Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03312/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03312-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1961 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Each Defendant moved separately except for Brown and Bougeard

and Kalman and Perkins who filed joint motions.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HANA HILSENRATH and OLIVER

HILSENRATH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EQUITY TRUST (JERSEY) LIMITED,

CANDOVER INVESTMENTS PLC, INSINGER DE

BEAUFORT HOLDINGS SA, JARDINE

MATHESON HOLDINGS LIMITED, PHILIP

JOSEPH AUSTIN, GRANT BROWN, MELVYN

KALMAN, JOHN PERKINS and CAROLINE

BOUGEARD,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 07-3312 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS

TO DISMISS WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND AND

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Defendants Equity Trust (Jersey) Limited, Candover Investments

PLC, Insinger de Beaufort Holdings SA (IBH), Jardine Matheson

Holdings Limited, Phillip Austin, Grant Brown, Melvyn Kalman, John

Perkins and Caroline Bougeard move to dismiss the complaint.1

Plaintiffs Hana and Oliver Hilsenrath oppose the motions. The

motions were submitted on the papers. Having considered the

parties' papers, the Court grants Defendants' motions to dismiss

without leave to amend and without prejudice to refiling the

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2

For a complete history of the prior litigation underlying the

current case, see the Court's concurrently filed order denying

Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify Latham & Watkins from representing

Equity Trust. 

3

A later motion to join Equity Trust as a counter-claim

defendant in the 2002 suit was denied.

2

appropriate jurisdiction or jurisdictions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this case on June 25, 2007, alleging various

claims based on a lawsuit entitled Janvrin Holdings Limited et al

v. Hilsenrath et al, No. C 02-1068 (2002 suit), brought against

them in 2002 by entities not party to this case. At issue in that

suit was the propriety of the settlement agreement reached in an

earlier suit between the same parties.2 The Hilsenraths had filed

counterclaims against the plaintiffs in that suit, claiming that

they improperly accessed the Hilsenraths' confidential personal

information prior to the settlement of the earlier suit. The

Hilsenraths further alleged that Equity Trust provided the

confidential information to those plaintiffs, but the Hilsenraths

did not include Equity Trust as a counter-claim defendant.3 The

Hilsenraths now allege that Defendant Equity Trust brought the 2002

suit "by means of Janvrin et al" and that it breached its fiduciary

duty to the Hilsenraths by disclosing their confidential

information. FAC ¶ 68. This fiduciary duty was allegedly based on

company management agreements (CMAs) Equity Trust entered into with

Plaintiffs. It is undisputed that none of the current Defendants

were party to the 2002 suit or to the earlier settlement. 

According to the present complaint, the other Defendants are

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entities that created Equity Trust or controlled it and individuals

who were executives of Equity Trust and Janvrin. FAC ¶¶ 14-23. 

Each Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint on various bases,

including jurisdictional grounds, improper venue, forum non

conveniens, failure to state a claim and defective service.

DISCUSSION

Because Defendants move to dismiss the case on individual

jurisdictional bases, each motion is discussed separately below. 

I. Candover Investments

Candover Investments moves to dismiss based on lack of

personal jurisdiction. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule

12(b)(2), when a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that

jurisdiction exists. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374

F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff "need only

demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the

defendant." Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995);

Fields v. Sedgwick Assoc. Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir.

1986). Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken

as true. AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588

(9th Cir. 1996). However, the court may not assume the truth of

such allegations if they are contradicted by affidavit. Data Disc,

Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284

(9th Cir. 1977). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in the

plaintiff's favor. AT&T, 94 F.3d at 588.

There are two independent limitations on a court's power to

exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: the

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applicable state personal jurisdiction rule and constitutional

principles of due process. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361

(9th Cir. 1990); Data Disc, Inc, 557 F.2d at 1286. California's

jurisdictional statute is co-extensive with federal due process

requirements; therefore, jurisdictional inquiries under state law

and federal due process standards merge into one analysis. Rano v.

Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).

The exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

violates the protections created by the due process clause unless

the defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum State so that

the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. 

General jurisdiction exists where the defendant's contacts with the

forum State are so substantial or continuous and systematic that

jurisdiction exists even if the cause of action is unrelated to

those contacts. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc.,

223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard for establishing

general jurisdiction is "fairly high." Id.; Brand v. Menlove

Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986). The defendant's

contacts must approximate physical presence in the forum State. 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. Factors considered in evaluating

the extent of contacts include whether the defendant makes sales,

solicits or engages in business, designates an agent for service of

process, holds a license, or is incorporated in the forum State. 

Bancroft & Masters, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1086. 

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Specific jurisdiction exists where the cause of action arises

out of or relates to the defendant's activities within the forum. 

Data Disc, Inc, 557 F.2d at 1286. Specific jurisdiction is

analyzed using a three-prong test: (1) the non-resident defendant

must purposefully direct its activities or consummate some

transaction with the forum or a resident thereof; or perform some

act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits

and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises

out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities;

and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Lake v.

Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987). Each of these

conditions is required for asserting jurisdiction. Insurance Co.

of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir.

1981). 

A showing that a defendant "purposefully availed" itself of

the privilege of doing business in a forum State typically consists

of evidence of the defendant's actions in the forum, such as

executing or performing a contract there. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d

at 802. The requirement of purposeful availment ensures that the

defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into the state

court of the forum based on its contacts. World-Wide Volkswagen

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The purposeful

availment test is met where "the defendant has taken deliberate

action within the forum state or if he has created continuing

obligations to forum residents." Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498. 

 A showing that a defendant "purposefully directed" its conduct

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toward a forum State "usually consists of evidence of the

defendant's actions outside the forum state that are directed at

the forum, such as the distribution in the forum state of goods

originating elsewhere." Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803. 

Purposeful direction may be established under the "effects test"

where the defendant (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly

aimed at the forum State, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows

is likely to be suffered in the forum State. Dole Food Co. v.

Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002).

The second factor requires that the claim arise out of or

result from the defendant's forum-related activities. A claim

arises out of a defendant's conduct if the claim would not have

arisen "but for" the defendant's forum-related contacts. 

Panavision Int'l v. L.P.v. Toeppa, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir.

1998).

Once the plaintiff has satisfied the first two factors, the

defendant bears the burden of overcoming a presumption that

jurisdiction is reasonable by presenting a compelling case that

specific jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985); Haisten v. Grass Valley

Medical Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986). Seven

factors are considered in assessing whether the exercise of

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is reasonable: (1) the

extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum

State's affairs, (2) the burden on the defendant, (3) conflicts of

law between the forum State and the defendant's home jurisdiction,

(4) the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (5) the

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4

Plaintiffs also argue that each Defendant should be subject

to nation-wide jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(k)(2). However, Rule 4(k)(2) only allows nation-wide

jurisdiction when "the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with

the Constitution and laws of the United States." Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(k)(2). Plaintiffs have not established that subjecting

Defendants to personal jurisdiction in the United States would be

consistent with the Constitution. 

Similarly, Plaintiffs' second argument -- that Candover and

IBH's participation in commercial banking in the United States is

sufficient to establish nation-wide federal jurisdiction --

misinterprets the case on which it relies. That case holds only

that a foreign state can be subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts

under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act based on the "commercial

7

most efficient judicial resolution of the dispute, (6) the

plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief, and

(7) the existence of an alternative forum. Caruth v. International

Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995); Roth v.

Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 1991).

A. General Jurisdiction

According to the declaration of Company Secretary Andrew

Moberly, Candover Investments PLC is a British holding company that

organizes and invests in large European buyouts. Moberly Decl. 

¶ 2. Its principal place of business is in the United Kingdom and

it does not maintain an office, mailing address, bank account or

employees in California. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 6. Candover is not

registered or licensed to do business in California; nor does it

solicit or conduct business in the State. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that general jurisdiction exists

over Candover because it invests in various American companies,

alleging that Candover owns and controls those companies. Only one

of those companies, Lombard Investments, Inc., is a California

corporation.4 However, as Candover notes, "engaging in commerce

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activities" exception when it participates in commercial banking. 

See First City, Texas-Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 281 F.3d 48,

53 (2d. Cir. 2001).

5Plaintiffs also cite Mackey v. Compass Mktg.,391 Md. 117

(2006), in support of their argument that each of the Defendants is

subject to jurisdiction in this Court because they are coconspirators with Janvrin, which committed overt acts in this State

during the underlying litigation. However, the Ninth Circuit has

not adopted a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, and

district courts within the Ninth Circuit have rejected it. See,

e.g., Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 873 n.14 (N.D. Cal.

1976) ("[P]ersonal jurisdiction over any non-resident individual

must be premised upon forum-related acts personally committed by

the individual. Imputed conduct is a connection too tenuous to

warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction."). 

8

with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind

of activity that approximates physical presence within the state's

borders." Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086. Further, even

taking as true Plaintiffs' allegation that Candover owns the

American companies in which it invests, "[t]he existence of a

relationship between a parent company and its subsidiaries is not

sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the parent on

the basis of the subsidiaries' minimum contacts with the forum." 

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Candover does not have sufficient contacts with California to

establish general jurisdiction over it.5 

B. Specific Jurisdiction

In support of their argument that the Court should exercise

specific jurisdiction over Candover, the Hilsenraths state only

that it "acted as the de facto management" of Equity Trust. The

Hilsenraths submit a variety of unauthenticated documents to

support this allegation. However, even taking those documents as

true, and assuming for purpose of argument that the Court has

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personal jurisdiction over Equity Trust, there is insufficient

evidence to establish that Candover operated as the alter ego of

Equity Trust. "[A] parent corporation may be directly involved in

the activities of its subsidiaries without incurring liability so

long as that involvement is 'consistent with the parent's investor

status.'" Id. at 926 (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S.

51, 71 (1998)). Although the documents cited by the Hilsenraths

state that Candover and the management of the companies it buys

"act as partners to build long-term value for these businesses,"

Hilsenrath Decl., Ex. 21, this does not establish that Candover

maintained "control of the subsidiar[ies'] internal affairs or

daily operations" as required for alter ego status. Doe, 248 F.3d

at 926.

The Court grants Candover's motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

II. Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited

Jardine moves to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of

personal jurisdiction and for failure effectively to serve it. 

A. General Jurisdiction

According to company secretary Charles Wilken, Jardine is a

Bermuda company that has never conducted business or had property,

bank accounts, assets, offices, officers, directors, agents or

employees in California. Wilken Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4. As with Candover,

Plaintiffs allege that the Court has general jurisdiction over

Jardine because it is the "owner" of various companies that do

business in the United States. However, Wilken declares that

Jardine has no involvement in the day-to-day operations of the

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companies Plaintiffs cite. Wilken Reply Decl, ¶¶ 3-6. Jardine

does not have sufficient contacts with California to support

general jurisdiction over it.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs argue that "Janvrin, Crossgar and Ryburn were owned

and operated by Jardine Matheson" during 2000. Opposition at 16. 

However, the unauthenticated document they cite in support of this

argument shows only that a company called C N Limited held one

share in Ryburn in trust for the Matheson Trust Company (Jersey)

Limited. Hilsenrath Decl., Ex. 7. This share was worth $1.00. 

Id. Even assuming that Matheson Trust Company is the same as

Jardine Matheson, that Matheson Trust company had one share held in

trust for it is insufficient to establish that it owned and

operated Ryburn. Further, Wilken declares that "Jardine has never

owned or operated Janvrin, Ryburn, or Crossgar." Wilken Reply

Decl. ¶ 2. 

Plaintiffs also argue, "Under Jardine Matheson they negotiated

the original securities of Janvrin et al. [sic]." Opposition at

16. Neither of the unauthenticated documents cited in support of

this argument mentions Janvrin, Ryburn or Crossgar.

The Court grants Jardine's motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction. Because the Court finds that it does not

have jurisdiction over Janvrin, it need not reach the argument that

Plaintiffs failed properly to serve Jardine. 

III. Insinger de Beaufort Holdings S.A.

IBH moves to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of

personal jurisdiction and for failure effectively to serve it. 

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A. General Jurisdiction

According to Chief Financial Officer Robert Mooij, IBH is a

holding company with its principal place of business in Luxembourg. 

Mooij Decl. ¶ 2. IBH is not licensed or registered to do business

in California and has no offices, property, bank accounts,

employees or officers in California. Id. at ¶ 3-5. IBH does not

advertise in California and does not have any contracts with

California companies. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiffs argue that the Court

has general jurisdiction over IBH because it is "an intensive

player in the US federal legal system." Opposition at 26. 

However, each of the unauthenticated documents cited in support of

this argument concern various IBH subsidiaries' contacts with the

State of New York and the United States in general. Mooij declares

that IBH "does not manage the affairs of its subsidiaries or

investments," Mooij Decl. ¶ 1, and Plaintiffs do not provide any

evidence that it does. 

B. Specific Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs argue that "in the 2001/2 time frame [Janvrin,

Crossgar and Ryburn] were operated and owned by Insinger de

Beaufort." Opposition at 16. In support of this argument, the

Hilsenraths submit documents indicating that the director of

Insinger de Beaufort in Jersey approved the settlement at issue in

the 2002 suit and participated in the meeting in London at which

Equity Trust allegedly improperly disclosed Plaintiffs'

confidential personal information. Hilsenrath Decl., Exs. 41, 44. 

Even assuming that these documents are sufficient to establish

jurisdiction over Insinger de Beaufort in Jersey, Plaintiffs have

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not established that IBH is involved in the day-to-day operations

of Insinger de Beaufort in Jersey. Therefore, there is no basis on

which to exercise specific jurisdiction over IBH.

Because the Court grants IBH's motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction, it need not address the alternate ground for

dismissal based on failure properly to serve IBH.

IV. Equity Trust, Kalman, Perkins, Bougeard, Brown and Austin

The remaining Defendants are Equity Trust and former and

current Equity Trust employees and officers (collectively, the

Equity Trust Defendants). Equity Trust is a Jersey company and the

individuals are Jersey residents. The Equity Trust Defendants each

move to dismiss the complaint based on improper venue, lack of

personal jurisdiction, defective service and the doctrine of forum

non conveniens. In addition, the individuals argue that Plaintiffs

have failed to state a claim against each of them. 

Although personal jurisdiction is generally a threshold issue

to be determined before any other consideration of a case and all

of the Equity Trust Defendants have argued that the Court lacks

personal jurisdiction over them, the Court dismisses the claims

against them on the basis of forum non conveniens without first

determining questions of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court

recently held that "where subject-matter or personal jurisdiction

is difficult to determine, and forum non conveniens considerations

weigh heavily in favor of dismissal, the court properly takes the

less burdensome course." Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l

Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1194 (2007). 

The Court finds that it would not be able to determine whether

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6

As mentioned above, pro se Plaintiffs have filed extensive

documents in support of their opposition to the motions to dismiss. 

And, as Defendants note in their joint evidentiary objections, the

majority of those documents are not properly authenticated. In

order to determine personal jurisdiction with respect to the Equity

Trust Defendants, the Court likely would have to allow Plaintiffs

an opportunity to re-submit and authenticate the evidence filed in

support of their opposition to the motions to dismiss. Further,

the Court would have to expend considerable effort determining the

corporate structure of Equity Trust, a Jersey corporation. As

discussed below, the Court finds that the agreements between Equity

Trust and the Hilsenraths, and therefore the Hilsenraths'

allegations which stem from those agreements, are governed by

Jersey law. Therefore, the Court would have to determine Equity

Trust's corporate structure based on Jersey law in order to decide

whether it has personal jurisdiction over Equity Trust. This

weighs toward dismissing this case on the basis of forum non

conveniens without reaching the question of personal jurisdiction. 

13

it has personal jurisdiction over the Equity Trust Defendants

without granting the parties additional opportunities to supplement

the record.6 Further, the Court finds that the factors it must

consider in making a forum non conveniens determination weigh

heavily toward dismissal.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the district court

has discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case where

litigation in an alternative forum would be more convenient for the

parties. Dismissal based on forum non conveniens is "an

exceptional tool to be employed sparingly." Ravelo Monegro v.

Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court

instructs that dismissal is ordinarily appropriate only where "the

plaintiff's chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or

the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific

reasons of convenience supporting his choice." Piper Aircraft Co.

v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981). 

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 In deciding whether to dismiss an action due to forum non

conveniens, the district court must "consider the availability of

an adequate alternative forum, and then . . . whether several

'private' and 'public' interest factors favor dismissal." Leetsch

v. Freedman, 260 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2001). There is a

strong presumption in favor of a domestic plaintiff's choice of

forum, which can be overcome only when the private and public

interest factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative

forum. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 265-66; Ravelo Monegro, 211

F.3d 509 at 514. 

The Equity Trust Defendants argue that Jersey is the proper

forum for this case and that the Jersey courts provide a sufficient

"avenue for redress." Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech System PTE,

Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995). Although the Ninth Circuit

has never addressed the ability of the Jersey courts to provide

plaintiffs with an adequate remedy, other federal courts have. 

See, e.g., Kovzac Ltd. v. Westway Trading Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 10767 (E.D. La.); Mayo Assoc. v. Union Bank of Switzerland,

1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7791 (S.D.N.Y.). 

Further, the Equity Trust Defendants argue that both private

and public interest factors weigh in favor of dismissing this case. 

The Ninth Circuit holds that the private interest factors to be

considered include: 

(1) the residence of the parties and the witnesses; 

(2) the forum's convenience to the litigants; (3) access

to physical evidence and other sources of proof; 

(4) whether unwilling witnesses can be compelled to

testify; (5) the cost of bringing witnesses to trial;

(6) the enforceability of the judgment; and (7) all

other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,

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expeditious and inexpensive. 

Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotations omitted). All of the Equity Trust Defendants

are Jersey residents. Further, the conspiracy that Plaintiffs

allege only includes one California participant, the non-party law

firm Nixon Peabody. Therefore the private interest factors related

to the accessibility of witnesses and physical evidence weigh in

favor of resolving this case in Jersey. As Equity Trust argues, it

appears that the vast majority of the witnesses involved in the

case would be outside this Court's subpoena power. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 45. Plaintiffs counter, "The events, the witnesses, the

documentation and the agents of the US government who will be

called to testify are all in California." Opposition at 41. 

However, Plaintiffs do not indicate who these witnesses are or what

this evidence is. 

The public interest factors to be considered are: 

(1) local interest of lawsuit; (2) the court's

familiarity with governing law; (3) burden on local

courts and juries; (4) congestion in the court; and 

(5) the costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to this

forum.

Id. at 1147. Again, these factors weigh heavily in favor of

resolution of this case in the Jersey courts. At the core of the

case are allegations of a breach of fiduciary duties arising out of 

the CMAs, which specifically provide that they 

shall be governed by[,] construed and interpreted in

accordance with the laws of the Island of Jersey, and all

parties shall submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of

the said Island.

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7Equity Trust also argues that this clause requires a finding

that venue is only proper in Jersey. However, Ninth Circuit case

law clearly holds that such language is permissive rather than

mandatory. See, e.g., Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 76-78 (9th Cir. 1987) (interpreting a similar clause

indicating that a certain court "shall have jurisdiction" over the

parties in any dispute arising out of the contract as permissive);

see also Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des

Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1995). Although

this provision might prevent Plaintiffs from contesting personal

jurisdiction if Equity Trust brought a suit against them in the

Jersey court and it requires any interpretation of the agreements

to be made under Jersey law, it does not require any case arising

out of the contract to be tried in the courts of the Island of

Jersey. 

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Austin Decl., Ex. F at 4; Id., Ex. G at 5.7 Not only are the

Jersey courts better equipped to resolve the questions of Jersey

law governing claims arising out of the Equity Trust agreements,

but they have a stronger interest than this Court in the resolution

of a dispute arising out of a Jersey corporation's agreement with

an individual who held himself out to be an Israeli citizen at the

time the agreement was made.

Plaintiffs argue that these forum selection clauses should not

control because they were contained in adhesion contracts. 

However, the California courts have held, "A forum selection clause

within an adhesion contract will be enforced as long as the clause

provided adequate notice to the party that he was agreeing to the

jurisdiction cited in the contract." Intershop Communic. AG v.

Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 104 Cal. App. 4th 191, 201 (2002)

(internal quotations and alterations omitted). Plaintiffs have not

provided any evidence that they did not have adequate notice of the

import of the forum selection clause. 

The Court acknowledges that this case is based in part on

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facts related to earlier cases decided by this Court. However, the

Court finds that the required application of Jersey law, the Jersey

court's interest in the resolution of this case and the likely

increase in cost associated with litigating in California outweigh

this Court's interest in maintaining jurisdiction over any

overlapping disputes. Further, neither Equity Trust nor any

Individual Defendant was a party to any of those lawsuits.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants'

motions to dismiss (Docket Nos. 4, 21, 40, 41, 45, 70, 83). The

dismissal is without leave to amend and without prejudice to

refiling in the appropriate jurisdiction or jurisdictions.

The Court DENIES as moot Defendants' objections to the

exhibits filed in support of Plaintiffs' oppositions to the motions

(Docket No. 84). The Court did not rely on any improper or

inadmissible evidence in deciding these motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3/18/08

Dated: ________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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