Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_01-cv-01430/USCOURTS-almd-2_01-cv-01430-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

TONY LEE SMITH, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 2:01cv1430-T

MICHAEL HALEY, et al., ) (WO)

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, plaintiff Tony Lee

Smith, a former inmate in the Alabama Department of

Corrections (ADOC) system, brought this lawsuit naming

various ADOC employees as defendants and claiming

violations of various constitutional and statutory rights

resulting from prison officials’ denial of his requests

for certain religious accommodations to practice Odinism

while he was incarcerated. 

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2

In the magistrate judge’s original and supplemental

recommendations addressing defendants’ motions for

summary judgment, he recommended that certain defendants

be denied qualified immunity on a damages claim for

violations of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc through 2000cc-5, and that summary

judgment be granted with respect to all other claims. 

By judgment entered earlier, the court rejected the

magistrate judge’s recommendations to the extent he

concluded that summary judgment should be denied on the

defendants’ qualified-immunity defense; the court,

instead, entered summary judgment in favor of all

defendants in all respects. The court promised that a

memorandum opinion would follow. This is the promised

opinion. 

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 2 of 32
3

I. STANDARDS

The court makes a “de novo determination upon the

record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of

the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific

written objection has been made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b);

see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1). The court “may accept,

reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive

further evidence, or recommit the matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,

673-84 (1980).

In addition, summary judgment is appropriate “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule

56, the party seeking summary judgment must first inform

the court of the basis for the motion, and the burden

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 3 of 32
4

then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why

summary judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick

v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The nonmoving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court’s role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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5

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Smith is a practitioner of Odinism, an ancient preChristian faith whose theology is based on historic

Icelandic sagas and runic mysticism. At the time his

lawsuit was filed, he was an inmate in the Limestone

Correctional Facility in Capshaw, Alabama. 

Smith brings this lawsuit against various ADOC

officials, claiming violations of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments as enforced through § 1983, as well

as violations of RLUIPA. In his complaint, he seeks

$ 500 in damages from each defendant, and injunctive

relief requiring that (1) ADOC recognize Odinism as an

official religion and (2) defendants allow him to light

a small fire or light a candle, wear a Thor’s hammer

necklace, and possess a small crystal. 

Smith filed this lawsuit on November 21, 2001, after

several of his requests for certain religious

accommodations were denied by the ADOC Religious Review

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 5 of 32
1. Recommendation of magistrate judge (Doc. No.

146), p. 4.

2. Id.

3. Id.

6

Committee.1

 Around June 16, 2003, while this suit was

pending, Smith submitted an additional inmate request to

the Religious Review Committee in which, among other

things, he again requested the allowance of one small

quartz crystal, the use of a ceremonial fire, one

religious necklace, and a designated area of worship;

Smith explained the religious significance of each

requested item and attached written documentation in

support of his requests.2

An ADOC chaplain then gathered information about

Odinism, “researched the credibility” of Smith’s

requests, and submitted his findings to the Religious

Review Committee.3

 After meeting on October 17, 2003, the

committee made a number of findings with respect to

Smith’s requests; essentially, the committee granted all

of Smith’s requests but two. 

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4. Id. at 5.

5. Id. at 5-6.

7

First, the committee denied his request to possess a

small crystal approximately one inch in diameter. The

reason given was that “there is a lack of supporting

materials validating a need for this item.”4

 Second, the

committee denied Smith’s request to be allowed a

continually designated place of worship to perform these

rites; however, the committee added that, “when a secure

place of worship is required, the Warden and Chaplain may

designate a suitable location for Smith to conduct his

rites.” Thus, the committee accommodated Smith’s request

in this regard. The reason given for not continually

designating a place of worship was security; the

committee indicated that Odinism draws and embraces

certain members of the Aryan Nations and Neo-Nazis,

which, combined with the prevalence of prison gangs and

a hostile inmate population, would be “detrimental to

security and a strong potential for harm.”5

 

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6. ADOC also allowed Smith other religious

(continued...)

8

Smith was released from prison in January 2004.

B. Magistrate Judge’s Recommendations

i. Initial recommendation

The magistrate judge’s original recommendation

reduced Smith’s claims down to one issue: whether Smith

is entitled to damages for the ADOC Review Committee’s

refusal to allow him to possess a crystal. 

Smith initially sought both damages and injunctive

relief from the defendants. However, after Smith filed

his lawsuit, the Religious Review Committee issued

findings (1) granting his request to recognize Odinism as

an official religion; (2) determining that the warden and

chaplain would designate a place of worship for Smith to

conduct his rights when necessary; (3) approving Smith’s

request to wear a Thor’s hammer necklace; and (4)

allowing him to light a candle in a private and secure

place.6

 

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6. (...continued)

accommodations, such as the possession of runes and a

fern tree twig. However, these additional allowances are

not relevant to the present suit; in his complaint, Smith

requests a court order allowing him only the four things

described above. 

7. Id. at 10, citing Los Angeles County v. Davis,

440 U.S. 625 (1979); Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777

(11th Cir. 1985).

9

Thus, the magistrate judge correctly recommended that

this Religious Review Committee decision moots all but

one of Smith’s claims: his request for injunctive and

declaratory relief as well as damages for the ADOC Review

Committee’s denial of his request for permission to use

and possess a small quartz crystal.7

The magistrate judge further recognized that Smith’s

claim for injunctive relief with respect to the crystal

is also moot because Smith has already been released from

prison. His release constituted a change in the facts

that ended the controversy with respect to injunctive

relief for this alleged injury. Furthermore, his case

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8. These exceptions to the mootness doctrine are a

small but important detail the magistrate judge failed to

mention in his recommendation. For example, Smith’s suit

is not one in which a secondary or “collateral” injury

survives even though his primary injury has been

resolved, see, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53

(1968); nor do the facts present a case of voluntary

cessation. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 173 (2000). In addition, Smith’s

injury cannot be categorized as ‘capable of repetition,

yet evading review,’ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),

because his injury is not of a type likely to happen to

him again. To satisfy this exception to the mootness

doctrine, “there must be a reasonable expectation or a

demonstrated probability that the same controversy will

recur involving the same complaining party.” Murphy v.

Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). It is unlikely--or at

the very least, purely speculative--that Smith will be

incarcerated again and subject to the same decision of

the same ADOC Religious Review Committee. See id., at

483-84 (defendant’s challenge to state law denying

pretrial bail to those accused of violent sex crimes

dismissed as moot after the defendant’s conviction,

because no likelihood that the defendant would be

arrested for a similar offense and denied bail in the

future). 

10

did not fall into any of the exceptions to the mootness

doctrine.8

The magistrate judge also recommended that the court

grant summary judgment in favor of defendants on Smith’s

equal-protection claim. The court agrees. Smith’s

equal-protection claim is that defendants violated his

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11

right to equal protection by allowing other religious

groups (and denying him) the ability to possess religious

objects and providing them (and denying him) designated

areas to conduct religious activities. The magistrate

judge’s recommendations suggest that this claim is

largely mooted by ADOC’s 2003 decision allowing Smith to

possess certain religious objects, as well as an area in

which to practice his faith. The magistrate judge notes

that Smith was not provided with as large a space as that

of the Native-American inmates, who are given a 20' x 20'

outdoor area to practice certain rituals. However, these

inmates require a larger space in which to practice their

rituals because there is a large number of them in ADOC

facilities; furthermore, the practice of Native-American

spirituality is substantially different from that of

Odinism. Thus, the magistrate judge correctly concluded

that Smith had failed to show that ADOC possessed the

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 11 of 32
9. Recommendation of magistrate judge (Doc. No.

146), p. 23. 

10. Id. at 9.

11. The magistrate judge also recommended granting

summary judgment with respect to Smith’s claims against

the ADOC Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner because it

is clear that these defendants are being sued solely

because of their administrative positions, and there is

no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under

(continued...)

12

requisite discriminatory intent in denying him an equally

large space.9

 

The magistrate judge also correctly concluded that

defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to

Smith’s suit for damages against the officers in their

official capacities should be granted because a plaintiff

seeking to recover money damages against persons in their

official capacities must look to the government entity

itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).10

Thus, Smith’s claims against the defendants in their

official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Thus, all that remains is Smith’s claim for damages

against certain ADOC employees,11 in their individual

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11. (...continued)

§ 1983. The magistrate is correct about the law;

although Smith raised a factual objection to this

recommendation, this issue is moot because summary

judgment is due to be granted on his damages claim for

the crystal, as discussed below.

12. Defendants’ objections to recommendation of the

magistrate judge (Doc. No. 150), pp. 5-6.

13. Supplemental recommendation of magistrate judge

(Doc. No. 151).

13

capacities, for ADOC’s denial of his request to use and

possess a small quartz crystal.

ii. Supplemental recommendation

Defendants filed objections to the magistrate judge’s

original recommendation, arguing, among other things,

that their actions did not violate RLUIPA, and that,

regardless, they were entitled to qualified immunity.12

The magistrate judge then issued a supplemental

recommendation addressing the issue of qualified

immunity.13 His recommendation concluded that (1)

defendants’ actions violated RLUIPA, because depriving

Smith of a crystal “substantially burdened” the exercise

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 13 of 32
14. The magistrate judge actually made this finding

in his initial recommendation (Doc. No. 146), pp. 18-20.

In his supplemental recommendation (Doc. No. 151), he

addressed solely the issue of whether the law was clearly

established at the time of the defendants’ actions.

15. Supplemental recommendation of magistrate judge

(Doc. No. 151), p. 4.

14

of his religion14 and (2) defendants were not entitled to

qualified immunity because the law was clearly

established at the time of their actions.

In reaching this second conclusion, the magistrate

judge reasoned that, at the time defendants denied

Smith’s request for a crystal in 2003, RLUIPA, which was

enacted on September 22, 2000, had been in existence for

over three years. He further noted that, “Although three

years had passed since the enactment of the statute,

there is no showing that the defendants in any way

attempted to apply RLUIPA when deciding to deny Smith’s

request for a small crystal.”15

Consequently, the magistrate judge concluded that

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of

qualified immunity with respect to Smith’s RLUIPA claim

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16. Id.

17. Defendants’ objections to supplemental

recommendation of magistrate judge (Doc. No. 152).

18. Plaintiff’s objection to supplemental

recommendation of magistrate judge (Doc. No. 155). Smith

objected to the court’s dismissal of his claims against

the ADCO Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner; as

discussed above, these objections are rendered moot by

this court’s conclusion that summary judgment is due to

be granted on all of Smith’s claims. 

Smith’s objections further state that, “For the

record, Plaintiff reiterates that during this litigation,

he asked to bring additional claims that transpired after

the initial complaint was filed....” Id. at 1-2.

However, the court cannot locate any motion by Smith to

amend his complaint in the record of this case. Because

Smith never formally requested nor received permission to

add these additional claims to his lawsuit, the court

finds it unnecessary to address the claims.

15

should be denied because “they have provided no evidence

that their actions were consistent with clearly

established law.”16

Defendants then filed an additional set of objections

to the magistrate judge’s supplemental recommendation,

again arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity.17

Smith also filed several objections.18

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16

For the following reasons, the court disagrees with

the magistrate judge’s analysis on the issue of qualified

immunity.

III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

A. Applicability to RLUIPA Claim

To be sure, a threshold issue is whether the doctrine

of qualified immunity even applies to a RLUIPA claim.

But imbedded in that issue is another one, which,

unfortunately, neither the magistrate judge nor the

parties addressed: whether there is even individual

liability for damages (that is, damages liability against

government employees in their individual capacities)

under RLUIPA. Cf. Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009

(11th Cir. 1996) (Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213, does not provide for individual

liability); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772

(11th Cir.1991) (no individual liability under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 16 of 32
17

§§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17); Smith v. Capitol City

Club of Montgomery, 850 F. Supp. 976, 978 (M.D. Ala.

1994) (Thompson, J.) (same). Absent liability for

damages in their individual capacities, there is no need

for government employees to raise, and thus for the court

to address, the qualified-immunity defense.

RLUIPA reads, in relevant part, that:

“No government shall impose a

substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a person residing in or

confined to an institution, as defined

in section 1997 of this title, even if

the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, unless the

government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling

governmental interest; and 

(2) is the least restrictive means of

furthering that compelling governmental

interest.”

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a) (emphasis added). The statute

further provides that, “A person may assert a violation

of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 17 of 32
18

proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a

government.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-2(a) (emphasis added).

Thus, the statute’s proscriptive language addresses

conduct by “government,” not individuals, and, similarly,

the statute’s relief provision provides for judicial

relief against “a government,” not individuals.

Admittedly, RLUIP defines “government” as not only “a

State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity

created under the authority of a State,” 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i), but also an “official of [such]

entity” and “any other person acting under color of State

law.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(ii) & (iii).

However, because the term at issue is “government,” the

definitional words “official” and “other person acting

under color of State law” could be reasonably read, and

understood, to make clear that such person’s actions

would make the government for which he worked liable

under RLUIP, and thus the words could be read to mean

that such person could be sued in his official, and not

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19

necessarily individual, capacity. Because there is

simply nothing in the statute that clearly suggests that

government employees can be liable for damages in their

individual capacities, the court doubts that RLUIP

provides for such. But see Orafan v. Goord, 2003 WL

21972735, *10 (N.D. N.Y. 2003) (Treece, M.J.) (holding

that RLUIP allows officials to be sued for damages in

their individual capacities). 

However, because the parties did not raise and brief

the issue of whether RLUIP provides for damages liability

against government employees in their individual

capacities and because, even it does, Smith cannot

recover from defendants in their individual capacities,

the court will assume that the statute does provide for

such liability.

The court therefore turns the initial question of

whether the doctrine of qualified immunity applies to

RLUIPA claims. Because the Supreme Court has held that

“government officials ... are shielded from liability for

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 19 of 32
20

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights,”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis

added), this court concludes that the doctrine applies to

RLUIP as well. See, e.g., Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui

Planning Comm’n, 229 F.Supp.2d 1056 (D. Hawai’i 2002)

(S.P. King, J.) (defendant entitled to qualified immunity

on RLUIPA claim); Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.Supp.2d 937

(W.D. Wisc. 2002) (Crabb, J.) (officials violated RLUIPA

but entitled to qualified immunity because they did not

violate a “clearly established” right); Williams v.

Bitner, 359 F.Supp.2d 370 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (Conner, J.)

(defendants not entitled to qualified immunity on RLUIPA

claim because law was clearly established regarding a

Muslim inmate’s religious beliefs regarding prohibitions

on the handling of pork).

The next question is thus whether defendants in this

case are entitled to qualified immunity.

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 20 of 32
21

B. Qualified-Immunity Analysis

In order to be entitled to qualified immunity, a

public-official defendant must first prove that he was

acting within the scope of his discretionary authority at

the time of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Lee

v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 1192 (11th Cir. 2002). Once

this has been established, the court must undertake the

two-pronged inquiry outlined in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194 (2001). Under the Saucier framework, the court must

first determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the

light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrate that the

official’s conduct violated a statutory right. If so,

the next inquiry becomes whether that right was clearly

established in light of the specific context of the case.

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194 (2004).

It is undisputed that defendants in this case were

acting within the scope of their discretionary authority;

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19. RLUIPA was enacted after the Supreme Court

invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which

was enacted in response to Employment Div., Dept. of

Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Smith held that neutral, generally applicable, laws “may

be applied to religious practices even when not supported

by a compelling governmental interest.” City of Boerne

v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997). Because RLUIPA

essentially reinstates the strict-scrutiny analysis

eviscerated by Smith, a prisoner’s rights are more

expansive under RLUIPA than under the First Amendment. 

22

thus, the court must next employ the two-part Saucier

inquiry. 

i. Violation of a right

The first question is whether defendants’ conduct

violated Smith’s right under RLUIPA. By requiring that

a government’s restrictions on religious practice be

justified by “a compelling governmental interest,” 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a)(1), RLUIPA affords prisoners

engaged in religious conduct federal statutory

protections greater than those afforded by the First

Amendment under current free-exercise case law.19

Charles, 220 F.Supp.2d at 942. 

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 22 of 32
20. RLUIPA’s legislative history indicates that the

term “substantial burden” as employed in the statute

should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court

jurisprudence. S. Rep. No. S7776 (July 27, 2000). Thus,

the magistrate judge correctly discussed the changing

definition of “substantial burden” in Supreme Court and

Eleventh Circuit case law before settling on the

definition he employed. 

23

In his initial recommendation, the magistrate judge

concluded that defendants had violated RLUIPA by denying

Smith his request to use and possess a small crystal.

Applying the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of

“substantial burden”20 as “akin to significant pressure

which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform

his or her behavior accordingly,” Midrash Sephardi, Inc.

v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.

2004), the magistrate judge concluded that the ADOC

Religious Review Committee had substantially burdened

Smith by its actions with respect to the crystal. In

doing so, he accepted Smith’s allegation that the use of

a crystal is fundamental to his practice of Odinism

because “without [a crystal], meditation and prayer are

rendered impossible, much like a telephone without a

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 23 of 32
21. Recommendation of magistrate judge (Doc. No.

146), p. 19. 

22. Id.

23. Id. at 20.

24

receiver.”21 Thus, the magistrate judge found that

depriving Smith of a crystal essentially forced him to

refrain from practicing his religion, as he could not

pray or meditate without it.22

The magistrate judge further held that ADOC failed to

provide a compelling governmental interest for its

decision to deny Smith permission to use a crystal; the

record indicates that the reason for denial was simply

the “lack of supporting evidentiary materials validating

a need for this item.”23 

The court accepts this conclusion for the purposes of

analysis.

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25

ii. Clearly established law

Assuming that defendants did violate Smith’s right

under RLUIPA, the next inquiry is whether that right was

clearly established under existing law at the time of the

violation.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from

suit when they make decisions that, even if

constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the

law governing the circumstances they confronted.

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, ___, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599

(2004). Because the qualified-immunity inquiry focuses

on whether the officials had fair notice of the

unlawfulness of their conduct, the court must examine the

officials’ reasonableness at the time of the alleged

conduct. Only if the law at that time clearly

established that the alleged conduct violated Smith’s

statutory rights, are defendants liable for their

conduct. Id. 

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26

In making this determination, “the relevant,

dispositive inquiry ... is whether it would be clear to

a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The

Supreme Court recently emphasized that this inquiry “must

be undertaken in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau, 543

U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 599 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 201). The court must therefore inquire whether, at

the time of defendants’ alleged actions, it was “clearly

established” in the more “particularized” sense that they

were violating Smith’s statutory right. Id. 

Thus, the magistrate judge’s analysis that Smith’s

rights under RLUIPA were clearly established in 2003

because RLUIPA was enacted in 2000 is flawed. His

reasoning assumes that the operative question is simply

the date of the enactment of RLUIPA. However, concluding

that defendants violated clearly established law by

denying Smith possession of a crystal in 2003 because

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 26 of 32
24. While the magistrate judge is correct that

defendants should have known about and employed the test

set out in RLUIPA for determining whether refusing Smith

possession of a crystal violated his right, the fact that

they failed to do so does not necessarily mean that they

are precluded from availing themselves of qualified

immunity. Even if they had employed the test set forth

in RLUIPA, they may have reached the same decision to

deny Smith possession of the crystal. In short, as long

(continued...)

27

RLUIPA was enacted in 2000 is akin to concluding that a

police officer violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a

suspect by using force during an arrest in 2005 because

the Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1771. 

It is clear from qualified-immunity case law in

Fourth Amendment and other constitutional contexts that

the operative question is not the date on which the law

in question was enacted, but rather whether the contours

of plaintiff’s rights under that law were sufficiently

clear at the time the conduct occurred. Saucier, 533

U.S. at 202. In other words, the issue is whether it

would be clear to reasonable prison officials that

depriving an inmate of a crystal to practice Odinism

violated his statutory right under RLUIPA in 2003.24 

Case 2:01-cv-01430-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 12/01/05 Page 27 of 32
24. (...continued)

as their decision to deny Smith possession of the crystal

was not contrary to clearly established law, defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Furthermore, the fact that defendants denied Smith’s

request based on the purported lack of supporting

evidentiary materials does not necessarily indicate they

failed to employ the rubric of RLUIPA. For example,

defendants may have concluded that, based on the lack of

materials provided by Smith, a crystal was not essential

to the practice of his religion, and that therefore,

denying him possession of one would not substantially

burden his exercise of Odinism under RLUIPA. 

28

The court was unable to locate any case specifically

indicating that refusing to provide a practitioner of

Odinism with a crystal for religious purposes violates

RLUIPA. In fact, a search of all federal case law for

opinions containing the two words “Odinism” and “crystal”

turned up zero results. In addition, it is significant

that the court could not locate any other RLUIPA case

brought by prisoner practitioners of Odinism that

references a request to use and possess a crystal, much

less concludes that depriving an Odinist possession of a

crystal violates his rights under RLUIPA. See, e.g.,

Lindell v. Frank, 2003 WL 23198509 (W.D. Wis.) (Crabb,

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J.) (Odinist defendant alleging violations of RLUIPA

based on refusal of prison officials to provide writing

paper claimed necessary to write and draw religious

poetry and “spellcraft,” and to allow telephone access to

spiritual adviser, among other things); Rust v. Clarke,

883 F.Supp. 1293 (D. Neb. 1995) (Kopf, J.) (Odinist state

inmates allege violations of RLUIPA based on denial of

request for numerous religious items, including Thor’s

hammer necklace, an evergreen tree, a cauldron, a small

stone altar, an ash spear, a drinking horn, viking-type

swords, meats for ritual, etc.); Borzych v. Frank, 340

F.Supp.2d 955 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (Crabb, J.) (allegations

of RLUIPA violations based on denial of request to

possess Odinist texts). 

Furthermore, a more general search of case law

regarding religion and spiritual practice and the use of

crystals turned up nothing. In short, the court could

not locate any cases suggesting that it is clearly

established under any law--be it RLUIPA or the First

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Amendment--that the refusal to allow a prisoner a crystal

or other prayer conduit for religious purposes violates

his statutory or constitutional rights. 

Finally, this is not an “obvious case” where a

constitutional violation can be “clearly established”

even without a body of relevant case law. See Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002) (holding that the

appropriate qualified-immunity inquiry is whether

relevant case law “gave reasonable warning that the

conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights,”

regardless of whether the facts of prior cases are

“materially similar”). This is particularly true given

the relative obscurity of Odinism as a religion, as well

as the fact that questions regarding the free exercise of

religion are often presented with “fluid precedent.”

Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d

820, 824 (10th Cir. 1988). As the Eleventh Circuit has

observed, “[i]nterpretation and application of the free

exercise clause has created, within that field of

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constitutional doctrine, areas dotted by unanswered

questions.” Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 721 F.2d

729, 733 (11th Cir. 1983). Therefore, it is impossible

to conclude that it should have been “obvious” to prison

officials that refusing to allow Smith a crystal to

practice Odinism violated his statutory (or

constitutional) rights. 

Thus, even if defendants’ refusal to allow Smith to

possess a crystal violated his right under RLUIPA,

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because

Smith’s right to possess a crystal as part of his

practice of Odinism was not clearly established by any

law at the time of the actions in question.

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the

magistrate judge erred in his recommendations that

Smith’s claim for damages for denial of possession of a

crystal proceed to trial. The court agrees with the

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magistrate judge’s recommendations with respect to the

other claims. Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on all claims.

An appropriate judgment has already been entered.

DONE, this the 1st day of December, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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