Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02113/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02113-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN OROZCO and JUAN OROZCOBRISENO, on behalf of themselves 

and on behalf of all persons similarly 

situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC., a 

corporation, and DOES 1 through 50 

inclusive,

Defendant.

No. 14-cv-02113-MCE-EFB

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

This putative class action proceeds on Plaintiffs Juan Orozco and Juan OrozcoBriseno’s Complaint against their former employer Illinois Tool Works, Inc. (“ITW”). 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 85, in 

which Plaintiffs seek to certify two classes. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion 

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.1

///

///

 1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

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BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs are former material processors who worked for the ITW Rippey 

Corporation (“Rippey”), one of ITW’s more than forty business facilities in California. The 

Rippey facility is ITW’s only facility in California that manufactures PVA brush rollers 

used for cleaning semi-conductors. The manufacturing process for the PVA brush 

rollers requires material processors at the Rippey facility to wear hazmat-type protective 

gear. Plaintiffs allege that the hazards of the manufacturing process at the Rippey 

facility sometimes prevent material processors from taking their scheduled meal and rest 

breaks.

ITW also owns Kairak, which previously operated a manufacturing facility in 

California. Plaintiffs never worked at that facility, but allege that Kairak’s shop workers 

were deprived of meal and rest breaks in a manner similar to their experiences at the 

Rippey facility. Plaintiffs allege that the mealtime policies at the Rippey and Kairak

facilities violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and these allegations form 

the basis of Plaintiffs’ proposed UCL Class.

Plaintiffs also allege that wage statements they received from ITW that included 

overtime pay were legally deficient under California law. They contend that all of ITW’s 

California employees who received overtime pay received the same defective wage 

statements, and these allegations form the basis of Plaintiffs’ proposed Wage Statement 

Class.

Plaintiffs originally filed suit in state court, but on September 12, 2014, Defendant 

removed Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) to this Court pursuant to its 

diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand, ECF No. 6, which 

was denied, ECF No. 13. Plaintiffs now move for class certification.

 2 The following recitation of facts is taken from Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 

Support of the Motion for Class Certification and Defendant’s Opposition thereto. See ECF No. 85-1 

(Plaintiffs’ memorandum); ECF No. 88 (Defendant’s opposition).

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STANDARD

A court may certify a class if a plaintiff demonstrates that all of the prerequisites of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) 

have been met. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; see also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 

1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996). The trial court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to 

determine whether the party seeking certification has established those prerequisites. 

Id. at 1233. While the trial court has broad discretion to certify a class, its discretion 

must be exercised within the framework of Rule 23. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 

Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).

According to Rule 23(a), class certification may be had under the following 

circumstances: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable; (2) questions of law or fact exist that are common to the class; (3) the 

claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 

the class and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 

of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(b) requires a plaintiff to establish one of 

the following: (1) that there is a risk of substantial prejudice from separate actions; 

(2) that declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the class as a whole would be 

appropriate; or (3) that common questions of law or fact predominate and the class 

action is superior to other available methods of adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

ANALYSIS

A. The Putative Classes

Plaintiffs define the UCL Class as “[a]ll individuals who are or previously were 

employed by Defendant . . . in California as non-exempt employees during the period 

March 27, 2013 to the present who worked at (a) Rippey as Material Processors; or, at 

(b) Kairak as Shop Workers.” Mem. of P & A in Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification 

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(“Mot. for Class Cert.”) at 10. Plaintiffs allege a violation of the UCL for “unfairly or 

deceptively” violating meal period requirements imposed by California law. Mot. for 

Class Cert. at 16. Plaintiffs “do[] not ask the Court to find that Defendant violated the 

meal period laws under the California Labor Code.” Id. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that 

“Defendant’s system” for providing mealtimes was unfair under the UCL. Id.

Plaintiffs define the Wage Statement Class as “[a]ll individuals who are or 

previously were employed by Defendant . . . in California as non-exempt employees 

during the period March 27, 2013 to the present who received a wage statement that 

reflects a second overtime payment.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 10. Plaintiffs allege that all 

members of this proposed class received wage statements that were deficient under 

California Labor Code § 226, which requires, in part, that “[e]very employer . . . furnish 

each of his or her employees . . . an accurate itemized statement in writing showing . . . 

all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number 

of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee.” Cal. Labor Code § 226(a).

While Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification makes no allegations that the wage 

statements provided by ITW are inaccurate—unlike Plaintiffs’ FAC—they allege that the 

wage statements are not sufficiently clear to satisfy the California Labor Code’s 

requirement that employees be able to “promptly and easily determine from the wage 

statement alone . . . [t]he amount of gross wages or net wages paid to the employee 

during the pay period.” Cal. Labor Code § 226(e)(2)(B). All of ITW’s California 

employees who received “a second overtime payment”3 are alleged to have suffered this 

injury, since ITW “used one . . . centralized payroll processing department for all its 

employees” and used the same format for all its employees. Mot. for Class Cert. at 3–4.

///

///

 3 Plaintiffs use this terminology to reference additional payments made to supplement an 

employee’s overtime pay when the employee’s regular hourly rate has been adjusted by a bonus or other 

special pay during the pay period. See Mot. for Class Cert. at 5.

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B. Defendant’s Challenge To The Pleading Of The Wage Statement Claim

Defendant initially challenges certification of the Wage Statement Class by 

arguing that its underlying claim was not adequately pled. Def’s. Opp’n at 8–11. 

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) contained five causes of action: (1) unfair 

competition in violation of the UCL for failing to comply with California break and 

overtime law; (2) failure to adequately pay overtime compensation; (3) failure to provide 

sufficient wage statements; (4) failure to pay wages as due; and (5) violation of the 

Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). FAC ¶¶ 42–89, ECF No. 1-1. The theory of 

recovery for the Wage Statement Class falls under the Third Cause of Action, and the 

theory of recovery for the UCL Class falls under the First Cause of Action. Plaintiffs 

have not sought certification of any class to pursue the other three causes of action.

Defendant argues that the Third Cause of Action, as pled, is entirely derivative of 

a cause of action now abandoned by Plaintiffs. According to Defendant, the FAC 

alleges the wage statements provided to Plaintiffs were defective because they included 

incorrect overtime pay calculations. Def’s. Opp’n at 10. Thus, they argue, the claim is 

wholly derived from the now-abandoned Second Cause of Action, which alleged a failure 

to adequately pay overtime compensation. Id. at 10–11. Plaintiffs are now making a 

direct claim that wage statements including overtime pay were legally defective, even if

the wages paid were correct. See Mot. for Class Cert. at 5.

Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the FAC does contain a standalone claim of 

legally deficient wage statements: “At all times relevant herein, DEFENDANT violated 

Cal. Lab. Code § 226 in that DEFENDANT failed to provide an accurate wage statement 

in writing that properly and accurately itemized the effective overtime rates of pay for 

overtime hours worked . . . .” FAC ¶ 75. Accordingly, the claim asserted on behalf of the 

Wage Statement Class is adequately pled, and Defendant’s challenge to certification on 

this basis is not persuasive.

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C. Rule 23(a) Requirements

1. Numerosity

To meet the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a), a class must be “so numerous 

that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “Courts have 

routinely found the numerosity requirement satisfied when the class comprises 40 or 

more members.” Collins v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 294, 300 (E.D. Cal. 

2011). However, “[t]he numerosity requirement includes no specific numerical 

threshold.” Andrews Farms v. Calcot, Ltd., 258 F.R.D. 640, 651 (E.D. Cal. 2009) order 

clarified on reconsideration, 268 F.R.D. 380 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Rule 23(a)’s “requirement 

that the class be so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical does not mean 

that joinder must be impossible, but rather means only that the court must find that the 

difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class makes class litigation 

desirable.” In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (citing Harris v. 

Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 913–14 (9th Cir. 1964)). Courts have 

been inclined to certify classes of fairly modest size. See, e.g., Jordan v. Los Angeles 

Cty., 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (willing to find numerosity for classes with 

thirty-nine, sixty-four, and seventy-one people), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810 

(1982).

The Court finds, and the Defendant does not dispute, that numerosity is met for 

the Wage Statement Class because it consists of 164 members. Similarly, the UCL 

Class is sufficiently numerous because it consists of 102 members (44 Rippey 

employees and 58 Kairak employees).

2. Commonality

Under Rule 23(a)(2), commonality is established if “there are questions of law or 

fact common to the class.” This requirement is construed permissively and can be 

satisfied upon a finding of “shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates.” 

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 

v. Dukes, the Supreme Court clarified: “What matters to class certification . . . is not the 

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raising of common ‘questions'—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide

proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” 

131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (ellipsis in original). Even a single common question that 

meets this criteria satisfies Rule 23(a)(2). Id. at 2556 n.9.

a. Wage Statement Class

The Court finds that commonality exists as to the claims of the members of the 

Wage Statement Class. All members received the same kind of wage statements that 

Plaintiffs allege are defective. A classwide proceeding would be more than effective in

generating a common answer to whether the kind of wage statement offered by ITW is 

deficient under California law.

b. UCL CLass

With regard to the UCL Class, Plaintiffs claim there are common questions as to 

whether Defendant had a “policy of failing to specify a timing requirement for meal 

periods, failing to provide for a second meal period, and failing to pay premium wages 

for these violations.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 12. It is unclear, though, whether a 

classwide proceeding would generate the kind of common answers that would “drive the 

resolution of the litigation.” The Rippey employees and Kairak employees operated 

under different meal policies. Plaintiffs do not identify any ITW policy that applied to both 

facilities that would have led to the alleged violations of California law. And indeed, the 

unique manufacturing policy at the Rippey plant that allegedly drove Defendant to deny 

workers their required mealtimes was not present at the Kairak facility. The Court, 

though, need not decide whether there is sufficient commonality among the UCL Class 

because, as described below, the UCL Class fails for lack of typicality.

3. Typicality

“The [Rule 23(a)(3)] test of typicality is whether other members have the same or 

similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named 

plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of 

conduct.” Hanon v. Dataprods. Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

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omitted). “Under the rule's permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if 

they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not be 

substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. The Ninth Circuit has found typicality 

if the requisite claims “share a common issue of law or fact and are sufficiently parallel to 

insure a vigorous and full presentation of all claims for relief.” Cal. Rural Legal 

Assistance, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation 

omitted), amended, 937 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991).

a. Wage Statement Class

Defendant argues that a claim under California Labor Code § 226 requires proof 

of injury. Def’s. Opp’n at 11–12. Namely, Defendant argues that individuals can recover 

only by proving they actually viewed the allegedly defective statements. Id. at 12.

Accordingly, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy typicality—they are not 

typical of those who suffered an injury because they never suffered an injury 

themselves. Id. at 12–13.

Defendant relies heavily on Holak v. Kmart Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00304-AW-MJS, 

2015 WL 2384895 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2015), in support of the notion that a plaintiff must 

actually view the wage statements to recover under § 226. However, Holak analyzed 

§ 226 before it was amended in 2013 to define its injury requirement. It is clear that 

post-amendment, an injury is established if a wage statement is legally defective. Cal. 

Labor Code § 226(e)(2)(B) (“An employee is deemed to suffer injury for purposes of this 

subdivision if the employer fails to provide accurate and complete information as 

required by any one or more of the items . . . of subdivision (a) . . . .”); see also Brewer v. 

Gen. Nutrition Corp., No. 11-CV-3587 YGR, 2015 WL 5072039, at *10 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 

Aug. 27, 2015) (“Holak is distinguishable on many grounds, but most significantly that 

the court there . . . found the 2013 Amendment to be a substantive change that was not 

entitled to retroactive application.”).

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently typical of the Wage Statement 

Class’s.

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b. UCL Class

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of any claims the Kairak 

workers might have because mealtime policies differed between the two plants. The 

Kairak workers were subject to a collective bargaining agreement that provided meals 

would be taken after six hours, rather than the statutory five. Def’s. Opp’n at 6.

Furthermore, Defendant argues—and Plaintiffs do not refute—that the claims made on 

behalf of Kairak workers are barred as a matter of law. Id. at 17. “[T]he Industrial 

Welfare Commission may adopt a working condition order permitting a meal period to 

commence after six hours of work if the commission determines that the order is 

consistent with the health and welfare of the affected employees.” Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 512(b). Just such an order exists for manufacturing employees subject to a collective 

bargaining agreement: “In the case of employees covered by a valid collective 

bargaining agreement, the parties to the collective bargaining agreement may agree to a 

meal period that commences after no more than six (6) hours of work.” Cal. Code Regs. 

Tit. 8, § 11010, ¶ 11(a).

Accordingly, because Kairak workers were subject to an entirely different 

mealtime policy, Plaintiffs’ mealtime claims are not typical of any that could be brought 

by Kairak workers. Because Plaintiffs have not shown that the UCL class members’ 

claims are sufficiently parallel, the motion for certification of this class must be denied.

4. Adequacy of Representation

“The final hurdle interposed by Rule 23(a) is that ‘the representative parties will 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.’” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)). “To satisfy constitutional due process concerns, 

absent class members must be afforded adequate representation before entry of a 

judgment which binds them.” Id. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940)).

“Resolution of two questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and 

their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the 

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named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the 

class?” Id.

Defendant does not challenge adequacy of representation, and there is no 

indication that Plaintiffs or their counsel have a conflict of interest. Plaintiffs have

committed to seeing the litigation to its conclusion, and Plaintiffs’ counsel has already 

been found qualified by this Court in another employment class action proceeding 

concurrently with this one. See Culley v. Lincare, 2:15-cv-00081-MCE-CMK, 2016 WL 

4208567, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016).

D. Rule 23(b) Requirements4

1. Predominance

“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are 

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). “This calls upon courts to give careful scrutiny to the 

relation between common and individual questions in a case.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 

Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016).

An individual question is one where members of a proposed 

class will need to present evidence that varies from member 

to member, while a common question is one where the same 

evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie 

showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class- wide proof. The predominance inquiry asks whether the 

common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more 

prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation- defeating, individual issues.

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs’ claim on behalf of the Wage Statement Class is premised wholly on an 

allegation that the wage statements provided by ITW are deficient under California Labor 

Code § 226. To succeed on a claim under California Labor Code § 226, a plaintiff must 

show (1) that the wage statement an employee received failed to comply with the 

 4 Because the Court already determined that certification of the UCL Class would be improper 

because Plaintiffs failed to show the requisite typicality, only the Wage Statement Class is addressed 

below. 

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statutory requirements and (2) that the failure was “knowing and intentional” on the part 

of the employer. Cal. Labor Code § 226(e)(1).

All of the class members received the same kind of wage statements from ITW. 

Furthermore, whether the alleged failures of those wage statements to comply with 

§ 226 were “knowing and intentional” requires only a showing that ITW was aware of the 

format of the wage statements and intended to provide them in that format. See Willner

v. Manpower Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2014). These common issues 

form the basis of Plaintiffs’ wage statement claim and accordingly the Court finds that the 

Wage Statement Class fulfills Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement.

2. Superiority of Class Action

Plaintiffs must also establish that the proposed class action is the superior method 

of resolving the dispute in comparison to available alternatives. “A class action is the 

superior method for managing litigation if no realistic alternative exists.” Valentino, 

97 F.3d at 1234–35. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a class action is a plaintiff's 

only realistic method for recovery if there are multiple claims against the same defendant 

for relatively small sums. Local Joint Exec. Bd. Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las 

Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001).

A class action on behalf of the Wage Statement Class is superior to alternative 

methods of adjudication. Individuals likely have little interest in pursuing litigation 

themselves, especially given potential fears of employment retaliation. Furthermore, 

neither the parties nor the Court is aware of any other similar suit pending elsewhere. 

There also appears to be no reason why concentrating the litigation in this Court would 

be undesirable. For the Wage Statement Class, the proposed class action is thus the 

superior method of resolving the dispute, and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met. 

Plaintiffs having shown compliance with Rule 23 are entitled to certification of the Wage 

Statement Class.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification of the Wage 

Statement Class is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED without prejudice as to 

the UCL Class. ECF No. 85.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2016

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