Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02420/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02420-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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28 This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RUCKER,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

NATIONWIDE CREDIT, INC., 

 Defendant.

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2:09-cv-2420-GEB-EFB

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR ADJUDICATION

MOTION*

Defendant Nationwide Credit, Inc. moves for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s complaint, and in the alternative for summary

adjudication of issues. Defendant also moves for attorneys fees under 15

U.S.C. § 1692k, based on its contention that Plaintiff brought this

action in bad faith. Plaintiff does not oppose the portion of the motion

challenging two of his claims alleged under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) and 

§ 1692g of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and

“voluntarily withdraws” those claims in his opposition brief. (Pl.’s

Opp’n 13:25-14:18.) Therefore, these claims are dismissed. 

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendant violated the

FDCPA and California’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal

Act”), by harassing him with telephone calls for the purpose of

collecting a debt and failing to provide meaningful disclosure of its

identity when it called him. 

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

The movant for summary judgment and summary adjudication bears

the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24

(1986). If this burden is satisfied, “the non-moving party must set

forth . . . specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). “All

reasonable inferences [capable of being drawn from admitted evidence]

must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Bryan v. McPherson, 590

F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2009). However, “[m]ere argument does not

establish a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.”

MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir.

1993).

Further, Local Rule 260 requires: 

Each motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication

[to] be accompanied by a ‘Statement of Undisputed Facts’

that shall enumerate discretely each of the specific

material facts relied upon in support of the motion and

cite the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit,

deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or other

document relied upon to establish that fact. . . .

Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment . . .

[must] reproduce the itemized facts in the [moving

party’s] Statement of Undisputed Facts and admit those

facts that are undisputed and deny those that are

disputed, including with each denial a citation to the

particular portions of any pleading, affidavit,

deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or other

document relied upon in support of that denial.

E.D. Cal. R. 260 (a)-(b). If the nonmovant does not “specifically . . .

[controvert duly supported] facts identified in the [movant’s] statement

of undisputed facts,” the nonmovant “is deemed to have admitted the

validity of the facts contained in the [movant’s] statement.” Beard v.

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Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 (2006).

II. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

The uncontroverted facts are the following. Plaintiff “began

receiving calls [from Defendant] in the early part of 2009;” and

“received approximately 80 phone calls . . . from Defendant in 2009.”

(Pl.’s Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Fact (“Pl.’s Facts”) ¶¶

1, 2.) “Plaintiff also . . . received multiple calls per day from

Defendant[.]” Id. “Further, . . . if [Plaintiff] failed to answer his

cell phone Defendant would contact his home phone.” Id. 

Plaintiff had 11 connected telephone calls from Defendant in

2009. Id. ¶¶ 4,5,6. Defendant did not leave a voice message each time it

called Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 9. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Continuous and Harassing Telephone Calls

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claims in which Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s telephone

calls were continuous and harassing, in violation of the FDCPA and the

Rosenthal Act. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 25.)

15 U.S.C. § 1692d of the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from

engaging in “any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass,

oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a

debt.” § 1692d proscribed conduct includes: “[c]ausing a telephone to

ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or

continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the

called number.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). The Rosenthal Act prohibits debt

collectors from “[c]ausing a telephone to ring repeatedly or

continuously to annoy the person called;” and from “[c]ommunicating, by

telephone or in person, with the debtor with such frequency as to be

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unreasonable and to constitute an harassment to the debtor under the

circumstances.” Cal. Civil Code §§ 1788.11(d)-(e). 

“Whether there is actionable harassment or annoyance turns not

only on the volume of calls made, but also on the pattern of calls.”

Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos., LLC, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1168 (N.D.

Cal. 2002). 

Court opinions differ . . . as to the amount or pattern

of calls sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact

regarding the intent to annoy, harass, or oppress.

Although there is no bright-line rule, certain conduct

generally is found to either constitute harassment, or

raise an issue of fact as to whether the conduct

constitutes harassment[.]

Arteaga v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 3310259,

at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2010). “Calling a debtor numerous times in the same

day, or multiple times in a short period of time, can constitute

harassment under the FDCPA” and under the Rosenthal Act. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff began receiving calls from Defendant in the

early part of 2009, and received approximately 80 phone calls from

Defendant in 2009. This evidence is sufficient to create genuine issues

of material fact on the issues of whether Defendant’s telephone calls

violated the proscribed conduct. Therefore, this portion of the motion

is denied.

B. Failure to Provide Meaningful Disclosure

Defendant also seeks summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s

claims that Defendant failed to provide meaningful disclosure of its

identity when it telephoned Plaintiff without leaving voice messages on

Plaintiff’s voice message recorder. (Mot. 10:8-11, 15:22-23; Compl. ¶¶

17, 25.) 

15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) of the FDCPA proscribes “the placement of

telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.”

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Further, the Rosenthal Act prohibits: “Placing telephone calls without

disclosure of the caller’s identity, provided that an employee of a

licensed collection agency may identify himself by using his registered

alias name as long as he correctly identifies the agency he represents.”

Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.11(b). 

Defendant’s “failure to leave a message . . . does not by

itself violate . . . § 1692d.” Clark v. Quick Collect, Inc., No. CV

04-1120-BR, 2005 WL 1586862, at *4 (D. Or. 2005) (citing Udell v. Kansas

Counselors, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1144 (D. Kan. 2004)). 

Section 1692d(6) does not, when read in isolation,

specify whether a debt collector who calls a consumer

must leave a message when the consumer does not answer

the call. When this provision, however, is read in

conjunction with the entirety of § 1692d, it is clear

that not leaving a message is not the type of harassing,

oppressive, or abusive conduct that violates the statute.

Udell, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1144. 

However, Defendant has not shown that the portion of its

motion challenging Plaintiff’s claim alleged under section 1788.11(b)

should be granted.

Therefore, Defendant’s motion on these claims is granted on

the federal claim and denied on the state claim. 

C. Section 1788.17 of the Rosenthal Act

Defendant also argues that its motion should be granted on

Plaintiff’s section 1788.17 claim, which is alleged under the Rosenthal

Act, since Plaintiff lacks evidence demonstrating that Defendant

violated the FDCPA. (Mot. 15:24-25.) Plaintiff alleges in his complaint

that Defendant violated section 1788.17 “by continuously failing to

comply with the . . . FDCPA.” (Compl. ¶ 25.) Section 1788.17

incorporates violations of the FDCPA and “[t]herefore, claims asserted

under the FDCPA constitute violations of the [Rosenthal Act].” Costa v.

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National Action Financial Services, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1077 (E.D.

Cal. 2007). 

However, Plaintiff still has claims alleged under the FDCPA

that survive Defendant’s motion. Therefore, this portion of the motion

is denied.

D. Attorney’s Fees

Defendant also seeks attorney’s fees under § 1692k which

provides: “On a finding by the court that an action under this section

was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court

may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the

work expended and costs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). However, Defendant

has not addressed what the word “action” means as used within the text

of § 1692k(a)(3). The Seventh Circuit states in Horkey v. J.V.D.B. &

Associates, Inc., 333 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2003): “An action in its

usual legal sense means a lawsuit brought in a court.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Since Defendant has not shown § 1692k should

be interpreted as its conclusory argument indicates, this portion of its

motion is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s summary adjudication

motion is GRANTED on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692d(6), and the remainder of the motion is DENIED. 

Dated: January 4, 2011

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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