Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05072/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05072-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENT BECKWAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPUTY PAUL DESHONG, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C07-5072 TEH

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

This matter is before the Court on two motions for reconsideration, the first filed by

Defendant Deputy Paul DeShong (“DeShong”), and the second by Defendants Deputy

Richard Ward (“Ward”), Sheriff Rodney Mitchell, County of Lake, and County of Lake

Sheriff’s Department (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants ask the Court to reconsider

its May 12, 2010 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motions for

Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 89) (“May 12, 2010 Order”), in particular the Court’s

conclusion that Plaintiff Brent Beckway (“Beckway”) is not currently in custody for

purposes of habeas corpus. For good cause appearing, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

A detailed factual and procedural background of this case is set out in the Court’s May

12, 2010 Order, and will not be repeated here. In summary, Beckway’s lawsuit arises out of

his October 27, 2006 arrest by Ward and DeShong, deputies with the County of Lake

Sheriff’s Department, for striking and threatening his neighbor following a dispute over the

sale of a cord of wood. Beckway pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of resisting arrest (Cal.

Pen. Code § 148(a)(1)) on October 27, 2009, and was sentenced to “one year summary

probation,” with the “conditions that [he] obey all laws, commit no same or similar offenses

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1

 This Court dismissed the false arrest claim based on collateral estoppel in its May

12, 2010 Order, a ruling that is not at issue on these motions.

2

 The nolo contendere plea “shall be considered the same as a plea of guilty” and,

upon that plea, “the court shall find the defendant guilty.” Cal. Pen. Code § 1016(3). The

nolo contendere plea is the equivalent of a conviction for purposes of Heck. See Nuno v.

County of San Bernardino, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1999).

2

and that he pay a fine in the amount of $160[.]” Preston Decl. (Doc. 72), Ex. F at 6:9-15. 

Beckway was also required to “[n]otify the Court of any changes in mailing address, physical

address or telephone number,” and to “[f]ollow all orders of the Court.” Id., Ex. G at 3. 

Beckway filed this lawsuit on October 2, 2007, bringing claims for excessive use of force

and false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for battery, negligence,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress.1

 He alleges that Ward and DeShong applied

excessive force and seriously injured his left knee.

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court barred a § 1983 plaintiff from recovering

damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid,” unless the plaintiff has proven that the conviction has been reversed,

expunged, or otherwise declared invalid or called into question. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87

(1994). Defendants, in their motions for judgment on the pleadings, urged the Court to apply

the Heck rule to bar Beckway’s excessive force claim, because the use of excessive force by

an officer would necessarily preclude a section 148 conviction.2

 In opposition, Beckway

asserted two bases for the Court to find Heck inapplicable.

First, he invoked the exception to the Heck rule carved out by Justice Souter in his

concurrence to Heck, 512 U.S. at 491, which a majority of justices later endorsed in Spencer

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring), id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting). According to Justice Souter, Heck should not bar the § 1983 claims of a plaintiff

who is not “in custody” and cannot therefore “invoke federal habeas jurisdiction, the only

statutory mechanism besides § 1983 by which individuals may sue state officials in federal

court for violating federal rights.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring). Beckway

asserted that he was not in custody and therefore could not seek habeas relief, a position

Defendants – in reply – did not dispute. After observing that “it is undisputed that Beckway

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is not currently in custody, and that habeas corpus is not an available avenue of relief,” this

Court followed Justice Souter’s rationale in concluding that the Heck bar was inapplicable

here. May 12, 2010 Order at 8-9.

Beckway’s second argument relied on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Smith v. City of

Hemet that an action is not barred by Heck where “the excessive force may have been

employed against [the plaintiff] subsequent to the time he engaged in the conduct that

constituted the basis for his conviction.” 394 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 2005). Beckway

argued that the excessive force underlying his claim – the stomping on his knee by one of the

two deputies – occurred after his arrest had been effected, in which case his claim would not

be inconsistent with his conviction. Since the Court had already found Heck to be

inapplicable based on Beckway’s first argument, however, it concluded that it did not need to

rule on this second ground.

Defendants now challenge this Court’s ruling on Beckway’s first argument. 

Defendants had presented evidence that, on October 27, 2009, Beckway was sentenced to

one year of summary probation. In reliance on that evidence, Defendants now argue – for

the first time – that habeas was (and remains) available to Beckway: as his probation term

does not expire until October 27, 2010, Defendants contend that Beckway is currently “in

custody” for habeas purposes. Since the Court did not previously consider the material fact

of Beckway’s summary probation, the Court granted Defendants leave to file the motions for

reconsideration that are now before the Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows “any order or other

decision” that does not end an action to “be revised at any time before the entry of a

judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Under the

local rules of this district, one basis for allowing leave to file a motion for reconsideration is

the showing of a “manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal

arguments” previously presented to the Court. Civ. L. R. 7-9(b)(3). The Court previously

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granted Defendants leave to file the instant motions based on its failure to consider the

material fact of Beckway’s probation term. See Order Granting Leave to File Motions for

Reconsideration (Doc. 100) at 2.

Since Defendants ask the Court to reconsider a ruling on motions for judgment on the

pleadings, the Court must continue to apply the standard governing such motions. “After the

pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment

on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the

moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact

remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). “[T]he same

standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog,”

because the motions are “functionally identical.” Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867

F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court must “accept all material allegations in the

complaint as true,” and resolve all doubts “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 

McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988). A court may also

consider, on a Rule 12(c) motion, “facts that ‘are contained in materials of which the court

may take judicial notice.’” Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981 n.18

(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994)).

DISCUSSION

The Court begins by considering whether habeas is available to Beckway because he

is in custody by virtue of his summary probation. If habeas is available, Justice Souter’s

exception to Heck does not apply and the Court will address the question raised by

Beckway’s second argument: whether his allegation that excessive force occurred following

his arrest removes this claim from the scope of Heck.

//

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I. Is Beckway currently “in custody” for habeas purposes?

Justice Souter concurred in Heck out of concern that the Court’s majority opinion

could be interpreted to “needlessly place at risk the rights of those . . . not ‘in custody’ for

habeas purposes.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 500. Since “individuals not ‘in custody’ cannot invoke

federal habeas jurisdiction,” a requirement that they “show the prior invalidation of their

convictions or sentences in order to obtain § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment” would “deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights to

those who cannot first obtain a favorable state ruling.” Id. He therefore concluded – with the

agreement of four other justices – that “a former prisoner, no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring a

§ 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without

being bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would be impossible as a

matter of law for him to satisfy.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring).

Justice Souter’s concurrences carve out an exception to the Heck bar for those not in

custody because habeas relief is available only to those who are. The key question on

Defendants’ instant motion is what qualifies as “in custody.” The federal habeas statute

provides that a federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court’s “interpretation of the ‘in

custody’ language has not required that a prisoner be physically confined in order to

challenge his sentence on habeas corpus.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989). 

Under California law, a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted by “[e]very person

unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, . . . to

inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.” Cal. Pen. Code § 1473(a). The

writ is available not only to those who are “physically imprisoned,” but also to individuals

“in constructive custody” like those on parole, probation, or bail. In re Wessley W., 125 Cal.

App. 3d 240, 246 (1981). As Justice Souter himself explained, among individuals not “in

custody” are “people who were merely fined, for example, or who have completed short

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 Although Justice Souter’s concurrence was concerned with avoiding the denial of

“any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 500

(emphasis added), a party is required to exhaust state remedies before pursuing habeas relief

in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). 

For that reason, the Court addresses the “in custody” requirement for habeas corpus on the

federal and state levels. 

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terms of imprisonment, probation, or parole, or who discover (through no fault of their own)

a constitutional violation after full expiration of their sentences.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 500.

Beckway was sentenced to one year of summary probation on October 27, 2009, a

sentence that will presumptively end on the same date in 2010. “Summary probation” is

formally referred to as a “conditional sentence” in the California Penal Code, and is defined

as “the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of revocable

release in the community subject to conditions established by the court without the

supervision of a probation officer.” Cal. Pen. Code § 1203(a); see also People v. Bishop, 11

Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1131-32 (1992) (describing 1981 and 1982 amendments to the Penal

Code introducing “conditional sentence” and clarifying “that what was formerly referred to

as ‘summary probation’ or ‘court probation’ was henceforth to be known as ‘conditional

sentence’”). The conditions for Beckway’s release were to “obey all laws, commit no same

or similar offenses and . . . pay a fine in the amount of $160,” Preston Decl. (Doc. 72), Ex. F

at 6:9-15, as well as to “[n]otify the Court of any changes in mailing address, physical

address or telephone number,” and to “[f]ollow all orders of the Court,” id., Ex. G at 3.

An individual on probation can generally petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

both state and federal law.3

 See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (ruling that “a

state prisoner who has been placed on parole is ‘in custody’” for habeas purposes); Arketa v.

Wilson, 373 F.2d 582, 583 (9th Cir. 1967) (applying Jones’s holding to individuals on

probation, observing that “[i]n California, a convict who is on probation is as much in

custody as one who is on parole; he remains subject to the control of the probation officer

and the court”); In re Wessley W., 125 Cal. App. 3d 240, 246 (1981) (“Today, the writ is

available to one on . . . probation[.]”). In Jones, the Supreme Court observed that the writ of

habeas corpus “never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy,” but rather is one whose

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“scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose – the protection of individuals against erosion

of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.” Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. 

With that in mind, the Court concluded that the conditions of the petitioner’s parole, which

“confine[d] and restrain[ed] his freedom,” were “enough to keep him in the ‘custody’ of the

members of the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute.” Id.

The Court “reasoned that the petitioner’s release from physical confinement under the

sentence in question was not unconditional; instead, it was explicitly conditioned on his

reporting regularly to his parole officer, remaining in a particular community, residence, and

job, and refraining from certain activities.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491 (discussing Jones).

Jones was the first in a line of Supreme Court decisions expanding the scope of

habeas corpus beyond challenges to the convictions of “prisoners actually in the physical

custody of the State.” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502,

508 (1982). In Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968), the Court concluded that a

habeas petitioner’s unconditional release during his action’s pendency did not moot a claim

that was filed when he was in physical custody, because he still faced the “collateral

consequences” of his conviction. The Court later found that a defendant who had been

released on his own recognizance post-sentencing but pre-incarceration was “in custody” for

habeas purposes, because he was “subject to restraints ‘not shared by the public generally.’” 

Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (citing Jones, 371 U.S. at 240). Those

decisions “have limited the writ’s availability to challenges to state-court judgments in

situations where – as a result of a state-court criminal conviction – a petitioner has suffered

substantial restraints not shared by the public generally.” Lehman, 458 U.S. at 510. The

question before this Court, then, is whether Beckway’s summary probation subjects him to

“substantial restraints not shared by the public generally.”

The parties have cited no cases addressing whether summary probation under

California law is a sufficient restraint on liberty to qualify as custody for habeas corpus

purposes. An individual sentenced to summary probation is “subject to conditions

established by the court.” Cal. Pen. Code § 1203(a). Summary probation falls within section

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 Although Beckway was also fined, a fine does not trigger habeas jurisdiction. See

Dreman v. Francis, 828 F.2d 6, 7 (9th Cir. 1987).

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1203.2 of the California Penal Code, which dictates the procedures to be followed when a

condition of probation is violated:

At any time during the probationary period of a person released

on probation under the care of a probation officer pursuant to this

chapter, or of a person released on conditional sentence or

summary probation not under the care of a probation officer, if

any probation officer or peace officer has probable cause to

believe that the probationer is violating any term or condition of

his or her probation or conditional sentence, the officer may,

without warrant or other process and at any time until the final

disposition of the case, rearrest the person and bring him or her

before the court or the court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant

for his or her rearrest. Upon such rearrest, or upon the issuance of

a warrant for rearrest the court may revoke and terminate such

probation if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its

judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation

officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the

conditions of his or her probation, has become abandoned to

improper associates or a vicious life, or has subsequently

committed other offenses, regardless whether he or she has been

prosecuted for such offenses. 

Cal. Pen. Code § 1203.2(a) (emphasis added). In characterizing an earlier version of section

1203.2, the Ninth Circuit observed that “a prisoner released on probation may at any time be

rearrested without warrant, brought before the court, and have his probation revoked and

terminated upon the mere report of the probation officer.” Benson v. California, 328 F.2d

159, 162 (9th Cir. 1964). An individual on summary probation faces those same constraints.

On the surface, the conditions imposed on Beckway appear no different than those

imposed on the general public: to “obey all laws” and “commit no same or similar offenses.”4

For that reason, Beckway argues that his summary probation is not analogous to the cases

that concluded one on probation or parole is “in custody.” He is not required to report to a

probation officer or submit to government supervision, and he does not have a suspended

sentence that could lead to incarceration if he violates a condition of probation. His

circumstances bear little resemblance to the conditions in Jones that prompted the Supreme

Court to conclude that parole satisfies the “in custody” requirement.

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The Court agrees that summary probation is distinct from probation, and that the

restraint on Beckway’s liberty is substantially less than that faced by an individual on

probation. However, the Supreme Court addressed the significance of such seemingly

innocuous conditions in a footnote to Jones: “Even the condition which requires petitioner

not to violate any penal laws or ordinances, at first blush innocuous, is a significant restraint

because it is the Parole Board members or the parole officer who will determine whether

such a violation has occurred.” Jones, 371 U.S. at 242 n.19. Thus an individual on parole

could “be thrown back in jail to finish serving the allegedly invalid sentence with few, if any,

of the procedural safeguards that normally must be and are provided to those charged with

crime.” Id. at 242. The possibility of a parole officer deciding whether a violation has

occurred by itself constitutes, according to the Supreme Court, a “significant restraint” on

liberty.

Section 1203.2 puts Beckway in an analogous condition. “[I]f any probation officer . .

. has probable cause to believe that the probationer is violating any term or condition of his

or her . . . conditional sentence, the officer may, without warrant or other process . . . ,

rearrest the person and bring him or her before the court[.]” Cal. Pen. Code § 1203.2. 

Although the requirement that the probationer be brought “before the court” demonstrates the

retention of some procedural protections, a probation officer is still entitled to make an arrest

“without warrant or other process.” Probation can be revoked by the court if it “has reason to

believe from the report of the probation officer or otherwise that the person has violated any

of the conditions of his or her probation, has become abandoned to improper associates or a

vicious life, or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless whether he or she has

been prosecuted for such offenses.” Id. (emphasis added). The loss of procedural safeguards

can be a sufficient basis to conclude that an individual is “in custody” for habeas purposes. 

See Jones, 371 U.S. at 242 n.19. Since Beckway loses some procedural protection by

operation of section 1203.2 while he is on summary probation, the Court concludes that he is

“in custody” for habeas purposes. Justice Souter’s exception to Heck is therefore

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 Section 148 makes it a misdemeanor to “willfully resist[], delay[], or obstruct[] any .

. . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or

employment.” Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1).

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inapplicable; the Court reverses its prior conclusion to the contrary. Defendants’ motions for

reconsideration are GRANTED IN PART as to this issue.

II. Does Beckway’s claim imply the invalidity of his conviction?

Beckway reasserts a second basis for determining that Heck does not bar his § 1983

claim, which the Court concluded it did not need to address in its original order. Beckway’s

excessive force claim would not imply the invalidity of his conviction for resisting arrest,

according to Beckway, because he alleges that the excessive force occurred only after his

arrest was effected. As this theory would remove Beckway’s excessive force claim from the

scope of Heck, the Court agrees that it must now be addressed.

Defendants contend that Beckway’s claim is barred by Heck because one can only be

convicted of resisting an arrest that is lawful, see People v. Wilkins, 14 Cal. App. 4th 761,

776 (1993), but an officer “is not permitted to use unreasonable or excessive force in making

an otherwise lawful arrest,” People v. Olguin, 119 Cal. App. 3d 39, 46 (1981). The

allegation that the officers used excessive force therefore implies the invalidity of his

conviction for resisting a lawful arrest under section 148 of the California Penal Code.5

Although Beckway does not dispute that an excessive force claim can be inconsistent with a

resisting arrest conviction, he argues that there is no such inconsistency here. As alleged in

his complaint, one of the two deputies stomped on his leg and fractured his knee only after

his “face and abdomen were on the ground” and the other deputy was holding Beckway’s

“hands behind his back.” Complaint (Doc. 1) ¶ 15. At that point, Beckway argues, his arrest

had already been effected and he was no longer offering resistance. The excessive force

therefore occurred after the events underlying his conviction for resisting arrest, and his

claim does not imply the invalidity of that conviction.

Beckway’s argument relies on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Hemet.

394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff in Smith pled guilty to a section 148(a)(1)

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violation, after repeatedly defying the orders of police officers who had been called to his

home in response to a domestic violence complaint. Each act of defiance – including

refusing to remove his hands from his pockets, refusing to step off his porch, and refusing to

put his hands on his head – occurred as the police officers were lawfully investigating the

complaint, and each by itself “could support a conviction under [section 148] for obstructing

the criminal investigation.” Id. at 697. Smith continued to defy section 148 by resisting the

officers when they came onto his porch to arrest him, at which time they deployed pepper

spray and sicced the police canine on him. Although the defendants cited Heck to bar

Smith’s § 1983 excessive force claim, the court recognized that the applicability of Heck

depended on the factual basis for Smith’s guilty plea. If he pled guilty “based on his

behavior after the officers came onto the porch, during the course of the arrest, his suit would

be barred by Heck,” because “a successful § 1983 action” would mean the officers had used

excessive force to arrest him, which would demonstrate the invalidity of his section 148

conviction. Id. at 697-98 (emphasis in original). If, however, his plea was based on his

behavior while standing “alone and untouched on his porch,” then the alleged excessive force

“occurred subsequent to the conduct on which his conviction was based” and his § 1983

action would not conflict with his conviction. Id. at 698 (emphasis in original). Since the

basis for the plea was unknown, the Ninth Circuit held that Smith’s § 1983 action was “not

barred by Heck because the excessive force may have been employed against him subsequent

to the time he engaged in the conduct that constituted the basis for his conviction.” Id. at

693. As a result, the “§ 1983 action neither demonstrate[d] nor necessarily implie[d] the

invalidity” of Smith’s conviction. Id.

The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion four years earlier in Sanford v. Motts,

when it allowed the plaintiff, Regina Sanford, to bring an excessive force claim alleging that

an officer had punched her in the face after she was already handcuffed. 258 F.3d 1117 (9th

Cir. 2001). Sanford pled nolo contendere to a section 148(a)(1) charge after she and her

boyfriend had intervened with a police officer who was attempting to arrest her boyfriend’s

brother. In her § 1983 claim, she alleged that excessive force was used after her arrest. The

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court concluded that “Heck is no bar”: if the officer “used excessive force subsequent to the

time Sanford interfered with his duty, success in her section 1983 claim will not invalidate

her conviction.” Id. at 1120. As excessive force “used after an arrest is made does not

destroy the lawfulness of the arrest,” Sanford’s case hinged on her ability to “prove the

punch was delivered after she was arrested.” Id. 

Likewise, in Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit

confronted the applicability of Heck to a plaintiff who had pled guilty to assault with a

deadly weapon for driving a truck at two officers. Although Heck barred him from

challenging the probable cause for his arrest, it did not bar his claim that the officers used

excessive force after he had exited the vehicle, as his conviction was based on his conduct in

the truck. Id. at 952. “To the extent that Smithart seeks to recover for defendants’ alleged

use of excessive force during the course of his arrest, his section 1983 action may proceed,”

the court concluded. Id. at 953.

To distinguish the present facts from these and similar cases cited by Beckway,

Defendants argue that, in Beckway’s case, “there was a single act of resistance that coincided

with the arrest upon which Beckway’s plea was entered.” Defs.’ Reply in Support of Motion

for J. on the Pleadings (Doc. 85) at 6 n.9. As a result, Defendants assert, there can be no

dispute over the factual basis for Beckway’s plea: only one act of resistance would subject

Beckway to the section 148 charge, and the officers’ alleged use of excessive force at that

time would be inconsistent with his conviction. As described in the police reports and in

Beckway’s own complaint, Beckway’s altercation with the officers appears to have been

brief and rapid:

DeShong . . . contacted Beckway at his home while accompanied

by Ward as a cover unit. He found Beckway to be visibly

intoxicated and unsteady on his feet. After soliciting Beckway’s

account of his altercation with Keats, DeShong notified Beckway

that he was placing him under arrest. Beckway “pulled away”

and “started to spin around, attempting to gain physical

advantage,” but then “lost his balance and fell to the deck of the

residence.” Preston Decl., Ex. A at 3. Beckway, having fallen

forward, had his hands and arms beneath his torso; the officers

attempted to gain control of his hands and soon placed him in

handcuffs. As the officers helped him up, Beckway complained

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of a pain to his left leg, and was transported by medical personnel

to a hospital for treatment. Beckway alleges in his complaint that

the officers had forcibly thrown him to the ground and stomped

on the back of his left knee, causing his injury.

May 12, 2010 Order at 2-3. In Smith, the Ninth Circuit found multiple potential bases for the

plaintiff’s guilty plea because he had engaged in numerous, discrete acts of defying officer

commands. Beckway attempts to do the same here, arguing that he engaged in distinct acts –

his initial delay upon being told of his arrest, for example, and his pulling away from

DeShong’s grip – each of which could have formed the basis of his plea. Defendants argue

that such a breakdown of his arrest is infeasible, because the arrest was a fluid, uninterrupted

act that could be measured in seconds. Defendants urge the Court to follow instead the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Cunningham v. Gates, which found the Heck bar applied because “there

was no break between [the plaintiff’s] provocative act” and “the police response that he

claims was excessive.” 312 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002).

Smith forces the Court to examine the temporal relationship between the acts

underlying a conviction and the acts underlying the § 1983 claim. If “the excessive force

may have been employed against him subsequent to the time he engaged in the conduct that

constituted the basis for his conviction,” the Heck bar does not apply. Smith, 394 F.3d at

693. Thus, a claim that the officers used excessive force after Beckway had already

submitted to their authority would not be subject to Heck. That is precisely what Beckway

alleges: he claims one of the deputies stomped on his leg after his arrest was already effected,

when he was on the ground and in the grasp of one deputy. Even if the arrest itself was fluid,

any excessive force that occurred after the arrest had been effected would fall beyond the

scope of Heck.

On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court construes all doubts in favor of

the plaintiff. The Court must therefore credit Beckway’s allegations as true, and as such

cannot conclude at this time that the excessive force claim is barred by Heck. To the extent

that Beckway alleges the use of excessive force following his arrest, his § 1983 claim does

not necessarily imply the invalidity his conviction for resisting arrest. As in Sanford v.

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Motts, Beckway’s case hinges on his ability to prove the kick “was delivered after []he was

arrested.” 258 F.3d at 1120. Defendants’ motions for reconsideration are therefore DENIED

IN PART as to their requests that the Court dismiss Beckway’s § 1983 claim for excessive

force and the related state law claims for battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. The Court concludes that Beckway is currently in custody for habeas

purposes, and that the exception to Heck carved out by Justice Souter does not apply here. 

The motions are therefore GRANTED IN PART as to this issue. However, the Court also

finds that Heck does not bar Beckway’s claim that excessive force was used after his arrest. 

Judgment on the pleadings is therefore DENIED IN PART as to Beckway’s § 1983 claim

and the related state law claims for battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/28/10 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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