Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00090/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE L. HERMOSILLO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 10cv00090-WQH (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. No. 22.]

vs.

LARRY SMALL, Warden

Respondent.

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge William

Q. Hayes in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California.

I. Introduction

Jose L. Hermosillo (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner serving a sentence of fortyfive years to life for child molestation. On January 12, 2010, Petitioner, proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Petition”) with the

Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1]. The Petition asserts nine grounds for relief. [Id.]. 

Petitioner raised the first seven grounds on direct appeal in state court and the remaining two

grounds in state habeas corpus proceedings. Respondent’s Answer concedes that the Petition was

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timely and that all grounds are properly exhausted. [Doc. No. 11]. Petitioner filed a Traverse on

August 30, 2010. [Doc. No. 16].

After considering the documents presented, and for the reasons stated below, the Court

RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

II. Procedural History

On September 1, 2004, a jury convicted Petitioner of four counts of indecent exposure, six

counts of child molestation, two counts of lewd acts on a child with “One Strike” allegations

attached1, three counts of forcible lewd acts on a child with One Strike allegations attached, and

one count each of false imprisonment and attempted forcible lewd acts on a child. [Lodgement 7

at 1-2]. Petitioner’s motion for a new trial based on a claim of mistaken identity and new evidence

was denied. [Lodgment 2, Vol. 10 at 1371, ll. 16-20]. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to

forty-five years to life, consisting of three consecutive fifteen years to life terms imposed on one

count of lewd acts on a child and two counts of forcible lewd acts on a child. [Lodgment 7 at 2]. 

Sentences on all other convictions were imposed concurrently or stayed. [Lodgment 7 at 2].

The California Court of Appeal (hereinafter “Court of Appeal”) affirmed the judgment in

an unpublished opinion filed November 28, 2006. [Lodgment 7]. The California Supreme Court

denied the Petition for Review on March 14, 2007. [Lodgment 9]. The United States Supreme

Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on October 1, 2007, Hermosillo v. California, 552

U.S. 884 (2007), concluding Petitioner’s direct appeals.

Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in San Diego

County Superior Court. The state petition asserted two grounds for relief based on

ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. [Lodgment 11 at 3-4]. The

San Diego County Superior Court denied the petition on November 20, 2008. [Lodgment

12]. The Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s ensuing habeas

corpus petitions on February 19, 2009 and December 2, 2009 respectively, [Doc. No. 1 at

1

California’s One Strike Law, Penal Code § 667.61, provides fifteen years to life and twentyfive years to life sentences for conviction of a sex related offense under qualifying circumstances.

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4], concluding Petitioner’s state habeas corpus proceedings. Petitioner filed this federal

petition on January 12, 2010. [Doc. No. 1].

III. Standard of Review

Federal courts may only grant a petition for habeas corpus relief based on grounds

reviewed on the merits in state court when the state court's decision: "(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2010); Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, ___ (2011), 131 S. Ct. 770, 785. The first prong applies both to

questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact. Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000). The second prong applies to decisions based on factual

determinations. Miller-El v. Cockell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). This deferential standard

found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sees federal courts review state prisoner habeas corpus

petitions based on the soundness of prior state court decisions on the merits rather than the

soundness of the underlying conviction directly.

A state court decision is only "contrary to" Supreme Court authority under §

2254(d)(1) if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry), 529

U.S. at 412-13.

A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" Supreme Court authority

under § 2254(d)(1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme

Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case."

 Williams at 413. Federal courts may not issue a writ of habeas corpus "simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather the

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application must be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ. See id. at 409.

"Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. 

A petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s

presumption of correctness; conclusory assertions will not suffice. Miller-El at 340.

Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), a state court decision "based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

In reviewing prior state court decisions, the Court looks to the last reasoned state

court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d

1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). In this case, the last reasoned opinions are those of the Court of

Appeal from November 28, 2006 and February 19, 2009 concerning Petitioner’s direct

appeal and state habeas corpus proceedings respectively. The Court reviews these decisions

to determine whether they are “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1).

IV. Discussion

Petitioner’s nine grounds for relief are as follows:

 (1) his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense was violated when the trial

court sustained an objection to a portion of defense counsel’s closing argument contending

that a witness’s failure to notice tattoos on Petitioner’s arms suggested misidentification;

(2) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when the trial

court denied his motion for a physical lineup;

(3) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when the trial

court refused to disclose the denial of his motion for a physical lineup to the jury;

(4) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when the

prosecutor argued that an alibi lacked credibility after the prosecutor objected to the

admission of hearsay evidence allegedly corroborating the witness’s testimony;

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(5) his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when

defense counsel failed to object to “double hearsay” evidence;

(6) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment rights

were violated when the trial court denied his Motion for a New Trial;

(7) his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial

court sentenced him to multiple indeterminate life terms;

(8) his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when

defense counsel failed to investigate potential alibi witnesses; and

(9) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel were violated when defense counsel failed to request a jury

admonition after the prosecutor asked a question touching on inadmissible gang affiliation

evidence while cross-examining Petitioner.

The Court first considers Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel grounds,

then considers his due process grounds and concludes by considering his remaining grounds

for relief.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Grounds 5, 8, 9)

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “in all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . assistance of counsel for his defense.” 

U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The Supreme Court recognizes that “the right to counsel is the

right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.

14 (1970). A petitioner seeking relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel must

demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient; and, (2) that

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011). A petitioner has the burden

of proving both prongs of a Strickland claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland at 687; Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787. 

Representation is constitutionally deficient when it falls below “an objective

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standard of reasonableness.” Harrington at 787. Courts “apply a ‘strong presumption’ that

counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance,”

and a petitioner must show “that counsel’s errors were so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.

Prejudice results from deficient performance of counsel when there is a “reasonable

probability” that the result of the trial would have been different had counsel performed

competently. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “Counsel’s errors must be so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787-88.

When reviewing state court decisions on ineffective assistance of counsel claims,

federal courts employ the “highly deferential” standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) on top of

the “highly deferential” standards articulated in Strickland. 466 U.S. at 788. This “doubly

deferential judicial review” requires the Court to ask not whether the state court’s Strickland

decision is incorrect, but whether the state court’s decision is unreasonable. Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009).

1. Defense Counsel’s Failure to Object to License Plate Testimony Did

Not Constitute Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Ground 5)

On direct appeal, Petitioner contended that defense counsel’s failure to object to

alleged hearsay testimony during trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

[Lodgment 7 at 17]. Ashley P. was one of the victims Petitioner was convicted of

molesting. [Lodgment 7 at 3]. She testified at trial that on December 9, 2001, when she

was fourteen years old, she was in a 7-Eleven store when she felt someone squeeze her

bottom. [Lodgment 7 at 3-4]. After realizing that Petitioner had touched her, Ashley’s

friend read the license plate number on Petitioner’s car out loud while Ashley wrote it down

on a piece of paper. [Id.]. Ashley gave the note containing the license plate number to

police, and identified Petitioner in a photographic lineup. [Id.]. Petitioner contended that

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defense counsel should have objected to the note’s admission as hearsay and that the failure

to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. [Id. at 17].

The Court of Appeal held that Petitioner failed to establish the necessary prejudice

for a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim. [Lodgment 7 at 17]. While Petitioner

now contends that the note constituted the sole evidence linking him to the scene, the Court

of Appeal relied on Petitioner’s admission to police that he had been at the 7-11 with the car

during the incident. [Id. at 18]. Without a showing of prejudice, an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim fails regardless of whether counsel’s performance was actually deficient. 

Strickland 466 U.S. at 697. The Court of Appeal’s holding is not contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. 785. 

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

2. Defense Counsel’s Failure to Investigate Potential Alibi Witnesses Did

Not Constitute Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Ground 8)

In his state habeas corpus proceedings, Petitioner contended that defense counsel’s

failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

[Lodgment 14 at 1]. In his state petition, Petitioner identified these potential alibi witnesses

as “Danny, Juan, Adrian and Shelly.” [Lodgment 13]. In denying the petition, the Court of

Appeal held that Petitioner did not “explain who they are and how they could have aided in

his defense. The claim is without any evidentiary support.” [Lodgment 14 at 1]. Petitioner

restates the claim here. [Doc. No. 1-1 at 33-34].

The Court of Appeal’s holding that Petitioner had not demonstrated deficient

performance of counsel is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Petitioner did not offer any information about who “Danny, Juan, Adrian and Shelly” are, or

that they could testify to a credible alibi defense. [Lodgment 14 at 1]. The burden rests on

Petitioner to make out a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Harrington at 787. 

As the Court of Appeal concluded, defense counsel’s performance was not deficient absent

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additional information about credible alibi witnesses2. An attorney may limit investigation

of potential witnesses based on the information provided by a client. Strickland at 691. An

attorney’s decision not to interview potential witnesses is not ineffective assistance of

counsel if that decision is made in the exercise of professional judgment. See Griffin v.

West, 791 F. 2d 1578, 1580 (10th Cir. 1986). In the absence of identifying information of

the alleged alibi witnesses and reason to believe any witnesses possessed alibi testimony,

the Court of Appeal’s holding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden in claiming

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

federal law. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785.

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

3. Defense Counsel’s Failure to Seek an Admonition Is Not Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel (Ground 9)

In his state habeas corpus proceedings, Petitioner contended that defense counsel’s

failure to seek an admonition, following a successful relevancy objection to the prosecutor’s

question as to his alleged gang affiliation, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

[Lodgment 14 at 1-2]. During the cross-examination of Petitioner, the prosecutor asked

whether Petitioner was affiliated with a gang. [Lodgment 2, Vol. 5 at 1104]. Defense

counsel’s relevancy objection was sustained, and the prosecutor moved on. [Id.]. Petitioner

did not answer the question. [Id.]. Defense counsel did not request the court admonish the

jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question. [Id.]. The Court of Appeal held that defense

counsel’s actions were neither constitutionally deficient nor demonstrably prejudicial under

Strickland. [Lodgment 14 at 1-2]. The Court of Appeal noted that seeking an admonition

could serve “to highlight Hermosillo’s possible gang involvement” to the jury. [Id. 1-2]. 

And the Court of Appeal concluded that “Hermosillo has not shown he would have

2

A declaration by Adrian Rodarte was submitted along with Petitioner’s subsequent state

habeas corpus petition to the California Supreme Court, providing an alibi for Petitioner on January

31, 2002. [Lodgment 15]. However, Petitioner was not convicted for any offenses committed on

January 31, 2002. [Doc. No. 11-1 at 8]. 

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achieved a better outcome absent any alleged errors by defense counsel.” [Id. at 2].

The Court of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. Defense counsel’s failure to request an admonition falls

within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance” to which courts defer when

considering a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787. As

referred to by the Court of Appeal, counsel may have concluded that seeking an admonition

would serve to draw the jury’s attention to Petitioner’s possible gang affiliation. [Lodgment

14 at 1-2]. By allowing the course of questioning to move on without further comment,

defense counsel may have better served Petitioner. Allowing the jury to disregard a

question may prove more effective than instructing the jury to disregard a question. 

Defense counsel could conclude as much while providing constitutionally sufficient

representation within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance” falling short of

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787.

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

B. Due Process (Grounds 1, 2, 3)

The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits a state from

“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

Amend. XIV, § 1. In state criminal proceedings, the federal Due Process Clause

“guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64

(1967). Beyond the enumerated protections contained in the Bill of Rights, however, “the

Due Process Clause has limited operation” and violations of fundamental fairness have been

“very narrowly” defined. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). State court

proceedings normally do not offend the Due Process Clause unless they offend “some

principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked

as fundamental.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).

1. Trial Court Preventing Defense Counsel From Arguing

Misidentification Based on Hand Tattoo Evidence Did Not Violate

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Petitioner’s Due Process Rights (Ground 1)

On direct appeal, Petitioner contended that the trial court violated his due process

rights by refusing to permit defense counsel to argue that the failure of one of the victims,

Lucy R., to notice a tattoo on Petitioner’s hand evidenced misidentification. [Lodgment 7 at

7-9]. During trial, Petitioner showed tattoos on his arms and left hand to the jury pursuant

to a motion in limine. [Id. at 7]. While other witnesses were asked whether they had

noticed tattoos on Petitioner’s arms, Lucy R. was never asked about tattoos on Petitioner’s

arm or hand. [Id.]. During closing argument, the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s

objection to defense counsel’s argument that this was evidence of misidentification. [Id.]. 

Petitioner contended that the trial court’s ruling violated his constitutional rights by

preventing his counsel from arguing the evidence to the jury. [Id. at 7-8]. The Court of

Appeal held that because Lucy R. had not been asked whether she noticed a tattoo on

Petitioner’s hand, an argument based on what she may or may not have seen was

unsupported by the evidence. [Id. at 8-9]. 

Petitioner has not stated a violation of his federal constitutional rights. The Court

of Appeal concluded “[d]efense counsel was misstating the record and attempting to draw

inferences that were not supported by the evidence.” [Lodgment 7 at 9]. In rejecting

Petitioner’s claim, the Court of Appeal relied exclusively on California law as articulated in

Malkasian v. Irwin, 61 Cal. 2d 738, 747 (1964). [Id.]. “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does

not lie for errors of state law,” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990), and any error

based on these grounds is not cognizable in federal court. Nor did the trial court’s refusal to

permit defense counsel’s argument as to Lucy R. infringe on the “fundamental elements of

fairness” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. Spencer 385 U.S. at 563-64.

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

2. Trial Court’s Denial of Petitioner’s Motion for a Live Lineup Did Not

Violate Petitioner’s Due Process Rights (Ground 2)

On direct appeal, Petitioner contended that the trial court’s denial of his motion for

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a physical lineup violated his due process rights. [Lodgment 7 at 9-10]. California law

permits an accused to compel a physical lineup when identification is a material issue and a

reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification exists. Evans v. Superior Court, 11

Cal.3d 617, 625 (1974). However, there is no federal constitutional right to a live lineup. 

United States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 857( 9th Cir. 1979). In the absence of any

recognized federal law on the right to a physical lineup, the Court of Appeal’s decision

cannot be contrary to or involve and unreasonable application of federal law. Harrington,

131 S. Ct. at 785.

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

3. Trial Court’s Refusal to Inform the Jury of the Denial of Motion for a

Live Lineup Did Not Violate Petitioner’s Due Process Rights (Ground 3)

On direct appeal, Petitioner contended that the trial court’s refusal to inform the

jury about the denial of his motion for a physical lineup violated his due process rights. 

[Lodgment 7 at 10-11]. The Court of Appeal held that the denial of the motion for a

physical lineup was not relevant evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in refusing to inform the jury of the motion. [Id. at 11].

Errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are generally not a basis for federal

habeas corpus relief. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 457 (1913). Only when an

evidentiary decision “create[s] an absence of fundamental fairness that fatally infect[s] the

trial” will a petitioner be entitled to habeas relief. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891,

897 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Court of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. The outcome of an Evans motion is not itself evidence

tending to prove a fact in dispute. See 11 Cal. 3d 617 (1974). Because Evans concerns

California law, federal habeas corpus review is limited. Patterson at 201-02. The trial

court’s refusal to inform the jury about the motion’s denial does not create an “absence of

fundamental fairness that fatally infect[s] the trial.” Ortiz-Sandoval at 897. The Court of

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Appeal’s determination is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785.

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

C. Remaining Grounds (Grounds 4, 6, 7)

Petitioner’s three remaining grounds for relief are made under differing

constitutional provisions.

1. Petitioner’s Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct is Procedurally

Defaulted (Ground 4)

On direct appeal, Petitioner contended that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

commenting on the credibility of an alibi witness after having successfully excluded as

hearsay a calendar purporting to support the alibi witness’s account. [Lodgment 7 at 12]

At trial, the defense called Petitioner’s sister, Jenny Coronel, as an alibi witness. 

[Doc. No. 1-1 at 21]. Coronel testified that Petitioner spent January 9, 2002, the date on

which offenses involving Adilene M., Edith G., Taylor M., and Lucy R occurred, at her

home. [Lodgment 7 at 4-5, 12]. Evidence that Coronel had postponed a doctor’s

appointment on January 9th, in the form of a document from the doctor’s office mentioning

an appointment on January 9th and Coronel’s testimony about changing the appointment

time on that date, was ruled partly inadmissible as hearsay by the trial court. [Id. at 12]. The

trial court permitted limited testimony of the document while barring Coronel from

volunteering testimony about conversations she had with the doctor’s office regarding the

appointment time. [Id. at 12-13]. The prosecutor was permitted to comment on the absence

of a change in Coronel’s appointment time from the document itself. [Id.]. The prosecutor

successfully objected when Coronel twice attempted to refer to conversations she had with

the doctor’s office during cross examination. [Id. at 13-14]. The prosecutor subsequently

commented on the credibility of Coronel’s testimony during closing argument. [Id. at 15-

17]. Petitioner contends this amounts to prosecutorial misconduct, depriving him of his due

process rights. [Doc. No. 1-1 at 21-24].

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The Court of Appeal held that Petitioner’s claims were barred on direct appeal under

California’s contemporary objection rule and that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred. 

[Lodgment 7 at 14-17]. California requires claims of prosecutorial misconduct be preserved

for appeal by a timely objection at trial and a request for an admonition. People v. Frye, 18

Cal.4th 894, 970 (1998), overruled on other grounds by People v. Keith Zon Doolin, 45 Cal.

4th 390, 421 (2009). Defense counsel did not try to claim prosecutorial misconduct during

Coronel’s cross examination or at any time during trial. [Lodgment 7 at 14].

Federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if

the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal

question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729

(1991). “When a federal habeas court releases a prisoner held pursuant to a state court

judgment that rests on an independent and adequate state ground, it renders ineffective the

state rule.” Id. at 730. This rule applies when a petitioner fails to meet state procedural

requirements that bar relief in state court resulting in a procedural default of the state

prisoner’s ground for relief in federal habeas review. Id. at 729-30. A state prisoner’s

defaulted grounds are barred unless a petitioner can “demonstrate cause for the default and

actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure

to consider the ground for relief will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. at

750.

Petitioner’s failure to make a contemporaneous objection of prosecutorial

misconduct at trial procedurally defaults this ground for relief here. See Rich v. Calderon,

187 F.3d 1064, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s

corresponding claim during his direct appeal because no objection was made at trial to

preserve the claim for appeal. [Lodgment 7 at 14-15]. Petitioner has not asserted cause and

prejudice to excuse this procedural default. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will result from declining to reach the merits of this

ground here. The Court finds that California’s contemporary objection rule bars relief on

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this ground in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Rich at 1069-70.

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

2. Trial Court’s Denial of Petitioner’s Motion for a New Trial Did Not

Violate Petitioner’s Right to Present a Meaningful Defense (Ground 6) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner contended that the denial of his motion for a new trial

violated his due process rights and his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 

[Lodgment 7 at 18-21]. Petitioner’s new trial motion based on new evidence under

California Penal Code § 1181(8) argued that his step-brother, Roberto Hermosillo,

committed the crimes for which Petitioner was convicted. [Id. at 18]. Petitioner’s motion

was accompanied by declarations from family members asserting that Roberto Hermosillo’s

hair color more closely matched one victim’s description of the perpetrator’s hair color,

Roberto Hermosillo had access to the car driven by Petitioner linked to the offenses, and

Roberto Hermosillo had a history of lewd conduct with a minor six years before the offenses

for which Petitioner was convicted occurred. [Id. at 18]. Petitioner contended that this

amounted to “powerful evidence that Roberto and not [Petitioner] is responsible for the

conduct charged in this case.” [Id. at 18]. The Court of Appeal held that “any similarities

between the actions of the two Hermosillo brothers were not strong enough to render a

different result probable on retrial.” [Id. at 21]. Petitioner was linked to the offenses for

which he was convicted by eyewitness identifications and DNA evidence. [Id. at 19-20].

"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or

in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the

Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). 

“This right is abridged by evidence rules that infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused

and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted). In Holmes, a South Carolina procedural rule barred the admission of

defense evidence of third party guilt based on the strength of the prosecution’s case without

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considering the probative value of the defense’s evidence. Id. at 329. The defense’s

evidence of third party guilt consisted of witnesses placing the third party around the crime

scene at the relevant time, testifying to the third party’s statements admitting to the crime,

and testifying about prosecutorial efforts to secure false testimony and manufacture

evidence. Id. at 323. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed South Carolina’s rule

excluding such evidence without considering its probative value. Id. at 331.

The Court of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. Unlike in Holmes, the trial court considered Petitioner’s

evidence produced as part of his motion for a new trial alongside the evidence produced at

trial before denying Petitioner’s motion. [Lodgment 7 at 19-20]. The Court of Appeal

incorporated the rationale of the trial court in concluding that the newly offered evidence was

not strong enough to affect the outcome at trial. [Id. at 18-21]. And Petitioner’s evidence of

third party guilt is not as strong as the evidence of third party guilt offered in Holmes.

Evidence that Roberto Hermosillo’s hair color more closely matched that of the described

perpetrator was offset by one witness’s testimony as to Petitioner’s hair color at the time of

the offense. [Id. at 19]. Petitioner’s DNA was also found on that witness. [Id.] Evidence

that Roberto Hermosillo had access to the car linked to the offenses was offset by

Petitioner’s admission to using the car exclusively. [Id.] And evidence of Roberto

Hermosillo’s previous incident of lewd acts on a child was offset by aggregate weight of all

evidence linking Petitioner to the offenses charged. [Id. at 19-20]. Instead of providing

“powerful evidence” of third party guilt, Petitioner’s evidence more closely resembles the

kind of “repetitive . . . only marginally relevant” evidence that poses “an undue risk of

harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues” which the U.S. Constitution permits courts

to exclude. Holmes at 326-27.

Considering Petitioner’s fair opportunity to present a defense, the consideration

given to the merits of the evidence accompanying his motion for a new trial, and the

deficiency of Petitioner’s evidence of third party guilt when considered against the evidence

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produced at trial, the Court of Appeal’s decision denying Petitioner’s motion for a new trial

is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at

785.

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

3. Trial Court Sentencing Petitioner to Multiple Life Sentences Did Not

Violate Due Process, Double Jeopardy or Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Clauses (Ground 7)

On direct appeal, Petitioner contended that his sentence to three consecutive

indeterminate life terms violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and

the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the U.S. and California constitutions. 

[Lodgment 7 at 25]. Petitioner contended that “Double one strike punishment for two lewd

act convictions, where a second conviction is used to increase the punishment for a first

conviction from a determinate term and then the first conviction is used to increase the

punishment for a second conviction from a determinate sentence to an indeterminate term”

violated both state and federal constitutional guarantees. [Id.]. The Court of Appeal held

that Petitioner had not demonstrated that his sentence was cruel or unusual under the U.S.

Constitution and that the sentence did not violate the double jeopardy clauses of the U.S. or

California constitutions. [Id. at 25-27]. This Court considers Petitioner’s claims under the

U.S. Constitution’s guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy.

a. Petitioner’s Sentence Does Not Violate the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause

 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “our precedents [on cruel and unusual

punishment] have not been a model of clarity” in determining what constitutes “clearly

established federal law” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). However, “one governing legal principle emerges as ‘clearly

established’ under § 2254(d)(1): A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to

sentences for terms of years.” Id. at 72. As the last relevant Supreme Court case decided

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before the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, Lockyer v. Andrade constitutes

“clearly established federal law” for purposes of reviewing this Petition. See Norris v.

Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 2010).

Leandro Andrade was convicted of stealing video tapes worth approximately $150. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66. His petty theft conviction when paired with a prior theft conviction

elevated his offence to a felony, and a jury found that Andrade had previously been

convicted of three counts of residential burglary. Id. at 68. The trial court sentenced

Andrade to two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life. Id. at 74.

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision granting Andrade’s habeas

corpus petition. 538 U.S. at 77. In doing so, the Supreme Court concluded that the state

appellate court’s consideration of the length of the sentence, the availability of parole, the

severity of the offense, and the impact of recidivism were not contrary to clearly established

federal law. Id. at 73-74.

In this case, the Court of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. The court concluded that Petitioner “simply

has not shown or provided any persuasive authority” to support the claim that his sentence

was grossly disproportionate to the severity of his crime. [Lodgment 7 at 26]. In

considering the merits of his claim, the court relied on Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11

(2003), and Andrade to hold that Petitioner’s indeterminate life sentence did not violate the

Eighth Amendment in light of the legislature’s goal to severely punish offenders who

commit lewd acts on multiple child victims. [Lodgment 7 at 26-27]. The court noted that

Petitioner targeted several young female victims and that the severity of Petitioner’s criminal

acts escalated over a five month period. [Lodgment 7 at 25]. In relying on Andrade and

Ewing, and noting the severity of Petitioner’s offenses and multiple victims involved, the

Court of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785. 

b. Petitioner’s Sentence Does Not Violate the Double Jeopardy

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Clause 

Nor is the Court of Appeal’s decision contrary to clearly established federal double

jeopardy law. Petitioner was sentenced to three fifteen years to life sentences under

California Penal Code § 667.61(b), (c), and (e). [Lodgment 7 at 1-2]. Subsection (b)

provides for a sentence of fifteen years to life for persons convicted of certain offenses in

subsection (c), where certain circumstances in subsection (e) are present. Cal. Pen. Code §

667.61 (Deering 2011) Subsection (c) provides lewd or lascivious acts as offenses eligible

for sentencing under subsection (b). Id. Subsection (e) provides that a conviction for a

subsection (c) offense against multiple victims is a circumstance for subsection (b) purposes. 

Id. Petitioner’s sentence was based on one count of lewd acts on a child and two counts of

forcible lewd acts on a child, subsection (c) offenses eligible for subsection (b) sentencing. 

[Lodgment 7 at 1-2]. His convictions against multiple victims – Luz L., Lucy R., and Zuri T.

– were used as subsection (e) circumstances, thus permitting the imposition of three fifteen

years to life sentences. [Id. at 1-6].

Double jeopardy protections do not apply to sentencing proceedings outside of

capital cases. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998). “Historically, we have found

double jeopardy protections inapplicable to sentencing proceedings, because the

determinations at issue do not place a defendant in jeopardy for an ‘offense.’” Id.; see

United States v. Blanton, 476 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering Monge’s

forcefulness following Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). In this case,

Petitioner’s sentence derives from his convictions for lewd acts and a forcible lewd act on a

child. [Lodgment 7 at 2]. All three offenses were pled and tried in the same trial. The three

offenses involve three separate acts, against three separate victims, occurring in three

successive months. [Id. at 4-6]. The use of one lewd act offense as a circumstance to permit

more severe One Strike punishment under § 667.61 is a matter of sentencing, and does not

offend the principles of double jeopardy. Monge at 728. The Court of Appeal’s decision is

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Harrington,

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131 S. Ct. at 785. 

Accordingly, the Petition for relief should be DENIED on this ground.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing

that Judgment be entered denying the Petition and dismissing this action. 

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988). Any

party may filed written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties by

December 22, 2011. The document shall be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed by January 12,

2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specific time may

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 1, 2011

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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