Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03738/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03738-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.A. LaMARQUE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-3738 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

On August 11, 2003, Carlos Hernandez (“petitioner”), a California prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. On October 8, 2003, after reviewing the petition, the Court ordered

respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted based on petitioner’s four

cognizable claims. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which, on January

28, 2004, was granted as to two of petitioner’s claims. The Court then ordered respondent

to show cause why relief should not be granted as to petitioner’s two remaining claims: (1)

that the trial court’s findings with respect to petitioner’s prior “strike” convictions violated his

right to due process because they were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) that

he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing. Respondent has

filed an answer, accompanied by a memorandum and exhibits, contending that the petition

should be denied. Petitioner has not filed a traverse.

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The weapon’s blade was made of thin sheet metal folded over several times; its

handle was made of wax wrapped in cardboard and masking tape. People v. Hernandez, No. H024021, slip op. 1, 10. (Cal. Ct. App. March 27, 2003) (hereinafter “Slip op.”).

2

 Because the claims addressed herein do not pertain to the conduct of the trial, but

rather to petitioner’s sentence, the Court provides this brief summary of the trial evidence,

derived from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal. Slip op. at 2-3.

3

 Petitioner waived a jury on the issue of his prior convictions.

4

 The record indicates that although the information pleaded only seven felony

convictions, petitioner actually was convicted on thirteen felony counts at the 1993 trial. 

5

 Under California’s Three Strikes Law, where a defendant is convicted of a felony

and the prosecution has pled and proved the defendant has two prior convictions for

offenses classified as “violent” or “serious” felonies, the minimum sentence mandated

2

BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2001, petitioner was an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison. 

Near the end of a recreation period, petitioner and another inmate, Garcia, engaged in a

fight. While breaking up the fight, prison guards ordered petitioner to get down on the

ground. As he moved to the ground, a guard saw petitioner throw an inmate-made

weapon1

 that landed at the feet of one of the other guards. Garcia received lacerations that

were consistent with those caused by such a weapon.2

Petitioner was tried before a jury in the Monterey County Superior Court and was

found guilty of possessing a dangerous weapon while confined in prison. In a bifurcated

proceeding, the trial court3 found true allegations that petitioner had sustained seven prior

felony convictions, all arising from a single trial in 1993, which convictions qualified as

“strikes” under California’s “Three Strikes” law.4

 The facts of the 1993 trial were

summarized by the California Court of Appeal as follows:

On April 9, 1992 defendant kidnaped an eleven year old girl from her

front yard at gunpoint. As the defendant was walking away with the young

girl, her frantic father tried to retrieve his daughter. The defendant shot at the

father, forcing him to abandon the chase. The defendant then forced the

young victim into a secluded area and forced her into a number of sex acts,

including oral copulation, cunnilingus, sucking the victim’s breasts, digital

penetration of the victim and rape. 

Slip op. at 16. 

The trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of 25 years to life in state prison5, to be

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 under California law is 25 years to life. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667(e)(2), 1170.12(c))(2).

3

served consecutively to the 30-year state prison term he was already serving. The

California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the California

Supreme Court denied the petition for review. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-404, 409 (2000). 

Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct.

1910, 1920 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). A federal

court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1).

B. Legal Claims

1. Insufficient evidence of three prior convictions

Petitioner contends that his right to due process was violated because there was

insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that three of the seven prior

convictions were strikes. The Due Process Clause requires “proof beyond a reasonable

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 The version of California Penal Code § 288a(c) in effect at the time of petitioner’s

1993 convictions provided: “‘Any person who participates in an act of oral copulation with

another person who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than he or

she, or when the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence,

duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another

person, or where the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to retaliate

in the future against the victim or any other person . . . shall be punished by imprisonment

in the state prison for three, six, or eight years.’” Slip op. at 12, fn. 5. (citing Historical and

Statutory Notes, 48 West’s Ann. Pen. Code (1999 ed.) Foll. § 288a, p. 501; Stats. 1998, ch.

936, § 25, p. 5413).

7

 In 1998, the statute was amended to include three separately numbered

paragraphs, each describing a separate means of commission. Slip. op. at 12-13, fn. 5. 

4

doubt of every fact necessary to constitute” the crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S.

358, 364 (1970). Accordingly, a claim that the evidence supporting a state conviction does

not establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a cognizable claim under the Due

Process Clause. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1979). The evidence of a prior

conviction is sufficient and satisfies due process if, when it is viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the prior conviction to

be true beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842, 847-48 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

 The three prior strike convictions that petitioner contends are not supported by

sufficient evidence all were obtained under California Penal Code § 288a(c). Section

288a(c) can be violated in any of three ways: by oral copulation of a victim under the age of

14 years, by forcible oral copulation, or by oral copulation by threat of retaliation. See Cal.

Pen. Code § 288a(c).6 The Court of Appeal explained, and the parties agree, that under

California law only the first two means of commission qualify as strikes, while the third does

not. Slip op. at 13. At the time petitioner was convicted, § 288a(c) did not include

subsections corresponding to the three different means of commission.7 Petitioner argues

that because the statute did not contain such subsections, a conviction under § 288a(c) did

not exclude a conviction based on the third, non-strike, offense. 

The evidence produced at trial included the abstract of judgment from petitioner’s

1993 trial. See Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 117 (Respt. Ex. B). The abstract of judgment

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

Petitioner was charged with only three of the four prior § 288a(c) convictions.

5

lists the thirteen convictions, four of which were pursuant to “section 288a(c).”8

 See id.

The abstract further states that two of these convictions were for “ORL COP PERS 14 YR”

and two were for “FORCIBLE ORL CPLATN.” Id. Given such evidence, it was reasonable

for the trial court to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the phrase “ORAL COP PERS 14

YR” corresponds to the first method set forth in section 288a(c), oral copulation of a victim

under the age of 14 years. Similarly, the trial court could find, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the phrase “FORCIBLE ORAL CPLTN” corresponds to the second method set forth in

section 288a(c), specifically, forcible oral copulation. Neither phrase reasonably suggests

the third, non-strike, method of oral copulation, i.e., by threat of retaliation. In short, viewed

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the abstract of judgment constitutes sufficient

evidence on which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

petitioner had sustained three prior convictions that qualified as strikes. See, e.g., United

States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (approving

consideration of judgment where prior conviction does not “facially qualify” as

enhancement). Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s denial of this claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Moreover, even if the evidence as to petitioner’s three § 288a(c) convictions was

insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by their inclusion as strikes. On habeas review,

an error is deemed “harmless” if it does not have a “substantial and injurious effect on the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies

to habeas review of an error with respect to sentencing, in other words, the test is whether

such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. See Calderon v.

Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas relief to be granted based

on constitutional error in capital case penalty phase, error must have had substantial and

injurious effect on jury’s verdict in penalty phase). Here, the trial court found petitioner had

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

sustained four prior strike convictions in addition to the three at issue in this claim. 

Petitioner does not challenge the trial court’s finding as to these other four strikes. Even if

the trial court had discounted the three § 288a(c) strike convictions for lack of evidence,

petitioner nonetheless would have had more than a sufficient number of other strikes to

require a 25-years-to-life sentence under the Three Strikes law. Consequently, petitioner

was not prejudiced as a result of any arguable error in the trial court’s findings with respect

to the three § 288a(c) convictions.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

on his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding he had

sustained three “strike” convictions under § 288a(c). 

 2. Ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing

 Petitioner claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing

hearing. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the prosecution filed a sentencing brief, arguing

for a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. Petitioner claims counsel did not file a response

to this brief “or any other pleading.” Pet. at 22. At the hearing, the prosecutor argued for

the same sentence, 25 years to life. Petitioner claims his counsel failed to offer any

counter-argument. 

In analyzing this claim, the Court first notes the lack of Supreme Court precedent

regarding performance of counsel in connection with sentencing. In Strickland v.

Washington, the Supreme Court announced a standard for effective assistance of counsel

but expressly declined to apply that standard to assistance in a noncapital sentencing

proceeding, stating: “We need not consider the role of counsel in ordinary sentencing,

which . . . may require a different approach to the definition of constitutionally effective

assistance.” 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue

since Strickland. Recently, the Ninth Circuit, holding “there is no clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court” with respect to the standard for evaluating

ineffective assistance of counsel in a noncapital sentencing, concluded habeas relief

cannot be granted on such a claim. See Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir.

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Because of the lack of “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent in this

context, state courts are “free” to “establish what constitutes ineffective assistance of

counsel at sentencing.” See Davis, 443 F.3d at 1158. In the instant case, the California

Court of Appeal, in rejecting petitioner’s claim, cited People v. Hart, 20 Cal. 4th 546, 623-24

(1999), which applies the Strickland standard. Slip op. at 15.

7

2006) (finding lack of clearly established Supreme Court precedent as to assistance of

counsel in noncapital sentencing cases precluded habeas relief); Cooper-Smith v.

Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005) (same).9 Accordingly, petitioner cannot

obtain habeas relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. 

Moreover, even if Strickland were deemed to be “clearly established federal law”

applicable to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, see Davis, 443 F.3d

at 1159 (Graber, J. concurring) (reading Supreme Court precedent as making Strickland

applicable to ineffective assistance claims where noncapital sentencing is “formal” and

“involves findings or conclusions that provide a standard for the imposition of sentence”),

petitioner’s claim nonetheless would fail. Under Strickland, in order to prevail on a Sixth

Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner first must establish his counsel's

performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness"

under prevailing professional norms. See Strickland at 688. The relevant inquiry is not

what defense counsel could have presented, but rather whether the choices made by

defense counsel were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.

1998). A petitioner also must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Id. 

Here, petitioner points to counsel’s failure to offer counter-arguments, but does not

specify any grounds on which counsel could have argued for a lesser sentence. Petitioner

carries the burden of explaining what counsel should have done or what counsel could

have argued on his behalf. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1998)

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

(rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in capital sentencing phase where

petitioner “fail[ed] to explain what counsel should have done to prepare fully for sentencing”

and failed to “specify what further investigation would have uncovered”). As petitioner

points to no meritorious issue that should have been raised, it cannot be said that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Further, petitioner cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. 

Petitioner argues that he is not required to show prejudice because counsel’s performance

amounted to a failure to “subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” 

See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1984) (providing for presumption of

prejudice in certain situations, such as where counsel fails to meaningfully test

prosecution’s case). The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that the Cronic

standard is a “narrow exception to Strickland’s holding” and is “reserved for those situations

in which counsel has entirely failed to function as the client’s advocate.” See Florida v.

Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004) (refusing to apply Cronic standard even where counsel

had advised defendant to concede guilt in capital case); see also United States v. Thomas,

417 F.3d 1053, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing as “limited” circumstances under which

Cronic applies, specifically, those “so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of

litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659)). 

Here, counsel actively advocated on petitioner’s behalf throughout the trial. Unlike a capital

case, there was no separate trial with respect to penalty. Cf. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,

697 (2002) (discussing application of Cronic in context of capital case penalty phase). In

any event, the nature of the asserted deficiency is not of the sort found cognizable under

Cronic. See id. (holding “[t]he failure to adduce mitigating evidence and the waiver of

closing argument [in capital sentencing phase] . . . are plainly of the same ilk as other

specific attorney errors we have held subject to Strickland’s performance and prejudice

components”). Consequently, although counsel did not submit a brief or present

arguments at sentencing, there is no authority that his conduct amounts to a complete

failure to function as petitioner’s advocate, such as to implicate the narrow exception

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Even if one discounts the three priors challenged herein, the trial court would have

had to have stricken three of the remaining four strike convictions.

11 Indeed, following the jury’s verdict, petitioner wanted to proceed immediately to

sentencing. See Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 259 (Respt. Ex. A).

9

provided in Cronic and, accordingly, prejudice is not presumed in this case. 

Finally, petitioner’s claim fails under the prejudice prong of the Strickland test

because the trial court found that all seven alleged prior convictions were true, and that

they constituted strikes. Petitioner carries the burden of demonstrating a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s errors. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (“[A] court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the

defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely

have been different absent the errors.”) Although a trial judge has discretion to strike or

vacate a pled and proved prior strike conviction, that discretion is confined to situations

where the defendant “may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit.” See People v.

Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148, 161 (1998). Here, for petitioner to have avoided a 25-years-to-life

sentence under the Three Strikes law, the trial court would have had to have stricken six of

his seven prior strike convictions.10 In that regard, the trial court had before it the abstract

of judgment, listing the thirteen felony convictions that petitioner suffered in 1993; the

prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum, describing the exceptionally aggravated nature of

petitioner’s 1993 convictions; and a probation report from 1998, indicating petitioner had a

prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon while in prison. Slip op. at 16. As noted,

petitioner does not identify any arguments or mitigating evidence that counsel could have

presented to suggest a ground for striking all but one of the remaining priors or to support a

lesser sentence,11 nor does he otherwise show that the outcome would have been different

absent the claimed error. As petitioner has not met his burden of establishing prejudice, his

claim fails under the Strickland test as well.

In sum, there is no clearly established federal law regarding performance of counsel

at noncapital sentencing proceedings. As a result, there is no basis upon which to grant

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

habeas relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Furthermore,

even if the Strickland test for effective assistance of counsel were the applicable federal

standard, petitioner’s claim fails to satisfy that test because he does not show that

counsel’s performance was deficient or prejudicial. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on his claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 __________________________ Dated: August 18, 2006 MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-03738-MMC Document 11 Filed 08/18/06 Page 10 of 10