Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00823/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00823-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EDDIE L. PITTS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

C. DAVIS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-0823 TLN AC P 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court are defendants’ motions for summary judgment. ECF 

Nos. 140, 143. 

I. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on July 27, 2012. ECF No. 13. On screening, 

the court dismissed defendants State of California, Swarthout, and Cate. ECF No. 14. The court 

also found that plaintiff had stated cognizable deliberate indifference claims against defendants 

Fontillas, Braunger, Kiesz, and Froland,1 for “failing to provide plaintiff with timely access to a 

primary care physician and/or for not ascertaining that plaintiff’s prescribed medications were 

 1

 Then identified as Freland. See ECF No. 79 at 17-18 (directing Clerk of Court to correct 

name on docket). 

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timely.” ECF No. 15 at 1-2.2 Plaintiff was also found to have stated cognizable claims against 

defendants Austin, Morgan, Mefford, McAlpine, Boughn, Trujillo, Davis, Fleischman, and 

de la Vega3 for “the delayed shoulder injury pain and/or [for] permitting or ratifying a practice of 

policy of delays in the Pharmacy Department’s distribution of prescribed medication.” Id. at 2. 

Defendants Kiesz, Fleischman, McAlpine, Trujillo, Austin, Morgan, Villanueva, Mefford, 

Braunger, and Davis filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that some of plaintiff’s claims had 

not been exhausted and that other claims failed to state a claim.4 ECF No. 24. In findings and 

recommendations filed July 24, 2013, the court found that plaintiff had not exhausted his claims 

against defendants Braunger and Kiesz regarding denial of timely access to a primary care 

physician and took no position on the exhaustion of his claims that Braunger and Kiesz failed to 

ensure timely provision of prescription medication because the issue was not raised by defendants 

in their motion. ECF No. 40 at 9-10 & n. 8. The court also found that plaintiff had not exhausted 

his supervisory claims as to defendants Austin, Morgan, Mefford, McAlpine, Trujillo, Davis, 

Fleischman, and Villanueva and that his claims against these defendants based on their 

participation in the alleged violations were insufficient to state a claim. Id. at 12-15. The 

undersigned recommended dismissal of the claims against Braunger and Kiesz for failing to 

provide timely access to a primary care physician and dismissal of all claims against defendants 

 2

 All page numbers referenced in these findings and recommendations reflect the numbers 

assigned by the court at the top of each page upon filing. 

3

 Identified alternatively as “Villanueva.” See ECF No. 40 at 1. 

4

 The motions to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust that were filed in this case 

were resolved prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Albino v. Baca, which requires that 

questions of administrative exhaustion be decided pursuant to motions for summary judgment. 

747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). In this case, copies of the appeals considered by the court in 

deciding the motions to dismiss were attached to the first amended complaint. ECF No. 13 at 

58-140; ECF No. 13-1 at 1-57. Since the court may properly consider documents attached to the 

complaint, United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted), 

plaintiff’s “failure to exhaust [was] clear from the face of the complaint and the result would not 

be altered by discovery,” McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Albino, 

747 F.3d at 1169). Because there was “no need for further factual development[,]” Albino does 

not affect the decisions in this case. McBride, 807 F.3d at 985. 

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Austin, Morgan, Mefford, McAlpine, Trujillo, Davis, Fleischman, and Villanueva. Id. at 16-17. 

The findings and recommendations were adopted in full. ECF No. 66. 

Both defendants Fontillas and Froland also moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on the 

ground that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. ECF Nos. 36-2, 

46-1 at 3-5. Defendant Froland also moved to dismiss on the ground that the allegations in the 

complaint failed to state a claim. ECF No. 46-1 at 6-8. In findings and recommendations filed 

January 3, 2014, the court found that plaintiff had exhausted his claims as they related to the 

failure to ensure his prescriptions were timely refilled, but not as to his claim that they failed to 

ensure timely access to a primary care physician. ECF No. 79 at 9-10. The court then found that 

plaintiff’s allegations against both defendants for failure to ensure that his prescriptions were 

timely refilled failed to state a cognizable claim. Id. 12-14. The undersigned recommended 

dismissal of all claims against both defendants. Id. at 18. The district judge adopted the findings 

and recommendations in part. ECF No. 97. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Fontillas and 

Froland for failing to ensure his prescriptions were timely refilled were dismissed, as were any 

claims he had against defendant Fontillas related to his November 24, 2010 interview. Id. at 3. 

However, plaintiff’s claims that defendants failed to provide timely access to a primary care 

physician were found to state a claim and to have been exhausted and were therefore not 

dismissed. Id. 

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are against defendants Kiesz and Braunger for failing to 

ensure his prescriptions for pain medication were timely refilled, and against defendants Fontillas 

and Froland for failing to provide timely access to a primary care physician. 

Plaintiff alleges that on December 8, 2010, he submitted a request to refill/renew his 

ibuprofen prescription. ECF No. 13 at 7. He was then interviewed by defendant Braunger on 

December 10, 2010; the interview consisted of Braunger saying that she had checked and 

confirmed that plaintiff’s ibuprofen was given to him. Id. 

With respect to defendant Kiesz, plaintiff alleges that he submitted a request for kitchen 

clearance and a renewal of his ibuprofen prescription on January 4, 2011, and he was interviewed 

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by Kiesz on January 6, 2011. Id. During the interview he told Kiesz that he wanted assistance 

with his other requests regarding his shoulder and delayed ibuprofen, and she told him that she 

did not see anything about that in his file, she would only address what was on his request, and 

after that they would be done. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff left and was asked to sign a treatment refusal 

form, which he did not sign because he was not refusing treatment; it was Kiesz that failed to 

provide any treatment for his injuries and pain. Id. at 8. 

On February 10, 2011, plaintiff submitted a healthcare request in which he complained 

that he was not getting his prescribed medications, that his shoulder pain was also causing neck 

pain, and that his rash had developed into sores. Id. at 9. He was interviewed by defendant 

Froland on February 14, 2011, and was told that he was already scheduled to see a primary care 

physician in a week and could discuss his injuries at that time. Id. Plaintiff did not receive any 

medical assistance at the time of the interview. Id. 

Finally, plaintiff submitted another healthcare request on March 20, 2011, in which he 

requested to see a doctor for his shoulder injury and complained that his allergy medications had 

not been provided. Id. at 9. Plaintiff was interviewed by defendant Fontillas on March 22, 2011, 

at which time defendant Fontillas did nothing to assist plaintiff in seeing a primary care 

physician. Id. at 9-10. 

III. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, “[t]he moving party initially bears the burden 

of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 

627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). 

The moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory 

answers, or other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or 

/// 

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presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

“Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle 

Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 

Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, “after adequate time for discovery and upon 

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. In such 

a circumstance, summary judgment should “be granted so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a 

fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” Anderson, 447 U.S. at 248. 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “‘the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the 

truth at trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. V. Cities 

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Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the 

pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the 

court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” 

Walls v. Central Costa Cnty. Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

It is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may 

be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations 

omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank, 

391 U.S. at 289). 

On June 15, 2015, defendants served plaintiff with notice of the requirements for opposing 

a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 142-4; 143-1. 

See Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1988); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 

960 (9th Cir. 1998) (movant may provide notice) (en banc). 

IV. Plaintiff’s Responses 

It is well-established that the pleadings of pro se litigants are held to “less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) 

(per curiam). Nevertheless, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that 

govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other 

grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). However, the 

unrepresented prisoners’ choice to proceed without counsel “is less than voluntary” and they are 

subject to “the handicaps . . . detention necessarily imposes upon a litigant,” such as “limited 

access to legal materials” as well as “sources of proof.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 

1364-65 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). Inmate litigants, therefore, should not be held to a standard of 

“strict literalness” with respect to the requirements of the summary judgment rule. Id. 

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The court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s more overarching caution in this context, as 

noted above, that district courts are to “construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by 

pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 

611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, though plaintiff has largely complied with the 

rules of procedure, the court will consider the record before it in its entirety. However, only those 

assertions in the opposition which have evidentiary support in the record will be considered. 

V. Defendant Kiesz’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

 Defendant Kiesz moves for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff did not 

exhaust his administrative remedies, that his allegations against her do not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation, and that she is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 140. 

 Plaintiff opposes the motion and argues that defendant Kiesz is barred from arguing 

exhaustion because the issue was already fully litigated in her motion to dismiss and that she 

should be estopped from raising the argument because plaintiff believed the exhaustion issue to 

be over and he abandoned seeking any evidence on the issue. ECF No. 163 at 1-2. He also 

argues that Kiesz’ position that his allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation 

relies on the material facts being undisputed and they are not. Id. at 3. With respect to Kiesz’ 

qualified immunity argument, plaintiff argues that Kiesz should be estopped from arguing 

qualified immunity because it has already been litigated and he therefore did not collect any 

evidence on the matter. Id. at 3-4. He also argues that she is not entitled to qualified immunity 

because the law was clear and Kiesz was responsible for knowing the law that governed her 

profession. Id. 

 A. Legal Standards for Exhaustion 

Because plaintiff is a prisoner suing over the conditions of his confinement, his claims are 

subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under the PLRA, 

“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or 

any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until 

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. 

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) (“§ 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoners 

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seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences”). “The PLRA mandates that inmates 

exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing ‘any suit challenging prison 

conditions,’ including, but not limited to, suits under § 1983.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 

1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)). 

Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204, 216 (2007). “[T]he defendant’s burden is to prove that there 

was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available 

remedy.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th 

Cir. 1996)). “[T]here can be no ‘absence of exhaustion’ unless some relief remains ‘available.’” 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the 

defendant must produce evidence showing that a remedy is available “as a practical matter,” that 

is, it must be “capable of use; at hand.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171 (citations and internal 

quotations marks omitted). Once the defendant has carried his burden, the burden shifts to 

plaintiff to provide evidence that administrative remedies were unavailable to him. Id. at 1172. 

“However, . . . the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant.” Id. 

For exhaustion to be “proper,” a prisoner must comply with the prison’s procedural rules, 

including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 

(“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural 

rules.”). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of 

proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. 

B. Discussion 

Plaintiff’s initial argument that defendant Kiesz is barred from arguing exhaustion is 

without merit. The order granting Kiesz’ motion to dismiss stated that the decision had no effect 

on the claim that Kiesz failed to ensure plaintiff’s prescription medications were timely filled, 

because the motion did not argue lack of exhaustion as to that claim. ECF No. 40 at 10 n.8. 

While defendants are encouraged to bring claims that a plaintiff failed to exhaust early in a case, 

it is not required, and Kiesz’ argument that plaintiff failed to exhaust was properly brought in her 

motion for summary judgment. 

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On the issue of exhaustion, the parties are in agreement that plaintiff filed a number of 

healthcare and non-healthcare appeals during the relevant time period. Defendant Kiesz’ 

Statement of Undisputed Facts (Kiesz’ SUF) (ECF No. 140) at 7-9, ¶¶ 17-18; Response to Kiesz’ 

SUF (ECF No. 165) at 7-8, ¶¶ 17-18. What is in dispute is whether any of those appeals were 

sufficient to exhaust plaintiff’s administrative remedies as to his claim that defendant Kiesz failed 

to ensure timely provision of his prescription pain medication. Defendants claim that plaintiff did 

not file any appeals that dealt with his appointment with defendant Kiesz on January 6, 2011 

(Kiesz’ SUF at 9, ¶ 19), while plaintiff claims that appeal number SOL-24-11-10870 was 

intended to grieve “[a]ll non-assistance to his shoulder injury” until it was cancelled as a duplicate 

of appeal number SOL-24-11-10898 (Response to Kiesz’ SUF at 8, ¶ 19) (alteration in original). 

He further asserts that as a result of the appeal being cancelled, he was prevented from developing 

necessary facts. Id. Plaintiff does not provide copies of or argue that he submitted additional 

appeals that exhausted his administrative remedies as to his interaction with Kiesz on January 6, 

2011. Response to Kiesz’ SUF; ECF No. 163 at 1-2. 

 Assuming for the sake of this analysis that appeal number SOL-24-11-10870 was 

improperly cancelled, as plaintiff appears to argue, it is not sufficient to exhaust his 

administrative remedies. The appeal states as follows: 

On approximately 02/10/22, I submitted a form 7362 complaining 

of a shoulder injury. On 02/14/11, I was interviewed by R.N. 

regarding said. No med assistance was provided. On 

approximately 03/18/11, I submitted a 2nd form 7362 for same 

shoulder injury. On 03/22/11, I saw R.N. again for said injury. No 

assistance was provided. To present date, I have yet to receive any 

assistance for shoulder. I have continued to suffer severe pain 

without the requested med assistance since 02/10/11. 

ECF No. 13 at 71.5

 Broadly construing the appeal to encompass delays in plaintiff’s receipt of his 

pain medication, this appeal notifies prison officials only that plaintiff began having issues with 

 5

 Defendant Kiesz attached a copy of the appeal to her motion for summary judgment, but 

the copy provided is barely legible. ECF No. 141-2 at 25. The court has therefore relied upon the 

copy of the appeal attached to the first amended complaint. In the future, defendant should be 

more mindful of the quality of her attachments, as the court will not consider as evidence 

documents that it cannot read. 

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the treatment he was receiving on February 10, 2011. 

Under 15 C.C.R. § 3084.2(a)(3),6 an appeal was required to identify the staff members 

involved, including the dates of their involvement, or any information that would assist in 

identifying the staff members if their identities were not known. There is no indication in the 

appeal that plaintiff had any issues prior to February 10, 2011, either generally or with respect to 

a particular interaction with healthcare staff, and the appeal would not have put prison officials on 

notice of issues prior to that date or with the care provided by Kiesz. Because plaintiff was seen 

by Kiesz on January 6, 2011, and admits that he did not see defendant Kiesz after that date7

(Response to Kiesz’ SUF at 2, ¶ 4), his interaction with Kiesz is not encompassed by the appeal. 

 Appeal SOL-24-11-10898, which was exhausted, is essentially a more detailed version of 

SOL-24-11-10870. In appeal SOL-24-11-10898, plaintiff specifically mentioned that his 

ibuprofen prescription was not being refilled and that he had requested refills during his 

encounters with healthcare staff on February 14, 2011; March 22, 2011; and March 30, 2011. 

ECF No. 13-1 at 41.8

 He further stated that he had been having difficulty getting his prescribed 

pain medication “since February 2011.” Id. at 46. As with appeal SOL-24-11-10870, this appeal 

does not indicate that plaintiff had issues receiving his pain medication prior to February 2011. 

 Plaintiff submitted one other appeal, IA-24-2011-10816, that alleged that his prescription 

pain medication was not being refilled and it is identical to SOL-24-11-10898. ECF No. 141-2 at 

40-44. It appears that IA-24-2011-10816 was cancelled because the second page of the appeal 

was not on the proper form (id. at 38-39) and it was assigned log number SOL-24-11-10898 when 

plaintiff resubmitted it using the proper form. As with appeal SOL-24-11-10898, appeal IA-24-

 6

 The regulations governing inmate appeals were modified in January 2011, but 

§ 3084.2(a)(3) remained unchanged. Compare Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3) (2010) with 

id. (2011). 

7

 Though he alleges that he is “su[ing] for an event that ‘started’ on January 6, 2011” (id., 

¶ 3), the complaint does not contain any allegations against Kiesz beyond her alleged failure to 

act on January 6, 2011 (ECF No. 13). 

8

 Again, the copy of the appeal provided by defendant Kiesz (ECF No. 141-2 at 4) is 

difficult to read and the court has relied upon the higher quality copy provided by plaintiff. 

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2011-10816 does nothing to further plaintiff’s claim that he exhausted his administrative 

remedies. 

Plaintiff submitted only two other appeals that addressed medication issues: SOL-24-11-

10706 and SOL SC 11000259.9 Appeal SOL-24-11-10706 alleged that plaintiff was not 

receiving his prescription allergy medicine (ECF No. 141 at 23-24, 33-34, 44-45) while SOL SC 

11000259 alleged that two nonparty nurses were harassing him and refusing to properly 

administer his diet supplement drinks (ECF No. 141-1 at 20-22). Neither of these appeals 

exhausts plaintiff’s administrative remedies for his claim that Kiesz failed to ensure his 

prescription pain medication was timely refilled. 

C. Conclusion 

The court finds that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to the claim 

that defendant Kiesz failed to ensure his prescription for pain medication was timely filled. 

Defendant Kiesz’ motion for summary judgment should therefore be granted and the remaining 

claim against defendant Kiesz should be dismissed. Because the court recommends dismissal 

based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust, it declines to address defendant Kiesz’ other arguments. 

VI. Defendants Braunger, Fontillas, and Froland’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

 Defendants Braunger, Fontillas, and Froland move for summary judgment on the grounds 

that they were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs and that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity. ECF No. 143-3 at 14-20. 

 Plaintiff argues that defendants’ motion should be denied because there are disputed 

issues of material fact, as evidenced by the court’s screening of the complaint and orders on 

defendants’ motions to dismiss. ECF No. 162 at 1-3. He further argues that they are not entitled 

to qualified immunity because the law was clear and defendants were responsible for knowing the 

law that governed their profession. Id. at 3-4. 

/// 

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 Appeal SOL SC 11000259, which is a staff complaint, was initially opened as a regular 

healthcare appeal and assigned number SOL HC 11022574. ECF No. 13 at 103. 

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A. Legal Standard Governing Eighth Amendment Claims 

In order to state a §1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on 

inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

To prevail, plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that 

defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 

298-99 (1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1992) (on remand). The 

requisite state of mind for a medical claim is “deliberate indifference.” Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). 

“A ‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled on other 

grounds WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Examples of a 

serious medical need include “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient 

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition 

that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 

substantial pain.” Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 

1990) (citing cases); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court established a very 

demanding standard for “deliberate indifference.” “While poor medical treatment will at a certain 

point rise to the level of constitutional violation, mere malpractice, or even gross negligence, does 

not suffice.” Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334. Even civil recklessness (failure to act in the face of an 

unjustifiably high risk of harm which is so obvious that it should be known) is insufficient to 

establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37 & n.5. It is not enough 

that a reasonable person would have known of the risk or that a defendant should have known of 

the risk. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, deliberate indifference 

is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 

inmate health and safety.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate 

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indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). A difference of opinion between an 

inmate and prison medical personnel—or between medical professionals—regarding appropriate 

medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. To establish a 

difference of opinion rises to the level of deliberate indifference, plaintiff “must show that the 

course of treatment the [medical personnel] chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Material Facts 

The following material facts are undisputed except as indicated. 

 1. The Parties 

At all times relevant to the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at the California State Prison 

(CSP)-Solano. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (DSUF) (ECF No. 143-2) at 1, ¶ 1; 

Response to DSUF (ECF No. 162) at 9, ¶ 1. At all relevant times defendants Braunger, Froland, 

and Fontillas were registered nurses working at CSP-Solano. DSUF at 1-2, ¶¶ 2-4; Response to 

DSUF at 10, ¶¶ 2-4. 

 2. Healthcare Procedures 

Inmates could request healthcare services using CDCR Form 7362. DSUF at 2, ¶ 6; 

Response to DSUF at 11, ¶ 6. The forms were to be collected by healthcare staff on a daily basis 

and reviewed by a registered nurse (RN). DSUF at 2, ¶¶ 7, 10; Response to DSUF at 11-12, ¶¶ 7, 

10.10 Forms that requested prescription renewals and refills did not require a face-to-face meeting 

with a RN. DSUF at 2, ¶ 8; Response to DSUF at 12, ¶ 8. If the Form 7362 reported medical 

 10 Plaintiff denies DSUF ¶¶ 5, 7-8, 10, and 12-14 on the ground that defendants present 

the policies on how things were supposed to be done as factual statements of what was actually 

done, but he does not dispute the policy requirements themselves. The court considers these 

statements as undisputed only to the extent they reflect the procedures outlined in the policies and 

does not consider them to be evidence of what was actually done. 

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symptoms and requested medical services, the inmate was to be seen in person by a RN who 

made a determination whether a referral to a physician was necessary. DSUF at 2-3, ¶¶ 11, 14; 

Response to DSUF at 13-14,¶¶ 11, 14.11 Inmates who needed to see a physician were to be seen 

immediately in the case of an emergency, within twenty-four hours for urgent conditions, and 

within fourteen days for routine, non-urgent matters. DSUF at 3, ¶ 14; Response to DSUF at 

13-14, ¶ 14. The RNs did not schedule the appointments with the physicians. DSUF at 3, ¶ 15; 

Response to DSUF at 14, ¶ 15.12

 3. Plaintiff’s Interaction with Defendant Braunger 

Plaintiff’s records indicate that on December 7, 2010, a physician renewed his 

prescription for ibuprofen and faxed it to the pharmacy the same day. ECF No. 143-7 at 18; 

DSUF at 4, ¶ 21; Response to DSUF at 15, ¶ 21.13 On December 8, 2010, plaintiff submitted a 

Form 7362 complaining of pain in his left shoulder/back and neck area and requesting a renewal 

of his ibuprofen prescription. DSUF at 4, ¶ 22; Response to DSUF at 15, ¶ 22. The same day he 

signed for a fifteen day supply of ibuprofen that was to be kept on person (KOP). DSUF at 4, ¶ 

23; ECF No. 143-7 at 20.14 On December 9, 2010, defendant Braunger reviewed plaintiff’s 

December 8, 2010 healthcare request. DSUF at 4, ¶ 24; Response to DSUF at 16, ¶ 24. Plaintiff 

was seen by Braunger on December 10, 2010. ECF No. 13 at 7. In addressing plaintiff’s Form 

/// 

 11 Plaintiff objects to DSUF ¶ 11 on the grounds that it is not supported by the evidence 

cited. The objection is overruled as the declaration and policy cited sufficiently support 

defendants’ statement. 

12 Plaintiff denies DSUF ¶ 15 on the ground that RNs determined the timeframe for 

appointments. This is not the same as scheduling an appointment and plaintiff does not offer 

evidence that RNs were responsible for scheduling. DSUF ¶ 15 is deemed undisputed. 

13 Plaintiff disputes DSUF ¶ 21 only as to whether the refill was actually faxed, which is 

immaterial to deciding the motion. What is material is whether his records indicate the refill was 

faxed, which they do. ECF No. 143-7 at 18. 

14 Plaintiff does not offer any response to DSUF ¶ 23 (Response to DSUF at 15-16, ¶ 23) 

and his records indicate that the statement is true (ECF No. 143-7 at 20). DSUF ¶ 23 is therefore 

deemed admitted. 

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7362, defendant Braunger reviewed plaintiff’s prescription records. DSUF at 4, ¶ 25; Response 

to DSUF at 16, ¶ 25.15 

The records reflect that plaintiff’s prescription for ibuprofen was renewed on December 7, 

2010; that a refill was pending at the time (ECF No. 143-7 at 18); and that he signed for receipt of 

a fifteen day supply of ibuprofen on December 8, 2010 (id. at 20). DSUF at 4-5, ¶¶ 25, 27-28; 

Response to DSUF at 16-17, ¶¶ 25, 27-28. Based on this information, Braunger determined that 

plaintiff’s prescription request had been addressed. DSUF at 4-5, ¶¶ 25, 27-28; Response to 

DSUF at 16-17, ¶¶ 25, 27-28.16 

 4. Plaintiff’s Interaction with Defendant Froland 

On February 10, 2011, plaintiff submitted a Form 7362 requesting healthcare services and 

complaining of shoulder and neck pain from an injury sustained in September 2010, and itchy, 

dry skin that was causing sores. DSUF at 5, ¶ 33; Response to DSUF at 18, ¶ 33. Plaintiff further 

stated that an x-ray of his collar bone was negative, his bruising was gone, and that he had not yet 

received his prescription medications. ECF No. 143-7 at 22. He was interviewed by defendant 

Froland about his request on February 14, 2011, at which time Froland re-faxed his prescriptions 

to the pharmacy. Id.; ECF No. 13 at 9. During the interview, defendant Froland attempted to 

take plaintiff’s vital signs, but plaintiff refused. DSUF at 5, ¶ 36; Response to DSUF at 19, ¶ 36. 

Froland also had plaintiff move his left shoulder in a circular motion and noted that he had pain 

when he moved his shoulder. DSUF at 6, ¶¶ 38-39; Response to DSUF at 19, ¶¶ 38-40; ECF No. 

162 at 6-7, ¶ 10. At the time plaintiff was seen by defendant Froland, he was already scheduled 

to see a physician on February 21, 2011, and was informed of the appointment. DSUF at 6, ¶ 42; 

 15 Plaintiff denies DSUF ¶ 25 but offers no evidence that defendant Braunger did not 

review his records, and Braunger’s declaration regarding her actions and notation that medication 

was dispensed on December 8, 2010, support the statement. DSUF ¶ 25 is therefore deemed 

admitted. 

16 Plaintiff denies DSUF ¶¶ 27-28 on the grounds that defendant Braunger did not record 

her thoughts on what the records meant. He does not dispute the accuracy of his medical records 

or provide any evidence that would indicate Braunger reached a different conclusion from her 

review of the records. The record and plaintiff’s own allegation that Braunger told him his 

prescription had already been filled support the statements and they are deemed admitted. 

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Response to DSUF at 20, ¶ 42. Since plaintiff was already scheduled to see a physician in seven 

days, defendant Froland did not request another appointment be scheduled. DSUF at 6, ¶ 45; 

Response to DSUF at 18-19, ¶ 45.17 

 5. Plaintiff’s Interaction with Defendant Fontillas 

On March 20, 2011, plaintiff submitted a Form 7362 in which he stated that he had seen a 

RN for a shoulder injury and pain on approximately February 9, 2011, and that he was scheduled 

to see a physician about his pain as a result but the appointment did not happen. ECF No. 143-7 

at 23. He also stated that he had not received his allergy medication and needed to renew his 

ibuprofen. Id. Plaintiff was seen by defendant Fontillas on March 22, 2011. Id. During the 

appointment, defendant Fontillas faxed plaintiff’s prescription to the pharmacy and called to 

make sure it was received. DSUF at 8, ¶ 59; Response to DSUF at 25, ¶ 59. She also measured 

plaintiff’s vital signs and asked him about what problems he was having. DSUF at 7, ¶¶ 52, 54; 

Response to DSUF at 23-24, ¶¶ 52, 54. At the time plaintiff was seen by defendant Fontillas, he 

was scheduled to be seen by a physician on April 4, 2011 (ECF No. 143-7 at 23), which was 

thirteen days after his appointment with Fontillas. 

C. Discussion 

 1. Defendant Braunger 

The record shows, and plaintiff does not deny, that on December 8, 2010, two days before 

he saw defendant Braunger, plaintiff signed for receipt of a fifteen-day supply of ibuprofen. 

DSUF at 4, ¶ 23; ECF No. 143-7 at 20. The record also shows that when plaintiff saw Braunger 

on December 10, 2010, his ibuprofen prescription had already been renewed. ECF No. 143-7 at 

18; DSUF at 4, ¶ 21; Response to DSUF at 15, ¶ 21. While plaintiff argues that there is no 

evidence of exactly when the renewal was faxed to the pharmacy, he does not dispute that the 

prescription was in fact renewed. Response to DSUF at 15, ¶ 21. Even if plaintiff affirmatively 

claimed that the prescription was not timely faxed, that assertion would be clearly contradicted by 

 17 Plaintiff’s arguments regarding what Froland should have done do not create a dispute 

as to what she actually did or her reasoning for her actions. DSUF ¶ 45 is therefore deemed 

admitted. 

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the medical records showing that he signed for receipt of another fifteen-day supply of ibuprofen 

on December 12, 2010, and that that supply was issued based on the renewed prescription. ECF 

No. 143-7 at 21. 

Although plaintiff argues that defendant Braunger failed to conduct a physical 

examination or address his other complaints (ECF No. 162 at 2; Response to DSUF at 17-18, 

¶¶ 29, 31), his only remaining claim against Braunger is that she failed to ensure that he timely 

received his prescription for pain medication. The record and plaintiff’s own allegations 

demonstrate that defendant Braunger verified that plaintiff received his ibuprofen two days prior 

to his appointment with her and that the prescription had already been renewed by a physician. 

There is no indication that Braunger had any reason to believe that plaintiff was in danger of not 

receiving his pain medication in a timely manner. Moreover, given that plaintiff had only just 

received a refill and renewal of his ibuprofen prescription, it is not clear what further action 

defendant Braunger could or should have taken with respect to plaintiff’s receipt of his 

medication. 

For these reasons, the court finds there no evidence that defendant Braunger was 

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical need with respect to plaintiff’s timely receipt 

of his prescription pain medication. 

 2. Defendants Froland and Fontillas 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims against defendants Froland and Fontillas are that they failed 

to provide him with timely access to a physician when they saw him about his healthcare requests 

on February 14, 2011, and March 22, 2011, respectively. Plaintiff appears to argue that on both 

dates his condition warranted emergency or urgent care, which defendants would have known had 

they actually conducted a physical examination as required. ECF No. 162 at 2-3. 

While there is some dispute over the extent of the examinations performed by defendants 

Froland and Fontillas, these disputes do not create an issue of material fact. Plaintiff alleges that 

both defendants failed to conduct a physical evaluation (Response to DSUF at 18-19, 23, ¶¶ 35, 

40, 50), but his own admissions and statements demonstrate that he refused to allow defendant 

Froland to take his vital signs (Response to DSUF at 19, ¶ 36) and that, at a minimum, he verbally 

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relayed his problems to both defendants (ECF No. 162 at 6-7, ¶ 10; Response to DSUF at 23, 

¶ 52), defendant Froland evaluated the movement of his shoulder (ECF No. 162 at 6-7, ¶ 10), and 

defendant Fontillas took his vital signs (Response to DSUF at 24, ¶ 54). Even if this was the full 

extent of the evaluations conducted by each defendant, plaintiff’s allegations that they did not 

provide him with timely access to a physician still fail to establish and Eighth Amendment 

violation. 

Though plaintiff argues that his condition was an emergency or urgent and required that 

he see a physician immediately (ECF No. 162 at 2-3), the policy that he cites indicates that the 

Urgent/Emergent Response procedures covered situations where the inmate’s condition was lifethreatening. Id. at 28. There is no evidence that plaintiff was suffering from, or appeared to be 

suffering from, a life-threatening condition. Moreover, though plaintiff argues that defendants 

failed to conduct proper assessments18 and therefore did not timely refer him to a physician (ECF 

No. 162 at 2-3; Response to DSUF at 20-22, 26, ¶¶ 45, 47, 63), both times he was seen he was 

already scheduled to see a physician within the fourteen days mandated for routine referrals (id. at 

20, 26, ¶¶ 42, 63). Although it appears that neither of the scheduled doctor’s appointments 

occurred, there is no evidence that either defendant had reason to believe the appointments would 

not take place as scheduled or that they had anything to do with plaintiff not being seen as 

scheduled. 

Plaintiff’s belief that he should have been referred to a physician immediately amounts to 

no more than a difference of opinion. The evidence shows that plaintiff’s shoulder pain was due 

to an old injury (DSUF at 5, ¶ 33; Response to DSUF at 18, ¶ 33); that he had a prescription for 

pain medication that both defendants contacted the pharmacy to have filled (ECF No. 13 at 9; 

Response to DSUF at 25, ¶ 59); that he had already been seen by a physician about his rash and 

the issue was that he had not yet received the prescribed allergy medication (ECF No. 13 at 8), 

 18 To the extent plaintiff may be attempting to argue that defendants Froland and Fontillas 

were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because they failed to provide treatment during 

the appointments, these allegations are immaterial to this motion because plaintiff’s only 

surviving claim against these defendants is that they failed to provide him timely access to a 

physician. 

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which both defendants attempted to address (ECF No. 13 at 9; Response to DSUF at 25, ¶ 59); 

and that he was already scheduled to see a physician within the required fourteen-day period for 

routine referrals (Response to DSUF at 20, ¶ 42; ECF No. 143-7 at 23). He offers no evidence 

that it was medically unacceptable for defendants to determine that he required only a routine 

referral and that his already scheduled appointments met that need. The evidence before the court 

shows that defendants conducted some level of evaluation of plaintiff’s condition and believed 

plaintiff’s already scheduled appointments, coupled with resubmitting his prescriptions to the 

pharmacy, were sufficient to meet his needs. At most, defendants’ failure to refer plaintiff for an 

earlier physician’s appointment constitutes negligence, which does not rise to the level of 

deliberate indifference. 

D. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment be granted and the remaining claims against the defendants be dismissed. Because the 

court finds that there are no triable issues of fact regarding deliberate indifference, it declines to 

consider defendants’ qualified immunity argument. 

VII. Summary 

 Defendant Kiesz’ motion for summary judgment should be granted because plaintiff did 

not exhaust the appeals process before he filed this lawsuit. 

 Defendants Braunger, Froland, and Fontillas’ motion for summary judgment should be 

granted because plaintiff cannot show that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs. Plaintiff’s prescription for pain medication had already been refilled and 

renewed by the time he saw defendant Braunger, and plaintiff’s belief that defendants Froland 

and Fontillas should have referred him for an immediate physician’s appointment is nothing more 

than a difference of opinion. 

 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Defendant Kiesz’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 140) be granted and the 

remaining claim against defendant Kiesz be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust. 

/// 

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 2. Defendant Braunger, Froland, and Fontillas’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 

No. 143) be granted and the remaining claims against defendants Braunger, Froland, and Fontillas 

be dismissed with prejudice. 

 3. Judgment be entered for the defendants. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 22, 2016. 

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