Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00642/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00642-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victor O. Dema,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Mesa et al.,

Defendants. 

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CV 09-642-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Victor O. Dema’s Motion for Reconsideration

(doc. #23). The Court previously granted the City of Mesa’s Motion to Dismiss (doc.

#22). 

I. Standard of Review

“The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a

showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have

been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1).

II. Analysis

The Court has already described the incidents that gave rise to Dema’s claims in its

October 5, 2009 Order (doc. #14), and it will not repeat those allegations here. In that

Order, the Court dismissed Dema’s Amended Complaint (doc. #7) for failure to state a

claim against the City of Mesa. If a pleading can be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissal of

the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The

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Court gave Dema multiple opportunities to amend his complaint to supply additional facts

that would support his claims against the City of Mesa. However, the facts alleged in

Dema’s Second Amended Complaint were virtually identical to the facts alleged in

Dema’s Amended Complaint. The Court had already determined that those facts were

insufficient to state a municipal liability claim against the City of Mesa. As a result, the

Court concluded that further amendment could not cure the deficiencies in Dema’s

complaint. The Court therefore dismissed Dema’s claims against the City of Mesa with

prejudice. 

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Dema argues that the Court applied the wrong

standard when considering the City of Mesa’s Motion to Dismiss. He contends,

essentially, that the Court should have applied a more lenient standard in deciding

whether he stated a claim for relief. However, under recent Supreme Court precedent, to

avoid dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must “provide

the grounds of [his] entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is not sufficient. Id. 

The pleading must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable, but a plaintiff must

allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 556-57. 

A document filed pro se is construed liberally, and “a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). However, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not

supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Dema has not alleged enough facts to state a claim for which the City of Mesa

could be found liable. Dema alleged two discrete encounters with police that he contends

demonstrate that the City of Mesa has a practice of racial profiling and of using excessive

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force. However, isolated incidents do not give rise to § 1983 liability. See City of Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989). Dema did not explain how the two isolated incidents

he described give rise to an inference that the City of Mesa engaged in widespread,

unconstitutional practices. The Court therefore did not commit “manifest error” in

granting the City of Mesa’s Motion to Dismiss. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Victor O. Dema’s Motion for

Reconsideration (doc. #23) is Denied. 

DATED this 22nd day of February, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-00642-NVW Document 28 Filed 02/22/10 Page 3 of 3