Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04001/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ralph Carr,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 18-04001-PHX-ROS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Ralph Carr, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison, has filed a pro se

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed

an Answer (Doc. 13), but despite the opportunity to do so, Petitioner has not filed a reply.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Maricopa County Superior Court, case #CR

2012-010243, of 11 counts of sexual abuse, class 3 felonies, and three counts of sexual

abuse, class 5 felonies, and was sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment. (Doc. 6.) The

Arizona Court of Appeals described the facts of the case, as follows:

¶ 2 Carr worked as a horse trainer and riding teacher at a northwest Phoenix

horse ranch. Carr’s students ranged in age, with some as young as eight years

old. In March 2006, one of Carr’s students, whose mother noticed had lost her

excitement about going to her classes at Carr’s ranch, confessed to her parents

that Carr had touched her breasts multiple times. The parents called the police,

who then sent a Maricopa County Sheriff’s Deputy to speak with the family.

Two years later, another student, who had likewise suddenly lost interest in

attending her classes, told her mother and police that Carr had touched her

breasts multiple times.

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¶ 3 Approximately nine months after the second report, the Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office assigned a detective to investigate the claims. Soon after

interviewing both girls, the Sheriff’s Office issued a press release with Carr’s

information and the allegations made about him, asking if any other children

had similar experiences with him and requesting that they report any additional

incidents of abuse to them. This call for information led to an additional report

from another female student that Carr had inappropriately touched her.

Eventually, several girls came forward stating that Carr inappropriately

touched them while taking classes with him or working with him. Each

allegation involved Carr either touching the child’s breasts or buttocks.

Consequently, the State charged Carr with multiple counts of sexual abuse for

incidents occurring between 2002 and 2009.

¶ 4 Carr’s first trial began in October 2012, on an indictment alleging nine

counts of sexual abuse against four different victims. The jury was unable to

reach a verdict on any of the offenses. The State then moved to dismiss the

case without prejudice, which the trial court granted. The State subsequently

indicted Carr for 16 felonies: 15 counts of sexual abuse and one count of

aggravated assault for touching one of his female students “with the intent to

injure, insult, or provoke her.” The State alleged that the alleged incidents of

sexual abuse occurred between 2002 and 2009 on victims ranging in age from

9 to 15 years old.

¶ 5 Before the court set trial on the current indictment, Carr moved to sever

each of the counts. The court held an evidentiary hearing on Carr’s motion, at

which it considered whether evidence of the offenses would be admissible as

“other acts” under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 404 if the offenses were

tried separately. To show that evidence of the offenses would be admissible

because they showed a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual

propensity, the State presented expert testimony from a psychologist relating

to Carr’s emotional propensity and opining on his “aberrant behavior.” Carr

called his own expert witness to refute the State’s evidence and the State’s

expert’s conclusions. The expert specifically criticized the State’s expert’s

methodology in reaching his conclusion as unreliable because it could not be

verified and reproduced by other experts and did not include estimated error

rates.

¶ 6 Relying in part on testimony at an evidentiary hearing and on testimony

from the first trial, the trial court denied Carr’s motion on the first day of his

February 2015 trial. The court explained in a lengthy minute entry that each

of the offenses were “without question” of the same or similar character.

Additionally, the court found that the evidence would be cross-admissible at

separate trials to show intent and absence of mistake or accident under Rule

404(b) and to show an aberrant sexual propensity under Rule 404(c). In doing

so, the trial court agreed with the State’s expert’s findings, stating that it

“reache[d] the same ultimate conclusion that a person who engaged in the

conduct as alleged by the State has a character trait that would give rise to

aberrant sexual behavior.” The court also found that the evidentiary value of

the other offenses would not be substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice to Carr. After a 19–day trial, the jury acquitted Carr of the

aggravated assault offense and one count of sexual abuse, but could not reach

a verdict on the remaining counts. Accordingly, the trial court set a re-trial on

the remaining 14 counts of sexual abuse.

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¶ 7 Carr’s re-trial began in October 2015. Each of the female victims testified

that when they were young girls, Carr repeatedly reached from behind them

and touched, rubbed, or pinched their breasts. They also testified that the

incidents occurred after they started taking private horseback riding lessons

from Carr, and in one victim’s case, at a horse stable where she worked. The

conduct occurred over a period of seven years, with a gap between incidents

of at most 27 months—which began in 2009.

¶ 8 On the second day of testimony, Carr’s counsel reported that at the end of

the lunch break, she and her assistant had “started to walk into the women’s

restroom on this floor and [ ] immediately could hear and see [a victim

witness] and her mother there in the bathroom already talking.” Defense

counsel told the court that they waited until the two had left the bathroom, and

when they entered, “saw one of the jurors who had been in the bathroom

apparently the entire time” while they had been waiting outside. She noted,

however, that they “couldn’t hear who was talking or what was being said.”

She said that she was not sure, but thought that it might have been juror

number 11 in the bathroom, and described her hair and what she was wearing.

¶ 9 At the end of the day, the court excused all jurors except juror number 1,

who had been identified as juror number 11 during jury selection, and asked

her, “at any point today, have you been in the restroom or any area in the

courthouse where you have overheard the lawyers or a witness speaking about

this case in any way?” The juror responded, “no,” then added that she was in

the restroom when one of the victim witnesses and her mother were as well.

She stated that at least one lawyer came into the restroom as they were leaving,

but that “they weren’t talking about the case at all.” The court thanked the

juror and dismissed her. Carr did not object at any time or suggest to the court

that it was questioning someone other than the person Carr’s counsel saw in

the restroom.

¶ 10 At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury to consider

each offense separately and advised that each must be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. The trial court sua sponte also gave a supplemental Rule 404

limiting instruction after closing arguments to ensure “there is further clarity

to the jury on how they can use the other counts as evidence.” Before

dismissing the jury to deliberate, the court designated two jurors as

alternates—one of which was juror number 1, whom the court had questioned

earlier regarding the alleged restroom conversation. After deliberating, the jury

convicted Carr of the charged offenses. The court sentenced Carr to a total of

four years in prison, followed by lifetime probation and ordered him to register

as a sex offender. Carr timely appealed.

State v. Carr, 2017 WL 3866319 (Ariz. Ct. App. September 5, 2017).

In his direct appeal, Petitioner argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to sever the charges involving the different victims because the evidence

involving each victim was too remote and not cross-admissible; (2) he was prejudiced during

the second trial, in which the jury acquitted him on two counts and was unable to reach a

verdict on 14 counts, because the jury was exposed to media coverage and a juror’s personal

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prejudice; and (3) the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial due to the fact that the trial

court questioned the wrong juror upon learning that one or more of the jurors in the third trial

had overheard a witness and her mother talking in the bathroom during the break. See id.

On September 5, 2017, applying state law to reject Petitioner’s state law claims, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See id. Petitioner,

thereafter, filed a petition for review and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on April

30, 2018.

On October 2, 2017, Petitioner filed two notices of post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in

state court – one through counsel and another pro se. (Exhs. DDDD, EEEE, YYYY, ZZZZ.)

Through counsel, Petitioner alleged the existence of newly discovered material facts which

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, and the existence of facts which

established that he was actually innocent by clear and convincing evidence. (Exh. DDDD.)

In his pro se notice, Petitioner asserted the same two claims in addition to an IAC claim and

a claim that his failure to file a timely PCR notice was not his fault. (Exh. EEEE.) The court

subsequently appointed PCR counsel (Exh. FFFF), and on November 29, 2017, Petitioner,

through counsel, filed a motion to stay the PCR proceeding because he was preparing a

petition for review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision (Exh. GGGG). On December

10, 2017, the trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding without prejudice, noting that the

rules governing PCR proceedings did not permit the court to issue stays, and allowing

Petitioner to refile his PCR petition at the conclusion of his direct appeal. (Exh. HHHH.)

On May 3, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR notice asserting a general IAC claim.

(Exh. IIII.) He was subsequently appointed counsel (Exh. JJJJ), but on August 1, 2018,

Petitioner filed a pro se motion seeking clarification and/or modification of the conditions

of his probation. (Exh. MMMM.) On August 10, 2018, counsel filed a motion to dismiss and

to withdraw Petitioner’s PCR notice because Petitioner had advised counsel that he no longer

wished to pursue post-conviction relief. (Exh. NNNN.)

On August 17, 2018, the trial court issued a minute entry dismissing the PCR

proceeding. (Exh. OOOO.) On that same date, the court also issued an order requesting

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clarification on whether Petitioner wanted to pursue a claim, given his pro se motion to

modify or clarify the conditions of his probation. (Exh. PPPP.) Petitioner’s counsel filed a

notice informing the court that he had filed the motion to dismiss at Petitioner’s request

because Petitioner did “not wish to pursue any claims under Rule 32,” and it was counsel’s

understanding that the probation motion was unrelated to the PCR proceeding. (Exh.

QQQQ.) On August 29, 2018, the trial court vacated its previous dismissal order and, in

accordance with the clarification, dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding. (Exh. RRRR.)

Petitioner did not appeal the court’s order.

On November 8, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus raising

three grounds for relief. In Ground One, he alleges the trial court erred by denying his motion

to sever, among other errors, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Ground Two,

Petitioner alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated where two previous

juries had hung on the charges against him, which showed that there was sufficient evidence

to preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at his third trial. Petitioner also

alleges that the trial court’s decision to seclude the jury, which was on the verge of hanging

in his third trial, exerted pressure on that jury to convict him. In Ground Three, Petitioner

alleges a violation of his Fifth and his Fourteenth Amendment rights based upon the trial

court’s ruling on the admissibility of “other acts” evidence. (Docs. 6, 1.)

In their Answer, Respondents argue that Grounds One, Two, and Three are

procedurally defaulted without an excuse for the default.

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

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Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process, is insufficient

to achieve fair presentation. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 163 (1996)); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an

underlying federal legal theory.”). Similarly, a federal claim is not exhausted merely because

its factual basis was presented to the state courts on state law grounds – a “mere similarity

between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway,

223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted); see Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77.

Even when a claim’s federal basis is “self-evident,” or the claim would have been

decided on the same considerations under state or federal law, a petitioner must still present

the federal claim to the state courts explicitly, “either by citing federal law or the decisions

of federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted),

amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004)

(claim not fairly presented when state court “must read beyond a petition or a brief ... that

does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim” to discover implicit federal claim).

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1

 A state procedural default rule is “independent” if it does not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002).

2

 A state procedural default rule is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” Johnson

v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-53 (1982)).

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Additionally, a federal habeas court generally may not review a claim if the state

court’s denial of relief rests upon an independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the

rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court

could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run

around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-31. A petitioner who fails to follow a state’s procedural requirements for

presenting a valid claim deprives the state court of an opportunity to address the claim in

much the same manner as a petitioner who fails to exhaust his state remedies. Thus, in order

to prevent a petitioner from subverting the exhaustion requirement by failing to follow state

procedures, a claim not presented to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner is

deemed procedurally defaulted, and is generally barred from habeas relief. See id. at 731-32.

Claims may be procedurally barred from federal habeas review based upon a variety

of factual circumstances. If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner

attempted to raise the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both

“independent”1

 and “adequate”2 – review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court

is ordinarily barred. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law

default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can

ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.”) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-

88 (1977) and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)).

Moreover, if a state court applies a procedural bar, but goes on to alternatively address

the merits of the federal claim, the claim is still barred from federal review. See Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989) (“[A] state court need not fear reaching the merits of

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a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and independent

state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient

basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law. ...

In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing its interests in

finality, federalism, and comity.”) (citations omitted); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s application of a procedural rule is not undermined where, as

here, the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.”) (citing Harris, 489 U.S.

at 264 n.10).

A procedural bar may also be applied to unexhausted claims where state procedural

rules make a return to state court futile. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (claims are barred

from habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now

find the claims procedurally barred”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim ‘applies only

when a state court has been presented with the federal claim,’ but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or ‘if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally

barred.’”) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 263 n.9).

Specifically, in Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either

direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt

to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of

claims for which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief),

32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s

decision). Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further

review of claims that were not raised on direct appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction

proceedings. See, e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (determinations made under Arizona’s

procedural default rule are “independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191,

1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly

followed [“adequate”] in several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds,

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Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th

Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly followed”

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 334-36,

916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. See Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim unless a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result,

or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Pursuant to the

“cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented him

from following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim. “A

showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s

procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government interference or

reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ignorance of the State’s

procedural rules or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of legal training and a

petitioner’s mental condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a petitioner’s

failure to fairly present his claim. Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court

has made clear that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional

violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477

U.S. at 495-96. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss

plainly meritless claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state

court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate

in federal court to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal

under § 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”).

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1. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

by the trial court’s failure to: (a) grant his motion to sever; (b) declare a mistrial due to jury

exposure to media coverage; (c) declare a mistrial where one juror said “the Petitioner can

continue to do it if we don’t stop Ralph”; and (d) declare a mistrial due to juror allegedly

being given hearsay evidence by a victim and her mother. (Doc. 1 at 6.)

In his direct appeal, Petitioner argued the following state law claims: (1) the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his motion to sever the charges involving the different

victims because the evidence involving each victim was too remote and not cross-admissible;

(2) he was prejudiced during the second trial, in which the jury acquitted him on two counts

and was unable to reach a verdict on 14 counts, because the jury was exposed to media

coverage and a juror’s personal prejudice; and (3) the trial court erred by not declaring a

mistrial due to the fact that the trial court questioned the wrong juror upon learning that one

or more of the jurors in the third trial had overheard a witness and her mother talking in the

bathroom during the break. See Carr, 2017 WL 3866319.

Applying state law, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner claims and

affirmed his convictions and sentences. See id.

Petitioner having failed to allege in state court, the same federal constitutional claims

he alleges in the instant habeas petition, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to fairly

present the claims asserted in Ground One. Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have

“fairly presented” to the state courts the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing

the operative facts and federal legal theory upon which the claim is based. See Picard, 404

U.S. 270, 275-78 (1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with

the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.”); Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (A claim is

only “fairly presented” to the state courts when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to

the fact that [he] was asserting a claim under the United States Constitution.”); Johnson, 88

F.3d at 830 (“If a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal

constitutional claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues

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raised in state court.”). Failure to fairly present these claims has resulted in the procedural

default of the claims because Petitioner is now barred from returning to state court. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a).

2. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated where two previous juries had hung on the charges against him, which showed that

there was sufficient evidence to preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at his

third trial. Petitioner also alleges that the trial court’s decision to seclude the jury, which was

on the verge of hanging in his third trial, exerted pressure on that jury to convict him. (Doc.1

at 7.)

The record reflects that Petitioner failed to fairly present these claims to any level of

the state courts. Failure to fairly present these claims has resulted in the procedural default

of the claims because Petitioner is now barred from returning to state court. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a).

3. Ground Three

 In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges a violation of his Fifth and his Fourteenth

Amendment rights based upon the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of “other acts”

evidence. Petitioner complains about the “standard of proof for admission of other acts

evidence,” and the “adjoinment of each alleged victim without consideration to the Petitioner

... .” (Doc. 1 at 8.)

Again, on direct appeal, Petitioner argued pursuant to state law that the trial court

should have granted his severance request and argued that the evidence regarding each victim

was too remote and not cross admissible. He failed to argue a violation of his federal

constitutional rights by the trial court’s application of the clear and convincing standard in

its other acts determination. See Carr, 2017 WL 3866319. Petitioner having failed to allege

in state court, the same federal constitutional claims he alleges in the instant habeas petition,

the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to fairly present the claim asserted in Ground Three.

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Failure to fairly present this claim has resulted in the procedural default of the claim because

Petitioner is now barred from returning to state court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a).

4. Cause for the Defaults and Actual Prejudice, or a Fundamental

Miscarriage of Justice

Although a procedural default may be overcome upon a showing of cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51,

Petitioner has not filed a reply, and has not otherwise established that any exception to

procedural default applies.

Moreover, Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge and assistance,

and limited legal resources do not establish cause to excuse the procedural bar. See Hughes

v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s

lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse lawyers

did not constitute cause). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown cause for his procedural

default.

Petitioner has also not established a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal

court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner demonstrates

that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The standard for establishing a Schlup procedural gateway

claim is “demanding.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). The petitioner must present

“evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the

trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Under Schlup, to overcome the procedural hurdle created by

failing to properly present his claims to the state courts, a petitioner “must demonstrate that

the constitutional violations he alleges ha[ve] probably resulted in the conviction of one who

is actually innocent, such that a federal court’s refusal to hear the defaulted claims would be

a ‘miscarriage of justice.’” House, 547 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Schlup, 513 at 326, 327). To

meet this standard, a petitioner must present “new reliable evidence – whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

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evidence - that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the

burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327. Petitioner has failed to establish,

much less argue, a sufficient showing of actual innocence to establish a miscarriage of

justice. Therefore, Petitioner cannot excuse his procedural defaults on this basis.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Grounds One, Two, and Three are procedurally

defaulted and Petitioner has not established that any exception to procedural default applies.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Grounds One, Two, and Three are procedurally defaulted

without an excuse for the default, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

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in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2019.

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