Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02232/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02232-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The court hereby substitutes Ken Clark, Warden of the facility where petitioner

currently is locate, as the respondent. See Rule 2(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings; Fed.

R. Civ. P. 25(d).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN ROBERTS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-2232 MCE EFB P

vs.

KEN CLARK, Warden,

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Respondent.1

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner without counsel seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254. He proceeds on the April 5, 2005, first amended petition. Respondent moves to

dismiss on the grounds that this action is untimely and that petitioner failed to exhaust the

available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d), 2254(b). For the reasons explained below,

the court finds that some claims in the petition are untimely. Additionally, the court further finds

that those claims that are timely are unexhausted. Accordingly, the motion must be granted.

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I. Procedural History

On October 7, 1998, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to a charge of lewd and lascivious

conduct in violation of section 288(a) of the California Penal Code. Docs. Lodged in Supp. of

Resp.’s April 7, 2006, Mot. to Dism. (“Lod. Doc.”), 1. On December 17, 1998, the court

adjudicated him guilty, sentenced petitioner to eight years in prison, but suspended execution

thereof in favor of placing petitioner on five years’ formal probation. Id. Petitioner attempted to

appeal. Lod. Doc. 2. On January 19, 1999, the trial court notified petitioner that his notice of

appeal did not comply with the rules of court. Lod. Doc. 3.

On August 3, 1999, petitioner’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke probation and 

requested a bench warrant. Lod. Doc. 4. The trial court issued a warrant in August of 1999,

which was served on petitioner in December of 2001. Lod. Doc. 5. On December 21, 2001, the

trial judge found that the facts supported the allegations in the petition, and on January 18, 2002,

issued an order revoking probation and revoking the order suspending execution of the sentence. 

Lod. Doc. 6. Petitioner appealed, and on September 18, 2002, the appellate court modified the

order by revoking all visitation rights petitioner had with the victim, but affirmed it in all other

respects. Lod. Doc. 8. Petitioner sought review in the California Supreme Court. Lod. Doc. 9. 

On December 11, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. Lod. Doc. 10.

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the state courts but the sequence of his

petitions followed a peculiar course. On November 18, 2002, he filed in the appellate court a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the revocation of parole. He also

alleged a failure accurately to calculate credits for time in custody and time on parole. Lod. Doc.

11. That court denied relief without comment or citation on December 12, 2002. Lod. Doc. 12.

 On January 2, 2003, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. Lod.

Doc. 13. This petition challenged the calculation of time credits for his sentence, trial counsel’s

effectiveness with regards to the determination of the credits to which he was entitled, the

voluntariness of his plea of guilty in the first place and counsel’s effectiveness in the proceedings

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leading to the guilty plea. Id. On January 14, 2002, the trial court denied the writ on the ground

that the petition did not comply with the rules of court. Lod. Doc. 14.

Petitioner returned to the appellate court on January 17, 2003, by filing a notice of appeal

of the trial court’s order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lod. Doc. 15. On

April 15, 2003, he notified the appellate court that he wished voluntarily to dismiss the appeal. 

Lod. Doc. 16. The appellate court entered an order of dismissal on April 16, 2003. Id. Also on

April 16, 2003, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court, in which he

challenged his conviction, the revocation of his parole and the calculation of time credits to

which he was entitled. Lod. Doc. 17. On April 24, 2003, the appellate court denied this writ

with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal.App.2d 293 (Cal. App. 1962).

On September 18, 2003, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court challenging his conviction, the revocation of his parole and the calculation of

time credits to which he was entitled. Lod. Doc. 19. On March 17, 2004, that court denied relief

with citations to In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (Cal. 1949) and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th

464, 474 (Cal. 1995).

On October 20, 2004, petitioner filed his initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this

court. As grounds for relief, he alleged the following: (1) trial counsel coerced him into entering

a plea of guilty; (2) the trial court’s decision to deny his motion to withdraw his plea violated

due process; (3) his prison sentence does not accurately reflect credit for the time he was in

custody before he entered his plea; (4) trial counsel failed to raise on direct appeal the failure

properly to calculate time credits; (5) his prison sentence does not accurately reflect credit for

the time he was on probation or for the time he was in custody before the revocation hearing; (6)

counsel who appealed the order revoking probation was ineffective for failing to raise the failure

properly to calculate time credits; and, (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

motion to suppress statements made during custodian interrogation. 

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Petitioner’s April 5, 2005, amended petition is nearly identical to the initial petition. 

However, he included attachments not submitted with the initial petition.

II. Statute of Limitations

Respondent contends that the initial petition was filed late. Analysis of whether a federal

habeas action is timely must begin with a determination of when the limitations period

commenced. Most commonly, the event that triggers the running of the limitations period is the

time the judgment becomes final on direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Here,

respondent asserts that petitioner in fact challenges two judgments, i.e., the adjudication of guilt

and imposition of sentence, and the order revoking probation and directing that the sentence be

executed. An argument that a single act or course of conduct leading to criminal charges, trial,

conviction and sentence could result in more than one judgment of conviction is, at best, curious. 

However, California law specifies which order constitutes the final judgment for purposes of

appeal in a situation where, such as here, the sentence is imposed but suspended in favor of

probation. Thus, the court must consider how California treats the orders in question to

determine what portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) triggers the running of the limitation period.

III. Standards 

Congress has enacted the following limitation period applicable to petitions brought

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run fro the latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

the State action in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action’

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The term “judgment” in subsection (d)(1)(A) “refers to the judgment of

conviction and sentence,” and “direct review” refers to the direct appellate review of that

judgment. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003).

Respondent argues that there are two judgments in this case. Insofar as petitioner

challenges the conviction, the date the judgment of conviction became final on direct review

controls. However, to untangle respondent’s argument, it is necessary to consider how

California treats the two orders at issue in this case. The first order adjudicates petitioner guilty,

imposes a specific sentence, but suspends execution the sentences and places him on probation. 

The second order revokes probation and the suspension of the execution of sentence, and

imposes the prison term imposed.

 The first order is the judgment of conviction and sentence referred to in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). In California, a defendant to a criminal action may ordinarily take an appeal

from “a final judgment of conviction” and from “any order made after judgment, affecting the

substantial rights of the party.” Cal. Pen. Code § 1237(a), (b). The term “final judgment”

includes an order imposing a sentence and an order granting probation. Id. Thus, an order

adjudicating defendant’s guilt and imposing sentence, but suspending the execution of sentence

for the defendant to serve a term of probation is a judgment of conviction from which the

defendant may appeal. People v. Arguello, 30 Cal.Rptr. 333, 381 (Cal. 1963); People v. Munoz,

124 Cal. Rptr. 322, 325 (Cal. App. 1975). Once this right to appeal accrues, the defendant must

timely “raise all matters going to the validity” of the conviction. Munoz, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 325. 

Thus, the order immediately following petitioner’s guilty plea, which adjudicated him guilty,

imposed an eight-year sentence, but suspended the sentence to give petitioner the opportunity

successfully to complete five years’ probation was a final judgment that petitioner could appeal,

assuming he followed the applicable court rules.

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Under California law, an order that revokes probation and revokes the suspension of

sentence is an order after judgment which affects “the substantial rights of the defendant.” Id., at

325, fn. 1. Therefore, while respondent is correct that petitioner challenges two different orders

and that they each are a basis for separate calculations of the timeliness of his claims, the court

finds that only the first order is a judgment of conviction. The second is an appealable order

after the judgment. The next question is which portions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provide the

triggering dates to commence the running of the limitation period.

The answer is not as elusive as it might seem. As noted, it is clear that with respect to the

December 17, 1998, judgment of conviction, the limitations period began to run the date the

conviction became final on direct review or when the time for seeking such review expired. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(a). The order revoking probation and revoking the suspension of

sentence is analogous to an order finding a petitioner not suitable for release to parole. The

Ninth Circuit considered in Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003), which

subsection governs the determination of when the limitations period would commence for an

order finding him not suitable for parole. In that case, it was clear that the order petitioner

challenged was not the judgment of conviction. The only other possibility was § 2244(d)(1)(D),

i.e., the date on which the factual predicate the claim could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. Redd, 343 F.3d at 1083. The Ninth Circuit then had to determine the

“factual predicate” of petitioner’s claims. Because the factual predicate was an order to deny

parole, the question was when in the process that decision was firm enough to justify placing on

the petitioner an obligation to seek federal habeas relief.

At the time Redd was denied parole, California did not provide for direct judicial review

of such decisions. Id., at 1079. However, California did require prisoners to exhaust their

claims in the administrative grievance process. Id. Upon completion of the administrative

grievance process, a prisoner could seek post-conviction relief in California’s courts. Id. Thus,

while the trigger commencing the running of the limitation period was 28 U.S.C. §

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2244(d)(1)(D), it was measured by the completion of the processes available for a prisoner to

obtain review of the decision to be challenged. The appellate court rejected the completion of

state post-conviction proceedings “because the date of the ‘factual predicate’ for Redd’s claim . .

. is not dependent on when Redd complied with AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement. Rather, it is

determined by inquiring when Redd could have learned of the factual basis for his claim through

the exercise of due diligence.” Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082. Thus, the limitation period began to run

the day after the prisoner’s grievance was denied on the highest level of review. Id., at 1084. 

The similarity between the facts in Redd and in this case are plain. Petitioner’s challenge

to the order revoking parole is not a judgment of conviction. Thus, the question is when

petitioner had a basis for knowing that he could challenge the decision, independent of whether

he had exhausted his claims. As noted above, petitioner had a limited opportunity to appeal the

decision to revoke his probation and suspension or the sentence. He had a factual basis for filing

in federal court either when the time for seeking that review expired or when the decision on that

review became final. Ultimately, then, although 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) governs, the analysis

resembles that undertaken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). With these standards in mind,

the court turns to the facts of this case. 

IV. Analysis

A. Timeliness of Claims Challenging Judgment of Conviction

The threshold question is when the judgment of conviction became final. The judgment

on direct review becomes final when the 90-day limit for filing a petition for certiorari expires.

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). In California, a notice of appeal must

ordinarily be filed “within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order

being appealed.” Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.308. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced on

December 17, 1998. He filed a notice of appeal on January 15, 1999. Two days later, the

appellate court found that petitioner’s failure to follow the applicable court rules rendered the

notice inoperable. There is no evidence that petitioner ever filed a notice of appeal that complied

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with the rules. Thus, the judgment of conviction became final February 15, 1999, and petition

had until February 15, 2000, to file his federal habeas application. Absent tolling, petitioner’s

October 20, 2004, federal habeas petition is more than four years and eight months late. 

Insofar as petitioner asserts that he is entitled to statutory tolling based on the state

habeas petitions in which he challenged his conviction, his assertion fails. The period is tolled

once a petitioner properly files a state post-conviction application, and remains tolled for the

entire time that application is “pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In California, a properly-filed

post- conviction application is “pending” during the intervals between a lower court decision and

filing a new petition in a higher court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). The

petitioner has the burden of showing facts entitling him to statutory tolling. Smith v. Duncan,

297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, it was not until January 2, 2003, nearly three years

after he had to file his federal petition that he filed a state post-conviction motion including a

challenge to the conviction itself . Because the limitations period had expired by the time he

filed any post- conviction challenges to the conviction, petitioner is not entitled to statutory

tolling. All of petitioner’s claims related to the judgment of conviction and sentence are

untimely.

B. Claims Challenging Parole Revocation and Time Credit Calculation

As explained above, the statutory criteria for determining the finality of the order

revoking probation and revoking the suspension of the sentence is the date on which the factual

predicate of a claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner had a limited right of appeal, which he exercised, resulting in

a slight modification of the trial court’s order. Petitioner sought review in the California

Supreme Court, which was denied on December 11, 2002. That order was final the date it was

filed. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.532(b)(2)(A). Thus, petitioner had until December 11, 2003,

to file a federal petition challenging the order to revoke probation. Absent tolling, the October

20, 2004, petition is 314 days late. 

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Turning to the question of statutory tolling, respondent concedes that the habeas petitions

were properly filed post-conviction motions. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to tolling for the

entire time he sought state post-conviction relief. Petitioner’s November 18, 2002, petition in

the appellate court challenging the decision to revoke probation was denied on December 12,

2002, the day after the order was final on direct review. Thus, this provided one day of statutory

tolling, and the federal habeas petition had to be filed no later than December 12, 2003. 

Petitioner is entitled to tolling from January 7, 2003, when he filed his habeas petition in the trial

court, until March 17, 2004, when the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. 

All counted, this amounts to 435 days’ statutory tolling. Petitioner had to demonstrate at least

314 days’ tolling, and accordingly, the federal petition is timely. 

C. Failure to Exhaust

Respondent also contends that petitioner failed to exhaust available state remedies with

respect to his claims challenging the revocation of his parole. Petitioner asserts that he did

exhaust the available state remedies.

1. Standards

A district court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless “the applicant

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,” or unless there is no State

corrective process or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion

requirement by presenting the “substance of his federal habeas corpus claim” to the state courts. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971) (no exhaustion where the petitioner presented

operative facts but not legal theory to state courts); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995)(to exhaust a claim, a state court “must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are

asserting claims under the United States Constitution”). A claim is unexhausted if any state

remedy is available. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (petitioner must seek

discretionary review from state court of last resort); Roberts v. Arave, 874 F.2d 528, 529 (9th

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Cir. 1988)(no exhaustion where state supreme court referred petitioner’s appeal of trial court’s

denial of post-conviction relief to lower appellate court and petitioner failed to appeal lower

court’s disposition of that appeal to state supreme court). A dismissal on procedural grounds that

leaves the petitioner an opportunity to file in state court again does not satisfy the exhaustion

requirement. McQuown v. McCartney, 795 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1986). Unless the

respondent specifically consents to the court entertaining unexhausted claims, a petition

containing such claims must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3); Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. 

For a California prisoner to exhaust, he must present his claims to the California Supreme Court

on appeal in a petition for review or on post-conviction in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 223, 239-40 (2002) (describing California’s habeas corpus

procedure); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (to exhaust, prisoner must

present claims on appeal to California Supreme Court in a petition for review). 

2. Analysis

Respondent concedes that petitioner presented to the California Supreme Court the same

claims that he makes in the federal habeas petition. Respondent argues that this was inadequate

to exhaust because the California Supreme Court denied the petition with citations to In re

Duvall, 37 Cal.Rptr. 2d 259, 265 (Cal. 1995) and In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (Cal. 1949). 

Respondent asserts that petitioner merely failed to plead his case with adequate particularity and

the denial was without prejudice to bringing the same claims again, only better stated. Thus, the

court must determine whether citation to Duvall and Swain signified that petitioner could present

his claims again in state court. If this was the case, then petitioner has failed to exhaust.

While the California Supreme Court in Duvall states that a habeas petition should “state

fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought,” the case concerns “the legal

sufficiency of the People’s return to an order to show cause” that the appellate court ordered. 

Duvall, 37 Cal.Rptr. at 262 (emphasis added). In Duvall, the petition was adequately pled and

the problem was the state’s response. However, the application in Ex parte Swain, 34 Cal.2d

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300, 304 (Cal. 1949), was inadequately pled, and the court denied it without prejudice to filing a

new petition. Swain, 34 Cal.2d at 304. Citation of these two cases together, suggests that the

petition was, in fact, denied on the ground that it was inadequately pled. The California

Supreme Court’s denial on this ground is a finding that “the petition was procedurally deficient.” 

Harris v. Superior Court of California, 500 F.2d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1974). Because the

California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s state habeas applications with citations to Swain

and Duvall, it did not reach the merits because of a procedural deficiency. Petitioner had the

opportunity to submit his claims again. Thus, petitioner failed to exhaust the available state

remedies with respect to his claims challenging the order revoking probation.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the court finds that petitioner’s claims related to his

conviction are untimely and should be dismissed. Furthermore, the claims relating to the

revocation of probation are not exhausted. Thus, respondent’s January 30, 2006, motion to

dismiss must be granted.

Accordingly, it hereby is RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s January 30, 2006, motion to dismiss be granted as follows:

a. All claims challenging the judgment of conviction be dismissed with prejudice

on the ground that they are untimely; 

b. All claims challenging the order to revoke probation and to revoke suspension

of the sentence be dismissed without prejudice on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust the

available state remedies; and

2. The Clerk be directed to close the case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

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to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: March 7, 2008.

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