Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Greg Moore; et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Sean Garnand; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 19-0290 TUC RM (LAB)

ORDER

Pending before the court is a motion, filed by the non-party City of Tucson (City) on

November 20, 2019, to quash the plaintiffs’ subpoena served on Tucson Fire Department

Inspector Jorge Lola and the Notice of Deposition directed to Tucson Police Officer Jacob

Smith. (Doc. 54) Since filing its motion, the City has discovered that the plaintiffs issued a

subpoena to Officer Smith to testify at the deposition. (Doc. 73-1, p. 3) The court will treat

the motion as though it seeks to quash these two subpoenas. The plaintiffs filed a response

on December 4, 2019. (Doc. 65) The City filed a reply on December 11, 2019. (Doc. 73)

The plaintiffs in this action claim their constitutional rights were violated when the

defendants executed search warrants in connection with an arson investigation into the

destruction of the Forgeus Apartments on June 8, 2017. (Doc. 1) They bring this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s 1983. (Doc. 1, p. 4) The defendants apparently believe that the

plaintiffs may be responsible for the fire that destroyed these apartments. (Doc. 1) They

further believe that the fire that destroyed the Forgeus Apartments displayed similarities to

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the fire that destroyed an apartment on Blacklidge Drive in 2011. (Doc. 1, p. 10) The

investigation into the Forgeus fire is ongoing. 

In the pending motion, the defendants move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii)

and (iv) to quash the plaintiffs’ subpoena directed to Tucson Fire Department Inspector Jorge

Lola to testify at a deposition and produce documents related to his investigation of the

Forgues fire. (Doc. 54-1, p. 2) They also seek to quash the subpoena directed to Tucson

Police Officer Jacob Smith to testify at a deposition. (Doc. 54-1, p. 6); (Doc. 73-1, p. 3)

The defendants argue, among other things, that the depositions are precluded by the law

enforcement investigatory privilege. See Conan v. City of Fontana, 2017 WL 2874623, at

*4 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“[T]he law enforcement investigatory privilege is based on the harm

to law enforcement efforts which might arise from public disclosure of investigatory files.”).

Rule 45 reads in pertinent part as follows:

On timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must

quash or modify a subpoena that:

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(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception

or waiver applies; or

(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A).

When the pending motion was filed, the court had under advisement the defendants’

previously filed motion to stay discovery pursuant to the law enforcement investigatory

privilege. (Docs. 23, 37) That motion has since been granted in part. (Doc. 74) The

plaintiffs appealed that order, but they were unsuccessful. (Doc. 113)

In its motion, the City asserts that the plaintiffs are only seeking information that falls

within this privilege. (Doc. 54) The court finds that this is a fair assumption in light of the

plaintiffs’ failure to suggest any other purpose for the depositions. (Doc. 65, pp. 6-7) The

motion to quash will be granted because the depositions would violate the law enforcement

investigatory privilege.

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The plaintiffs argue to the contrary that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preclude

the City’s motion. Specifically, they argue that “any party may move the Court to modify

or quash a subpoena on the grounds of privilege,” but a non-party, like the City, cannot do

so, citing, among other things, Salem Vegas, L.P. v. Guanci, 2013 WL 5493126, at *3 (D.

Nev. 2013). (Doc. 65, p. 2)

This court, however, finds nothing in the wording of Rule 45(d)(3)(A) that precludes

the City from filing the pending motion. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ proposed reading of Rule

45 would leave the City with a right but no remedy. The proposed depositions threaten to

violate the City’s privilege. Accordingly, the Rules should be interpreted in a way that

permits it to file a motion to quash. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1; see also R. Prasad Indus. v. Flat

Irons Envtl. Sols. Corp., 2014 WL 2804276, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2014) (collecting cases) 

The plaintiffs further argue that the City might have standing to object to a subpoena

for documents, but it has no standing to oppose a deposition subpoena. (Doc. 65, p. 2)

Again, the court fails to find anything in the wording of Rule 45(d)(3)(A) that supports the

plaintiffs’ proposed reading. Moreover, the court fails to see why the Rules would be

constructed in such a way. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. The proposed depositions are just as likely

to violate the City’s privilege as would be the disclosure of documents. It would not make

sense if the Rules allowed the City to quash a subpoena duces tecum but not a deposition

subpoena.

The plaintiffs note that the City previously disclosed to them Loya’s fifteen-page

report on the Forgeus fire. (Doc. 65, p. 4) They argue that this disclosure waives the City’s

claim of privilege over any related matters. The court does not agree.

This court adopts the reasoning of the First Circuit and holds that in the context of the

law enforcement privilege, the “release of a document only waives the[] privilege[] for the

document or information specifically released, and not for related materials.” Commonwealth

of Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 66 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Sealed Case,

121 F.3d 729, 741 (D.C.Cir.1997)). “This limited approach to waiver serves important

interests in open government by ensuring that agencies do not forego voluntarily disclosing

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some privileged material out of the fear that by doing so they are exposing other, more

sensitive documents.” Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 490 F.3d at 66 (punctuation

modified). Moreover, if the disclosure was inadvertent or negligent, it hardly seems

equitable that the public at large, one of the beneficiaries of the privilege, should pay the

price for the City’s improvidence.

IT IS ORDERED that the motion, filed by the non-party City of Tucson (City) on

November 20, 2019, to quash the plaintiffs’ subpoenas served on Tucson Fire Department

Inspector Jorge Lola and Tucson Police Officer Jacob Smith is GRANTED. (Doc. 54) 

The plaintiffs’ motion for an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

26(C)(3) and 37(a)(5) incorporated into their response brief is DENIED. (Doc. 65)

DATED this 2nd day of April, 2020.

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