Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00023/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00023-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE GALINDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:11-CV-00023-DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(DOC. 9)

Screening Order

I. Background

Plaintiff Jesse Galindo (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this

action by filing his complaint on January 6, 2011. Doc. 1. On June 22, 2011, the Court screened

Plaintiff’s complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim with leave to amend. Doc. 6. 

On August 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. Doc. 9. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

1

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 10 Filed 12/06/11 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

II. Summary of First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) in

Tehachapi, California, where the events giving rise to this action occurred. Plaintiff names as

Defendants Matthew Cate, secretary of CDCR; warden Gonzales of CCI, and dentists John Does

1 and 2 of CCI.

Plaintiff alleges the following: On April 9, 2010, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant John

Doe 1, complaining of a mild pain that became excruciating when Plaintiff ate food or drank

water. Defendant requested an x-ray. Defendant showed Plaintiff the x-ray and explained that

Plaintiff was suffering toothache due to a metal filling that touched a nerve at the root of the

tooth. Defendant advised Plaintiff to keep all food on the left side of the mouth to minimize

Plaintiff’s pain. Amend. Compl. 8-9.

On May 25, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a request for medical services stating he was in a

lot of pain and begging to the tooth pulled. On May 30, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a second

request stating that he was suffering extreme pain on the right side of head. On June 1, 2010,

Plaintiff told John Doe 2 that he was in extreme pain. Defendant requested an x-ray and

examined his dental history file. Amend. Compl. 13. 

Plaintiff learned from Defendant John Doe 2 on June 1, 2010, that a root canal could

alleviate his toothache and save the tooth. Defendant John Doe 2 explained that he was not

2

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 10 Filed 12/06/11 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

permitted to perform a root canal on the tooth, and that Plaintiff’s only option was to pull the

tooth. Defendant extracted Plaintiff’s tooth. 

Plaintiff complains that Defendant Cate implemented a dental service policy that violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights because it excluded root canals on posterior teeth as an available

treatment. Plaintiff contends that root canals can be performed, but only with prior approval

from the dental authorization review committee. Plaintiff complains that Defendant Gonzales as

warden implemented this policy and is liable under the same theory as Defendant Cate.

Plaintiff contends deliberate indifference by all Defendants. Plaintiff requests as relief

monetary damages.

III. Analysis

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. “The Constitution does

not mandate comfortable prisons.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation and

citation omitted). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). The deliberate

indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation

must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[]

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Id. at 837.

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under

this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the

inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no

matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

3

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 10 Filed 12/06/11 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff again fails to state a claim against Defendants John Doe 1 or John Doe 2 for

deliberate indifference. Regarding John Doe 1, Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that

Defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. Plaintiff has not alleged a sufficiently serious harm at the time Defendant John Doe 1

examined Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s tooth pain was only mild during April of 2010. Additionally,

Defendant John Doe 1's failure to provide a root canal at the time of the incident does not rise to

the level of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff’s allegations amount at most to a difference of

opinion between a medical professional and a prisoner regarding the appropriate course of

treatment, which does not amount to deliberate indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058.

Regarding John Doe 2, Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that Defendant knew of

and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Defendant John

Doe 2's failure to provide a root canal does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The

fact that Plaintiff disagreed with the recommended extraction indicates a difference of opinion

and not deliberate indifference by John Doe 2. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th

Cir.1989). Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that the extraction was chosen “in conscious

disregard of an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. 

As with his original complaint, Plaintiff again names Defendants Cate and Gonzales

based on their supervisory roles. The term “supervisory liability,” loosely and commonly used by

both courts and litigants alike, is a misnomer. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “Government officials

may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of

respondeat superior.” Id. at 1948. Rather, each government official, regardless of his or her

title, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.

When the named defendant holds a supervisor position, the causal link between the

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

1978). To state a claim for relief under § 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege

some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation

of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated

4

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 10 Filed 12/06/11 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional

rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642,

646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Cate or Gonzales. Plaintiff fails to

allege facts which indicate that Defendants personally participated in an allege constitutional

deprivation, knew of constitutional violations and failed to act, or promulgated or implemented a

policy that was so deficient as to be the moving force of a constitutional violation. Hansen, 885

F.3d at 646; Taylor, 880 F.3d at 1045. 

IV. Conclusion And Order

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against any Defendants. Plaintiff was

previously provided leave to amend to cure the deficiencies identified herein, but was unable to

do so. Accordingly, further leave to amend will not be granted. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), this action is

HEREBY DISMISSED, with prejudice, based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted under § 1983. This dismissal is subject to the “three-strikes” provision set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 5, 2011 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

5

Case 1:11-cv-00023-DLB Document 10 Filed 12/06/11 Page 5 of 5