Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03978/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03978-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSICA H. LOCKETT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 BAYER HEALTHCARE,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-03978 CRB

ORDER

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Plaintiff is

correct that the Court’s judgment included an erroneous factual conclusion: that Bob Russey

was not “involved” in the termination decision. As Lockett notes, Russey admitted in his

deposition that the team investigating Lockett’s alleged falsification asked Russey for his

opinion on how to discipline Lockett, and Russey recommended termination. Nonetheless,

the central question remains whether a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant’s

stated reason for termination – the falsification of BPRs – was pretextual and that Lockett

was actually fired for filing a complaint with CalOSHA. Based upon the evidence before the

Court, the answer to that question remains no.

To survive summary judgment, Lockett must establish more than that she filed a

CalOSHA complaint and an individual tangentially involved in the termination decision

knew that Lockett was responsible. There must be some evidence that Bayer terminated

Lockett because of the complaint, rather than because Bayer believed that she falsified

Case 3:05-cv-03978-CRB Document 92 Filed 03/17/08 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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documents. Put simply, the mere fact that someone at Bayer knew Lockett made the

complaint is not the kind of “specific” and “substantial” evidence of pretext necessary to

create a triable issue. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). 

There must be evidence – some evidence – that Russey’s knowledge motivated Lockett’s

termination. That evidence is nowhere to be found. Accordingly, Lockett has not carried her

burden of proving pretext.

Lockett’s other justifications for leave to file are unavailing. If Lockett was indeed

precluded from properly defending the summary judgment motion because of Defendant’s

litigation tactics, she should have filed a timely Rule 56(f) motion to order a continuance. 

Having failed to do so, it is improper to raise discovery-related arguments now that an

adverse judgment has been entered.

Lockett argues that her termination was the result of false reports and allegations

levied by coworkers. To the extent Lockett intends to suggest that those false reports

constituted actionable harassment, her argument is rejected for the reasons set forth on pages

13-15 of the Court’s summary judgment order. To the extent Lockett believes the falsity of

her coworkers’ reports demonstrates pretext, that argument also must be rejected. For

purposes of proving pretext, the pertinent question is not whether Lockett’s coworkers lied –

or even whether Lockett falsified BPRs or not – but rather, whether Defendant “honestly

believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason [was] foolish or trivial or even baseless.” 

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). That is to say, to

survive summary judgment, Lockett must proffer specific and substantial evidence

demonstrating that Defendant did not honestly believe that she falsified BPRs. Lockett has

proffered no evidence demonstrating that the defendant knew – at the time of termination –

that Lockett’s coworkers were untruthful or untrustworthy, or that Bayer doubted the veracity

of the charges.

Finally, Lockett argues that she presented sufficient evidence of pretext with respect

to her racial discrimination claim, in that other non-African-American, Bayer employees who

also falsified BPRs were not terminated. To show that other employees allegedly receiving

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 Indeed, unlike Lockett, Tran denies having ever pre-filled out BPRs. See Tran Depo.

at 57:25-58:2.

G:\CRBALL\2005\3978\Denying Motion for Reconsideration.wpd 3

more favorable treatment are similarly situated, “the individuals seeking relief must

demonstrate, at the least, that they are similarly situated to those employees in all material

respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). It is

material, if not dispositive, that there is a lack of any evidence establishing that coworkers of

Doan Tran brought evidence of her falsifications to the attention of Bayer officials.1

 That

distinction is material because it is not appropriate to compare Bayer’s treatment of Lockett

with its treatment of an employee who has had no charges of falsification levied against her. 

Because Lockett has failed to identify a sufficient justification for reconsideration, the

motion for leave to file is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2008 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-03978-CRB Document 92 Filed 03/17/08 Page 3 of 3