Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03163/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03163-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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1 All parties have consented to my jurisdiction,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for all proceedings, including

entry of final judgment.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANITA HERNOKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social

Security

Defendant.

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No. 05-3163 BZ

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

ATTORNEY’S MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Before me is plaintiff’s counsel Tony Arjo’s amended

motion for attorneys’ fees.1 Arjo moves for an award of

$6,300.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 406(b). In

pertinent part, section 406(b) provides that a court may

award counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees, not to exceed 25

percent of total past-due benefits to which the claimant is

entitled by reason of a favorable judgment. See 42 U.S.C. §

406(b)(1)(A).

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2 There is nothing in the record to suggest that the

fee agreement was coerced or that it is otherwise

unenforceable.

3 The October 3, 2006 Notice of Award was issued

concurrently with a check for plaintiff representing all

benefits owed through August 2006. Although rather cryptic,

the Notice includes the exact figures plaintiff was awarded. 

Arjo and defendant agree, and the court’s own calculations

verify, that plaintiff was owed $26,292 in benefits from June

2002 through May 2006. 25 percent of that figure is $6,573,

the maximum fee Arjo could seek under section 406(b). 

4 Arjo asserts, and defendant agrees, that $6,573 -

exactly 25 percent of the $26,292 figure - was withheld from

plaintiff’s initial check. Although difficult to discern from

the Notice, the court’s own calculations suggest that an amount

slightly in excess of $6,573 may have been withheld. At any

2

A court reviewing a petition for section 406(b) fees

serves “as an independent check” to assure that contingency

fee agreements between Social Security claimants and their

attorneys yield reasonable results. See Gisbrecht v.

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). As long as the resultant

fee is within the 25 percent statutory cap, the attorney need

only “show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services

rendered.” Id.

Plaintiff filed her appeal of defendant’s denial of her

Social Security payments with this court in August 2005. 

Plaintiff and Arjo entered into a contingency fee agreement

setting fees at 25 percent of awarded past-due benefits.2 In

June 2006, I entered judgment in favor of plaintiff,

directing defendant to calculate and pay the disability

benefits owed. Plaintiff was subsequently awarded past-due

benefits through May 2006 totaling $26,292.3 Defendant

withheld approximately $6,573 from plaintiff’s total award in

anticipation of attorneys’ fee claims under section 406(b).4

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rate, Arjo seeks less than the full 25 percent amount, and any

remaining funds withheld by defendant will be refunded to

plaintiff. 

3

As already noted, Arjo seeks $6,300 - an amount slightly

below the 25 percent maximum he could seek.

To demonstrate the reasonableness of his request, Arjo

submitted a one-page “time log” accounting for time worked on

plaintiff’s case. The accounting shows that Arjo worked a

total of 23.8 hours on the case. The hours were largely

spent on preparing various filings in the matter, and seem

eminently reasonable. The case moved quickly, and there is

no indication that Arjo filed superfluous papers.

In light of the hours expended on the matter, defendant

argues that an award of $6,300 is tantamount to approving a

de facto hourly rate of $264.71. Assuming that a contingency

fee agreement may be so construed, I cannot say as a matter

of law that the rate is unreasonable. See Hearn v. Barnhart,

262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1036-37 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (approving of

a de facto hourly rate of $450, and citing numerous cases in

which courts approved of similarly high de facto rates). 

Indeed, considering that plaintiff continues to collect

payments and enjoy the benefits of Arjo’s work, the award

does not appear unreasonable. In short, an award of $6300 is

reasonable in light of the work tasks completed and the

overall benefit to plaintiff. 

 Here, however, Arjo and defendant stipulated to an

award of fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),

28 U.S.C. section 2412(d), in the amount of $3,500. In

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circumstances in which a court awards fees under both EAJA

and section 406(b), the lesser of the two awards shall be

refunded to the claimant. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796;

Hearn, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as

follows:

1. Arjo’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the

amount of $6,300, to be paid out of the sums

withheld by defendant;

2. Defendant shall refund to plaintiff any funds

withheld in anticipation of a request for

attorneys’ fees in excess of the $6,300;

3. Arjo will reimburse plaintiff in the amount of

$3,500 - the amount of EAJA fees to which

plaintiff’s attorney and defendant stipulated. 

DATED: December 1, 2006 

 Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

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