Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05208/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05208-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of 1

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for Commissioner Jo Anne

 B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

CHERYL D. WEBER

a/k/a CHERYL D. LONG PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-5208

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE , Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Cheryl Weber, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

September 26, 2006, a report and recommendation was entered recommending that the case be

remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 9). On

October 20, 2006, the report and recommendation was adopted and the case was remanded for

further consideration. (Doc. # 10). Plaintiff now moves for an award of $1224.78 in attorney's

fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter "EAJA"),

requesting compensation for 7.40 attorney hours for work before the court at an hourly rate of

$156.00 for the work performed in 2005 and $160.00 for the hours performed in 2006 and 2007,

as well as $49.50 in costs. (Doc. # 12). The defendant has filed a response, expressing no

objection to this award. (Doc. # 13). 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

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was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

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of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the

EAJA at an hourly rate of $125.00. We find plaintiff's attorney entitled to compensation at this

rate. 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $156.00 an hour for work

performed in 2005 and $160.00 per hour for work performed in 2006 and 2007. Attorney's fees

may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum statutory rate under §

2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor such

as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

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The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the discretion of the

district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919

F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased when there is

"uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees

of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel

has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit and has presented evidence

of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned believes his argument for

enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has merit. 

The Commissioner has not raised an objection to the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s

counsel. We note, however, that an award based upon an hourly rate of $150.00 per hour,

reflecting an increase in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly fee awards in cases

in Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, based upon

the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this

case is $150.00 per hour. 

We next address the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel claims she spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks reimbursement for a total of 2.75 hours of attorney work

performed between September 21, 2005, and December 29, 2005. The Complaint was not filed

in this court until December 29, 2005. (Doc. # 1). We note that time spent at the administrative

level is not compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th

Cir. 1984). However, we do note that some of the time submitted was clearly in preparation for

the filing of the Complaint with this court and should be allowed. Therefore, we will deduct .75

hour. 

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Counsel also request reimbursement for .25 hour for preparing a letter to the Social

Security Administration. However, as previously stated, this time is not compensable under

EAJA. See id. Therefore, we will deduct .25 hour from counsel’s total compensable time.

Likewise, counsel has requested 1.0 hour for preparing letters of service. However, the

court finds that these tasks could have been performed by support staff. Granville House, Inc.

v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1987) (work which could have been

completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Therefore, these hours are not

compensable under the EAJA. Therefore, 1.00 attorney hours must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel.

Counsel has also requested 2.50 hours of compensation for the preparation of her EAJA

motion and brief. This court concludes that it should not have taken an attorney experienced in

handling social security cases this amount of time to perform this task. Bowman v. Secretary of

H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989). Therefore we are deducting 1.00 hour from the total

number of compensable hours sought. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $49.50 in expenses incurred with regard to the

copying fees and postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $49.50

to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 4.40 (7.40 - 3.00) attorney hours, at the rate of $150.00 per hour, and $49.50 in expenses,

for a total attorney's fee award of $709.50. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not

out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten

days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver

of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be

both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of February 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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