Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05111/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 15, 2002 Decided August 23, 2002

No. 01-5111

Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc.,

Appellant

v.

Elaine Chao,

Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor and

Charles N. Jeffress, Assistant Secretary of Labor

for Occupational Safety and Health,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01026)

Richard D. Wayne argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Brian J. Sonfield, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

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Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, Eugene Scalia, Solicitor, U.S. Department of

Labor, Joseph M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor, and Bruce

Justh and Ronald J. Gottlieb, Counsel. Michael J. Ryan,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Sentelle, Randolph, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc.

filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, challenging the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration's Data Collection Initiative as unlawful. The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, and that the company must pursue

its claims through the review process prescribed by the

Occupational Safety and Health Act. We agree.

I

We begin with a description of the statutory framework

and of prior proceedings involving Sturm Ruger.

A

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to promulgate workplace safety

and health standards, 29 U.S.C. s 655(b), as well as regulations "necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of [the

Act] or for developing information regarding the causes and

prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses," id.

s 657(c)(1). It further directs the Secretary to "prescribe

regulations requiring employers to maintain accurate records

of, and to make periodic reports on, work-related deaths,

injuries and illnesses." Id. s 657(c)(2). And it gives the

Secretary enforcement power, authorizing her to issue citations and to assess penalties for violations of the Act and of

the standards and regulations promulgated thereunder. Id.

ss 658, 659. The Secretary has delegated the bulk of these

statutory responsibilities and authorities to the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

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While the OSH Act charges the Secretary with rulemaking

and enforcement, it gives the task of "carrying out adjudicatory functions" to an independent entity, the Occupational

Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC or the Commission). Id. s 651(b)(3); see Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S.

144, 147 (1991) (explaining that the OSH Act "assigns distinct

regulatory tasks to two different administrative actors").

Under the Act, employers may contest OSHA citations before

OSHRC. 29 U.S.C. s 659(c). Such contests are heard first

by an ALJ, whose decision becomes the final order of the

Commission unless the Commission decides to hear the case.

Id. s 661(j). Both employers and the Secretary may seek

review of OSHRC orders in the courts of appeals. Id.

s 660(a), (b).1

In 1996, OSHA launched an annual survey called the Data

Collection Initiative (DCI). See 62 Fed. Reg. 6434, 6434

(Feb. 11, 1997). Under the DCI, OSHA requires selected

employers to report the number of workers they employed

and the number of hours their employees worked during a

specified period, as well as the number of work-related injuries and illnesses their employees suffered during that period.

See, e.g., OSHA Data Collection Form for Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 2000 (J.A. at 67). From this information,

OSHA calculates injury/illness incidence rates, which it uses

to identify establishments to target for inspection. See 62

Fed. Reg. at 6435; Secretary of Labor v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,

OSHRC Nos. 99-1873 & 99-1874 (ALJ Order Den. Mot. to

Suppress, July 5, 2000) [hereinafter July 2000 ALJ Order]

(noting that OSHA uses the DCI to target "sites in highhazard industries with average or above rates of injury and

illness").2

__________

1 A person adversely affected by a Commission order may obtain

review in "any United States court of appeals for the circuit in

which the violation is alleged to have occurred or where the

employer has its principal office, or in the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit." 29 U.S.C. s 660(a).

2 When the DCI was first implemented in 1996, OSHA had in

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B

In April 1997, OSHA sent Sturm Ruger a DCI survey,

requiring it to provide information regarding its Pine Tree

Castings Division, a New Hampshire facility that manufactures steel investment castings. Sturm Ruger complied and

returned the completed survey to OSHA. In June 1998,

based on information in the survey, two OSHA compliance

officers arrived at Pine Tree to inspect the facility. See 29

U.S.C. s 657(a) (providing that the Secretary may enter,

inspect, and investigate workplaces as necessary to "carry out

the purposes of [the Act]"). Sturm Ruger refused to consent

to the inspection, prompting OSHA to obtain a search warrant from the United States District Court for the District of

New Hampshire. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.

307, 311 (1978) (holding that OSHA must obtain a warrant to

conduct nonconsensual inspections of business premises).

When OSHA officers arrived to execute the warrant, Pine

Tree employees prevented them from doing so. On the same

day, Sturm Ruger moved to quash the warrant, arguing that

the data used to target Pine Tree for inspection was derived

from a survey that was not authorized by regulation, and that

the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.

__________

related injuries and illnesses, 29 C.F.R. s 1904.2, and to provide

these logs to OSHA upon its request, id. s 1904.7. OSHA did not,

however, have a regulation that required employers to respond to

the DCI survey. Several employers filed suit against the Secretary, seeking an injunction against its implementation. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Reich, 955 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1997).

In January 1997, the district court granted summary judgment for

the employers, holding that OSHA "must promulgate a regulation

before purporting to command employers to file reports like the one

at issue here." Id. at 7. The Secretary did not appeal that

decision, and the next month, to "clarify OSHA's authority," OSHA

adopted 29 C.F.R. s 1904.17, which we discuss below. See 62 Fed.

Reg. 6434, 6434 (Feb. 11, 1997). Since the filing of Sturm Ruger's

complaint, OSHA has revised 29 C.F.R. pt. 1904, and the regulation

concerning the DCI now appears at 29 C.F.R. s 1904.41. See 66

Fed. Reg. 5916 (Jan. 19, 2001).

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On January 22, 1999, the district court denied the motion to

quash and enforced the warrant. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v.

United States, No. Civ. 98-418-JD, 2000 WL 36931, at *11

(D.N.H. Jan. 22, 1999). Sturm Ruger appealed to the United

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and sought a

stay of execution of the warrant pending appeal. The First

Circuit denied the stay, and OSHA executed the warrant.

After inspecting the Pine Tree facility, OSHA announced that

it was considering issuing citations for violations of safety and

health standards discovered during the inspection. Sturm,

Ruger & Co. v. OSHA, 186 F.3d 63, 63 (1st Cir. 1999).

In August 1999, the First Circuit dismissed Sturm Ruger's

appeal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Noting

that the OSHA inspection had already occurred and that

citations could soon issue, the court of appeals held that

Sturm Ruger had to pursue its challenge by contesting the

citations through the review process established by the OSH

Act. The court noted that this process "would involve initial

review by an administrative law judge, discretionary review

by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,

and eventual review by this court." Id. at 63 (citing 29 U.S.C.

ss 659-61).

The First Circuit reached its conclusion notwithstanding

Sturm Ruger's insistence that its claim "involve[d] a 'purely

legal' issue consisting of a 'facial' challenge" to the DCI. Id.

at 64. The court found that Sturm Ruger had "not suggested

that its claims cannot be adequately adjudicated in the ...

anticipated enforcement proceeding," id. (internal quotation

marks omitted), and that in fact "a successful appeal following

exhaustion of administrative remedies" would vindicate its

rights, id. at 65. Moreover, the court held that, while the

company had "not shown that requiring exhaustion would

subject it to irreparable harm," permitting the district court

to hear the claim would interfere with "agency autonomy."

Id. at 64-65.

On September 2, 1999, OSHA issued citations to Sturm

Ruger based on its inspection of the Pine Tree facility. In

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ny contested those citations before an ALJ appointed by

OSHRC. See 29 U.S.C ss 659(c), 661(j). At the outset of

the proceeding, Sturm Ruger moved to suppress the evidence

obtained during the Pine Tree inspection, arguing that no

regulation authorized OSHA to collect the survey data that it

used to target employers for inspection, and that the use of

the data violated the Fourth Amendment. The ALJ denied

the motion on the ground that, by responding to the survey,

Sturm Ruger had waived the right to challenge its legality.

July 2000 ALJ Order at 4.

After the ALJ issued a final decision on the merits, Sturm

Ruger petitioned for, and the Commission granted, discretionary review. Sturm Ruger's petition argued that the

citations should be vacated because they were discovered in

an inspection based on data collected through an unlawful and

unconstitutional survey. Pet. for Discretionary Review p 15,

reprinted in Secretary of Labor v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,

OSHRC Nos. 99-1873 & 99-1874, 2001 WL 95794 (ALJ Final

Order, Jan. 23, 2001). The DCI was unlawful under the OSH

Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

s 706, the company contended, because no regulation required employers to maintain the data sought by the survey.

Id. pp 4, 7. And it was unconstitutional because Sturm Ruger

had "a privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment

in the information that the survey form compelled it to

produce." Id. p 23. Sturm Ruger's case is currently pending

before the Commission.

C

On May 9, 2000, two months before the ALJ denied its

motion to suppress, Sturm Ruger filed a complaint against

the Secretary of Labor and the Assistant Secretary responsible for OSHA in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Herman, 131

F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.D.C. 2001). Like its filings before the

Commission, the company's complaint alleged that the DCI

was unlawful under the OSH Act, the APA, and the Fourth

Amendment. It sought both a declaratory judgment and an

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injunction barring OSHA from compelling compliance with

the DCI survey, from conducting inspection programs that

rely on survey data, and from "pursuing enforcement proceedings under the unlawful targeting inspection programs."

Compl. at 13-14.

In its complaint, Sturm Ruger made the same argument

now pending before the Commission: that the DCI was

invalid because it required employers to report employment

data (the number of employees and the hours they worked)

despite the alleged absence of a regulation requiring employers to create and maintain such data. The company rested

its argument on a section of the OSH Act that states:

On the basis of the records made and kept pursuant to

section 657(c) of this title, employers shall file such

reports with the Secretary as he shall prescribe by

regulation....

29 U.S.C. s 673(e). Sturm Ruger did not dispute that OSHA

had satisfied the requirement of the final clause of the section

with 29 C.F.R. s 1904.17, a regulation that requires employers to file reports in response to annual DCI surveys.3 But it

argued that the first clause of the section only permits the

agency to compel employers to provide information that is

contained in "records made and kept pursuant to section

657(c)." Section 657(c), in turn, provides:

Each employer shall make, keep and preserve, and make

available to the Secretary ..., such records regarding

his activities relating to this chapter as the Secretary ...

may prescribe by regulation....

__________

3 Each employer shall, upon receipt of OSHA's Annual Survey

Form, report to OSHA ... the number of workers it employed

and the number of hours worked by its employees for periods

designated in the Survey Form and such information as OSHA

may request from records required to be created and maintained pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Part 1904.

29 C.F.R. s 1904.17.

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29 U.S.C. s 657(c)(1). Sturm Ruger claimed that, although

OSHA had a regulation requiring employers to create and

maintain the injury and illness data sought by the DCI

survey, 29 C.F.R. s 1904.2, no regulation required them to

create and maintain the employment data also demanded by

the survey. Thus, the company argued, the DCI's requirement that employment data be reported was unlawful under

the OSH Act, ss 657(c) & 673(e), and consequently under the

APA because it was not "in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C.

s 706(2).4 Finally, like its pleadings before the Commission,

Sturm Ruger's complaint also contended that employers

"have a privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment

in the information that the survey form seeks to compel them

to produce." Compl. p 40.

The Secretary of Labor moved to dismiss Sturm Ruger's

complaint on the ground that "the administrative review

process established by the OSH Act is the exclusive means by

which plaintiff may challenge the DCI's legality." Sturm,

Ruger & Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d at 215. The district court

agreed and granted the motion. Applying the holding and

reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in Thunder Basin

Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994), the court concluded

that the OSH Act established a comprehensive review procedure that precluded district court jurisdiction.

III

On appeal, we review de novo the dismissal of Sturm

Ruger's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and

must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true.

__________

4 Sturm Ruger does not dispute that OSHA has mooted this

argument for DCI surveys applicable to years beginning after

January 1, 2002. Appellant's Br. at 17 n.1, 29. As the company

points out, OSHA has promulgated regulations, effective as of that

date, "which now require employers to create and maintain the DCI

Survey data" regarding the number of employees and the hours

they worked for each establishment. Id. at 17 n.1 (citing 29 C.F.R

s 1904.32 (2002); 66 Fed. Reg. 5916, 6042 (Jan. 19, 2001)).

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See Sloan v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev.,

236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001). We first consider whether

the OSH Act has a statutory review structure like that of the

statute at issue in Thunder Basin, the Federal Mine Safety

and Health Amendments Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C.

s 801 et seq. We then address whether Sturm Ruger's

claims "are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed

within this statutory structure." Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at

212.

A

In Thunder Basin, the Supreme Court considered a preenforcement challenge filed by a mine operator against the

Secretary of Labor. The operator's employees had selected

two employees of the United Mine Workers, who were not

employees of the mine, to serve as their miners' representatives under s 813(f) of the Mine Act. Thereafter, the Mine

Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) of the Department

of Labor instructed the operator to post the employees'

designated representatives, as required by the statute and a

MSHA regulation. Instead, the operator filed suit in federal

district court for an injunction against enforcement of the

regulation, contending that designation of nonemployee union

representatives violated its rights under the National Labor

Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. s 141 et seq. The operator

also argued that requiring it to challenge MSHA's interpretation of the statute and regulation through the Mine Act's

statutory review process would violate the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it would force the

operator to choose between violating the Act and incurring

penalties, or complying and thereby suffering irreparable

harm. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 205.

The Court held that the statutory review scheme of the

Mine Act deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the operator's complaint. It declared that "[i]n

cases involving delayed judicial review"--that is, where appeal can be taken to the court of appeals after completion of

administrative proceedings--"we shall find that Congress has

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allocated initial review to an administrative body where such

intent is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.' " Id. at

207 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S.

340, 351 (1984)). The Court found that intent discernible in

the following elements of the Mine Act's statutory review

procedure.

First, the Court noted that the "Act establishes a detailed

structure for reviewing violations" of MSHA standards and

regulations. Id. The Mine Act gives a mine operator thirty

days to challenge before the Commission any citation issued

by MSHA, after which time an uncontested order becomes

" 'final' " and " 'not subject to review by any court or agency.' " Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. s 815(a), (d)). Challenges filed

within the thirty-day period "are heard before an administrative law judge (ALJ), with possible Commission review" to

follow. Id. at 207-08 (citation omitted). "Only the Commission has authority actually to impose civil penalties proposed

by the Secretary, and the Commission reviews all proposed

civil penalties de novo." Id. 208 (citations omitted).

The Court further noted that under the Act, "[m]ine operators may challenge adverse Commission decisions in the

appropriate court of appeals, whose jurisdiction 'shall be

exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final' except

for possible Supreme Court review." Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C.

s 816(a)(1)). Courts of appeals must "uphold findings of the

Commission that are substantially supported by the record."

Id. (citation omitted). In addition, "the statute establishes

that the Commission and the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to agency enforcement proceedings," and its "comprehensive review process does not

distinguish between pre-enforcement and post-enforcement

challenges, but applies to all violations of the Act and its

regulations." Id. at 208-09 (citation omitted). Finally, the

"Act expressly authorizes district court jurisdiction in only

two provisions ..., which respectively empower the Secretary to enjoin habitual violations of health and safety standards and to coerce payment of civil penalties." Id. at 209

(citations omitted). "Mine operators," by contrast, "enjoy no

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corresponding right but are to complain to the Commission

and then to the court of appeals." Id.

In the instant case, the district court concluded, and we

agree, that "[t]he administrative and judicial review procedures in the OSH Act are 'nearly identical' to those in the

Mine Act." 131 F. Supp. 2d at 216 (quoting In re Establishment Inspection of Manganas Painting Co., 104 F.3d 801,

802 (6th Cir. 1997)). This is hardly surprising since, as we

have previously noted, the Mine Act's review process was

written to conform to the review process of the OSH Act.

See Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 268 F.3d

1123, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also 123 Cong. Rec. 4387-88

(1977) (statement of Sen. Williams, the Act's sponsor, upon

introduction of the Act). Like the Mine Act, the OSH Act

gives employers a limited period to contest a citation issued

by OSHA, and provides that if no contest is brought within

that period, the citation is "deemed a final order ... not

subject to review by any court or agency." 29 U.S.C.

s 659(a). Contests to OSHA citations are brought before an

independent adjudicatory commission (OSHRC), where they

are heard first by an ALJ and then reviewed by the Commission, at its discretion. Id. ss 659(c), 661(j). Only the Commission has authority to impose civil penalties proposed by

the Secretary, which the Commission reviews de novo. Id.

s 666(j).

As under the Mine Act, employers may appeal adverse

Commission decisions to the appropriate court of appeals,

whose jurisdiction "shall be exclusive and its judgment and

decree shall be final," but which must uphold the Commission's findings of fact if "supported by substantial evidence."

Id. s 660(a); see supra note 1. And like the Mine Act, the

OSH Act does not distinguish between pre- and postenforcement challenges. Finally, also like the Mine Act, the

OSH Act expressly grants district courts jurisdiction over

specified actions, see 29 U.S.C. ss 657(b), 660(c)(2), 662(a) &

(d), 666(l), but those do not include actions brought by

employers.

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In short, in every relevant respect the statutory review

provisions of the OSH Act parallel those of the Mine Act, and

we therefore join the First and Sixth circuits in concluding

that Thunder Basin's analysis of review under the Mine Act

is fully applicable to the OSH Act. See Manganas Painting

Co., 104 F.3d at 803; Northeast Erectors Ass'n of the BTEA

v. Secretary of Labor, 62 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1995).5

B

Our conclusion that the OSH Act creates a comprehensive

review process comparable to that of the Mine Act's does not

end the inquiry. We must also consider whether Sturm

Ruger's claims "are of the type Congress intended to be

__________

5 Sturm Ruger suggests that this conclusion is "implicitly" inconsistent with our decision in Workplace Health & Safety Council v.

Reich, 56 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See Appellant's Br. at 41. In

that case, the petitioner sought pre-enforcement review of an OSHA

rule in this court, and we therefore had to decide whether the rule

was a "standard," the only kind of OSHA action that the OSH Act

expressly authorizes courts of appeals to review directly. See 29

U.S.C. s 655(f). We held that the rule was a "regulation" rather

than a "standard," and that we therefore did not have jurisdiction.

Workplace Health, 56 F.3d at 1467-68. At the same time, we

stated our belief that pre-enforcement review of regulations was

appropriate in the district court. Id. at 1469. And in a subsequent

case, in the course of deciding that we had original jurisdiction over

an OSHA standard, we cited Workplace Health for the proposition

that regulations are subject to review in the district court. Chamber of Commerce v. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 209 (D.C. Cir.

1999). Neither Workplace Health nor Chamber of Commerce,

however, mentioned Thunder Basin or considered its impact on

district court jurisdiction. And as the Supreme Court has "repeatedly held," "the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional defects"

gives a ruling "no precedential effect" on the unaddressed question.

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996); see Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1997); Hagans v.

Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534-35 n.5 (1974).

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reviewed within this statutory structure." Thunder Basin,

510 U.S. at 212. In Thunder Basin, the Court indicated that

district courts could still assert jurisdiction over "claims

considered wholly collateral to a statute's review provisions

and outside the agency's expertise." Id. at 212 (internal

quotation marks omitted). That is "particularly" so, the

Court said, "where a finding of preclusion could foreclose all

meaningful judicial review." Id. at 212-13. Sturm Ruger's

claims, however, do not fit within those categories.

Like the statutory claims at issue in Thunder Basin, Sturm

Ruger's claim that the DCI violates the OSH Act because it is

not authorized by regulation is not "wholly collateral" to the

OSH Act's review provisions. Id. at 214. Rather, it "require[s] interpretation of the parties' rights and duties" under

the Act and its regulations, and therefore "fall[s] squarely

within the Commission's expertise." Id. at 214; see Martin,

499 U.S. at 154-55. As for the company's claim that the DCI

violates the Fourth Amendment, we note that the same

factors that persuaded the Thunder Basin Court that the

constitutional challenge at issue there should be raised within

the statutory review structure are present here: (1) "the

reviewing body is not the agency itself but an independent

Commission"; (2) the Commission has addressed constitutional claims in previous enforcement proceedings, see, e.g.,

McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1998)

(reviewing an OSHRC decision that an OSHA regulation

authorizing a warrantless and nonconsensual search of business records violated the Fourth Amendment); and (3) the

employer's claims can still "be meaningfully addressed in the

Court of Appeals" after the Commission has rendered a

decision. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215.

In light of these considerations, we find Sturm Ruger's

invocation of the Supreme Court's opinion in Leedom v. Kyne,

358 U.S. 184 (1958), inapposite. Leedom involved a union's

challenge to a determination by the National Labor Relations

Board that a bargaining unit including both professional and

nonprofessional employees was appropriate--despite a directly contrary provision of the NLRA. Id. at 185-86; see 29

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U.S.C. s 159(b)(1). Although the Court had previously held

that a Board order in a certification proceeding was not "a

final order" and therefore "not subject to judicial review

except as it may be drawn in question by a petition for ...

review of an order ... restraining an unfair labor practice," it

nonetheless held that the district court had jurisdiction over

the union's challenge. Leedom, 358 U.S. at 187, 191. "Central" to the decision in Leedom, the Court has since explained,

was the understanding that barring district court review

would have "wholly deprive[d] the union of a meaningful and

adequate means of vindicating its statutory rights," because

the union's members had " 'no other means, within their

control' " of obtaining judicial review. Board of Governors v.

MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Leedom, 358

U.S. at 190); see Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 213 (citing

Leedom as an example of a case in which the plaintiff had no

other means to protect its rights).

As we have just discussed, however, barring district court

review in this case will not deprive employers of the opportunity to obtain judicial review. An employer can, for example,

refuse to answer the survey, draw a citation from OSHA, and

then contest the citation through the statutory review procedure that ultimately ends in a court of appeals. See Thunder

Basin, 510 U.S. at 216. Sturm Ruger contends that this

review option is not meaningful because, faced with the threat

of OSHA sanctions, employers will not risk ignoring the

survey.6 But the Court rejected a similar argument in Thunder Basin, noting that "[a]lthough the Act's civil penalties

unquestionably may become onerous if petitioner chooses not

to comply, the Secretary's penalty assessments become final

and payable only after full review by both the Commission

and the appropriate court of appeals." Id. at 218 (citing 30

U.S.C. ss 820(i) & 816); see OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. ss 666(j) &

660. Moreover, in this case Sturm Ruger has already trig-

__________

6 Sturm Ruger also appears to make the opposite argument,

contending that OSHA is attempting to shield the DCI from review

by choosing not to cite employers who fail to respond. But if that

were the case, a point OSHA disputes, employers that fail to answer

the survey would suffer no injury.

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gered the review process that ultimately will bring it to a

court of appeals, by contesting the citations its Pine Tree

facility received as the allegedly tainted product of a search

based on information obtained through the DCI.7

Finally, we consider our recent decision in National Mining Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 856-57 (D.C.

Cir. 2002), in which this court held that, notwithstanding the

rule of Thunder Basin, a district court had jurisdiction to

hear a "generic" challenge to regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30

U.S.C. s 901 et seq. That decision is inapplicable to Sturm

Ruger's challenge for three reasons.

First, National Mining Association emphasized that the

challenge at issue there was a direct attack on the validity of

"a formal regulation," issued pursuant to "notice-andcomment" rulemaking. National Mining Ass'n, 292 F.3d at

858. In so holding, we distinguished Compensation Department v. Marshall, in which the Third Circuit held that a

district court lacked jurisdiction to review a claim that the

Secretary's policy of independently examining x-rays submitted by those seeking black lung benefits was unlawful under

the BLBA. 667 F.2d 336, 340-44 (3d. Cir. 1981). That case,

we explained, involved an attack on an enforcement policy

rather than a regulation, and "there was no reason why the

[plaintiff] could not challenge [the] policy in an individual

adjudication before the Benefits Review Board and, if neces-

__________

7 In a footnote, Sturm Ruger suggests that it cannot receive

meaningful review through the statutory process because the ALJ

held that, by voluntarily responding to the survey, the company had

waived its right to challenge it. See Appellant's Br. at 39 n.11. But

the ALJ's decision does not preclude the Commission, or the court

of appeals upon subsequent review, from rejecting the ALJ's decision and accepting Sturm Ruger's contention that the "waiver" was

involuntary because its response to the survey was coerced. On the

other hand, if both the Commission and court conclude that the

company did voluntarily answer the survey, then its injury will have

been due to its own voluntary action, and it will lack standing to

complain. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).

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sary, in the Court of Appeals." National Mining Ass'n, 292

F.3d at 858.

The same is true here. As we described in Part I.C, Sturm

Ruger does not challenge the validity of an OSHA regulation.

To the contrary, it insists that there is no regulation that

authorizes the collection of the employment information demanded by the DCI, and that the survey is therefore ultra

vires. See Appellant's Br. at 16, 18, 34.8 Moreover, as in

Compensation Department, the gravamen of Sturm Ruger's

complaint is that OSHA is employing an unlawful enforcement strategy, in which it "use[s] the information gained

through the survey form to target its enforcement activities

on employer establishments." Compl. p 10; see id. at pp 1,

32.9 As we said in National Mining Association regarding

Compensation Department, there is no reason why Sturm

Ruger cannot challenge the Secretary's enforcement strategy

in an individual adjudication before the Commission. See

National Mining Ass'n, 292 F.3d at 858.

Second, we noted in National Mining Association that the

regulations there at issue were "challenged primarily on the

__________

8 See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 25 ("Because no OSHA regulation

requires maintenance of such data, there can be no requirement to

report said information [and] [t]herefore, the Annual DCI Surveys

are an unlawful exercise of authority by OSHA...."); id. at 34

("[A]t all times relevant to the Complaint, there has been no

regulation ... requiring employers to create and maintain the data

which OSHA requires employers to report on the DCI concerning

number of employees and number of hours worked by employees in

establishments."). In particular, Sturm Ruger does not contend

that 29 C.F.R. s 1904.17 unlawfully requires employers to report

employment information that OSHA has not separately required

the employers to create and maintain. Rather, it contends that

s 1904.17 "merely authorizes OSHA to collect such data which

OSHA requires employers to maintain by regulation and no such

regulation requires this data to be maintained." Compl. p 36.

9 See also Compl. at 13-14 (seeking a declaratory judgment that

OSHA's "site specific targeting plans utilizing [DCI] data [are] ultra

vires," and an injunction "enjoin[ing] Defendants from conducting

inspection programs which... rely upon" DCI data).

ground that they are impermissibly retroactive," that to

determine whether that was true would require analysis of

"all of the regulations together as well as the entire rulemaking process," and that such an analysis "would not be feasible

in individual adjudications dealing with particular regulatory

provisions." Id. at 858-59. By contrast, as we have discussed above, there is no reason why Sturm Ruger cannot

obtain meaningful review of its challenge through the statutory review process.

Third, and most important, National Mining Association

was not a case in which the "plaintiff sought to short-circuit

the administrative process" through the vehicle of a district

court complaint. Id. at 858. Sturm Ruger's complaint,

however, fits that description well. As the district court

noted, the company "raised the identical claims in its chalUSCA Case #01-5111 Document #697527 Filed: 08/23/2002 Page 16 of 18
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lenge to the citations that is currently pending before the

OSHRC." 131 F. Supp. 2d at 217 n.1; see Pet. for Discretionary Review pp 4, 7, 15, 23; supra Part I.B. Moreover, it

raised similar claims before the First Circuit, and was directed by that court to exhaust its remedies before the

Commission. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 186 F.3d at 63. Rather

than allowing the statutory review process to run its

course--a course that will eventually lead back to a court of

appeals--Sturm Ruger sought to make an end run around

that process by going directly to district court. Indeed, the

company is attempting to end the process altogether: its

complaint seeks an injunction permanently barring the Secretary from "pursuing enforcement proceedings under the

unlawful targeting inspection programs," Compl. at 14, an

injunction that would terminate the proceeding currently

pending before the Commission. Our obligation to respect

the review process established by Congress bars us from

permitting Sturm Ruger to make this end run, and requires

dismissal of its district court complaint.10

__________

10 See Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 216 (holding that Congress did

not intend "to allow mine operators to evade the statutory review

process"); Northeast Erectors Ass'n of the BTEA, 62 F.3d at 40

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IV

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court, dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, is

Affirmed.

__________

gress's intent to have such claims reviewed through the OSH Act's

detailed administrative procedure"); cf. Great Plains Coop v.

CFTC, 205 F.3d 353, 354-55 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying Thunder

Basin to the Commodity Exchange Act, and holding that the

plaintiff could not "make an 'end run' around the statutory [review]

scheme" by filing a district court complaint aimed at "halting the

CFTC's administrative proceedings against" the plaintiff); Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding

that an employer may not "bypass the review procedures Congress"

established under the OSH Act by filing, at the same time that it

was contesting a safety citation before OSHRC, a district court

complaint "assert[ing] its defenses to the Secretary's citations").

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