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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUN 151990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

EDMUND MICHAEL OUELLETTE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

OFFICER PEREGOY, OFFICER ) 

TRAVELSTEAD; OFFICER HAMILTON; ) 

OFFICER GREY; CITY OF LAKEWOOD; ) 

and THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 88-1953 

(D.C. No. 87-A-900) 

(D. Colorado) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, Senior 

District Judge.** 

This is a two-count § 1983 action. The first count, 

challenging on Fourth Amendment grounds the validity of 

plaintiff's arrest, was dismissed by the trial court upon motion 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Howard 

District Court for 

designation. 

C. Bratton, Senior Judge, United States 

the District of New Mexico, sitting by 

Appellate Case: 88-1953 Document: 010110036204 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 1 
for directed verdict. The second count, questioning on Fourteenth 

Amendment grounds the force applied by defendants to effect the 

arrest of plaintiff, resulted in a an adverse jury verdict. 

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in directing the verdict 

and, by its conduct, denied him a fair trial. We affirm. 

Plaintiff Edmund Michael Ouellette was a passenger in a car 

driven by his cousin, Dennis Wattenberger. Defendant Timothy 

Peregoy, a Lakewood, Colorado, police officer, observed the 

erratic way in which the vehicle was being operated and suspected 

the driver was intoxicated. After stopping the car, Agent Peregoy 

noticed a half empty bottle of beer between plaintiff's legs. 

Agent Peregoy demanded the bottle and the identity of the driver. 

Although Mr. Wattenberger responded with a name and date of birth, 

he did not have a valid driver's license to produce. 

Returning to his car, Agent Peregoy radioed for assistance 

and proceeded to check the identity of the driver. Agent Peregoy 

"ran" the identification given him by Mr. Wattenberger but, 

finding no record of such a person, returned to the vehicle and 

asked Mr. Wattenberger once again to state his proper name and 

date of birth. Mr. Wattenberger repeated the same name, which was 

false, but gave a different date of birth. 

In the meantime, the backup assistance arrived at the scene. 

Agents Hamilton and . Grey proceeded to administer a roadside 

sobriety test to Mr. Wattenberger as well as to attempt to verify 

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his correct name. 1 Soon after, Agent Travelstead arrived to 

provide additional assistance. 

During the roadside test, plaintiff got out of the car and 

began to approach Agents Grey and Hamilton. He was intercepted by 

Agent Peregoy and instructed to return to the vehicle. Mr. 

Ouellette ignored the instruction and continued to walk toward 

Agents Hamilton and Grey. Once again, Agent Peregoy instructed 

plaintiff to return to the car. 

In an attempt to identify the driver of the vehicle, Agent 

Peregoy then asked Mr. Ouellette for the driver's name. Plaintiff 

first responded he did not know but, upon further prompting, 

admitted the driver was his cousin. Mr. Ouellette finally stated 

the driver's family name was Wattenberger, but only after Agent 

Peregoy intervened several times with Agent Hamilton to see if he 

had obtained the correct name. 

Noting Mr. Ouellette's slurred speech, bloodshot and watery 

eyes, uncooperative attitude, and strong odor of alcohol, Agents 

Peregoy and Travelstead decided Mr. Ouellette was intoxicated. 

Agent Travelstead concluded plaintiff was incapable of using "good 

judgment." He was further concerned that once Mr. Ouellette 

discovered the officers had arrested his cousin, Mr. Ouellette 

might try to drive to the police station to give him aid. Because 

Travelstead knew -Mr-. . Ouellette was alone and without someone "in a 

more sober state to watch him, and insure he did not drive," he 

1Mr. Wattenberger was ultimately arrested on charges not material 

to this case and placed in Agent Hamilton's patrol car. 

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decided to place Mr. Ouellette in protective custody. 2 Agent 

Travelstead then testified: 

I had ordered him to turn around, face away from 

me, place his hands on top of his head, and informed him 

that he was going to be charged with an open container 

violation. . . . And additionally, that he was going 

to be taken into [protective] custody. 

As I reached up to contact the back of his hands, 

to start the arrest procedure, that is the point that he 

pulled away from me and tried to turn on me. 

To regain control, Agent Travelstead placed his hands on plaintiff 

and drew him to the ground. While Mr. Ouellette struggled to 

remain standing, Agents Hamilton, Peregoy, and Grey ran to assist 

Agent Travelstead. During the ensuing struggle, the officers 

pulled Mr. Ouellette's arms behind his back to handcuff his wrists 

and forced his head to the pavement to keep him under control. 3 

Plaintiff asserts two theories involving his arrest. He sets 

out a Fourth Amendment theory on the ground his "arrest" for 

protective custody was without probable cause, and a Fourteenth 

Amendment theory that the "arrest" was effected with excessive 

2colo. Rev. Stat. 25-1-310 permits a law enforcement officer to 

take into custody an intoxicated or incapacitated person who is 

clearly dangerous to himself and others. 

·•3Plaintiff testified this treatment caused him various injuries, 

including abrasions to his right cheek and ear. Agent Travelstead 

testified he examined Mr. Ouellette closely after placing him in 

the police car but was unable to detect any injury. Full face and 

right profile pictures taken of plaintiff when he arrived in the 

station fail to disclose any injury visible to the naked eye. See 

Appellee's Addendum, exhibit A. Interestingly, the full face 

photograph displays a widely smiling visage more compatible with 

joviality than pain or injury. 

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force. 4 The court directed a verdict on the first theory, finding 

as a matter of law the officers had probable cause to effect 

custody. Although plaintiff now contends the trial court erred in 

failing to perceive his arrest gave rise to a Fourth Amendment 

issue, it is quite clear the trial court's dismissal of the first 

claim was predicated upon its determination that the officers had 

probable cause to effect custody. (Vol. XVI, p.6). Contrary to 

plaintiff's argument, the court did not rule plaintiff was not 

"seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, 

plaintiff's contention concerning the trial court's perception of 

the Fourth Amendment claim is irrelevant to this appeal. 

Because police officers who effect custody with probable 

cause are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim, 

Jones v. City and County of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 

1988), the only question we must answer is whether the trial court 

correctly determined the issue of probable cause. 5 We have no 

difficulty agreeing with that decision. 

Our analysis is predicated upon the language of Colo. Rev. 

Stat. 25-1-311, which states: "When any person is intoxicated or 

incapacitated by alcohol and clearly dangerous to the health and 

safety of himself or others, such person shall be taken into 

protective custody by law enforcement authorities acting 

4since the filing of the complaint, the Supreme Court has 

clarified that the reasonableness of force used by police officers 

to effect an arrest is to be measured by Fourth Amendment 

standards. Graham v. Connor, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1865 

(1989). 

5rn this case, we regard the trial court's ruling as the 

functional equivalent to a grant of qualified immunity. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1953 Document: 010110036204 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 5 
with probable cause." (Emphasis added.) The nature of the 

probable cause required by this section has not been defined by 

the Colorado Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the statutory language 

makes clear two requirements: (1) the individual must be 

intoxicated or incapacitated by alcohol, and (2) the individual 

must present a danger to himself or others. If those conditions 

exist, placing the person in custody is mandatory within the plain 

language of the statute. It is further evident that intoxication 

is not the only cause for prompting custody under this statute. 

Given those circumstances, we believe the trial court 

correctly concluded the defendants had probable cause to take 

plaintiff into custody. 6 The officers described his physical 

condition of slurred speech, watery and bloodshot eyes, and 

combativeness, which, when coupled with the smell of alcohol about 

his person and his possession of a half consumed bottle of beer, 

constitute sufficient probable cause to believe he was either 

intoxicated or incapacitated by alcohol. The further testimony of 

Agent Travelstead that plaintiff demonstrated poor judgment, had 

access to a vehicle, and might attempt to come to the aid of his 

6we do not have before us a complete transcript of all 

proceedings. For that reason, it is difficult to evaluate 

plaintiff's contention that the trial court made an incorrect 

assumption regarding probable cause. We have some sympathy with 

the trial court because the theories of prosecution were not 

-clearly presented -in the record. Nonetheless, given the muddling 

of distinctions between whether plaintiff was "arrested" for the 

municipal ordinance "open container" violation or merely issued a 

complaint, and whether he was "arrested" or merely "placed in 

custody" for his own protection, we look to the substance of the 

trial court's ruling. On that basis, we think it plain that the 

trial court believed the plaintiff's contentions regarding the 

validity of the arrest/detention were without merit because the 

officers had probable cause for their actions. That conclusion is 

amply supported by the evidence. 

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cousin, is ample probable cause that he presented a danger to 

himself or others. Thus, we conclude the trial court properly 

dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim against the officers because 

the actions relating to this claim were protected by qualified 

immunity. 7 

The remaining issue is whether the trial court improperly 

injected itself into the proceedings by comments the judge made 

during the course of the trial. 8 The issue is whether the trial 

court's actions denied the plaintiff a fair trial. In the record 

submitted to us, there were thirty-one occasions upon which the 

trial court interrupted testimony. On nine of those, the court 

interrupted to clarify or refocus the testimony of a witness. 

Sixteen of those times the court corrected counsel for the 

plaintiff and six times did so to counsel for the defendants. 

Only once was an objection voiced when the court warned counsel 

for the plaintiff: "I am notifying you, counsel, the next time 

that you are arrogant, impertinent, insolent, you are going to be 

7Plaintiff argues the officers could not have had probable cause 

because plaintiff's witnesses testified he was not intoxicated. 

That argument is partially supported by reference to the testimony 

of witnesses that was not transcribed. Nonetheless, whether 

plaintiff was actually intoxicated is not the test of probable 

cause in this case. The officers do not have to possess facts 

sufficient to establish guilt to have probable cause; the issue is 

whether they have reasonably trustworthy information that would 

cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that an act 

warranting custody has been committed, and there is a factual 

basis for the conclusion of the officers. United States v. 

Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1407 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 

1023 (1985). That basis exists here. Moreover, as already noted, 

the statute requires action by officers even if a person is not 

intoxicated. 

8Plaintiff's counsel tries to exacerbate the severity of those 

comments by making two issues out of the same words. 

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held in contempt of Court." Counsel's reaction was to ask for ''a 

mistrial and recusal." 

In the absence of objection, we examine the actions of the 

court for plain error. United States v. Wheeler, 444 F.2d 385, 

390 (10th Cir. 1971). We have examined carefully each instance in 

which the court took occasion to interrupt the proceedings and, in 

each instance, we see justifiable provocation for the court's 

action. Federal trial judges are not mere referees whose only 

function is to rule on objections. They are, instead, imbued with 

an inherent responsibility to insure that a trial is a focused 

search for the truth. In that role, they act correctly when they 

require responsive and direct answers by witnesses and proper 

conduct by lawyers. Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee 

Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1154-55 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

439 U.S. 862 (1978); Lane v. Wallace, 579 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th 

Cir. 1978). Moreover, a party cannot complain of interruptions by 

the trial court that the party has induced or invited. Rasmussen, 

571 F.2d at 1155. 9 

Consistent with our duty to examine the record to determine 

whether the trial court's interruptions affected the plaintiff's 

right to a fair trial, Lane, 579 F.2d at 1203-04, we have 

determined there is no reason to believe the actions of the trial 

court in any way affected the outcome of this case. We further 

9we are satisfied in each instance in which the trial court 

interrupted, whether prompted by plaintiff or defendant, the 

person to whom the trial court directed remarks had amply provoked 

the trial court's action. 

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.. 

conclude plaintiff has demonstrated no grounds for the granting of 

the motion for mistrial. Rasmussen, 571 F.2d at 1154. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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