Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01937/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01937-26/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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28 1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RICHARD LYTEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

JANET SIMPSON, 

Defendant.

___________________________________

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

___________________________________

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Case No.: C 05-1937 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF/COUNTERDEFENDANT LYTEL’S MOTION

FOR MENTAL EXAMINATION OF

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-CLAIMANT

SIMPSON

On July 18, 2006, the parties appeared before Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull for

hearing on Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Lytel’s (“Lytel”) motion for mental examination of

Defendant/Counter-Claimant Simpson (“Simpson”).1 Based on the briefs and arguments presented,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lytel’s motion for an order permitting the mental

examination is GRANTED. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2000, dismissed Counter-Defendant Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”) employed

Simpson as a Strategic Sales Development Representative in Dallas, Texas. In August 2003, Sun

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28 2 As used herein, IIED refers to both Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress. 

ORDER, page 2

employed Lytel as the Vice President of the Advanced System Development Center (“ASD”) in

Menlo Park, California. As Vice President, Lytel was responsible for three research and

development projects, including the Life Sciences project. Lytel and Simpson met during one of

Simpson’s business trips to the Menlo Park office in July 2003. Simpson and Lytel discussed the

possibility of Simpson joining Lytel’s Life Sciences project. After obtaining permission to create the

position, Lytel offered Simpson a Program Manager position on the Life Sciences Project. Simpson

accepted the position and formally became Lytel’s subordinate on September 19, 2003. Simpson

continued to work out of Dallas but traveled to Menlo Park and other locations as needed. 

Simpson alleges that between August 2003 and May 2004, Lytel subjected her to sexual

harassment. Simpson filed a complaint with Sun’s Human Resources Department, alleging that

Lytel engaged in sexual harassment and retaliatory behavior. The Human Resources Department

found that Lytel had engaged in inappropriate conduct. In April 2005, Simpson filed a claim with

the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing against Lytel and Sun alleging sexual

harassment and retaliation.

On May 10, 2005, Lytel commenced the instant action against Simpson. In his complaint,

Lytel alleges that Simpson falsely accused him of sexual harassment. He seeks relief for two claims

of Defamation, Intentional Interference of Prospective Economic Advantage, and Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)2. Simpson responded with ten counterclaims against Lytel

and Sun, including a claim of IIED stemming from the alleged sexual harassment and retaliatory

behavior by Lytel. On May 8, 2006, the District Court granted Lytel partial summary judgment with

respect to Simpson’s retaliation claim. On May 22, 2006, Simpson dismissed all of her claims

against Sun.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO ORDER MENTAL EXAMINATION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a) (“Rule 35(a)”) permits a court to compel a party to

submit to a mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner when that party’s mental

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ORDER, page 3

condition is in controversy. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown, and

notice to the person to be examined and all parties, specifying time, place, manner, conditions, and

scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a). 

The Supreme Court held that evaluating a Rule 35(a) motion “requires discriminating application by

the trial judge, who must decide, as an initial matter in every case, whether the party requesting a

mental...examination...has adequately demonstrated the existence of the Rule’s requirements of ‘in

controversy’ and ‘good cause.’” Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118-119 (1964).

 B. POLICY CONCERNS AND RULE 35(a)

Generally, “the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.” 

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). The Hickman Court found that a policy favoring

liberal discovery facilitates proper litigation. Id. This policy is evidenced by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(b)(1) (“Rule 26(b)(1)”), which states that parties may obtain discovery of any matter,

not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party. 

In Schlagenhauf, the Supreme Court contrasted the lowered relevance standard of Rule

26(b)(1) with the standard prescribed by the text of Rule 35(a). See Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 117. 

The Schlagenhauf Court observed that in addition to relevance, Rule 35(a) required that before a

court may order a mental or physical examination, the matter be “in controversy”and the moving

party demonstrate “good cause.” Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that these two requirements

demonstrated a heightened standard that could not be met merely by the relevancy standard of Rule

26(b)(1). Id. at 118. Finally, the court concluded that the express limitations in Rule 35(a) were

designed to guard against “sweeping examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue

his own mental or physical condition,” and “to hold otherwise would mean that such examinations

could be ordered routinely.” Id. at 121-122.

C. THE “IN CONTROVERSY” REQUIREMENT OF RULE 35(a)

As previously stated, courts must determine whether the moving party affirmatively

demonstrates that the other party’s mental condition “is really and genuinely in controversy.”

Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118. The District Court in Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.

Cal. 1995), conducted an extensive analysis of case law to determine whether a party’s claim of

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ORDER, page 4

“emotional distress” is sufficient to place that party’s mental state in controversy. The Turner Court

found that courts will order a mental examination where, in addition to emotional distress, cases

involve one or more of the following: 1) a cause of action of IIED; 2) an allegation of a specific

mental or psychiatric injury or disorder; 3) a claim of unusually severe emotional distress; 

4) plaintiff’s offer of expert testimony to support a claim of emotional distress; and/or 5) plaintiff’s

concession that her mental condition is “in controversy” within the meaning of Rule 35(a). Id. at 95. 

In Turner, the court found that the weight of authority suggested that “garden-variety” emotional

distress alone is not sufficient to place a party’s mental state in controversy. Id. at 97. The court in

Turner explained that Rule 35(a) was not meant to be applied in so broad a fashion as to allow courts

to order a mental examination whenever a plaintiff claimed emotional distress. Id. at 97. Courts

evaluating a Rule 35(a) motion also consider whether a party has alleged some type of ongoing

mental injury. See, e.g., Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F.Supp. 216, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)

(ongoing severe mental injury); Duncan v. Upjohn, 155 F.R.D. 23, 25 (D.Conn. 1994) (ongoing

psychiatric harm); Hodges v. Keane, 145 F.R.D. 332, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (ongoing mental illness).

III. DISCUSSION

A. SIMPSON’S MENTAL STATE IS “IN CONTROVERSY”

Lytel argues that a mental examination of Simpson is warranted in this case. He contends

that Simpson’s claims of ongoing distress, coupled with conflicts from the written record regarding

hospitalization and why she was prescribed antidepressants require such an examination.

In opposing this motion, Simpson argues that Lytel fails to meet the standards of a Rule 35(a)

motion. Simpson contends that Lytel does not meet the burden of the “in controversy” requirement,

as she is claiming only garden-variety distress. Moreover, Simpson argues that she will abandon any

claim for ongoing distress. She further contends that she does not intend to retain or designate an

expert to examine her or testify about mental condition.

Lytel argues that he has sufficiently met the standards for a Rule 35(a) motion. Lytel argues

that Simpson has placed her mental state in controversy, as she is alleging a separate cause of action

for IIED. He further contends that, contrary to Simpson’s position, she is alleging ongoing distress

based on her First Amended Counterclaim (“FAC”) and deposition testimony from her treating

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3 One rationale for denying requests for examinations where there is no ongoing emotional

distress is that there is no current condition for the examiner to observe. When all of the distress is truly

in the past, there is little to be gained from an examination that cannot be obtained from the individual’s

past medical records and a deposition of the doctors who treated the individual at the time. On the other

hand, where there is in fact continuing distress and only a strategic decision by an individual to place

a temporal limit on her claim of damages for such distress, the distress still exists and observation of the

individual by a medical examiner does provide a level of information that is not available from prior

medical records and the deposition testimony from the treating physician.

4 An electronic copy of which Simpson again filed in the public record just yesterday, 

July 20, 2006.

ORDER, page 5

physician.

 A party’s separate claim of IIED, in and of itself, sufficiently places that party’s mental

condition “in controversy” so as to warrant a Rule 35 examination. See Turner, 161 F.R.D. at 95;

Gattegno v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, 204 F.R.D. 228, (D. Conn. 2001). Thus, the

examination is warranted based solely on Simpson’s allegation of an IIED cause of action.

In addition, the record indicates Simpson has ongoing severe distress.3 Simpson’s FAC4,

dated June 30, 2006, alleges that Lytel’s conduct caused her to suffer “severe emotional and physical

distress,” and that she “suffered and continues to suffer” emotional distress. Recent deposition

testimony from Simpson’s treating physician indicates that she continues to suffer from depression,

as she has recently obtained a refill for her antidepressant medication. 

The instant case is similar to Gattegno. In that case, the defendant sought an order to compel

a mental examination of the plaintiff who alleged ongoing mental injury as a component of her

Discrimination and Retaliation claims and a separate cause of action for IIED. Gattengo, 204 F.R.D.

at 229. The plaintiff opposed the motion on the grounds that she asserts only “garden-variety”

distress and did not allege severe distress. Id. In an attempt to show that her mental state was not in

controversy, the plaintiff argued that she did not intend to support her emotional claims with medical

records or testimony of treating physicians or experts. Id. at 232. The Gattengo court found that the

plaintiff had adequately placed her mental condition in controversy by alleging a separate and

independent cause of action for IIED. Id. at 231. The court further found that the plaintiff’s

allegations of ongoing distress, based on claims in her complaint and her discovery responses, were

enough to place her mental condition in controversy. Id. at 232.

Turning to the present case, the court finds that Simpson has placed her mental state “in

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5

It is conceivable that an instance may arise where a plaintiff has a claim for genuinely past

IIED, under circumstances where a mental examination would not be warranted. Since this is not such

a case, it is unnecessary to reach that issue.

6 Nothing herein precludes Simpson from moving to exclude the information from the

mental examination at trial.

ORDER, page 6

controversy” within the meaning of Rule 35(a). While Simpson argues that she is abandoning her

claim for ongoing distress, the record indicates she is still actually experiencing distress. To the

extent that Simpson seeks to take her mental condition “out of controversy” by forgoing any claims

of ongoing distress and forgoing expert testimony, Simpson’s mental state is nonetheless “in

controversy” as that term is used in Rule 35(a), because she has a cause of action for IIED.5 See

Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1995). None of the cases cited by Simpson

in support of her opposition to the mental examination include a separate tort claim for IIED. Thus,

those cases are distinguishable.

B. GOOD CAUSE EXISTS TO PERMIT A MENTAL EXAMINATION

Having found that Simpson’s mental state is “in controversy,” this court accordingly finds

that Lytel has adequately demonstrated “good cause” to order the examination. Lytel claims that

there are conflicts between the written record and physician testimony regarding the reason for

Simpson’s need for antidepressants. As such, Lytel argues that a mental examination is necessary to

evaluate Simpson. The court agrees. Moreover, denying this motion would deprive Lytel of a fair

opportunity to defend against Simpson’s claims of emotional distress in the event Simpson is later

allowed to submit her treating physician’s testimony, such as in rebuttal.

The Schlagenhauf Court instructed, “What may be good cause for one type of examination

may not be so for another.” Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118 (1964). While mindful of

the intrusive nature of a mental examination, the court finds Lytel has made a satisfactory showing of

good cause to order the mental examination under the principles articulated in Schlagenhauf.

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D. THE EXAMINATION

Dr. James R. Missett will conduct the examination on Tuesday, August 1, 2006, beginning at

9:00 a.m. Dr. Missett will carry out the examination at his office located at 1187 University Drive,

Menlo Park, California, 94025. Lytel failed to propose what specific psychological tests would be

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ORDER, page 7

administered by Dr. Berg, thus depriving Simpson of an opportunity to challenge them and depriving

the court of any ability to determine the necessity for the tests. As such, no psychological tests will

be ordered. The scope of the examination is limited to assessing the nature, cause and extent of

Simpson’s emotional distress. Both Simpson and Dr. Missett may audiotape the examination. With

respect to expenses, Lytel is responsible for Simpson’s reasonable lodging costs associated with

attending the mental examination. 

Dated: 7/21/06

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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