Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05517/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05517-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH CUVIELLO AND DENIZ BOLBOL,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, ALAMEDA

COUNTY, OAKLAND-ALAMEDA

COUNTY COLISEUM AUTHORITY,

OAKLAND COLISEUM JOINT VENTURE,

L.L.C., SMG, OAKLAND POLICE OFFICER

R. VALLADON, OAKLAND POLICE

OFFICER R. VILLEGAS, OAKLAND

COLISEUM ASSISTANT SECURITY

MANAGER “SKEET” ELLIS, AND DOES 1-

100,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-5517 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Feld Entertainment’s Motion to

Intervene; Plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify the

Preliminary Injunction; Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs filed suit against various defendants alleging violations of their civil rights. Before

the court are Feld Entertainment’s motion to intervene, plaintiffs’ motion to modify the preliminary

injunction, and plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment regarding California Civil Code section

52.1. The court finds these motions suitable for decision without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). 

Having considered the parties’ submissions, the court enters the following memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, all background facts throughout this order are taken from the joint

statement of undisputed facts. See Docket No. 285 (JSUF). Plaintiffs Joseph Cuviello and Deniz

Bolbol are members of Citizens for Cruelty-Free Entertainment, a group dedicated to the humane

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treatment of animals. Plaintiffs appear at events organized by the Ringling Brothers and Barnum &

Bailey Circus to videotape and protest animal abuses by these entities.

Defendant Alameda County (the “County”) is a governmental entity which owns the Oracle

Arena (the “Arena”) in conjunction with defendant City of Oakland (the “City”). In 1995, the

County and the City formed the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority (the “Authority”) to

oversee the Arena. Defendants Villegas and Valladon are police officers employed by the Oakland

Police Department. Defendants Oakland Coliseum Joint Venture and SMG are private entities

which have contracted with the Authority to provide facilities management at the Arena, including

event organization, booking, promotion, advertising, security and concession services.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to intervene

Feld Entertainment Inc. (“Feld”), which owns the Ringling Brothers Circus, has filed a

motion to intervene. The motion is unopposed.

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs intervention in an action by a nonparty. It states that “[o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims

an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated

that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impeded the movant’s ability to

protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(a)(2).

All three factors are met with respect to Feld. Its motion is timely. It has an interest in the

action which may be impaired without allowing intervention: since the Ringling Brothers Circus

performs annually at the Arena, Feld would be bound by the terms of an injunction implicating

Arena facilities. Feld’s interests are not adequately represented by existing defendants who, as

governmental actors, have different interests. The governmental-actor defendants appear mainly

concerned with crowd control and public safety, whereas Feld may be more interested in the

operation of its circus. Feld’s motion is therefore granted.

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II. Preliminary injunction

A. Background

 Three different preliminary injunctions have issued in this action—one each in 2007, 2008

and 2009. The preliminary injunction currently in force, adopted by this court on August 10, 2009,

see Docket No. 240 (August 2009 Order), provides that up to four persons including plaintiffs and

persons acting in concert with them be permitted to access certain enumerated areas of the Arena

without an admission ticket. The injunction allows access to, inter alia, “[t]he barricaded corridor

leading to the animal compound, the area outside of but directly adjacent to the corridor, and the gap

between the corridor and the animal compound entrance except that there shall be a ten-foot barrier

zone surrounding the entrance to the compound. Plaintiffs may temporarily be moved from the gap

to permit movement of equipment and animals.” Docket No. 235 (PI Report) at 12-13.

Plaintiffs claim that during the 2009 Ringling Brothers Circus’ “Animal Open House” event,

wherein ticket holders are invited to enter the animal compound area to view the animals, Feld

placed an employee and a table within the ten-foot buffer zone, as established above, to espouse the

Circus’ point of view by distributing promotional materials. This, they claim, undercuts any

argument regarding the necessity of a buffer zone to alleviate congestion, and also leads to

viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. They seek elimination of the buffer

zone.

B. Discussion

“[A] district court retains jurisdiction to modify the terms of its injunctions in the event that a

change in circumstances requires it.” Anderson v. Central Point Sch. Dist., 746 F.3d 505, 507 (9th

Cir. 1984). “A party seeking modification . . . of an injunction bears the burden of establishing that

a significant change in facts or law warrants revision . . . of the injunction.” Sharp v. Weston, 233

F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2000).

Restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech are reasonable “provided the restrictions

‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored

to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for

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communication of the information.’” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)

(quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Each of the three

prongs are met with respect to the buffer zone, and the changed circumstances presented by

plaintiffs do not warrant its elimination.

Judge Chen articulated the purpose of the ten-foot buffer zone. Specifically noting the

possibility of congestion within the public corridor, he recommended that the free speech zone

“[s]hould extend the length of the corridor up to the entrance of the animal compound excepting,

however, any space within ten feet of the compound entrance to safeguard against traffic

congestions.” PI Report at 9. The court shared Judge Chen’s concerns and adopted his

recommendation. August 2009 Order. The first Ward prong is met because the buffer zone is a

narrowly tailored remedy that does not reference the content of the regulated speech. See Schenck v.

Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (upholding injunction provisions prohibiting

demonstrations within fifteen feet of abortion clinics’ doorways, parking lot entrances, driveways

and driveway entrances). The second Ward prong is met because there is a significant governmental

interest in allowing ease of ingress and egress at the compound entrance. See Kuba v. 1-A Agr.

Ass’n., 387 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The Association asserts that it has a significant

governmental interest in preventing traffic congestion and ensuring the safety of pedestrians and

drivers. These interests are indeed significant as many cases have recognized. [citations]”). Finally,

the third Ward prong is met because plaintiffs may protest throughout the length of the corridor;

thus, the injunction does not violate plaintiffs’ free speech rights as there remain “ample alternative

channels for the communication of information.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at

293).

Feld’s temporary occupation of a portion of the ten-foot buffer zone does not compel

elimination of the buffer. Even if, as plaintiffs contend, the presence of Feld personnel within the

buffer did not lead to congestion, the same result would not follow if the buffer was completely

eliminated and unfettered access to the animal compound entrance was allowed. Video evidence

submitted by plaintiffs shows the area to be quite small; even a few protestors within the buffer

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could block the entrance and prevent patrons from entering or leaving. See Docket No. 316 (Bolbol

Decl.), Exh. A (Video). The court is also aware that there “is a considerable amount of friction that

exists between the protestors and Feld Entertainment” and that protestors have made attempts to

“drown out” the sales and promotional activities of Feld employees. See Docket No. 305 (Bryant

Decl.) ¶¶ 2, 11. While the court expresses no opinion regarding plaintiffs’ protest tactics, the record

reveals that in jockeying for the ear of circus-goers, both Feld employees and plaintiffs could flood

the buffer. Therefore, if the buffer were eliminated, it is likely that: 1) the entrance would become

crowded and potentially unsafe; 2) ease of access for patrons would decrease; and 3) tensions

between the parties would escalate. Feld’s temporary occupation of the buffer does not compel its

elimination.

Kuba does not compel a different result either. That court noted that while measures

prohibiting protestors within a certain distance from building entrances were reasonable precautions,

the policy at issue “which relegate[d] communication activity to three small, fairly peripheral areas,

d[id] not ‘sufficiently match’ the stated interest of preventing congestion.” 387 F.3d at 862 (citing

Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1994)). In contrast, the injunction

here excludes plaintiffs from only a small space at the entrance of the animal compound. Moreover,

unlike here, there was only a slight chance of congestion in Kuba. Id. at 862 (“[I]n large parking

lots, the likelihood of pedestrian congestion is small.”). Here, the entrance to the compound could

be easily blocked. See id. at 861 (“We do not mean to suggest, of course, that the Association could

not prevent demonstrations that do prevent patrons from entering or leaving the facility. . . .”). As a

result, despite the new evidence, the ten-foot buffer zone limitation stands.

Feld does not dispute that its employee was within the buffer zone at certain times; instead, it

claims that its employee was driven into the buffer by plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs do not claim

that the injunction was violated by Feld, the court clarifies that the buffer zone may not be occupied

by anybody, regardless of the content of their speech. Any other standard would allow any number

of Feld employees to take cover in the buffer zone, thereby completely eliminating the congestionalleviation purpose of the buffer zone. Moreover, the buffer was not created as a safe haven for Feld

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to disseminate its own viewpoint. Because injunction restrictions must be content neutral, Feld and

its employees may not speak inside the buffer zone, just as plaintiffs are not free to speak there. See

Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (stating that restrictions on free speech must be “justified without reference to

the content of the regulated speech”). Therefore, hereafter, the prohibition on entering the buffer

zone applies to all parties here. Of course, patrons of the circus may pass through the buffer zone to

access the animal compound and Feld's employees may enter the buffer zone only as absolutely

necessary to assist patrons or attend to exigent circumstances. In view of this holding, the court does

not reach Feld’s captive audience arguments.

III. Civil Code section 52.1

A. Background

In August 2005, as well as in August 2006, plaintiffs sought access to various portions of the

Arena to view and videotape circus animals. In each instance, certain defendants’ refusal to permit

access prevented plaintiffs from videotaping the animals.

On August 18, 2005, plaintiffs attempted to access the north ramp and landing of the Arena,

but were prevented from access by, inter alia, Officer Villegas. Plaintiffs told the officer that they

were not trespassing pursuant to California Penal Code section 602 because the statute contains an

exemption for constitutionally protected activity. Plaintiffs were nonetheless denied access. On

August 19, 2005, Bolbol tried to access the north landing but was prevented from doing so by

Assistant Security Manager Ellis. On August 20, 2005, Bolbol managed to access the north landing

but was asked to leave by Ellis and other security personnel. Officers Villegas and Valladon then

appeared at the scene, and told Bolbol that she would be placed under citizen’s arrest if she did not

leave the area. Bolbol left the landing. Thereafter, she purchased a ticket and again managed to

access the north landing. This time Ellis told her that even though she had a ticket, she had to leave

because her ticket was for the following show, at 3:30 p.m. Officers Villegas and Valladon again

appeared at the scene, and Officer Villegas instructed Bolbol that if a citizen’s arrest were

effectuated, she would be taken to jail instead of being cited and released. Bolbol left the landing. 

Thereafter, after the 3:30 pm show had started, Cuviello took Bolbol’s ticket and accessed the north

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landing. He was told by Ellis and Officer Villegas that his ticket was invalid, and thereafter was

arrested for trespass pursuant to California Penal Code section 602. He spent the night in jail.

In August of the next year, 2006, Bolbol again accessed the north landing. While there, she

was again approached by Ellis and Officers Villegas and Valladon. They told her that the north

landing was only open to ticketed persons and that she would be arrested if she did not leave. 

Bolbol left the landing. The officers and Bolbol were then met by Cuviello, who suggested that

Bolbol ask the officers to accept Bolbol’s citizen’s arrest of a security person who had assaulted her. 

Bolbol did so, but neither officer acted upon her request. After Bolbol’s request, Bolbol called the

City police and asked that officers who were not working at the Arena be dispatched. Officers were

sent and, after they watched her video, they told her that the security person would be arrested and

cited.

B. Discussion

Plaintiffs claim that defendants have violated California Civil Code section 52.1, which

provides for damages if a person “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to

interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or

individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured

by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city

attorney . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). This court has already found that plaintiffs’ rights under

Section 52.1 were violated by defendants City of Oakland, Oakland Coliseum Joint Venture, Ellis

and officers Villegas and Valladon. See Docket No. 263 (Order Adopting R&R). The only question

remaining is the quantum of damages available for this violation.

California Civil Code section 52.1(b) provides that for a violation of Section 52.1, any

individual “may institute and prosecute in his or her own and on his or her own behalf a civil action

for damages, including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other

appropriate equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights

secured.” The plain language of the statute thus makes a range of remedies available to the

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aggrieved Section 52.1 plaintiff, including damages under Section 52; however, nowhere does the

language specify the scope of the word “damages.”

Section 52 enumerates many different types of remedies, including actual damages, treble

damages, punitive damages and civil penalties. Cal. Civ. Code § 52. At issue here is Section

52(b)(2), which provides for a civil penalty of $25,000 for violations of Section 51.7. See id.

§ 52(b)(2) (“A civil penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the person

denied the right provided by Section 51.7 in any action brought by the person denied the right, or by

the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney.”).

This court has held that because Section 52.1 simply refers to damages under Section 52

without limiting its reference to either sections 52(a) or 52(b), all damages made available by

Section 52 may be sought for a violation of Section 51.2. Docket No. 218 (R&R) at 37; Order

Adopting R&R at 2. The court reaffirms its prior holding that all damages under Section 52 are

available to an aggrieved Section 52.1 plaintiff, and the court now addresses whether the civil

penalty of Section 52(b)(2) may be awarded for a Section 52.1 violation. Plaintiffs claim that civil

penalties are automatic for a Section 52.1 violation; defendants claim civil penalties requires

intentional acts with respect to the protected categories enumerated in Section 51.7. Both sides are

wrong.

This is an issue of first impression. Although the court previously held that a prevailing

Section 52.1 plaintiff may be entitled to civil penalties as provided for in Section 52(b)(2), it revisits

that holding here. City of Los Angeles v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.

2001) (district court can reconsider its prior orders sua sponte because “[a]ll rulings of a trial court

are subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment.”); see Order Adopting R&R at 2

(“The court finds the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that penalties and punitive damages under

section 52(b) are not automatic for a violation of section 52.1 to be the most reasonable

interpretation of the statute.”). Upon further review, the court holds that civil penalties provided by

Section 52(b)(2) are not available to a Section 52.1 plaintiff.

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The remedies specified in Section 52.1(b) allow for “damages, including, but not limited to,

damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief . . . .” Cal. Civ.

Code § 52.1(b). The legislature thus distinguished between damages, injunctive relief and equitable

relief. The legislature also distinguished between injunctive relief, equitable relief and civil

penalties in Section 52.1(a), which allows public attorneys to seek any of the three forms of relief. 

Id. § 52.1(a). Finally, in Section 52.1(h), the legislature allowed all Section 52.1 litigants to seek

attorneys’ fees in addition to damages, injunctions and equitable relief. Id. § 52.1(h). Thus, Section

52.1, when analyzed as a whole, demonstrates that the legislature distinguished between the five

potential remedies: damages, injunctive relief, equitable relief, civil penalties, and attorneys fees.

There is a distinction between civil penalties and damages, which is apparent from the basic

definitions of the terms. “Penalty” is defined as “a sum of money exacted as punishment for either a

wrong to the state or a civil wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the injured party’s

loss),” whereas “damage” is defined as “[o]f or relating to monetary compensation for loss or injury

to a person or property.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) 1247, 445. Thus, a penalty, unlike

damages, is a fine assessed for a violation of a statute without regard to the actual injury suffered.

Case law is in accord. In Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d 139 (1991), the

California Supreme Court distinguished between damages and civil penalties to hold that state law

which limits state liability for damages imposed as punishment does not limit the state’s liability

with respect to statutory civil penalties. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559

(1996), the Supreme Court distinguished between punitive damages and civil penalties by holding

that the factors to be considered when assessing the validity of a punitive damages award include the

difference between punitive damages awarded by jury and civil penalties authorized or imposed in

comparable cases. Recently, in Los Angeles County Metro. Trans. Ath. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.

App. 4th 261 (2004), the California Court of Appeal also distinguished between remedial civil

penalties and punitive damages by holding that a governmental entity was not immune from civil

penalties imposed by Section 52 even though Government Code section 818 bars imposing punitive

damages against public entities. Given the numerous instances in which this distinction has been

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addressed, the word “damages” in Section 52.1(b) does not include, sub silentio, the civil penalties

specified in Section 52(b)(2). Section 52 damages include actual damages, treble damages and

exemplary damages. Moreover, actual damages include both special damages and general damages. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52(h). Accordingly, Section 52(b)(2) civil penalties are not available under Section

52.1(b).

This holding does not render the “including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52”

language in Section 52.1(b) surplusage. Section 52.1 does not discuss either treble or exemplary

damages, both of which are incorporated by reference to Section 52. Moreover, the addition of the

language referencing Section 52 was described in the legislative history as follows: “This bill would

specify that the cause of actions for damages includes, but is not limited to, among other damages,

those damages set forth in (3).” 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 607 (S.B. 98). The legislative history of

point (3) states: “This bill would delete the award of 3 times the amount of actual damages and,

instead, would provide merely for an award of exemplary damages. The bill also would increase the

civil penalty to $25,000 and would delete the proration of this civil penalty between multiple

offenders.” Id. Again, actual damages, exemplary damages and civil penalties are all treated

differently. The legislative history goes on to specify that “this bill would define ‘actual damages’

to mean special and general damages.” Id. This declaration of intent, which clarifies the scope of a

certain type of damages, but fails to specify that the term “damages” was intended to include civil

penalties, further supports the distinction between damages and civil penalties.

Los Angeles County Metro. Trans. Ath., 123 Cal. App. 4th 261, does not compel a different

result. That court held that a successful Section 51.7 plaintiff was entitled to actual damages,

exemplary damages as determined by the jury, a $25,000 civil penalty, and attorneys’ fees as

determined by the court. Id. at 266-67 (“The civil penalty, however, must be awarded in the sum of

$25,000 provided a plaintiff has proven a violation of section 51.7.”). The court did not address the

scope of damages available for a Section 52.1 violation; consequently, its discussion of Section

52(b)(2) within the context of a Section 51.7 violation is inapposite. That court did not hold that all

violations of Section 52.1, even if they do not implicate Section 51.7, mandate a $25,000 civil

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penalty. Likewise, D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake School, 176 Cal. App. 4th 836 (2009), is also

unpersuasive because plaintiffs there claimed a violation of Section 51.7 based on death threats. 

Although a violation of Section 52.1 was also claimed, the court did not even discuss damages, let

alone civil penalties, for a Section 52.1 violation in the absence of a Section 51.7 violation.

The above holding overrules the court’s prior holding that civil penalties are available for

serious violations of Section 52.1. R&R at 38. However, the court reaffirms that “[p]laintiffs are

correct that courts have held a violation of section 52.1 itself not to require any heightened severity. 

See Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820 (2004) (holding section 52.1 not to require

showing of actual intent to discriminate).” Order Adopting R&R at 2. A plaintiff need not

demonstrate actual intent to discriminate in order to establish a prima facie Section 52.1 claim. This

holding also does not add limitations to the scope of Section 52.1. See Venegas, 32 Cal. 4th at 843

(“added limitations on the scope of section §52.1 [is] more a legislative concern than a judicial

one . . . .”). The standard for liability under Section 52.1 remains undisturbed, and encompasses a

broader range of acts than enumerated in Section 52, which applies only to certain enumerated

classes. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b) (listing sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,

disability, medical condition, marital status and sexual orientation as protected classes). This broad

application of Section 52.1 comports with the language of Section 52.1(g), which states that “[a]n

action brought pursuant to this section is independent of any other action, remedy, or procedure that

may be available to an aggrieved individual under any other provision of law, including, but not

limited to, an action, remedy, or procedure brought pursuant to Section 51.7.” Id. § 52.1(g).

CONCLUSION

Feld Entertainment’s motion to intervene is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motion to modify the

preliminary injunction is DENIED; the ten-foot buffer zone restriction applies to all parties,

including Feld Entertainment. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED because civil

penalties under California Civil Code section 52(b)(2) are unavailable for a Section 52.1 violation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2010 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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