Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01365/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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18cv1365-MMA (WVG) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ARMANDO R. LOPEZ, JR., 

Plaintiff,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 18cv1365-MMA (WVG) 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS; 

[Doc. No. 2] 

DISMISSING ACTION PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

 On August 24, 2010, Armando R. Lopez, Jr. pleaded guilty to distributing 

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Case No. 10cr1077-MMA, 

Doc. No. 28. The Court sentenced Lopez to a thirty-six month term of imprisonment and 

four years of supervised release. Id., Doc. No. 44. Lopez commenced his initial term of 

supervised release on November 13, 2012. Id., Doc. No. 52. Since that time, Lopez has 

violated the conditions of his supervised release on multiple occasions and served 

additional terms of imprisonment. Id., Doc. Nos. 65, 88, 99. Lopez is currently 

incarcerated, and is awaiting a final hearing in this Court on charges that he once again 

violated the conditions of his supervised release. Id., Doc. No. 100. 

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Prior to his arrest, Lopez, proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action against the 

United States, complaining generally about previous proceedings in his criminal case that 

resulted in the revocation of his supervised release and a six-month term of incarceration. 

Lopez did not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required to commence a civil action by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead he moves to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 2. 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP 

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to Section 

1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court 

may authorize the commencement of a civil action without prepayment of fees if a person 

submits an affidavit, including a statement of all assets he possesses, which shows he is 

unable to pay the required filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The determination of 

indigence falls within the court’s discretion. See Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 

F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993); see also 

Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (noting that while a 

civil litigant need not “be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the [28 U.S.C. § 

1915],” his affidavit must nevertheless demonstrate to the court that he cannot, because 

of poverty, pay or give security for the costs of suit “and still be able to provide himself 

and dependents with the necessities of life.”) (internal quotations omitted). The facts as 

to the affiant’s poverty must be stated with “some particularity, definiteness, and 

certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation 

omitted). 

 The Court finds that Lopez’s submission is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 

Section 1915(a)(1). Lopez’s affidavit shows his only source of income is public 

assistance, to wit, CalFresh Benefits. Lopez claims no monthly expenses for food and 

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unspecified medical and dental expenses; however, he owns no home, vehicle, or any 

other asset. Lopez further attests he is unemployed, and as noted above, since filing this 

action, Lopez has been arrested and is currently incarcerated. As such, the Court finds 

Lopez has insufficient available funds from which to pay any filing fees at this time, and 

therefore GRANTS his motion for leave to proceed IFP. 

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

A. Standard 

 Pursuant to Section 1915, the Court must review complaints filed by all persons 

proceeding IFP “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). 

The Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who 

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)). “The standard for determining whether a 

plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for 

failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 To state a claim, every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed 

factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

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 While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to 

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an 

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Bd of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Complaint 

Lopez generally complains of proceedings in his criminal case which resulted in 

the revocation of his supervised release and a six-month term of incarceration. 

According to Lopez, he pleaded “guilty to failure to appear/unexcused absences in the 

matter of urinalysis appointments (UAs) and to keep in contact with my probation 

officer.” Doc. No. 1 at 2. Lopez alleges that he pleaded guilty “due to inadequate 

representation” provided by his court-appointed attorney. Lopez states that “defense 

counsel was derelict in three (3) ways,” including “not seeking evidence of good-faith 

attempts at telecommunication, e.g. phone records, showing Mr. Lopez did in fact reach 

out to seek excused absences,” and encouraging Lopez to plead guilty despite his desire 

to go to trial. Id. Lopez alleges that because he “did not receive [an] adequate defense,” 

he was “unjustly deprived of his liberty for six (6) months.” Id. As a result, Lopez 

requests relief in the form of a court order vacating “the latest order of probation” and 

expunging his “latest conviction.” Id. at 3. 

C. Analysis 

As an initial matter, Lopez fails to state a claim against the only named defendant 

in this action, the United States government. Lopez’s complaint contains no factual 

allegations against the United States. Moreover, Lopez requests only injunctive relief, 

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which is barred by the United States’ sovereign immunity. See Atwood v. United States, 

No. 17cv1315-MMA (BLM), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103001, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 

2017) (citing Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 

F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Lopez clearly seeks to attack the revocation judgment in his criminal case based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel. But he may not do so in this civil action. Lopez should 

have directly appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit, or collaterally attacked the judgment in his criminal case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2255. And even if the Court liberally construed this action as being brought pursuant to 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Lopez cannot pursue civil 

rights claims in a Bivens action because his revocation judgment has not been declared 

invalid or otherwise impugned. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Martin v. 

Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the rationale of Heck applies to 

Bivens actions.”). 

In sum, Lopez fails to state a plausible claim for relief and dismissal of this action 

is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27. 

III. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Lopez’s motion to proceed IFP and 

DISMISSES this action. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 

accordingly and close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: October 16, 2018 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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