Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02247/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02247-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christopher Lohmeier, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02247-TUC-BPV

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Christopher Lohmeier has filed the instant action seeking review of the 

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 17), Defendant’s Brief 

(Doc. 19), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 20). 

 The Magistrate Judge has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the parties’ 

consent. (Doc. 24). For the following reasons, the Court remands the matter for further 

proceedings. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff filed applications, with a protective filing date of September 27, 2012, for 

disability benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. 

(Doc. 17, p. 1; Transcript/Administrative Record (Doc. 15) (“Tr.”) 20, 216-226). 

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Plaintiff alleges that he has been unable to work since October 3, 20121, due to “Major 

depressive disorder, anxiety, mood disorder”; hepatitis C; carpel tunnel syndrome; 

substance abuse disorder; anti-social disorder; oppositional defiance disorder; and 

compressed discs in his lower back. (Tr. 302). After Plaintiff’s applications were denied 

initially and upon reconsideration, he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”). (Doc. 17, pp. 1-2). On January 21, 2014, the matter came on for hearing 

before ALJ Larry E. Johnson, where Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and 

Vocational Expert (“VE”) Kathleen McAlpine testified. (Tr. 37-61). On March 28, 

2014, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 20-31). The Appeals Council 

subsequently denied Plaintiff’s request for review, thereby rendering the ALJ’s March 

28, 2014 decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff then 

initiated the instant action. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff was born in December 1971. (Tr. 216). He quit high school after the 

ninth grade and has a GED. (Tr. 42, 55, 367). In the past, Plaintiff worked as an 

electrician’s helper. (Tr. 40-41). Plaintiff is divorced and has a fiancée. (Tr. 42, 56). 

Other than his fiancée, Plaintiff has no friends and he is not in touch with his children or 

other family: “I don’t know why it is, I just...shut down.” (Tr. 50). In the past, Plaintiff 

has been homeless and lived under a bridge. (Tr. 42-43). Plaintiff’s fiancée pays for his 

room and board. (Tr. 43; see also Tr. 56 (Plaintiff and his fiancée do not live together); 

Tr. 664 (Plaintiff lives in transitional housing)). 

 The record reflects Plaintiff’s long history of substance abuse and treatment for 

mental health issues. Plaintiff’s parents separated when he was eight years of age and his 

father sent him and his siblings to Minnesota when he was eleven “to get rid of us.” (Tr. 

367). Plaintiff was molested by an older brother and sister when he was between five and 

ten years old. (Tr. 367; see also Tr. 54 (Plaintiff testified he was molested by his 

 

1

 Plaintiff initially indicated a disability onset date of July 15, 2005, however, he later amended his alleged disability onset date to October 3, 2012. (See Tr. 20, 39-40, 

216, 223). 

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brothers)). 

 Plaintiff started using drugs at around age eleven. (Tr. 54; see also Tr. 367 

(Plaintiff “[s]tarted using THS and alcohol at age thirteen....”)). His drug use “gradually 

increased w/ cocaine including IVDU of cocaine and heroin.” (Tr. 367 (Plaintiff started 

using heroin at age 22); see also Tr. 403 (Plaintiff reporting having “an addictive 

personality and [that he] has been addicted to many different types of drugs throughout 

his lifetime with the most recent being heroin, cocaine, and alcohol”)). 

 The record reflects Plaintiff’s report that his depression began when he was twelve 

years of age and he started to lose interest in things. (Tr. 367). Plaintiff also testified that 

he has had trust issues as long as he can remember: 

I don’t know how to say it, except for I just don’t like people. I don’t trust 

people. I mean, I think that’s my biggest issue is trust. And I’ve gone to 

therapy for that a very long time, a very long time, both private paid years 

and years ago, as well as through La Frontera. I mean, I would give my 

right leg to be what they call normal, but I’m just not. 

(Tr. 51-52; see also Tr. 54). 

 Plaintiff testified that he is unable to function in the workplace because he “shut[s] 

down[]” and he does not “do well around people....I get very quiet....I just withdraw.” 

(Tr. 49-50; see also Tr. 50 (Plaintiff described shutting down as being “just blah. I just 

don’t feel anything.”)). His “biggest problem lies...in making it...” to work on a regular 

basis. (Tr. 50). When he found work, he “could do okay for two or three weeks, maybe 

four or five if I was lucky, and then I would shut down, and then there went another job, 

and then I would do it over again. And then there went another job, and then I would 

lose my place to live, and then I would be out on the street, and then I’d start using 

again,....” (Tr. 50-51; see also TR. 55 (Plaintiff would be fired from work because of his 

absences and “[S]ometimes, you know, when I was there I wasn’t there.”); Tr. 58). 

 Plaintiff testified that on some days he does not feel like doing anything and does 

not shower. (Tr. 47). Although he likes to read, he is unable to concentrate on reading 

because his medication makes him sleepy. (Tr. 57). He mostly watches television during 

the day. (Tr. 55, 57 (Plaintiff also tried exercising but his wrist prevented him from 

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continuing to exercise)). 

 During Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff was 

“bobbing and weaving...”, but he was not exhibiting that behavior when the ALJ 

observed him earlier in the hallway. (Tr. 49). Plaintiff responded that he did not take his 

medications before the hearing because it caused him to “nod[] out and slobber[].” (Id.). 

He takes the medications because “I do rock a lot, and I sweat a lot[.]” (Id.; see also Tr. 

46). Plaintiff also testified that when he is not taking medication, he is not a “very 

friendly person. I’m just really short-fused.” (Tr. 56). 

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

 A. CLAIM EVALUATION

 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined pursuant to a five-step sequential 

process. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520, 416.920. To establish disability, the claimant must 

show: (1) he has not performed substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability 

onset date (“Step One”); (2) he has a severe impairment(s) (“Step Two”); and (3) his 

impairment(s) meets or equals the listed impairment(s) (“Step Three”). “If the claimant 

satisfies these three steps, then the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits. If the 

claimant has a severe impairment that does not meet or equal the severity of one of the 

ailments listed..., the ALJ then proceeds to step four, which requires the ALJ to 

determine the claimant's residual functioning capacity[2]....After developing the RFC, the 

ALJ must determine whether the claimant can perform past relevant work..... If not, then 

at step five, the government has the burden of showing that the claimant could perform 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy given the claimant's 

RFC, age, education, and work experience.” Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 405 (citations 

omitted). 

 B. FINDINGS IN PERTINENT PART

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had “the following severe combination of 

 2

 Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) “is defined as ‘the most’ the claimant can 

do, despite any limitations.” Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 2015), as 

amended (Feb. 5, 2016) (citation omitted). 

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impairments: substance abuse disorder, carpal tunnel syndrome, hepatitis C, [and] 

affective disorder....” (Tr. 23). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s impairments, 

“including the substance use disorders...”, met the listings for 12.04 (affective disorders) 

and 12.09 (substance addiction disorders). (Id.). However, the ALJ also determined that 

if Plaintiff stopped substance use, Plaintiff would no longer meet the listings, and, upon 

consideration of his remaining limitations, he would be able to perform medium work.3

(Tr. 24-26). The ALJ went on to find that if Plaintiff stopped substance abuse, he would 

be precluded from performing past work, but the Medical-Vocational Rules (“GRIDS”), 

supported the conclusion that there still remained a significant number of jobs in the 

national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 30). 

Therefore, the ALJ concluded that: 

The substance use disorder is a contributing factor material to 

determination of disability because the claimant would not be disabled if he 

stopped the substance use (20 CFR 404.1520(g), 404.1535, 416.920(g), and 

416.935). Because the substance use disorder is a contributing factor 

material to the determination of disability, the claimant has not been 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the 

alleged onset date through the date of this decision. 

(Tr. 31). 

IV. DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ’s finding of a material substance abuse disorder 

was unsupported by the evidence of record; (2) the ALJ did not properly consider the 

opinions from an examining consultant and nurse practitioner; and (3) the ALJ 

improperly rejected lay testimony.4

 Defendant counters that the ALJ properly considered 

 

3

 “Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent 

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. If someone can do medium work, we 

determine that he or she can also do sedentary and light work.” 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1567(c). 

See also 20 C.F.R. ' 416.967(c). Elsewhere in his decision, the ALJ stated that “[i]f the 

claimant stopped the substance use, the claimant would not have the residual functional 

capacity to perform the full range of medium work. However, the additional limitations that 

would remain have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled medium work[]”, 

thus resulting in a non-disability finding. (Tr. 31).

4

Plaintiff indicated he had attached additional evidence outside the administrative 

record to his Opening Brief as Exhibit A (Doc. 17, p. 6), however, that material was not 

submitted to the Court and Defendant subsequently objected to any such submission. 

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the evidence and that his decision was supported by substantial evidence. 

 A. STANDARD

 The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, 

a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. §405(g). The 

factual findings of the Commissioner shall be conclusive so long as they are based upon 

substantial evidence and there is no legal error. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). This Court may “set aside the 

Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based 

on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 

 Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla[,] but not necessarily a 

preponderance.’” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 

871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. Further, substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Where “the 

evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of 

the ALJ.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (citing Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th

Cir. 1992)). Moreover, the Commissioner, not the court, is charged with the duty to 

weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts in the evidence and determine the case 

accordingly. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. However, the Commissioner's decision “‘cannot 

be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Tackett,

180 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.1998)). 

Rather, the Court must “‘consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that 

 (Doc. 19, p. 3 n.1). In his Reply, Plaintiff acknowledged that he failed to attach the evidence which “consisted of further lab results proving Plaintiff’s sobriety...contin[ing] through October 2014, but as the ALJ does not question Plaintiff’s reports of sobriety, Plaintiff states no argument to Defendant’s objection to a future submission of this evidence to this Court.” (Doc. 20, p. 3). Therefore, the submission of additional evidence 

is not at issue in this case. 

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supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Id. (quoting 

Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

 B. ANALYSIS

 1. PRELIMINARY ISSUES

 At the outset, Plaintiff bases much of his argument on two assertions that require 

discussion. The first addresses Plaintiff’s alleged period of abstinence from substance 

abuse (see Doc. 17, p. 11; Doc. 20, p. 7) and the second involves Plaintiff’s position that 

“the Administration’s non-examining consultants[] [found] that the Plaintiff’s prior 

substance abuse was not material herein.” (Doc. 20, p. 8; see also Doc. 17, p. 11). 

 a. PERIOD OF ABSTINENCE FROM SUBSTANCE ABUSE

 Plaintiff argues that he had not “abus[ed] drugs for nearly a year prior to his 

amended alleged onset date of 10/03/12, which was supported by concrete laboratory 

evidence (clean drug screens) from a licensed facility, for one year leading up to the 

hearing and further supported by the treating source records and opinion letters.” ((Doc. 

17, p. 10 (citing Tr. 682-91 (“clean” lab tests from October 3, 2012 to May 3, 2013); Tr. 

701-05 (“clean” lab tests from June 30, 2013 to October 7, 2013); see also Doc. 20, p. 7 

(Plaintiff’s “proven sobriety period was of a duration of some seventeen (17) months 

before the hearing, and more than a year prior to his amended A[lleged] O[nset] D[ate].”) 

(citing Tr. 632)). 

 Approximately one year prior to Plaintiff’s amended alleged onset date, treatment 

records reflect Plaintiff’s report to La Frontera staff on October 20, 2011, about a 

“signif[icant] relapse into heroin use recently d[ue]/t[o] being homeless, inability to find 

work, not being able to speak with his children d/t losing phone privileges while in CDV. 

He left CDV...d/t conflicts with staff....Reports he last used heroin 2 days ago.” (Tr. 

479). Plaintiff also reported he had recently been incarcerated where he received 

Thorazine which helped with heroin withdrawal. (Id. (Thorazine had also been 

prescribed because Plaintiff had been hearing voices)). At this time, Plaintiff was 

diagnosed with anxiety disorder, nos; major depressive disorder, recurrent; opiod type 

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dependence, continuous; and cocaine dependence, continuous (Id.). He was prescribed 

Celexa, Chlorpromazine, and Benadryl. (Tr. 480). By November 14, 2011, Plaintiff 

expressed his desire to stop using drugs. (Tr. 541) Although he experienced improved 

sleep, up to eight hours a day, with a use of a sleep aid (Id.), he also requested to switch 

from Celexa to Prozac because Celexa made him feel anxious and nervous. (Tr. 481). At 

this time he presented as euthymic, with fair judgement and insight, and “ok” thought 

processes. (Id.). 

 In December 2011, Plaintiff and a friend presented for family counseling “to assist 

[Plaintiff]...in identifying what patterns lead [sic] to relapse in the past.” (Tr. 554). 

Plaintiff’s friend “reported client will gain sobriety but will then have the pressure of 

paying bills when living with others which eventually leads to relapse.” (Id. (at this time 

Plaintiff was living at New Directions)). Also in December 2011, Plaintiff stated he 

discontinued Thorazine, which he had been taking to help him sleep, because it made him 

“feel drowsy all day.” (Tr. 483). He reported increased depression. (Id.). On 

examination, he appeared euthymic, with “ok” affect, thought content and speech. (Id.). 

His judgement and insight were fair. (Id.). There was no evidence of drug or alcohol 

use. (Tr. 484). 

 By February 2012, Plaintiff’s sister reported to La Fonterra staff that he had stolen 

her husband’s car and been arrested for an extreme DUI. (Tr. 521). Plaintiff was unable 

to identify the reason for his relapse. (Tr. 523 (“Coordinator...explained to client that 

relapse is a part of the cycle of recovery.”); see also Tr. 615 (Plaintiff’s February 2012 

report that “he recently relapsed into drug use.”)). Upon Plaintiff’s report of being 

depressed and anxious, his Prozac dosage was increased. (Tr. 615). His examination was 

normal. (Id.). 

 In March 2012, Plaintiff reported 

no substance abuse for the last 3 weeks, is working about 15 hours a week 

and is looking to start working more often with church, and continues to 

attend all court dates which displays increase in functioning. Client also 

reports depressive symptoms are minimal, experiencing them about 1-2 

times a week. Client also reported being able to sleep 8 hours a night but is 

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taking Benadryl nightly to assist in this. 

(Tr. 532). 

 However, on June 28, 2012, Plaintiff reported that he used heroin the day before. 

(Tr. 619). Nurse Practitioner Priscilla Tellis’ treatment note also reflects: “Also abusing 

cocaine and MJ. Last drank alcohol 06/19/2012...Unemployed. Lives at Primavera. 

Appetite, sleep, energy poor.” (Id.). He presented as euthymic with “ok” affect, thought 

content, speech, judgement and insight. (Id.). He also exhibited mild to moderate 

withdrawal symptoms. (Id.). NP Tellis also stated that: “No evidence of drugs and/or 

alcohol use.” (Id.). 

 A mental status examination performed in August 2012 by Linda Banziger,5

FPMHNP, at La Frontera, reflected that Plaintiff presented with poor eye contact, speech 

that was increased in rate and somewhat forceful, and a reserved affect. (Tr. 623). His 

thought processes were rapid, circumstantial and logical. (Id.). His insight and 

judgement were fair. (Id.). NP Banziger also noted Plaintiff’s “long term history of 

polysubstance abuse with multiple relapses.” (Id.). Plaintiff reported during the 

examination that he experienced mood swings and “[s]ometimes he feels optimistic and 

he can do anything and then he shuts down and won’t take a shower or eat.” (Id.). He 

also reported depression, anxiety, hypersexuality and that his concentration and focus 

were not good. (Id.). Bipolar mood disorder was added to Plaintiff’s diagnoses, which 

included anxiety disorder, opioid type dependence continuous, and cocaine dependence 

continuous. (Tr. 624, 677). Plaintiff was prescribed Risperidone. (Tr. 624). At this time, 

Plaintiff was living in a sober living house. (TR. 678). 

 In September 2012, Plaintiff reported to NP Banziger that he “continue[d] to 

struggle with anxiety and not wanting to be around people. He finds if he is able to go to 

work, he gets ‘out of self’ and that is helpful.” (Tr. 676). On mental status examination, 

Plaintiff presented with intermittent eye contact, depressed and anxious mood, monotone 

 

5

 NP Banziger’s name also appears spelled as “Banzinger”. (See. e.g., Tr. 672). 

For consistency, the Court refers to her as NP Banziger. 

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slowed speech, linear and logical thought processes, and good insight and judgement. 

(Id.). NP Banziger’s impression was that Plaintiff experienced “persistent difficulty with 

anxiety and depression.” (Id.). She increased lamotrigine and added gabapentin for 

anxiety. (Id.).6

 On October 18, 2012, soon after Plaintiff’s amended alleged onset date, Plaintiff 

reported “things are not good; not sleeping well and really depressed. Cynical again – 

expects the worse....Has a feeling that people don’t have good intentions towards him.” 

(Tr. 674). He exhibited good eye contact but he verbalized rapidly and his affect was 

restricted. (Id.). His mood was irritable and depressed and his speech was monotone but 

at a normal rate. (Id.). His thought processes were logical, linear and goal directed and 

his insight was intact and judgement fair. (Id.). NP Banziger increased gabapentin and 

lamotrigine and continued him on hydroxyxine. (Id.). 

 On November 18, 2012, Plaintiff reported waking up three to four times a night, 

which left him tired throughout the day. (Tr. 672). He experienced racing thoughts, 

increased paranoia and was fighting a lot with his girlfriend. (Id.). NP Banziger 

discontinued gabapentin, noting that the drug has been found to increase paranoia. (Id.). 

She added Seroquel and continued Plaintiff on hydroxyzine pamoate and lamotrigine. 

(Tr. 671-72). She also noted that Plaintiff continued on methadone maintenance and he 

had been “[c]lean for seventy days.” (Tr. 672). 

 In December 2012, Plaintiff reported that he still was not sleeping well, but he was 

working out, doing 500 pushups a day, which made him feel better. (Tr. 670). He 

exhibited good eye contact, restricted affect, increased rate of speech, and euthymic 

mood. (Id.). His thought processes were linear and logical and his insight was intact 

with good judgement. (Id.). NP Banziger found an “[o]verall showing improvement 

 

6

 Along with methadone treatment, Plaintiff underwent laboratory testing beginning in September 2012. (See Tr. 683 (October 3, 2012 results for collection taken 

on September 25, 2012)). The record contains laboratory test results reflecting that Plaintiff was drug free from the October 3, 2012 result, which is the same date as 

Plaintiff’s amended alleged onset date, through at least October 7, 2013 (Tr. 683-91, 701-

05; see also Doc. 20, p. 7 n.1). 

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with current medications [hydroxyzine pamoate, lamotrigine, Seroquel, and methadone]. 

Self initiation of exercise program.” (Tr. 669-70). 

 In February 2013, Plaintiff reported impaired sleep and unstable moods. (Tr. 664). 

NP Tellis adjusted Plaintiff’s dosages of hydroxyzine pamoate and Seroquel to address 

this. (Id.). He presented with euthymic mood, appropriate affect, thought processes 

within normal limits and “ok” attention, thought content, speech, insight and judgement. 

(Id.). Plaintiff was living at “5 Points Transitional Housing facility.” (Id.). There was no 

evidence of drug or alcohol use. (Id.). 

 In March, 2013, Plaintiff reported to NP Tellis that he was “stable and doing well 

on current meds. Denies adverse effects and wants to continue taking them....Appetite, 

sleep, energy ok.” (Tr. 662). His mental status exam was normal. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff asserts that he was drug free “for nearly a year prior to his amended 

alleged onset date of 10/03/12....”, (Doc. 17, p. 10). The record speaks for itself as to the 

documented instances of Plaintiff’s substance abuse during the year prior to his amended 

alleged onset date. The record supports Plaintiff’s assertion that he “abstained from 

illicit drug use for the entire time from his amended A[lleged] O[nset] D[ate] until the 

ALJ’s determination.” (Doc. 17, p. 11; see also Tr. 24, 683-91, 701-05). 

 b. SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL (“SMI”) DETERMINATION

 Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ’s findings conflicted with “the Administration’s 

non examining consultants’ findings that the Plaintiff’s prior substance abuse was not 

material herein.” (Doc. 20, p. 8 (citing Tr. 632); see also Doc. 17, p. 11 (citing Tr. 632)). 

The document cited by Plaintiff is a Referral for SMI Determination signed in 2010 by 

Reviewer Nurse Practitioner Ellen M. McVay, Jane Crawford Recovery Facilitator, BA, 

and Dawn Norton, Clinical Supervisor, MC, NCC, LPC. (Tr. 631-35; see also (Tr. 636 

(SMI eligibility determination signed by NP McVay on May 3, 2010)). The document 

reflects that the “qualifying SMI diagnosis” includes: major depressive disorder, 

recurrent, severe; and mood disorder, not otherwise specified. (Tr. 631). That same page 

contains the question whether the deficits are caused by substance abuse, and “N” was 

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indicated as the answer. (Id.) Page 632, the page cited by Plaintiff, indicates he has: 

been homeless for the past seven years; held 25-30 jobs over the past two years; 

significant impairment in interpersonal relationships including that he is not allowed to 

see his children; periods of extreme activity and periods where he cannot get out of bed; 

and that he is a danger toward self or others because he had been to prison for selling 

drugs and multiple drug charges. (Tr. 632). 

 “[T]he ultimate responsibility for determining whether an individual is disabled 

under Social Security law rests with the Commissioner....” Social Security Ruling 

(“SSR”) 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, *7. Disability determinations by other 

governmental and non-governmental agencies are not binding on the Commissioner. Id.; 

see also 20 CFR §' 404.1504, 416.904. This rule applies even where the standards for 

obtaining disability benefits through another agency are more rigorous than the standards 

applied by the Social Security Administration. Wilson v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1383, 1386 

(9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, while a state finding of disability can be introduced into 

evidence in a proceeding for Social Security disability benefits, an ALJ may attribute as 

much or as little weight to the finding as he or she deems appropriate. 20 C.F.R. §'

404.1504, 416.904; see also Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990), 

overruled on other grounds by Bunnel v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991); Little v. 

Richardson, 471 F.2d 715, 716 (9th Cir.1972) (state determination of disability was not 

binding in proceedings on application for Social Security disability benefits). Cf., SSR 

06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, *7 (Although such a determination is not binding, “the 

adjudicator should explain the consideration given to these decisions in the notice of 

decision for hearing cases and in the case record for initial and reconsideration cases.”). 

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, there is no support for the conclusion that the 

2010 SMI determination was rendered in conjunction with Plaintiff’s current applications 

for disability benefits at issue here. In addressing the SMI determination, the ALJ 

acknowledged that when the determination was made, Plaintiff 

was assigned a GAF of 53 while reporting a history of being clean and 

sober from illicit substances. [Tr. 634] The undersigned notes that the 

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treatment records indicate that many of the claimant’s symptoms were the 

result of his self-report and not generated as a result of psychometric 

testing. 

(TR. 26 (citing Tr. 631)). At first glance, the ALJ’s reason for rejecting the SMI 

determination arguably conflicts with his earlier finding that Plaintiff is credible 

concerning the symptoms and limitations he alleged in 2010 as cited in the SMI 

paperwork. (Tr. 24 (citing 634-36 (SMI paperwork)). However, the ALJ went on to 

explain that: 

It appears from the record that, until 2012, the claimant had a history of 

substance abuse, intermittent sobriety and relapses. Until the claimant 

began methadone treatment and blood testing it appears to the undersigned 

that the therapists at La Frontera based their assessments as to whether the 

claimant was sober or not entirely on the claimant’s self-report. As such, 

the undersigned finds that it is difficult, if not impossible to separate the 

claimant’s alleged mental impairments from the effects caused by his 

substance abuse. 

(Tr. 24). 

 It follows from the ALJ’s discussion that he questioned the basis on which it was 

determined that Plaintiff’s deficits resulting in the SMI determination were not caused by 

substance abuse. Although the SMI paperwork completed in the spring of 2010 reflects 

Plaintiff “has been clean for the past 1.5 years” (TR. 634), a February 2010 La Frontera 

progress note reflected Plaintiff’s report that he “has been clean since 2008 but has 

relapsed w[ith] the last time being in Nov. 2009.” (Tr. 367; see also Doc. 17, p. 2). 

Furthermore, as discussed above, an SMI determination does not automatically equate to 

a finding that the claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act. Nor is there any 

showing on the instant record that the 2010 SMI determination translates to any specific 

limitations regarding Plaintiff’s abilities to perform work related activity during the 

period at issue here. 

 2. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ADDICTION

 A person is not considered disabled “if alcoholism or drug addiction would...be a 

contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is 

disabled.” 42 U .S.C.§423(d)(2)(C). In determining whether a claimant's alcoholism or 

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drug addiction is material under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C), the test is whether an 

individual would still be found disabled if he or she stopped using alcohol or drugs. See 

20 C.F .R. §§ 404.1535(b), 416.935(b); Parra, 481 F.3d at 746-47; Sousa, 143 F.3d at 

1245. 

 If the ALJ finds a claimant disabled after applying the five-step sequential 

evaluation process, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), and there is medical 

evidence of drug addiction or alcoholism (“DAA”), the ALJ must determine whether the 

DAA is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability. See SSR 13-2p, 

2013 WL 621536, at *2. In order to determine whether the DAA is a contributing factor 

material to the determination of disability, the ALJ determines whether the claimant's 

other impairments would improve to the point of nondisability in the absence of the 

DAA. Id. at *7. In doing so, the ALJ applies the steps of the sequential evaluation a 

second time to determine whether the claimant would be disabled if he or she were not 

using drugs or alcohol. Id. at *4. If the remaining limitations would not be disabling 

after applying the sequential evaluation a second time, then the DAA is a contributing 

factor material to the determination of disability and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1535, 416.935; SSR 13-2p, 2013 WL 621536, *4. The ALJ is to make this 

determination based on the record as a whole. Plaintiff continues to have the burden of 

proving disability throughout the DAA analysis. SSR 13–2, 2013 WL 621536, *4; see 

also Parra, 481 F.3d at 744 (“the claimant bears the burden of proving that his substance 

abuse is not a material contributing factor to his disability.”). 

 Plaintiff argues that the DAA analysis was unwarranted given that he has not used 

drugs since his amended alleged onset date. Defendant counters that “the regulations do 

not limit the ALJ to consideration of only that medical evidence which dates during the 

adjudicative period; rather, the regulations require an ALJ to consider the entire record 

when evaluating a claim. 20 C.F.R. ''404.1520(a)(3), 416.920(a)(3)....Thus, the ALJ did 

not error by considering the entire record, which included significant evidence of 

substance abuse prior to the amended alleged onset date.” (Doc. 19, p. 5 (record citations 

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omitted)). 

 While both parties concede it was proper for the ALJ to consider evidence prior to 

the alleged onset date (see id.; Doc. 20, p. 7), it is not entirely clear that the ALJ was 

required to engage in the DAA analysis given the laboratory evidence that Plaintiff had 

stopped using illicit drugs beginning at least in September 2012, which was the month 

before his amended alleged onset date. Cf. SSR 13-2p n. 26, 2013 WL 621536, *12 n. 26 

(“If, however, a claimant is abstinent and remains disabled throughout a continuous 

period of at least 12 months, DAA is not material even if the claimant’s impairment(s) is 

gradually improving.”). Nonetheless, in light of Plaintiff’s long history of drug use with 

intermittent periods of sobriety and relapse, including the close proximity of his relapse 

in June 2012 to his amended disability onset date a few months later in October, the 

ALJ’s consideration of the impact of Plaintiff’s drug use, if any, on Plaintiff’s alleged 

impairments was reasonable. Even if the ALJ should not have engaged in a DAA 

analysis, there is no showing that the error, in and of itself, harmed Plaintiff given that the 

ALJ went on to apply the sequential evaluation to determine that Plaintiff was not 

disabled upon discontinuation of substance abuse. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 

1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). “[A]n ALJ's 

error is harmless where it is []inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.[]...In other words, in each case [the court] look[s] at the record as a whole 

to determine whether the error alters the outcome of the case.” (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to determine which of 

impairments would be severe if he stopped substance abuse. (Doc. 20, p. 9). However, 

implicit in the ALJ’s opinion is that, in the absence of substance abuse, Plaintiff had the 

following severe combination of impairments: carpal tunnel syndrome, hepatitis C, and 

affective disorder. (See Tr. 23; see also Tr. 25-26 (discussing whether Plaintiff would 

meet or equal the Listings for 11.14 (carpel tunnel syndrome) and 12.04 (affective 

disorder) if he stopped substance use)).7

 As required by the second part of the DAA 

 

7

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analysis, the ALJ then went on to assess whether Plaintiff was disabled if he stopped 

substance abuse under the sequential evaluation–a determination that took into account 

Plaintiff’s period of sustained sobriety which is precisely what Plaintiff argues the ALJ 

should have done. (See e.g., Doc. 17, p. 11). 

 3. OPINION EVIDENCE

 Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s treatment of medical opinions from examining 

Psychologist Glen Marks, Ph.D., and Plaintiff’s treating providers at La Frontera. 

 There are three types of medical opinions (treating, examining, and nonexamining) 

and each type is, generally, accorded different weight. See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th

Cir. 1995); see also Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Those 

physicians with the most significant clinical relationship with the claimant are generally 

entitled to more weight than those physicians with lesser relationships.”). Generally, 

more weight is given to the opinion of a treating source than the opinion of a doctor who 

did not treat the claimant. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 

1222 (9th Cir. 2010); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). An ALJ may 

reject a treating physician’s uncontradicted opinion only after giving “‘clear and 

convincing reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 

157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). “Even if the treating 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion 

without providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in 

the record.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d. at 830). 

 “And like the opinion of a treating doctor, the opinion of an examining doctor, 

even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-

 addiction disorders, 12.09, is ... different from that for the other mental disorder listings. Listing 12.09 is structured as a reference listing; that is, it will only serve to indicate which of the other listed mental or physical impairments must be used to evaluate the 

behavioral or physical changes resulting from regular use of addictive substances.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, '12.00(A). 

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31. The ALJ can meet this burden “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of 

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 

findings. The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions....He must set forth his own 

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

 a. EXAMINING DR. MARKS

 Dr. Marks examined Plaintiff in January 2013. (Tr. 640-45). His diagnoses 

included major depressive disorder-moderate-recurrent and bipolar disorder versus mood 

disorder NOS. (Tr. 642). Upon examination, Dr. Marks found, in pertinent part, that 

Plaintiff 

presented with an anxious mood and blunted affect....Throughout the entire 

interview, he was crumpling a paper, and there was ongoing psychomotor 

restlessness. Speech was unremarkable, and he was able to provide 

articulate responses to all questions. Thought processes were linear, logical 

and goal directed. He was somewhat vague in describing symptoms, and it 

appeared that he had difficulty in articulating what he was feeling. 

 Eye contact was avoidant throughout the entire evaluation. He did 

not once make eye contact....Level of insight appeared to be minimally 

intact. Intellectual level of functioning appeared to be in the low averageto-average range. 

 On the Mini Mental Status Exam,...[Plaintiff] scored 27/30. [He] 

misidentified the year as 2012. However, he did appear to be completely 

oriented, and that was likely an error due to recent change in year. He was 

able to complete serial sevens, without any difficulty. He could only recall 

one out of three words on a delayed recall trial but was able to identify the 

other two words when given a multiple choice option. He had difficulty 

with repetition. He was able to follow a three-step command, and was able 

to both generate a sentence and read a simple sentence. 

(Tr. 642). Dr. Marks assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) Score of 50 

(Tr. 642), which indicates “[s]erious symptoms...or any serious impairment in social, 

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).”8

 American 

 

8

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“A GAF score is a rough estimate of an individual's psychological, social, and occupational functioning used to reflect the individual's need for 

treatment.” Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (9th Cir.1998). 

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Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994), 

p. 32. 

 Dr. Marks completed a Psychological/Psychiatric Medical Source Statement 

wherein he indicated Plaintiff’s limitations caused by his mental impairments were 

expected to last twelve continuous months from the date of the examination. (Tr. 643). 

He further indicated that with regard to: (1) understanding and memory, Plaintiff “does 

demonstrate some difficulty retaining new information. If he could work, he would 

likely need to work in a position that required hands on types of learning.”; (2) sustained 

concentration and persistence, Plaintiff “could likely work for short periods of time. Yet, 

he would likely need frequent breaks.”; (3) social interactions, Plaintiff, “if he were 

capable of working for an extended period of time, would likely need to be able to work 

at his own pace without interacting on a continual basis with others.”; (4) adapting to 

change, Plaintiff had sufficient capabilities. (Tr. 644). 

 The ALJ gave what he termed “appropriate weight” to Dr. Marks’ opinion. (Tr. 

28). The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Marks’ examination was performed after Plaintiff 

“was presumed to be clean and sober from illicit substances.” (Tr. 28-29). According to 

the ALJ, Dr. Marks’ “noted that the claimant was highly functional, based upon his test 

results.” (Tr. 29). The ALJ went on to reject Dr. Marks’ assessment that Plaintiff would 

 According to the DSM–IV, a GAF score between 41 and 50 describes 

“serious symptoms” or “any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.” A GAF score between 51 to 60 describes “moderate 

symptoms” or any moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning.” Although GAF scores, standing alone, do not control determinations of whether a person's mental impairments rise to the level of 

a disability (or interact with physical impairments to create a disability), they may be a useful measurement. We note, however, that GAF scores are 

typically assessed in controlled, clinical settings that may differ from work environments in important respects. See, e.g., Titles II & XVI: Capability to Do Other Work–The [M]edical–Vocational Rules As A Framework for Evaluating Solely Nonexertional Impairments, SSR 85–15, 1983–1991 Soc. 

Sec. Rep. Serv. 343 (S.S.A 1985) (“The mentally impaired may cease to function effectively when facing such demands as getting to work regularly, having their performance supervised, and remaining in the workplace for a full day.”). 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1002 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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be able to work for short periods of time only and would require frequent breaks. (Id.). 

According to the ALJ, these limitations were “not supported by any of his test results and 

appear to be based, at least in part, on the claimant’s self-report or the claimant’s history 

of mental health treatment, as documented in La Frontera records, which do not give 

adequate weight to the claimant’s drug use.” (Id.). 

 At the outset, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Dr. Marks disbelieved 

Plaintiff’s description of his symptoms. See e.g. Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 166 

F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (substantial evidence did not support ALJ’s finding that 

examining psychologists took the claimant’s “statements at face value” where 

psychologists’ reports did not contain any indication that the claimant was malingering or 

deceptive); see also Ryan v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(same where there was nothing in the record to suggest that examining psychologist 

disbelieved the claimant’s description of her symptoms). Further, although Defendant 

argues that a discrepancy between a doctor’s opinion and his examination findings is a 

proper basis for rejection, (Doc. 19 citing Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 

601 (9th Cir. 1999)), this case involves no such discrepancy. Rather, the ALJ ignored Dr. 

Marks’ observations noted in his report, that Plaintiff, among other things, presented with 

an anxious mood, blunted affect, ongoing psychomotor restlessness, avoidant eye contact 

during the entire evaluation and had difficulty retaining new information. (Tr. 642). The 

ALJ also failed to acknowledge that testing showed that Plaintiff had difficulty with 

repetition. (Id.). As the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, “‘[m]erely to state that a medical 

opinion is not supported by enough objective findings ‘does not achieve the level of 

specificity our prior cases have required, even when the objective factors are listed 

seriatim.’” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988)). Moreover, 

[c]ourts have recognized that a psychiatric impairment is not as readily 

amenable to substantiation by objective laboratory testing as is a medical 

impairment and that consequently, the diagnostic techniques employed in 

the field of psychiatry may be somewhat less tangible than those in the field 

of medicine. In general, mental disorders cannot be ascertained and verified 

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as are most physical illnesses, for the mind cannot be probed by mechanical 

devices in order to obtain objective clinical manifestations of mental 

illness.... [W]hen mental illness is the basis of a disability claim, clinical 

and laboratory data may consist of the diagnoses and observations of 

professionals trained in the field of psychopathology. The report of a 

psychiatrist should not be rejected simply because of the relative 

imprecision of the psychiatric methodology or the absence of substantial 

documentation, unless there are other reasons to question the diagnostic 

technique. 

Sanchez v. Apfel, 85 F.Supp.2d 986, (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting Christensen v. Bowen, 633 

F.Supp. 1214, 1220-21 (N.D.Cal. 1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). There is 

nothing in the record to suggest that Dr. Marks relied more heavily on Plaintiff’s self 

report or records from La Frontera rather than his own clinical observations in assessing 

Plaintiff’s limitations, including that Plaintiff would be able to work for short periods of 

time only and would require frequent breaks. See e.g. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1200 

(substantial evidence did not support ALJ’s finding that examining psychologist’s 

findings relied more heavily on the claimant’s self report rather than the doctor’s clinical 

observations). On this record, the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons to reject Dr. 

Marks’ opinion that Plaintiff would be able to work for short periods of time only and 

would require frequent breaks. 

 b. TREATING PROVIDERS

 On January 10, 2014, Nurse Practitioner Priscilla Tellis and Dr. Karaumanchi, 

both of La Frontera, wrote a letter confirming Plaintiff’s treatment at La Fonterra since 

2010, and stating that Plaintiff met the Listings for affective disorder (12.04), anxietyrelated disorders (12.06), and substance addiction disorders (12.09).9

 (Tr. 744-45). In 

summarizing Plaintiff’s treatment history, they stated out that 

[his] symptoms support a qualifying diagnosis of Seriously Mentally Ill 

(SMI) due to meeting the functional criteria for SMI A, which indicates Mr. 

Lohmeier is unable to live in an independent living setting and may be at 

 

9

 Defendant points out that NP Tellis is not considered a medical source. (Doc. 

19, p. 10 n. 3). However, “for the sake of simplicity, Defendant treats this source statement as if [sic] were adopted by Dr. Karaumanchi, which makes it subject to the specific and legitimate standard for purposes of rejection.” (Id. (citation omitted)). 

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risk of harm to self or others. At the onset of treatment with La Frontera, 

Mr. Lohmeier presented as homeless and unable to maintain employment 

with significant impairment in personal relationships and unable to 

maintain personal relationships. He reported periods of extreme activity and 

sudden onset of periods where he couldn’t get out of bed, which was 

supported by his erratic employment history. At this time, he endorsed 

symptoms of mood swings, irritability, insomnia/hypersomnia, feelings of 

hopelessness, and racing thoughts. It was determined that Mr. Lohmeier’s 

disabilities were not caused by substance abuse or an underlying medical 

condition. 

*** 

Mr. Lohmeier has consistently presented with symptoms that support his 

current diagnoses: racing thoughts; sense of hopelessness; reported periods 

of activity with sudden onset of periods of complete mental shut down and 

isolation; anxiety as evidenced by rocking, fidgeting, and poor eye contact; 

increased rate of speech and forced speech, and other times monotone and 

sowed speech; depressed, anxious, or irritable mood, and reported sleep 

disturbances. Mr. Lohmeier currently demonstrates a prolonged period of 

abstinence from alcohol and drug use. However, although the psychiatric 

medications that Mr. Lohmeier is currently taking seem to have decreased 

the frequency of his symptoms, the symptoms that impair his ability to 

exhibit normal responses to stress (mood swings, irritability, and 

hopelessness), develop and maintain personal relationships, avoid episodes 

of decomposition (severe depressive cycles and isolation), and avoid sleep 

disturbances are persistent. It is likely that these symptoms will continue 

indefinitely. 

 The symptoms Mr. Lohmeier exhibits and the medications[10] he is 

prescribed significantly decrease his capacity to function in situations that 

require a consistent routine or schedule, prolonged interaction with others, 

sustained periods of wakefulness and concentration, stressful environments, 

or environments requiring mid to high-level problem solving. I do not 

believe Mr. Lohmeier is eligible for gainful employment. 

(Id.). 

 The ALJ gave “reduced weight” to this opinion. (Tr. 29). However, initially, the 

ALJ apparently agreed in part with the assessment given that he, too, found that Plaintiff 

met the Listings for 12.04 and 12.09 while engaging in substance abuse. The ALJ’s 

opinion primarily differed from the treating provider assessment when he went on to 

 

10 Plaintiff’s psychiatric medications included: hydroxyzine pamoate, lamotrigine, Seroquel, and methadone. (Tr. 745). 

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address whether Plaintiff would be disabled in the absence of substance abuse. The ALJ 

rejected the treating provider opinion because “as discussed above, the claimant’s mental 

impairments simply do not meet the criteria of any of the mental impairment listings. 

Furthermore, Ms. Tellis’ assertion that the claimant continues to experience severe 

mental health symptoms is inconsistent with the most recent La Frontera records, which 

document that the claimant was stable, doing well and had a grossly normal mental status 

examination.” (Tr. 29). 

 While disability opinions are reserved for the Commissioner, reasons for rejecting 

a treating doctor's opinion on the ultimate issue of disability are comparable to those 

required for rejecting a treating physician's medical opinions. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 

F.3d 1195, 1202-03 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725). “If the treating 

physician's opinion on the issue of disability is controverted, the ALJ must still provide 

‘specific and legitimate’ reasons in order to reject the treating physician's opinion. Id.

 In challenging the ALJ’s finding, Plaintiff argues that La Frontera records during 

Plaintiff’s period of sustained sobriety reflect his complaints that he continued to 

experience unstable moods (Tr. 664 (February 27, 2013 (adjusted medication in attempt 

to address unstable mood)) and impaired sleep (Tr. 670 (December 7, 2012); Tr. 664 

(February 27, 2013)). There are not many records from La Frontera dating from 

Plaintiff’s amended alleged onset date of October 3, 2012, which also coincides with 

laboratory results showing Plaintiff has been drug free since that time. Treatment notes 

during this time also reflected that Plaintiff presented as “very anxious, fidgets, rapid and 

forceful speech. Rocks back and forth. Feels paranoid. Thought processes are rapid, 

circumstantial and logical.” (Tr. 672 (November 2012); see also Tr. 670 (on December 7, 

2012, Plaintiff presented with increased speech and restricted affect)). Yet, as Plaintiff 

continued with abstinence from substance abuse, the treatment notes also documented 

good eye contact (Tr. 670 (December 7, 2012)), linear and logical thought processes 

(Id.); see also Tr. 664 (February 27, 2013 treatment note indicating euthymic, thought 

processes within normal limits, appropriate affect, and “ok” attention, thought content, 

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speech, insight and judgement); Tr. 662 (March 29, 2013 treatment note indicating 

euthymic, thought process within normal limits and “ok” thought content, speech, insight 

and judgement)). 

 There can be no argument that the La Frontera records dating from Plaintiff’s 

period of sustained sobriety show improvement. However, during this same time frame, 

Plaintiff lived in a transitional housing facility. (Tr. 664 (February 27, 2013)). The Ninth 

Circuit has emphasized that reports of improvement “must also be interpreted with an 

awareness that improved functioning while being treated and while limiting 

environmental stressors does not always mean that a claimant can function effectively in 

a workplace.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017-18. Cf. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 

12.00(E) (“if you have chronic organic, psychotic, and affective disorders, you may 

commonly have your life structured in such a way as to minimize your stress and reduce 

your symptoms and signs. In such a case you may be much more impaired for work than 

your symptoms and signs would indicate.”). The treating providers state that Plaintiff’s 

symptoms during his sobriety and his medications decrease his capacity to function in 

situations that require a consistent routine or schedule, prolonged interaction with others, 

sustained periods of wakefulness and concentration, stressful environments, or 

environments requiring high-level problem solving.11 The ALJ did not appear to take 

into account that the treatment records he relied upon to reject this opinion occurred 

during a period when Plaintiff appeared to be living in such a way as to have reduced 

stressors: he was living in a transitional housing facility, he was not subjected to the 

demands of adhering to a regular schedule, nor is there evidence he was interacting with 

others aside from his fiancée and treating providers. As such, the record as a whole does 

not support the ALJ’s stated reasons for rejecting the treating provider assessment 

concerning Plaintiff’s limitations. 

 4. LAY TESTIMONY

 Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s rejection of a third party function report 

 

11 Many of these limitations are arguably in line with Dr. Marks’ opinion. 

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submitted on October 29, 2012 by Plaintiff’s friend, Allison Huff. Ms. Huff indicated, in 

pertinent part, that Plaintiff is unable to sleep through the night, sometimes wears the 

same clothes for days, and “gets in a ‘funk’ [and] won’t shower sometimes for days.” 

(Tr. 282-83). Although he will go with her to the grocery store, he will not shop alone. 

(Tr. 285). Plaintiff has no friends and isolates himself, he is “anti-social” and trusts no 

one. (Tr. 286, 287). His conditions affect his abilities to: lift, squat, bend, kneel, talk, 

remember, complete tasks, concentrate, use his hands, and get along with others. (Id.). 

 The ALJ declined to attribute “significant weight” to Ms. Huff’s report because 

she “is not medically trained to make exacting observations...”, thus resulting in 

questions as to the accuracy of her statements. (Tr. 29-30). Although the ALJ initially 

referred to Ms. Huff as Plaintiff’s “friend” (Tr. 29), he later stated that Ms. Huff, as 

Plaintiff’s “niece....cannot be considered a disinterested third party witness whose 

testimony would not tend to be colored by affection for...” Plaintiff and to agree with the 

symptoms and limitations he alleges. (Tr. 30). The ALJ also rejected Ms. Huff’s 

testimony because it was not consistent with the preponderance of the opinions and 

observations by the medical doctors. (Id.). 

 “Lay testimony as to a claimant's symptoms or how an impairment affects the 

claimant's ability to work is competent evidence that the ALJ must take into account.” 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir.1996);

Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.1993)). Further, “in order to discount 

competent lay witness testimony, the ALJ ‘must give reasons that are germane to each 

witness,’ Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. Lay witness testimony 

cannot be discredited due to lack of medical or vocational expertise. See Bruce v. Astrue, 

557 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Defendant concedes the ALJ’s reliance on Ms. Huff’s lack of medical training was 

improper, but argues that the remaining reasons proffered by the ALJ are valid. (Doc. 19, 

p. 12 n.4). Defendant argues that the ALJ correctly dismissed Ms. Huff’s statement 

given that “treatment notes document grossly normal mental status examinations during 

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the sober period from late 2012 forward..., which are inconsistent with Ms. Huff’s 

suggestion of disabling limitations.” (Doc. 19, p. 13 (record citations omitted)). 

 Near the time Ms. Huff submitted her statement, Plaintiff’s treatment notes 

reflected he had trouble sleeping. (Tr. 672 (November 2012); Tr. 670 (December 2012)). 

A November 2012 note reflected Plaintiff presented as “[v]ery anxious, fidgets, rapid and 

forceful speech. Rocks back and forth. Feels paranoid. Thought processes are rapid, 

circumstantial and logical.” (Tr. 672). In December 2012, Plaintiff’s speech was 

increased in rate and his affect was restricted, although his feelings of paranoia had 

resolved upon a change in medication. (Tr. 670). Ms. Huff’s October 2012 statement 

appears to accurately reflect Plaintiff’s situation in late 2012 with regard to his mental 

impairments. Contrary to the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Huff’s statement was “not 

consistent with the preponderance of the opinions and observations by the medical 

doctors in this case” (Tr. 30), Dr. Marks and the treating providers at La Frontera 

indicated that Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused limitations. While later records 

reflect some improvement in Plaintiff’s symptoms that were described by Ms. Huff, as 

discussed above, the ALJ’s consideration of those records failed to take into account that 

during this period of improvement, Plaintiff appeared to have structured his life so as to 

have reduced stressors. 

 Further, the ALJ’s rejection of Ms. Huff’s statement because of bias due to her 

relationship as his “niece” is not supported by the record given that there is no evidence 

that Ms. Huff is Plaintiff’s niece. To the extent that Defendant argues that Ms. Huff is, 

nonetheless “an interested witness who has a tendency to endorse Plaintiff’s alleged 

symptoms and limitations[]” (Doc. 19, p. 13), at this point on this record such presumed 

bias would be the only reason to discount Plaintiff’s testimony. Defendant has cited no 

authority for the premise that an ALJ can reject lay witness testimony solely on presumed 

bias based on the witness’s relationship to or “affection for the claimant” (Tr. 30). 

Instead, the case law supports the opposite conclusion. See e.g., Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996); Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (ALJ 

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provided more than one reason to discount lay testimony). Cf. Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 

(noting that lay witnesses may not be dismissed based upon the “broad rationale” that 

they are interested parties). 

 5. REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

 Plaintiff requests that the Court “either remand the case for further consideration 

or find in Mr. Lohmeier’s favor.” (Doc. 17, p. 15). Defendant argues that in the event 

the Court finds that the ALJ erred, remand for benefits is not the appropriate remedy. 

(Doc. 19, pp. 13-17). 

 “A district court may ‘revers[e] the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing,’ Treichler v. Comm'r of 

Soc., Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)) 

(alteration in original), but ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand 

to the agency for additional investigation or explanation,’ id. (quoting Fla. Power & 

Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985)).” 

Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 407. Remand for an award of benefits is appropriate where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant 

testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited 

evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the 

claimant disabled on remand.[12]

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (footnote and citations omitted); see also Benecke v. 

Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In evaluating whether 

further administrative proceedings would be useful, the court “consider[s] whether the 

record as a whole is free from conflicts, ambiguities, or gaps, whether all factual issues 

have been resolved, and whether the claimant's entitlement to benefits is clear under the 

applicable legal rules.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103-04. 

 

12 The Ninth Circuit has noted that the third factor “naturally incorporates what we have sometimes described as a distinct requirement of the credit-as-true rule, namely that there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 n. 26 (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292). 

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 The Ninth Circuit has made clear that it is an abuse of discretion to remand “for an 

award of benefits when not all factual issues have been resolved.” Garrison, 775 F.3d at 

1101, n.5 (citation omitted). Moreover, even when all three factors of the test are met, 

the “district retains the flexibility to ‘remand for further proceedings when the record as a 

whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act.’” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Garrison,

759 F.3d at 1021); see also Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 407-08 (“the district court must 

consider whether...the government has pointed to evidence in the record ‘that the ALJ 

overlooked’ and explained ‘how that evidence casts into serious doubt’ the claimant’s 

claim to be disabled.”) (quoting Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1141). 

 Plaintiff has presented no argument to support a finding that the matter should be 

remanded for an immediate award of benefits rather than for further proceedings. 

Instead, Plaintiff recognizes, “[t]he proper course, except in rare cases, is to remand for 

additional explanation [sic] investigation.” (Doc. 20, p. 3 (citing Treichler, 775 F.3d 

1090)). Defendant contends that remand for further proceedings is appropriate because 

Dr. Marks’ “evaluation was inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] presentation during other 

contemporaneous provider visits[]” and that Dr. Marks’ assessed limitations are 

internally inconsistent. (Doc. 19, pp. 15-16). That Plaintiff had good eye contact with a 

treating provider, whom he had seen more than once, but avoided eye contact with Dr. 

Marks when they met presumably for the first and only time does not undermine Dr. 

Marks’ observation that Plaintiff avoided eye contact. Further, the note by examining 

internal physician Dr. Suarez under “physical examination...general” that Plaintiff had 

“adequate recall” (see Tr. 647) (all capitalization omitted), does little to undermine 

Psychologist Marks’ findings about Plaintiff’s recall upon administering the Mini Mental 

Status examination and his clinical assessment of Plaintiff’s mental functioning. This is 

not a situation where Dr. Suarez was treating Plaintiff’s mental impairments or 

specifically assessing signs associated with same. Cf. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1231-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (accepting treating physician’s opinion of plaintiff’s mental state 

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where he prescribed medication for plaintiff’s psychiatric condition). Furthermore, there 

is no explicit showing of inconsistencies in Dr. Marks’ assessed limitations at issue, 

which addressed different topics. He found that, with regard to the topic of “sustained 

concentration and persistence”13, Plaintiff could “likely work for short periods of time[]” 

with frequent breaks. With regard to the topic of “social action”14, Dr. Marks made no 

express finding that Plaintiff could likely work for extended periods. He indicated that if

Plaintiff were capable of working for an extended period, he would need to be able to 

work at his own pace without interacting on a continual basis with others. (TR. 644) (all 

capitalization omitted). Nonetheless, questions remain regarding Dr. Marks’ assessed 

limitations. For example, there is no indication what Dr. Marks meant by a “short 

period[]” or the how frequent breaks should be. (Tr. 644). Nor was the VE questioned 

about the limitations assessed by Dr. Marks. (See Tr. 59-60). 

 Additionally, as discussed above with regard to the treating provider assessment 

and Ms. Huff’s statement, the ALJ should consider whether Plaintiff is more impaired 

than his symptoms and signs reflected in the La Frontera treatment notes during his 

period of sustained sobriety would indicate in light of the fact that Plaintiff appears to 

have structured his life in such a way as to reduce his exposure to stressors and, thus, 

reduce his symptoms. See e.g. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017-18. The ALJ’s consideration 

of this issue may also require taking additional evidence and further questioning of the 

VE. 

 In light of the ambiguities in the record, as well as the likely need for further 

testimony from a VE, remand for further proceedings is appropriate in this case. See 

Garrison, 775 F.3d at 1101, n.5 (citation omitted). The Court is not unsympathetic to the 

fact that remand for further proceedings prolongs an ultimate resolution, however, the 

 

13 Sustained concentration and pace involves “the ability to carry out simple instructions, maintain attention and concentration, and maintain regular attendance”. (Tr. 644). 

14 Social interaction involves “the ability to get along with co-workers, respond appropriately to supervision, maintain socially appropriate behavior, and adhere to basic standards of neatness”. (Tr. 644). 

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instant record supports no other outcome. As, the Ninth Circuit has stated: “While we 

have recognized the impact that delays in the award of benefits may have on claimants, 

such costs are a byproduct of the agency process, and do not ‘obscure the more general 

rule that the decision of whether to remand for further proceedings turns upon the likely 

utility of such proceedings.’” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Harman v. Apfel, 211 

F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

V. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further 

proceedings consistent with this Order. 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that: 

 (1) the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits is REVERSED; and 

 (2) this action is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings 

consistent with this Order. 

 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter Judgment accordingly and to close its 

file in this matter. 

 Dated this 2nd day of March, 2016. 

 

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