Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05326/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05326-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2000 Decided March 13, 2001

No. 99-5326

Dynaquest Corp., d/b/a A.C.L., et al.,

Appellants

v.

United States Postal Service,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv00564)

Max Kravitz argued the cause for appellants. With him on

the briefs was David B. Smith.

David T. Smorodin, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

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Before: Henderson, Randolph and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Dynaquest Corp. seeks the release of funds held in escrow in connection with administrative proceedings brought against the company by the United

States Postal Service. Various incarnations of Dynaquest's

claims have been heard by numerous courts--including this

court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit--over a period spanning ten years. We conclude that

Dynaquest's present efforts to obtain the funds are barred by

the doctrine of res judicata and affirm the district court's

dismissal of Dynaquest's complaint.

I

Dynaquest, an Ohio corporation, buys and sells discontinued lines, unwanted special order items, liquidated goods, and

other "distressed merchandise." It also mails unsolicited

advertisements for a training program, which includes a

manual entitled Liquidate Your Way to a Fortune, instructing purchasers in the business of asset location and liquidation.

On June 7, 1990, the Postal Service filed an administrative

complaint against the company before a Postal Service Administrative Judicial Officer (AJO) in Washington, D.C. The

complaint charged Dynaquest with "conducting a scheme for

obtaining money or property through the mail by means of

false representations," in violation of 39 U.S.C. s 3005. Postal Service Compl. at 1 (J.A. at 54). The complaint alleged

that the company's mailings contained eleven false representations.1 Eight days later, the Postal Service filed a separate

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1 As discussed below, three of the eleven allegations were

ultimately upheld on appeal. Dynaquest Corp. v. United States

Postal Serv., 12 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Those allegations

charged that Dynaquest falsely represented it would: (1) "assist

purchasers of [its] program to earn ... thousands of dollars without

the need ... to make any additional payments to [Dynaquest]," (2)

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action in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Ohio, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. s 3007, seeking a

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction directing the detention of Dynaquest's mail pending the resolution of the s 3005 administrative proceedings. Section 3007

authorizes the district court in the district in which a defendant receives its mail to enter such interim relief. 39 U.S.C.

s 3007(a).

The Ohio district court issued a temporary restraining

order under s 3007, directing the Postal Service to hold all

checks and accompanying information mailed in response to

the Dynaquest advertisements, and scheduled a hearing on

the Postal Service's motion for a preliminary injunction for

June 21, 1990. Prior to commencement of the hearing, the

parties entered into--and the court approved--an "Agreed

Order." The Agreed Order required that all checks and

applications be returned to prospective customers, along with

a "bounce-back" letter "clarifying" Dynaquest's offer and

asking whether the customers still wished to purchase Dynaquest's services. Agreed Order at 1-2 (J.A. at 51-52). The

Order further directed the Postal Service to forward any

checks sent by customers who had received bounce-back

letters to a co-administered escrow account. Finally, the

parties stipulated that the Agreed Order would remain in

effect until "the final disposition of the administrative complaint," id. at 1 (J.A. at 51), which would "be deemed to occur

after the conclusion of any appeal by [Dynaquest] from the

... decision of the Postal Service Judicial Officer," id. at 2-3

(J.A. at 52-53).

Following entry of the Agreed Order, the parties proceeded

to litigate the s 3005 proceeding in Washington, D.C., and

then returned to Ohio to litigate the s 3007 proceeding. In

1996, Dynaquest once again went to Washington to file the

pleadings that led to the instant appeal. We describe each of

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"pay a hundred dollars ($100.00) in cash to any addressee who

purchases [the] program," and (3) "provide purchasers of the program with comprehensive training in the merchandise liquidation

field." Postal Service Compl. pp 10(d), (g), (i) (J.A. at 56-57).

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these three courses of litigation below, in order to provide the

background necessary to understand our disposition of this

case.

A

During the summer of 1990, the AJO conducted a full trialtype hearing in the s 3005 proceeding in Washington, D.C.

Following the hearing, the AJO concluded that Dynaquest

had violated the statute by making four of the materially false

representations alleged in the Postal Service's complaint. In

re A.C.L., P.S. Docket No. 36/90 (U.S. Postal Serv. Dec. 28,

1990). Dynaquest was ordered to cease and desist from

making those representations.

On March 18, 1991, Dynaquest moved for reconsideration

of the AJO's decision, challenging the false representation

findings and requesting the release of the funds held in

escrow. Resp't Mot. for Recons. (J.A. at 259). With respect

to the latter request, Dynaquest argued that because the

escrow funds were sent by customers who had received the

bounce-back letters, any initial misrepresentations had been

cured. Thus, Dynaquest argued, it would be unjust to deprive the company of those funds. Id. at 12-16 (J.A. at 270-

74).

The AJO denied Dynaquest's motion in its entirety. In re

A.C.L., P.S. Docket No. 36/90 (U.S. Postal Serv. May 15,

1991). He rejected the company's challenges to the false

representation findings, and dismissed the request for the

release of funds on the ground that the escrow accounts had

been established under the Agreed Order of the district court

in Ohio. Only that court, the AJO held, had jurisdiction over

the interpretation and enforcement of its own Order. Id. at

4.

Dynaquest sought review of the AJO's decisions in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia,

pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

ss 701-706 (1994). It sought a declaratory judgment that the

false representation findings were not supported by substantial evidence and an injunction against enforcement of the

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AJO's order. Dynaquest did not, however, reassert its claim

that the bounce-back letters had cured any alleged misrepresentations, nor did the company otherwise appeal the AJO's

determination that he lacked jurisdiction over the escrow

funds. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district

court affirmed the AJO's findings regarding three of the four

representations, vacated the fourth, and sustained the Postal

Service's order. Dynaquest Corp. v. United States Postal

Serv., No. 91-1582 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 1992). Dynaquest appealed to this court, contending that two of the three findings

upheld by the district court were not supported by substantial

evidence. We affirmed the district court's decision on January 18, 1994. Dynaquest Corp. v. United States Postal Serv.,

12 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Dynaquest did not seek

further review.

B

In early 1994, the parties filed cross motions for summary

judgment in the still-pending s 3007 proceeding in the Southern District of Ohio, seeking to resolve the disposition of the

escrow funds. On June 2, 1994, the district court granted

judgment for the Postal Service and directed that the funds

be returned to Dynaquest's customers. United States Postal

Serv. v. Klass, No. C2-90-450, slip op. at 9, 11 (S.D. Ohio

June 2, 1994). The court interpreted the language of the

Agreed Order to require that, upon final disposition of the

administrative complaint, the funds were to go to the party

prevailing in the s 3005 proceeding in Washington. Id. at 9.

This interpretation was confirmed, the court said, by statements of Dynaquest's counsel at a status conference held in

the s 3007 proceeding in February 1992. Id. at 9-10. In

light of this circuit's affirmance of the AJO's findings of

misrepresentation, and Dynaquest's failure to seek further

review, the Ohio district court concluded that final disposition

of the s 3005 administrative complaint had occurred and that

the Postal Service was the prevailing party. Id. at 8-9. The

court rejected as irrelevant Dynaquest's claim that the

bounce-back letters had cured the misrepresentations. Section 3007 did not give it authority to make such a determinaUSCA Case #99-5326 Document #582074 Filed: 03/13/2001 Page 5 of 13
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tion, the court said. Whether customers were misled was a

question for the s 3005 proceeding, and that proceeding was

now closed. Id. at 9-10.

Dynaquest appealed the Ohio district court's refusal to

award it the escrow funds to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The company made two

principal points. First, it argued that the district court erred

in not determining whether the bounce-back letters cured the

misrepresentations. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the district court was indeed without

authority to decide, in a s 3007 proceeding, whether the

bounce-back letters violated the false representations statute.

That, the court said, could only have been decided in the

s 3005 proceeding in Washington, and Dynaquest should

have amended its administrative pleadings to raise the issue

there. United States Postal Serv. v. Klass, 74 F.3d 1241,

1996 WL 20504, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 1996) ("Section 3007

specifies that the district court issuing the injunction has no

authority to 'determine any fact at issue in the statutory

proceeding.' " (quoting 39 U.S.C. s 3007(a) (repealed 1999))).

Second, Dynaquest argued that the district court erred in

construing the Agreed Order to require disposition of the

escrow funds to the victor in the s 3005 proceeding. Moreover, the company insisted, the court further erred in interpreting its counsel's statements as confirming that view.

Once again, the Sixth Circuit disagreed, this time on the

merits:

[F]orwarding the money to Dynaquest would violate the

intent of the parties when they entered into the agreement. Statements from the injunction hearing indicate

the parties' understanding that Dynaquest would not

receive the funds unless it prevailed on all of the claims

of misrepresentation. The record clearly demonstrates

Dynaquest's expectation that it would not receive the

escrowed funds unless it prevailed.

Id. (citation omitted). By the terms of the Agreed Order, the

Sixth Circuit held, Dynaquest could not obtain the escrow

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tation. Id. Because Dynaquest had not, the court affirmed

the award of the escrow funds to the Postal Service. Id. at

*3.2

C

On June 19, 1996, Dynaquest returned to Washington to

file a motion with the AJO seeking, inter alia, an order

directing release of the escrow funds. Dynaquest argued

that the Postal Service did not have authority under the

AJO's original order to return remittances to those who had

received bounce-back letters. Dynaquest Mot. at 16 (J.A. at

35). Dynaquest also argued that it had never received a

hearing on the merits of its claim that it was entitled to the

escrow funds because the bounce-back procedures had cured

any misrepresentations in its initial solicitations. Id.

On December 30, 1997, the AJO denied Dynaquest's request. In re A.C.L., P.S. Docket No. 36/90 (U.S. Postal Serv.

Dec. 30, 1997). The AJO held that "the disposition of the

escrowed funds is essentially a question of interpreting the

provisions of the Agreed Order that was negotiated by the

parties and issued by the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio." Id. at 5. That court, the AJO

said, had concluded that Dynaquest "had failed to prevail in

the s 3005 proceedings, and that under the terms of the

Agreed Order the funds held in escrow were to be returned

to the consumers who had ordered [Dynaquest's] materials."

Id. Moreover, the AJO stressed, the Sixth Circuit had

affirmed the district court's order, concluding that Dynaquest

was "precluded from receiving the escrowed funds by the

terms of the Agreed Order that [it] entered into." Id. at 5-6.

Dynaquest's current motion was, therefore, "in effect, a col-

__________

2 Although the Southern District of Ohio stated that the escrow

funds should be returned to Dynaquest's customers, the Sixth

Circuit described the district court's order as awarding the funds to

the Postal Service. The Postal Service has indicated that once it

gains possession of the funds, it intends to release them to the

customers. Further action regarding release of the funds has been

stayed, however, pending resolution of this appeal.

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lateral attack on the judgments of those two courts and seeks

to have the Judicial Officer overrule the courts and direct that

the funds held in escrow be paid" to Dynaquest. Id. at 6.

That, the AJO concluded, he did "not have the authority to

do." Id.

On March 5, 1998, Dynaquest sought review of the AJO's

decision in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia. On August 2, 1999, the district court found that

Dynaquest's motion for release of the escrow funds was

barred by the res judicata effect of the initial, 1990 proceeding before the AJO. "Dynaquest's claim that any false

representations in its solicitations were cured by the bounceback letters," the court said, "was within the purview of the

[1990] administrative proceeding. Dynaquest's failure to litigate this issue constitutes a waiver of its right to raise it in

subsequent proceedings." Dynaquest Corp. v. United States

Postal Serv., No. 98-0564, slip op. at 5-6 (D.D.C. Aug. 2,

1999) (citations omitted). On September 27, 1999, Dynaquest

filed a notice of appeal.3

II

Although the course that led the parties to this court was a

tortuous one, disposition of this appeal is not equally difficult.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of

Ohio concluded that, by the terms of the Agreed Order

approved by that court, Dynaquest was not entitled to the

escrow funds. The Sixth Circuit agreed, holding that "the

intent of the parties when they entered into" the Agreed

Order was that "Dynaquest would not receive the [escrow]

funds unless it prevailed on all of the claims of misrepresentation." Dynaquest, 1996 WL 20504, at *2. Because Dynaquest had not prevailed on all of the misrepresentation

__________

3 We note that 39 U.S.C. s 3007 was subsequently amended on

December 12, 1999, effective 120 days later, to provide: "If any

order is issued under [s 3007(a)] and the proceedings under section

3005 are concluded with the issuance of an order under that section,

any judicial review of the matter shall be in the district in which the

order under [s 3007(a)] was issued." 39 U.S.C. s 3007(b).

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claims, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the award of the funds to

the Postal Service. Id. at *3. Dynaquest sought no further

review.

The Sixth Circuit's ruling is a final decision on the merits.

The AJO correctly concluded that he was bound by that

decision under the doctrine of res judicata. See Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) ("Under res judicata, a final

judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or

their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have

been raised in that action."); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333

U.S. 591, 601 (1948).4 This court is likewise so bound.

Although Dynaquest argues, vehemently, that the Sixth Circuit misconstrued both the language of the Agreed Order and

the statements of its counsel, those issues are foreclosed from

our consideration. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,

452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) ("Nor are the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits altered

by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong....").

The place for Dynaquest to have raised those concerns was in

a petition for rehearing en banc to the Sixth Circuit, or in a

petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

This circuit, however, has no authority to collaterally review

the decisions of a sister circuit. See id. ("A judgment merely

voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the law is

not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a

direct review...." (citation omitted)); Fort Sumter Tours,

Inc. v. Babbitt, 202 F.3d 349, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Dynaquest further contends that res judicata cannot bar its

claim regarding the curative effect of the bounce-back letters,

because neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Southern District of

Ohio decided that claim on the merits. Rather, Dynaquest

notes, those courts merely held themselves without authority

__________

4 We use "res judicata" in its generic sense to include the

concepts of both issue preclusion (also known as "collateral estoppel") and claim preclusion. Because the meaning and effect of the

Agreed Order were litigated by the parties and decided by the

court, issue preclusion is the specific concept at work here. See

Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1

(1984); 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H.

Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure s 4402, at 6-8 (1981).

to decide the claim, on the ground that only the AJO in the

s 3005 proceeding had such authority. See 18 Wright, Miller, & Cooper s 4402, at 11 ("Dismissal of a suit for want of

federal subject matter jurisdiction, for example, should not

bar an action on the same claim in a court that does have

subject matter jurisdiction...."). Moreover, Dynaquest continues, both the Sixth Circuit and the district court in the

present litigation erred in stating that the company had not

raised the issue before the AJO. As Dynaquest correctly

points out, it did raise the issue in its 1991 motion for

reconsideration, where it was met by the AJO's ruling that he

lacked jurisdiction to decide the question. See In re A.C.L.,

P.S. Docket No. 36/90, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Postal Serv. May 15,

1991); Resp't Mot. for Recons. at 16 (J.A. at 274).

Unfortunately for Dynaquest, whatever the validity of its

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arguments about the merits of the bounce-back cure, or about

our jurisdiction to resolve that issue, those arguments are

now moot. Their only relevance in the present case is to the

question of whether the escrow funds should be released to

Dynaquest. But the Sixth Circuit has already construed the

Agreed Order to bar release of the escrow to Dynaquest--

irrespective of any bounce-back cure--because three of the

company's initial representations were found to have been

false. Accordingly, resolving the bounce-back question would

have no impact on disposition of the escrow funds. And

because a favorable judicial decision on the bounce-back

question would not bring Dynaquest the redress it seeks, we

are without authority to adjudicate the issue. See Iron

Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) ("To

satisfy the Art. III case-or-controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some actual injury that can be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision."); see also Spencer

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); United States Parole

Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980); FDIC v.

Kooyomjian, 220 F.3d 10, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2000).5

Finally, Dynaquest contends, for the first time on this

appeal, that the decision of the AJO below is invalid because

__________

5 Resolution of the bounce-back question is also barred by the

doctrine of res judicata as a result of Dynaquest's failure to appeal

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Postal Service AJOs are appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. art. II,

s 2, cl. 2. Although we normally would not permit a litigant

to present a legal theory that it failed to raise below, see

Grant v. United States Air Force, 197 F.3d 539, 542 (D.C.

Cir. 1999), courts have discretion to consider Appointments

Clause challenges raised for the first time on appeal, see

Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878-79 (1991).6 But

as was true of the bounce-back issue, a victory on its Appointments Clause challenge would not advance Dynaquest's

__________

the AJO's jurisdictional ruling in 1991. As Dynaquest notes, it

raised the bounce-back issue in its 1991 motion for reconsideration

before the AJO. In his decision on that motion, the AJO ruled both

that Dynaquest's initial representations were false and that he

lacked jurisdiction over the bounce-back issue. Although Dynaquest's appeal of the AJO's order challenged the former ruling, it

did not challenge the AJO's conclusion that he was without jurisdiction to decide the bounce-back question. Accordingly, that issue is

now res judicata between the parties. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94

("Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action

precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that

were or could have been raised in that action." (emphasis added));

Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

("[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies to dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction as well as for other grounds...."); 2 Kenneth Culp

Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise

s 13.3, at 250 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that res judicata applies to

administrative as well as judicial adjudications, and to questions of

law as well as fact).

6 We may not, however, consider challenges to the validity of

the AJO's 1990 and 1991 decisions, which were affirmed by this

court in 1994 and are no longer open to attack. Cf. Baltimore S.S.

Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 325 (1927) ("A judgment merely

voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the law is not

open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a direct

review and not by bringing another action upon the same cause.");

18 Wright, Miller, & Cooper s 4428, at 282 ("[F]ederal court

judgments are binding notwithstanding a simple lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, without regard to whether the jurisdictional

question was litigated."); id. at 282 n.29 ("An assertion of jurisdicUSCA Case #99-5326 Document #582074 Filed: 03/13/2001 Page 11 of 13
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cause. In the decision presently on appeal, the AJO held

nothing more than that he was without authority to grant

Dynaquest's motion for release of the escrow funds. He

based that holding on his conclusion that the Sixth Circuit's

ruling--that the district court's Agreed Order precluded such

release--bound him by the force of res judicata. As we have

just held, the AJO's resolution of this legal question was

correct. No AJO, regardless of the validity of his appointment, would have authority to decide the issue otherwise.

Indeed, the same is true of this Article III court. Accordingly, resolution of the Appointments Clause issue in Dynaquest's favor would bring the company no relief and would

amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion. Issuance

of such an opinion is, of course, beyond our power under

Article III. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,

761 (1987).7

IV

The Sixth Circuit interpreted the district court's Agreed

Order as requiring that the escrow funds be awarded to the

__________

tion by an administrative tribunal is likely to be treated in the same

way as an assertion by a court if the decision has been subjected to

judicial review." (citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,

310 U.S. 381, 403 (1940))).

7 Dynaquest asserts that this court's decision in Landry v.

FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000), establishes that it is "unnecessary that Dynaquest demonstrate that it was directly harmed by

the Postal Service's unconstitutional appointments mechanism" in

order to obtain judicial review of an Appointments Clause challenge.

Dynaquest Br. at 22. In Landry, we entertained such a challenge

to the authority of an FDIC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), even

though the FDIC had itself reviewed the ALJ's decision de novo,

arguably curing any harm that might have resulted from the

alleged unconstitutional appointment. See 204 F.3d at 1132. In

Landry, however, a properly-appointed ALJ would have had authority to decide Landry's case. As noted above, in this case even a

properly-appointed AJO would lack authority to collaterally review

the Sixth Circuit's decision.

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Postal Service. That holding is res judicata and may not be

collaterally attacked in this court. Moreover, because that

holding leaves Dynaquest without a remedy even if it were to

obtain a favorable ruling on the additional claims it raises

here, we are without authority to adjudicate those claims.

The district court's dismissal of Dynaquest's complaint is

therefore

Affirmed.

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