Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06285/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06285-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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28 By order dated October 11, 2005, and upon the consent of the parties, Judge Anthony W. Ishii ordered the 1

case assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARLENE MARTINEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

JOHN W. SNOW, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:04-cv-6285-SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS ACTION FOR LACK OF

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (DOC.

59) 

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.1

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss. By

separate order, the Court has vacated the previously set hearing

on the motion and has deemed the matter submitted to the Court

for decision.

I. Background

A. The Instant Action

The original complaint was filed on September 16, 2004. By

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order dated August 8, 2005 (Doc. 46), the Court granted in part

and denied in part a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for breach of duty of fair

representation for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Order at

pp. 6-7.) Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII were also dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. p. 8.) With respect

to Plaintiff’s possible claim of violations of the Family and

Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Court granted Defendant Snow’s

motion for a more definite statement and granted Plaintiff leave

to file an amended complaint within twenty days. On August 24,

2005, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which she alleged

that her employer violated regulations and a bargaining agreement

by limiting the hours of family medical leave to which Plaintiff

was entitled, not providing her with provisional leave of thirty

days, and not accepting medical documentation provided by

Plaintiff’s health care provider during August through December

2002. Defendant John W. Snow, the head of the Treasury

Department, answered the complaint on September 2, 2005, and

raised affirmative defenses, including lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and failure to exhaust

applicable administrative remedies. On November 9, 2006,

Defendant filed and served on Plaintiff a notice of motion and

motion, memorandum of points and authorities, and declaration of

Brian W. Enos with exhibits A through H. Plaintiff failed to file

any opposition or objections or notice of non-opposition; by

separate order, the Court has vacated the hearing on the motion

and has deemed the matter to be submitted to the Court for

decision on the papers filed by Defendant.

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B. Facts

Plaintiff began working for the IRS in January 1985, working

in the processing division until 1993, at which point she was

redeployed to the business master file adjustments division until

2001, when she worked on individual instead of business tax

returns; she applied for a disability retirement, which was

approved in September 2004. (Decl. of Enos, Ex. A, Dep. of

Plaintiff Arlene Martinez, pp. 21, 26, 29, 30, 30.)

In July 2002, Plaintiff’s team leader, Julian D. Bockoven, 

wrote Plaintiff a memo advising her that she had taken all but

four hours of her allocated sick leave; her sick leave usage

would be monitored and, if it did not improve, might be subject

to a sick leave restriction letter; further, Plaintiff was

reminded that if she had a medical situation that might continue

and prompt use of leave, she could request “Family Medical Leave

Act (FMLA).” (Decl. of Enos, Ex. B.) 

On August 26, 2002, Plaintiff applied for leave under the

FMLA anticipated to start in August 2002 and to end December 31,

2003, because of a serious medical condition which required time

off for medical treatment. (Enos Decl., Ex. C.)

By September 9, 2002, a grievance regarding Plaintiff’s sick

leave was transmitted to Janet Stewart, the chief of Plaintiff’s

department. (Dec. Ex. D, Ex. A pp. 44-46.) 

By November 2002, the IRS had approved Plaintiff for 144

hours of FMLA leave. (Decl., Ex. C, pp. 2-4, Ex. E.) A memorandum

of March 14, 2003, from Stewart to the chief union steward,

comprising a step 2 response, indicated that the initial request

for leave had been properly refused because no reason or

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documentation was given; however, Plaintiff qualified for FMLA,

and adjustments were made back to October 7, 2002, which removed

all AWOL charges relating to FMLA. (Ex. D, pp., 7-8.) Plaintiff

testified that she was informed that she could appeal to the

third level to meet with the director; she could not remember if

she appealed, but she believed that she was denied the extension.

(Decl., Ex. A, Dep. of Martinez, pp. 44-48.) The grievance

process provided for three steps, the third involving a

resolution meeting between a union designee and an executive.

(Decl., Ex. F, p. 114.) If an adverse decision at the third level

was unsatisfactory, it could be appealed to binding arbitration.

(Ex. F, p. 114.) Plaintiff did testify that the grievance was

never arbitrated. (Id. p. 48.) Exhaustion through the EEO process

did not take place because Plaintiff had filed a union grievance,

and thus the EEO on September 10, 2003, determined that Plaintiff

had elected to pursue the matter in a negotiated grievance forum

instead, and the remaining EEO process would not include the FMLA

complaint. (Id. p. 106; Decl., Ex. H pp. 2-3.) Evidence which

Defendant’s counsel declares constitutes an IRS-generated

automated labor/employee relations tracking system print-out for

Plaintiff’s FMLA grievance reflects that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust her administrative grievance procedures with respect to

her FMLA claim because she failed to file timely for an appeal at

step three, and further, after requesting extensions for a stepthree meeting, Plaintiff’s grievance was closed on April 6, 2004,

because she had failed to pursue it. (Ex. G.)

//

///

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II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

The presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction of a

federal court is a question of law. McCarthy v. United States,

850 F.2d 558, 560 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989).

Except in removed cases, it is in effect presumed that the Court

lacks jurisdiction, and it is the plaintiff who bears the burden

of proof of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994);

Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville

Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9 Cir. 1989); Valdez v. United th

States 837 F.Supp. 1065, 1067, aff’d., Valdez v. United States,

56 F.3d 1177 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Challenges to jurisdiction by way of Rule 12(b)(1) may

proceed on the basis of the face of the complaint, or on the

basis of evidence beyond the complaint. When proceeding on the

basis of the face of the complaint, the Court must accept all of

the factual allegations of the complaint as true and ask whether

the allegations state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991);

Berkovitz v.United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540 (1988). 

However, when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1), the district court is not restricted to the face

of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits

and testimony, and may weigh the evidence and resolve and

determine factual disputes concerning the existence of

jurisdiction; this consideration of evidence does not convert the

motion into a motion for summary judgment. McCarthy v. United

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Nevertheless, where the facts upon which jurisdiction depends are also an essential element of the federal 2

claim, the challenge to the facts goes both to federal jurisdiction (which is otherwise always a question of law for the

Court) and to the merits of the claim. The Court should not resolve genuinely disputed facts where the question of

jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d

1173, 1177 (9 Cir. 1987). In such a case, the district court assumes the truth of factual allegations in a complaint th

unless controverted by undisputed facts in the record. Dismissal is then appropriate where it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. 

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States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9 Cir. 1988). Under such th

circumstances, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the

plaintiff’s allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173,

1177 (9 Cir. 1987). th 2

B. Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)

Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) provides for the making of a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted; such a motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claim

or claims stated in the complaint. Dismissal for failure to state

a claim is proper only if it is clear that no relief could be

granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations. Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

1273, 1274 (9 Cir. 1993). A complaint should not be dismissed th

under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46, (1957). Dismissal is proper only where there is either a

lack of a cognizable legal theory, or an absence of sufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). th

In considering a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a

court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff; accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as

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true; and determine whether the plaintiff can prove any set of

facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9 Cir. 1996). A th

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a

determination on the merits and is thus a dismissal without

prejudice. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th

Cir. 1985).

A motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted] may be raised

after the moving party has filed a responsive pleading to the

challenged complaint by way of a motion for judgment on the

pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9 Cir. 1980). A th

motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when,

taking all allegations in the pleading as true, the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Merchants Home

Delivery Service, Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1488

(9 Cir. 1995). The standard on a motion for judgment on the th

pleadings is the same as that applied on a motion pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9 Cir. 1990). th

C. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is an important limitation on the subject

matter jurisdiction of federal courts. The United States is

immune from suit unless it consents to be sued, and the terms of

its consent to be sued in a court defines that court’s

jurisdiction to hear the suit. United States v. Sherwood, 312

U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The United States, as sovereign, can only

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be sued to the extent that it has waived its sovereign immunity;

further, a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly

construed in terms of its scope in favor of the sovereign. Vacek

v. United States Postal Service, 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9 Cir. th

2006) (citing Dept. of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255,

260 (1999)). A waiver must be unequivocally expressed in the

statutory text and may not be implied. United States v. Testan,

424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff had been employed for

more than twelve months of service. The right to enforce

statutory rights concerning family and medical leave for federal

employees of under one year is governed by Title I of the FMLA

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 through 2619, including § 2617(a)(2), which

expressly provides for a private right of action to enforce

entitlement to leave and to obtain compensation therefor. Russell

v. United States Department of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9th

Cir. 1999); Sullivan-Obst v. Powell, 300 F.Supp.2d 85, 98 (D.D.C.

2004). However, the provisions governing federal civil service

employees with more than twelve months of service are Title II,

appearing at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381 through 6386, which do not grant a

private right of action to an aggrieved employee. Russell v. U.S.

Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9 Cir. 1999). The th

failure to include an express private right of action constitutes

a bar to a claim such as Plaintiff’s because there is no consent

to suit or waiver of sovereign immunity. Russell v. U.S. Dept. of

the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (9 Cir. 1999); Mann v. Haigh, th

120 F.3d 34, 37 (4 Cir. 1997). Further, because of the th

comprehensive nature of the Civil Service Reform Act (scattered

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sections of 5 U.S.C.) (CSRA), any avenue of relief through the

Administrative Procedure Act or via a Bivens suit is foreclosed.

Russell, 191 F.3d at 1019-20. Finally, it appears that Plaintiff

cannot prove any set of facts which would entitle her to relief.

See, Sullivan-Obst v. Powell, 300 F.Supp.2d 85, 98 (D.C.C. 2004). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated facts or otherwise

shown that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s complaints concerning the leave she gained through

the FMLA and her treatment by her employer with respect to the

FMLA. Thus, Plaintiff’s action should be dismissed.

D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 

The CSRA permits a plaintiff either to pursue FMLA claims

through a statutory procedure or to seek relief through available

union grievance procedure, but not both. Title 5 U.S.C. §

7121(a)(1) provides that in essence that except for stated

exceptions, a collective bargaining agreement shall provide

procedures for the settlement of grievances which shall be the

exclusive administrative procedures for resolving grievances

within the scope of the agreement. Section 7121(d) and (e)

provide that an aggrieved employee affected by specified events

and practices may raise the matter under a statutory procedure or

the negotiated procedure, but not both. See, United States Postal

Service v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 5 (2001).

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff elected to pursue a

grievance by September 9, 2002, and that the last step in the

grievance procedure actually undertaken was the March 2003 step 2

response of Stewart. Plaintiff believed that an extension of time

for appealing to the third level had been denied. There is

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documentation of Plaintiff’s having abandoned the grievance, and

Plaintiff admitted that it was not taken to arbitration. Further,

it is documented that exhaustion through the EEO process did not

take place because Plaintiff had filed a union grievance, and the

portion of the EEO complaint subsumed by the grievance was

dismissed. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to

file a statutory or EEO complaint, and that Plaintiff, who

elected to use the grievance procedure under the collective

bargaining agreement, failed to exhaust the grievance procedure,

thereby failing to exhaust her administrative remedy.

It is established that federal employees who elect the

grievance procedure remedy under the collective bargaining

agreement pursuant to § 7121 must exhaust the administrative

remedy before seeking review in court. Vinieratos v. United

States Department of Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 768, 773-74 (9th

Cir. 1991); Macy v. Dalton, 853 F.Supp. 350, 353, 355 (E.D.Cal.

1994) (and authorities there cited).

The failure to exhaust her grievance completely results in

Plaintiff’s failing to establish jurisdiction or to state a

claim. The remedy is dismissal. Macy v. Dalton, 853 F.Supp. at p.

358.

III. Disposition

In summary, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed on the

basis of sovereign immunity and failure to exhaust the

administrative remedy resulting in a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction in this Court. 

It IS ORDERED that the motion of Defendant to dismiss

Plaintiff’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction IS

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GRANTED. The dismissal is without prejudice. The Clerk IS

DIRECTED to close this action because this order terminates the

action in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 11, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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