Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01523/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01523-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES H. SIMS, CASE NO. CV-F-05-1523 AWI DLB P

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

vs.

J. WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants. [Doc. 1]

 /

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on November 30, 2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who isimmune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any

filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time 

if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984),

citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve

all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at Avenal State Prison, where plaintiff

is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff names J. Woodford, K. Mendoza-Powers, D. Griffith, L. Cotta, G.

Gunn, C. Lawhorn, A. Arnold, and M. Escobar as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and

injunctive relief. 

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on January 18, 2005, he appeared before the initial

classification committee consisting of defendants Griffith, Cotta and Gunn. Plaintiff alleges these

defendants elected to wrongfully classify him as a convicted sex offender thereby making him ineligible

for family visiting privileges. Plaintiff alleges the committee refused and failed to carefully review his

criminal history despite his information that he had never been arrested or charged with a sexual offense.

Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance on January 31, 2005 requesting that his classification be

corrected. The appeal was denied at the second level by defendant Mendoza-Powers. 

Plaintiff states that on October 25, 2005, he appeared before the Unit Classification Committee

for annual review and the committee removed the “R” suffix from his record but refused to remove all

information in his file that erroneously stated that he had been convicted of a sex offense and/or was

classified as a sex offender for the prior 12 months. Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief for the

alleged violation of his constitutional rights. 

C. Discussion

1. Due Process Claim

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The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due process

of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action for

deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for

which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from

state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983).

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in a particular

classification status. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88, n.9 (1976). The existence of a liberty

interest created by state law is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to

freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

Under certain circumstances, labeling a prisoner with a particular classification may implicate a

liberty interest subject to the protections of due process. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir.

1997) (“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label coupled with the

subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program whose successful completion is a

precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of deprivations of liberty that require procedural

protections.”). In this instance, plaintiff has alleged no facts that establish the existence of a liberty

interest with respect to the assignment of the “R” suffix designation. The assignment of an “R” suffix

alone does not “impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Neal at 830; Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F.Supp.2d 1090,

1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Johnson v. Gomez, No. C95-20717 RMW, 1996 WL 107275, at *2-5 (N.D. Cal.

1996); Brooks v. McGrath, No. C 95-3390 SI, 1995 WL 733675, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Moreover,

plaintiff admits that the designation has now been removed. Plaintiff’s desire to have a judicial

declaration that the designation was incorrect does not transform the previous classification into one of

constitutional magnitude. 

Further, even assuming plaintiff had established the existence of a liberty interest in remaining free

from the “R” suffix classification, plaintiff has not alleged that he was denied due process. Plaintiff’s

disagreement with the classification is insufficient grounds upon which to impose liability for denial of

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due process. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for relief under

section 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause. 

2. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief for violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Equal protection

claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are treated differently without a

rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that defendants acted with intentional discrimination

against plaintiff or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,

528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v.

Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe

v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply

conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”

Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that support a claim that his rights under the Equal Protection

Clause were violated. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983.

3. Eighth Amendment Claim

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide

prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9thCir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982).

Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may

be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost

v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment

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Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The

objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary

standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required

to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted).

With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal

offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”

Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that support a claim that hisrights under the Eighth Amendment

were violated. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

under section 1983.

The court will, by this order, provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is informed that the Civil Rights Act under

which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causesto be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth

Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits

to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is

made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under

section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that

demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

Further, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

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supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589

F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To show a prima facie case of

supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that supervisory defendants either: personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutionalrights; knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to 

support claims under Section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163,

168 (1993). 

D. Conclusion

The court findsthat plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable claims for relief against the

named defendants. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint,

if plaintiff wishes to do so. In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is

advised Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference

to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must file an

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to obey

a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 12, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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