Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05086/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05086-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DREW GARRETT WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOE'S CRAB SHACK, a Texas

corporation doing business in

California, KEVIN, an individual,

and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants. 

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Case No. 09-5086 SC

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO REMAND

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Remand

("Motion") filed by Plaintiff Drew Washington ("Plaintiff" or

"Washington"). Docket No. 9. Defendant Crab Addison, Inc.,

("Defendant" or "Crab Addison") filed an Opposition and Plaintiff

submitted a Reply. Docket Nos. 16, 17. For the following

reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the

Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco. Notice of

Removal, Docket No. 1, Ex. 1 ("Compl."). According to the

Complaint, Plaintiff is a California citizen, and Crab Addison --

erroneously referred to in the Complaint as "Joe's Crab Shack" or

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1 The Notice of Removal also states that Crab Addison is a

Texas corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. 

Notice of Removal ¶¶ 23-25. 

2

"JCS" -- is a company organized and existing under the laws of the

State of Texas.1 Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. As well as Crab Addison,

Plaintiff also sued "Kevin," an employee of Crab Addison. Compl.

¶ 3. The Complaint contains no allegations concerning Kevin's

citizenship. The Complaint alleges causes of action including

wrongful termination, discrimination, harassment, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). Id. ¶¶ 31-94. It

asserts no federal causes of action. See id.

In the section of the Complaint entitled "General Factual

Allegations Common to all Causes of Action," Plaintiff alleges

that he worked for Crab Addison as a host, waiter, and bartender. 

Id. ¶ 17. According to the Complaint,

Beginning in or around September 2007, Plaintiff

was subjected to constant, daily, discriminatory

and harassing conduct by Defendants, which was

severe and pervasive so as to alter the terms

and conditions of his employment agreement with

JCS. Such conduct by Defendants includes, but

is not limited to, (1) forcing Plaintiff to pay

the tabs of customers who left without doing so;

(2) making derogatory comments such as, "You're

black, I know you can dance," and "You're black,

you can dance."; (3) forcing Plaintiff to dance

for customers although knowing he was

uncomfortable about it; (4) threatening

Plaintiff's job if he did not dance; (5)

excusing Plaintiff's absence and then

terminating him for taking an absence; (6)

suspending Plaintiff for taking a sick day; (7)

refusing to put Plaintiff on the schedule when

he returned from sick leave; (8) failing to pay

earned overtime; and (9) requiring Plaintiff to

purchase uniforms from Defendant without

compensation.

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Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis added). Although many of Plaintiff's causes of

action are only asserted against Crab Addison, Plaintiff's claim

for harassment based on race/disability in violation of California

Government Code § 12940 et seq.; and his claim for IIED are

asserted against all Defendants. See id. ¶¶ 56-66, 90-94.

On October 26, 2009, Crab Addison removed the case to federal

court, stating that Plaintiff has never served Defendant "Kevin,"

and that it is now clear that he is a sham defendant sued only to

destroy diversity. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 2, 27-37. Plaintiff

moves to remand the case back to state court. 

 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Any civil action brought in a state court may be removed to

this Court where there is complete diversity of citizenship and

where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§

1332, 1441. A defendant may remove a case lacking complete

diversity and seek to persuade the district court that any

non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined. McCabe v. Gen.

Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). "If the

plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident

defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled

rules of the state, the joinder of the resident defendant is

fraudulent." Id. A defendant must prove fraudulent joinder by

clear and convincing evidence and there is a general presumption

against fraudulent joinder. Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem.

Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). Fraudulent joinder

claims may also be resolved by "piercing the pleadings" and

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considering summary judgment-type evidence such as affidavits and

deposition testimony. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d

1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cavallini v. State Farm Mut.

Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir.1995)). However, the

court must resolve "all disputed questions of fact and all

ambiguities in the controlling state law in favor of the

non-removing party." Plute v. Roadway Package System, Inc., 141

F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting Dodson v.

Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. State Court Proceedings

On March 17, 2009, the state court issued an Order to Show

Cause ("OSC") why the case should not be dismissed for Plaintiff's

failure to file a proof of service and obtain an answer or enter

default against Defendant "Kevin, an individual." Notice of

Removal ¶ 8, Ex. 17 ("First OSC"). The Court set a May 18, 2009

hearing date for the OSC. Id. On May 15, 2009, the state court

canceled the hearing, and issued a new OSC with a July 9, 2009

hearing date. Id. Ex. 33 ("Second OSC").

On July 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Case Management Statement

stating that "Kevin Hall - Plaintiff is in the process of looking

for address information for this defendant - plaintiff, thus

request [sic] the Court to continue this OSC hearing for 60 days." 

Id. Ex. 34 ("Pl.'s Case Management Statement"). On July 7, 2009,

Plaintiff filed and served an amendment to the Complaint

correcting the name of defendant "Kevin" to "Kevin Austin." Id.

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2

 Daniel L. Feder, attorney for Plaintiff, filed a Declaration

in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Docket No. 11.

5

Ex. 35 ("Amendment").

On July 14, 2009, the state court set an October 8, 2009

hearing date for an OSC as to why Plaintiff's counsel should not

be sanctioned for failing to "file proof of service on

defendant(s) and obtain answer(s) or enter default(s)." Id. Ex.

36 ("Third OSC"). At the OSC hearing on October 8, 2009,

Plaintiff's counsel allegedly misrepresented to the state court

that he had sent a letter to Defendant's counsel requesting the

address of Defendant Kevin Austin ("Austin"). Id. ¶ 18. Once

more, the state court issued an OSC as to why Plaintiff's counsel

should not be sanctioned for failure to serve Austin. Id. Ex. 38

("Fourth OSC").

Based on the foregoing, Crab Addison alleges as follows:

[I]t was not clear from the face of the

Complaint that Austin was a sham defendant.

Indeed, this did not become clear until the

October 8, 2009 OSC regarding dismissal as to

Austin. . . . In a blatant attempt to avoid

dismissal as to Austin and certain removal to

federal court, Feder [Plaintiff's attorney]

represented to the Court that he had sent a

letter to Defendant's counsel seeking Austin's

contact information, which Defendant's counsel

had refused to respond to. . . . This was

blatantly false. . . . Upon discovery that

Austin was nothing more than a sham defendant,

Defendant promptly and properly removed this

action within thirty (30) days.

Opp'n at 4. Plaintiff's counsel disputes whether his

representation in state court was false, declaring that he

believed at the time of the hearing that the letter had been sent. 

Feder Decl. ¶ 7.2

 Subsequent to the OSC hearing, Plaintiff's

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counsel served Crab Addison's attorney with a special

interrogatory seeking the last known address and telephone number

of Austin. Id. ¶ 8, Ex. 1 ("Pl.'s Special Interrogs.").

B. Crab Addison Has Not Shown Fraudulent Joinder

The problem for Defendant is that Plaintiff's failure to

serve Austin, and Defendant's contentions concerning what occurred

at the OSC hearing, do not establish that Austin is a sham

defendant. To show that Austin was fraudulently joined, Crab

Addison has the burden of showing that it is obvious according to

the settled rules of California law that Plaintiff has failed to

state a claim against Austin. Crab Addison has not met this

burden.

Plaintiff's Complaint states claims for harassment and IIED

against all Defendants. See Compl. ¶¶ 56-66, 90-94. Under

California law, an employee cannot be held personally liable for

acts of discrimination. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a); Reno v.

Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 663 (1998). However, an employee can be

held liable for acts of harassment. See Cal. Gov't Code §

12940(j)(3); Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines P'ship, 42 Cal.4th

1158, 1162 (2008); Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th

55, 62 (Ct. App. 1996). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for

harassment against Austin, who is alleged to have been an employee

of Crab Addison, is not facially-barred. 

Defendant contends that the Complaint is devoid of any

specific factual allegations suggesting Austin subjected Plaintiff

to offensive comments or other abusive conduct based on a

protected category. Opp'n at 12. However, the Complaint alleges

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that Defendants forced Plaintiff to dance for customers, and made

derogatory comments such as "You're black, I know you can dance." 

Compl. ¶ 19. Actionable harassment consists of conduct outside

the scope of necessary job performance. Reno, 18 Cal.4th at 657;

Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 63. If Austin engaged in the conduct

alleged in the Complaint, then Plaintiff has an actionable

harassment claim against Austin. 

Crab Addison relies on the fact that the Complaint merely

states that "Defendants" engaged in this conduct, and it does not

specifically allege that Austin did so. See Opp'n at 10 n.7, 12. 

However, any doubts arising from merely inartful or ambiguous

pleadings should be resolved in favor of remand. Lewis v. Time,

Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 460 (E.D. Cal, 1979). "Defendants" includes

Austin. Therefore, Crab Addison has not met its burden of showing

that Plaintiff has obviously failed to state a harassment claim

against Austin. See Asurmendi v. Tyco Electronics Corp., No.

08-5699, 2009 WL 650386, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11 2009)(finding

actionable claim for harassment based on allegations of

supervisor's criticisms and remanding case to state court); see

also Alderman v. Pitney Bowes Mgmt. Servs., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1113,

1116 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (remanding case to state court where

plaintiff's complaint omitted to state harassment claim against

manager and co-worker, but plaintiff intended to pursue such

claim).

For similar reasons, the Court finds that Crab Addison has

failed to meet its burden of showing that Plaintiff has not stated

an IIED claim against Austin. "The elements of the tort of

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intentional infliction of emotional distress are: '(1) extreme and

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing,

or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional

distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the

emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. . . .'" 

Christensen v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991) (quoting

Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982)). In

Asurmendi, the court found that a supervisor's verbal criticisms,

including the reprimand that Plaintiff was doing things "the old

fashioned way," could form a sufficient basis for an IIED claim. 

2009 WL 650386, at *5. Similarly here, the Court finds that

Austin's alleged conduct forms a sufficient basis. Accordingly,

this Court concludes that remand is proper. 

C. Attorney Fees and Costs

Under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), "[a]n order remanding the case may

require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including

attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." A district

court has wide discretion in assessing fees pursuant to section

1447(c). Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 201

F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2000). Absent unusual circumstances,

attorney's fees should not be awarded when the removing party has

an objectively reasonable basis for removal. See Martin v.

Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005); Patel v. Del

Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2006). In this case, the

Court notes that if Plaintiff's counsel had diligently attempted

to serve Defendant, Kevin Austin, Crab Addison may not have

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removed the case to this Court. Under these circumstances, the

Court finds that the imposition of fees upon Crab Addison is not

warranted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's motion to remand

this case to the Superior Court of California, County of San

Francisco, is GRANTED. Plaintiff's request for an award of

attorney's fees and costs is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2010 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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