Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02839/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02839-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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16cv2839-JLS (PCL)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIALLO B. DARRINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD D. HUFFMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv2839-JLS (PCL)

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH 

PREJUDICE

(ECF No. 4)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), (ECF 

No. 4). The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, but 

dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1983 case without prejudice pursuant to its sua sponte 

screening duty under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). (See generally Order 

Granting Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Dismissing Compl. Without Prejudice 

(“Prior Dismissal Order”), ECF No. 3.) Specifically, the Court noted that although it 

“entertains serious doubts that Plaintiff will be able to cure his Complaint through 

amendment, Plaintiff is nonetheless granted leave to amend his Complaint.” (Id. at 4 

(emphasis removed).) This was because:

Plaintiff’s claims against the three named Defendants are for actions taken in 

their judicial capacities, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)

(“[W]hether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the nature of the 

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16cv2839-JLS (PCL)

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act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to 

the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his 

judicial capacity.”), and Section 1983 explicitly prohibits Plaintiff’s requested

form of relief: “[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 

omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not 

be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 

unavailable[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although there may well be other 

deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint, this alone is sufficient to warrant 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.

Id.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint again asserts Section 1983 claims against California 

Associate Justices Richard D. Huffman, Gilbert Nares, and Terry B. O’Rourke. The claims 

again center on “[t]he failure of [each Justice] to either reverse the lower court[,] void 

judgment, or take judicial notice pursuant to [the California Evidence Code] . . . .” (Am. 

Compl. 2.) As previously explained, this type of suit is explicitly barred both by the 

doctrine of judicial immunity and Section 1983 itself. Accordingly, Plaintiff again fails the 

sua sponte screening and—because Plaintiff has for a second time failed to assert a viable 

claim for relief, and because it appears from both iterations of Plaintiff’s Complaint that 

the core of Plaintiff’s alleged harm stems from valid judicial proceedings—the Court this 

time DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See also, e.g., 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining 

federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought by state-court losers 

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments”).

Because this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 20, 2017

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