Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00725/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00725-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO MORENO, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, MAX

FERNANDEZ, JOSHUA PINO, JOHN

VANELLA, UNKNOWN POLICE

OFFICERS, 1-10, 

Defendants.

CIV-S-01-0725 DFL DAD 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Mario Moreno obtained a favorable jury verdict in

his civil rights action against the City of Sacramento and three

of its employees. He now seeks to recover “a reasonable

attorney’s fee” for work performed by attorneys Andrea Miller

(“Miller”) and Steven P. Belzer (“Belzer”) as provided by 42

U.S.C. § 1988. For the reasons discussed below, the court awards

Moreno: (1) $428,053.00 in attorney’s fees and $39,680.12 in

expenses for work Miller and her staff performed; (2) $20,594.33

in costs; and (3) $82,707.50 in attorney’s fees for work Belzer

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 Moreno raised this total to $704,858.07 in his Reply to 1

Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

because he underestimated the amount of time Miller and her staff

would spend on post-trial motions.

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and his paralegal performed.

I.

Following a one-week trial, a jury found that the City of

Sacramento and three of its employees violated Moreno’s civil

rights by seizing and destroying his property without affording

him due process of law. Miller and Belzer represented Moreno at

trial and in the lengthy pre-trial proceedings. Following trial,

Moreno submitted: (1) a bill of costs totaling $26,211.80; (2) a

motion for fees for Miller totaling $689,377.07; and (3) a 1

motion for fees for Belzer totaling $115,800.00. (Miller Mot. at

17; Belzer Mot. at 16.) Defendants objected to dozens of items

listed in Moreno’s bill of costs and to parts of both requests

for attorney’s fees. (Obj. at 1-6; Miller Opp’n at 1-10.) 

II.

A. Costs

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 provides that “costs other than attorneys’

fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless

the court directs otherwise.” Local Rule 54-292(f) provides a

list of “items taxable as costs.” These include clerk’s fees,

fees for service of process, court reporter’s fees, docket fees,

fees for copying necessary documents, bond premiums, witness per

diem, and costs on appeal. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Defendants object to 52 items on Moreno’s bill of costs. In

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response, Moreno withdrew the following expenses and added them

to his Motion for Attorney’s Fees for Miller: (1) $1,672.50 in

expert witness fees; (2) $600 in non-testifying witness fees; (3)

$105 for the Civil Appeals Docketing Statement filing fees; (4)

$26.29 in travel fees; and (5) any expenses listed on the bill of

costs that are denied by the court. (Resp. at 4,7.) 

Consequently, Moreno requests an award of $23,808.01 in costs. 

1. State Court Filing Fees

Defendants object to $322.80 in state court filing fees

because this case was not removed from state court. (Obj. at 1.) 

This expense is not taxable as a cost. See Pershern v. Fiatalis

N. Am. Inc., 834 F.2d 136, 140 (8th Cir. 1987). Moreno’s request

to tax this expense as a cost is DENIED. 

2. Fee for Expert Witness Subpoena

Defendants object to $35 in costs for serving a subpoena on

Franz Broker (“Broker”), an expert witness who did not testify at

trial. (Obj. at 1.) Moreno claims that Broker’s testimony would

have been similar to another expert’s testimony and because the

court limited the time allotted for trial, Moreno decided not to

call Broker. (Resp. at 2.) Moreno concedes that witness fees

for Broker are improper, but argues that serving him with a

subpoena was necessary. (Id.) 

The expense of serving Broker properly would be considered a

cost had he testified. Local Rule 54-292(f)(2). Since he did

not testify, however, the necessity of serving him is not

apparent, particularly given that Broker’s testimony was

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corroborative at best, cumulative at worst. Moreno’s argument

that he was only prevented from calling Broker because of the

time limits is unconvincing because Moreno knew this information

two weeks before he served Broker. (5/5/2005 Minute Order.) 

Moreno presents no other justification for this cost. Moreno’s

request to tax this expense as a cost is DENIED. 

3. Remaining Objections

Defendants’ remaining forty-five objections can be divided

into four groups: (1) costs related to law and motion

transcripts; (2) deposition costs; (3) copy and exemplification

costs; and (4) internal copying costs. 

a. Costs Related to Law and Motion Transcripts

Defendants object to $45.50 in law and motion transcripts. 

(Obj. at 1-2.) Defendants contend that these transcripts were

“not necessarily obtained for use in this case.” (Id.) Moreno

argues that: (1) the only use for such transcripts was to

prosecute this case; (2) ordering the transcripts was

necessitated by defendants’ actions; and (3) defendants listed

similar transcripts on the bill of costs which they submitted

earlier in the case. (Resp. at 2.) Transcripts are taxable as

costs. Local Rule 54-292(f)(3). These appear to be legitimate

requests, therefore, Moreno’s request to tax this expense as a

cost is GRANTED. 

b. Deposition Costs

Defendants object to a total of $475 in postage and handling

for transcripts, $20 in ASCII disks, $34.75 in “certified

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 Each deposition transcript bill has a separate charge for 2

the “Original & One Certified Copy.” There is no indication that

this charge is discounted because of the Realtime/LiveNote

purchase.

 These expenses were for creating, copying, or enhancing 3

CDs, videotapes, photographs, and cassettes. (Id.) 

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question” charges, and $20 in fees for condensed transcripts. 

(Obj. at 2-3.) These charges are related to handling some 32

depositions. (Id.) These are appropriately taxable as costs.

Local Rule 54-292(f)(3). Moreno’s request to tax these expenses

as a cost is GRANTED. 

Defendants object to $2,059.80 in Realtime/LiveNote charges

arising from the 32 depositions. (Obj. at 2-3.) Moreno argues

that the Realtime/LiveNote service alleviates the need to request

expedited transcripts or to reorder a lost transcript. (Resp. at

3.) However, expedited and replacement transcripts are not

necessary costs. These services appear primarily designed to

facilitate trial preparation by making transcripts more

functional. They are billed separately from, and are in addition

to, the fee for the actual deposition transcript. Consequently, 2

although they are billed by the court reporter, they are not the

“court reporter’s fees” described in the local rule. Moreno’s

request to tax this expense as a cost is DENIED. 

c. Copy and Exemplification Costs

Defendants object to including expenditures for six

electronic exemplifications in the award for costs. (Obj. at 3

4.) Moreno contends that these electronic exemplifications

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Specifically, the exemplifications included community and 4

city council meetings and the video of the demolition. There

were also charges for clean up and enhancement, transcription,

and for transferring data between mediums. (Resp. at 4.)

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should be included in the cost award because they are related to

the case. Of the six receipts challenged by defendants, only 4

one specifically indicates what is contained on the electronic

exemplification. Three of the other five only state that they

are for the Moreno case. The other two receipts reflect a $17.65

charge for photograph development at Raley’s Supermarket and a

$239.10 charge for transferring media stored on video tapes and

cassettes to DVDs and CDs, respectively. 

Expenses related to exemplifications “necessarily obtained

for use in the case” are taxable as costs. Local Rule 54-

292(f)(5). Moreno has the burden of showing that these were

necessary expenses. Moreno has put forth no evidence other than

an unlabeled receipt to demonstrate his need to use the

photographs at trial. This is an insufficient showing. Moreno’s

request to tax this expense as a cost is DENIED. 

The decision to transfer media from an analog to a digital

format appears to have facilitated presentation of the case by

permitting counsel to store all exhibits on a single computer

from which they could be shown or played to the jury. In the

context of a complex trial, such a cost is fairly described as

necessary. Moreno’s request to tax this expense as a cost is

GRANTED. Because they appear to have been used at trial,

Moreno’s request to tax the four remaining electronic

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exemplifications as a cost is GRANTED. 

Defendants object to $378.88 in color copies. (Obj. at 5.) 

Moreno indicates that these documents were used to make the four

exhibit books used at trial. (Resp. at 5.) This is an

appropriate exemplification under Local Rule 54-292(f)(5). 

Moreno’s request to tax this expense as a cost is GRANTED. 

Defendants object to $352.44 in copies. (Obj. at 5.) 

Defendants point out that: (1) the receipt lacks any indication

that the documented expense relates to this case; (2) there is no

indication of why the copies were made; and (3) there is no

corresponding line item in the detail at pages 58-62 of the bill

of costs to account for this charge. (Id.) Moreno contends that

“[i]t is clear” that these are “case related evidentiary

photographs relevant to testimony for trial.” (Resp. at 5.) 

The court disagrees. The handwriting on the receipt

reproduced in the bill of costs is mostly illegible. (Bill of

Costs (“BOC”) at 75.) It is impossible to tell the content,

date, and purpose of the photocopies. Moreover, Moreno does not

address this specific receipt in his response. (Resp. at 5.) 

Instead, he provides a general statement equating this receipt to

four other documents listing charges. (Id.) Those four other

documents, however, are not receipts. More importantly, those

documents clearly indicate Moreno’s case number and provide

descriptions of the charges. They share no similarities with

this receipt. Moreno has not shown that these copies were

necessary for this case. Moreno’s request to tax this expense as

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a cost is DENIED. 

Defendants object to four sets of charges that are without

supporting receipts or other documentation. (Obj. at 5.) Moreno

contends that these documents reveal that each listed charge is

related to “evidentiary photographs relevant to testimony for

trial.” (Resp. at 5.) Although Moreno fails to provide a

receipt for these charges, most are described and all indicate

that they were used for this case. (See BOC at 77-80.) Moreno’s

request to tax these expenses as a cost is GRANTED because: (1)

the descriptions appear relevant; (2) the costs appear reasonable

per the description; and (3) there is no indication that these

services were double-billed.

Finally, defendants object to: (1) an incorrectly paid bill;

(2) three charges that are not reflected as line items in the

details at pages 58-62; and (3) $55.90 for photocopies of the

state court file of this case. (Obj. at 5-6.) Moreno contends

that the alleged incorrectly paid bill was appropriately

documented and paid. (Resp. at 5.) The court finds that the

bill is documented and was related to a necessary

exemplification. (BOC at 81-82). Moreno’s request to tax this

expense as a cost is GRANTED. 

Moreno contends that the expense of copying the superior

court file is taxable as a cost because defendants attempted to

tax this expense as a cost. (Id. at 5-6.) Moreno does not aver

that he used the documents at trial or that they were necessary

for his case. Because only necessary exemplifications are

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properly taxable as costs, the court DENIES Moreno’s request to

tax the expense of copying the state court file as a cost. 

Moreno does not address the other three charges. Therefore,

Moreno’s request to tax these expenses as costs is DENIED. 

d. Internal Copying Fees

Defendants object to $3,979.25 in “internal copying” fees. 

Defendants allege that the copies were made for the convenience

of counsel, that the tabulation in the bill of costs makes no

reference to this case, and that Moreno failed to identify what

the copies were for on the bill of costs tabulation. (Obj. at

6.) Moreno argues that such fees are proper and that the

$3,979.25 expense is limited to those copy jobs on the bill of

costs tabulation that included a description and were identified

with this case. (Resp. at 6.) Moreno does not allege that the

copies were not for his counsel’s convenience. Instead, he

argues that the correct test is whether they were “necessarily

obtained for use in the case.” Local Rule 54-292; 28 U.S.C. §

1920(4); Haagen Dazs Co., Inc. v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice

Creams, Inc., 920 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In Haagen Dazs, the court of appeals upheld a district

court’s decision to award costs for half of 320,000 copies made

in the course of litigation. 920 F.2d at 587. The decision was

based on a finding that these copies were necessarily for use in

the case even though none were introduced at trial. Id. 

Moreno’s original bill of costs reflects that he pared down the

amount of copies for which he seeks a cost award from $6,467.75

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to $3,979.25. Each copy job in his request is linked to this

case and has a description. (See BOC at 100-11.) Moreno’s

request to tax this expense as a cost is GRANTED. 

For the reasons stated above, the correct amount of costs to

be awarded is $20,594.33. 

B. Attorney’s Fees

As the prevailing party in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Moreno

seeks attorney’s fees and reasonable expenses under 42 U.S.C. §

1988. Absent special circumstances, the court should award

Moreno a reasonable attorney’s fee. See Hensley v. Eckert, 461

U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983). 

Moreno requests a total of $704,858.07 in fees and expenses

for Miller. (Miller Reply at 16.) He alleges that he has

accrued pre-trial and trial fees for Miller in the amount of

$637,163.75, ancillary expenses in the amount of $35,842.82, and

post-trial fees in the amount of $31,851.50. (Id.) In addition,

Moreno requests an additional $5,249.38 in ancillary expenses

that were improperly listed as costs. 

Moreno requests $115,800.00 in fees for Belzer. (Belzer

Mot. at 16.) He alleges that he has accrued pre-trial and trial

fees for Belzer in the amount of $113,520.00 and fees for the

motion for fees in the amount of $2,280.00. (Id.)

Defendants do not contest: (1) that Moreno is entitled to

attorneys fees and reasonable expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

(2) the reasonableness of the $35,842.42 requested as “Ancillary

Expenses” for Miller; (3) the reasonableness of the $16,370.00

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 The total number of hours billed by attorneys was reduced 5

6% (from 2125.9 to 1996.5). The total number of hours billed by

paralegals and law clerks was reduced 25% (from 679.55 to

505.55). 

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originally requested for post-trial fees for Miller; or (4) the

reasonableness of the $2,280.00 requested for the motion for fees

for Belzer. (Miller Opp’n at 1.) Defendants do contest the

amount of pre-trial and trial fees requested for Miller and

Belzer. (Id.) 

The proper place to start for determining a reasonable fee

is with the lodestar amount. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The

lodestar is calculated by multiplying the total number of hours

reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. However,

the court will “exclude from this initial fee calculation hours

that were not ‘reasonably expended.’” Id. (citing S.Rep. No. 94-

1011, p. 6 (1976)). 

1. Hours Reasonably Expended

Miller provides billing records and rates for herself and

four attorneys, three paralegals, and two law clerks in her

office. (Miller Decl. Ex. 2.) Excluding post-trial work, Miller

and her staff billed a total of 2,805.45 hours to this case. 

(Id.) Because not all of these hours were “reasonably expended,”

Miller reduced this total by 9.3% to 2,502.05 hours. (Id. at 5

3.) 

Belzer provides billing records and rates for himself and

one paralegel. (Belzer Decl. Exs. 1, 2.) Belzer spent a total

of 392.4 hours on this case. (Id. Ex. A.) Belzer reduced that

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total by 18.3 hours (4.7%) to 374.1 hours to account for any time

not reasonably expended. (Belzer Mot. at 6.) Belzer’s paralegal

spent 18.9 hours on this case. (Belzer Decl. Ex. 2.) Belzer

reduced that total by 1.7 hours (9%) to 17.2 hours to account for

any time not reasonably expended. (Belzer Mot. at 6.) 

Defendants argue that the number of hours should be reduced

further because: (1) Moreno was unsuccessful on numerous causes

of action; (2) Miller and her staff spent too much time on

certain aspects of the litigation; (3) Belzer and Miller both

billed for work that only one needed to do; and (4) defendants’

counsel billed 1300 fewer hours than Moreno’s counsel. 

a. Moreno’s Success on his Causes of Action 

Moreno alleged six causes of action in the complaint: (1)

unlawful search in violation of the 4th Amendment; (2) denial of

procedural due process in violation of the 14th Amendment; (3)

denial of due process in violation of Article 1 § 7 of the

California Constitution; (4) unlawful taking of property in

violation of the 5th Amendment; (5) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional

distress. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-61.) At trial, Moreno prevailed on: (1)

his procedural due process claim; (2) his Fourth Amendment claim

concerning seizure of his personal property; and (3) his claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Special Verdict

Form at 1-3). In addition to $367,000 in compensatory damages,

the jury awarded Moreno $350,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at

4.) 

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Defendants argue that Moreno was “unsuccessful on numerous

causes of action.” (Miller Opp’n at 3.) These include a takings

claim under the 5th Amendment, a substantive due process claim, a

claim under the California Constitution, and an illegal search

claim, relating to entry into Moreno’s building. (Id.) 

Defendants make no recommendation as to how the court should

adjust the hours as a result of these “unsuccessful” causes of

action. (Id.) 

In general, a prevailing party should not recover attorney’s

fees for work expended on a claim that is unsuccessful and

unrelated to the successful claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. 

However, “[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his

attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this

will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” 

Id. “In these circumstances the fee award should not be reduced

simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every

contention raised in the lawsuit.” Id. 

Moreno obtained excellent results in this case. He received

a full compensatory award plus an almost equal amount in punitive

damages. Even if he had been successful on every cause of

action, he would likely not have received a better financial

result. Because “the most critical factor [in determining a

reasonable attorney’s fee] is the degree of success obtained,”

neither Miller’s nor Belzer’s number of billable hours will be

reduced because Moreno did not prevail on all of his claims. 

Moreover, all of the claims are significantly intertwined and

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focus on the same series of events. It would be exceedingly

difficult to identify any time spent on any one claim that would

not contribute to the prosecution of all other claims.

b. Miller’s Time

Defendants argue that some of the following hours billed by

Miller are excessive and should be stricken: (1) 48.4 hours for

the complaint; (2) 137.3 hours for “investigation”; (3) 75 hours

for summarizing 3,000 pages of written discovery; (4) 275.2 hours

for depositions; (5) 227.9 hours for research; (6) 135.1 hours

for defendants’ motion for summary judgment; (7) 269.3 hours for

the appeal; and (8) 607.3 hours for trial preparation. (Miller

Opp’n at 3-6.) 

i. The Complaint

Miller seeks compensation for 48.4 hours spent drafting the

complaint and analyzing defendants’ answer. The complaint is

fourteen pages long, pieces together almost thirty paragraphs of

factual information, and sets forth six causes of action. Some

of the claims presented novel legal theories. The answer is

thirteen pages long, addresses the assertions listed in the

complaint, and sets forth thirty-eight affirmative defenses. 

Defendants argue that these hours should “be reduced by at least

fifty percent” because “a substantial portion” were “ultimately

unsuccessful.” (Id. at 3.) 

Moreno was unsuccessful on two of his six claims. However,

as described above, his results were excellent. Under Hensley,

Miller should be compensated for all hours “reasonably expended

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on the litigation.” 461 U.S. at 435. The court finds that the

time Miller spent on the complaint and answer was reasonable,

therefore she is entitled to fees for all of this time. 

ii. Investigation

Miller seeks compensation for 137.3 hours of investigation. 

(Miller Decl. ¶ 6(c).) This effort included collecting

information regarding the City’s demolition practices from public

sources, interviewing similarly situated individuals, and

discussing the case with Moreno. (Id.) Defendants argue that

these activities were “unnecessary and non-productive” because

they “lent little” to plaintiff’s ultimate recovery. (Miller

Opp’n at 4.) Defendants support this assertion by pointing out

that the evidence from the interviews with similarly situated

individuals was “admitted on an extremely limited basis.” (Id.) 

Defendants request that this amount of time be reduced by fifty

percent. (Id.) 

Moreno argues that he was justified in finding additional

witnesses to testify about “the depth and breadth” and

“institutional habituation” of the City’s malfeasance because:

(1) Rule 11 required him to find out if the City’s behavior in

this case was an aberration; and (2) had the trial not been

truncated, these witnesses would have testified and bolstered his

claim for punitive damages. (Reply at 4.) Although undertaking

an effort to check Moreno’s story and develop a punitive damages

theory was appropriate, Moreno spent an unreasonable amount of

time engaged in this activity. This time should be reduced by

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50%. Miller will be compensated for 68.7 hours of time instead

of 137.3 hours. 

iii. Written Discovery

 Miller seeks compensation for 127.1 hours of time spent

preparing written discovery and summarizing approximately 3,000

pages of documents. (Miller Decl. ¶ 6(d).) Miller applied the

40 pages per hour standard established by the California Supreme

Court, even though this can result in a significant reduction in

the total number of billable hours for summarizing documents. 

(Id.) She avers that she personally summarized the documents to

avoid duplicating work. (Id.) 

Defendants only challenge the 75 hours allotted to document

summaries. (Miller Opp’n at 4.) Defendants argue that Miller

should not have summarized the documents herself. (Id.) 

Instead, defendants claim she could have “substantially reduced

the burden on both herself and the ultimate fee award by allowing

paralegals to do that work.” (Id.) Defendants request that

this amount of time be reduced by fifty percent. (Id.) 

Miller’s choice to conduct the document summaries herself is

reasonable. It not only prevented any duplication of work, but

it likely assisted her in becoming intimately familiar with the

information in the summarized documents. This familiarity was a

significant asset to her at tiral. Moreover, the time spent

reading and summarizing the documents undoubtedly reduced the

time required to prepare for trial. Finally, given the nature of

the trial and the evidence, it was important for Miller to assure

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herself that her understanding of the case was complete. Miller

is entitled to attorney’s fees for all of this time. 

iv. Depositions

Miller seeks compensation for 275.2 hours spent taking and

summarizing depositions. (Miller Decl. ¶ 6(h).) Defendants

again challenge Miller’s choice to summarize deposition testimony

herself. (Miller Opp’n at 4.) As to the depositions, the court

takes a different view. Either Miller or Belzer was present at

the depositions when they were first taken. Summaries of

depositions is precisely the kind of work typically assigned to

paralegals. These hours will be compensated at the paralegal

rate. 

v. Research

Miller seeks compensation for 227.9 hours of time spent

researching the law. (Miller Decl. ¶ 6(i).) She argues that

this is a reasonable amount of time because the case was legally

challenging, fact intensive, and the defendants presented “many

and varied arguments on issues.” (Id.) Defendants argue that a

substantial amount of time should be cut because: (1) the

plaintiff was unsuccessful on many of his claims; and (2) the

amount of time claimed is excessive in light of the hours spent

in connection with the summary judgment motion and the appeal. 

(Miller Opp’n at 4-5.) 

Again, the fact that Moreno was not successful on two of his

six claims is unpersuasive given the ultimate outcome of the

case. However, the total number of hours Miller spent on

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research is unreasonable given that she spent over four hundred

additional hours for the summary judgment motion and the appeal. 

Although this case was complicated, these hours are somewhat

high. Miller’s research hours will be reduced by 25% to

compensate for this excess. Miller will be compensated for 171

hours of time instead of 227.9 hours. 

vi. Summary Judgment Motion

Miller seeks compensation for 135.1 hours of time spent on

the motion for summary judgment. (Miller Decl. ¶ 6(m).) 

Defendants argue that this time should be substantially reduced

because Moreno was “ultimately unsuccessful on most of the issues

raised by summary judgment.” (Miller Opp’n at 5.) Moreno

replies that Miller’s hours should not be reduced because: (1)

she has already voluntarily reduced them; (2) these hours are

reasonable; and (3) the defendants only obtained limited success

on the motion. (Reply at 7.) In light of the reduction in

compensable research hours above and Moreno’s ultimate success at

trial, Miller is entitled to attorney’s fees for all of this

time.

vii. Appeal

Miller seeks compensation for 269.3 hours of time spent on

the appeal. (Miller Decl. ¶ 6(n).) Defendants argue that this

time should be reduced because: (1) the “majority of the issues

were ruled on in defendant’s favor”; (2) Miller spent twice the

amount of time on the appeal as she did on the summary judgment

motion from which the appeal was brought; and (3) the number of

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hours exceed the total amount of time Miller spent preparing for

the first trial. (Miller Opp’n at 5.) 

The amount of time for the appeal does appear high in light

of the time already spent on legal research and summary judgment. 

The court considers that an attorney of Miller’s experience could

prepare the briefing and be ready for oral argument in 180 hours.

viii. Trial Preparation

Miller seeks compensation for time spent preparing for three

trial dates. Miller originally prepared for the case to be tried

in July 2002. (9/05/2001 Order at 6.) However, because of an

intervening appeal and remand, the trial was delayed until 2005.

(12/21/2004 Order at 22.) Miller then prepared for a trial in

February 2005. Trial was delayed again until May 2005. 

(2/18/2005 Minute Order.) Miller combines her preparation time

for the first two trial dates and lists that time separately from

the time she spent preparing for the May 2005 trial. 

Miller seeks compensation for 266.6 hours spent preparing

for the first two trial dates and for 340.7 hours spent preparing

for the May 2005 trial. (Miller Decl. ¶ 6(p).) Defendants argue

that the total amount of time spent on trial preparation is

excessive. (Miller Opp’n at 5.) In particular, defendants point

to the fact that Miller spent approximately 80 more hours

preparing for the third trial than she did for the first two. 

(Id.) 

A seasoned trial lawyer must anticipate intervening appeals

and trial delays. If a trial is delayed, she must be able to

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draw from her efforts to prepare for the first trial date in

order to reduce the time to “get up to speed” for the subsequent

trial date. Miller seeks compensation for over six hundred hours

of trial preparation. Although trial preparation is important,

this is excessive. A reasonable adjustment is to reduce her

trial preparation hours for the first two trials by 50%. 

Therefore, Miller will be compensated for 133.3 hours spent

preparing for the first two trial dates and 340.7 hours spent

preparing for the May 2005 trial. 

c. Belzer Billing

Defendants argue that the following hours billed by Belzer

are excessive and should be stricken entirely: (1) 13.8 hours of

paralegal time; (2) all 116.0 hours spent attending depositions;

(3) all 27.3 hours spent drafting and arguing motions; (4) 33.0

of the hours spent for trial preparation; and (5) 19.1 of the

hours billed during trial. (Belzer Opp’n at 5-10.) 

i. Paralegal Time

Defendants claim that all paralegal time other than that

spent for review and marking of depositions was clerical in

nature and therefore should be included in Belzer’s overhead. 

(Id. at 5.) After a review of Belzer’s paralegal’s time sheets,

it appears that 15.1 hours were spent on work appropriate for a

paralegal and 2.1 hours of work was of the type that should be

included in overhead. (Belzer Decl. Ex. 2.) Therefore, the

number of billable paralegal hours is reduced to 15.1. 

ii. Deposition Attendance

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Defendants claim that it was unreasonable for both Miller

and Belzer to attend the same depositions and therefore only the

deposing or defending attorney should be compensated. (Belzer

Opp’n at 5.) Moreno argues that both attorneys should be awarded

fees because: (1) the defendants had two attorneys present at

several depositions in this case; (2) having two attorneys

present ensured that the trial could be conducted even if one

attorney could not participate; and (3) this argument is a red

herring under existing precedent. (Reply at 8.) 

Moreno’s arguments are weak. That two defense attorneys

were present at some of the depositions has little bearing on

whether it was compensable for Moreno to have both Belzer and

Miller attend depositions. More importantly, the argument that

having both Belzer and Miller present at each deposition would

facilitate Moreno’s case going forward in the event that one of

them could not be present at trial appears disingenuous. Miller

and Belzer bifurcated the trial based on their expertise. 

Because Miller likely could not have performed the eminent domain

portion of the trial without Belzer, and Belzer likely could not

have handled the trial alone, Moreno obtained no insurance from

having both attorneys attend depositions together. In fact,

Moreno’s trial approach actually increased his chance of having

to delay trial. Finally, defendants’ argument is not a red

herring. There are cases where courts have refused to fully

compensate multiple attorneys attending the same deposition. See

Broom v. Biondi, 17 F.Supp.2d 230, 235-36 (S.D.N.Y 1997); W.C. v.

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DeBruyn, 883 F.Supp. 354, 356 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Rateree v.

Rocket, 685 F.Supp. 670, 671 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 

It is apparent that both Miller and Belzer did not need to

attend the same depositions. Therefore, the deposition time

billed by the lawyer who was present but did not conduct the

deposition or defense will be cut by 75%. The 25% awarded

approximates the time the non-participating attorney would have

spent reviewing the transcript.

Belzer and Miller were both present at twenty-six of the

thirty-two depositions. (Belzer Opp’n at 5-8.) Belzer conducted

eight of the depositions, Miller conducted the other eighteen. 

(Id.) Belzer billed a total of 73.8 hours for the eighteen

depositions he attended but did not conduct. (Id.) Therefore,

his number of compensable hours shall be reduced by 55.4 hours. 

Miller billed a total of 27.3 hours for the eight

depositions that she attended but did not conduct. Therefore,

her number of compensable hours shall be reduced by 20.5 hours.

iii. Motion Work

Defendants claim that Belzer’s bill for 27.3 hours for the

summary judgment motion, Moreno’s appeal of the summary judgment

ruling, and other pre-trial motions should be stricken or reduced

because Miller and her staff have already billed over four

hundred hours for these matters. (Id. at 8-9.) Because Belzer

was responsible for several aspects of this case, his

contribution of approximately 5% of the time spent in preparing

the pre-trial motion work is reasonable. There will be no

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reduction of his hours. 

iv. Trial Preparation

In his time sheets, Belzer listed 33.0 hours as “trial

preparation.” (Belzer Decl. Ex. 1.) Defendants claim that this

description is “insufficiently distinct to allow for an award of

fees.” (Belzer Opp’n at 9.) The party seeking an award of fees

must adequately document the hours worked. Hensley, 461 U.S. at

433. However, “[p]laintiff's counsel, of course, is not required

to record in great detail how each minute of his time was

expended.” Id. at 436 n. 12. Obviously, there is a gray area

between stating in “great detail how each minute” was spent and

“inadequate” documentation. Belzer’s description falls into that

gray area. 

Belzer’s time sheets indicate that he spent this time

preparing for trial. Although this is a minimal amount of

information, it is enough to determine how he expended his time

and whether, in light of the circumstances, the amount of time he

expended was reasonable. Belzer was not the lead attorney in

this case. However, he did examine several witnesses and provide

expertise on certain aspects of eminent domain law. This work

necessitated some amount of preparation and 33.0 hours is not

excessive. Belzer is awarded fees for 33.0 trial preparation

hours. 

v. Trial Hours

Defendants argue that Belzer’s compensable hours during the

trial should be reduced by 19.1 hours because he claimed more

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hours than Miller. (Belzer Opp’n at 9.) This argument is

unconvincing. Belzer claimed 10.0 and 11.5 hours for trial

attendance and preparation on May 31 and June 6, 2005. (Id.) 

Miller claimed 7.9 and 9.5 hours for those same dates. (Id.) It

is reasonable for Belzer to have worked twelve hour days during

this trial, even if Miller worked less. Although Miller’s time

is instructive, it does not establish what was reasonable for

Belzer. 

In addition, defendants challenge the 15.0 hours that Belzer

spent on June 8, 2005 for attendance at trial and “preparation

for closing argument” because Miller delivered the closing

argument. Although it would be unreasonable for Belzer to claim

time spent for the closing argument if he made no contribution to

it, Miller’s closing relied upon arguments and the evidence he

developed. Consequently, the court finds that Belzer contributed

to the closing argument, even though Miller delivered it. 

Fifteen billable hours in a single day is certainly a high

number, but that kind of effort was likely required during the

last push before the close of trial. Belzer is awarded fees for

all of the time he spent at trial.

c. Relative Number of Hours

Miller documents that she and her staff spent 2,805.5 hours

on this case. (Miller Mot. at 3.) Belzer documents that he and

his staff spent an additional 411.3 hours on this litigation. 

(Belzer Decl. Exs. 1, 2.) Therefore, in total, Moreno’s counsel

spent 3216.8 hours on this case. In contrast, defendants assert

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that their counsel worked for a total of 1,933.1 hours on this

litigation. (Miller Opp’n at 6.) Defendants claim that this

disparity in hours worked is evidence of inaccurate and

unreasonable billing by Miller and Belzer. (Id.)

Although Moreno’s attorneys and staff worked significantly

more hours on this case than did the defendants’ attorneys and

staff, that does not necessarily mean that the number of

requested hours are unreasonable. Importantly, defendants

provide no analysis of what a reasonable difference between the

hours worked by plaintiff’s and defense counsel would be for a

case of this nature. Without such evidence, it is impossible to

tell whether Miller or Belzer deviated unreasonably. 

Furthermore, defendants were defeated in this case. Their

estimate of what was needed to present a winning defense is not

subject to much deference. Consequently, they have failed to

establish that their hours are a reasonable benchmark. Comparing

hours in this case provides little insight into the

reasonableness of the number of hours Miller and Belzer spent. 

2. Reasonable Rate

Miller requests compensation at $300 per hour and submitted

a range of compensation rates for her staff. (Miller Decl. ¶ 4.) 

Belzer requests that he be compensated at the rate of $300 per

hour and that his paralegal be compensated at $125 per hour. 

(Belzer Decl. ¶ 18.) However, in Belzer’s motion, he uses $75

per hour to calculate his paralegal’s fee. (Belzer Mot. at 16.) 

Because $75 per hour is more appropriate for a paralegal, the

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26 Miller does not explain why she is requesting $50 less per 6

hour in this case. 

26

court establishes that rate for Belzer’s paralegal.

Defendants challenge Miller’s and Belzer’s requested $300

per hour rate as unreasonable and also challenge several of

Miller’s staff members’ rates as excessive compared to the work

they actually did. (Miller Opp’n at 7, 9-10.) 

a. Miller and Belzer

Miller has the burden of providing evidence “that the

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct 1541 (1984). Miller has been

in private practice since 1981. (Miller Decl. ¶ 2(b).) Miller’s

declaration conveys that she is an accomplished attorney with a

significant amount of litigation experience. (Id. ¶¶ 2(a)-(e).) 

She avers that she typically charges clients between $250 and

$400 per hour depending on the circumstances. (Id. ¶ 4.) She

claims that her rate for civil rights actions is $350. (Id.) 6

Miller provides declarations from three lawyers who practice

in Sacramento: Rhonda Cate Canby (“Canby”) of Downey Brand LLP,

Michael Johnson (“Johnson”) of Union Pacific Railroad, and Larry

Winberry (“Winberry”), a sole practitioner. (Id. Ex. 3, 4, 5.) 

Canby graduated from law school in 1991 and declares that her

billing rate is “$295 for litigation work.” (Id. Ex. 3 ¶ 4.) 

Canby avers that $300 is a reasonable rate for Miller because of

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her experience and excellent reputation in the community. (Id.

Ex. 3 ¶ 6.) Johnson is an “in-house” lawyer so he does not

usually bill for his time. (Id. Ex. 4 ¶ 4.) However, he

declares that when he does bill for his time, he does so at rates

between $250 and $350 per hour. (Id.) Johnson states that $300

is a reasonable fee for Miller because of her years of experience

and reputation as a competent civil rights attorney. (Id. Ex. 4

¶ 5.) Finally, Winberry states that he graduated from law school

in 1976 and charges $300 to new litigation clients. (Id. Ex. 5 ¶

4.) He avers that $300 is a reasonable fee for Miller in this

case because of her experience and ability. (Id. Ex. 5 ¶ 6.) 

Miller also provides evidence that a Sacramento County

Superior Court decided that $350 per hour was a reasonable rate

for “an experienced trial attorney in the field of employment

litigation who exhibited exceptional expertise in his

understanding of the applicable legal principles” in the case. 

(Id. Ex. 7.) Finally, Miller points to Judge England’s decision

to award an experienced attorney $300 per hour in the 2003 case

of Curs v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., CIV-S-99-2514 MCE GGH, slip op.

at 7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2003) to support her request. (Id. Ex.

8.) 

Defendants argue that $300 is excessive because: (1) Moreno

was “unsuccessful on a number of claims”; (2) it greatly exceeds

(by more than 50%) the rates charged for the other attorneys in

her office; (3) the supporting declarations are not probative;

and (4) defense counsel charges between $125 and $145 per hour. 

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(Miller Opp’n at 7.) Defendants do not cite any cases where an

attorney with Miller’s experience was denied a request to be

compensated at $300 per hour. 

That Moreno was unsuccessful on some of his claims seems

immaterial to the reasonableness of Miller’s rate. It is

undisputed that Moreno is the prevailing party in this case, and,

as discussed above, he obtained excellent results. That Miller’s

rate is 50% greater than other attorneys in her office is only

probative if they are of comparable skill and experience. 

Defendants note that one of her attorneys, Lawrence Hensley, has

been practicing since 1982 and his billing rate is only $185 per

hour. Without a more detailed comparison of his relative

experience and ability as a trial lawyer, it is impossible to

determine whether his rate is reasonable. Similarly, the

declarations regarding defense counsel’s rates are less than

ideal in this case because: (1) they do not allege a similar

level of experience or skill; (2) they are not working on a

contingency fee basis; (3) they provide no evidence that the

hourly rate they charge is reasonable; and (4) they concede that

they “are willing to accept substantially less in hourly

compensation” because they represent a municipality. This

admission suggests that were they not representing a

municipality, they too would have a substantially higher hourly

billing rate. 

While a rate of $300 might be reasonable for Miller in some

cases, the court finds that $250 per hour is the appropriate rate

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in this case given the way in which it was managed. Although she

is an experienced trial attorney, Miller spent much of her time

on this case engaging in activities better suited for a less

experienced lawyer. For example, she personally participated in

all 32 depositions. She then summarized the deposition testimony

herself. She also summarized some 4000 pages of documents

herself. While it was reasonable to spend time on these tasks,

to charge $300 per hour while doing them seems excessive. The

high rates that big firm lawyers charge are based on

specialization of labor such that those with the highest rate

only work on those tasks that a junior attorney cannot perform. 

After evaluating the time records, the court finds that a rate of

$250/hour is appropriate for both Miller and Belzer. 

b. Miller’s Staff

Defendants do not challenge the appropriateness of Miller’s

billing rates for paralegals and law clerks. (Miller Opp’n at

9.) However, they claim that much of the work done by the nonattorney members of Miller’s staff was merely “clerical or

mechanical in nature.” (Id.) Consequently, defendants argue the

time charged for Aaron Hudson, Benjamin Kinne, Michael Rouzer,

Russell Till, and Amy Clark should be significantly reduced or

cut from the fee request entirely. (Id. at 9-10.) Defendants

cite no case in which such a reduction was deemed proper, nor do

defendants provide any evidence that the tasks performed by these

individuals were not necessary to the ultimate success of the

litigation. 

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In her declaration, Miller discusses the work these staff

members performed. (Miller Decl. ¶¶ 4(a)-(j).) She suggests

that they were used whenever possible to minimize the total

amount of attorney’s fees. (Id. ¶ 5.) Miller also cut 25% of

the non-attorney hours off of the fee request. (Id. Ex. A at

16.) This is a substantial reduction and accounts for any

excessive staff charges. Because Miller worked the majority of

the hours spent on this case and these individuals accomplished

substantive tasks that contributed to the success of the case, no

further reduction is necessary. 

Therefore, based on the foregoing analysis, the appropriate

lodestar amount for Miller and her staff for their pre-trial,

trial, and post-trial work is $428,053.00. The appropriate

lodestar amount for Belzer and his paralegal is $82,707.50. 

3. Adjusting the Lodestar

The Supreme Court has held that establishing the lodestar

rate does not “end the inquiry.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 

Instead, the fee may be increased or decreased depending on the

circumstances. Id. In the Ninth Circuit, however, this

adjustment should only be made “in rare cases.” Gates v.

Deukmajian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreno does not

request an increase in the fee award; however, the defendants

suggest that a decrease from the lodestar amount is appropriate. 

To determine whether a departure from the lodestar amount is

warranted, courts look to the factors discussed in Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc. 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied

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425 U.S. 951 (1976). The defendants argue that because “a

substantial portion of the claims made by plaintiff were

ultimately rejected,” two Kerr Factors support decreasing

Miller’s fee award: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions involved; and (2) the amount involved and the results

obtained. (Miller Opp’n at 6, 8.) Moreno achieved excellent

results in this case. No adjustment is called for.

C. Expenses

In addition to his attorney’s fees, Moreno seeks to recover

for “ancillary expenses” incurred while conducting the

litigation. Moreno originally requested compensation for the

following expenses: (1) internal photocopying; (2) computer

indexing; (3) messenger fees; and (4) expert witness fees. The

defendants did not object to the original expense request. 

Moreno asks the court to add to the fee motion all charges

that the court denied as costs. The court denied the following

charges as costs: (1) non-testifying witness fees; (2) civil

appeal filing fee; (3) travel fees; (4) state court filing fee;

(5) expense of copying the state court file; (6) fee for serving

Broker; (7) Realtime/LiveNote; (8) transferring media; (9)

undocumented photograph development; and (10) undocumented

photocopies. The court assumes that the defendants reiterate

their challenge to Moreno’s request that they pay for these

expenses formerly listed as costs. 

Moreno “may recover as part of the award of attorney’s fees

those out-of-pocket expenses that would normally be charged to a

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fee paying client.” Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th

Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However,

these expenses must be reasonable. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988

(permitting the court to award a reasonable attorney fee to the

prevailing party). The court finds that the following charges

are reasonable expenses that would normally be charged to a feepaying client: (1) internal photocopying; (2) computer indexing;

(3) messenger fees; (4) expert witness fees; (5)

Realtime/LiveNote expense; and (6) the civil appeal filing fees. 

Therefore, these charges are recoverable as expenses.

The court finds that the non-testifying witness fees, the

fee for serving Broker, and the expense of photocopying the state

court case file are not reasonable because there is no showing

that these charges aided in the success of the litigation. 

Finally, the court denies the charges for travel, external

photocopying, and developing photographs because they are not

documented. 

Based on the analysis above, the court awards Moreno

$39,680.12 for expenses.

///

///

///

///

///

///

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III.

Moreno is entitled to recover his costs and a reasonable

attorney’s fee under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. For the reasons discussed

in this order, Moreno is awarded: (1) $428,053.00 in attorney’s

fees and $39,680.12 in expenses for work Miller and her staff

performed; (2) $20,594.33 in costs; and (3) $82,707.50 in

attorney’s fees for work Belzer and his paralegal performed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/14/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:01-cv-00725-JAM-DAD Document 257 Filed 12/15/05 Page 33 of 33