Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01460/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01460-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:0701 Maritime Subsidy Board

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United States District Court

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 The Court has reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s Statement of Recent Decision and supplemental

memo, filed July 25, 2005 (docket #213). 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAOMI WALTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-01460 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Having carefully considered the argument of

counseland the papers submitted on the motion,1the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion forsummary

judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed forfourteen years as a court security officer (“CSO”) by AkalSecurity. CSOs

guard courthouse entrances, screen visitors, inspect packages and mail, and provide a security presence in

courtrooms. Akal has been contracted by the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) to provide security

at federal courthouses in the Ninth Circuit. CSOs must meet physicalrequirements established in the contract

between Akal and USMS through yearly physical examinations. 

Until 2000, CSOs were evaluated formedicalconditions using a federalCivil Service formdeveloped

in the 1960's. In 1999, the United States Judicial Conference, which oversees the judicial security program,

requested a job-task analysis of the CSO position. In response to that request, Dr. Richard Miller, Director
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of Law Enforcement Medical Programs for the Office of Federal Occupational Health, produced a report

recommending changes to the physicalrequirementsforCSOs. Dr. Miller’s report was largely adopted by the

Judicial Conference, which directed the USMS to implement a number of changes to CSO medical standards.

Some ofthese changes involved minimumhearing standards which must be met without the use ofhearing aids.

However, the Judicial Conference allowed CSOs who pass the hearing test without hearing aids to wear

hearing aids on the job.

In November 2001, plaintiff underwent audiological testing. On January 17, 2002, Dr. Chelton, a

medical review officer for the Office of Federal Occupational Health, reviewed plaintiff’s medical submission

and found that it did not meet the required standard. In response, plaintiff performed another audiogram test

on April 5, 2002. Dr. Chelton reviewed the additional results on May 31, 2002 and found that plaintiff has “a

significant hearing impairment according to the results ofthe tests provided.” Specifically, plaintiff tested to have

a disparity between her right and left ear in her ability to detect sound. This disparity would impact her ability

to localize sound. Localizing sound is the “ability to identify the direction and distance of a sound source outside

the head.” Benay Decl, Ex. Z at USA000571. Based on the test results, Dr. Chelton concluded that plaintiff

was not qualified to perform the job of CSO. As a result, USMS disqualified plaintiff from her position as a

CSO. Due to her disqualification, plaintiff’s employment with Akal was terminated. 

Plaintiff brought suit in this Court, alleging thatshe has suffered and continuesto suffer irreparable harm

after being terminated. In her Third Amended Complaint, plaintiff has sued various individuals and federal

agencies under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Administrative Procedures

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 etseq. The Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on January 24, 2005.

Defendants now bring their motion for summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary judgment

Summary judgment is proper “ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears
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the initialburden ofdemonstrating the absence of a genuine issue ofmaterialfact. See CelotexCorp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which

the non-moving party will have the burden of proofat trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court

that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. See id. at 325.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue fortrial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving party

must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for

the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255. “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

II. Rehabilitation Act

To state a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a

person with a disability, (2) who is otherwise qualified for employment, and (3)suffered discriminationbecause

of her disability. See Lucero v. Hart., 915 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990); Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d

571, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1987). Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the

defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Once the

defendant articulatessucha reason, the plaintiff must then offer evidence to show that the defendant’s proffered

reason is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation for protected activity. See Lucero, 915 F.2d at 1371.

DISCUSSION

I. Proper defendants

Under the RehabilitationAct, the proper defendant is the head ofthe government agency against which
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discrimination is alleged. See Barsen v. Department ofthe Interior, 896 F.2d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1990); Dean

v. United States, 484 F.Supp. 888, 898-890 (D.C.N.D. 1980). Defendants argue that the only proper

defendant for plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim is Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, as the head of the

Department ofJustice. Plaintiff, in her complaint, does not clearly designate which causes of action are brought

against each defendant. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment to all

defendants except the Attorney General for plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

Defendants also assert that Marc Farmer, the Chief of the Judicial Protective Services of the United

States Marshals Service, is the only proper defendant under plaintiff’s Administrative Procedures Act claim.

Actions under 5 U.S.C. § 703 may be brought against “the United States, the agency by its officialtitle, or the

appropriate officer.” Defendants argue that Farmer made the final agency decision involved in plaintiff’s APA

claim by approving the decision that plaintiff was not qualified to continue her employment as a CSO. Plaintiff

appears to argue that Farmer, the United States Marshals Service, and the United States Department ofHealth

& Human Services were all involved in plaintiff’s termination.

Courts have recognized that “when an instrumentality of the United States is the real defendant,” then

the plaintiff may name as defendant “the United States, the agency by itsofficialtitle, or the appropriate officer.”

Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Agency, 801 F.Supp. 15, 19 (M.D.Tenn 1992). Additionally, “[t]he

outcome of the case should not turn on the plaintiff’s choice.” Id. Therefore, the Court will allow plaintiff to

bring her APA claim against Farmer and the United States Marshals Service, as both were directly responsible

for the determination to terminate her employment. However, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion with

respect to all defendants aside from Farmer and the USMS for plaintiff’s APA claim.

Given the Court’s holding that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales is the only proper defendant for

plaintiff’s RehabilitationActclaim and thatFarmer and the USMS are the proper defendants for plaintiff’s APA

claim, the Court now turns to defendants’ arguments regarding the merits of those claims.

II. Rehabilitation Act

A. Is plaintiff “disabled” as defined by the Rehabilitation Act?

The Americans withDisabilitiesAct(“ADA”), whose standards ofsubstantive liability are incorporated
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in the RehabilitationAct, defines “disability” as: 1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more of the major life activities of such individual; 2) a record ofsuch an impairment; or 3) being regarded

as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Coons v. Secretary of the U.S. Dept. ofthe Treasury,

383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004).

1. Physical impairment

Defendants request that the Court grant summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim that she is

actually disabled because plaintiff has not presented any evidence that her hearingimpairmentsubstantially limits

any majorlife activity in her daily life. Plaintiff acknowledges that she is not actually disabled as defined under

the Rehabilitation Act. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion with

respect to the first prong of the definition of “disability” under the Rehabilitation Act.

2. Record of a physical impairment

In a single paragraph, plaintiff contends that her audiological testing results demonstrate that she has

a record of a disability. Specifically, plaintiff’s test results found more than a 25dB difference between the

hearing in the right and left ear. Benay Decl., Ex. U at ¶ 5. 

A record of an impairment “means [that the individual] has a history of, or has been misclassified as

having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(k). “The purpose of this provision is largely to protect those who have recovered or are recovering

fromsubstantially limiting impairments from discrimination based on their medicalhistory.” Baileyv. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002); see also 9 Lex K. Larson Employment Discrimination

§ 153.08, at 153-62 (“A worker without a current impairment may nevertheless benefit from . . . protection

if he or she has a record of a substantially limiting impairment”). Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that

she has a medical history of hearing loss, as plaintiff was not aware of her limitation until the testing under the

new CSO medical standards. Plaintiff also has not produced any evidence that she has recovered her ability

to localize sound; in fact, plaintiff still has the impairment documented in her test results. Therefore, the Court

GRANTS defendants’ motion with respect to the second prong of “disability” under the Rehabilitation Act.
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2 This Court’s January 20, 2005 order denyingplaintiff’s motion forsummary judgment paid insufficient

attention to the standards set out by the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. UPS. Accordingly, they are set out at more

length here. 

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3. Regarded as having an impairment

Plaintiff asserts that she is “disabled” under the RehabilitationAct because the USMS “regarded” her

as having an impairment that substantially limits the major life activities of working and hearing. 

In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service, 306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir.

2002),2 the Ninth Circuit stated that “the Supreme Court has held that a person is ‘regarded as’ disabled (at

least for purposes of the major life activity of working) if the covered entity ‘mistakenly believes that the

person’s actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one ormore majorlife activities.’”306 F.3d at 804

(citing Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1999)). The court then cited the

following passage from Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999):

There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this

statutory definition: 1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person

has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities, or 2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairmentsubstantially limits one or more major life activities. In

both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions

about the individual–it must believe either that one has a substantiallimiting

impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantial limiting

impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. These

misperceptions often result from stereotypic assumptions not truly

indicative of individual ability.

EEOC v. UPS, 306 F.3d at 803.

The court also recognized that perceived impairments must be “substantially limiting and significant.”

Id. In EEOC v. UPS, the court dealt with an ADA claim by plaintiffs with monocular vision, who did not

qualify as drivers because of defendant’s visionprotocol. When evaluating the claim of a plaintiff alleging that

defendant “regarded” him as disabled, the Ninth Circuit found that in order to satisfy the requirements provided

in Sutton, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendant “regarded their vision impairment as substantially limiting

their overall ability to see for daily living.” Id. at 806. Although Sutton applied to the major life activity of

working, the court found the test to be equally applicable to seeing. Id. at 804. Therefore, the standard also

applies for plaintiff’s claim with respect to hearing. 
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i. Working

Working is a major life activity under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Additionally, the major life

activity of work contains a specific definition of “substantially limits”:

The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to

perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes

as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and

abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not

constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

Plaintiff presents no evidence that defendants mistakenly believe that plaintiff has a substantially limiting

impairment that plaintiff does not actually have. Instead, the parties agree on the extent of plaintiff’s impairment

based on the auditory test results. 

Plaintiff has presented evidence that defendants believed that plaintiff’s limiting impairment could

preclude her from various law enforcement positions. Benay Decl., Ex. E at 289; Benay Decl., Ex. F at 78.

However, plaintiff’s evidence is limited to active duty, weapons-carrying law enforcement positions. “An active

law enforcement position [is] not a broad enough job category to be a substantial limitation on working.” Bass

v. The County ofButte, 2004 WL 1925468, * 5 (E.D. Cal. 2004). For example, many courts have recognized

that “being declared unsuitable for the particular position of police officer is not a substantial limitation of a

majorlife activity.” Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215-16 (2d Cr. 1989); see also Rossbach v. City ofMiami,

371 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Instead, the proper scope ofplaintiff’s occupationis “law enforcement generally.” Hughes v. Bedsole ,

48 F.3d 1376, 1388-89 (4th Cir. 1995); Papadopoulos v. Modesto Police Department, 31 F.Supp.2d 1209,

1221 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that position ofbackground investigatorwas “lawenforcementwork”); Smaw

v. Virginia Department of State Police, 862 F.Supp. 1469, 1475 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that former state

trooper demoted to dispatcher was still employed in the law enforcement field). Plaintiff has presented no

evidence ofdefendants’ opinionregardingjobsinthe field oflaw enforcement, other than active duty, weaponscarryinggovernment law enforcement positions; therefore, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence insupport

of her claim that defendants regarded her as significantly restricted in performing a “class” or “broad range” of

jobs under the Rehabilitation Act. The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment with
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respect to the life activity of working.

ii. Hearing

Plaintiff allegesthat defendantsregard plaintiffas substantially limited in the majorlife activity ofhearing.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); see 29 C.F.R. § 1360.2(j)(ii) (defining “substantiallimitation” as “significantly restricted

as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform . . . as compared to . . . the

average person in the general population”). Plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants regarded plaintiff as

having an impairment that prevents or severely restricts use of her hearing in daily life. EEOC v. UPS, 306

F.3d at 806. It is not sufficient for plaintiff to demonstrate that defendants regarded plaintiff as having a limiting,

but not substantially limiting, hearing impairment. Id. 

Plaintiff was found to be unable to localize sound based on auditory testing established by defendants.

However, defendants’ hearing requirement does not establish that defendants regard plaintiff as substantially

limited in the life activity of hearing. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490. Instead, “an employer is free to decide that

physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an impairment . . . are preferable

to others, just as it is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make

individuals less than ideally suited for a job.” Id. at 490-91. 

Defendants have presented evidence that the hearing requirements solely relate to performing the

essentialfunctions ofthe CSO position. Roth Decl. at ¶ 8; Miller Decl. at ¶12; Barson Decl. at ¶ 5(a). In fact,

Judge Roth, the chair of the United States JudicialCommittee on Security and Facilities, stated that the policy

“was in no way intended to reflect a CSO’s ability to engage in life activities.” Roth Decl. at ¶ 8; see also Miller

Decl. at ¶ 12; Barson Decl. at ¶ 5(a). If the USMS recommends removal of the CSO based on medical

disqualification, “the USMS does not consider whether the CSO’s medicalcondition . . . affects his orher dayto-day activities. We are only concerned with whether the individual meets the CSO medical standards and

is capable of performing the essential functions of the CSO position.” Farmer Decl. at ¶ 36. 

The determination ofthe essentialCSO functions was made based on a report by Dr. Miller. In order

to prepare his report, Dr. Miller visited five district courthouses and spoke with CSOs, federal judges, U.S.

Marshals and Deputy U.S. Marshals. Miller Decl. at ¶ 8. Dr. Miller identified 29 essential job functions, which
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included the ability to determine the location of sound. Farmer Decl. at ¶ 26. Dr. Miller asserted that “[t]he

safety of the federal judiciary, court personnel, and the public depends on CSO’s ability to hear, localize,

discriminate, recognize, and/or understand a variety of environmental and speech sounds.” Miller Decl. at ¶

20. Specifically, Dr. Miller found that CSOs “must be able to discern the direction of a disturbance or detect

an approaching threat (sound localization).” Id. at ¶ 22. 

Plaintiff took two medical examinations for the CSO position. Supp. Chelton Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 9. The

results of both examinations were reviewed by Dr. Louis Chelton, a reviewing physicianforLaw Enforcement

Medical Programs at the department of Federal Occupational Health. Id. at ¶ 1. Dr. Chelton found that

plaintiff’s “pure tone audiogramdid notmeet the required standard.” Supp. Chelton Decl. at Ex. 1. According

to Dr. Cheltonthe disparity between her right and left ear in her ability to detectsound would “impact her ability

to perform the essential job function of localizing sound.” Id. at ¶ 7. 

Therefore, the “evidence bearing on [defendants’] perception of [plaintiff’s] impairment indicates that

its perception was not based upon speculation, stereotype, ormyth,”but was based uponmedicaltest results.

Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995). When Dr. Chelton found that plaintiff was not

medically qualified for the CSO position, he stated that “[w]ith only one functioning ear, you are unable to

localize the direction of sound, an essential job function.” Benay Decl., Ex. N at 2. However, none of the

above evidence demonstrates that defendants regarded the inability to localize sound and discern the direction

of a disturbance as a substantial limitation on hearing in plaintiff’s daily life. 

Plaintiff presents the declaration of Dr. Robert Sweetow, Director of Audiology at the University of

California. See Supp. Simmons Decl., Ex. 1. In that declaration, Dr. Sweetow states that the ability to localize

sound is “essential” to the manner in which individuals use their sense of hearing. Id. at 1. He concludes that

“being unable to localize sound severely/significantly restricts one’s hearing as compared to how unimpaired

people normally hear in everyday life.” Id. However, this evidence does not demonstrate that defendants

regarded plaintiff’s hearing impairment as “substantially limiting” her “overall ability to [hear] for daily living.”

EEOC v. UPS, 306 F.3d at 794. Instead, Dr. Sweetow provides his medical opinion regarding the general

impact of an individual’s inability to localize sound. Plaintiff also refers to a draft report on auditory

localization prepared for United States Immigration and Naturalization Services by Dr. Lynn E. Cook, an
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occupational audiologist for the U.S. Naval Medical Center. See Benay Decl., Ex. Z. In the October 2002

report, Dr. Cook states that auditory localization“allows us to pinpoint the direction of a yell for help or other

sound ofinterest, locate an air leak on a vehicle, locate the position of another person, . . . locate sounds to the

floor above or below, [and] locate the direction and distance ofa moving vehicle or an emergency siren.” Id.

at USA000573. Dr. Cook also states that “[p]erhaps most importantly, auditory localization allows the listener

to quickly locate and attend to the speaker, especially when conversation switches rapidly between speakers.”

Id. However, Dr. Cook found that “[w]hile visual localization of a sound source is generally just as accurate,

it is not nearly as efficient (quick) as auditory localization.” Id. In summary, Dr. Cook determined that

“[d]ifficulty in localizing environmentalsounds can be inconvenient, and in some situations the impaired listener

may be in danger.” Id.

However, Dr. Cook’s report does not demonstrate that defendants regarded plaintiff as disabled as

defined under the Rehabilitation Act for many reasons. It is not clear that this excerpt is sufficient to find that

Dr. Cook finds individuals who are unable to localize sound to be significantly limited in hearing in their daily

life. Although Dr. Cook lists a number of activities affected by the inability to localize sound, she describes

these problems as “inconvenient.” 

Assuming Dr. Cook finds that individuals who cannot localize are substantially limited in the activity of

hearing, plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendants also regarded those individuals as disabled. Dr. Cook

was not responsible for creating the CSO medical requirements; instead, she was “periodically consult[ed]”

by Dr. Miller. Miller Decl. at ¶ 24. Dr. Miller was responsible for drafting the policy and has testified that he

did not consider an individual’s ability to engage in life activities when creating the CSO medical standards.

Id. at ¶ 12. Dr. Miller also did not rely upon Dr. Cook’s opinions with respect to everyday activities, as the

“standards reflect input we received from [Dr. Cook] regarding the hearing demands of this type of position

and the problems associated with hearing aids.” Id. at ¶ 24. There is no evidence that defendants considered

Dr. Cook’s positions with respect to the daily life activity of hearing. Again, every individual responsible for

the creation and implementation of the CSO medical standards stated that the policy does not reflect any

opinion about everyday life activities. Roth Decl. at ¶ 8; Miller Decl. at ¶ 12;Barson Decl. at ¶ 5(a); Farmer

Decl. at ¶ 36. 
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Even ifDr.Cook’sfindings are applied to defendants, it is notsufficient to find that defendants regarded

plaintiff as disabled in the major life activity of hearing under the Rehabilitation Act. In Sutton, the Supreme

Court held that in order to find that a person is regarded as disabled, “it is necessary that a covered entity

entertain misperceptions about the individual – it must believe either that one has a substantial limiting

impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantiallimiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment

is not so limiting.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. 

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that defendants have any “misperceptions” with respect to

plaintiff’s hearing. Plaintiff does not dispute the test results frommultiple medicalexaminations or defendants’

assertion that plaintiff, without hearing aids, has difficulty localizing sound. Nor does plaintiff present any

evidence that defendants believed plaintiff’s hearing loss to be more substantialthan it really was. Plaintiff also

does not present any evidence that defendants have a misperception regarding the limitations ofherimpairment.

In fact, plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sweetow, testifiesthat the inability to localize sound “severely/significantly restricts

one’s hearing as compared to how unimpaired people normally hear in everyday life.” Supp. Simmons Decl.,

Ex. 1 at 1. Thus, plaintiff’s expert finds that the limitation is as significant, if not more significant, as Dr. Cook’s

finding that the inability to localize sound is “inconvenient” because impaired individuals have difficulty

performing some tasks. Given the overlap between Dr. Sweetow’s and Dr. Cook’s findings, plaintiff has failed

to present any evidence that defendants had any “misperceptions” about plaintiff. Therefore, Dr. Cook’s

testimony does not support plaintiff’s assertion that defendants’ regarded her as disabled under the

Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff’s remaining evidence consists of the defendants’ medical requirements for the CSO position

and Dr. Chelton’s review of plaintiff’s examination results. As the Supreme Court found in Sutton, a hearing

requirement alone is not sufficient to establish that defendants regarded plaintiff as substantially limited in the

major life activity of hearing. Dr. Chelton’s report only considers plaintiff’s examination results with respect

to her ability to perform the essential CSO functions. Dr. Chelton makes no reference to disabilities or

limitations on daily life activities. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to present evidence that defendants regarded

plaintiff as substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing and the Court GRANTS summary judgment

in favor of defendants.
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B. Summary

As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she is a person with a disability under any

ofthe three definitions ofdisability in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Being a person with a disability as defined under

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) is one of the three requirements to stating a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation

Act. Given that plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendant for plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

III. Administrative Procedures Act 

Defendants bring a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff’s Administrative Procedures Act

claim. Plaintiff brings this claim in the alternative, in order to protect this cause of action if an appellate court

finds that the USMS is not a joint employer ofplaintiff. However, this Court has found that the USMS meets

the requirements of the joint employer test; therefore, plaintiff does not have a valid claim against defendant

under the APA at this time. Defendants ask the Court to rule on the merits of plaintiff’s claim at this time in

order to avoid remand. The Court will not address the merits of a claim that currently is invalid. The Court

GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s APA claim; however, if the

Court’s holding that the USMS is a joint employer is reversed, the Court will address the merits of plaintiff’s

APA claim on remand.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion

forsummary judgment in its entirety. The pending motions in limine are denied as moot. [Docket ## 167, 168,

178, 193, 203, 213.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2005
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Court has reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s Statement of Recent Decision and supplemental

memo, filed July 25, 2005 (docket #213). 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAOMI WALTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-01460 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Having carefully considered the argument of

counseland the papers submitted on the motion,1the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion forsummary

judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed forfourteen years as a court security officer (“CSO”) by AkalSecurity. CSOs

guard courthouse entrances, screen visitors, inspect packages and mail, and provide a security presence in

courtrooms. Akal has been contracted by the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) to provide security

at federal courthouses in the Ninth Circuit. CSOs must meet physicalrequirements established in the contract

between Akal and USMS through yearly physical examinations. 

Until 2000, CSOs were evaluated formedicalconditions using a federalCivil Service formdeveloped

in the 1960's. In 1999, the United States Judicial Conference, which oversees the judicial security program,

requested a job-task analysis of the CSO position. In response to that request, Dr. Richard Miller, Director
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of Law Enforcement Medical Programs for the Office of Federal Occupational Health, produced a report

recommending changes to the physicalrequirementsforCSOs. Dr. Miller’s report was largely adopted by the

Judicial Conference, which directed the USMS to implement a number of changes to CSO medical standards.

Some ofthese changes involved minimumhearing standards which must be met without the use ofhearing aids.

However, the Judicial Conference allowed CSOs who pass the hearing test without hearing aids to wear

hearing aids on the job.

In November 2001, plaintiff underwent audiological testing. On January 17, 2002, Dr. Chelton, a

medical review officer for the Office of Federal Occupational Health, reviewed plaintiff’s medical submission

and found that it did not meet the required standard. In response, plaintiff performed another audiogram test

on April 5, 2002. Dr. Chelton reviewed the additional results on May 31, 2002 and found that plaintiff has “a

significant hearing impairment according to the results ofthe tests provided.” Specifically, plaintiff tested to have

a disparity between her right and left ear in her ability to detect sound. This disparity would impact her ability

to localize sound. Localizing sound is the “ability to identify the direction and distance of a sound source outside

the head.” Benay Decl, Ex. Z at USA000571. Based on the test results, Dr. Chelton concluded that plaintiff

was not qualified to perform the job of CSO. As a result, USMS disqualified plaintiff from her position as a

CSO. Due to her disqualification, plaintiff’s employment with Akal was terminated. 

Plaintiff brought suit in this Court, alleging thatshe has suffered and continuesto suffer irreparable harm

after being terminated. In her Third Amended Complaint, plaintiff has sued various individuals and federal

agencies under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Administrative Procedures

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 etseq. The Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on January 24, 2005.

Defendants now bring their motion for summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary judgment

Summary judgment is proper “ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears
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the initialburden ofdemonstrating the absence of a genuine issue ofmaterialfact. See CelotexCorp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which

the non-moving party will have the burden of proofat trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court

that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. See id. at 325.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue fortrial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving party

must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for

the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255. “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

II. Rehabilitation Act

To state a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a

person with a disability, (2) who is otherwise qualified for employment, and (3)suffered discriminationbecause

of her disability. See Lucero v. Hart., 915 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990); Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d

571, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1987). Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the

defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Once the

defendant articulatessucha reason, the plaintiff must then offer evidence to show that the defendant’s proffered

reason is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation for protected activity. See Lucero, 915 F.2d at 1371.

DISCUSSION

I. Proper defendants

Under the RehabilitationAct, the proper defendant is the head ofthe government agency against which
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discrimination is alleged. See Barsen v. Department ofthe Interior, 896 F.2d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1990); Dean

v. United States, 484 F.Supp. 888, 898-890 (D.C.N.D. 1980). Defendants argue that the only proper

defendant for plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim is Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, as the head of the

Department ofJustice. Plaintiff, in her complaint, does not clearly designate which causes of action are brought

against each defendant. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment to all

defendants except the Attorney General for plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

Defendants also assert that Marc Farmer, the Chief of the Judicial Protective Services of the United

States Marshals Service, is the only proper defendant under plaintiff’s Administrative Procedures Act claim.

Actions under 5 U.S.C. § 703 may be brought against “the United States, the agency by its officialtitle, or the

appropriate officer.” Defendants argue that Farmer made the final agency decision involved in plaintiff’s APA

claim by approving the decision that plaintiff was not qualified to continue her employment as a CSO. Plaintiff

appears to argue that Farmer, the United States Marshals Service, and the United States Department ofHealth

& Human Services were all involved in plaintiff’s termination.

Courts have recognized that “when an instrumentality of the United States is the real defendant,” then

the plaintiff may name as defendant “the United States, the agency by itsofficialtitle, or the appropriate officer.”

Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Agency, 801 F.Supp. 15, 19 (M.D.Tenn 1992). Additionally, “[t]he

outcome of the case should not turn on the plaintiff’s choice.” Id. Therefore, the Court will allow plaintiff to

bring her APA claim against Farmer and the United States Marshals Service, as both were directly responsible

for the determination to terminate her employment. However, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion with

respect to all defendants aside from Farmer and the USMS for plaintiff’s APA claim.

Given the Court’s holding that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales is the only proper defendant for

plaintiff’s RehabilitationActclaim and thatFarmer and the USMS are the proper defendants for plaintiff’s APA

claim, the Court now turns to defendants’ arguments regarding the merits of those claims.

II. Rehabilitation Act

A. Is plaintiff “disabled” as defined by the Rehabilitation Act?

The Americans withDisabilitiesAct(“ADA”), whose standards ofsubstantive liability are incorporated
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in the RehabilitationAct, defines “disability” as: 1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more of the major life activities of such individual; 2) a record ofsuch an impairment; or 3) being regarded

as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Coons v. Secretary of the U.S. Dept. ofthe Treasury,

383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004).

1. Physical impairment

Defendants request that the Court grant summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim that she is

actually disabled because plaintiff has not presented any evidence that her hearingimpairmentsubstantially limits

any majorlife activity in her daily life. Plaintiff acknowledges that she is not actually disabled as defined under

the Rehabilitation Act. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion with

respect to the first prong of the definition of “disability” under the Rehabilitation Act.

2. Record of a physical impairment

In a single paragraph, plaintiff contends that her audiological testing results demonstrate that she has

a record of a disability. Specifically, plaintiff’s test results found more than a 25dB difference between the

hearing in the right and left ear. Benay Decl., Ex. U at ¶ 5. 

A record of an impairment “means [that the individual] has a history of, or has been misclassified as

having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(k). “The purpose of this provision is largely to protect those who have recovered or are recovering

fromsubstantially limiting impairments from discrimination based on their medicalhistory.” Baileyv. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002); see also 9 Lex K. Larson Employment Discrimination

§ 153.08, at 153-62 (“A worker without a current impairment may nevertheless benefit from . . . protection

if he or she has a record of a substantially limiting impairment”). Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that

she has a medical history of hearing loss, as plaintiff was not aware of her limitation until the testing under the

new CSO medical standards. Plaintiff also has not produced any evidence that she has recovered her ability

to localize sound; in fact, plaintiff still has the impairment documented in her test results. Therefore, the Court

GRANTS defendants’ motion with respect to the second prong of “disability” under the Rehabilitation Act.
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2 This Court’s January 20, 2005 order denyingplaintiff’s motion forsummary judgment paid insufficient

attention to the standards set out by the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. UPS. Accordingly, they are set out at more

length here. 

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3. Regarded as having an impairment

Plaintiff asserts that she is “disabled” under the RehabilitationAct because the USMS “regarded” her

as having an impairment that substantially limits the major life activities of working and hearing. 

In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service, 306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir.

2002),2 the Ninth Circuit stated that “the Supreme Court has held that a person is ‘regarded as’ disabled (at

least for purposes of the major life activity of working) if the covered entity ‘mistakenly believes that the

person’s actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one ormore majorlife activities.’”306 F.3d at 804

(citing Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1999)). The court then cited the

following passage from Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999):

There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this

statutory definition: 1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person

has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities, or 2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairmentsubstantially limits one or more major life activities. In

both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions

about the individual–it must believe either that one has a substantiallimiting

impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantial limiting

impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. These

misperceptions often result from stereotypic assumptions not truly

indicative of individual ability.

EEOC v. UPS, 306 F.3d at 803.

The court also recognized that perceived impairments must be “substantially limiting and significant.”

Id. In EEOC v. UPS, the court dealt with an ADA claim by plaintiffs with monocular vision, who did not

qualify as drivers because of defendant’s visionprotocol. When evaluating the claim of a plaintiff alleging that

defendant “regarded” him as disabled, the Ninth Circuit found that in order to satisfy the requirements provided

in Sutton, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendant “regarded their vision impairment as substantially limiting

their overall ability to see for daily living.” Id. at 806. Although Sutton applied to the major life activity of

working, the court found the test to be equally applicable to seeing. Id. at 804. Therefore, the standard also

applies for plaintiff’s claim with respect to hearing. 
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i. Working

Working is a major life activity under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Additionally, the major life

activity of work contains a specific definition of “substantially limits”:

The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to

perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes

as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and

abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not

constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

Plaintiff presents no evidence that defendants mistakenly believe that plaintiff has a substantially limiting

impairment that plaintiff does not actually have. Instead, the parties agree on the extent of plaintiff’s impairment

based on the auditory test results. 

Plaintiff has presented evidence that defendants believed that plaintiff’s limiting impairment could

preclude her from various law enforcement positions. Benay Decl., Ex. E at 289; Benay Decl., Ex. F at 78.

However, plaintiff’s evidence is limited to active duty, weapons-carrying law enforcement positions. “An active

law enforcement position [is] not a broad enough job category to be a substantial limitation on working.” Bass

v. The County ofButte, 2004 WL 1925468, * 5 (E.D. Cal. 2004). For example, many courts have recognized

that “being declared unsuitable for the particular position of police officer is not a substantial limitation of a

majorlife activity.” Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215-16 (2d Cr. 1989); see also Rossbach v. City ofMiami,

371 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Instead, the proper scope ofplaintiff’s occupationis “law enforcement generally.” Hughes v. Bedsole ,

48 F.3d 1376, 1388-89 (4th Cir. 1995); Papadopoulos v. Modesto Police Department, 31 F.Supp.2d 1209,

1221 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that position ofbackground investigatorwas “lawenforcementwork”); Smaw

v. Virginia Department of State Police, 862 F.Supp. 1469, 1475 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that former state

trooper demoted to dispatcher was still employed in the law enforcement field). Plaintiff has presented no

evidence ofdefendants’ opinionregardingjobsinthe field oflaw enforcement, other than active duty, weaponscarryinggovernment law enforcement positions; therefore, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence insupport

of her claim that defendants regarded her as significantly restricted in performing a “class” or “broad range” of

jobs under the Rehabilitation Act. The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment with
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respect to the life activity of working.

ii. Hearing

Plaintiff allegesthat defendantsregard plaintiffas substantially limited in the majorlife activity ofhearing.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); see 29 C.F.R. § 1360.2(j)(ii) (defining “substantiallimitation” as “significantly restricted

as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform . . . as compared to . . . the

average person in the general population”). Plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants regarded plaintiff as

having an impairment that prevents or severely restricts use of her hearing in daily life. EEOC v. UPS, 306

F.3d at 806. It is not sufficient for plaintiff to demonstrate that defendants regarded plaintiff as having a limiting,

but not substantially limiting, hearing impairment. Id. 

Plaintiff was found to be unable to localize sound based on auditory testing established by defendants.

However, defendants’ hearing requirement does not establish that defendants regard plaintiff as substantially

limited in the life activity of hearing. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490. Instead, “an employer is free to decide that

physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an impairment . . . are preferable

to others, just as it is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make

individuals less than ideally suited for a job.” Id. at 490-91. 

Defendants have presented evidence that the hearing requirements solely relate to performing the

essentialfunctions ofthe CSO position. Roth Decl. at ¶ 8; Miller Decl. at ¶12; Barson Decl. at ¶ 5(a). In fact,

Judge Roth, the chair of the United States JudicialCommittee on Security and Facilities, stated that the policy

“was in no way intended to reflect a CSO’s ability to engage in life activities.” Roth Decl. at ¶ 8; see also Miller

Decl. at ¶ 12; Barson Decl. at ¶ 5(a). If the USMS recommends removal of the CSO based on medical

disqualification, “the USMS does not consider whether the CSO’s medicalcondition . . . affects his orher dayto-day activities. We are only concerned with whether the individual meets the CSO medical standards and

is capable of performing the essential functions of the CSO position.” Farmer Decl. at ¶ 36. 

The determination ofthe essentialCSO functions was made based on a report by Dr. Miller. In order

to prepare his report, Dr. Miller visited five district courthouses and spoke with CSOs, federal judges, U.S.

Marshals and Deputy U.S. Marshals. Miller Decl. at ¶ 8. Dr. Miller identified 29 essential job functions, which
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included the ability to determine the location of sound. Farmer Decl. at ¶ 26. Dr. Miller asserted that “[t]he

safety of the federal judiciary, court personnel, and the public depends on CSO’s ability to hear, localize,

discriminate, recognize, and/or understand a variety of environmental and speech sounds.” Miller Decl. at ¶

20. Specifically, Dr. Miller found that CSOs “must be able to discern the direction of a disturbance or detect

an approaching threat (sound localization).” Id. at ¶ 22. 

Plaintiff took two medical examinations for the CSO position. Supp. Chelton Decl. at ¶¶ 7, 9. The

results of both examinations were reviewed by Dr. Louis Chelton, a reviewing physicianforLaw Enforcement

Medical Programs at the department of Federal Occupational Health. Id. at ¶ 1. Dr. Chelton found that

plaintiff’s “pure tone audiogramdid notmeet the required standard.” Supp. Chelton Decl. at Ex. 1. According

to Dr. Cheltonthe disparity between her right and left ear in her ability to detectsound would “impact her ability

to perform the essential job function of localizing sound.” Id. at ¶ 7. 

Therefore, the “evidence bearing on [defendants’] perception of [plaintiff’s] impairment indicates that

its perception was not based upon speculation, stereotype, ormyth,”but was based uponmedicaltest results.

Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995). When Dr. Chelton found that plaintiff was not

medically qualified for the CSO position, he stated that “[w]ith only one functioning ear, you are unable to

localize the direction of sound, an essential job function.” Benay Decl., Ex. N at 2. However, none of the

above evidence demonstrates that defendants regarded the inability to localize sound and discern the direction

of a disturbance as a substantial limitation on hearing in plaintiff’s daily life. 

Plaintiff presents the declaration of Dr. Robert Sweetow, Director of Audiology at the University of

California. See Supp. Simmons Decl., Ex. 1. In that declaration, Dr. Sweetow states that the ability to localize

sound is “essential” to the manner in which individuals use their sense of hearing. Id. at 1. He concludes that

“being unable to localize sound severely/significantly restricts one’s hearing as compared to how unimpaired

people normally hear in everyday life.” Id. However, this evidence does not demonstrate that defendants

regarded plaintiff’s hearing impairment as “substantially limiting” her “overall ability to [hear] for daily living.”

EEOC v. UPS, 306 F.3d at 794. Instead, Dr. Sweetow provides his medical opinion regarding the general

impact of an individual’s inability to localize sound. Plaintiff also refers to a draft report on auditory

localization prepared for United States Immigration and Naturalization Services by Dr. Lynn E. Cook, an
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occupational audiologist for the U.S. Naval Medical Center. See Benay Decl., Ex. Z. In the October 2002

report, Dr. Cook states that auditory localization“allows us to pinpoint the direction of a yell for help or other

sound ofinterest, locate an air leak on a vehicle, locate the position of another person, . . . locate sounds to the

floor above or below, [and] locate the direction and distance ofa moving vehicle or an emergency siren.” Id.

at USA000573. Dr. Cook also states that “[p]erhaps most importantly, auditory localization allows the listener

to quickly locate and attend to the speaker, especially when conversation switches rapidly between speakers.”

Id. However, Dr. Cook found that “[w]hile visual localization of a sound source is generally just as accurate,

it is not nearly as efficient (quick) as auditory localization.” Id. In summary, Dr. Cook determined that

“[d]ifficulty in localizing environmentalsounds can be inconvenient, and in some situations the impaired listener

may be in danger.” Id.

However, Dr. Cook’s report does not demonstrate that defendants regarded plaintiff as disabled as

defined under the Rehabilitation Act for many reasons. It is not clear that this excerpt is sufficient to find that

Dr. Cook finds individuals who are unable to localize sound to be significantly limited in hearing in their daily

life. Although Dr. Cook lists a number of activities affected by the inability to localize sound, she describes

these problems as “inconvenient.” 

Assuming Dr. Cook finds that individuals who cannot localize are substantially limited in the activity of

hearing, plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendants also regarded those individuals as disabled. Dr. Cook

was not responsible for creating the CSO medical requirements; instead, she was “periodically consult[ed]”

by Dr. Miller. Miller Decl. at ¶ 24. Dr. Miller was responsible for drafting the policy and has testified that he

did not consider an individual’s ability to engage in life activities when creating the CSO medical standards.

Id. at ¶ 12. Dr. Miller also did not rely upon Dr. Cook’s opinions with respect to everyday activities, as the

“standards reflect input we received from [Dr. Cook] regarding the hearing demands of this type of position

and the problems associated with hearing aids.” Id. at ¶ 24. There is no evidence that defendants considered

Dr. Cook’s positions with respect to the daily life activity of hearing. Again, every individual responsible for

the creation and implementation of the CSO medical standards stated that the policy does not reflect any

opinion about everyday life activities. Roth Decl. at ¶ 8; Miller Decl. at ¶ 12;Barson Decl. at ¶ 5(a); Farmer

Decl. at ¶ 36. 
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Even ifDr.Cook’sfindings are applied to defendants, it is notsufficient to find that defendants regarded

plaintiff as disabled in the major life activity of hearing under the Rehabilitation Act. In Sutton, the Supreme

Court held that in order to find that a person is regarded as disabled, “it is necessary that a covered entity

entertain misperceptions about the individual – it must believe either that one has a substantial limiting

impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantiallimiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment

is not so limiting.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. 

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that defendants have any “misperceptions” with respect to

plaintiff’s hearing. Plaintiff does not dispute the test results frommultiple medicalexaminations or defendants’

assertion that plaintiff, without hearing aids, has difficulty localizing sound. Nor does plaintiff present any

evidence that defendants believed plaintiff’s hearing loss to be more substantialthan it really was. Plaintiff also

does not present any evidence that defendants have a misperception regarding the limitations ofherimpairment.

In fact, plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sweetow, testifiesthat the inability to localize sound “severely/significantly restricts

one’s hearing as compared to how unimpaired people normally hear in everyday life.” Supp. Simmons Decl.,

Ex. 1 at 1. Thus, plaintiff’s expert finds that the limitation is as significant, if not more significant, as Dr. Cook’s

finding that the inability to localize sound is “inconvenient” because impaired individuals have difficulty

performing some tasks. Given the overlap between Dr. Sweetow’s and Dr. Cook’s findings, plaintiff has failed

to present any evidence that defendants had any “misperceptions” about plaintiff. Therefore, Dr. Cook’s

testimony does not support plaintiff’s assertion that defendants’ regarded her as disabled under the

Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff’s remaining evidence consists of the defendants’ medical requirements for the CSO position

and Dr. Chelton’s review of plaintiff’s examination results. As the Supreme Court found in Sutton, a hearing

requirement alone is not sufficient to establish that defendants regarded plaintiff as substantially limited in the

major life activity of hearing. Dr. Chelton’s report only considers plaintiff’s examination results with respect

to her ability to perform the essential CSO functions. Dr. Chelton makes no reference to disabilities or

limitations on daily life activities. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to present evidence that defendants regarded

plaintiff as substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing and the Court GRANTS summary judgment

in favor of defendants.
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B. Summary

As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she is a person with a disability under any

ofthe three definitions ofdisability in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Being a person with a disability as defined under

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) is one of the three requirements to stating a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation

Act. Given that plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendant for plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

III. Administrative Procedures Act 

Defendants bring a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff’s Administrative Procedures Act

claim. Plaintiff brings this claim in the alternative, in order to protect this cause of action if an appellate court

finds that the USMS is not a joint employer ofplaintiff. However, this Court has found that the USMS meets

the requirements of the joint employer test; therefore, plaintiff does not have a valid claim against defendant

under the APA at this time. Defendants ask the Court to rule on the merits of plaintiff’s claim at this time in

order to avoid remand. The Court will not address the merits of a claim that currently is invalid. The Court

GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s APA claim; however, if the

Court’s holding that the USMS is a joint employer is reversed, the Court will address the merits of plaintiff’s

APA claim on remand.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion

forsummary judgment in its entirety. The pending motions in limine are denied as moot. [Docket ## 167, 168,

178, 193, 203, 213.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2005
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge