Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02126/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02126-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESLEY RILEY,

NO. CIV. S-06-2126 LKK/KJM

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

MICHELE GIGUIERE,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff Wesley Riley has brought suit against Michelle

Giguiere, Budget Property Management, Inc., Cal Investors, Inc.,

and Josephine Santos under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. The crux of the plaintiff’s complaint is

that the defendants improperly instituted unlawful detainer actions

against him, based upon a residential lease agreement into which

the plaintiff had entered. 

Defendant Giguiere moves for summary judgment on four issues.

The court decides the motion upon the papers and after oral

argument.

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26 1 The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

2

I. FACTS1

On May 21, 1999, the plaintiff entered into a one-year

residential lease agreement for a property located at 8749 Grayling

Avenue in Sacramento with Budget Property Management. The

plaintiff’s girlfriend, Sherry Ahrens, was also a party to the

lease agreement. According to the plaintiff, he faxed a letter to

Budget Property Management on December 6, 1999 that stated that he

would no longer reside on the property as of January 1, 2000. He

also alleges that he dropped off his keys to the property at the

Budget Property Management office. 

On August 10, 2004, an employee of Cal Investors, Inc. (the

successor to Budget Property Management) posted on the door of the

Grayling Avenue property a three-day notice to pay back rent. He

also mailed a copy of the notice to the plaintiff and Ms. Ahrens,

at the Grayling Avenue address. At that time, rent had not been

paid for July and August, 2004. Defendant Giguiere, who had been

retained by Cal Investors, initiated an unlawful detainer action

against the plaintiff and Ms. Ahrens on August 17, 2004 in

Sacramento County Superior Court. Defendant Giguiere had been

provided with copies of the lease agreement, the property

management agreement, the three-day notice, and changes to the

lease agreement. Ms. Ahrens was personally served and the defendant

contends that substituted service was effected on the plaintiff by

the server leaving a copy of the Summons and Complaint with Ms.

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Ahrens and mailing a copy to the plaintiff at the Grayling Avenue

property. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 39. Later

that month, Ms. Ahrens paid Cal Investors the owed rent.

In November 2004, Cal Investors again posted a three-day

notice on the property and mailed a copy to Ms. Ahrens and the

plaintiff at that address. On November 22, 2004, a second unlawful

detainer action was initiated against Ms. Ahrens and the plaintiff.

The defendant contents that service was effective on both of them

by leaving a copy of the Summons and Complaint with an occupant of

the Grayling Avenue property. Id. ¶ 45. 

On December 14, 2004, a default judgment was entered against

the plaintiff. On January 10, 2005, Ms. Ahrens presented Cal

Investors with checks for the back-due rent. However, a stoppayment was later placed on the checks. Consequently, Cal Investors

again posted a three-day notice on the property on January 18, 2005

and mailed a copy to the plaintiff and Ms. Ahrens at that address.

After receiving no response, defendant Giguiere initiated a third

unlawful detainer action on January 24, 2005. On January 31, 2005,

the defendant contends that the plaintiff was sub-served by the

Complaint and Summons being left with Ms. Ahrens at the Grayling

Avenue property. Id. ¶ 53. On February 2, 2005, Ms. Ahrens filed

an answer to this action, in which she stated that the plaintiff

had not resided at the property since December 2000.

A default judgment was entered against plaintiff on March 8,

2005. In January 2006, the plaintiff learned of the judgment and

wrote a letter to defendant Giguiere challenging the validity of

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the debt and the default judgment. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement

of Undisputed Facts ¶ 15. On February 2, 2006, defendant Giguiere

submitted an Abstract of Judgment to the Sacramento County Superior

Court. The court issued the abstract the next day. In April 2006

the plaintiff moved to set aside the default judgment. Defendant

Giguiere opposed the motion. Id. ¶ 19. In May 2006, the court

granted the motion, setting aside the default judgment. Id. ¶ 20.

Later that month, defendant Giguiere sent a letter to the

plaintiff’s counsel proposing a mutual release of all claims with

no money being paid by either party. Id. ¶ 22. She recorded the

Release of Abstract of Judgment in July 2006. Id. ¶ 24. The

plaintiff filed the present action with this court on September 25,

2006.

Defendant Giguiere is a solo practitioner specializing in real

estate law. About 40-50 percent of her practice is unlawful

deatiner work. Id. ¶ 3. Of this, her collection work for Budget

Property Management and Cal Investors has comprised about 3 percent

of her legal work since 1987. Id. This includes the filing of about

forty debt collection cases in the past three years. Id. She

asserts that she does not employ anyone to assist her in her debt

collection work. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 5.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD UNDER 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

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genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

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parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093

(9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County

of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

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doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

The defendant moves for summary judgment on four grounds: (1)

that she was not a debt collector under FDCPA, (2) that she did not

perform a communication or collection activity under FDCA, (3) that

the plaintiff’s claim is time-barred, and (4) that she had no duty

to confirm the plaintiff’s residence at the property before

initiating the underlying action. For the reasons discussed below,

the court grants the motion in part.

A. Whether Defendant Was a Debt Collector Under FDCPA

For purposes of the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate

commerce or the mails in any business the principal

purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who

regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or

indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or

due another. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a. In applying this provision, the Ninth Circuit

has held that an attorney whose practice included eighty percent

debt collection work was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. Fox

v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir.

1994). There appears to be no other cases from the Ninth Circuit

construing this section, but both parties have directed the court

to the rules employed by other circuits. 

Some circuits consider the number of collection activities in

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the relevant period, the frequency of the collection activities,

whether the defendant has personnel who work on collection

activities, whether the defendant has systems to facilitate debt

collection, and whether the collection activities take place as

part of an on-going client relationship with another entity which

has hired the defendant to perform collection work. See Goldstein

v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek, Gainen, Carroll & Bertolotti, 374 F.3d

56, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2004); Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1176

(6th Cir. 1999). Courts also consider what percentage of the

defendant’s caseload and revenues are collection activities.

Schroyer, 197 F.3d at 1176. In the Third Circuit, a defendant may

be deemed a debt collector if he engages in collection activities

“more than a handful of times per year,” although a defendant’s

ongoing client relationship with an entity on whose behalf the

defendant does collection work is also relevant. Crossley v.

Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569-70 (3rd Cir. 1989).

The defendant argues that her alleged collection activities

in the years prior to the activities underlying the present action

is irrelevant. She directs the court to Goldstein, where the Second

Circuit considered the number of collection activities the

defendant performed “in the relevant period.” Goldstein, 374 F.3d

at 62. Despite this language, however, the Goldstein court did not

explain what the “relevant period” was, nor is it apparent in its

analysis. See id. at 63. Moreover, the Goldstein court explained

that the factors it used to determine whether the defendant was a

debt collector were “illustrative rather than exclusive,”

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encouraging a case-by-case analysis. Id. at 62.

Here, it appears to the court that there is sufficient

evidence to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the

defendant was a debt collector under FDCPA. By her own declaration,

the defendant has one client for whom she routinely does collection

work, Giguiere Decl. ¶ 33, although that work comprises less than

5 percent of her total work and less than 2 percent of her income.

Id. Defendant has filed about forty cases for this client in the

past three years. Id. She does not employ anyone to assist her in

her collection cases. Id. at ¶ 32. Moreover, in her deposition, Ms.

Giguiere stated that between 40-50 percent of her work is unlawful

detainer work. Giguiere Depo. 17:2-18:3, 21:16-21:20. In her

deposition, she clarified that in her declaration she meant to

state that there was one client for whom she did collection work,

and the collection work for that client comprised 5 percent of her

work; taking into account the additional clients for whom she did

unlawful detainer work, the figure was between 40-50 percent. Id.

at 17:2-19:6.

Based on this, a jury could reasonably conclude that the

defendant is a debt collector. Although the defendant asserts that

her statement in her deposition that about 40-50 percent of her

work was unlawful detainer work does not necessarily constitute a

collection activity, this argument is unavailing. By the

defendant’s own statements, all unlawful detainer actions include

a demand for payment. Giguierre Depo. 19:18-21:12. Consequently,

the court cannot conclude that, as a matter of law, the defendant

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was not a debt collector under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. The defendant’s

motion as to this issue is denied. 

B. Whether the Plaintiff’s Claim is Time-Barred

The statute of limitations for bringing a FDCPA action is one

year from the date the alleged offense occurred. 15 U.S.C. §

1692k(d); Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1997). This

limitations period has been described as jurisdictional and not

subject to waiver. Mattson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 967

F.2d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1992); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)

(describing the limitations period under the heading

“Jurisdiction”), Naas, 130 F.3d at 892 (characterizing district

court’s dismissal for plaintiffs’ failure to bring claim within the

one-year limitations period as an exercise of jurisdiction).

In this case, the plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September

25, 2006. The only acts of the defendant alleged to have occurred

in the limitations period are the defendant’s filing of an Abstract

Judgment on February 2, 2006, her filing of an opposition to the

plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on May 1, 2006,

and her letter to plaintiff’s counsel proposing a settlement on May

19, 2006. All other acts of the defendant of which the plaintiff

complains occurred outside the limitations period and therefore

cannot be a basis for the defendant’s liability under FDCPA. The

defendant’s motion is therefore granted as to those allegations.

C. Whether the Defendant Performed Collection Activity or

Communications Under the FDCPA

The defendant asserts that those acts that did occur within

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 The court opined, however, that if in the debt collector's

communication with the attorney, she threatened to contact the

debtor, this could be actionable under the FDCPA. Guerrero, 499

F.3d at 936.

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the limitations period cannot, as a matter of law, constitute

violations of FDCPA. The court agrees in part.

1. Communication With Plaintiff’s Attorney

The plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the FDCPA by

contacting the plaintiff’s attorney on May 19, 2006, proposing a

settlement by which each party would release all claims. This

conduct is not actionable under the FDCPA. The Ninth Circuit has

held that a debt collector’s communications with a debtor’s

attorney are not collection activities for the purposes of the

FDCPA. Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions, LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 935 (9th

Cir. 2007). The Guerrero court reviewed several sections of the

FDCPA and observed that the Act consistently treated the debtor and

his attorney as separate entities. Id. This comported with the

purpose of the Act, as “Congress viewed attorneys as intermediaries

able to bear the brunt of overreaching debt collection practices

from which debtors . . . should be protected.” Id.2

Here, the defendant’s communication with the plaintiff’s

attorney on May 19, 2006 clearly falls within the ambit of

Guerrero. The letter was directed to the plaintiff’s counsel only

and proposed a mutual release of all actions. She also stated,

“Please let me know if this is acceptable to your client. If I have

not heard from you by May 30, I will assume this is not acceptable

and will proceed with a memorandum to set the case for trial.” This

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 The plaintiff also argues that the defendant violated 15

U.S.C. § 1692g by failing to cease collection after the plaintiff

disputed it. The plaintiff, however, has not pled this theory of

liability in his complaint and may not raise it now. See Coleman

v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000).

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communication was not directed at the plaintiff nor did it threaten

contact with the plaintiff. It is, therefore, not actionable. The

court grants defendant’s motion as to plaintiff’s cause of action,

insofar as it is based on this communication.

2. Filing of Abstract Judgment and Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Default

The plaintiff’s cause of action alleges violations of 15

U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f.3 These sections prohibit the

debt collector from engaging in improper conduct “in connection

with the collection of any debt.” By their plain language, these

sections are not limited to communications with the debtor. See,

e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(3) (prohibiting the publication of lists

of consumers who refuse to pay debts). The Ninth Circuit has held

that a defendant can be liable under the FDCPA for acts that

related to a judicial proceeding or that were performed to enforce

a judgment. Fox v. Citicorp Credit Svcs., 15 F.3d 1507, 1517 (9th

Cir. 1994). It rejected the argument that FDCPA does not cover

“purely legal” acts, such as the filing of a writ of garnishment.

Id. at 1511-12. Elsewhere, the court has emphasized the broad

language of the FDCPA, holding that it should be so liberally

construed as to approximate a strict liability statute. Clark v.

Capital Credit & Collection Svcs. Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1171, 1175

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(9th Cir. 2006).

Accordingly, the court cannot conclude that as a matter of law

the allegations that the defendant improperly filed an Abstract

Judgment and improperly opposed the plaintiff’s motion to set aside

the default judgment are not viable. The plaintiff alleges that

these acts were performed for the purpose of collecting on a debt.

He also presents evidence that they were deceptive in that the

defendant had reason to know the debt may not have been lawful. See

Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 9-11, 15-19. These

facts create a genuine issue of material fact that could permit a

reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant’s filing of the

Abstract of Judgment and opposing the plaintiff’s Motion to Set

Aside the Default Judgment violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e,

and/or 1692f. Defendant’s motion is therefore denied insofar as the

plaintiff’s cause of action relies on these factual allegations.

D. Whether Defendant Had A Duty to Investigate the Basis for the

Unlawful Detainer Action

Finally, the defendant seeks summary judgment on the issue of

whether she was obligated to investigate the basis for the unlawful

detainer action against the plaintiff. This issue is not an element

of the plaintiff’s cause of action but is relevant to an

affirmative defense of bona fide error. 

As a preliminary matter, the court observes that the defendant

did not list the bona fide error defense in her Answer to the First

Amended Complaint. As such, she has waived it. See Federal Rule of

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 The question of whether plaintiff's non residence was a

defense to the wrongful detainer cause of action is not the subject

of the present lawsuit.

15

Civil Procedure 8(c). 

Even if it was not waived, the court cannot conclude that a

reasonable jury would be required to find that the defendant has

established the elements of this defense. The bona fide error

defense provides that the debt collector will not be liable if she

shows “by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was

not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding

the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such an

error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Therefore, to succeed in a motion

for summary judgment on this issue the defendant must present

evidence showing that, inter alia, she had maintained “procedures

reasonably adapted to avoid such an error.” See id.; Fox, 15, F.3d

at 1514. 

Here, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant’s

acts, if they were violations of the FDCPA, were not bona fide

errors under section 1692k(c). The plaintiff has offered evidence

that the defendant was on notice that the plaintiff did not reside

there at the time of the initiation of the detainer actions.4

First, prior to initiating the unlawful detainer action, the

defendant obtained a copy of the lease, which included a change of

terms. This change of terms had only been served on Ms. Ahrens, not

the plaintiff. Second, Ms. Ahrens filed an answer to the third

detainer summons, in which she stated that the plaintiff has not

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resided there since December 2000. The defendant received this

answer and contacted her clients to inquire whether the plaintiff

did reside at the property. She was told that there was no record

of the plaintiff having given thirty-day notice of moving out. See

Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, ¶¶ 11-12. Based

on these facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the

defendant’s acts did not result from “bona fide errors,” but rather

that the defendant knew or should have known that the debt the

defendant sought to enforce did not exist. 

Moreover, the defendant has not offered any evidence that she

maintained procedures reasonably designed to avoid such errors. The

only procedures of which the court is aware, offered by the

plaintiff, is the defendant’s phone call to her client to verify

whether the plaintiff in fact resided at the Grayling Avenue

property. See Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,

¶¶ 11-12. Whether this represents a reasonable procedure to avoid

errors remains a question for the jury. Certainly, there is not

sufficient evidence to convince the court that the defendant has

met her burden to show that no reasonable jury could find that the

defendant’s violations of the FDCPA were “bona fide errors” under

the standard stated in section 1692k(c). The court denies the

defendant’s motion as to this defense.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided herein, the court GRANTS IN PART the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 14, 2008.

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