Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02477/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02477-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peggy A. Petri, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 10-2477-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Claimant’s appeal from the Administrative Law Judge’s

(“ALJ”) denial of Claimant’s Title II application for disability insurance benefits and Title

XVI application for supplemental security income based on disability.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Claimant Peggy A. Petri filed Title II and Title XVI applications for Disability

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits on December 22, 2006,

alleging that her disability began on September 15, 2006. (Record Transcript (“TR”) 112-

29). Claimant’s applications were denied on May 31, 2007 and, upon reconsideration, on

December 31, 2007 (TR 64 and TR 78). On April 1, 2009, a hearing was held before an

ALJ, who issued an unfavorable decision on August 3, 2009. (TR 27 and TR 10). On

September 17, 2010, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Petri’s request for review of the ALJ’s

decision. 

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On November 16, 2010, Claimant filed her Complaint for Judicial Review of the

Administrative Determination of Claim, which is the subject of this appeal (Doc. 1). 

Claimant argues that the Court should vacate the Administrative Law Decision

because of procedural error and lack of substantial evidence. (Doc. 16). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 16, 2009, Clamant was diagnosed with an inferior wall myocardial

infarction. (TR 298). Two days later, Claimant underwent a successful stenting of her right

coronary artery. (TR 265). Tests showed a minimal left ventricular systolic dysfunction with

inferior hypokinesis, but preserved ejection fraction of 60%. (TR 265). On November 6,

2006, after Claimant experienced night sweats, chest discomfort, shortness of breath and

related symptoms, tests showed dyspnea on exertion, hyperlipidemia, and under control

hypertension. (TR 249). Doctors recommended that Claimant stop smoking. (Id.). 

On December 21, 2006, after Claimant experienced chest pain and shortness of breath,

tests showed left ventricular hypertrophy with mild mitral regurgitation and normal left

ventricular function and hyperlipidemia. (TR 245). As a result of persistent symptoms and

an abnormal nuclear stress test, Claimant’s doctors decided to repeat the left heart

catheterization. (Id.). On January 11, 2007, following the left heart catheterization,

Claimant presented with no chest pain or shortness of breath, but was complaining of pain

in her legs, which the doctors felt could be secondary to venous insufficiency, caused by

Claimant’s significant varicose veins, or peripheral arterial disease. (TR 242). 

On September 20, 2007, Claimant’s doctor noted that Claimant’s great saphenous vein

in her left leg was found to be incompetent, but her insurance company denied approval for

surgery. (TR 431). The doctor recommended endovenous laser ablation. (TR 431).

Claimant underwent endovenous laser ablation on October 8, 2007. (TR 367). 

On January 4, 2008, because of Claimant’s complaints of chest pain and exhaustion,

Claimant was given a left heart catheteritization, from which her doctor found her left

ventriculogram ejection fraction was approximately 45%. (TR 385). In March 2008,

Claimant underwent a neurological consultation due to pain, discomfort, numbness,

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1

 Claimant argues that her position of Corporate Compliance Officer is not past

relevant work within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). The Court will discuss this

argument more fully herein.

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paresthesias in her feet, and sensory disturbance in her upper extremities. (TR 441).

Claimant reported that she was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome six years before, but

refused surgery because she was concerned about the recovery process. (TR 441). 

On June 20, 2008, Claimant reported pain in her arms and hand, from her elbows to

her fingers, and numbness and paresthesias. (TR 439). In response, her doctor changed her

medication, suspected possible early onset diabetes, and recommended a hand surgery

evaluation regarding the possibility of carpal tunnel release versus carpal tunnel injection.

(TR 440). In September 2008, Claimant’s symptoms were stable for the most part, though

she stated any time she was on her feet for more than two hours per day, her feet would be

quite painful and would feel swollen and throbbing. (TR 437). 

In October 2008, Claimant reported that, after injections for carpal tunnel injections,

she felt relief in her hands for a short period of time, but she still felt pain, numbness, and

tingling. (TR 453). She requested surgery for her left hand. (Id.). In November 2008,

Claimant underwent carpel tunnel surgery, but the surgery was incomplete because of

unexpected tissue encountered by the physician during the surgery. (TR 460). Two weeks

after the surgery, Claimant reported that her numbness, tingling, and pain were better, though

she still had pain in the long finger. (TR 451). 

At the time of the ALJ’s hearing, Claimant was 47 years old and had a past work

experience of Quality Control Officer, Financial Aid Officer, File Clerk, Teacher’s Aide and

Corporate Compliance Officer.1

 (TR 133). 

Claimant argues that (1) the RFC Assessment stated by the ALJ does not meet legal

standards, (2) the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons to justify the decision on the

benefit, and (3) the ALJ failed to weigh subjective complaint reporting and medical source

opinion evidence. Claimant argues that these errors entitle her to a remand for either an

award of benefits or further proceedings based on the ALJ’s failure to resolve vocational

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issues.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Definition of Disability

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show,

among other things, that he is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The Social

Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months.” Id. at § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is “under a disability

only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not

only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy.” Id. at § 423(d)(2)(A). 

B. Five-Step Evaluation Process 

The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for evaluating

disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th

Cir. 1998) (describing the sequential process). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the

sequential process will end the ALJ’s inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant

bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the ALJ at the final

step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

The five steps are as follows:

1. First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled.

2. If the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines whether the

claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s]

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. at § 404.1520(c). Basic work

activities means the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs.” Id. at § 404.1521(b). Further,

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the impairment must either be expected “to result in death” or “to last for a continuous period

of twelve months.” Id. at § 404.1509 (incorporated by reference in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of

groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). 

3. Having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the

impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments specifically listed in the regulations.

Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without considering the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience. Id. at § 404.1520(d). 

4. At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the

claimant can still perform “past relevant work.” Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To make this

determination, the ALJ compares its “residual functional capacity assessment . . . with the

physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” Id. at § 404.1520(f).

If the claimant can still perform the kind of work the claimant previously did, the claimant

is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.

5. At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an

adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity,

together with vocational factors (age, education, and work experience). Id. at §

404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, then he is not

disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work, he will be found disabled. As

previously noted, the ALJ has the burden of proving the claimant can perform other

substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

IV. ANALYSIS

With regard to steps 1-3, in this case, the ALJ found that Claimant: (1) had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 15, 2006, (2) had the following

severe impairments: coronary artery disease, status post myocardial infarction and stenting,

carpal tunnel syndrome, and small fiber peripheral neuropathy of the lower extremities, and

(3) did not have one of the impairments specifically listed in the regulations. (TR 15-16).

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With regard to step 4, the ALJ found that Claimant had the residual functional capacity to

perform past relevant work as a Compliance Officer. (TR 16-21). 

Claimant does not dispute the ALJ’s findings with regard to steps 1-3, but argues that

the ALJ’s conclusion with regard to step 4 is in error because (1) the RFC Assessment stated

by the ALJ does not meet legal standards, (2) the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons

to justify the decision on the benefit, and (3) the ALJ failed to weigh subjective complaint

reporting and medical source opinion evidence. The Court will discuss each of these

arguments in turn.

A. Whether the Residual Functional Capacity Assessment Meets Legal

Standards

1. Past Relevant Work

Claimant argues that her work as a compliance officer does not constitute past relevant

work because Claimant did not work at the job long enough to learn the position. (Doc. 16

at 7). “Duration refers to the length of time during which the person gained job experience.

It should have been sufficient for the worker to have learned the techniques, acquired

information, and developed the facility needed for average performance in the job situation.

The length of time this would take depends on the nature and complexity of the work.” SSR

82-62, 1982 WL 31386 (Aug. 20, 1980). 

 The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) lists a specific vocational preparation

(“SVP”) time for each described occupation, which is the amount of time a typical worker

needs to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for

average performance in a specific job situation. DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES,

Appendix C II (4th ed. 1991). In this case, the vocational expert identified the compliance

officer position as having an SVP of 8. (TR 44). An SVP of 8 corresponds to “over 4 years

and up to and including 10 years” of preparation. Dictionary of Occupational Titles,

Appendix C II. 

In her Work History Report, Claimant listed the following jobs as work she had

performed in the past 15 years: (1) Quality Control Clerk for approximately 10 years; (2)

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Corporate Compliance Officer for a Beauty School for approximately 6 months; (3) File/Mail

Clerk for approximately 1 year and 3 months; (4) Financial Aid Officer for a Beauty College

for approximately 2 years and 2 months; (5) Financial Aid Officer for a Motorcycle Institute

for approximately 2 years and 2 months; (6) Paraprofessional for approximately 3 years and

3 months; and (7) Special Education Assistant for approximately 8 months. (TR 133).

Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the Vocational Expert testimony that

Claimant could perform the work of a Compliance Officer because that position is not past

relevant work because Claimant did not work as a Compliance Officer long enough to learn

the job according to the SVP found in the DOT.

The Court agrees that the Record is unclear on this point, but this ambiguity does not

allow the Court to adopt Claimant’s interpretation of the Vocational Expert’s testimony, i.e.

that the Compliance Officer position is not past relevant work of Claimant. When asked

what Claimant’s past relevant work was, the Vocational Expert testified:

The Claimant has worked as a compliance officer in a couple of

schools and that work is sedentary exertion. It’s a skilled job,

SVP 8. She’s worked as a teachers’ aide. I forgot to look that

up. I’m sorry. While I look that up, she worked as a tutor

which is light and it’s skilled work. She worked as a file clerk,

Judge. That’s light, semi-skilled. The teachers’ aide is light,

semi-skilled. However, Judge, the client did work with the

special ed population and sometimes those jobs can be more

exertional than light depending on the population she works

with. 

(TR 44-45) (emphasis added). The Vocational Expert did not classify “financial aid officer”

separately as one of Claimant’s jobs, and the Vocational Expert’s assertion that Claimant

worked in the position of a Compliance Officer “in a couple of schools” indicates that she

had concluded that Financial Aid Officer and Compliance Officer were the same position.

Claimant argues that the Vocational Expert could not have meant to indicate that these

two jobs were the same position because the “vocational consultant testified that, assuming

the restrictions assessed by the ALJ, [Claimant] would not be able to perform the financial

aid officer work as she performed it in the past.” (Doc. 26). However, Claimant does not

cite to any portion of the Record to support this argument. (Id.). 

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Claimant argues that because Claimant described the jobs of Financial Aid Officer and

Corporate Compliance Officer differently in her Work History Report, the Vocational Expert

could not have determined that they were the same job. However, the Court cannot

determine from the current Record why the Vocational Expert conflated the two positions.

Accordingly, additional testimony from the Vocational Expert is necessary to determine why

the Vocational Expert determined that Claimant had worked as a Compliance Officer in a

couple of different schools and the exact requirements of such a position. It is especially

difficult to determine what the Vocational Expert was relying on as past relevant work

experience, because when Claimant’s counsel asked for the DOT number for the position of

a Corporate Compliance Officer, the Vocational Expert replied “186117090.” (TR 50).

However, this number does not match any DOT number in the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles. This Court has no way of determining why or how the Vocational Officer made this

error with the DOT number. 

Accordingly, the Record is unclear as to whether Claimant’s work as Financial Aid

Officer/Corporate Compliance Officer constitutes past relevant work that she is currently

capable of performing. Because the ALJ relied on the Vocational Expert’s testimony that

Claimant “is not precluded from performing the demands of her past relevant work as a

compliance officer,” (TR 21), and it is unclear from the Record what evidence the Vocational

Expert was relying on to determine that such work was “past relevant work,” the step four

finding is inadequate. 

As such, the matter should be remanded for additional findings at step four. On

remand, the ALJ should hear additional testimony from a vocational expert regarding

Claimant’s past relevant work. After a determination is made as to past relevant work, the

ALJ should ensure compliance with the additional requirements of a step four analysis,

including the functional analysis of the physical requirements of the prior job and resolution

of any inconsistencies between the Vocational Expert’s testimony and the DOT.

2. Assessment of Residual Function Capacity

Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in not setting forth a function-by-function

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assessment of residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as required by Social Security Ruling 96-

8p. (Doc. 16 at 10-11). Claimant argues that, instead of addressing specific work related

functions, the ALJ impermissibly classified the RFC in terms of category of work. Claimant

argues that the ALJ needed to specify the length of time Claimant could sit at one time or in

a total eight-hour day; and/or, can stand or walk at one time in a total eight-hour day. (Doc.

16 at 10). 

Social Security Rule 96-8p provides: 

The RFC assessment must first identify the individual’s

functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her

work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, including

the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 CFR 404.1545

and 416.945. Only after that may RFC be expressed in terms of

the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy,

and very heavy.

The Court is not aware of, and Claimant does not cite to, any case requiring the ALJ to

specify the length of time a Claimant is able to engage in certain activities. In this case, the

ALJ stated:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and

416.967(a) except that the claimant is able to lift and carry 10

pounds frequently. She is precluded from repetitive forceful

gripping and grasping. The claimant is limited to occasional

bending, stooping, kneeling, crawling and climbing ramps and

stairs. She is precluded from climbing ladders, ropes and

scaffolds. The claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to

hazards such as moving machinery.

(TR 16). The ALJ then went on to describe the basis for these conclusions, including a

summary of Claimant’s testimony at the hearing, and determining “the undersigned finds that

the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause

the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statement concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are

inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (TR 18). The ALJ

then went on to discuss the medical evidence supporting Claimant’s medical problems and

the ALJ’s reasoning for determining that they are not as persistent, intense, and limiting as

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urged by Claimant. 

By discussing each of Claimant’s medical conditions and the weight accorded to the

evidence of those conditions, combined with the ALJ’s specific findings regarding

Claimant’s ability to grip, grasp, bend, stoop, kneel, crawl, and climb, the Court finds that

the ALJ did assess Claimant’s work-related abilities. The ALJ specifically noted that she

credited the Vocational Expert’s testimony that “claimant, given the above noted limitations,

is not precluded from performing the demands of her past relevant work as a compliance

officer.” (TR 21). 

Claimant is correct that the ALJ did not specifically find the length of time Claimant

could sit at one time or in a total eight-hour day; and/or, can stand or walk at one time in a

total eight-hour day. However, Social Security Policy Ruling 96-8 does not require the ALJ

to assess Claimant’s ability to perform activities at certain lengths of time. Nor is it likely

that the ALJ could make such assessments in a case where the ALJ clearly found that

Claimant had the medical conditions she complained of, but, at times, Claimant’s symptoms

were worse than others with regard to all of her medical conditions, and none of Claimant’s

medical conditions would limit her for any consecutive 12 month period. (TR 18). 

Nonetheless, because the ALJ must determine whether the duties of a Compliance

Control Officer/Financial Aid Officer is past relevant work for Claimant, on remand the ALJ

will necessarily have to determine whether, as a result of all of her medical conditions,

Claimant is able to perform the specific work-related functions for that past relevant work.

Because the determination as to what is past relevant work necessarily leaves an open

question as to whether Claimant could perform past relevant work on a function-by-function

basis, on remand, the ALJ must make a determination as to whether or not Claimant could

perform past relevant work on a function-by-function basis after making a positive

determination as to what constitutes past relevant work. Such a determination should be

made by further development of the record with regard to Claimant’s past relevant work, the

nature of such work, and the durational requirements for tasks implicit in that work. Such

determinations will have to be made through further testimony of Claimant and further

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testimony of a Vocational Expert on these issues. 

B. Whether the ALJ Articulated Sufficient Reasons to Justify the Decision

on the Benefit

Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh subjective complaint reporting

and medical source opinion evidence, and, as a result, this Court should credit Claimant’s

evidence of a disability as true.

1. Whether the ALJ Properly Weighed Subjective Complaint

Reporting

Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh her subjective complaint

reporting of shortness of breath, fatigue, and foot, hand, and leg pain and the ALJ failed to

consider her impairments in “combination.”

Once a claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment which is

reasonably likely to be the cause of some pain, the ALJ ‘may not discredit a claimant’s

testimony of pain and deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged by

the claimant is not supported by objective medical evidence.’” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d

748, 749-750 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 (9th Cir.

1991) (en banc). In this case, there is no question that the ALJ found that there was medical

evidence of underlying impairments that would be reasonably likely to cause pain. See TR

18 (“After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with

the above residual functional capacity requirement.”). 

The question then is whether the ALJ discredited Claimant’s testimony of pain solely

because such pain was not supported by objective medical evidence. “Although an ALJ

‘cannot be required to believe every allegation of disabling pain,’ the ALJ cannot reject

testimony of pain without making findings sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court

to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Orteza, 50

F.3d at 750 (quoting Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th

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Cir.1989)). Factors that the adjudicator should consider when making such credibility

determinations include the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and

intensity of any pain, precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement, activity,

environmental conditions), type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any pain

medication, treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain, functional restrictions, and

the claimant’s daily activities. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 (citing SSR 88-13, 1988 WL 236011

(July 20, 1988)). 

“[I]f the claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be

transferred to the workplace, an adjudicator may discredit the claimant’s allegations upon

making specific findings relating to the claimant’s daily activities.” Id. (citing Fair, 885 F.2d

at 603. “Another relevant factor may be ‘unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to

seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.’” Id. (internal citation omitted).

“An adjudicator may also use ‘ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation’ to test a

claimant’s credibility.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “So long as the adjudicator makes

specific findings that are supported by the record, the adjudicator may discredit the

claimant’s allegations based on inconsistencies in the testimony or on relevant character

evidence.” Id.

In this case, the ALJ made specific findings to support her determination that

Claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her

conditions were not fully credible and did not prevent her from performing light work.

While the ALJ did make specific findings that the objective medical evidence did not support

the extent of Claimant’s complaints (TR 18-19) , the ALJ also considered the factors required

by SSR 88-13 in making her credibility determination. The ALJ specifically found that

Claimant had reported to the Administration that “other reasons she had stopped working”

were because her father had a stroke and surgery in January 2006 and Claimant reported to

her doctor that, although she previously had a sitting down job, she was now at home taking

care of her mother. (TR 19 and TR 358). The ALJ explained that in combination with the

other credibility issues, these other reasons not to work “suggest that [Claimant] is not as

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limited as alleged and “raise the question whether the claimant’s continued unemployment

is due to reasons unrelated to her alleged impairments.” (TR 19-20). 

The ALJ also took into account Claimant’s daily activities of performing light

household chores, shopping and preparing meals as evidence that Claimant is not “precluded

from performing all work.” (TR 20). The ALJ found that Claimant exaggerated her

difficulty concentrating because she reads regularly and continues to drive, suggesting her

ability to concentrate is not significantly impaired. (TR 20). 

Claimant argues that it was improper for the ALJ to consider these activities as

evidence that Claimant can work. Claimant argues that she should not be penalized for

attempting to live a normal life and these activities do not transfer to the grueling pace of a

work environment. While the Court agrees that this evidence, taken alone, could not support

Claimant’s ability to perform all jobs, the ALJ did not make such a conclusion. In

accordance with the factors to consider under SSR 88-13, the ALJ considered evidence of

daily activities. Such consideration is not improper. See Fair, 885 F. 2d at 603 (“More

realistically, if, despite his claims of pain, a claimant is able to perform household chores and

other activities that involve many of the same physical tasks as a particular type of job, it

would not be farfetched for an ALJ to conclude that the claimant’s pain does not prevent the

claimant from working”). 

Here, the ALJ considered evidence of Claimant’s activities and reached the conclusion

that she is not precluded from performing “all work.” Further, the ALJ relied on several

factors when determining Claimant’s credibility and did not rely on this factor alone.

Accordingly, it was not improper for the ALJ to consider Claimant’s daily activities in

assessing her credibility. 

Finally, the ALJ specifically found that Claimant failed to follow her treating

physicians’ advice to stop smoking, which could possibly somewhat alleviate her symptoms.

In late 2006, two of Claimant’s doctors, from different facilities, asked her to stop smoking

(TR 249, 299), but Claimant testified she was still smoking 5 cigarettes a day at the time of

the hearing before the ALJ. (TR 42). The ALJ concluded that this “failure to follow medical

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advice,” “tends to suggest that her symptoms are not as severe as alleged.” (TR 20). 

Based on foregoing, it is clear that the ALJ did not “discredit a claimant’s testimony

of pain and deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged by the claimant

was not supported by objective medical evidence,” but rather made “specific findings that

are supported by the record.” 

2. Whether the ALJ Properly Weighed Medical Source Opinion

Evidence

Claimant argues that the ALJ did not give proper weight to the opinions of her treating

physicians. When evaluating the medical evidence throughout the five-step process, the ALJ

must give appropriate consideration based on the source of testimony. The ALJ should

afford the most weight to the treating physician’s opinion, a lesser amount of weight to an

examining physician’s opinion, and an even lesser amount to a physician who has neither

treated nor examined the claimant. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). 

If the treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another physician, it is given

controlling weight and may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons supported

by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 632 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830

(9th Cir. 1995)). However, even if there is conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ may not

reject the treating physician’s opinion without providing “specific and legitimate reasons”

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. 

Similarly, the ALJ may only reject the uncontradicted opinion of an examining

physician by presenting clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in

the record. Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999).

If the examining physician’s opinion is contradicted, the ALJ must still offer specific and

legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion. Id. If an examining physician’s opinion differs

from the treating physician’s opinion, and both opinions are based on the same medical

findings and differ only in their ultimate conclusions, then the treating physician’s opinion

is still entitled to controlling weight. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. However, if the examining

physician’s conflicting opinion is based on independent findings, e.g., a different diagnosis

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or findings from different objective medical tests, then the treating physician’s opinion is no

longer given controlling weight, but is still entitled to deference. Id. at 632-33. 

Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider the opinion of Dr.

Gorman, one of Claimant’s treating physicians. The ALJ specifically considered Dr.

Gorman’s opinion. The ALJ noted that she was not giving Dr. Gorman’s medical assessment

(TR 491-492) controlling weight because he did not provide the maximal exertional

functions that Claimant could perform, he did not provide any explanation as to why

Claimant was totally precluded from stooping given her impairments, Claimant’s course of

treatment did not reflect the level of impairments indicated by Dr. Gorman, and Dr.

Gorman’s opinions conflicted with the opinions of Dr. Bitza, another of Claimant’s treating

physicians and Dr. Chatham, Claimant’s examining physician. (TR 20). The ALJ

specifically relied on the February 2007 report of Dr. Bitza that Claimant’s impairments

would not impose any limitations for 12 months. (TR 20 and TR 229). The ALJ also

specifically relied on the opinion of Dr. Chatham, an examining physician, that Claimant

could perform sedentary work. (TR 20 and TR 376). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that

the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Gorman’s opinions as to the

extent of Claimant’s impairments. 

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did articulate sufficient reasons justifying

the decision and the benefit and appropriately weighed Claimant’s subjective complaint

reporting and medical source opinion evidence. However, as set forth herein, further

proceedings are necessary to resolve issues concerning Claimant’s past relevant work and

whether she can perform such past relevant work. 

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Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is REVERSED

and REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings consistent

with this Order.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2012.

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