Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_17-cv-08185/USCOURTS-azd-3_17-cv-08185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sharline Krause, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

County of Mohave, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-17-08185-PCT-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Ryan Andrew Krause’s (“Movant”) Motion to Intervene (Doc. 12, 

Mot.), to which Defendants have filed a Response (Doc. 16, Resp.), and to which Movant 

has filed a Reply (Doc. 17, Reply). Plaintiff Sharline Krause did not file a responsive 

brief, and thus neither takes a position opposing or in support of the Motion. Because 

Movant is already party to this action, the Court denies the Motion to Intervene. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 This matter stems from the death of Drey Krause (“Decedent”)—Plaintiff’s son 

and Movant’s father—during a confrontation with deputies from the Mohave County 

Sheriff’s Office on February 13, 2017. Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on September 14, 

2017, and amended her Complaint on October 5, 2017. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 

contains five claims, four of which Plaintiff brings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged 

violation of her own Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. (Doc. 7, Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 67–131.) Plaintiff additionally asserts a claim of wrongful death under 

Arizona state law on behalf of herself and decedent’s statutory beneficiaries, including 

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Movant. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 132–137.) Movant now requests to intervene in the action 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). 1 

II. ANALYSIS 

 In Arizona, an action for wrongful death may be brought by “the surviving 

husband or wife, child, parent or guardian, or personal representative of the deceased 

person for and on behalf of” the deceased’s statutory beneficiaries. A.R.S. § 12-612A. 

Although the statute permits a number of parties to initiate such a suit, it “contemplates 

that claims by all statutory beneficiaries be consolidated in a single action. Wilmot v. 

Wilmot, 58 P.3d 507, 511 (Ariz. 2002). Thus, “[a] wrongful death action . . . is one action 

for damages with one plaintiff and one judgment.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Begay 

v. City of Tucson, 715 P.2d 761 (Ariz. 1986)); see also Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 

No. CV-08-884-PHX-ROS, 2010 WL 11512381, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan 5, 2010). 

 That statutory beneficiaries are not named plaintiffs “does not preclude them from 

being ‘parties’ to the litigation.” Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 684 P.2d 151, 152 (Ariz. 

1984). However, the single plaintiff rule significantly restricts a non-plaintiff 

beneficiary’s participation in the matter. See Williams v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 332, 

334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). Under this rule, statutory beneficiaries may participate only in 

the damages portion of the litigation as of right. Id. Nevertheless, a beneficiary, along 

with counsel, is entitled to attend depositions pertaining to a defendant’s liability, even 

though that party’s participation in those depositions is limited to aspects relating to the 

beneficiary’s damages. Id. at 333–34. 

 Although the statutory plaintiff drives the liability phase of litigation, he owes a 

fiduciary duty “to the other beneficiaries, both in conducting and settling the action and 

 

1

 When filing a motion to intervene, the moving party must include “a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). Movant purports to base his motion on every claim contained within the Amended Complaint, which includes Plaintiff’s claims brought under § 1983 and the wrongful death claim brought under Arizona state law. (Mot. at 6.) However, Plaintiff’s Motion 

addresses intervention only with respect to Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim. As such, the 

Court limits its analysis to the wrongful death claim and denies the Motion to the extent 

Movant seeks to intervene in the remaining claims in the action, which are all personal to Plaintiff. 

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making distribution of proceeds to each of the other beneficiaries at the conclusion.” 

Wilmot, 58 P.3d at 512. Thus, the plaintiff may push the matter to settlement; however, 

the remaining beneficiaries must agree to any settlement. Id. “Consent from the other 

beneficiaries does not necessarily need to be a formal agreement . . . , [but] the consent 

must be expressly given or manifested.” Id. 

Thus, notwithstanding the Motion to Intervene, Movant is already a party to this 

action because he alleges to be one of Decedent’s statutory beneficiaries. Defendants 

concede this point. (Resp. at 3.) Dissatisfied by the rights afforded to him under Arizona 

law, Movant seeks an expanded role that would allow him to “ensure . . . that all viable 

claims are asserted, that all responsible persons are made parties to the action, [and] that 

all admissible evidence is presented in the litigation.” (Mot. at 5.) Additionally, Movant 

seeks the right “to participate in any court-ordered alternative dispute resolution 

proceeding” and “to obtain discovery such that he may prove his damages occasioned by 

Decedent’s death.”2

 (Mot. at 5.) Accordingly, the Court must determine whether Movant 

should be permitted an increased role by way of intervention. 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides for two types of intervention: 

intervention as of right and permissive intervention. Movant, however, bases his Motion 

solely on intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit outlines four 

requirements for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention: 

(1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have a “significant protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the transaction; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the 

disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the existing parties in the lawsuit. 

 

2

 Arizona law restricts damages in a wrongful death action to injuries “resulting from the death.” A.R.S. § 12-613. This can “include the decedent’s prospective earning capacity; the loss of companionship comfort, and guidance caused by the death; and the survivor’s emotional suffering, but not the decedent’s own pain and suffering.” Walsh v. 

Advance Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 273 P.3d 645, 648 (Ariz. 2012). As such, the 

beneficiary possesses nearly all of the evidence needed to prove his own damages, which limits the value of further discovery. 

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Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996). The movant’s 

failure to satisfy any single one of these four factors is fatal to a motion to intervene 

under Rule 24(a)(2). Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 950 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

 Because it is dispositive, the Court addresses only whether the existing parties will 

adequately represent Movant’s interest. “Where an applicant for intervention and an 

existing party ‘have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of 

representation arises.’” Nw. Forest Res. Council, 82 F.3d at 838 (quoting Ore. Envtl. 

Council v. Ore. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 775 F. Supp. 353, 359 (D. Ore. 1991)). The 

moving party thus bears the burden of demonstrating that the existing party does not 

adequately represent its interest. Id. 

 Here, Movant offers two bases to show that Plaintiff is incapable of representing 

his interest. First, Movant suggests that Plaintiff’s age disqualifies her, going so far as to 

argue that “[P]laintiff’s advanced age puts her at a disadvantage to the youthful Ryan.” 

(Reply at 3.) Even ignoring the unwarranted generalizations embedded within Movant’s 

briefs, this line of argument is utterly unpersuasive and looks past the fact that licensed 

counsel represents Plaintiff in the matter. As such, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s 

age makes her incapable of representing the interest of any statutory beneficiary. 

 Second, Movant argues that “Plaintiff’s status as both statutory beneficiary and as 

plaintiff puts her in unavoidable conflicting roles.” (Mot. at 5.) This argument, however, 

is perplexing given that almost every plaintiff in a wrongful death action is also a 

statutory beneficiary. See Wilmot, 58 P.3d at 511 (“[I]n most instances . . . the plaintiff is 

the surviving spouse or child and is also a beneficiary, thus conducting the action and 

receiving the proceeds as both litigant beneficiary and trustee.”). Although it is 

conceivable that conflict could exist between a plaintiff and a statutory beneficiary 

warranting an expansion of the beneficiary’s right to participate in the matter, this is not 

that case. See, e.g., Rexroad v. Volvo Truck Corp., Nos. CV-06-1437-PHX-JAT, CV1714-PHX-JAT, 2007 WL 2949004, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007) (finding conflict in 

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liability phase of wrongful death action when statutory plaintiff was also the defendant in 

a second wrongful death suit stemming from the same set of operative facts and brought 

by beneficiary). Outside of proving Movant’s own damages, Plaintiff’s and Movant’s 

interests are one in the same—proving that Defendants are liable for the wrongful death 

of Drey Krause. See Williams, 820 P.2d at 335 (“[T]he party plaintiff and the petitioner 

share the same interest, namely to establish the defendant’s liability . . . .”). As such, 

Movant fails to show that his interest would be inadequately represented absent 

intervention. The Court therefore denies the motion.

III. CONCLUSION 

 As this Court has articulated, and as Defendants acknowledge, Movant is already 

party to this litigation with limited rights afforded to him by Arizona law. These include 

the right to litigate issues pertaining to Movant’s own damages, as well as the right to 

attend and observe depositions on issues of liability. As a party, Movant is further entitled 

to notice of all aspects of the litigation, including this Court’s orders and the pleadings of 

all parties. Finally, Movant is entitled to attend all hearings and participate to the extent 

warranted by law. As a matter of judicial economy, however, Plaintiff shall direct all 

issues pertaining to Defendants’ liability. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Movant Ryan Krause’s Motion to 

Intervene (Doc. 12). Because Movant is already a party to the action, he is permitted to 

participate in this litigation to the extent articulated by the Court. 

 Dated this 9th day of April, 2018. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge 

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