Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00248/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00248-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. MUNSON, No. CIV S-04-0248-RRB-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GORDON R. ENGLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the court is

defendants’ motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment (Doc. 39). 

Plaintiff filed a request to file a late opposition (Doc. 43) and an opposition (Doc. 42). 

Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 44).

Plaintiff’s complaint is a one page document which states “I Charles E. Munson

was discriminated by a co-worker, which, is a white male, which I was called by him a dumb

nigger which I am a black male.” (Complaint at 1.) Defendants’ answer sets forth several

affirmative defenses including, inter alia, insufficient service of process, failure to state a claim,

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The motion to

dismiss is based on insufficient service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Case 2:04-cv-00248-JAM-CMK Document 46 Filed 01/17/08 Page 1 of 7
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These facts are taken from defendants’ statement of undisputed facts in the 1

memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss or summary judgment. The facts are supported

by documents attached to the memorandum. Plaintiff has not objected to these facts, and the

court finds they are supported by the documents.

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4(i). The alternative motion for summary judgment argues plaintiff is unable to meet his prima

facie burden on his Title VII claim and that the agency took appropriate remedial action.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff, who is African-American, was employed at the Marine Corps Logistics

Base in Barstow, California in 1999. On or about August 31, 1999, a co-worker of plaintiff’s,

Patricia Irving, told plaintiff that another co-worker, Lawrence Prince, told Irving that another coworker, Edward Kenworthy, referred to plaintiff and Irving as “dumb niggers.” Plaintiff

contacted an EEO counselor, and filed a formal EEO complaint dated October 7, 1999. The

incident was investigated, and an Administrative Judge found no discrimination. Plaintiff

appealed the decision, but his request for reconsideration was denied because plaintiff had

already filed the instant case raising the same claim. Edward Kenworthy, the co-worker who

allegedly made the discriminatory statement, was suspended for two days and was transferred to

another work section.

MOTION TO DISMISS

The motion to dismiss is based on an argument that service of process was

insufficient pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). Rule 4(i) requires plaintiff to serve

a number of parties in addition to the defendant agency. At issue here is not the service upon the

defendant agency, but the service upon the US Attorney. Specifically, the US Attorney needs to

be served as follows: 

(A) by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the

United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought

or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee

designated by the United States attorney in a writing filed with the

clerk of the court or by sending a copy of the summons and of the

complaint by registered or certified mail addressed to the civil

process clerk at the office of the United States attorney . . .

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Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(i) (emphasis added). It is this last segment that defendants claim was not

followed properly: “by sending a copy ... addressed to the civil process clerk at the office of the

US attorney.” 

Defendants claim that instead of sending the summons and complaint to the US

Attorney’s office addressed to the civil process clerk as required, plaintiff sent it directly to the

attorney assigned to the case - Bobbie J. Montoya. Ms. Montoya informed plaintiff about the

defects in his service of process, but plaintiff failed to correct the service. 

“Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as a party

receives sufficient notice of the complaint.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union v.

Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing FTC v. Compagnie de SaintGobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1312 & n.61 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). “However, neither

actual notice nor simply naming the defendant in the complaint will provide personal jurisdiction

without ‘substantial compliance’ with” its requirements. Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th

Cir. 1986) (quoting Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982)). Federal courts

are instructed to liberally construe the “inartful pleading of pro se litigants,” especially “when

evaluating compliance with the technical rules of civil procedure.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Draper v.

Combs, 702 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986)) (other citations omitted).

Here, plaintiff substantially complied with Rule 4(i) by sending a copy of the

summons and complaint to the US Attorney’s office. He addressed the envelope to the assistant

US Attorney assigned to this case, whom had contacted him previously, instead of addressed to

the “civil process clerk.” Given the need to liberally construe pro se pleading, the undersigned

finds plaintiff substantially complied with Rule 4, and the US Attorney’s office was given actual

notice. Therefore, the motion to dismiss should be denied.

/ / /

/ / /

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4

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants argue that plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination vis-a-vis racial harassment. According to defendants, plaintiff must demonstrate

he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of his race, the conduct was unwelcome

and the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s

employment and create an abusive work environment. See Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F3d.

792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The first problem defendants say plaintiff has is the fact that the statement that is

the basis of the entire complaint is hearsay and is not admissible evidence. The statement was

made to a co-worker of plaintiff’s, not directly to plaintiff or in his hearing. Plaintiff only heard

about the statement third hand. 

Second, defendants argue plaintiff cannot establish that the alleged conduct

complained of was so severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of his employment and

create an abusive work environment. This was a one-time incident, and the single incident did

not so pollute the workplace that it altered the conditions of employment. They argue isolated

incidents, unless extremely serious, will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and

conditions of employment. Stray remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination, and mere

utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee is not

sufficient to violate Title VII. The only time a single comment may be sufficient is if it is made

by a supervisor, which was not the case here. 

Defendants also argue that, even if plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie

case, appropriate remedial action was taken by the agency in response to this alleged comment. 

The employee who made the statement (Kenworthy) was transferred to a different department

and was suspended for two days. 

As evidence, defendants attach as an exhibit to the motion an affidavit (Exhibit D)

signed by plaintiff regarding the incident. This affidavit appears to have been signed at the time

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Plaintiff filed a request to file a late opposition. Due to plaintiff’s health issues, 2

he was unable to timely file his opposition. This request should be granted, and the opposition to

the motion considered. 

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the incident was investigated by defendants. In this affidavit, plaintiff stated Ms. Irving informed

plaintiff about the statement made by Mr. Kenworthy, who was told about the statement from

Mr. Prince. Plaintiff stated this was the only time Mr. Kenworthy made such a statement. 

However, he did state he failed to inform management “because this type of conduct has been

going on here at Barstow for years and [he] did not think Management would take any action.” 

(Doc. 39-3, page 9, ¶ 6d). Plaintiff also acknowledged Kenworthy was transferred and he

believed Kenworthy received a suspension, but also stated he continued to be forced to have

contact with Kenworthy, which he refused to do. Plaintiff also claimed that although this was a

one time incident by Kenworthy, he had other confrontations with Kenworthy (apparently after

this initial incident) and it appears plaintiff claimed Kenworthy was harassing him regularly. 

When plaintiff complained about this behavior, the response he claimed he received was “oh,

that’s just Ed.” (Doc. 39-3, page 9-10, ¶7).

In opposition , plaintiff provided the court with a copy of a United States Supreme 2

Court decision, a newspaper article, and a letter from Senator Dianne Feinstein. It does not

appear to the court that any of these documents support plaintiff’s claims, and plaintiff does not

explain the relevance of these documents. He does not set forth any argument in his filings in

opposition of defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

To raise a prima facie case of racial harassment under Title VII or § 1981, plaintiff

“must raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether: (1) he was subjected to verbal or physical

conduct based on his race; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [plaintiff’s] employment and to create an abusive

work environment.” Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff 

“must show that his workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation such that his

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working environment could both subjectively and objectively be perceived as abusive.”

Martinez v. Marin Sanitary Serv., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1251 (N.D. Cal 2004) (internal quotes

and citations omitted). 

In evaluating the objective portion of the inquiry, the court should

utilize a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test, which includes factors

such as: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) the

severity of the discriminatory conduct; (3) whether the conduct is

physically threatening and publicly humiliating or merely an

offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably

interferes with the employee’s work performance.

Id. (citing Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 966 (9th cir. 2002), Brooks v.

City of San Mateo, 299 F.3d 917, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2000)). “The less severe or serious the nature

of the harassing conduct, the more pervasive or frequent such conduct must be.” Id. (citing

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991)). “Simple teasing, offhand comments, and

isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will rarely give rise to a reasonable perception that a

term or condition of employment has been so altered as to include harassment.” Id. (citing

Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798, Brooks, 229 F.3d at 924 (finding that “an isolated incident of

harassment by a co-worker will rarely (if ever) give rise to a reasonable fear that [racial]

harassment has become a permanent fixture of the employment relationship”)). 

Here, there was only an isolated incident, which did not occur in the presence of

plaintiff. The statement was made to a third party and related to plaintiff after the fact. The

statement referred to plaintiff and another co-worker as “dumb niggers”, but plaintiff’s name was

not specifically used. This does not appear to be the kind of incident that would rise to the level

of harassment, but would be characterized more as “simple teasing, offhand comments, and

isolated incidents” and thus would not give rise to a reasonable perception that a condition of

employment has been so altered as to include harassment. It appears from the affidavit plaintiff

signed during the investigation of his EEO complaint, that there may have been additional

behavior and incidents of harassment other than the statement plaintiff complains about in his

complaint. (See Doc. 39-3, Ex. D.) However, there is no evidence in the record, nor has plaintiff

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brought any additional incidents to the court’s attention, to support a finding of harassing

behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and

to create an abusive work environment. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that 

1. Plaintiff’s request to file a late opposition be granted; 

2. The motion to dismiss be denied;

3. The motion for summary judgment be granted; and

4. Judgment be entered in this case, and the case be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 16, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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