Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07064/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07064-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 29, 1998 Decided April 3, 1998

Nos. 97-7064, 97-7066, & 97-7067

Benjamin W. Scott, Roger Dawson, & Sylvester Smith,

Appellees

v.

District of Columbia,

Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(94cv01603)

(94cv02136)

(94cv02269)

Kathleen S. Beecher argued the cause for appellant. With

her on the briefs were John M. Ferren, Corporation Counsel,

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Ronald S. Flagg.

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Douglas B. McFadden argued the cause for appellees.

With him on the brief was Athan T. Tsimpedes.

Before: Ginsburg, Henderson, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: When these lawsuits began,

Scott, Dawson and Smith were prisoners of the District of

Columbia in the Lorton Correctional Complex in Virginia.

Second-hand tobacco smoke at Lorton, they alleged in separate complaints, violated the cruel and unusual punishments

clause of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The

district court agreed and issued a permanent injunction ordering the District to provide each of them with a smoke-free

environment. See Crowder v. District of Columbia, 959

F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997). The District's appeal is mainly on

the ground that the court misapplied the standards articulated in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).

Events occurring after the district court's final order present a problem of mootness. None of the three plaintiffs is

still jailed at Lorton. Scott completed his sentence and was

released more than a year ago. Dawson and Smith are now

serving time at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, a

private facility operated for the District. They were transferred to Ohio in September 1997 pursuant to s 11201(c) of

the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 712, 734.

Normally, a prisoner's transfer or release from a prison

moots any claim he might have for equitable relief arising out

of the conditions of his confinement in that prison.1 It does

__________

1 See Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 257 (D.C. Cir.

1993); Dorman v. Thornburgh, 955 F.2d 57, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see

also Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1997);

Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 1993); Johnson

v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519-22 (9th Cir. 1991); Magee v. Waters,

810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334,

1337 (8th Cir. 1985); MacKinnon v. Talladega County, 745 F.2d

1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984).

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not matter that Smith and Dawson are still being held under

the authority of the District of Columbia. The cases do not

distinguish between intra- and inter-jurisdiction transfers of

inmates. See Cameron, 983 F.2d at 257; Stewart, 5 F.3d at

1037-38; Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337; see also Dilley v. Gunn,

64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995).

As to Scott, his release from confinement surely moots his

case. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 147-48 (1975);

Dorman, 955 F.2d at 58; Martin-Trigona v. Smith, 712 F.2d

1421, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Neither he nor the other two

plaintiffs are before us asking for damages. None of the

three complaints has blossomed into a class action. Each

plaintiff's request for injunctive relief stemmed from conditions alleged to exist at Lorton.

Smith and Dawson are still in prison, but they are now in

Ohio. What is left of their complaints about second-hand

tobacco smoke at Lorton? The District answered at oral

argument that the cases are saved from mootness by the

"capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review" doctrine. See

Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 369-71 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This is plausible

but not particularly persuasive; nothing in the record tells us

the likelihood of Smith or Dawson winding up at Lorton

again.2 A more telling point, endorsed by all parties, stems

from the breadth of the injunction. It seems to apply no

matter where Smith and Dawson are incarcerated, so long as

they are under the District's jurisdiction. The District says it

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2 The Supreme Court must have pondered the same mootness

issue in Helling v. McKinney. At oral argument, counsel disclosed

that prisoner McKinney, whose complaint dealt with his exposure to

second-hand smoke at Nevada's Carson City State Prison, had been

transferred to Nevada's Ely State Prison. When one Justice asked

why this did not moot the case, counsel replied that McKinney could

be transferred back to Carson City. See Helling, 61 U.S.L.W. 3518,

3518-19 (U.S. argued Jan. 13, 1993). The Supreme Court's opinion

said nothing on the subject of mootness. The fact that McKinney

sought not only an injunction but damages (see 509 U.S. at 28)

cannot explain the Court's silence. Most of the opinion's legal

analysis concerned injunctive relief. See id. at 35-36.

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treated the injunction this way when it transferred Smith and

Dawson to the Ohio facility. On this view, the controversy

remains alive so long as these two prisoners are held pursuant to the District's authority, no matter where they are

held.3 This interpretation of the injunction saves the cases

from mootness. But it also exposes the injunction's defects.

The extraordinary scope of the decree, a decree following

these prisoners wherever the District incarcerates them, misapprehends the demands of the Eighth Amendment. The

key decision is the Supreme Court's in Helling v. McKinney.

A prisoner "states a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that [prison officials] have, with deliberate

indifference, exposed him to levels of [tobacco smoke] that

pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future

health." 509 U.S. at 35. The Court referred to the first

element--exposure to unreasonably high levels of secondhand smoke--as "objective." Id. at 35, 36. To prove this

element, the prisoner must show (1) that "he himself is being

exposed to unreasonably high levels of" second-hand smoke;

and (2) that the exposure creates a risk of harm "so grave

that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose

anyone unwillingly to such a risk," id. at 36; see also Oliver v.

Deen, 77 F.3d 156, 159-60 (7th Cir. 1996); Simmons v. Sager,

964 F. Supp. 210, 212 (W.D. Va. 1997). The Court referred to

the second element--deliberate indifference--as "subjective."

Helling, 509 U.S. at 35, 36.

The district court quoted from Helling but then reformulated the standard into what it called a conclusion of law:

"involuntary exposure to significant amounts of [second-hand

smoke] is intolerable under contemporary societal standards."

Crowder, 959 F. Supp. at 8. This raises several questions,

not the least of which is how much is a "significant" amount?

A footnote to the opinion explained: "exposure to significant

amounts" means "any direct exposure to tobacco smoke,

whether from the same room or from an adjacent area." Id.

__________

3 The court's order commands the District to provide Smith and

Dawson with smoke-free quarters and common areas "for the

remainder of their incarceration." Crowder, 959 F. Supp. at 11.

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at 8 n.6. If "any" exposure is intolerable, what does one do

with Helling's requirement that the inmate must prove an

"unreasonably high" level of smoke at the prison? And what

of Helling's requirement that exposure to second-hand smoke

must present a "grave" risk to the prisoner's health? Are we

to believe that any exposure to tobacco smoke, no matter

what the level, no matter what the length of time, poses a

grave health risk? The district court cited no scientific

studies to support that proposition and the plaintiffs offered

none. Given the law imbedded in the district court's formulation--involuntary exposure to any level of second-hand tobacco smoke in prison violates the Eighth Amendment--it is

easy to see why the court's injunction would follow these

prisoners wherever the District incarcerated them. It is also

easy to see why the district court was mistaken.

Helling did not read the Eighth Amendment as mandating

smoke-free prisons. It is impossible to read any such per se

rule into Helling's "objective" element. It is also impossible

to find that these plaintiffs presented enough evidence to

satisfy Helling's standard, correctly understood. They did

put on some evidence of their involuntary exposure to some

second-hand smoke at Lorton. But the evidence consisted

merely of anecdotal accounts, such as testimony that there

"was smoking being done in the sleeping areas" and that

Lorton's Medium Security Facility was like "a nightclub."

J.A. 207, 251. Missing entirely from the plaintiffs' affirmative

case was any objective evidence of the level of second-hand

smoke. There was no "scientific and statistical inquiry into

the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that

... injury to health will actually be caused by exposure."

Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. The only quantitative evidence

consisted of the District's measurements of the air quality in

Lorton's dormitories and common areas (including the areas

of which the plaintiffs complained). The measurements revealed that the amounts of second-hand smoke were below

levels considered acceptable under the standards of both the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the

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tioning Engineers, standards which apply to buildings in the

District and Virginia.4 In short, Dawson and Smith failed to

prove that even while they were at Lorton, they were exposed

to such an unreasonable level of tobacco smoke that it posed a

serious risk to their future health. See, e.g., Deen, 77 F.3d at

160; Davidson v. Coughlin, 920 F. Supp. 305, 308-09 (N.D.

N.Y. 1996); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 267 (D.D.C.

1995); Jackson v. Berge, 864 F. Supp. 873, 882 (E.D. Wis.

1994); see also McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 125 (7th Cir.

1994). Needless to say, there is no evidence regarding their

present conditions of confinement in Ohio, or what those

conditions would be absent the injunction. Yet before an

injunction may issue the inmate must prove that he currently

"is being exposed to unreasonably high levels" of smoke.

Helling, 509 U.S. at 35 (our italics).

Both plaintiffs say they are suffering "from a physical

ailment that is aggravated by second-hand cigarette smoke."

Brief of Appellees at 4. Their expert witness, Dr. Albert

Munzer, testified that exposure to second-hand smoke would

aggravate the conditions of persons suffering from the plaintiffs' alleged health problems and would have an adverse

effect even on otherwise-healthy persons. The plaintiffs believe that, in light of this evidence, their involuntary exposure

to tobacco smoke at almost any level was unreasonable.

The district court apparently agreed with this line of

reasoning. See Crowder, 959 F. Supp. at 8-9. We do not.

Smith's evidence consisted of his statements that exposure to

__________

4 The District's air quality measurements were taken after the

district court had issued a preliminary injunction ordering the

District to enforce Lorton's policy regarding nonsmoking areas.

For this reason the court found the measurements "of little practical help," Crowder, 959 F. Supp. at 9 n.7. But it was never

proven that the conditions at Lorton were worse before the preliminary injunction than after. Dawson and Smith in fact claim that

prison officials ignored the preliminary injunction. See Brief of

Appellees at 6, 7. Furthermore, even the earliest measurements

were taken weeks after the preliminary injunction had expired. By

that time, any improvements in Lorton's air quality attributable to

the preliminary injunction might well have dissipated.

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smoke caused him headaches, chest pains, and "a lot of

stress." J.A. 210. He identified no specific medical condition, and provided no records documenting any ailment.

Dawson, on the other hand, said he had been treated for

thyroid cancer and had a history of asthma. The District

contested the asthma claim, but we will assume it to be true.

Even so, Dawson failed to demonstrate a causal relationship

between his conditions and an increased risk of harm to him

from second-hand smoke. Dr. Munzer's testimony established no such nexus. He never examined Dawson (or

Smith). He had no knowledge of Dawson's medical condition

or of the actual levels of smoke to which Dawson was

exposed. Yet Dr. Munzer testified that the health effects of

exposure to second-hand smoke "var[y] tremendously with

the individual," and "in order to assess the actual risk to the

plaintiffs in this case ... to a reasonable degree of scientific

or medical certainty," he "would certainly have to know ...

what the levels of exposure were" and would have to be

familiar with the plaintiffs' medical histories. J.A. 377, 387-

88.

Helling also required Dawson and Smith to prove "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison authorities, 509 U.S. at

35-36, that is, to prove that the authorities were "knowingly

and unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk

of harm" to the plaintiffs' safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 846 (1994). The officials "must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and ... must also draw the

inference." Id. at 837. On this aspect of the case, the

district court concluded that the plaintiffs had carried their

burden by showing that the Lorton officials were "unable or

unwilling" to enforce prison regulations banning smoking in

certain areas. Crowder, 959 F. Supp. at 9. This cannot be

right. The court heard no evidence demonstrating the existence of any substantial risk of harm. Yet there must be an

"objectively intolerable risk" in order for there to be a

"knowing and unreasonable" disregard of it. It makes no

sense to charge someone with improperly ignoring a danger

that never existed.

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Besides, it is hard to see how imperfect enforcement of a

nonsmoking policy can, alone, satisfy Helling's subjective

element. That the District even has such a policy militates

against a finding of deliberate indifference. The Supreme

Court said as much in Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. See also

Davidson, 920 F. Supp. at 309; Pryor-El, 892 F. Supp. at

267. Here prison officials testified to their good-faith attempts to enforce the prison's nonsmoking policy to the best

of their abilities. A fire protection specialist found the prison

in substantial compliance with nonsmoking rules during unannounced inspections. Guards and prisoners caught ignoring

or violating the nonsmoking policy were disciplined. Steps

were taken to improve ventilation in problem areas about

which the prisoners complained. Grievances and requests

from inmates and prison physicians regarding exposure to

tobacco smoke were answered and acted upon. And again,

actual measurements of the amount of smoke in the prison

revealed that prison officials were doing a good job keeping

the environment reasonably smoke-free. Deliberate indifference is characterized by "obduracy and wantonness." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Those words do not fit

the actions of the prison officials here.

•••••••Reversed.

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