Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00589/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00589-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CANDACE SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00589-BAM

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 

ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION

(Doc. 4)

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Candace Smith (“Plaintiff”) proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

action. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will recommend that this action be 

dismissed for failure to obey a court order, for lack of jurisdiction, and for failure to state a 

cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on May 16, 2024. (Doc. 1.) On July 2, 2024, the Court 

screened Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and determined that the 

complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, 

failed to allege this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and failed to state a cognizable claim for 

relief. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend within thirty (30) days of service of the Court’s 

order. (Doc. 4.) Plaintiff was expressly warned that if she failed to file an amended complaint in 

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compliance with the Court’s order, then the Court would recommend dismissal of this action for 

failure to obey a court order, for lack of jurisdiction, and for failure to state a cognizable claim 

upon which relief may be granted. (Id. at 5.) The deadline for Plaintiff to file her amended 

complaint has passed and Plaintiff has not complied with the Court’s order. The Court therefore 

will recommend dismissal of this action.

II. Failure to Comply with Rule 8, Allege Jurisdiction, and State a Cognizable 

Claim

A. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma 

pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to 

dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 

is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Community Regional Hospital; (2) Saint 

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Agnes Hospital; (3) Kaiser & Kennesaw Hospital; and (4) United Health Care. (Doc. 1 at 2-3.)

Plaintiff filed the complaint using the Court’s complaint form. In the statement of claim 

section of the form, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Upon such stating purposeful and criminal conducted charges against the 

incumbents of hospital that purposely mislead details of triplet pregnancy. Upon 

such commited felonist acts against myself by commiting a malepractice w/o 

detail & purposely druggings, over dose & mislead details of pregnancy. Did not 

remove dying fetuses

(Doc. 1 at 1) (unedited text). As relief, Plaintiff appears to seek monetary damages and 

restoration of health. (Id. at 6.) 

C. Discussion

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is not a plain statement of her claims. While short, Plaintiff’s 

complaint does not clearly state what happened, when it happened, and who was involved. 

Without basic factual allegations, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff states a cognizable 

claim for relief. 

2. Federal Court Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate only those cases 

authorized by the Unites States Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary 

appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)). Without 

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jurisdiction, the district court must dismiss the case. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. 

California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, there are 

two bases for subject matter jurisdiction: (1) diversity jurisdiction; and (2) federal question 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. As pled, the complaint fails to allege this Court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff has not alleged diversity jurisdiction. Instead, Plaintiff claims that this action is 

based on federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal 

district courts have jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States.” “A case ‘arises under’ federal law either where federal law creates 

the cause of action or ‘where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on 

some construction of federal law.’” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 

1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 

463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by 

the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question 

is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id.

Plaintiff does not allege any violation arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States. Indeed, Plaintiff does not cite any particular federal statute or constitutional 

provision that would be applicable to the allegations in her complaint. Thus, Plaintiff's 

complaint does not establish federal question jurisdiction.

3. Criminal Prosecution

Although not entirely clear, it appears from Plaintiff’s complaint that she is attempting to 

bring criminal charges against defendants. As a private citizen, Plaintiff has no authority to 

criminally prosecute anyone. See Turner v. Salorio, No. 1:19-cv-01620-DAD-BAM (PC), 2020 

WL 1974207, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020); see also Sn v. Gariah, No. 2:22-cv-01796-KJMCKD (PS), 2022 WL 17722617, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2022) (indicating federal law does not 

allow a private citizen to bring a criminal prosecution against another citizen).

///

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III. Failure to Obey a Court Order 

A. Legal Standard

Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 

any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 

within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 

dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 

appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 

court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 

failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 

46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order 

requiring amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 

1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order).

In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: (1) 

the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 

779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 

B. Discussion

Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint is overdue. The action cannot proceed without 

Plaintiff’s cooperation and compliance with the Court’s order. Moreover, the Court cannot hold 

this case in abeyance awaiting compliance by Plaintiff. The Court additionally cannot 

effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating her case. Thus, the Court finds that 

both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

The third factor, risk of prejudice to the defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, as a 

presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 

Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs 

against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 

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291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 

responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 

progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. 

Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the Court’s order will result in 

dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1262; Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s July 2, 2024 screening 

order expressly warned Plaintiff that her failure to comply would result in a recommendation for 

dismissal of this action. (Doc. 4 at 5.) Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal could result 

from her noncompliance. 

Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 

would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 

unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status in this action 

indicates that monetary sanctions are of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is 

likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating her case.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Clerk of the Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to randomly assign a District Judge to 

this action. 

For the reasons stated, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed

based on Plaintiff’s failure to obey the Court’s order, for lack of jurisdiction, and for failure to 

state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may 

file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the 

magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

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2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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