Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03859/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03859-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3859

___________

Scott A. Crow, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Marty Montgomery, Individually and * District Court for the Eastern

as Sheriff of Faulkner County, * District of Arkansas.

Arkansas; Kyle Kelly, Individually *

and as Administrator of the Faulkner *

County Detention Center; *

Lieutenant Gene Stephens, *

Individually and in his official capacity *

as Disciplinary Officer for the *

Faulkner County Detention Center, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: September 17, 2004

Filed: April 12, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Scott A. Crow brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 civil rights

action against officials of Faulkner County Detention Center (FCDC), alleging

violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Appellate Case: 03-3859 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/12/2005 Entry ID: 1889685
1

The facts are disputed as to what precipitated the attack. Crow contends he

was the victim of an unprovoked attack while the FCDC officials contend Crow made

provocative remarks. For purposes of our review, we accept the facts as alleged by

Crow.

-2-

Constitution. Appellants Marty Montgomery, Sheriff of Faulkner County; Kyle

Kelly, jail administrator of the FCDC; and Gene Stephens, lieutenant and disciplinary

officer for the FCDC (collectively referred to as "FCDC officials") moved for

summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The district court denied the

motion, finding genuine issues of material fact existed and therefore the FCDC

officials were not entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense.

The FCDC officials now appeal that ruling. We reverse and remand. 

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2001, Crow surrendered himself to the custody of the FCDC after

violating his probation. Crow, a nonviolent offender, expected to be released on bond

the next morning. FCDC placed Crow in cell 305, which consisted of a day room and

two bedroom cells. Shortly thereafter, two inmates in cell 305 punched Crow and

broke his jaw.1

 FCDC personnel removed Crow from the cell and took him to a local

hospital for emergency treatment. Crow's jaw was surgically repaired and he

remained in the hospital for several days. 

In the ensuing litigation, Crow sued the FCDC officials in their individual and

official capacities. Crow alleged that the FCDC was unreasonably dangerous due to

chronic overcrowding and that the FCDC officials knew it. Crow also alleged that

the FCDC officials exacerbated the already unsafe conditions by operating with

insufficient staff who were inadequately trained and supervised. Finally, Crow

alleged that the FCDC officials acted with deliberate indifference by allowing

overcrowding, failing to take reasonable measures to protect Crow from violence at

Appellate Case: 03-3859 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/12/2005 Entry ID: 1889685
-3-

the hands of other detainees, and disregarding Crow's safety and medical needs, all

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. None of the defendants was on duty or even

present at the FCDC when Crow was classified, placed in cell 305, and assaulted.

II. DISCUSSION

Ordinarily, there is no appeal from a trial court order denying summary

judgment. Moore v. Duffy, 255 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001). However, we do have

limited authority through interlocutory appeals to review the denial of qualified

immunity. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995). Such review is limited to

issues of law raised by the denial. Moore v. Briggs, 381 F.3d 771, 772 (8th Cir.

2004). "[A] defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not

appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines

whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial."

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319-20. "'[T]he appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether

the facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law.'" Id. at

313 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1995)). Accordingly, at this

point, we may not assume any fact asserted by the FCDC officials which the district

court has deemed to be genuinely disputed. Parks v. Pomeroy, 387 F.3d 949, 954 (8th

Cir. 2004). 

Qualified immunity shields government officials "from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court required to rule upon the qualified

immunity issue must first consider the threshold question of whether, construed in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the

officers' conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity."

Appellate Case: 03-3859 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/12/2005 Entry ID: 1889685
-4-

Id. Only if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties'

submissions, do we take the next step and ask whether the right was clearly

established. Id. at 201. For these inquiries, we conduct a de novo review. Parks, 387

F.3d at 954. 

We first consider whether the facts as alleged show the FCDC officials'

conduct violated a constitutional right. As a pretrial detainee, Crow's claims against

the FCDC officials are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d

1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). The FCDC officials violated Crow's due process rights

if the FCDC's conditions of confinement constituted punishment. Id. However,

because, "[u]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees are entitled to 'at

least as great' protection as that afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth

Amendment," we apply the identical deliberate-indifference standard as that applied

to conditions-of-confinement claims made by convicts. Id. (quoting City of Revere

v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)); see also Whitnack v. Douglas

County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994). 

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual

punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth

Amendment requires prison officials to take "reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of the inmates [and] . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (quotations omitted).

In order to establish a constitutional violation, Crow must show: (1) that his

incarceration in cell 305 posed a substantial risk of serious harm (objective

component), and (2) the FCDC officials actually knew of but disregarded, or were

deliberately indifferent to, Crow's health or safety (subjective component). Pagels v.

Morrison, 335 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1151

(8th Cir. 1998). 

Appellate Case: 03-3859 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/12/2005 Entry ID: 1889685
-5-

For purposes of this appeal we assume that Crow's incarceration in cell 305

posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Crow and that the FCDC officials were

aware of the risk. However, we reverse the district court's denial of qualified

immunity because, as a matter of law, the facts alleged by Crow do not establish that

the FCDC officials disregarded any known risk alleged by Crow. 

To satisfy the subjective element of Crow's Eighth Amendment claim, the

FCDC officials "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference."

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "In short, [Crow] must show that [the FCDC officials]

acted, or failed to act, with 'deliberate indifference' to the safety of [Crow]." Pagels,

335 F.3d at 740 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). "'[D]eliberate indifference

includes something more than negligence but less than actual intent to harm'; it

requires proof of a reckless disregard of the known risk." Jackson, 140 F.3d at 1152

(quoting Newman v. Holmes, 122 F.3d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1997)). 

Crow alleges that the FCDC officials failed to keep adequate records. He also

alleges that the facility was overcrowded, poorly supervised and understaffed and that

the detainees were inadequately classified. All of this, he claims, contributed to the

June 2001 incident in cell 305 and provides evidence of the reckless disregard of a

known risk sufficient to constitute deliberate indifference. The district court held that

the reasonableness of the FCDC officials' actions in response to the known risks at

the facility was a jury question. We disagree. At most, Crow's allegations show that

the FCDC officials may have acted unreasonably in failing to take particular measures

to improve the conditions at the facility, but that does not rise to the level of

deliberate indifference. Even if they were unreasonable, and might have done various

things to prevent the blow Crow endured, "reasonableness is a negligence standard"

and negligence cannot give rise to an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. Id.

Appellate Case: 03-3859 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/12/2005 Entry ID: 1889685
-6-

"The Supreme Court has generously construed qualified immunity protection

to shield 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'"

Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 711-12 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). "'Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they

are liable for transgressing bright lines.'" Id. at 712 (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner,

973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992)). "A prison official's duty under the Eighth

Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety, a standard that incorporates due regard for

prison officials' unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under

humane conditions." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45 (quotations omitted). 

Crow alleges, at most, institution-wide deficiencies which were known to these

supervisory officials but over which they had only partial control. On these facts, we

refuse to hold supervisory jail officials liable for acts that may or may not have

contributed to Crow's injury in June of 2001. In short, there is no record evidence of

anything beyond the FCDC officials' simple negligence. Thus, on the facts taken in

the light most favorable to Crow, he has not made out a constitutional violation. 

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse that part of the district court's order denying qualified immunity to

the FCDC officials, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. 

SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I am unable to join the panel's decision. The district court ruled that there

remain material factual disputes regarding the FCDC officials' knowledge and

conduct. It is my view that, under our applicable precedents, we cannot review the

denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity in this interlocutory

appeal. 

Appellate Case: 03-3859 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/12/2005 Entry ID: 1889685
-7-

Our jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment in qualified

immunity cases is limited. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995); see also Parks v.

Pomeroy, 387 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2004); Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487, 489 (8th Cir.

2002). In Johnson, the Court held "a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified

immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar

as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue

of fact for trial." Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20. The Court reasoned that "the

appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged support a claim of

violation of clearly established law." Id. at 313 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 528 n.9 (1995)). 

In Krein, we applied Johnson and held that "summary judgment is not

appropriate when there is a genuine issue of material fact surrounding the question

of the plaintiff's or defendant's relevant conduct-because, under those circumstances,

the court cannot determine as a matter of law what predicate facts exist in order to

decide whether or not the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law."

Krein, 309 F.3d at 493 (emphasis in original). We concluded that interlocutory

appellate jurisdiction was lacking over the district court's determination that there

remain genuine issues of material fact and challenges to the sufficiency of the

plaintiff's evidence to support that conclusion. Id.

In this case, Crow specifically alleged that FCDC was increasingly and

unreasonably unsafe due to chronic overcrowding and that the FCDC officials were

aware and had even acknowledged these facts. Crow also alleged that the

unreasonable danger to detainees due to overcrowding was exacerbated by understaffing of trained personnel to provide reasonable safety to detainees. Finally, Crow

alleged that the FCDC officials acted with deliberate indifference in allowing overcrowding, failing to take reasonable measures to protect Crow from violence at the

hands of other detainees, and showed deliberate indifference to Crow's safety and

medical needs. The district court found that the facts respecting the subjective

Appellate Case: 03-3859 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/12/2005 Entry ID: 1889685
-8-

knowledge of the FCDC officials and their actions in response to what they knew

were genuinely disputed and thus not sufficiently conclusive to entitle the FCDC

officials to summary judgment. This is precisely the type of case we are unable to

hear on interlocutory appeal under both Johnson and Krein.

As the majority correctly notes, an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim

requires proof greater than negligence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).

The plaintiff must show that the defendants subjectively knew that an excessive risk

to detainees existed and that they disregarded that risk. Id. The proper question under

an analysis for deliberate indifference is whether the FCDC officials intended to

avoid taking action that would have addressed the known serious risk of harm to

Crow or purposely took ineffective action. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Alleging and

showing the FCDC officials failed to respond reasonably is insufficient under Farmer

to establish deliberate indifference. 

If the facts required to determine whether the FCDC officials are entitled to

qualified immunity are not genuinely in dispute, we have jurisdiction and may resolve

the question as a matter of law. Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1995).

However, in this case, the district court has definitively found that material factual

disputes exist regarding the FCDC officials' knowledge and conduct. The FCDC

officials raise sound arguments that upon further factual development could prove

meritorious for the application of qualified immunity, but at this stage of the

litigation, it is not our call.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-3859 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/12/2005 Entry ID: 1889685