Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01264/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01264-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP SANDERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER MARK BISHOP AND IGNACIO

RUIZ,

Defendants.

 

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1:06-cv-1264 OWW GSA

SCHEDULING CONFERENCE ORDER 

Discovery Cut-Off: 7/1/08

Non-Dispositive Motion

Filing Deadline: 7/15/08

Dispositive Motion Filing

Deadline: 8/1/08

Settlement Conference Date:

7/10/08 10:00 Ctrm. 10

Pre-Trial Conference

Date: 10/14/08 11:00 Ctrm.

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Trial Date: 11/25/08 9:00

Ctrm. 3 (JT-4 days)

I. Date of Scheduling Conference.

March 20, 2008.

II. Appearances Of Counsel.

Plaintiff, Phillip Sanders, appeared in pro se. 

Weakley, Ratliff, Arendt & McGuire, LLP by Erica M.

Camarena, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants. 

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III. Summary of Pleadings. 

Defendants’ Contentions

1. Plaintiff Phillip Sanders (hereinafter “Plaintiff”),

brings this action against Defendants, both employees of the

Fresno Police Department, for an alleged violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause. 

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges two separate

incidents:

a. On or about May 6, 2006, Officer Ruiz allegedly

followed Plaintiff home, asked Plaintiff if he was on probation

to which Plaintiff responded, “yes,” searched Plaintiff’s

vehicle, and arrested him without reasonable cause. He was then

transported to Fresno County Jail where he remained for three

days.

b. On or about December 3, 2005, while Plaintiff was

waiting at a bus stop, Defendant Officer Bishop allegedly asked

Plaintiff if he was on probation to which he responded “yes.” 

Officer Bishop asked Plaintiff to stand and place his hands on

the police car and asked Plaintiff the reason for his probation. 

Plaintiff responded that the information was already available to

him, and that Officer Bishop was already aware of the reasons

Plaintiff was on probation. Officer Bishop allegedly searched

Plaintiff and placed him under arrest without probable cause. 

Plaintiff was transported to Fresno County Jail where he remained

for four days.

2. Plaintiff does not allege any state law claims and

seeks compensatory damages for loss of tuition fees, costs and

legal fees. In addition, Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages

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against both officers.

3. With respect to the May 6, 2006, incident, Defendant

Officer Ruiz contends that at approximately 10:47 p.m., Officer

Ruiz was working a double unit, uniformed patrol detail, assigned

to the Southwest District Crime Suppression Team. Officer Ruiz,

who at the time was a Probation Liaison, was given instructions

to pick up Plaintiff for a probation hold and was provided with a

photograph of Plaintiff for identification purposes. Officer

Ruiz knew that Plaintiff was on active felony probation for a

prior narcotic conviction.

4. As part of his active duties, Officer Ruiz and his

partner made contact with Plaintiff who was sitting inside his

girlfriend’s vehicle, which was parked partially in the driveway

of Plaintiff’s residence at 347 W. Almy Avenue. The car was not

pulled over while Plaintiff was driving as he alleges. Officer

Ruiz approached the driver’s window of the car and confirmed

Plaintiff was the probationer in the photograph. Plaintiff

exhibited objective symptoms of being under the influence of a

controlled substance, specifically, rock cocaine base or “crack

cocaine.” The officers observed that Plaintiff had dilated

pupils, no pupillary reaction to light, eyelid tremors, and

involuntary muscle movements. Plaintiff made statements to the

officers such as “I’m not high” and “you’re harassing me because

I’m black.”

5. Officer Ruiz searched Plaintiff’s car and did not find

any illegal substances or contraband. He arrested Plaintiff for

being in violation of his probation terms and conditions and

booked him into the Fresno County Jail.

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6. As for the December 3, 2005, incident, at or about 9:17

p.m., Officer Bishop was working a double unit assigned to the

Southwest Crime Suppression Unit. They were patrolling a high

narcotic and high gang area of Fig and North Avenues in Fresno. 

They observed a black male (Plaintiff) walk off from a group of

subjects on the southeast corner of Fig and North, a location

known for narcotic related activity. The officers made

consensual contact with Plaintiff who was walking northbound in

an open parking lot. Plaintiff stated he was just walking to the

bus stop. Plaintiff was asked if he was on parole or probation

and Plaintiff responded that he was not. Plaintiff said he was

going to the store and pointed east, away from where the bus stop

was. 

7. Officer Bishop recognized Plaintiff from at least two

prior felony arrests. Due to his previous contacts with

Plaintiff, Officer Bishop suspected Plaintiff was on probation. 

Officer Bishop made contact with Plaintiff and smelled an

alcoholic odor coming from him, and observed that he was very

argumentative and uncooperative. Officer Bishop conducted a

records check and confirmed that Plaintiff was on active felony

probation, open to search. The information listed on the

Sharenet (probation information that goes through dispatch)

indicated a condition of Plaintiff’s probation was “no alcohol.” 

Plaintiff was searched, however, no illegal items or contraband

were found on his person. Due to the no alcohol condition and

lying to the officers, Plaintiff was arrested for violation of

his probation under Penal Code § 1203.2A. Plaintiff’s probation

officer was contacted and advised of the arrest.

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Defendants’ Legal Contentions

8. Defendants are still of the position that Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim and the allegations

regarding the search and seizure are vague. Defendants also do

not see any correlation between the incidents as alleged and

occurred six months apart. 

9. It is Defendants’ contention that at the time of

Plaintiff’s arrests, Plaintiff was then on searchable probation.

10. If someone is on searchable probation, California case

law permits an officer to conduct a search for no reason, that is

without “reasonable suspicion” or any other amount of

particularized suspicion, as long as the probation condition

permits a search by any law enforcement officer without a

warrant. People v. Brown, 191 Cal.App.3d 761, 765-766 (1987). 

An officer may search that person and any property under his

control without any particularized suspicion, and without first

contacting the probation officer. People v. Bravo, 43 Cal.3d

600, 609-610 (1987). Adult probationers consent to the condition

when they choose probation over prison. People v. Ramos, 34

Cal.4th 494, 506 (2004); People v. Miller, 124 Cal.App.4th 216,

221 (2004). Adult probationers thereby waive their Fourth

Amendment right to privacy.

11. From a federal standpoint, the Ninth Circuit has not

resolved the conflict of whether a warrantless probation search

needs to be supported by reasonable suspicion. Nevertheless, the

United States Supreme Court has validated California’s parole

search law and held that suspicionless searches of parolees are

not prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. Parolees, unlike

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average citizens, do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy

under the Fourth Amendment based on their parolee status and the

plain terms of their parole search condition. Samson v.

California, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2199 (2006). 

12. Although the Supreme Court in Samson did not address

suspicionless “probation” searches, the Court did incorporate

California probation search cases in its analysis. Additionally,

the Court rested its holding on California’s parole search

condition that “severely diminishes” a released prisoner’s

reasonable expectation of privacy. Because most probation search

conditions are identical to parole search conditions in their

language permitting searches by any law enforcement officer with

or without cause, a probationer subject to a search condition -

just like a state parolee - has no greater expectation of privacy

for Fourth Amendment purposes than a parolee. 

13. The Ninth Circuit has consistently found no

“constitutional difference between probation and parole for

purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d

1072, 1083, fn.9 (en banc) (9th Cir. 2005). Any attempt by the

federal court to find a meaningful distinction between the

validity of a parole search condition and an identical probation

search condition, will be difficult given the Supreme Court’s

holding in Samson. 

14. Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity. 

Viewing the facts most favorable to Plaintiff, he has failed to

establish that his arrest and search of his person and/or

property violated his constitutional rights. 

15. Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand

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trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001) quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985). The privilege of qualified

immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost

if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. Courts

stress “the importance of resolving immunity questions at the

earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 227 (1991). A quick resolution of a qualified immunity

claim is essential. Will v. Hallock, 126 S.Ct. 952, 955 (2006). 

16. The initial inquiry in a qualified immunity analysis

is, whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable

to the Plaintiff, show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right. Saucier, supra, at 201 (2001). The next

inquiry, if a constitutional violation could be made out, is

whether the right protected was clearly established. Id. “[T]he

right the official is alleged to have violated must have been

‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more

relevant, sense. The contours of the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

640 (1987). 

17. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a police

officer’s conduct is shielded if a reasonable officer could have

believed his conduct to be lawful, in light of the clearly

established law and information the officer possessed. Andersen,

at 641. The purpose of qualified immunity is to permit police

officers to undertake their responsibilities without fear that

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they will be held liable in damages for actions that appear

reasonable at the time. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819

(1982). 

18. It appears from the facts as alleged, that Officers

Bishop and Ruiz would be entitled to qualified immunity. 

Plaintiff’s Contentions

1. “In response to city atty scheduling conference report

1st officer ruiz stated he had pictures and the probation office

sent him out to arrest me over looking a probation report on

6/8/06 were probation stated they didn;t know why I was arrested

on 5/7/06 meaning 5/6/06 booking layover dated and still didn’t

have the reports #06-41208 1 mth afterword (attachment #1

probation report)the first paragraph doesn’t make scence when 1

veiws the reports and the scheduling statement,next the lie told

I was sitting in grilfriends car when I was driveing is just bold

face lie I have witness .next officer bishop stated he was

rideing with south west crime unit and seen me walk away from a

group a lie had I known this lie I could of got video tapes from

the store because of the area, store had cameras everwere next

its kind of funny that bishop is listed as 1 does in atty kapetan

civil case for a trumped up police report were bishop wrote a gun

weapon charge when weapon was not broom a mistake I;m in court

with the atty about that for not catching the error state

superiorcourt judge alan simpson, not to speak of a illegal

search in 03 by bishop with docs to prove that I never filed

adout inshort he left a paper trail last if i was doing something

illegal they could have asked the store for the tapes and tested

me last bishop called probation officer allmost 1 week later a

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said I confessed to drinking to him when I thought you call

probation before one is arrested like parole another attemp to

trump up some more charges like the weapons error . as fare as

the compensatory Im asking max under the law and the fastist

motion, trail dates court has.” 

IV. Orders Re Amendments To Pleadings.

1. The parties do not presently contemplate amending the

pleadings. 

V. Factual Summary.

A. Admitted Facts Which Are Deemed Proven Without Further

Proceedings. 

1. Plaintiff, Phillip Sanders, is a resident of the

Eastern District of California, Fresno Division, and a citizen of

the United States. 

2. Defendants were, at all times alleged in the

lawsuit, employed as police officers by the City of Fresno and

were acting in the course and scope of their employment and under

color of law. 

3. On May 6, 2006, Officer Ruiz did place Plaintiff

under arrest and booked him in to the Fresno County Jail.

4. On or about November 30, 2005, Officer Bishop did

place Plaintiff under arrest and booked him in to the Fresno

County Jail. 

5. Plaintiff was on searchable probation at the time

of both these arrests. 

B. Contested Facts.

1. All remaining facts in this case are contested,

including the issues of liability and damages, if any. 

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VI. Legal Issues.

A. Uncontested.

1. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

B. Contested. 

1. Whether Plaintiff was in violation of his

probation at the time of his arrest. 

2. Whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights under federal law. 

3. Whether Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. 

4. The nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries and

damages, if any. 

VII. Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction.

1. The parties have not consented to transfer the 

case to the Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including trial.

VIII. Corporate Identification Statement.

1. Any nongovernmental corporate party to any action in

this court shall file a statement identifying all its parent

corporations and listing any entity that owns 10% or more of the

party's equity securities. A party shall file the statement with

its initial pleading filed in this court and shall supplement the

statement within a reasonable time of any change in the

information. 

IX. Discovery Plan and Cut-Off Date.

1. The Defendants will make a decision as to whether to

move to sever issues depending upon the relationship of the

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incidents alleged and whether they pertain to the same conduct or

course of conduct. 

2. The parties are ordered to complete all discovery on

or before July 1, 2008.

3. The parties are directed to disclose all expert

witnesses, in writing, on or before May 6, 2008. Any

supplemental or rebuttal expert disclosures will be made on or

before June 6, 2008. The parties will comply with the provisions

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) regarding their

expert designations. Local Rule 16-240(a) notwithstanding, the

written designation of experts shall be made pursuant to F. R.

Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(2), (A) and (B) and shall include all

information required thereunder. Failure to designate experts in

compliance with this order may result in the Court excluding the

testimony or other evidence offered through such experts that are

not disclosed pursuant to this order.

4. The provisions of F. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) shall 

apply to all discovery relating to experts and their opinions. 

Experts may be fully prepared to be examined on all subjects and

opinions included in the designation. Failure to comply will

result in the imposition of sanctions. 

X. Pre-Trial Motion Schedule.

1. All Non-Dispositive Pre-Trial Motions, including any

discovery motions, will be filed on or before July 15, 2008, and

heard on August 22, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge

Gary S. Austin in Courtroom 10. 

2. In scheduling such motions, the Magistrate

Judge may grant applications for an order shortening time

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pursuant to Local Rule 142(d). However, if counsel does not

obtain an order shortening time, the notice of motion must comply

with Local Rule 251. 

3. All Dispositive Pre-Trial Motions are to be

filed no later than August 1, 2008, and will be heard on

September 8, 2008, at 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable Oliver W.

Wanger, United States District Judge, in Courtroom 3, 7th Floor. 

In scheduling such motions, counsel shall comply with Local Rule

230. 

XI. Pre-Trial Conference Date.

1. October 14, 2008, at 11:00 a.m. in Courtroom 3, 7th

Floor, before the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United States

District Judge. 

2. The parties are ordered to file a Joint PreTrial Statement pursuant to Local Rule 281(a)(2). 

3. Counsel's attention is directed to Rules 281 

and 282 of the Local Rules of Practice for the Eastern District

of California, as to the obligations of counsel in preparing for

the pre-trial conference. The Court will insist upon strict

compliance with those rules.

XII. Trial Date.

1. November 25, 2008, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. in

Courtroom 3, 7th Floor, before the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger,

United States District Judge. 

2. This is a jury trial.

3. Counsels' Estimate Of Trial Time:

a. 4 days.

4. Counsels' attention is directed to Local Rules

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of Practice for the Eastern District of California, Rule 285. 

XIII. Settlement Conference.

1. A Settlement Conference is scheduled for July 10, 2008,

at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 10 before the Honorable Gary S.

Austin, United States Magistrate Judge. 

2. Unless otherwise permitted in advance by the

Court, the attorneys who will try the case shall appear at the

Settlement Conference with the parties and the person or persons

having full authority to negotiate and settle the case on any

terms at the conference. 

3. Permission for a party [not attorney] to attend

by telephone may be granted upon request, by letter, with a copy

to the other parties, if the party [not attorney] lives and works

outside the Eastern District of California, and attendance in

person would constitute a hardship. If telephone attendance is

allowed, the party must be immediately available throughout the

conference until excused regardless of time zone differences. 

Any other special arrangements desired in cases where settlement

authority rests with a governing body, shall also be proposed in

advance by letter copied to all other parties. 

4. Confidential Settlement Conference Statement. 

At least five (5) days prior to the Settlement Conference the

parties shall submit, directly to the Magistrate Judge's

chambers, a confidential settlement conference statement. The

statement should not be filed with the Clerk of the Court nor

served on any other party. Each statement shall be clearly

marked "confidential" with the date and time of the Settlement

Conference indicated prominently thereon. Counsel are urged to

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request the return of their statements if settlement is not

achieved and if such a request is not made the Court will dispose

of the statement.

5. The Confidential Settlement Conference

Statement shall include the following: 

a. A brief statement of the facts of the 

case.

b. A brief statement of the claims and 

defenses, i.e., statutory or other grounds upon which the claims

are founded; a forthright evaluation of the parties' likelihood

of prevailing on the claims and defenses; and a description of

the major issues in dispute.

c. A summary of the proceedings to date.

d. An estimate of the cost and time to be

expended for further discovery, pre-trial and trial.

e. The relief sought.

f. The parties' position on settlement,

including present demands and offers and a history of past

settlement discussions, offers and demands. 

XIV. Request For Bifurcation, Appointment Of Special Master, 

Or Other Techniques To Shorten Trial. 

1. If punitive damages are sought, the amount of punitive

damages, if any, shall be tried in a separate, second phase in a

continuous trial before the same jury. 

XV. Related Matters Pending.

1. There are no related matters.

XVI. Compliance With Federal Procedure.

1. The Court requires compliance with the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice for the

Eastern District of California. To aid the court in the

efficient administration of this case, all counsel are directed

to familiarize themselves with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice of the Eastern District

of California, and keep abreast of any amendments thereto.

XVII. Effect Of This Order.

1. The foregoing order represents the best

estimate of the court and counsel as to the agenda most suitable

to bring this case to resolution. The trial date reserved is

specifically reserved for this case. If the parties determine at

any time that the schedule outlined in this order cannot be met,

counsel are ordered to notify the court immediately of that fact

so that adjustments may be made, either by stipulation or by

subsequent scheduling conference. 

2. Stipulations extending the deadlines contained

herein will not be considered unless they are accompanied by

affidavits or declarations, and where appropriate attached

exhibits, which establish good cause for granting the relief

requested. 

3. Failure to comply with this order may result in

the imposition of sanctions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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