Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01499/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luis Enrique Reyes,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-1499-PHX-NVW (JFM)

Report & Recommendation on 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison at Kingman, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 

24, 2013 (Doc. 1). On January 17, 2014 Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 10). 

Petitioner has not filed a Reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the facts as follows:

In March 2009 a drive-by shooting occurred in front of a 

Phoenix home where three witnesses were present outside; several 

shots rang out, however no one was injured. Witnesses described 

three passengers in the vehicle, a green Grand Marquis, and 

identified Defendant as the driver. In particular, witnesses described

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 1 of 18
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the driver as a Hispanic male who appeared to be in his forties, had 

a goatee and black hair, was wearing a white "muscle shirt" tank 

top, and had tattoos on his upper chest and shoulders. One witness

also identified a residence in the neighborhood where he had 

previously seen the green Grand Marquis parked.

In April, a witness spotted both the car and Defendant about 

a mile away from the scene of the crime and notified police. 

Officers responded and determined that while Defendant was not 

the owner of the car, he was known to use it. Officers questioned

Defendant and subsequently arrested him. At the time of his arrest, 

Defendant had a goatee, black hair, and tattoos "around the collar" 

and "upper shirt area."

(Exhibit M, Mem. Dec. at 1-2.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. #, are referenced herein as 

“Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on one count of driveby shooting and three counts of aggravated assault. (Exhibit B, Indictment.) A plea 

agreement was offered (Exhibit C, M.E.7/15/09), and a settlement conference was held 

(Exhibit D, M.E. 9/17/09), but the matter was not settled and Petitioner proceeded to a 

jury trial and testified in his own behalf alleging another person was the shooter. 

(Exhibit M, Mem. Dec. at 2.) 

Petitioner was found guilty as charged (Exhibit E, M.E. 11/3/9), and on February 

12, 2010 was sentenced “to 10.5 years' imprisonment for the drive-by shooting and 7.5 

years' each for three counts of aggravated assault, all sentences running concurrently.” 

(Exhibit M, Mem.Dec. at 2; Exhibit F, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, counsel was appointed, and filed a brief 

arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, citing a litany of 

Arizona state court cases. (Exhibit K.) Petitioner cited no federal authorities and 

referenced no constitutional provisions. (Id. at 4-5, and generally.) The Arizona Court 

of Appeals rejected the claim, citing no federal authorities or principles. (Exhibit M, 

Mem. Dec.)

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 2 of 18
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner did not seek further direct review. (Exhibit N, Mandate; Petition, Doc. 

1 at 3; Exhibit FF, Arizona Court of Appeals Docket.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit O) and counsel was 

appointed (Exhibit P, Order 3/28/11), who ultimately filed a Notice (Exhibit Q) of 

inability to find a colorable claim for relief. Petitioner then filed a pro per Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit R) asserting ineffective assistance: (1) of appellate 

counsel because counsel failed to adequately argue Petitioner’s insufficiency of the 

evidence claim; (2) of trial counsel for failing to advise Petitioner of the existence of a 

favorable plea offer made the day of trial; (3) of trial counsel for failure to retain an 

identification expert; (4) of trial counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress various 

trial testimony. Petitioner also argued his actual innocence. (Id.) Petitioner also moved 

for appointment of new counsel, appointment of an identification expert, and for 

discovery. (Exhibits S, T, U.) 

The PCR court rejected the actual innocence claim as being precluded under 

Arizona R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3). It found any claim of insufficiency under Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1(h) without merit. It found the claims of ineffective assistance to be 

without merit. In particular, the court found: (a) the record of the settlement conference 

reflected Petitioner’s knowledge of the plea offer; (b) there was no basis for a motion to 

suppress; (c) no other colorable claim of ineffectiveness had been presented. (Exhibit Z, 

M.E. 3/14/12.) 

Petitioner moved for reconsideration (Exhibit AA), which was denied on 

December 3, 2012 (Exhibit CC, M.E. 12/3/12.)

On January 28, 2013, a person purporting to be a “distant relative” of Petitioner 

filed a motion seeking an extension of time for Petitioner to file a petition for review. 

The PCR court denied the motion as an unauthorized third-party filing by a non-attorney. 

(Exhibit DD, M.E. 2/4/13.) 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 3 of 18
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Petition, Doc. 1 

at 5.; Exhibit EE, Superior Court Docket.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 24, 2013 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following six grounds for relief:

(1) Petitioner’s conviction violates his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights because substantial evidence 

demonstrated he was not the driver of the vehicle;

(2) Petitioner’s Rule 32 counsel was ineffective in violation of 

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in 

failing to consult with an identification expert;

(3) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective in violation of the 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments in failing to inform 

Petitioner that the state had made a plea offer;

(4) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective, in violation of the 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments in failing to file a 

motion to suppress an illegal identification of Petitioner;

(5) Petitioner’s appellate counsel was ineffective in violation of 

the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal; and

(6) Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel was ineffective in 

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments in 

failing to seek the appointment of an eyewitness 

identification expert.

(Order 10/21/13, Doc. 3.) 

Response – On January 17, 2014, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 10). Respondents argue that all of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

Reply – In the Court’s service Order, Petitioner was given 30 days from the date 

of service of the answer to file a reply. (Order 10/21/13, Doc. 3 at 3.) Petitioner has not 

filed a reply, and the time to do so has passed.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, and thus 

are barred from federal habeas review.

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 4 of 18
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 5 of 18
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

10 at 10.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 

2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme 

Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, 

and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as 

among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 

1071. Claims based upon ineffective assistance of counsel are determined by looking at 

“the nature of the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 6 of 18
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. 

Petitioner cannot now seek review of his existing PCR proceeding. Arizona Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c) requires that petitions for review be filed within 30 days 

of the final decision of the trial court. That time has long since passed.

Further, Petitioner would be time barred from instituting a new proceeding. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those 

which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and 

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct 

appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 

1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition of pleading 

defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That time has long since 

passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 7 of 18
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 

1127 (2011). 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 8 of 18
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

a. Ground One – Insufficient Evidence - In Ground One of his Petition, 

Petitioner argues that insufficient evidence supported his conviction, in violation of his 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, citing inter alia Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 315 (1979). Respondents contend that although Petitioner raised a similar 

state law claim on direct appeal, he did not fairly present his federal law claim. 

Indeed, Petitioner did assert an insufficiency of the evidence claim on direct 

appeal. He did not, however, assert it as a federal claim. 

Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the claim amounts to 

failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995). While 

the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,” Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 

(9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim 

were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state law claim was made.” 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (per curiam). However, "a citation to a state 

case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as a citation to a 

federal case analyzing such an issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

Here, Petitioner’s appellate brief did not explicitly assert a federal constitutional 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 9 of 18
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claim, and cited only state authorities. Moreover, none of the state cases cited were 

founded upon a federal constitutional analysis. (See Exhibit K, Opening Brief at 4 

(listing citations).) 

Most of the state cases Petitioner cited were merely applying Arizona’s 

“substantial evidence” standard for a judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 20(a). See State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 393, 646 P.2d 268, 278 

(1982); State v. Doss, 192 Ariz. 408, 412, 966 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1998); State v. Franklin, 

130 Ariz. 291, 292, 635 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1981); State v. Hallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 38, 668 

P.2d 874, 881 (1983); State v. Hunter, 136 Ariz. 45, 48, 664 P.2d 195, 198 (1983); State 

v. Mosley, 119 Ariz. 393,402,581 P.2d 238,247 (1978); State v. Parker, 113 Ariz. 

560,561,558 P.2d 905, 906 (1976); State v. Paris-Sheldon, 214 Ariz. 500, 510, 154 P.3d 

1046, 1056 (2007); State v. Paoletto, 133 Ariz. 412, 416, 652 P.2d 151, 155 (1982); 

State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, 104 P.3d 873, 875 (2005); State v. Ramirez, 142. Ariz. 

171, 175, 688 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1984); State v. Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, 283, 131 P.2d 1261, 

1264 (2007); and State v. Stevens, 184 Ariz. 411, 412, 909 P.2d 478,479 (1995).

In a number of the cases cited by Petitioner, the Arizona courts were also 

applying Rule 20(a), but in doing so made references to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 315 (1979). Those courts did not, however, undertake to “analyz[e] a federal 

constitutional issue" Peterson, 319 F.3d at 1158, but instead looked to that decision as 

persuasive authority for guidance in resolving such motions or to reference the 

reasonable doubt standard. See State v. Edwards, 136 Ariz. 177, 186,665 P.2d 59, 68 

(1983) and State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66,796 P.2d 866, 868 (1990); State v. Mincey, 

141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); and State v. Sharma, 216 Ariz. 292, 

294, 165 P.3d 693, 695 (2007).

In State v. Clifton, 134 Ariz. 345, 348, 656 P.2d 634. 637 (1982), the Arizona 

Court of Appeals referenced various federal cases in federal prosecutions, but did so only 

to decide, as a question of first impression in Arizona, the procedural question whether a 

post-trial motion for a new trial could be granted where the mid-trial motion for a 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 10 of 18
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judgment of acquittal had been denied, and to demonstrate the broad discretion of trial 

judges in granting such motions. Thus, Clifton did not analyze a federal constitutional 

issue. 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner did not fairly present his 

federal claim in Ground One to the Arizona Court of Appeals. For the reasons discussed 

hereinabove, Petitioner’s state remedies on this claim are now procedurally defaulted.

b. Grounds Two through Six – Ineffective Assistance – The remainder of 

Petitioner’s claims are founded upon various allegations of ineffective assistance of his 

various counsel. In his Ground Two, Petitioner argues that his PCR counsel was 

ineffective in failing to consult with an identification expert. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) In 

Ground Three, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform Petitioner 

that the state had made a plea offer. (Id. at 8.) In Ground Four, he argues trial counsel 

was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress an illegal identification of 

Petitioner. (Id. at 9.) In Ground Five, he argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in 

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. (Id. at 10.) In his Ground Six, he argues that PCR 

counsel was ineffective in failing to seek the appointment of an eyewitness 

identification expert. (Id. at 11.) 

Respondents concede these claims were raised in Petitioner’s pro per PCR 

petition (Exhibit R), but argue that Petitioner’s state remedies were not properly 

exhausted by raising them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a subsequent petition for 

review. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 11.) 

Indeed, Petitioner did not seek review of the denial of his PCR petition by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. The PCR court denied the claims on the merits, and thus did 

not apply a procedural bar. 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner did not properly exhaust 

his state remedies on his claims in Grounds Two through Six. For the reasons discussed 

hereinabove, Petitioner’s state remedies on this claim are now procedurally defaulted.

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 11 of 18
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

e. Summary Re Exhaustion – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his state remedies on all of his 

claims.

B. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel - Petitioner argues in his Petition that 

this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural defaults as to Grounds Two 

through Six based on the ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, citing Martinez v. Ryan, 

132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7-11.)

Ineffectiveness of PCR Counsel Not Cognizable - Ineffective assistance of 

counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly exhaust claims in state courts and 

excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 

1998). However, the Courts have long rejected claims of ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel. "There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 12 of 18
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel in such proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 

(1991) (citations omitted). The Coleman Court thus held that the ineffectiveness of PCR 

counsel also could not establish cause to excuse a failure to properly exhaust state 

remedies and procedural default on a claim.

Limited Exception for Claims re Trial Counsel - In Martinez, the Court 

recognized that because the states increasingly reserve review of claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel to post-conviction relief proceedings, the ineffectiveness of 

counsel in such PCR proceedings could effectively defeat any review of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the Court recognized a narrow exception to Coleman’s 

ruling on the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause to excuse a procedural default on 

such a claim.1 Arizona, the state at issue in Martinez, is just such a state, and 

accordingly ineffective assistance of PCR counsel can establish cause to excuse a 

procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Because Petitioner’s claims in Grounds One (insufficient evidence), Two and Six 

(ineffective assistance of PCR counsel), and Five (ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel) do not raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, any ineffectiveness 

of PCR counsel in bringing those claims would not qualify as “cause” under Martinez. 

Application to Grounds Three and Four – In contrast, in Grounds Three and Four 

Petitioner does assert claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Thus, if 

Petitioner’s failure to properly exhaust his state remedies of these claims was the result 

of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, then under Martinez, Petitioner’s procedural 

default may be excused.

Here, however, Petitioner’s procedural default did not result from the 

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel. To be sure, Petitioner’s PCR counsel failed to raise the 

claims in Grounds Three and Four. However, Petitioner did raise them in his pro per

 

1

In Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013), the Court extended Martinez to cases 

where state law did not mandate that claims of ineffectiveness be brought in PCR 

proceedings, but provided no other meaningful avenue for review.

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 13 of 18
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PCR petition. And they were heard by the PCR Court on the merits. 

Rather, Petitioner’s procedural default resulted from his failure to seek further 

review by the Arizona Court of Appeals in a petition for review. Petitioner has not 

alleged that counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue review in the proceeding, nor 

even that he was represented by counsel in doing so.2 

Moreover, the Martinez court made clear that the limited exception it was creating 

for ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as “cause” did not extend outside the initial PCR 

proceeding.

The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other 

kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review 

collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, 

and petitions for discretionary review in a State's appellate courts. It 

does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first 

occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral

proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320. Thus, even if Petitioner continued to be represented by his 

PCR counsel after the dismissal of his PCR petition, any ineffectiveness by counsel 

thereafter (when Petitioner’s procedural default occurred) would not only not qualify as a 

constitutional violation but would not be cognizable as “cause” under Martinez. 

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

/ /

 

2

The normal practice in Arizona seems to be that appointed PCR counsel is released 

from further obligation upon conclusion of the trial court proceedings, and has no 

responsibility for seeking review. In the absence of contrary allegations by Petitioner, 

the undersigned presumes that was the situation in this case.

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 14 of 18
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE AS CAUSE

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner makes no assertion of his actual innocence. 

Although Petitioner does allege there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction, even if true that would not establish his actual innocence. “Finally, as the 

Schlup decision explains, the gateway actual-innocence standard is ‘by no means 

equivalent to the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 

L.Ed.2d 560 (1979),’ which governs claims of insufficient evidence.” House v. Bell, 547 

U.S. 518, 538 (2006). The Court in House explained that an insufficiency of the 

evidence claim is founded upon an evaluation of the evidence presented to the jury, 

while an actual innocence claim is founded upon “evidence the trial jury did not have 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 15 of 18
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

before it.” Id. See U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (lack of proof of FDIC 

insurance in a bank robbery case, without evidence that insurance did not exist, not 

sufficient to establish actual innocence where lack of such insurance not shown). 

Indeed, such a determination is based upon all the available evidence, including evidence 

which may have been “excluded or unavailable at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328. 

Petitioner makes no suggestion that all the available evidence (whether or not presented 

at trial) would preclude a reasonable juror from finding him guilty.

Accordingly Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred claims 

must be dismissed with prejudice. 

Because all of his claims are procedurally defaulted, the Petition should be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 16 of 18
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not Afind 

it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, 

to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed July 24, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 17 of 18
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 28, 2014

13-1499r RR 14 03 19 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:13-cv-01499-NVW Document 11 Filed 03/28/14 Page 18 of 18