Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35331/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35331-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117,

a Washington corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Defendant-Appellee,

JANE DOE CLASS,

Intervenor-Defendant–Appellee.

No. 13-35331

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-05760-

BHS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 9, 2014—Seattle, Washington

Filed June 12, 2015

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

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2 TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR.

SUMMARY*

Labor Law

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment, the

panel held that the Washington Department of Corrections

did not discriminate against male correctional officers on the

basis of sex in violation of Title VII by designating a number

of female-only correctional positions in women’s prisons.

The panel denied the Department’s motion to dismiss the

appeal, holding that the record, as supplemented on appeal,

established standing on the part of the correctional officers’

union.

On the merits, the panel concluded that the Department’s

individualized, well-researched decision to designate discrete

sex-based correctional officer categories was justified

because sex was a bona-fide occupational qualification

reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the women’s

prisons. The panel stated that the Department was

well-justified in concluding that rampant abuse should not be

an accepted part of prison life and taking steps to protect the

welfare of female inmates under its care.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 3

COUNSEL

Spencer Nathan Thal (argued), General Counsel, and Daniel

A. Swedlow, Senior Staff Attorney, Teamsters Local Union

No. 117, Tukwila, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Peter B. Gonick (argued), Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney

General, Kara A. Larsen, Senior Counsel, and Ohad M.

Lowy, Assistant Attorney General, Washington State Office

of the Attorney General, Olympia, Washington, for Appellee.

Nicholas B. Straley (argued) and Melissa R. Lee, Columbia

Legal Services, Seattle, Washington, for IntervenorDefendants–Appellees.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

For years, Washington faced problems common to a

number of states in their women’s prisons: sexual abuse and

misconduct by prison guards, breaches of inmate privacy, and

security gaps. A primary driver, according to prison

authorities, was the lack of female correctional officers to

oversee female offenders and administer sensitive tasks, such

as observing inmates showering and dressing and performing

the pat (or “pat-down”) and strip searches that are stitched

into the fabric of day-to-day prison life. After long wrestling

with this gender gap, the state undertook a comprehensive

assessment and ultimately designated a limited number of

female-only correctional positions—specifically, 110

positions to patrol housing units, prison grounds, and work

sites. The prison guards’ union, Teamsters Local No. 117

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4 TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR.

(“Teamsters” or the “Union”), challenged this practice,

though it acknowledges the legitimacy of 50 of the femaleonly designations. This case juxtaposes the prison’s

penological interests against male correctional officers who

claim the staffing policy discriminates against them on the

basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

We conclude that the Washington Department of

Corrections’ (the “Department” or the “state”) individualized,

well-researched decision to designate discrete sex-based

correctional officer categories was justified because sex is a

bona-fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for those

positions. The Union’s thin evidenti ary

submissions—coupled with expert claims that were largely

unsubstantiated or missed the point—failed to raise amaterial

factual issue. Indeed, the startling statement by one of the

Union’s experts underscores the legitimacy of the state’s

efforts to combat sexual abuse: “Sexual abuse is present in all

areas of our society. . .[F]emale inmates must be taught as

part of the rehabilitation process to deal with all abusive staff:

males and females . . .” The Department was well-justified

in concluding that rampant abuse should not be an accepted

part of prison life and taking steps to protect the welfare of

inmates under its care. We affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the Department.

BACKGROUND

The Department runs two women’s prisons. The

Washington Corrections Center for Women in Gig Harbor

has a capacity of 738 inmates, although it is often

overcrowded. That prison runs the gamut from minimum

security facilities to housing for violent offenders and those

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TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 5

with mental health issues. It also houses Washington’s death

row for female prisoners. The second facility is Mission

Creek Corrections Center for Women in Belfair, a smaller

minimum-security prison that houses around 300 inmates.

For decades, men dominated the ranks of prison guards,

though neither party has provided precise figures. Facing a

shortage of female guards in the late 1980s, state prison

administrators began allowing male guards to perform

random, clothed body searches—commonly known as pat

searches—of the female inmates at Washington Corrections

Center. Female inmates challenged these cross-gender

searches as unconstitutional. The district court granted an

injunction and halted the practice. Sitting en banc, we

affirmed, concluding that cross-gender body searches inflict

unnecessary and wanton pain on female inmates, many of

whom have suffered a history of sexual abuse before

incarceration, and, therefore, violate the Eighth Amendment.1

Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (en

banc). Under both Jordan and a later-enacted Washington

law, female correctional officers must perform all nonemergency pat searches of female inmates. Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9.94A.631(2) (2012).

In the years following Jordan, the Department struggled

with the challenges posed by having an overwhelminglymale

workforce. In 1998, it asked the Washington Human Rights

Commission (the “Commission”) for an opinion on proposed

correctional assignments reserved exclusively for female

1 Experts in the case noted that 85% of female offenders reported a preincarceration history of sexual abuse. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1525–26.

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6 TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR.

officers. The Commission did not favor the Department’s

approach at that time.2

In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination

Act, which included findings that, based upon experts’

conservative estimates, 13% of prisoners had been sexually

assaulted while in prison. See 42 U.S.C. § 15601. The

legislation also noted that many instances of abuse go

unreported and prison personnel were inadequately trained to

deal with these issues. See id. §§ 15601–09. Under the Act,

the Department received a $1 million grant to hire two fulltime employees to investigate sexual misconduct allegations

in prisons.

In the years that followed, the Department fielded

widespread allegations of sexual abuse in its women’s

prisons. State officials, for example, substantiated 46

instances of misconduct in a single two-and-a-half-year

stretch. In the aftermath, in 2007, female inmates brought a

class action in state court alleging misconduct at the

Washington Corrections Center. The complaint detailed

incidents where guards assaulted and fondled female inmates

and forced them to perform oral sex and masturbate in the

presence of male officers. Complaint, Jane Doe v. Clarke,

2 The Human Rights Commission, established in 1949, is the

administrative agency responsible for administering and enforcing the

state’s antidiscrimination laws. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.120 (2007). 

The Commission’s view is treated as an “advisory interpretative

statement” under WashingtonRevisedCodeSection 34.05.010(8). Before

adopting female-only guard positions, the Department requested opinion

letters from the Commission. Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. State of

Wash. Human Rights Comm’n, 235 P.3d 858, 860 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

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TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 7

No. 07-2-01513-0, Dkt. No. 4 (Thurston Co. Super. Ct. July

31, 2007).

Within a week of the filing of that lawsuit, the

Department hired a consultant to investigate sexual activity

and misconduct. After a four-month internal investigation,

the consultant detailed the facts in a 240-plus-page report. 

The investigation included interviews with 72 “Jane Doe”

inmates, who alleged that they faced sexual advances and

harassment from prison guards. Among the lurid details,

male guards twice impregnated inmates and smuggled

contraband in exchange for sexual favors.

The Department also hired two additional consultants to

review prison practices. Marianne McNabb, of the Social

Research Institute based in Olympia, Washington, wrote:

Cross-sex supervision is currently one of the

most significant issues facing the

administration of women’s prisons. Today in

many states, over 50 percent of the custody

force in prisons for women are men. The fact

that so many women in prison have

experienced sexual abuse bymen makes them

different from male prisoners who do not

share that history and therefore do not

experience the same level of anxiety or

violation as do women, when under the

custody or supervision of an officer of the

opposite sex.

McNabb noted that several jurisdictions, including Idaho

and Michigan, “have established sex-specific posts in female

institutions” in response to these dynamics. Her report

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concluded, “While this may seem to be a solution for many

of the concerns identified, this practice is generally not fully

understood or accepted by staff and has faced some legal

challenges.”

Donald Kelchner, superintendent of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections, urged the Department to adopt a

host of reforms, including guard assignments reserved

specifically for women. In particular, Kelchner

recommended that the state ensure any double-staffed

housing units have at least one female guard. Kelchner

concluded, “It is more desirable in an institution housing

females to have a higher number of female staff, to work with

and supervise the inmates.”

Following the expert recommendations, the Department

in January 2008 implemented an array of reforms to “reduce

prison sexual assaults and related behavior.” Those efforts

included aggressive recruitment of female prison guards;

pre-hiring psychological testing; training programs to

enhance “gender awareness”; and the installation of privacy

curtains, security cameras, and restricted access entry cards.

Then, in May 2008, prison administrators again requested

guidance from the Commission on the Department’s

proposed 110 female-only guard post assignments at the two

prisons. The Department submitted a tailored request for

each post, explaining the job responsibilities and why the

positions needed a female officer. The state told the

Commission that “[i]ncreasing the number of female staff

will reduce the risk of sexual misconduct, reduce allegations

of sexual misconduct, and protect male staff exposed to

vulnerable situations” and unfounded complaints of abuse. 

The state also emphasized the privacy requirements of female

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TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 9

inmates and the operational need to have female officers on

hand to perform necessary searches and other tasks. The

requested staffing changes, according to the state, would

“ensure the security of the prisons, safety of incarcerated

offenders, and protection of the privacy and dignity of female

offenders.”

Aftertouring the prisons, interviewing administrators, and

collecting detailed documentation, the Commission in

February 2009 approved the Department’s request for all 110

positions. The Commission offered Teamsters the chance to

provide input but none was forthcoming. The Commission

determined that, with the then-existing staff makeup at the

prisons, the state was “unable to ensure a proper balance

between security considerations and the privacy rights of

offenders” and that there were no reasonable alternatives to

sex-based staffing.

The class action settled soon after. As part of the

settlement agreement, the Department agreed to enforce a

“zero tolerance” policy regarding sexual misconduct, not to

rehire five male correctional officers accused of abuse, and to

submit regular reports on staff misconduct in women’s

prisons. The settlement also included an undisclosed payout

to abused prisoners. Stipulation and Proposed Order, Jane

Doe v. Clarke, No. 07-2-01513-0, Dkt. No. 170 (Thurston Co.

Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2010).

The Department’s reprieve from the courtroom did not

last long. In September 2011, Teamsters, which represents

some 6,000 state correctional workers, filed this federal

lawsuit, alleging that the sex-based staffing policy

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10 TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR.

implemented in 2009 violates the civil rights of male prison

guards.3

At the conclusion of discovery, the district court granted

summary judgment for the state. Teamsters Local Union No.

117 v. Wash. Dep’t of Corr., No. C11-5760 BHS, 2013 WL

1412335 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2013). The district court first

found that the Union had failed to demonstrate the type of

“cognizable injury” required to trigger Title VIIliability. The

court noted that the record developed by Teamsters included

only “hypothetical evidence” of the damages its members

would face, thus entitling the state to summary judgment. Id.

at *4. Alternatively, the district court also granted summary

judgment for the state on the question of sex discrimination. 

As an initial matter, the district court ruled that judicial

deference to state prison officials was warranted. Id. The

court concluded that, although there may have been factual

questions on whether female guards were needed inside the

housing units to prevent sexual assaults, the staffing policy

was justified as a BFOQ to protect the privacy of inmates for

each job category. Id. at 5–9.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDING

This case is a cautionary tale about the threshold

importance of standing. The state argues, for the first time on

3 Teamsters also represents female correctional officers. The Union

asserts in its brief that the female-only correction positions result in “an

increase in mandatory overtime” for female guards. The Union presented

no evidence to support that contention. Our analysis therefore focuses on

the male guards.

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TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 11

appeal, and after receiving Teamsters’ opening brief, that the

Union lacks standing because it produced no evidence that

any of its members suffered concrete injury. The issue is not,

as Teamsters urges, whether the question was addressed by

the district court; rather, as a jurisdictional matter, “a

challenge to constitutional standing is one which we are

required to consider” apart from whether it was argued or

addressed below. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d

1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation mark and

citation omitted).

The standing inquiry is governed by the familiar elements

of injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability. “To

establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete,

particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the

challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For

associational standing, Teamsters must show in addition that

“its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their

own right.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., San Diego

Chapter v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th

Cir. 2013). In other words, the Union “must show that a

member suffers an injury-in-fact that is traceable to the

defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Id.

The complaint posited varied theories of injury: male

guards were forced to transfer jobs and prisons; suffered lost

earnings, including overtime pay; were laid off; and

experienced “loss of status, diminished sense of self-worth,

anxiety, emotional distress, embarrassment, humiliation,

mental anguish, and other related damages.” Surprisingly,

proof of these general allegations did not materialize as

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evidence. The Union’s submissions on summary judgment

are thin, at best, in terms of identifying one or more specific

members who suffered injury. Ironically, it is the testimony

the Union elicited from the state that provides the strongest

support for the Teamsters’ constitutional standing. 

Throughout discovery, the state did not dispute the general

allegations that its staffing policy resulted in the transfer of

male guards and lost overtime opportunities. While no

evidence linked a specific officer with a discrete wage loss,

Superintendent Doug Cole indicated that six male officers

had been displaced from their regular shifts—mentioning two

by name—and agreed with the Union’s lawyer that, with

respect to male correctional officers, the staffing changes

would result in “some reduction in their overtime opportunity

. . .” Every male correctional officer who was displaced from

his regular shift, however, was offered a position on a

different shift.

As the state points out, when a challenge to standing is

raised at summary judgment, a plaintiff organization must

“submit competent evidence, not mere allegations, to

demonstrate that at least one of its members had standing.” 

Associated General, 713 F.3d at 1194. This is a settled

proposition, though curiously the state never moved for

summary judgment on standing nor contested the Union’s

standing allegations. Nonetheless, a party is not excused

from establishing standing simply because the opposing party

did not tumble to the issue until the appeals stage. See Gest

v. Bradbury, 443 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The[]

elements of standing must be supported in the same way as

any other matter for which a plaintiff bears the burden of

proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required

at the successive stages of the litigation.”).

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TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 13

In response to the state’s motion to dismiss on appeal,

Teamsters moved to supplement the record with affidavits

from five Union members and an administrator. Why this

evidence surfaced only on appeal is a mystery. Ordinarily,

we do not allow parties to supplement the record on appeal

absent “extraordinary circumstances.” United States v.

Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 975–76 (9th Cir. 2009). Here,

however, we accept the affidavits for the limited purpose of

confirming the job-related harms that the Department

acknowledged in general terms during discovery. Doing so

is “in the interests of justice and efficiency,” Ouachita Watch

League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1170 (11th Cir. 2006)

(internal citation omitted), since the hiring policy has been on

the books since 2009 and has been the subject of multiple

proceedings; a remand or dismissal on procedural grounds

would merely prolong resolution of the underlying issues. In

the affidavits, male correctional officers assert that they have

suffered precisely the types of harm that the state

acknowledged in discovery—most importantly, lost overtime.

Although the Union hardlymade a slam-dunk showing of

prospective harm, the record as supplemented on appeal

reflects the bare minimum necessary to satisfy the threshold

requirement of standing. The Department’s motion to

dismiss the appeal on standing grounds is denied.

II. TITLE VII AND THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL

QUALIFICATION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits

employment practices that discriminate on the basis of race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 

Nevertheless, a facially discriminatory employment practice,

such as the sex-based hiring practice we have here, may pass

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legal muster if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification or

BFOQ. That narrow exception—found in § 2000e-2(e)(1)—

provides:

[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer to hire and employ

employees . . . on the basis of . . . sex . . .

where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational

qualification reasonably necessary to the

normal operation of that particular business or

enterprise.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he BFOQ

defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it

narrowly.” UAWv. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201

(1991). The BFOQ defense applies to “special situations”

where employment discrimination is based upon “objective,

verifiable requirements” that “concern job-related skills and

aptitudes.” Id. An “occupational qualification” means a

“qualification[] that affect[s] an employee’s ability to do the

job.” Id.

Under our precedent, the BFOQ defense “may be invoked

only when the essence of the business operation would be

undermined by hiring individuals of both sexes.” Breiner v.

Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2010)

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). To justify discrimination under the BFOQ

exception, an employer must show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that: (1) the “job qualification justifying the

discrimination is reasonably necessary to the essence of its

business”; and (2) that “sex is a legitimate proxy for

determining” whether a correctional officer has the necessary

job qualifications. Ambat v. City & Cty. of San Francisco,

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TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 15

757 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Breiner,

610 F.3d at 1210).

In light of these demanding legal standards, BFOQs are

few and far between. In many industries, it is difficult to

imagine any jobs that would qualify as BFOQs. However, the

“unique context of prison employment,” id. at 1028, is one

area where courts have found sex-based classifications

justified. The Supreme Court directly addressed the prison

environment in just one case, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.

321 (1977). The Court held that, in the context of a

maximum-security facility “where violence is the order of the

day” and sex offenders were interspersed with other

prisoners, a female guard’s sex may “undermine her capacity

to provide the security that is the essence of a correctional

counselor’s responsibility.” Id. at 335–36. Referencing

Dothard, the Court in Johnson Controls explained that “[s]ex

discrimination was tolerated because sex was related to the

guard’s ability to do the job—maintaining prison security.” 

499 U.S. at 202.

When justified under the circumstances, we and other

circuits similarly have upheld sex-based correctional officer

assignments in women’s prisons. See Robino v. Iranon,

145 F.3d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (BFOQ

designation of six correctional officer positions at Hawaii

women’s prison); Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d

737, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2004) (BFOQ designation of 250

correctional officer positions at Michigan women’s prisons);

Tharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 224 (8th Cir.

1995) (BFOQ designation of all correctional officer positions

in women’s residential unit within a mixed-gender minimum

security prison); cf. Torres v. Wisc. Dep’t of Health and Soc.

Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (noting

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that prison officials are not required to provide “objective

evidence, either from empirical studies or otherwise,” and

remanding the denial of a BFOQ designation for evaluation

“on the basis of the totality of the circumstances contained in

the entire record.”).

Although limited gender discrimination may be

permissible in the prison employment context, prison

administrators do not get a free pass. The Department must

have an objective “basis in fact” for “its belief that gender

discrimination is ‘reasonably necessary’—not merely

reasonable or convenient—to the normal operation of its

business.” Everson, 391 F.3d at 748 (citing W. Air Lines, Inc.

v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985)). This means prison

administrators “seeking to justify a BFOQ must show a high

correlation between sex and ability to perform job functions.” 

Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1213 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Speculation about gender roles is

insufficient—the evidence must demonstrate that prison

administrators had a “concrete, logical basis for concluding

that gender restrictions are reasonably necessary” and that

alternatives to sex discrimination have been “reasonably

considered and refuted.” Ambat, 757 F.3d at 1028 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

An additional significant factor is at play: deference to

prison officials. “Judgments by prison administrators that are

the product of a reasoned decision-making process, based on

available information and expertise, are entitled to some

deference.” Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1212 n.6 (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Robino, 145 F.3d at 1110 (holding

that, where Hawaii prison administrators appointed a task

force to review prison policies, their “professional judgment

is entitled to deference”).

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Although we have not offered up a cookbook for a

“reasoned decision-making process,” cases that have invoked

the deference principle point to undertakings that address

systemic issues, consider outside views and data, and weigh

reasonable alternatives. See Robino, 145 F.3d at 1111

(deferring to Hawaii prison administrators who directed a

“specially appointed task force” to study prison problems);

Everson, 391 F.3d at 741–45 (deferring to Michigan prison

administrators where they conducted three studies, one

pursuant to a settlement with the Department of Justice). To

be sure, although studies and empirical data are indicia of a

deliberative approach, we have emphasized that “the

decision-making process supporting a discriminatory policy”

need not “take any particular form.” Ambat, 757 F.3d at

1026. Deference is a threshold legal determination.

The Department’s exhaustive process fits well within the

rubric of “reasoned decision making” and is entitled to

deference. After the Jane Doe prisoner class action was filed

in 2007, the Department did not rush headlong into sex-based

staffing. Instead, it hired experts, consulted with other states,

reviewed relevant caselaw, documented scores of sexual

misconduct allegations and investigated many more, and

sought advice from the Human Rights Commission. Drawing

on its decades of experience, the state did not view sex-based

staffing as a panacea, instead proposing a package of reforms

that included measures such as applicant psychological

testing, sex-awareness training, and security cameras.

Teamsters argues that the Department implemented sexbased staffing “during a time of Departmental crisis” and in

a “panic” that was little more than a “desperate attempt” to

settle the state court class action. The Union’s

characterization begs the question: If sordid details of sexual

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abuse and constitutional violations do not inspire a “crisis”

and feelings of “panic,” then what does? The state shouldn’t

be demonized for kicking into gear to find a remedy for its

long-running challenges. In any event, our inquiry does not

turn on the subjective state of mind of the Department’s

leadership. The Department undertook a rigorous review of

its staffing policies to address the issues raised in the report

and the class action.

The Department’s thorough, thoughtful approach stands

in stark contrast to the sheriff in Ambat, who rejected out of

hand alternatives to discrimination—such as pre-hiring

screening, surveillance cameras, and training—and declined

to order an internal investigation or hire outside consultants. 

See 757 F.3d at 1022, 1026. The sheriff did not consult

deputies directlyresponsible for prisoner supervision or other

jurisdictions with similar policies, and no internal review

documented the extent of misconduct. Id.

Ambat instructs that “[d]etermining whether a corrections

official is entitled to deference is a fact-intensive and

case-specific inquiry” that is “generally within the discretion

of the district court.” Id. at 1026. The district court found

that the Department’s process merited deference, and we see

no reason to conclude otherwise. Accordingly, we give

“some deference,” Robino, 145 F.3d at 1110, to Washington’s

prison administrators, although we remain mindful of the

antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII.

III. THE PRISON POLICY AND BFOQ REQUIREMENTS

In 2009 the Department determined that designating 110

female-only guard positions at the two prisons would

substantially improve prison security, protect the privacy of

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female inmates, and prevent sexual assaults. Teamsters

challenges approximately sixty of those positions, which fall

into four general categories: medium- and high-security

housing units (18 positions); programs and activities

supervisors (3 positions); work crew supervisors (6

positions); and relief posts to replace female guards who are

on breaks or absent from work (32 positions).4

The Union paints the Department staffing policy as

“broad and overreaching”—a “blunderbuss approach to the

issue.” The record demonstrates the opposite. Instead of a

blanket ban on male prison personnel, the Department crafted

the staffing needs to fit each specific facility and guard post. 

It targeted only guard assignments that require direct, day-today interaction with inmates and entail sensitive job

responsibilities such as conducting pat and strip searches and

observing inmates while they shower and use the restroom.

As the Union’s expert acknowledged, “[n]o remedy is

perfect nor perfectly effective.” We couldn’t agree more. 

This reality underscores the rationale for deference to prison

administrators and the hazard of nitpicking the state’s

thoughtful response to deep-rooted problems in its women’s

prisons.

4 The Union acknowledges that the remaining 50 positions—such as

guard assignments in minimum-security housing units and those on the

graveyard shift, where repeated instances of sexual misconduct

occurred—are properly designated as female-only.

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A. The Department’s Policy Rationales Are

Reasonably Necessary to the Essence of Prison

Administration

At issue on appeal is whether the state established as a

matter of law that sex-based restrictions are “a bona fide

occupational qualification reasonably necessary” to normal

prison operations. Under the well-worn standard of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56, we affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment because there is “no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the [state] is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Teamsters failed to produce “specific facts showing there is

a genuine issue for trial” to survive summary judgment. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

Curiously, Teamsters did not offer specific testimony

from its members, former guards, or others with actual

knowledge of on-the-block operations at the prisons. 

Although Teamsters offered up the reports of two experts, in

the end their testimony does not create a material factual

issue. For starters, the reports generally fail to address the

specific posts at issue. Instead, they rehash alternatives to

sex-based staffing that were exhausted and rejected by prison

administrators or serve up proposals without any evidence of

efficacy or practicality. Finally, the Union’s experts opine on

the interpretation of social science research that is not central

to the state policy in any event.

Although the sexual assaults that spawned the Jane Doe

class action permeate this lawsuit, the state did not justify its

BFOQ positions solely as a means to prevent sexual assaults. 

Instead, it identified several intertwined reasons for

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designating the female-only positions. In the initial request

to the Human Rights Commission, the Department cited the

need to “enhance the security of the prisons, safety of staff

and offenders, and to protect the privacy and dignity of

female offenders.” The Commission, in turn, concluded that

absent the BFOQ designations, the prison is “unable to ensure

a proper balance between security considerations and privacy

rights of offenders” and endorsed the female job assignments

“for the explicit purpose of ensuring privacy rights of female

offenders.”

Not surprisingly, under our precedent all of these

interrelated objectives go to the heart of prison operations. In

Ambat, we held that, as a matter of law, “protecting female

inmates from sexual misconduct by male deputies,

maintaining jail security, [and] protecting inmate privacy”

were all reasonably necessary to the essence of prison

administration. 757 F.3d at 1027–28. The same holds true

here.

Security, of course, is the paramount concern of prison

administrators. As the Supreme Court has noted: “The

essence of a correctional counselor’s job is to maintain prison

security.” Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335; see also Everson,

391 F.3d at 753 (“Unquestionably, the security of the prisons

relates to the essence of [prison business].”). That maxim is

no less true today. Security concerns are necessarily

intertwined with prison programs and objectives.

Inmate privacy encompasses the inmate’s “interest in not

being viewed unclothed bymembers of the opposite sex”—an

interest that “survives incarceration” despite prisoners’

diminished privacy expectations. See Robino, 145 F.3d at

1111. In the same vein, inmates have a privacy interest in

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having non-emergency strip and pat searches—a pervasive

fact of prison life—performed by guards of the same sex. See

Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524; Tharp, 68 F.3d at 226.

Preventing sexual assaults is also a legitimate prison

objective. First and foremost, prison administrators have a

high interest in shielding inmates from abusive and inherently

coercive encounters. Indeed, even allegations of sexual

misconduct can destabilize prison life: they can breed

mistrust and damage morale among officers and prisoners;

drain prison resources; and undercut the effectiveness of male

officers with the looming threat of a career-ending

accusation. See Robino, 145 F.3d at 1111 (discussing damage

to prison morale caused by allegations of male staff sexual

misconduct); Everson, 391 F.3d at 753 (“[A]llegations of

sexual abuse, whether true or not, create a ‘poisoned

atmosphere’ that breeds misconduct on the part of inmates

and guards.”).

Amazingly, one of the Union’s experts offered the

following view:

Female inmates cannot be shielded from the

world in which we live. If they are to

reintegrate into society, they have to be taught

how to deal with abusive staff, male or

female. They have to be taught what

constitutes a healthyinteraction and what does

not. They cannot learn those skills if they are

sheltered from contact with males in a

position of authority. ¶ Sexual abuse is

present in all areas of our society: in schools,

(at all levels), business, government, military

and families. Just as females have to be

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taught how to deal with those abuses in the

larger society, female inmates must be taught

as part of the rehabilitation process how to

deal with all abusive staff: males and females,

custody staff and civilian staff.

To state something so obvious we never imagined it

would need to be written: we reject any suggestion that

female prisoners would benefit from being subjected to

abusive prison guards as “part of the rehabilitation process”

so that they may better “reintegrate into society.” See, e.g.,

Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(11)

(“Victims of prison rape suffer severe physical and

psychological effects that hinder their ability to integrate into

the community and maintain stable employment upon their

release from prison.”).

We have little difficulty holding that the state’s reasons

for adopting the BFOQ designations—improving security,

protecting inmate privacy, and preventing sexual

assaults—are each reasonably necessary to the essence of

operating Washington’s women’s prisons. That conclusion

does not end the analysis, however. The state also must

demonstrate that sex is a “legitimate proxy” to achieve one or

more of these goals, meaning that there is a “high correlation

between sex and ability to perform job functions.” Breiner,

610 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at

202). In addition, the state must show that alternatives to the

sex-based classification were “reasonably considered and

refuted.” Ambat, 757 F.3d at 1028.

Before addressing these remaining requirements in the

context of specific positions, we consider Teamsters’

overarching arguments that the staffing policy is based on

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stereotypes and that the state failed to consider

nondiscriminatory alternatives.

Teamsters argues at length that the state policy is based

on an impermissible stereotype that male guards are more

likely to commit sexual misconduct than their female

counterparts. This stereotyping argument misses the mark. 

To begin, the Union acknowledged that the policy was

adopted in the face of documented allegations of abuse.5 The

Department also did not rest on assumptions; it provided

objective legal and operational justifications for why only

women can perform particular job functions, like observing

inmates unclothed and conducting non-emergency searches.

We also reject Teamsters’ argument that the Department

could simply have hired new executives or reconfigured

prison layouts. As our discussion of the day-to-day realities

of the positions at issue demonstrates, neither of those

alternatives actually addresses the specific operational

challenges of maintaining prison security, preserving

inmates’ privacy, and stopping abuse.

5 Because the 2009 policy stemmed from a documented history ofsexual

misconduct in Washington prisons, this case is distinguishable from

Breiner. There, Nevada prison officials designated as female-only three

upper-management positions based on the assumption that men were

“incapable of adequately supervising front line staff in female prisons.” 

610 F.3d at 1213. The record disclosed no evidence that anyone in

upper-management had ever abused an inmate. Id. at 1214. Here, by

contrast, the sex-based job assignments are all “front line” positions that

require direct, day-to-day interaction with female inmates. Washington

has substantiated dozens of instances of sexual abuse implicating every

job category at issue in this lawsuit.

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B. Sex is an Objective, Verifiable Job Qualification

for the Designated Positions

We conclude that sex is an objective, verifiable job

qualification for the posts designated as female-only by the

Department and that the Department appropriatelyconsidered

reasonable alternatives.

1. Housing Units

The staffing restriction with the “largest impact,”

according to the Union, involves 18 positions at the mediumand high-security housing units at Washington Corrections

Center.6 The housing units have two guards on duty on each

shift. Unlike other states, the Department did not ban male

guards entirely; rather, the staffing policy requires at least one

female guard per shift, an approach recommended by one of

the state’s consultants.

In the housing units, correctional officers “must conduct

pat and strip searches of female offenders entering and

leaving the facility” as well as frequent random and

suspicion-based searches within the housing units. In the

segregation and mental illness units, inmates are strip

searched every time they enter or leave their cells. Except in

emergency circumstances, male guards cannot legally

perform any of these searches. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523; see

also Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.631(2).

6 The Union concedes that positions in minimum-security housing units

are properly designated female-only. Because Mission Creek is a

minimum-security facility, the housing-unit positions at that prison are not

at issue here.

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Beyond searches, officers in the housing units also “may

encounter female offenders in varying states of undress while

showering, toileting, and dressing.” Guards must collect

urine samples from inmates, and a failure to “observ[e] the

offenders during the entire process of urinalysis collection

significantly impacts the reliability of the test results . . .” 

According to the state, “[m]ale staff cannot observe female

offenders when they are engaged in these activities.”

Given these operational needs, there is no reasonable

substitute for having female guards inside housings units,

according to the Department. Notably, temporarily removing

a female guard from another part of the prison to cover in a

housing unit “creates a gap for dealing with privacy issues at

the post vacated.” At best, that solution fixes one problem

but creates another.

The evidence Teamsters puts forward to counter the

Department’s justifications is entirely inapposite. One of its

experts points out that sexual assault is not a severe problem

in medium- and high-security housing because “as the level

of security increases, the opportunity for sexual assault

decreases.” This may be true, but it fails to acknowledge that

the staffing decisions were designed to protect inmate

privacy, which is “essential to the operation of a corrections

facility and has been recognized as justifying facially

discriminatory policies in other contexts.” Ambat, 757 F.3d

at 1028. The Union’s other expert quarrels with citations to

social science regarding female inmates’ privacy needs and

matters relating to sexual relationships between inmates and

guards. This testimony again fails to raise any genuine

dispute of material fact as to the Department’s reasoned

determination that the realities of operating Washington’s

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women’s prisons necessitate designating these specific

positions as female-only.

2. Programs and Activities

Programs and activities officers directly supervise inmate

activities such as educational and religious classes, gym,

crafts, and visitation hours. During these programs and

activities, inmates are searched at random and if suspected of

hiding contraband. Guards must collect urine samples from

inmates and at times relieve housing unit officers, which

requires “room checks” where they may “encounter female

offenders in varying states of undress. . . .” These guards also

supervise visitation hours, after which 50% of inmates are pat

searched and 50% are strip searched. To fulfill these job

functions, the state designated three programs and activities

positions as female-only.

The Union’s proposed alternative to designating these

positions as female-only is a return to the system employed

for the last two decades: dispatching female officers as

rovers—or “response and movement” guards, in prison

lingo—who could be paged when needed for searches.7 The

Union offers no data, expert testimony, or other evidence to

support the efficacy of this approach. Instead, undisputed

evidence established that the rover system was rife with

problems, to say the least. During this era, prison

administrators “shuttle[d] women staff from location to

location throughout the prisons to perform essential security

7 Union expert Gladwin says the female-only designation of programs

and activities posts is “arbitrary,” because the programs and activities

officer who supervises the bike program can be a male guard. That

officer, however, is not required to perform searches.

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procedures, leaving other areas of the prison without

appropriate staffing.” Wait times for searches lasted an hour

or more. With female guards stretched thin, inmates went

unsupervised showering, using the restroom, or

dressing—raising security and safety risks. Superintendent

Eldon Vail testified that, before the BFOQ positions were

implemented, the prison functioned “in the broadest sense”

but the shortage of female guards restricted the prison’s

ability to deploy unannounced, random pat searches, an

important tool in preventing the flow of contraband.

In light of this checkered history, the Union’s conclusory

assertion that the Department successfully“managed [privacy

and search] issues for at least two decades” rings hollow. 

FTC v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171

(9th Cir. 1997) (“[C]onclusory, self-serving statements in

appellate briefs . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue

of material fact.”). We will not displace prison

administrators’ experience and expertise in favor of an

alternative that boils down to the “same old, same old.” Cf.

Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529 (“[P]rison administrators always

have been expected to innovate and experiment.” (citing

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 (1987) (prison

administrators must be allowed “to adopt innovative solutions

to the intractable problems of prison administration”)).

3. Work Crews

Work crew officers escort groups of ten prisoners to offsite work locations and supervise their workdays. Searches

are again part and parcel of the job—comprising 70% of dayto-day responsibilities. Strip searches are required each time

an inmate leaves and reenters the prison grounds. Before the

2009 staffing policy, female officers had to be “pulled from

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somewhere else in the facility” to conduct these searches,

which can “creat[e] [] a staff shortage in another area of the

facility” and pose “a potential security risk,” according to the

Human Rights Commission. During the workday, officers

also must accompany female inmates as they use the

restroom. The Department concluded that, because of these

job responsibilities, it needed female officers alongside work

crews. The Department therefore designated six positions as

female-only.

Nonetheless, with respect to work crews, the Union

argues that the Department should merely station female

guards at prison entry and exit points. If the need for a search

arises “while work is in progress, this would constitute an

‘emergent’ search which is not prohibited for a male officer

as a matter of law, policy or contract.” The Union produced

no evidence or legal support for its emergency-search

proposal. Even if the Department could disingenuously label

every work-site search as an emergency, the state’s interest is

broader than merely avoiding illegal searches. Having male

officers conduct pat searches under any non-emergency

circumstancesis undesirable and harmful to prisoner privacy

and security.

Staging female officers at entry and exit points also

ignores the state’s interest in preserving security during work

assignments. The record showed that at least two inmates

escaped from public bathrooms while on work crews, when

they were not watched by male guards and no female guards

were on hand. The Union does not explain, much less

provide evidence for, how its alternative proposal would

address concerns about on-the-job observation.

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4. Relief Posts

Officers in the 32 relief positions substitute for female

guards in female-only positions when they have a regular day

off, are on vacation, or are out sick. The relief officers

perform the job responsibilities described above in housing

units and elsewhere. As the Human Rights Commission put

it, the relief positions “alleviate understaffing of female

officers, because a BFOQ position needs to be relieved by a

BFOQ position.” In other words, if only male officers are

available to fill in for BFOQ positions, it undermines the

documented need of making those positions female-only in

the first place.

According to the Union, 32 relief positions is too many,

so the issue “must be reserved for trial because the Court

cannot assess whether the relief sought was excessive without

conducting a careful analysis of all such positions.” To

survive summary judgment, however, the Union “may not

merely state that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence

at trial and proceed in the hope that something can be

developed at trial in the way of evidence to support its claim.” 

T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d

626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Argument without evidence is

hollow rhetoric that cannot defeat summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

for the state. The Washington Department’s creation of a

narrow category of female-only job assignments is a “bona

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fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the

normal operation” of the women’s prisons.8

AFFIRMED.

8

In light of our holding that the positions are lawful BFOQs, we need

not decide whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment

on the alternative ground that the Union has not shown that any of its

members suffered cognizable injury under Title VII.

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