Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00689/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00689-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAOMI KIMBERLY HEATER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0689 MCE DAD P

vs.

GLORIA HENRY, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges her 1999 conviction on

charges of special circumstance first degree murder, assault with a firearm, assault with a deadly

weapon, and attempted first degree robbery, with an enhancement for having personally used a

firearm in the commission of the crimes. She seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) her convictions

for attempted robbery and felony murder and the robbery-murder special circumstance are not

supported by sufficient evidence; and (2) the jury was not adequately instructed on the special

circumstance allegation. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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1

 Petitioner was also sentenced to pay a restitution fine of $10,400, which was reduced on

appeal to $10,000. (Opinion of the Third District Court of Appeal - Filed 3/12/2001 (hereinafter

Opinion), lodged in support of respondents’ answer on August 14, 2002.)

2

 The documents referred to in this manner were so-titled by respondent and were lodged

with this court on August 14, 2002.

2

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 10, 1999, a complaint was filed in the Sacramento Superior and

Municipal Court charging petitioner with murder by personal use of a firearm, in violation of

California Penal Code § 187(a), with the special circumstance that the murder was committed

while petitioner was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crime of

robbery, within the meaning of California Penal Code § 190.2(a) (17) (count one). (Clerk’s

Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 33-36.) The complaint also charged petitioner with assault with a

firearm, in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a) (2) (count two); assault with a deadly

weapon other than a firearm (a frying pan), in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a) (1)

(count three); and robbery, in violation of California Penal Code § 211 (count four). (Id.) 

After a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder; two counts of

assault with a deadly weapon; and one count of attempted robbery, a lesser included offense of

the crime of robbery. (Answer, Ex. A.) The jury found the robbery-murder special circumstance

allegation to be true and also found that petitioner personally used a firearm in connection with

the crimes charges in counts one, two and four. (Id.) On December 21, 1999, petitioner was

sentenced to state prison for 24 years plus a consecutive indeterminate term of life without the

possibility of parole. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 438-441.)1 

The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed

petitioner’s judgment of conviction in an unpublished decision dated March 12, 2001. (Opinion

of the Third District Court of Appeal – Filed 3/12/20012; Answer Ex. B.) On April 18, 2001,

petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Petition for Review of

Naomi Kimberly Heater.) That petition was summarily denied on June 19, 2001. (Petition for

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3

 The following summary is drawn from the Opinion of the California Court of Appeal at

pgs. 2-7.

4

 To avoid confusion, we shall occasionally refer to the Allens by their first names.

3

Review denial letter from California Supreme Court – Filed 6/13/2001.) Petitioner filed this

federal habeas action on April 1, 2002.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (People v.

Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 387), the evidence is as follows.

On July 5, 1998, 63-year-old Parker Allen and his 70-year-old

wife, Toshiko Allen, lived in North Highlands.4 Defendant, their

only child, lived in downtown Sacramento. The Allens adopted

defendant when she was eight months old.

In 1991, the Allens purchased a new Toyota pickup truck for

defendant to use in commuting to work, on the condition that she

repay them the purchase price without interest. The truck was

registered to defendant and Parker; Parker paid for its insurance. 

After defendant made several payments, she returned the truck to

the Allens saying she could not afford it. From time to time

thereafter, they allowed her to use the truck when she needed it. 

However, about a week before the present offenses, she borrowed

the truck and they had trouble getting it back. When they went to

her residence to obtain the truck, she told them it was out being

washed. Defendant left the apartment but the Allens stayed. 

Eventually, a girl brought the truck to the apartment and the Allens

took possession of it. The truck had not been washed.

On July 5, 1998, at about 9:30 a.m., Parker overheard a

conversation between defendant and Toshiko in a nearby room. 

After that, he heard what sounded like a firecracker, followed by

his wife’s single scream and then two loud moaning noises. Parker

went to see what had occurred. He saw defendant in the hallway

and asked her what had happened. Without responding, she shot

him in the left arm. The bullet broke a bone and exited from the

rear of the arm, causing blood to gush from it. Defendant then

walked closer to Parker, placed the pistol about six inches from his

chest, and pulled the trigger. However, the weapon did not fire. 

Parker, now worried about Toshiko, ran into the kitchen. 

Defendant grabbed a cast iron skillet and struck Parker in the back

and in the head. While defendant fiddled with the malfunctioning

pistol, Parker asked her “what have you done,” and stated that “you

have ruined your life.” When asked about her mother, defendant

told Parker that she was upstairs and tied up. Defendant held the

gun on Parker and locked him in a downstairs closet. Then she

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nailed a board across the closed door and placed furniture against

the door. Defendant repeatedly asked Parker for the personal

identification numbers he used with his credit cards. He could hear

her ransacking different parts of the house, including the family

financial records. Finally, Parker, who had intervals of

unconsciousness, kicked his way out of the closet. Because

defendant had disabled the telephone line, Parker was not able to

call 911 until about 12:55 p.m. After law enforcement arrived, he

was taken to the U.C. Davis Medical Center. Parker determined

that defendant had taken the family’s 1992 Honda sedan.

Michael Setser and Gregory Hurd are neighbors of defendant. On

the day that the Allens reclaimed the pickup truck from defendant,

Setser saw the Allens and defendant engaged in a screaming

argument about the matter. The same day, defendant told Setser

that she was going to “get even for her parents taking the truck

back.” Later, on the evening of July 4, 1998, defendant showed

him a pistol and stated she felt “like she wanted to shoot

somebody.” The next day, July 5, Setser saw defendant coming

from the apartment complex parking lot; she had arrived in her

parents’ sedan.

Hurd saw defendant on July 5 during the day. She told him that

she “had used . . . her nine millimeter,” that it was out in the car,

that she had shot her parents, and that “now two people are dead.” 

Hurd later was contacted by police and evidently directed them to

defendant’s apartment.

Defendant was taken into custody at her apartment. She told police

that her gun, a nine-millimeter Lorcin automatic, was in a Honda

that was parked near the apartment complex. Search of the Honda

yielded the gun, a bloody denim shirt, and the Allens’ checkbooks

and credit cards. Search of defendant’s apartment yielded the key

to the Honda. Examination of the gun revealed that an expended

cartridge casing was jammed in the chamber. The gun had a

“medium” trigger pull for that type of firearm.

An autopsy showed that Toshiko died of a gunshot to the chest that

severed her aorta.

Defendant waived her constitutional rights and made a lengthy

statement to homicide detectives. She stated that she had a “crank”

habit and that she had “done a little” the night before the offenses. 

She claimed the gun had been given to her “to hold” by a person

she refused to identify. On the morning of July 5, 1998, she and

“Johnny” left her apartment to go to her parents’ residence. Her

“main purpose for going there was to convince [her] parents to let

[her] have the truck back.” She had the gun, knew there were two

bullets in the clip, and intended to “scare” her mother with the

weapon. She took the gun with her “because [she] wanted to make

sure [she] got [her] truck back.” At a gas station, defendant

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inserted the ammunition clip into the weapon. En route to the

Allen residence, Johnny asked defendant what she was going to do,

and she discussed her possession of the gun. She told him, “I want

my truck,” and that she needed a gun to intimidate or persuade her

mother into letting her have it. Once at her parents’ residence,

defendant got in an argument with Toshiko. Defendant asked for

the truck and Toshiko said no. Toshiko told defendant that she

needed to leave and took her to the door. At that point, defendant

pulled the gun out of her waistband. She began fumbling with the

bullets, repeatedly picking them up off the floor and placing them

back in the weapon. Although she knew that the weapon was

loaded with live ammunition, although she had the weapon pointed

at Toshiko, and although she deliberately pulled the trigger, she

nevertheless claimed that she had no intent to shoot or hurt

Toshiko. Rather, she “trusted” the safety on the firearm. 

Defendant claimed her only intent was to “pretend like [she was]

gonna pull the trigger,” that Toshiko will “be intimidated,” that

Toshiko will “give [her] the truck,” and that “[she will] go home.” 

Defendant claimed she did not intend to shoot Toshiko and did not

realize she had in fact shot her until Toshiko screamed. Defendant

then dragged the body behind a couch and covered it with a rug. 

When Parker appeared, she was still holding the gun. She had

worked the slide of the gun so that another round was in the firing

chamber; she thus knew that the gun was loaded. When Parker

began asking where Toshiko was, defendant shot him only in order

to scare him. Defendant’s preference was that Parker stay there,

and not begin looking around for Toshiko. Defendant then locked

Parker in the closet, tried to clean up, and left in the Allens’

Honda. She absconded with various items of their property,

including their checkbooks, and later tried to use their ATM card.

Defendant testified on her own behalf as the only defense witness. 

Her testimony was generally similar to her statement to detectives. 

Her defense was that she lacked intent to kill, and that the murder

was not deliberate or premeditated.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. 

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However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas corpus

petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). See also Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Crisafi v. Oliver,

396 F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are applicable. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 2254(d) as amended by the AEDPA, sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

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II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner’s first claim is that “the evidence was insufficient to support the

conviction for attempted robbery and felony murder and the finding of the robbery special

circumstance.” (Pet. at 5.) Specifically, petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence that she

intended to “permanently deprive her parents of the truck.” (Id.) She explains that she only

intended to take the truck temporarily “to use as she had done before.” (Id.) She argues that “the

fact [she] did not take the truck after the incident and did not kill her father who would know she

had taken the truck supports the finding she did not intend to steal the truck.” (Id.) Petitioner

also contends that if this court finds the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for

attempted robbery and the robbery special circumstance, her conviction for first degree murder

should also be set aside because “there is affirmative evidence in the record to show a reasonable

probability the first degree murder conviction was based on felony murder and not on a

premeditated and deliberated murder.” (Id.)

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument in this regard,

stating the following:

Robbery is the taking of personal property from a person or the

person’s immediate presence by means of force or fear, with the

intent to permanently deprive the person of the property. (§ 211;

People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.) Robbery requires

intent to steal before or during the application of force, rather than

after its application. (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1984) 159

Cal.App.3d 821, 826-827.) The robbery-murder special

circumstance requires that the murder was committed “while the

defendant was engaged in . . . the . . . attempted commission of”

the robbery. (§190.2, subd.(a) (17) (A).)

In this case, there was evidence that defendant had talked of

“getting even” with her parents for reclaiming the pickup truck and

had talked of “shooting somebody.” She admitted to police that

she intended to obtain the truck from her parents by means of fear. 

She acknowledged that her “main purpose for going” to their

residence “was to convince [her] parents to let [her] have the truck

back.” She took the gun with her “because [she] wanted to make

sure [she] was going to get [her] truck back.” She admitted that

she intended to “scare” Toshiko with the gun. Defendant stated

that she planned to “pretend like [she was] gonna pull the trigger,”

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that Toshiko will “be intimidated,” that Toshiko will “give [her]

the truck,” and that “[she will] go home.” This is more than

sufficient evidence that defendant intended to steal the truck when

she went to her parents’ house.

Contrary to defendant’s argument, the jury was not required to

speculate that she intended to obtain the truck for only a limited

time. Rather, reasonable jurors could deduce from her pointing a

loaded gun at Toshiko that she was willing to forfeit any prospect

of being allowed to “borrow” the truck as she had in the past. 

Jurors could thus deduce that she intended the present taking to be

permanent. Whether she had the means to effect a permanent

taking, i.e., whether her threat to kill Toshiko was likely to

intimidate Parker sufficiently to dissuade him from asserting his

legal rights as co-owner of the truck, is not determinative of her

desire or intent to effect such a taking. Were it otherwise, any

robber could defeat a robbery charge by claiming that he or she

was not likely to get away with it.

Defendant’s reliance upon her cryptic trial testimony that she

intended to “bring the truck manuals” to her parents’ house is

misplaced. While defendant’s intent in that regard is less than

clear, reasonable jurors could infer that she presented the manuals

to Toshiko in order to induce her to consent to defendant’s ensuing

request to take the truck. When that did not succeed, defendant

threatened Toshiko’s life by pointing the loaded gun at her. The

jury was not required to speculate that defendant ultimately

intended to reunite the truck with the manuals at her parents’

residence.

Nor was the jury required to attach significance to the fact that

defendant departed from the Allens’ residence in their Honda and

not in the truck. She made plain her intent to take the truck by

means of fear. Why she failed to act on that intent, and why she

stole other items that she had not planned to take, is not

determinative of her intent at the time of the murder. The

attempted robbery conviction and the robbery special circumstance

are supported by sufficient evidence.

(Opinion at 9-10.)

There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979). See also Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “Put

another way, the dispositive question under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could

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 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to consider the question of whether

the AEDPA requires an additional degree of deference to state courts’ resolution of sufficiency of

the evidence claims. See Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 956 (9th Cir. 2004); Chein, 373 F.3d

at 983. Because petitioner’s claim fails under the Jackson standard this court also need not

decide whether the enactment of the AEDPA altered that test for purposes of federal habeas

proceedings. 

9

reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 

978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318).5 The court must review the entire

record when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in habeas proceedings. Adamson v.

Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th

Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts

in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to

ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “The question is not whether we are personally

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion

that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal

habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive elements of 

the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at

983.

The state court decision rejecting petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is

not contrary to federal law as set forth above and should not be set aside. The legal standard

applied by the state court is consistent with the federal standard set forth in Jackson and the

decision of the state court was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. As

explained by the California Court of Appeal, the evidence regarding the circumstances of the

crime was more than sufficient to support that jury’s conclusion that petitioner intended to

permanently deprive her parents of the truck. Petitioner brought a loaded gun to her parents’

house, demanded the truck, and shot both parents when her mother refused to surrender the

vehicle. Petitioner’s behavior was simply not consistent with that of a person who only intended

to borrow the truck temporarily. Under the facts presented at trial, a reasonable jury could have

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found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of attempted robbery and that she

committed the murder in the attempted commission of a robbery, as that crime is defined under

California law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on her claim that the evidence

presented at her trial was insufficient to support her conviction for attempted robbery and felony

murder and the finding of the robbery special circumstance. 

III. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner claims that the jury’s robbery-murder special circumstance finding must

be vacated because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the special circumstance would

not apply if the robbery was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. (Pet. at 5-6.) In

this regard, petitioner asserts that she and Toshiko were discussing “how her mother had not

protected her as a child when her father abused her,” and that the gun “accidentally discharged”

during that conversation. (Id. at 6.) She argues that the jury may have found the shooting was

accidental and/or incidental to this tense conversation with her mother and was not committed in

order to carry out or advance the commission of the robbery. Petitioner contends that, under

these circumstances, the trial court’s failure to so instruct the jurors prevented them from

“finding the special circumstance to be not true.” (Id.)

The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument as well based upon the

following reasoning:

The trial court instructed the jury with a modified form of CALJIC

No. 8.81.17, as follows: “To find the special circumstance referred

to in these instructions as murder in the commission of robbery or

attempted robbery is true, it must be proved: [¶] 1a. The murder

was committed while the defendant was in the commission or

attempted commission of a robbery.”

A second part of CALJIC No. 8.81.17, omitted from this case

without objection, would have provided: “2. The murder was

committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the

crime of [robbery] or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid

detection. In other words, the special circumstance referred to in

these instructions is not established if the [attempted] [robbery]

was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.” (See

People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21, disapproved on other

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 We note that the omitted portion of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 is based on authority (People

v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1; People v. Thompson, (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303) that predates

Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104. Anderson holds that intent to kill is not an element of a

felony-murder special circumstance. (Id., at pp. 1138-48, overruling Carlos v. Superior Court

(1983) 35 Cal.3d 131.)

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grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543, fn. 5.)

The omitted portion of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 does not describe an

element of the robbery special circumstance and need not be given

where there is no substantial evidence that the attempted robbery of

the truck was merely incidental to the murder. (People v. Kimble

(1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501.)

Defendant concedes that there was “no strong motive” for her to

kill Toshiko. However, she claims her poor relationship with

Toshiko and their argument shortly before the killing could support

a finding that the murder was committed because of anger and not

to further the robbery. We disagree. There was no substantial

evidence that defendant acted merely out of anger at her parents

and not out of any desire to reclaim the truck. Nor was there any

evidence that reclaiming the truck would advance the murder or

would facilitate defendant’s escape from the murder scene in a way

that taking the Honda would not.

Defendant claims the omitted portion of the instruction prevented

the jury from properly evaluating her testimony that the shooting of

her mother was accidental. She reasons that, if the killing were

accidental, the jury would not have found that the killing was

committed to carry out or advance the robbery. However, the jury

was instructed that, “If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant actually killed a human being, you need not find

that the defendant intended to kill in order to find the special

circumstance to be true.” (CALJIC No. 8.80.1 (1997 Revision);

see People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1143.) Under this

instruction, the special circumstance may be found true even

though the killing is unintentional or accidental. (E.g., People v.

Parnell (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 862, 874.)6 Defendant does not

claim that CALJIC No. 8.80.1 is erroneous or was not properly

given in this case. In light of CALJIC No. 8.80.1, it is not

reasonably likely that jurors would have understood the second

paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 to mean that an unintentional or

accidental killing does not support the special circumstance. 

(People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663; People v. Kelly (1992)

1 Cal.4th 495, 525-526.)

(Opinion at 10-12.)

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In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085 (citing Engle, 456 U.S. at 119); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695

F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury

instructions “cannot be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but

must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v.

California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To

prevail on such a claim petitioner must demonstrate “that an erroneous instruction‘so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 317 (quoting

Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In

making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in the

context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.’” Prantil, 843

F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). Where the

challenge is to a refusal or failure to give an instruction, the petitioner’s burden is “especially

heavy,” because “[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than

a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). See also Villafuerte

v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, petitioner has failed to meet her heavy burden to show that the trial court’s

failure to give the second part of CALJIC No. 8.81.71 rendered her trial fundamentally unfair. 

The California Court of Appeal found no “substantial” evidence that petitioner killed her mother

solely because of anger and not out of an attempt to further the robbery. This conclusion is a

reasonable interpretation of the evidence presented at trial in this case. Notwithstanding

petitioner’s self-serving testimony to the contrary, the evidence produced at petitioner’s trial,

when viewed as a whole, leads to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner went to her parents’

house for the purpose of obtaining the truck, by force if necessary, and that she shot her mother

because she refused to relinquish it. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not act 

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improperly in failing to inform the jury that the special circumstance did not apply if the robbery

was merely incidental to the murder. 

 In addition, the conclusion of the state appellate court that the jury in petitioner’s

case was not prevented from accepting her testimony that the shooting was accidental is a

reasonable interpretation of the facts of this case. Under the instructions given, particularly

CALJIC No. 8.80.1, the jury could have found the special circumstance true even if they believed

petitioner’s testimony that the shooting was accidental. Given the evidence presented at

petitioner’s trial, the jury instructions as given properly defined the robbery-murder special

circumstance under California law. Accordingly, there was no federal constitutional violation

resulting from the trial court’s failure, without objection, to instruct the jury with the second part

of CALJIC No. 8.81.17. 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 6, 2005.

DAD:8

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