Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01323/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01323-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JDDL-K 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Angel Soto, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-1323-PHX-SMM (MEA) 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 

On June 13, 2014, Plaintiff Angel Soto, who is confined in the Arizona State 

Prison Complex-Eyman, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court 

will grant the Application to Proceed and will order Plaintiff to show cause why his 

Complaint should not be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $18.60. The remainder of the fee will 

be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to 

Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 

agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 

Case 2:14-cv-01323-SMM-DMF Document 7 Filed 08/21/14 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JDDL-K 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

Case 2:14-cv-01323-SMM-DMF Document 7 Filed 08/21/14 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JDDL-K 

 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 

facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 

of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may 

possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 

III. Complaint 

 In his two-count Complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants: Arizona 

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) Director Charles Ryan; Sergeant Sweetman at 

SMU II Browning Unit; CO II Zamora at SMU II Browning Unit; CO II Gutierrez at 

SMU II Browning Unit; SSU Banghart at Rynning Unit; CO II Ramirez at SMU II 

Browning Unit; CO II Harris at SMU II Browning Unit; CO II Jones at SMU II 

Browning Unit; CO II Schell at SMU II Browning Unit; CO II Emore at SMU II 

Browning Unit; CO II Rodriguez at SMU II Browning Unit; Sergeant Victoria at SMU II 

Browning Unit; CO II Bope at SMU II Browning Unit; Sergeant Swaney at SMU II 

Browning Unit; and Sergeant McClellan at SMU II Browning Unit. Plaintiff seeks a 

declaratory judgment and damages. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a claim of excessive force and alleges the following 

facts: Plaintiff required suicide watch treatment after explaining to staff that he had 

stopped taking his medications and was experiencing paranoid psychosis. Instead of 

treating Plaintiff, “Defendant(s) brutally attacked [Plaintiff] and used torture.” 

Defendants assaulted Plaintiff and then hand and leg cuffed him. While Plaintiff was 

subdued, he was again “violently assaulted, with punches, kicks and excessive pepper 

spray.” The “Defendant(s) got on [Plaintiff’s] back and twisted [his] right hand causing 

(2) broken fingers.” Plaintiff’s hair was pulled up and held while a sergeant “violently 

stomped [Plaintiff’s] head smashing [his] jaw into the concrete [and] inflicting a 

laceration that required several stitches.” Plaintiff was then placed face down onto a 

gurney, still leg and hand cuffed, and strapped down. A sergeant climbed on top of 

Plaintiff, “spread [his] buttocks and inserted pepper spray into [his] rectum.” Plaintiff 

Case 2:14-cv-01323-SMM-DMF Document 7 Filed 08/21/14 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JDDL-K 

requested medical but “the torture continued.” As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he 

suffered a debilitating jaw injury, two broken fingers, stitches in his chin which left a 

scar, limited function in his right hand, emotional trauma, PTSD, and pain from the mace 

which caused his skin to peel. 

 Plaintiff asserts a threat to safety claim in Count Two and alleges the following 

facts: “The Director and all Defendant(s) were deliberately indifferent when he failed to 

train his subordinates by implementing a policy to recognize mental health problems not 

protective segregation problems.” By this deliberate indifference, Defendant Banghart 

allowed another inmate to talk to Plaintiff “making him believe the reason [Plaintiff] 

requested suicide watch was for protection.” Word spread across the prison that Plaintiff 

was seeking protection and the inmates plotted against Plaintiff, causing him to become 

paranoid and psychotic and barricading his cell. The incident caused Plaintiff to be sent 

to SMU II “where officers knew or should have known [Plaintiff] was suffering from 

mental illness, but instead brutally assaulted [Plaintiff] by pepper spray, sexually 

assaulting [Plaintiff], breaking fingers and causing several stitches to [his] jaw.” Plaintiff 

alleges he was injured by a debilitating jaw injury, two broken fingers, limited functions 

in his right hand, emotional and psychological trauma, and burned skin from the mace. 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state when the alleged events took place. However, 

Plaintiff did attach several Inmate Letters and a grievance that he filed and responses that 

he received indicating that the alleged events took place in April 2010. For example, in 

an Inmate Letter dated May 18, 2010, Plaintiff wrote that on April 17, 2010 he was taken 

to SMU II Browning Unit “where the COs used excessive force on [Plaintiff]. They also 

tortured [Plaintiff] with mace and sexually assaulted [Plaintiff] [i]n the process.” In an 

Inmate Letter dated February 19, 2014, Plaintiff wrote that he was attempting to 

informally resolve an issue relating to an incident in April 2010 when he was taken to the 

SMU II Browning Unit watch pod where he was beaten and stomped on by COs, 

Sergeants and SSU staff. A Memorandum dated April 4, 2014 from E. Bonkowski, a 

Special Investigator from the Criminal Investigations Bureau, stated that the “date of the 

Case 2:14-cv-01323-SMM-DMF Document 7 Filed 08/21/14 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JDDL-K 

incident claimed by you, which was 4-17-2010, was confirmed referenced [sic] several 

staff members involved with your incident. The totality of the circumstances was 

deemed unfounded/insufficient evidence to support your allegation.” 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 It appears that Plaintiff is alleging violations of his constitutional rights based on 

incidents that occurred on or about April 17, 2010. The failure to state a claim includes 

circumstances where a defense is complete and obvious from the face of the pleadings. 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying former § 1915(d) 

now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Further, in the absence of waiver, a court 

may raise the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte. See Levald, Inc. v. City of 

Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 

1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (appropriate to dismiss prisoner’s complaint sua sponte as timebarred under § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 

956 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc ) (same); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) 

(same); Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Johnson v. 

Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 107-108 (1st Cir. 1991) (same). 

 In § 1983 actions, the Court applies the statute of limitations of the forum state for 

personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 274-76 (1985); TwoRivers 

v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th 

Cir. 1991). The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. 

Case 2:14-cv-01323-SMM-DMF Document 7 Filed 08/21/14 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JDDL-K 

See A.R.S. § 12-542 (1); Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1997); Vaughan, 927 F.2d at 478. Arizona law also provides for the tolling of the 

statute of limitation after a cause of action accrues for the period during which a plaintiff 

was less than 18 years old or of unsound mind. See A.R.S. § 12-502. 

 It appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that his claims accrued more than 

two years before he filed his Complaint and that they are, therefore, time barred. His 

Complaint was filed on June 13, 2014. For his claims to be timely, they must have 

accrued no earlier than June 13, 2012, two years before his Complaint was filed. See

Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Under federal 

law, the claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the 

injury which is the basis of his action.”) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff alleges in 

Count One that prison officials used excessive force on him, apparently on April 17, 

2010. Plaintiff alleges in Count Two that Defendant Banghart allowed another inmate to 

talk to Plaintiff, causing the other inmate to believe Plaintiff was seeking protective 

custody, which led to Plaintiff barricading himself in his cell and being sent to SMU II 

where prison officials allegedly assaulted Plaintiff on April 17, 2010. It appears that 

Plaintiff had contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous knowledge of these incidents 

because on May 18, 2010 Plaintiff filed an Inmate letter regarding the April 17, 2010 

alleged assault. Plaintiff’s claims for excessive use of force and threat to safety, 

therefore, accrued no later than May 18, 2010, but Plaintiff did not file suit on such 

claims until June 13, 2014, more than four years later. Thus, Plaintiff will be ordered to 

show cause why his claims in Counts One and Two should not be dismissed as timebarred. 

V. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

Case 2:14-cv-01323-SMM-DMF Document 7 Filed 08/21/14 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JDDL-K 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

 C. Copies

 Because Plaintiff is currently confined in ASPC-Eyman and this case is subject to 

General Order 14-08, Plaintiff is not required to submit an additional copy of every filing 

for use by the Court, as would ordinarily be required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 

5.4. If Plaintiff is transferred to a prison other than ASPC-Eyman, he will be notified of 

the requirements regarding copies for the Court that are required for inmates whose cases 

are not subject to General Order 14-08. 

 D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdikv. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing 

fee of $18.60. 

(3) Plaintiff must file a written response to this Order within 30 days of the 

date of this Order in which he shows cause as to why his claims in Counts One and Two 

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

Case 2:14-cv-01323-SMM-DMF Document 7 Filed 08/21/14 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JDDL-K 

(4) If Plaintiff fails to file a written response within 30 days in which he 

attempts to show cause why his claims in Counts One and Two should not be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a 

judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice. 

DATED this 21st day of August, 2014. 

Case 2:14-cv-01323-SMM-DMF Document 7 Filed 08/21/14 Page 8 of 8