Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01129/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01129-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule,” which provides that petitions are

deemed filed upon delivery to prison officials. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar

v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 223 (9th Cir. 2001) (application of Houston’s mailbox rule to federal habeas

filings); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing same with

regard to state habeas petitions). Here, the instant federal Petition was signed on June 19, 2007, and this

Court will therefore construe the Petition as having been filed on that date.

1 07cv1129

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOMCHIT JOY NASIRICHAMPANG,

Petitioner,

v.

VICTOR M. ALMAGER, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No.07cv1129 L (AJB)

Report and Recommendation to Grant

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. No. 13]

On June 19, 20071, Petitioner, Somchit Joy Nasirichampang, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his December 28,

2000, conviction in San Diego Superior Court, Case No. SCD151547. [Doc. No. 1]. On November 21,

2007, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition as procedurally time-barred pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). [Doc. No. 13]. On December 19, 2007, Petitioner filed an Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. No. 14]. Based upon a review of all the materials, for the reasons set

forth herein, it is recommended that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition as procedurally timebarred be GRANTED.

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Again, Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the mailbox rule to determine the filing date of his

state habeas petitions. See supra, note 1.

2 07cv1129

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Conviction and Sentence

On December 28, 2000, a jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder (Cal. Penal Code §§

187(a), 189). The jury also found Petitioner personally used a handgun in committing the murder (Cal.

Penal Code § 12022.5(a)(1)). Petitioner was sentenced to serve a term of fifty-nine years to life in state

prison (25 years to life for first degree murder, doubled due to a “strike”; five years for prior serious

felony conviction and four years for personal use enhancement). [Notice of Lodgment in Support of

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition (“Lodgment”) 1, at p. 7].

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One, challenging his conviction on numerous grounds. [Lodgment 1]. On June 9,

2003, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. [Id.]. On July 14, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court. [Lodgment 2]. On September 17, 2003, the Supreme Court

denied his petition for review. [Id.]. Petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court. [Pet. at 3.]

C. First State Court Petition for Habeas Review

On March 8, 20042

, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Superior

Court, arguing four of the same grounds raised on direct appeal. [Lodgment 3]. On May 4, 2004, the

Superior Court denied the writ. [Lodgment 4]. On May 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. [Lodgment 5]. 

On June 17, 2007, the Court of Appeal denied the petition. [Lodgment 6]. On June 27, 2004, Petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in th2e California Supreme Court. [Lodgment 7]. On May 18,

2005, the Supreme Court denied the petition. [Lodgment 8 ].

D. Second State Court Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On December 12, 2005, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court, arguing three grounds relating to his conviction that were not previously

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raised on direct appeal or in the first round of state habeas petitions. [Lodgment 9, at pp. 3, 4; Lodgment

9, Memo. of Points and Authorities, at p. 23]. On February 8, 2006, the Superior Court denied the

petition. [Lodgment 10]. On March 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One. [Lodgment 11, at p. i]. On June 30, 2006, the

Court of Appeal denied the petition. [Lodgment 12].

On July 26, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court. [Lodgment 13, at p. i]. On May 23, 2007, the Supreme Court denied the petition, citing the

following cases: In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770,780 (1990) (which sets forth timeliness framework for

petitions); In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993) (which holds that absent justification, successive or

untimely petitions will be summarily denied); In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.2d 218 (1965) (which holds that

habeas corpus cannot serve as a second appeal); and In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (1953) (which holds

that a writ of habeas corpus is not available for claims that should have been raised on appeal).

[Lodgment 14]. 

E. Present Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition on June 19, 2007, challenging his conviction based on

numerous grounds raised on direct appeal and in his state habeas petitions. [Pet., at 6-17]. On

November 21, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition, claiming the Petition is barred by

the one-year statute of limitations. [Doc. No. 13]. On December 19, 2007, Petitioner filed an Opposition

to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, claiming statutory tolling places the Petition within the limitations

period. [Doc. No, 14-2]. Petitioner also alleges in his Opposition that Respondent acted in bad faith in

requesting an extension of time to respond to the Petition because Respondent’s request was limited to

an extension to file an “answer” and not a motion to dismiss. The Court finds this claim is without

merit. Even though Respondent’s request uses the term “answer”, the Court understands the request as

an extension of time to file a response, which is either an answer or a motion to dismiss.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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4 07cv1129

DISCUSSION

A. The AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations

Petitions filed after April 24, 1996, are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) which sets forth a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners seeking

collateral review in federal court. Pursuant to AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d):

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period

shall run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C § 2244 (d) (1) (A)-(D).

Only section 2244 (d)(1)(A) applies in this case. While section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides no

definition of “final by the conclusion of direct reveiw,” the Supreme Court has explained that “final”

means “a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.” 

Griffith v, Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n. 6 (1987) (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542

n. 8 (1982)). Moreover, it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that “direct review” includes the

ninety-day period within which a habeas petitioner can file a petition for writ of certiorari from the

Supreme Court, whether or not that petitioner in fact files such a petition. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1158-58; Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 2002); Supreme Ct. Rule 13.1 (“A petition for a

writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary

review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry

of the order denying discretionary review.”). 

/ / /

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In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on direct

appeal on September 17, 2003. Petitioner’s conviction became final on December 16, 2003, upon

expiration of the ninety-day period in which Petitioner could have sought certiorari. Thus, the one-year

statute of limitations period commenced on December 17, 2003, and expired one year later on December

17, 2004. Therefore, the instant Petition, which was filed on June 19, 2007, is untimely unless the

limitations period was sufficiently tolled.

B. Tolling of the AEDPA’s Limitations Period

1. Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus petition is

“pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state-court petition is “properly filed” when “its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz

v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). Time limits on post-conviction petitions are conditions to filing. Id., at

8, 11. In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Court held that the time between the denial of a

petition in a lower California court and the filing of a subsequent petition in the next higher state court

does not toll the statute of limitations (i.e., an application for post-conviction relief is not “pending”

during the interstitial periods while one is pursuing a full round of state collateral review) if the petition

is ultimately found to be untimely. Id., at 223-26. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), the

Court held that statutory tolling is not available for the period a petition is under consideration (i.e., an

application for post-conviction relief is not “properly filed”) if it is untimely. Id., at 413-14. “When a

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, “that [is] the end of the matter” for purposes of

section 2244 (d)(2).” Id., at 414. Furthermore, “petitioner is not entitled to tolling during the gap

between the completion of one full round of state collateral review and the commencement of another. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2003). 

As set forth above, the statute of limitations began to run on December 17, 2003, and expired on

December 17, 2004. Statutory tolling began when Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California

Superior Court on March 8, 2004, 81days into the 365-day AEDPA limitations period (December 17,

2003, to March 7, 2004 (day before tolling began) equals 81 days). Statutory tolling ended and the

clock began to run again when the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition on May

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18, 2005. Statutory tolling began again when Petitioner filed his second habeas petition in the

California Superior Court on December 12, 2005, 207days into the limitations period (May 18, 2005, to

December 11, 2005 (day before tolling began again) equals 207 days), for a total of 288 days into the

365-day statute of limitations. Statutory tolling ended when the California Court of Appeal denied the

petition on June 30, 2006, leaving 77 days in the statutory limitations period.

Even though Petitioner thereafter filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, he is

not entitled to statutory tolling for the time between the California Court of Appeal denial on June 30,

2006, and the California Supreme Court denial on May 23, 2007, because the state Supreme Court

denied the petition as untimely. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-14; Carey, 536 U.S. at 223-26; Bonner v.

Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that under Pace, “if the petition was untimely

under California law, it was never properly filed,” and rejecting the proposition that statutory tolling is

available when the state court denied a post-conviction petition both on the merits and as untimely), as

amended, 439 F.3d 993, cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 132 (2006), citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 225-26.

The citations to In re Robbins and In re Clark by the state Supreme Court, and in particular, the

reference to the specific page in Robbins, clearly indicates that Petitioner’s state Supreme Court petition

was untimely and that he failed to adequately explain his delay in presenting the claims. See In re

Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1990) (setting forth “analytical framework governing our timeliness

determinations”); In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993) (absent justification, successive or untimely

petitions will be summarily denied (“[a] successive petition presenting additional claims that could have

been presented in an earlier attack on the judgment is, of necessity, a delayed petition.”) Id., at 770. 

Furthermore, a state Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for other reasons does not negate the denial

based on timeliness. See Bonner, at 1148-49; Carey, 536 U.S. at 225-26. 

Here, when the Court of Appeal denied the petition on June 30, 2006, only 77 days remained in

the limitations period. However, Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until June 19, 2007, 277

days beyond the statute of limitations period. Thus, the instant Petition is untimely absent equitable

tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling

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The statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling, but such tolling is unavailable in

most cases. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling applies only when

“extraordinary circumstances beyond a petitioner’s control” make it impossible to file a timely petition. 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Equitable tolling

does not extend to “garden variety” contentions of “excusable neglect” such as lack of knowledge of the

filing deadlines, lack of representation, and unfamiliarity with the legal process. Irwin v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating both

“extraordinary circumstances” and due diligence in pursuing his rights. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418 (2005); see also Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d, 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, Petitioner failed to make a showing that there were any circumstances, much less

extraordinary circumstances, which prevented him from filing his Petition in a timely manner. Because

the statute of limitations ran on federal habeas corpus relief, Petitioner is not excused from filing an

untimely petition.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED. This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(1988). Any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties by February 15, 2008. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed by February 29, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v.

Y1st, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 25, 2008

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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