Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05202/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05202-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LYNN GAVIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-05202-EMC 

ORDER DECLARING PLAINTIFF A 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 13, 2015, Plaintiff Lynn Gavin filed the instant pro se suit against multiple 

defendants, alleging various federal and state law violations. Docket No. 1 (Compl.). This suit 

was the tenth in a series of suits filed by Plaintiff and/or her son, Bamidele Hambolu, in the 

Northern District of California. See Hambolu v. Parkmerced Investors Props., No. 12-cv-3824-

PJH; Gavin v. Murphy, No. 12-cv-5864-RS; Gavin v. Arntz, No. 13-56-PJH, Hambolu v. San 

Francisco Hous. Auth., No. 14-cv-3020-JSC; Gavin v. FCOF PM EQ LLC, No. 14-4582-RS; 

Gavin v. Bd. Of Supervisors, No. 14-cv-4583-RS; Hambolu v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., No. 14-

cv-4975-RS; Hambolu v. PCOF PM EQ, LLC, No. 15-cv-2780-RS; Gavin v. San Francisco Hous. 

Auth., No. 15-cv-4097-RS. Each of these suits alleges that Plaintiff was wrongfully evicted from 

the Parkmerced apartments in 2012, after she failed to pay allegedly usurious utility bills. Compl. 

at ¶¶ 99, 100; see also Hambolu v. PCOF PM EQ, LLC, Nos. 15-cv-2780-RS and 15-cv-4097-RS, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123876, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2015).

Plaintiff‟s cases have been dismissed on various grounds, including preclusion, statute of 

limitations, failure to prosecute, failure to state a viable claim, and failure to comply with 

administrative requirements such as the California Torts Claims Act. See Docket No. 7, Exh. A 

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(listing cases). This case was no different, with this Court dismissing the case with prejudice 

based on claim preclusion, failure to provide a short and plain statement of the claim, time bar, and 

failure to state a viable claim. Id. at 3-5. The Court also issued an Order to Show Cause as to why 

Plaintiff should not be declared a vexatious litigant, given her history of litigation in this district. 

Id. at 6. Plaintiff did not file a response.

For the reasons listed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

District courts have the inherent power to enter pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants 

under the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 

1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned, however, that “such pre-filing orders 

are an extreme remedy that should rarely be used” because of the danger of “tread[ing] on a 

litigant‟s due process right of access to the courts.” Id. Nevertheless, such pre-filing orders are 

sometimes appropriate because “[f]lagrant abuse of the judicial power . . . enables one person to 

preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of 

other litigants.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. De Long Factors

In De Long, the Ninth Circuit set forth the requirements for entering pre-filing orders 

against vexatious litigants:

(1) The litigant must be given notice and opportunity to be heard before the order is 

entered;

(2) The court must compile an adequate record for review, including a list of all filings and 

motions leading to the conclusion that an individual is a vexatious litigant;

(3) The court must make substantive findings that the litigant‟s filings are frivolous or 

harassing; and

(4) The pre-filing order may not be overly broad, and must be “narrowly tailored to closely 

fit the specific vice encountered.”

De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147-48.

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1. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard

The first factor simply requires that the litigant be given an opportunity to oppose the order 

before it is entered. De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. It does not require an in-person hearing. Courts 

in this circuit have held that a motion to declare a litigant vexatious does not require oral 

argument. See, e.g., Reddy v. MedQuist, Inc., No. 12-cv-1324-PSG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

171421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (“The requirement that the plaintiff receive an opportunity 

to be heard; the opportunity to brief the issue fully satisfies due process requirements.”) (internal 

quotations omitted); Fiechtner v. Young, No. CV 13-9-M-DLC, JCL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

31086, at *3 (D. Mont. Feb. 6, 2013) (“An opportunity to be heard is satisfied by providing an 

opportunity to file a brief, and does not necessarily require an oral or evidentiary hearing in 

court.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31158 (D. Mont. Mar. 4, 

2013). Additionally, at least one circuit court has held that a pro se litigant has a right to be heard 

on paper but not necessarily in person. See, e.g., Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 354 (10th Cir. 

1989) (“The notice and opportunity requirement does not, however, require an in-person hearing 

in the district court.”).

The Court finds that the first De Long factor is met because the Court issued an Order to 

Show Cause, and Plaintiff had an opportunity to file a written opposition. Docket No. 7 at 6; see 

also Martin v. Redwood City Dental Care, Case No. 15-cv-3151-JST, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

173275, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) (finding that Plaintiff was given an opportunity to be 

heard despite not responding to the order to show cause or appearing at the hearing); Adams v. 

Currie, Case No. EDCV 14-1838 PSG (SS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100684, at *14 (C.D. Cal. 

July 6, 2015) (finding that Plaintiff was given notice and an opportunity to be heard despite not 

responding to an OSC), report and recommendation adopted by 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100617, at 

*1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2015); Jibreel v. Hock Seng Chin, Case No. 14-cv-02774-JST, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 164359, at *3 fn. 1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014) (finding that Plaintiff was given 

opportunity to be heard even when order to show cause was returned as undeliverable because per 

Civil Local Rule 3-11, pro se parties have a duty to maintain a current address with the Court).

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2. Adequate Record for Review

The second factor is merely procedural. De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147 (“An adequate record 

for review should include a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district court to 

conclude that a vexatious litigant was needed.”). It requires only that the court compile a list of 

actions and filings by the litigant. See, e.g., Hurt v. All Sweepstakes Contests, No. C-12-4187-

EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4802, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013) (finding the second De Long

factor met where the court “compiled a list of all the actions Plaintiff filed”). This factor is met 

here as the Court has listed and discussed each of the ten actions that the Plaintiff has filed. See 

Docket No. 7 at 2-3, Exh. A.

3. Frivolous of Harassing Filings

The third factor “gets to the heart of the vexatious litigant analysis,” see Molski, 500 F.3d 

at 1059, and requires the district court to look to “both the number and content of the filings as 

indicia” of the frivolousness of the litigant‟s claims. De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148. “An injunction 

cannot issue merely upon a showing of litigiousness. The plaintiff‟s claims must not only be 

numerous, but also be patently without merit.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059.

The Court notes that the number of cases filed by Plaintiff and her son (ten) is relatively 

low compared to other cases where litigants were found vexatious. See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147 

(citing cases involving 35, “over 50,” and “over 600” actions); Miles v. Makishima, No. C-08-

4091-MMC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75676, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009) (same). However, 

the number of lawsuits filed by the litigant need not be numerous. See Boustred v. Government, 

No. C-08-00546-RMW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111090, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2008) 

(Boustred II) (finding “plaintiff has now brought three actions containing similar rambling, largely 

incomprehensible claims against a multitude of defendants” sufficient in terms of finding an 

“adequate record for review‟).

But while the number of filings here (ten) does not establish Plaintiff as vexatious per se, 

the patently meritless nature of her filings and motions do. See, e.g., Huggins v. Hynes, 117 Fed. 

Appx. 517, 518 (9th Cir. 2004) (unpublished disposition) (affirming district court‟s pre-filing 

order in part because “Huggins abused the courts by repeatedly relitigating the same controversy 

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and repeatedly filing frivolous motions and pleadings”). Here, each of Plaintiff‟s ten cases are 

based on the same facts, namely her allegedly wrongful eviction from the Parkmerced apartments 

in 2012, based on her failure to pay allegedly usurious utility bills. Eight of the nine previous 

lawsuits were either dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim or failure to prosecute; the 

last was voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff after the court sua sponte dismissed the case with leave 

to amend. See Docket No. 7, Exh. A. In addition to issues of claim preclusion, Plaintiff‟s legal 

theories were patently flawed; each of her causes of action in this case were either time-barred or 

based on federal criminal statutes that cannot support a civil cause of action. Docket No. 7 at 4-5. 

Furthermore, like many of her prior complaints, Plaintiff‟s 84-page complaint simply repeated the 

same conclusory statements, with almost no factual allegations. Even the Temporary Restraining 

Order (TRO) application filed in this case was a repeat; Plaintiff filed the same exact TRO 

application in Gavin v. San Francisco Housing Authority, which was denied by Judge Seeborg on 

September 16, 2015. Compare Docket No. 4 with Case No. 15-cv-4097-RS, Docket No. 3. 

Dissatisfied with the ruling, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, naming Judge Seeborg as one of the 

over 30 named defendants.

Certain of the Second Circuit Safir factors, which the Ninth Circuit has found “helpful” in 

considering the third (frivolous and harassing filings) and fourth (narrow tailoring of order) De 

Long factors, are instructive here. See Molski, 500 F.3d at 1058 (“Thus, the Second Circuit‟s fivefactor standard provides a helpful framework for applying the two substantive factors (factors 

three and four) of our own four-factor standard.”). The Second Circuit standard as articulated in 

De Long considers:

(1) the litigant‟s history of litigation and in particular whether it 

entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the 

litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have 

an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the 

litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused 

needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary 

burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other 

sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.

Molski, 500 F.3d at 1058 (citing Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)). Courts 

in this district have also considered the Safir factors to augment the De Long factors. See, e.g., 

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Boustred II, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111090, 2008 WL 4287570, at *2-3 (considering all five Safir

factors).

Most relevant here are the Safir factors three and four. First, since Plaintiff is not 

represented by counsel and instead proceeds pro se, this Court treads carefully when considering 

whether and how to fashion an appropriate pre-filing order. See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147 (noting 

use pre-filing orders to curb access to courts should be done with care where a pro se litigant is 

involved yet recognizing the courts are also free to enjoin litigants with “abusive and lengthy 

histories”). Second, the fourth Safir factor speaks directly to the factual scenario currently before 

this Court -- though low in number, Plaintiff's filings and motions have imposed substantial costs 

upon the many named defendants and the courts, both in terms of time and money. See, e.g., Moy 

v. U.S., 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding despite fact that litigant only “filed over five 

claims,” those claims arose “out of the same set of operative facts,” expended “a great deal of the 

district court's and defendants' time and money attempting to relitigate claims that the district 

court” had already found unsupported by facts or law as “sufficient justification for enjoining 

further complaints” but ultimately modifying district court's order as overbroad). Accordingly, 

while Plaintiff has filed relatively few actions, her lawsuits are frivolous, factually and legally 

unsupported, and seek to relitigate previously rejected claims, which have imposed substantial 

cost to defendants and the courts.

4. Narrowly Tailored

The fourth and final factor requires the pre-filing order be narrowly tailored to the 

vexatious litigant‟s wrongful behavior. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061. “Narrowly tailored orders are 

needed „to prevent infringement of the litigator‟s right of access to the courts.‟” De Long, 912 

F.2d at 1148 (citing Woods v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1525 

(9th Cir. 1983)).

Although Plaintiff has filed relatively few lawsuits, she has brought multiple lawsuits 

before multiple judges in this district, based on previously rejected facts and theories. 

Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to deem her a vexatious litigant and to fashion a 

narrowly tailored pre-filing order as set forth below:

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Plaintiff must obtain leave of court before filing any further suits based on her allegations 

that she was wrongfully evicted from the Parkmerced apartments in 2012. The Clerk of this Court 

shall not accept for filing any further complaints filed by Plaintiff or on behalf of Plaintiff alleging 

any claims described herein until that complaint has first been reviewed by a judge of this court 

and approved for filing. The pre-filing review will be made by the general duty judge who will 

determine whether Plaintiff has stated a potentially cognizable claim in a short, intelligible, and 

plain statement.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is hereby DECLARED a vexatious litigant. The Clerk 

of this Court may not file or accept any further complaints filed by or on behalf of Plaintiff

alleging any claims of wrongful eviction from the Parkmerced apartment in 2012. If Plaintiff 

wishes to file a complaint alleging any such claims, she shall provide a copy of any such 

complaint, a letter requesting that the complaint be filed, and a copy of this Order to the Clerk of 

this Court. The Clerk shall then forward the complaint, letter, and copy of this Order to the Duty 

Judge for a determination whether the complaint should be accepted for filing. Any violation of 

this Order will expose Plaintiff to a contempt hearing and appropriate sanctions, and any action 

filed in violation of this Order will be subject to dismissal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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