Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04667/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04667-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICKEY KRAUS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-04667 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is an employment discrimination action. Plaintiff is African-American, female

and a lesbian. She also claims she is disabled by dyslexia, emotional distress and brain

damage from lead poisoning. Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that

many of plaintiff’s claims are untimely and/or are unexhausted. It also contends that plaintiff

cannot make a prima facie showing of employment discrimination or retaliation. After

carefully considering the papers and evidence filed by the parties, and having had the benefit

of oral argument, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has worked with the National Park Service since 1983 and with The Presidio

Trust since 1998. She is currently a maintenance inspector and held this position at all times 

relevant to her complaint.

//

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A. The First EEO Complaint

1. Plaintiff’s Declaration

The Presidio Trust subsidized a vanpool program. The vanpool traveled from

Vacaville to San Francisco, passing through Suisun City, where plaintiff resides. All

employees utilizing the vanpool were male. In December 2001 plaintiff asked if there was

space available, and she was told there was not. Another member of the vanpool told her

there was space available. Nonetheless, over the next several months plaintiff attempted to

join the vanpool without success.

Plaintiff lodged an official complaint with her supervisor, Stephen Potts. Potts sent

plaintiff to EEO Officer, Deborah Zipp. When Zipp did not get back to plaintiff for several

weeks, plaintiff contacted James Lechleitner, Deputy Director of Human Resources and the

Director of EEO. Lechleitner referred plaintiff to Carolyn Provost, an EEO counselor. 

Provost told plaintiff that there was still time to file a formal complaint, but that she must do

so through Zipp.

When plaintiff contacted Zipp, Zipp was upset that plaintiff had gone “over her head”

to Zipp’s supervisor. Zipp persuaded plaintiff to resolve the situation informally, rather than

through a formal complaint. Also during this time plaintiff contacted The Presidio Trust

General Counsel, Karen Cook. Shortly thereafter the vanpool was dismantled.

In October 2002, plaintiff’s friend, an African-American male, interviewed with Mark

Feickert, the Abatement Supervisor. Plaintiff learned that during the interview Feickert told

the friend that he was not suited for the job and that Mexicans were better laborers. Plaintiff

notified her supervisor, Potts, of Feickert’s remark and also gave Potts a letter regarding the

incident.

In February 2003, plaintiff received her appraisal. She was “called into” Feickert’s

office where Feickert spoke to her about her communication skills. She received a rating of

“3” on her appraisal for communication. 

On February 24, 2003, Zipp called plaintiff into her office. Zipp told plaintiff that an

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employee, Rosa Medina, had made a sexual harassment complaint against plaintiff and that

plaintiff needed to be “put in her place.”

Plaintiff later initiated a complaint with EEO Counselor Carolyn Provost. Provost

began the counseling session, “but was abruptly removed by management.” As a result,

plaintiff initiated a reprisal complaint.

2. The Administrative Process 

Plaintiff made her initial contact with an EEO counselor alleging discrimination on

March 21, 2003. On March 26, 2003, the counselor interviewed plaintiff. On March 31,

2003, Zipp assigned a contract EEO counselor to conduct informal EEO counseling of

plaintiff’s pre-complaint.

On May 19, 2003, plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination. As plaintiff

has not submitted any evidence in support of her opposition to summary judgment other than

her own declaration, the only documentary evidence in the record is that submitted by the

Presidio Trust. Those documents, which involve letters from The Presidio Trust to plaintiff,

identify plaintiff’s discrimination complaints as follows:

Based on her race (African-American), sex (Female), sexual preference

(Female), disabilities (Emotional distress and dyslexia), and reprisal (EEO

complaint filed on March 21, 2003 and protected activity regarding the

complainant’s request for corrective actions regarding the discriminatory

administration of vanpools) the complainant alleges that the Presidio Trust

discriminated against her when:

1. On February 11, 2003, Stephen Potts, Director of Operations assigned her a

rating of “3” instead of “4” for the communication element of her performance

appraisal.

2. On February 24, 2003, Deborah Zipp, the EEO Officer, falsely accused the

complainant of sexual harassment and in retaliation for contacting Karen Cook,

General Counsel of the Presidio Trust.

3. On March 31, 2003, Deborah Zipp, the EEO Officer retaliated against the

complainant by assigning a contract EEO Counselor, instead of Carolyn

Provost, the Presidio Trust EEO Counselor, to conduct informal EEO

Counseling of her pre-complaint.

Declaration of William G. Coffman (“Coffman Decl.”) Exh. A. The Presidio Trust

conducted an investigation and issued a Report of Investigation on January 12, 2004. Id.

Exh. D. 

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Plaintiff chose to have her case heard by an administrative judge prior to The Presidio

Trust issuing a Final Agency Decision. The administrative judge granted The Presidio

Trust’s motion for summary judgment without a hearing after plaintiff failed to file a

response, even after having been given an extension to do so. Id. Exh. E. The Presidio Trust

issued its Final Agency Action, adopting the administrative judge’s ruling, on July 14, 2004. 

Plaintiff appealed to the EEOC, Office of Federal Operations. The EEOC affirmed the

decision on April 27, 2006. Plaintiff received the EEOC’s decision on May 2, 2006.

B. The Second EEO Complaint

1. Plaintiff’s Declaration

During a meeting on February 4, 2004, Tom Blein, plaintiff’s then supervisor, stated

that in his absence plaintiff would not be allowed to work as supervisor in his place. When

she had first started in her position, Blein had said that plaintiff and two other employees

would rotate alphabetically in filling the supervisor’s job responsibilities.

In March 2004, Blein relocated all of plaintiff’s co-workers to another building except

plaintiff; in particular, Blein moved one co-worker, with whom plaintiff shared an office, but

not plaintiff. 

On June 2, 2004, Blein criticized plaintiff for submitting too many work orders.

Later, Blean told plaintiff to find a desk for herself. She moved herself into the

building where her co-workers were located.

In August 2004, Blean told plaintiff she was responsible for bringing down the morale

of the department. Plaintiff’s subsequent appraisal, in January 2005, was lower than her

previous appraisal, from an overall 4 to an overall 3.

Plaintiff was off work on a workers’ compensation back injury from August 23, 2004

through January 11, 2005.

2. The Administrative Process

On February 24, 2005, plaintiff initiated EEO counseling. On May 31, 2005, she filed

a formal complaint of discrimination. After a series of letters between Zipp and plaintiff, 

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Zipp sent plaintiff a notice of Formal EEO Complaint of Discrimination that identified

plaintiff’s claims as follows:

In your statement dated February 16, 2005, you alleged that you have been

subjected to unlawful discrimination by the agency based on your race

(African-American), sex (female), sexual preference (female), disabilities

(emotional distress, anxiety, depression, brain damage from lead poisoning,

sciatic nerve) and reprisal (prior EEO activity). Specifically, during counseling

you alleged the following incidents as claims of discrimination against the

Presidio Trust.

(1) In April 2001, you were dissatisfied with Deborah Zipp’s handling of your

complaints of sexual harassment.

(2) From December 2001 until December 2002, an all male group of Presidio Trust

employees denied you membership in their vanpool.

(3) On December 17, 2002, you complained about Mark Feickert’s

unprofessional behavior, discrimination, and disparate treatment of an

applicant you had referred to him for a job interview.

(4) On February 11, 2003, Stephen Potts, Director of Operations assigned you a

rating of “3” instead of “4” for the communication element of your 2002

performance appraisal.

(5) On February 24, 2003, Deborah Zipp, the EEO Officer, falsely accused

you of sexual harassment.

(6) In March 2003, Deborah Zipp retaliated against you by denying you the EEO

Counselor of your choice.

(7) On April 30, 2003, Rosa Medina, a co-worker, made rude, misleading and

insensitive comments to you.

(8) In mid-February 2004, Tom Blean, relocated your male co-worker’s workspace

from building 1750 to building 1752, but did not relocate your workspace.

(9) On February 4, 2004, Tom Blean, your supervisor, denied you the opportunity to

act as the Maintenance Supervisor in his absence.

(10) On June 2, 2004, Tom Blean criticized you for submitting too many work orders

for trash.

(11) During your mid-year review on August 19, 2004, Tom Blean criticized you for

bringing down the morale of the department.

(12) On August 23, 2004, and January 20, 2005, your supervisor, Tom Blean and your

manager, Steve Bueno did not conduct responsibilities as required by the agency’s

performance appraisal system.

(13) On January 20, 2005, your supervisor, Tom Blean rated Element #3 of your 2004

performance appraisal, Quality of Work as “2” (less than fully successful), thereby

preventing you from receiving a 3% comparability pay increase in February 2005.

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(14) On or about September 2004, a Trust supervisor, Mark Feickert, falsely accused

you of sexual harassment.

Coffman Decl. Exh. J. Plaintiff chose not to have an administrative judge resolve these

complaints.

C. The District Court Complaint

Plaintiff filed this action on July 31, 2006. She alleges discrimination on the basis of

race, sex, disability, sexual orientation, and hostile work environment. Defendant now

moves for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A

party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial (usually the defendant) has the initial burden of producing evidence negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the non-moving party has no

obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. If, on the other hand,

the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then the non-moving party

may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead

must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine issue of fact is one that

could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it could

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

In determining whether to grant or deny summary judgment, it is not a court’s task “to

scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Rather, a court is entitled to rely on the

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nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes

summary judgment. See id.

DISCUSSION

A. May 2003 Administrative Complaint Claims

1. Timeliness

Defendant first argues that plaintiff’s claims arising from the May 2003 complaint are

time barred. Plaintiff had 90 days from the receipt of The Presidio Trust’s final decision,

dated April 27, 2006, to file her complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Plaintiff attests in her

signed declaration that she received the decision on May 2, 2006; her complaint is therefore

timely.

2. Adverse Action

To satisfy her prima facie burden on her employment discrimination and retaliation

claims, plaintiff must prove, among other things, that she suffered an “adverse employment

action.” See Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Co., 292 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir.

2002) (discrimination); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir.

2002) (retaliation).

Defendant contends that none of the challenged actions set forth in the May 2003

administrative complaint--the appraisal, sexual harassment talk, and change in the assigned

EEO Counselor--constitutes an adverse employment action as a matter of law.

Only non-trivial employment actions that would deter reasonable employees from

complaining about Title VII violations will constitute actionable retaliation. Among

those employment decisions that can constitute an adverse employment action are

termination, dissemination of a negative employment reference, issuance of an

undeserved negative performance review and refusal to consider for promotion. By

contrast, we have held that declining to hold a job open for an employee and

badmouthing an employee outside the job reference context do not constitute adverse

employment actions.

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ray v.

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (“an action is cognizable as an adverse

employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected

activity”). The Court will therefore consider whether a reasonable trier of fact could find

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that any of the three challenged actions constitutes an adverse employment action sufficient

to satisfy plaintiff’s prima facie burden. 

a. The change in EEO counselor

No reasonable trier of fact could find that the assignment of a contract EEO counselor

to plaintiff’s complaint was an adverse employment action. First, EEO regulations provide

that the EEO shall dismiss any claim alleging dissatisfaction with the EEO process. 29

C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(8) (emphasis added). This regulation means that the EEOC does not

deem how an employee is treated as part of the EEO process to be an adverse employment

action.

In any event, plaintiff offers no evidence that an objective employee would find the

assignment of a contract EEO counselor to be objectively disadvantageous or that it would in

any way deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination. Judgment

must be granted on this claim.

b. The sexual harassment allegation 

Plaintiff alleges that she was falsely accused of sexually harassing another employee. 

She does not contend, however, that she was in any way disciplined; that is, that anything

happened other than that the accusation was levied against plaintiff. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at

929 (noting that badmouthing an employee outside of the job reference context is not an

adverse employment action). Plaintiff does not cite any case that suggests that an accusation

in a single meeting, without more, is sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action,

especially where, as here, the accusation was made in a private meeting between plaintiff and

EEO Officer Zipp; indeed, plaintiff does not respond to defendant’s argument that this

“talking to” is not an adverse employment action as a matter of law.

c. The appraisal

Defendant gave plaintiff her written appraisal for her year 2002 performance in

February 2003. There were five possible ratings applied to each element: 5 = outstanding; 4;

3 = fully successful; 2; and 1 = unsuccessful. Plaintiff was evaluated as a “4” in four of the

categories (productivity, job knowledge and skill, quality of work, judgement), and as a “3”

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in two of the categories (safety and teamwork/communication/customer service). Coffman

Decl. Exh. B. Plaintiff challenges only the “3” rating for teamwork/communication. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that an “undeserved negative performance rating can

constitute an adverse employment decision.” Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th

Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, on the record before the Court, no reasonable trier of fact could

find that the “3” rating in the communication category is an adverse employment action

because the “3”--fully successful--had no tangible effect. The performance evaluation

worksheet shows that a “summary rating” is computed from the scores in the various

categories. Plaintiff’s summary rating was a “4” and still would have been a “4” even if she

had received a “4” in teamwork/communication. Coffman Decl. Exh. K. The “fully

successful” rating in the communication category thus was not reasonably likely to deter an

employee from engaging in protected activity; it simply had no negative consequence. See

Alonzo v. Principi, 2006 WL 1582358 * 6 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2006) (holding that the

lowering of the plaintiff’s performance rating was not an adverse employment action as a

matter of law because plaintiff failed to show that it “resulted in any sort of adverse

personnel action”).

Plaintiff does not offer any evidence that the raw score (as opposed to her summary

rating) would deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination; instead,

she contends that she has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery on how supervisors

use the raw score to determine promotions. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides that “[s]hould it appear from the

affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that the party cannot for

reasons stated” present evidence essential to oppose summary judgment, the trial court may

deny the motion for summary judgment or continue the hearing to allow for needed

discovery. In making a Rule 56(f) request, a party opposing summary judgment “must make

clear what information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment.” Garrett v.

City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987). The party seeking

additional discovery must also explain its inability to presently provide the evidence it seeks

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to discover; that is, it must show that it previously exercised due diligence to obtain the

evidence it now seeks a continuance to obtain. Brae Trans., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790

F.2d 1439, 1442-43 (9th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff has not met her Rule 56(f) burden. First, the Rule requires the party opposing

summary judgment to submit an affidavit demonstrating the need for the additional time to

gather evidence. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f); see also Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco,

441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A party requesting a continuance pursuant to Rule

56(f) must identify by affidavit the specific facts that further discovery would reveal, and

explain why those facts would preclude summary judgment.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff

did not submit the affidavit required by Rule 56(f). 

Second, even assuming Rule 56(f) did not require an affidavit, plaintiff’s

memorandum in opposition does not explain why she has been unable to conduct discovery. 

Third, even assuming plaintiff had met her burden of showing she has not had

adequate time to conduct discovery, plaintiff has not explained why she needs discovery to

offer evidence to show that the “fully successful” rating in the communications category of

her appraisal is an adverse employment action. The dispositive question is whether the

employer’s conduct would deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. 

See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. If an employee is not aware that a “fully successful” rating in a

particular category has any employment consequence, it would not deter a reasonable

employee from engaging in protected activity. See Schlosser v. Potter, 2007 WL 2750288

(9th Cir. Sep. 21, 2007) (holding that employer conduct that does not have any employment

consequences is not an adverse employment action). 

Finally, plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition does not identify what facts plaintiff

seeks to discover to defeat summary judgment on this issue. United States v. $5,644,540.00

in U.S. Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir.1986) (“The nonmovant may not simply rely

on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts.”)

(citation and alteration omitted).

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As the record is insufficient to support a finding that the “3” rating in the

communications category was an adverse employment action, defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on this claim must be granted.

B. May 31, 2005 Administrative Complaint

Several of plaintiff’s 14 “claims” in the May 2005 administrative complaint are

encompassed by her May 2003 complaint and thus are discussed above. The remaining

claims are discussed below. 

1. Timeliness

Federal regulations provide that federal employees “who believe they have been

discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or

handicap must consult a Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to try to informally

resolve the matter.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105. In particular, the employee “must initiate contact

with a[n] [EEO] Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be

discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the

action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(1). 

The following “claims”-- to the extent they could even be considered discriminatory

acts--are time barred as it is undisputed that plaintiff did not initiate counseling until

February 24, 2005: 

(1) in April 2001, plaintiff was dissatisfied with Deborah Zipp’s handling of her

complaints of sexual harassment, 

(2) from December 2001 until December 2002, an all male group of Presidio Trust

employees denied plaintiff membership in their vanpool, 

(3) on December 17, 2002, plaintiff complained about Mark Feickert’s unprofessional

behavior, discrimination, and disparate treatment of an applicant plaintiff had referred

to him for a job interview,

(4) on April 30, 2003, Rosa Medina, a co-worker, made rude, misleading and

insensitive comments to you,

(5) in mid-February 2004, Tom Blean, relocated plaintiff’s male co-worker’s

workspace from building 1750 to building 1752, but did not relocate plaintiff’s

workspace,

(6) on February 4, 2004, Tom Blean, plaintiff’s supervisor, denied plaintiff the

opportunity to act as the Maintenance Supervisor in his absence,

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(7) on June 2, 2004, Tom Blean criticized plaintiff for submitting too many work

orders for trash,

(8) during plaintiff’s mid-year review on August 19, 2004, Tom Blean criticized

plaintiff for bringing down the morale of the department,

(9) on August 23, 2004 plaintiff’s supervisor, Tom Blean and plaintiff’s manager,

Steve Bueno did not conduct responsibilities as required by the agency’s performance

appraisal system, and

(10) On or about September 2004, a Trust supervisor, Mark Feickert, falsely accused

plaintiff of sexual harassment.

Plaintiff’s failure to initiate counseling within 45 days of these allegedly discriminatory

events is fatal to her discrimination claims. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir.

2002).

Plaintiff responds that these claims are timely because “she complained to Deborah

Zipp with regard to each and every one of these claims within the 45 day period, however,

Ms. Zipp would discourage Plaintiff from filing or would delay processing her complaints,

and would not process her complaints as Plaintiff requested.” Opp. at p. 20. The only

evidence plaintiff has submitted in support of her opposition, however, is her declaration. At

paragraph 46 she baldly states:

For each claim identified by Defendants regarding failure of me to exhaust my

administrative remedies, I complained the same day or the following day to my

supervisor, my manager, and always to the EEO Officer.

In considering defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court must assume plaintiff’s

assertion is true. The question, then, is whether evidence that plaintiff “complained” to an

unidentified EEO officer, without more, satisfies the requirement that she contact an EEO

counselor. 

“Under federal regulations promulgated by the EEOC, federal employees complaining

of discrimination by a governmental agency ‘must consult a[n EEO] Counselor prior to filing

a complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter,’ 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a), and

they ‘must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged

to be discriminatory,’ 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).” Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1095. “This deadline

constitutes an administrative requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to

waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Id. at 1095 n.5. Thus, plaintiff must initiate contact

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with an EEO counselor to exhaust her remedies. See Scholosser v. Potter, 2007 WL

2750288 (9th Cir. Sep. 21, 2007) (affirming dismissal of claims for failure to initiate contact

with EEO Counselor within 45 days). Plaintiff does not cite any authority that suggests that

making an unspecified complaint to a supervisor or some other EEO officer is sufficient.

Plaintiff also does not offer any evidence that suggests waiver, estoppel or equitable

tolling as to any of the above claims, except, perhaps, for the vanpool claim. There is no

evidence that defendant discouraged plaintiff from initiating counseling or that plaintiff was

thwarted in her attempt to do so. Plaintiff also does not contend that she was unaware of the

45 day requirement; nor could she, since she officially contacted an EEO counselor as early

as February 2003. See Leorna v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997)

(noting that having neither actual nor constructive knowledge of 45 day time suffices to

establish equitable tolling). In sum, despite her admitted knowledge of the requirement that

she initiate counseling within 45 days of the challenged incident, and her availment of the

process in the past, she failed to do so here. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on the above claims, with the exception of the vanpool claim, must be granted.

Plaintiff’s evidence as to the vanpool claim is distinguishable from her other claims.

Plaintiff attests that she initiated contact with an EEO counselor who referred plaintiff to

Zipp. Plaintiff’s Decl. ¶¶ 7-10. While there is no dispute that plaintiff did not formally

initiate the required counseling, for purposes of defendant’s motion the Court will assume

that plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies for the vanpool claim.

2. Plaintiff waived the van pool claim

Even if plaintiff timely initiated contact with an EEO counselor on her vanpool claim,

she subsequently waived the issue. The EEO Counselor’s Report for plaintiff’s 2003 contact

with an EEO counselor reflects that plaintiff told the counselor that the vanpool issue had

been resolved and was not part of her current complaint. Coffman Decl. Exh. C at p. 4. 

Plaintiff does not offer any evidence to contradict this evidence of her waiver; nor does she

object to the admissibility of the Counselor’s Report.

//

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3. January 2005 performance appraisal for year 2004

Defendant concedes that plaintiff’s challenge to her year 2004 appraisal is timely. It

nonetheless moves for summary judgment on this claim on the ground that plaintiff cannot

meet her prima facie showing of discrimination on any basis (race, gender, sexual

orientation, disability) or a prima facie showing of retaliation.

a. Discrimination

In order to prevail in a Title VII disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must first

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In particular, a plaintiff must show that (1) she

belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position, (3) she was subjected to

an adverse employment action, and (4) she was similarly situated to others not members of

the protected class who were treated more favorably. See Aragon, 292 F.3d at 658. If a

plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the

defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s

articulated reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination “by either directly persuading the

court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by

showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot meet her prima facie burden and, even if she

had, defendant has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the “2” rating on the

work quality category of her year 2004 performance evaluation. Blean attests in an affidavit

that he is the Maintenance Inspection Supervisor over three employees, including plaintiff. 

About 70 percent of his supervisory time was spent with plaintiff helping her make

corrections to paperwork and get her paperwork in on time. He only rarely had these same

problems with the other two employees in his unit. Her gave her the “2” on the work quality

element of her performance evaluation because he has to correct her calculations 90 percent

of the time. The other inspectors make similar mistakes only once a month or every other

month. 

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Plaintiff responds that she needs additional time to conduct discovery. As the Court

explained above, plaintiff has not met her Rule 56(f) burden as she has not submitted the

required affidavit, let alone an affidavit that explains why she has been unable to acquire the

needed discovery and identifies the specific evidence she seeks to defeat summary judgment.

Moreover, even if the Court assumes that plaintiff has satisfied her prima facie

burden, she does not dispute defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her “2”

rating; namely, the quality of her work. Plaintiff does not need discovery to dispute this

evidence; she has personal knowledge of whether Blean frequently had to correct her

calculations. In her affidavit, however, plaintiff never disputes Blean’s description of her

work. As it is therefore undisputed that plaintiff’s work quality had problems, defendant is

entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that the “2” rating in the work quality

category of her year 2004 performance evaluation was discriminatory.

b. Retaliation

Plaintiff also claims that the performance evaluation was made in retaliation. A

plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that: (1) he engaged in a

protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) there was a

causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. See

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish

causation, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that engaging in the

protected activity was one of the reasons for the adverse employment decision and that but

for such activity the decision would not have been made. See id. 

Plaintiff’s opposition does not identify the protected activity that allegedly motivated

the lower performance rating. The triggering protective activity cannot be her 2003

administrative complaint as the record does not reflect that either Blean or Bueno were

involved with that earlier complaint and plaintiff did not name them in the earlier complaint;

nor were they her supervisors at the time. In her opposition plaintiff states, without citation

to any support, that she had complained to her supervisors and others about Blean and that

Blean was aware of those complaints. Opp. at 26. Such a vague and unsupported assertion

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is insufficient to support a finding of causation. Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing

that the performance rating was made in retaliation for plaintiff having engaged in a

protected activity.

Even if plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of retaliation, as is explained above

defendant has met its burden to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the

performance evaluation. Since defendant has carried its burden, plaintiff must demonstrate

that the “‘assigned reason’ was ‘a pretext or discriminatory in its application.’” Lynn v.

Regents of the Univ. of California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973)). Pretext may be shown either (1)

directly showing that a discriminatory motive more likely than not motivated the employer or

(2) indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 ( 9th Cir. 1998). To establish pretext,

“very little” direct evidence of discriminatory motive is required, but if circumstantial

evidence is offered, such evidence has to be “specific” and “substantial.” Id. at 1222; Little

v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 2001). As is explained above,

plaintiff offers no evidence of pretext; her declaration--the only evidence proffered by

plaintiff--does not dispute Blean’s explanation of plaintiff’s work errors.

4. Ongoing pattern of discrimination and a hostile work environment

Plaintiff also contends that all of the unexhausted claims are part of an ongoing

pattern of discrimination and therefore her claims are timely. In National R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the Supreme Court held that “discrete discriminatory

acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely

filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging

that act.” Id. at 109; see also Porter v. California Dep’t. of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 891-

92 (9th Cir. 2005) (following Morgan). Plaintiff alleges a series of discrete acts: being told

she was requesting too many work orders; being told she was bringing down the morale of

the department; not being transferred to a building with her co-workers, and so forth. 

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Plaintiff’s claim that they are “related” to the timely challenged January 2005 performance

evaluation claim is immaterial. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109.

The Supreme Court also recognized, however, that “[h]ostile environment claims are

different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct.” 526 U.S.

at 115. “The ‘unlawful employment practice’ therefore cannot be said to occur on any

particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to

discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. . . . Such claims

are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.” Id. “Provided that an act contributing

to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment

may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” Id. at 117. 

Here, the one timely challenged act is the January 2005 performance evaluation. The

question, then, is whether plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to show that this “act” is

part of an actionable hostile work environment. She has not.

 “A hostile work environment claim involves a workplace atmosphere so

discriminatory and abusive that it unreasonably interferes with the job performance of those

harassed.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 923. “The working environment must both subjectively and

objectively be perceived as abusive.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Whether the workplace is objectively hostile must be determined from the perspective of a

reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics and hostility must be measured

based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. “These [circumstances] may include the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 

As the Court explained above, plaintiff has not produced any evidence that suggests

the January 2005 performance evaluation was discriminatory and she has not rebutted

defendant’s non-discriminatory explanation for her review. Thus, the performance

evaluation cannot be the act that makes plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim timely. 

Defendant is entitled to judgment on this claim, too.

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C. New Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint also includes new claims that were never raised in any

administrative complaint: (1) plaintiff overheard Feickert explain that a sick employee had

“white spots on his dick;” (2) employees urinated in the fields in front of her; (3) Blean

requested that she hold his dick while he urinated; (4) males in the shop hung a picture of a

female on the bulletin board, and so on. She contends these claims are exhausted based on

her conclusory declaration statement that as to each claim defendant claims she did not

exhaust she “complained the same day or the following day to my supervisor, my manager,

and always to the EEO officer.” Kraus Decl. ¶ 46. 

As the Court explained above, however, plaintiff does not cite any case that holds that

such complaints satisfy the requirement that she initiate contact with an EEO counselor. 

Moreover, all of these “new” incidents occurred before one or the other of plaintiff’s

administrative complaints. The documents produced by defendant demonstrate that plaintiff

had ample opportunity to identify any additional claims she wished to make and yet she

never notified defendant that its list of her claims was incomplete. Defendant is entitled to

judgment on these new, unexhausted claims.

D. Disability Claim

Defendant moves for summary judgment of plaintiff’s disability claim on the ground

that she does not have evidence sufficient to establish that she has “a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities.” It also argues

that plaintiff has failed to identify how her alleged disabilities, and, presumably, defendant’s

failure to accommodate them, impacted the performance of her job. Finally, defendant notes

that to the extent plaintiff claims disparate treatment based on disability, there is no evidence

that any of the acts of which plaintiff complains were motivated by plaintiff’s alleged

disabilities.

Plaintiff merely responds that she has been exposed to lead and that her supervisor,

Blean, acknowledged that she suffers from dyslexia. She also states, without support, that

she has a psychiatric disability and back problems. Opp. at 26-27. Finally, she claims she

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needs time for discovery, although she does not explain how discovery of defendant will

assist her in demonstrating that she suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA

or enable her to explain how her alleged disabilities impacted her ability to do her job. Such

information, if it exists, is in plaintiff’s possession. It is apparent that plaintiff has no basis

for making this claim; it is simply one of a plethora of claims made in her complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of

plaintiff’s claims is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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