Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00726/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00726-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Morgan Howarth, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Ryan Patterson, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-19-00726-PHX-ESW

ORDER 

 This Order sets forth the Court’s rulings on a number of pending Motions (Docs. 

40, 41, 43, 46, 47, 52, and 53). 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ “Motion for a Bond Requirement for Plaintiff” (Doc. 40) and 

Plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Defendants’ Untimely Reply, and to Strike or 

Disregard Arguments Raised for the First Time Therein” (Doc. 46) 

 Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) 54.1(c), Defendants filed a 

Motion (Doc. 40) requesting that the Court order Plaintiff to post a $25,000 bond for 

Defendants’ fees and taxable costs incurred in this action.1

 (Doc. 40). Plaintiff filed his 

Response (Doc. 42) on June 21, 2019. On July 1, 2019, Defendants filed their Reply (Doc. 

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 LRCiv 54.1(c) states: “In every action in which the plaintiff was not a resident of the District of Arizona at the time suit was brought, or, having been so, afterwards removed 

from this District, an order for security for costs may be entered upon application therefor within a reasonable time upon notice.” 

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45). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion in his Motion to Strike (Doc. 46), Defendants’ Reply 

is timely. Plaintiff correctly recounts that the rules provide a seven-day deadline for filing 

a reply in support of a motion. Plaintiff, however, neglects to consider that Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 6(d) states: 

When a party may or must act within a specified time after 

service and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or 

(F), 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire 

under Rule 6(a). 

Rule 5(b)(2)(E) includes service by electronic means. Seven days from Plaintiff’s June 21, 

2019 Response (Doc. 42) is June 28, 2019. After adding another three days pursuant to 

Rule 6(d), Defendants’ reply deadline was July 1, 2019. Although Plaintiff alternatively 

argues that the Court should strike or disregard arguments raised for the first time in 

Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 45), the Court finds that the arguments contained therein are in 

response to issues raised in Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 42). The Court will deny Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Strike (Doc. 46).2

 For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant 

Defendants’ Motion for a Bond (Doc. 40). 

“There is no specific provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to 

security for costs. However, the federal district courts have inherent power to require 

plaintiffs to post security for costs.” Simulnet E. Assoc. v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 

37 F.3d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1994). “Typically federal courts, either by rule or by case-to 

case determination, follow the forum state’s practice with regard to security for costs, as 

they did prior to the federal rules; this is especially common when a non-resident party is 

involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The historical purpose of 

bond requirements is “to help resident defendants collect costs when victorious against 

non-resident plaintiff whose property was beyond the reach of the court.” Gay v. Chandra, 

682 F.3d 590, 594 (7th Cir. 2012). 

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 The Court observes that many of Defendants’ briefs fail to comply with LRCiv 7.1(b)(1), which requires all original documents filed with the Clerk of Court to be in a 

“fixed-pitch type size no smaller than ten (10) pitch (10 letters per inch) or in a proportional font size no smaller than 13 point, including footnotes.” Continued failure to comply with LRCiv 7.1(b)(1) will result in a filed brief being stricken. 

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In Simulnet, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its 

discretion by dismissing a case after the plaintiffs failed to post a $500,000 cost bond, 

which was imposed five days before trial was set to commence. 37 F.3d at 573. In holding 

that the district court abused its discretion, the Ninth Circuit stated that the district court: 

knew that the plaintiffs could not post the bond, but imposed 

the bond because of its belief that the defendants would prevail 

in the jury trial, even though the court declined to hold the 

plaintiffs’ claims were vexatious. In practical effect, this 

amounted to a judgment as a matter of law in a case where 

discovery proceedings revealed there was a genuine issue of 

material fact to be determined by the jury. 

Id. at 576. The Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]n order to avoid depriving a plaintiff of 

access to the courts by a security bond requirement, the courts in some cases must strike a 

delicate balance.” Id. The Ninth Circuit did not hold that district courts must use a specific 

balancing test, but noted that the “First Circuit made an illuminating comment” regarding 

the issue. Id. In Aggerwal v. Ponce School of Medicine, 745 F.2d 723, 727-28 (1st Cir. 

1984), the First Circuit weighed the following three factors in determining whether a 

district court abused its discretion in requiring a security for costs: (i) the degree of 

probability or improbability of success on the merits, and the background and purpose of 

the suit; (ii) the reasonable extent of the security to be posted, if any, viewed from the 

defendant’s perspective; and (iii) the reasonable extent of the security to be posted, if any, 

viewed from the nondomiciliary plaintiff’s perspective. Aggerwal, 745 F.2d at 727-28. 

The First Circuit further explained that: 

just as factors such as the absence of attachable property within 

the district or the conduct of the parties may bear on a 

defendant’s legitimate need for the prophylaxsis of a bond, so 

too, a plaintiff’s ability to post surety for costs must weigh in 

the balance when the third figure of the equation is tabulated 

. . . . The district court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, 

must settle upon an assurance which is fair in the light not only 

of the case itself and of the exigencies faced by the defendant, 

but also fair when illuminated by the actual financial situation 

of the plaintiff. 

Id. at 728. 

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Here, given the early stage of litigation, the Court does not conclude that either party 

is more likely to succeed. Defendants reasonably assert that a bond is required because 

Plaintiff does not reside in the State of Arizona and does not own any property within 

Arizona out of which a judgment for costs can be satisfied. Plaintiff states that he has 

substantial equity in his out-of-state residence. (Doc. 42 at 7). Plaintiff has not shown that 

he cannot afford to post a bond. 

“[I]t is neither unjust nor unreasonable to expect a suitor ‘to put his money where 

his mouth is[.]’” Simulnet, 37 F.3d at 576 (quoting Aggarwal 745 F.2d at 728). After 

considering the circumstances of this action and the parties, the Court concludes that the 

balance of the relevant factors weigh in favor of requiring Plaintiff to post a $25,000 

security bond in this case. Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 40) will be granted. 

B. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to Join Parties and File a First Amended 

Complaint” (Doc. 41) and Defendants’ “Motion to Extend Time for 

Defendants’ Opposition to Amend” (Doc. 47) 

On June 17, 2019, Plaintiff timely moved for leave of Court to file a First Amended 

Complaint. (Doc. 41). Defendants’ deadline for responding was July 5, 2019.

3

 On July 

2, 2019, Defendants filed a “Motion to Extend Time for Defendants’ Opposition to 

Amend” (Doc. 47). For good cause shown, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 

47). Defendants’ Response (Doc. 54) filed on July 15, 2019 is deemed timely. Plaintiff’s 

“Motion to Strike Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion for Extension, or Grant Leave 

to File Surreply” (Doc. 53) will be denied. 

 The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefing concerning Plaintiff’s “Motion for 

Leave to Join Parties and File a First Amended Complaint” (Doc. 41). Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that “leave [to amend a pleading] shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.” “The power to grant leave to amend . . . is entrusted to the discretion 

of the district court, which ‘determines the propriety of a motion to amend by ascertaining 

the presence of any of four factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, 

 3

 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ response deadline was July 1, 2019. Plaintiff again neglects to consider the three additional days to be added pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d). 

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and/or futility.’” Serra v. Lappin, 600 F. 3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting William 

O. Gilley Enters. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 588 F.3d 659, 669 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Generally, 

this determination should be performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.” 

Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). “The party opposing 

amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice,” futility, or one of the other permissible 

reasons for denying a motion to amend. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187; see also 

Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that leave to amend 

should be freely given unless opposing party makes “an affirmative showing of either 

prejudice or bad faith”). 

In asserting that the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 41), Defendants 

contend that the proposed amendment would be futile. (Doc. 54 at 4-8). “[A] proposed 

amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the 

pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. RykoffSexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court does not find that there are no 

sets of facts that can be proved under the lodged First Amended Complaint that would 

constitute a valid claim. In addition, the Court finds that Defendants have not satisfied 

their burden of showing bad faith, undue delay, or prejudice to defeat Plaintiff’s Motion. 

As the relevant factors weigh in favor of granting leave to amend, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 

42) will be granted. 

C. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel” (Doc. 43) 

In his June 28, 2019 Motion (Doc. 43), Plaintiff states that Defendants have failed 

to respond to discovery requests and have failed to respond to attempts to meet and confer. 

Based on emails attached to the Motion, it appears that Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ 

request to postpone the deadline for discovery requests pending resolution of Plaintiff’s 

Motion (Doc. 41) seeking leave to file a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 43-1 at 32). The 

Court will deny Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel” (Doc. 43) to allow 

counsel to meet and confer regarding substantive discovery issues. See Cardoza v. 

Bloomin’ Brands, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1145 (D. Nev. 2015) (explaining that the 

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meet and confer obligation “promote[s] a frank exchange between counsel to resolve issues 

by agreement or to at least narrow and focus matters in controversy before judicial 

resolution is sought”) (citation omitted). 

The parties are directed to meet and confer regarding discovery issues no later than 

fourteen days after the date Plaintiff posts his security for costs. The parties are directed 

to follow the procedures set forth in the Case Management Order to the extent discovery 

disputes remain after the meet and confer. Defendants’ “First Request for Motion to 

Extend Time for Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery” (Doc. 52) will be denied. 

II. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants’ “Motion for a Bond Requirement for 

Plaintiff” (Doc. 40). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by September 6, 2019, Plaintiff shall post 

security for costs in this action in the amount of $25,000.00 with the Clerk of the Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Defendants’ 

Untimely Reply, and to Strike or Disregard Arguments Raised for the First Time Therein” 

(Doc. 46). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants’ “Motion to Extend Time for 

Defendants’ Opposition to Amend” (Doc. 47). Defendants’ Response (Doc. (Doc. 54) filed 

on July 15, 2019 is deemed timely. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to Join 

Parties and File a First Amended Complaint” (Doc. 41). Plaintiff shall file his First 

Amended Complaint by August 20, 2019. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendants’ “First Request for Motion to 

Extend Time for Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery” (Doc. 52). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s “Motion to Strike Defendants’ 

Reply in Support of Motion for Extension, or Grant Leave to File Surreply” (Doc. 53). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any future briefs filed by a party that does not 

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comply with the font size requirements set forth in LRCiv 7.1(b)(1) will be stricken. 

Dated this 8th day of August, 2019. 

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