Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00187/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00187-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN GARRETT BAUTISTA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JIM BABCOCK, etc.; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-187 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS AND

SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE 

A. Introduction

Shawn Garrett Bautista, in custody at the Santa Clara County Jail, filed this pro se civil

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court determined that the complaint alleged

cognizable § 1983 claims against defendants Turbovich, Ramirez, and Hodges for retaliation.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. In response, Bautista moved to compel discovery

and to delay filing his opposition to the motion for summary judgment until he has received

discovery responses. Several problems in the parties' briefs lead the court to deny the motions.

B. Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

Defendants' motion for summary judgment presents a confused view of the law of

retaliation. First, the brief errs in suggesting that the allegedly retaliatory actions must violate

a constitutional right. It is well-settled that a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim need not show

that the retaliatory action taken in response to his exercise of a constitutional right

independently deprived him of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ.

v. Doyle, 429

Case 3:04-cv-00187-SI Document 47 Filed 01/30/06 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The two cases defendants cite on this point, Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir.

1996), and Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987), are not even retaliation cases, and

do not appear to stand for anything relevant to a retaliation claim. 

2

U.S. 274, 283 (1977) (absence of right to continued employment does not defeat claim for

retaliatory firing for First Amendment expression); Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th

Cir. 1997) (discharge from prison job for refusal to waive constitutional right states claim despite

no constitutional right to prison job); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995)

(retaliatory transfer would be actionable even though inmate has no constitutional right to be

held in a particular location or in a single cell). Despite this settled state of the law, defendants

repeatedly argue that their allegedly retaliatory conduct did not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. They argue that the alleged threats do not give rise to a claim under §

1983, see Motion, p. 11,1

 and that inmates have limited constitutional rights to have erroneous

information expunged from their prison file, Motion, p. 11, and to have a particular

classification, id. at 12. That an inmate has no independent constitutional right to be free from

threats, to have accurate records or to have any particular classification says nothing about

whether depriving the inmate of these things for a retaliatory purpose can amount to a

constitutional violation. At best, defendants' arguments show that Bautista has no claims other

than his retaliation claims; at worst, they mislead by framing the retaliation debate incorrectly.

Second, the brief presents an inaccurate legal description regarding the harm or injury

required for a retaliation claim. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment

because the allegedly retaliatory conduct did not have a chilling effect on Bautista, as evidenced

by his continued litigiousness. This argument overlooks several Ninth Circuit cases that suggest

that the prisoner's continued litigation or grievance-filing activity is not a bar to a successful

retaliation claim. Rhodes v. Rowland, 408 F.3d 559, 568-69 (9th Cir. 2005), rather clearly states

that the fact that the prisoner continues with his First Amendment activity does not mean there

has not been a chilling effect. Although Rhodes was decided after defendants' motion was filed,

Ninth Circuit cases on the books before defendants' motion was filed also indicate that harm that

is more than minimal will almost always have a chilling effect sufficient for a retaliation claim.

Case 3:04-cv-00187-SI Document 47 Filed 01/30/06 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

See, e.g., Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2001); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d

265 (9th Cir. 1997). Hines explained that the injury may be the retaliatory act's chilling effect

on the inmate's First Amendment rights, even if there is no demonstration of a more substantial

injury. Id. at 269. Rhodes stated that, at least at the pleading stage, the proper inquiry is

"'whether an official's acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First

Amendment activities.' . . . Because 'it would be unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability

for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his

protected activity,' [the prisoner] does not have to demonstrate that his speech was 'actually

inhibited or suppressed.'" Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (internal citations omitted). Defendants

are incorrect to the extent they suggest Bautista does not have an actionable retaliation claim

because he continued to file grievances. 

In light of these problems in defendants' motion, and the prisoner-plaintiff's limited

access to legal materials, the court is unwilling to decide the motion for summary judgment as

presented. A litigant's misstatement of the law is always a concern to the court, but especially

so in a case where the opponent is a pro se prisoner because it raises something akin to a notice

problem: a pro se prisoner untrained in law and with very limited access to legal materials might

not recognize his opponent's legal error and might simply attempt to prove his case within the

framework set up by opposing counsel's motion. For this reason, defendants' motion for

summary judgment will be denied, but without prejudice to defendants filing a new motion for

summary judgment that correctly states the law of retaliation and frames the dispute in a way

that the court can decide the motion based on the parties' presentations. 

C. Bautista's Motion To Compel Discovery

The glaring problem in Bautista's motion to compel is that he did not make a good faith

effort to meet and confer before seeking court intervention in the discovery dispute.

The court generally is not involved in the discovery process and only becomes involved

when there is a dispute between the parties about discovery responses. Discovery requests and

responses normally are exchanged between the parties without any copy sent to the court. See

Case 3:04-cv-00187-SI Document 47 Filed 01/30/06 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (listing discovery requests and responses that "must not" be filed with the

court until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders otherwise). Only when the parties

have a discovery dispute that they cannot resolve among themselves should the parties even

consider asking the court to intervene in the discovery process. The court does not have enough

time or resources to oversee all discovery, and therefore requires that the parties present to it

only their very specific disagreements. To promote the goal of addressing only very specific

disagreements (rather than becoming an overseer of all discovery), the court requires that the

parties meet and confer to try to resolve their disagreements before seeking court intervention.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B); N. D. Cal. Local Rule 37. Where, as here, one of the parties is

a prisoner, the court does not require in-person meetings and instead allows the prisoner and

defense counsel to meet and confer by telephone or exchange of letters. Although the format

of the meet-and-confer process changes, the substance of the rule remains the same: the parties

must engage in a good faith effort to meet and confer before seeking court intervention in any

discovery dispute. 

Bautista's meet-and-confer letter to defense counsel was simply ridiculous in its assertion

that defendants "waived any right of privilege information, if any there was, when they decided

to violated the rights and privileges of the plaintiff's." Motion To Compel, Exh. 2 (spelling and

grammar errors in source). No reasonable attorney reading that assertion would have been

persuaded to reconsider any privilege that had been asserted. By making such a ridiculous

assertion, Bautista almost guaranteed that the meet-and-confer process would be unsuccessful.

Bautista's assertion in the letter that the responses were incomplete does not identify any

incompleteness other than that some documents had not been produced because a privilege had

been claimed. Bautista's meet-and-confer effort was not a good faith effort and thwarts the goal

of reducing court involvement in the discovery process. The court denies the motion to compel

because Bautista failed to make a good faith effort to meet and confer with opposing counsel

before he filed the motion. This denial is without prejudice to Bautista filing a new motion to

compel after he engages in a good faith effort to meet and confer with opposing counsel to

resolve any discovery dispute.

Case 3:04-cv-00187-SI Document 47 Filed 01/30/06 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

A few words of guidance for the parties in their discovery and resolution of discovery

disputes: First, Bautista cannot move to compel responses to requests he has "amended" after

the responses have been served. If Bautista wants to request additional or different materials,

he must submit a new discovery request to defendants. 

Second, a request for production of documents under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure can be used only for existing documents. A request for production of documents

cannot be used to ask for information to be compiled and questions answered. If Bautista wants

information (rather than documents) from defendants, he needs to use other discovery tools, e.g.,

interrogatories, depositions, or requests for admissions. 

Third, the court seriously questions defendants' assertion of privilege for an operations

manual or other documents that state standards for jail operations. The court recognizes the need

to avoid disclosure of confidential information to inmates -- such as the identity of an informant,

or a membership roster for a gang, or a weakness in security that may provide an avenue of

escape – but defendants appear to have taken an overly aggressive view of what needs to be kept

confidential for safety reasons. The court simply doesn't understand why the Santa Clara County

Jail policy and procedure manual must be kept confidential when other penal facilities' written

policies and procedures are not shrouded in such secrecy. See U.S. Bureau of Prisons Program

Statement 5100.07, Security Designation And Custody Classification Manual, available at

http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_007.pdf - Nov 30, 2004; Cal. Code Regs. title 15, §

3375 (Cal. Department of Corrections classification procedures). Unless defendants are able to

show something unusually sensitive in the jail's manual, it should be disclosed in discovery. The

court has considered the Sepulveda declaration but is unable to determine the merits of the

asserted need for confidentiality without seeing the manual itself. If defendants contend that the

manual cannot be disclosed to Bautista, they may file a motion for a protective order under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). If they file such a motion, they should submit the manual

under seal for the court to evaluate the claims of confidentiality and should submit a declaration

from a knowledgeable person identifying each portion of the manual that they contend must be

kept confidential and explaining why it should not be disclosed to Bautista. 

Case 3:04-cv-00187-SI Document 47 Filed 01/30/06 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Fourth, reports that have been prepared regarding Bautista generally should be disclosed

to Bautista except as necessary to preserve jail safety. If defendants contend that the reports

concerning Bautista cannot be disclosed to him, they may file a motion for protective order. If

they file such a motion, they should submit the reports under seal for the court to evaluate the

claims of confidentiality and should submit a declaration from a knowledgeable person

identifying each portion of the reports that they contend must be kept confidential and explaining

why it presents a risk if disclosed to Bautista. If some portions of a document need to be

redacted to prevent the disclosure of confidential information, the court wants to see the

unredacted document to determine how much material genuinely needs to be redacted. Counsel

is reminded to comply with Local Rule 79-5(b) in filing any document under seal. 

D. Amendment

The court received a document entitled "Plaintiff's Notice To Amend Complaint" on

December 16, 2005. Filing such a notice accomplishes nothing. If plaintiff wants to file an

amended complaint, he must file a motion to amend and attach to it a proposed amended

complaint. Construing the notice to be a motion to amend requires that it be DENIED because

the court cannot determine whether to allow an amended pleading without seeing it.

If plaintiff has claims that are against persons other than the existing defendants or are

unrelated to the retaliation claims already at issue, he should file a new civil rights action rather

than attempt to amend the existing complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (persons "may be joined

in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants

will arise in the action.")

Case 3:04-cv-00187-SI Document 47 Filed 01/30/06 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

E. Conclusion

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice. (Docket # 21.)

Bautista's motion to compel is DENIED without prejudice. (Docket # 31.) In light of the denial

of the motion to compel, the motion to strike the opposition to that motion is DENIED as moot.

(Docket # 41.) To the extent the notice to amend complaint is construed as a motion to amend,

it is DENIED. (Docket # 46.) 

The court prefers that the discovery problems be resolved before a new summary

judgment motion is filed and prefers that any motion for a protective order be resolved before

a motion to compel is made as to any remaining discovery disputes. The court therefore sets the

following briefing schedule for defendants to move for a protective order on the materials they

claim are privileged or otherwise confidential:

1. Any motion for a protective order must be filed and served by defendants

no later than March 3, 2006. Defendants are reminded to meet and confer before filing such a

motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

2. If defendants file a motion for a protective order, plaintiff must file and

serve his opposition no later than April 3, 2006. 

c. Any reply brief from defendants must be filed and served no later than

April 14, 2006.

 After the court rules on the motion for a protective order (or if no motion is filed by the

deadline), the court will set a schedule for plaintiff to file a motion to compel at to any remaining

discovery disputes. Plaintiff is reminded that he must engage in a good faith effort to meet and

confer to resolve any discovery dispute before he files a motion to compel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2006 _____________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-00187-SI Document 47 Filed 01/30/06 Page 7 of 7