Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01591/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01591-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

)

Plaintiff/Respondent, ) No. CV-99-1591-PHX-RCB(LOA)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Castulo Soto-Valdez, )

)

Defendant/Movant. ) )

Introduction

Currently pending before the court is the Report and

Recommendation (“R & R”) of the Honorable United States

Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson (“the Magistrate

Judge”), wherein he recommends: (1) denying movant’s Motion

for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) (Doc. 1);

granting movant’s Motion to Supplement his Rule 60(b)(6)

(Doc. 11); and denying a Certification of Appealability

(“COA”) and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

R & R (Doc. 12) at 7:16-24. Movant pro se, Castulo SotoCase 2:99-cv-01591-RCB Document 19 Filed 09/19/13 Page 1 of 57
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28 1 When referring to him by name, as does the movant, the court will

refer to Mr. Soto-Valdez as Valdez. 

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Valdez (“Valdez”1), timely objected to the R & R. Also pending

before the court is the movant’s second motion to supplement

(Doc. 14), based upon, inter alia, two cases decided after

the issuance of the R & R. The final pending matter is the

movant’s “Motion for Disposition” (Doc. 18). 

There being no objections to the R & R’s factual

recitation, the court adopts that background as if fully set

forth herein. See R & R (Doc. 12) at 1:18-3:22. For

convenience though, the court reiterates those facts bearing

most heavily on the pending R & R. The facts relevant to

plaintiff’s motion to supplement, filed after the issuance of

the R & R, also are set forth below. 

Movant Valdez is serving a 360 month sentence for a

conviction for conspiring to distribute and possess with

intent to distribute methamphetamine. The movant, through

his then attorney, Colin Jon Kooyumjian, appealed that

conviction. Although it affirmed the movant’s conviction,

the Ninth Circuit specifically, “decline[d] to consider

[Valdez’s] ineffective assistance of counsel [(“IAC”)]

claim,” on the basis that it “should be resolved in a

separate habeas corpus proceeding.” United States v. SotoValdez, 191 F.3d 462, 1999 WL 701896, at *1 (9th Cir. 1999)

(unpublished). 

Background

I. Habeas Corpus Motion

Presciently, just a few days prior to the issuance of

Case 2:99-cv-01591-RCB Document 19 Filed 09/19/13 Page 2 of 57
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28 2 “CR” refers to the underlying criminal case, CR 95-320-PHX-RCB,

and items docketed therein.

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that decision, on September 3, 1999, attorney Kooyumjian,

filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside,

or Correct sentence, asserting an IAC claim and prosecutorial

misconduct. R & R (Doc. 12) at 3:3-9 (citation omitted). 

The IAC claim was predicated upon trial counsel’s alleged

failure to listen to and obtain a voice analysis of wiretaps

purporting to be conversations between him and other

conspirators. See CR2 Doc. 1210 at 1:26-2:1. 

After additional briefing and an evidentiary hearing on

the IAC claim, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying the

section 2255 petition in its entirety. CR Doc. 1206. 

Accepting the R & R, on January 8, 2001, this court denied

that petition; dismissed the case and entered judgment

accordingly. See CR Docs. 1210 and 1211; and Mot. (Doc. 1),

exh. A thereto at 9. Attorney Kooyumjian timely appealed. 

R & R (Doc. 12) at 3:15-16 (citation omitted); see also id.,

exh. D thereto at 13. Shortly thereafter, on February 28,

2001, this court filed a COA and an order to proceed in forma

pauperis on appeal, finding that the movant “ha[d] made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right

with respect to the . . . [IAC] issue[] . . . , and no other

issue.” Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. C thereto at 12. Ultimately,

because the movant did not file an opening brief, the Ninth

Circuit dismissed his appeal on March 6, 2002. Mot. (Doc.

1), exh. F thereto at 17.

. . .

Case 2:99-cv-01591-RCB Document 19 Filed 09/19/13 Page 3 of 57
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3 After the respondent submitted evidence establishing that

attorney Kooyumjian was eligible to practice law during the section 2255

proceedings, the movant abandoned his claim that Kooyumjian was not

authorized to practice law during that time. See R & R (Doc. 12) at 4:22-

23, n. 2. It was not until much later, in 2005, when Kooyumjian became

ineligible to practice law in California and then later, on January 14,

2010, he was disbarred for failing to pay an arbitration award. Id. at

4:24-25, n. 2. 

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II. “Rule 60(b)(6)” Motion

Slightly more than nine years later, on February 7, 2011,

the movant filed his self-styled “Motion for Relief from

Judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)[.]” Mot. (Doc. 1) at 1 (emphasis

omitted). The movant advances two reasons purportedly

establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief

under that Rule. Only one is relevant at this juncture.3 In

particular, the movant argues that attorney Kooyumjian 

“‘abandoned’” him by not timely filing an opening brief in

the Ninth Circuit, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal,

despite the issuance of a COA by this court as to movant’s

ICA claim. Id. at 3. In his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the

movant is seeking to have the court vacate the judgment and

order denying his section 2255 motion; “reopen the § 2255

proceedings and reschedule a renewed evidentiary hearing[;]”

and appoint counsel to represent him at that hearing. Id. at

6. Alternatively, the movant requests that the court vacate

that judgment and “reenter [it] providing [him] with a

renewed direct appeal from the denial of his § 2255 motion.” 

Id.

The United States counters that the court should deny the

pending motion because the Ninth Circuit appeal divested this

court of jurisdiction. Further, the United States argues

Case 2:99-cv-01591-RCB Document 19 Filed 09/19/13 Page 4 of 57
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4 “Although Gonzalez was limited to § 2254 cases, 545 U.S. at 529

n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 2641, [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] held that its analysis is

equally applicable to § 2255 cases[]” such as the present one. See United

States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1057, 1062 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1609, 182 L.Ed.2d 214

(2012). 

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that this motion is untimely because it was not brought

within a “reasonable time” as Rule 60(c)(1) requires.

The movant retorts that this court “retains jurisdiction

over the § 2255 proceedings” because “the integrity of the

habeas proceedings” was “undermined[.]” Reply (Doc. 10) at 3

and 5. According to the movant, that occurred when, although

this court had issued a COA as to the ICA claim, the Ninth

Circuit dismissed the appeal because his lawyer did not file

an opening brief. As a result, the movant maintains that he

was deprived of the opportunity to pursue his IAC claim on

appeal. 

III. R & R

Rule 60(b) may not be used as a vehicle for circumventing

“the requirement that a successive habeas petition be

precertified by the court of appeals as falling within an

exception to the successive-petition bar.” Gonzalez v. Crosby,

545 U.S. 524, 531, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005)

(citing § 2244(b)(3)).4 Accordingly, the threshold issue is

whether, under Gonzalez, the movant’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is

in fact a disguised § 2255 motion. See Washington, 653 F.3d

at 1062; United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 722 (9th

Cir. 2011). Reasoning that “[u]nder Gonzalez, Movant’s

‘assertion that his post-conviction counsel gave him

ineffective assistance in connection with his § 2255 motion

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does not go to the integrity of the habeas proceedings but, in

effect, asks for a second chance to have the merits determined

favorably[,]’” the Magistrate Judge found the movant’s Rule

60(b)(6) motion to be “a disguised § 2255 motion[.]” R & R

(Doc. 12) at 6:10-15 (quoting U.S. v. Bahna, 2010 WL 491658, 

* 3 (C.D.Cal, Nov. 24, 2010)). On that basis, the Magistrate

Judge recommended dismissal of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for

lack of jurisdiction “to consider the merits . . . absent

authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).” Id. at 7:2-4 (citations omitted).

During the pendency of the movant’s 60(b)(6) motion

before the Magistrate Judge, the Supreme Court decided Maples

v. Thomas, --- U.S. ––-, 132 S.Ct. 912, 181 L.Ed.2d 807

(2012), holding “that abandonment by post-conviction counsel

could provide cause to excuse procedural default of a habeas

claim.” Stokley v. Ryan, 705 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted). Shortly after the issuance of Maples, the

movant filed a motion “urg[ing] the [Magistrate Judge] to

consider” Maples as an “intervening . . . decision . . . right

on point with” his case. Mot. (Doc. 11) at 2. The Magistrate

Judge found that “Maples does not change the fact that the

Movant’s claim of ineffective assistance of § 2255 counsel is

not cognizable in a Rule 60(b)(6) motion.” R & R (Doc. 12) at

7:11-12. Nonetheless, the Magistrate Judge recommended

granting the motion to supplement “to the extent that the

Court considered whether Maples impacts the Rule 60(b)(6)

motion.” Id. at 7:13-14.

. . .

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IV. Objections

Objecting to the R & R, movant Valdez directly challenges

“the Magistrate’s finding that [the movant’s] Rule 60(b)(6)

motion is ‘a disguised § 2255 motion[.]’” Obj. (Doc. 13) at 2. 

Arguing that under Gonzalez, his Rule 60(b)(6) motion “does

not challenge the merits of the judgment denying habeas

relief[,] nor does it raise a new claim[,]” the movant

maintains that this court “has jurisdiction to grant the

requested relief.” Id. at 5. In his objections, the movant

narrows the scope of relief which he is seeking. Now, he is

seeking only what he originally termed his alternative form of

relief, i.e. vacatur of the judgment denying his section 2255

motion; “reent[ry]” of that judgment, which the movant

believes would “allow [him] to file a timely Notice of Appeal

and take a new appeal to which he is entitled.” Id. at 6. 

Additionally, the movant broadly contends that this court

has the authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,

to provide the requested relief, but he does not elaborate. 

Id. at 6, footnote. “The All Writs Act authorizes federal

courts to issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of

jurisdiction and agreeable to usages and principles of law. 

The writs are extraordinary writs and as such should be

reserved for really extraordinary causes.” Samson v. NAMA

Holdings, LLC, 637 F.3d 915, 936 n. 93 (9th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Insofar as his motion to supplement is concerned, the

movant’s objections include a selective quote from Maples, but

nothing more. 

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Discussion

I. Report & Recommendation

A. Standard of Review

The movant’s specific objection to the finding that his

Rule 60(b)(6) motion is a disguised section 2255 motion

requires de novo review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge

. . . shall make a de novo determination of those portions of

the report or specified proposed findings or recommendation to

which objection is made.”); see also Wang v. Masaitis, 416

F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (“Of

course, de novo review of a R & R is only required when an

objection is made to the R & R[.]”); United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) emphasis in

original) (Section 636(b)(1) “makes it clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not

otherwise.”) In conducting such a review, “[a]lthough a de

novo hearing is not necessary, the district court must arrive

at its own independent conclusion about those portions of the

magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations to which a

party objects.” Olson v. Lemos, 2008 WL 782724, at *1

(E.D.Cal. 2008) Id. (citing United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d

614, 616 (9th Cir. 1989)). Thus, as it must, this “reviewing

court [is] not defer[ring] to the [Magistrate Judge’s] ruling”

that the movant’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is a disguised section

2255 motion, “but [is] freely consider[ing] the matter anew,

as if no decision had been rendered below.” See Dawson v.

Marshall, 561 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

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quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added).

B. Jurisdiction

1. Affect of Appeal

Based solely upon Moroyoqui v. United States, 570 F.2d

862 (9th Cir. 1977), the United States contends that “[b]ecause

of the Appeal, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this

matter.” Resp. (Doc. 3) at 4:10-11. This argument is flawed. 

Critically, the United States is overlooking the Ninth

Circuit’s dismissal of the movant’s appeal well before the

filing of the present motion. Admittedly, “‘[t]he filing of a

notice of appeal . . . confers jurisdiction on the court of

appeals and divests the district court of its control over

those aspects of the case involved in the appeal[.]’” Small ex

rel. NLRB v. Operative Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l

Assoc., 611 F.3d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Griggs v.

Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400,

74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam)). However, on March 6,

2001, nearly ten years prior to the filing of the pending

motion, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the movant’s appeal and

issued the mandate, thus restoring jurisdiction to this court. 

See Delman v. Barclay Hotel, LLC, 2009 WL 424345, at *2

(C.D.Cal. Feb. 18, 2009) (citing Sgaraglino v. State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[O]nce an

appellate mandate is issued, the district court reacquires

jurisdiction.”) 

Primarily because of that dismissal, the United States

fares no better by relying upon Moroyoqui. Basically,

Moroyoqui stands for the proposition that once a petitioner

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5 “This section provides that such a motion cannot be considered

unless it has first been certified by the court of appeals to contain

either ‘(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light

of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the

movant guilty of the offense,’ or ‘(2) a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that

was previously unavailable.’” Washington, 653 F.3d at 1059 (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2255(h)). 

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files an appeal of an appealable order, such as a double

jeopardy claim, that filing “divests the district court of

jurisdiction to proceed to trial.” United States v. Bhatia,

2007 WL 2795066, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 26, 2007) (citing,

inter alia, Moroyoqui, 570 F.2d at 864). Obviously, Moroyoqui

has no place in this court’s jurisdiction analysis where the

appeal has been dismissed and the mandate issued. Despite

these shortcomings in the United States’ argument, as will

soon become evident, the court agrees that it lacks

jurisdiction to entertain the movant’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion,

but for entirely different reasons than the United States

advances. 

2. Second or Successive Petition?

 The Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”) generally limits petitioners to one section

2255 motion. Thus, a petitioner “may not bring a ‘second or

successive motion’ unless . . . the exacting standards of 28

U.S.C. § 2255(h)[]”5 are met. Washington, 653 F.3d at 1059. 

To avoid having to comply with “the exacting standards” of

section 2255(h), “petitioners often attempt to characterize

their motions in a way that will avoid the strictures of” that

statute. Id. For example, as did Valdez, a petitioner may

“characterize [his] pleading as being a motion under Rule

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6 As the Ninth Circuit astutely observed in Harvest v. Castro, 531

F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2008):

 If the motion seeking relief from the judgment 

is, in reality, a successive petition, the motion 

would be inconsistent with the [AEDPA]. . . . 

Like the other Civil Rules, Rule 60 applies only 

to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with 

any statutory provisions or [the habeas] rules[.]

Id. at 745 n. 5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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60(b) . . . , which ‘allows a party to seek relief from a

final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a

limited set of circumstances,’ . . . , including, as relevant

here, that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting relief

under subsection six of that Rule. See id. (quoting Gonzalez,

545 U.S. at 528, 125 S.Ct. 2641). 

In that situation, it is incumbent upon the court to

decide whether the movant is bringing a legitimate Rule 60(b)

motion or whether the motion “should be treated as a disguised

§ 2255 motion.”6 See id. at 1063 (citation omitted). “Rule

60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to play in habeas

cases[,]” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 534, 125 S.Ct. 2641; hence, a

court has jurisdiction to entertain a legitimate Rule 60(b)

motion. At the same time, however, a court lacks jurisdiction

to entertain a disguised section 2255 motion unless the movant

“me[e]t[s] the stringent standard for presenting a second or

successive § 2255 motion.” Washington, 653 F.3d at 1065

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)); see also United States v. Allen,

157 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court lacked

jurisdiction to consider merits of petitioner’s claim because

he did not “request the requisite certification” from the

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Ninth Circuit prior to filing his § 2255 motion, raising a

successive claim).

That said, “the Supreme Court has not adopted a brightline rule for distinguishing between a bona fide Rule 60(b)

motion and a disguised second or successive § 2255 motion[.]”

Id. at 1060. Rather, in Gonzalez, the Supreme Court explained

that “when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks . . . some defect in

the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings[,]” such as

“[f]raud on the federal habeas court[,]” it is a valid Rule

60(b) motion. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 and 532 n.5, 125

S.Ct. 2641. A “defect in the integrity of the federal habeas

proceeding” can also be found in a “Rule 60(b) motion

contending that the district court erred in making a

procedural ruling, such as ‘failure to exhaust, procedural

default, or statute-of-limitations bar,’ that actually

‘preclude[s] a merits determination.’” Washington, 653 F.3d

at 1063 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n. 4, 125 S.Ct.

2641). So, for example, in Gonzalez, where the petitioner

challenged the district court’s ruling that his habeas

petition was time-barred, the Supreme Court held that his Rule

60(b) motion was not the equivalent of a second or successive

§ 2254 petition. 

However, “if the [purported Rule 60(b)] motion presents a

‘claim,’ i.e., ‘an asserted federal basis for relief from a 

. . . judgment of conviction,’ then it is, in substance, a new

request for relief on the merits and should be treated as a

disguised § 2255 motion.” Id. (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at

530, 125 S.Ct. 2641). Such “claims” can take a variety of

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forms, including a motion that “attacks the federal court’s

previous resolution of a claim on the merits[.]” Gonzalez, 545

U.S. at 532, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in

original). “On the merits” in this context “refer[s] . . . to

a determination that there exist or do not exist grounds

entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief[.]” Id. at 532

n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 2641. 

The Supreme Court in Gonzalez “gave a number of examples

of . . . ‘claims’” which, if present in a Rule 60(b) motion,

are “in substance. . . a new request for relief on the merits

and should be treated as a disguised § 2255 motion.” 

Washington, 653 F.3d at 1063 (citation omitted). One such

claim, as the Supreme Court recognized, and which is of

particular significance here, is an “attack based on . . .

omissions” by habeas counsel[.]” See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 

532 n. 5, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (citation omitted). The reason such

attacks are deemed to be “claims,” which, in turn, should be

“treated as “disguised § 2255 motion[s]” is because

“ordinarily” such attacks “do[] not go to the integrity of the

[habeas] proceedings, but in effect ask[] for a second chance

to have the merits determined favorably. Id. (emphasis

added). Claims such as this are thus outside the purview of

Rule 60(b). 

“[F]ocus[ing] on the substance” of Valdez’s motion,

Washington, 653 F.3d at 1063 (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at

530-533, 125 S.Ct. 2641), persuades this court that his Rule

60(b)(6) motion is, actually, a disguised section 2255 motion. 

Movant Valdez argues that the “integrity of [his] § 2255

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proceeding[]” was “compromised” because, even though this

court had granted a COA as to his IAC claim, the movant was

denied appellate review of that claim due to his habeas

counsel’s failure to file an opening brief, resulting in the

dismissal of the movant’s appeal. See Mot. (Doc. 1) at 5. On

that basis, the movant believes his reliance upon Rule

60(b)(6) is proper. 

The Supreme Court’s explicit observation in Gonzalez that

“an attack based on . . . habeas counsel’s omissions does not

go to the integrity of the proceedings[]” forecloses Valdez’s

argument, however. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n. 2, 125

S.Ct. 2641 (emphasis added). Furthermore, as the following

discussion shows, since Gonzalez, “[f]ederal courts [have]

routinely hew[n] to this language in denying Rule 60(b)

motions . . . for lack of jurisdiction.” See United States v.

Harris, 2010 WL 2231893, at *3 (S.D.Ala. June 2, 2010) (citing

cases). What is more, as also will be seen, the fact that a

petitioner’s IAC claim is not addressed on appeal as a result

of some omission by habeas counsel, does not change this

result. That is because courts have implicitly found that an

“on the merits” determination, as the Gonzalez Court defined

it, does not encompass appellate review of a district court’s

denial of a habeas petition, even when that court granted a

COA as to the ICA claim. 

Because they are closely analogous to the present case,

Gray v. Mullin, 171 Fed.Appx. 741 (10th Cir. 2006)

(unpublished), and Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419 (6th Cir.

2005), are particularly instructive. Gray is particularly so

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because the absence of appellate review due to an omission by

habeas counsel, as here, did not prevent the Tenth Circuit

from finding that there had been a merits determination within

the meaning of Gonzalez. 

In Gray, the district court denied the petitioner’s

original habeas petition and granted a COA as to his IAC

claim. The petitioner was not afforded appellate review of

that denial, however, because of an omission by habeas

counsel. His habeas counsel was under the mistaken belief

that the district court would transmit the entire record,

including the state court records, to the appellate court.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Gray’s habeas

petition because his counsel did not provide a complete

appellate record. Petitioner’s counsel sought rehearing and

leave to supplement the record. In denying that relief, the

Tenth Circuit “not[ed] [that] it was not permitted . . . to

grant rehearing based on attorney neglect, and that 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(j) prohibits habeas relief based on ineffective counsel

in state or federal collateral post-conviction proceedings.” 

Id. at 743 (citation omitted). 

Petitioner Gray resorted to Rule 60(b)(6). In granting

that motion, the district court “vacated its original . . .

order. . . ; issued a new, verbatim order denying habeas

relief; and granted petitioner a certificate of

appealability.” Id. Vacating that order, the Tenth Circuit

held that the district court lacked “jurisdiction to grant the

motion or to reach the merits of petitioner’s claims.” Id.

Strictly based upon Gonzalez, the Gray Court held that the

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petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion was “an improper attempt to

file a second and successive habeas petition[.]” Id.

Distinguishing Gonzalez, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that

the district court’s procedural ruling therein “precluded a

merits analysis of the habeas claims by that court[,]” whereas

the “district court in [Gray] did rule on the merits of

petitioner’s habeas claims, and petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion

unquestionably reassert[ed] the same substantive [IAC] claim

that he asserted in his § 2254 petition.” Id. (emphasis in

original). Further, because the Supreme Court in Gonzalez

unequivocally declared that “‘an attack based on . . . habeas

counsel’s omissions ordinarily does not go to the integrity of

the proceedings,’” the Gray Court rejected the petitioner’s

argument “that he properly invoked Rule 60(b) to avoid a

fundamental miscarriage of justice so that his appeal could be

heard on the merits, [and] not be dismissed because of his

counsel’s failure to transmit the necessary record on appeal.” 

Id. (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. 2641). 

Given the similarities between Gray and the present case,

Gray’s reasoning applies with equal force here. Just as in

Gray, this court denied the movant’s habeas motion and granted

a COA solely as to his IAC claim. Also as in Gray, albeit for

a different reason, movant Valdez did not have appellate

review on the merits of his habeas motion alleging IAC. And

finally, movant Valdez, as did petitioner Gray, is seeking to

have this court vacate its denial of his habeas motion so he

can pursue his appeal on the merits of his IAC claim. As Gray

makes clear, however, this court lacks jurisdiction to

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entertain the movant’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion because, under

these circumstances, it constitutes an impermissible second

and successive habeas motion. See also Gurry v. McDaniel, 149

Fed.Appx. 593, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2005) (vacating district

court’s decision on the merits of petitioner’s Rule 60(b)

motion, because it was a successive habeas petition in that he

alleged, inter alia, an IAC claim with respect to his previous

habeas counsel). 

Post is similarly instructive because it held that the

petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was a second or successive

habeas petition, although, as here, it did not “attack the

district court’s substantive analysis of” its “prior dismissal

of [petitioner’s] habeas petition.” Post, 422 F.3d at 424-

425. In his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Post alleged “incompetent

and ineffective representation . . . during his federal postconviction collateral review” because his lawyer did not

pursue discovery, even though Post sought and obtained

district court approval for that discovery. Id. at 423. It

was “clear” to the Post Court that “whatever appellation [it]

might apply to counsel’s neglect[,]” the AEDPA did not allow

for relief. Id. In finding Post’s motion to be a second or

successive habeas petition, the Court reasoned:

It makes no difference that the motion itself

does not attack the district court’s 

substantive analysis of those claims but, 

instead, purports to raise a defect in the 

integrity of the habeas proceedings, 

namely his counsel’s failure-after obtaining 

leave to pursue discovery-actually to 

undertake that discovery[.]

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Id. at 424. Continuing, the Court further reasoned: “[A]ll

that matters is that Post is ‘seek[ing] vindication of’ or

‘advanc[ing]’ a claim by taking steps that lead inexorably to

a merits-based attack on the prior dismissal of his habeas

petition.” Id. at 424-425 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-

532, 125 S.Ct. 2641). 

That is precisely what movant Valdez is doing through his

Rule 60(b)(6) motion. By seeking to vacate the denial of his

section 2255 motion alleging IAC, and allowing an appeal of

that denial, clearly the movant is taking “steps that lead

inexorably to a merits-based attack on the prior dismissal of

his habeas [motion].” See id. Gonzalez and its progeny

simply do not allow movant Valdez to circumvent section

2255(h)’s restrictions on the filing a second and successive

section 2255 habeas petition in that way.

This court’s holding is entirely consistent with other

courts within this District. Relying upon Gonzalez and Post,

those courts likewise have held that claims of incompetent

habeas counsel do not challenge “some defect in the integrity

of the federal habeas proceedings[,]” but, rather, are

“‘claim[s]’ . . . attacking the federal court’s previous

resolution of a claim on the merits[.]” See Gonzalez, 545 U.S.

at 532 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). In Van

Adams v. Schriro, 2009 WL 89465 (D.Ariz. Jan. 14, 2009), a

capital case, among the asserted grounds for Rule 60(b) relief

was the petitioner’s claim that “he was not afforded competent

habeas counsel.” Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). During the habeas proceeding, the court

appointed an expert psychiatrist to examine petitioner and

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7 In Rohan, the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner “has a statutory

right to competence in his federal habeas proceedings,” with competence

defined as “the capacity to understand his position and to communicate

rationally with counsel.” Rohan, 334 F.3d at 819. Just recently, the

Supreme Court abrogated Rohan. See Ryan v. Gonzales, —-- U.S. -—-, 133

S.Ct. 696, 184 L.Ed.2d 523 (2013).

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make a competency determination in accordance with Rohan v.

Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003).7 Then District Court

Judge Murgia, rejected the petitioner’s argument “that his

allegations of Rohan incompetence and ineffective assistance

of habeas counsel challenge the integrity of the habeas

proceedings and therefore constitute[d] a basis for a proper

motion under Rule 60(b).” Id. at *4 (footnote added); see

also West v. Schriro, 2008 WL 4693393, *5 (D.Ariz. Oct. 20,

2008) (Rule 60(b) motion “based on habeas counsel’s failure to

obtain mental health evidence that Petitioner . . . wishe[d]

to present . . . to challenge” district court’s denial of his

IAC claim was “in essence” an improper “request to adjudicate

a successive petition”); United States v. Bahna, 2010 WL

4916584 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (IAC claim against postconviction counsel did not “provide[] a cognizable basis for a

Rule 60(b) motion[,]” but was “in effect [a] habeas ‘claim[]’

to be litigated in accordance with the AEDPA[]”); United

States v. Buenrostro, 2008 WL 1925245, *4–5 (E.D.Cal. Apr. 30,

2008)[, aff’d, 638 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 2011),] (Rule 60(b)

motion predicated on habeas counsel’s lack of diligence is, in

substance, a successive § 2255 motion cloaked in Rule 60(b)

rubric). Courts outside this District have reached the same

conclusion. See, e.g., Akemon v. Brunsman, 2008 WL 1766707,

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8 Indeed, in U.S. v. Soto-Valdez, 2009 WL 1311954 (D.Ariz. May 12,

2009), the court foresaw the possibility “that any subsequent habeas corpus

petition which defendant files may be deemed a ‘second or successive’

petition which the [AEDPA] generally prohibits.” Id. at *2 n. 1 (citation

omitted). 

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*4 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 17, 2008) (“Petitioner . . . is unable to

prevail on any claim that his habeas counsel’s ineffectiveness

amounted to a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas

proceedings which may be considered by [the district court] as

a ground for granting relief under [Rule 60(b)]”) (internal

quotation marks omitted); United States v. Sowers, 2007 WL

2302426, *3 (M.D.Ala. Aug. 9, 2007) (where petitioner’s Rule

60(b) motion only challenged presentation of evidence by

habeas counsel and sought to present additional evidence in

support of original claim for relief, it did not affect

integrity of proceedings and was a second or successive habeas

petition). After independently reviewing the movant’s selfstyled Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and based upon this great weight

of authority, it is abundantly clear, as the Magistrate Judge

recommended, that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain

this motion because it is an impermissible second or

successive habeas petition.8 Hence, it must be denied. 

C. Motion to Supplement

With respect to his motion to supplement, movant Valdez

did not provide any specific objections to the R & R’s

treatment of Maples. Consequently, this court has no

obligation to review the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation in

that regard. See Gordon v. Ryan, 2012 WL 2572192, at *1

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(July 2, 2012) (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106

S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (emphasis added by Gordon

court)) (“[C]onstruing the Federal Magistrates Act, the

Supreme Court has found that that “‘statute does not on its

face require any review at all, by either the district court

or the court of appeals, of any issue that is not the subject

of an objection.’”) 

The court hastens to add that even construing the

movant’s selective quotes from Maples as an objection, it is

meritless because the movant has not even attempted to show

that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation was either “clearly

erroneous” or “contrary to law.” See Ranza v. Nike, Inc.,

2013 WL 869522, at *2 (D.Or. March 7, 2013) (applying that

standard pursuant to section 636(b)(1)(A) to a magistrate

judge’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to supplement the

record). Therefore, as did the Magistrate Judge, this court

finds that Maples does not change the analysis or the result

with respect to whether the movant’s “pleading labeled as a

Rule 60(b)[(6)]” includes a claim attacking his habeas

counsel’s omission, and as such “‘is in substance a successive

habeas petition and should be treated accordingly.’” See

Delgado v. United States, 2012 WL 761594, at *3 (E.D.Cal.

March 8, 2012) (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531) (other

citation omitted). 

II. Post-R & R Motion

After the issuance of the R & R and the filing of the

movant’s objections thereto, Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132

S.Ct. 1309, 132 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), and Mackey v. Hoffman, 682

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F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2012), were decided. Thereafter, the

movant filed a “motion to supplement” his Rule 60(b)(6)

motion. Mot. (Doc. 14) at 1. In that motion, movant Valdez

is seeking to have this court “consider” Martinez, Mackey and,

as he did previously, the Supreme Court’s decision in Maples,

132 S.Ct. 912. Id. at 2. Although not framed in this way, as

the court construes his motion, the movant is contending that

those three cases are tantamount to an intervening change in

law, which, in turn, constitutes an extraordinary circumstance

justifying relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

60(b)(6). 

The United States counters that none of those three cases

change the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, because they did not 

“create additional claims cognizable” under Rule 60(b)(6). 

Resp. (Doc. 16) at 3:1-3 (emphasis omitted). As it did

originally, the United States again raises the issue of

timeliness. By the United States’ calculations, Valdez did

not file his Rule 60(b)(6) motion until nine years after the

filing date for his opening brief in the Ninth Circuit. Not

only that, but, as the United States stresses, Valdez did not

file his motion until five and a half years after learning

that attorney Kooyumjian was not entitled to practice law in

California. 

To refute that timeliness argument, in his reply, movant

Valdez offers a litany of reasons, discussed herein, which he

claims are tantamount to “‘extraordinary circumstances’

[which] prevented [him] from taking timely action to challenge

the abandonment of his appeal by attorney . . . Kooyumjian.” 

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9 Actually, the United States indicates that this motion was filed “more

than nine years” late. Resp. (Doc. 3) at 5:22 (emphasis added). That calculation

is based upon the United States’ inaccurate assumption that “[t]he alleged failure

occurred on September 4, 2001[.]” Id. at 5:17-18. At one point the opening brief

was due on that date, but the movant was granted an extension so that his opening

brief and excerpts were due by November 5, 2001. U.S v Soto-Valdez, # 01-15427 (9th

Cir.) at 7 (August 20, 2001) and 8 (September 19, 2001). Of more import though is

that the alleged failure, as the United States later recognizes, was the dismissal

of the appeal for failure to perfect. That did not occur until March 6, 2002.

Thus, the more accurate date for this calculation is March 6, 2002, meaning this

motion was filed almost nine years late, not “more than nine years late[,]” as the

United States maintains. See Resp. (Doc. 3) at 5:22. 

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Reply (Doc. 17) at 3. 

 A. Rule 60(b)(6)

Pursuant to Rule 60(b)’s catchall provision, a district

court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding for “any other reason that justifies relief.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). A motion brought pursuant to that Rule

“must be made within a reasonable time[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). 

A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) also must “show

‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a

final judgment.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. In the present

case, even if the court were to conclude that movant Valdez

otherwise properly invoked Rule 60(b)(6), he has shown neither

timeliness nor extraordinary circumstances. 

1. Timeliness

Noting that movant Valdez’s appeal was dismissed on March

6, 2002, for failure to file his opening brief, the United

States points out that he waited almost nine years9 -– until 

February 7, 2011 –- to file this motion. The United States

further relies upon the May 13, 2005, letter from the State

Bar of California informing the movant that at that time Mr.

Kooyumjian’s was “not entitled to practice[]” law there. Mot.

(Doc. 1), exh. G thereto. Even with that knowledge, the

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movant waited more than five and a half years from that date

before filing his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Based upon these two

events, the United States argues that this motion was not

brought within a “reasonable time” within the meaning of Rule

60(c)(1). 

What constitutes a “reasonable time” involves a factspecific inquiry. It “‘tak[es] into consideration the

interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical

ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied

upon, and prejudice to the other parties.’” See Lemoge v.

United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

Whether viewed individually or collectively, movant Valdez’s

proffered reasons do not “demonstrate ‘that circumstances

beyond [his] control prevented timely action to protect its

interests.’” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Fibercom, Inc. (In

re Int’l Fibercom, Inc.), 503 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting U.S. v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047,

1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). In the absence of such a showing,

movant Valdez is not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief. See id.

(emphasis added)(“relief under Rule 60(b) should only be

granted where the moving party is able to” make such a

showing). 

According to the movant, the “[f]irst and foremost”

factor excusing his delay in filing this motion is the

purported validity of his IAC claim against attorney

Kooyumjian. See Reply (Doc. 10) at 6. While the movant

places a great deal of significance on this factor, he does 

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not cite to any authority showing that the relative merits of

an underlying claim somehow excuse an otherwise untimely Rule

60(b)(6) motion. The lack of authority to support that

proposition is not surprising given that the relative merits

is not among the factors courts consider in assessing what

constitutes a “reasonable time” for bringing such a motion.

In contrast, the facts and circumstances available to the

movant as early as 2005 are highly probative in ascertaining

the timeliness of this motion. As his own exhibit shows, in

2005 the movant had concerns about attorney Kooyumjian’s

representation of him. In a letter dated March 3, 2005, to

the State Bar of California movant Valdez alleged professional

misconduct against Kooyumjian. See Mot. (Doc. 1), exh. G

thereto at 18. The May 13, 2005, response informed the movant

of Mr. Kooyumjian’s “current status with the State Bar[;]” he

was “not entitled to practice[] law. See id. So by mid-May

2005, the movant knew or reasonably should have known that Mr.

Kooyumjian was not entitled to practice law in California. 

Indeed, initially, when he filed this motion in February,

2011, movant Valdez relied upon that letter as the first of

two bases for seeking relief from judgment. 

Additionally, because on approximately February 16, 2001,

the movant, among others, was provided with a copy of his

habeas notice of appeal, see Doc. 1212 (95-CR-320-PHX-RCB), he

knew or reasonably should have known that that notice had been

filed more than four years earlier. These circumstances, at a

minimum, should have prompted movant Valdez to make some

inquiry, regardless of the source, as to the status of his

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10 The Ninth Circuit’s docket seems to corroborate that on January

7, 2008, it “[r]eceived [a] letter from pro se re: status of the case.”

U.S. v Soto-Valdez, # 98-10389 (9th Cir.)(Jan. 7, 2008) at 37. The Ninth

Circuit almost immediately responded by sending the “[p]ublic docket

sheet” on January 10, 2008. Id. This docket entry is from plaintiff’s

appeal in his criminal case, but seemingly he also was provided a copy of

the docket from his section 2255 appeal at this time. 

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appeal; but he did not. The record is void of any evidence

that at that time Valdez, or anyone on his behalf, attempted

to contact his attorney, the Ninth Circuit, or this district

court. 

The movant’s failure to take some action in 2005 is even

more puzzling given that by then he had some familiarity with

the length of the appellate process. In 2005, the movant knew

or reasonably should have known that the Ninth Circuit had

affirmed his conviction approximately one year after the

filing of his notice of appeal. Thus, in the movant’s

experience, albeit limited, hearing nothing about his habeas

appeal after approximately four years, should have prompted

him to make some inquiry or take some action. This is all the

more so taking into account, as just discussed, that in midMay 2005 the movant was fully aware that his habeas appellate

counsel was no longer entitled to practice law in California. 

Rather than pursuing the status of his appeal, or taking

any other action, the movant sat idly by for about two and a

half more years. As the movant candidly acknowledges, “[i]t

was not until 2008, when [he] . . . obtained a copy of the

Docket Records from his case that he discovered that the

appeal from his § 2255 motion had been dismissed because no

opening brief had been filed on his behalf[.]”10 Reply (Doc.

10) at 7. Even when armed with that additional knowledge,

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movant Valdez did not file a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 

In an effort to explain his inaction in 2008, the movant

faults attorney Kooyumjian who allegedly “took all the records

of Valdez[’s] case[,]” and “never provided” them to Valdez. 

Reply (Doc. 17) at 3; and Reply (Doc. 10) at 6. Consequently,

the movant contends that it was not “until 2011[,]" after two

years of litigation, that he came into “possession of

sufficient records of this case that . . . allow[ed] him to

discover his claims[].” Reply (Doc. 10) at 7. More

specifically, the movant contends that he “discovered that

attorney . . . Kooyumjian had abandoned [the movant’s] appeal

without filing appellant’s brief.” Id. 

 Regardless of how Mr. Kooyumjian’s conduct is

characterized, as just explained, however, three years

earlier, in 2008, the movant knew that his appeal had been

dismissed for failure to file an opening brief. Thus, the

movant did not need to obtain his case records to confirm what

he already knew. Moreover, the movant was very clear as to

why he wanted to obtain those records – not because of

anything pertaining to his appeal – but rather, to pursue an

actual innocence claim. U.S. v. Soto-Valdez, 2009 WL 1311954,

at *2 (D.Ariz. May 12, 2009) (internal quotation marks,

citation and footnote omitted) (“Defendant asserts . . . that

he needs access to the court's file to perfect[ ] . . . a

collateral attack raising an actual innocen[ce] claim[.]”) The

foregoing eviscerates the movant’s argument that it was not

until 2011 that he became aware that his attorney had not

filed an opening brief in the Ninth Circuit. Movant Valdez 

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knew of that omission in 2008, as he admits. 

 Further endeavoring to show circumstances beyond his

control which prevented him from timely filing this motion,

the movant advises that he is a “Mexican Nationalist[,]” who

has limited English proficiency, and “no understanding of the

American federal justice system.” Reply (Doc. 10) at 6. 

Movant Valdez adds his lack of financial resources to hire “an

attorney to investigate his case or what happened to his

appeal[.]” Reply (Doc. 17) at 3. Regrettably, limited English

proficiency and a lack of financial resources are not uncommon

among the prison population and, more importantly, do not

factor into the court’s reasonableness inquiry. 

 Despite these claimed limitations, in 2008, movant Valdez

was able to obtain “the assistance of an Inmate Law Clerk[,]”

which is how he learned that his habeas appeal had been

dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Reply (Doc. 10) at 7. 

Significantly, the movant does not explain why he waited until

2008, nearly seven years from the filing of his notice of

appeal, to obtain such assistance. Additionally, the movant’s

claimed limitations did not hinder the ability of movant

Valdez, pro se, to file: (1) a motion seeking his case file

(Doc. 1310); (2) a motion for leave to appeal in forma

pauperis (Doc. 1319); and (3) a notice of appeal as to the

order denying his motion to obtain his case file (Doc. 1316). 

These actions belie Valdez’s assertion that he “has no

understanding of the American federal justice system.” Reply

(Doc. 10) at 6 (emphasis added). These actions further

demonstrate that the movant’s limited English proficiency, 

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while perhaps a circumstance beyond his control, did not

prevent him from timely filing his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 

To recount, in 2005, insofar as the movant was aware, his

appeal had been pending without resolution since February

2001. Also in 2005, the movant learned that his appellate

attorney was no longer entitled to practice law in California. 

Nonetheless, movant Valdez did nothing to ascertain the status

of his appeal. Another two and a half years or so passed

before the movant contacted the Ninth Circuit and was put on

notice that his appeal was dismissed for failure to file an

opening brief. Even at that time, however, in early 2008, the

movant did not file a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Instead, he

waited roughly three more years before filing such a motion. 

Courts have routinely held that delays of less than three

years in seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief are not reasonable. 

See, e.g., Morse–Starrett Products Co. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d

244, 249 (9th Cir. 1953) (22 months unreasonable); Foley v.

Rowland, 2012 WL 4027129, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 12, 2012) (16

month delay unreasonable), adopted, 2012 WL 4490881 (E.D.Cal.

Sept. 28, 2012); Hogan v. Robinson, 2009 WL 1085478, at *4

(E.D.Cal. April 22, 2009) (Rule 60(b)(6) motion “filed over 18

months after judgment was entered, and over two years after

Plaintiffs were put on notice of the facts and circumstances

upon which they rely[]” was untimely); Henry v. Lindsey, 2008

WL 4594948, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 15, 2008) (Rule 60(b)(6)

motion untimely where the petitioner waited “an additional two

and a half years” after the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance before

filing); Swait v. Evans, 2008 WL 4330291, at *5 - *6 (C.D.Cal.

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Sept. 22, 2008) (Rule 60(b) motions untimely where petitioner

“failed to proffer any legally valid explanation for his twoyear delay” in filing). Accordingly, this court has little

difficulty finding that movant Valdez did not file his Rule

60(b)(6) motion within a reasonable time. 

This conclusion is all the more compelling considering, 

as the court must, the interest in finality and prejudice to

the other parties. Given that the movant’s habeas appeal was

dismissed on March 6, 2002, his case was closed and the

judgment final for almost nine years before he sought relief

under Rule 60(b)(6). Under these circumstances, granting

movant Valdez’s motion would severely undermine the integrity

of the appellate process and prejudice the government. See

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,

864, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,

dissenting) (“This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is

essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved”). 

For all of the reasons discussed herein, even if movant

Valdez’s motion could properly be construed as being brought

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), he did not bring it within a

“reasonable time” as Rule 60(c) mandates. 

2. “Extraordinary Circumstances 

 The Ninth Circuit “use[s] Rule 60(b)(6) sparingly as an

equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.” Lal v.

California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, “[i]n order

to bring himself within the limited area of Rule 60(b)(6) a

petitioner is required to establish the existence of

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extraordinary circumstances which prevented or rendered him

unable to prosecute an appeal.” Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1251

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). “Such [extraordinary] circumstances will rarely

occur in the habeas context.” Gonzalez, 125 S.Ct. at 2649. 

a. Maples 

Through his “motion to supplement,” apparently movant

Valdez is attempting to establish extraordinary circumstances

based upon a claimed intervening change in the law, i.e.,

Maples, 132 S.Ct. 912, Martinez, 566 U.S. 1, and Mackey, 682

F.3d 1247. Typically, when confronted with such an argument,

the court would apply the analytical framework adopted in

Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009), requiring a

“case-by-case inquiry[,]” balancing a number of competing

factors. Id. at 1133 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131, 1135–37 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, —–- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 55, 183 L.Ed.2d

698 (2012). A Phelps analysis would be a futile exercise in

this case, however, at least with respect to the Supreme

Court’s decisions in Maples, 132 S.Ct. 912, and Martinez, 566

U.S. 1. Even assuming arguendo that Maples is a change in law

as applied to movant Valdez, it is not an intervening change

in that Maples was decided while Valdez’s motion was pending

before the Magistrate Judge. And, indeed, as earlier

discussed, the Magistrate Judge considered and rejected the

movant’s argument that Maples supports his Rule 60(b)(6)

motion –-- a conclusion with which this court agrees. Thus,

strictly from a temporal standpoint, Maples is not an

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11 To the extent movant Valdez’s post R & R motion can be read as

asserting that Martinez can form the basis for a application for a second

or successive section 2255, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro v.

United States, 697 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2012), forecloses that argument. The

Buenrostro Court unambiguously held that “Martinez cannot form the basis

for an application for a second or successive motion because it did not

announce a new rule of constitutional law.” Id. at 1139. Likewise, the

Ninth Circuit held that “Martinez cannot form the basis for Buenrostro’s

application” to file a second or successive § 2255 motion because: 

(1) “Martinez concern[ed] procedural default based on ineffective

assistance of habeas counsel in state habeas proceedings[;]” and 

(2) “Buenrostro is a federal prisoner who wishes to collaterally attack

the legality of his federal conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255.” Id. at 1140. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found Martinez to

be “inapplicable to federal convictions[.]” Id.

Buenrostro’s rationale applies with equal force here. Movant Valdez

is a federal prisoner who, like Buenrostro, “wishes to collaterally attack

the legality of his federal conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”

See id. As Buenrostro makes clear, though, Martinez does not apply to

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intervening change in law, and cannot support a finding of

extraordinary circumstances in this case. 

b. Martinez 

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. 1309, likewise does not constitute an

intervening change in law as it relates to movant Valdez. In

Martinez, the Supreme Court carved out “a narrow exception[]” 

–- an “equitable ruling[,]” 132 U.S. at 1319 –- to the

“unqualified statement in” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), “that an attorney’s

ignorance or inadvertence in a postconviction proceeding does

not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default.” 

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. The Martinez Court “held that a

procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from

hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial

if, in the [State’s] initial-review collateral proceeding,

there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was

ineffective.” Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct.

1911, 1912, --- U.S. L.Ed.2d ---- (2013) (emphasis added).11 

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federal convictions, such as the movant’s. Thus, Martinez cannot form the

basis for a second or successive section 2255 petition in this case. 

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Because the present case does not “involve the initial

review of the state collateral proceeding[,]” the United

States contends that Martinez is “inapposite.” Resp. (Doc.

16) at 4:24; and at 3:8. Based upon unspecified “language” in

the Martinez “holding[,]” the movant responds that that

holding “applies to both state and federal prisoners[.]” See

Reply (Doc. 17) at 5. The movant misapprehends the scope of

Martinez. 

A close reading of Martinez confirms its limited

applicability and, in turn, the strength of the United States’

position herein. Because “[t]he rule of Coleman governs in

all but the limited circumstances recognized” in Martinez, the

Supreme Court could not have been more clear; its “holding 

. . . does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of

proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral

proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and

petitions for discretionary review in a State’s appellate

courts.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320 (citations omitted).

Stressing its limited holding, the Supreme Court further

explained that Martinez “does not extend to attorney errors in

any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a

prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial,

even though that initial-review collateral proceeding may be

deficient for other reasons.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations

omitted). Finally, the Court expressly limited its holding to

“only the constitutional claims presented in this case, where

the State barred the defendants from raising the claims on

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direct appeal.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Pinnell v. Belleque, 2012 WL 6649229, at *2 (D.Or. Dec.

20, 2012), illustrates just how narrowly courts have construed

Martinez. In Pinnell, the court rejected the petitioner’s

argument that “pursuant to Martinez [an] ineffective

assistance of post-conviction trial counsel [c]ould serve as

cause to excuse the default of his ineffective assistance of

direct appellate counsel claims.” Id. at *2. Pointing out

that Martinez “specifically limited the exception to claims

on ineffective assistance of trial counsel[,]” the Pinnell

court declined to extend Martinez to cover claims of

ineffective assistance of direct appellate counsel. See id. 

Movant Valdez’s situation is even more attenuated when

compared to Martinez. Clearly, the present case is outside

the narrow scope of Martinez given that movant Valdez is a

federal prisoner, without any claims of procedural default and

cause and prejudice. See Cross v. Benedetti, 2012 WL 3252863,

at * 3 (D. Nev. Aug. 7, 2012) (footnote omitted) (Martinez

inapplicable because neither petitioner’s “first nor . . .

second federal [habeas] petition constituted initial-review

state collateral proceedings.”). Simply put, Martinez “did

not change the law in a manner germane to the judgment

rendered in this action.” See Hamilton v. Swarthout, 2012 

WL 4343830, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 21, 2012). Consequently,

the court readily concludes that Martinez does not represent

an intervening change in law, and cannot form the basis for a

finding of extraordinary circumstances here. 

. . .

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c. Mackey 

The third decision upon which movant Valdez is relying to

show extraordinary circumstances is Mackey, wherein the Ninth

Circuit held “that a district court may grant an incarcerated

habeas petitioner relief from judgment pursuant to” Rule

60(b)(6) “if his attorney’s abandonment causes him to fail to

timely file a notice of appeal.” Mackey, 682 F.2d at 1248

(emphasis added). Mackey, a state prisoner, represented by

counsel, filed a timely federal habeas petition, alleging IAC

by his trial counsel. The court issued an order directing the

state to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus should not

be granted, which it did. Mackey’s counsel, LeRue Grim, “did

not file a traverse by the March 2008 due date[,]” however. 

Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1248. 

 In June, 2008 attorney Grim wrote Mackey, informing him

that his case was before the federal court in San Francisco,

that they were waiting for a trial date, and telling Mackey to

ask his parents to make a payment on his legal bill. Id.

Attorney Grim did nothing further. On July 13, 2009, the

district court denied Mackey’s habeas petition on the merits

and entered judgment against him. Id. Although he received

prompt notification of that entry of judgment, attorney Grim

did not notify Mackey and he did not file a notice of appeal. 

Id. at 1249. 

 Eight months after the entry of judgment, Mackey wrote the

district court “stating that he was ‘unaware of the current

status’ of his case.” Id. After being advised of the entry

of judgment against him, Mackey again wrote to the 

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district court, “concern[ed] about his appellate rights[.]” 

Id. Mackey further advised the court that for months his

lawyer had been telling him that he had a court date. Id. 

At the direction of the court, attorney Grim responded

that Mackey’s parents had retained him for state postconvictions proceedings, but they had only partially paid him. 

Id. Nonetheless, attorney Grim, pro bono, filed a section

2254 petition on Mackey’s behalf, while at the same time

“‘fully inform[ing]’” Mackey and his family that without

payment, he would not perform any other legal work regarding

that petition. Id. 

After Mackey accused Grim of continuously lying to him

about a hearing date, Grim informed the court that because

Mackey’s parents had stopped paying Grim, “apparently [they

have] abandoned their son’s legal defense.” Id. Although it

expressed “concern” about a perceived “failure of

communication” between Mackey and attorney Grim, the district

court denied Mackey’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion because it

determined that it did not “‘possess[] the discretion to

vacate and reenter the judgment in order to allow [Mackey] the

opportunity to appeal[.]’” Id. at 1254. Mackey appealed.

The Ninth Circuit readily acknowledged that “‘[a] federal

habeas petitioner — who as such does not have a Sixth

Amendment right to counsel — is ordinarily bound by his

attorney’s negligence, because the attorney and the client

have an agency relationship under which the principal is bound

by the actions of the agent.’” Id. at 1253 (quoting Towery v.

Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. 

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––––, 132 S.Ct. 1738, 182 L.Ed.2d 271 (2012)). Simultaneously

though, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “when a federal

habeas petitioner has been inexcusably and grossly neglected

by his counsel in a manner amounting to attorney abandonment

in every meaningful sense that has jeopardized the

petitioner’s appellate rights, a district court may grant

relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).” Id. (citing, inter alia,

Maples, 132 S.Ct. at 924; Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170). In light

of the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit found that if, as Mackey

contended, “he has demonstrated that extraordinary

circumstances — here, abandonment by counsel of record –

prevented him from being notified of the order denying his

federal habeas petition[,] . . . justice requires that relief

be granted so that he may pursue an appeal.” Id. at 1253

(citation omitted). Reversing and remanding, the Ninth

Circuit instructed the district court to make a finding as to

abandonment and, if so, whether to exercise its discretion to

grant Mackey Rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment. Id. at

1254.

Upon remand, the district court held that Mackey had been

abandoned by his lawyer and thus was entitled to Rule 60(b)(6)

relief. Mackey v. Hoffman, 2012 WL 4753512, at *1 (N.D.Cal.

Oct. 4, 2012). Focusing on the lack of communication between

Mackey and his attorney, the district court faulted Grim for

“not keep [Mackey] apprised of the status of []his case[.]”

Id. “[M]ost importantly,” the district court found that Grim

had “failed to inform [Mackey] that [his] [habeas] petition

had been denied and that judgment had been entered.” Id. The

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court further found that Mackey “did not learn of the denial

until the time for appeal had lapsed, and this abandonment by

his counsel was an ‘extraordinary circumstance beyond his

control.’” Id. (quoting Maples, 132 S.Ct. at 924). The court

also pointed out that Grim did not abide by the district

court’s rule “requiring him to seek permission to withdraw as

attorney of record[.]” Id. at 1253 (citation omitted). 

Therefore, the court granted Mackey’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and

vacated its prior judgment denying such relief. 

Without offering any explanation, in his motion to

supplement the movant simply contends that Mackey “direct[ly]

imp[]act[s] . . . the issues presented” herein. Mot. (Doc.

14) at 1. The United States is of the view, however, that

“Mackey applies the holding in Maples but does not expand it

in any way meaningful to the [movant’s] case.” Resp. (Doc. 16)

at 3:6-7. Distinguishing Mackey on the basis that it “dealt

with . . . failure to file a notice of appeal and not[,]” as

here, “the effective prosecution of that appeal once it

commenced,[,]” the United States argues that Mackey does not

alter the R & R’s analysis. Id. at 4:15-17. 

Charging the United States with reading Mackey “too

narrow[ly][,]” in rejoinder, the movant claims that, much like

Mackey, his attorney abandoned him when he did not file the

opening brief, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal. 

Reply (Doc. 17) at 1. Based upon that alleged attorney

abandonment, the movant asserts that he is entitled to

“vacature and reentry of the judgment denying his initial 

§ 2255 motion and granting a [COA] on the issue of ineffective

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assistance of trial counsel, so that [he] can prosecute the

appeal he was denied due to abandonment by his [appellate]

attorney[.]” Id. at 5. 

“[A] change in the law will not always provide the truly

extraordinary circumstances necessary to reopen a case.” 

Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1133 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that

“[i]ntervening developments in the law by themselves rarely

constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief

under Rule 60(b)(6)[.]” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239,

117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). As the Ninth Circuit

instructed in Phelps, “[t]he proper course when analyzing a

Rule 60(b)(6) motion predicated on an intervening change in

the law is to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the

specific motion before the court.” Id. at 1133. That

analysis involves “a case-by-case inquiry . . . . balanc[ing]

numerous factors[.]” Id. Those factors include but are not

limited to: (1) “the nature of the intervening change in

law[;]” (2) “the petitioner’s exercise of diligence in

pursuing the issue during the federal habeas proceedings[;]”

(3) “the interest in finality[;]” (4) the “delay between the

finality of the judgment and the motion for Rule 60(b)(6)

relief[;]” (5) the “degree of connection” between the original

and intervening decisions at issue in the Rule 60(b)(6)

motion; and (6) “comity.” Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1135-1137

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

enumerated factors above are not meant to “impose a rigid or

exhaustive checklist[]” in the exercise of this court’s

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discretion. Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1135. Guided by the six

Phelps factors, this court will consider whether Mackey

constitutes an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of Rule

60(b)(6) so as to justify vacating movant Valdez’s judgment of

dismissal of his habeas petition entered over a decade ago. 

i. Nature of Change

The first Phelps factor “focuses on the extent to which

the law was settled prior to the intervening change[.]”

Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1139. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 524,

illustrates a situation where a change in law did not

constitute extraordinary circumstances. The district court

in Gonzalez had dismissed the petitioner’s first federal

habeas petition as untimely based upon the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), the petitioner

sought to reopen that judgment, arguing that a subsequent

Supreme Court decision had changed the interpretation of the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations, so as to render timely his

previously time-barred claims. The petitioner argued that

that change in law constituted an extraordinary circumstance

warranting relief under that Rule. 

Disagreeing, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he

District Court’s interpretation was by all appearances

correct under the Eleventh Circuit’s then-prevailing

interpretation” of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Id.

at 536 (emphasis added). Continuing, the Supreme Court

pointed out that it was “hardly extraordinary that . . .

after petitioner’s case was no longer pending,” and in

resolving a Circuit split, it “arrived at a different

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interpretation.” Id. 

Contrasting Gonzalez, where the change in law “upset or

overturn[ed] a settled legal principle[,]” the Ninth Circuit

in Phelps, held that an intervening change of law favored

granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief where the disputed issue “was

decidedly un settled” when Phelps’ petition was before the

district court.” Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1136 (emphasis in

original). When “Phelps’ original appeal was pending before

a panel of [the Ninth Circuit], the exact same issue was

pending before two other Ninth Circuit panels considering

other appeals.” Id. And, “those panels reached

diametrically opposite outcomes from that reached by the

panel reviewing Phelps’ case.” Id. In fact, the intervening

precedent in Phelps “resolved a conflict between multiple

Ninth Circuit panels that had issued contemporaneous but

contradictory memorandum dispositions.” Id. at 1139. see

also Anderson v. Kane, 2009 WL 3059122, at *1 (D.Ariz. Sept.

22, 2009) (comparing cases) (weighing in favor of Rule

60(b)(6) relief because the issue was “not settled in the

Ninth Circuit” prior to the intervening change in law). “The

law regarding the core disputed issue in the Phelps’ case did

not become settled until fifteen months after his appeal

became final[.]” Id. at 1136. What is more, at that point it

became apparent that the interpretation was the one Phelps

“had pressed all along.” Id. Under these circumstances, the

Ninth Circuit found that the first factor “necessarily cuts

in favor of granting” Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Id.

The Ninth Circuit in Lopez, 678 F.3d 1131, was confronted

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12 But see Tilcock v. Budge, 2013 WL 2324452, at *2 (D.Nev. May 28,

2013) (cataloging cases) (“[V]irtually every court to have examined the

import of Martinez in the context of a request for Rule 60(b)(6) relief has

rejected the notion that Martinez satisfies Rule 60(b)(6)’s ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ requirement.”) 

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with a change in intervening law which “differ[ed] from the

situations at issue in Gonzalez and Phelps.” Id. at 1136. 

That is because unlike Phelps, prior to Lopez bringing his

Rule 60(b)(6) motion, “it was settled law that postconviction counsel’s effectiveness was irrelevant to

establishing cause for procedural default.” Id. (citation

omitted). However, in Martinez, 132 S.Ct. 1309, the Supreme

Court “‘recogniz[ed] a narrow exception’” to that settled

law. Id. (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315). Finding

“the Supreme Court’s development in Martinez” to be a

“remarkable — if ‘limited,’ – development in the Court’s

equitable jurisprudence[,]” the Ninth Circuit in Lopez held

that the nature of the change in intervening law 

“weigh[ed] slightly in favor of reopening Lopez’s habeas

case” pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1136

(internal citation omitted)(emphasis added).12 

The nature of the intervening change of law here -–

Mackey, 682 F.3d 1247 –- does not fit squarely within the

contours of Gonzalez, Phelps, or Lopez. After careful

consideration, though, the court finds that the nature of the

change of law in Mackey weighs against granting Rule 60(b)(6)

relief. Mackey did not “upset or overturn[] a settled legal

principle as to now permit the petitioner to raise a credible

claim that he could not have previously raised.” See Gates,

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2011 WL 6369731, at *2 (emphasis added). Indeed, even prior

to Mackey, the Ninth Circuit, albeit not in the habeas

context, had allowed Rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment

where, as movant Valdez is alleging, attorneys engaged in

gross negligence, virtually abandoning their clients. 

In Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir.

2002), the Ninth Circuit held that a default judgment could

be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) where the defense

attorney “‘virtually abandoned his client by failing to

proceed with his client’s defense despite court orders to do

so’ and deliberately deceived his client about what he was

doing (or not doing).” Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tani, 282 F.3d at 1171-1172). The

Tani Court reasoned:

[C]onduct on the part of a client’s 

alleged representative that results 

in the client’s receiving practically 

no representation at all clearly constitutes 

gross negligence, and vitiat[es] the 

agency relationship that underlies our 

general policy of attributing to the 

client the acts of his attorney.

Tani, 282 F.3d at 1171. 

Extending Tani, the Ninth Circuit in Lal, 610 F.3d 518,

granted Rule 60(b)(6) relief from a Rule 41(b) dismissal for

failure to prosecute where the attorney’s conduct was

strikingly similar to the attorney’s conduct in Tani. Both

were grossly negligent in virtually abandoning their clients’

cases and deliberately misleading them. Id. at 525; see also

Madison v. First Mangus Financial Corp., 2009 WL 1148453, at

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*4 (D.Ariz. Apr. 28, 2009) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted) (granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief from

dismissal of case for failure to file a second amended

complaint, where attorney’s conduct met the Tani gross

negligence standard in that he virtually abandoned his client

by failing to proceed with her case – a deficiency

“intensified by his failure to apprise Plaintiff of the

developments in her case and by his representations that he

would perform his responsibilities as her counsel”). 

Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that Mackey

did announce a new rule of law in this Circuit, “it did not

change the law in a manner germane to the judgment rendered”

herein. See Hamilton v. Swarthout, 2012 WL 4343830, at *3

(N.D.Cal. Sept. 21, 2012). That is because when movant

Valdez filed his Rule 60(b)(6) motion in February 2011,

“there was no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit precedent

barring him from” arguing that attorney Kooyumjian’s failure

to file the opening appellate brief constituted gross

negligence and amounted to virtual abandonment. See id.

(Ninth Circuit decision “announce[ing] a new rule of law” as

to actual innocence “did not change the law in a manner

germane to the” petitioner because when he originally filed

his habeas petition, “there was no Supreme Court or Ninth

Circuit precedent barring him from asserting such a claim”);

see also Gates, 2011 WL 6369731, at *3 (citations omitted)

(same). In short, because Mackey did resolve an unsettled

issue of law and because Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court

precedent did not foreclose the movant’s abandonment

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argument, the nature of the change in law due to Mackey

weighs against a finding of extraordinary circumstances so as

to justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

 ii. Diligence 

The second Phelps factor “considers the petitioner’s

exercise of diligence in pursuing the issue during the

federal habeas proceedings.” Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1136

(citation omitted). This factor cuts against reopening

movant Valdez’s habeas petition because, as detailed herein,

he was not diligent in pursuing the issue of alleged attorney

abandonment during the course of this federal habeas

proceeding. To reiterate, in 2005 the movant did nothing to

ascertain the status of his appeal, even though it had been

pending for roughly four years and he had learned that his

attorney was no longer entitled to practice law in

California. After waiting another two and a half years, the

movant finally contacted the Ninth Circuit regarding the

status of his appeal. And, although he learned in early 2008

that his appeal had been dismissed for failure to file the

opening brief, plaintiff waited another three years before

filing this Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Under these circumstances,

the court cannot find that the movant was diligent in

pursuing his claim of attorney abandonment. Indeed, similar

to Gonzalez, the purported change in the law wrought by

Mackey is “all the less extraordinary” due to the movant’s

lack of diligence. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct.

2641. 

. . .

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iii. Finality 

The third Phelps factor is whether granting relief from

judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) “would ‘undo the past, executed

effects of the judgment,’ thereby disturbing the parties’

reliance interest in the finality of the case.” Phelps, 569

F.3d at 1137 (quoting Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1402

(11th Cir. 1987)). “Rule 60(b)(6) relief is less warranted

when the final judgment being challenged has caused one or

more of the parties to change his legal position in reliance

on that judgment.” Id. In Phelps, because neither party

changed its legal position in reliance upon the district

court’s dismissal of Phelps’ time-barred habeas petition, the

Ninth Circuit found this factor “weigh[ed] heavily in [his]

favor.” Id. at 1138. 

The same could be said here. Therefore, on the face of

it Phelps appears to be analogous to the present case. When

the movant’s petition was dismissed on appeal, as in Phelps

“his federal case simply ended: [movant Valdez] remain[s] in

prison, and the [United States] [has] stopped defending his

imprisonment.” See id. at 1138. As a result, as in Phelps,

there are “no ‘past effects’ of the judgment that would be

disturbed if the case were reopened for consideration on the

merits of [Valdez’s] habeas petition because the parties

would simply pick up where they left off.” See id. 

But that is only one side of the coin. There are two

critical distinctions between Phelps and the present case

which compel a finding that “the strong public interest in

[the] timeliness and finality of judgments” would not be

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served by granting movant Valdez’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion based

upon Mackey. See Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1135 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The first critical

distinction is that Phelps “demonstrated more diligence than

[the Ninth Circuit] could ever reasonably demand from a

habeas petitioner.” Id. at 1136. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit

could not “imagine a more sterling example of diligence than

Phelps has exhibited.” Id. at 1137. For over a decade, at

every step of the way, Phelps pursued all avenues of relief,

“put[ting] forth cogent, compelling, and correct legal

arguments[.]” Id. In contrast, as previously discussed,

movant Valdez was the opposite of diligent. 

The second equally compelling difference between Phelps

and the present case is that “entirely as a result of

misfortune[,]” despite over eleven years of litigation,

Phelps sat in prison “without a single federal judge ever

having evaluated the substance of his petition for habeas

corpus[.]” Id. at 1123. Movant Valdez did not suffer that

same misfortune; his habeas petition was decided on the

merits. A United States Magistrate Judge thoroughly

considered the movant’s habeas petition, ordering

supplemental briefing and conducting an evidentiary hearing, 

during which the movant offered the testimony of two

witnesses. CR Doc. 1206 at 1. After a thorough analysis,

the Magistrate Judge recommended denying Valdez’s section

2255 motion. Movant Valdez did not file any objections,

despite being given ample opportunity to do so (three

months). CR Doc. 1210 at 4:7. Reviewing and accepting that

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report, this court denied Valdez’s section 2255 motion. 

Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that the interest

in the finality of judgment also weighs against an

extraordinary circumstance finding.

 iv. Delay

 “The fourth factor concerns delay between the finality

of the judgment and the motion for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.” 

Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1136 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). This factor embodies the principles that 

“individuals seeking to have a new legal rule applied to

their otherwise final case should petition the court for

reconsideration with a degree of promptness that respects the

strong public interest in timeliness and finality.’” Phelps,

569 F.3d at 1138. 

Here, just three weeks after the issuance of Mackey, 682

F.3d 1247, movant Valdez filed his motion to supplement based

thereon. Thus, although movant Valdez significantly delayed

in bringing his original Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the same

cannot be said of his motion to supplement. Therefore, this

factor augurs slightly in favor of movant Valdez. See Lopez,

678 F.3d at 1136 (petitioner moved with the requisite degree

of promptness, weighing in favor of reopening his habeas case

by filing his Rule 60(b)(6) motion within three weeks after

the issuance of Martinez, 132 S.Ct. 1309). 

v. Degree of Connection

“The fifth consideration pertains to the degree of

connection between” movant Valdez’s case and Mackey, and

overlaps somewhat with the nature of the change discussed

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earlier. See Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1137 (citation omitted). 

The degree of connection “factor is designed to recognize

that the law is regularly evolving.” Phelps, 569 F.3d at

1139. Given the common law heritage of the American judicial

system, “legal rules and principles inevitably shift and

evolve over time, but the mere fact that they do so cannot

upset all final judgments that have predated any specific

change in law.” Id. That is why, as the Court in Phelps

underscored, “the nature of that change is important.” Id.

(emphasis in original). Thus, courts are “to examine closely

the original and intervening decisions at issue in a

particular motion for reconsideration predicated on an

intervening change in the law: if there is a close connection

between the two cases, the court [will be more likely to]

f[i]nd the circumstances sufficiently extraordinary to

justify disturbing the finality of the [original] judgment.”

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Closely examining Mackey and movant Valdez’s current

theory of abandonment persuades the court that because of the

tenuous connection between the two, Mackey does not

constitute an extraordinary circumstance for Rule 60(b)(6)

purposes. In the first place, this case is readily

distinguishable from Phelps, 569 F.3d 1120, where the Court

found the requisite close connection. In so finding, the

Ninth Circuit relied upon the same two factors as it did in

finding that the nature of the change in law cut in favor of

a finding of extraordinary circumstances. To repeat, the

Court in Phelps relied upon the fact that “the intervening

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change in the law directly overruled the decision for which

reconsideration [had been] sought[;]” and “the intervening

precedent resolved a conflict between competing and co-equal

legal authorities.” Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1339 (citation

omitted). Neither of those factors exists here, as discussed

in conjunction with the nature of the change in law in

Mackey. It necessarily follows that unlike Phelps, there is

no “direct relationship” between the movant’s abandonment

theory herein and Mackey. See Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1339. 

The necessary degree of close connection is lacking for a

second, more fundamental reason. The requisite identity

between Mackey and movant Valdez’s current theory is missing

because Mackey is distinguishable and hence inapplicable

here. See Lopez, 678 F.3d at 1137 (Lopez’s claim did not

provide the sort of identity with Martinez favoring Rule

60(b)(6) relief because a merits review of his claim was not

precluded by procedural default, as in Martinez, but by his

failure to develop the factual basis of his claim under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)); see also Tilcock, 2013 WL 2324452, at 

* 2 (D.Nev. May 28, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(“the degree of connection between the extraordinary

circumstance and the decision for which reconsideration is

sought [was] completely lacking” because “[p]etitioner’s

claim that perjured testimony was used to convict him . . .

d[id] not fall within the Martinez exception[]”). Of the many

distinctions between Mackey and the present case, perhaps the

most significant is timing. Petitioner Mackey first

contacted the district court to inquire about the status of

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his case a mere eight months after the entry of judgment

against him. Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1249. Additionally, he

contacted the district court a second time, after being

advised of the entry of judgment against him, because he was

“concern[ed] about his appellate rights[.]” Id. Given that

prompt inquiry and follow-up, the Ninth Circuit had no

occasion to consider, as this court has, the impact of a

significant delay upon a Rule 60(b)(6) motion based upon a

purported change in law. 

There is also a significant distinction between the

circumstances which gave rise to a finding of abandonment in

Mackey and the present case. Not only did Mackey’s attorney

fail to keep him apprised of the status of his case,

resulting in the petitioner missing the deadline for filing

an appeal, but he “misled” Mackey and freely admitted doing

“nothing more on the case” after filing an amended § 2254

petition. Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1249. Moreover, Mackey’s

attorney himself informed the district court that Mackey had

“been deprived of counsel in this habeas corpus proceeding

through no fault of his own[,]” and that “[f]airness

suggests” vacating the order dismissing Mackey’s habeas

petition; reinstating that proceeding and appointing counsel

to represent Mackey. Id. at 1250. 

There are no such compelling circumstances in the present

case. The sole basis for movant Valdez’s abandonment theory

is that his attorney did not file an opening brief, resulting

in dismissal of his habeas petition by the Ninth Circuit. 

This is not a situation, as in Mackey, where Valdez’s

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attorney filed the notice of appeal and then did nothing. 

Slightly more than a month after filing the notice of appeal,

Mr. Kooyumjian successfully moved the Ninth Circuit for

modification of the briefing schedule. U.S. v. Soto-Valdez, 

# 01-15427 (9th Cir.) at 5 (April 12, 2001). Mr. Kooyumjian

was also successful in obtaining two further extensions of

time in which to file the opening brief. Id. at 7 and 8; see

also Mot., exh. E thereto (Doc. 1) at 16. And eventually,

attorney Kooyumjian did file an opening brief, but it was

“deficient no excerpts[.]” Id. at 12 (Nov. 7, 2001). 

Furthermore, there are no allegations, much less proof,

as there was in Mackey, that Mr. Kooyumjian “‘continuously 

. . . lied’” or “misled” movant Valdez. See Mackey, 682 F.3d

at 1249; 1253. Rather the situation here is more akin to

Towery, 673 F.3d 933, where the Ninth Circuit found

“unpersuasive” a capital prisoner’s claim of abandonment

based upon his attorney’s omission of “a colorable

constitutional claim from his . . . amended petition.” Id.

at 942. In upholding the district court’s finding of no

abandonment, the Towery Court pointed out that that the

petitioner made “no claim [that his attorney] performed

incompetent legal work, failed to communicate with him,

refused to implement his reasonable requests or failed to

keep him informed of key developments in his case.” Id. at

944. 

Movant Valdez’s claim of attorney abandonment is

similarly lacking, although implicit in his petition is a

claim that Mr. Kooyumjian did not inform him that his appeal

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had been dismissed for failure to file an opening brief. 

Nevertheless, on this limited record, the court cannot find

that Kooyumjian’s singular failure of filing a deficient

appellate brief resulted in “inexcusabl[e] and gross

neglect[] . . . amounting to attorney abandonment[.]” See

Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1253 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

In addition, the scant proof before this court undermines

movant Valdez’s claim that Mr. Kooyumjian abandoned him by

not filing an opening brief. At least as of March 2005, well

after the dismissal of his appeal, the movant still had an

attorney-client relationship with Mr. Kooyumjian, as can be

seen from the former’s letter to the State Bar of California. 

In response to the movant’s March 2005 inquiry regarding Mr.

Kooyumjian, the State Bar closed the matter because the

movant “indicated that Mr. Kooyumjian [wa]s still

representing” him. Mot., exh. G thereto (Doc. 1) at 18

(emphasis added). It explained that the State Bar “does not

pursue disciplinary investigations when an ongoing attorneyclient relationship exists between the complainant and the

attorney against whom the complaint has been filed.” Id.

(emphasis added). Under these circumstances, obviously,

movant Valdez has not shown severance of the attorney-client

relationship – at least not as of March 2005, and

necessarily then, not earlier, in 2001, when Mr. Kooyumjian

filed a deficient appellate brief. 

While the court certainly does not condone Mr.

Kooyumjian’s conduct, it cannot find that his actions or

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inactions were sufficiently egregious to constitute

abandonment, as occurred in Mackey. On this limited record,

at most, Mr. Kooyumjian’s singular omission of filing a

deficient brief “suggest[s] simple negligence[]” -– not

abandonment. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2564 (counsel’s

failure to timely file petitioner’s petition and ignorance of

the limitations period “suggest[ed] simple negligence[]”). 

What is more, “a federal habeas petitioner[,]” such as movant

Valdez, “who as such does not have a Sixth Amendment right to

counsel . . . is ordinarily bound by the attorney’s

negligence, because the attorney and the client have an

agency relationship under which the principal is bound by the

actions of the agent.”. See Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1253

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nothing on

this record convinces the court, even in light of Mackey, to

depart from that rule here. Thus, due to the differences

between Mackey and the present case, the necessary degree of

connection between the two is missing. Consequently, this

factor also militates against a finding that Mackey is an

extraordinary circumstance entitling movant Valdez to Rule

60(b)(6) relief. 

vi. Comity

The final Phelps factor, “the need for comity between the

independently sovereign state and federal judiciaries[,]” 569 

F.3d at 1139, does not come into play here because movant

Valdez is a federal prisoner. 

After “intensively balanc[ing]” the Phelps factors, the

court finds that movant Valdez has not established that

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Mackey constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying

Rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment. See Phelps, 569 F.3d at

1133. Four of those factors weigh against such a finding –

the nature of the change in law, the movant’s lack of

diligence, the strong interest in finality of judgments, and

the lack of a close connection between Mackey and the

movant’s abandonment theory. One factor – the short delay

between the time Mackey was decided and the movant’s bringing

that decision to this court’s attention – slightly favors an

extraordinary circumstance finding. Comity, the last Phelps

factor, is neutral. 

The court’s conclusion is not merely the result of a 

mechanical application of the Phelps factors though. At all

times it has been highly cognizant that, at bottom, “Rule

60(b)(6) is a grand reservoir of equitable power.” See

Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1133; and 1135 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). In the present case, as the Phelps

analysis has shown, the equities weigh against reopening a

more than decade old judgment. And, these factors “including

the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the

incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be

done in light of all the facts[,]” compel a finding that

Mackey, 682 F.3d 1247, is not an intervening change in law

tantamount to an extraordinary circumstance so as to allow

relief from judgment in this case. See id. at 1133 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, on this record,

the court is not at liberty to “use [the] provisions of Rule

60(b) to circumvent the strong public interest in [the]

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timeliness and finality of judgments.” Id. at 1135 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To summarize, albeit for different reasons, movant Valdez

cannot rely upon Maples, 132 S.Ct. 912, Martinez, 132 S.Ct.

1309, or Mackey, 682 F.3d 1247, to establish extraordinary

circumstances justifying relief from judgment pursuant to

Rule 60(b)(6). 

III. All Writs Act 

As an afterthought, in a footnote in his objections to

the Magistrate Judge’s R & R, movant Valdez asserts that this

court has the authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1651, “to provide a remedy for the relief requested.” 

Obj. (Doc. 13) at 6. Movant Valdez offers no basis

whatsoever for the granting of such extraordinary relief. 

Therefore, this aspect of the movant’s petition fails as

well.

IV. Motion for Disposition

The court’s rulings herein render moot petitioner’s 

“Motion for Disposition on Pending Motion under Rule

60(b)(6)” (Doc. 18). Accordingly, the court hereby DENIES

such motion.

Conclusion

To conclude, after conducting this de novo review, the

court finds no merit to any of movant Valdez’s objections to

the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 12). 

The court further finds that movant Valdez’s Rule 60(b)(6)

motion is an impermissible second or successive habeas

petition, over which this court lacks jurisdiction. Even if

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there were jurisdiction to entertain Valdez’s Rule 60(b)(6)

motion, this court would, nonetheless, deny it because such

motion was neither brought within a reasonable time; nor is

it predicated upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances.

Accordingly, the court hereby ORDERS that: 

(1) United States Magistrate Judge Anderson’s Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 12) is ADOPTED; and accordingly, 

(2) Petitioner Castulo Soto-Valdez’s “Motion for Relief

from Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(6) (Doc. 1) is DENIED; 

(3) Petitioner Castulo Soto-Valdez’s “Motion to

Supplement Pending Rule 60(b) Motion with New Decision by the

United States Supreme Court that Would Support Petitioner’s

Rule 60(b) Motion” (Doc. 11) is GRANTED to the extent that

the Court considered petitioner’s arguments therein; and 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

(4) Petitioner Castulo Soto-Valdez’s “Motion to

Supplement Pending Motion Under Rule 60(b)(6) with Recent

Circuit Law” (Doc. 14) is GRANTED to the extent that the

Court considered petitioner’s arguments therein; and

(5) Petitioner Castulo Soto-Vadlez’s “Motion for

Disposition on Pending Motion Under Rule 60(b)(6) (Doc. 18)

is DENIED as moot. 

 DATED this 18th day of September, 2013.

Copies to counsel of record and defendant/movant pro se

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