Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07038/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07038-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 1996 Decided May 31, 1996

No. 95-7038

CHARLES BRIDGES,

APPELLANT 

v.

SHARON PRATT KELLY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv01559)

Charles Bridges, appearing pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Martin B. White, Assistant CorporationCounsel, argued the cause for appellees, withwhomCharles

F.Ruff,CorporationCounsel,CharlesL. Reischel, DeputyCorporationCounsel, and LutzA.Prager,

Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief. Garland Pinkston, Jr., Principal Deputy

Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Appellant Charles Bridges was terminated from his position as an

attorney-advisor in the District of Columbia's Department of Administrative Services ("DAS")

pursuant to a 1993 reduction-in-force ("RIF") action. Appellant brought suit in federal court against

the District of Columbia ("D.C." or "the District") and various D.C. officials, alleging that his 1993

termination was the last in a series of actionstaken against him in retaliation for hisfiling of a lawsuit

challenging a 1991 RIF notice that was canceled before it took effect. In his complaint, which alleges

violations ofrights protected under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), theVeteransReemployment

Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988) ("VRA"), and the United States Constitution, appellant requests

reinstatement with associated benefits, a total of $8 million in compensatory damages, and a total of

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 1 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1 We find no merit in appellant's claim of bias on the part of the District Court, and we reject

his request to reassign this case to another judge.

In addition, apart from a warning, which we hereby issue, we decline to take further

disciplinary action against appellees' counsel for his failure to comply with filing deadlines

established by the court. Although counsel's conduct was careless, it was not attributable to any

willful conduct and it caused no prejudice to appellant, so no sanction other than a warning is

warranted in this instance. 

$20 million in punitive damages.

Prior to filing his action in District Court, appellant exercised his right under D.C. law to

appeal his 1993 termination to the District's Office of Employee Appeals ("OEA"). Although this

administrative appeal was filed on or about August 13, 1993, and the statutory deadlines for OEA

action have long passed, appellant's OEA claim has not yet been adjudicated and remains pending

before the local agency. On the assumption that the matters in issue in the federal court action could

be pursued before the OEA, the District Court applied the doctrine of equitable restraint, set forth

in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny, and dismissed appellant's complaint.

Appellees concede in their brief before this court that a Younger-grounded dismissal was

improper asto certain of appellant's claims, but not asto all. Brief for Appellees at 6, 8, 14. We find

that, even assuming, arguendo, that the Younger doctrine may be employed in lawsuitsinvolving the

District of Columbia, Younger clearly has no application here. This is because, in the instant case,

appellant has raised federal claims and sought relief that are beyond the compass of the D.C.

administrative/judicialsystem. In particular, it is conceded that appellant could not receive from the

D.C. system the full panoply of remedies available to him from the District Court in connection with

his federal claims. On this record, we hold that there was no basis for a dismissal of appellant's

lawsuit pursuant to Younger. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.1

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint Allegations and Prayer for Relief

According to his complaint, appellant held a position of attorney-advisor and functioned as

a claims officer in the District's DAS for five years prior to his termination in 1993. Appellant's

troubles with the District began in the Fall of 1991, shortly after his return from active service with

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 2 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2 An appeal of appellant's lawsuit challenging the 1991 RIF action remained pending before

this court until April 26, 1994, when the case was dismissed as moot, because "[a]ppellant's

employment with the D.C. government was never terminated, and appellant failed to amend his

complaint to allege any injury resulting from mere notice of termination." Bridges v. District of

Columbia, No. 92-7224 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Judgment"). 

3 The D.C. Court of Appeals has described the creation and role of the OEA as follows:

The Merit Personnel Act was enacted to establish a comprehensive

the United States Army Reserves in the Persian Gulf War. By letter dated October 1, 1991, the

District notified appellant that, pursuant to a RIF being undertaken pursuant to the District of

Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act of 1978 Emergency Amendment Act of

1991, 38 D.C. Reg. 4935 (1991), he would be terminated effective November 8, 1991.

Appellant filed a lawsuit challenging the separation notice as violative of, inter alia, his

retention rights under the VRA, which mandates that reservists returning to their old jobs following

a period of active duty cannot be discharged, except for cause, for a period of one year. See 38

U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)(1) & 2024(b) (1988). The complaint states that the United States Department

ofLabor ("DOL") also intervened on appellant's behalfincontesting the separationnotice. Complaint

¶ 5, reprinted in Appellant's Appendix ("App.") Section B; see also 38 U.S.C. § 2025 (1988) (The

VRA directs DOL to assist veterans in resuming their former positions upon returning from active

duty.). In recognition of appellant's retention protection, the District canceled the October 1

separation notice on October 28, 1991.2

Appellant allegesin his complaint that, following the District'srescission of the October 1991

separation notice, his supervisors "subjected [him] to a continuous pattern of harassment for nearly

two years... in retaliation for [his] law suit" challenging the separation notice. Complaint WW 5, 17,

reprinted in App. Section B. According to appellant, this harassment entailed a variety of adverse

personnel actions and culminated in the issuance of a second RIF-based separation notice on June 18,

1993, pursuant to which appellant was terminated from employment with the District on July 23,

1993.

Appellant exercised his right under D.C. law to appeal his 1993 termination to the District's

OEA,3 with a subsequent right to judicialreview in the D.C. Superior Court.4 Section 1-606.3 of the

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 3 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

merit-based personnel system for employees of the District of Columbia. In order

to ensure compliance with the merit system principles set forth in the Act, its

drafters created the OEA, a quasi-judicial body empowered to review final agency

decisions affecting, inter alia, performance ratings, adverse actions, and employee

grievances. Although the Act does not define the standards by which the OEA is

to review these decisions, it is self-evident from both the statute and its legislative

history that the OEA is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency and

that its role ... is simply to ensure that managerial discretion has been legitimately

invoked and properly exercised. Indeed, the OEA's own regulations state that it

will uphold an agency decision unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence,

(2) there was harmful procedural error, or (3) it was not in accordance with law or

applicable regulations.

Stokes v. District of Columbia, 502 A.2d 1006, 1009-10 (D.C. 1985) (internal quotation and

citations omitted). 

4 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-606.3 (1992) states, in part, as follows:

(a) Any employee may appeal a final agency decision affecting ... a

reduction-in-force ... to the Office [of Employee Appeals] upon the record and

under such other rules and regulations which the Office may issue.

* * * * *

(d) Any employee or agency may appeal the decision of the Office to the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia for a review of the record and such Court may

affirm, reverse, remove, or modify such decision, or take any other appropriate

action the Court may deem necessary. 

5 At oral argument, appellant suggested that he had received authorization from the D.C.

Court of Appeals to withdraw his OEA appeal and that he had in fact voluntarily dismissed the

agency case during the pendency of his appeal before this court. Our review of the parties'

post-argument filings, however, indicates that the OEA has yet to rule on appellant's request for

voluntary dismissal, and, as near as we can tell, the D.C. Court of Appeals has offered no opinion

D.C. Code provides that the OEA Hearing Examiner shall render a decision "within 120 days,

excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, from the date of the appellant'sfiling of the appeal

with the [OEA]," the only exception being that the OEA "may promulgate rules to allow a Hearing

Examiner a reasonable extension of time if extraordinary circumstances dictate that an appeal cannot

be decided within the 120-day period." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-606.3(c) (1992). However, although

appellant filed his administrative appeal on or about August 13, 1993, Brief of the Appellant at 25,

and although the OEA apparently failed to extend the statutory time frame for adjudication of the

case, id. at 16, appellant's OEA appeal has not yet been adjudicated and remains pending before the

OEA.5 Appellant alleges in his complaint that his OEA appeal "has been unreasonably delayed

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 4 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

on the matter other than to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction appellant's petition for a writ of

mandamus ordering the OEA to rule on his pending motions. Thus, appellant's administrative

appeal is apparently still pending before the OEA. 

6 Two weeks after filing his complaint, appellant submitted a notice of typographical errors

stating, in part, as follows: "Page 20, Item 2, DAMAGES, the cumulative damages total from

Counts 1-4 should read $20,000,000.00 in lieu of $20,000.00." PRAECIPE ¶ 2. This correction

was made in accordance with the $5 million appellant requested as punitive damages for each of

the four counts of the complaint. 

beyond the required statutory 120 day time frame for adjudication, depriving [appellant] of due

process of law[ ]. OEA has failed to address three ... consecutive defaults by the District in that case;

and the administrative process does not provide complete and adequate relief to [appellant]...."

Complaint ¶ 5, reprinted in App. Section B.

In Counts One through Three, the complaint further alleges that the manner in which the

District effected appellant's 1993 termination, the pattern of harassment preceding the termination,

and theDistrict'smotive forsubjecting appellant to termination allrepresent conduct actionable under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint WW 10-42, reprinted in App. Section B. In particular, appellant

allegesthat his discharge was "a sham, an illegalscheme/device to oust him from hisjob ... in obvious

reprisal for a pending lawsuit and subsequent appeal, as well as for other illegal reasons." Id. ¶ 42,

reprinted in App. Section B. Finally, Count Four of the complaint alleges a section 1983 claim for

intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotionaldistress. Id. WW43-44,reprinted in App. Section

B.

Appellant's prayer for relief states as follows:

(1) All compensatory damages in the sum of $8,000,000 [$2 million for each of the four counts of

the complaint], or as the Court believes just and due, and it is requested that the court grant

[appellant] reinstatement to his job with full seniority rights, back pay with accumulated

raises, restoration of annual leave, accumulated sick leave, pension entitlements, and other

benefits [appellant] is entitled to by his employment and damages for humiliation, pain,

suffering, embarrassment, loss of reputation, nervous condition, the intentional and/or

negligent infliction of mental and emotional distress, anxiety, and harassment.

(2) Punitive Damages in the amount of $20,000.00 [intended to read "$20,000,000.00"

6

].

(3) The cost of this action and [appellant's] expenses incurred in this matter, including reasonable

attorney fees. (42 U.S.C. § 1988)

(4) And such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper in law and equity.

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 5 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Id. at 19-20, reprinted in App. Section B.

B. Proceedings Before the District Court

Appellant filed his complaint before the District Court on July 15, 1994. One week later, on

July 22, 1994, the District Court ordered Corporation Counselfor the District to respond by August

22, 1994, regarding whetherthe complaintshould be dismissed. On August 22, Corporation Counsel

filed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing that, in light of the pending OEA appeal

concerning appellant'stermination, the DistrictCourtshould dismiss appellant's complaint both under

the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint and for failure to exhaust local administrative remedies.

In support of its dismissal arguments, Corporation Counsel characterized appellant's complaint as

follows:

In essence, [appellant] merely seeksto have this Court review his employment

termination from the District. While the complaint attempts to set forth allegations

to give rise to federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint sets forth

allegations which amount to no more than [appellant] seeking to have this Court take

the place of the OEA and its authority to review [appellant's] termination.

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant District of Columbia's Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint at 5.

At a scheduled status hearing held on January 17, 1995, the trial judge decided to hear oral

argument from the parties concerning the issues presented by the pending motion to dismiss.

Corporation Counsel, in addition to the equitable restraint and exhaustion arguments raised in its

filings, also presented yet a third ground for dismissing appellant's complaint. According to

CorporationCounsel, appellant'sfederal constitutional claims boiled downto due process arguments,

which could be asserted before the OEA (and on appeal to the D.C. Superior Court) along with "any

other rights that [appellant] may wish to bring up." Transcript of Status Hearing ("Tr.") at 5,

reprinted in App. Section C. Thus, Corporation Counsel argued that appellant had "not been

deprived of any substantive due processrights;" rather, according to Corporation Counsel, appellant

already was pursuing under the D.C. administrative/judicial system "all the rights that he is entitled

to." Id.

At the conclusion of the parties' arguments, the trial judge stated as follows:

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 6 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Now, the best thing that I can do for you, Mr. Bridges, is this. I am going to dismiss

these claims in view of the pendency of the claim before the District of Columbia

Board, pursuant to the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act, without prejudice if you

lose, to assertion of these claims in the Superior Court.

In other words, I am not going to be the Judge that throws you out of court.

I am not going to do that to a lawyer. I am just not going to do it. I could dismiss

it with prejudice, I think, but I am not going to do that. I am going to do you a favor

and dismiss it without prejudice after this administrative adjudication takes place, so

that you will not be impaired.

I have written a brief memorandum to that effect.

Id. at 11, reprinted in App. Section C.

On January 18, 1995, the District Court filed a four-page Order disposing of the case.

Bridges v. Kelly, Civ. Action No. 94-1559 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 1995) ("Order"), reprinted in App.

Section D. The court accepted the view espoused by Corporation Counsel that, "[a]lthough

[appellant] hasfiled several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at bottom[appellant]seeksreinstatement

of his former position." Order at 2, reprinted in App. Section D. Without mention of Corporation

Counsel's arguments regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies or the due process nature of

the complaint's federal allegations, the District Court proceeded to apply the Younger doctrine of

equitable restraint to dismiss appellant's complaint based on the following findings:

First, there is an ongoing state proceeding because [appellant's] appeal of his

employment termination is now pending before the [OEA]. By statute, the OEA is

the proper entity to hear such an appeal. See D.C. Code § 1-606.3(d).

Second, [appellant's] assertion of improper removal from his employment

position pursuant to the District's official reduction-in-force implicates an important

state interest, due to the District's need to manage and supervise its public employee

labor force.

Last, there is an adequate opportunityfor [appellant]to raise federalquestions

in the pending administrative action. Pursuant to the statute that [appellant's]

administrative action is now proceeding under, a public employee has the right to

judicial review of an adverse ruling by the D.C. Superior Court, then the D.C. Court

of Appeals, and if necessary, the United States Supreme Court. See D.C. Code, §§

1-606.3(d), 11-102 and 11-721.

Id. at 3-4, reprinted in App. Section D. The court dismissed appellant's complaint "without

prejudice, from the dockets of this Court, subject to [appellant's] alleged right to later bring an

appropriate claim in the District of Columbia Superior Court." Id. at 4, reprinted in App. Section

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 7 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

7 The District Court referred to its dismissal of appellant's complaint as an application of the

"abstention doctrine" set forth in Younger v. Harris. Order at 2-3, reprinted in App. Section D.

However, in the interest of clarity, this opinion will refer to the doctrine enunciated in Younger v.

Harris as the doctrine of "equitable restraint," pursuant to which a federal case is dismissed (i.e.,

removed from the federal court's jurisdiction) on considerations of comity and federalism; 

equitable restraint is distinct from the "abstention" doctrine set forth in Railroad Commission of

Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), which does not result in dismissal, but rather serves

to delay federal adjudication while a local forum resolves pertinent issues of local law. See

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) ("Unlike those situations where a federal court

merely abstains from decision on federal questions until the resolution of underlying or related

state law issues ... Younger v. Harris contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and

the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts." (footnote omitted)); 

Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 207 n.11 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Younger ... requires dismissal of

the complaint rather than retention of jurisdiction as is the case under Pullman abstention."); see

also Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477-81 (1977), for a

discussion of the differing considerations underlying Younger equitable restraint and Pullman

abstention. See also Hoai v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 866 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Despite the District Court's curious statement that appellant's complaint was being

dismissed "without prejudice," it seems clear that the intention of the court and the understanding

of the parties was that appellant's complaint was being fully removed from the District Court's

jurisdiction pursuant to the teachings of Younger and its progeny. We assume that what the

District Court meant to say is that, in dismissing, the federal court was rendering no judgment on

the merits. In any event, this opinion will analyze the court's dismissal of appellant's complaint as

an application of the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint. 

D.7

II. ANALYSIS

"[T]he doctrine of Younger v. Harris ... and its progeny restrains federal courts from

interfering inongoing state judicialproceedings." DistrictPropertiesAssocs. v. District of Columbia,

743 F.2d 21, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court's espousal of the restraint doctrine "was based

partly on traditional principles of equity, but rested primarily on the "even more vital consideration'

of comity." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364

(1989) ("NOPSI") (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44) (citation omitted); see also Hoai v. Sun Ref.

& Mktg. Co., 866 F.2d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Under the Younger... doctrine of ... equitable

restraint, a federal court may dismiss an action when there is a direct conflict between the exercise

of federal and state jurisdiction and considerations of comity and federalism dictate that the federal

court should defer to the state proceedings.").

Nevertheless, because of "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise

the jurisdiction given them," Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 8 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

8 Because we find the facts of this case outside the scope of Younger's equitable restraint

doctrine, we need not, and do not, confront the still-open question avoided by previous panels of

this court regarding the extent to which Younger applies at all in situations where the ongoing,

non-federal proceeding is before an arm of the District of Columbia. In LaShawn v. Kelly, 990

F.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994), we recently stated as

follows:

This Court has never decided whether the District of Columbia is a state for

Younger abstention purposes. Instead, every time the question has arisen, we have

assumed that the doctrine applies to the District and nonetheless determined, in

light of the facts of each particular case, that Younger abstention has not been

appropriate. See, e.g., District Properties Assocs. v. Dist. of Columbia, 743 F.2d

21, 28 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d

695, 701 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In the present case, we again find it unnecessary

to reach the issue, because Younger abstention would not be required here even if

the doctrine applied to the District with full force.

But cf. Hoai, 866 F.2d at 1517, 1519 (In a case where the District Court stayed proceedings in an

attempt to avoid "questions arguably posed by Younger," the court found that an ongoing action

in D.C. Superior Court satisfied the "ongoing state proceedings" prong of Younger analysis.). 

Like the panels before us, we merely assume, arguendo, but do not decide, that the Younger

doctrine applies to the District. 

800, 817 (1976), the appropriateness of refraining "from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the

exception, not the rule," id. at 813; see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992)

(The Court observed that doctrines permitting federal courts to abstain from exercising their

jurisdiction "rarely should be invoked."); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813 (" "[A] doctrine of

abstention ... is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate

a controversy properly before it.' " (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.

185, 188 (1959))). Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Younger doctrine must be

applied in accordance with "the rule that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's

refusal to decide a case in deference to the States." NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368. We find no such

circumstances present in the instant case and therefore reverse the DistrictCourt'sruling that Younger

requires dismissal of appellant's federal complaint.8

For the Younger doctrine to apply,

a rigid three-prong test must be satisfied: first, a federal court may dismiss a federal

claim only when there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature;

second, the state proceedings must implicate important state interests; third, the

proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity in which to raise the federal claims.

Hoai, 866 F.2d at 1518 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 9 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

9 On the other hand, we are not at all certain that the OEA proceeding in this case can be

considered "ongoing" for Younger purposes. Appellant makes a powerful argument that the

District agency has defaulted on its statutory directive to issue a decision "within 120 days,

excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, from the date of the appellant's filing of the

appeal with the Office." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-606.3(c) (1992). Far from being resolved within

the 120-day period mandated by the statute, appellant's OEA appeal has languished for almost

three years. According to appellant, and the District has stated nothing to the contrary, OEA did

not even assign a judge until a year after appellant filed his administrative appeal, dispositive

motions filed before the agency years ago still have not been ruled upon, and the agency never

exercised its statutory option to promulgate rules allowing "a reasonable extension of time if

extraordinary circumstances dictate that an appeal cannot be decided within the 120-day period." 

Id.; see also Brief of the Appellant at 25; Reply Brief for Appellant at 11-12. Under these

circumstances, it is questionable whether a Younger-based dismissal of appellant's federal

complaint was appropriate because there simply is no "ongoing" local proceeding. However, we

need not decide this issue, because we find the inadequacy of the relief available to appellant

through the D.C. system to be a more apparent basis for reversal. 

423, 432 (1982)). We note at the outset that appellees concede in their brief that it was error for the

trial court to applyYoungerto appellant's claimsregarding "retaliatory" actions otherthan appellant's

actual employment termination, because the record is inadequate to establish that the other adverse

personnel actions allegedlytaken against appellant are the subject of anyongoing District proceeding,

as required under the first prong of Younger analysis. See Brief for Appellees at 6, 8, 14. However,

we also find that dismissal was inappropriate as to appellant's termination-related claims as well.

We agree with appellees that the OEA appeal process, with the attendant review in the D.C.

Superior Court and D.C. Court of Appeals, is judicial in nature,9and that the District has an

important interest in its own ability to implement reductions in the size of its workforce. However,

we find that the District Court erred in concluding that the OEA proceeding, together with the

availability of judicial review in the D.C. courts, presents an adequate forum in which appellant can

fully and fairly pursue his federal claims. The most obvious basis for our finding on this issue, and

the one on which we rest, isthe inability of the D.C. systemto grant appellant the fullreliefrequested

in connection with his federal claims.

Contrary to the District Court's assertion, appellant seeks much more than simply

reinstatement to his former position, with associated back pay and benefits. In connection with the

termination-related claims stated in Counts One and Three of his complaint, appellant seeks a total

of $4 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages; and appellant's 1993

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 10 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

10 The D.C. Code simply states that "[i]n any appeal taken pursuant to this section [including

an appeal of a final agency decision affecting a reduction-in-force], the [OEA] shall review the

record and uphold, reverse, or modify the decision of the agency." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-

606.3(a), (b) (1992). Although there is case law to support appellees' contention that the OEA is

empowered to order reinstatement with back pay and some associated benefits, Brief for

Appellees at 11; see also District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 635 & n.25 (D.C.)

(The court observed that an employee who files an appeal before the OEA is "able to seek

reinstatement, and perhaps back pay."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942 (1991), such relief is far

narrower than the remedies appellant requests from the District Court. 

11 To the contrary, it appears that D.C. courts reviewing decisions of the OEA apply the

"arbitrary and capricious" standard typical for judicial review of agency action. See Office of the

Dist. of Columbia Controller v. Frost, 638 A.2d 657, 660 (D.C. 1994) ("[W]e examine the

agency record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support OEA's findings of

fact, or whether OEA's action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." (internal

quotation omitted)). It would seem that, as a necessary corollary of this standard of review, a

D.C. court hearing an appeal from the OEA would not entertain claims and arguments not raised,

or not eligible to be raised, before the agency. Cf. Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 568 & n.9

(D.C. 1992) (The court noted that the language of section 1-606.3(d) authorizing "appeal" of an

OEA decision to the Superior Court was to be contrasted with the language of a different D.C.

Code section deemed to authorize an "original proceeding" in which the court could exercise de

novo review and address matters not considered by the agency.). 

termination is part of the basis for Count Four's allegation of intentional and/or negligent infliction

of emotional distress, pursuant to which appellant seeks an additional $2 million in compensatory

damages and $5 million in punitives. See Complaint at 10-11, 15-18, reprinted in App. Section B.

We find nothing in the D.C. Code, and appellees cite nothing, authorizing the OEA to grant relief

such as punitive damages and compensatory damages (in excess of back pay and benefits) for harms

flowing from tortious conduct.10 Nor have we found anything suggesting that, on appeal from the

OEA, the D.C. Superior Court or Court of Appeals could entertain requests for relief that were not

cognizable before the OEA.11 Indeed, counsel for the District conceded at oral argument that the

OEA and reviewing D.C. courts could not provide appellant the full relief he seeks under his section

1983 claims.

Following our decision in District Properties, we hold here that the inability of the D.C.

system to afford appellant the full relief he seeks in connection with his federal claims is sufficient to

preclude dismissal under Younger. In District Propertieswhere appellant landlords challenged the

operation of the District agency responsible for administering local rent control lawswe observed

that the landlords' charges, if proven true, might well entitle them "to broader ... forms of relief " than

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 11 of 12
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

were available from the agency or under the judicial review procedures authorized by D.C. law. 743

F.2d at 26. Therefore, we rejected the District Court's application of Younger equitable restraint:

Younger principles do not require dismissal of appellants' complaint, for there are no

ongoing proceedingsin the local[system] in which appellants could raise their federal

... claims.... [A]ppellants' claims are in a number of respects considerably broader

than the claims they were able to assert in the proceedings in local courts or before

[the agency] itself. And the relief they seek in this case isfar broaderthan that which

the local court could have granted in the administrative review proceeding.

Therefore, the District Court erred in its ... holding that this case should be dismissed

on Younger grounds. There being no pending state ... proceedings that would have

afforded appellants a full and fair opportunity to litigate their [federal] claims, the

predicate for Younger abstention was simply absent in this case.

Id. at 28 (emphasis added). The same reasoning applies here. Accordingly, we reverse the District

Court's decision dismissing appellant's complaint on grounds of equitable restraint.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's dismissal of appellant's complaint is

reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #95-7038 Document #203323 Filed: 05/31/1996 Page 12 of 12