Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01209/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alger Iván Rodríguez Aguilera, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Gabriela Samaniego De Lara 

 Respondent. 

No. CV14-1209 PHX DGC 

ORDER 

 Petitioner Alger Iván Rodriguez Aguilera has filed a “Petition for Return of Child 

under the Hague Convention.” Doc. 1. Respondent Gabriela Samaniego De Lara 

opposes the petition. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on July 9, 2014. For the 

reasons that follow, the Court will grant the petition. 

I. Background.

 Petitioner and Respondent are the parents of a nine-year-old daughter, referred to 

herein as “I.R.,” who was born in Aguascalientes, Mexico in 2004. Petitioner and 

Respondent were not married at the time, but began living together in Aguascalientes 

after I.R. was born. Respondent and I.R. moved out of the home in 2006, and, after a 

period of reconciliation, moved out again in 2008. 

 Respondent continued to live in Aguascalientes with I.R. until July of 2013. The 

relationship between Petitioner and Respondent was difficult during this time, but the 

evidence demonstrated that Petitioner maintained a relationship with I.R. Between 2008 

and 2013, I.R. attended a private school in Aguascalientes, had medical insurance, was 

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involved with numerous family members on both sides, and had friends. Using a tourist 

visa, Respondent left Aguascalientes with I.R. on July 5, 2013, telling Petitioner that she 

and I.R. would visit Respondent’s mother in Arizona for one month and would then 

return. After arriving in Arizona, Respondent informed Petitioner that she and I.R. would 

not return. Petitioner asks the Court to apply the Hague Convention and order that I.R. 

be returned to Mexico until custody rights can be resolved in a custody action now 

pending in the Mexican courts. 

II. The Hague Convention and ICARA.

 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 

seeks to deter parents from moving their children across international borders in order to 

gain the upper hand in custody disputes. See Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 508 (9th 

Cir. 2010). With a few narrow exceptions, a court must return the child to its country of 

habitual residence so that the courts of that country can determine custody. Id. Both the 

United States and Mexico are signatories to the Hague Convention and are Contracting 

States within its meaning. Congress enacted the International Child Abduction Remedies 

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq. (“ICARA”), to implement the Convention. 

 The objectives of the Convention are “to secure the prompt return of children 

wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State,” and “to ensure that rights of 

custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in 

the other Contracting States.” Convention, Art. 1 (reprinted at 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494). 

“An action under the Convention and ICARA is not an action to determine the merits of 

custody rights[.]” Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2006). 

 Under Article 12 of the Convention, the Court must order the return of a minor 

child to its country of habitual residence if the child was wrongfully removed from that 

country. Removal of a child is wrongful where: 

 (a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person . . . 

under the law of the state in which the child was habitually resident 

immediately before the removal or retention; and 

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 (b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually 

exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for 

the removal or retention. 

Convention, Art. 3. 

 Even when a child has been wrongfully removed, the Court can decline to order 

the child’s return if certain exceptions are satisfied. ICARA characterizes these 

exceptions as “narrow.” 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4). Four exception are relevant in this 

case. The Court may decline to return I.R. if Respondent shows that (1) Petitioner was 

not exercising his custody rights at the time of removal (by a preponderance of the 

evidence), (2) return of the child to Mexico would present a grave risk of physical or 

psychological harm to the child (by clear and convincing evidence), (3) return of the 

child would present a grave risk of placing the child in an intolerable situation (by clear 

and convincing evidence), or (4) the child objects to being returned and has attained an 

age and degree of maturity sufficient for the Court to take account of her views (by a 

preponderance of the evidence). Convention, Art. 13; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e). 

III. Analysis.

 At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Petitioner and Respondent 

agreed that I.R. was habitually resident in Mexico immediately before her removal and 

that Petitioner had custody rights under Mexican law.1

 In addition, Petitioner’s verified 

petition and supporting affidavit make a sufficient showing that Petitioner was exercising 

his custody rights at the time of removal.2

 Given these established facts, Respondent’s 

 

1

 These custody rights under Mexican law, referred to as “patria potestas,” recognize a parent’s right to care for the child, reside with the child, and provide for the child’s necessities. The rights belong to both parents. Ramirez v. Buyauskas, No. 11-

6411, 2012 WL 606746 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012); March v. Levine, 136 F. Supp. 2d 831, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2000); Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, International Law – U.S./Mexico 

Cross-Border Child Abduction – The Need for Cooperation, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 289, 297 

(1999). 

2

 To show that a removal was wrongful under Article 3 of the Convention, a 

petitioner need only make a minimal showing that he or she was exercising custody rights at the time of removal. The person opposing return then has the burden of showing, as an exception to the return requirement, that the rights were not being exercised. See 

Department of State: Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986) (“State Department Regulations”). 

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removal of I.R. was “wrongful” within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention 

and the Court must order I.R.’s return to Mexico unless Respondent has established one 

or more of the exceptions set forth above. 

 The Court will discuss each of the exceptions addressed by Respondent at the 

hearing. This discussion includes factual findings made by the Court on the basis of the 

testimony and documents presented during the hearing, including the Court’s credibility 

determinations. 

A. Petitioner’s Exercise of Custody.

 To satisfy the Convention’s requirement that he was exercising custodial rights at 

the time of removal, Petitioner need not have had exclusive or even primary custody of 

I.R. Where a father has remained in regular contact with a child, visited the child, and 

provided financial support, the father has exercised sufficient custody within the meaning 

of the Hague Convention. Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009). 

As the Ninth Circuit explained: 

if a person has valid custody rights to a child under the law of the country 

of the child’s habitual residence, that person cannot fail to ‘exercise’ those 

custody rights under the Hague Convention short of acts that constitute 

clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child. Once it determines that 

the parent exercised custody rights in any manner, the Court should stop – 

completely avoiding the question whether the parent exercised the custody 

rights well or badly. 

Id. (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1066 (6th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis 

added). 

 Petitioner was exercising sufficient parental rights to satisfy the requirements of 

the Convention. Evidence presented at the hearing showed that, after Respondent and 

I.R. moved out of his home in 2008, Petitioner continued to see I.R. regularly, took her to 

his parents’ home, movies, parks, and out to eat, picked her up from school on occasion, 

accompanied Respondent and I.R. to the child’s doctor appointments, provided medical 

insurance for I.R., and provided at least some additional financial support. These 

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activities satisfy the custody requirement of the Hague Convention. 

 Respondent’s counsel argued at the hearing that Petitioner signed a document 

granting exclusive custody of I.R. to Respondent in 2008. The evidence on this issue was 

not sufficient to show that such an agreement was signed. The copy of the document 

placed in evidence (Exhibit 8) is not signed, Petitioner testified that he never signed the 

document, and Respondent gave the same testimony at one point in her testimony. What 

is more, even if Petitioner agreed that Respondent could have physical custody of I.R., 

the cases discussed above show that Petitioner could continue to exercise his custody 

rights within the meaning of the Convention by visiting I.R., providing some financial 

support for her, and otherwise remaining involved in her life. 

 Respondent has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Petitioner was not exercising his custody rights prior to I.R.’s removal from Mexico. 

This exception, therefore, does not preclude return of I.R. to Mexico. 

B. Grave Risk of Physical or Psychological Harm.

 The Convention provides that return of I.R. is not required if Respondent shows 

that “there is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or 

psychological harm.” Convention, Art. 13(b). The Ninth Circuit has explained that this 

exception “[is] ‘drawn very narrowly, lest [its] application undermine the express 

purposes of the Convention – to effect the prompt return of abducted children.’” Goudin 

v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting State Department Regulations, 

51 Fed. Reg. at 10,509). The risk must be “grave, not merely serious,” id., and must be 

proved by clear and convincing evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A). The grave risk 

exception “is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where the 

child would be happiest.” Goudin, 415 F.3d at 1035; see also Cuellar, 596 F.3d at 509. 

 Respondent presented several categories of evidence to suggest that returning I.R. 

to Mexico would present a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. 

 1. General Character. 

 Respondent presented evidence regarding Petitioner’s general character and, it 

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appeared, his fitness to serve as a father. This included testimony that Petitioner is 

controlling and manipulative, uses profane language, has an explosive temper, was 

unfaithful to Respondent, partied on weekends, and, on at least one occasion, was present 

with a prostitute or stripper. Most of this evidence goes to Petitioner’s fitness as a father 

or spouse, a subject the Court may not decide in this case. More will be said below about 

Petitioner’s volatility and alleged violence. 

 2. Assaults on Adults. 

 Respondent presented evidence that Petitioner struck her on five different 

occasions. She did not testify that medical treatment was required on these occasions. 

Respondent also testified that Petitioner struck her 70-year-old father in the mouth during 

a disagreement over whether I.R. should spend time with Petitioner. Respondent testified 

that I.R. was present when her grandfather was struck, and the evidence suggested that 

I.R. was present on at least one occasion when Petitioner struck Respondent. 

 Respondent testified that three of the assaults on her occurred before she and 

Petitioner separated, which would have been in 2008 or earlier. Two assaults apparently 

occurred after their separation, but the Court cannot determine whether they occurred in 

2008 or 2009 or closer in time to when Respondent removed I.R. to the United States. 

Nor can the Court determine when the assault occurred on Respondent’s father. 

 Petitioner’s violent actions toward Respondent and her father are utterly 

inappropriate and very concerning. As already noted, however, the Court’s task under 

the Convention is not to decide whether Petitioner is a suitable father or good spouse, 

whether granting him custody of I.R. would be an appropriate decision, or whether I.R. 

would fare better with Respondent. The Court’s task is to determine whether returning 

I.R. to Mexico would present a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm. The word 

“grave,” when used in this context, means “likely to produce great harm or danger.” 

Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1981); see also Oxford English Dictionary 

(“giving cause for alarm”). And the State Department Regulations make clear that “[t]he 

person opposing the child’s return must show that the risk to the child is grave, not 

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merely serious.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510. As noted, the Ninth Circuit has also 

emphasized that this exception is “drawn very narrowly.” Goudin, 415 F.3d at 1036. 

Given the narrowness of this exception, and for several factual reasons, the Court cannot 

conclude that Petitioner’s assaults on Respondent and her father satisfy the grave risk 

requirement. 

 As noted, the assaults were directed at Respondent and another adult, not I.R. 

Other Hague Convention cases have recognized that physical abuse or threats towards a 

spouse are not the same as physical abuse or threats toward a child. See Nunez Escudero 

v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 375-78 (8th Cir. 1995) (denying defense where respondent 

alleged that she was physically, sexually, and verbally abused by her husband and treated 

as a prisoner by her husband and father-in-law); Nunez v. Ramirez, No. CV-07-01205-

PHX-EHC, 2008 WL 898658, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008) (evidence that petitioner 

struck respondent several times not sufficient to show risk to the child); Tabacchi v. 

Harrison, No. 99C 4130, 2000 WL 190576 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000) (although 

petitioner’s behavior toward his wife was unacceptable, to qualify as grave risk of harm 

under the Convention the risk must be to the child). 

 In addition, at least some of the assaults, and perhaps all, occurred several years 

ago. The Ninth Circuit has instructed that the focus must be on the present – whether a 

grave risk will exist if the child is returned now. Goudin, 415 F.3d at 1036-37 (“The 

grave risk inquiry should be concerned only with the degree of harm that could occur in 

the immediate future”). The fact that some or all of the assaults on adults occurred 

several years ago mitigates to some extent the risk they now present for I.R. 

 Finally, Petitioner is not asking to be granted physical custody of I.R. He made 

clear at the hearing that he believes Respondent is a good mother and should continue to 

have full-time custody of I.R. Petitioner simply seeks to preserve his rights to have a 

relationship with I.R. Thus, a return of I.R. to Mexico need not result in her being placed 

in Petitioner’s physical custody. 

/ / / 

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 3. Physical Actions Toward I.R. 

 Respondent and I.R. testified that Petitioner slapped I.R. on one or more occasions 

and twisted her arm when he was angry. Respondent and I.R. did not testify that these 

actions caused serious physical injury or required medical attention. Nor did Respondent 

or I.R. explain whether these actions were disciplinary in nature or simple assaults. 

 Petitioner’s actions toward I.R. clearly are relevant to the “grave risk” inquiry. 

The question is whether slapping a child or twisting her arm shows a grave risk of 

physical or psychological harm. As noted, the Ninth Circuit and other authorities have 

instructed that the risk of harm must be grave, not merely serious. In addition, Petitioner 

does not seek custody of I.R. This fact mitigates, to some extent, any risk that might be 

presented to I.R. by Petitioner’s past tendency to slap or twist arms. 

 Courts have also recognized that many countries of habitual residence have the 

capacity to protect children, including Mexico. See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068 (“In 

thinking about these problems, we acknowledge that courts in the abducted-from country 

are as ready and able as we are to protect children. If return to a country, or to the 

custody of a parent in that country, is dangerous, we can expect that country’s courts to 

respond accordingly.”); see also Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377. 

 For these reasons, the Court concludes that this evidence does not meet the high 

threshold of clear and convincing evidence that a return of I.R. to Mexico would present 

a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. 

 4. Separation from Respondent. 

 Respondent testified that she has bonded with I.R. and that separating them would 

seriously damage I.R. In addition, Respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Leonard D. 

Goodstein, a consulting psychologist, that separation of I.R. from Respondent would 

present a grave risk of psychological harm to I.R. 

 Although the Court does not wish to underestimate this concern, several courts 

have held that separation of a parent and child, although traumatic, is not itself sufficient 

to satisfy a grave risk exception. See, e.g., Charalambous v. Charalambous, 627 

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F.3d 462, 469-70 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The district court correctly concluded that ‘the impact 

of any loss of contact with the Mother is something that must be resolved by the courts of 

the Children’s habitual residence.’”); England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 270-72 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (“Courts considering this issue have uniformly found considerations such as 

[separation from the mother or the unsettling effects of return to the country of habitual 

residence] inapposite to the ‘grave risk’ determination.”); Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 

377 (“The district court incorrectly factored the possible separation of the child from his 

mother in assessing whether the return of the child to Mexico constitutes a grave risk that 

his return would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in 

an intolerable situation.”). The Court agrees with these decisions. Separation from an 

abducting parent is a likely consequence in many Hague Convention cases. If the 

difficulty caused by such separation were deemed sufficient to satisfy the grave risk 

exception, the purposes of the Convention would be largely frustrated. Parents could 

carry their children across international borders to obtain an advantage in custody 

disputes and then defeat return under the Convention by virtue of the fact that return 

would be traumatic for the child. The Court cannot conclude that such a result was 

intended by the grave risk exception. 

The Court finds Respondent’s separation argument unpersuasive for a second 

reason. If the Court orders I.R. returned to Mexico, she need not return alone. 

Respondent could accompany her. Nothing in the law would prevent Respondent from 

returning to Mexico with her daughter. Indeed, it appears that Respondent is a citizen of 

Mexico. 

Respondent did testify at the hearing that she would not return to Mexico because 

she does not want to subject herself to the abusive and manipulative actions of Petitioner. 

But the choice is hers. The Court asked Dr. Goodstein whether a return of I.R. to Mexico 

with Respondent would present a grave risk of psychological harm, and he was unable to 

say that it would. Thus, if the Court honors the mandate of the Convention, Respondent 

can choose to separate from her daughter and cause the trauma she claims is substantial, 

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or she can return to Mexico and retain physical custody of I.R. (Petitioner testified that he 

does not seek to obtain physical custody of I.R.). The Court has difficulty concluding 

that an abducting parent can invoke the grave risk exception simply by refusing to return 

to the country of habitual residence with the child. 

In summary, the Court finds Petitioner’s separation argument unpersuasive for two 

independent reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the intent of the Hague Convention. 

Second, because Respondent can return to Mexico with I.R. and retain physical custody 

of her, Respondent has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that an order that 

I.R. be returned presents a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. 

 5. Cumulative Evidence. 

 The Court has considered carefully whether the cumulative effect of Respondent’s 

evidence satisfies the grave risk exception. This evidence consists of Petitioner having a 

volatile temper, having struck Respondent on several occasions and her father on one 

occasion, having slapped I.R. and twisted her arm, and evidence that a separation of I.R. 

from Respondent would cause psychological harm. The effect of this evidence – even in 

its cumulative form – is mitigated substantially by the fact that Petitioner does not seek 

physical custody of I.R. and Respondent could choose to return to Mexico with I.R. In 

addition, some of the violence is quite dated and was directed at adults. 

 When considering the cumulative evidence, the Court must also consider evidence 

presented by Petitioner. His testimony, like Respondent’s and I.R.’s, appeared to be 

genuine and credible. Petitioner presented evidence that he is nearing completion of a 

university degree in psychology, that he has been employed by an insurance company for 

six years, that his father is an executive with the insurance company, and that Petitioner 

provided health insurance for I.R., picked her up from school, and took her out for social 

events. Contrary to the suggestion that I.R. is uncomfortable in Petitioner’s presence, 

Petitioner presented a number of photographs and videos, including a video taken the day 

before I.R. was removed to Arizona, showing I.R. happily interacting with Petitioner. 

I.R. does not appear in these videos to be at all uncomfortable in Petitioner’s presence. 

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To the contrary, she is laughing with him, dancing with him, and wrestling with him in a 

swimming pool. Petitioner also presented testimony from his father and current 

girlfriend that he is a caring and loving father, and evidence from I.R.’s pediatrician that 

he was an engaged and caring parent. 

 When all evidence is considered, the Court cannot conclude that Respondent has 

presented clear and convincing evidence that returning I.R. to Mexico would present a 

grave risk of physical or psychological harm to I.R. Although Petitioner’s past violence 

is clearly concerning, the fact remains that Petitioner does not seek to have I.R. returned 

to his physical custody and Respondent, if she chooses to do so, can accompany I.R. to 

Mexico and retain primary custody of her. Although Petitioner would surely seek to 

spend time with I.R. and to have involvement with her life as he did in the past, the Court 

cannot conclude that such involvement would present a “grave” risk of physical or 

psychological harm to I.R. in the immediate future. Goudin, 415 F.3d at 1037. 

C. Intolerable Situation.

 This exception is also narrow. The State Department Regulations provide this 

explanation: “A review of deliberations on the Convention reveals that ‘intolerable 

situation’ was not intended to encompass return to a home where money is in short 

supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited than in the requested 

State. An example of an ‘intolerable situation’ is one in which a custodial parent sexually 

abuses the child.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,510. 

 Respondent presents no evidence of an intolerable situation that is separate from 

the evidence discussed above. For reasons already explained, her evidence does not rise 

to the level of a grave risk of an intolerable situation. 

 D. Wishes of the Child.

 The Court may choose not to return I.R. to Mexico if such a return would be 

against her wishes and I.R. “has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is 

appropriate to take account of [her] views.” Convention, Art. 13. This exception, like 

the others, is to be applied narrowly. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4). 

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 The Hague Convention provides no specific age at which a child is deemed 

sufficiently mature for his or her opinion to be considered. Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang 

Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 279 (3d Cir. 2007). Indeed, “[g]iven the fact-intensive and 

idiosyncratic nature of the inquiry, decisions applying the age and maturity exception are 

understandably disparate.” de Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007). 

 The State Department Regulations explain that “a child’s objection to being 

returned may be accorded little if any weight if the court believes that the child’s 

preference is the product of the abductor parent’s undue influence over the child.” 51 

Fed. Reg. at 10,510. Such influence need not be intentional or sinister; it may simply 

result from the child’s retention by one parent. Hirst v. Tieberghien, 947 F. Supp. 

2d 578, 598 (D.S.C. 2013); Haimdas v. Haimdas, 720 F. Supp. 2d 183, 204 

(E.D.N.Y. 2010). 

 It was evident during I.R.’s testimony at the hearing that she is bright, capable, and 

able to express her views. I.R. stated unequivocally that she does not wish to return to 

Mexico. When asked why, however, she said: “I don’t like seeing my mom sad and I 

don’t want to be sad because of that.” Court’s Livenote Transcript, 7-9-14. When asked 

leading questions as to whether her father frightens her and whether that is a reason she 

does not want to return to Mexico, she said yes. When then asked again how she would 

feel about returning to Mexico, she said: “Really sad and frustrated because my mom 

would be really sad and I don’t want to not be myself. I like being myself.” Id. I.R. also 

testified that she enjoys her new school, is doing well, and has many friends, but she did 

not give these as reasons when asked why she did not want to return to Mexico, 

 After careful reflection, the Court concludes that I.R. has not reached the age of 

maturity sufficient for the Court to rely upon her objection in its ruling in this case. 

Although clearly capable, I.R. is still a young girl. She appeared very much her age – 

nine years – during her testimony and through her demeanor in the courtroom for the 

remainder of the hearing. In addition, her primary reason for not wanting to return to 

Mexico – that it would make her mother sad – appeared to be more a reflection of 

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Respondent’s feelings than I.R.’s.3 

 I.R. was recalled to the witness stand after Petitioner had presented videos of her 

having fun with him. When asked a leading question, she testified that she was not really 

happy when she was with Petitioner, testimony that appeared clearly contrary to the 

images in the videos. When asked why, she said that when her father watched T.V. with 

her or took her to the movies, they watched things he wanted to see. When asked 

whether she enjoyed the time she spent with him in the swimming pool as depicted in one 

of the videos, she said no because she got sunburned. These answers, as well as those 

provided during direct questioning about her mother being unhappy, did not reflect a 

mature evaluation of whether I.R. should be returned to Mexico. 

 It also appeared clear to the Court that I.R. has been influenced in her views by her 

mother and her mother’s parents and other family members. The Court does not attribute 

any sinister motive to Respondent or her family in this respect. The Court rather 

concludes that it is likely the result of their close and loving support. I.R. is surrounded 

in Arizona by a loving family. She sat with her grandparents and other family members 

throughout the hearing, leaned on them frequently, looked at them in reaction to 

testimony during the proceeding, and often responded similarly in her own reactions. It 

appeared clear that I.R. is fully embedded in her Arizona family and comfortable in that 

setting. Moreover, she has not seen Petitioner in more than one year, has spoken with 

him only infrequently, and has not spoken with him at all in the last six months. The 

Court concludes that the views expressed during her testimony have been influenced by 

her separation from Petitioner and by her current family setting. 

 

3

 Respondent proposed that Dr. Goodstein testify about I.R.’s maturity level. The Court concluded that such testimony would come dangerously close to an expert testifying on the credibility of another witness, which generally is not allowed, and the Court therefore did not permit the testimony. The Court informed Respondent’s counsel that they could seek to present Dr. Goodstein’s maturity testimony after I.R. had testified, but they did not do so. Dr. Goodstein’s expert report (Exhibit 131) was admitted in 

evidence without objection and the Court has read it. It includes the results of a 

vocabulary test administered to I.R. and Dr. Goodstein’s opinion regarding her maturity and ability. The Court finds Dr. Goodstein’s opinion and test to be marginally relevant on the issue of maturity. The Court concludes that its own observations of I.R.’s 

testimony and demeanor outweigh Dr. Goodstein’s opinions on the same issues. 

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 Respondent’s counsel called the Court’s attention to an “autobiography” written 

by I.R. at school. The document mentions her father’s anger and discipline and describes 

them as unhappy events in her life. Respondent’s counsel emphasized that this 

autobiography was written by I.R. on her own, with no input from her family. Although 

this is true, the Court concludes that I.R.’s view of her father has surely been influenced 

by her family. Moreover, the concerns expressed in the autobiography would primarily 

be relevant if I.R. were being asked to return to her father’s custody. She is not. And as 

explained above, Respondent’s ability to return to Mexico with I.R. would significantly 

impact any possible threat to I.R. and concerns about being separated from her mother. 

 The Court concludes that Respondent has not shown by a preponderance of the 

evidence that I.R.’s views are sufficiently independent and based on sufficient age and 

maturity for the Court to given them deference. Respondent has not satisfied this narrow 

except to the Hague Convention. 

IV. Conclusion.

 The Court wishes again to emphasize what it is not deciding. The Court is not 

deciding who is the better parent, which location would be preferable for I.R., or who 

should have custody of I.R. Nor is the Court ordering that physical custody of I.R. be 

returned to Petitioner. 

 The Court’s ruling is narrow. The Court finds that Petitioner has made the 

showing required under the Hague Convention for a mandatory return of I.R. to Mexico. 

The Court also concludes that Respondent has not established, by the required levels of 

proof, any of the narrow exceptions to the return mandate. Applying the law to the facts 

as accurately it can, the Court concludes that it must grant the petition and order that I.R. 

be returned to Mexico until the courts of that country can resolve custody issues. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. The Petition for Return of Child Under the Hague Convention (Doc. 1) is 

granted.

 2. Respondent shall return I.R. to Mexico within 20 days of this order, and 

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I.R. shall remain in Mexico until the custody proceedings in the Mexican 

courts have been concluded. 

 Dated this 15th day of July, 2014. 

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