Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00149/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRENDA M. SLATE, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0149-WS-M

 )

SHELL OIL COMPANY, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (doc. 4) this action to the

Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, as well as the parties’ complementary Motions for

Leave to Take Limited Discovery (docs. 6, 9). These motions are ripe to be taken under

submission at this time.

I. Background.

On May 23, 2004, Ronald Hansford Slate, Anthony Slate, and Joseph Saylor were

working on a platform rig in Alabama state waters in connection with their duties as employees

of nonparty Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., when a tragic accident occurred. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) In

particular, a section of metal grating/flooring allegedly became detached and fell to the area in

which those three individuals were working. (Id., ¶ 2.) According to the Complaint, the falling

grate caused injuries to all three men, including fatal injuries to Ronald Hansford Slate. (Id.) It

is alleged that the platform rig was owned, operated, leased and/or otherwise controlled by Shell

Oil Company and Shell Yellowhammer Plant, and that the Slates and Saylor were working at the

direction of the Shell entities, with equipment and materials provided by the Shell entities, at the

time of the accident. (Id., ¶¶ 3-4.)

On February 1, 2006, plaintiffs Brenda M. Slate, as personal representative of the estate

of Ronald Hansford Slate, deceased; Anthony D. Slate; Sandra J. Slate; Joseph Saylor and Leah

Venessa Saylor (collectively, “plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,

Alabama, against defendants Shell Oil Company, Shell Yellowhammer Plant, James R. Blanton,

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 1 of 18
1 To be clear, plaintiffs do not ask this Court to find that Echols’ Alabama

citizenship must be considered for purposes of federal jurisdiction, and do not seek remand on

that basis. In light of plaintiffs’ concessions on this point, the Court will not sua sponte explore

the strength of defendants’ fraudulent joinder argument as to Echols. Instead, the Court will

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and Daniel Echols (collectively, “defendants”), as well as certain fictitious defendants, seeking

relief for injuries and other damages arising from the May 23, 2004 accident. Specifically,

Brenda Slate brought causes of action for wrongful death (on both negligence and wantonness

theories), Anthony Slate and Joseph Saylor advanced substantially similar claims for negligence

and wantonness, and Sandra Slate and Leah Saylor presented claims for loss of consortium. The

Mobile County proceedings were styled Brenda M. Slate, et al. v. Shell Oil Company, et al.,

Civil Action No. CV-2006-0406.

Although it does not appear that proof of service is included in the state court file,

defendants allege that they were served with process by certified mail on various dates between

February 10, 2006 and February 24, 2006. Defendants filed a Joint Notice of Removal (doc. 1)

on March 10, 2006, removing this action to this District Court. As grounds for removal,

defendants maintained that there was complete diversity of citizenship and that the amount in

controversy exceeded $75,000, such that removal was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To

show diversity, defendants maintained that all of them were of diverse citizenship to plaintiffs

except for defendant Daniel Echols, who shares Alabama citizenship with plaintiffs. (See Joint

Notice of Removal, at ¶¶ 6, 10.) In an Affidavit accompanying the removal petition, Echols

averred that he had no supervisory or operational responsibilities in connection with Shell’s

Yellowhammer Plant or Fairway Field as of May 2004 because he was assigned to a Shell

facility in McAllen, Texas at the time in question. (Echols Aff., ¶¶ 3-4.) According to Echols’

Affidavit, he was not assigned to the Yellowhammer Plant or Fairway Field until November

2004, some six months after the accident. (Id., ¶ 5.) In light of this evidence, defendants argue

that there is no possibility that plaintiffs could establish claims against Echols in state court, and

that his non-diverse citizenship is therefore irrelevant for diversity purposes.

On April 6, 2006, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand (doc. 4). In so doing, plaintiffs

conceded that they “will most likely be unable to recover from” Echols, given the content of his

Affidavit. (Plaintiffs’ Brief (doc. 5), at 12 n.4.)1

 Nonetheless, plaintiffs insist that diversity

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 2 of 18
exclude Echols’ citizenship from the diversity calculus because the uncontradicted evidence is

that he had no connection to Shell’s Yellowhammer Plant until six months after the events at

issue here, and plaintiffs have shown no reasonable likelihood that an Alabama state court might

find Echols liable. See Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (facts on fraudulent

joinder issue cannot be resolved in plaintiff’s favor if plaintiff neither disputes defendant’s

version of the facts nor offers evidence of contradictory facts).

2 In an unusual twist, both plaintiffs and defendants suggest that limited discovery

is warranted to answer one question or the other. In particular, in the event that the Court is

unpersuaded by their evidence and argument on the fraudulent joinder issue, defendants request

leave to take limited discovery “regarding plaintiffs’ allegations against Blanton in order to

determine whether plaintiffs can state a legally sufficient claim against him.” (Defendants’

Motion for Leave to Take Limited Discovery, at 2.) By contrast, in the event that the Court is

not convinced by their evidence and argument on the issue of Blanton’s domicile, plaintiffs

“move for leave to take limited discovery as to the citizenship of James R. Blanton.” (Plaintiffs’

Motion for Leave to Take Limited Discovery, at 2.) These ancillary motions will be addressed

in the course of discussing the two principal questions.

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jurisdiction is lacking, shifting the focus from Echols to defendant James R. Blanton. Plaintiffs’

position is that Blanton is properly classified as a citizen of Alabama for diversity purposes, and

is therefore not diverse from the plaintiffs. Defendants counter that Blanton is a Louisiana

citizen for diversity purposes, and that even if he were not, his citizenship is immaterial because

plaintiffs have fraudulently joined him. Plaintiffs dispute both Blanton’s citizenship and

defendants’ fraudulent joinder objection. As such, the issues joined in the Motion to Remand

may be succinctly expressed as follows: (1) Was Blanton fraudulently joined in this lawsuit? and

(2) If not, is he properly considered to be a citizen of Louisiana or Alabama for § 1332 purposes? 

Those two questions guide the Court’s inquiry at this time.2

II. Governing Legal Standard.

A removing defendant must establish the propriety of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441

and, therefore, must establish the existence of federal jurisdiction. Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a

Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A removing defendant bears the burden of proving

proper federal jurisdiction.”); Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir.

1996), overruled on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir.

2000). Because removal infringes upon state sovereignty and implicates central concepts of

federalism, removal statutes must be construed narrowly, with all doubts resolved in favor of

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remand. See University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th

Cir. 1999) (explaining that strict construction of removal statutes derives from “significant

federalism concerns” raised by removal jurisdiction); Whitt v. Sherman Int’l Corp., 147 F.3d

1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) (expressing preference for remand where removal jurisdiction is not

absolutely clear); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (uncertainties

regarding removal are resolved in favor of remand); Newman v. Spectrum Stores, Inc., 109 F.

Supp.2d 1342, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“Because federal court jurisdiction is limited, the

Eleventh Circuit favors remand of removed cases where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely

clear.”).

There being no federal question presented in the Complaint, defendants based removal on

diversity of citizenship. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal courts have original jurisdiction

over all civil actions between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy

“exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Id.; see Triggs v. John

Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). Section 1332 contemplates and

demands complete diversity, such that no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any

defendant. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th

Cir. 2002); Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287. That said, however, “[f]raudulent joinder is a judicially

created doctrine that provides an exception to the requirement of complete diversity.” Triggs,

154 F.3d at 1287. A non-diverse defendant who is fraudulently joined does not defeat diversity

because his citizenship is excluded from the diversity calculus. The doctrine is triggered when:

(i) “there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause of action against the resident

(non-diverse) defendant”; (ii) “there is outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional

facts”; or (iii) a diverse defendant is joined with a nondiverse defendant as to whom there is no

joint liability and the claims against the two defendants have no real connection to each other. 

Id. The remand issue concerning Blanton implicates only the first of these applications.

Where fraudulent joinder is alleged, the defendant bears the burden of proof on that issue. 

See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir.1997); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663

F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (“where there have been allegations of fraudulent joinder, it is clear

that the burden is upon the removing party to prove the alleged fraud”). This burden is heavy. 

See Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538; B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549 (“The burden of persuasion placed upon

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 4 of 18
3 In weighing the parties’ respective arguments, the Court examines “the plaintiff’s

pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits and deposition transcripts

submitted by the parties.” Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322 (citation omitted). In that respect, the

procedural mechanism for resolving a fraudulent joinder objection is akin to that utilized on

summary judgment. See id. In this case, both sides have supplemented the record with material

outside the pleadings in support of their respective positions. All such submissions will be

considered, just as they would be if this were a Rule 56 proceeding.

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those who cry ‘fraudulent joinder’ is indeed a heavy one.”). In assessing a fraudulent joinder

objection, the Court must view the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

and resolve any uncertainties about applicable law in the plaintiff’s favor. See Pacheco de Perez

v. AT & T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998); Poole v. American Int’l Group, Inc., 414 F.

Supp.2d 1111, 1116 (M.D. Ala. 2006); Jones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 385 F. Supp.2d 1268, 1271

(M.D. Fla. 2005).

For purposes of fraudulent joinder, the Court is mindful that “[i]f there is even a

possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any

one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and

remand the case to the state court.” Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also GMFS, L.L.C. v. Bounds,

275 F. Supp.2d 1350, 1353-54 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (“A defendant (typically a resident of the forum)

is fraudulently joined if there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause of action

against him.”); Raye v. Employer’s Ins. of Wausau, 345 F. Supp.2d 1313, 1317 (S.D. Ala. 2004)

(similar). “The plaintiff need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent

defendant; he need only have a possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the

joinder to be legitimate.” Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1380

(noting that a “colorable claim” is all that’s required to negate fraudulent joinder argument). 

Nonetheless, it bears emphasizing that “[t]he potential for legal liability must be reasonable, not

merely theoretical,” in order to foil a fraudulent joinder objection. Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d

1317, 1325 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that possibility of liability is assessed by reason and

common sense, and that more is required than such a possibility that a designated residence

might be struck by a meteor on a given evening) (citations omitted).3

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 5 of 18
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III. Analysis.

A. Fraudulent Joinder Issue.

In their Joint Notice of Removal, defendants invoke fraudulent joinder doctrine by

suggesting that plaintiffs could not establish a viable cause of action against Blanton in state

court because the Complaint offers only general and conclusory allegations that fail to delineate

any act on his part that might give rise to liability. (Doc. 1, ¶ 17 n.5.) The characterization of

the Complaint as bereft of allegations of acts or omissions specifically and individually tied to

Blanton is accurate. Indeed, the Complaint does not discuss his alleged wrongdoing in specific

terms. Rather, plaintiffs lump Blanton in with the other defendants, outlining the factual

predicate against those defendants collectively instead of singling out any particular defendant’s

wrongful acts. For example, the First Cause of Action charges defendants collectively with

negligently failing to provide Ronald Hansford Slate with a safe place to work, negligently

failing to provide safe and proper equipment and materials, negligently failing to establish safe

work practices, negligently failing to install and secure the metal grating in a responsible and

safe manner, negligently failing to provide adequate supervision for the work being performed,

negligently failing to design a suitable plan for the work being performed, negligently failing to

provide adequate warnings to the decedent and others on the platform rig, negligently failing to

discover and eliminate hazardous conditions that defendants knew or reasonably should have

known existed, and the like. (Complaint, at 3-4.) The initial pleading does not “unpack” those

allegations by ascribing specific acts or omissions to specific defendants.

In their Motion to Remand, plaintiffs assert that defendants cannot meet their heavy

burden of establishing fraudulent joinder. Plaintiffs rely on Blanton’s acknowledgment that at

the time of the May 2004 accident, he “served as Operations Superintendent for Shell’s

Yellowhammer Plant and Fairway Field in Mobile, Alabama.” (Blanton Decl., ¶ 3.) As

Operations Superintendent, plaintiffs assert, Blanton’s duties and responsibilities necessarily

would have included items (e.g., responsibility for providing workers with a safe place to work,

for providing workers with safe and proper equipment and materials, for establishing safe work

practices, for adequately supervising work performed on the platform rig, for eliminating known

hazardous conditions on the site, and the like) that form the basis of plaintiffs’ negligence and

wantonness theories of liability. (Plaintiffs’ Brief (doc. 5), at 12.) 

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 6 of 18
4 Defendants assert that plaintiffs’ filings “fail[] to articulate in any manner the

responsibilities and specific duties purportedly breached by Blanton.” (Opposition Brief, at 14.) 

This statement is incorrect. The Complaint enumerates a laundry list of responsibilities and

duties purportedly breached by defendants as a group, and plaintiffs’ briefs assert that Blanton’s

Operations Superintendent job vested those responsibilities and specific duties in him. 

Therefore, the Court cannot agree with defendants’ characterization that the allegations against

Blanton are devoid of content.

5 Under Alabama law, an employee may be held personally liable for the

corporation’s negligent acts only if he has breached a duty that “contributed to, or helped bring

about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act.” Crigler v. Salac,

438 So.2d 1375, 1380 (Ala. 1983); see also Turner v. Hayes, 719 So.2d 1184, 1188

(Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (“[C]orporate employees are liable personally for the wrongful action of the

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Defendants respond by decrying plaintiffs’ failure to identify specific allegations against

Blanton and their approach of “theorizing” that his duties included those at the core of their

negligence and wantonness claims. (Defendants’ Opposition (doc. 10), at 13-14.)4

 Defendants

appear to be arguing that Blanton is fraudulently joined because plaintiffs have not proven that

his Operations Superintendent duties encompassed the supervisory, safety, and other

responsibilities that form the cornerstone of plaintiffs’ negligence and wantonness theories. But

this argument turns the applicable burden of proof on its head. As discussed supra, the law of

this Circuit leaves no doubt that (a) the removing defendant has the burden of proving that there

is no possibility that a cause of action can be established against the resident defendant, (b) this

burden is heavy, and (c) the district court is charged with “drawing all reasonable inferences

from the record in the plaintiff’s favor and then resolving all contested issues of fact in favor of

the plaintiff.” Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538, 1541-42. For fraudulent joinder purposes, plaintiffs do

not have to prove the alleged nexus between Blanton’s Operations Superintendent job duties and

the safety/supervisory duties at the heart of the negligence and wantonness claims. Rather,

defendants have the burden of showing that no such nexus exists. This they have not done. 

Defendants proffer no evidence that those safety and supervisory roles were beyond Blanton’s

purview as Operations Superintendent of that facility. Viewed in the light most favorable to

plaintiffs, then, the record shows that the claims against Blanton rest on alleged breach of duties

to perform certain safety and supervisory functions at the platform rig where the accident

occurred, and that Blanton was Operations Superintendent at the rig at the time of the accident.5

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 7 of 18
company ... only if they personally participate in the tort.”). Such personal participation has

been adequately alleged here.

6 The Court is sensitive to the Legg court’s admonition that factual questions can be

resolved in a plaintiff’s favor on fraudulent joinder analysis only where factual questions

actually exist. See Legg, 428 F.3d at 1323. In that regard, defendants’ fraudulent joinder

argument might rest on a different footing had they presented undisputed evidence that, as

Operations Superintendent of the Yellowhammer Plant, Blanton had no responsibility in May

2004 for supervising the work on the platform rig, for establishing or implementing safety

procedures, for furnishing workers on-site with appropriate equipment and materials, and for

remediating known hazardous conditions. But defendants have never even suggested that those

responsibilities fell outside the scope of Blanton’s job duties. Instead, defendants attempt to shift

the burden to plaintiffs to prove that such duties did fall within Blanton’s job description. This

maneuver is foreclosed by Legg, Crowe and a host of other binding authorities.

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In the absence of any proof from defendants that Blanton’s Operations Superintendent job did

not include those functions, plaintiffs need make no further showing to withstand a fraudulent

joinder challenge.6

Nor is defendants’ invocation of Rule 8 availing for purposes of their fraudulent joinder

argument. A recurring theme in defendants’ filings is that pleading rules in the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure forbid plaintiffs from naming an individual defendant in a complaint without

identifying specific facts reciting his alleged acts and omissions. (Notice of Removal, at 6 n.5;

Opposition Brief, at 14.) This argument does not bolster defendants’ fraudulent joinder claims. 

To be sure, the Complaint could have more expansively delineated the factual basis of the

liability that plaintiffs ascribe to Blanton. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require

only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule

8(a)(2). Applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that “the threshold of

sufficiency to which a complaint is held at the motion-to-dismiss stage is exceedingly low.” 

United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). The rules do not oblige a

plaintiff to plead its claims with as much specificity as it can. See In re Southeast Banking

Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1551 (11th Cir. 1995) (“For better or for worse, the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure do not permit district courts to impose upon plaintiffs the burden to plead with the

greatest specificity they can.”). Under the law of this circuit, “[a] complaint need not specify in

detail the precise theory giving rise to recovery. All that is required is that the defendant be on

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 8 of 18
7 In arguing to the contrary, defendants argue that plaintiffs “merely list a number

of Shell employees that they think are Alabama citizens and aver that they must have done

something wrong” and that they “simply go down the chain of command theoretically suing

individuals solely for the purpose of destroying diversity jurisdiction.” (Opposition Brief, at 14.) 

Such rhetoric is misplaced here. Far from randomly suing Shell employees willy-nilly in hopes

that they might be Alabama citizens who defeat diversity jurisdiction, plaintiffs have named as a

defendant the person who was Operations Superintendent at the facility when the accident

occurred. If, as it appears, the Operations Superintendent is a ranking manager vested with

wide-ranging responsibilities for operation of the facility, then plaintiffs’ decision to name

Blanton as a defendant was neither inappropriate nor forum-shopping gamesmanship. There are

undoubtedly cases where plaintiffs strategically sue superfluous individual defendants for

diversity reasons when the real defendant is the corporate employer of such individuals;

however, nothing before the Court suggests that this is such a case.

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notice as to the claim being asserted against him and the grounds on which it rests.” Sams v.

United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, 866 F.2d 1380, 1384 (11th

Cir. 1989). The Complaint was undeniably sufficient to place Blanton on notice of these

matters; therefore, it passes muster under the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.7

The bottom line in any fraudulent joinder analysis is that the district court’s role is

“limited to checking for obviously fraudulent or frivolous claims.” Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1542. 

After careful review of the materials presented by the parties, the Court finds that defendants

have not satisfied their burden of establishing that plaintiffs’ claims against Blanton are

obviously fraudulent or frivolous; therefore, the fraudulent joinder objection to the Motion to

Remand is overruled.

Before leaving the fraudulent joinder issue, the Court notes that defendants have

requested permission “to take limited discovery regarding plaintiffs’ allegations against Blanton

in order to determine whether plaintiffs can state a legally sufficient claim against him.” 

(Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Take Limited Discovery, at 2.) No authority is presented for

this novel request, nor have defendants outlined any legal, equitable or practical reason that

might warrant the granting of such an unusual remedy. Paragraphs 7, 9, 11 and 14 of the

Complaint plainly delineate the duties that defendants (including Blanton) are alleged to have

breached with respect to plaintiffs’ negligence and wantonness theories. Given that plaintiffs’

allegations against Blanton are clearly expressed in the Complaint and plaintiffs’ accompanying

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 9 of 18
8 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not make allowance for the type of

exploratory discovery requested by defendants. If a complaint is too vague, too ambiguous or

too incomprehensible to enable a defendant to ascertain whether it states a cognizable claim,

then the defendant’s recourse is to file a motion for more definite statement under Rule 12(e),

Fed.R.Civ.P. In the absence of a Rule 12(e) motion (which has not been and could not

reasonably be filed here, given the adequacy of the allegations against Blanton under a Rule 8(a)

analysis), the legal sufficiency of a complaint for Rule 12(b) purposes is determined based on the

as-is status of the complaint, so the notion of taking preliminary discovery of plaintiffs “in order

to determine whether plaintiffs can state a legally sufficient claim” that might survive Rule 12(b)

scrutiny is a concept that is utterly foreign to the applicable procedural framework.

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filings, the Court perceives no useful benefit to the litigants, the Court, or the interests of justice

to be gained by authorizing defendants to take unspecified discovery “regarding plaintiffs’

allegations against Blanton” at the outset of these proceedings. Given the undersigned’s implicit

finding, supra, that the Complaint adequately states claims against Blanton, no useful purpose

could be served by taking the extraordinary and logically stilted step of authorizing preliminary

discovery as to the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Take

Limited Discovery (doc. 9) is denied.

8

B. Domicile Issue.

In removing this action from state court, defendants represented that Blanton is a citizen

and resident of Louisiana, and that he is therefore of diverse citizenship from plaintiffs, all of

whom are Alabama citizens. (Joint Notice of Removal, ¶¶ 6, 9.) Plaintiffs contest this

characterization of Blanton’s citizenship, arguing that he is in fact an Alabama citizen. This

dispute is not simply academic. If Blanton is properly deemed a Louisiana citizen, then his

presence does not destroy federal subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. If, however,

Blanton is an Alabama citizen, then he is non-diverse from plaintiffs (who are undisputedly also

Alabama citizens) and defendants cannot rely on the diversity provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as

a basis for removal jurisdiction.

1. Legal Standard for Assessing Citizenship.

For diversity purposes, a person is a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled. See

McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Citizenship is equivalent to

‘domicile’ for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.”); Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d

358, 366 (1st Cir. 2001) (same). “Domicile,” in turn, is properly defined as “the place of his true,

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 10 of 18
9 In this regard, a critical distinction emerges between residence and domicile. As

a matter of law, a person residing in a particular state is not necessarily domiciled there, and

therefore is not necessarily a citizen of that state. See, e.g., Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians

v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (observing that “one can

reside in one place but be domiciled in another”); Chico v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Authority,

312 F. Supp.2d 153, 157 (D.P.R. 2004) (“Mere residence is insufficient to determine a party’s

jurisdictional status.”). That said, while the two concepts are analytically distinct, a party’s place

of residence is prima facie evidence of his domicile. See Chaara v. Intel Corp., 410 F. Supp.2d

1080, 1091 (D.N.M. 2005) (“Residence alone is not the equivalent of citizenship, but the place

of residence is prima facie the domicile.”) (citations omitted); Audi Performance & Racing, LLC

v. Kasberger, 273 F. Supp.2d 1220, 1226 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (recognizing presumption that state

of residence equates to domicile).

10 One appellate court has explained in colorful fashion that “in this age of second

homes and speedy transportation, picking out a single state to be an individual’s domicile can be

a difficult, even a rather arbitrary, undertaking. Domicile is not a thing, like a rabbit or a carrot,

but a legal conclusion ....” Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991).

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fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of

returning whenever he is absent therefrom.” Sunseri v. Macro Cellular Partners, 412 F.3d 1247,

1249 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); Valentin, 254 F.3d at 366; see also Kanter v. WarnerLambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A person’s domicile is her permanent home,

where she resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends to return.”); Broadwater v.

Heidtman Steel Products, Inc., 300 F. Supp.2d 671, 672 (S.D. Ill. 2003) (“An individual

defendant is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled, which is the place one intends to

remain.”) (citations omitted).9

Determination of a party’s domicile requires a “totality of the circumstances” approach

weighing a constellation of objective facts, no single one of which is entitled to controlling

weight. See Macone v. Nelson, 274 F. Supp.2d 136, 139 (D.P.R. 2003); Greenblatt v. Gluck, 265

F. Supp.2d 346, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Audi Performance & Racing, LLC v. Kasberger, 273 F.

Supp.2d 1220, 1227 (M.D. Ala. 2003).10 Among the numerous indicia considered are the state(s)

where civil and political rights are exercised, where taxes are paid, where real and personal

property are located, where driver's and other licenses are obtained, where mail is received,

where telephone numbers are maintained and listed, where bank accounts are maintained, where

places of business or employment are located, and where memberships in local professional,

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11 A recent district court opinion accurately summarized the authorities on this point

as follows: “To determine where an individual intends to remain, courts look for objective

manifestations of intent such as where the individual is employed and registered to vote; where

he pays taxes; the location of his bank accounts, personal property and any land he owns; and

whether the individual belongs to any clubs or organizations. ... Also, an individual's statement

that he intends to remain indefinitely in a particular state is given some weight.” O'Neal v.

Atwal, --- F. Supp.2d ----, 2006 WL 880240, *3 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 4, 2006)

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civil, religious or social organizations are established. See Macone, 274 F. Supp.2d at 139;

Greenblatt, 265 F. Supp.2d at 351; Audi, 273 F. Supp.2d at 1226.11 In addition to these objective

criteria, the domicile inquiry also considers a party’s subjective statements of intent, although

such representations are not dispositive. See Audi, 273 F. Supp.2d at 1227 (statements of intent

are also considered in determining domicile, but may be negated by other declarations or

inconsistent acts).

A party can have only one domicile at any given moment. See Valentin, 254 F.3d at 367. 

When one’s domicile is established, it can change only upon a concurrent showing of both (1)

physical presence at the new location, and (2) intent to remain there indefinitely. See

McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1258. As one district court in this circuit has explained:

“Once a person establishes a domicile, it continues until the person establishes a

new domicile. In this circuit, it is elementary that, to effect a change of one’s

legal domicile, two things are indispensable: First, residence in the new locality;

and second, the intention to remain there. The change cannot be made, except

facto et animo. Both are alike necessary. Either without the other is insufficient.”

Audi, 273 F. Supp.2d at 1226 (citations and emphasis omitted); see also Valentin, 254 F.3d at

366 (“in order to change domiciles, a person must move to a new state in which she intends to

remain indefinitely”). “When ... a party contends that it has changed its domicile, and that

contention has been challenged by the opposing party, there is a presumption of continuing

domicile that must be overcome.” Reynolds v. Wohl, 332 F. Supp.2d 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

This presumption imposes “a heavier burden on a party who is trying to show a change of

domicile than is placed on one who is trying to show the retention of an existing or former one.” 

Audi, 273 F. Supp.2d at 1226 (citation omitted). 

More generally, the burden on the question of Blanton’s domicile rests squarely with

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 12 of 18
12 Plaintiffs’ reliance on the 12-month occupancy condition as evidence that Blanton

must be domiciled in Alabama is curious because that mandatory occupancy period would have

expired in April 2005. The operative date for ascertaining Blanton’s domicile for purposes of

this litigation is February 1, 2006, when this action was filed in state court. See Freeport-

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defendants because it is they who seek a federal forum. See McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1257 (“the

party invoking the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, facts supporting the existence of federal jurisdiction”); Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at

1373 (“In a motion to remand, the removing party bears the burden of showing the existence of

federal jurisdiction.”); Reynolds, 332 F. Supp.2d at 656 (“Hornbook law provides that the party

invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving facts to establish that jurisdiction.”).

2. Application of Standard to Facts.

The parties have mustered conflicting evidence as to whether Blanton is domiciled in

Louisiana or Alabama for diversity purposes. In removing this action to federal court,

defendants represent that Blanton is domiciled in Louisiana because he undertook a work-related

move from Alabama to Louisiana in September 2004, he has lived and worked in Louisiana

since that time, and he intends to remain in Louisiana indefinitely.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand mounts a direct challenge to defendants’ representation in

the Notice of Removal that Blanton is a citizen and resident of Louisiana. To support their

position, plaintiffs unveil several items of investigative detective work that they contend

demonstrate that Blanton remains an Alabama citizen. Among the evidence to which plaintiffs

point is the following: (a) Blanton was served with process via certified mail (and appears to

have personally signed for same) in February 2006 at 5749 Carrick Road, Eight Mile, Alabama;

(b) the 2005-2006 BellSouth Real Yellow Pages for Greater Mobile lists telephone numbers for

“J Blanton” and “James Blanton” at that same 5749 Carrick Road address; (c) Mobile County

Probate Records reflect that Blanton entered into the latest of several mortgages on the 5749

Carrick Road property in May 2004; and (d) two mortgage documents executed by Blanton and

his spouse in April 2004 for the benefit of two different lenders included an occupancy provision

under which the Blantons agreed to occupy, establish and use 5749 Carrick Road as their

principal residence for at least one year, beginning no later than 60 days after execution of the

mortgage, unless the lenders waived that condition in writing.12 (Plaintiffs’ Brief, at 3-6.) 

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 13 of 18
McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 111 S.Ct. 858, 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991) (citing

“well-established rule that diversity of citizenship is assessed at the time the action is filed”);

Chaara, 410 F. Supp.2d at 1091 (explaining that events preceding or following the filing of the

complaint cannot defeat citizenship); Reynolds, 332 F. Supp.2d at 656 (similar). As such,

whether Blanton was domiciled in Alabama or not in April 2005, and whether he was in breach

of an occupancy clause in a mortgage instrument, is not relevant to the jurisdictional issue

presented here.

13 The format of the Blanton Declarations is questionable. Congress has provided

that unsworn declarations signed under penalty of perjury must be dated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746. 

Substantial compliance with § 1746 is all that is required. See, e.g., Pieszak v. Glendale

Adventist Medical Center, 112 F. Supp.2d 970, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (enumeration of month and

year is sufficient to constitute substantial compliance with date requirement of § 1746). But the

Blanton declarations plainly do not satisfy even that low threshold, as they neglect to mention

even month and year of execution. Nonetheless, as plaintiffs have not objected to the Blanton

declarations on the basis of this technical defect, the Court will not strike them sua sponte as

nonconforming under § 1746.

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According to plaintiffs, this evidence establishes that Blanton remains an Alabama citizen for

diversity purposes, notwithstanding his statements about having moved to Louisiana in 2004.

In support of their contention that Blanton is domiciled in Louisiana, defendants

primarily rely on two undated declarations executed by Blanton.13 In his earlier declaration,

Blanton avers that he presently works for Shell Oil Company in New Orleans, Louisiana; that he

moved to Louisiana in September 2004 to take his current job with Shell; that he has “worked

and resided in Louisiana since September of 2004”; that he anticipates continuing to work and

reside in Louisiana “for the foreseeable future” and “indefinitely”; that he files Louisiana tax

returns, has a Louisiana bank account, pays a Louisiana cable bill and purchases Louisiana

groceries; and that he does not intend to live or work in Alabama for the foreseeable future. 

(Doc. 1, at Exh. E, ¶¶ 2, 4-6.) Blanton’s subsequent declaration repeats and in some instances

expands on these points by stating that he has worked and resided in Louisiana since October

2004; that his wife and son have remained in Alabama to allow his son to complete high school,

with graduation to occur in May 2006; that Blanton’s wife “will move to Louisiana this summer

to join” him, at which time they plan to purchase a home in the New Orleans area and remain in

Louisiana indefinitely; that they plan to place their Alabama home on the market for sale in the

immediate future; that ever since October 2004 Blanton’s “sincere and fixed intention is to live

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 14 of 18
14 At most, Blanton offers that he paid Louisiana income taxes for 2004 and 2005

(without indicating whether he also paid Alabama taxes for those years), that he was employed

in Louisiana, that he has a bank account in Louisiana (again, without mentioning whether he also

has an Alabama account), that he pays a Louisiana cable bill (without referencing any other

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in Louisiana indefinitely and make it [his] personal residence”; and that he harbors “no intention

to return to Alabama in the foreseeable future.” (Doc. 10, at Exh. A, ¶¶ 2-6.)

Unfortunately, this record is incomplete and inconclusive as to Blanton’s domicile, as the

fragmentary evidence submitted by the parties raises more questions than it answers. The record

clearly reflects that Blanton was domiciled in Alabama prior to September 2004. Thus, he

remained domiciled in Alabama in February 2006 absent adequate evidence of a change in

domicile, which requires “concurrent showing of (1) physical presence at the new location with

(2) an intention to remain there indefinitely.” McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1258. On this record, the

Court cannot ascertain whether either element is satisfied. Concerning the presence element, it is

unclear from the vague statements in his declarations whether Blanton was always physically

present in Louisiana in February 2006, whether he was splitting time between Louisiana and

Alabama, and what the percentage breakdown of his time in the two states might have been. (He

was evidently physically present in Alabama on at least some occasions in February 2006, given

that he appears to have personally signed for the certified envelope containing the summons and

complaint.) As for the intent requirement, Blanton’s declarations profess the requisite intent to

remain in Louisiana indefinitely; however, such self-serving statements are of limited

evidentiary value and must be weighed in tandem with more objective evidence of intent. See

Audi, 273 F. Supp.2d at 1227 (indicating that declarations of intent to change domicile are

permissible, but “may lack persuasiveness or be negated by other declarations or inconsistent

acts”). As described supra, the case law identifies numerous objective indicia of intent,

including such factors as where civil and political rights are exercised, where taxes are paid,

where real and personal property are located, where driver's and other licenses are obtained,

where mail is received, where telephone numbers are maintained and listed, where bank accounts

are maintained, where places of business or employment are located, and where memberships in

local professional, civil, religious or social organizations are established. The record is silent on

most of these factors for Blanton as of February 2006.14

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 15 of 18
utilities, much less whether he is paying Alabama utility bills too), and that he buys groceries

and other goods in Louisiana (once again, without mentioning whether he is also purchasing

goods in Alabama).

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Because of the partial and inconclusive nature of the record, two drastically divergent

sets of inferences may be culled from the evidence presented. One plausible inference from

these facts is that when Blanton accepted a job in Louisiana in late 2004, he moved to that state

and never looked back, establishing roots in Louisiana and settling in to reside there for an

indefinite period of time. Another inference that one might extract from these facts is that

Blanton took a job in Louisiana, but as of February 2006 was continuing to shuttle back and

forth between Alabama and Louisiana, maintaining his residence in Alabama without taking

objective steps to establish a new residence in Louisiana, even though he intended to do so in the

future. Although the former situation would evince the requisite change of domicile, the latter

unquestionably would not. See, e.g., Audi, 273 F. Supp.2d at 1228 (no change in domicile where

defendant accepted job in Florida and lived in Florida part-time, but maintained principal

residence in Alabama, kept spouse and home furnishings in Alabama, paid for Alabama utilities,

utilized an Alabama driver’s license and vehicle registration/tag, was registered to vote in

Alabama, utilized an Alabama cell phone, and failed to establish membership in any Florida

organizations); Valentin, 254 F.3d at 367 (“An amorphous desire to relocate from one place to

another at an indeterminate future date does not suffice to effect a change of domicile.”).

To date, the parties have simply marshaled insufficient evidence to inform the Court’s

judgment as to whether Blanton had actually changed his domicile to Louisiana by February

2006, or whether he was merely planning to do so at some later date following his son’s

graduation from high school in Alabama. The jurisdictional significance of this distinction is

immense, so it would be manifestly inappropriate to render an off-the-cuff opinion based on an

incomplete record. Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that limited

jurisdictional discovery is necessary to identify a critical mass of relevant facts concerning

Blanton’s citizenship. Because this issue is of vital importance to an assessment of diversity

jurisdiction, the Court grants plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Take Limited Discovery (doc. 6),

as a matter of equity and fairness, in light of the uncertainty in the record and the legitimate

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 16 of 18
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grounds for questioning whether Blanton has actually changed his domicile from Alabama to

Louisiana.

That said, however, the Court is not authorizing free-ranging discovery regarding any

topics that might be of interest to the litigants. Rather, this preliminary round of discovery shall

be strictly limited to the question of Blanton’s domicile as of the date on which this lawsuit was

initiated. In the undersigned’s view, the requisite information needed to pinpoint Blanton’s

February 2006 domicile can be readily derived from taking his deposition, and perhaps engaging

in limited use of other discovery tools. In that regard, plaintiffs are authorized to propound

written discovery (not to exceed 10 interrogatories and 10 requests for production, with each

subpart to be counted separately) to Blanton. Such written discovery must be served by no later

than June 2, 2006, with responses due no later than July 3, 2006. Moreover, the parties are

ordered to cooperate in good faith to set a jurisdictional deposition of Blanton on or before July

10, 2006. The parties are directed to confer and cooperate in good faith in determining the

logistics of the deposition, including its date, time, location, and mode (e.g., in person,

telephonic, videoconference, etc.). This deposition (and all discovery authorized herein) must be

narrowly confined to exploration of domicile issues reasonably necessary for resolution of the

pending Motion to Remand, and may not veer into the merits of this dispute or any other

subjects, other than the common law factors considered in assessing Blanton’s domicile as of

February 2006. The discovery contemplated herein is not a substitute for, and in no way shall

preclude, merits discovery as to Blanton during the ordinary course of discovery if the Motion to

Remand is ultimately denied. 

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. Defendants’ objection to the Motion to Remand (doc. 4) on grounds that Blanton

was fraudulently joined is overruled.

2. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Take Limited Discovery (doc. 9) on the

fraudulent joinder issue is denied.

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Take Limited Discovery (doc. 6) on the issue of

Blanton’s domicile is granted, subjected to the parameters and constraints set

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 17 of 18
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forth above.

4. The Motion to Remand (doc. 4) will be held in abeyance on the question of

whether complete diversity of citizenship exists pending the completion of

jurisdictional discovery concerning Blanton’s domicile, as outlined above.

5. All parties may file supplemental briefs containing additional (not redundant)

information and argument on the subject of Blanton’s domicile on or before July

17, 2006, at which time the domicile issue presented in the Motion to Remand

will be taken under submission.

DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of May, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00149-WS-M Document 15 Filed 05/25/06 Page 18 of 18