Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01826/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01826-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL MOSES COOK,

Inmate Booking #17145418, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

JONATHAN LAROCHE; JOSEPH 

GOMES; SAN DIEGO COUNTY 

SHERIFF'S DEP'T; JACK IN THE BOX, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01826-JAH-JMA

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2];

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

(ECF No. 3); and

(3) DISMISSING CLAIMS FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A(b)

Daniel Moses Cook (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the George Bailey 

Detention Facility (“GBDF”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se,

has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.)

In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF Nos. 2, 

4.)

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I. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel to assist him in this matter. (ECF No. 4.) 

However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of 

Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). While under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district 

courts have some limited discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent 

civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), 

this discretion is rarely exercised and only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see 

also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional 

circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the 

merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103, quoting Wilborn 

v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Applying these factors to Plaintiff’s case, the Court DENIES his Motion to 

Appoint Counsel because a liberal construction of his original pleadings shows he is 

capable of articulating the factual basis for his claims. All documents filed by pro se 

litigants are construed liberally, and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, 

must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Moreover, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) requires that 

“[p]leadings . . . be construed so as to do justice.” 

The pleadings filed by Plaintiff to date demonstrate that while Plaintiff may not be 

a trained in law, he is capable of legibly articulating the facts and circumstances relevant 

to his claims, which are typical, straightforward, and not legally “complex.” Agyeman,

390 F.3d at 1103. Therefore, neither the interests of justice nor any exceptional 

circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel in this case at this time. LaMere v. 

Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

II. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

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$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However, 

prisoners who are granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in 

“increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 

(2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of 

whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. 

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) also requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate completed 

by a GBDF accounting official attesting to his trust account activity and balances for the 

six-months preceding the filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 2 at 2; 28 U.S.C. 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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§ 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show 

that Plaintiff had an average monthly balance of $3.34, and average monthly deposits of 

$150.00 to his account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his 

Complaint, as well as an available balance of $6.67 at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 

2. Based on this financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 

IFP (ECF No. 2), and assesses his initial partial filing fee to be $30.00 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the Court will direct the Watch Commander for GBDF, or his designee, 

to collect this initial fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at the 

time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event 

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or 

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to 

pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available 

to him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in 

this case must be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1).

III. Initial Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)

The Court is obligated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) to review 

complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are 

“incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 

delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, 

pretrial release, or diversionary program,” at the time of filing “as soon as practicable 

after docketing.” See Doc. No. 8 at 4; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under the 

PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who 

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

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1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

A. Standard of Review

“The purpose of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious 

suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 

n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 

(7th Cir. 2012)). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the 

familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are well-pleaded 

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

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While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to 

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an 

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in 

civil rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, the Court finds that Defendant Jack in the Box, a purported corporation, is 

not alleged to be “person[s] acting under color of state law.” See West; 487 U.S. at 48; 

Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (The party 

charged with a constitutional deprivation under § 1983 must be a person who may fairly 

be said to be a governmental actor) (citation and quotations omitted). 

The Constitution protects individual rights only from government action and not 

from private action; it is only when the government is responsible for the specific conduct 

of which the plaintiff complains that individual constitutional rights are implicated. 

Single Moms, Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 746-47 (9th Cir. 2003). Generally, 

private parties do not act under color of state law. See Price v. Hawai’i, 939 F.2d 702, 

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707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). Section “1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no 

matter how discriminatory or wrong.” Sutton, 193 F.3d at 835 (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. 

Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 

see also Ouzts v. Md. Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir.1974) (a purely private 

actor may be liable for his misconduct in state court, but his conduct is not actionable 

under Section 1983, regardless of how egregious).

In order for private conduct to constitute governmental action, “something more” 

must be alleged. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (“Action 

by a private party pursuant to [§ 1983], without something more, [i]s not sufficient to 

justify a characterization of that party as a ‘state actor.’”). Courts have used four different 

factors or tests to identify what constitutes “something more”: (1) public function, (2) 

joint action, (3) governmental compulsion or coercion, and (4) governmental nexus. See 

id.; Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1997); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. 

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995); Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. 

Improvement and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that the 

corporation he has named as Defendant performed any public function traditionally 

reserved to the state, acted as a willful participant in joint action with government agents, 

was compelled or coerced, or had any connection whatsoever with the state, when it 

allegedly injured Plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.

C. Heck Bar

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Defendants and claims 

they falsely arrested him, he may not pursue those claims in a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his conviction has already been invalidated. 

See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

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In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal 

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 

§ 1983.

Id. at 486-87. 

“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 

‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state 

prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but 

not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 

2003), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of 

habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the 

“exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court).

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an arrest he alleges was “false” and 

based on perjured testimony (ECF No. 1 at 3-4), his claims amount to an attack on the 

validity of his underlying criminal conviction, and may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, 

unless his conviction has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 

334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted 

available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. 

at 489. While Plaintiff identifies no specific acts of misconduct taken by the Defendants 

prior to or during the course of his criminal proceedings, except to point to the “false 

narratives, contentious charges and overzealous attacks” (ECF No. 1 at 4), see Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 677 (noting that “[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her 

title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct”), the Court will 

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presume he intends to sue these law enforcement officials for acting together to

wrongfully convict him in violation of “due process.” (ECF No. 1 at 4). 

However, such claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction and 

continued incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In other words, were Plaintiff to succeed 

in showing that Defendants conspired to wrongfully convict him based on false evidence 

or perjured testimony, an award of damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of 

his conviction and/or sentence. Id., 512 U.S. at 487; see also Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 

697, 701 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding § 1983 action stemming from allegations of wrongful 

arrest, malicious prosecution, and a general conspiracy of “bad behavior” among officials 

in connection with the plaintiff’s arrest, prosecution, and incarceration were barred by 

Heck).

D. Defendant San Diego Sheriff’s Department

The Court also finds Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) to the extent it seeks relief under 

§ 1983 against the San Diego Sheriff’s Department. The San Diego Sheriff’s

Department, unlike the County of San Diego itself, is not subject to suit under § 1983. 

See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a 

municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 

action against a municipality.”); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. 

Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s 

constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’)). 

Therefore, while the County of San Diego may be considered a “person” subject to suit 

under § 1983, see Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)), its Sheriff’s Department

may not. 

E. Medical care claims

Plaintiff alleges that he was treated by an unnamed medical doctor while housed by 

the San Diego Sheriff’s Department for “blood and discharge” coming from his ear due 

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to the alleged excessive force incident. (Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff claims the Doctor 

provided him with “ear drops and antibiotics” but only referred to his condition as a 

“mild ear infection.” (Id.)

Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Clouthier 

v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle’s 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims 

alleged to violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights). 

Here, Plaintiff claims suffered from “blood and discharge” from his ear for up to 

twelve days, but he fails to include any further “factual matter” sufficient to show or 

describe how or to what extent his medical needs were objectively serious. See 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining a “serious medical 

need” as one which the “failure to treat ... could result in further significant injury or the 

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”), overruled on other grounds by WMX 

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The “existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient 

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical 

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of 

chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ 

need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059-60.

Moreover, even if the Court assumes Plaintiff’s ear condition was an “objectively 

serious” medical condition, nothing in his Complaint supports a “reasonable inference 

that [any individual] defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. “In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege 

sufficient facts to indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” 

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must 

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be substantial; inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does 

not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) 

(citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 

F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)). A difference of opinion between a pretrial detainee and 

the doctors or other trained medical personnel at the Jail as to the appropriate course or 

type of medical attention he requires does not amount to deliberate indifference, see Snow 

v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 

242 (9th Cir. 1989)), and any delay in providing an appropriate course of treatment does

not by itself show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is alleged have caused harm. 

See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 

F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(“[D]elay in providing a prisoner with dental treatment, standing alone, does not 

constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, as currently pleaded, does not include facts to show that any 

individual San Diego Sheriff’s Department official actually knew of, yet disregarded any 

serious medical need. See Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1193 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“[D]eliberate indifference requires the defendant to be subjectively aware that 

serious harm is likely to result from a failure to provide medical care.”). Nor does it 

allege that any decision to refuse or delay a particular course of medical treatment caused

him actual harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Without more, Plaintiff’s Complaint 

currently amounts only to “unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation[s],” which “stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

‘entitlement to relief’” as to any constitutionally inadequate medical care claim. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

F. Excessive force claims

The Court does find that Plaintiff’s excessive force allegations are sufficient to 

survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 

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U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), because it alleges excessive force claims as to 

Defendants LaRoche and Gomes which are plausible on its face.2 See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d 

at 1123. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 

2466, 2473 (2015) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use 

of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 395 n.10 (1989)). Under Kingsley, a pretrial detainee, unlike a convicted prisoner, 

need not prove that the defendant subjectively knew that the force applied was excessive; 

that state-of-mind inquiry is “solely ... objective.” Id. at 2473; Austin v. Baker, 616 F. 

App’x 365, 366 (9th Cir. 2015); cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (when 

prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is “... whether force was applied in a good-faith 

effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”). 

G. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his pleading to state a claim unless 

it is absolutely clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect”). 

Therefore, the Court will grant him a chance to fix the pleading deficiencies discussed in 

this Order or he may notify the Court of the intent to proceed as to the excessive force 

claims only. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

If Plaintiff notifies the Court of his intention to proceed as to the excessive force 

claims only, the Court will enter an order dismissing all the remaining claims and 

 

2 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative 

of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [any individual 

defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. 

Cal. 2007).

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Defendants, as well as directing the United States Marshals Service to effect service of 

the Complaint on Defendants LaRoche and Gomes.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 4) without 

prejudice.

2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

3. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Watch 

Commander, George F. Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, #5300, San Diego, 

California 92158.

5. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims, with the exception of Plaintiff’s excessive 

force claims, for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

6. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to either: (1) file a First

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order; 

or (2) notify the Court of the intention to proceed as to the excessive force claims only. 

Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that should he choose to file a First Amended Complaint, 

it must be complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that 

any claim not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal 

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) 

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(“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 

896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not 

re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to follow these instructions and/or files a First Amended 

Complaint that still fails to state a claim, his case may be dismissed without further leave 

to amend. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2017

HON.JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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