Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05299/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05299-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2015 Decided May 29, 2015

No. 14-5299

JIHAD DHIAB, DETAINEE, GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL

STATION AND SHAKER AAMER, AS NEXT FRIEND OF JIHAD

DHIAB,

APPELLEES

v.

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

HEARST CORPORATION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-01457)

Catherine H. Dorsey, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Benjamin

C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Vincent H. Cohen,

Jr., Acting U.S. Attorney, and Matthew M. Collette, Attorney. 

David A. Schulz argued the cause for appellees Hearst

Corporation, Inc., et al. With him on the brief was Matthew L.

Schafer. 

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Jon B. Eisenberg argued the cause for appellee Dhiab. With

him on the brief were Lisa R. Jaskol, Cori Crider, Alka

Pradhan, and Eric L. Lewis. 

Ryan M. Keats was on the brief for amici curiae

Constitutional Law Professors in support of appellees.

Rachel Levinson-Waldman was on the brief for amici curiae

Brennan Center for Justice and Electronic Frontier Foundation

in support of intervenors-appellees. 

Hina Shamsi and Arthur B. Spitzer were on the brief for

amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union and Reporters

Committee for Freedom of the Press in support of intervenorsappellees. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and MILLETT and

WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Abu Wa’el (Jihad) Dhiab was a detainee at

the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba until

December 2014. During the course of his habeas corpus

proceedings in the district court, Dhiab went on a hunger strike. 

Subsequently, he filed a motion asking the court to enjoin the

government from forcibly extracting him from his cell and

force-feeding him. In determining whether to grant the motion,

the court examined 32 classified videotapes of Dhiab’s forcible

cell extractions and force-feedings.

In June 2014, several news media organizations intervened

in Dhiab’s habeas proceedings for the purpose of filing a motion

to unseal and release the videotapes. Currently before us is the

government’s appeal from the district court’s decision, 

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effectuated in two orders, granting the media organizations’

motion with certain modifications. We cannot reach the merits

of this appeal, however, because it is premature. The district

court’s decision did not terminate the action, and it does not

qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order. We

therefore lack jurisdiction to review it. Nor does this case

present the extraordinary circumstances required to grant the

government’s alternative request for a writ of mandamus. 

I

Pursuant to statute, this court has “jurisdiction of appeals

from all final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

A “‘final decisio[n]’ is typically one ‘by which a district court

disassociates itself from a case.’” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.

Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (alteration in original)

(quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42

(1995)). The “statute’s core application is to rulings that

terminate an action.” Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct.

897, 902 (2015) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,

233 (1945)). 

The district court’s two orders in this case plainly do not

match that description. The first order granted the intervenors’

motion to unseal with the condition that “counsel shall work

cooperatively . . . to ensure that all necessary redactions of the

videotapes shall be made so that they may then be entered on the

public docket.” Order at 2, Dhiab v. Obama, No. 05-1457

(D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2014). The order further provided that “the

videotapes shall remain sealed until all such redactions are

made.” Id. The second order directed the parties to “submit a

Joint Proposal regarding how the videotapes can be made

available to the public most efficiently.” Order at 1, Dhiab v.

Obama, No. 05-1457 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2014). It further provided

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that “the videotapes shall remain under seal until the Court has

approved the Joint Proposal.” Id. 

The government has not yet begun to make the redactions

required by the district court, and no Joint Proposal has yet been

prepared. At oral argument, the government and Dhiab agreed

that it is likely that there will be disputes regarding the scope of

the redactions once they are made, rendering further litigation

over those disputes in the district court, and then on appeal, also

likely. Oral Arg. Recording at 2:26-40; id. at 36:50-59; see

Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106 (recognizing that “[p]ermitting

piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . undermines efficient

judicial administration and encroaches upon the prerogatives of

district court judges, who play a special role in managing

ongoing litigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Accordingly, because the district court’s decision is not one that 

“‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the

court to do but execute the judgment,’” it is not the kind of

decision that typically falls within the meaning of § 1291. 

Gelboim, 135 S. Ct. at 902 (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233); see

Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867

(1994)).

Nor does the decision fall within the collateral order

doctrine, which holds that § 1291 “encompasses not only

judgments that terminate an action, but also a small class of

collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are

appropriately deemed final.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106

(internal quotation marks omitted). “That small category

includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve

important questions separate from the merits, and that are

effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in

the underlying action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

At a minimum, the government has failed to satisfy the third

requirement. 

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The government maintains that the district court’s decision

will be unreviewable on appeal because, by the time a final

judgment is entered in the case, the videotapes will have been

released and the “cat [will be] out of the bag.” Gov’t Br. 30

(quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 

But that is incorrect. As quoted above, the district court directed

that “the videotapes shall remain sealed until all . . . redactions

are made” and “until the Court has approved the Joint Proposal.” 

Hence, unless and until the district court approves the Joint

Proposal and orders the unsealing and release of the redacted

videotapes, the cat will remain comfortably in the bag. This is

simply not a case in which the district court has already ordered

disclosure of allegedly protected documents. Cf. Al Odah v.

United States, 559 F.3d 539, 543-44 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding

that an order “directing disclosure of . . . unredacted classified

information” was “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a

final judgment” because, “[o]nce the information is disclosed,

the ‘cat is out of the bag’ and appellate review is futile” (quoting

Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 251)).

Moreover, in light of the district court’s willingness to stay

its interlocutory orders pending this appeal, we are confident

that it would do so again with respect to an order directing the

unsealing and release of the videotapes, or that it would at least

grant a stay providing sufficient time for this court to act before

the effective date of that order. If the district court does not do

so, the government may, of course, apply to this court for an

emergency stay pending appeal. Accordingly, the district

court’s decision is not effectively unreviewable on appeal.

The government further contends that the district court’s

decision is effectively unreviewable because, in the absence of

an appeal, it will have to devote hundreds of hours of its

employees’ labor to making the required redactions. But the

Supreme Court has consistently declined to find litigation

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burdens sufficient to bring a case within the narrow scope of the

collateral order doctrine. As the Court held in Mohawk

Industries, “[t]hat a ruling ‘may burden litigants in ways that are

only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final

district court judgment . . . has never sufficed’” to satisfy the

third requirement of the doctrine. 558 U.S. at 107 (quoting

Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 872); see, e.g., Lauro Lines S.R.L. v.

Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989) (“‘[T]he possibility that a

ruling may be erroneous and may impose additional litigation

expense is not sufficient to set aside the finality requirement

imposed by Congress’ in § 1291[.] Instead, we have insisted

that the right asserted be one that is essentially destroyed if its

vindication must be postponed until trial is completed.” 

(quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436

(1985))). Indeed, “[i]f the expense of litigation were a sufficient

reason for granting an exception to the final judgment rule, the

exception might well swallow the rule.” Richardson-Merrell,

472 U.S. at 436 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that we are without

jurisdiction to entertain the government’s interlocutory appeal. 

We further note that leaving this matter with the district court

for the time being may have three salutary effects. First, it will

give the district court an opportunity to consider whether the

eight-day time frame it set for the redaction process is

reasonable in light of the declaration the government

subsequently filed concerning the complexity of the task, as well

as the commitment Dhiab’s counsel made at oral argument to

accommodate a request for more time. Second, it is possible

that appropriate redactions will limit the scope of, or perhaps

eliminate altogether, the government’s concerns over release of

the videotapes. Finally, leaving the case in the district court will

also give that court an opportunity to consider the supplemental

declarations that the government submitted in support of its

motion for a stay. When it ruled on the intervenors’ motion to

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unseal, the district court did not have an opportunity to consider

those declarations, which set out the harm associated with

release of the videotapes in considerably more detail than the

declarations the government submitted in opposition to the

initial motion. 

II

We also conclude that the government’s alternative request

for a writ of mandamus must be denied, for substantially the

same reasons that we lack jurisdiction under § 1291. Mandamus

is a “‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really

extraordinary causes.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist.

of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey,

332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947)). To qualify for a writ of

mandamus, three conditions must be satisfied: “(1) the

mandamus petitioner must have ‘no other adequate means to

attain the relief he desires,’ (2) the mandamus petitioner must

show that his right to the issuance of the writ is ‘clear and

indisputable,’ and (3) the court, ‘in the exercise of its discretion,

must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the

circumstances.’” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d

754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81).

As we have explained above, the government has another

adequate means to prevent the release of the videotapes because

it can appeal anew if the district court finally orders the

videotapes unsealed and released. And just as the government’s

desire to avoid litigation burdens is insufficient to bring the case

within the scope of the collateral order doctrine, it is likewise

insufficient to warrant mandamus. See In re Thornburgh, 869

F.2d 1503, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Bankers Life & Cas.

Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)). Under these

circumstances, issuing a writ of mandamus would subvert the

purpose of the no-other-adequate-means condition of

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mandamus, which is “designed to ensure that the writ will not be

used as a substitute for the regular appeals process.” Cheney,

542 U.S. at 380-81. And that is something we will not do.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction and deny the request for a writ of mandamus. 

So ordered.

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