Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-55048/USCOURTS-ca9-08-55048-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NORTH COUNTY COMMUNICATIONS 

CORP.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA CATALOG &

TECHNOLOGY, d/b/a CTT

Telecomms (OCN 573B),

Defendant,

TGEC COMMUNICATIONS CO. LLC,

CA (OCN 5969); UNITED STATES

CELLULAR CORP-CALIFORNIA, (OCN

6261); GTE MOBILNET OF TAMPA, No. 08-55048

INC., (OCN 6339); ARCH WIRELESS D.C. No. HOLDINGS, INC., (OCN 6630); EL  CV-06-01542-LAB DORADO CELLULAR, d/b/a Mountain

Cellular (OCN 6980); BROOKS OPINION

FIBER PROPERTIES, INC., (OCN

7219); THE OTHER PHONE

COMPANY, INC., (OCN 7452);

CHARTER FIBERLINK CA-CCO LC,

(OCN 776C); FIRSTWORLD SO. CA,

(OCN 7839); A+ WIRELESS INC.,

d/b/a Advantage Wireless-CA

(OCN 822A); MPOWER

COMMUNICATIONS CORP-CA, (OCN

8322); CHOICE TELECOMM, LLC-CA

(OCN 885B); TRANS NATIONAL

COMMUNICATIONS INTL, INC.-CA 

2419

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(OCN 864C); COMMPARTNERS, 

LLC-CA (OCN 869C); ALLEGIANCE

TELECOM, INC.-CA (OCN 8782;

ONESTAR COMMUNICATIONS, LLCMD (OCN 9992); INTEGRATED

COMMUNICATIONS CONSULTANTS,

INC.-CA (OCN 9397); NTCHCALIFORNIA, INC. (OCN 9607);

TELEMEX INTERNATIONAL-CA (OCN

998B); BAY AREA CELLULAR

TELEPHONE; PACIFIC CENTREX

SERVICES, INC.-CA (OCN 3662);

BULLSEYE TELECOM, INC.-CA (OCN

069A); COMM SOUTH COMPANIES,

INC.-CA (OCN 4 00A); ARRIVAL

COMMUNICATIONS, INC.-CA (4553);  BLUE CASA COMMUNICATIONS LLCCA (OCN 111B); COMCAST

PHONE OF CALIFORNIA LLC-CA

(OCN 7610); COMMUNICATIONS

EXPRESS INC., d/b/a Com Express;

ECI COMMS INC., d/b/a ITS

Network Services-CA (OCN

3630); ERNEST COMMUNICATIONS,

INC.-CA (OCN 4961); EXCEL

TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.-CA

(OCN 243A); EXPRESS TELEPHONE

SERVICES, INC.-CA (OCN 093A);

GLOBAL NAPS CALIFORNIA, INC.-CA

(OCN 5300); IN TOUCH

COMMUNICATIONS, INC.-CA (OCN

047B); 

2420 NORTH COUNTY COMM. v. CELLCO.

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LIGHTYEAR NETWORK SOLUTIONS, 

LLC-CA (OCN 5370); MCGRAW

COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (OCN

5597); METROPOLITAN TELECOMMS

CALIFORNIA, D/B/A Mettel-CA

(OCN 180A); PNG TELECOMMS

d/b/a Powernet Global Comms CA

(OCN 240B); POINTE

COMMUNICATIONS CORP-CA (OCN

2595); PREFERRED CARRIER

SERVICES, INC., d/b/a Phones For

All (OCN 5428); TELEPHONE

SERVICE INCORPORATED, d/b/a

FRIENDLYLEC CA (OCN 2015);

VCOM SOLUTIONS, INC.-CA (OCN

334B); WHOLESALE AIR-TIME, INC.-

CA (OCN 199B); LEAP WIRELESS

INTL, INC. d/b/a Cricket Comm, 

Inc. (OCN 0822); BLUE LICENSES

HOLDING LLC, (OCN 6010);

PACIFIC BELL MOBILE SERVICES,

(OCN 6672),

Defendants,

and

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, d/b/a

Verizon Wireless-CA (OCN

6006); CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, d/b/a

Verizon Wireless-NM (OCN

6573); T-MOBILE USA, INC., (OCN

6529); CAL-ONE CELLULAR LP,

(OCN 6604); PHONECO, L.P.-CA,

(OCN 542B); CINGULAR WIRELESS;

CRICKET COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

NORTH COUNTY COMM. v. CELLCO. 2421

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 17, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed February 10, 2010

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson and N. Randy Smith,

Circuit Judges, and Claudia Wilken,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

*The Honorable Claudia Wilken, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Appellant North County Communications is represented by

Joseph G. Dicks (argued) and Christopher J. Reichman, Dicks

& Workman, San Diego, California.

Appellee Cal-One Cellular L.P. and Cellco Partnership are

represented by John Hueston and Laura W. Brill (argued),

Irell & Manella, Los Angeles, California.

Appellees T-Mobile USA, Cingular Wireless, and Cricket

Communications, Inc. are represented by Martin L. Fineman,

Suzanne K. Toller, and Gregory J. Kopta (argued), Davis

Wright Tremaine LLP, San Francisco, California. 

Appellee PhoneCo, L.P. is represented by Alan E. Greenberg

and Kelly A. Van Nort, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman

& Dicker LLP, San Diego, California.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

The dispute in this telecommunications case stems from

Appellant North County Communication’s (North County)

contention that it has a private right of action to enforce various compensation arrangements pursuant to the Federal Communications Act. In its complaint, North County, a

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competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC), alleged that

Appellees, as commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) providers, failed to properly compensate North County for terminating their calls on North County’s network. 

North County challenges the district court’s dismissal of its

declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the district court held that North County

had no private right of action to enforce the compensation

arrangements in federal court. On appeal, North County

asserts that 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(5), 201(b), 206 and 207, and

the implementing Federal Communications Commission

(Commission or FCC) regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 20.11, provide

the requisite private right of action. We disagree, and affirm

the district court’s judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

Prior to enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,

the Commission established rules governing connections

between Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) and CMRS providers. These rules required “mutual compensation for the

exchange of traffic between LECs and CMRS providers.” In

The Matter of Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime (T-Mobile Decision), 20 F.C.C.R. 4855, 4856,

¶ 2 (2005) (footnote reference omitted). “In particular, the

rules required the originating carrier, whether LEC or CMRS

provider, to pay reasonable compensation to the terminating

carrier in connection with traffic that terminates on the latter’s

network facilities.” Id. at 4856, ¶ 2 (footnote reference omitted).

The Commission eventually determined that 47 U.S.C.

§ 251(b)(5) “obligates LECs to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the exchange of intraMTA [Major

Trading Area] traffic between LECs and CMRS providers.”

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Id. at 4856, ¶ 3 (footnote reference omitted). For traffic originating and terminating within the same MTA, reciprocal compensation obligations under § 251(b)(5), rather than interstate

or intrastate access charges, applied. See id. at 4856-57, ¶ 3

(footnote references omitted). 

“Although section 251(b)(5) and the Commission’s reciprocal compensation rules reference an arrangement between

LECs and other telecommunications carriers, including

CMRS providers, they do not explicitly address the type of

arrangement necessary to trigger the payment of reciprocal

compensation or the applicable compensation regime, if any,

when carriers exchange traffic without making prior arrangements with each other.” Id. at 4857, ¶ 4 (footnote reference

and internal quotation marks omitted). This lack of guidance

generated a legion of disputes among the carriers, see id. at

4858, ¶ 6, and prompted clarification from the Commission.

As the existing rules did not expressly preclude the filing

of tariffs to set compensation, the Commission clarified that

the reciprocal compensation rules did not, at that time, prohibit incumbent LECs from filing state termination tariffs,

which CMRS providers were obligated to accept. See id. at

4860, ¶ 9. “Because the existing compensation rules [were]

silent as to the type of arrangement necessary to trigger payment obligations, [the Commission found] that it would not

have been unlawful for incumbent LECs to assess transport

and termination charges based upon a state tariff.” Id. at 4860,

¶ 10 (footnote reference omitted). However, the Commission

also “amend[ed] [its] rules to make clear [its] preference for

contractual arrangements by prohibiting LECs from imposing

compensation obligations for non-access CMRS traffic pursuant to tariff.” Id. at ¶ 9 (footnote reference omitted).1

1

“[T]he term ‘non-access traffic’ refers to traffic not subject to the interstate or intrastate access charge regimes, including traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) of the Act [reciprocal compensation arrangements] and ISPbound traffic.” T-Mobile Decision, 20 F.C.C.R. at n.6 (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

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Upon the effective date of the Commission’s amendments,

any “existing wireless termination tariffs [would] no longer

apply.” Id. at 4863, ¶ 14. 

B. The District Court’s Dismissal of North County’s

Third Amended Complaint

According to its third amended complaint, North County

“is a CLEC that provides switched and non-switched local

exchange, exchange access, and other telecommunication services to end users in California.” North County alleged that

the defendant-appellees “are CMRS and CLEC providers that

offer calling plans allowing calls to areas serviced by [North

County].”

North County asserts that it “incurs costs in terminating

calls sent to [its] end users by the Defendants’ end users.”

North County alleged that defendant-appellees “knowingly

send traffic to [North County] in the absence of an interconnection agreement or a reciprocal compensation agreement[2]

for [North County] to terminate to its end users customers. As

a common carrier, [North County] is obligated to terminate

calls received from other carriers to [North County’s] end

users.”

North County alleged that it “began sending monthly bills

to the Defendants for traffic termination in January, 2003,”

and that it “billed the Defendants $ 0.004 per minute and

$0.007 per call set-up, before increasing its rate to the prevailing market rate of $0.011 per minute.” According to North

County, the defendants refused to pay the bills or enter into

a compensation arrangement. 

2North County defined reciprocal compensation as “the payment

arrangement that recovers the costs incurred for the transport and termination of local telecommunication traffic originating on one party’s network

and terminating on the other party’s network.” 

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Relying on the T-Mobile Decision, North County contended that “it is proper for a LEC, like [North County], to be

compensated for traffic sent to its end-users that originates

with CMRS providers pursuant to its tariff on file.” North

County acknowledged that the Commission “limited the scope

of this finding to time periods preceding April 29, 2005, the

effective date of the amendments to 47 C.F.R. section 20.11

promulgated by the T-Mobile Decision.” According to North

County, “CMRS providers still remained obligated to comply

with the principles of mutual compensation and to pay reasonable compensation to the LEC for the termination of traffic

that originates with the CMRS provider.” 

In its first cause of action, North County sought declaratory

judgment, alleging that “it is entitled to be compensated for

the termination of traffic which the Defendants sent and continue to send to [North County’s] end users . . .” North

County recognized that “while determining the precise rate of

compensation for termination of traffic, including call set-up

and minutes of use, under these circumstances may be a matter beyond the expertise of this court and within the expertise

of the appropriate regulatory body, the FCC has also indicated

that ‘collection actions’ do not state a cause of action under

its rules.” North County requested that the district court determine:

(1) the number of calls and the number of minutes

originating on the Defendants’ networks and terminated on [North County’s] network from April 29,

2005 up through the time of trial, (2) that [North

County] is entitled to receive mutual compensation

for the termination of calls to [North County’s] endusers which originate on the Defendants’ networks,

and (3) that the Defendants are required to commit

to compensate [North County] at a rate to be determined by the appropriate regulatory body, or else

refrain from sending any traffic to [North County’s]

end-users and refrain from taxing [North County’s]

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limited resources, (4) that the Defendants’ conduct

amounts to an unjust and unreasonable practice in

violation of section 201 and 202 of the Federal Communications Act (47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202) which has

damaged [North County] (47 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207).

North County’s second cause of action is premised on

quantum meruit. North County alleged that “Defendants

knowingly accepted, used, enjoyed and benefitted from the

services provided by [North County].” According to North

County, “[i]t would be unjust to allow the Defendants to have

the benefit of [North County’s] services without paying reasonable compensation for these benefits and the Defendants

should be so ordered to pay.” North County sought damages

“covering the period beginning April 29, 2005 and continuing

up through the time of trial.” 

In its third cause of action, North County asserted damages

pursuant to the applicable tariff “covering the period beginning 3 years before the filing of this complaint and continuing

up to and including April 28, 2005.” 

The district court granted defendant-appellees’ motion to

dismiss, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction,

because North County failed to properly allege a federal

claim. The district court also concluded that declaratory judgment “would not achieve the objectives of granting such

relief.” North County filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review de novo dismissals under Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6).” Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Holcombe v. Hosner, 477 F.3d 1094,

1097 (9th Cir. 2007)). “For the purposes of reviewing such

dismissals, and where, as here, no evidentiary hearing has

been held, all facts alleged in the complaint are presumed to

be true.” Id. (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277,

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289-90 (1995)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“District court decisions about the propriety of hearing

declaratory relief actions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289-90) (alterations and

internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Although we review the ultimate decision to decline to

exercise jurisdiction for abuse of discretion, we conduct de

novo review of the court’s application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine[.]” Id. at 1162 n.11 (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. North County’s Declaratory Judgment Act Claims

[1] North County’s claims are hampered by the very relief

it seeks — a declaratory judgment. “[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act does not by itself confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction[.]” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d

1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2005). “As required by Article III, courts

may adjudicate only actual cases or controversies.” Rhoades,

504 F.3d at 1157 (citation omitted). “The disagreement underlying the declaratory relief action must not be nebulous or

contingent but must have taken on a fixed and final shape so

that a court can see what legal issues it is deciding, what

effect its decision will have on the adversaries, and some useful purpose to be achieved in deciding them.” Id. (quoting

Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycott Co. Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 244

(1952)) (alteration omitted). 

[2] North County contends that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act

because the Federal Communications Act creates a private

right of action for violations of its compensation requirements. “Where a federal statute does not explicitly create a

private right of action, a plaintiff can maintain a suit only if

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Congress intended to provide the plaintiff with an implied private right of action.” In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.,

549 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000))

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). “Accordingly, the judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has

passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not

just a private right but also a private remedy.” Id. at 1231

(quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001))

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, it is not enough for North County to broadly proclaim that it is entitled to compensation under the Federal

Communications Act. Instead, North County “must demonstrate that a federal statute vests [North County] with such a

right.” Rouse v. United States Dep’t of State, 567 F.3d 408,

418 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (citation omitted) (emphasis

in the original). “Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not.” Id.

(quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 291) (parentheses and footnote reference omitted).

A broad assertion of a private right of action is not easily

maintained under the Federal Communications Act, as our

statutory analysis is intertwined with the requisite deference

to the Commission’s interpretation of the Federal Communications Act. This is so because “the FCC is the agency that

is primarily responsible for the interpretation and implementation of the Telecommunications Act and of its own regulations.” Greene v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 340 F.3d 1047, 1052

(9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Howard v. AOL,

208 F.3d 741, 752 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Congress created the

FCC to enforce the Communications Act. The Supreme

Court’s opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the FCC’s

judgment regarding how the public interest is best served is

entitled to substantial judicial deference.”) (quoting FCC v.

WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981)) (alteration

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and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent a supporting

Commission determination, and with no showing of Congressional intent to create a private right of action, North County

cannot assert a viable claim for relief. See Greene, 340 F.3d

at 1050-51. 

In support of its contention that it has a private right of

action to seek compensation from the CMRS providers in federal court, North County relies on 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b); 47

U.S.C. § 251(b)(5); 47 U.S.C. § 201(b); 47 U.S.C. § 206; and

47 U.S.C. § 207. We examine each of these cited sources to

determine if the referenced statutory or regulatory language

provides for a private right of action or for a private remedy.

We simultaneously consider any relevant determinations from

the Commission. Applying this two-fold analysis and deferring to the Commission’s primary jurisdiction, we conclude

that 47 U.S.C. § 251(b) and 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b) cannot support North County’s claims for declaratory relief. “The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a doctrine specifically applicable

to claims properly cognizable in court that contain some issue

within the special competence of an administrative agency.”

W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 530 F.3d 1186, 1200 (9th

Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“[T]he primary jurisdiction doctrine is designed to protect

agencies possessing quasi-legislative powers and that are

actively involved in the administration of regulatory statutes.”

Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.

2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Charged with the administration of the Telecommunications

and Federal Communications Acts, the FCC is such an agency.” Id. (citation omitted). Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, courts may decline to decide issues that are “within the

special competence of an administrative agency.” Id. at 1114.

Specifically, the Commission’s determinations that 47 U.S.C.

§ 251(b) is inapplicable to CMRS providers, and that the

Commission is the appropriate forum for pursuing compensation under 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b) are fatal to North County’s

contention. We also conclude that North County’s declaratory

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judgment claims premised on 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) are fatally

flawed because the Commission has not determined that the

CMRS providers’ lack of compensation to CLECs violates

§ 201(b). Finally, we hold that, because North County cannot

establish an independent right to compensation, 47 U.S.C.

§ 206 and § 207 are not viable vehicles for it to seek relief.

1. 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b)

47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b) provides:

Local exchange carriers and commercial mobile

radio service providers shall comply with principles

of mutual compensation. (1) A local exchange carrier shall pay reasonable compensation to a commercial mobile radio service provider in connection with

terminating traffic that originates on facilities of the

local exchange carrier. (2) A commercial mobile

radio service provider shall pay reasonable compensation to a local exchange carrier in connection with

terminating traffic that originates on the facilities of

the commercial mobile radio service provider.

[3] Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5), “[e]ach local

exchange carrier has the following duties: . . . The duty to

establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.” 

[4] According to North County, a violation of 47 C.F.R.

§ 20.11(b)’s compensation requirements is the equivalent of

a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) for which it has a federal

remedy. However, nothing in the plain language of

§ 251(b)(5) provides for a right to compensation. Rather,

§ 251(b)(5) provides for the duties of local exchange carriers,

not even mentioning CMRS providers. See 47 U.S.C.

§ 251(b)(5).

[5] Our reading of § 251(b)(5)’s plain language is bolstered by the Commission’s determination that § 251(b) is

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inapplicable to CMRS providers. In North County Commc’ns

Corp. v. MetroPCS California, LLC, 24 F.C.C.R. 3807

(2009), North County alleged that MetroPCS, a CMRS provider, failed to compensate North County for traffic terminated on North County’s network. See id. at 3807-08, ¶¶ 1, 4.

Rejecting North County’s claims made pursuant to § 251, the

Commission held:

Section 251(b)(5) imposes a duty to establish reciprocal compensation only upon LECs. Moreover, the

Commission has stated unequivocally that CMRS

providers will not be classified as LECs and are not

subject to the obligations of section 251(b). Therefore, as a CMRS provider, MetroPCS is not subject

to the obligations arising directly from section

251(b) itself . . .

MetroPCS, 24 F.C.C.R. at 3814-15, ¶ 16 (footnote references

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

[6] The Commission also delineated the procedures that a

private party must undertake in pursuit of reasonable compensation under 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b). The Commission “decline[d] to determine, in the first instance, what constitutes

reasonable compensation” under 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b). Id. at

3810, ¶ 9 (footnote reference and internal quotation marks

omitted). The Commission expounded that “the more appropriate venue for determining what constitutes reasonable compensation for North County’s termination of intrastate traffic

originated by MetroPCS is not this Commission, but rather

the California PUC, via whatever procedural mechanism it

deems appropriate under state law (e.g., complaint proceeding, declaratory ruling proceeding, generic cost or rulemaking

proceeding).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).3,4 The

3The full FCC upheld the enforcement bureau’s determination that “the

California PUC is the more appropriate forum for determining the reasonable compensation rate for North County’s termination of intrastate,

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Commission explained that it would consider North County’s

claims once a determination of the rate of reasonable compensation was made by the appropriate state commission. Id. The

Commission’s ruling demonstrates that it is the proper forum

for North County’s claims premised on 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b),

once North County has met the predicate procedural requirements.5

[7] We readily defer to the Commission’s resolution of

North County’s claims asserted pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 251,

and its determination of the procedures applicable to claims

made under 47 C.F.R. § 20.11(b). See Fones4All Corp. v.

F.C.C., 550 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are interpreting the FCC’s regulations, and courts should give

substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of

its own regulations.”) (citation and internal quotation marks

intraMTA traffic originated by MetroPCS.” North County Commc’ns

Corp. v. MetroPCS California, LLC, No. EB-06-MD-007, FCC 09-100,

2009 WL 4005067, at *3, ¶ 12 (F.C.C. November 19, 2009). The full FCC

also denied “the parties’ Applications for Review regarding the forum

issue primarily by affirming and incorporating by reference the reasoning

and holdings of the Bureau Merits Order.” Id. (footnote reference omitted). 

4The Commission observed that its T-Mobile Decision was consistent

with the conclusion that state commissions should initially determine the

reasonable rate of compensation. See MetroPCS, 24 F.C.C.R. at 3812-13,

¶ 12; see also North County Commc’ns Corp. v. MetroPCS California,

LLC, 2009 WL 4005067, at *4, ¶¶ 13-14. 

5North County’s assertion that the Commission equated a violation of

47 C.F.R. § 20.11 with a violation of the Federal Communications Act is

unfounded. The Commission did not make such a determination. Rather,

it “assume[d], without deciding, that a violation of rule 20.11 would be a

violation of the Act cognizable under section 208 of the Act.” MetroPCS,

24 F.C.C.R. at n.30 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In any event, the

Commission’s determination demonstrates that the Commission, not the

federal courts, should make this decision. 

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omitted).6,7

2. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)

Section 201(b) provides in relevant part: 

All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such communication

service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such

charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is

unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful[.]

[8] It is arguable that the plain language of § 201(b) contains an implication that private parties may pursue remedies

for violations of the statute. However, given the broad language of the statute, a more reasonable interpretation is that

it is within the Commission’s purview to determine whether

a particular practice constitutes a violation for which there is

a private right to compensation. See In re Long Distance Telecomm. Litig., 831 F.2d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 1987), as amended

6North County maintains that CMRS providers are subject to the same

regulations as common carriers under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A) and 47

C.F.R. § 20.15(a). However, these broad statutory and regulatory provisions appear to be limited to CMRS providers’ general obligations under

the Federal Communications Act. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.15(a) (“Commercial

mobile radio services providers, to the extent applicable, must comply

with sections 201, 202, 206, 207, 208, 209, 216, 217, 223, 225, 226, 227,

and 228 of the Communications Act”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A)

(deferring expressly to regulations promulgated by the Commission). The

Commissions’s recent decision regarding CMRS providers supports this

conclusion. See MetroPCS, 24 F.C.C.R. at 3812, ¶ 11 (noting that § 332

does not apply to “intercarrier rates”). 

7North County’s reliance on the T-Mobile Decision to establish a private

right to compensation is also misplaced. In T-Mobile, the Commission

considered a petition seeking “to reaffirm that wireless termination tariffs

are not a proper mechanism for establishing reciprocal compensation

arrangements for the transport and termination of traffic.” 20 F.C.C.R. at

4855, ¶ 1 (footnote reference omitted). The Commission never addressed

violations of 47 C.F.R. § 20.11, nor the remedies for such violations. 

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(“This [charge of unreasonable practices] is a determination

that Congress has placed squarely in the hands of the FCC.”)

(quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Recycling

Indus., Inc., 449 U.S. 609, 612 (1981)) (alteration and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Greene, 340 F.3d at 1049-

50. However, the Commission has not determined that the

CMRS providers’ lack of payment to CLECs like North

County violates § 201(b).8 North County essentially requests

that the federal courts fill in the analytical gap stemming from

the absence of a Commission determination regarding

§ 201(b). This we decline to do. The district court properly

dismissed North County’s declaratory judgment claim premised on § 201(b), because entry of a declaratory judgment

“would . . . put interpretation of a finely-tuned regulatory

scheme squarely in the hands of private parties and some 700

federal district judges, instead of in the hands of the Commission.” Greene, 340 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Conboy v. AT&T

Corp., 241 F.3d 242, 253 (2d Cir. 2001)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Long Distance

Telecommunications Litig., 831 F.2d at 631.9

8North County argues that the Commission concluded in MetroPCS that

the CMRS providers’ failure to pay reasonable compensation violated

§ 201(b). However, in MetroPCS, the Commission merely “[f]or purposes

of [that] Order only, . . . assume[d], without deciding, that a CMRS carrier’s failure to enter in good faith into an agreement with a CLEC regarding the termination of intrastate traffic, and a failure to pay a CLEC for

such termination, could constitute a violation of section 201(b) of the

Act.” MetroPCS, 24 F.C.C.R. at n.72 (citation omitted). The Commission

simply did not make the determination that North County seeks. 

9North County fails to provide any supporting authority evidencing

Congressional intent to create a private right to compensation pursuant to

§ 201(b). See In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d at 1230-31

(“In the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent, we may not

usurp the legislative power by unilaterally creating a cause of action. Touche Ross [& Co. v. Redington], 442 U.S. [560,] 578 [1979]). The ultimate

question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court

thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted

into law.”) Id. (parenthesis omitted). 

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Our conclusion, that an FCC determination is integral to

claims involving § 201(b), is bolstered by the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Global Crossing Telecommuns.,

Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommuns., Inc., 550 U.S. 45 (2007).

In Global Crossing, the Supreme Court considered whether

§ 207 of the Telecommunications Act authorized a payphone

operator to bring a federal claim against carriers who refused

to pay compensation ordered by the FCC. 550 U.S. at 47. The

FCC determined “that a carrier’s refusal to pay the compensation ordered amounts to an unreasonable practice within the

terms of § 201(b).” Id. at 52 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “That determination, it believed, would permit a payphone operator to bring a federal-court lawsuit under

§ 207, to collect the compensation owed.” Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court opined that § 207’s language “makes

clear that the lawsuit is proper if the Commission could properly hold that a carrier’s failure to pay compensation is an

unreasonable practice deemed unlawful under § 201(b).” Id.

at 52-53 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the

original).

In reviewing § 207, the Supreme Court noted the linkage

between the statute’s purpose and the FCC’s regulations.

“[T]he purpose of § 207 is to allow persons injured by

§ 201(b) violations to bring federal-court damages actions.”

Id. at 53 (citations omitted). “History also makes clear that the

FCC has long implemented § 201(b) through the issuance of

rules and regulations. This is obviously so when the rules take

the form of FCC approval or prescription for the future of

rates that exclusively are reasonable.” Id. (citations omitted).

“It is also so when the FCC has set forth rules that, for example, require certain accounting methods or insist upon certain

carrier practices, while (as here) prohibiting others as unjust

or unreasonable under § 201(b).” Id. (citations omitted). “Insofar as the statute’s language is concerned, to violate a regulation that lawfully implements § 201(b)’s requirements is to

violate the statute.” Id. at 54 (citation omitted) (emphasis in

the original). 

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Given these statutory and regulatory considerations, the

Supreme Court framed the issue as “whether the particular

FCC regulation . . . lawfully implements § 201(b)’s unreasonable practice prohibition.” Id. at 55. The Supreme Court

opined that “[t]he carrier’s refusal to divide the revenues it

receives from the caller with its collaborator, the payphone

operator, despite the FCC’s regulation requiring it to do so,

can reasonably be called a ‘practice’ ‘in connection with’ the

provision of that service that is ‘unreasonable.’ ” Id. (citation

omitted). 

However, the Supreme Court limited its holding, as it did

“not suggest that the FCC is required to find carriers’ failures

to divide revenues to be § 201(b) violations in every

instance.” Id. at 56 (citation omitted). “Nor [did it] suggest

that every violation of FCC regulations is an unjust and unreasonable practice. Here there is an explicit statutory scheme,

and compensation of payphone operators is necessary to the

proper implementation of that scheme. Under these circumstances, the FCC’s finding that the failure to follow the order

is an unreasonable practice is well within its authority.” Id.

“[T]he FCC properly implements § 201(b) when it reasonably

finds that the failure to follow a Commission, e.g., rate or

rate-division determination made under a different statutory

provision is unjust or unreasonable under § 201(b).” Id. at 60

(citations and emphasis omitted). “Moreover, in resting [its]

conclusion upon the analogy with rate setting and rate divisions, the traditional, historical subject matter of § 201(b),

[the Supreme Court] avoid[ed] authorizing the FCC to turn

§§ 201(b) and 207 into a back-door remedy for violation of

FCC regulations.” Id.10

10North County cites APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 489

F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2007). However, in that case, the D.C. Circuit considered whether violations of § 201(b) provide a private right of action for

payphone service providers. See id. at 1250. The D.C. Circuit held that,

in accordance with Global Crossing, “a violation of the regulation at issue

is a violation of § 201(b) of the Act, for which a private right of action is

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[9] In contrast to the facts in Global Crossing, the Commission has not made any findings that CMRS providers’ failure to compensate CLECs constitutes an unreasonable

practice in violation of § 201(b). Because North County cannot demonstrate a violation of § 201(b) in the absence of an

FCC determination, the district court properly dismissed

North County’s claims. See Greene, 340 F.3d at 1052-53. 

Unable to demonstrate any statutory or regulatory violations for which there is a private right to compensation, North

County fares no better in seeking declaratory judgment under

47 U.S.C. § 206 and § 207. 

3. 47 U.S.C. § 206 and § 207

47 U.S.C. § 206 provides in pertinent part:

In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall

omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this chapter

required to be done, such common carrier shall be

liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the

full amount of damages sustained in consequence of

any such violation of the provisions of this chapter

. . .

[10] 47 U.S.C. § 207 provides:

Any person claiming to be damaged by any common

carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter may

either make complaint to the Commission as hereinauthorized by § 207 of the Act, in effect creating a right of action to remedy a violation of the regulation itself.” Id. (citation omitted). The D.C.

Circuit’s holding was based on the reasoning of Global Crossing and its

reference to the predicate determination by the Commission of a regulatory violation, facts not present here. 

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after provided for, or may bring suit for the recovery

of the damages for which such common carrier may

be liable under the provisions of this chapter, in any

district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person shall not have the right to

pursue both such remedies.

The plain language of §§ 206 and 207 establish procedures for

private parties to pursue claims in federal court, but does not

establish an independent private right of action for compensation. In Greene, we clarified that there must be an independent

right to compensation for a private right of action to lie under

§§ 206 and 207. Greene, 340 F.3d at 1050-51 (“Because the

private right of action created by §§ 206 and 207 extends only

to violations of this chapter, and § 276 does not require IXCs

to compensate PSPs, there is no violation of § 276 for which

a private action explicitly lies for payphone compensation.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, because North

County has failed to establish a right to specific compensation

pursuant to any statute or regulation, §§ 206 and 207 cannot

form the basis for its compensation claims. See id.

[11] We have also held that claims pursuant to § 207, like

those premised on § 201(b), are particularly amenable to resolution by the FCC. In W. Radio Servs. Co., we considered

whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over

claims that an ILEC failed to negotiate an interconnection

agreement in good faith. 530 F.3d at 1189. We observed that

“issues regarding the applicability of § 207 are complex and

should not be decided without the participation of the FCC,

the agency principally responsible for the enforcement of the

Telecommunications Act.” Id. at 1204. “Whether § 207 provides a cause of action may, in fact, have an impact on FCC

regulation in other contexts. For example, determining

whether § 207 provides a private right of action . . . may

involve interpreting the relationship between the terms common carrier, local exchange carrier, and telecommunications

carrier. Section 207 refers to damages caused by a common

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carrier.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “On the one

hand, the statutory definitions and the use of the terms in

other provisions of the Acts suggest that local exchange carriers are not necessarily a subset of common carriers.” Id. (citations omitted). “On the other hand, the statutory definition of

telecommunications carrier — a term which is used along

with local exchange carrier in § 252 — as well as FCC guidance on the relationship between common carriers and telecommunications carriers, suggests that local exchange carriers

may be common carriers for purposes of § 207.” Id. (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). “As all three terms are

frequently used throughout the telecommunications acts,

interpreting them may have consequences in areas of telecommunications law other than the reach of § 207.” Id. at 1205.

We opined:

In addition, interpretation of § 207 potentially implicates the jurisdiction of the F.C.C. Section 207 offers

aggrieved individuals a choice of remedies for

alleged violations of the Telecommunications Act:

they may go to the F.C.C., presumably by bringing

a complaint under § 208—which provides a mechanism for filing complaints before the F.C.C.—or to

a district court. Given that the statute provides a

choice between these two remedies, it may be logical

to expect that if a claim can be brought in district

court under § 207, it also may be brought to the

F.C.C. under § 208. On the other hand, the F.C.C.

has never directly decided whether it has jurisdiction

over good faith claims . . .

Id. Because of this complexity, § 207 does not lend itself to

declaratory relief.11

11North County also posits, without legal support, that the CMRS providers’ payment to other LECs, and not North County, constitutes a discriminatory practice prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 202(a). North County has

waived this argument. See Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1048

n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Arguments made in passing and inadequately briefed

are waived.”) (citation omitted). In any event, the Commission has

rejected North County’s claims under § 202(a) against CMRS providers.

MetroPCS, 24 F.C.C.R., at 3817, ¶ 22. 

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[12] We, therefore, conclude that the district court properly

dismissed North County’s declaratory judgment claims, as

North County cannot demonstrate a right to compensation

under any statute or regulation that is enforceable pursuant to

a federal private right of action.12

B. North County’s State Law Claims

[13] North County’s second cause of action was for quantum meruit and its third cause of action sought compensation

pursuant to a state tariff. Because the district court dismissed

North County’s federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court lacked jurisdiction over North County’s state claims. See Herman Family Revocable Trust v.

Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the District Court had original jurisdiction, but dismissed for nonjurisdictional reasons, then it could maintain supplemental

jurisdiction at its discretion. If it dismissed the underlying

claim on jurisdictional grounds, then it could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”) (quoting Saksenasingh v. Sec’y of

Educ., 126 F.3d 347, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 

C. The District Court’s Dismissal Of North County’s

Claims With Prejudice13

[14] “The primary jurisdiction doctrine allows courts to

stay proceedings or to dismiss a complaint without prejudice

12North County also contends that the federal courts are the proper

forum for resolving its claims because the Commission does not decide

collection actions. However, the Commission has ruled that once North

County seeks a rate of reasonable compensation from the relevant state

commission, the Commission would be able to resolve North County’s

“collection” claims. See MetroPCS, 24 F.C.C.R. at 3810-11, ¶ 9. 

13It does not appear that the district court relied on the primary jurisdiction doctrine in dismissing North County’s declaratory judgment claims,

nor did North County request a stay of the proceedings. However, we may

apply the doctrine sua sponte. See Syntek Semiconductor Co., Ltd. v.

Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended.

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pending the resolution of an issue within the special competence of an administrative agency.” Clark, 523 F.3d at 1114.

Given the Commission’s consideration of North County’s

compensation claims in MetroPCS and the absence of a Commission determination regarding whether the CMRS providers’ failure to compensate North County violates § 201(b), we

conclude that “the initial decisionmaking responsibility

should be performed by the relevant agency rather than the

courts.” Syntek Semiconductor, 307 F.3d at 778. As a result,

the dismissal of North County’s claims should have been

without prejudice to allow filing of the claim in the proper

forum. See Syntek Semiconductor, 307 F.3d at 782; see also

Clark, 523 F.3d at 1115. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it dismissed North County’s declaratory judgment

claims, because North County is unable to assert a federal

claim. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, as North County

cannot establish a private right to compensation under the

provisions of the Federal Communications Act. The Commission has not determined that the CMRS providers’ failure to

pay compensation violates the Federal Communications Act.

Because we are ill equipped to properly resolve North County’s claim in the absence of a predicate determination from

the Commission, we vacate the judgment and remand this

case so that North County’s claims can be dismissed without

prejudice. 

VACATED and REMANDED for dismissal without

prejudice.

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