Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02669/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02669-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

McKESSON INFORMATION

SOLUTIONS, INC.,

NO. CIV. S-02-2669 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BRIDGE MEDICAL, INC.,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff McKesson

Information Solutions, Inc.’s (“plaintiff”) motion to re-open

discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b).1 

Arguing said relief is necessary because of recently discovered

evidence, plaintiff seeks an order (1) requiring defendant Bridge

Medical, Inc. (“defendant”) to supplement certain of its

responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories and document requests;

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 574 Filed 03/13/06 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

(2) permitting plaintiff to depose additional fact witnesses

relevant to this newly-discovered evidence; and (3) permitting

plaintiff to update its expert reports on the issues of

infringement and damages based on this new discovery. Defendant

opposes the motion, arguing there is no newly discovered evidence

and its prior discovery responses remain complete and accurate.

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motion to reopen discovery is DENIED. Evidence relating to Sutter Health is

not newly discovered and even if it were, and to the extent there

may be other newly discovered evidence, pertaining to other

hospitals allegedly using the accused “MedPoint System” on

handheld or unmounted devices, at this late juncture in the case,

good cause does not exist to re-open discovery.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the course of discovery, plaintiff sought

information from defendant about how defendant’s customers used

the accused “MedPoint System.” Defendant responded to those

requests indicating that all, but two of its customers, Lancaster

General Hospital and Children’s Hospital of New Orleans, used its

MedPoint software on computers mounted on carts and/or walls. 

After the close of discovery, plaintiff found a June 10, 2005

article on defendant’s website that described the use of the

“MedPoint System,” at Sutter Health hospitals in Sacramento,

California. The article states:

Sutter clinicians either carry devices from room to

room or use more traditional machines on carts. Which

device they use depends on whether a clinician stays in

particular department or makes rounds throughout the 

hospital. ‘If a physician or nurse needs to walk around,

we’ll give them a tablet. If they’re more stationary,

we’ll put them on a cart.’

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 574 Filed 03/13/06 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(Hall Decl., filed Feb. 21, 2006, Ex. B at 4, quoting former

Sutter Health Chief Information Officer John Hummel.) On January

26, 2006, plaintiff requested that defendant supplement its

discovery responses in light of the information in the article. 

Defendant refused, stating supplementation was not necessary

because: 

[S]utter hospitals do not operate Bridge’s MedPoint 

software on unmounted computers. To be sure, all sorts

of computing devices can be found in use at the 

Sutter hospitals, as is documented in the [above article].

However, the bar code-enabled point of care system

used by the Sutter hospitals last year, and also as of

today, employ computing devices which are mounted to

mobile stands or fixed in each room.

(Id. at Ex. C.)

Plaintiff then contacted Mr. Hummel, who is not currently

employed by Sutter Health and is working in Texas. Plaintiff

states Mr. Hummel “confirmed” that Sutter Health hospitals have

used the “MedPoint System” with unmounted TabletPC computers and,

that he personally witnessed such uses at three Sutter Health

hospitals as recently as March or April 2005. (Id. at ¶s 7-8.) 

On January 30, 2006, defendant contacted Sutter personnel

who it asserts confirmed that all Sutter sites are operating

MedPoint on computing devices mounted to mobile stands or affixed

to the wall in patient rooms. Additionally, after plaintiff

filed the instant motion, defendant contacted Julie Cooper,

Sutter Health’s Senior Technical Project Manager, responsible for

implementing MedPoint at Sutter, who defendant states confirmed

that handheld and tablet computers are not used to operate

MedPoint at any Sutter facility. (Patiño Decl., filed Mar. 1,

2006, at ¶ 4.) 

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 574 Filed 03/13/06 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

4

STANDARD

A pretrial order “shall not be modified except upon a

showing of good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).2 The district

court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably

be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.

1992) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, advisory committee’s notes

(1983 amendment)). The “good cause” standard set forth in Rule

16 primarily focuses upon the diligence of the party requesting

the amendment. “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to

the party opposing the modification might supply additional

reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the

moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. 

The moving party may establish good cause by showing “(1)

that [he or she] was diligent in assisting the court in creating

a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that [his or her] noncompliance

with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, notwithstanding

[his or her] diligent efforts to comply, because of the

development of matters which could not have been reasonably

foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling

conference; and (3) that [he or she] was diligent in seeking

amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that [he

or she] could not comply with the order.” Jackson v. Laureate,

Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (citations omitted).

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 574 Filed 03/13/06 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

ANALYSIS

Clearly, the parties dispute whether Sutter Health has

employed or is presently employing the MedPoint software on

unmounted point of care devices. Resolution of that issue,

however, is not necessary to this motion. The question under

Rule 16(b) is whether plaintiff was diligent in seeking discovery

from Sutter Health. If plaintiff was not diligent, “the inquiry

should end.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

Here, plaintiff argues it was diligent because it was not

aware of Sutter Health’s relevance to this action until it

reviewed the June 2005 article on defendant’s website. However,

plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s proffer on the motion, that

nearly 2,000 documents were produced during discovery regarding

the selection, installation, and use of the MedPoint software at

Sutter Health. (Patiño Decl., ¶ 2.) Sutter Health is the only

MedPoint customer within this district, plaintiff’s chosen forum. 

Several of the produced documents specifically quote or reference

Mr. Hummel. (Id. at Exs. C & D.) Additionally, one document, an

email from Ms. Cooper, stated that Sutter Health “is not pursuing

tablets as a standard” for the MedPoint software. (Id. at Ex.

A.) 

Despite the above, plaintiff did not depose Mr. Hummel or

Ms. Cooper or a Sutter Rule 30(b)(6) deponent during discovery,

which was open for almost two years. Only now, more than a year

after discovery closed on February 28, 2005, does plaintiff move

for discovery regarding Sutter Health’s use of the MedPoint

software. Indeed, though becoming aware of the alleged new

information in June 2005, plaintiff did not request the instant

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 574 Filed 03/13/06 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The court, however, does not make any such findings

herein.

4 While Mr. Hummel is outside the subponea power of the

court, his presence would appear to be of less importance as he

is no longer employed at Sutter Health.

6

relief from the court until the time of the final pretrial

conference on March 10, 2006. Plaintiff offers no explanation

for this eight-month delay. Under these circumstances, good

cause to re-open discovery does not exist.

Moreover, the court notes that even if plaintiff were

factually correct that it was “duped” by defendant into believing

that only mounted point of care devices were used at Sutter

Health for MedPoint,3 that fact would not justify re-opening

discovery at this last juncture in the case (motions in limine

are to be filed in two weeks and the bifurcated court trial is

set to commence May 2, 2006), where plaintiff was not diligent in

seeking relevant discovery from Sutter Health. Conkle v. Jeong,

73 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1995) (the court rightly denies

“‘further discovery if the movant has failed diligently to pursue

discovery in the past’”). 

Additionally, also weighing in the court’s analysis is the

fact that Sacramento-based Sutter Health is within the subpoena

power of the court. Should plaintiff seek to offer its claimed

“new” evidence, it may call Sutter Health at trial.4

Finally, plaintiff raises for the first time in its reply,

that it has discovered two other customers of defendant that have

used unmounted computers with the MedPoint software, Jewish

Hospital in Kentucky, who has used unmounted Hitachi TabletPCs

(Vandall Reply Decl., filed Mar. 6, 2006) and Vassar Brothers

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 574 Filed 03/13/06 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Medical Center in New York, who has used unmounted Symbol PDAs

(LeMay Reply Decl., filed March 6, 2006). Because these new

facts were provided only in the reply, they are not properly

considered by the court on the motion. Eberle v. City of

Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1990) (movants may not raise

new issues or facts for the first time in their reply briefs);

Sweet v. Pfizer, 232 F.R.D. 360, 364 n. 6, 7 (C.D. Cal. 2005)

(considering plaintiffs’ reply brief on motion for class

certification only to the extent it did not “raise new issues or

introduce new information”). 

However, even were the court to consider such purported

evidence, it does not, for the same reasons as set forth above,

justify the re-opening of discovery. Again, plaintiff offers no

explanation for why it only recently discovered this evidence

such that it should be permitted additional time for discovery. 

The law assumes that parties will continue their investigation

for impeachment materials in preparation for trial, which

plaintiff is apparently doing. Rice v. United States, 164 F.R.D.

556, 557 (N.D. Okla. 1995). However, that continued

investigation beyond the discovery deadline is not grounds to reopen formal discovery. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck

KGaA, 190 F.R.D. 556, 560 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (denying request for a

further deposition on ground that “[w]hile it is certainly

permissible for a party to continue its formal investigation of

facts underlying claims in a case after the expiration of the

discovery period, [the] attempt to engage in formal discovery is

improper”). Certainty and efficiency of the trial process are

gained from the enforcement of discovery deadlines, and under the

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 574 Filed 03/13/06 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

facts here, there is no basis to depart from those deadlines.

As for either parties’ obligations under Rule 26(e) to amend

and/or supplement any previous discovery responses based on newly

discovered evidence, those obligations are in place regardless of

any order of the court on this motion, which is limited to the

issue of grounds to re-open formal discovery based on plaintiff’s

diligence in seeking such relief. To the extent any information

brought to light by this motion requires defendant to amend or

supplement its previous discovery responses, Rule 26(e) is selfenforcing and defendant is bound to follow it. Nevertheless,

that supplementation of discovery responses may be necessary does

not require or dictate the re-opening of formal discovery. Were

that true, discovery in any case would likely never close.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to re-open

discovery pursuant to Rule 16(b) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 13, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 574 Filed 03/13/06 Page 8 of 8