Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06451/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06451-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JERRY CANNON, Individually 

and on behalf of the Estate of 

Phyllis Cannon, Deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

GROUP HEALTH SERVICE OF ) 

OKLAHOMA, INC., d/b/a Blue ) 

Cross & Blue Shield of Oklahoma;) 

GHS HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANI- ) 

ZATION, INC., d/b/a Blue Lines ) 

HMO, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

No. 94-6451 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Western District of Oklahoma 

D.C. No. CIV-94-159-A 

Larry Alan Tawwater (Jo L. Slama and Terry T. Wiens with him on 

the briefs), McCaffrey & Tawwater, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Mark E. Schmidtke (Page Dobson and J.R. "Randy" Baker, Holloway 

Dobson Hudson Bachman Alden Jennings Robertson & Holloway, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), J.R. Ebenstein 

Consultants, Valparaiso, Indiana, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 94-6451 Document: 01019276437 Date Filed: 02/28/1996 Page: 1 
Before PORFILIO, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges; and HOLMES, District 

Judge.* 

PORFILIO, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Sven Erik Holmes, United States District Court Judge 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

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Jerry Cannon filed this action against Group Health Service 

of Oklahoma, Inc., d/b/a Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Oklahoma, and 

GHS Health Maintenance Organization, Inc., d/b/a Blue Lines HMO 

(insurers) to recover damages for the death of his wife, Phyllis 

Cannon. After removal to federal court, the district court 

granted summary judgment for the insurers, holding Mr. Cannon's 

claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security 

Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1461. The district court also 

denied Mr. Cannon's motion to amend his complaint, holding his new 

claims could not withstand a motion to dismiss. Mr. Cannon now 

appeals. Although moved by the tragic circumstances of this case 

and the seemingly needless loss of life that resulted, we conclude 

the law gives us no choice put to affirm. 

I 

Phyllis Cannon was diagnosed with acute myeloblastic leukemia 

in September of 1991. She was treated with chemotherapy, and her 

leukemia went into remission. The insurers paid for this medical 

treatment. Mrs. Cannon's treating physician, Dr. Ruben Saez, 

recommended she undergo an autologous bone marrow transplant 

(ABMT), and on August 10, 1992, sought preauthorization from the 

insurers. 

On August 11, 1992, the insurers denied preauthorization for 

the ABMT, contending the treatment was experimental during a first 

remission of leukemia. Dr. Saez requested the insurers reconsider 

his request and submitted medical literature in an attempt to 

demonstrate his proposed treatment was not experimental. Dr. Saez 

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also informed the insurers his request needed urgent action 

because it was critical the ABMT be completed prior to any cancer 

recurrence. 

On August 21, 1992, the insurers again denied preauthorization. The Cannons persisted in their request for reconsideration, 

and on September 21, 1992, the insurers reversed their decision 

and agreed to authorize ABMT. Unfortunately, Mrs. Cannon was not 

notified until October 10, 1992, in a letter dated September 28, 

1992. By that time, her leukemia had returned and she could no 

longer beneficially receive ABMT, and none was ever administered. 

She was admitted into the hospital on October 12, 1992, and died 

on November 21, 1992. 

Mrs. Cannon was insured through her employer, Hendershot Tool 

Company. She chose health insurance coverage through Blue Lines 

HMO, one of three options of Hendershot's health insurance plan. 

When Mrs. Cannon was first diagnosed with leukemia in September 

1991, the Blue Lines HMO plan provided: 

The following services or procedures are not covered by 

BlueLincs HMO: . . . . (13) Organ transplants other than 

skin, cornea, bone, bone marrow and kidney. 

However, four months after Mrs. Cannon's diagnosis, effective 

January 1, 1992, Blue Lines HMO issued an "Amendatory Rider" which 

specified: 

Preauthorization 

be provided, for 

. . . . Such 

remission; . . . . 

will be denied, and benefits will not 

autologous bone marrow transplants 

as: acute leukemia in first 

The insurers claimed the Rider was only a clarification in their 

policy, not a change in coverage. These facts are not in dispute. 

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Initially, on December 30, 1992, Mr. Cannon filed suit in 

Oklahoma state court to recover damages for the death of his wife. 

He alleged her insurers either negligently or in bad faith refused 

to authorize the ABMT for seven weeks, at a time when it offered 

Mrs. Cannon her only chance of a cure for her leukemia. The 

insurers filed a Notice of Removal to federal court asserting Mrs. 

Cannon's health insurance plan was an employee welfare benefit 

plan within the meaning of ERISA providing exclusive federal 

jurisdiction. 

Although Mr. Cannon moved to remand, that motion was denied, 

and the district court granted the insurers' subsequent motion for 

summary judgment. The district court concluded Mrs. Cannon's 

group health insurance coverage was an ERISA plan; and, as such, 

it preempted all of Mr. Cannon's state common law and statutory 

claims. Preemption, the court held, was required because the 

state claims related to the ERISA plan and did not fall within 

ERISA'S savings clause. These conclusions notwithstanding, the 

district court gave Mr. Cannon the opportunity to file an amended 

complaint. 

Thereafter, the district court denied Mr. Cannon's motion to 

amend his complaint because his new claims could not withstand a 

motion to dismiss, making amendment futile. Mr. Cannon's amended 

complaint stated three claims under ERISA: (1) for benefits under 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B); (2) for equitable relief under 29 

U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3); and (3) for breach of fiduciary duty pursuant 

to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2). Mr. Cannon's complaint also brought a 

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claim pursuant to the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 to 

1127. 

In its holding, the court disposed of Mr. Cannon's claims for 

benefits and equitable relief under ERISA because Mrs. Cannon 

never incurred medical expenses nor received ABMT. The court 

stated: 

[It] carefully considered plaintiff's argument but 

stands unpersuaded that he can sue under subsection 

1132(a) (1) or (3) to recover anything other than payment 

for medical expenses actually incurred, when that is the 

benefit provided by the plan. Plaintiff cites no legal 

authority for the proposition that a person may sue to 

recover the value of a service that would have been a 

benefit of the plan if the plan's terms had been 

satisfied. 

The court also concluded Mr. Cannon's breach of fiduciary duty 

claim was unavailing because beneficiaries cannot recover 

compensatory damages for any such breach, stating: "A fiduciary 

is liable under ERISA, if at all, to the plan and not to the 

beneficiary." Finally, the court held Mr. Cannon failed to state 

. a claim under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act. Mr. Cannon has not 

appealed the district court's decision on this issue; therefore, 

we deem it abandoned and do not address it. 

II 

A 

Mr. Cannon raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues 

ERISA does not preempt state causes of action where ERISA does not 

provide a remedy. Mr. Cannon contends ERISA preemption in this 

context is inconsistent with the policies behind ERISA, the 

McCarran-Ferguson Act, and the Tenth Amendment. Second, Mr. 

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Cannon argues application of ERISA to preempt state laws where 

ERISA provides no remedy violates his fundamental right to access 

justice. Third, Mr. Cannon maintains the federal common law 

includes the concept of equitable estoppel allowing him to assert 

his claim. 

This court reviews the district court's interpretation of 

ERISA de novo. St. Francis Regional Medical Center v. Blue Cross 

& Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 49 F.3d 1460, 1462 (lOth Cir. 1995); 

National Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1557 

(lOth Cir.), cert. ·denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992). Determining 

whether a particular state law action is preempted by ERISA 

depends on the interrelationship of three ERISA statutory 

provisions -- the preemption clause, the savings clause, and the 

deemer clause. The preemption clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), 

provides: 

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section 

[the savings clause] , the provisions of this subchapter 

and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any 

and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter 

relate to any employee benefit plan. . . . 

The savings clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A), reads: 

Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer 

clause] , nothing in this subchapter shall be construed 

to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any 

State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities. 

The deemer clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B), states: 

Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust 

established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an 

insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, 

or investment company or to be engaged in the business 

of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any 

State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment 

companies. 

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The interpretation and analysis of these three provisions has been 

a recurrent theme in both the Supreme Court and this court. 

The seminal Supreme Court ERISA preemption case is Pilot Life 

Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). In Pilot Life, the Court 

addressed the appropriate inquiry for determining whether a 

particular state law claim was preempted under ERISA. A court 

must analyze whether the state statutory or common law actions 

asserted in the plaintiff's complaint "'relate to' an employee 

benefit plan and therefore fall under ERISA'S express pre-emption 

clause." Id. at 47. The Court noted the preemption clause had an 

"expansive sweep," and must be given its "broad common-sense 

meaning." Id. 

More recently, the Court has elaborated: 

The pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth. 

Its deliberately expansive language was designed to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal 

concern. The key to § 514(a) is found in the words relate to. Congress used those words in their broad 

sense, rejecting more limited pre-emption language that 

would have made the clause applicable only to state laws 

relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA. . . . 

A law relates to an employee benefit plan, in the 

normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with 

or reference to such a plan. Under this broad commonsense meaning, a state law may relate to a benefit plan, 

and thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is not 

specifically designed to affect such plans, or the 

effect is only indirect. Pre-emption is also not 

precluded simply because a state law is consistent with 

ERISA'S substantive requirements. 

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138-39 (1990) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted) . A common law cause of 

action which "relates to" ERISA is preempted unless it falls 

within one of the exceptions to § 514(a). 

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Mr. Cannon's initial claims were for breach of contract or a 

breach of fiduciary duty cause of action related to the improper 

processing of Mrs. Cannon's benefit claim for ABMT. Both the 

Supreme Court and this court have consistently held these types of 

claims are preempted by ERISA. See, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 

57 (common law tort and contract actions asserting improper 

processing of a claim for benefits preempted by ERISA); 

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-3 (1987) 

(common law tort and contract claims are preempted); Pitman v. 

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 121-22 (lOth Cir. 

1994) (tortious breach of contract claim preempted); Kelso v. 

General American Life Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 388, 389-91 (lOth Cir. 

1992) (common law breach of contract action preempted). But see 

Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 841 

(1988) (general Georgia garnishment statute not preempted by 

ERISA; but specific provision referring to ERISA is preempted) ; 

Guidry v. Sbeet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 39 F.3d 1078, 

1083-86 (lOth Cir. 1994) (en bane) (general Colorado garnishment 

statute not preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 

(1995). 

Mr. Cannon does not really dispute the fact his claims would 

be preempted based on these precedents. Instead, he argues a 

question of first impression exists whether ERISA may preempt 

state common law claims if no alternative remedy is possible under 

ERISA. The district court concluded Mr. Cannon had no available 

remedy under ERISA, and we agree. However, even assuming Mr. 

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Cannon did not have any remedy pursuant to ERISA, we do not 

believe this fact has any bearing on our preemption analysis. 

Mr. Cannon is correct the Supreme Court has not addressed 

this precise issue. He has skillfully crafted an argument, based 

on a variety of different cases, that by implication preemption 

only is appropriate when ERISA provides a remedy. However, none 

of the cases he cites stand for the broad proposition an exception 

to ERISA'S express preemption clause exists when ERISA provides no 

remedy. 

Mr. Cannon is effectively asking us to rewrite ERISA to craft 

such an exception. Although there are sound reasons why such an 

exception is appropriate, the Congress, and not this court, is the 

appropriate forum for such policy arguments. 

While the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, we 

have. In dicta, we have noted the unavailability of a remedy 

under ERISA is not germane to preemption analysis. 

Finally, plaintiffs suggest that a definition of 

"participant" which excludes them will leave them without a remedy, inasmuch as their state law claims were 

held preempted by ERISA. Preemption is not at issue in 

this case, and we do not address it. However, we note 

the fact that a state law claim may be preempted does 

not necessarily mandate that there be an ERISA remedy. 

See Corcoran v. United Healtbcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 

1333 (5th Cir.) ("While we are not unmindful of the fact 

that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves 

a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect 

participants in employee benefit plans, the lack of an 

ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption analysis."), 

cert. denied, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 812, 121 L.Ed.2d 

684 (1992); Cromwell -v: Equicor HCE Cor,p., 944 F.2d 

1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Nor is it relevant to an 

analysis of the scope of federal preemption that 

appellants may be left without a remedy."), cert. 

denied, u.s. ___ , 113 S. Ct. 2, 120 L.Ed.2d 931 

(1992); Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health 

Ins., 944 F.2d 752, 755 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("We are aware 

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that preemption normally is not dependent on the 

availability of ERISA remedies."). 

Raymond v. Mobil Oil Cor,p., 983 F.2d 1528, 1537-38 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 81 (1993) (footnote omitted). 

Further, the Supreme Court has clarified Congress intended 

the civil enforcement mechanisms of ERISA to be exclusive, and 

this legislative policy choice must be respected. In Pilot Life, 

the Court explained: 

In sum, the detailed provisions of§ 502(a) set 

forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that 

represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt 

and fair claims settlement procedures against the public 

interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others 

under the federal scheme would be completely undermined 

if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free 

to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA. 

Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54. We see no reason why this calculation 

should differ because of the unavailability of ERISA remedies. 

Mr. Cannon has failed to explain why one class of potential 

plaintiffs --those without available ERISA remedies-- should be 

entitled to state common law and statutory remedies which would 

remain unavailable to another class of plaintiffs --those with 

alternative ERISA remedies. The proper focus for preemption 

analysis should be on the nature of the claim for relief, not on 

whether a particular plaintiff has a potential remedy under ERISA. 

B 

Next, Mr. Cannon crafts an argument out of a creative reading 

of the deemer and savings clauses. He suggests his claims fall 

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within the savings clause because they regulate insurance. There 

are numerous problems with this analysis, however. 

We have found no case which stands for the proposition an 

insurance company which contracts through an employer to supply 

insurance to an employee benefit plan should be deemed an 

insurance company. The savings clause indicates Congress sought 

to allow states to regulate the business of insurance. In turn, 

the deemer clause reveals Congress' fear the states would 

overzealously deem employee benefit plans as insurance for the 

purpose of regulating them. Mr. Cannon's argument is in direct 

contradiction to this provision because there is no doubt Mrs. 

Cannon's plan was an employee benefit plan within the meaning of 

ERISA. 

Mr. Cannon's broad policy argument related to the McCarranFerguson Act is equally inapposite. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 

v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 742-44 (1985), the Court adopted 

the definition of "business of insurance" from this Act to help 

determine whether a state law falls within the savings clause. 

Unfortunately for Mr. Cannon, his claims arise from generally 

applicable common law principles which do not specifically 

regulate insurance within the meaning of the savings clause. FMC 

Cor,p. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-8 (~990). Therefore, even if 

Mrs. Cannon's health plan was considered "insurance," the savings 

clause would not save Mr. Cannon's claims from the application of 

the preemption clause. 

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c 

Finally, Mr. Cannon argues the Tenth Amendment supports his 

theory no remedy equals no preemption. However, he has failed to 

indicate how the Tenth Amendment precludes Congress from 

exercising its Commerce Clause authority to enact ERISA. ERISA 

substantially affects commerce to a greater degree than what has 

recently concerned the Supreme Court in this area, regardless of 

the Tenth Amendment. See United States v. Lopez, ___ U.S. ___ , 

115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 

18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (A), exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause 

authority). Mr. Cannon's broad policy arguments concerning the 

reserved powers of the states are unavailing to his cause. We 

conclude the district court ruled correctly on this issue. 

III 

Mr. Cannon argues, if ERISA is applied to preempt Oklahoma 

law, he has suffered an unconstitutional denial of his right to 

access justice. Mr. Cannon locates this fundamental right in 

several sources. First, in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 

Clause and the Ninth Amendment. He argues one of the Ninth 

Amendment's rights reserved to the people is the right to access 

courts for redress. Mr. Cannon cites the Magna Carta in support 

of this proposition. "To none will we sell, to none will we deny, 

to none will we delay right to justice." Magna Carta, Art. 40. 

Second, he finds such a right in two cases. Bounds v. Smith, 430 

u.s. 817 (1977); Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370 

(Wash. 1991) ("That justice which is to be administered openly is 

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not an abstract theory of constitutional law, but rather is the 

bedrock foundation upon which rest all the people's rights and 

obligations."). Third, he argues such a right is implicit in 

numerous Supreme Court cases which determined federal regulatory 

law did not preempt state torts law. Mr. Cannon argues in these 

cases the Court was concerned with whether preemption would 

deprive a party of a remedy. 

Although impressed with the inventiveness of this argument, 

we believe it is without substance. Simply put, a fundamental 

right to access justice has yet to be defined. The Supreme Court 

has carefully limited those rights considered part of the 

substantive component of liberty within the meaning of the Due 

Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See 

generally Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pa. v. Casey, ___ , 

U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-08 (1992) (discussing a woman's 

right to terminate her pregnancy as a fundamental right); Cruzan 

v. Director, Mjssouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-85 (1990) 

(discussing the right to die as a fundamental right) ; Bowers v. 

Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986) (discussing the right of 

homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy as not a fundamental 

right) . 

Neither case Mr. Cannon cites supports this fundamental right 

to access justice. First, in Bounds, the Court held "the 

fundamental right of access to the courts requires prison 

authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 

meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law 

libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 

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430 U.S. at 828. The fundamental right Mr. Cannon seeks is much 

broader than the Court's holding in Bounds. Second, in Doe, the 

Washington Supreme Court addressed whether the recipient of a 

blood transfusion contaminated with AIDS could compel the 

discovery of the name of the blood donor from the Blood Center. 

The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion the donor's name 

could be discovered. Doe, 819 P.2d at 373. We fail to see the 

relevance of Doe to Mr. Cannon's argument. Finally, the other 

cases involving federal preemption cited by Mr. Cannon are also 

inapposite. 

IV 

Last, Mr. Cannon argues the concept of equitable estoppel 

should apply here. He asserts federal courts have a duty to 

develop federal common law to supplement ERISA, and this court 

should look to state law to develop this federal common law. Mr. 

Cannon asserts the court in National Companies Health Benefit Plan 

v. St. Joseph's Ho~. of Atlanta, 929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991), 

adopted the principle of equitable estoppel in ERISA cases. He 

urges equitable estoppel principles should apply here to prevent 

the insurers from benefitting from their unreasonable conduct. 

Although Mr. Cannon relies upon National Companies for the 

general proposition a federal common law of equitable estoppel 

should be applied in his case, the Eleventh Circuit concluded 

equitable estoppel could apply only under certain circumstances, 

explaining: 

In Nacbwalter v. Ghristie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 

1986), this court held that the federal common-law claim 

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of equitable estoppel is not available to plaintiffs in 

cases involving oral amendments to or modifications of 

clear terms of employee benefit plans governed by 

ERISA. . 

In Kane [v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1283, 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 232 (1990)], this court further 

clarified the scope of the holding in Nacbw.alter, 

"differentiat[ing] between oral amendments or 

modifications to a plan and oral interpretations of a 

plan." The court held that the federal conunon-law claim 

of equitable estoppel may be applied when an employee 

relies, to his detriment, on an interpretation of an 

ambiguous prov1s1on in a plan by a representative of 

that plan. . . . The rationale of Kane is equally 

applicable to informal written interpretations of an 

ERISA plan. 

Id. at 1571-72 (citation omitted). The court applied its 

equitable estoppel rule to a written interpretation of an ERISA 

continuing coverage provision. Id. at 1572. In National 

Co~es, the Eleventh Circuit identified five elements of a 

common-law claim of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be 

estopped misrepresented material facts; (2) the party to be 

estopped was aware of the true facts; (3) the party to be estopped 

intended that the misrepresentation be acted on or had reason to 

believe the party asserting the estoppel would rely on it; (4) the 

party asserting the estoppel did not know, nor should it have 

known, the true facts; and (5) the party asserting the estoppel 

reasonably and detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation. Id. 

(citing Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 

467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) and Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 

F.2d 1210, 1217 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987)). 

The major distinction here which negates equitable estoppel 

is the absence of misrepresentation of any term of the plan 

triggering Mrs. Cannon's reasonable detrimental reliance. The 

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' 

• 

controversy surrounding whether the plan would authorize ABMT had 

nothing to do with any misrepresentation; it simply was a 

disagreement over the proper interpretation of the terms of the 

plan. Although it is arguable whether the insurers improperly 

interpreted the plan, misinterpretation does not amount to the 

misrepresentation necessary to support an equitable estoppel 

claim. 

This court has neither adopted nor rejected an equitable 

estoppel rule in the ERISA context. In Averhart v. U.S. West 

Management Pension Plan, 46 F.3d 1480 (lOth Cir. 1994), we 

effectively avoided a decision of this issue by not explicitly 

saying an equitable estoppel theory was viable, but concluding the 

plaintiffs failed to state .such a claim. We explained: 

We hold that, in any event, the plaintiffs have not 

shown any viable basis for the estoppel theory they 

advance--that there were representations made interpreting ambiguous Plan terms. Courts that have recognized estoppel claims in these circumstances have done 

so only where "the terms of the plan are ambiguous" and 

"the employer['s] communications constituted an 

interpretation of that ambiguity." 

Id. at 1486 (citations omitted). Because Mr. Cannon has failed to 

state an equitable estoppel claim here, we·do not believe this is 

a case in which the availability of such a claim should be 

decided. 

AFFIRMED. 

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