Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01700/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01700-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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MICHAEL 

v. 

KROBLIN 

INC., 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

C. MESSINA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, ) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

l!ILBO 

United Seit~ Cou,r of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

M.l.Y 21 iiiO 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No, 86-1700 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 84-C-173-E) 

Louis w. Bullock of Bullock and Bullock, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Neal Tomlins of Baker, Hoster, Mcspadden, Clark & Rasure, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, (J. Ronald Petrikin, M. Benjamin Singletary, and Timothy 

A. Carney of Gable & Gotwals, Tulsa, Oklahoma, on the briefs) for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1700 Document: 010110284264 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 1
Plaintiff Michael Messina appeals from a jury verdict in 

favor of defendant Kroblin Transportation Systems, Inc. (Kroblin) 

on his claim that he was unlawfully terminated in violation of the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 u.s.c. ch. 14, and 

from a directed verdict for defendant on Messina's pendent state 

law slander claim. On appeal we consider three issues, whether 

the district court erred (1) in instructing the jury on Messina's 

ADEA claim; (2) in directing a verdict for defendant on Messina's 

slander claim; and (3) in refusing to admit evidence of the 

conduct of certain defense witnesses. 1 We affirm the district 

court on all issues. 

I 

On Messina's ADEA claim, the district court instructed the 

jury in accordance with its view of the standards enunciated in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 ( 1973), and this 

circuit's opinion in Smith v. Consolidated Mut. Water Co., 787 

F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1986). The instructions at issue provided: 

"In order to prove the essential elements of plaintiff's claim the burden is upon plaintiff to 

establish by a preponderance of evidence in the case the 

following facts: 

First: That the plaintiff was.employed by the 

defendant, and was capable of continuing to perform 

in a satisfactory manner; 

Second: That he was at least forty years of age but 

less than seventy years of age at the time of his 

discharge; 

1 Because we affirm the district court's handling of Messina's 

ADEA claim in all other respects, we do not reach his contention 

that the court's instruction with regard to backpay was improper. 

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Third: That the plaintiff's 

determinative factor in whether 

retained or discharged; and 

age was the 

he was to be 

Fourth: that a younger person replaced him. 

Once plaintiff has established through evidence the 

essential elements of his age discrimination claim. 

the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show some 

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's 

termination. If defendant comes forth with such 

evidence, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to prove 

that the business reason proffered by defendant is 

merely a pretext for discriminating against plaintiff." 

IR. tab 83. Messina argues that this instruction incorrectly 

required him to prove the ultimate question of the trial--whether 

age was the determinative factor in his discharge--as part of his 

prima facie case. 

This instruction may misstate the evidence a plaintiff must 

present in order to avoid a directed verdict under McDonnell 

Douglas, but the presumption and burdens inherent in the McDonnell 

Douglas formulation drop out of consideration when the case is 

submitted to the jury on the merits. As the Supreme Court noted 

in United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 

711, 713-14 (1983), the important issue is discrimination vel non 

not the orderly presentation of evidence. 

Other circuits have disapproved jury instructions which 

delineate the intricacies of McDonnell Douglas because a jury is 

not well equipped to understand the shifting burdens of such a 

formulation. The First Circuit recognized the potential for juror 

confusion and stated: 

"[T]o read [McDonnell Douglas'] technical aspects to a 

jury, as was done here, will add little to the juror's 

understanding of the case and, even worse, may lead 

jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize upon 

poorly understood legalisms to decide the ultimate 

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Appellate Case: 86-1700 Document: 010110284264 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 3
question of discrimination. Since the advantages of 

trial by jury lie in utilization of the jurors' common 

sense, we would have serious reservations about using 

McDonnell Douglas if doing so meant engulfing a lay jury 

in the legal niceties discussed in this opinion." 

Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979); see 

also Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 1983) 

("[T]he defendant's proposed instructions, couched in such 

lawyerly cant as 'prima facie case' and 'shifting burden of 

proof,' would only have confused the jury."). 

While it is appropriate for courts to use the law developed 

in the context of Title VII cases in ADEA disputes, McDonnell 

Douglas guidelines play differently to a jury than they do in a 

bench trial. The McDonnell Douglas inferences provide assistance 

to a judge as he addresses motions to dismiss, for summary 

judgment, and for directed verdict, but they are of little 

relevance to the jury. The district courts, therefore, to avoid 

potential jury confusion, should prepare instructions that do not 

rely on technical legal distinctions likely to be understood only 

by attorneys and judges. 

"McDonnell Douglas is to a large extent an analytical 

framework enunciated post hoc, in light of a given set 

of facts, to give judges a method of organizing evidence 

and assigning the burdens of production and persuasion 

in a discrimination case. In light of this and the fact 

that the defendants' burden is one of production rather 

than of persuasion, only the factual determinations 

necessary to the underlying rationale of McDonnell 

Douglas need be made by the jury--the burden-shifting 

can and should be monitored by the judge. Moreover, the 

term 'prima facie case' need never be mentioned to the 

jurors; McDonnell Douglas should be used to 

identify the important factual issues, and these can be 

set out in the charge, or in special questions, divorced 

from legal jargon." 

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Appellate Case: 86-1700 Document: 010110284264 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 4
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1016 (footnote omitted). 

Despite our misgivings, we hold that the instruction given by 

the trial court does not warrant reversal. In Smith, we upheld an 

instruction not much different from that given here. 787 F.2d at 

1442-43. The court's instructions on the age discrimination issue 

directed the jury's attention to the ultimate question--was age a 

determinative factor in Messina's discharge. "Our standard of 

review is not whether an instruction was faultless in every 

respect, but whether the jury, considering the instructions as a 

whole, was misled. 'Thus, only in those cases where the reviewing 

court has a substantial doubt whether the jury was fairly guided 

in its deliberations should the judgment be disturbed.'" United 

States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Irving 

v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1982)). We do not 

have such doubt in the case before us. 

II 

Messina asserts that the district court erred in directing a 

verdict against him on his slander claim. In defending against 

Messina's ADEA claim, Kroblin alleged that it terminated Messina 

because, inter alia, he intentionally postdated a vehicle 

inspection report that he filed with the company, a violation of 

federal safety regulations for which Kroblin could have been 

sanctioned. Messina denied that his handling of the inspection 

report was improper, and his slander claim arises from the manner 

in which Kroblin dealt with the incident. Messina contends that 

Tom Thoma, maintenance supervisor for Kroblin, accused him, in 

front of several co-workers, of not doing the inspection and 

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Appellate Case: 86-1700 Document: 010110284264 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 5
falsifying the report. He alleges that this accusation 

constitutes slander per se. Kroblin argues that Thoma did not 

accuse Messina of falsifying the report; rather, he requested an 

explanation of the discrepancy between the date written on the 

report and the date Messina claimed he inspected the vehicle in 

question. In addition, Kroblin asserts that (1) no defamation 

occurred because communication between corporate employees does 

not constitute publication of the defamatory information and 

(2) Messina failed to overcome Kroblin's qualified privilege by 

showing actual malice or recklessness in the communication. 

After hearing evidence on the issues, the trial court 

directed a verdict for Kroblin on the slander claim. The court 

determined as a matter of law that none of the employees who heard 

the conversation between Messina and Thoma thought less of Messina 

and, therefore, no slander could have occurred. Messina argues 

that the trial court misapplied Oklahoma law by confusing 

defamation per quod, which requires proof of damage, with 

defamation per se, in which damage is presumed. 

We agree with Kroblin that under Oklahoma law statements made 

by one corporate employee during the performance of his duties 

within the hearing only of other corporate employees does not 

constitute publication. Because defamation requires that 

information be communicated to others besides the plaintiff, we 

hold that the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the 

company was correct. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Davidson, 148 

P.2d 468, 471 (Okla. 1944); and M.F. Patterson Dental Supply Co. 

v. Wadley, 401 F.2d 167, 171 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Anson v. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1700 Document: 010110284264 Date Filed: 05/21/1990 Page: 6
Erlanger Minerals and Metals, Inc., 702 P.2d 393, 398 n.4 (Okla. 

App. 1985) (assuming statements in staff meetings not publication 

under doctrine of Magnolia Petroleum). 

III 

Finally, Messina argues that the district court erred in 

failing to allow him to introduce evidence and argue to the jury 

the full extent of Kroblin's "failure to play by the rules." The 

case had been partially tried earlier, and a mistrial had been 

declared, apparently because one of Kroblin's witnesses discussed 

his testimony with another witness in violation of a court order. 

Messina makes several complaints about the retrial, but focuses 

principally on the court's limitation on his cross-examination of 

Kroblin's witnesses involved in the violation of the sequestration 

order in the earlier trial. 

We are generally reluctant to overturn evidentiary rulings of 

the trial court. We review such rulings only to determine if the 

trial court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of the 

evidence presented. Weir v. Federal Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387, 1396 

(10th Cir. 1987). In this case the district court was attempting 

to balance the interests of plaintiff Messina in presenting his 

case with the undoubted prejudice that would arise if the jury 

were informed that prior defense misconduct had required a new 

trial. We cannot find fault with the balance the court struck. 

The court allowed Messina to cross-examine the witnesses who were 

involved in the previous violation regarding the fact that they 

had violated the sequestration order. While Messina might have 

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wished to belabor the point, the district court did not err in 

refusing to let him do so. 

Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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