Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-mc-00151/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-mc-00151-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 871
Nature of Suit: IRS 3rd Party Suits 26 USC 7609 (U.S. plaintiff)
Cause of Action: 26:7609 IRS: Petition to Quash IRS Summons

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KOBRA RESTAURANT PROPERTIES, 

LLC,

Petitioners,

v.

CITIBANK USA N.A., UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

Case No. 2:24-mc-00151-DAD-JDP

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 

BE DENIED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 

AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

BE GRANTED

ECF Nos. 1 & 4

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

DAYS

Plaintiff has filed a motion to quash an IRS collection summons issued to Citibank USA. 

ECF No. 1. Plaintiff argues that that the underlying target of the summons is not an account 

holder or signer on the bank accounts at issue, and that the summons is overbroad and was issued 

in bad faith. ECF No. 1-1 at 3-4. The IRS has filed a motion to summarily deny plaintiff’s 

motion for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 4. Having considered the parties’ filings, I agree with

the government that jurisdiction is lacking and recommend that the motion to quash be denied.

Background

IRS Revenue Agent David Barbearo is conducting an investigation to locate and verify

assets to satisfy outstanding federal tax liabilities assessed against Abe Alizadeh, who has unpaid 

taxes exceeding $14,000 for tax years 2014 through 2018. ECF No. 4-2 ¶¶ 1, 6-8. Plaintiff, 

Case 2:24-mc-00151-DAD-JDP Document 8 Filed 10/02/24 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Kobra Restaurant Properties, LLC, is owned by Alizadeh’s sister. ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 4-5. 

On March 6, 2024, Agent Barbearo issued the relevant summons to Citibank “in aid of the 

collection of Abe Alizadeh’s previously assessed federal tax.” ECF No. 4-2 ¶ 9. The summons 

pertains to accounts involving Alizadeh or Kobra Restaurant Properties, LLC, and seeks “books, 

records, papers, and other data relating to the tax liability or for the purpose of inquiring into any 

offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws 

concerning” Abe Alizadeh. ECF No. 1-2 at 5-7. Agent Barbearo believes that, based on his 

investigation, the production of the summonsed documents likely will identify potential sources 

of Abe Alizadeh’s assets for the purpose of satisfying his existing federal tax liabilities. ECF No. 

4-2 ¶ 10. 

The summons notes on its face that pursuant to IRC 7609(c)(2)(D), it is exempt from 

notice requirements pertaining to third party summonses, and that pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 

§ 3413(c) and 26 U.S.C. § 7609(j) it is also exempt from the notice requirements of the Right to 

Financial Privacy Act. ECF No. 1-2 at 5. 

Discussion

Plaintiff asserts that the summons should be quashed because Abe Alizadeh is not an 

account holder or signer on the Citibank accounts, and because the summons is overbroad and 

was issued in bad faith. ECF No. 1-1 at 3-4. For the reasons explained below, the court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s motion.

“Congress ‘has authorized and required’ the IRS ‘to make the inquires, determinations, 

and assessments of all taxes’ the Internal Revenue Code imposes.” United States v. Clarke, 573 

U.S. 248, 249-50 (2014) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)). To support effect tax investigations, 

“Congress has endowed the IRS with expansive information-gathering authority.” United States 

v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984). In particular, under 26 U.S.C. § 7602, the IRS 

has “broad latitude to issue summonses ‘[f]or the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any 

[tax] return, making a return where none has been made, [or] determining the liability of any 

person for any interest revenue tax[.]” Clarke, 573 U.S. at 250 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)) 

(alterations in original)). The IRS also may serve a summons to “collec[t] any such liability.” 

Case 2:24-mc-00151-DAD-JDP Document 8 Filed 10/02/24 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Polselli v. Internal Revenue Serv., 598 U.S. 432, 434 (2023). Collection summonses “can extend 

to third parties beyond the taxpayer under investigation”; the IRS may request the production of 

“books, papers, records, or other data” from “any person” who possesses information concerning 

a delinquent taxpayer. Id. at 434-45 (quotations and citations omitted). 

The United States is immune from suit unless there is a valid waiver of sovereign 

immunity. Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1995). The only statute that 

provides the court with jurisdiction to quash an IRS summons is 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b), which is

“the exclusive method by which a taxpayer can challenge a summons issued by the IRS to a thirdparty recordkeeper.” Viewtech, Inc. v. United States, 2009 WL 3378990, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 

2009) (citing Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 653 F.3d 

1102 (9th Cir. 2011).

Only a party entitled to notice of a summons is permitted to bring a motion to quash under 

section 7609(b). See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A). The IRS is generally required to give notice to

“any person . . . who is identified in the summons.” 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a). Under 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7609(c)(2)(D), however, the IRS is exempted from providing notice when the summons is 

issued “in aid of the collection of [ ] an assessment made or judgment rendered against the person 

with respect to whose liability the summons is issued.” 26 U.S.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). 

Accordingly, for notice purposes, collection summonses are different from summonses used to 

investigate and assess correct tax liabilities. Individuals identified in a collection summons under 

26 U.S.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) are not entitled to notice and do not have a right to bring a motion to 

quash. 

Here, the IRS assessed a tax liability against Abe Alizadeh and issued the challenged 

summons to Citibank to aid in the collection of that liability. The summons, therefore, falls 

squarely under the notice exception found in 26 U.S.C. § 7609(c)(d)(D)(i). Accordingly, plaintiff 

was not entitled to notice and does not have standing to challenge the summons. The court lacks 

jurisdiction to rule on the motion to quash. See Polselli, 598 U.S. at 437-38, 445. 

Based on the foregoing, I recommend that the petition to quash be summarily denied.

Case 2:24-mc-00151-DAD-JDP Document 8 Filed 10/02/24 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Recommendation

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion to quash, ECF No. 1, 

be denied for lack of jurisdiction, and defendant’s motion to summarily deny plaintiff’s motion to 

quash, ECF No. 4, be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of 

service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 

court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 

within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:24-mc-00151-DAD-JDP Document 8 Filed 10/02/24 Page 4 of 4