Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00083/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00083-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KONG MENG XIONG, and LUH XIONG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF MERCED, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________

Case No. 1:13-cv-00083-SKO Consolidated with No. 1:13-cv-00111-SKO

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. No. 45)

I. INTRODUCTION

This action, Kong Xiong v. City of Merced, et al., 1:13-cv-00083-SKO, was filed by Kong 

Meng Xiong ("Kong") on January 17, 2013. (Doc. 1.) The case was deemed related to a second 

civil action filed by Luh Xiong ("Luh") on January 23, 2013, captioned Luh Xiong v. City of 

Merced, et al.("Luh Xiong"), 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, and the two cases were consolidated under the 

lead case No. 1:13-cv-00083-SKO (collectively Kong and Luh are referred to as "Plaintiffs").

1

 

Defendants City of Merced, Officer Chavez ("Chavez"), Officer Lodwick ("Lodwick"), Sergeant 

Court ("Court"), and Detective Deliman ("Deliman") (collectively, "Defendants") filed a motion 

for summary judgment, Plaintiffs each filed an opposition brief, and Defendants filed reply briefs 

to each of the opposition briefs filed by Plaintiffs. 

 1 References to documents filed in the Luh Xiong case No. 1:13-cv-00111-SKO will denote the case number along 

with the docket number. References to filings in the Kong Xiong case No. 1:13-cv-00083 will denote only a docket 

number.

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On July 17, 2015, Defendants filed a letter brief indicating they discovered an incidentrelated Force Review Board report, which was being transmitted to Kong and Luh's counsel. The 

Court continued the July 22, 2015, hearing to July 29, 2015, to provide Plaintiffs time to review 

the document and respond. Plaintiffs filed a response indicating they had reviewed the document 

and determined it was not relevant to their opposition to Defendants' motion. Upon review of the 

parties' papers and supporting documents and material, the matter was deemed suitable for 

decision without oral argument, and the hearing set for July 29, 2015, was vacated.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED 

in part and DENIED in part.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

A. Report of Incident and Officers Dispatched to 1594 Buckingham Court3

In the evening of December 3, 2011, Merced Police Officer Chavez and Merced Police 

Officer Lodwick were each separately on patrol. (Docs. 63, 64 DUMF 1, 5.) Each was dispatched 

to a call: Chavez was told there was an Asian adult male displaying a gun at a residence at 1594 

Buckingham Court and to respond to a call for Penal Code § 417; Lodwick was told there was an 

Asian adult male exhibiting a firearm at a party. (Docs. 63, 64, DUMF 2, 3, 6.)4 According to 

Lodwick, the Asian male was yelling at everyone at the party while exhibiting a firearm. (Docs. 

63, 64, DUMF 7.)5 There is a recording of the radio traffic between dispatch and the officers. 

 2 Citation to undisputed facts will reference the corresponding number in Defendants' Separate Statement of 

Undisputed Material Facts ("DUMF"); Defendants statement, Plaintiffs' responses, and Defendants replies are found 

at Docket Nos. 63 and 64. The disputed facts will be noted as such.

3 The parties each made objections, which the Court has carefully reviewed. To the extent the Court necessarily relied 

on evidence that has been objected to, the Court relied only on admissible evidence and, therefore, the objection is 

OVERRULED. It is not the practice of the Court to rule on evidentiary matters individually in the context of 

summary judgment, unless otherwise noted. This is particularly true when the evidentiary objections consist of 

general objections such as "irrelevant" or "vague." See Capital Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 

1200 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 

4 Kong disputes the characterization that anyone was "brandishing" a weapon as that is not supported by the dispatch 

recording. The dispatcher stated that someone had "pulled out a gun." Defendants contend Kong's dispute over the 

words "brandishing" and a "disturbance" are overly technical. However, DUMF No. 6 relates to what dispatch told 

Lodwick. The radio recording of the dispatcher's instructions to the officers is the best evidence of what the 

dispatcher reported. The dispatcher did not use the words "brandishing" or "disturbance," and Defendants do not cite 

the radio recording. DUMF No. 6 is disputed.

5 Kong disputes that the Asian male was reportedly "yelling" with the gun, that he was "brandishing" the gun, or that 

the person described by the dispatcher was Kong. Defendants cite only to Lodwick's testimony for this disputed fact, 

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The parties dispute Defendants' characterization of the dispatcher's statement that the adult male 

was "pointing a gun," which is discussed below.

Both officers responded to the call, and did not speak to each other as they responded. 

(Docs. 63, 64, DUMF 8.) Upon arriving at the location, Chavez parked his patrol car on 

Nottingham Lane and Lodwick parked behind him. (Docs. 63, 64, DUMF 9, 10.) Both officers 

exited their vehicles, approached 1594 Buckingham Court,6 and had a conversation to confirm the 

house address. (Docs. 63, 64, DUMF 11, 12.)

B. Officers' Approach to 1594 Buckingham Court

As the officers approached 1594 Buckingham Court, Chavez heard voices coming from the 

house, and an argument had been going on.7 (DUMF 13.) Chavez took cover behind a pickup 

truck located at the house next door (DUMF 14), and Lodwick was on Chavez' right and walked 

alongside the house when a motion light came on.8 Lodwick then joined Chavez behind the truck. 

(DUMF 15.) Lodwick also heard an argument.9

C. Officers Confront Kong

1. Officers' Version

While looking at the house, Chavez heard a gun slide – i.e., the racking of a handgun. 

(Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 64:20, 65:7, 67:24-68:4.) He thought a bullet was being chambered in 

a gun, and determined the sound had come from the vicinity of the house. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez 

Depo., 66:22-24, 153:5-8.) To Chavez, the sound was like a semi-automatic gun. (Doc. 46-1, 

 

which is not the best evidence of what the dispatcher told the officers. While it is not disputed this is what Lodwick 

believes the dispatcher reported, the dispatcher did not use the words "brandishing" or "yelling"; thus, this fact is 

disputed. (Docs 62, 63 DUMF 7.)

6 Kong disputes that the officers knew where 1594 Buckingham Court was located and were looking for the wrong 

address initially. To the extent this is disputed, it is not material.

7 Kong disputes Defendants' characterization of what Chavez heard as an "argument" (see Doc. 56-3), although Luh 

does not dispute this characterization (see Doc. 59). Chavez testified at his deposition that he heard a loud 

conversation that sounded like an argument, but he did not know what the individuals were saying. (Compare Doc. 

46-1, Chavez Depo., 58:11-21, 136:8-34 with Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo., 61:25, 62:23-24.)

8 Kong disputes which house Lodwick was walking next to when the motion light came on. To the extent this is 

disputed, it is not material.

9 Kong disputes Defendants' characterization that what Lodwick heard was an argument.

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Chavez Depo., 66:10.) Lodwick also heard the sound – he heard a gun slide and believed a bullet 

was being chambered. (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 66:6-13.) Lodwick then pulled out his 

handgun, in the "low-ready" position and asked Chavez if he'd heard that; Chavez said yes. (Doc. 

46-1, Chavez Depo., 66:25-67:11, Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 66:14-25.) Chavez pulled out his 

handgun. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 81:3-15.)

Chavez attempted to call dispatch about the gun-racking sound, when Kong opened the 

gate from the backyard and walked to the front of the house, toward the street/sidewalk. (Doc. 46-

1, Chavez Depo., 70:5-71:2, 71:13-72:4; Doc. 46, Ex. D, Incident Related Video ("Video"), 3:11-

3:30.) Lodwick testified Kong appeared within 3 to 5 seconds of the "gun-slide" sound, and Kong 

emerged from the area where Chavez and Lodwick had heard the argument. (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick 

Depo., 59:7-12, 67:1-8; Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 137:16-138:1.) Kong was wearing dark pants 

with a flannel jacket, either light gray-and-white or white-and-black. (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 

67:9-14.) Kong then stopped in front of the house, at which point a light was shone on Kong, and 

Chavez and Lodwick issued him verbal commands. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 79:23-80:9, 

84:21-85:2, 88:17-89:8; Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 70:7-11; Doc. 46, Exh. D, Video, 3:27-3:30.) 

Lodwick initially saw Kong's right-hand inside the waistband area of his jacket, but he could not 

actually see Kong's right hand. (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 70:2-6.) Lodwick also observed 

Kong holding a gun in his right hand (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 75:24-77:12), and Kong later 

corroborated the gun's existence by admitting to having a gun at the time the officers fired at him. 

(Doc. 46-5, Kong Depo. 69:2-7, 69:13-20, 69:24-70:3, 82:2-7.) 

Kong's gun was pointed in the officers' direction, and the officers fired. (Doc. 46-1, 

Chavez Depo., 92:3-21, 129:9-12, 129:17-22; Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 77:13-15.) Kong fell to 

the ground, at which time Chavez knew Kong had been shot. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 97:16-

21, 142:11-14.) Chavez shot to incapacitate Kong and to stop the threat, but he was not shooting 

to kill. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 153:24-154:5.) Both officers stopped firing when Kong fell to 

the ground. (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 81:10-13; Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 97:16-98:20.)

At the moment they fired at Kong, neither officer could see people behind the fence to the 

backyard. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 121:17-20; Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 89:24-90:16.) 

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While Chavez had reason to believe there were others on the property, he had no knowledge as to

whether these people were inside or outside when he fired his weapon at Kong. (Doc. 46-1, 

Chavez Depo., 145:20-23.) When Lodwick fired his weapon, he was also not aware that people in 

the backyard were at risk of being hit by a bullet. (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 82:24-83:3.)

After the shooting, Kong lay on the ground and continued to move, including his hands 

towards his waist. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 98:12-20; 101:6-12.) The officers gave him 

commands, including putting his hands up. When Sergeant Court arrived on scene, he saw a gun 

lying next to Kong. (Doc. 46-10, Court Depo., 19:8-20:3; 22:7-20.) Court asked Chavez if he and 

Lodwick were okay, inquired as to who fired, and told them to keep giving Kong commands; the 

officers told Court that Kong had a gun, which Court observed. (Doc. 46-10, Court Depo., 19:8-

20:3.) At that moment, however, Court did not believe the scene was secure as the gun was still 

on the ground by Kong, at least a dozen people were streaming out of the house, and only three 

officers were on the scene. (Doc. 46-10, Court Depo., 22:21-23:15, 24:1-18; 25:16-20.) First aid 

was rendered to Kong when it was safe to do so. (Doc. 46-10, Court Depo., 23:21-24:18.) 

Court and the other officers moved Kong to a safe area near paramedics. (Doc. 46-10, 

Court Depo., 31:6-21; 58:8-17; Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 91:10-22.) Kong obtained first aid 

within 10 to 15 minutes of the incident. (Doc. 46-10, Court Depo., 27:13-20.) The officers acted 

to ensure Kong's medical care, despite that they were not operating in a secure area. (Doc. 46-10, 

Court Depo., 31:6-32:3.) In doing so, the officers exceeded Merced policy, which only states that 

first aid is to be rendered "to injured parties if it can be done safely." (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., 

Exh. M.) Lieutenant McIntyre arrived on-scene when Kong was moved. (Doc. 46-10, Court 

Depo., 59:2-25.) Once Kong was moved, Chavez and Lodwick entered the backyard of 1594 

Buckingham Court. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 104:16-105:14.) The officers never entered the 

house. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 104:16-105:14.) Upon exiting the backyard, Chavez walked to 

the street and back to Nottingham Street with Merced Police Officer Gonzalez. (Doc. 46-1, 

Chavez Depo., 105:18-106:12.) Lieutenant McIntyre asked both Chavez and Lodwick questions 

which constituted a public safety statement. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 108:11-109:8, Doc. 46-3, 

Lodwick Depo., 30:3-20.)

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Once most of the people had left the house, the SWAT team from Merced County Sheriff's 

Department took over searching and clearing the rest of the property. (Doc. 46-10, Court Depo., 

45:3-13, 48:13-19, 50:7-22.)10 

2. Plaintiffs' Version11

While standing in front of 1594 Buckingham Court, Lodwick and Chavez both testified 

they heard a noise which they believed to be the racking of a semi-automatic handgun from the 

general area of the house. (Doc. 60-2, Chavez Depo., 70:5-15, 71:13-72:18; Doc. 60-3, Lodwick 

Depo., 65:10-66:13; Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo.,

12 66:22-68:22) (testifying sound came from the 

general area of the house). However, neither Luh nor Kong heard the noise or observed anyone 

racking a gun in the backyard, and the sound cannot be heard on the video of the incident. (Doc. 

60, Exh. E, Video 23:03:08; Doc. 60-6, Kong Depo., 70:12-23; Doc. 60-15, Luh Decl., ¶ 5.) 

Lodwick asked Chavez: "You hear that?" and Chavez responded, "yes." (Doc. 60-3, Lodwick 

Depo., 14-25; Doc. 60-6, Kong Depo., 55:19-25, Doc. 60, Exh. E, Video, 23:08:18.) As Chavez 

attempted to contact dispatch, Kong exited the side gate area of 1594 Buckingham Court and 

walked toward the public sidewalk in the front of the homes. (Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo., 70:5-14; 

71:13-72:18.) The officers immediately drew their firearms, and illuminated Kong with their gunmounted flashlights. (Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo., 86:7-23, Doc. 57-1, Lodwick Depo., 73:2-7, Doc. 

60-2, Chavez Depo., 70:5-71:12, 79:23-81:15.) Kong maintains Chavez had his gun pointed at 

Kong even before he had illuminated Kong with his flashlight. (Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo., 80:6-

21.)13 Kong was wearing a black and white checkered jacket and did not fit the description of the 

 10 Plaintiff Luh disputes this and contends the Merced County Sheriff's SWAT team is interdepartmental and contains 

officers from MPD who participated in the search. 

11 Plaintiffs' factual version is drawn from Kong and Luh's opposition briefs in combination, as well as their responses 

to Defendants' separate statement of undisputed material facts and Plaintiffs' separate statement of disputed material 

facts.

12 All references to the Chavez Deposition at Document 57-1 refer to Chavez' 2015 deposition at Exhibit E. Any 

reference to the 2012 Deposition at Exhibit C is denoted as the 2012 Deposition.

13 Chavez was specifically asked at his deposition whether he pulled his gun at the same time as turning on the light or 

whether the gun was already pointed at Kong and then Chavez turned on the light; Chavez responded that he didn't 

"remember exactly how it was done." (Doc. 57-1, 82:18-25.)

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person who reportedly had exhibited a weapon at the party. (Doc. 60-3, Lodwick Depo., 67:1-

69:2; Doc. 46, Exhibit B, Incident Related Radio Traffic ("Radio Traffic"), 4:00-4:34.)14 

Rather than announcing their presence, the officers yelled for Kong to raise his hands, but 

they failed to identify themselves as the police and did not warn him they would shoot if he did 

not follow commands. (Doc. 60-2, Chavez Depo., 72:22-74:14, Doc. 60-3, Lodwick Depo., 

70:15-71:5.) The officers did not know who Kong was, as he did not fit the description of the 

suspect provided by dispatch, and they had no information that Kong had violated any laws. (Doc. 

57-1, Chavez Depo., Doc. 60-3, Lodwick Depo., 71:11-72:2.) When Kong saw the light, he was 

unsure who they were and did not know they were police officers; he became scared and turned in 

the opposite direction of the officers to run away. (Doc. 60-6, Kong Depo., 67:4-21.) Kong had a 

firearm tucked in the waistband of his pants, but he made no motion to reach down into his 

waistband, rack the gun, or point it at the officers. (Doc. 60-6, Kong Depo., 67:4-21, 69:5-18, 

70:12-13, 71:18-20.) 

The officers opened fire on Kong, shooting several bullets in the direction of Kong and the 

backyard as he was running away from the officers toward the backyard gate. (Doc. 60-3, 

Lodwick Depo., 81:18-82:5; Doc. 60-2, Chavez Depo., 92:19-95:11, 140:6-141:5; Doc. 60-6, 

Kong Depo., 70:24-71:3.) The officers fired in a manner meant to incapacitate Kong. (Doc. 57-1, 

Chavez 153:24-154:20; Doc. 57-1, Lodwick Depo., 83:4-8.) One of the bullets struck Kong in the 

leg. (Doc. 60-6, Kong Depo., 28:9-29:15.) When Kong exhibited signs of being shot, the officers 

stopped firing. (Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo., 97:16-98:20.)

The officers knew a party was being held in the home, and they heard a group of people 

talking loudly behind Kong as they fired on him. (Doc. 60-3, Lodwick Depo., 82:17-83:12, Doc. 

60-2, Chavez Depo., 61:23-62:13.) The officers were fully aware that shooting at Kong put other 

people in the backyard in danger of being shot as well. (Doc. 60-3, Lodwick Depo., 108:18-

109:10, 120:18-24.) A partygoer standing behind the gate was shot in the foot and chest and died 

as a result of his injuries (Doc. 60-2, Chavez Depo., 143:17-144:2, 148:3-5; Doc. 60-3, Lodwick 

Depo., 115:19-116:2), and Luh was also standing in the backyard just behind the gate when he 

 14 Each of the parties lodged copies of the incident video and dispatch recordings. 

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was shot in the leg (Doc. 60-3, Lodwick Depo., 116:8-11; Doc. 60-15, Luh Decl., ¶ 6).

After being shot in the leg, because Luh did not know who was shooting and, fleeing for 

his life and feeling faint from the trauma, he ran into the house and hid in a bathtub. (Doc. 60-15, 

Luh Decl., ¶ 7.) 

Chavez and Lodwick's supervisor, Court, came onto the scene within minutes of the 

shooting and began giving orders, including an order to remain in place and wait for additional 

units to secure the location and Kong. (Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo., 100:3-23, 101:25-103:8.) Kong 

maintains that Chavez, Lodwick, and Court rendered him no aid. (Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo., 

104:7-13, Doc. 57-1, Lodwick Depo., 81:18-82:17.)15 Partygoers exiting the home informed the 

officers that another shooting victim was inside the home. (Doc. 60-4, Court Depo., 48:21-50:6.) 

D. SWAT Team and Post-Arrest Interview of Kong

Court turned the task of controlling the scene over to the Merced County Sheriff's SWAT 

team which Luh maintains was comprised of Merced City police officers who participated in the 

incident. (Doc. 60-4, Court Depo., 45:3-46:11, 50:7-51:6.)16 Luh also contends that based on the 

Merced police officers on the scene reporting that Kong pulled a gun and pointed it at Chavez and 

Lodwick, the SWAT team deployed a police dog that went into the house and bit Luh until the 

officers went in and pulled him out of the home.17 The parties do not dispute that once the Merced 

 15 Although he cited it, Kong did not include page 81 of Lodwick's deposition. Moreover, this portion of the 

deposition transcript does not discuss the aid Lodwick did or did not render to Kong. The only testimony supporting 

this fact is that of Chavez, who was asked whether he rendered Kong aid in any way, to which Chavez responded, 

"no." (Doc. 57-1, Chavez Depo., 104:12-13.)

16 Sergeant Court testified that, once all the people were drawn out, Lieutenant McIntyre "kind of took over in terms 

of initiating the rest of the search of the residence and the location," and "we called the SWAT out." (Doc. 60-4, 

Court Depo., 45:7-19, 46:7-8.) He also testified that SWAT "kind of take over the scene in terms of the security of the 

perimeter and a lot of the stuff that – you know, they – we pull our officers out . . . Once they get there, they kind of 

take over." (Doc. 60-4, Court Depo., 48:6-12.) Sergeant Court testified that it was the Merced County Sheriff's 

SWAT team that was utilized, and Court identified two of the members of the SWAT team, but did not identify them 

as officers with the Merced Police Department. (Doc. 60-4, Court Depo., 50:9-19.)

17 Luh cites Sergeant Court's deposition as evidence that the police officers on scene reported to the SWAT team that 

Kong pulled out a gun and pointed it at them. However, Court's testimony is not that specific. He states that, "I didn't 

have – you know, other than information I provided to them. I mean, by this time, the two people had been – the—

Mr. Xiong or Xiong and the other subject inside the gate, I think it's Xiong as well, they had been transported by 

Riggs, which is a paramedic company, so other than providing information as to what we knew, in terms of what we 

saw before their arrival, provided them with that information." (Doc. 60-4, 52:12-20.) There is no testimony as to 

what specific information was relayed to the SWAT team or the basis of the SWAT team's decision to deploy the 

police dog.

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County Sheriff's SWAT team arrived, the Merced Police pulled back to the outer perimeter, and

the SWAT team controlled the inner perimeter. (See Docs. 62, 63, DUMF 91-93.) 

Merced Police Detective Deliman prepared a search warrant for 1594 Buckingham Court 

and interviewed Kong. Kong made several admissions during the course of his post-arrest 

interview including that the incident was his fault, that he had a gun in his possession when 

officers stopped him, and that he had pointed his gun towards the officers. (Doc. 46, Exhibit L, 

Post-Arrest Interview Video ("Interview Video")).

18

E. Merced Police Department ("MPD") Policies and Training

The parties do not dispute any of the following facts regarding MPD's polices. At the time 

of the incident, MPD used policies developed by Lexipol. (See Docs. 62, 63, DUMF 125.) 

Lexipol is a commercial company that provides policies and procedures for police departments in 

California and was MPD's provider of policies and procedures at the time of the incident. (See

Docs. 62, 63, DUMF 126-27.) These policies included: (1) Law Enforcement Authority (Police 

100); (2) Training Policy (Policy 208); (3) Use of Force (Policy 300); (4) Deadly Force Review 

(Policy 302); (5) Shooting Policy) (Policy 304); (6) Officer-Involved Shooting (Policy 310); (7) 

Firearms (Policy 312); (8) Search and Seizure (Policy 332); (9) Disciplinary Policy (Policy 340); 

(10) Report Preparation (Policy 344); (11) Racial Profiling (Policy 402); (12) Briefing Training 

(Policy 404); (13) Crime and Disaster Scene Integrity (Policy 406); (14) Field Training Officer 

(Policy 436); and (15) Detentions and Photographing Detainees (Policy 440). (Doc. 50, Trindad 

Decl., ¶ 8.)

The Commission on Police Officer Standards & Training ("POST") is a state-wide quasigovernmental organization composed of law enforcement executives and advisors. POST sets 

forth standards for the basic and continued training of peace officers, and certifies that local lawenforcement agencies and their officers are in compliance with those standards. In addition, POST 

reviews and certifies training courses developed by local law-enforcement agencies as in 

 18 Kong and Luh make several evidentiary objections to Kong's post-arrest interview statements, although Kong does 

not deny that he made these statements. These objections are considered in the Court's discussion of the interview 

statements in the analysis section below.

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compliance with POST standards and expectations. POST conducts regular audits of local 

agencies and officers to determine compliance, and certifies that those agencies and officers are in 

compliance. (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., ¶ 9.) 

Court successfully completed a POST-certified police academy with 680 hours of training. 

Chavez successfully completed a POST-certified police academy with 1,200 hours of training. 

Lodwick successfully completed a POST-certified police academy with 1,007 hours of training. 

Deliman successfully completed a POST-certified police academy with 1,332 hours of training. 

(Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., ¶ 11.) Officers in the MPD may also choose to obtain additional 

certificates which are based on an officer's further education and experience. At the time of the 

incident, Court possessed his Basic, Intermediate, Advanced, and Supervisory certificates; 

Deliman possessed his Advanced certificate; and Chavez and Lodwick possessed a Basic 

certificate. (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., ¶ 12.)19

MPD requires firearms requalification as well as mandatory monthly firearms training. 

(Doc. 46-15, Williams Depo., 16:10-19; 55:25-58:3.) The monthly training reflects an officers' 

real-world environment: day shift officers shoot during the day-time, night-shift officers shoot at 

night. (Doc. 46-15, Williams Depo., 36:17-25.)20 Additionally, every officer in the Department is 

required to attend an annual nighttime shoot, regardless of their shift. (Doc. 46-15, Williams 

Depo., 37:1-9.) The subject matter of monthly training depends on the lesson plan prepared by the 

range instructor. (Doc. 46-15, Williams Depo., 16:20-17:15, 18:8-20.) MPD utilizes scenario-

 19 Kong objects to Trindad's declaration (Doc. 50), paragraphs 10, 14, and 15 because Trindad offers testimony about 

various training MPD performs, as well as the number of hours of biannual update training Lodwick, Chavez, 

Deliman, and Court had completed as of the date of the incident because these documents were not produced under 

Rule 26 to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 56-3, DUMF 136-38.) Although Trindad references training and the number of hours of 

training Chavez, Lodwick, Court, and Deliman had completed at the time of the incident, Defendants are not offering 

the actual training documents as evidence. The documents may not have been disclosed by Defendant pursuant to the 

initial disclosure requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), but this does not preclude Trindad from 

offering testimony within his personal knowledge about the training completed by the officers or within the 

department, particularly as there is no argument that Trindad was not disclosed as a witness and because Trindad was 

deposed, in part, on these matters.

20 Although Kong objects that this testimony from Matthew Williams is irrelevant, this testimony is relevant to Kong's 

Monell claim for inadequate training. Kong also objects that no documents were produced by Defendants pursuant to 

Rule 26 initial disclosure requirements regarding this training. However, Williams was deposed by Kong on March 

16, 2015. Defendants are not precluded from relying on the deposition testimony solicited by Kong from Williams. 

Moreover, Defendants are not offering the underlying training documents to support their defense to Kong's Monell

claim; thus they are not offering documents in violation of their initial disclosure requirements under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(a). Kong's objections are OVERRULED.

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based training (also known as laser-shot system), which officers are required to undergo at least 

once a year. (Doc. 46-15, Williams Depo., 25:24-26:19, 43:21-44:15.) This is a pass-fail system, 

and officers are not allowed to leave if they fail the scenario-based training. (Doc. 46-15, 

Williams Depo., 26:20-29:8.) Officers who initially fail undergo additional training before 

undergoing the scenario shooting again. (Doc. 46-15, Williams Depo., 28:20-29:8.) The same 

rule applies to live-fire training: all officers must take until they pass (and get additional training 

if they initially fail). (Doc. 46-15, Williams Depo., 28-20-29:8.)

F. MPD Investigation into the Shooting Incident

The MPD adheres to the California Penal Code § 832.5, which requires that the 

Department have a procedure for investigating complaints made by the public and make a written 

description of the procedure available to the public. An Internal Affairs investigation conducted 

by the MPD results in one of the following findings for each allegation, which have the following 

meanings: (a) Exonerated: Action complained about did occur, but was lawful, justified, and 

proper; (b) Not sustained: There is insufficient information/evidence to prove or disprove the 

allegation; (c) Sustained: The allegation is supported by sufficient information and/or evidence; 

(d) Unfounded: The allegation is false; alleged act did not occur, employee or MPD was not 

involved. (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., ¶ 5.) 

The MPD conducted an officer-involved shooting investigation after the subject incident in 

this case. Internal Affairs conducted an administrative investigation pursuant to Policy 310, and 

Trindad and Lieutenant Jim Gurden were the investigating lieutenants. The investigation included 

(1) interviewing the reporting party who called 911 the night of the incident; (2) interviewing 

Chavez, Lodwick, and Court; (3) interviewing Luh Xiong; (4) canvassing the neighborhood of 

1594 Buckingham Court for witnesses; (4) visiting the scene and inspecting the incident-related 

residence; (5) reviewing the incident-related video from Chavez' glasses; (6) reviewing the 

incident-related radio traffic; and (7) reviewing the incident-related photographs taken by the 

Crime Scene Response Team. The neighborhood canvass uncovered three civilians who were 

interviewed. The investigators also interviewed a guest at the party that evening. The 

investigators attempted to interview another person, but were unsuccessful. The investigators 

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attempted to interview Kong, but he declined. Internal affairs found no violation of MPD policy 

regarding the use of deadly force. (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., 15.)21

G. Video Evidence

The parties each submitted a video of the incident that was obtained from a camera 

embedded in Chavez' glasses. Both sides assert it supports their respective accounts of the 

incident and, in turn, contradicts the opposing party's account. The Court has reviewed the video, 

which is incorporated by reference herein. The Court will not provide a summary of the video, 

except in a general way as it would give rise to subjective interpretation.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

It is undisputed that, due to the events on December 3, 2011, Kong was charged and found 

guilty by jury of violation of penal Code § 12021(d), possession of a gun while on probation. He 

was released from custody on June 25, 2012.

Kong filed a complaint in this Court on January 17, 2013. He alleges claims for violation 

of the California Civil Code §§ 51.71 and 52.1, battery, assault, negligence, excessive force in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment, conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a Monell claim 

pursuant to Section 1983 (see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)), a claim for 

injunctive relief, and seeks punitive damages.

Luh filed a complaint against Officers Chavez and Lodwick as well as the City of Merced 

on January 23, 2013. Luh alleges claims against Officers Chavez and Lodwick under Section 

1983 for unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment (Luh Xiong, 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, Doc. 2, ¶¶ 24-25), violation of Luh's due process 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Luh Xiong, 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, Doc. 2, ¶¶ 24-25), and 

state-law claims for assault, battery, and negligence (Luh Xiong, 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, Doc. 2, ¶¶ 

40-46). Against the City of Merced, Luh Xiong alleges a Monell claim under two separate 

 21 Kong does not dispute these actions occurred, but disputes they were sufficient to properly investigate the incident. 

(Doc. 57-1, T.T. Williams Depo., 10:16-11:6.) Kong also asserts that no administrative shooting investigation report 

was ever provided in discovery, and objects to Trindad's declaration regarding the administrative investigation. 

Defendants do not offer the administrative report as evidence to support their defenses; instead, they offer Trindad's 

declaration regarding his personal knowledge about the administrative shooting investigation. Also, Trindad was 

deposed by Plaintiffs on June 4, 2015, and he gave testimony about the Internal Affairs investigation. Kong's 

objection is OVERRULED.

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theories: (1) custom, policy, and practice; and (2) ratification. (Luh Xiong, 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, 

Doc. 2, ¶¶ 26-39.)

On September 6, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to consolidate the two cases, which was 

granted. (Doc. 25, 27.) On June 3, 2015, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all 

Plaintiffs' claims. (Doc. 45.) Luh and Kong filed briefs in opposition and separate responses to 

Defendants' undisputed statement of material facts. Defendant filed a reply brief in response to 

both Plaintiffs' opposition briefs. Plaintiffs assert there are multiple issues of material fact that 

preclude summary judgment including whether Defendants used excessive force in shooting Kong 

and Luh.

IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants request that the Court take 

judicial notice of the following documents: (1) the jury verdict from Kong's incident-related 

criminal prosecution; (2) minutes regarding the jury's verdict in Kong's incident-related criminal 

prosecution; (3) the probation order from Kong's incident-related criminal prosecution; (4) the jail 

record regarding Kong's release from custody on June 25, 2012; (5) a copy of Kong's tort claim to 

the City of Merced, presented on June 1, 2012; and (6) a copy of the City of Merced's amended 

notice of rejection of Kong's tort claim, served on July 16, 2012. (Doc. 52.) Neither Plaintiff 

objects to Defendants' request for judicial notice of these documents.

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a "court may judicially notice a fact that is not 

subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial 

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2). Judicially noticed facts often consist of 

matters of public record. See, e.g., Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994) (records 

and reports of administrative bodies subject to judicial notice); Toney v. Burris, 829 F.2d 622, 

626-27 (7th Cir. 1987) (city charters and city ordinances subject to judicial notice); and Rothman 

v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (taking judicial notice of a filed complaint as a public 

record). The records to be judicially noticed include court and other public documents which are 

subject to accurate and ready determination. Defendants request for judicial notice is granted.

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V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and 

any affidavits provided establish that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one 

that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)

The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The exact nature of this 

responsibility, however, varies depending on whether the issue on which summary judgment is 

sought is one in which the movant or the nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. 

See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007); Cecala v. Newman, 532 

F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132 (D. Ariz. 2007). If the movant will have the burden of proof at trial, it 

must demonstrate, with affirmative evidence, that "no reasonable trier of fact could find other than 

for the moving party." Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. In contrast, if the nonmoving party will have 

the burden of proof at trial, "the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence 

of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 

allegations in its pleadings to "show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative 

evidence from which a jury could find in [its] favor." FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th 

Cir. 2009). "[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence" will not suffice in this respect. Id.

at 929; see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 

(1986) ("When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."). "Where 

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the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, 

there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, "the court does not make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence." Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. That remains the 

province of the jury or fact finder. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Instead, "[t]he evidence of the 

[nonmoving party] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor." 

Id. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party must produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may reasonably be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight 

Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Claims Against Officers Chavez and Lodwick

Luh and Kong allege excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment as to both Luh and 

Kong's claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code provides a cause of action for the deprivation of 

"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" by any 

person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." Gomez v. 

Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but 

instead is a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). A claim under Section 1983 requires an allegation that (1) the conduct 

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct 

violated a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

1. Plaintiff Luh's Claims Under the Fourth Amendment for Excessive Force

a. Luh's Shooting Was Not A Constitutionally Cognizable Seizure

The Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable "searches" and "seizures." 

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). "[I]t is not a general prohibition of all 

conduct that may be deemed unreasonable, unjustified, or outrageous." Medeiros v. O'Connell, 

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150 F.3d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

Thus, the first step in analyzing a Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 is to determine 

whether there has been a constitutionally cognizable seizure. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 

692, 696 (1981). "[A]pprehension by the use of deadly force is a "seizure." Tennessee v. Garner, 

471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 

The parties dispute whether Chavez and Lodwick's shooting of Luh constituted a "seizure" 

since he was not the person Chavez and Lodwick were attempting to seize. Defendants assert that 

a bystander, such as Luh, injured incidental to a police officer's use of force is not seized within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Brower v. 

County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989), a person can only be seized for Fourth Amendment 

purposes if the person was the deliberate object of the exertion of force intended to terminate the 

freedom of movement. Defendants also cite Rodriquez v. City of Fresno, 819 F. Supp. 2d 937, 

946 (E.D. Cal. 2011) where police were investigating a domestic disturbance at an apartment 

reportedly involving an armed gang member. When officers approached the apartment, they 

observed a man (Hernandez) walking away from the apartment and identified themselves as police 

officers. Id. at 943-44. The officers alleged that Hernandez ran into the apartment and as he was 

running, his hands shifted to the area around his front waistband where officers had reason to 

believe a handgun was located. Id. The officers followed him into the apartment, and Hernandez 

was seen moving toward an open doorway. Id. Fearing that Hernandez posed a deadly threat, one 

of the officers fired two shots, one of which hit Hernandez and the other hit a bystander. Id. The 

court determined that the shooting of the bystander was not a seizure within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment. Id. The officer who fired the shots was focused on Hernandez and had no 

reason, expressed or conjectural, to seek to restrain the bystander. Id. Defendants contend this 

case is similar to Rodriquez in that Chavez and Lodwick unintentionally injured Luh, who was 

only a bystander. Luh was never the deliberate object of the exertion of force, and they never 

intentionally desired to terminate his freedom of movement. (Doc. 46, 30:19-31:21.)

Luh argues the Ninth Circuit rejected a similar argument in Nelson v. City of Davis, 

685 F.3d 867, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2012), and that, under Brower, the intentionality requirement is 

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satisfied when the termination of freedom of movement occurs through means intentionally 

applied. Luh contends that Chavez and Lodwick intentionally drew their guns and fired multiple 

times in the direction of a crowd of people, effectively seizing the entire crowd and hitting Luh, 

Xiong, and another bystander. The fact that Defendants did not intend to shoot Luh misstates the 

requisite standard. (Doc. 58, 15:9-17:12.)22

Defendants respond that Nelson is distinguishable in that the officers in Nelson intended to 

fire their pepperball guns at the plaintiffs to disperse a crowd. Here, there is no evidence the 

officers fired upon Kong to seize any group that Luh was with, and there is no evidence the 

officers intended to seize anyone except Kong. To the extent Luh claims the officers observed a 

group of people on the other side of the fence, the statement is a mischaracterization of the 

officers' testimony. Defendants contend this case is more factually similar to Logan v. City of 

Pullman, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (E.D. Wash. 2005) where the police deployed OC (oleoresin 

capsicum) spray during a fight taking place on the first floor of a two-story building. The cloud of 

OC affected partygoers on the second floor, causing injury. The court found that none of the 

plaintiffs who suffered secondary exposure to the OC were seized under the Fourth Amendment 

because these plaintiffs were not among those the officers intended to seize, despite that they 

intended to deploy the OC. Id. at 1260. Here, Luh offers no evidence he was intentionally 

targeted by the officers; rather, the undisputed facts show that he was a bystander and not the 

deliberate object of the officers' use of force.

To be a constitutionally cognizable seizure, there must be purposeful conduct:

Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical 

control. A seizure occurs even when an unintended person or thing is the object of 

the detention or taking, but the detention or taking itself must be willful. This is 

implicit in the word "seizure," which can hardly be applied to an unknowing act.

Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 

The distinction Defendants draw between those whom officers intended to seize and those 

unintentionally injured in the attempt to seize another is persuasive. In Nelson, approximately 

 22 All citations to pages of the parties' briefs refer to the CM/ECF pagination at the top of the filed document.

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1,000 people had gathered at an apartment building for a party. 685 F.3d at 872-73. When 

officers were initially unsuccessful in dispersing the crowd, they returned armed with pepperball 

guns. Id. at 873. A group of students had congregated on the breezeway of the first floor of the 

complex, which included one of the plaintiffs – Nelson. Id. at 873-74. The plaintiffs testified they 

stood in the breezeway awaiting instructions from the police, but the officers failed to inform them 

what they wanted the plaintiffs to do. Id. at 874. The officers claimed they warned the 

congregants to disburse, and when the partygoers failed to disburse, the officers shot pepperballs 

towards Nelson's group. One of the pepperballs struck Nelson's eye, and he immediately 

collapsed on the ground. Id. The officers argued that Nelson was not individually targeted by the 

officers and therefore his shooting was unintentional and incapable of causing a Fourth 

Amendment violation. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument reasoning that the absence of 

concern regarding the ultimate recipient of the government's use of force does not negate volition: 

Regardless of whether Nelson was the specific object of governmental force, he 

and his fellow students were the undifferentiated objects of shots intentionally fired 

by the officers in the direction of that group. Although the officers may have 

intended that the projectiles explode over the students' heads or against a wall, the 

officers' conduct resulted in Nelson being hit by a projectile that they intentionally 

fired towards a group of which he was a member. Their conduct was intentional, it 

was aimed towards Nelson and his group, and it resulted in the application of 

physical force to Nelson's person as well as the termination of his movement. 

Nelson was therefore intentionally seized under the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 877. The officers' intentionality arose from more than simply intending to pull the trigger of 

the pepperball gun – their intention was to shoot the gun toward a specific group of people, of 

which Nelson was one, for the purposes of disbursing the entire group collectively. 

In Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1097 

(1992), the Fourth Circuit similarly analyzed a claim by the father of a bystander who was killed 

by police officers attempting to "apprehend[] a madman run amok, threatening the lives of 

everyone in his way." Id. at 281. The court concluded that Brower foreclosed the father's Fourth 

Amendment claim: "[Brower] does not mean, as Rucker contends, that a seizure occurs just so 

long as the act of restraint itself is intended (here the act of shooting) though it restrains one not 

intended to be restrained." Id. 

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Additionally, in Medeiros v. O'Connell, 150 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 1998), the mother, as 

administrator of her son's estate, brought a Section 1983 claim against the officers who fired into a 

school van in an attempt to stop the driver who had commandeered the van and taken her son 

hostage. The Second Circuit held that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred because the police 

did not intend to restrain the hostage – the deflection of the bullet intended for the hostage-taker 

"did not transform the troopers' rescue efforts on the hostages' behalf into a seizure." Id. at 169.

Luh's argument that Chavez' and Lodwick's intent to shoot the gun constitutes a seizure

regardless that they did not intend to restrain Luh, is too broad an interpretation of Brower. Even 

to the extent the officers heard people arguing over the fence and knew that there may have been

others behind the fence, there is no evidence they intentionally shot at anyone other than Kong. 

Luh suggests that attempting to distinguish who Chavez and Lodwick intended to shoot is a 

subjective consideration, which is not relevant. However, the facts and circumstances cast in the 

light most favorable to Luh do not require inquiry into the officers' subjective intent. Unlike in 

Nelson, there is no evidence that Chavez and Lodwick observed and fired into a crowd of 

individuals that they observed. Rather, Chavez testified he heard an argument while he was taking 

cover behind a truck when first arriving at the house, but he never saw any individuals behind the 

fence leading to the backyard:

Q. And I take it while you were in your position of cover and concealment, 

you're hearing those voices, four to five people. Appears like they may be 

arguing. You can't make out exactly what they're saying, you could tell that 

these people are outside the house, and your attention is focused in the area 

of this gate, right?

A. Yes.

Q. The very gate that Mr. Xiong wound up coming out of, correct?

A. Yes.

. . . 

Q. So as you're hearing this four to five people talk of what you think is an 

argument taking place, you're focusing on where it's coming from to 

determine that it's coming somewhere behind the gate, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So you're looking at the gate. Could you see the people who you heard 

arguing?

A. No.

Q. Could you see any portion of their body, either the top of their head, their 

hair, anything?

A. No.

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Q. No. But you formed the opinion that the noise – the voices are coming from 

behind this gate, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And this is also where you claim that you heard the noise which you 

interpreted to be the racking of a gun coming from the same location, 

correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And then, you know, within in some short proximity of time, the gate opens 

up, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And when the gate opened up, did you see – you saw a person step from 

behind that gate. Is that true?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see people behind that person?

A. No.

Q. You were focused on the person coming through the gate, right?

A. Right.

Q. When you saw this person from your standpoint, that person appeared to be 

alone?

A. Was alone.

Q. And so there was only one person coming through the gate, right?

A. Yes.

(Chavez Depo., Doc. 46-1, 137:16-139:23.) Lodwick also testified that he could not see any 

people behind the gate at the time he fired his weapon at Kong:

Q. Of course, you couldn't see behind the gate, could you?

A. No.

. . . 

Q. Were you aware that there were people in the yard behind the subject?

A. I was aware that there were people in the backyard.

Q. Where you aware as you were shooting, that those people were in risk and 

in danger of being hit by your bullets?

A. I was focused on the threat in front of me.

. . . 

Q. Now, from where you were standing, could you see over the top of the 

fence?

A. No. Well, I can see over the top of the fence, I mean.

Q. Bad question, good answer. Could you see into the backyard over the top 

of the fence?

A. To what extent?

Q. So you could see who all was back there?

A. We could not see anybody who was in the backyard from where we were 

standing.

(Lodwick Depo., Doc. 46-3, 72:20-22; 82:24-83:3; 89:24-90:8) 

Because there is no evidence that the officers saw and intentionally fired at Luh, this case 

is distinguishable from Nelson. The Court concludes there is no evidence that Luh was seized 

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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

on this claim.

b. There Was No Integral Participation by Lodwick and Chavez in the 

SWAT Team's Deployment of a Canine and Luh's Resulting Dog Bite

Luh claims the dog bite he sustained inside the house was the result of excessive and 

unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment. Luh contends Chavez and Lodwick's inaccurate 

report that Kong pulled out a gun and pointed it at the officers led the Merced County SWAT team

to search the house and deploy a canine that bit Luh.

Defendants argue that neither Chavez nor Lodwick participated in the SWAT team's

deployment of the canine against Luh. Neither was a canine officer, and the dog and its handler 

were from the Merced County Sheriff's Office as part of its SWAT team. Neither Chavez nor 

Lodwick requested SWAT to respond to the incident, nor ordered that the canine be deployed. As 

such, neither Chavez nor Lodwick is liable for the canine bite Luh sustained. (Doc. 45, 30:3-17.) 

Luh contends that Chavez and Lodwick falsely represented the circumstances leading up to 

the shooting and, based on their erroneous and overwrought representations, the Merced County 

SWAT team took control of the scene and ultimately made the decision to deploy a police dog. 

Defendants respond that Luh fails to dispute that Chavez and Lodwick were not integral 

participants in the deployment of the canine, Luh cites no evidence to support his contention that 

Lodwick and Chavez made false representations that led Merced County to deploy the canine, and 

fails to state any causal link between the alleged misrepresentation and the dog bite. Pursuant to 

the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 770 (9th Cir. 2009), because 

Lodwick and Chavez did not participate in the planning or the execution of the SWAT police 

dog's deployment, they are entitled to summary judgment on Luh's Fourth Amendment excessive 

force claim arising out of the dog bite.

Section 1983 liability requires a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights 

deprivation – there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of 

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (requiring 

personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

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(9th Cir.1980) (holding that section 1983 liability must be based on the personal involvement of 

the defendant).

In Hopkins, police responded to a reported hit-and-run car accident that resulted in the 

search of a house. 573 F.3d at 759-60. Three officers responded to the residence where the alleged 

hit-and-run driver lived; one officer remained outside in front of the house interviewing the party 

who reported the incident, while two other officers conducted a welfare check inside the house 

with guns drawn and ultimately arrested the hit-and-run suspect, Hopkins. Id. 760-61. Hopkins 

sued all three officers. Id. The court found that only two officers were integral participants in the 

search and the seizure of Hopkins, because the officer who interviewed the reporting party did not 

participate in or direct the search or participate in a conversation about whether to conduct a 

search. Id. at 769-70. Because there was no evidence of any participation in the search and 

seizure, the third officer was not subject to liability under Section 1983. Id. 

Here, similar to Hopkins, Luh cites no evidence to support his contention that SWAT 

deployed its canine because of reports from Chavez and Lodwick or that Chavez and Lodwick

participated in the search or deployment in some way. Although Court testified SWAT was 

informed of the situation, he did not testify as to the details given to SWAT or how that 

information caused SWAT to deploy a canine. There is no evidence that Chavez or Lodwick 

requested Merced County SWAT assistance, gave information to SWAT that led to the 

deployment of a canine dog, or that they oversaw, directed, or participated in SWAT's search of 

the house with a canine. Although Luh alleges the SWAT team contains officers from the MPD, 

the portion of Court's deposition cited for this proposition does not establish that MPD officers 

were part of the Merced County Sheriff's SWAT team. (See Doc. 46-10, Court Depo., 45:3-46:11, 

50:7-51:6.) Even to the extent the Merced County SWAT team has an interdepartmental 

relationship with the MPD as Luh suggests, there is simply no evidence that Lodwick or Chavez 

bore any causal relationship to the SWAT search or the decision to deploy the canine inside the 

house. As such, Luh's Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force related to the dog bite he 

sustained is not viable against Chavez and Lodwick, and they are entitled to summary judgment 

on this claim.

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2. Plaintiff Kong's Excessive Force Claim is Not Heck Barred

Defendants argue that under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Kong's claim of 

excessive force is barred. Pursuant to Heck, a Section 1983 claim is barred if it "would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence." Id. at 487. Defendants contend 

that because Kong was found guilty of gun possession while on probation – which stems from his 

gun possession on the night of the incident – Kong's excessive force claim here and his conviction 

are mutually exclusive: If Kong never had a firearm, then there is no basis for the officers firing 

upon him in self-defense. Kong's excessive force claim "calls into question the firearms 

conviction" and thus Heck bars the claim.

Kong contends Defendants' Heck argument conflates possession of a firearm with the 

dispute as to whether Kong was actively resisting arrest, necessitating self-defense by the officers. 

However, even if there had been an active resisting-arrest charge against Plaintiff, Heck would not 

bar his claims for excessive force. Kong is not calling into question the lawfulness of his 

conviction for possession of a firearm, but the excessive use of force and violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights that occurred before his arrest and before the officers had knowledge of his 

"illegal" action in possessing a firearm. According to Kong, a finding of excessive force or failure 

to provide timely medical assistance would not affect his underlying conviction.

Where a plaintiff has been convicted of a crime under state law and then seeks damages in 

a Section 1983 suit, "the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

 

It is undisputed that, based on the events giving rise to this lawsuit, Kong was convicted of 

a violation of California Penal Code section 12021(d) which provides as follows:

(d) Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the laws of the United 

States, the State of California, or any other state, government, or country, or of an 

offense enumerated in subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 23515, or who is 

addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, and who owns, purchases, receives, or has 

in possession or under custody or control any firearm is guilty of a felony. 

It is also undisputed that Kong was a felon prior to this incident and had a firearm in his 

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possession at the time of the incident. Whether or not the officers in this case exercised reasonable 

force by discharging their weapons and shooting Kong does not implicate his conviction for being 

a felon in possession of a firearm. Moreover, Kong was released from custody on June 25, 2012, 

before he filed his complaint here. (Doc. 52, Exh. E.) Once the Section 1983 plaintiff has served 

his sentence, the Heck bar no longer applies. Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 

2002). Heck does not bar Kong's claim for excessive force.

3. There Are Disputed Issues of Material Fact Regarding Kong's Claim for

Excessive Force

Kong claims that Chavez' and Lodwick's decision to shoot him was excessive and 

unreasonable in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 120-128.) Defendants 

argue there is no dispute that Kong pointed a gun in the officers' direction, and their use of force 

was in self-defense and undisputedly reasonable.

"Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 

individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at 

stake." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To conduct this 

balancing act, the court must evaluate "the facts and circumstances of each particular case, 

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The most important factor is whether the suspect 

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. Id. 

The Graham factors, however, are not exhaustive. George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 837-

38 (9th Cir. 2013). Rather, courts are to "examine the totality of the circumstances and consider 

'whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether or not listed in 

Graham.'" Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Franklin v. 

Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)). "Other relevant factors include the availability of 

less intrusive alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings were given and whether 

it should have been apparent to officers that the person they used force against was emotionally 

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disturbed." Glenn v. Washington Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

"The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a 

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396 (1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)). "The calculus of reasonableness 

must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 

judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of 

force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. The factors involved in that inquiry include 

(1) "the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 

safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight." Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005).

Reasonableness of the use of force is usually a question for the finder of fact, rather than a 

question of law. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Defendants argue that Chavez' and Lodwick's shooting of Kong was not unreasonable 

under the circumstances pursuant to the factors in Graham. Although resort to deadly force is the 

most significant intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests, it was reasonable under the conditions 

presented to Lodwick and Chavez. Chavez and Lodwick were facing a life-threatening situation 

in responding to a report of a firearm being brandished, they heard a round being chambered in a 

semi-automatic weapon at the residence, and they saw Kong emerge from the backyard 

immediately after the sound of the gun being racked. Chavez and Lodwick ordered Kong to show

his hands, but he refused and instead removed a firearm from his waist, pointed it in the officers' 

direction, and the officers fired on him in self-defense. Defendants maintain none of these facts is 

disputed.

Kong contends that when the officers stopped him he was wearing a white and black or 

white or gray plaid shirt, but the person reportedly exhibiting a weapon at the party was described 

as wearing a black hoodie. As Kong did not match the description of the suspect, the officers had 

no basis to believe Kong was the individual reportedly exhibited a gun at the party or that he was 

armed at all. Although the officers claim to have heard the racking of a gun a few seconds before 

Kong came through the fence to the front yard, the video of the event does not indicate a racking 

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sound, and Kong testified he never racked the gun or heard anyone else racking a gun. When the 

officers confronted Kong by illuminating him with their gun-mounted flashlights and told him to 

put his hands up, they neither identified themselves as police nor warned him they would shoot if 

he did not comply, Kong never reached for or removed the gun from his waistband, and Kong 

turned to run away without his weapon drawn. Kong argues he did not pose a threat to the officers 

and ran away from them because he did not know who they were. As he posed no objective threat 

to the officers or the public when he began to run away out of fear, the officers had no objective 

and reasonable basis to fire their weapons at him while he was retreating.

There are several critical factual disputes about the situation with which the officers were 

confronted at Buckingham Court during the incident. While the parties do not dispute that the 

officers were dispatched to investigate a report of violation of California Penal Code 417,23 the 

reported incident did not involve any threats with the weapon, only that it had been exhibited by 

the suspect. Defendants cite the 911 dispatch call indicating an Asian male was brandishing a gun 

at a party. Plaintiffs dispute Defendants' characterization of the dispatcher's description that there 

was an Asian adult male "displaying a gun and/or pointing a gun at people." The dispatcher's

statement cited by Defendants advises Officer Chavez to respond to a call at 1594 Buckingham:

. . . going to be for a 417 . . . advises that they are at a party at that location and an 

AMA with a black hooded sweatshirt pulled out a firearm . . . advised that there's a 

black firearm and advised that the male pulled it out . . . responsible was still on 

scene.

(Doc. 46, Radio Traffic, Exh. B, 4:00-4:34.) The officer asked for a description, and the 

dispatcher repeated it was an "AMA, black hooded sweatshirt."24 (Doc. 46, Radio Traffic, Exh. B, 

4:00-4:34.) Defendants state it is undisputed the dispatcher stated the Asian male "pulled out a 

gun and pointed it at people" and specifically used the term "pointed" between 4:01 and 4:12 on 

 23 California Penal Code § 417(a)(1) provides that "[e]very person who, except in self-defense, in the presence of any 

other person, draws or exhibits any deadly weapon whatsoever, other than a firearm, in a rude, angry, or threatening 

manner, or who in any manner, unlawfully uses a deadly weapon other than a firearm in any fight or quarrel is guilty 

of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not less than 30 days."

24 Although each side provided an audio recording of the 911 call and the dispatch calls to Chavez and Lodwick, no 

transcript of these calls was provided. The total radio traffic is over an hour in length, and some of the words are 

difficult to discern. The ellipses are inserted where words were inaudible or impossible to definitively determine.

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the recording. (Doc. 62, DUMF 2, Defendants' Response.) However, the word "pointed" is not 

used – the dispatcher states that the male "pulled out a firearm." (Doc. 46, Radio Traffic, Exh. B, 

4:00-4:34.) The officers were advised there was no report of a threat with the weapon that had 

been exhibited when dispatch re-contacted the reporting party. (Doc. 46, Radio Traffic, Exh. B, 

7:45-8:31.) Thus, while the severity of the crime was not minimal – such as the violation of a 

leash law (see Hesterberg v. United States, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 13-cv-01265-JSC, 2014 WL 

5073716, at *9 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 9, 2014)), there is no evidence of a report of active shooting or of 

any threats made with the weapon.

As to the immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, which is the most 

important factor, there are multiple disputed factual issues. While the officers were taking cover 

behind a truck gathering intelligence, they claim to have heard the sound of a loud conversation 

that seemed to be an argument.25 Then, they heard a gun being racked just before Kong came

through the gate from the backyard to the front yard. Chavez and Lodwick both testified to 

hearing the sound, but Plaintiffs dispute the officers' version and note the video does not reflect the 

sound the officers reported. (Doc. 60-5, Exh. E, Video 23:03:08.) While Kong and Luh do not 

dispute that the officers testified they heard a gun being racked just prior to Kong coming through 

the gate, they contend the video does not actually capture such a sound. Plaintiffs also cite the 

testimony of their expert Greg Stutchman who concluded that the video contains no event before 

the shooting consistent with a semi-automatic firearm chambering a round. (Doc. 57-1, 

Stutchman Depo., 66:19-23.)26 Finally, Kong maintains he never racked a gun, and Luh did not 

 25 Kong disputes the characterization of the loud voices as an argument, but there is no dispute that this is what 

Lodwick and Chavez testified it sounded like to them.

26 Defendants object to Stutchman's opinion during his deposition that the video does not reflect the sound of a gun 

being racked and that Chavez' camera glasses were capable of picking up the sounds of a gunshot racking in terms of 

quality of the recording file and the microphone sensitivity (Doc. 57-1, Stutchman Depo., 66:25-67:5). Defendants 

argue that Stutchman's first opinion is irrelevant and lacks foundation. The opinion is relevant to corroborate Kong's 

deposition testimony that he did not rack the gun, and Luh's declaration that he did not see a gun being racked. 

Defendants also object that Stutchman's opinion lacks foundation because it is based on exemplar testing using a 

Glock 9 mm whereas Kong's gun was a Taurus 40 caliber. (See Doc. 65.) However, Stutchman's deposition 

testimony was not that no gun racking sound of a particular caliber could be heard on the video – it was that no sound 

consistent with a semi-automatic weapon could be heard. It is undisputed that Kong's gun was a semi-automatic 

handgun. (See Doc. 62, DUMF 77.) Defendants' objections to Stutchman's statement in this regard are 

OVERRULED. Moreover, although there is no dispute that Chavez and Lodwick testified to hearing a gun racking 

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see anyone racking a gun.27 ((Doc. 60-6, Kong Depo., 70:12-23; Doc. 60-15, Luh Decl., ¶ 5.) 

Whether there was the sound of a gun racking prior to Kong walking through the gate is a disputed 

issue, regardless that it is undisputed the officers testified they heard such a sound. (See Doc. 46-

1, Chavez Depo., 66:22-24, 153:5-8; Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 66:6-13.) It is for the jury to 

consider each party's version of events, weighing the officers' testimony, that of Kong and Luh, 

and drawing inferences from the video. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (jury has 

responsibility "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts").

While it is undisputed that Kong had a gun at the moment Chavez and Lodwick stopped 

him,28 there is a dispute whether Kong removed his gun from his waistband and pointed it in the 

direction of the officers. Defendants argue that based on Kong's police interview where he 

admitted he pointed a gun at the officers and the officers' testimony that Kong pointed the gun in 

the officers' direction, as well as Michael Schott's expert testimony about the video, it is 

undisputed that Kong pointed his gun in the officers direction. (DUMF 33.) Defendants cite the 

following interchanges between Defendant Deliman and Kong during Kong's post-arrest

interview:29

 

sound, the video itself and the testimony from Kong and Luh is sufficient to dispute the officers' version of events 

even without Stutchman's testimony in this regard.

Defendants also argue Stutchman was not disclosed as an expert who would offer an opinion of the quality 

and capability of the camera-embedded glasses' recording device. Because there is sufficient evidence to dispute 

whether there was a racking of a handgun just before Kong came through the gate without Stutchman's opinion as to 

the sound quality of the camera-embedded glasses, the Court does not reach Defendants' objection to Stutchman's 

opinion in this regard. Defendants remain free to raise this argument through a motion in limine. 

27 To the extent Kong's deposition testimony is inconsistent with his post-arrest interview statements, that issue is 

discussed below.

28 Although Kong disputes DUMF 32 that Kong corroborated the gun's existence and admitted to having a gun at the 

moment in time officers stopped him, Kong's objection is relevant to his post-arrest interview. The evidence cited to 

support DUMF 32, however, is Kong's deposition testimony. Kong conceded during his deposition that he was in 

possession of a gun at the moment the officers stopped him. (Doc. 46-5, Kong Depo., 69:2-7.) Luh does not dispute 

this fact. (See Doc. 63, DUMF 32.)

29 Kong objects that his statements during the post-arrest interview are not relevant to what the officers knew at the 

moment they stopped him. (Doc. 56-3, 102-121, Kong's Responses to DUMFs.) Kong is correct. The testimony 

from Kong's post-incident interview regarding whether he pointed a gun at officers during the course of the incident is 

not relevant to show what the officers knew at the time they confronted Kong – that cannot be established by 

information discovered after the fact. However, these statements are relevant to corroborate the officers' testimony 

about what they perceived during the incident, as Kong's interview statements suggest that he pointed his gun at the 

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Deliman: "And you're in possession of the gun that was pointed at the officers, and 

they fired back, protecting themselves. Don't you think?

Kong: "Yeah, that's true." (Interview Video, Doc. 46-13, Exh. M, 21:56-22:12.)

...

Deliman: "I don't know what you meant to happen today, but something did 

happen, where officers had to protect themselves, from people pointing guns at 

them. Why, why point the gun?

Kong: "I was like, I don't know, I was just like, panicking, and I didn't know what 

to do. I don't know." (Doc. 46-13, Interview Video, Exh. M, 27:45-28:14.) 

Defendants also cite to Chavez and Lodwick's testimony that Kong had a gun and pointed it in 

their direction. Lodwick testified he saw Kong's right hand inside the waistband area of his jacket, 

but he could not see Kong's right hand itself. (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 70:2-6.) Chavez 

observed Kong move his left-hand away from his body, revealing a gun in Kong's right hand, 

which Kong then pointed in the officers' direction. (Doc. 46-1, Chavez Depo., 89:9-13, 90:10-19, 

92:3-21.) As Kong turned toward the officers, Lodwick observed Kong holding a gun in his right 

hand pointed in the officers' direction, and they began to fire. (Doc. 46-3, Lodwick Depo., 75:24-

77:12.) Kong then fell to the ground. (DUMF 34.) Defendants' expert, Michael Schott, reviewed 

and analyzed the video of the event, focusing on Frames 5,211-5,350. (Doc. 49.) Schott indicates 

that Frame 5,251 shows Kong, with his right hand in proximity to his front waist area, running 

 

officers, giving credence to their testimony about the threat they perceived. The statements about whether Kong 

reached for the gun in his waistband and pointed it at officers are admissible as party-opponent admissions. Fed. R. 

Evid. 801(d)(2). Kong also objects under Federal Rule of Evidence 602, which allows a witness to testify only if there 

is evidence to support a finding the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Kong maintains that he was 

intoxicated and in pain during the course of his interview and disputes that he understood the questions or his 

response. (Kong Depo., 66:10-19; 73:16-17; 86:8-16.) Whether Kong was intoxicated and on pain medication affects 

the credibility of his statements, not the admissibility of such statements as one without personal knowledge about a 

matter under Rule 602. On these grounds, Kong's objections to his post-arrest interview statements are 

OVERRULED.

Additionally, Defendants object to Kong's contention in his responses to Defendants' undisputed statement of 

facts that he was interviewed by Detective Deliman within one hour of the shooting. Kong cites to his deposition to 

support his argument, but the cited portions of his deposition relate to his alleged intoxication at the time of the 

shooting, his pain at the time he was shot, and his pain medication and not remembering whether he understood 

Detective Deliman's statement that he was going to ask Kong questions. Defendants argue none of this evidence 

concerns the timing of Kong's arrest and interview and note that the shooting occurred at approximately 11:00 p.m. 

(Radio Traffic, 15:05-15:35 (documenting shooting at approximately 11:13 p.m).) The interview began on December 

4, 2011, at approximately 3:30 a.m. (Doc. 48, Deliman Decl., ¶ 3, Interview Video, Allen Decl., Ex. L.) Thus, Kong's 

evidence does not support the contention that his post-arrest interview began only one hour after the shooting.

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toward the rear of the residence; Frame 5,264 shows a rectangular or L-shaped object in direct 

proximity to Kong's right hand; Frame 5,266 shows Kong reversing direction and turning toward 

the front of the residence; Frame 5,280 shows Kong resuming movement towards the rear of the 

residence; and Frame 5,303 shows Kong reversing direction and turning toward the front of the 

residence. (Doc. 49, Schott Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)30

Despite this testimony from the officers, Kong's post-arrest interview statements,31 and 

Schott's expert declaration, Plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of 

material fact as to whether Kong removed the gun from his waistband and pointed it in the 

officers' direction. Smith, 661 F.3d at 441 (whether suspect posed immediate threat to the safety 

of officers or others is the most important Graham factor). Kong's post-arrest interview 

statements are not clear yes or no responses to single questions, but even if they were, Kong 

testified at his deposition he never pulled the gun from his waistband when confronted by the 

officers:

Q. Did you ever rack the slide on that gun?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what that means?

A. Yes.

. . . 

Q. So as you turn to run, the first thing – the next thing you hear is gunshots?

A. Yes.

Q. And then what happens?

A. I was down.

Q. What happened to the gun?

A. It was right side by me.

Q. Did you pull it out of your waistband and drop it?

A. No. It just came out.

 30 Kong objects to Schott's declaration as irrelevant, but it is relevant to corroborate the officers' version of events. 

Kong also argues that the opinion that Frame 5,251 shows Kong with his right hand in proximity to his front waist 

area is outside the scope of his retention as an expert. Defendants argue Schott was requested "to examine the video 

images and associated audio track recorded by the apparatus worn by Chavez." In his rule 26 expert report, two issues 

were identified for Schott to address. One included determining "[f]rom the time that the first video images of Mr. 

Xiong appear and continuing until the last shot is fired, establish and document the movements and actions of Mr. 

Xiong [] captured on the video images." Schott's opinion as to what Frame 5,251 shows is within the scope of his 

retention as an expert, and Kong's objection is OVERRULED.

31 Kong also objects to his post-arrest interview statements regarding whether he was a gang member, whether he had 

run from police before, and whether he had a tattoo on his right inner forearm as irrelevant. (See Doc. 62, DUMF 

104-06.) Kong is correct. These statements are irrelevant to what the officers' perceived when they confronted Kong. 

Kong's objection to these statements as irrelevant is SUSTAINED and they are not considered.

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Q. And after you fell to the ground, what happened next?

A. I was in pain.

Q. You can remember the light shining on you; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever reach down to your waistband to pick up the gun?

A. No.

(Doc. 60-6, Kong Depo. 70:12-15, 70:24-71:20.) To the extent that Kong's deposition testimony 

contradicts his prior interview statements to Deliman, the interview statements were not sworn 

testimony and thus do not trump or supplant Kong's deposition testimony. Unsworn testimony 

cannot provide a basis for the court, as a matter of law, to disregard contrary sworn testimony. See 

Leslie v. Grupo, ICA, 198 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1999).32 Here, Kong's deposition testimony is 

sworn and must be taken as true; his prior interview statements, even if contradictory, are not 

sworn. It is for the jury to decide how to credit Kong's statements during the police interview. Id.

at 1159. Kong's deposition testimony is admissible evidence that Kong never pulled the gun out 

of his waistband or pointed it in the officers' direction.

Additionally, Plaintiffs offer earlier deposition testimony from both officers showing some 

divergence as to whether they actually perceived Kong pointing a gun in their direction. 

Specifically, Lodwick gave the following testimony at his 2012 deposition:

Q. Well, did [Kong] raise the weapon up and point it at you?

A. I didn't give him that opportunity.

Q. Where was the weapon when you shot at him?

A. About here.

Q. You have your hand out in front with the weapon down towards the round or 

pointing towards you or what's going on?

A. At that distance I couldn’t tell if it was pointed at the ground or pointed at me.

(Doc. 57-1, Exh. D, 2012 Lodwick Depo., 33:5-14). Officer Chavez was asked whether the 

"suspect actually raise[d] his weapon in a shooting position towards you," and Chavez responded, 

 32 In Leslie, the district court recognized that the plaintiff's deposition testimony and sworn declaration were 

sufficient, if believed, to create a material factual dispute and survive summary judgment, but the court concluded that 

Leslie had made contradictory statements in prior correspondence with the defendant that were so inconsistent with 

his subsequent deposition testimony as to render the deposition testimony unbelievable. Id. at 1154. On appeal, the 

court rejected the trial court's determination reasoning that the letters were not sworn testimony sufficient to contradict 

the subsequent deposition testimony and in the deposition, the plaintiff attempted to explain his statements in the 

earlier letters to the defendant. The court held that disbelief of the sworn statements because of prior, contradictory 

unsworn statements was not sufficient to support summary judgment. Leslie, 198 F.3d at 1159. 

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"no." (Doc. 57-1, Exh. C, 2012 Chavez Depo., 22:24-23:1.) 

Finally, Plaintiffs argue the video of the incident contradicts the officers' statements that 

Kong pointed the gun in their direction.33 Interpreting the video in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiffs and drawing all inference in Plaintiffs' favor, the video can be interpreted to contradict 

the officers' testimony. Blakenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 468 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Although the officers testified they heard a racking of a gun just before Kong came through the 

backyard gate, no racking sound is audible on the video. At the moment Kong is illuminated in 

the video, he appears to be facing the officers with his hands down by his waist. The video is

susceptible to Plaintiffs' contention that Kong's gun was never revealed, nor did he remove it from 

his waistband or point it in the officers' direction. Defendants argue the video did not necessarily 

capture everything Chavez and Lodwick saw or heard and cannot therefore dispute the officers' 

testimony about what they perceived. While it is possible the video did not capture everything the 

officers testified they heard or saw, the jury must evaluate whether the events as portrayed in the 

video more accurately reflect what happened or whether the officers' testimony more accurately 

reflects the events – this is a factual issue for the jury, not one for the court to decide as a matter of 

law. See Castro v. Cnty of L.A., 785 F.3d 336, 346 (9th Cir. 2015) (where video footage neither 

confirmed or refuted testimony, the jury could review the footage and the testimony in context to 

perform a full assessment of each witness's credibility). 

If the factual disputes are resolved in Defendants' favor, a reasonable jury could find the 

officers' conduct was reasonable. However, Plaintiffs have offered evidence that the officers had 

no reason to believe Kong had a weapon as he did not match the description of the person 

reportedly exhibiting the gun. Kong testified at his deposition that he never reached for the gun in 

his waistband, and the video is susceptible to the interpretation that Kong did not pull out his gun, 

point it at officers or in their direction, or threaten them with it. According to Plaintiffs, the video 

reflects the officers neither identified themselves as police officers nor gave Kong a verbal

 33 Defendants object to Kong's citation to the video because it does not reference a specific timeframe. The moment 

where officers confront Kong on the video is a very specific portion, so the failure to note a specific time stamp is not 

problematic. Moreover, Luh cites the specific portion of the video in disputing whether Kong revealed a gun or held a 

gun in his right hand. (Doc. 59, Luh's Response to DUMF 30, 31.)

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warning they would shoot. As such, Kong attempted to run away from the officers because he did 

not know it was the police. His back was to the officers, and he was moving away from them 

when he was shot. Under this version of events, Kong posed no threat to the safety of officers,

and turning his back on the officers was not a high level of resistance. Based on the evidence 

offered by Plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could find that the officers' action in shooting Kong was 

not reasonable. Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Law enforcement 

officials may not kill suspects who do not pose an immediate threat to their safety or to the safety 

of others simply because they are armed."); Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 323 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (holding deadly force was unreasonable where, according to plaintiff's version of facts, 

the decedent possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers 

when they shot him).

The parties dispute facts that bear directly on whether a reasonable officer would have 

viewed Kong as an immediate threat to the officers. Resolution of disputed material facts about 

whether a gun was racked just before Kong came through the gate into the front yard and whether 

Kong reached for the gun and pointed it at the officers when they stopped him involve credibility 

determinations and interpretation and inferences from the video footage, which are within the 

province of a jury. Whether Kong posed a threat to the officers is the most critical fact in 

assessing the reasonableness of the officers' conduct, and because there are material factual 

disputes as to the threat that Kong posed, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Chavez 

and Lodwick acted reasonably in shooting Kong. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to 

Kong's claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment is DENIED.

B. Luh's Fourteenth Amendment Claims

1. Shooting Outside the House

As Luh's Fourth Amendment claim is foreclosed because of the lack of a cognizable 

seizure, the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is considered. Lewis, 

523 U.S. at 843.

The Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process clause protects against the arbitrary 

or oppressive exercise of governmental power. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845-46. "[T]he Due Process 

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Clause is violated by executive action only when it can be properly characterized as arbitrary, or 

conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense." Id. The cognizable level of executive abuse of 

power is that which "shocks the conscience" or "violates the decencies of civilized conduct." Id.

at 846. Mere negligence or liability grounded in tort does not meet the standard for a substantive 

due process claim. Id. at 849.

To address whether a constitutional violation was committed, a court must first decide the 

appropriate standard of culpability to determine whether the defendants' conduct "shocks the 

conscience" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 

(1998). The court must then determine whether the defendants' conduct meets that standard of 

culpability. The degree of culpability required to meet the conscience-shocking level depends on 

the context. Id. at 850 ("[d]eliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so 

patently egregious in another"). To determine whether "deliberate indifference" is sufficient to 

shock the conscience, or whether the more demanding standard of "purpose to harm" is required, 

"the 'critical consideration [is] whether the circumstances are such that actual deliberation is 

practical.'" Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moreland v. Las Vegas 

Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 372 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

"Where actual deliberation is practical, then an officer's 'deliberate indifference' may suffice to 

shock the conscience. On the other hand, where a law enforcement officer makes a snap judgment 

because of an escalating situation, his conduct may be found to shock the conscience only if he 

acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives." Hayes v. Cnty. of 

San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d at 546, 554 

(9th Cir. 2010)).

Defendants contend this situation is analogous to the circumstances presented in Lewis and 

Moreland in that Chavez and Lodwick were responding to a call of a gun being exhibited.

34 At 

the scene, they heard a gun being racked, seconds later Kong emerged, and the officers believed 

 34 Lewis involved a police chase of a motorcycle. 523 U.S. at 837. The motorcycle passenger was thrown from the 

bike and was hit by the chasing officers. Id. Moreland involved police response to a gunfight in a parking lot of a 

bar. 159 F.3d at 368. In both cases, the purpose-to-harm standard was applied in considering a bystander's claim 

under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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he "pulled a gun on them." Defendants argue the officers only shot for legitimate self-defense 

purposes, their only intent was to stop the threat, and the incident happened within seconds with 

no time for deliberative action. (Doc. 45, 40:16-42:11.) Moreover, the facts show the officers did 

not act with any purpose to harm Luh or with any purpose other than attempting to stop Kong.

Luh maintains the deliberate indifference standard applies to determine whether Chavez 

and Lodwick's conduct shocked the conscience, and a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that 

by indiscriminately firing into a wooden gate knowing partygoers were on the other side, the 

officers acted with deliberate indifference with regard to Luh.

At the summary judgment stage, a court may determine whether the officer had time to 

deliberate (such that the deliberate indifference standard applies to determine whether the conduct 

shocks the conscience) or instead had to make a snap judgment because he found himself in a 

quickly escalating situation (such that the purpose to harm standard applies to determine 

conscience shocking), "so long as the undisputed facts point to one standard or the other." Bui v. 

City & Cnty. of S.F., 61 F. Supp. 3d 877, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Duenez v. City of 

Manteca, No. CIV. S-11-1820-LKK-KJN, 2013 WL 6816375, at * 14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2013)). 

"But, '[b]y its nature, the determination of which situation [the officer] actually found himself in is 

a question of fact for the jury, so long as there is sufficient evidence to support both standards.'" 

Id. (quoting Duenez, 2013 WL 6816375, at *14). 

The parties' dispute about the facts surrounding the officers' use of force precludes 

summary judgment as to Luh's Fourteenth Amendment claim for excessive force. Construing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the officers were responding to a report of an 

individual exhibiting – but making no threats with – a gun at a house party. The officers heard 

people outside the house before they stopped Kong. Although the officers testified they heard the 

racking of a gun just before Kong opened the backyard gate to come into the front yard, Kong 

testified he never racked the gun nor did Luh observe anyone doing so. Moreover, the video does 

not necessarily reflect the sound of a gun-racking noise. Significantly, when the officers stopped 

Kong, he was not wearing a black hoodie like the person who was described as exhibiting the 

weapon at the party. While the officers told Kong to put up/show his hands, they did not identify 

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themselves as police officers or give any warning they would shoot if he failed to comply with 

their command to put his hands up. The video of the event is also susceptible to a finding that 

Kong's gun was not visible to the officers when they stopped Kong; Kong never reached for his 

gun, held it in his hand or pointed it in the officers' direction; and Kong had begun to run away 

from the officers with empty hands when he was fired upon. Although the officers testified they 

could not see over the backyard gate to observe any people, they both indicated they heard voices 

outside when they approached the house. When Kong turned to flee the officers, he turned toward

the gate leading to the backyard. Officers fired at Kong as he moved away from officers toward 

the backyard gate, despite the knowledge there were people outside the house.

Under this version of the facts, the officers could be found to have had sufficient time to 

contemplate their use of force and the deliberate indifference, not the purpose-to-harm, standard 

would apply. See Duenez, 2013 WL 6816375, at *15 ("Even if it found that decedent had a knife 

in his hand, that alone would not necessarily bring the situation into a 'purpose to harm' situation 

since a reasonable jury could find that decedent was not advancing on [the officer], nor threatening 

him with the knife."). In McCloskey v. Courtnier, No. C 05-4641 MMC, 2012 WL 646219, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012), the court denied officers' motion for summary judgment as to 

bystanders' claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. The bystanders were the unintended objects 

of the officer's use of pepper spray, and the court found that disputed factual issues precluded a 

determination of whether the officer had time to fully consider his use of pepper spray and thus the 

court could not determine which culpability standard should apply. Id.

Similarly, in Bui, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 901, the court denied officers' motion for summary 

judgment on Fourteenth Amendment claims against them because there were material factual 

disputes about whether the officers had adequate time to deliberate and which standard of 

culpability should apply. Id. The officers submitted evidence that when they confronted a suspect 

in a residence, he came down the hall after them and attacked, or at least threatened them, with a 

knife. Id. The officers provided evidence showing they responded by raising their guns, 

instructing the suspect to lower the knife, and retreating until they no longer could do so. Id. It 

was only when they and some other teenagers were at risk of being stabbed or injured that the 

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officers shot the suspect. Id. The plaintiff proffered evidence that, while the suspect had an XActo knife in his hand, it was always down at his side, rather than charging at the officers, he 

assumed a defensive, cringing posture and shuffled down the hall because officers had told him to 

come out of the bathroom, and the suspect was not directly facing the officers in the erect position 

when he was shot. Id. The court concluded there was a factual dispute whether a reasonable 

officer could have viewed the suspect as an immediate threat to officers or others. Id. In 

considering the culpability standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court reasoned that it 

was possible, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that the deliberate 

indifference and not the purpose to harm standard would apply to determine whether the conduct 

shocked the conscience. Id. at 901.

Because the circumstances under which the officers fired upon Kong are disputed, the 

standard of culpability under the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be determined at this stage and 

summary judgment is not appropriate. McCloskey, 2012 WL 646219, at *4; Bui, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 

901-02. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Luh's claim of excessive force related to 

his shooting under the Fourteenth Amendment is DENIED.

2. Dog Bite Inside the House

As discussed above, because Chavez and Lodwick were not integral participants in Merced 

County SWAT's search of the house and deployment of the canine that bit Luh, they are not liable 

to Luh under the Fourteenth Amendment for excessive force. See Blakenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 

n.12. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Luh's claim of excessive force related to 

the dog bite inside the house under the Fourteenth Amendment is GRANTED.

C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants alternatively argue that Chavez and Lodwick are shielded by qualified 

immunity as to the constitutional claims against them.

"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "Qualified immunity balances 

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two important interests – the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 

perform their duties reasonably." Id. "The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of 

whether the government official's error is 'a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based 

on mixed questions of law and fact.'" Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) 

(Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 

The Supreme Court has "mandated a two-step sequence for resolving government officials' 

qualified immunity claims." Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). "First, a court must 

decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional 

right." Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). This prong of the inquiry "mirrors the substantive 

summary judgment decision on the merits." Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). 

"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established," then the 

officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. "Second, if the plaintiff has 

satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was 'clearly established' at 

the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. "Qualified immunity is 

applicable unless the officials conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right." Id. 

(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 

"For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Hope v. 

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, (2002). While the reasonableness inquiry may not be undertaken as a 

broad, general proposition, neither is official action entitled to protection "unless the very action in 

question has previously been held unlawful." Hope, 536 U. S. at 739. 

The existence of material factual disputes does not necessarily preclude a finding of 

qualified immunity. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002). 

"Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 

judgments about open legal questions." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085 

(2011). 

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1. Chavez and Lodwick Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity As to Kong's 

Excessive Force Claim At Summary Judgment

Chavez and Lodwick invoke qualified immunity as a defense to Kong's excessive force 

claim. However, in "Fourth Amendment unreasonable force cases, unlike in other cases, the 

qualified immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits." Scott v. Henrich,, 

39 F.3d 912, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 885 n. 3 (9th Cir. 

1992)). At step one, as discussed above, there are disputed issues of fact whether the officers 

used objectively reasonable force in shooting Kong. At step two, "the relevant, dispositive inquiry 

in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

Defendants argue that as of December 2011, when the officers shot Kong, case law clearly 

established that "where a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon such as a gun or a knife, the 

officer is justified in using deadly force." Smith, 394 F.3d at 703. As considered above, however, 

under Plaintiffs' version of the facts, Kong did not attack or threaten Chavez and Lodwick. While 

Kong did have a gun in his waistband, there is evidence that he did not remove it from his 

waistband and never pointed his gun at the officers. Kong did not match the description of the 

person reportedly exhibiting the weapon at the party such that officers could have believed he had 

a gun based solely on his appearance. The caselaw cited by Defendants does not support a finding 

that, where a suspect does not threaten the officers and turns to flee, deadly force is reasonable. 

While the officers may be entitled to qualified immunity after the disputed material facts 

are resolved, the Court denies Defendants' motion to the extent it seeks qualified immunity for 

Chavez and Lodwick's shooting of Kong. Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 

2003) ("Where the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity depends on the resolution of 

disputed issues of fact in their favor, and against the non-moving party, summary judgment is not 

appropriate."); Santos v Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 855 n.12 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding it premature to 

decide the qualified immunity issue "because whether the officers may be said to have made a 

'reasonable mistake' of fact or law may depend on the jury's resolution of disputed facts and the 

inferences it draws therefrom") (internal citation omitted).

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2. Chavez and Lodwick are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity as to Luh's 

Fourteenth Amendment Claim Related to His Shooting35

Defendants argue that assuming Luh could establish a constitutional violation under the 

Fourteenth Amendment for excessive force, the law was not clearly established that firing in selfdefense at a lethal threat was an illegitimate law enforcement purpose. However, like Defendants' 

arguments for qualified immunity regarding Kong's Fourth Amendment claim, this argument must 

also fail with respect to Luh's Fourteenth Amendment claim. Based on the evidence presented by 

both sides, the circumstances presented to Chavez and Lodwick are disputed, and the Court cannot 

decide as a matter of law whether it would have been "clear to a reasonable officer that his 

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the alternative ground of qualified immunity 

as to Luh's excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is DENIED.

D. Monell Claims Against the City of Merced ("Merced")

Plaintiff Kong's complaint alleges that MPD owed a duty to Plaintiffs to properly train and 

supervise police officers in the proper use of deadly force. This duty includes having all officers 

cognizant as to the criteria for using deadly force and when to cease applying deadly force. 

Chavez and Lodwick did not properly investigate the situation, did not announce themselves, and 

ended up shooting Kong as the result of reckless and negligent discharge of a firearm toward or 

into an occupied area where the officers knew there was a party. Kong also alleges that by failing 

to bring disciplinary action against Chavez and Lodwick, MPD ratified the officers' conduct. 

(Doc. 1, ¶ 140.)

Merced argues that Kong's inadequate training and supervision claim fails as a matter of 

law because the MPD's training program met or exceeded standards set forth by POST. All four 

officers (Chavez, Lodwick, Deliman, and Court) completed Merced's FTO program, which is 25-

 35 Because the Court concludes Luh's Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force is not cognizable, the Court does 

not reach Defendants' alternative argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Luh's Fourth Amendment 

excessive force claim. Similarly, as the Court finds that Luh's excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 

for his dog bite injury was not cognizable against Lodwick and Chavez, the Court does not reach Defendants' 

alternative argument for qualified immunity as to this claim.

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weeks long, more than double the 10-weeks mandated by POST. Merced also has a robust and 

continuous training program on firearms, and officers are trained only to shoot as allowed under 

applicable law. Kong's inadequate discipline claim fails because Merced maintained a system for 

discipline consistent with California Penal Code § 832.5. Merced had a policy for receiving 

citizen complaints and investigating allegations. It carried out an administrative investigation in 

this case. As to Kong's theory of ratification by a final policymaker, there is no evidence that the 

Chief of Police, who is the final policymaker for Merced, ratified an unconstitutional shooting of 

Kong or that he ratified any alleged unconstitutional basis for the shooting. Even assuming 

excessive force was used against Kong, Defendants also assert there is no causal relationship to

Merced's customs, policies, and practices. 

To establish a claim against Merced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must show that they 

were deprived of their constitutional rights and that this deprivation was proximately caused by a 

Merced policy, custom, or practice that amounts to deliberate indifference. Monell, 436 U.S. at 

690-91. Specifically, municipal liability can be established through (1) conduct pursuant to an 

expressly adopted official policy or a longstanding custom which constitutes the standard 

operating procedure of the local government entity; (2) a decision of a decision-making official 

who was a final policy-making authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent 

official policy in the area of the decision; and (3) an official with final policymaking authority 

either delegating that authority to, or ratifying the decision of the subordinate. See Price v. Sery, 

513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008); Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992). A 

policy is "'a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various 

alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 

subject matter in question.'" Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012).

After proving that one of the circumstances existed, a plaintiff must also show that the 

municipality's action was the cause of the constitutional deprivation. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 

911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).

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1. Kong's Monell Claims Against Merced Are Not Supported By 

Sufficient Evidence

a. Failure to Train – Single Incident

Complete inadequacy of training may constitute a "policy" giving rise to Monell liability; 

however, "adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little 

about the training program or the legal basis for holding the [municipality] liable." City of Canton 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989) ("Canton"). Therefore, a claim of inadequate training is only 

cognizable under Section 1983 "where that city's failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to 

the constitutional rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 392.

A Section 1983 plaintiff alleging a policy of failure to train peace officers must show 

(1) he/she was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the local government entity had a training or 

policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights of persons with whom its 

peace officers are likely to come into contact; and (3) his/her constitutional injury would have 

been avoided had the local government unit properly trained those officers. Blankenhorn v. City 

of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 485 (9th Cir. 2007). "[A]bsent evidence of a program-wide inadequacy 

in training, any shortfall in a single officer's training can only be classified as negligence on the 

part of the municipal defendant – a much lower standard of fault than deliberate indifference." Id.

at 484-85 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

In sum, "the identified deficiency in a city's training program must be closely related to the 

ultimate injury." Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. The required "deliberate indifference" is established 

where "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result 

in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to 

have been deliberately indifferent to the need." Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 

1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). Since Canton, although the 

Supreme Court has recognized the continuing viability of a single-incident theory for failure to 

train in Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1361-65 (2011), the theory is limited to the 

complete absence of training the Supreme Court hypothesized in Canton, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). 

"Canton's single incident theory does not allow inquiry into subtleties of training. Canton should 

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not be read to infer deliberate indifference for failure to train after any violation, for in virtually 

every instance of a constitutional violation by a city employee a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to 

point to something the city could have done to prevent the unfortunately incident." Wereb v. Maui 

Cnty., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1033 (D. Haw. 2011) (quoting Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1363). 

Showing that additional training would have been helpful in making difficult decisions does not 

establish municipal violations. Id. Further, proving that an injury or accident could have been 

avoided if an employee had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular 

injury-causing conduct will not suffice. Id.

In this case, even if Chavez and Lodwick's actions amount to a constitutional violation, 

Kong has failed to establish a genuine disputed issue of material fact regarding the existence of a 

policy of inadequate training. Defendants have presented evidence of Merced's training and 

policies regarding use of excessive force by its officers. The nature and scope of the training of 

Officers Chavez, Lodwick, Court, and Deliman is undisputed by Kong. Kong argues only that,

while the officers' training may be "robust," it "was certainly per se inadequate given the actions 

taken against [Kong]." (Doc. 56, 28:5-8.) This is precisely the type of single-incident conduct of a 

non-policy making employee that fails to establish a custom or policy of the municipality. Davis

v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1989) (single incident of excessive force 

by police officers inadequate to establish Monell liability). Merced is entitled to summary 

judgment on Kong's Monell claim under a failure-to-train theory of liability.

b. Ratification

Kong alleges a Monell claim against Merced based its failure to discipline Chavez and 

Lodwick for their conduct during the incident or retrain them or their supervisors. By failing to 

discipline the officers, Merced ratified the conduct and breached its duty to supervise and properly 

train police officers. (Doc. 1, Kong Cmplt., ¶¶ 139-140.)

Defendants argue that to prevail on a Monell claim under a ratification theory, Kong must 

show that an official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional 

decision and the basis for it. The parties do not dispute that the Chief of Police is the final policymaker for the City of Merced as to its Police Department policies. Kong contends the Chief of 

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Police (the "Chief") ratified Chavez and Lodwick's use of force through multiple internal reviews. 

The Chief was provided a memo outlining the actions taken by the officers and their explanations, 

and he had the authority and discretion to impose discipline, ask for further investigation, and to 

approve of their conduct as within policy. As explained by Trindad in his deposition, the Chief 

also approved the recommendations made by his subordinates, determined Lodwick and Chavez 

acted in conformance with the policies and training of the Police Department, and ratified their 

conduct. (Doc. 56, 28:10-29:2 (citing Doc. 57-1, Exh. K, Trindad Depo., 21:9-23:23, 50:13-16, 

57:21-59:22, 69:11-72:16, 98:8-10, 105:22-106:18).) Kong contends that because the Chief 

exonerated the officers involved, this reflects ratification by a final policymaker. 

Defendants respond that because the Chief declined to discipline the officers does not 

mean that he ratified unconstitutional conduct and the basis for it. Defendants cite Cloutheir, 591 

F.3d at 1253-54, which requires that the policymaker "made a conscious, affirmative choice to 

approve" the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct and adopted it as official policy. Further, 

Monell liability requires a causal link between the ratification and the unconstitutional act, and 

Kong has not shown how the failure to discipline the officers caused Kong's constitutional 

deprivation.

A municipality may be held liable for a constitutional violation under the theory of 

ratification if an authorized policymaker approves a subordinate's decision and the basis for it. 

Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). However, "mere failure to overrule a 

subordinate's actions, without more, is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim." Id. at 393. For 

there to be ratification, there must be "something more" than a single failure to discipline or the 

fact that a policymaker concluded that the defendant officer's actions were in keeping with the 

applicable policies and procedures. Kanae v. Hodson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1191 (D. Haw.

2003). As discussed by the court in Kanae,

The law does not say that every failure to discipline an officer who has shot 

someone is evidence of a “whitewash” policy or some other policy of “sham” 

investigations. The law does not say that, whenever an investigative group accepts 

an officer's version over a victim's differing version, this acceptance establishes a 

policy for which a municipality may be held liable under § 1983. If that were the 

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law, counties might as well never conduct internal investigations and might as well 

always admit liability. But that is not the law. The law clearly requires "something 

more."

See also Peterson v. City of Forth Worth Texas, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009) (no ratification 

of use of excessive force where the Chief of Police determined after investigation that the officers 

complied with department policies); Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989) ("As 

we have indicated before, we cannot hold the failure of a police department to discipline in a 

specific instance is an adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell.").

According to Trindad's declaration, MPD adheres to California Penal Code § 832.5, which 

requires MPD to have a procedure for investigating complaints made by the public. (Doc. 50, 

Trindad Decl., ¶ 4.) Under MPD policy, Internal Affairs conducts an investigation that results in a 

finding of exonerated (action complained of did occur, but was lawful, justified, and proper), not 

sustained (insufficient information/evidence to prove or disprove the allegation), sustained 

(allegation is supported by sufficient information or evidence), and unfounded (allegation is false; 

alleged act did not occur, employee or MPD was not involved). (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., ¶ 5.) 

Specifically, the investigation team gathers information, conducts interviews, prepares a memo 

outlining the investigation, and creates a recommendation. The completed package of information 

is then given to the Chief who reviews it. The Chief then either concurs with the recommendation, 

sends it back for further investigation, or modifies the recommendation. (Doc. 57-1, Trindad 

Depo., 22:1-18.) The Chief is the person with the final say as to the form of discipline imposed as 

a result of the investigation. (Doc. 57-1, Trindad Depo., 23:19-23.) 

After the shooting of Kong, MPD conducted an administrative investigation, and Internal 

Affairs found no violation. (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., ¶ 15.) Chavez and Lodwick were found 

exonerated by Internal Affairs after the investigation into the event, and those findings were 

forwarded to the Chief. (Doc. 57-1, Trindad Depo., 105:22-106:17.) 

The fact that the Chief reviewed the Internal Affairs investigation, accepted its 

recommendation that Chavez and Lodwick be exonerated for the shooting incident, and did not 

impose any discipline or modify the recommendation is insufficient in-and-of-itself to establish 

the Chief made a conscious, affirmative choice to approve the officers' actions and adopt them as 

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official policies. There must be something more, as noted in Kanae, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. For 

example, in Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991), the court held there was sufficient 

evidence to support a jury finding that the Chief of Police ratified the excessive use of force 

against the plaintiffs. The "something more" necessary to show ratification present in Larez

included an obviously flawed investigation of the plaintiff's excessive force complaint. The 

investigation was conducted by the unit responsible for the constitutional violation and contained 

gaps and inconsistencies "that should have been visible to any reasonable police administrator." 

Id. at 647. The Chief did not question the investigation and accepted the results. Id. at 635. The 

LAPD investigations were also found to be unreliable by a two-year study of LAPD complaints 

which showed that it was "almost impossible for a police officer to suffer discipline as a result of a 

complaint lodged by a citizen." Id. at 647. The evidence supported the plaintiff's theory that 

LAPD's disciplinary and complaint process contributed to the police excesses complained of 

because the procedures made clear to officers that they "could get away with anything." Id. 

Unlike Larez, Kong cites no evidence other than that the Chief reviewed the Internal 

Affairs investigation and recommendation and did not impose discipline. This alone is 

insufficient to establish ratification. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848; Santiago, 891 F.2d at 382; Kanae, 

294 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. There is also no evidence showing a causal connection between the 

Chief's acceptance of the Internal Affairs' investigation recommendation regarding the officers' 

conduct and the alleged violation of Kong's constitutional rights. In Larez, there was evidence that 

the refusal to discipline officers for complained-of conduct was a widespread practice giving 

officers the impression that they could "get away with anything," which supported a causal 

connection between the approval of officer conduct and the constitutional violation the plaintiff 

suffered. There is no such evidence of how a one-time refusal to discipline is evidence of a causal 

connection between the alleged ratification and the excessive force Kong complains of here.

In sum, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Kong's claims against the City 

of Merced under Monell pursuant to a theory of ratification.

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2. Luh's Monell Claims Against Merced Are Not Supported by Sufficient 

Evidence

Luh also states claims against the Merced under Monell. (Doc. 2, 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, 

Luh's Cmplt., ¶¶ 32-39.) Luh's claims are predicated on a repeated course of conduct tantamount 

to a custom or policy of condoning or tacitly encouraging abuse of police authority and the 

disregard of citizens' constitutional rights; he also alleges a Monell claim under a theory of 

ratification. (Doc. 2, 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, Luh's Cmplt., ¶ 33.)

Defendants argue Luh's ratification theory fails for the same reasons as Kong's: (1) there is 

no evidence the Chief of Police ratified unconstitutional conduct and the basis for it; and (2) there 

is no causal link between any supposed ratification and Luh's shooting.36 As to the custom, 

policy, and practice theory, Luh's claim fails for the same reason as Kong's: it is a single-incident 

theory which is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.

Luh contends it is undisputed that the officers violated several Deadly Force and Officer 

Involved Shooting policies that the City requires. Luh notes that Chavez and Lodwick rode to the 

hospital together in disregard of policies that they remain sequestered and not discuss the shooting. 

None of the officers were reprimanded or disciplined for this policy violation. Luh contends there 

are material issues of fact under the ratification theory whether the officers exercised reasonable 

force during the incident. Luh cites Estate of Villarreal v. Cooper, 929 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (E.D. 

Wash. 2013), where the district court denied summary judgment on the plaintiff's ratification 

theory because there were disputed issues of facts as to the reasonableness of the force used and 

the Police Chief had expressly stated that the officers' actions complied with department policies

and that he supported all of the officer's actions.

Unlike Cooper, however, here there is no express statement from the Chief supporting and 

approving Chavez' and Lodwick's conduct as comporting with policy and supporting the officers' 

actions. As discussed above, there is also no evidence of a causal link between any ratification of 

excessive force and the officers' conduct in this case. Even to the extent the officers violated 

 36 Defendants also argue Luh's claim should be dismissed as to DOE Defendants. Luh clarifies that his Monell claim 

is against the City of Merced. (Doc. 58, 25, n. 5.)

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policy in this instance by not being sequestered and by riding together to the hospital, there is no 

evidence how a one-time policy violation bears a causal nexus to the shooting of Kong and Luh. 

As to Luh's theory that the City is liable under Monell based on a custom, policy, and practice 

theory, the evidence of a single incident in this case is not sufficient to maintain the claim for the 

reasons discussed as to Kong's Monell claim for a failure-to-train. See Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918

("Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be 

founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has 

become a traditional method of carrying out policy"). Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on Luh's Monell claims.

E. Official Capacity Suits

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs Luh and Kong sued Chavez and Lodwick in both their 

individual and their official capacities. Additionally, Kong sued Deliman and Court in their 

individual and official capacities. Defendants correctly maintain that the official capacity suits 

against these individual defendants are superfluous because Merced is the real party in interest. 

Neither Luh nor Kong addresses this argument. As such, the official capacity suits against 

Deliman, Court, Chavez, and Lodwick are dismissed and Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment as to such claims.

F. MPD is an Improperly Named Defendant

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any "person" who, under color of law, 

deprives an individual of federal constitutional or statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The term 

"person" includes local governmental entities, Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 

1188 (9th Cir. 2002), but does not encompass municipal or county departments. See United States 

v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir.2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (municipal police 

departments and bureaus are generally not considered "persons" within the meaning of section 

1983); Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing 

sua sponte Santa Clara Department of Corrections as improper defendant); Garcia v. City of 

Merced, 637 F. Supp. 2d 731, 760 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing Sheriff's Department as improper 

defendant). It is clear that as a department of the City of Merced, the MPD is not a proper 

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defendant in Plaintiffs' section 1983 actions. As such, the MPD is not a proper party and is 

DISMISSED from this action.

G. State Law Claims

1. Kong's Claims Are Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Defendants assert that all seven of Kong's state-law claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations found in California Government Code § 945.6 which requires that a lawsuit against a 

public entity be filed within 6 months of the entity's Notice of Rejection of Claim. Kong filed his 

tort claim with the City of Merced on June 1, 2012, and it was rejected on July 16, 2012. Kong's 

last day to file suit against the City or its officers was January 16, 2013. Kong filed his claim on 

January 17, 2013 – one day late.

Kong argues that California Government Code § 6800 computes time calculations under 

statute by excluding the first day and including the last day, unless it is a holiday, which is also 

excluded. Defendants' calculation counts the first day. When the first day is excluded, the 

calculation of time begins on July 17, 2012. Using the 184-day rule along with California Code § 

6800, the complaint was due on January 17, 2013 – the date it was filed.

In their reply, Defendants do not dispute Kong's timeliness argument. California 

Government Code Section 945.6 requires complaints to be filed within 6 months of the notice of 

rejection of the claim. Gonzalez v. County of Los Angeles, 199 Cal. App. 3d 601, 604-06, (1988) 

explains that under Section 945.6, a claimant has 184 days to file suit if the rejection notice is 

mailed between March and August, as a 6-month period on a calendar ranges in days from 181 to 

184. Applying California Government Code Section 6800, the first day of the 184 days is the day 

after the rejection notice was mailed. Here, the claim rejection notice was mailed on July 16, 

2012, and the 184-day time period began running on July 17, 2012. The complaint was filed on 

January 17, 2013, exactly 184 days from July 17, 2012. Thus, Kong's complaint is timely and 

none of his state law claims are barred. 

2. Merced is Not Liable for State Law Torts

Defendants argue that Merced is not liable for any of the common-law torts alleged by 

Kong. In his opposition, Kong concedes his claims for civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, 

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but Kong's opposition brief does not address whether his negligence claim against Merced is 

barred. In their reply, Defendants argue Kong's failure to address this issue is an implicit 

concession and the issue has been waived.

The California Tort Claims Act governs the liability of state and local governmental 

entities for tort claims. See Cal. Gov. Code § 810 et seq; see also Eastburn v. Regional Fire 

Protection Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1183 (2003) ("[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be 

based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of 

care . . . ."). Section 815 of the California Government Code provides that a public entity is not 

liable for injury arising out of an act or omission except as provided by statute. Kong has not 

alleged an independent statutory basis for imposing on Merced liability for his common law

negligence claim, as required by California law, and he does not identify any statutory basis in his 

opposition. Therefore, the Court finds that Merced is entitled to summary judgment on Kong's 

state-law negligence claim against it.

3. Kong's Bane Act Claim Is Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence

Kong alleges a violation of the Bane Act under California Civil Code Section 52.1 against 

Defendants Chavez and Lodwick for allegedly interfering with Kong's constitutional rights 

through threats, intimidation, or coercion. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 66-78.) 

Defendants argue that in Rodriquez, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 937, the court held that to maintain 

a claim under the Bane Act, the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an 

interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right – it is not sufficient that the right 

interfered with is the right to be free of the force that was applied. Here, Kong's Bane Act claim is 

predicated upon violation of his Fourth Amendment right against excessive force. Defendants 

argue the coercion alleged under the Bane Act cannot be the same conduct as alleged under the 

Fourth Amendment violation. Thus, Defendants argue they are entitled to judgment on Kong's 

Bane Act claim.

Kong argues that Defendants' argument hinges on Rodriquez, but this case is "outdated" 

and other courts have refused to follow the reasoning offered by Defendants. Kong argues that 

Defendants acted intentionally in firing upon him, and their ambush tactics were meant to 

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intimidate him. "Hiding behind a vehicle and ambushing [Kong], and threatening/intimidating 

him with gunfire as a means of effectuating arrest is precisely the aim of the legislature in enacting 

the Bane Act."

The Bane Act prohibits any person from interfering "by threats, intimidation, or coercion . 

. . with the exercise or enjoyment by an individual . . . of rights secured by the Constitution or laws 

of the United States." Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. "The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the 

defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., 'threats, intimidation or coercion'), tried to or did 

prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force 

the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law." Austin B. v. 

Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883 (2007) (citing Jones v. Kmart Corp.,

17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 (1998)). 

District courts in California were split on the issue of whether a Fourth Amendment 

excessive force or false arrest violation alone satisfies the element of interference with a legal 

right under the Bane Act. In Justin v. City and County of San Francisco, the court held that 

"Section 52.1 is only applicable when a defendant intends by his or her conduct to interfere with a 

separate, affirmative right enjoyed by a plaintiff; it does not apply to a plaintiff's allegation of use 

of excessive force absent a showing that the act was done to interfere with a separate state or 

federal constitutional right." No. C05-4812-MEJ, 2008 WL 1990819, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 

2008). The court concluded a false arrest claim alone was insufficient for establishing violation of 

a separate right. However, in Cole v. Doe 1 thru 2 Officers of City of Emeryville Police 

Department, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2005), the court held that the use "of law 

enforcement authority to effectuate a stop, [and] detention (including use of handcuffs) . . . can 

constitute interference by 'threat, intimidation, or coercion under [§ 52.1].'" (quoting Venegas v. 

Cnty of L.A., 32 Cal. 4th 820, 843 (2004) (holding allegations and evidence of unreasonable search 

and seizure, accompanied by threats, intimidation, or coercion, are sufficient to withstand a 

demurrer under § 52.1)). 

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Rodriquez was decided while district courts were split on this issue.37 Like the court in 

Justin, the court determined a cause of action under the Bane Act requires a predicate – the 

application of threat, intimidation or coercion, and an object – interference with a constitutional or 

statutory right. The court concluded, based on case authority and the language of the statute, that 

to maintain a claim under the Bane Act, the coercive force applied against a plaintiff "must result 

in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right. It is not sufficient that the right 

interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied." Rodriquez,

819 F. Supp. 2d at 954. 

One year later, a California Court of Appeal decided Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 

32 Cal. App. 4th 947 (2012). Shoyoye was lawfully arrested on August 19, 2007, because, in the 

act of reporting an unrelated incident to the police, officers discovered he had two outstanding 

warrants. The first warrant was related to his failure to address a citation he receiving for riding 

the subway without a ticket, and the second related to a former roommate who stole his identity 

and was convicted of grand theft under Shoyoye's name. Shoyoye was incarcerated, appeared in 

court, and was ordered released on the first warrant. A few days later, he appeared on the second 

warrant, and that matter was resolved in his favor. On August 22, 2007, he was ordered released, 

subject to any other holds. He was transported back to the jail, expecting to be released at any 

time. Due to a processing error, a Department of Corrections hold intended for another parolee 

was placed in the computer under Shoyoye's name. 

When Shoyoye was transferred to the Detention Center in Castaic, he continued to ask why

he was not being released, he received no assistance, and he was transferred again to the Pitchess 

Detention Center. Finally, he was able to contact his roommate and his boss who in turn 

contacted a state assemblyman's office, and the error was discovered. Shoyoye was ultimately 

released on September 7, 2007. During his wrongful incarceration, he was subjected to strip 

searches, anal cavity searches, required to wait naked in line to shower, and shackled. He also 

witnessed criminal activity, fights, and was housed in a dormitory with hundreds of inmates –

many of whom were gang members. 

 37 The facts of Rodriquez were summarized above.

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Shoyoye filed suit, including a claim under the Bane Act. The court found there was no 

coercion independent from the inherent coercion in his wrongful detention. While county 

employees had been rude to him at times, they did not threaten or intimidate him for voicing his 

opinion that he should be released. They coerced him to remain incarcerated, but they did not 

coerce him to stop inquiring about his release, threaten him for doing so, or punish him in any 

way. "No one ignored him deliberately, knowing that he should in fact be released, let alone 

purposefully threaten or intimidate him." Moreover, while there was "[n]o doubt the experience 

was traumatic and frightening, [] there was no evidence of any coercion independent of that 

inherent in a wrongful detention itself." Id. at 961-62. 

Federal district courts deciding Bane Act claims since Shoyoye have disagreed about the 

significance of that court's holding that there must be evidence of "coercion independent of that 

inherent in the wrongful detention itself." Compare Hunter v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No. 11-4911-

JSC, 2012 WL 4831634, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012) with Quinn v. Fresno Cnty. Sheriff, No. 

10-cv-1617, 2012 WL 6561562, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2012). 

In Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968 (2013), a California court of 

appeals reviewed a number of district court decisions prior to Shoyoye and determined that, to the 

extent those cases held that an unlawful seizure or arrest committed with unlawful use of force did 

not constitute a violation of the Bane Act, those cases did not reflect the current state of California 

law. Bender, however, sidestepped the issue because there was both an unlawful arrest claim and

an excessive force claim. The court held that where "an arrest is unlawful and excessive force is 

applied in making the arrest, there has been coercion 'independent from the coercion inherent in 

the wrongful detention itself.'" Id. at 978 (quoting Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 959). Bender did 

not address the question whether an excessive force claim alone could suffice under the Bane Act. 

As recognized by judges in this district, "the landscape has evolved since Rodriquez, 

including the more recent decision in Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. App. 4th 947 

(2012)." Youngblood v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:12-cv-1150-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 1386392, at 

*12-13 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2009); see also Rodriquez v. City of Modesto, No. 1:10-cv-1370-LJOMJS, 2013 WL 6415620, at *10-11 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013). However, courts continue to 

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disagree about whether there must be coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the 

claimed excessive force or unlawful search.

In considering the case authority on this issue, the Court finds most persuasive and 

consistent the interpretation of Shoyoye and the other authority noted in Youngblood. Youngblood

involved the search of a residence of a disabled individual who was bitten by a police canine 

during the course of the search. In considering a Bane Act claim, the court adopted the 

interpretation of Shoyoye applied in N.H. v. City of Alameda, No. 11-cv-02868-JST, 2013 WL 

1701591 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2013) such that "where Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure or 

excessive force claims are raised and intentional [police] conduct is at issue, there is no need for a 

plaintiff to allege a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the seizure or 

use of force at the pleading stage." Youngblood, 2014 WL 1386392 at *13 (emphasis added). 

The Youngblood court explained that such an interpretation aligns with the decision in Bender by 

leaving open the chance that a plaintiff who alleges an improper seizure or arrest may, upon 

development of facts, be able to show that excessive force was employed and thereby prevail in a 

claim under the Bane Act." Id. The Youngblood court reasoned that there were facts proffered 

that, if proven, could show that there was no justification for the plaintiff's seizure and that 

excessive force was applied. As such, the court concluded that it would not grant summary 

judgment as to the plaintiff's Bane Act claims. Id. 

Kong's Bane Act claim is distinguishable from Youngblood. While it may be sufficient for 

pleading purposes, there is no evidence proffered showing there was any coercion outside the 

alleged use of excessive force. As such, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to 

Kong's claim under the Bane Act. 

4. Luh and Kong's Assault and Battery Claims 

Kong and Luh each allege claims for assault and battery against Chavez and Lodwick. 

Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment as to both Plaintiffs' claims.

"A police officer in California may use reasonable force to make an arrest, prevent escape 

or overcome resistance, and need not desist in the face of resistance." Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid 

Transit, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1073-74 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Edison v. City of Anaheim, 

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63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272 (1988)). "The standard jury instruction in police battery actions 

recognizes this: 'A peace officer who uses unreasonable or excessive force in making a lawful 

arrest or detention commits a battery upon the person being arrested or detained as to such 

excessive force.'" Id. In an assault and battery claim against a police officer under California law, 

a plaintiff must show that the officer used reasonable force. Id.

A claim for assault under California Law must allege that (1) defendants intended to cause 

harmful or offensive contact, or the imminent apprehension of such contact, and (2) Plaintiff was 

put in imminent apprehension of such contact. Brooks v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617 

(N.D.Cal.1998) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)). "The tort of assault is 

complete when the anticipation of harm occurs." Kisesky v. Carpenters' Trust for So. Cal., 144 

Cal.App.3d 222, 232 (1983). Physical injury need not be present for either a claim of assault or 

battery. Id. "A civil action for assault is based upon an invasion of the right of a person to live 

without being in fear of personal harm." Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7 (1944). 

a. Disputed Factual Issues Preclude Summary Judgment of Kong's 

Assault and Battery Claims

Defendants contend that Kong's state law claims for battery and assault are barred by Heck

and because the Officers used reasonable force. For the reasons discussed above, there are issues 

of material fact as to whether the officers used reasonable force against Kong, and Defendants 

argument under Heck is not persuasive. Accordingly, the motion to Kong's assault and battery 

claim against Chavez and Lodwick is DENIED. 

b. Disputed Factual Issues Preclude Summary Judgment of Luh's Assault 

and Battery Claims

Defendants contend that Luh was never placed in apprehension for purposes of his assault 

claim: "He had no prior knowledge he was about to be struck, and thus could not have reasonably 

believed he was about to be hit." (Doc. 45, 57:6-10.) While there is no evidence that Luh 

observed the officers' interaction with Kong such that he was placed in apprehension before he 

was shot, after Luh was shot he states in his declaration he did not know who shot him and he was 

"in fear for [his] life." (Doc. 60-15, Luh Decl., ¶ 7.) While fearing for his life, he went into the 

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house and "crawled into a bathtub for safety." (Doc. 60-15, Luh Decl., ¶ 7.) This is sufficient 

evidence of imminent apprehension of contact following the alleged battery. 

Defendants also contend the requisite intent is not met with respect to Luh's assault and 

battery claims because the officers never intended to make harmful contact with Luh. Under the 

doctrine of transferred intent, the viability of a claim of assault and battery by a bystander against 

a police officer turns on the reasonability of the application of force by the police officer against 

the intended suspect. See Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 527 n.10 (2009) (under 

transferred intent doctrine, if police officer's actions are reasonable as to the suspect, then they are 

necessarily reasonable as to the third-party plaintiff). As noted above, in the presence of 

conflicting evidence, the court cannot find that Chavez and Lodwick's decision to employ deadly 

force against Kong was reasonable as a matter of law. Although Defendants contend Luh cannot 

show that the officers intended to shoot him as a bystander who they could not see behind the 

fence, the doctrine of transferred intent will apply to an innocent bystander. Because the officers 

intended to fire upon Kong, that intent transfers to Luh. 

In sum, neither Kong's nor Luh's assault and battery claims are subject to summary 

judgment, and Defendants' motion with respect to these claims is DENIED.

5. Luh and Kong's Negligence Claims

Luh and Kong each allege negligence claims against Defendants. Defendants assert they 

are entitled to summary judgment as to both Plaintiffs' claims.

To prevail on a common law claim of negligence against a police officer, Plaintiffs must 

show that (1) the officer owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the officer breached the duty by failing 

"to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of profession commonly possess and 

exercise," (3) there was a "proximate causal connection between the [officer's] negligent conduct 

and the resulting injury" to the plaintiff; and (4) the officer's negligence resulted in "actual loss or 

damage" to the plaintiff. Harris v. Smith, 157 Cal. App. 3d 100, 104 (1984). Therefore, "to 

prevail on the negligence claim, Plaintiffs must show that the Defendant officers acted 

unreasonably and that the unreasonable behavior harmed Plaintiffs." Robinson v. City of San 

Diego, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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a. Kong's Negligence Claims

Defendants identify three separate theories pled in Kong's complaint regarding negligence 

of the officers: (1) excessive force against Chavez and Lodwick; (2) inadequate medical care 

against Court; and (3) inadequate investigation by Deliman. Kong does not dispute this 

characterization of his claims or the Defendants identified under each theory.

(i) Factual Issues Preclude Summary Judgment as to Kong's 

Negligence Claim Based on Excessive Force of Chavez and 

Lodwick

Defendants contend because there is no material dispute that Chavez and Lodwick's use of 

force was reasonable, there is no issue of fact with regard to Kong's negligence claim. (Doc. 45, 

57:24-27.) 

Kong contends there are disputed issues of fact as to the reasonableness of the officers' use 

of force, and even if the officers' use of force were reasonable, their conduct before the shooting 

could still be found to be negligent. Kong cites Hayes v. County of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 

917 (1996) for the proposition that California negligence law is broader than federal Fourth 

Amendment law, and the officer's tactical conduct and decisions preceding the use of deadly force 

are relevant considerations as to whether the officers were negligent.

"Law enforcement officers do have a duty to refrain from unreasonable use of deadly 

force." Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1094 (2004), as modified on denial 

of rehearing. The Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard applies to claims that officers were 

negligent in using excessive force. See Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 1156, 1170 (9th Cir. 

2011) (citing Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1108-09 (2004)). 

Kong's claim of negligence against Chavez and Lodwick involves disputed issue of fact 

regarding the reasonableness of the force used. Making a determination regarding negligence 

would require the same determinations of credibility, weighing evidence, and drawing inferences 

from the facts – none of which are the Court's function at the summary judgment stage. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 355. To the extent Kong's negligence claim is premised on the officers' pre-shooting 

tactics, those facts are also considered in the totality of circumstances surrounding the officers' 

ultimate use of force. The officer's duty to act reasonably when using deadly force extends to preCase 1:13-cv-00083-SKO Document 74 Filed 07/29/15 Page 57 of 64
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shooting conduct. Hayes v. City of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 689 (2013) ("[T]he totality of the 

circumstances, including the preshooting conduct of the officers, might persuade a jury to find the 

shooting negligent. [Citations omitted]. In other words, preshooting circumstances might show 

that an otherwise reasonable use of deadly force was in fact unreasonable.") It is for the jury to 

determine whether the preshooting tactics, in light of the officers' ultimate use of force, amounted 

to reasonable or negligent conduct. Therefore, Kong's negligence claim cannot be resolved on 

summary judgment for the same reasons as Kong's constitutional excessive force claim.

(ii) Summary Judgment is Warranted as to Kong's Negligence

Claim Based on Inadequate Medical Care

Defendants contend there is no evidence that, even if they had a duty to render medical 

care, Chavez, Lodwick, or Court breached the duty to provide Kong medical care following the 

shooting. Defendants argued that Kong received care within 10 to 15 minutes after police moved 

Kong to a safe area to be treated by paramedics. In fact, the officers moved Kong even before the 

scene was secure and went "above and beyond Department police" to render such aid. Their 

conduct was reasonable. 

Kong contends that Defendants are required to provide medical care pursuant to their own 

policies. The video shows that officers refused to provide medical care for over 15 minutes based 

on the theory that other possible threats could exist in the home. Although Defendants state they 

have no duty to provide medical care in a particular period of time after an incident, they cite no 

authority other than their own duty manual. As such, Kong contends Defendants have not met 

their burden on summary judgment.

Determining whether officers owed Kong a duty of care requires consideration of the 

foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the 

closeness of the connection between the conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached 

to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 

defendant, and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty of care, the availability, 

cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 

3d 197, 203 (1982). 

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Merced Policy 310 (officer involved shooting) provides guidelines used in the 

investigation of an officer-involved shooting. (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., Exh. F.) The policy 

describes the duties of any initial on-scene supervisor at an officer-involved shooting. Pursuant to 

Policy 310.4.1, the first uninvolved supervisor should "[t]ake all reasonable steps to obtain 

emergency medical attention for all apparently injured individuals." (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., Exh. 

F.) Policy 406 also requires officers to use reasonable efforts to render medical aid to any 

obviously injured parties at a crime scene. (Doc. 50, Trindad Decl., Exh. M.) Assuming the 

officers owed Kong a duty of care to provide timely medical care pursuant to these policies, the 

court considers the remaining elements of Kong's negligence claim.

A police officer breaches a duty of care when he fails to use the skill, prudence, and 

diligence that other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise. Harris, 157 Cal. 

App. 3d at 104. As there is no dispute that medical care was summoned, Kong claims the officers 

were negligent in not providing more timely medical care. Kong offers the testimony of expert 

Timothy Williams who stated that it took officers seven minutes to pull Kong out so that he could 

receive treatment from paramedics which was too long in his opinion, and the scene could have 

been secured much more quickly than it was. (Doc. 57-1, T.T. Williams Decl., 85:12-86:25.) 

Kong also asserts the video confirms the scene could have been secured more quickly and aid 

could have been rendered sooner. Officer Court testified that first aid was rendered to Kong when 

it was safe to do so. (Doc. 46-10, Court Depo., 23:21-25.) Kong offers evidence sufficient to

create a factual dispute about whether the scene could have been secured more quickly and care 

rendered in a more timely manner (in less than the seven minutes Williams observed it took to pull 

Kong out so he could be treated by the paramedics). See Hernandez v. KWPH Enterprises, 116

Cal. App. 4th 170, 175 (2004) (whether a duty of care has been breached is normally a question of 

fact).

As to causation and damages, however, Kong neither cites to any evidence or argument as 

to how any breach of the duty caused him additional injury nor identifies any injury as a result of 

any delay in medical care. All Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Kong's 

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negligence claim for failure to render timely medical care. 38 

(iii) Summary Judgment is Warranted as to Kong's Negligence

Claim Based on Post-Shooting Investigation

Kong alleges that Defendants breached their duty of care by engaging in an incomplete and 

negligent investigation, failing to question the officers, or to use well-established legal principles 

to determine whether or not there were any questionable activities on the part of Chavez and 

Lodwick. (Doc. 1, Kong's Cmpt., ¶ 116.)

Defendants contend that, even assuming there is a duty to investigate, there is no evidence 

that Deliman breached any duty. After obtaining a search warrant, Deliman was instructed to 

interview Kong – which he did. (Doc. 45, 58:16-28.) Kong contends Defendants have an inherent 

duty to investigate criminal wrongdoing, which includes that of their own officers. Kong asserts 

that Deliman did not separate the officers and did not interview the officers on the night in 

question. Deliman's entire investigation centered on Kong's criminal liability, which is unrelated 

to his duty to investigate whether the shooting was proper.39 

Kong has not established that Deliman had a duty to conduct a post-shooting investigation 

into the shooting incident, or that he was charged with separating the officers and interviewing 

them on the night of the incident. Although Merced and the MPD may have had a duty to 

investigate the officer-involved shootings, the City is not liable for common law negligence. 

Moreover, Kong has not established how any failure to investigate the shooting was the proximate 

cause of any additional injury to Kong. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Kong's 

theory of negligence arising out of an inadequate post-shooting investigation.

 38 Kong's complaint for negligence is against all Defendants, but Merced is not liable for negligence absent a statutory 

duty, which was discussed above. See Cardinal Buchnoff, No. 06-cv-72-MMA (BLM), 2010 WL 3609489, at * 2 

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (citing Universal By-Prods, Inc. v. City of Modesto, 43 Cal. App. 3d 145, 153 (1975) 

(stating there is "no common law liability of a public entity; liability is wholly statutory)).

39 In his responses to the DUMFs (see Doc. 56-3, DUMF 122), Kong disputes that Deliman was not involved in the 

disciplinary decision for Chavez and Lodwick because his report was part of the investigation file used to clear 

Chavez and Lodwick. Kong cites no particular portion of Deliman's deposition to support his dispute. Deliman was 

asked during the course of his deposition whether he was involved in the investigation of the officers, and he said he 

did "some canvassing of the neighborhood after the fact, but, no, I don't believe so." (Doc. 46-11, Deliman Decl., 

17:22-18:2.) He also indicated he did not participate in the decision-making process as it related to recommending 

discipline for either of the officers. (Doc. 46-11, Deliman Decl., 17:22-18:2.)

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b. Factual Issues Preclude Summary Judgment as to Luh's Negligence 

Claim Against Chavez and Lodwick

Luh claims the officers' use of excessive force against Kong negligently caused Luh injury. 

(Case No. 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, Luh's Cmplt., ¶ 44-46.)

Chavez and Lodwick contend they are entitled to summary judgment because their use of 

force against Kong, which led to the shooting of Luh, was reasonable. Luh contends there are 

disputed issues of fact whether Chavez and Lodwick's use of force was reasonable, precluding 

summary judgment of Luh's negligence claim based on the same conduct. As with Kong's claim 

of negligence due to the officers' use of excessive force, Luh's claim is subject to the same factual 

disputes which require the jury to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, and draw 

inferences about totality of the circumstances the officers faced and the use of force employed. As 

such, Defendants' motion with respect to Luh's negligence claim is DENIED.

H. Punitive Damage Claims

Kong has conceded his punitive damage claim as to the City of Merced, but maintains 

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on his punitive damages claims against the 

individual officers. 

Pursuant to federal law, a jury may award punitive damages in a Section 1983 case 

alleging excessive force either "when a defendant's conduct was driven by evil motive or intent, or 

when it involves a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others." Dang v. 

Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 33 (1983) (punitive 

damages may be awarded "if the conduct of one or more of the defendants is shown to be a 

reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others"). A Section 1983 

punitive damage claim is subject to summary adjudication "where plaintiff fails to produce 

evidence raising a material question of fact regarding aggravating circumstances or the reckless or 

callous nature of defendant's actions." Megargee v. Wittman, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1214 (E.D. 

Cal. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

As discussed with respect to Kong's excessive force claim and state law claims for 

negligence, battery, and assault, the parties have provided differing versions of events regarding 

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the officers' use of force against Kong. These disputes raise factual issues whether Chavez and 

Lodwick engaged in malicious, wanton, or oppressive conduct under federal law as well as 

whether the officers acted with malice, oppression, or fraud under California law. Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 3294(a). As discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Castro, 785 F.3d at 349-50, even where the 

standard on the underlying merits of the claim is one of recklessness, punitive damages may still 

be awarded by a jury without any additional culpable conduct. Because there is evidence from 

which a reasonable jury could conclude the officers' conduct was unreasonable, there is sufficient 

evidence to support an award of punitive damages.

Similarly, issues of fact as to the reasonableness of the officers' conduct preclude summary 

judgment as to Luh's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim and his state law claims for 

negligence, assault and battery. These factual issues similarly preclude summary judgment as to 

Luh's claim for punitive damages.

I. Kong's Conceded Claims

In his opposition, Kong conceded his claims for violation of the California Civil Code 

§ 51.7, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, injunctive relief, and punitive damages – as to Merced 

only. (Doc. 56, 30:18-22.) Defendants' summary judgment motion is granted as to these claims, 

and they are dismissed.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 

1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Kong's claims is DENIED as 

follows:

a. Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force (Doc. 1, Cmplt., Sixth Cause 

of Action);

b. Qualified Immunity for Fourth Amendment claim for excessive 

force; and

c. State law claims for negligence, assault, and battery (Doc. 1., Cmplt., 

Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action).

2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Kong's claims is GRANTED as 

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follows:

a. California Civil Code §§ 51.7 and 52.1 (Doc. 1, First Cause of Action, 

Count 1);

b. Common law conspiracy (Doc. 1, Cmplt., First Cause of Action, Count 2);

c. Aiding and Abetting (Doc. 1, Cmplt., First Cause of Action, Count 3);

d. Negligence on theories of (1) untimely medical care; and (2) inadequate 

investigation (Doc. 1, Cmplt., Fourth Cause of Action);

e. Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Doc. 1, Cmplt., Seventh Cause of 

Action)

f. Monell (Doc. 1, Cmplt., Eighth Cause of Action);

g. Injunctive Relief Request (Doc. 1, Cmplt., Ninth Cause of Action); and 

h. Punitive Damage claim against the City of Merced.

3. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Luh's claims is DENIED as 

follows:

a. Excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment as to shooting (1:13-cv00111-SKO, Doc. 2, Cmplt., First Cause of Action);

b. Alternative request for qualified immunity as to the Fourteenth Amendment 

excessive force claim as to the shooting; and

c. State law claims for assault, battery, and negligence 1:13-cv-00111-SKO, 

Doc. 2, Cmplt., Fourth And Fifth Causes of Action).

4. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Luh's claims is GRANTED as 

follows:

a. Fourth Amendment Claim for excessive force as to shooting and dog bite;

b. Fourteenth Amendment Claim for excessive force as to dog bite; and

c. Monell.

5. In sum, this case proceeds against Chavez and Lodwick only as to the following 

claims:

a. Kong's claims for (1) excessive force under the Fourth Amendment; 

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(2) negligence; and (3) assault and battery; and

b. Luh's claims for (1) excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment; 

(2) negligence; and (3) assault and battery.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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