Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-11-06323/USCOURTS-ca6-11-06323-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0236p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

FARRIS GENNER MORRIS, 

Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

v. 

WAYNE CARPENTER, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

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Nos. 11-6322/6323 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson. 

No. 1:07-cv-01084—J. Daniel Breen, Chief District Judge. 

Argued: March 3, 2015 

Decided and Filed: September 23, 2015 

Before: BOGGS, SILER, and CLAY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Jennifer L. Smith, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Jerome C. Del Pino, OFFICE OF THE 

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, 

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ON BRIEF: Andrew Hamilton Smith, 

OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for 

Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Jerome C. Del Pino, Paul R. Bottei, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Nashville, Tennessee, 

for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

>

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_________________ 

OPINION

_________________ 

SILER, Circuit Judge. Warden Wayne Carpenter (“Carpenter”) appeals the district 

court’s order granting Farris Genner Morris’s (“Morris”) petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 

part and vacating his death sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at 

sentencing. Morris cross-appeals the district court’s decision to deny his claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in the guilt phase. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district 

court’s denial of Morris’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilt phase, VACATE 

the district court’s grant of habeas relief on Morris’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in 

the sentencing phase, and REMAND to the district court. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Tennessee Supreme Court summarized the facts of the case as follows: 

Guilt Phase

Charles and Angela Ragland lived in a duplex residence in Jackson, Tennessee. 

The defendant, Farris Genner Morris, lived with his wife in the adjoining 

residence. 

In the early morning hours of September 17, 1994, Angela Ragland arrived at her 

home along with her 15-year-old cousin, Erica Hurd. Charles Ragland was awake 

in the bedroom with the light on. Shortly after arriving, Erica went outside to 

retrieve something from the car. When Erica came back into the house, Angela 

heard a scream and saw that Morris was holding a shotgun to Erica’s head. 

Morris pushed Erica onto the bed in the Raglands’ bedroom and asked Charles 

“where the dope was.” Charles Ragland replied that he “didn’t have any” and 

asked Morris if he wanted money.FN4 After Morris responded that he would 

“find it himself,” Morris fired a shot into the floor and ordered Charles Ragland to 

get on the floor. He placed a pillow on Ragland’s head and shot him one time in 

the head. 

FN4. Angela Ragland testified that her husband did not sell or use drugs. 

Morris ordered Erica to get into a closet by threatening to “blow her head off.” 

He forced Angela into another bedroom, tied her wrists and ankles, and covered 

the window with a mattress so that “nobody could see if they walked by.” Morris 

then retrieved Erica from the closet. Angela Ragland testified that she heard Erica 

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pleading for Morris not to kill her and that she heard Morris say “shut up.” She 

testified that she heard Erica screaming and gasping for breath, and then silence. 

Morris returned to the bedroom and, still holding the shotgun, forced Angela 

Ragland to bathe him. Afterward he ordered Angela to put on a negligee and 

make him something to eat, which she did. Morris then forced Angela to have 

sexual intercourse with him “three or four times” and to perform oral sex upon 

him. Morris told her that he had once been “accused of raping someone and . . . 

if he was going to jail, he was going to go to jail for doing something.” He told 

Angela that “society made him the way he was” and “was the reason that he was 

doing what he did.” 

Around 6:30 a.m., Morris heard his wife in the adjoining residence and told 

Angela that he would let her go. He instructed her to tell police that she found the 

bodies of her husband and cousin when she arrived home that morning. Morris 

used a cloth to wipe off objects he had touched and he warned Angela not to go to 

the police. Angela fled to the house of a nearby friend, who drove her to the 

police station. The police found Morris at his home shortly thereafter and arrested 

him. 

The bodies of Charles Ragland and Erica Hurd were later discovered in the 

Ragland residence. Charles Ragland had been shot in the head. Erica Hurd had 

been beaten and stabbed repeatedly. A blood-stained steak knife was found 

behind a couch and a large butcher knife with traces of blood was found in a chair 

in the living room. Angela Ragland testified that neither knife belonged to her or 

her husband. A 12-gauge pistol grip, pump action shotgun was later found 

underneath Morris’s dresser drawer. 

After being advised of and waiving his constitutional rights, Morris gave a 

statement to Officers Patrick Willis and James Golden of the Jackson Police 

Department.[] Morris said that on the day of the offense he had purchased and 

smoked $250 worth of cocaine. He admitted that he had an exchange with 

Charles Ragland at 1:00 a.m., just a few hours prior to the murders, in which he 

asked Ragland to sell him drugs and, when Ragland declined, told Ragland that 

“he was going to regret disrespecting me.” Morris admitted that he went to his 

house, got his shotgun, loaded two shells into the shotgun, and waited for 

Ragland’s wife, Angela, to get home. Morris admitted that he entered the 

Ragland’s residence with the shotgun and demanded that Charles Ragland sell 

him drugs. He admitted that after Ragland said he didn’t have any drugs, he fired 

a shot into the floor, put a pillow over the barrel of the gun and shot him in the 

head. Morris admitted that he put Erica Hurd in a closet and tied up Angela 

Ragland. Morris told officers that he intended only to tie up Erica Hurd but that 

he stabbed her because she acted crazy and they struggled over a knife. Morris 

admitted he had sexual intercourse and oral sex with Angela Ragland. 

Dr. O.C. Smith, the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for West Tennessee, testified 

that Charles Ragland died from a shotgun wound to the head. Dr. Smith testified 

that he found evidence of an “intermediate target” between the weapon and 

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Ragland’s head, but that Ragland’s death was “instantaneous because the brain 

[was] destroyed.” 

Dr. Smith testified that Erica Hurd had died as a result of multiple injuries 

including, stab wounds, blunt trauma to the head, skull fractures, and damage to 

the brain. Dr. Smith found that there were 37 stab wounds, 23 of which were 

sustained prior to death and 14 of which were post-mortem. Dr. Smith testified 

that 25 of the stab wounds were to the victim’s neck and face and that the force of 

the stabbings was great enough to cause the knife blades to bend upon striking 

bone. 

The defense theory focused on Morris’s use of crack cocaine. In addition to 

Morris’s own statement to police, Russell Morris, the defendant’s brother, 

testified that he saw the defendant smoking crack around 5:15 p.m. on the evening 

before the murders. 

. . . . 

The jury convicted Morris of two counts of premeditated first degree murder and 

one count of aggravated rape. 

Penalty Phase

Dr. O.C. Smith again testified regarding his findings from the autopsy of Erica 

Hurd, including the blunt trauma, skull fractures, and 37 stab wounds. Dr. Smith 

said that the wounds would have been painful and that the stab wounds that struck 

bone would have caused severe pain. Dr. Smith explained that the wounds were 

“in areas that may be targeted, the face, the head, the chest, the back,” and that 

they showed “sites of selection, as opposed to a random pattern of distribution.” 

Dr. Smith, noting that some of the wounds were severe and others were 

superficial, testified that it “may imply an element of control . . . or it may imply 

an element of torment by being very superficial in nature.” 

Several witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant. Mickey Granger, the 

defendant’s employer, testified that Morris was a good, dependable employee 

who suffered a “downhill slide” in performance when accused of rape shortly 

before these offenses. Granger became aware of Morris’s drug problem when he 

found a crude crack pipe fashioned from a soft drink can. 

Jack Thomas, a friend of the defendant’s, testified that when he visited Morris in 

prison, Morris admitted his responsibility for the killings but denied that he raped 

Angela Ragland. According to Thomas, Morris said that he had used a large 

amount of cocaine on the night of the offenses in an effort to overdose. Several 

other witnesses, including teachers and prison employees, testified that Morris is a 

good student, participates in class, and is punctual. Several of the witnesses 

testified that Morris helps others [sic] inmates, studies frequently, and uses 

reference material from the library. The defendant did not testify. 

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The jury imposed a death sentence for the first degree murder of Erica Hurd after 

finding that the evidence of two aggravating circumstances—that the murder was 

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious 

physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death,” and that the murder was 

“committed while the defendant was engaged in committing . . . any first degree 

murder, rape, burglary or kidnapping”––outweighed mitigating evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) and (7). 

The jury imposed a sentence of life without parole for the murder of Charles 

Ragland after finding that the evidence of two aggravating circumstances––that 

the defendant “knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons 

other than the victim murdered during the act of murder” and that the murder was 

committed while the defendant was engaged in committing any “first degree 

murder, rape, burglary or kidnapping”––did not outweigh mitigating evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(3) and (7). In a 

separate sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a 25-year sentence for the 

aggravated rape conviction and ordered that it be served consecutively to the 

sentence of life without parole. 

State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 792-94 (Tenn. 2000). 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Morris’s convictions and sentences, 

State v. Morris, No. 02C01-9801-CC-00012, 1999 WL 51562 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 1999), 

the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, Morris, 24 S.W.3d at 816, and the United States 

Supreme Court denied certiorari, Morris v. Tennessee, 531 U.S. 1082 (2001). In 2001, Morris 

filed a state post-conviction petition, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the 

petition. In 2006, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that decision. Morris v. 

State, No. W2005-00426-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 WL 2872870 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2006). 

In 2007, Morris filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court 

appointed counsel, and counsel filed an amended petition in 2008. Morris raised claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the pretrial, guilt, and sentencing phases of trial and on 

appeal. He claimed that the trial court violated his rights against self-incrimination, to a jury 

drawn from a fair cross section of the community, to a fair and impartial jury, and to due process. 

He also alleged that the prosecution violated his rights to due process, exculpatory evidence in its 

possession, a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, and a fair and impartial 

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jury. Finally, Morris claimed that the selection of the foreperson of the grand jury and the 

deliberations of the petit jury violated his constitutional rights. 

The district court denied Morris’s request for an evidentiary hearing and granted the 

state’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. It found that Morris received 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase and granted him a conditional writ, but 

it denied Morris’s other claims and denied him a certificate of appealability (“COA”). 

We granted a COA on Morris’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase 

for failing to investigate and to present a state-of-mind defense to the charge of first-degree 

intentional, deliberate, premeditated murder. Also before us is the government’s appeal of the 

district court’s grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus with respect to the sentencing phase. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a district court 

shall not grant a habeas petition on a claim that was decided on the merits in state court unless 

the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

DISCUSSION

I. Testimony About Morris’s Mental State and Sentence 

A. Testimony Presented at the Guilt Phase 

 Prior to trial, the court ordered that Morris be examined to determine his competency to 

stand trial and whether he could pursue an insanity defense. Dr. Richard Drewery (“Dr. 

Drewery”) and Dr. Richard Pullen (“Dr. Pullen”) concluded that Morris was competent and that 

there was no basis for an insanity defense. During the guilt phase of the trial, Morris’s counsel 

presented testimony from pharmacologist Dr. Robert Parker (“Dr. Parker”) and psychiatrist Dr. 

William Bernet (“Dr. Bernet”). Dr. Parker was an assistant professor of pharmacology at the 

University of Tennessee. He testified that within ten to fifteen seconds of smoking crack 

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cocaine, the user experiences euphoria, becomes very excited, speaks rapidly, and sweats 

profusely. The user also may become suspicious and paranoid, lose inhibition, suffer impaired 

judgment, and experience enhanced sex drive and performance. The euphoric effects last ten to 

thirty minutes, while the other effects last longer. Dr. Parker explained that a binge is when a 

crack user tries to maintain his high by taking more and more crack. The euphoria is replaced by 

intense anxiety, irritability, fear, suspicion, and paranoia. Binging on crack increases the risk of 

violent or homicidal behavior. Some crack users experience delusions and hallucinations. 

Extensive use can cause mania––heightened mental and physical activity––and psychosis––a lost 

concept of reality. After a user stops ingesting crack, he experiences a crash. A crash is 

characterized by an intense craving for more cocaine, profound depression, exhaustion, suicidal 

thoughts, paranoia, anxiety, and irritability. 

 Dr. Parker testified that Angela Ragland’s (“Angela”) and Morris’s statements to the 

police regarding Morris’s behavior were consistent with crack cocaine ingestion. Angela 

described Morris as moving around a lot, acting very excited, and sweating. Morris said he was 

very agitated and upset because he perceived that Charles Ragland (“Ragland”) had disrespected 

him. Dr. Parker testified that it was hard to say whether Morris was under the acute effects of 

crack or was crashing when he committed the crimes. He said that someone taking crack from 

Friday at 5:00 p.m. until midnight could still have effects Saturday at 5:20 p.m., when Morris 

gave his statement. On cross-examination, Dr. Parker testified that a person who has taken crack 

is not usually violent or homicidal in the crash stage. 

 Dr. Bernet, the medical director of the University of Vanderbilt’s Psychiatric Hospital, 

took Morris’s medical history, examined him, and testified at trial. He also reviewed police 

reports, interviews, and reports by Drs. Drewery, Pullen, and Parker. Dr. Bernet testified that 

Morris’s life was pretty stable prior to September 1994. Morris was accused of rape and worried 

that the charge would result in his going to prison and would destroy his relationship with his 

wife and children. On September 16, 1994, Morris was upset and thought about killing himself 

by overdosing on cocaine. Physically, he experienced a rush, his heart rate increased, he sweated 

profusely, and he spoke rapidly. Psychologically, he became highly agitated and paranoid. 

Morris argued with Ragland and came to believe that Ragland was capable of killing Morris and 

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his family. Dr. Bernet said that Morris felt threatened by Erica Hurd (“Hurd”) and first stabbed 

her accidentally. He attributed the rest of the stabbings to Morris’s agitation and overreaction. 

Dr. Bernet also noted that Morris behaved irrationally after killing Ragland and Hurd. Morris 

had Angela bathe him, did not kill her although she could identify him, and went to his home 

next door and waited for the police. However, Morris also wiped his fingerprints off items in the 

house. Dr. Bernet testified that Morris’s cocaine intoxication may have prevented him from 

premeditating and forming the specific intent to murder Ragland and Hurd, and that he was 

under extreme mental and emotional disturbance. 

 The trial court instructed the jury on first- and second-degree murder. Morris’s counsel 

presented an intoxication defense. The court instructed the jurors that if they found Morris was 

intoxicated to the extent that he could not have possessed the required culpable mental state, then 

he could not be guilty of the offense charged. The jury found Morris guilty of two counts of 

first-degree murder and one count of aggravated rape. 

B. Testimony Presented at the Penalty Phase

The state called one witness, Dr. O.C. Smith, during the penalty phase. Dr. O.C. Smith, the 

medical examiner, testified about the nature and extent of Hurd’s injuries. Referring to photos 

and a chart, Dr. O.C. Smith described blunt force injuries to Hurd’s head and stab wounds to her 

face, neck, abdomen, and back. He said the blunt force injuries and most of the stab wounds 

occurred while Hurd was alive, and the remaining stab wounds were inflicted after she died. Dr. 

O.C. Smith testified that the stab wounds Hurd received while she was alive would have been 

painful and described the wounds that hit bone as causing severe pain. He also testified that the 

nature and location of the stab wounds implied control, targeting, and torment. On crossexamination, Dr. O.C. Smith acknowledged that he could not be certain there were control 

wounds, that the blunt force to Hurd’s head could have rendered her unconscious, and that she 

would not have felt pain if comatose.

Morris’s trial counsel presented six witnesses at the penalty phase. Morris’s former 

employer at a funeral home and cemetery, Mickey Granger (“Granger”), testified that Morris 

was a good and dependable employee. According to Granger, Morris suffered a “downward 

slide” in performance after he was accused of rape. Granger testified that Morris was very 

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concerned that he would lose his wife, and the rape charge was all he talked about. Granger was 

not aware that Morris used drugs before the rape charge. 

Next, Jack Thomas (“Thomas”), Morris’s friend from work, testified. When Thomas 

visited Morris in prison, Morris admitted to Thomas that he killed Ragland and Hurd. According 

to Thomas, Morris said that he had sex with Angela, but did not rape her. Morris told Thomas 

that he bought a lot of cocaine on the night of the offenses in an effort to overdose. Morris said 

he was going to be charged for something he did not do and did not want to live any longer. For 

about thirty to forty minutes, Morris contemplated killing Angela but he “cam[e] back to his 

right frame of mind” and decided to let her go. 

Three prison employees, Robert Griffin, Anna Campbell, and Brenda Russell, also 

testified on behalf of Morris. They said that Morris participated actively in classes, helped other 

inmates, did extra work, and was an excellent student. Finally, Morris’s counsel submitted a 

letter from Frank Brasher (“Brasher”), one of Morris’s former employers. According to Brasher, 

Morris worked for him for about a year and a half in the late 1980s, performed his duties 

satisfactorily, was prompt, and was courteous. 

 Ultimately, the jury imposed a death sentence for the murder of Hurd and life without 

parole for Ragland’s murder. 

C. Post-Conviction Testimony 

After Morris’s conviction and sentence, he filed a post-conviction petition in state court. 

At the evidentiary hearing, Morris’s post-conviction counsel presented witnesses, including the 

testimony of: (1) his former employer, Granger; (2) his brother, Russell Morris; (3) his three trial 

counsel, George Googe (“Googe”), Daniel Taylor (“Taylor”), and Jesse Ford, III (“Ford”); 

(4) his mitigation investigator, Gloria Shettles (“Shettles”); (5) mental health experts, Dr. Pamela 

Auble (“Dr. Auble”), Dr. Murray Smith (“Dr. Smith”), and Dr. George Woods (“Dr. Woods”); 

and (6) affidavits by friends and relatives. 

 Granger testified that Morris could dig more graves in a day than other workers and 

preferred to work alone. He said that Morris had mood swings and was easily offended if he 

thought someone was ignoring or disrespecting him. Morris talked to Granger about problems 

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with his role in society. Granger believed Morris had good relationships with his brother and 

father, but a poor relationship with his mother. He found indications that Morris drank and 

smoked crack on the job. Granger said that Morris called him shortly before he was arrested to 

say that he would not be coming to work because of an injury to his finger. Morris did not 

mention the killings. 

 Morris’s brother, Russell Morris, testified that their father’s girlfriend lived with the 

family for a time. According to Russell Morris, their mother had mood swings and was hardest 

on Morris because he would not walk away when she and he argued. She kicked Morris out of 

the house several times. Russell Morris testified that Morris complained about society to him 

and got upset when people ignored him. Russell Morris acknowledged that Morris drank alcohol 

and used drugs, and that their mother drank. 

 Googe testified that Morris’s case was the first death penalty case he tried. Googe 

reviewed a defenders’ death-penalty manual and attended seminars on capital litigation. He had 

worked with co-counsel Taylor on at least four other murder cases. 

 Googe found Morris to be a good client and very cooperative. He was very talkative and 

sometimes volatile. Morris told him he did not want his family contacted, and neither Googe nor 

Taylor contacted Morris’s relatives when they had the opportunity. Googe said Morris’s 

childhood was unremarkable, and that school records were not helpful. 

Googe’s defense theory was that Morris had diminished capacity because he took crack 

cocaine and tried to overdose. Googe contacted Dr. Parker to testify about the effects of cocaine 

generally, both at the suppression hearing about Morris’s statement to the police and in the guilt 

phase. Shettles, the mitigation investigator, told Googe and Taylor that she thought Morris 

possibly needed a doctor’s care for a mental disorder, that he had severe mood swings, was 

easily excited, may have experienced a drug-induced psychosis, “had a screw loose” and may 

have been manic depressive. She recommended consulting a neuropsychologist. Googe 

acknowledged that Shettles told him her concerns about Morris but did not think that Morris was 

losing control. 

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The subject of cocaine’s effect on Morris was left to Dr. Bernet, a psychiatrist. Googe 

wanted Dr. Bernet to testify about Morris’s cocaine withdrawal and how it disturbed his ability 

to form the intent to commit murder. Googe provided Dr. Bernet with the criminal complaint 

against Morris, the police department’s incident report, an interview with Angela, Morris’s 

statement to the police, and Morris’s interviews with Drs. Drewery and Pullen, who had 

examined Morris for competency and sanity. Googe acknowledged that law enforcement 

officers were present when Dr. Drewery examined Morris and that Morris was in handcuffs and 

agitated. When asked about Morris’s comments to Dr. Drewery that Morris was unable to make 

decisions properly and did not have total control of his mind, Googe said that the defense team 

used this as part of its strategy to portray Morris’s acts as things he would not have done 

ordinarily. Based on Dr. Bernet’s evaluation, Googe did not think Morris had a mental illness. 

Googe also testified that he did not consider Dr. Drewery’s findings helpful as mitigation 

evidence. According to Googe, there was nothing in the experts’ reports that would have led him 

to investigate bipolar disorder. 

 Googe testified that Taylor told an investigator to ask Morris’s wife if he had mental 

problems. Morris’s wife told Googe and Taylor that Morris had a mental disorder, severe mood 

swings, a very bad temper, and was easily excited. Googe said that Morris became agitated 

about certain issues, but Morris did not agree with mitigation investigator Shettles that he was 

losing control. Googe was not aware that Morris had mood swings on the job. Googe was 

questioned about Shettles’s recommendation that Morris be examined by a neuropsychologist 

and her belief that Morris was possibly manic depressive. There was also a note from Googe to 

Shettles saying that they “may not need a psychologist.” Googe did not know if Shettles’s 

concerns about Morris’s mental health were relayed to Dr. Bernet. He did not know why Dr. 

Bernet did not get investigative notes about Morris. When asked whether Morris had received 

head injuries, Googe said Morris had mentioned a car accident but did not say it was a problem. 

A note Googe wrote indicated that Morris was in a car wreck and had suffered two gun-shot 

wounds and a head injury. Googe was shown a note from Taylor, which indicated that Morris 

was in five major car accidents and had a lump on his head. 

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Googe also testified that Dr. Bernet interviewed Morris and repeated that Morris did not 

want his wife involved in the case. Morris’s wife told Googe that Morris had mood swings after 

using drugs. Googe stated that nothing in Dr. Drewery’s report suggested that Morris was 

bipolar or had a mental illness. Googe relied on Dr. Bernet’s evaluation of Morris, and although 

lay people had suggested Morris seemed manic depressive, Dr. Bernet did not think so. Based 

upon the experts who evaluated Morris, Googe saw no reason to pursue the issue of whether 

Morris was bipolar. 

Taylor, Googe’s co-counsel, worked as an assistant public defender with Googe 

beginning in July 1993. Morris’s case was Taylor’s twenty-fifth trial and his first death-penalty 

case. He reviewed a Tennessee public defenders’ death-penalty manual, attended death-penalty 

seminars, and met with the head of the public defenders’ capital division. Taylor was the 

defense team’s primary contact with Shettles. Shettles was to research Morris’s life history, 

interview potential mitigation witnesses, and assist with jury selection. Taylor described Morris 

as excited, animated, and very loud but not disrespectful. Morris did not want to talk about the 

facts of the case. 

 Taylor was asked about school, prison, and military records. He responded that some of 

the information about Morris’s education was sketchy and that he did not recall anything about 

Morris’s military records. The defense team had two investigators in addition to the mitigation 

specialist. The investigators conducted interviews and gathered documents about the events 

leading to Morris’s arrest. Before Morris’s case, Taylor had not used a psychological expert in a 

jury trial. He found pharmacologist Dr. Parker through the University of Tennessee. Taylor’s 

notes indicated that Dr. Parker could not be conclusive as to the motion to suppress Morris’s 

statement to the police but would be very helpful during trial. Dr. Parker talked with Morris 

briefly before trial, but not before the suppression hearing. Taylor also worked with Dr. Bernet, 

who evaluated Morris’s mental health and the effect of drugs on Morris’s ability to premeditate. 

Taylor was concerned about two issues: premeditation and Morris’s competency at the time he 

gave his statement. He reviewed Dr. Drewery’s report, prison records, and a letter from Morris’s 

employer. 

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 Taylor asked Shettles to question Morris’s wife about any mental problems. Morris’s 

wife said that Morris had a mental disorder and mood swings, was easily excited, and had a very 

bad temper after he used drugs. Morris did not want defense counsel to contact his family. 

Taylor denied that Morris lost control, but acknowledged that sometimes their conversations got 

off track. Through Shettles’s investigation, Taylor learned that Morris’s grandfather committed 

suicide and that Morris received an other than honorable discharge from the Army. Shettles 

recommended that Morris be seen by a neuropsychologist, which prompted Taylor to contact Dr. 

Bernet. Shettles was concerned about Morris’s courtroom demeanor and said that Morris had a 

screw loose and was possibly manic depressive. Taylor did not recall that Morris had any head 

injuries. 

According to Taylor, the defense’s theory was that Morris was under the influence of 

cocaine and lacked the mens rea to commit murder. Taylor said that the defense team hired Dr. 

Parker to testify about the effects of cocaine for the suppression hearing and as related to 

Morris’s ability to premeditate. With regard to mitigation, Taylor said they presented six 

witnesses, and the jury also heard from Drs. Parker and Bernet in the guilt phase. Taylor said he 

did not mention manic depression or head injuries to Dr. Bernet, but recalled expressing his 

concern about Morris’s demeanor. Dr. Bernet examined Morris in March 1996, before Shettles 

voiced her concerns. Taylor said he relied on the evaluations of Drs. Parker and Bernet. 

 Ford, the third member of the defense team, entered the case in September 1996 as a 

consultant on trial strategy. Morris’s trial was Ford’s first death-penalty case. Ford 

unsuccessfully sought a plea deal for Morris. Although he had no direct contact either with Dr. 

Parker or with Dr. Bernet, Ford testified that the defense team did not think they needed another 

mental-health evaluation after receiving their evaluations. Ford testified that if he had had doubt 

about Morris’s mental status, he would have had Morris examined. He stated that he did not 

discuss a need for further mental-health examinations of Morris because of what Dr. Bernet said. 

 Shettles, the mitigation specialist, began working on Morris’s case in February 1996. She 

had attended death-penalty seminars and had a limited role in previous death-penalty cases. 

With regard to Morris’s case, she said she was not proactive and did not know it was the 

attorneys’ first death-penalty case. She identified weaknesses in the mitigation investigation in 

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Morris’s case: the attorneys did not have his birth or pediatric records, they had only minimal 

school records, they did not follow up to identify his teachers, and they did not obtain his 

military records. Shettles said that Morris had a history of taking and dealing drugs, including 

LSD and PCP. She did not tell Morris’s attorneys that they needed more information but would 

have done so by the time she testified today. She said there was a concern about the cost of the 

investigation. 

 After an interview with Morris in February 1996, Shettles wrote in a note that Morris was 

very verbal, had difficulty focusing, and was losing control. Shettles said there was no follow-up 

after she learned that Morris’s grandfather committed suicide, and she did not follow up on his 

work history. She thought Morris had some side effects from using cocaine, possibly 

experienced drug-induced psychosis, and had neuropharmacological issues. Shettles 

recommended having a neuropharmacologist evaluate Morris and said he may have been manic 

depressive. She was not asked to contact an expert witness. Shettles interviewed Morris’s 

mother and brother in person and other family members by phone. Shettles did not learn that 

Morris’s mother had thrown him out of the house or that she had mood swings. Shettles said that 

there should have been additional in-person interviews with Morris’s family. She did not meet 

with defense counsel as a team, did not talk to Dr. Bernet, and did not interview Morris’s wife. 

Shettles assisted with jury selection and attended the trial to keep Morris calm and focused. She 

described him as agitated, very loud, and unable to control his arms. 

Neuropsychologist Dr. Auble met with Morris three times in early 2002. She found that 

Morris was not malingering and concluded that he had some impairments in memory, motor 

skills, and mental functioning. Dr. Auble found that Morris’s IQ was ninety. He had difficulty 

inhibiting responses, and she could not tell if it was because of frontal lobe damage or a mood 

disorder. She said that Morris had suffered blows to the head, was chemically dependent, 

paranoid, and suspicious. Dr. Auble was not asked to do personality testing, and did not make a 

formal diagnosis for bipolar disorder. Morris did not receive a CAT scan. 

Addiction specialist Dr. Smith also evaluated Morris at post-conviction counsel’s request. 

He reviewed the trial transcripts, Dr. Auble’s report, and statements by Morris’s family and 

friends. Morris told Dr. Smith he was falsely accused of rape and his name was in the 

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newspaper. He was distressed by this because he feared he would lose his wife and family and 

violate his probation. Morris said that he bought $250 of cocaine, perhaps to kill himself, and 

ingested it over the course of thirteen hours. Dr. Smith termed this a normal crack binge. 

 According to Dr. Smith, Morris had a verbal and physical confrontation with Ragland. 

Morris told Dr. Smith that Ragland threatened him, that he thought Ragland was a crack user and 

dealer, and that he decided he needed to kill Ragland. Dr. Smith agreed that Morris’s behavior 

after the effects of cocaine should have worn off was irrational. He listed characteristics of 

Morris that were not necessarily related to his drug use: he was hypomanic, grandiose, 

insomnious, hypersexual, and easily distracted. Hypomanic behavior is characterized by 

irritability, hyperactivity, racing thoughts, risk-taking, hypersexuality, and a decreased need for 

sleep. Dr. Smith suspected Morris suffered from bipolar disorder and brain damage at the time 

of the crimes, said that Morris experienced a cocaine-induced psychosis, and thought that Morris 

was under the delusions that killing Ragland made sense and that Angela consented to sex with 

him. He also found evidence of frontal-lobe dysfunction. Based on his assessment, Dr. Smith 

believed Dr. Parker erred by attributing Morris’s crimes only to intoxication because his 

symptoms far exceeded the effects of intoxication. Dr. Smith opined that the cocaine, coupled 

with a pre-existing mental illness, caused Morris to go from hypomania to mania to psychosis. 

He said that Morris was able to premeditate at the time of the crimes but was delusional. 

 On cross-examination, Dr. Smith testified that Morris is hypomanic most of the time but 

was manic when he killed Ragland and Hurd. According to Dr. Smith, Morris displayed 

hypomanic behavior when Dr. Smith saw him in 2003. He acknowledged that there was no 

record that Morris was ever hospitalized for mental illness. He said irritability could be 

accounted for by paranoia, that paranoia can be caused by cocaine, and that paranoia can lead to 

delusion. Dr. Smith said that Morris would need to see a psychiatrist to be diagnosed as bipolar. 

He had never seen Morris depressed, did not have evidence of manic or depressive episodes prior 

to the homicides, and acknowledged that there was no direct evidence that Morris met the criteria 

for bipolar disorder before the killings. Dr. Smith disagreed with Dr. Bernet that it was the 

effects of cocaine that caused Morris to commit the crimes. 

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 Neuropsychologist Dr. Woods interviewed Morris in February 2002. He reviewed the 

testing done by the other mental health experts, affidavits by Morris’s friends and family, his 

school records, and his military records. Dr. Woods diagnosed Morris as having bipolar 

disorder. He testified that bipolar disorder is characterized by phases of mania and depression, 

and includes manic, hypomanic, euthymic, and depressive behavior. The criteria for hypomania 

include problems sleeping, distractibility, racing thoughts, and rapid, pressured speech. 

Hypomania is the same as mania but without delusions and hallucinations. A person could stay 

in one stage of bipolar disorder his whole life, and one manic episode could be attributed to 

bipolar disorder. Someone with hypomania can do good work and appear normal. Dr. Woods 

found Morris’s military records significant because of Morris’s short stay in the Army. He noted 

that several of Morris’s family and friends remarked that Morris spoke rapidly and was moody. 

Some commented that Morris’s mother was moody and acted strangely, that Morris’s 

grandfather committed suicide, that Morris’s father brought his mistress and her children to live 

with Morris’s family, that Morris used drugs, and that Morris’s son had periods of depression 

and agitation. 

Dr. Woods commented that Dr. Bernet did not have Morris’s social history because he 

did not talk to Shettles and focused on the crime rather than an overall view of Morris’s mental 

health. He stated that the documents Dr. Bernet reviewed would not have given him insight into 

Morris’s bipolar disorder and that bipolar symptoms could be missed in a two-and-one-half hour 

interview. Dr. Woods described Morris’s behavior as acting on a plan in service of the delusion 

that Ragland needed to die. He said that Morris’s head injuries could have impaired his 

functioning, that he experienced an interplay of drugs and mental illness, and that cocaine 

amplified his psychotic state. Dr. Woods agreed that Morris was able to premeditate, understood 

the consequences of rape, and had never been treated for bipolar disorder. From a review of 

Dr. Bernet’s notes, Dr. Woods found that Dr. Bernet considered, but did not diagnose, bipolar 

disorder. Dr. Woods acknowledged that Morris was not being treated for bipolar disorder in 

prison. 

Morris’s post-conviction counsel also submitted affidavits by Morris’s friend Greg 

Longmeyer, his aunt Flossie Mayes, his nephew David Morris, Donna Marie Owens (the sister 

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of his first child’s mother), his stepson James Kevin Stevens, and Anita Louise Owens Stewart, 

the mother of his first child. These witnesses stated that: Morris spoke quickly and profusely; 

his mother was moody and behaved strangely; Morris took drugs and was moody; and Morris’s 

behavior resembled that of his mother. Stewart, who had worked in a mental hospital, thought 

that Morris’s mother was bipolar. 

Neuropsychologist Dr. James Walker (“Dr. Walker”) testified for the state. He reviewed 

the evaluations by the other mental-health experts as well as Morris’s and Angela’s statements 

and the affidavits submitted by Morris’s friends and family. Dr. Walker met with Morris four 

times and administered psychological tests. He found that Morris did not have obsessions or 

delusions, that Morris’s thinking was logical, and that his intelligence was low-average. 

 Morris told Dr. Walker that he was the victim of social injustice most of his life. Dr. 

Walker said that Morris’s thinking was logical. He was defensive on the personality-assessment 

inventory, mistrustful, and egocentric. He had conflicts with authority and was cynical. Morris 

denied ever having hallucinations, including on the night of the crimes. He told Dr. Walker that 

he had been shot and hit in the head but never lost consciousness. He took no medications and 

had not received psychiatric treatment. Morris admitted taking PCP and LSD and drinking up to 

twelve beers a day. Dr. Walker learned from other sources that Morris had abused 

amphetamines. Morris was arrested many times in St. Louis for selling drugs, and moved to 

Jackson, Tennessee to get away from that lifestyle. He worked nine or ten years as a grave 

digger. Morris was arrested for assaulting a man and waving a shotgun at a woman. At the time 

of the crimes, Morris lived with his wife, children, and step-children. He engaged in multiple 

extramarital affairs. According to a prison evaluation that Dr. Walker reviewed, Morris had 

performed poorly in school, had trouble with thinking, had a constricted affect, was defensive, 

rigid, complained constantly, and was potentially paranoid and anti-social. 

 The account of the crimes Morris gave to Dr. Walker differed from his statement to the 

police. Morris told Dr. Walker that he smoked $500 of crack in twelve hours and drank twentyfour beers and some liquor. He said he was very upset and used cocaine for the first time in 

order to take his life. Morris told Dr. Walker that Ragland threatened him and his wife with 

harm. He was angry at the disrespect and determined to take Ragland’s life. He entered the 

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house, got Ragland to apologize, and shot him. Morris planned to leave but noticed Hurd behind 

him. Morris told Dr. Walker that he hit Hurd with a gun, and that Hurd must have fallen on a 

knife. Morris said the police fabricated the evidence that he stabbed Hurd thirty-seven times. He 

said cocaine made him paranoid and nervous. Dr. Walker concluded that Morris was intoxicated 

on cocaine and alcohol on the night of the crimes and that intoxication was a very powerful 

factor affecting his behavior. Morris’s problems with thinking and reasoning also played a role. 

Dr. Walker diagnosed Morris as being paranoid and anti-social with a history of hypomania. He 

placed Morris in the Bipolar II category. Dr. Walker said there is a range of bipolar disorders––

all of which involve difficulty in regulating mood––with Bipolar I being more severe than 

Bipolar II. Dr. Walker found that Morris did not experience cocaine-induced psychosis. 

II. Guilt Phase

On appeal, Morris argues that the district court erred when it determined that trial 

counsel’s ineffective assistance did not prejudice him in the guilt phase of trial because the court 

ignored the impact of his psychiatric and cognitive impairments on his capacity to act with the 

state of mind necessary for first-degree murder. We disagree. 

A. Background 

In his post-conviction petition, Morris alleged that his trial counsel failed to investigate 

and present evidence of his background and mental impairments that would have shown him 

incapable of the mens rea required for first-degree murder. The Tennessee trial court held an 

evidentiary hearing and denied Morris relief. The trial court found that Morris’s counsel 

conducted a thorough and proper investigation and adequately prepared for trial. Counsel had no 

reason to believe that Morris had a mental or physical disease, defect, or condition that would 

have supported an insanity defense, prevented him from having culpable intent, or mitigated the 

crimes. Morris had never been treated for mental illness and had lived a reasonably normal life. 

Counsel had every reason to believe that Dr. Bernet would have recommended an evaluation by 

a neuropsychologist or neuropsychiatrist if doing so would have aided in the defense. 

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that counsel made an informed decision to pursue the 

theory that Morris was unable to form the intent to commit the crimes charged because of preexisting mental-health problems exacerbated by the use of a large amount of cocaine, and 

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counsel reasonably relied upon lay proof of Morris’s abnormal behavior and expert proof by Drs. 

Parker and Bernet. Ultimately, counsel’s strategy was reasonable, and the opinions of Morris’s 

post-conviction experts were contradicted by the facts of the case that showed motive, intent, 

deliberation, premeditation, and mental competence. 

The Tennessee appellate court adopted the trial court’s findings and affirmed the decision 

to deny Morris’s claim. The court quoted and cited Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984), for the elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Morris, 2006 WL 

2872870, at *44, *62. Morris’s guilt- and penalty-phase ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 

relied on similar allegations, and the state court addressed both claims in the section of the 

opinion devoted to Morris’s guilt-phase claims. The court reasoned that it “cannot conclude that 

had Dr. Bernet been in possession of [additional] information that he would have made the same 

diagnosis as Dr. Woods and/or the impact of such a diagnosis would have such effect upon the 

jury as to alter the outcome.” Id. at *54. After reviewing the information known by counsel and 

the trial testimony, the court held that Morris’s trial counsel could not “be faulted for failing to 

provide an expert that would have diagnosed the Petitioner with Bipolar Disorder.” Id. The 

court noted that the jury heard two versions of events: the defense’s theory that Morris lacked 

specific intent for premeditation because of his cocaine intoxication and mental impairments and 

the government’s theory that Morris planned to get back at his neighbor and acted deliberately. 

Id. at *51-54. 

The federal district court reviewed the decision of the Tennessee Court of Criminal 

Appeals de novo out of concern that the state court had misapplied Strickland and considered 

evidence Morris submitted to the district court. Morris v. Bell, No. 07-1084-JDB, 2011 WL 

7758570, at *25 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2011) (order). 

The district court found that the state court recited both parts of the Strickland standard 

correctly, but omitted the phrase “reasonable probability” when analyzing whether Morris had 

shown prejudice from his counsel’s performance. Id. at *22-23. The district court held that 

Morris’s trial counsel’s performance in the guilt phase was deficient because they failed to 

investigate and obtain an appropriate social history, failed to supply such information to their 

expert witnesses, and failed to determine whether they needed other experts. Id. at *27. 

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However, the court held that Morris did not establish prejudice because his actions demonstrated 

that he had the mens rea to be convicted of first-degree murder. Id. Accordingly, there was not 

a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different with the additional 

information. Id. 

B. Strickland Analysis 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, Morris must show both that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687. Counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Abby v. Howe, 742 F.3d 221, 226 (6th Cir. 2014). Counsel’s performance 

prejudices a defendant in the guilt phase if “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the 

errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Hinton v. Alabama, 

134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). 

 “The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). Where 

review is under Strickland and AEDPA, a federal court’s review of a state court’s decision on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is “doubly deferential.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 

13 (2013) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)). If the state court’s 

decision is contrary to federal law, this court reviews the petitioner’s claim de novo. See Dyer v. 

Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 284 (6th Cir. 2006). 

The conclusion of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals that Morris’s counsel’s 

performance was not deficient was not an unreasonable application of Strickland because 

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. By 

adopting the trial court’s findings, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that Morris’s 

counsel’s performance was not deficient because their investigation and preparation were 

thorough, and that counsel had no reason to believe that Morris was suffering from a mental 

condition that would have prevented him from forming the requisite intent. Morris, 2006 WL 

2872870, at *54. Accordingly, AEDPA deference applies to this aspect of Morris’s claim. 

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 Morris’s counsel satisfied Strickland’s standard. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. 

Counsel’s strategy was to convince the jury that Morris lacked the mens rea to commit firstdegree murder because of the effects of cocaine and mental stress. They declined to pursue an 

insanity defense after the court-appointed experts concluded that Morris was competent to stand 

trial and sane at the time of the crimes. Counsel retained two qualified experts, a pharmacologist 

and a psychiatrist, to testify about the effects of cocaine generally and the effects on Morris on 

the night in question. Dr. Parker testified that Morris’s actions and mental state, including 

paranoia and delusions, were consistent with his account of binging on crack. Dr. Bernet stated 

that Morris’s cocaine intoxication may have left him incapable of premeditating and forming the 

intent to murder Hurd. Although the testimony of Drs. Parker and Bernet did not persuade the 

jurors, it supported counsel’s theory that Morris lacked the requisite mens rea. Attorneys are 

entitled to rely on the opinions and conclusions of mental-health experts. See McGuire v. 

Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 738 F.3d 741, 758 (6th Cir. 2013); Black v. Bell, 664 F.3d 81, 

104-05 (6th Cir. 2011). None of Drs. Drewery, Pullen, and Bernet indicated that Morris suffered 

from bipolar disorder or any other mental illness. Given the evidence against Morris and the 

unavailability of a plea deal or an insanity defense, Morris’s counsel reasonably chose to rely on 

their experts and argue that he lacked the mens rea for first-degree murder of Hurd. 

 Morris’s post-conviction evidence demonstrated that lay people who had contact with 

him suspected he had mental problems, and Drs. Auble, Smith, and Woods identified mental 

impairments and disorders. Drs. Woods, Smith, and Walker diagnosed Morris as bipolar, and 

Dr. Woods said that Dr. Bernet lacked the background information to diagnose Morris. Since 

Morris did not call Drs. Drewery, Pullen, or Bernet as witnesses in the post-conviction 

evidentiary hearing, there is no evidence that the doctors wanted more information about 

Morris’s background or that Morris refused to cooperate. As the district court found, there were 

red flags that could have led Morris’s counsel to investigate further. See Wiggins v. Smith, 

539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003); Hodges v. Colson, 727 F.3d 517, 542 (6th Cir. 2013). The mitigation 

investigator expressed concern about Morris’s mental health and passed on Morris’s wife’s 

comments. Had counsel passed on more information to Dr. Bernet, he may have discovered 

more of Morris’s problems. But neither counsel nor Dr. Bernet believed Morris was mentally ill. 

However, in light of counsel’s reasonable efforts to put together a plausible defense based on 

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cocaine intoxication, their failure to be more aggressive in pursuing evidence of free-standing 

mental illness does not, by itself, render their performance constitutionally deficient. 

 Giving proper deference to the state court’s decision and counsel’s judgment, Morris has 

not shown that the state court’s decision was unreasonable. See Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13; 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403; Abby, 742 F.3d at 226; Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 800 

(6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, because counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient, 

we need not address the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. 

III. Sentencing Phase

The district court granted habeas relief on Morris’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel in the sentencing phase, and the government cross appeals. On appeal, the government 

argues that the district court erred because the state court reasonably determined that Morris 

failed to establish a diagnosable illness and that counsel consulted with three mental-health 

experts who strategically chose not to rely on that theory. We agree. 

A. Background 

In post-conviction proceedings, Morris argued that counsel failed to investigate his 

mental illness and failed to properly use a mitigation specialist. According to Morris, counsel 

should have had him examined by mental-health experts to determine the existence of a brain 

injury or mental impairment. Counsel also should have brought out his childhood poverty, 

neglect, abuse, and exposure to violence, drugs, and alcohol. Finally, Morris argued that counsel 

failed to provide Drs. Bernet or Parker with pertinent information and failed to present expert or 

lay mitigation testimony. 

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the claim was intertwined with 

Morris’s guilt-phase claim and again cited and quoted Strickland’s two-part test. Morris, 

2006 WL 2872870, at *60-62. The appellate court adopted the trial court’s finding on 

performance that Morris’s counsel conducted a thorough and proper investigation and had no 

reason to believe Morris was suffering from a mental disease, defect, or condition that would 

have mitigated his crimes. Id. at *64. The court also concluded that counsel was entitled to rely 

on Dr. Bernet’s judgment about whether an evaluation by a neuropsychiatrist or 

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neuropsychologist was needed. Id. at *56. Turning to prejudice, the court stated that: 

“A defendant must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [unprofessional] 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ The Petitioner has failed to meet 

this standard.” Id. at *62 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Considering the aggravating 

circumstances, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals noted that “we cannot conclude that 

had expert testimony that the Petitioner suffered from Bipolar Disorder II been presented to the 

jury that a sentence other than death would have been imposed.” Id. at *54. The court 

recognized that the additional mitigation evidence Morris presented in post-conviction 

proceedings was double-edged because it showed both a history of personality problems in 

Morris and his family and a history of drug abuse and illegal activity. Id. at *61-62. 

The federal district court reviewed Morris’s claim de novo out of concern that the state 

court improperly applied Strickland’s prejudice prong. Morris, 2011 WL 7758570 at *25. The 

district court found that there was substantial information that should have caused counsel to 

investigate further whether Morris was mentally ill and how cocaine and alcohol affected his 

cognitive abilities. Id. at *28. It noted that the mitigation specialist’s investigation was limited, 

that Dr. Bernet’s testimony was not used in mitigation, and that there was no mitigation proof 

about Morris’s background, family history, brain damage or mental illness. Id. Accordingly, the 

district court found that there was a reasonable probability that one juror would have voted 

against the death penalty had Morris’s counsel presented the available mitigation evidence. Id.

B. Strickland Analysis 

 “An attorney’s failure to reasonably investigate the defendant’s background and present 

mitigating evidence to the jury at sentencing can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 318 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-22). To 

assess the reasonableness of counsel’s performance, “[t]he court must consider not only the 

evidence known to counsel, but also whether that evidence ‘would lead a reasonable attorney to 

investigate further.’” Hodges, 727 F.3d at 542 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527). “[S]trategic 

choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 

reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on the investigation.” Wiggins, 

539 U.S. at 528 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). Courts should not second-guess 

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counsel’s strategic decisions, and should presume that counsel’s conduct is reasonable. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Jackson v. Bradshaw, 681 F.3d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 2012). 

“The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s 

deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. 

 To assess the potential prejudice to a defendant at sentencing, the court must reweigh the 

evidence in aggravation against the total available mitigating evidence adduced at trial and in 

post-conviction proceedings, see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, to determine “whether there is a 

reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the 

balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 695; see also Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39-40 (2009); Wong v. Belmontes, 

558 U.S. 15, 19-20 (2009). The petitioner must present new evidence that differs both in 

strength and subject matter from the evidence actually presented at sentencing, not just 

cumulative mitigation evidence. Jackson, 681 F.3d at 770; Phillips v. Bradshaw, 607 F.3d 199, 

216 (6th Cir. 2010). 

As a threshold matter, Morris argues on appeal that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), allow 

him to rely on evidence he produced in the district court. In Martinez, the Court held that 

ineffective assistance or absence of collateral counsel may constitute cause to excuse the 

procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. 132 S. Ct. at 1320.1

However, Martinez and Trevino do not apply to Morris’s case because he did not 

procedurally default his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. Morris presented his 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in state post-conviction proceedings. The 

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals denied them on the merits. Morris, 2006 WL 2872870, at 

*54, *62. Martinez does not apply to claims that were fully adjudicated on the merits in state 

court because those claims are, by definition, not procedurally defaulted. Detrich v. Ryan, 

740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013). 

 1

Martinez and Trevino apply to cases in Tennessee. Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F.3d 787, 795-96 (6th Cir. 

2014). 

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The decision of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals to deny Morris’s claim was not 

an unreasonable application of Strickland. Morris’s counsel’s strategy was to make the case that 

Morris would not have committed the crimes if he had not been intoxicated and that he was 

basically a good person who would function well in prison. Counsel hired experts in 

pharmacology and psychology, investigators, and a mitigation specialist. The defense team 

investigated Morris’s background, to an extent, and relied on mental-health experts’ opinions to 

form their strategy. To the extent that Morris failed to provide defense counsel and the mentalhealth experts with background information, counsel cannot be blamed. See Fautenberry v. 

Mitchell, 515 F.3d 614, 625 (6th Cir. 2008); Hicks v. Collins, 384 F.3d 204, 215 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Based upon the experts’ findings, counsel presented testimony in the guilt phase to show how 

cocaine intoxication and withdrawal can affect the user’s ability to reason and that Morris may 

have been unable to form the intent to commit murder. They did not present new expert 

testimony at sentencing, but the experts’ testimony was already before the jury. In closing 

arguments, Morris’s counsel attempted to connect the guilt- and penalty-phase evidence. 

Morris’s counsel were entitled to rely upon the assessments performed by mental-health experts 

in forming their strategy. Mitigation witnesses testified about Morris’s character, work habits, 

and good behavior in prison. See McGuire, 738 F.3d at 758; Black, 664 F.3d at 104-05. There is 

a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. See Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 105. 

By not presenting additional mental-health testimony in the mitigation phase, counsel 

avoided opening the door to rebuttal evidence of Morris’s history of drug dealing, drug use, and 

other illegal acts. See Wong, 558 U.S. at 25-27 (finding that introduction of additional mitigation 

evidence could have invited rebuttal evidence that petitioner was responsible for a second 

murder); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 700 (2002) (noting counsel’s fear that calling witnesses 

from petitioner’s childhood or time in the Army could have led to prosecutor’s introducing 

evidence about respondent’s criminal history); Sutton v. Bell, 645 F.3d 752, 763-64 (6th Cir. 

2011) (holding that state court reasonably considered the possibility that presenting evidence of 

petitioner’s troubled background could have opened the door to rebuttal evidence of his prior 

drug use and violent acts). Under Tennessee law, the prosecution may introduce evidence to 

rebut a mitigating factor raised by the defendant. Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 598-600 (6th Cir. 

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2000); Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tenn. 1979). This court may entertain possible 

reasons for counsel’s decisions even if not expressed by counsel. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 

1407. Accordingly, the risk of rebuttal evidence is a valid consideration whether or not Morris’s 

counsel considered it. 

The Supreme Court and this court have denied habeas relief on similar claims. 

See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1405-06 (concluding that state court’s denial of deficientperformance claim was not unreasonable because counsel consulted a psychiatrist who found no 

brain damage, petitioner bragged about his criminal activities, and counsel reasonably chose to 

rely on seeking sympathy for petitioner’s mother); Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-02 (finding Tennessee 

Court of Criminal Appeals’s denial of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland because, even though trial counsel offered no mitigation 

evidence at the penalty phase, counsel called jury’s attention to guilt-phase evidence that was 

presented to support insanity defense); Black, 664 F.3d at 104-05 (holding that petitioner who 

alleged that counsel should have hired a psychiatrist who would have diagnosed him with brain 

damage did not show ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel had him evaluated by 

mental-health experts and had no reason to believe that further investigation would have 

produced mitigation evidence); Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 526-30 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding 

no ineffective assistance of counsel at mitigation because counsel used a qualified psychologist 

and post-conviction evidence did not establish that trial counsel missed probative mental-health 

evidence). 

Here, the conclusion of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals that Morris’s counsel’s 

performance was not deficient was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 378 (2010). Accordingly, 

because counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient, we need not address the 

prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. 

AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part, and this case is REMANDED to the 

district court for a denial of the writ in accordance with this decision. 

 Case: 11-6323 Document: 146-2 Filed: 09/23/2015 Page: 26