Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-08106/USCOURTS-ca10-94-08106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

~TEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DONALD R. DOW, 

Plaintiff- Appellant, 

v. 

THE LOUISIANA LAND AND 

EXPLORATION COMPANY, a 

Maryland corporation; CLAYTON 

WOOD CONSULTING, INC., an 

Oklahoma corporation, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 94-8106 

Un"te FILED 

I d States Court or A ... ..,,..,.~ Te:~th Circuit .. ~ ...... ...) 

FEB 14 1996 

PATRICK FISH:2R 

Cieri: 

APPEAL FROM THE ~TED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-178) 

David B. Hooper of Hooper Law Offices, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Michael D. Gaffuey (Donald F. Carey with him on the brief) of Quane, Smith, Howard & 

Hull, Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, COFFIN* and McKAY, Circuit Judges. 

*The Honorable Frank M. Coffin, United States Circuit Judge for the First Circuit, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-8106 Document: 01019277312 Date Filed: 02/14/1996 Page: 1 
McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

PlaintiffDonald Dow appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for 

the Defendants Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. ("LLE") and Clayton Wood 

Consulting, Inc. ("CWC") in this negligence action. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 

Mr. Dow worked for W. R. Grace Drilling Co. ("Grace Drilling") as a member of 

a drilling crew. LLE hired Grace Drilling as an independent contractor to drill an oil and 

gas well. Mr. Dow was part ofthe crew which performed this service. CWC, represented 

by Clayton Wood, served as LLE's agent at the drilling site. One day, after another 

contractor finished its work at the drill site, Mr. Wood told Mr. Dow's crew something to 

the effect of"get back in the hole." The crew began putting the drilling assembly 

together in reverse order. Before the process was complete, the drill assembly, six to 

eight feet tall and weighing over 1,000 pounds, fell on Mr. Dow, breaking his leg in 

several places. 

Mr. Dow asserts that Mr. Wood was rushing the crew to complete its work. If the 

crew had not been rushed, he reasons, they would have assembled the drilling apparatus 

in the correct order and the drill assembly would not have fallen over. Mr. Dow premises 

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Appellate Case: 94-8106 Document: 01019277312 Date Filed: 02/14/1996 Page: 2 
liability on Mr. Wood's involvement with the drilling operations. He claims that Mr. 

Wood's control over the operations was so pervasive that Defendants became liable for 

his injury despite his status as the employee of an independent contractor. Mr. Dow also 

claims that Defendants are liable because they assumed affirmative duties to protect the 

crew. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on both claims. 

Under Wyoming law, an owner of land owes a general duty of care to invitees, 

including employees of an independent contractor. Despite this general rule, the owner 

"is not obligated to protect the employees of an independent contractor from hazards 

which are incidental to, or part of, the very work the contractor was hired to perform." 

Jones v. Chevron U.S.A .. Inc., 718 P. 2d 890, 894 (Wyo. 1986). However, an owner 

who retains the right to direct the manner of an independent 

contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with 

respect to safety owes a duty of reasonable care to an 

employee of the independent contractor even if the employee 

is injured doing the very work the contractor was hired to 

perform. 

:til at 896. In order for liability to exist, the owner's right to direct the manner of work 

must be extensive: 

"[T]he owner 'must retain more than the general right to order 

the contractors to stop work, to inspect the progress of the 

work, to make recommendations thereon, or to prescribe 

alterations br deviations in the work' .... The product of our 

precedent is that an employer of an independent contractor, 

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Appellate Case: 94-8106 Document: 01019277312 Date Filed: 02/14/1996 Page: 3 
although potentially responsible for injuries to employees of 

the contractor, must assume a controlling and pervasive role 

in the work being done in order to generate any duty of care 

sufficient to establish vicarious liability for the negligence of 

the independent contractor." · 

Natural Gas Processin~ Co. v. Hull, 886 P. 2d 1181, 1184 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 

Cockburn v. Terra Resources. Inc., 794 P. 2d 1334, 1342 (Wyo. 1990) (citations 

omitted)). Here, Mr. Dow simply fails to present evidence from which a jury could 

determine that Defendants assumed a "controlling and pervasive role in the work being 

done." Mr. Dow presents evidence that Mr. Wood, LLE's agent, told the crew to "get 

back in the hole" and also that the crew felt rushed by Mr. Wood. No evidence is 

presented that Mr. Wood ever told the crew how to perform its work or that it had to have 

its work finished by a certain deadline. At best, this evidence shows that Mr. Wood had a 

general right to require the crew to begin working. Such a general, limited right does not 

give rise to liability. 

Mr. Dow argues, however, that this case is similar to Natural Gas Process in~ Co. 

v. Hull, 886 P. 2d 1181 (Wyo. 1994). In Natural Gas Processin~, the Supreme Court of 

Wyoming held an employer liable for the injury of an independent contractor's employee. 

I d. at 1186. The court relied on three facts: (1) the employer controlled the equipment 

used by the independent contractor; (2) the employer specifically directed the 

independent contractor in the performance of its work; and (3) the employer drove the 

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Appellate Case: 94-8106 Document: 01019277312 Date Filed: 02/14/1996 Page: 4 
independent contractor's employees to work faster. !d.. at 1185. At best, Mr. Dow has 

shown that Mr. Wood made the crew work faster. Without further evidence of Mr. 

Wood's ability to control the crew's work, Natural Gas Processin~ is clearly 

distinguishable. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for 

Defendants on this claim. 

Mr. Dow next argues that Defendants are liable because they affirmatively 

assumed duties with respect to safety. ~Jones, 718 P. 2d at 896. Thus, he reasons, 

Defendants are liable for his injuries despite Grace Drilling's status as an independent 

contractor. In support of this contention, Mr. Dow cites to the original lease between 

LLE and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and to the master service contract 

between LLE and ewe. Both the lease and the master service contract contain language 

which obligates LLE and/or ewe to comply with all applicable safety regulations and to 

provide generally for the safety and health of workers and employees. 1 

1

Specifically, Mr. Dow cites to the following language in the BLM lease: 

G) Diligence, prevention of waste, health and safety of 

workmen. ... [T]o carry on all operations in accordance with 

approved methods and practice as provided in the Oil and Gas 

Operating Regulations, having due regard for the ... health 

and safety of workmen and employees. 

Appellant's App. at 19. Mr. Dow also points out similar language in the master service 

contract between LLE and ewe: 

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Appellate Case: 94-8106 Document: 01019277312 Date Filed: 02/14/1996 Page: 5 
Mr. Dow misconstrues, however, the law relating to independent contractors. As 

stated before, an employer can become liable in tort to an independent contractor where it 

exercises control over the manner of the independent contractor's performance or where it 

assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety. Jones, 718 P. 2d at 897; Natural Gas 

Processing. 886 P. 2d at 1184. This rule is discussed in the context of the employer's 

relationship with the independent contractor. Exercise of control and assumption of 

affirmative duties are signals that the employer's role in the performance of the 

independent contractor's work has become so pervasive that tort liability is warranted. In 

other words, the rule is concerned with the interaction between the employer and the 

independent contractor. The rule does not concern itself with the interaction between the 

5. CONTRACTORS RESPONSIBILITIES: 

(e) Contractor shall perform the work in accordance 

with safe practices, taking all reasonable precautions to 

protect ... workmen. . . . Contractor shall, prior to the 

commencement of work, become fully familiar with ... 

safety regulations and all occupational safety regulations set 

forth in applicable law. Contractor shall be responsible for 

full compliance with such regulations. 

G) Contractor shall comply with all laws, 

regulations ... which are applicable to this Contract .... 

Appellant's App. at 121-22. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8106 Document: 01019277312 Date Filed: 02/14/1996 Page: 6 
employer and other parties. Thus, in order for the employer to assume duties of safety 

within the meaning of the rule, it must warrant to the independent contractor, either 

contractually or as evidenced by its actions, that it has affirmatively assumed duties of 

safety. See. e.~., Abraham v. Andrews Truckin~ Co., 893 P. 2d 1156, 1157 (Wyo. 1995) 

(examining agreement between employer and independent contractor as well as the 

"duties ... actually exercised" in order to determine whether affirmative duties were 

assumed); Hill v. Pacific Power & Li~t Co., 765 P. 2d 1348, 1350 (Wyo. 1988) 

(examining contract between employer and independent contractor in order to determine 

whether affirmative duties were assumed). For purposes of this rule, the Defendants' 

contracts with the BLM or between themselves are irrelevant. Mr. Dow has not pointed 

out how the Defendants, either contractually or through their actions, assumed any duties 

of safety directly with Grace Drilling. We have reviewed our decision in Hull v. Chevron 

U.S.A .. Inc., 812 F.2d 584 (lOth Cir. 1987), and have determined that it is not contrary to 

our resolution of this case.2 

Our conclusion is further buttressed by the Supreme Court of Wyoming's opinion 

2

In Hull, we held that the threshold duty owed by the holder of a federal lease to its 

agent's employee could be confirmed by regulatory language that "track[ed]" the 

common law standard of care. 812 F.2d at 590. We did not hold, or even indicate, that 

such regulatory language altered Wyoming law as to what constitutes an affirmative 

assumption of duties in an employer/independent contractor relationship. Hull, 

accordingly, does not advance Mr. Dow's argument. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8106 Document: 01019277312 Date Filed: 02/14/1996 Page: 7 
in Stockwell v. Parker Drillin~ Co., 733 P. 2d 1029 (Wyo. 1987). In Stockwell the court 

discussed the Restatement, Second, of Torts§ 424 which provides: 

"One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a 

duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the 

safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose 

protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure 

of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards 

or precautions." 

Stockwell, 733 P. 2d at 1032. The court held that the term "others" did not encompass 

employees of independent contractors. J.d.. Thus, Defendants did not owe Mr. Dow any 

statutory duty of care in the absence of the necessary affirmative assumption of duty or 

the exercise of control over Mr. Dow's work. 

Finally, Mr. Dow argues that the district court improperly struck portions of his 

expert's affidavit. In light of our disposition of the case, we need not consider this issue. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. 

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