Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01417/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01417-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOBY WADE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

J. HARTLEY, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:08-cv-01417 AWI YNP [DLB] (HC) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

[Doc. #14]

Petitioner is a State prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and is currently serving a State prison

term of sixteen years to life. On April 11, 2006, Petitioner was denied parole. He filed this petition

claiming that the denial violated his right to do process because the Board of Parole Hearings’

decision was not backed up by “some evidence” that Petitioner poses a current risk of danger to

society. (Pet.)

State habeas petitions

On March 18, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Sacramento

Superior Court. (Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1.) The petition was denied on May, 10, 2007. (Mot. to 1

Dismiss, Ex. 2.) 

Unless otherwise specified, all petitions are deemed filed on the date on which they were signed pursuant to the

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prison mailbox rule. See Rule 3(d) for the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; see also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.

266 (1988).

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

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On August 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. (Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 3.) The petition was summarily 

denied on September 6, 2007. (Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 4.)

On November 28, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Supreme Court, which was denied without comment on June 11, 2008. (Mot. to Dismiss,

Exs. 5-6.)

Federal habeas petition

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of California on September 18, 2008. (Doc. #1.) On August 3, 2009, Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition was untimely and unexhausted. (Doc. #14.) 

Petitioner did not file objections to Respondent’s motion. It is Respondent’s motion to dismiss that

will be considered herein.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, prisoner filed this petition complaining of his parole denial while housed at

Avenal State Prison, located in Avenal, California, which is within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the AEDPA, which applies to all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood,

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition

was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 2

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Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." See Hendricks

v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990).

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using

Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis,

874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to

dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal.

1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and

the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.

12. Because the arguments in the motion to dismiss are procedural in nature and Respondent has not

yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

III. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after

the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. at 117; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d at 1499. As

noted above, the instant petition is subject to the requirements laid out in the AEDPA. The AEDPA

imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 3

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘§ 2244's one-year limitation period applies to all habeas

petitions filed by persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court’ even if the petition

challenges an administrative decision rather than a state court judgment.” Eric v. Shelby, 391 F.3d

1061, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. After the Board of Parole Hearings denied Petitioner’s parole there was no

further direct review available; therefore, the judgment became final on the date parole was

denied–April 11, 2006. The one-year limitation period began to run the next day, on April 12, 2006.

Thus, absent any applicable tolling, Petitioner had to file his petition in the U.S. District Court by

April 11, 2007.

Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application for

state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. Carey v. Saffold, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d

1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state court

petition and the filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v. Stewart,

251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the "AEDPA's one-year grace period is tolled

during the pendency of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at issue."); cf.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 4

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Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001) (Court found no tolling between consecutive filings

at the same level); Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.2001) (holding that the

interval between a motion for sentence modification in the state superior court and a habeas petition

in the superior court was not tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

The limitation period is tolled while a “properly filed application for state post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005). “A state post conviction petition rejected by the state court

as untimely” cannot be considered “properly filed.” Id.

Petitioner commenced his first round of State collateral appeals by filing his State superior

court petition on March 18, 2007–340 days into the one-year limitation period. Assuming tolling

through Petitioner’s State superior court, appellate court, and supreme court petitions, the limitations

period began to run again on June 12, 2008, the day after the State supreme court denied the

petition.

The limitation period does not toll during the period between completion of state review and

filing a petition in federal court. Rhines v. Weber, 545 U.S. 269, 274-75 (2005) (citing Duncan, 533

U.S. 167 , 181-82 (2001)). Assuming tolling during the entire time that Petitioner was filing habeas

petitions in the State courts, he only had 25 days in which to file a federal petition after the conclusion

of his State proceedings. Petitioner allowed 98 days to lapse between the day his petition was denied

by the State supreme court and the day he filed in this Court; thus, the instant petition was not filed

within the one-year statute of limitations.

Equitable Tolling

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S. Dist.

Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d

696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997)); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ctourt for the

Cent. Dist. Of Cal.(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will

not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary

circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time"), overruled on

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 5

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other grounds by Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. Of California, 163 F.3d 530, 539 (9th

Cir. 1998), abrogated by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). "When external forces, rather

than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Smith v. Duncan, 297

F.3d 809 (9th Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993).

Petitioner did not present any argument for equitable tolling nor did the Court see

extraordinary circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling in its review of the petition; thus,

equitable tolling is not applicable in this case.

Because the petition was not filed within the time period required by the AEDPA, the Court

declines to address Respondent’s argument that the petition is unexhausted.

CONCLUSION

The instant petition must be dismissed as untimely because it was filed after the AEDPA’s

one-year statute of limitations ended.

RECOMMENDATION

It is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and 

2) the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 6

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