Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00443/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00443-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jonathon Gordon Sperberg, II,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-11-0443-PHX-PGR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on March 7, 2011 (Doc. 1), and supplemented it on May 16, 2011 (Doc. 10, 11). 

On June 28, 2011, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 14). Petitioner filed an 

Amended Reply on November 10, 2011 (Doc. 36).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As reflected in the Pre Sentence Report, on February 6, 1994, when Petitioner was 

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approximately 20 years of age, he and four others (including two juveniles) decided to 

go “bum rolling,” and found the victim behind a store in Casa Grande, Arizona. After 

attempting to get money from the victim, one of the five shot the victim twice, causing 

his death. (Exhibit G, Pre Sentence Report at 1-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 14, 

are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On February 17, 1994, Petitioner and two co-defendants were indicted in Pinal 

County Superior Court on charges of First Degree Murder in the course of Armed 

Robbery, and attempted Armed Robbery. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) The State filed a 

Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty (Exhibit B). 

Following selection of a jury, Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement 

(Exhibit C), agreeing to plead guilty to the murder charge, in exchange for a stipulated 

sentence of life without possibility of parole for 25 years and dismissal of the remaining 

counts. Petitioner entered his plea of guilty on March 29, 1995. (Exhibit D, R.T. 

3/29/95.) 

On his own motion, Petitioner underwent a court ordered mental examination, and 

the results were sealed. (Exhibit E, M.E. 5/10/95; Exhibit F, Sealed Report Envelope.) 

The Pre-Sentence Report reflected a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, with 

hospitalizations dating back to age 14. (Exhibit G at 4.) Petitioner was apparently found 

competent. (Id. at 5.) 

On June 12, 1995, Petitioner was convicted to the murder charge and sentenced to 

life in prison with a possibility of parole after 25 years. (Exhibit H, M.E. 6/12/95; 

Exhibit I, Sentence; Exhibit J, R.T. 6/12/95; Exhibit K, Spec. Verdict.) 

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C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Having pled guilty, Petitioner had no right to, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033 (2001), 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e), and did not file a direct appeal (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2).1 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST CONVICTION RELIEF

Almost seven years after his conviction, on April 16, 2002, Petitioner filed 

through counsel his first Petition for Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit L), arguing that the 

Arizona Department of Corrections was improperly evaluating his sentence as being 

without possibility of parole. The prosecution responded (Exhibit M) that the issue was 

not properly raised in a PCR proceeding. On June 3, 2002, upon agreement of the 

parties, the PCR court issued a clarification of the sentence, reflecting the life sentence 

without possibility for release for 25 years. (Exhibit P, M.E. 6/3/02.)

E. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND POST CONVICTION RELIEF

On September 27, 2004, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit Q), arguing his actual innocence based upon a co-defendant shooting the victim 

without any prompting from Petitioner. Petitioner acknowledged his request was 

untimely, but asserted the claim was brought under the actual innocence and no-fault 

exceptions to the timeliness rule. (Id. at 2.) On the same date, the PCR court disposed of 

the petition by finding that the request was untimely and Petitioner failed to state a 

claim.2 (Exhibit R, M.E. 9/27/04.)

 

1

In an apparent reference to his Petition for Review in his Fifth PCR proceeding, 

Petitioner asserts he filed an “appeal” to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

3.)

2

Presumably the conclusion that Petitioner’s actual innocence argument failed to state a 

claim was based upon the fact that Arizona’s felony murder offense does not mandate 

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F. PROCEEDINGS ON THIRD POST CONVICTION RELIEF

On December 8, 2004, Petitioner filed a new Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit S), again asserting his actual innocence, citing discrepancies and false 

statements in the police interviews. On the same date, the PCR court again disposed of 

the petition by finding that the request was untimely and Petitioner failed to state a claim. 

(Exhibit T, M.E. 12/08/04.)

G. PROCEEDINGS ON FOURTH POST CONVICTION RELIEF

Notwithstanding the PCR Court’s order, on January 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a 

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit U), asserting ineffective assistance of 

counsel based upon counsel’s failure to file an appeal of the sentence. On the same date, 

the PCR court again disposed of the petition by finding that “all remedies have 

previously been exhausted.” (Exhibit V, M.E. 1/3/05.)

H. PROCEEDINGS ON FIFTH POST CONVICTION RELIEF

On March 17, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence (Exhibit W), 

arguing that his sentence should be reduced to a flat 25 years, based upon his having 

only a minor role in the shooting. On April 13, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition to 

Modify Sentence, attempting to reduce his sentence to a flat 25 years and to eliminate 

any community supervision after release.3

On April 16, 2010, the trial court construed the Motion to Reduce Sentence as an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus and denied it. (Exhibit Y, M.E. 4/16/10.)

 

that the defendant have been the cause of death or even the promoter, but simply an 

accomplice in the underlying robbery. See State v. Rios, 217 Ariz. 249, 251, 172 P.3d 

844, 846 (App. 2007). 

3

Petitioner identifies this as his first PCR Petition. (Petition , Doc. 1 at 4.)

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On April 27, 2010, Petitioner filed a “Motion of Appeal” (Exhibit Z) and a 

“Motion of Discovery” (Exhibit AA). 

On May 14, 2010, the trial court issued a modification to its earlier order to 

correct the Petitioner’s name, and directing the file be closed. (Exhibit BB, M.E. 

5/14/10.) On May 18, 2010, the trial court denied the Motion of Appeal as moot, noting 

the proper procedure was to file a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Exhibit CC, M.E. 5/18/10.)

On May 14, 2010, Petitioner filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals a “Notice of 

Appeal” (Exhibit DD), and on June 1, 2010 a Petition for Review (Exhibit FF) and 

Appendix (Exhibit GG).4 His motion for oral argument was denied. (Exhibit HH 

Motion, Exhibit II, Order 9/10/10.) 

On October 27, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the Petition for 

Review as to both the Motion to Reduce Sentence and the Petition to Modify Sentence. 

The court found that the attack on Petitioner’s sentence was procedurally precluded 

because it was addressed in the earlier proceeding, and his other claims challenging his 

sentenced were waived by his failure to bring them earlier, or were not ripe. (Exhibit JJ, 

Mem. Dec.)

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit KK, 

Petition),

5 which summarily denied review on February 24, 2011. (Exhibit LL, Order.) 

The Mandate issued April 12, 2011 (Exhibit MM).

/ /

/ /

 

4

Petitioner identifies this as his second PCR petition. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4.)

5

Petitioner identifies this as his third PCR petition. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.)

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I. OTHER STATE CORRESPONDENCE

Beginning in October, 2001 and continuing through 2010, Petitioner began 

addressing a series of letters to the Pinal County Superior Court, most of them 

specifically addressed to the Court Clerk (Exhibit NN). On several occasions in 2008, 

the Clerk responded, declining to offer legal advice and directing Plaintiff to retain 

counsel or conduct his own legal research. (Id.)

J. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 7, 2011 (Doc. 1). Petitioner 

asserts four grounds for relief, the nature of which is not crystalline. The Court’s service 

Order simply quoted the summaries from the Petition:

(1) “6th Amendment [-] I placed in a mo[]tion for o[ra]l 

argument to State Court of Appeals.”

(2) “6th Amendment for the following that the attorney that 

placed in my first rel[ie]f was not valid.”

(3) “14th Amendment for due process for the fact that AZ has in 

fact violated [its] ow[]n state law of sentence to convicted persons 

after 1994 Jan (1).”

(4) “5th Amendment [-] I was denied due pro[c]es[s] by the 

Court of Appeal[s] by not noticing the over[sight] by Mr. Villareal.”

(Service Order, Doc. 4 at 2.)

Respondents have characterized them as follows:

(1) A challenge to “the Court of Appeal’s September 10, 2010, Order denying oral 

argument in connection with his 2010 Petition for Review.” (Answer, Doc. 14 

at 17.)

(2) A “claim for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id. at 18.)

(3) A claim “that Petitioner’s federal due process rights were somehow violated 

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because the State did not comply with a provision of Arizona law effective 

January 1, 1994, although Petitioner does not state what aspect of his sentence 

was allegedly defective.” (Id. at 20.)

(4) A claim “that Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights were denied 

when the Arizona Court of Appeals filed to notice an ‘over[sight’ by 

Petitioner’s defense counsel, who represented Petitioner in his 1995 guilty 

plea and sentencing and his 2002 First PCR.” (Id. at 22.)

Petitioner has not opposed these characterizations.

As noted by Petitioner, this Court is obligated to pursue his pro se filings 

liberally. "We must construe pro se habeas filings liberally, and may treat the allegations 

of a verified complaint or petition as an affidavit." Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 

924 (9th Cir. 2003).

In light of the foregoing, and having reviewed the language of Petitioner’s 

Petition and the record, the undersigned liberally construes Petitioner’s Petition to assert 

the following claims:

(1) Self Representation - Petitioner was denied his right of self-representation 

under the Sixth Amendment when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied him 

oral argument and discovery in his 2010 petition for review.

(2) Ineffective Assistance - Petitioner’s post conviction relief counsel provided 

ineffective assistance, in violation of the 6th Amendment, by failing to 

adequately raise all of Petitioner’s claims.

(3) Disparate Sentencing - Petitioner was denied due process when the State of 

Arizona violated its own law by sentencing Petitioner more harshly than his 

co-defendants, who committed the same acts.

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(4) Due Process on Review - Petitioner was denied due process in his 2010 

Petition for Review, when the Arizona Court of Appeals failed to recognized 

that Petitioner had not been given any relief in his first PCR proceeding

attacking ADOC’s calculation of his sentence.

On May 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a “Motion of Amendment” (Doc. 10) seeking to 

supplement his arguments in support of the Petition with several case citations and 

copies of his current sentence computation. The Court granted the motion to the extent 

that the supplemental citations and exhibits would be considered. (Order 5/18/11, Doc. 

11.)

Response - On June 28, 2011, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 14). Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely and barred by the 

statute of limitations, and that Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable federal claims, were 

procedurally barred under independent and adequate state grounds, or are procedurally 

defaulted. 

Reply – Petitioner then filed a series of motions, including a Motion to Respond 

(Doc. 15), and Motion to Introduce Witnesses (Doc. 17). The motions were denied, and 

Plaintiff was given a deadline to file a traverse addressing the procedural defenses raised 

in the Answer. (Order 8/17/11, Doc. 21.) 

On September 2, 2011, Petitioner filed his original Reply (Doc. 23). 

Petitioner then sought to file a series of supplements and partial amendments. 

(Docs. 24, 26, 27, 29.) The Court denied these and granted Petitioner leave to file a 

single amended reply. (Order 11/1/11, Doc. 34.) 

On November 10, 2011, Petitioner filed his Amended Reply (“Amendment to 

Respon[se] of Travers[e]”). Petitioner argues that his challenges to an illegal sentence 

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are not subject to the statute of limitations, that his claims have either been resolved on 

the merits, or any failure to exhaust was not a deliberate bypass of state remedies and 

resulted from the state’s refusal to grant him an evidentiary hearing, and that he has 

cause to excuse any procedural default because he is pro se, untrained, and has had 

difficulties in obtaining copies. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Finality - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins 

to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

For Arizona pleading defendants, their opportunity for direct review is an Arizona 

Rule 32 of-right post conviction relief proceeding. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 

(9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, Petitioner did not seek an “of-right” PCR proceeding. Such a proceeding 

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must be commenced “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence.” 

Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 32.4(a). Thus, Petitioner's conviction became final 90 days after the 

January 12, 1995 sentence (Exhibit I), or on April 12, 1995. 

Effective Date - However, the AEDPA was not adopted until April 24, 1996. 

"State prisoners...whose convictions became final prior to AEDPA's enactment [on 

April 24, 1996], had a one-year grace period in which to file their petitions." Patterson 

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Rule 6(a), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, that one year grace period "ended on April 24, 1997 in the absence of 

statutory tolling." Id. at 1246.

Thus, barring any statutory tolling, Petitioner's one year began to run after April 

24, 1996, and he had until April 24, 1997 to file his federal habeas petition. 

Discovery – Although Petitioner does not raise the issue, the undersigned notes 

that the statute of limitations provides a number of alternate commencement dates, 

including “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Here, 

Petitioner’s Grounds 1 (Self Representation) and 4 (Due Process on Review) relate to 

violations of his rights purportedly occurring in his Fifth PCR Proceeding, in 2010. And, 

his Ground 2 relates to ineffective assistance of counsel occurring in his first PCR 

proceeding in 2002. These claims could not have been brought in 1996 or 1997, when 

Petitioner’s ordinary one year limitations period was running. 

As to both Ground 1 and 4, Petitioner was aware of the purported denial of his 

rights by the Arizona Court of Appeals at least by that court’s October 27, 2010 

Memorandum Decision (Exhibit JJ). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner’s one year on those claims would have commenced running at least by that 

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date, and expired on October 27, 2011, making this habeas Petition timely on those 

claims.

As to Ground 2, Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was concluded by June 3, 2002, 

when the PCR court issued its final ruling in that proceeding (Exhibit P). Accordingly, 

the undersigned presumes for purposes of this Report & Recommendation that 

Petitioner’s one year on those claims would have commenced running at least by that 

date, and expired on June 3, 2003.

As to Ground 3, however, Petitioner in that claim challenges the original 

sentence. Petitioner’s claim is founded upon the sentences afforded to the other 

defendants, and the interviews of them. Petitioner does not suggest that this information 

was not available to him at the time of his conviction. 

Illegal Sentence – Petitioner contends that because he is challenging an “illegal 

sentence,” he can bring his claims at any time. (Amended Reply, Doc. 25 at 1.) 

However, the only federal authority he cites for this proposition, U.S. v. Gonazles, 12 

F.3d 298 (1st Cir. 1993), does not deal with the habeas statute of limitations, but applies 

the principle that the federal sentencing guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing 

control a federal sentence.6 The federal habeas statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, 

controls the timeliness of federal habeas petitions, not the federal sentencing guidelines.

Timeliness – Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner’s Petition, filed March 7, 

2011, was timely as to Grounds 1 and 4, but in the absence of adequate tolling, untimely 

as to Grounds 2 and 3.

 

6

The state authority Petitioner cites reflects the state policy of applying the sentencing 

laws in effect at the time of commission of the crime. See State v. Newton, 200 Ariz. 1, 

21 P.3d 387 (2001)

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3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was commenced on April 16, 2002 on the filing 

of his first Petition for Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit L). At that time, the limitations 

period on his Ground 3, which commenced running on the effective date of the AEDPA, 

had been expired for almost five years. Once the habeas statute has run, a subsequent 

post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not reset the running of the one year 

statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Petitioner is 

entitled to no statutory tolling with respect to Ground 3 (Disparate Sentence).

Petitioner’s one year on Ground 2 (Ineffective Assistance) commenced running 

on June 3, 2002, on the issuance of the PCR court’s order (Exhibit P), and expired on 

June 3, 2003. Petitioner’s next PCR proceeding was not commenced until over six 

months later when he filed his Notice of Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit Q) in his second 

PCR proceeding. At that time, his one year had already expired, and thus no further 

tolling is applicable. Jiminiez, 276 F.3d at 482.

Accordingly, as to both Grounds 2 and 3, Petitioner has not shown adequate 

statutory tolling to make his Petition timely. 

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

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were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.). 

In his Petition, Petitioner argues that his delay should be excused because he had 

been denied access to mail for some period of time. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner’s 

vague and conclusory allegation is not sufficient to show he is entitled to equitable 

tolling during the relevant periods. 

As to Ground 2 (Ineffective Assistance), Petitioner’s one year was running in 

2002 and 2003. By at least September 27, 2004 Petitioner was able to file his Notice of 

Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit Q) in his second PCR proceeding. Thus, at best, 

Petitioner would be entitled to equitable tolling until that date. Even if this Court were to 

find Petitioner entitled to statutory tolling for the entire time from there through the 

dismissal of his fourth PCR proceeding on January 3, 2005 (Exhibit V), over five years 

expired between that proceeding and his March 17, 2010 Motion for Reduction (Exhibit 

W). 

As to Ground 3 (Disparate Sentencing), Petitioner’s one year was running in 1996 

and 1997. Even if this Court were to presume Petitioner was denied access to mail all 

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the way until his 2002 PCR Petition, and that he was entitled to statutory tolling during 

the pendency of that first PCR, that proceeding was concluded on June 2, 2002 and no 

other proceeding was commenced until his second PCR notice, filed September 27, 

2004, over two years later.

The fact that Petitioner’s Petition may have been subsequently delayed, e.g. by 

denial of mail immediately prior to its filing, is irrelevant. As to Grounds 2 and 3, the 

statute had long since expired.

The Court also notes that Petitioner has at most times been proceeding pro se, and 

that Petitioner suffers from apparent mental afflictions. A prisoner's pro se status is not 

an extraordinary circumstance. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000). And, 

"ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not 

excuse prompt filing." Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir.1999). Nor does 

Petitioner show that his disabilities have precluded a timely filing. Despite those 

disabilities, Petitioner has prosecuted on his own some four separate PCR proceedings, 

as well as the instant habeas proceeding. There is nothing to suggest that those 

disabilities had anything to do with the years which have elapsed without a federal filing 

by Petitioner.

The undersigned finds no basis for equitable tolling.

5. Actual Innocence

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the statute of limitations is subject to an 

exception for claims of actual innocence. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011).

Petitioner makes no such claim in this proceeding.

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6. Summary

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s claims in 

Grounds 2 and 3 are barred by the statute of limitations, and Grounds 1 and 4 are not. 

B. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents contend that Ground 1 (Self Representation) and Ground 4 (Due 

Process on Review) were never fairly presented to the state courts and are now 

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review. (Answer, Doc. 14 at 19, 

21.)

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Forum/Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

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constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).7

 b. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, 

but must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a 

"fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his 

constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 

(1971). A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has 

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is 

based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, 

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

c. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Ground 1 (Self Representation) – For his Ground 1, Petitioner argues he was 

denied his right of self-representation under the Sixth Amendment when the Arizona 

Court of Appeals denied him oral argument and discovery in his 2010 petition for 

 

7

The Arizona statutes on which Swoopes was based were subsequently amended to 

exclude life sentences from an appeal of right to the Arizona Supreme Court. See State 

v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 158, n.1, 777 P.2d 220, 221, n.1 (1989). Because Petitioner 

did not present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the undersigned does not 

reach whether presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court would also have been 

required.

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review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Petitioner did file a Motion for Oral Argument (Exhibit HH) with the appellate 

court, citing his lack of counsel. However, Petitioner did not argue that a denial of 

counsel would be a violation of his right of self-representation or otherwise assert a 

constitutional claim. The only authority cited in his Motion was the state court rule.

Petitioner also repeated his request for counsel and oral argument in his Petition 

for Review (Exhibit FF at 2) and his Appendix (Exhibit GG) to his Petition for Review, 

but again, cited no federal authority and asserted no constitutional violation.

Petitioner did not raise to the Arizona Supreme Court any issues of his 

representation in his 5th PCR proceeding, but solely complained of the actions of his 

counsel in his first PCR proceeding and at trial. (Exhibit KK, PFR at 2, 4.) 

It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were 

before the state courts or that a "somewhat similar state law claim was made." Anderson 

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). Failure to alert the state court to the 

constitutional nature of the claim amounts to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995).

Petitioner has never asserted to the state courts the 6th Amendment claim he now 

urges. Accordingly, this claim was not properly exhausted.

Ground 4 (Due Process on Review) – For his Ground 4, Petitioner argues he 

was denied due process in his 2010 Petition for Review, when the Arizona Court of 

Appeals failed to recognize that Petitioner had not been given any relief in his first PCR 

proceeding.

Petitioner did complain to the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit FF, PFR at 2) 

and the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit GG, PFR at 2) about the lack of relief in his 

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first PCR proceeding. However, Petitioner did not assert this as a violation of due 

process and did not cite any federal authority in support of the proposition. Thus, 

Petitioner has not fairly presented this claim, and has failed to properly exhaust his state 

remedies. Anderson, supra; Duncan, supra.

d. Summary re Exhaustion - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds 

that Petitioner’s Grounds 1 and 4 were not properly exhausted.

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper 

absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 

1, 11 (1984).

Petitioner argues that notwithstanding any procedural default, he is entitled to 

review of his claims if “he has not ‘deliberately bypassed’ or abuse[d] state court 

procedures.” (Amended Reply, Doc. 35 at 2.) The “deliberate bypass” standard was 

formerly the law under Faye v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434, 438 (1963), but was overruled

in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and in its place the cause and prejudice 

standard was adopted.

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

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to the state courts, and thus they are procedurally defaulted. Respondents generally rely 

upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time bar, set 

out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.4(a). (Answer, Doc. 14 at 17, n. 13.) 

Remedies Within Prior PCR- To the extent that Petitioner should have raised 

his complaints to either the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court in 

his fifth PCR proceeding, those proceedings have concluded with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals mandate issued April 12, 2011 (Exhibit MM). As noted in that Mandate, the 

time for a motion for reconsideration had already expired. Petitioner does not suggest 

that some other means of direct review in that proceeding remains available.

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, as 

a pleading defendant in a non-capital sentence case, Petitioner had no right to file a direct 

appeal. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033 (2001); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e) (waiver of appeal 

by guilty plea). Accordingly, review by direct appeal is not available.

Remedies by New Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review 

by a subsequent PCR Petition. Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction 

process, a claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post conviction relief that 

"has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the 

State simply shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a 

previous collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 

1070 (2002) (quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient 

constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, 

''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." 

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Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by 

a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 

(App.Div. 2, 2007). In coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona 

Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a 

jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona 

Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 

46 P.3d at 1071.8

Here, Petitioner’s unexhausted claims do not fit within the list of claims identified 

as requiring a personal waiver. Nor are they of the same character. The closest would be 

Petitioner’s allegation of a denial of self-representation, with regard to a waiver of the 

right to counsel. However, there is no right to counsel in Arizona or under the federal 

Constitution after direct appeal or an of-right PCR petition. See Lammie v. Barker, 185 

Ariz. 263, 264, 915 P.2d 662, 663 (1996). Therefore, the undersigned concludes that 

Petitioner’s claims would be precluded by his failure to raise them in an earlier 

proceeding.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

 

8

 Some types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type of waiver 

required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz. at 450, 

46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission), Swoopes, 

216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived by 

omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy 

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal 

sentence (waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge 

conflict of interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 

2008).

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the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Illegal Sentences - Petitioner argues that he can challenge an illegal sentence at 

any time. (Amended Reply, Doc. 35 at 1-2.) However, none of the authorities Petitioner 

cites support that proposition. For example, he cites Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4037, but that 

statute merely acknowledges the Arizona Supreme Court’s authority to correct an illegal 

sentence on appeal, it does not provide an exception to the time limits for seeking appeal. 

He cites State v. Newton, 200 Ariz. 1, 21 P.3d 387 (2001), but that case deals only with 

the sentencing statutes applicable to a given offense.8 

Petitioner also argues that his claims of illegal sentence “cannot be procedurally 

barred under by (AEDPA) Part II under state law.” (Amended Reply, Doc. 35 at 2.) 

However, state law does not dictate the requirements for consideration of claims in this 

federal habeas court. This Court looks to state law only to ascertain whether Petitioner’s 

state remedies were properly exhausted and/or are now procedurally defaulted.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

 

8

Petitioner also references State v. Cox, and State v. Coy, but provides no citation. 

(Amended Reply, Doc. 35 at 1.) The undersigned is unable to discern the intended 

authorities.

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d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed 

has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts 

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the 

trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly 

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative 

or used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence 

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical 

significance at trial such that the evidence probably would have 

changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without 

fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined 

to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's 

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence 

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish 

that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of 

the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court 

would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. 

Paragraph 32.1(d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner, like Petitioner, who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or 

sentence, without asserting that the sentence has already expired. While Petitioner does 

complain that ADOC has miscalculated his sentence, he does not allege that his actual 

sentence has already expired. 

Petitioner asserts no newly discovered evidence, and his underlying factual 

assertions have all been previously argued to the state courts. Where a claim is based on 

"newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state courts, the 

evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application.

Paragraph (f) has no application because Petitioner's claims are not barred 

because not timely presented on direct appeal or PCR of-right.

Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in 

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the law since his last PCR proceeding. 

Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application 

to Petitioner’s procedural claims. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404, 166 P.3d 

945, 959 (App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where petitioner had “not established that 

trial error ...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”). 

Summary - Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that review through 

Arizona’s direct appeal and post-conviction relief process is no longer possible for 

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims, and that the unexhausted claims are now procedurally 

defaulted, and absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence, must be 

dismissed with prejudice.

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123. 

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can occur, the 

Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. Barton, 894 

F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 

832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily 

turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

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under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Here, Petitioner does not proffer any good cause to excuse his failures to exhaust. 

Petitioner does complain that he was not afforded an evidentiary hearing and oral 

argument. (Amended Reply, Doc. 35 at 2.) While perhaps the absence of an evidentiary 

hearing or oral argument might have made Petitioner unsuccessful in proving the claims 

he did raise, Petitioner does not suggest how their absence precluded him from asserting 

his federal claims to the state courts. 

Petitioner complains that he has been pro se, untrained, received aid from other 

inmates and was denied permission to make a copy of an article to support his case. 

(Amended Reply, Doc. 35 at 4.) In Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376 (1988), the Ninth 

Circuit rejected a prisoner’s argument that his mental condition and reliance upon 

incompetent “jailhouse lawyers” established cause to excuse a procedural default. 

Petitioner does not suggest how the inability to copy an article kept him from laying out 

his federal claims.

Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his procedural default. Both "cause" and 

"prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, although a court need not 

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. 

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th 

Cir.1991). Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's claims or 

the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion 

intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a 

“miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

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(9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the 

Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion 

outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & 

Proc., §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly 

limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 

2008). Here, Petitioner makes no pretense of asserting his actual innocence.

Accordingly, Petitioner's procedural defaults may not be avoided, and his 

procedurally defaulted claims in Grounds 1 and 4 must be dismissed with prejudice.

C. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 2 (Ineffective Assistance) and 3 (Disparate 

Sentencing) are barred by the statute of limitations, and must be dismissed with 

prejudice. Petitioner’s state remedies on his claims in Grounds 1 (Self Representation)) 

and 4 (Due Process on Review) were not properly exhausted, are now procedurally 

defaulted, and therefore these claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the Petition in its entirety must be 

dismissed with prejudice.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

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when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected under the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned 

finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable whether the district court was 

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correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this 

Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed March 7, 2011 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJDUICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be

DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

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47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 17, 2012

11-0443r RR 12 02 08 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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