Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_12-cv-04344/USCOURTS-cand-5_12-cv-04344-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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Case No.: 5:12-cv-04344-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

BALJINDER RAI, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

SANTA CLARA VALLEY 

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 5:12-cv-004344-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

CLASS CERTIFICATION

(Re: Docket No. 143)

Each weekday, 139,582 people ride the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority’s bus 

and light rail train system.1 Richard Rosa and Walter Silveira are system operators who allege that 

from August 17, 2009 onward VTA subjected them to a common and unlawful compensation 

scheme.2 Plaintiffs say that VTA required them to “work off-the-clock without compensation” 

because VTA did not compensate them for “all hours worked” performing compensable work 

 1 See Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority System Summary, 

http://www.vta.org/transparency/performance-indicators/system-summary (139,582 average 

weekday boarding riders for the financial year to date 2015 first quarter). 

2 By stipulation of the parties, Silveira substituted for former Plaintiff Baljinder Rai. See Docket 

No. 142.

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activities such as traveling to their routes and meeting with their supervisors.

3 Plaintiffs move for

certification of a class of operators under-compensated during the relevant time period.4

Whatever their ultimate success on the merits, the substantial record compiled by the parties

shows that Plaintiffs meet the requirements for class certification.

5 The court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ 

motion. 

 3 See Docket No. 36 at 12-13.

4 See Docket No. 143. Plaintiffs seek class certification for the Second and Third Causes of Action 

of their Fourth Amended Complaint, which allege failure to pay all hours worked. See id. at 12-13; 

see also Docket No. 143 at 1. Plaintiffs also make other claims not at issue here.

5 The court may take judicial notice of a “fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is 

generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). If the fact is not in dispute and may be 

verified by resort to the public record, the court takes judicial notice as requested. A court may 

take judicial notice of laws, city ordinances and opinion letters. See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs 

v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Mendoza v. Home Depot, U.S.A., 

Inc., Case No. 09-05843-SJO(JCx), 2010 WL 424679, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2010) (Industrial 

Wage Orders and California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement Opinion Letters “are 

properly subject to judicial notice”). Plaintiffs request that the court take judicial notice of (1) the 

California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 9-2001, codified at 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 

11090 (Docket No. 144, Ex. 1); (2) the City of San Jose Minimum Wage Ordinance (Docket No. 

144, Ex. 2) and (3) a California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement Opinion Letter of 

January 29, 2002 (Docket No. 144, Ex. 3). Because none is subject to a reasonable dispute, the 

court takes notice as requested. 

Plaintiffs also object to the tardiness of VTA’s opposition brief, see Docket No. 167 at 2, and 

further complain that the declarations of Anita Geleynse, Eric Rosenberg and David Terrazas are 

not signed and lack an attestation by the filer as Civ. L.R. 5-1(i)(3) requires. See id; see also 

Docket Nos. 154-1, 154-2, 155. Plaintiffs assert that these declarations—along with the 

declaration of Joseph P. Ryan—are defective because they purport to be “under penalty of perjury 

under the laws of the State of California,” not under federal law. See Docket No. 167 at 2 (citing 

Mejia v. City of San Bernardino, Case No. EDCV-11-00452-VAP(DTBx), 2012 WL 1079341, at 

*2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012)); see also Docket No. 154-3. The court does not condone late filings

or filings of defective, unsigned declarations. But as explained below, class certification is proper, 

even considering these declarations and VTA’s opposition brief. 

For its part, VTA objects that Plaintiffs “filed a voluminous motion just before Thanksgiving” 

without giving VTA time to discuss a discovery plan with Plaintiffs. See Docket No. 154 at 4. 

Plaintiffs filed their motion in compliance with the stipulated, court-ordered schedule and gave 

VTA an extension of time to file its opposition. See Docket Nos. 132, 143, 153. This was 

sufficient.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

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I.

“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on 

behalf of the individual named parties only.’”6 To satisfy class certification requirements, class 

members’ claims must be capable of satisfaction in “one stroke.”7 To satisfy the four threshold 

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable” (numerosity); (2) there must be “questions of law or fact common to the 

class” (commonality); (3) “the claims or defenses of the representative parties” must be “typical of 

the claims or defenses of the class” (typicality); and (4) the named plaintiffs must “fairly and 

adequately protect the interests of the class” (adequacy).8 Plaintiffs seeking class certification must 

also satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b), subdivisions 1, 2 or 3, which define three different 

types of classes.9

 

Here, Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the predominance standard.10

To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the party seeking class certification must establish that both 

that (1) “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members” and that (2) a class action would be “superior to other available 

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”11 “The shared legal or factual 

issues must be of sufficient importance to the case that the Court is convinced that the most 

 6 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 

U.S. 682, 700-1 (1979)).

7 Id. at 2551.

8 In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-

(4)); see also Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013).

9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Leyva, 716 F.3d at 512. 

10 See Docket No. 143 at 18.

11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

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efficient, fair, and sensible method of adjudication is through a class action.”12 As a result, the 

predominance inquiry examines “whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 

adjudication by representation.”13

In evaluating whether a party has met the requirements of Rule 23, “Rule 23 does not set 

forth a mere pleading standard.”14 “A party seeking class certification must affirmatively 

demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in 

fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”15 This is a “rigorous 

analysis”16 that must “‘entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.’”17 

Over three hundred and eighty bus and train operators perform public transit services for 

VTA each day.18 Each of these operators is assigned to one of four divisions.

19 VTA oversees and 

operates all divisions.

20 Since 2008, VTA and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 265, which 

represents all bus and train operators at VTA, have been parties to collective bargaining 

agreements that set forth operators’ wages, hours of work and working conditions.

21

 12 Stitt v. San Francisco Mun. Transp. Agency, Case No. 12-cv-3704, 2014 WL 1760623 (N.D. Cal. 

May 2, 2014) (citing Cal. Prac. Guide Fed. Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 10–C § 10:274).

13 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (internal citations omitted).

14 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.

15 Id. (emphasis in original).

16 See id.; see also Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542-43 (9th Cir. 2013).

17 See Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551; In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., Case No. 5:13-md-02430-LHK,

2014 WL 1102660, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar.18, 2014); General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. 

Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (“[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains 

. . . indispensable.”). 

18 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. G, Cuff Depo. at 26:8-27:10.

19 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1 at 10:13-12:1.

20 See id. at 10:20-11:3, 12:9-13, 18:20-25.

21 See Docket No. 155, Terrazas Decl. at ¶¶ 3-11, see also Docket Nos. 155-162, Terrazas Decl., 

Ex. 1-2.

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Throughout the proposed class period, VTA has used Trapeze, a computer software suite, to 

design schedules for its bus and light rail operators.

22 VTA uses Trapeze to create a “Synopsis of 

Runs” that identifies each operator’s daily assignment.23 The Synopsis of Runs enables VTA to 

calculate a predetermined daily pay amount for each operator. To determine this amount, VTA 

calculates the operator’s total “straight time,” which is a predetermined amount of compensable 

time for various categories of time associated with the operator’s run.24 In some situations, straight 

time includes additional time that operators are paid in order to meet full time operators’ guarantee 

of eight hours of daily pay and “elapsed time,” which is a premium for work time that exceeds ten 

hours and thirty minutes.25 VTA adds straight time hours to overtime hours and then multiplies 

this figure by the applicable hourly rates to calculate the operator’s total daily pay.26

Plaintiffs allege that VTA’s compensation system does not pay operators for “all (1) splitshift travel time, (2) turn-in time, (3) bulletin time, (4) meeting time, (5) pre-departure time and (6) 

all time actually spent driving.”27 In the Second and Third Causes of their Fourth Amended 

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that by not “compensat[ing] operators for all hours worked,” VTA has 

 22 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 9:7-10:25, 28:3-14, 29:5-19; see 

also Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1 at 18:6-25.

23 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 31:7-32:4; Docket Nos. 145-2, 

145-3, Tidrick Decl., Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex. 1.

24 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1 at 79:23-80:24; Docket No. 

145-7, Tidrick Decl., Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex. 5 at Section 11, pages 5 (“Synopsis of Runs: 

Explanation of each Column as Follows” defining the column labeled “STRT TIME” as “Straight 

Time. A combination of total platform, travel time, allowed time, report time and elapsed time”); 

see also Docket Nos. 145-2, 145-3, Tidrick Decl., Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex. 1.

25 See Docket No. 145-7, Tidrick Decl., Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex. 5 at Section 11, pages 5. 

26 See id. (“Synopsis of Runs: Explanation of each Column as Follows” defining “TOTAL PAY” 

as “[t]he number of hours being paid at straight time rate for STRAIGHT TIME and OVER TIME 

(Total Run Pay). Multiply this time by the hourly rate to figure total pay for the day”); see also 

Docket Nos. 145-2, 145-3, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex. 1.

27 Docket No. 143 at 5.

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violated California Industrial Wage Order No. 9, California Labor Code § 1194 and San Jose 

Municipal Code Chapter 4.100.28 

Plaintiffs now request that the court certify a class with request to these causes of action of 

“[a]ll individuals who are currently employed, or formerly have been employed, by the Santa Clara 

Valley Transportation Authority as a bus or train operator at any time on or after August 17, 

2009.”29 Plaintiffs also seek authorization to send to all class members the class notice attached to 

the Declaration of Steven G. Tidrick, appointment of Plaintiffs Richard Rosa and Walter Silveira as 

representatives of the class and appointment of the Tidrick Law Firm as class counsel.30

II.

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338. The parties further 

consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

III.

At issue is whether Plaintiffs’ proposed class should be certified. Because Plaintiffs have

met the requirements of both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), the court certifies the proposed class.

First, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims. “[I]f none of the named plaintiffs 

purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the 

defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.”31 Put 

 28 See Docket No. 36 at 12-13.

29 Docket No. 143 at 1. Plaintiffs also request that the class exclude “anyone employed by counsel 

for Plaintiffs in this action, and any Judge to whom this action is assigned and his or her immediate 

family members.” See id. at 1. 

30 See id. 

31 See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003).

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another way, if “the individual plaintiff lacks standing, the court need never reach the class action 

issue.”32

VTA suggests that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek compensation for time allegedly worked 

in excess of eight hours because they are guaranteed eight hours per day under their collective 

bargaining agreements.

33 While Section 510 of the California Labor Code and Wage Order No. 9 

provide that employers must pay overtime to employees who work in excess of certain time 

periods,34 neither Section 510 nor Wage Order No. 9 applies to employees like Plaintiffs covered 

by a “valid collective bargaining agreement” that expressly provides for “premium wage rates for 

all overtime hours worked” and a “regular hourly rate of pay...of not less than 30 percent more 

than the state minimum wage.”35 But, as Plaintiffs point out, no state court has ruled that the time 

the operators receive under a guarantee of eight hours of paid work per shift may “offset any time 

spent performing tasks that are not built into the schedules.”36

VTA’s assertion that Plaintiffs’ failure to use the procedures provided in the CBAs to 

grieve their claims is “a jurisdictional bar to pursuing those claims” in this court similarly lacks 

merit.

37 As with VTA’s claim that Plaintiffs’ overtime claims are barred, no court has ruled that a 

 32 See id. (internal citations omitted); see also Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 

(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff 

meets the requirements.”)

33 See Docket No. 154 at 7-8.

34 See Cal. Labor Code § 510(a); 8 C.C.R. § 11090(3).

35 See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510(a)(2), 514; 8 C.C.R. § 11090(3)(H); see also Docket No. 154 at 8; see 

also Docket No. 155, Terrazas Decl. at ¶¶ 8, 10.

36 See Docket No. 167 at 7; cf. Docket No. 144, Ex. 3 at 11 (“Averaging of all wages paid under a 

CBA or other contract, within a particular pay period, in order to determine whether the employer 

complied with its minimum wage obligations is not permitted under these circumstances, for to do 

so would result in the employer paying the employees less than the contract rate for those activities

which the CBA or contract requires payment of a specified amount equal to or greater than the 

minimum wage, in violation of Labor Code sections 221-223.”).

37 See Docket No. 154 at 9-10. VTA asserts that a party to a collective bargain agreement which 

“provides grievance and arbitration machinery for the settlement of disputes” within the scope of 

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lack of exhaustion bars Plaintiffs’ claims, especially where, as here, Plaintiffs assert that they “can 

prove that their claims are not subject to mandatory arbitration.”38 VTA’s challenges to Plaintiffs’ 

claims thus do not rise to the level necessary to “establish” that Plaintiffs have no viable claims.39

Second, Plaintiffs meet the numerosity requirement. Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be 

“so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” The Rule creates greater access to 

judicial relief, particularly for those persons with claims that would be “uneconomical to litigate 

individually.”40 A class of forty or more members “raises a presumption of impracticability of 

joinder based on numbers alone.”41 

Plaintiffs have shown, and VTA concedes, that Plaintiffs meet the numerosity 

requirement.

42 Plaintiffs have presented evidence that VTA employed at least 1,083 people as 

operators during the proposed class period.43 Given the number of class members, joinder would 

be impracticable.44

 

such agreement “must exhaust the internal remedies” before seeking redress in court “in the 

absence of facts excusing such exhaustion.” See Docket No. 154 at 9 (citing Johnson v. Hydraulic 

Research & Mfg. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 675, 679 (1977)); see also Docket No. 155, Terrazas Decl., 

Ex. 1, Part A, Section 19 (providing a grievance procedure for disputes regarding the CBA); 

Docket No. 159, Terrazas Decl., Ex. 2, Part A, Section 19 (same).

38 See Docket No. 167 at 8; cf. Lierboe, 350 F.3d at 1023 (noting that state supreme court had 

“established” that plaintiff’s claim was not viable under state law).

39 See id. 

40 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985); 7A Charles Alan Wright, et al., 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1762 (3d ed. 2005).

41 1 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12, (5th ed. 2011); see also Rannis v. 

Recchia, 380 Fed. Appx 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010).

42 See Docket No. 154 at 4 (“VTA does not question the ‘numerosity’ criterion.”).

43 See Docket No. 145, Tidrick Decl. at ¶ 3 (“VTA produced to Plaintiffs’ counsel contact 

information for a total of 1,083 Operators...taking into account additional individuals that VTA has 

hired as Operators since that time, the proposed class size is at least 1,083 people.”).

44 Under the ascertainability doctrine, the class must be sufficiently definite so that it is feasible for 

the court to determine membership by reference to objective criteria. See Williams v. Oberon 

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Third, Plaintiffs have met the commonality requirement. Commonality is met when there 

are “questions of law or fact common to the class.”45 “Commonality requires the plaintiff to 

demonstrate that the class members “have suffered the same injury,” and not merely violations of 

“the same provision of law.”46 The class members’ claims must “depend upon a common 

contention” such “that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 

validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”47 “Put another way, the key inquiry is not 

whether the plaintiffs have raised common questions, ‘even in droves,’ but rather, whether class 

treatment will ‘generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’”48 

Dissimilarities between class members must be considered in determining whether a 

common question will generate a common answer because dissimilarities within the proposed class 

can “impede the generation of common answers.”49 Thus, commonality must be determined based 

on an understanding of the nature and merit of the underlying claims to the extent such analysis is 

“relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.”50 

 

Media, Inc., 468 Fed. Appx. 768, 770 (9th Cir. 2012) (class motion was properly denied because 

the proposed members are not “precise, objective or presently ascertainable”). VTA does not 

dispute that this requirement is met, and Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that VTA 

maintains records from which the class members can be identified. See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick 

Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 21:2-24; Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw 

Depo. Vol. 1 at 70:18-23; Docket No. 150, Drogin Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 17-18; Docket No. 145, Tidrick 

Decl. at ¶ 3.

45 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).

46 Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (internal citations omitted).

47 Id.; see also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 675 (9th Cir. 2014).

48 Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Ass., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. 

at 2551 (emphasis in original)).

49 Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (internal citations omitted).

50 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (2013) (internal 

citations omitted); see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[A] district court must consider the merits [of plaintiffs’ claims] if they overlap with the Rule 

23(a) requirements.”) (emphasis in original). 

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Plaintiffs need not show, however, that “every question in the case, or even a preponderance of 

questions, is capable of class-wide resolution. So long as there is ‘even a single common 

question,’ a would-be class can satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).”51 Thus, 

“[w]here the circumstances of each particular class member vary but retain a common core of 

factual or legal issues with the rest of the class, commonality exists.”52

In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court held the plaintiffs had not established commonality when

plaintiffs had not alleged an “express corporate policy” of discrimination and the challenged 

employment decisions were “generally committed to local managers’ broad discretion.”53 The 

Supreme Court noted that there is a “conceptual gap” between an individual’s claim of injury and 

“the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury.”54 The plaintiffs could 

have bridged this gap by offering “significant proof that [their] employer operated under a general 

policy of discrimination.”55 However, because the plaintiffs provided “no convincing proof of a 

companywide” policy of discrimination, the Supreme Court concluded that they had “not 

established the existence of any common question.”56

Plaintiffs allege that VTA maintains common policies, procedures and practices relating to 

the compensation of all operators with respect to each of the six categories of time for which they 

seek compensation. The court considers each in turn. 

 51 Wang, 737 F.3d at 544 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2556).

52 Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir.2012) (internal citations 

omitted).

53 Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2547-48.

54 Id. at 2553 (internal citations omitted).

55 Id. at 2553 (internal citations omitted).

56 Id. at 2556-57.

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To begin, Plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence that VTA maintains a policy not to 

pay operators for “split-shift travel time.”57 VTA requires operators to sometimes work “split 

runs” which consist of two parts which are separated by some amount of time.

58 The first part of 

these “split runs” ends at a location that is geographically distant from the beginning of the other 

part of the split run.59 As a result, an operator incurs split-shift travel time when he or she travels

from the end of the first part of the split run to the beginning of the second split run.60 Even though 

VTA’s route and scheduling decisions cause operators to engage in this travel,61 VTA pays 

operators for the travel time based on “scheduled running time of the service available at that time 

of day,” a computation that, except for light rail operators, as a “general rule” does not include 

“time for waiting or walking.”62

Plaintiffs also have presented substantial evidence that VTA has policies not to compensate

operators for “pre-departure time” and “turn-in time.”63 Operators incur pre-departure time

 57 See Docket No. 143 at 5-6.

58 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 58:1-59:9, 67:17-68:17; see 

also Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶¶ 9-12 (describing split-shift travel 

time); see also Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls. (declarations of 

other operators describing split-shift travel time).

59 Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶ 9; see also Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, 

Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls.

60 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 58:2-23; Docket No. 145-1, 

Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶ 9; see also Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, 

Operators’ Decls.

61 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 59:3-60:6, 67:17-68:17; Docket 

No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶ 10 (“This ‘split-shift travel’ is the result of 

Defendant’s route and scheduling decisions and is for the convenience and benefit of Defendant 

only.”); Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls. (similar assertions).

62 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 55:5-56:9 (payment for “travel 

time” as a “general rule” does not include time spent “walking or waiting” except that light rail is 

“paid for the waiting time”).

63 See Docket No. 143 at 6-9.

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because VTA has developed policies that result in operators sometimes arriving early to locations 

at which they relieve other operators from their routes.

64 Operators incur turn-in time because 

VTA requires operators to incur turn-in time performing various tasks after they pull into the 

divisions at which some shifts end.

65

VTA employee Eric Rosenberg asserts that turn-in time is “obsolete” and that the time that 

operators spend pulling into the division, parking the buses and walking into the division to turn in 

their pouches is “built into the run pay” and was “measured at each Division.”66 However, 

 64 Operators sometimes relieve other operators at locations on routes that are geographically distant 

from their current locations. See Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶ 28 (“I 

have had to travel from either a relief point or my division to relieve another Operator.”); see also 

Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls. VTA recommends that 

operators take the bus or train to the relief location that is two buses or trains ahead of the bus or 

train that would get the operator to the relief point at the exact time of or just before the relief that 

the operator is making. See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 77:2-78:2; 

Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. C, Marshall Decl. at ¶¶ 6-8. Operators are “subject to 

discipline” if they do not arrive at the relief point within a certain timeframe, but “excused from 

such discipline” if they followed VTA’s recommendation regarding which bus or train to take to 

the relief location. See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. E, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 2 at 100:1-

102:7. VTA acknowledges that following its recommendation would “typically” result in 

operators arriving at relief locations early. See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. E, Stanislaw 

Depo. Vol. 2 at 102:8-12; see also Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 

77:21-78:2; Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶ 29 (describing how VTA’s 

instructions “routinely” result in early arrival to operator’s relief location); see also Docket Nos. 

145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls. (describing similar early arrivals).

65 Some operators’ shifts end at relief points and others end at divisions. See Docket No. 145-2, 

Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1 at 32:16-20. VTA maintains policies and procedures 

that require operators to perform various tasks after pulling into divisions. See id. at 26:10-28:17, 

32:21-33:8; Docket No. 145-8, Tidrick Decl., Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex. 6, Rule 4.25 

(“Responsibilities After Pull-In”), Docket No. 146, Ex. 7, Rule 4.25 (“Responsibilities After PullIn”), Docket No. 146-2, Ex. 8, Rule 12.12.13 (“Place the defect card on the clipboard attached to 

the shop office door.”); Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. E, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 2 at 102:17-

103:7; Docket No. 146-7, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 2, Ex. 26, Rule 4.25 (“Responsibilities After PullIn”); Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶ 13 (describing how VTA requires 

operator to “turn in various documents (for example, defect cards, run paddles, operator comment 

forms, lost property tags, and suspect description forms) to the dispatcher at the division at the end 

of my day’s assignment and/or at the end of a route that requires me to return my vehicle back to 

the division”); see also Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls. 

(describing time spent on similar turn-in activities).

66 See Docket No. 154-2, Rosenberg Decl. at ¶¶ 8-9.

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Plaintiffs have presented evidence that VTA does not include both pre-departure time and turn-in 

time in its “Synopsis of Runs” which it uses to calculate its predetermined payment amounts for 

operators.

67 Multiple operators also state that VTA has not paid them for all turn-in time.68

Accordingly, while the evidence Rosenberg presents suggests that operators sometimes are paid for 

turn-in time, it is not sufficient to rebut Plaintiffs’ substantial evidence that VTA has policies and 

practices that result in operators not being compensated for all pre-departure and turn-in time.

Similarly, Plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence that VTA has common policies and 

practices not to compensate operators for bulletin time and meeting time. VTA requires operators 

to spend “bulletin time” checking bulletin boards at their divisions for bulletins and notifications, 

reviewing any items posted and meeting with superiors if the operator needs clarification or 

instructions regarding the posted materials.69 VTA also requires operators to spend “meeting time” 

with their supervisors to talk about “items related to [operators’] job duties and other business” of 

 67 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1 at 79:23-80:24, Docket No. 

145-7, Tidrick Decl., Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex. 5 at Section 11, pages 4-5 (showing that “straight 

time” consists of “a combination of total platform, travel time, allowed time, report time and 

elapsed time” and stating that “Turn In Time” is “[n]ot used at this time”), Docket No. 145-2, 

Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex 1 (indicating no time allocation in “Turn Time” 

column); Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 55:5-56:9 (payment for 

“travel time” as a “general rule” does not include time spent walking or waiting except that light 

rail operators are paid for waiting time).

68 Docket No. 145-1 Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Silveira Decl. at ¶¶ 17, 21 (stating that VTA has not 

compensated operator for all pre-departure and turn-in time); Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick 

Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls. Plaintiffs also present evidence that operators are not paid for 

turn-in time because they are “off-the-clock” when they arrive at the gate of the division. See 

Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1 at 25:9-12 (“[P]ull-in” is the “time 

when the operator is scheduled to pull into the division gate”); Docket No. 145-3, Tidrick Decl.,

Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, Ex. 2 (“Pull In 11:27p” for “Run[] 2128” indicating that the time the 

vehicle pulls into division is 11:27 pm); Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1, 

Ex.1 at 3 (“Time Off 11:27p” indicating that scheduled ending time of run 2128 is 11:27 pm). 

69 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Vol. 1 at 68:8-22-69:5, Docket No. 145-

7, Ex. 6 at pg III-IV, Docket No. 146 Ex. 7, at pg III-IV, Docket No. 146-1, Ex. 8, Rule 1.3; see 

also Docket No. 146-7, Tidrick Decl., Ex. E, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 2, Ex. 26, 2014 Coach Operator 

Rulebook at pg. III-IV.

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VTA.

70 Despite these requirements, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that VTA does not pay 

operators for all time spent on bulletin time and all time spent in meetings regarding payroll 

correction forms.

71

With respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for additional driving time, Plaintiffs also have provided 

substantial evidence showing that VTA has a common policy of compensating operators for 

driving time based on a predetermined schedule rather than the actual time the operators spend 

driving.72 Operators incur “routinely late time” not included in this schedule because they arrive at 

the end points of their runs after the scheduled arrival times.

73

 70 See Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶¶ 34-39; see also Docket Nos. 145-1, 

145-2, Tidrick Decl. Ex. B, Operators’ Decls. (describing time spent on similar meeting-related 

activities). 

71 Plaintiffs cite to evidence showing that VTA “has maintained a policy and practice of not 

including Bulletin Time in the Synopsis of Runs that it creates using Trapeze, and not paying for 

that time.” See Docket No. 143 at 9 (citing Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw 

Depo. Vol. 1 at 79:23-80:24; Docket No. 145-7, Ex. 5 at Section 11, page 5 (showing that straight 

time consists of “total platform, travel time, allowed time, report time and elapsed time”)). VTA 

also has a policy not to compensate operators for time meeting regarding payroll correction forms. 

See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. Vol. 1 at 60:1-3 (agreeing that 

operators are not “paid for the time meeting with the timekeeper about...paycheck investigation 

request[s]”).

72 See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. H, Chaney Depo. at 21:10-12 (“Your schedule is what 

you’re paid for.”); Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶ 23 (“The amount I 

receive in compensation per day is set by the same schedule for the particular run assignment. If 

my vehicle arrives at the ending point after the scheduled arrival time, then I am not compensated 

for such time.”); see also Docket Nos. 145-1, 142, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls. 

73 Operators claim that runs are “routinely” late. See Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. 

B, Operators’ Decls. VTA is aware that operators sometimes arrive at the end points of their runs 

late. See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. H, Chaney Depo. at 17:3-20 (noting that operators 

complain that “there is not enough time” in the schedule and they are “rushing to get from point A 

to point B”), 18:20-19:1 (noting that operators submitted “overtime cards for coming in late”), 

19:11-20:10 (“I know that occasionally [buses] do come back to the division late.”). Plaintiffs 

have presented evidence that VTA maintains policies and practices that contribute to this lateness. 

For instance, VTA’s “general rule...that [operators are] not supposed to leave [time points] early” 

prohibits operators from driving ahead of schedule. See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, 

Rosenberg Depo. at 32:5-24, 40:11-41:18. 

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VTA broadly asserts that “[t]he alleged common policies on which Plaintiffs rely do not 

actually exist.”74 However, given the substantial evidence Plaintiffs have presented, VTA’s 

attempt to negate the existence of these policies is unpersuasive. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have 

presented “significant proof” that VTA has established and maintained “uniform policies and 

practices relating to compensation of class members that admitted of no appreciable discretion and 

that allegedly resulted in systematic, illegal under-compensation.”75 With respect to these policies 

and practices, Plaintiffs have raised the common questions of whether the categories of time for 

which Plaintiffs seek payment are compensable work time and whether VTA’s compensation 

scheme violates the SJMWO, Wage Order No. 9 or California Labor Code § 1194 by failing to 

separately allocate pay for time spent on various non-driving work tasks.

76 With respect to 

routinely late time, Plaintiffs also present the common question of whether VTA has “actual and 

constructive knowledge of the regularity and extent of [uncompensated work time] such that its 

failure to compensate [o]perators for such time is knowing and willful.”77 Resolution of these 

questions will resolve “in one stroke” whether the class members have a legal right to be 

compensated for these categories of time.

78 Plaintiffs thus present common questions that “will 

connect” the compensation scheme to “their claim for class relief.”79

VTA cites to its purported policy “to pay for all work performed” to support its contention 

that commonality is not established because Plaintiffs have not shown that common policies or 

 74 See Docket No. 154 at 12-13.

75 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *4.

76 See Docket No. 143 at 15-16.

77 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *5.

78 See Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551.

79 See Ellis, 657 F.3d at 981 (internal citations omitted). 

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practices will drive resolution of the lawsuit.80 In particular, VTA points to its procedure by which 

employees can submit extra time reports when they work longer than the hours that are usually 

allocated to their shifts.

81 The regular submission of these records and routine payment for the 

additional time claimed, VTA contends, shows VTA is not aware that operators work additional 

time without submitting extra time records.82 VTA also asserts that its receipt of less than one 

extra pay request per operator per week shows that there is “no evidence” that unpaid routinely late 

time occurs regularly.83 Further, VTA claims that operators have not been undercompensated 

because VTA pays all operators for at least eight hours of work on all shifts regardless of the actual 

length of the shift.

84

The court finds these claims unavailing. Nothing about the policies VTA identifies negate 

the classwide nature of the questions of whether the categories of time Plaintiffs identify are 

compensable work time and whether the failure of VTA’s compensation scheme to separately 

allocate pay for these categories of time is improper. To the contrary, as Plaintiffs note, VTA’s 

assertions regarding these policies actually raise additional common questions. For instance, 

Plaintiffs contend that VTA has constructive and actual knowledge that routinely late time occurs 

for which operators do not submit extra time requests.

85 Plaintiffs further assert even though VTA 

 80 See Docket No. 154 at 10-11; see also Docket No. 155, Terrazas Decl. at ¶ 15 (“It is VTA policy 

that all employees are to be paid for all time worked and that there be no off the clock work 

unpaid.”). 

81 See Docket No. 154-1, Geleynse Decl. at ¶¶ 3-6. 

82 See Docket No. 154 at 11, 13. VTA receives about “36,500 extra pay requests annually from a 

workforce of approximately 975 Bus and Light Rail Operators.” See Docket No. 154-1, Geleynse 

Decl. at ¶¶ 3-6. These requests are “rarely denied.” See id. 

83 See Docket No. 154 at 11.

84 See id.; Docket No. 155, Terrazas Decl. at ¶ 11 (“At all times from the year 2008 to present, the 

Collective Bargaining Agreements between VTA and ATU Local 265 provided for an eight hour 

daily pay guarantee for all Bus and Light Rail Operators.”).

85 Plaintiffs contend that VTA has knowledge that routinely late time occurs because VTA 

monitors vehicle locations using GPS devices. See Docket No. 143 at 11 (citing Docket No. 145-2, 

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is unaware that this under-compensation occurs, VTA adheres to burdensome policies regarding 

the extra pay request process which systematically result in operators not submitting such 

requests.

86 These practices, Plaintiffs assert, constitute a “policy-to-violate-the-policy” against 

VTA’s stated prohibition against off-the-clock work.

87 As stated above, Plaintiffs also contend that 

VTA’s policy of a guarantee of eight paid hours per shift should not “offset any time” operators 

spend performing tasks that are not included in their schedules.88 Because the disputed policies 

apply to all class members, Plaintiffs’ allegations about these polices raise the common questions 

of whether VTA’s extra time report practices and guarantee of eight hours per shift actually 

prevent off-the-clock work.

 

Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 32:5-34:18; Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. G, Cuff 

Depo. at 16:5-16, 29:10-30:19, 32:3-18); see also Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl, Ex. B, 

Operators’ Decls. Plaintiffs also claim that VTA is aware vehicles are routinely late because it has 

received reports from operators showing that vehicles are late. See Docket No. 143 at 11 (citing 

Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. F, Rosenberg Depo. at 44:1-46:11; Docket No. 145-2, 

Tidrick Decl., Ex. H, Chaney Depo. at 13:20-14:18; Docket Nos. 148-6 to 149-4, Tidrick Decl., 

Exs. M, N). Further, VTA is aware that operators do not always submit extra time requests when 

their vehicles are late. See Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. D, Stanislaw Depo. at Vol. 1 at 

61:15-62:1; Docket No. 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. G, Cuff Depo. at 31:8-22; Docket No. 145-2, 

Tidrick Decl., Ex. H, Chaney Depo. at 15:3-20.

86 See Docket No. 143 at 11-13. Plaintiffs note that VTA keeps blank extra pay request forms at 

divisions instead of in its transit vehicles or operators’ pouches. See id. at 12 (citing Docket No. 

145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. H, Chaney Depo. at 38:19-39:19). Further, VTA conceded that it might 

consider it “excessive” if an operator turned in an extra pay request every day. See Docket No. 

145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. H, Chaney Depo. at 34:11-20. VTA also does not allow operators to call 

in their unscheduled time by telephone and does not discipline supervisors who know that 

operators have performed unscheduled work for which they have not submitted an extra pay 

request. See id. at 38:4-9, 54:7-21. The named plaintiffs and other operators state that VTA’s 

“burdensome and confusing” procedures regarding extra pay requests discourage them from 

submitting such requests. See Docket Nos. 145-1, 145-2, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Operators’ Decls.

87 See Docket No. 143 at 13 (citing Mahoney v. Farmers Ins. Exch., Case No. 4:09-cv-2327, 2011 

WL 4458513, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2011) (concluding that defendant’s actual practices 

regarding “off-the-clock work” are evidence of a “policy-to-violate-the-policy”)).

88 See Docket No. 167 at 7. 

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VTA may ultimately be able to show that Plaintiffs’ positions lack merit and that its 

policies properly compensate the class members. But the court “is required to examine the merits 

of the underlying claim in this context, only inasmuch as it must determine whether common 

questions exist” and must not “turn class certification into a mini-trial” by “determin[ing] whether 

class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims.”89 Rather, the court’s 

conclusion that resolution of the questions Plaintiffs raise will “generate common answers apt to 

drive the resolution of the litigation” is sufficient to meet the commonality requirement.

90

Plaintiffs have shown that VTA has uniform policies and procedures relating to 

compensation that “did not leave the relevant compensation decisions to the discretion of local 

supervisors.”91 Given this uniformity, divergences in the behavior of individual operators or their 

responses to these policies not establish a lack of commonality. In particular, the ability of

operators to decide not to submit extra time reports for individualized reasons or arrive at the end 

points of their runs late for reasons that are “unrelated to compensable work time” does not negate 

the “class-wide nature of the primary question” of whether VTA’s policies systematically result in 

under-compensation.92 Likewise, VTA’s defense that Plaintiffs engaged only in de minimis

activities for which they are not entitled to compensation does not preclude class treatment because 

analysis of this defense requires resolution of a “common issue of law,” not an “individualized 

 89 See Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983 n.8.

90 See Abdullah, 731 F.3d at 957 (emphasis in original).

91 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *6 (citing Eddings v. Health Net, Inc., Case No. 10-1744-

JST(RZx), 2011 WL 4526675, at * 1, (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (finding that defendant subjected 

the purported class members to the same “timekeeping and rounding policies” and plaintiffs’ claim 

“satisfies Dukes and is proper for classwide resolution”)).

92 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *4; see also Docket No. 154-2, Rosenberg Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4 

(asserting that the data Plaintiffs possess does not show “the reasons why a bus was late” and that 

“[b]uses can return late to Divisions for many reasons unrelated to work” such as operators running 

personal errands or taking extended breaks).

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inquiry” into each operator’s activities.93 As a result, Plaintiffs have met the commonality 

requirement with respect to all categories of compensable time at issue.

Fourth, Plaintiffs have met the typicality requirement. Typicality94 “refers to the nature of 

the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or 

the relief sought.”95 While typicality and commonality occasionally merge, typicality derives its 

independent legal significance from its ability to “screen out class actions in which the legal or 

factual position of the representatives is markedly different from that of other members of the class 

even though common issues of law or fact are present.”96 The test of typicality is “whether other 

members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not 

unique to the named plaintiffs and whether other class members have been injured by the same 

 93 See Docket No. 154 at 12; Bibo v. Fed. Express, Inc., Case No. C-07-2505-TEH, 2009 WL 

1068880, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2009) (“[W]hether the amounts of work in question are de 

minimis is a common question of law.”); see also Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *5-6 (rejecting 

defendant’s claim that the commonality requirement is not met because defendant claimed that “the 

record evidence shows that [the time for which plaintiffs seek compensation] is de minimis”). In 

the cases to which VTA cites, courts found that de minimis defense weighed against class 

certification in part because plaintiffs presented substantial evidence of uniform policies and 

procedures that precluded resolution of the de minimis defense on a classwide level. See Docket 

No. 154 at 12 (citing cases); Reed v. County of Orange, 266 F.R.D. 446, 461-62 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 

(“Since Plaintiffs have not provided substantial evidence of a single [defendant] policy or practice 

that violates the FLSA...the Court finds that proving [the de minimis defense] will be as 

individualized as the claims are.”); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Services USA, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 

399-401 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding that de minimis defense could not be resolved on a classwide 

basis for some of plaintiffs’ claims when “individual security officers in the putative class worked 

under different circumstances and were managed by different personnel”); Espinoza v. Cnty of 

Fresno, 290 F.R.D. 494, 506-7 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (The “de minimis defense [is not] meaningful 

[when] the various plaintiffs’ claims [are] like apples and oranges...By contrast, where there is less 

variation, the de minimis defense is susceptible of classwide resolution, such as by determining 

how much time is de minimis as a matter of law and what characteristics time must have before it 

can be considered de minimis.”) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have shown that their 

claims are sufficiently uniform that “the de minimis defense is susceptible of classwide resolution.” 

See id. 

94 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).

95 Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685 (internal citation omitted).

96 7A Wright, § 1764. 

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course of conduct.”97 However, “[u]nder the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are 

‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not be 

substantially identical.”98 

The named plaintiffs and all members of the proposed class are similar because they all are 

or were employed as bus or train operators during the proposed class period.99 VTA asserts that 

the typicality requirement is not met in part because the named plaintiffs’ claims are so 

individualized that they even diverge from each other with respect to the categories of time for 

which they seek compensation.

100 The court agrees with VTA the named plaintiffs’ claims are not 

“substantially identical” to the other class members’ claims.101 But these differences do not negate 

the fact that all proposed class members’ claims are grounded on the same VTA policies, practices 

and procedures.102 Further, VTA’s contention that it can assert “unique” de minimis defenses 

against some of the representative’s claims is unpersuasive because as previously noted, the de 

minimis defense can be resolved on a class-wide basis even if the amounts of time for which each 

 97 Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992).

98 Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685 (internal citations omitted).

99 See Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶ 2, Silveira Decl. at ¶ 2. VTA’s 

complaint that Silveira is an improper representative because he was “never before identified as a 

class representative and is a “late minute substitution” lacks merit because VTA stipulated to the 

substitution and amendment adding Silveira as a representative. See Docket No. 154 at 4; see also 

Docket Nos. 141, 142. 

100 See Docket No. 154 at 16-17; see also Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Rosa Decl. at ¶¶ 

7, 11, 15 (asserting that Rosa has been compensated straight time for start-end travel time, splitshift travel time and turn-in time); Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Silveira Decl. at ¶¶ 7,

11, 21 (asserting that Silveira has not been compensated for all straight time or at one-and-a-half 

time with respect to start-end travel time, split-shift travel time and turn-in time). 

101 See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685.

102 See Lopez v. G.A.T. Airline Ground Support, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-2268-IEG(BGS), 2010 WL 

3633177, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (“Notwithstanding these variations in the named 

Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently representative of the proposed 

class members . . . Although not all the named Plaintiffs can assert all of the claims, their claims 

are collectively typical of the class members as a whole.”).

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representatives and class member seek compensation differ.

103 Accordingly, the named plaintiffs

meet the typicality requirement because their claims are “reasonably coextensive” with the claims 

of the other class members.104

Fifth, Plaintiffs have met the adequacy requirement. “To satisfy constitutional due process 

concerns, absent class members must be afforded adequate representation before entry of a 

judgment which binds them.”105 Class representatives and counsel are adequate if they do not have 

“any conflicts of interest with other class members” and if they will “prosecute the action 

vigorously on behalf of the class.”106 The adequacy of class counsel concerns whether proposed 

counsel is (1) “qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation” and (2) will 

“vigorously prosecute the interests of the class.”107 “These standards are generally met with 

members of the bar in good standing typically deemed qualified and competent to represent a class 

absent evidence to the contrary.”108

VTA contends that the Plaintiffs have not zealously pursued the class members’ interests 

because they choose to seek unpaid straight time and minimum wage claims when they could have 

sought claims for unpaid overtime.109 VTA claims that this decision is contrary to the class

members’ best interest because the Fair Labor Standards Act does not provide compensation for 

hours worked beyond eight hours in a day and because class members will lose their rights to seek 

 103 See Docket No. 154 at 16; see also Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Ex. B, Silveira Decl. at ¶

19 (turn-in time activities take “up to 5 minutes every work day”), ¶ 30 (routinely late time is 

between about one and ten minutes); Docket No. 145-1, Tidrick Decl., Rosa Decl. at ¶ 13 (turn-in 

activities take “up to ten (10) minutes every time”).

104 See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685.

105 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

106 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

107 Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *7 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); 23(g)).

108 See id. (citing Newberg on Class Actions § 3:72 (5th ed.)).

109 See Docket No. 154 at 17.

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overtime compensation for claims that are adjudicated in this action.110 However, the existence of 

alternative strategies does not show that the strategy Plaintiffs selected is inadequate. Plaintiffs 

contend they have made “reasonable decisions to pursue statutory minimum wage claims under 

Wage Order No. 9...and to pursue overtime claims under the FLSA.”111 Although Plaintiffs may 

not ultimately prevail on these claims, they have presented sufficient justification for their chosen 

strategy to establish that it is a method by which they can “prosecute the action vigorously on 

behalf of the class.”112 Further, given proposed class counsel’s extensive experience with class 

action litigation and wage and hour actions,

113 VTA’s suggestion that its status as “such a small 

law firm” would prevent it from being able to adequately represent the class lacks merit.114

Likewise, proposed class counsel’s engagement in alleged misconduct in relation to the

Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District in another lawsuit, while more disconcerting than proposed 

class counsel’s size, also does not establish that proposed class counsel is inadequate. AC Transit 

concluded that one attorney for proposed class counsel used his position as a board member at AC 

Transit to gain access to privileged and confidential information regarding FLSA litigation against 

AC Transit in order to advance litigation against VTA and Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation 

District of Oregon.115 AC Transit also concluded that this attorney took part in confidential legal 

briefings about the FLSA litigation against AC Transit without informing its board that he was 

 110 See id.

111 See Docket No. 167 at 14.

112 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

113 See Docket No. 145, Tidrick Decl. at ¶¶ 17-18; Docket No. 149-4, Ex. O.

114 Docket No. 154 at 17.

115 See Docket No. 154-3, Ryan Decl. at ¶¶ 3-8. 

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involved in similar cases against VTA and Tri-Met.116 Complaints were made to the state bars of

California and Oregon and the AC Transit Board of directors “publicly censured” this attorney.

117

Ultimately, the State Bar of California determined that the allegations of misconduct did not 

“warrant further action” and the Oregon State Bar concluded that there was not probable cause of 

an ethics violation.118 The court does not condone “reward[ing]” misconduct with an appointment 

as class counsel.119 But given the dismissal of both of these actions and proposed class counsels’ 

status as “members of the bar in good standing,” the court does not find that this attorney’s actions

rise to the level sufficient to establish that proposed class counsel are not “qualified and competent 

to represent a class.”120

Sixth, Plaintiffs have shown that common questions of law and fact predominate. Under 

Rule 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs must establish that “questions of law or fact common to class members 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Rule 23(b)(3)’s 

predominance requirement “tests whether the proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 

adjudication by representation.”121 “Where common questions present a significant aspect of the 

case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, there is clear 

justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis.”122

With respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for unpaid wages for time spent on non-driving activities, 

common questions predominate. Because Plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence that VTA 

 116 See id. at ¶ 6.

117 See id. at ¶¶ 7-8; Docket No. 168, Tidrick Decl. at ¶ 4.

118 See id. at ¶ 4, Exs. A, B.

119 See Docket No. 154 at 18.

120 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *7.

121 Wang, 737 F.3d at 545 (internal citations omitted).

122 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022.

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has common policies not to separately allocate pay for these time spent on these activities, 

Plaintiffs’ claims for these categories of time raise questions regarding “the legality of [VTA’s] 

payment practices [which] apply to all [o]perators.”123 Accordingly, although the extent to which 

these policies affect each operator differs, for all Plaintiffs’ claims for the time spent on these

activities, “the predominant question is whether [VTA’s] policies and practices not to compensate 

[the class members] for such time” is illegal.124

Likewise, although each operator’s behavior varies, the class is “sufficiently cohesive to 

warrant adjudication by representation” with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for routinely late time.

125

VTA contends its policies against off-the-clock work insure that unpaid time occurs only as a result 

of individual operators’ decisions not to submit extra time reports and other “individualized 

factors.”126 However, as stated above, the policies VTA identifies create common questions 

regarding the degree to which these policies actually prevent off-the-clock work. These issues, in 

addition to questions regarding whether VTA has knowledge that operators work routinely late 

time without compensation and whether its scheduling policy systematically requires operators to 

incur routinely late time, are central to the determination of whether the class members are entitled 

to compensation for routinely late time.

127 It is true that individual operators may decide not to 

submit extra time reports for unique reasons. However, in light of the prevailing nature of the 

common questions identified above, VTA’s assertion that “individual issues essential to liability” 

predominate is unpersuasive.128

 123 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *8.

124 See id. 

125 See Wang, 737 F.3d at 545.

126 See Docket No. 154 at 13.

127 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *9 (noting the existence of similar common questions with 

respect to operators’ claims for routinely late time).

128 See Docket No. 154 at 13.

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Likewise, VTA’s claim that, like in cases in which courts “repeatedly” held that “off-theclock claims for unpaid wages present individualized issues that preclude certifications as a class,” 

VTA’s “policy pays for overtime work and requires that such work be reported” is misguided.

129

The cases to which VTA cites establish the principle that when “the evidence establishes a formal 

policy prohibiting off-the-clock work, plaintiffs must present substantial evidence of a systematic 

company policy to pressure or require employees to work off the clock.”130 But even if the court 

found that VTA’s extra pay report procedure was sufficient to establish a “formal policy” against 

off-the-clock work, this would not show that individual questions predominate because, as stated 

above, Plaintiffs have presented “substantial evidence” that VTA follows a “policy-to-violate-thepolicy” against off-the-clock work.131

Plaintiffs have also sufficiently explained how they intend to prove damages for their 

unpaid wage claims on a class-wide basis. In Behrend, the Supreme Court held that in order to 

satisfy the predominance inquiry, a plaintiff must present a damage model that (1) identifies 

damages that stem from the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing and (2) establishes that “damages are 

susceptible of measurement across the entire class.”132 Damage calculations at the class 

 129 See Docket No. 154 at 10-11 (citing cases).

130 See Brewer v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., No. 11–CV–3587-YGR, 2014 WL 5877695, at *11 (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 12, 2014) (internal citations omitted); In re Autozone, Inc. Wage and Hour Employment 

Practices Litigation, 289 F.R.D. 526, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Here, ...there is a uniform policy 

prohibiting off-the-clock work. In light of that policy, Plaintiffs must present substantial evidence 

that AutoZone requires its employees to work off-the-clock.”); Collins v. ITT Educational Services, 

Inc., Case No. 12-cv-1395-DMS-BGS, 2013 WL 6925827, at *6 (S.D. Cal., July 30, 2013) 

(Because “the only uniform policy Plaintiffs have shown is Defendant’s written policy requiring 

employees to report all time worked...and prohibiting off-the-clock work.... In light of that policy, 

Plaintiffs must establish that they were uniformly required to work overtime and not report it.”); 

Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., C–12–05859 EDL, 2013 WL 6236743, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 

2013) (employer had policy against off-the-clock work and there was “no evidence” of a policy 

requiring off-the-clock work).

131 See Brewer, 2014 WL 5877695 at *11.

132 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013).

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certification stage are not required to be “exact,” but the court’s analysis of the proposed damage 

calculation model must be “rigorous.”133 However, the Ninth Circuit recognizes “the presence of 

individualized damages cannot, by itself, defeat class certification” and holds that Behrend requires 

plaintiffs “to show that their damages stemmed from the defendant’s actions that created the legal 

liability.”134

To prove that damages could be calculated on a class-wide basis, Plaintiffs offered the 

opinion of Richard Drogin, who asserted he could determine damages amounts for the unpaid 

wages that the class members are allegedly owed based on the data Plaintiffs provided to him.

135

Drogin states that to calculate damages for unpaid time (1) “[a]n exact calculation for everyone in 

the class can be made based on available data” or (2) “a random sample can be drawn, and 

damages calculations for the sample can be projected to the class as whole, using appropriate 

statistical formulas.”136

VTA claims that Plaintiff cannot meet the predominance requirement because Plaintiffs 

have not shown that “damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.”137 In particular, 

VTA asserts that Drogin’s first proposed method does not show damages are susceptible to 

common proof because he identifies sources of data without showing how he proposes to use those 

sources to perform an “exact calculation.”138 But while Drogin could have provided more insight 

into his proposed application of his first method to the available data, this lack of detail does not 

 133 See id. 

134 Leyva, 716 F.3d. at 514.

135 See Docket No. 150, Drogin Decl. at ¶¶ 4-6.

136 See id. at ¶ 22. 

137 See Docket No. 154 at 15 (citing Behrend, 133 S.Ct. at 1433).

138 See Docket No. 154 at 14.

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show that Plaintiffs have fallen short of Behrend because at this stage of the litigation damage 

calculations need not be “exact.”139

Likewise, VTA’s allegation that Drogin’s first method does not “measure up to the Daubert

standard of reliability” is unavailing.

140 In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court stated that it “doubt[ed]” 

the “proposition that Daubert simply did not apply” at the class certification stage but did not 

provide guidance about the “extent and rigor of the appropriate Daubert analysis.”141 However, 

when considering expert testimony in relation to the predominance requirement, the central 

question is whether Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that damages can be calculated on a 

classwide basis. Accordingly, the relevant inquiry is a “tailored Daubert analysis which 

‘scrutinize[s] the reliability of the expert testimony in light of the criteria for class certification and 

the current state of the evidence.’”142

Here, Drogin proposes to calculate damages using standard methodology premised on data 

common to all class members.

143 Further, given that the data Drogin proposes to use is from

VTA’s own records,144 VTA’s assertion that Drogin’s opinion falls short of Daubert because 

“there is no evidence” that data upon which the calculation would rely “is itself reliable” lacks

merit.145 As a result, Plaintiffs have met their burden under Behrend because Drogin’s proposed 

 139 See Behrend, 133 S.Ct. at 1433.

140 See Docket No. 154 at 14.

141 See Tait v. BSH Home Appliances Corp., 289 F.R.D. 466, 490 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing WalMart, 133 S.Ct. at 2553-54).

142 See id. at 495; (citing In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 614 (8th 

Cir. 2011)); see also Sirko v. IBM Corp., Case No. CV-13-03192-DMG, 2014 WL 4452699, at *6 

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014) (“At the class certification stage, courts should apply a ‘tailored’ Daubert 

analysis to determine the reliability of the expert’s testimony regarding the Rule 23 requirements, 

not the merits of the case.”) (internal citations omitted).

143 See Docket No. 150, Drogin Decl. at ¶¶ 4-19.

144 See id. at ¶ 4.

145 See Docket No. 154 at 14.

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method is sufficiently reliable to establish that damages are “susceptible of measurement across the 

entire class.”146

VTA’s attempt to invalidate Drogin’s second proposed method of using random sampling 

to extrapolate damages is also unavailing. VTA complains that Drogin’s opinion does not apply 

the facts of the case to the “theoretical possibility” of extrapolating damages based on sampling.

147

However, Drogin, while not providing exacting detail, shows that he could calculate class-wide

damages by creating a “random sample of class members” and requiring people in the sample to be 

deposed or questioned at trial so that that trier of fact could make “findings that would be the ‘data’

used by the statistician to calculate unpaid time.”148 In a similar vein, VTA complains that Drogin

does not explain how sampling will take the variations in individual operators’ claims into 

account.

149 However, the existence of such variations is not a sufficient reason to defeat class 

certification analysis when “damages will be calculated,” as Drogin proposes to do here, “based on 

the wages each employee lost due to [the VTA’s allegedly] unlawful practices.”150

Seventh, a class action is superior to other methods for adjudication. When seeking to 

certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must show that a class action is “superior to other 

 146 Behrend, 133 S.Ct. at 1433.

147 See Docket No. 154 at 15.

148 See Docket No. 150, Drogin Decl. at ¶¶ 32-33. VTA’s assertion that Drogin’s opinion is 

defective because he did not describe the necessary sample size or anticipated margin of error is 

incorrect. See Docket No. 154 at 14. Drogin may make that assessment after the parties have 

stipulated to or the court has ruled on what margin of error is acceptable. See Docket No. 150 at ¶ 

29 (“The choice of a required margin of error estimate is an issue that should either be agreed upon 

by the parties, or set by the court.”).

149 See Docket No. 154 at 14-15.

150 See Tokoshima v. Pep Boys - Manny Moe & Jack of California, Case No. C-12-4810-CRB, 

2014 WL 1677979, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014) (citing In re: High–Tech Employee Antitrust 

Litig., 985 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2013)); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Seegott Holdings, 

Inc., 768 F.3d 1245, 1257, 1269 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that “Wal-Mart does not prohibit 

certification based on the use of extrapolation to calculate damages” and that a defendant “has no 

interest in the method of distributing the aggregate damages award among the class members”). 

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available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” To determine if a class 

action is superior, courts consider the following non-exhaustive factors: (1) “class members’ 

interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions”; (2) the extent 

and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against the class

members”; (3) “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 

particular forum”; and (4) “the likely difficulties likely in managing a class action.”151

The first factor weighs in favor of certification. A class action is a superior method of 

adjudication when few class members would have “any meaningful redress against [the 

defendant]” because “few potential class members could afford to undertake individual litigation 

against [VTA] to recover the relatively modest damages at issue.”152 The damages at issue here are 

too modest for individual lawsuits to be practical because each operator would recover a small 

amount of money and pursuit of the individual operators’ claims would require extensive 

examination of VTA’s policies, practices and procedures.

The second factor also weighs in favor of certification. Plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that it is 

unaware of any individually filed actions alleging the same claims that Plaintiffs assert here, and 

VTA makes no representation that such actions exist.153 The absence of such individual suits is 

another indication that “each class member’s potential damages recovery does not ‘provide the 

incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.’”154

As to the third factor, the court finds that concentration the litigation in this court is 

desirable. The class members’ claims all stem from VTA’s allegedly improper policies, practices, 

and procedures. It would be both “redundant” and a “wildly inefficient use of limited judicial 

 151 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).

152 Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 223 F.R.D.524, 527 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

153 See Docket No. 143 at 24.

154 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *10 (internal citation omitted).

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resources” for each operator to file an individual lawsuit alleging claims for their unpaid wages.155

As Plaintiffs note, such individual lawsuits would result in “several hundred trials relitigating...the same legal questions” about VTA’s conduct.156 Further, the modest amounts at

stake in each of these lawsuits makes it unlikely that the individual operators could afford to pursue 

their claims. And even if such individual lawsuits were economically feasible, the chance these 

individual suits would convince VTA to reform its conduct is “infinitesimal.”157 Accordingly, the 

third factor weighs in favor of certification. 

The fourth factor weighs in favor of certification because adjudication of this case as a class 

action will not present unmanageable difficulties. VTA’s contention that class treatment of 

Plaintiffs’ claims is “impossible” because “separate and controlling inquiries” regarding each 

operator’s claims predominate fails.158 In support of this claim, VTA essentially repeats its prior 

assertion that the common questions of law and fact do not predominate because “there is no 

employer wide policy covering the purported claims” and each operators’ claim for “each day must 

be individually tested for factual support and legal significance.”159 The court has already 

concluded that individualized inquiries about each operator’s conduct do not predominate over 

common questions. Given that common questions predominate and the class is easily 

ascertainable, “certification will not generate any complexities from a case management 

perspective.”160 Because all the factors weigh in favor of certification, a class action is superior to 

other methods for adjudicating this lawsuit.

 155 See id. at *10.

156 See Docket No. 143 at 24-25.

157 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *10.

158 See Docket No. 154 at 18.

159 See id. 

160 See Stitt, 2014 WL 1760623 at *10.

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