Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00558/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00558-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I.R., a minor, individually and as successor in 

interest to Raul Rosas and by and through her 

guardian ad litem, Claudia Nava, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF FRESNO, a municipality; et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________________

RAUL ROSAS, an individual; and EVA 

ROSAS, and individual,

 Plaintiffs,

 vs.

CITY OF FRESNO, a municipality, et al., 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO. 1:12-CV-00558-AWI-GSA

(Consolidated with Case No.: 1:13-CV-00850 

AWI GSA) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 

RECORDS

ORDER GRANTING DEFEDANTS’ 

MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY 

DEADLINES

(Doc. 72 and 75 )

I. Introduction

Pending before the Court is County Defendants’ (“Defendants”) Motion to Compel the 

production of mental health records of Raul Rosas identified in subpoenas duces tecum served on 

both the Fresno County Department of Behavioral Health (“County DBH”) and Kaweah Delta 

Mental Health (collectively, “third parties”). (Doc. 72). The Court has reviewed Defendant’s 

motion filed on January 31, 2014 (Doc. 72), and their replies filed on February 21, 2014 and 

March 21, 2014, respectively. (Docs. 79 and 85). The Court has also reviewed the opposition 

filed by the County DBH filed on January 31, 2014 (Doc. 75), and the opposition filed by 

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiffs, H.R., I.R., and Raul and Eva Rosa (“Plaintiffs”) filed on March 14, 2014 (Doc. 84). 

No opposition was filed by Kaweah Delta Mental Health. Upon a consideration of the pleadings,

Defendants’ Motion to Compel is GRANTED. 

II. Relevant Background and the Parties’ Positions

On November 30, 2012, Plaintiffs I.R. and H.R. (“the children”) filed a First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) alleging federal causes of action against the City of Fresno, Miguel Alvarez, 

Sammy Ashworth, Officer Troy Miller (collectively, “City Defendants”), the County of Fresno, 

Deputy Christian Lightner, and Deputy Manuel Flores (collectively, “County Defendants”). 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants caused the death of Raul Rosas (“the decent”) during an 

altercation with police officials. Specifically, the complaint alleges a violation of the children’s 

civil rights and the civil rights of the decedent under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, as well as various 

state law causes of action including wrongful death, a survival action, negligence, battery, and 

violations of the Bane Act (“the children’s complaint”). On June 4, 2013, the decedent’s parents,

Raul and Eva Rosas (“the parents”) filed a complaint alleging causes of action for a violation of 

the Fourteenth Amendment and municipal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Raul Rosas et 

al., v. City of Fresno et al., 13-cv-850 AWI-GSA (Doc. 2) (“the parents’ complaint”). The two 

cases were consolidated on October 18, 2013. (Doc. 71).

In the course of discovery, it was revealed that the decedent had been treated for 

substance abuse, schizophrenia, paranoia and auditory hallucinations. In the instant motion, 

County Defendants seek a court order requiring that the third parties release the decedent’s 

mental health records that were requested pursuant to subpoenas duces tecum. 

1 County 

 

1 The request provided as follows : 

All records relating to treatment and diagnosis of Raul Rosas, Jr., DOB: [**/**]/1982,

including but not limited to medication prescription and monitoring, counseling session

dates and start and stop times, the modalities and frequencies of treatment furnished,

results of clinical tests, notes, and any records and summaries of the following items:

diagnosis, functional status, the treatment plan, symptoms, and prognosis. This request

specifically includes mental health treatment records. To include records of Cecilia

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Defendants have limited the document request to ten years prior to the decedent’s death. (Doc. 

85, pg. 6).

The County DBH opposes the release of the information based on California Welfare and 

Institutions Code § 5328 and the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Plaintiffs also oppose 

the release of the records based on the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

Defendants argue that both of the third parties waived their right to oppose releasing the 

documents because neither of their initial objections were properly raised pursuant to the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Kaweah Delta Mental Health never filed an opposition 

to the Motion to Compel. 

Similarly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ failure to file a motion for protective order or 

a motion to quash waives their right to object to the requests. Moreover, Plaintiffs have waived 

any psychotherapist-patient privilege because Plaintiffs Raul and Eva Rosa testified about the 

decedent’s mental health treatment during their depositions. Finally, Defendant contends that all 

of the Plaintiffs have placed decedent’s health and mental health at issue in the complaints 

thereby waiving the psychotherapist privilege. 

III. Discussion

A. The Scope of Discovery

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) establishes the scope of discovery and states in pertinent part:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, non privileged, that is relevant to any 

party’s claim or defense, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, 

and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and 

location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the 

court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the 

action. Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears 

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Id.

 

Salazar, NP.

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Thus, discovery is appropriate of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the 

action. Relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that 

reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in a case.” 

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). (Emphasis added). 

B. Waiver of Privilege 

As a preliminary matter, Kaweah Delta Mental Health has waived any objection to 

producing the requested material because it has not filed an opposition to this motion, nor has it 

filed a motion to quash the subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 45(c)(3)(A). Similarly, Plaintiffs 

have not adequately addressed the Defendant’s argument that they have waived their right to 

object to the subpoenas because they failed to file a motion to quash or a motion for a protective 

order. In the absence of any arguments by Plaintiff addressing this issue, the Court agrees with 

the Defendants. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 45, a nonparty served with a subpoena duces 

tecum may make objections to the subpoena within 14 days after service, or before the time for 

compliance, if less than 14 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). On timely motion, the court may 

quash or modify the subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 45(c)(3)(A). A party cannot object to a 

subpoena duces tecum served on a nonparty, but rather, must seek a protective order or make a 

motion to quash. Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide: Federal Civil 

Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 11:2291 (2014); see also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 

708 F.2d 492, 494 n. 5 (9th Cir.1983) (“Once the person subpoenaed objects to the subpoena ... 

the provisions of Rule 45(d) come into play. Then the party seeking discovery must obtain a 

court order directing compliance.”); Dornell v. City of San Mateao, 2013 WL 5443036 * 2 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) (A court may quash an otherwise relevant subpoena if the subpoena 

“requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A) (iii). Failure of the Plaintiff to file a motion to quash or seek a 

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

protective order constitutes a waiver.”) Here, Plaintiffs never filed a motion to quash or a motion 

for a protective order, and only raised objections after County DBH refused to produce the 

documents. Therefore, Plaintiffs waived their right to object to the requests. The Court is not 

persuaded by the argument that Plaintiffs somehow preserved their rights to object because 

Plaintiffs’ counsel had been in touch with the third parties’ attorneys before any objections were 

filed.

Notwithstanding the above, even if Plaintiffs had properly objected by filing the 

appropriate motion, they have waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing the 

decedent’s mental health at issue in the complaints. Under Jaffee, the party seeking to invoke the 

benefit of the privilege bears the burden of showing that : 1) the therapist is licensed, 2) the 

communications were confidential, and 3) the communications were made during the course of 

diagnosis or treatment. United States v. Romo, 413 F. 3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005); Speaker v. 

County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d. 1105, (C.D. Cal. 2000) (burden of proof for the 

psychotherapist/patient privilege is on the party seeking to establish that the privilege exists). 

Even if a party meets this burden, a party may waive the privilege. In determining whether a 

waiver to the psychotherapist-patient privilege has occurred, two different approaches have 

emerged since Jaffee. 

Under the broad approach, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is waived whenever the 

patient places his mental condition at issue. Sanchez v. U.S. Airways Inc, 202 F.R.D. 131 (E.D. 

Penn. 2001) (Plaintiffs alleging Title VII violation waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege 

by alleging emotional distress); Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 567 (S.D. Cal. 1999) 

(Plaintiff in employment discrimination case who seeks to recover for emotional distress 

damages is relying on her emotional condition as an element of her claim and waives the 

privilege); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (Plaintiff in 

American with Disabilities Act case who alleged defendant did not accommodate her depression 

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

waived psychotherapist-patient privilege); EEOC v. Danka Industries, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138 

(E.D. Missouri, 1997) (Plaintiff waived psychotherapist patient privilege by alleging emotional 

distress damages in sexual harassment case brought pursuant to Title VII).

Under the narrow approach, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is waived only if the 

patient places the contents of the communication itself at issue, which excludes raising a claim of 

emotional distress. Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D. Mass. 1997). 

Utilizing this approach, the psychotherapist privilege is not waived in cases such as this one, in 

which a plaintiff alleges generic damages for emotional distress. Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 

F.R.D. 632 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Fristsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 621 (S.D. Cal. 

1999) (holding that party did not waive the privilege by putting emotional state at issue.); 

Ruhlman v. Ulster County Department of Social Services, 194 F.R.D. 445, 448-449 (N.D. N.Y. 

2000) (“A party does not put his or her emotional condition at issue by merely seeking 

incidental, ‘garden variety’ emotional distress damages, without more.”); Santelli v. ElectroMotive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 308-309 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that privilege was not waived so long 

as plaintiff limits her testimony on emotional distress damages to common humiliation and 

embarrassment). 

Given the facts of this case, the Court finds that the broad approach to the psychotherapist 

privilege should apply. Although no specific cause of action of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress was made, Plaintiffs’ complaints make generic allegations of emotional 

distress. In particular, the children’s complaint alleges that Decedent suffered extreme and 

severe mental anguish and pain, was injured in mind and body, and suffered a loss of life. (Doc. 

25, ¶ 49, 59, 77, 80, 84, 85, 92). The children also allege a loss of financial support. (Doc. 25, ¶ 

59). Similarly, both the parents and the children allege that they were “deprived of the life-long, 

love, companionship, comfort, support, society, and care of the decedent, and will continue to be 

deprived for the remainder of their natural lives.” (Doc. 25, ¶ 49, 59, 80, and 92 and Parent’s 

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

complaint, Doc. 2, ¶ 41). Thus, decedent’s emotional distress and the Plaintiffs’ loss of familial 

relationship are central to the claims alleged in both compliants. The extent to which decedent 

was suffering from mental illness, or whether he had a significant drug problem at the time of the 

incident, may have affected his ability to participate in familial relationships and/or to provide 

financial support to his family. It may also have affected the altercation he had with police. 

Given the broad definition of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), Defendants should be able 

to investigate these areas at this phase of the litigation. Whether any material produced in 

discovery will ultimately be admissible at trial will be addressed by the trial judge at a later time. 

Additionally, the decedent’s privacy can be protected though a protective order. 

The County DBH opposes the release of the information based on California Welfare and 

Institutions Code § 5328.

2

 However, privileges asserted in response to discovery requests in 

federal question cases are determined under federal law, not the law of the forum state. 

Fed.R.Evid. 501; United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989). In cases involving federal 

civil rights and state law claims such as this one, “any asserted privileges relating to evidence 

relevant to both state and federal claims are governed by federal common law.” 6 James Wm. 

Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 26.47[4], at 26–334.1 (3d ed. 2013); see Fitzgerald v. 

Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 635 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (applying federal law of privilege to alleged 

violations of Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, and various state law claims); Stallworth v. 

Brollini, 288 F.R.D. 439, 442 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying federal common law to resolve claims 

of privilege in an action alleging § 1983 and state law claims). Accordingly, federal common law 

will be applied to this case because the information sought is relevant to both the state and the 

federal claims. Notwithstanding the above, this district has also recognized that “in mixed federal 

and state claim cases, although federal law is ultimately binding, state privilege law which is 

 

2

In light of the waiver of the psychotherapist privilege based on the allegations in the complaints, the Court need 

not address whether the County DBH properly raised this privilege in its objections, or whether Plaintiffs waived the 

privilege as a result of their deposition testimony.

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying privilege law to discovery

disputes.” Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, 2010 WL 5059644 * 5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2010) (citations 

omitted). While California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5328 prohibits the release of mental 

health records, release of such documents are permissible pursuant to a court order. Cal. Welfare 

and Institutions Code § 5328(f).3 Accordingly, under both state and federal law, release of these 

documents by the third parties is permissible. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to compel is 

granted and the third parties shall release the records pursuant to the subpoena requests.

IV. Modification of the Scheduling Order

Defendants have requested a sixty day extension of the discovery deadlines to conduct 

additional discovery based on the subpoena requests. The Court grants this request as 

Defendants have been diligent and the request is reasonable. 

V. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ Motion to Compel is GRANTED. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that :

1) Within fifteen days, Fresno County Department of Behavioral Health and Kaweah 

Delta Mental Health SHALL comply with the subpoena issued by County Defendants 

on September 23, 2013, except that only documents dated after June 5, 2001 need to 

be produced; 

2) The records SHALL be maintained as confidential and their use SHALL be limited to 

this litigation only. If used at a deposition, the portion of the deposition referencing 

the content of the records SHALL be sealed. If a party wishes to file the records or 

 

3 Although not raised by the parties, release of this information is also prohibited under the Health Insurance 

Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d. (“HIPPA”). See 45 C.F.R. 

§ 164.502(a) However, health care providers are permitted to disclose medical records in response to a court order. 

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1). 

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

any portion thereof, the party SHALL seek authorization to file the documents under 

seal according to Local Rule 141; and

3) Within five days, the parties shall meet and confer and provide the Court with 

proposed discovery deadlines consistent with this order, and proposed dates for any 

other deadlines in the scheduling order that need to be amended as a result of this 

modification.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2014 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:12-cv-00558-AWI-EPG Document 87 Filed 04/11/14 Page 9 of 9