Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04275/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04275-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARUK TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________

No. C 04-4275 SBA

 

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 54, 59, 65] 

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 54],

Defendants' Motion to Strike Portions ofPlaintiff's Declaration ofToz Soto [Docket No. 59], and the Miners'

Motion for Miscellaneous Relief Concerning the Record [Docket No. 65]. Having read and considered the

arguments presented by the parties in the papers submitted to the Court, the Court findsthis matter appropriate

for resolution without a hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Strike Portions of

Plaintiff's Declaration of Toz Soto, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Miners' Motion for

Miscellaneous Relief Concerning the Record, and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual and Regulatory Background.

A. The Parties.

Plaintiff Karuk Tribe of California ("Plaintiff" or the "Tribe") is a federally-recognized Indian Tribe

located in Happy Camp, California. Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") ¶ 11. The Tribe has lived in

northern California since time immemorial. Declaration of Leaf Hillman (“Hillman Decl.”) at ¶ 3. The Tribe

works to protect certain fish species and the water quality of the streams and rivers in the Klamath National

Forest. Id. ¶ 12. A primary concern of the Tribe is the protection and restoration of native fish and wildlife

species that the Tribe has depended upon fortraditional, cultural, religious, and subsistence uses. Hillman Decl.

¶ 3. The center of the Karuk world is Katimin, where the Salmon River meets the Klamath River. Id. 

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2

Defendant United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") is an agency of the United States

Department ofAgriculture. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant Margaret Boland is the Supervisor for the Klamath National

Forest. Id. The Forest Service is responsible for implementing all laws and regulations relating to the

management of the Klamath National Forest. Id. ¶ 16. 

Intervenor the New 49'ers, Inc. (the "New 49'ers") is a California corporation with a principal place

of business in Happy Camp, California. Miners' Answer to Second Amended Complaint ("Miners' Answer")

¶ 3. The New 49'ers own or control numerous mining claims in a 60-mile area surrounding the Salmon,

Klamath, and Scott Rivers. SAC ¶¶ 36-37. The New 49'ers also leases many of its mining claims located

along these rivers to its members. Miners' Answer ¶ 3. Intervenor Raymond W. Koons ("Koons") is an

individual who resides in Happy Camp. Id. He is also the owner ofseveralunpatented mining claims located

around the Klamath River. Id. Koons leases his mining claims to the 49'ers (the New 49'ers and Koons are

collectively referred to herein as the "Miners"). Id.

B. The Applicable Mining Regulations.

Mining in national forests is governed by the General Mining Law of 1872 ("General Mining Law"),

which confers a statutory right upon citizens to enter certain public lands forthe purpose of prospecting. See

30 U.S.C. § 22, as amended by 30 U.S.C. § 612 (the "Surface Resources Act of 1955"). Pursuant to the

General Mining Law, "Except as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the

United States . . . shall be free and open to exploration and purchase." Id.

The application of the General Mining Law to national forests was specifically affirmed by Congress

in the Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 478 et seq., which makes the national forests "subject to entry under the

existing mining law of the United States and the rules and regulations applying thereto." See 16 U.S.C. § 482;

see Wilderness Soceity v. Dombeck , 168 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1999). The Organic Act allows the

Secretary of Agriculture to make rules regulating the "occupancy and use [of national forest land] and to

preserve the forests thereon from destruction." 16 U.S.C. § 551. However, the Organic Act also expressly

states that it "shall[not] be construed as prohibiting . . . any person fromentering upon such nationalforests for

all proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral resources

thereof." 16 U.S.C. § 478. 

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3

In 1974, pursuant to the Organic Act, the Forest Service promulgated regulations governing the use

of surface resources in connectionwith the mining activities on nationalforests. See 39 Fed. Reg. 31317 (Aug.

28, 1974) (presently codified as amended at 36 C.F.R. Part 228, subpart A (referred to herein as the "Part

228 regulations")). Before the Forest Service issued the final regulations, the House Committee on Interior and

Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands (the "Subcommittee") held oversight hearings and heard

testimony from the Chief of the Forest Service and representatives from both the mining and environmental

communities. Id. Following these hearings, the Subcommittee chairman wrote the Chief of the Forest Service

and stated that "the 1897 [Organic] Act clearly cannot be used as authority to prohibit prospecting, mining, and

mineral processing" in national forests. See Letter from Rep. John Melcher to John McGuire, Forest Service

Chief (June 20, 1974), reproduced in S. Dempsey, Forest Service Regulations Concerning the Effect of

Mining Operations on Surface Resources, 8 Nat. Res. Law 481, 497-504 (1975). He further urged that

the final regulations be reasonable and not "extend further than to require those things which preserve and

protect the National Forests from needless damage by prospectors and miners." Id. The Subcommittee

chairman also specifically expressed concerns regarding "the possibility of unreasonable enforcement of the

regulations, with resulting cost increases that could make otherwise viable mineral operations prohibitively

expensive." 39 Fed. Reg. 31317.

Due to the Subcommittee's concerns, the chairman ultimately recommended the adoption of a "simple

notificationprocedure" thatwould enable the Forest Service to determine whether the miner would be required

to submit a more comprehensive plan ofoperation ("PoO") before proceeding with mining operations. 8 Nat.

Res. Law at 500. As the chairman explained:

An effort [should] be made to define more precisely whatsort ofprospecting would

be excepted from the requirement to file operating plans. The National Wildlife

Federal, the American Mining Congress, and the Idaho Mining Association[] all

seem to agree that prior notification of proposed operations is a reasonable

requirement. The Subcommittee therefore recommends that the Forest Service

provide a simple notificationprocedure in any regulations it may issue. The objective

in so doing would be to assist prospectors in determining whether their operations

would or would not require the filing of an operating plan. Needless uncertainties

and expense in time and money in filing unnecessary operating plans could be

avoided thereby. 

Id.

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28 1The current regulations are now set forth at 28 C.F.R. Part 228, subpart A.

4

Inresponse, the Forest Service stated that it "recognize[d]that prospectors and miners have a statutory

right, not mere privilege, under the 1872 mining law and the Act ofJune 4, 1897, to go upon and use the open

public domain lands ofthe National Forest System for the purposes of mineral exploration, development and

production." 39 Fed. Reg. 31317. The Forest Service also acknowledged that "[e]xercise of that right may

not be unreasonably restricted." Id. To address the Subcommittee's concerns, the Forest Service adopted

a final rule that included a provision for notices of intent ("NOIs"). The Forest Service also noted that a

"specific provision [was] made in the operating plan approvalsection ofthe regulations [that] charg[ed] Forest

Service administrators with the responsibility to consider the economics of operations, along with the other

factors, in determining the reasonableness of the requirements for surface resource protection." Id. In

accordance with the NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct, a FinalEnvironmentalImpact Statement was prepared

and filed that discussed the environmental impact of the regulations. Id.

The regulations, as originally promulgated, provided that, with certain exceptions, "a notice ofintention

to operate [would be] required from any person proposing to conduct operations which might cause

disturbance of surface resources." 39 Fed. Reg. 31317. They further provided that, "[i]f the District Ranger

determines that such operations will likely cause significant disturbance of surface resources, the operator

[would be required to] submit a proposed plan of operations to the District Ranger." Id. Additionally, the

regulations provided that the "requirementsto submit a plan ofoperations [would] not apply . . . to individuals

desiring to search for and occasionally remove small mineralsamples or specimens [or] to prospecting and

sampling which will not cause significantsurface resource disturbance" and that a "notice of intent need not be

filed . . . for operations which will not involve the use ofmechanized earthmoving equipmentsuch as bulldozers

or backhoes and will not involve cutting of trees." Id. at 36 C.F.R. § 252.4(a)(2).1 All persons entering

national forests formining purposes were required to comply with the regulations after their promulgation. See

16 U.S.C. § 482. 

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2Although the Northwest Forest Plan was technically superseded by the new forest plan, the term

"NFP" is still used to refer to the conservation strategy incorporated into the Klamath National Forest Plan.

3Standards and guidelines are the "rules and limits governing actions, and the principles specifying the

environmental conditions or levels to be achieved and maintained in managing specific lands." See Attachment

A to the Record of Decision. In essence, they are conditions which apply either forestwide or to specific land

use allocations within a national forest. Id. 

5

C. The Northwest Forest Plan.

In 1994, the Secretaries ofthe Interior and Agriculture issued the Record ofDecision for Amendments

to Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") Planning Documents Within the Range of the

Northern Spotted Owl, commonly known as the Northwest Forest Plan. The Northwest Forest Plan (or

"NFP") amended the forest plans for numerous nationalforests, including the Klamath National Forest. In July

1995, the Klamath Forest issued a newforest plan, referred to as the Klamath Forest Plan, which incorporated

elements of the NFP.2

The Northwest Forest Plan is a common approach to managing about 24 millionacres offederalland

within the range of the northern spotted owl across the Pacific Northwest. See Record of Decision for

Northwest Forest Plan at 1-2. It consists of an extensive system of standards and guidelines3 and land use

allocations designed to balance extractive uses, such as mining, with considerations for wildlife species. Id.

at 7, 12. One land use allocation in the Northwest Forest Plan is known as the "RiparianReserves" (or "RRs").

Id. at 7. Riparian Reserves include "areas along all streams, wetlands, ponds, lakes, and unstable or potentially

unstable areas where the conservation of aquatic and riparian-dependent terrestrialresources receives primary

emphasis.” Id. Riparian Reserves are intended to "protect the health ofthe aquatic systemand its dependent

species" by maintaining and restoring riparian structure and function. Id.

It is explicitly stated in the Northwest Forest Plan that the standards and guidelines "do not apply where

theywould be contrary to existing law or regulation, or where they would require the agencies to take actions

for which they do not have authority." See Attachment A to the Record of Decision. One of the Northwest

Forest Plan standards and guidelines governing mineral management is MM-1, which requires, among other

things, an approved PlanofOperation ("PoO") for all minerals operations that include areas designated as RRs.

Id. This guideline is incorporated into the forest plan for the Klamath National Forest as standard MA 10-34.

D. The Forest Service's Interpretation of the Northwest Forest Plan. 

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4The administrative record is referred to herein as "AR."

5Suction dredge mining is a "popular, relatively low cost miningmethod." AR 418. In suction dredge

mining, the "gravel within the active streamchannelis suctioned from the bottom of the stream and processed

over a sluice on a floating platform." Id. A "gasoline powered motor and pump are mounted on the floating

platform for powering the suction apparatus and for driving the air pump which supplies air to the persons

working underwater." Id. The size of dredges used in California "ranges from 2-inches [to] up to 10-inches

or more." Id. 

6Region 5 encompasses California. See 36 C.F.R. § 200.2(e).

6

In 1995, the RegionalForesters issued a memorandum clarifying how the Part 228 mining regulations

should be applied to the standard and guidelines addressing mining within RRs. AR 212-213.4 In that

memorandum, the Regional Foresters noted that there were "numerous, small placer operations using suction

dredges5 and similar equipment occurring in RR's and [late successional reserves] throughout Regions 5

6

 and

6," the majority of whichwould notrequire PoOs due to the "insignificant nature of their operation." AR 212.

The memorandum further stated that, since mining was lawfully conducted under NOIs, the stricter standards

and guidelines applicable to mining in RRs would not apply, since "there is no regulatory provision for including

[the standards and guidelines] in an NOI." AR 213. 

In February 2002, the Forest Service issued another memorandum again clarifying the regulation of

mining within RRs. AR 216. It explained that requiring a PoO for mining that does not cause a significant

disturbance of surface resources would be inappropriate and "contrary to law and regulation." AR 216. The

memorandum further explained that:

If no significant surface disturbance is occurring, we have no reason to require a

reclamation bond, nor would we be able to determine that bond amount. 

In areas covered by the Northwest [Forest] Plan . . . or covered by other general

management guidance orstrategies, forest users can conduct non-significantsurface

disturbing activities without filing plan of operations per the intent of the Forest

Service Mining Regulations. A Notice of Intent to Operate (NOI) will still be

required if the proposed activity might cause disturbance of surface resources and

it doesn't meet the provisions of 36 CFR 228.3(a)(2).

Id. The Forest Service thus concluded that, to be consistent with 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a), PoOs would only be

required in RRs where proposed mining would likely cause significantsurface resource disturbances. AR 216-

217.

In a 2004 memorandum, the Regional Forester for Region 5 reiterated that the requirement to submit

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a PoO in RRs would apply "only when the proposed activity is likely to cause significant surface resource

disturbance." AR 219. The 2004 memorandum further stated that if the District Ranger concludes that a PoO

is not required, then "there is no decision and, hence, no federal action" to trigger the National Environmental

Protection Act ("NEPA") or the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") for the Forest Service." AR 219. The

memorandum also acknowledged that PoOs would be subject to the requirements of NEPA and the ESA.

Id. 

E. Amendments to the Mining Regulations.

On July 9, 2004, in response to a decision of the United States District Court of the Eastern District

of California in United States v. Lex, 300 F.Supp.2d 951 (E.D. Cal. 2003), the Forest Service decided to

amend the mining regulations in order to further clarify the Forest Service's position with respect to how 36

C.F.R. § 228.4(a) should be interpreted. See 70 Fed. R. 32713. The interim rule, whichwas published in the

Federal Register, took effect on August 9, 2004. See id. at 32714. The interim rule stated that it was

specifically intended to clarify that "the requirement to file a notice of intent to operate with the District Ranger

is mandatory in any situation in which a mining operation might cause disturbance of surface resources,

regardless of whether that operation would involve the use of mechanized earth moving equipment, such as

bulldozer or backhoe, or the cutting of trees." Id. "The interim rule also sought to eliminate possible confusion

by more specifically addressing the issue of what level of operation requires prior submission of a notice of

intent to operate and what level of operation requires prior submission and approval of a plan of operations."

Id. Although it was not required to, the Forest Service provided the public with a 60-day comment period and

stated that comments received on the interim rule would be considered in adopting a final rule. Id.

During the comment period, the Forest Service received a request that the new regulation include a

provision exempting mining activities using only "small portable suction dredges, such as those with an intake

of four inches or less" from the requirement to submit an NOI or PoO. Id. at 32720. The respondent who

submitted the request indicated that "various studies, including those by the United States Environmental

Protection Agency, the Department of Interior, United States Geological Survey, and the State of Alaska

Department of Natural Resources, have shown that these dredges do not cause significant disturbance of

streams or rivers." Id. The respondent further stated that "such a provisionwould [also] be consistent with the

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recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council's 1999 report entitled,

'Hardrock Mining on Federal Lands.'" The Forest Service declined to add such a provision to the final rule,

but noted that:

The environmental impacts ofoperating suction dredges, even small ones, are highly

site-specific depending on the circumstances and resource conditions involved. The

environmental impacts of using a suction dredge on two bodies of water which are

otherwise similar can vary greatly if a threatened or endangered specie inhabits one

body ofwater but not the other. Even with respect to a particular body ofwater, the

environmental impacts of suction dredge operations can vary by season due to

climatic conditions or the life cycles of aquatic species. Given this variability, the

Department believes that, insofar as suction dredge operations are concerned, the

need for the prior submission of a notice of intent to operate or for the prior

submission and approval of a proposed plan of operations must be evaluated on a

site-specific basis. While the operation of suction dredges with intakes smaller than

four inches may not require either a notice of intent to operate or an approved plan

ofoperations in many cases, the prior submission of a notice of intent to operate will

be required in some cases, and the priorsubmissionand approvalofa proposed plan

of operations will be required in fewer cases.

Id. at 32720. 

The final rule was adopted by the Forest Service and published in the Federal Register on June 6,

2005. As amended, 28 C.F.R. 228.4 now reads in pertinent part:

§ 228.4 Notice of intent--plan of operations--requirements.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a notice of intent to

operate is required from any person proposing to conduct operations which might

cause significant disturbance of surface resources . . . .Each notice of intent to

operate shall provide information sufficient to identify the area involved, the nature

of the proposed operations, the route of access to the area of operations, and the

method of transport.

(1) A notice of intent to operate is not required for:

(i) Operations which will be limited to the use ofvehicles on existing

public roads or roads used and maintained for National Forest System purposes;

(ii) Prospecting and sampling whichwill not cause significant surface

resource disturbance and will not involve removalofmore than a reasonable amount

ofmineraldeposit for analysis and study which generally might include searching for

and occasionally removing small mineralsamples orspecimens, gold panning, metal

detecting, non-motorized hand sluicing, using battery operated dry washers, and

collecting of mineral specimens using hand tools;

(iii) Marking and monumenting a mining claim;

(iv) Underground operations which will not cause significantsurface

resource disturbance;

(v) Operations, which in their totality, will not cause surface resource

disturbance which is substantially different than that caused by other users of the

National Forest System who are not required to obtain a Forest Service specialuse

authorization, contract, or other written authorization;

(vi) Operations which will not involve the use of mechanized

earthmoving equipment, such as bulldozers or backhoes, or the cutting of trees,

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7As a result of this meeting with the Karuk Tribe, and due to the Karuk Tribe's concerns, the New

49'ers eventually withdrew their Notice of Intent to mine for gold on the lower Salmon River. AR 041. 

9

unless those operations otherwise might cause a significant disturbance of surface

resources; or

(vii) Operations for which a proposed plan ofoperations issubmitted

for approval;

(2) The District Ranger will, within 15 days ofreceipt of a notice of intent to

operate, notify the operatorif approvalof a plan ofoperations is required before the

operations may begin.

. . . 

(4) If the District Ranger determines that any operation is causing or will

likely cause significant disturbance of surface resources, the District Ranger shall

notify the operator that the operator must submit a proposed plan of operations for

approval and that the operations can not be conducted until a plan of operations is

approved.

28 C.F.R. § 228.4 (June 6, 2005). 

F. The 2004 Mining Season.

On or about February 1, 2004, Rangers and staff from the Klamath, Six Rivers, and Shasta Trinity

National Forests met to discuss issues relevant to the upcoming mining season. AR 110. One of the issues

discussed was suction dredging and whether the Rangersshould develop a template to be used in the evaluation

of NOIs. Id. On February 4, 2004, the Rangers conducted a meeting with representatives from the New

49'ers in order to evaluate issues surrounding the New 49'ers mining operations. AR 112. 

On March 22, 2004, members of the Forest Service met with the Karuk Tribe and the New 49'ers

to discuss potentialissuesforthe upcoming dredging season. AR 109. A representative from the Karuk Tribe

indicated that the Tribe was concerned about the effects of suction dredge operations on the Salmon River.

Id. The Karuk Tribe representative also expressed concern regarding the New 49'ers potential interference

with certain areas of ceremonial import to the Tribe. AR 109.7 The attendees of the meeting agreed to

reconvene on April 20, 2004 or April 21, 2004 to further discuss potential impacts of suction dredging on

fisheries. Id.

During this time, the Happy Camp Ranger, Alan Vindiver ("Vindiver"), was working with two Forest

Service biologists,Jon Grunbaum ("Grunbaum") and BillBemis("Bemis"),to develop standardsfor determining

when proposed operations in the Klamath Forest were likely to cause significantsurface disturbances, thereby

requiring a PoO. AR 095. As part of this process, Vindiver reviewed an April 20, 2004 report prepared by

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Grunbaum, a United States Forest Service Fisheries Biologist forthe mid-Klamath and Salmon River regions.

AR 095. Grunbaum's report noted that "[r]elatively few studies have examined the effects of suction dredging

and related activities on riparian and aquatic habitats, and on fish and other aquatic organisms," and that "[t]he

majority of the studies show[] that suction dredging can adversely affect aquatic habitats and biota." AR 294.

Grunbaum's report also noted that a United States Forest Service technicalteamhad reviewed information on

potential suction dredging effects on fisheries in 1998 and concluded that, "[i]n some situations, the effects of

a dredging may be local and minor, particularly when compared to the effects of other human activities . . .

[while, in] other [situations], dredging may harm the population viability of threatened species." Id. 

Vindiver also received input from Bemis, another District Fisheries biologist. AR 095. Vindiver

observed that Bemis' opinions "varied widely [from Grunbaum's] on the effect of dredge operations on

fisheries." Id. After considering the opinions ofbothGrunbaum and Bemis, Vindiver identified three key issues

regarding fisheries, which he set forth in an internalForest Service memorandum. AR 095. First, he identified

twenty-two cold water refugia on the Klamath River used by fish when river temperatures are high, in which

dredging might impact fish. AR 097-105. Second, Vindiver developed threshold dredging levels (e.g. ten

dredges per mile on the Klamath River and three dredges per mile on tributary streams) which he felt would

not lead to a significant disturbance of surface resources. AR 095, AR 108. Finally, he concluded that tailing

piles should be raked back into dredge holes to protect spawning gravel on Elk Creek. Id. These

recommendations were discussed in an open forum with potential miners. AR 091, AR 096. Vindiver's

findings were also summarized in a comprehensive set ofinternalguidelines. AR 097-105. A shorter summary

of Vindiver's findings was circulated to potential miners. AR 091.

On May 17, 2004, members ofthe Forest Service met with members ofthe Karuk Tribe and the New

49'ers to further discuss potential fisheries issues associated with the upcoming dredge season. AR 106. At

the meeting, Vindiver identified the three key issues that needed to be addressed in all NOIs: (1) cold water

refugia areas on the Klamath River; (2) stability of coho spawning gravels in a portion of Elk Creek, and (3)

the number of dredges per mile of stream. AR 106. With respect to the first issue, Vindiver identified twenty

discrete areas of cold water refugia where dredging would not be permitted between June 15, 2004 and

October 15, 2004. AR 106. Vindiver also stated that all dredge trailings would have to be raked back into

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dredge holes by the end of the season. AR 107. Finally, Vindiver set up a threshold dredge intensity level of

"10 dredges per mile on the Klamath River" and "no more than three dredges per mile on Klamath tributaries."

AR 108. Vindiver concluded that "this level of intensity would not lead to a significant disturbance of the

surface resource." Id.

1. The New 49'ers Notice of Intent.

On May 24, 2004, the New 49'ers submitted an NOI to conduct operations within the HappyCamp

Ranger District. AR 031-040. The NOI indicated that the level of dredging activity would involve "a daily

average of10 active suction dredges out of approximately 40 dredges disbursed throughout 35 miles ofstream

course between the months of May through mid-September." AR 033. The NOI also indicated that the

average amount ofmaterialmoved per dredge was estimated to be around 1/4 yard, that no operations would

occur within 500 feet of numerous cool water refugia, and that dredge holes would be back-filled to replicate

the original contour of the streambed. AR 033-34. The NOI further stated that large mechanized equipment,

such as backhoes and bulldozers, would not be used, and instead proposed a very limited use of hand tools

outside the streambut with the mean high water channel. AR 035. On May 25, 2005, the Ranger notified the

49'ers that they would not need to submit a PoO. AR 029. 

2. Nida Johnson's Notice of Intent.

On May 29, 2004, Nida Johnson submitted an NOI to conduct suction dredging on several claims in

the Happy Camp Ranger District. AR 069. The NOI indicated that no mechanized earthmoving equipment

would be used, that no trees would be cut, that all dredge tailings would be leveled, and that no dredging would

be conducted within 500 feet above or below the mouth ofIndependence Creek. AR 069-070. On June 14,

2004, the Forest Service informed Johnson that he would not need to submit a PoO. AR 067. 

3. Robert Hamilton's Notice of Intent.

On June 2, 2004, Robert Hamilton submitted an NOI indicating that he would be performing suction

dredge mining fortwelve days, fromJuly 12, 2004 to July 23, 2004, between the hours of 9:30 a.m. and 3:30

p.m. AR 075. The NOI also indicated thatHamiltonwould be using a pan, shovel, and a 4-inch suction hose

with a 2.5-inch nozzle. AR 075. It further stated that "[u]p to 20 cu[bic] y[ar]ds ofmaterialcould be moved

down to a depth of approx[imately] 6 f[ee]t or bedrock, whichever comes first" and that all "tailings will be

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Jeff Walters is the Forest Supervisor for the Six Rivers National Forest.

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returned to a dredge hole if possible in shallow areas or spread over large area in deep areas." AR 076. On

June 15, 2004, the Ranger informed Hamilton that he would not need to submit a PoO. AR 074. 

4. Ralph Easley's Notice of Intent.

On June 14, 2004, Ralph Easley submitted an NOI indicating that he intended to perform suction

dredging at his one mining claim from July 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004. AR 082. The NOI further

indicated that two people would be using a 4-inch dredge hose and other assorted hand tools, but that

mechanized earth-moving equipment would not be used. Id. It also stated that all dredge tailings would be

raked back into dredge holes. Id. On June 15, 2004, the Forest Service informed Easley that he would not

need to submit a PoO. AR 081. 

5. The Forest Service's Subsequent Monitoring of Suction Dredge Activities.

Throughout the summer of2004, the Forest Service – often in conjunctionwith a representative ofthe

Karuk Tribe – monitored the activities taking place within the Forest to evaluate compliance with the NOIs.

AR 087. For example, on June 8, 2004, Vandiver floated the Klamath River with the River Ranger and the

Deputy Forest Supervisorto monitor compliance with the NOIs. AR 090. On June 15, 2004, Vandiver also

consulted with a member of the Karuk Tribe to discuss a monitoring strategy forthe dredge season. AR 088.

Further, on June 23, 2004, a member of the Forest Service monitored a number of mining operations with a

member of the Karuk Tribe. AR 087. The Tribe continued to participate in the Forest Service's monitoring

trips in September. AR 085. 

II. Procedural Background.

On October 8, 2004, Plaintifffiled a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Reliefagainst the United

States Forest Service,JeffWalters,8and MargaretBoland (collectively, "Defendants"). On October 15, 2004,

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief("Amended Complaint"). Pursuant

to a stipulationbetween the parties, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was dismissedwithoutprejudice on January

24, 2005. 

On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's Second Amended

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Initially, the Second Amended Complaint also challenged five instances in which the Forest Service

required a miner to submit a PoO, but allegedly failed to comply with the additionalrequirementstriggered by

the PoO approval process. Id. ¶ 3. These allegations, and Defendant Jeff Walters, were dismissed from the

lawsuit pursuant to a stipulation between the parties. 

10The Second Amended Complaint also asserts causes of action for (1) violations of the Organic Act

and the Forest Service's mining regulations; (2) violations of the Clean Water Act; and (3) violations of the

Organic Act's special use regulations. However, in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states

that it is not moving for summary judgment on these causes of action and requests that the causes of action be

"excised from the case." The Court construes this request as a motion to amend the Second Amended

Complaint such that the fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action are dismissed from the case without prejudice.

See Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. United States Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 689-90 (9th Cir.

2005). Accordingly, Plaintiff's request is GRANTED and Plaintiff's fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action are

hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

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Complaintseeks declaratory and injunctive relief arising from Defendants' allegedly improper management of

suction dredge and otherminingoperations inwaterways and riparian areas within the Klamath NationalForest.

Id. ¶ 1. The Second Amended Complaint challenges four Forest Service decisions allowing suction dredge

and other mining operations to occur pursuant to a Notice ofIntent instead ofa Plan ofOperation:(1) the New

49'ers NOI; (2) the Johnson NOI; (3) the Hamilton NOI; and (4) the Easley NOI. Id. ¶ 2.9

The Second Amended Complaint alleges violations of the following statutes: (1) the National Forest

Management Act ("NFMA"); (2) the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"); and (3) the Endangered

Species Act ("ESA").10 Id. ¶¶ 94-127. Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act

("APA") and the citizen suit provision of the ESA. Id. ¶ 8. 

On March 1, 2005, the New 49'ers and Koons (hereinafter the "Miners") filed a Motion to Intervene.

On April 26, 2005, the Court granted the Miners' Motion to Intervene. On April 29, 2005, Plaintiff filed the

instant Motion for Summary Judgment. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all of the evidence in the light

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most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). If the

moving party does not bear the burden ofproofat trial, he or she may discharge his burden of showing that no

genuine issue of material fact remains by demonstrating that “there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party's case." Celotex Corporation v. Catret, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving

party meets the requirements ofRule 56 by showing there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden shiftsto the party resisting the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). 

Where, as here, the Court's review is limited to the administrative record, stipulated to by the parties,

there are no triable issues of fact, and summary judgment is appropriate. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n

v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 18 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir.1994).

II. Administrative Procedure Act.

The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because

of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actionwithin the meaning ofthe relevantstatute,

is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702.

The APA limits the scope of judicial review of agency actions. Generally, a court may not set aside

an agency action unless that action was "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). "To make this finding, the court must consider whether the

decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of

judgment." Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). "Although this inquiry

into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not

empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Id. "This is especially appropriate where, as

here, the challengeddecision implicatessubstantialagency expertise." Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v.Espy, 986

F.2d 1568, 1571 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Deference to an agency's technical expertise and experience is particularly

warranted with respect to questions involving . . . scientific matters").

In determining whether an agency's actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with the law, "the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by

a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error." 5 U.S.C. § 706. "The focalpoint for

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11These documents were submitted to the Court as exhibitsto Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

12These documents were submitted to the Court as exhibits to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment. 

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judicialreview should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in

the reviewing court." Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985). "The task of the

reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision

based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court." Id. at 743-44. A court may not consider

information “that was not available at the time the [agency] made its decision.” Airport Cmty. Coalition v.

Graves, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1213 (W.D.Wash.2003). "If the court were to consider this new information

in an arbitrary and capricious analysis, the court would effectively transform that analysis into de novo review,

a level of review for which the court is not authorized.” Id.

ANALYSIS

I. The Administrative Record.

As a preliminary matter, the parties seek to include, and exclude, certain materials that are not part of

the stipulated administrative record. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to include the following documents: (1) excerpts

from the Klamath National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan; (2) a December 2001 Draft

Environmental Impact Statement for the Siskiyou National Forest; and (3) an April 24, 2000 letter from the

Acting Forest Supervisor for the Siskiyou National Forest.11 Additionally, Plaintiff has submitted the

Declaration of Toz Soto ("Soto Declaration") and the Declaration of Leaf Hillman ("Hillman"). In support of

their Opposition brief, Defendants seek to include the following documents: (1) excerpts from the Record of

Decision for Amendments to Forest Service and Bureau ofLand Management Planning Documents Within the

Range of the Northern Spotted Owl("Record ofDecision"); (2) Attachment A to the Record of Decision; (3)

excerpts from the Final Environmental Impact Statement and Land and Resource Management Plan for Six

Rivers National Forest; (4) excerpts from Chapter 4 of the Klamath National Forest Land and Resource

Management Plan; (5) a copy of Volume 8 of Natural Resources Lawyer; and (6) a copy of the originally

promulgated Part 228 mining regulations, as published in the FederalRegister.12 In support of their Opposition

brief, the Miners have submitted the Declaration of Joseph C.Greene ("Greene Declaration"), the Declaration

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ofDennis Maria ("Maria Declaration"), and the Declaration ofDavid McCracken ("McCrackenDeclaration").

The Miners also seek to supplement the record with the following documents, which are attached to the

Declaration of James L. Buchal ("Buchal Declaration"): (1) a copy of the Forest Service Manual; (2) a copy

of the Forest Service Handbook; (3) a Forest Service report entitled "The Process Predicament"; (4) a copy

of the Declaration of Thomas Kitchar, President of the Waldo Mining District; (5) the transcript of the

proceedings in California State Grange v. Dept. of Commerce, USDC CV 02-6044, January 11, 2005;

and (6) a copy of the 1974 Environmental Impact Statement prepared in connectionwith the promulgationof

the Part 228 mining regulations. 

The Ninth Circuit allows a reviewing court to consider extra-record materials in an APA case only

under four narrow exceptions: (1) when it needs to determine whether the agency has considered all relevant

factors and has explained its decision; (2) when the agencyhasrelied upon documents or materials not included

in the record; (3) when it is necessary to explain technical terms or complex matters; and (4) when a plaintiff

makes a showing of agency bad faith. Southwest Centerfor Biological Diversity v. United States Forest

Service, 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996). For extra-record material to be considered, a plaintiff must

first make a showing that the record is inadequate. Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1437

(9th Cir. 1988) (“The [plaintiff] makes no showing that the district court needed to go outside the administrative

record to determine whether the [agency] ignored information”). At the same time, “[a] satisfactory explanation

of agency action is essential for adequate judicial review, because the focus of judicial review is not on the

wisdomofthe agency’s decision, but on whether the process employed by the agencyto reachitsdecision took

into consideration all the relevant facts.” Asarco, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 616 F.2d

1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980). 

A. Defendants' Motion to Strike the Soto Declaration.

1. Paragraph 9 and Exhibit 1 of the Soto Declaration.

In their Motion to Strike, Defendants move to strike paragraph 9 and Exhibit 1 ofthe Soto Declaration

on the grounds that such materials do not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that

the Courtmay not consider extra-record declarations in an APA review. Defendants also argue that paragraph

9 and Exhibit 1 contain inadmissible opinion testimony. In response, Plaintiff argues that the Soto Declaration

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is admissible and necessary to establish the Karuk Tribe's standing.

Plaintiffis correct that extra-record declarations may be used and, indeed, are required at the summary

judgmentstage to establish standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting

that, at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff "must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts" to

demonstrate standing). Although neither Defendants nor the Miners have contested Plaintiff’s standing, to the

extent that the Soto Declaration serves to establish standing, it is permissible. Id. However, as Defendants

correctly note, paragraph 9 of the Soto Declaration contains several purportedly factual statements that go

beyond Plaintiff’s need to establish standing. Specifically, in paragraph 9 of the Soto Declaration, Mr. Soto

makes certain statements regarding the effects of suction dredging operations. See Soto Decl. ¶ 9. Similarly,

Exhibit 1 to the Soto Declaration is a four-page white paper prepared by Mr. Soto thatsummarizes Mr. Soto’s

personal observations and opinions regarding “the negative impacts from section dredging.” See Soto Decl.

at Ex. 1. There is no evidence before the Court that Mr. Soto's opinions were considered by the Forest

Service before making the decisions challenged in this action and Plaintiff has notshown that such information

should be part of the administrative record. 

Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendants thatPlaintiffhas notestablished thatMr. Soto is an expert

qualified to offer testimony concerning scientific, technical, or other specialized matters of expertise. See Fed.

R. Evid. 701, 702. Specifically, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with Mr. Soto's curriculum vitae or a list

of his qualifications, education, training, experience, or publications. Accordingly, even if the Court could

consider such extra-record materials, there is no basis for this Court to defer to Mr. Soto on technical issues

relating to suction dredging. Since paragraph 9 and Exhibit 1 of the Soto Declaration are not necessary to

establish standing, and are not appropriately part of the administrative record, the Court hereby GRANTS

Defendants’ request to STRIKE Paragraph 9 and Exhibit 1 of the Soto Declaration. 

2. Paragraph 10 and Exhibit 2 of the Soto Declaration.

Defendants also argue that paragraph 10 and Exhibit 2 of the Soto Declaration should be stricken on

the grounds that they contain, and depict, information that is outside of the administrative record. Defendants

further argue that the information described in paragraph 10 and depicted in Exhibit 2 is not relevant to the

instant litigation. In response, Plaintiff asserts that paragraph 10 and Exhibit 2 are relevant and admissible

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because they relate to Plaintiff's standing. 

Plaintiff does not dispute, however, thatExhibit 2 contains four photographs of suction dredge mining

that occurred on the Salmon River in August and September 2003 and that these activities are not challenged

in the Second Amended Complaint. Similarly, Plaintiff does not dispute that paragraph 10 of the Soto

Declaration contains a description of certain mining activities,such as "highbanking," that have no relevance to

this litigation. Accordingly, the Court finds that paragraph 10 and Exhibit 2 are not necessary to establish

Plaintiff's standing and may not be considered part of the administrative record. Paragraph 10 and Exhibit 2

to the Soto Declaration are therefore STRICKEN from the record. 

B. The Miners’ Motion for Miscellaneous Relief Concerning the Record.

1. Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Intheir separately filed Motion forMiscellaneous ReliefConcerning the Record, the Minersfirstrequest

that the Court strike Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that it is not properly

part of the administrative record. However, as the Miners concede, the exhibit, which is a December 2001

Draft EnvironmentalImpact Statementrelatingto the SiskiyouNationalForest (the "2001 SiskiyouDraft EIS"),

is cited in a document entitled “Suction Dredge Literature Review as of December 6, 2004" that is currently

part of the administrative record. See AR 303. Moreover, Defendants do not object to the inclusion of the

2001 Siskiyou Draft EIS in the administrative record and have stated that the document was omitted fromthe

record only due to oversight. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the document is properly part of the

administrative record and the Miners’ request to strike Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

is DENIED. 

2. Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Second, the Miners request that the Court strike Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff’s Motion forSummaryJudgment,

which is an April 24, 2000 letter from an Acting Forest Supervisorforthe Rogue River and SiskiyouNational

Forests. Since Plaintiff has conceded that Exhibit 3 should be withdrawn, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

request to withdraw the document and Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

STRICKEN from the record.

3. References to Siskiyou Regional Education Project v. Rose.

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Third, the Miners request that the Court ignore all of Plaintiff’s references to the factual findings in

Siskiyou Regional Education Project v. Rose, 87 F.Supp.2d 1074 (D. Or. 1999). Specifically, the Miners

argue that the factual findings in Rose must be ignored because that case was allowed to proceed without any

“input whatsoever from the Miners under circumstances the Miners regard as collusive.” The Court findsthe

Miners’ wholly speculative and unsupported assertions regarding the legitimacyofthe Court’s ultimate findings

in Rose inappropriate and unpersuasive. However, the Court also recognizes that its review in the instant action

is limited to the administrative record that is properly before it, and may not include the factual findings of a

different district court in a separate proceeding that occurred outside ofthisjurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court

sustains the Miners' objection on this basis, and has disregarded Plaintiff's references to the factualfindings set

forth in the Siskiyou opinion. 

4. Declarations of Soto and Hillman.

Fourth, the Miners request that the Court “reject the Declarations ofSoto and Hillmanin their entirety

because no party to thislitigationcontests Plaintiff’sstanding." However, as noted above, Plaintiff is permitted -

indeed required - to submit such declarations regardless of whether any party contests standing. Moreover,

pursuant to Defendants' request, the Court has alreadystrickenthe portions ofthe Soto Declaration that exceed

Plaintiff's need to establish standing. The Miners’ request that the Court strike both declarations in their entirety

is therefore improper and unnecessary. As such, the Court DENIES the Miners’ request to strike the

Declarations of Soto and Hillman in their entirety.

5. Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Buchal Declaration.

Fifth, the Miners seek to have the Court take judicial notice of the Forest Service Manual, which is

attached as Exhibit 1 to the BuchalDeclaration, and the Forest Service Handbook, which is attached asExhibit

2 to the Buchal Declaration. The Miners argue that these documents should be considered by the Court

because the administrative record refers to the documents but does not include them. The Miners further

contend that the parties do not object to the Court taking judicial notice of the documents. Accordingly, the

Court hereby takes judicial notice of the Forest Service Manual and the Forest Service Handbook and has

considered them only to the extent that they are necessary to understand the Forest Service's actions. See

Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450 (allowing a court to consider extra-record

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13David McCracken is the President and GeneralManager ofthe New 49er’s, Inc. McCracken Decl.

at ¶ 1. 

14Dennis Maria is a biologist formerly employed by the California Department of Fish and Game.

Maria Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3. 

15Joseph Greene is a research biologist formerly employed by the United States Environmental

Protection Agency. Greene Decl. at ¶ 1.

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materials when it has been shown that the agency relied upon certain documents or materials not included in

the record). 

6. Declarations of McCracken, Maria, and Greene.

Sixth, the Miners seek to supplement the administrative record with the Declarations of David

McCracken, 13 Dennis Maria,14 and Joseph Greene.15 The Miners argue that the Declarations of McCracken,

Maria, and Greene are necessary to:(1) further illuminate highly technical issues forthe Court; (2) demonstrate

the adequacy of the Forest Service’s consultations with Plaintiff; and (3) show "relevant" factors not

documented in the record. The Miners also argue that the materials are necessary to "rebut" the Hillman and

Soto Declarations. Defendants and Plaintiff object to the inclusion of these declarations in the record. 

The Miners’ attempt to supplement the administrative record with "rebuttal" declarations is

inappropriate. Courts may not consider technical testimony elicited for the sole purpose of determining the

scientific merit of the agency's decision. Asarco, Inc., 616 F.2d at 1161. The Court also may not consider

informationcreated during the litigation"thatwas not available at the time the [agency] made its decision." See,

e.g., Airport Cmty. Coalition, 280 F.Supp.2d at 1213. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES the Declarations

of McCracken, Maria, and Greene from the record. 

7. California Department of Fish and Game Environmental Impact Reports and

Federal Environmental Impact Statement.

Seventh, the Miners seek to supplement the administrative record with Exhibit 1 to the Maria

Declaration, which is a 1994 California EnvironmentalImpact Report, and Exhibit 6 to the BuchalDeclaration,

which is a federalEnvironmentalImpact Statement thatwas prepared inconnectionwith the initialpromulgation

of the Part 228 mining regulations. The Miners further argue that the Court should compel Defendants to

“complete” the administrative record by locating additionalCalifornia EnvironmentalImpactReports and “such

other and further documents.” Plaintiff and Defendants object to the inclusion of these documents on the

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grounds that the documents were not considered by the agency in reaching the decisions challenged in the

instant lawsuit. Plaintiff and Defendants also contend that the administrative record is complete and does not

need to be further supplemented.

The Court finds that the California Environmental Impact Report and the Environmental Impact

Statement for the Part 228 mining regulations are not necessary to determine whether the Forest Service

considered all relevant factors relating to its decision or to explain any technical terms or complex matters.

Further, the Court finds it highly relevant that the Defendants have expressly stated that the documents the

Miners seek to include were not considered by Forest Service. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Exhibit 1

to the Maria Declaration and Exhibit 6 to the Buchal Declaration from the record. 

8. Process Predicament Report.

Eighth, the Miners seek to supplement the record with a United Forest Service report called “The

Process Predicament,”which is attached as Exhibit 3 to the BuchalDeclaration. The Miners, however, do not

even make a minimal attempt to show that this document is relevant to the instant analysis orthat it should be

properly considered part ofthe administrative record under Southwest Centerfor Biological Diversity. Id.

at 1450. The Court therefore concludes that this document is entirely irrelevant to the Court's review and

STRIKES Exhibit 3 to the Buchal Declaration from the record. 

9. Declaration of Thomas Kitchar.

Ninth, the Miners request that the Court considerthe DeclarationofThomas Kitchar, which is attached

as Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of James Buchal, as a "rebuttal" to Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff Motion for Summary

Judgment. According to the Miners, the Kitchar Declaration “explains how the ‘notice of intent’ regulatory

scheme operated successfully for decades until local environmentalists and forest service officials joined

improperly forces inanextraordinary, bad-faith campaignagainstsuction dredge mining.” Again, this document

does not fall within any of the four exceptions identified by the Ninth Circuit in Southwest Center for

Biological Diversity. Id. at 1450. Additionally, the Kitchar Declaration concerns a different case and matters

that are entirely outside of the scope of this litigation. Accordingly, Exhibit 4 to the Buchal Declaration is

STRICKEN from the record. 

10. Transcript from California State Grange v. Dept. of Commerce.

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Last, the Miners seek to include the transcript from the proceedings in California State Grange v.

Department of Commerce in the administrative record. The Miners, however, do not provide any rationale

for the Court as to why this document should be considered as part of the administrative record. It does not

appear that any of the parties involved in the instant litigation were involved in the California State Grange

case. Further, there is no evidence that the transcript, or the facts ofthe California State Grange case, were

considered by the Forest Service before making the decisions challenged here. Therefore, the Court declines

to consider this document as part of the administrative record and, accordingly, the document is STRICKEN

from the record.

II. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

A. Plaintiff’s Standing.

In order to maintain this action, Plaintiff must first establish that it has standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 561 (noting that, at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff "must set forth by affidavit or other evidence

specific facts" to demonstrate standing). "Article III of the Constitution limitsthe 'judicialpower' of the United

States to the resolutionof'cases' and 'controversies.'" Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United

for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (citations omitted). There are three

requirementsfor Article III standing:(1) an injury in fact, whichmeans an invasionof a legally protected interest

that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjecturalor hypothetical; (2) a causal

relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, whichmeans that the injury fairly can be traced to

the challenged action of the defendants, and has not resulted from the independent action of some third party

not before the court; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, whichmeans

that the prospect ofobtaining relieffromthe injury as a result of a favorable ruling is not too speculative. Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560-61. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing each of these

elements. Id. 

Here, neither Defendants nor the Miners contest Plaintiff’s standing, and the Court concludes that

Plaintiff has adequately satisfied the requirements setforth in Lujan. Specifically, Plaintiff has shown that it has

a reasonable beliefthatsuction dredge mining and other mining operations occurring in and along the Klamath

River and itstributaries could impactthe Tribe’s abilityto enjoy the spiritual, religious,subsistence, recreational,

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wildlife, and aesthetic qualities ofthe areas affected by the mining operations. Soto Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. Accordingly,

any alleged failure of the Forest Service to properly regulate mining operations could directly and adversely

harm the Tribe and its members. Hillman Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8. 

B. Alleged Violations of the National Forest Management Act.

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintifffirst allegesthat the Forest Service violated the National

Forest Management Act ("NFMA"). 

Pursuant to the NFMA, the Secretary of Agriculture has developed certain land and resource

management plans ["LRMPs"] for units of the National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). The LRMP

provides the overall management direction and general guidelines for the forest units for a period of up to 15

years. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b). The "plans . . . contain desired conditions, objectives, and guidance for project

and activity decision making in the plan area." 36 C.F.R. § 219.3. However, the "[p]lans do not grant,

withhold, or modify any contract, permit, or other legalinstrument,subject anyone to civil or criminal liability,

or create any legal rights." Id. Any resource plans, permits, contracts, or other instruments for the use and

occupancy ofNationalForest Systemlands must be consistent with the LRMPs. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). Here,

the relevant LRMPs are the Klamath NationalForest Land and Resource Management Plan ("Klamath Forest

Plan") and the Northwest Forest Plan. 

Plaintiff allegesthat the Forest Service violated the NFMA by:(1) failing to require a PoO for all mining

operations occurring in RRs, regardless of whether those mining operations were likely to cause surface

resource disturbances; (2) failing to surveyforand protect two sensitive species, the spring chinook salmon and

summer steelhead; and (3) failing to consult with the Karuk Tribe or to otherwise protect Tribal resources.

Because the NFMA does not authorize judicial review or create a private cause of action to enforce its

provisions, Plaintiff's claims are brought pursuant to the APA. Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest

Service, 137 F.3d 1372, 1377-38 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court may set aside the Forest Service's

actions only if it finds that such actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. The Court finds that Plaintiff

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16In their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Miners raise many of the same

arguments set forth in Defendants' Opposition brief. The arguments that are entirely duplicative of Defendants'

arguments are not separately referred to herein. The Court notes that the Miners have also argued that the

NFMA does not apply to mining operations and that federal regulation of suction dredge mining is preempted

by California's extensive regulatory regime. However, since "[i]t is well settled that a court may not uphold an

agency action on grounds not relied on by the agency," the Court declines to consider the Miners' additional

arguments. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 420 (1992). 

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has not made this showing.16 

1. Notices of Intent.

With regard to the firstissue,PlaintiffassertsthatDefendants violated standard MM-1 ofthe Northwest

Forest Plan, which is incorporated into the Klamath Forest Plan as standard MA 10-34. See AR017. MA

10-34 reads as follows: 

Require a reclamation plan, approved Plan of Operations and reclamation bond for

all minerals operations that include RRs. Such plans and bonds must address the

costs of removing facilities, equipment and materials; recontouring disturbed areas

to near pre-mining topography; isolating and neutralizing or removing toxic or

potentially toxic materials; salvage and replacement of topsoil; and seedbed

preparation and revegetation to meet Aquatic Conservation Strategy objectives. 

 

AR017. Plaintiff argues that this provision is binding on the Forest Service and compels the Forest Service to

require a PoO for every single mining operation occurring in the Klamath Forest, regardless of whether that

mining operation is likely to involve a significant disturbance of surface resources. Plaintiff further argues that

MA 10-34 must be followed by the Forest Service because it has the force and effect of binding law. 

Plaintiff's position, however, is wholly unsupported by the relevant factual and regulatory background.

As Defendants pointout, MA 10-34 does not compelthe Forest Service to require PoOsin RRs when

the District Ranger has determined that a surface disturbance is not likely to occur. Indeed, as Defendants

argue, Plaintiff's narrow reading ofthe Klamath Forest Plan is untenable in light ofthe numerous regulatory and

statutory provisions that apply to mining in national forests and blatantly ignores the fact that, pursuant to the

General Mining Law and 36 C.F.R. § 228, the Forest Service may not interfere with mining that is not likely

to result in a significant disturbance of surface resources. See 39 Fed. Reg. 31317 ("[The] [e]xercise of [the]

right [to mine] may not be unreasonably restricted."). 

Further, Plaintiff's assertion that the standards and guidelines have the "force and effect ofbinding law"

is flatly contradicted by the explicit language in the Northwest Forest Plan. Specifically, the Northwest Forest

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17Standard 19-1 ofthe Plan also states that the Forest Service must "[a]dminister alllocatable,leasable,

and saleable mineral resource activities according to the 36 CFR 228 Regulations and other applicable laws,

regulations and orders." AR 012. Although Plaintiff argues that this standard applies only to those areas

outside of RRs, the standard is found in the section entitled "Management Direction - Forestwide" and thus

"applies to all management areas, unless specifically excluded by the direction for that specific management

area." Id.

18Plaintiff's argument that there is no "conflict"between MA 10-34 and the mining regulations because

the requirement of a PoO is not an absolute "prohibition"on mining completely ignores the extensive regulatory

history and discourse leading up to the promulgation of the Part 228 mining regulations. See 39 Fed. Reg.

31317 (noting that the Forest Service"recognize[d]thatprospectors and miners have a statutory right, notmere

privilege, under the 1872 mining law and the Act of June 4, 1897, to go upon and use the open public domain

lands ofthe NationalForest Systemforthe purposes ofmineralexploration, development and production" and

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Plan clearly provides that its standards and guidelines "do not apply where they would be contrary to

existing law or regulation, or where they would require the agencies to take actions for which they do not

have authority." See Record ofDecision for Northwest Forest Plan, Attachment A at A-6 (emphasis added).

Indeed, the portion of the Northwest Forest Plan that discusses the intended force and effect of the standard

and guidelines reads in its entirety:

Designated areas, matrix, and KeyWatershed allhave specific management direction

regarding how those lands are to be managed, including actions that are prohibited

and descriptions of the conditions that should occur there. This management

direction is known as "standards and guidelines" – the rules and limits governing

actions, and the principles specifying the environmental conditions or levels to be

achieved and maintained. Although the direction in all sections of this document

constitutes standards and guidelines, standards and guidelines specific to particular

land allocation categories [such as RRs], orrelative to specific types ofmanagement

activities, are included in Section C of these standards and guidelines.

Additional direction to management agenciesincludes, but is not limited to

directives, policy, handbooks, manuals, as wells as other plans,regulations,

laws and treaties. The standards and guidelines presented here supersede other

direction except treaties, laws, and regulations unless that direction is more

restrictive or provides greater benefits to late-successional forest related species.

These standards and guidelines do not apply where they would be contrary

to existing law or regulation, or where they would require the agencies to

take actions for which they do not have authority. 

See id. (emphasis added).17 

Since MA 10-34 appears to require miners to submit a PoO in all instances, even when a significant

disturbance of surface resources is not likely, and the Part 228 mining regulations permit a miner to proceed

under an NOI when a significant disturbance of surface resources is not likely, MA 10-34 and the mining

regulations are in conflict. By the Plan's own terms, the mining regulations supersede the requirements of MA

10-34.18

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28 that the "[e]xercise of that right may not be unreasonably restricted"). 

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Plaintiff's sole response to this overwhelming evidence is the bare assertion that Defendants' position

does not deserve deference because the Forest Service has not consistently interpreted the Northwest Forest

Plan. As a preliminary matter, even if this Court were to conclude that the Forest Service's interpretation of

the Northwest Forest Plan has been inconsistent, this would not necessitate a finding that the Forest Service's

actions were arbitrary or capricious. See Seldovia NativeAss'n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th

Cir. 1990) (holding that consistency is only "one relevant factor in judging [an agency's] reasonableness.").

While "the consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due," Good

Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993), "[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency

administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the

degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to [the] persuasiveness of

the agency's position." United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); see also Skidmore v. Swift, 323

U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) ("The weight accorded [to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will

depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with

earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to

control."). 

More importantly, however, the Court does not agree with Plaintiff that Defendants have been

inconsistent or arbitrary. Plaintiff's sole "evidence" of inconsistency is its assertion that the Forest Service made

an abrupt "about-face regarding the Plan of Operations . . . requirement in Riparian Reserves" following the

District Court of Oregon's ruling in Siskiyou Regional Education Project v. Rose, 87 F.Supp.2d 1074 (D.

Or. 1999). This argument is flawed forseveralreasons. First and foremost, the Siskiyou opinion was issued

approximately five years ago and involved discrete areas within the Siskiyou forest in Oregon, not the Klamath

Forest in California. It thus goes without saying that the facts and administrative record considered by the

Siskiyou court were different. Further, the persuasiveness ofthe Siskiyou opinion is diminished considerably

in light of the fact that its analysis of the issues relevant to this litigation is extremely limited. For example,

although the Forest Service apparently argued in Siskiyou, as it does here, that the standards and guidelines

of the Siskiyou National Forest Plan (the "Siskiyou Plan") were in conflict with the mining regulations, the

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Siskiyou court ultimately concluded thatthe Forest Service's interpretation ofthe SiskiyouNationalForest Plan

was "clearly erroneous and inconsistent with the plain language of the Standards and Guidelines." Id. 1087-

1088. Inexplicably, however, the Siskiyou opinion has absolutely no analysis of the express provision in the

Northwest Forest Plan thatstates thatstandards and guidelines may not conflict with existing regulations. Nor

does the Siskiyou opinion have any meaningful discussion regarding the inherent conflict between MM-1 and

36 C.F.R. § 228, or the Forest Service's positionwith respect to how to resolve the conflict. In light of the fact

that the Siskiyou opinion does not address these issues, which are at the very heart of this lawsuit, this

Court declines to find the Siskiyou opinion persuasive or its holdings relevant.

Additionally, the Siskiyou opinion does not prove that the Forest Service has changed its position in

an arbitrary or capricious manner. To the contrary, the fact that the Forest Service raised the same argument

it is relying upon here – that MM-1 cannot be followed due to its inherent conflict with the mining regulations

– proves just the opposite. 

Further, the administrative record in this case demonstrates that Defendants have been anything but

inconsistent. Significantly, Defendants first noted the conflict between the standards and guidelines of the

Klamath Forest Plan and 36 C.F.R. § 228 in 1995 – almost four years prior to the Siskiyou litigation. Those

conclusions were set forth in a February 21, 1995 memorandum almost immediately following the issuance

of the Record of Decision for the Northwest Forest Plan. See AR 212-213. The memorandum, which was

jointly issued by the Regional Foresters from the Pacific Northwest and Pacific Southwest Regions to all ofthe

Forest Supervisors, including the Forest Supervisorforthe Klamath Forest, specifically recognized the inherent

conflict between the regulations governing the use of the surface of National Forest Lands in connection with

operations authorized by the United States mining laws(i.e. 36 C.F.R. 228, subpart A) and the standards and

guidelines applicable to Riparian Reserves. AR 212. The memorandum resolved the conflict by concluding

that the Forest Service may require a miner to submit a PoO only when the proposed mining operation is likely

to cause a significant disturbance ofsurface resources. See AR 212 (concluding that "The mining S&G's within

the President's Plan for RR's and LSR's would therefore not apply because there is no regulatory provision for

including S&G's in an NOI."). 

OnJanuary 30, 2002, the Deputy Chiefforthe NationalForest Systemissued a directive thatreiterated

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the Forest Service's positionwith respect to the way the MM-1 is to be interpreted. In the letter, the Deputy

Chief expressly stated that "[t]o apply . . . [the MM-1]standard and guideline to activities notmeeting the 'likely

to cause significant surface disturbance' test is not appropriate and contrary to law and regulation. If no

significantsurface resource disturbance is occurring, [the Forest Service has] no reason to require a reclamation

bond, nor would [the Forest Service] be able to determine the bond amount." AR 214. The letter concludes

by stating that the "MM-1 standard and guideline applies only when the proposed activity is likely to cause

significantsurface disturbance. This policy is consistent with Bureau of Land Management policy for lands they

manage, as well as the February 21, 1995, joint Regional Foresters' letter." AR 215.

Significantly, the Deputy Chief's letter did not ignore the Siskiyou litigation, but specifically addressed

the outcome of the litigation as follows:

Small-scale mining activity on the Siskiyou Forest has been suspended pending

completion of a cumulative effects analysis. The Forest Supervisor decided that

numerous small scale ming activities occurring in the same area at the same time may

likely cause significance [sic] surface disturbance, and that a forest-wide effects

analysis should be completed to determine terms and condition[s] for conducting

suction dredging. A Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Suction Dredging

Activities was released January 2001. It is our expectation that, upon completion for

this science based cumulative effects analysis, the Forest Supervisory may find that

certain types and levels of activities may require a plan of operations and others

may not. 

AR 215 (emphasis added). 

On February 5, 2002, the Director ofMinerals and Geology Management circulated a memorandum

to allRegionalForesters thatsummarizedthe DeputyChief'sfindings and conclusions with respect to the MM-1

standard and guideline. The memorandum stated: 

In the areas covered by the Northwest [Forest] Plan . . . or covered by other general

management guidance or strategies, forest users can conduct non-significantsurface

disturbing activities without filing a plan of operations per the intent of the Forest

Service Mining Regulations. A Notice of Intent to Operate (NOI) will still be

required if the proposed activity might cause disturbance of surface resources and

it doesn't meet the provisions if 36 CFR 228.4(a)(2). The MM-1 standard and

guideline applies only when the proposed activity is likely to cause significant surface

disturbance. This policy is consistent with the Bureau of Land Management policy

for lands they manage, and is consistent with both the February 21, 1995, joint

Regional Foresters' letter, and a January 30, 2002 letter from Deputy Chief Tom

Thompson[.]

AR 217.

In May 26, 2004, the Regional Forester for the Pacific Southwest Region circulated a memorandum

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to all Forest Supervisors that again "clarif[ied] the roles and responsibilities of the Forest Service for the

regulationofsuction dredge mining activitiesthat occur on national Forest System lands within Region 5." AR

218 - AR 220. The memorandum provided Forest Rangers with the following guidance:

The District Ranger must [first] evaluate the [mining] operation as described in the

Notice of Intent, including the environmental protection measures that are required

through the state dredging permit and any other state or federal permits, and

determine if there is likely to be significant disturbance of surface resources, thus

requiring a more-detailed Plan of Operations. Forests under the Northwest Forest

Plan should be aware that the MM-1 standard and guideline (requiring a Plan of

Operations for all mineral operations in riparian reserves) applies only when the

proposed activity is likely to cause significant surface resource disturbance. . . . 

The District Ranger's evaluation of suction dredging Notice of Intent must consider

all activities, proposed and reasonably foreseeable, in the waters and on the banks,

includingcumulative effects. Suction dredging operations frequently involve incidental

use and occupancy ofthe banks and shores for camping, fueland equipmentstorage,

campfires, and similar uses. In fact, the on-shore activities may often present more

concern for causing significant surface disturbance than the suction dregding

operations. The District Ranger cannot separate the on-shore from the in-water

activities for the purpose of the evaluation of significant disturbance.

The District Ranger's evaluation should define the thresholds or parameters within

which suction dredging can occur without becoming a significant disturbance of

surface resources. By doing so, the District Ranger will be able to determine what

type and level of operations can be conducted under a Notice of Intent, and which

ones will require a Plan ofOperations. A Notice of Intent may suffice if the operator

proposes to limit the hours ofoperation and to confine camping and other incidental

uses to existing campgrounds or to a levelthatwould not be likely to cause significant

disturbance of surface resources. District Rangers are therefore encouraged to

discuss or communicate to operators the parameters for a Notice of Intent prior to

submittal[]. 

AR 219. 

Based on the foregoing evidence in the administrative record, the Court concludes that the Forest

Service has consistently, and reasonably, interpreted the Northwest Forest Plan and Klamath Forest Plan to

address the inherent conflictbetween the mining regulations and the Northwest Forest Plan. In fact, the weight

of the evidence supports a finding that the Forest Service has exercised considerable care in achieving the

correct balance between the guidelines ofthe Forest Plan, onone hand, and the mandates ofthe relevant mining

statutes and regulations, on the other. 

2. Threatened and Endangered Species and Tribal Consultation and Protection

of Tribal Resources.

Plaintiff has also not shown that the Forest Service's acceptance of the four NOIs challenged in this

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litigation violated any other provisions within the Klamath Forest Plan, including: (1) standard 8-3, which

requires the Forest Service to "[r]eview all Forest Service planned, funded, executed or permitted programs

and activities for possible effects on TE&S [threatened and endangered] species"; (2) standard 6-8, which

provides that "[p]roject areas should be surveyed for the presence of Sensitive species before project

implementation[and]. . . assessed forthe presence and condition ofSensitive species habitat[ifsurveys cannot

be conducted]"; (3) standard 8-18, which requires the Forest Service to "[a]void or minimize impacts to

Sensitive species where possible"; (4)standard 24-24, whichrequires the Forest Service to provide for Native

American needs for collection and/or use of traditional resources; or (5) standard 24-27, which requires the

Forest Service to consult and coordinate with the Tribe on all projects that have the potential to affect Native

American values. See AR 006, AR 009-010.

First, the Forest Service's duty, under the NFMA, to comply with these standards in the Klamath

Forest Plan is not triggered by the NOI process because the Forest Service's receipt of an NOI is not a federal

project or a "permit[], contract[], [or] other instrument for the use and occupancy of the National Forest

System lands." See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (providing that "[r]esource plans and permits, contract, and other

instruments for the use and occupancy of National Forest System lands shall be consistent with the land

management plans."). Moreover, even if the NFMA did apply, the administrative record demonstrates that

the Forest Service fulfilled its obligations under standards 8-3, 6-8, 8-18, 24-24, and 24-27. Specifically, the

administrative record shows that the HappyCamp Ranger developed an extensive series ofrecommendations

to provide better protection forfisheries,includingsensitive species. See AR 097-100. The record also shows

that Defendants consulted with members of the Karuk Tribe, responded to the Tribe's concerns, conducted

several meetings with Karuk Tribe members and others, and directly engaged the Tribe in suction dredge

compliance monitoring activities. See AR 041, AR 106, AR 109, AR 381-83, and AR 384-91. 

Accordingly, with respect to its NFMA allegations, Plaintiff has failed to establish that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, and therefore Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its NFMA claim is

DENIED.

B. Alleged Violations of the National Environmental Protection Act.

Plaintiff has also not shown that Defendants violated the National Environmental Protection Act

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19According to the BLM's placer mining regulations, "notice" mine is a mining operation relating to

alluvial or glacial deposits of gold that "causes a cumulative surface disturbance offive acres or less per year."

43 C.F.R. § 3809.1-3(a). 

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("NEPA"). Plaintiff's specific assertion is that Defendants violated NEPA by failing to prepare an Environmental

Assessment ("EA") or Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") before allowing mining to proceed under the

four NOIs challenged in this action. 

NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f, requires the preparation of a detailed EIS for all "major [f]ederal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2). Should the agency

determine that there is a federal action, but that the federal action does not significantly affect the quality ofthe

humanenvironment, the agency's analysis may take the form ofan EA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c)-(e). Thus,

the most important threshold question is whether the action falls within NEPA in the first place. Citizens

Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp. Bd., 267 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C.Cir. 2001); SaveBartonCreek

Ass'n v. Fed. Highway Admin., 950 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir.1992). If there is no “major federal action,”

that is the end of the inquiry; the agency need not prepare an EIS or EA. Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails,

267 F.3d at 1151. 

As Defendants correctly note, Plaintiff's belief that NEPA applies to the NOI process is in direct

conflict with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988). In

Penfold, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the BureauofLand Management's ("BLM") processing of "notice mines"19

and concluded that the BLM's review of notice mining did not amount to a "major federal action" triggering

NEPA compliance. Id. at 1313. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion even after observing

that:(1) the BLM's involvement in reviewing the notices was extensive; (2) the BLM was required to, and did,

conduct compliance inspections of the notice mining; (3) the BLM was responsible for promulgating the

regulations relating to notice mining; and (4) the BLM issued letters indicating that the notice mining was

"approved." Id. at 1314. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that "[n]either BLM's approval process nor

regulatory involvement is sufficient to trigger NEPA . . . application." Id.

Plaintiff nevertheless argues that the holdinginPenfold is inapposite because the Ninth Circuit's holding

in Penfold was premised entirely on the fact that the BLM was not vested with any "discretion" to deny notice

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20Tellingly, Plaintiff does not support this statement with any actual citations to Penfold. That is

because this "holding" does not appear anywhere in the Penfold opinion. 

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mining due to the regulation's "categorical5-acre cutoff rule."20 Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Penfold might

be persuasive if this were actually the holding of Penfold. But it is not. See Penfold, 857 F.2d at 1314

(concluding only that notice mining is not a major federal action because "[n]otice mine operators [do not]

receive federalfunding . . . [and]BLM cannotrequire approvalbefore an operation can commence developing

the mine"); see also Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2003) (agreeing with the

district court in Sierra Club v.Penfold that notice mining is merely "the basis for limited enforcement review

. . to target the distribution of information" and thatthe notices are "ministerialreminder[s] . . . [that] encourage

miners to comply with their legal responsibilities."). 

Although the Court is cognizant ofthe fact thatPenfold concerns placer mining, rather than the specific

type ofmining and mining regulations at issue here, the Court finds that Penfold is sufficiently analogous to the

instant case such that the holding ofPenfold is controlling. Thus, pursuant to Penfold, the Court finds that the

Forest Service's acceptance of the four NOIs was not a "federal action" that triggered NEPA. Accordingly,

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to its NEPA cause of action is DENIED. 

C. Alleged Violations of the Endangered Species Act.

Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants violated the Endangered

Species Act ("ESA") by failing to comply with ESA's Section 7 consultation requirements. Section 7(a)(2)

of the ESA requires all federal agencies "to insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such

agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence" of any endangered or threatened species or result

in the destruction of critical habitats. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Under the applicable regulations, a "federal

action" includes activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by

federal agencies, such as:(a) actions intended to conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation

ofregulations;(c)the grantingoflicenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid;

or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. If an

agency determines that its proposed action "mayaffect" an endangered or threatened species, the agency must

formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service and/or the National Marine Fisheries Service, depending

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21The Miners raise this same argument in their Opposition brief. Additionally, the Miners argue that

the ESA does not apply to this case because the listing of the Southern Oregon/Northern California (SONC)

coho salmon as a threatened species is invalid. However, Defendants have conceded that the coho listing is

currently still in effect and still valid. Thus, the Court declinesto consider this argument. The Court also finds

unpersuasive the Miners' alternative argument that Plaintiff's ESA claim fails because Plaintiff "offers no

evidence that any listedspecieswere present during any mining operations conducted with the [four] challenged

notices of intent." The correct standard under the ESA is whether a federal action "may affect" the listed

species. Pacific Coast Fed. v.Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F.Supp.2d 1228, 1240-41 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

Plaintiff does not need to prove actual harm to the species. Id. 

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on the species that are protected in the area ofthe proposed action. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas,

30 F.3d 1050, 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir.1994). "Section 7 and [its] requirements . . . apply to all actions where there

is discretionary [f]ederal involvement and control." 50 C.F.R. § 402.03. Judicial review of administrative

decisions involving the ESA is governed by section 706 of the APA.

Plaintiff argues that the Forest Service's review of an NOI constitutes an "authorization" of that mining

operation and thus is a "federal action" within the meaning of the ESA. In response, Defendants maintain that

the only mining operations that are "authorized"by the Forest Service are those operations that are proceeding

under a PoO. Consequently, Defendants contend that the ESA is not triggered by the NOI review process

because the review process is not a "federal action."21 Accordingly, with respect to Plaintiff's allegations under

the ESA, the critical question is this: Is the Forest Service's determination that a mining operation is not likely

to cause a significant disturbance ofsurface resources an "authorization"ofthe subsequent miningactivitiessuch

that the entire NOI review process constitutes a "federal action" within the meaning of the ESA? 

The Court findsthat the answerto this question is "No"forseveralreasons. First, neither party disputes

that the miners, who are all private entities, are the ones carrying out the mining operations described in the

NOI. This factor, though not dispositive, weighs in favor of a finding that the activity is "private" and not

"federal." Second, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Penfold makes clear that a federalagency's review ofmining

"notices" is not a "federal action" within the meaning of NEPA. Although this factor is also not necessarily

dispositive with respect to an ESA claim, it weighs heavily in favor of a finding that the Forest Service's does

not "authorize" an NOI merely by reviewing it and, thus, the NOI review process, in and of itself, is not a

"federal action." See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the

standards for "major federal action," under NEPA, and "agency action," under the ESA, are much the same,

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22Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, United States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1981) does not

support Plaintiff's position. Weiss states that "[u]nder the [Forest Service mining] regulations, the Forest

Service must be notified of any mining-related operation that is likely to cause a disturbance of surface

resources. The initiation or continuation of such operation is subject to the approval of the Forest Service."

Weiss, 642 F.2d at 297. Since Defendants do not dispute that mining operations likely to cause a disturbance

of surface resources must be approved by the Forest Service, Weiss is consistent with Defendants' position.

Plaintiff, however, unjustifiably reads this second sentence as stating: "The initiation or continuation of [any

mining operation, even those that are not likely to cause a significant disturbance of surface resources]

is subject to the approval of the Forest Service." This is not what Weiss actually says, and the Court declines

to adopt Plaintiff's contorted reading of the case. 

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though acknowledging that the NEPA standard may be more broad).22 This is further strengthened by the fact

that the Forest Service has only fifteen days within which it must review the NOI and inform the operator

whether a PoO will be required. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(2)(iii). 

Third, Plaintiff's argument utterly ignores the fact that mining operations take place pursuant to the

General Mining Law and the Surface Resources Act, which confers a statutory right upon miners to enter

certain public lands for the purpose ofmining and prospecting. This distinction is significant, as it differentiates

mining operations from"licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid,"which

are permissive in nature. Last, Plaintiff has not identified any sufficiently analogous case law that supports its

argument that the Forest Service's "discretion" to determine what constitutes a "significant surface resource

disturbance" is the type of "discretionary control" over the NOI process that invokes the ESA. 

In fact, although Plaintiff vigorously argues that any act requiring"discretion"invokesthe ESA, it is wellestablished that not every agency action triggers the consultation requirement of Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.

As the Ninth Circuit has made clear:

Within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, Congress undoubtedly has the

power to regulate all conduct capable of harming protected species. However,

Congress chose to apply section 7(a)(2) to federalrelationships with private entities

only when the federal agency acts to authorize, fund, or carry out the

relevant activity. 

Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff'sreliance on Turtle IslandRestorationNetwork v.NationalMarine Fisheries Service, 340

F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003) does not compel a different conclusion. Although Turtle Island does stand for the

general proposition that "Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is

discretionary Federal involvement or control," id. at 975, the discretionary involvement and control in Turtle

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23The Compliance Act requires "United States vessels to obtain permits [from the National Marine

Fisheries Service before they] engage in fishing operations on the high seas." 16 U.S.C. §§ 5504-5506.

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Island arose out of the agency's responsibilities under the Compliance Act to regulate and authorize fishing

operations.23 Id. at 973. Thus, the discretion retained by the agency in Turtle Island is closely analogous to

the discretion retained by the Forest Service when approving a PoO; however, the facts in Turtle Island are

not analogous to the NOI review process. 

For the same reasons, Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) is also

inapposite. In Pacific Rivers Council, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a forest's land resource management

plan ("LRMP") is an "continuing agency" action within the meaning of the ESA. Id. at 1056. The Pacific

Rivers Council opinion squarely addresses projects that are "planned" and "implemented" by the Forest

Service pursuant to the LRMP, such as timber sales, range activities, grazing permits, and road building

projects. Id. at 1053. Arguably, a PoO would fall within this description, and indeed, Defendants do not

dispute that it does. But Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Pacific Rivers Council holding extends to the

NOI process, which merely provides the Forest Service with notice of activities occurring pursuant to the

GeneralMining Law. Indeed, in Environmental Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber, 255 F.3d 1073, 1081

(9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit declined to followPacific Rivers Council, even though the action challenged

under the ESA involved the Forest Agency's continuing administration of a logging permit issued to a private

person. Id. at 1080 ("The Forest Service has plenary control [over its LRMPs] because it is the agency

charged with promulgating, approving, and implementing LRMPs on Forest Service land. In contrast,

Simpson's . . . permit, like the right-of-wayagreementinSierraClub, involves agency authorizationof a private

action and a more limited role for the [Forest Service]."). 

Finally, pursuant to Marbled Murrelet, the Court finds that Plaintiff's generalized challenge to the

"discretionary"nature ofthe Forest Service's implementationofthe NOI review processisinsufficientto invoke

the ESA. Although, here, the Forest Service engaged in an interactive process with the miners prior to the start

of the 2004 mining season, which process involved a discussion of the types of activities that would be

considered a significant disturbance of surface resources, this process is most properly considered the type

of"advisory" conduct that does not trigger the ESA. Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d. at 1074. Indeed, as the

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Ninth Circuit stated in Marbled Murrelet:

Protection of endangered species would not be enhanced by a rule which would

require a federal agency to perform the burdensome procedural tasks mandated by

section 7 [of the ESA] simply because it advised or consulted with a private party.

Such a rule would be a disincentive for the agency to give such advice or

consultation. Moreover, private parties who wanted advice on how to comply with

the ESA would be loathe to contact the [agency] for fear of triggering burdensome

bureaucratic procedures. As a result, desirable communication between private

entities and federal agencies on how to comply with the ESA would be stifled, and

protection of threatened and endangered species would suffer.

Id. at 1074-75. 

Here, Plaintiff has not established that the NOIs are"permits" that are "authorized" by the Forest

Service. Nor has Plaintiff established that the Forest Service's initial consultation process with the minersis a

federal action that triggers the ESA. Thus, while the Court is sensitive to the fact that the ESA is broadly

construed, Plaintiff has simply not demonstrated that the statute is so broad as to encompass activities – such

as the NOI review process– where the only federal involvement is (1) the agency's internal policy

determinations with respect to the parameters of the review process; and (2) the review process itself.

Significantly, were the Court to adopt Plaintiff's reading of the ESA, it would essentially eviscerate any

meaningful distinction between the NOI and the PoO processes whatsoever. Thus, the Court does not find

thatDefendants' actions were arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and thereforeDENIES Plaintiff'smotion

for summary judgment on its ESA cause of action. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1. Plaintiff's fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE; 

2. Defendants' Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Declaration of Toz Soto [Docket

No. 59] is GRANTED;

3. The Miners' Motion forMiscellaneous ReliefConcerning the Record [Docket No. 65]

is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; and 

4. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 54] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Saundra Brown Armstrong 

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Dated: 7/1/05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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