Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02184/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02184-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In this matter the EEOC was both the respondent agency and the adjudicating authority. The

EEOC’s adjudicatory function is separate and independent from those offices charged with the in-house

resolution of discrimination complaints. See Denial, EEOC Appeal No. 01A34154 (Sept. 11, 2006),

at n.1 (attached to Complaint).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA EUNICE REYES-VANEGAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

EEOC,

Defendant. /

No. C-07-02184 EDL

ORDER DENYING REQUEST TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND

DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff Maria Eunice Reyes-Vanegas alleges her employer, the U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), discriminated against her because of her disability, and

harassed and retaliated against her for protesting discriminatory practices, between 1997 and

November 2003 when she was terminated. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Nondiscrimination in

Federal Government Employment), Plaintiff first pursued her claims in the Office of Equal

Opportunity of her employer, exhausting all appeals, and received a right-to-sue letter from the

EEOC on September 11, 2006.1

 On April 20, 2007, Plaintiff filed a form employment

discrimination complaint, an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and a request for appointment

of counsel. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of the United States magistrate judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Defendant has not been served; however, the Court does not require the

consent of Defendant in order to dismiss this action because Defendant has not been served and

therefore is not a party within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Ornelas v. De Frantz, 2000

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11640, *3, n.2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2000) (Spero, M.J.) (citing Neals v. Norwood,

Case 3:07-cv-02184-EDL Document 7 Filed 07/09/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prisoner’s civil rights

action without consent of the defendants because the defendants had not been served yet and

therefore were not parties)). For the reasons stated below, the complaint is dismissed with leave to

amend. The application to proceed in forma pauperis and request for appointment of counsel are

denied. 

The Court may permit an individual to file an action in federal court without prepayment of

fees when the Plaintiff has demonstrated his or her poverty. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Leave to

proceed in forma pauperis is properly granted when the plaintiff has demonstrated his poverty and

his complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted and is not frivolous or malicious. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a), (d). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint which fails to state a claim. See Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir.

1996); see also Tripati v. First National Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A

district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of

the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”). 

Title VII protects the rights of federal employees to oppose any “unlawful employment

practice” enumerated in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16 to 16(c). A federal employee’s right to

file an action based on discrimination in federal court is dependent on the employee’s exhaustion of

administrative remedies and adherence to strict filing deadlines. See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin.,

425 U.S. 820, 829-35 (1976); Kaanapu v. Potter, 51 Fed. Appx. 244, 247 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Federal

regulations expressly require all federal employees to pursue their discrimination complaints within

the Equal Employment Opportunity office of the federal agency that allegedly discriminated against

them prior to filing in district court.”). An action challenging the federal agency’s final decision on

appeal is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court if a complainant files it within

ninety days of receipt of the Commission's final decision on an appeal. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; 29

C.F.R. §§ 1614.105 and 1614.407. The ninety-day period constitutes a statute of limitations; and

“[i]f [a] claimant fails to file within [the] 90-day period, the action is barred.” Scholar v. Pacific

Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 892 F.2d 1442,

1445 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Here, according to the papers Plaintiff submitted with her Complaint, Plaintiff received her

final decision on appeal around September 11, 2006. See Complaint (attaching decision). As

required by law, the EEOC informed Plaintiff in the decision that she had ninety days from the date

she received that decision to file a civil action. See id; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (requiring

that a complainant be provided notice of the ninety-day deadline). However, Plaintiff failed to file

an action in federal court until April 20, 2007, well beyond the ninety-day statutory period. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is untimely and therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. Although the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s situation, the “[p]rocedural

requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be

disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.” Baldwin County Welcome

Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (discussing Title VII’s ninety-day filing period). The

Court is required to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Marks v.

Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996).

A court should only dismiss a complaint without leave to amend when the court can rule out

“any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating

a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Gomez v. USAA Federal

Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794 (2d Cir. 1999)). Dismissal of an action with prejudice is appropriate

where a plaintiff fails to follow the “strict procedural requirements” of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(c). See

Lal v. Henderson, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5217, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. March 24, 2004) (Walker, C.J.)

(dismissing complaint with prejudice because failure to file within ninety-day deadline cannot be

cured by amendment). In Title VII matters, however, “the ninety-day filing period is a statue of

limitation not a jurisdictional requirement and therefore, is subject to equitable tolling.” Baldwin,

466 U.S. at 151; see also Scholar, 963 F.2d at 267 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In deciding whether to apply equitable tolling to the ninety-day filing period, the court

examines a number of factors including whether the claimant received adequate notice of the

deadline, whether the opposing party engaged in misconduct, and whether the claimant acted

diligently by attempting to file a timely complaint. See Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 151; Scholar, 963 F.2d

at 268 (noting that the doctrine of equitable tolling “has been applied sparingly; for example ... when

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the statute of limitations has not been complied with because of defective pleadings, when a

claimant was tricked by an adversary into letting a deadline expire, and when the EEOC’s notice of

the statutory period was clearly inadequate.”). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is silent as to the timing of her filing, and accordingly fails to provide

any explanation that may justify an equitable tolling of the ninety-day deadline for filing of her Title

VII action. Nor does Plaintiff allege that the actions of defendants prevented her from filing suit,

which could raise a claim for equitable estoppel. See Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170,

1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that equitable estoppel focuses primarily on the actions taken by

the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit, whereas equitable tolling focuses on the

plaintiff's excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on lack of prejudice to the defendant). 

However, if granted leave to amend, Plaintiff may be able to bolster her Complaint with allegations

sufficient to warrant the application of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel to extend the ninetyday limitations period. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Within 30 days of this

Order, Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint, which must address her failure to file her claim in

federal court within ninety days of the final agency decision. 

Because this Court holds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, Plaintiff’s application to

proceed in forma pauperis and request for appointment of counsel are denied at this time without

prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2007 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:07-cv-02184-EDL Document 7 Filed 07/09/07 Page 4 of 4