Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00122/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00122-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRUZ MIRELES, et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PARAGON SYSTEMS INC., 

Defendant.

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Case No.: 3: 13-cv-00122-L-BGS

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

STRIKE [Doc. #34.]

On May 24, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike three affirmative defenses from

Defendant Paragon Systems, Inc.’s First Amended Answer. [Doc. # 34.] The motion has been

fully briefed and is decided without oral argument. 

1. Background

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarity situated, filed this putative

class action against Defendant seeking unpaid wages and compensation for withheld meal and

rest periods. (Comp. ¶ 1.) Defendant, a California corporation conducting substantial business in

San Diego County, employed the named Plaintiffs as security officers. (Id. ¶¶ 4-18.) Plaintiffs

assert eight causes of action: (1) failure to provide meal period premium pay under California

Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 and California Code of Regulations Title 8, § 11040; (2) failure to

provide rest break premium pay under California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 and California Code

of Regulations Title 8, § 11040; (3) failure to pay overtime premium pay under California Labor

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Code §§ 510 and 1198; (4) failure to reimburse/indemnify under California Labor Code § 2802;

(5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements under California Labor Code §§ 226

and 1174; (6) failure to promptly pay wages owed under California Labor Code §§ 201-204; (7)

unfair and unlawful business practices under California Business and Professions Code §§

17200, et. seq.; and (8) violation of California Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).

Defendant answered, asserting thirty-six affirmative defenses. [Doc. # 30.] Plaintiffs

move to strike Defendant’s 29th, 35th and 28th affirmative defenses as insufficient. 

2. Rule 12(f) Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading

any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike are “generally disfavored because they are often used as

delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice.” Rosales

v. Citibank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001). A federal court will not exercise its

discretion under Rule 12(f) to strike a pleading unless the matters sought to be omitted have no

possible relationship to the controversy, may confuse the issues, or otherwise prejudice a party.

Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1223 (2010). In other words,

“[m]otions to strike generally will not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken

could not have any possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” In re Facebook PPC

Adver. Litig., 709 F.Supp.2d 762, 773 (N.D. Cal. 2010). When considering a motion to strike,

the court “must view the pleadings in a light most favorable to the pleading party.” In re

2TheMart .com, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (2000). Finally, Rule 12(f) “does not authorize a

district court to strike a claim for damages on the ground that such damages are precluded as a

matter of law.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi–Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 971 (2010).

As noted above, a court may strike a pleading that is: (1) redundant, (2) immaterial, (3)

impertinent, or (4) scandalous. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). An “immaterial” matter has no essential or

important relationship to the claim for relief or defenses pleaded. Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substances

Control v. ALCO Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). An “impertinent” allegation is neither responsive nor relevant to the issues

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involved in the action. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (1993) (rev'd on other

grounds). A scandalous pleading is one which “improperly casts a derogatory light on someone,

most typically on a party to the action.” Aoki v. Benihana, Inc., 2012 WL 899691 at *3 (D. Del.

2012) (internal citations omitted).

3. Discussion

a. Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice

“Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may take judicial notice of a

fact that is not ‘subject to reasonable dispute’ because ‘it is either (1) generally known within the

territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’ Judicial notice ‘may be

taken at any stage of the proceeding.’ Further, judicial notice is mandatory ‘if requested by a

party and supplied with the necessary information.’ ” Austero v. Aurora Loan Servs. Inc., C-11-

00490 JCS, 2011 WL 1585530 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2011) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(a, f, d)).

Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following documents:

1. Exhibit A: Copy of the Collective-Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between

Paragon Systems Incorporated and the United Government Security officers of America

International Union, and its affiliated Local 52, effective March 17, 2008. This document was

previously attached to Defendant’s Notice of Removal filed January 16, 2013.

2. Exhibit B: Copy of the CBA between Paragon Systems Incorporated and the

United Government Security Officers of America International Union, and its affiliated Local

52, effective November 20, 2010. This document was previously attached to Defendant’s Notice

of Removal filed January 16, 2013.

3. Exhibit C: Copy of the CBA between Paragon Systems Incorporated and the

International Union, Security, Police, and Fire Professionals of America and its affiliated Local

52, effective August 31, 2011 through November 13, 2014. This document was previously

attached to Defendant’s Notice of Removal filed January 16, 2013.

4. Exhibit D: Copy of the CBA between Paragon Systems Incorporated and the

United Government Security Officers of America, International Union, and its affiliated Local

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330, effective December 22, 2012 through December 21, 2013. This document was produced by

Defendant on May 22, 2013. (Dec. of Matthew Butler, ¶ 3.)

5. Exhibit E: Copy of the preamble between Paragon Systems Incorporated and the 

International Union, Security, Police, and Fire Professionals of America and its affiliated Local

52, effective August 1, 2010 through September 30, 2013. Defendant produced this document on

May 22, 2013. (Dec. of Matthew Butler, ¶ 3.)

6. Exhibit F: Copy of the Amendment to the Agreement between Paragon Systems 

Incorporated and the International Union, Security, Police, and Fire Professionals of America

and its affiliated Local 52, effective August 1, 2010 through September 30, 2013. Defendant

produced this document on May 22, 2013. (Dec. of Matthew Butler, ¶ 3.)

The documents marked as Exhibits A-F have been authenticated and are undisputed;

therefore, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s exhibits.

b. Defendant’s 29th, 35th Affirmative Defenses

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s 29th and 35th affirmative defenses are insufficient. Both

defenses are based on the CBA exception to Labor Code §§ 510 and 512(a) found in Labor Code

§§ 512(e) and 514, respectively. Labor Code § 514 provides as follows:

Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered by a valid

collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the

wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the

agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and

a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent

more than the state minimum wage.”

Labor Code § 514. 

Labor Code § 512 provides:

Subdivisions [512](a) and (b) do not apply to an employee specified in

subdivision (f) if both of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The employee is covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement.

(2) The valid collective bargaining agreement expressly provides for the

wages, hours of work, and working conditions of employees, and expressly

provides for meal periods for those employees, final and binding arbitration of

disputes concerning application of its meal period provisions, premium wage

rates for all overtime hours worked, and a regular hourly rate of pay not less

than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage rate.

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Labor Code §514. Plaintiffs contend that the CBAs are inadequate because they do not expressly

provide for overtime wages. Plaintiffs’ reasoning rests on an interpretation of the CBAs. But the

validity of the CBAs are not at issue at this time, but the sufficiency of the defense is. There are

threshold issues of fact and law as to whether the CBAs provide an exception to Labor Code §§

510 and 512(a). A motion to strike is not to decide the merits of a case, but rather to decide

whether the defenses asserted are so implausible that they are insufficient to preclude Defendant

from liability. 

The authority Plaintiffs cite rests on the subtleties of the CBAs in the individual cases. In

particular, Plaintiffs rely on Gregory v. SCIE, LLC, 317 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2003). In Gregory,

there was no dispute over the interpretation of the CBAs. Id. at 1053. This is not the case here.

Defendant has sufficiently presented a plausible argument that the CBAs’ terms may provide an

exception to Plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, the Court will not strike the 29th and 35th affirmative

defenses as insufficient.

Additionally, Plaintiffs move to strike Defendant’s 29th and 35th defenses as insufficient

because a CBA cannot functionally negotiate away state law protections. Specifically, Plaintiffs

argue that the CBAs redefine overtime in a manner inconsistent with Section 510. Plaintiffs

interpret the law to mean that Defendant must provide the same premium pay as state law, and

Defendants contend otherwise. As noted, whether or not the CBAs adhere to the labor protection

laws is a question on the merits of the case that cannot not be decided at this time. Defendant has

sufficiently presented cases and other relevant authority to counter Plaintiffs’ argument for the

Court to deny Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Defendant’s 29th and 35th affirmative defenses.

c. Defendant’s 28th Affirmative Defense

Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant’s 28th affirmative defense is insufficient and

immaterial because Plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185). Defendant disagrees, arguing that the defense is sufficient

because the claim requires interpretation of the CBAs. Section 301 of the LMRA governs claims

founded directly on the rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and is “substantially

dependent on the analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482

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U.S. 386, 394 (1987). This analysis relies on the §§ 512(e) and 514 exemptions. If the exemptions

apply, then the violations are not applicable. Analysis of the CBAs, Plaintiffs’ wage statements,

and testimony are all required to interpret whether or not a violation of §§ 510(a) and 512(a)

exists, or if they are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Questions of

substantive law are not intended to be resolved in a motion to strike. Plaintiffs’ have failed to

show that there is no set of circumstances in which Defendant can prevail. See SEC v. Sands 902

F.Supp 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (in moving to strike affirmative defense as insufficient, plaintiff

must demonstrate that under no set of circumstances could defense succeed). Furthermore,

Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendant’s 28th affirmative defense is immaterial because they

have not demonstrated that the defense “could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of

the litigation.” Terry v. McBride, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 89736 at *30 (S.D. Cal. 2009).

4. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove that Defendant’s affirmative defenses

are “insufficient” or “immaterial.” There are a variety of circumstances within which Defendant

may prevail on its defenses. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s 28th, 29th, and

35th affirmative defenses in the First Amended Answer is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 8, 2013

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. BERNARD G. SKOMAL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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