Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01735/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01735-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN E. MONTGOMERY,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16cv1735 - JLS (PCL)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Doc. 25]; and 

DEFENDANT'S CROSS MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Doc. 26]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Sean E. Montgomery has filed a pro se complaint seeking judicial review 

of Defendant Social Security commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill’s denial of his application 

for Supplemental Security Income and for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social 

Security Act. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25), and 

Defendant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26-1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

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RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion be DENIED and that Defendant’s motion be 

GRANTED.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance and 

Supplemental Security Income pursuant to Titles II and XIV of the Social Security Act, 

alleging bipolar disorder, phobias, depression, paranoia, suicidal thoughts, insomnia, and 

physical impairments beginning January 1, 1993. (A.R 256, 322.) Plaintiff’s disability 

onset date was later amended to June 5, 2007. (A.R. 36.) Plaintiff’s applications were 

denied initially and upon reconsideration. (A.R 126-29.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a written 

request for a hearing. (A.R. 140-50.) An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing

on May 26, 2011. (A.R. 49-113.) On July 6, 2011, the ALJ issued a written decision finding 

Plaintiff not disabled because he could perform a significant number of jobs in the national 

economy. (A.R. 32-48.) After considering all the evidence in the record as a whole, the 

ALJ found:

1. Plaintiff’s disability onset date was amended to June 5, 2007. (A.R. 36.)

2. Amendment of Plaintiff’s disability onset date was appropriate in light of Title XVI 

eligibility. (A.R. 36.)

3. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability 

onset date of June 5, 2007. (A.R. 36.)

4. Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: back pain; right elbow, hand, and 

wrist impairment; nerve damage in the right elbow; gastroesophageal reflux disease

(“GERD”); status post right foot fracture; dysthymia or mood disorder NOS; and 

substance abuse (drugs), by history. (A.R. 36.)

5. Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments 

in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (A.R. 37.)

6. Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to lift or carry twenty-five 

pounds frequently and fifty pounds occasionally; stand and/or walk for a total of 

about six hours out of an eight-hour workday; sit for a total of about six hours out of 

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an eight-hour workday; is restricted to frequent climbing, balancing, stooping, 

kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and mentally limited to work with no public 

contact and minimal contact with co-workers. (A.R. 38.)

7. Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (A.R. 39.)

8. Plaintiff was 41 years old when the application was filed, which is defined as a 

younger individual age 18-49. (A.R. 39.)

9. Plaintiff has a high school education and is able to communicate in English. (A.R. 

39.)

10. Plaintiff’s education and training do not permit direct entry into skilled work. (A.R. 

40.)

11.Transferability of job skills is not an issue because Plaintiff does not have past 

relevant work. (A.R. 40.)

12.In light of Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 

Plaintiff can perform. (A.R. 40.)

13.Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

June 5, 2007, through the date of his decision on July 6, 2011. (A.R. 41.)

On January 29, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ 

decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. (A.R. 26-29.)

Plaintiff then filed a federal complaint on July 1, 2016, seeking judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 1.)

III. ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

A. Psychological Evidence

1. Prison and Parole Records

Chronological Interdisciplinary Progress Notes (“chronos”) from August 9, 2008 to 

May 8, 2007, detail Plaintiff’s treatment while incarcerated before the alleged onset date 

of Plaintiff’s disability. (A.R. 437-63.) These treatment notes contain summaries of brief 

interactions with Plaintiff on a semi-regular basis. Plaintiff had a consistently moderate 

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treatment plan throughout this time and the records show no significant increase in either 

treatment frequency or medication. (Id.) 

Frequently, these treatment notes tie Plaintiff’s mood and affect to the prison’s 

efforts to move Plaintiff out of his secure housing unit, where he lived alone, and into 

housing with a cellmate. (A.R. 442, 447-48, 453-55, 457-63.) Plaintiff indicated that he 

had a previous experience with a “cellie” where the individual attacked him in his sleep 

and he had to “beat him down badly” in an effort to defend himself. (A.R. 454.) Plaintiff 

worried that having to live with a cellie again would create a potential conflict that Plaintiff 

wanted to avoid given that he already had two strikes and a third would destroy his chances 

of being released in July, 2007. (Id.) Plaintiff often engaged in hunger strikes as a way of 

challenging his housing transfer. (A.R. 457-58, 460, 463.)

Plaintiff’s treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff had bipolar disorder “by history,” 

however none of the chronos provide an original diagnosis. (A.R. 437-63.) His behavior 

was always within normal limits and Plaintiff never demonstrated either suicidal or 

homicidal ideations, however Plaintiff did display a consistent fear of bugs. (Id.) On 

December 5, 2006, a psych evaluation was requested after staff discovered while reviewing 

outgoing mail that Plaintiff wrote he was going to commit suicide. (A.R. 453.) Plaintiff

reaffirmed the intention over the phone to his sister. (Id.) The clinical psychologist who 

attended to Plaintiff found him calm, alert, oriented to time, place person and situation, and 

cooperative. (Id.) Plaintiff told the psychologist that his behavior was an attention seeking 

device in order to not be moved in with a cellmate. (Id.) During this conversation Plaintiff 

denied any current suicidal ideation, indicated that he would likely hunger strike, and the 

psychologist deemed Plaintiff not suicidal. (A.R. 454-55.)

Client Episode Profile (Parole) records for Plaintiff detail information relayed 

following Plaintiff’s release from Prison on May 10, 2007. (A.R. 476-87.) Plaintiff 

indicated he had been incarcerated many times, frequently for burglary and that he had a 

long history of substance abuse, going back to age fifteen, starting with PCP and later 

preferring cocaine. (A.R. 481.) Plaintiff indicated that he last used cocaine in 2001. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff also indicated that while in prison he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and that 

he was taking Pisperidone, Wellbutrin, and Benadryl for his mood swings. On June 12, 

2007, Plaintiff described himself as “moody” and reported that his elevated moods are 

“more up than normal.” (A.R. 485.) The clinician noted that Plaintiff’s description of “up” 

does not describe mania or hypomania, but rather “just very energetic as compared to when 

he’s depressed.” (Id.) Notes also indicated that Plaintiff was enrolled at City College and 

hoping to find part-time work. (A.R. 486.) 

The June 18, 2007 case note indicates Plaintiff has cocaine dependence in remission 

and the assessment and plan calls for ruling out the possibility of a substance induced mood 

disorder and malingering of mental illness for secondary gain. (A.R. 481-82.) Plaintiff also 

provided his class schedule, as he would be missing weekly sessions, instead attending 

classes full time. (A.R. 481.) Additionally, the clinician noted that “[i]t has been very 

obvious during the interview that [Plaintiff] was more focused [on] how to get SSI rather 

than address any mental health issues.” (Id.)

Parole records from September 2010 indicate that following a twenty-six month 

period of incarceration, Plaintiff was transient and looking for housing. (A.R. 645-47.) 

Notes indicate that at this time Plaintiff “denied current mental health symptoms.” (A.R.

646.) 

2. Evaluating and Consulting Physicians

Plaintiff’s mental health impairments were evaluated by Luyen T. Luu, M.D., on 

November 2, 2007. (A.R. 491-501.) Using the SSA’s Psychiatric Review Technique form,

Dr. Luu was unable to make a determination of Plaintiff’s disposition because there was 

insufficient evidence. (A.R. 491.) 

On August 31, 2010, Dr. K. Loomis, M.D. completed another Psychiatric Review 

Technique form and determined that Plaintiff’s impairments were not severe. (A.R. 620-

30.) Dr. Loomis reviewed Plaintiff’s records to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s impairments 

met or equaled listing 12.04: Affective Disorder. (A.R. 620.) Dr. Loomis determined that 

a medically determinable impairment was present that does not precisely satisfy the 

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diagnostic criteria for 12.04. (A.R. 623.) Dr. Loomis, in evaluating Plaintiff’s functional 

limitations, determined that Plaintiff experienced mild limitations in restriction of activities 

of daily living, difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace. (A.R. 628.) Dr. Loomis also noted that Plaintiff had no 

repeated episodes of decompensation. (Id.)

B. Medical Evidence

1. Plaintiff’s Provided Records

Records from a MRI on October 7, 2009, indicate that Plaintiff was diagnosed with 

minimal multilevel spondylosis but without a focal disc herniation, spinal stenosis, or 

foraminal narrowing, the cause of his lower back pain. (A.R. 610.) Plaintiff’s pain was 

treated with Neurontin and at an appointment on January 11, 2010, he was also instructed 

to perform back exercises for ten minutes, twice daily. (A.R. 586.) Plaintiff’s records 

indicate that similar treatment was recommended on February 18, 2010 and March 22, 

2010. (A.R. 580, 583.) The March 22 note also indicates that Plaintiff was unable to get 

Tylenol #3 because a policy prohibited prescriptions in excess of ten days. (A.R. 580.) In 

May 2010, Plaintiff reported that his back pain was well controlled with Neurontin and an 

over the counter pain reliever (naprosen). (A.R. 575.) The clinician recommended Plaintiff 

take naprosen thirty to sixty minutes before exercising. (Id.) Plaintiff indicated his pain was 

a three to five (presumably out of ten) with his current regimen and that he had minimal 

interference in his functional activities. (Id.)

An orthopaedic surgery record from October 9, 2009, shows that Plaintiff was 

suffering from a ganglion cyst in his right wrist. (A.R. 612.) The record indicates that this 

was not the first cyst Plaintiff had. (Id.) Because an aspiration would have been dangerous 

given proximity to the radial artery, the surgeon recommended an excision. (Id.) The cyst 

was successfully excised on November 12, 2009. (A.R. 590-91.) Plaintiff complained of 

numbness in his fourth and fifth fingers as a result of the excision at an appointment in 

January 2010. (A.R. 586.) Plaintiff was still experiencing numbness in February 2010 and 

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his doctor recommended Plaintiff wear a wrist splint, which he received in March 2010. 

(A.R. 583, 586.)

The progress note from May 2010 reports that Plaintiff suffered a volar plate fracture 

of his middle phalanx right middle finger. (A.R. 574, 611.) The note indicates that Plaintiff 

injured his finger playing basketball two or three months before the May 20 appointment. 

(Id.) 

2. Evaluating and Consulting Physicians

On November 29, 2010, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Thomas Sabourin, M.D., 

who provided a medical source statement. (A.R. 658-62.) Dr. Sabourin noted that 

Plaintiff’s social history did not include drug use, but that Plaintiff smoked upwards of half 

a pack of cigarettes a day. (A.R. 659.) The statement indicates that Plaintiff sits and stands 

with normal posture, without evidence of a tilt or list, and sits comfortably. (Id.) Plaintiff 

was able to rise from a chair without difficulty and used no assistive device except for the 

splint on his right wrist. (Id.) Dr. Sabourin noted that while Plaintiff’s neck range of motion 

is normal, he does experience pain with right lateral flexion. Plaintiff demonstrated no 

tenderness in his neck but did have neck pain with axial loading. (Id.) Additionally, 

Plaintiff’s back range of motion was normal, but he had pain with full flexion. (A.R. 660.) 

Dr. Sabourin indicated that Plaintiff’s range of motion of the wrists was grossly 

normal and painless. (A.R. 660.) His wrists were without tenderness, warmth, crepitus, 

instability, or swelling. (Id.) Dr. Sabourin did note that Plaintiff had well-healed volar and 

dorsal scars on the right wrist, though there was no instability. (Id.) Plaintiff’s range of 

motion was grossly normal and painless in his shoulders, elbows, wrists, hands and fingers, 

hips, knees, ankles, and feet. (Id.)

From his examination, Dr. Sabourin produced the following diagnostic impression:

1) Status post excision of right wrist ganglion cyst; 2) Mild irritation of the right 

antebrachial cutaneous nerve, right arm; 3) Lumbar strain and sprain with minimal 

degenerative changes on MRI; 4) Status post right foot fifth metatarsal base fracture, 

healed; and 5) Fracture of the right long finger volar plate at the middle joint, well-healed 

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with full range of motion. (A.R. 661.) Dr. Sabourin indicated that Plaintiff’s severity and 

duration of his complaints is disproportionate to Plaintiff’s determinable condition. (A.R. 

662.) There was no discernable reason why Plaintiff would need to continue using the wrist 

splint and he displayed no weakness or neurological deficit. (Id.) With regard to Plaintiff’s 

back pain, Dr. Sabourin indicated that Plaintiff has nominal changes on MRI and a full 

range of motion without neurological deficit or atrophy. (Id.) Dr. Sabourin concluded his 

discussion by stating that “[i]n general, [Plaintiff] is doing quite well at this time.” (Id.)

Dr. Sabourin indicated that Plaintiff could lift or carry fifty pounds occasionally and 

twenty-five pounds frequently; could stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday 

and could sit for the same amount of time. (A.R. 662.) Plaintiff’s push and pull limitations 

were equal to his lift and carry limitations, and Plaintiff would be able to climb, stoop, 

kneel, and crouch frequently. Dr. Sabourin indicated that Plaintiff had no manipulative 

limitations and no need for assistive devices. (Id.)

Medical Consultant J. Ross, M.D., completed a Physical RFC Assessment on 

December 1, 2010. (A.R. 665-70.) In terms of exertional limitations, Plaintiff was limited 

to occasionally lifting fifty pounds and frequently lifting twenty-five pounds. (A.R. 666.) 

Plaintiff was limited to standing or walking for six hours in an eight-hour workday and 

sitting for the same. Like Dr. Sabourin’s determination, Dr. Ross limited Plaintiff’s ability 

to push and pull in line with Plaintiff’s lift and carry limitations. (Id.) Posturally, Plaintiff 

was limited to frequently climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. 

(A.R. 667.) Plaintiff’s RFC included no manipulative, visual, communicative, or 

environmental limitations. (A.R. 667-68.) 

C. Administrative Hearing

On May 26, 2011, ALJ Jerry F. Muskrat conducted a hearing to determine Plaintiff’s 

disability claims. (A.R. 49-113.) Plaintiff appeared in person, represented by his partner 

Mary Edwards. (A.R. 49.) Medical Expert Dr. Kent Layton and Vocational Expert John 

Koucher also testified. (Id.)

///

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1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified that he was forty-five years old, obtained his GED, and had no 

vocational training. (A.R. 77-78.) Plaintiff testified that he has been incarcerated “off and 

on.” (A.R. 79.) Plaintiff supported himself through food stamps, as he has not been 

working. (A.R. 80.) Plaintiff also testified that he had been incarcerated for a time since 

the alleged onset date of his disability, from December 2007 to September 2010. (Id.) 

Plaintiff testified that in terms of mental health, he suffers from bipolar disorder, 

phobia, depression, paranoia, suicidal ideation, schizoaffective disorder, and obsessive 

compulsive disorder. (A.R. 83.) Additionally, Plaintiff indicated he has nerve damage to 

his right elbow and wrist, back pain, and is supposed to use a cane as a result of his oncebroken right foot. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that although the break was in 2005, he still 

experienced “real bad” pain. (A.R. 83-84.) Plaintiff testified that he attempted suicide in 

February 2010 by hanging himself with a bed sheet while in prison. (A.R. 85.) He indicated 

that his OCD leads him to repeatedly clean something “to make sure it’s clean.” (A.R. 86-

87.) Plaintiff testified that he was taking Klonopin for OCD, Risperdal to treat his 

schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, Mapap for the pain in his hand, arm, and back, and 

Prilosec for acid reflux. (A.R. 66-67, 71-74.)

When given the opportunity to supplement Plaintiff’s testimony, Ms. Edwards 

indicated that Plaintiff is “very suicidal.” (A.R. 88.) Ms. Edwards also indicated that 

Plaintiff was unable to be around people or talk to others, and that “he’ll have outbreaks 

where if you bother him too much, then he may try to harm you.” (Id.)

2. Medical Expert Testimony

Clinical Psychologist Dr. Kent Layton, Psy.D., testified regarding his analysis of the 

medical and psychological evidence. (A.R. 90-103.) Dr. Layton indicated that Plaintiff 

likely suffered from substance addiction disorder and that any hallucinations Plaintiff 

experienced are likely “a result of the large amount of amphetamines, crystal meth, [and] 

cocaine that [Plaintiff] used.” (A.R. 91.) With respect to Plaintiff’s claims of bipolar 

disorder, Dr. Layton pointed out that none of the evidence establishes that Plaintiff has ever 

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suffered a manic episode and therefore indicated that Plaintiff is not bipolar. (A.R. 92.) Dr. 

Layton testified that substance addiction disorder was likely the cause of Plaintiff’s 

depression. (Id.)

Dr. Layton thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff’s records and highlighted that at one point 

Plaintiff seemed more focused on how to get SSI benefits than committed to his treatment. 

(A.R. 92.) Also highlighted was the fact that after the alleged onset date of his disability,

Plaintiff was being excused from mental health meetings so he could go to school. (Id.) Dr. 

Layton indicated that when looked at as a whole, the evidence shows that Plaintiff has some 

OCD traits, but not the disorder. (A.R. 93.) 

Dr. Layton, with the help of the Social Security Administration’s psychiatric review 

technique form, analyzed Plaintiff’s impairments under listing 12.09 (substance addiction 

disorder) and 12.04 (affective disorder). (A.R. 94-95.) With respect to 12.04, Dr. Layton 

testified that Plaintiff exhibited, to some extent, psychomotor agitation, problems with 

concentrating or thinking, thoughts of suicide, delusions or paranoid thinking, 

hyperactivity, and easy distractibility. (A.R. 96.) Dr. Layton indicated that with respect to 

degree of limitation due to both 12.04 and 12.09, Plaintiff experienced a mild restriction of

activities of daily living, moderate difficulty maintaining social functioning, moderate 

difficulty with maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace, and rare and brief 

episodes of decompensation that are not severe enough to result in a loss of adaptive 

functioning. (A.R. 97-98.) When asked if, in his expert opinion, Plaintiff’s impairments 

meet a listing, Dr. Layton testified that he did not. (A.R. 98.) 

Addressing Plaintiff’s capacity to perform work functions, Dr. Layton testified that 

Plaintiff can have simple or complex tasks, minimum interaction with either the public or 

co-workers, and should have no problem with supervisors. (A.R. 98-99.) Dr. Layton also 

testified that should Plaintiff be found disabled, his condition would likely stabilize and 

improve with consistent medical treatment over the following eighteen months. (A.R. 99-

100.) 

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3. Vocational Expert Testimony

Vocational expert John Koucher determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. 

(A.R. 104-106.) The ALJ proposed the following hypothetical to Mr. Koucher: a 

hypothetical individual limited to medium range work with postural limitations limiting 

him to frequent climbing, balancing, stooping, and crouching or crawling and mental 

limitations requiring him to work in a non-public environment with minimal contact with 

co-workers, has a high school education, no past relevant work, and is categorized as a 

younger individual. Mr. Koucher indicated that based solely on the exertional limitations 

as proposed, the hypothetical calls for a finding of not disabled. (A.R. 107.) Mr. Koucher 

also indicated that despite the slight erosion effect of the hypothetical’s non-exertional 

limitations, there were a significant number of jobs that the hypothetical individual could 

perform including a hand packager, cleaner, and laundry worker. (A.R. 107-109.) 

Ms. Edwards countered Mr. Koucher’s testimony by asserting that Plaintiff would 

be unable to be a packager because Plaintiff’s “is like completely gone.” (A.R. 110-11.) 

Similarly, Ms. Edwards argued that Plaintiff would be unable to work as a laundry worker 

because he was unable to lift.” (A.R. 111.) 

IV. ALJ DECISION

The ALJ sought to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled under sections 216(i), 

223(d) and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (A.R. 35.) The ALJ ruled that Plaintiff 

was not disabled as defined by the Act from June 5, 2007 through the date of his decision 

on July 6, 2011. (A.R. 32, 41.)

The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). (A.R. 32-48.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

alleged disability onset date needed to be adjusted to June 5, 2007, and that Plaintiff had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since that date. (A.R. 36.) At step two, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of back pain; right elbow, hand and wrist 

impairment; nerve damage in the right elbow; GERD; status post right foot fracture; 

dysthymia or mood disorder NOS; and substance abuse (drugs), by history. (Id.) At step 

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three, the ALJ determined that none of Plaintiff’s impairments or combination of 

impairments met or equaled any impairment listed in 20 CFR, Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 

(the Listings). (A.R. 37.) The ALJ next determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to lift or 

carry twenty-five pounds frequently and fifty pounds occasionally; stand and/or walk for a 

total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday; sit for a total of about six hours in an 

eight-hour workday; is restricted to frequent climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, 

crouching, and crawling; and mentally limited to work with no public contact and minimal 

contact with co-workers. (A.R. 38.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 

testimony was not fully credible. (Id.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable 

to perform any past relevant work. (Id.) Finally, at step five the ALJ found that considering 

Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers 

in the national economy that Plaintiff was capable of performing. (A.R. 40.) As a result of 

the five-step analysis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the 

Act. (A.R. 41.)

The ALJ weighed the evidence in Plaintiff’s case as follows. The ALJ summarized 

Plaintiff’s diagnoses from the medical record including chronic back pain, GERD, a 

ganglion cyst with decreased digit sensitivity following excision, irritation of the right 

arm’s right antebrachial cutaneous nerve, post-right foot fracture, drug abuse history, and 

mood disorder NOS. (A.R. 36.) At the administrative hearing, Kent Layton, Psy.D. testified 

that Plaintiff suffered from dysthymia or mood disorder NOS and a history of drug abuse. 

Dr. Layton testified that the medical record showed evidence that Plaintiff’s mood disorder 

was manifested as a depressive syndrome characterized by “psychomotor agitation, 

difficulty concentrating or thinking; thoughts of suicide; delusions or paranoid thinking as 

well as manic syndrome characterized by hyperactivity and easy distractibility.” (A.R. 37.)

The ALJ indicated that both he and the medical evidence as a whole concur with Dr. 

Layton’s mood disorder and drug abuse diagnoses and as such, the ALJ adopted Dr. 

Layton’s analysis. (Id.)

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In determining that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments do not meet or 

medically equal a listing, the ALJ discussed and analyzed both the medical expert 

testimony and Plaintiff’s medical evidence. (A.R. 37-39.) First, the ALJ noted that while 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments resulted in mild restrictions of the activities of daily living, 

moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, moderate difficulties in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, there were no episodes of decompensation. 

(A.R. 37.) The ALJ indicated that the medical evidence did not establish the presence of 

any “C” criteria of the Listings. (Id.)

In making his RFC determination, the ALJ considered all symptoms and the extent 

to which the symptoms were consistent with the objective medical and opinion evidence. 

(A.R. 38.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms but that Plaintiff’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the symptoms were not fully 

credible. (Id.) The ALJ indicated that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with “rule out 

malingering of mental illness for secondary gain” and that he had not been compliant with 

his prescribed treatment protocol. (Id.) Further, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was enrolled 

in and attending City College courses for music production five days a week during the 

alleged onset of his disability. (Id.) The ALJ also noted that in April 2008 Plaintiff told the

consulting psychologist that he did not have an alcohol or drug problem, while throughout 

the rest of the record Plaintiff has spoken “volumes about his longstanding drug abuse since 

age 15.” (Id.) 

The ALJ discussed the severity and intensity of Plaintiff’s medical treatment and 

indicated that the course of Plaintiff’s treatment has been generally conservative despite 

claims that Plaintiff is totally disabled. (A.R. 39.) The medical evidence, as summarized 

by the ALJ, indicates that Plaintiff does not require any special accommodation to relieve 

pain or other symptoms and that despite Plaintiff’s claims of disabling fatigue and 

weakness, Plaintiff does not exhibit significant atrophy, loss of strength, or difficulty 

moving that would be demonstrative of severe and disabling pain. (Id.) Further, the ALJ 

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reported that the objective evidence establishes that the prescribed medication has been 

effective in controlling Plaintiff’s symptoms and that he has not alleged any side effects 

from the medication. (Id.)

In summarizing the medical evidence, the ALJ noted that there was no evidence of 

loss of weight or appetite due to pain or depression. (A.R. 39.) Similarly, there is no 

evidence of sleep deprivation or cognitive deficits due to pain or depression. (Id.) 

Ultimately, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff’s claims of significant limitations are not 

supported by Plaintiff’s own description of his daily activities noting that Plaintiff is able 

to cook, clean, shop, and do errands. (Id.)

Last, the ALJ noted that within the medical evidence, no physician has indicated that 

Plaintiff is totally disabled and precluded from all work and that Dr. Sabourin indicated 

Plaintiff was capable of performing medium exertional work with frequent postural 

limitations. (A.R. 39.) 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant must 

show that: (1) he suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected 

to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 

twelve months or more, and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of 

performing the work that he previously performed or any other substantially gainful 

employment that exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 423 (d)(1)(A) (West 

2004). An applicant must meet both requirements to be “disabled.” Id.

A. Sequential Evaluation of Impairments

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step process to determine whether an 

applicant is “disabled.” The five steps are as follows: (1) Whether the claimant is presently 

working in any substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the 

evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Whether the claimant’s impairment is severe. If not, 

the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three. (3) Whether the 

impairment meets or equals a specific impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments. If 

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so, the claimant is disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Whether the 

claimant is able to do any work he has done in the past. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

If not, the evaluation proceeds to step five. (5) Whether the claimant is able to do any other 

work. If not, the claimant is disabled. Conversely, if the Commissioner can establish there 

are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can do, the 

claimant is not disabled. 20 CFR § 404.1520; see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F. 3d 1094, 

1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999).

B. Judicial Review

Sections 206(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allow unsuccessful 

applicants to seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C.A 

§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The scope of judicial review is limited. The Commissioner’s final 

decision should not be disturbed unless: (1) the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or 

(2) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Schneider v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence means “more 

than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 

53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001); Desroisers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 

F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, 

resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Vasquez v. 

Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039). Where 

the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must 

be affirmed. Id. (citation and quotations omitted). “A decision of the ALJ will not be 

reversed for errors that are harmless.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C.A §405(g). This matter may also be 

remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

///

///

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VI. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that he “meets and exceeds” the requirements to be awarded SSI 

benefits. (Doc. 25 at 2.) To support his contention, Plaintiff relies on the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the California State Prisoner’s Handbook. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff 

does not contend that the ALJ made specific errors with regard to Plaintiff’s credibility, 

evaluating the medical record, or weight given to the examining or consulting medical 

experts. (Doc. 25.) Defendant argues that neither the ADA nor Prisoner’s Handbook are 

applicable as the Social Security Act has its own definition of disabled which is to be used 

to determine eligibility for benefits. (Doc. 26-1 at 4.) 

“For purposes of the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if the claimant is 

unable ‘to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.’” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) citing 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(1)(A). It is the providence of the ALJ to apply this standard to the medical evidence 

and where substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination, there is no error. 

Schneider, 223 F.3d at 973.

Here, there is substantial medical evidence in the record to support the legal 

conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. At no point in any 

of the medical evidence did a physician or psychologist indicate that Plaintiff was disabled 

and precluded from working. In fact, treating clinicians and doctors as well as the 

examining and consulting physicians all indicated that Plaintiff’s impairments are mild and 

pose the most modest of limitations on Plaintiff’s RFC. Medical experts determined that 

Plaintiff did not suffer from bipolar disorder as he claimed and additionally found that 

overall, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were disproportionate to the realities of his

impairments. 

To the extent that the ALJ was required to identify and weigh the evidence in the 

record, the ALJ noted that the evidence showed a conservative course of treatment that did 

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not become more intense to meet Plaintiff’s claims of increased impairment. (A.R. 38-39.) 

Plaintiff received instructions to exercise his back to alleviate symptoms and the medical 

expert testified that Plaintiff’s impairments were expected to improve with consistent 

treatment. Additionally, the medication recommended to Plaintiff for his impairments, 

such as naprosen, is a low-level over the counter drug. Were Plaintiff’s back and arm 

impairments as significant as claimed, one would expect the record to reflect a more 

advanced course of treatment. While Plaintiff did have surgery on his wrist for a cyst

excision, the examining physician indicated that Plaintiff was fully healed from surgery 

and no longer needed to wear a wrist splint.

Additionally, after reviewing the entire medical record, there is more than substantial 

evidence present to determine that Plaintiff is not disabled and totally precluded from all 

work. Along with the fact that no medical staff determined that Plaintiff was disabled, 

Plaintiff’s own behavior indicates that Plaintiff has the capacity to work. First, the record 

indicates that Plaintiff was, after the disability onset date, attending City College as a full 

time student studying music production. Second, Plaintiff injured himself playing 

basketball. Plaintiff claims that his physical and mental impairments prevent him from 

working, but surely those same impairments would prevent him from full time coursework 

and recreation. At the very least, this establishes that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living 

are not impacted by Plaintiff’s impairments. This evidence also runs counter to Ms. 

Edwards’ assertions at the hearing with respect to Plaintiff’s ability to work with others. 

Coursework and basketball are both activities that generally include interactions with 

others. It is unlikely that Plaintiff was taking his full-time coursework alone, so the 

assumption is that Plaintiff would have to engage with others fairly regularly, and 

successfully, if he was to continue in his studies. 

The medical record as a whole, including the records, reports from examining and 

consulting physicians, and expert testimony; when evaluated through the lens of the 

standard for determining disability, reveals that Plaintiff does not meet the definition of 

disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. This is strengthened by both the record and 

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testimony that indicates Plaintiff displayed more focus on obtaining SSI benefits than 

improving his mental health impairments and the likelihood that he was malingering for 

secondary gain. As such, the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence and 

there is no error.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends granting Defendant’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties on or before July 12, 2017. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall 

be served and filed on or before July 26, 2017. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specific time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2017

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