Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01985/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01985-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICKAIL MYLES,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15cv1985-BEN (BLM)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO TAKE DISCOVERY AFTER 

THE CUTOFF AND TO COMPEL 

DEPOSITIONS OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY 

SHERIFF WILLIAM GORE AND SAN 

DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT CHIEF LEGAL ADVISOR 

ROBERT FAIGIN AND PRODUCTION OF 

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 

[ECF No. 31]

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s July 19, 2016 “Motion to Take Discovery After the 

Cutoff and to Compel Depositions of San Diego County Sheriff William Gore and San Diego 

County Sheriff’s Department Chief Legal Advisor Robert Faigin and Production of Additional 

Documents” [ECF No. 31 (“MTC”)], Defendants’ August 2, 2016 opposition to the motion [ECF 

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No. 33 (“Oppo.”)], and Plaintiff’s August 5, 2016 reply [ECF No. 34 (“Reply”)]. Having 

considered the briefing submitted by the parties and having reviewed all of the supporting 

exhibits, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for the reasons set forth below.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 4, 2015, Plaintiff Mickail Myles filed a complaint against the County of San 

Diego and Deputy Jeremy Banks, employed by the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, 

alleging assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, violation of California Civil Code §§ 51.7 & 52.1, and violation of civil rights 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2)-(3), 1986. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that he was 

“unlawfully profiled, stopped, detained, hand-cuffed, assaulted, battered, beaten, bitten, 

berated, defamed, falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned, cited and threatened to be charged with 

crimes he did not commit, by armed, uniformed, on-duty law enforcement officers, solely 

because he was a black man driving his own car to his family home in a predominately white 

neighborhood in Fallbrook, California.” Id. at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on 

September 5, 2014, he was driving his younger brother home from a local indoor roller-rink and,

about a block from his home, noticed a police car with activated emergency lights behind his 

car. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff claims that he pulled his car over to the curb, waited for an officer to 

approach his driver’s side window with instructions, and when no officer approached, rolled 

down his driver’s side window. Id. at 9. Plaintiff states that he then heard a “cacophony of 

voices coming from the area behind his vehicle screaming at him and making numerous 

confusing and inconsistent demands,” as well as “barking, growling and snarling” from a police 

dog. Id. Plaintiff maintains that he attempted to comply with the officers’ commands by opening 

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his driver’s side door, exiting the car, raising his hands above his head, facing away, and walking 

backward toward the officers, before he was hand-cuffed. Id. Plaintiff asserts that although he 

was “hand-cuffed, unarmed, passive and completely non-threatening toward the officers,” the 

officers “beat[] him about the head with a club” and commanded their dog to attack him. Id. 

Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that Defendants were negligent in their hiring and screening practices, 

failed to supervise, investigate or discipline for wrongdoing, engaged in “cover-up” of police 

misconduct, and adhered to a “code of silence.” Id. at 4-8. Plaintiff further claims that prior to 

the incident at issue, Defendants had “engaged in the same or similar conduct [as alleged in 

Plaintiff’s complaint] with respect to other minority members of the general public.” Id. at 12.

On May 4, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel 

the production of police records held by Defendant County of San Diego. ECF No. 24. The 

Court ordered the production of various categories of documents concerning Defendant Deputy 

Banks and four non-party deputies who were present at the scene during Plaintiff’s incident. 

See id. Following Defendants’ production of responsive documents, Plaintiff brought the instant 

motion seeking to expand the scope of discovery and to extend the discovery cutoff, as well as 

to depose Sheriff Gore and Sheriff Department’s Chief Legal Advisor Faigin. See MTC. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is defined as follows: 

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant 

to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, 

considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 

controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’

resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 

the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. 

Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to 

be discoverable.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). District courts also have broad discretion 

to limit discovery to prevent its abuse. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (instructing that courts must 

limit discovery where the party seeking the discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the 

information by discovery in the action” or where the proposed discovery is “unreasonably 

cumulative or duplicative,” “obtain[able] from some other source that is more convenient, less 

burdensome, or less expensive,” or where it “is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)”). 

A party may request the production of any document within the scope of Rule 26(b). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). “For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection 

and related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for 

objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Id. at 34(b)(2)(B). The responding party is 

responsible for all items in “the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Id. at 

34(a)(1). Actual possession, custody or control is not required. Rather, “[a] party may be 

ordered to produce a document in the possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal 

right to obtain the document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the 

document.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, “a party may move for an order compelling 

disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). The party seeking to compel discovery has 

the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevance requirement of Rule 26. Soto, 

162 F.R.D. at 610. Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the 

discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of “clarifying, explaining, and supporting its 

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objections.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Blankenship 

v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Sheriff Gore

Plaintiff seeks to depose Sheriff Gore and claims that “Sheriff Gore’s public appearance 

in the media condoning [D]eputy Banks’ conduct in the severe use of force against a juvenile, 

without the benefit of any internal affairs [“IA”] investigation, is consistent with the policy, 

custom and practice in the Sheriff’s Department of covering-up, hiding, excusing, ratifying and, 

in fact, commending and encouraging the systematic use of excessive force and other abusive 

police tactics . . . .” MTC, Declaration of Joseph G. Dicks (“Dicks Decl.”) at 5-6; MTC at 18-19.

Plaintiff argues that Sheriff Gore’s deposition is relevant because it will substantiate his Monell

claim1 against the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department and his pending motion to amend to 

add Sheriff Gore as a defendant. Dicks Decl. at 6; MTC at 19-20 (citing Chew v. City of Los 

Angeles, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion arguing that Plaintiff’s request to depose Sheriff 

Gore is premature because Sheriff Gore is not a party in this action, and Plaintiff’s motion to add

Sheriff Gore as a defendant has not yet been adjudicated. Oppo. at 14-15. Defendants further 

claim that Plaintiff already has deposed “persons most qualified in the areas of Internal Affairs 

 

1 A municipality can be sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the “execution 

of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts 

or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of 

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 

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investigations/policies, claims/command investigations and policies, use of force policies, use of 

K-9s (policies and training) and personnel files,” “all officers on scene in the subject incident, 

including Deputy Banks,” and has obtained all “IA investigations involving the five on-scene 

officers and Deputy Banks’ personnel file.” Id. at 14. Defendants also argue that the June 13, 

2015 incident regarding which Sheriff Gore held a press conference is unrelated because it 

occurred nine months after the incident at issue in this case and involved different 

circumstances.

2

Id. at 15. 

Plaintiff replies that after he obtained “the evidence that Gore was ratifying, encouraging, 

condoning and commending his deputies’ conduct without the benefit of a single internal affairs 

investigation,” he had proof that Sheriff Gore was a “moving force behind the policies, 

procedures and practices,” thereby justifying the deposition. Reply at 7 (emphasis omitted). 

Plaintiff objects to any restrictions on the scope of the requested deposition arguing that they 

would prevent questioning about Sheriff Gore’s understanding and implementation of policies 

and procedures at issue in this case. Id. at 8. Plaintiff asserts that in light of his Monell claim 

and his “potential” claim against Sheriff Gore individually, he is entitled to discover evidence of 

a supervisor’s participation that “may involve the setting in motion of acts which cause others 

to inflict constitutional injury.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Courts have often observed that discovery seeking the deposition of high-level 

executives (so-called ‘apex’ depositions) creates ‘a tremendous potential for abuse or 

 

2

 Defendants explain that during the June 13, 2015 incident Deputy Banks was bitten by a 

juvenile resisting detention, whereas in this case, Plaintiff was bitten by Deputy Banks’ K-9. Id.

at 15.

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harassment’ that may require the court’s intervention for the witness’s protection under 

Rule 26(c).” K.C.R. v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 2014 WL 3434257, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) 

(quoting Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 282 F.R.D. 259, 263 (N.D. Cal. 2012)). In 

order to avoid an apex deposition, the individual must first show that he or she is sufficiently 

high-ranking to merit protection. If the witness is able to do so, the party seeking to depose 

the official must “show (1) the official’s testimony is necessary to obtain relevant information 

that is not available from another source; (2) the official has first-hand information that cannot 

reasonably be obtained from other sources; (3) the testimony is essential to the case at hand; 

(4) the deposition would not significantly interfere with the ability of the official to perform his 

government duties; and (5) the evidence sought is not available through less burdensome means 

or alternative sources.” Thomas v. Cate, 2010 WL 1343789, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010). The 

apex doctrine does not protect high-ranking officials from all depositions. K.C.R., 2014 WL 

3434257, at *3. “In determining whether to allow an apex deposition, courts consider 

(1) whether the deponent has unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge of the facts at issue 

in the case and (2) whether the party seeking the deposition has exhausted other less intrusive 

discovery methods.” Id. (citing Apple Inc., 282 F.R.D. at 263). If, however, the official is 

“removed from the daily subjects of the litigation, [and] has no unique personal knowledge of 

the facts at issue, a deposition of the official is improper.” Id. at *4 (quoting Celerity, Inc. v. 

Ultra Clean Holding, Inc., 2007 WL 205067, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2007)). Courts also 

generally do not permit depositions of high ranking officials to occur before the depositions of 

lower ranking employees with more direct knowledge of the case have been taken. Id. 

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Plaintiff acknowledges that Sheriff Gore is the San Diego Sheriff’s Department’s chief 

policy maker and highest ranking government officer. See MTC at 19. As such, the Court finds 

that Sheriff Gore is a high-ranking government official. See Jarbo v. County of Orange, 2010 

WL 3584440, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2010) (finding that the Sheriff of Orange County was a 

high-ranking government official not subject to deposition absent extraordinary circumstances);

Holguin v. County of Los Angeles, 2011 WL 7128640, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011) (finding 

that the Sheriff of Los Angeles County was a high-ranking official not subject to deposition 

absent extraordinary circumstances). Because Sheriff Gore is a high-ranking government 

official, the burden switches to Plaintiff to demonstrate the need for Mr. Gore’s testimony. 

Thomas, 2010 WL 1343789, at *1. Plaintiff does not carry his burden. 

Initially, the Court notes that Sheriff Gore is not a named defendant and the fact that 

Plaintiff is seeking leave to amend his complaint to add Sheriff Gore as a named defendant does 

not justify the deposition.

3

 Plaintiff does not assert that Sheriff Gore was present for or 

participated in the conduct underlying the conduct in this case. Plaintiff also does not identify 

the specific information that can only be obtained from Sheriff Gore. Rather, Plaintiff relies on 

an expert opinion to argue that he should be able to depose Sheriff Gore because he is the chief 

 

3

 Plaintiff relies on Chew, 27 F.3d 1432, to argue that it is not unusual to depose a department 

head. MTC at 20. In Chew, Plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against the City of Los Angeles, 

Police Chief Gates, police officers who trained the canine unit, and the supervisors of the canine 

unit, alleging that the release of the police dog that assaulted plaintiff violated his constitutional 

rights. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1435-36. In Chew, Chief Gates was named as a defendant, whereas 

in this case, Sheriff Gore has not been named as a defendant. Id. at 1435. As such, at this 

stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff’s reliance on Chew to support his motion to compel Sheriff 

Gore’s deposition is unavailing.

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policy maker and Plaintiff seeks to depose Sheriff Gore regarding the San Diego County Sheriff’s 

Department’s practices concerning the training, supervision, review, investigation and discipline 

for “violations of policy and law relating to use of force, including racially discriminatory use of 

force against ethnic minorities.” See MTC at 18-20; id., Expert Report of Jeffrey J. Noble (“Noble 

Rpt.”) at 6-8. However, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence establishing that Sheriff Gore 

has “unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge” of the San Diego County Sheriff’s 

Department’s policies and practices. See K.C.R., 2014 WL 3434257, at *3. Plaintiff already has 

deposed the “persons most qualified in the areas of Internal Affairs investigations/policies, 

claims/command investigations and policies, use of force policies, use of K-9s (policies and 

training), and personnel files.” See Oppo. at 14. Plaintiff also has deposed Deputy Banks and

all officers on the scene during Plaintiff’s incident, and has obtained all “IA investigations 

involving the five on-scene officers and Deputy Banks’ personnel files.” Id. Additionally, 

according to Plaintiff’s own assertions, the evidence he already has obtained during the course 

of discovery “establishes the County’s liability for its willful failure to property investigate 

allegations of officer misconduct,” and Sheriff Gore’s deposition will only “buttress and support 

the highly revealing discovery obtained to date.” MTC at 19.

The only specific action taken by Sheriff Gore identified by Plaintiff as justifying the 

requested deposition is the press conference held by Sheriff Gore many months after Plaintiff’s 

incident. See id. at 15; Oppo. at 14. On June 13, 2015, Deputy Banks was on patrol and 

encountered a minor who was reported as a “runaway.” MTC at 15. According to Plaintiff,

during the encounter, Defendant Banks struck, pushed, pulled, and tased the minor, and 

attempted to apply a “carotid sleeper.” Id. Within two days of the incident, Sheriff Gore held a 

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press conference during which he discussed Banks’ actions, responded to questions about the 

incident, and displayed photos of the injuries Banks suffered during the incident. See id.; Oppo. 

at 11; see also MTC, Exh. J. Defendants argue that this incident is different because Deputy 

Banks was bitten by the juvenile who was resisting arrest and the fact that Sheriff Gore spoke 

about the incident at a press conference does not justify his deposition in this case. Oppo. at

15. The Court agrees with Defendants. The fact that Sheriff Gore spoke at a press conference 

addressing a different incident that occurred many months after the incident in this case, even 

considering the fact that Deputy Banks was involved in both incidents, does not justify deposing 

Sheriff Gore in this case.

The Court finds that at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has not established that 

Sheriff Gore’s testimony “is necessary to obtain relevant information that is not available from 

another source” and is “essential to the case at hand,” or that Sheriff Gore “has first-hand 

information that cannot reasonably be obtained from other sources.” See Thomas, 2010 WL 

1343789, at *1. Because Sheriff Gore is a high-ranking official who is not a named defendant 

in this action and to whom the apex doctrine applies, and because Plaintiff has not established 

the requisite need for Sheriff Gore’s testimony, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff’s motion to compel Sheriff Gore’s deposition. See Holguin, 2011 WL 7128640, at *3-4 

(barring plaintiff from deposing the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, where plaintiff’s complaint 

alleged a Monell claim against the County for the Sheriff’s Department’s use of force, its internal 

procedures for investigating use of force incidents, and its lack of discipline of officers).

///

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II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Robert Faigin

Plaintiff seeks to depose Robert Faigin, the Sheriff Department’s Chief Legal Advisor. MTC 

at 20-21. In support, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ discovery responses were misleading and 

the document production was incomplete, and that Mr. Faigin verified all of the discovery 

responses under the penalty of perjury. Id. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to depose Mr. 

Faigin as the person responsible for assuring the accuracy and completeness of the discovery 

responses, privilege log and produced documents. Id. at 20-21. Plaintiff also argues that 

Defendants may not assert any privilege based on Mr. Faigin’s title or position, because Mr. 

Faigin waived any alleged privilege as the “verifier of the truth” of the Sheriff Department’s

discovery responses. Id. at 21.

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion arguing that Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 does not require a 

verification and that Plaintiff is thus mistaken that Mr. Faigin “verified document requests.” 

Oppo. at 15-16. Defendants further assert that Plaintiff has not alleged what specific discovery 

responses were misleading, and claim that Plaintiff’s request is meant to harass and discover 

confidential attorney-client communications. Id. at 16. Defendants also contend that Mr. Faigin 

explains in his declaration what he does when asked to verify interrogatories, and thereby 

provides sufficient detailed information to negate any need for a deposition. Id.

In his reply, Plaintiff admits that the responses to requests for documents were not 

verified and were not required to be verified, but argues that Mr. Faigin verified interrogatories 

and stated under the penalty of perjury that the relevant and responsive documents were 

identified in the privilege log served with Defendants’ discovery responses. Reply at 9. Plaintiff 

asserts that Mr. Faigin attested to the accuracy and completeness of the privilege log, which 

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Plaintiff contends is “a critical misrepresentation, whether intentional or not.” Id. (emphasis 

omitted). Plaintiff thus claims that he is entitled to question Mr. Faigin regarding the search for 

and the production of relevant responsive documents. Id. at 9-10. 

An attorney’s signature on a disclosure document constitutes a certification that to the 

best of the attorney’s knowledge and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry the disclosures 

are correct and complete as of the date signed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(A) (“[b]y signing, 

an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief 

formed after a reasonable inquiry . . . with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as 

of the time it is made.”). The production of documents under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 “does not 

require verification in the same manner that interrogatory responses do” because documents 

“produced under Rule 34 are subject only to the general signature requirement in Rule 26(g).” 

Kas v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WL 473931, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012). A party has 

a continuing duty to supplement or correct its disclosure or response upon learning that “in 

some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional 

or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 

discovery process or in writing.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A); see also Rodriguez v. IBP, Inc.,

243 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) (a party is under a continuing duty to supplement 

incomplete information disclosed in interrogatories). 

Here, after the Court issued its May 4, 2016 order granting in part and denying in part 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel [ECF No. 24], Defendants produced additional documents responsive 

to the Court’s Order. See Dicks Decl. at 4-5. Plaintiff does not set forth any evidence indicating 

that Defendants intentionally withheld relevant documents after the Court determined the scope 

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of permissible discovery in this case or that Defendants’ initial responses were intentionally 

misleading. Defendants, on the other hand, have provided a declaration indicating that they did 

not deliberately withhold the requested documents. See Oppo., Declaration of George Brewster 

(“Brewster Decl.”) at 2-3 (stating that “[t]here was no deliberate or intentional withholding of 

the [requested] documents,” and that Defendants supplemented document production after 

discovering that there were additional responsive documents that had not been produced). In 

addition, Mr. Faigin submitted a declaration in support of Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s 

motion detailing the procedure he follows in responding to discovery requests. See Oppo., 

Declaration of Robert Faigin (“Faigin Decl.”). 

Mr. Faigin declares that he is a Special Assistant to San Diego County Sheriff Gore, serves

as the Chief Legal Advisor for the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, and oversees the 

Department’s Legal Affairs Unit that serves as the Department’s liaison with the Office of County 

Counsel. Id. at 1-2. The Legal Affairs Unit receives requests for admissions, interrogatories, 

and requests for production of documents from the Office of County Counsel and forwards the 

requests to a particular bureau, unit or person to “conduct a reasonable investigation for 

responsive documents and answers.” Id. at 2. Each individual bureau, unit, or person is 

responsible for providing correct documents and answers to the Legal Affairs Unit, which are 

then copied and forwarded to the Office of County Counsel. Id. at 3. The County Counsel drafts 

pleadings and responses based on the discovery provided by department staff and forwards 

them to the Legal Affairs Unit for review. Id. Mr. Faigin reviews the responsive pleadings “in 

conjunction with the information provided by Department staff, to ensure that they contain the 

information provided to the Office of County Counsel, and that they are accurate based on the 

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information that [he] ha[s] been previously provided.” Id. Once Mr. Faigin “ha[s] reviewed the 

draft response and [is] satisfied as to the accuracy of the answers, [he] attest[s] to the truth of 

the interrogatory responses on behalf of the Department by completing a verification under 

penalty of perjury.” Id. As such, Mr. Faigin’s declaration provides specific and detailed 

description of his role in the San Diego Sheriff’s Department and the process within the 

Department of formulating discovery responses, including the process of verifying interrogatory 

responses.

Despite Plaintiff’s allegations, the evidence establishes that Defendants are complying 

with the federal rules by providing written responses and responsive documents, including 

privilege logs, and supplementing those items when additional information is discovered or 

required to be produced by the Court. Additionally, as noted above, Plaintiff has conducted 

numerous depositions of the individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the pertinent facts in 

this case. In light of the above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to compel the deposition 

of Mr. Faigin. See Miller v. United States, 203 F. App’x 577, 579 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s request to depose an Air 

Force attorney who signed answers to interrogatories, reasoning that the “attorney was not a 

fact witness; he was an Air Force attorney charged with the duty of collecting information 

regarding this lawsuit because it was more efficient for one person to perform this task,” and 

that the plaintiff “had ample opportunity to discover facts from other available witnesses who 

had knowledge of the pertinent circumstances.”). 

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III. Motion to Compel Production of Additional Documents

Months after the close of fact discovery [see ECF No. 10], Plaintiff asks the Court to 

extend the fact discovery cutoff and to expand the scope of discovery “into the nature and 

extent of the Sheriff Department’s failure and refusal to properly investigate and review claims 

of misconduct by its sworn officers.” MTC at 21-23. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks the following 

categories of documents from September 5, 2009 through the present: (1) “[a]ll Use of Force 

reports,” (2) “[a]ll Internal Affairs investigations,” (3) “[a]ll disciplinary actions within the 

department,” and (4) “[a]ll allegations of dishonesty, all investigations into allegations of 

dishonesty, all disciplinary actions relating to deputy dishonesty, and all Brady lists identifying 

dishonest deputies.” Id. at 22-23. In support, Plaintiff alleges that he learned from Defendants’ 

recent document production, as well as through his own investigation, about five instances 

where Deputy Banks used excessive force and where the Sheriff’s Department did not conduct 

any IA reviews and investigations. Id. at 21-22. Plaintiff claims that the incidents point to the 

Sheriff’s Department’s “pattern and practice” of hiding, concealing and enforcing the “code of 

silence” that protects officers from scrutiny or discipline. Id. at 22. 

Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s requests for the information concerning every deputy 

in the San Diego Sheriff’s Department for a seven-year period are not proportional to the case

and seek irrelevant information. Oppo. at 6-14, 19; id., Declaration of Jeffrey Duckworth 

(“Duckworth Decl.”) at 3. In support, Defendants maintain that responding to Plaintiff’s requests 

will require at least 2,700 hours at a cost exceeding $325,000. Oppo. at 8; see also Brewster 

Decl. at 3-5. Defendants also assert that the requests seek numerous irrelevant documents, 

such as, for example, IA investigations, which concluded that there was no misconduct, and 

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documents concerning the conduct of deputies under different circumstances.

4

 Id. at 10 (citing

id., Exh. 2, Deposition of Jeffrey Duckworth at 11-12). With respect to the use of force reports, 

Defendants claim that there are many types of force employed by officers, such as “hands on 

control, intermediate weapons, chemical agents or the pointing of a firearm.” Id. at 11 (citing

Duckworth Decl. at 2-3). Defendants also maintain that Plaintiff’s requests for disciplinary 

records will include records about deputies who were reviewed for possible discipline for 

unrelated actions, such as handling neighbor disputes, overseeing vehicle tows, and chasing 

feeing felons. Id. at 13. Defendants further allege that the Sheriff’s Department does not 

maintain a “Brady List” identifying dishonest deputies. Id. at 12; Faigin Decl. at 3. Defendants

thus argue that that the burden and cost of producing the requested records far outweigh any 

potential benefit to Plaintiff’s case. Id. at 13-14.

Plaintiff replies that this case is centered on the allegations that the Sheriff’s Department 

is operating under policies, procedures, customs and practices which encourage, cause, approve 

and ratify constitutional violations against Plaintiff and others similarly situated. Reply at 10. 

Plaintiff asserts that in light of his claims and interests of “making real structural, systemic and 

lasting changes” to the Sheriff’s Department, Defendants’ assertion of “burden” and “expense” 

carry little weight. Id. at 11. Plaintiff thus claims that he must be allowed access to the 

requested records. Id. at 13.

 

4 Defendants explain that such circumstances include “varying locations, types of crime 

investigated, times of day or night, officer safety issues, public safety issues, known suspects, 

fleeing felons, among many other factors an officer faces in each investigation.” Id. at 10.

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Defendants already have produced a broad range of documents including the use of force 

reports for Plaintiff’s incident and other incidents involving Deputy Banks, all IA investigations 

conducted within three-and-a-half years of the incident at issue involving Deputy Banks and the

four non-party deputies on the scene during Plaintiff’s incident involving allegations of excessive 

force, racial discrimination, false arrest and false imprisonment, and the personnel files for all 

five deputies, including information regarding fitness for duty, knowledge of or compliance with 

policies and procedures, false arrest and use of force issues, racial discrimination and profiling 

issues, and performance evaluations. See Brewster Decl. at 2; Oppo. at 8-9, 12. Defendants 

also have produced the Sheriff’s Department’s written procedures, and deposed Lt. Duckworth, 

whom Defendants identified as the most qualified person to discuss IA Investigations. Oppo. at 

8-9; id., Exh. 2, Deposition of Jeffrey Duckworth. 

Plaintiff now seeks “[a]ll Use of Force reports,” “[a]ll Internal Affairs investigations,” “[a]ll 

disciplinary actions within the department,” and “[a]ll allegations of dishonesty, all investigations 

into allegations of dishonesty, all disciplinary actions relating to deputy dishonesty, and all Brady 

lists identifying dishonest deputies” from September 5, 2009 through the present. MTC at 22-

23. Plaintiff’s requests are extremely overbroad, seek irrelevant information, and are not 

proportional to the needs of the case. The San Diego Sheriff’s Department employs 2,528 sworn 

personnel, including 1,320 law enforcement sworn personnel. Duckworth Decl. at 2. The 

records for such personnel for a seven-year period will undoubtedly contain a vast amount of 

irrelevant information and will cost in excess of $325,000 to compile. See Oppo. at 8; Duckworth 

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Decl.; Brewster Decl. Plaintiff makes no effort to tailor his requests to the needs of the case5, 

and this Court will not “fashion new discovery requests” where Plaintiff’s requests are extremely 

overbroad and seek irrelevant information. See Bartolome v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 2008 WL 

2736016, at *1, 14 (D. Haw. July 14, 2008) (declining to “invent a duty for a judge to fashion 

new discovery requests when the ones presented are overbroad,” where plaintiff sued two police 

officers and the City and County of Honolulu alleging, inter alia, that the City failed to train 

officers on the appropriate use of force and maintained a custom or policy that endorsed the 

use of excessive force by failing to investigate and discipline officers). The Court therefore 

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to expand the scope of discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) 

(limiting the scope of discovery to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim 

or defense and proportional to the needs of the case”). Because the Court denies Plaintiff’s

motion to expand the scope of discovery, the Court does not find good cause to extend the 

discovery cutoff and DENIES the motion.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1) DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s motion to compel Sheriff Gore’s deposition;

2) DENIES Plaintiff’s request to compel the deposition of Mr. Faigin; and

///

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5 The Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to tailor his requests particularly vexing since he did not

address in his Reply the numerous facts and concerns raised by Defendants and did not include 

the types of limitations imposed by the Court in its last discovery order. See ECF No. 24 at 26-

33.

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3) DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to expand the scope of discovery and to extend the discovery 

cutoff.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 8/15/2016

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