Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00882/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00882-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael O’Brian Watkins, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Louis Winn, Warden, 

Respondent.

No. 12-00882-TUC-DCB (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 (Petition), filed on November 20, 2012. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner, Michael 

O’Brian Watkins, claims his due process rights were violated when he was wrongfully 

convicted of a disciplinary violation that resulted in the loss of good time credits.1

 Before the Court is the Petition (Doc. 1) and Respondent’s Answer to Petition and 

Motion to Dismiss Petition (Doc. 10) with accompanying exhibits2

 (Doc. 9) (Answer). 

Petitioner filed a reply. (Doc. 17.) 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 7.) 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

 

1

 Ground Two of the Petition, a First Amendment claim, was previously dismissed by the Court. (Doc. 5.) 

2

 Petitioner first filed his Answer and Motion to Dismiss with accompanying exhibits with the Court at docket 9, but refilled the Answer and Motion to Dismiss 

without the accompanying exhibits at docket 10 to correct a filing error. No substantive changes were made. 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 1 of 13
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Court enter an order dismissing the Petition for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter 

an order denying the Petition on the merits. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Watkins is an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, in Tucson, Arizona (USP 

Tucson). See (Petition, at 1; Answer, Ex. A, Declaration of David T. Huband (“Huband 

Decl.”) ¶ 3). Petitioner contends that he was denied due process of law in connection with 

a prison disciplinary finding that resulted in the loss of good-time credits. Watkins alleges 

specifically that he was denied an opportunity to present his defense, call witnesses, or 

present exculpatory evidence. (Pet. at 4.) Watkins is currently serving a 254-month 

sentence of incarceration for robbery, conspiracy to possess and brandish a firearm in 

furtherance of a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime 

of violence and is projected to complete this sentence on March 8, 2027. (Answer, Ex. A, 

Huband Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) 

II. DISCIPLINARY HEARING AND PROCEEDINGS

 On August 6, 2012, at 6:30 a.m., Officer Nemcik was conducting a visual search 

of Watkins. (Answer, Ex. B, Att. 1 “Incident Report”, ¶ 11.) Officer Nemcik reported 

that, during the search, Watkins “came at [him] in an aggressive manner.” Id. Officer 

Nemcik “perceived that inmate Watkins was going to assault [him]” and placed him on 

the ground and restrained him. Id. Officer Nemcik wrote an Incident Report charging the 

petitioner with Attempted Assault on Any Person, in violation of Prohibited Act Code 

224(A). Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. 

 On August 6, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., Lieutenant R. McCollum, delivered a copy of 

the Incident Report to the Petitioner, advised him of his right to remain silent, and 

conducted an investigation of the incident. Id. at ¶¶ 14-16, 22-24. During the 

investigation Watkins stated that he did not try to assault Officer Nemcik, but that Officer 

Nemcik did place him on the ground and applied restraints. Id. at ¶ 24. Lieutenant 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 2 of 13
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

McCollum reported that Watkins did not request any witnesses. Id. at ¶ 26. Lieutenant 

McCollum concluded his investigation by finding that the Incident Report was accurate 

as written by the reporting officer; Petitioner remained in the Special Housing Unit 

pending a Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) action. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. 

 On August 13, 2012, Watkins was again advised of his rights. Id. at ¶ 23; see also

(Answer, Ex. B, Att. 4, “Disciplinary Hearing Report (DHR)”, § II). Watkins commented 

to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) regarding the Incident Report, that he “was 

naked and [the officer] threw me to the floor.” Id. at ¶ 17. Due to the severity of the 

report, the UDC referred the inmate to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) for 

further action, and recommended “ds [disciplinary segregation] time” and “loss [of] GTC 

[good time credits].” Id. at ¶¶19-20. Watkins requested the presence of two witnesses at 

the DHO hearing. Id. at ¶ 17. 

 On August 28, 2012 Vickie Petricka, the DHO, conducted a Disciplinary Hearing. 

(Answer, Ex. B, Att. 4, DHR.) Petitioner waived his right to request a staff 

representative, (Id. at § II “Staff Representative”); but Correctional Officer Hookland 

submitted a statement on his behalf: 

When inmates are placed in the holding cell they are pat searched and told 

to remove their shoes, belts, and any other personal items. If we believe an 

inmate has contraband under their clothing the officer will conduct a visual 

search where his clothes are removed.” 

Id. at § III “Witnesses”. 

Petitioner stated at the hearing that he did not attempt to assault the officer. Id. at § III. 

 In addition to the Incident Report and Investigation, the DHO considered staff 

memos, photographs, and medical assessments. Id. at § III “Documentary Evidence”. 

 The DHO found Petitioner committed the prohibited act of Assaulting any person 

with less serious physical injury (Attempted), Code 224A. Id. § at V. “Specific 

Evidence”. The DHO based her findings on the “reporting officer’s account of the 

incident” and, though she considered Watkin’s statement during the DHO proceedings 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 3 of 13
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that he did not attempt to assault the officer, and further considered Officer Hookland’s 

statements, verifying that every time Watkins went into the holding cell Watkins took his 

clothes off, the DHO concluded that the statement was irrelevant as a defense as staff 

could perceive a threat to their person regardless of whether an inmate was clothed or 

not.3 Id. The DHO found the staff member’s statements and observations credible and 

believable, as the statements were made strictly in the performance of his duties, and he 

had no reason to make up false accusations, and thus found Watkin’s denial without 

merit. Id. 

The DHO sanctioned Petitioner to a forfeit of 20 days good conduct time; a 

disallowance of 27 days good conduct time; 60 days of disciplinary segregation; loss of 

commissary privileges for 180 days; and a monetary fine of $100.00. Id. at § VI. 

The DHO completed the report of the hearing on October 4, 2012, and delivered it 

to Petitioner via institution mail on October 6, 2012. See (Answer, Ex. B, Declaration of 

Vickie Petricka “Petricka Decl.”, ¶ 12). On October 17, 2012, the Bureau of Prisons’ 

Western Regional Office received a Request for Administrative Remedy from Watkins 

concerning this incident. See (Answer, Ex. A, Huband Decl., ¶ 15; Att. 7). The regional 

appeal was rejected for the reason that the issue Watkins raised was “not sensitive”, and 

Watkins was directed to “file a request or appeal at the appropriate level via regular 

procedure.” Id. at ¶ 15; (Att. 7 “Rejection Notice – Administrative Remedy”). Watkins 

filed no further appeal of the disciplinary action. See id. at ¶ 16. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction 

 A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. 

 

3

 DHO Petricka also questioned Watkins regarding his request during the UDC hearing for two additional witnesses. Watkins stated that he wanted SIS staff A. Mendez 

and Lieutenant T. Palomaris present because they would verify that he always strips down when placed in the holding cell. The DHO deemed the request irrelevant for the same reasons she deemed his defense irrelevant: Staff can perceive a threat from an inmate, clothed or not. (Answer, Ex. B, Att. 4, DHR, § V.) 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 4 of 13
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). Writ of habeas corpus relief 

extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United States if the petitioner 

can show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) & (3). A prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must bring a petition pursuant to 

§ 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez,, 204 F.3d at 864, and must file the petition in 

the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 

677 (9th Cir. 1980). 

 In the instant case Petitioner is seeking relief with respect to disciplinary 

proceedings that, in part, resulted in the loss of good time credit while incarcerated at 

USP Tucson. Petitioner is challenging the legality of the manner in which his sentence is 

being executed. Thus, Ground One is properly before this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

B. Exhaustion 

 There is no statutory requirement, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, that federal 

prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition in 

court, thus it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th

Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995). 

Nevertheless, federal courts “require as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners 

exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 

2241.” Castro–Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other 

grounds Fernandez–Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 (2006). Thus, while “courts 

have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when prudentially required, this 

discretion is not unfettered.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004). A court 

may waive the exhaustion requirement where administrative remedies are inadequate, 

futile, or pursuit of them would cause irreparable harm. Id. at 1000-01; see also Fraley v. 

United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (waiving 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 5 of 13
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

exhaustion where the initial request for an administrative remedy was denied based on 

official Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy and further appeal would almost certainly have 

been denied based upon the same policy. 

 Accordingly, if the petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the district 

court, in its discretion, may either “excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits or 

require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding to court,” 

Brown, 895 F.2d 535, unless such remedies are no longer available, in which instance he 

may have procedurally defaulted on his claims, see Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354-

55 & n. 2 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying procedural default rules to administrative appeals); see 

generally Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 

72, 86-87 (1977); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir.1988). If a prisoner is 

unable to obtain an administrative remedy because of his failure to appeal in a timely 

manner, then the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his habeas corpus claim. See Nigro 

v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 1994)(citing Francis, 894 F.2d at 354; Martinez, 

804 F.2d at 571). If a claim is procedurally defaulted, the court may require the petitioner 

to demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the alleged 

constitutional violation. See Francis, 894 F.2d at 355 (suggesting that the cause and 

prejudice test is the appropriate test); Murray, 477 U.S. at 492 (cause and prejudice test 

applied to procedural defaults on appeal); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 

F.2d 905, 906-08 (9th Cir.1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to pro se litigants). 

 The BOP has established an administrative remedy process permitting an inmate 

to seek review of an issue relating to “any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. 

§ 542.10(a). The BOP’s Administrative Remedy program requires, in most cases, that the 

prisoner complete informal resolution and submit an initial formal written Administrative 

Remedy request within “20 calendar days following the date on which the basis for the 

Request occurred” to the institution staff member designated to receive such Requests. 28 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 6 of 13
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

C.F.R.§ 14 (a)-(c). 

 There are some exceptions to initial filing at the petitioner’s place of confinement. 

With respect to appeals from DHO hearings, an inmate is not required to seek informal 

resolution or to submit an initial request to the Warden. Instead, an inmate is to submit an 

appeal from a DHO hearing directly to the Regional Director, with subsequent appeal to 

the General Counsel, as described above. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14(d)(2); 542.15(a). An 

inmate also may submit an initial request directly to the Regional Director if he or she 

believes the sensitive nature of the issue raised would place him or her in danger if it 

became known at the institution. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1). If the Regional Office 

determines the matter is not sensitive, as defined in the regulations, the request will be 

rejected, and the inmate will be directed to resubmit the request to the institution. Id. 

 “An inmate who is not satisfied with the Regional Director’s response may submit 

an appeal . . . to the General Counsel within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional 

Director signed the response.” 28 U.S.C. § 542.15(a). The time limits may be extended 

upon a showing of a valid reason for the delay. Id. “Appeal to the General Counsel is the 

final administrative appeal.” Id.

 In this case, Watkins filed an appeal to the Regional Director on August 31, 2012, 

before completion of the disciplinary process. See (Answer, Ex. A, Att. 7). This appeal 

was not from the Disciplinary Hearing, which was completed on October 4, 2012 when 

DHO Petricka completed the DHR, but concerned the initial incident and the Incident 

Report which Watkins alleged he received in retaliation for expressing his intent to file a 

grievance. Id. The Regional Director rejected the appeal because it was “not sensitive”, 

and Watkins should have filed the appeal at the appropriate level. Id. 

 BOP records demonstrate that no appeal was taken following the Disciplinary 

Hearing, and, despite Watkin’s assertions to the contrary, BOP records demonstrate that 

he was capable and able to file grievances even while he remained in segregated housing. 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 7 of 13
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

See e.g., (Answer, Ex. B, Huband Decl., ¶¶ 11, 16; Atts. 4-7). 

 The purpose of requiring inmates to file administrative remedies is to allow prison 

officials the opportunity to resolve problems and obviate the need for litigation. Ruviwat 

v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844,845 (9th Cir. 1983). It allows for the development of a factual 

record and for the agency to correct any errors, in addition to conserving court time. Id. 

Further, the administrative remedy procedure was implemented, in part, to conserve the 

resources of federal courts. Id. Petitioner did not allow the administrative remedy 

program an opportunity to address this issue, and he has not administratively exhausted 

this issue. Exhaustion is required prior to filing a lawsuit. Petitioner failed to exhaust his 

claims, and they are procedurally defaulted. 

 Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that he exhausted administrative 

remedies or that exhaustion would be futile. Neither has Petitioner raised any grounds 

that would support a finding of cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse a procedural 

default. Allowing petitioner to bypass the exhaustion requirement on this issue would 

only encourage Petitioner and other prisoners to deliberately bypass the BOP's 

administrative remedy process. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner's claim should be dismissed without prejudice for failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies. Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge addresses the 

merits of the claim below. 

C. Merits 

1. Ground One: Due Process Claim 

 Federal prisoners have a statutory right to good time credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624. 

Accordingly, they have a due process interest in the disciplinary proceedings that may 

take away those credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). "Due process 

in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives written notice of the 

charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison officials and the reasons 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 8 of 13
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

for disciplinary action." Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)(citing 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66.). "The inmate has a limited right to call witnesses and to 

present documentary evidence when permitting him to do so would not unduly threaten 

institutional safety and goals." Id. (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.) Once these Wolff

procedural protections are followed, the only function of a federal court is to review the 

statement of evidence upon which the committee relied in making its findings to 

determine if the decision is supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent. Mass. Corr. 

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1984) (“The requirements of due process are satisfied if 

some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board.”). 

 The Court has reviewed the incident report and the DHO report and finds that the 

due process requirements of a prison disciplinary hearing, as established by Wolff, supra, 

were met in this case. Petitioner received notice well in advance of the hearing. He was 

allowed to call witnesses (Officer Hookland). The DHO determined the witness was 

unavailable, but, consistent with policy, considered her written statement at the hearing. 

See 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(4). He declined staff representation. He received a written copy 

of the DHO’s findings. The DHO provided the Petitioner an impartial DHO in this 

matter; she had neither investigated the matter, nor was she a witness or involved in any 

other significant manner with the incident. The Petitioner received the limited due 

process required by the Supreme Court in all disciplinary matters. 

 Watkins asserts that the disciplinary code prohibits assault, but not attempted 

assault. (Pet. at 4.) This claim is without merit. A Code 224 violation, “Assaulting any 

person” is classified as a “High Severity Level Prohibited Act” and is to be used “when 

less serious physical injury or contact has been attempted or accomplished by an inmate.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 541.3, Table 1 “High Severity Level Prohibited Acts”(emphasis added); 

see also (Answer, Ex. B, Petrick Decl. ¶ 10(discussing prison policy)). Thus, pursuant to 

regulation and prison policy a disciplinary code is violated by both the completed and the 

attempted act. 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 9 of 13
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Watkins asserts that DHO Petricka determined he was guilty before the hearing, 

and without hearing his defense. (Pet. at 4.) The record does not support this claim. DHO 

Petricka heard and recorded Watkins’ defense in her report, but found it irrelevant to the 

charges. She found the reporting officer to be credible, and his statement to be a basis to 

support the charges. Watkins submitted an “Affidavit of Complaint” (Pet. at Atts. 17- 23) 

in support of his allegations that DHO Petricka predetermined his guilt at his disciplinary 

hearing. Many of his allegations in the “Affidavit” are either irrelevant, or simply not 

credible. Watkins alleges that he was denied the right to present witnesses. Officer 

Hookland, however, provided a witness statement on his behalf. DHO Petricka also 

questioned Watkins regarding his request during the UDC hearing (at which time he was 

not allowed witnesses) for two additional witnesses. Watkins stated that he wanted SIS 

staff A. Mendez and Lieutenant T. Palomaris present because they would verify that he 

always strips down when placed in the holding cell. The DHO deemed the request 

irrelevant for the same reasons she deemed his defense irrelevant: Staff can perceive a 

threat from an inmate, whether clothed or not. (Answer, Ex. B, Att. 4, DHR, § V.) 

Watkins asserts in his Petition that he had several witnesses that would have submitted 

statements that he was generally not violent. It is not clear that he ever requested the 

presence of these witnesses; nonetheless, none of these witnesses were witnesses to the 

event in question. Watkins alleges he was not permitted to present his defense, but clearly 

DHO Petricka considered the statements he made in his defense during the hearing, and 

that he denied the charges against him. Id. Finally, Watkins alleges that DHO Petricka 

predetermined his guilt because prior to the hearing DHO Petricka asked Watkins to sign 

a blank “Acknowledgement of Receipt of DHO Hearing Sanctions” form. (Pet. at Atts. 

20-21.) DHO Petricka explains that it is her ordinary practice, and the procedure she used 

in Watkin’s Disciplinary Hearing, to present an inmate a blank Acknowledgment form 

and advise the inmate that if he is found to have committed a prohibited act, she will 

enter the sanctions on the form and provide a copy to him at the conclusion of the 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 10 of 13
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

hearing; in the event she finds that the inmate did not commit a prohibited act, she will 

destroy or shred the form. (Answer, Ex. B, Petricka Decl., ¶ 5) DHO Petricka explains 

that she has implemented this procedure because in her experience and practice as a DHO 

it is often difficult, after sanctions have been imposed, to convince an angry and agitated 

inmate to sign the Acknowledgement and the procedure is used to protect the safety of 

the staff members attending the hearing.4 Id. The Court finds that use of this procedure 

does not support Watkin’s allegations that DHO Petricka predetermined her findings in 

this case. Contrary to his allegations, DHO Petricka explains her findings and reasons 

therefore thoroughly in the DHR. It is evident from the report that DHO Petricka 

questioned Petitioner, and considered the statements and evidence submitted by the 

witnesses. Further, even if this procedure were flawed, it was harmless error. One 

Magistrate Judge recently summarized harmless error analysis as it applies in the prison 

disciplinary setting as follows: 

On a repeated and consistent basis, federal courts hold that in prison 

disciplinary cases, “[e]ven if a prison official's actions create a potential due 

process violation, a habeas petitioner needs to demonstrate that he was 

harmed by the violation in order to obtain relief.” Jordan v. Zych, No. 

7:10–cv–491 (W.D.Va.2011) 2011 WL 2447937 at *4, citing Brown v. 

Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 508 (4th Cir. 2004). See also Powell v. Coughlin, 

953 F.2d 744, 751 (2nd Cir. 1991) (“it is entirely inappropriate to overturn 

the outcome of a prison disciplinary proceeding because of a procedural 

error without making the normal appellate assessment as to whether the 

error was harmless or prejudicial”); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th

Cir. 2003) (alleged due process violation rejected based on harmless error 

analysis, because prisoner failed to explain how excluded testimony would 

have aided his defense against disciplinary charges); Pilgrim v. Luther, 571 

F.3d 201, 206 (2nd Cir. 2009) (“a prisoner is entitled to assistance in 

‘marshaling evidence and presenting a defense,’ “ but “any violations of 

this qualified right are reviewed for ‘harmless error’ ”); Grossman v. Bruce, 

 

4

 The Court notes that, while Petitioner’s acknowledgment of receipt of the form is 

not at issue in this case, such a pre-signed form certainly would be of no more legal significance than a “refusal to sign” and causes concern to those involved in the 

disciplinary system that they are being treated fairly, and causes concern to those involved in reviewing the disciplinary process that the system is trustworthy. 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 11 of 13
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

447 F.3d 801, 805 (10th Cir. 2006) (“errors made by prison officials in 

denying witness testimony at official hearings are subject to harmless error 

review”). 

Adams v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2011 WL 7293381, *3 (D.Minn., December 6, 

2011) Here, Petitioner has not shown that the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings 

would have been different if he had signed the “Acknowledgement of Receipt of DHO 

Hearing Sanctions” form after the Disciplinary Hearing. Thus, even if this was a 

procedural error during the disciplinary proceeding, Petitioner has offered no reason to 

believe that this error affected the outcome of the proceeding. For this reason, Petitioner 

cannot be granted a writ of habeas corpus based on the above due process claims. 

 Once these Wolff procedural protections are followed, the only function of a 

federal court is to review the statement of evidence upon which the committee relied in 

making its findings to determine if the decision is supported by “some evidence.” 

Superintendent. Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1984) (“The requirements of 

due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary 

board.”) In this case, the evidence relied upon by the DHO was that Petitioner “came at 

[the officer] in an aggressive manner,” resulting in Petitioner being charged with Code 

224, Assaulting any person. See (Answer, Ex. B, Petricka Decl., ¶ 8; Att. 4, ¶ V). The 

regulatory language describing a Code 224 violation explains that “a charge at this level 

is used when less serious physical injury or contact has been attempted or accomplished 

by an inmate.” See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1. Petitioner’s aggressive move toward the 

officer conducting the visual search is “some evidence” that Petitioner attempted less 

serious physical contact. The DHO properly considered this evidence, and exercised her 

discretion to give it greater weight than Petitioner’s statement that he did not attempt to 

assault anyone or his witness’s statement that Petitioner would have been naked during 

the visual search. The DHO relied on sufficient reliable evidence to satisfy the “some 

evidence” test. Due process only requires that there be “some evidence” supporting the 

disciplinary decision. It does not require that the supporting evidence outweigh the 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 12 of 13
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

evidence to the contrary. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. The petition should be denied. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent 

review, enter an order Dismissing Ground One and the Petition in its entirety for failure 

to exhaust the claim. 

 Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter an 

order denying Ground One and the Petition on the merits. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. If 

objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the District 

Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 12-

00882-TUC-DCB. 

 Dated this 5th day of November, 2013. 

Case 4:12-cv-00882-DCB Document 18 Filed 11/05/13 Page 13 of 13