Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01265/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01265-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1441rl Removal- Rent, Lease, &amp; Ejectment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTINA GONZALEZ 

KREUTZKAMP,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-01265-BAS-KSC

ORDER:

(1) REMANDING ACTION FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION; AND

(2) TERMINATING MOTIONS 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS (ECF Nos. 2, 4, 5)

v.

LETICIA VEGA, et al.,

Defendants.

On June 21, 2017, Defendants Lila Galindo, Damariez Vega, and Leticia Vega 

removed this matter to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 based 

on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (ECF No. 1.) On the same 

day, Defendantsfiled motionsseeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 

2, 4, 5.)

A court addresses the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first, as “[t]he 

requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the 

nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is ‘inflexible and 

without exception.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 

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(1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by 

Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited 

jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. 

Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006).

Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 

(9th Cir. 1992); see also Sygenta Crop Prot. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 

(2002); O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The 

‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always 

has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see 

also Nishimoto v. Federman–Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir.

1990); O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there 

is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

It is well-established that “a district court’s duty to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.” See United Inv’rs Life 

Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may 

consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have an 

‘independent obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo 

Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States 

v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)).

Here, Defendants seek to remove this action from state court based upon 

federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 provides that 

“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 

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Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[T]he 

presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet 

v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). A federal “defense is not part of a plaintiff’s 

properly pleaded statement of his or her claim.” Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, (1987)). A case, therefore, may not be removed to federal court 

based on a federal defense “even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s 

complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly

at issue in the case.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for 

S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983); see also Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475.

The case removed here is a residential unlawful detainer action. (Compl. –

Unlawful Detainer, Notice of Removal Ex. A, ECF No. 1.) It contains one cause of 

action for unlawful detainer brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1161(2). (Id.) Therefore, the action arises exclusively under California state 

law. Defendants argue in their Notice of Removal that a federal question exists 

because they filed a responsive pleading in state court that required a determination 

of the parties’ “duties under federal law.” (Id.) The Court is unconvinced. Plaintiff’s 

Complaint does not raise a federal issue. Consequently, even if Defendants have 

implicated the parties’ “duties under federal law” by raising federal defenses in their 

responsive pleading, this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction under the wellpleaded complaint rule. See Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475; see also, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank 

NA v. Zimmerman, No. 2:15-cv-08268-CAS-MRWx, 2015 WL 6948576, at *4 (C.D. 

Cal. Nov. 10, 2015) (remanding unlawful detainer action to state court); McGee v. 

Seagraves, No. 06-CV-0495-MCE-GGH-PS, 2006 WL 2014142, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

July 17, 2006) (same).

//

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Accordingly, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing this 

Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, the Court REMANDS this action 

to the San Diego Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). Further, because the Court 

lacks jurisdiction over this case, the Court TERMINATES Defendants’ motions to 

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 4, 5).

In addition, the Court warns Defendants that any further attempt to 

remove this action without an “objectively reasonable basis for removal” may 

result in an award of attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff. See Martin v. Franklin Capital 

Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Wells Fargo Bank 

Nat’l Ass’n v. Vann, No. 13–cv–01148–YGR, 2013 WL 1856711, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

May 2, 2013) (awarding $5,000.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 

following defendant’s third attempt to remove unlawful detainer action despite the 

court’s two prior orders remanding the action). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 22, 2017

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