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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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bound volumes go to press. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 9, 2009 Decided April 24, 2009

No. 08-5110

GUADALUPE L. GARCIA, FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF

G.A. GARCIA AND SONS FARM, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

THOMAS VILSACK, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:00-cv-02445-JR)

______

No. 08-5135

ROSEMARY LOVE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

USCA Case #08-5135 Document #1177401 Filed: 04/24/2009 Page 1 of 14
2

THOMAS VILSACK, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:00-cv-02502-JR)

Stephen S. Hill argued the cause for appellants Guadalupe L.

Garcia, Jr., et al. With him on the briefs were Alan M. Wiseman,

Robert L. Green, and Kenneth C. Anderson.

Barbara S. Wahl argued the cause for appellants Rosemary

Love, et al. With her on the briefs were Marc L. Fleischaker,

Kristine J. Dunne, Jennifer A. Fischer, Roderic V.O. Boggs,

Susan E. Huhta, Alexander John Pires, Jr., and Phillip L. Fraas.

Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the causes the appellee. With him on the brief

were Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey A.

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Marleigh D. Dover, Attorney. 

Before: ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: These appeals relate to the

continuing efforts by farmers to obtain relief from the

discriminatory distribution of federal farm benefits by the United

States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). See, e.g., Pigford

v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This time the

complaints were filed by female and Hispanic farmers who

USCA Case #08-5135 Document #1177401 Filed: 04/24/2009 Page 2 of 14
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alleged that since 1981 the USDA has unlawfully discriminated

against them in the administration of its farm benefit programs

and failed to act on their administrative complaints in accordance

with USDA regulations. This court affirmed the denial of class

action certification and the dismissal of the failure-to-investigate

claims brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act

(“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f. Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d

723 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir.

2006). The question in this second interlocutory appeal is

whether appellants’ failure-to-investigate claims are reviewable

under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§

701-706. Because appellants fail to show they lack an adequate

remedy in a court, we affirm the dismissals of their APA failureto-investigate claims and remand the cases to the district court.

I.

The ECOA provides that it is “unlawful for any creditor to

discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of

a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race, color, religion,

national origin, sex or marital status, or age.” 15 U.S.C. §

1691(a). The statute authorizes the recovery of actual damages

from creditors, including the federal government, see id. §§

1691a(e)-(f), 1691e(a), and a court “may grant such equitable and

declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce [the ECOA],” as well

as “reasonable attorney’s fees” to applicants bringing a

“successful action.” Id. § 1691e(c)-(d). Claims under the ECOA

must be filed within two years of the “date of the occurrence of

the violation.” Id. § 1691e(f). 

USDA regulations have long provided that applicants

alleging discrimination by the USDA in its direct benefit

programs may file administrative complaints with the USDA.

See 7 C.F.R. § 15d.4; see also Love v. Connor, 525 F. Supp. 2d

USCA Case #08-5135 Document #1177401 Filed: 04/24/2009 Page 3 of 14
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1

 The USDA regulations treat the filing of administrative

complaints alleging discrimination as permissive, rather than

mandatory. See Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs

and Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 62,962, 62,963 (proposed Nov. 10, 1998).

2

 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM, USDA, CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 46-47 (1997); see

also Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2002);

Treatment of Minority and Limited Resource Producers by the U.S.

Department of Agriculture: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on

Dep’t Operations, Nutrition and Foreign Agric. and the H. Comm. on

Agric., 105th Cong. 97 (1997) (statement of the Secretary of the

USDA).

155, 157-58 (D.D.C. 2007).1 Appellants allege, however, that for

years the USDA ignored discrimination complaints like theirs.

Indeed, in 1997 the USDA publicly acknowledged that in the

early 1980s it “effectively dismantled” its civil rights

enforcement apparatus.2

 

In response, Congress enacted a special remedial statute in

1998 for applicants who had filed a “nonemployment related

complaint” with the USDA before July 1, 1997 that alleged

discrimination occurring between January 1, 1981 and December

31, 1996. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741(e), 112

Stat. 2681-31 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2279 Note) (hereinafter

“Section 741”). The statute extended the ECOA statute of

limitations until October 21, 2000, and provided that such eligible

complainants could either file an ECOA action in federal court,

pursuant to Section 741(a), or renew their administrative

complaints and obtain a determination on the merits of their

claim from the USDA, pursuant to Section 741(b). Subsection

(b) of the statute required the USDA to timely process renewed

administrative complaints, to investigate the claims, and to issue

merits determinations after a hearing on the record. Subsections

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3

 Two Garcia appellants filed administrative complaints with

the USDA regarding discrimination occurring after 1996. Those

complaints would not be covered by Section 741. This is a

circumstance of no significance because we hold that all of the

appellants have an adequate remedy at law in the ECOA for their

failure-to-investigate claims. During oral argument government

counsel acknowledged, however, that were agency action on the post1996-occurrence complaints unreasonably delayed, these Garcia

appellants could seek judicial relief in the district court under

Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70,

79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Government counsel expressed no opinion on

whether such delay had occurred as to these two administrative

complaints. We leave for another day whether TRAC relief would be

available given our holding that the ECOA provides an adequate

remedy at law for failure-to-investigate claims.

4

 See Love v. Veneman, Civ. No. 00-2502, slip op. at 1

(D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2001); Garcia v. Veneman, Civ. No. 00-2445, 2002

WL 33004124, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2002).

(d) and (g) provided that complainants denied administrative

relief could seek de novo review in federal court. 

Appellants, nearly all of whom appear to have filed

complaints with the USDA before July 1, 1997,3

 chose the first

option: On the eve of the October 21, 2000 deadline, they filed

complaints in the federal district court here under the ECOA and

the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Their

complaints also included claims under the APA.4

 They alleged

that the USDA had discriminated against them with respect to

credit transactions and disaster benefits in violation of the ECOA,

and also had systemically failed to investigate complaints of such

discrimination in violation of USDA regulations. In the district

court only appellants’ ECOA credit transaction claims and the

Garcia appellants’ APA disaster benefit claims have survived the

USDA’s motion to dismiss. The district court also denied

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appellants’ motions for class certification on their remaining

ECOA discrimination claims, and this court affirmed upon

interlocutory review in 2006. See Love, 439 F.3d 723; Garcia,

444 F.3d 625. Following a remand of the APA failure-toinvestigate claims, the district court reaffirmed its dismissal of

those claims on the ground that Section 741 provided appellants

an adequate remedy at law. See Love v. Connor, 525 F. Supp. 2d

155; Order, Garcia v. Veneman, Civ. No. 00-2445. The district

court certified its interlocutory ruling, and this court granted

appellants’ petition for leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1292(b).

II.

The APA provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by

statute and final agency action for which there is no other

adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 5

U.S.C. § 704. In Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 904

(1988), the Supreme Court interpreted § 704 as precluding APA

review where Congress has otherwise provided a “special and

adequate review procedure.” Id. at 904 (internal quotations

omitted). An alternative remedy will not be adequate under § 704

if the remedy offers only “doubtful and limited relief.” Id. at 901.

So understood, this court has held that the alternative remedy

need not provide relief identical to relief under the APA, so long

as it offers relief of the “same genre.” El Rio Santa Cruz

Neighborhood Health Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs., 396 F.3d 1265, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Thus, for example,

relief will be deemed adequate “where a statute affords an

opportunity for de novo district-court review” of the agency

action. Id. at 1270. In such cases, the court has reasoned that

“Congress did not intend to permit a litigant challenging an

administrative denial . . . to utilize simultaneously both [the

review provision] and the APA.” Id. at 1270 (quoting Envtl.

Defense Fund v. Reilly, 909 F.2d 1497, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1990))

USCA Case #08-5135 Document #1177401 Filed: 04/24/2009 Page 6 of 14
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(omission and alteration in original). Relief also will be deemed

adequate “where there is a private cause of action against a third

party otherwise subject to agency regulation.” Id. at 1271. In

evaluating the availability and adequacy of alternative remedies,

however, the court must give the APA “‘a hospitable

interpretation’ such that ‘only upon a showing of clear and

convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent should the

courts restrict access to judicial review.’” Id. at 1270 (quoting

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)); see also

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. at 904. 

Appellants contend that the district court erred in two

respects in holding that they could not bring a claim under the

APA challenging the USDA’s failure to investigate their civil

rights complaints: First, the district court misapplied Bowen by

disregarding record evidence that under Section 741 there was no

real adequate alternative remedy in a court for their failure-toinvestigate claims; second, the district court mistakenly relied on

this court’s precedents involving claims against an agency for

failing to regulate third-party wrongdoers, and therefore failed to

follow circuit precedent that permits a plaintiff to bring an APA

claim for the agency’s failure to follow its regulations in addition

to a non-APA discrimination claim. Appellants emphasize that

their survival as farmers depends in significant part on their

ability to obtain federal benefits authorized by Congress to be

administered by the USDA, and that when the USDA fails to

comply with its regulations for handling and processing

administrative complaints, the benefits systems envisioned by

Congress are thwarted and their efforts to survive as farmers are

stymied. Although this court has no occasion to doubt

appellants’ claims of harm, their legal challenges to the dismissal

of their APA failure-to-investigate claims are unpersuasive. 

First, there is clear and convincing evidence that in enacting

Section 741 Congress did not intend for complainants who

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choose to proceed in the district court on their ECOA claims to

pursue their failure-to-investigate claims under the APA

simultaneously in the same lawsuit. In responding to the

dilemma presented by the USDA’s failure to investigate

discrimination claims, Congress resurrected time-barred claims

and gave such complainants two options: either file a complaint

in the district court or renew their administrative complaint with

the USDA with subsequent judicial review if the USDA denied

relief. Although appellants had the option first to renew their

administrative complaints with the USDA pursuant to Section

741(b), they chose not to do so. Had appellants done so, the

USDA would have been obligated to process, investigate, and

adjudicate appellants’ complaints of discrimination in a timely

fashion and absent relief de novo judicial review would be

available. Having chosen instead to proceed directly to the

district court pursuant to Section 741(a), appellants’ complaints

sought declaratory and injunctive relief that the USDA should

have investigated their old, unrenewed administrative complaints

about discrimination and requiring USDA to develop a better

processing system for such claims — in other words to grant

appellants the relief that they chose to forego when they filed

their lawsuits pursuant to Section 741(a). By extending the

statute of limitations for administrative complaints and by

providing for judicial review of USDA’s determinations,

Congress provided appellants an adequate remedy in court within

the meaning of the APA. Appellants are therefore barred from

relying on the APA to obtain relief they chose to forego. 

Appellants contend, however, that they were entitled to seek

a court order pursuant to the APA to remedy the USDA’s failure

to investigate their old administrative complaints because the

alternative administrative option under Section 741(b) was

illusory. To that end, appellants offered unrebutted evidence that

the USDA never successfully implemented the required

administrative process; they also suggested that no plaintiff has

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5

 See, e.g., Decl. of Rosalind Gray, Former Director, USDA

Office of Civil Rights, Apr. 6, 2002; Gray Supp. Decl., Oct. 18, 2006;

Gray Second Supp. Decl., Sept. 12, 2007; Benoit v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., 577 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2008). 

yet obtained de novo district court review pursuant to Section

741(b).5 Because of the flaws in the Section 741(b) option,

appellants conclude that they may obtain through their Section

741(a) complaint relief under the APA promised by Section

741(b). 

There are two problems with appellants’ approach. The first

is simply a matter of statutory interpretation. Adoption of

appellants’ interpretation would effectively rewrite the statute

that Congress specifically enacted in response to the USDA’s

failure to address discrimination complaints. The plain text of

Section 741 required complainants to make a choice between

going to court immediately or first renewing their administrative

complaints. Congress required the USDA to process, investigate,

and adjudicate the renewed administrative complaints and

afforded complainants who obtained no relief the opportunity to

seek de novo review in the district court. Each option afforded an

in-court remedy. Moreover, had appellants renewed their

administrative complaints pursuant to Section 741(b) and thereby

attempted to obtain relief pursuant to the APA through the

USDA’s administrative process, and been unable to obtain a final

determination due to the USDA’s unreasonable delay, they could

have sought, as government counsel acknowledged during oral

argument, relief in the district court under Telecommunications

Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79-80 (D.C. Cir.

1984). Cf. In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855, 860

(D.C. Cir. 2008); In re Tennant, 359 F.3d 523, 531 (D.C. Cir.

2004). Appellants’ futility contention, then, fails to show that in

enacting Section 741 Congress did not intend to require eligible

complainants to make a choice between two remedial regimes.

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Cf. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088-89 (D.C. Cir.

1996).

The second problem arises because, even giving credence to

appellants’ futility suggestion, they still would be unable to show

that they lack an adequate remedy at law. Under the ECOA, to

the extent appellants can offer proof that the USDA discriminated

against them in the administration of its credit programs,

appellants will be entitled to recover money damages and

attorneys’ fees, and, as appropriate, also injunctive and

declaratory relief. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e. This court’s precedent in

Council of and for the Blind of Delaware County Valley, Inc. v.

Regan, 709 F.2d 1521 (1983) (en banc), and its progeny — Coker

v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 84 (1990), and Women’s Equity Action

League v. Cavazos (“WEAL”), 906 F.2d 742 (1990) — make

clear that an ECOA discrimination claim filed directly against the

USDA would be adequate to preclude a cause of action under the

APA. In those cases the court held that the plaintiff could not

maintain an action under the APA directly against a federal

agency for failure to investigate and rectify the wrongdoing of a

third party where Congress had provided the plaintiff with a

private right of action against the third party. See Council, 709

F.2d at 1531-33; Coker, 902 F.2d at 89-90; WEAL, 906 F.2d at

750-51. For example, in Council, the plaintiffs had alleged that

the Office of Revenue Sharing had failed to process and resolve

administrative complaints in a timely manner. On appeal, they

contended that a national suit against the federal agency would be

more effective. This court held that even so the remedy in the

form of a private suit against state and local governments

provided by Congress was adequate to address the alleged

discrimination. Council, 709 F.2d at 1532-33. 

The relevant question under the APA, then, is not whether

private lawsuits against the third-party wrongdoer are as effective

as an APA lawsuit against the regulating agency, but whether the

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private suit remedy provided by Congress is adequate. See

Council, 709 F.2d at 1532; WEAL, 906 F.2d at 751. As a result,

the availability of actions against individuals may be adequate

even if such actions “cannot redress the systemic lags and lapses

by federal monitors” and even if such “[s]uits directly against the

discriminating entities may be more arduous, and less effective

in providing systemic relief, than continuing judicial oversight of

federal government enforcement.” WEAL, 906 F.2d at 751. This

is because the court concluded in Council, Coker, and WEAL,

“situation-specific litigation affords an adequate, even if

imperfect, remedy.” Id. As explained in El Rio Santa Cruz,

third-party suits are an adequate remedy for the alleged victims

of statutory violations, like unlawful discrimination, because they

provide relief of “the same genre” as that offered by an APA

claim. 396 F.3d at 1272 (quoting WEAL, 906 F.2d at 751). 

Appellants’ attempts to avoid this precedent are

unpersuasive. The court has confirmed that its approach is

consistent with the Supreme Court’s construction of the APA in

Bowen. In El Rio Santa Cruz, the court explained that, consistent

with Bowen, Council, Coker, and WEAL held that an alternative

adequate remedy at law exists where Congress chooses to grant

those allegedly aggrieved by agency failure to remedy the wrongs

of a regulated third parties a private cause of action against those

third parties. 396 F.3d at 1270-71. The fact that appellants fault

the USDA’s regulation of itself and not its regulation of a third

party does not mean that Council and its progeny are inapposite,

because there is no material difference between the adequacy of

the ECOA remedy and the third-party actions in Council, Coker

and WEAL. The suggestion that ECOA relief would not vindicate

appellants’ interest in ensuring that the USDA adheres to its dutyto-investigate regulations, was rejected in Council, Coker, and

WEAL when the court concluded that a direct action against a

regulated private party was an adequate remedy at law for

whatever additional injury a plaintiff suffered as a result of a

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federal agency’s failure to remedy that violation administratively.

See Council, 709 F.2d at 1531-33; Coker, 902 F.2d at 89-90;

WEAL, 906 F.2d at 750-51. If anything, an ECOA discrimination

claim filed directly against the USDA affords a better remedy

than those available in Council, Coker, and WEAL. If successful,

a plaintiff can obtain declaratory and injunctive relief against the

agency itself, in addition to money damages, and such remedies

would presumably deter the USDA to the same extent as a

successful APA claim from discriminating against plaintiff-credit

applicants and failing to adhere to its duty-to-investigate

regulations. On appellants’ view of Council, Coker, and WEAL,

the availability of a direct ECOA claim against a private creditor

would constitute an adequate remedy barring APA challenges to

the FTC’s oversight of a private creditor, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691c,

1691c(a)-(c); see also 22 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 11, 1998 WL

1180049, at *1, but the availability of a nearly identical claim

against the USDA would not constitute an adequate remedy.

Appellants cannot show that Congress intended such disparate

results. 

McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984), is

of no assistance to appellants. In McKenna, the court held that

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, did

not provide the exclusive judicial remedy for a probationary

employee’s claim that the agency failed to follow its regulations

in effecting an allegedly discriminatory discharge. Id. at 791.

The court observed that “Ms. McKenna’s claim under the APA

is not one of discrimination. Rather, she charges that the agency,

whether its motive was legal or illegal, failed to conform to its

own regulations. She does not claim that these procedural

violations constitute employment discrimination.” Id. (emphasis

in original). In other words, her claim related to a personnel

matter that was completely distinct from her gender

discrimination. Here, by contrast, appellants’ APA failure-toUSCA Case #08-5135 Document #1177401 Filed: 04/24/2009 Page 12 of 14
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6

 See Nichols v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 &

n.2 (D.D.C. 1998); Lynch v. Bennett, 665 F. Supp. 62, 64-65 (D.D.C.

1987). 

investigate and lending discrimination claims are inextricably

linked.

As appellants read McKenna, it stands for the proposition

that a plaintiff may always bring an APA claim alleging that an

agency failed to follow its own regulations in processing or

investigating discrimination allegations, notwithstanding the

existence of other adequate remedies at law. But McKenna

cannot bear the weight that appellants place upon it. In

McKenna, the court did not address whether the judicial and

administrative procedures under Title VII constituted an adequate

remedy at law so as to preclude APA review and so cannot be

read, as appellants urge, as inconsistent with Council and its

progeny. Appellants cite to no case that reads McKenna that

way, and such precedent as we have found does not support their

position.6

 In McKenna the court simply assumed without

deciding that Title VII procedures did not constitute an adequate

remedy at law. Cf. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir.

2006). Appellants’ other authorities also provide no support. For

instance, their reliance on Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 984-85

(D.C. Cir. 1989), is misplaced; the court held only that the

potential availability of a cause of action in the Claims Court was

not an adequate remedy because that court lacked equitable

jurisdiction and it was doubtful that court had jurisdiction over

the plaintiffs claims.

Remaining are appellants’ APA claims that the USDA

discriminated in dispersing non-credit disaster benefits, which are

not covered by Section 741. We remand these claims. As to the

Garcia appellants, the district court’s dismissal did not address

their non-credit claims. See Order, Garcia v. Veneman, Civ. No.

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00-2445 (Nov. 30, 2007). As to the Love appellants, the district

court’s conclusion that there was no reason to allow them to

proceed with their non-credit claims “at this time,” Love, 525 F.

Supp. 2d at 161, was not a dismissal with prejudice, see Foremost

Sales Promotions, Inc. v. Dir., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &

Firearms, 812 F.2d 1044, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 1987); 12 MOORE’S

FEDERAL PRACTICE § 58.02. Finally, the court will not address

the government’s jurisdictional and other contentions for

dismissal of these claims because the district court has yet to rule

on them and they were not adequately briefed in this interlocutory

appeal.

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissals of appellants’ APA

failure-to-investigate claims and otherwise remand the cases to

the district court.

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