Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02347/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02347-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL RENARD,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07-CV-2347-H

(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND 

vs.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT

DISTRICT, and DOES 1 through 65,

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

Defendant San Diego Unified Port District (“Defendant”) removed this case from

San Diego Superior Court on December 17, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff Daniel

Renard (“Plaintiff”), pro se, filed a motion to remand on January 2, 2008. (Doc. No.

3.) Defendant filed its opposition on January 29, 2008. (Doc. No. 7.) On February 4,

2008, Plaintiff filed his reply brief. (Doc. No. 8.) The Court submits the motion on the

papers pursuant to its discretion under Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons

stated below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court.

Background

Plaintiff is the owner and operator of vessels in San Diego Bay. (Doc. No. 1.)

On August 23, 2003, Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendant in this court. (Id.)

On or about December 2, 2003, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a settlement

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agreement. (Id.) Under the agreement, Defendant granted Plaintiff a disabled permit

to anchor his vessel in a free anchorage area, and Plaintiff agreed to dismiss his claims

with prejudice. (Id.) On or about June 6, 2006, Defendant’s Board of Port

Commissioners voted to permanently eliminate the free anchorage area and revoked

Plaintiff’s disabled permit. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant thereafter unlawfully

seized and impounded vessels, including the Plaintiff’s vessel. (Id.)

On August 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in San Diego Superior

Court. (Id.) Plaintiff’s initial complaint stated seven causes of action: enforcement of

settlement agreement, breach of written contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and

deceit, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, injunctive relief and

disgorgement under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., and

declaratory relief. (Doc. No. 8.) On November 9, 2007, the Superior Court denied

Defendant’s motion for demurrer. (Id.) Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed on

November 19, 2007, eliminated the § 17200 cause of action. (Doc. No. 1.) All six

remaining causes of action at least in part arise from the parties’ negotiation of the

settlement agreement and Defendant’s alleged breach of that agreement. Plaintiff’s

declaratory relief cause of action seeks a determination of the parties’ rights and duties

under the settlement agreement and 33 C.F.R. § 110.90, which defines the anchorage

grounds for vessels in San Diego Bay. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated this

regulation when it eliminated the free anchorage area in the San Diego Bay and revoked

Plaintiff’s disabled permit. (Id.) 

On December 17, 2007, Defendant removed Plaintiff’s amended complaint to this

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). (Id.) Defendant contends that it may remove

Plaintiff’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 33 C.F.R. § 110.90. (Id.) However,

Plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint does not allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 or 33 C.F.R. § 110.90.

Discussion

A civil action is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) if it is “founded on a claim

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or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States ... .” 28

U.S.C. § 1441(b). A claim arises under federal law if “a well-pleaded complaint

establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right

to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). See

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (holding that the “party who

brings the suit is the master to decide what law he will rely upon.”) Courts should

construe removal statutes restrictively and resolve doubts regarding removability in

favor of remanding the case to state court. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313

U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Defendant has failed to demonstrate that removal is proper in this action.

Plaintiff’s first five claims seek damages from Defendant’s alleged breach of written

contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud & deceit, and breach of implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing. (Doc. No. 1.) These clearly do not arise under federal

law. See, e.g. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 382

(1994) (finding that state courts should hear settlement agreement enforcement cases,

unless an independent basis for jurisdiction exists); Gardener v. UICI, 508 F.3d 559

(9th Cir. 2007) (indicating that remand of plaintiff’s breach of contract and conspiracy

suit was proper without diversity jurisdiction). Federal courts also do not have inherent

or ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement simply because the plaintiff

filed the underlying lawsuit in federal court. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-81. 

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Plaintiff did not bring a cause of action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 33 C.F.R. § 110.90. First, Plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint does

not allege that Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Removal jurisdiction is not

conferred simply because plaintiff had an opportunity to sue under a federal statute.

See Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that

removal was improper because although plaintiff’s complaint referred to a federal

statute, the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim did not arise under the federal

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statute); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997)

(finding no removal jurisdiction when a plaintiff’s sexual harassment complaint referred

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the U.S. Constitution but sought only state law

remedies). Plaintiff’s complaint makes no mention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore,

removal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is improper.

Second, Plaintiff’s declaratory relief cause of action, which refers to 33 C.F.R.

§ 110.90, does not confer removal jurisdiction. 33 C.F.R. § 110.90, which defines the

anchorage grounds for vessels in San Diego Bay, does not create a federal cause of

action. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986).

 In Merrell, the court stated that when evaluating whether a federal statute creates a

federal cause of action, courts should look to: (1) whether Congress passed the statute

to benefit the class of plaintiffs to which plaintiff belongs, (2) whether Congress

intended to provide a private right of action, (3) whether a federal cause of action would

further the statute’s underlying scheme, and (4) whether state law traditionally controls

the plaintiff’s cause of action. Merrell, 478 U.S. at 810-11. Congress passed 33 U.S.C.

§ 471, which authorized 33 C.F.R. § 110.90, to ensure safe and efficient nautical

navigation, not to provide allegedly injured parties with a private right of action. 33

U.S.C. §§ 471, 1221-36, 2030, 2035, and 2071. Morever, state law traditionally

controls Plaintiff’s causes of action. Therefore, a federal question does not arise from

Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief relating to 33 C.F.R. § 110.90 because the

regulation does not create a federal cause of action.

Plaintiff’s right to relief also does not rely on a court’s resolution of a substantial

federal law question. The regulation anticipates state actors resolving issues arising

under 33 C.F.R. § 110.90, noting that “[m]ariners anchoring in these anchorages,

excluding Anchorage A-6, should consult applicable local ordinances of the San Diego

Unified Port District.” 33 C.F.R. § 110.90. Therefore, Plaintiff’s well-pleaded

complaint does not raise a federal law question. 

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Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand

this case to state court. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 13, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record

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