Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06288/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06288-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

FRANCOIS P. GIVENS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

DERRAL G. ADAMS, et al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 04-6288 AWI DLB P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO FILE THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro per with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

section 1983. Pending before the Court is the second amended complaint, filed June 17, 2005. July

12, 2004. On March 7, 2007, the Court granted plaintiff’s request to file a third amended complaint. 

However, on March 30, 2007, plaintiff filed objections to the Court’s order denying his motion for

preliminary injunction in which he requested that the court screen the second amended complaint.

BACKGROUND

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend

may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). th

In the instant case, plaintiff brings action against former Director Woodford; Secretary

Hickman; Warden D. Adams; Associate Warden Allison; K. Santaro; Appeals Coordinator Cooper;

Captain J. Lais; R. Wessel; Lieutenant Field; Sergeant Kamal; Correctional Counselor T. Oehlert;

Librarian Klippenstein; Drs. Smith, Garcia, and Snow; the Estate of Dr. Wong; Nurse Ruff; and

Correctional Officers Ramos, Harris and Soloroa.

A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Claim 1

Plaintiff claims that on October 25, 2003, he suffered a severe knee injury while on the BYard facility. Plaintiff saw defendant Dr. Wong (deceased) a few days later who ordered x-rays,

ibuprofen and provided plaintiff with a cane. Plaintiff complains that Dr. Wong did not initially

order a lower bunk chrono. However, plaintiff acknowledges that Dr. Wong later authorized a lower

bunk chrono. 

At Dr. Wong’s direction, plaintiff saw defendant Dr. Smith, an orthopedic specialist, on

January 7, 2004. Dr. Smith recommended arthroscopic surgery. Dr. Smith performed the surgery on

April 27, 2004. Plaintiff contends that if Dr. Smith had informed him that the surgery would result

in plaintiff having a permanent disability, he would not have agreed to the procedure. Plaintiff began

physical therapy in November 2004. Plaintiff makes various allegations relating to his care after

September 21, 2004. As discussed below, claims based on these allegations are not cognizable as

plaintiff could not have exhausted the administrative remedies prior to filing suit. 

Claim 2

Plaintiff alleges that on September 17, 2003, Dr. Garcia issued a prescription for glasses that

was not accurate. Plaintiff alleges that on March 22, 2004, defendant Wessel required him to file

another grievance concerning his prescription despite having previously done so. Plaintiff alleges

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that defendant Duvall called him on August 30, 2004 to discuss the appeal regarding plaintiff’s

glasses. Duvall informed plaintiff that CDC could provide plaintiff another pair of glasses but that

plaintiff would have to see Dr. Garcia for a prescription. Plaintiff objected because he already had

obtained a corrected prescription from Dr. Garcia. Plaintiff states that he appealed this issue further

but the appeal was denied. 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in a

deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of

State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 for

violation of the Eighth Amendment. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi,

391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

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Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Plaintiff’s assertion that if Dr. Smith had informed him that surgery would result in

permanent disability, he would not have agreed to the procedure is not sufficient to state a claim for

deliberate indifference against Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith’s failure to advise plaintiff of the risks involved

in surgery is at most negligence, which does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. To

prevail, plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically

unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose this course in conscious disregard

of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)

(internal citations omitted). “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical

authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a section 1983 claim,” Franklin v. Oregon, 662

F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted), and a difference of opinion between

medical personnel regarding treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild,

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that support a claim that any of

the named defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Dr. Garcia issuing an incorrect prescription for glasses are

insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 for violation of the Eighth

Amendment. As discussed, mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not

support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980),

citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the

victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45

F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical

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needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the handling of his appeals by defendant Duvall relating to

his prescription glasses also fail to state a claim. There is no constitutional right to an inmate appeals

process. The Ninth Circuit has held that Prisoners do not have a "separate constitutional entitlement

to a specific prison grievance procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003),

citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). The non-existence of, or the failure of

prison officials to properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison system

does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). See also, 

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.1991);

Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill.1982) ("[A prison] grievance procedure is a

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not

give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the

fourteenth amendment"). A failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation.

Buckley, supra. State regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause

of the federal constitution only if those regulations pertain to "freedom from restraint" that "imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995).

Finally, plaintiff’s claims regarding his medical care and events occurring after September

21, 2004, the date of filing this action, must be dismissed. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform

Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. §

1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

The section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. 

Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative

process, regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the

process, as long as the administrative process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). “Proper exhaustion[, which] demands compliance with

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Plaintiff’s allegation regarding delay in his legal mail after September 21, 2004 cannot support 1

his claims in this case as plaintiff did not exhaust the available administrative remedies as to such claims

prior to filing suit.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 6

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . . .” is required, Ngo v. Woodford, 126

S.Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006), and must occur prior to filing suit, McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198,

1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). Because plaintiff could not have exhausted claims which occurred after

the filing of this action, those claims must be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

B. Mishandling of Plaintiff’s Mail

Plaintiff alleges that the mail system at CSATF/SP has been dysfunctional since his arrival in

July 2003. He contends that from October 2003 through February 2004, the delivery of mail to

inmates on the B-yard facility averaged from 30-45 days. Plaintiff contends the disruption in mail

receipt has adversely affected him in that his medical chronos have been delayed and his legal mail

has been delayed. 

1

Plaintiff also alleges that his inmate appeals regarding the mail issues were delayed and

improperly denied by Warden Adams. 

As set forth in the preceding paragraph, the failure to respond to plaintiff’s inmate appeals 

does not give rise to a claim for relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

With respect to the First Amendment, prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and

receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). The Civil Rights Act under

which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . .

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

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v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In

order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with

some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

In this instance, plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting a claim that any of the named

defendants tampered with or hindered the delivery or receipt of his mail. Plaintiff’s general

allegations that the mail system at CSATF “has been dysfunctional” since his arrival, are insufficient

to support a claim that any of the named defendants were responsible. The complaint is devoid of

any factual linkages between an act or omission of these defendants and a violation of plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. 

To the extent plaintiff claims the alleged delay in receipt of his legal mail somehow affected

his access to the Court’s, for the reasons discussed below, this claim also fails.

C. Access to the Court System

Plaintiff alleges that the B-yard facility has recently implemented a policy which prohibits

inmates from access to the law library during program modification, i.e. lockdowns or staff training. 

Due to the recent influx of yard closures, plaintiff alleges his access to the law library has been

limited. He also complains that the law library does not have the Shepard’s series for California

Reporters and that the recently acquired copy machine in the B-yard law library produces illegible

copies. Plaintiff also appears to contend that his legal mail was delayed thereby affecting his access

to the Court system.

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the law library and his legal mail fail to state a claim for

denial of access to the court system. A prisoner alleging a violation of his right of access to the

courts must demonstrate that he has suffered “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-50

(1996). The right to access the courts is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus

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proceedings, and civil rights actions challenging conditions of confinement. Id. at 354-55. “An

inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or

legal assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical sense.” Id. at 351. Rather, the inmate “must

go one step further and demonstrate that the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts

to pursue a legal claim.” Id. The actual-injury requirement mandates that an inmate “demonstrate

that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.” Id. at 353. In Lewis v.

Casey, the Supreme Court defined prisoners’ right of access to the courts as simply the “right to

bring to court a grievance.” Id. at 354. The Court specifically rejected the notion that the state must

enable a prisoner to “litigate effectively once in court.” Id. (quoting and disclaiming language

contained in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825-26 (1977)); see also Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d

894, 898 (9 Cir. 1995) (determining that prisoners’ right of access to the courts is limited to the th

pleading stage of a civil rights action or petition for writ of habeas corpus). Here, plaintiff alleges

that his time in the law library is limited and the law library does not have certain materials and

equipment. He also generally alleges that he did not receive legal mail in a timely manner. Plaintiff

does not allege any “actual injury.” Thus, plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under section 1983.

D. Retaliation

Plaintiff next alleges that he filed an inmate grievance against Officer Garster regarding a cell

move. Sergeant Kamal then offered to move plaintiff back to his bunk if he would drop the

complaint. Plaintiff states that he declined to drop the complaint and that subsequently, there was a

severe decrease in his incoming mail (both regular and legal). He also alleges that officers began

referring to him as “Johnny Corcoran” and became indifferent to his needs. Plaintiff contends he

was routinely locked out of his housing unit; body and bed searches increased; his property was

confiscated and/or destroyed; and he was threatened by staff and other inmates. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Avila gave him a serious rules violation for attempting to

file an inmate appeal regarding his legal mail. 

Plaintiff further alleges that on May 23, 2004, he filed an inmate appeal against Officer B.

Eskew regarding the application of his time credits. On July 8, 2004, plaintiff prepared a legal

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Plaintiff’s allegations regarding alleged retaliation after September 21, 2004 cannot support his 2

claims in this case as plaintiff did not exhaust the available administrative remedies as to such claims

prior to filing suit. These claims will therefore not be addressed by the Court.

U.S. District Court

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memorandum entitled “Intent to Pursue Litigation,” addressed to the Director of Corrections in

which he addressed various appeals regarding the mail room, the inadequacy of the law library and

his complaint against Officer Garster. Plaintiff alleges that during a July 13, 2004 interview,

defendant Lais refused to address plaintiff’s allegations that Eskew filed false information with a

state agency. Plaintiff alleges that “during this time (July 2004), the incoming and outgoing mail for

all inmates in Housing Unit B-1 was severely delayed.” Plaintiff alleges that as he pursued the

appeal through the administrative process, his legal mail was opened outside of his presence. 

Further, on September 11, 2004, he was searched by Avila as he exited the law library, which

plaintiff contends had never happened before. 

2

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4)

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is

sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary firmness” from engaging in

that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227

F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Jacks, No. 06-1995, 2007 WL 1374746, *2 (8th

Cir. May 11, 2007); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Bennett v. Hendrix,

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423 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ.,

411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir. 2004); Rauser v.

Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Both litigation in court and filing inmate grievances are

protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate against inmates for

engaging in these activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will be sufficient to

support a claim under section 1983 for retaliation. In the prison context, cases in this Circuit

addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action taken by the

defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary confiscation and

destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation for filing grievances);

Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (retaliatory placement in administrative segregation for filing grievances);

Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (retaliatory validation as a gang member for filing grievances); Hines v.

Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267(9th Cir. 1997) (retaliatory issuance of false rules violation and

subsequent finding of guilt); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (retaliatory prison transfer and double-cell status);

Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138 (inmate labeled a snitch and approached by other inmates and

threatened with harm as a result); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-32 (retaliatory reassignment out of

vocational class and transfer to a different prison).

Plaintiff’s allegations that his mail was withheld or delayed, his property was confiscated and

he was given a serious rules violation are sufficiently adverse to give rise to a retaliation claim under

section 1983. However, plaintiff’s general allegations that he was threatened do not support a claim

for retaliation under section 1983. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, the

mere involvement of some defendants in responding to plaintiff’s inmate appeals does not support a

claim for retaliation under section 1983. In addition, as noted above, plaintiff’s allegations regarding

events that occurred after the filing of this action are not cognizable. 

Plaintiff has named numerous defendants in this action. In order to proceed with his

retaliation claim under section 1983, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a claim that each

defendant named in the complaint either acted or failed to act in a manner that was adverse to

plaintiff and that the defendant did so in retaliation against plaintiff for either litigating in court or

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filing inmate grievances. For example, plaintiff alleges that during the time he was pursuing inmate

appeals, his mail was delayed and/or withheld. However, plaintiff fails to allege who was

responsible for the mishandling of his mail. Given the length of plaintiff’s complaint and the 

number of defendants, the court cannot ascertain which claims against which defendants are

cognizable and which are not in light of the fact that the complaint contains a mix of cognizable and

non-cognizable claims. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended

complaint that complies with Rule 8(a) and sets forth for each defendant, as briefly as possible, what

action that defendant took or failed to take and why (e.g., to retaliate against plaintiff for litigating in

court or for filing inmate grievances). Plaintiff should utilize the legal standards provided in this

order for guidance. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed, with

leave to file a third amended complaint within thirty days.

Plaintiff is advised Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in

itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes

the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an

amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant

must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff's second amended complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a third

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket

number assigned this case and must be labeled "Amended Complaint. Failure to file an amended

complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this action for failure to state a

claim and failure to comply with the court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 2, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06288-AWI-DLB Document 92 Filed 06/04/07 Page 12 of 12