Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02226/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02226-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Plaintiff now lives in Tennessee. See (ECF No. 37).

2

 Plaintiff’s underlying condition was a tumor located near his perineum. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER ROMERO LOMAX,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv2226-WQH (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT (ECF No. 24)

vs.

DR. CANLAS, et al.,

Defendants.

Introduction

Plaintiff, formerly incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San

Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983.1

 Plaintiff alleges various prison and medical officials at RJD have violated his Eighth

Amendment right to adequate medical care.2

 (Compl. at 9; ECF No. 1). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief

as well as general and punitive damages. (Id. at 60-61).

On April 21, 2011, defendants in the above entitled action brought a motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s Complaint on the following grounds: (1) plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendant

Jayasundara for deliberate indifference to his medical needs under the Eighth Amendment; (2)

plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendants Franklin, Romero, and Grannis under the Fourteenth

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3

 These facts are taken from plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the Complaint, and must construe the Complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2002). Additionally, courts construe pro se pleadings liberally on a defendant's motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Id. 

4

 Citations and further details of these events can be found in the following section which

identifies the particular defendants and in Appendix A.

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Amendment due process clause with respect to plaintiff’s inmate appeal; (3) plaintiff fails to state a

claim against defendants Hernandez and Cate for supervisory liability; and, (4) plaintiff cannot sue

any of the defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 24, p. 2). Plaintiff filed a response to the

motion to dismiss on June 9, 2011. (ECF No. 29). Defendant filed a reply to plaintiff’s response on

July 1, 2011. (ECF No. 36). 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge William Q.

Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.3 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. After reviewing the pleadings and parties' briefs, for the reasons

set forth below, the Court recommends defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

Factual Background3

Due to the Complaint’s verbose and disorganized presentation, the Court breaks down the

factual background relevant to the present motion to dismiss into three categories: (1) a brief summary

of relevant events; (2) a list of the defendants presently moving to dismiss (including their

involvement in plaintiff’s alleged injuries); and, (3) a catch-all miscellaneous section which covers

events and claims not easily attributable to any particular date and/or defendant. Also, the Court

includes a time-line of events as an appendix to this report and recommendation. 

Brief Summary of Relevant Events4

Plaintiff first requested to be seen by RJD medical staff on July 25, 2007 regarding a growth

near his buttocks. Two months later, a ultrasound was performed at Alvarado Hospital. The

ultrasound confirmed plaintiff’s growth was Lipoma. 

Following this diagnosis, Dr. Canlas submitted a request for surgery on October 10, 2007. Dr.

Farinas examined plaintiff and measured the growth on December 28, 2007 and January 8, 2008.

Between March 31, 2008 and May 27, 2008, plaintiff submitted numerous forms to the RJD medical

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staff inquiring on the status of the surgery and requesting treatment. On June 11, 2008, plaintiff

underwent surgery to remove the growth. Between June 12, 2008 and June 20, 2008, plaintiff

submitted more inquiries regarding the delay of his surgery, including a letter to defendant Hernandez.

In August of 2008, Dr. Choo examined plaintiff. Dr. Choo did not find any remaining surgical

staples. A few weeks later, Jayasundara and Dr. Canlas removed the final staple. 

Between September 24, 2008 and April 21, 2009, plaintiff continued to file grievance forms

and administrative appeals. These grievances and appeals regard the delay in surgery, sensations of

pain and twitching, and loss of bowel control. 

The Defendants

In his Complaint, plaintiff identifies the following defendants who are the subject of the

present motion to dismiss: Canlas, Whitehead, Choo, Jayasundara, Franklin, Tyler, Hernandez, Silva,

and Romero. 

Defendant Canlas

Dr. Canlas allegedly denied plaintiff medical care, allowed defendant Jayasundara to perform

unauthorized medical procedures, and wrote a false report. (ECF No. 1, pg. 2). At some point prior

to surgery, plaintiff informed Dr. Canlas the growth was getting bigger. (Id. at 11). Dr. Canlas falsified

a progress report which indicated plaintiff’s tumor had stopped growing and plaintiff was not

experiencing pain. (Id. at 35). Dr. Canlas refused to remove the staple within 5-7 days of surgery. (Id.

at 48). Dr. Canlas denied plaintiff mandatory post-operative care. (Id. at 49).

Defendant Whitehead

Nurse Whitehead allegedly denied medical care to plaintiff. (Id. at 2). At some point prior to

surgery, plaintiff informed Nurse Whitehead the growth was getting bigger. (Id. at 11). At some point

following plaintiff’s June 11, 2008 surgery, plaintiff asked Nurse Whitehead when the surgical staples

would be removed. (Id. at 14). Nurse Whitehead disregarded and ignored plaintiff’s pleas for help and

falsified medical documents. (Id. at 28-29). Nurse Whitehead refused to remove the staple within 5-7

days of surgery. (Id. at 48). Nurse Whitehead denied plaintiff mandatory post-operative care. (Id. at

49).

///

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Defendant Choo

Dr. Choo, the Chief Medical Officer at RJD, knew of plaintiff’s pain but did not help alleviate

the pain. (Id. at 3-4). Dr. Choo examined plaintiff following his surgery and informed him all staples

had been removed. (Id. at 16). However, the final staple was not removed until a few weeks later. (Id.

at 16). Dr. Choo intentionally left the staple inside plaintiff to protect other doctors and nurses. (Id.

at 40). Dr. Choo refused to remove the staple within 5-7 days of surgery. (Id. at 48). Dr. Choo denied

plaintiff mandatory post-operative care. (Id. at 49). 

Defendant Jayasundara

Nurse Practitioner Jayasundara performed unauthorized surgery on plaintiff in an unsterile

environment. (Id. at 4). This surgery caused plaintiff extreme pain and defendant Jayasundara did not

provide plaintiff with any medication to alleviate the pain. (Id.) Jayasundara “cut” on plaintiff for over

an hour in an attempt to remove the staple. (Id. at 17). Plaintiff informed Jayansundara he was in

extreme pain. (Id. at 17). Jayasundara declined to give plaintiff any pain medications. (Id. at. 17).

Jayasundara refused to remove the staple within 5-7 days of surgery. (Id. at 48). Jayasundara denied

plaintiff mandatory post-operative care. (Id. at 49).

Defendant Cate

Defendant Cate, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”), knew plaintiff had a serious medical condition yet denied plaintiff medical care. (Id. at 5,

57). 

Defendant Grannis

Defendant Grannis, the Chief Inmate Appeals Coordinator, denied plaintiff’s right to redress

grievances. (Id at 6). He also denied plaintiff’s First Amendment right by denying plaintiff’s appeals.

(Id. at 53).

Defendant Franklin

Defendant Franklin, the Inmate Appeals Coordinator at RJD, denied plaintiff his right to

redress grievances for a serious medical need. (Id. at 6). He also denied plaintiff’s First Amendment

right by denying plaintiff’s appeals. (Id. at 53).

///

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Defendant Tyler

Nurse Tyler intentionally delayed scheduling plaintiff’s surgery. (Id. at 7). Nurse Tyler

intentionally disregarded plaintiff’s July 7, 2007 physicians request for a sonogram. (Id. at 9). Nurse

Tyler intentionally delayed Dr. Canlas’s October 10, 2007 request for surgery. (Id. at 10). Nurse Tyler

intentionally delayed making a surgical appointment for plaintiff at the hospital. (Id. at 14).

Defendant Hernandez

Defendant Hernandez, Warden at RJD, disregarded and ignored plaintiff’s pleas for medical

assistance. (Id. at 7, 57). 

Defendant Silva

Dr. Silva refused to perform her duties as a medical doctor. (Id. at 8). Dr. Silva should have

contacted the Medical Authorization Review committee (“MAR”) in June of 2008 to check the status

of plaintiff’s surgical procedure request. (Id. at 14). 

Defendant Romero

Defendant Romero, the Health Care Manager at RJD, intentionally denied plaintiff medical

care and refused to perform his duties. (Id. at 8). Romero wrote a false administrative appeal response

and ignored plaintiff’s other issues. (Id. at 55).

All defendants

All defendants ignored plaintiff’s pleas for pain medication and allowed the tumor to grow.

(Id. at 47-48). 

Miscellaneous Facts

Plaintiff contends surgery should have been performed when tumor was 3cm. (ECF No. 1, pg.

18). In addition, Whitehead, Canlas, Choo, Jayasundara, Grannis, Franklin, and Hernandez

intentionally left the staples inside plaintiff for weeks after the surgery. (Id. at 18). At some point postsurgery, plaintiff complained to Nurse Whitehead about his uncontrollable bowel movements but

Nurse Whitehead did not address the problem or allow plaintiff to see a doctor. (Id. at 20).

Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd.

of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). The old formula—that the complaint must not be dismissed unless

it is beyond doubt without merit—was discarded by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563

n. 8 (2007).

Now, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint,

as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2004)

(citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

Cir.1986).

The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8. A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

generally proper only where there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001)

(citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988)).

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true; rather, it must

“examine whether [they] follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11

F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir.1994)) (stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a

court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged[ ]”). “Nor is the court required to

accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

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inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001).

When analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint, Courts may consider the plaintiff’s exhibits

attached to his complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d

1208, 1210 n. 2 (9th Cir.1980)). The court may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged

in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

pleading ....” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.2002); Stone v. Writer's Guild of Am. W.,

Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313–14 (9th Cir.1996). Here, Plaintiff has attached various grievance forms,

administrative appeal forms, and medical request forms to his Complaint. The Court will consider

these exhibits in addressing defendant's motion.

Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must construe the

pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1992). However, in

giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir.1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev.

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d

at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809

F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir.1987)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the

court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. Karim–Panahi, 839

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F.2d at 623–24. But where amendment of a pro se litigant's complaint would be futile, denial of leave

to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.2000).

Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show (1) a person

acting “under color of state law” committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir.1986).

Discussion

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim Against Defendant Jayasundara

Plaintiff claims defendant Jayasundara “performed surgery” on plaintiff to remove surgical

staples and performed this surgery in an unsterile environment. See (ECF No. 1, Compl. at 4).

Plaintiff also asserts Jayasundara’s unauthorized surgery caused plaintiff tremendous pain but

Jayasundara did not provide plaintiff with any pain medications. (Id. at 9, 16-17). Plaintiff

contends defendant Jayasundara and Dr. Canlas worked in tandem to remove the remaining

surgical staple. See (Id. at 17). Although the pair of defendants discussed possibly taking plaintiff

to the hospital to have the stubborn staple removed, Jayasundara eventually removed the staple at

the prison. See (Id. at 17). Finally, plaintiff asserts Jayasundara intentionally left the surgical

staples in plaintiff following his initial surgery to remove the tumor. (Id. at 18).

Not every prisoner claim of inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth

Amendment. To state a section 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted

with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show: (1) a

“‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in

further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) the

defendant's response “was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1991)).

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of and disregard an

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excessive risk to inmate health; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may

be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need

and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be

shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or

by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner's medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05;

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Deliberate indifference requires a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner's safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Indeed, “neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. Cal. Dep't Corrs., 220 F.Supp.2d

1098, 1105 (N.D.Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1980)

(mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not support a claim

under § 1983). “[A] mere ‘difference of medical opinion ... [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to

establish deliberate indifference.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.2004);

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley v. Nev.

Bd. State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985). Also, the indifference must be

substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle,

429 U .S. at 105-06. 

Here, plaintiff has successfully established a serious medical need because plaintiff alleges

the presence of a serious tumor intertwined with his internal parts in a private and sensitive area.

Compl. at 9-10. Furthermore, plaintiff’s Complaint and attached exhibits show plaintiff’s postsurgery recovery process involved the removal of 15 surgical staples recovered from plaintiff’s

surgical site on three separate occasions. (Compl. 14-17). The Court finds these allegations and

supporting factual descriptions establish a serious medical need.

However, plaintiff fails to establish Jayasundara acted with a deliberate indifference to

plaintiff’s medical needs by failing to remove the staples 5-7 days following surgery. Plaintiff’s

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Complaint does not allege any interaction or event involving Jayasundara until Jayasundara

attempted to remove the staple. Nor does plaintiff set forth any facts to show Jayasundara had any

knowledge or involvement in plaintiff’s initial surgery or subsequent consultations. Thus, plaintiff

has failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Jayasundara for failing

to remove the surgical staple at an earlier date.

Plaintiff also claims defendant Jayasundara acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s

medical needs by removing the staple without providing plaintiff with pain medication. 

Plaintiff alleges Jayasundara and Dr. Canlas knew the staple was deeply embedded in his skin and

should have been removed weeks before. (Compl. at 17). Plaintiff also alleges Dr. Canlas and

Jayasundara took turns attempting to remove the staple and “cut” plaintiff for over an hour without

providing him with pain medication either before or after the procedure. (Id.) Plaintiff concludes

this amounts to cruel and unusual punishment whereas defendants conclude this merely constitutes

a difference in medical judgment. (ECF No. 24, pg. 6). 

After careful review of plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court concludes plaintiff has failed to

state a plausible Eighth Amendment cause of action against defendant Jayasundara. Although

plaintiff’s allegations suggest Jayasundara may have acted negligently, something more than

negligence, or gross negligence, or medical malpractice is required for a violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. Notably, plaintiff does not allege Jayasundara acted with

an ulterior motive when deciding against giving plaintiff pain medication. Nor does plaintiff allege

Jayasundara or Dr. Canlas restrained or subdued plaintiff in order to cut him. Such allegations may

be sufficient to raise a negligence claim to the level of constitutional violation. See, e.g., Jackson v.

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Rather, plaintiff’s Complaint merely alleges

Jayasundara, along with Dr. Canlas, denied plaintiff’s request for medications. Thus, without

more, the Complaint fails to set forth facts to demonstrate Jayasundara acted with a deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs. 

This Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Jayasundara be

DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants Franklin, Romero, and Grannis

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Construed liberally, plaintiff’s complaint contains allegations that defendants Franklin,

Romero, and Grannis violated plaintiff’s First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s supposed Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim.

(ECF No. 24, pg. 6). 

“If a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision ... the claim must

be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of

substantive due process” of the Fourteenth Amendment. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

833, 843 (1998) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7 (1997)); accord Saucier

v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

Here, plaintiff appears to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim and an Eighth

Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim under the generalized notion of due process.

Accordingly, the Court will analyze this claim under the First and Eighth Amendments. See

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1994) (noting that when a broad “due process” violation

is alleged, but a particular amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection” against a particular sort of government behavior, “that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”

(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 882

(9th Cir. 2001).

As an initial matter, plaintiff’s claims against Romero, whether categorized as First,

Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment claims, lack the specificity and factual content required for a

cognizable claim. A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there “is no

cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal

theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988)). Here, plaintiff alleges Romero “wrote things that are not

true within his/her staff second level staff response” and “decided not to address most of the

appeal issues.” (ECF No. 1 at 54). Plaintiff neither specifies what false things Romero wrote in his

response nor identifies the issues Romero failed to address. Additionally, plaintiff does not connect

Romero’s alleged conduct to any particular legal theory. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim

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against Romero.

Plaintiff’s more specific Eighth Amendment claims against Grannis and Franklin also

suffer for lack of sufficient facts. Plaintiff contends Grannis and Franklin intentionally left the

staples inside plaintiff for weeks after the surgery. However, plaintiff has failed alleged any facts

regarding Grannis’ and Franklin’s knowledge of the presence of the staple. Indeed, the grievance

forms and inmate appeals attached to the complaint do not reference the staple but rather contain

general grievances regarding the delay of surgery. (See Compl., Exhibit F). Assuming, arguendo,

Grannis and Franklin knew of the presence of the final surgical staple, plaintiff has still failed to

allege any facts to indicate these defendants intentionally denied, delayed, or interfered with his

medical treatment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Accordingly, plaintiff has

failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Grannis and Franklin.

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against Grannis and Franklin also fail. Here, plaintiff

contends Grannis and Franklin denied his “emergency” grievances regarding his medical care.

(ECF No. 1, pg. 53). Similarly, plaintiff claims Romero “decided not to address most of the appeal

issues.” (Id. at 54). Although there is a First Amendment right to petition government for redress

of grievances, there is no right to a response or any particular action. See Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d

728 (8th Cir.1991) (“prisoner's right to petition the government for redress ... is not compromised

by the prison's refusal to entertain his grievance.”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s First Amendment

claims against Grannis, Franklin, and Romero should be dismissed.

To the extent plaintiff raises a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Grannis,

Franklin, and Romero separate and apart from his First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court

finds Plaintiff fails to state a legally cognizable claim because he does not allege any facts in

support thereof with sufficient specificity. If plaintiff intends to amend his pleadings to raise a

separate Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, plaintiff must show: (1) a life, liberty or

property interest exists and has been subject to interference by the state; and (2) the procedures

attendant upon the deprivation of an existing interest were constitutionally insufficient. Kentucky

Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1990).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS plaintiff’s allegations against Grannis, Franklin,

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and Romero be DISMISSED with leave to amend.

///

Plaintiff’s Claim Against Defendants Hernandez and Cate for Supervisory Liability

Vicarious liability does not apply to supervisorial personnel in a civil rights action. Graves

v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 848 (9th Cir.2003); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942

F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074, 112 S.Ct. 972, 117 L.Ed.2d

137 (1992). Rather, a supervisor may be liable only if he or she is personally involved in the

constitutional deprivation, or if there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 937 (9th

Cir.2002); MacKinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir.1995). A sufficient causal

connection may be established by showing the supervisor set in motion a series of acts by others

which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the

injury. Graves, 339 F.3d at 848; Redman, 942 F.2d at 1447. A supervisor also may be liable for a

constitutional violation by a subordinate if the supervisor knew of the violation and failed to

prevent it. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Finally, a supervisor may be liable if

the alleged deprivation resulted from a failure to properly train or supervise personnel, or from an

official policy or custom for which the supervisor was responsible. Watkins v. City of Oakland,

California, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home

Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir.1984).

Here, plaintiff claims defendant Cate, the CDCR director, and defendant Hernandez, the

RJD warden, are liable as supervisors for denying plaintiff medical care and ignoring plaintiff’s

pleas for help. (ECF No. 1 at 5, 7, 57-8). Plaintiff attached, as exhibits to his complaint, two letters

he allegedly sent to defendant Cate and one letter he allegedly sent to defendant Hernandez. (ECF

No. 1-4 pg. 10 & No. 1-5 pg. 38-39, 47-48). In his two letters to Cate, plaintiff explains what

grievance and appeals levels he has satisfied, requests a response regarding the delay of surgery,

and asks if the “medical system” will continue to treat him after his release. Both letters were

written to Cate following plaintiff’s surgery. Similarly, in his letter to Hernandez, plaintiff relates

the history of his treatment, asks why the surgery took so long to be scheduled and performed, and

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states “I’m not wanting anyone to lose their job of anything but . . . I think you should be aware of

these actions that happened to me.” (Id.)

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to suggest Cate and Hernandez “participated in or

directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Importantly, plaintiff did not request either Cate or Hernandez 

immediately intervene in his then present treatment, but rather requested the defendants address

the prior delay in scheduling his surgery. Additionally, plaintiff did not mention the surgical staple

issue or allege Cate and Hernandez were present or on notice of any of the alleged violations

before receiving plaintiff’s letters. Thus, plaintiff has failed to present any facts to suggest Cate or

Hernandez knew of or participated in the alleged violations. Accordingly, this Court

RECOMMENDS plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against defendants Cate and Hernandez

be DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity For Official Acts

Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff's monetary damages claim to the extent it is based on

acts taken in an official capacity. While the Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner's section 1983

claims against state actors sued in their official capacities, it does not bar damage actions against

state officials in their personal capacities. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). In addition, it

does not bar actions against state officers in their official capacities if the plaintiff seeks injunctive

relief. Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 252 (9th Cir.1989).

Here, plaintiff has sued defendants in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff's

prayer also seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. (ECF No. 1 at

61). Although plaintiff is foreclosed from seeking money damages against defendants in their

official capacity, he may still seek injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacity

as well as money damages against the defendants in their individual capacity. Accordingly, IT IS

RECOMMENDED defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for money damages ONLY

against Defendants in their official capacity be GRANTED with prejudice. Plaintiff's claim for

injunctive relief may not be dismissed on these grounds. See Chaloux, 886 F.2d at 252.

///

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///

///

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered as

follows:

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s claims against defendant Jayasundara be

GRANTED with leave to amend.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss claims against Defendants Franklin, Romero, and Grannis

be GRANTED with leave to amend.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s claims against defendants Cate and Hernandez

for supervisory liability be GRANTED with leave to amend.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against all defendants in their official

capacities for money damages be GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 6, 2012, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than January 13, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 9, 2011

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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APPENDIX A

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Timeline

July 25, 2007 Plaintiff requests to be seen for growth. (ECF No. 1, pg. 9).

July 26, 2007 Unidentified doctor submits a request for services (sonogram). Id.

August 19, 2007 Plaintiff submitted a “CDC 7362" form to Nurse Whitehead . Id. at 24.

Nurse Whitehead processed plaintiff’s form on August 22, 2007. Id.

August 27, 2007 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. Nurse Whitehead

processed this form on August 28, 2007. Id.

September 6, 2007 Dr. Lehv submits another request for services form. Dr. Lehv marked

this form as “initial” as opposed to “follow-up.” Id. at 10. Dr. Canlas

allegedly wrote a false report about plaintiff’s tumor. Id. at 33.

September 26, 2007 Ultrasound performed at Alvarado Hospital confirming Lipoma. Id. at

10.

October 10, 2007 Dr. Canlas submits a request form for surgery. Id. at 10.

December 13, 2007 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. Nurse Whitehead

processed this form on December 18, 2008. Id. (note: 2008 may be typo)

December 28, 2007 Dr. Farinas examined plaintiff and indicated the mass 6cm in size. Dr.

Farinas recommended excision. Id. at 10.

January 8, 2008 Dr. Farinas examined plaintiff and indicated mass was now 6-7cm in

size. Plaintiff told Dr. Farinas he was in a lot of pain. Id. at 11.

March 31, 2008 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 25. Nurse Whitehead

processed this form on April 4, 2008. Id.

April 28, 2008 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 25. Nurse Whitehead

processed this form on May 1, 2008. Id.

May 12, 2008 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 25. This form not

processed. Id. Also submits an administrative appeal. Id. at 49.

May 21, 2008 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 26. Whitehead

received request form. Id. This form not processed. Id. 

May 27, 2008 Plaintiff submits an administrative appeal re: delay of surgery. Id. at 49.

June, 2008 Dr. Silva called the RJD specialty clinic to inquire about the status of the

surgery. Id. at 13. Dr. Silva sent plaintiff back to his cell without an

examination or explanation of the delay. Id. at 13.

June 11, 2008 Plaintiff underwent surgery to remove the growth. Id. at 14.

June 12, 2008 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 26. No indication this

form was received or processed. Id. 

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June 17, 2008 Plaintiff sent a letter to defendant Hernandez requesting help. Id. at 57.

June 20, 2008 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 26. Whitehead

processed form on June 25, 2008. Id. Whitehead informed plaintiff that

nurses would keep an eye on his staples. Id. Plaintiff complains he is

using t-shirts for dressing the surgical site, is in extreme pain, and has

not received any pain medication. Id. 

June 27, 2008 Plaintiff had “surgery” on this date. Id. at 26. Plaintiff sent

administrative appeals which were returned. Id. at 50.

July 29, 2008 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 27. Nurse Whitehead

processed this form on July 31, 2008. Id. 

August 2008 Plaintiff examined by Dr. Choo. Id. at 16. Dr. Choo did not find any

remaining surgical staples. Id. at 16. Plaintiff informed Dr. Choo he felt

something poking him and he was in pain. Id. at 16. A staple was

discovered and removed a few weeks later. Id. at 16.

September 24, 2008 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 27. Nurse Whitehead

processed this form on September 30, 2008. Id. 

January 2, 2009 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 27. Nurse Whitehead

processed this form on January 6, 2009. Id. 

January 23, 2009 Plaintiff sends letter to defendant Cate requesting help. Id. at 57.

March 9, 2009 Plaintiff submits another “CDC 7362" form. Id. at 28. No indication this

form was processed but it was received by Nurse Whitehead on April 22,

2009. Id. 

April 21, 2009 Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal. Id. at 19.

May 28, 2009 Dr. Canlas allegedly falsified progress reports relating to plaintiff’s

inability to control his bowel movements. Id. at 44.

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