Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07156/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 30, 1999 Decided September 24, 1999

No. 98-7156

John A. Boehner,

Appellant

v.

James A. McDermott,

Appellee

United States of America,

Intervenor for Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv00594)

Michael A. Carvin argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was R. Ted Cruz.

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Scott R. McIntosh, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for intervenor United States. With him on

the briefs were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General at the time the briefs were filed, David W. Ogden, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, William B. Schultz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas N. Letter, Litigation

Counsel.

Frank Cicero, Jr., argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief were Christopher Landau and Daryl Joseffer.

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., argued the cause for amici

curiae The Washington Post Company, et al. With him on

the brief were Seth M.M. Stodder, Mary Ann Werner, and

Jane Kirtley.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Opinion filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg concurring in the

judgment and in Parts I, II.B, and II.D (except the first and

last paragraphs) of the opinion for the Court.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: "Congress shall make no law ...

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.

Const. amend. I. A federal statute prohibits private parties

from intentionally intercepting wire, oral and electronic communications. The law also forbids any person from disclosing

the contents of such a communication, if the person knew it

was illegally intercepted. Is it part of "the freedom of

speech" for an individual to give a newspaper the tape

recording of a cellular telephone call he received from the

criminals who conducted the illegal eavesdropping? That is

the ultimate question in this appeal from the district court's

dismissal of a complaint brought against the individual who

transferred the tape to the New York Times and other

newspapers. The district court ruled that, as applied in this

case, the federal prohibition on disclosure violated the First

Amendment because the defendant "legally obtained" the

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tape recording, and because the tape contained conversations

relating to matters of "public concern." The United States has

intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute.

I

John A. Boehner, a Republican member of the House of

Representatives, representing the Eighth District of Ohio,

brought this action against James A. McDermott, a Democratic member of the House representing the Seventh District of Washington. The following events are the focus of

the complaint.1

On December 21, 1996, Representative Boehner participated in a conference call with members of the Republican Party

leadership, including Representatives Dick Armey and Tom

DeLay, and then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. At

the time of the conversation, Gingrich was the subject of an

investigation by the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct--the House Ethics Committee. See In the

Matter of Representative Newt Gingrich, H.R. Rep. No. 105-1

(1997); see also H.R. 31, 105th Cong. (1997) (adopting the

report). Boehner was chairman of the House Republican

Conference. The participants discussed strategy regarding

an expected Ethics Subcommittee announcement of Gingrich's agreement to accept a reprimand and to pay a fine in

exchange for the committee's promise not to hold a hearing.

Boehner was driving through northern Florida when he

joined the conference call. He spoke from a cellular telephone in his car. John and Alice Martin, who lived in

Florida, used a radio scanner to eavesdrop on the conversation. They tape recorded the call and later met with Democratic Representative Karen Thurman of Florida to discuss

both the tape and the possibility of their receiving immunity

for their illegal interception of the call.

__________

1 Because this matter comes before the court as an appeal of the

district court's grant of a motion to dismiss, we take as true the

allegations made by Boehner in his complaint. See Edmondson &

Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1263 (D.C.

Cir. 1995).

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At Thurman's suggestion, the Martins personally delivered

the tape to Representative McDermott on January 8, 1997.

McDermott was then the ranking Democratic member of the

House Ethics Committee. The Martins' cover letter explained that the tape contained "a conference call heard over

a scanner," and closed with this statement: "We understand

that we will be granted immunity."

The next day, January 9, 1997, McDermott gave copies of

the tape to the New York Times, the Atlanta JournalConstitution, and Roll Call. Because the tape revealed Gingrich engaging in conduct that might have violated the terms

of the agreement, it had great news value for the three

newspapers, and each ran a story on the party leaders'

conversation. The New York Times published its story on

the front page of its January 10, 1997 edition and included a

verbatim transcript of a portion of the conversation.

After the newspaper accounts appeared, the Martins publicly confessed their role in recording the conversation and

admitted giving a copy of their tape to McDermott. On

January 13, 1997, McDermott provided his fellow Ethics

Committee members with the Martins' tape (or a copy of it)

and resigned from the committee. The committee chairman,

Representative Nancy Johnson, forwarded the tape to the

Justice Department. The government prosecuted the Martins for violating 18 U.S.C. ss 2511(1)(a) and 2511(4)(b)(ii).

Under s 2511(1)(a), anyone who "intentionally intercepts,

endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to

intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication" is guilty of an offense punishable by fine or

imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. ss 2511(1)(a), 2511(4).

The Martins entered guilty pleas on April 23, 1997, and were

each fined $500.

One year later Boehner brought this suit against McDermott, invoking the civil liability provisions of the Electronic

Communications Privacy Act. See 18 U.S.C. s 2520. His

complaint charged McDermott with violating 18 U.S.C.

s 2511(1)(c):

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(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this

chapter any person who--

* * *

(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to

any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or

electronic communication, knowing or having reason to

know that the information was obtained through the

interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection;

* * *

shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be

subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).

Claiming that McDermott had illegally disclosed the contents

of the conference call, knowing it to have been illegally

intercepted, Boehner sought statutory damages of $10,000

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 2520(c)(2)(B).2

McDermott moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that

s 2511(1)(c), as applied to him, violated the free speech clause

of the First Amendment. He claimed, and the district court

agreed, that the First Amendment "prohibits the punishment

under any of the statutes cited in the Complaint for the

disclosure of truthful and lawfully obtained information on a

__________

2 In a separate count, Boehner brought a claim under Fla. Stat.

Ann. s 934.03(1)(c)--which, in relevant respects, is identical to 18

U.S.C. s 2511(1)(c). Because our analysis of the two statutes will

be the same with respect to McDermott's First Amendment claim,

whenever this opinion refers to the federal statute, we intend to

include the state statute as well.

In his motion to dismiss, McDermott also argued that the Florida

statute could not apply to his conduct because his alleged actions

occurred outside the state's borders. Because the district court

dismissed the complaint on other grounds, it did not address this

argument. See Boehner v. McDermott, Civ. No. 98-594 (TFH),

1998 WL 436897, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. July 28, 1998).

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matter of substantial public concern." Motion to Dismiss at

1.

II

A

In mounting his First Amendment defense, McDermott

obviously thinks he engaged in speech, speech for which he

would suffer liability in damages if s 2511(1)(c) were applied

to him. What speech? A simple question, but crucial. Too

bad McDermott devotes only one sentence of his brief to the

answer: "Because the disclosure of information is unquestionably speech, these provisions [of federal and state law] impose

a naked prohibition on speech." Brief for Appellee at 11.

But those who expose private activity to public gaze are not

necessarily engaging in speech, let alone "the freedom of

speech." Otherwise, one might as well say the Martins were

exercising their right of free speech when they personally

handed over the product of their crime to McDermott; or

that they would have been engaging in free speech if they had

surreptitiously dropped the tape on his doorstep, or mailed it

to him anonymously in a plain wrapper. Not even McDermott goes so far. See, e.g., Oral Arg. Tr. at 41, 43.3 If the

Martins were not exercising their right of free speech, as

McDermott seems to concede, it is difficult to see why

McDermott was exercising his freedom of speech when he

gave copies of their tape to the newspapers.

At one point in his brief, McDermott asserts that "[t]his is

core political speech, and lies at the very heart of the First

Amendment." Brief for Appellee at 45. His assertion, however, deals with the contents of the tape. The tape does

__________

3 At oral argument, McDermott conceded that, on the facts

alleged in the complaint, his delivery of the tapes to the newspapers

brought him within s 2511(1)(c)'s prohibition against anyone who

"intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose" the contents of an

illegally intercepted communication. Oral Arg. Tr. at 38-43.

Whether in this case the actual disclosure occurred only after the

newspaper took possession of the tape and played it is therefore of

no moment.

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indeed contain speech about political matters. But the

speech is not McDermott's and s 2511(1)(c) does not render

him liable for anything anyone said on the recording. As to

McDermott's speech, it is safe to assume that he said something when he arranged for delivery of the tapes to the

newspapers. The New York Times in fact attributed several

statements to him:4 a "Democratic Congressman hostile to

Mr. Gingrich ... insisted that he not be identified further";

the "Congressman said the tape had been given to him on

Wednesday by a couple who said they were from northern

Florida"; the Congressman "quoted them as saying it had

been recorded off a radio scanner ... about 9:45 A.M. on

Dec. 21." In making these remarks McDermott was undoubtedly engaging in speech. But neither these statements,

nor any other statements he may have made to the newspapers in connection with his delivery of the tape, are the basis

of the complaint. McDermott's liability under s 2511(1)(c)

rests on the truth of two allegations: that he "caused a copy

of the tape" to be given to the newspapers; and that he "did

so intentionally and with knowledge and reason to know that

the recorded phone conversation had been illegally intercepted (as the cover letter on its face disclosed)." Complaint p 20.

Although the circumstances of McDermott's transactions with

the newspapers, including who said what to whom, may

become evidence at trial, it is his conduct in delivering the

tape that gives rise to his potential liability under

s 2511(1)(c). McDermott's behavior in turning over the tapes

doubtless conveyed a message, expressing something about

him. All behavior does. But not all behavior comes within

the First Amendment.

"[E]ven on the assumption that there was [some] communicative element in" McDermott's conduct, the Supreme Court

has held that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are

combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-

__________

4 We assume McDermott was the unnamed Congressman mentioned in the Times article. See Edmondson & Gallagher, 48 F.3d

at 1263.

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ment can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment

freedoms." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376

(1968). The O'Brien framework is the proper mode of First

Amendment analysis in this case. McDermott's challenge is

only to the statute as it applies to his delivery of the tape to

newspapers. Whether a different analysis would govern if,

for instance, McDermott violated s 2511(1)(c) by reading a

transcript of the tape in a news conference, is therefore a

question not presented here. Nor should we be concerned

with whether s 2511(1)(c) would be constitutional as applied

to the newspapers who published the initial stories about the

illegally-intercepted conference call. The focus must be on

McDermott's activity and on his activity alone. See Hoffman

Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495

(1982); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974); United

States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1960); contrast Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).

B

In its modern iteration, the O'Brien analysis applies to

statutes containing generally applicable, content-neutral prohibitions on conduct that create incidental burdens on speech.

See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 662

(1994); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791

(1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468

U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Section 2511(1)(c) is a statute fitting

that description. It is one of several provisions constituting

"a comprehensive statutory scheme dedicated to preserving

personal privacy by sharply limiting the circumstances under

which surveillance may be undertaken and its fruits disclosed." Lam Lek Chong v. DEA, 929 F.2d 729, 733 (D.C.

Cir. 1991). It prohibits the disclosure of all illegally intercepted communications, without regard to the substance of

the communication or the identity of the person who does the

disclosing. It reveals no governmental interest in distinguishing between types of speech based on content. It

neither favors nor disfavors any particular viewpoint. To the

extent that the particular type of conduct s 2511(1)(c) addresses--"disclosure"--may entail constitutionally protected

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speech, the statute regulates it without reference to content.

See Lam Lek Chong, 929 F.2d at 733; see also Turner

Broad., 512 U.S. at 642-43; R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,

386 (1992); Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d

957, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

The oft-repeated test laid down in O'Brien is as follows:

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is

within the constitutional power of the Government; if it

furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the

suppression of free expression; and if the incidental

restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no

greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

391 U.S. at 377.

Here, the "substantial governmental interest" "unrelated to

the suppression of free expression" is evident. Section

2511(1)(c), rather than impinging on speech, as McDermott

supposes, promotes the freedom of speech. Eavesdroppers

destroy the privacy of conversations. The greater the threat

of intrusion, the greater the inhibition on candid exchanges.

Interception itself is damaging enough. But the damage to

free speech is all the more severe when illegally intercepted

communications may be distributed with impunity.5 This is

why s 2511 does not merely prohibit the unauthorized interception of wire, oral and electronic communications. It is

why the federal statute also forbids the use and disclosure of

the illegally intercepted communication.6 It is why, in certain

__________

5 See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 52 (1972): "to compel

the testimony of these witnesses compounds the statutorily proscribed invasion of their privacy by adding to the injury of the

interception the insult of compelled disclosure. And, of course,

Title III makes illegal not only unauthorized interceptions, but also

the disclosure and use of information obtained through such interceptions. 18 U.S.C. s 2511(1); see 18 U.S.C. s 2520."

6 In addition to Florida, forty-four other states and the District of

Columbia prohibit not only the interception of electronic communi`

---------

Note 6--Continued

cations, but also the disclosure of those communications by persons

not acting under color of law. Most of these statutes mirror the

wording of 18 U.S.C. s 2511. See Ala. Code ss 13A-11-31,

13A-11-35 (1994); Alaska Stat. ss 42.20.300 to 42.20.330 (Michie

1989 & Supp. 1995); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. ss 13-3005, 13-3006

(West 1989) (limiting criminal disclosure liability to telecommunications employees and those acting in concert with them); Cal. Penal

Code ss 631, 632 (West 1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. s 18-9-303 (1986 &

Supp. 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. ss 53a-187, 53a-188, 53a-189, 54-41r

(1994) (allowing civil recovery from any unauthorized discloser, but

limiting criminal penalties to telecommunications employees and

those acting in concert with them); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, s 1336

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(1996); D.C. Code Ann. ss 23-542, 23-554 (1996); Ga. Code Ann.

ss 16-11-62, 16-11-66.1 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. s 803-42 (1995);

Idaho Code s 18-6702 (1996); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/14-2

(1993); Ind. Code Ann. s 35-45-2-4 (West 1994) (limiting criminal

disclosure liability to telecommunications employees); Iowa Code

ss 808B.2, 808B.8 (1994), as amended by Act of Apr. 28, 1999, 1999

Iowa Legis. Serv. S.F. 309 (West); Kan. Stat. Ann. s 21-4002

(1996); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. ss 526.020, 526.060 (Michie 1998); La.

Rev. Stat. Ann. ss 15:1303, 15:1312 (West 1992); Me. Rev. Stat.

Ann. tit. 15, ss 710, 711 (West 1998); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.

Proc. s 10-402 (1998); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, s 99(c) (West

1990); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. ss 750.539c, 750.539e, 750.539h (West

1991 & Supp. 1995); Minn. Stat. Ann. ss 626A.02, 626A.13 (West

1998); Mo. Rev. Stat. ss 542.402, 542.418 (1996); Mont. Code Ann.

s 45-8-10 213 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. ss 86-702, 86-707.02 (1995);

Nev. Rev. Stat. ss 200.620, 200.630, 200.650, 200.690 (1994); N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. s 570-A:2 (1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. ss 2A-156A-3,

2A-156A-24 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); N.M. Stat. Ann.

ss 30-12-14 1, 30-12-11 (Michie 1994); N.Y. Penal Law ss 250.05,

250.25 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995); N.C. Stat. Ann. s 15A-287

(1996); N.D. Cent. Code s 12.1-15-02 (1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

ss 2933.52, 2933.65 (Banks-Baldwin 1998) (prohibiting interception

and use, authorizing civil damages for interception, disclosure, and

use); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, ss 176.2 to 176.5 (West 1994); Or.

Rev. Stat. ss 165.540, 165.543 (1998); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.

ss 5703, 5725 (West 1999); R.I. Gen. Laws s 11-35-21 (1998);

Tenn. Code Ann. ss 39-13-601 to 39-13-603 (1994); Tex. Penal

Code Ann. ss 16.02, 16.05 (West 1994); Utah Code Ann.

ss 77-23a-4, 77-23a-11 (1994); Va. Code Ann. ss 19.2-62, 19.2-69

(Michie 1990); W.Va. Code ss 62-1D-3, 62-1D-12 (1990); Wis.

circumstances, the law also punishes disclosure even if the

interception was itself legal, as when a law enforcement

official has conducted a wiretap pursuant to a court order.

See 18 U.S.C. s 2511(1)(e).

In all of this it is well to remember that although the

"essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit

improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of

ideas," there is "a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly,

which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in

its affirmative aspect." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.

Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (quoting with approval Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244

N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)); see also Halperin v. Kissinger,

606 F.2d 1192, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 713 (1981)

(per curiam). The freedom not to speak publicly, to speak

only privately, is violated whenever an illegally intercepted

conversation is revealed, and it is violated even if the person

who does the revealing is not the person who did the intercepting.7 For his part, McDermott correctly concedes that

the Martins could have been punished not only for intercepting the conference call, but also for giving the tape to him.

See Oral Arg. Tr. at 41, 43, 53. But as we have indicated, he

offers no good explanation why, if he had a First Amendment

right to disclose the call, the Martins did not. Comparing the

Martins' conduct with McDermott's, one might rank the

__________

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Stat. Ann. s 968.31 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); Wyo. Stat.

ss 7-3-602, 7-3-609 (1987); see also Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and application of state statutes authorizing

civil cause of action by person whose wire or oral communication

is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of statutes, 33

A.L.R.4th 506 (1998). Arkansas does not separately prohibit the

disclosure of intercepted communications, but its laws achieve a

similar effect by making it a crime "to record or possess a recording

of such communication." Ark. Code Ann. s 5-60-120(a) (Michie

1994).

7 The link between the Martins and McDermott was direct.

Whether someone further down the chain would have a defense

similar to that suggested by Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.

338, 341 (1939)--that the taint of illegality was sufficiently dissipated--is something we do not decide.

Martins as more culpable. Yet in terms of damage to the

privacy of conversations and to the freedom of speech,

McDermott's alleged actions had a far more devastating

impact.

There are other substantial government interests underlying s 2511(1)(c), interests best illustrated through a hypothetical. Suppose Boehner had tape recorded his conference

call.8 Suppose as well that the Martins later break into

Boehner's office, steal the tape and give it to McDermott, who

then acts exactly as he is alleged to have acted here: he

accepts the tape from the Martins and delivers it to the press.

In the hypothetical, there is no doubt that if McDermott knew

how the Martins acquired the tape, he could be prosecuted

for receiving stolen property. See D.C. Code Ann. s 22-3832.

With respect to McDermott, it is hard to see any practical

constitutional distinction between the hypothetical and the

facts alleged here. In the one case the Martins steal the

tape; in the other, they illegally "seize" the conversation.

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In both

instances, McDermott knows of the illegality. The contents

of both tapes are identical; what McDermott does with the

tape is the same; and in both cases McDermott knows the

Martins' are giving him something they acquired illegally.

Receiving stolen property is punished in order to remove the

incentive to steal, to dry up the market for stolen goods. See

Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law s 93,

at 692 (1972). For a similar reason--that is, "to dry up the

market"--states have made distribution and possession of

child pornography criminal offenses. Osborne v. Ohio, 495

U.S. 103, 110 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760

(1982). And for the same reason Congress has forbidden the

disclosure of the contents of illegally intercepted communications. The district court was quite right in thinking that

without s 2511(1)(c)'s prohibition on disclosure, the government would have "no means to prevent the disclosure of

private information, because criminals like the Martins can

__________

8 Federal law does not prohibit someone who is a party to a

conversation from taping it. See 18 U.S.C. s 2511(2)(d).

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literally launder illegally intercepted information" and there

would be "almost no force to deter exposure of any intercepted secret." Boehner v. McDermott, Civ. No. 98-594 (TFH),

1998 WL 436897, at *4 (D.D.C. July 28, 1998).

What we have just written also explains why whatever

incidental restriction on speech s 2511(1)(c) imposes, it is "no

greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest"--

the final consideration in the O'Brien formulation. 391 U.S.

at 377. Unless disclosure is prohibited, there will be an

incentive for illegal interceptions; and unless disclosure is

prohibited, the damage caused by an illegal interception will

be compounded. It is not enough to prohibit disclosure only

by those who conduct the unlawful eavesdropping. One

would not expect them to reveal publicly the contents of the

communication; if they did so they would risk incriminating

themselves. It was therefore "essential" for Congress to

impose upon third parties, that is, upon those not responsible

for the interception, a duty of nondisclosure.

C

As against the foregoing analysis, McDermott maintains

that he "lawfully obtained" the tape recording from the

Martins because he committed no offense in accepting it; that

the tape contained truthful information of public concern; and

that the First Amendment therefore prohibits holding him

liable for handing the tape (or copies of it) over to the

newspapers.9 He believes the following "limited First

__________

9 It appears that McDermott, or someone acting for him, made

copies of the tape. No one disputes that the Martins gave but one

copy of the tape to McDermott. The New York Times, in its article

of January 10, 1997, reported that it had received a tape recording

of the conference call from a "Democratic Congressman" who did

not wish to be identified. The complaint alleges that McDermott

also gave audiotapes to two other newspapers. After the Martins

held a press conference on January 13, 1997, McDermott delivered

still another copy of the tape to the House Ethics Committee, which

turned the tape over to the Justice Department. McDermott may

also have made a transcript of the call. According to the New York

Times, in its article of January 10, 1997, "a transcript of [the

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Amendment principle" controls: "If a newspaper lawfully

obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, then [the government] may not constitutionally punish

publication of the information, absent a need to further a

state interest of the highest order." Florida Star v. B.J.F.,

491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989), quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g

Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).10

The district court, believing that Florida Star left it no

other choice, reluctantly adopted McDermott's line of reasoning. Reluctantly because the court thought these decisions

had forced it into an "illogical" interpretation of the First

Amendment. Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *4. McDermott's

theory was, the court thought, "a slippery one, as it not only

defends, but even encourages, the circumnavigation of wiretap statutes, which are designed to prevent the disclosure of

private conversations." Id. at *3. By accepting this theory,

the district court had rendered the government powerless "to

prevent disclosure of private information, because criminals

like the Martins can literally launder illegally intercepted

information." Id.

There are many reasons for disagreeing with McDermott

and with the district court about the significance of Florida

Star as applied to this case. But first the facts of Florida

Star. A Florida statute made it unlawful to publish the name

of a rape victim "in any instrument of mass communication."

491 U.S. at 526 n.1. The Sheriff's Department in Duval

County, Florida, mistakenly included a rape victim's name in

__________

conference call] was made available by" the same unidentified

Congressman who supplied the tape.

10 The quotation does not fit precisely. The case before us is a

civil suit for damages, not a criminal prosecution to impose punishment. Boehner makes nothing of this distinction and neither will

we. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).

Also, the complaint alleges that McDermott disclosed the conversation, not that he published it. Publication of course will always

amount to a disclosure, but not every disclosure may amount to the

sort of publication the Supreme Court had in mind.

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its publicly available police blotter. A Florida Star reporter

took down the victim's name, and the newspaper published it.

The victim sued the Sheriff's Department and the newspaper

for violating the statute. Before trial, the Sheriff's Department settled with the plaintiff. A jury awarded damages

against the Florida Star and a state appellate court affirmed.

The Supreme Court sustained the newspaper's First

Amendment attack on the statute. The Court believed the

newspaper had "lawfully obtained" the rape victim's name

because the government--in the form of the Sheriff's Department--had made this information available. See id. at 534-

36. The Court then explained why there was no "need" for

the state to forbid the mass media from publishing the

victim's name. The government had provided the information to the media and thus could more effectively have

"policed itself" to prevent dissemination of the information.

Id. at 538. The statute contained no scienter requirement;

and the press was entitled to assume the government "considered dissemination lawful," id. at 539, because the information

stemmed from a "government news release," id. at 538. And

last, the statute was underinclusive, prohibiting publication

only in "instruments of mass communication," while not prohibiting revelation of the victim's identity through other

means. Id. at 540.

A comparison of Florida Star with this case reveals far

more significant differences than similarities. And it is critical to recognize each of those differences. The Supreme

Court did not intend to declare a universal First Amendment

principle in Florida Star. The several phrases McDermott

has fastened upon are tempered, not only by other language

in the opinion, but also by the context in which they were

written. Throughout, the Court stresses that it meant its

decision to be narrow. The state of the law in this area is

"somewhat uncharted," id. at 531 n.5; the "future may bring

scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily," id. at 532; the Court is following the practice of

resolving "this conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual

context," id. at 531; "[o]ur holding today is limited," id. at

541.

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Let us now compare the statute in Florida Star with

s 2511(1)(c). One could say, as McDermott seems to, that

both provisions are alike in that both prohibit the "disclosure"

of "information." But when we dig more deeply many critical

differences appear. To ignore them would be to convert

Florida Star from a narrow decision into an expansive one.

Consider first exactly what the statutes forbid. The Florida

statute prohibited the act of printing, publishing or broadcasting "in any instrument of mass communication." 491 U.S. at

526 n.1 (quoting Fla. Stat. s 794.03 (1987)). The federal law

is not, however, limited to those means of disclosure and it is

not aimed at the press. Anyone who discloses, or endeavors

to disclose, illegally intercepted communications knowing of

the illegality violates s 2511(1)(c). The objectives of the laws

are different too. The Florida statute sought to protect the

privacy of rape victims. See 491 U.S. at 537. The federal law

seeks to protect the privacy of communications. See, e.g.,

Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1972). In that

respect, the federal law--unlike the Florida statute--advances First Amendment interests for reasons already mentioned. See supra pp. 9-12. The Florida statute dealt with

information in the government's possession; release of the

information was therefore in the government's control. See

491 U.S. at 534-36, 538-39. The federal law deals with

communications between private persons, the content of

which will not be known to the government, unless it has

complied with the rigorous procedures needed to obtain a

court order allowing electronic surveillance for law enforcement purposes. See 18 U.S.C. s 2518; see also id.

ss 2511(2)(b)-(f), 2515-2517, 2519. The state law in Florida

Star (and in Daily Mail) "defined the content of publications

that would trigger liability." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501

U.S. 663, 670-71 (1991). Here, the federal prohibition on

disclosure is not dependent on the content of the communication. And of greatest importance, s 2511(1)(c) prohibits disclosure of the communication only if the original interception

was itself illegal and only if the person charged with unlawfully disclosing its contents knew of the illegality. See 18 U.S.C.

s 2511(1)(c). In contrast, the Florida statute had no scienter

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requirement, see Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 539, and the

government lawfully acquired the information--the victim's

identity--while investigating a crime.

This last distinction must be underscored because the

Supreme Court in Florida Star attached such great significance to it. After citing cases for the proposition that when

"information is entrusted to the government, a less drastic

means than punishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts,"

the Court dropped a footnote:

The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may

ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the

ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised but

not definitively resolved in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and reserved in Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. [829,] 837 [(1978)]. We

have no occasion to address it here.

491 U.S. at 535 n.8.

To understand this footnote correctly one must remember

that in the newspaper business, sources provide information,

but newspapers, not sources, are the publishers. Suppose a

"source" breaks into an office, steals documents, gives them

to a newspaper and the newspaper, knowing the documents

were stolen, publishes them in violation of a state or federal

law. We read footnote 8 to mean that the "Daily Mail

principle" would not determine if the newspaper had a First

Amendment right to publish the stolen documents. What

takes this hypothetical case out of Daily Mail and Florida

Star? The fact that the documents are the product of a

crime, committed by a "source." McDermott thinks he

stands in the shoes of the "newspaper" in Florida Star. He

treats a newspaper's "publication" as the equivalent of his

disclosure. Given his press analogy, the Martins played the

role of McDermott's "source." It follows from footnote 8 that

the "Daily Mail principle" and the decision in Florida Star

do not "settle" this case.

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McDermott's effort to explain away the Florida Star footnote is thoroughly unconvincing. He proposes that footnote 8

"simply reserved the question whether a person who discloses

unlawfully acquired information is subject to punishment only

for the unlawful acquisition or for both the unlawful acquisition and the disclosure." Brief for Appellee at 31. In other

words, all the Court left open is the question whether the

Martins could have been punished not only for intercepting

the call, in violation of s 2511(1)(a), but also for giving the

tape to McDermott, in violation of s 2511(1)(c). This cannot

be correct. For one thing, the Court did not have before it a

case in which the published information--the rape victim's

name--had been "acquired unlawfully ... by a source"; the

Sheriff's Department was the newspaper's "source" and it

acquired the victim's name both lawfully and with her consent. Also, given the facts of Florida Star, and particularly

in light of the Court's resolve to confine the opinion to the

"discrete factual context" of the case, 491 U.S. at 531, the

Court necessarily did not decide the question before us. For

another thing, McDermott's reading of the footnote could

make sense if and only if a "source" first illegally obtained

information and then did the "ensuing publication." In the

context of the footnote, this is farfetched indeed. Again, the

newspapers' sources do not publish; the newspapers do. The

point of the footnote is that regardless whether the illegality

is committed by a newspaper's reporter or by a source, if the

newspaper publishes the illegally obtained information, the

First Amendment may not shield it from punishment. The

Court came close to holding as much in Branzburg v. Hayes,

408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972): no matter how great "the

interest in securing the news," the First Amendment "does

not reach so far as to override the interest of the public in

ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the

rights of other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to other persons."

Furthermore, if McDermott were right about the footnote,

there is no explaining the Court's citation to the "Pentagon

Papers" case--New York Times Co. v. United States, 403

U.S. 713 (1971). At the time of that decision, everyone knew

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that a "source" (later identified as Daniel Ellsberg, a researcher at the RAND Corporation on contract with the

Department of Defense) had illegally obtained copies of classified Defense Department documents. See generally David

Rudenstine, The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the

Pentagon Papers Case 33-65 (1996).11 The issue before the

Court was whether enjoining the New York Times and the

Washington Post from publishing the material amounted to a

prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. As the

Florida Star footnote stated, the Court left unresolved the

question whether the Post and the Times could be punished

for later publishing the documents Ellsberg had illegally

acquired.12 In short, McDermott's reading of footnote 8 in

__________

11 The United States later prosecuted Ellsberg for violating the

Federal Espionage Act and for theft of government property. See

generally Rudenstine, supra, at 341-43. The district judge barred

the prosecution after the government revealed that the "White

House plumbers" had burglarized Ellsberg's psychiatrists' office

and intercepted telephone conversations, in violation of the Constitution. See id.; see also Russo v. Byrne, 409 U.S. 1219 (1972)

(Douglas, Circuit J.) (issuing a stay against Ellsberg's prosecution);

United States v. Russo & Ellsberg, Crim. No. 9373 (WNB) (C.D.

Cal. May 11, 1973) (dismissing the prosecution because of government misconduct). Ellsberg and others later sought civil damages

from the interceptors under the same provision Boehner now

invokes against McDermott. See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 807

F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir.

1986); Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

12 Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, put it this way in his

concurring opinion:

The Criminal Code contains numerous provisions potentially

relevant to these cases.... If any of the material here at

issue is of [the kind described in 18 U.S.C. s 797 or s 798], the

newspapers are presumably now on full notice of the position of

the United States and must face the consequences if they

publish. I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions

under these sections on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior restraint.

403 U.S. at 735-37 (White, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted); see

also id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring) (noting

Florida Star is flatly contradicted by the Court's citation to

the Pentagon Papers case, by the Court's distinction between

a source and a newspaper, and by the Court's expressed

intent to confine its Florida Star opinion strictly to the facts

of the case. Given footnote 8, McDermott is not correct in

arguing that the First Amendment precludes punishing an

individual for disclosing information illegally transmitted to

him, so long as the individual violated no law in receiving the

information. Brief for Appellee at 30.13

__________

that "several [criminal laws] are of very colorable relevance to the

apparent circumstances in these cases" and acknowledging the

possibility of future criminal or civil proceedings); id. at 744-45

(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that "equity will not enjoin the

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commission of a crime" and identifying two statutes under which "a

good-faith prosecution could have been instituted"); id. at 752

(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (expressly agreeing with Justice White's

comments concerning "penal sanctions"); id. at 759 (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting) (expressing "substantial accord" with Justice White's

comments concerning criminal sanctions). In dissent, Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, listed

among "questions [which] should have been faced"--"Whether the

newspapers are entitled to retain and use the documents notwithstanding the seemingly uncontested facts that the documents, or the

originals of which they are duplicates, were purloined from the

Government's possession and that the newspapers received them

with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired." Id. at

753-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1967, amended 1968) (holding that

plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction)).

13 McDermott also relies on the following passage in Florida Star:

[U]nder Florida law, police reports which reveal the identity of

the victim of a sexual offense are not among the matters of

"public record" which the public, by law, is entitled to inspect.... But the fact that state officials are not required to

disclose such reports does not make it unlawful for a newspaper to receive them when furnished by the government. Nor

does the fact that the Department apparently failed to fulfill its

obligation under [the Florida statute] not to "cause or allow to

be ... published" the name of a sexual offense victim make the

newspaper's ensuing receipt of this information unlawful. Even

McDermott also misreads Landmark Communications,

Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978), which the Florida

Star footnote also cited. In that case a newspaper was

indicted for publishing an article about a pending investigation of a state judge.14 McDermott is right in describing

what Landmark did not decide. The Court wrote: "We are

not here concerned with the possible applicability of the

statute to one who secures the information by illegal means

and thereafter divulges it." Id. But McDermott is wrong in

describing what Landmark did decide. The Court did not, as

he contends, determine that a newspaper has a First Amendment right to publish illegally acquired information. The

record in Landmark contained no evidence regarding who

supplied the newspaper with the information or how they

obtained it. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 233 S.E.2d 120, 123 n.4 (Va. 1977) ("The record is

silent, however, concerning the manner in which Landmark

secured the information."). The Court therefore decided only

that "the Commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions [were] insufficient to justify the

actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and

__________

assuming the Constitution permitted a State to proscribe receipt of information, Florida has not taken this step.

491 U.S. at 536. It appears to us that the Court intended to confine

these remarks to information "furnished by the government." Id.

The quoted passage follows the Court's point, made in the previous

paragraph, that "depriving protection to those who rely on the

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government's implied representations of the lawfulness of dissemination, would force upon the media the onerous obligation of sifting

through government press releases, reports, and pronouncements

to prune out material arguably unlawful for publication." Id.

14 The Virginia Constitution commanded that proceedings before

the state Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission "shall be confidential." Va. Const. art. 6, s 10. The statutes implementing this

provision made it a misdemeanor for "any person" to "divulge

information" about those proceedings, Va. Code ss 2.1-37.11,

2.1-37.12 (1973), which Virginia's highest court construed to include

newspaper publication. See Landmark, 435 U.S. at 837 n.9.

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of the press which follow therefrom." Landmark, 435 U.S. at

838.15

Footnote 8 of Florida Star, and the marked contrast

between s 2511(1)(c) and the Florida rape victim statute, are

enough to indicate that Florida Star cannot control this case.

But this discussion should not end without mention of an

additional basis for rejecting the district court's analysis.

The Supreme Court said in Florida Star that its application

of the Daily Mail principle rested on three considerations.

Not one of them is present here.

The Court first pointed out that "when information is

entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than

punishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts." 491 U.S. at

534. In this case, the content of the conference call was not

information "entrusted to the government." It was instead--

in the Supreme Court's words--"sensitive information" in

"private hands" and, therefore, if the government forbids "its

nonconsensual acquisition," as it has in s 2511(1)(a), "the

publication of any information so acquired" is "outside the

Daily Mail principle." Id. "The right to speak and publish

does not," in other words, "carry with it the unrestrained

right to gather information." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17

(1965).

"A second consideration undergirding the Daily Mail principle is the fact that punishing the press for its dissemination

of information which is already publicly available is relatively

unlikely to advance the interests in the service of which the

State seeks to act." Id. at 535.16 That consideration too is

__________

15 The Court flatly rejected the argument that "truthful reporting

about public officials in connection with their public duties is always

insulated from the imposition of criminal sanctions by the First

Amendment." Id.

16 The Florida Star Court described the Daily Mail formulation

as a "synthesis of prior cases involving attempts to punish truthful

publication." 491 U.S. at 533. In two of those cases--Oklahoma

Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court, 430 U.S. 308

(1977), and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)--

absent here. The conference call was not "already publicly

available" when McDermott gave the tape to the newspapers.

Apart from the participants (and those they informed), the

contents of the call were then known only to a select few,

including the Martins and McDermott. And they--the Martins and McDermott--gained their knowledge of the call only

through illegal transactions.

"And" is emphasized in the last sentence because throughout this litigation, McDermott has attempted to portray himself as an innocent. Again and again he insists that he

"lawfully obtained" the tape recording from the Martins. By

this he means that he broke no law in taking possession of the

tape. But this is hardly certain. The Martins violated

s 2511 not once, but twice--first when they intercepted the

call and second when they disclosed it to McDermott. By

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accepting the tape from the Martins, McDermott participated

in their illegal conduct. That transaction may have involved a

quid pro quo. When they transmitted the tape to McDermott, the Martins expressed their understanding that they

would be receiving immunity for their illegal conduct. The

inference is that someone promised this in return for the

tape. Who? The obvious candidate is McDermott, or someone acting in concert with him. One need not go so far as to

say that the Martins and McDermott entered into a conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 371. It is enough to point out,

as Boehner does, that in receiving the tape, McDermott took

part in an illegal transaction. See Reply Brief for Appellant

at 11. If he did not thereby break the law, he was at least

skirting the edge.

The Florida Star Court's third reason for applying the

"Daily Mail principle" was "the 'timidity and self-censorship'

__________

the published information had, like the information in Florida Star,

been placed in the public domain by the government. In Daily

Mail, the newspapers had "obtained [the information] from witnesses, the police, and a local prosecutor," 491 U.S. at 531, and the

state sought to punish the printing of the information after it had

already been broadcast on the radio. See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at

104-05.

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which may result from allowing the media to be punished for

publishing" "information released, without qualification, by

the government." 491 U.S. at 535-36. McDermott is not the

"Media"; the government did not release this information;

and it would not be out of "timidity [or] self-censorship" for

someone to alert the authorities after being handed evidence

of a crime by those who perpetrated the offense. It would

instead be an act worthy of a responsible citizen. See 18

U.S.C. s 3 (accessory after the fact); 18 U.S.C. s 4 (misprision of a felony).

In short, the illegal activity of the Martins, of which

McDermott was well aware when he took possession of the

tape, takes McDermott's actions "outside of the Daily Mail

principle" and the Florida Star line of cases. 491 U.S. at

534.17

Beyond those cases, one can find no firm First Amendment

right to disclose information simply because the information

was, in the first instance, legally acquired by the person who

revealed it. For instance, a grand juror who lawfully obtains

knowledge of the testimony of witnesses may not disclose that

testimony to anyone else. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e); see In re

Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499-500 (D.C. Cir.

1998). There appears to be no constitutional difficulty with

laws prohibiting the disclosure of lawfully obtained trade

secrets or with laws protecting proprietary interests in performances. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433

U.S. 562, 577-79 & n.13 (1977). Congress may provide

remedies for the unauthorized publication of copyrighted

material even if the publisher broke no law in receiving the

__________

17 Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990), on which McDermott also relies, held that under the First Amendment the government could not prohibit a grand jury witness from publicly disclosing his own grand jury testimony. The Court did not suggest that

grand jurors, who are under a duty of confidentiality, or someone

who steals grand jury transcripts, could not be punished for disclosing such testimony. While Butterworth might apply if the law

prohibited a person not only from tape recording his own conversation, but also from disclosing the contents of his conversation, the

opinion had nothing to say about McDermott's situation.

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material. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555-60. In

discovery, litigants lawfully acquire private information from

their opponents. This does not mean the First Amendment

precludes a court from issuing a protective order to prevent

disclosure of that information. See Seattle Times Co. v.

Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31, 36-37 (1984). Courts may enforce

a reporter's promise not to publish the lawfully obtained

name of a confidential informant. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at

669-72; see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)

(per curiam) (enforcing CIA agent's employment agreement

to submit his writings for prepublication review). And a law

enforcement official who conducts a wiretap or a judge who

authorizes the interception has no First Amendment right to

disclose the contents of the intercepted call or the existence of

the electronic surveillance. United States v. Aguilar, 515

U.S. 593, 605 (1995).18

One might try to distinguish these cases on the basis that

in each there was some pre-existing duty not to reveal the

__________

18 This recital hardly exhausts the category of laws prohibiting

disclosure of information without regard to whether the recipient

violated the law in obtaining the information. For instance, lawyers

may suffer suspension or disbarment for revealing client confidences. Those who rent or sell video tapes may be held liable for

disclosing "personally identifiable information concerning" their customers. 18 U.S.C. s 2710. With some exceptions, employees of

state motor vehicle departments may not disclose information about

individuals who have received drivers' licenses or vehicle registrations. 18 U.S.C. s 2721. Under 18 U.S.C. s 794, it is an offense,

punishable by death or imprisonment, for anyone intending to

injure the United States to disclose to a foreign nation documents

relating to our national defense. Tax return preparers are subject

to civil and criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of tax

return information. See 26 U.S.C. ss 6713, 7216; see also 26

U.S.C. s 6103 (imposing duty of confidentiality on IRS employees);

Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The IRS

and the office of Chief Counsel are the gatekeepers of federal tax

information. Through s 6103, Congress charged these two agencies and their employees with the duty of protecting return information from disclosure to others within the federal government, and to

the public at large.").

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information lawfully received. McDermott makes the attempt. In each of these cases, he says, "a person or entity

obtains confidential information pursuant to a concomitant

duty of nondisclosure, and the First Amendment does not

preclude the enforcement of that duty." Brief for Appellee at

20. But this is no distinction at all. McDermott too obtained

the tape under a duty of nondisclosure. In his case the duty

arose from a statute--s 2511(1)(c). The same was true in

Harper & Row, the only difference being that the duty there

stemmed from the copyright laws. It is true that Congressional authority to pass copyright laws is provided specifically

in the Constitution (Article I, s 8) and that copyright itself

serves as an "engine of free expression." Harper & Row, 471

U.S. at 558. But much the same may be said of s 2511: the

Commerce Clause of the Constitution gave Congress the

power to regulate interstate communications, and s 2511,

including s 2511(1)(c), promotes free expression.

D

Our dissenting colleague finds it difficult to draw any lines

between McDermott's disclosure of the tape and a newspaper's publication of the contents of the illegally acquired

conversation. One line, clearly drawn in this case, is the line

between conduct and speech. When a newspaper publishes,

it engages in speech. In each of the cases our colleague

discusses--in Cox Broadcasting, in Oklahoma Publishing, in

Daily Mail, and in Florida Star19--there was no doubt the

defendant engaged in speech for which it was held liable. As

explained earlier, here there is doubt, very real doubt.20 It is

__________

19 We emphasize again that in each of these cases, the information

the defendant published was in the public domain, and the government was responsible for putting it there. Not so here: the

conference call was not in the public domain and there was no

government involvement in making it public.

20 It is good that our dissenting colleague believes the press has

no greater First Amendment rights than anyone else. The Supreme Court agrees with him. So do we. See New York Times Co.

v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964); First Nat'l Bank of Boston

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McDermott's conduct in handing over the tape to the newspapers, not anything he wrote or said, for which Boehner seeks

recovery under s 2511. And because we are dealing with

conduct, McDermott's case falls squarely within the Supreme

Court's O'Brien analysis. Whether the statute would be

constitutional as applied to a newspaper who published excerpts from the tape--who, in other words, engaged in

speech--thus raises issues not before us.

Our dissenting colleague also thinks the statute "burdens

speech based on its content--that is [s 2511(1)(c) forbids] its

publication because it contains information obtained at an

earlier time in an illicit fashion." Dissenting op. at 8. One

might as well say that prosecuting a dealer in stolen books

burdens his speech on the basis of the contents of the books.

That of course would be silly, but as far as content discrimination is concerned, there is no relevant difference here. We

have already explained why McDermott's liability under

s 2511(1)(c) does not turn on who said what during the

conference call. McDermott would have violated the law if he

had handed over the tape of an illegally intercepted communication between a husband and wife, or an investor and

stockbroker, or a judge and law clerk. Each such conversation has in common that someone violated federal law to

intercept it, but this relates to the method of acquisition not

the contents of the communication. In all of this, it is

important to keep McDermott's defense firmly in mind--he

claims that s 2511(1)(c) unconstitutionally burdens his speech

in this case. One cannot possibly evaluate that claim without

making the effort to identify precisely what McDermott said,

or wrote, or did to incur liability. Our dissenting colleague

has not made the effort, which may be why he has fallen into

the trap of equating the conversation on the tape with the

contents of McDermott's speech.

Our colleague cannot understand why Congress thought it

necessary to prohibit not only the interception of communications, but also their disclosure. Dissenting op. at 9. The

__________

v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d

731, 734 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

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reasons are apparent. One is that prohibiting disclosure

furthers the freedom of speech, and reduces the damage

caused by unlawful eavesdropping. Another is that prohibiting disclosure removes an incentive for illegal interceptions.

But in our colleague's judgment, disclosure should never be

prohibited because illegal political espionage might uncover

misdeeds that would otherwise go undetected. Dissenting op.

at 6. This is the old ends-justifies-the-means rationale.

Worse still, it is a rationale willing to sacrifice everyone's

freedom not to have their private conversations revealed to

the world, because some criminal at some time might illegally

"seize" some politician's incriminating conversation.

Finally, our colleague believes that "the First Amendment

permits the government to enjoin or punish the release of

information by persons who have voluntarily entered into

positions requiring them to treat the information with confidentiality." Dissenting op. at 9. That describes this case

perfectly. McDermott "voluntarily" entered into just such a

position when he accepted the illicit tape from the Martins.

At that point he had a duty, if not of "confidentiality," then of

nondisclosure. The duty stemmed of course from every

citizen's responsibility to obey the law, of which s 2511(1)(c)

is a part.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we hold that s 2511(1)(c) and the

Florida statute, see supra note 2, are not unconstitutional as

applied in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is reversed and the case is remanded.

So ordered.

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Opinion filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg concurring in the

judgment and in Parts I, II.B, and II.D (except the first and

last paragraphs) of the opinion for the Court:

Although I agree that s 2511(1)(c)* is not unconstitutional

as applied in this case, I find it unnecessary, in order to reach

that conclusion, to address a number of the questions addressed by Judge Randolph. Specifically, I assume rather

than decide that (1) McDermott's delivery of the tape to the

newspapers constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States--a proposition

that no party to the case disputes; and (2) the holding of

Florida Star, namely, that publication of "lawfully obtain[ed,]

truthful information about a matter of public significance ...

may not constitutionally [be] punish[ed] ... absent a need to

further a state interest of the highest order," 491 U.S. 524,

533 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S.

97, 103 (1979)), applies in principle to this case. Because

McDermott did not in fact lawfully obtain the tape, however,

he may be punished under s 2511(1)(c), as he concedes, if the

statute as applied to him survives intermediate scrutiny. I

conclude it does for the reasons stated in the opinion for the

Court.

Although by its terms Florida Star does not apply to all

cases involving privately held information, see 491 U.S. at 534

("To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands,

the government may under some circumstances forbid its

nonconsensual acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the

Daily Mail principle the publication of any information so

acquired"), we may assume, as McDermott argues, that Florida Star does apply here. Therefore, there is no need to

decide whether "publication," as used in footnote 8 of that

case, must mean "publication by the media" and cannot mean

"divulged by an individual," as it does in the context of libel

law. See Op. at 17-22. Nor need we delve into the ambiguities in the Court's dictum regarding privately held information--under what circumstances? what is "sensitive information"?--because even if Florida Star applies to McDermott's

dissemination of the privately held information contained in

__________

* My conclusions regarding s 2511(1)(c) apply as well to the

Florida statute. See Op. at 5 n.2.

the illegal wiretap, he did not lawfully acquire that information. McDermott therefore does not satisfy an essential

element of the Florida Star test. See 491 U.S. at 536 ("The

first inquiry is whether the newspaper 'lawfully obtain[ed]

[the] information' ").

Indeed, McDermott concedes that the Martins, who violated s 2511(1)(a) in acquiring the information they passed on to

him, are not protected by the principle of Florida Star. See

Op. at 11. Nonetheless, he argues that he lawfully obtained

the tape from them because no federal statute prohibits

receiving the contents of an illegal wiretap. That does not

mean, however, that McDermott "lawfully obtain[ed]" the

information. Though the Congress has not prohibited the

receipt of information obtained by means of an illegal wiretap,

it has prohibited the intentional and knowing disclosure of the

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contents of such a wiretap. Not only was the transaction in

which McDermott obtained the tape therefore illegal--albeit

only the Martins could be punished for effectuating it--but

McDermott knew the transaction was illegal at the time he

entered into it. See Op. at 4, 24. One who obtains information in an illegal transaction, with full knowledge the transaction is illegal, has not "lawfully obtain[ed]" that information in

any meaningful sense.* And the Court's decision in Florida

Star was not an exercise in empty formalism. See Op. at 15.

McDermott points nonetheless to this passage in Florida

Star:

[T]hat the [Police] Department apparently failed to fulfill

its obligation under [state law] not to "cause or allow to

be ... published" the name of a sexual offense victim

[does not] make the newspaper's ensuing receipt of this

information unlawful. Even assuming the Constitution

__________

* For example, the District of Columbia "prohibits solicitation and

pimping, but does not criminalize prostitution itself." United States

v. Jones, 909 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Therefore, a "John"

who has sex in exchange for money, but who did not solicit that sex,

has apparently violated no law. Only the most formal minded,

however, would describe that sex as having been lawfully obtained.

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permitted a State to proscribe receipt of information,

Florida has not taken this step.

491 U.S. at 536 (emphasis in original). The Court's reference

to a State "proscrib[ing] receipt of information" must be read

in light of Florida's decision not to prohibit all disclosures of

the name of a rape victim. See id. at 540 (noting that statute

prohibits only publication in mass media, but "does not prohibit the spread by other means of the identities of victims of

sexual offenses"). Accordingly, the transaction in which the

newspaper obtained the name was not illegal per se; if the

newspaper had not later published the name, the police

department would have violated no law. By contrast, the

Congress prohibited the transaction in which McDermott

obtained the tape, without regard to whether its contents

were subsequently published as a result.

In any event, as noted in the opinion for the Court at 20-21

n.13, the remarks upon which McDermott relies are apparently confined to information furnished by the Government. The

Court recognized in Florida Star that when information is in

the hands of the Government "a less drastic means than

punishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts." 491 U.S. at

534. When sensitive information is in private hands, however, the same cannot be said; the Government has at once less

power to prevent nonconsensual acquisition of the information

and more need to prohibit its subsequent dissemination,

whether by the thief or by one such as McDermott who

received it from the thief. Cf. id.

In sum, nothing in Florida Star requires us to accept

McDermott's claim that he "lawfully obtain[ed]" the tape

simply because no statute prohibited his receiving it. Nor

does McDermott provide us with any reason to extend Florida Star in a manner that, as the district court put it, permits

"a criminal [to] launder the stains off illegally obtained property simply by giving it to someone else, when that other

person is aware of its origins." Boehner v. McDermott, No.

Civ. 98-594, 1998 WL 436897, at *4 (D. D.C. July 28, 1998). I

therefore conclude only that one does not "lawfully obtain[ ],"

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within the intendment of that phrase in Florida Star, information acquired in a transaction one knows at the time to be

illegal. See United States v. Riggs, 743 F. Supp. 556, 559

(N.D. Ill. 1990) (criminal defendant who "did not actually steal

the [information, but] was completely aware that it was stolen

when he received it" did not "lawfully obtain[ ]" it).

McDermott concedes, and both Boehner and the Government agree, that if Florida Star does not require the application of strict scrutiny in this case, then we should apply at

most intermediate scrutiny. I agree the statute passes that

test for the reasons given in the opinion for the Court at 8-13.

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Sentelle, Circuit Judge, dissenting: "Hard cases make

bad law," is a cliche. Phrases become cliches through much

repetition. Much repetition sometimes results from the inherent truth in the phrase much repeated. I fear that by not

making the hard choice, the court today once again proves

that hard cases still make bad law.

A statute of the United States makes it a felony for anyone

to "intentionally intercept[ ] ... any wire, oral, or electronic

communication...." 18 U.S.C. s 2511(1)(a) (1994).1 Further subsections of the same act render it felonious to "intentionally disclose[ ] ... to any other person the contents of any

wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having

reason to know that the information was obtained through the

interception of" such communication; or to "intentionally

use[ ] the contents" of any such intercepted communication.

18 U.S.C. s 2511(1)(c)-(d) (1994). On the undisputed record

before us, Alice and John Martin committed at least two and

probably three of the felonies created by this Act of Congress. Knowing of these felonies, a Member of the Congress

of the United States, the elected representative of his people,

the sworn servant of the law, dealt with the felons, received

from them their feloniously obtained communications, and

converted it to his own use. He obtained these communications not for the purpose of disclosing the felonies or assisting

in the enforcement of law, but solely for the purpose of using

the contents of the communications in the pursuit of the

politics of personal destruction. To compound the wrong, this

was not just any congressman, but the co-chair of the House

Ethics Committee. In other words, a public official charged

with the oversight of the ethics of his colleagues willfully

dealt with felons and knowingly received unlawfully obtained

evidence on the chance that he might be able to use something contained therein to embarrass one of the colleagues

whose ethics he was charged with policing. Protecting such

__________

1 Though the litigation before us concerns also Florida statutes,

see Fla. Stat. Ann. ss 934.03(c) & 934.10 (West 1996), these statutes

are patterned after the federal statute and do not differ from it in

any constitutionally significant way. Therefore, for simplicity I will

direct the discussion in my dissent to the federal statute, intending

the reasoning to apply as to both.

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an official in such an act cannot be an easy thing to do.

Nonetheless, it is, I think, that hard task that the Constitution compels us to undertake.

The first element of the dispute between the parties, and

perhaps the decisive one, is the level of scrutiny applicable to

a constitutional review of the statutes. McDermott contends,

and I agree, that this case is controlled by a line of Supreme

Court cases dealing with various gradations of the question:

Under what circumstances may state officials constitutionally

punish publication of information?2 As I read those cases,

the answer is that the state may do so, if at all, only when the

regulation survives a test of strict scrutiny--it must "further

a state interest of the highest order." Smith v. Daily Mail

Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).

The line of relevant Supreme Court cases begins with Cox

Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In Cox

Broadcasting, the Supreme Court reviewed a judgment in

favor of the family of a rape-murder victim against a broadcast corporation which had published the name of the victim

in violation of a Georgia statute, Ga. Code Ann. s 26-9901

(1972), which made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast

the name or identity of a rape victim. Although the Georgia

courts vacillated between reliance on the statute and common

law tort theories " 'for the invasion of the ... right of privacy,

or for the tort of public disclosure,' " in the end the Georgia

Supreme Court did pass on the constitutionality of the statute

and sustained it as a " 'legitimate limitation on the right of

freedom of expression contained in the First Amendment.' "

__________

2 While I refer throughout this opinion to punishment, for First

Amendment purposes I consider the term to include civil damage

provisions. As the Supreme Court noted in New York Times Co. v.

Sullivan, "What a State may not constitutionally bring about by

means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil

law or libel. The fear of damage awards ... may be markedly

more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal

statute." 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (footnote and citation omitted).

Similarly, the discussions of prohibition of publishing included in

some of the cases which follow apply to post-publication punishment

as well as to prior restraint.

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420 U.S. at 474, 475 (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.

Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127 (Ga.1973)). The high court, noting that

the broadcasting company had obtained the published information from public records, declared itself "reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records generally

available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive

to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man." Id. at

496. Then, in an opinion narrowed to the issue most squarely

before it, held that "[a]t the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to

liability for truthfully publishing information released to the

public in official court records." Id. Cox Broadcasting thus

left open the question of the state's ability to impose liability

for publishing information not released to the public in official

court records.

Two years after Cox Broadcasting, in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977), the Supreme

Court reached the same result as to information not released

in public records, but otherwise publicly available. Several

reporters, including those employed by the petitioner company, had been present in the courtroom during the hearing of

an eleven-year-old boy charged with second degree murder.

The district court of Oklahoma County enjoined members of

the news media from " 'publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture of [a] minor

child' " in coverage of pending juvenile court proceedings.

Id. at 308 (quoting pretrial order). Citing Cox Broadcasting,

as well as Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539

(1976), as compelling its result, the Supreme Court held that

"the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a

state court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated

information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact

opened to the public." Id. at 310. The respondent had

attempted to distinguish Cox Broadcasting on the basis that a

state statute provided that juvenile hearings would be closed

unless the court specifically opened them to the public, and

that the record did not reflect a specific opening in the instant

case. The Supreme Court found that this made no difference, but held that the critical fact was that the information

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published, that is "[t]he name and picture of the juvenile"

were " 'publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of

the crime[.]' " Id. at 311 (quoting Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S.

at 471). While Oklahoma Publishing, like Cox Broadcasting,

is still not factually identical to the instant case, it moves one

step further toward compelling the result sought by McDermott.

Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979),

goes yet another step. That case involved the publication of

the identity of a juvenile offender obtained by reporters

lawfully monitoring a police scanner. The reporters were

indicted under a statute, W.Va. Code s 49-7-3 (1976), making

it unlawful to knowingly publish the name of a juvenile

involved in a juvenile court proceeding. The United States

Supreme Court upheld the West Virginia Supreme Court

decision prohibiting prosecution of the indictment on constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court expressly declared its

holding a narrow one. Proclaiming that there was "no issue

... of unlawful press access to confidential judicial proceedings, [and] no issue ... of privacy or prejudicial pretrial

publicity," id. at 105 (citation omitted), it declared that "[a]t

issue is simply the power of a state to punish the truthful

publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully

obtained by a newspaper." Id. at 105-06 (footnote omitted).

In Cox Broadcasting and Oklahoma Publishing, the information sought to be suppressed was released by the court itself,

either in public record or by opening access to the public. In

Daily Mail, the information came from a scanner, but it was

lawfully obtained. The holding was narrow one, but it moved

narrowly toward encompassing the protection sought by

McDermott today.

Closer still comes Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524

(1989). In Florida Star, a woman referred to by her initials,

BJF, had been robbed and sexually assaulted by an unknown

assailant. The investigating law enforcement department

prepared and placed in its pressroom an incident report

identifying her by her full name. Employees of the Florida

Star newspaper obtained the report and published an account

of the sexual assault, including her name, in violation of a

Florida statute which "ma[de] it unlawful to 'print, publish, or

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broadcast ... in any instrument of mass communication' the

name of the victim of a sexual offense." Florida Star, 491

U.S. at 526 (quoting Florida Stat. s 794.03 (1987)) (footnote

omitted). BJF sued civilly, relying on the statute for a

standard of negligence per se. She obtained a judgment

which stood through the state appellate process. The newspaper appealed to the United States Supreme Court arguing

that imposing civil liability on the newspaper, pursuant to the

statute, violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court

agreed.

The Supreme Court in Florida Star recognized that it had

articulated in Daily Mail a principle derived from a synthesis

of its prior cases: " '[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful

information about a matter of public significance then state

officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the

information, absent a need to further a state interest of the

highest order.' " 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Daily Mail, 443

U.S. at 103). Thus, the Supreme Court made it plain that the

fact of constitutional significance in Cox Broadcasting, Oklahoma Publishing and Daily Mail was not that the publishers

in those cases had obtained the information at issue from

public record or public hearings, or publicly available communications from official sources, but that they had lawfully

obtained the information. Even in Florida Star, the Court

expressly limited the scope of its ruling, holding: "only that

where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it

has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if

at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the

highest order...." 491 U.S. at 541. Because I believe this

holding of the Supreme Court instructs our decision on the

facts before us, I would hold that 18 U.S.C. s 2511 cannot

constitutionally be applied to penalize McDermott's publication of the contents of the unlawfully intercepted communication.

I concede at the outset that there are distinctions between

our case and the cases in the Cox Broadcasting-Florida Star

line. However, I think none of the distinctions permits a

difference in result. First, I think it is of no constitutional

significance that the holding in Florida Star expressly covUSCA Case #98-7156 Document #465468 Filed: 09/24/1999 Page 36 of 41
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ered the situation "where a newspaper publishes truthful

information," while McDermott is not a newspaper. I have

never believed that the First Amendment protection of "the

freedom ... of the press," afforded greater protection to

professional publishers than it does to anyone who owns a

typewriter, or for that matter than its protection of "the

freedom of speech" affords those who communicate without

writing it down. Indeed, it is safe to say that when the

Framers of the Constitution used the expression "the press,

they did not envision the large, corporate newspaper and

television establishments of our modern world," but rather,

"refer[red] to the many independent printers who circulated

small newspapers or published writers' pamphlets for a fee."

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995)

(Thomas, J., concurring). Therefore, as the court holds today

that the state can punish the release by McDermott based on

the manner in which his source obtained that information, in

a later day the state can burden the publishers of newspapers

and the broadcasters of television and radio on the same

basis.

I can envision felonious eavesdroppers like the Martins in

this case obtaining not marginally embarrassing information

about congressmen but information of critical public importance about, for example, some public official's accepting a

bribe or committing perjury or obstruction of justice. Even

if those hypothetical felons dumped information of that critical nature not into the hands of politicians but of a newspaper

publisher or a television news network, the public could never

know of the wrongdoing, because under today's ruling, those

news media would be barred from further publication of that

information. Therefore, I cannot think that the identity of

the communicator can be a distinction of difference.

Judge Randolph's repeated attempt to distinguish between

"newspapers" on the one hand and "sources" (apparently

meaning all those who are not newspapers but might communicate information to a newspaper) on the other is without

substance or force. His attempt to extend to newspapers

some First Amendment protection not available to all those

others who might communicate by stating that "sources do

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not publish; newspapers do," creates a hierarchy of First

Amendment protection for a publishing aristocracy nowhere

suggested in the Amendment, its history, or the cases applying it. As I noted above, the Framers' use of the expression

"the press" does not connote a protected entity, but rather a

protected activity. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 360 (Thomas,

J., concurring). The First Amendment protections of speech

and press extend to those who speak and those who write,

whether they be press barons, members of Congress, or other

sources.

Judge Randolph's further attempt to pass off what McDermott did as unprotected conduct rather than protected speech

is likewise unconvincing. Contrary to Judge Randolph's essential position, it was not McDermott's "conduct in delivering the tape that gives rise to his potential liability under

s 2511(1)(c)." Maj. Op. at 7. What made his conduct punishable under the statute was the information communicated on

the tapes. He could have provided the two newspapers with

all the tapes in Washington on a given day and incurred no

liability but for the speech contained on the tapes. Indeed,

the majority's hypothetical concerning the Martins breaking

into Boehner's office stealing a tape and giving it to McDermott illustrates the weakness of the majority's position, not

its strength. Had the Martins broken into the office and

stolen such a tape and given it to McDermott, he would have

received stolen property without regard to its contents. Had

he then copied its contents to other tapes and passed those

copies off to The New York Times and The Washington Post,

he would have incurred no liability under 18 U.S.C. s 2511,

nor would he have aggravated his crime of receiving stolen

property. What he is being punished for here is not conduct

dependent upon the nature or origin of the tapes; it is speech

dependent upon the nature of the contents.

Next, and of somewhat greater persuasion, is the distinction that the information was unlawfully obtained somewhere

in the chain. That is to say, the Florida Star Court limited

its holding to truthful information, lawfully obtained. Indeed,

the Court in Florida Star expressly reserved "the issue

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lawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may

ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing

publication as well." Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535 n.8

(additional emphasis added) (noting further that "[t]his issue

was raised but not definitively resolved in New York Times

Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and reserved in

Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 837."). That is the

question. The second half of that question is the one we must

answer today. Where the punished publisher of information

has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in

itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may

the government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a chain? I say not. This

separates me from the majority.

As the Court held in Florida Star, "punishment may

lawfully be imposed, if at all" upon the publisher of truthful

information, lawfully obtained, "only when narrowly tailored

to a state interest of the highest order...." 491 U.S. at 541.

The Supreme Court has elsewhere described "the 'nowsettled approach' that state regulations 'imposing severe burdens on speech ... [must] be narrowly tailored to serve a

compelling state interest." Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 642 n.12 (internal quotations and punctuation omitted) (quoting Thomas, J., concurring).

Otherwise put, the statutes before us burden speech based

on its content--that is they forbid its publication because it

contains information obtained at an earlier time in an illicit

fashion. It is established Supreme Court law that when the

state "establishes a financial disincentive to ... publish works

with a particular content ... 'the State must show that its

regulation is necessary to serve a compelling State interest

and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' " Simon &

Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 502

U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.

v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). I will not dispute that

the protection of the privacy of electronic communication is a

compelling state interest. I will concede for purposes of the

present case that punishment of an unlawful interceptor, both

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criminally and by the allowance of civil damages, may well be

sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive even the strict scrutiny required here. I do not, however, see that either the

United States or the State of Florida has established that an

undifferentiated burden on the speech of anyone who acquires

the information contained in the communication from the

unlawful interceptor is necessary to accomplish the state's

legitimate goal or narrowly tailored to serve that end. I do

not see how we can draw a line today that would punish

McDermott and not hold liable for sanctions every newspaper, every radio station, every broadcasting network that

obtained the same information from McDermott's releases

and published it again. Not only is this not narrow tailoring,

this is not tailoring of any sort. As I recognized above, we

are not squarely within the language of Florida Star. I think

we must answer the question reserved in that decision, and I

think we must answer it against the burdening of publication.

Although appellant offers other distinctions from the reasoning of Florida Star, I find none compelling, or worth more

than passing mention. It is true, as appellant and the United

States as intervenor argue, that the Supreme Court has held

that the First Amendment permits the government to enjoin

or punish the release of information by persons who have

voluntarily entered into positions requiring them to treat that

information with confidentiality. See, e.g., Snepp v. United

States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding constructive trust

against all profits of the publication of truthful information of

public importance lawfully obtained through petitioner's employment at the CIA, where he had contracted to keep the

same confidential); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593

(1995) (allowing punishment of a federal judge who disclosed

sensitive information concerning statutorily authorized wiretap); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)

(upholding restrictions on disclosure of otherwise confidential

information obtained by court order in civil discovery). Appellant and intervenor argue that McDermott can be punished for his disclosure because of his having, in their view,

obtained the information at issue in his capacity as a member

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mott did not in fact obtain the information in his official

capacity. The felons who communicated it to him were not

looking for him to use his official ethical capacity but rather

his unofficial political capacity to disseminate their unlawfully

obtained information. It may well be the case that had he

obtained the same information, for example, by Committee

subpoena, he could not have lawfully disclosed it and his

disclosure would not be constitutionally protected. Indeed,

that is perhaps more likely than not. But those are not the

facts before us.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, I would uphold the judgment of the district court and I respectfully dissent from the

decision of the court to the contrary.

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