Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01774/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01774-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 A co-plaintiff who asserted similar claims has previously been dismissed after she ceased

participating in the prosecution of the litigation.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

*E-filed 10/27/06*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GLORIA FRANCO, 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION,

Defendants. /

NO. 05-cv-1774 RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Gloria Franco brought this action alleging she was wrongfully terminated from her

employment with defendant Boston Scientific Corporation as a catheter assembler. The complaint

was originally filed in state court, and asserts claims under California’s Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Govt. Code § 12900 et seq. and California Unfair Business Practices

Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.1

 Boston Scientific removed the action to this Court on

the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

Boston Scientific now moves for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff cannot

establish a prima facia case of discrimination, and that even if she can, there are no material facts in

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dispute to rebut Boston Scientific’s showing that Franco’s employment was terminated for

legitimate business reasons. Based on the parties’ briefing, the argument of counsel, and the record,

the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

 II. BACKGROUND

Franco was hired by Boston Scientific in 1994 when she was 47 years old. She worked on a

production line, assembling catheters apparently used in treatment of cardiovascular conditions. 

Between 1995 and 2003, Franco received a series of verbal and written warnings under Boston

Scientific’s disciplinary policies regarding certain attendance and behavioral issues. In general,

Franco was disciplined for excessive tardiness and absences, and for several instances involving

conflict between Franco and her coworkers. One written warning related to an incident when

Franco allegedly pried a door off a garment cabinet to obtain a smock. During the same time period,

Franco received annual performance reviews that noted some of these issues, yet others recorded

that her attendance record met expectations and even commended her for being “dedicated to

producing a defective free product.”

In July of 2003, Franco received a “Final Written Warning” based on her violation of

company policy against storing personal items and make up in her gowning locker. On Friday,

March 5, 2004, Franco agreed to work a “voluntary” overtime shift the following morning at 4:00

a.m. There is a dispute as to whether Franco also informed her supervisors at that time that she

might not be able to work as planned. In deposition, Franco testified as follows:

Q: What did he say?

A: Could I come in the next day.

Q: What did you say?

A: I said I would try.

Q: Did you say anything else?

A: No.

Q: Did you tell him that there was any reason that you wouldn’t be able to make it?

A: I told him it’s possible that I can’t make it.

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2

 Franco’s testimony on the point is not entirely clear, and there is dispute as to the terms “old”

and “contaminated,” as well as to whether she had sufficient personal knowledge to support whatever

complaint she made. Nevertheless, her testimony is sufficient to raise a factual issue that she made some

3

* * *

Q: And you told both of them [certain coworkers] you may work the next day?

A: “I may work.”

* * *

Q: Did you speak to any body else at the company about working that Saturday?

A: No.

In later testimony, however, Franco asserted that she told her supervisor, Sam Alam, that she

“wasn’t feeling well” and would not be able to come in on that Saturday after all. Even assuming

the inconsistencies in Franco’s own testimony raise a question as to whether Franco’s commitment

to work on the Saturday in question was equivocal, she has pointed to no evidence from which a

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Boston Scientific lacked a reasonable basis to believe

that Franco had agreed to work the Saturday overtime shift. 

Franco did not appear for work on the Saturday in question. In deposition, Franco testified

that she had set her alarm clock for 3:00 a.m. and that it went off, but she did not hear it. Her

husband tried to rouse her at some point, but she ended up sleeping until 1:00 p.m. Franco tried to

telephone her supervisor, but by then, everyone at Boston Scientific had gone home. Her call was

not answered and she did not leave a message.

Boston Scientific asserts that it began reviewing Franco’s employment history the following

Monday in light of her failure to appear for the Saturday shift. Given the prior warnings about

attendance issues, and the fact that Franco was on “Final Written Warning” (albeit for a nonattendance issue), Boston Scientific concluded that it had grounds under its disciplinary policies to

terminate her, and it did so on the following Wednesday.

According to Franco, however, on the same Monday after she missed the Saturday shift, she

had complained to her supervisor, Sam Alam, that certain other assembly line workers were using

“old” or “contaminated” glue, which she viewed as a health and safety hazard.2

 Franco testified that

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28 complaint regarding glue being used in a manner that she believed created a health risk to users of the

catheters.

4

in response to her complaint, Alam responded that Franco was “the only one he has to worry about,”

that she “talk[ed] way too much” and that he “was going to make some changes around there.”

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary

judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986).

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Id. at 323. If it meets this burden, the moving party is then entitled to judgment as a

matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element

of his case with respect to which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23.

The non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party cannot defeat the moving party’s properly

supported motion for summary judgment simply by alleging some factual dispute between the

parties. To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party must bring forth

material facts, i.e., “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .

Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,

475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, including

questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence. Masson v. New Yorker

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Magazine, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2434-35 (1991) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). It is the court’s responsibility “to determine

whether the ‘specific facts’ set forth by the nonmoving party, coupled with undisputed background

or contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor

based on that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Service, 809 F.2d at 631. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if

the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, “[w]here the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there

is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The application of these standards in

the context of employment discrimination claims is described further below.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Age Discrimination

FEHA provides that “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to

hire or employ, or to discharge, dismiss, reduce, suspend, or demote, any individual over the age of

40 on the ground of age.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12941. Because the same analysis is used to evaluate

both FEHA claims and claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621,

et seq., (“ADEA”), “California courts interpreting FEHA often look to federal cases interpreting the

ADEA.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996).

 In general, a plaintiff asserting a claim of discriminatory discharge from employment has the

initial burden of establishing the existence of a prima facie case. Wallis v. Simplot, 26 F.3d 885, 889

(9th Cir. 1994). This initial burden can be satisfied by presenting evidence that “gives rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination.” Id. Indeed, “very little proof is needed to establish a prima

facie case.” Chaffin v. Textron, Inc., 861 F.Supp. 972, 975 (E.D. Cal. 1994). A plaintiff can carry

her initial burden by showing that she: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) performed her job

in a satisfactory manner; (3) was discharged; and (4) was replaced by a substantially younger

employee with equal or inferior qualifications. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 891; Chaffin, 861 F.Supp. at 976.

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If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must produce evidence

demonstrating that the adverse employment action was taken “‘for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason.’” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (quoting Texas Dept. of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)); see also Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889; Chaffin,

861 F.Supp. at 975. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

defendant’s proffered explanation is mere pretext. Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912,

918 (9th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff can establish pretext by offering evidence showing that: (1) the

defendant’s alleged reason for the discharge was false, or (2) a discriminatory reason more than

likely motivated the employer. Id.; Chaffin, 861 F.Supp. at 975. Plaintiff “must produce ‘specific,

substantial evidence of pretext’” in order to meet her burden at summary judgment. Wallis, 26 F.3d

at 885 (quoting Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)). “Mere conclusory

allegations” regarding the defendant’s motivation are “wholly empty” and generally insufficient to

survive summary judgment. Steckl, 703 F.2d at 393. Where the evidence is “totally lacking,”

summary judgment will be appropriate even though plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case. 

Schnidrig v. Colombia Machine, Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996); Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890;

Chaffin, 861 F.Supp. at 975.

Although “very little evidence” is necessary to establish a prima facia case, it is far from

clear that Franco has met her burden to do so in this instance. Other than a few conclusory

comments that she believed Alam “preferred” younger employees, Franco points to no evidence of

any age-based discrimination or animus whatsoever. Additionally, Franco does not contend she

was replaced by a younger employee. 

Even assuming plaintiff can make out a prima facia case of age discrimination, however, she

has made no showing, in the context of age discrimination, to rebut Boston Scientific’s showing that

it terminated her for non-discriminatory reasons. Tellingly, even in the section of her brief directed

to age discrimination, Franco argues that Boston Scientific’s proffered reasons for firing her were

pretextual because, in her view, there is an inference that her firing was retaliatory and motivated by

her complaints about the glue. Accordingly, Franco has failed to demonstrate the existence of a

triable issue of fact with respect to her age discrimination claim.

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B. Gender Discrimination

Franco’s gender discrimination claim suffers from the same defects as her age discrimination

claim. Other than vague and conclusory comments regarding her subjective belief that Alam

preferred male employees, Franco can point to no evidence of gender based discrimination. Indeed,

although it is not entirely clear where Franco believes the “discrimination” lay, as Boston Scientific

points out, her arguments more neatly fit a disparate treatment claim the one she has pleaded and is

attempting to pursue in this case. Again, Franco relies on her contention that she was retaliated

against, rather than pointing to any factual dispute that would suggest her termination was motivated

by discrimination rather than by the reasons offered by Boston Scientific. Thus, Franco has failed to

demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact with respect to her gender discrimination claim.

C. Failure to Accommodate Disability

The complaint alleges that Franco had a sleeping disorder that Boston Scientific failed to

accommodate prior to her termination, and that the termination itself constituted a failure to

accommodate. In both her deposition and in her opposition to this motion, however, Franco has

never articulated what accommodations she required, what she requested but was denied, or what

accommodations Boston Scientific should have provided even without a direct request from her. 

Franco does contend that she informed various of her supervisors about a number of physical

conditions over the years, but she never sets forth any specific failure on Boston Scientific’s part that

would be actionable as disability discrimination. At best, Franco’s theory may be that her alleged

sleeping disorder contributed to her failure to appear for the Saturday work shift preceding her

termination, but the facts surrounding that event do not rise to a failure to accommodate a disability. 

Franco does not suggest that Boston Scientific did or would have required her to work that shift,

irrespective of whether she had any disability. Rather, the undisputed facts show that Boston

Scientific simply believed–rightly or wrongly- that Franco had agreed to appear for the voluntary

overtime shift. Even if Boston Scientific’s reliance on Franco’s failure to appear was pretextual, it

was not a failure to accommodate or otherwise discriminate based on disability. Franco has failed to

demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact to the contrary.

D. Retaliation

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3

 See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 172 (1980).

4

 The Green court went on to hold that administrative regulations could also serve as a source

of public policy.

8

As noted above, the real focus of Franco’s argument that her termination was pretextual is

that an inference reasonably arises from timing and other circumstances that she was terminated in

retaliation for making health and safety complaints. Although the question is close, the Court

concludes there are triable issues of fact in this regard. Franco’s testimony as to Alam’s reaction to

her complaints, coupled with the timing, could support an inference drawn by a trier of fact that the

termination was motivated by retaliatory intent. 

In moving for summary judgement on this claim, Boston Scientific has focused on the

particular Labor Code referenced in Franco’s complaint, and has argued that the facts do not

establish a violation of those particular statutes. At oral argument, defense counsel argued that

Franco’s attempts to support this claim failed because she had pleaded specific statutory violations

rather than a general “Tameny” claim. 3

 The complaint, however, entitles this claim as “Termination

in Violation of Public Policy.” While perhaps not a model of pleading, it is sufficient to encompass

a “Tameny” claim regardless of whether it also asserts specific statutory violations unsupported by

these facts.

Under such a claim, there is no requirement that the employee make complaints to anyone

outside the company. See Green v. Ralee Engineering Company, 19 Cal.4th 66, 77 (1998). 

Nevertheless, plaintiffs seeking to show termination in violation of public policy must “show that

the important public interests they seek to protect are ‘tethered to fundamental policies that are

delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” Green v. Ralee, 19 Cal.4th at 71 (quoting Gantt

v. Sentry Insurance, 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 (1992)).4

 Here, neither Franco’s complaint nor her

opposition to this motion specifically identifies statutes or regulations to which she can tether her

claim. In the context of medical devices, however, it seems reasonably self-evident that Franco may

be able to identify pertinent governing authority that would be implicated by her complaints about

the catheter assembly. Franco must eventually identify such authority because, under California

law, the courts are not free to determine what is or is not a “fundamental public policy,” Green v.

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 Boston Scientific’s motion does not expressly address Franco’s claim under Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200 et seq., although that claim would fail automatically if all the other claims failed.

Ralee, 19 Cal.4th at 71. Nevertheless, the Court declines to enter summary judgment on this claim

simply because to date Franco has not cited specific statutes or regulations that may be pertinent.5

V. CONCLUSION

Boston Scientific’s motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to Franco’s claim

for discrimination based on age, gender, or disability. The motion is otherwise denied. The parties

shall appear for a status conference on November 8, 2006, at 2:30 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 27, 2003 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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