Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02024/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL FLORES,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT et 

al,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15cv2024 AJB (RBB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 

DISMISS [ECF NO. 16]

On September 10, 2015, Plaintiff Rafael Flores, proceeding pro se, filed a civil 

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 [ECF No. 1]. On November 25, 2015, 

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6); or, Alternatively, for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(e) [ECF No. 16]. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion [ECF No. 20], and Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 23]. For the 

following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part.

//

//

//

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at George Bailey Detention Facility in San 

Diego, California. (See Notice Change Address, ECF No. 28.) Flores brings this civil 

rights action against the San Diego Police Department and several individual police 

officers: Bradley, Sullivan, Stanley, and Jones. (Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 1.)1 The events 

giving rise to the action occurred before Flores was taken into custody. 

Plaintiff alleges that on March 19, 2014, at 29th Street and Commercial Street in 

San Diego, California, San Diego Police Officer Bradley tased Flores while Plaintiff was 

on a ten to thirteen foot fence, causing Plaintiff to fall to the ground and land on his head. 

(Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff claims there was no life-threatening situation justifying Bradley’s 

actions. (Id. at 2.) Flores alleges that after he was tased, San Diego Police Officer 

Sullivan “jumped on him,” put him in a carotid choke hold, and “repeatedly hammerfisted” Plaintiff on the back of the head. (Id. at 2-3.) Flores contends that Sullivan was 

“trying to knock [Plaintiff] into a coma” while Flores was “running out of fright.” (Id. at 

3.) Flores contends that Defendant Officer Stanley pushed Plaintiff causing him to fall

after he was tased. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff contends that San Diego Police Officer Jones 

handcuffed him “after everything occurred.” (Id.) 

Flores claims that his head was “cracked open” and he was rendered unconscious 

as a result of Defendants’ actions. (Id. at 3.) He also alleges he suffered from cracked 

and broken ribs. (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to the UCSD Intensive Care Unit to be treated 

for his injuries. (Id.) Flores claims that he has pain in his rib area and suffers from 

“random black-outs” and a loss of vision. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also has numbness and 

severe pain in both arms and legs, and has difficulty holding a book in his hands due to 

numbness. (Id.) 

//

 

1 All citations are to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. 

Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula -- that the 

complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt without merit -- was discarded 

by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 

(2007)].” Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The court must accept as true all material 

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and 

must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready 

Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 

1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 

1986).

The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. 

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true; rather, it must 

“examine whether [they] follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” 

Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see Halkin 

v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 

F.3d at 973 (quoting Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 

1994) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not required to accept legal 

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conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 

be drawn from the facts alleged.”)). “Nor is the court required to accept as true 

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must 

construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of 

liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil 

rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not 

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights 

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. 

Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations 

unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must 

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in 

that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint 

“unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting 

Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights 

complaint may be dismissed, the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the 

complaint’s deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where amendment of a 

pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. See

James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

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C. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim

In the course of arresting an individual, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 

unreasonable seizures permits law enforcement officers to use the degree of force that is 

“objectively reasonable” under the circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 

(1989); see also Gravelet–Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The 

Fourth Amendment, which protects against excessive force in the course of an arrest, 

requires that we examine the objective reasonableness of a particular use of force to 

determine whether it was indeed excessive.”). To assess objective reasonableness, the 

court weighs “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 

Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 

Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cty. of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Because the Fourth Amendment test for reasonableness is inherently fact specific, see

Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 

330 (9th Cir. 1989)), it is a test that escapes “mechanical application” and “requires 

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,” Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396; accord Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Excessive force analysis involves three steps: (1) assessing the severity of the 

intrusion on the individual's constitutional rights by evaluating the type and amount of 

force inflicted, (2) evaluating the government's interest in the use of force, and (3) 

balancing the gravity of the intrusion on the individual's rights against the government's 

need for that intrusion. Lowry v. City of San Diego, 818 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2016). 

The government's interest in the use of force depends on numerous factors, including the 

severity of the underlying crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the 

safety of officers or others, and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011). The 

most important consideration is whether objective factors show that the suspect posed an 

immediate threat to safety. Id. Balancing the individual's Fourth Amendment interests 

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against the governmental interests requires an examination of “the totality of the 

circumstances, including whatever factors may be relevant in a particular case.” Marquez 

v. City of Phoenix, 693 F.3d 1167, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“The ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 

hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This does not mean that police officers are 

required to use the least amount of force possible; rather, the amount of force employed 

must be reasonable under all the relevant circumstances. See Forrester v. City of San 

Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994). In fact, the officer's right to make an arrest 

necessarily includes the right to use some force in doing so. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1290 (9th Cir. 2000). In Graham, the Court 

instructed that “[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and 

quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the 

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting another source) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A list of non-exclusive factors used to analyze the 

reasonableness of the force used may include “the relationship between the need for the 

use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort 

made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security 

problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff 

was actively resisting.” See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 

2466, 2473 (2015). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against each of the individual 

Defendants, claiming that the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 12, ECF No. 16.) Alternatively, 

Defendants move for a more definite statement, arguing that Flores should be required to 

clarify whether he alleges claims for excessive force under the Fourth or the Eighth 

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Amendment. (Id. at 24.) The Court will address the claims against each Defendant 

separately. 

A. Claim Against Defendant Bradley 

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Bradley tased him while Flores was on a fence,

causing Plaintiff to fall and sustain injuries. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.) The Ninth Circuit 

has held that the use of a taser in dart mode against a passive bystander was an intrusion 

on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests because it involves “an intermediate level 

of force with ‘physiological effects, [ ] high levels of pain, and foreseeable risk of 

physical injury.’” Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 825 (9th Cir. 2010)). “[T]asers 

and stun guns fall into the category of non-lethal force.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 825. “Nonlethal, however, is not synonymous with non-excessive; all force—lethal and nonlethal—must be justified by the need for the specific level of force employed.” Id. (citing 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.) Even so, a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights are not 

violated if the “officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 

Defendants argue that Flores fails to provide a sufficient factual context for the 

alleged excessive force incident, such as “what lead up to the initial encounter with the 

police, the plaintiff’s reaction to the initial encounter with the police, plaintiff’s response 

to the Defendants and their use of force, and how the incident was resolved . . . and 

whether the plaintiff was arrested or not.” (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 

16, ECF No. 16.) Defendants rely on Hoffmann v. Jourdan, No. 2:14–cv–2736 MCE 

KJN P, 2015 WL 6438249, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015) (granting a motion to 

dismiss for failure to provide sufficient factual foundation for the excessive force 

allegations). In that case, plaintiff alleged she suffered a broken left eye orbital bone and 

nose, and sustained long term jaw, spine, and brain injury, as well as a miscarriage, heart 

circulation issues, strokes, seizures, and scar burns, after police officers broke down her 

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motel room door, punched her in the face, tased her, and jumped on her. Hoffmann v. 

Jourdan, 2015 WL 6438249, at *1. In dismissing the claim with leave to amend, the 

court noted that it was “unable to evaluate the totality of the circumstances” because 

plaintiff failed to “fully set forth the circumstances surrounding this incident, including 

her own actions . . . .” Id. at *3. 

Here, Flores claims there was no “life-threatening situation” justifying the use of a 

taser by Officer Bradley. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleged that he was “running 

out of fright” and was on a ten-to-thirteen-foot fence when Defendant Bradley used the 

taser gun on him. (Id. at 3.) In Cabral v. Cty. of Glenn, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1191 

(E.D. Cal. 2009), the court found that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded an excessive 

force claim where a pretrial detainee claimed that during an attempted cell extraction, the 

defendant utilized his taser multiple times on the plaintiff, who was naked, unarmed, and 

hiding behind a toilet. The court found the allegations sufficient to survive a motion to 

dismiss and explained that "[t]he reasonableness of those actions is most properly a 

question for the finder of fact.” Id. 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is 

facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, 

“the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must 

be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In this case, Flores alleged that Defendant used a taser gun on him while he was 

running away, and as a result, Plaintiff fell and sustained serious injury to his head. 

(Compl. 1-3, ECF No. 1.) Taking the factual allegations as true and making all 

reasonable inferences, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Bradley’s tasing of Flores 

was unreasonably excessive under the circumstances is plausible. Accordingly, 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against Officer 

Bradley should be DENIED. 

B. Claim Against Defendant Sullivan

Flores alleges that after Plaintiff was tased and fell from the fence, Defendant 

Sullivan “jumped on him” and rendered him unconscious. (Compl. 2-3, ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff claims that Sullivan put him in a carotid choke hold and “repeatedly hammerfisted” him on the back of the head. (Id.) Defendants move to dismiss these allegations 

as “vague and conclusory,” arguing that Plaintiff fails to support his claims with a proper 

factual foundation. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 16, ECF No. 16.) 

They contend that Flores fails to state sufficient facts for the Court to infer that Defendant 

acted unreasonably because Plaintiff did not allege why the encounter with the police 

occurred, or whether Plaintiff attempted to injure or harm any of the Defendants. (Id. at 

17.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for excessive force 

against Defendant Sullivan. See Davis v. City of San Jose, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1006 

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support an excessive 

force claim where he claimed that defendants “continued to strike him after he was on the 

ground, and placed him into a chokehold that ultimately caused him to lose 

consciousness”). 

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sullivan “jumped on him” and 

hammer-fisted the back of Flores’s head “numerous times” after Plaintiff was hit with the 

taser and fell from the fence. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.) Flores claims that Sullivan’s 

actions rendered him unconscious and that he had to be taken to a hospital to be treated 

for injuries to his head and ribs. (Id.) The force used by law enforcement officials after 

an arrestee is under complete control of officers, or is otherwise helpless, may be 

excessive. See LaLonde v. Cty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 

that subjecting an arrestee to prolonged exposure to pepper spray constituted excessive 

force); Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “excessive 

force has been used when a deputy sics a canine on a handcuffed arrestee who has fully 

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surrendered and is completely under control[]”). The Defendant’s conduct, as well as the 

seriousness of Plaintiff’s injuries, if taken as true, suggest that Flores’s claim of excessive 

force against Sullivan is facially plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Sullivan should be 

DENIED. 

C. Claims Against Defendants Stanley and Jones

Flores contends that Defendant Officer Stanley pushed Plaintiff causing him to fall 

after he was tased. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that San Diego Police 

Officer Jones handcuffed him “after everything occurred.” (Id. at 2.) Defendants Stanley 

and Jones move to dismiss the claims against them, arguing that the Complaint fails to

allege facts sufficient to state a claim that the Defendants’ conduct constituted excessive 

force. (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 21-23, ECF No. 16.) 

“‘Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a 

judge's chambers,’ violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396 

(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d, 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). To state an excessive 

force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that Defendant’s use of 

force was objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the 

officer; the officer's underlying intent or motivation is not part of the inquiry. Id. at 397, 

399. An example of the objective analysis can be found in Lawson v. Youngblood, No. 

1:09–cv–00992–MJS (PC), 2011 WL 826353, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011). In 

Lawson, the court held that a plaintiff who alleges “a push from behind causing him to 

fall to the ground at a time when he was fully restrained at the ankle, waist, and wrists” 

sufficiently states an excessive force claim. Although Flores was not in restraints at the 

time of his interactions with Stanley, Flores had been tased. His setting is analogous to 

that in Lawson. Therefore, the allegations against Stanley are adequate to give rise to a 

plausible excessive force claim. 

As to Jones, however, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for

excessive force based on placing him in handcuffs. An officer’s refusal to remove tight 

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handcuffs from a prisoner’s wrists may constitute excessive force when the prisoner’s 

repeated pleas to loosen the cuffs are alleged to have been ignored, and he complains of 

pain or injury as a result. See Wall v. Cty. of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2004); Alexander v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1322-24 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“[T]ight handcuffing can constitute excessive force.” Lalonde v. Cty. of Riverside, 204

F.3d at 960. Flores does not allege that his handcuffs caused him any pain or discomfort, 

or that he asked Defendant to loosen the cuffs. 

In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that his 

claims against Defendants Stanley and Jones should not be dismissed because his 

Complaint survived the initial screening. (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n 3, ECF No. 20.) He also 

contends that Defendants Stanley and Jones stood by and allowed “their fellow officers to 

induce excessive force . . . .” (Id.) Defendants reply that to the extent Flores is 

attempting to argue a new theory of liability, he has not stated the factual elements for 

this theory in his operative pleading. (Defs.’ Reply 8, ECF No. 23.) Defendants point 

out that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that Stanley and Jones were actually present 

when Defendants Bradley and Sullivan allegedly used excessive force on Flores. (Id.) 

Even under a liberal interpretation of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, the Court may 

not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey, 673 F.2d at

268. Plaintiff’s allegations against Jones, as stated, do not provide sufficient factual 

support for his excessive force claim against the Defendant. For these reasons, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against Officer 

Jones should be GRANTED, but the Motion to Dismiss claims against Officer Stanely 

should be DENIED.

D. Defendant San Diego Police Department

In his Complaint, Flores named as Defendant the San Diego Police Department. 

(Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) Defendants are moving to dismiss the San Diego Police 

Department, claiming that the municipal department is not a proper defendant in this 

action. (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 23, ECF No. 16.) 

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“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 

Campbell v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Flores fails to state a claim against Defendant San Diego Police Department

because this entity is not a “person” acting under color of state law subject to suit under 

§ 1983. See Vance v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 

(“‘Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of 

pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.’”) (quoting Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 

808, 816 (D. Colo. 1991)); accord Powell v. Cook Cty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. 

Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone's 

constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person’ . . . .”). 

Accordingly, because San Diego Police Department is not a “person” acting under color 

of state law, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss claims against it should be GRANTED. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force 

claims against Bradley, Sullivan, and Stanley should be DENIED. The Court should

GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force 

claims against Jones and San Diego Police Department. The Court recommends 

GRANTING Plaintiff leave to amend the claims against Jones. The Court recommends 

DENYING leave to amend as to Defendant San Diego Police Department. See Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining that leave to amend 

should be given unless amendment would be futile). 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or 

before August 1, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

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Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before 

August 15, 2016. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 

(9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: July 5, 2016

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