Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01715/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01715-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONATHAN MADRID,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MONO, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01715-MCE-KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through this action, Plaintiff Jonathan Madrid (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief under 

42 U.S.C § 1983 for the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights arising from his 

employment with the Defendant County of Mono Sheriff’s Department (“the 

Department”). Plaintiff names as Defendants the County of Mono (“the County”), Sheriff 

Richard Scholl (“Defendant Scholl”), Undersheriff Ralph Obenberger (“Defendant 

Obenberger”), and David O’Hara (“Defendant O’Hara) (collectively “Defendants”). 

Plaintiff also seeks relief for retaliation under California Labor Code section 1102.5(b). 

Plaintiff has previously amended his Complaint, and the County now moves to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

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be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure1 12(b)(6). Def’s Mot., May 15, 

2014, ECF No. 39. 

For the reasons below, the County’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.2

BACKGROUND3

In 2001, the Department hired Plaintiff as a deputy sheriff. The first years of

Plaintiff’s career with the department were successful; he received forty-three 

commendations and performed several different roles within the department.

In 2008, Plaintiff “spoke out about the mishandling of medications for jail inmates.” 

Compl. at 4. Plaintiff notified Lieutenant Weber, Sergeant Minder and Sergeant Nelson 

that the Department’s practice violated the law. The disclosures made by Plaintiff were 

not part of his normal work duties; rather, he spoke out because of “genuine concern for 

the health of the inmates.” Compl. at 5. Additionally, Plaintiff disclosed information 

regarding the falsification of a report by another member of the Department. In response 

to Plaintiff’s actions, Defendant O’Hara issued a written directive to Plaintiff that he not 

report crimes or emergencies, or personally render assistance to those in need, while 

off-duty. 

Because of his disclosures, Plaintiff alleges that employees of the County, acting 

as final policymakers for the County, retaliated against him in numerous ways. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants retaliated against him by denying his advanced P.O.S.T. 

Certificate and attendant pay increase. Later, in 2009, according to Plaintiff, Defendant 

O’Hara was overheard publicly announcing his goal to have Plaintiff ’ terminated. 

 1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

2 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered these matters 

submitted on the briefs pursuant to E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

3 The following recitation of facts is taken, at times verbatim, from Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint. Compl., May 15, 2014, ECF No. 35.

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Plaintiff reported that incident to Defendant Obenberger, but Defendant Obenberger took 

no action. 

On several occasions between 2008 and the date of his employment termination, 

the individual Defendants called Plaintiff into their offices and questioned him about the 

status of his divorce, his finances, and his personal relationships. Plaintiff claims that 

Defendants later attempted to use this information against Plaintiff in his administrative 

appeal hearing. Plaintiff contends that during this period Defendants gradually 

eliminated Plaintiff’s special assignments and denied him new opportunities without 

giving Plaintiff any explanation for those changes.

In May 2011, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Obenberger initiated a sham 

investigation against Plaintiff for alleged theft of the County’s gasoline. Plaintiff states 

Defendants served him the disposition paperwork in front of several other officers and 

publicly announced that the paperwork involved an Internal Affairs Investigation against 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff was immediately placed on administrative leave and forced to 

surrender his badge, gun, and law enforcement identification card. A few days later, 

Defendant Scholl sent a letter to Plaintiff imposing an additional twenty-hour suspension 

which had the effect of reducing Plaintiff’s final paycheck by twenty hours of paid time, 

which Plaintiff claims was done “with no legitimate reason . . . other than spiteful, further 

retaliation.” Compl. at 7. 

While on administrative leave, Defendants ordered Plaintiff to report to the 

Department. There, Plaintiff claims he was not reissued his gun, badge, or identification 

card, and was subjected to menial tasks by Defendants for the purpose of humiliating 

Plaintiff. During this time, Defendants initiated a second “sham” investigation against 

Plaintiff for allegedly sleeping on the job.

In June 2012, Plaintiff’s treating doctor took him off work. Plaintiff eventually 

depleted his accrued sick time and began drawing disability benefits through a private 

insurance policy that Plaintiff held with California Law Enforcement Association. Plaintiff 

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contends Defendants contacted the California Law Enforcement Association with the 

intent to interrupt Plaintiff’s collection of benefits. 

Finally, when it became clear that Plaintiff was going to win his administrative 

appeal, and despite the fact that Plaintiff’s doctor ordered him off work, Defendants 

claimed that Plaintiff had abandoned his job. On January 10, 2013, Defendant 

Obenberger sent a letter to Plaintiff accusing him of the same because Plaintiff had 

allegedly failed to provide a doctor’s note for his absence.

On February 7, 2013, the Arbitrator of the administrative appeal issued a written 

decision in Plaintiff’s favor, ordering full reinstatement. The Arbitrator found that 

“[m]anagement acted in a discriminatory and capricious manner which was 

unreasonable under the circumstances.” Compl. at 10. Defendants nonetheless refuse 

to reinstate Plaintiff.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) 

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating 

that the pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely 

creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)). 

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . 

have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their 

complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed 

even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a 

recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 

232, 236 (1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

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Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)).

ANALYSIS

Presently before the Court is the County’s motion to dismiss both Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim and Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim, brought pursuant to California Labor 

Code section 1102.5. Each is addressed in turn, below.

A. § 1983 Claim

Local governments can be “persons” subject to suit for “constitutional tort[s]” 

under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The County, 

as a local government, is therefore subject to suit under § 1983. “A local government 

entity is liable under § 1983 when ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy of some 

nature cause[s] a constitutional tort.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1992)). “In 

addition, a local governmental entity may be liable if it has a ‘policy of inaction and such 

inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Oviatt, 

954 F.2d at 1474). “The custom or policy of inaction, however, must be the result of a 

conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action made from among various 

alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect 

to the subject matter in question.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Thus, to prevail on his § 1983 claim against the County, Plaintiff must sufficiently 

allege that: (1) he was deprived of his constitutional rights by the County and its 

employees acting under color of state law; (2) that the County has customs or policies 

which “amount[ ] to deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (3) that 

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these policies are the “moving force behind the constitutional violation[s].’” Id. at 681-82 

(quoting Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1473, 1477).

There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a 

municipality: (1) [b]y showing a longstanding practice or 

custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of 

the local government entity; (2) [b]y showing that the 

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final 

policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said 

to represent official policy in the area of decision or (3) [b]y 

showing that an official with final policymaking authority either 

delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 

subordinate.

Garcia v. City of Merced, 637 F. Supp. 2d 731, 761 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Menotti v. 

City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

Here, Plaintiff contends Defendants were final policymakers on behalf of the 

County regarding personnel decisions. Compl. at 2, 3, 11. “Whether a particular official 

has ‘final policymaking authority’ is a question of state law.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). This determination is not a “categorical, ‘all or nothing’ 

matter,” Streit v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 56o (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997)), but whether the official is a 

final policymaker for the local government “in a particular area, or on a particular issue,” 

Brewster v. Shasta Cnty., 275 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. 

at 785). Courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that California sheriffs are final 

policymakers when it comes to investigating crimes, Brewster, 275 F.3d at 807, and in 

the administration of the release of prisoners from county jails, Streit, 236 F.3d at 

564-65.

Plaintiff specifically alleges that the Sheriff is a final policymaker regarding 

“personnel decisions” for the County. Compl. at 11. Plaintiff supports his allegation with 

the contentions that the Board of Supervisors of the County delegated to the Sheriff their 

final policymaking authority “for all purposes connected with the management of 

employment” within the Department, and that their decisions were “not subject to review 

or reversal by any other employees or officials within the County of Mono.” Id. 

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Contrary to the County’s contentions, Plaintiff’s allegations are neither conclusory 

nor groundless. Examining the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, and accepting all allegations of fact as true, Plaintiff’s allegations as to the 

policymaker prong of his § 1983 claim are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 

Specifically, the Complaint identifies Defendants Scholl and Obenberger, the Sheriff and 

Undersheriff, respectively, as final policymakers on behalf of the County with respect to 

managing the Department. The Complaint further asserts the County delegated 

authority over the Department’s personnel decisions to Scholl and Obenberger, and that 

their decisions in such matters were not reversible by any other County official. Compl. 

at 11. These factual allegations are enough to satisfy the requirements of providing “fair 

notice” of the nature of the claim as well as the “grounds” on which it rests. Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556 n.3. 

Plaintiff’s assertions are bolstered by review of the Mono County Code of 

Ordinances (“the Code”). The Code reveals that the Sheriff, as department head of the 

Sheriff-Coroner Department, is vested with independent authority to appoint employees, 

to direct employees, and to discipline Department employees. County of Mono, Cal., 

Code of Ordinances §§ 2.68.50, 2.68.070, 2.68.220 (2013). While the Code requires 

that certain disciplinary decisions be reviewed by the district attorney before discharge, it 

does not state that the district attorney has authority to reverse, cancel, or otherwise veto 

the decision. On the contrary, the district attorney is assigned to represent the 

department head seeking to implement discipline should the disciplined employee seek 

appeal. Code of Ordinances § 2.68.302(F). Moreover, the County does not contend, 

and the Court does not find, that the existence of an appellate process for disciplinary 

action nullifies the Defendants’ designation as final policymakers for the Department. 

B. California Labor Code section 1102.5 Claim

The County next argues that Plaintiff insufficiently alleges a violation of California 

Labor Code section 1102.5. Section 1102.5(b) is a whistleblower statute, stating in 

relevant part that

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an employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, 

shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing 

information . . . to a government or law enforcement agency 

[or] to a person with authority over the employee . . . if the 

employee has reasonable cause to believe that the 

information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or 

a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal 

rule or regulation.

Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under section 

1102.5, an employee must show “(1) that he engaged in [a] protected activity, (2) that he 

was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment action by his employer, and (3) that 

there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment 

action.” Love v. Motion Indus., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to adverse employment action in the 

form of persistent harassment, fraudulent misconduct investigations, and termination. 

Compl. at 11. Plaintiff contends that said actions were a consequence of his “[speaking] 

out” about the “mishandling of medication for jail inmates,” and for disclosing information 

regarding “the falsification of a report by another member of the Department.” Compl. 

4-5. Defendants assert that these allegations are insufficient to meet the first 

requirement for a claim of retaliation under section 1102.5(b), which requires 

participation in a protected activity, because Plaintiff does not indicate what specific law 

was violated, as section 1102.5(b) also requires. Def.’s Mot. at 6. 

While it is true that Plaintiff must plead more than mere conclusions, in this case 

Plaintiff need not go so far as citing a specific law regarding the falsification of the police 

report at the pleading stage. Rather, Plaintiff must only plead facts sufficient to 

demonstrate that his claim of retaliation is more than speculative, and to give notice to 

Defendants of the grounds on which the complaint rests. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555. By this standard, and accepting all allegations of fact in the complaint as true, 

Plaintiff’s contentions that he disclosed the falsification of a police report satisfy section 

1102.5’s requirement. The Court agrees. As Plaintiff states: “Defendant cannot 

seriously contend that [Plaintiff’s superiors] would not have understood that filing false 

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police report is a violation of the law.” Pl.’s Opp’n, May 15, 2014, ECF No. 40 at 12-13. 

Additionally, and in any event, as Plaintiff makes clear in his Opposition, falsification of a 

police report by an officer is a crime under California Penal Code sections 118.14 and 

148.5. The plain language of section 1102.5 requires that Plaintiff prove the disclosure 

of a violation of a statute, rule or regulation, and is not satisfied by the disclosure of 

conduct that merely violates workplace guidelines. Mueller v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 

176 Cal. App. 4th 809, 822 (2009) (“To exalt . . . internal personnel disclosures with 

whistleblower status would . . . thrust the judiciary into micromanaging employment 

practices and create a legion of undeserving protected ‘whistleblowers' arising from the 

routine workings and communications of the job site”). While citing a specific law may 

be necessary to withstand a motion for summary judgment for a claim under section 

1102.5, see Love, 309 at 1134, it is not necessary at this stage in the proceedings. 

However, Plaintiff’s allegations that he disclosed information regarding 

“mishandling of medications for jail inmates” cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. 

While Plaintiff asserts that the practice “violated the law,” such a declaration is 

conclusory. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff does not specify which law was violated by this 

conduct, and unlike the allegations surrounding the falsified police report, “mishandling 

of medications” lacks sufficient factual basis for the court to infer that any Defendant 

violated the law. See Thomsen v. Sacramento Metro. Fire Dist., 2:09-CV-01108 FCD, 

2009 WL 8741960 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2009) (granting motion to dismiss section 

1102.5(b) claim where it was “unclear from the face of the complaint what state or 

federal statute was or would be violated. Further, the factual basis for these violations is 

unclear.”). What exactly this alleged “mishandling” entailed is left to speculation, and it is 

not clear from the facts provided that this conduct violated any law. Notably, Plaintiff’s 

Opposition neither elaborates nor elucidates this aspect of the section 1102.5 claim, but 

rather recites the language of the Second Amended Complaint and declares the 

 4 Plaintiff had originally cited to “§ 181.1,” which is presumed erroneous and is here corrected. 

Opp’n. at 13.

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language to be “factual allegations.” Opp’n. at 12. These assertions and barebones 

allegations are inadequate to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, the County’s 

motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s section 1102.5 claim to the extent that claim 

arises from the mishandling of medications.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 

No. 39 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:

1. DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s Monell claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1983;

2. DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s claim under Cal Lab. Code § 1102.5 

to the extent the claim arises from the falsification of a police report; and

3. GRANTED with leave to amend with respect to Plaintiff’s claim under Cal. 

Lab. Code § 1102.5 to the extent the claim arises from the mishandling of 

medications.

Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file an amended complaint within thirty (30) 

days of the date of this memorandum and order. If no amended complaint is filed, the 

causes of action dismissed by virtue of this memorandum and order shall be dismissed 

with prejudice and without further notice to the parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 24, 2014

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