Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04191/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACQUELINE SEBASTIANA NIEVES,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-04191-KAW 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Jacqueline Sebastiana Nieves seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g), of the Commissioner’s final decision, and the remand of this case for further proceedings. 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment. Having considered the papers filed by the parties, and for the 

reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and grants 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2009, Plaintiff Jacqueline Sebastiana Nieves filed a Title XVI application 

for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) Benefits. Administrative Record (“AR”) 160-63. 

Plaintiff’s application alleges a disability onset date of approximately July 1, 2008. AR 160.

Plaintiff's claim was denied on July 2, 2009. AR 74. Plaintiff’s Request for Reconsideration was 

denied on May 28, 2010. AR 79. A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Caroline 

H. Beers on January 18, 2012. AR 20-71. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged disability 

onset date to March 31, 2009, the date of her SSI application. AR 46.

Plaintiff is forty-six years old. She is unmarried and lives with housemates. AR 62. 

Plaintiff has not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 31, 2009. AR 22, 51. At 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 1 of 14
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she obtained her four year college degree, but that it took her 

seven years. AR 48. During the past 15 years, Plaintiff has worked full-time doing clerical 

accounting work, including data entry and filing. AR 49-50. She left her last position because “the 

firm went bankrupt.” AR 50.

On June 11, 2009, Robert Bilbrey, Ph.D., performed a psychological evaluation of 

Plaintiff. AR 322-24. Plaintiff reported a history of mood swings, depression, and occasional 

manic symptoms, rare sleep problems, and periods of grandiosity or pressured speech. AR 322.

She reported occasional suicidal ideation, but denied homicidal ideation or any history of auditory 

or visual hallucinations. AR 322. Plaintiff reported that she was not taking any psychiatric 

medication at that time, but had previously taken Zoloft and Neurontin. AR 322. Plaintiff alleged 

that she had symptoms of fatigue. AR 322. On examination, Plaintiff’s grooming was adequate, 

and she was polite and cooperative, with good eye contact. AR 323. She was oriented, and 

expressed a normal affect. Id. She repeated 4 out of 4 words and recalled all of them after a five 

minute delay. Id. She could spell the word “world” backwards. Id. Her thought process was 

reality based and her stream of mental activity and speech were linear and goal focused. AR 323. 

Dr. Bilbrey diagnosed her with Depression, not otherwise specified (NOS), and fatigue. AR 324. 

He assigned Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 80, and opined that 

her symptoms would be expected to improve within one year if she obtained continuous mental 

health treatment, including psychotherapy and a medication evaluation. Id. Dr. Bilbrey opined 

that Plaintiff could understand, remember and perform simple and repetitive tasks, as well as 

detailed and complex tasks, accept instructions from supervisors, but would have some difficulty 

interacting with coworkers and the public. Id. He further noted that Plaintiff would have some 

difficulty maintaining regular attendance in the workplace and some difficulty completing a 

normal workday/workweek without interruptions from her psychiatric condition. Id.

On June 13, 2009, Frank Chen, M.D., performed a comprehensive internal medicine 

evaluation. AR 327-30. Plaintiff reported symptoms of tiredness since July 2008, body pain, on 

and off nausea for the past two years, headaches, and allergies. AR 327. Dr. Chen’s examination 

showed no physical abnormalities, but diagnosed “[n]onspecific symptoms of tiredness, body 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 2 of 14
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

aches, and nausea.” AR 329. Dr. Chen opined that Plaintiff can sit in an eight-hour workday 

without limitation and could lift and carry 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally. Id.

On January 15, 2010, Michael Bass, M.D., performed a comprehensive neurologic 

evaluation. AR 365-69. Dr. Bass reviewed limited medical records in connection with the 

evaluation. AR 365. Plaintiff reported frequent nausea and mild headaches, as well as a migraine 

in the frontal region and the right eye. Id. During her examination, Plaintiff reported that she was 

“low energy,” and has never been enthusiastic about things. Id. She admits to depression and that 

she sleeps much of the time. Id. Plaintiff successfully remembered 3 of 3 objects after distraction 

and could perform simple math. AR 368. Her answers to Dr. Bass’s questions were “satisfactorily 

prompt.” Id. Dr. Bass diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic depression, possible chronic fatigue 

syndrome, and a possible sleep disorder. AR 368. Despite these diagnoses, Dr. Bass did not feel 

that the conditions imposed any limitations for 12 continuous months, including workplace, 

environmental conditions. Id.

On January 16, 2010, Said Shefayee, M.D., performed a consultative psychiatric 

examination. AR 372-75. Plaintiff maintained complaints of fatigue and depression. AR 372. 

Plaintiff reported having taken various medications over the years, including Prozac, Paxil, 

Sinequan, and Zoloft. AR 372. She stopped taking Zoloft because, while it improved her mood, 

she became manic. Id. Plaintiff admitted that her noncompliance with her medication contributed 

to her difficulties. AR 373. Dr. Shefayee found that Plaintiff’s general appearance was 

appropriate, her hygiene was fair, and she had fair eye contact and was able to communicate. Id. 

He also found her to be very sad and dysphoric. Id. Dr. Shefayee diagnosed Plaintiff with major 

depression NOS and assigned a GAF score of 50. AR 374-75. Dr. Shefayee stated that Plaintiff 

was able to manage her funds and perform simple, repetitive tasks, and could accept instructions 

from supervisors and get along with people in the workplace as long as she is compliant in terms 

of taking her medications. AR 375.

On May 27, 2010, State agency physician F. Mateus, M.D., reviewed the record and 

opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the ability to understand and remember detailed 

instructions, carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 3 of 14
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

periods, interact appropriately with the general public, accept instructions and respond 

appropriately to criticism from supervisors, and respond appropriately to changes in the work 

setting. AR 387-94. Dr. Mateus also found moderate limitations in the ability to complete a 

normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and 

to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. AR 

388. Dr. Mateus opined that Plaintiff was limited to simple tasks, and had moderate problems 

with persistence and pace, social functioning, and adaptation. AR 389. 

On March 10, 2010, a psychiatric assessment was completed at Sausal Creek Outpatient 

Stabilization Clinic by Dr. Gleul. AR 485-92. Dr. Gleul identified depressed mood, normal to 

pressured speech, and sad affect. AR 487. Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar and affective 

disorder (type II), and assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 38. AR 487. She was prescribed 

Cymbalta and Lamictal. Id. 

On March 18, 2010, Plaintiff was seen by Alameda County Mental Crisis Evaluation, 

where she received a diagnosis of mood disorder NOS, major depressive disorder, and personality 

disorder NOS, and was assigned a GAF score of 40. AR 535-37. She continued to obtain 

treatment through Alameda County Behavioral Health Care Services, and was seeing Dr. John 

Cotrufo, D.O., and Donald Hackett, LCSW, from March 25, 2010 to November 2010. AR 537-96. 

On March 25, 2010, Dr. Cotrufo assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 50. AR 585. The notes indicate 

that Plaintiff was stable, but reflect no significant worsening or improvement of symptoms. See 

AR 537-96.

On November 9, 2011, Farrell Barnett, M.D., completed an assessment of Plaintiff’s 

ability to do work-related activities. AR 494-96. Dr. Barnett opined that Plaintiff had a “poor” 

ability to relate to coworkers, deal with the public, interact with supervisors, deal with work 

stresses, and maintain attention/concentration. AR 495. She also had “poor” ability to understand, 

remember and carry out complex job instructions, maintain personal appearance, and relate 

predictably in social situations. AR 495-96. Dr. Barnett indicated that Plaintiff had a “fair” ability 

to follow work rules, use judgment, function independently, behave in an emotionally stable 

manner, demonstrate reliability, and understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions. 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 4 of 14
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

AR 495-96.

In a February 2, 2012 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 20-30. 

On February 14, 2012, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision. 

AR 15-16. The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the 

Appeals Council denied review on July 8, 2013. AR 1-6. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of 

the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment. (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 

No. 13.). On February 15, 2014, Defendant filed its opposition and cross-motion for summary 

judgment. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 14.) Plaintiff filed an untimely reply on March 6, 2014, 

which the Court will consider since she is proceeding pro se. (Pl.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 15.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may reverse the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits only when the 

Commissioner's findings are 1) based on legal error or 2) are not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 

(9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance”; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Id. at 1098; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). In 

determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the 

Court must consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the 

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion. Id. “Where evidence is susceptible 

to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Comm'r 

of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, disability claims are evaluated 

according to a five-step sequential evaluation. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 

1998). At step one, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. Id. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At 

step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment 

or combination of impairments,” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 5 of 14
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

721. If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If the answer is yes, the Commissioner 

proceeds to step three, and determines whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment 

under 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If this requirement is 

met, the claimant is disabled. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. 

If a claimant does not have a condition which meets or equals a listed impairment, the 

fourth step in the sequential evaluation process is to determine the claimant's residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) or what work, if any, the claimant is capable of performing on a sustained basis, 

despite the claimant’s impairment or impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can 

perform such work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). RFC is the application of a legal 

standard to the medical facts concerning the claimant's physical capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). 

If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an inability to perform prior work, the 

Commissioner must show, at step five, that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 

work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. The claimant bears the 

burden of proof in steps one through four. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-954 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five. Id. at 954.

III.THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the date of her application. AR 22. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s severe 

impairments were bipolar disorder and depression. AR 22. At step three, the ALJ concluded that 

the Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a 

listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 23-24. The ALJ based this 

finding on Plaintiff having only moderate restrictions in daily living, and moderate difficulties in 

concentration and social functioning. AR 23. These difficulties were not tantamount to the 

marked restrictions or repeated episodes of decompensation required to satisfy step three. Id.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform “a full range of work 

at all exertional levels,” including simple tasks, simple work-related decisions with few workplace 

changes, and maintain occasional interact with the public and coworkers. AR 24-28. The ALJ 

found that Plaintiff was doing well in school until she enrolled in a master’s degree problem. AR 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 6 of 14
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

27. Despite a longstanding history of depression dating back to 1986, Plaintiff was able to 

successfully complete an undergraduate program prior to her alleged onset date. Id. Further, while 

she complains of fatigue, there is no physical diagnosis for those symptoms. Id. Plaintiff watches 

television most of the day, reads a lot, goes to the store several times per week and uses the 

computer sometimes all day. Id. The ALJ found that the records show that Plaintiff “is stable with 

medication but that she has had issues with compliance.” AR 28. “In essence, when she takes her 

medications, she does well and can function to the point that she can perform college level work in 

molecular biology.” Id. 

At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work,

because the demands of her past relevant work exceed her residual functional capacity. AR 28.

Plaintiff was born in 1968, and was 40 years old on the date the application was filed, 

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49. AR 28. She has at least a high school 

education and is able to communicate in English. Id. Transferability of job skills was not material 

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is 

“not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. Id. Considering Plaintiff’s 

age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. AR 28-30. Therefore, 

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 30.

IV.DISCUSSION

Plaintiff makes three arguments in her motion for summary judgment: (1) that the ALJ 

rejected the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating sources without clear and convincing or specific and 

legitimate reasons; (2) that the ALJ mischaracterized Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her 

medication and its effect on her; and (3) that the ALJ did not consider all of the vocational expert’s 

testimony. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 1-5.)

The Court will address each argument in the order of the five-step evaluation. There is no 

dispute that Plaintiff is not currently engaged in a substantial gainful activity, and so the analysis 

proceeds to step two to determine whether she is disabled.

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 7 of 14
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

A. ALJ gave proper credit to treating sources’ opinion.

The opinions of treating medical sources may be rejected only for clear and convincing 

reasons if not contradicted by another doctor. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Where the record contains conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ must make a credibility 

determination and resolve the conflict. Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)). “If a treating or examining 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by 

providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence....” Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any 

physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 

supported by clinical findings.” Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

Psychologists and psychiatrists, in diagnosing mental illness, often make five different subdiagnoses, on what they call “Axes.” Williamson v. Astrue, No. EDCV 12–00364–CW, 2013 WL 

141544, at *4 n. 4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013). Axis V measures the Global Assessment of 

Functioning ("GAF"). Id. The GAF is a scale ranging from zero to 100, used to rate social, 

occupational and psychological functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health. Id. The

GAF score is a subjective determination that represents the clinician's judgment of the individual's 

overall level of functioning. Sigmon v. Kernan, No. CV 06–5807 AHM (JWJ), 2009 WL 1514700, 

at *9 n.3 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2009). A GAF score may help an ALJ assess mental residual 

functional capacity, but is not raw medical data. People with a GAF score of 41 to 50 have 

"serious symptoms" or any serious impairment in social, occupational or school functioning. 

Williamson v. Astrue, No. EDCV 12–00364–CW, 2013 WL 141544, at *4 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 

2013). By contrast, a GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates only "moderate difficulty in functioning." 

Atkinson v. Astrue, No. 2:10–cv–02072–KJN, 2011 WL 4085414, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 

2011). People in that category may have flat affects, circumstantial speech, occasional panic 

attacks, few friends, or conflicts with coworkers. Id. A GAF score of 61 to 70 indicates some mild 

symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning but generally 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 8 of 14
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

functioning well with some meaningful interpersonal relationships. Sigmon v. Kernan, No. CV 

06–5807 AHM (JWJ), 2009 WL 1514700, at *9 n.3 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2009).

1. Alameda County Behavioral Health Services

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have given greater weight to the medical records from 

Alameda County Behavioral Health Services, and not dismissed the low GAF scores as

inconsistent with the observations made by other medical examiners. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2-3.) Plaintiff 

contends that this was her primary treating source from March 2001 through November 2010, 

including the nine month period from March 2010 to November 2010. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2.) During 

that nine month period, she saw Dr. Cotrufo seven times and Mr. Hackett twelve times in person, 

and an additional seven times by telephone. Id. On March 25, 2010, Dr. Cotrufo assigned Plaintiff 

a GAF score of 50. AR 585. On November 4, 2010, however, Dr. Cotrufo opined that “Pt. not 

suited for regimented, mainstream economy because she cannot emotionally handle routines,” and 

assigned her a GAF score of 40. AR 595.

As an initial matter, whether a claimant is disabled is an administrative, rather than a 

medical, finding that is reserved for the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e); SSR 96-5p (“issues 

[that] are not medical issues regarding the nature and severity of an individual’s impairment(s) but 

are administrative findings” include “[w]hether an individual is ‘disabled’ under the Act”). The 

source of any opinion, medical or otherwise, is not entitled to “any special significance.” SSR 96-

5p (“treating source opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to 

controlling weight or special significance”). “[W]hen evaluating conflicting medical opinions, an 

ALJ need not accept the opinion of a doctor if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 

supported by clinical findings.” Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216 (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 

1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, the ALJ is not bound by Dr. Cotrufo’s assessment. The 

Court notes that Plaintiff concedes this point in her reply. (Pl.’s Reply at 3.)

When weighing the medical evidence as part of assessing the claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of her impairments, the ALJ gave both Sausal Creek’s (38) and Dr. 

Cotrufo’s November 4, 2010 (40) GAF scores less weight than other opinions, because the ALJ 

concluded that “the scores are not consistent with the observations made by the physical and 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 9 of 14
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

mental consultative examiners. AR 28, AR 535-96. On March 10, 2010, the Sausal Creek records 

describe Plaintiff as requiring routine mental health services and only having some distress. Id. 

Further, the mental status exam showed normal sensorium, orientation, relatedness, grooming, 

insight, judgment, thought process, and thought content. AR 28. Plaintiff only exhibited sad affect, 

depressed mood, normal to pressured speech, and was hyperverbal. Id. The March 25, 2010, 

progress notes state that she was conversant, intellectualized, and relatively nonchalant given her 

ongoing complaints and disconnect from the mainstream economy. Id.

Additionally, other medical evidence was not consistent with Dr. Cotrufo’s assessment. In 

accessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ gave the greatest weight to the opinions 

of Dr. Chen and Dr. Bass based on their examining relationship, and because their opinions are 

consistent and supported by the underlying treatment notes. AR 27. Dr. Chen opined that Plaintiff 

had no physical abnormalities, and could, despite “[n]onspecific symptoms of tiredness, body 

aches, and nausea,” lift and carry 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally. AR 329. Dr. 

Bass performed a comprehensive neurologic evaluation, and diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic 

depression, possible chronic fatigue syndrome, and a possible sleep disorder. AR 368. Despite 

these diagnoses, Dr. Bass did not feel that the conditions imposed any limitations for 12 

continuous months, including workplace, environmental conditions. Id. Dr. Shefayee performed a 

psychiatric examination and diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression NOS and assigned a GAF 

score of 50. AR 26, 375. Dr. Shefayee opined that Plaintiff’s ability to accept instructions from 

supervisors and get along with people in the workplace should be intact if she takes her 

medication regularly. AR 375. Similarly, Dr. Mateus opined Plaintiff could perform simple tasks 

and had moderate limitations with persistence and pace, social functioning, and adaptation. AR 26, 

389. The ALJ gave weight to Dr. Mateus’ opinion because it was consistent with Dr. Shafayee’s 

opinion and the overall record. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 948, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The 

opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when 

the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record”). 

The ALJ gave less weight to Dr. Bilbrey’s opinions, because he only administered a mental status 

exam, and did not perform any psychological testing. AR 27. The ALJ assigned no weight to Dr. 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 10 of 14
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Barnett’s opinion because it was not supported by the underlying treatment records or her 

activities of daily living, and his statement consisted of a check box form. AR 27, 494-96.

Additionally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s statements and testimony. AR 23, 26. At the 

hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had difficulty taking care of her hygiene, but that she shopped 

in stores such as Safeway, Target, and Smart and Final, and visited her mother. AR 23, 53, 58-60. 

Plaintiff provided that she sometimes spent up to eight or ten hours a day on the Internet, reading 

and writing comments to people on blogs, and went out to eat with her mom or a group of friends 

about once per month. AR 23, 60, 237. Plaintiff reported to the agency that she prepared simple 

meals, washed laundry, and used public transportation. AR 207. Based on the above statements, 

the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s self-reported activities showed she “remain[ed] quite 

functional.” AR 23. Plaintiff’s contention that she could not properly care for her hygiene was 

contradicted by other evidence in the record, including the observations of three consultative 

examiners. AR 27, 324, 366, 374. 

Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ had reason to discount the medical records from the 

Alameda County Behavioral Health Services, including the GAF scores assigned to Plaintiff by its 

providers. 

B. ALJ did not mischaracterize Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her medication

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly consider her ability to function when she 

was compliant with medication. (Pl.’s Mot. at 1-2, 4.) Plaintiff argues that she is not stable with 

medication, even when taken regularly, as evidenced by her difficulties being on time for her 

classes despite her compliance. (Pl.’s Mot. at 4.)

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she resumed taking medication regularly in March 

2010. AR 54. “Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling 

for the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI benefits.” Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 

F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983) 

(affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s impairments were responsive to 

medication). The ALJ asked Plaintiff if medications helped her symptoms when she took them, 

and Plaintiff admitted that medication improved her symptoms, and she is able to shop for 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 11 of 14
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

groceries, perform some chores, and get along better with her housemates. AR 25, 55. 

Plaintiff’s belief that she in unable to function while on medication is undermined by the 

medical evidence. Dr. Shafayee concluded that Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive work as 

long as she was compliant with her medication. AR 26, 375. Further, in August 2010, after five 

months of taking her medication, Plaintiff was functioning well enough that Mr. Hackett, her 

social worker, suggested that she consider looking for work. AR 556. According to the treatment 

notes, this suggestion was not well received by Plaintiff. Id. The ALJ acknowledged that while 

Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work, unskilled positions exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that are within her abilities. AR 28. Accordingly, the ALJ 

reasonably found that medication improved Plaintiff’s symptoms and she retained the capacity to 

work.

C. The ALJ properly considered the Vocational Expert’s testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on vocational expert (“VE”) testimony based 

on a hypothetical that did not include all of Plaintiff’s limitations to find that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. (Pl.’s Mot. at 3-4.)

After finding that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of 

work at step four of the sequential disability analysis, the burden shifted to the ALJ to demonstrate 

that Plaintiff is not disabled and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the 

national economy. Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ may meet this 

burden at step five by "asking a vocational expert a hypothetical question based on medical 

assumptions supported by substantial evidence in the record and reflecting all of the claimant's 

limitations, both physical and mental, supported by the record." Id. 

If the ALJ’s question to a VE fails to include all of the impairments from which the 

claimant suffers, then the expert’s testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence upon which to 

base a conclusion that the claimant is not entitled to benefits. Id. at 1162. The ALJ’s RFC 

included that Plaintiff could only “perform simple and repetitive tasks” and make simple, workrelated decisions with occasional workplace chances, and maintain occasional contact and 

interaction with coworkers and the public. AR 65-66. The VE responded that such positions 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 12 of 14
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

existed, including that of a janitor and laundry worker. Id. The ALJ then asked for two examples 

of sedentary positions, and the VE responded that the positions of small products assembler and 

officer helper were available in the national economy and in the San Francisco Bay Area. AR 67. 

Then the ALJ asked the VE to exclude phone contact, and the VE responded that a jewelry stone 

setter was an example.

The ALJ posed a second hypothetical, which assumed everything in the first hypothetical, 

but assumed only superficial contact with the public and coworkers and occasional interaction 

with her supervisor. AR 68-69. The VE responded that anything less than frequent contact with a 

supervisor precluded employment, because unskilled workers have frequent contact with 

supervisors. AR 69.

At the hearing, Plaintiff’s advocate asked the VE whether any of those positions would “be 

able to accommodate four days of absenteeism in an average month on an ongoing basis.” AR 69.

The VE responded that four days of absenteeism would preclude all employment. Id.

The ALJ reasonably declined to accept this limitation because it was not supported by the 

record. First, there is no indication in the record that Plaintiff would miss that many days of work

per month nor does Plaintiff explain where four days came from. Her prior employment 

evaluations indicate some tardiness, and Plaintiff reported having difficulty getting to places on 

time, including when it came to her school attendance. See AR 599, 602-04, 608. These 

employment evaluations, however, are from before Plaintiff started taking her medication 

regularly, as they are from 1996 to 1999. Further, Plaintiff left her last job because the firm went 

bankrupt, not because she was fired. AR 50, 184. Also, while Dr. Bilbery opined that she “would 

have some difficulty maintaining regular attendance,” that does not mean that she would have 

frequent absences. 

In her reply, Plaintiff concedes that she showed up on time and behaved reasonably at the 

three consultative exams. (Pl.’s Reply at 4.) She states that this is because they were all in the 

afternoon or evening, each was the only thing she had to get done on that day, and because she 

knew the importance of the exams to her case. Id. As a result, absent additional evidence, Plaintiff 

has not met her burden to show that she was more limited, and the ALJ was not required to 

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 13 of 14
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

include limitations for additional social restrictions or absenteeism in the hypothetical to the VE. 

See Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) (“ALJ, though, ‘is free to accept or 

reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not supported by substantial evidence’”).

Thus, the RFC used in the hypothetical included all of Plaintiff’s established limitations, 

and the VE’s testimony supports the ALJ’s non-disability finding.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2015

______________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:13-cv-04191-KAW Document 17 Filed 01/12/15 Page 14 of 14