Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-19-02171/USCOURTS-ca2-19-02171-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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19-2171-cv

Barnet et al. v. Ministry of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic

In the

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AUGUST TERM 2019

No. 19-2171-cv

HOWARD J. BARNET, AS TRUSTEE OF THE 2012 SARETTA BARNET 

REVOCABLE TRUST, PETER L. BARNET, AS TRUSTEE OF THE 2012

SARETTA BARNET REVOCABLE TRUST, JANE L. BARNET, AS TRUSTEE 

OF THE 2012 SARETTA BARNET REVOCABLE TRUST, SOTHEBY’S, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND SPORTS OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC,

Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

ARGUED: MARCH 5, 2020

DECIDED: JUNE 9, 2020

Before: HALL, LYNCH, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.

The Ministry of Culture and Sports of the Hellenic Republic

(“Greece”) appeals from a decision of the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of New York (Failla, J.), issued on June 21, 

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2019, concluding that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act over Plaintiffs’ suit 

seeking declaratory relief against Greece. 

We conclude that Greece’s claim of ownership over an ancient 

horse figurine was not in connection with any commercial activity by 

Greece outside of the United States, and accordingly there is no 

jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA. We REVERSE and REMAND with 

instructions to dismiss this action.

GARY STEIN, Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, New York, New 

York (Randall T. Adams, Bayard P. Brown, and Minji 

Reem on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

ANDREW Z. SCHWARTZ, Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, 

Massachusetts (Leila A. Amineddoleh on the brief), for 

Defendant-Appellant.

MENASHI, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we decide whether Greece’s assertion of 

ownership over an ancient horse figurine was “in connection with a 

commercial activity” by Greece within the meaning of the Foreign 

Sovereign Immunities Act. We conclude that the assertion of 

ownership was in connection with Greece’s enactment and 

enforcement of patrimony laws that declare the figurine to be the 

property of Greece and that these are sovereign rather than 

commercial activities. Accordingly, the FSIA does not authorize 

jurisdiction over this dispute, and we reverse and remand with 

instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

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In 2018, Sotheby’s auction house announced that it planned to 

auction a bronze horse figurine on behalf of the 2012 Saretta Barnet 

Revocable Trust. Greek officials learned of the auction and sent a 

letter via e-mail to Sotheby’s stating that the figurine belonged to 

Greece pursuant to its 1932 Antiquities Act and its 2002 Protection of 

Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in General Act (together, 

“patrimony laws”), which declared historic Greek artifacts to be the 

property of Greece. Sotheby’s withdrew the figurine from its auction 

and subsequently joined the trustees of the Trust in filing suit against 

Greece in the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs seek only 

declaratory relief on the disputed issue of ownership; they seek no 

damages or injunctive relief. As the basis for jurisdiction, Plaintiffs 

invoke the FSIA, which codifies certain enumerated exceptions to the 

rule that foreign states are immune from suit.

In denying Greece’s motion to dismiss, the district court agreed 

with Plaintiffs that Greece lacks immunity here because its action of 

sending the letter claiming ownership falls within the FSIA’s 

“commercial activity” exception. That exception authorizes suit 

against a foreign state that undertakes “an act outside the territory of 

the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 

foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).1 The district court reasoned that the 

“act” outside the United States was Greece’s sending of the letter, and 

it was “in connection with a commercial activity” outside the United 

States because non-state actors may, and do, send demand letters 

claiming ownership of artifacts up for auction. In other words, the 

1 The commercial-activities exception covers two other circumstances that 

the parties agree do not apply here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).

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conduct was commercial because it was not the sort of activity in 

which only sovereigns engage.

We agree that the core challenged act in this case was Greece’s 

sending of the letter asserting ownership over the figurine. We 

disagree, however, that the act was undertaken in connection with a 

commercial activity outside the United States. The connected activity 

was Greece’s enactment and enforcement of patrimony laws that 

declare the figurine to be the property of Greece. The enactment and 

enforcement of such patrimony laws are archetypal sovereign 

activities and therefore do not provide the requisite connection to 

commercial activity that would authorize suit under the FSIA. 

Because the commercial-activity exception was the only 

purported basis for jurisdiction, we reverse and remand with 

instructions to dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND2

I

In 1932, Greece enacted the Antiquities Act, which states that 

“[a]ll antiquities movable or immovable found in Greece and in any 

State land, in rivers, lakes and at the bottom of the sea, and in 

municipal, monasterial and private estates from ancient times 

onwards, are the property of the State.” Diatagma (1932:5351) Περί 

αρχαιοτήτων [On Antiquities], ΕΦΗΜΕΡΊΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΉΣΕΩΣ (ΦΕΚ)

[LEGAL GAZETTE] 1932, Art. 1 (Greece) [hereinafter Antiquities Act].

2 The case was resolved at the threshold motion-to-dismiss stage. The 

district court did not purport to resolve any disputes of fact and relied only 

on the complaint and Greece’s letter to Sotheby’s, which was incorporated 

by reference into the complaint. Barnet v. Ministry of Culture & Sports of the 

Hellenic Republic, 391 F. Supp. 3d 291, 296 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

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The Act further provides that “[w]hoever becomes in any way the 

owner of an antiquity, must within fifteen days of the time it came in 

his/her possession, declare it to the nearest archaeological or police 

authority, or to the Archaeology Department of the Ministry of 

Education and Religious Affairs, while at the same time letting them 

know how he/she obtained this antiquity and, if possible, the place 

where this was found.” Id., Art. 5. 

An owner who fails to make this required declaration within 15 

days but who does so within two months will face a fine. Id., Art. 6. If 

the declaration is made after two months, the fine will increase. Id.

And “[i]f the holder of the antiquity is found after said two month 

period and prior to the declaration, in addition to the [increased] fine 

the confiscation of what was discovered will be done in favor of the 

State Museums.” Id. “Whoever for the purpose of illegally disposing 

of an antiquity fails to declare possession thereof for more than two 

months, they shall be punished by imprisonment for 1 to 6 months 

and a fine of 1000-4000 drachmas.” Id.

In 2002, Greece enacted the On the Protection of Antiquities 

and Cultural Heritage in General Act, which states that “the Greek 

State shall care for the protection of cultural objects originating from 

Greek territory whenever they may have been removed from it” and 

“wherever they are located.” Nomos (2002:3028) Για την προστασία 

των Aρχαιοτή των και εν γέ νει της πολιτιστική ς κληρονομιάς [On 

the Protection of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in General], 

ΕΦΗΜΕΡΊΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΉΣΕΩΣ (ΦΕΚ) [LEGAL GAZETTE] 2002, Art. 1(3) 

(Greece) [hereinafter Cultural Heritage Act]. The 2002 Act further 

provides that “[m]ovable ancient monuments dating up to 1453 

belong to the State in terms of ownership and possession, are 

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imprescriptible and extra commercium.” Id., Art. 21(1).3 The holder of 

such an object “may transfer his possession, after notifying the

[Ministry of Culture] of his intention and the personal data of the 

candidate holder, who shall submit an application for a permit of 

possession,” but “[a]ny transfer effected without this permit shall be 

null and void and the movable monuments shall be taken without 

formalities by the State.” Id., Art. 28(1). 

The 2002 Act also authorizes criminal penalties: “Any person 

who transfers the ownership or the possession of a monument or 

acquires ownership or possession of a monument without the permit, 

authorization or notification, required by law, shall be punished by a 

term of imprisonment not exceeding two (2) years. An imprisonment 

of at least two (2) years shall be imposed in case of an ancient 

monument that has not been lawfully declared.” Id., Art. 59.

II

The bronze horse figurine at the center of this case is “of 

Corinthian type, 14 cm tall, [and] from the Geometric Period.” Compl. 

¶ 1. It was sold at a public auction in Switzerland in 1967. Thereafter, 

the figurine was acquired by antiquities dealer Robin Symes, who 

then sold it to Howard and Saretta Barnet in 1973.4 Howard Barnet 

passed away in 1992, and in 2012 the figurine was transferred to the 

3 The term “ancient monuments” is defined as “all cultural objects dating 

back to prehistoric, ancient, Byzantine and post-Byzantine times up to 

1830.” Cultural Heritage Act, Art. 2(b)(i).

4 Decades later, Symes was suspected of selling stolen items. Greece 

confiscated “the Symes-Michailides photo archive” recording items that 

were in his possession. J. App’x 133.

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2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Trust. Saretta Barnet passed away in 

2017, and the Trust consigned the figurine for auction at Sotheby’s. 

Sotheby’s planned to auction the figurine on May 14, 2018, in 

New York City. On April 25, 2018, Sotheby’s published an auction 

catalogue online that included the figurine as “Lot 4, Greek Figure of 

a Horse of Corinthian type, of stylized attenuated form standing on 

an openwork rectangular base, with crested mane with fine notches 

at the edge, cylindrical muzzle nearly encircled by grooved markings, 

long striated ears, and fragmentary tail, Bronze, Height 5 1/2 in (14 

cm), Geometric Period, circa 8th Century BC, Greek,” with an 

estimated auction price of $150,000 to $250,000. Id. ¶ 33.

On May 11, 2018, the Friday prior to the Monday auction date, 

the Greek Ministry of Culture emailed a letter to Sotheby’s marked 

“URGENT.” The letter made the following points:

• Greece “has become aware of your intention to auction, 

among other items, a bronze figurine of a horse, dated in 

the end of the Geometric era, in a session that will take 

place in New York in 14/05/2018.” J. App’x 133.

• “[T]hree photos of this specific figurine are included in 

the Symes-Michailides photo archive,” and the “specific 

figurine, which you intend to auction, is of Greek origin.” 

Id.

• “There are no records in the archives of our Service (i.e.

an export permit from Greece) to prove that this figurine 

has left the country in a legal way.” Id.

• “The Greek National Law 5351/1932 on Antiquities and 

the one following it, Law 3028/2002, on the Protection of 

Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in General state that 

all movable ancient monuments belong to the State in 

terms of ownership and possession, are imprescriptible 

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and extra commercium. Additionally, according to the 

Greek Criminal Law (Act 3028/2002, article 55) the illegal 

acquisition and trading of cultural property of great 

value ... constitutes a serious criminal offence, 

irrespective of where it takes place.” J. App’x 133. 

• Greece’s “national legislation is fully in compliance with 

the relevant international Treaties including the 

UNSECO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 

Preventing the illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 

Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris 1970.” Id.

• “In addition we would like to inform you that there is 

also in force a Memorandum of Understanding between 

the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the 

Government of the United States of America concerning 

the imposition of import restrictions on categories of 

Archaeological and Byzantine Ecclesiastical, 

Ethnological material through the 15th century A.D. of 

the Hellenic Republic.” Id.

• “For all above reasons and reserving all our rights, WE 

ASK YOU TO: - immediately withdraw the ancient 

Greek figurine of the list from the items to be auctioned 

on 14/05/2018[;] refrain, from today on, from any activity 

related to any type of delivery of the figurine to any third 

party[; and] contact us immediately in order to confirm 

your intention to conform to the above and subsequently 

cooperate for the repatriation of the coin [sic] and its 

return to the Greek state.” Id. at 133-34.

• “In any case, Greece reserves the right to take the 

necessary legal action in the competent courts in order to 

repatriate the coin [sic].” Id. at 134. 

After receiving the letter, Sotheby’s withdrew the figurine from 

its auction and responded to Greece in writing, disputing Greece’s 

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claim to ownership but inviting Greece to provide any evidence in 

support of its claim. Greece did not respond.

On June 5, 2018, Sotheby’s and the trustees of the Trust sued 

Greece in the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs seek no 

damages or injunctive relief. The sole count for relief is for a 

“Declaration of Ownership.” 

Greece filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing 

that Greece was immune from suit by reason of sovereign immunity 

and that Plaintiffs had not satisfied any FSIA exception. On June 21, 

2019, the district court denied that motion, concluding that Greece’s 

act of sending the letter was commercial, that it had a direct effect in 

the United States, and therefore that the commercial-activity 

exception of the FSIA applied. Barnet, 391 F. Supp. 3d 291. In the 

district court’s view, the core act challenged in the suit was Greece’s 

sending of the letter to Sotheby’s in May 2018; because private parties 

send letters claiming ownership of historical artifacts up for auction, 

the act was not uniquely sovereign and therefore was commercial. Id.

at 299-300.

Greece filed an interlocutory appeal of that order, and the 

district court has stayed proceedings pending appeal.5

5 “Our jurisdiction over the district court’s FSIA ruling is premised on the 

collateral order doctrine, which ‘allows an immediate appeal from an order 

denying immunity under the FSIA.’” Petersen Energia Inversora S.A.U. v. 

Argentine Republic & YPF S.A., 895 F.3d 194, 203 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2007)). Because the 

decision under review was made on a motion to dismiss and did not 

purport to decide any dispute of fact, the determination of whether 

Plaintiffs carried their burden under the commercial-activity exception is a 

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DISCUSSION

I

“The FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction 

over a foreign state in the courts of this country. The Act states that a 

‘foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of 

the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 

to 1607.’” Petersen, 895 F.3d at 204 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Sovereign immunity from suit is the default rule, 

subject only to specific exceptions.

The parties agree that the only exception at issue in this case is 

the “commercial-activity exception,” which contains three separate 

clauses: 

A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 

of courts of the United States ... in any case ... in which 

the action is based [1] upon a commercial activity carried 

on in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon 

an act performed in the United States in connection with 

a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or 

[3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States 

in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign 

state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the 

United States[.]

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 

Plaintiffs focus on clause 3, also known as the “direct-effect 

clause,” and accordingly our analysis is limited to that provision. To 

satisfy the clause, the suit must be “(1) based upon an act outside the 

legal matter reviewed de novo. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 

1016-17 (2d Cir. 1991).

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territory of the United States; (2) that was taken in connection with a 

commercial activity of [Greece] outside this country; and (3) that 

caused a direct effect in the United States.” Republic of Argentina v. 

Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992) (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted).

For the first element, “we must identify the act of the foreign 

sovereign State that serves as the basis for plaintiffs’ claims.” Petersen, 

895 F.3d at 204. We look at the “core” of Plaintiffs’ suit: the particular 

acts for which relief is sought. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. 

Ct. 390, 396 (2015).

For the second element, we identify the “activity” in connection 

with which the core act was taken, then ask whether that activity was 

an exercise of “‘only those powers that can also be exercised by 

private citizens,’ as distinct from those ‘powers peculiar to 

sovereigns.’” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993) (quoting 

Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614). “The commercial character of an activity 

shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct 

or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 

purpose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).

The third element is satisfied if an effect “simply follow[ed] as 

an immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity.” Atlantica 

Holdings v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC, 813 F.3d 98, 108 

(2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The 

effect “need not be ‘substantial’ or ‘foreseeable.’” Id.

II

We first must identify Greece’s predicate “act” that “serves as 

the basis for plaintiffs’ claims.” Petersen, 895 F.3d at 204. We look for

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the “core” action taken by Greece outside the United States for which 

relief is sought, OBB, 136 S. Ct. at 396, as defined by the “elements of 

[the] claim that, if proven, would entitle [Plaintiffs] to relief under 

[their] theory of the case,” Nelson, 507 U.S. at 357.

The district court correctly concluded that “sending the 

Demand Letter” from Greece to Sotheby’s in May 2018 was the 

predicate act. Barnet, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 298, 299. The letter “assert[ed]

an ownership interest in the Bronze Horse when demanding that 

Sotheby’s withdraw the figure from the auction.” Id. at 299. The 

complaint confirms that sending the letter claiming ownership was

the “core” act that Plaintiffs challenge. OBB, 136 S. Ct. at 396.

Having identified the core predicate act—sending a letter 

asserting ownership of the figurine—we next determine whether that

act was taken “in connection with a commercial activity” by Greece 

outside the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). It was not. 

The district court analyzed whether sending a letter claiming 

ownership was an act that a private party may typically undertake in 

the marketplace and, concluding that it was, the court found that act 

to be commercial and therefore not sovereign. 6 The error in this 

analysis was treating Greece’s act of sending the letter as both the 

predicate “act” and the related “commercial activity” required by 

§ 1605(a)(2). The direct-effect clause applies when a suit seeks relief 

for an “act” that a foreign state undertakes “in connection with a 

commercial activity,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), and a single act cannot be 

6 See Barnet, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 299 (“Plaintiffs argue that the relevant 

conduct, the act of sending the Demand Letter, was a commercial activity, 

while Defendants assert that the act was purely sovereign in nature. The 

Court agrees with Plaintiffs.”) (internal citations omitted).

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undertaken in connection with itself. If the letter were properly 

considered to be both the act and the commercial activity—that is, if 

Plaintiffs were seeking relief for a single, self-contained commercial 

activity—it would suggest that Plaintiffs should proceed under the 

first clause of the commercial activity exception, which authorizes 

suits “based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United 

States by the foreign state,” rather than the direct-effect clause, which 

requires both an act and a commercial activity to which the act is 

connected. Id.; see also Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 

166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

But we think the parties have properly focused on the directeffect clause because the letter was not a single, self-contained 

activity. In their suit, Plaintiffs do not challenge the mere sending of 

the letter but the claim of ownership over the figurine that the letter 

expresses. It is apparent that Greece undertook the act of sending the 

letter in connection with its claim of ownership over the figurine 

pursuant to its patrimony laws. 7 Identifying the activity in 

connection with which the letter was sent, as the statute requires, 

reveals its sovereign nature: Greece has claimed ownership over the 

figurine by adopting legislation that nationalizes historical artifacts 

and by enforcing those patrimony laws.

In its letter to Sotheby’s, Greece expressly invoked the “Greek 

National Law 5351/1932 on Antiquities and the one following it, Law 

7 At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiffs acknowledged that the letter was 

sent in connection with Greece’s claim of ownership. Oral Argument Audio 

Recording at 22:08-22:21 (“[T]he act ... is the sending of the letter under the 

statute. The commercial activity elsewhere is Greece’s assertion of its 

ownership—purported ownership—of this property, which also happened 

elsewhere.”).

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3028/2002, on the Protection of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in 

General,” which “state that all movable ancient monuments belong to 

the State in terms of ownership and possession, are imprescriptible 

and extra commercium.” J. App’x 133. Those laws declare artifacts such 

as the figurine to be the property of Greece. See Cultural Heritage Act, 

Art. 21(1) (declaring that “[m]ovable ancient monuments ... belong to 

the State in terms of ownership and possession”); Antiquities Act,Art. 

1 (declaring that “[a]ll antiquities movable or immovable found in 

Greece ... are the property of the State”). Those laws also regulate the 

export of artifacts such as the figurine and impose criminal liability in 

certain circumstances, as Greece noted in its letter.

Nationalizing property is a distinctly sovereign act. See Nelson, 

507 U.S. at 362 (“[L]egislation ... can be performed only by the state 

acting as such.”); Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 

2006) (“Expropriation is a decidedly sovereign—rather than

commercial—activity.”); Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 

705 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that “the nationalization 

of [property] ... is a quintessential Government act”); see also Petersen, 

895 F.3d at 201 (“[A] sovereign’s power of expropriation ... can be 

vast.”). Just as nationalization or expropriation of property is 

considered a sovereign activity rather than a commercial “claim of 

ownership” by the foreign state, so too here Greece is acting in a 

sovereign capacity by enforcing laws that regulate ownership and 

export of nationalized artifacts. A “foreign state’s exercise of the 

power of its police has long been understood ... as peculiarly 

sovereign in nature,” Nelson, 507 U.S. at 361, as has “the sovereign’s 

right to regulate its exports” through a permitting process, Honduras 

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Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Honduras, 129 F.3d 543, 549 (11th Cir. 

1997).8

The FSIA directs that the commercial or sovereign character of 

an activity be determined by reference to the “nature” of the activity 

rather than its “purpose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). Here, the “outward 

form” of Greece’s “activity” was the enactment and enforcement of 

laws declaring the figurine to be state property. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 

617. Its insistence on recognition of and obedience to its patrimony 

laws are not “the type of actions by which a private party engages in 

‘trade and traffic or commerce,’” nor is that activity “analogous to a

private commercial transaction.” Id. at 614, 616. Plaintiffs contend that 

because Greece has not physically seized the figurine it has not 

undertaken the sovereign acts of nationalization or law enforcement.9

But we think that adopting its patrimony laws and insisting on 

compliance with those laws is enough to establish that its activity was 

sovereign rather than commercial. The FSIA does not require a 

foreign state to invade the United States and to seize disputed 

property in order to maintain its immunity from suit. Even though a 

private party might be able to send a letter disputing ownership of an 

object, no private party could nationalize historical artifacts and 

regulate the export and ownership of those nationalized artifacts—

and that is the activity in connection with which Greece sent its letter.

8 At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiffs acknowledged that “only a 

foreign state can make an ownership claim to allegedly stolen property 

pursuant to a patrimony law.” Oral Argument Audio Recording at 25:20 to 

25:26.

9 See Oral Argument Audio Recording at 29:33 to 29:37 (“That might be a 

sovereign act if they actually go out and grab it. But that’s not what they 

did here.”).

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In Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Management v. P.T. Jamsostek, 600 

F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2010), we explained that even though a state-owned 

health insurer provided services that resembled those of a private 

insurer, it was important to recognize that it did so “as the default 

health insurer under Indonesia’s national social security program.” 

Id. at 177. Because it acted within that legal framework, its activities 

did “not equate to those of an independent actor in the private 

marketplace of potential health insurers” but were “sovereign in 

nature” and outside “the ‘commercial activity’ exception to the FSIA.” 

Id. at 178. Here, too, we think that Greece is not buying or selling 

historical artifacts “in any traditional sense” and “does not otherwise 

compete in the marketplace like a private” antiquities dealer. Id. at 

177. Rather, it is seeking to enforce a scheme of patrimony laws 

according to which artifacts such as the figurine are “extra 

commercium.” To “hold otherwise and look only to the fact of [a mere 

claim of ownership] for purposes of our ‘commercial activity’ analysis 

would allow the exception to swallow the rule of presumptive 

sovereign immunity codified in the FSIA.” Id. at 178.

Our conclusion finds additional support in the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 94 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1996). In that 

case, the Philippines had frozen, seized, or sold various assets around 

the world to repatriate money that had allegedly been stolen by the 

Philippines’ former president. The Ninth Circuit held that the 

Philippines was “acting under a statutory mandate to recover 

property allegedly stolen from the treasury,” which was an “exercise 

of police power [that] is a governmental rather than commercial 

activity.” Id. at 546. Likewise here, we think it misses the nature of 

Greece’s activity to ignore the scheme of patrimony laws that governs 

it. That would be like saying that the Philippines was merely claiming 

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ownership and selling property, as any private party might do. 

Although the district court was correct that merely claiming 

ownership or encouraging cultural heritage are not uniquely 

sovereign activities, Barnet, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 300, the district court 

did not appreciate that Greece’s act of sending its letter was connected 

to the sovereign activity of claiming ownership through 

nationalization and enforcement of patrimony laws.

Plaintiffs contend in response that the patrimony laws may not 

even apply to this particular figurine because it is unclear whether it 

left Greece before the patrimony laws went into effect or because the 

laws may be unenforceable here because of due process concerns 

about applying Greek law to property in the United States. 10 But

these arguments confirm that the issue in this case—ownership of the 

figurine—is inextricably bound up with sovereign activity. Litigation 

of Plaintiffs’ claims would require the district court to evaluate the 

validity, scope, and application of Greece’s patrimony laws—putting 

at issue precisely those sorts of sovereign acts for which Greece enjoys 

sovereign immunity. “[P]ermitting the cause of action here would 

appear to undermine the immunity Congress intended to confer on 

[Greece] under the FSIA.” Garb, 440 F.3d at 589-90.11

10 See, e.g., Oral Argument Audio Recording at 30:00 to 30:06 (“The whole 

thesis of our complaint is that [the figurine] doesn’t fall within the law

because there’s no proof that it was stolen.”); id. at 32:59-33:13 (“There are 

potential defenses as a matter of due process. If the Patrimony Law hasn’t 

actually been communicated or actually enforced, there is a vein of caselaw 

to that effect, under U.S. caselaw, that I think might be applicable.”).

11 In briefing to this Court, Plaintiffs suggest that if the figurine were 

recovered, perhaps Greece would use it in connection with commercial 

exhibits in Greece, and that might provide a connection between the letter 

and a commercial activity. The complaint contains no allegation of such a 

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18

CONCLUSION

Greece’s act of sending the letter was not in connection with a 

commercial activity outside of the United States. Because the directeffect clause of the commercial-activity exception in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605(a)(2) is not satisfied, the district court erred in concluding that 

it had jurisdiction. We therefore do not address Greece’s remaining 

arguments on appeal, and we REVERSE the district court’s decision 

and REMAND with instructions to dismiss this action for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction.

future use, but even if it did, the outcome would not change. Sovereigns do 

not lose immunity because parties can imagine potential commercial 

activities downstream from the sovereign activity. See Garb, 440 F.3d at 587 

(“Concededly, the expropriation of property ... is, in some sense, 

‘connected’ to any subsequent commercial treatment of that property or its 

proceeds. ... Such a connection, however, is simply too ‘attenuated,’ and 

not substantive enough, to satisfy § 1605(a)(2).”); see also Chettri v. Nepal 

Rastra Bank, 834 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[A] plaintiff must cite more than 

tangential commercial activities to which the ‘acts’ forming the basis of the 

claim have only an attenuated connection.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

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