Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00087/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DARRELL LONG, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 16-0087-WS-B

 )

PATTON HOSPITALITY )

MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant Ironshore Specialty Insurance 

Company’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (doc. 35). The court-ordered briefing 

schedule having expired, the Motion is now ripe for submission.1

In his First Amended Complaint (doc. 30), plaintiff, Darrell Long, brought claims against 

defendants, Patton Hospitality Management, LLC, and Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company, 

arising from a slip and fall. According to Long’s well-pleaded factual allegations, he was an 

invitee at Escapes! To the Shores Condominium in Orange Beach, Alabama, on February 10, 

2015, when he stepped onto a slippery marble flooring, fell down, and hit his head. (Doc. 30, ¶ 

 1 By Order (doc. 37) entered on April 1, 2016, plaintiff’s deadline for filing a 

response to the Motion to Dismiss was set for April 14, 2016. Plaintiff has responded to neither 

the Motion nor the April 1 Order, and his deadline for doing so has long since expired. 

Accordingly, plaintiff has waived the opportunity to be heard on Ironshore’s pending dispositive 

motion. That said, plaintiff’s failure to respond to Ironshore’s Motion to Dismiss neither 

constitutes a legal abandonment of his claims against Ironshore nor authorizes the reflexive 

granting of said Motion without examining its merits. See, e.g., Gailes v. Marengo County 

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 916 F. Supp.2d 1238, 1243-44 (S.D. Ala. 2013) (explaining that “the Court will 

not treat a claim as abandoned merely because the plaintiff has not defended it in opposition to a 

motion to dismiss,” but that “the Court will review the merits of the defendant’s position” 

instead); Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 2014 WL 7184340, *7 n.10 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 16, 2014) 

(“the Court declines to equate plaintiff’s failure to respond [to a Rule 12(b) motion] with waiver 

or abandonment of those claims”). That said, plaintiff’s omission is at his peril. The Court will 

not fill in the blanks with arguments he could have raised but did not.

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6.) The First Amended Complaint alleges that the condominium development was managed by, 

and under the direct control of, Patton Hospitality at the time of this incident. (Id., ¶ 5.) With 

regard to defendant Ironshore, the only factual allegations in the operative pleading are that (i) 

Ironshore is an Arizona corporation with its principal place of business in New York, and (ii) 

during relevant times, Ironshore “had in full force and effect a policy of liability insurance 

providing coverage to Patton” Hospitality. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 11.) The Amended Complaint alleges a

state-law claim that Patton Hospitality was negligent but identifies no specific claim, cause of 

action or theory of liability against Ironshore.

As reflected in the pleadings, then, Long is suing Ironshore directly for the purported 

negligence of Ironshore’s insured (Patton Hospitality), not for any acts or omissions of Ironshore 

itself. The trouble with this configuration is that, as Ironshore’s Motion to Dismiss correctly 

points out, Alabama law forbids direct actions against a liability insurer for the alleged wrongs of 

an insured whose legal liability has not been fixed by judgment. Indeed, in Alabama, “[a] cause 

of action against a defendant’s liability-insurance carrier does not accrue until a final judgment 

has been entered against the defendant.” Gillis v. Frazier, --- So.3d ----, 2014 WL 3796382, *6 

(Ala. Aug. 1, 2014).2 Alabama law leaves no doubt that any claims Long might have against 

 2 See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 894 So.2d 643, 648 (Ala. 2004) 

(“The injured party, however, can bring an action against the insurer only after he has recovered 

a judgment against the insured ....”) (citation omitted); Knox v. Western World Ins. Co., 893 

So.2d 321, 324 (Ala. 2004) (“This Court has interpreted § 27-23-1 and § 27-23-2 to preclude an 

injured party from bringing an action against an insurer before the injured party has recovered a 

final judgment against the insured.”); Howton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 448, 

450 (Ala. 1987) (recognizing “the fundamental and well-established general principle that an 

accident victim (a third party to a liability insurance contract) cannot maintain a direct action

against the insurer for the alleged liability of the insured where the legal liability of the insured 

has not been determined by judgment”); Ex parte Curry, 157 So.3d 906, 912 n.1 (Ala.Civ.App. 

2014) (“because Curry and Walker had not yet secured a judgment against the alleged tortfeasor, 

who, in this instance, is MacArthur, they would not have been permitted to sue State Farm to 

recover the amount of damages for which they alleged MacArthur should be responsible and for 

which State Farm might be liable under its insurance contract”); Ex parte Lammon, 688 So.2d 

836, 838 n.2 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996) (“[W]hen the liability of an insurer to pay for injuries suffered 

by a third party is predicated on the establishment of the liability of its insured to that third party, 

a direct action by the third party against the insurer is not permitted under Alabama law until the 

third party has obtained a judgment against the insured.”) (citation omitted); Ala. Code § 27-23-2 

(“Upon the recovery of a final judgment ... for loss or damage ..., if the defendant in such action 

was insured against the loss or damage at the time when the right of action arose, the judgment 

creditor shall be entitled to have the insurance money provided for in the contract of insurance 

(Continued)

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Ironshore to recover insurance proceeds for the alleged negligence of Ironshore’s insured, Patton 

Hospitality, cannot be brought unless and until Long first obtains a judgment against such 

insured. To date, of course, he has not done so.

In light of the foregoing, Long’s claims against defendant Ironshore Specialty Insurance 

Company are not cognizable at this time, and Ironshore’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 35) is 

granted. Plaintiff’s claims against Ironshore are dismissed without prejudice. This action will 

proceed henceforth solely as to plaintiff’s claims against defendant Patton Hospitality 

Management, LLC. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Ironshore Specialty Insurance 

Company as a party defendant in this matter.

DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of April, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

between the insurer and the defendant applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, and if the 

judgment is not satisfied within 30 days after the date when it is entered, the judgment creditor 

may proceed against the defendant and the insurer to reach and apply the insurance money to the 

satisfaction of the judgment.”).

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