Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00078/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00078-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Diana M. Mendoza, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J. Astrue, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-12-00078-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Diana M. Mendoza (“Plaintiff”)’s motion for 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d). (Doc. 38). The Court now rules on the motion. 

I. Background 

On June 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits 

under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 12-3 at 18). Plaintiff’s claim was denied 

initially on September 13, 2007, and again upon reconsideration on June 19, 2008. (Id.) 

After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s benefits claim 

on April 13, 2010, finding that although she suffered from severe fibromyalgia, she could 

perform past relevant work. (Id. at 15–30). On June 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed an appeal 

with the Appeals Council, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security 

Administration, which ultimately denied review of the ALJ’s decision on November 17, 

2011. (Id. at 13). On January 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Court seeking 

judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 1). 

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 On April 30, 2013, the Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff 

disability benefits. (Doc. 27). The Court specifically held that the ALJ’s decision was 

adequately supported by the evidence on the record and was not in legal error. (Id. at 6–

21). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision on 

appeal and remanded for an award of benefits. (Doc. 34-1). Plaintiff now seeks 

$19,127.50 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to the EAJA. (Doc. 43 at 12). 

II. Legal Standard 

 The Ninth Circuit has succinctly stated the legal standard for an award of 

attorneys’ fees under the EAJA as follows: 

 EAJA provides that a court shall award to a prevailing party other 

than the United States fees and other expenses incurred by that party in any 

civil action unless the court finds that the position of the United States was 

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 

It is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially 

justified. Substantial justification means justified in substance or in the 

main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. 

Put differently, the government’s position must have a reasonable basis 

both in law and fact. The position of the United States includes both the 

government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action giving 

rise to the civil action. Thus, if the government’s underlying position was 

not substantially justified, we must award fees and need not address 

whether the government’s litigation position was justified. 

Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations, quotation marks, and 

alterations omitted). 

III. Analysis 

 A. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to an Award of Fees under the EAJA 

 Because the Ninth Circuit reversed the ALJ’s denial and remanded for an award of 

benefits, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party within the meaning of the 

EAJA. See Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that an 

applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA 

if the denial of benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits 

ultimately are awarded). Nonetheless, “the fact that one other court agreed or disagreed 

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with the Government does not establish whether its position was substantially justified.” 

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 596 (1988). 

 Although Plaintiff agrees that the reversal does not resolve the issue of attorneys’ 

fees, she argues that the ALJ committed three errors that justify an award of fees. 

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that awarding fees is appropriate because: (1) the ALJ’s 

decision to assign “little weight” to treating physician Dr. Nolan’s opinions was not 

supported by “reasonable, substantial and probative evidence”; (2) Plaintiff’s credibility 

was rejected without “specific, clear and convincing reasons”; and (3) the testimony of 

Plaintiff’s father-in-law was rejected without “specific, clear and convincing reasons.” 

(Doc. 43 at 2). In response, the Government posits that this Court’s prior agreement with 

its position on these issues indicates that a reasonable person could find that its litigation 

position was substantially justified. (Doc. 40 at 3). 

 The Ninth Circuit has made “clear that when an agency’s decision is unsupported 

by substantial evidence it is a strong indication that the position of the United States is 

not substantially justified.” Campbell v. Astrue, 736 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 2013). Only 

“decidedly unusual” cases overcome this “strong presumption.” See Thangaraja v. 

Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Indeed, it will be only a decidedly unusual 

case in which there is substantial justification under the EAJA even though the agency’s 

decision was reversed as lacking in reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the 

record.” (citation omitted)). In this case, the Ninth Circuit determined that “neither of the 

reasons the ALJ gave for assigning little weight to Dr. Nolan’s opinion were supported 

by substantial evidence.” (Doc. 34-1 at 19). Thus, as the Ninth Circuit found the ALJ’s 

decision to be lacking in “substantial evidence,” there is a “strong indication” that the 

Government’s position was not “substantially justified” unless the case is “decidedly 

unusual.” Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 874. Rather than explain how this case meets this 

criteria, the Government focuses its argument entirely on the reasonableness of its 

actions. (Doc. 40 at 4–9). Although the Court agrees with the Government that record 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to afford “little weight” to Dr. Nolan’s opinion, the 

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circumstances of this case do not warrant a finding that the case is “decidedly unusual.” 

See Campbell, 736 F.3d at 869 (explaining that extrapolating medical records to make a 

decision about a past condition constitutes a “decidedly unusual case”). Consequently, 

because the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by “substantial 

evidence,” the Court must award Plaintiff her attorneys’ fees under the EAJA. See Martin 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 598 F. App’x 485, 487 (9th Cir. 2015) (“This case is not 

one of those ‘decidedly unusual’ cases in which there is substantial justification under 

EAJA even though the agency’s decision was reversed for a lack of substantial 

evidence.” (citing Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2013)).1

 

 B. Whether the Requested Fees are Reasonable 

Plaintiff requests $19,127.50 in attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 43 at 11). Specifically, 

Plaintiff seeks to recover $505.65 for 2.80 hours of work performed in 2011; $5,197.82 

for 28.20 hours of work performed in 2012; $2,693.08 for 14.40 hours of work performed 

in 2013; $8,942.32 for 47.05 hours of work performed in 2014; and $608.89 for 3.2 hours 

of work performed in 2015. (Doc. 38 at 1).2

 Plaintiff also requests recovery of $1,179.74 

for 6.20 hours of work to review the Government’s opposition to her application for 

attorneys’ fees, perform legal research, and draft and edit her reply. (Doc. 43 at 11).3

 

 The Government does not object to the upward cost of living requested by 

Plaintiff or to the number of hours that Plaintiff’s counsel spent on this case. After review 

of the relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–30 & n.3 

 

1

 The Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ committed three errors, see (Doc. 34-1 at 2–

4), but this error is itself sufficient to render the Government’s position not substantially 

justified. 

2

 The statutory maximum hourly rate, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, 

for 2011 is $180.59, for 2012 is $184.32, for 2013 is $187.02, for 2014 is $190.06, and 

for 2015 is $190.28. See United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Equal Access to 

Justice Act–Rates, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 

(last visited June 21, 2016). 

3

 This amount was calculated at $190.28 per hour, the applicable statutory 

maximum hourly rate for 2015. 

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(1983),4 the Court finds that the requested number of hours is reasonable and that 

Plaintiff is entitled to the cost-of-living adjustment to the statutory hourly rate pursuant to 

the EAJA and Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876–77. The Court will also award Plaintiff her 

attorneys’ fees for time spent litigating her EAJA fee application. See Comm’r, 

Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161–62 (1990) (holding that a 

prevailing party in an EAJA action may recover attorneys’ fees incurred during fee 

litigation). 

IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (Doc. 38) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded $19,127.50 in attorneys’ 

fees. This award shall be made payable directly to Plaintiff and is subject to offset to 

satisfy any pre-existing debt that Plaintiff owes the United States pursuant to Astrue v. 

Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). 

 Dated this 5th day of July, 2016. 

 

4

 In Whitehead v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1464469, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 14, 

2016), the court noted that Hensley had been superseded, in part, by the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act. As this case does not involve prisoner litigation, this statutory change is 

irrelevant. 

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