Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01392/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01392-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Pursuant to the local rules of this district, the motions have been submitted on the

papers without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 16-5.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY DODGEN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant /

No. C-04-01392 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Gary Dodgen, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Commissioner”). Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, as well as the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment and

opposition to plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff has not filed a reply in support of his motion or in

opposition to the Commissioner's cross-motion. Having considered the papers filed by the

parties, the Court rules as follows.1

BACKGROUND

On December 11, 2001, plaintiff, who was at that time 45 years of age, filed with the
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“The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing

whether a claimant is disabled. 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant

is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step

three. If not a finding of not disabled is appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is

automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is

not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to 

perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is

disabled.”

McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1074 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Social Security Administration (“SSA”) an application for Supplemental Security Income

benefits, alleging in an accompanying Disability Report that he has been unable to work

since April 10, 1997, as a result of right and left shoulder injuries and pain in his arms. 

(See Certified Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (“Tr.”) 39, 54.) After plaintiff’s

application was denied by the SSA, both initially, (see Tr. 28-31), and on reconsideration,

(see Tr. 33-36), plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”),

(see Tr. 37). On June 24, 2003, the ALJ conducted a hearing. (See Tr. 320.)

On November 26, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision, analyzing plaintiff’s claim under

the SSA’s five-step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.2

 At the first step, the

ALJ found plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity as of April 4, 1997. (See

Tr. 12.) At the second step, the ALJ found plaintiff has “severe” impairments, specifically,

“chronic impingement syndrome, right shoulder, with status-post arthroscopic right shoulder

surgery (1997); status-post aggressive subacromial decompression, right shoulder (1998);

status-post right clavicle surgery (2003); status-post left fifth carpometacarpal joint surgery

(2003); and moderate to severe sensorineural hearing loss.” (See Tr. 15.) At the third

step, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal an impairment listed in the

federal regulations. (See Tr. 14.) At the fourth step, the ALJ found plaintiff retains the

ability to perform light work, except for light work requiring “exposure to loud noise,” (see

Tr. 14), and that because plaintiff’s past relevant work, as a drywall hanger, entails “at least
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medium work,” plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work. (See Tr. 15.) Finally, at the

fifth step, the ALJ concluded that the Commissioner had met her burden to show plaintiff

was not disabled, in light of plaintiff’s ability to perform light work, and given his age,

education and work experience. (See id.)

Plaintiff next filed a request with the Appeals Council, seeking review of the ALJ’s

decision. (See Tr. 7.) After the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, (see

Tr. 4-6), plaintiff filed the instant action.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Commissioner’s determination to deny disability benefits will not be disturbed if

it is supported by substantial evidence and based on the application of correct legal

standards. See Reddick v. Charter, 157 F. 3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “Substantial

evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F. 3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). If the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the reviewing court will uphold the

decision of the ALJ. See id.

DISCUSSION

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff states the effects he experiences as a

result of his impairments, and argues that the medical evidence in the record supports a

finding that he has the following impairments: “chronic impingement syndrome, right

shoulder, with status-post arthroscopic right shoulder surgery (1997); status-post

aggressive subacromial decompression, right shoulder (1998); status-post right clavicle

surgery (2003); status-post left fifth carpometacarpal joint surgery (2003); and moderate to

severe sensorineural hearing loss.” (See Pl.’s Mot., filed December 30, 2004, at 2.) As

noted above, the ALJ expressly found plaintiff had these precise impairments. Accordingly,

plaintiff has failed to show, or even suggest, that the ALJ erred with respect to identifying

the nature of plaintiff’s impairments. In light of plaintiff’s pro se status, and his discussion of

the subjective effects experienced as a result of his impairments, however, the Court
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construes plaintiff’s motion to assert that the ALJ erred in finding plaintiff, in spite of his

impairments, retains the ability to perform light work activities.

Light work requires “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or

carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds,” and “a good deal of walking and standing.” 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The SSA has interpreted “a good deal of walking and

standing” to mean that a claimant can walk or stand “off and on, for a total of approximately

6 hours of an 8-hour workday,” and that “[s]itting may occur intermittently during the

remaining time.” See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-10.

With respect to the lifting requirement, plaintiff, in response to the ALJ’s question as

to how much weight plaintiff could lift “without a problem,” answered, “[p]robably ten, 15

pounds.” (See Tr. 329.) Plaintiff’s treating physician, Joseph W. McCoy, M.D., (“Dr.

McCoy”), opined in a report issued in August 2001 that plaintiff could lift 20 pounds

overhead on an “occasional basis.” (See Tr. 124.) Given such evidence, the record

contains substantial evidence to support a finding that plaintiff can perform the requisite

lifting necessary for light work.

With respect to sitting, plaintiff testified at the hearing that he could sit for

approximately an hour at a time. (See Tr. 331.) Thus, the record contains substantial

evidence to support a finding that plaintiff, during an eight-hour work day, can sit for two

hours on an intermittent basis.

The remaining issue, as to plaintiff’s ability to perform light work activities, is whether

substantial evidence exists to support a finding that plaintiff can walk or stand for a total of

six hours during an eight-hour work day. At the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff testified

that he can only walk “a couple of blocks,” (see Tr 330), and that he can stand for “around

ten minutes” before he needs to move around, (see Tr. 331.) Plaintiff also testified that he

experiences pain in certain of his lower extremities, specifically, his left leg, left ankle, and

right knee, (see Tr. 327-28), and that such pain increases when he engages in “any type of

activity,” (see Tr. 329.) Although not clearly expressed in his motion, it appears plaintiff is

arguing that his testimony is sufficient to support a finding that plaintiff cannot walk or stand
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for a total of six hours during an eight-hour work day, and that the ALJ erred in not

accepting plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony.

The ALJ found plaintiff’s testimony, to the extent offered for the proposition that

plaintiff could not perform light work activities, “not credible or reliable.” (See Tr. 14.) In

support of this finding, the ALJ cited an opinion provided by plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr.

McCoy, along with the results of functional capacity analyses conducted by, respectively,

an examining physician and a consulting physician, as well as plaintiff’s description of daily

activities.

When an ALJ finds a claimant’s testimony is not credible, “the ALJ must make a

credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude

that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit” that testimony. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F. 3d

947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). Among the many factors that an ALJ can properly consider in

evaluating credibility are the “observations of treating and examining physicians and other

third parties regarding, among other matters, the nature, onset, duration, and frequency of

the claimant’s symptoms” and the “claimant’s daily activities.” See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.

3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). “If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial

evidence in the record, [the district court] may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas,

278 F. 3d at 959.

In an August 1997 evaluation, Dr. McCoy, plaintiff’s treating physician, opined that,

with the exception of an injury to plaintiff’s right shoulder that reportedly occurred after

plaintiff lifted a “heavy tool box” while at work, plaintiff was “otherwise quite healthy.” (See

Tr. 103.) In a later, August 2001, evaluation, Dr. McCoy reported that plaintiff has “wellhealed surgical scars on the right dominant shoulder,” and that plaintiff is an “otherwise

healthy male.” (See Tr. 122.) Dr. McCoy also stated that plaintiff’s spine has an “excellent”

range of motion. (See id.) With respect to plaintiff’s lower extremities, Dr. McCoy reported

that plaintiff “has had some bilateral knee pain, which he describes as arthritic-type pain,”

and “has also had surgical intervention for a left ankle fracture.” (See Tr. 121.) 

Significantly, although Dr. McCoy set a number of work restrictions, he did not set any
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The limitations set by Dr. McCoy were restrictions on “frequent overhead use of

either upper extremity,” on “strenuous overhead work,” and on lifting more than 20 pounds

“overhead” except on “an occasional basis.” (See Tr. 124.)

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Dr. Mariotti’s August 2003 examination took place approximately eight weeks after

plaintiff testified before the ALJ. Dr. Mariotti’s report analyzing the results of the August

2003 examination was provided to the ALJ before the ALJ issued his decision denying

plaintiff’s application for disability benefits. (See Tr. 3, 14.)

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limitations as to plaintiff’s ability to stand or walk,3 and, indeed, observed that plaintiff

“walk[ed] into the office without noticeable limp or deformity.” (See Tr. 122.)

In a June 13, 2002 Orthopedic Evaluation, Joseph Mariotti, M.D. (“Dr. Mariotti”), an

examining orthopedic surgeon, reported that plaintiff had undergone surgery to his left

shoulder and to his left calf and/or ankle, and that, in Dr. Mariotti’s view, plaintiff obtained

“reasonably good results” from such surgeries. (See Tr. 131-32.) Dr. Mariotti stated that

during the course of his conducting a musculoskeletal evaluation of plaintiff, he observed

that plaintiff was able to “mount[ ] and dismount[ ] the examining room table freely,” that

plaintiff’s gait was “normal,” and that plaintiff could “walk on his heels and toes without

demonstrative weakness.” (See Tr. 131.) Dr. Mariotti examined plaintiff’s spine and lower

extremities, and measured plaintiff’s “[r]ange of motion . . . with attention to pain,” (see id.),

finding “no evidence of joint swelling” and that “[a]ll the joints are stable.” (See Tr. 132.) 

Dr. Mariotti further concluded that plaintiff has “good/normal function,” (see id.), and that

plaintiff did not have any impairment as to the activities of standing and walking, (see id.). 

In a later report, dated August 14, 2003, Dr. Mariotti again reported that during his

examination of plaintiff, he observed that plaintiff’s gait was “normal” and that plaintiff was

able to “mount[ ] and dismount[ ] the examining room table freely,” although Dr. Mariotti

further noted plaintiff “frequent[ly]” engaged in “moaning, groaning, huffing and puffing”

during the examination. (See Tr. 306.)4 Based on the results of his examination, Dr.

Mariotti concluded plaintiff could “stand 1-2 hours at a time” and “walk 1-2 miles,” and that

plaintiff could perform such activities “8 out of an 8-hour day.” (See Tr. 308.)

LolaLee VanCompernolle, M.D. (“Dr. VanCompernolle”), a state medical consultant,

opined, in a functional capacity assessment dated October 8, 2002, that plaintiff could
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stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday, (see Tr. 153-54), and observed that

her opinion was “not significantly different” from those expressed by plaintiff’s treating

physician and examining physicians, (see Tr. 158).

In short, all of the above-referenced physicians are of the opinion that plaintiff is able

to perform the walking or standing activities necessary to perform light work. In the case of

Dr. Mariotti, such opinion was provided after each of two examinations, and, in the case of

Dr. McCoy, his 2001 opinion was given after his having provided treatment to plaintiff over

the course of at least four years. As noted above, the ALJ may consider the observations

of physicians in determining whether a claimant is credible. See Smolen, 80 F. 3d at 1284;

see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (providing that in determining credibility, ALJ should

consider statements by treating or examining physicians as to how claimant’s impairments

affect claimant). Consequently, the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s disabling pain allegations

were not credible in light of the observations and conclusions of physicians, including his

treating physician, is based on a legitimate ground, and is supported by substantial

evidence.

As noted, the ALJ also considered plaintiff’s daily activities in determining whether

plaintiff was credible. Such activities, as described by plaintiff, include watching his 14-year

son during the day while his wife works, (see Tr. 325-26, 337), performing “chores,” such

as “pick[ing] up” and vacuuming, (see Tr. 337), as well as shopping and fixing meals, (see

Tr. 314), driving three times a week to visit relatives, (see Tr. 325-26), and performing

certain yard work at his father’s home, for example, picking up trash and fruit in the yard,

(see Tr. 337-38). In Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F. 3d 853 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit

affirmed an ALJ’s finding that a claimant’s disabling pain allegations were not credible,

where the claimant engaged in similar daily activities, such as watching a child while the

claimant’s spouse was working, cooking, housekeeping, shopping, and leaving the home

for visits. See id. at 857. Even if plaintiff is contending the ALJ’s interpretation of plaintiff’s

testimony is not the only reasonable interpretation thereof, the fact that differing reasonable

inferences can be drawn from plaintiff’s testimony is not a basis to find the ALJ erred. See
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id. (holding where “ALJ’s interpretation of [the claimant’s] testimony may not be the only

reasonable one,” ALJ’s interpretation should not be disturbed on review because it is not

reviewing court’s function to “second-guess” credibility finding supported by substantial

evidence).

In sum, the Court finds the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit plaintiff’s testimony;

rather, the ALJ’s credibility finding is based on legitimate grounds and is supported by

substantial evidence. See Thomas, 278 F. 3d at 958-59. Consequently, plaintiff has not

shown the ALJ erred with respect to his credibility findings.

Accordingly, plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ’s decision denying plaintiff’s claim

for disability benefits should be reversed or that grounds exist to remand the matter.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED; and

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge