Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01464/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01464-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DOUGLAS, Civil No. 10-CV-1464-MMA (BGS)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT DEFENDANTS SMELOSKY AND

VALENZUELA’S MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

v.

MICHAEL SMELOSKY, Warden; WALKER,

Sergeant; and VALENZUELA, Lieutenant,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Robert Douglas, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a

Complaint on July 12, 2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (“Compl.”, Doc. No. 1.) Douglas asserts

a claim against Defendants Michael Smelosky, Sergeant Walker and Lieutenant Valenzuela for

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights based upon freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

(Id.) On November 30, 2010, Defendants Smelosky and Valenzuela filed a motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 9.) On January 27, 2011, nunc

pro tunc to January 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. (Doc. No. 12.) Defendants

did not file a reply. 

This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”). On January 13, 2011, the Court determined that this matter is

appropriate for resolution without oral argument and submitted the motions on the parties’ papers

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1). (Doc. No. 10.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court

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RECOMMENDS that Defendant Smelosky and Valenzuela’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Background

Plaintiff Robert Douglas is a California state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis on his Complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff asserts one

cause of action for violation of his Eight Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment against Defendants Michael Smelosky, Warden of Centinela State Prison; Walker, a

sergeant at Centinela State Prison; and Valenzuela, a lieutenant at Centinela State Prison. (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 2.) The following

description of events is taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and is not to be construed as findings of

fact by the Court. 

Plaintiff alleges that on July 8, 2008, he was ordered by Sgt. Walker to sit on a dayroom

bench next to another inmate during cell searches. (Id. at 3.) When Plaintiff stated that there was

no room for him to sit because the other inmate refused to move over, Sgt. Walker accused Plaintiff

of refusing a direct order. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation, Sgt. Walker escorted

Plaintiff outside where SWAT personnel forced Plaintiff, who was bare-chested, up against the

housing unit wall in approximate 100o weather. (Id. at 3.) Sgt. Walker, Lt. Valenzuela, and SWAT

personnel mocked Plaintiff about how hot it was and how it must burn. (Id. at 3.) Lt. Valenzuela

asked Plaintiff several times during the search whether he had a problem with Sgt. Walker. (Id. at

3.) When Plaintiff noticed that SWAT personnel were discarding his personal property during the

search and brought it to the attention of Lt. Valenzuela, plaintiff was again escorted outside where

he was placed up against the hot wall. (Id. at 3.) SWAT personnel threatened to keep Plaintiff in

that position until the entire search was over. (Id. at 3.) 

After Plaintiff returned to his cell, his cell-mate began throwing out paper under the cell door.

(Id. at 3.) SWAT personnel came to the cell door and claimed that Plaintiff threw the paper out the

door. (Id. at 3.) Lt. Valenzuela ordered the SWAT personnel to escort Plaintiff outside where he

was placed in a squad van with the door closed. (Id. at 3.) Officers, SWAT personnel, and Lt.

Valenzuela mocked Plaintiff about how hot it must be inside the van. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff sweat so

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much that he could not see. (Id. at 3.) When Plaintiff exited the van, he stumbled and had to be

carried back inside the housing unit. (Id. at 3.) Medical staff arrived and registered nurse Laughrin

started taking Plaintiff’s vitals. (Id. at 3.) Lt. Valenzuela asked Laughrin to give him a minute with

Plaintiff. (Id. at 3.) SWAT personnel surrounded Plaintiff and Lt. Valenzuela asked Plaintiff what

happened, which Plaintiff could not answer. (Id. at 3.) Lt. Valenzuela then began calling Plaintiff

a “punk bitch” until Plaintiff passed out. (Id. at 3.) 

Defendants Smelosky and Valenzuela move to dismiss for failure to state a claim against

Defendant Warden Smelosky and for failure to state a claim for monetary damages against the

official-capacity defendants. (Doc. No. 9-1.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should deny

Defendants’ motion because his Complaint survived the Court’s sua sponte screening under 28

U.S.C. §1915. (Doc. No. 12 at 1-2.) As the Court cautioned in its order screening the Complaint,

“the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any

subsequent Rule 12[] motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” (Doc. No. 4 at 4 (citing

Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1119 (S.D.Cal.2007).) Therefore, the Court will consider

the merits of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Discussion

I. Legal Standard 

The plaintiff’s complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

[he] is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –––U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Id. “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Additionally, factual allegations asserted by pro se plaintiffs, “however inartfully pleaded,”

are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (reaffirming that this

standard still applies to pro se pleadings post-Twombly). Thus, where a plaintiff appears pro se in

a civil rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit

of the doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In giving liberal

interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims

that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir.1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are

not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733

F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to

state a claim under §1983). “The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt

acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal

quotation omitted).

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s claim against Warden Smelosky

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Smelosky failed to protect plaintiff from Cruel and Unusual

Punishment while acting under color of law.” (Compl. at 2.) Defendant Smelosky argues that

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against him under §1983 because there is no respondeat superior

liability under §1983 and because Plaintiff fails to plead any facts supporting a claim that Smelosky

failed to protect Plaintiff from cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 3.) 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)

(overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 (1986)); Flagg

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Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). “A person deprives another of a constitutional right,

where that person ‘does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to

perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

Under §1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home

Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir.1984). A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a

showing of personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v. County of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). A supervisor therefore

generally “is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.”

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th

Cir. 2011) (holding that Iqbal did not change case law on deliberate indifference claims against

supervisors in conditions of confinement cases and therefore, “a plaintiff may state a claim for

supervisory liability based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional

conduct by others”). This includes evidence that a supervisor implemented “a policy so deficient

that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the

constitutional violation.” Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446; see Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff’s only allegation regarding Smelosky is that Smelosky was the Warden at Centinela

State Prison and failed to protect Plaintiff from cruel and unusual punishment. (Compl. at 2.) Prison

officials are required to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–34 (1994). To state a claim for failure to protect, an inmate must allege

facts supporting that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of harm and that

jail officials were “deliberately indifferent” to the inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;

Redman, 942 F.2d at 1443. To adequately allege deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must set forth

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facts to support that a defendant official knew of an excessive risk to inmate safety, but disregarded

the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official must both [have been] aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must

also [have] draw[n] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Redman, 942 F.2d at 1442.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support a supervisory liability claim

against Smelosky for the alleged constitutional violations of his subordinates, Sgt. Walker and Lt.

Valenzuela. Even construing the pleadings liberally, Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any factual

allegations against Warden Smelosky. Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting that Smelosky

participated in or directed Sgt. Walker and Lt. Valenzuela to place Plaintiff against a hot wall and

in a van with the doors closed. As for his legally conclusory allegation that Smelosky failed to

protect Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting that Smelosky knew of Sgt. Walker’s and

Lt. Valenzuela’s intended actions and disregarded the risk of harm to Plaintiff by failing to prevent

their actions. Therefore, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Smelosky was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety. Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts supporting that Warden Smelosky

implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and

was the moving force of the violations alleged in his Complaint. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief against

Warden Smelosky and RECOMMENDS the motion to dismiss this claim be GRANTED without

prejudice and with leave to amend. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A pro

se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”). 

B. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their Official Capacities

Plaintiff sues all three defendants in both their individual and official capacities and seeks

relief in the form of monetary damages. (Compl. at 2 & 7.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims

against them in their official capacities for monetary damages are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment and therefore fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. No. 9-1 at

4.) It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner’s §1983 claims for monetary

damages against state actors sued in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

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491 U.S. 58, 66, 71 (1989) (emphasizing that the amendment prohibits damages actions against the

“official’s office,” in other words, actions that are in reality suits against the state itself, rather than

its individual officials); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992).

The courts have recognized a vital exception to this general rule. In Ex parte Young, 209

U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court held that a suit for prospective relief provides a narrow

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir.

2007); Rounds v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Doe v.

Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1997). When sued for prospective

relief, a state official, in his official capacity, is not immunized from liability under the Eleventh

Amendment. See Flint, 488 F.3d at 825.

Thus, to the extent Plaintiff sued Defendants in their official capacities seeking monetary

damages as a remedy, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed.

Plaintiff has not requested any prospective relief in his Complaint. Therefore, this Court

RECOMMENDS the claims for damages against all Defendants in their official capacity be

DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend. Plaintiff cannot plead facts sufficient

to overcome the eleventh amendment bar to these claims. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10.

Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that Defendants Smelosky and

Valenzuela’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and:

1. the claim against Warden Smelosky be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to

amend;

2. the official capacity claims for monetary damages against Defendants be dismissed with

prejudice.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than July 15, 2011, any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

/ / /

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 captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 17, 2011

 

BERNARD G. SKOMAL

United States Magistrate Judge

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