Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02658/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02658-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

THOMAS JENNINGS, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

W. MUNIZ, Warden, 

 Respondents. 

Case No.: 14-cv-2658-AJB-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

MOTION FOR STAY 

[ECF No. 6] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

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For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner’s motion for a stay be DENIED and that grounds three 

and four of Petitioner’s Petition be DISMISSED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Federal Proceedings 

Thomas Jennings (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se. (ECF No. 3 at 1). On October 27, 2014, Petitioner constructively 

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this District.1 (ECF Nos. 

1, 2). 

Petitioner asserts four grounds for relief: (1) ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel for failing to argue that three of Petitioner’s 

strikes should be stricken because they arose out of a single period of 

aberrant conduct and for failing to produce the reporter’s transcript 

from the 2002 sentencing proceeding; (2) that Petitioner’s Sixth and 

 

1 Although R. Grounds was the warden at the time Petitioner filed this 

Petition, Petitioner has notified the Court that William L. Muniz is now 

warden. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s 

website confirms William L. Muniz is the Warden of Salinas Valley 

State Prison. Accordingly, in order to conform with the requirements of 

Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the Court hereby sua 

sponte ORDERS the substitution of W. Muniz as Respondent in place 

of R. Grounds. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

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Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by CALCRIM No. 376’s 

admission of a burglary conviction where Petitioner’s possession of 

stolen property is combined with “slight” corroborating evidence; (3) 

that Petitioner’s appellate counsel failed to defend Petitioner’s right of 

protection against cruel and unusual punishment of a one-hundredplus-five-year sentence for burglary, grand theft, and unlawful taking 

of a vehicle; and, (4) that the trial court failed to adequately inform 

Petitioner that his “plea would result in four separate strikeable 

enhancements in the future.” (ECF No. 1 at 6-23). Petitioner concedes 

that grounds three and four were not raised in the California Supreme 

Court, but requests a stay because they are currently pending in the 

California Superior Court. (ECF No. 1 at 7-8). 

On November 14, 2014, this Court filed an Order Setting Briefing 

Schedule on Request for Stay. (ECF No. 4). This Court found that 

Petitioner did not allege exhaustion as to claims three and four. Id. at 

2. Petitioner was notified that he must meet the stay and abeyance 

requirements and was advised of the one-year statute of limitations 

that applies to federal habeas corpus actions, which is tolled while a 

properly filed state habeas petition is pending. Id. at 2-3. 

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On January 5, 2015, Petitioner filed a Brief in Support of Motion 

for Stay on grounds three and four of his Petition. (ECF No. 6). On 

February 4, 2015, Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner’s Motion 

for Stay. (ECF No. 7). 

B. State Proceedings 

In 2002, Petitioner was previously convicted of four counts of 

residential burglary. (Lodg. No. 7 at 2). Each count qualified as a 

strike under the Three-Strikes law. Id. In 2010, Petitioner was 

charged in two new criminal cases (SCD229068 and SCD236226) 

involving seven new felonies regarding four more residential 

burglaries. Id. 

On September 7, 2011, a jury found Petitioner guilty of one count 

of burglary of an inhabited dwelling (Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 459 and 460) 

in SCD229068. Id. On that same day, Petitioner also admitted the 

following: (1) a first prison prior conviction allegation (Cal. Pen. Code, 

§§ 667.5(b) and 668); (2) a first serious felony prior conviction 

allegation based on the four 2002 offenses (Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 

667(a)(1), 668, and 1192.7(c)); and, (3) that those four offenses were 

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prior strike convictions within the meaning of the Three-Strikes law 

(Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 667(b)-(i), 668, and 1170.12). Id. 

On February 29, 2012, in SCD236226, a jury found Petitioner 

guilty of three counts of burglary of an inhabited dwelling (Cal. Pen. 

Code, §§ 459 and 460), one count of unlawful taking of a vehicle (Cal. 

Veh. Code, §10851(a)), and three counts of grand theft of personal 

property (Cal. Pen. Code, §§484(a), 487(a), and 488). Id. at 3. 

At a combined sentencing hearing on April 13, 2012, the court 

sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate prison term of one-hundredyears-to-life-plus-five-years.2 (Lodg. No. 4 at 955-56). Specifically, in 

SCD236226, the court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive twenty-fiveyear-to-life terms for all three residential burglary convictions, plus 

concurrent twenty-five-year-to-life terms for all three grand theft 

convictions and the taking of a vehicle conviction, and struck the 

prison prior allegation. (Lodg. No. 7 at 3). In SCD229068, the court 

sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five-years-to-life for his residential 

 

2 It appears Petitioner has the possibility of parole. A sentence 

resulting in imprisonment in the state prison includes parole 

supervision unless waived. Cal. Pen. Code § 3000(a)(1). There is no 

evidence of a waiver of parole. 

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burglary conviction consecutive to the sentence imposed in 

SCD236226, plus a consecutive five-year term for the true finding on 

the serious felony prior conviction allegation, and struck the prison 

prior allegation. Id. 

On October 19, 2012, Petitioner appealed. (Lodg. No. 5). First, 

he contended that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 

assistance by “(1) failing at the sentencing hearing to discuss People v. 

Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490 (Garcia) and argue that three of his four 

2002 prior strike convictions should be stricken because they arose out 

of a single period of aberrant conduct” and by “(2) failing to provide the 

court at sentencing with a reporter’s transcript of the 2002 hearing at 

which he was sentenced for those prior convictions.” (Lodg. No. 7 at 3-

4). 

Second, Petitioner contended the court erred by failing to stay 

the execution of the sentences imposed in SCD236226 for the three 

grand theft convictions and for the conviction of unlawfully taking or 

driving of a vehicle under California Penal Code § 654. Id. at 4. 

Third, Petitioner contended his Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated in that each element of the charged 

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offenses was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that jury 

instruction CALCRIM No. 376 in SCD236226, regarding the 

possession of recently stolen property as evidence of a crime, violated 

his due process rights. Id. 

On November 13, 2012, while his direct appeal was still pending, 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California 

Court of Appeal. (Lodg. No. 6). On June 24, 2013, the court of appeal 

affirmed the judgment in SDC229068, but modified the judgment in 

SDC236226 to stay the execution of the twenty-five-year-to-life 

sentences imposed for Petitioner’s three grand theft convictions and 

his conviction of unlawfully taking or driving of a vehicle under 

California Penal Code § 654. Id. at 30. The California Court of Appeal 

also denied Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus.3 California Courts, 4th 

Appellate District, Division 1, Docket (Register of Actions) In re: 

THOMAS DEAN JENNINGS on Habeas Corpus Case Number 

 

3 Respondent labeled Lodgment No. 14 “Order, Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus Denied, California Court of Appeal case no. D062961,” 

but it is an order notifying parties that the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus will be considered at the same time as the pending appeal. 

Respondent should ensure that all lodgments filed with this Court are 

correctly labeled. 

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D062961( June 16, 2015, 10:21 AM), 

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=41

&doc_id=2030256&doc_no=D062961. 

On July 29, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the 

Supreme Court of California for the “sole purpose of exhausting his 

state remedies prior to presenting his claims for federal habeas corpus 

relief.” (Lodg. No. 17 at 1). On September 11, 2013, the Supreme 

Court of California denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (Lodg. No. 

16). 

On August 6, 2013, Petitioner filed a Motion for Appointment of 

Counsel and Declaration of Indigency and a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodg. No. 19). 

Petitioner asserted two grounds for relief: (1) that the trial court 

erroneously imposed an illegal sentence and restitution fine that was 

excessive without determining Petitioner’s ability to pay; and, (2) that 

Petitioner should be resentenced under Proposition 36 (the ThreeStrikes Reform Act of 2012). Id. 

On September 30, 2013, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s 

writ of habeas corpus for two reasons: (1) Petitioner did not raise the 

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excessive restitution claim in the trial court or on appeal and waived 

the claim as a result; and (2) Petitioner’s resentencing claim is 

improperly raised by petition for writ of habeas corpus and is better 

brought by a separate petition for recall of sentence pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 1170.126. (Lodg.No. 20). 

On October 6, 2014, Petitioner constructively filed a second 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court claiming 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to challenge 

Petitioner’s sentence as cruel and unusual punishment.4 (Lodg. No. 

19). This petition is still pending. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) governs this Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. AEDPA has two 

main purposes: (1) to “reduce delays in executing state and federal 

criminal sentences,” and, (2) to “streamline federal habeas proceedings 

by increasing a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all claims in state 

court.” Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 

4 Respondent’s Lodgment No. 19 appears to include Petitioner’s second 

petition on accident. Respondent is again reminded to ensure the 

accuracy and organization of lodgments filed with the court. 

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A petitioner who wishes to challenge either his state court 

conviction or the length of his confinement in state prison must first 

exhaust his judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. 

Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987) (“[A]s a matter of [federal-state] 

comity, federal courts should not consider a claim in a habeas corpus 

petition until after the state courts have had an opportunity to act.”) 

(citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)). 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must fairly 

present his federal claim to the highest state court or demonstrate that 

no state remedy remains available. Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 

829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) 

and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). A federal claim is fairly 

presented if the petitioner has stated the “operative facts and the 

federal legal theory upon which his claim is based so that the state 

courts have a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to 

the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.” Kelly v. Small, 315 

F.3d 1063, 1066 (2003) (citing Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6 (1982)). 

A petition with both exhausted and unexhausted claims (“mixed 

petition”) must be dismissed without prejudice pending exhaustion. 

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Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). Under Lundy, a petitioner 

may file a new federal petition for writ of habeas corpus once the 

claims are exhausted, creating a total exhaustion rule. Rhines v. 

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). 

 Under stay and abeyance procedure, “rather than dismiss the 

petition pursuant to Lundy, a district court might stay the petition and 

hold it in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to 

exhaust his previously unexhausted claims.” Id at 275. The district 

court lifts the stay once petitioner exhausts state court remedies and 

then permits the petitioner to proceed in federal court. Id. at 275-76. 

The Ninth Circuit has established two procedures to seek a stay. 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278 (2005); Kelly, 315 F.3d (2003), overruled on 

other grounds by Robbin v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

Under Rhines, Petitioner must demonstrate: (1) good cause for 

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust all his claims before filing his federal 

habeas action; (2) that the unexhausted claims are potentially 

meritorious; and, (3) that Petitioner is not engaged in intentionally 

dilatory tactics. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. If all three requirements are 

met, the Court should stay the habeas case and hold it in abeyance, 

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leaving the mixed petition intact while Petitioner returns to state 

court to present his unexhausted claims. Id. 

The second method of staying a timely federal petition while a 

petitioner returns to state court to exhaust claims is the “withdrawal 

and abeyance” procedure – a three step process outlined by the Ninth 

Circuit in Kelly, 315 F.3d 1063. See also King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 

1139-40 (9th Cir. 2009). Unlike the Rhines “stay and abeyance” 

procedure, a petitioner seeking to use the Kelly procedure need not 

show good cause for his failure to exhaust. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1140. 

Instead, a petitioner may withdraw any unexhausted claims from his 

federal petition, return to state court and exhaust those claims while 

the federal court holds the fully exhausted claims in abeyance, then 

seek to amend the timely, stayed federal petition with the newly 

exhausted claims. Id. at 1139-40. The newly exhausted claims, 

however, must either themselves be timely under the statute of 

limitations or they must “relate back” to the claims in the fullyexhausted petition; that is, they must share a “common core of 

operative facts” with the previously exhausted claims. Id. at 1140-41; 

(quoting Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005)). 

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AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of 

federal petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The statute of limitations does 

not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. 

28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999); but see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that 

“an application is ‘properly filed when its delivery and acceptance [by 

the appropriate court officer for placement in the record] are in 

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”). 

However, the filing of a federal habeas petition does not toll the 

statute of limitations. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Currently pending before this Court is Petitioner’s request to 

stay and hold grounds three (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

for failing to challenge Petitioner’s sentence as cruel and unusual 

punishment) and four (the trial court in 2002 violated Petitioner’s 

rights by accepting his guilty plea) of his Petition in abeyance while he 

returns to state court to exhaust them. (ECF Nos. 1, 6, 7). 

// 

// 

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A. Rhines Stay and Abeyance 

This Court’s Order Setting Briefing Schedule informed Petitioner 

that if he “wishes to use the ‘stay and abeyance’ procedure,” he must 

demonstrate there are potentially meritorious claims which he wishes 

to exhaust in state court, that he is diligently pursuing his state court 

remedies, and that good cause exists for his failure to timely exhaust 

his state court remedies. (ECF No. 4 at 3) (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. 

277-78 (2005)). 

Assuming, without deciding, that Petitioner was diligent and can 

show good cause, his motion nevertheless fails under Rhines, because 

his claims are not potentially meritorious. Casset v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 

614 (9th Cir. 2005). A claim is not potentially meritorious if “the 

applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Casset, 406 

F.3d at 624; see Thomas v. Scribner, 389 Fed.Appx. 726 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(denying the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus on the merits because it 

does not raise a colorable federal claim). 

 1. Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to argue that his sentence of oneCase 3:14-cv-02658-AJB-MDD Document 9 Filed 07/21/15 Page 14 of 25
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hundred-years-to-life-plus-five-years is cruel and unusual punishment. 

(ECF No. 8 at 9). 

Respondent does not discuss the merits of Petitioner’s third 

ground. Petitioner states that four of his prior strikes arose from one 

single act, constituting one “swing at the bat” under the Three-Strikes 

Law. See id. at 7-8. As such, he argues his sentencing is excessive and 

unlawful. Id. He also indicates that because his crimes were against 

property and did not involve physical harm to persons he has the right 

to reduce his sentence under California Penal Code § 1170.126 and 

California Proposition 36. Id. 

Whether Petitioner’s sentence is subject to reduction pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 1170.126 and California Proposition 36 is a 

state law issue. This aspect of Petitioner’s claim does not present a 

potentially meritorious federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

This leaves the issue of whether Petitioner’s counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue that Petitioner’s sentence constituted 

cruel and unusual punishment. An ineffective assistance claim has 

two components: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, which 

requires showing that counsel made serious errors; and (2) counsel’s 

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deficient performance prejudiced the defense to the extent that the 

defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

First, there is no evidence that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. Instead, it appears that appellate counsel made a strategic 

decision to challenge Petitioner’s sentence on the grounds that “three 

of [Petitioner’s] strikes should be stricken due to the strikes arising out 

of a single period of aberrant conduct.” (Lodg. No. 5 at i). The courts 

generally defer to appellate counsel’s strategic choice to raise one claim 

over another, negating Petitioner’s deficient performance claim. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681. 

Additionally, asserting that Petitioner’s sentence constituted 

cruel and unusual punishment would have been futile. The Eighth 

Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly 

disproportionate to the crime. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 

997 (1991). Recidivist statutes, like California’s Three-Strikes Law, 

punish the offense of conviction and the defendant’s repetitive 

convictions. Holmes v. Valadez, No. C02-4566JSW(PR), 2005 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 31403, at *23 (N.D. Cal Nov. 21, 2005); 2005 WL 3113085. 

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In Holmes, the petitioner claimed his ninety-years-to-life 

sentence on two counts of burglary of an inhabited dwelling was cruel 

and unusual. Id. California considers burglary of an inhabited 

dwelling to be “inherently dangerous” and “incredibly violent toward 

the personal freedoms and living space of the victim of those crimes,” 

negating any argument of non-violent offenses. Id. at 25. Holmes had 

an extensive criminal history in the past thirty years and the court 

noted he was being punished for “his most recent conviction” and “for 

his recidivism.” Id. at 26. The court held that “[g]iven [Holmes’] 

extensive criminal recidivism, it cannot be said that [Holmes’] 

sentence of ninety years-to-life is grossly disproportionate.” Id. at 26-

27. For this reason, Holmes’ claim that his sentence was cruel and 

unusual punishment was denied. Id. 

Petitioner’s situation is analogous to Holmes. Petitioner was 

convicted of burglary of an inhabited dwelling and had been engaged 

in criminal activity since the age of thirteen. (ECF No. 8, Lodg. No. 7). 

His sentence was determined after taking into consideration his 

current convictions and his criminal recidivism. Petitioner’s sentence 

of one-hundred-years-to-life is only slightly longer than Holmes’ 

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sentence of ninety-years-to-life and can be justified because Petitioner 

was convicted of four counts of burglary of an inhabited dwelling as 

opposed to Holmes’ two counts. Petitioner’s appellate counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to raise a futile argument. 

Second, Petitioner does not meet the burden of pleading facts to 

show that the decision reached would “reasonably likely have been 

different absent the errors.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. As stated 

above, even if appellate counsel did raise the issue of cruel and 

unusual punishment, the effort would not be successful. 

The California Court of Appeal’s unpublished opinion forecloses 

the possibility that the outcome of the decision would be different. The 

opinion quotes the sentencing hearing from April 13, 2012 to show that 

an aggregate prison term of one-hundred-years-to-life-plus-five-years 

is reasonable: 

Well, standing before this court is an individual who has been 

convicted on two different jury trials of four residential 

burglaries. He has prior residential burglaries. He has been 

to prison. He started his criminal career at age 13 with a 

robbery which is depicted on page 5 [of the Probation Officer’s 

Report in SCD236226]. 

And he made a decision early in his life that he wanted to be 

a criminal. And he has no regard at all for other people, or 

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other people’s property. He is the type of individual who when 

they wrote the Three-Strikes law . . . were thinking about 

somebody like him. 

I have thought about exercising my Romero discretion. What 

Romero requires me to do is look at the nature and 

circumstances of the current crime, the nature and 

circumstances of prior crimes, strikes, and his chances of 

rehabilitation. 

So if we just take a very brief view of the current cases, not 

only does he break into people’s houses, steal their property, 

but the utter disrespect of just ransacking the houses, and the 

horror that the victims must feel when they come home, not 

just to find that their property is gone, but that somebody else 

has come in and completely destroyed, not just their property, 

but their sense of well-being; their safety. A home is supposed 

to be the one place where all people can come in and feel safe. 

He has utterly shattered that in these particular cases. 

I look at the nature and circumstances of his prior strikes. 

Again, the same scenario plays out as in our current cases. 

He can’t change. He won’t change. He has no interest in 

changing. His chances of rehabilitation are zero. He is a 

career criminal. He is somebody that in order to protect the 

community, he must be locked up in prison for the rest of his 

life. That’s what is going to happen today. 

(Lodg. No. 7 at 17) (emphasis added). 

 The court of appeal found that Petitioner is a “habitual offender” 

and that his sentence is appropriate under the Three-Strikes Law. Id.

at 23; see also Holmes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31403, 2005 WL 

3113085. The United States Supreme Court held that the ThreeCase 3:14-cv-02658-AJB-MDD Document 9 Filed 07/21/15 Page 19 of 25
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Strikes Law does not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); see 

also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding a life sentence 

imposed under a Texas recidivist statute). As such, Petitioner’s 

sentence is appropriate under the Eighth Amendment and does not 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 

2. Ground Four: 2002 Guilty Plea Violation 

Petitioner asserts that he was unaware that his guilty plea from 

2002 waived his constitutional rights to a jury, to confront witnesses 

against him, and to avoid self-incrimination – and therefore did not 

waive his rights. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that the court 

advised him his plea was not a strike offense when the crime actually 

constituted four strikes. Id. at 8-9. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s fourth ground for relief is 

meritless. Id. at 6. Respondent references Lackawanna County Dist. 

Atty. v. Coss (“Lackawanna”) to prove that “habeas corpus relief is not 

available to a criminal defendant who challenges a judgment for which 

his sentence has fully expired but was used to enhance a later 

sentence because the defendant was no longer ‘in custody’ as a result 

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of the earlier judgment.” Id. at 6 (citing Lackawanna County Dist. 

Atty., 532 U.S. 394, 401 (2001)). 

Petitioner’s assertion that he was unaware his guilty plea waived 

his constitutional rights or that the trial court misadvised him that his 

plea was not a strike offense is not supported by the record. The San 

Diego Superior Court’s reporter’s transcript from July 17, 2002 states: 

The Court: Gentlemen, do each of you understand that by 

pleading guilty, you’re giving up the following constitutional 

rights: that is, the right to a speedy and public trial by judge 

or jury; the right to confront and to cross examine any and all 

witnesses against you; the right to remain silent and unless 

you choose to give up that right, and you can give testimony 

in your own behalf; the right to present evidence and to 

subpoena witnesses to give testimony in your behalf at no cost 

to you. 

(Lodg. No. 1 at 61) 

Petitioner acknowledged that he understood that his guilty plea 

was a waiver of those rights: 

[The Court:] Do each of you understand that by pleading 

guilty, you’re giving up each of these constitutional rights? 

[Petitioner]? 

[Petitioner]: Yes, sir. 

Id. 

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 Moreover, the court advised Petitioner his plea constituted strike 

offenses: 

The Court: Gentlemen, these offenses, these residential 

burglaries are also called serious or violent felonies, therefore, 

subjecting you to what are called strike offenses. 

Id. at 63. 

Additionally, Lackawanna clarifies that this claim is not 

potentially meritorious. In Lackawanna, a federal habeas corpus 

petitioner challenged a current sentence enhanced by an allegedly 

invalid prior sentence. Lackawanna County Dist. Atty., 532 U.S. at 

401-02. The United States Supreme Court held that relief is 

unavailable through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “when a 

prisoner challenges a current sentence on the ground that it was 

enhanced based on an allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction for 

which the petitioner is no longer in custody.” Id. at 396 (citing Daniels 

v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 384 (2001)). 

 Here, Petitioner was sentenced in 2002 to a term of four-years, 

with each of his four counts concurrent with the other. (Lodg. No. 6, 

Exhibit B at 11). In 2013, after Petitioner was no longer in custody 

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plus-five-years. (Lodg. No. 7 at 3). Petitioner is challenging the 

sentence he is currently serving “on the ground that it was enhanced 

based on an allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction for which 

[Petitioner] is no longer in custody.” Lackawanna County Dist. Atty., 

532 U.S. at 396 (citing Daniels, 532 U.S. at 384). Lackawanna applies 

to this claim and renders Petitioner’s fourth ground meritless. 

Neither of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are potentially 

meritorious. As a result, this Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s 

Motion for stay under Rhines be DENIED. 

B. Kelly Withdrawal and Abeyance 

Petitioner’s main argument is that stay and abeyance is 

appropriate according to the three-step procedure outlined in Kelly. 

Under this approach, a petitioner may withdraw any unexhausted 

claims from his federal petition, return to state court and exhaust 

those claims while the federal court holds the fully exhausted claims in 

abeyance, then seek to amend the timely, stayed federal petition with 

the newly exhausted claims. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1139-40. 

Assuming that a stay is otherwise warranted under Kelly, this 

Court may deny claims for a writ of habeas corpus where they are 

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clearly meritless. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (stating that meritless claims 

can be denied even though such claims are unexhausted). As 

previously discussed, Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not 

potentially meritorious. Granting Petitioner’s Motion for Stay would 

be an empty gesture. Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay under Kelly be DENIED. This Court 

FURTHER RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s third and fourth grounds be 

DISMISSED. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting 

this Report and Recommendation; (2) DENYING Petitioner’s Motion 

for Stay; and, (3) DISMISSING Petitioner’s third and fourth grounds 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than August 11, 2015. The document should be captioned “Objections 

to Report and Recommendation.” 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

August 18, 2015. The parties are advised that the failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 21, 2015

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