Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02446/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02446-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARC STUDENTS FOR LIBERTY

CAMPAIGN, an unincorporated

association,

NO. CIV. S-09-2446 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

LOS RIOS COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DISTRICT, BRICE W. HARRIS,

Chancellor, in his official 

capacity; WILLIAM V. KARNS,

Vice Chancellor in his

capacity, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

 /

This case concerns an election for a Student Trustee at Los

Rios Community College. Due to perceived voting irregularities the

community college district invalidated the election and ordered the

student trustee to be selected by several student representatives.

Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated

below, plaintiff’s motion is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 8, 2009, plaintiff ARC Students for Liberty

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Campaign filed a complaint against defendants Los Rios Community

College District (“Los Rios” or “District”), Bruce W. Harris

(“Harris”), Chancellor of Los Rios, and William V. Karns

(“Karns”), Vice Chancellor of Los Rios. This complaint alleged

violations of federal law concerning the District’s invalidation

of the April 2009 election for the student trustee to Los Rios’s

governing board and subsequent establishment of procedures to

select a student trustee, who was not chosen by popular vote.

Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Defendants

removed the complaint to federal court on August 31, 2009. 

On October 9, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction to require the District to count the

votes in the April 2009 election and to seat the student who

received the most votes. This motion raised complex questions of

federal due process and other constitutional issues. On November

19, 2009, the court denied plaintiff’s motion, reasoning that

while the facts and law as then presented by the parties

suggested that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits,

they nonetheless did not rise to a level sufficient for the

court to order a mandatory preliminary injunction.

On December 23, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion for summary

judgment. This motion raised the same legal arguments brought in

plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and relied on

the same facts presented in the earlier motion. Defendants,

however, filed an opposition that not only raised new legal

arguments, but also provided a fuller picture of the factual

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issues involved in this case. Of particular importance to the

disposition of this motion are facts that suggest (1) that the

irregularities in the polling hours may have affected the result

of the election and (2) that members of ARC Students for

Liberty, while serving as the majority of American River College

Student Association (“ARC Student Association”), may have

intentionally caused the irregular polling hours to ensure that

the candidate of their choosing won the election. For the

reasons described below, plaintiff’s motion is denied because

defendants are entitled to discovery on these factual issues.

Accordingly, the court does at this time resolve the legal

arguments concerning federal due process. 

II. STANDARDS

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no

genuine issue as to any material fact. Such circumstances

entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144, 157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 1995). Under summary judgment practice, the moving

party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986);

see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. In doing so, the

opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings,

but must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of

affidavits and/or other admissible materials in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

also First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. In evaluating the

evidence, the court draws all reasonable inferences from the

facts before it in favor of the opposing party. Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587-88 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.

654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); County of Tuolumme v. Sonora

Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless,

it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual

predicate as a basis for such inferences. See Richards v.

Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). The

opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (citations omitted).

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B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) Avoidance of Summary Judgment

Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a

party to avoid summary judgment where affidavits are not

available, which are necessary to support a party’s opposition

to the motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 

Rule 56(f) applications are to be granted freely where the party

requesting additional time has complied with the Rule’s

requirements. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co. v.

Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d

767, 773-774 (9th Cir. 2003); Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick,

264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001). In order to be successful on

a 56(f) application, the party must show (1) that it has set

forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to

elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist,

and (3) that these sought-after facts are “essential” to resist

the summary judgment motion. State of Cal., on Behalf of

California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138

F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998); see also VISA Intern. Service

Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of America, 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th

Cir. 1986) (“[D]enial of a Rule 56(f) application is generally

disfavored where the party opposing summary judgment makes (a) a

timely application which (b) specifically identifies (c)

relevant information, (d) where there is some basis for

believing that the information sought actually exists.”).

56(f) applications should be granted liberally “unless the

non-moving party has not diligently pursued discovery of the

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 In its reply, plaintiff argues that defendants failed to 1

comply with Local Rule 78-230(c) when they electronically filed

their opposition fourteen days before this case was set for

hearing. Under the local rules in effect before December 1, 2009,

parties were required to electronically file and serve oppositions

seventeen days before a hearing, but need only physically file and

serve oppositions fourteen days before a hearing. Recognizing that

parties receive electronically filed documents earlier than mailed

documents, this court’s standard practice was to issue a scheduling

order setting the deadline for electronically filing oppositions

at fourteen days and for physically filing oppositions at seventeen

days. On December 1, 2009, the Eastern District of California

similarly revised its local rules to require oppositions to be

filed fourteen days before a hearing, even if filed electronically.

Local Rule 230(c). Plaintiff is advised to review the local rules

currently in effect.

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evidence.” Wichita Falls Office Assoc. v. Banc One Corp., 978

F.2d 915, 919 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has also

held that denial of 56(f) applications is “especially

inappropriate where the material sought is also the subject of

outstanding discovery requests.” VISA Intern. Service Ass'n, 784

F.2d at 1475. 

III. ANALYSIS1

This motion was filed prior to discovery or even to the

issuance of a scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.

Consequently, the court may deny plaintiff’s motion either

because there are triable issues of fact or because defendants

have not had the opportunity to discover information that is

essential to their opposition. Because the court denies the

motion on the latter justification, it does not address the

former. Specifically, the court denies summary judgment such

that defendants may seek discovery of factual issues, including,

but not limited to, the extent to which there was intentional

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 Plaintiff objects to much of the evidence produced by 2

defendants in opposition to its motion for summary judgment. Most

of these arguments concern factual arguments, which actually

further demonstrate the need for discovery by defendants.

Specifically, while defendants’ evidence may not entitle defendants

to summary judgment on the factual issues of election tampering by

ARC Students for Liberty members nor on whether the changes in

polling hours likely affected the outcome of the election,

defendants have presented sufficient evidence to suggest the

possibility that with discovery they could present evidence of

material factual disputes that would, at least, preclude summary

judgment. Plaintiff’s remaining objections to defendants’ evidence

are not relevant to the court’s disposition of this motion in that

the court denies the motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), and

not for plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that it is entitled to

summary judgment.

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election tampering by members of ARC Students for Liberty.

With their opposition, defendants have set forth in an

affidavit the specific facts concerning election tampering by

plaintiff’s members that they hope to elicit through discovery.

Defendants have also demonstrated that there is some basis to

believe this information actually exists. In particular, they

have presented meeting minutes of the ARC Student Association

concerning the election, which suggest that the association may

have been involved in election tampering as well as suggest that

the student association at this time was controlled by a

majority of members of plaintiff. Lastly, this evidence is 2

essential to defendant’s opposition in that (1) it could provide

a complete defense to liability and (2) it could demonstrate

that defendants did not violate the state education code in

invalidating the election. 

Specifically, if defendants are able to demonstrate a

factual dispute with respect to whether ARC Student Association

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 The affirmative defense of unclean hands “derives from the 3

maxim that ‘he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.’”

Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985).

The doctrine “closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted

with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which

he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of

defendant.” Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 877

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automative

Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)). The material

question in application of this doctrine “is not that the

plaintiff’s hands are dirty, but that he dirtied them in acquiring

the right he now asserts, or that the manner of dirtying renders

inequitable the assertion of such rights against the defendants.”

Ellenburg, 763 F.2d at 1097 (internal quotation omitted). The Ninth

Circuit concluded that “equity requires that those seeking its

protection shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as

to the controversy in issue.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

 The court nonetheless notes that there is a question as to 4

whether misconduct of plaintiff’s members constitutes misconduct

of plaintiff for unclean hands to apply.

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tampered with the election for the student trustee, the

District’s actions invalidating the election would be far more

likely not to offend due process. Moreover, if defendants are

able to demonstrate that ARC Students for Liberty members

orchestrated and implemented the alleged election tampering,

they may be able to prove the affirmative defense of unclean

hands, which would bar plaintiff from relief, the only type of 3

relief sought in plaintiff’s complaint and motion for summary

judgment. Accordingly, defendants have met the burden of Fed. 4

R. Civ. P. 56(f) to preclude the court from granting summary

judgment for plaintiffs.

When considering an argument under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f),

courts are given discretion to “(1) deny the motion; [¶]

(2)order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained,

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depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or

[¶] issue an other just order.” Here, denial of the motion is

more appropriate than granting defendants a continuance to

conduct discovery on these issues. Because no discovery has yet

occurred, and because it does not appear that discovery sought

by either party would greatly exceed that sought by defendants

in its Rule 56(f) application, it is more efficient for the

court to deny the motion without prejudice. Doing so also serves

judicial economy in that the court will not needlessly resolve

legal questions that may be mooted by defendants’ potential

defenses.

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders that

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Doc. No. 30 is DENIED

without prejudice. 

The court further orders that a scheduling conference is

set for March 8, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. Parties shall file status

report(s) ten (10) days before the conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 1, 2010.

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