Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02723/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02723-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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14cv2723-BAS (DHB) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL DAYNE BRIDGEMAN, 

Petitioner,

v. 

SHERMAN, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

 Case No.: 14cv2723-BAS (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF No. 15]; 

AND 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

[ECF No. 18] 

On November 17, 2014, Michael Dayne Bridgeman (“Petitioner” or “Bridgeman”), 

a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.)1

 Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief 

from his state court conviction in which he was found guilty of assault by means likely to 

produce great bodily injury and dissuading a witness by force or threat. (Id. at 2.) In 

                                                                

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer 

to those imprinted by the Court’s electronic case filing (“ECF”) system, except for 

lodgments.

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ground one, Petitioner alleges that the assault victim named in the amended information 

charging Petitioner should have been changed to another name. (Id. at 3.) In ground two, 

he alleges the trial court abused its discretion by denying three motions for new counsel, 

thereby violating Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (Id. at 6-7.) 

Prior to filing the instant Petition, in 2012, Bridgeman filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus in this district seeking relief from the same conviction. (Lodgment No. 4.) 

On May 7, 2014, the Honorable Roger T. Benitez denied Bridgeman’s prior federal habeas 

petition on the merits and denied a certificate of appealability. (Lodgment No. 8.) 

Pending before the Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss, filed on March 16, 

2015. (ECF No. 15.) Respondent’s primary contention is that dismissal is proper because 

the Petition is an unauthorized second or successive petition.2

 (ECF No. 15-1 at 4:11-5:24.) 

On April 28, 2015, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (ECF 

No. 18.) 

After a thorough review of the Petition, Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner’s 

opposition, all supporting documents, and the Court’s records relating to Petitioner’s prior 

habeas petition3

, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS

that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

                                                                

2

 Respondent also contends dismissal is warranted because the Petition is barred by 

the statute of limitations and contains an unexhausted claim. (ECF No. 15-1 at 5:25-6:11.) 

However, because the Court recommends dismissal of the Petition for lack of jurisdiction, 

i.e., because it is an improper second or successive petition, the Court declines to address 

Respondent’s alternative arguments. 

3

 The Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings and court orders from Petitioner’s 

prior federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Asdar Grp. v. Pillsbury, Madison and Sutro, 

99 F.3d 289, 290 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).

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I. BACKGROUND4 

After a jury convicted Petitioner of assault by means likely to produce great bodily 

injury and dissuading a witness by force or threat, the state trial court sentenced Petititioner 

to eleven years in state prison. During the trial proceedings, Petitioner contended that his 

attorney, Bruce Kolter, was not providing adequate representation and Petitioner made 

three motions for new appointed counsel. The trial court denied each of his motions. 

(Lodgment No. 1 at 3-6.) 

Following his conviction, Petitioner filed a timely appeal in which he asserted that 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his three motions for new counsel, thereby 

violating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (Id. at 2.) On August 11, 2011, the 

California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court. (Id.) 

Bridgeman then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, arguing the 

same grounds. (Lodgment No. 2.) On October 19, 2011, the California Supreme Court 

summarily denied Bridgeman’s petition for review. (Lodgment No. 3.) 

On January 20, 2012, Bridgeman filed a federal habeas petition in the Southern 

District of California, Case No. 12cv212-BEN (PCL). On March 12, 2012, he filed an 

amended petition arguing that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment, and that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied his three motions for new counsel. (Lodgment No. 4.) On December 26, 2012, the 

Honorable Peter C. Lewis issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that both 

grounds in Bridgeman’s amended petition be denied. (Lodgment No. 6.) On May 7, 2014, 

Judge Benitez adopted Judge Lewis’ Report and Recommendation and denied the amended 

petition. (Lodgment No. 8.) 

On November 17, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition in which he challenges 

the same conviction as his prior federal habeas petition. (ECF No. 1.) The Petition raises 

                                                                

4

 Because the factual history relating to Petitioner’s crimes are not germane to the 

issues presently before the Court, the Court focuses solely on the procedural history. 

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the same claims presented in his prior petition and raises an additional claim that was not 

previously presented. Specifically, Petitioner reasserts that he was provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that the trial 

court abused its discretion when it denied his three motions for new counsel. He also raises 

for the first time an argument that the assault victim named in the amended information 

charging Petitioner should have been changed to another name. (Id. at 3.) Respondent 

filed a motion to dismiss the Petition on March 16, 2015. (ECF No. 15.) On April 28, 

2015, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 18.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Petition is an Improper Second or Successive Petition

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) “greatly 

restricts the power of federal courts to award relief to state prisoners who file second or 

successive habeas corpus applications.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001). By 

enacting AEDPA, Congress “established a stringent set of procedures that a prisoner ‘in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), must follow if he 

wishes to file a ‘second or successive’ habeas corpus application challenging that custody.” 

Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152 (2007) (per curiam); see also Greenawalt v. Stewart, 

105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (second or successive habeas petitions 

are subject to AEDPA’s “extremely stringent” requirements). 

AEDPA “creates a ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism for the consideration of second or 

successive applications in district court.” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996). This 

“gatekeeping” function requires “that successive § 2254 petitions be dismissed unless they 

meet one of the exceptions outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).5

 Under that provision, a 

                                                                

5

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) states: 

 

A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under 

section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed 

unless-- 

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successive application is permissible only if it rests on a new rule of constitutional law, 

facts that were previously unavailable, or facts that would be sufficient to show 

constitutional error in the petitioner’s conviction.” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)). 

“Even if a petitioner can demonstrate that he qualifies for one of these exceptions, 

he must seek authorization from the court of appeals before filing his new petition with the 

district court.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(A) (“Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is 

filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for 

an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”) (emphasis added); 

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998). A three-judge panel of the court 

of appeals then has thirty days to determine whether “the application makes a prima facie 

showing that the application satisfies the requirements of” § 2244(b). 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(B). 

Absent authorization from the appropriate court of appeals, second or successive 

habeas petitions filed in the district court shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); see also Burton, 549 U.S. at 153 (where petitioner neither sought nor 

received authorization from the court of appeals before filing second or successive petition, 

district court should have dismissed petition for lack of jurisdiction). “‘When the AEDPA 

                                                                

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional 

law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 

was previously unavailable; or 

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 

previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying 

the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant 

guilty of the underlying offense. 

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is in play, the district court may not, in the absence of proper authorization from the court 

of appeals, consider a second or successive habeas application.’” Cooper v. Calderon, 274 

F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Libby v. Magnusson, 177 F.3d 43, 

46 (1st Cir. 1999)). 

Based on the foregoing legal standards, the issue before the Court is whether the 

instant Petition is “second or successive” and, thus, subject to dismissal. “Whether a 

habeas application is deemed second or successive can be critical because ‘AEDPA greatly 

restricts the power of federal courts to award relief to state prisoners who file second or 

successive habeas corpus applications.’” United States v. Lopez, 534 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Cooper, 274 F.3d at 1272-73). However, “AEDPA does not define the 

terms ‘second or successive.’” Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2002). “That a 

prisoner has previously filed a federal habeas petition does not necessarily render a 

subsequent petition ‘second or successive.’” Id. at 898 (citing In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 

235 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)). “Generally, a new petition is ‘second or successive’ if 

it raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on their merits in an earlier 

petition.” Cooper, 274 F.3d at 1273 (citing United States v. Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d 

862, 867 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 45 (1st Cir. 1999); 

Vancleave v. Norris, 150 F.3d 926, 928-29 (8th Cir. 1998)). A second-in-time habeas 

petition which attacks a prisoner’s underlying conviction for the second time is a “prime 

example of a ‘second or successive’ petition under § 2244(b).” Hill, 297 F.3d at 899. 

In Burton, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner had filed an improper 

second or successive habeas petition. 549 U.S. at 153. The petitioner “twice brought 

claims contesting the same custody imposed by the same judgment of a state court. As a 

result, under AEDPA, he was required to receive authorization from the Court of Appeals 

before filing his second challenge. Because he did not do so, the District Court was without 

jurisdiction to entertain it.” Id.

Here, the instant Petition is an improper second or successive habeas petition 

because Petitioner is seeking to challenge the same conviction that he challenged in his 

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prior federal habeas petition, and there is no indication that Bridgeman has obtained 

authorization, or even requested authorization, from the Ninth Circuit to file a second or 

successive petition. 

 It matters not that Petitioner is now also asserting a new legal claim that was not 

presented in his prior federal habeas proceedings. “[I]f a petitioner seeks to assert a claim 

that was not presented in [his] first habeas application, [he] must move for authorization 

from [the court of appeals] to file a second or successive application, and the motion will 

be denied unless it makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies the requirements of one of 

[the] narrow exceptions” set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Lopez, 534 F.3d at 1033 

(citing Cooper, 274 F.3d at 1273; 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), (b)(3)). “If 

the petitioner does not first obtain [the court of appeals’] authorization under 

§ 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider the second or successive 

application.” Id. (citing Burton, 549 U.S. 147). 

 Accordingly, the Petition should be dismissed. 

B. Petitioner’s Request for Appointment of Counsel

 In his opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner appears to request 

appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 18 at 1.) Petitioner previously filed a motion for 

appointment of counsel which the Court denied. (ECF Nos. 8, 10.) Petitioner presents no 

new evidence or argument that would alter the Court’s conclusion that appointment of 

counsel is unwarranted. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request for 

appointment of counsel. 

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

under 28 §636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) of the United States District Court for 

the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s renewed 

request for appointment of counsel is DENIED. Additionally, IT IS RECOMMENDED 

that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

/ / / 

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order (1) approving 

and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that judgment be entered 

dismissing the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than September 16, 2015, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document shall be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than September 28, 2015. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 17, 2015 

_________________________ 

 DAVID H. BARTICK 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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