Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02218/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02218-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID EDWARDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SWARTHOUT,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-2218 JAM DB P

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter proceeds on plaintiff’s original complaint 

against defendant Warden Gary Swarthout on equal protection and due process claims for the 

defendant’s implementation of two modified programs at California State Prison in Solano, 

California (“CSP-Solano”). 

Pending now are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff moves for 

summary judgment on the ground that there is no dispute of material fact as to either of his 

claims. Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that (a) plaintiff failed to exhaust 

his administrative remedies as to the second modified program, (b) defendant did not violate 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and (c) defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Each of the 

motions is fully briefed and ready for disposition. 

////

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 1 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In the amended complaint, plaintiff, a White inmate, brings suit against Warden Swarthout 

for implementing two modified programs—the first in July 2010 and the second in February 

2011—in response to separate incidents involving White inmates. Plaintiff was not involved in 

either of these incidents but was nonetheless subjected to the restrictions imposed on all White

inmates. Per plaintiff, defendant’s implementation of the modified programs violated plaintiff’s 

“Eighth Amendment rights, and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights to due process and 

equal protection, ....” Compl. at 2 (ECF No. 1 at 7). 

II. Relevant Procedural Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 23, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant filed an answer 

on December 15, 2014, and a Discovery and Scheduling Order (“DSO”) issued on December 24, 

2014. (ECF Nos. 18, 19.) Pursuant to the DSO, the discovery deadline was set for April 10, 2015, 

and the dispositive motion deadline was set for July 6, 2015. 

On June 15, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.) 

Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 6, 2015. (ECF No. 27.) These 

motions are fully briefed.

III. Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion 

On March 5, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to have his requests for admissions deemed 

admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) due to the defendant’s failure to 

respond to those requests within thirty days. For the reasons set forth here, this motion will be 

denied. 

Under Rule 36(a)(3), “A shorter or longer time for responding may be stipulated to under 

Rule 20 or be ordered by the court.” Pursuant to this Rule, the December 24, 2014, DSO 

specifically extended the time period for a response: “Responses to written discovery requests 

shall be due forty-five days after the request is served.” DSO at 4 ¶ 2. In addition, defendant was 

granted an extension of time on March 2, 2015, to respond to plaintiff’s written discovery. (ECF 

No. 22.) Defendant’s failure then to respond to plaintiff’s requests for admissions within thirty 

days is excused both by the DSO and the Court’s March 2, 2015, Order. 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 2 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

IV. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative 

Remedies Related to the February 2011 Modified Program

A. Legal Standards 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995, requires that prisoners exhaust 

“such administrative remedies as are available” before commencing a suit challenging prison 

conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Ross v. Blake, ––– U.S. –––– 136 S. Ct. 1850 (June 6, 

2016) (“An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies that are ‘available.’”). 

Exhaustion is mandatory unless unavailable. “The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies 

persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there 

are no ‘remedies ... available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. 

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 

U.S. 731, 739 (2001)).

This statutory exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, Porter 

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (quotation marks omitted), regardless of the relief sought by 

the prisoner or the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and 

unexhausted claims may not be brought to court, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (citing 

Porter, 534 U.S. at 524).

The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of 

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

“In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may 

move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, the defendants 

must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to summary judgment 

under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

shows he failed to exhaust. Id.

CDCR has an administrative remedy process for inmate grievances. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, § 3084.1 (2014). Compliance with section 1997e(a) is mandatory and state prisoners are 

required to exhaust CDCR’s administrative remedy process prior to filing suit in federal court. 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85-86 (2006); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 3 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

2010). 

CDCR’s administrative grievance process for non-medical appeals consists of three levels 

of review: (1) first level formal written appeals; (2) second level appeal to the Warden or 

designees; and (3) third level appeal to the Office of Appeals (“OOA”). Inmates are required to 

submit appeals on a standardized form (CDCR Form 602), attach necessary supporting 

documentation, and submit the appeal within thirty days of the disputed event. Cal. Code Regs. 

tit. 15, §§ 3084.2, 3084.3(a), 3084.8(b).

B. Analysis

As noted supra, this action concerns two modified programs implemented at CSP-Solano: 

the first in July 2010 and the second in February 2011. Plaintiff filed a grievance and completed 

the administrative review process through all three levels of review for his claims related to the 

July 2010 modified program, Appeal Log No. SOL-10-01051 (“the July 2010 grievance”). See

Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Exs. E-F; Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B (ECF No. 28). 

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims related to the February 

2011 modified program for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In support, defendant 

submits evidence that, although such remedies were available to him, plaintiff did not initiate a 

new grievance concerning the February 2011 modified program. Instead, plaintiff merely 

supplemented the July 2010 grievance and submitted it directly to the Director’s level of review. 

His concerns regarding the February 2011 modified program were dismissed after the decision 

noted that plaintiff had “added new issues and requests to his appeal. The additional requested 

action is not addressed herein as it is not appropriate to expand the appeal beyond the initial 

problem and the initially requested action.” Decl. of M. Voong in Supp. of Def.’s MSJ Ex. B 

(ECF No. 27-5). 

Plaintiff concedes that he did not file a separate grievance for the February 2011 modified 

program, claiming that he did not need to initiate a new grievance because he “had no legal 

requirement to file a separate appeal for an ongoing constitutional violation of discrimination ....” 

Pl.’s Reply at 7 (ECF No. 28). Notably, plaintiff does not claim that administrative remedies were 

unavailable to him. 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 4 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

While plaintiff invokes the ongoing violation doctrine, the Supreme Court recently

reaffirmed a strict interpretation of the exhaustion requirement and clarified that there are only 

“three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the 

books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859. These circumstances are as 

follows: (1) the “administrative procedure ... operates as a simple dead end – with officers unable 

or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates;” (2) the “administrative 

scheme ... [is] so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use ... so that no 

ordinary prisoner can make sense of what it demands;” and (3) “prison administrators thwart 

inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or 

intimidation.” Id. at 1859-60 (citations omitted). Other than these circumstances demonstrating 

the unavailability of an administrative remedy, the mandatory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 

“foreclose[es] judicial discretion,” which “means a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust, 

even to take [special] circumstances into account.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1856-57.

In this case, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the administrative procedures were a dead 

end, were so opaque as to be incapable of use, or that prison officials thwarted his ability to file a 

grievance. In the absence of one of these circumstances, the undersigned will recommend that 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be 

granted as to plaintiff’s claims related to the February 2011 modified program. 

V. The Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Related to the July 2010 

Modified Program

A. Undisputed Facts

Plaintiff is an unaffiliated White inmate who, at all relevant times, was housed at CSPSolano. Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“DSUF”) 1-2. Defendant Swarthout, as the 

Warden of CSP-Solano, approved the Program Status Report at issue here: PSR No. SOL-July11-10-027. DSUF 4.

////

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 5 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

1. Race, Prison Violence, and Modified Programs1

a. Modified Program Overview

CSP-Solano is a Level III institution that houses violent felons. DSUF 5. At institutions 

like CSP-Solano, violence is a fact of life and can be directed at inmates or correctional staff. 

DSUF 5. In order to ensure the safety of all inmates after a serious incident, prison officials may 

modify or restrict program activities for some or all inmates by implementing a modified program 

affecting all or a portion of the inmate population. DSUF 8.

During a modified program, regular institutional programming is interrupted. DSUF 9. 

Affected inmates are not allowed out of their cells without being escorted. DSUF 9. Oftentimes, 

the escorts have further restrictions including additional mechanical restraints or additional 

officers. DSUF 9. All support programs for inmates, including educational programs, prison jobs, 

religious services, visitation, access to the law library, and group mental health, among others, 

may be restricted or unavailable. DSUF 9. These restrictions are continually evaluated and 

subsequently modified to allow access as soon as it is deemed safe to do so. DSUF 9. 

b. Race as a Factor

Race (or ethnicity) is one of the factors that can cause violence. DSUF 6. Inmates often 

segregate themselves by race, and within the various racial groups of inmates there are subgroups of gangs or disruptive groups, such as the White Skin Heads, Black Guerilla Family, 

Mexican Mafia, Southern Hispanics, Bloods, Crips, etc. DSUF 6. Even inmates who are not 

affiliated with a gang or disruptive group sometimes join in or sympathize with members of their 

racial group, and gang members often pressure unaffiliated inmates of the same race to participate 

in violent activities. DSUF 7. Additionally, incidents that begin without racial animus often 

evolve into racial conflict. DSUF 7. For instance, a fight between two inmates of different races 

that had nothing to do with race initially may erupt into a race riot. DSUF 7.

Under the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) policy at 

 

1

Plaintiff makes several vague, unsupported, and speculative objections to defendant’s evidence.

See Pl.’s Resp. to DSUF (ECF No. 29). Only those objections with proper evidentiary support 

will be noted herein. 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 6 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

the time, inmates’ race and ethnicity may also be one of the factors that could be considered in 

determining the scope of a modified program. DSUF 8. The lockdowns, however, are never based 

solely on race or ethnicity. DSUF 8. Rather, prison officials use a systematic process of 

elimination to rule out potential gang and/or disruptive groups, personal issues, and/or possible 

retaliation issues. DSUF 8. Unless prison staff receives information clearing an entire group, an 

individual inmate cannot be released from modified program without putting inmates and staff at 

risk of further violence. DSUF 8.

c. Investigation of Incidents

After a modified program is implemented, prison officials begin an investigation to 

determine when normal programming may be safely resumed. DSUF 10. The investigation 

includes (a) interviews of inmates and staff; (b) searches of yards, cells, common areas and other 

areas of the prison for evidence, weapons, and contraband; (c) review of video surveillance; and 

(d) a daily review by the Warden or his/her designee of the information collected. DSUF 10-11. 

In addition, the Warden or designee is required to provide weekly updates to his superiors 

regarding the prison’s efforts to return to normal programming. DSUF 11. 

The investigation process can be slow, time-consuming, and labor intensive. DSUF 15. 

Correctional staff are often diverted from other facilities to assist with escorts or conduct 

interviews and searches. DSUF 15. For this reason, modified programs drain manpower and 

stretch institutional resources. DSUF 15. Additionally, prison officials must meet constantly and 

thoroughly document all updates on a program status report, which imposes administrative 

burdens as well. DSUF 15.

d. Return to Normal Programming

One risk of prematurely lifting a modified program is further incidents of violence, 

including the loss of life. DSUF 16. Given the seriousness of this risk, caution is warranted and 

the gradual return to normal programming is recommended. DSUF 16. Striking the right balance 

between ensuring the safety and security of inmates, staff, and the institution on one hand, and 

returning inmates to normal programming and regular exercise as soon as safely possible on the 

other, is difficult. DSUF 16.

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 7 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Once prison officials determine that it is safe to do so, inmates are gradually returned to 

normal programming in phases, beginning, for example, with the incremental restoration of 

specified program activities. DSUF 12. The determination to return to normal programming is 

made based on the totality of circumstances, including the absence of information indicating 

potential for further violence. DSUF 12. If an incremental release is successful, more inmates and 

privileges are restored until all the inmates’ privileges are restored. DSUF 12.

Releasing inmates to the recreation yard creates the biggest security risk because large 

groups of inmates are able to congregate and interact in a less controlled area. DSUF 13. The 

number of inmates on a yard greatly outnumbers the correctional staff members assigned to 

monitor the area. DSUF 13. On the yard, inmates can commit assaults, communicate threats, plan 

illegal activities, and exchange or obtain weapons or contraband, that could result in injury or 

even death to inmates and staff. DSUF 13. Following a return to a normal program, violence is 

most likely to occur on an exercise yard. DSUF 13. Thus, among all of the programming 

activities that are suspended during a modified program, it is most difficult to determine when 

exercise programs can safely resume. DSUF 13.

Releasing one group at a time to the yard is not practical or efficient because of the limited 

staff available to supervise the inmates, especially when much of the staff resources are directed 

to cell searches and interviews because of the ongoing investigations. DSUF 14. Also, releasing 

one group of inmates to the yard at a time gave that group an opportunity to organize or 

coordinate further attacks. DSUF 14.

2. The July 2010 Modified Program

On July 11, 2010, a Black officer was found seriously injured on the main kitchen back 

dock between Facilities I and II. DSUF 18. The officer was found unconscious and appeared to 

have been assaulted. DSUF 18. The inmates working on the main kitchen back door were placed 

into administrative segregation pending investigation into their possible involvement. DSUF 18. 

Plaintiff submits an administrative grievance filed by an inmate witness who claimed that the 

officer provoked the attack, and that the attack involved only one inmate. Pl.’s Statement of 

Undisputed Facts 4 (ECF No. 25).

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 8 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

As a result of this incident, all inmates on Facilities I and II were placed on modified 

program pending further investigation. DSUF 18. This incident resulted in PSR No. SOL-July11-10-027. DSUF 18.

Following an investigation, it was determined that two of the inmates who were working 

the back dock were White Skin Heads who assaulted the officer, and they were immediately 

transferred to another institution. DSUF 19. Although the perpetrators were identified, the cause 

of the assault had not yet been determined. DSUF 19. For example, it was not yet determined 

whether the incident was personal, gang-related, or racially-motivated, or whether it was the 

result of an ordered hit with additional staff potentially at risk. DSUF 19. Given these unknown 

factors, the severity of the assault, and that a Black officer was assaulted by White inmates, staff 

did not know whether further violence would occur due to tension between other White inmates 

and/or possible retaliation from Black inmates. DSUF 19. Therefore, in order to minimize the risk 

of further violence, the modified program was continued for all inmates on Facilities I and II 

pending further investigation. DSUF 19. This modified program affected a total of 1710 inmates, 

including 764 Black inmates, 278 White inmates, 358 Hispanic inmates, and 148 “Other” 

inmates. DSUF 19. Inmates on the other facilities, III and IV, were not placed on modified 

program. DSUF 20. 

As a result of the modified program, various restrictions were instituted, including one-toone restrained escorts, unclothed body searches prior to escorts, cell feeding, no visits, no inmate 

workers, no showers, no legal library, no dayroom activities, no recreation yard, no canteen, no 

packages, no phone calls, and no religious services. DSUF 22. 

Warden Swarthout immediately ordered interviews to be conducted of the inmates 

working on the main kitchen back dock at the time of the event, of the officer who was hurt, and 

of inmates of different races on Facilities I and II. DSUF 21. Due to the direct involvement of 

two White inmates, the incident was determined to be “group related,” as opposed to an isolated 

incident between two individual people, because at least two White inmates were determined to 

be involved in the staff assault. DSUF 21. This suggested that other White inmates were also 

possibly involved. DSUF 21. 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 9 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

On July 12, 2010, as investigations were ongoing, escorting for White inmates remained 

one-to-one but escorting for all other inmates was modified to five-to-one, meaning five inmates 

were escorted by only one officer. DSUF 23. This was because the attackers were identified as 

White inmates and based on the information received thus far, it was determined that White

inmates posed a greater security threat. DSUF 23.

On July 14, 2010, all inmates with the exception of White inmates on Facilities I and II 

returned to normal programming. This was due because the investigation had revealed that the 

incident was confined to White inmates and did not involve inmates of other races. DSUF 24. By 

restricting those inmates who might initiate or be subjected to further violence, Warden 

Swarthout was trying to safeguard the safety and security of all inmates, staff, and the institution, 

while restricting the normal programming of the fewest number of inmates. DSUF 24. At this 

time, restrictions of the modified program were further eased to allow showers three days a week 

and to allow chaplains to make rounds within the housing units. DSUF 24.

On July 23, 2010, as investigations continued, restrictions of the modified program were 

further eased to allow limited legal library use for inmates with approved court deadlines. DSUF 

25. On August 5, 2010, restrictions were further eased to allow inmates to resume normal 

programming within their housing units and normal feeding in the facility dining hall. DSUF 26. 

This gradual resumption of normal programming allowed staff the opportunity to observe inmate 

interaction and behavior in small groups and in a controlled setting. DSUF 26.

By August 12, 2010, all inmates returned to normal programming. DSUF 27. This 

modified program resulted in the denial of yard privileges to White inmates for approximately 

thirty days. DSUF 27. 

A state of emergency requiring the approval of the Secretary or Secretary’s designee is 

required when a lockdown of all housing units and sub-facilities within a facility is to exceed 24 

hours, or a lockdown of fewer than all housing units and sub-facilities within a facility is to 

exceed 72 hours. DSUF 39. The July 2010 modified program complained of in this lawsuit did 

not meet the criteria for a State of Emergency because it was changed from affecting all inmates 

within a facility to less than all inmates within a facility within three days. DSUF 39. 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 10 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

B. Legal Standards 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a).

Under summary judgment practice, “[t]he moving party initially bears the burden of 

proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 

376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving 

party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory answers, or 

other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the 

fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, 

the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving 

party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, “after adequate time for 

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

Id. at 323. Summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court 

demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 11 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific 

Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., 

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” 

Anderson, 447 U.S. at 248.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “‘the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the 

truth at trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings 

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita, 475 

U.S. at 587 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the 

court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” Walls 

v. Central Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). It is 

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations 

omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank, 391 

U.S. at 289).

C. Analysis

1. Equal Protection

Plaintiff first alleges that defendant violated his equal protection rights by subjecting 

plaintiff to a modified program based solely on his race. 

“Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 12 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

from invidious discrimination based on race.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) 

(citation omitted). Invidious racial discrimination such as racial segregation, which is 

unconstitutional outside prisons, also is unconstitutional within prisons. Johnson v. California, 

543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005). A prison classification based on race is immediately suspect and is 

subject to the same strict scrutiny as a racial classification outside prison. Id. at 508-10. Prison 

officials must therefore demonstrate that the race-based policy or action is narrowly tailored to 

serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 510-11; Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 671 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (applying Johnson to racial lockdowns in response to prison disturbances). 

Johnson did not rule out race-based classifications and did not eliminate prison security as 

a reason for such classifications. However, Johnson determined that prison officials must 

demonstrate that race-based policies are narrowly tailored to address a compelling government 

interest such as prison security. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 511-13, 515 (remanding case for 

determination of whether Department of Corrections’ policy of temporarily segregating inmates 

by race when they arrive in the prison system initially or are transferred to a new prison is 

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment and opposes defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment on the ground that race-based lockdowns violate a May 13, 2009, order issued 

from the Solano County Superior Court in In re the Application of Marcellious Tucker, Case No. 

FCR233502. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. K. He also argues that race-based lockdowns are 

categorically prohibited pursuant to Johnson absent a “social emergency.” Each of these 

arguments will be addressed herein.

a. State Court Order

In re Tucker concerned a CSP-Solano Black inmate who filed a habeas petition 

challenging the prison’s race-based lockdowns in June 2005, November 2005, and May 2006. 

The judge in that case determined that the prison’s then-existing race-based policy for releasing 

inmates from a modified program violated the respondent’s constitutional rights because it was 

not as narrowly tailored as it could be. That determination was made in light of a new policy that 

was implemented in 2007 and that incorporated a more individualized assessment of each 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 13 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

inmate’s risk of violence. In re Tucker is inapplicable here as it concerns an older policy that the 

superior court expressly acknowledged had since been updated as of the time that order issued, 

which was well over one year before the incident at issue in this case.

b. “Social Emergency”

Plaintiff next argues that defendant’s consideration of race during the modified program 

was impermissible absent a “social emergency.” This assertion appears to be based on a 

misreading of the following passage in Johnson: 

We did not relax the standard of review for racial classifications in 

prison in Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)] and we refuse to 

do so today. Rather, we explicitly reaffirm what we implicitly held 

in Lee: The “necessities of prison security and discipline,” 390 

U.S., at 334, 88 S. Ct. 994, are a compelling government interest 

justifying only those uses of race that are narrowly tailored to 

address those necessities. See Grutter, 539 U.S., at 353, 123 S. Ct. 

2325 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 

(citing Lee for the principle that “protecting prisoners from violence 

might justify narrowly tailored racial discrimination”); J.A. Croson 

Co., 488 U.S., at 521, 109 S. Ct. 706 (SCALIA, J., concurring in 

judgment) (citing Lee for the proposition that “only a social 

emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limbfor example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of 

inmates-can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the 

Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and 

neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens’” (quoting 

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 

(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))); see also Pell, 417 U.S., at 823, 94 

S. Ct. 2800 (“[C]entral to all other corrections goals is the 

institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections 

facilities themselves”).

543 U.S. at 512-13. Johnson neither issued a categorical prohibition against prison classifications 

based on race nor limited its use to social emergencies. Rather, it held that a race-based policy 

may be based on prison security and discipline so long as the policy is narrowly tailored. One

situation where these government interests are at stake is during a social emergency, such as a 

prison race riot. Johnson, however, did not limit all use of race-based policies to social 

emergencies. 

The dispositive questions in this case are whether defendant’s consideration of race during 

the July 2010 modified program advanced a compelling government interest and was narrowly 

tailored.

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 14 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

i. Compelling Government Interest

As to the first factor, defendant produced evidence that the modified program was based 

on legitimate prison goals of security and safety. The investigation into the July 2010 incident, in 

which a Black correctional officer was assaulted by White skin heads, raised concerns about racebased violence, including a coordinated attack by White inmates and/or a retaliatory attack by 

Black inmates. Further supporting defendant’s concern about race-based violence was the 

involvement of more than one White inmate, again suggesting a coordinated attack. As a result, 

defendant subjected White inmates to the modified program pending further investigation. 

Plaintiff maintains that there was no real threat following the July 11, 2010, incident, 

either by him specifically or White inmates in general. But even if defendant was ultimately 

mistaken about the cause of the incident or the number of White inmates who were involved in 

the assault on the Black officer, plaintiff has not refuted defendant’s explanation for the decision 

to segregate. 

Plaintiff also disputes defendant’s claim that lockdowns are never based solely on race or 

ethnicity. He points to evidence suggesting that race was indeed the only factor considered by 

defendant in targeting White inmates, including the program status reports, the administrative 

responses to plaintiff’s grievance, and defendant’s statements in this litigation. Plaintiff, however,

is suggesting once again that the defendant’s use of race violated Johnson’s prohibition against 

race-based policies. As previously discussed, this argument is premised on a misreading of 

Johnson since that case did not issue a categorical prohibition against the consideration of race.

Moreover, the evidence reveals that, in fact, not all White inmates were affected by the modified 

program. For example, defendant also considered the location of the inmates; those White 

inmates housed in Facilities I and II were subject to the modified program while the White 

inmates in Facilities III and IV were not. 

ii. Narrowly Tailored

Likewise, defendant has met his burden of showing that the modified program was 

narrowly tailored to combat the threat of race-based violence. He submitted evidence that, as 

additional information was gathered, White inmates were slowly released, which allowed 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 15 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

correctional staff to monitor the reintegration of White inmates in controlled settings. Once it was 

deemed safe to do so, all inmates were released from the modified program. Defendant has thus 

submitted adequate evidence that the modified program did not last longer than deemed necessary 

based on the risks.

Even though plaintiff may not have been involved in the incident nor an active member of 

any gang, defendant produced evidence that even non-affiliated inmates were at risk, such as 

during the reintegration attempts where non-affiliated White inmates were released with Black

inmates. The result was inmate-on-inmate violence regardless of the gang affiliation or lack 

thereof. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that he was held any longer than necessary, such as 

after the threat of racial violence had passed. He thus has not identified a genuine issue on the 

material question of whether the segregation was narrowly tailored to secure the safety of inmates 

and correctional staff. For these reasons, summary judgment is appropriate for defendant.

Plaintiff makes a related argument concerning defendant’s alleged failure to comply with 

California Code of Regulations, tit. 15 § 3383, which directs that certain procedural requirements

be met in a state of emergency. Pursuant to §3383(a), 

A state of emergency shall exist when the institution head or 

regional parole administrator/deputy director, Division of Adult 

Parole Operations (DAPO), temporarily suspends any nonessential 

operation, procedure, service or function, and the normal time 

limits or schedules for such activity in order to prevent, contain or 

control a disturbance.

Defendant rightly argues that this provision is inapplicable to plaintiff’s claims since it 

relates to only these three instances, none of which was present in this case:

(1) A lockdown or modified program of all housing units/subfacilities within a facility's security perimeter is to exceed 24 hours.

(2) A lockdown or modified program of fewer than all housing 

units/sub-facilities within a facility’s security perimeter is to exceed 

72 hours.

(3) The suspension of a facility’s major program or operation is to 

exceed 72 hours; e.g., an academic or Career Technical Education 

program, visiting program, yard operation, or dining room 

operation.

The July 2010 modified program did not include a lockdown “of all housing units” since it 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 16 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

specifically excluded Facilities III and IV; “of fewer than all housing units” for more than 72 

hours since the lockdown on Facilities I and II did not exceed 72 hours; or the suspension of a 

major program for more than 72 hours. Moreover, a violation of a prison regulation, which is not 

itself challenged as unconstitutional, does not provide a basis for liability. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 

481-82 (a “prison regulation [is] primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the 

administration of a prison” and is “not designed to confer rights on inmates....”).

2. Due Process

Insofar as plaintiff claims that he was denied due process before or during the lockdown, 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that prisoners are not entitled to such 

procedural due process rights if there is a state of emergency at the prison. See Hayward v. 

Procunier, 629 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1980). In Hayward, prisoners of the East Block of San Quentin 

State Prison filed a civil rights action claiming they were entitled procedural due process in 

connection with a five-month prison lockdown. Id. They urged that a lockdown lasting more than 

a short time without notice and a hearing of some sort deprived them of a protected liberty 

interest. Id. at 601. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, holding that the prisoners had no due process 

right to a hearing during their five-month lockdown in light of the state of emergency that had 

existed at the prison. Hayward, 629 F.2d at 603. The Ninth Circuit noted that between 1970 and 

1974, the rate of violence at San Quentin State Prison had more than tripled, and that prison 

officials responded by locking down the prison several times. Id. at 600. The Ninth Circuit 

explained that the prisoners were not “being subjected to treatment wholly outside the foreseeable 

consequences of criminal conviction, such as commitment to a mental institution in the absence 

of a mental disease or defect.” Id. at 601-02. The court emphasized that in cases where prisoners 

are entitled to a due process hearing, the subject of the hearing was the fate of an individual 

prisoner and his conduct or conditions. Id. at 602 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539

(1974)). In contrast, in Hayward the court observed that, “the question to be decided is whether 

the degree of emergency justifies a continuation of the lockdown—a determination involving a 

high degree of policy and prediction.” Id.

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 17 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Although the Ninth Circuit decided Hayward before the Supreme Court decided Sandin v. 

Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), which altered the methodology for evaluating procedural due 

process claims brought by prisoners, Hayward is still good law. As another California district 

court recently explained in a decision rejecting a prisoner’s due process claim challenging his 

modified programming:

First, Hayward has not been overruled, and it has been applied post 

Sandin in cases raising due process claims.

Second, Hayward’s conclusion that the increased security 

represented by a lockdown is a “foreseeable consequence of a 

criminal conviction” indicates that a modified program in response 

to assaults by inmates on staff and other inmates, even one lasting 

for a few months, is not an atypical and significant hardship relative 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Third, Sandin receded from the due process methodology of Hewitt 

v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) in 

part because “the Hewitt approach” had “led to the involvement of 

federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons,” which ran 

“counter to the view expressed in several of our cases that federal 

courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state 

officials trying to manage a volatile environment.” To counteract 

this “undesirable effect,” the Sandin Court “return[ed] to the due 

process principles” reflected in Wolff and Meachum v. Fano, 427 

U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976).

Consistent with the due process principles later articulated in 

Sandin, the Ninth Circuit relied on Wolff and Meachum to support 

its due process analysis in Hayward, and it also took into account 

the need to afford deference to prison officials in making decisions 

respecting the continuance of lockdown and the pace of return to 

normal operations.

Finally, Sandin did not invalidate the distinction that the Ninth 

Circuit drew in Hayward between a lockdown imposed on a group 

of inmates in response to inmate assaults and an individualized 

disciplinary determination affecting a particular inmate’s conditions 

of confinement.

Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1013-14 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

In considering defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s due 

process claim, the court is required to believe plaintiff’s evidence and draw all reasonable 

inferences from the facts before the court in his favor. Drawing all reasonable inferences from 

that evidence in plaintiff’s favor, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to submit sufficient 

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claim that he had a protected 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 18 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

liberty interest in avoiding his challenged confinement. Specifically, plaintiff has failed to 

establish that he was subjected to anything more than modified, albeit harsher, programming. 

Following the decision in Hayward, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have consistently 

held that subjecting specific groups of prisoners to lockdowns or harsher modified programs does

not require prison officials to provide those specific groups of prisoners with procedural due 

process protections. 

Thus, in Corona v. Harrington, No. 08-cv-0237 LJO DLB, 2010 WL 318555 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 20, 2010), the plaintiffs were general population cellmates in Building 5 at Kern Valley State 

Prison with the highest privilege group classification. Id. at *1. After a staff attack in May 2006, 

which plaintiffs were not involved in, prison officials placed Buildings 1-8 on a lockdown and 

interviewed all inmates regardless of ethnicity or gang affiliation. Id. Prison officials placed the 

inmates actually involved in the attack in administrative segregation. Id. In June 2006, prison 

officials concluded that the attack involved only Southern Hispanics or Mexican Nationals and 

kept the Hispanic inmates on lockdown but allowed Black, White, and “Other” inmates to return 

to normal programming with restoration of all privileges. Id. at *2. 

Prison officials also allowed Hispanic inmates assigned to the substance abuse program in 

Building 5 and age 35 and older (not plaintiffs) to return to normal privileges. Id. By September 

2006, prison officials had allowed all inmates except Southern Hispanic inmates to return to 

normal programming because additional incidents involving Southern Hispanics had taken place. 

Id. At that point, prison officials also moved plaintiffs from Building 5 to Building 9. Id. In 

October 2006, the warden approved dayroom access, telephone calls, and a normal shower 

program for Southern Hispanics in Buildings 1-4 but kept Southern Hispanics in Buildings 6-8,

including plaintiffs, on more restrictive programs. Id. Effective November 2006, prison officials 

lifted the lockdown and allowed all Southern Hispanics to return to normal program. Id. at *3. 

The plaintiffs filed a civil rights action in which they claimed that they had been deprived of a 

protected liberty interests without due process of law because they did not receive a hearing or 

other individualized determination prior to or during defendants’ subjecting them to the modified 

programming. Id. at *3. 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 19 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hayward, the court held that the key to 

plaintiffs’ due process claim was whether the degree of emergency justified continuation of the 

lockdown. See Corona, 2010 WL 318555 at *9. In rejecting plaintiffs’ due process claim, the

court explained:

The procedural due process claim rests on the conclusory claim that 

no emergency existed to justify a five-month lockdown. Plaintiffs 

do not appear to contest the initial lockdown based on the staff 

attack. They appear to contest the continuation of lockdown of 

Hispanic inmates under age 35. As noted above, the continued 

lockdown applied to a limited prison population and not to 

Hispanics as a whole. Plaintiffs themselves refer to the lockdown 

inmates as a “sub-group.” Decisions to maintain the lockdown for 

the sub-group “is not a disciplinary measure, but an administrative 

strategy designed to preserve order in the prison and protect the 

safety of all inmates” as well as staff. The maintenance of the 

lockdown for the “sub-group” is akin to assigning suspected gang 

affiliates to particular prison housing units which “is essentially a 

matter of administrative discretion.” In the absence of challenge to 

their Southern Hispanic affiliation, the FAC fails to establish a 

procedural due process violation for the continued lockdown of 

Hispanic inmates under age 35. 

Corona, 2010 WL 318555 at *9. See also Mitchell, 2014 WL 4081763 at *8 (“This analysis does 

not turn on the fact that the lockdown at issue in Hayward was institution-wide. It applies equally 

to the collective lock-down of inmates in a particular unit of a prison.”). 

In Negrete v. Lewis, No. C 11-3436 RS (PR), 2012 WL 4903001 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 

2012), aff’d 585 Fed. Appx. 364 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014), another California district court has 

rejected a similar due process claim brought by a prisoner in connection with lockdowns and 

modified programming with respect to two rival prison gangs. In that case two violent incidents 

had occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison between inmates of the Northern Hispanic and Southern 

Hispanic gangs. Id. at *1. Prison officials implemented lockdowns and modified programs 

designed to separate the two gangs. Id. Further violence between the two gangs thwarted efforts 

to terminate the restrictive programming. Id. Plaintiff transferred into the prison, and prison 

officials classified him as a Southern Hispanic inmate and immediately subjected him to the 

modified program. Id. The plaintiff claimed that defendants violated his right to due process by 

placing him on constant lockdown or modified programming for almost two years. Id. The court 

held that the plaintiff had not shown a triable issue of material fact with respect to his due process 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 20 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

claim. Id. at *3. In so holding, the court explained as follows:

Although plaintiff did not directly participate in the incidents, his 

conduct is not at issue. What is at issue is whether the degree of 

emergency justified a continuation of the lockdown. The 

undisputed facts in the record show that before plaintiff arrived at 

Pelican Bay and during plaintiff’s stay, there were a number of 

incidents between the Northern Hispanic and Southern Hispanic 

inmates. Although plaintiff described them as “small incidents,” he 

nonetheless characterized some of them as assaults or riots. 

Because prison officials must maintain the safety of inmates, it was 

reasonable to implement lockdowns to separate Northern and 

Southern Hispanic inmates after the assaults. Here, the captain of 

Facility B stated that lockdowns and modified programs were 

implemented initially in response to a violent incident that occurred 

in August 2008 at Facility B’s main exercise yard. The fact that 

more violence occurred after the initial incident in 2008 tends to 

support the idea that the lockdowns were a necessary response in 

order to maintain prisoners’ safety during that time .... Because the 

lockdowns were in response to a genuine emergency and were not 

used as punishment, plaintiff was not owed procedural due process 

in the form of a hearing or otherwise before being locked down.

Id. at *3. 

Another California district court has rejected a similar claim by Muslim inmates who 

maintained that prison officials denied them their right to due process when they implemented 

modified programming without providing the inmates advance notice or an opportunity for a 

hearing. See Robins v. Lamarque, No. C 02-4720 JF (PR), 2008 WL 744816 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 18, 2008). In Robins, the plaintiff was housed in Facility D, a maximum-security housing 

unit for prisoners requiring the highest security custody. Id. at 1. On October 5, 2001, prison 

officials informed Muslim inmates that they were being placed on a modified program and

restricted to their cells because prison officials had learned of a plan by Muslim inmates to attack 

prison staff. Id. In that case the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, 

concluding that plaintiff’s due process claim failed as a matter of law and explaining as follows:

In light of the undisputed evidence concerning threats of violence 

by Muslim inmates, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether the inmates had a liberty interest that triggered a right to 

notice. Moreover, it is clear that Plaintiff knew that the modified 

program had been initiated, as shown by the fact that he filed an 

administrative grievance on October 14, 2001, only nine days after 

the modified program was put in place. Prison officials responded 

to the grievance in November 2001 and interviewed Plaintiff after 

he appealed to the Second Level of Review. Prison staff also 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 21 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

responded to Plaintiff’s separate appeal as a member of a group of 

inmates who filed a grievance in October 2001. 

Id. at 5.

Similarly, in the present case the evidence fails to create a triable issue of fact with respect 

to whether defendant’s decision to implement and continue the July 2010 modified program was 

warranted in light of the assault on a Black staff member by two White inmates. See Hayward, 

629 F.2d at 602 (the question is whether the degree of emergency justified the continued 

lockdown); see also Furnace v. Evans, No. 06-cv-4229 MMC (PR), 2009 WL 2511967 at *16 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants because plaintiff 

failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether prison officials reasonably determined 

that prison conditions warranted the implementation and continuation of a modified program), 

aff’d in relevant part 459 Fed. Appx. 630, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011). 

Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, the undersigned concludes that

judgment should be entered for defendant on plaintiff’s due process claim.

3. Outdoor Exercise

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 

Const. amend. VIII. The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment prohibited by the United States Constitution. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 

312, 319 (1986). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must show, objectively, 

that he suffered a “sufficiently serious” deprivation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991). The plaintiff must also show that each 

defendant had, subjectively, a culpable state of mind in causing or allowing plaintiff’s deprivation 

to occur. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

The Ninth Circuit has clarified the elements necessary to state a deprivation that rises to 

the level of an Eighth Amendment violation:

An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official has deprived 

inmates of humane conditions must meet two requirements, one 

objective and one subjective. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 

(9th Cir. 1995). “Under the objective requirement, the prison 

official's acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the minimal 

civilized measure of life's necessities. The subjective requirement, 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 22 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

relating to the defendant's state of mind, requires deliberate 

indifference.” Id. (citations omitted).

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2000). Determining “deliberate indifference” 

is a two-part inquiry. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 834). First, the inmate must show that the prison officials were aware of a “substantial 

risk of serious harm” to an inmate’s health or safety. Id. Second, the inmate must show that the 

prison officials had no “reasonable” justification for the deprivations, in spite of that risk. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“Prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health 

or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably.”); Thomas, 611 F.3d at 

1150.

Outdoor exercise is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment, and the 

denial of outdoor exercise may violate the Constitution, depending on the circumstances. 

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1070 

(9th Cir. 2010). When an inmate alleges the denial of constitutionally adequate outdoor exercise, 

the inquiry is fact specific. In determining whether a deprivation of outdoor exercise is 

sufficiently serious, the court must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of the 

deprivation. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979).

“[T]he Ninth Circuit has not identified a specific minimum amount of weekly exercise 

that must be afforded” under the Eighth Amendment. Jayne v. Bosenko, No. 2:08-cv-2767 MSB, 

2009 WL 4281995, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2009) (citation omitted). Indeed, complete denial of 

outdoor exercise for a month may not be unconstitutional. Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 

603 (9th Cir. 1980) (denial of yard time for a month not unconstitutional); May v. Baldwin, 109 

F.3d 557, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of yard time for 21 days not unconstitutional). 

However, in Lopez, the Ninth Circuit found that plaintiff’s claim that he was denied all outdoor 

exercise for six and a half weeks met the objective requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim. 

203 F.3d at 1132–33. 

The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between “temporary” denials of outdoor exercise and 

“long-term” denials. For a temporary denial of exercise to be actionable, plaintiff must 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 23 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

demonstrate an adverse medical impact. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133 n.15. A long-term deprivation 

is considered substantial regardless of its effects. Id.; see also Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1070. The 

21-day denial of yard time in May met the definition of a “temporary” deprivation, while the sixweek denial of yard time considered in Lopez was a “long-term” deprivation. See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1133 n.15. 

The facts in this case demonstrate that plaintiff was deprived of outdoor exercise for 

approximately 30 days during the July 2010 modified program. Plaintiff claims this denial 

violated his Eighth Amendment rights, though he does not claim that this deprivation resulted in 

an adverse medical impact. Even if this denial amounts to a long-term denial, Norwood held that 

such deprivations of exercise are permissible if necessary for security reasons, 591 F.3d at 1065, 

and defendant maintains that security concerns necessitated the 30-day modified program. 

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “prison officials are entitled to ‘wide-ranging 

deference’ and that the courts must defer to prison officials’ judgment as long as it does not 

manifest deliberate indifference or an intent to inflict harm.” Gomez v. McDonald, No. 2:11-cv659-KJM-DAD, 2015 WL 5435256, at *38 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015) (quoting Noble v. Adams, 

646 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

Here, there is no evidence that defendant’s decision to confine plaintiff to his cell without 

exercise was deliberately indifferent or intended to inflict harm. After a violent incident, 

defendant concluded that it was necessary to do so for the safety of staff and inmates. Plaintiff has 

provided no evidence to suggest that defendant’s conclusion was in any way unreasonable or 

impermissible. There is no evidence that plaintiff’s 30-day confinement “was in excess of what 

was required to restore order, was unrelated to the officials’ security and safety responsibilities, 

and was kept in effect for a longer period than necessary.” Noble, 646 F.3d at 1148. The 

undersigned therefore concludes that plaintiff’s 30-day deprivation of exercise did not violate the 

Eighth Amendment.

In light of the above recommendations, the undersigned declines to consider defendant’s 

alternative argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The undersigned also declines to 

consider additional claims asserted by plaintiff in his motion for summary judgment, which 

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 24 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

include loss of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment and denial of access to religious 

services in violation of the First Amendment. This is because these claims either cannot be fairly 

encompassed by the allegations asserted in the complaint or are already incorporated in the claims

addressed herein. 

VI. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to have matter 

deemed admitted (ECF No. 23) is denied; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

A. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 25) be DENIED; 

B. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 27) be GRANTED:

a. Plaintiff’s claims as to the February 2011 modified program be dismissed for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and

b. Judgment be entered for defendant on all of plaintiff’s claims related to the 

July 2010 modified program;

C. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. 

////

////

////

////

////

////

////

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 25 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 8, 2017

/DLB7;

DB/Inbox/Substantive/edwa2218.msj.v2

Case 2:13-cv-02218-DJC-SCR Document 33 Filed 02/09/17 Page 26 of 26