Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00649/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00649-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AFREDO GOMEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIKE McDONALD et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-0649 LKK DAD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff seeks relief 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Several motions filed by the parties are pending before the court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding on an amended complaint against defendants Davey, Domondan, 

Gower, Sanders, and Van Leer. Therein, plaintiff alleges that on October 6, 2009, defendants 

placed him in a Single Cell Unit/Special Purpose Segregation Unit (“SCU/SPSU”) and retained 

him there for eight months because they believed he was a member of the 2-5 disruptive group. 

While segregated, plaintiff alleges that defendants refused to inform him of any disciplinary 

charges being brought against him or of their reasons for holding him in segregation him and did 

not provide him with an informal non-adversary hearing to allow him to present his views. 

Plaintiff also alleges that while held in segregation defendants denied him outdoor exercise, 

forced him to stay in a cell in which the temperature averaged only 35 degrees, and refused to 

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provide him with personal hygiene necessities. Plaintiff alleges that on May 25, 2010, defendants 

asked him to sign a document stating that he had no intention of participating in any 2-5 

activities. Plaintiff signed the document, and two days later, he was returned to the general 

population at the institution where he was incarcerated. (Am. Compl. Attach. at 6-32.)

On July 31, 2012, the court found that plaintiff‟s amended complaint appeared to state 

cognizable claims for relief against defendants Davey, Domondan, Gower, Sanders, and Van 

Leer. Specifically, the court found that plaintiff‟s amended complaint appeared to state a 

cognizable claim against those defendants for denial of plaintiff‟s right to due process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment in connection their alleged involvement with his placement and retention 

in an SCU/SPSU. In addition, the court found that plaintiff‟s amended complaint appeared to 

state a cognizable claim against defendants Davey, Gower, and Van Leer for cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment for their alleged involvement in denying plaintiff

outdoor exercise, placing him in a cold cell, and refusing to provide him with personal hygiene

items. Finally, however, the court found that plaintiff‟s amended complaint did not state 

cognizable claims for relief against defendant Chapman or for the alleged denial of equal 

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, denial of religious freedom under the First 

Amendment, retaliation under the First Amendment, and conspiracy. (Doc. No. 9)

On December 18, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff‟s 

amended complaint fails to state any cognizable claim. (Doc. No. 18) On July 23, 2013, the 

undersigned issued findings and recommendations, recommending that defendants‟ motion to 

dismiss be denied. (Doc. No. 28) On August 26, 2013, the assigned district judge adopted those 

findings and recommendations in full. (Doc. No. 29) On September 12, 2013, defendants filed 

an answer to plaintiff‟s amended complaint. (Doc. No. 30) On September 23, 2013, the court 

issued a discovery and scheduling order in this matter. (Doc. No. 31)

THE PARTIES’ PENDING MOTIONS

I. Plaintiff‟s Motion to Deem Facts in the Amended Complaint Admitted

Plaintiff has filed a motion to deem facts in the amended complaint admitted because, in 

plaintiff‟s view, defendants‟ answer did not properly admit or deny certain allegations, or

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defendants merely asserted “a sham” of a claim that they lack information and belief as to factual 

content for which defendants purportedly have first-hand knowledge. (Pl.‟s Mot. to Deem Facts 

Admitted at 1-8.) Defendants have opposed the motion, and plaintiff has filed a reply.

Under Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party in responding to a 

pleading must “admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B). Under Rule 11(b), “a party certifies that . . . the denials of factual contentions

are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or 

lack of information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4). 

Here, the court agrees with defense counsel‟s observation that many of the allegations that 

plaintiff believes defendants failed to properly answer relate to claims that the court already found 

are not cognizable or are related to prison officials who are not named defendants in this action. 

(See Am. Compl. at 7-8.) Plaintiff is advised that defendants were not required to respond to 

plaintiff‟s allegations in connection with claims this court previously found fail to state a 

cognizable claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B) (responding party must “admit or deny the 

allegations asserted against it . . . .”) Nor were defendants required to respond to allegations 

concerning the alleged conduct of other prison officials not named as defendants. (Id.) Finally, 

defendants were not required to respond to plaintiff‟s allegations concerning events that allegedly 

took place at different prisons well before the named defendants had any contact with plaintiff. 

(Id.) 

Moreover, as to defendants‟ assertion of lack information and belief as to certain factual 

allegations made by plaintiff, courts have deemed an assertion of lack of knowledge in an initial 

answer as an admission only in extreme circumstances, primarily, after a party persists in 

disclaiming knowledge throughout the adjudication of claims. See Gallagher v. England, No. 

CIVR 050750 AWI SMS, 2005 WL 3299509 at *4-*5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2005) (discussing cases 

involving “extreme circumstances” of parties claiming lack of knowledge to contrast a party‟s

acceptable assertion of lack of knowledge in an initial answer). Defendants have not disclaimed 

knowledge throughout the adjudication here, and in fact, they have recently filed a detailed

motion for summary judgment addressing the merits of plaintiff‟s case. (Doc. No. 55)

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Finally, as defense counsel argues, defendants explicitly state in the first paragraph of 

their answer that any allegations that they do not expressly admit, they deny. (Defs.‟ Opp‟n to 

Pl.‟s Mot. to Deem Facts Admitted at 2-3.). Under Rule 8(b)(3), the defendants are permitted to 

“generally deny all [allegations] except those specifically admitted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(3). See

generally 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1266 (Dec. 

2013). 

Accordingly, for these reasons, the court will deny plaintiff‟s motion to deem facts in the 

amended complaint admitted.

II. Plaintiff‟s Request for Sanctions

Plaintiff has also filed a request for sanctions against defendants for not timely opposing 

his motion to deem facts in the amended complaint admitted. Plaintiff contends that, under the 

mailbox rule, he filed his motion with the court on September 22, 2013, and defendants did not

file their opposition until October 17, 2013. (Pl.‟s Req. for Sanctions at 1-2.) Defendants have 

opposed plaintiff‟s request for sanctions, and plaintiff has filed a reply.1 

Whenever a prisoner uses the prison‟s internal mail system, the court considers the date 

the prisoner turns over his filing to prison authorities for mailing the filing date. See Houston v. 

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). The court applies this so-called “mailbox rule” to pro se 

prisoner legal filings to ensure that their filings are not unfairly barred as untimely due to delays 

beyond their control. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009). The mailbox 

rule, however, is not intended for use against an opposing party to prevent the court from 

considering that party‟s filings. See Brown v. Kyle, No. 1:04-cv-06539 AWI SKO PC, 2011 WL 

3358967 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3 2011). 

Based on the record before the court, defense counsel received service of plaintiff‟s 

motion via the court‟s electronic filing service on September 27, 2013. Defendants then filed 

 

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In plaintiff‟s reply in support of his motion to deem facts in the amended complaint admitted, 

plaintiff asks to withdraw his request for sanctions. However, plaintiff subsequently filed a reply 

in support of his request for sanctions in which he persists with his argument that the court should 

grant his request for the imposition of sanctions. Under these circumstances, the court will 

proceed as though plaintiff wishes to pursue his request for sanctions. 

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their opposition to the motion twenty days later on October 17, 2013. Under Local Rule 230(l), 

“[o]pposition, if any, to the granting of the motion shall be served and filed by the responding 

party not more than twenty-one (21), days after the date of service of the motion.” See E.D. Cal. 

Local Rule 230(l). Given that this court, and therefore presumably defense counsel, did not 

receive plaintiff‟s motion by mail until September 27, 2013, the court finds that defendants timely 

filed their opposition to plaintiff‟s motion to deem facts in the amended complaint admitted on 

October 17, 2013. 

Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff‟s request for sanctions.

III. Defendants‟ Motion to Strike

Defendants have filed a motion to strike plaintiff‟s opposition to their previously-filed 

motion for an extension of time on the grounds that plaintiff‟s motion to strike is an unauthorized 

pleading and is now moot. On November 6, 2013, defendants filed a request for an extension of 

time to respond to plaintiff‟s discovery requests, sets one and two. On November 8, 2013, the 

court granted defendants‟ request. On November 15, 2013, seven days after the court issued its 

order, plaintiff filed his “conditional opposition” to defendants‟ request for an extension of time 

and asserted that he would not oppose defendants‟ request if defendants were willing to respond 

to his discovery requests without objections. (Defs.‟ Mot. to Strike at 3.) Plaintiff has opposed 

defendants‟ motion to strike, and defendants have filed a reply.

Local Rule 144(c) provides:

The court may, in its discretion, grant an initial extension ex parte

upon the affidavit of counsel that a stipulation extending time 

cannot reasonably be obtained, explaining the reasons why such a 

stipulation cannot be obtained and the reasons why the extension is 

necessary. 

Local Rule 144(c).

In this case, defendants‟ initial request for an extension of time to respond to plaintiff‟s 

discovery requests showed good cause and complied with Local Rule 144. Moreover, on 

December 5, 2013, defense counsel served plaintiff with responses to all of his discovery 

requests. (Defs.‟ Reply, Bajwa Decl.) 

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Accordingly, the court will grant defendants‟ motion to strike and strike plaintiff‟s 

“conditional opposition” as having been rendered moot.

IV. Plaintiff‟s Motion to Strike

The court now turns to plaintiff‟s motion to strike affirmative defenses in defendants‟ 

answer. In the motion, plaintiff seeks to strike various affirmative defenses as redundant or 

because they fail to provide plaintiff with fair notice with respect to their application to his 

claims. (Pl.‟s Mot. to Strike at 4-13.) Defendants have opposed the motion, and plaintiff has 

filed a reply.

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Motion to Strike. The Court may strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter. The court may act: 

(1) on its own; or 

(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to 

the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days 

after being served with the pleading.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 

Here, defendants filed and served their answer on September 12, 2013. Plaintiff did not 

file his motion to strike until December 20, 2013, well outside of the 21-day time period allowed 

to file a motion to strike. The court will therefore sua sponte decline to consider striking 

defendants‟ affirmative defenses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1). Accordingly, plaintiff‟s motion to 

strike is denied.

V. Plaintiff‟s Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order

Finally, plaintiff has filed a motion to modify the previously issued discovery and 

scheduling order in this case to allow the parties an additional sixty days to resolve discovery 

disputes. In the motion, plaintiff contends that this court previously granted defendants thirty 

days to serve plaintiff with responses to his discovery requests, and that extension of time left him 

with only thirty days to review defendants‟ objections and research their applicability to the 

discovery requests. Plaintiff contends that he made a diligent effort to resolve all discovery 

disputes informally with defense counsel to no avail. (Pl.‟s Mot. to Modify the Discovery & 

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Scheduling Order at 4-7.) Defendants have opposed plaintiff‟s motion to modify the discovery 

and scheduling order, and plaintiff has filed a reply. 

Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may modify the 

scheduling order for “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The “good cause” standard 

“primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” See Johnson v. 

Mammoth Re-creations, 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). In this regard, the court may modify 

a scheduling order deadline “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party 

seeking the extension.” Id. See also Zivkovich v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 

1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If the party seeking the modification „was not diligent, the inquiry 

should end‟ and the motion to modify should not be granted.”). 

Here, the court finds that plaintiff has demonstrated diligence in complying with the 

original dates set forth in the court‟s discovery and scheduling order and that plaintiff has 

established “good cause” to modify the discovery deadline to allow him thirty days to file a 

motion to compel. Although plaintiff has requested an additional sixty days to conduct discovery,

plaintiff only seeks sixty additional days because he believes the parties need that time to comply 

with Local Rule 251 (a)-(c). As stated in the court‟s discovery and scheduling order, however, 

Local Rule 251 does not apply to this action. (Doc. No. 31)

Accordingly, the court will grant plaintiff‟s motion to modify the discovery and 

scheduling order in part and allow him an additional thirty days to file a motion to compel if he so 

desires. In addition, on March 21, 2014, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The 

court will relieve plaintiff of the obligation to file an opposition to defendants‟ motion for 

summary judgment until thirty days after the court rules on his motion to compel or thirty days 

after expiration of the time granted to plaintiff to file a motion to compel in the event he fails to 

file such a motion.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s motion to deem facts in the amended complaint admitted (Doc. No. 32) is 

denied;

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2. Plaintiff‟s request for sanctions (Doc. No. 34) is denied;

3. Defendants‟ motion to strike (Doc. No. 43) is granted. Plaintiff‟s conditional 

opposition (Doc. No. 42) is stricken as moot.

4. Plaintiff‟s motion to strike (Doc. No. 47) is denied; and

5. Plaintiff‟s motion to modify the court‟s discovery and scheduling order (Doc. No. 49) 

is granted in part. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of this order to file a motion to 

compel if he so desires. Plaintiff is also relieved of the obligation to file an opposition to 

defendants‟ motion for summary judgment until thirty days after the court rules on any 

forthcoming motion to compel or thirty days after expiration of the time to file such a motion. 

Except as provided in this order, the court‟s September 23, 2013 discovery and scheduling order 

remains in effect.

Dated: April 1, 2014

DAD:9

gome0649.mots

 

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