Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_98-cv-00528/USCOURTS-azd-4_98-cv-00528-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FRANK J. KONARSKI, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

CITY OF TUCSON, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 98-528-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from

Dismissal Order and Discretionary Denial of Order for New Trial/Re-File [Doc. # 57].

Respondents have filed a Response and Petitioner hasfiled a Reply. Oral argument has been

requested, but the Court finds pursuant to L. R. Civ. 7.2(f) that a hearing is not necessary to

assist the Court in making its decision.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 30, 1999, the Honorable Raner C. Collins of the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona dismissed Plaintiff's suit against the City of Tucson. Judge

Collins denied Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion for Authority

to Refile Complaint on October 14, 1999. Plaintiff now moves for relief from judgment

under Rule 60(b)(6), claiming that Tameron Collins, the "blood-relative son" of Judge

Collins, was employed by the City of Tucson's Human Resources Department during

Plaintiff's case before Judge Collins. Motion at 4. There is no basis to conclude from

Case 4:98-cv-00528-CKJ Document 75 Filed 10/11/07 Page 1 of 7
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Plaintiff's Motion that Tameron Collins is Judge Collins' son. In his Reply, however,

Plaintiff provides a basis to conclude that Tameron Collins is Judge Collins' adult child. The

Court will assume for the purpose of resolving this Motion that Tameron Collins is Judge

Collins' adult child and that Tameron Collins was employed by the City of Tucson at the time

Judge Collins issued his order.

Applicability of Rule 60(b)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a court "on motion and upon such terms

as are just" to "relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . (6) any

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

Bias or perceived bias of a judge justifies relief in some cases. Liljeberg v. Health Svcs.

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 867 (1988) (judge who was a trustee of a university should

have recused himself from a case where the university was a party, the statute required

disqualification, and his involvement created a strong appearance of impropriety). Because

a "very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be

preserved," the Court reiterated that it is only appropriate to invoke Rule 60(b)(6) in

"'extraordinary circumstances.'" Id. at 873 (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S.

193, 199 (1950)). The rule can only be used "where extraordinary circumstances prevented

a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment." U.S. v.

Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Here, Plaintiff claims that the alleged father-son relationship between Judge Collins

and Tameron Collins, an employee of the City of Tucson, implicates Rule 60(b)(6). The

Court disagrees. In Liljeberg, the judge was a trustee of a party, and the appearance of

impropriety was extreme. 486 U.S. at 867. Here, the claim is only that the Judge has an

adult, non-dependent child employed by the City of Tucson, and whose department was not

involved in the litigation. Judge Collins' child had no perceivable interest in the outcome of

a police brutality claim against the city, whereas the judge in Liljeberg presided over a case

where he had been a trustee of Loyola University and the success of negotiations in which

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he was involved in that capacity "turned, in large part, on Liljeberg prevailing in the

litigation." Id. at 850. Furthermore, it has been almost eight years since judgment was

entered against Plaintiff, and the alleged impropriety has just now been claimed. If Plaintiff

himself failed to notice the alleged impropriety for nearly eight years, it is practically

impossible that the integrity of the judicial system has been put into doubt in the public eye.

The Court also notes that if Plaintiff did in fact notice the impropriety during the initial

proceedings and simply waited to plead it for tactical purposes, Rule 60(b)(6) is not properly

implicated. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d at 1049. 

Moreover, as Defendants note, the relevant rule in this case is not Rule 60(b)(6), but

Rule 60(b)(2). Plaintiff himself claims that his motion is predicated on a "recent judicialconflict revelation this month [June 2007] . . . ." Motion at 1. This brings his motion within

the scope of Rule 60(b)(2), which governs motions based on "newly discovered evidence

which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time for a new trial under Rule

59(b)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). It is no wonder that Plaintiff chose not to invoke this rule,

because he could make no plausible claim that the information he has recently discovered

could not have been discovered by him with due diligence in time to move for a new trial

(ten days after the entry of judgment). Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b). Plaintiff's case was dismissed

on August 30, 1999, and his Motion for New Trial was denied on October 14, 1999. The

new evidence Plaintiff presents, if true, shows that Tameron Collins has worked for or been

"associat[ing] with" the City of Tucson "since August 17, 1998." Motion at 3. Plaintiff

cannot maintain that this fact could not have been discovered with due diligence in the 388

days that passed before the last day he could have filed a Rule 60(b)(2) motion. Attempts

to use Rule 60(b)(6) to circumvent the time limits in other provisions of Rule 60 are

improper. Margoles v. Johns, 798 F.2d 1069, 1073 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Relief under Rule

60(b)(6) is proper only if the grounds asserted for relief do not fit under any of the other

subsections of Rule 60(b) . . . Otherwise, a movant could use subsection (6) to circumvent

the rather demanding time limitations placed on a motion under subsections (1) through

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(3)."); see, e.g., Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d at 1050 ("Rule 60(b)(6) is not a

substitute for 60(b)(1)."). Neither is it a substitute for Rule 60(b)(2). 

"Discretionary Denial" of Motion for New Trial

Plaintiff claims that Judge Collins' denial of his Motion for New Trial was

"discretionary." Motion at 2. Judge Collins made clear in his October 14, 1999, Order that

the dismissal of Plaintiff's case was "outside the parameters of A.R.S. § 12-504 and no relief

is available under that statute" because that statute by its own terms does not apply to final

judgments on the merits. Order at 2. Because Plaintiff's case was dismissed under Rule 41(b)

for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court orders, the dismissal operates as a

final judgment on the merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Judge Collins therefore had no choice

but to deny Plaintiff relief under § 12-504, and he made this clear in the Order. 

Plaintiff misunderstands the language that immediately followed this analysis:

"Further, because relief under the statute would be discretionary with the Court, the Court

believes that such relief is not warranted based on the record of this action." Order at 2.

Judge Collins was noting that even if relief were allowed under § 12-504, the court would

not have been required to grant relief, but would have had the discretion whether to do so,

and the facts of Plaintiff's case led Judge Collins to opine that he would not have granted

relief, anyway. This was the "discretionary denial" Plaintiff complains of. Judge Collins was

bound by the law not to grant relief, as he noted in the Order, and his assessment of whether

he would have granted relief if the law had allowed him to is dicta, not judicial action, and

hence there is nothing in it for Plaintiff to challenge.

Statutory Obligation to Recuse

A federal judge has a duty to disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Plaintiff notes that United

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States v. Amico requires recusal based on the appearance of impropriety. 486 F.3d 764, 775

(2nd Cir. 2007). He is correct. The question is: "would an objective, disinterested observer

fully informed of the underlying facts, entertain significant doubt that justice would be done

absent recusal?" Id. The Court does not believe that in this case an objective, disinterested

observer would entertain significant doubt that Judge Collins could properly administer

justice in a police brutality claim against the City of Tucson simply because Judge Collins'

adult child was employed in the City's Human Resources Department when the claim was

litigated. 

Amico concerned a judge who improperly failed to recuse himself because of prior

financial dealings with a key government witness. Id. at 775-76. The court there concluded

that an objective observer would doubt the impartiality of the judge because of the judge's

potential motivation to discredit a witness (McNamara) who had previously made

accusations against the judge concerning a mortgage application–allegations that were

similar to those McNamara made at trial against the defendant. Id. The Second Circuit

noted that during the trial the judge had commented on the witness' past accusations against

him, calling them "upsetting and offending." Id. at 776. The defendants' motion for recusal

in that case was also joined by the government, an unusual situation making concern over the

judge's partiality evident to any objective observer. Id. 

Unlike in Amico, this case does not involve any prior dealings with parties or

witnesses relevant to the subject matter of the claims before the court, or any comment by

the judge during the proceedings that would lead an objective observer to perceive bias.

Also, the government here is not advocating recusal. An objective, disinterested observer

to the proceedings would not entertain significant doubt that Judge Collins could properly

administer justice in this case. See Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 599-600 (5th Cir.

2004) (district judge not required to recuse when his wife was an employee of the district

attorney's office litigating matters in his court). 

A federal judge also has a duty to disqualify himself if " . . . a person within the third

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degree of relationship [to the judge]" is an "officer . . . of a party . . . [or] is known by the

judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(5)(i) and (iii). Plaintiff claims that because Judge Collins'

adult child was an employee of the City of Tucson during Plaintiff's case, Judge Collins also

should have disqualified himself under these subsections of the statute. Plaintiff has not

shown that Tameron Collins' position in the Human Resources Department of the City of

Tucson qualifies as an "officer" of the City as opposed to an "employee" or that Tameron

Collins' interests could have been "substantially affected" by the outcome of a police brutality

claim against the City. 

First, the Supreme Court has long recognized that not every employee is an "officer."

United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878) (holding that an employee was not an

"officer" of the United States if he had not been appointed by the President or the head of a

department, which was necessary according to the constitutional definition of "officer").

Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Tameron Collins was ever an "officer" of the City of

Tucson according to whatever definition is used in the City's charter or incorporating

instrument. The City of Tucson's Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations

distinguishes between "officers" and "employees." Tucson Civ. Svc. Commn. R. and Regs.,

Rule II, § 2(b). 

Second, a judgment against the City would affect Tameron Collins only in the same

way as any resident of Tucson would be affected by the effect on the City's budget. This is

not enough to meet the "substantially affected" requirement. There is no basis for believing

that Tameron Collins' pay, benefits, or other interests related to city employment would be

"substantially affected," or affected at all for that matter, by the outcome of Plaintiff's case.

In summary, Plaintiff has not shown an appearance of impropriety, that Tameron

Collins was an "officer" of the City of Tucson during Plaintiff's case, or that Tameron Collins

had an interest that could be "substantially affected" by the outcome of the case. Even if all

these things were true, Plaintiff has no recourse to relief under Rule 60 because his motion

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is untimely. 

Sanctions

Defendant asks the Court to impose sanctions against Plaintiff by ordering the

payment of costs and attorneys' fees, pointing out that Plaintiff has been admonished about

filing meritless claims. Order, May 1, 2007, CIV-06-177 at 3:27-28 (warning that the court

would consider sanctions if Plaintiff continued to file the same claims already ruled upon by

district court judges). However vexatious Plaintiff has been in the past, the present Motion

is not a repetitive claim, but rather a new Motion based on allegations not previously

claimed. In its discretion, the Court declines to impose sanctions.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Motion for Accelerated Hearing [Doc. # 64] is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Dismissal Order and

Discretionary Denial of Order for New Trial/Re-File [Doc. # 57] is DENIED,

and;

3. Defendant's Request for Sanctions is DENIED.

DATED this 10th day of October, 2007.

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