Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00633/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00633-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0207 Fair Labor Standards Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JAMES PICKERING, JR., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-CV-633-WKW[WO]

 ) 

LORILLARD TOBACCO CO., INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Collective Action or, in the

Alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. # 6), and accompanying brief (Doc.

# 7). The motions are filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff filed a Response to the motion (Doc. # 15), to which Defendant

replied (Doc. # 19). Based upon careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the

appropriate law and the Complaint’s allegations, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be

granted without prejudice, and the motion for a more definite statement (Doc. # 6) will be

denied as moot.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331. Personal jurisdiction and venue are adequately pleaded and not contested.

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the

legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states

a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court

to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. “[F]acial plausibility”

exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Hence, the complaint need not set out “detailed factual

allegations,” but something “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action” is required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

B. Rule 12(e)

A party may “move for a more definite statement” under Rule 12(e) when a pleading

is “so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(e). District courts also have the “inherent authority to require the [plaintiff] to file a

more definite statement” if not by Rule 12(e), then by their authority “to narrow the issues

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in the case in order to speed its orderly, efficient, and economic disposition.” Fikes v. City

of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1083 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996).

III. FACTS

Plaintiff alleges that, while employed full-time by Defendant as a sales representative,

Defendant did not pay him overtime for hours he worked beyond forty hours per week, in

violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). (Compl.

¶¶ 8-10.) He further avers that he was a non-exempt employee and was “performing the job

functions and duties of a non-exempt employee.” (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11.) Plaintiff also seeks to

bring a collective action under the FLSA, contending that both he and “all similarly situated

employees” employed by Defendant are entitled to remedies provided under the FLSA. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 17, 18, 22, 23.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendant moves to dismiss the collective action component of Plaintiff’s FLSA

lawsuit. It argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead or define any attributes of the alleged

similarly situated employees and that, therefore, the allegations fail to state a claim for relief

as a collective action. (Def. Br. 1.) 

“The FLSA authorizes collective actions against employers accused of violating the

FLSA.” Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing

29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); see also § 216(b) (“An action . . . may be maintained against any

employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and

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other employees similarly situated.”). “The FLSA itself does not define how similar the

employees must be before the case may proceed as a collective action.” Morgan, 551 F.3d

at 1259. As set out in Morgan, the Eleventh Circuit has “not adopted a precise definition of

the term.” Id. It has, though, provided some clues. The employees should be “‘similarly

situated’ with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.” Id.

(quoting Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1991)). 

However, the positions need not be identical, only similar. Id. at 1260 (citing Grayson v. K

Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996)). 

Applying these principles in light of the pleading standards established in Twombly

and Iqbal, the court finds that the collective action allegations lack the level of factual

specificity required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. That he worked as a full-time “sales

representative” is the only detail provided in the Complaint about Plaintiff’s job. (Compl.

¶ 8.) This is a job title, but not a job description. The allegation that Plaintiff performed the

“functions and duties of a non-exempt employee” is conclusory and reveals nothing about

Plaintiff’s actual job duties as a “sales representative.” See 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (“A job title

alone is insufficient to establish the exempt status of an employee. The exempt or nonexempt

status of any particular employee must be determined on the basis of whether the employee’s

salary and duties meet the requirements of the regulations in this part.”). There simply are

no allegations revealing what Plaintiff did when he reported to work. 

Moreover, there is no description of the job duties (or even the job titles) of the

proposed similarly situated employees in the Complaint. In his response brief, Plaintiff says

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that the similarly situated employees also were “sales representatives.” (Doc. # 15, at 5.) 

This is the first time Plaintiff has identified the job title of the other employees allegedly

similarly situated. A job description nonetheless remains missing, and in any event, pleading

deficiencies cannot be cured in a brief. See GJR Investments, Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132

F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to correct the complaint’s

deficiencies in arguments made in a brief), overruled on other grounds as recognized in

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010)). Nor are there any allegations concerning

the similarly situated employees’ pay provisions. Plaintiff merely seeks relief on behalf of

“all similarly situated employees.” This phrase is a legal conclusion and, absent some factual

elaboration, is insufficient to satisfy Twombly’s and Iqbal’s pleading bar. See Iqbal, 129 S.

Ct. at 1949 (One of the “working principles under[lying] [the] decision in Twombly” is “that

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 

In sum, the Complaint contains no factual basis by which to assess whether Plaintiff

and the other employees are similarly situated. In the absence of any detail, Plaintiff has not

sufficiently alleged an action on behalf of others similarly situated. 

Plaintiff will be permitted, however, to file a motion to amend his Complaint to

replead the FLSA collective action allegations. The motion must set forth the substance of

the proposed amendment, see Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999), and the

original of the amended complaint shall be attached to the motion, see M.D. Ala. LR 15.1

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(Dec. 1, 2010). Leave to amend will be “freely given” to Plaintiff if “justice so requires.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

The foregoing conclusions obviate the necessity to discuss Defendant’s alternative

Motion for a More Definite Statement, filed pursuant to Rule 12(e). The alternative motion,

therefore, will be denied as moot.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Collective Action (Doc.

# 6) is GRANTED. The individual claims brought by Plaintiff remain, but the FLSA

collective action allegations are DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff is GRANTED

leave to and including January 25, 2011, to file a motion to amend the complaint, consistent

with the directives herein.

It is further ORDERED that Defendant’s alternative Motion for a More Definite

Statement (Doc. # 6) is DENIED as moot.

DONE this 13th day of January, 2011. 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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