Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02726/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02726-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL RENTERIA, No. 2:06-CV-2726-MCE-EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY;

RODERICK HICKMAN; WALTER

ALLEN, III; TIM MAHONEY; STEVE

STENOWSKI; STATE of

CALIFORNIA; CALIFORNIA YOUTH

AUTHORITY; HERRERA; STEVE

CRUZ; DJJ; and STEVE KRUSE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Manuel Renteria

(“Renteria”) has alleged that Defendants California Youth

Authority; Roderick Hickman; Walter Allen, III; Tim Mahoney;

Steve Stenowski; State of California (“State”); California Youth

Authority; Herrera; Steve Cruz; California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation Division of Juvenile Justice

(“DJJ”); and Steve Kruse (“Defendants”) violated his civil rights

by engaging in assault and battery (“First Claim”); 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

 Defendant Stenoski (erroneously sued as “Stenowski”) has 2

not been served and is not presently moving. Accordingly, all

references to Defendants herein shall not include Defendant

Stenoski.

2

negligently supervising, hiring, training, disciplining employees

and negligently operating a correctional facility (“Second

Claim”); engaging in fraud and concealment (“Third Claim”);

conspiracy (“Fourth Claim”); constitutional violations of the

Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments (“Fifth

Claim”); violating the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (“Sixth

Claim”); negligence per se (“Seventh Claim”); violating Cal.

Gov’t Code § 845.6 (“Eighth Claim”); and violating Cal. Civ. Code

§ 51.7 (“Ninth Claim”).1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

Defendants herein seek an order dismissing the Complaint on the 2

basis that: (1) the State and DJJ are immune from liability for

any injury to a prisoner pursuant to California Government Code

section 844.6; (2) the State and DJJ cannot be sued in the

absence of a statutory basis for liability; (3) Plaintiff’s state

law claims against the State and DJJ are barred by applicable

state statutes; (4) Plaintiff’s state law claims for violation of

a statutory duty and failure to supervise and state law claims

for negligent hiring, supervision, and training are barred in

this instance; (5) the complaint fails to allege any statutory

mandatory duty owed by any State defendant and has failed to

allege any facts to support any viable theory of liability

against moving Defendants; 

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(6) the complaint fails to state a claim for violation of

California Civil Code section 52.1 (the Bane Act); (7) the

complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants State, DJJ,

Hickman, Kruse, Allen, Mahoney, and Herrera for violation of

California Government Code section 845.6, failure to provide

medical care to a prisoner; (8) Plaintiff’s claims brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants State, CYA, Hickman, Kruse,

Allen, and Mahoney fail as they are sued solely in their

supervisory capacity, and the required causal connection between

their conduct and the alleged violation is missing; and (9) the

Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by Plaintiff are subsumed by

the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff Manuel

Renteria was a ward of N.A. Chaderjian Youth Correctional

Facility (“Chaderjian Youth Facility”) in Stockton, California. 

On December 30, 2003, Plaintiff alleges Defendants negligently or

intentionally permitted a canine, Officer Herrera, to attack him

causing grievous bodily injury and mental distress. In addition,

Plaintiff alleges Defendants engaged in excessive force and abuse

against wards housed at the Chaderjian Youth Facility.

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STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.

Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). While a complaint attacked by a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of

his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 2007

U.S. LEXIS 5901, 20-22 (U.S. 2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 21 (citing

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216,

pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain something

more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”).

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If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, ... undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of ... the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

1. First Claim - Assault and Battery

Defendants State and DJJ first claim they are immune from

suit pursuant to California Government Code sections 815 and

844.6. Plaintiffs do not object to Defendant State and DJJ’s

argument they are immune from suit and clarify their First Claim

is brought only against Officer Herrera (“Herrera”) and

supervising employees Hickman, Kruse, Allen, and Mahoney

(“Defendant Employees”). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss as

brought by the State and DJJ is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant Employees seek to dismiss this First Claim on the

ground that Plaintiff fails to state a claim as against them. 

Specifically, these Defendants contend the Complaint is

insufficient because it does not allege intentional offensive

contact with Plaintiff.

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A supervisor may be liable in his individual capacity if he

sets in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused

to terminate a series of acts by others, which he knew or

reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict a

constitutional injury. See Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630,

646 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145

F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) (a supervisor can be held liable

in his individual capacity if he participated in the deprivation

of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.) In addition, to the

extent Defendants contend Plaintiff failed to allege intentional

conduct on the part of Defendant Employees, the Complaint is

contrary. Specifically, the Complaint alleges as follows: “At

said time and place, the herein referenced defendants...

intentionally assaulted and battered plaintiff by releasing a dog

to attack the plaintiff.” Compl. 3:22-25. These allegations are

sufficient to state a claim for assault and battery as against

Defendant Employees. 

Given the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims against Hickman, Kruse, Allen, and Mahoney is

DENIED. 

2. Second Claim - Negligent Supervision, Hiring, Training,

Employee Discipline and Operation of a Correctional

Facility

Defendants seek to dismiss this claim as against Herrera and

Defendant Employees on the ground that a claim of negligent

supervision, hiring, training, and employee discipline may only

be brought against an employer.

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Plaintiffs rebut that a public officer can be responsible for the

acts or omissions of subordinates where the supervisor has

directed such acts to be done or has personally cooperated

therein. In fact, as noted above, supervisory liability may be

imposed against a supervisory official in his individual capacity

for his own culpable action or inaction in the training,

supervision, or control of his subordinates. Larez, 946 F.2d at

646 (citing Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1987)). 

The Court finds the claims against Herrera, Hickman, Kruse,

Allen, and Mahoney permissible to the extent they directed or

personally cooperated in the alleged incidents giving rise to

this cause of action. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

this claim is DENIED.

3. Third Claim - Fraud and Concealment

Defendants argue this Third Claim must be dismissed as to

Defendant State and DJJ because those entities are immune from

suit. In addition, Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to

allege a specific statutory basis for this claim. Plaintiff

opposes Defendants’ Motion on the ground he has plead sufficient

facts to state a claim. Herrera and Defendant Employees further

contend this claim must be dismissed as against them because

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts with sufficient

particularity for this claim to proceed.

Under the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), a public

entity is not liable for “[a]n injury to any prisoner.” Cal.

Gov’t. Code § 844.6(a)(2).

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8

There are exceptions to the foregoing provision, however,

Plaintiff has failed to allege any of the exceptions applies in

the present action. Consequently, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Third Claim against the State and DJJ is GRANTED with

leave to amend.

Herrera, Hickman, Kruse, Allen, and Mahoney argue that this

claim has not been plead with sufficient particularity. The

Court disagrees. Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (U.S. 2007). However, when a

plaintiff is pleading fraud, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

requires such a claim be “stated with particularity.”

Here, Plaintiff alleges the foregoing employees participated

in the incident giving rise to this claim by watching and failing

to prevent the incident. Compl. ¶ 21. In addition, the

Complaint alleges these Defendant Employees filed false written

reports concerning the incident, made false statements,

distortions, misrepresentations, and concealed facts concerning

the events leading up to the incident. Id.

Taking the foregoing to be true, as we must at this stage in

the litigation, the Court finds the allegations sufficient to

state a cause of action against Herrera and the Defendant

Employees for fraud and concealment. Consequently, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss the Third Claim as to Herrera and the Defendant

Employees is DENIED.

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4. Fourth Claim - Conspiracy

Defendants State and DJJ once again allege they must be

dismissed as they are immune from suit under the CTCA.

The Court agrees for the reasons set forth supra. Consequently,

Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for conspiracy as against the State and

DJJ is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

As in the Third Claim for relief, Herrera and Defendant

Employees allege this claim has not been plead with sufficient

particularity. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the

Ninth Circuit has instructed that plaintiffs alleging a

conspiracy to deprive them of their constitutional rights must

include in their complaint non-conclusory allegations containing

evidence of unlawful intent or face dismissal prior to the taking

of discovery. Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.

1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). These

allegations may be supported by either direct or circumstantial

evidence. Id. at 1195. This standard is not intended to be

difficult to meet as it serves the limited purpose of enabling

the district court to dismiss insubstantial suits prior to

discovery and allowing the defendant to prepare an appropriate

response, and where appropriate, a motion for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity. Id. (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

In reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds it insufficient

to meet the heightened pleading standard required for allegations

of conspiracy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Fourth Claim against

Herrera and Defendant Employees is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

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5. Fifth Claim - Civil Rights

Defendants State and DJJ seek to dismiss this Fifth Claim on

the ground that Plaintiff has improperly named these state

entities as neither can be deemed a “person” for purposes of

liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (“Section 1983”). 

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ position with respect to

these two Defendants.

Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many

deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a

federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for

alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment

bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity. Will

v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). 

Consequently, this Fifth Claim as against the State and DJJ is

DISMISSED without leave to amend.

Defendant Employees seek to dismiss this claim on the ground

that they must be affirmatively engaged in the deprivation in

order to be liable. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under

color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that

the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420,

101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 106 S. Ct. 662

(1986).

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There is no question this case is brought against state officials

acting under color of law. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether

Herrera and Defendant Employees’ conduct deprived Plaintiff of

his constitutional rights. 

A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within

the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). The inquiry into

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 375-77,

46 L. Ed. 2d 561, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged Defendant Employees were

deliberately indifferent to a long standing custom and practice

of using excessive force. In essence, Plaintiff’s argument is

that each of these Defendants individually engaged in the

affirmative act of creating and enforcing a policy of excessive

force. The Court finds these allegations sufficient to support

this Fifth Claim for deprivation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. 

Defendant Employees’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim

for violation of the Eighth Amendment is DENIED.

Defendant Employees also argue the Fourteenth Amendment

element of this Fifth Claim must be dismissed as to all

Defendants as it is subsumed by the Eighth Amendment element of

this Claim.

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When an explicit textual provision of the federal

constitution protects against a challenged government action, the

claim must be analyzed under that specific provision alone and

not under the more general guarantee of substantive due process. 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114, 114 S.

Ct. 807 (1994) (plurality opinion of REHNQUIST, C. J.) (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 109 S.

Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In fact, it is the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause

that makes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment applicable to the states. That said, after

conviction, the Eighth Amendment serves as the primary source of

substantive protection in cases where the deliberate use of force

is challenged as excessive and unjustified. Id. at 395 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Any protection that

substantive due process affords convicted prisoners against

excessive force is, at best, redundant of that provided by the

Eighth Amendment. Id. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim to the extent he

relies on it to seek redress for a violation of substantive due

process is GRANTED without leave to amend.

6. Sixth Claim - Bane Act

Defendants State and DJJ seek to dismiss this Sixth Claim on

the ground they are immune. The Court agrees for the reasons set

forth above. Defendant State and DJJ’s Motion to Dismiss the

Sixth Claim for relief is GRANTED with leave to amend.

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Defendants further argue that, with respect to Herrera and

Defendant Employees, Civil Code section 52.1(a),(b) prohibit

violations of civil rights brought about by “threats,

intimidation, or coercion” but that Plaintiff fails to so allege. 

Plaintiff, conversely, argues his Complaint sufficiently alleges

intimidation and coercion by use of excessive force. 

In a thorough review of the Complaint, the Court finds the

Complaint does sufficiently state a claim for violation of the

Bane Act. Specifically, Plaintiff does allege he suffered

brutality at the direction of Defendant Employees which could

clearly be construed as intimidation or coercion. Consequently,

Defendant Employees’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim is

DENIED.

7. Seventh Claim - Negligence Per Se

As with the foregoing claims, Defendant State and DJJ

contend they are immune from this Seventh Claim. The Court

agrees as explained above. Accordingly, Defendant State and

DJJ’s Motion to Dismiss this Seventh Claim is GRANTED with leave

to amend.

Herrera and Defendant Employees move to dismiss this claim

on the ground that it fails to allege a cause of action but,

rather, merely alleges these Defendants have mandatory duties

under California laws and that those duties were violated. 

Plaintiffs have failed to oppose this portion of Defendants’

Motion.

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Despite Plaintiff’s failure to oppose this Seventh Claim,

the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately alleged a cause of

action for negligence per se. Specifically, Plaintiff has

alleged the precise regulation pursuant to which he seeks redress

under this legal theory. See Compl. ¶ 37 (citing Cal. Code of

Regs. Tit. 15, Div. 4, Sec. 4039; 4040). Plaintiff alleges these

regulations were violated during the course of his restraint. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated sufficient allegations to state

this Seventh Claim. Herrera and Defendant Employees’ Motion to

Dismiss is DENIED.

8. Eighth Claim - Failure to Summon Medical Care

Defendants seek to dismiss this claim on the ground that

there is no requirement under California Government Code

section 845.6 to summon “immediate” medical care. However,

Defendants argue, the statute does not mandate a duty to provide

reasonable medical care. Defendants go on to argue the duty to

provide medical care is limited to occasions where the public

entity intentionally or unjustifiably fails to furnish immediate

medical care and that Plaintiff has failed to allege any of the

foregoing statutory predicates.

Plaintiff rebuts that paragraph 41 of the Complaint is

sufficient to put Defendants on notice of the allegations facing

them. In addition, Plaintiff argues the specifics of how and

whether Defendants were intentional or unjustifiable in their

actions cannot be ascertained absent further discovery. The

Court agrees.

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Paragraph 41 of the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was in

need of immediate medical care, that Defendants were aware of

that need and unreasonably failed to accommodate that need. 

Those allegations are sufficient to meet the notice pleading

standard of Rule 8 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Consequently, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Claim is DENIED.

9. Ninth Claim - Civil Code Section 51.7

Plaintiff’s Ninth Claim arises under California Civil Code

section 51.7. Defendants first allege immunity for Defendant

State and DJJ. As explained above, the Court agrees that

immunity exists for claims arising against these Defendants. 

Accordingly, this Ninth Claim against Defendant State and DJJ is

DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Herrera and Defendant Employees allege Plaintiff’s Ninth

Claim fails as he did not allege the acts of which he complains

were motivated by gender, race or membership in a protected

class. Defendants are correct that a claim arising under this

Section 51.7 affords relief only when the offense is committed

with improper motives. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7. Because the

Complaint does not allege the incident was motivated by gender,

race or membership in a protected class, it fails to properly

state a claim for relief. Consequently, Herrera and Defendant

Employees’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Ninth Claim is GRANTED

with leave to amend.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant State and DJJ’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Claim is GRANTED without

leave to amend. Defendant State and DJJ’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Claims is

GRANTED with leave to amend. Defendant State and DJJ’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim is DENIED inasmuch as it seeks to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim. Defendant State and

DJJ’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim inasmuch as it

seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is

GRANTED without leave to amend. Defendant State and DJJ’s Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Claim is DENIED.

Defendant Herrera and Defendant Employees’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth

Claims is DENIED. Defendant Herrera and Defendant Employees’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim is GRANTED with leave

to amend. Defendant Herrera and Defendant Employees’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim is DENIED inasmuch as it seeks to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim. Defendant Herrera

and Defendant Employees’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth

Claim inasmuch as it seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim is GRANTED without leave to amend. Defendant

Herrera and Defendant Employees’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Ninth Claim is GRANTED with leave to amend.

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Plaintiff is hereby granted twenty (20) days from the date

of this Order to file an Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 9, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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