Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01624/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01624-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

SHELVIN PRASAD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-01624 PHX JWS (MEA)

)

KATRINA S. KANE, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 ) 

Respondent. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK:

Mr. Shelvin Prasad (“Petitioner), who is currently

detained at the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona, filed a

pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 on August 23, 2007, seeking his release from detention.

Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 8) on November 15, 2007.

Petitioner filed a pro se reply to the response to the petition

on December 17, 2007. See Docket No. 9.

I. Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Fiji. See

Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Response”), Exh. 1. On July 18, 1998, Petitioner was admitted

to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Response,

Exh. 1 & Exh. 3.

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-2-

On or about October 4, 2005, the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against

Petitioner by serving Petitioner with a Notice to Appear. Id.,

Exh. 2 & Exh. 6. The Notice to Appear alleged that, on May 17,

2004, Petitioner was convicted by the State of California on one

charge of receiving stolen property. Id., Exh. 2. The Notice

to Appear alleged Petitioner was removable because he was an

immigrant who had been convicted of an aggravated felony as that

term is defined by federal immigration statutes, i.e., a state

conviction for a theft or burglary offense for which the imposed

term of imprisonment was at least one year. Id., Exh. 2.

Petitioner was taken into the custody of the DHS on October 4,

2005. See Answer at 2.

The charge of removability based on Petitioner’s 2004

theft conviction was withdrawn on November 15, 2005. Id., Exh.

2 & Exh. 3. On that same day, DHS alleged Petitioner was

removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), because he

had been convicted of violating a state law or regulation

related to a controlled substance other than a single offense

involving the personal use of marijuana. Id., Exh. 3. The DHS

filed a Notice of Additional Charges alleging that, in May of

2004, Petitioner was convicted by the State of California on one

count of felony possession of methamphetamine and one

misdemeanor count of being under the influence of

methamphetamine. Id., Exh. 5. 

Petitioner, through counsel requested a hearing

regarding his continued detention without bond on or about

October 26, 2005. Id., Exh. 7. Petitioner also submitted a

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Respondent’s Exhibit 5 indicates that, initially,

Petitioner pled guilty to both charges and that the imposition of his

sentence was suspended and he was placed on three years of informal

probation and given “credit for time served: 80 actual, 40 conduct,

totaling 120 days.” Petitioner alleges in his reply to the answer

that the 2004 drug convictions were vacated nunc pro tunc after the

initiation of his removal proceedings, and that he entered a plea of

nolo contendere to a charge of possession of a controlled substance

for which conviction he received a suspended sentence and unsupervised

probation. See Docket No. 9.

-3-

second request for a bond hearing on November 23, 2005. Id.,

Exh. 7. On December 2, 2005, an Immigration Judge noted the

“request for custody hearing was withdrawn.” Id., Exh. 8.

Petitioner appeared at a hearing before an Immigration

Judge on November 15, 2005. Id., Exh. 8. Petitioner’s case was

continued because his counsel did not appear. Id., Exh. 8. On

or about December 7, 2005, Petitioner admitted the allegations

in the amended Notice to Appear regarding his citizenship and

denied the allegations of his 2004 drug convictions. Id., Exh.

9. On or about January 24, 2006, at a hearing before an

Immigration Judge, Petitioner admitted the factual allegations

in the amended Notice to Appear regarding his 2004 drug

convictions. Id., Exh. 9.1 At that time, Petitioner conceded

his removability and the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the

charges in the amended Notice to Appear. Id., Exh. 9. 

Petitioner then filed applications for asylum and

withholding of removal. Id., Exh. 9. In a decision issued May

2, 2006, the IJ denied Petitioner’s applications for asylum and

withholding of removal, and ordered Petitioner be removed from

the United States to Fiji. Id., Exh. 10.

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 On October 4, 2006, the BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to

remand based on the state court’s vacature of his convictions nunc pro

tunc. See Answer, Exh. 15.

-4-

Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id., Exh. 11 & Exh. 12. The BIA

dismissed the appeal on September 8, 2006. Id., Exh. 13.2

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals on or about November 1, 2006. Id., Exh. 16.

Petitioner also filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit to stay his

removal, which was granted on February 22, 2007. Id., Exh. 17

& Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Docket No. 06-75173.

Petitioner filed another appeal in the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals on January 29, 2007 (Ninth Circuit Docket No.

07-70372), which matter was consolidated with his initial appeal

on April 9, 2007. The pleading before the Ninth Circuit, in

which matter Petitioner is represented by retained counsel, was

completed October 24, 2007. See Ninth Circuit Docket No. 06-

75173.

On May 1, 2007, DHS notified Petitioner that his

custody status would be reviewed on May 16, 2007. Id., Exh. 20.

On or about June 12, 2007, DHS issued a decision to continue

Petitioner’s detention. Id., Exh. 21. The decision states:

“your criminal history shows that you have difficulty complying

with terms of supervised release and you may pose a flight

risk.” Id., Exh. 21. The decision further states: “a travel

document is available for your return to Fiji pending the

outcome of your current appeal...” Id., Exh. 21. 

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 The affidavit regarding the likelihood that Petitioner is

removable in the reasonably foreseeable states Petitioner was ordered

removable because he committed an aggravated felony and avers the

government of Fiji would not issue a travel document for Petitioner

until the conclusion of his appeal. Answer, Exh. 21. Petitioner’s

crimes were not classified as aggravated felonies and the charge that

he was removable based on an aggravated felony was withdrawn. The

statement in the affidavit that Fiji had not issued a travel document

contradicts the statement by the detention hearing officer that a

travel document had been issued.

-5-

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on August

23, 2007. In his federal habeas action, Petitioner asserts he

has been detained beyond the six-month constitutionallypermissible period pending his removal from the United States,

citing the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Zadvydas v.

Davis. Petitioner has been detained since October 4, 2005,

i.e., as of April of 2008, for a period of approximately two

years and six months.

Respondent avers that “[t]he total time of petitioner’s

detention, during proceedings, was eleven months...” Docket No.

8 at 5. Citing the date Petitioner’s motion to stay his removal

was filed, Respondent avers Petitioner’s order of removal was

stayed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on November 2,

2006. Accordingly, she asserts, Petitioner’s order of removal

has not become final and Petitioner’s case does not fall under

the rubric of Zadvydas. Respondent further contends there is a

reasonable likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the foreseeable

future and, therefore, that his constitutional rights are not

violated by his continued detention. Docket No. 8 at 8.

Respondent also notes Petitioner is a criminal alien, although

she allows he is not a known national security risk. Id.3

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-6-

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over the amended section

2241 petition only, arguably, to consider the merits of

Petitioner’s claim his continued detention violates his

constitutional rights. See Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383

F.3d 956, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2004); Moallin v. Cangemi, 427 F.

Supp. 2d 908, 920 (D. Minn. 2006). The District Court does not

have jurisdiction to consider whether the IJ properly concluded

Petitioner’s crimes constituted a legitimate basis for

removability and whether relief from removal is barred and,

accordingly, the propriety of the order of removal currently

under appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See Real ID Act, Pub. L. No.

109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005); Padilla v. Gonzales, 470

F.3d 1209, 1213 (7th Cir. 2006). 

The plain language of the REAL ID Act grants

jurisdiction to appellate courts to review questions of law

presented in petitions for review of final orders of removal,

even those pertaining to otherwise discretionary determinations.

See Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2006);

Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.

2005). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded the

District Courts have jurisdiction to determine if a habeas

petitioner’s continued discretionary detention violates federal

statutes or the detainee’s constitutional rights. See Nadarajah

v. Gonzalez, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006). The

undersigned notes that other federal courts have concluded they

may review the constitutionality of the detention but only to a

limited extent the breadth of the discretionary authority

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Certainly, the Court has no jurisdiction to

review DHS’s decision to retain custody of Kambo

without bond on the merits. Under section

1226(a), the Attorney General has broad

discretion to detain an alien. Section 1226(a)

provides that “an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien

is to be removed from the United States.” The use

of the term “may” indicates discretion. There are

no limitations on or standards for exercising

that discretion in the statute. Further,

“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c),” which

is not applicable here, “pending such decision

-7-

conferred on the Department of Homeland Security to detain an

alien during the pendency of their removal proceedings. After

a thorough discussion of the relevant federal court opinions,

the Western District of Texas concluded:

The Court therefore finds that it has

jurisdiction to consider a constitutional

challenge to section 1226(a) and the extent

of the Attorney General’s authority under

section 1226(a). However, under section

1226(e) and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

Loa-Herrera, as well as section

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the Court finds that it

does not have jurisdiction to review the

decision to deny release on bond itself or

the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment

regarding the application of 1226(a),

“including the manner in which that

discretionary judgment is exercised, and

whether the procedural apparatus supplied

satisfies regulatory, statutory, and

constitutional constraints.” Loa-Herrera, 231 F.3d at 991.

Kambo v. Poppell, 2007 WL 3051601, at *10 (W.D. Tex.), comparing

Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding

that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar challenge to the

constitutionality of the procedures used in alien’s parole

proceeding because it is never within the Attorney General’s

discretion to act unconstitutionally).4 Nonetheless, the

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

[on whether the alien is to be removed], the

Attorney General may continue to detain the

arrested alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Again, there

are no express limitations on or standards for

the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion to

continue to detain the alien. Further, under

section 1226(e), no court may review the Attorney

General’s “discretionary judgment regarding the

application of this section” or “set aside any

action or decision by the Attorney General under

this section regarding the detention ... of any

alien or ... denial of bond.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).

-8-

undersigned notes that at least one federal court has concluded

that the District Courts do not, as a matter of federal

statutes, i.e., 8 U.S.C. 1252, have the power to review

Respondents’ discretionary power to detain Petitioner during the

pendency of his removal proceedings as a flight risk. See Sai

Zhao Jiang v. Chertoff, 2008 WL 80582, at *8 (D. Minn. 2008).

III. Analysis

This Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a

Department of Homeland Security detainee who is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2007). Federal

law provides for the detention of removable aliens in two

separate circumstances. Section 236(c) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226, governs

the detention of aliens who are not under an administratively

final order of removal. Section 231 of the INA, codified at 8

U.S.C. § 1231, governs the detention of aliens whose order of

removal is administratively final.

Federal law provides: “Except as otherwise provided in

this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney

General shall remove the alien from the United States within a

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the

“six month” limit to be a total of six months from the date the order

of removal becomes final, rather than six months from the expiration

of the removal period. See Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298,

1300 (9th Cir. 2004); Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.5

(9th Cir. 2001); accord Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052

(11th Cir. 2002). 

-9-

period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal

period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2005 & Supp. 2007). In

Zadvydas v. Davis, the United States Supreme Court held section

1231 could not be read to authorize the potentially indefinite

detention of a removable alien. The court concluded due process

concerns were implicated by the detention of an alien, pending

their removal from the United States, for more than six months

after their order of removal is final. See 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.

Ct. 2491 (2001).5

However, the statutory ninety day limit for

effectuating removal is not applicable until the “removal

period” begins. See, e.g., Kothandaraghipathy v. Department of

Homeland Sec., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1107 (D. Ariz. 2005).

Ordinarily the “removal period” begins on “[t]he date the order

of removal becomes administratively final.” 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(B)(i) (2005 & Supp. 2007). However, if the alien

files an appeal and the Circuit Court of Appeals orders a stay

of removal, the removal period begins on “the date of the

court’s final order.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). See also Tijani

v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1248 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005); Balogun v.

INS, 9 F.3d 347, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1993); Kothandaraghipathy, 396

F. Supp. 2d at 1107.

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 A stay of removal is not automatic, but is granted only

if the petitioner shows either the probability of success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious

legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply

in the petitioner’s favor. See Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477,

484-484 (9th Cir. 2001)(en banc).

-10-

The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of his order of

removal and the denial of relief from removability on September

8, 2006. The order of removal became “administratively final”

on that date. However, approximately two months later

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the order of removal

in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner

simultaneously filed a motion to stay his removal, which was

granted by the Ninth Circuit on February 22, 2007.6 Pursuant

to the governing law, even though Petitioner’s order of removal

might once have been “administratively final,” upon the BIA’s

dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal, the “removal period” specified

in section 1231 has not yet begun because the Court of Appeals

has not issued a “final order” with regard to Petitioner’s order

of removal. In other words, any “finality” bestowed by the

BIA’s decision was eradicated when Petitioner sought review of

the decision by the Ninth Circuit.

Petitioner asserts the order of removal became “final”

when the BIA issued its decision dismissing his appeal.

Petitioner contends that the Ninth Circuit’s granting of his

motion to stay only stayed the execution of the order of

removal, and not the onset of the removal period. Docket No. 9

at 5. As stated supra, although Petitioner is technically

correct in stating that the order of removal was

administratively final when the BIA issued its decision, as a

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 To avoid confusion as to how, or whether, to classify the

interval between the issuance of a BIA decision and the date an

appellate court stays removal as part of the “removal period,” some

federal courts have concluded that the ninety-day removal period is

“tolled” during the time the alien’s removal is stayed by a Circuit

Court of Appeal, as compared to reasoning that the removal period does

not begin until the Circuit Court of Appeal has finished its review.

See, e.g., Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.4 (11th Cir.

2002); Aghahowa v. Attorney General, 2008 WL 189566, at *3 (E.D. Pa.

2008); Riley v. Greene, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1261 (D. Colo. 2001)

(“At least two federal circuit courts and several district courts have

found that if an alien contributes to the delay of his departure he

is not allowed the benefit of a release pending his actual removal,

and the six-month period to effect an alien’s departure is tolled.”).

-11-

function of law the “removal period” regarding his order of

removal will not begin until the Ninth Circuit issues its

decision. See Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1104 n.12

(9th Cir. 2001) (“[i]f the removal order is stayed pending

judicial review, the ninety day period begins running after the

reviewing court’s final order.”); Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F. Supp.

2d 905, 917-18 (D. Minn. 2007). 

Because the “removal period” does not commence until

after the appellate court has concluded its review of a

challenged order of removal, prior to that time the alien’s

detention is pursuant to section 1236 rather than section 1231.

See Martinez-Jaramillo v. Thompson, 120 Fed. App. 714, 717 (9th

Cir. 2005) (holding that where a stay of removal is granted

pending judicial review, INA section 236 provides the statutory

basis for detention); Martinez v. Gonzales, 504 F. Supp. 2d 887,

893 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 2d

1221, 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“Because Petitioner’s removal

order has been stayed by the Ninth Circuit pending its review of

the BIA decision, the ‘removal period’ has not yet commenced,

and Petitioner therefore is detained pursuant to INA § 236.”).7

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The undersigned notes the precedential effect of Akinwale is

undermined because the statement in Akinwale was in dicta in a

footnote. See Martinez v. Gonzales, 504 F. Supp. 2d 887, 898 (C.D.

Cal. 2007). See also Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F. Supp. 2d 905, 918 (D.

Minn. 2007).

8

 Some issues implicated by Petitioner’s detention were

presented to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prieto Romero v.

Gonzales, Ninth Circuit Docket No. 07-35458, a case arising in the

Western District of Washington, which was consolidated with other

cases.

-12-

Accordingly, the issue before the Court is whether

Petitioner’s continued detention violates section 1226 or his

constitutional rights. If his continued detention is not

authorized by section 1226, he is entitled to a writ of habeas

corpus. Alternatively, if his detention violates his

constitutional right to substantive or procedural due process,

the writ may issue.

A. Petitioner’s detention is not authorized by section

1226

Petitioner has now been detained for a period of two

years and six months and his detention is not required by

section 1226(c) because the basis of his removability is not one

stated in that section. One year of that detention occurred

while Petitioner’s removal proceedings were before the agency

and approximately one year and six months of that detention have

occurred while Petitioner’s action before the Ninth Circuit has

been pending.

The appropriate analysis to utilize when determining

whether his continued detention violates the authority conferred

by federal statutes is not completely clear.8 The published and

unpublished federal Circuit Courts of Appeal opinions which

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award of habeas relief

because there was no strong special justification for detaining the

petitioner, and because the period of time required to conclude the

petitioner’s removal proceedings was unreasonable, and because actual

removal was not reasonably foreseeable because there was no

repatriation agreement with the petitioner’s home country.

by construing the pre-removal detention statute

to include an implicit requirement that removal

proceedings be concluded within a reasonable

time, we avoid the need to mandate the procedural

protections that would be required to detain

deportable aliens indefinitely. Although we

affirm the grant of habeas corpus and the

district court’s finding that incarceration for

18 months pending removal proceedings is

unreasonable, we do not require the United States

to hold bond hearings for every criminal alien

detained under § 236. Ly’s case is not the norm,

in that he is not actually removable. In the

majority of cases, where an order of removal is

-13-

address whether an alien’s detention during the pendency of

their removal proceedings violates federal statutes or their

constitutional rights generally arise in the context the

mandatory detention provisions of section 1226(c), which provide

for the mandatory detention of certain classes of aliens, rather

than section 1226(a), governing the discretionary detention of

all other aliens, including Petitioner. See, e.g., Demore v.

Kim 538 U.S. 510, 527-29, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1719-21 (2003)

(concluding the alien’s detention was “reasonably related” to

the goal of preventing flight, both because the alien was

unquestionably removable, and thus presented a high flight risk,

and because the time period for the average removal was brief);

Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1249-50; Hoang Mingh Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d

263, 273 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding an alien’s continued

detention for one and a half years during pre-removal

proceedings violated their right to substantive due process

because the detention was unreasonable);9 Martinez, 504 F. Supp.

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

promptly entered and removal is effected within

the time allotted under Zadvydas, bond hearings

are not required. As Zadvydas made clear, the

liberty interest of deportable criminal aliens is

adequately served by the reasonableness

limitation on the period of incarceration

Hoang Mingh Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis

added).

-14-

2d at 895; Bah, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 915.

In a published decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals held an alien who had been confined for five years, who

had “not been charged with any crime, and who ha[d] won relief

at every administrative level, [wa]s unreasonable under the

standards set forth by the Supreme Court.” Nadarajah, 443 F.3d

at 1081. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, in

somewhat dissimilar circumstances, that when an alien had been

detained pursuant to section 1226 for an unreasonable period of

time, and their removal was unforeseeable, the government’s

continued detention of the alien violated federal law and they

were entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. See id., 443 F.3d at

1082 (holding the DHS had improperly denied parole on bond and

ordering the petitioner’s release, pursuant to their authority

under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, inter alia,

because the IJ had granted relief from removal and so removal

was not foreseeable). 

In other cases judges of the District of Arizona have

concluded detention for a time period of two years was not

unreasonable. See Mboussi-Ona v. Crawford, 2007 WL 3026946, at

*3 (NVW BPV) (rejecting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation

that relief be granted pursuant to Tijani and concluding the

alien’s section 1226(c) detention was not indefinite and did not

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-15-

violate his constitutional rights because he would either be

granted relief from removal and released or removed to

Cameroon); Ibeagwa v. Crawford, 2007 WL 2702006, at *2-*3 & n.2

(SRB BPV) (noting that, but for the petitioner’s decision to

file a judicial appeal, he would no longer be in detention);

Passano v. Gonzalez, 2007 WL 1577908, at *1 & *3 (JWS DKD)

(declining to apply Tijani in a case where detention was not

mandatory and alien had been detained for two years, because the

majority of the alien’s detention occurred during his judicial

appeal, wherein the administrative process was concluded in six

months, the alien conceded removability, and there was no

indication that the country of nationality would not accept the

petitioner). But see Lawson v. Gerlinski, 332 F. Supp. 2d 735,

745 (M.D. Pa. 2004).

B. Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not

violated

Other federal courts which have considered similar

cases have granted habeas relief when the petitioner could

establish their removal was not likely in the reasonably

foreseeable future, holding that potentially indefinite

detention violates the petitioner’s right to substantive due

process.

Petitioner has a Fifth Amendment liberty interest which

is violated by detention which is potentially indefinite.

The remaining question is whether petitioner

has “provid[ed] good reason to believe that

there is no significant likelihood of removal

in the reasonably foreseeable future,” making

his continued detention “reasonably necessary

to bring about” his removal. If so, the

government must respond with evidence

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-16-

sufficient to rebut that showing....

Martinez, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 899. See also Hoang Minh Ly, 351

F.3d at 271-72 (affirming the grant of habeas relief because

there was no reasonable likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future even if removal proceedings concluded with

affirmation of the order of removal). 

A finding that Petitioner’s removal is not “reasonably

foreseeable,” either because he is likely to win his appeal or

because there is an institutional barrier to his ultimate

removal, would negate the contention that his continued

detention was reasonably necessary to ensure his removal. The

undersigned cannot conclude Petitioner’s removal is not

reasonably foreseeable. There is no reason to believe the Ninth

Circuit will not affirm the order of removal and denial of

relief from removability in the foreseeable future. Although

Petitioner contests his eligibility for relief from removal,

both the IJ and the BIA found him removable and ineligible for

relief from removal, distinguishing Petitioner’s situation from

the petition in Nadarajah. Additionally, there is no reason to

believe that Fiji will refuse to repatriate Petitioner, as

compared to the petitioner in Hoang Minh Ly wherein there was no

repatriation agreement in place with the designated country of

removal, Vietnam. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Prasad’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-17-

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 15th day of April, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-01624-JWS Document 10 Filed 04/16/08 Page 17 of 17