Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04142/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN RAMON TUGGLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAMARA, psych technician; et al.,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-4142 MHP (pr)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT 

INTRODUCTION

Steven Ramon Tuggle filed this pro se prisoner's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. This case is now before the court for consideration of defendant's motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and miscellaneous motions. For the

reasons discussed below, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted and the

other motions denied.

BACKGROUND

Steven Ramon Tuggle alleged in his complaint that defendant Sannoh Kamara gave

him medicine to which he was allergic and he thereafter had a bad allergic reaction to it. 

The following facts are undisputed except as otherwise noted:

On December 13, 2003, Tuggle was an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison and Sannoh

Kamara was a psychiatric technician at the prison. At the time, Tegretol was prescribed and

supposed to be dispensed to Tuggle as an anti-seizure medication. 

Tuggle was allergic to the anti-seizure medication Dilantin, as well as to Motrin and

penicillin. The drug allergy information was in his medical records. 

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The parties disputed whether Kamara gave Tuggle the wrong medication on

December 13, 2003. Tuggle stated in his verified complaint that he was "given the wrong

seizure medication." Complaint, p. 3. Kamara stated in his declaration that the medication

he gave to Tuggle on December 13 "was [T]egretol. I did not give Tuggle Dilantin." 

Kamara Decl., ¶ 2. 

Tuggle described the situation in his inmate appeal: Kamara "gave me three (3)

Dilantin 100 mg capsules and I asked him, 'What's up with this new medication.' He

responded, 'It's your seizure medication,['] so I took it. Then he said, 'let me see.' I told him I

already took it. . . . [¶] I had an allergic reaction. I was waiting for Kamara to come back and

check on me to see if I needed some medical attention. But Kamara never came back. . . . [¶]

The following day on December 14, 2003 I had to report Kamara. I told Mrs. Beegle and she

had me taken to the infirmary." Complaint, Exh. A, form CDC-602. When Tuggle returned

from the infirmary that day, he was given Benadryl capsules as ordered by a doctor who had

phoned in the order. Tuggle was admitted to the infirmary on December 17, 2003 for

treatment of his allergic reaction. The medical records attached to the complaint had

notations that Tuggle had an acute allergic reaction to medication. 

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

Venue is proper in the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because

the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in Del Norte County, within the

Northern District. This court has federal question jurisdiction over this action brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The court will grant summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ... since a complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (a fact is material if it might affect the

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outcome of the suit under governing law, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine "if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.") 

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record which

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the

'depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted.) 

The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations

or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv.

v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the inferences to be drawn

from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at

631.

On issues as to which the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial -- such as the

qualified immunity defense in this case -- he must come forward with evidence which would

entitle him to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See Houghton v.

Smith, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). He must establish the absence of a genuine

issue of fact on each issue material to his affirmative defense. Id. at 1537. Once the moving

party has come forward with this evidence, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth

specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of fact on the defense.

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it

is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff's

verified complaint as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity

with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and

correct, and allegations were not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). 

Tuggle's complaint was signed under penalty of perjury and therefore may be considered in

deciding defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court also has considered the

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materials Tuggle filed in support of his own motion for summary judgment when evaluating

defendant's motion.

DISCUSSION

A. Kamara's Motion For Summary Judgment

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth

Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 102-04 (1976). To prove that the response of prison officials to a prisoner's medical

needs was constitutionally deficient, the prisoner must establish (1) a serious medical need

and (2) deliberate indifference to that need by prison officials. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prison official is deliberately

indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards

that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837, 844 (1994). 

Medical malpractice and negligence do not amount to an Eighth Amendment

violation. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Frost v.

Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no merit in constitutional claims

stemming from alleged delays in administering pain medication, treating broken nose and

providing replacement crutch, because claims did not amount to more than negligence);

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,

without more, does not violate a prisoner’s 8th Amendment rights); O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920

F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (repeatedly failing to satisfy requests for aspirins and antacids

to alleviate headaches, nausea and pain is not constitutional violation; isolated occurrences of

neglect may constitute grounds for medical malpractice but do not rise to level of

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain).

The parties appear to agree that Tuggle had a serious medical need to avoid medicine

to which he was allergic. The objective prong of the Eighth Amendment claim is satisfied.

Tuggle's claim falters on the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment. Defendant

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Kamara is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Eighth Amendment claim because

Tuggle has failed to raise a triable issue of fact that Kamara acted with the required mental

state of deliberate indifference. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Tuggle and drawing inferences therefrom in his favor, he has not shown a triable issue of fact

that Kamara knew of and disregarded a serious medical need he possessed. Accepting

Tuggle's version of the facts as true – as the court must while evaluating Kamara's motion for

summary judgment – Kamara gave him the wrong medication. That may well amount to

negligence, but the mere fact of a medication error alone does not show or lead to a

reasonable inference that the person who committed the error did so with deliberate

indifference. 

Tuggle presented evidence with his declaration showing that another technician made

two medication errors with a different drug in 2002. (See Docket # 29.) The fact that

another person made two errors in the preceding year does not prove anything with regard to

Kamara's mental state on December 13, 2003. Tuggle also presented evidence that his claim

of a medication error was sustained during a review of his inmate appeal and that the

reviewing doctor stated that there was no medication error report documented and the

technician had not had Tuggle seek assistance after the error was discovered. This evidence

is not enough to prove or support a reasonable inference that Kamara's mistake was the

product of deliberate indifference. (See Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (docket #

20, Exh. C.) Tuggle received medical care when he complained of allergic reaction

symptoms the day after receiving the wrong medication. He also received further medical

care when his symptoms worsened a few days later.

There is no proof on the requisite element of deliberate indifference. “A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Kamara is entitled to summary

judgment his favor on the merits of Tuggle's Eighth Amendment claim. 

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B. Tuggle's Motion For Summary Judgment

Tuggle filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In order for him to prevail on his

motion, he would have to show that he prevails as a matter of law on the undisputed facts or

that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on defendant's version of the facts if the

facts are disputed. Tuggle cannot prevail under either route because the facts are not

undisputed and under Kamara's version of the disputed facts, he did not make a medication

error. See Kamara Decl., ¶ 2 (denying that he gave Tuggle Dilantin instead of Tegretol). On

Kamara's version of the facts, Tuggle's claim would fail on both prongs of the Eighth

Amendment claim: there was no objectively serious medical need to avoid the correct

medication and Kamara would not have acted with deliberate indifference in giving the

correct medication. Tuggle's motion for summary judgment is denied. 

The idea that there is a triable issue of fact to defeat Tuggle's motion but not to defeat

Kamara's motion may seem confusing to a non-lawyer such as Tuggle, but it is the proper

result due to the parties' burdens on summary judgment. When a defendant files a motion for

summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

but the opposite occurs when the plaintiff files a motion for summary judgment. 

Additionally, to prevail on a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must

show he wins on every element of his claim, while a defendant prevails on a defendant's

motion for summary judgment if he knocks out just one element of the plaintiff's claim. That

is just what happened here. The defendant needed to defeat only one of the two

elements/prongs of the Eighth Amendment claim and did so by defeating the deliberate

indifference prong. The parties' dispute of fact about whether a medication error actually

occurred (i.e., the objective prong) did not matter for purposes of defendant's motion because

there was an absence of proof of deliberate indifference (i.e, the subjective prong) on the

Eighth Amendment claim. 

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C. Miscellaney

Plaintiff filed an ex parte application to extend the deadline to August 21, 2006 for

him to file a reply brief in support of his motion for summary judgment. The application is

granted. (Docket # 26.) The court accepts as timely filed the declaration which he filed on

July 10, 2006. He never filed a reply brief, even by his proposed extended deadline. 

Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is denied. (Docket # 19.) He did not meet and

confer with defense counsel to attempt to resolve the discovery dispute before filing the

motion as he was required to do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B); N. D. Cal. Local Rule 37. 

CONCLUSION

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Docket # 24.) Plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment is DENIED. (Docket # 20.) Plaintiff's application for an

extension of time to file his reply brief is GRANTED. (Docket #26.) Plaintiff's motion to

compel is DENIED. (Docket # 27.) Judgment shall be entered in defendant's favor and

against plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March _8__, 2007 ______________________

 Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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