Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00851/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00851-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JESSICA BROOKS ) 

o/b/o D.M.W.B., a minor, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-cv-00851WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff Jessica Brooks, on behalf of her minor son D.M.W.B., applied for 

supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The 

application was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and 

received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, 

the ALJ issued a decision in which he found D.M.W.B. not disabled since the date the 

application was filed. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to 

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proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 8); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 7). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 

includes the standard for defining child disability under the Social Security Act. See 

PUB. L. NO. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2188 (1996). The statute provides that an 

individual under age eighteen (“18”) shall be considered disabled “if that individual has a 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and 

severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (1999). 

 The sequential analysis for determining whether a child claimant is disabled is as 

follows: 

1. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she is not 

disabled. 

2. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the 

Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a physical or mental 

impairment which, whether individually or in combination with one or 

more other impairments, is a severe impairment. If the claimant’s 

impairment is not severe, she is not disabled. 

 

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

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3. If the impairment is severe, the Commissioner determines whether the 

impairment meets the durational requirement and meets, medically equals, 

or functionally equals in severity an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, and Appendix 1. If the impairment satisfies this 

requirement, the claimant is presumed disabled. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)-(d) (1997); see also Shinn ex rel. Shinn v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 391 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004). 

In determining whether an impairment functionally equals a listed 

impairment, the ALJ must consider the child’s ability to function in six 

different “domains”: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and 

completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about 

and manipulating objects; (5) “caring for yourself;” and (6) health and 

physical well-being. If the child has “marked” limitations in two of these 

domains, or an “extreme” limitation in any one domain, then his 

impairment functionally equals the listed impairments, and he will be found 

to be disabled. A “marked” limitation is one that seriously interferes with 

the child’s ability to initiate, sustain, or complete activities. An extreme 

limitation is one that “very seriously” interferes with the child’s ability to 

initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 

Coleman ex rel. J.K.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F. App’x 751, 752 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The Commissioner’s regulations provide that if a child’s impairment or 

impairments are not medically equal to, or functionally equivalent in severity to, a listed 

impairment, the child is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d)(2) (1997). In 

reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court asks only whether the ALJ’s findings 

concerning the steps are supported by substantial evidence. “Under this limited standard 

of review, [the court] may not make fact-findings, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute 

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[its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Bryant v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 478 F. App’x 644, 645 

(11th Cir. 2012) (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005)). 

“Where substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s fact findings exists, [the court] cannot 

overturn those findings even if other substantial evidence exists that is contrary to the 

ALJ’s findings.” Id. (citing Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991)); see 

also McMillian, o/b/o A.T.F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 521 F. App’x 801, 802 (11th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)) (“‘Even if the 

evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] factual findings, we must affirm if 

the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’”). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 D.M.W.B. was six years old at the time of the administrative hearing before the 

ALJ. See Tr. 13, 43 (noting D.M.W.B.’s birthday to be November 2, 2007, and the date 

of the administrative hearing before the ALJ to be March 14, 2014). Following the 

hearing, the ALJ found at Step One that D.M.W.B. had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity at any time since March 29, 2013. Id. The ALJ found at Step Two that 

D.M.W.B. has the severe impairments of “attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 

oppositional defiant disorder[,] and asthma.” Id. Next, the ALJ concluded under Step 

Three that these impairments do not meet or medically equal in severity the criteria for 

any impairment in the Listing of Impairments. Id. The ALJ further found that 

D.M.W.B.’s impairments do not functionally equal in severity any such listings because 

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D.M.W.B. has either less than marked limitations or no limitations in each of the six 

domains of function. Id. at 13-24. Consequently, the ALJ found that D.M.B.W. was not 

disabled. Tr. 24. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents two issues for this court’s consideration in review of the ALJ’s 

decision: (1) whether “[t]he Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, because the 

teacher questionnaire completed by Ms. Hamlet–evidence the ALJ fails to address in any 

meaningful way–contains abundant evidence that cuts against the ALJ’s conclusion”; and 

(2) whether “the ALJ erred by failing to provide meaningful rationale to support his 

meets, medically equals and functionality equals determination.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 3. 

V. DISCUSSION 

A. Whether the ALJ’s consideration and discussion of Ms. Hamlet’s 

questionnaire was proper.

 

Plaintiff first argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because 

the ALJ failed to meaningfully consider the evidence submitted by D.M.W.B.’s teacher, 

Ms. Amy Hamlet (“Ms. Hamlet”), through a teacher questionnaire she completed in 

March 2014. Id. at 3-8. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring the 

evidence in the report that is patently inconsistent with the ALJ’s ultimate functionality 

findings. Id. at 8. To support this assertion, Plaintiff points the court to Wilson ex rel. 

T.M.W. v. Colvin for the premise that an ALJ “cannot ‘pick and choose’ evidence from [a 

teacher] questionnaire that supports [his] conclusion and ignore evidence that does not.” 

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Id. at 8 (citing Wilson ex rel. T.M.W. v. Colvin, No. CA 2:12-307-C, 2013 WL 788075, at 

*8 (S.D. Ala. March 1, 2013)). Plaintiff also references Green v. Commissioner of Social 

Security, which provides that an ALJ’s decision must sufficiently enable a court to 

conclude that the ALJ fully considered a claimant’s condition, and did not ignore 

evidence in a teacher’s evaluation that was patently inconsistent with the ALJ’s ultimate 

findings. Id. (citing Green v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., No. 6:09-cv-1936-Orl-28DAB, 2010 

WL 4941425, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2010)). 

The Commissioner argues that, even though teacher evaluations are considered 

“other” sources and thus not entitled to special weight or significance, the ALJ properly 

considered the teacher questionnaire from Ms. Hamlet. Comm’r’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 5-8. 

The Commissioner notes that the ALJ was not required “to recite every part of Ms. 

Hamlet’s opinion[,]” id. at 8, and points to the ALJ’s inclusion of portions of Ms. 

Hamlet’s teacher questionnaire that the ALJ explicitly noted in his opinion.2 Id. at 6. 

Further, the Commissioner argues that Wilson and Green, cited by Plaintiff, are 

distinguishable because, in contrast to the former, the ALJ in this matter “cited portions 

of Ms. Hamlet’s opinion that weighed in favor of limitations[,]” id. at 7, and, in contrast 

to the latter, the ALJ in this matter “considered [Ms. Hamlet’s] responses under each 

functional domain and noted [that D.M.W.B.] had some problems in the domains of 

 

2

 The Commissioner points to the ALJ’s inclusion of Ms. Hamlet’s “description of [D.M.W.B.’s] 

difficulties with focus for extended periods, moodiness, acting out when seeking attention, and a need for 

special reading intervention for 30 minutes each day” under the appropriate domains as reported on the 

teacher questionnaire. Id. at 6. 

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acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks, and interacting and 

relating with others[,]” id. at 8. 

As previously noted, there are six functional equivalence domains: (1) acquiring 

and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating 

with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for himself; and (6) 

health and physical well-being. See, infra, Coleman, 454 F. App’x at 752. If the child 

has “marked” limitations in two of these domains, or an “extreme” limitation in any one 

domain, then his impairment functionally equals the listed impairments, and he will be 

found to be disabled. Id. 

Under the domain of acquiring and using information, Ms. Hamlet concluded that 

D.M.W.B. has a serious problem3

 in all ten categories, noting that D.M.W.B. “is pulled 

for reading intervention daily for 30 min[utes].” Tr. 151-56 (Ex. 15E (Doc. 14-6)). 

Similarly, in evaluating D.M.W.B.’s proficiency in attending and completing tasks, Ms. 

Hamlet determined that D.M.W.B. has a serious problem in twelve out of thirteen 

categories, noting that he “has a hard time focusing for an extended period of time to 

finish his work.” Tr. 152. Considering the domain of interacting and relating with 

others, Ms. Hamlet advised that D.M.W.B. has a serious problem in all thirteen 

categories, and that behavior modification was necessary to curb D.M.W.B.’s 

inappropriate actions. Tr. 153. In evaluating D.M.W.B.’s ability to move and manipulate 

 

3

 A serious problem is scored as four out of five on the rating scale for the teacher evaluation. 

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objects, Ms. Hamlet concluded that he has a very serious problem4 in all seven 

categories.5

 Tr. 154. She also noted that D.M.W.B. “has to move all of the time.” Id. In 

the domain of caring for himself, Ms. Hamlet scored D.M.W.B. as having a serious 

problem in one out of ten categories, an obvious problem in four, a slight problem in two, 

and no problem in three. Tr. 155. Ms. Hamlet further noted, however, that D.M.W.B. 

“has difficulty with controlling his moods.” Id. Finally, in the domain of health and 

physical well-being, Ms. Hamlet noted that D.M.W.B. “has asthma, but [it] has not been 

a problem.” Tr. 156. 

With regards to these domains, the ALJ found that D.M.W.B. had “less than 

marked limitation” in the domains of acquiring and using information, attending and 

completing tasks, interacting and relating with others, and health and physical well-being. 

Tr. 19-24. The ALJ found that D.M.W.B. had “no limitation” in the domains of moving 

about and manipulating objects, and in caring for himself. Tr. 22-23. In reaching these 

determinations, the ALJ referenced Ms. Hamlet’s teacher evaluation on three occasions: 

 

4

 A very serious problem is scored as five out of five on the rating scale for the teacher evaluation. 

5

 As noted in the ALJ’s opinion, “[t]his domain considers how well a child is able to move his body from 

one place to another and how a child moves and manipulates objects. . . . Limitations . . . can be 

associated with musculoskeletal and neurological problems, other physical impairments, medications or 

treatments, or mental impairments.” Tr. 22. While Ms. Hamlet marked that D.M.W.B. has severe 

impairments in all of the seven categories, she noted that D.M.W.B. “has to move all the time.” Tr. 154. 

It is possible that Ms. Hamlet assumed that this domain related to D.M.W.B.’s hyperactive movements, 

instead of his motor skills and his ability to manipulate objects, and marked the limitations accordingly. 

However, that determination is not for the undersigned to make. 

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(1) In acquiring and using information, the ALJ noted that Ms. Hamlet “reports 

a need for some special reading intervention for 30 minutes each day. . . .” Id. 

at 20. He did not reference Ms. Hamlet’s assessment that D.M.W.B. has a 

serious problem in all ten categories of this domain. 

(2) In attending and completing tasks, the ALJ noted that Ms. Hamlet 

“describes some difficulties with focus for extended periods. . . .” Id. at 21. 

He did not reference Ms. Hamlet’s assessment that D.M.W.B. has a serious 

problem in twelve out of thirteen categories in this domain. 

(3) In interacting and relating with others, the ALJ noted that Ms. Hamlet 

reported “some moodiness and acting out inappropriately when [D.M.W.B.] is 

seeking attention.” Id. at 22. He did not reference Ms. Hamlet’s assessment 

that D.M.W.B. has a serious problem in all thirteen categories of this domain. 

Under the domains of moving about and manipulating objects, and caring for oneself, the 

ALJ noted that there were “no allegation[s] of limitation[s] in [those] domains.” Id. at 

22, 23. 

Social Security Ruling 06–03p states: 

Since there is a requirement to consider all relevant evidence in an 

individual’s case record, the case record should reflect the consideration of 

opinions from medical sources who are not “acceptable medical sources” 

and from “non-medical sources” who have seen the claimant in their 

professional capacity. Although there is a distinction between what an 

adjudicator must consider and what the adjudicator must explain in the 

disability determination or decision, the adjudicator generally should 

explain the weight given to opinions from these “other sources,” or 

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otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or 

decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the 

adjudicator’s reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the 

outcome of the case. 

SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6 (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has held 

that an ALJ need not specifically refer to every piece of evidence in the record, Dyer v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). However, the ALJ must explain the 

weight afforded to “obviously probative exhibits[,]” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 

735 (11th Cir. 1981), or the reasoning in his decision must sufficiently enable a court to 

conclude that the ALJ fully considered the claimant’s condition, and did not ignore 

evidence—like that in a teacher evaluation—that was patently inconsistent with the 

ALJ’s ultimate findings, Green, 2010 WL 4941425, at *4. Here, the court cannot 

conclude that the ALJ has met this standard. 

As an initial note, nowhere in his opinion does the ALJ state what weight he is 

assigning to Ms. Hamlet’s evaluation. Thus, according to SSR 06-03p, he must 

otherwise ensure that his discussion of the evidence allows a subsequent reviewer to 

follow his reasoning for his decision that D.M.W.B. is not disabled. 

During the Step Three determination of whether D.M.W.B. has a combination of 

impairments that results in either “marked” limitations in two of the functional 

equivalence domains or “extreme” limitation in one domain, the ALJ referenced his 

review of Ms. Hamlet’s teacher evaluation in three of the six domains. That review, 

however, failed to note that Ms. Hamlet reported D.M.W.B. to have “serious” problems 

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in ten of ten categories related to the domain of acquiring and using information; twelve 

of thirteen categories related to the domain of attending and completing tasks; and 

thirteen of thirteen categories related to the domain of interacting and relating with 

others. The ALJ’s review failed to note that Ms. Hamlet reported D.M.W.B. to have 

“very serious” problems in seven of seven categories related to the domain of moving and 

manipulating objects. Instead, when discussing each domain, the ALJ noted the evidence 

supporting his conclusion that D.M.W.B. was not disabled,6

 and followed that brief 

discussion with one sentence reciting Ms. Hamlet’s handwritten notes regarding the 

domain. See Tr. 20 (“However, a teacher reports a need for some special reading 

intervention. . . .”); Tr. 21 (“However, one teacher describes some difficulties with focus. 

. . .”; Tr. 22 (“A teacher reports some moodiness and acting out inappropriately. . . .”). 

While the ALJ pointed to the notes made by Ms. Hamlet on the questionnaire that cut 

slightly against the ALJ’s finding, he failed to address Ms. Hamlet’s concerns that 

D.M.W.B. had serious and very serious problems in multiple domains. Instead, it 

appears that the ALJ downplayed Ms. Hamlet’s assessment by including the information 

that did not reflect the severity of her concerns. Further, the ALJ provided no reasoning 

as to why he was discounting Ms. Hamlet’s evaluation by not discussing her concerns for 

D.M.W.B. in the different domains. Thus, because the ALJ failed to provide a 

 

6

 The ALJ’s opinion provides lengthy discussion during Step Two with regards to evidence in the case 

from consulting physicians, D.M.W.B.’s mother, and D.M.W.B.’s grandmother. See Tr. 14-19. In that 

discussion, the ALJ notes that he is assigning “great weight” to the findings of the DDS medical experts 

who found no more than less than marked limitations. Tr. 18. The ALJ did not refer to Ms. Hamlet’s 

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meaningful discussion involving his evaluation of the evidence, this court is precluded 

from conducting a meaningful review of his decision to determine whether the ALJ 

ignored evidence that was patently inconsistent with his ultimate findings. See Tyler v. 

Colvin, 2016 WL 4445482, at *8 (N.D. Fla. June 14, 2016) (holding that the ALJ’s 

discussion involving teach questionnaires did not allow a meaningful review by the court 

when the only portion of the questionnaires the ALJ credited were the statements that the 

plaintiff’s symptoms improved with medication). 

The ALJ’s failure to sufficiently discuss the reasons why he discounted Ms. 

Hamlet’s questionnaire is evident in the ALJ’s evaluation of the domain of moving about 

and manipulating objects. In that domain, Ms. Hamlet concluded that D.M.W.B. has a 

very serious problem—the most severe rating that could be assigned under the 

questionnaire—and noted that he “has to move all of the time.” Tr. 154. However, in 

making his determination that D.M.W.B. has no limitation in that area, the ALJ noted 

that “there is no allegation of a problem in this domain.” Tr. 22. The undersigned cannot 

agree with the ALJ that there is no allegation of a problem in this domain. If the ALJ was 

of the opinion that Ms. Hamlet’s assessment was faulty in some way, or if the ALJ relied 

upon other evidence suggesting that there was no problem in this area, the ALJ could 

have easily discussed the reasons for his conclusion and discounted Ms. Hamlet’s 

opinion. He did not, and now the court is left with evidence that there is an allegation of 

 

questionnaire during Step Two. 

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a problem within the domain of moving about and manipulating objects that the ALJ has 

ignored. 

Accordingly, the matter is due to be remanded for the ALJ to properly consider 

Ms. Hamlet’s teacher evaluation, and all other evidence in the record, pertaining to 

D.M.W.B.’s limitations in the six different domains. 

B. Whether the ALJ provided meaningful rationale to support his meets, 

medically equals, and functionality equals determination. 

Because the undersigned concludes that this matter is due to be reversed and 

remanded for further proceedings, the undersigned will not address Plaintiff’s second 

argument at this time. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above; the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this 

matter is REMANDED back to the Commissioner. A separate judgment will issue. 

 Done this 26th day of October, 2016. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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