Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02056/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02056-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

TROY WALLACE PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-2056

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff Troy Wallace appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

September 16, 2005, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 12). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $2,135.61 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 13.95 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $153.09. (Doc. # 13). The defendant has filed a response, expressing objections

to certain hours requested. (Doc. # 14).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

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An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

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counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at $153.09 per hour, for the 13.95

hours which he asserts he devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this court. The party

seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum

statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living

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or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains

at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In the

present case, plaintiff’s counsel did submit a Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban

consumers but he did not indicate that he was seeking an increase in the set hourly rate because

of cost of living increases. However, in his amended motion, plaintiff’s counsel states he is

seeking the increased rate due to cost of living increases. (Doc. # 16). 

The Commissioner has not raised an objection to the hourly rate requested. We note,

however, that an award based upon an hourly rate of $148.00 per hour, reflecting an increase

in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly fee awards in cases in Arkansas. See

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, based upon the above factors,

we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $148.00

per hour.

As to the number of hours for which plaintiff's counsel seeks compensation, defendant

argues that the 1.10 hours claimed byplaintiff's counsel for work performed on February 3, 2005,

February 11, 2005, and February 14, 2005, should be deducted. Plaintiff's counsel seeks a total

of 2.75 hours of work from February 3, 2005, through April 1, 2005. The brief two page

Complaint was not filed in this court until April 4, 2005. (Doc. # 1). We note, time spent at the

administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d

978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, some of the time submitted on the above referenced dates

was clearly in preparation for the filing of the Complaint with this court. Therefore, we will

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allow 2.00 hours. Accordingly, 0.75 hours must be deducted from the total compensable time

sought by counsel.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 13.20

(13.95-0.75) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $148.00 per hour for a total attorney's fee

award of $1,953.60. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due

benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 3 day of May 2006. rd

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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