Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00754/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00754-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD B. SPENCER,

Plaintiff,

v.

N. FAIRFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:14-cv-00754-DAD-EPG

ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT FINDINGS 

AND RECOMMENDATIONS, GRANTING 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND, 

FINDING THE SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF 

ACTION, AND INITIATING SERVICE

(Doc. Nos. 16, 19)

Edward B. Spencer (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a 

United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On February 11, 2016, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and 

recommendations recommending this action be dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. No. 16.) On February 29, 2016, plaintiff filed 

objections to the findings and recommendations as well as a motion seeking leave to file a second 

amended complaint. (Doc. Nos. 17, 19.) Plaintiff also lodged a proposed second amended 

complaint. (Doc. No. 20.)

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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304, the 

undersigned has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire 

file, including plaintiff’s objections to the pending findings and recommendations and his motion 

to amend, the undersigned declines to adopt the findings and recommendations. 

In his complaint, and in his proposed first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges claims for 

retaliation against defendants Correctional Officers Fairfield and Lopez. The magistrate judge

screened the initial complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim and granted leave to 

amend. (Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on February 17, 2015. (Doc. No. 

11.) In the pending findings and recommendations, the assigned magistrate judge finds 

concluded that the first amended complaint failed to state any cognizable claims, and that the 

deficiencies could not be cured by further amendment. Accordingly, the magistrate judge 

recommended the complaint be dismissed without further leave to amend.

Plaintiff objects to the magistrate’s findings and recommendations and requests leave to 

file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff’s argument in support of his motion to amend is found 

in his objections to the findings and recommendations. (Doc. No. 17.) Therein, plaintiff argues 

he should be permitted to further amend the complaint because his proposed second amended 

complaint cures the noted deficiencies in the first amended complaint. Plaintiff has submitted a 

second amended complaint for the court’s consideration. As discussed below, the undersigned 

finds plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint does state a claim against defendants. 

Accordingly, the case will be referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for further 

proceedings.

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend their 

pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a). Otherwise, a party may amend only by leave of court or by written consent of the 

adverse party. Id. “Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.’” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 445 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). However, courts “need not grant leave to amend 

where the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces 

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an undue delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.” Id. Because plaintiff has already amended his

complaint once, he requires leave of court to file a second amended complaint. Since this case is 

before the court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, there is no prejudice to the opposing 

party or undue delay in the litigation if further amendment were to be permitted. Therefore, the 

only basis for not permitting amendment is if it is futile. 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005). Accord Watison 

v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The adverse action need not be an independent constitutional harm, and the “mere 

threat of harm can be an adverse action.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. 

The first element for such a claim requires plaintiff to allege an adverse action. Adverse 

actions that have been held sufficient by the Ninth Circuit under this test include situations where: 

1) officers “arbitrarily confiscated, withheld, and eventually destroyed [a plaintiff’s] property, 

threatened to transfer [the plaintiff] to another correctional institution, and ultimately assaulted 

him,” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568; 2) an officer “filed a false disciplinary charge” against plaintiff, 

resulting in him being placed in administrative segregation and having a parole board deny his 

parole, Watison, 668 F.3d at 1115; and even 3) where an officer noted on the denial of an appeal 

form, “I’d also like to warn you to be careful what you write, req[u]est on this form,” Brodheim v. 

Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1265–66, 1269–71 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, plaintiff alleges he was moved to a 

different housing block, which housed more violent offenders, two weeks after filing a prison 

grievance against defendant Fairfield. (Doc. No. 20 at ¶¶ 15–17, 44(b).) Given the decisions 

cited above, the undersigned concludes that moving an inmate to a different cell in a different 

housing block—especially when it is alleged that block houses more violent inmates and affords 

fewer opportunities than the prisoner’s housing—could be sufficiently adverse to satisfy this 

element of the above test.

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Second, plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected conduct. It is indisputable that 

filing a prison grievance is protected conduct under the First Amendment. See Watison, 668 F.3d 

at 1114 (citing Rhodes 408 F.3d at 568).

Third, plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the protected conduct and the 

adverse action. “Because direct evidence of retaliatory intent rarely can be pleaded in a 

complaint, allegation of a chronology of events from which retaliation can be inferred is sufficient 

to survive dismissal.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 (citing Pratt v. Rowland , 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th 

Cir. 1995)). Here, plaintiff alleged he was transferred between units in the same prison two 

weeks after submitting a prisoner grievance about defendant Fairfield. (Doc. No. 20 at ¶¶ 15–17.) 

Plaintiff also alleges when he requested to be allowed to move into an empty bunk in another 

inmate’s cell instead of being transferred, he was refused and told by defendants, “We have 

accommodated you enough.” (Doc. No. 20 at ¶ 30.) The alleged housing transfer is sufficiently 

close in time to the protected conduct for a retaliatory intent to be inferred and is sufficient to 

survive dismissal at this stage of the litigation.

Fourth, plaintiff alleges this retaliatory conduct had a chilling effect on both his and other 

prisoner’s exercise of their First Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 20 at ¶ 44(a)–(h).) This is in part 

because plaintiff alleges that the two units house offenders of different security levels (Doc. No. 

20 at ¶ 44(b)), because one unit has fewer dayroom activities than the other (Doc. No. 20 at 

¶ 44(d)), and because such transfers may deprive inmates of contact with friends they have 

developed in a given housing unit (Doc. No. 20 at ¶ 44(e)).

Fifth, plaintiff alleges this transfer did not advance a legitimate penological goal, because 

the reason given by defendants—that they needed a full cell into which to transfer a new 

prisoner—was belied by their refusal of plaintiff’s offer to share a double-occupancy cell with 

another prisoner who was living alone, thereby freeing up a full cell. (Doc. No. 20 at ¶ 20–32.) 

The Ninth Circuit has noted the factors the Supreme Court has announced may be considered in 

analyzing this prong of the applicable test: 1) whether there is a valid rational connection between 

the regulation or decision at issue and a legitimate, neutral government interest put forward to 

justify it; 2) the existence of alternative means of inmates exercising their First Amendment 

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rights; 3) the impact accommodation of the right will have on guards, other inmates, and the 

allocation of prison resources generally; and 4) the absence of ready alternative available to the 

prison for achieving their objectives. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1272 (citing Shaw v. Murphy, 532 

U.S. 223, 228 (2001)). 

The undersigned concludes plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts, which if taken as true 

and when considering the timing, suggest his housing transfer was retaliatory. Defendants may 

well be able to provide a legitimate penological reason for the transfer that defeats plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim. However, plaintiff has provided enough facts to suggest he was given a reason 

which, assuming the truth of the facts plaintiff states and drawing the appropriate inferences in his 

favor, was pretextual. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has found this prong satisfied at the pleading 

stage when a plaintiff successfully pleads the conduct at issue is retaliatory, presumably because 

retaliatory conduct meant to inhibit First Amendment expression can never be a legitimate 

penological goal. See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1115–17. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. The findings and recommendations (Doc. No. 16) are not adopted;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. No. 19) is 

granted, and the Clerk of Court is directed to file the second amended complaint, which 

was lodged on February 29, 2016 (Doc. No. 20);

3. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is found to state a cognizable claim for First 

Amendment retaliation against the defendants, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A;

4. Service should be initiated on all defendants. The Clerk of Court is directed to send 

plaintiff two (2) USM-285 forms, two (2) summons, a Notice of Submission of 

Documents form, an instruction sheet, and a copy of the second amended complaint, filed 

February 29, 2016 (Doc. No. 20);

5. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff should complete 

and return to the court the Notice of Submission of Documents form along with the 

following documents:

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a. Two (2) completed summons,

b. One (1) completed USM-285 form for each defendant,

c. Three (3) copies of the second amended complaint filed February 29, 2016; and

6. Upon receipt of the above-described documents, the court directs the United States 

Marshal’s Service to serve the above-named defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4 without payments or costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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