Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00895/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00895-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:2101 Worker Adjustment and Retaining Notification Act

---

1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JUDY WEEKES-WALKER, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 3:10-cv-895-WKW-WC 

 ) 

MACON COUNTY GREYHOUND ) 

PARK, INC. (a/k/a Victory Land), ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 Before the court are several post-judgment motions and briefs filed by the Plaintiff Class, 

Defendant, and a non-party. On December 9, 2014, the District Judge entered an Order (Doc. 

190) referring several matters to United States Magistrate Judge Charles S. Coody, including the 

following: (1) Defendant’s Motion to Quash or, in the Alternative, to Stay Writ of Garnishment 

(Doc. 177); (2) Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Join Patricia McGregor as Party Defendant (Doc. 

183); (3) Defendant’s Motion to Stay Motion to Join Patricia McGregor as a Party Defendant 

and Motion for Writ of Execution on Fraudulently Conveyed Assets (Doc. 186); and (4) 

Plaintiffs’ Verified Application for Writ of Execution (Doc. 189). Subsequently, Judge Coody 

entered an Order (Doc. 194) instructing the parties to file any further responses in support or 

opposition to those matters pending before him. Plaintiffs filed an additional brief in support of 

their various filings. See Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 195). On March 23, 2015, this matter was reassigned to 

the undersigned Magistrate Judge. On July 14, 2015, the undersigned conducted a status hearing 

with counsel for all parties and non-party Patricia McGregor in attendance. Pursuant to the 

undersigned’s direction at the hearing, counsel for Patricia McGregor filed a brief (Doc. 203) on 

behalf of Mrs. McGregor in which she joined in Defendant’s request that this court stay 

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Plaintiffs’ writ of garnishment, motion for writ of execution, and motion to add her as a party 

defendant. Plaintiffs then filed a response (Doc. 205) in opposition to Mrs. McGregor’s brief. 

All of these matters are before the undersigned and are ripe for decision or recommendation to 

the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that 

Defendant’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 186) be granted, and that this court abstain from adjudicating 

Plaintiffs’ claim that certain assets of Defendant were fraudulent transferred to Mrs. McGregor. 

I. BACKGROUND

 This case was filed nearly five years ago, and a final judgment (Doc. 168) was entered 

more than one year ago. The particulars of the claims brought by Plaintiffs and the outcome of 

same are not necessarily germane to the matters presently before the court. It is sufficed for 

present purposes to note that Plaintiffs are a class of former employees of Defendant who 

brought suit pursuant to the Worker’s Adjustment and Retraining (“WARN”) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 

2101, et seq., after a series of “mass layoffs” or “plant closings” at Defendant’s electronic 

gaming facility, Victoryland, in 2010. Final Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs on July 

22, 2014, in the amount of two million seven hundred thirty-four thousand eight hundred fiftyone dollars and 63/100 ($2,734,851.63), with said amount to include Plaintiffs’ monetary 

judgment, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. Final Judg. (Doc. 168) at 1. 

 On October 23, 2014, Plaintiffs filed with the Clerk of Court a Verified Application for 

Writ of Garnishment (Doc. 169) seeking to have garnished from the garnishee, Lower 

Tallapoosa Timber, any debt or effects owed or possessed by the garnishee for Defendant. On 

October 27, 2014, the Writ of Garnishment (Doc. 170) was issued by the Clerk and it was served 

on Lower Tallapoosa Timber on November 5, 2015. See Return of Service of Writ of 

Garnishment (Doc. 173). On November 12, 2014, Lower Tallapoosa Timber filed its Answer 

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(Doc. 175) to the writ of garnishment, disclosing that it has in its possession non-exempt 

property belonging to the Defendant and consisting of “timber stumpage.”1

 

 On November 12, 2014, Plaintiffs filed, under seal, their initial “Motion to Join Patricia 

McGregor as Party Defendant and Motion for Writ of Execution on Fraudulently Conveyed 

Assets” (Doc. 174-1). In the motion, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “made conveyances 

involving real and personal property in anticipation” of the judgment obtained by Plaintiffs, that 

such “conveyances are in violation of Alabama’s Fraudulent Transfer Act[,]” and that this court 

“may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds” pursuant to Alabama law. Id. 

Plaintiffs’ Verified Application for Writ of Execution further (Doc. 174-2) sought execution on 

several items of personal and real property said to be in the possession of Defendant. The 

following day, on November 13, 2014, Mrs. McGregor filed a Complaint for Declaratory 

Judgment (Doc. 177-1) in the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama, in which she describes a 

number of loan transactions she made to benefit Defendant in return for a promissory note which 

was secured by a mortgage executed by Defendant in her favor on September 27, 2012, and 

recorded in Macon County Probate records on February 5, 2013. In her state court action, Mrs. 

McGregor requests that the state court declare that her mortgage is a valid, enforceable lien on 

the subject property owned by Defendant, and that, under Alabama law, her mortgage primes the 

judgment obtained by Plaintiffs in this action because the Certificate of Judgment was not filed 

by Plaintiffs in Macon County until October 30, 2014. 

 Subsequently, on November 18, 2014, Defendant filed its Motion to Quash, or in the 

Alternative, to Stay, Writ of Garnishment (Doc. 177), contending that the Writ of Garnishment to 

 

1

 Notably, the Answer does not indicate a dollar amount or valuation of the “timber stumpage” held by 

Lower Tallapoosa Timber. Nor, as best the undersigned can tell, do any of the parties, or non-party, 

indicate precisely what is at stake, in concrete monetary terms, in the Writ of Garnishment issued to 

Lower Tallapoosa Timber. 

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Lower Tallapoosa Timber should be quashed because the prior recording of Mrs. McGregor’s 

mortgage vis a vis Plaintiffs’ judgment gives her priority under Alabama law. In the alternative, 

Defendant contends that, in light of Mrs. McGregor’s pending state court action, this court 

should stay the Writ of Garnishment and abstain from deciding any issues surrounding the 

validity or priority of Mrs. McGregor’s mortgage pursuant to the principles articulated by the 

Supreme Court in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 

(1976). The various briefs and procedural developments already described above followed.2

II. DISCUSSION

 As a preliminary matter, the court addresses its jurisdiction to consider this matter. 

Neither Defendant nor Mrs. McGregor appear to argue that the court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider the various post-judgment enforcement measures brought by Plaintiffs, including their 

claim that Mrs. McGregor was the recipient of one or more fraudulent transfers by Defendant. 

Thus, as Plaintiff argues, and as the undersigned acknowledged at the status hearing in this 

matter, subject to some conditions, the court maintains such ancillary jurisdiction as is necessary 

to enforce its judgment, including the authority to consider in a supplementary proceeding 

whether a fraudulent transfer should be avoided. See, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 

356-58 (1996) (“[W]e have approved the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of 

supplementary proceedings involving third parties to assist in the protection and enforcement of 

 

2

 In addition to the writ of garnishment served on Lower Tallapoosa Timber, the District Judge has 

referred Plaintiffs’ Verified Application for Writ of Execution (Doc. 189), which was filed on December 

9, 2014. In the application, Plaintiffs’ request that the court levy execution upon several items of personal 

property and a parcel of real property said to be in the possession of Defendant. Because Plaintiffs are 

seeking to execute upon an aircraft which was pledged as security for a loan Mrs. McGregor extended to 

Defendant on August 20, 2013, and said loan has not yet been satisfied by Defendant, Mrs. McGregor has 

amended her state court complaint “to seek a declaration that the Aircraft Security Agreement is a valid, 

enforceable lien on the Aircraft which primes the Plaintiffs’ judgment.” Def.’s Mot. To Stay (Doc. 186) 

at 3. Accordingly, the validity of the Aircraft Security Agreement, and Plaintiffs’ claim that such is the 

product of a fraudulent transfer, is before this court in the same fashion as is Mrs. McGregor’s mortgage 

on the property subject to Plaintiffs’ writ of garnishment. 

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federal judgments—including . . . the prejudgment avoidance of fraudulent conveyances.”). Of 

course, this ancillary jurisdiction is not without limits. The court is not free to entertain a 

supplementary proceeding with the intended effect of bringing “a new lawsuit to impose liability 

for a judgment on a third party” that was not a party of the lawsuit resulting in the judgment 

already entered by the court. Id. at 359. See also Nat’l Maritime Servs., Inc. v. Straub, 776 F.3d 

783, 786-87 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he district court had ancillary jurisdiction over this 

supplementary proceeding because National Maritime sought to disgorge Straub of a 

fraudulently transferred asset, not to impose liability for a judgment on a third party.”). Thus, 

any supplementary proceeding instituted by Plaintiffs with the aim of imposing liability on Mrs. 

McGregor is limited to the value of any interest which was fraudulently transferred to her by 

Defendant, and may not result in personal liability for Mrs. McGregor for any unsatisfied amount 

of the judgment in excess of any purported fraudulent transfer for her benefit. Id. at 787. 

Plaintiffs acknowledge this reality and maintain they “are not seeking to impose personal 

liability on Mrs. McGregor,” but are instead only seeking to “obtain satisfaction of their 

judgment from assets that belong to the defendant.” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 181) at 4. 

 An additional limitation on the court’s ancillary jurisdiction in enforcing its judgment by 

way of execution is that the “procedure of execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and 

in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is 

located[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). Thus, any supplementary proceeding brought by Plaintiffs 

and adjudicated by this court must comport with the procedures applicable to same under 

Alabama law. Although courts have opined that Rule 69 is not meant to “put the judge into a 

procedural straightjacket whether of state or federal origin[,]” Resolution Trust Corp. v. 

Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993), this court must generally observe and follow the 

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procedures established under Alabama law, including particularly the Alabama Fraudulent 

Transfer Act, Ala. Code § 8-9A-1, et seq., in any supplementary proceeding brought by Plaintiffs 

for the purpose of avoiding supposedly fraudulent transfers by Defendant in anticipation of the 

judgment entered in this case. 

 “Straightjacketed” or not, Circuit precedent makes clear that state law pertaining to 

ancillary proceedings to enforce a judgment is vital to determining how this court may proceed 

in this area. For example, Florida law plainly permits a judgment creditor to initiate a 

supplementary proceeding and implead a supplemental defendant for purposes of challenging a 

supposedly fraudulent transfer to that party. See, e.g., Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale Materials 

Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1496 n.22 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Florida Statute 56.29 sets forth the 

procedures for impleading supplemental defendants. Under decisional law interpreting 56.29, 

the two jurisdictional prerequisites for supplementary proceedings are (1) an unsatisfied writ of 

execution, and (2) an affidavit averring that the writ is valid and unsatisfied along with a list of 

persons to be impleaded.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). As such, federal courts 

have repeatedly applied Florida law in supplementary proceedings challenging supposedly 

fraudulent transfers under Rule 69. See, e.g., Straub, 776 F.3d 786-88. 

 On the other hand, where state law is less clear about the exact procedures to be followed 

under state law, federal courts are more guarded in their application of Rule 69. See, e.g., 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. C-Staff, Inc., 280 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that 

Georgia law “does not expressly authorize the commencement of supplementary proceedings 

against third-parties for the enforcement of a judgment” and certifying appropriate question to 

the Georgia Supreme Court).3

 Although it appears the judgment creditor in C-Staff was 

 

3

 For what it is worth, the Supreme Court of Georgia ultimately determined that Georgia law does not 

permit a judgment debtor to implead and hold liable persons who were not parties to the judgment. CCase 3:10-cv-00895-WKW-WC Document 241 Filed 09/02/15 Page 6 of 22
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attempting to hold the putative third party defendants personally liable for the judgment entered 

against C-Staff, the lack of clarity about Georgia law discussed in that case is consequential even 

in cases where, as here, the judgment creditor seeks only to impose liability up to the amount of 

any fraudulently transferred interest to the third party. See Reyes-Fuentes v. Shannon Produce 

Farm, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-059, Order (Doc. 73), 2012 WL 3562399, *4-*6 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 

2012) (finding that, although plaintiffs were not seeking to hold a wife of a party defendant, who 

allegedly benefitted from a fraudulent transfer by the defendant, personally liable for the 

judgment, “Georgia law does not statutorily provide for supplementary proceedings in which 

motions and complaints challenging fraudulent conveyances may be raised . . . [and that the] 

proper procedure appears to be the filing of a new complaint seeking the avoidance of the 

fraudulent conveyance along with other remedies.”).4

 Given all of the above, while more than satisfied that a federal court may, as a general 

matter, exercise ancillary jurisdiction over supplementary proceedings to enforce a judgment, 

including those seeking to avoid a fraudulent transfer, the undersigned has some reservations 

about whether the court may do so in this specific instance and what are the specific procedures 

 

Staff, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Ga. 624,625-26, 571 S.E.2d 383, 384-85 (Ga. 2002). Instead, the 

Court held, “ a judgment-creditor in Georgia must initiate a civil action against those it seeks to hold 

responsible for satisfying the debt by following the procedures set forth in the Civil Practice Act, which 

requires a complaint to be filed and the defendants to be served with process.” Id., 275 Ga. at 626, 571 

S.E.2d at 385. 

4

 The plaintiffs in Reyes-Fuentes “filed a post-judgment complaint to void an allegedly fraudulent 

transfer from Defendant Ricardo Gaspar to his wife, Glenda Caspar.” 2012 WL 3562399, *1. That 

document, styled “Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Fraudulent Transfer” was in the form of a third-party 

complaint, succinctly alleging the court’s jurisdiction, identifying all parties, and presenting detailed, 

separately numbered factual allegations about the alleged fraudulent transfer as well as the specific 

provisions of Georgia law violated by the alleged transfer. See Reyes-Fuentes, No. 6:08-cv-059, Third 

Party Complaint (Doc. 59, filed Feb. 7, 2012). Although the District Court in Reyes-Fuentes determined 

that Georgia law did not permit a supplementary proceeding to litigate issues of alleged fraudulent 

conveyances to third parties, because the post-judgment complaint otherwise complied with Georgia law 

concerning filing and service of civil complaints, the court determined it would “be inefficient to order 

Plaintiffs to re-file their fraudulent transfer complaint” and therefore directed the Clerk of Court to “open 

a new case for the adjudication of Plaintiffs’ complaint.” 2012 WL 3562399, *6. 

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to be applied under Alabama law. In particular, the undersigned is concerned with whether 

Alabama law permits a judgment creditor to bring a supplementary proceeding challenging a 

supposedly fraudulent transfer to a non-party, or if such a party is required by Alabama law, as in 

Georgia, to bring a separate civil action for fraudulent transfer against such third party. As best 

the court can tell, Plaintiffs have presented no authority for their implicit proposition that 

Alabama law permits what they are trying to do in this case. Plaintiffs appear to believe that it is 

as simple as filing a motion to “add” or “join” Patricia McGregor as a party defendant, cause the 

court to find (presumably after some sort of hearing before a duly authorized finder of facts) that 

the mortgage and security interest given to her were fraudulent, and proceed to order execution 

on Defendant’s assets “free and clear of any claims of Mrs. McGregor.” See Pls.’ Am. Mot. 

(Doc. 183) at 6-7; Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 195) at 14. However, again, there are no citations to Alabama 

statutory or decisional law confirming that, indeed, this is the procedure in Alabama. Elsewhere, 

Plaintiffs have argued that they “requested that Mrs. McGregor be added as a party to this 

litigation only to satisfy the requirements of due process[,]” Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 205) at 6, but, again, 

Plaintiffs cite to no law establishing that this is all Alabama law, or even “due process,” requires. 

As with the Georgia law discussed in C-Stop, supra, nothing in the discrete provisions of the 

Alabama Fraudulent Transfer Act appears to address this question.5

 Perhaps there is authority 

existing somewhere in Alabama statutes, rules, or cases establishing the propriety of Plaintiffs’ 

efforts in this court, but it is incumbent upon them to present that authority to the court when 

asking it to exercise its ancillary jurisdiction over a state-law-controlled execution proceeding 

 

5

 The Act merely provides, at Ala. Code § 8-9A-7(b), that “[i]f a creditor has obtained a judgment on a 

claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or 

its proceeds.” Plaintiffs have not cited, and the court is unaware of, any Alabama case interpreting the 

Act in a fashion similar to Florida’s law, as discussed in Straub and General Trading Inc., supra. 

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under Rule 69.6

 Accordingly, the undersigned is not entirely satisfied that Plaintiffs have 

sufficiently instituted supplementary proceedings, in compliance with Alabama law, seeking to 

set aside any supposedly fraudulent transfer to Mrs. McGregor. 

 In sum, while the court is undoubtedly vested with some ancillary jurisdiction over postjudgment matters seeking to enforce its judgment, such jurisdiction is not without limits and, in 

the specific circumstance in which Plaintiffs presently invoke it, it must be exercised with 

fidelity to the procedures which would be available to Plaintiffs under Alabama law. With the 

reservations described above, the undersigned assumes for purposes of this Recommendation 

that it may exercise jurisdiction as urged by Plaintiffs. However, distinct from the question of 

whether this court may exercise jurisdiction in this specific instance, the filings by the parties 

raise the issue of whether this court should exercise jurisdiction in this instance. To this end, the 

undersigned turns to Defendant’s argument that, even if this court may exercise jurisdiction, it 

should abstain from deciding the matters before it pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine. 

 The Eleventh Circuit has described the abstention doctrine of Colorado River, and 

particularly the judiciousness with which it is to be applied, as follows: 

 

6

 As discussed above, this is not merely an academic question. Rather, it determines whether, and how, 

the court should proceed. As recognized in Straub, Florida law appears to permit a supplementary 

proceeding to impose liability on a third party where the judgment creditor seeks only to recover 

“fraudulently transferred asset from a third party.” See 776 F.3d at 788. However, as discussed in the CStop cases and Reyes-Fuentes, Georgia law does not appear to authorize such proceedings and, instead, a 

new, separate proceeding alleging a fraudulent transfer must be brought against the transferee, even 

where, as here, the judgment creditor seeks to recover only the amount of the supposedly fraudulent 

transfer and does not seek to hold the third party personally liable for the judgment entered against the 

defendant. If Alabama law is like that of Florida, then the court’s exercise of jurisdiction as requested by 

Plaintiffs does not appear problematic. If, however, Alabama’s law is more akin to Georgia’s, then the 

court must assess whether Plaintiff’s “Amended Motion to Join Patricia McGregor as Party Defendant” 

(Doc. 183) suffices under Alabama law as a complaint for purposes of bringing a cause of action for 

fraudulent transfer as to Mrs. McGregor, as the district court found in Reyes-Flores. Furthermore, even if 

Plaintiffs’ “Amended Motion” is sufficient for that purpose, it does not appear that the “Amended 

Motion” was served upon Mrs. McGregor by Plaintiffs. See Cert. of Serv. (Doc. 183) at 8. 

Notwithstanding any lack of service on Mrs. McGregor, her attorneys have entered limited appearances in 

this court, as directed by the undersigned, for purposes of filing her brief in support of Defendant’s 

motion to stay proceedings. 

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In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, the Supreme 

Court held that a federal court could abstain from a case if (1) a parallel lawsuit 

was proceeding in state court, and (2) judicial-administration reasons so 

demanded abstention. 424 U.S. 800, 818–20 (1976). Since the general rule is 

that “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings 

concerning the same matter” in federal court, and since the federal courts have a 

virtually unflagging obligation to exercise their jurisdiction, Colorado River

abstention applies in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 817–18 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Only the clearest of justifications” merits abstention. Id. at 819. 

As the Supreme Court explained, and as this Court has repeatedly cautioned, 

abstention “is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District 

Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.” Id. at 813 (quoting Cnty. of 

Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959)); Ambrosia Coal 

& Constr. Co. v. Pagés Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir.2004); see also 

Met. Life v. Lockette, 155 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir.1998) (“Abstention from the 

exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.”). And while 

abstention as a general matter is rare, Colorado River abstention is particularly 

rare, “permissible in fewer circumstances than are the other abstention doctrines.” 

Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1331. Thus, we have cautioned that “dismissal of an 

action in deference to parallel state proceedings is an extraordinary step that 

should not be undertaken absent a danger of a serious waste of judicial resources.” 

Noonan S., Inc. v. Cnty. of Volusia, 841 F.2d 380, 383 (11th Cir.1988); see also 

First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. McCollum, 144 F.3d 1362, 1364 (11th Cir.1998) (per 

curiam) (“[D]ismissal is warranted in light of a concurrent state court action only 

when a balancing of relevant factors, heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of 

jurisdiction, shows the case to be exceptional.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Electric Capital Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1140 (11th Cir. 2013). So, in 

order for Colorado River abstention to apply, there must be a parallel state court proceeding and 

the court must consider whether a number of “judicial administration” factors warrant abstention 

in deference to the parallel state court proceeding. 

 The “judicial administration” factors relevant to whether a federal court should abstain to 

a parallel state court proceeding include the following: “(1) whether one of the courts has 

assumed jurisdiction over property, (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) the potential 

for piecemeal litigation, (4) the order in which the fora obtained jurisdiction, (5) whether state or 

federal law will be applied, and (6) the adequacy of the state court to protect the parties' rights.” 

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Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1331. “No single factor is dispositive, and [a federal court is] 

required to weigh the factors with a heavy bias favoring the federal courts’ obligation to exercise 

the jurisdiction that Congress has given them.” Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1141. Nevertheless, 

where the federal court finds it to be sufficiently compelling or extraordinary, “[o]ne factor alone 

can be the sole motivating reason for the abstention.” Moorer v. Demopolis Waterworks & 

Sewer Bd., 374 F.3d 994, 997 (11th Cir. 2004). See also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (noting that in Colorado River itself, the Supreme 

Court’s approval of abstention was predicated on the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation). 

 The undersigned first considers whether Mrs. McGregor’s state court declaratory 

judgment action is a parallel proceeding. The court must determine whether the proceedings 

“involve substantially the same parties and substantially the same issues.” Ambrosia Coal, 368 

F.3d at 1330. Defendant asserts that “Plaintiffs’ proposed fraudulent conveyance claim against 

Mrs. McGregor and their motion for writ of execution on the Mortgaged Property and the 

Aircraft present the identical issues, as the Plaintiffs are entitled to such relief only if the 

Mortgage and Aircraft Security Agreement are invalid.” Def.’s Mot. To Stay (Doc. 186) at 4. 

Without ever explicitly discussing the requirements of Colorado River abstention, Plaintiffs 

appear to assert that Mrs. McGregor’s state court action is not a parallel proceeding. 

 The issue of whether or not the mortgage and security interest claimed by 

Mrs. McGregor is a fraudulent conveyance is not pending in any court other than 

this Court. After the Class attempted to execute against the assets of MCGP, 

attorneys for Mrs. McGregor filed her lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Macon 

County, Alabama, purportedly to determine the priority of her mortgage with 

regard to the Class’ judgment. That litigation does not raise the issue of whether 

or not her claim is a fraudulent conveyance. MCGP is not even a party to that 

lawsuit. MCGP made the fraudulent conveyances of assets that it still controls, 

and Mrs. McGregor’s lawsuit only delays this Court from holding that the 

mortgage and security interest are fraudulent conveyances (due to be disregarded 

by this Court) and executing on MCGP’s assets. 

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Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 205) at 6 (emphasis in original). 

 To the extent Plaintiffs are indeed arguing that there is not a parallel state court 

proceeding, the undersigned is not persuaded. Plaintiffs’ argument that Mrs. McGregor’s 

complaint concerns only the priority of her interest, while the pending litigation in this court 

concerns the validity of her interest in light of Plaintiffs’ claim that it was fraudulently 

transferred to her, is semantical at best. There can be no doubt that, unless Plaintiffs do not 

contest Mrs. McGregor’s priority in state court, Plaintiffs must, and will, raise their fraudulent 

transfer claim as a compulsory counterclaim in order to show that Mrs. McGregor’s mortgage 

and security interest are not valid and are therefore not entitled to priority over Plaintiffs’ 

judgment lien. See, e.g., Nat’l Council on Compensation Ins., Inc. v. Caro & Graifman, P.C., 

259 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179 n.2 (D. Conn. 2003) (remarking that, where pending federal suit sought 

declaratory judgment regarding distribution of escrow funds while state court action sought a 

declaratory judgment as to priority of a mortgage or a judgment lien, “a determination regarding 

the validity of C & C’s mortgage must be made before considering which lien has priority”).7

 

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs are arguing that Mrs. McGregor’s state court action is not 

parallel for Colorado River purposes because Defendant is not a party to that suit, the 

undersigned notes that this matter involves substantially the same parties because, in order to 

obtain the relief Plaintiffs seek, they are explicitly requesting that the court “add” or “join” Mrs. 

 

7

 Notably, the District Court in Caro & Graifman considered the competing claims and issues in state 

and federal court only in conjunction with its evaluation of one of the Colorado River abstention factors, 

namely, whether the state court proceeding could adequately protect the rights of the party contesting 

abstention. 259 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79 n.2. There does not appear to be any determination by the court 

that, despite that “the validity of C & C’s mortgage” was not a direct issue before the state court, the state 

court proceeding was not a parallel proceeding since the state court was tasked with resolving the priority 

of the relative liens and a “determination regarding the validity [of one lien] must be made before 

considering which lien has priority.” Id.

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13 

McGregor as a defendant in this matter and, as a practical matter, Defendant will be a party to 

any fraudulent transfer counterclaim which might be brought in state court.8

 Concluding, then, that Mrs. McGregor’s state court action is indeed a parallel proceeding, 

the court must consider whether the “judicial administration” factors described above warrant 

abstention in this instance. The first factor is whether this court or the state court has assumed 

jurisdiction over the in rem property at issue. The undersigned’s understanding is that neither 

this court nor the state court has yet assumed jurisdiction over the property. As such, this factor 

is neutral and, considering the heavy bias the court is to entertain when weighing the Colorado 

River factors, this factor weighs in favor of exercising jurisdiction. 

 The second factor is the relative inconvenience of the federal forum. This factor focuses 

“primarily on the physical proximity of the federal forum to the evidence and witnesses . . . .” 

Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1332. Defendant asserts that “the Macon County Circuit Court is 

more convenient for, and has a greater connection to, the parties” because Plaintiffs’ “original 

complaint arose out of actions relating to the Plaintiffs’ employment at VictoryLand in Macon 

County and the Mortgaged Property which the Plaintiffs seek to execute on is located in Macon 

County.” Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 186) at 5. Although Plaintiffs make numerous arguments about why 

the state court forum is inconvenient because it is “cumbersome” and would force them into a 

“procedural quagmire,” there is no disputing Defendant’s contention that Macon County is, 

minimally, where the Plaintiffs were employed when their federal causes of action arose and is 

also where the land which is the subject of the mortgage which was supposedly fraudulently 

transferred to Mrs. McGregor is situated. However, given the proximity of Macon County to the 

federal forum, the undersigned does not find that the federal forum is inconvenient and, 

 

8

 Plaintiffs appear to concede this point, arguing that Defendant “made the conveyances and will be a 

necessary party to the proceedings that decide that issue.” Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 205) at 10. 

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accordingly, this factor does not favor abstention. See Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1141 (“The 

federal forum neighbors Polk County, Florida, where the state forum is located. Hence, the 

federal forum and the state forum are equally convenient; this factor thus cuts against 

abstention.”). 

 The third factor is the potential for piecemeal litigation. This factor “does not favor 

abstention unless the circumstances enveloping those cases will likely lead to piecemeal 

litigation that is abnormally excessive or deleterious.” Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1333.9

 

Moreover, it “does not favor abstention when litigation is ‘inevitably piecemeal.’” JacksonPlatts, 727 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc., 743 

F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984)). Litigation is “inevitably piecemeal” where it will involve 

disparate legal theories and evidence in the two forums. Id. at 1442-43. See also Daniel v. 

Cullman Cnty. Court Referral, LLC, No. 5:15-cv-101-AKK, 2015 WL 3604210, *3 (N.D. Ala. 

June 8, 2015) (describing “inevitably piecemeal” litigation as occurring “where parties operate 

under disjunctive legal frameworks and must offer differing evidence and testimony”). 

Defendant asserts that this factor favors abstention because “the Plaintiffs and Mrs. McGregor 

will be litigating issues relating to the validity and priority of the Mortgage both here and in the 

Macon County Action.” Def.’s Mot. (Doc. 186) at 5. Plaintiffs do not appear to contest 

 

9

 Ambrosia Coal takes a particularly narrow view of the scope of this factor, reversing a district court’s 

decision to abstain which was based, the Eleventh Circuit summarized, on the fact that both the federal 

and state actions “deal with the validity of the Agreement.” 368 F.3d at 1333. The Circuit Court 

reasoned, “[o]n the district court’s misguided reasoning, the third Colorado River factor would seemingly 

support abstention in every federal case that has a parallel state case. If this mistaken approach were in 

fact the rule, defendants could always escape federal courts simply by filing parallel state lawsuits.” Id. 

Of course, in this instance, the parallel suit was not brought by the Defendant in this action, but was 

instead immediately initiated by a third party, Mrs. McGregor, when she learned that Plaintiffs charged 

her with having participated in fraudulent transactions involving Defendant. As such, Ambrosia Coal’s 

concern with forum manipulation by federal defendants is inapposite in this case. 

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Defendant’s argument that, should both actions proceed, both the state and federal courts will be 

applying the same substantive law to the same relevant pool of facts.10 

 In the undersigned’s view, this factor weighs in favor of abstention. It is evident that if 

this litigation proceeds in both courts, with Plaintiffs alleging a fraudulent transfer under the 

Alabama Fraudulent Transfer Act in both courts, the litigants and the court will be “exposed to 

unnecessary inconvenience, expense, and the danger of needless duplication of effort.” Daniel, 

2015 WL 3604210, *3. See also Amason & Assoc., Inc. v. Columbus Land Development, LLC, 

No. 7:12-cv-2459, 2014 WL 467509, *12 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 5, 2014) (“Having the same factual 

claims in state and federal courts causes unnecessary inconvenience and expense and raises a 

distinct danger of duplicative, piecemeal litigation. The more the two actions are alike, the more 

this is exacerbated.”). Likewise, should the state court determine that Mrs. McGregor’s action is 

not abated, the parallel litigation could foreseeably result in the sort of “conflicting obligations 

that the Colorado River doctrine seeks to avoid.” Daniel, 2015 WL 3604210, *3. Indeed, it is 

possible that Mrs. McGregor’s state court action could be resolved in a manner that would moot 

the fraudulent conveyance issue in this court. See, e.g., SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Parks, 

No. 14-cv-050, 2014 WL, *4 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 2014). For these reasons, so long as Mrs. 

McGregor’s action remains pending before the state court, the undersigned is of the conviction 

that the failure to abstain in this matter could result in piecemeal litigation.11 

 

10 Rather, Plaintiffs appear to argue that this factor does not favor abstention because Mrs. McGregor’s 

state court action is abated by this action under Alabama law. See Pls.’ Mot. In Opp. (Doc. 187) at 4. 

Indeed, Plaintiffs have filed a motion to dismiss Mrs. McGregor’s action under this theory. However, 

abatement is an issue for the state court and is not relevant to this court’s analysis of this factor. 

11 Of course, should the state court determine that Mrs. McGregor’s action should be dismissed pursuant 

to Alabama’s law on abatement, then this factor, indeed the entire question of abstention, is mooted and 

this court may proceed free of such concerns. 

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 The fourth factor is the order in which the respective fora obtained jurisdiction. “What 

matters is not so much the chronological order in which the parties initiated the concurrent 

proceedings, but the progress of the proceedings and whether the party availing itself of the 

federal forum should have acted earlier.” Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotation 

omitted). As discussed above, Plaintiffs first alleged a fraudulent conveyance and sought to 

“add” Mrs. McGregor as a defendant on November 12, 2014. The following day, November 13, 

2014, Mrs. McGregor filed her parallel state court action. The undersigned is advised that 

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to dismiss Mrs. McGregor’s action in state court, that Mrs. 

McGregor has responded in opposition, and that nothing further has transpired. See Pl.’s Br. 

(Doc. 205) at 14. In this court, there has only been a series of motions and briefs and a status 

hearing concerning the parties’ filings. Neither the state court nor this court has progressed 

appreciably beyond the initial filings seeking to invoke the respective courts’ jurisdictions over 

this issue. Assuming that Plaintiffs have indeed sufficiently invoked this court’s ancillary 

jurisdiction for purposes of conducting a supplementary proceeding under Alabama’s Fraudulent 

Transfer Act, which, as discussed above, is a tenuous assumption at this point, it is evident that 

this factor does not weigh considerably in one direction or the other. Neither court has 

progressed substantially on the respective issues and Plaintiffs are not entitled to significant 

credit in having raised the issue in federal court one day before Mrs. McGregor went to state 

court, especially considering that Mrs. McGregor had no reason to file anything anywhere, and 

could not have filed anything in federal court, to protect her interest until she is either made a 

party or, as happened here, her attorneys were directed to file something on her behalf before 

Plaintiffs’ motion to add her as a defendant is adjudicated. As such, the undersigned finds that 

this factor is, at most, neutral on the question of abstention.12

 

12 And, of course, if Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the court that Alabama law permits them to initiate a 

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 The fifth factor is whether state or federal law will be applied. “[T]his factor favors 

abstention only where the applicable state law is particularly complex or best left for state courts 

to resolve.” Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1143. Apart from the procedural questions discussed 

above, the undersigned does not find, and Defendant does not appear to argue, that Alabama’s 

Fraudulent Transfer Act is “particularly complex or best left for state courts to resolve.” As 

such, this factor favors the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court. 

 “The sixth and final factor concerns whether the state court can adequately protect the 

parties’ rights.” Id. This factor weighs in favor of or against abstention only “when one of the 

fora is inadequate to protect a party’s rights.” Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1333. It is as to this 

factor that Plaintiffs appear to present their most forceful argument in favor of this court 

exercising jurisdiction. While Plaintiffs do not appear to argue that the state court is incapable of 

fairly deciding their fraudulent transfer claim and otherwise declaring their rights relative to Mrs. 

McGregor, they repeatedly point to numerous perceived procedural difficulties in having to 

prosecute their fraudulent transfer claim in the state courts: 

The class members who own the judgment in this case are not parties to the State 

Court proceeding until the state court certifies this as a class action. Plaintiffs’ 

attorneys have not been appointed to represent the class by the State Court. Class 

representatives have not been appointed by the State Court. All the required 

procedures in State Court would be very cumbersome. Unless relief is granted in 

this case, that will certainly hinder and delay the collection of the judgment 

rendered by this Court. Unless this court exercises the jurisdiction to enforce the 

judgment, including the issue of fraudulent transfers, the Plaintiffs will be in a 

procedural quagmire. 

 

supplemental proceeding to enforce a judgment against a third party, or that their Amended Motion to 

Join Patricia McGregor as Party Defendant (Doc. 183) is indeed sufficient under Alabama law for that 

purpose, then this factor will weigh heavily in favor of abstention if not render the question moot since 

Plaintiffs would not have sufficiently invoked this court’s ancillary jurisdiction if the proceeding they are 

attempting to bring is not compliant with Alabama law. 

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Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 195) at 6. Plaintiffs argue that Mrs. McGregor’s state court complaint “bristles 

with procedural difficulty,” including that it names the Class representatives from this case as 

defendants but “was not filed as a class action and Mrs. McGregor has not undertaken to have 

the Class certified by the state court.” Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 205) at 4.13 They assert that, “[i]n state 

court, whether the conveyance was fraudulent would be inextricably intertwined with the 

procedural defects of the complaint.” Id. at 5. However, it is difficult to perceive how any 

asserted procedural defects of Mrs. McGregor’s complaint will render the state court forum 

inadequate to protect Plaintiffs’ rights. Certainly, those defects, if actual, seemingly would cause 

a more abrupt termination of the state court litigation, not an ongoing proceeding leaving 

Plaintiffs unable to vindicate their claim in that court. In any event, the purported procedural 

defects of Mrs. McGregor’s complaint are matters plainly due to be addressed by the state court. 

 Elsewhere, Plaintiffs make clear that their preference for the federal forum is due to the 

perceived more “efficient procedure” available in federal court. Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 205) at 2. But 

they do not explain how the perceived inefficiencies of the state forum render it “inadequate” to 

protect their interests as opposed to simply not favored. They argue “this Court should not 

require the Class to seek the relief required for enforcement of the Court’s judgment in the 

Circuit Court of Macon County and delay the collection of the judgment for the usual two-tothree-year period that it will take for there to be a resolution of the case in Macon County.” Id. at 

15. They further contend that any state court action could lead to lengthy and burdensome 

appeals in the state courts which will only delay the collection of their judgment. Id. at 15. 

Curiously, Plaintiffs do not acknowledge that, just as they would have in state court, Defendant 

or Mrs. McGregor will have appellate rights in any supplementary proceeding concerning 

 

13 It should be noted, however, that none of these supposed procedural difficulties deterred Plaintiffs 

from filing their motion to dismiss Mrs. McGregor’s action pursuant to Alabama’s abatement statute. 

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alleged fraudulent transfers adjudicated in this court. See id. at 17 (“If this Court rules that the 

mortgage and security interest are fraudulent conveyances, that will be the end of the matter.”). 

It is manifest, however, that the lengthy appeals Plaintiffs portend can result in federal court just 

as easily as in state court. While understanding of Plaintiffs’ concerns with proceeding on this 

issue in state court, the undersigned finds no reason to believe that the state court is inadequate to 

protect Plaintiffs’ rights. As such, this factor is neutral at most. 

 As set forth above, in the undersigned’s analysis of the relevant “judicial administration” 

factors, only one factor, the potential for piecemeal litigation, weighs considerably in favor of or 

against the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over this issue, and, in the undersigned’s view, 

this factor weighs in favor of abstention. As articulated above, if the state court determines that 

Mrs. McGregor’s complaint is not abated, it is not difficult to imagine the two cases proceeding 

on parallel tracks with considerable duplication of effort by the parties and both courts. There 

does not appear to be any dispute that the central issue raised by Plaintiffs—alleged fraudulent 

conveyances made by Defendant to Patricia McGregor—will be the fundamental question 

presented in both state and federal court. Both courts will be required to conduct fact-finding 

proceedings with the same witnesses testifying about the same events. Both courts will seek to 

apply the same Alabama laws to the facts adduced at such proceedings. As such, this litigation 

will be inherently piecemeal. More ominous, though, is the potential for conflicting rulings by 

the state and federal courts concerning the same subject matter, resulting in conflicting rights and 

obligations for the parties concerning the subject property. This is the precise result which the 

Colorado River doctrine is intended to avoid, Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16; 

Moorer, 374 F.3d at 997, and this, more than any perceived inefficiencies of litigating in state 

court, is the “quagmire” which this court should seek to avoid. 

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 On balance, none of the other relevant factors, which, as set out above, are mostly 

neutral, weigh as heavily on either side of the abstention question as does the potential for 

piecemeal litigation. In the undersigned’s view, this factor weighs sufficiently heavily on the 

side of abstention that it ultimately skews the analysis in favor of abstention. The undersigned 

does not arrive at this belief lightly or without due concern for Plaintiffs’ rights. However, the 

undersigned also notes that, should the court abstain from deciding this issue out of deference to 

the ongoing state court proceeding, Plaintiffs are not foreclosed from all available federal process 

for enforcing their judgment. Indeed, during the pendency of these motions, Plaintiffs have 

continued to conduct discovery on the assets of Defendant and, on August 20, 2015, filed 

thirteen separate applications for writs of garnishment seeking to collect Defendant’s holdings at 

various banks. See Docs. 208-20. Simply put, federal court abstention of Plaintiffs’ claim of 

fraudulent conveyance does not preclude Plaintiffs from their ongoing efforts to satisfy their 

judgment. It merely affords Mrs. McGregor the opportunity to vindicate her name and property 

interests in her chosen forum while promoting judicial economy and comity with the state courts 

and avoiding potentially onerous and deleterious piecemeal litigation. 

 Furthermore, the issue before the court is not as simple as Plaintiffs have portrayed it to 

be. Plaintiffs assert that the court “should not allow MCGP, which lost this case, and lost the 

appeal in this case, to dictate the venue for litigation pertaining to the collection of the 

judgment.” Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 205) at 14. However, Plaintiffs understate the implications of their 

current actions. This is not an instance where Defendant filed a state court complaint in an effort 

to create grounds for federal court abstention or otherwise thwart or delay Plaintiffs’ efforts. 

See, e.g., Ambrosia Coal, 368 F.3d at 1333. Rather, Plaintiffs charged Mrs. McGregor with 

having participated in and benefitted from illegal and fraudulent transactions, and she promptly 

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sought protection in state court when she was not a party to the federal proceeding in which 

Plaintiffs levied this very serious charge against her. Certainly, Plaintiffs have the right, within 

the parameters of applicable law, to have their claims decided in the forum of their choosing. 

However, Mrs. McGregor, too, has a similar right to have her claims decided in the forum of her 

choosing. Where these rights conflict, and the relevant parties have appealed to different fora, 

the court is placed in the difficult position of having to balance the relative interests and to 

reconcile, to the extent possible, the rights of all concerned. The undersigned believes that, 

given the likelihood of piecemeal litigation flowing from Mrs. McGregor’s ongoing state court 

action, and considering that, notwithstanding any stay of their claims of fraudulent conveyance 

as to the subject mortgage and security interests, Plaintiffs may continue their collection efforts 

against other property of Defendant while Mrs. McGregor’s state court action proceeds, this 

court should abstain from deciding this issue to allow the state court a reasonable opportunity to 

determine the issues presented to it by Mrs. McGregor and the Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss. 

 Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS as follows: 

 a. that Defendant’s Motion to Quash, or in the Alternative, to Stay Writ of 

 Garnishment (Doc. 177) be DENIED; 

 b. that Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Join Patricia McGregor as Party Defendant 

 be STAYED pending the state court’s adjudication of Mrs. McGregor’s 

 declaratory judgment action and Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss same; and 

 c. that Defendant’s Motion to Stay Motion to Join Patricia McGregor as a Party 

 Defendant and Motion for Writ of Execution on Fraudulently Conveyed Assets 

 (Doc. 186) be GRANTED; and 

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 d. Plaintiffs’ Verified Application for Writ of Execution (Doc. 189) be STAYED 

 pending the state court’s adjudication of Mrs. McGregor’s declaratory judgment 

 action and Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss same. 

 It is further

 ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before September 15, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. 

Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The 

parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is 

not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court 

of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in 

the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or 

manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds 

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 

(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth 

Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

 Done this 2nd day of September, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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