Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00084/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00084-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PEDRO REYES, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al., 

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv84-JLS (BLM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 

WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED 

[ECF Nos. 90, 91] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Janis L. 

Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the following reasons, 

the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [see ECF No. 91] be GRANTED. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 This case commenced on January 5, 2016, when Plaintiff Pedro Reyes, a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, against Defendants Brown, Ortega, and Madden. ECF No. 1 (“Comp.”). Plaintiff alleged 

claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 3-18. A detailed recitation of the 

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procedural history is set forth in this Court’s Report and Recommendation dated December 13, 

2017. ECF No. 76. The more recent and relevant procedural history is set forth below. 

 On December 13, 2017, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation for “Order 

Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) for Failure 

to State a Claim for Which Relief May be Granted.” Id. The Court’s December 13, 2017 Report 

and Recommendation also included an “Order (1) Granting Plaintiff’s Request for Additional Time 

to File a Third Amended Complaint, (2) Granting Plaintiff’s Request for Copy of the Local Rules, 

and (3) Clarifying the Status of the Pleadings.” Id. This Court’s R&R found that Plaintiff’s SAC 

did not allege facts supporting Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant Ortega was deliberately 

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Id. at 9-10. As a result, the Court again found 

that Plaintiff’s SAC still failed to state a declaratory judgment claim and again recommended 

dismissal of this claim. Id. at 10. 

On January 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Third Amended Complaint 

Objections to Matters Address by This Court And Demand for Jury Trial,” which was docketed 

twice: once as Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint [ECF No. 77] and once as an objection to 

the Court’s December 13, 2017 Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 78]. On February 9, 

2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint. ECF No. 79. On April 23, 2018, Judge Sammartino issued an “Order: (1) Adopting 

Report and Recommendation; (2) Dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint; and (3) 

Denying as Moot Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.” ECF No. 86. Judge Sammartino’s Order 

overruled Plaintiff’s objections and granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss dismissing without 

prejudice Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 11. With respect to the document 

docketed as Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint [ECF No. 77], Judge Sammartino found that 

“Plaintiff could not have filed an operative third amended complaint while his Second Amended 

Complaint had an R&R pending before this Court. . .The Court emphasize[d] that it d[id] not 

consider Plaintiff’s January 16, 2018 document to be his third amended complaint. The Court 

[] allow[ed] Plaintiff to amend his complaint and re-file a third amended complaint.” ECF No. 86 

at 12. 

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Judge Sammartino noted: 

The Court entertains serious doubts concerning Plaintiff’s ability to cure the 

deficiencies outlined in Judge Major’s R&R as well as in this Order. Plaintiff has 

filed multiple complaints with similar factual allegations and each time has filed 

fewer factual allegations than the prior complaint. (internal citation omitted). 

Id. 

 On June 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”),1 which is currently 

before the Court. ECF No. 90. On July 5, 2018, Defendants Beltran, Madden, and Ortega filed 

a Motion to Dismiss the TAC for Failure to State a Claim. ECF Nos. 91 and 91-1. In the Motion 

to Dismiss, Defendants allege that the TAC fails to state a claim because it does not allege any 

facts demonstrating that Madden and Beltran violated Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights nor does it 

allege facts that would establish an Eighth Amendment claim against Ortega for deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. ECF No. 91-1 at 2. 

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 

 Because this Court is resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all 

material factual allegations in the complaint, and must construe the facts in the complaint and 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Thompson 

v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 According to the TAC, Plaintiff alleges that “defendant Ortega did in fact, violate Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights when he acted with deliberate indifference by not acting with the medical 

aspects of treatment to his person and leaving [his] condition with a very minimal attention like 

putting a bandade on a servered finger....” ECF No. 90 at 1. Plaintiff further alleges that 

“protocol calls for a complete diognistic check-up and tretament according to the established set 

up by CDCR’s medical protocol and humanitarian set of treatments set up by same.” Id. Plaintiff 

also states that he “did fall and [was] in need of competent medical care, and was not given 

                                                      

1 Plaintiff titled the document “fourth amended complaint,” however, in accordance with Judge Sammartino’s Order: 

(1) Adopting Report and Recommendation; (2) Dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint: and (3) Denying 

as Moot Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court will construe the document as Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint. ECF No. 86 at 12-13.

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this care and the fact that due to this lack of care, Plaintiff’s issue got progressively worse and 

as a consepuence [sic], surgery was necessary and that is the claim of [his] contention....” Id. 

at 2. Plaintiff alleges that he has established the two prong standard for deliberate indifference 

“to a serious medical need when Defendant Ortega failed to meet the burden in Farmer v. 

Brenner when Defendant Ortega failed to act in the treatment of Plaintiff when the treatment 

time laps caused, due to the lack of or failure to administer proper treatment and as such, 

surgery was necessary to combate [sic] deeper and more serious damage could set in and or 

further tretment [sic] would be necessary for the condition set forth thereof.” Id.

LEGAL STANDARD 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it 

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). Additionally, for an amended complaint, the document must be complete by itself, and 

any claim, against any defendant not re-alleged will be considered waived. Lacey v. Maricopa 

Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not 

re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”). 

 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but 

whether he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). If the facts alleged in 

the complaint are “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability, the plaintiff has not satisfied 

the plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, “[a] claim has facial 

plausibility when the [plaintiff] plead[s] factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

 When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the pleadings 

liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007); Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895 (9th Cir. 2002). This rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important” in civil rights cases. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 

(S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that because “Iqbal incorporated the 

Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter the courts’ treatment of pro se filings; 

accordingly we continue to construe pro se filings liberally . . . .” This is particularly important 

where the petitioner is a pro se prisoner litigant in a civil matter). When giving liberal 

construction to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court is not permitted to “supply 

essential elements of the claim[] that were not initially pled.” Easter v. CDC, 694 F. Supp. 2d 

1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d 

at 268). 

 The court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint, “unless the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 

F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, 

“before dismissing a pro se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of 

the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to 

amend effectively.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261. 

 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that (1) a 

person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct 

deprived the plaintiff of some “rights, privileges, or immunities” protected by the Constitution of 

the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and 

show an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of the defendant.” Harris v. Schriro, 

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652 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2009) (citation omitted). A particular defendant is liable 

under § 1983 only when the plaintiff proves he participated in the alleged violation. Id. 

A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Care Claim Against Defendant Ortega 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ortega violated his constitutional rights by acting with 

deliberate indifference with regards to Plaintiff’s medical treatment. ECF No. 90 at 1. Plaintiff 

states that “[D]efendant Ortega did in fact, violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when he acted 

with deliberate indifference by not acting with the medical aspects of treatment to his person 

and leaving my condition with a very minimal attention like putting a bandade on a servered 

finger. . .” Id. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Ortega on the 

ground that Plaintiff’s TAC fails to state a claim for relief for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference to medical need claim. ECF No. 91-1 at 2. Defendants claim that “[t]here 

are no specific allegations as to Ortega’s alleged unconstitutional behavior. Rather, Plaintiff 

simply makes a sweeping, generalized claim that he was not given adequate medical care.” ECF 

No. 91-1 at 7. 

A prison official’s “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” violates 

the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Clement v. 

Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)). 

A prisoner must satisfy an objective and a subjective requirement to assert an Eighth 

Amendment violation. Id. The objective requirement is satisfied so long as the prisoner alleges 

facts to show that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such that the “failure to treat [the] 

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-

32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The subjective component requires the prisoner to allege facts 

showing a culpable mental state, specifically, “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of 

serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1970) (emphasis added). The 

indifference must be substantial, and inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross 

negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 

Indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with 

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medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical 

care.” Tracey v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff, 2008 WL 154607, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008) 

(quoting Hutchinson v. U.S., 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

“Mere delay of medical treatment, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of 

deliberate medical indifference.” Robinson v. Catlett, 725 F. Supp.2d 1203, 1208 (S.D. Cal. July 

19, 2012) (quoting Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985)). To state a claim for deliberate indifference arising from a delay in treatment, a prisoner 

must allege that the delay was harmful, although an allegation of substantial harm is not 

required. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds 

by, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). Factual allegations indicating that 

the official “sat idly by as [the prisoner] was seriously injured despite the defendant’s ability to 

prevent the injury” or that the official “repeatedly failed to treat an inmate properly ... strongly 

suggests that the defendant’s actions were motivated by ‘deliberate indifference’ to the 

prisoner’s medical needs.” Id. at 1060-61. “In sum, the more serious the medical needs of the 

prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in light of those needs, the more 

likely it is that a plaintiff has established “deliberate indifference” on the part of the defendant.” 

Id. at 1061. Isolated incidents relative to a plaintiff's overall treatment suggest no deliberate 

indifference. Id. at 1060. 

I. Objective Prong 

In the Court’s first and second Report and Recommendations, the Court provided a 

lengthy summary of the law governing Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Ortega. See ECF No. 57 at 

15-21 and ECF No. 76 at 7-10. That law continues to govern Plaintiff’s current claim against Dr. 

Ortega. In the first two Report and Recommendations, the Court found that Plaintiff had 

satisfied the objective requirement of alleging a serious medical need when he alleged that he 

fell, hurt his neck, and ultimately required surgery. See ECF No. 57 at 16-17 and ECF No. 76 at 

8-9; see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131-32. 

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations in the TAC do not specify the nature of the injury or provide 

factual support for Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference. See ECF No. 90. Though Plaintiff 

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mentions his “condition” and vaguely references a surgery and experiencing pain, he does not 

set forth any factual allegations demonstrating that he has a serious medical need. Id. While 

Plaintiff did allege sufficient factual detail to meet the objective prong in his First Complaint and 

Second Amended Complaint, he does not identify or describe his medical need in his TAC.2 Id. 

For example, Plaintiff states that Defendant Ortega acted with deliberate indifference by giving 

him minimal attention like “putting a bandade on a servered finger.” ECF No. 90 at 1. Plaintiff 

alleges that, as a result, he has “continued suffering for that matter with an increase of pain 

pills.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations as set forth in the TAC do not describe with sufficient specificity 

any facts establishing that Plaintiff had a serious medical need, injury, or illness. See Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 834. Therefore, Plaintiff does not meet the objective requirement of a deliberate 

indifference claim. 

II. Subjective Prong 

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Dr. Ortega was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s 

serious medical needs and thereby also fails to satisfy the subjective element. See Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 836; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. In the Court’s first Report and Recommendation, 

the Court explained to Plaintiff that he failed to satisfy the subjective prong of a deliberate 

indifference to medical care claim against Defendant Ortega because: 

the medical records establish that Defendant Ortega provided ongoing diagnostic 

testing and medical care to Plaintiff in an effort to determine the exact extent and 

cause of his pain and other symptoms. Even accepting as true Plaintiff’s 

allegations that Defendant Ortega discounted his claims and symptoms, at most, 

the evidence could establish negligence or malpractice, neither of which 

constitutes a constitutional violation. 

ECF No. 57 at 19-20.3 

                                                      

2 Judge Sammartino’s Order explained that “[t]he Court cautions Plaintiff that should he choose to file a Third 

Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself and that any claim, against any defendant not re-alleged will be 

considered waived.” Citing Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed 

with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”). 

3 The Report and Recommendation also advised Plaintiff that he could not receive injunctive relief against Defendant 

Ortega without showing a persistent pattern of misconduct by officials or that there was a "real or immediate 

threat” that he will be wronged again or that there is a “likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury." 

ECF No. 57 at 20-21 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). Plaintiff did not reassert this 

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Judge Sammartino agreed and gave Plaintiff another opportunity to amend his complaint 

and add more facts. ECF No. 63 at 6. In the Court’s second Report and Recommendation, the 

Court found that Plaintiff’s SAC was insufficient because while it alleged that Plaintiff was not 

seen by a doctor until nine days after his fall and not seen by a “bonafide” doctor for 

approximately three months, it did not allege facts showing what Dr. Ortega did to cause the 

delay. ECF No. 76 at 7-9. The Court provided Plaintiff with the applicable law regarding delay 

and deliberate indifference and explained that Plaintiff must allege specific facts regarding what 

Dr. Ortega did to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. Further, Justice Sammartino’s April 

23, 2018 Order found that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim in his SAC was deficient and 

instructed: 

The subjective element of deliberate indifference is a difficult standard; Plaintiff 

must show by well-pled factual allegations, that Defendant Ortega knew of and 

disregarded a substantial risk of harm. (internal citation omitted). Instead, both 

Plaintiff’s SAC and his objections do not address Defendant Ortega’s subjective 

state of mind. At most, Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that Defendant Ortega 

was responsible for his care, but do not address Defendant Ortega’s subjective 

awareness of Plaintiff’s condition. 

ECF No. 86 at 7. 

Plaintiff’s TAC does not comply with the Court’s repeated instructions and does not fix 

any of the inadequacies identified by the Court in the First Complaint and Second Amended 

Complaint. The TAC does not provide any facts regarding Dr. Ortega’s medical care nor describe 

how Dr. Ortega caused the delay in Plaintiff’s medical treatment or otherwise provided 

unconstitutional care. ECF No. 90 at 1-2. Rather, the TAC merely states in general terms that 

Dr. Ortega was responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries, in charge of Plaintiff’s medical treatment, and 

that Dr. Ortega provided inadequate medical care. Id. Plaintiff appears to argue that he has 

satisfied the subjective prong because he received medical care that was delayed and may have 

required surgery unnecessarily as a result. Id. at 1. Even if Plaintiff’s arguments were properly 

                                                      

claim in the TAC and does not seek injunctive relief. 

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alleged in the TAC, those arguments would not state a constitutional violation as they do not 

constitute deliberate indifference by Defendant Ortega. Inadequate medical care, even at the 

level of malpractice or gross negligence, does not establish deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 106. 

Plaintiff’s allegations in the TAC do not state a claim for deliberate indifference by Dr. 

Ortega. Because Plaintiff has unsuccessfully attempted to state a constitutional claim against 

Dr. Ortega four times, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs against Defendant 

Ortega be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (court 

may dismiss without leave to amend if the pleading cannot be cured by the addition of other 

facts). 

B. Eighth Amendment Claim Against Defendant Beltran 

 Plaintiff does not re-assert his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Beltran, nor 

did he mention Defendant Beltran by name in his TAC. See ECF No. 90. The Court has 

repeatedly told Plaintiff that any claims not re-asserted in the TAC would be considered waived. 

See e.g., ECF No. 63 at 3; ECF No. 76 at 11; ECF No. 86 at 12. Therefore, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against 

Defendant Beltran be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Lacy v. Maricopa Cnty., 

693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not realleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”); see also Ramirez, 

334, F.3d at 861 (court may dismiss without leave to amend if the pleading cannot be cured by 

the addition of other facts). 

C. Declaratory Judgment Claim Against Defendant Beltran 

Plaintiff does not re-assert his Declaratory Judgment claim against Defendant Beltran, 

nor does he mention Defendant Beltran by name in his TAC. See ECF No. 90. Therefore, for the 

same reasons as stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment claim against Defendant Beltran be GRANTED WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND. 

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D. Defendant Madden 

 Plaintiff does not re-assert any claims against Defendant Madden, nor does he mention 

Defendant Madden by name in his TAC. See ECF No. 90. Therefore, for the same reasons as 

stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims 

against Defendant Madden be GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court issue 

an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) granting 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and (3) dismissing all claims against Defendants Ortega, Beltran, 

and Madden with prejudice. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties on or before October 29, 2018. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with this Court 

and served on all parties on or before November 12, 2018. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 9/25/2018 

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