Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_13-cv-00210/USCOURTS-ared-5_13-cv-00210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

ANTONIO WRIGHT

ADC#148629 PETITIONER

VS. 5:13CV00210 KGB/JTR

RAY HOBBS, Director,

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition 

(“Recommendation”) has been sent to United States District Judge Kristine G. 

Baker. Any party may file written objections to this Recommendation. Objections 

must be specific and include the factual or legal basis for disagreeing with the 

Recommendation. An objection to a factual finding must specifically identify the 

finding of fact believed to be wrong and describe the evidence that supports that 

belief. 

An original and one copy of the objections must be received in the office of 

the United States District Clerk within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. 

If no objections are filed, Judge Baker can adopt this Recommendation without 

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independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you 

may also waive any right to appeal questions of fact.

Mail your objections to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Room A149 

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

I. Background

Pending before the Court is a § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

filed by Petitioner, Antonio Wright (“Wright”). Doc. 2. Before addressing 

Wright’s habeas claims, the Court will review the procedural history of the case in 

state court.

On September 30, 2009, a Columbia County jury convicted Wright of: (1)

second-degree murder; and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon. Doc. 7-2. At

trial, the state relied on strong direct evidence of Wright’s guilt:

The State’s evidence included testimony by Tomeca Snell, Barbara 

Bell, Leroy Harris, and Detective Todd Dew. Snell testified that she 

was in a park when Wright and two other men walked up to Parker, 

that there was a conversation and Wright shot Parker, and that Snell 

heard only one shot. Bell testified that she saw Wright shoot Parker. 

Harris testified that he observed no act by Parker that would have 

provoked Wright, and Wright shot again. Detective Dew testified that 

he did not interview Wright while investigating the case because he 

thought it would not be productive in light of what officers on the 

scene had said about Wright's demeanor.

Wright testified in his own defense, explaining what had occurred 

when he and the victim encountered one another in a park:

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I saw Rod Parker, he was mouthing some words.... I went over to 

him. Before I could finish what I was saying he pushed me. Then 

Mario Blake jumped up and tried to get him to calm down. I 

shoved Rod back and then he hit me. Then we started fighting. I 

was hit twice in the back of my head. So I pulled out the gun. I 

fired one single shot. I did that because I feared for my life. I was 

being jumped on.... He was coming at me until I fired.

He stated that he stopped shooting after the first shot, and he reiterated 

on cross-examination that he was the one who fired the gun.

Wright v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 389, 2012 WL 1432381 (April 25, 2012). He 

received an aggregate 65-year sentence.1 Id.

Wright appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals. His sole argument was 

that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. On April 25, 2012, 

the Court affirmed. Wright v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 389, 2012 WL 1432381 (April 

25, 2012). 

On June 26, 2012, Wright filed a pro se Rule 37 Petition, asserting 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Doc. 7-6. On October 17, 2012, the trial 

court entered an Order denying Rule 37 relief. Doc. 7-7. On November 14, 2012, 

Wright filed a Notice of Appeal. Doc. 7-5 at 4. However, because Wright failed to 

lodge the record with the Arkansas Supreme Court, his appeal was dismissed. 

1 Wright was charged with first-degree murder, but the jury convicted Wright of the lesser-included offense 

of second-degree murder.

At the time Wright committed the crimes, he was on probation for a 2005 first-degree battery conviction. 

Doc. 7-8. Prior to trial, the state moved to revoke his probation. The parties agreed to a procedure where the trial 

court would consider the evidence at trial to separately decide the question of Wright’s probation revocation. Trial 

Tr. 191. After the jury convicted Wright, the trial court revoked Wright’s probation. Trial Tr. 887. The trial court 

imposed a five-year sentence on the probation revocation, running concurrent with the 65-year sentence. Doc. 7-8.

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On July 8, 2013, Wright initiated this habeas action. Doc. 2. In his Petition, 

he argues that: (1) he was entitled to a new trial because the prosecution withheld 

Brady material; (2) his lawyer was ineffective for failing to get the trial court to 

sever the murder and felon-in-possession charges; and (3) his lawyer was 

ineffective for allowing the trial court to decide the pending probation revocation

case immediately after the jury returned its guilty verdict. Id. According to 

Respondent, Ray Hobbs, Wright’s habeas claims either: (1) fail on the merits; or 

(2) are procedurally defaulted. Doc. 7.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that the Petition be 

denied, and that the case be dismissed, with prejudice.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review for Habeas Corpus Relief Under the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

A federal court will not grant habeas relief unless a state court's decision 

“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-

(2).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it 

reaches a conclusion opposite that of the Supreme Court on a question of law, or 

reaches a decision contrary to the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable 

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facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision involves 

an “unreasonable application” of federal law when it identifies the correct legal 

rule, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407.“A state court's application 

of clearly established federal law must be objectively unreasonable, not merely 

incorrect, to warrant the granting of a writ of habeas corpus.” Jackson v. Norris, 

651 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2011).

Finally, the state court’s findings of fact are presumptively correct, and the 

habeas petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by 

clear and convincing evidence.” Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 

2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

B. Analysis of Petitioner’s Habeas Claims

1. The State’s Failure to Disclose Brady Material Prior to 

Wright’s Trial

According to Wright’s testimony, he shot the victim, Roderick Parker

(“Parker”), in self-defense. Trial Tr. 772-74. He testified that, on May 25, 2009, he 

was at Southside Park in Magnolia, talking to some girls. Parker approached him 

and began “mouthing[.]” Trial Tr. 772. Parker allegedly shoved him, Wright

shoved back, “and that’s when he [Parker] hit me.” Trial Tr. 773. “Before you 

know it, we’re fighting. Out of the blue I was hit twice like in the back of the head 

and that’s when I pulled out the gun.” Trial Tr. 773. Because he “feared for his 

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life,” Wright testified that he fired a single shot, and then Parker backed up and fell 

down. Trial Tr. 773-74.

Several days after Wright’s conviction, his lawyer was preparing for trial in 

another criminal case in which he represented Roland Jamerson (“Jamerson”). As 

part of the discovery in Jamerson’s case, the prosecutor provided Wright’s attorney 

with a videotaped statement from a jailhouse informant, Robert Alexander

(“Alexander”). In this videotaped statement, which was recorded on February 8, 

2010, Alexander told Magnolia police detectives about statements that Jamerson 

made to him while they were detained together in the Columbia County jail. 

Alexander also told the detectives about statements that Wright made to him about 

the shooting of Roderick Parker.2

On November 19, 2010, Wright’s trial counsel filed a Motion for New Trial, 

arguing that the state committed a Brady violation by failing to turn over 

Alexander’s videotaped statement during discovery in Wright’s case. Trial Tr. 141.

After noting that the state’s failure to disclose Alexander’s videotaped statement to 

Wright’s trial counsel was a Brady violation, the trial court held that, because 

2 Alexander’s February 8, 2010 videotaped statement was made seven months before Wright’s September

29-30, 2010 trial. On the videotape, Alexander tells the detectives what Wright said to him and a group of other 

detainees in the Columbia County jail. According to Alexander, Wright said that “they [Wright and Parker] had been 

arguing and they had an altercation prior. Then they all went to the park and they got to arguing at the park and the 

dude [Parker] was telling Quez [Wright] . . . ‘Man, I’m not scared of you. Everybody else is scared of you,’ because 

they know Quez [Wright] had a reputation for shooting people . . . Instead of arguing the guy [Parker] ended up 

slapping Quez [Wright] and when the guy slapped him, . . . Quez [Wright] came out of the back pocket and . . . 

[p]opped him, shot him right here in the stomach [indicating]. He say he stood over him and got ready to shoot him 

again, but he looked and seen so many witnesses around he told him, ‘I ought to,’ he said ‘I ought to pop you 

again.’” DVD Interview Tr. 43-44.

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Wright had not shown a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of trial would 

have been different had the videotape been produced to him, it was not prejudicial 

and a new trial was not warranted. Trial Tr. 162-65.

On direct appeal, Wright argued that the trial court erred in denying his 

Motion for New Trial based on the Brady violation. The Arkansas Court of 

Appeals rejected the argument:

Wright has failed to show that he was so prejudiced by the alleged 

discovery violation that there is a reasonable probability the outcome 

of the trial would have been different. The information, Wright’s own 

statements, was not exculpatory in light of the fact that Wright 

admitted to the shooting. Moreover, Wright already had knowledge of 

the information because it was a statement he had made. He suffered 

no prejudice by the State’s failure to disclose the informant's 

statement in discovery, and we find no abuse of the trial court's 

discretion in the refusal to grant a new trial.

Wright v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 389, 2012 WL 1432381 (April 25, 2012).

Wright now contends that he is entitled to federal habeas relief based on this 

Brady violation.

3 He argues that, without Alexander’s videotaped statement, he 

“lost valuable opportunities to find valuable and mitigating evidence,” and “lost 

any opportunity . . . to call the informant as a witness[.]” Doc. 2 at 4. 

Alexander’s videotaped statement contains some marginally “favorable 

evidence,” along with a considerable amount of unfavorable inculpatory evidence.

3 To establish a Brady violation, a habeas petitioner must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed 

evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was material. United States v. Spencer, 

753 F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 2014). As to the third element, “[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id.

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However, as explained by both the trial court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals, 

notwithstanding this Brady violation, there is not a reasonable probability that the 

result of Wright’s trial would have been different if Alexander’s videotaped 

statement had been disclosed to Wright’s attorney.

In Alexander’s videotaped statement, he tells the detectives what Wright told 

him. Obviously, at the time of his trial, Wright already knew what he had said to 

other detainees in the Columbia County jail about his confrontation with Parker. 

Thus, at most, the exculpatory portion of Alexander’s videotaped statement was a 

hearsay version of Wright’s own self-serving testimony at trial; i.e., he shot the 

unarmed victim after getting into a fight with him. Other witnesses at trial testified 

that they saw Wright shoot the victim without provocation. The jury clearly 

rejected Wright’s testimony that he shot the victim in self-defense. 

Under the deferential standard of review this Court must apply in habeas 

cases, it concludes that the reasons given by the Arkansas Court of Appeals for 

rejecting Wright’s Brady claim were neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law,” nor were they based on an 

“unreasonable determination of the facts.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e).

Accordingly, Wright’s habeas claim, based on the Brady violation, is without 

merit.

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2. Wright’s Attorney’s Alleged Failure to “Obtain a Ruling” 

on the Motion to Sever the Murder and Felon-In-Possession 

Charges

Next, Wright argues that his attorney was ineffective for: (1) failing to 

“obtain a ruling” on his motion to sever the first-degree murder charge from the

felon-in-possession of a firearm charge; and (2) putting him on the stand to testify, 

which opened the door to the introduction of evidence of his prior felony 

conviction for first-degree battery for shooting someone else. Doc. 2 at 5.

Wright’s arguments badly mischaracterize how the severance issue was 

actually addressed by the court. His lawyer filed a pretrial motion to bifurcate the 

first-degree murder and felon-in-possession charges. Trial Tr. 31. At a pretrial 

hearing, the trial court granted the motion, and the State agreed that it would not 

put on any evidence of Wright’s prior felony conviction in the murder trial. Trial 

Tr. 178-79. However, the prosecutor and Wright’s attorney both agreed that, if 

Wright testified in his murder trial, his prior felony conviction would be 

admissible.

During voir dire, Wright’s attorney informed prospective jurors (in groups of 

three) that: (1) Wright had decided to testify and tell his side of the story; and (2)

they would find out about Wright’s prior battery conviction for a similar shooting. 

He then extensively questioned the prospective jurors about whether they could 

fairly consider the evidence with knowledge of the prior felony conviction. When 

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Wright later testified at trial, his attorney, on direct examination, elicited from him 

the facts surrounding his earlier battery conviction. During the jury instruction 

conference, Wright’s attorney and the prosecutor agreed to submit the felon-inpossession charge to the jury because Wright’s prior felony conviction had been 

introduced into evidence.

In Wright’s Rule 37 Petition, he argued that his lawyer “disregard[ed] the 

motion to sever” and “open[ed] the door for the state” by calling him to testify. 

Doc. 7-6 at 3-5. The trial court denied Rule 37 relief, noting that “defendant and 

his trial counsel had made the tactical decision that defendant should testify in his 

own defense, and that decision opened the door for an examination of his prior 

felony record. Trial tactics are not subject to review in a Rule 37 proceeding.” Doc. 

7-7 at 2.

As noted earlier, Wright failed to appeal the denial of Rule 37 relief to the 

Arkansas Supreme Court. Ordinarily, a habeas petitioner procedurally defaults a 

claim that is not presented to the state’s highest appellate court. However, in 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 

(2013), the Court recognized that, in a narrow range of habeas cases, a petitioner 

can rely on his lack of counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel, which occurred 

at the initial step of post–conviction review, to establish “cause” to excuse his 

procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The Eighth 

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Circuit has made it clear that, in § 2254 habeas claims arising in Arkansas, the 

Martinez exception only allows a district court “to find ‘cause,’ thereby excusing a 

habeas petitioner’s procedural default ... where (1) the claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel was a ‘substantial’ claim; (2) the ‘cause’ consisted of 

there being ‘no counsel’ or only ‘ineffective’ counsel during the state collateral 

review proceeding; and (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the ‘initial’ 

review proceeding with respect to the ‘ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim.’” Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 834 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Sasser v. 

Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833, 853 (8th Cir. 2013). 

Wright appears to have satisfied the second and third elements of Dansby

because he lacked counsel during the state post-conviction proceeding, and it was 

the “initial” proceeding in which he should have raised his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. However, to invoke the Martinez exception, Wright must also 

satisfy the first element of Dansby, which requires him to establish that his 

“underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one.”4

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318; Dansby, 766 F.3d at 834.

For an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to have “some merit,” a 

prisoner must establish that his attorney’s conduct “fell below an objective 

4 According to the Court in Martinez, for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to be “substantial,” the 

habeas petitioner must demonstrate that his claim: (1) has “some merit”; and (2) is supported by at least some facts. 

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19. If a habeas petitioner is unable to satisfy either part of this “substantiality test,” his 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is procedurally defaulted and cannot be considered by a federal court in a § 

2254 habeas action. 

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standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional norms,” and that the 

“professionally unreasonable” conduct of counsel “prejudiced the defense.”5

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691-92 (1984). If a prisoner fails 

“to establish either Strickland prong [it] is fatal to an ineffective-assistance claim." 

Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 498 (8th Cir. 2011). 

Thus, to determine if Wright’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim has 

“some merit,” this Court must decide: (1) if Wright’s trial counsel’s alleged 

misconduct “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) if so, 

whether it “prejudiced the defense.” If the Strickland standard is not met, as a 

matter of law, Wright’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is “without merit” 

and cannot be deemed to be a “substantial” claim under Martinez. 

During Wright’s trial, the prosecution introduced overwhelming evidence 

that Wright shot the unarmed victim. This undoubtedly led Wright’s attorney to 

make the tactical decision to try to counter that evidence by having Wright testify 

that he shot the victim in self-defense.6 See United States v. Thomas, 992 F.2d 201, 

205 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Trial counsel’s decisions concerning the theory of defense, 

testimony of witnesses and whether [defendant] should testify are all tactical 

decisions. We cannot rely on hindsight to evaluate defense counsel’s trial 

5 The defendant is prejudiced by the deficient performance if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, infra at 694. 6 Wright also called other witnesses who testified that Wright and Parker were in a fight before Wright shot 

him. Wright’s sister testified that Parker hit Wright first. Trial Tr. 760.

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strategy[.]”) (internal quotations omitted). Anticipating that he would need to call 

Wright to testify during the trial, his attorney told the jury during voir dire that 

Wright would be a witness and he asked prospective jurors if they could fairly 

consider the evidence in light of Wright’s prior conviction for battery. Finally,

based on the overwhelming evidence of Wright’s guilt, even if Wright had not 

testified and the jury had not learned about his prior conviction for battery, there is 

not a reasonable probability that the result of trial would have been different.

Wright has not established a “substantial” and meritorious ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim arising from the way in which his trial counsel handled 

the motion to sever the murder and felon-in-possession charges. Accordingly, the 

Martinez exception cannot excuse Wright’s procedural default in failing to appeal 

the denial of Rule 37 relief to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Thus, this Court is 

barred from considering the merits of this ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

3. Wright’s Attorney’s Alleged Failure to Object to the Court 

Deciding Wright’s Probation Revocation Immediately After the

Jury Returned Its Verdict

Finally, Wright argues that his lawyer was ineffective when he “failed to 

object to the [probation] revocation hearing being held in the same day of trial.” 

Doc. 2 at 6. He argues this somehow “prejudiced” his defense and “exposed the 

jury” to his prior bad acts. While Wright raised this claim in his Rule 37 Petition, 

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he did not appeal the denial of Rule 37 relief to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Thus, 

this claim is procedurally defaulted unless the Martinez exception applies.

Contrary to Wright’s suggestion, the jury heard nothing about the pending 

probation revocation proceeding. In the interest of efficiency the parties simply 

agreed to allow the trial court to decide if Wright’s earlier sentence of probation, 

for committing first-degree battery, should be revoked based on the same evidence 

introduced during Wright’s murder trial. Tr. 882-883. After the jury returned its 

verdict, the trial court revoked Wright’s probation and sentenced him to five years 

in prison to run concurrently with the jury’s sixty-five year sentence for seconddegree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. This procedure for 

deciding if Wright’s earlier probationary sentence should be revoked in no way 

prejudiced Wright’s trial on charges of first-degree murder and being a felon in 

possession of a firearm. 

 Wright has not established a “substantial” and meritorious ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim arising from the conduct of his attorney, with regard to 

the procedure she agreed the court should follow in deciding if Wright’s probation 

should be revoked. Thus, the Martinez exception cannot be used by Wright to 

excuse his failure to raise and appeal that claim in his state postconviction 

proceeding; thereby resulting in his procedural default of that claim. Accordingly, 

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the Court is now barred from considering this ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim.

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT the Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be DENIED and this habeas action be DISMISSED, WITH 

PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases.

DATED this 26th day of January, 2015.

____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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