Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-13055/USCOURTS-ca11-15-13055-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-13055

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00297-WBH

KEVIN DARNELL JONES, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

MAJOR K. BEASLEY,

F.C.J.,

DEPUTY WARDEN OF CARE AND TREATMENT –

COASTAL STATE PRISON,

(C.S.P.),

PAROLE INTERVIEWER C.S.P.,

PROBATION INTAKE OFFICER,

(all to be named and identified),

 Defendants - Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(March 8, 2016)

USCA11 Case: 15-13055 Date Filed: 03/08/2016 Page: 1 of 7
2

Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Kevin Jones, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte 

dismissal of his due process violation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the 

reasons which follow, we reverse and remand. 

I

In his pro se complaint filed with the district court, Mr. Jones alleged that in 

2012 Judge Lovett, a Georgia state trial judge, sentenced him to a term of 

probation. In June 2013, he was arrested on a new charge. A different judge, 

Judge Russell, imposed a new term of probation and terminated Judge Lovett’s 

probationary term. Judge Russell’s probationary term for the 2013 offense

included six months at a sober living program in East Point Georgia, but the order 

included a “come back” notice. This “come back” notice required that Mr. Jones 

report to probation on January 22, 2014, if he was not in the sober living program, 

or that he report to probation within 48 hours of being placed in the sober living 

program. Mr. Jones contends that the “come back” notice inferred release if the 

sober living program was closed. Mr. Jones’ original transport order to the sober 

living program expired before he was transferred, and Mr. Jones’ attorney had to 

obtain a new transport order for January 20, 2014.

USCA11 Case: 15-13055 Date Filed: 03/08/2016 Page: 2 of 7
3

On January 20, 2014, Mr. Jones was processed out of jail and turned over to 

Sergeant King of the F.C.J. transport division. At this time Mr. Jones was 

provided with proof of incarceration and release. According to Mr. Jones’ 

complaint, during transport to the sober living program prison officials learned that 

the program had closed. Major K. Beasley told those officials to return Mr. Jones 

to the jail, despite Mr. Jones’ protests and the “come back” notice. The officials

returned Mr. Jones to the jail, but did not book him. 

On January 21, 2014, Mr. Jones informed the probation intake unit about the 

situation. At the time the inmate database listed Mr. Jones as “released.” On 

January 28, 2014, Mr. Jones was transferred to Coastal State Prison on a 13-month 

revocation sentence that was part of the originally imposed sentence by Judge 

Lovett in 2012. This occurred without either a hearing or a waiver of a hearing. 

Within the next 10–14 days, Mr. Jones explained the situation to the orientation 

counselor, the deputy warden of care and treatment, and his initial parole 

interviewer. However, none of these officials helped.

Mr. Jones filed a habeas petition in the state court and, on March 2, 2014, 

Judge Russell ordered Mr. Jones’ immediate release. Mr. Jones was not released 

for nine more days, however, and Judge Russell had to follow up and threaten to 

retrieve Mr. Jones personally.

USCA11 Case: 15-13055 Date Filed: 03/08/2016 Page: 3 of 7
4

Mr. Jones then filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of 

his Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty rights for the extended time he was 

held incarcerated beyond his sentence and Judge Russell’s court order.

II

On appeal, Mr. Jones argues that the district court erred when it dismissed 

his complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The 

district court gave one reason, and one reason only, for dismissal, and that was the

complaint was barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Mr. 

Jones failed to show that his conviction or sentence had been reversed or 

invalidated. 

A

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state 

a claim under § 1915A. See Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278–

79 (11th Cir. 2001). To avoid dismissal, the complaint must state a claim for relief 

that is facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The 

complaint here is viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Jones, and his wellpleaded facts are accepted as true. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 

F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). We will, moreover, liberally construe Mr. 

USCA11 Case: 15-13055 Date Filed: 03/08/2016 Page: 4 of 7
5

Jones’ pro se pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 

(11th Cir. 1998). 

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that 

an act or omission committed by a person acting under color of law deprived him 

of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. See Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). 

False imprisonment is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and a viable claim 

under § 1983. See Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996). A § 

1983 claim for false imprisonment requires a showing of (1) the common law 

elements of false imprisonment, and (2) a Fourteenth Amendment due process 

violation. See Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009). Under 

common law, false imprisonment requires an intent to confine, an act resulting in 

confinement, and the victim’s awareness of the confinement. Id. A due process 

violation ensues from the continued detention of a person after it was or should 

have been known that the detainee was entitled to release. Id. A plaintiff must 

also show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference, which requires 

proving that the defendants subjectively knew of a risk of serious harm, and 

disregarded that risk by actions that constitute more than mere negligence. Id. 

A § 1983 claim is barred by Heck and cannot “be brought by a prisoner for 

damages if the adjudication of the civil action in the plaintiff’s favor would 

USCA11 Case: 15-13055 Date Filed: 03/08/2016 Page: 5 of 7
6

necessarily imply that his conviction or sentence was invalid unless the plaintiff 

can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 

Morrow v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 610 F.3d 1271, 1272 (11th Cir. 2010). To 

demonstrate invalidation, a plaintiff must show that the “conviction or sentence has 

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a 

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. 

But Heck applies only if a prisoner’s § 1983 claim would necessarily affect the fact 

or duration of his confinement and the prisoner seeks either immediate release or a 

shortening of his confinement. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 

(2005); Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004). “[A]s long as it is 

possible that a § 1983 suit would not negate the underlying conviction, then the 

suit is not Heck-bared.” Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 879–80 (11th Cir. 2007). 

B

In Georgia, a prisoner may inquire about the legality of his imprisonment 

through a writ of habeas corpus. See O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1. If the examining judge 

determines that imprisonment or restraint is illegal, he or she will grant the writ, 

requiring the prisoner to be released. See O.C.G.A. § 9-14-5.

Because we accept the well-pleaded facts as true, and view them in the light 

most favorable to Mr. Jones, we find that the complaint sufficiently alleges that his 

USCA11 Case: 15-13055 Date Filed: 03/08/2016 Page: 6 of 7
7

term of imprisonment was invalidated with the successful granting of a habeas 

corpus petition by Judge Russell. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. Therefore, even 

if Mr. Jones’ claim is decided in his favor, his allegations do not improperly call 

into question the validity of his conviction or sentence. See Wilkson 544 U.S. at 

81–82. See also Morrow, 610 F.3d 1272 (holding that a prisoner’s claim under the 

FTCA based on being imprisoned for an extra ten days did not call into question 

the conviction or sentence and was not barred by Heck). At the very least, Mr. 

Jones sufficiently alleged that he was intentionally held, without legal authority, 

between March 2, 2014—when habeas corpus was granted—and March 11, 2014.

Because he was fully aware of his confinement, Mr. Jones sufficiently pled a 

constitutional claim for false imprisonment. See Campbell, 586 F.3d at 840. 

III

Based on what is set forth in the complaint, Mr. Jones has sufficiently 

alleged a due process violation under § 1983 that is not barred by Heck. The 

district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim was erroneous, and 

we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

USCA11 Case: 15-13055 Date Filed: 03/08/2016 Page: 7 of 7