overheard an attorney from the Attorney General’s Office tell 

another attorney ‘why would he refuse to testify?’” (Id.) In his petition for review to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner attached several of Ms. Schaffer’s emails regarding 

whether Petitioner would be needed as a witness against Mr. Keller and codefendants. 

(See Doc. 19-7, Ex. S, at 13-18.) The emails demonstrate Ms. Schaffer was diligently 

working on Petitioner’s case to attempt to secure opportunities for him to cooperate. The 

records do not reflect a secret agreement, or that Petitioner was prejudiced in any way. 

 Petitioner also alleges Ms. Schaffer was ineffective for “not objecting when Judge 

Anderson sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated 17 year prison sentence when his 

mitigating factors outweighed his aggravating factors. . . .” (Doc. 1 at 17.) Under federal 

law, counsel is not required to object to a court’s imposition of sentence. See

Fed.R.Crim.P. 51(a) (“Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary” to 

preserve claims of error); United States v. Enriquez, 548 F. App’x 473 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(unpublished) (finding Defendant “was not required to lodge a further objection or 

exception to the court’s ruling in order to preserve his challenge” to the sentence 

imposed). Sentencing counsel was not required to object to preserve Petitioner’s 

sentencing claims. Therefore, Petitioner has not established counsel was ineffective. 

 In his Reply, Petitioner raises a new claim that Ms. Schaffer “failed to request a 

mitigation specialist.” (Doc. 25-1 at 17.) The Arizona Court of Appeals determined (1) 

Petitioner identified “no error in the trial court’s review,” and (2) this claim, among 

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others, warranted “summary rejection.” Dudley, 2014 WL 3732476, at *2. Whether the 

state court properly weighed aggravating and mitigating factors under state law is not 

reviewable here. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Petitioner also fails to 

establish how the trial court’s slightly aggravated sentencing decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. 

Petitioner’s claim fails. 

iv. Appeal counsel (Ms. Terpstra) 

 Petitioner asserts appellate counsel (Ms. Terpstra) was ineffective when she 

“abandoned her adversarial position as Petitioner’s agent in opening brief” by 

acknowledging Petitioner admitted multiple prior felony convictions and that he was 

represented by counsel in his Massachusetts case. (Doc. 1 at 17-18.) Petitioner does not 

deny having multiple prior felony convictions or that he was represented by counsel in 

his Massachusetts case. Instead, Petitioner now claims that his counsel was not present on 

the day of plea and sentencing in Massachusetts. For the reasons outlined in Ground 

Three above, Petitioner’s claim fails. Appellate counsel was not ineffective. 

i. Ground Nine 

 Petitioner re-alleges the following arguments, but alleges a violation of his Sixth 

Amendment rights: counsel Goldstein did not attend a freetalk between Petitioner and 

police (Ground Eight) and did not interview witness Gerrich (Ground Eight). The Court 

determined that counsel was not ineffective regarding these issues, and these arguments 

are denied for the reasons outlined above. 

 Petitioner also alleges “Judge Anderson never ruled on whether or not Petitioner 

had counsel in his Massachusetts prior conviction.” (Doc. 1 at 20.) Petitioner alleges that 

if counsel Goldstein had “objected at the 4-28-08 ruling” then “there is a reasonable 

probability of a different outcome.” (Id.) But counsel did object to the admission of the 

prior at the April 28, 2008 hearing. One of the “defects” of the Massachusetts prior that 

counsel argued to the court was that “there’s nothing in those – either of the 

Massachusetts priors that states a defendant was represented by duly appointed counsel 

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and had access to counsel as he would here in Arizona. . . .” (Doc. 19-13, Ex. BB, at 32.) 

The trial court found the prior conviction qualified to enhance Petitioner’s sentence, and 

thus implicitly overruled counsel’s argument. (Doc. 19-1, Ex. C, at 14.) Assuming 

arguendo the court did not explicitly rule on the motion, it was still denied. See State v. 

Hill, 848 P.2d 1375, 1385 (Ariz. 1993) (“A motion that is not ruled on is deemed denied 

by operation of law.”). 

 The Court determined, in Ground Three, that Petitioner failed to overcome the 

“presumption of regularity” that attached to his Massachusetts conviction. Even if 

counsel was required to object to the trial court’s failure to rule, Petitioner fails to 

establish prejudice. Petitioner had no additional information to present to the trial court 

other than his avowal, which is insufficient.7

 

j. Ground Ten

 Petitioner re-alleges the following arguments, but alleges a violation of his Sixth 

Amendment rights: counsel failed to object to venue (Ground One) and cumulative error 

(Ground Two). (Doc. 1 at 21.) Petitioner’s claims are meritless for the reasons explained 

above.

k. Ground Eleven 

 Petitioner re-alleges the following arguments, and alleges a violation of his 

Fourteenth Amendment rights: counsel Terpstra was ineffective for failing to object on 

appeal to the Massachusetts prior conviction (Ground Eight); counsel “should have raised 

lack of venue in the indictment” (Ground One); and, counsel should have argued 

Petitioner’s preliminary hearing was improperly vacated (Ground Seven). Petitioner’s 

claims fail for the reasons outlined above. 

l. Ground Twelve 

 Petitioner re-alleges the following arguments, and alleges a violation of his Sixth 

 

7

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the court found Petitioner “has not offered any credible evidence that he was not 

represented by counsel in his prior conviction to overcome the presumption of regularity” (Doc. 19-2, Ex. J, at 51). 

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Amendment rights: counsel Schaffer (1) improperly entered an agreement for Petitioner 

to cooperate against others (Ground Eight); (2) failed to hire a mitigation specialist 

(Ground Eight); (3) failed to object to an aggravated sentence (Ground Eight). (Doc. 1 at 

24.) Petitioner’s claims fail for the reasons outlined above. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are timely, but procedurally defaulted or meritless. The Court will 

therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

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Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 4th day of April, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00471-SMM Document 28 Filed 04/04/16 Page 25 of 25