Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01115/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01115-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES, INC., a

California corporation,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-1115 H (POR)

ORDER RE MOTIONS IN

LIMINE

vs.

RENAISSANCE GROUP

INTERNATIONAL, a New Jersey

company; RALPHS GROCERY

COMPANY, an Ohio corporation,

Defendants.

On May 12, 2008, the Court held a hearing on the parties’ motions in limine. Peter W.

Ross and Steven W. Winton appeared for plaintiff Brighton Collectibles, Inc. Christopher R.

Ball and Colin T. Kemp represented defendant Ralphs Grocery Company. After considering

the briefing by both parties and the arguments presented by counsel at the hearing, the Court

summarizes its rulings on the parties’ motions in limine as follows:

Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

1. Plaintiff’s first motion in limine seeks exclusion of any argument or evidence 

related to intellectual property infringement allegations and/or lawsuits brought against

Plaintiff by parties not involved in this case. (Doc. No. 176.) The Court denies the motion,

without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to contemporaneously object at trial to the admissibility

of such evidence.

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2. Plaintiff’s second motion in limine seeks exclusion of evidence relating to any

Brighton product other than those identified by Plaintiff as exhibiting the trade dress asserted

by Plaintiff in this case. (Doc. No. 177.) Plaintiff contends that a trade dress plaintiff may

define its product line however it chooses, and therefore that evidence of other products is

inadmissible under Rules 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendant responds

that it should be permitted to put on evidence regarding what constitutes the “Brighton line”

of products, since such evidence is relevant to whether Plaintiff possesses a distinctive trade

dress. Defendant also contends that evidence regarding other products made by Plaintiff is

relevant to whether Plaintiff’s asserted trade dress has “secondary meaning.” 

The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion. To establish a protectable trade dress, Plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing that the products it asserts against Defendant have acquired

“secondary meaning.” Wal-Mart v. Samara, 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000). Secondary meaning

exists when, “in the minds of the public, the primary significant of a [trade dress] is to identify

the source of the product rather than the product itself.” Id. at 211. The Ninth Circuit defines

secondary meaning as “the mental association by a substantial segment of consumers and

potential consumers between the alleged mark and a single source of the product.” Levi

Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985). 

“Secondary meaning can be established in many ways, including (but not limited to)

direct consumer testimony; survey evidence; exclusivity, manner, and length of use of a [trade

dress]; amount and manner of advertising; amount of sales and number of customers;

established place in the market; and proof of intentional copying by the defendant.” Filipino

Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publications, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999).

Advertising activities, however, “must involve ‘image advertising,’ that is the ads must feature

in some way the trade dress itself. Otherwise, even evidence of extensive advertising or other

promotional efforts would not necessarily indicate that prospective buyers would associate the

trade dress with a particular source.” First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378,

1383 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The Court concludes that evidence regarding products other than those Plaintiff has

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28 1 Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s fourth motion in limine, regarding evidence of

settlement discussions. (See Doc. No. 190.) The Court therefore grants that motion.

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identified as bearing the trade dress at issue is relevant to Plaintiff’s “manner of advertising,”

which in turn bears relevance to whether Plaintiff’s asserted products have acquired secondary

meaning. See Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1151. The Court concludes that, although

Plaintiff is free to define whichever products it chooses as bearing the asserted trade dress, so

too is Defendant entitled to present evidence related to other products made by Plaintiff insofar

as that evidence is relevant to whether Plaintiff has advertised its trade dress in a manner that

has caused it to achieve secondary meaning. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion

in limine to exclude such evidence. Plaintiff may object at trial to the admissibility of evidence

regarding products not bearing Plaintiff’s asserted trade dress.

3. Plaintiff’s third motion in limine requests exclusion of all evidence relating to

Brighton’s yearly revenues or net worth, pursuant to Rules 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules

of Evidence. (Doc. No. 178.) Defendant responds that Plaintiff has put its revenues at issue

by asserting a claim for approximately $2.5 million in harm to its goodwill. (See Doc. No.

188.) 

The Court concludes that evidence of Brighton’s yearly revenues is relevant to

Plaintiff’s claim for lost goodwill. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion on Rule

402 grounds. The Court also declines at this time to exclude the evidence under Rule 403.

Plaintiff may object at trial to the admissibility of this evidence.

4. Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s fourth motion in limine, regarding 

evidence of settlement discussions. (Doc. Nos. 179, 190.) The Court therefore grants that

motion.

5. Plaintiff’s fifth motion in limine1

 seeks exclusion at trial of any argument that

insufficient evidence exists regarding actual consumer confusion. (Doc. No. 180.) Plaintiff

contends that it was denied access to the names and contact information of consumers who

purchased from Defendant’s stores the Langdon Leather products at issue. During discovery

Plaintiff requested that Defendant produce the identities of such consumers. When Defendant

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refused, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendant to produce the information. (See Doc.

No. 101.) On June 20, 2007, the magistrate judge issued an order denying Plaintiff’s motion

to compel. (Doc. No. 111.) The magistrate judge concluded that “Ralphs’ need to protect the

information sought outweighs Brighton’s need to know at this juncture in the litigation.” The

magistrate judge’s ruling was “without prejudice to Brighton renewing its request at a time

when the requisite need may be shown.” (Id.) On August 9, 2007, the Court affirmed the

magistrate judge’s ruling. (Doc. No. 133.) Subsequently, Plaintiff has not attempted to narrow

or renew its request for this information.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to exclude argument that insufficient evidence

exists regarding actual consumer confusion. Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on all

elements of its trade dress claim, including “that there is a likelihood that the public will be

confused by the infringing use.” Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Services, Inc., 127 F.3d

821, 828 (9th Cir. 1997). The jury may consider all factors the Ninth Circuit has stated are

relevant to likelihood of confusion, including whether evidence exists regarding actual

confusion. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). The

Court declines to prohibit Defendant from presenting argument regarding the sufficiency of

Plaintiff’s evidence. Plaintiff may object at trial, however, if Defendant presents arguments

that are likely to unduly prejudice Plaintiff or mislead the jury. The Court denies Plaintiff’s

fifth motion in limine. 

6. Plaintiff’s sixth motion in limine seeks exclusion of all evidence regarding prior

attempts by Brighton to register Brighton’s “Dangling Heart” trademark or any other

trademark, as well as evidence about the alleged reasoning behind the United States Patent and

Trademark Office decision to grant Plaintiff’s application. (Doc. No. 181.) Defendant’s

pretrial memorandum of contentions of fact and law references Brighton’s prior unsuccessful

attempts to register what is now its Dangling Heart trademark and statements made by the

USPTO in connection with those unsuccessful attempts. Plaintiff argues for exclusion under

Rules 402, 403 and 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The Court concludes that the evidence at issue is relevant to the strength of Plaintiff’s

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2 Plaintiff has filed statements of non-opposition regarding Defendant’s motions in

limine numbers 1, 2, 3 and 9. (Doc. Nos. 195, 199.) The Court therefore grants those motions by

Defendant.

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trademark and falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)

(“[r]ecords, reports, statements . . . in any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth 

. . . (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law . . . or factual findings resulting

from an investigation”). Additionally, the Court declines at this time to exclude the evidence

on Rule 403 grounds. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion, without prejudice to

Plaintiff’s ability to raise contemporaneous objections at trial.

Defendant’s Motions in Limine

1. Defendant’s fourth motion in limine2 asks the Court to preclude Laura Young,

one of Plaintiff’s employees, from offering testimony as a so-called percipient expert. (Doc.

No. 166.) 

In its expert witness designation, Plaintiff designated Dr. David Stewart, a professor of

marketing, to provide expert analysis and testimony on surveys conducted regarding the public

perception of Brighton’s products and/or the likelihood that consumers will confuse

Renaissance’s goods with Brighton’s goods. Defendant deposed Dr. Stewart regarding his

conclusions on whether consumers were likely to be confused by the sale of Langdon Leather

products.

Plaintiff also designated Laura Young, Brighton’s president of marketing and sales, as

a percipient expert witness to offer testimony regarding consumers’ perceptions of Brighton’s

products, whether consumers are likely to be confused by Defendant’s sales of infringing

products, and how Brighton’s reputation and goodwill are harmed by Defendant’s sale of

allegedly infringing products.

The Court grants Defendant’s motion to exclude expert testimony except for testimony

as a percipient witness. As the proponent of Ms. Young’s expert testimony, Plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing its admissibility. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). Expert testimony must be (1) “based on sufficient facts or data,”

(2) “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and (3) applied “reliably” to the facts of

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the case. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to establish that Ms.

Young is qualified to testify as an expert regarding likelihood of confusion. Ms. Young may

possess many years’ experience as Brighton’s president of marketing, but Plaintiff fails to

establish that Ms. Young has “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” sufficient

to qualify her to offer expert testimony regarding consumer perception or the likelihood of

confusion between Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s products. As Defendant points out, the first

time Ms. Young saw a Renaissance bag was on September 13, 2007, when she was deposed

by Defendant. (See Young Depo. at 200:13-19.) The Court also concludes that Plaintiff fails

to establish Ms. Young’s qualification to offer opinion testimony regarding how Defendant’s

sale of allegedly infringing products has impacted Plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to exclude the expert opinion testimony of

Laura Young, but will permit her to testify as a percipient witness. 

2. Defendant’s fifth motion in limine seeks to preclude Plaintiff from presenting

the expert opinion testimony of Dr. David Stewart, a professor of marketing, who proposes to

testify that Brighton lost one customer transaction for each sale by Defendant of an allegedly

infringing product. Defendant also seeks to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s damages

expert, Dr. Robert Wunderlich, who arrived at his damages calculation by using Dr. Stewart’s

conclusion that Plaintiff lost one customer transaction for each sale by Defendant. 

Under Daubert, “[e]xpert testimony is admissible pursuant to Rule 702 if it is both

relevant and reliable.” Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063-64

(9th Cir. 2002). The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Dr. Stewart’s

testimony regarding lost sales satisfies this standard. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Dr.

Stewart’s opinion is “based on sufficient facts or data” or that it is “the product of reliable

principles and methods” that have been applied “reliably” to the facts of this case. See Fed.

R. Evid. 702. The Court concludes that the challenged portion of Dr. Stewart’s proposed

testimony is too speculative to merit admission as expert opinion that can “assist the trier of

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. Accordingly, the Court

grants Defendant’s motion to preclude Plaintiff from presenting expert testimony that Plaintiff

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lost one customer transaction for each Langdon Leather product sold by Defendant. The Court

declines to exclude Dr. Stewart’s testimony in its entirety, and Defendant may make a

contemporaneous objection to his testimony.

Although Defendant contends that the exclusion of Dr. Stewart’s testimony regarding

lost sales renders inadmissible the testimony of Dr. Wunderlich, Plaintiff’s damages expert,

the Court disagrees. Subject to contemporaneous objection at trial, the Court will permit

Plaintiff to present Dr. Wunderlich’s testimony regarding the amount of Plaintiff’s damages

assuming that Plaintiff lost one transaction per item sold by Defendant if Plaintiff offers

evidence of Defendant’s sales of the allegedly infringing items. The parties may argue to the

jury the issue of what represents a proper method of calculating Plaintiff’s damages. 

3. The Langdon Leather products at issue in this case were sold by Defendant 

between June and August 2005, and again between April 19 and May 17, 2006. Defendant’s

sixth motion in limine seeks exclusion of testimony by Plaintiff’s expert witness regarding

damages resulting from the sales that occurred in 2005. (Doc. No. 169.) 

Dr. Robert Wunderlich, an expert witness retained by Plaintiff to testify regarding

Plaintiff’s alleged damages, produced his initial expert report on September 17, 2007. (See

Decl. of Christopher R. Ball ISO Ralphs’ In Limine Motion No. 6 (“Ball Decl.”), Ex. D.) That

report set forth Dr. Wunderlich’s opinions regarding alleged lost profits and harm to goodwill

resulting from Defendant’s 2006 sales. Dr. Wunderlich noted that Renaissance began selling

Langdon Leather products to Ralphs in 2005, but stated, “[a]s of the date of this report, I am

not aware of records of these sales.” (Ball Decl., Ex. D at 4 n.2.) Dr. Wunderlich stated that

he “may revise [his] analysis as appropriate should [he] become aware of additional sales of

the product at issue.” (Id.) 

On November 14, 2007, Dr. Wunderlich revised his report but did not offer any

opinions regarding alleged damages from Defendant’s 2005 sales. (See Ball Decl. ¶ 7.) At

his November 14, 2007, deposition, Dr. Wunderlich produced to Plaintiff a supplement to his

expert report, which modified certain of his opinions regarding damages stemming from 2006

sales. (Ball Decl., Ex. E.) On November 28, 2007, Plaintiff sent to Defendant’s counsel a

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proposed trial exhibit described by Plaintiff as “supplemental calculations performed by Dr.

Wunderlich regarding Ralphs’ Langdon Leather sales in 2005.” Ball Decl., Ex. F.) Defendant

contends that Dr. Wunderlich should be prohibited from offering testimony regarding damages

allegedly resulting from 2005 sales because Plaintiff failed to timely disclose Dr. Wunderlich’s

opinions and conclusions regarding that issue.

Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a retained expert

must timely disclose a written report containing “a complete statement of all opinions to be

expressed and the reasons therefore.” “[A]ny additions or changes to this information shall

be disclosed by the time the party’s disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(e). Pursuant to the Court’s July 10, 2007, scheduling order, the parties’ Rule 26(a)(3)

disclosures were due by November 19, 2007. (Doc. No. 115.) The Court concludes that

Plaintiff failed to timely disclose Dr. Wunderlich’s opinions regarding damages allegedly

resulting from the 2005 sales.

Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, “[a] party that without

substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to

amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure

is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial . . . any witness or information not so

disclosed.” See also Yeti By Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th

Cir. 2001) (evidence precluded unless failure to comply with disclosure requirements was

either substantially justified or harmless). Plaintiff contends that it was substantially justified

in disclosing Dr. Wunderlich’s updated damages calculations for the first time in November

2007 because Defendant delayed producing sales figures related to the 2005 sales. Plaintiff

argues, alternatively, that Defendant cannot demonstrate that it suffered prejudice by any

failure by Plaintiff to timely disclose Dr. Wunderlich’s opinions, because Dr. Wunderlich’s

supplemental disclosure merely applied, to newly received data, a methodology which Plaintiff

already had disclosed to Defendant. (See Doc. No. 182.)

The Court declines at this time to completely exclude the challenged testimony of Dr.

Wunderlich. Both parties have arguments in favor of their position regarding who bears

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responsibility for Dr. Wunderlich’s supplemental disclosure after the close of expert discovery,

and the law favors trial on the merits. Cf. Computer Task Group, Inc. v. Brotby, 364 F.3d

1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004). In light of all the circumstances of this case, the Court concludes

that it is appropriate to permit renewed expert discovery limited to Dr. Wunderlich’s

conclusions based on sales that occurred in 2005. Defendant may depose Dr. Wunderlich

regarding his supplemental disclosure and, if desired, Defendant’s expert may offer a brief

rebuttal report. The Court will permit Plaintiff to briefly depose Defendant’s expert regarding

any rebuttal report. The parties should attempt to meet and confer to determine whether and

to what extent such renewed discovery is necessary. In the event the parties cannot reach an

agreement, the Court will refer the parties to the magistrate judge to determine the appropriate

extent (if any) of renewed expert discovery and whether any cost-shifting measures and/or

sanctions are appropriate. In light of the above discussion, the Court denies without prejudice

Defendant’s sixth motion in limine.

4. Defendant’s seventh motion in limine seeks to preclude Plaintiff from calling 

as a witness Debby Shelly, a store clerk in a Ralphs grocery store located in Garden Grove,

California. (Doc. No. 171.) Ms. Shelly worked at that store in April and May of 2006, when

Ralphs engaged in a four week program selling Langdon Leather products. On May 23, 2006,

Ms. Shelly used her personal computer to visit the website of Renaissance Group International,

the New Jersey wholesaler that manufactured the Langdon Leather products sold by Ralphs.

She clicked on a “contact us” link and sent an e-mail stating, “I wanted to know if you are

affiliated with Brighton . . . because your Langdon, Scandia and Tasket line look so much like

the name brands.” (See Ball Decl., Ex. A.) 

When Renaissance Group filed for bankruptcy in May of 2007, counsel for the

bankruptcy trustee produced documents including Ms. Shelly’s May 23, 2006 e-mail. (Ball

Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6.) Discovery closed on November 16, 2007, without Plaintiff having deposed Ms.

Shelly or identified her on its disclosures. On November 19, 2007, the parties exchanged and

filed their witness and exhibits lists. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff did not list Ms. Shelly as one of its

witnesses. (Id.) The Court held a pretrial conference on December 10, 2007, and entered the

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pretrial order in this matter on December 12, 2007. (See Doc. No. 157.) Ms. Shelly was not

listed as one of Plaintiff’s witnesses.

On December 26, 2007, Plaintiff indicated Ms. Shelly’s May 23, 2006, e-mail as an

addition to its list of trial exhibits. (Ball Decl. ¶ 6.) On January 3, 2008, Plaintiff requested

a deposition of Ms. Shelly. (See Decl. of Keith J. Wesley, Ex. D.) That deposition took place

on March 4, 2008. On March 21, 2008, Brighton amended its witness list to include Ms.

Shelly.

Defendant contends that Ms. Shelly should be precluded from testifying because

Plaintiff failed to timely disclose her as a witness. Plaintiff responds that, since Ms. Shelly is

a Ralphs employee with relevant information, she should have been disclosed by Ralphs.

The Court concludes that any failure by Plaintiff to timely disclose Ms. Shelly as a

witness was substantially justified and, even if it was not, that under all the circumstances of

this case Plaintiff’s late disclosure was harmless. Defendant has been able to depose Ms.

Shelly, who is one of Defendant’s own employees, well in advance of trial. Accordingly, the

Court denies Defendant’s motion to preclude Ms. Shelly from testifying at trial.

5. Finally, Defendant’s eighth motion in limine seeks to exclude evidence of 

Ralphs’ profits or financial condition unless the jury returns a verdict for Plaintiff awarding

actual damages and finding that Ralphs is guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Doc. No.

173.) The Court grants Defendant’s motion. If the evidence supports Plaintiff’s request,

Plaintiff may ask the jury to find malice, oppression, fraud or other prerequisite on a special

verdict for a finding of punitive damages, and the Court will bifurcate any financial

information or finding of punitive damages until the jury makes the appropriate threshold

determination for punitive damages.

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The Court sets this matter for trial on September 23, 2008 at 9:00 a.m. The Court

schedules a status conference for September 22, 2008 at 10:30 a.m. If the parties wish to

utilize a jury questionnaire, the parties should submit a joint proposed questionnaire no later

than August 1, 2008. The parties shall serve, file and exchange trial preparation materials not

less than seven calendar days prior to the date for trial, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 16.1(f)(9).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 13, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CC: Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter

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