Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02002/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02002-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GARTH JASON GUMIENNY, 

Petitioner,

v. 

MICHAEL F. MARTEL, et al., 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 14cv2002-BAS (DHB) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING: 

(1) RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND 

(2) PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO AMEND 

 Petitioner Garth Jason Gumienny, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging 

his conviction and sentence imposed by the San Diego County Superior Court in case 

number SCE289767. Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition asserting it is time barred 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (ECF No. 10.) Petitioner has filed an opposition, and 

Respondent has replied. (ECF Nos. 17, 22.) Petitioner has also filed a Motion for Leave 

to Amend the Petition, which Respondent opposes. (ECF Nos. 24, 30.) After a thorough 

review of the pleadings and all supporting documents, the Court finds the Petition is 

statutorily barred by the expiration of the limitations period. Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED, and that 

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Petitioner’s Motion to Amend be DENIED. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On March 12, 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to sexual penetration of a child ten years 

of age or younger and committing a lewd act upon a child. (Lodgment No. 2; ECF No. 

11-3.1

) On August 10, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of 21 years to life. 

(Id.) Petitioner did not appeal his conviction. 

 On October 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San 

Diego Superior Court.2

 (Lodgment No. 5; ECF No. 11-6 at 67.) The petition was denied 

on December 13, 2013. (Lodgment No. 5; ECF No. 11-6 at 43.) 

 On February 17, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the 

California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 5; ECF No. 11-6 at 5.) The Court of Appeal 

construed the filing as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and denied the petition on 

March 19, 2014. (Lodgment No. 6.) 

 On May 22, 2014, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme 

Court. (Lodgment No. 7; ECF No. 11-9.) On July 30, 2014, the petition was denied 

without comment. (Lodgment No. 8; ECF No. 11-10.) 

 On August 18, 2014, Petitioner constructively filed the instant federal Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner raises four 

grounds for relief: (1) Miranda violation; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (3) 

denial of right to appeal; and (4) denial of transcripts. (Id.) 

                                                                

1

 For ease of reference, the Court includes citation to the page numbers imprinted at the top of the page 

by the Court’s electronic case filing (ECF) system. 

2

 For purposes of determining the date on which an incarcerated pro se habeas petitioner files a 

document with the court, courts generally apply the prison “mailbox rule” under which a petitioner is 

deemed to have filed the document on the date he deposited it to prison officials for mailing. See 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 

2000). The “mailbox rule” “applies to prisoners filing habeas petitions in both federal and state courts.” 

Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 

(9th Cir. 2000)). Therefore, when referring to documents filed by Petitioner, the Court will cite to the 

signature date, rather than the date the documents were filed on the courts’ dockets. 

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 Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 17, 2014. (ECF No. 10.) On 

January 5, 2015, Petitioner filed an opposition and supplemental exhibits. (ECF Nos. 17, 

18.) Respondent filed a reply on January 29, 2015. (ECF No. 22.) 

 On January 28, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Petition. 

(ECF No. 24.) Respondent opposed the motion on March 12, 2015. (ECF NO. 30.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Motion to Dismiss 

 Respondent argues the Court should dismiss the Petition because it is time barred 

by the one year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner counters 

that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to mental illness. 

 Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a oneyear period of limitation applies to an application for writ of habeas corpus filed “by a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The limitations period begins to run on “the date on which the judgment became final by 

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period for seeking direct review under Section 

2244(d)(1)(A) includes the 60-day period within which Petitioner could have appealed 

his conviction. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.308(a). The one year limitations period begins to run on 

the day after judgment becomes final and terminates on the last day of the period. 

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 In this case, Petitioner was sentenced on August 10, 2010. (Lodgment No. 2; ECF 

No. 11-3.) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal, therefore his conviction became final 60 

days later, on October 12, 2010.3

 Thus, absent any tolling, Petitioner had one year, until 

October 12, 2011 to file his federal petition. Petitioner filed his federal Petition on 

                                                                

3

 Respondent states that Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 9, 2010. (ECF No. 10-1 at 4.) 

However, October 9, 2010 fell on a Saturday, and the following Monday, October 11, 2010 was 

Columbus Day. Therefore, the last day Petitioner could have filed an appeal in the California Court of 

Appeal was Tuesday, October 12, 2010. See Cal R. Ct. 8.810(a); Cal. Code of Civ. P. §§12a(a), 135. 

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August 18, 2014, approximately 2 years and 10 months (1041 days) after AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, the Petition is untimely unless 

AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision or the doctrine of equitable tolling extend the filing 

deadline. 

1. Statutory Tolling 

 AEDPA’s one year limitations period is tolled during the period of time a 

petitioner seeks post-conviction relief in state court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2). 

Specifically, AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision provides: 

The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction 

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this 

subsection. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2). 

 However, the statute of limitations is not tolled from the date on which the 

judgment became final and “the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because 

there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 

(9th Cir. 1999) overruled on other grounds by Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th 

Cir. 2008). 

 Here, Petitioner filed his first petition for habeas relief in the California Court of 

Appeal on October 2, 2013.4

 (Lodgment No. 5; ECF No. 11-6 at 67.) By that time, 

AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations had already expired. Specifically, the state 

                                                                

4

 Respondent notes that Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate on October 2, 2012. (Lodgment 

No. 3.) The Court of Appeal denied the petition without comment on November 28, 2012. (Lodgment 

No. 4.) However, this filing was not a habeas corpus petition because it did not directly attack 

Petitioner’s conviction. Rather, Petitioner argued the Superior Court improperly denied his requests for 

free transcripts. See e.g. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding motion that 

did not challenge the petitioner’s conviction, but “simply ‘sought material he claimed might be of help’ 

in later state proceedings” did not toll the AEDPA limitations period); McCaffery v. Henry, 2008 WL 

859455 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) (holding various filings the petitioner made in state court prior to 

filing her state habeas petitions did not constitute a challenge to her conviction). Moreover, even 

assuming the petition for writ of mandate were to be construed as a habeas petition, AEDPA’s one year 

statute of limitations had already expired 356 days before the petition for writ of mandate was filed. 

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habeas petition had been filed approximately 2 years (721 days) after the limitations 

period ended. The filing of a state habeas petition after the limitations period expires 

“result[s] in an absolute time bar.” Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(explaining that a state petition filed before AEDPA’s limitations period runs will toll the 

limitations period, but a state petition filed after the limitations period ended will not). 

See also Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2254(d) 

does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state 

petition was filed.”). 

 Thus, the Petition is untimely unless petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. 

2. Equitable Tolling 

 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that AEDPA’s one year statute of 

limitations may be tolled for equitable reasons. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

645 (2010). See also Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. 

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). In Holland, the Supreme Court held equitable 

tolling is appropriate when the petitioner can show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and 

prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 

(2005)). However, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “[e]quitable tolling will not be 

available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary 

circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 

(9th Cir. 1996)). See also Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting 

equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases”). The ‘extraordinary circumstances’ must 

be the “but-for and proximate cause” of the untimely filing. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 

798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under 

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit cautioned that district courts must 

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“take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process” and “only 

authorize extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1289. 

The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling is warranted. 

Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 a. Unavailability of Records 

 The main thrust of Petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling is 

based on mental impairment. However, to the extent Petitioner’s argument is also based 

on the unavailability of records, the Court finds he is not entitled to relief. 

 Petitioner asserts that the state courts denied him access to free transcripts, which 

he contends he needed to substantiate his habeas corpus petition. It appears Petitioner 

ascribes a portion of his delay in timely filing his Petition due to his efforts to obtain free 

transcripts. The Ninth Circuit has held that equitable tolling may be appropriate if a 

petitioner was denied access to his legal materials. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 

F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). A 

petitioner seeking equitable tolling on the basis of lack of access to a legal file “bears the 

burden of showing his own diligence and that the hardship caused by lack of access to his 

materials was an extraordinary circumstance that caused him to file his petition . . . late.” 

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013. Here, Petitioner did not request the transcripts from 

the state court until May 16, 2012 – approximately seven 7 months (218 days) – after the 

AEDPA statute of limitations had already expired. (See Lodgment No. 5; ECF No. 11-7 

at 26.) Therefore, he has not met his burden of showing that he was pursuing his rights 

diligently, or that the alleged delay was the “but-for and proximate cause” of the late 

filing. Allen, 255 F.3d at 800. Moreover, as the state court noted below, Petitioner could 

have filed his habeas petition without the transcripts, which it appears he ultimately did. 

(See Lodgment No. 5; ECF No. 11-6 at 74; ECF No. 11-7 at 49.) Thus, ‘[i]f diligent, he 

could have prepared a basic form habeas petition and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA 

deadline, or at least could have filed it less than [1041] days late assuming that some 

lateness could have been excused.” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1014 (denying 

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equitable tolling based on claimed lack of access to legal materials). 

 b. Mental Incompetency 

 In Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit held that a 

petitioner’s mental impairments may serve as the basis for equitable tolling. The Court 

formulated a two-part test: 

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control, [] by demonstrating the 

impairment was so severe that either 

 (a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally 

 understand the need to timely file, or 

 (b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to 

 prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing. 

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims to the 

extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made it 

impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the 

circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance. 

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100. 

 Here, Petitioner claims that he suffered from mental illness that prevented him 

from timely filing his Petition. However, Petitioner presents scant evidence of his mental 

illness or treatment.5

 Petitioner provides a limited number of treatment records that date 

primarily from 2001 and 2002.6

 (See ECF No. 4 at 18-23.) Petitioner does not present 

any medical records from the relevant filing period, in particular from the time his 

conviction became final on October 12, 2010 until he filed the Petition on August 25, 

                                                                

5

 The Court finds Petitioner has not made “a non-frivolous showing that he had a severe mental 

impairment during the filing period that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 

1100. Accordingly, the Court finds the Motion to Dismiss can be resolved by reference to the record, 

and without an evidentiary hearing. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). 

6

 Petitioner submitted 5 military health records dated from November 6, 2001 to May 14, 2002. (ECF 

No. 4 at 18-23.) Petitioner also submitted a single Medical Encounter Form from the San Diego 

Sheriff’s Department dated July 26, 2009 (ECF No. 1 at 40), and a single Medication Reconciliation 

Form from Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility dated September 23, 2010. (ECF No. 4 at 31.) 

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2014. The Court has carefully reviewed the records that Petitioner did submit, and finds 

that at most, the records show Petitioner had “mild situational depression” in 2001-2002 

(ECF No. 4 at 18), and had been prescribed medication for depression and/or anxiety in 

July 2009 and September 2010. (ECF Nos. 1 at 40; 4 at 31.) These records do not 

demonstrate that Petitioner was in fact mentally impaired, much less suffering from a 

mental impairment that was so severe he was “unable rationally or factually to personally 

understand the need to timely file” or “unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and 

effectuate its filing.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100. 

 Even assuming, without deciding, that Petitioner’s unsubstantiated claims of 

mental illness should be credited, and that Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the 

Petition would still be untimely. Petitioner claims he “came out of mental incompetency” 

on January 15, 2012. (ECF No. 17 at 30.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed his first state 

habeas petition on October 2, 2013, approximately 1 year and 8 months (626 days) later. 

Under the assumption the AEDPA statute of limitation was equitably tolled until January 

15, 2012, at which point it began running again, the limitations period had expired by the 

time Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d at 482 

(a state habeas petition filed after the limitations period expires “result[s] in an absolute 

time bar); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d at 823. Even if statutory tolling could be 

applied from October 2, 2013 to July 30, 2014, while the state habeas petitions were 

pending, the Petition would still be 645 days late.7

 Thus, even assuming Petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling and statutory tolling, the Petition would be time barred. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds equitable tolling is not warranted in this case, and 

therefore RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

/ / / 

                                                                

7

 The 645 days is comprised of 626 days from January 15, 2012 (the date equitable tolling ended and 

limitations period re-commenced) to October 2, 2013 (the date the first state habeas petition was filed) 

and 19 days from July 13 2014 (the date the last state habeas petition was denied) to August 18, 2014 

(the date the federal Petition was filed). 

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 B. Motion to Amend the Petition 

 Petitioner seeks leave to amend the Petition to assert additional claims. (ECF No. 

24.) In light of the fact the Court finds the Petition is time barred, the Court finds 

amendment would be futile. Where amendment of a petitioner’s petition would be futile, 

denial of leave to amend is appropriate. James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 

2000); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobile Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (leave 

to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) “need not be granted where the amendment . . . constitutes 

an exercise in futility . . ..”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS 

the Motion to Amend the Petition be DENIED. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 After a thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing 

analysis, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be 

GRANTED, and that Petitioner’s Motion to Amend be DENIED. 

 The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Cynthia Bashant under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than July 24, 2015 any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed and served 

on all parties no later than ten (10) days after being served with the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 8, 2015 ____________________________ 

 DAVID H. BARTICK 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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