Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_18-cv-01863/USCOURTS-alnd-7_18-cv-01863-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

JASON ALAN RAMSEY

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

COMMISSIONER,

Defendant.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 7:18-CV-01863

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jason Alan Ramsey (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to Sections 216(i) and 

223(d) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying his claim for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits (“DIB”). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Based on the court’s review of the record 

and the parties’ briefs, the court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.

I. Proceedings Below

Plaintiff filed his application for disability insurance benefits on May 29, 2015, alleging 

that he became disabled on July 19, 2013. (Tr. 217-20). On October 15, 2015, the Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 153-57). Plaintiff received a hearing 

before Administrative Law Judge Cynthia W. Brown (“ALJ”) on July 13, 2017. (Tr. 118-39). In 

a decision dated January 8, 2018, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been under a disability 

within the meaning of Sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act. (Tr. 101-17). The Appeals Council 

FILED

 2020 Feb-28 AM 09:33

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:18-cv-01863-RDP Document 16 Filed 02/28/20 Page 1 of 15
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denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision on September 26, 2018. (Tr. 35-41).

That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, and therefore a proper subject of 

this court’s appellate review.

II. Facts

Plaintiff was thirty-two years old on the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 112). Plaintiff 

dropped out of school in the twelfth grade, but later obtained his GED. (Tr. 488). After completing 

two years of welding training, Plaintiff became a certified welder. (Id.). Plaintiff is married with 

no children. (Id.). His employment history includes work as an auto mechanic apprentice, 

maintenance mechanic, welder, automobile body repair technician, and a retail store manager. (Tr. 

135-36, 236-37, 273). Immediately prior to filing for disability, Plaintiff was employed at Odom 

Chevrolet as an auto mechanic apprentice from January 2012 to July 15, 2013. (Tr. 122-23, 235, 

273). Plaintiff alleges he suffers from the following disabling impairments: Rocky Mountain 

Spotted Fever; fatigue, chronic not controlled; generalized pain, chronic, not controlled; attention 

deficit disorder; COPD; bulging discs at L4 and L5; and anxiety. (Tr. 141, 235).

Plaintiff’s earliest report of medical care occurred on May 23, 2013, where Plaintiff

presented to Dr. Archie Hooper at Rush Medical Group. (Tr. 239). Dr. Hooper ordered a blood 

test for Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Lyme Disease, as well as blood and metabolic panels. (Tr. 

239-40). On a follow-up appointment in June 2013, Dr. Hooper diagnosed Plaintiff with Rocky 

Mountain Spotted Fever, and prescribed doxycycline for fourteen days. (Tr. 406-10). 

While Plaintiff does not allege a specific date of diagnosis for Generalized Anxiety 

Disorder (GAD) or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Dr. Hooper reported as early 

as June 2013 that Plaintiff was taking Adderall and Xanax. (Tr. 407). Dr. Hooper further noted 

that Plaintiff was scheduled for an appointment with Dr. Jagani, an infectious disease specialist, 

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and recommended that Plaintiff follow up only if his symptoms persisted or worsened. (Tr. 405-

07). On July 2, 3013, Dr. Jagani concluded that Plaintiff’s symptoms were not related to Rocky 

Mountain Spotted Fever, and recommended Plaintiff get tested for hepatitis and HIV. (Tr. 342). 

On July 19, 2013, Plaintiff presented to The Spine Care Center complaining of low back 

pain. (Tr. 314-22, 331). Dr. Wesley Spruill ordered an MRI scan of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine. (Tr. 

330, 339). The scan showed mild degenerative disc changes at L4 and L5, but “no significant 

appearing canal or foraminal narrowing.” (Id.). Overall, Dr. Spruill described the scan results as 

“unremarkable.” (Id.). Due to a positive urine drug screen, Dr. Spruill declined to write any 

prescription for Plaintiff. (Tr. 330, 339). No treatments were recommended, other than NSAIDs 

and physical therapy. (Tr. 339). 

In January 2014, Plaintiff presented to Oncology Associates of West Alabama for 

evaluation of lymphadenopathy. (Tr. 357-62). Dr. Susan Bostick ordered a CT scan. (Id.). The 

exam revealed “no evidence of any type of malignancy or lymphadenopathy.” (Tr. 362). Dr. 

Bostick did, however, find evidence of emphysema which “would [have been] unusual for a 33 

year old.” (Id.). Dr. Bostick prescribed a Pro-Air inhaler. (Id.). Additionally, Dr. Bostick gave 

Plaintiff 30 Norco for pain control as Plaintiff had earlier complained of joint pain. (Tr. 361-62). 

Plaintiff had previously been prescribed Norco from a “Med Center” physician. (Tr. 357).

In February 2014, Plaintiff visited Rush Medical Group, complaining of rib and back pain. 

(Tr. 428). Dr. Todd Vaughan, a physician at Rush Medical, found no evidence of chest, neck, or 

back pain, nor evidence of shortness of breath, or dizziness. (Tr. 428-29). Dr. Vaughan noted that 

Plaintiff reported years of chronic pain, “[a]chy in nature,” but tests had always revealed normal 

results. (Id.). In regard to medication, Plaintiff reported he was doing well with no issues. (Tr. 

428). Numerous laboratory tests failed to reveal any known problems. (Tr. 423, 425).

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On referral from Dr. Bostick for COPD, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Aslam of Tuscaloosa 

Lung, Critical Care, and Sleep on March 3, 2014, complaining of chest pain. (Tr. 380-82). 

Plaintiff followed up on September 8, 2014. (Tr. 374-76). Since Plaintiff’s last visit in March 

2014 with Dr. Aslam, Plaintiff reported no new symptoms, nor any recent infection, while at the 

September 2014 appointment. (Tr. 374). Plaintiff had no recent emergency room visits or 

hospitalizations. (Id.). And, in regard to Plaintiff’s respiratory condition, Dr. Aslam reported a 

normal chest appearance, normal breath sounds, no rales, no rhonci, and no wheezing. (Tr. 375).

In September 2015, Plaintiff underwent a physical conducted by Dr. Ronnie Chu, a 

consultative examiner. (Tr. 436-39). Dr. Chu reported that Plaintiff had a normal gait, no ataxia, 

and produced a negative straight raise. (Tr. 438). Plaintiff had no back spasms, no tenderness, 

and no deformity. (Id.). Dr. Chu noted Plaintiff’s “[g]ood fine and gross motor movements.”

(Id.). Additionally, Dr. Chu noted that Plaintiff’s range of motion measured within normal limits, 

including the range of motion of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine, cervical spine, hips, knees, shoulders, 

elbows and forearms, ankles, wrists, and fingers. (Id.). Dr. Chu reported that that Plaintiff failed 

to take vitamins to combat Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, which would “help him tremendously 

with symptoms.” (Tr. 439). Dr. Chu cautioned Plaintiff against marijuana use “per drug screens 

in the past.”1(Tr. 436, 439). Overall, Dr. Chu noted that Plaintiff had a normal exam, and opined 

that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.).

In July 2015, Plaintiff’s wife completed a Function Report. (Tr. 255-64). The report 

provides that Plaintiff is able to get up in the morning, prepare a meal, attempt to complete chores, 

and drive. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff feeds and walks pets. (Id.). Plaintiff does not need special 

1 Dr. Spruill has reported a urine drug screen positive for marijuana, morphine, amphetamine, and hydrocodone. 

(Tr. 325, 330, 339). 

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reminders to take care of his personal needs, nor does Plaintiff need reminders to take medication. 

(Id.). Plaintiff’s wife reports that Plaintiff can no longer fish or ride ATVs with friends. (Tr. 262).

On March 31, 2017, Dr. Vaughan ordered a CT scan. (Tr. 463). In comparing the 2017 

CT scan to Plaintiff’s most recent September 2014 CT scan, Dr. Vaughan noted that biapical 

pleural and parenchymal scarring had progressed slightly. (Tr. 463). The results showed no mass 

or lymphadenopathy that caused concern. (Id.). Dr. Vaughan reported Plaintiff’s heart size was 

within normal limits, and no pleural effusions were present. (Id.). Generally, Dr. Vaughan noted 

some progression of the emphysematous changes when compared with the prior exam. (Id.). Dr. 

Vaughan advised Plaintiff that he “[m]ust stop smoking.” (Tr. 467).

In regard to Plaintiff’s alleged ADHD and GAD, Dr. Vaughan reported that Plaintiff was 

doing well on Xanax in March 2017. (Tr. 456). In general, Plaintiff’s ADHD and GAD are both 

controlled by Adderall and Xanax. (Tr. 454-62).

III. ALJ Decision

The Social Security Administration has established a five-part sequential evaluation 

process for determining whether an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). First, the 

ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §

4041520(a)(4)(i). Substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) is defined as work activity that involves 

doing significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a). “Gainful work activity” 

is work that is usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1572(b). If the ALJ finds that the claimant engages in substantial gainful activity, then the 

claimant cannot claim disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that is “severe” or a combination 

of impairments that is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c). An impairment or combination of 

Case 7:18-cv-01863-RDP Document 16 Filed 02/28/20 Page 5 of 15
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impairments is “severe” within the meaning of the regulations if it significantly limits an 

individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Absent such 

impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id. Third, the ALJ must determine whether 

the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments is of a severity to meet or medically 

equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart Π, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. If such criteria are met, the claimant is declared 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(iii).

If the claimant does not fulfill the requirements necessary to be declared disabled under the

third step, the ALJ may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. The ALJ must 

first determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which refers to the claimant’s 

ability to work despite the claimant’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). In the fourth step, 

the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is determined to be capable of performing past relevant work, 

then the claimant is deemed not disabled. Id. If the ALJ finds the claimant unable to perform past 

relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

In the final part of the analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is able to do any 

other work considering his residual functional capacity age, education, and work experience. 20 

C.F.R § 404.1520(g). Here, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the ALJ to prove the 

existence, in significant numbers, of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can do given 

the residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 1512(f). 

404.1560(c).

The ALJ faithfully followed the established five-step sequential evaluation process in 

assessing whether Plaintiff was disabled. (Tr. 105-13). First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not 

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engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 19, 2013, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 106). 

Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: Rocky Mountain 

Spotted Fever, fatigue, chronic pain syndrome (CPS), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 

(ADHD), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), lumbar spondylosis, emphysema, and 

generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). (Tr. 106). Third, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of 

one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart Π, Appendix 1. (Tr. 107). In reaching 

this conclusion, the ALJ considered the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments, both “singly 

and in combination,” as well as whether “paragraph B” and “paragraph C” criteria were satisfied; 

the record did not support a finding that Plaintiff satisfied the criteria. (Id.).

In assessing the fourth step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform his past 

relevant work as an auto mechanic apprentice, mechanic, welder, body repairer, or a retail store 

manager. (Tr. 112). But, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to 

perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.157(b). (Tr. 109). Specifically, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff must work without concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, or 

pulmonary irritants, and without any exposure to hazards. (Id.). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff 

could understand, remember, and apply simple instructions, and attend to those for at least twohour periods, and Plaintiff could also tolerate occasional interaction with the public and coworkers; 

changes in the workplace should occur no more than occasionally. (Tr. 109, 136). In making these

findings, the ALJ considered all symptoms and the extent to which those symptoms could 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence. (Tr. 

109). Finally, the ALJ considered the testimony of a vocational expert, and found that there was 

other work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy and that Plaintiff could 

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perform based on his age, education, past work experience, and RFC. (Tr. 113). Because Plaintiff 

retained the ability to perform the work requirements of representative occupations, such as a 

merchandise price marker or a routing clerk, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under 

Sections 216(i) and 223(d). (Tr. 113).

IV.Plaintiff’s Argument for Remand or Reversal

Plaintiff presents three arguments for review. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that (1) the 

ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the 

ALJ erred in not giving substantial weight to the opinion of a treating physician; and (3) the ALJ 

erred in failing to accurately consider the side effects of Plaintiff’s medications. (Pl.’s Br., Doc # 

14 at 2). The court addresses each argument, in turn.

V. Standard of Review

Judicial review of disability claims under the Act is limited to whether the Commissioner’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence or whether the correct legal standards were applied.

42 U.S.C. §405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial 

evidence is less than a preponderance, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable person 

would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th 

Cir. 2005); see also Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth 

v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). The Commissioner’s factual findings are 

conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th 

Cir. 2001). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s factual findings must be 

affirmed, even if the record preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings. Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. 

Legal standards are reviewed de novo. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).

Case 7:18-cv-01863-RDP Document 16 Filed 02/28/20 Page 8 of 15
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VI.Discussion

For the reasons explained below, the court finds that the Commissioner based her decision 

on substantial evidence and correct legal standards were applied. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision 

is due to be affirmed.

A. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (“RFC”) Is 

Supported By Substantial Evidence.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s silence as to Plaintiff’s alleged depression and chronic 

fatigue makes it “impossible” to determine whether substantial evidence supports the residual 

functional capacity assessment. (Pl.’s Br., Doc # 14 at 2-3, 5). The court disagrees.

The RFC is “an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical 

and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis. A ‘regular and continuing

basis’ means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” Social Security 

Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must base her findings on “all 

of the relevant medical and other evidence,” including a claimant’s testimony regarding the 

limitations imposed by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). The RFC represents the most 

an individual can do despite his limitations. Id. at 416.945(a). “In making the RFC determination, 

the ALJ must consider all the record evidence, including evidence of non-severe impairments.”

Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). Although the ALJ must consider all 

impairments, the ALJ is not required to refer to every piece of evidence in the record. Dyer v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005); Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th 

Cir. 1986) (stating that the ALJ need not "mechanically recite the evidence leading to her 

determination").

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1. Depression Diagnosis

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ was not required to address Plaintiff’s alleged 

depression. See Sullivan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 694 F. App'x 670, 671 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding

ALJ had no obligation to investigate a claim that a plaintiff did not allege in her application for 

benefits, nor raise at her hearing before the ALJ). Here, Plaintiff failed to allege disability due to 

depression on his application for benefits in May 2015. (Tr. 141); see Street v. Barnhart, 133 F. 

App'x 621, 627 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the claimant’s failure to raise a mental health issue 

as a basis for disability at the hearing “alone could dispose of his claim” because an administrative 

law judge is “under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application 

for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability”) (quoting Pena v. Chater, 76 

F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 1996)); Robinson v. Astrue, 365 Fed. Appx. 993, 995 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 

curiam) (unpublished) (same). Similarly, Plaintiff did not allege he was disabled due to the 

depression at his July 13, 2017 hearing. Indeed, when asked whether any mental impairments 

were alleged, Plaintiff stated, “No, no mental.” 2 (Tr. 122-25). In any event, a review of the record 

shows that the ALJ considered the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments, both “singly and in 

combination,” and determined that the impairments did not meet or medically equal the criteria of 

listing 12.06 and 12.11. (Tr. 107). Because substantial evidence supports that the ALJ based her

findings on “all of the relevant medical and other evidence,” the court finds no reversible error on 

this claim.

2. Chronic Fatigue Diagnosis

Also contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ properly considered the combined effects of 

Plaintiff’s impairments, including chronic fatigue, when assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff 

2 The ALJ later confirmed that no mental impairments were alleged, other than anxiety. (Tr. 135).

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argues that there is “no mention” of chronic fatigue; however, the ALJ did, in fact, address fatigue.

(Pl.’s Br., Doc # 14 at 3). Specifically, the ALJ noted that on two occasions Dr. Vaughan “found 

no fatigue.”

3

(Tr. 111). The ALJ considered the entirety of Plaintiff’s symptoms, in light of the 

reasonable, objective medical evidence, as well as opinion evidence. (Tr. 109). See Sneed v. 

Barnhart, 214 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2006) (ALJ satisfied duty to consider the combined 

effect of a claimant’s impairments by stating that he considered whether the claimant suffered from 

any impairment or combination of impairments); accord Jones v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 941 F.2d

1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding the ALJ had given adequate consideration to the combination 

issue based upon a conclusory statement that the claimant did not have “an impairment or 

combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listen in Appendix 1”). Therefore, 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 

to perform a full range of light work.

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Not Giving Substantial Weight to The Opinion of 

the Treating Physician.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give substantial weight to the opinion of 

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Todd Vaughan. (Pl.’s Br., Doc # 14 at 6). An ALJ must give 

the opinion of a treating physician “substantial or considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is 

shown to the contrary.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Good cause exists when “(1) [the] treating physician’s 

opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) [the] evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) 

[the] treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical 

records.” Id. at 1240-41. “With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion, 

3 Dr. Vaughan found “no fatigue” on March 5, 2015 and on April 27, 2017 —only a month prior to Plaintiff’s filing 

for DIB. (Tr. 111, 412, 415).

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but he ‘must clearly articulate [the] reasons’ for doing so.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting 

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241; alteration in Winschel).

Here, the ALJ articulated two justifications for giving lesser weight to Dr. Vaughan’s 

opinion: (1) Dr. Vaughan’s opinion was inconsistent with his own records, and (2) the opinion was 

not “consistent with other objective evidence.” (Tr. 111). Specifically, the ALJ explained that Dr. 

Vaughan noted Plaintiff reported years of chronic pain, yet tests “always revealed normal results.”

(Tr. 109). Numerous laboratory tests failed to reveal any known problems. (Id.). Dr. Vaughan’s 

reports also show that Plaintiff could logically order his thoughts and conversation, Plaintiff’s 

associations were intact, and Plaintiff’s affect was appropriate with no confusion; such reports 

evidence “mild to, at most, moderate limitations” and do not provide a basis for disability. (Tr. 

111). Because good cause exists for discounting Dr. Vaughan’s opinion, this court cannot disturb 

that determination. See, e.g., Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 823 (11th Cir. 

2015); Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159–61 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that 

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discredit the opinions of the claimant’s 

treating physicians where those physicians' opinions regarding the claimant’s disability were 

inconsistent with the physicians' treatment notes and unsupported by the medical evidence).

While a treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to more weight than a consulting 

physician’s opinion, nothing prevents an ALJ from giving greater weight to the opinion of a nontreating source as long as the ALJ articulates good cause for allocating the weight in that way. See 

Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Social Security regulations 

provide:

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Generally, we give more weight to medical opinions from your treating sources . . . . If we 

find that a treating source’s medical opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of 

your impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your 

case record, we will give it controlling weight.

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2) (emphasis added). Here, the ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. Ronnie 

Chu, as it was Dr. Chu’s “opinion [that was] consistent with the great weight of medical evidence.” 

(Tr. 112). Plaintiff presented to Dr. Chu, a consultative examiner, in September 2015. (Tr. 436-

39). Dr. Chu reported that Plaintiff had no back spasms, no tenderness, and no deformity. Records 

indicate that Plaintiff had a normal gait, no ataxia, and produced a negative straight leg raise. (Tr. 

438). Moreover, Dr. Chu observed that Plaintiff’s range of motion in his lumbar spine, cervical 

spine, hip, and knees were within normal limits. (Tr. 439). Overall, Dr. Chu noted that Plaintiff’s 

exam was “normal.” (Id.). Because good cause existed for discounting Dr. Vaughan’s opinion,

and the ALJ articulated sufficient reasons for allocating more weight to Dr. Chu, the court finds 

the ALJ did not err in assigning weight to be given to these physicians’ opinions.

C. The ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Medication Side Effects.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not adequately consider the side effects of Plaintiff’s

medication. (Pl.’s Br., Doc # 14 at 10). Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. 

First, no objective medical evidence supports Plaintiff's claim that he suffered any alleged 

side effects, or that the medications caused any alleged side effects. Plaintiff appears to suggest

that his medications cause fatigue and the need to lie down. (Pl.’s Br., Doc # 14 at 10-11). 

Specifically, Plaintiff cites to testimony during the July 2017 hearing that he lies down two to three 

times during the day, sometimes for 20 to 30 minutes at a time, and sometimes for several hours. 

(Pl.’s Br., Doc # 14 at 10). A contextual reading of this testimony, however, demonstrates that the 

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need to lie down is not a side effect of medication, but rather a method of dealing with pain.4In 

fact, the only discussion of Plaintiff’s medications during the hearing occurs where Plaintiff reports 

the medications “do help a good bit.” (Tr. 126). Because Plaintiff does not explain what 

medication side effects he believes the ALJ failed to consider, and there is a lack of substantial 

evidence in the record to support this assertion, Plaintiff has not met the burden of showing his 

claim that the side effects of his medications make him unable to work is supported. Ellison v. 

Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003); Walker v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 404 Fed. Appx. 

362, 366 (11th Cir. 2010); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (“[Claimant] must furnish medical and other 

evidence that we can use to reach conclusions about [Claimant’s] medical impairment(s).”).

Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Vaughan expressed concern regarding side effects. (Pl.’s 

Br., Doc # 14 at 11). But that allegation is off the mark. Dr. Vaughan reports Plaintiff takes 

Adderall, Xanax, and Norco. (Tr. 374, 399-402, 407, 407, 411, 455). While Dr. Vaughan appears 

to have expressed a concern over Plaintiff’s “complex” medical regimen, he did not state any

concern about the side effects of the medications. Dr. Vaughan merely asserts in conclusory 

fashion that the medications “make it difficult to function at the level he would need to hold 

employment.” (Tr. 453). But there is no evidence in Dr. Vaughan’s records to support such a

contention. Plaintiff has cited no records showing that a doctor expressed concern regarding 

any side effects; Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to meet his burden to show that side effects are part 

of her alleged disabling condition. See Werner v. Commissioner, 421 Fed. Appx. 935, 938 (11th 

Cir. 2011) (“a claimant’s failure to report side effects to her physicians is an appropriate factor for 

4 During the hearing, Plaintiff reported he experienced pain at a 6 or 7 level. When asked by the ALJ what Plaintiff 

does to “try to deal with this pain,” Plaintiff stated that he would lie down, and “try[] to relax.” (Tr. 127). Plaintiff 

further provided that he would lie down “maybe twice, three times a day.” (Tr. 128). A thorough review of the 

hearing transcript shows no mention of medication side effects. 

Case 7:18-cv-01863-RDP Document 16 Filed 02/28/20 Page 14 of 15
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the ALJ to consider in evaluating whether a claimant’s alleged symptoms are consistent with the 

record”).

Plaintiff argues briefly that that any side effects could result in off task behavior of 10% or 

more in a typical workday. The significance of this, according to the Vocational Expert, would 

preclude all work. (Tr. 138). Plaintiff, however, fails to cite any objective medical evidence 

showing alleged side effects would have affected his ability to work.

Given Plaintiff’s failure to provide objective medical evidence to support his allegations of 

side effects from medication, the ALJ was not required to make findings on the effect of 

medications and their alleged side effects. See Passopulos v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 642, 648 (11th 

Cir. 1992); see also Burgin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 420 F. App'x 901, 904 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f 

there is no evidence before the ALJ that a claimant is taking medication that cause side effects, the 

ALJ is not required to elicit testimony or make findings regarding the medications and their side 

effects.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s arguments on the ALJ's failure to make findings on the effect of 

prescribed medications and their side effects are without merit.

VII. Conclusion

The court concludes that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is

supported by substantial evidence, and the proper legal standards were applied in reaching this 

determination. The Commissioner’s final decision is therefore due to be AFFIRMED. A separate 

order in accordance with this memorandum decision will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this February 28, 2020.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 7:18-cv-01863-RDP Document 16 Filed 02/28/20 Page 15 of 15