Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00782/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00782-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KAREN CERVANTES, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

DHS: CPS OF MICHIGAN et al. 

Defendants. 

CASE NO: 11-CV-782-IEG (JMA) 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS; 

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

REQUEST FOR 

TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER AND 

PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION; 

(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 

[Doc. Nos. 1 & 2] 

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Karen Cervantes’s complaint, in which she requests a 

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction [Doc. No. 1], and Plaintiff’s motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Doc. No. 2.] 

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BACKGROUND

The exact nature of Plaintiff’s allegations is unclear. It appears that Plaintiff is the mother of 

two children who were removed from her custody. Plaintiff suggests the children were removed 

because she was involved in an automobile accident while she, another individual, or both were 

intoxicated, and because Plaintiff left the children in the temporary custody of a minor. [See Compl., 

at 2, 15, 25.] It also appears that the removal and the underlying incidents occurred in Michigan, and 

that the children and all Defendants remain there.1

 [See id. at 2, 3, 14.] Plaintiff seeks temporary and 

permanent injunctions to return children to her custody, alleging violations of her Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as Michigan’s Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 37.2201 et seq. 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Proceed IFP 

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, 

except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff 

is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 

1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets is sufficient to show that 

she is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action. See CivLR 3.2(d). 

Plaintiff is currently unemployed and lists no significant assets. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

II. Request for TRO and Preliminary Injunction 

To obtain a TRO or preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she is likely to 

succeed on the merits; (2) that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in her favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public 

interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008). Injunctive 

 1

 The complaint does not state where in Michigan any of the events occurred or in what city the 

children currently reside. The caption of the complaint makes one reference to Kent County. 

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relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.” Id. at 375-76. 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that her claims are likely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiff 

alleges her children were removed from her custody, but she does not allege that the removal 

procedures in Michigan are inadequate or that someone effected the removal of her children without 

following the procedures mandated under Michigan law. Rather, Plaintiff intimates that a judge in the 

State of Michigan approved the removal and merely takes issue with the judge’s decision. [See

Compl., at 14-15 (“State judge granted bogus [removal] petition based solely on [an automobile] 

accident [allegedly involving Plaintiff and intoxicating substances].”); id. at 15 (noting another 

allegation that Plaintiff left her children in the custody of a minor).] Plaintiff’s allegations are 

insufficient to support her claims. 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint has not been served. Until the complaint is served and 

Defendants have appeared in this action, the Court has no jurisdiction over any Defendant and may not 

issue orders mandating that they take certain action. See Zepeda v. U.S. Immigration Serv., 753 F.2d 

719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over 

the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of 

persons not before the court.”) (emphasis added). 

Because Plaintiff has failed to show the requisite likelihood of success on the merits, the Court 

does not consider the remaining three factors. Plaintiff’s request for a TRO and preliminary injunction 

is DENIED. 

III. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by any person 

proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and 

dismissal by the court if it fails to adequately state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but 

requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the “the language of 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). As currently 

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pleaded, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim and is subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). To avoid a dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed 

factual allegations, but it must plead enough facts to state a facially plausible claim. See Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (alteration in original). A court need not accept mere “legal conclusions” as 

true. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. In spite of the deference the Court is bound to pay to a plaintiff’s 

allegations, it is not proper for the Court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] 

has not alleged or that defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983). 

Plaintiff’s current complaint does not plead facts suggesting Defendants are liable for any 

misconduct; it merely states that Plaintiff’s children were removed. The complaint does not 

adequately describe the circumstances surrounding the children’s removal or any misconduct by 

Defendants. To state a claim, Plaintiff must describe the circumstances that give rise to her claims. 

 Additionally, Plaintiff brought her case in an improper venue. Plaintiff must bring this action 

“in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State; (2) a 

judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 

occurred . . . or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in 

which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also U.S. Aluminum Corp. v. 

Kawneer Co., Inc., 694 F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Section 1391(b) provides in essence, venue 

is proper in the district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose.”). It appears that the 

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incidents underlying Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Michigan, and that Plaintiff’s children and all 

Defendants are in Michigan. Plaintiff’s claims did not arise and no Defendant is alleged to reside in or 

have any contacts with the Southern District of California. Therefore, venue is not proper in this 

district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); U.S. Aluminum Corp., 694 F.2d at 195-96. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or to allege facts establishing venue in this Court, 

Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

[Doc. No. 2] Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is 

DENIED, and the complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. [Doc. No. 1.] 

 If Plaintiff chooses to amend her complaint, she should do so in the appropriate district in 

Michigan.2

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: _______________________________ 

 IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge 

 United States District Court 

 

 2

 Plaintiff’s complaint makes reference to Kent County, Michigan. Assuming venue would be 

proper in the district that includes Kent County, Plaintiff should file her amended complaint in the 

Western District of Michigan. See 28 U.S.C. § 102(b). 

4/20/11

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