Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05661/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05661-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENT CRAIG, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CRAIG KOENIG, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 19-cv-05661-EMC 

ORDER OF SERVICE 

Docket No. 9 

INTRODUCTION 

Kent Craig, a prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed this pro se

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and the 

Rehabilitation Act. The Court reviewed the complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend. Mr. 

Craig’s amended complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. His 

application for appointment of counsel also is before the Court for consideration. 

BACKGROUND

 Mr. Craig alleges in his amended complaint that he has intervertebral spinal disc syndrome 

and is protected by the Americans With Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. Docket No. 9 at 

1. He alleges that, on January 25, 2018, he was provided a “lower bunk accommodation(s) via 

form CDCR 1824.” Docket No. 9 at 2.1

 Mr. Craig further alleges that he was deprived of his 

1

 The form attached the amended complaint is not a CDCR-1824 request for reasonable 

accommodation form and instead is a February 5, 2018, response from the Reasonable 

Accommodation Panel (RAP) that was considering Mr. Craig’s request for a lower bunk. That 

RAP response form states that (a) Mr. Craig was given an interim accommodation of a lower bunk 

on January 23, 2018, “pending RAP”; (b) the RAP found no recent medical record of hip and back 

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lower bunk accommodation and ordered to relocate to another bunk on April 26, 2019, by 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) officials, even though the 

accommodation form had not been rescinded. Id. 

Mr. Craig further alleges that when he, an African-American, was moved out, his lower 

bunk then was assigned to a Hispanic inmate. Docket No. 9 at 2. He further alleges that “due 

process” is violated when the CDCR fails to follow its own regulations on housing and the ADA. 

Id. at 4. 

DISCUSSION

 A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which 

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings 

must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and 

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended and codified in 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (RA), prohibit 

discrimination on the basis of a disability in the programs, services or activities of a public entity. 

Federal regulations require a public entity to “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, 

or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 

disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would 

fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 

The elements of a cause of action under Title II of the ADA are: (1) the plaintiff is an 

individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the 

benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either 

pain for Mr. Craig and therefore scheduled an appointment for him to address his concerns with 

his primary care registered nurse; and (c) in the interim, Mr. Craig has “been temporarily housed 

in a lower bunk pending medical evaluation.” Docket No. 9 at 10. The RAP response form did 

not grant permanent permission to have a lower bunk. 

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excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs or 

activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, 

denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. Thompson v. Davis, 

295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). A cause of action under § 504 of the RA essentially parallels 

an ADA cause of action. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 590 (1999); Duvall v. County of 

Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). Liberally construed, the amended complaint states a 

claim against the CDCR for a violation of the ADA and RA based on prison officials’ refusal to 

allow Mr. Craig to remain in a lower bunk in April 2019. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Mr. Craig alleges that an inmate of a different race obtained the lower bunk Mr. Craig was 

removed from in April 2019. Even with liberal construction, this allegation does not state a claim 

for a violation of Mr. Craig’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause. As the Court explained in 

the order of dismissal with leave to amend, a plaintiff trying to state a claim for an equal 

protection violation “must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate 

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 

425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Any inmate 

who replaced Mr. Craig would be of some race and the mere fact that the replacing inmate was of 

a different race does not suggest an equal protection violation. Mr. Craig alleges no facts that 

remotely suggest an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based on his race. Further leave 

to amend will not be granted because it would be futile: the Court already explained what Mr. 

Craig needed to allege and he was unable or unwilling to make the necessary allegations. 

Mr. Craig alleges that prison officials’ failure to comply with state regulations about 

housing and the ADA violated due process. The due process claim is dismissed without leave to 

amend because the theory asserted – that a state law violation is automatically a due process 

violation – has no legal support. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011) (a mere error 

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of state law is not a denial of due process); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1975) (“the 

search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed 

from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause”); id. at 484, 

487 (right to due process in prison is generally limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes 

an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life,” and (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence”). A due process 

claim under § 1983 against individual defendants for failing to comply with the ADA also is 

unavailing. “[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in 

her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act.” Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Finally, Mr. Craig has requested that counsel be appointed to represent him in this action. 

A district court has the discretion under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(1) to designate counsel to represent an 

indigent civil litigant in exceptional circumstances. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 

1331 (9th Cir. 1986). This requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success on the merits 

and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal 

issues involved. See id. Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together 

before deciding on a request for counsel under § 1915(e)(1). Exceptional circumstances are not 

present because it appears that there is a low likelihood of success on the merits, see footnote 1, 

and Mr. Craig was able to adequately articulate his claim pro se. Mr. Craig’s request for 

appointment of counsel to represent him in this action therefore is DENIED. Docket No. 9 at 7. 

CONCLUSION 

 1. The amended complaint, liberally construed, states a cognizable claim under the 

ADA and RA against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. All other 

defendants and claims are dismissed. 

2. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, the summons, a copy of the amended complaint, and a copy of all the 

documents in the case file upon the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 

Sacramento, California. 

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 3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule for 

dispositive motions is set: 

 a. No later than August 14, 2020, Defendant must file and serve a motion for 

summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendants is of the opinion that this case cannot 

be resolved by summary judgment, Defendant must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion 

is due. If Defendant files a motion for summary judgment, Defendant must provide to Plaintiff a 

new Rand notice regarding summary judgment procedures at the time it files such a motion. 

See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendant no later than September 25, 2020. Plaintiff 

must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment provided later in this order 

as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

 c. If Defendant wishes to file a reply brief, the reply brief must be filed and 

served no later than October 16, 2020. 

 4. Plaintiff is provided the following notices and warnings about the procedures for 

motions for summary judgment: 

The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by which they seek to have 

your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. . . . Rule 56 tells you what you must do 

in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 

be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real 

dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for 

summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly 

supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your 

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that 

contradict the facts shown in the defendants' declarations and documents and show that 

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence 

in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary 

judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 

If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 

it is seeking to have the case dismissed. As with other defense summary judgment motions, if a 

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motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is granted, Plaintiff's 

case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. 

 5. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendant’s 

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendant’s counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendant’s 

counsel has been designated, Plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to the 

defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to the party. 

 6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery. 

 7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility. 

8. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case. 

9. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is DENIED. Docket No. 9 at 7. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 15, 2020 

______________________________________ 

EDWARD M. CHEN 

United States District Judge 

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