Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02251/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02251-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOSHRA AL-BAYATI,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-02251 CKD (TEMP)

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.1 

For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is denied, defendant’s cross-motion is 

granted, and the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is affirmed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2011, plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning on

April 15, 2008. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 127-33.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, (id. at 

82-85), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 86-88.) Plaintiff requested a hearing and a hearing was 

 

1

 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Dkt. Nos. 5 & 7.

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held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on December 11, 2012. (Id. at 40-67.) 

Plaintiff was represented by an attorney and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 40-41.) 

In a decision issued on February 21, 2013, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. 

(Id. at 33.) The ALJ entered the following findings: 

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the 

Social Security Act on December 31, 2012. 

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity

during the period from her alleged onset date of April 15, 2008 

through her date last insured of December 31, 2012 (20 CFR 

404.1571 et seq).

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following 

severe impairments: bilateral knee degenerative joint disease, 

lumbar strain with degenerative disc disease, and diabetes with 

neuropathy (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). 

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 

404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the 

residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 

20 CFR 404.1567(c) except she cannot climb ladders, ropes, and 

scaffolds. The claimant should avoid working at heights and 

around dangerous machinery. 

6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of 

performing past relevant work as a home health aide. This work 

did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded 

by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, at any time from April 15, 2008, the alleged onset 

date, through December 31, 2012, the date last insured (20 CFR 

404.1520(f)). 

(Id. at 22-32.)

On August 20, 2014, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s February 21, 2013 decision. (Id. at 1-3.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on September 29, 2014. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If 

not, the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

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The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

In her pending motion plaintiff asserts the following five principal claims: (1) the ALJ

erred in determining plaintiff’s alleged onset date; (2) substantial evidence does not support the

ALJ’s finding that plaintiff can perform past relevant work; (3) the ALJ failed to consider the 

combination of plaintiff’s impairments; (4) the ALJ improperly rejected plaintiff’s own subjective 

testimony; and (5) the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error.

I. Alleged Onset

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining plaintiff’s alleged onset date. In this 

regard, plaintiff argues that there “are three potential onset dates in the record.” (Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. 

No. 17) at 17.2) The first is April 15, 2008, the date plaintiff listed in her application for disability 

benefits. The second is April 1, 2009, the date used in a prehearing brief. And the third is simply 

“2010,” a date provided by way of a letter submitted by plaintiff to the Commissioner. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ chose the date the (sic) 2008, despite that it is not what the claimant 

wanted,” and that “[i]f the treating physician’s opinion is given full weight, [plaintiff] would have 

been found disabled at Step 5 of the sequential evaluation with the 2010 onset date.” (Id.)

Obviously, plaintiff’s argument assumes that the treating physician’s opinion should have 

been given full weight, an assumption which is incorrect for the reasons discussed below. 

Moreover, the question before the ALJ was whether plaintiff had been under a disability “at any 

time from April 15, 2008 . . . through December 31, 2012.” (Tr. at 32.) In this regard, the ALJ’s 

use of the April 15, 2008 date, the earliest possible date plaintiff could have been disabled, did 

not harm plaintiff. See generally Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1068 (8th Cir. 2012) (“any 

error regarding Renstrom’s substantial gainful activity was harmless, because the ALJ explicitly 

 

2

Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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found Renstrom was not disabled from his alleged onset date through the date he was last 

insured—including the challenged 2002 and 2003 time periods”).

Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to relief with respect to this claim.

II. Past Relevant Work

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step four of the sequential evaluation by concluding 

that the plaintiff could perform past relevant work as it was generally performed without making 

a finding “as to how [plaintiff] actually performed her work.” (Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 17) at 18-20.) 

However, the Ninth Circuit has “never required explicit findings at step four regarding a 

claimant’s past relevant work both as generally performed and as actually performed.” Pinto v. 

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“A claimant must be able to perform her past relevant work either as actually 

performed or as generally performed in the national economy.); Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 

798 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The claimant has the burden of proving an inability to return to his former 

type of work and not just to his former job.”).

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the ALJ had committed an error at step four, any 

such error would be harmless because the ALJ made an alternative step five finding that plaintiff 

could also perform other jobs in the national economy. (Tr. at 31-32.) See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 

533 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Cadena v. Astrue, 365 Fed. Appx. 777, 780 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“the ALJ’s alternative ruling at step five—that Cadena could perform light, unskilled 

work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy—renders the step four error 

harmless”).3

Accordingly, plaintiff is also not entitled to relief with respect to this claim.

III. Plaintiff’s Combined Impairments

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to consider the impairments caused by her 

hypertension, diabetes, “impairments that produce pain,” obesity, and depression. (Pl.’s MSJ 

(Dkt. No. 17) at 20-22.) Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, however, the ALJ’s decision expressly 

 

3 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 

36-3(b).

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considered these impairments. 

In this regard, the ALJ’s decision discussed plaintiff’s “poorly controlled hypertension 

and diabetes,” noting that plaintiff “has not been hospitalized or been referred for specialized 

treatment and examinations have not reflected any end organ damage,” and that both conditions 

appeared to be complicated by plaintiff’s lack of compliance with her prescribed medications. 

(Tr. at 24, 28.) Similarly, the ALJ’s decision discussed plaintiff’s “ongoing joint pain, primarily 

over her back and knees,” noting that “examinations have not reflected any significant 

abnormality over any joint, including swelling over the knees,” and “examinations have not 

described any loss of motor strength over the lower extremities or muscle wasting or atrophy, 

findings usually associated with severe pain . . . .” (Id. at 28.) Nonetheless, the ALJ found it 

appropriate “given the overall effect of her joint pain and diabetes . . . to limit [plaintiff] to the 

performance of medium work.” (Id. at 30.) 

The ALJ’s decision also discussed plaintiff’s weight, finding that “[a]lthough the claimant 

is overweight, the record is devoid of any objective findings showing that her weight causes any 

serious related limitations,” and “no examiner has suggested that she experiences any additional 

limitations due to her weight.” (Id. at 29.) The ALJ’s decision also discussed plaintiff’s “serious 

mental limitations,” noting that “the record does not show that she participates in any dedicated 

course of medical or non-medical treatment for her complaints.” (Id.) Moreover, the decision 

noted that plaintiff’s treating physician did not refer plaintiff for “mental health treatment.” (Id.

at 30.) 

Accordingly, plaintiff is also not entitled to relief with respect to this claim. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s allegations of pain were not credible 

was “not supported by substantial evidence.” (Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 17) at 23.) The Ninth Circuit 

has summarized the ALJ’s task with respect to assessing a claimant’s credibility as follows:

To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step 

analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

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symptoms alleged. The claimant, however, need not show that her 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of 

the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Thus, the 

ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply 

because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably 

produce the degree of symptom alleged.

Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence 

of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so . . . .

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security 

cases.” Moore v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). “At 

the same time, the ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else 

disability benefits would be available for the asking . . . .” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012).

“The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 

693 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999)). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider, among other things, the 

“[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s] testimony or 

between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2002) (modification in original) (quoting Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 

1997)). If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Id. 

Here, the ALJ’s decision provided several reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s testimony. In 

this regard, the ALJ noted that plaintiff “gave very little effort during testing.” (Tr. at 29.) The 

ALJ also noted that an examining physician found that plaintiff’s complaints were “significantly 

out of proportion to the objective findings,” and that four months after plaintiff claimed to have 

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diminished vision she was found to have 20/20 vision. (Id.) Those findings are supported by the 

record, id. at 205, 265, 272-74, 493, and are a specific, clear and convincing reason for rejecting 

plaintiff’s testimony. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (“efforts to 

impede accurate testing of her limitations supports the ALJ’s determinations as to her lack of 

credibility”); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ may employ “ordinary 

techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent 

statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 

candid”).

The ALJ also rejected plaintiff’s testimony because plaintiff had not been fully compliant 

with taking her prescribed medications and had received essentially conservative treatment. (Tr. 

at 28-29.) These findings are supported by the record, id. at 265, 345, 640, and are also specific, 

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s testimony. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 

F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (ALJ may properly rely on plaintiff’s unexplained failure 

to request treatment consistent with the alleged severity of her symptoms.); Fair v. Bowen, 885 

F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJ permissibly considered discrepancies between claimant’s 

allegations of “persistent and increasingly severe pain” and the nature and extent of treatment 

obtained).

Accordingly, plaintiff is also not entitled to relief with respect to this claim.

V. Medical Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of her treating physician, 

Dr. Peter Droubay. (Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 17) at 29-33.) 

The weight to be given to medical opinions in Social Security disability cases depends in 

part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or nonexamining health 

professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). “As a 

general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion 

of doctors who do not treat the claimant . . . .” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This is so because a 

treating doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 

as an individual. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285; Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 

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1990). The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be rejected only for 

clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of a treating or examining physician that is 

controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. “The opinion of a nonexamining 

physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 

of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” (Id. at 831.) Finally, although a 

treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to significant weight, “‘[t]he ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.’” Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 

671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 

2009)).

Here, on February 15, 2012, Dr. Peter Droubay, M.D., who specializes in internal 

medicine, completed a “Treating Source Assessment” in which he opined that plaintiff could lift

only 2 pounds frequently, could only stand and walk for 15 minutes without interruption, 1 hour 

total, could sit no more than 4 hours in an 8-hour work day, would be absent from work as a 

result of her impairments three or more days per month, and was markedly restricted in her 

activities of daily living, social functioning and ability to maintain concentration, persistence or 

pace. (Tr. at 636-39.)

The ALJ, however, gave “little weight,” to Dr. Droubay’s February 15, 2012 opinion due 

to “the evidence of record, including inconsistencies in [Dr. Droubay’s] statements.” (Id. at 27.) 

The ALJ supported this finding by noting that Dr. Droubay’s opinion “contrasts sharply” with the 

opinions of the four examining physicians. In this regard, on August 30, 2008, Dr. Avinash 

Ramchandani, M.D., administered a comprehensive neurological examination. (Id. at 203-06.) 

On October 12, 2008, Dr. Silvia Torrez, Psy. D., administered a comprehensive psychiatric 

evaluation. (Id. at 209-14.) On June 17, 2011, Dr. Fabria Vesali, M.D. administered a 

comprehensive orthopedic evaluation. (Id. at 263-67.) And on July 7, 2011, T. Renfro, Psy. D., 

administered a comprehensive psychological evaluation. (Id. at 268-76.) Dr. Droubay’s opinion 

was inconsistent with, and contradicted by, the findings of each of these examining physicians. 

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Moreover, Dr. Droubay’s February 15, 2012 opinion was also inconsistent with Dr. 

Droubay’s own assessment offered just 3 months earlier. (Id. at 26-27.) In this regard, after a 

November 8, 2011 office visit, Dr. Droubay noted that he could not “really tell if [plaintiff] is 

impaired mentally . . . .” (Id. at 326.) Moreover, Dr. Droubay stated that, although he believed 

plaintiff was “disabled,” he could not “assess her disability,” though plaintiff was “not disabled 

physically from motor standpoint,” and “needs evaluation by psychiatry.” (Id.) 

In this regard, the undersigned finds that the ALJ offered specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record for discrediting Dr. Droubay’s opinion. See

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (“A conflict between treatment notes and 

a treating provider’s opinions may constitute an adequate reason to discredit the opinions of a 

treating physician or another treating provider.”); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (“We hold that the ALJ properly found that Dr. Magsarili’s extensive conclusions 

regarding Connett’s limitations are not supported by his own treatment notes.”); Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Where the opinion of the claimant’s treating 

physician is contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating source is based on independent clinical 

findings that differ from those of the treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may 

itself be substantial evidence; it is then solely the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict.”).

Accordingly, plaintiff is also not entitled to relief with respect to this claim.

CONCLUSION

The court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment in her favor with respect 

to any of the arguments advanced in her pending motion.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 17) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 20) is granted; and

3. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed.

Dated: February 18, 2016

BVD\al-bayati2251.ord.docx

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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