Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01080/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01080-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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We note plaintiff’s counsel requested $1,924.70; however, this appears to have been a calculation error. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

T.C. MATHIS PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-1080

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff T.C. Mathis appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

February 14, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $1,886.45 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice 1

Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 4.25 attorney hours of work before the

court at an hourly rate of $156.00, 14.60 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $65.00; and $274.45

in expenses. (Doc. # 15). The defendant has filed a response, expressing objectionsto the hourly

rate requested for attorney hours. (Doc. # 16).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

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sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

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However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at $156.00 per hour, for the 4.25

hours which he asserts he devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this court. The party

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seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum

statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living

or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains

at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be

increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify

hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index.

Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit (Doc. # 15)

and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned

believes his argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has merit. 

The Commissioner has raised an objection to the hourly rate requested. We agree and

find that an award based upon an hourly rate of $148.00 per hour, reflecting an increase in

the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly fee awards in cases in Arkansas. See

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, based upon the above factors,

we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $148.00

per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.75 paralegal hour on September 23, 2005 (letters to SSA, U.S.

Attorney and U.S. Attorney General with Summons and Complaint), from which we deduct 0.75

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paralegal hour. This time cannot be compensated, under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v.

Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed

by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, we deduct 0.75 paralegal

hour from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel also seeks 2.00 paralegal hours on January 11, 2006, for the

preparation of the itemized billing and EAJA documents. We find the time sought on the above

referenced date to be excessive and deduct 0.50 paralegal hour from the total compensable time

sought by counsel.

Plaintiff's counsel seeks compensation for 4.25 attorney hours of work before this court.

We find that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to be compensated under the EAJA for 4.25 hours of

work that he indicates he expended on this case at the district court level. We further find

plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to 13.35 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $65.00. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $274.45 in expenses incurred with regard to the

filing fee and postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $274.45 to

be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 4.25

hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $148.00 per hour, 13.35 (14.60-1.25) hours for paralegal

fees at an hourly rate of $65.00, and $274.45 in expenses, for a total attorney's fee award of

$1,771.20. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits

which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

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The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 23 day of May 2006. rd

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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