Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03424/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03424-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ENRIQUE TORRES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UTILITY TREE SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-03424-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to remand on the ground that Defendant, Utility Tree 

Service, Inc.’s removal is untimely. Mot. 2, ECF 12-1. For reasons stated below, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2015, Plaintiffs Enrique Torres and Ruben Hermosillo filed a complaint 

on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated in the Superior Court of the State of 

California, alleging that Defendant, Utility Tree Service, Inc. violated California wage and hour 

laws, among other claims. Compl., ECF 1-1. Plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint on 

November 12, 2015. On January 26, 2016, the state trial court continued a case management 

conference to allow Defendant to conduct limited discovery regarding removability. Opp’n 3, 

ECF 13. Defendant then served Plaintiffs Torres and Hermosillo various discovery requests on 

February 3, 2016. Id. On March 23, 2016, Plaintiffs requested an extension of time to respond to 

the discovery requests but having received no agreement from Defendant, they served unverified 

responses on the same day. Ex. 7 to Thomas Decl. in support of Notice of Removal (“Thomas 

Decl. I”), ECF 2-2. Later, on two separate occasions, Defendant demanded Plaintiffs produce 

verified responses. Exs. 2, 3 to Thomas Decl. in support of Opp’n (“Thomas Decl. II”), ECF 14. 

Case 5:16-cv-03424-BLF Document 22 Filed 01/03/17 Page 1 of 7
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Finally, on April 19, 2016, Plaintiffs’ counsel noted that Plaintiff Torres’ verifications will be 

provided shortly but Plaintiff Hermosillo was traveling. Ex. 4 to Thomas Decl. II. On May 18, 

2016, Plaintiff Torres provided his verifications but to date, Plaintiff Hermosillo has not provided

verifications for his responses. Thomas Decl. II, ¶ 13; Ex. 8 to Thomas Decl. I.

On June 17, 2016, Defendant filed its notice of removal, within 30 days of receiving 

Plaintiff Torres’ verification on May 18, 2016. Notice of Removal, ECF 1. According to 

Defendant, the notice of removal was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1332(d) (the Class 

Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)), 1441, 1446, and 1453 on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs Enrique 

Torres and Ruben S. Hermosillo are “citizen[s] of a State different from any defendant,” (2) “the 

number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is” more than 100 members

and (3) “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest 

and costs.” Id. In the notice of removal, Defendant also states that “Plaintiff Torres’ Verified 

Responses to Defendant’s Special Interrogatory Request Set One provides sufficient information 

to determine the amount in controversy.” Id. ¶ 18; Opp’n 1. Plaintiffs now move to remand, 

arguing that Defendant’s removal was untimely.

Having carefully considered the submitted papers, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion 

and remands this action to state court for the reasons discussed below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Removal is proper where the federal courts have original jurisdiction over an action 

brought in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Pursuant to CAFA, federal courts have original 

jurisdiction over state law actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 

$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, the number of members of all proposed plaintiff 

classes in the aggregate is more than 100, and in this case, where any member of a class of 

plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Courts strictly 

construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. E.g., Provicial Gov’t of Marinduque v. 

Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans 

Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.2008). “A defendant seeking removal has the burden 

to establish that removal is proper and any doubt is resolved against removability.” Luther, 533 

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F.3d at 1034 (citation omitted); see also Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 

1244 (9th Cir.2009) (“[A]ny doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of 

remand.”).

28 U.S.C. section 1446(b) imposes two separate 30-day time limits on defendants wishing 

to remove cases to federal court. The first 30-day limit requires that a defendant remove within 30 

days after receiving a complaint that is removable on its face. Id. § 1446(b)(1). Alternatively, if 

the complaint is not removable on its face, the second 30-day limit requires that a defendant 

remove within 30 days after receiving “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from 

which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” Id. § 

1446(b)(3); Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2005).

The term “other paper” generally encompasses any documents in the proceeding’s state 

court record, but can also extend to unfiled depositions and responses to interrogatories. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(A) (“[I]nformation relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the 

State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an ‘other paper’ under 

subsection (b)(3).”); Mix v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1449880, at *2 (C.D. Cal. April 19, 2000) 

(finding that a “statement of damages” served on defendant by plaintiff constituted “other paper”); 

Riggs v. Continental Baking Co., 678 F. Supp. 236, 238 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that plaintiff’s 

deposition constituted “other paper”); Olonzo v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2010 WL 330245, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Jan.21, 2010) (finding that a “case management statement” constituted “other paper”).

III. DISCUSSION

The issue in this case is whether Defendant was put on notice of the grounds for removal 

by receipt of an unverified discovery response. If so, it is undisputed that Defendant’s removal 

was untimely. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant received Plaintiff Torres’ unverified 

interrogatory responses on March 23, 2016 so Defendant was required to remove by April 22, 

2016. Mot. 4. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs assert that federal law provides that 

unverified documents, such as a settlement letter, are “other papers” under 28 U.S.C. section 

1446(c)(3)(A) that can constitute a basis for removal. Mot. 5-6 (citing Babasa v. LensCrafters, 

Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007)). Even if unverified discovery responses are not 

Case 5:16-cv-03424-BLF Document 22 Filed 01/03/17 Page 3 of 7
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admissible evidence, Plaintiffs argue that they can have validity in certain contexts, such as a prior 

inconsistent statement for impeachment, or for other “non-discovery” purposes. Mot. 7; Reply 2-3 

(citing McDaneil v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 55 F. Supp.3d 1244, 1260 (E.D. Cal. 2014)). 

Regardless, Plaintiffs contend that federal law, and not California law, governs whether the 

unverified response can be a basis for removal. Id. at 5, 7; Reply 2-3. 

In opposing this motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ unverified responses cannot 

trigger the clock for time to file a notice of removal. Opp’n 7. Specifically, Defendant contends 

that the time limit “is triggered only when the information supporting removal is unequivocally 

clear and certain.” Id. at 5-6 (citing Mattel, Inc. v. Bryant, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1089-90 (C.D. 

Cal. 2005)). Defendant asserts that both California Code of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure require that answers to interrogatories be answered “under oath” and signed by the 

answering party. Opp’n 6. As such, Defendant contends that unverified responses lack 

evidentiary value for the purpose of removal. Id. Defendant further claims that Plaintiffs’ counsel 

implied that Plaintiff Hermosillo had not reviewed the interrogatory responses. Id. at 7.

The Court finds the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs persuasive and that Plaintiff Torres’ 

unverified interrogatory responses can trigger the clock for removal. In making this determination 

the Court relies on the holding in Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007). In 

affirming the order remanding the case to state court, the Ninth Circuit in Babasa held that a letter 

sent in preparation for mediation constituted a valid basis for removal even if the letter was

privileged under California law. Id. at 974. In reaching this holding, the Ninth Circuit noted that 

the law governing California mediation privilege does not preclude a determination that the letter 

constituted section 1446(b) notice for purposes of removal to federal court. Id. at 974-75. As 

such, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the filing of notice of removal was untimely, as it was over 

thirty days after the defendant could have “ascertained that the case was removable.” Id. at 975 

(citing Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.2002)).

Similarly here, while the Court acknowledges that civil procedural rules require the 

responses be verified or made “under oath,” such rules do not preclude finding that an unverified 

discovery response can serve as a proper section 1446(b) notice for purposes of removal. 

Case 5:16-cv-03424-BLF Document 22 Filed 01/03/17 Page 4 of 7
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Defendant attempts to distinguish Babasa in that Babasa concerned a settlement letter and the 

civil procedural rules impose no verification requirement on counsel making a representation in a 

settlement offer, unlike in the interrogatory responses here. Opp’n 8. However, the Court finds 

that this is a distinction without a difference. Babasa notes that even if the settlement letter were 

to be inadmissible due to California mediation privilege, that would not control what constituted 

section 1446(b) notice for purposes of removal to federal court. 498 F.3d at 974-75. Rather, the 

focus of the inquiry is on whether a defendant “could have ascertained that the case was 

removable” and thus was on notice. Id. at 475. Here, in its notice of removal, Defendant cites to 

Plaintiff Torres’ unverified responses served on March 23, 2016 as the basis for the amount of 

controversy supporting the removal of this case. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 15, 42; Ex. 7 to Thomas 

Decl. I. Defendant does not dispute that the content of the unverified responses was unclear, but 

only that the absence of verification made it supposedly unreliable. The Court notes that Plaintiff 

Torres’ verification, served on May 18, 2016, consisted of only a verification without any changes 

to the responses served on March 23, 2016. Ex. 8 to Thomas Decl. I; see also McDaniel, 55 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1260 (in a case concerning whether a settlement deadline has run, noting that the 

verification “conveys no substantive information” and that “[b]ecause an unverified interrogatory 

can serve a ‘non-discovery’ purpose, . . . it is unknown why the unsworn responses could not have 

started the settlement clock”). Accordingly, Defendant could have ascertained that the case was 

removable based on Plaintiff Torres’ unverified responses, just as the Babasa defendant could 

have done based on the settlement letter.

The cases relied upon by Defendant have limited applications here and do not militate a 

contrary finding. In Melendrez v. Superior Court, the court was trying to determine whether to 

deem admitted unverified responses to requests for admissions and to determine who had the 

authority to verify the responses. 215 Cal. App. 4th 1343, 1348, 1351-54 (2013). The proposition 

noted by the Melendrez court that “an unverified response is tantamount to no response at all” was 

in reference to whether the responses could be admissible at trial and was not related to section

1446(b) notice for purposes of removal to federal court. Id. at 1348.

The facts of Mattel, Inc. v. Bryant are not analogous to this case, either. 441 F. Supp. 2d at 

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1086-87. In Mattel, the plaintiff, Mattel, argued that the defendant should have removed after 

receiving in a document production a Wall Street Journal article suggesting that the defendant had 

copied Mattel’s intellectual property relating to the “Bratz” dolls, a right that was not asserted in 

the complaint at the time. Id. at 1086. Because the right to the “Bratz” dolls was worth more than 

$75,000, satisfying the amount in controversy, Mattel contended that the defendant was on notice

of the basis for removal. Id. at 1090. In rejecting Mattel’s argument, the court found that the Wall 

Street Journal article provided no notice that Mattel would assert in litigation that the defendant 

stole the Bratz idea from Mattel. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the time limit under section 

1446(b) “is triggered only when the information supporting removal is unequivocally clear and 

certain.” Id. This is not the case here with Plaintiff Torres’ unverified responses. Defendant 

argues that the interrogatory responses are not reliable, and that it is likely that Plaintiffs had not 

seen the responses prepared by their counsel, but this argument is not persuasive. Opp’n 7. As 

noted above, the responses are clear, and in fact, constitute the information relied upon by 

Defendant to support the amount of controversy. Ex. 7 to Thomas Decl. I. Moreover, evidentiary 

rules do not control what constitutes section 1446(b) notice for purposes of removal to federal 

court. Babasa, 498 F.3d at 974-75. The absence of verification also did not make the responses 

equivocal like the Wall Street Journal article in Mattel for the purposes of removal.

Similarly, the other cases cited by Defendant do not compel a different conclusion. E.g., 

Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that diversity of 

citizenship was not apparent in the initial pleading and concluding “that notice of removability 

under § 1446(b) is determined through examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, 

not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry”); Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 

156 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that the initial pleading did not provide enough 

information to determine whether the alleged conduct was wholly related to a federal officer and 

noting that the “clock begins to run is when the defendant is able to ‘intelligently ascertain 

removability’”) (citations omitted).

Based on the weight of authority, the Court finds that the 30-day time limit started when 

Plaintiff Torres’ unverified responses were served on March 23, 2016, and that Defendant did not 

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timely remove this case.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The motion to remand is GRANTED. 

2. The Clerk shall REMAND this case to Santa Clara County Superior Court. All 

other matters are TERMINATED and VACATED, and the Clerk shall close this file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2017

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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