Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_99-cv-02933/USCOURTS-alnd-5_99-cv-02933-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0151ta - Telecommunications Act of 1996

---

1Tritel Communications, L.L.C., is now know as Cingular Wireless. However, for

purposes of this opinion, the court will continue to refer to this plaintiff as Tritel.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

AMERICAN TOWER, L.P.; TRITEL

COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; BGR

PROPERTIES, L.L.C.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA;

DAVID WILLIAMS; BOB GAMMONS;

JANET WATSON; CRAWFORD

HOWARD; PHIL LOFTIS,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 99-B-2933-NE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Beginning June 15, 2005, this court conducted a bench trial on plaintiffs’ claims

against defendants. Plaintiffs – American Tower, L.P., Tritel Communications, Inc.,

1

 BGR

Properties, L.L.C. – have sued the City of Huntsville and the individual members of the

Huntsville Board of Zoning Adjustments [hereinafter collectively referred to as the “BZA”]

alleging that defendants violated the anti-prohibition provision of the Telecommunications

Act of 1996 [“TCA”], 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). Plaintiffs also seek de novo review,

pursuant to Ala. Code § 11-52-81, of the BZA’s decision to deny American Tower’s

application for a special exception and variance to build a 180' telecommunications tower in

a residential district. In accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

FILED

 2006 Mar-22 AM 10:07

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 1 of 40
2The court notes that its FCC license requires Tritel to provide “quality coverage.”

For a wireless provider, the absence of coverage over a high-use area (e.g. a

population cluster or major road) creates legal and commercial problems. In

order to retain its FCC license for a region, a licensee must achieve quality

coverage (defined by the industry as the absence of “dropped” calls) for a

certain percentage of the region’s population within a certain number of years

after the license was granted; if the licensee fails to do so, it will forfeit its

entire license. See 47 C.F.R. § 90.685(d) (2002). In addition, the ability to

provide uninterrupted coverage in high-use areas is considered essential for a

wireless company to remain competitive in that region.

Nextel West Corp. v. Unity Township, 282 F.3d 257, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2002)(emphasis added).

2

the court hereby enters this Memorandum Opinion, which sets forth its findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

I. STIPULATED FACTS

The parties have stipulated that the following facts are not in dispute:

1. Plaintiff Tritel Communications, L.L.C. . . . is a wireless

telecommunications service provider offering wireless personal

communications services in several southeastern states, including Alabama.

2. Tritel holds a broadcast license from the Federal Communications

Commission to develop and operate a wireless network in and around the City

of Huntsville, Alabama . . . .2

3. Tritel’s network in [Huntsville] consists of a network of antenna

facilities in and around [Huntsville] that serve portable wireless

communications handsets and mobile telephones.

4. Tritel and Plaintiff American Tower, L.P. . . . sought to construct a

wireless telecommunications tower and antenna facility on a 6.33-acre tract of

land owned by Plaintiff BGR Properties, LLC . . . located at 1220 Blevins Gap

Road in [Huntsville] (the “Property”).

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 2 of 40
3

5. The Property is zoned as a Residence 1-A District (R-1A) under the

1989 Zoning Ordinance for the City, as updated to May 1, 1998 . . ., and

portions of the Property are leased and used as soccer fields by Grissom High

School and leased and used as a Montessori School.

6. On May 18, 1999, Tritel entered into an Option and Lease

Agreement with BGR, thereby securing an option to lease a site (the “Site”)

consisting of a 10,000 square-foot parcel of the Property.

7. The Site lies approximately in the center of the Property, and the

tower at the Site stands approximately 211 feet south of the Blevins Gap Road

right-of-way.

8. On June 23, 1999, Tritel assigned its interests in its Option and

Lease Agreement with BGR to American Tower.

9. On August 31, 1999, an application was filed with the BZA (the

“Application”) seeking a special exception authorizing the placement of a

proposed telecommunications facility at the Site and a variance authorizing

American Tower to construct a 180-foot monopole, exceeding the Zoning

Ordinance’s height limitation by 80 feet.

10. On November 1, 1999, American Tower exercised its option under

the Option and Lease Agreement and became the Lessee of the Site.

11. The BZA conducted a hearing on the Application on October 19,

1999, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the BZA denied the Application.

12. The record of the materials and testimony received by the BZA on

the Application is found in the Statutory Certification of Record of

Proceedings Before BZA filed in this action on March 24, 2000 (the “BZA

Record”).

13. The Application before the BZA and the zoning appeal under Ala.

Code § 11-52-81 to be tried in this case are governed by the Zoning Ordinance,

a true and correct copy of which is found at pages 1-397 of the BZA Record.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 3 of 40
3Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each

document as it is filed in the court’s record.

4Defendants have argued that American Tower did not have standing to apply for the

special exception and variance. However, American Tower’s standing has been established

in earlier rulings by this court, which were affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in American

Tower LP v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1206 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002)(“In the light of the

BZA’s motion to dismiss, the district court determined that American Tower had standing

to bring its application before the BZA and to bring its Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) claim in this

case. Given the usual rules of agency, the district court’s conclusion was correct.”).

4

(Doc. 105 [footnote added].)3

For purposes of deciding the issues in this case, the court has accepted the parties’

stipulated facts as true.

II. APPEAL OF THE BZA’S DECISION

Plaintiffs assert that defendants violated the anti-prohibition provision of TCA, 47

U.S.C. § 322(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), when the BZA denied American Tower’s request for a special

exception and a variance. Also, they seek a de novo review, pursuant to Ala. Code § 11-52-

81, of the BZA’s denial of American Tower’s application for a special exception and a

variance.4

 Because a decision favorable to plaintiffs on their de novo appeal would moot

the TCA claim, this court, “sit[ting] as a ‘glorified board of adjustment,’” Ex parte Chapman,

485 So. 2d 1161, 1163 (Ala. 1986), will first decide whether American Tower is entitled to

a special exception and a variance allowing them to construct a 180' communications tower

at the Blevins Gap Road site.

Section 11-52-81 of the Alabama Code provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by . . .

[a] decision of [a] board of zoning adjustment” has the right to appeal that decision to the

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 4 of 40
5American Tower, as well as Tritel and BGR, are “part[ies] aggrieved” by the BZA

decision to deny American Tower’s application for a special exception and a variance. See

Ex parte Steadham, 629 So.2d 647 (Ala.1993).

5

state circuit court.5

 Ala. Code § 11-52-81. The proceedings before the circuit court “shall

be tried de novo.” Id. On appeal, this court “sits as a ‘glorified board of adjustment,’ and

[it] is limited to considering only that which the board itself could have considered.” Ex

parte Chapman, 485 So. 2d at 1163 (quoting City of Homewood v. Caffee, 400 So.2d 375,

377 (Ala. 1981); other citations omitted). 

A. DECISION OF BZA

American Tower filed an application for a special exception to allow it to construct

a communications tower in a residential district and for a variance to allow it to build a 180'

tower, which would exceed the 100' height limitation of the Ordinance. (See Pls. Ex. 16.)

The transcript of the hearing before the BZA reveals the basis for its decision to deny

American Tower’s application. See American Tower v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203,

1207 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002)(“The BZA sent American Tower a letter denying [its] application,

and the BZA’s reasons for that denial appear in the minutes and transcript of the hearing.”).

At the hearing, the members of the BZA stated:

MR. GAMMONS: Your Honor, can I make a motion that the request

for a special exception be granted but subject to a 100 foot limitation.

CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: There is a motion. Is there a second?

It dies for the lack of a second.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 5 of 40
6

All right, back to the original motion. The request is for the location

and height of a telecommunications tower facility at 1220 Blevins Gap Road.

All those is favor signify by raising your hand.

CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: And I see none. It is defeated.

. . .

. . . Let me do this for the record.

In my personal opinion, I was not willing to grant a special exception

for the height reason and because of the fact that it would not provide them

sufficient coverage, I did not feel like a special exception was in order.

MR. HOWARD: My reasoning against it was the fact of its

proximate location to the school and the kids in the soccer field – there is a

potential safety hazard that it could pose if the kids, as an example kicked their

soccer ball over – the gate is locked and all – and start climbing the fence and

go over inside to get it. It can cause a potential problem – a safety hazard out

there.

CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: Anyone else, for the record?

MS. WATSON: Well, I was leaning on the health and safety issue, too,

as well as the aesthetic impact. When you see you have the topography that

you have out there and the number of homes – I thought it definitely would

have an aesthetic impact.

MR. GAMMONS: I think that the record in this case is probably more

clear – at least in my view – than many other cases that have been presented.

In that we have had some technical input from both sides. I certainly don’t

think that anyone from the tower company is misrepresenting anything – I

know they have their view as to what is optimum – but I think the health and

safety issue is a concern. That it is densely populated residential area concerns

me. In addition to the school, I think that – in my view, there should be a

higher burden to come in and see what the ordinance authorizes – that is, the

100-foot level. I would have been prepared to vote to accept the 100-foot

tower, given the work that has been done on the ordinance, but not beyond

that, in this particular location.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 6 of 40
6The transcript of the BZA hearing contained in the record is condensed with multiple

pages reduced and copied onto a single page. The court has cited to the page number of the

original transcript.

7

(Pls. Exh. 36, Hearing Transcript at 77-79.)6

 Hulan Smith sent a letter to American Tower

that stated its application for a variance and special exception had been denied. (Pls. Exh.

35.)

B. SPECIAL EXCEPTION

1. Zoning Ordinance

“[A] special exception, though it is not a regular permitted use, is a use that is

expressly listed in and permitted by a set of zoning regulations, provided that it is specially

approved in accordance with the procedures, and subject to the conditions, set forth in those

regulations.” Shades Mountain Plaza, L.L.C. v. City of Hoover, 886 So.2d 829, 836 (Civ.

App. 2003), cert. denied (Ala. 2004). The Huntsville Zoning Ordinance provides a special

exception for placement of “[t]owers intended to support personal wireless service antennas”

in a district zoned for residential use. (Pls. Exh. 11, § 92.5.3(9).) The Ordinance states:

The Board of Adjustment may permit, as a special exception, the following

uses in the specified district:

. . .

(9) Towers intended to support personal wireless service antennas in any

residential district; approval shall be subject to the conditions contained

in Sections 73.20.4 – Lighting, 73.20.5 – Tower Color, 73.20.6 – Site

Security, 73.20.8 – Structural Design of Towers, 73.20.9 – Signs,

73.20.10 – Access, 73.20.11 – Landscape, 73.20.16 – Co-Location, and

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 7 of 40
8

73.20.17 – Building Permits for Towers of this ordinance, and to the

following conditions:

(a) Towers must be monopoles and must be designed to implode under

stress; antennas used must be of the least visually obtrusive design

available at the time of application.

(b) A signed affidavit from the applicant verifying the inability to

locate the proposed antennas on existing towers or other structures

accompanied by supporting documentation as specified in Section

73.10.16 – Co-Location, and including substantial evidence that the

tower cannot, by technical necessity, feasibly be located in a nonresidential district.

(c) Any new tower permitted must be designed to accommodate

personal wireless service antennas for at least one additional user for a

reasonable fee if technically feasible.

(d) Accessory facilities shall be fully automated and shall not include

offices, vehicle storage, outdoor storage, or broadcast studios.

(e) Tower heights shall not exceed one hundred (100) feet.

(f) Setbacks for towers shall be at least fifty feet (50') from all lot lines,

and setbacks for accessory structures shall be a minimum of twenty (20)

feet from all lot lines or as required for primary structures in the district

if greater.

(g) Towers shall not be permitted within the boundaries of any historic

district listed on the National Register nor shall towers be located on

the same lot with a residential structure.

(h) Accessory buildings and security fences or walls shall be

constructed so as to be compatible with the surrounding residential

neighborhood by virtue of their design, materials, textures, and colors.

(i) New towers permitted on mountain tops or slopes should be

clustered with existing towers, if any, to the extent that such location is

technically feasible and safe as well as aesthetically, environmentally

and visually compatible. 

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 8 of 40
7The parties do not dispute the fact that American Tower’s proposed tower exceeded

the 100' height limitation; however, American Tower sought a variance from this limitation.

The merits of American Tower’s application for a height variance is discussed below.

8The process of locating wireless antennas on existing structures is sometimes referred

to as “collocation.” See PrimeCo Personal Communications, Ltd. Partnership v. City of

Mequon, 352 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2003)(“The commissioners invoked a preference for

‘collocation’ (also and more illuminatingly spelled ‘co-location’) – that is, for placing a new

antenna in an existing telecommunications tower or other structure of the requisite height and

capacity, such as a church steeple.”) However, for the sake of clarity, the court will use “colocation,” the spelling adopted in the Zoning Ordinance.

9

(Id.) At trial, the only disputed issue regarding whether American Tower met the conditions

for a special exception was whether it satisfied the co-location criteria.7 The Ordinance

contains the following requirements regarding co-location of communication antennas:

73.20.16 Co-Location8

To minimize the adverse visual, aesthetic and environmental impacts

associated with the proliferation of towers, co-location of antennas by more

than one user on existing or permitted towers shall take precedence over the

construction of new towers. Towers shall be designed to maximize shared use

to the extent possible for the type of tower proposed without creating structural

instability or electromagnetic interference with other antennas on the tower.

(1) Subject to Section 73.20.16(2), no new tower shall be permitted unless the

applicant demonstrates by sufficient documentary evidence that at least one of

the following conditions is applicable:

(a) No existing towers or suitable structures are located within the

geographic area required to meet applicant’s engineering requirements,

and no such towers are under consideration for building permits.

(b) Existing towers or other structures are not of sufficient height and

cannot be reasonably altered to meet applicant”s engineering

requirements.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 9 of 40
10

(c) Existing towers or other structures do not have sufficient structural

strength and cannot be reasonably altered to support applicant’s

proposed antenna and related equipment.

(d) The proposed antenna would cause electromagnetic interference

with existing antenna(s) on the tower or structure, or the existing

antenna(s) would cause interference with the proposed antenna and the

interference cannot be prevented at a reasonable cost.

(e) The applicant demonstrates that there are other limiting factors that

render existing towers and structures unsuitable.

(f) Co-location would have a more detrimental environmental,

aesthetic, or visual impact on the surrounding area than would

construction of a new tower.

(2) Even if an applicant is able to demonstrate the existence of one of the

foregoing conditions, a new tower may not be permitted if it is determined that

the proposed location of the tower is not essential to the applicant to provide

service in a given geographical area, and the tower would:

(a) interfere with or endanger the use of other telecommunication

facilities; or

(b) endanger persons or property; or

(c) not be compatible with existing or proposed adjacent development;

or

(d) have an impermissible environmental, visual, or aesthetic impact

on the surrounding area.

(3) Written requests by certified mail to co-locate on an existing or proposed

tower shall be answered by the tower owner within thirty days of receipt of the

request. Denial of a request without substantial documentary evidence as

required herein demonstrating why co-location would not be possible or failure

to respond to a request shall be a violation of the Zoning Ordinance.

(Id. § 73.20.16.)

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 10 of 40
11

With regard to the co-location requirements, the parties dispute that plaintiffs have

shown that a tower at the site is “essential” to the provision of service, (see id.(2)); that it

presents a safety problem, (id. (2)(b)); and that would have an impermissible aesthetic

impact, (id. (2)(d)).

2. Essential to Applicant to Provide Service in a Geographical Area

As required by § 92.5.3(9), plaintiffs have submitted “[a] signed affidavit . . .

verifying the inability to locate the proposed antennas on existing towers or other structures

. . . and . . . substantial evidence that the tower cannot, by technical necessity, feasibly be

located in a non-residential district.” (See Pls. Exh. 11, § 92.5.3(9)(b); Pls. Exh. 18; see Pls.

Exh. 11, § 73.20.16(1).) The parties do not dispute the fact that there is no existing tower or

suitable structure in the search ring. Therefore, the court assumes that plaintiffs have meet

the requirement of § 73.20.16(1)(a).

When co-location is not possible, a special exception for a tower in a residential

district may not be denied if the tower is “essential to the applicant to provide service in a

given geographical area.” (Pls. Exh. 11, § 73.20.16(2).) The parties dispute the fact that a

tower at the Blevins Gap Road site is essential to the provision of service in the area.

Plaintiffs have presented evidence that technically and practically a tower for Tritel’s antenna

is necessary at the site and cannot be placed elsewhere. Defendants contend that a tower at

the site is not essential because a prior network design did not include a tower at the site,

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 11 of 40
12

because a lower-signal would provide coverage in the area, and/or because the tower could

be placed on another site and provide coverage in the area.

a. Original Network Design

The geographic area for the tower was fixed based on the design for the Huntsville

area created by Galaxy Engineering for Tritel. (Tr.42, 227-28.) Defendants contend that,

because the design at issue was the second design and because the first design did not include

a tower at the site, the tower at the site is not essential to provide service in this geographic

area.

Tritel holds an FCC license to provide wireless communication services for the

Huntsville area. (See doc. 105.) This license requires Tritel to provide quality, uninterrupted

service, (Tr.107); failure to provide such adequate coverage could cause Tritel to lose its

license. See Nextel West Corp. v. Unity Township, 282 F.3d 257, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2002). The

court notes that wireless networks have certain parameters – technical and practical – within

which they must be designed.

Generally speaking – 

To create a wireless network that provides uninterrupted cell phone

service for a given geographical region, a telecommunications company must

stitch together a patchwork of transmission cells. An antenna is located in the

approximate center of a cell and the antenna transmits wireless signals to and

from cell phone users in that cell. Because an antenna transmits signals on a

line-of-sight basis, it is typically mounted on a tower or other tall structure.

The perimeter of each cell is shaped by the topography surrounding the

antenna. Where the terrain is flat, a cell is circular and several miles in

diameter. But . . . hilly terrain [will] distort[] the shape and shrink[ ] the size

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 12 of 40
13

of a cell. The gaps these distortions create complicate the process of stitching

together cells to blanket the targeted region.

Because each wireless company is licensed by the Federal

Communications Commission (“FCC”) to use a different radio frequency, and

because different companies use different transmission technologies, each

wireless provider must deploy its own network of antennae, spaced at intervals

so that their cells interlock.

Unity Township, 282 F.3d at 259.

Moreover, “the system must be designed so that signals that are generated in one cell

do not interfere significantly with signals at the same frequencies that are used in

non-adjacent cells.” (Tr.504.) Gregg L. Vaughn, Ph.D., P.E., a licensed engineer and the

Chair of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department of University of Alabama at

Birmingham, testified – 

Typical cellular systems have a frequency reuse pattern, so that the same

frequency is not used in adjacent cells, but it is used in the same area, in the

Huntsville area. . . . The frequency reuse typically employed is a seven-cell

pattern. So some frequencies are going to be reused among [the 17 antennas

in Tritel’s Huntsville network]. Now, when you do anything at one tower or

in one area to increase coverage, . . you may increase coverage in that area,

but it’s going to cause more interference in another area across town and

decrease coverage in that area. So the whole thing has to be balanced. 

(Id.; see also Pls. Exs. 52, 53.)

The original design of Tritel’s Huntsville network required the building of numerous

new towers. (Tr.63, 338-39.) The Ordinance requires that wireless telephone towers be colocated on existing towers or other structures if possible. (Pls. Exh. 11, §§ 73.20.16,

92.5.3(9)(b).) The second network design required 17 antenna sites to provide coverage in

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 13 of 40
9A propagation study is “a computerized calculation of how a tower will perform. It’s

. . . a prediction tool. So if you put in certain parameters, it’s going to give you the results

of what the coverage will be.” (Doc. 54 at 40-41.) The engineer enters certain information

– such as “site, . . . tower height, antennas, parameters about the propagation, the effects of

the surrounding area – into a computer and “he can generate an anticipated downlink of

coverage.” (Tr.261.) “A downlink, which is the RF energy from the site to a model, a

location on the ground.” (Id.)

10Defendants have presented evidence that some residents of the area had cell phone

service before the tower was built. (See Tr. 665, 680,-81.) However, these residents did not

use Tritel’s service. (Id. at 665, 681.) With regard to granting a special exception for a tower

in a residential district, the Ordinance specifically states that the applicant must show that the

tower was essential to the applicant’s ability to provide service in the geographic area; the

applicant is not required to show that the tower was essential to any provider’s service in the

14

Huntsville. (Tr.97.) Of these 17 sites, 13 antennas were co-located on existing structures;

therefore, only four new towers were required. (Id.) Of these four towers, permits were

issued for towers at three sites in areas zoned for commercial use. (Id.) Only the site at issue

in this case was in an area zoned for residential use and, thus, required a special exception

and variance. (Id.) 

The court finds that the first network design did not meet the requirements of §

73.20.16 and § 92.5.3(9) of the Ordinance. Therefore, the court finds that the first network

design was not a feasible alternative and, therefore, evidence of the first design is not

evidence that an antenna at the BGR site was not essential.

b. Required Signal Strength 

Plaintiffs have presented propagation studies9

 they contend show an impermissible

lack of coverage without a tower at the site based on a lack of adequate signal strength at the

site without the tower.10 (Pls. Exh. 21 at Bates no. 001485-46.) According to Nathan

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 14 of 40
area. (See Pls. Exh. 11, § 73.20.16(1)(a) and (2).) Therefore, the fact that another provider

was able to provide service in the area without the tower is not relevant to the court’s

determination of whether American Tower satisfied the co-location criteria for a special

exception.

15

McNeal, a radio frequency engineer involved in the design of Tritel’s Huntsville network,

a signal strength of at least -88 dBm is needed for in-vehicle coverage. (Pls. Exh. 54 at 108-

09.) He testified that a user of a Tritel phone could stand outside and “operate a call” at -92

dBm. (Id. at 108.) He also testified that there is a loss of 6-8 dBm inside a vehicle, and a

loss of 10-12 dBm inside a building. (Id. at 109) Ron Rowland, an engineer with Tritel,

testified that the engineer designing a network would also add a “fade margin” of 5-7 dBm

above the minimum at which the system could operate “to account for variations in signal

strength.” (Tr.332.) Although defendants have presented evidence that Tritel’s phones will

work on some level at -104 dBm, (see Tr.753), the court finds that the weight of the evidence

favors plaintiffs’ position that Tritel needed a signal strength of at least -88 dBm to have

quality in-vehicle coverage in the geographic area around the site. Therefore, the court finds

that a tower and antenna at the site were essential to providing quality coverage in the

geographic area surrounding the site.

c. Alternative Sites

Defendants contend that plaintiffs have not shown that the tower at Blevins Gap Road

was essential to Tritel because there are alternative sites for the tower and antenna. For the

reasons set forth below, the court disagrees.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 15 of 40
11When asked whether an antenna could be located outside of a search ring, Rowland

testified, “If the engineer has dropped the search ring and has looked at options within the

search ring, I would want to say that – if it was a search ring that I issued, the answer would

be no.” (Tr.340.)

16

i. Search Ring

A search ring “is just an area, a bounded area, that the RF engineer wishes to locate

a site, a bounded geographical area, based on his analysis of the propagation expected from

the tower.” (Tr.257.) When Galaxy designed the network, it specifically established the area

in which antenna was to be located. (Tr.42.) Vaughn testified that “the applicant’s

engineering has resulted in a search ring, in which the tower would be required to be built

or to reside. So the tower would need to be built in the search ring.” (Tr.486; see also

Tr.340.)11 McNeal testified that he had never located an antenna outside a search ring. (Pls.

Exh. 54 at 77.) Vaughn testified that antennas could be located outside the search ring to

provide coverage within the search ring, but that such a placement of antennas was rare and

only used “on occasion to provide targeted service to a generally very specific location, such

as to increase coverage along a highway. And typically those antennas that are not in a

regular cell structure are called microcells, and their coverage is in hundreds of feet rather

than in miles.” (Tr.515-16.)

Defendants have presented evidence that search rings are generally round and the

search ring at this site is irregularly shaped. (Tr.770-71; Pls. Exh. 3 at 2.) McNeal testified

that this search ring was irregular due to differences in elevation of the land. (Pls. Exh. 54

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 16 of 40
17

at 77-78.) The court finds that the search ring at issue follows the elevation lines of a

topography map of the area. (Compare Pls. Exh. 1 with Pls. Exh. 3 at Bates no. 00002.)

Therefore, the court finds the irregular shape of the search ring is dictated by the topography.

Based on the evidence, the court also finds that engineering requirements of Tritel’s

network require that the tower and antenna be placed inside the search ring.

ii. Selection of the Site

Based on the evidence, the court finds that the BGR site was selected because it was

in the search ring, was not occupied by a residence, was sufficiently large enough to provide

space for the tower and equipments and for the set-backs mandated by the Ordinance, and

the owners were willing to lease the property. (See Pls. Exh. 16; Tr. 98-99.) Although other

sites were considered, no other site within the search ring met all these requirements.

iii. Alternative Sites Within the Search Ring

A. Grissom High School

The Huntsville City School Board refused, in writing, to negotiate with American

Tower for placement of the tower at Grissom High School. (Pls. Exh. 13.) In a letter to

William McCarroll of American Tower, Paul Kelly, Executive Director, Business, for the

Huntsville City School System, wrote:

Our school system is not interested at this time in leasing a portion of

our property at Grissom High School for a period of 20 years or greater.

Grissom is our most crowded school and, since we have limited acreage, we

do not feel that we can afford to tie up any portion of the land for other than

school uses.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 17 of 40
18

(Id.)

Because the Huntsville City School System refused to tie up “any portion” of its

Grissom High School property, the court finds Grissom High School was not an available

alternative to the Blevins Gap Road site.

B. Antennas on Smaller Towers 

Defendants have suggested that a number of antennas on smaller towers would

provide coverage in the targeted area. Vaughn testified that “many smaller antennas” would

be needed to replace the antenna on the tower at the Blevins Gap Road site. (Tr. 516.)

According to the evidence, every site within the search ring – other than the BGR property

and Grissom High School – is currently occupied by a residence. (Tr. 166-67; Pls. Exh. 36,

Hearing Transcript at 10.) The Zoning Ordinance prohibits the placement of a tower on the

same land as a residence. (Pls. Exh. 11, Ordinance § 92.5.3(9)(g).) The court finds that there

is no lot in the search ring, other than Grissom High School and the BGR property, that is not

occupied by a residence. Therefore, even if the court found that multiple smaller towers were

a viable technical alternative to the 180' tower at the BGR site, nothing in the record indicates

that placement of multiple smaller towers in the search ring is a viable alternative due to the

residential development within the search ring.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 18 of 40
19

iv. Alternative Sites Outside the Search Ring

The record contains evidence that American Tower considered four sites outside the

search ring as alternatives to placing Tritel’s antenna in a residential district. For the reasons

set forth below, the court finds that these are not feasible alternatives to the BGR site.

A. Willowbrook Shopping Center

The Willowbrook Shopping Center is across Bailey Cove Road from Grissom High

School. Although a tower at the Willowbrook Shopping Center, which is outside the search

ring, (see Pls. Exh. 3 at 2), would provide some coverage in the area, the owner would not

agree to lease land to American Tower and the shopping center did not have sufficient space

to meet the Ordinance’s setback requirements, (Tr.122-24, 237-38). Barry Gannon of

American Tower testified:

[T]he Willowbrook Shopping Center was another property that we did

talk to, and they were not willing to lease land. So you have to have a willing

property owner to do a tower as well or do anything. That property owner was

not willing to do it from that standpoint.

Also from that property, there were zoning and compliance issues that

were associated with that, setback issues, which could not be met. It would

have required variances like we did on our site as well.

(Tr. 122-23.)

The court finds these facts are sufficient to show that Willowbrook Shopping Center

is not a feasible alternative to the BGR site for Tritel’s antenna.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 19 of 40
20

B. Water Tank

McNeal testified that the water tank on Huntsville Mountain is not a feasible

alternative site for Tritel’s antenna. Based on a propagation study, McNeal determined that

an antenna on the water tower would overshoot Tritel’s coverage objectives. (Pls. Exh. 54

at 34.) Likewise, Rowland testified:

Well, I think there were two issues with the water tank location was that

it would be too far away to cover the area in question.

And also the water tank is located up on a hilltop. Anytime you locate

a cell site on a hilltop, and if you’re aiming it away on the hilltop side away

from the area you’re covering, you get an effect known as shading where the

knee of the hillside actually blocks the signal going down hill. 

. . .

[Overshooting] can potentially cause interference long distances away

to other mobile subscribers. They may be far enough away that they should get

a line of sight coverage from the hilltop site, and it can cause – depending on

the frequency plan that’s being used, it could cause interference.

It also can cause the subscriber to lock on to the site without, you know,

program hand off to get off the site because of the area where it’s located.

So it ends up doing what we call a drag and drop where he’s on the site,

but he’s so far away, he has no site to hand off to, and he actually drops the

call.

(Tr.288-89.)

McNeal also testified that, because the water tower was only 40 feet tall, the signal

from an antenna on the water tower would be blocked by the surrounding trees. (Id.; see also

Tr.208.) 

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 20 of 40
21

Based on this evidence, the court finds the water tank is not a feasible alternative to

a tower at the Blevins Gap Road site.

C. Commercial Areas North and South of the Search

Ring

In addition to the locations above, Gannon testified that he also considered the two

commercial areas closest to the Blevins Gap Road site for placement of the tower: (1) the

commercial area near the intersection of Bailey Cove Road and Four Mile Post Road to the

north and (2) the commercial area at the intersection of Bailey Cove Road and Weatherly

Road to the south. (Tr.121; see also Pls. Exh. 22.) Gannon testified that these sites did not

provide coverage to the area and that there was too much overlap with other existing sites.

(Tr.122.)

The court finds that plaintiffs have established that these two sites in commercial

districts outside the search ring are not feasible workable alternatives to a tower at the site.

Therefore, the court finds that plaintiffs have established that a tower at the site is essential

to Tritel to provide service in the geographic area around the tower and that there are no

feasible alternatives that would provide adequate service in the area.

The court notes that, because plaintiffs have shown that the antenna is essential to

providing service in the area, a special exception cannot be denied based upon Ordinance

73.20.16(2)(b), for reasons of safety or aesthetic concerns. According to the plain language

of 73.20.16(2)(b), a permit to construct a new tower can be denied only if the antenna and

tower are not essential to providing service in a geographical area. (See Pls. Exh. 11,

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 21 of 40
22

Ordinance § 73.20.16(2)(b).) Nevertheless, the court finds that plaintiffs have shown that

a tower and antenna at the site would not endanger persons or property and would not have

an impermissible aesthetic impact.

3. Endanger Persons or Property

One of the reasons the BZA gave for denying American Tower’s application for a

special exception and a variance was a concern about safety. The court notes that the Zoning

Ordinance imposes very specific structural requirements on towers that are borrowed from

published engineering standards (the EIA/TIA standards). (See Pls. Exh. 11, Zoning

Ordinance § 73.20.8; Tr.374-76.) At trial, defendants questioned the tower’s safety during

a tornado. As built, the tower will withstand winds of 70 miles per hour, which is the

required EIA standard for Madison County. (Tr. 378.) Jim Walker, a structural engineer,

testified that it is “very unlikely” that the tower would fail because of bending due to wind.

(Id. at 385.) This is because, “if it started to bend a little, it gets stronger.” (Id. at 385, 386.)

He testified that “[p]robably nothing would happen” if the tower was hit with 100 mph

winds. (Id. at 386.) When asked about tornados, Walker testified that, although “[t]ornados

are not a designed-based event,” the tower was more likely to withstand the wind than the

school. (Id. at 393.)

The court finds that the tower does not pose a safety risk based on its inability to

withstand tornado force winds.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 22 of 40
23

Defendants also contend that the tower presents a safety risk because is it located near

a school. (See doc. 110 at 41.) Joel F. Thomas, a resident whose home is across the street

from the site, testified that the tower was “an attractive nuisance, and it begs to be climbed.”

(Tr.622.) Similar concerns were raised by defendant Howard, who expressed a concern that

children playing soccer on the adjacent soccer field may climb the fence surrounding the

tower to retrieve an errantly kicked soccer ball, (Pls. Exh. Ex. 36, Hearing Transcript at 78.)

The court finds that compliance with the Ordinance’s fencing requirements for site security

as well as signs indicating potentially dangerous radiation within the fenced area are

sufficient to eliminate the foreseeable danger that a child might attempt to enter the site and

climb the tower. Therefore, the court finds that the potential for trespassing children is very

slight and, therefore, the tower does not pose a danger to children.

4. Impermissible Aesthetic Impact on the Surrounding Area.

Substantial evidence supports the BZA’s finding that the proposed tower would have

some negative visual impact on the surrounding area. However, plaintiffs presented expert

testimony that the tower, as built, did not have an actual affect on property values. Plaintiffs

presented expert testimony from Harris B. Simpson, an MAI-certified real property appraiser

who, among other types of appraisal work, has performed special studies over the last ten

years to determine whether telecommunications towers affect surrounding property values.

(Tr.401-05; Pls. Ex. 51.) As part of his special study on the tower at issue in this case,

Simpson visited the site and the surrounding neighborhoods. (Tr.410-11.) He described the

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 23 of 40
12Such testimony by property owners is permissible as lay opinion under Rule 701 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639, 644 (11th Cir. 1983).

24

area surrounding the site as heavily wooded with deciduous and evergreen trees and said that

in driving in the neighborhood around the site, there are not many places from which he

could get a clear view of the tower. (Tr.413.) 

Simpson also met with a local privately-employed appraiser and Madison County’s

appraiser. (Id. at 411, 413-14.) Simpson testified that the Madison County appraiser told

Simpson that he had never had anyone argue to him that their property value had been

harmed by a telecommunications tower. (Id. 414.)

Simpson also researched actual sales data in Huntsville in the area surrounding the

tower and in other residential areas of Huntsville that were near telecommunications towers.

(Id. at 414-19; Pls. Exhs. 51, 55.) He concluded that telecommunication towers had not

negatively affected the values of properties in the surrounding area or the rates of

appreciation of those properties. (Tr.420.)

Defendants did not present any expert testimony to rebut the findings of Simpson.

However, five local residents testified that they believed the presence of the tower was

harming their property values.12 However, none of these residents had actually sold or tried

to sell their homes, and none had had their homes appraised before and after the tower was

built. (Tr.625, 660, 674-75, 687.) Therefore, the court finds their testimony regarding a

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 24 of 40
25

reduction in the value of their homes was speculative and was not based on first-hand

experiences of the witnesses.

One witness, Joel F. Thomas, testified that he had received a valuation notice from

Madison County, which showed an increase in his property value, but that he did not believe

that the increase value was as significant as it would have been without the tower. (Tr. at

625-26). Such testimony, without more, is too speculative to base a finding that the value

of Thomas’s home was lower than it would be without the tower. Thomas also

acknowledged that the tower is more visible from the side of Huntsville Mountain than in the

valley surrounding the tower, (Tr.646), yet new homes continued to be built on the side of

the Huntsville Mountain after the tower was constructed, (id.).

The court finds that plaintiffs have established that the tower, although visually

unappealing, has not actually affected property values in the surrounding neighborhood and

that it is not expected to affect property values in the surrounding neighborhoods. Therefore,

the court finds that any negative aesthetic impact of the tower is not impermissible.

Based on the foregoing, in consideration of the testimony and exhibits presented at

trial, the court finds that plaintiffs have established that American Tower met all the

requirements for a special exception to build a tower to support personal wireless service

antennas in a residential district, except for the minimum height requirement for which they

seek a variance.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 25 of 40
26

C. VARIANCE

The Zoning Ordinance providing a special exception for towers in residential districts

restricts the height of such towers to 100'. American Tower applied for a variance to allow

it to build a tower of 180', which it contends is needed for Tritel to provide adequate

coverage.

Under Alabama law – 

[V]ariances should be granted sparingly and only under unusual and

exceptional circumstances where the literal enforcement of the ordinance

would result in unnecessary hardship. An “unnecessary hardship” sufficient

to support a variance exists where a zoning ordinance, when applied to the

property in the setting of its environment, is so unreasonable as to constitute

an arbitrary and capricious interference with the basic right to private property.

The determination of what constitutes an “unnecessary hardship” must be

determined from the facts of the particular case.

Town of Orrville v. S & H Mobile Homes, Inc., 872 So.2d 856, 858-59 (Ala. Civ. App.

2003)(internal citations and quotations omitted). “The unnecessary hardship which will

suffice for the granting of a variance must relate to the land rather than to the owner . . . .

Further, a self-inflicted or self-created hardship may not be the basis for a variance or for a

claim thereof.” Id. at 861.

With regard to variances, the Zoning Ordinance states that the BZA may – 

authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of this

ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special

conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of this ordinance will result

in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of this ordinance shall be

observed and substantial justice done. 

(Pls. Ex. 11, § 92.5.4.)

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 26 of 40
27

1. Special Conditions and Circumstances

The court notes that the “use” of the site for a “tower to support personal wireless

service antennas” is permitted on the property under the conditions of the special exception.

(Id. § 92.5.3(9).) For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that plaintiffs have met all

the requirements for the special exception, except that plaintiffs need a 180' tower, and that

the Blevins Gap Road property is the only site in the area that is suitable for placement of this

antenna. 

The court finds that the topography of the area surrounding the site requires that

Tritel’s antenna be placed at 180' to achieve coverage in the area. The tower is in a valley

at the foot of Huntsville Mountain. (Pls. Exh. 1 at 2.) McNeal testified that terrain is “the

most important factor” in predicting how a tower and antenna will operate because:

depending on the elevation, it will either limit the distance or the [radio

frequency] propagation or it will give you more distance basically. If you’re

in a mountainous area, you’re not going to – its not going to propagate as far.

Q. Is that because mountain make – 

A. Mountains will block the signal. They will block the signal.

If you’re in a valley dealing with the terrain, you’re going to have – it’s

not a good area to put – usually to put a tower. The valley, the surrounding

area, as you’re going up, it’s going to block the signal.

So you try to use elevation to make up for that.

(Id. at 44-45.) McNeal testified that he performed propagation studies for an antenna placed

at 100', 150', and 180', and that antennas at 100' and 150' did not work. (Pls. Exh. 54 at 43.)

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 27 of 40
13One court has held “literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance,” which limited the

height of a cellular tower, “would result in an unnecessary hardship” because the hilly terrain

28

The court finds that there are special conditions and circumstances peculiar to the

Blevins Gap Road site that require a 180' tower to provide wireless services. Nothing in the

record indicates that the special conditions and circumstances that necessitate American

Tower’s need for a 180' tower to support Tritel’s antenna apply to other sites, structures, or

buildings in the district. (See Pls. Exh. 11, § 92.5.4(1)(a)(variance will not be granted

“unless and until” the applicant shows that “special conditions and circumstances exist which

are peculiar to the land, structure, or building involved and which are not applicable to other

lands, structures, or bguildings in the same district”).) Therefore, the court finds that

plaintiffs have established the special conditions required by § 92.5.4(1)(a).

2. Unnecessary Hardship

Plaintiffs contend that strict enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance prohibiting a 180'

tower would impose unnecessary hardships on Tritel. The court agrees.

As set forth above, McNeal testified that a tower of 100' or 150' would not fill the gap

in coverage. A gap in coverage results in lost revenues and lost goodwill, (Tr.107-08), and

could result in a loss of Tritel’s FCC license, see Unity Township, 282 F.3d at 259-60. The

court finds that this gap in coverage is an unnecessary hardship for Tritel. Gannon testified:

So in the sense that Tritel is a licensed wireless service provider, their

FCC license requires that they provide service to this market. There’s a gap

in coverage to that area of the city that could not be covered with a hundred

foot tower as would [be allowed] under the special exception.13

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 28 of 40
would block cellular transmissions at the height limitation of the ordinance. Paule v. Sante

Fe County Board of County Commissioners, 117 P.3d 240, (N.M. 2005). 

29

No other parcels or landowners in the area would be similar to Tritel in

[that] they’re not licensed FCC service providers that have to provide coverage

to this part of the city. So it certainly stands them out from adjacent property

owners and other landowners in the area which the variance criteria probably

applies to. 

Other hardships that Tritel would certainly be maybe more along the

business terms or financial terms, lost revenues from customers who would

either drop the service, because they were not providing coverage to that area;

customers who would never maybe sign up for Tritel service because they

couldn’t provide service to that area of Huntsville. I think it’s general

goodwill with their customers that would be lost.

(Tr. 107-08. [footnote added].)

The court does not find that plaintiff BGR would suffer an “unnecessary hardship”

without the variance. BGR’s loss would be loss of rental income, which is a mere economic

loss to the landowner. See Ex parte Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of Mobile, 36 So.2d

415, 418 (Ala. 1994)(“It is clear that the loss of potential future economic gain on the part

of the landowner is insufficient to establish an ‘unnecessary hardship’ justifying the grant of

a use variance.”).

Based on the foregoing and consideration of the testimony and exhibits, the court

finds that the evidence supports a finding that Tritel and American Tower will suffer

unnecessary hardship caused by the peculiar conditions and circumstances of the site if a

variance to build a 180' tower is not granted.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 29 of 40
30

3. Public Interest

The Zoning Ordinance prohibits the BZA from authorizing a variance that is “contrary

to the public interest.” (Pls. Exh. 11, § 92.5.4.) See Ala. Code § 11-52-80. “The interest

of the public as affected by the contrary interest of the people within a district is a factor to

be considered in determining whether to grant a variance.” Pipes v. Adams, 381 So.2d 86,

88 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).

“Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) to promote

competition and higher quality in American telecommunications services and to encourage

the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” City of Rancho Palos

Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1455 (2005). Certainly, the public

has an interest in competitive, high-quality cellular service. 

The court finds that allowing American Tower to build a tower at sufficient height to

allow Tritel and other providers of cellular phone service to provide effective cellular service

is in the interest of the public. Therefore, the court finds that granting a variance to allow

American Tower to build a 180' tower would not be contrary to the public interest.

4. Spirit of the Ordinance

The court notes that, under the terms of the Zoning Ordinance, cellular towers are

allowed in residential districts if certain definite criteria, including “substantial evidence that

the tower cannot, by technical necessity, feasibly be located in a non-residential district,”

(Pls. Exh. 11, § 92.5.3(9)(b).) For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that plaintiffs

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 30 of 40
31

have proven that their proposed tower and antenna met all the criteria for a special exception,

except the height limitation. Plaintiffs have proven that an antenna placed on a 100' tower,

the height limit set forth in the special exception, would not adequately provide service in the

area. However, a tower of 180' would provide adequate reliable service.

Plaintiffs do not request a use variance, a variance to allow them to use the property

in a manner prohibited by the Zoning Ordinance. Rather, plaintiffs seek a variance only as

to the height limitation, without which Tritel’s antenna would not be capable of providing

reliable wireless service to the area. The court finds that granting of the variance under these

conditions observes the spirit of the ordinance and that denying the variance would work a

substantial injustice.

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds plaintiffs have established, by substantial

evidence, that they are entitled to a special exception for the construction of a tower to

support Tritel’s antenna at the Blevins Gap Road site, and that they are entitled to a variance

to allow them to construct a 180' tower. 

D. APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS AND SAFEGUARDS

Section 92.5.4(3) states, “In granting any variance, the Board of Adjustment may

prescribe appropriate conditions and safeguards in conformity with this ordinance.” (Pls.

Exh. 11, § 92.5.4(3).) Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court finds that additional

conditions regarding the appearance of the tower and its surrounding area should be imposed

to minimize, to the extent possible, the negative aesthetic impact on the surrounding homes.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 31 of 40
32

To this end, the court will order the parties to submit suggestions regarding such additional

conditions within 45 days of the entry of the court’s judgment. The court will specifically

retain jurisdiction for the purpose of prescribing such additional conditions.

III. TCA PROHIBITION CLAIM

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to a special

exception and variance for the construction of a 180' tower to support Tritel’s wireless

communications antenna at the Blevins Gap Road site. Therefore, the TCA claim is moot.

However, the court finds, as an additional or alternative ground for its decision to approve

the construction of a 180' tower at the Blevins Gap Road site, that the BZA’s denial of

American Tower’s application for a special exception and variance violated the antiprohibition provision of the TCA.

Plaintiffs allege that the BZA’s denial of American Tower’s application for a special

exception and a variance violated the anti-prohibition clause of the TCA. The

Telecommunications Act of 1996 – 

was enacted “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy

framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of

advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all

Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition.” H.R.

Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,

124. In addition, the TCA was intended “to promote competition and reduce

regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for

American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment

of new telecommunications technologies.” Telecommunications Act of 1996,

Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996). Wireless telephone service was

one of the many telecommunications technologies Congress considered when

enacting the TCA.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 32 of 40
33

With respect to the construction of telecommunications facilities,

Congress recognized zoning decisions by state and local governments had

created an inconsistent array of requirements, which inhibited both the

deployment of personal communications services and the rebuilding of a

digital technology- based cellular telecommunications network. H.R.Rep. No.

104-204, at 94 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61. Despite this

recognition, Congress also acknowledged “there are legitimate State and local

concerns involved in regulating the siting of such facilities . . ., such as

aesthetic values and the costs associated with the use and maintenance of

public rights-of-way.” Id. at 94-95, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61.

As a result, Congress enacted § 704(a) to “preserve[ ] the authority of State

and local governments over zoning and land use matters except in . . . limited

circumstances . . . .” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), at 207-08,

reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 222.

In § 704(a), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), Congress enunciated a

number of substantive and procedural limitations upon the authority of state

or local governments to regulate the construction of facilities for wireless

communication services. Local zoning authorities may not unreasonably

discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services, may not

make zoning decisions which prohibit or effectively prohibit the provision of

personal wireless services, and may not make zoning decisions premised on

concerns regarding the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions

associated with wireless telephone service. 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I),

332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (1994).

Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 2002). 

The TCA states, in pertinent part, “The regulation of the placement, construction, and

modification of personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or

instrumentality thereof . . . shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision

of personal wireless services.” 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).

The Eleventh Circuit has not had occasion to address an alleged violation of the antiprohibition provision of the TCA. However, the Fourth Circuit has held that only a general

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 33 of 40
34

ban on towers would result in a violation of the anti-prohibition clause of the TCA. USCOC

of Virginia RSA #3 v. Montgomery County Bd. of Supervisors, 343 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir.

2003). That court has held:

To be entitled to relief under a(B)(i)(II) prohibition of service claim, the

plaintiff’s burden is substantial. In AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council

of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428-29 (4th Cir.1998), we held that a

telecommunications provider could not prevail in a challenge to an individual

zoning decision absent a general ban or policy to reject all applications. See

also 360/ Communications Co. v. Board of Supervisors of Albemarle County,

211 F.3d 79, 88 (4th Cir. 2000)(“The burden for the carrier invoking this

provision is a heavy one: to show from language or circumstances not just that

this application has been rejected, but that further reasonable efforts are so

likely to be fruitless that it is a waste of time to try.”). In determining that an

individual zoning decision could not form the basis for a prohibition of service

claim, we reasoned that because subsection (B)(iii) specifically preserves the

authority of local governments to reject applications for wireless facilities, a

reading of the statute that prohibited local governments from rejecting

individual applications would effectively eliminate local control. To preserve

local authority and to reconcile subsections (B)(i)(II) and (B)(iii), we

determined that the statute should be interpreted to provide relief only upon a

showing of a blanket ban of wireless facilities. Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at

429. We have since recognized, however, the theoretical possibility that the

denial of an individual permit could amount to a prohibition of service if the

service could only be provided from a particular site, but we noted that such

a scenario “seems unlikely in the real world.” Albemarle County, 211 F.3d at

86.

Id.

Other circuit courts have rejected the Fourth Circuit’s blanket prohibition test and

“have held that . . . a locality can run afoul of the TCA’s ‘effective prohibition’ clause if it

prevents a wireless provider from closing a ‘significant gap’ in service coverage.” MetroPCS

v. City and County of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 731 (9th Cir. 2005). “This inquiry

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 34 of 40
35

generally involves a two-pronged analysis requiring (1) the showing of a ‘significant gap’

in service coverage and (2) some inquiry into the feasibility of alternative facilities or site

locations.” Id.; see also VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County, 342 F.3d 818,

828-29 (7th Cir. 2003); Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd.

of Easttown Township. 331 F.3d 386, 397-98 (3d Cir. 2003); Second Generation Properties,

L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 2002); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth,

176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999).

A. SIGNIFICANT GAP IN COVERAGE

“[T]he term ‘significant gaps’ embraces a de minimis principle. ‘Where the holes in

coverage are very limited in number or size (such as the interiors of buildings in a sparsely

populated rural area, or confined to a limited number of houses or spots as the area covered

by buildings increases) the lack of coverage likely will be de minimis so that denying

applications to construct towers necessary to fill these holes will not amount to a prohibition

of service.’” APT Pittsburgh Ltd. Partnership v. Penn Tp. Butler County of Pennsylvania,

196 F.3d 469, 480 n.7 (3d Cir. 1999)(quoting Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643-44). In other words,

the “significant gap” must be more than a dead spot. 

The circuit courts that have addressed this issue disagree about whether a gap in

coverage is defined as a gap in a particular provider’s coverage or a gap in any coverage.

“The test employed by the Second and Third Circuits holds that a ‘significant gap’ in service

exists only if no provider is able to serve the ‘gap’ area in question.” MetroPCS, 400 F.3d

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 35 of 40
36

at 731(citing, inter alia, Omnipoint, 331 F.3d at 398; Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643)(emphasis in

original); see also Second Generation Properties, L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 632

(1st Cir. 2002). As explained in MetroPCS, 

This test is sometimes referred to as the “one provider” rule since, if any single

provider offers coverage in a given area, localities may preclude other

providers from entering the area (as long as the preclusion is a valid,

nondiscriminatory zoning decision that satisfies the other provisions of the

TCA). This rule has been touted as proceeding from the consumer’s

perspective rather than the individual service provider’s perspective, which the

Third Circuit argues is more in keeping with the regulatory goals of the TCA

– as long as some provider offers service in the area, consumers will be

adequately served and the TCA’s goal of establishing nationwide wireless

service will be achieved. Under this view, the TCA protects only the

individual user’s ability to receive service from one provider or another; it

does not protect each service provider’s ability to maintain full coverage

within a given market.

Id. at 731-32 (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original).

The one-provider rule has been rejected by the First and Ninth Circuits. These circuits

have adopted a rule “that a significant gap in service (and thus an effective prohibition of

service) exists whenever a provider is prevented from filling a significant gap in its own

service coverage.” Id. at 733 (emphasis in original). The MetroPCS court held:

The First Circuit has recently rejected the “one provider” approach and

held that a local regulation creates a “significant gap” in service . . . if the

provider in question is prevented from filling a significant gap in its own

service network. See Second Generation Props., 313 F.3d at 631-33. This

approach formally takes the perspective of the individual service provider in

assessing coverage gaps, but, as the Second Generation Properties court

persuasively explains, this approach actually better serves both individual

consumers and the policy goals of the TCA. The Second Generation

Properties court notes that the TCA “aims to secure lower prices and better

service for consumers by opening all telecommunications markets to

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 36 of 40
37

competition.” Id. at 631 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996)).

The court then warns against the dysfunctional implications of the Second and

Third Circuits’ “one provider rule”:

A flat “any service equals no effective prohibition” rule would

say that a town could refuse permits to build the towers

necessary to solve any number of different coverage problems

. . . . Such a rule would be highly problematic because it does

not further the interests of the individual consumer. To use an

example from this case, it is of little comfort to the customer

who uses AT & T Wireless (or Voicestream, Verizon, Sprint, or

Nextel) who cannot get service along the significant geographic

gap which may exist along Route 128 that a Cingular Wireless

customer does get some service in that gap . . . . The result [of

such a rule] would be a crazy patchwork quilt of intermittent

coverage. That quilt might have the effect of driving the

industry toward a single carrier. When Congress enacted

legislation to promote the construction of a nationwide cellular

network, such a consequence was not, we think, the intended

result. 

Id. at 633 (footnote omitted). In short, the First Circuit’s multiple provider

rule better facilitates the robust competition which Congress sought to

encourage with the TCA, and it better accommodates the current state of the

wireless services market.

Id. at 732-33(emphasis in original).

This court adopts the multiple-provider rule of the First and Ninth Circuits as such

rule best satisfies the goals of the TCA. And, based on the evidence cited above, the court

finds that plaintiffs have established that Tritel has a significant gap in coverage without an

antenna at the site. Moreover, the court finds that the evidence clearly demonstrates that,

without an antenna at 180', the signal strength in the area is inadequate to provide quality

service.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 37 of 40
38

B. FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVES

“Under all existing versions of the ‘significant gap’ test, once a wireless service

provider has demonstrated that the requisite significant gap in coverage exists, it must then

make some showing as to the intrusiveness or necessity of its proposed means of closing that

gap.” MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734. The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits’ test requires the

provider to show “that the manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap in service

is the least intrusive on the values that denial sought to serve.” Nextel West Corp. v. Unity

Township, 282 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2002)(quoting APT Pittsburgh Ltd. Partnership v.

Penn Township, 196 F.3d 469, 480-81 (3d Cir. 1999); see MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734-35

(“The Second and Third Circuit[s’] ‘least intrusive’ standard . . . allows for a meaningful

comparison of alternative sites before the siting application process is needlessly repeated.

It also gives providers an incentive to choose the least intrusive site in their first siting

application, and it promises to ultimately identify the best solution for the community, not

merely the last one remaining after a series of application denials); Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643

(“A local government may reject an application for construction of a wireless service facility

in an under-served area without thereby prohibiting personal wireless services if the service

gap can be closed by less intrusive means.”).

The First and Seventh Circuits’ test does not require the provider to show that its

proposed facility is the least “intrusive;” rather, their test requires that the provider

demonstrate “that its ‘existing application is the only feasible plan’ and that ‘there are no

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 38 of 40
14In rejecting the“least intrusive” test, the Seventh Circuit has noted, “A community

could rationally reject the least intrusive proposal in favor of a more intrusive proposal that

provides better service or that better promotes commercial goals of the community.” St.

Croix, 342 F.3d 818, 834 n.8.

39

other potential solutions to the purported problem.’ St. Croix, 342 F.3d at 834 (quoting

Pelham, 313 F.3d at 630, 635)(emphasis added).14 

The court notes that it is of the opinion that the more exacting test of the First and

Seventh Circuit best serves the goals of the TCA and allows local zoning authorities to

prohibit the siting of a wireless antenna if there is any other available alternative site.

However, in this case, the court finds plaintiffs have proven that the denial of the application

for special exception and variance would violate the anti-prohibition provision of the TCA

under either the “least intrusive” test or “feasible alternative” test.

As set forth above, the evidence in this case shows that Blevins Gap Road site is the

only site available for Tritel’s antenna that would close the significant gap in coverage along

Bailey Cove Road. Plaintiffs have established that only a tower in the search ring would

provide adequate coverage for the area. The Blevins Gap Road site is the only available

property in the area on which to construct any tower. Also, they have established that only

a tower at 180' would provide adequate coverage for the area. For the reasons discussed

above, the court finds that the Blevins Gap Road site is the only feasible, and therefore, the

least intrusive, alternative to close the significant gap in Tritel’s coverage.

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 39 of 40
40

Therefore, the court finds that denial of a special exception and variance to allow

plaintiffs to build and operate a 180' tower at the Blevins Gap Road site would have the

effect of prohibiting wireless service in the area in violation of the TCA.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to a special

exception and a variance for the construction of a 180' wireless communications tower at the

Blevins Gap Road site. The court also finds that defendants violated the anti-prohibition

clause of the TCA; however, such claim is moot based upon the court’s de novo

consideration of the application.

DONE this 22nd day of March, 2006.

 

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 5:99-cv-02933-SLB Document 114 Filed 03/22/06 Page 40 of 40