Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02898/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02898-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shaunnell Beyart, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. Civ. 04-2898-PHX-NVW (MS)

ORDER

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

While confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona,

Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State

Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents Answer was filed on

September 15, 2005. [Doc. 10]. Petitioner's Reply was filed on October 27, 2005.

The Court now Reports and Recommends as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner drove his friend, Harold Jackson, to meet a drug dealer from whom

Jackson planned to steal a quantity of the illegal drug commonly known as Ecstasy.

[Doc. 10, Exh. F at 2; Exh. A at 119, 139-141, 157-172]. During the course of the

transaction, Jackson shot and killed the dealer. [Doc. 10, Exh. F at 2; Exh. A at 117,

166-172]. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of: (1) first-degree felony murder, and

(2) transportation for sale or transfer of dangerous drugs. [Doc. 10, Exh. B]. He was

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sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 25 years on the

murder conviction and five years' imprisonment on the drug conviction, to be served

concurrently. [Doc. 10, Exh. C]. 

Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising the following issues:

(1) whether his felony-murder conviction should be overturned because the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to prove that the quantity of drugs at issue equaled

or exceeded the required statutory threshold amount, and (2) whether his sentence

for the drug conviction was illegal because the required statutory threshold amount

of drugs was not proven at trial. [Doc. 10, Exh. D at 8]. The Arizona Court of

Appeals affirmed. [Doc. 10, Exh. F]. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with

the Arizona Supreme Court, raising the same issues he had raised in the Court of

Appeals. [Doc. 10, Exh. G]. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. [Doc. 10,

Exh. H].

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on December

14, 2004. [Doc. 1]. In his federal Petition, Petitioner claims that his rights under the

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and his

rights under the Arizona Constitution were violated because: (1) the state failed to

prove that the amount of drugs at issue met the threshold requirements established

by Arizona statute, and (2) "the insufficiency of the evidence of threshold affected

the sentence on count two, thus rendering the sentence illegal." [Doc. 1 at 5-6].

Respondents oppose the Petition, arguing that Petitioner's claims were not fairly

presented to the Arizona Supreme Court or Arizona Court of Appeals and are now

procedurally defaulted. [Doc. 10].

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

No writ may be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the

remedies available in state courts. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). Under the exhaustion

doctrine, a petitioner must present his claims to the state courts on direct appeal or

through collateral proceedings before a federal court will consider a habeas corpus

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petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Lindquist v. Gardner, 770 F.2d 876,

877 (9th Cir. 1985). Specifically, exhaustion requires that a petitioner either fairly

present his or her claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that “except in habeas petitions in capital

cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal

habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”), or show that no

state remedies remain available. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.

1983) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982). To satisfy the fair

presentation requirement, a petitioner must fairly present the “substance of federal

claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and

to correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). See also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004);

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278

(1971); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2004).

A habeas court will not review a question of federal law if that question has been

decided by a state court and the court’s decision "rests on a state law ground that

is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000). The state law ground may be substantive or procedural.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30 (recognizing that the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine bars federal habeas corpus review where a state court “declined to

address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state

procedural requirement”). To be independent, "the state law basis for the decision

must not be interwoven with federal law." LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704

(9th Cir. 2001). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002)(stating that "[I]f

the state court's decision rested primarily on a ruling on the merits . . ., its decision

would not be independent of federal law."). "To be deemed adequate, the state law

ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied." Bennett v.

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1 In most cases, victims of a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" will

meet the standard for cause and prejudice. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-

96.

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Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573,

577 (9th Cir. 1999)("A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal

court review if it was 'firmly established and regularly followed' at the time it was

applied by the state court")(quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). 

When a petitioner procedurally defaults his federal claims in state court, either

because he failed to comply with a state procedural rule or because he would be

unable to return to state court to present his claims, federal habeas review of the

claims is barred unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and actual

prejudice or shows that failing to review the claims “will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. "'Cause' is a legitimate excuse

for the default; 'prejudice' is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional

violation." Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). If the petitioner

fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the court need not consider

whether the petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional

violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). To show a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must make the extraordinary showing that the

alleged constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of an innocent

person.1

 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

496, (1986). The circumstances constituting a fundamental miscarriage of justice

apply in only a "narrow class of cases." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. To establish

actual innocence, the Petitioner must show that considering all the evidence, "it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Id. at 327-

28.

III. Discussion

A. Alleged Failure to Fairly Present Claims to the Arizona Supreme Court

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2 Swoopes states, “in cases not carrying a life sentence or the death

penalty, review need not be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court

in order to exhaust state remedies. 196 F.3d at 1010 (emphasis

added). However, Arizona law no longer requires that a life sentence

case be appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court. Arizona Revised

Statute (“A.R.S.”)§12-120.21(A)(1); A.R.S. §13-4031. The only cases

that must be appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court are "criminal

actions involving crimes for which a sentence of death has actually

been imposed." Id. The language in Swoopes which states that life

sentence cases must be appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court

derives from the language of the statutes before they were amended

in 1989. See A.R.S. §12-120.21(A)(1)(1988), amended by Laws 1989,

Ch. 58 § 1; A.R.S. §13-4031 (1988), amended by Laws 1989, Ch. 58,

§ 2. Before the amendments, the statutes excluded both death penalty

and life imprisonment cases from Arizona Court of Appeals jurisdiction,

making the Arizona Supreme Court the only court to which these cases

could be appealed. Id. Swoopes apparently relies on these older

statutes because the conviction and appeal at issue in that case were

decided before the 1989 amendment of the statutes. The review now

available is discretionary in nature. Such review is "unavailable" under

Swoopes. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Because

Petitioner was convicted after the statutes were amended in 1989, he

is only required to present his claims before the Arizona Court of

Appeals, despite the fact that he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

 

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Respondents first argue that Petitioner's claims were not properly exhausted

because Petitioner failed to fairly present his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court.

The Court disagrees.

In Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit

established that non-capital Arizona state prisoners may exhaust their claims by

fairly presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals; exhaustion in the Arizona

Supreme Court is not required.2

 Respondents acknowledge the holding of Swoopes,

but contend that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Baldwin, 541 U.S.

27, rather than Swoopes, controls. [Doc. 10 at 9]. In so arguing, Respondents cite

Baldwin for the proposition that a state habeas petitioner is required to present his

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claims “in each appropriate state court, including a state supreme court with powers

of discretionary review.” [Id.].

Respondents' argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, the issue in

Baldwin was not whether exhaustion in a state supreme court is always required.

The issue presented was instead whether a state supreme court with powers of

discretionary review is required to read lower court opinions or other materials in

order to discover federal claims. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32 ("We consequently hold

that ordinarily a state prisoner does not "fairly present" a claim to a state court if that

court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does not

alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower

court opinion in the case, that does so"). The Court's parenthetical reference to

"state supreme court[s] with powers of discretionary review" is therefore not

dispositive.

Moreover, O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999), one of the two cases

cited by the United States Supreme Court in connection with the Baldwin statement

quoted by Respondents, was extensively examined by the Ninth Circuit in Swoopes.

O'Sullivan held that "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's

established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. The Court

determined that, under Illinois law, the availability of discretionary review in the

Illinois Supreme Court required exhaustion to that court. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at

848. However, O'Sullivan's holding was expressly limited. The Court wrote: "there

is nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requiring federal courts to ignore a state law or

rule providing that a given procedure is not available." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847-

848. In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit determined that discretionary view in the Arizona

Supreme Court was "unavailable" under O'Sullivan. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010.

As such, the Court held that exhaustion in Arizona ends at the Court of Appeals. Id.

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3 While Swoopes could be construed as requiring review by the Arizona

Supreme Court of all state life imprisonment and death penalty cases

as was the fact when it was decided in 1987, this Court looks to the

holding as one relating primarily to "non-availability" of discretionary

review. In that sense, cases involving a sentence of life imprisonment

are generally subject to review by the Arizona Court of Appeals rather

than by the Arizona Supreme Court, see fn. 2, supra at page 5, and are

included in the same rule as other non-death penalty cases for

purposes of exhaustion of state remedies. The Swoopes rule of

exhaustion is not so much based on the penalty imposed (except in

cases of a sentence of death) as it is the question of whether the state

requires the state's highest court to consider an appellant's (or

petitioner's) claim(s) and enforces that requirement.

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Just as discretionary review is unavailable in the Arizona Supreme Court under

O'Sullivan, it is unavailable under Baldwin. 

Finally, subsequent to Baldwin, the Ninth Circuit reinforced Swoopes. In Castillo

v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court reiterated that the

claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once

the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998 n. 3

(quoting Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010). Swoopes remains the law of this Circuit.3

 For

the foregoing reasons, the Court rejects Respondents' argument.

B. Alleged Failure to Present Claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals

Respondents further contend that Petitioner failed to fairly present his claims as

federal issues in the Arizona Court of Appeals. The Court agrees.

To fairly present a claim, a federal habeas petitioner must provide the state courts

with a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon

the federal constitutional claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-

66 (1995). The state prisoner must describe in the state proceedings both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Kelly v.

Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6 ("It

is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before

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the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made"); Picard, 404

U.S. at 276 ("we have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the

same claim he urges upon the federal courts"); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

670 (9th Cir. 2000), amended at 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that a petitioner

must characterize the claims raised in state proceedings "specifically as federal

claims"). Generally, the petitioner must reference specific provisions of the federal

constitution, federal statute, or federal case law. Lyons, 232 F.3d at 670, amended

at 247 F.3d 904. General appeals to broad constitutional principles such as due

process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial are insufficient to establish

exhaustion. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996); see also Hiivala v.

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). 

As noted above, Petitioner argued in state court that: (1) the evidence presented

at trial was insufficient to prove that the quantity of drugs at issue equaled or

exceeded the statutory threshold amount, such that Petitioner's felony murder

conviction could not be sustained, and (2) because the statutory threshold amount

of drugs was not proven at trial, Petitioner's sentence for the drug crime was illegal.

[Doc. 10, Exh. D at 8, Exh. E. at 2, Exh. G. at 2]. In support of his first state court

argument, Petitioner relied primarily on Arizona statute and state case law from other

jurisdictions. [Doc. 10, Exh. D at 9-14, Exh. E at 3-9, Exh. G at 6-10]. Although the

caption of Petitioner's first argument in his opening and reply briefs to the Court of

Appeals referenced the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution, [Doc. 10, Exh. D at 9, Exh. E at 3], Petitioner did not elaborate

upon how his rights were violated. Additionally, the only federal case cited by

Petitioner in his opening brief to the Court of Appeals was not offered to show that

a deprivation of Petitioner's federal constitutional rights, but to show that Ecstasy can

be classified as an amphetamine. [Doc. 10, Exh. D at 13]. Likewise, although

Petitioner cited some federal authority in his Reply brief in the Court of Appeals and

in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court, none of this federal

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4 In connection with his second claim, Petitioner did argue that any retrial

would be barred by principles of double jeopardy. [Doc. 10, Exh. D at

18-21, Exh. E at 14-18]. Petitioner cited federal authority in support of

this argument. [Id.]. However, Petitioner's double jeopardy argument

does not save federal habeas Petition because the question whether

retrial is an appropriate remedy arises only if Petitioner's sentence is

found illegal. As explained in the body of this Report and

Recommendation, the illegal sentence issue was not fairly presented

and is procedurally defaulted. Thus, whether double jeopardy would be

violated were retrial ordered as a remedy is a secondary issue that

need not be reached by this Court. 

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authority supported a Fifth, Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment claim. [Doc. 10, Exh.

E at 4-5, 9, Exh. G at 9-10]. Moreover, the relevant portion of Petitioner's second

state court issue was supported only by state law.4

 [Doc. 10, Exh. D. at 15-18, Exh.

E at 10-14, Exh. G at 10-12].

Although citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue may

sometimes serve the same purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing the

issue, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), "for a

federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision dealing with both

state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the citation must be accompanied by

some clear indication that the case involves federal issues." Casey, 386 F.3d at 912

n. 13. Here, nothing in the case law or Petitioner's brief put the Arizona Court of

Appeals on notice that Petitioner was attempting to raise a federal claim.

The Court further finds Petitioner's solitary reference to the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments in the caption of his first state court argument insufficient

to establish fair presentation. The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated that exhaustion

requires petitioners to delineate a relationship between a particular federal citation

and the claim being alleged. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1002-03 ("Exhaustion demands

more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an underlying federal

theory"). In Castillo, the Ninth Circuit held that a Petitioner's citation to the Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in the parting

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5 An exception to this rule may exist under Rule 32.2(b) for a defendant

who raises claims under Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h). None of the

claims at issue here were raised under those subsections of Rule 32.1.

6 Petitioner's claims would also likely be precluded pursuant to Rule

32.2(a)(3), as were the other claims he failed to raise in his initial postconviction relief petition. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (stating that "[A]

defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any

ground.... (3) that has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding"). However, in Cassett v. Stewart, 406

F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit recently held that preclusion

may not always be clear under Rule 32.2(a)(3) in cases of technical

exhaustion and procedural default. In light of Cassett, this Court places

only secondary reliance on rule 32.2(a)(3).

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sentence of his brief to the Court of Appeals was insufficient to support a finding of

fair presentation. Id. at 1002. The Court explained that Castillo's "conclusory,

scattershot citation of federal constitutional provisions, divorced from any articulated

federal legal theory . . . left the Arizona Court of Appeals to puzzle over how the

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments might relate" to Castillo's claims.

Here, as in Castillo, Petitioner left the state court "to puzzle" over the relationship

between his state court arguments and the federal Constitution. He neither identified

any specific ways his federal rights were violated nor related the federal Constitution

to the operative facts of his case. Instead, the body of his brief focused on state

statutory definitions and state law principles. Just as broad references to

constitutional principles and "scattershot" citations are insufficient to meet the

requirements of fair presentation, Petitioner's detached citation to the federal

Constitution fails to fairly present his claims. 

In Arizona, post-conviction proceedings must be initiated under Rule 32 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure within ninety days of the entry of judgment and

sentence or within thirty days of the order and mandate on the judgment and

sentence on direct appeal.5

 See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a).6 Thus, were Petitioner to

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attempt to return to state court, his claims would be time- barred. Id. Because

Petitioner would be precluded under Arizona law from returning to state court to

properly exhaust his claims, the claims are deemed "technically exhausted" but

procedurally defaulted. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); see

also Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621, n. 5 (discussing the concepts of technical exhaustion

and procedural default). 

Federal habeas review of the merits of Petitioner's procedurally defaulted claims

by this Court is barred unless Petitioner can show cause for the procedural default

and actual prejudice, or that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Petitioner has not done so. In his

Reply brief, Petitioner argues only that he properly exhausted his claims in the

Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court. [Doc. 15 at 1-3]. For the

reasons stated above, the Court disagrees. Moreover, the Court's review of the

Petition and record reveals no basis for finding either cause and prejudice or a

miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, it is recommended that Petitioner's Petition be

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [Doc. 1] be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s

judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to

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the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2006.

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