Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00338/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00338-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEPHANIE SNOW POIROUX, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.: 03-0338-BH-M

)

THE CITY OF CITRONELLE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Supplemental Briefs (Docs. 54 & 56) regarding

summary judgment in this matter. These briefs were ordered by this Court upon the remand of this case

fromthe Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This Court’sfindingthatsummaryjudgment was appropriate

for Plaintiff’s claims ofviolationof28 U.S.C. §1983 against Officer MarshallChennault has beenreversed

and the issue is now set for trial. Furthermore, due to the remand ofthisfederal claim, Plaintiff’s state law

claims have also been reinstated against Defendants Officer Marshall Chennault, Officer Clint Jordan,

Officer KeithMiller, Clarence Parker, Dispatcher Eva Henderson, the late former Police Chief Clarence

Parker and Assistant Chief of Police Conrad Reid. 

Upon review of the parties’ Supplemental Briefs, the following concessions have been made by

both sides. First, Defendants concede that the wrongful death claim under Alabama law against Officer

MarshallChennault, like the 28 U.S.C. §1983 claimagainst him, is not appropriate forsummaryjudgment.

Also, Plaintiff concedes all but three of the remaining state law claims should be dismissed. Plaintiff

contends that only the Alabama law wrongful death claims against Defendants Eva Henderson and Clint

Jordanand the Alabama lawfailure to train claim against Defendant Conrad Reid should escape dismissal

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 1 of 10
1

 The Court relies on its original “Findings of Fact,” as proffered in its Order (Doc. 45)

originally granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s federal claims. Though reversing, in part, our

decision in that Order, there have been no indications nor contentions that the Court’s “Findings of

Fact” was erroneous in any way. 

by this Court. Therefore, the Court finds that the Alabama law wrongful death claim against Defendants

Keith Miller and Clarence Parker are due to be DISMISSED. 

I. Alabama Wrongful Death Claims 1

Pursuant to Alabama Code §6-5-410, a cause of action may be brought against a personwhose

“wrongful act, omission, or negligence” results in the death of another. The Alabama Supreme Court has

held, inthe jailsuicide context, that “proofofthe existence of a dutyowing fromthe defendant to the injured

party is a prerequisite for proving negligence or wantonness and that the question of whether a legal duty

exists is essentially a question of law for the court, to be resolved by determining whether the injury was

foreseeable.” City of Crossville v. Haynes, 2005 WL 1926435, *6 (Ala. 2005)(citing Keebler v.

Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So.2d 841, 844 (Ala. 1988)). The “controlling factor in determining

whether there may be a recovery for a failure to prevent a suicide is whether the defendants reasonably

should have anticipated that the deceased would attempt toharmhimself.” Popham v. City of Talladega,

582 So.2d 541, 543 (Ala. 1991). “Without foreseeability that the decedent would attemptsuicide, there

can be no recognized legal duty to prevent a suicide attempt and, thus, no right of recovery.” Haynes,

2005 WL 1926435 at *9. The Alabama Supreme Court further stated that forseeability of a suicide could

only be established if the deceased had a history of suicidal proclivities known to the defendants, orifthe

deceased manifested suicidal proclivities in the presence of the defendants, or the deceased was admitted

to the facility because of a suicide attempt. Popham, 582 So.2d at 543; Haynes, 2005 WL 1926435 at

*6. 

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 2 of 10
A. Clint Jordan

OfficerJordan transported Poiroux to Springhill MemorialHospitalwhere she received treatment

in response to her complaints ofseizure and migraine headache. (Doc. 40, Springhill Memorial Records).

WhenPoiroux was presented to the emergencyroompersonnelinthe earlymorning hours ofJune 3, 2001,

she was complaining of a seizure and a migraine headache, but denied having suicidal ideations. (Id.).

Before seeing a doctor, OfficerJordanoverheard Poiroux telling a nurse that she had tried to overdose in

the past using pills. The EmergencyPhysicianReport forthat morning indicates that Poiroux was seen by

Dr. Donna Ballard, who diagnosed Poiroux with depression and instructed the patient to follow up with

her personal physician. The Emergency Physician Report confirms that Officer Jordan remained in the

hallway when Poiroux was placed in an examination room with her handcuffs removed. Officer Jordan

statesthat he did notreceive any documentationfromSpringhillMemorialHospital and is not aware of any

documentation being given to Poiroux.

Officer Jordan admitsthat the doctor at Springhill Memorial Hospital told him that Poiroux might

need to go to Mobile Infirmary. Plaintiff asksthe Court to presume that the doctor’s reference to Mobile

Infirmary is with regard to its facility for treating psychiatric patients. However, the Springhill Memorial

doctor’s vague comment about Mobile Infirmary does not clearly make reference to psychological or

psychiatric treatment. In fact, there is no evidence that the medical professionals at Springhill Memorial

Hospital made any reference to Poiroux’s need for additional psychiatric or psychological evaluation.

More importantly, the recordsfromSpringhillMemorialHospitalreflect that Poiroux denied having suicidal

ideations and that the medical professionals at SpringhillMemorialHospitaldischarged her without further

instructions to Officer Jordan.

As Springhill Memorial Hospital did not have the proper release forms for blood and urine

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 3 of 10
specimens, OfficerJordantransported Poiroux to USAMedical Center. Officer Jordan admitsthat while

theywere at USAMedicalCenter, he overheard Poirouxmake a statement to the emergencyroomdoctor

about a prior overdose attempt, but he did not receive any specific information about that attempt. The

recordsfromUSAMedicalCenter document that Poiroux told the emergencyroomphysicianthatshewas

experiencing suicidal ideations, but there is no evidence that Officer Jordan overheard Poiroux make any

statement about experiencing current suicidal ideations. One of the emergency room doctors at USA

Medical Center told Officer Jordan that he was going to contact Mobile Mental Health Center because

of some of the things Poiroux told him during the examination. The emergency room doctor also told

Officer Jordan that he was ordering some additionaltestsfor Poiroux. While there is an inference that the

doctor at USA Medical Center wished to contact Mobile Mental Health because of Poiroux’s current

suicidal ideations, there is no evidence that this specific inference was relayed to Officer Jordan. 

Apparently, OfficerJordanwastold byanemergencyroomdoctor at SpringhillMemorialHospital

that Poiroux might need to go to Mobile Infirmary and Officer Jordan was told by an emergency room

doctor at USAMedical Center that he had contacted Mobile Mental Health about Poiroux. None ofthe

doctors from either hospital instructed Officer Jordan that Poiroux needed additional psychological

counseling or treatment. The Court finds that the references to Mobile Infirmary and Mobile Mental Health

do not warrant an inference that Poiroux’s subsequent suicide was, or should have been, foreseeable by

Officer Jordan. 

Next,Plaintiffrelies onthe medicalrecordsfromUSAMedicalCenter to support the inferencethat

Officer Jordan had a subjective awareness of Poiroux’s suicidal mental state, thus making her action

foreseeable. A review of these records in conjunction with the testimony of Officer Jordan and the medical

providers at USA Medical Center renders such inference unreasonable. The Outpatient Record and the

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 4 of 10
Discharge Checklistfor Poiroux fromUSAMedicalCenter bothcontain the words “suicidalideation,”but

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that this information was passed along to Officer Jordan or any of the

other individual defendants. The Court finds unreasonable an inference that such transfer of information

occurred. 

Poiroux was seen at USA Medical Center by Dr. James Wan and Dr. Nicholas Guan. Dr. Wan

does not recall treating Poiroux or speaking to Officer JordanonJune 3, 2001. (Doc. 37, Wan depo. p.

27; 30-31). Dr. Wan testifies that Officer Jordan would not have been allowed to look at the medical

records of Poiroux that morning because of patient confidentiality, nor would Officer Jordan have been

given a copy ofany of those records. (Id. at 31-32). Neither would Poiroux have been given a copy of

her medicalrecords. (Id. at 28-29). Although he has no recollection of that night, Dr. Wan speculates that

he would have instructed the nurse to convey to the patient or police officer the statement from the

Outpatient Record thatreads “will give Rx for home meds; to be taken into custody and observed.” (Id.

at 27,30,60). Regardless, Dr. Wan’s statement would not have provided Officer Jordan with specific

information about why Poiroux needed to be observed or how she should be observed.

Lisa Archie was the USA Medical Center emergency room nurse involved with the treatment of

Poiroux onJune 3, 2001. Nurse Archie does not recall treating Poiroux orspeaking to OfficerJordanthat

night. (Doc. 37, Archie depo. pp. 15-21). At the time, Dr. Nicholas Guan was a resident in the

Department of Psychiatry with the USA Medical Center, but he rotated as an intern through its various

departments. (Doc. 37, Guan depo. p. 9). During Dr. Guan’s one month rotation in the emergency

department, his supervising physician in the emergency room was Dr. Wan. (Id. at 13, 23). Accordingly,

Dr. Guanhadtorely onDr. Wanto make any finalrecommendations or orders upondischarge of a patient.

(Id. at 15). Dr. Guan does not recall treating Poiroux nor does he recall even if there was a police officer

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 5 of 10
with Poiroux that night. (Id. at 14, 22).

Dr. Wan and Nurse Archie both agree that if he had given her specific instructions to relay to the

patient, then those instructions would likely have been charted on the Patient Instruction Sheet. (Wan

depo. p. 53; Archie depo. pp. 23-24). Dr. Wan confirms that the only medical records that might have

been given to the patient are the Patient InstructionSheet and her prescriptions. (Dr. Wan depo. pp. 53-

54). Importantly, Poiroux’s Patient Instruction Sheet and her prescriptions do not mention a suicidal

ideationor warn of a risk for self-harm. According to his testimony, Officer Jordan conversed with USA

Medical Center personnel only about how Poiroux’s written prescriptions were to be administered. 

IndeterminingOfficer Jordan’s possible liabilityasto the federalclaimsfiled against him, the Court

found that coupled with the testimony of Dr.Wan, Dr. Guan, Nurse Archie, and OfficerJordan, the USA

Medical Center records at issue did not support the inference that Officer Jordan had a subjective

awareness of a strong likelihood ofimminentsuicide byPoiroux. Under Alabama law, however, Plaintiff’s

burden is not so steep. Now the Court is faced with the question of whether the deceased’s suicide was

reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. For the most part, the facts indicate that it was not reasonably

foreseeable to OfficerJordanthat Poiroux would commitsuicide. However, the Alabama Supreme Court

has held that the foreseeability can be sufficient when the defendant had knowledge ofdeceased’s history

of suicidal proclivities. In the instant case, it is clear that Officer Jordan had some knowledge of Poiroux’s

historyas he twice overheard her mention that she had attempted to overdose on pills inthe past. Though

thisinformationis notsufficient to sustain a federal §1983 claim, it doesseemto fulfillPlaintiff’s burdenthat

Poiroux’s death was foreseeable under Alabama law and, thus, is not ripe for summary judgment on that

ground. 

Because the Court has determined that a jury could find that Poiroux’s suicide was reasonably

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 6 of 10
foreseeable to Officer Jordan, his “peace officer” immunity, under Alabama Code §6-5-338(a) is not

applicable. The Alabama statute extends “state-agent” immunityfor “peace officers” arising out of their

conduct of a discretionaryfunctionwithin the line and scope of their law enforcement duties. Howard v.

City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala. 2003); Ala. Code §6-5-338(a) 1975. Therefore, the

applicability of the peace officer immunity is to be addressed under the principles set forth in Ex parte

Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000). Howard, 887 So.2d at 203. Despite the general

immunity for acts performed by peace officers in their law enforcement duty, in Cranman the Alabama

Supreme Court noted a state agent is not immune from civil liability when he acts “willfully, maliciously,

fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.” 792

So.2d at 405. In the instant case, the Court findsthat because a jurycould find that OfficerJordanshould

have reasonably foreseen Poiroux’s, it could also be determined that his failure to report this reasonably

foreseen possibility to his fellow officers was willful, malicious or inbad faith. Taking all the facts in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court findsthat there are genuine issues of material fact as to

whether OfficerJordanshould have reasonably foreseenPoiroux’ssuicideattemptand,ifso,washisfailure

to report this informationa willful, malicious or bad faith omission. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion (Doc.

27) and Supplemental Brief (Doc. 54) for Summary Judgment, as to the Alabama state law claim of

Wrongful Death against Officer Clint Jordan, are due to be DENIED. 

B. Eva Henderson

Dispatcher Henderson states that while she witnessed Poiroux acting in a disruptive manner, she

never heard Poiroux make any statements about suicide or saw her exhibit any behavior which might

indicate that she was suicidal. As OfficersJordanand Chennault admit that theydid not informDispatcher

Henderson of any suicidal ideations, Dispatcher Henderson had no reason to believe that Poiroux was a

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 7 of 10
threat to commit suicide.

There is no evidence that Dispatcher Henderson was aware that Poiroux was contemplating

or making preparations forsuicide. Dispatcher Henderson now admits that she saw Poiroux tearing strips

of a blanket in her cell, but Dispatcher Henderson thought at the time that Poiroux was playing with or

tearing pieces oftoilet paper. To support her testimony, Dispatcher Henderson offers that had she realized

Poiroux was tearing strips of a blanket and not toilet paper, she would have taken steps to stop such

behavior whether she thought Poiroux was preparing a noose or simply destroying city property.

Furthermore, the Court points out that Dispatcher Henderson checked on Poiroux at 9:00 p.m. and that

Poiroux wasfound hanging approximately tenminuteslater. Apparently, whenDispatcher Hendersonfirst

saw Poiroux hanging in the cell she believed that Poiroux was leaning over the sink possibly to wash her

face. Once Dispatcher Hendersonand Officer Millerrealized that Poiroux was actually hanging, theymade

immediate efforts to assist her.

According to the jail log, Dispatcher Henderson checked on Poiroux at 8:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.

Had Dispatcher Henderson been aware of a strong likelihood of imminent suicide, she testifies that she

would have checked on Poiroux every fifteen minutes instead of every thirty minutes. As Dispatcher

Henderson called Assistant Chief Reid at approximately 9:10 p.m. to notify him of the situation, Poiroux

committed suicide within an approximate ten minute time frame, to wit, between 9:00 and 9:10 p.m.

Hence, Dispatcher Henderson’s actual monitoring of Poiroux falls within the fifteen minute monitoring

intervalforsuicidaldetainees. In addition, Dispatcher Henderson maintained contact with Poiroux because

the latter was constantly beating on the dispatcher’s windowand attempting to speak through its opening.

Dispatcher Henderson kept the video camera trained on the female holding area so that she could watch

Poirouxmore regularly. After Poiroux was quiet for only a few minutes, Dispatcher Henderson and Officer

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 8 of 10
Miller checked on her, found her hanging, and immediately came to her assistance.

Based onthe alreadydiscussed standards established inPopham and Haynes,theCourtfindsthat

Dispatcher Henderson owed no duty to the decedent because her suicide attempt was not foreseeable.

It is undisputed that Henderson had no knowledge of Poiroux’s suicidal history. Further, Poiroux neither

manifested suicidal proclivities in the presence of the Henderson nor was she admitted to the facility

because of a suicide attempt. Therefore, the Court finds that the evidence does not rise to the level

necessary to establish that defendant could have or should have reasonably foreseen Poiroux presented

a threat to herself. Based upon this lack of foreseeability, the Courtfindsthat Defendants’ Motion (Doc.

27) and Supplemental Brief (Doc. 54) for Summary Judgment, as to the state law Wrongful Death claim

against Dispatcher Eva Henderson, are due to be GRANTED.

II. Alabama Failure to Train Claim

A. Assistant Chief of Police Conrad Reid

Plaintiff also asserts a claim of failure to train against Assistant ChiefofPoliceConrad Reid for his

failure to adequately train Eva Henderson and/or the rest of the staff at the jail to prevent the suicide of

Poiroux. Specifically, Plaintiff cites that there was not a written suicide policy and there were different

interpretations asto its oralpolicy. (Suppl. Brief, Doc. 57, p. 6). The Court finds, however, that this claim

is inappropriate as it is precluded by Reid’s immunity under Alabama Code §6-5-338(a). As already

discussed, Reid is provided immunity as a “peace officer” for his discretionary actions taken while in the

line or scope of his employment. Howard, 887 So.2d at 203. The establishment of policies and

procedures, including the mannerinwhichthe employees ofthe police department are trained to supervise,

evaluate, and monitor arrestees and prisoners, is within the Reid’s judgment in the administration of the

department. Haynes, 2005 WL 1926435, *10. Therefore, based on Assistant Chief of Police Conrad

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 9 of 10
Reid’s“peaceofficer”immunity,theCourtfindsthat Defendants’ Motion(Doc. 27) and SupplementalBrief

(Doc. 54), asto the Alabama state law claim of Failure to Train against him, are due to be GRANTED.

III. Conclusion

Based onthe above findings and analysis, the Court holds that Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 27) and

Supplemental Brief (Doc. 54) are due to be and hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. As to the federal §1983 and Alabama law wrongful death claims against Officer Marshall

Chennault, the Court finds that summary judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court also finds summary

judgment on the state law claim of wrongful death against Officer Clint Jordan is hereby DENIED.

However, as to all other claims asserted in this suit, asruled oneither in this Order or in previous Orders,

the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be and hereby GRANTED.

So ORDERED, this 13th day of October, 2005.

s/ W. B. Hand

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-00338-BH-M Document 58 Filed 10/13/05 Page 10 of 10