Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03688/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03688-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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*

After examining the brief and the record, we conclude that oral argument is not

necessary.  See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).  The appellee was not served with process in the

district court and is not participating in this appeal.

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 25, 2010*

Decided May 26, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3688

MARYLYNN DIXON,

           Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 06‐cv‐0141‐MJR

Michael J. Reagan,

Judge.

O R D E R

Marylynn Dixon filed for judicial review of a decision of the Social Security

Commissioner denying her disability benefits.  Dixon never served the defendant, however.

Eleven months later, the district court issued a “Notice of Impending Dismissal” informing

her that she needed to serve the defendant or, if service had been perfected, seek default.

Dixon did not perfect service but sought default anyway.  Three additional months later the

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-3688 Document: 17 Filed: 05/26/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09‐3688 Page 2

court again warned her that she needed to perfect service or the case would be dismissed

for lack of prosecution.  Dixon did nothing, so the court dismissed the case.  Two years later

Dixon filed a cursory motion to vacate, claiming generally that she “did not receive the

Notice of Electronic Filings” and did not know of the order threatening dismissal or the

subsequent order dismissing the case.  The court construed the motion as being brought

under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b), and denied the motion.  The court found that the “docketing

information belie[d]” Dixon’s assertion that she had no notice of the court’s warning of

dismissal, and that the two‐year passage of time between the dismissal and the motion to

vacate was unreasonable.

On appeal Dixon argues that her Rule 60(b) motion was not dilatory and that she is

entitled to relief because she did not know about the orders threatening dismissal and

dismissing her case.  But relief under Rule 60(b) is an “extraordinary remedy” and “granted

only in exceptional circumstances,” Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009)

(quoting McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000)).  Here Dixon offered

nothing other than her “bald allegation, unsupported by any proof,” such as an affidavit,

that she did not receive the notice; under the circumstances, the district court acted within

its discretion in denying the motion.  See Ingram v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,

371 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2004).

AFFIRMED.

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