Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00527/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00527-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANGELO PAUL VICTOR 

PAMINTUAN, 

Petitioner,

v. 

DR. JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 15cv527-BEN (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[ECF No. 9] 

 Petitioner Angelo Paul Victor Pamintuan, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, is 

seeking federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by challenging the conviction 

and sentence imposed by the San Diego County Superior Court in case number 

SCN279791. (ECF No. 6 at 1.)1

 On June 16, 2015, Respondent moved to dismiss the 

First Amended Petition asserting it is time barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (ECF 

No. 9.) On July 16, 2015, Petitioner filed a response in opposition to Respondent’s motion 

to dismiss. (ECF No. 13.) Respondent did not file a reply. 

                                                                

1 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer 

to those imprinted by the Court’s electronic case filing (“ECF”) system. 

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 After a thorough review of the pleadings and all supporting documents, the Court 

finds the First Amended Petition is statutorily barred by the expiration of the limitations 

period and that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Accordingly, the 

Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner pleaded no contest to a charge of assault with a deadly weapon likely to 

cause great bodily injury in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1). (ECF No. 10-

1 at 1.) Petitioner also admitted to having a prior felony conviction resulting in a five-year 

enhancement. (Id.) On December 1, 2010, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to thirteen 

years in prison. (ECF No. 10-3 at 1.) Petitioner did not file an appeal of the conviction in 

the California Court of Appeal, nor did he seek review of the conviction in the California 

Supreme Court. (ECF No. 6 at 2.) 

 On July 7, 2014, Petitioner filed in the trial court a motion to modify the five-year 

enhancement arguing that the interests of justice would be served because (a) his trial 

attorney was ineffective in advising Petitioner to accept the plea, and (b) he had been 

rehabilitated in prison. (ECF No. 10-2.) However, on August 13, 2014, the trial court 

denied the motion after determining that it lacked jurisdiction to strike the enhancement 

and the motion was untimely. (ECF No. 10-3.) 

 On September 2, 2014, Petitioner constructively filed a petition for writ of mandate 

to the California Court of Appeal to challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

modify his sentence. (ECF No. 10-4.) On September 16, 2014, the California Court of 

Appeal denied the petition without comment. (ECF No. 10-5.) 

 On October 6, 2014, Petitioner constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Supreme Court claiming that the trial court abused its discretion 

in denying his motion to modify the enhancement. (ECF No. 10-6.) On January 14, 2015, 

the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment. (ECF No. 10-7.) 

 On March 3, 2015, Petitioner constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the Southern District of California, thereby commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On 

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March 23, 2015, the Court dismissed the petition due to Petitioner’s failure to (a) pay the 

$5.00 filing fee; (b) allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies; and (c) sign the petition. 

(ECF No. 4.) To reopen the case, the Court required Petitioner to pay the filing fee and 

submit a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus curing the pleading 

deficiencies. (Id. at 4:4-7.) On April 10, 2015, Petitioner filed the First Amended Petition. 

(ECF No. 6.) 

 The First Amended Petition raises a single ground for relief. Petitioner asserts that 

the state trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process by denying his motion 

to modify the sentence enhancement. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner argues his trial counsel failed 

to provide adequate legal representation and failed to “at the very least explain[] what the 

charges petitioner was pleading to on the [plea] agreement, such as the fact that Petitioner 

would receive a FIVE YEAR PRISON ENHANCEMENT consecutive to the prison term 

for the acts themselves,” and “Petitioner did not have the opportunity to have his defense 

counsel properly challenge any of the charged offenses, nor did counsel file any meaningful 

motions to dismiss any charges, and work to receive a more favorable sentence. Petitioners 

[sic] counsel was ineffective for failing to at the very least, challenge the five year 

enhancement to a one-year enhancement instead.” (Id. at 14:11-19.) Petitioner argues he 

“was denied the right to trial by jury and to confront his accusers, in violation of the Due 

Process Clause, and the Sixth Amendment, and amounting to violations of the Eighth 

Amendment [prohibition against] Crual [sic] Punishment.” (Id. at 6.) Petitioner seeks to 

have the five-year enhancement reduced to a one-year enhancement. (Id. at 14:20-22.) 

 On June 16, 2015, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Petition, 

asserting that Petitioner commenced this action after the expiration of the statute of 

limitations. (ECF No. 9.) On July 16, 2015, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 13.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Respondent argues the Court should dismiss the First Amended Petition because this 

action is time barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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(ECF No. 9 at 3.) Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”), as amended, “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for 

a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period begins to run from the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State 

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, 

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized 

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

 In California, when a prisoner does not appeal his conviction, the judgment becomes 

final sixty days after entry of judgment. See CAL. R. CT., RULE 8.104. Here, Petitioner did 

not appeal his conviction in state court. (ECF No. 6 at 2.) Thus, his judgment became final 

on January 30, 2011, which is sixty days after the trial court sentenced him on December 

1, 2010. (ECF No. 6 at 1; ECF No. 10-1 at 1.) The statute of limitations begins to run on 

the day after judgment becomes final and terminates on the last day of the limitation period. 

See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1). Thus, absent a later start date or any tolling, Petitioner had one 

year, until January 31, 2012, to file a federal habeas petition. Petitioner constructively 

commenced this action on March 3, 2015,2

 more than three years after AEDPA’s one-year 

                                                                

2

 The Court finds that Petitioner should be afforded the benefit of the “prison mailbox 

rule,” which provides that a pro se prisoner’s pleading is deemed filed as of the date the 

pleading is delivered to prison officials. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1106 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Here, Petitioner delivered his initial petition to prison officials on March 3, 

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statute of limitations expired. Therefore, this action is untimely unless Petitioner is entitled 

to a later limitations start date, statutory tolling, or equitable tolling. 

A. Commencement of Limitations Period

 As noted above, AEDPA provides for a one-year statute of limitations, although 

AEDPA postpones the date on which the limitations period begins to run when the prisoner 

is unable to file the petition due to a state-created impediment, upon the retroactive 

application of a newly-recognized constitutional right, or because the factual predicate for 

a claim was not previously known despite due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-

(D). Petitioner does not argue that a state-created impediment prevented him from filing a 

timely petition, nor does he contend that the Supreme Court recently recognized and made 

retroactive the constitutional rights underlying his claims. However, in viewing the 

pleadings in the light most favorable to Petitioner, Petitioner does assert an argument under 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), which acts to postpone the limitations start date to “the date on 

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” 

 Specifically, Petitioner contends that he “was 19 years old at the time [of his plea], 

and had a lack of knowledge regarding penal codes, and strike enhancements, counsel 

should have informed his client what the strike enhancement was, and petitioner . . . would 

have likely pursued trial.” (ECF No. 6 at 14:22-25.) Petitioner also argues in his opposition 

to Respondent’s motion to dismiss: 

In 2010 the Petitioner knew nothing about the legal system. Petitioner’s trust 

was in the public defendant’s office, who was inadequate. After the guilty 

plea, Petitioner educated himself by getting a college degree so that he could 

continue to exercise his due diligence and pursue injustice. Petitioner sought 

help, but no [one] would help him without charging a fee. Petitioner finally 

found free help. . . . Petitioner has been working on this case for years, and a 

                                                                

2015, although the petition was not filed on the Court’s docket until March 6, 2015. (ECF 

No. 1 at 74.) However, even affording Petitioner the benefit of this rule, this action is still 

untimely, for the reasons discussed herein.

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few weeks ago he discovered his current charge [California Penal Code 

§] 245(a)(1), assault by force likely to produce [great bodily injury], was used 

as the second component of his five year enhancement, but it is not a serious 

or violent crime per s.s. 1192.7 or 667.5. Petitioner is factually innocent of 

the 667 (a) five year enhancement. 

(ECF No. 13 at 3:1-11.) 

 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument. Petitioner knew or should have 

known in 2010 that his plea would result in a thirteen-year prison sentence that included a 

five-year enhancement, as the December 1, 2010 Abstract of Judgment clearly indicates as 

much (see ECF No. 10-1 at 1), and Petitioner was aware of the legal services his counsel 

provided him. What Petitioner apparently did not understand was the legal significance of 

those facts. However, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), “the ‘due diligence’ 

clock starts ticking when a person knows or through diligence could discover the vital facts, 

regardless of when their legal significance is actually discovered.” Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 

F.3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 

2003); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001)). Because Petitioner 

knew or should have known of the factual predicate of his claim in 2010 yet he waited 

more than three years after the statute of limitations expired to seek federal habeas relief, 

Petitioner did not exercise the due diligence required to permit a later limitations start date 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Thus, the statute of limitations expired on January 31, 

2012, which is one year from the date Petitioner’s judgment became final. 

B. Statutory Tolling 

 1. Legal Standard 

 AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is tolled during the period of time a petitioner 

seeks post-conviction relief in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Specifically, AEDPA’s 

statutory tolling provision provides: “The time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this 

subsection.” Id. Tolling begins “from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until 

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the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge” as long as 

the petitions are properly filed. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). 

 2. Analysis 

 Here, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Petitioner’s conviction became 

final on January 30, 2011, yet he did not begin to seek collateral relief in state court until 

July 7, 2014, when he filed a petition for writ of mandate. By that time, however, the oneyear limitations period had long-since expired, and his subsequent state petitions, even if 

“properly filed,” do not serve to revive the already-expired statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

1. Legal Standard 

 The United States Supreme Court has determined that equitable tolling is available 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 

(2010). In Holland, the Supreme Court recognized equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year 

limitations period only when the prisoner can show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and 

prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 

(2005)). The Ninth Circuit has also held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is 

subject to equitable tolling. See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision is subject to equitable tolling.”); Calderon v. 

United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other 

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

However, the Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in 

most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Beeler, 128 F.3d 

at 1288 (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)); see 

also Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107 (equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases.”). “[T]he 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

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exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). District judges 

must “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process” and “only 

authorize extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1289. The 

extraordinary circumstances must be the “but-for and proximate cause” of the untimely 

filing. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 A habeas petitioner “bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is 

appropriate.” Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). In other words, the 

burden is on Petitioner to show that “extraordinary circumstances” were the proximate 

cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part. Spitsyn v. 

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

 When courts assess a habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable tolling, they 

must conduct a “highly fact-dependent” inquiry. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) (“As a 

discretionary doctrine that turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, 

equitable tolling does not lend itself to bright-line rules.”). 

 Petitioner’s status as a pro se litigant, though not by itself sufficient to warrant 

equitable tolling, is relevant. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 967, 970 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(in considering whether equitable tolling applies, court “consider[ed] it highly relevant that 

[petitioners] were proceeding pro se until appointed counsel by the district court. . . . [E]ven 

though pro se status alone is not enough to warrant equitable tolling, it informs and colors 

the lens through which we view the filings, and whether these filings made sufficient 

allegations of diligence.” (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990)). 

2. Analysis 

 As noted above, Petitioner claims he did not know that his trial counsel was 

rendering him bad legal advice regarding the plea, and that he lacked knowledge of the 

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legal significance of the facts surrounding his plea and sentence enhancement. To establish 

equitable tolling, Petitioner is required to show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. 

at 418. 

 For the same reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s efforts to obtain an education do 

not entitle him to equitable tolling. Petitioner had knowledge of the facts that led to his 

plea and sentence in 2010. Petitioner attempts to satisfy the due diligence requirement by 

explaining that he obtained a college degree and that he “has been working on this case for 

years.” (ECF No. 13 at 3:7.) Such a generalized statement is not sufficient to establish 

due diligence. Neither is Petitioner’s claim that he did not discover until “a few weeks 

ago” the legal significance of certain facts. In addition, Petitioner fails to establish the 

existence of any “extraordinary circumstances” that prevented him from seeking federal 

habeas relief at an earlier time. Equitable tolling would be available for the vast majority 

of federal habeas petitioners if a lack of legal education amounted to “extraordinary 

circumstances” sufficient to qualify for equitable tolling. However, equitable tolling “is 

unavailable in most cases,” Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107, “lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 In conclusion, the Court finds that Petitioner has not satisfied his burden of 

demonstrating that equitable tolling is appropriate because he fails to demonstrate that he 

has been pursuing his rights diligently and the existence of extraordinary circumstances 

that prevented him from timely seeking federal habeas relief. 

D. Actual Innocence

 As noted above, Petitioner claims he “is factually innocent of the 667(a) five year 

enhancement.” (ECF No. 13 at 3:10-11.) The Court construes this statement to be an 

argument that Petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying prior conviction which is 

the basis for the five-year enhancement. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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1. Legal Standard

 The Supreme Court has recognized that AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to 

an “actual innocence” exception.” See McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 

1924, 1931-32 (2013); see also Lee v. Lambert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 

(holding “that a credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to 

AEDPA’s limitations period.”). “In order to present otherwise time-barred claims to a 

federal habeas court under Schlup, a petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual 

innocence to bring him ‘within the narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice.’” Lee, 653 F.3d at 937 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-

15 (1995)). Schlup provides that if a petitioner “presents evidence of innocence so strong 

that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also 

satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error, the petitioner should be 

allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying claims.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Schlup requires that a “petitioner must show that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” Id. at 327. “This exacting standard ‘permits review only in the extraordinary 

case,’ but it ‘does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner’s guilt or innocence.’” 

Lee, 653 F.3d at 938 (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)). Schlup further 

requires a “petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence -- whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, 

or critical physical evidence -- that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. A 

federal habeas court then “considers all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and 

exculpatory,” to determine “what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” Lee, 

653 F.3d at 938 (citing House, 547 U.S. at 538; Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477-78 

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). “‘[A]ctual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal 

insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998) (citing Sawyer v. 

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)). 

/ / / 

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 However, it has been recognized that “[t]he Schlup test does not work well with a 

petitioner who has pled guilty or no contest rather than gone to trial.” Lewis v. Spearman, 

No. C 12-6221 SI (pr), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145827, at *9 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2013). 

In Lewis, the court assumed without deciding “that the actual innocence gateway would be 

available to a petitioner who has pled no contest,” but the court recognized that it “is an 

open question.” Id. (citing Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (en 

banc)). In Smith, the Ninth Circuit similarly assumed that Schlup’s actual innocence 

gateway was available to a petitioner that entered a no contest plea because “the state ha[d] 

not raised the argument and, more importantly, [the petitioner] ha[d] failed to satisfy the 

requirements under Schlup.” Smith, 510 F.3d 1140 n.9. 

2. Analysis

 In this case the Court will similarly assume that Schlup’s actual innocence gateway 

is available to Petitioner. However, Petitioner cannot pass through this gateway because 

he makes no effort to demonstrate he is actually innocent of the prior conviction underlying 

his sentence enhancement. Rather, he concedes he has a prior conviction. (See ECF No. 

13 at 4:2-6.) His argument is that the record does not demonstrate that his prior conviction 

is the type of conviction sufficient to trigger a five-year enhancement under California law. 

(See id.) This argument is unsupported by any evidence. Thus, the Court is left with the 

only available evidence on this issue, namely, that Petitioner admitted to having a prior 

conviction under California Penal Code §§ 667(a)(1) and 668.3

 (See ECF No. 10-1.) Based 

                                                                

3

 California Penal Code § 667 provides that “any person convicted of a serious felony 

[as defined in Penal Code § 1192.7(c)] in this state or of any offense committed in another 

jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in 

addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year 

enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately.” CAL.

PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1). 

 California Penal Code 668 provides that “[e]very person who has been convicted in 

any other state, government, country, or jurisdiction of an offense for which, if committed 

within this state, that person could have been punished under the laws of this state by 

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on this record, the Court cannot find that Petitioner has demonstrated a miscarriage of 

justice sufficient to excuse compliance with AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

E. Evidentiary Hearing

 In the caption of the First Amended Petition, Petitioner requests an evidentiary 

hearing. (ECF No. 6 at 1.) Although his First Amended Petition does not contain any 

substantive arguments in support of this request, Petitioner does raise the issue in his 

opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, Petitioner contends that “[t]he 

merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing. The Fact finding 

procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing.” 

(ECF No. 13 at 6-9.) Petitioner further contends his “prior and current case rest on a guilty 

plea of a prior. There is no record of the underlying facts that during the burglary ‘a person 

other than an accomplice was present in the residence during the commission of the 

burglary” [Cal. Penal Code §] 667.5(c)(21). Therefore, Petitioner’s prior does not count 

as a strike prior.” (Id. at 4:2-6.) 

 AEDPA prescribes the manner in which federal courts must approach the factual 

record and “substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary 

hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400-01 (2011) (“Section 2254(e)(2) imposes a limitation on 

the discretion of federal habeas courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing.”) 

(citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). In determining whether an 

evidentiary hearing is warranted, a district court presented with a request for an evidentiary 

hearing . . . must determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the 

petitioner’s claim.” Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078. 

                                                                

imprisonment in the state prison, is punishable for any subsequent crime committed within 

this state in the manner prescribed by law and to the same extent as if that prior conviction 

had taken place in a court of this state. The application of this section includes, but is not 

limited to, all statutes that provide for an enhancement or a term of imprisonment based on 

a prior conviction or a prior prison term . . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE § 668. 

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[District courts must also] consider whether such a hearing could enable an 

applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would 

entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. . . . Because the deferential 

standards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a 

federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an 

evidentiary hearing is appropriate. . . . It follows that if the record refutes the 

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district 

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. 

Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. 

 Initially, Petitioner’s citation to California Penal Code § 667.5, which provides for 

the “[e]nhancement of prison terms for new offenses because of prior prison terms,” is 

misplaced. That section provides that when a new offense is contained in that section’s list 

of “violent felonies,” a three-year enhancement will attach for each prior prison term served 

following conviction of prior “violent felonies.” Here, however, Petitioner’s sentence 

enhancement was based on Penal Code § 667, which, as detailed above, see supra note 3, 

provides for a five-year enhancement for any person previously convicted of a serious 

felony. These two sections provide for different enhancements (three years vs. five years) 

based on different lists of prior offenses (violent felonies vs. serious felonies). The fact 

that there is no record demonstrating the existence of a prior offense that would implicate 

§ 667.5(c)(21) is immaterial, as that section was not the statutory basis of Petitioner’s fiveyear enhancement. Thus, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to enable Petitioner to 

prove his factual allegations. 

 Furthermore, because the record establishes that Petitioner’s claim is barred by 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations, as discussed above, Petitioner does not satisfy the exacting 

AEDPA standards prerequisite to receiving an evidentiary hearing, and his request is 

DENIED. 

F. Request for Appointment of Counsel

 In the caption of the First Amended Petition, Petitioner also requests that he be 

appointed counsel, although he does not make any substantive arguments in support of this 

request in either the First Amended Petition or his opposition. (ECF No. 6 at 1.) 

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 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus 

actions by state prisoners. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 

801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 

1986). However, financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever the court “determines that the interests 

of justice so require.’” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (2010); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 

F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984); 

Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). 

 The interests of justice require appointment of counsel when the court conducts an 

evidentiary hearing on the petition. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 

728; Rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The appointment of counsel is discretionary when 

no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 

728. As noted above, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted in this case. Thus, 

appointment of counsel is discretionary. 

 In the Ninth Circuit, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are 

not entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that 

appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 

1196; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-29. The Ninth Circuit considers the clarity and coherence 

of a petitioner’s district court pleadings to determine the necessity of appointment of 

counsel; if clear and understandable, the court typically finds appointment of counsel 

unnecessary. LaMere v. Risely, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987.) “Where the issues 

involved can be properly resolved on the basis of the state court record, a district court does 

not abuse its discretion in denying a request for court-appointed counsel.” Hoggard, 29 

F.3d at 471. 

 Here, it does not appear that appointment of counsel is required to prevent a due 

process violation. There is no indication that the issues are too complex or that Petitioner 

is incapable of presenting his claims. In fact, Petitioner has been able to articulate the 

factual and legal bases of his claim in a thorough, clear, and coherent manner. Therefore, 

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the Court finds that the interests of justice do not require the appointment of counsel. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. CAL. PENAL 

CODE § 667(a)(1). 

III. CONCLUSION 

 After a thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing 

analysis, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be 

GRANTED. 

 The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Roger T. Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than December 23, 2015, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than January 6, 2016. 

 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 

1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 23, 2015 

DAVID H. BARTICK 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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