Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00133/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00133-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Bryan L. Booker, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV12-0133-TUC-CKJ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

 Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) 

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Bryan L. Booker. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 As summarized by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the facts giving rise to this 

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case are as follows: 

In 1997, Booker and a passenger drove to a convenience store. While 

there, Booker had an argument with the victim. Booker returned to the 

car, reached for something under the seat, then got into the car and shut 

the door. He backed the car out of the parking space, stopped for 

approximately fifteen seconds, and slowly drove toward where the 

victim was standing. As he neared the victim, Booker stopped the car. 

Five gunshots were fired from the car's passenger window, one of 

which struck and killed the victim. One witness testified that she had 

seen Booker fire the shots. 

Answer, Ex. N, p. 2. 

 Following a jury trial, Booker was convicted first-degree murder and drive-by 

shooting in January 1998. Answer, Ex. A. Booker was sentenced to concurrent 

terms of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder and 10.5 years for the drive-by 

shooting. Id., Ex. G., p. 2. Concluding that certain jury instructions and evidentiary 

rulings were improper, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed Booker’s convictions 

and remanded for a new trial. Id., Ex. G. 

 Booker was retried and in October 2000 was again found guilty of first-degree 

murder and drive-by shooting. Id., Ex. H. The trial court again sentenced Booker to 

a term of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder and to a concurrent 10.5-year 

term for the drive-by shooting charge. Id., Ex. I. The trial court enhanced both 

sentences pursuant to the former A.R.S. § 13-604(R). Id. 

 Booker again appealed his conviction. Id., Exs. J, K, L, and M (briefs). In a 

published opinion filed of September 12, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed 

Booker’s convictions and his pre-enhancement sentences, but found that Booker was 

“constitutionally entitled to have a jury determine his release status for sentence 

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enhancement purposes,” vacated the sentence enhancements and remanded on that 

issue. Id., Ex. N, p. 2. 

 Booker then petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review and the State 

filed a cross-petition for review. Id., Exs. O and P. On April 22, 2003, the Supreme 

Court denied both petitions, but ordered the Court of Appeals’ Opinion not be 

published and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of State v. Thompson, 

204 Ariz. 471, 65 P.3d 420 (2003). Answer., Ex. Q. The parties submitted 

supplemental briefs to the Court of Appeals. Id., Exs. R and S. On February 23, 

2005, the Court of Appeals issued a Supplemental Memorandum Decision, again 

affirming Booker’s convictions and pre-enhanced sentences and again vacating his 

sentence enhancements. Id., Ex. T. Booker filed a petition for review with the 

Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on September 29, 2005. Id., Exs. U and 

V. On February 1, 2006, the trial court, after Booker waived his right to a jury trial 

on the sentencing enhancements, determined Booker was on release status and 

resentenced him to the same terms of imprisonment and sentence enhancements. Id., 

Ex. W.

 On November 25, 2005, Booker filed a notice for post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”) pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Ex. X. The 

trial court appointed counsel and ordered that the PCR petition be filed within 60 

days of counsel’s receipt of the record. Id., Ex. Y. After Booker’s counsel filed a 

notice that he could find no meritorious issues to raise in a PCR petition, id., Ex. Z, 

the trial court ordered that Booker have until January 16, 2007, to file a PCR petition 

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pro se. Id., Ex. AA. After granting several extensions to the deadline, the trial court 

ordered that the PCR petition be filed no later than July 3, 2007, or it would be 

dismissed. Id., Ex. BB (Order dated June 4, 2007). On July 5, 2007, through an 

attorney, Booker filed a “Notice and Status Report” describing difficulties in 

retaining counsel and requesting that the PCR proceeding be “dismissed without 

prejudice.” Id., Ex. CC. That same day, the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 

proceedings without prejudice. Id., Ex. DD. 

 On February 24, 2009, Booker filed another PCR notice. Id., Ex. EE. On 

February 26, 2009, the trial court dismissed the notice as untimely. Id., Ex. FF. 

However, upon Booker’s motion to file a delayed notice, the trial court allowed him 

to file a delayed PCR petition by July 28, 2009. Id., Exs. GG and HH. Booker then 

timely filed a Rule 32 petition. Id., Ex. II. The trial court, finding no material issues 

of fact or law, dismissed the petition by Ruling filed October 29, 2009. Id., Ex. KK. 

Booker filed a petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Ex. LL. By 

Memorandum Decision filed on April 14, 2010, the Court of Appeals granted review, 

but denied relief. Id., Ex. MM. Booker did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme 

Court. Id., Ex. NN. 

 On August 12, 2010, Booker filed a “Motion To Request The Court To 

Suspend Filing Time Frames” in District of Arizona case CV 10-1730-PHX-GMS 

(ECV). The court denied the request and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 

Booker v. Ryan, CV 10-1730-PHX-GMS (ECV), Doc. 3. 

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 On January 4, 2011, Booker filed another notice and Rule 32 petition. 

Answer, Exs. OO and PP. The trial court, finding that the petition amounted to a “repackaging” of claims previously raised and concluding that any new claims did not 

meet any exception available under Rule 32, dismissed the petition. Id., Ex. QQ. 

Booker filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Ex. RR. 

By Memorandum Decision filed on May 20, 2011, the Court of Appeals granted 

review but denied relief. Id., Ex. SS. Review by the Arizona Supreme Court was 

then sought and denied November 9, 2011. Id., Exs. TT and UU. 

 The Certificate of Service attached to the instant petition reflects that Booker 

mailed the petition on February 22, 2012, for filing with the Clerk of the Court, and 

that the petition was actually filed on February 24, 2012. (Doc. 1.) 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. The Petition is untimely. 

 1. Booker did not satisfy the AEDPA statute of limitations.

 The Respondents contend that Booker’s petition is untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides for a one 

year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations period must be dismissed. 

Id. 

 The one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions generally begins 

to run on “the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 

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2244(d)(1)(A). In Arizona, the opportunity for direct review includes postconviction relief proceedings filed under Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. “Arizona’s Rule 

32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within 

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 

(9th Cir. 2007). The limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a properly 

filed state post-conviction proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). 

 In this case, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its supplemental 

memorandum decision denying Booker’s appeal on February 23, 2005. Answer, Ex. 

T. On February 1, 2006, the trial court resentenced Booker in accord with the 

Arizona Court of Appeals decision. “Final judgment in a criminal case means 

sentence. The sentence is the judgment.” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 

(2007) (quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937). Accordingly, 

Booker’s limitations period was set to commence after he was sentenced and the time 

for seeking appeal expired. Burton, 549 U.S. at 156-57 (AEDPA statute of 

limitations begins to run after entry of an amended judgment following resentencing). 

 However, at the time Booker was sentenced, he had already filed a PCR notice 

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Ex. X. Section 

2244(d)(2) tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of “a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.” Due to Booker’s 

failure to file a petition in support of his PCR efforts, on July 5, 2007, the trial court 

dismissed the Rule 32 proceedings. Id., Ex. DD. As of that date, there was no 

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properly filed post-conviction proceeding pending. As such, the one-year limitations 

period began to run the next day and expired one year later, on July 5, 2008. The 

instant petition, filed in February 2012, is therefore untimely.1

 

 2. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

 The United States Supreme Court has determined that “§ 2244(d) is subject to 

equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 

(2010). However, it is available only when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time” and “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.” Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. 

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 

F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

 In his Reply, Booker admits that his petition is untimely and recognizes there 

are no extraordinary circumstances that excuse the tardy filing. Instead, Booker 

argues he is actually innocent and his untimely filing should therefore be excused. 

B. Booker has not established actual innocence.

 

1

 Although, on February 24, 2009, Booker filed another PCR notice, Answer, Ex. EE, 

the limitations period had already expired. The reinitiation of state court proceedings 

after the limitations period has expired does not serve to reinitiate the AEDPA 

limitations period. Pace, 544 U.S. at 410, 417 (holding that untimely state postconviction petition is not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2)); 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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 In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013), the Supreme 

Court held that actual innocence, “if proved,” serves as an exception to the AEDPA 

statute of limitations. 133 S.Ct. at 1928. However, the Court noted that tenable 

claims of actual innocence are rare and require a petitioner to “show that it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new 

evidence.” 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). 

 Booker’s actual innocence claim does not satisfy this standard. Booker bases 

his claim of actual innocence on the trial court’s alleged failure to properly instruct 

the jury on premeditation and because the jury would not have convicted him if 

evidence of the victims’ “challenging” and “disrespectful” conduct had been 

introduced. To the extent that these claims allege legal defects in his conviction, they 

do not support a claim of actual innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 

623 (1998) (“[A]ctual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal 

insufficiency.”). 

 Additionally, actual innocence claims are available to allow the court to look 

at new evidence “that was either excluded or unavailable at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 327-28. Booker’s first argument—that the jury was not properly instructed – is 

purely legal and does not involve evidence that was either not available or not 

presented at trial. His second argument—that the victim was disrespectful—is 

evidentiary in nature. However, that evidence was available at the time of trial and it 

was a strategic decision by Booker’s counsel to introduce it because it would have 

“opened the door to gang evidence” and “testimony relating to gang behavior.” 

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Answer, Ex. KK, p. 6. The evidence does nothing to support actual innocence. 

Rather, it is offered in an attempt to diminish, but not absolve, Booker’s culpability 

in the murder. It does not, however, cause the Court to believe that, if the evidence 

had been offered at trial, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 

have convicted Booker. As such, Booker’s claim of actual innocence does not save 

the petition from dismissal based on its untimely filing. 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss with prejudice Petitioner’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and 

file written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the 

following case number: 12-CV-00133-TUC-CKJ. No replies shall be filed without 

leave to do so from the District Court. 

 Dated this 23rd day of July, 2013. 

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