Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01887/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01887-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE RIVERA,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOZANO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01887-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 14) 

30-DAY DEADLINE

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint because, as discussed in 

detail below, it fails to state any claims that are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the 

Court will grant Plaintiff one final opportunity to correct the deficiencies in his pleadings. 

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed 

per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed 

as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has 

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not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015).

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Allegations

Plaintiff complains of incidents that occurred at Kern Valley State Prison ("KVSP"). As 

in his original complaint, Plaintiff names a number of Defendants by name and others by position. 

Plaintiff’s allegations continue to be disjointed, illogical, and fanciful.

1

 

When screening his original complaint, the Court observed, 

Plaintiff alleges that he is being mentally and physically tortured and 

requests an investigation and that the torture be stopped. Plaintiff alleges that all of 

the Defendants are “absorbing everything out of [his] brain and replacing it with 

nonsence [sic] had [sic] denying [him] grooming” (Doc. 1, p. 3); that he is being 

physically tortured, raped, and abused (id.); they “manipulate” his eyes because he 

is against rapists and homosexuals (id.); that they make Plaintiff harm himself to 

the point that he “lost 60% of his blood” (id., at p. 4); they deny his eating and 

exercising in his cell “as well as reading and writing. By them [sic] putting videos 

of child pornography in [his] eyes” (id.); and that in 2013 he was pulled of his cell 

“and one of these voices injected me leaving unsound or what one would call 

‘crazy’” (id.).

(Doc. 9 at 2) His allegations in the FAC continue along these same lines. Plaintiff alleges that 

Lozano used his “IGI tactics” attempting to get Plaintiff to volunteer for an experiment regarding 

solitary confinement. (Doc. 1, p. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Lozano passed out the addresses of his 

family members and loved ones in an attempt to black-mail Plaintiff into being involved in the 

experiment. (Id., p. 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that Phillips and Err told general population inmates that they were using 

Plaintiff’s eyeballs as cameras and that B. Valdez told him that people told her to show Plaintiff 

her lips if he wanted to submit to torture, and he asks “Why am I being held accountable for this 

peoples broken plates?” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges these three Defendants told him that if he wanted 

“to put a stop to all this torture/abuse/rape?” his way out is to commit suicide. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges C. Brian told Plaintiff she was trying to help him by moving him “to another building, 

which was a lie.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he brought this up to Capt. Lesniac and tried to reach 

 

1

All materials in quotations are duplicated exactly as they appear in the First Amended Complaint. No effort has 

been made to correct grammatical and other errors in quoted allegations. Further, all of Plaintiff’s allegations are 

summarized here.

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out to the Assistant Warden, Chief Deputy Warden, and the Warden “since they know of their 

technology & their serounding in their prison & they told me that its not enough evidence to 

continue with this investigation, which they know what this technology is capable of.” (Id., pp. 4-

5 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff alleges Capt. Coplan IGI also “knows of this technology” too, 

but everyone refuses to put a stop to it. (Id., p. 5.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Kumar refused “to put a stop to this torture/abuse/rape/spying 

when he as the power to” and that C/Os E. Martinez and D. Lee told Plaintiff they were going to 

make a call and put a stop to it, but did not do so. (Id., p. 6.) Plaintiff also alleges C/O E. 

Martinez told him once that he was behind “all of this” and for Plaintiff not to send inmate 

request forms “if I continue to I was going to keep my copy as a memory.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Iverson “one time put a man’s private part behind me and used 

this computer in advance to keep me calm since he was denying I was Rivera at Committee in 

front of all Committee. Where Dr. Howard was present & the Sergeant Iverson spoke about what 

they were doing to me in person and Dr. Howard refuse to stop to it along with Committee & said 

I wasn’t Rivera.” (Id.) Capt. Tyson is allegedly aware of the technology and told Plaintiff he was 

going to call maintenance “to regulate this frequency on the voices, which was a lie, he never 

regulated” and that Plaintiff told him to “stop all this abuse & spying & disconnect me to 

whichever computer they have me connected to.” (Id., pp. 6-7.) 

A. Robles allegedly once told Plaintiff that “(They?) gave up my brain that she was 

involved in the triangle, which that’s what they called this supposebly torture.” (Id., p. 7.) Dr. 

Howard allegedly told Plaintiff “she was involved with this torture along with CDCR, and the 

Government.” (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that these allegations amount to violations of his rights under the Eighth 

Amendment and of his rights to association and speech. (Doc. 14, p. 3.) As the examples above 

show, Plaintiff’s allegations are not facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Though he has now linked various Defendants with statements and/or activities, his 

claims are not cognizable since not facially plausible. Thus, he is given general pleading

standards and the standards under the First and Eight Amendments and one final opportunity to 

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file an amended complaint. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 

quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff must set forth 

Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are accepted as true, but 

legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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Though the First Amended Complaint is not lengthy, it is convoluted and disjointed and 

does not contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that he is entitled to relief as 

Rule 8 requires. If he chooses to file a second amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to 

make it as concise as possible and under twenty-five pages in length. He should merely state 

which of his constitutional rights he feels were violated by each Defendant and its factual basis. 

2. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under 42 USC § 1983, Plaintiff must link each 

named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 

Plaintiff=s federal rights. 

Plaintiff must clearly state which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation 

of his constitutional rights and their factual basis as his complaint must put each Defendant on 

notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

D. Claims for Relief

1. Eighth Amendment

a. Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment prohibits those who operate our prisons from using Aexcessive 

physical force against inmates.@ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 

F.2d 1237, 1246, 1250 (9th Cir.1982) (prison officials have Aa duty to take reasonable steps to 

protect inmates from physical abuse@); see also Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741 (9th 

Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989) (Aprison administrators= indifference to brutal 

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behavior by guards toward inmates [is] sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim@). As 

courts have succinctly observed, A[p]ersons are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment.@ 

Gordon v. Faber, 800 F.Supp. 797, 800 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (citation omitted), aff=d, 973 F.2d 686 

(8th Cir.1992). ABeing violently assaulted in prison is simply not >part of the penalty that criminal 

offenders pay for their offenses against society.=@ Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, (quoting Rhodes, 452 

U.S. at 347).

When a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the 

cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, the question turns on Awhether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.@ Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In determining whether the use of force was 

wanton and unnecessary, it is proper to consider factors such as the need for application of force, 

the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived 

by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The extent of a prisoner=s injury is also a factor that may suggest whether 

the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Id. 

Although the absence of serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, it is not 

determinative. Id. That is, use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel 

and unusual punishment even though the prisoner does not suffer serious injury. Id. at 9.

b. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 

Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison 

officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 

2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference. . . .” 

Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. 

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County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective prong. 

First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer at 834. 

Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). 

c. Sexual Abuse

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment in penal institutions. 

Whether a specific act constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is measured by “the evolving 

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 8 (1992).

Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections employee is a violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. Wood v. Beauclair , 692 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2012) citing Schwenk 

v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir.2000) (“In the simplest and most absolute of terms ... 

prisoners [have a clearly established Eighth Amendment right] to be free from sexual abuse....”); 

see also Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 

F.Supp. 634, 665 (D.D.C.1994) ( “[U]nsolicited touching of ... prisoners' [genitalia] by prison 

employees are ‘simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses 

against society’ ” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994))), aff'd 

in part and vacated in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C.Cir.1996).

““[S]exual contact between a prisoner and a prison [employee] serves no legitimate role 

and is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. 

Where there is no legitimate penological purpose for a prison official’s conduct, courts have 

‘presum[ed] malicious and sadistic intent.’” Wood, 692F.3d at 1050-51, quoting Giron v. Corr. 

Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir.1999); also citing Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 

857, 861 (2d Cir.1997). Even sexual contact which is not violent and leaves no physical injury is 

given this presumption. Id. 

“At its core, the Eighth Amendment protects ‘the basic concept of human dignity’ and 

forbids conduct that is ‘so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous 

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infliction of suffering.’” Wood, 692F.3d at 1050-51, quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 

182–83, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976). Sexual assault on a prisoner by a prison employee is always 

“deeply ‘offensive to human dignity’ ” and is completely void of penological justification. 

Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1196. 

d. Medical Care

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first Ashow a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.@ 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). 

The existence of a condition or injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual=s daily activities, and the existence of chronic or substantial pain are indications of a 

serious medical need. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. 

v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (quotation marks omitted); Doty v. 

County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). For screening purposes, Plaintiff's lower 

back pain is accepted as a serious medical need. 

Deliberate indifference is Aa state of mind more blameworthy than negligence@ and 

Arequires >more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner=s interests or safety.=@ Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 835 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). ADeliberate indifference is a high legal standard.@ 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). AUnder this standard, the prison official 

must not only >be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists,= but that person >must also draw the inference.=@ Id. at 1057 (quoting 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, 

then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.=@ Id.

(quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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2. First Amendment 

AIn a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First Amendment rights that are 

>inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the 

corrections system.=@ Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822. Prisons, it is obvious, differ in numerous 

respects from free society. To begin with, they are involuntarily populated by people who have 

been found to have violated one or more of the criminal laws established by society for its orderly 

governance. In seeking a “mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives (of 

prisons) and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application,@ Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S., at 556, the [Supreme] Court has repeatedly recognized the need for major 

restrictions on a prisoner=s rights. See, e.g., Id., 418 U.S., at 561-562; Lanza v. New York, 370 

U.S. 139, 143 (1962). These restrictions have applied as well where First Amendment values 

were implicated. Jones, 433 U.S. at 129-30 citing Pell v. Procunier, supra; Procunier v. 

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).

“An inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration,” and “freedom of 

association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 

U.S. 126, 131, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 2167 (2003). Accordingly, “[s]ome curtailment of that freedom 

must be expected in the prison context.” Id.

3. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff may have named some Defendants merely because they hold supervisorial 

positions at KVSP. However, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 

for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a 

named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed 

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th 

Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 

(1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, 

Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: 

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations 

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and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the 

policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional 

violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be 

imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat 

superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not 

answer for the torts of their servants - the term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. 

Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; 

each government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id. 

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch 

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather 

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. 

Thus, any allegations that supervisory personnel violated Plaintiff's rights and are 

somehow liable because of the acts of those under his or her supervision does not state a 

cognizable claim. 

E. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed with 

leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty days. This is the last opportunity 

Plaintiff will be given to correct the deficiencies in his pleading. Alternatively, within that 

same time frame, Plaintiff should file a notice of voluntary dismissal if he decides not to pursue 

this action further. If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall 

file a motion seeking an extension of time before the deadline expires. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any second amended complaint how the conditions 

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 

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Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). A second amended complaint must allege in specific 

terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless 

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed 

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

A second amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and plain 

statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. The Court provides Plaintiff with one final opportunity to amend to 

cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-

49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 

"buckshot" complaints).

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a second 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or 

a notice of voluntary dismissal.

///

///

///

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If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to obey a 

court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 22, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01887-JLT Document 15 Filed 11/22/16 Page 12 of 12