Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01002/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01002-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Case No. 1-8-cv-1002-JF (E.D. Cal.)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(DPSAGOK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESNO DIVISION

Tyrone Wayland MILES,

 Petitioner,

 v.

Michael MARTEL, Acting Warden of Mule Creek

State Prison,

 Respondent.

Case No. 1-8-cv-1002-JF

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

On March 17, 2010, the Court issued an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus filed by Petitioner Tyrone Wayland Miles, and judgment for Respondent was entered. 

(Docs. Nos. 14 & 15.) Now before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, (Doc.

No. 18), which the Court will treat as a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Petitioner contends that two cases not previously

addressed in the instant litigation demonstrate good cause to alter or amend the judgement:

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, No. 08-651 (Mar. 31, 2010), and Moore v. Czerniak, 574 F.3d

1092 (9th Cir. 2009).

In Padilla, the petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to transporting

marijuana. In doing so, he relied on his counsel’s advice that a guilty plea would have no

consequences for his immigration status. This advice was erroneous; in fact, Padilla’s plea to the

Case 1:08-cv-01002-JF Document 20 Filed 04/14/10 Page 1 of 3
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Case No. 1-8-cv-1002-JF (E.D. Cal.)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(DPSAGOK)

drug charges “made his deportation virtually mandatory.” Slip op. at 1. The United States

Supreme Court held that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient; it did not reach

the issue of whether this deficient performance prejudiced Padilla. Id. at 2.

Padilla pleaded guilty in reliance on counsel’s erroneous advice. In contrast, in the

instant case Petitioner initially did not plead guilty in reliance on counsel’s erroneous advice but

subsequently did plead guilty on counsel’s accurate advice. Here, unlike the situation in Padilla,

counsel’s deficient performance could not have had an effect on the actual plea bargain to which

Petitioner acceded.

In fact, Padilla supports the conclusion that Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. As the

Supreme Court explained:

The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to

a guilty plea—an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to

trial—imposes its own significant limiting principle: Those who

collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain

obtained as a result of the plea.

Id. at 15. If Petitioner were granted relief in the present action, the Court could not order the

State of California to offer Petitioner the initial plea bargain that he rejected; rather, Petitioner

simply would be restored to the same position he was in immediately prior to his plea, i.e., a

possible—indeed, reasonably probable—sentence of more than one hundred years to life if he

elected to go to trial. Under these circumstances, the Court is not convinced that a decision to

reject the actual plea bargain that Petitioner accepted would have been rational. See id. at 14 (“to

obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject

the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s

reliance on Padilla is misplaced.

In Moore, the Ninth Circuit held that counsel’s failure to file what would have been a

meritorious motion to suppress Moore’s taped confession on involuntariness grounds was

constitutionally deficient. The court also held that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

Moore because had he gone to trial Moore “would have faced a potential sentence identical to

that he received as a result of his plea bargain.” 574 F.3d at 1094.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals explained that, “[i]n the context of a plea

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Case No. 1-8-cv-1002-JF (E.D. Cal.)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(DPSAGOK)

bargain, we specifically ask whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

deficient performance, the petitioner would have gone to trial rather than accept the plea bargain

offered by the state.” Id. at 1100; see also Padilla, slip op. at 15. In the instant case, while the

plea bargain that Petitioner accepted was not as favorable to him as the initial offer that his

counsel erroneously advised him to reject, it nonetheless was far superior to the outcome

Petitioner faced if he went to trial—that is, a sentence of more than one hundred years to life. 

The present action thus is distinguishable from Moore, in which the petitioner did not receive any

benefit from the plea bargain that he accepted.

Accordingly, and good cause appearing therefor, Petitioner’s motion, (Doc. No. 18), will

be denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 13, 2010 _______________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 1:08-cv-01002-JF Document 20 Filed 04/14/10 Page 3 of 3