Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00014/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00014-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jeremy Keith Barrientes, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00014-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”). Doc. 13. The R&R suggests that this Court deny the pro se petition for writ of 

habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 12. Specifically, the 

Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies under the 

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The matter is fully briefed, 

and no party has requested oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the Court will 

deny the petition for habeas relief. 

I. Background. 

 On August 11, 2010, a grand jury indicted Petitioner on kidnapping, first-degree 

burglary, theft of a means of transportation, trafficking in stolen property, two counts of 

misconduct involving weapons, and three counts of armed robbery. Doc. 12 at 2. At the 

time, Petitioner was on probation, and the state moved to revoke the probation after the 

indictment was issued. Id.

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 After he was found competent to stand trial, Petitioner pled guilty on February 18, 

2011, to two counts of armed robbery and one count of misconduct involving weapons. 

Id. The remaining counts were dismissed, and Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent 

sentences of 21 years on the two armed robbery counts and a concurrent sentence of 2.5 

years on misconduct involving weapons. Id. Petitioner received a 5-year sentence for 

violating his probation, to be served concurrently with the other sentences. Id. 

 On March 25, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief under 

Arizona Rule 32 challenging his guilty plea and the revocation of his probation. Id. at 2-

3. Petitioner’s court-appointed counsel filed a notice that he could raise no colorable 

claims on Petitioner’s behalf. Id. at 3. Petitioner then filed a pro se motion, and the state 

conceded that Petitioner was entitled to be resentenced. Id. In his motion, Petitioner 

raised seven other claims: (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) the court’s 

finding that he was competent to stand trial violated due process; (3) he was threatened 

and coerced by the prosecutor into pleading guilty; (4) the court modified the plea 

agreement; (5) his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; (6) the 

court failed to set forth the aggravating factors when imposing his sentence; and 

(7) Maricopa County jail subjected him to mental torture. Id. 

 On October 16, 2012, the state court partially granted Petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief, ordered that he be resentenced, and denied his other claims. Id. The 

court found that because Petitioner pled guilty, he had waived all non-jurisdictional 

defects and defects occurring prior to the plea, as well as all claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel not relating to his plea. Id. As a result, Petitioner was precluded 

from raising his speedy trial claim, his competency claim, the mental torture claim, and 

his claim that the court failed to properly consider his pro per motions. Id. at 4. The 

court also found that Petitioner’s claims that he did not understand his potential sentence 

and was coerced into pleading guilty were meritless. Id. 

 On November 5, 2012, Petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, which granted review and denied relief on February 25, 2014. 

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Doc. 10-5 at 35-58; 101-04, see also State v. Barrientes, Docket No. 1-CA-CR-12-0677-

PRPC (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2012). The Court of Appeals also denied Petitioner’s 

motion for special action jurisdiction. Doc. 10-5 at 124, 132. 

 On November 12, 2012, Petitioner was resentenced to the same terms previously 

imposed. Doc. 12 at 4. Petitioner then filed a second petition for post-conviction relief 

in September 2013 (Doc. 10-3 at 46-90, Doc. 10-4), which was denied by the trial court 

in January 2014 (Doc. 10-5 at 32-33). The Arizona Court of Appeals docket indicates 

that Petitioner has appealed the denial of his second petition, but the matter is still 

pending. See State v. Barrientes, Docket No. 1-CA-CR-14-0069-PRPC (Ariz. Ct. App. 

Jan. 27, 2014). 

 There has been considerable confusion in this case about when and whether 

Petitioner appealed the denials of his two Rule 32 petitions and when the Arizona Court 

of Appeals ruled on them. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner did not appeal 

the denial of his first petition. Doc. 12 at 4. Respondents contend that Petitioner filed an 

appeal of the first petition, but assert that “the Court of Appeals did not do anything with 

the case” because it was improperly appealed. Doc. 14 at 3. The Court’s review of the 

record suggests that both are incorrect. 

 Petitioner did appeal the denial of his first Rule 32 motion. The appeal was filed 

on November 5, 2012, as shown at Doc. 10-1 at 4. The appeal was assigned case number 

1-CA-CR-12-0677-PRPC. See State v. Barrientes, Docket No. 1-CA-CR-12-0677-PRPC 

(Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2012). The Arizona Court of Appeals decided this appeal on 

February 25, 2014, and found that Petitioner had failed to present the petition in the form 

required by Arizona law. Doc. 10-5 at 101-04. The fact that this decision concerned the 

first petition and not the second is clear from at least two facts: the decision bore the 

number of the first appeal (1-CA-CR-12-0677-PRPC), and noted that “[t]he trial court 

granted relief on a sentencing issue and resentenced Barrientes to the same sentence in 

both cases,” a clear reference to the first petition. Id. at 101-02. 

 Petitioner appealed the trial court’s denial of his second Rule 32 petition on 

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January 27, 2014, and it was assigned appeal number 1-CA-CR-14-0069-PRPC. See

State v. Barrientes, Docket No. 1-CA-CR-14-0069-PRPC (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2014). 

A review of the docket of the Arizona Court of Appeals shows that no decision has been 

made on this appeal. Id.

II. Analysis. 

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge in a habeas case. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to 

which specific objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner’s sole objection is that the 

Magistrate Judge incorrectly found that he failed to appeal the state court’s denial of his 

first petition. Doc. 13. He argues that he properly exhausted his claims.1

 The AEDPA prohibits a federal court from reviewing a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus filed “on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” 

unless the petitioner has “exhausted the remedies available in the court of the State[.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“Before a 

federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his 

remedies in state court.”); Kyzar v. Ryan, 780 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2015) (same). 

“[T]he exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity 

to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal 

courts.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. 

 If the state court denies relief for “noncompliance with a state procedural rule, the 

federal claim is procedurally defaulted and a federal court cannot grant relief unless 

petitioner shows cause for the default and prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violation.” Smith v. Or. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 736 F.3d 

 

1

 To the extent Petitioner challenges the entirety of the R&R in his one-paragraph objection, the Court declines to address the challenge. General objections have the same effect as a failure to object, and create no right to de novo review. Warling v. Ryan, No. 

CV-12-1396-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5276367, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2013). 

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857, 862 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977)). In this 

case, Petitioner procedurally defaulted the claims in his first petition and does not assert 

cause, prejudice, or actual innocence in his objection to the R&R. 

 “For the procedural default rule to apply, ‘the application of the state procedural 

rule must provide an adequate and independent state law basis on which the state court 

can deny relief.’” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bennett v. 

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003)). A ground is independent if “the last state 

court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests 

on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). A ground is 

adequate if it is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of petitioner’s 

purported default. Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found that Petitioner’s first petition failed to 

comply with Rule 32 because Petitioner failed to “set forth specific claims, present 

sufficient argument supported by legal authority, and include citation to the record.” 

Doc. 10-5 at 102. Denial of relief rested solely on Petitioner’s failure to comply with 

Rule 32. Id. The court noted that “[c]ompliance with Rule 32 is not a mere formality. A 

petitioner must strictly comply with Rule 32 in order to be entitled to relief. [Petitioner] 

has failed to comply with Rule 32.” Id. The Arizona Supreme Court likewise has stated: 

“We have consistently required that parties ‘strictly comply’ with [Rule 32] to be entitled 

to relief.” Canion v. Cole, 115 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Ariz. 2005). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision thus rested on independent and adequate grounds sufficient to support 

a finding for procedural default, and Petitioner may not assert his first-petition claims in 

this Court. As noted, he does not assert cause, prejudice, or actual innocence in his 

objection to the R&R. 

 Nor can Petitioner assert the claims in his second Rule 32 petition. The second 

petition was denied by the trial court, but, as noted above, remains pending. Because the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has not yet decided the second-petition issues, those issues are 

unexhausted. See McMonagle v. Meyer, 766 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The 

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exhaustion requirement affords state courts a full opportunity to consider and correct any 

constitutional or federal law challenges to a state judgment before a habeas defendant can 

collaterally attack the judgment in federal court.”). 

 In summary, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on the claims in his first 

Rule 32 petition and has not yet exhausted the claims in his second petition. For these 

reasons, the Court will accept the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the habeas 

petition be denied, albeit for slightly different reasons than those set forth in the R&R. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 

 2. A certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

 3. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 2nd day of June, 2015. 

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