Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01040/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01040-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RICHARD MALOTT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PLACER COUNTY, et al.,1

 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on the motions by defendants Sacramento County, 

Scott Jones, Javier Bustamante, Michelle Hendricks, and Darin Epperson (Sacramento County 

defendants) and defendants Nevada County and David DeVogelaere (Nevada County defendants) 

to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

 1

 Plaintiff has identified certain Doe defendants. The Ninth Circuit has held that if a 

defendant’s identity is not known before the complaint is filed, a “plaintiff should be given an 

opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 

F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 

F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Plaintiffs are warned, however, that Doe defendants will be 

dismissed if “it is clear that discovery would not uncover the[ir] identities, or that the complaint 

would be dismissed on other grounds.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillespie, 629 

F.2d at 642). Plaintiffs are also warned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) is applicable to 

Doe defendants. That rule provides the court must dismiss defendants who have not been served 

within 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless good cause is shown. See Glass v. Fields, 

No. 09-00098, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97604 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); Hard Drive Prods. v. 

Does, No. 11-01567, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109837, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2011). 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 1 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

(ECF Nos. 47, 50.) Plaintiff opposes the motions (ECF Nos. 52, 53), and the Sacramento and 

Nevada County defendants have replied (ECF Nos. 54, 55). The court held a hearing on the 

matters on March 27, 2015. Stewart Katz appeared for plaintiff, Scott McLeran appeared for 

Nevada County defendants, and Robert Chalfant appeared for Sacramento County defendants. 

As explained below, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendants’ motions. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On or about April 25, 2013, Sacramento County Sheriff Deputies Bustamante and 

Epperson stopped plaintiff for rolling through a stop sign, found a gun on his person, arrested him 

for carrying a concealed weapon without a permit, searched his Jeep, and seized his diary, among 

other things. (Compl., ECF No. 46 ¶¶ 25–38.) During the search of the Jeep, plaintiff, 

handcuffed in the back of Bustamante’s and Epperson’s patrol car, began to experience “extreme 

physical distress.” (Id. ¶ 39.) He told the officers he believed he was suffering from a heat 

stroke. (Id. ¶¶ 40–41.) The officers refused to call for medical assistance, believing plaintiff was 

faking his symptoms. (Id. ¶ 42.) As plaintiff was leaning against the patrol car door, Bustamante 

opened the door, causing plaintiff’s head to fall out; Bustamante then closed the door on 

plaintiff’s head and then shoved it back into the car. (Id. ¶ 43.) 

Bustamante told Epperson plaintiff was “playing them” and so, as plaintiff’s head 

was leaning against the back of the passenger seat, Bustamante twice used a small, hard object to 

push on his sternum, looking for a reaction. (Id. ¶¶ 44–47.) These “sternum rubs” were painful 

and caused bruising. (Id. ¶ 47.) During both sternum rubs, defendant Epperson was sitting in the 

front passenger seat of the same patrol car. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49.) 

Plaintiff alleges defendant Sheriff Jones was aware of Bustamante’s propensity to 

use unreasonable force, as the County had just settled a lawsuit stemming from Bustamante’s 

killing of an unarmed man. (Id. ¶ 55.) At the same time, Sacramento County allegedly declines 

to track the number of reported instances of force by officer and fails to undertake the proper 

training and discipline of officers whose conduct suggests they are at high risk of using force. 

(Id. ¶ 56.) 

On April 29, 2013, plaintiff initiated a citizen’s complaint in Sacramento County 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 2 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

concerning Bustamante’s and Epperson’s actions. (Id. ¶ 95.) Although Sheriff’s personnel asked 

for plaintiff’s medical records, plaintiff was unable to contact the officer who had requested the 

information. (Id. ¶¶ 97–99.) In a letter dated October 10, 2013, defendant Jones rejected 

plaintiff’s citizen complaint. (Id. ¶ 100.) 

Later Bustamante and Epperson gave plaintiff’s diary to defendant Hendricks, a 

detective with the Sheriff’s Department, who was part of a task force designed to target plaintiff. 

(Id. ¶¶ 59–60.) Despite the diary’s benign contents, Hendricks copied portions of it and showed 

these to plaintiff’s former girlfriend and his close friend. (Id. ¶¶ 62–63.) As a result of 

Hendricks’ encouragement, plaintiff’s former girlfriend filed a request for a restraining order in 

Placer County Superior Court. (Id. ¶ 73.) The request was granted. (Id.) 

Sometime later, Placer County Sheriff’s Deputies entered plaintiff’s property 

located in Nevada County without a warrant. (Id. ¶ 80.) On at least one occasion, the Nevada 

County Sheriff’s Department assisted in the warrantless search of plaintiff’s property by 

providing Placer County Sheriff’s Deputies with the code to open the locked security gate 

surrounding plaintiff’s property. (Id. ¶ 82.) 

Even though plaintiff reported these actions to defendant DeVogelaere, a Nevada 

County Sheriff’s Deputy, DeVogelaere developed a pretextual reason for the Placer County 

authorities’ entry onto plaintiff’s property. (Id. ¶¶ 85–87.) DeVogelaere was aware of Placer 

County’s numerous illegal entries onto plaintiff’s property and assisted in a cover-up of these 

actions. (Id. ¶ 84.) 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint contains thirteen claims. In their motions, 

the Sacramento County and Nevada County defendants do not seek to dismiss all the claims. The 

Sacramento County defendants seek dismissal of: claim number one, unreasonable force under 

the Fourth Amendment against Epperson; and claim number ten, conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s 

Fourth Amendment rights in the search of his diary against Bustamante, Epperson, Hendricks.2

 

 2

 The complaint also alleges a Placer County defendant Matt Hardcastle participated in 

this conspiracy, but the Sacramento County defendants do not address his involvement. 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 3 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

The Nevada County defendants seek dismissal of claim eleven, conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s 

Fourth Amendment rights in the search of his property against DeVogelaere and Nevada County. 

The Placer County defendants have not filed a motion to dismiss, so the claims against them are 

not discussed here. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a 

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A court may dismiss 

“based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), to survive a motion to 

dismiss this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something 

more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the 

interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the 

action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court “must presume all factual 

allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule 

does not apply to “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, to “allegations that contradict matters 

properly subject to judicial notice,” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the 

complaint, Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 4 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Sacramento County’s Motion to Dismiss 

1. First Claim: Excessive Force Against Epperson 

Defendants assert plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not state a claim 

showing Epperson’s involvement in Bustamante’s alleged use of force. (ECF No. 50-1 at 4.) 

Even though Epperson was allegedly sitting in the front seat of the patrol vehicle at the time, 

defendants argue there are no factual allegations suggesting Epperson personally participated in 

Bustamante’s alleged applications of force. (Id. at 5.) Furthermore, they argue there is no 

indication in the second amended complaint that Epperson even had an opportunity to intervene 

because Epperson was sitting in the front seat of the patrol car and plaintiff was seating in the 

back. (Id. at 5–6.) 

Plaintiff responds that Bustamante’s statement that plaintiff was “playing them” 

alerted Epperson to the use of force. (ECF No. 52 at 4.) Additionally, plaintiff argues Epperson 

had enough time to intercede between being alerted to the use of force and the actual use of force, 

including the two sternum rubs, which lasted 10 to 25 seconds each. (Id.) Moreover, plaintiff 

asserts that he could see Epperson, who was sitting in the front seat “the entire time . . . 

Bustamante was performing each sternum rub” (id. at 5), which, he argues, implies Epperson 

could likewise see him (id.). 

In reply defendants claim the complaint only shows that Epperson was present, 

and any contrary argument must rely on conclusory statements. (ECF No. 54 at 2–4.) They also 

point out the complaint does not allege Epperson witnessed the two sternum rubs. (Id. at 3–4.) 

 A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has two elements: (1) a violation of a federal 

constitutional or statutory right (2) committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

Long v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, the person acting 

under color of state law must have personally participated in the acts giving rise to the claim or 

“set in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would 

cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). A defendant is a personal participant 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 5 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

in an alleged deprivation of rights “‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 

affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 

deprivation . . . .’” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Johnson, 588 

F.2d at 743) (emphasis in original); see also Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(foreclosing group liability for constitutional violations). 

 Even when a defendant does not inflict the constitutional injury himself, he may be 

liable if he failed to intervene to prevent others’ actions: “‘police officers have a duty to intercede 

when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.’” 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Koon v. United States, 34 

F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). However, 

officers may be liable under a failure-to-intercede theory only when they have the opportunity to 

do so. Id. As one district court has said, to proceed on a failure to intervene claim, “plaintiff 

must show that the defendant-bystanders had enough time to observe what was happening and to 

intervene to stop it.” Harrison v. Hedgpeth, No. 12-0963, 2014 WL 46701, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 

6, 2014). 

 The court’s original order dismissed this claim because, among other reasons, 

plaintiff had not alleged Epperson was close to or in the vehicle. Now plaintiff alleges Epperson 

was not only in the vehicle at the time, but could see plaintiff and Bustamante, and could have 

intervened but did not. Construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, these allegations are 

sufficient at this stage to identify Epperson as an integral participant in the alleged violation. 

Although plaintiff relies on an assumption that Epperson could see him because he saw Epperson, 

that assumption is not wholly implausible; all plaintiff must do is to allege sufficient factual 

matter to state a claim plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plaintiff has done that here. Accordingly, 

the Sacramento County defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED. 

2. Tenth Claim: Conspiracy Against Bustamante, Epperson, and Hendricks 

 Defendants argue plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim because he has not 

alleged sufficient facts to meet the Ninth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard for conspiracy 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 6 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

claims. (ECF No. 50-1 at 4–5.) Specifically, defendants argue the complaint is insufficient 

because the factual allegations do not plausibly establish a meeting of defendants’ minds. (Id. at 

5.) Plaintiff has not alleged Bustamante reproduced or disseminated the diary; rather, he says he 

simply booked it into evidence. (ECF No. 54 at 4–5.) Defendants point out the absence of any 

allegations they ever discussed the diary’s contents. (Id. at 5–6.) 

 Plaintiff counters the Ninth Circuit no longer imposes a heightened pleading 

standard on conspiracy claims. (ECF No. 52 at 5 n.1.) He also argues a meeting of the minds 

may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, for example, from the defendants’ actions. (Id. at 

6.) As such, reproducing and disseminating the alleged illegally seized diary establishes 

sufficient evidence to infer a meeting of the minds. Additionally, plaintiff correctly notes that his 

initial complaint raised this same claim, and that the defendants did not contest its adequacy in 

their initial motion to dismiss. He argues, therefore, that should the complaint’s factual 

allegations fall short, he should be afforded an opportunity to correct the deficiency. He suggests 

an amended complaint could include allegations of the relevant, publicly available reports. (Id. at 

7.) 

 The elements of a conspiracy claim under section 1983 are (1) the existence of an 

agreement, either express or implied, to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights and (2) a 

deprivation of rights resulting from the agreement. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 

2010). Although the conspiratorial agreement need not be overt, a complaint must include some 

factual basis to support the inference defendants’ acts were propelled by the agreement. 

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999); Harris v. 

Clearlake Police Dep’t, No. 12-0864, 2012 WL 3042942, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012). The 

plaintiff “must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Buckey v. 

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Burns v. Cnty. of Kings, 883 F.2d 819, 

821 (9th Cir. 1989). Allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 

action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts . . . .” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. 

Cnty. Of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Vague claims that defendants were involved 

in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his rights will not suffice. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 7 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 937 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting conclusory conspiracy allegations are insufficient to provide notice to defendants); 

Cabrera v. Maddock, No. 10-00611, 2015 WL 3466398, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2015) (noting “a 

bare allegation that defendants conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights will not suffice 

to give rise to a conspiracy claim under section 1983”). 

 Here, plaintiff alleges that Bustamante and Epperson, after seizing the diary and 

forwarding it to Hendricks, entered into a conspiracy to reproduce and disseminate the diary for 

unlawful purposes. (ECF No. 52 at 6.) These allegations are vague and conclusory recitations of 

the bare-bone elements of conspiracy stripped of any meaningful detail. A meeting of the minds 

does not plausibly follow from the lone fact of the defendants’ reproduction and distribution of 

the diary. These allegations do not establish “some factual basis to support the inference that 

defendants’ acts were propelled by the agreement.” Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1301. However, this 

is the defendants’ first challenge of this claim. Plaintiff has suggested additional factual 

allegations he would include in an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Sacramento County 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy is GRANTED with leave to amend 

if plaintiff can do so consonant with Rule 11. 

B. Nevada County’s Motion to Dismiss 

1. Eleventh Claim: Conspiracy Against DeVogelaere and Nevada County 

 Plaintiff claims defendant DeVogelaere conspired to violate plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment rights, alleging some of the Placer County defendants entered his property on more 

than one occasion in August 2013. (ECF No. 46 at 24.) Plaintiff also claims DeVogelaere 

supplied the Placer County defendants with the code to his security gate, concealed their illegal 

conduct, conspired to fabricate a pre-textual reason for the entries, and failed to document the 

actions of Placer County law enforcement. (Id. at 24–25.) 

 Defendants argue plaintiff’s second amended complaint has failed to allege any 

facts or claims against Nevada County. (ECF No. 48 at 4–6.) Defendants also argue an 

agreement to violate plaintiff’s rights cannot be implied simply because DeVogelaere gave Placer 

County law enforcement a code to his property, saying there is nothing demonstrating the code 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 8 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

was confidential and could not be disclosed to law enforcement. (Id. at 7.) Defendants further 

argue that “[p]laintiff has failed to allege any facts to demonstrate he had a legally cognizable 

privacy interest in the . . . property.” (Id.) Moreover, they claim DeVogelaere is entitled to 

qualified immunity. (Id. at 10–13.) 

 Plaintiff counters his privacy interest lies in his residence in a home located on the 

Malott Ranch. (ECF No. 53 at 4.) He cites Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), suggesting 

“[e]ven an ordinary overnight guest has sufficient privacy interest in a residence to establish 

Fourth Amendment standing.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also dismisses defendants’ assertion that 

DeVogelaere is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 6-8.) 

 In reply, defendants say that plaintiff’s complaint fails to demonstrate any 

evidence aside from conclusory arguments tending to prove DeVogelaere conspired with others 

to violate plaintiff’s rights. (ECF No. 55 at 5–6.) 

 Here, plaintiff agrees Nevada County’s inclusion was inadvertent, and the 

complaint does not adequately allege Nevada County’s policy or custom was the moving force 

behind the alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED 

with prejudice as to Nevada County. 

 Moreover, the complaint does not adequately describe DeVogelaere’s involvement 

in a conspiracy. Plaintiff contends his pleading is sufficient because it shows DeVogelaere 

acquiesced in Placer County law enforcement’s illegal activities. (ECF No. 55 at 5–6.) However, 

plaintiff has not adequately pled how DeVogelaere’s supplying the Placer County defendants 

with the code to his security gate constitutes a conspiracy. In fact, a more plausible 

understanding of DeVogelaere’s conduct is his knowledge of the outstanding felony firearm 

charges against plaintiff, the restraining order against plaintiff, and the belief that the Placer 

County defendants intended to complete a legitimate welfare check of the Malott property. While 

it gives the court pause that Placer County law enforcement performed a welfare check on a 

Nevada County resident, the facts as currently pled do not adequately implicate DeVogelaere in a 

conspiracy. 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 9 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

 Nevada County defendants also reassert that DeVogelaere, as a law enforcement 

officer, is entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 55 at 7–8.) Here, because the facts alleged 

do not support a claim that DeVogelaere violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the court need 

not reach the question of qualified immunity. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to 

the claim against defendant DeVogelaere. Plaintiff is given leave to amend if he can do so 

consonant with Rule 11. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows: 

1. The Sacramento County defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim against 

defendant Epperson arising out of the use of excessive force is DENIED. 

2. The Sacramento County defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s conspiracy 

claim against defendants Bustamante, Epperson, Hendricks is GRANTED with 

leave to amend. 

3. The Nevada County defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of 

conspiracy against defendant Nevada County is GRANTED with prejudice. 

4. The Nevada County defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of 

conspiracy against defendant DeVogelaere is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

5. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint is due within twenty-one (21) days of the 

date of this order. 

6. This order resolves ECF Nos. 47, 50. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 17, 2015. 

Case 2:14-cv-01040-KJM-EFB Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 10 of 10