Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03783/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03783-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MONICA SUD, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 15-cv-03783-JSW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 80, 81 

Now before the Court for consideration is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants 

Charoen Pokphand Foods (“Charoen”), PCL, C.P. Food Products, Inc. (“CP Foods”) (collectively 

the “CP Defendants”). Also before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed by Costco Wholesale 

Corporation (“Costco”) (collectively “Defendants”). The Court has considered the parties’ papers, 

relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it HEREBY GRANTS the motions, and it 

DISMISSES this case with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural History. 

On August 19, 2015, Plaintiff Monica Sud (“Sud”) filed this putative class action asserting 

claims under California’s: Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Business and Professions Code 

sections 17200, et seq.; False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Business and Professions Code sections 

17500, et seq.; and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Civil Code sections 1750, et seq. 

Each of these claims were based on allegations that Costco sold and the CP Defendants supplied 

prawns farmed in Thailand, for which the supply chain was tainted by slavery, human trafficking, 

and other illegal labor practices. 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 1 of 18
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

On January 15, 2016, the Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that 

Sud lacked Article III standing, because she had not alleged facts to show that she purchased 

prawns that were a product of Thailand. (See Dkt. No. 76.) The Court gave Sud leave to amend to 

(1) expand the allegations to cover the purchase of prawns farmed in countries other than 

Thailand; (2) add her mother, Cecilia Jacobo (“Jacobo”) as a class representative to such expanded 

claims; or (3) amend to include an additional class representative who could allege facts showing 

that he or she purchased prawns that are a product of Thailand. On February 19, 2016, Sud and 

Jacobo (“Plaintiffs”) filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), in which they assert a claim 

under the UCL against the Defendants. Plaintiffs also assert a claim under the FAL and under the 

CLRA against Costco. 

B. Factual Background. 

Plaintiffs allege that Costco sells farmed prawns that “come from Southeast Asia, 

including, but not limited to, the countries of Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, and the 

international waters off these countries’ coasts[.]” (FAC ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs allege the supply chain 

for these farmed prawns, specifically the fish used to create fishmeal for the framed prawns 

depends on slavery, human trafficking, and other labor abuses. Plaintiffs also allege that Charoen 

and CP Foods supply such prawns to Costco. (FAC ¶¶ 12-13, 16; see also id., ¶¶ 80-134 

(detailing facts underlying allegations regarding slavery, human trafficking and labor abuses).) 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are aware the feed for the prawns comes from trash fish 

caught on boats that use slave labor or other illegal labor practices, including human trafficking. 

(See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 79, 196.) According to Plaintiffs, Costco publicly states on its website 

that it has a “supplier Code of Conduct which prohibits human rights abuses in our supply 

chain[.]” (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege these statements are misleading, because Costco continues to 

sell prawns that it knows are derived from a supply chain tainted by slavery, human trafficking 

and other human rights violations. Plaintiffs also allege Costco fails to advise consumers of this 

fact and allege that it “market[s] and sell[s] the product in packages which only advise that the 

contents are imported as a product from a foreign country....” (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15-19.) 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 2 of 18
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Plaintiffs also allege the CP Defendants1 are aware the fishmeal for prawns is tainted by 

slave labor, have made public statements that they are “‘committed’ to ensuring that [their] supply 

chain is free from these human rights violations,” continue to sell prawns tainted by these abuses, 

and fail to disclose that fact to California consumers. (See id. ¶¶ 8, 69-79.) 

Plaintiffs each purchased prawns from Costco, which were sourced from Indonesia and 

Vietnam. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38, 41.) Plaintiffs expanded the allegations of their original complaint, and 

they now seek to represent a class of “persons and entities residing in California that [sic], from at 

least 2011, through the present purchased frozen (or previously frozen) Southeast Asian farmed 

prawn products in the United States from Costco[.]” (Id. ¶ 187.) Plaintiffs allege they would not 

have purchased these prawns if they were aware of the facts regarding the supply chain. Plaintiffs 

also allege that they “would want to purchase farmed prawns from Defendants in the future but 

only if Defendants address the human rights abuses in their supply chains and couple that effort 

with full compliance with the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act2 so that Plaintiffs can 

make informed purchasing decisions.” (Id. ¶¶ 26, 42.) 

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in its analysis. 

ANALYSIS 

The facts described in the FAC are tragic and “raise significant ethical concerns.” McCoy 

v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (discussing use of child labor in 

supply chain for cocoa products). The issue this Court faces, as others have before it, “is whether 

California law requires corporations to inform customers” of these facts “on their product 

packaging and point of sale advertising.” Id.; see also Hodson v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 

(N.D. Cal. 2016) (addressing allegations of child labor in supply chain for cocoa products); Dana 

v. The Hershey Company, Inc., No. 15-cv-04453-JCS, 2016 WL 1213915 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 

2016) (same); Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234 (C.D. Cal. 

Feb. 5, 2016) (addressing allegations of slave labor and forced labor in supply chain for seafood 

 

1

 Plaintiffs refer collectively throughout the FAC to the CP Defendants as CP Foods and do 

not clearly distinguish between these two defendants. 

2

 California Civil Code § 1714.43. 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 3 of 18
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

used in petfood); Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, (C.D. Cal. 2015) (same).3 The 

Court concludes Plaintiffs’ claims cannot proceed. 

A. The Court Grants the CP Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. 

The CP Defendants move to dismiss the UCL claim, in part, for lack of Article III 

standing. Because this is a threshold issue, and because the Court finds it dispositive, it does not 

reach the CP Defendants’ alternative arguments.4 The Court evaluates a motion to dismiss for 

lack of Article III standing under Rule 12(b)(1). See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 

(9th Cir. 2011); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(1) may be “facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack on jurisdiction occurs when factual allegations of the complaint 

are taken as true. Federation of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 

(9th Cir. 1996); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the 

pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may 

suffice, for on a motion dismiss, [courts] presume that general allegations embrace those specific 

facts that are necessary to support the claim.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The 

plaintiff is then entitled to have those facts construed in the light most favorable to him or her. 

Federation of African Am. Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1207. 

In order for Plaintiffs to establish standing, they must show they: “(1) suffered injury in 

fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, (3) that is likely to be 

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 

1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Plaintiffs must “‘clearly allege ... facts 

demonstrating’ each element.” Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)). Plaintiffs 

allege that Costco sells prawns sourced by the CP Defendants. (FAC ¶ 72.) However, Plaintiffs 

 

3

 Each of these cases is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit.

4

 The CP Defendants also move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which is their 

primary argument, lack of statutory standing and failure to state a claim. The CP Defendants also 

argue that the Court should equitably abstain from adjudicating this case, and Costco joined in that 

argument. 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 4 of 18
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

do not allege that the prawns they purchased were sourced by either of the CP Defendants, and 

there are no facts in the FAC from which the Court could reasonably infer that is the case. A key 

component of Article III standing is “traceability, i.e., a causal connection between the injury and 

the actions” about which a plaintiff complains. Easter v. American West Financial, 381 F.3d 948, 

961-62 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiffs who could not trace injury to a particular defendant 

did not have standing to sue that defendant). Thus, in cases “where there are multiple defendants 

and multiple claims, there must exist at least one named plaintiff with Article III standing as to 

each defendant and each claim - but a single named plaintiff who can meet these criteria will 

suffice[.]” Reniger v. Huyndai Motor America, 122 F. Supp. 3d 888, 895 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 

In response to the CP Defendants’ argument that, for this same reason, Plaintiffs lack 

statutory standing to pursue the UCL claim, Plaintiffs argue they “need not have purchased every 

product covered by the class,” and that they have standing to assert this claim “regardless of the 

branding.” (Dkt. No. 83, Opp. Br. at 22:6-7, 24:14-15.) Plaintiffs rely on a number of food 

labelling cases in which a defendant argued the plaintiff lacked standing to sue based on products 

the plaintiff had not purchased. In those cases, the issue was whether the plaintiff had standing to 

sue based on products they had not purchased but which had been manufactured or marketed by 

the same defendant or defendants. In each case, at least one of the plaintiffs did allege they 

purchased at least one product from the defendant or defendants. In sum, there was no dispute the 

plaintiffs alleged an injury caused by and traceable to the defendant or defendants. See Brown v. 

The Hain Celestial Group, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889-90 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Cardenas v. 

NBTY, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 984, 992 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, 

Inc., No. 11-cv-2190-EMC, 2012 WL 2990766, at *1, *12-23 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012); Koh v. 

S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 09-CV-927-RMW, 2010 WL 94265, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 

2010).5

 

The McCoy and Hudson courts similarly concluded that the plaintiffs had standing under 

 

5

 Plaintiffs also rely on Colucci v. Zoneperfect Nutrition Company, No. 12-CV-2907-SC, 

2012 WL 6737800 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012). In that case, the court dismissed claims of one of 

the plaintiffs, because he failed to allege he purchased the defendant’s product. Id., 2012 WL 

6737800, at *5.

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 5 of 18
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Article III. Again, in those cases, there was no dispute the plaintiffs purchased a product 

manufactured or marketed by any of the named defendants. See McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 962-

64; Hodson, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1021-23. Because Plaintiffs do not allege they purchased any 

prawns that were produced or marketed by either of the CP Defendants, they fail to allege facts to 

show that they have Article III standing to pursue the UCL claim against the CP Defendants.6

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the CP Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis.7

B. The Court Grants Costco’s Motion. 

Costco argues: (1) it did not owe Plaintiffs a duty to disclose the information at issue; (2) 

the FAL does not apply to omissions; (3) the claims are barred by the safe harbor doctrine; and (4) 

Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief. Because the Court finds the first two arguments 

dispositive, and because those arguments impact Plaintiffs’ ability to state a violation of any of the 

statutes at issue, the Court does not reach Costco’s alternative arguments. 

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court’s “inquiry is limited to the allegations 

in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). Even under the 

liberal pleadings standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim for relief will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 

Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable but must 

allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

 

6

 To the extent Plaintiffs rely on allegations of agency, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and 

concerted actions to show they were injured by the CP Defendants, those allegations are mere 

legal conclusions couched as fact. (See FAC ¶¶ 48-50.) Cf. Easter, 381 F.3d at 962 (concluding 

plaintiffs failed to establish a juridical link between defendants). 

7

 For that same reason, and assuming the Court could assert personal jurisdiction over either 

Charoen or CP Foods, Plaintiffs lack statutory standing under the UCL. Because they have not 

alleged they purchased prawns produced by either of the CP Defendants, they have not alleged 

facts showing they lost money or property as a result of the CP Defendants’ conduct. 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 6 of 18
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

1. Reliance and Statutory Standing Under the CLRA, UCL and FAL. 

The Court begins with Costco’s argument regarding reliance, because Plaintiffs must 

allege reliance to show they have statutory standing to pursue each of their claims. See In re 

Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 289, 326 (2009) (“Tobacco II”); Hodson, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022. 

Based on the facts of this case, this issue will impact the scope of Plaintiffs’ claims. 

In order to show actual reliance, whether based on an affirmative misrepresentation or a 

material omission, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the misrepresentation or omission was an 

“immediate cause of the injury-causing conduct.” Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 328; accord Daniel v. 

Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs need not prove the 

misrepresentation or omission was the “only,” “sole,” “predominant,” or “decisive” cause of the 

injury-causing conduct. Rather, they may show that the misrepresentation or omission was a 

substantial factor in their decision making process. Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225; Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 

4th at 328. If an omission is material, the fact that one would have behaved differently “can be 

presumed, or at least inferred.” Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225. However, a plaintiff cannot use that 

presumption, “if the evidence establishes an actual lack of reliance.” Lanovaz v. Twinings North 

America, Inc., No. 12-cv-02646-RMW, 2014 WL 46822, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2014) (citing, 

inter alia, In re Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 327); cf. In re iPhone Application Litig., 6 F. Supp. 3d 

1004, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (presumption cannot be applied to misrepresentations plaintiffs never 

saw). 

In Daniel, the court identified two “sub-elements” a plaintiff must prove to show an 

omission was a substantial factor in a purchasing decision: awareness; and a change in behavior. 

806 F.3d at 1225-26. The latter sub-element may be presumed if the omitted information is 

material, but a plaintiff must still be able to show she would have been aware of the information if 

it had been disclosed. Id. at 1225-26. In Daniel, the court found that the plaintiffs created a 

genuine issue of material fact about whether they would have been aware of the omitted 

information. There, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the defendant disclosed the allegedly 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 7 of 18
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

omitted information to its dealerships, and plaintiffs testified that they engaged with and obtained 

information from sales staff at the dealerships before they purchased their cars. Id. “Since 

Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to establish a plausible method of disclosure and to establish 

that they would have been aware of information disclosed using that method, there is a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether they in fact relied on” defendant’s omissions. Id. at 1227 

(emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs allege Costco fails to include information about the labor abuses in the supply 

chain for farmed prawns on the packaging and, instead, states only that the prawns are a product of 

a given country. (FAC ¶ 15.) There are sufficient allegations in the FAC from which the Court 

could infer Plaintiffs relied on the statements on the packaging before they purchased the prawns 

at issue and, thus, that they have statutory standing to pursue their claims based on that omission. 

However, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Costco’s conduct are based, in part, on the fact 

that Costco publishes a “Disclosure Regarding Human Trafficking and Anti-Slavery” (the 

“Disclosure”) on its website. They also are based on the fact that Costco advertises a supplier 

Code of Conduct, which purports to prohibit the type of labor abuses described in the FAC. (FAC 

¶¶ 18-20, 59-61.) According to Plaintiffs, through the Disclosure, Costco “affirmatively 

represents to consumers that it makes efforts to monitor its suppliers to eradicate human rights 

abuses in the supply chain.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs also allege that Costco’s “practices are 

fraudulent in that ... Costco affirmatively represents that it enforces standards to prohibit the use of 

slave labor.” (Id. ¶ 196.) 

While the Disclosure might have been a “plausible method” of disclosing the fact that 

Costco sells prawns “tainted” by labor abuses in the supply chain, neither Plaintiff alleges that she 

read or relied on the Disclosure before she purchased prawns from Costco. Therefore, to the 

extent their claims are based allegations that the Disclosure is misleading, either because it 

contains affirmative misrepresentations or because it omits information, Plaintiffs fail to allege 

facts to show reliance. Similarly, Plaintiffs have not alleged they read or relied on Costco’s Code 

of Conduct and, thus, fail to allege facts to show they relied on any affirmative statements in that 

Code. They also fail to allege facts to show they were aware of the Code, such that they could 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 8 of 18
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

premise an omissions claim on it. See, e.g., Stanwood v. Mary Kay, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 

1218 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing claims relating to website and other documents where plaintiff 

did not allege “that she viewed any of those sources, and therefore cannot link her injuries to those 

misrepresentations”). 

Further, although in paragraph 207 Plaintiffs refer to generally “false statements in 

[Costco’s] television, radio, and print advertising, website, brochures, and ... other written and 

oral materials,” they do not allege with particularity any advertisements on which they relied. 

Plaintiffs also do not attempt to allege that Costco engaged in a long term advertising campaign 

about the practices at issue in the FAC, which might otherwise enable them to avoid pleading 

reliance on a particular advertisement with specificity. See Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 328 (holding 

a plaintiff “is not required to necessarily plead and prove individualized reliance on specific 

misrepresentations or false statements where ... those misrepresentations and false statements 

were part of an extensive and long-term advertising campaign”). 

In sum, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ arguments that Costco has made affirmative 

misrepresentations or has made partial representations, their claims must be limited to alleged 

omissions from product packaging. 

1. The Duty to Disclose. 

Plaintiffs allege that, “[g]iven its representations about excluding slave labor from its chain 

of supply, ... Costco has a duty to accurately disclose to consumers that slavery, forced labor and 

human trafficking have been tainting and continue to taint Costco’s supply chain for farmed 

prawns.” (FAC ¶ 25.) Costco moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claims under the UCL and the CLRA, 

in part, on the basis that it did not have a duty to disclose this information. 

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. 

& Prof. Code § 17200. “Since section 17200 is [written] in the disjunctive, it establishes three 

separate types of unfair competition. The statute prohibits practices that are either ‘unfair’ or 

‘unlawful,’ or ‘fraudulent.’” Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins., 112 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1496 (2003). 

To state a claim under the UCL, a “plaintiff must establish that the practice is either unlawful (i.e., 

is forbidden by law), unfair (i.e., harm to victim outweighs any benefit) or fraudulent (i.e., is likely 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 9 of 18
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

to deceive members of the public).” Albillo v. Intermodal Container Servs., Inc., 114 Cal. App. 

4th 190, 206 (2003). The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 

acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in 

the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). 

Plaintiffs allege Costco violated all three prongs of the UCL. The Court will address 

Plaintiffs’ claims under the unlawful and unfair prongs in more detail in Section B._, infra. In this 

portion of the Order, the Court focuses on the claims under the fraudulent prong. Under both the 

UCL and the CLRA, in order to determine whether a representation is misleading, a court 

evaluates whether members of the public are likely to be deceived. Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 312 

(allegations that the fraudulent deception was “actually false, known to be false by the perpetrator 

and reasonably relied upon by a victim who incurs damages” are not necessary) Colgan v. 

Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 680 (2006).8 

A plaintiff may base a UCL claim or a CLRA claim “in terms constituting fraudulent 

omissions, [but] to be actionable the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made 

by the defendant, or an omission of a fact that the defendant was obliged to disclose.” Daugherty 

v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 835 (2006); see also id. at 838 (finding that 

plaintiff failed to state a UCL claim, because “the failure to disclose a fact one has no affirmative 

duty to disclose” is not likely to deceive a reasonable consumer). In general, “California courts 

have ... rejected a broad obligation to disclose[.]” Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 

1141 (9th Cir. 2012); cf. Gray v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 554 Fed. Appx. 608, 609 (9th 

Cir. 2014).9

 

In Wilson, the plaintiffs alleged the defendant was aware of, but concealed, a design defect 

 

8

 The standard is the same under the FAL. See Colgan, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 680. 

9

 Although Gray is unpublished, the Court finds it instructive. The Ninth Circuit concluded 

the plaintiffs could not state a claim under the UCL or the CLRA, on a pure omissions theory, 

where they alleged the defendant failed to disclose internal fuel economy data, which plaintiffs 

alleged was contrary to EPA estimates. Gray, 554 Fed. Appx. at 609. The Gray court reasoned 

“California law instructs that a manufacturer’s duty to its consumers is limited to its warranty, 

unless a safety issue is present or there has been some affirmative misrepresentation.” Id. 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 10 of 18
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

that rendered certain of its laptop computers unusable and that posed a safety risk. Wilson, 668 

F.3d at 1138. The plaintiffs argued a “concealed fact need only be ‘material,’” to state a claim 

under the CLRA and relied on Falk v. General Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. 2007). 

The Wilson court rejected that argument. It distinguished cases on which the plaintiffs had relied 

on the basis that, in those cases, the defendant either made affirmative misrepresentations or the 

cases involved services rather than products. Id. at 1143. It also stated that even if it applied “the 

factors from Falk regarding materiality[,] ... for the omission to be material, the failure must still 

pose safety concerns.” Id., 668 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotations and citation omitted).10 

In Hodson, the plaintiff alleged the defendant, which marketed and distributed chocolate 

products, failed to disclose that some of the cocoa beans used to make its products “come from 

Cote d’Ivoire, where children,” some of whom had been sold or kidnapped, “and forced laborers” 

were forced to work under dangerous conditions. Hodson, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. The court, 

relying on Wilson and “overwhelming authority to the contrary,” found the defendant did not have 

a duty to disclose these “horrific labor practices,” because the plaintiffs neither alleged those 

practices posed a safety risk to consumer nor alleged they were a product defect. Id. at 1025-26. 

Therefore, the court held the “duty to disclose does not extend to situations, as here, where 

information may persuade a customer to make different purchasing decisions.” Id. at 1026; see 

also Wirth, 2016 WL 4711234, at *5-6 (finding, in pure omissions case, defendant had no duty to 

disclose alleged labor violations in fishing industry on packaging for pet food that contained 

seafood caught in Thailand and that was manufactured in Thailand). 

In McCoy, the plaintiff’s claims were essentially identical to the claims alleged in Hodson, 

although they named a different chocolate manufacturer as a defendant. McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d 

at 956 (plaintiff alleged defendant failed “to disclose on [its] packaging of ... chocolate products 

that some of the cocoa used therein originated at farms in [the Ivory Coast] that use slave labor 

 

10 In Falk, the court held a failure to disclose can constitute actionable fraud under the CLRA 

in four circumstances: “(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) 

when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when 

the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant 

makes partial representations but also suppresses some material fact.” Id., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 

(quoting LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 336-37 (1997)). 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 11 of 18
12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

and the worst forms of child labor”).11 Following Wilson and Hodson, the court determined that 

the “the weight of authority limits a duty to disclose under the CLRA to issues of product safety, 

unless disclosure is necessary to counter an affirmative misrepresentation.” Id. at 966. Because 

the plaintiff did not allege an omission of “known dangers to the safety of consumers, there is no 

duty to disclose that is applicable to this case.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue that Wilson’s holding is not as broad as Costco argues, and they urge the 

Court not to follow the reasoning set forth in McCoy, Hodson and Wirth. In support of this 

argument, Plaintiffs rely on the Stanwood case, supra. The Court does not find Plaintiffs’ reliance 

on Stanwood persuasive. First, it “is not free to deviate from the Ninth Circuit’s construction of 

California law in Wilson absent subsequent interpretation from California’s courts that the 

interpretation was incorrect.” Rasmussen v. Apple Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 

2014). Second, it appears that the Stanwood case represents a minority view on this issue. See, 

e.g., Hodson, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1025 (“Stanwood stands alone in” the conclusion that Wilson is 

limited to product liability cases where warranties protected consumers.). Third, the Court finds 

the reasoning set forth in McCoy and Hodson on this issue persuasive. For the reasons set forth in 

those cases, it concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Wilson is not as narrow as the 

Stanwood court construed it to be. See Hodson, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1025-26; McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 

3d at 995-66. 

Finally, the Court concurs with the McCoy court that “some bright-line limitation on a 

manufacturer’s duty to disclose is sound policy, given the difficulty of anticipating exactly what 

information some customers might find material to their purchasing decisions and wish to see on 

product labels.” McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 966; see also Hall v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., 

No. 15-CV-660-CAB-RBB, 2015 WL 9659911, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015) (“Under the 

standard argued by Plaintiffs, any consumer would have standing to sue any company that fails to 

disclose product ingredients or components, or business practices that could cause that consumer 

 

11 The McCoy court also decided the Dana case, cited above. Because the Court’s reasoning 

in Dana is substantially similar to, if not identical to the reasoning in McCoy, which is published, 

this Court has relied on McCoy. 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 12 of 18
13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

to regret patronizing that business.”). 

Plaintiffs do not allege that the labor practices described in the FAC, while horrific, 

constitute a safety risk to consumers or constitute a product defect. On the facts of this case, 

Plaintiffs fail to show Costco had a duty to disclose the allegedly omitted information. Therefore, 

they fail to state a claim under the CLRA and fail to state a claim under the fraudulent prong of the 

UCL. McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 966-67; Hodson, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1026; see also Wirth, 2016 

WL 471234, at *3-*5. Even if Wilson’s holding should be limited to cases involving products 

covered by a warranty, the Court still is not persuaded Plaintiffs have alleged facts to establish a 

duty to disclose. 

As set forth in Falk, there are four circumstances that may give rise to a duty to disclose, 

only three of which are at issue in this case. 496 S. Supp. 2d at 1095. First, Plaintiffs argue 

Costco had exclusive knowledge of the facts, which were not known to Plaintiffs. In McCoy, the 

plaintiff also argued the defendant had a duty to disclose the facts about labor practices in its 

supply chain for cocoa based on its purportedly superior knowledge of the allegedly omitted facts. 

173 F. Supp. 3d at 967. The court noted the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “acknowledge[d] 

on a public website its suppliers use of slave labor,” and also included other public disclosures 

about the use of such labor in the supply chain for cocoa. Id. Based on those allegations, the court 

found she had not alleged the defendant had exclusive or superior knowledge of the facts. Id. 

Plaintiffs, like the plaintiff in McCoy, include numerous paragraphs in the FAC that describe 

public disclosures of the labor conditions in the fishing industry in Thailand and Southeast Asia 

and the manner in which those conditions affect the supply chain for farmed prawns. (See, e.g, 

FAC ¶¶ 64-65, 77-78, 86-89.) The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to show 

that Costco would have superior, let alone exclusive, knowledge of those facts. 

Plaintiffs also assert that Costco actively concealed the facts about the supply chain for its 

farmed prawns, but their argument on this point is focused on their assertion that Costco made 

partial representations. (See Opp. Br. at 6:25-10:21.) In addition, the FAC does not contain any 

facts that would support an inference that Costco actively concealed information about abuses in 

the supply chain for farmed prawns. 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 13 of 18
14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Third, Plaintiffs argue Costco made partial representations but suppressed other material 

facts. In the FAC, the Plaintiffs do allege Costco made partial representations, but those 

allegations pertain to the Disclosure and the Code of Conduct. Plaintiffs do not allege that they 

relied on those statements. In addition, Plaintiffs do not allege Costco made partial 

representations on the product packaging that are misleading absent a disclosure. The Court 

concludes they cannot rely on a partial representation theory to allege a duty to disclose. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Costco’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs 

fail to allege it had duty to disclose the information about labor abuses in the supply chain for 

farmed prawns from Southeast Asia on its product packaging. 

2. The Court Dismisses the Remainder of the UCL Claim. 

Plaintiffs also pursue claims against Costco under the unlawful and unfair prongs of the 

UCL. Costco argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts to support a claim under either prong. 

a. Unlawful prong. 

The UCL’s unlawful prong proscribes “anything that can be properly called a business 

practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 717-18 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). “[A] violation of another law 

is a predicate for stating a cause of action” under the unlawful prong. Berryman v. Merit Property 

Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal. App 4th 1544, 1554 (2007). Plaintiffs allege that Costco’s conduct violates 

the FAL and the CLRA. (FAC ¶ 195.) However, for the reasons set forth in Section B.1 and 

Section B.3, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under either statute. Therefore, they fail to state a UCL 

claim based on alleged violations of those statutes. See, e.g,McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 967; 

Berryman, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1554. 

Plaintiffs also allege that Costco’s conduct “in sourcing and selling farmed prawns actively 

contributes to the use of slave labor in violation of bans on such human trafficking enacted by the 

U.S., California and by international conventions, including but not limited to the Tariff Act of 

1930[,] ... [t]he Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and 

California Penal Code § 236, § 237, et seq.,” and the Supply Chains Act. (FAC ¶ 195.) The 

Supply Chains Act does not clearly speak to product labels, and, to the extent Plaintiffs are 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 14 of 18
15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

attempting to suggest the Disclosure does not comply with the requirements of the Supply Chains 

Act, the Court also has concluded that Plaintiffs lack statutory standing to pursue claims based on 

the Disclosure. With respect to the remaining statutes and the Declaration of Human Rights cited 

in paragraph 195, Plaintiffs do not attempt to show how the allegations in the FAC support alleged 

violations of these laws in their opposition brief. Rather, they simply repeat the allegations set 

forth in the FAC. (Compare FAC ¶ 195 with Opp. Br. at 12:4-12.) 

The Court concludes Plaintiffs fail to plead a violation of the UCL’s unlawful prong. 

b. Unfair Prong. 

The UCL also proscribes business practices that are “unfair,” but it does not define that 

term. In Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., the California Supreme 

Court considered a number of definitions relied upon by the courts of appeal and found they were 

“too amorphous and provide too little guidance to courts and businesses.” 20 Cal. 4th 163, 185 

(1999). The Cel-Tech court determined that, in claims between direct competitors, “the word 

‘unfair’ ... means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the 

policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation 

of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” Id. at 187. The Cel-Tech

court “limited” the test to claims between competitors and to allegations of anticompetitive 

practices. Id. at 187 n.12. Thus, “the proper definition of ‘unfair’ conduct against consumers ‘is 

currently in flux’ among California courts.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 

1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 

2007)); see also McVicar v. Goodman Global, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 

(citing Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc., 198 Cal. App. 4th 230, 252 (2011)). 

To the extent California courts examine whether the alleged practice “is immoral, 

unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers” and weigh “the utility 

of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim,” the Court 

concludes Plaintiffs do not allege facts to satisfy this test. See Boschma, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 252 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). As in the McCoy and Hodson cases, the harm 

Plaintiffs have alleged is that they would not have purchased the farmed prawns had they been 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 15 of 18
16 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

aware of the potential of slave and forced labor in the supply chain. In Hodson, the court held 

that, given the harm at issue, the defendant’s conduct was not “unfair” within the meaning of the 

UCL. 

Such information [about the prospect for child labor in the 

defendant’s supply chain] is, in fact, readily available to consumers 

on Mars’s website. Given that Hodson, like any other consumer, 

has access to information about the source of Mars’s cocoa beans, 

the absence of such information on the packaging is not 

“substantially injurious to consumers” or necessarily immoral. 

Granting that the labor practices at issue are immoral, there remains 

an important distinction between them and the actual harm for 

which Hodson seeks to recover, namely his purchase of Mars’s 

chocolate products absent any disclosure. Mars’s failure to disclose 

information it had no duty to disclose in the first place is not 

substantially injuries, immoral, or unethical[.] 

162 F. Supp. 3d at 1027; accord McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 969. The Court agrees with this 

reasoning. 

Similarly, to the extent California courts require a UCL claim to be “tethered to specific 

constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions,” the Court concludes Plaintiffs’ allegations are 

not sufficient. See Boschma, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 252 (citations omitted). Again, as in the McCoy

and Hodson cases, “the crux of” Plaintiffs’ claim “is not that [Costco] used slave labor ..., but 

rather that [Costco] does not disclose the existence of those labor abuses in its supply chain on the 

packaging of its products.” McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 968; see also Hodson, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 

1027. As in those cases, the Plaintiffs have not identified a particular policy or other statutory or 

regulatory provision that demonstrate “it is ‘unfair’ within the meaning of the UCL for [a] 

manufacturer to fail to disclose” such violations on its product packaging. McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 

3d at 968. The Court concludes Plaintiffs have failed to allege a violation of the unfair prong of 

the UCL. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Costco’s motion to dismiss for these reasons as well. 

3. The Court Dismisses the FAL Claim. 

Costco moves to dismiss the FAL claim on the basis that the FAL does not apply to 

omissions. The FAL states, in part, that “[i]t is unlawful for any ... corporation ... with intent 

directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property... to make or disseminate ... any 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 16 of 18
17 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

statement ... which is known, or by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue 

or misleading[.]” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. “[M]any courts have held a plaintiff who 

asserts that a business omitted a material fact in its advertisements, labels, or literature has not 

stated a claim under the FAL.” Hodson, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1023. However, some courts have 

concluded otherwise. Id. (citing cases). 

The Hodson court found these two lines of cases were “not necessarily discordant.” Id. It 

concluded that if “the crux of a plaintiff’s FAL claim is that the defendant did not make any 

statement at all about a subject, then a claim under the FAL may not advance.” Id. However, if a 

plaintiff alleges “the defendant actually made a statement, but omitted information that undercuts 

the veracity of the statement,” a claim under the FAL could proceed. Id. Because the plaintiff 

Hodson alleged the defendant failed “to issue any statement at all” about the alleged labor abuses 

in its supply chain. Therefore, the court concluded he failed to state a claim for relief and 

dismissed the FAL claim without leave to amend. Id.

In McCoy, the court also found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FAL. 

McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 969-70. The court reasoned that the “plain language of the statute -- 

which prohibits making, disseminating, or causing the dissemination of false or misleading 

statements -- does not encompass omissions.” Id. at 969 (emphasis in original). It then 

distinguished a number of cases on which the plaintiff relied and concluded those cases either 

failed to address the issue or involved at least some form of affirmative misrepresentation. Id. at 

969-70. It concluded, following Hodson, that because the plaintiff’s claims were based solely on 

omissions, she failed to allege the defendant “‘made or disseminated or caused to be made or 

disseminated’ any false or misleading statement,” and failed to state a claim under the FAL. Id. at 

970 (brackets in McCoy omitted). 

Plaintiffs here have not expressly limited their claims to pure omissions, and although the 

FAC includes allegations about partial or affirmative representations. However, as the Court has 

concluded, Plaintiffs do not allege they relied on those statements, and it is clear from the FAC 

that the crux of their claims is that Costco omitted information about labor abuses in its supply 

chain from the product packaging. That is, the “focus” of their “claim is on the message that does 

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 17 of 18
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

not

Co

cla

alle

C.

am

296

246

dis

Ho

bas

ori

the

ori

any

Pla

cla

file

Da

t appear on” 

urt finds the

aim is based 

eged omissio

Accord

The Co

In gene

mend, unless 

6 (9th Cir. 1

6-47 (9th Ci

strict court’s 

otel, 726 F.3d

sis of standin

ginal motion

e Court’s ruli

ginal Compl

y of Costco’

aintiffs furth

For the 

aims with pre

e. 

IT IS S

ated: January

Costco’s pr

e reasoning i

on pure omi

ons, they fai

dingly, the C

ourt Denies 

eral, if the all

amendment 

990); Cook, 

r. 1990). Ho

discretion to

d 1124, 1133

ng. Howeve

ns to dismiss

ing on the is

laint and the

s statements

er leave to a

foregoing re

ejudice. The

SO ORDER

y 24, 2017 

rawn product

n McCoy an

issions, it can

l to state a c

ourt GRANT

Plaintiffs L

legations are

would be fu

Perkiss & L

owever, whe

o deny leave

3 (9th Cir. 2

er, the Defen

s that they ha

ssue of duty,

e FAC that th

s in other con

amend. 

easons, the C

e Court shall

RED. 

18

t packaging.

nd Hodson pe

nnot proceed

laim under t

TS Costco’s

Leave to Am

e insufficient

utile. See, e.g

Liehe, Inc. v.

ere a plaintif

e to amend is

013). In its 

ndants each r

ave raised in

and given P

heir reliance 

ntexts, the C

CONCLU

Court GRAN

l enter a sepa

___

JEF

Un

8

. Id. at 1024

ersuasive, an

d. Because P

the FAL. 

s motion to d

mend. 

nt to state a c

g. Reddy v. L

 N. Cal. Col

ff has previo

s particularly

previous Or

raised many 

n their renew

Plaintiffs’ co

 was based o

Court conclud

USION 

NTS the mot

arate judgme

__________

FFREY S. W

nited States D

4 n.3 (empha

nd it conclud

Plaintiffs’ cl

dismiss on th

claim, a cour

Litton Indus

llection Serv

usly amende

y broad[.]” S

rder, the dism

of the same

wed motions 

onsistent repr

on product p

des it would

tions to dism

ent, and the 

___________

WHITE 

District Judg

asis in origin

des that whe

laims are lim

his basis as w

rt should gran

s., Inc., 912 F

v., Inc., 911 F

ed a complai

Salameh v. T

missed solely

 arguments i

to dismiss. 

resentations 

packaging, ra

d be futile to 

miss, and it d

Clerk shall c

__________

ge 

nal). The 

en an FAL 

mited to 

well. 

nt leave to 

F.2d 291, 

F.2d 242, 

int, “a 

Tarsadia 

y on the 

in their 

In light of 

in the 

ather than on

grant 

dismisses the

close the 

________ 

n

Case 4:15-cv-03783-JSW Document 93 Filed 01/24/17 Page 18 of 18