Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00626/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00626-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

JAVIER RAYGOSA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12-cv-0626-AJB-MDD

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS [ECF No. 13]

vs.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(1) of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. For the reasons set forth herein, the

Court RECOMMENDS the Motion To Dismiss be DENIED. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Javier Raygosa (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner currently

incarcerated by the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) in Delano, California. (ECF No. 13). Petitioner

is serving an indeterminate sentence of seventeen years to life for seconddegree murder with a firearm enhancement. (Id.). Petitioner does not

challenge his underlying conviction. Instead, Petitioner challenges

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CDCR’s finding that he is guilty of a rule violation. (ECF No. 10). 

On July 19, 2009, Anabelina Bermudez-Carillo visited Petitioner at

Calpatria State Prison. (ECF No. 10 at 50). During the visit, Ms. Carillo

kissed Petitioner on the mouth. (Id.). It appeared to a guard that Ms.

Carillo passed an unknown object into Petitioner’s mouth during the kiss. 

(Id.). A guard searched Petitioner and claimed to find a leafy green

material in his mouth. (Id. at 51). After consenting to a search, Ms.

Carillo admitted to having multiple “bindles” of marijuana “secreted” in

her vagina. (Id. at 50). Petitioner was charged with “distribution of a

controlled substance/introduction of a C/S” and was found guilty. (Id. at

49). Petitioner disputes this finding.

On November 11, 2009, Petitioner filed an inmate appeal which

was denied. (ECF No. 10 at 35). On December 15, 2009, Petitioner’s

second level appeal was denied. (Id. at 38-39). On April 1, 2010,

Petitioner’s Director’s Level Appeal was denied. (ECF No. 1 at 9).1

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in Imperial County Superior Court on

July 14, 2010. (ECF No. 10 at 17). On August 19, 2010, the petition was

denied. (Id. at 18). On October 1, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (See ECF No.

13). On November 24, 2010, the petition was denied. (Id.). On February

17, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Supreme Court. (Id.). On August 10, 2011, the petition was

denied. (ECF No. 10 at 20). 

On March 12, 2012, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the instant

1

Although ECF No. 1 is no longer the operative pleading, the only copy

of the final Director’s Level Decision before the Court is attached to the

original Petition. 

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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF

No. 1). On March 15, 2012, the Court dismissed the petition without

prejudice for failure to name a proper respondent. (ECF No. 2). On July

23, 2012, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition. (ECF No. 10).

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because

there was insufficient evidence to support CDCR’s rule violation finding. 

(Id.). On October 5, 2012, Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition as

untimely. (ECF No. 13). On February 13, 2013, Petitioner filed a

Response in Opposition. (ECF No. 27).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Title 28, United States Code, § 2244, subsection (a) provides the

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or

a district court shall entertain an application for a writ

of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

imposes a one-year statute of limitation on habeas corpus petitions filed

by state prisoners in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 subsection (d)(1);

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). Section

2244(d)(1) states: 

 A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

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the constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by

the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

 “[T]he limitation period in section 2244 on its face is not limited to

petitions challenging a state court judgment” but instead “reaches any

and every habeas petition filed by persons who are in custody pursuant

to state court judgments.” Shelby v. Barnett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th

Cir. 2004). In Shelby, the Ninth Circuit held that the section’s “one-year

limitation period applies to habeas petitions challenging administrative

decisions.” Id. at 1065. Thus, unless tolled, Petitioner had one year from

the final Director’s Level Decision to file his federal habeas petition. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

A. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation is tolled when a properly

filed petition for habeas relief is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). The limitation period is also tolled as “pending” during the

period between a state court’s disposition of a habeas petition and the

filing of an appeal or petition at the next state appellate level, so long as

the petitions are filed within a “reasonable time” of each other. Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). 

B. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s statute of limitation period is also “subject to equitable

tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560

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(2010). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling if “extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir.

2003) (citing Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). “[A]

litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S.

89, 96 (1990)). 

The petitioner has the burden of showing that “extraordinary

circumstances” were the cause of any untimeliness, rather than his lack

of diligence. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Further,

“the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule. ” Miranda v. Castro, 292

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). As a result, equitable tolling is

unavailable in most cases. Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Respondent claims that the Petition is untimely and barred from

federal review by ADEPA’s one-year statute of limitation. (ECF No. 13). 

Respondent asserts that the statute of limitation began to run on April 1,

2010, the day Petitioner was informed of the Director’s Level Decision

and discovered the “predicate to his claims.” (Id. at 4-5). From that

point, 103 days passed until July 14, 2010, the day Petitioner filed his

habeas petition in Imperial County Superior Court. (Id.). Respondent

does not dispute that the limitation period was tolled while Petitioner’s

state habeas petitions remained pending. Respondent asserts that the

statute of limitation began to run again on August 10, 2011, the day the

California Supreme Court denied the petition. (Id.). From that point,

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337 days passed until July 12, 2012, the day Petitioner signed the First

Amended Petition. (Id.). Accordingly, Respondent contends that a total

of 440 days lapsed before the Petition was filed and the Petition is time

barred. (Id.). 

Petitioner does not dispute that the statute of limitation began to

run on April 1, 2010, the day of the final Director’s Level Decision. (ECF

No. 27). Rather, Petitioner argues that statutory tolling and/or equitable

tolling renders the Petition timely. (Id.). 

A. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision provides the principles

governing when the one-year statute of limitation begins to run and

when it is tolled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

Here, the one-year statute of limitation began to run from “the date

on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(D). On April 1, 2010, the final Director’s Level Decision was

issued, Petitioner learned the factual predicate of his claim, and the

statute of limitation began to run. See Id; (ECF No. 1). 

The time during which a properly filed application for state review

is pending does not count towards AEDPA’s one-year limitation. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On July 14, 2010, Petitioner filed his petition in

Imperial County Superior Court and the statute of limitation stopped

running. Id. Thus, 103 untolled days count against ADEPA’s 

one-year limitation.2

2

 The general rule for time computation in federal court, Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 6, governs the calculation of the AEDPA’s one-year period. Patterson

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

6(a)(1)(A), the day of the event that triggers the period is excluded. Under

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 6(a)(1)(C), the last day of the period is included.

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 With the state review process concluded on August 10, 2011, the

statute of limitation again began to run. Thus, whether the instant

petition is timely depends on what day constitutes the filing date of the

subsequent federal habeas petition. 

Petitioner asserts that the correct filing date for purposes of the

statute of limitation is March 12, 2012, the date he originally filed the

Petition rather than the date he filed the First Amended Petition. (ECF

No. 27). Petitioner contends that the First Amended Petition relates

back to the original Petition within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure15(c)(2). If correct, the day the original Petition was filed is the

proper date to determine the Petition’s timeliness. Using this date, the

Petition would be timely. 

By statute, Congress provided that a habeas petition “may be

amended . . . as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil

actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Similarly, Rule 11 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts states that “[t]he

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not

inconsistent with these rules, may be applied, when appropriate, to the

petitions filed under these rules.” There is “no inconsistency between

AEDPA’s statute of limitation and Rule 15(c)’s amendment regime where

. . . the state is on notice of the claims to be raised” in the amended

petition. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Under Rule 15, amendments made after the statute of limitation

has run relate back to the date of the original pleading when “the 

claim . . . asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,

transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the

original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(c)(2). “So long as the original and

amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of

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operative facts, relation back will be in order.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S.

644, 664. However, “[a]n amended habeas petition . . . does not relate

back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a

new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type

from those set forth in the original pleading.” Id. at 645. 

In his original Petition, Petitioner claimed there was insufficient

evidence to support a finding he was guilty of a rule violation. (ECF No.

1). Petitioner argued that this finding violated his due process rights. 

(Id.). Petitioner presents an almost identical claim in his First Amended

Petition. (ECF No. 10). Petitioner contends that CDCR’s rule violation

procedures denied him the “minimum procedures appropriate under the

circumstances and required by the due process clause.” (Id.). There are

no “new claims” that differ in time or type from those contained in the

original complaint. Both petitions challenge decisions arising out of a

common core of operative facts, that is, the charges and circumstances of

Petitioner’s rule violation. (ECF Nos. 1, 10). 

 Consistent with the policy behind Rule 15(c), the state had

sufficient notice of the facts and claims giving rise to the proposed

amendments. See Anthony, 236 F.3d at 576. The Court finds that the

First Amended Petition relates back to the original Petition for statute of

limitation purposes. AEDPA’s one-year limitation began to run on

August 11, 2011, and ran for 214 days until Petitioner filed the original

federal Petition on March 12, 2012.

Accordingly, the untolled periods are as follows: 103 days between

the final Director’s Level Decision and the day Petitioner filed in 

Imperial County Superior Court; and 214 days between the California

Supreme Court’s denial and the day Petitioner originally filed his federal

habeas petition. Accordingly, 317 days expired before Petitioner filed in

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federal court. This is less than 365 days and within AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Thus, Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss the Petition as untimely should be DENIED.

B. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner also contends he is entitled to equitable tolling of any

untolled period prior to the federal filing. (ECF No. 27). Petitioner

claims he was in solitary and/or segregated confinement when both the

Director’s Level Decision and the California Supreme Court’s denial were

issued. (Id.). Specifically, Petitioner claims he was without access to the

legal materials and personal property necessary to file meaningful

petitions, and that this deprivation of legal materials justifies equitable

tolling. (Id.). Because the Court finds the petition is timely based on

statutory tolling grounds, it need not address Petitioner’s argument

regarding equitable tolling. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order DENYING Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than July 10, 2013. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

//

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//

//

//

//

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than July 17,

2013. The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 26, 2013

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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