Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01378/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01378-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FI LED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 2 8 1990 

THOMAS BROOKS CHARTERED, a professional) 

corporation, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES BURNETT, NORMAN WIEMEYER, and 

THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY 

BOARD, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1378 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. NO. 88-Z-1345) 

Windle Turley (Richard N. Countiss and James P. Piper with him on 

the brief), Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Peter R. Maier, Appellate Staff Attorney (Stewart M. Gerson, 

Assistant Attorney General; Michael J. Norton, United States 

Attorney; Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Appellate Staff Attorney, with 

him on the briefs), Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Before ANDERSON and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER,* District 

Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by I designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 1 
The National Transportation Safety Board ("the NTSB" or "the 

Board") appeals the district court's award of summary judgment 

holding that the NTSB could not invite manufacturers of a plane 

and its component parts to participate in an NTSB investigation 

without also allowing a representative of the individual who was 

killed in the crash to participate as an observer. We reverse. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The NTSB is the independent federal agency charged with, 

investigating, determining the cause, and making recommendations 

for future precautions with respect to aircraft accidents. 1 To 

1 Two statutes govern the operation of the Board. The 

Independent Safety Board Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. establishes 

the Board and requires it to: 

investigate or cause to be investigated (in such detail 

as it shall prescribe), and determine the facts, conditions, and circumstances and the cause or probable cause 

or causes of any--

(A) 

VII of 

amended; 

aircraft accident ... pursuant to title 

the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as 

49 u.s.c. app. § 1903(a)(l)(A) (1988). 

The Federal Aviation Act states: 

It shall be the duty of the National Transportation 

Safety Board to--

(2) Investigate [aircraft] accidents and 

report the facts, conditions, and circumstances 

relating to each accident and the probable cause 

thereof; 

(3) Make such recommendations to the 

Secretary of Transportation as, in its opinion, 

will tend to prevent similar accidents in the 

future;. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 2 
fulfill this task the Board is given authority to "examine and 

test to the extent necessary any civil aircraft, aircraft engine, 

propeller, appliance, or property aboard an aircraft involved in 

an accident in air commerce. 112 49 u.s.c. § 1441(c). 

Under the applicable enabling statute, the NTSB is authorized 

to make "rules and regulations as may be necessary to the exercise 

of its functions." 49 u.s.c. § 1903(b)(ll). To that end, the 

Board promulgated a series of rules and regulations governing its 

investigation of aviation mishaps. Among them is the declaration 

that Board investigations are "fact-finding proceedings with no 

formal issues and no adverse parties .... " 49 C.F.R. § 831.4. 

Board inquiries "are not conducted for the purpose of determining 

(4) Make such reports public in such form and 

manner as may be deemed by it to be in the public 

interest; .... 

49 u.s.c. app. § 144l(a) (2)-(4) (1988). 

2 The foundation for the present day NTSB was initially laid in 

1958 when Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 731, 

782 authorizing "creation of special boards of inquiry to 

investigate accidents which involve substantial questions of 

public safety in air transportation." H.R. Rep. No. 2360, 85th 

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 

3741, 3757. In 1966 the NTSB was designated as a subordinate 

agency within the Department of Transportation. It held that 

status until the mid 1970's when Congress made it a "totally 

separate and independent agency." S. Conf. Rep. 93-1347, 93d 

Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 

7669, 7694. See 49 u.s.c. § 1902(a). 

When Congress redesignated the Board it recognized its 

outstanding record of investigating aviation accidents. S. Conf. 

Rep. 93-1347, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code 

Cong. & Admin. News 7669, 7698. The parties do not dispute that 

record in this case nor do we have any reason to doubt the 

independence and integrity of the Board. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 3 
the rights or liabilities of any person." Id. 

When an investigation commences an investigator-in-charge is 

selected to organize, conduct, and control the field phase. This 

individual assumes responsibility for supervising and coordinating 

all Board and non-Board personnel who are associated with the onsite probe. 49 C.F.R. § 831.8. Among the specific powers given 

to the investigator-in-charge is the authority to designate 

participating parties to the inquiry. The regulations provide, in 

relevant part: 

(a) The investigator-in-charge may, on behalf of 

the Director, Bureau of Accident Investigation, or the 

Director, Bureau of Field Operations, designate parties 

to participate in the field investigation. Parties to 

the field investigation shall be limited to those ... 

government agencies, companies, and associations whose 

employees, functions, activities, or products were 

involved in the accident and who can provide 

suitable qualified technical personnel to actively 

assist in the field investigation. 

49 C.F.R. § 831.ll(a). 

The regulations contemplate active participation from 

designated parties to an investigation. However, parties remain 

accountable to the Board "and may be relieved from participation 

if they do not comply with their assigned duties or if they 

conduct themselves in a manner prejudicial to the investigation." 

49 C.F.R. § 831.ll(b). Also, designated parties who exercise any 

of the broad investigatory powers of the Board -- including the 

right to inspect, photograph, or copy accident-related documents 

and records under 49 C.F.R. § 831.9(a) -- may not be "represented 

by any person who also represents claimants and insurers." 49 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 4 
C.F.R. § 831.ll(c). Access to accident-related wreckage and 

records is restricted to NTSB personnel 

participants. 49 C.F.R. § 831.12(a). 

and investigation 

The NTSB claims the investigator-in-charge may as a 

condition of participation require parties to waive any 

objection to civil discovery about their investigatory role in the 

event litigation commences. In this appeal, the NTSB asserted 

this waiver is uniformly required from a "product manufacturer 

designated as a party." (Appellant's Brief at 5.) However, the 

NTSB cites no authority for this proposition and at oral argument 

conceded the requirement is merely derived from the implicit 

authority that an investigator-in-charge possesses and, as such, 

is discretionary. The record indicates the parties to this 

investigation signed statements indicating 

participating for purposes of litigation. 3 

they were not 

3 The statement signed by the parties provided: 

It is understood that a party representative to an 

investigation may not be a person who also represents 

claimants or insurers. The placement of a signature 

hereon constitutes a representation that participation 

irt this investigation is not on behalf of either 

claimants or insurers and that, while any information 

obtained may ultimately be used in litigation, 

participation is not for the purposes of preparing for 

litigation. 

By placing their signatures hereon all participants 

agree that they will neither assert nor permit to be 

asserted on their behalf, any privilege in litigation, 

with respect to information or documents obtained during 

the course of and as a result of participation in the 

NTSB investigation as described above. It is 

understood, however, that this form is not intended to 

prevent the undersigned from participating in litigation 

arising out of the accident referred to above or to 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 5 
The only parties an investigator-in-charge is required to 

designate are other federal government representatives who are 

involved in regulating air commerce. Congress specifically calls 

for the Secretary of Transportation, or his representatives, to 

join with the NTSB in investigating air accidents. 4 However, 

investigatory primacy remains with the Board and the Board has 

exclusive authority to determine the probable cause of an 

accident. 5 

In addition to parties, the investigator-in-charge has 

discretionary power to allow observers at select portions of an 

investigation; but admittance through this avenue is strictly 

limited. The NTSB observer policies are fashioned to allow 

"aeronautical organizations, current operators of like equipment, 

designated military personnel or representatives of a foreign 

require disclosure of the undersigned's communications 

with counsel. 

4 Under the specific prevision of the Federal Aviation Act 

regarding NTSB investigations of air accidents, .the Board is 

called upon to "provide for the appropriate participation of the 

Secretary of Transportation and his representatives in any 

investigations conducted " 49 u.s.c. § 1441(g). A similar 

requirement is imposed by the Independent Safety Board Act 

establishing the Board. 49 U.S.C. § 1903(a)(l). See, ~, 49 

C.F.R. § 831.ll(d) ("[W]hen appropriate, other Federal agencies, 

will normally be a party to field investigations and will have the 

same rights and privileges and be subject.to the same limitations 

as other parties."). 

5 "[T]he Secretary of Transportation or his representatives 

shall not participate in the determination of probable cause by 

the National Transportation Safety Board " 49 u.s.c. 

§ 1441(g). "Any investigation of an accident conducted by the 

Board ... shall have priority over all other investigations of 

such accident conducted by other Federal agencies." 49 u.s.c. 

§ 1903(a) (1). 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 6 
government" to be on-hand for "initial organizational and final 

'wind up' meetings" only. NTSB Investigation Manual Aircraft 

Accidents and Incidents, at 4-12 (1980). The policies contain no 

clause permitting aircraft owners, representatives of deceased 

passengers, passengers, or others, to observe NTSB inquiries. Id. 

at 4-12. See Miller v. Rich, 723 F. Supp. 505, 508-09 (C.D. Cal. 

1989) (Miller II) (no section in the current NTSB Investigation 

Manual grants aircraft owners the right to attend an accident 

investigation) . 

There is no provision in any other statute, regulation, or 

manual that either requires or expressly permits the investigatorin-charge to admit merely interested persons as participants or 

observers of an investigation. For example, the news media is 

typically not allowed to attend an NTSB inquiry. Of course, given 

the broad authority the NTSB contends it implicitly has, it is 

conceivable that an investigator-in-charge could open an 

investigation for viewing by an interested person. 

Although access to the investigation itself is strictly 

limited, the work-product of the NTSB is ultimately public and 

available to anyone. 49 u.s.c. § 1903(a)(2); 49 C.F.R. § 845.50. 

The work-product encompasses the NTSB report including "all 

factual information concerning the accident." 49 C.F.R. 

§ 845.50(a). Moreover, 

never "officially closed"; 

submission of new and 

the NTSB public docket on an accident is 

rather, it is kept open "for the 

pertinent evidence by any interested 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 7 
person. 11 49 C.F.R. § 845.51. 

Because the NTSB book on an accident is never shut, it is 

conceivable the NTSB could alter its findings about the cause of 

an aviation mishap following development of new information by 

persons not permitted to attend the NTSB inquiry. Any interested 

person, in fact, may submit proposed findings to the Board 

regarding an accident's probable cause. 49 C.F.R. § 831.14. 

Also, anyone questioned by the NTSB during an investigation 

is entitled to have a representative, such as an attorney, present 

with them. 49 C.F.R. § 831.7. Thus, if an owner of a plane is 

deposed about its crash, or if a family member of a deceased pilot 

or passenger of a plane is questioned, they may be accompanied by 

their attorney. 

Consistent with its fact-finding mission that is 

neutral, NTSB reports are barred as evidence in court. 

litigation 

49 u.s.c. 

§ 1441(e) ("No part of any report or reports of the 

Transportation Safety Board relating to any accident 

National 

or the 

investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in 

any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned 

in such report or reports."). See also 49 U.S.C. § 1903(c). 

Board employees may give limited testimony concerning the "factual 

information they obtained during the course of the accident 

investigation, including factual evaluations embodied in their 

factual accident reports." 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b). When making 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 8 
these statements, Board employees may refer to their reports to 

refresh their recollection. 49 C.F.R. § 835.4. See, ~, Keen 

v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 549-51 (10th Cir. 1978) 

(NTSB investigator and FAA maintenance supervisor may testify as 

to what they observed at an .accident scene and the manner in which 

they conducted their investigations but may not testify as to the 

proximate cause of the crash). 

The restrictions 

and former employees. 

without deciding that 

on testimony are limited to NTSB employees 

See 49 C.F.R. §§ 835.3, 835.7. We assume 

the restrictions do not apply to those 

designated as parties to an accident investigation who are not 

Board employees. 

Finally, the NTSB does not forbid private investigations 

conducted with an eye toward civil litigation. In fact, after its 

inquiry the Board releases any wreckage or records it took custody 

of while conducting its inquiry. 49 C.F.R. § 831.12(b). This 

material is then available to litigants to use in preparing their 

cases. 

II. FACTS 

The sad facts underlying this action are undisputed. On 

August 2, 1988, Thomas w. Brooks was killed when the Beech 

Musketeer airplane he was piloting crashed on takeoff from the 

Philmont Scout Ranch near Cimarron, New Mexico. (Appellant's 

Brief at 8; Appellee's Brief at 3.) After the crash, the NTSB 

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initiated its examination with Norman Wiemeyer of the Denver Field 

Office appointed investigator-in-charge. 

At Wiemeyer's direction the aircraft wreckage was taken to a 

repair station in Greeley, Colorado, for testing and parties to 

the investigation were named. The parties included the aircraft 

manufacturer, Beech Aircraft, along with the engine manufacturer, 

Avco-Lycoming. Philmont Scout Ranch was also designated as a 

party. Wiemeyer did not, however, designate the plane's owner, 

Thomas Brooks, Chartered, a Colorado Professional Corporation 

("Brooks"), as a party. 

Wiemeyer made the decision not to include Brooks after 

reviewing pilot and aircraft records Brooks supplied. Wiemeyer 

determined Brooks' records were all that was needed for the NTSB 

study and there was no need for further contact with the owner of 

record in regard to the aircraft or pilot. 

Thereafter, Wiemeyer was contacted by an attorney 

representing the deceased pilot's family. The attorney asked for 

permission to observe the aircraft evaluation. That request was 

subsequently rejected based on Wiemeyer's belief the attorney 

represented claimants and, as such, was barred from attending the 

investigation under NTSB rules. 49 C.F.R. § 831.ll(c). Wiemeyer 

also denied the observation request based on his conclusion that 

the attorney had no technical expertise that would aide the 

investigation. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 10 
The NTSB General Counsel supported Wiemeyer's decision in a 

letter to the family attorney. Referring to the Board's enabling 

statutes, rules, and Investigator's Manual, the letter gives the 

reasons for declining the observation request by stating, in 

relevant part, that: 

A determination has been made that the investigator in 

charge does not have a specific need for any additional 

expertise. Moreover, you did not make a showing to Mr. 

Weimeyer [sic] that you could provide specialized 

expertise which he needed. 

An agreement has been made that, at the completion 

of the teardown, the disassembled engine will be 

returned to the registered owner in accordance with 

Board Rule 831.12(b), formerly Rule 831.lO(b). 

In view of the foregoing and in light of the 

that the Board's procedures make no provision 

observers to the teardown, the Board's determination 

that neither you nor your representative may observe 

teardown. 

fact 

for 

is 

the 

Within a reasonable length of time after the 

teardown, a public docket that contains all the 

documents that comprise the Board's factual 

investigation of this accident will be created and will 

be available to any interested person who requests a 

copy from the NTSB .... 

The letter concludes by referring to the opportunity the attorney 

will have to depose investigators following the NTSB accident 

review. 

The instant case was commenced in the district court 

following receipt of the NTSB letter by Brooks. Brooks claimed: 

(1) the NTSB abused its discretion and could not lawfully bar the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 11 
owner of a plane from being present at the investigation concerning its crash; (2) the NTSB was arbitrary and capricious in refusing to allow Brooks to attend the investigation; and, (3) the NTSB 

decision was a taking of property without due process in violation 

of the Fifth Amendment. 

The district court granted a preliminary injunction 

forbidding any disassembly, dismantling, or destructive inspection 

of the plane unless a Brooks observer was present. The court 

further ordered that Brooks' observer should be a technically 

qualified FAA airframe and powerplant mechanic. The order allowed 

the observer to take notes, but provided he could not take 

photographs or speak unless spoken to. The order finally granted 

the investigator-in-charge the power to exclude the observer if 

any conditions of the order were violated. 

The district court subsequently granted Brooks summary 

judgment and made its preliminary injunction permanent. In so 

doing, it read the Independent Safety Board Act, 49 u.s.c. 

§§ 1903(b)(2), 1905, and saw in it no hint of a Congressional 

desire to bar an owner's representative from watching the NTSB 

team work. The court held it was an abuse of discretion for the 

NTSB to include manufacturers as parties without also including 

the aircraft owner. 6 

6 The district court's decision was made in a ruling 

bench wherein the judge stated: 

from the 

The 

judgment 

Court will 

and issue a 

grant the 

permanent 

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motion for 

injunction 

summary 

in this 

Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 12 
The court's permanent injunction differed from the 

preliminary injunction in only one minor respect: the permanent 

injunction ordered that Brooks' observer could be either an FAAcertified airframe and powerplant mechanic, or other suitably 

case .... I don't think we're talking about who is going 

to be part of the investigation team. We're talking 

very simply about whether a knowledgeable person may be 

an observer of what this team does in the fact situation 

where the owner is interested--in this case, the 

plaintiff--and where in this particular situation a 

representative of the manufacturer and the engine 

manufacturer, who certainly have stakes in the outcome 

of this investigation, are going to be part of this 

investigation team or observers. 

I have looked at the statute; and for the record, 

we're talking more specifically about 49 United States 

Code section 1903(b)(2). There is nothing in 1903(b)(2) 

which would indicat[e or] even hint that Congress does 

not want a representative, a qualified representative of 

the owner to be an observer of what their team is doing. 

I've also looked at the other sections cited; and if 

anything, those sections lend weight to the position of 

the plaintiff and not the position of the defendant. 

For example,· 1905 talks about public access to 

information. 

Where we have this particular situation, where the 

manufacturer's rep and the engine manufacturer's 

representatives are going to be there and are going to 

be participating or observing--I'm not sure if they're 

actually going to be participating, or observing--the 

free exchange of ideas certainly is going to be 

inhibited no more by having the owner present, where you 

already have these representatives present. If free 

interchange is going to be inhibited, it's going to be 

inhibited with these representatives present. 

But in any case, in this particular situation where 

you do have these parties present and then you are saying we're not going to allow observer status--not team 

status, because we're not talking about them being a 

part of the team, but observer status to the owner's 

representatives--to me it's just rather obvious that it 

is an abuse of discretion; that it is arbitrary and 

capricious. 

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qualified observer, whereas the preliminary injunction said the 

observer had to be an FAA-certified airframe and powerplant 

mechanic. NTSB now appeals from this order. 7 

III. ANALYSIS 

NTSB makes two arguments. First, it contends that its 

decision to bar Brooks' representative from observing the accident 

investigation was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and was not an 

abuse of discretion. The Board secondly asserts that the decision 

on who may attend an investigation is committed, by statute, to 

the agency's discretion. The Board therefore reasons that its 

decision is unreviewable in the district court. Because the 

second argument implicates the jurisdiction of the lower court 

and, ipso facto, our review, we begin with it. 

At the outset, we note that a determination of the district 

court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law 

reviewable de novo on appeal. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 

558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); 

Madsen v. United States ex rel. United States Army, Corps of 

Eng'rs, 841 F.2d 1011, 1012 (10th Cir. 1987). 

7 On appeal, the Board waives its contention made in the trial 

court that summary judgment is precluded because genuine issues of 

material fact are unresolved. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Appellant's 

Brief at 11 n.12. Appellant also waives. any argument concerning 

whether Brooks' request was properly styled and whether he 

exhausted administrative remedies. Appellant's Brief at 10 n.9. 

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We begin our analysis with the Administrative Procedure Act's 

("the APA") provisions governing review of agency action. 

Judicial review of agency action is generally allowed except where 

"statutes preclude judicial review," or where "agency action is 

committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(l)-(2) 

(1988). These are two separate tests and must be taken in order. 

If there is no statute that precludes judicial review, 

§ 70l(a)(l), then we determine whether the action is committed to 

agency discretion by law, § 70l(a)(2). See Turner v. United 

States Parole Comm'n., 810 F.2d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 1987); 

Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 728 F.2d 518, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

Congress has not expres-sly forbidden review of actions by the 

NTSB. In fact, in the NTSB enabling act Congress specifically 

provides that "[a]ny order, affirmative or negative, issued by the 

Board" is subject to review in the court of appeals. 49 U.S.C. 

§ 1903(d). Review is in accordance with the APA. Id. 

Reading this provision, we see that Congress has evinced no 

express statutory intent that decisions by the NTSB a~e precluded 

from judicial review under section 70l(a)(l). See Sierra Club v. 

Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1075 (10th Cir. 1988) (in the absence of an 

express statutory prohibition of judicial review which would 

invoke APA § 70l(a)(l) an agency bears a heavy burden in 

overcoming the presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit 

all judicial review). Nor do we discern a limitation on judicial 

review in this instance from the "structure of the statutory 

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! 

scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of 

the administrative action involved." Block v. Community Nutrition 

Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). 

The questions remains, however, whether some actions by the 

NTSB are committed to its discretion by virtue of APA section 

701(a) (2). Under 

where "the statute 

section 701(a)(2), there is no judicial review 

is· drawn so that a court would have no 

meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise 

of discretion." Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). "In 

such a case, the statute ('law') can be taken to have 'committed' 

the decisionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely." Chaney, 

470 U.S. at 830. In short, there is no judicial review of an 

agency decision where there is no law for the court to apply. Id. 

at 830. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 

U.S. 402, 410 (1971). However, this is a very narrow exception. 

Id. at 410; Hondros v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n., 720 F.2d 

278, 293 (3d Cir. 1983); Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of 

Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir. 1982); Sabin v. Butz, 515 

F.2d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 1975). 

In Chaneyf the Court was faced with a decision by the Food 

and Drug Administration wherein the agency declined to commence an 

enforcement action. The Court referred to the decision not to act 

as an example of a decision committed to agency discretion by law. 

The Court concluded an agency is free to refrain from acting 

absent a Congressional enactment withdrawing discretion and 

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commanding performance. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 834-35. In a 

situation where Congress commands the agency act there is law to 

apply and a court, pursuant to the standards of the APA, may 

review whether the agency acted in accordance with Congress' 

wishes. Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 260 n.7 (1986) 

(where the statutory command is that the agency shall act, a 

complainant adversely affected by the failure to act may bring an 

action in district court); Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 

1048 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Review of agency nonenforcement decisions 

is permissible only where statutory language sets constraints on 

the agency's discretion."). 

We, however, are not faced with a situation where the NTSB 

refuses to make a decision or take some action. The NTSB 

affirmatively decided that Brooks would not be allowed to 

participate in, or even observe, its official investigation into 

the crash of its plane. See slip op. at p. 11. And under Chaney, 

"when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a 

focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have 

exercised its power in some manner. The action at least can be 

reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory 

powers." 470 U.S. at 832 (emphasis in original). 

Affirmative agency action is also reviewable where the agency 

purports to act pursuant to its own rules, rather than a statute. 

The failure of an agency to follow its own regulations is 

challengeable under the APA. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 

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(1957); Community Action of Laramie County, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 

F.2d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1989) (substantive federal regulation is 

binding to the same extent as a statute and is reviewable). In 

this case the investigator-in-charge relied on both statutes and 

NTSB rules for naming participants, designating observers, and 

denying Brooks permission to witness the engine teardown. 8 

The regulations the investigator relied on set forth 

objective criteria that are easily susceptible to judicial review. 

For example, government agencies, companies, and associations 

whose employees, functions, activities, or products were involved 

in the accident are eligible to be named parties if they can 

8 The investigator-in-charge 

affidavit: 

states the following in 

After my preliminary examination I selected parties 

to the investigation in accordance with the criteria set 

forth in Section 831.11 of the NTSB Accident 

Investigation Procedures (49 CFR 831.11) on the basis of 

need for their active assistance in the technical 

aspects of the crash investigation. 

I focused upon my understanding of Section 304 (c) of 

the Independent Safety Board Act (49 u.s.c. 1903 (c)) as 

the provision had been explained to me, and used by me, 

on numerous occasions by both the NTSB Denver Office 

Regional Director and by the NTSB General Counsel. 

I made a reasoned determination, based on my 

understanding of the NTSB regulations, policy, and 

procedures governing aviation accident investigations, 

that I would have no need for the presence of a 

representative of the deceased pilot, or the owner of 

record, to participate in the aircraft evaluation .... 

(Emphasis added.) 

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his 

Appellate Case: 89-1378 Document: 01019956435 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 18 
provide qualified technical personnel to assist. 49 C.F.R. 

§ 831.ll(a). Observers are likewise allowed if they are 

accredited members of aeronautical organizations, current 

operators of like equipment, designated military personnel, or 

representatives of a foreign government. NTSB Investigation 

Manual - Aircraft Accidents and Incidents at 4-12 (1980). 

Thus, this case is readily distinguishable from our decision 

in Laramie County. In Laramie County, there were no objective 

guidelines for the federal agency to follow when it decided to end 

a federal grant that had been given to a local group. Laramie 

County, 866 F.2d at 353. Instead, the federal agency could 

terminate the grant based on its mere subjective belief that 

termination was more appropriate than a lesser sanction. Because 

discretion within the agency was so broad, we concluded the 

district court "has no standard against which to measure [the] 

exercise of discretion." Id. The same conclusion is not 

appropriate here because of the presence of readily identifiable 

objective criteria that were expressly relied on by the NTSB. 

Therefore, we hold that the district court had law to apply and so 

could review the NTSB decision under the standards set forth in 

the APA. 

We further note that, to the extent 

constitutionality of the NTSB decision, 

reviewable in court. Webster v. Doe, 486 

Brooks challenges the 

the matter is also 

U.S. 592, 603 (1988) 

(serious constitutional question would arise if federal statute 

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were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable 

constitutional claim); Laramie County, 866 F.2d at 352-53 

("[J]udicial review of colorable constitutional claims remains 

available unless Congress has made its intent to preclude review 

crystal clear."). 

h 

Having determined that the NTSB decision barring Brooks from 

the accident investigation is judicially cognizable, we proceed to 

the merits. NTSB argues it was neither arbitrary nor capricious, 

and that ·it did not abuse its discretion, when it made the 

decision to keep Brooks out. In response Brooks argues just the 

opposite. He further suggests the NTSB' s attempt to .forbid his 

observation of the investigation violates the Fifth Amendment. In 

answering these contentions, we first stop to address the standard 

of review. See,~, Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413 ("[T]he 

existence of judicial review is only the start: the standard for 

review must also be determined."). 

Both parties are correct in urging us to apply the statutory 

"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law" standard of 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(A) (1988) in 

determining whether to "hold unlawful and set aside [the) agency 

action." 5 u.s.c. § 706(2). Informal agency action is reviewed 

utilizing this standard. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm 

Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 

414; CF&I Steel Corp. v. Economic Dev. Admin., 624 F.2d 136, 139 

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(10th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, it is well-settled that even 

though our inquiry is searching and careful, our ultimate standard 

of review is narrow. All the agency need do is demonstrate it 

considered relevant factors and alternatives after a full 

ventilation of the issues, and that the choice it made was 

reasonable based on those considerations. =Am=e=r=i~c~a=n-=--~M=i=·n=i=n=g 

Congress v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 1982). We do 

not substitute our judgment for the agency's. Instead, we must 

uphold the agency if there is a rational basis for its decision. 

Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F.2d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 1989); New Mexico 

Envtl. Improvement Div. v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 

1986); Anderson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 701 

F.2d 112, 115 (10th Cir. 1983). 

An agency's action will be set aside as unlawful if we are 

able to discern the agency "relied on factors which Congress did 

not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an 

important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 

decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or 

is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 

view or the product of agency expertise." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 

Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42. Accord Thomas, 789 F.2d at 829-30; Bedford 

County Memorial Hosp. v. Health & Human Servs., 769 F.2d 1017, 

1022 (4th Cir. 1985). 

We further recognize that although the agency's action may 

have first been considered by the district court, we accord the 

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district court's decision no particular deference on appeal. Webb 

v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 1989). Our determination 

is an independent one based on the same administrative record that 

was before the court below. Webb, 878 F.2d at 1254. See, ~, 

Washington Health Facilities Ass'n v. Washington Dep't of Social & 

Health Servs., 879 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1989) (standard in 

reviewing agency decisions is the same as used by the district 

court). 

Turning now to the NTSB's principal argument on appeal, the 

Board makes three points. It asserts that the district court: 

misread NTSB's governing statutes and regulations; ignored or 

misapplied relevant case law; and, finally, wrongfully imposed its 

own views of procedural fairness on the Board. 

The NTSB believes a correct reading of the applicable 

statutes and regulations provide only for the federal government -

namely the Federal Aviation Administration - to participate in an 

NTSB inquiry as a matter of right. Otherwise, it feels the Board 

acting through the investigator-in-charge has discretion on who 

will participate or observe. The NTSB says the decision on who to 

admit is, and must be, made on a case by case basis. The 

decision, it maintains, turns on whether the potential party is 

able to assist the investigation in a meaningful way. 

The district court came to a different conclusion. It said 

49 U.S.C. § 1903(b)(2) of the Independent Safety Board Act reveals 

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no hint that Congress meant to ban a representative of the owner 

from observing. In addition, it said references to public access 

to information in§ 1905 lend weight to Brooks' position. See 

slip op. at n.6. The court relied on a Ninth Circuit case to 

support its holding. Miller v. Rich, 845 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(Miller I). 

The plaintiff in Miller I was the owner of a single-engine 

plane that crashed, killing one of the two occupants. Miller 

requested that his representative be on-hand to observe the engine 

disassembly. But the NTSB refused and the district court 

subsequently denied 

Ninth Circuit, on 

Miller's application for an injunction. 

appeal, reversed and remanded because 

The 

it 

believed the NTSB abused its discretion by denying Miller's 

request without offering any explanation. It rejected the NTSB's 

-position that no reason need be given for the denial when the NTSB 

argued it possessed absolute authority regarding who to admit to 

its inspections. Miller I, 845 F.2d at 191-93. 

At the time of the circuit court's decision, the NTSB manual 

on conducting aircraft crash investigations specified that an 

owner should be allowed to participate. Id. at 192. However, by 

the time the case was heard on remand the NTSB had revised its 

manual, deleting the language that called for treating aircraft 

owners differently from others who seek party status. Miller II, 

723 F. Supp. at 511. In Miller II, the district court determined 

the NTSB was not abusing its discretion in preventing the owner 

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( 

\ 

( 

from attending the investigation. The NTSB explanations that the 

owner could not help the safety probe, might impede free 

discussions, and might hinder the flow of information among the 

parties because of his litigation-oriented personal interests were 

enough for the lower court. It concluded the NTSB had a rational 

basis for excluding the owner that was not an abuse of discretion. 

The injunction was again denied. Id. at 508, 511. 

In this case, the district court distinguished the denial of 

an injunction in Miller II because that judge was not faced with a 

situation where the manufacturer's representatives were members of 

the team of parties to the exclusion of the owner. The lower 

court here felt that any NTSB fears concerning the potential 

adverse impact on free discussions due to the owner's presence 

were not applicable. We disagree and believe the rationale of 

Miller II is even more persuasive where an owner seeks to 

insinuate himself into an investigation that already includes a 

potential adversary in forthcoming civil litigation. The 

likelihood that the owner's presence would hinder the free 

exchange of ideas between the NTSB and manufacturer, thereby 

compromising the NTSB investigation, is plain. 

We do not concur with the district court's interpretation of 

the statutes. Section 1903(b)(2) is directed at employees of the 

Board, and authorizes them to "enter any property wherein a 

transportation accident has occurred or wreckage from any such 

accident is located and do all things therein necessary for a 

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proper investigation II 49 u.s.c. § 1903(b)(2). In conducting 

their accident tests, the provision requires NTSB employees to 

reduce interference with remaining transportation services and to 

preserve, to the maximum extent feasible, any evidence relating to 

the transportation accident "consistent with the needs of the 

investigation and with the cooperation of [the] owner or 

operator." Id. (emphasis added). Nothing in this provision 

expressly issues an owner an automatic admission ticket to an NTSB 

. t' t' 9 inves iga ion. 

We further find the legislative history of section 1903 

supports our view. The statute refers to evidence gathering by 

the NTSB and calls on the NTSB to cooperate with owners to the 

extent possible to avoid unnecessary litigation about uncovering 

evidence. 

If, however, arrangements cannot be worked out, the NTSB 

9 The Board further argues that § 1903(b)(2) does not even 

apply to aviation accidents because it only addresses examination 

and testing of a surface "vehicle, rolling stock, track, or 

pipeline component or any part of any such item when such 

examination or testing is determined to be required for purposes 

of such investigation." 49 U.S.C. § 1903(b)(2). The Board says 

investigation into aircraft accidents is governed separately by 

§ 1441 of Title 49. In support of this position the Board refers 

to the legislative history of§ 1903 and the House Report that 

specifically says "examinations and tests for aviation safety is 

dealt with by section 701 of the Federal Aviation Act." H.R. Rep. 

No. 97-108, Part II, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1981 U.S. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 1737 n.1. The Board surmises that even 

if § 1903(b)(2) can be read to allow an owner the right to 

participate in an NTSB investigation, the section does not apply 

here because this accident involves an airplane and not a surface 

vehicle. Brooks, in contrast, maintains that the word vehicle 

can be read to include aircraft. Because we believe§ 1903 does 

not grant owners the right to attend an investigation in any 

event, we need not decide whether§ 1903 governs NTSB conduct with 

respect to surface accidents only. 

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has the authority to secure an immediate court order as 

necessary to obtain evidence and conduct examinations or 

tests. Thus, consent of the owner is not a precondition 

to NTSB conducting examinations or tests consistent with 

the needs of the investigation. 

H.R. Rep. No. 97-108, Part II, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 

1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1736-37. In this case, the 

NTSB received the input it needed from Brooks when it asked for, 

and received, its aircraft records. Slip op. at p. 10. Assuming 

without deciding that section 1903(b)(2) applies to this 

investigation, slip op. at n.9, both Brooks and the NTSB complied 

with the statute by cooperating with each other regarding the 

aircraft's records. We read no additional requirement into the 

statute about Brooks' attendance at the subsequent NTSB 

investigation except to stress again that the statute clearly 

focuses the Board's attention on the "needs of the investigation," 

and not on the desires of the owner. 49 u.s.c. § 1903(b)(2). 

Also, section 1905, which the district court referred to in 

its ruling, slip op. at n.6, discusses public access to 

information. It provides that copies of any "communication, 

document, investigation, or other report, or information received 

or sent by the Board" shall be available for the public to inspect 

and purchase at a reasonable cost. 49 U.S.C. § 1905(a). The 

statute does not, however, give any member of the public the right 

to be present when the NTSB report is being written. In addition, 

the NTSB regulations, made pursuant to the statutes, further focus 

our attention on the fact-finding, litigation neutral aspect of 

the investigation. Whether parties are named is left to the 

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discretion of the investigator-in-charge. When they are picked, 

they are identified according to "who can provide suitable 

qualified technical personnel to actively assist in the field 

investi.gation." 49 C.F.R. § 831. ll(a). Likewise, observer status 

is granted only to "aeronautical organizations, current operators 

of like equipment, designated military personnel or 

representatives of a foreign government" who possess a safetyrelated interest in the investigation that goes beyond the· 

litigation-planning posture Brooks is in. NTSB Investigation 

Manual - Aircraft Accidents and Incidents, at 4-12 (1980). 

Moreover, we believe the district court implicitly recognized 

Brooks would not help this investigation when it ordered he would 

have to be completely silent during any meeting he went to, and 

that he could only take notes and not speak unless spoken to. The 

district court apparently imposed its own idea of proper conduct 

you would rightly expect to find in civil litigation that 

determines tort liability. But the district court's view is not 

consistent with the purpose of the NTSB probe. "Wherever the 

parties may stand with respect to each other under applicable tort 

law, they stand on much different footing vis-a-vis the NTSB's 

investigation." Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 

1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987). 

"The NTSB's function is 'to promote transportation safety by 

conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating 

safety improvement recommendations.'" Graham, 805 F.2d at 1389 

(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1901(1)). Because the Board has no role in 

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determining civil liability, it need not be forced to admit a 

plaintiff as a fly on the wall. Brooks' presence would compromise 

this investigation by hindering the NTSB as it works to zero in on 

the cause of the mishap. If Brooks attends, the Board will be 

prevented from fulfilling its statutory mission of formulating 

safety recommendations in a neutral, calm and scientific 

atmosphere. Furthermore, Brooks' attendance would certainly chill 

the give-and-take between the NTSB and any manufacturer. The 

incentive a manufacturer has in uncovering potential product 

defects by working with the NTSB will be frustrated the instant 

Brooks arrives to monitor discussions and take notes. An NTSB 

investigation is a forum for developing safety recommendations. 

It is not a show for an audience of silent note takers looking for 

someone to sue. 

The district court's order will also, if taken to its logical 

boundaries, result in unwieldy NTSB investigations. In this case 

the court ordered a single observer to be present at every NTSB 

meeting concerning the crash. It is possible, however, the expert 

the court made room for will not be qualified to observe with 

understanding each aspect of the NTSB inquiry. If something comes 

up beyond the scope of the authorized observer's qualifications, 

the entire probe may be halted while the plaintiff attempts to 

find a suitable replace~ent, Additionally, the NTSB may elect to 

have certain tests conducted by outside experts while continuing 

to meet on the accident as a whole. In that event, a plaintiff 

could further complicate the investigation by insisting that a 

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separate representative be present for each outside test while 

the first observer continues to watch the primary accident-related 

discussions. Finally, should the rule announced by the district 

court be extended to investigations of major aircraft accidents 

involving many individuals, it is conceivable the NTSB would be 

forced to make room for dozens of outside observers who would 

contribute nothing to the inquiry. 

to listen for potential theories of 

their clients. We could expect 

Their only function would be 

tort liability to benefit 

numerous petitions to the 

judiciary requesting observer status for each new expert. 

In insisting he should attend, Brooks suggests without 

providing any evidence that having the manufacturer present 

without the owner compromises the integrity of the NTSB factual 

report. In making this suggestion, Brooks contends the 

manufacturers actually run the investigation while the NTSB takes 

a back seat. He sees the official investigation as little more 

than a cover-up by manufacturers. Under Brooks' scenario, a 

verdict pinning an accident's cause on pilot error instead of on a 

manufacturer's product is perordained whenever the owner does not 

go to the NTSB meetings. In making these charges, Brooks ignores 

the checks built into the statutes and NTSB rules that help ensure 

the investigation's credibility. 

First, NTSB's reports are freely available to anyone. 49 

u.s.c. § 1905(a). However, as a protection for plaintiffs 

Congress forbids an NTSB probable cause ~etermination from being 

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introduced as evidence in a related tort case. Only factual 

aspects of an NTSB report may be used. 49 u.s.c. §§ 1441(e), 

1903(c). Second, after the NTSB investigation the aircraft and 

its component parts are returned to the owner so he may commence 

an independent investigation and compare his findings to those of 

the NTSB. 49 C.F.R. § 831.12(b). The owner may use the results 

of his independent inquiry in his tort case without any 

restriction. Third, the owner may depose NTSB employees about the 

"factual information they obtained during the course of the 

accident investigation, including factual evaluations embodied in 

their factual accident reports." 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b). The owner 

may also depose parties to the investigation who are not NTSB 

employees and may utilize their direct testimony in court. In 

this case, we note that Brooks has the added protection of knowing 

that all parties, including the manufacturers, signed discovery 

waivers as a condition of their party status. They therefore gave 

up discovery privileges potentially assertable in a tort liability 

case. Slip op. at n.3. Finally, NTSB rules prohibit any party to 

the investigation from being represented by "any person who also 

represents claimants or insurers.'' 49 C.F.R. 831.ll(c). 

The NTSB explained its reasons for denying Brooks admission, 

slip op. at 11, and reiterated those justifications to the 

district court. Reviewing the Board's explanation, we do not 

believe it relied on factors that Congress did not intend it to 

consider, or that it entirely failed to consider an important 

aspect of the problem. The proffered explanation does not run 

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counter to the evidence in the record and is certainly not 

implausible. Accordingly, we hold the NTSB was neither arbitrary 

nor capricious, and did not abuse its discretion or act contrary 

to law when it barred Brooks from its official investigation. ·we 

find our holding is supported by Graham, wherein the court was 

faced with a similar case of a deceased pilot's representative 

seeking admission to an NTSB engine teardown. The court 

determined the pilot's representative could add "nothing unique" 

to the investigation, and upheld the NTSB decision keeping the 

representative out. Graham,. 805 F.2d at 1389. As for Brooks' 

suggestions of impropriety by the NTSB, we believe Brooks performs 

a disservice to the dedicated investigators by implying all NTSB 

investigations are compromised when a manufacturer is a party. 

Finally, Brooks also asserts that barring him from the 

investigation constitutes an impermissible taking of property in 

violation of the Fifth Amendment. We find no merit to this claim. 

As we have noted, Brooks gets all of his property back after the 

NTSB completes its inquiry. In the unlikely event that something 

happens to the property while the NTSB is supervising its testing 

by the manufacturer, he has at his disposal all the "sanctions 

available to punish those who [wrongfully] alter or destroy 

evidence." Graham, 805 F.2d at 1390 n.9. By its mere testing of 

the plane, the NTSB is not denying Brooks the chance to make a 

claim against a manufacturer. For these reasons, we find that 

Brooks cannot validly claim that the NTSB investigation is 

unconstitutional. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

The decision of the NTSB denying Brooks admission to the 

official investigation concerning the crash of his plane was not a 

decision the district court was prevented from reviewing either by 

statute, or by virtue of the decision being committed to the 

NTSB's discretion by law. To the extent the NTSB decision 

implicated the Constitution, the district court also had the power 

to review it. Having so held, we further conclude that the NTSB 

decision barring Brooks from the investigation was not arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with the law. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is 

REVERSED and its permanent injunction is VACATED. 

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