Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00013/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00013-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405rs Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YVONNE MARIE FORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16cv13-JLS (NLS)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION; (2)

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; AND (3) DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF Nos. 13, 15, 17)

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s 

MSJ”), (ECF No. 13), Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition 

to Plaintiff’s MSJ (“Def.’s MSJ”), (ECF No. 15), and Plaintiff’s Reply and Response to 

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Reply”), (ECF No. 16). Also before the Court is 

the Administrative Record (“Admin. R.”) relevant to these Motions. (ECF No. 10.) 

Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes issued a thorough Report and Recommendation on both 

parties’ MSJs, (“R&R”), (ECF No. 17), in which she recommended granting Defendant’s 

MSJ and denying Plaintiff’s MSJ. Plaintiff timely filed objections to Judge Stormes’s R&R

(“R&R Obj.”), (ECF No. 18). Defendant did not file a response. After considering the

/ / /

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parties’ arguments and the law, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and 

ADOPTS Judge Stormes’s R&R in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

The R&R adequately details the administrative record in this case. (See R&R 2–7.) 

The Court incorporates the R&R’s background discussion by reference, and notes relevant 

facts where necessary in assessing Plaintiff’s objections. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Objections to a Report and Recommendation 

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition” of a 

magistrate judge on a dispositive matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). “[T]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the [report and 

recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). However, 

“[t]he statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s 

findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in 

original); see also Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). “Neither the 

Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and 

recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 

1121.

II. Judicial Review of Agency Action

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of a final agency decision 

denying a claim for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must affirm 

the denial of benefits if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and 

applies the correct legal standards. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,

1193 (9th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is a term of art that means “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999)). Put another way, it is “more than a 

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scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 

2002) (quoting Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). If the evidence 

is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the agency’s decision must be 

upheld. Id.; Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant objects to Judge Stormes’s R&R on two grounds: “(1) the R&R does not 

properly address the [Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)] failure to provide specific and 

legitimate reasons to discredit an examining psychologist’s evaluation; and (2) the R&R 

does not properly address the ALJ’s failure to provide clear and convincing reasons to

discredit Ms. Ford’s credibility.” (R&R Obj. 2.) The Court addresses each objection in 

turn.

I. Student Tiffani Wang, M.S.’s Evaluation

Plaintiff’s first objection in principle is that the ALJ did not adequately explain his 

reasons for accepting medical evaluations contrary to a nine-page report prepared by 

student Tiffani Wang, M.S. under the supervision of Dr. Stamatia Daroglou. (Id. at 2–4.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ both mischaracterized and used “boilerplate 

language” to discredit and summarize the report such that the ALJ failed to “meet[] the 

specific and legitimate standard for rejecting the examining psychologist’s evaluation.” 

(Id. at 3.)

Where an examining physician is contradicted by another physician, an ALJ must 

provide “specific and legitimate” reasons based on “substantial evidence” to reject an

examining physician’s opinion. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31. The opinion of an 

examining physician alone can constitute “substantial evidence” because it rests on an

independent examination. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). This 

is in part because the “ALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the 

medical evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In the present case, the ALJ expressly cited Ms. Wang’s report, but “g[a]ve[] little 

weight to the statements that reported the claimant was unable to work . . . .” (Admin R. 

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19.) Specifically, the ALJ determined the “conclusion ha[d] no probative value” because it

was “not supported by the objective medical evidence . . . discussed” earlier in the ALJ’s 

opinion, and therefore merely articulated an ultimate determination “reserved to the 

Commissioner . . . .” (Id.) Plaintiff first attacks the ALJ’s determination by arguing that the 

specific page the ALJ cited “does not contain a statement or conclusion that Ms. Ford is 

unable to work.” (R&R Obj. 3.) However, on the page immediately following the ALJcited page Ms. Wang concluded that Plaintiff “likely will not be able to return to the 

workforce, and thus may need assistance with accessing social security services[,]” (id. at 

427), a conclusion bolstered by the beginning of Ms. Wang’s report where she noted that 

Plaintiff was referred to her because her Doctor “thinks that an assessment can help 

determine if [Plaintiff] is capable of going back to work,” and that Plaintiff “disclosed an 

interest in accessing social security disability benefits[,]” (id. at 419). Viewed in this 

context, the Court cannot conclude that a one-page citation discrepancy constitutes 

reversible error on the part of the ALJ due to lack of specificity or legitimacy.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not discuss the entirety of Ms. Wang’s report, 

instead focused on the conclusion that Plaintiff likely could not return to the workforce, 

and therefore did not adequately support his decision to value other reports over Ms. 

Wang’s. However, the ALJ discussed in great detail many Adult Third Party Function 

Reports, many specific treatment notes, Plaintiff’s own statements and earlier request to 

serve as her daughter’s conservator, and the range of Plaintiff’s Global Assessment of 

Function scores. (Id. at 15–19.) And only after such discussion did the ALJ determine that 

Ms. Wang’s conclusion that Plaintiff likely could not return to the workforce—the exact 

conclusion for which Plaintiff was referred to Ms. Wang, (id. at 419)—was “not supported 

by the objective medical evidence as discussed above.” (Id. at 19.) 

As previously noted, the opinion of an examining physician alone can constitute 

“substantial evidence” because it rests on an independent examination. Tonapetyan v. 

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ relied on objective medical 

evidence in the form of “the State agency medical consultants who found [Plaintiff] capable 

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of simple tasks[,]” (id. at 19), Dr. Glassman’s examining conclusions that Plaintiff was 

“capable behaving in a socially appropriate manner and of getting along adequately with 

others; [and] [was] capable of understanding and following at least simple instructions,” 

(id. at 18), and many other treatment notes concluding that Plaintiff “was doing better and 

sleeping better[,]” that Plaintiff’s “mental status examination [findings] were normal[,]” 

that Plaintiff’s “affect was appropriate and her memory was normal[,]” and that Plaintiff’s 

“mental health issues were reported as controlled[,]” (id. at 18). This is adequate evidence 

to support a rational determination by the ALJ to give little weight to Ms. Wang’s 

conclusion that Plaintiff likely could not return to the workforce. Accordingly, the Court 

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s first Objection.

II. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Credibility

Plaintiff’s second objection is that the ALJ did not provide specific, clear, and 

convincing reasons to discredit Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (R&R Obj. 4–7.)

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the R&R “provid[es] a list of medical evidence that the 

ALJ cited in the decision, but not in the credibility analysis[,]” and that therefore the 

medical evidence is not “specific” enough insofar as the ALJ did not explicitly cite the 

evidence in his four paragraphs discussing the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony. (See 

R&R Obj. 5, 7; Admin. R. 15–16.)

In deciding whether to credit a claimant’s testimony about subjective symptoms or 

limitations, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Smolen

v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281. Under the first step, the claimant must produce objective 

medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to 

produce pain or other symptoms. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. If 

this test is satisfied, and there is no affirmative evidence that the claimant is malingering, 

then the ALJ must determine the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints. At the 

second step, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of symptoms 

as long as he gives specific, convincing reasons for doing so. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195; 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). “General findings are 

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insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 

In the present case, the ALJ specifically found Plaintiff’s “allegations concerning 

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms[,]” and Plaintiff’s “overall 

credibility” regarding her “testimony of a disabling condition[,]” to be less than fully

credible. (Admin. R. 16.) This was because Plaintiff’s testimony alleging severe limitations 

to her daily activity ran at least partly contrary to the “relatively benign medical evidence” 

presented, and Plaintiff’s own reports that “she was able to attend clubhouse activities, do 

some household chores, watch television, drive, and go out alone.” (Id.) Additionally, the 

ALJ noted that during the hearing Plaintiff “did not demonstrate or manifest any difficulty 

concentrating[,]” but was instead “able to remember past details” and “appeared to process 

. . . questions without difficulty, and to respond to the questions appropriately and without 

delay” all while “pa[ying] attention throughout the hearing.” (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that these findings constitute merely “vague allegation[s]” by the 

ALJ regarding a lack of a credibility that are devoid of “any support from the case record,”

(R&R Obj. 5), but that simply is not so. The ALJ expressly tied his credibility assessment 

to Plaintiff’s testimony regarding “the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her 

symptoms,” insofar as they established (or failed to establish) “a disabling condition . . . .” 

(Admin R. 16 (emphasis added).) And aside from the specific evidence the ALJ listed in 

the same paragraph—that Plaintiff “was able to attend clubhouse activities, do some 

household chores, watch television, drive, and go out alone[,]” (id. at 16)—the ALJ also 

referenced the “relatively benign medical evidence and other factors discussed in this 

decision[,]” (id.) which the ALJ then proceeded to catalog over the next three pages of the 

opinion, (id. at 17–19.) Even if this were an impermissible structuring of the ALJ’s opinion 

such that he could not permissibly rely on the subsequently cataloged medical evidence to 

assess Plaintiff’s credibility at the hearing, the ALJ also explicitly noted in the same 

credibility-assessing paragraph that Plaintiff’s actions, responses, and manner at the 

hearing controverted her testimony.

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In sum, the ALJ specifically and convincingly determined that Plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms—and the extent 

to which they created a qualifying “disabling” condition—should be discredited due to 

specific contrary testimony and evidence, as well as Plaintiff’s own actions, responses, and 

manner at the hearing.1

CONCLUSION

After conducting de novo review, the Court is satisfied that Judge Stormes’s R&R 

is analytically sound. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections and 

ADOPTS Judge Stormes’s R&R in its entirety. The ALJ’s decision was supported by 

substantial evidence, and thus the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Because this concludes 

the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2017

 

1

It is also important to keep in mind that the ALJ was assessing Plaintiff’s credibility in order facilitate 

his determination as to whether a sufficient impairment existed to award benefits, i.e., one that “must have 

lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.1509.

This goes directly to the “intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms . . . .”

(Admin. R. 16.)

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