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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 12, 2015*

Decided March 16, 2015 

Before 

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 14-2339 

MARK ANDERSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

AGRICULTURE, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Illinois. 

No. 13-cv-672-JPG-PMF 

J. Phil Gilbert, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Mark Anderson sued the Illinois Department of Agriculture, the United States 

Department of Agriculture, and the Farm Service Agency (part of the Department that 

implements farm conservation and regulation laws), alleging that the agencies failed to 

investigate and regulate a neighboring farmer whose diseased cattle infected his own 

herd. The district court dismissed Anderson’s claims against the federal defendants 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 14-2339 Page 2 

without prejudice for failure to effect service, and dismissed the claims against the 

Illinois Department of Agriculture with prejudice for failure to state a claim. We affirm. 

According to his complaint, many of Anderson’s cattle died after Ronald 

Shepard, a neighboring cattle farmer who was on supervised release after being 

convicted of wire fraud involving cattle transactions (see United States v. Shepard, 

154 F. App’x 849 (11th Cir. 2005)), allowed his diseased cattle to trespass on Anderson’s 

land. Anderson filed several grievances with the Illinois Department of Agriculture, 

asserting that Shepard was bringing diseased cattle from out of state without health 

certificates and that the cattle were spreading illness. The Department investigated 

Anderson’s complaints, but on each visit investigators found Shepard’s cattle to be in 

generally good health and spotted only minor problems—a single dead calf in a pasture 

and a fence that had been partially knocked down by a fallen tree—which Shepard 

remedied by the investigators’ next visit. Nonetheless, a substantial portion of 

Anderson’s herd became sick and died; he attributes this loss to Shepard’s cattle. 

Anderson also contacted Shepard’s federal probation officer and the federal 

Department of Agriculture, but they were unhelpful. The probation officer told him to 

“be quiet” and stop interfering with the government’s ongoing investigation into 

Shepard’s activities. The federal Department did not respond. 

In 2011 Anderson became delinquent on a loan he had received from the Farm 

Service Agency. The Agency declined his application to restructure the loan, concluding 

that, given other debts, Anderson would not have been able to afford a restructuring 

plan even if most of his herd had not died. 

In 2012, after Anderson’s cattle had died and he had left the farming business, 

both the probation officer and the federal Department took action against Shepard. The 

probation officer asked Judge Gilbert to revoke Shepard’s supervised release for 

violating its terms, including engaging in further crimes involving livestock. In 

September the court revoked Shepard’s release and ordered him incarcerated for 

24 months. United States v. Shepard, No. 4:11-cr-40007-JPG (S.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012). In 

April the federal Department filed an administrative complaint charging Shepard with 

trading in livestock without filing a bond or being properly registered with the Grain 

Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (an agency within the Department 

that regulates markets in farm products and animals), and with issuing bad checks in 

payment for livestock. The administrative proceedings concluded in January 2013 when 

the agency assessed a $582,000 civil penalty and prohibited Shepard from dealing in 

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livestock for 10 years. In re Ronald Ryan Shepard, Jr., P. & S. No. D-12-0357, 2013 WL 

8208352 (U.S.D.A. 2013). 

Anderson filed an administrative complaint in spring 2012 contending that the 

Department had violated his rights by failing to investigate Shepard promptly, thereby 

permitting him to continue to bring diseased cattle into Illinois. According to Anderson, 

the Department did not adequately investigate this complaint. 

Anderson turned to federal court in July 2013 and filed his complaint seeking 

damages from the state and federal agencies for failing to prevent the infection and 

death of his cattle. He alleged that the agencies violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986, committed 

fraud and misrepresentation by failing to disclose documents in response to information 

requests, violated an unspecified “Whistleblower Act,” and generally violated Title VI of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d–7. The Illinois Department of 

Agriculture moved to dismiss, arguing that Anderson’s claims were barred by sovereign 

immunity and otherwise lacked merit. 

The federal agencies were never served with process. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(1), 

when the United States is a defendant, service means delivering (or mailing) the 

complaint and summons to a specified person in the office of the United States attorney 

for the district in which the action has been filed. Copies must be sent to the Attorney 

General as well, but formal service is on the local United States attorney. When the 

complaint names an agency, that agency also gets copies. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(2). Anderson 

mailed or delivered copies to the Attorney General and agency officials in Washington, 

D.C., but did not serve the United States attorney. 

When the agencies did not answer the complaint, Anderson moved for default 

judgment. The district court denied that motion, informing Anderson that he needed to 

serve the local United States attorney. Anderson, who contends that service on the local 

United States attorney is unnecessary because the suit concerns actions (or inactions) of 

officials in Washington, D.C., declined to follow the district judge’s instructions. The 

judge gave him a second chance after the 120 days provided by FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) had 

run; he still did not serve the local United States attorney. The judge then dismissed the 

suit against the federal defendants for failure to serve them with process. 

In response Anderson moved for Judge Gilbert’s recusal, contending that the 

judge was biased because he had presided over Shepard’s criminal proceeding and 

therefore had knowledge of facts not in evidence, and that his bias was reflected in the 

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court’s denials of Anderson’s motions for default judgment. The judge denied his 

motion. 

The following month the court dismissed the claims against the Illinois 

Department of Agriculture with prejudice, concluding that three of the claims are barred 

by sovereign immunity and that the last claim does not include any specific allegations 

regarding the state agency and therefore does not state a claim against it. 

In this appeal the Illinois Department of Agriculture raises a threshold argument 

that we lack jurisdiction because Anderson filed his notice of appeal 31 days after the 

district court’s judgment. It is true that an untimely filed notice of appeal deprives us of 

jurisdiction, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209–10 (2007), but Anderson had 60 days 

to file his notice because a United States agency is a party, see FED. R. APP. P. 

(4)(a)(1)(B)(ii). Our jurisdiction is secure. 

As for the merits, Anderson first challenges the district court’s dismissal of the 

federal defendants for lack of service. He contends that he did not need to serve the local 

United States attorney because only the state defendant was located in the district where 

he brought the suit, and that the court misapplied Rule 4. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Anderson’s claims 

against the federal defendants. To serve a United States agency, a plaintiff must follow 

the directives of Rule 4(i), see McMasters v. United States, 260 F.3d 814, 817–18 (7th Cir. 

2001), and Anderson failed to do so. The rules provide a party “reasonable time to cure 

its failure to ... serve a person required to be served under Rule 4(i)(2), if the party has 

served either the United States attorney or the Attorney General of the United States.” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(4)(A). The district court provided Anderson this opportunity, but he 

still failed to serve the United States attorney. The federal defendants were properly 

dismissed. 

Anderson also contends that Judge Gilbert wrongly refused to recuse himself 

because of his personal knowledge of Shepard’s activities. According to Anderson, the 

judge knew of these activities as a result of presiding over the revocation of Shepard’s 

supervised release and the judge’s bias was evident in his refusal to grant a default 

judgment against the federal defendants. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s motion for 

recusal. Recusal is appropriate where the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned,” see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or where the judge has a “personal bias or prejudice 

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concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts.” See id.

§ 455(b)(1). But Anderson does not offer any evidence of judicial bias. The judge denied 

his motions for entry of default and presided over the revocation of Shepard’s 

supervised release, but those steps do not show bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 

540, 555 (1994); In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2005); Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 

235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Finally Anderson challenges the district court’s conclusion that sovereign 

immunity forecloses three of his claims against the Illinois Department of Agriculture 

and further argues that his complaint states claims for relief against the state agency. But 

Anderson’s first claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, is not cognizable because the agency is 

not a “person” under the statute. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 

(1989); Small v. Chao, 398 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005). Anderson may not sue a state in 

federal court for violations of state law, so he may not proceed on two of his remaining 

claims, a state-law claim for fraud and misrepresentation (his second) and a claim under 

the state’s Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS 174/1–40 (his fourth). See Pennhurst State Sch. & 

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); Sorrentino v. Godinez, No. 13-3421, 2015 WL 

294383, at *4 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2015). And he did not allege that the state agency 

discriminated against him based on his race, color, or national origin, so his third claim, 

nominally under Title VI, also fails. 

AFFIRMED 

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