Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03234/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03234-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 29:791 Job Discrimination (Rehabilitation Act)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK E DICKASON,

Plaintiff,

v

JOHN E POTTER, Postmaster 

General

Defendant. /

No C-05-3234 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant on August 9, 2005,

alleging disability discrimination in violation of the

Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 USC § 701 et seq, and age

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (ADEA), 29 USC § 621 et seq. Doc #1 (Compl). Defendant has

moved for summary judgment on both of plaintiff’s claims. Doc #55. 

Plaintiff has moved for sanctions pursuant to FRCP 37(b)(2). Doc

#38. For reasons discussed below, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

//

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United States District Court

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I

Plaintiff was employed by the United States Postal

Service (USPS) in various positions from August 30, 1969, until

December 13, 2000, which was the effective date of plaintiff’s

resignation. Doc #70 (Dickason decl), ¶ 1. At the time of his

resignation, plaintiff was 50 years old and worked at USPS’s San

Francisco processing and distribution center (PD&C) as a motor

vehicle operator, a position plaintiff had held since November 18,

2000. Id. 

The events leading up to plaintiff’s resignation began in

the early morning of December 13, 2000, when plaintiff was

instructed by his supervisor to make additional stops at post

offices in Burlingame and Brisbane, California. Doc #59, Ex 1

(Dickason depo) at 93:10-94:15. Plaintiff informed his supervisor

that he believed the assignment to be a safety hazard, as plaintiff

had been driving his vehicle for more than ten hours during his

twelve-hour shift. Id. Plaintiff asserts that his supervisor

ordered him to “[d]o it anyway.” Doc #70, ¶ 4. 

After plaintiff arrived home from his shift in the

morning of December 13, 2000, he decided to resign from USPS. Doc

#59, Ex 1 at 94:17-21. That evening, plaintiff reported to work

and notified Erasmo “Mito” Marquez, the supervisor on duty at the

motor vehicle operator department, that he intended to resign from

USPS due to unsafe working conditions. Id at 94:21-25. Plaintiff

filled out a resignation form, a safety complaint and an exit

interview form. Doc #70, ¶ 6. 

//

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3

The following day, after talking to Gessner Syas, the

American Postal Worker Union’s craft president for the motor

vehicle operator department, plaintiff decided to rescind his

resignation so that he could pursue a union grievance against USPS. 

See Doc #70, ¶¶ 7-8. Syas instructed plaintiff to report back to

work later that night for plaintiff’s scheduled shift. Id at ¶ 8. 

Later that afternoon and before reporting back to USPS as Syas

suggested, plaintiff suffered an injury to his eye at his “second

job.” Doc #1, ¶ 12. As plaintiff’s counsel informed the court at

argument, this second job entailed serving as a transit operator

for the San Francisco municipal railway. As a result, plaintiff

reported to work at USPS that night, but promptly requested sick

leave due to his injury. Doc #70, ¶ 9. Apparently, plaintiff

never rescinded his resignation. A few weeks later, plaintiff

returned to USPS to pick up his paycheck and discovered that USPS

had processed his resignation. Doc #70, ¶ 11, Ex F. 

Fifteen months later, plaintiff applied for reinstatement

to USPS’s San Francisco district, requesting reinstatement in any

position he had held (except carrier craft), as well as any

position for which he would have qualified after taking an

examination. Doc #57, Ex 3. Plaintiff was notified on August 2,

2002, that his name had been reached for reinstatement for the

motor vehicle operator and maintenance mechanic crafts. See Doc

#70, ¶ 15. When plaintiff arrived at USPS on September 9, 2002, to

fill out an employment application, Carol Smith-Parker, a human

resources clerk at USPS, informed plaintiff that she would not send

him for a physical examination, which led plaintiff to believe his

application “was not being processed properly.” Doc #70, ¶ 16. 

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4

In October 2002, plaintiff returned to USPS to submit

paperwork concerning the motor vehicle operator position. Doc #70,

¶ 17. During this time, Smith-Parker allegedly told plaintiff that

it was “general knowledge that [plaintiff] was seeking

reinstatement in order to recover all of the sick leave that

[plaintiff] had accumulated,” which totaled 1331.51 hours. Id. 

Plaintiff interpreted this statement to mean “that the Postal

Service knew that [he] would be seeking retirement soon.” Id. 

In early March 2003, plaintiff received a letter from

USPS’s human resources department, stating that plaintiff’s

reinstatement application had been denied because plaintiff was not

the “best qualified” candidate. See Doc #70, ¶ 19; Doc #57, Ex 5. 

A document dated March 4, 2003, from human resources manager Donald

Barrett stated that plaintiff’s reinstatement application was

denied because “[plaintiff’s] sudden resignation demonstrated

complete disregard for [his] employer.” Doc #57, Ex 4. Barrett

continues to deny plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination,

asserting that he did not consider plaintiff’s age when making the

decision whether to reinstate him. Doc #56, ¶ 4. 

II

Plaintiff initiated the present action on August 9, 2005,

alleging discrimination on the basis of plaintiff’s age and

disability. Doc #1. Plaintiff challenges both the decision to

process his resignation and the decision to reject his

reinstatement. Id at ¶ 16. On November 2, 2006, defendant moved

for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims. Doc #55. 

//

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5

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. “[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v

Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. And

the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett,

477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). When the moving party has the burden of

proof on an issue, the party’s showing must be sufficient for the

court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

than for the moving party. Calderone v United States, 799 F2d 254,

258-59 (6th Cir 1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence supporting

its claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec

Serv v Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir

1987). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not

himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter

but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id

at 249.

//

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6

III

A

The court first considers defendant’s argument that the

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

rehabilitation claim because plaintiff has failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. Doc #55 at 10. At argument, plaintiff

conceded that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s disability claim. 

“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in

any cause.” Steel Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US

83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex Parte McCardle, 74 US 506, 507 (1868)). 

“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold

matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power

of the United States and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” 

523 US at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield, C & L Co v Swan, 111 US 379,

382 (1884)). 

A federal employee’s right to file an action based on

discrimination in federal court is dependent on the employee’s

exhaustion of administrative remedies and adherence to strict

deadlines. See Brown v General Services Administration, 425 US

820, 829-35 (1976). Although failure to file an Equal Employment

Opportunity (EEO) complaint is not a complete bar to district court

jurisdiction, substantial compliance with the exhaustion

requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Sommatino v United

States, 255 F3d 704, 708 (9th Cir 2001). See also Vinieratos v

United States, 939 F2d 762 (9th Cir 1991) (extending the exhaustion

requirement to claims under the Rehabilitation Act). 

//

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7

The jurisdictional scope of a plaintiff’s court action

depends on the scope of the EEO charge and investigation. EEOC v

Farmer Bros Co, 31 F3d 891, 899 (9th Cir 1994); Sosa v Hiraoka, 920

F2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir 1990). This court has jurisdiction over

any charges of jurisdiction that are “like or reasonably related

to” the allegations made within an EEO charge, as well as charges

that fall within the scope of the investigation that reasonably

could be expected to grow out of the allegations. Sosa, 920 F2d at

1456. 

In the present action, plaintiff did not bring an

administrative complaint on the grounds of disability

discrimination regarding USPS’s decision to reject his

reinstatement application. Doc #71, Ex A (EEO investigation

report). Moreover, plaintiff never attempted to amend his EEO

charge to reflect his Rehabilitation Act claim. Instead, plaintiff

pursued his claim of age discrimination with respect to USPS’s

failure to reinstate him. See id. Plaintiff’s disability claim

relies on a different theory and a different statute from his age

discrimination claim. Disability discrimination was not

investigated pursuant to the EEO report, and such an investigation

could not have been reasonably expected to grow out of plaintiff’s

charges. Nothing in plaintiff’s affidavit would have led the

investigators to suspect that he was disabled or had been subjected

to disability discrimination. Finally, plaintiff’s charges do not

provide USPS with adequate notice of his disability discrimination

claim. Compare Farmer Bros, 31 F3d at 899 (holding that the

plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim gave the employer adequate

notice of a related sex discrimination claim added during

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8

litigation). 

A decision that an EEO complaint with no mention

whatsoever of disability is “like or reasonably related to”

plaintiff’s age discrimination claim would reduce the exhaustion

requirement to a formality. Although “the EEOC charge does not

demand procedural exactness,” Sosa, 920 F2d at 1458, it requires

more than plaintiff provided. This court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over a complaint alleging new theories of

discrimination. Shah v Mt Zion Hospital and Medical Center, 642

F2d 268, 271 (9th Cir 1981). Accordingly, the court grants summary

judgment on plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim. 

B

Next, the court addresses plaintiff’s claim for age

discrimination in violation of the ADEA. Section 623(a)(1) of the

ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer * * * to discharge any

individual * * * because of such individual’s age * * *.” Because

plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is based on circumstantial

evidence of discrimination, the court applies the burden-shifting

analysis announced by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v

Green, 411 US 792 (1973). See Enlow v Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co,

Inc, 389 F3d 802, 812 (9th Cir 2004). The Ninth Circuit has

summarized the standard for evaluating motions for summary judgment

in employment discrimination cases as follows:

//

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9

A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case

of discrimination. If the plaintiff establishes a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the

defendant to articulate a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for its employment

decision. Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff

must demonstrate that the employer’s alleged reason

for the adverse employment decision is a pretext

for another motive which is discriminatory.

Wallis v J R Simplot Co, 26 F3d 885, 889 (9th Cir 1994) (citations

and internal quotations omitted). See also Palmer v United States,

794 F2d 534, 536 (9th Cir 1986); Ritter v Hughes Aircraft Co, 58

F3d 454, 456 (9th Cir 1995). It should also be noted that “when

evidence to refute the defendant’s legitimate explanation is

totally lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even though

plaintiff may have established a minimal prima facie case * * *.”

Wallis, 26 F3d at 889. 

1

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination

under a McDonnell Douglas-type presumption, plaintiff must

demonstrate that he was (1) a member of the protected class (at

least age 40); (2) performing his job satisfactorily; (3)

discharged; and (4) replaced by a substantially younger employee

with equal or inferior qualifications. Coleman v Quaker Oats Co,

232 F3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir 2000). 

Plaintiff fails to meet his burden under the fourth prong

of the McDonnell Douglas presumption, as plaintiff presents no

evidence that individuals outside of plaintiff’s protected class

were treated more favorably. Indeed, the evidence before the court

is to the contrary. 

//

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10

Most damaging to plaintiff’s case is a list of

individuals reinstated in postal centers in the San Francisco Bay

area between 2001 and 2003, which defendant produced pursuant to an

order by Magistrate Judge James. See Doc #71, ¶ 20, Ex S; see also

Doc #34 (discovery order). According to this list, one employee

was reinstated as a motor vehicle operator during the relevant time

period, and that person was seven years older than plaintiff. See

Doc #71, Ex S (employee designated with D/A code 435); see also Doc

#71, Ex W (Marquez depo) at 53:10-13 (identifying codes for motor

vehicle operator). 

In response to this recent evidence, plaintiff downplays

the significance of the reinstatement list, focusing instead on

defendant’s delay in producing the list. Doc #72 at 9-11. 

Plaintiff argues that because defendant failed to disclose this

information in a timely manner, the court should prevent defendant

from claiming that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. Doc #72 at 8-10. 

The court disagrees. Defendant’s alleged delay in

presenting evidence does not absolve plaintiff of his obligation to

present a prima facie case of discrimination. Even if defendant

was precluded from presenting evidence on this issue pursuant to

FRCP 37(b)(2), see infra section IV, plaintiff’s burden remains. 

To be sure, that a member of a protected class was hired

or promoted in place of an ADEA plaintiff is insufficient to

insulate an employer from liability. See Greene v Safeway Stores,

Inc, 98 F3d 554, 561 (10th Cir 1996). While showing replacement by

a substantially younger person is probative, it does not follow

that such a showing is required. See, e g, Kralman v Illinois

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Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, 23 F3d 150 (7th Cir 1994); Terry v

Ashcroft, 336 F3d 128 (2d Cir 2003) (concluding that even though

one of the replacements was older, the plaintiff was able to

establish a prima face case of age discrimination because there was

evidence in the record that age factored into the decision not to

promote him.). 

Nevertheless, absent evidence that plaintiff was replaced

by an older person in order to ward off a lawsuit, this evidence

weighs against plaintiff’s claim. Compare O’Connor v Consolidated

Coin Caterers Corp, 517 US 308, 313 (1996) (concluding that “the

fact that a replacement is substantially younger is a far more

reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the

plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.”). 

At minimum, this fact compels plaintiff to set forth other evidence

in support of his prima facie case. 

Because plaintiff’s motions and declarations focus

exclusively on defendant’s delay, they fall short of establishing

an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court finds that

plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of age

discrimination under the ADEA.

2

Even if plaintiff had proffered evidence establishing a

minimal prima facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas presumption,

plaintiff’s discrimination claim would still merit summary

judgment. Establishing a prima facie case shifts “the burden of

production, but not persuasion, * * * to the employer to articulate

some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged

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action.” Chuang, 225 F3d at 1123. Once the defendant has tendered

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for his hiring decision, “the

presumption of discrimination drops away,” and the burden of

production shifts back to the plaintiff. Nidds v Schindler

Elevator Corp, 103 F3d 854, 858 (9th Cir 1996). To meet this

burden, the plaintiff must introduce evidence demonstrating that

the defendant’s proffered reason for the employment decision was

pretextual and the plaintiff’s age was the actual reason. See

Wallis, 23 F3d at 892. Hence, the plaintiff must support his

allegation of discrimination with some sort of factual evidence. 

Plaintiff at argument conceded that defendant advances a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to reinstate

plaintiff: namely, plaintiff’s sudden resignation suggested that

plaintiff was not a dependable employee. In particular,

plaintiff’s official personnel file, reinstatement file and

attendance reports were forwarded to the USPS manager of human

resources for the San Francisco district, Donald Barrett, on

February 25, 2003. See Doc #57, Ex 4. Barrett reviewed the

documents on March 4, 2003, and noted that “[e]mployee’s sudden

resignation demonstrates complete disregard for [his] employer.” 

Id. Barrett thus disapproved the application because plaintiff’s

file demonstrated that plaintiff “did not deserve to return to the

Unites States Postal service as an employee.” Doc #56, ¶ 4. 

Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact

concerning whether defendant’s proffered justification is merely a

pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff first attacks Barrett’s

decision by arguing that plaintiff’s sudden resignation was

essential to preserve public safety. A closer look at the

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evidence, however, suggests otherwise. In his resignation form,

plaintiff states that his supervisor’s instruction to make

additional stops “jeopardiz[ed] public safety” because plaintiff

had not slept “for [the] previous 24 hours.” Doc #71, Ex A

(PS041). But plaintiff’s 12-hour shift at USPS did not require

that plaintiff be awake for 24 hours. Instead, the likely culprit

for plaintiff’s sleepless stretch (and the real threat to public

safety) was plaintiff’s second job with the San Francisco municipal

railway, as a transit operator no less. The court thus rejects

plaintiff’s efforts to wrap himself in the mantle of public safety

and declines to second guess Barrett’s professional judgment. 

Next, plaintiff points to a remark made by a personnel

clerk at USPS that it was “general knowledge that [plaintiff] was

seeking reinstatement in order to recover all of the sick leave

that [plaintiff] had accumulated,” which totaled 1331.51 hours. 

Doc #72 at 13 (citing Doc #70, ¶ 14). Even if the court accepts

plaintiff’s peculiar interpretation of this statement (“that the

Postal Service knew that [he] would be seeking retirement soon”),

this remark is insufficient to establish a causal relationship

between discriminatory intent and the adverse employment action

because it was made by an assistant who was not involved in the

reinstatement decision. See Doc #56, ¶¶ 2-4. 

Finally, plaintiff contends that Barrett’s decision was

tainted by his conversation with Rudy Daniel, a USPS employee who

has been the target of discrimination allegations on five occasions

over the course of his career. See Doc #71, Ex X (Barrett depo) at

55:19-58:4. But this theory obscures two analytical gaps. First,

these unproven allegations against Daniel do not ipso facto

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establish that Daniel pursued a discriminatory agenda in the

present case. Second, no evidence suggests that Barrett succumbed

to Daniel’s judgment. To the contrary, Barrett asserts that he

spoke with Daniel to confirm the facts underlying plaintiff’s

resignation; he did not adopt Daniel’s judgment or decision. Id at

55:19-56:4. In sum, even if plaintiff presented evidence that

Daniel intended to discriminate against plaintiff (which is

lacking), there is no evidence that such an intent manifested

itself in Barrett’s decision. 

In opposing a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff

must specify and cite to the evidence supporting his argument,

rather than hope that the court, reviewing a voluminous record,

somehow manages to find it. See, e g, Carmen v San Francisco Unif

Sch Dist, 237 F3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir 2001). The evidence

proffered by plaintiff is far too thin a reed to support such an

attenuated theory of discrimination. Accordingly, the court grants

summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for age discrimination. 

IV

Finally, the court turns to plaintiff’s motion for issue

sanctions and attorney fees on the ground that defendant has failed

to produce “information and documents on similarly situated

employees who were granted reinstatement.” Doc #38 at 2. As

defendant notes, the posture of this case has changed significantly

since October 5, 2006, the date plaintiff filed his motion for

sanctions. Most significantly, the information that is the subject

of plaintiff’s motion (the reinstatement list) has been

reconstructed and disclosed to plaintiff. See Doc #71, ¶ 20, Ex S. 

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15

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) authorizes a court

to sanction a party “if [that] party * * * fails to obey an order

to provide or permit discovery * * *.” In such a case, the court

may, inter alia, (1) order that the matters contained in unproduced

discovery be deemed admitted, (2) refuse to permit the disobedient

party to support or oppose any claims or defenses addressed by the

unproduced discovery, (3) strike out all or part of the pleadings

relevant to the unproduced discovery, (4) dismiss all or part of

the action, (5) treat the failure to produce as contempt of court

or (6) “make such orders in regard to the failure as are just.” 

FRCP 37(b)(2). 

“Sanction orders taking the plaintiff’s allegations as

established and awarding judgment on that basis are ‘the most

severe penalty,’ and are authorized only in ‘extreme

circumstances.’” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v Noble Metals

Int’l, Inc, 67 F3d 766, 770-71 (9th Cir 1995) (quoting United

States ex rel Wiltec Guam, Inc v Kahaluu Contr Co, 857 F2d 600,

603, 603 n 5 (9th Cir 1988); further internal citation omitted). 

To justify their imposition, the district court must find that the

failures were “due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the

party.” Id at 771 (quoting Wyle v RJ Reynolds Indus, Inc, 709 F2d

585, 589 (9th Cir 1983)). Before ordering such a sanction, a

district court must weigh a set of five factors:

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution

of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants;

(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases

on their merits and (5) the availability of less

drastic sanctions.

Thompson v Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles, 782 F2d 829, 

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831 (9th Cir 1986). In addressing the availability of lesser

sanctions, the court must consider whether the court has already

warned the disobedient party that a terminating sanction may be

forthcoming. See Malone v United States Postal Service, 833 F2d

128, 132 (9th Cir 1987). An express warning is generally required,

except in cases involving “egregious circumstances.” Id; see

Kahaluu, 857 F2d 600 at 604. In the end, termination is proper

“where at least four factors support dismissal, * * * or where at

least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Yourish v Calif

Amplif, 191 F3d 983, 990 (9th Cir 1999) (quoting Ferdik v Bonzelet,

963 F2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir 1992)).

Here, plaintiff’s motion for sanctions concerns a request

plaintiff made on February 9, 2005, for documents relating to the

reinstatement applications of employees to the motor vehicle

operator, maintenance craft and any other positions at the San

Francisco postal center from 2000 to the present. See Doc #71, Ex

I at 6-7. In response to this request, defendant took the position

that only the names of other rejected applicants from 2001 to 2003

were relevant and that it would be too burdensome to produce

additional records. See Doc #32 at 4-5. 

The court referred this discovery dispute to Magistrate

Judge James on April 28, 2006. Doc #23. Defendant argued that

plaintiff was not entitled to the reinstatement files because

plaintiff had made no allegation that his failure to be reinstated

was the result of a pattern or practice of discrimination. Doc #27

at 4; see also Obrey v Johnson, 400 F3d 691, 694 (9th Cir 2005)

(statistical evidence may be relevant to allegations regarding a

pattern or practice of discrimination). Defendant also contended

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that because Barrett left USPS in September 2003, any documents

after that time period were not relevant. Doc #27. Magistrate

Judge James agreed with plaintiff’s request but narrowed its scope,

ordering production of documents and information regarding

reinstatement from January 1, 2000, through September 2003. Doc

#28. 

Following the issuance of the order, defendant asserts it

devoted several hours of time in attempting to comply with the

court’s order. Doc #75 (Supp Simmons decl), ¶ 3; Ex 2 (summary of

time). After defendant informed plaintiff that some documents had

been destroyed in connection with USPS’s document retention policy,

plaintiff filed the pending motion for sanctions. See Doc #38. 

Despite the destruction of some paper records, defendant

substantially complied with the court’s order by compiling computer

records to construct a chart listing persons reinstated during the

relevant time period along with the birth dates of such persons. 

Doc #75, ¶ 5. 

In view of defendant’s compliance with the discovery

order, FRCP 37(b) no longer governs, as it authorizes a court to

sanction a party “if [that] party * * * fails to obey an order to

provide or permit discovery * * *.” In any event, to the extent

defendant disobeyed the court’s order, this conduct does not amount

to the kind of “extreme circumstance[]” that warrants taking the

plaintiff’s allegations as established. See Commodity Futures

Trading Comm’n, 67 F3d at 770-71.

To deal with a wider range of discovery abuses than those

covered by FRCP 37, a district court must turn to its inherent

sanctioning authority “to impose sanctions for discovery abuses

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that may not be a technical violation of the discovery rules.”

Roadway Express, Inc v Piper, 447 US 752, 764-67 (1980). A court’s

inherent power authorizes it to impose a similarly wide range of

sanctions, including dismissal. Such action by the court may be

justified to “protect[] the due and orderly administration of

justice” and “maintain[] the authority and dignity of the court.” 

Primus Automotive Financial Servs, Inc v Batarse, 115 F3d 644, 648

(9th Cir 1997) (citing United States v Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34

(1812)).

The Ninth Circuit described the finding a district court

must make before it can exercise its inherent sanctioning power in

Fink v Gomez, 239 F3d 989 (9th Cir 2001). In Fink, the appellate

panel held that “mere recklessness, without more, does not justify

sanctions under a court’s inherent power.” Id at 993-94. The

“more” required is a finding by the district court of “bad faith or

conduct tantamount to bad faith.” Id at 994. More specifically,

the court of appeals held “that an attorney’s reckless

misstatements of law and fact, when coupled with an improper

purpose, such as an attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings

in one case in order to gain a tactical advantage in another case,

are sanctionable under the court’s inherent power.” Fink, 239 F3d

at 994.

The court’s inherent power to sanction is thus “both

broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions.” 

Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32, 46 (1991). It is broader in that

it “extends to a full range of litigation abuses,” unlike, e g,

FRCP 37. Id at 46-47. It is narrower in that a finding of “bad

faith or willful disobedience of a court’s order” is a prerequisite

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to its utilization. Id. To invoke the court’s inherent authority,

the court must accordingly find “willful disobedience of a court

order * * * or [a party acting] in bad faith, vexatiously,

wantonly, or for oppressive reasons * * *.” Roadway Express, Inc v

Piper, 447 US 752, 766 (1980).

Although defendant’s course of conduct has been less than

exemplary, it does not constitute “bad faith or willful

disobedience of a court’s order.” Chambers, 501 US at 46. 

Defendant was reluctant to produce the reinstatement list because

defendant believed it to be irrelevant, as plaintiff did not

advance a disparate impact theory in his complaint. Doc #27 at 4. 

Once Magistrate Judge James rejected this argument and ordered

production of the reinstatement file, defendant substantially

complied, albeit two months later. Doc #75, ¶ 5; Doc #71, Ex S. 

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that defendant’s delay

constitutes “willful disobedience of a court order.” Piper, 447 US

at 766. Nor does plaintiff’s evidence support a finding that

defendant acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for

oppressive reasons * * *.” Id. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion

for sanctions is DENIED. 

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V

In sum, the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

disability claim because plaintiff has not exhausted this remedy.

Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim also fails because plaintiff

neither establishes a prima facie case nor rebuts defendant’s

legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the adverse

employment action. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED. 

The clerk is DIRECTED to close the file and TERMINATE all motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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