Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00328/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00328-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TONY LEE MOSELEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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CIV. ACT. NO. 2:13cv328-TFM

 (WO)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Tony Lee Mosely (“Moseley”) applied for supplemental security income 

benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., 

alleging that he is unable to work because of a disability. His application was denied at 

the initial administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before 

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that 

Moseley was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. The ALJ, 

therefore, denied the plaintiff’s claim for benefits. The Appeals Council rejected a 

subsequent request for review. Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1 See Chester v. 

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties 

 1 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-296, 108 

Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social Security matters were 

transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

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have consented to entry of final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge. The 

case is now before the court for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1631(c)(3). 

Based on the court’s review of the record in this case and the parties’ briefs, the court 

concludes that the Commissioner’s decision should be AFFIRMED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . 

To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person's impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.”

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).2

The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This 

court must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

 2 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The same 

sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited as authority in 

Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

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evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may 

not look only to those parts of the record which supports the decision of the ALJ but 

instead must view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts 

from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 

1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar 

presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. THE ISSUES

A. Introduction

Moseley was 49 years old when he applied for supplemental security income and 

has completed the ninth grade. (R. 40, 130). He has prior work experience as a 

handyman and scrap metal worker. (R. 150). Moseley alleges that he became disabled 

on February 1, 2010, due to a stroke, a heart condition, back problems, memory 

problems, and heavy legs. (R. 42-43, 149, 187). After the hearing on August 23, 2011, 

the ALJ found that Moseley suffers from minimal cervical and lumbar degenerative joint 

disease; status post cerebral vascular accident; anxiety; depression; and borderline 

intellectual functioning. (R. 15). The ALJ found that Moseley is unable to perform his 

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past relevant work, but that he retains the residual functional capacity to perform light 

work with the following limitations:

The claimant can lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently, 20 pounds 

occasionally. He requires a sit/stand option permitting him to alternate 

positions throughout the workday. He can use his feet for no more than 

occasional operation of foot controls. He is unable to climb ladders and 

scaffolds, and he cannot work around unprotected heights or hazardous 

machinery. He should avoid exposure to extreme heat and cold. The 

claimant is limited to work involving simple, routine, and repetitive tasks 

that do not require reading as part of the job duties. 

(R. 20). Testimony from a vocational expert led the ALJ to conclude that a significant 

number of jobs exist in the national economy that Moseley can perform, including work 

as a production assembler, electronics worker, and assembler of electronics accessories. 

(R. 25). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Moseley is not disabled.3

 (R. 26).

B. Plaintiff’s Claim

Moseley’s sole issue for the Court’s consideration is whether the “ALJ erred in 

finding that [Moseley] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work with 

certain exertional and non-exertional limitations.” (Doc. No. 13, Pl’s Comp., p. 5). 

 3 Moseley represented himself pro se during the hearing before the ALJ. 

“A hearing before an ALJ is not an adversarial proceeding” and, whether or not the 

applicant is represented, “the ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair 

record.” Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The ALJ 

has a special duty to ensure the record demonstrates that an unrepresented claimant who 

did not waive counsel was not prejudiced by the lack of counsel. Brown v. Shalala, 44 

F.3d 931, 934 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). By implication, where counsel has been 

waived, the special duty to develop the record does not take effect. See id.

Robinson v. Astrue, 235 Fed. Appx. 725, 727 (11th Cir. 2007). Moseley expressly waived his right to 

counsel during the hearing. (R. 32-33, 127). Thus, the ALJ’s special duty to develop the record did not 

take effect in this case. Moseley is represented by counsel in the proceedings before this court. 

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IV. DISCUSSION

Moseley asserts that the ALJ’s determination that he has the residual functional 

capacity to perform light work with limitations is not supported by substantial evidence. 

Specifically, he argues that there is no evidence that he is able to stand and/or walk off 

and on for a total of six hours during an eight hour work day. He contends that the ALJ 

should have fully developed the record by obtaining a residual functional capacity 

assessment from a medical specialist. 

 An ALJ is required to independently assess a claimant’s residual functional 

capacity “based upon all of the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) (“We will 

assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other 

evidence.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (“If your case is at the administrative law judge 

hearing level. . ., the administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your 

residual functional capacity.”). See also Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440 (“The residual 

functional capacity is an assessment, based upon all of the relevant evidence, of a 

claimant’s remaining ability to do work despite his impairments.”). “Residual functional 

capacity, or RFC, is a medical assessment of what the claimant can do in a work setting 

despite any mental, physical or environmental limitations caused by the claimant’s 

impairments and related symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).” Peeler v. Astrue, 400 Fed. 

Appx. 492, 494 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010). 

In determining the effect of Moseley’s impairments on his residual functional 

capacity to perform light work, the ALJ found:

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There are significant indications of medication noncompliance in the 

record. The claimant’s pharmacy records show that he filled 30-day 

courses of his prescriptions on April 13, 2010, but he did not fill any more 

prescriptions until January 30, 2011 (Exhibit 9F, pgs. 3-4). Although he 

sought treatment at Lister Hill Health Center on December 2, 2010, and 

was prescribed medications, he did not fill them at that time (Exhibit 8F, 

pg. 8; 9F, pg. 5). Apparently, the claimant went for approximately eight 

months between May 2010 and January 2011 without any medication for 

his hypertension and other chronic complaints. On May 10, 2011, he 

reported that he had been out of Norvasc (amlodipine) for two weeks, but 

his pharmacy records actually show that he had not filled this prescription

since January 2011, indicating that he had actually been off this medication 

for more than two months (Exhibits 8F, pg. 5; 9F, pgs. 4-5). Considering 

his history of mild stroke, it is particularly important for the claimant to 

maintain good blood pressure control, but fortunately, it does not appear 

that there have been any serious consequences arising from his failure to 

take his blood pressure medications as prescribed. It is possible, however, 

that some of the claimant’s alleged problems, such as headaches and 

feelings of heaviness in his legs, could result from inadequate blood 

pressure control owing to poor medication compliance. In limiting the 

claimant to a reduced range of light work, the undersigned has considered 

his hypertension and the symptoms that could reasonably be expected to 

result from continued medication compliance issues.

(R. 22).

When discussing the effects of Moseley’s previous stroke on his residual 

functional capacity to perform work, the ALJ also found:

With regard to the claimant’s history of stroke, the medical evidence of 

record does not indicate that he has any significant residual effects. 

Following his discharge from the hospital in February 2010, his medical 

treatment records from Dr. Widhani’s office indicate that he did not 

demonstrate any focal weakness or other neurological abnormalities 

(Exhibit 2F). When Dr. Hayden examined the claimant in August 2010, he 

noted no signs of any sensory, motor, or reflex deficiencies, and he stated 

that the claimant appeared to retain function and to use all of his extremities 

well (Exhibit 4F). He complained of staggering in February 2011, and in 

June 2011, nurse practitioner Duncan noted that he was having neurological 

symptoms, including staggering gait and paresthesias in both arms, and she 

referred him to neurology (Exhibit 8F, pgs. 4-6). The undersigned has 

considered any neurological symptoms the claimant may experience in 

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limiting him to light work with a sit/stand option and no exposure to 

unprotected heights or hazardous machinery. 

(R. 22-23).

The ALJ’s findings regarding Moseley’s ability to stand and/or walk are fully 

supported by the evidence. The medical records demonstrate that, although Moseley had 

some difficulties standing and walking immediately after suffering a stroke in February 

2010, his condition steadily improved. For example, on February 4, 2010, Moseley was 

admitted to Community Hospital, complaining of dizziness and that his “legs got really 

tired.” (R. 211). Dr. Leena Bhasin’s diagnostic assessment was acute versus subacute 

stroke. (R. 212). The attending physician noted that after resting “he did not have any 

further episode of dizziness and he walked the entire stretch of the room . . . without any 

support and there was no wobbliness noted. The gait was within normal limits.” (Id.).

During a follow-up appointment with Dr. Nitin Widhani on February 15, 2010, 

Moseley complained of “leg cramps especially when he walks around.” (R. 235). Upon 

examination, however, Dr. Widhani noted that Moseley “[d]enies weakness, numbness, 

tingling or incoordination. Dizziness and lightheadedness are much better than before. 

Denies any tremors, seizures, gait problems, memory problems.” (R. 236). On March 9, 

2010, Moseley returned to Dr. Widhani’s office complaining of severe back pain after 

“trying to change his [television] antennae at home.” (R. 230). Dr. Widhani found “no 

radiation of pain” and that “[h]e does not have any tingling or numbness in his lower 

extremity.” (R. 231). The physician prescribed Lortab to treat Moseley’s headaches and 

backaches and recommended an x-ray of his lumbar spine. (R. 232). On March 16, 

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2010, Moseley denied any dizziness symptoms. (R. 229). On March 25, 2010, Moseley 

underwent an exercise stress test. (R. 244). A physician noted Moseley “walked a total 

of 6 minutes to a rate of 165” and that “[t]he test was stopped due to fatigue and leg 

weakness.” (Id.). The physician, however, concluded that the graded exercise test was 

normal. (Id.).

On August 24, 2010, Dr. Steven M. Hayden, a family practitioner, conducted a 

consultative examination, finding normal leg stability, range of motion, strength, muscle 

tone, gait, station, and deep tendon reflexes. (R. 256-57). Dr. Hayden also found 

Moseley “had mild stroke but appears to retain function” and “[p]hysically he has use of 

all extremities.” (R. 258). The medical records also indicate that Moseley did not refill 

his hypertension medication as frequently as recommended by his physicians. (R. 287, 

300-07).

During the hearing, Moseley also testified about his ability to walk and stand. 

Moseley stated that his legs “get heavy” and “cramps a little bit,” but that he is able to 

walk the length of “probably a football field” before having to sit. (R. 42, 46, 52). He 

also stated that he is able to stand “45 minutes probably, might could stay longer than 

that, it just all depends” and remain seated “probably several hours.” (R. 52-53). Thus, 

the evidence fully supports the ALJ’s findings concerning Moseley’s ability to perform 

light work with a sit/stand option.

Moseley argues that the ALJ’s determination is not supported by substantial 

evidence because the ALJ failed to secure a physical residual functional capacity 

determination from a physician. The plaintiff’s argument conflates the nature of residual 

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functional capacity with the responsibility for making the residual functional capacity 

determination. The Commissioner’s regulations clearly show who is responsible for 

making the residual functional capacity determination when a case has reached the 

administrative law judge hearing. 

If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level or at the 

Appeals Council review level, the administrative law judge or the 

administrative appeals judge at the Appeals Council (when the Appeals 

Council makes a decision) is responsible for assessing your residual 

functional capacity.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1546.

The essential question raised by the plaintiff is whether it is necessary to have a 

residual functional capacity assessment by a medical provider as part of the evidence 

which an ALJ must consider in reaching a determination. In this case, the answer is no. 

While the ALJ has the responsibility to make a determination of a plaintiff’s RFC, it is 

the plaintiff who bears the burden of proving his RFC, i.e., he must establish through 

evidence that his impairments result in functional limitations and that he is “disabled” 

under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (instructing claimant that the 

ALJ will consider “only impairment(s) you say you have or about which we receive 

evidence” and “[y]ou must provide medical evidence showing that you have an 

impairment(s) and how severe it is during the time you say that you are disabled”). See 

also Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (it is claimant’s burden 

to prove RFC, and ALJ’s responsibility to determine RFC based on medical records, 

observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s description of limitations).

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In support of his position regarding his RFC, Moseley relies on Coleman v. 

Barnhart, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (S.D. Ala. 2003), and Hernandez v. Barnhart, 203 F. 

Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2002), for the proposition that the Commissioner’s residual 

functional capacity assessment must be supported by a residual functional capacity 

assessment of a treating or examining physician. More recently, however, in Packer v. 

Astrue, 2013 WL 593497, *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013), the court rejected the absolutism 

of requiring a RFC assessment by a treating physician, noting that “numerous courts had 

upheld ALJ’s determinations notwithstanding the absence of an assessment performed by 

an examining or treating physician.” Like those other courts, this court rejects the 

seemingly mandatory requirement that the Commissioner’s fifth-step burden must be 

supported by an RFC assessment of a physician. The ALJ had before her sufficient 

medical evidence from which she could make a reasoned determination of Moseley’s 

residual functional capacity. Thus, she was not required to secure a residual functional 

capacity assessment from a medical source.

Moselely argues that the ALJ failed to apply SSR 83-10 properly because he did 

not consider the frequency or amount of time Moseley would need to alternate sitting or 

standing when determining his residual functional capacity to perform light work. At the 

administrative hearing, the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the vocational expert which 

included a sit/stand option. “Although the ALJ did not specify in the hypothetical 

question posed to the VE the frequency with which Plaintiff needed to change his 

sit/stand position, the ALJ’s instruction to the VE to include a sit/stand option . . . 

contains the reasonable ‘implication’ that ‘the sit/stand option would be at [Plaintiff’s] 

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own volition.’” Hart v. Colvin, No. 5:12cv156-EMT, 2013 WL 4736841, *15 (N.D. Fla. 

August 30, 2013) (citing Williams v. Barnhart, 140 F. App’x 932, 937 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(per curiam)). See also Emory v. Astrue, No. 1:11cv2908-TWT-JFK, 2013 WL 1010660, 

*8 (N.D. Ga 2013) (quoting Lucas v. Astrue, 2012 WL 6043089, *4 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 

2012) (A “’common-sense reading of the ALJ’s RFC assessment and the hypothetic 

question he posed to the BE is that the ALJ contemplated a sit/stand option at will.’”). 

Furthermore, Moseley has failed to present evidence showing that his need to sit or stand 

would prevent him from performing the jobs identified by the vocational expert, which he 

must do in order to be found disabled. See Williams, supra; Emory, supra; Hart, 2013 

WL 4736841, *16. 

Moseley also argues that “if [he were] limited to sedentary work and in the 

category of closely approaching advanced age, a finding of disabled is mandated by Rule 

201.10 of the Medical Vocational Guidelines.” (Doc. No. 13, Pl’s Comp., p. 7). The 

problem with Moseley’s argument is that 201.00 is applicable to claimants with an RFC 

of sedentary work. In this case, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination 

that Moseley has the residual functional capacity to perform light work with restrictions. 

Thus, Moseley’s claim that the ALJ erred by failing to consider his ability to perform 

sedentary work along with his age at the time of the hearing is without merit. 

Pursuant to the substantial evidence standard, this court’s review is a limited one; 

the entire record must be scrutinized to determine the reasonableness of the ALJ’s 

findings. Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992). The ALJ evaluated all 

the evidence before her which led her to conclude that Moseley is able to perform light 

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work with limitations. It is not the province of this court to reweigh evidence, make 

credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Instead the 

court reviews the record to determine if the decision reached is supported by substantial 

evidence. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 108, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence 

“is less than a preponderance, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable person 

would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Given this standard of review, 

the court concludes that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment is consistent 

with the medical evidence as a whole. After a careful examination of the administrative 

record, the court concludes that substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the ALJ 

concerning Moseley’s residual functional capacity to perform light work with limitations. 

V. CONCLUSION

The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled. Thus, 

the court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial 

evidence. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be and is 

hereby AFFIRMED. 

DONE this 31st day of March, 2014.

 /s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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