Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00148-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 This action is proceeding on the amended complaint filed January 12, 2006. See Order 1

filed February 2, 2006.

 Defendant’s motion was filed on July 13, 2007. On July 30, 2007, plaintiff filed an

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opposition to the motion. On the same day, plaintiff filed a request to designate his opposition as

both an opposition and a cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s opposition is grounded

in his contention that there are “material facts in dispute.” Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 30, 2007, at 1. Plaintiff also contends that the facts

show defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s health and that the denial of food was

sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 4-6. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request

will be granted. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD FOSTER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0148 GEB JFM P

vs.

E. MERAZ, ORDER AND

Defendant. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that defendant violated his rights under the Eighth

Amendment by denying him meals on several occasions. This matter is before the court on 1

cross-motions for summary judgment. 

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS UNDER RULE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

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must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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 Plaintiff also avers that on various occasions defendant threw plaintiff’s meals at him, 3

swore at plaintiff, or mocked him. (Foster Declaration at, e.g., ¶¶ 5-10.) Defendant denies these

allegations. (Meraz Declaration at ¶ 6.) The gravamen of the claim at bar arises from the alleged

denial of meals, and no separate claim arises from these allegations.

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On April 14, 2005, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS

I. Facts

At all times relevant to this action plaintiff was an inmate at High Desert State

Prison (High Desert) in Susanville, California. At all times relevant to this action defendant was

a correctional officer at High Desert. During the period at issue, plaintiff was fed in his cell. 

Plaintiff avers that defendant failed to provide plaintiff with breakfast on August

25, 2004 through August 28, 2004, September 3, 2004 through September 9, 2004, September

14, 2004 though September 18, 2004, and September 21, 2004 through September 25, 2004. 

(Declaration of Ronald Foster in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed July 30, 2007 (Foster Declaration), at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff avers that

defendant failed to provide plaintiff with lunch on August 19, 2004, August 21, 2004 through

August 31, 2004, September 1, 2004 through September 4, 2004, September 9, 2004 through

September 11, 2004, September 14, 2004 through September 18, 2004, and September 21, 2004

through September 25, 2004. (Id. at ¶ 3.)3

Defendant Meraz avers that during the period at issue plaintiff would occasionally

fail to comply with regulations at High Desert governing in-cell feeding of inmates. (Ex. A to

Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed

July 13, 2007, Declaration of E. Meraz in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Meraz Declaration), at ¶ 5.) Defendant avers that at such times staff “would attempt

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to gain Foster’s compliance in order that we could feed him.” (Id at ¶ 3.) Defendant avers that

plaintiff “may have missed a small number of meals, or alternately, he may have been fed those

meals later than the inmates were fed.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) 

Both parties represent that between July 2004 and October 2004, plaintiff lost

seven pounds. (Declaration of Dr. Tate in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed July 13, 2007 (Tate Declaration), at ¶ 3; see also Plaintiff’s Statement of

Undisputed and Disputed Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed July 30, 2007, at 2.) The medical records provided by defendant do

not appear to support a finding that plaintiff lost weight in August and September 2004. 

Attachment 1 to the Tate Declaration is a Primary Care Flow Sheet which shows that plaintiff

weighed 200 pounds on May 25, 2004, and 204 pounds on September 7, 2004. (Tate

Declaration, Attachment 1, p.1.) The date on the entry in the column following the September 7,

2004 entry appears to be April 29, 2004, in which case it is out of sequence; it could also be

September 29, 2004. (Id.) In either event, plaintiff weighed 211 pounds at the time of that entry. 

Id. By the date of the next entry, June 3, 2005, plaintiff weighed 218 pounds. (Id.) If the dates

are chronological across the chart, no weight loss is shown; in any event, even if the third date is

April 29, 2004, no weight loss is shown for the period at bar. Plaintiff is 6'3" tall. (Tate

Declaration at ¶ 4.) Dr. Tate avers that the ideal body weight for a moderately active 6'3" male is

between 150 and 198 pounds. (Id.) 

II. Legal Standards

Plaintiff claims that defendant Meraz violated his rights under the Eighth

Amendment when he failed to provide plaintiff with meals. The Constitution imposes on prison

officials a duty to provide humane conditions of confinement; officials must ensure that inmates

receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of inmates. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). “Adequate

food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at

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1246. While prison food need not be ‘tasty or aesthetically pleasing,’ it must be ‘adequate to

maintain health.’ LeMaire [v. Maass], 12 F.3d [1444] at 1456 [(9th Cir. 1993)].” Keenan v.

Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996). In LeMaire, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]n Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2571-72, 57

L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), the Supreme Court observed that serving inmates a tasteless food

concoction called ‘grue’, which provided only 1000 calories a day, might be unconstitutional if

served for long periods,” specifically, “‘a diet of “grue” might be tolerable for a few days and

intolerably cruel for weeks or months.’” LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1456 (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at

686-87.)

An Eighth Amendment claim has two components: an objective component,

which requires proof of a “sufficiently serious” deprivation, and a subjective component, which

requires proof that the defendant acted with a culpable state of mind. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1451. 

To prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, “plaintiff must prove a denial of ‘the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392,

2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), occurring through ‘deliberate indifference’ by prison personnel or

officers, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2326-27 (1991) (citations

omitted).” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). Deliberate indifference is shown

where there is a proof that a prison “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). However, “an Eighth Amendment claimant need

not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an

inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial

risk of serious harm.” Id. at 841.

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 Defendant has not provided caloric intake information for August 22, 23, 24, 29 or 30, 4

2004, or September 5, 6, or 9, 2004. Plaintiff only claims to have missed one meal on each of

those days, and it is reasonable to infer that his caloric intake did not fall below the low end of

the range on any of those days. 

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III. Application

Defendant seeks summary judgment on the grounds that (1) even if the denial of

meals alleged by plaintiff is true, the deprivation did not pose a substantial risk of harm to

plaintiff’s health as he received a sufficient number of calories per day to remain healthy; (2) the

evidence does not support a finding that defendant was deliberately indifferent; (3) plaintiff did

not suffer a cognizable physical injury; and (4) defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 

Plaintiff opposes each of these arguments, and contends that the facts show he is entitled to

summary judgment. 

It is clear that the parties dispute the number of meals missed by plaintiff over the

two month period at issue. That dispute is only material, however, if, viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to plaintiff, the number of meals missed left plaintiff with inadequate

nutrition to maintain his health. See Keenan v. Hall, supra.

Plaintiff has presented evidence that he missed one meal on each of the following

days: August 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, and 31, 2004 and September 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11,

2004. Plaintiff has presented evidence that he missed two meals on August 25, 26, 27, and 28,

2004, and September 3, 4, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25, 2004. Plaintiff testified at

his deposition that he ate dinner every day and there is no evidence that plaintiff missed dinner

on any of the days on which he missed breakfast, or lunch, or both. 

In support of the motion for summary judgment, defendant has presented evidence

of the caloric intake plaintiff received on most of the foregoing days absent the meals he claims

he did not receive. Over the thirty-eight day period at bar, plaintiff missed one or two meals on 4

thirty-three days. He had dinner every day. (Defendant’s Ex. D.) On the days when he claims

he missed meals the remaining caloric intake would have provided a range from a low of 1028

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 Because the evidence does not establish the objective component of an Eighth 5

Amendment violation, the court need not reach the remaining arguments raised by the parties in

their cross-motions for summary judgment. 

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calories to a high of 2652 calories. (See Declaration of S. Summersett, filed July 13, 2007.) 

Plaintiff testified at his deposition that his injury from the alleged deprivation of food was weight

loss and mild dizziness. (See Defendant’s Ex. D.) As noted above, according to the parties,

plaintiff lost seven pounds between July 2004 and October 2004. It is undisputed that plaintiff’s

body weight never fell below a healthy weight for a man of his height and activity level during

any time relevant to this action. 

After review of the record herein, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to present

evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact on the question of whether defendant

Meraz violated plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment by denying him meals. 

Specifically, even assuming that defendant Meraz denied plaintiff every meal plaintiff claims to

have been denied, the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff’s diet during the period in

question was adequate to maintain plaintiff’s health. There is no evidence that the deprivation

alleged was “sufficiently serious” to satisfy the objective component of plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim. For this reason, plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment should be

denied and defendant’ motion for summary judgment should be granted.5

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s July 30,

2007 motion to designate plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment as

an opposition and a cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s July 30, 2007 cross-motion for summary judgment be denied; and

2. Defendant’s July 13, 2007 motion for summary judgment be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 3, 2008.

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fost0148.57

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